IDEOLOGY, TRADITION AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT
A STUDY ON CRITICAL AND HERMENEUTICAL THEORIES OF PLANNING

by

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to the required standard

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Recent planning literature raises important questions about the objectivity of knowledge and the relationships among theory, experience and practice. Social learning theories of planning, in particular, are concerned with these matters. Two current German schools of philosophy, critical theory and hermeneutics, as developed by Jürgen Habermas and Hans-Georg Gadamer respectively, have examined these matters in great detail. However, it appears that planning theorists have not given these schools the attention they deserve.

The present study explores concepts in critical theory and hermeneutics as they relate to the field of planning. It intends to contribute to current discussions in social learning theories. In addition to interpreting ideas of the two schools, the study aims at critically examining these ideas. Hence it includes an analysis of the debate between Habermas and Gadamer as well as that between two commentators. Finally the study discusses how critical theory and hermeneutics might contribute to the field of planning and why some of the concepts in these two schools have to be further developed before they can address planning issues directly.

With the help of concepts in critical theory and hermeneutics, this study attempts to situate the planning process in the context of social evolution. It finds that
Habermas raises questions pertinent to planning: conflict of interests, spontaneity, nature-human relations and relations among humans. Yet his answers are not always satisfactory. His assumption of suppressed generalizable interests and his use of reconstructive sciences are not entirely convincing. Gadamer stresses the significance of cultural tradition in society and people's self-understanding of their tradition. His argument leads to the following conclusion: a planning process which is not based on the self-understanding of the people directly implicated is bound to destroy social meanings inherent in that society. But Gadamer ignores some of the major problems in contemporary industrial society: conflict and rapid social change. In short, Habermas and Gadamer deal with different issues related to planning. Planning theorists should seriously take into account the ideas of both thinkers. This study proposes a theory of planning that answers Habermas' questions by employing hermeneutical insights.
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Both Clyde Weaver and Henry Hightower offered valuable criticisms on an early draft. They exposed some of the central weaknesses in my organization and development of ideas. They were at the same time encouraging. I wished I had consulted them more frequently. Gary Wedeking of the Philosophy Department read the same early draft. His remarks led me to reconsider my approach in writing a philosophically oriented thesis. Peter was instrumental in helping me shape my ideas into the present form.

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One of the foremost scholars on the Habermas-Gadamer debate, Dieter Misgeld at the Ontario Institute for Studies in
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Ideas are never created entirely by a single individual. Intellectual ideas must be sustained in an intellectual community and can only grow on favorable intellectual soil. My peers at West Mall Annex have no doubt contributed to my thinking, although we do not always agree with one another.

The presence of many artist friends keeps reminding me people express themselves in a variety of forms. My analytically trained mind has been somewhat enriched by such an environment.

*****

Late at night, faced with the project I immersed myself in, I often wondered if it was really worth the effort. Through the loudspeakers came Schubert's String Quintet in C. It was a contemplation of the world ..... emotional yet restrained. It was a struggle for meaning in life ..... a long and lonesome journey. But even in the darkest moments a beam of hope shone through. Schubert always retained a sense of optimism.

I knew Schubert!
ABBREVIATIONS

The following abbreviations are used in the text and in the notes. Bibliographical details are given in the bibliography.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Title and Author(s)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BT</td>
<td>M.Heidegger, Being and Time.</td>
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<td>CES</td>
<td>J.Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of Society.</td>
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<td>&quot;CT and H&quot;</td>
<td>D.Misgeld, &quot;Critical Theory and Hermeneutics&quot;.</td>
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<td>&quot;DC&quot;</td>
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<td>D.Misgeld, &quot;On Gadamer's Hermeneutics&quot;.</td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot;H-G Debate&quot;</td>
<td>J.Mendelson, &quot;The Habermas-Gadamer Debate&quot;.</td>
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<tr>
<td>KHI</td>
<td>J.Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests.</td>
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<td>LC</td>
<td>J.Habermas, Legitimation Crisis.</td>
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<tr>
<td>PhH</td>
<td>H-G.Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics.</td>
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<td>PhS</td>
<td>G.W.F.Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit.</td>
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<td>&quot;Postscript to KHI&quot;</td>
<td>J.Habermas, &quot;A Postscript to Knowledge and Human Interests&quot;.</td>
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<td>&quot;Retreat&quot;</td>
<td>D.Misgeld, &quot;Habermas' Retreat from Hermeneutics&quot;.</td>
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<td>TP</td>
<td>J. Habermas, <em>Theory and Practice</em>.</td>
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<td>TRS</td>
<td>J. Habermas, <em>Toward A Rational Society</em>.</td>
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<td>&quot;Utopian Content&quot;</td>
<td>D. Misgeld, &quot;Science, Hermeneutics and the Utopian Content of the Liberal-Democratic Tradition&quot;.</td>
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NOTE ON TRANSLATIONS

Many of the literary sources utilized in the present research have German origins. Unfortunately translations of important terms have not been standardized. The use of different translations of a key term in the same essay is not only confusing, it tends to obscure the original meanings, mislead readers, and make a sound argument virtually impossible. Standardization of translations is not always possible due to the difference in the ranges of meaning between the closest pair of German-English words. But in many cases this problem can be mitigated. Although published English translations are cited in this essay, effort has been made to check crucial technical terms against the original German texts. Whenever necessary these translations are modified according to the following scheme without further notice. Comments on other translations are made in notes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>German Term</th>
<th>English Translation</th>
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<tr>
<td>Bildung</td>
<td>self-formation or culture (depending on context)</td>
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<td>Bildungsprozess</td>
<td>self-formative process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geist</td>
<td>Spirit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naturwissenschaft</td>
<td>natural science</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geisteswissenschaft</td>
<td>human science</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vorurteil (as used by Gadamer)</td>
<td>prejudice</td>
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this study is to discuss the significance for planning of the debate between two current German schools of philosophy, critical theory and hermeneutics, as developed by Jürgen Habermas and Hans-Georg Gadamer respectively. The relevance of critical theory has already been addressed in planning literature. But the richness in the concepts of this school, let alone of the debate between it and hermeneutics, appears not to have been adequately considered by planning theorists. On the basis of the analysis of critical theory and hermeneutics, the study proceeds to explore the relationship between planning and social evolution. It is intended that this exploration deepen and extend the insights of social learning theories of planning.

At a general level, we may conceptualize planning as an activity by which society steers itself, directly or indirectly, toward a desirable future. Essentially, planning here is considered at a societal level (including entities such as community, region and nation, and excluding entities such as individual person, private group and corporation) and is taken to be a goal-oriented activity. We believe this definition is
sufficiently broad to include practically all views in academic and professional planning literature.

Social Learning Theories

The social learning concept in planning outlined below is a general one. It consists of a group of theories which are not entirely consistent in details. Well-known theorists include John Friedmann, Donald Schon, Edgar Dunn, Charles Hampden-Turner, Donald Michael, etc. Social learning theories emerged in recent years as a result of the recognition of severe limitations of rational and comprehensive concepts of planning. Due to the many rapid and unpredictable changes occurring in industrial society, standardized ways of confronting or even defining problems and opportunities can no longer be taken for granted. This is the social reality social learning theorists attempt to grapple with. In social learning, groups and individuals involved in a situation play active roles in changing their perceptions and behaviors in order to confront the situation. Often, a separate party - let us call them planners - assists the parties directly affected in their change process.

Theorists promoting the social learning concept tend to eschew the terms "planning" and "planner" since it is different from the more established ones - especially rational and comprehensive planning - and the theorists do not wish to confound established images with new ones. The meanings of "planning" and "planner" have shifted significantly in the past.
and will probably continue to do so in the future. At any point of time in history, there has never been a consensus on what these terms mean. If we consider planning in the broad sense mentioned earlier, then the term can accommodate the social learning concept as well.

The basic assumption of social learning is that, each party involved in a situation possesses valuable exclusive knowledge. Hence no single party nor an outsider is in a position to decide unilaterally the best solution to a predicament. Furthermore, it is assumed that much valuable knowledge cannot be derived a priori; it can only be acquired through experience. Hence social learning is bound to be somewhat experimental in nature. The purpose of this planning approach is to have involved parties solve their own problems. With social learning, the status quo is not immune against fundamental questioning and reorganization. Due to the experimental nature of social learning, planning process and implementation are completely intertwined.

The government does not have to be an actor in social learning. In practice, however, actions involved in social learning may have to be backed up by some government controls and regulations.

As a result of the short history of social learning theories, many significant ideas in these theories are still in a developmental stage. But outside the field of planning closely related ideas have been explored and seriously discussed in the last two centuries. We are referring to the German philosophical tradition which begins with Kant and culminates in the current
debate between critical theory and hermeneutics. The debate brings into focus a number of key philosophical issues concerning social development. Since these issues are also central to social learning theories we believe a study on this debate can contribute to the development of social learning theories. In the present study attention is drawn to the two protagonists of the debate - Jürgen Habermas of critical theory and Hans-Georg Gadamer of hermeneutics - whose thought can only be adequately comprehended in the context of the German intellectual tradition to which they belong.⁷

Critical theory and hermeneutics revolve around social evolutionary frameworks derived from Hegel. Social evolution here is understood in a broad sense. It refers to social changes governed by a basic continuity in society over time; it does not imply the notions of teleology or progress. With the help of ideas emerging from the debate, we can situate planning in the context of social evolution.

Setting of the Habermas-Gadamer Debate

In 1960 the Heidelberg scholar Hans-Georg Gadamer published his **magnum opus**, *Wahrheit und Methode*,⁸ which started the current movement in hermeneutics. Building on the humanist tradition of Hegelian dialectics and Heideggerian existential phenomenology, Gadamer opened up a new perspective on the phenomenon of human understanding and the nature of human sciences.⁹ This book is potentially rich in consequences for the study of society and social development. The Frankfurt
philosopher and sociologist Jürgen Habermas acknowledged the achievement of Gadamer and borrowed some of the latter's concepts to construct his own critical theory. On the other hand, Habermas also rejected part of Gadamer's thought; his view toward hermeneutics was made explicit in the article "Zur Logik der Sozialwissenschaften" in 1967. Thus Habermas initiated the debate. In the same year Gadamer counterattacked with the paper "Rhetorik, Hermeneutik und Ideologiekritik", repudiating especially Habermas' therapeutic approach to social development. Since then further exchanges have taken place and other theorists have directly and indirectly joined the now famous debate, which is still going on today.

Instead of analyzing the debate from a historical point of view, it would probably be more rewarding to examine the key issues involved. We shall begin with an exposition of the theories of Habermas and Gadamer; then we shall compare them. These will be followed by a discussion of two other theorists' proposals on alternative approaches to social development, based on ideas of both Gadamer and Habermas. The present study does not attempt to scrutinize all aspects of Habermas' and Gadamer's theories. Emphasis will be placed on where the two theories collide and what this means to planning.
Variations of a Theme by Hegel

In order to elucidate the ideas of Habermas and Gadamer, let us extract a unifying theme from the two theories. The theme is Hegel's concept of self-formation. "Self-formation" is the translation of Bildung, which means formation, education, cultivation and culture. In Hegelian philosophy Bildung also connotes "maturation, fulfilment, joy, suffering, a drenching in the stream of time and an emergence to the plateau of judgment". It is a profound holistic developmental concept of society. For Hegel (1770-1831), culture is the product of a historical self-formative process (Bildungsprozess) of mankind; it is continuously evolving. Self-formation involves progressive development of human consciousness, freedom and rationality simultaneously. Such development can occur only through continuous interaction between individuals and society:

Action is always individual; it is always I who act. It is my purpose which I want to fulfil. This purpose may be a good one, a universal aim; on the other hand, the interest may be a particular, a private one. This does not mean that it is necessarily opposed to the universal good. On the contrary, the universal must be actualized through the particular.

But each individual is also the child of a people at a definite stage of its development. One cannot skip over the Spirit of his people ....... Only through his own effort can he be in harmony with his substance; he must bring the will demanded by his people to his own consciousness, to articulation. The individual does not invent his own content; he is what he is by acting out the universal as his own content.

On the one hand, society evolves as a result of individual action; and on the other hand, individuals can develop themselves only within the general framework of society. As we
shall see, the Hegelian concept of self-formation has decisive influence on the theoretical foundations of Marx, Gadamer, Habermas and many other social theorists.

Self-formation is not to be construed as part of the biological evolution of mankind. Rather, it is the manifestation of an omnipresent human spirit in society. For Hegel, Spirit is necessarily embodied in social practices.¹⁷ To the extent individual human beings alone can take action, Spirit does not have an existence independent of individuals. However, Spirit is not merely the sum of individuals. Consciously and unconsciously, people pick up behaviors and attitudes from society, practice them and pass them on to future generations. Social practices - the embodiment of Spirit - are thus sustained in society rather than in the heads of individuals. Alternatively speaking, Spirit exists prior to, and remains after, the existence of each individual.

In Hegelian thinking the self-formative process is the movement of Spirit:

Spirit is never at rest but always engages in ever progressing motion ....... The self-formative Spirit (der sich bildende Geist) matures slowly and quietly toward the new form, dissolving one particle of the edifice of its previous world after the other, while its tottering is suggested only by some symptoms here and there ....... The gradual crumbling which did not alter the physiognomy of the whole is interruped by the break of day that, like lightning, all at once reveals the edifice of the new world ....... The beginning of the new Spirit is the product of a far-reaching revolution in ever so many forms of culture and education (Bildungsformen); it is the prize for an immensely tangled path and an equally immense amount of exertion and toil.¹⁸

Hegel is describing how, in the self-formative process, mankind
struggles toward higher levels of consciousness, freedom and rationality. The process entails incessant gradual changes culminating in stages of quantum leaps, with each stage building on the accomplishment of the previous one. The old cultural form is cancelled, abolished; but at the same time certain rudiments are preserved and affirmed, so that the new form emerges from the old one and transcends it:  

In the Spirit who stands on a higher level than another, the lower concrete existence has been reduced to an insignificant moment; what formerly was the matter itself has become a simple shade.

This is the pattern of Spirit in action. And the action of Spirit is none other than the self-development of mankind:

The criterion of Spirit is its action, its active essence. Man is his own action, the sequence of his actions, that into which he has been making himself.

Both Habermas and Gadamer realize the profundity of the concept of self-formation and the penetrating insight it offers to the analysis of society. They internalize much of the concept without embracing all of Hegel's thought. We believe the similarities and differences between Habermas and Gadamer can be best illuminated if their theories are perceived as two variations of the Hegelian theme.

In this essay we take self-formation to be the general Hegelian concept outlined above as well as its variations in Marx, Habermas, Gadamer, etc. The variation referred to should be plain from the context. Several interrelated terms will be used; they all belong to the concept of self-formation, although each one stresses one aspect of the concept. Self-formative
process (Bildungsprozess) refers to the process itself, the movement over time. Culture (Bildung), a product of the self-formative process, is the totality of social practices of a people, together with their intersubjective meanings, at a given point in the self-formative process. Social practice involves interaction with people and nature; certainly it is subject to material constraints (physical-chemical laws and biological requirements). Life-world (Lebenswelt), also a product of the self-formative process, refers to the cultural world an individual or a group encounters in everyday life; it places an emphasis on experiences that have lasting effects on individual perception and behavior. Tradition (Ueberlieferung) stresses what is handed down or transmitted from the past; it establishes a link from the past to the present, and hence, to the future as well. Other terms such as history and society are obviously also related to self-formation.

NOTES


2 The term "social learning" here is not to be confused with the kind associated with behavioral psychology - Pavlovian and Skinnerian conditioning. Sometimes the term "social guidance" is used for this approach, but it is also unsatisfactory, since it suggests that there is an active guide to be followed by the passively guided.

4 E.g. Friedmann, The Good Society, op.cit., uses the terms "radical practice" and "radical practitioner", and Dunn, op.cit., uses the terms "creative social learning" and "entrepreneurial leaders of social learning systems".


6 Terry Moore - in "Why Allow Planners to Do What They Do? A Justification from Economic Theory", Journal of the American Institute of Planners, vol.44, pp.387-98, 1978 - offers a good synopsis of why government controls and regulations are necessary. While these measures do have their roles in society, by themselves they are insufficient for coping with a society that is no longer in a "stable state".

7 The term "critical theory" usually refers to a family of related theories developed by members of the Frankfurt School, including Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse, Habermas, Schmidt, Wellmer and others. In the present essay the term critical theory is restricted to the theory of Habermas. In the past few years planning theorists - such as J.Forester, G.Hemmens and B.Stiftel - have shown some interest in the work of Habermas. But the nature of their interest in Habermas is substantially different from what is presented in this essay. They seek to apply Habermas' conclusions; we critically examine Habermas' theorizing.

8 Translated as Truth and Method, New York: Crossroad, 1975. The translation will hereafter be referred to as TM.

9 In this essay the term "human sciences" is the translation of Geisteswissenschaften which include social sciences and certain disciplines in the humanities (other translations found in literature include cultural sciences, sciences of man, human studies, historical and cultural studies, humanistic studies, etc.) Geisteswissenschaft is used in contradistinction to Naturwissenschaft (natural science). One characteristic of the humanist tradition is its objection to positivism which applies the natural science methodology to human sciences. Gadamer attributes the
beginning of modern humanist tradition to Italian philosopher G.B. Vico (1668-1744).


The translation of Bildung is not standardized. In fact, due to its multifarious meanings, it cannot be represented by a single standardized English expression. We deem J. Shapiro's translation of Bildung into self-formation most satisfactory for the present purpose. But even so, sometimes Bildung has to be rendered into some other words in order to convey the meaning more adequately.


Ibid., pp. 38-9.


This is what Charles Taylor calls "the principle of necessary embodiment", op. cit., p. 83. He aptly stresses the centrality of this principle in the Hegelian concept of self-formation. See Taylor's lucid characterization of embodiment of Spirit in op. cit., Ch. 3. The significance of the principle of embodiment is also emphasized by John O'Neill, in "Embodiment and History in Hegel and Marx", in Sociology as a Skin Trade, New York: Harper and Row, 1972. "Spirit" is the translation of Geist. In the past Geist was
often rendered "mind", which is inaccurate and misleading. The commonly accepted English equivalent today is Spirit.


This concept is captured in Hegel's use of the word Aufhebung, which means simultaneously cancellation, preservation and up-lift. There is no satisfactory English equivalent for Aufhebung.

Ibid., p. 44.

Reason in History, op. cit., p. 51.

The term Lebenswelt was not used by Hegel himself; it was coined by E. Husserl in the 1930s in reaction to Heidegger's existential thinking. We borrow this term from Husserl without endorsing his philosophy.
Knowledge and Human Interests, first published in German in 1968, is Habermas' "early" major work. Although he had published other books prior to that, it is in KHI that he systematically sets up the framework of his critical theory. We shall start with an interpretation of this work, for two reasons. First, in KHI Habermas reveals much of his intellectual roots and presents rigorous arguments to clarify his position. Kant, Hegel and Marx probably exert the most enduring influence on Habermas despite his later expansion into systems theory, analytical philosophy and other intellectual traditions. We suggest that his analysis of Kant, Hegel and Marx in KHI should not be overlooked. In his recent works, by contrast, Habermas tends to borrow findings extensively from a multitude of sources. His comments on these findings are usually brief and sometimes vague. As he characterizes himself, he has become more of a "synthesizer" than an "analyst". It is difficult to grasp his recent thinking without a background in his earlier writings, especially KHI. Second, although Habermas has modified his framework since KHI, the changes are made to deal with some problematic areas in the early framework. Without knowing what
he changes from, one cannot tell what he changes to.

There is no doubt the understanding of Habermas' intentions would be enhanced if one is familiar with the writings of the first generation critical theorists, especially Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse. For the present purpose, however, we believe it is possible to interpret Habermas without relating his thought to the critical theory tradition. We shall not be involved with the latter.

In KHI Habermas considers his project to be the latest effort toward a critique of knowledge which started with Kant two centuries ago. In order to grasp Habermas' thought let us trace how he perceives the accomplishments and failures of his predecessors and how he defines his own task in this book.

Legacy of Kant and Hegel

Despite the prevalence of empirical sciences in the 18th century, Kant (1724-1804) refused to take for granted that scientific knowledge based on sense-experience and scientific method represents the objective world. In Critique of Pure Reason Kant writes:

But though all our knowledge begins with experience, it does not follow that it all arises out of experience. For it may well be that even our own faculty of knowledge (sensible impressions serving merely as the occasion) supplies from itself ... Knowledge that is thus independent of experience and even of all impressions of the senses ... is entitled a priori, and distinguished from the empirical, which has its sources a posteriori, that is, in experience.

Further,

while the matter of all appearance is given to us a
posteriori only, its form must lie ready for the sensations a priori in the mind.\(^5\)

As opposed to the empiricist position, Kant postulates that there is a subjective dimension to all knowledge, and that part of this subjective dimension is the human mental faculty. The way a person experiences the world is governed by such subjective elements.

For Kant, "pure reason" is that which contains the principles whereby we know anything absolutely a priori. An organon of pure reason would be the sum-total of those principles according to which all modes of pure a priori knowledge can be acquired and actually brought into being.\(^6\)

Kant is concerned with "the critique of the faculty of pure reason". He considers a clarification of a priori knowledge essential for judging the reliability of knowledge. "Otherwise the unqualified historian or critic is passing judgments upon the groundless assertions of others by means of his own, which are equally groundless."\(^7\)

Considering the intellectual climate of those days, Kant's achievement should not be underrated. It seems reasonable that Habermas takes Kant to be his point of departure for a historical account of the critique of knowledge.

The Kantian epistemology was criticized by Hegel. Although Kant's investigation into a priori knowledge is presumed to be free from presuppositions, Hegel finds evidence to the contrary. Habermas condenses Hegel's argument into three points. First, Kant implicitly accepts the validity of mathematics and physics, adopts the scientific procedure, and uses their
generalized form as the basis of his inquiry. Second, Kant assumes a complete, fixed knowing subject, independent of its socio-historical context. Third, Kant entertains a concept of knowing subject different from that of the acting subject (and correspondingly, he separates the critique of knowledge from the critique of rational action).  

Hegel observes that Kant fails to take into consideration human consciousness is a product of history, the outcome of a continuous self-formative process. According to Hegel, then, the validity of scientific knowledge is always judged with respect to the standard of a particular historical era, the a priori knowledge of a knowing subject is always historical, and the concepts governing both knowledge and rational actions are always shaped by the self-formative process. Hegel argues that the inquiry into knowledge must begin with experience of phenomena in the life-world; only through stages of self-reflection on experiences can consciousness develop.  

Hegel thus shows that Kant's critique of knowledge is "dependent on something prior and given", something that Kant has taken for granted. "Hegel radicalizes the approach of the critique of knowledge by subjecting its presuppositions to self-criticism." This is a breakthrough Habermas truly appreciates. 

Unfortunately Hegel also smuggles in his own presupposition - Absolute knowledge. For Hegel, the self-formative process of mankind proceeds toward Absolute knowledge, the ultimate goal of the universal order. "In this knowing ... Spirit has concluded the movement in which it has shaped itself." The evolvement of
mankind comes to an end. In this final stage of history, "appearance becomes identical with essence"; human knowledge coincides with the ultimate truth. Hegel even entertains the idea that "history is a conscious, self-mediating process - Spirit emptied out into Time". In other words, the self-formative process and its eventual outcome has been plotted out all along as part of the cosmic order. In Habermas' view, while in a sense Hegel radicalizes the critique of knowledge, in another sense he abandons the critique of knowledge by positing the Absolute. Habermas points out: it was Marx (1818-1883) who appreciated the radical elements in Hegel and attempted to revive them.

The Marxian Problematic

For Kant, the knowing and acting subject is the individual only. Hegel postulates a historical subject, Spirit, in addition to the finite, individual one. Marx adopts the concept of self-formation as the self-creation of mankind through its own labor; he applauds Hegel for this "outstanding achievement".

Hegel grasps the self-creation of man as a process, objectification as loss of the object, as alienation and transcendence of this alienation, and ... he, therefore, grasps the nature of labor, and conceives objective man (true, because of real man) as the result of his own labor. The real, active orientation of man to himself as a real species-being (i.e. as a human being) is only possible so far as he really brings forth all his species-powers (which is only possible through the cooperative endeavors of mankind and as an outcome of history) and treats these powers as objects, which can only be done at first in the form of alienation.

However, Marx accuses Hegel of "mystifying" the self-formative
process by positing Spirit as the historical subject; he argues that Hegel places undue emphasis on the spiritual dimension of the self-formative process, at the expense of the material dimension. Marx indicates that Hegel pays little attention to human material requirements, Hunger, for example, is a human material need that has to be satisfied by objects outside the human body. For Marx, "the fact that man is an embodied, living, real, sentient, objective being with natural powers, means that he has real, sensuous objects as the objects of his being, or that he can only express his being in real, sensuous objects". Thus Marx reformulates the concept of self-formation with his material emphasis:

History is nothing but the succession of the separate generations, each of which exploits the material, the capital funds, the productive forces handed down to it by all preceding generations, and thus, on the one hand, continues the traditional activity in completely changed circumstances and, on the other, modifies the old circumstances with a completely changed activity.

Like Hegel, Marx observes that old cultural forms are superseded by new ones: each of these forms is cancelled, preserved and transcended. Again like Hegel, Marx stresses that each stage of the self-formative process can only emerge from the previous one:

Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living.

What Marx rejects are the Hegelian notions of Spirit and the Absolute; for him, the historical subject in the self-formative
process is the human species whose evolution does not terminate at an absolute level. With the Marxian version of self-formation, human development is no longer conceived as manifestation of the cosmic order.

While Marx accepts the existence of a nature that exists independent of the mind and the impossibility of transcending the laws of nature, he holds that the human species has access to nature - in terms of both knowledge and action - only through social categories, which are dependent upon the labor process. The labor process is seen by Marx as the mechanism of self-formation: on the one hand, it governs the way nature is transformed, and on the other hand, it transforms the laboring subjects themselves (the human species):

Labor is, in the first place, a process in which both man and Nature participate, and in which man of his own accord starts, regulates, and controls the material re-actions between himself and Nature. He opposes himself to Nature as one of her own forces ....... By thus acting on the external world and changing it, he at the same time changes his own nature.

Thus the self-formation of mankind is not separated from the evolution of nature. In fact Marx considers the evolutions of nature, modes of production and human consciousness to be aspects of the same historical process:

History itself is a real part of natural history, of the development of nature into man. Natural science will one day incorporate the science of man, just as the science of man will incorporate natural science; there will be a single science.

Here Marx is not proposing the reduction of human sciences to natural sciences, in the manner of positivism; rather, he intends to show that natural and human sciences are completely
interwined.

Further, Marx maintains that, in the self-formative process, the mode of production is more primary than human consciousness, as the former shapes the latter:

Men are the producers of their conceptions, ideas, etc. - real, active men, as they are conditioned by a definite development of their productive forces and the intercourse corresponding to these, up to its furthest forms. Consciousness can never be anything else than conscious existence, and the existence of men is their actual life-process.\textsuperscript{26}

To this extent, an individual subject can comprehend itself only when it realizes its historically conditioned social role in the context of material production.

In Marxian thinking each stage of history is characterized by its distinctive mode of production, which is a specific combination of forces and relations of production. Habermas explains the Marxian terms: forces of production consists of labor force, production technology and knowledge for organizing the labor force;\textsuperscript{27} relations of production are social institutions and mechanisms which determine how forces of production are utilized, and indirectly, how socially produced wealth is distributed.\textsuperscript{28}

Based on these two Marxian concepts, Habermas introduces two of his own: instrumental action and communicative action. Instrumental action is productive work aiming at the technical control of nature.\textsuperscript{29} As a result of productive work, human material needs can be satisfied; humans can free themselves from nature imposed sufferings such as hunger and cold. Hence instrumental action is related to forces of production.\textsuperscript{30}
Communicative action is human interaction within the framework of social institutions: it includes the regulation of human relationship through established norms as well as social and political structures. Hence communicative action is connected to relations of production. Habermas probably is not suggesting that certain human actions are exclusively instrumental while others are exclusively communicative; in fact most human actions seem to consist of both components, albeit with varying proportions. Habermas makes a distinction between these two concepts in order to diagnose a serious problem inherent in Marx.

Marx placed so much emphasis on material production that he seemed to have taken for granted that social institutions exist in order to serve the purpose of material production; in other words, forces of production and relations of production appeared to him different aspects of a unified process. But Marx was by no means a naive thinker. The Hegel and Marx scholar Shlomo Avineri observes:

[Marx] attributes to human mind the capacity to evolve a model of the final product prior to the physical existence of the product itself. The way in which Marx treats this problem strongly suggests that he did not lose sight of the philosophical dilemma involved, though he did not spell out the process through which the ideal model is created in man's mind prior to material production.

Marx was aware of this difficulty in his materialist conception of history, but unable to solve it. The problem that Habermas attempts to grapple with is similar to the one Avineri points out. According to Habermas, the difficulty arises from Marx's failure to distinguish instrumental and communicative actions as
two types of action, each having its own logic of operation and its own development in the self-formative process. He maintains that the two developments do not converge, although they are interdependent. In a later work, Habermas clarifies his view on this relationship:

The rules of communicative action do develop in reaction to changes in the domain of instrumental and strategic action; but in doing so they follow their own logic.

Thus the "ideal model" of production follows the logic of communicative action, not instrumental action - a concept Marx did not entertain. The self-formative process, as Habermas sees it, is not a unified process but a product of two relatively independent processes.

In Habermas' view, a major consequence of Marx's inadequate conception of the self-formative process is that it vitiates the latter's critique of ideology. We have seen that, for Marx, ideas in society are conditioned by the mode of production. But Marx carries it further; he claims these ideas represent thoughts of the domineering class in that particular mode of production:

The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force.

A certain type of ruling ideas is necessary to justify a ruling position. In other words, a ruling class is compelled, merely in order to carry through its aim, to represent its interest as the common interest of all the members of society, that is, expressed in ideal form.

This is the use of ideology.
The Marxian critique of ideology is based on three related premises. First, there is a definite class structure in society: the ruling class and the non-ruling class(es). Second, the ruling class controls the means of material production. This is performed at the expense of the non-ruling class(es) (although the ruling class also suffers under this mode of production, without its realizing it). Third, the ruling class justifies its position with an ideology.

In liberal capitalism, the two basic classes are the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, with the former controlling the means of production. The legitimation basis of liberal capitalism is the principle of equivalent exchange of labor and commodities. Marx's critique of political economy (the capitalist mode of production) has demonstrated the impossibility of equivalent exchange under liberal capitalism. To this extent, Marx has unmasked the bourgeois ideology - an accomplishment Habermas acknowledges.³⁷

However, since the late 19th century, liberal capitalism has been gradually replaced by state-regulated capitalism. And correspondingly, according to Habermas, the ideology of equivalent exchange has been substituted with a technocratic background ideology. Now the question Habermas raises is, can Marxian theory adequately perform a critique of this new ideology.

Under the new ideology, Habermas observes, the primary societal goal is system maintenance: this includes economic stability and growth as well as individual employment security,
income stability, social welfare and opportunity for upward mobility. To this end, politics is "oriented toward the elimination of dysfunctions and avoidance of risks that threaten the system". Thus the legitimation basis of state-regulated capitalism is exclusively technocratic manipulation of society for the purpose of system maintenance. As far as Habermas is concerned, this way of thinking is an ideology. For it "makes a fetish" of the progress of science and technology; it shuts out questions on whether technocratic measures contribute to overall human development in the self-formation of mankind. Habermas points out: "The question is not whether we completely utilize an available or creatable potential, but whether we choose what we want for the purpose of the pacification and gratification of existence." The answer to the first question is expressed in technical terms; it is continuously being worked out in state-regulated capitalist society. The second question refers to societal members' reflections on the kind of society they desire; it is by no means a technical question. Hence the answer to it necessitates unrestrained communication among members of society. It is Habermas' contention that the new ideology eliminates the second question.

Habermas notices that, unlike the case of liberal capitalism, class structure in state-regulated capitalism cannot be clearly defined. He argues that the new ideology thrives on "a political form of distributing social rewards that guarantees mass loyalty". The new system furnishes everybody with privatized material goods, leisure time and achievement
opportunities so that capitalists, managers, professionals, skilled and unskilled workers alike share the same interest in maintaining the system. Besides, the political distribution mechanism makes technocratic adjustments according to public demands. Hence state-regulated capitalism does not fit into the framework of Marxian analysis. According to Habermas, the fundamental problem with society today is not so much a technical one as a communicative one. Since Marx did not differentiate the logic of communicative action from that of instrumental action, Habermas concludes that Marxian theory is no longer effective.

Against Positivism

Despite the significant contributions Hegel and Marx made to the concept of knowledge, Habermas laments that these thinkers simultaneously stripped the critique of knowledge of its cutting edge. This permitted positivism to flourish in the 19th and 20th centuries.*

Habermas characterizes positivism as follows: it takes the achievements of sciences for granted; knowledge is defined as the findings of sciences (i.e. results of the scientific method); the limits of knowledge correspond to the limits of the scientific method; anything that is not potentially verifiable by science is rendered meaningless. Positivism replaces epistemology with the philosophy of science. The latter only aims at improving scientific methodology; it obliterates the knowing subject in the name of objectivity. Thus in Habermas'
view, the positivist concept of knowledge is a regression to the pre-Kantian level.43

Certainly Habermas realizes that positivism, a particular attitude toward science, does not coincide with science itself. But he denounces positivism's lack of fundamental questioning of science:

By making a dogma of the sciences' belief in themselves, positivism assumes the prohibitive function of protecting scientific inquiry from epistemological self-reflection.¹

It is clear that Habermas considers positivism to be an integral part of the technocratic ideology: positivism and this ideology reinforce each other. For this reason positivism becomes Habermas' prime target of attack in his critique of knowledge.

Against the main current of positivism, according to Habermas, the late 19th century saw the beginning of self-reflection of the sciences. Habermas identifies two of the pioneers in this direction as Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914) in the natural sciences and Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911) in the human sciences.

Peirce's Reflection on Natural Sciences

Peirce was somewhat cautious about the positivist attitude toward the validity of natural sciences. While the positivists' major concern was to clarify the scientific method within the established framework, Peirce took a step beyond. He inquired into the procedure in which scientific theories were established. This led him to take into account scientists in addition to sciences themselves.⁴⁴ In other words, Peirce
introduced an intersubjective element in his logic of inquiry. Instead of relying on an objective scientific method alone, Peirce defined scientific knowledge to be the kind of information whose validity is accepted through the consensus of a community of inquirers. Habermas explains:

True means for him [Peirce] interpretations that have stood up to indefinitely repeated tests and are intersubjectively recognized in the long run. From this definition of reality Peirce can conclude that everything real is knowable and that, insofar as we know reality, we know it as it is.\(^5\)

Since consensus is not always obtained and any consensus obtained is subject to change, validity of scientific knowledge cannot be definite at any point of time. But Peirce had confidence in the scientific method and in scientific progress. He believed that a definite answer would be available if the process of inquiry proceeds far enough: the structure of scientific method guarantees it.\(^6\) Put differently, nobody can be certain about individual scientific findings, whose validity is subject to continuous revisions through the process of inquiry; yet in principle a definite answer is forthcoming.

Habermas observes that Peirce's notion of knowledge acquisition makes sense only if one crucial condition is fulfilled: "the assumption of actual progress in scientific knowledge".\(^7\) With this assumption, Habermas argues, Peirce succumbed to an objectivism he did not realize:

The fact of scientific progress induces Peirce to define universal propositions exclusively in relation to the anticipated end of the process of inquiry as a whole and yet to assume at the same time that, in increasing measure, we objectively arrive at the true statements even before the consummation of this process - despite subjective
uncertainty about the truth value of every single one of these statements. What Peirce did was a softening of the edges of objective sciences without renouncing them; he kept the door open to inquiry at all times.

With his emphasis on a community of inquirers Peirce introduced the concept of intersubjectivity to the critique of scientific knowledge. Unlike Kant, whose critique was based on the individual knowing subject independent of the life-world, Peirce's critique was based on the intersubjectivity of a community of scientists affected by experiences in the life-world. Thus in Habermas' view Peirce advanced beyond Kant in this respect.

Nevertheless, Habermas indicates that Peirce did not adequately conceptualize "the ground of intersubjectivity in which investigators are always already situated when they attempt to bring about consensus about metatheoretical problems." According to Habermas, this intersubjectivity is grounded in communicative action, which does not follow the logic of instrumental action:

The communication of investigators requires the use of language that is not confined to the limits of technical control over objectified natural processes. It arises from symbolic interaction between societal subjects who reciprocally know and recognize each other as unmistakable individuals.

In the way that he criticizes Marx, Habermas finds Peirce's major weakness in his inability to make a proper distinction between communicative and instrumental actions. In Habermas' view, only human sciences - which deal with communicative action - can shed
light on the intersubjectivity which has been presupposed in any
natural science; since Peirce did not see this, his self-
reflection of natural sciences lacked a genuine bite on
positivism.

Dilthey's Reflection on Human Sciences

One of Dilthey's most renowned contributions to human
sciences is his formal distinction between natural and human
sciences. The difference, according to him, is not so much in
the object of study as in the attitude of the knowing subject
toward the object of study. He points out that, for instance,
although both physiology and psychology study humans, the former
is a natural science whereas the latter is a human science. The
cognitive orientation of natural science is "explanation":

systematic formulation of experiences into natural laws of
causal relationships so that control of the natural world
becomes possible through the study of its laws. In contrast,
the cognitive orientation of human science is "understanding":
grasping of intersubjectivity in life expressions so that
reproduction of expressions becomes possible under appropriate
situations in life. Reproduction of expressions is governed by a
system of interactions (Wirkungszusammenhang) in which
"common values and orderly procedures for realizing them are
established and accepted as unconditionally valid". With this
clarification of cognitive orientations, two kinds of subject-
matter for sciences can be distinguished:

The range of human sciences is determined by the
objectification of life in the external world.
Spirit can only understand what it has created. Nature, the subject-matter of the natural sciences, embraces the reality which has arisen independently of the activity of spirit. Everything on which man has actively impressed his stamp forms the subject-matter of human sciences.\

Hailing the Hegelian notion of embodiment of Spirit "a profound and fortunate creation", Dilthey modified it into his own concept of objectification of life. Instead of seeing the world as manifestation of the cosmic order, Dilthey perceives society as the totality of human life expressions:

We must start from the reality of life: life contains the sum of all mental activities (die Totalität des seelischen Zusammenhangs). Hegel constructed metaphysically, we analyze the given.

While human sciences are concerned with mental activities, Dilthey stresses that they are not independent of nature: "human sciences embrace many physical facts and are based on knowledge of the physical world". Thus Dilthey describes his approach to human sciences:

I start from the physical world as I see it, I notice that mental facts have their place in the temporal and spatial arrangements of the external world ....... This is the origin of the scientific approach which proceeds from the external to the internal, from material to mental changes.

This approach follows from the notion that life is objectified in the natural world.

Dilthey's main interest in human science is the study of its methodology. As a result of the difference in orientation between natural and human sciences the empirical-analytic methodology of the former is inappropriate for the latter. In human sciences the knowing subject and the subject-matter of study cannot be clearly separated. This is due to the
peculiarity of "understanding". In Dilthey's way of thinking there is an intimate interrelation (Zusammenhang) of life, expression and understanding which manifests itself in everyday interpersonal communication and in social structures:

We can only know ourselves thoroughly through understanding; but we cannot understand ourselves and others except by projecting what we have actually experienced into every expression of our own and others' lives. So man becomes the subject-matter of human sciences only when we relate experience, expression and understanding to each other.

For Dilthey the proper methodology for human sciences is hermeneutics.

The subject-matter for understanding is a "text", as the life-world (or part of it) is called in the context of hermeneutical sciences. There is a historical reason for the use of the term text. In the early days hermeneutics dealt with the interpretation of holy scriptures and classic literature, i.e. written texts. Since the 18th century it was generally held that, understanding of a historical text requires the interpreter to imagine himself or herself to be part of the life-world of that particular historical era in question.

Dilthey extended this concept of understanding to human sciences in general, whose subejct-matter of study - the life-world (or part of it) - resembles a written text in many ways. As methodology, the task of hermeneutics is text interpretation. Hermeneutical understanding "can be described as a projection of the self into some given expression":

It could not be considered simply as an act of thought; transposition, re-creation (Nachbilden), re-experiencing (Nacherleben), - these facts pointed
toward the totality of mental life which was active in it. In this respect it is connected with experience which, after all, is merely a becoming aware of the whole mental reality in a particular situation. So all understanding contains something irrational because life is irrational; it cannot be represented by a logical formula. 69

To the extent the interpreter of a text must imagine himself or herself to become part of the self-formative process of the text (to re-create it, re-experience it) in order to understand, there cannot be a standard way to understand, nor can the validity of any interpretation be verified empirically.

Now here is a dilemma. On the one hand, an interpreter has immediate access to merely one part of the content of a text at a time; it is impossible for anyone to grasp the content of the entire text at the beginning of a reading; he or she can only attempt to understand the text gradually, part by part. On the other hand, since every part of a text is an expression of the life-world, and the meaning of an expression cannot be established outside of the context of the life-world to which the expression belongs, understanding of parts is impossible without understanding the whole. This is a problem peculiar to hermeneutics known as the "hermeneutical circle": "it [is] only possible to understand a part in terms of its place in a larger whole, yet the whole [can] only become comprehensible in terms of its parts". 70

But the hermeneutical circle is not a vicious circle, as it might first appear to be. This is due to hermeneutics' immediate practical relation to life. Dilthey points out that social life always follows some principle of organization; it is never
completely chaotic. He argues that a principle of organization can occur only because there is meaning in life:

The category of meaning designates the relationship, inherent in life, of parts of a life to the whole

...... The meaning of a past moment ... is significant for communal life because the individual intervened in the shaping of mankind contributed to it with his essential being ...... The particular moment gains meaning from its relationship with the whole, from the connection between past and future, between individual and mankind.71

It is the existence of a coherence in social meaning that gives rise to a principle of organization. But neither meaning nor social organization is fixed; they keep building on the past in a self-formative process:

Our view of the meaning of life changes constantly. Every plan for your life express a view of the meaning of life. The purposes we set for the future are determined by the meaning we give to the past.72

Now the interrelation of experience, expression and understanding can be better illustrated with the concept of meaning. "An experience is a unit made up of parts linked by a common meaning" and "every expression has a meaning in so far it is a sign which signifies or points to something that is part of life".73 With experience, one can understand how certain parts of life, represented by expressions, are connected to the whole. This is the way one understands the meaning of an expression. In order to approach the hermeneutical circle an interpreter must start out with some preconceived conception of the principle of organization of this particular life-world, no matter how inadequate this conception may be. As the interpreter experiences this life-world, he or she attempts to integrate individual expressions in terms of this conception. Further
experience reveals inconsistencies between expressions and the
preconceived conception, which leads to a correction of the
latter. Attempts are again made to integrate experiences in
terms of the corrected conception. With each repetition of this
procedure the interpreter's imagined self-formative process
progressively resembles the kind in the text; he or she
gradually discovers the coherence in meaning in the life-world
under study. Consequently his or her understanding improves: the
hermeneutical circle does not return to its starting point. This
way of approaching the hermeneutical circle has been
characterized as "a spiral approximation toward greater accuracy
and knowledge".74

Although the hermeneutical method lacks the rigor of the
empirical-analytic method of the natural sciences, Dilthey did
not abandon the notion of objectivity:

Every science implies a claim to validity. If there
are to be strictly scientific human sciences they
must aim more consciously and critically at
validity.75

Dilthey realized there is a conflict between the goal of
objectivity in human sciences and the notion that knowledge in
these sciences arises from life. He believed this problem can be
solved by considering an objective system of interactions within
each culture:

I find the principle for the settlement of the
conflict within these sciences in the understanding
of the historical world as a system of interactions
centered on itself; each individual system of
interactions contained in it has, through the
positing of values and their realization, its center
within itself, but all are structurally linked into
a whole in which the meaning of the whole web of the
social-historical world arises from the significance
of the individual parts; thus every value-judgment and every purpose projected into the future must be based exclusively on these structural relationships.\textsuperscript{76}

Thus Dilthey was convinced that the hermeneutical method could be and should be objective in its own fashion: if the interpreter keeps working on the part-whole relation, eventually, in principle, the hermeneutical circle can be dissolved and the social-historical world under study would then present itself to the interpreter objectively. Put differently, Dilthey assumed the possibility of a neutral observer: while individual interpreters take their respective initial situations as points of departure, they are supposed to arrive at the same destination.

Habermas appreciates the advancement Dilthey made regarding human sciences. But he also exposes the latter's major weakness. What Dilthey ignored, according to Habermas, was that all sciences are governed by "interests". Here Habermas introduces the concepts of technical and practical cognitive interests. The former governs the viewpoint of possible technical control; it is the cognitive interest behind instrumental action and the basis of natural sciences. The latter governs the viewpoint of effective communication; it is the cognitive interest behind communicative action and the basis of human sciences.\textsuperscript{77} When Habermas speaks of practical cognitive interest he uses the term "practical" not in the ordinary sense but in a Kantian sense. In \textit{Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals} and \textit{Critique of Practical Reason} Kant discusses the morality of individual action; what is practical to him is always tied to morality.\textsuperscript{78}
Certainly Habermas does not subscribe to the Kantian a priori notion of morality, but he inherits the moral connotation of the word "practical." For Habermas, human interaction is always anchored in norms and social institutions; effective communication requires observation of norms. It is in this sense that he calls communicative action practical. "The practical cognitive interest defines the level of hermeneutics itself a priori in the same way that the technical cognitive interest defines the framework of the empirical-analytic sciences." This, according to Habermas, is what Dilthey failed to realize.

As we shall see later, Gadamer shows that understanding a text is not a matter of transposing oneself into the text, recreating and re-experiencing the text. Rather, interpretation is analogous to a dialogue, with interpreter and text as conversation partners. The interpreter does not simply receive information from the text; he or she helps create it. Learning from Gadamer, Habermas develops a similar argument against Dilthey: since Dilthey perceived the interpreter as an observer of the text instead of a participant communicating with the text, he could not see that the hermeneutical process itself is governed by norms. Thus in Habermas' view Dilthey's way of thinking eliminates the possibility of self-reflection of human sciences at a higher level.

The distinction Dilthey made between natural and human sciences is crucial to the foundation of Habermas' critical theory. Largely based on this distinction Habermas develops his own categories of action and cognitive interest. While
instrumental action and technical cognitive interest correspond to natural sciences, communicative action and practical cognitive interest correspond to human sciences. One can tell that Dilthey's influence on Habermas is immense.\(^3\)

**Notion of Emancipation**

Habermas considers the above mentioned concept of two cognitive interests inadequate for a critique of society. For him, these two interests essentially explain the functioning of the status quo but they do not reveal the direction in which society moves. For this reason he introduced a third element, called emancipatory cognitive interest, which guides the directions of the two "lower" interests. Habermas derives this element of his theory from Hegel and Marx.

It was Hegel who developed the concept of mankind moving in the direction of greater freedom, consciousness and rationality in the self-formative process. More precisely, mankind was seen to be progressing toward greater freedom through self-reflection in a process guided by Reason. The Hegelian notion of Reason is "the thinking which follows reality in its contradictions, and therefore can see each level turns into the next one".\(^4\) This kind of thinking is self-reflection on experiences. It reveals how mankind can overcome its adversities and advance to a higher level of freedom. The beauty of Reason, in Habermas' view, is the self-reflective power it contains;\(^5\) it permits mankind to search for a brighter future unobscured by the ideology of any historical epoch. "The act of self-reflection that 'changes a
life' is a movement of emancipation." Habermas thus incorporates Reason into his own theory as emancipatory cognitive interest, which is an orientation toward freedom and "aims at the pursuit of reflection". Like many other Hegelian notions, Reason is not fixed; it has to be actualized in the self-formative process. By the same token, the specific content of emancipatory cognitive interest evolves.

But Habermas observes that the notion of Reason places excessive emphasis on thought. He maintains that emancipation can only be realized in the material world. Marx has already shown that human freedom at the societal level includes freedom from natural necessity as well as freedom from interfering power of other humans. Habermas argues that while emancipation from nature-imposed requirements is achieved in instrumental action, emancipation from human repression can only be achieved through undistorted communicative action. Hence all knowledge and action, and indeed, technical and practical cognitive interests, are ultimately guided by an interest in emancipation. More accurately, we should say these interests are embodied in all knowledge and action since, as Habermas stresses, interest is not external to knowledge and action. For Habermas, freeing communication from distortion requires self-reflection; it is not a by-product of a change of the mode of production. It is clear Habermas' notion of emancipation owes as much to Hegel as to Marx.
The Psychoanalytic Model

In order to facilitate self-reflection systematically at the societal level, Habermas seeks to develop a critical science. This science is intended to generate knowledge for redirecting a "deviant self-formative process"\(^9^2\) through self-reflection; in other words, it is to be a vehicle for the emancipation of mankind.\(^9^3\) To this end Habermas adopts psychoanalysis as the model of his critical science:

Psychoanalysis is relevant to us as the only tangible example of a science incorporating methodical self-reflection. The birth of psychoanalysis opens up the possibility of arriving at the dimension that positivism closed off, and of doing so in a methodological manner that arises out of the logic of inquiry.\(^9^4\)

Dream analysis - the hallmark of psychoanalysis - is a type of text interpretation. Habermas considers psychoanalysis to be a modified hermeneutical science; but he also points out that the former includes a dimension not found in Dilthey's methodology. While Dilthey restricted his inquiry to consciously intended expressions in the life-world, Freud (1856-1939) focused his attention on unconscious meaning structures (Sinnzusammenhaenge) disclosed in his patient's dreams. For Dilthey, a subject's life expressions can in principle be completely understood by the subject itself. Inadequate or unintelligible expressions, i.e. distortions from what is intended, are considered accidents; they play no significant role in the methodology. For Freud, however, omissions and distortions in a dream text must be systematically analyzed. After a screening process, the contents left are the real "dream symbols", which are characterized by
their resistance to interpretation. Yet interpretation of dream symbols is precisely the task of psychoanalysis. Habermas observes that, unlike Dilthey's hermeneutics, which discovers the meaning of a possibly distorted text, psychoanalysis searches for the meaning of a text distortion.⁹⁵

Let us summarize how Habermas perceives the logic of psychoanalysis: the social norms are represented by the model of undistorted communication, under which all life expressions are comprehensible; the patient's self-formative process has deviated from the norms, so his or her communication, as manifested in dreams, becomes distorted; in psychoanalysis the patient self-reflects and realizes the source of the distorted communication; by correcting this distortion, the patient corrects his or her self-formative process and life then becomes normal.⁹⁶

To the extent dream symbols resist interpretation by the patient, the interpreting process has to be performed by a therapist and the outcome suggested to the patient, who must then decide to accept or reject the interpretation:

The intellectual work is shared by physician and patient in the following way: The former reconstructs what has been forgotten from the faulty texts of the latter, from his dreams, associations, and repetitions, while the latter, animated by the constructions suggested by the physician as hypotheses, remembers ....... Only the patient's recollection decides the accuracy of the construction.⁹⁷

If the patient rejects the interpretation, further information is to be sought and the process repeated until a final interpretation is accepted by the patient. The patient's self-
reflection is then complete.\textsuperscript{98}

Freud extended his psychology into social theory. The normality or deviance of an individual is judged according to the institutional framework of the society to which this individual belongs; by the same token, Freud held that the pathological state of societal self-formation can be determined in relation to other cultures.\textsuperscript{99}

This is how Habermas interprets Freud's social theory: due to material scarcity people must work in order to survive; collective effort to combat scarcity requires the establishment of social institutions, which impose demands on people so that their wishes are repressed; the imposition of social norms is accomplished in a subtle and unconscious manner, through religions, rites, ideals, values, styles and art; this distorted structure of communication is a necessary evil in mankind's struggle against nature, but the price mankind pays is the repression of human instincts, which is the root of societal pathology.\textsuperscript{100}

Freud assumed that the ultimate purpose of human organization is the control of nature, so that technical progress would reduce the need for repression. With technical progress, according to him, the rigidified power structure in society and the ideology that rationalizes it become obsolete; they can no longer be legitimimized. Hence political action has to be taken to correct the distorted communication. The goal is to bring social institutions in line with the achieved technological level. In short, society should seek to minimize
repression of human instincts within the framework of current technological achievements.¹⁰¹

In Habermas' view, Freud's social theory is an improvement over Marx's in one important respect: the former separates communicative action from instrumental action. Freud realized that a separate course of action is required for a change in social institutions, which does not follow automatically from technological innovations.¹⁰² Yet Habermas rejects Freud's naturalistic stance. Freud took human instincts to be "the prime mover of history"; he failed to see that human needs and drives are shaped by culture, that the form of such needs and drives is itself the product of communication.¹⁰³ Since mankind can never completely control nature, it follows from Freud's theory that a certain degree of repression in society is always justified. This, according to Habermas, is the major flaw in Freudian thinking. Marx, on the other hand, knew from the very beginning that human nature is conditioned by the self-formative process: "The cultivation of the five senses is the work of all previous history."¹⁰⁴ Educated in the humanist tradition of Hegel, Marx and hermeneutics, Habermas does not fall into the naturalistic trap; he refuses to share the pessimism of Freud.

Instead of extending psychoanalysis from the individual to societal level centering on the concept of instinct, Habermas attempts to capitalize on the concept of self-reflection:

Just as in the clinical situation, so in society, pathological compulsion itself is accompanied by the interest in its abolition. Both the pathology of social institutions and that of individual consciousness reside in the medium of language and of communicative action and assume the form of a
The methodology of self-reflection in psychoanalysis, Habermas concludes, is Freud's true contribution to social theory, despite the fact that Freud himself was unaware of it. The critical science Habermas has in mind is to follow the therapeutic model of psychoanalysis; it can free society from its ideology.

From Early to Recent Writings

In the preceding pages we discussed Habermas' concept of the self-formative process, mainly by following his argument in Knowledge and Human Interests. Essentially he points out there are two basic components in the self-formative process: instrumental and communicative actions. Although interrelated, neither of these components can be reduced to the other. There is a third component, emancipation, which corrects the self-formative process when it becomes deviant. Corresponding to the three types of activities, Habermas classifies scientific knowledge into three spheres: natural, human and critical sciences. The orientations of the three categories of knowledge and action, according to him, are governed by three cognitive interests - technical, practical and emancipatory - which are embedded in all knowledge and action. The specific contents of these interests, however, are not fixed: they are outcomes of the self-formative process; in other words, they are cultural as
well as historical.

KHI establishes the foundation of Habermas' later writings. This does not mean he has not changed his views since then. In fact, he has modified his position by shifting emphases, elaborating on different aspects and incorporating new elements, some of which are not entirely consistent with earlier ones.

In "A Postscript to Knowledge and Human Interests" Habermas indicates the new direction of his future endeavors. He explains that in the preceding few years several other writers have made much headway in the critique of the scientistic orientation in society "which makes criticism less urgent. What is now needed is the construction of a theory of communication (which I hope to be able to work out soon)". Thus Habermas wishes to direct his effort toward what he considers the least developed aspects of his critical theory. This clarifies the intention of his later essays on communication such as "What Is Universal Pragmatics?", and his exploration of social evolution in terms of his concept of communication, including the essay "Toward a Reconstruction of Historical Materialism".

Although Habermas seldom makes direct reference to KHI in his recent works, there is no indication he has completely renounced the tripartite model he established there. On the contrary, his recent research topics would seem fragmentary and incoherent if taken by themselves; his intention becomes intelligible only if these topics are considered efforts to develop or modify his earlier position. For example, his critique of rational planning in Legitimation Crisis is an
elaboration of his critique of technocratic ideology, and
"Toward a Reconstruction of Historical Materialism" is a
reformulation of the Marxian conception of history based on his
own notion of self-formation. Besides, his detail analysis of
the structure of speech acts and utterances in "What Is
Universal Pragmatics?" would seem irrelevant to social theory
unless one is familiar with KHI and "Postscript to KHI". For
this reason, KHI is of primary import for understanding
Habermas' critical theory.

Rudiments of many of Habermas' recent research directions
can be found in his Introduction to Theory and Practice\textsuperscript{107} and
"Postscript to KHI". For our present purpose it is not necessary
to analyze all the materials that Habermas has written since
KHI. But a few changes that affect the basic framework of his
critical theory deserve attention. We shall discuss these in the
rest of the chapter.

**Action, Experience and Discourse**

In a revision of the earlier model Habermas makes an
important distinction between the realm of action and experience
and that of discourse. In KHI Habermas had not yet defined
"discourse". Speech communication was considered part of
communicative action. There Habermas argued that self-
reflection, such as critique of ideology, could only take place
through communicative action. Now he finds this concept too
vague and unsatisfactory; it has to be modified. With the new
formulation, discourse is given a special, somewhat independent
status from the realm of everyday social practice where people act and experience.  

According to Habermas, when people participate in communicative and instrumental actions in daily life, they naively assume their actions are based on true information. They also uncritically accept that the norms of their actions are correct and that the norms for judging actions are appropriate. In other words, there is an implicit, unreflective approval of existing social practices.

With his hermeneutical method, Dilthey investigated social norms of action. But he did not question whether these norms were justifiable: he simply accepted them as they were. Furthermore, Dilthey did not take into account there were norms governing the process of inquiry itself. For Habermas, these critical issues concerning norms must be tackled in a course of argumentative reasoning separated from action.

Habermas argues that experience in the life-world must claim to be objective, to the extent it can be intersubjectively shared. He probably means that a different person can potentially experience something similar under similar circumstances. This is due to the a priori knowledge that is intersubjectively shared:

> Whenever I perceive something, this experience necessarily has the objectivity by virtue of the categorical framework in which I interpret my experience a priori as an experience of objects in the world.

When Habermas speaks of experience he usually refers to experience in practical life, as distinct from, say, data
acquired from experiments. The former is directly related to action in life whereas the latter is withdrawn from the everyday world.\textsuperscript{112} Habermas contends that experience in everyday life, like action, is essentially unreflective.

To the extent humans are speaking subjects, they are capable of making statements about actions and experiences. The subject-matter of a statement may be things, relationship between people and things, or relationship among people. Hence it covers the sphere of instrumental action, communicative action, or both. Habermas' main concern here is the kind of statements about experience in practical life. He observes: "Since experience claims to be objective there is a possibility of error or deception."\textsuperscript{113} In his view, whether a statement about experience is free from error or deception cannot be judged by experience alone. Certainly, the outcome of actions taken on the basis of a stated experience informs the actor something about the objectivity of the stated experience. Yet, Habermas argues, the "objectivity of stated experience is not the same as the truth of a statement".\textsuperscript{114} The latter cannot be determined without a due process of reasoning. Stated experience merely provides information for reasoning.

In order to question validity claims, Habermas introduces the concept of discourse. When the validity of a statement with propositional content is in question, it is presented as part of a discourse. At this stage, the content of the statement is considered hypothetical only. "What we call a fact is the content of a statement after it has been subjected to a
discourse that is now (for the time being) concluded. A fact is what we want to assert as true after a discursive test."\textsuperscript{115}

Obviously influenced by Peirce, Habermas takes truth to be something whose validity is accepted through the consensus of a community of inquirers – a concept called "a consensus theory of truth".\textsuperscript{116} This consensus is an explicit agreement among participants of the discourse. Unlike Peirce, Habermas does not assume that the ultimate truth is gradually being unfolded.

The purpose of a discourse is to arrive at a consensus about a problematic claim through argumentative reasoning. The claim in question can be "the truth of utterances". It can also be "the correctness of norms for action" and "the appropriateness of norms for valuation which we are to follow".\textsuperscript{117} In other words, a discourse is an inquiry into the spheres of instrumental as well as communicative action.

A discourse presupposes the existence of a structure and a set of rules governing the discourse. This is what Habermas calls an "ideal speech situation". It consists of "structural elements of communication which make reasoning possible".\textsuperscript{118} In \textit{KHI} Habermas complained that Peirce did not properly work out the logic of linguistic communication for the purpose of validating truth claims. In order to go beyond Peirce, Habermas investigates the requirements of an ideal speech situation. For our present purpose, we do not have to be involved with the details of those structural elements Habermas discovered.

For Habermas, a discourse is a specific type of speech communication. He delegates statements expressing action and
experience to the realm of action and experience itself. For these statements do not dispute the norms of action nor verify claims about experience; they operate at an unreflective level. Discourse, then, must be distinguished from action and experience as well as statements expressing them. A discourse operates at a level that permits reflection:

Because of their communicative structure, discourses do not compel their participants to act. Nor do they accommodate processes whereby information can be acquired. They are purged of action and experience. The relation between discourses and information is one where the latter is fed into the former. The output of discourses, on the other hand, consists in recognition or rejection of problematic truth claims. Discourses produce nothing but arguments.¹¹⁹

In a discourse, "all motives except that of the cooperative search for truth are excluded".¹²⁰

As a result of consensus reached through discourses, truth claims can be settled, norms of action and evaluative criteria can also be justified. Habermas believes that the use of discourses is the only way that renders self-reflection of society possible. But discourse is not the same as self-reflection. The use of discourses is a necessary but insufficient condition for self-reflection of society, as we shall see later.

The realm of discourse, which generates theoretical knowledge, is linked to the realm of action and experience by cognitive interests. Technical cognitive interest subjects problems in the sphere of instrumental action to argumentative reasoning in a discourse. The theoretical knowledge thus gained is again directed by this interest back to the specific content
of application in everyday life, i.e. instrumental action.
Similarly, practical cognitive interest serves the corresponding function in the sphere of communicative action. These cognitive interests can be conceived as generalized motives for systems of action, which are guided by means of the communication of statements which can be true. Actions are channeled by the recognition of claims to validity that can be resolved discursively.¹²¹

This notion of the two "lower" cognitive interests is an extension of what Habermas presented in KHI; it is now integrally connected to the new concept of discourse.

There is a third cognitive interest, the emancipatory, which aims at self-reflection. In KHI Habermas adopted the psychoanalytic model to realize this interest. Now he points out that "the psychoanalytic dialogue is not a discourse".¹²² He argues that self-reflection has to be achieved independently of discursive reasoning. In order to follow Habermas' argument, we have to see how he differentiates reconstruction from self-reflection.

**Reconstruction and Self-reflection**

In Habermas' view, the concept of self-reflection he developed in KHI - an inheritance from Kant and Hegel - has to be modified. He points out that in traditional German philosophy the term "reflection" covers two different forms of self-knowledge, which he claims scholars usually confuse. Habermas admits that in KHI he had the same trouble as those scholars. Now he considers the distinction between these two forms of
self-knowledge crucial to critical theory. He thus has to clarify his concept of reflection, which is intended to include both forms:

On the one hand, it denotes the reflection upon the conditions of potential abilities of a knowing, speaking and acting subject as such; on the other hand, it denotes the reflection upon unconsciously produced constraints to which a determinate subject (or a determinate group of subjects, or a determinate species subject) succumbs in its process of self-formation.¹²³

Habermas indicates that Kant's search for *a priori* grounds of knowledge (and morality) is reflection of the first kind. It inquires the conditions under which acquisition of knowledge is possible and the form in which knowledge appears. According to Habermas, recent development in this mode of reflection can be found in the philosophy of language. It seeks to discover "generative rules and cognitive schemata".¹²⁴ Generative rules reveal the conditions under which linguistic communication is possible; cognitive schemata show the form in which linguistic communication takes place.

Hegel incorporated the Kantian sense of reflection, but he also introduced a second sense of reflection. This is the critical attitude, guided by Reason, that is oriented toward the transcendence of the present form of knowledge and action. "In other words, he embraced a concept of reflection which contains the idea of an analytical emancipation from objective illusions"¹²⁵ - illusions collectively held by all members of society at any particular point in history. Habermas observes that Freud developed the second notion of reflection into the therapeutic method of psychoanalysis. The Freudian method aims
at rescuing the individual patient from his or her illusions.

In *KHI* Habermas focused on this second notion of reflection, which he called self-reflection or criticism. He extended the Freudian method into his critical theory: society was to emancipate itself from its objective illusions through self-reflection. Now he believes he had previously neglected the first notion of reflection, with the result that critical theory suffered from the lack of a solid theoretical basis for the purpose of self-reflection. Inspired by Kant's rigorous investigation of the forms of knowledge, Habermas seeks to develop the Kantian sense of reflection for application in critical theory. He is convinced that a "separation of the *a priori* conditions of reasoning from those of experience" is justified and necessary. Since a discourse is a process of reasoning, it is important to find out the pre-theoretical knowledge participants must have in order to carry out a discourse. This is a task Kant did not perform. Hence it is the pre-theoretical knowledge - including *a priori* knowledge - of reasoning that Habermas is most concerned with here. He calls this transformed Kantian mode of reflection rational reconstruction:

Reconstructions try to understand anonymous systems of rules which can be followed by any subject at all provided it has the requisite competences. A branch of study dealing with reconstructions in a particular field is what Habermas calls reconstructive science. He cites logic, general linguistics and universal pragmatics (Habermas' own theory of speech communication) as examples of
reconstructive sciences.

While the notion of reconstruction owes its origin to Kant and is much influenced by him, it is significantly different from the Kantian mode of reflection. Kant's critique of knowledge starts with a knowing subject. The \textit{a priori} knowledge Kant discovered belongs to this subject. In contrast, "reconstructions ... do not encompass subjectivity".\textsuperscript{128} They are concerned with anonymous rule systems which do not belong to any subject. However, any subject can learn to comply with these rule systems and acquire a level of competence in the use of them. For instance, people can competently apply the principles of logic or general linguistics after properly learning them.

Habermas maintains that pre-theoretical knowledge for reasoning always exists among competent subjects. It exists in an intuitive or implicit form. In other words, competent subjects often follow anonymous rule systems in their everyday life without being aware of them. Hence a reconstruction does not seek to create rules. Rather, it attempts to render implicit rules explicit:

A successful reconstruction ... raises an "unconsciously" functioning rule system to consciousness in a certain manner; it renders explicit the intuitive knowledge that is given with competence with respect to the rules in the form of "know how".\textsuperscript{129}

For Habermas, the anonymous rule systems reconstructive sciences seek to understand are not purely \textit{a priori}. A reconstruction incorporates \textit{a posteriori} elements as well. This means an inquiry into anonymous rule systems is partially rooted in empirical findings. According to Habermas, what is
reconstructed can be substantiated by competent subjects. In the case of grammatical theory, say, competent speakers can tell if a sentence is grammatical. Hence a grammatical theory must be consistent with the judgments of competent speakers.\textsuperscript{130}

The reconstructive sciences Habermas has in mind are those at the level of general theories (such as general linguistics, rather than the linguistic theory of a particular language). The anonymous rule systems to be discovered are held to be universal:

Reconstructions relate to pre-theoretical knowledge of a general sort, to universal capabilities, and not only to the particular competences of individual groups or to the ability of particular individuals.\textsuperscript{131}

Since a reconstruction inquires at the level of "a general capability, a general cognitive, linguistic, or interactive competence", Habermas declares that reconstructive sciences aim at "the reconstruction of species competences".\textsuperscript{132}

The a priori knowledge Kant searched for is supposed to be universal: it is shared by every single knowing subject. One possesses this knowledge simply because one is a member of the human species. Reconstructive sciences, on the other hand, do not assume that every knowing, acting and speaking subject possesses the pre-theoretical knowledge represented by explicit anonymous rule systems. Only competent subjects conform to these rule systems. Not everybody is competent, or necessarily so; but one can acquire competence through learning. Everybody has the potential to become competent subjects. It is in this sense that Habermas speaks of universal capabilities.\textsuperscript{133}
Hence a crucial concept associated with reconstruction is competence, which is built into the definition of the former. Reconstructions attempt to understand implicit anonymous rule systems as practiced by competent subjects, not those practiced by incompetent ones. Whether a subject is competent cannot be determined solely on an empirical basis. Otherwise the relationship between competence and reconstructed rule systems would be circular. This is why Habermas indicates that in reconstruction, "the distinction between drawing on a priori knowledge and drawing on a posteriori knowledge becomes blurred". The sharp distinction between these two modes of knowledge made by Kant cannot be maintained.

By rendering implicit anonymous rule systems of competent subjects explicit, it is hoped that incompetent subjects would learn to become competent by adhering to these explicit rules. That is the purpose of reconstructive sciences.

Reconstructive sciences are not intended to replace critical sciences, which are required for self-reflection. According to Habermas, the theoretical knowledge generated in reconstructive sciences has no practical consequences: "By learning logic or linguistics I acquire theoretical knowledge, but in general I do not thereby change my previous practice of reasoning or speaking." He probably means that people who learn anonymous rule systems can become more effective reasoners or speakers; but they do not gain insight into the problem they wish to solve simply by learning rule systems. Hence reconstructions do not obviate self-reflections. However, self-
reflections should not be arbitrary: they must rely on the theoretical basis provided by reconstructive sciences. Habermas gives an example:

A universal pragmatic capable of understanding the conditions of why linguistic communication is at all possible has to be the theoretical basis for explaining systematically distorted communication and deviant processes of socialization.  

The point is: one must have a pre-notion, or rough understanding, of what undistorted communication is before one can trace systematic distortions. This is the way Habermas relates self-reflection to reconstruction. It also explains why discourses alone - which are based on rule systems - are insufficient for emancipation.

Reconstructive Sciences

One of the most important reconstructive sciences Habermas seeks to develop is what he calls "universal pragmatics" - a general theory of speech communication. According to him, universal pragmatics studies speech in a way similar to general linguistics studies language (language in general rather than individual languages). An utterance is the elementary unit of speech in the sense that a sentence is the elementary unit of language.  

Habermas claims there are four general presuppositions in successful speech communication. First, the sentence uttered must be comprehensible. This means the words used belong to a natural language and the sentence is constructed in accordance with the grammar of the language. The sentence is comprehensible
to the extent the hearer is competent in the use of the language. Second, the utterance must refer to some reality in the world; it claims that something in the world is true. In other words, the speaker imparts some knowledge to the hearer. Third, the utterance must represent what the speaker intends. This refers to the honesty, sincerity or truthfulness of the speaker. The speaker expects the hearer to trust him or her. Finally, what is uttered must conform to recognized social norms or to accepted self-images. This means the speakers has to speak in a manner that the hearer can relate to. Habermas points out that, of the four presuppositions, only the first one is pertinent to linguistics, since linguistics studies sentences, not utterances. The three additional presuppositions are peculiar to pragmatics: they take into account the social reality in which the uttered sentence is embedded. These four presuppositions, Habermas claims, are always already implicit in any speech act oriented toward understanding. Universal pragmatics, as a reconstructive science, makes them explicit.

Much of the essay "What Is Universal Pragmatics?" is a detail analysis of the structure of speech and its elementary unit, the utterance. In the essay Habermas classifies speech acts into a variety of categories. The category he focuses on consists only of speech acts that are propositionally differentiated (i.e. they make claims about something in the world), verbal, explicit, institutionally unbounded (i.e. the contents are not defined in terms of particular social institutions) and context independent (i.e. the meanings do not
shift according to context). Habermas rigorously reconstructs the anonymous rule system for utilizing speech acts in this category.

This detail analysis of speech acts seems to be a digression from Habermas' other writings, if we do not realize it is undertaken for a definite reason. As we have seen, a discourse is a process of argumentative reasoning that examines the validity claims of statements. In order for statements to be examined effectively, Habermas argues, they must conform to a certain structure. According to him, this structure is the anonymous rule system of the special category of speech acts mentioned above. It follows that a competent speaker in a discourse has to observe the rules reconstructed in universal pragmatics, specifically, the four general presuppositions of successful speech communication and the anonymous rule system of the special category of speech acts. Further, it follows that all participants of a discourse are required to be competent speakers before the discourse can fulfil its role in critical theory.

Universal pragmatics is not the only reconstructive science Habermas develops as a component of critical theory. He extends the idea of reconstruction into two other areas: ego development and social evolution. We shall briefly describe these.

Convinced that "basic psychological and sociological concepts can be interwoven because the perspectives projected in them of an autonomous ego and an emancipated society reciprocally require one another" - a theme that has been
pursued by earlier critical theorists - Habermas decides to reconstruct the psychological development of an individual. According to the reconstructed model, presented in "Moral Development and Ego Identity", there are seven stages of moral consciousness in the development of ego identity. The competence of an individual is to be determined with respect to these stages. At the lowest stage, the individual - in this case a child - only acts in response to anticipated punishments and rewards. As moral consciousness moves up the scale - which usually occurs with maturation of a child - the individual becomes increasingly autonomous and concerned about principles. At the highest stage - which is not always attained - the individual participates in discourses to question and justify validity claims:

The meaning of the transition from the sixth to the seventh stage can be found in the fact that need interpretations are no longer assumed as given, but are drawn into the discursive formation of will.

Habermas thus sees that proper psychological development of the individual is essential if the individual is to contribute to a discourse, which in turn is crucial to emancipation.

In KHI Habermas criticized Marx for his failure to distinguish instrumental and communicative actions as two relatively independent processes, with the result that the latter's theory of social evolution is inapplicable to state-regulated capitalism. But Habermas does not completely abandon Marx's theory of social evolution, which is popularly known as historical materialism. He sees much merit in historical materialism and attempts to reconstruct it. Besides employing
the term reconstruction in the sense of a reconstructive science, Habermas explains:

In the present connection, reconstruction signifies taking a theory apart and putting it back together again in a new form in order to attain more fully the goal it has set for itself. This is the normal way of dealing with a theory that needs revision in many respects but whose potential for stimulation has still not been exhausted.  

What he does is the incorporation of a communicative dimension, including the concept of competence, into historical materialism.

In the essays "Historical Materialism and the Development of Normative Structures" and "Toward a Reconstruction of Historical Materialism", Habermas draws a parallel between social evolution and ego development. With some precautions, he extends the reconstruction of the latter into that of the former:

One can see here the identity of the conscious structures that are, on the one hand, embodied in the institutions of laws and morality and that are, on the other hand, expressed in the moral judgments and actions of individuals.

The link between the two is the linguistically established intersubjectivity of understanding which permits sociocultural learning: "the reproduction of society and the socialization of its members are two aspects of the same process; they are dependent on the same structures." There is a reciprocal relationship between the two:

It is the personality system that is the bearer of the ontogenetic learning process; and in a certain way, only social subjects can learn. But social systems, by drawing on the learning capacities of social subjects, can form new structures in order to solve steering problems that threaten their
continued existence. To this extent the evolutionary learning process of societies is dependent on the competences of the individuals that belong to them. The latter in turn acquire their competences not as isolated monads but by growing into the symbolic structures of their life-worlds.\textsuperscript{148}

With concepts in reconstructive sciences — anonymous rule system and competence — Habermas elaborates on the Hegelian notion of interaction between individual and society.

In Marx's theory of social evolution society progresses in stages characterized by their distinctive modes of production (consisting of forces and relations of production). For each level of forces of production there corresponds a specific level of relations of production; in other words, the former largely determines the latter. As we have pointed out earlier, Habermas criticizes Marx for not separating the logics of instrumental and communicative actions. According to Habermas, the same forces of production can give rise to a certain range of possible social systems.\textsuperscript{149} Within this range some structures governing human relations are considered rational, others not. Normative structures are the rational ones; they are arrived at through consensus in discourses, which are independent of the logic of development of forces of production.\textsuperscript{150}

Habermas' reconstruction of historical materialism involves a separation of the logic from the dynamics of development. Although he follows Marx in incorporating the idea of social progress into his theory of social evolution,\textsuperscript{151} Habermas maintains that history, as it actually occurs, does not necessarily conform to the logic of social progress: "we need require of history neither unilinearity nor necessity, neither
continuity nor irreversibility." Only when societal members reach a consensus on normative structures, and only when these normative structures are embodied in the institutions of laws and morality and expressed in the moral judgments and actions of individuals, would the development of society proceed along its logical course. It follows that social progress requires proper psychological development of individuals and observation of the rules of universal pragmatics in discourses, in addition to development of forces of production. We may say Habermas' version of historical materialism is teleological in terms of the logic, but not the dynamics, of development. This is how he modifies Hegel and Marx.

The reconstructive sciences: universal pragmatics, ego development and reconstructed historical materialism, have become an integral part of critical theory.

The Advocacy Model

In *Legitimation Crisis* Habermas introduces his advocacy model. He realizes that society is not necessarily homogeneous, that it possibly consists of groups with conflicting interests. Here Habermas is not referring to the concepts of technical and practical cognitive interests, which he claims to be universal, but to their specific contents. In this context he writes:

I use the term "interests" for needs that are - to the extent of the withdrawal of legitimation and the rising of the consciousness of conflict - rendered subjective and detached, as it were, from the crystallizations of commonly shared values supported by tradition (and made binding in norms of
action).\textsuperscript{154}

Habermas believes that common or "generalizable" interests exist in society and can theoretically be separated from particular interests of various groups. Generalizable interests are the common interpretation of needs of all people in society. This interpretation is the outcome of a consensus to be arrived at through practical discourses\textsuperscript{155} - a type of discourse which we shall elaborate on shortly. Interests that are generalizable are no longer subjective or detached from the societal whole. Habermas calls social norms that express generalizable interests "justifiable" norms and claims that norms which do not express such interests are "based on force".\textsuperscript{156}

Conflict of interests, in Habermas' view, can only be ascertained in practical discourses. As long as no conflict is found in this manner, provided that such discourses do take place, society is considered unproblematic. As soon as conflict is discovered critical theory makes the assumption that there is a "suppression of generalizable interests", or an ideology, in society.\textsuperscript{157}

One can see that in LC Habermas modifies his concept of ideology he presented in the earlier work Toward A Rational Society. In LC, ideology is defined in terms of generalizable interests; it can be confirmed only in discourses. In TRS the ideology of state-regulated capitalism is taken to be exclusively technocratic manipulation of society for the purpose of system maintenance. This ideology exists as a result of lack of unrestrained communication in society. The question of
overall human development is thus neglected. Habermas considers this ideology of state-regulated capitalism to be a special case of ideology based on the notion of suppressed generalizable interests. Suppressed generalizable interests are ideological because the society involved "either asserts or counterfactually supposes a generalizability of interests" while at the same time avoids "thematization and testing of discursive-validity claims". In TRS Habermas had not yet separated discourse form communicative action, nor had he worked out the principles of practical discourse. His modification of the critical theory framework in the early seventies enables him to define ideology in a more sophisticated manner.

Based on the assumption of suppressed generalizable interests, a social theorist qua advocate reconstructs what he or she considers to be "hidden interest positions of involved individuals or groups" and identifies "the normative power [norms based on force] built into the institutional system of a society". As a critic of ideology the theorist offers the outcome of his or her reconstruction to the public and recommends hypothetical justifiable norms. The advocated hypothesis would then have to be confirmed and accepted by consensus through practical discourse among the people involved in the conflict before it is considered valid.

At this point we should perhaps clarify what Habermas means by practical discourse. For him, there are two kinds of discourse, namely, theoretical and practical:

In theoretical discourses - which serve to ground assertions - consensus is produced according to
rules of argumentation different from those obtaining in practical discourses - which serve to justify recommended norms. However, in both cases the goal is the same: a rationally motivated decision about the recognition (or rejection) of validity claims. In a theoretical discourse, statements about experience and action are examined by participants who attempt to reach a consensus about the truth claims of the statements. Self-reflection is not involved. In a practical discourse, hypothetical social norms are introduced and recommended by an advocate for participants to justify. As a result of the advocate's suggestions, the suppression of generalizable interests comes to light and participants of the discourse acquire insight into the problem in question (the nature of the conflict of interests). When participants eventually reach a consensus to accept the recommended norms, self-reflection is said to have been achieved. In the former case, the input for argumentative reasoning consists of statements about experience and action; in the later case, it consists of recommended norms. Hence in the advocacy model, the kind of discourse required is practical discourse, a process which involves both reconstruction and self-reflection.

In working out hidden interest positions and justifiable norms the theorist does not theorize subjectively. Rather, he or she adheres to reconstructive sciences. In his reconstruction of historical materialism Habermas argues there are "systematically reconstructible patterns of development of normative structures". This means that justifiable norms are derived from reconstructed historical materialism, and indirectly, from
ego development and universal pragmatics. Thus the advocate's hypothesis is scientifically based and adapted to the particular case of conflict of interests.

The significance of advocacy is that it helps society establish a social system that is rational at a given level of forces of production.

The advocacy model makes provision for a compromise. Habermas recognizes there are particular interests, i.e. non-generalizable interests, in addition to generalizable ones. He argues that a compromise of particular interests can be justified "only if both conditions are met; a balance of power among the parties involved and the non-generalizability of the negotiated interests exist."²⁶³ Without a balance of power, the outcome of a compromise would remain repressive. If an attempt to compromise is made on interests regardless of whether they are generalizable, society would resign itself to "an impenetrable pluralism of apparently ultimate value orientations".²⁶⁴ Whether the compromise indeed satisfies these two conditions again has to be determined through discourse.

Habermas' advocacy model can be considered a refinement of the psychoanalytic model he had described in KHI. There are four major aspects to this refinement. First, unlike the case of psychoanalysis, where there is only one patient, the advocacy model recognizes there are groups with possibly conflicting interests in society and thus has to take into account this heterogeneity. The psychoanalytic model aims at correcting deviations in the self-formative process of society. This notion
becomes vague once society is no longer taken to be homogeneous - which group in society is deviant? The advocacy model solves this problem by defining the suppression of generalizable interests to be social pathology; it aims at removing such suppression. Second, reconstructive sciences are utilized in the advocacy model. Discourses among groups are carried out in accordance with anonymous rule systems of universal pragmatics. The advocate reconstructs hidden interest positions and proposes justifiable norms in accordance with anonymous rule systems of reconstructed historical materialism and other reconstructive sciences. These are necessary since, in Habermas' view, the advocate should have a pre-notion of what undistorted communication is and the stages of social evolution are before he or she can help correct the systematically distorted communication in society.¹⁶⁵ Third, in the advocacy model, the symptom of social pathology is conflict of interests. A patient's suffering is the reason for seeking professional help from a psychoanalyst; by the same token a conflict of interests has to be resolved with the help of a social theorist qua advocate. Fourth, the issue of compromise does not exist in psychoanalysis since only one patient is involved at a time.

Keeping in mind this refinement one can tell the advocacy model runs in parallel to the psychoanalytic model. Both involve a division of labor: in psychoanalysis it is between therapist and patient, and in the advocacy model it is between advocate and social groups. The therapist reconstructs the childhood scene; the patient only says "yes" or "no". The advocate
reconstructs interest positions and proposes justifiable norms based on reconstructive sciences; social groups only confirm or reject the hypothesis through discourse. Neither the patient nor social groups do their own theorizing; nor do they criticize the theories offered to them. In fact one can perhaps understand the advocacy model better by observing the logic of the psychoanalytic model. For instance, Habermas does not clarify what happens if the advocated hypothesis is not accepted by consensus. Presumably — learning from the psychoanalytic model — the advocate has to acquire more information and make improvements to the hypothesis in further rounds, until the revised hypothesis is finally accepted. The critique of ideology would then be complete.

Approach to Planning

Habermas derives his approach to planning from the advocacy model. He gives a brief account of this approach against the backdrop of Niklas Luhmann's systems theory. Observing the complexity of modern industrial society Luhmann argues that the only realistic solution to societal problems is to free public administration from the interference of participatory politics. This autonomous administration is to take a scientific and systematic approach to increase its capacity to process information and to determine how society must adapt to the changing environment. It is assumed that the administration has the general responsibility and ability to handle societal problems in such a way that society can function smoothly. To
this extent, not only is input from the public domain superfluous, it undermines the effectiveness of the administration. Habermas' major complaint here is that systems theory spells "the end of the individual", that it "gives up the differentiation between power and truth in favor of a nature-like development withdrawn from reflection". Put differently, systems theory deals with social development exclusively from the perspective of instrumental action; it treats both nature and human relation in terms of systematic control for the purpose of system maintenance. Systems theory transforms "questions of validity into questions of behavior".

For Habermas, the validity of social norms has to be justified, and this is something Luhmann does not permit in his theory. In social development, Habermas argues, norms must be critically examined through public discourse. However, "this procedure of normative genesis must, of course, be connected to the systems-theoretic approach if it is to contribute to a suitable theory of social evolution." In other words, Habermas is impressed with systems theory's potential in addressing complex technical problems in industrial society, but at the same time he condemns its lack of a self-reflective component. The remedy, in his view, is to couple systems theory with the advocacy model. The former is responsible for administrative strategies in the control of nature and in organizing human relations. The latter deals with reflective activities in society - including the related issues of
justifiability of norms, suppression of generalizable interests, critique of ideology and compromise - through practical discourse. In practical discourse people reflect on what a systematic administration has taken for granted and thus deprive administration of its autonomous status. This marriage of systems theory and the advocacy model is Habermas' critical-reconstructive approach to planning.171

NOTES

1 The chapter title "Habermas: The Critique of Ideology" and the next one "Gadamer: The Hermeneutics of tradition" are taken from Paul Ricoeur, "Hermeneutics and the Critique of Ideology", in Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, J.B.Thompson (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981. These titles seem to capture the essence of the debate.

2 Knowledge and Human Interests, Boston: Beacon, 1971. Hereafter it will be referred to as KHI.

3 "The Dialectics of Rationalization: An Interview with Jürgen Habermas", Telos, no.49, 1981, pp.30-1.


5 Ibid., p.66.

6 Ibid., p.58.

7 Ibid., p.60.

8 KHI, pp.13-8.

9 G.W.F.Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, A.V.Miller (trans.), Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1977. Hereafter it will be referred to as PhS. The word Kant employed for "experience" was Erfahrung, by which he meant certain immediate particular sensation. Erlebnis acquired a
technical meaning and gained popularity with W. Dilthey and his contemporaries after the 1870s, to set itself apart from Erfahrung. In addition to a sense of immediacy Erlebnis (experience, sometimes called lived experience) connotes a content that has enduring significance. "As against the abstraction of the understanding and the particularity of perception or representation, this concept implies the connection with totality, with infinity" (Gadamer, TM, p.57). Hegel used the word Erfahrung only. But obviously what he means is closer to Erlebnis than to Erfahrung in the Kantian sense.

There is a theory about the "epistemological break" in Marx - espoused especially by structural Marxists (Althusser, Godelier, etc.) - maintaining that "mature" Marxian philosophy is non-Hegelian. But evidence is against this theory. For instance, in Afterword to the Second German Edition of Capital I, considered one of Marx's mature works, Marx remarks of Hegel: "I therefore openly avowed myself the pupil of that mighty thinker". Also, the recent publication of Grundrisse, Marx's personal notebooks outlining many of his mature works, vindicates that the mature Marx is no less Hegelian than the young Marx (see especially Forward to Grundrisse by Martin Nicolaus). In our present study, we assume a continuity in Marx's writings and draw on the entire corpus of his works. Although Habermas admits he has "learned something from Marxists like Godelier" (Communication and the Evolution of Society, Boston: Beacon, 1979, p.124; hereafter referred to as CES), he does not accept the structural Marxist anti-humanistic interpretation of Marx. Habermas' reading of Marx is closer to that of "the Hegelian-Marxist tradition from Lukács to Adorno" (Ibid.).

According to Marx, Hegel conceives the self-formative process mainly as "movements of thought". This characterization is inaccurate: we have seen that Spirit is
necessarily embodied in social practices. Marx was possibly aware of this fact; he was employing polemics against Hegel in order to bring out his own ideas. Richard Bernstein — in Praxis and Action, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971 — correctly points out that this difference between Hegel and Marx is best seen as a major shift in emphasis. For a similar view, see also John O'Neill, "Embodiment and History in Hegel and Marx", op.cit.

19 "1844 MSS", p.207


22 One of the best commentaries that clarifies this concept is Alfred Schmidt, The Concept of Nature in Marx, London: NLB, 1971. Habermas adopts a similar view.


24 Marx was much influenced by Charles Darwin's theory of biological evolution.

25 "1844 MSS", p.164.

26 Marx and Engels, op.cit., p.47. The popular notion held by certain Marxists that "social existence determines consciousness" is an oversimplification of Marx's thought.


29 The term "control of nature" should perhaps be clarified. For environmentalists the term might connote some kind of brutality toward the wilderness: damming of rivers, denuding of forests, and so on. But for Habermas and many other social theorists the term takes on a different meaning. There are natural requirements for human survival (e.g. food consumption). Carrying out of activities to satisfy such requirements (e.g. food production, including gathering of wild fruits) is the control of nature. It may or may not significantly alter the ecological balance of nature, depending on how it is carried out.
In a slightly later work, *Toward A Rational Society*, Habermas elaborates on the concept of "work", which he redefines as purposive-rational action. This concept includes instrumental action and strategic action. The former refers to technical means to achieve a goal while the latter refers to the process of goal-setting. See *Toward A Rational Society*, Boston: Beacon, 1970, pp.91-2. Hereafter this book will be cited as TRS. In our present study we use the term instrumental action in its broader sense to include both goal-setting and goal-achieving. This would be consistent with Habermas' terminology in *KHI* and would also take into account his later thinking. "Work" here is the translation of *Arbeit*; the same word has been translated as "labor" in relation to Marx. "Labor" suggests manual labor, which was essentially how instrumental action was carried out back in the days of Marx; but this is no longer true today, since many people involved in the control of nature are professionals, technicians, bureaucrats, etc.

**KHI**, p.53.


**KHI**, p.55.


**Marx and Engels, *op.cit.*, p.64.**

**Ibid.**, pp.65-6.

Habermas analyzes the issue of liberal capitalism and state-regulated capitalism in TRS, first published in German in 1968, the same year as *KHI*. In this and the next few paragraphs we draw on TRS, which complements the analysis of instrumental and communicative actions in *KHI*.

**TRS**, pp.102-3.

**Ibid.**, p.111.

**Ibid.**, p.119.

**Ibid.**, P.112.

For an illustration, see Alvin Gouldner's *The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology*, New York: Basic Books, 1970, which contains an account of how positivism has dominated sociology until very recently and how it is still influential today. See also Anthony Giddens, "Positivism and Its Critics" in *Studies in Social and Political Theory*, London: Hutchinson, 1977.
One of the most prevalent terms in Dilthey's writings is *Zusammenhang*, which means coherence, connection, relation, continuity, context, order, pattern. He uses this term by itself and in various combinations. Essentially he intends to emphasize that every aspect of human existence (life, experience, expression, action, understanding, meaning, society, history, etc.) is connected to every other aspect. This complexity of human life cannot be reduced to causal relations. When translated, *Zusammenhang* appears as a number of different English words. Thus the emphasis Dilthey intends is not so well pronounced. *Zusammenhang* is also one of Habermas' favorite terms.

"To form" here is the translation of *bilden*, which is the verb of *Bildung*. Dilthey implies the subject-matter of human sciences is the product of the self-formative process of mankind.
Recent studies on the extension of written text to this broader context can be found in Charles Taylor, "Interpretation and the Sciences of Man", Review of Metaphysics, vol.25, no.1, pp.3-51, 1971, and Paul Ricoeur, "The Model of the Text", in Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, op.cit.

Dilthey, op.cit., p.226.


Ibid., p.236.

Ibid.

H.P.Rickman, Introduction to Dilthey's Selected Writings, op.cit., p.11.

Dilthey, op.cit., p.183.

Ibid., pp.183-4.

KHI, p.176.


In fact the moral sense of "practical" can be traced to Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, M.Ostwald (trans.), Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1962, Book Six. Phronesis (practical wisdom) is distinguished from techne (from which we get the words technical and technology). The latter is concerned with production; the former involves what is virtuous.

The term Habermas uses is das praktische Erkenntnisinteresse (practical cognitive interest). J.Sharipo points out, in the preface to his translation of Habermas' Toward A Rational Society: "In current English, 'practical' often means 'down-to-earth' or 'expedient'. In
the text, this sense of 'practical' would fall under 'technical'. 'Practical' (praktisch) always refers to symbolic interaction within a normative order, to ethics and politics" (TRS, p.vii).

KHI, p.178.

Ibid., pp.179ff.

Certainly a major influence on Habermas is Hannah Arendt, who "stresses particularly three features: the fact of human plurality, the symbolic nature of the web of human relationships, and the fact of human natality, the counterpart of mortality" (Habermas, "On the German-Jewish Heritage", Telos, no.44, 1980, p.128. But Dilthey Dilthey's formulation probably gives Habermas' model a more formal structure.


KHI, pp.197f.

Ibid., p.212.

Ibid., p.198.

Ibid., p.211.

Besides these two aspects of freedom, I.Mészáros indicates there is a third aspect: freedom to develop individual potential. The prerequisites of this individual aspect of freedom are the two social ones: basic material needs must be satisfied as a result of social production and a favorable social-political environment must exist. See Mészáros, Marx's Theory of Alienation, 4th ed., London: Merlin press, 1975, pp.153-4.

KHI, p.53.

Ibid., pp.196f.

Ibid., p.189.

Habermas realizes that emancipation has two components: from natural necessity and from human domination. He focuses on the second component probably because he believes that technology today has advanced to such a level that the first component is no longer a major problem. Cf. Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, Boston: Beacon, 1975, pp.119-20. Hereafter Legitimation Crisis will be cited as LC.

KHI, p.214.
The actual therapeutic process is more complicated. Let us mention one detail that has significant implications on critical theory. Habermas points out, the patient's rejection of the therapist's hypothesis does not mean the hypothesis is necessarily wrong. Often, it only indicates the patient has not yet overcome his or her resistance to interpretation. In other words, the therapy is incomplete. On the other hand, a "yes" from the patient must also be taken cautiously. For the patient may want to conceal the illness; he or she pretends to accept the hypothesis even though he or she is not really convinced of its accuracy. See *Ibid.*, p.267-9. Habermas' interpretation of the therapeutic process reveals his perception of the relationship between critical theorist and society.
between action and discourse in the sense we present here. What he means by action and communication in other places will depend on context.

109 "Postscript to KHI", p.168; and, TP, p.18.


111 Ibid., p.169.

112 Ibid.

113 Ibid., p.168.

114 Ibid., p.169.

115 Ibid., p.168.

116 TP, p.19.

117 Ibid., p.18.

118 "Postscript to KHI", p.168.

119 Ibid.

120 LC, p.108.

121 TP, p.21.

122 Ibid., p.22.

123 "Postscript to KHI", p.182.

124 Ibid.

125 Ibid., p.183.

126 Ibid., p.172. Habermas elaborates on this point in CES, pp.21ff.

127 "Postscript to KHI", p.183.

128 TP, p.22.

129 Ibid., p.23. "Know how" is a term Habermas borrows from the analytical philosopher Gilbert Ryle. It refers to consciousness of implicit rules. See CES, pp.12-3.

130 CES, p.14.

131 Ibid.

132 Ibid.
Habermas' idea of rule following and competence is derived from the linguistic theory of Noam Chomsky.

Ibid., p.24.

Ibid., p.23.

"Postscript to KHI, p.184.


Ibid., pp.27-9.

Ibid., pp.36-40.

Ibid., p.64; also, TP, p.17.

CBS, p.71.

Habermas' idea of stages of moral consciousness is essentially an extension of Lawrence Kohlberg's cognitive developmental psychology.

Ibid., p.93.

Marx never used the term historical materialism. The term was coined by Marxists. Marx called his theory of social evolution the materialist conception of history. Habermas opts for the popular term.

Ibid., p.95.

Ibid., p.99.

Ibid.

Ibid., p.154.

Habermas prefers not to adopt the term relations of production since "to speak of the relations of production misleadingly suggests a narrow economistic interpretation" (LC, p.17).

CES, p.120.

Ibid., p.142.

Ibid., p.140.

Usually "advocacy" refers to the notion of advocating interests of particular groups in society. See e.g. P. Davidoff, "Advocacy and Pluralism in Planning", Journal of the American Institute of Planners, vol. 31, pp.331-8, 1965. Habermas uses the term in a different sense. See LC,
For him, "advocacy" refers to the notion of advocating the interests of society as a whole, not those of particular groups.

Habermas indicates this pre-notion of undistorted communication is necessary even for psychoanalysis at the individual level - a point he had neglected when writing KHI (See "Postscript to KHI", p.184).

In LC Habermas uses the terms "systems integration" and "social integration"; it reveals his influence by systems theory. These terms roughly correspond to instrumental action and communicative action respectively, although Habermas does not clarify the relationship. See pp.1-8.
Like Habermas, Gadamer is involved in the problems of knowledge and action, science and technology as well as social development. In fact the two share a somewhat similar intellectual heritage. No less than Habermas, Gadamer is profoundly indebted to the Hegelian concept of self-formation. This concept can be considered the backbone of both critical theory and hermeneutics; it is their bulwark against any argument for objective knowledge and technological control of society. However, few Hegel scholars today would defend the notion of the Absolute nor the cosmic principle according to which Reason operates; Habermas and Gadamer are no exceptions.

In regard to their stances toward positivism and philosophy of science, one can readily tell the two thinkers are on the same side of the fence. They even hold similar views on the role of philosophy in contemporary society. For Habermas, philosophy is to perform the critique of ideology:

Philosophy is preserved in science as critique. A social theory that puts forth the claim to be a self-reflection of the history of the species cannot simply negate philosophy. Rather, the heritage of philosophy issues in the critique of ideology, a mode of thought that determines the method of scientific analysis itself. Outside of critique,
For Gadamer, philosophy is a universal agent for awakening of consciousness:

The task of making consciousness aware of extant differences between peoples and nations assumes a priority in a world where [rational] planning and progress seem to guarantee the satisfaction of all desires. Such a awakening of consciousness, however, is now hardly ever performed by science. It is more readily a result of a critique of science . . . . To awaken a consciousness of what is, necessarily supposes the awakening of consciousness as to what science is. But it equally includes preserving the openness of one's own consciousness, and to be cognizant of the fact that not everything is, is or could become the object of science.

Both thinkers are gravely concerned with the trend of increasing technocratic manipulation of society and they challenge that way of thinking at its foundations.

Dilthey is no doubt a major precursor of both Gadamer and Habermas. Habermas applauds "Gadamer's first-rate critique of the objectivistic self-understanding of the human sciences" which is represented by Dilthey. In fact, it was Gadamer's penetrating critique of Dilthey that stimulated Habermas' interest in hermeneutics, which permitted the latter to venture in a direction untrodden by his predecessors in the critical theory tradition. Although both Gadamer and Habermas have transcended Dilthey's objectivism, these two current thinkers can hardly deny Dilthey's distinction between natural and human sciences and his concept of the process of understanding are indispensable to their theoretical backgrounds. With this distinction between natural and human sciences in mind, Habermas and Gadamer are able to criticize technocracy without
obliterating the contributions of modern science and technology. For them, the answer to today's societal problems is not to be found in the romantic image of a pre-industrial era. The study of utilization of science and technology for social development falls into the realm of human sciences. Besides, there is philosophy, which serves as critique of science and technology, and of society in general.

Unlike Habermas, Gadamer displays little influence from Marx; he hardly pays any attention to Peirce and seriously doubts the validity of a social theory based on the psychoanalytic model. Instead, Gadamer has inherited the phenomenological tradition of Husserl and Heidegger. Having studied under Heidegger in the 1920s, Gadamer extends his teacher's analysis of the fundamental conditions of human existence to the societal level, with the help of Hegelian philosophy.

In Truth and Method Gadamer examines the evolvement of modern hermeneutics and lays out much of the foundation of current hermeneutical thinking. Since we intend to contrast the theory of Habermas with that of Gadamer, it is reasonable that we start with the latter's relationship to Dilthey.

It was mentioned earlier that Gadamer endeavors to go beyond Dilthey. But Gadamer does not seek to improve Dilthey's methodology of human sciences: instead, he investigates the fundamental conditions of possible human understanding. In Gadamer's own words:

The hermeneutics developed here is not, therefore, a methodology of human sciences, but an attempt to
understand what the human sciences truly are, beyond their methodological self-consciousness, and what connects them with the totality of our experience of world ....... It is not my intention to make prescriptions for sciences or the conduct of life, but to try to correct false thinking about what they are.8

Hence Gadamer's work cannot be seen as a direct continuation of Dilthey's effort. One was occupied with methodology whereas the other explores what methodology - any methodology - has taken for granted. This shifting of direction in hermeneutics takes place when Gadamer incorporates Heidegger's insights.

Fore-structure of Understanding in Heidegger

In Being and Time Heidegger (1889-1976) observes that human knowledge has been compartmentalized into many subject areas, the systematic investigation in each of which is scientific research. But all basic concepts in each area of research has already been shaped by prescientific knowledge which represents aspects of human existence, Heidegger points out, so that true progress in research should involve "inquiring into the ways in which each particular area is basically constituted", rather than just "an increase in information".9 Heidegger considers Kant's quest for a priori knowledge to be a step in this direction. Nevertheless, as long as the inquiry does not take into account the meaning of human existence in general, Heidegger claims it remains "naive and opaque".10 His reasoning goes as follows.

A basic characteristic of human existence is that each individual exists in a world. By "world" here Heidegger does not
mean the physical or objective world. Rather, he refers to something like a personal world: it is the totality of meaning relations an individual has with entities around himself or herself. He illustrates the concept of the world with the example of equipment. As an individual grows up and becomes acquainted with the environment, he or she learns about pieces of equipment: what they are for and how they are used. The meaning of the equipment to the individual is embedded in its "serviceability, conduciveness, usability, manipulability", etc. The equipment by itself (i.e. without people) is meaningless. This is why a world is neither objective nor subjective.

Due to the fact that an individual exists in a world, he or she is always already acquainted with surrounding entities (including himself or herself and other humans) in the sense of having some kind of attitude toward them: "having to do with something, producing something, giving something up and letting it go, undertaking, accomplishing, evincing, interrogating, considering, discussing, determining ...." These attitudes or concerns are always operative, whether the individual involved is aware of them. They precede any knowledge, scientific or otherwise. According to Heidegger, if there is such a thing as knowing at all, "it belongs solely to those entities which know." These entities he refers to are humans. Hence "knowing is grounded beforehand" in the everyday mode of human existence. The a priori knowledge Kant searched for is not the most fundamental. For in knowing, one simply adopts a new attitude toward the world one has already discovered. To
this extent, Heidegger maintains that an analysis of the structures of human existence— or existential structures—is in order. He calls the outcome of such an analysis "fundamental ontology".\(^{17}\)

According to Heidegger's analysis, one of the key existential structures is "understanding".\(^{18}\) This notion of understanding, unlike that of Dilthey, does not refer to any methodology. Rather, this understanding is a basic characteristic of human existence, regardless of what methodology is employed in the pursuit of knowledge. The difference between the two notions of understanding is crucial since it underlies Gadamer's "ontological turn" from Dilthey.

For Heidegger, interpretation is the explicit form of understanding.\(^{19}\) An interpretation of an entity is always governed by three basic conditions: some comprehension of the totality of involvement in which the entity is embedded ("fore-having"), the initial step that the entity is approached ("fore-sight"), and an anticipation that determines the way the entity is conceived ("fore-conception"). These three basic conditions constitute what is known as the fore-structure of understanding. Thus "an interpretation is never a presuppositionless apprehending of something presented to us".\(^{20}\) These presuppositions depend on how the person involved perceives the object of understanding in the context of other entities in the world. Heidegger terms the totality of these presuppositions the "hermeneutical situation".\(^{21}\) Put simply, "all interpretation, which is supposed to generate understanding or knowledge, must
itself be based on prior understanding of what is to be known through interpretation". Since Dilthey's hermeneutical method does not take into account the existential structure of understanding, Heidegger relegates it to a derivative status. Gadamer accepts Heidegger's brief comment on Dilthey; he develops it into a critique of scientific method in general.

The Heideggerian View of Time and History

Heidegger argues that the most fundamental basis of existential structures is temporality, so that the analysis of human existence must be grounded in the concept of time. For him, "time" is more than the ordinary notion of an objective measure of durations in which sequences of events take place, more than what one reads from a clock or a calendar. When directly encountered, "time" is the way an individual perceives his or her future, past and present integrated into a meaningful whole. It is reflected in the individual's attitude toward entities in the world. Although there is a general agreement about the measurement of time - as in the use of a clock or a calendar - individuals relate to time differently. Even for the same individual, Heidegger points out, certain time may be seen to be more precious than others. Hence time is neither objective nor subjective.

There are different possibilities in temporality. But they all conform to the principle of what Heidegger calls "the priority of the future". One thinks and acts in anticipation of the future. It is this anticipation that shapes the
individual's perception of the past and the present as well as the world in this context. The significance of the future in temporality varies with cases. In many cases, individuals are concerned mainly with the immediate or the immediate future. Occassionally they think in the scale of their lifetime and make decision on that basis. This fundamental relationship between future, past and present, according to Heidegger, is the temporal constitution of human existence.

Heidegger links individual existence to the concept of history. First of all, he recognizes that an individual does not exist alone in the world: there are other humans around. As one grows up, one gradually establishes one's world, directly and indirectly, with the help of others. For instance, one learns form others how pieces of equipment are used. We have mentioned that the world is not subjective. Heidegger now clarifies that "the world is always the one that I share with Others". When one thinks or acts, even in solitude, one has already presupposed the existence of others. For one encounters others simply through interactions within one's world; as Heidegger puts it, "Others are encountered environmentally". This social nature of humans is considered a basic characteristic of human existence.

Although individuals can make their choices and act in various ways, they do not have complete freedom. In addition to the finitude of individual existence one has to face and the existential structures one cannot transcend, Heidegger points out, one is governed by the "destiny" of one's community or
people. Destiny does not result from the doing of any single individual; it is also beyond the control of any particular person. Besides being shaped by collective deeds of a people in the past, destiny is the outcome of the shared way in which a people grasps the relationship between future, past and present. Hence destiny is human reality due to the fact that human existence is socially and temporally constituted. It guides "in advance" what an individual would encounter. In order to alter destiny, collective action is required: "only in communicating and in struggling does the power of destiny become free". As in the case of individual existence, Heidegger sees history in terms of temporality. Only when one anticipates one's future, he indicates, would one be able to act in order to realize what is historically possible.

With this concept of history, Heidegger established a certain link between individual and society. Yet he did not systematically or explicitly explore the relationship between these two, in the sense of what Hegel had done before him. There is a lack of consensus among scholars on whether Heidegger's writings properly address societal issues. Nevertheless, Being and Time is suggestive in this respect. Gadamer extracts some central ideas from it and formally extends these ideas to the analysis of society.
Prejudgments

Gadamer is convinced that Heidegger's analysis of existential structures is an immensely valuable tool for his own study on the hermeneutics of cultural tradition. With Gadamer, the context of the problem of understanding is broadened to the societal level. Human understanding, as Gadamer perceives it, is grounded in cultural tradition. In other words, conditions of understanding, which define possibilities and limitations, are handed down through the ages. These conditions constitute what Gadamer calls prejudgments - a concept derived from the concept of fore-structure of understanding.

Heidegger has explained that understanding is never free from presuppositions and that history is possible due to the temporal constitution of human existence, Gadamer goes on to show how presuppositions develop historically in society as a result of the self-formative process. In Heidegger's conception, the world is not subjective; it is something an individual shares with others. Gadamer elaborates on and stresses the intersubjective nature of human understanding when he introduces the concept of prejudgment. For him, this intersubjectivity is the product of cultural tradition, which essentially shapes the way an individual understands. While Heidegger focusses on the individual, Gadamer shifts the emphasis to society.

The concept of prejudgment can perhaps be clarified in terms of Gadamer's analysis of the Enlightenment and Romanticism, two intellectual movements in the 18th and 19th centuries. The Enlightenment elevates reason to supremacy: "it
is not tradition, but reason that constitutes the ultimate source of all authority". On the other hand, Romanticism, a reaction against the Enlightenment, blindly adheres to tradition without regard to reason; "it shares the presupposition of the Enlightenment and only reverses the evaluation of it, seeking to establish the validity of what is old, simply because it is old". What these two movements fail to recognize, Gadamer reveals, is that tradition and reason are not diametrically opposed. He argues in the following manner. "Tradition does not persist by nature"; it has to be "affirmed, embraced, cultivated" through "an act of reason, though an inconspicuous one". Conversely, "reason exists for us only in concrete, historical terms, i.e. it is not its own master, but remains constantly dependent on the given circumstances in which it operates". To the extent both the Enlightenment and Romanticism refuse to acknowledge their prejudgments they succumb to illusions. For Gadamer, "true prejudgments must still finally be justified by rational knowledge, even though the task may never be able to be fully completed".

Essentially Gadamer maintains that prejudgments are inherent in tradition: they are omnipresent. Prejudgments can never be eliminated, although they can be modified in accordance with reason, which always stands within tradition. The significance of the concept of prejudgment to hermeneutics is well expressed in the following famous passage:

In fact history does not belong to us, but we belong to it. Long before we understand ourselves through the process of self-examination, we understand ourselves in a self-evident way in the family,
society and state in which we live. The focus of subjectivity is a distorting mirror. The self-awareness of the individual is only a flickering in the closed circuits of historical life. That is why prejudgments of the individual, far more than his judgments, constitute the historical reality of his being.  

Analogous to Heidegger's existential structures, prejudgments are cast in ontological terms: they are part of the irreducible reality of human existence.  

While Gadamer does not elaborate on it, we realize that the concept of prejudgment can be seen at two levels: the societal and the individual. For Gadamer intends to build on Heidegger's existential thinking rather than replacing it. At the societal level, prejudgments constitute an aspect of contemporary culture, as we have just discussed. As such, prejudgments are relatively homogeneous among people sharing the same culture, and perhaps even more so among those sharing the same sub-culture. But prejudgments are also differentiated on an individual basis, as Heidegger's inquiry into the fore-structure of understanding suggests. Due to a diversity of individual experiences and the unique situations each individual confronts, the culturally determined component of prejudgments is refined at the individual level. Thus the prejudgments of no two individuals are exactly alike, although they inevitably share many common features if the individuals belong to the same culture. Nevertheless, Gadamer's writings are mainly concerned with the common features inherited from tradition. He probably thinks Heidegger has sufficiently covered the individual level.  

In order to explain the dynamics involved in the
transformation of prejudgments, Gadamer utilizes the concept of horizon, which is "the range of vision that includes everything that can be seen from a vantage point". He implies that the vantage point one takes is shaped by one's cultural background and individual experiences and are influenced by the current situation. Now Gadamer claims that a horizon is not a rigid frontier:

The historical movement of human life consists in the fact that it is never utterly bound to any one standpoint, and hence can never have a truly closed horizon. The horizon is, rather, something into which we move and that moves with us. Horizons change for a person who is moving.

Gadamer goes on to claim that the movement of a horizon is connected to an awareness of one's prejudgments: "the horizon of the present is being continually formed, in that we have continually to test all our prejudgments". These claims are not obvious, unless we relate them to Hegel's analysis of how consciousness develops.

**Hegel's Dialectic of Consciousness**

According to Hegel, consciousness distinguishes itself from independent entities, and knowledge is what relates consciousness to these entities. But human consciousness is not merely knowledge of entities, for one is conscious of the truth of knowledge as well. Hence consciousness can be seen in its two capacities:

consciousness is, on the one hand, consciousness of the object, and on the other hand, consciousness of itself; consciousness of what for it is the True, and consciousness of its knowledge of the truth.
Hegel illustrates the progression of consciousness with the method of inquiry. Whatever the goal of consciousness is, an inquiry cannot take place without some presupposition which can serve as its underlying criterion. For an examination consists in applying an accepted standard, and in determining whether something is right or wrong on the basis of the agreement or disagreement of the thing examined.\(^5\)

Put differently, Hegel indicates that in any inquiry, a goal has to be operationalized in terms of some implicit criterion—a criterion embodied in social practice. Consciousness, in its first capacity, compares an entity with the criterion. If the criterion is met and consciousness in its second capacity judges that the goal is still not reached, then there is a "contradiction". It follows that the criterion is inadequate. Since the criterion is posited by consciousness itself, not by an external entity, "the investigation becomes a comparison of consciousness with itself".\(^6\) A contradiction alerts consciousness to its own incompleteness. This situation "brings about a state of despair",\(^7\) for consciousness realizes there are obstacles on the path toward its goal: consciousness must struggle to overcome the contradiction. For Hegel, the removal of contradiction has a determinate outcome: "a new form has thereby immediately arisen".\(^8\) The inadequate criterion is replaced by a more adequate one, the entity assumes an appearance that manifests itself more fully, and knowledge of the entity becomes more accurate.\(^9\) But these changes are none other than the development of consciousness itself. Contradiction thus results in the attainment of a higher level
of consciousness. The process repeats itself as long as a contradiction occurs, with each step depending on the outcome of the previous one. We have seen that, in Hegelian thinking, individuals can develop themselves only within the framework of society and society develops as a result of individual action. In other words, the development of individual consciousness always starts with the Spirit at that particular moment in history, and any individual achievement contributes to Spirit. Hence at the societal level there is a component of the developmental process parallel to the one at the individual level. That is the self-formative process of mankind. Hegel considers the process to be "the necessary progression and interconnection of the forms of the unreal consciousness" which "will by itself bring to pass the completion of the series".50

Fusion of Horizons

In the manner that Hegel speaks of testing the presupposed criterion, a process which results in a higher level of consciousness and an improved criterion, Gadamer speaks of testing prejudgments which leads to an expansion of horizon and modified prejudgments. If one encounters a situation which does not make sense according to existing prejudgments and yet the situation is an undeniable reality, then there is a contradiction in the Hegelian sense. In other words, "collision with other's horizons makes us aware of assumptions so deep-seated that they would otherwise remain unnoticed".51 This means the existing prejudgments can no longer be justified: they must
be transformed in such a way that the new horizon becomes broad enough to account for this situation. This transformation consists of the cancellation of inappropriate elements of existing prejudgments, confirmation of other elements, and incorporation of new elements so that the old prejudgments are transcended (the Hegelian concept of Aufhebung). "It is the untiring power of experience, that in the process of being instructed, man is ceaselessly forming a new preunderstanding". Unless one stubbornly closes one's mind to the challenge of new situations, existing prejudgments are susceptible to continuous alterations. It can be seen that the modification of prejudgments is not entirely automatic: it depends on one's willingness to open up one's mind.

Gadamer defines "situation" to be something representing "a standpoint that limits the possibility of vision". He explains:

The very idea of a situation means that we are not standing outside it and hence are unable to have any objective knowledge of it. We are always within the situation, and to throw light on it is a task that is never entirely completed.

In a hermeneutical situation one interprets a text. The interpreter is always governed by a limitation of vision. For Heidegger, a hermeneutical situation consists of all presuppositions involved in an interpretative process. Emphasizing presuppositions operating at the societal level, Gadamer defines a hermeneutical situation to be "the situation in which we find ourselves with regard to the tradition that we try to understand". The text to be interpreted always represents an aspect of tradition and hence must be seen in that
context. Reflection on presuppositions is necessary if true understanding of a text is desired. But it is a process that never comes to an end: presuppositions can only be changed, not eradicated.

What reflection leads to is an expansion of horizon. Certainly, the formation of an expanded horizon is not simply a quantitative change. With a new horizon, the situation is seen in a new light. In a hermeneutical situation, what is to be understood always represents another horizon, be it the horizon of a writer, a conversation partner, a culture or a historical past. For the text to be interpreted - writing, speech, life-world, etc. - is never isolated from the cultural tradition to which the writer, speaker or actor belongs. And the writer, speaker or actor is confined to his or her particular horizon which is largely determined by cultural tradition. Hence in the process of understanding one extends one's horizon to encompass the relevant portion of the other party's horizon. This is what Gadamer calls a "fusion of horizons". He elaborates on the concept:

This placing of ourselves is not the empathy of one individual for another, nor is it the application to another person of our own criteria, but it always involves the attainment of a higher universality that overcomes, not only our own particularity, but also that of the other ...... One learns to look beyond what is close at hand - not in order to look away from it, but to see it better within a larger whole and in truer proportion.

One can readily tell the concept of fusion of horizons is derived from Hegel's analysis of how consciousness develops.

As with Heidegger, Gadamer does not consider an act of
understanding to be an acquisition of something entirely new. It is rather the adoption of a new attitude toward the world one is already acquainted with. Thus a fusion of horizons, with the corresponding transformation of prejudgments, is the mechanism by which a new attitude is adopted. This is what Gadamer means by "all understanding is ultimately a self-understanding".

**Historical Dimension of Hermeneutics**

We have seen that understanding depends on prejudgments, which are products of self-formation, at both the societal and individual levels. But individual acts of understanding also contribute to the self-formative process of mankind, so that these acts are consequential at the societal level:

> In a tradition this process of fusion is continually going on, for there old and new continually grow together to make something of living value, without either being explicitly distinguished from the other.

Gadamer's concept of self-formation owes so much to Hegel that he declares: "Hegel has thought through the historical dimension in which the problem of hermeneutics is rooted."

Hegel observes that the individual human is a finite being, not only in terms of bio-physical existence - which is obviously true - but in terms of consciousness. This is why an individual must identify with Spirit, the historical subject that transcends individual finitude. So far Gadamer's thought runs in parallel to that of Hegel: the former's concept of tradition corresponds to the embodiment of Spirit. For Gadamer, the finite individual consciousness is an aspect of the ongoing cultural
tradition to which the individual belongs. While the Hegelian Spirit manifests the cosmic order - a "necessity", tradition serves no purpose outside itself. But Hegel goes further: the progression of consciousness of Spirit eventually reaches an absolute level; "this last shape of Spirit" is "absolute knowing" or "comprehensive knowing". Here Gadamer truly parts company with Hegel.

Learning from Nietzsche (1844-1900), Gadamer elucidates the finitude of individual consciousness with the concept of memory:

Forgetting belongs within the context of remembering and recalling ..... Forgetting ... is a condition of the life of mind. Only by forgetting does the mind have a chance of total renewal, the capacity to see everything with fresh eyes, so that what is long familiar combines with the new into a many levelled unity.

Nietzsche's notion of memory at the societal level is captured by eminent Nietzsche scholar Walter Kaufmann:

A people with absolutely no memory of their past would be unable to abide by a proven way of life, and to keep the law; a culture with no tradition, with no memory of past techniques or customs, would be similarly incapacitated. On the other hand, a people or culture without the ability to forget would be unable to make decisions, to act, and to be creative.

Hegel saw only one side of the coin; Nietzsche saw both. This is the insight Gadamer incorporates into hermeneutics:

Remembering, forgetting, and recalling belong to the historical constitution of man and are themselves part of his history and his self-formation.

Hence for Gadamer history is not oriented toward any ultimate goal and the self-formative process never comes to a halt. By the same token, prejudgments always exist, although they are continuously being transformed to adapt to changing societal and
individual conditions.

Notion of Application

Although Gadamer's analysis centers on the problem of human understanding, it should be clear that he is concerned with both knowledge and action. For he links interpretation to application and treats them as different aspects of the hermeneutical phenomenon.

How one interprets a text depends on the intended application of this interpretation, whether one is conscious of this intention or not: one does not interpret something free from its implications and then apply it to a concrete situation. The idea that an interpretation is shaped by its perceived implications can be seen as an extension of Heideggerian concepts. According to the concept of fore-structure of understanding, when one understands an entity one perceives it in the context of the totality of involvement. The implications of an interpretation are no doubt part of this involvement as well: they are presuppositions in the interpretative process. According to the concept of time, if one interprets an entity in anticipation of the future, then one sees something "in advance" as an integral component of the totality. Naturally applications of an interpretation are expected to become part of the future. Hence a consideration of the possible outcomes of an interpretation affects the interpretation itself.

On the other hand, any application of cultural elements
such as norms, ideals, laws and scriptures to daily life has already embodied an interpretation of these cultural elements. To the extent a person feels an action is appropriate or inappropriate, right or wrong, good or bad, the person has already implicitly interpreted what is appropriate, right or good. At the fundamental level, Gadamer points out, judgment "cannot be taught in general, but only practiced from case to case ... because no demonstration from concepts is able to guide the application of rules". Setting up rules to guide application of rules inevitably leads to an infinite regress. Ultimately a judgment rests on something that is presupposed in everyday practice, something that escapes theorizing. Thus an interpretation is often expressed not in words, but in action itself.

We have seen that Heidegger considers interpretation to be the explicit form of understanding. This Gadamer agrees. He further points out that "understanding is always an interpretation", although it may sometimes be an implicit form of interpretation. An implicit interpretation often manifests itself in action, which essentially is application of the interpretation. Hence to the two integral components of a hermeneutical act that Heidegger mentions - understanding and interpretation - Gadamer adds a third one: application. For him, understanding, interpretation and application are three components fused together in any single hermeneutical act: they comprise "one unified process".

It is worth noting that one of the admirers of this aspect
of Gadamer is Habermas, who brings out the former's idea lucidly:

I find Gadamer's real achievement in the demonstration that hermeneutical understanding is linked with transcendental necessity to the articulation of an action-orienting self-understanding. The immanent connection of understanding and application can be seen in the examples of theology and jurisprudence. Both the interpretation of the Bible in preaching and the interpretation of positive law in adjudication serve simultaneously as guideposts of how to apply the evidence in a given situation. The practical life-relation to the self-understanding of the clients is not simply a subsequent corollary to the interpretation. Rather, the interpretation is realized in the application itself.\(^7\)

Based on his analyses of legal and theological hermeneutics, Gadamer extends this principle to all aspects of life. He observes that, in every single moment of life, one implicitly or explicitly interprets the situation one confronts and takes action in accordance with this interpretation. Since no interpretation is free from prejudgments, neither is any action. Thus at the societal level, history proceeds in a direction that is shaped by human interpretations of their world, which in turn is grounded in tradition. Recognizing the power of interpretation, Gadamer claims that hermeneutics involves "the mode of the whole human experience of the world":\(^7\) the hermeneutical phenomenon is universal.
Critique of Scientific Method

Much of the groundwork for Gadamer's critique of scientific method has been laid out by Heidegger. Together with his own concepts such as prejudgment, fusion of horizons and application, Gadamer is able to carry out a critical analysis of scientific method. One of his major target of attack in Truth and Method is Dilthey.

In Dilthey's methodology of human sciences, interpretation of a text is based on the assumption of a meaningful part-whole relation inherent in the text. The relation is to be explored through imagined participation in the kind of life implicated in the text. With successive movements between the whole and the parts, the entire text would eventually be fully understood in an objective manner. In other words, the hermeneutical circle is dissolved. Gadamer seizes the weaknesses in Dilthey's thinking by pointing out two related problems. First, Dilthey is not serious about the notion of finitude of human consciousness. He naively believes that understanding, in the form of transposition, re-creation and re-experiencing, can overcome the finitude:

He sees one's own world of experience as the mere starting point for an expansion that, in a living transposition, fills out the narrowness and fortuitousness of one's own experience by the infinity of what is available in the re-experiencing of the historical world ....... At any rate, it is clear that Dilthey did not regard the fact that finite historical man was tied to a particular time and place as any fundamental impairment of the possibility of knowledge in the human sciences. 75

Consequently Gadamer indicates that Dilthey falls into the illusion that potential understanding is beyond any limitation.
Second, Dilthey thinks the starting point of any inquiry is immaterial to the final outcome:

He declares that only sympathy makes true understanding possible .... Dilthey speaks about universal sympathy ... which fundamentally transcends the barriers that the subjective accident of preference and affinity for an object has set to understand.  

Instead Gadamer shows that the starting point - the way one experiences the world - is always shaped by one's prejudgments. This is not a barrier that can be transcended by any scientific method, as Dilthey believes. For "it is the aim of science to objectify experience that it no longer contains any historical element". Scientific method is "concerned to guarantee ... that these basic experiences can be repeated by anyone". Hence a complete reliance on science can never do justice to the concept of prejudgment.

For Gadamer, understanding is a fusion of horizons, which is not the same as empathy or sympathy. He argues that understanding a text is analogous to understanding one's conversation partner in a dialogue:

Just as in a conversation, when we have discovered the standpoint and horizon of the other person, his ideas become intelligible, without our necessarily having to agree with him, the person who thinks historically comes to understand the meaning of what has been handed down, without necessarily agreeing with it, or seeing himself in it.  

In order to properly understand a conversation partner one must respect the partner's ideas as he or she presents it. This is the only way to learn about the other's point of view. In the same manner, when interpreting a text, the interpreter must pay attention to what the text has to say to him or her, rather than
simply extracting information from it or pretending the interpreter can transpose himself or herself into the text. Gadamer warns one against an "overhasty assimilation" of the text "to our expectations of meaning". Only when one permits a text to "make its own meaning heard" would an adequate fusion of horizons take place. In this sense text interpretation has a dialogic character.

In regard to the hermeneutical circle, Gadamer claims that it "is not dissolved in perfect understanding but, on the contrary, is most fully realized". Hence even in perfect understanding one does not attain objective knowledge; rather, what is to be understood comes into the best light under the interpreter's culturally and historically conditioned subjectivity.

Gadamer further explicates what he calls the highest type of hermeneutical experience in terms of an I-Thou relationship:

In human relation the important thing is ... to experience the Thou truly as a Thou, i.e. not to overlook his claim and to listen to what he has to say to us. To this end, openness is necessary ....... Without this kind of openness to one another there is no genuine human relationship.

This, according to Gadamer, is the proper principle behind a conversation as well as a text interpretation. In Gadamer's opinion, Dilthey's notion of hermeneutical experience is of a lower type. For a claim to objective knowledge of other people is a denial of openness to what these people say:

One claims to express the other's claim and even to understand the other better than the other understands himself ....... The claim to understand the other person in advance performs the function of keeping the claim of the other person at a distance
...... It is like the relation between the I and the Thou. A person who reflects himself out of the mutuality of such a relation changes this relationship and destroys its moral bond. A person who reflects himself out of a living relationship to tradition destroys the true meaning of this tradition in exactly the same way.  

In one stroke Gadamer pronounces the limitation of Dilthey's methodology and elevates the concept of hermeneutical experience to a higher level of sophistication.

Gadamer's critique of methodology in human sciences applies equally to natural sciences:

The history of mathematics or of the natural sciences is also a part of the history of the human spirit and reflects its destiny.

The image of scientific objectivity has to be shattered, since what is known in any science "certainly also embraces the being of the scientist" who is above all a living creature and a human. Consequently "each science, as a science, has a field of its research set out in advance, and to have knowledge of this field is to have power over it". Hence in Gadamer's view even natural sciences have a hermeneutical foundation.

Although Gadamer does not mention the concept of application in this connection, one can see that each science, by the very fact it attempts to understand a sphere of the world, is conditioned by its intended application. This does not mean Gadamer identifies science with technology. In fact he has clarified his position that he does not. The intended application of science by scientists is a subtle one. While individual scientists may not think explicitly in terms of application, the method employed and the research topics chosen
are reflections of their prejudgments.\textsuperscript{90}

Gadamer's attitude should not be taken as his animosity toward science per se. In fact, the concept of prejudgment only reveals "the limitation of 'method', but not that of science":

> What the tool of method does not achieve must - and effectively can - be achieved by a discipline of questioning and research, a discipline that guarantees truth.\textsuperscript{91}

Here Gadamer refers to a need to recognize the truth of tradition and to take a critical attitude toward science. In other words, Gadamer maintains that the validity of science has to be judged critically and continuously with respect to its context in the cultural tradition. Each science represents only one sphere of knowledge, which has its foundation in everyday human existence. Thus the development of science must be consistent with the overall human spirit.

Like Dilthey, Gadamer perceives the basic differences between natural and human sciences.\textsuperscript{92} Yet the latter refuses to endorse any methodology's claim to objectivity. Rather than obliterating the distinction between these two major fields of study, Gadamer adds a new dimension to it - the notion that scientific, as well as non-scientific, knowledge is always embedded in cultural tradition.\textsuperscript{93}
Critique of Rational Planning

Gadamer's views on planning are well expressed in his paper "Notes on Planning for the Future" which, to a large extent, is a rebuttal of the idea that the world should be rationally and systematically regulated for the purpose of maintaining order. This critique of rational planning is best seen as an extension of Gadamer's critique of scientific objectivity. When scientists ignore that they are products of their cultural traditions and believe that they are free from prejudgments, the science they create "is concerned only with those methods and possibilities which are necessary for the scientific control of things". By science here Gadamer is probably referring to natural sciences and positivistic social sciences, which follow the natural science model. We recall what Dilthey observed as the characteristic of the natural science model: establish scientific laws and control the environment based on the knowledge of such laws. The adoption of this scientific attitude in social development is what Gadamer considers to be the foundation of rational planning: planning legitimized by the "notion of a scientifically certified rationality".

According to Gadamer, there is an intrinsic contradiction in the concept of rational planning: "the contradiction between timeless truth, which is sought after by science, and the temporal condition of those who utilize science." In a rational model, a course of action is chosen not simply because it is possible; it has to be feasible. Contrary to what rational planners implicitly presuppose, Gadamer points out, the criteria
for feasibility are by no means eternal truths; they are shaped by a temporal condition in the form of culture or sub-culture at a particular point of history:

For what is feasible is not simply what is possible or, within the realm of the possible, the purely advantageous. Moreover, every advantage and preference is weighed according to a definite standard which one posits, or which has already been established. It is the aggregate of what is socially admissible: the norms, evolved from ethical and political convictions and fortified by training and self-education, which determine this standard. Gadamer thus accuses supporters of the rational model for neglecting the crucial factors of cultural tradition and prejudgments which are always built into the planning process.

There is a second aspect of temporal condition: the concept of situation. How one interprets a situation certainly depends on one's cultural background, but it also depends on the individual's experience and present encounters. A situation is thus always governed by the individual's horizon. This creates a "tension between a formal knowledge available to everyone, as it is associated with the concept of a teachable science, and the knowledge of what is practical and good for oneself". The latter depends on a given situation; it is this kind of knowledge that the rational model fails to take into account.

Rebuking the rational model, Gadamer proposes the model of "piloting" or steering (Modell des Steuerns). The latter consists of two integral notions:

the maintenance of equilibrium, which oscillates in a precisely set amplitude, and guidance, that is, the selection of a direction which is possible within the oscillating equilibrium.

The first notion is a recognition that each society operates
under its own dynamics: social practices are the embodiment of the human spirit in that society. Such dynamics must be preserved if the human spirit is not to be destroyed: "only where the forces of equilibrium are maintained can the factors of human volition and desire be of any consequence." Obviously behind this is the Hegelian idea that people can develop themselves only within the general framework of society. Yet within this general framework there are different possible directions that the self-formative process of this society can take. Thus the second notion of piloting refers to the choosing of a course of action that enhances the human spirit rather than violating it. In other words, social development must be grounded in the cultural tradition of the people whose lives are to be affected by the development. For Gadamer, the model of piloting does not seek to introduce something foreign into the self-formative process; rather, it endeavors to correct the process when serious societal problems occur:

When the bounds are exceeded the balance is offset completely and, if at all possible, must be corrected by a new expenditure of effort. Consequently, the re-establishment of equipoise is nothing more than the reintroduction of an oscillating equilibrium.

By selecting a direction within the general societal framework, piloting restores the inherent societal dynamics. This, according to Gadamer, cannot be achieved in any centralized management or planning based on scientific objectivity.

Gadamer immediately declares the limitations of the model of piloting: "this model also cannot hide the kinds of assumptions - knowledge of goals and directions - which are
necessary for piloting."

Besides the issues of culture and situation, which Gadamer has inquired, there is still the issue of who carries out the task of piloting, in other words, the relationship between intellectuals and the general public. Gadamer mentions the need for self-understanding, which means the public's knowledge of goals and directions is essential. But in contemporary society, science and technology are so pervasive that their implications are not readily understood by everybody. In Gadamer's view this requires an awakening of consciousness, which is the task of philosophy. He discusses what this entails:

With justified anxiety one may ask what the awakening of consciousness to these problems, as long as they remain confined to small intellectual circles, is to accomplish ....... The problem of intellectuals is a problem in itself. But, what is mirrored in their understanding - their naive superiority notwithstanding - can become the conscious property of everyone.

There still remains the question of whether the intellectuals' understanding reflects the public's experiences and situations. This is a crucial point Gadamer has not clarified. The model of piloting he proposes leaves a number of important issues he has not seriously tackled.
NOTES

1 See e.g. Gadamer's own historical analysis of Bildung in TM, pp.10-9.
4 KHI, p.63.
6 "Review of TM", p.344.
7 For analyses of why Habermas was attracted to hermeneutics in order to carry on the mission of the Frankfurt School, see D.Misgeld, "Critical Theory and Hermeneutics: The Debate between Habermas and Gadamer", in On Critical Theory, John O'Neill (ed.), New York: Seabury Press, 1976; J.Mendelson, "The Habermas-Gadamer Debate", New German Critique, no.18, pp.44-73, 1979; and, Habermas, "Technology and Science as 'Ideology'", in TRS.
8 TM, p.xiii.
9 M.Heidegger, Being and Time, J.Macquarrie and E.Robinson (trans.), New York: Harper and Row, 1962, p.29. Hereafter it will be referred to as BT. In order to simplify the discussion here, we shall avoid much of Heidegger's complicated special vocabulary, especially terms like Dasein, Being, and many hyphenated expressions. We attempt to summarize some of Heidegger's basic ideas while keeping the number of technical terms to a minimum. The sole purpose here is to furnish some background for interpreting Gadamer, who does not adopt Heidegger's esoteric vocabulary.
10 Ibid., p.31.
11 Ibid., pp.91-5.
12 Ibid., pp.95-102.
13 Ibid., p.83.
14 Ibid., p.87.
15 Ibid., p.88.
16 Ibid., p.90.
17 Ibid., pp.33-4.
18 Ibid., p.182.
19 Ibid., pp.188-90.
20 Ibid., pp.191-2.
21 Ibid., p.275.
23 BT, p.450.
24 Ibid., p.277.
25 Ibid., p.471.
26 Ibid., p.378.
27 Ibid., pp.372-8. "Anticipation" is a term Heidegger reserves for the case of an individual considering possibilities and making a choice - a mode of existence he calls "authentic". He uses the term "awaiting" for the case of an individual not considering possibilities and simply following the popular trend or letting things be - a mode of existence he calls "inauthentic". Even in the case of inauthentic temporality, one still has the future in mind, albeit to a lesser degree.
28 Ibid., p.155.
29 Ibid.
30 In BT Heidegger does not use terms like "social" or "society". In order to analyze the fundamental structure of human relations he uses his own expressions such as "Being-with", "Being-with-Others", "Dasein-with" and "with-world".
31 Ibid., p.436.
32 Ibid., p.437.
33 E.g. D.C. Hoy and M. Blitz, in their respective ways, argue that BT has profound political implications. N. Rotenstreich, on the other hand, is not convinced that Heidegger's analysis demonstrates any insight concerning society. See Hoy, "History, Historicity, and Historiography in Being and Time", in Heidegger and Modern Philosophy, M. Murray (ed.), New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1978; Blitz, *Heidegger's Being and Time and the*
Prejudgment" is the translation of Vorurteil, which is often taken literally to be "prejudice". But Gadamer stresses that his use of the word does not carry the negative connotation of false or unfounded judgment, as prejudice does. By Vorurteil Gadamer refers to a "provisional decision", which "can have a positive and a negative value" (TM, p.240). In order to avoid this misunderstanding we follow the suggestion of D. Misgeld and render Vorurteil into prejudgment. See Misgeld, "On Gadamer’s Hermeneutics", Philosophy of the Social Sciences, vol.9, 1979, p.221n.

To illustrate Hegel’s way of thinking let us consider an example. A goal may be the "good life" and the criterion would be embodied in social practice probably as a certain kind of personal possession, social status, pleasure, etc. Such criterion usually cannot be made completely explicit; it defies precise description. If people have acquired the kind of possession, social status, pleasure, etc. that is supposed to be the essence of the "good life" and yet they do not feel they have really attained the "good life", then
the criterion must be inadequate. But the criterion is set by people, it can be changed by people. With an improved criterion, life would be experienced in a new and more fulfilling manner.

D.E. Linge, Editor's Introduction to Gadamer's *Philosophical Hermeneutics*, *op. cit.*, p.xxi.


Gadamer coins the term Wirkungsgeschichte, which is translated variously as effective-history, historical influence, history of effects, etc. Essentially it refers to the effect of prejudgments on any hermeneutical act and stresses that prejudgments are a product of history. He also coins the term wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein, which is translated variously as effective-historical consciousness, consciousness of historical influence, consciousness of the history of effects, consciousness that is authentically historical, etc. With this consciousness, prejudgments do not remain fixed. Yet this consciousness is finite and is also shaped by history. The ideas expressed in these two terms are similar to those we have discussed concerning prejudgments and transformation of prejudgments.


Nietzsche's critique of the historical attitude was directed mainly against German scholars of his own days. It also pointed to a certain undesirable "Hegelian" influence on those scholars, who placed an excessive emphasis on
detail historical research. In The Use and Abuse of History Nietzsche argues: while one must learn from the past, what is truly important is that one takes action to live in the present. In order not to be overly burdened with the past one must be able to forget aspects of the past. As Nietzsche puts it: "we would serve history only so far as it serves life" (trans. by A. Collins, Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1957).

66 TM, p.16.
67 Ibid., pp.274-8.
68 BT, p.364.
69 TM, pp.274-8.
70 Ibid., p.30.
71 Ibid., p.274.
72 Ibid., p.275.
73 "Review of TM", p.351.
74 PhH, p.15.
75 TM, pp.205-6.
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid., p.311.
78 Ibid.
79 Ibid., p.270.
80 Ibid., p.272.
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid., p.261.
83 Ibid., p.324.
84 Ibid., pp.322-4.
85 Ibid., p.251.
86 Ibid., p.410.
87 Ibid.
88 Thomas Kuhn's celebrated analysis on paradigm shift
demonstrates that even a "hard" science like physics is not independent of human interpretation of the natural world; the history of physics is part of human history. See Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolution, 2nd edition, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970. In a symposium Gadamer counts Kuhn as one of his allies: "When Thomas Kuhn published The Structure of Scientific Revolution, I was very pleased because it supported my view. The framework of theoretical assumptions which guide scientific investigation has a communicative side which in the final analysis is connected to language. That argument supports the universality of the hermeneutical approach" (Gadamer et al, Summation of "Hermeneutics and Social Science", Cultural Hermeneutics, vol.2, 1975, p.336.

89 Ibid., p.335-6.


91 TM, p.447.

92 Ibid., pp.251-3.


94 This paper was presented at the Conference on Conditions of World Order, 1965, and published in English in 1966 as "Notes on Planning for the Future", op.cit. A revised German version appeared in 1967. Among the conferees, natural scientists and economists (such as Conrad Waddington and Jan Tinbergen) tended to favor rational international planning for world order; other social scientists (such as Raymond Aron and Henry Kissinger) were generally skeptical of this idea. Gadamer was most steadfastly against any systematic rational administration of the world. Although Gadamer's paper is mainly about planning at the global level, many of the arguments are also applicable to the national and sub-national levels. In Gadamer's paper, the term "planning" refers to rational planning. Gadamer's preferred approach to social development is "piloting". In conformance with our terminology we shall include this approach as planning.

95 Ibid., p.576.
106 In this paper Gadamer uses concepts in physics (equilibrium, oscillation, amplitude) and biology (self-corrective systems of living organism) rather than a concept like human spirit. This is understandable since the paper aimed at natural and social scientists who probably were unfamiliar with the humanist tradition. It is clear what Gadamer has in mind is the concept of Bildung, which cannot be adequately explained in physical or biological terms. This is why we interpret this paper in the context of Gadamer's other writings.

107 In the later German version Gadamer deleted his brief remark on the role of intellectuals. He does not discuss this issue elsewhere. Apparently this is something he has not properly thought out.
The Basic Difference between Habermas and Gadamer

In the preceding chapters we have witnessed two variations of a theme by Hegel. For Habermas, the driving forces behind self-formation are instrumental action and communicative action. In instrumental action people control nature whereas in communicative action people interpret the socio-historically constituted life-world. According to Habermas, a critique of ideology - based on the model of psychoanalysis and later the advocacy model - is requisite to correct the self-formative process when it has become deviant. For Gadamer, self-formation is continuous interpretation and application of cultural tradition, a process which gives rise to the current life-world. Even technical control of nature is embedded in tradition: what is controlled and how it is controlled are governed by society's appropriation of tradition. Gadamer indicates that tradition should not be blindly followed: reason must be employed to decide whether aspects of tradition are to be preserved or to be changed. Nevertheless, reason itself is embedded in tradition, as Gadamer points out: what makes sense and what does not cannot be determined outside of the context of tradition. This is why
Gadamer claims the universality of hermeneutics in the self-formative process of mankind whereas Habermas only takes hermeneutics to be one component of the process. In fact this difference in the concept of self-formation lurks behind all central issues of the Habermas-Gadamer debate.

**Limits of Prejudgments and Self-reflection**

While Habermas relates knowledge and action to the concept of interest, Gadamer relates them to the concept of prejudgment. There are similarities between these two concepts, but they are not the same. For Habermas, technical and practical cognitive interests govern instrumental and communicative actions; they also constitute the bases of natural and human sciences. Similarly for Gadamer prejudgments shape all knowledge and action. So far there is no major quarrel between the two thinkers. However, according to Habermas, there is a third cognitive interest. When society has become deviant in the self-formative process, critical self-reflection is required to bring society back to its normal path – an act of emancipation. The cognitive interest behind this is the interest in emancipation. If we follow Gadamer's line of thinking we see that, since ideas are embodied in social practices, in a deviated society social practices as well as thoughts are deviated. Any critical self-reflection that claims to transcend the deviated society must detach itself from the cultural background from which it arises. The possibility of such detachment is precisely denied by the concept of prejudgment. Gadamer clarifies his position, probably
having Habermas in mind but without mentioning the latter by name:

A critical consciousness that points to all sorts of prejudgment and dependency, but one that considers itself absolutely free of prejudgment and independent, necessarily remains ensnared in illusions. For it is itself motivated in the first place by that of which it is critical. Its dependency on that which it destroys is inescapable.¹

Thus Gadamer argues: no matter how critical one claims one's self-reflection is, it first of all belongs to the person's cultural tradition. This is a position Habermas cannot accept. He insists that "a structure of preunderstanding or prejudgment that has been rendered transparent can no longer function as a prejudgment".² But Gadamer wonders how prejudgments can become transparent in the first place. He reminds Habermas that any self-reflection is finite, while tradition is an infinite source that cannot be exhausted in a reflective process. Tradition manifests itself in everyday social practices of the past, present and future; reflection brings "something - but not every thing" to consciousness. This is what Gadamer means when he says that reflection on tradition is "inescapably more being than consciousness, and being is never fully manifest".³

Following Hegelian thinking, both Habermas and Gadamer consider various appearances or phenomena to be elements of the whole truth: "essence is not supposed to stay persistently behind or beyond appearance."⁴ Hence what appears to everybody in daily life is not something false but a partial truth. For Habermas, ideology is a societal misinterpretation of partial truth as the whole truth; it is the outcome of systematically
distorted communication in society. The solution, according to
him, is a correction of such distortion through a critical
science. For Gadamer, partial truth arises from the narrowness
of horizon. The remedy, then, is to promote understanding, or
the fusion of horizons. With an expansion of horizon things
would be seen in a broader context, or parts in a truer
proportion in relation to the totality, although the whole truth
is unattainable by any human being. Since knowledge of the truth
is always partial, in Gadamer's view, there does not exist a
vantage point from which communication can be judged
systematically distorted.

In response to a number of critics - and indirectly to
Gadamer - Habermas admits that his concept of critique of
ideology in Knowledge and Human Interests is inadequate. He thus
introduces reconstructive sciences to provide a normative basis
for his critique of ideology, as he clarifies in his
Introduction to Theory and Practice and "Postscript to KHI". But
this revised model also runs into difficulty - a point we shall
elaborate on in later sections.

Question of Language

Language occupies a special position in the theories of
both Gadamer and Habermas. As we have seen, Gadamer considers
all knowledge and action to be governed by people's
interpretation of their tradition. He further argues that,
within any tradition, language is of prime significance: "it is
the nature of tradition to exist in the medium of language, so
that the preferred object of interpretation is a linguistic one".\(^5\) This does not mean that language determines "all the material being of life-practice. It only suggests that there is no societal reality, with all its concrete forces, that does not bring itself to representation in a consciousness that is linguistically articulated."\(^6\) For this reason Gadamer maintains that the power of language is universal. In other words, language underlies all aspects of human life; it is the unconscious force behind the self-formative force. One interpreter of Gadamer puts it nicely:

\begin{quote}
Every historical situation elicits new attempts to render the world into language. Each makes its contribution to the tradition, but is itself inevitably charged with new unspoken possibilities that drive our thinking further and constitute the radical creativity of tradition.\(^7\)
\end{quote}

The role of language in the self-formative process in Gadamer's theory has been compared to the Hegelian Spirit.\(^8\)

Habermas has no doubt about the key role of language in self-formation; but he refuses to grant language the status of universality. With his model of communication, work and emancipation, Habermas indicates that Gadamer has neglected the two other dimensions:

\begin{quote}
Social actions can only be comprehended in an objective framework that is constituted conjointly by language, labor and domination.\(^9\)
\end{quote}

What disturbs Habermas most is Gadamer's encompassing conception of language, especially statements like the following:

\begin{quote}
A fundamental conversation is never one that we want to conduct ...... The people conversing are far less the leaders of it than the led. No one knows what will "come out" in a conversation ....... A conversation has a spirit of its own, and ... the
language used in it bears its own truth within it, i.e. it reveals something which henceforth exists.\textsuperscript{10}

Language always forestalls any objection to its jurisdiction. Its universality keeps pace with the universality of reason ...... Language is the language of reason itself.\textsuperscript{11}

From childhood on people learn about their world through the medium of language. To this extent language is by no means simply a tool people utilize to express themselves. For people cannot conceptualize the world other than the way that it is built into that particular language: they are "possessed by" the language.\textsuperscript{12}

In Habermas' opinion, this conception of language seriously undermines the possibility of emancipation through self-reflection. He accuses Gadamer of not looking beyond what is already embodied in language:

Language becomes a contingent absolute ...... This power becomes objective in the historical transformation of horizons of possible experience.\textsuperscript{13}

The result is that Gadamer's hermeneutics "fails to recognize the transcending power of reflection that is also operative" in hermeneutical experience.\textsuperscript{14}

In addition to being a foundation of social processes and institutions, Habermas holds that "language is also a medium of domination and social power; it serves to legitimate relations of organized force"; hence "language is also ideological".\textsuperscript{15}

This "deception with language", according to Habermas, is something Gadamer does not realize.

Gadamer replies that Habermas takes the scope of hermeneutics too narrowly:
From the hermeneutical standpoint, rightly understood, it is absolutely absurd to regard the concrete factors of work and politics as outside the scope of hermeneutics.\textsuperscript{16}

Even the critique of ideology, according to Gadamer, "is in itself a linguistic act of reflection."\textsuperscript{17} Nevertheless Habermas maintains that there is "reason to assume that the background consensus of established traditions and of language-games may be a forced consensus which resulted from pseudo-communication";\textsuperscript{18} and hence a critique of established tradition cannot be carried out within the Gadamerian framework.

**Therapeutic Approach to Social Development**

Gadamer's direct attack on Habermas focuses on the latter's therapeutic approach to social development. At the individual level the psychoanalyst is first of all a member of society, which has certain norms. A patient is one who has deviated from social norms. The psychoanalyst thus attempts to bring the patient back to society: the former treats the latter in accordance with social norms. In other words, the psychoanalyst is a representative of society in the therapeutic process. When the psychoanalytic model is extended to the societal level, as Gadamer observes, the situation is altogether different. The social theorist \textit{qua} therapist believes that communication in society is systematically distorted. He or she regards the entire society as patient in order to correct this distortion. Here the theorist can no longer treat the patient (society) in accordance with social norms (which are considered to be distorted); he or she is no longer a representative of society.
This situation thus implies the theorist stands outside of society and is superior to society. According to Gadamer, this is where Habermas' psychoanalytic model breaks down at the societal level.\textsuperscript{19} Paraphrasing Gadamer, a critic writes:

Serious or irreconcilable conflicts between social and political groups are not simply the result of distorted communication, of a temporary disruption of mutual comprehension; rather, they are grounded "in the difference of concrete interests and the discrepancy of experiences". To assume a therapeutic posture in this context betrays a considerable measure of doctrinaire arrogance: the charge that opponents are mentally incompetent or deranged implies a "monopoly of mental rectitude" - a claim which can be viewed as "a special case of derangement".\textsuperscript{20}

In his indirect response to Gadamer, Habermas dissociates himself from Leninism - via a critique of Georg Lukács. He argues that critical theory is not a theory of party organization; it does not seek to implant consciousness into the heads of the masses, as Lenin advocates. Instead, the psychoanalytic model requires a theory worked out by theorists to be accepted by the masses before it is considered valid.\textsuperscript{21} Habermas' repudiation of Leninism does not spare him from Gadamer's accusation. Gadamer points out that the doctor-patient relation is unequal from the very beginning. If equal social partnership among everybody is to be attained, the psychoanalytic model poses severe problems.\textsuperscript{22} Habermas provides no satisfactory answer to this.
Rehabilitation of Authority

Habermas agrees with "the hermeneutical insight" that understanding "cannot simply leap over the interpreter's relationships to tradition". But in association with his concept of tradition, Gadamer introduces a provocative idea - the rehabilitation of authority. He argues that the essence of authority is not blind obedience:

The authority of persons is based ultimately, not on the subjection and abdication of reason, but on recognition and knowledge - knowledge, namely, that the other is superior to oneself in judgment and insight and that for this reason his judgment takes precedence, i.e. it has priority over one's own. This is connected with the fact that authority cannot actually be bestowed, but is acquired and must be acquired, if someone is to lay claim to it.

He cites the examples of teachers and experts as people representing authorities in their respective fields. Gadamer considers authority to be something transmitted from the past and is thus part of tradition; for him the respect for tradition includes the respect for authority. A call for rehabilitation of authority flies in the face of theorists who criticize power and domination in society. No wonder Habermas is inclined to place Gadamer in the conservative camp. Habermas starts with tradition but he has no desire to preserve it. On the contrary, he attempts to rid tradition of its dominative character.

Gadamer believes tradition and authority are not to be followed without the use of reason; but the way he consistently favors the respect for authority and preservation of tradition with little consideration for other alternatives - which can also be the outcome of reason - reveals his conservative bias.
This attitude is what Gadamer calls "traditionalism" - a major target of Habermas' criticism.

Gadamer replies to critics who "feel the lack of an ultimate radicality in the drawing of conclusions" from his analysis. He admits his emphasis on the past is one-sided. Nevertheless he defends his one-sidedness by claiming it has "the truth of a corrective" against the prevailing modern thinking which ignores the power of tradition.

Moving Beyond Habermas and Gadamer

Let us epitomize the debate as follows. Gadamer points out that there are limits to self-reflection. In his opinion, Habermas' notion of critical self-reflection exceeds such limits, and thus becomes an illusion. While Habermas would not claim that critical self-reflection is devoid of limits, he does not clarify what the limits are. Habermas accuses Gadamer of not adequately exploring various possibilities in the future direction of human development; in fact, the former argues that the latter's conception of language virtually excludes such possibilities.

Both Gadamer and Habermas have raised key philosophical issues concerning social development. Neither one should be ignored. Yet the two positions seem to be mutually exclusive: adoption of one position automatically implies the rejection of the other. So there cannot be a happy compromise, in the sense that the two positions are both correct, complementary to each other and to be given roughly equal weight. Eclecticism can be
achieved only at the cost of logical inconsistency. To the extent the two protagonists of the debate refuse to modify their respective stances, neither one is able to overcome the other's objections. It remains the task of other theorists to solve this impasse.

Commentators of the debate do not arrive at a unanimous conclusion. Those who side with either Habermas or Gadamer without seriously answering the objections of the other would contribute little to the further development of the debate or its resolution. The working out of a satisfactory theory of social development cannot afford to ignore the key issues raised.

**Analyses by Misgeld and Mendelson**

Gadamer's conservative facade does not discourage radical thinkers from taking him seriously; after all, Marx discovered the "rational kernel" within Hegel's "mystical shell". Several thinkers realize there is untapped potential in hermeneutics. One who has made some headway in developing such potential is Dieter Misgeld, a Toronto social theorist who has written a number of essays on the Habermas-Gadamer debate. Taking Gadamer as the point of departure and discardimg his traditionalism - the conservative aspect of his theory - Misgeld argues that an improved hermeneutics can answer Habermas' challenge. Gadamer's theory shows that, by virtue of one's individual and social existence, one's self-reflective power is necessarily limited. The hermeneutical theory of social development suggested by
Misgeld recognizes this unalterable reality, yet endeavors to maximize the development of human potential in the self-formative process whenever possible. In short, it seeks to "politically and existentially radicalize" Gadamer's hermeneutics.28

There is another attempt to resolve the impasse in the debate: a "truly hermeneutically-enlightened critical theory" proposed by Jack Mendelson.29 Mendelson is convinced that critical theory can become a more adequate social theory than hermeneutics, although he realizes that at the present stage of development critical theory encounters fundamental problems it must overcome. While Mendelson is cautious about Habermas' earlier model, his major concern is the latter's recent preoccupation with reconstructive sciences: a social theory based on anonymous rule systems is incompatible with the idea that knowledge and action are dependent upon one's experience of the life-world. Mendelson believes that Habermas has to pay more attention to hermeneutics in order to bridge this gap.

Thus Misgeld and Mendelson represent two opposite directions in approaching the Habermas-Gadamer debate. One starts from the position of Gadamer and attempts to improve it, partially with Habermas' ideas; the other starts from the position of Habermas and incorporates some of Gadamer's insights. The two directions do not converge; sometimes they share similar concerns, but address them in different manners.

In the rest of this chapter we shall examine the arguments of Misgeld and Mendelson in some detail. They do not cover all
issues raised by everyone interested in the debate. But we believe they bring to light the gist of what is involved.

Prejudgments and Self-reflection Reconsidered

As we noted earlier, Gadamer rejects Habermas' claim that prejudgments can become transparent. Mendelson comes to Habermas' rescue by re-interpreting the latter's position. According to Mendelson, prejudgments can be distinguished into two types: "those inevitable preunderstandings which derive simply from one's participation in culture, and those false preconceptions which are anchored in systematically distorted forms of communication." He maintains that critical theory attempts to dissolve the second type through self-reflection; he also conceded that bringing everything into consciousness is an impossible task. Mendelson thus implies that critical theory and hermeneutics are not incompatible; in fact, critical theory builds on hermeneutics and goes beyond it. Assuming that this is indeed Habermas' position, we still have to see if it is viable. One obvious difficulty is drawing the line between the two kinds of prejudgments: the "inevitable" and the "false". Like Gadamer, Misgeld doubts the possibility of drawing such a line by a theorist. For this would amount to setting up an objective ideal of what life ought to be, and "it is with regard to the possibility of formulating such a notion of an ideal form of life that hermeneutics will take its final critical stance over against critical theory".

Misgeld stresses that hermeneutics does not exclude
criticism of tradition; it does believe that a critical attitude valuable to social change necessarily emerges from cultural tradition.\textsuperscript{32} To this extent, valuable criticism is never isolated from the tradition from which emerges; it cannot be based on an objective ideal. No doubt Gadamer reveals his bias toward preservation of what is handed down from the past - a traditionalism that Misgeld refuses to endorse.\textsuperscript{33} But Misgeld also notes that Gadamer does not specify what traditional form or content is to be preserved. Gadamer does not defend any particular social, economic or political form simply because it is the existing one. This is not the position of a conservative, argues Misgeld.\textsuperscript{34} However, Gadamer pays little attention to exploration of various modes of life based on people's self-understanding; his emphasis is on preservation of tradition rather than realizing possible futures.

Heidegger points out that in the process of understanding one discovers one's possibilities.\textsuperscript{35} For Heidegger, choosing and realizing one's possibilities is an important characteristic of human existence. He makes a distinction between the case of an individual choosing to realize his or her possibilities ("authentic") and the case of an individual simply accepting the given ("inauthentic").\textsuperscript{36} There is no intrinsic incompatibility between the conditions governing the act of understanding (the fore-structures of understanding) and a choice among different modes of human existence based on understanding. By the same token, the weight of tradition should not prevent society from choosing its own destiny. Although Gadamer builds on Heidegger's
thought, he largely ignores the inquiry concerning possible futures. This does not make Gadamer's proposal "inauthentic", for he refuses to follow tradition blindly. Nevertheless, his preoccupation with the past leaves little room for creative ways to deal with new situations. This seems to be one reason that Misgeld considers Gadamer's theory to be inadequate for social development and to be useful only as a starting point.

Authority Reconsidered

On the issue of authority Mendelson, following Habermas, points out that authority "may be rooted not only in knowledge but also in force and fear". Mendelson illustrates his case with the example of an authority - teacher. Initially a student accepts teachings "on the basis of the teacher's authority:

In "coming of age" the student is able to reflect upon the unfree context in which he first internalized these teachings and can examine them in the light of his own matured critical capacities. In this case, authority and knowledge do not converge, rather they are at odds.

Although Mendelson accuses Gadamer for not making a "distinction between genuine non-coercive recognition and pseudo-recognition based on force", he himself and Habermas seem to have a similar problem with two different concepts of authority. Let us call the first concept freely acknowledged authority and the second one coercive authority. In fact the two adjectives derived from the noun "authority", namely "authoritative" and "authoritarian", roughly represent these two concepts respectively. Gadamer's concept is the former one: authority is based on superior knowledge in a field; it has to be acquired
and be voluntarily acknowledged by others. For Gadamer, authority and knowledge are not opposed to each other. Habermas' concept is essentially the latter one: authority is always associated with power and domination, so that knowledge acquired from self-reflection would turn against authority if the two contradict each other. It is true that Gadamer ignores the second concept of authority, but then Habermas and Mendelson also confuse the two concepts by not considering them separately.

Let us refer to the teacher-student example. Under the first concept the teacher has superior knowledge in a field, students recognize this and accept the knowledge. With their matured critical capacity, these students may point out that the teacher's knowledge is inadequate or erroneous. If the teacher's authority is based on knowledge - as opposed to coercion - he or she would receive criticism with an open mind and be prepared to modify the knowledge as necessary. In this case authority and knowledge are not at odds. Under the second concept the teacher is in a position to use force and instill fear among students. Students would only pretend to accept the teachings; they probably would not internalize them, contrary to what Mendelson believes. As long as force and fear persist, a critical attitude toward the field of knowledge imparted by the teacher cannot alter this coerciveness. It requires a different kind of knowledge - knowledge concerning the power structure and its effects - to overcome an authority based on coercion. In this case coercive authority is at odds not with criticisms of the
knowledge imparted but with objections to the power structure to which the teacher belongs. Although these two kinds of authority may be present in one person, an analysis that does not distinguish the two concepts may fail to identify social problems involved.

When Misgeld speaks of authority he refers to the first concept. Interpreting Gadamer, he clarifies that authority is not restricted to specific persons or institutions: it is embedded in cultural tradition. Anyone who learns from others or from the past is accepting authority. It is the recognition that an individual can only acquire a limited amount of first-hand knowledge: one has to depend on what are generally considered reliable sources in various fields. Understood this way the issue of authority would merge with that of cultural tradition, with the notion of authority emphasizing a conscious search for reliable knowledge. Mendelson indicates he has no objection to "authority" if taken in this broad sense. But he wonders if the term "authority" is still appropriate since it deviates so much from its ordinary usage. To the extent that authority can mean something authoritative or something authoritarian, and that the meaning is usually not clarified, Mendelson seems to have a point.
The Advocacy Model Examined

Gadamer's critique of a social theory based on the psychoanalytic model hits one of Habermas' major weak spots. Few commentators would defend this model without reservation. Mendelson is not entirely satisfied with the model either, but he gives Habermas credit for attempting to provide safeguards against complete domination of social criticism by intellectuals. Misgeld's view here is similar to that of Gadamer's—the superiority of intellectuals is inherent in the model.

Mendelson does not discuss the advocacy model. Misgeld, on the other hand, analyzes it in detail. Before we present Misgeld's view on the model, let us consider the case of Marx. Among others, William Leiss points out a major dilemma in Marx's theorizing: class consciousness and the subsequent establishment of "a qualitatively different epoch of human history" depends on the assumption of "the potential existence of a class with an interest in general emancipation". Yet Marx failed to demonstrate that the assumption is plausible. According to Leiss, "the issue of whether the dialectic of capitalist or bourgeois society is in fact inherently capable of producing a class or group that can function as the agent of a qualitative transformation in history toward general emancipation ... was a central concern of critical theory."

Like the earlier critical theorists, Habermas is concerned with this issue. He assumes there are suppressed generalizable interests in society. Unlike Marx, who had confidence in the proletariat, Habermas has no confidence in any social group in
carrying out the task of general emancipation. He believes an hypothesis supplied by an advocate is indispensable. Misgeld points out that Habermas has not been able to demonstrate the existence of generalizable interests. Claiming the existence of such interests and saying they are suppressed "sounds like a circular argument". To this extent, Habermas does not fare any better than Marx. Now the difference is that the former relies on reconstructive sciences to uphold his claim: "Habermas' argument treats the model of suppressed yet generalizable interests as one which can be theoretically constructed." In Misgeld's opinion, this is essentially an "objectivist form of reflection". For the ideals established by reconstructive sciences obliterate what social groups have already articulated or expressed in life.

To the extent that the advocacy model is a refinement of the psychoanalytic model, and that the refinement does not alter the basic relationship between theorist and societal members, Gadamer's objection to the latter model applies to the former. Misgeld does not argue along this line, but he does question the role of intellectuals Habermas assigns in critical theory:

[Habermas] has not really reflected on the following issue: can those of whom it is said that they have implicitly mastered the notion of an ideal situation of discourse, of communication free from domination, ever become critics of the theory?

Put differently, Misgeld asks: can an "objectivist form of reflection" be criticized by its addressees?
The working out of reconstructive sciences and their places in critical theory are the foci of Habermas' more recent endeavors. These are directions Habermas embarked on after his direct confrontation with Gadamer in the late sixties and early seventies. The debate on the merits of reconstructive sciences is carried out by commentators such as Misgeld and Mendelson. Perhaps we can grasp the issue in terms of two different concepts of norm, one espoused by Gadamer and the other by Habermas.

Gadamer, who is convinced that tradition constitutes social reality far more than do individual judgments, naturally believes that the proper way to act cannot be judged independently of the existing way of life in society. As Misgeld puts it: "There are no ahistorical social norms." Under this concept, a norm is not an ideal society strives for; it is something that has already been achieved by society as a whole, though not necessarily by everybody in that society. Norms exist whether or not people are aware of them; they are embodied in social practices. When practices are passed from one generation to the next, norms are transmitted along with them: when people learn something new they at the same time learn about the appropriateness of using it under various circumstances. Since social practices evolve through a self-formative process, norms evolve accordingly.

For Habermas, existing norms may harbor ideology; they may be the outcome of systematically distorted communication. He is
suspicious of the validity of norms embodied in social practices and thus proposes a different concept of norm - justifiable norms - which is based on the assumption of suppressed generalizable interests. As we have seen earlier, hypothetical justifiable norms are formulated by a social theorist and offered to the public, who then confirms these norms through practical discourse. Unless no conflict of interests exists in society, critical theory takes justifiable norms to be different from existing ones. A justifiable norm is an ideal for society to pursue.

Both Misgeld and Mendelson are bothered by the highly theoretical character of this recent direction critical theory takes: since justifiable norms are arrived at through reconstructive sciences such as universal pragmatics and reconstructed historical materialism, they are divorced from existing social practices and thus lack political relevance.

**Mendelson: Doubts on Reconstructive Sciences**

Mendelson expresses his doubts about the usefulness of Habermas' communication theory:

> For it to become a historically-effective standard the rather formal criteria of undistorted communication would have to be articulated as a more concrete vision of new institutional structures.\(^5\)

While Mendelson has no objection to the formal criteria or norms Habermas worked out in universal pragmatics, his grave concern is what they really mean in concrete situations. Universal criteria can be interpreted in multitudinous ways that, unless there is an unambiguous method to apply them to particular
cases, they remain empty notions. For Mendelson, "this relation of the universal to the particular constitutes an unbridgeable gulf" between reconstructive sciences and social practices. He cites with approval a remark by Paul Ricoeur - another commentator of the debate:

Ricoeur has argued that "there are no other paths, in effect, for carrying out our interest in emancipation than by incarnating it within cultural acquisitions. Freedom only posits itself by transvaluing what has already been evaluated". Otherwise, "the self-positing of freedom is condemned to remain either an empty concept or a fanatical demand".

Ricoeur thus points out that the meaning of freedom to a people can only be determined in the context of that culture: freedom is not something that can be completely theorized. Mendelson thinks Habermas' reconstructive sciences have trouble confronting Ricoeur's hermeneutical insights: theoretically derived norms are not necessarily practical.

Mendelson proposes an alternative direction for critical theory. Convinced that a social theory has political relevance only if it emerges from existing social practices, he argues that critical theory should start with "the entire apparatus of constitutions, elections, parties and parliaments which embodies democratic ideals" and which "still has a living presence in late capitalist societies". This apparatus would represent the existing norms in politics. If research findings reveal that democratic ideals cannot possibly be realized under the present liberal democratic political apparatus - which is supposed to be the criterion of the ideals - then there is a "contradiction" in the sense of Hegel and Marx. A critical theory following this
direction would "both anticipate a better society and resonate with large numbers of people". Norms that emerge from the critique would then be pertinent to the particular situation involved and be ready to be incorporated into practice.

Nevertheless, Mendelson does not reject reconstructive sciences completely. He believes that a critical standard derived from reconstructive sciences may be valuable in certain cases if, in the future, Habermas is able to "concretize [his theory] into more down-to-earth demands". Should that happen, Mendelson argues, his own approach and reconstructive sciences would not be "alternatives but complementary steps in a single process".

Misgeld: Priority of Practice

It is clear Habermas wants to retain a life-world perspective in critical theory, as he indicates in *Legitimation Crisis*, for that is the only way to keep critical theory from degenerating into a theory of instrumental action or a systems theory. But the life-world is too elusive for Habermas, who decides to ground it in reconstructive sciences. As Mendelson and Misgeld see it, the incorporation of reconstructive sciences into critical theory undermines the life-world perspective. While Mendelson is cautious about the application of universal principles to practice, Misgeld is critical of it. He argues that "the application of stringent criteria for theory formation in some systematic way is not compatible with the requirement for theories to be practically enlightening".
Let us consider a life-world perspective. The way people perceive reality is governed by their prejudgments, which are in turn determined by their cultural and historical backgrounds as well as individual experiences and the particular situation in question. The validity of norms cannot be assessed by societal members without involving their prejudgments: it is situation-bound. As Misgeld puts it: "Action orienting knowledge is ... radically dependent upon situationally generated knowledge."62

Now let us consider Habermas' use of reconstructive sciences. He assumes that people's fore-knowledge (probably equivalent to what Gadamer calls prejudgments), or at least a significant portion of it, can be rendered explicit into universally valid anonymous rule systems. A social theorist qua advocate formulates hypothetical justifiable norms based on universal principles of communicative competence, action competence and social evolution. Societal members do not work out their own theories nor propose norms for discussion; they merely confirm and accept those offered by the advocate. The experiences of societal members do not contribute to the formulation of justifiable norms, which are derived from the anonymous rules of reconstructive sciences. Besides, societal members discuss the advocate's hypothesis only in the capacity of what Habermas considers competent speakers. The requirement of competence in speaking, i.e. observation of stringent rules, leaves little room for cultural and individual differences among societal members. In fact Habermas indicates that his theory of universal pragmatics is based on the premise of homogeneity
among participants in a discourse. It is
an idealized case... in which participants share a
tradition and their orientations are normatively
integrated to such an extent that they start from
the same definition of the situation and do not
disagree about the claims to validity that they
reciprocally raise. 63

When universal pragmatics is applied to a conflict situation, as
in the case of the advocacy model, it encounters a serious
problem. A conflict of interests in society implies people
involved play different social roles (such as capitalists,
workers, producers, consumers, developers, environmentalists).
These people are to engage in a practical discourse. From a
life-world perspective, a difference in social roles would mean
a difference in prejudgments among participants of the
discourse, so that there cannot be merely one single definition
of the situation. This violates the premise of universal
pragmatics. A discourse dealing with conflict of interests is
thus impossible. Habermas does not seem to have noticed this
problem. From our analysis it follows that the intent of
critical theory to embrace both reconstructive sciences and a
life-world perspective inevitably leads to internal
inconsistency. Between the two, one has to choose.

Unlike critical theory, hermeneutics does not seek to
develop a general theory of what society is, what it should be
and then apply the theory to particular cases. Misgeld points
out, hermeneutics recognizes "the priority of practice - and
seeks a characterization of knowledge in which knowledge is
understood, from the beginning, as the knowledge one has of
one's historical situation. The latter arises from the conduct
Hermeneutics accepts "the location of theorizing or reflectiveness in contingent starting points".\footnote{65}

For Habermas, anything a person wishes to express explicitly to others can be expressed in explicit speech:

In a given language, for every interpersonal relation that a speaker wants to take up explicitly with another member of his language community, a suitable performative expression is either available or, if necessary, can be introduced through a specification of available expressions.\footnote{66}

This performative expression refers to an explicit speech action satisfying a set of requirements Habermas delineates.\footnote{67} The centrality of explicit speech in critical theory can be seen from the way it is applied, in the form of discourse, to politics. In the context of planning Habermas defines "participation" to be "a general taking part, on the basis of equal opportunity, in discursive processes of will-formation".\footnote{68}

For him social action should take place in accordance with justifiable norms reached through practical discourse. His preoccupation with discourse implies that he believes life - at least the politically consequential portion of life - can be completely represented in discourse, a special application of explicit speech.\footnote{69} It seems as though verbally articulated ideas can become the sole guide of life. Misgeld reveals the naivety of Habermas' position:

Explicit argument, ... while often needed, cannot be the basis of life lived in common. One would become confused, lose one's grip on everyday events, were one to orient to this idea of argument for agreement on what needs doing and may be done as the only means for establishing a life together.\footnote{70}

No culture worth speaking about can be thought of as grounded in the explicit weighing of arguments and
in only one process of deliberation (a discourse of a theoretical kind debating "claims"). If estrangement from traditional culture is not lived, it cannot merely be produced by the cognitively pure form of argument Habermas singles out.\textsuperscript{71}

Here Misgeld agrees with Gadamer's insight that "being" always reaches beyond consciousness:\textsuperscript{72} life can never fully manifest itself in speech. It follows that in hermeneutical thinking politics encompasses the entire spectrum of social life, not merely political discourse. For the same reason Misgeld considers Mendelson's proposed critique of liberal democratic political apparatus as the impetus for social change to be too narrowly conceived.\textsuperscript{73}

Habermas' notion of competence is also subject to criticism: competence defined in terms of the stringent rules of reconstructive sciences is out of touch with the much broader realm of life. If competence refers to the ability to conduct a meaningful life or the ability to bring about a better society, then the competence Habermas has in mind cannot do justice to many people who are successful in those respects. Misgeld shows that Habermas "fails to notice the competence established in daily experience and deliberation".\textsuperscript{74} For instance, competence in politics is manifested in all kinds of social action, organized and unorganized, verbally articulated and not articulated, from passive resistance to open struggle. Misgeld believes that some of the most progressive changes in society result from the effort of social movements (such as the feminist, black and environmental movements). People identify with a social movement because its activities resonate with
these people's experiences, including "the lived form of oppression, dependence and exclusion". People participate in social action because it expresses or may lead to the kind of life they desire. Many of these activities are the outcome of implicit understanding rather than formal discourse.

Accomplishments of social movements often cannot be traced to speakers who adhere to the rules of universal pragmatics. Here the speech of people engaged in action cannot be considered in isolation from the action itself. Contrary to Habermas' intention to separate discourse from communicative action, a meaningful discourse concerning the situation cannot be "purged of action and experience".

The fact that speech is not all there is to life does not mean speech is politically insignificant. There is little doubt explicit argumentation constitutes an indispensable part of politics today. It behooves us to further examine the nature of political dialogues. Misgeld finds the positions of both Habermas and Gadamer unsatisfactory: they portray extreme cases that are virtually non-existent in practice. In the case of Habermas, speech act is classified into different types so that only the one conforming to a specific format is considered suitable for discourse, independent of the content of the discourse. The rigidity of the format precludes any consideration of contingencies in a life-world. Gadamer, on the other hand, does not distinguish different types of speech act and pays little attention to rules for employing speech. It seems as though speech defies any analysis.
Misgeld presumes that when Gadamer speaks of conversation he has in mind a philosophical discussion. In that case, participants cooperate to explore a concept. They have no partisan interest and do not take any progress or setback personally. Consequently, participants do not defend their respective positions or attack others systematically. The outcome of the conversation is somewhat unpredictable. What Gadamer stresses is the openness of a conversation. But a characterization of political dialogue in this fashion would be inaccurate.

While for Habermas the universal rules of discourse "objectify reality", it is the reverse for Gadamer: the content of a conversation reveals implicit rules of speech in that particular conversation. One focuses on the general, the other on the particular. Obviously Gadamer's conversation is not the same as Habermas' discourse. In an actual situation, as Misgeld points out, a dialogue consists of elements in what Gadamer calls conversation as well as those in what Habermas calls discourse. Misgeld gives Habermas credit for developing general criteria for discourse. He is referring to the four general presuppositions in successful speech communication Habermas worked out in universal pragmatics. These general criteria serve as a common purpose for participants to work toward. But these are only construed as general orientations for participants attempting to solve problems through dialogue. Detail rules of speech cannot be specified in advance. Only through mutual adjustments of implicit rules as a result of
understanding the content involved can participants gradually
discover one another's point of view. Only through a process of
questioning and weighing of arguments can the sincerity of
participants be determined.

From The Debate to Theory of Planning

Let us summarize Misgeld's radicalization of Gadamer's
hermeneutics. The self-formation of society consists of more
continuities than discontinuities. This has to remain so or else
people would lose their orientation in life and their sense of
community. Systematic redesign of society, no matter how well
intended, would inevitably destroy social meanings and
coherence. This does not mean, however, that people cannot be
critical of the status quo. The meaningful critical attitude is
the one "from within": the kind that emerges from people who
have actually committed themselves and have lived through the
problems. "Without having lived the commitment we would not know
what to turn to, when we turn away from it". This critical
attitude, embodied in social action, is found in many social
movements. Further social change can occur, if people discuss
problems explicitly, based on their own experiences.

Misgeld has remarked that Gadamer's work is best treated as
a point of departure: improvement to Gadamer's theory is
necessary if hermeneutics is to properly address the social and
political issues of contemporary industrial society. Misgeld
himself has no doubt contributed to this undertaking and
probably will continue to do so. Although the radicalization of
hermeneutics is apparently still at a preliminary stage, the suggestions so far touch the very heart of planning. Many ideas in hermeneutics seem to be in harmony with those in social learning theories of planning today. It makes sense to further pursue the relationship between hermeneutics and planning.

NOTES

1 PhH, pp.93-4.
3 PhH, p.38.
5 TM, p.351.
6 PhH, p.35.
7 D.E. Linge, Editor's Introduction to PhH, pp.lv-lvi.
10 TM, p.345.
11 Ibid., p.363.
12 PhH, pp.62-3; Linge, Editor's Introduction to PhH, p.xxiv.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid., p.360.
16 PhH, p.31.
Ibid., p.30.


PhH, pp.18-43.


TP, pp.30-40.

PhH, p.42.

"Review of TM", p.357.

TM, p.248.

Ibid., p.250.

Ibid., p.xxv (in Foreword to Second German Edition and included in the English translation).


D.Misgeld, "Habermas' Retreat from Hermeneutics", Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory, vol.5, no.1-2, 1981, p.10. Hereafter this article will be referred to as "Retreat".

"H-G Debate", p.44.

Ibid., p.62.

"CT and H", p.171.

"On Gadamer's Hermeneutics", op.cit., p.226. This article will hereafter be referred to as "GH".

"Retreat", pp.10 and 12.

"GH", p.226.
Ibid., p.68. Heidegger indicates his use of the terms "authentic" and "inauthentic" is a matter of terminology: it is not to be taken as an ethical judgment.

"H-G Debate", p.60.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Peter Boothroyd brought to our attention the use of the adjective "authoritative" in this connection.

"CT and H", p.167.


Ibid., pp.67-8.


Ibid., pp.342-3.

"Retreat", p.28.

Ibid., p.29.

Ibid., p.30.

Ibid., p.20.

"CT and H", p.178.

Misgeld, in "GH", shows that the hermeneutical notion of norm is not to be confused with those in structural-functionalism and ethnomethodology. In structural-functionalism norms are "imposed" on people in order to maintain stability in society. Norms are introduced to people who are then supposed to internalize them for guiding practice. These norms do not arise from practice. Ethnomethodology, on the other hand, is relativistic. It does not link practice to its historical development.

"H-G Debate", p.73.

Ibid.

Ibid.
Habermas argues that non-linguistic action can only perform highly restricted functions. He implies all non-linguistic action can in principle be represented in explicit speech (CES, pp.37-8). Many writers, including Gadamer, make an important distinction between "symbol" and "sign". While a sign is an indicator for action, a symbol conveys an explicit or implicit thought. Non-linguistic symbols are pervasive in life, from fine art to everyday human action. These symbols can never be adequately expressed linguistically. Cf. esp. Susanne Langer's vivid discussion on discursive and presentational symbols, in *Philosophy in a New Key*, 3rd edition, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1957. The kind of non-linguistic action Habermas refers to are signs; he has not seriously considered the significance of non-linguistic symbols.
Ibid., p.139.

"Retreat", p.37.

"Postscript to KHI", p.168.

D. Misgeld, "Discourse and Conversation", Cultural Hermeneutics, vol.4, 1977, p.327. Hereafter this article will be referred to as "DC".

Ibid., pp.326-7.

Ibid., p.329.

Ibid., p.333.

Ibid., p.327.


"DC", p.336.

Ibid.
Building on Gadamer and Misgeld

Historically hermeneutics has been hostile to planning due to the latter's image as centralized rational management of society. But the field of planning has evolved. The stereotyped image that is still generally held is no longer acceptable to most planning theorists today - particularly those influenced by social learning theories of planning. Hence hermeneutics and planning do not have to be at odds. In fact we shall show that hermeneutics is valuable to the field of planning and can be extended into this field. On the other hand, we shall argue that hermeneutics needs to incorporate the idea of planning if it is to fully develop its potential in politics. Let us begin with the second point by reviewing the thoughts of Gadamer and Misgeld concerning problem solving in contemporary industrial society.

Gadamer's repudiation of rational planning applies to any systematic reorganization of society, be it at the global level or the local level; it equally applies to sectoral or smaller projects where technocrats define problems and furnish solutions in the name of scientific objectivity. Gadamer characterizes a
wholesome societal dynamic as an "oscillating equilibrium" grounded in cultural tradition. He considers serious societal problems to be an offset of balance to the equilibrium. The solution, he believes, is to restore the equilibrium through what he calls the model of piloting - a model he discusses in general terms only. It appears that he has in mind a new equilibrium that is essentially the same as the old one. Gadamer does not address the issues of changing social conditions, needs and concerns. If the model of piloting fails to take these realities into account, or simply relegates them to the category of disturbances to the equilibrium, then it definitely is inadequate for dealing with the rapidly changing industrial society today. Further, Gadamer's view toward the role of intellectuals is ambivalent. Intellectuals are to awaken consciousness, which is the task of philosophy and presumably is an integral part of piloting. But if consciousness is the self-understanding of people directly involved in their everyday life, then it has little to do with intellectuals. Gadamer seems to have posed the problem of intellectuals without being able to solve it.

Misgeld upholds Gadamer's position regarding rational planning, but refuses to share the latter's confidence in the viability of preserving tradition. Misgeld believes that a critical attitude "from within" toward what is handed down from the past can be an important part of elaborating tradition. In other words, tradition is not simply preservation of the past; it seeks out new directions of development as well. This seeking
out of new directions is by no means arbitrary; it is based on experience in life. While Gadamer thinks of society as a whole as belonging to a cultural tradition, Misgeld is careful to differentiate sub-cultures within the larger whole. Due to differences in experiences, sub-cultures are not always in harmony with the larger culture. Certain social groups may be traditionally oppressed, exploited or excluded. They see no reason to preserve those aspects of tradition; they struggle against them; they search for new directions that offer liberation from their miseries. Since what counts as liberation cannot be separated from participants' own interpretation of it, the change process must be actively carried out by those directly involved. This is why Misgeld considers the emergence of social movements a good example in hermeneutics.

While social movements are important change agents in society, they cannot solve all the societal problems. In pursuit of their particular goals, different social groups may run into conflict. This often happens when various groups demand access to a common pool resource. The rather spontaneous activities of social movements have to be supplemented by the more formal process of planning.

Habermas has addressed the problem of social conflict. Yet his proposal - the advocacy model and the planning approach based on it - is highly disputable. When we consider a planning process, we should seriously take into account the issues he attempts to grapple with, without endorsing his proposal. We shall argue that a theory of planning which builds on the
thoughts of Gadamer and Misgeld would be more satisfactory when dealing with similar issues.

As we have indicated in the introduction of this essay, at a general level, we conceptualize planning as an activity by which society steers itself, directly and indirectly, toward a desirable future. It is clear that planning cannot proceed without an adequate knowledge of human problems, goals and ways to attain these goals. According to the hermeneutical position, human action, goals, social organization and dynamics are all part of the self-formation of mankind; it maintains that these human attributes are not to be treated as natural phenomena, and that it is inappropriate to explore them with the empirical-analytic method which is characteristic of natural sciences. If people involved in planning realize that they and others have feeling and aspiration, are expressive and creative beings, as opposed to the view that they are objects to be controlled and manipulated for the purpose of efficient societal functioning, then they would see that the planning process is compatible with the hermeneutical position. It is apparent now why hermeneutics can be significant to planning theory and practice.

Planning Situation as Hermeneutical Situation

Before we proceed to examine the pertinence of hermeneutics in planning, let us establish the domain of our inquiry. Comprehensive planning, with its systematic formulation of ends and means, to such an extent that no member of the public knows how these would affect him or her in practice," is naturally
antithetical to hermeneutical thinking. Planning that is based on a problem defined by people other than those directly involved is again inimical to a philosophy stressing the priority of everyday life. With these in mind we shall confine our domain of inquiry to a particular kind of situation, which can be characterized as follows.

First, let us assume a problem is recognized by people whose lives are affected or expected to be affected by the problem. These people desire to solve the problem. Second, these people do not form a homogeneous whole: they play different social roles and have particular interests. For the convenience of our discussion, let us assume these people are a number of social groups representing various social roles and particular interests. Third, no single group is able to solve the problem unilaterally. There may be a variety of reasons for this, including the lack of resources and opposition of other groups. Hence some cooperative effort is deemed necessary. We shall call a situation satisfying these criteria a planning situation.

To the extent a problem is defined not objectively, but by people affected by it, a socio-historically constituted life-world is implied in this notion of planning situation. The way people define the problem and figure out solutions to it thus depends on their interpretation of the situation. We shall show that a planning situation is indeed a hermeneutical situation, involving a text (life-world) to be interpreted by various people. One notices there are differences between the planning
situation and the case of written text interpretation. In our discussion of Dilthey's theory we already mentioned how interpretation of the life-world can follow the model of the written text. There are two other differences, however. First, interpretation of a written text normally involves one interpreter, whereas planning involves several participants. The planning situation invariably encounters what Donald Schon calls the Rashomon effect, in which "the same story, told from the point of view of several participants, fragments into several different and incompatible stories." Seen this way the planning situation is comparable to the case of a written text interpreted simultaneously by several interpreters, who may not agree with one another. Second, when we say a written text "speaks" we use the term metaphorically; but in planning, participants actually speak as living persons. As we have seen, Gadamer draws an analogy between text interpretation and conversation. Furthermore, interpretation of a planning situation cannot be separated from the intention of problem solving. This corresponds to Gadamer's notion that interpretation and application are integral parts of a single hermeneutical act. Hence the planning situation can be regarded as a complex variation of written text interpretation. It is a hermeneutical situation.
Problem of Nature

In many planning situations utilization of natural resources (in the broad sense of plants, animals, minerals, water, air, space and time) is an important issue. What aspect of nature counts as a resource, from a hermeneutical perspective, is culturally and historically defined. The same object may have different meanings and considered different resources by different social groups (an animal or plant may be treated as potential food, building material, or treasured as something aesthetic or even sacred). In other planning situations nature may be less directly involved, but it is not a category to be neglected. Historically hermeneutics has paid little attention to the concept of nature. Dilthey realized the fundamental difference between natural and human sciences; yet his study is on the latter. For Gadamer, there is a hermeneutical dimension in both natural and human sciences. But again his analysis focuses on the latter. Misgeld has not discussed this issue. The relationship between mankind and nature remains an undeveloped notion in hermeneutics. The concept of nature underwent considerable development from Hegel through Marx to critics of Marx. Hermeneutics can probably learn something from the Marxian heritage.

Both Hegel and Marx maintained that there are laws of nature independent of human knowledge of them. These laws are operative in all cultures and in all stages of history. As opposed to "laws of the land", which are not absolute, but "something posited, something originated by men", Hegel pointed
The laws of nature simply are what they are and are valid as they are; they are not liable to encroachment, though in certain cases man may transgress them. To know the laws of nature, we must learn to know nature, since its laws are rigid and it is only our ideas about them that can be false.

Similarly Marx asserted:

No natural laws can be done away with. What can change in historically different circumstances is only the form in which these laws assert themselves.

Thus the laws of nature, including those discovered in physics, chemistry and biology, limit what humans can do. But these laws do not determine human activities: the latter are shaped by culture and history subject to the constraints of the former. Implicitly Hegel and Marx demarcated the realm of natural sciences from that of human sciences.

In addition, Marx paid close attention to the human physical and biological requirements, which Hegel virtually ignored. For Marx, not only does human existence depend on nature, the meaning of life is linked to it as well:

Plants, animals, minerals, air, light, etc. constitute, from the theoretical aspect, a part of human consciousness as objects of natural science and art; they are man's spiritual inorganic nature, his intellectual means of life, which he must first prepare for enjoyment and perpetuation. So also, from the practical aspect, they form a part of human life and activity. In practice man lives only from these natural products, whether in the form of food, heating, clothing, housing, etc. .... Nature is the inorganic body of man; that is to say nature, excluding the human body itself. To say that man lives from nature means that nature is his body with which he must remain in a continuous interchange in order not to die. The statement that the physical and mental life of man, and nature, are interdependent means simply that nature is interdependent with itself, for man is a part of nature.
It is clear that Marx perceived the intimate relationship between mankind and the rest of nature. He stressed the role of nature in material production: nature is potential social wealth waiting to be transformed by social labor. Treating nature exclusively in terms of production and consumption, however, is an attitude peculiar to capitalist society:

For the first time, nature becomes purely an object for mankind, purely a matter of utility; ceases to be recognized as a power for itself .... Capital drives beyond national barriers and prejudices as much as beyond nature worship, as well as all traditional, confined, complacent, encrusted satisfactions of present needs, and reproductions of old ways of life.

Marx believed that in classless society, producers would "rationally regulate their interchange with nature". He implied that the issue of nature-human relation would be automatically settled with the emergence of socialized production. Marx did not anticipate the environmental crisis or the dwindling of natural resources which are generally recognized as major problems in contemporary industrial society. Even a classless society is not immune against these problems.

Habermas perceives nature mainly in its capacity for satisfying human material needs: by controlling nature mankind liberates itself from nature imposed sufferings. Perhaps to a greater degree than Marx, Habermas views nature in terms of material production and consumption. Preoccupied with distorted communication, he leaves theoretical issues on instrumental action toward nature essentially untouched. Presumably justification of social norms would settle the relationship between mankind and nature in addition to those
among humans. Habermas has not gone beyond Marx as far as the concept of nature is concerned.\(^1\)

The ability of Habermas' theory in dealing with current environmental and natural resource problems has been seriously questioned.\(^1\)

An analysis of deficiencies in Marx's concept of nature would shed light on Habermas' case. It would also help develop a concept of nature in hermeneutics. Marx's concept can be improved in at least two respects. First of all, it should take into account ecological relationships among living things and their bio-physical environments. There are ecological principles governing nature as much as physical and chemical ones. In addition to human biological requirements, it is necessary to include ecological principles as laws of nature.\(^1\)

Considering Marx's sophisticated view of the nature-human relation, he probably would have done so if ecology had been widely discussed back in his days.

The second point is related to the first one, and is no less important. The amount of natural resources available is limited (e.g. clean air, clean water, hydro power, arable land). Besides, non-renewable resources are not replaceable once they are depleted or destroyed (e.g. minerals, fossil fuels, natural landscape, endangered species). Despite Marx's emphasis that nature is potential social wealth, he forgot that a certain quantity of natural material is required for material production and that the quantity is limited.\(^1\)

Marx's conceptual framework presents no major problems provided that natural resources are abundant relative to the demands of society and that the
ecological balance is not significantly altered. This is no longer the case in contemporary industrial society. Hence one must take into account not merely how social labor transforms nature for the purpose of material production, but what the changing nature means to society. Marx was always aware of the fact that social well-being is more than material consumption. He realized that artistic, intellectual and religious activities as well as plain old traditional ways of life depend on nature for resources, although he was not sympathetic to all traditional activities. At any rate, it is clear that a society solely concerned with transformation of nature for the sake of material production may dry up the sources of material as well as non-material aspects of social well-being.

Recognizing the significance of ecological principles and the quantity of natural resources available is not the same as saying these factors are to be used to determine how people should live. No more than other laws of nature, ecological principles do not dictate a specific way of life. The lack or anticipated lack of certain natural resources does not mean there is basically only one alternative for society. Furthermore, recognizing natural factors by no means implies that nature has an "end-in-itself" so that humans must fit themselves into the grand scheme of nature.

Environmentalists are wont to say: "There is no such thing as a free lunch" which means "every gain is won at some cost". But what is a gain and what cost is acceptable? There are no universal or eternal answers. "Gain" and "cost" are abstract
notions; they acquire practical significance only when interpreted in concrete terms. From a hermeneutical perspective, all interpretations are governed by culture and history. The very identification of a substance as a specific resource has already presupposed a particular cultural framework. Questions of "gain" and "cost" are by no means technical ones. Laws of nature and quantity of natural materials merely establish the material constraints which humans cannot transcend. Within such constraints, culture and history play crucial roles in shaping the way people actually live. ²¹

Marx also considered natural factors to be material constraints - not determinants - of human life. This was seen to be so even at the subsistence level:

The way in which men produce their means of subsistence depends first of all on the nature of the actual means of subsistence they find in existence and have to reproduce. This mode of production must not be considered simply as being the production of the physical existence of the individuals. Rather it is a definite form of activity of these individuals, a definite form of expressing their life, a definite mode of life on their part. ²²

Though knowledge of material constraints has expanded since the days of Marx, his observation that each people expresses itself in its own manner remains an invaluable insight up to this day.

Neither Habermas nor hermeneutics has studied the implications of material constraints in the fashion discussed above. Yet a generalized Marxian concept of nature can be incorporated into hermeneutics as long as the realm of natural sciences does not collapse into that of human sciences. ²³ If we look beyond Marx's intricate analysis of different stages of
history we see that Marx and hermeneutics share the view that the culture of a people at any point of history is a product of tradition. Taking nature into account, hermeneutics would argue that people continuously interpret and re-interpret their knowledge of material constraints in the context of their cultural tradition. On the other hand, knowledge of material constraints also influences the way people judge the adequacy of their existing culture. Appropriate social change would then be pursued. To put it differently, hermeneutics denies that culture can be synthesized on the basis of detail knowledge of how nature operates and what condition nature is in. An attempt to create an ideal culture in a technocratic manner would only strip humans of their humanity. Instead of forsaking cultural tradition, hermeneutics encourages people to build on their own tradition, reflect constantly on material constraints and be creative within such constraints. Through a continuous self-formative process of preservation, cancellation and transcendence, people can meet the demands of nature and at the same time lead a meaningful life.²⁴

Interaction of Social Groups

Gadamer and Misgeld have laid out much of the foundation indispensable to a planning theory that adopts a hermeneutical point of view. However, neither one of them has explicitly analyzed the case of a text (life-world) interpreted simultaneously by different parties, although Misgeld's writing regarding conversation and discourse points in this direction.
Since the phenomenon of several parties dealing with the same problem is crucial to a planning situation, it behooves us to further explore it. The following is a tentative analysis of the nature of planning based on hermeneutical principles. It is an example to illustrate what a hermeneutical theory of planning might be concerned with. We shall focus our attention on issues regarding the interaction of social groups, the role of planners and the role of experts.

If no single group can solve a given problem unilaterally, then some kind of agreement among groups is requisite before actions are carried out. Let us call the actions based on agreement planned actions. Later we shall show that planned actions alone do not solve all societal problems; they must be embedded in a social evolutionary framework. In other words, planned actions are necessary, but insufficient, for desirable social change. The way one perceives what planned actions are appropriate depends on one's understanding of both the problem and the effectiveness of the proposed course of action. And since the groups involved must live with the consequences of the planned actions, their understanding - as distinct from the understanding of some independent party - is of prime importance. Now the existence of different social roles and particular interests implies the lack of uniformity in prejudgments among the groups: each group defines the problem in its own way and perceives solutions to the problem in its own way. In other words, each group is confined to a limited horizon, shaped by cultural and historical conditions as well as
social roles and particular interests. Under such circumstances it is difficult to reach agreement. Only when there is substantial overlapping of horizons would these groups have a reasonable common understanding of the problem and be in a position to deal with it. An expansion of horizon is thus an essential component of a planning process.

Interaction among groups can be enhanced if coordinated by a party that has no substantive interest in the problem. We can call this party planners. Hence a planner's task is to facilitate various groups to broaden their horizons through interaction, until their inadequate horizons become more adequate ones. In a planning process effort is made to reach an agreement of planned actions.26

In contemporary industrial society many of the problems encountered in planning situations include technical components requiring knowledge in natural and human sciences as well as applied fields (such as economics, ecology, engineering, law). The social groups involved in a planning situation may not have the technical knowledge background to analyze their problem properly. They need advice from experts. Experts are people recognized for their superior knowledge in their respective fields.27 As long as knowledge is not taken to be free from prejudgments, there is no reason social groups should adopt experts' views without reservation. Hence groups learn from experts through expansions of horizons: they question experts when they become suspicious and assimilate ideas that make sense to themselves.
Social theorists can be considered a type of expert as well. They offer alternative views of society based on their analyses of the given situation, including the nature-human relation and the relation among humans. While technical experts are engaged in institutionally defined specific areas of social functioning, social theorists are concerned with the social totality. As Paul Piccone puts it, the rationality of the former is "only instrumental in character"; it requires the latter to tackle "substantial questions of social organization and political direction".28

In hermeneutical thinking social theorists do not act in the capacity of therapists or advocates. Agnes Heller keenly observes:

In the free market system, the theory comes to the free market, too; people take it or leave it, make use of it or neglect it according to their own needs.29

People do not have to adopt one of the finite number of theories presented to them. Those willing to think often extract ideas from theories in order to enhance their understanding of the situation. But even in a free market the selection of ideas is by no means arbitrary: it is governed by these people's judgments.

In the Marxist tradition, ever since Lenin, there has been a concern with the problem of spontaneity. For Lenin, "spontaneity" is the attitude adopted and action taken by the proletariat as a result of their own experiences. Spontaneity leads to trade unionism within a capitalist society rather than a revolution that gives birth to socialism. The solution,
according to Lenin, is to have intellectuals develop a theory and implant it into the heads of the proletariat. Critical theorists are not followers of Lenin. They recognize the problem of spontaneity but do not accept Lenin's solution. Herbert Marcuse contends: "The primary liberation cannot be 'spontaneous' because such spontaneity would only express the values and goals derived from the established system." Marcuse offers no specific approach; his view toward the future is essentially pessimistic.

Habermas probably agrees with Marcuse's remark. The advocacy model is Habermas' answer to the problem of spontaneity. It differs from Leninism in two major respects. First, while Lenin takes his intellectuals' theory to be valid without any feedback from the proletariat, Habermas' advocate requires confirmation and acceptance from social groups after their discussions before the hypothetical theory is considered valid. Second, while the legitimacy of Leninist theory is based on the intellectuals' positions in the vanguard party, which is supposed to think and act on behalf of the proletariat, the credibility of the advocate's hypotheses rests on reconstructive sciences, which are held to be objective and universal. This way Habermas believes he can protect himself from accusations of Leninist proclivities. But still, he relies too heavily on intellectuals; he leaves virtually no room for the social groups' own ideas derived from their respective life-worlds.

One does not have to be a Marxist to be concerned with the problem of spontaneity. Marcuse's comment probably makes some
sense to anyone who does not take the status quo for granted. In treating social theorists as experts, the way it was described above, we believe it is possible to address the problem of spontaneity without establishing the hegemony of intellectuals. Social theorists qua experts need not impose particular theories on social groups. It is understood that they offer alternative views of society based on their expertise in this field of knowledge.

Thus we have seen that in a planning process each social group expands its horizon toward two directions: the experts and the other social groups. In doing so, each group perceives the situation in a broader context.

The intention of a planning process, from a hermeneutical perspective, is to help social groups to become better equipped to solve their common problem. In order to take a closer look at the relationship between particular interests of the groups and the common problem they encounter, let us borrow a beautiful passage from Bertell Ollman, who is interpreting Marx:

All individuals who service one another through the division of labor share a communal interest by virtue of their interdependence ....... However, the same division of labor which establishes the communal interest also creates a host of particular interests in the specialized tasks which fall into different parties ....... Now, it happens that in pursuing their particular interests individuals lose sight of the communal one ....... The result is, though it is creature of their cooperation, individuals are only conscious of the community when they come into conflict with it, when they are restricted in their attempt to satisfy personal interests ....... With the communal interest lost behind a host of competing particular interests, society becomes a battleground. People experience others only by struggling against them.33
We may not attribute particular interests solely to a division of labor, we may disagree with Marx's conclusions in his materialist's conception of history, and we may not share his optimism that struggles among groups can someday be eliminated, yet we do appreciate Ollman's passage for placing the planning process in perspective - without his intention to do so. What Marx reminds us is that social groups do not live in their respective isolated worlds. The emergence of a common problem - including conflicts - is a symptom of their straying from the interdependence that has been taken for granted. Given the task to solve a problem together, as in a planning situation, social groups would have to re-examine their particular interests in the context of the larger whole. And we can say with Gadamer that the situation "involves the attainment of a higher universality that overcomes, not only our own particularity, but also that of the other". But this happens only when people are willing to open up their minds to listen to others, or as Gadamer puts it, "to experience the Thou truly as a Thou". In this respect planners can probably help, since their lack of substantive interests spares them from the antagonism and distrust that usually exist among groups in a planning situation.

Attaining a higher level of universality does not mean all group conflicts will be resolved automatically, it only means people can see issues and solutions more clearly than before. An agreement on planned actions may or may not be reached. Temporary compromises may be necessary. Any expansion of horizon
is still finite; it never reaches an absolute level. For these reasons one cannot expect planning to solve societal problems once and for all. Different problems crop up from time to time, so that planning is an exercise that never becomes obsolete. Nevertheless, good planning can reduce human suffering, encourage cooperation and rekindle the human spirit.

Planning, Social Learning and Social Evolution

A hermeneutical theory of planning can have far-reaching consequences. One possible outcome is a formal agreement on planned actions, which sometimes carries the weight of law. Perhaps more important are the informal social changes that may occur as a result of improved self-understanding of goals as well as meaningful and effective ways to achieve these goals learned through planning processes. To this extent, the overall effect of planning is social learning. Seeing everyday life in a broader societal context, people may decide to change their own life-styles, develop a better sense of community, explore alternative modes of production and consumption. They may also stage a protest, a general strike or perhaps even a revolution, if they are convinced these are appropriate.\textsuperscript{36}

The Hegelian insight of necessary embodiment of idea or meaning in practice is integral to hermeneutics. Gadamer takes the driving force of society to be cultural tradition - a set of practices handed down from the past. He points out that self-reflection or theorizing can never completely reveal the ideas embodied in practice. Misgeld likewise stresses the priority of
practice. In addition to looking at society as a whole, he pays attention to the multifarious ways different social groups express themselves in life and the meanings embodied in those ways of life. This Hegelian insight can be extended into social learning in general.

Social learning permits a fundamental, yet often gradual, restructuring of society and transformation of culture to accommodate evolving human aspirations and the changing scene of the material world (such as dwindling natural resources). Many social actions taken may not be organized and goals may not be verbally articulated. Much of the emerging consciousness is embodied in a new set of social practices transmitted through everyday life.

When the new consciousness and practices proceed in a direction identifiable as significantly different from the conventional or mainstream way of life, they become a social movement. A commonly accepted definition of social movement is "a collectivity acting with some continuity to promote or resist a change in the society or group of which it is a part". This definition is compatible with the concept of social learning described above. Social movements are crucial agents for social change "from below". For they express what people believe in and what they need, not so much in theoretical terms as in social action. Eventually, some of the practices in social movements are institutionalized; they become part of the mainstream society.

But the direction in which social learning or social
movement takes may not be beneficial to any group in the long run; and it may not be beneficial to society as a whole. This is where planning comes in. In a planning process, people learn to see their actions and ideas in a broader societal context, so that social movements can become responsive to the needs of society as a whole.

Planning seen in the context of social learning does not restrict itself to minor or moderate reforms within an otherwise rigidified institutional system, as most advocates of liberal democracy tend to believe in, nor is it confined to changes based on formal political discourses which justify norms. However, no matter how drastic the social actions might turn out to be, they are not performed under the direction of a vanguard party. That is why hermeneutical thinking cannot be categorized as liberal, democratic socialist or Marxist.

Social learning infiltrates all aspects of life; it does not begin with planning and it does not end with planning. Good planning, however, can act as a catalyst for desirable social change. It should be clear by now that the formality of planning cannot substitute the apparent chaos of social movements. In fact, the two are complementary to each other in the self-formation of mankind.
Comparison with Habermas' Model

The hermeneutical theory of planning suggested above is significantly different from the critical-reconstructive approach to planning proposed by Habermas. In both cases, disagreement or potential disagreement among groups is the point of departure for planning. Resolution of disagreement is the immediate goal and improving society is the ultimate goal. But that is where the similarities end. The two theories differ in their premises and proceed in different manners. Many of the differences between the two theories have been mentioned directly and indirectly. We shall elaborate on a few points below.

The critical-reconstructive approach is based on the assumption of the existence of suppressed generalizable interests. In the planning process the advocate tentatively reconstructs hidden interest positions in accordance with reconstructive sciences. When these are finalized through discussions, the interests of all groups are supposed to be plain to view. The problem is then to be solved on that basis. From the hermeneutical perspective it is naive to believe a situation can be rendered transparent since prejudgments cannot be completely eliminated. The hermeneutical approach assumes groups are interdependent. Through interaction groups learn from one another and from experts. They generally discover there is an interdependence among them. But this interdependence can never be fully verbally articulated or even be fully known. The knowledge of interdependence manifests itself in the way groups
attempt to solve the problem.

Habermas does not clarify the role of technical experts in his model. Presumably they are involved in systems-theoretic analyses. It appears that technical issues are left to experts and that social groups only discuss interest positions in order to appropriate or criticize technical findings. In the hermeneutical approach, on the other hand, groups do not discuss interest positions in the abstract form. Due to their different social roles, groups usually have a general idea what their concerns and needs are. But it is often necessary to learn from technical experts and social theorists to enhance their understanding of how the situation affects them and what alternatives are plausible. Discussions involve concrete actions for solving the problem, the consequences and the fairness of these actions. With an improved knowledge base, groups can develop creative solutions to the problem. It is difficult to imagine how a theoretical discussion on interest positions - as proposed by Habermas - can generate a solution other than what is already specified in reconstructive sciences.

The notion of planning in critical theory rests on the idea of societal progress to higher levels on the social evolutionary scale. Stages of social evolution are revealed in reconstructive sciences. A hermeneutical theory of planning does not determine in advance what is progress. Progress is dependent upon people's interpretation of it; it does not conform to scientific criteria. In hermeneutics, social evolution is not teleological, either in the sense of inevitable stages of development in
history (as in Hegel and Marx) or in the sense of a universal logic of how society should develop from the lowest to the highest level (as in Habermas).

The hermeneutical approach suggested above does not answer all questions concerning a planning situation. Obviously there is much room for improvements. Nevertheless we believe we have shown that it is a more satisfactory and realistic approach than what Habermas proposes.

NOTES


2 We use the word "problem" here in a neutral sense. It does not have to connote something undesirable; it could be an opportunity, a challenge. Basically a problem is a societal issue people are interested in dealing with.

3 We use the word "interest" in the general sense of concern and need, not the specific sense in Habermas' definition.


6 Ibid.

7 K. Marx, "Marx to L. Kugelmann, July 11, 1868", in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Selected Correspondence, Moscow:

*1844 MSS*, pp.126-7.


Cf. *KHI*, pp.25-42.

Habermas has mentioned that the "ecological balance designates an absolute limit to growth" in connection with his analysis of crisis tendencies in advanced capitalism. But he seems to treat the environmental crisis as something peculiar to capitalist society. He implies that he agrees with Marx: socialized production would resolve the issue of nature-human relation (see *LC*, pp.41-3).


W.Leiss points out, ever since the Enlightenment, industrial society has been increasing its control over nature. Although the term control of nature may be neutral, it often connotes domination, manipulation and exploitation. The concept of interaction is more appropriate as far as the nature-human relation is concerned. Attention to ecological principles places this interaction in a better perspective. See *The Domination of Nature*, op.cit.

E.F.Schumacher succumbs to the popular misconception that Marx treated "as valueless everything that we have not made ourselves" (*Small Is Beautiful*, London: Abacus, 1973, p.11). In *Critique of the Gotha Program* Marx argued specifically how valuable is nature. What Marx forgot was the quantity of resource, especially non-renewable resource, available in nature. In this sense Schumacher's remark is partially correct.

Anthropologist Marshall Sahlins goes further than Marx. Based on empirical findings on hunters and gatherers, he argues that these people are affluent despite their low material consumption. These people have low expectations on material goods which can readily be met by their mode of production. That way of life is meaningful to them. Sahlins declares that poverty is above all "a relation between
people ... a social status. As such it is the invention of civilization" (Stone Age Economics, Chicago and New York: Aldine.Atherton, 1972, p.37).

J.Whitebook criticizes Habermas for his lack of a naturalistic ethic with the result that the latter cannot deal with the environmental crisis. Whitebook indicates that Habermas' "communicative ethics represents a variation on the anthropocentric theme in that it maintains that man, by virtue of his communicative capacity, is the only value-bearing being that can be identified. Thus, communicative ethics, as a form of anthropocentrism, rules out any conception of nature as an 'end in itself' ...... Habermas' transcendental stance prevents the sort of direct access to nature that would make any claim for nature as an end-in-itself possible" (Whitebook, op.cit., pp.52-3). A review of influential literature on environmental issues shows the main concerns are human survival and human quality of life in a broad sense. Cf. R.Carson, Silent Spring, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1962; G.Hardin, "The Tragedy of the Commons", Science, vol.162, pp.1243-8, 1968; B.Commoner, The Closing Circle, New York: Bantam, 1971; D.Meadows et al, The Limits to Growth, New York: Signet, 1972; and, G.T.Miller, Living in the Environment, Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1975. Whitebook does not seem to realize that even "respect for nature" and "living in harmony with nature" are human attitudes, which are governed by social norms; they are anthropocentric, in the sense Whitebook uses the term.


M.Sahlins provides some of the best arguments and empirical findings in support of this position. He concludes that "culture must conform to material constraints, but ... it does so according to a definite symbolic scheme which is never the only one possible" (Culture and Practical Reason, Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1976, p.viii). Nevertheless, the structuralist conceptual framework that Sahlins builds on tends to be too rigid: it confines the study of culture to specific forms and orders. Its emphasis on the "synchronic" at the expense of the "diachronic" also runs into difficulty when explaining social change. Sahlins does not clarify how he can overcome these difficulties inherent in structuralism.


In the extreme case of Richard Rorty, who also calls his theory hermeneutics, the distinction between natural and human sciences is eliminated. Nature is no longer taken seriously. Problem solving becomes nothing but "the conversation of mankind"; it refuses to take into account the nature-human relation. Rorty's reductionism cannot
possibly deal with most planning situations. See Rorty, 
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton: Princeton 

W. Leiss presents a parallel argument for what he calls a 
"negative theory of needs". According to him, this theory 
is "negative in the sense that it refrains from defining 
the categories that might be appropriate to a coherent 
network of needs. Only the individuals and groups who 
discover for themselves the inadequacy of the existing 
system can provide those categories" (The Limits to 
Satisfaction, Toronto and Buffalo: University of Toronto 

Let us describe a simplified rational planning process: 
there is a planning stage, which produces a plan; and then 
there is an implementation stage, which puts the plan into 
action. The implementation of a plan is a type of planned 
action. In our case, planned action is not confined to the 
narrow sense of implementation of an official plan. What we 
call an agreement on planned actions roughly corresponds to 
a plan in the rational model; it also corresponds to 
justifiable norms in Habermas' advocacy model. But these 
three are not identical concepts. An agreement on planned 
actions, a plan, and justified norms are arrived at through 
different processes. What they have in common is that they 
all serve as a basis for collective action prior to the 
action itself.

There is no intrinsic necessity that every planning 
situation would lead to an agreement on planned actions. 
The need for cooperative effort does not entail cooperation 
would always take place. For example, Marx argued that in 
capitalist society, resolution of class conflicts requires 
nothing short of a proletarian revolution. Even if we 
disagree with Marx's analysis, there is no reason to assume 
that an agreement can be reached among social groups. For 
the existing social structure may be oppressive toward 
certain groups. If oppressors insist to remain oppressors, 
an agreement is unlikely within the existing social 
structure. Nevertheless, we shall argue that a planning 
process, as a social learning process, can be beneficial to 
society whether an agreement is reached or not.

What we call experts here correspond to what Gadamer calls 
authorities. Since the term authority often connotes power 
and domination, we prefer to use the term expert which does 
not have such a connotation.

"Symposium: The Role of the Intellectual in the 1980s",
Telos, no.50, pp.115-60, 1981-2.

A. Heller, "Theory and Practice: Their Relation to Human 
On a closer look, one notices there are subtle similarities between Habermas and Lenin. In psychoanalysis, a "no" from the patient often indicates the patient's resistance to therapy. Now Habermas extends psychoanalysis to critical theory. When society rejects the critical theorist's reconstruction, Habermas probably considers societal members to be refusing to admit they are suffering from their ideology. Hence the critical theorist must attempt to correct societal members' perception. While Habermas' critical theorist relies on reconstructive sciences, the theory of Marx is sometimes also interpreted as science—the science of history. The Althusserian school, in particular, attempts to justify Leninism by interpreting Marx's theory as a science—something understood only by Party intellectuals. Only the Party knows when to seize the right moment to follow the logical course of history.


Most theorists today argue that political revolutions in highly industrialized capitalist societies are extremely unlikely; in other parts of the world, however, they do occur.


CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION

In this study we inquire about the concept of planning in the context of social evolution. We have compared, contrasted and critically evaluated ideas related to planning which emerge from two competing schools of thought in the German philosophical tradition, namely, critical theory and hermeneutics. Both schools are deeply concerned with philosophical issues such as objectivity of knowledge, experience, thought and action, theory and practice, which are also the foci of discussions in social learning theories of planning today. Let us summarize our findings.

A Summary

The critical theory of Habermas offers valuable insights and presents a challenge to planning theorists interested in the philosophical issues mentioned above. The questions Habermas explicitly and implicitly raises are important ones. Problems like conflict of interests, spontaneity, nature-human relations and human relations should be properly addressed in the field of planning. Nevertheless, Habermas' use of reconstructive sciences and his advocacy model are questionable. Besides, some of his
other ideas, including his assumption of suppressed
generalizable interests and his preoccupation with speech, are
not entirely convincing. Habermas' planning approach, which is
derived from these ideas, suffers as a result.

The hermeneutics of Gadamer consists of several profound
notions regarding the nature of human understanding. Recognizing
the significance of cultural tradition, hermeneutics furnishes a
sound theoretical foundation for a critique of both objectivism
and subjectivism. Hermeneutics also avoids some of the problems
that have plagued Habermas, such as the latent objectivism in
reconstructive sciences and the arrogance of critical theorists.
Yet Gadamer's emphasis on preserving tradition prevents him from
seeing new social directions in a favorable light. Since
Gadamer's thought is not readily applicable to the solving of
current social problems, his writings tend to escape the
attention of planning theorists. He has not received the
recognition he deserves in the social learning theories of
planning.

Having discovered the untapped potential in hermeneutics,
Misgeld builds on Gadamer's works. Shedding the traditionalism
of his predecessor, Misgeld explores the progressive aspects of
hermeneutical thinking, in particular, the priority of practice
in theorizing and the contribution of social movements. He
stresses the political relevance of hermeneutics to contemporary
society and thus brings hermeneutics a step closer to the field
of planning. However, he has not explored the concept of
planning directly.
Inspired by the highly suggestive ideas of Gadamer and Misgeld, we attempt to extend hermeneutics into the field of planning. We argue that planning and social movements interpenetrate and that both are essential to a social evolution that is conducive to the development of human potentials within the constraints of the changing material world. Both planning and social movement are embedded in cultural tradition. Their goals and activities arise from life, and hence their meanings cannot be fully appreciated except by those whose lives are directly implicated. Social movement is a general expression of a particular group or a particular aspect of life. Planning, on the other hand, focuses on problem solving among groups, and indirectly, among different aspects of society (including the division of labor). A planning problem that draws various groups together is usually narrow in scope and relatively restricted in space and time. In order for the self-understanding achieved in a planning process to benefit society in the long run, activities based on such self-understanding have to be carried on in social movements, and in general, daily life. That is why a hermeneutical theory of planning places planning in the fabric of cultural tradition, daily life and social movements. The ultimate purpose of planning is its contribution to a social evolution that is consistent with human aspirations. This concept of planning stresses social learning; it penetrates the roots of societal problems to an extent that is beyond the fathom of those who believe that planning is essentially the regulation of human activities for the purpose of efficient
The hermeneutical foundation of planning we have discussed is a philosophical concept; it does not prescribe a systematic strategy for planning practitioners to follow. As Misgeld points out, theories useful for guiding practice must arise from practice directly related to that situation. Even so, such theories are only tentative. Experimentation is always required. Long ago Hegel realized that accurate theories about society are always retrospective, never predictive. He expresses it in one of his most often cited passages:

One word more about giving instruction as to what the world ought to be. Philosophy in any case always comes on the scene too late to give it. As the thought of the world, it appears only when actuality is already there cut and dried after its self-formative process has been completed ...... The owl of Minerva spreads its wings only with the falling of the dusk.

Hegel thus points to the limitation of all theories, including his own. Hermeneutics incorporates these words of wisdom into its own way of thinking; it teaches that no theory can predict the future of society with any accuracy, so that planned actions cannot be established once and for all.

In fact hermeneutics is necessarily self-applicable. Current hermeneutical thinking is a self-reflection of contemporary industrial society. No less than other aspects of society hermeneutics is subject to continuous evolvement. But precisely because it springs from the soil of this society to address some of its major concerns, including the area of social
development, hermeneutical thinking is pertinent to the study of societal problems in this society. Perhaps hermeneutics deserves a place in planning thought today.

NOTES

1 "Retreat", p.17.
2 Philosophy of Right, op.cit., p.13.
### APPENDIX

**SCHEMATIC OF HABERMAS' MODEL**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Activity</th>
<th>Instrumental Action</th>
<th>Communicative Action</th>
<th>Discourse*</th>
<th>Critique of Ideology</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Goal of Activity</td>
<td>technical control</td>
<td>effective communication</td>
<td>examination of truth claims/justification of norms</td>
<td>emancipation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Function of Activity in Self-formative Process</td>
<td>work (human vs. nature)</td>
<td>interaction (relationship among humans)</td>
<td>confirmation of deviation in self-formative process</td>
<td>correction of deviant self-formative process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cognitive Interest</td>
<td>technical</td>
<td>practical</td>
<td>(indirectly emancipatory)</td>
<td>emancipatory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hierarchy of Interest at Species Level</td>
<td>basic (&quot;low&quot;)</td>
<td>basic (&quot;low&quot;)</td>
<td>ultimate (&quot;high&quot;)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source of Scientific Knowledge associated with this Type of Activity</td>
<td>natural science</td>
<td>human science</td>
<td>reconstructive science (universal pragmatics)</td>
<td>critical science (model of psychoanalysis)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodology of this Science/ Model</td>
<td>empirical-analytic</td>
<td>hermeneutical</td>
<td>reconstruction of anonymous rule systems</td>
<td>therapeutic/critical</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Critique of Ideology

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Psychoanalytic Model</th>
<th>Advocacy Model*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>emancipation</td>
<td>conflict resolution/emancipation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>correction of deviant self-formative process</td>
<td>advancement to higher level on evolutionary scale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ultimate (&quot;high&quot;)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Methodology of this Science/ Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Psychoanalytic Model</th>
<th>Advocacy Model*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>therapeutic/critical</td>
<td>reconstructive/critical</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### NOTES:

1. This schematic is only a rough approximation of Habermas' theory - many details are omitted.
2. This schematic is based on *Knowledge and Human Interests*, and as modified in later works. Columns marked with * indicate their introduction in later works.
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