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Philosophical problems in Jamaican education : an inquiry into relations between ideology and educational… McKenzie, Earl 1981

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PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS IN.JAMAICAN EDUCATION: AN INQUIRY INTO RELATIONS BETWEEN IDEOLOGY AND EDUCATIONAL POLICY by ST. HOPE EARL MCKENZIE B.A., Columbia U n i v e r s i t y , 1972 M.F.A., Columbia U n i v e r s i t y , 1974 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY i n THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES The Department of Philosophy We accept t h i s t h e s i s as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA November 1981 © St. Hope Earl McKenize, 1981 I n p r e s e n t i n g t h i s t h e s i s i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t o f t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r an advanced degree a t t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a , I a g r e e t h a t t h e L i b r a r y s h a l l make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r r e f e r e n c e and s t u d y . I f u r t h e r agree t h a t p e r m i s s i o n f o r e x t e n s i v e c o p y i n g o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r s c h o l a r l y p u r p o s e s may be g r a n t e d by t h e head o f my department o r by h i s o r h e r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . I t i s u n d e r s t o o d t h a t c o p y i n g o r p u b l i c a t i o n o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r f i n a n c i a l g a i n s h a l l n o t be a l l o w e d w i t h o u t my w r i t t e n p e r m i s s i o n . Department o f The U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a 2075 Wesbrook P l a c e V ancouver, Canada V6T 1W5 Date 2 7 TU^^MJ^ [°C2[ DE-6 (2/79) i i ABSTRACT My main aim in this thesis is to apply philosophical analysis to some of the central social and educational questions which were raised by the emergence of the Jamaican variant of democratic social ism, and by the attempt which was made at devising an educational policy as part of i ts strategy of social reform. I offer an account of the concept of ideology and then use i t to give accounts of the idea of democratic socialism, and of the Jamaican variant of democratic socialism. I then bring this conception of ideology to bear on the description and discussion of three of the problems in Jamaican society which the democratic soc ia l is ts addressed, and on my examination of the related problems of formulating educational policy aimed at their solution. F i r s t , I examine the problem of negative attitudes to work in Jamaican society, and the view that the solution is to be found in a soc ia l i s t ideology of work, and in educational pol icies based on this ideology. A dist inct ion between Labour and Work is introduced and used to interpret aspects of Jamaican social and histor ical experience. I argue that this dist inct ion is a suitable basis for educational pol icy. Second, I examine the problem of bringing educational arrange-ments to bear on the pursuit of egalitarian ideals. I deny the view that egalitarianisin requires a unitary school system, and I argue that a mixed school system is compatible with the pursuit of egalitarian as well as important non-egalitarian objectives. i i i Third, I examine the problem of po l i t ica l development in Jamaica, and the view that in order to aid i ts development, po l i t ica l education should be made a part of schooling. The notion of po l i t ica l education is analysed. I also examine some of the arguments which might be brought to bear on the issue of po l i t i ca l education in schools. I argue that formal po l i t i ca l education is just i f ied in the Jamaican context, and that a p o l i t i c a l l y aware l iberal arts curriculum is the approach to po l i t ica l education which is most l ike ly to enrich the po l i t ica l l i f e of a developing society. i v CONTENTS Page Abstract. . . . • i i Acknowledgements v Introduction 1 Chapter I The Concept of Ideology 5 II The Idea of Democratic Socialism 22 III The Jamaican Variant of Democratic Socialism 39 IV Education and the Ideology of Work 63 V Education and Egalitarian Ideology 97 VI Ideology and Pol i t ica l Education 132 Postscript 163 References 165 Acknowledgements I thank my supervisor Dr. D.G. Brown for many valuable discussions, for his comments, and for his encouragement. I also thank Drs. J .C . Dybikowski, R.J. Rowan, and E.R. Winkler for reading and commenting on early drafts of some of the chapters. I thank the Agency for Public Information in Jamaica for sending me copies of publications by the Government of Jamaica. I am grateful to my colleagues at Church Teachers' College, Mandeville, especially Ken and Laura Thaxter, Glynne Scott, and Beverley Minott, for sending me Jamaican materials, and for their interest and encouragement. I also wish to thank the Canadian Commonwealth Scholarship and Fellowship Committee for the f inancial assistance which made this study possible. vi DEDICATION To Adina and Wilmoth McKenzie, my mother and father. 1 INTRODUCTION This thesis is a philosophic study of problems in modern Jamacian social and educational thought and of some of the relations between these problems. In 1974, two years after i t was elected to o f f i ce , the Manley Government announced i ts commitment to democratic social ism; i t also tr ied to devise an educational policy as part of i ts strategy of social renewal. This wish to bring education to bear on a programme of social reform raised a number of what I regard as central questions in Jamaican educational philosophy. The main aim of this thesis is to apply philosophical analysis to a number of the questions which were raised, or rev i ta l ised , by these developments in Jamaican pol i t ics and education. The Jamaican democratic socia l ists saw ideology - - especially their own — as a requirement for the reform of Jamaican society, and they made the term an important one in the vocabulary of modern Jamaican p o l i t i c s . This concern with ideology is a widespread feature of reform movements throughout the Third World. These considerations led me to take the notion of ideology as the central concept of this inquiry; a l l the educational issues examined are related to problems in social and po l i t i ca l ideology. The study is divided into two main sections. The f i r s t three chapters are mainly expository: they are accounts of the background ideological issues, sources and contexts. In the f inal three chapters, philosophical analysis is applied to a number of practical social and educational questions which arise out of the issues discussed in the 2 earl ier chapters. The conception of ideology which is used in the study is introduced in chapter one. A number of ways of characterizing ideology are examined and rejected as unsatisfactory. The conception of ideology which is then offered is described as one which is within the conceptual boundaries of the existing concept of ideology, and which may also be brought to bear on discussion of the ideological movements in Third World contexts. In chapter two, the conception of ideology which is introduced in chapter one is used to elucidate an interpretation of the idea of demo-cratic socialism. Both the conception of ideology and the interpreta-tion of democratic socialism are then used, in chapter three, to give an account of the Jamaican variant of democratic socialism. The chapter on democratic socialism is an account of the histor ical sources and of the general conceptual backdrop against which the Jamaican interpreta-tion of the ideology might be viewed. The Jamaican variant of democratic socialism is then described as an interpretation and application of democratic soc ia l i s t ideas in the Jamaican context. Aspects of Jamaican educational policy under democratic socialism are examined in the second section of the study. The Jamaican demo-crat ic soc ia l is ts faced the problem of deciding what should be done in education in order to advance their envisioned ideals of social trans-formation. They raised and gave their own answers to a number of norma-tive questions in Jamaican education. Three of these questions are examined in the f inal chapters. The problem of bringing education to bear on negative attitudes to work in Jamaican society is examined in chapter four. The conception of ideology employed in the study is used to describe the problematic 3 condition of work in Jamaican society, and to explicate the democratic soc ia l i s t view that the solution is to be found in a soc ia l is t ideology of work and in i ts attendant educational po l ic ies . A. dist inction between Labour and Work which is inspired by, but which is different from that which Arendt draws between the animal laborans and homo faber is intro-duced. This dist inct ion is used to interpret aspects of Jamaican social and histor ical experience. It is also defended as a basis for a policy of work education in the Jamaican context. Egalitarianism was one of the main concerns of the Jamaican demo-cratic s o c i a l i s t s , and they believed that educational organization should be directed towards the achievement of egalitarian objectives. More spec i f i ca l l y , i t was argued that egalitarianism requires a unitary school system. In chapter f ive an account of egalitarianism is advanced, and relations between egalitarianism and education are explored. I defend the view that a mixed school system is compatible with the pursuit of egalitarian as well as important non-egalitarian objectives. The term 'po l i t i ca l education' was an important one in the vocabu-lary of Jamaican democratic social ism, and there were suggestions that po l i t ica l education should be made part of formal schooling. This pro-posal is examined in chapter six . I analyse the notion of po l i t ica l education. A dist inct ion between an ideology of the state and an ideology of government is introduced and relations between these two kinds of ideology and po l i t ica l education are examined. I argue that formal po l i t i ca l education is just i f ied in the Jamaican context. I also argue that a po l i t i ca l l y aware l iberal arts curriculum is the approach to po l i t i ca l education which is most l ikely to resist the dangers feared by opponents of formal po l i t i ca l education. This approach 4 to po l i t i ca l education is also defended as a way of bringing the richness and diversity of the development of mind to bear on the l i f e of the pol is . The thesis consists mostly of theoretical exposition and analysis, including conceptual analysis,, the application of work already done in philosophy, and the producing and examination of arguments which might be brought to bear on specif ic policy issues. The problems are not, however, altogether abstracted from their social context; there is some description of the social and po l i t i ca l setting in which these problems arose and in which they continue to exist . I draw from philosophical as well as non-philosophical sources; this is in keeping with my view that both po l i t ica l and educational, philosophy should aim at close inter -relations with the social sciences. The problems examined are not, in their main features, peculiar to the Jamaican context; but I believe that the part icular i t ies of the Jamaican condition can add something of value to a more general understanding of them. The thesis was under-taken largely out of a f e l t need to seek a form of philosophical inquiry which is informed by awareness of the problems of the underdeveloped societ ies , and which, hopefully, may contribute something to the d is -cussion of Third World a f fa i r s . 5 CHAPTER ONE THE CONCEPT OF IDEOLOGY In the nineteen f i f t i e s , and in a development described by i ts c r i t i cs as i t s e l f ideological , a number of scholars in the industrial ized west announced the 'end of ideology'. They were mistaken. Ideologies continue to exert considerable influence on the modern world and this seems to be especially the case in those countries that have come to be called the Third World. This study is partly about ideology: i t is about democratic socialism, one of the modern ideologies, and especially about i ts Jamaican variant; i t is also about aspects of the relations between this ideology and educational policy in the Jamaican context, and about some of the philosophical problems posed by these relat ions. In the interest of c la r i t y , I shall begin with an account of my understanding of the term ' ideology 1 , and what I shall mean by i t throughout the study. I take as my starting point the view that ideologies are bel ief systems. The expression .'belief system1 is one of the attempts at f ind -ing a non-evaluative way of describing them. This attempt at object-i v i ty suits my purposes, for I do not intend my use of 'ideology' to be either pejorative or laudatory. I propose to use i t in a way which is similar to that of some other writers who regard i t as part of the working vocabulary of ordinary social and po l i t i ca l l i f e , as well as of , social and po l i t i ca l theory. By ideologies I mean bel ief systems l ike socialism, l iberal ism, conservatism, or apartheid, nazism and facism. These kinds of bel ief 6 systems are sometimes contrasted with science, theories, and philosophies. Some accounts of ideology, for example those offered by Corbett (1965), and Maclntyre (1973), regard religions as ideologies; sometimes ideolo-gies are said to be earthbound 'secular re l ig ions ' . My own view is that while ideologies can be distinguished from other kinds of bel ief systems, ideological concerns sometimes overlap with those of science, theory, philosophy, and so on. Some of these areas of contrast wil l be noted as my account proceeds. J l I s h a l l , f i r s t of a l l , note a few aspects of the history of the word. Following this I shall review a number of what I consider unsat-isfactory ways of characterizing ideology. I shall then describe the conception of ideology which I think is most appropriate for this inquiry. It i s widely believed by those who have studied i ts etymology, in -cluding Lichtheim (1967), Drucker (1974) and Larrain (1979), that the word 'ideology' was f i r s t used by Destutt de Tracey near the beginning of the nineteenth century to mean 'the science of ideas ' . Since then the notion of ideology has become one of the most disputed concepts in social theory, and is i t se l f - the subject of ideological disagreement. After de Tracey, Marx used the word to refer to what he regarded as the ' fa lse consciousness' of the bourgeoisie. Mannheim followed Marx but contrasted ideology with Utopia, or the thinking of progres-sives. In many minds, the word is now associated with dogmatism, fanaticism, and the excesses of revolutionary upheavals. Those who 7 are opposed to ideology, make an evaluative dist inction between ideologi-cal and non-ideological approaches to p o l i t i c s ; their use of the word 'ideology' is intended to be pejorative. Others contend that a l l pol -i t i c a l doctrines are ideological . Some believe that in view of i ts long association with po l i t ica l concerns, use of the word should be restricted to the designation of po l i t ica l bel iefs . Others contend that ideologies may be either po l i t i ca l or non-po l i t ica l . In some accounts, ideological beliefs are described as i r ra t iona l , unverif iable, or habitual; some accounts, which also seek to discredit them, focus on their social causes. These are not central features of my own conception or interest. I shall consider each in turn. Raphael, in search of a contrast with po l i t ica l philosophy, claims that ideology is "a prescriptive doctrine that is not supported by rational argument." In his view, "A set of value judgements which have not been subjected to rational scrutiny by the tests of consistency and accordance may be called ideological . " He regards ideological doctrines as "non-rationally normative" (1976, pp. 17-20). The gist of Raphael's view is that ideological beliefs are . i r rat ional ly held. Part of what he might mean is that these beliefs are groundless, or that there are no good reasons for holding them. But suppose that one of the prescriptive doctrines of l iberalism i s , as Frankel suggests, the view that pol i t ica l organization should con-s is t in "constitutionalism mediated by elections" (1978, p. 105). There are good reasons which can be offered in support of this view. It might be argued, for example, that this approach to po l i t ica l organization fac i l i ta tes the peaceful transmission of authority. There are instances of class conf l i c t , from history as well as the present, which Marxists 8 can and do offer as reasons for the bel ief that "The history of a l l exist -ing society is the history of class struggles" (Marx and Engels, 1959, p. 7). S imi lar ly , conservatives offer the ongoing social and po l i t ica l manifestations of human f ra i l t y as the grounds for the bel ief in what Quinton cal ls the moral and intel lectual "imperfection of human nature" (1978, p. 13). Ideological beliefs are not necessarily without j u s t i -f i cat ion . Inquiry into the question of the alleged inconsistency be-tween the pursuit of l iberty and equality - - a n undertaking which Raphael regards as philosophical - - is one which is important for , and which may also be undertaken within the context of democratic ideologies l ike l iberal democracy and democratic socialism. Beliefs in ideals l ike l iberty and equality may be ideological be l ie fs . It is true, of course, that not a l l who hold ideological beliefs also believe that, in pr inc ip le , such beliefs should also be open to rational scrutiny and assessment. Ideological be l ie fs , l ike other bel iefs , may be dogmatically and tenaciously held. Drucker, in his discussion of ideological approaches to the definit ion of ideology suggests that "For Liberals , any theory is ideological i f i t teaches intolerance of other theories" (1974, p. 140). Even i f there are good reasons which might be offered in support of a particular ideological be l ie f , not everyone who holds i t may have or be able to give these reasons for believing i t . Some ideological beliefs may well be without j u s t i f i c a -t ion , and there may be times when some ideological beliefs are i r ra t ion -al ly held by those who believe them. But, in my view, i r rat ional i ty is not a necessary condition for beliefs being ideological . Another approach is to claim that statements expressing ideological beliefs cannot be ver i f ied , or as Popper would prefer, cannot be f a l s i -9 f ied . Ideologies are seen as systems of unverifiable or unfalsif iable be l ie fs . Posit iv ists have made similar claims about religious and moral be l ie fs . Berlin has this characteristic of ideological beliefs in mind when he marks off those domains of inquiry which can establish the truth or fa ls i ty of their claims by formal or empirical means from those which cannot, and in his view ideologies belong in the second group: The principal candidates for inclusion into this charmed c i r c l e , who have not suceeded in passing the required tests , are the occupants of the large, r ich and central , but unstable, volcanic and misty region of ' ideologies' (1962, p. 3). Now i t is true, I think, that many ideological be l ie fs , including some of the most important ones, are of this kind. They attempt, as Maclntyre puts i t , "to delineate certain general characteristics of nature or society or both, characteristics which do not belong only to particular features of the changing world which can be investigated only by empirical inquiry" (1973, p. 5). In his view, the marxist doctrine of d ialect ical change, and the God-made character which Christians attribute to the world, are examples of such characterist ics. Burke's view of po l i t i ca l l i f e as a contract between the l i v ing , the dead and the yet unborn, or conservative organicist views of society, may also be offered as examples. These beliefs are interpretative ways of com-prehending natural or social phenomena; they are forms of metaphorical or analogous thinking based as much on what is observed as on what is created; they are, as Wolin (1960) would put i t , acts of vision and imagination. They are found not only in ideology, but in theory and philosophy as wel1. But even i f i t is granted that some ideological bel iefs cannot be conclusively ver i f ied or f a l s i f i e d by empirical or formal means, not 10 a l l ideological beliefs are of this kind. Some, l ike marxist predictions, and the anthropological claims of nazism, have been fa l s i f i ed by exper-ience, or shown to be untenable. Ideological bel iefs are often about the history, economic structure, and social conditions of part icular , existing societ ies . Their claims are open to investigation and are as ver i f iable or fa l s i f iab le as the claims of history, economics or sociology. Another attempt at characterizing ideological beliefs thinks of them as being somehow below the level of ref lect ive consciousness; they are acquired ways of looking at the world which function, as Robinson puts i t , as "a substitute for inst inct" (1962, p. 4). Gauthier has a similar view when, obviously employing a Chomskian analogy, he thinks of ideology as "part of the deep structure of self-consciousness" (1977, p. 131). These views regard ideologies as systems of habitual, pre-ref lect ive bel iefs . This is also a claim which may be true of ideological bel iefs . They can become sett led, habitual, and taken for granted. But any kind of bel ief can sink to this level of consciousness; i t is not a character-i s t i c which distinguishes ideological from other kinds of be l ie fs . Bluhm has this poss ib i l i ty in mind, I think, when he distinguishes be-tween what he cal ls forensic and latent ideologies: "Forensic ideologies" are the elaborate, self-conscious word systems, formulated at a rather abstract l eve l , which constitute the language of po l i t ica l discussion in times of severe po l i t i ca l stress and st ra in . "Latent ideologies" are the impl ic i t sets of po l i t ica l words which are expressed in attitude and behaviour during more settled times, but which can be "excavated" - - that i s , raised to the forensic level - - by social sc ient i f i c research (1974, p. 10). The views of Robinson and Gauthier resemble what Bluhm cal ls latent 11 ideologies. But, as these writers do not deny, ideological beliefs may also be self -consciously held and debated; in Oakeshott's phrase, they may be abstract principles which are "independently meditated" (1967, p. 5). They may function at the 'surface' of ref lect ive consciousness. Ideological beliefs may be fresh and new as well as settled and habitual. Unlike Gauthier, I hold that conscious reflection is an important aspect of the function of ideological be l ie fs , and that this is especially so in Third World contexts. But I shall return to this later . Some approaches to the definit ion of ideological beliefs focus on their social causes. These approaches, presumably, seek to distinguish between social ly determined bel ief systems and those, l ike science, log ic , mathematics, and so on, which are not believed to be social ly determined, or which are believed to be less social ly determined than others. Ideol-ogies and religions are regarded as paradigms of those bel ief systems believed to be social ly determined. One apparently widespread approach is the view that ideological beliefs are caused by social i l l n e s s . They are seen as symptoms of social disorder, or as forms of catharsis by which societies r id them-selves of tension and discord. They are regarded as signs of a loss of social equilibrium. Those who regard ideologies in this way do not deny that ideologies have social value. According to their view, ideologies are valuable as indicators of disorder, or because of the social evi ls they help to reduce. But l ike the symptoms of disease, ideologies are associated with the evi ls with which i t is believed they are l inked. This i s , for the most part, a negative view of ideology. Ideologies are seen as having a secondary rather than a primary social function. It should be 12 noted that those who view ideology in this way usually have other people's ideological beliefs in mind. They would be less l ike ly to regard their own ideological bel iefs - - i f they admit that they have them - - mainly as the symptoms or expressions of social' inf i rmity . The second of these two causal approaches is that associated with marxism. It is what Seliger (1977) cal ls a restr ict ive conception of ideology in that i t includes only bel ief systems of a certain kind. Marx has been interpreted, by Singer for example, as believing in a materialist conception of history involving a three-t ier process: "productive forces determine relations of production, which in turn determine the super-structure" (1980, p. 37). On the marxist view, ideology, philosophy, re l ig ion , ar t , and so on, are parts of the superstructure. Ideology is associated with the ruling c lass. Ideological beliefs are the distorted rat ional izat ions, the ' false consciousness' by which the ruling class masks, protects, and promotes i ts se l f - in te res t . Habermas, who writes from a marxist perspective, offers the following account of ideology: From everyday experience we know that ideas serve often enough to furnish our actions with just i fy ing motives in place of the real ones. What is called rationalization at this level is called ideology at the level of co l lec -tive action (1971, p. 311). Both of these approaches make and emphasize the important observa-tion that ideological beliefs have causes and motives. They also draw attention to the importance of the relations between ideological beliefs and the social contexts in which they occur. But while I agree that ideological beliefs arise in response to social problems, I shall a t t r i -bute a more positive role to them than do those who view them mainly as symptoms of social ailment, or forms of tension-relieving social 13 expression. It is also not part of my view that ideological beliefs are chiefly forms of self - interested rat ional izat ion. There is a tendency in both of these approaches, at least according to some interpretations of them, to treat ideologies as i f they were epiphenomenal, as i f they lack primary, causal eff icacy in determining social events. But why must the causal flow of influence be one-way and asymmetrical and not two-way and symmetrical? It can be argued that ideological bel iefs also determine social real i ty by influencing what people do; they do not merely ref lect and express i t . In the account of ideology I shall of fer , I do not attach any deterministic primacy to the soc iety - to -bel ief causal relation against the bel ief - to -soc iety relat ion. I am more interested in the ef fects , or the expected effects of ideological beliefs than I am in their causes. My approach is to view ideological beliefs as the bases, the preconditions of social and po l i t i ca l action; they are part of what Aune, in his account of bel ief ca l ls "the conscious springs of purposive behaviour" (1977, p. 107). I agree with Robinson (1962, p. 4) that ideological bel iefs are social ly indispensable. They may at times constitute the very framework on which social organization rests. I l l I turn now to the conception of ideology which I wish to use in this study. It was devised mainly with the Jamaican experience and similar Third World contexts in mind. I believe that when Manley and other leaders of underdeveloped societies speak of an ideological approach to social reform they are thinking of some such conception of 14 ideology. At the same time I believe this conception is also broad enough to cover most of what is generally understood by the notion of ideology, i t does not, I believe, go beyond the confines of the existing concept. The term "ideology 1 , as I shall use i t , is governed by four conditions which I shall now describe. F i r s t , I regard ideologies as systems of shared be l ie fs . Ideological bel iefs are shared by the members of some group. An individual may de-scribe his bel ief as his theory or his philosophy even i f he is the only one who believes i t . Theoretical or philosophical bel iefs may or may not be shared with others, but a bel ief is ideological only i f i t is shared with others. Just as one cannot say how many stones make a heap, one cannot say how many persons must share a bel ief before i t becomes ideological . But a bel ief becomes ideological only i f i t is accepted by a s ignif icant number of people. But the bel ief must be shared in some group-identifying sense. Not al l shared beliefs are ideological . Ideological beliefs are taken seriously by the members of some group. The group is defined — by i ts members as well as by others - - by reference to these be l ie fs ; they give the group i ts social and pol i t ica l identity. A group is defined as marxist, l i b e r a l , conservative, and so on, by reference to certain shared be l ie fs . Ideological beliefs are sources of group se l f - ident i t y , and i t is also by reference to some set of shared beliefs that ind i -viduals define themselves as marxists, l i be ra ls , conservatives, and so on. Second, I take ideologies to be bel ief systems which direct action in the social and po l i t ica l spheres. Ideological beliefs are sometimes beliefs about the principles which should guide conduct in these spheres: 15 proletarian freedom, mediation, skepticism, and the l i ke . They are also bel iefs about human nature and social real i ty - - actual or possible - -which, in the l ight of the relevant pr inciples, require action. Maclntyre, who holds a simi1ar view, comments on this relational quality as follows: ideology "does not merely te l l us how the world is and how we ought to act , but is concerned with the bearing of the one upon the other" (1971, p. 6). Ideological concerns are centrally moral ones. I mean moral as opposed to amoral or nonmoral, not immoral, for particular ideological beliefs may well be regarded as immoral. This moral dimension is f re -quently noted. Partridge sees "moral ref lect ion" as the chief character-i s t i c of the "ideological impulse" (1967, p. 34). On Geertz's account, ideological beliefs may be described as clusters of shared moral beliefs which create what he cal ls a "col lective conscience" (1973, p. 220). In saying that ideological beliefs direct social and po l i t ica l action, I am also identifying what seems to me to be the main focus and content of ideological be l ie fs . Those who contrast ideology with rel igion - - i t is my own view that the two should be distinguished - -prefer to rest r ic t ideological concerns to these earthbound spheres. Ideologies may, but need not be set in wider metaphysical, philosophical, or religious contexts. In restr ict ing their concern to the direction of social and po l i t ica l action, I am also granting that ideologies may be social or p o l i t i c a l . The term ' soc ia l ' has a wider reference than ' p o l i t i c a l ' ; whatever is po l i t i ca l is necessarily s o c i a l , but social concerns need not be p o l i t i c a l . Pol i t ica l ideologies usually embrace social concerns, but social ideologies need not address po l i t i ca l questions. 16 Normative po l i t i ca l theory and moral and po l i t ica l philosophy are also concerned with the principles which should direct conduct. Their concerns overlap with those of ideology. But there are at least three differences. (a) There is a difference in the extent of their closeness to everyday social and po l i t i ca l action. While they are a l l beliefs in society, to employ a phrase used by Harris (1968), ideological beliefs character ist ical ly function closer to ordinary social and po l i t i ca l real i ty than do the beliefs of academic theory and philosophy. Keohane has this closeness to practice in mind in attributing a pract ica l , u t i l i ta r ian character to ideology: "Ideologies are appropriate equip-ment for those who play the game, who combat and perform in the pol i t ica l arena. The actor needs an ideology not a theory or a philosophy" (1976, p. 82). Ideologies do not monopolize this concern with practice; the difference is one of degree. Ideological emphasis f a l l s on practice while that of theory and philosophy fa l l s chiefly on analysis, ref lec -tion and explanation. The nature of the relation between theory and practice is i t s e l f a problematic issue. (b) Ideologies are as concerned with directing the means of social and po l i t i ca l organization as they are with the ends of such organiza-t ion . Unlike theories and philosophies - - contractarian theory and ut i l i tar ianism wil l do as examples — ideologies are heavily pro-grammatic. They prescribe, sometimes in considerable de ta i l , the soc ia l , economic, po l i t i ca l means by which the stated ends are to be achieved. (c) The forms of social and po l i t i ca l action they direct are advo-cated for popular acceptance, and they are usually zealously promoted. 17 This wide acceptance, I have already claimed, is a necessary feature of the character of ideological be l ie fs . Third, I regard ideologies as systems of sense-making social and pol i t ica l be l ie fs . I use the expression 'sense-making' to refer to a variety of notions: explanation and jus t i f i ca t ion , as well as the pro-cess by which i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y , meaning, order and coherence are given to experience. Ideological beliefs help people explain, jus t i f y , as well as give i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y , meaning, order and coherence to experience and action in the social and po l i t ica l spheres. Geertz, who regards ideologies as cultural symbol systems, captures aspects of this sense-making function when he describes ideologies as "extrinsic sources of information in terms of which human l i f e can be patterned"; "schematic images of social order"; and as "maps of problematic social real i ty" (1973, pp. 216-220). As part of this sense-making function, ideologies make knowledge claims; those who advocate ideological positions claim that they know that certain things are the case, and that they know how to realize certain ends. They promote values by advocating principles and by creating conceptions of the good l i f e . Ideologies employ a variety of sense-making devices. They rely on the narrative, sense-making eff icacy of history and myth. Linguistic as well as non- l inguist ic devices l ike slogans, mottoes, anthems, monuments and ceremonies are used to create the forms of emotional and intel lectual understandings which give point to social organization and action. The fourth feature of ideological beliefs concerns their system-atic nature. Ideological bel iefs are parts of a larger system or whole. It is sometimes said that in contrast with science, theory and philosophy, 18 there is less emphasis, in the case of ideology, on the logic of the relations between bel ie fs . This need not be the case, however, when the concerns of these areas overlap. Ideologists may also be concerned about the logical consistency of their views. Ideologies are also some-times said to be 'closed' rather than 'open' bel ief systems, meaning that they are more resistant to change. The claim is not, of course, that ideologies do not change, but that they do not attach a positive value to internal change, or to the possib i l i ty of such change. But the chief feature of their systematic nature which I wish to note is that ideological be l ie fs , l ike other forms of systematic organization, are usually structural ly organized around some central purpose; they are concentrated on some single unifying concern. Ideological purpose is focused on some possible feature of the social and po l i t ica l landscape, l ike preservation or change. Ideologies are systems of problem-solving social and po l i t i ca l be l ie fs ; they are at any rate problem-solving in their intent. The purpose of the organ-ization of ideological beliefs i s , in Geertz's phrase, the solution of some problematic social rea l i ty . In short, ideological beliefs (a) are shared by some group and help to define the social and po l i t i ca l identity of that group; (b) direct and guide social and po l i t ica l action; (c) are sense-making in that they help to explain, jus t i f y , as well as give i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y , meaning, order and coherence to social and pol i t ica l experience, and (d) are focussed on the solution of some specif ic problem of social and po l i t i ca l organization. In what follows, my use of 'ideology' wil l be governed by these four conditions. I turn now to some pre-liminary observations on the significance of this conception of ideology 19 in Third World contexts. II "Compared to the c lassic revolutions of the seventeenth to nine-teenth centures," writes MacPherson, "the revolutions of the under-developed countries in our time depend to a much higher degree on ideology" (1969, p. 303). He offers two main reasons. F i r s t , the leaders of the underdeveloped countries face the enormous challenge of taking backward often prepolit ical peoples into the modern world. Central to this task is the creation of po l i t i ca l and national con-sciousness, self-esteem, and faith and confidence in the future. This, he suggests, is a task for ideology. The second reason concerns the relation between ideology and economic development. In the absence of an indigenous bourgeoisie - - where this is the case - - economic i n i t i a -tive has to be taken by the state. To do so the state needs mass ideo-logical support i f i t is to assume and maintain leadership in creating and developing a modern labour force. MacPherson is r ight , I believe, in attributing importance to the role of ideology in the pol i t ics of the developing countries. The account of ideology just offered is a way of bringing some of the general issues he mentions into sharper focus; some of these issues bear importantly on the questions to be later examined. In these societ ies , the chief group which ideology seeks to define and give identity to, is the state or body p o l i t i c . Prepolit ical groups l ike nations and colonies have to be transformed into po l i t ies . There are also problems concerning the relations between states and internal groups l ike po l i t ica l 20 parties. Ideologies seek to direct soc ia l , economic and po l i t ica l action towards social reform and development. They launch moral critiques of existing social and po l i t ica l conditions, and undertake re-evaluation of the principles which hitherto directed conduct. There is a search for the programmes which might effect change, and the acceptance of some scheme is widely advocated. In these societies there is an espec-i a l l y strong need for social and po l i t ica l sense-making. The former colonial experience, often traumatic and disorienting, has to be compre-hended and made endurable in col lect ive memory. There is a need to give i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y , order and coherence to the confusion of flux and transit ion. Point and meaning have to be given to the new pol i t ies they hope to create. These ideologies are attempts at solving the problematic social and po l i t i ca l rea l i t ies of neo-colonialism and under-development. The underdeveloped countries, in their search for solutions, make ideological decisions which many social theorists worry about. Impat-ient with the slow process of incremental evolution, the leaders of these societies often attempt comprehensive, to ta l i s t i c solutions to their problems, an.^  approach c r i t i c i zed by those who hold organicist views of social development. In their attempts at advancing pol i t ica l consciousness, these leaders often seek to invest po l i t ica l l i f e with a primordial communalism which some, l ike Sh i l s , contend is not a characterist ic of c i v i l society (cited in Partridge 1967, p. 4). Broadly tutelary in their intent, the exponents of these ideologies usually see education as one of the chief instruments of social reform. Education is to be an important part of the means by which the envisioned social and pol i t ica l order is to be real ized. They incl ine to that view 21 of education - - central to the outlook of philosophers l ike Plato, Rousseau and Dewey - - which holds that the educational process can make v i t a l , fundamental contributions to social reconstruction, and to the advancement of some ideal of human perfection. " In 1974, two years after he was elected to o f f i ce , Michael Manley of Jamaica joined those Third World leaders who seek an jdeological route to social reform. The movement spearheaded by Manley and his government was called democratic socialism. An attempt was made at de-vising an educational policy which would function as part of i ts strategy. One of the most debated questions which followed Manley's announce-ment of the ideological path his government would follow was "What is democratic socialism?" After some preliminary observations on how this question might be answered, I shall give an account of the answer which the Jamaican adherents of democratic socialism gave to i t . Following this I shall take up a number of questions posed by the ideologically oriented deliberations on educational pol icy, and the expectation which accompanied them that education can contribute to the solution of the problematic rea l i t ies of the Jamaican experience. 22 CHAPTER TWO THE IDEA OF DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISM . The Jamaican variant of democratic socialism was an interpretation of a more general idea. Questions about the Jamaican version inevitably converge on the general conception in which i ts historical and in te l lec -tual sources are to be found. This chapter is an attempt at elucidating this general conceptual backdrop against which the Jamaican interpreta-tion of the ideology, and the educational questions posed by i t , may be more clearly examined. The aim is to state the basic ideological positions - - in the l ight of the account of ideology just given — by identifying and making ex-p l i c i t some of the root assumptions on which the enterprise of demo-cratic socialism rests. The key concepts are, of course, socialism and democracy, and a democratic soc ia l i s t is one who believes that the two notions are compatible; he claims to be both a soc ia l i s t and a democrat. In what follows I offer an introductory examination of the ideology, by stating and commenting on what I think are some of the basic premisses of the arguments a democratic soc ia l i s t might offer in support of his claims. I also make some introductory observations on the place of educational policy in the democratic soc ia l i s t scheme. The choice of the term 'democratic socialism' is in need of comment. There are a number of expressions used to describe the general ideological grouping which is here called 'democratic socia l ism' . These include 'social democracy', ' l iberal socialism' and 'evolutionary soc ia l ism' . I s h a l l , however, focus on the expression 'democratic socialism' since 23 this was the one used in the Jamaican context. Those who, l ike Manley, choose 'democratic socialism' presumably wish to contrast their variant of socialism with to ta l i ta r ian , 'undemo-crat ic ' approaches, by which they usually mean marxist-inspired or supposedly marxist-inspired communism. Some who see socialism as essen-t i a l l y democratic in s p i r i t , regard the use of the word 'democratic' as part of the name of the ideology as a regrettable adjectival redundancy made necessary by the perversions of this ideal in the to ta l i ta r ian , and in their view only so-cal led ' soc ia l i s t ' states. This redundancy functions partly as a rhetorical device: i t is a reminder that demo-cracy is supposed to be a part of the soc ia l i s t idea l , and is a cal l for i ts restoration. Others may hold that socialism can be undemocratic but that i t need not and should not be so. The expression 'social democracy' is one of the oldest in use. The emphasis here is on the social aspect of the soc ia l i s t idea l , and on the bel ief that democracy should be extended into the social domain; as Hook puts i t , the emphasis is on "democracy as a way of l i f e " (1980, p. 99). Those who prefer ' l iberal socialism' wish to emphasize the l iberal origins of the ideals espoused by adherents of the ideology. For the most part they accept the traditions and principles of l iberal c i v i l i z a -t ion. Gal l ie observes that socia l ists seek "not simply to inherit these pr inciples, but to generalize and f u l f i l them" (1967, p. 127). Liberal soc ia l is ts disagree with l iberals not so much over pr inciples, but over the methods by which they are to be real ized, and the scope of attain-ment envisaged. The expression 'evolutionary soc ia l ism' , with i ts biological con-24 notation, emphasizes the bel ief that soc ia l i s t society and culture should be realized through a process of gradual growth. Those who hold this view believe in piecemeal soc ia l i s t development. The contrast sought is with revolutionary socialism. The variety of expressions used is perhaps i t s e l f indicative of uncertainty concerning the identity of the movement. Democratic socialism is an evolving idea in search of a satisfactory way of character-izing i ts core conception. I shall take the term to refer to a variety of movements within social ism, especially those which seek alternatives to both marxism and capitalism. Whatever their differences, the basic position which unites them is the bel ief that socialism is a variant of democratic ideology. In what follows I state some of the reasons which I think those who hold this view might wish to offer in i ts defence. What makes the democratic soc ia l i s t a socia l is t? Social ists and students of soc ia l i s t thought are often, and understandably, hesitant about saying what socialism i s . To report on the use of the word 'social ism' is to report on vagueness, ambiguity and even contradiction. The word has been applied to bel ief systems as disparate as that of the early Christians and German National Socialism. Definitions are often, and perhaps inevitably, themselves ideologically influenced. Opponents of socialism define i t in terms of atrocit ies committed in the name of socialism. Advocates define i t in terms of ideals with which few would disagree. Some definit ions emphasize the ends of social ism, while others emphasize the means by which i t is believed these ends can be achieved. 25 I shall approach socialism as a doctrine of ends as well as of means. The democratic soc ia l i s t is a soc ia l i s t , I suggest, to the extent that he holds beliefs of the kind I shall now describe. Social ist ideologies have, as their fundamental assumption, an optimistic - - and some would say mistaken - - bel ief in the possible emancipation of human nature. Social ists pursue some vision of a 'new soc ia l i s t man' who can be liberated from the shackles imposed on him by society, and especially by capi ta l i s t society. Parekh suggests that the content of this vision of human development has centered on three main themes: "During i ts not very long history, soc ia l i s t thought has re-tained i ts vision of man as an essential ly soc ia l , rational and coopera-tive being and has given i ts history coherence and continuity" (1975, p. 6). Social ists believe that i t is by giving expression to his social nature, by exercising his capacity for self-improvement through rational control of his circumstances, and by cooperating with his fellows in their col lect ive interest , that man realizes his uniquely human potential . Socia l ist optimism has been fed by a number of sources, including Christianity and the Utopian tradit ion. Closely linked with the develop-ment of the idea of modernization, i t also had i ts roots, Taylor suggests, in the Enlightenment and Romanticism. The f i r s t took a "Promethean sel f -def in ing stance" in i ts approach to human nature. The second had what Taylor, following Ber l in , cal ls an 'expressivist' view of man, according to which "The potential which a man expresses is very much his own; i t develops out of him, and is not defined by some relation of harmony with a larger order" (1974, p. 49). Two sets of arguments converge on the soc ia l i s t posit ion. The f i r s t is offered in support of the view that capitalism is necessarily 26 destructive and restr icts the development of man's soc ia l i t y , rat ional i ty , cooperativeness, and the l i ke . The second seeks just i f icat ion for the claim that soc ia l i s t modes of organization do, or can encourage the development of these aspects of human nature. Socialism is h is tor ica l ly rooted in the rise of the labour movement in eighteenth and nineteenth century Europe. It began as a moral crit ique of the dehumanizing effects of the industrial revolution and the emergence of industrial capitalism. These developments created the problematic features of human experience which i ts leaders sought to solve. Soc ia l is t response to these developments took two main forms: admiration for man's growing technological and wealth-creating powers, and moral indignation at the resulting dehumanizatidn. The f i r s t led to the view that man is uniquely a working, self-improving economic animal; the second to the view -that work has to be creative and produc-tive i f i t is to have i ts humanizing and l iberating effects . Marx saw work as the chief characterist ic which distinguishes man from the non-human animals: Men can be distinguished from animals by consciousness, by rel igion or anything you l ike . They themselves begin to distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they begin to produce their means of subsistence, a step which is conditioned by their physical organization (Marx and Engels 1965, p. 31). But Marx also argued that capitalism is a system which alienates the worker from the products and processes of his ac t i v i t i es , as well as from his human essence and from his fellowmen (Marx 1961, pp. 93-109). To realize i ts l iberating potential work must be social ly useful and must be rationally organized to promote the col lect ive interests of those who through work, transform nature and create wealth. 27 One consequence of this outlook is the tendency, among some soc ia l i s ts , to elevate the economic at the expense of the p o l i t i c a l . The unity of the po l i t ica l and economic domains, commonly urged in soc ia l i s t thought and practice, is defended chiefly as a way of advancing economic welfare. It is sometimes argued that this tendency inevitably leads to t o t a l i -tarian results. But i t is worth noting that democratic soc ia l is ts advo-cate only a partial merging of these domains. Concerned as they are with the l iberating potential of work, soc ia l is ts have naturally aligned themselves with the working classes. Social ists attach importance to their views of themselves as members of the world's working community. Kolakowski observes that among students of soc ia l i s t thought there is wide agreement that "any meaningful con-cept of socialism implies the ab i l i t y of the working society to decide i ts own fate , which includes, in part icular , control over the means of production" (1974, p. 10). Concerned chiefly with the emancipation of the working classes, socialism is chiefly the ideology of po l i t i ca l parties and governments supposedly instituted to advance the interests of working people. Notions l ike 'working class' and 'working society' are, of course, vague. But although socialism is t radit ional ly associated with wage earners, and assigns a special role to this group, soc ia l is ts have ex-tended their concern to other groups as well . Bottomore, for example, argues that the quest for soc ia l i s t society should be seen as an enter-prise which embraces the aspirations of other groups as well as those of the labour movement (1974, p. 133). The chief sense-making function which socialism attempts, I think, is the elaboration of a man-as-worker view of social and po l i t ica l 28 organization. It seeks to explain and just i fy as well as give i n t e l l i -g i b i l i t y , point and meaning to^working experience. With i ts ontological , histor ical and mythic dimensions, marxism i s , in this respect, consider-ably richer than democratic socialism. It has a happy story about working-class destiny. But even i f i t is more sparing in these areas, I think democratic socialism nevertheless tr ies to f u l f i l l the same function. It is sometimes said that a moral approach to pol i t ics is one of the characteristics which distinguishes democratic socialism from marxism. Marxists prefer to describe their approach to socialism as ' s c i e n t i f i c 1 . Hampshire thinks of socialism as "a set of moral injunctions" which re-quire the abolit ion of poverty, the redressing of grave inequal i t ies, and the giving of pr ior i ty to the satisfaction of basic human needs (1974, p. 249). Gal l i e (1967) has a democratic soc ia l i s t system in mind in distinguishing soc ia l i s t morality from l iberal morality. The morality of democratic socialism centres on two main pr inciples. In the l i terature of the ideology, equality and freedom are widely advo-cated as the principles which should guide social and po l i t ica l action. The ultimate aim of democratic socialism, according to the Founding Congress of the Socia l is t International, is the creation of " a community in which free men work together as equals" (1951, p. 216). A democratic s o c i a l i s t , writes Radice, is a person who believes in equality and freedom, and in the conscious, directed organization of p o l i t i c a l , economic and social machinery to change society in accordance with these ideals (1965, p. 1). Democratic socia l ists deny that these are the principles which guide conduct in marxist and capi ta l is t systems. These two principles comprise 29 what Dworkin (1978, p. 116) would cal l the constitutive morality of demo-cratic social ism; they are the positions which are valued for their own sake rather than as strategies. There are important links between equality and freedom. Equality is often a precondition for freedom. But the two notions are also often in conf l ic t . The promotion of equality sometimes results in the res t r i c -tion of freedom, and freedom may be promoted'in ways which are det r i -mental to equality. The problem o f finding sustaining relations between these two principles is one of the main challenges of democratic socialism. Equality is widely regarded by many socia l ists as the more funda-mental of these two pr inciples. It is the central component of the soc ia l i s t ideal of communal col lect iv ism. The principle of equality has been the chief basis of soc ia l i s t crit ique of the inequalities of capitalism and the unfair distribution of worker-created wealth. Kolakowski sees equality as belonging to "the very core of a l l t rad i -tional soc ia l i s t ideologies" (1974, p. 4). According to Berki, ega l i -tarianism is "the harshest, and perhaps the most unpalatable tendency we can encounter in social ism"; but he also regards i t as "the most heroic, most dynamic and noblest of a l l soc ia l i s t principles" (1975, p. 26). Arthur Lewis regards a "passion for equality" as the definit ive soc ia l i s t point of view (quoted in Lichtheim 1970, p. 284). It is believed that social inequalities hinder human development. They rest r ic t freedom and deny power to some. Tawney, one of the chief theoreticians of democratic social ism, puts i t this way: i t is the mark of a c i v i l i zed society to aim at eliminat-ing such inequalit ies as have their source, not in ind i -vidual differences, but in i ts own organization, and . . . individual differences, which are a source of social energy, 30 are more l ike ly to ripen and find expression i f social inequalit ies are, as far as practicable, diminished (1964, p. 57). Social ist egalitarianism, of course, has to meet the usual wel l -known objections. These include claims about biological inequalities and about individual r ights. They include the claim that inequalities are functionally necessary in that social systems cannot function without hierarchy. They include arguments from u t i l i t y and claims about the high cost of implementing egalitarian schemes. There are long-standing reservations about the possib i l i ty of free-dom in soc ia l i s t society. Cr i t ics of socialism argue that individual freedom is inevitably restricted by the soc ia l i s t emphasis on c o l l e c t i -vism, working-class majoritarianism, the unity of the economic and the po l i t ica l domains, economic central izat ion, and the enlargement of the functions of government. But the grim record of total i tar ian ' soc ia l i s t ' regimes notwithstanding, i t is nevertheless debatable whether socialism and individual freedom are necessarily incompatible. Freedom has, in fact , been one of the chief concerns of soc ia l i s t theoreticians. It was the chief goal of Marx's radical humanism. Social ist theories of freedom have centered on the claim that for most workers a condition of unfreedom necessarily obtains under capitalism. It is only by control l ing the economic forces existing in the society, i t is held, that the worker can avoid becoming their victims. He can secure and maximize his freedom only by controll ing the productive forces through ownership and other forms of control. The soc ia l i s t conception of freedom, according to Gal l i e , empha-sizes "freedom to be" rather than freedom to get (1967, p. 128). 31 Harrington, in elaborating his conception of an ideal soc ia l i s t society, argues that "Its most basic premise is that man's battle with nature has been completely won and there is therefore more than enough of material goods for everyone" (1970, p. 421). Harrington argues in favour of the p laus ib i l i t y of the soc ia l i s t scheme by trying to show the human and social consequences which would follow from the rea l i za -tion of this imaginary condition. The claim is that material well-being — the freedom to be — is a precondition for the kinds of development which socia l is ts envision. Poverty l imits the freedom to carry out one's choices. Social ists believe that i t is only through the conscious, rational organization of the world's resources that the 'freedom to be1 can be made widely avai lable. The unity of the po l i t i ca l and economic domains is seen as a part of this process. "The special contribution of Social ists to the concept of freedom," writes Radice, "is their conviction that i t is the government's task not only to preserve po l i t i ca l freedoms but to widen the frontiers of freedom as a whole" (1965, p. 34). I take the foregoing to be some of the chief ends of socialism with which a democratic soc ia l i s t would concur. But there is generally more agreement among socia l is ts about ends than about means. The most general area of agreement is that socialism requires the deliberate and planned reorganization of society. Socialism is rat ional is t ic in i t s methodology in that, as Berki puts i t , the emphasis is on "reason, knowledge, eff ic iency in production, the rational purposeful organiza-tion of human society in the interest of progress" (1975, p. 34). Oakeshott (1962) in a conservative crit ique of rationalism in p o l i t i c s , argues that this approach is the pol i t ics of books; i t is 32 based on knowledge which can be explained, and not, in his view, on the more important practical but inexplicable knowledge of accumulated experience. The soc ia l i s t approach, he believes, is especially appeal-ing to those who lack experience. Democratic socia l ists also believe in a rat ional is t ic methodology, but they are more moderate than marxists in the strategies they espouse. They believe in public ownership and social control of the major, but not a l l , of the means of production, distribution and exchange. They also emphasize trade unions and cooperatives, and advocate extensive govern-ment involvement in social services l ike education and culture, social security, health care, and the l i ke . But they also encourage f l e x i b i l i t y of means. They believe that the strategies employed - - what Dworkin would cal l the derivative rather than constitutive positions (1978, p. 116) — should be suited to the contexts in which soc ia l i s t ends are pursued. I l l But i f the democratic soc ia l i s t claims he is a soc ia l i s t on the grounds that he hold beliefs of the kind just described, what are his reasons for claiming that the soc ia l i s t enterprise, as he sees i t , is also a democratic one? To this he might reply that he regards socialism as democratic in i ts ends as well as in i ts means. Two concepts of democracy are relevant to his point of view. The f i r s t sees democracy as an idea l , and involves a conception of a society which is egalitarian in i ts economic and social structure and l ibertar ian in i ts way of l i f e . On the second view, democracy is a procedural notion; the word refers to 33 certain procedures and institutions and involves the application of notions l ike self-determination, part ic ipat ion, and responsible representation to the workings of these procedures. The democratic soc ia l i s t might argue that both socialism and democracy are concerned with human development. He could agree with MacPherson that the aim of democracy "is to provide the conditions for the free development of human capacit ies, and to do this equally for a l l members of the society" (1965, p. 58). What distinguishes him as a soc ia l i s t is that, to use Parekh's examples, he is chiefly interested in the develop-ment of s o c i a l , rat ional , and cooperative capacities. Democracy can be regarded as an enterprise which depends on these capacit ies, and which is also concerned with their advancement. His view of democracy as a characterist ic of an ideal society centres chiefly on i ts social and economic structure. Wollheim (1975, p. 124) mentions some soc ia l i s t arguments which bear on this approach to democracy. There is the Guild Social ist argument that a society is demo-crat ic only i f a l l i ts institutions are also democratic. It is also argued that po l i t i ca l democracy is unsafe without democracy in the economic domain. There is also the claim that i t i s morally inconsis-tent to apply democracy in one domain while excluding i t from others. If democracy is good i t should be given the widest possible application. Given his special interest in man as worker, and in the economic foundations of his freedom and development, the democratic soc ia l i s t has a special interest in the idea of economic democracy. In his view a democratic society is without great economic inequal i t ies. He is also committed to working-class self-determination and believes that this requires a self-governed economy. The economy needs to be rationally 34 organized i f i t is to serve the col lect ive interest. If the problem of worker-alienation is to be solved, and i f the welfare of the worker is to be advanced, notions l ike participatory democracy and responsible representation should be brought to bear on the organization of the work-place. The worker needs to be able to influence the decision-making process at a l l levels of industrial organization. The democratization of the economy may be carried out on a small scale through common ownership of cooperatives, through the decentraliza-tion of economic control , or on a large scale involving col lect ive state ownership and control. Arneson, who believes that economic democracy is consistent with the preservation of freedom, argues that i t need not involve more than investing a democratically elected authority with the responsibi l i ty for making decisions concerning "the management of produc-tion and the selection of rules of distr ibution" or "deciding what is to be done with the major means of production - - what goods are to be produced, in what manner, and for what purposes" (1979, pp. 235-236). But the democratic soc ia l i s t also wants democracy in the wider social domain. He thinks human social development requires social equality and social freedom. A society is democratic only i f i t has these character ist ics. Thus the democratic soc ia l i s t speaks of "social rights" and of the abolit ion of distinctions "between the sexes, between social groups, between town and countryside, between regional and racial groups" (Founding Congress of the Socia l is t International 1951, pp. 219-222). Although chiefly aligned with the working-classes, the democratic soc ia l i s t rejects a class interpretation of democracy. Many marxist states describe themselves as 'people's democracies'. This need not be 35 seen as an i l legit imate use of the word. As MacPherson (1965) reminds us, the word 'democracy' or ig inal ly meant rule by or on behalf of the poor and the oppressed; this usage dates back as far as Plato. When marxists say they believe in rule by or on behalf of the proletar iat , i t can be argued that they are employing a modern interpretation of the original meaning of the term. Like marxists, the democratic soc ia l i s t envisions the ultimate disappearance of class div is ions, but he rejects a class conf l ic t view of how this might be real ized. He prefers to ground his democratic ideals not in a social entity l ike c lass , or in soc ia l i s t col lect iv ism, but in the idea of individualism and individual r ights, conjoined with notions l ike majority decision, and so on. Cole, who holds this view, defends i t on the ground that "the individual is the f inal repository of ethical values" (1975, p. 104). The democratic soc ia l i s t believes in po l i t i ca l democracy. It i s required by the ideals to which he is committed. He rejects revolutionary violence. He is committed to the view that socialism should be achieved with the consent of the governed. According to Radice, democratic soc ia l is ts "consider that the party system with competing pol i t ica l parties is the best way to ensure the poss ib i l i ty of a regular and peace-ful change of power and to preserve the basic c i v i l l iber t ies" (1965, p. 75). This emphasis on competitive party po l i t ics presupposes a demo-crat ic state or body p o l i t i c . It also assumes that the society has a considerable degree of communal sol idar i ty and a deeply embedded set of consensual values. Cole observes that "Only stable societies possessing a sense of sol idar i ty can in practice give ethical factors pr ior i ty over considerations of power" (1975, p. 104). It is of course debatable whether democratic socialism requires com-36 petit ive party p o l i t i c s . In Tanzania, for example, Nyerere had developed a model, described as democratic s o c i a l i s t , in which a single ideology functions as that of party, government and state; po l i t i ca l choices are allowed within a single ideological framework, but ideological pluralism is not allowed within the pol i ty . Some democratic soc ia l is ts might argue that this approach involves a restr ict ion of freedom of choice. The democratic soc ia l i s t might wish to emphasize his commitment to democracy by invoking his commitment to equality and freedom. The democratic enterprise, whether viewed as an ideal of society or as a set of institutions and procedures, assumes that there are respects in which a l l persons are equal. It assumes, for instance, that they are equal in having economic and social needs, and in having the right to influence the po l i t i ca l process. But equality is also necessary as a way of preserving and advancing equality in these domains. The demo-crat ic enterprise also assumes freedom, just as i t also seeks i ts pre-servation and maximization. Lane, for example, in expanding on a view attributed to Marx, sees autonomy as a precondition for democratic socialism. Without the psychological readiness which consists in a wide-spread capacity for autonomy, attempts at introducing soc ia l i s t i n s t i -tutions into.a society are l ikely to result in "degeneration into poverty, s tas is , or the abuse of power" (1979, p. 76). Thus the demo-crat ic soc ia l i s t might argue that he is committed to democracy as a way of maximizing the freedom which the development of human potential requires, and as an important foundation for the workings of the entire enterprise to which he is committed. Gay, in offering an assessment of this overall enterprise, has some observations on what he cal ls the 'dilemma' of democratic socialism: 37 A democratic Social ist movement that attempts to transform a capi ta l is t into a Social ist order is necessarily faced with the choice between.two incompatibles - principles and power. Socia l is t parties that are dedicated to democracy proceed on the fundamental assumption that their enemies are human too, an assumption that l imits the range of their weapons. Discussion, vote-getting, parliamentarism - -rather than terrorism, violence, revolution - - constitute the arsenal of the democratic Soc ia l i s t . Again, the Socia l is t who is also a democrat wil l eschew dictatorship to maintain himself in power and rely instead, on persuasion (1952, Preface). Democratic soc ia l is ts also face the prospect of never being elected, or having their soc ia l i s t achievements dismantled by succeeding governments. They are sustained, however, by faith in what they regard as the ration-a l i t y of their cause. As Cole observes, their commitment to education also proceeds from their bel ief about the rat ional i ty of their scheme, and the need to persuade: "As socialism was generally believed to have a strong rational basis , i t was natural that a l l schools of soc ia l is ts should set great store by education, persuasion and propaganda" (1967, p. 469). Social ists believe in what they often cal l 'po l i t i ca l educa-t i o n ' . IV I shall be examining a number of educational issues arising out of democratic social ism, and especially a number of problems posed by i ts Jamaican variant. An ideology may perform an educational function by bringing about new forms of awareness, or by keeping certain emphases in the public consciousness. Some social ists regard education as an important part of the quest for the emancipation of human nature; others, l ike Marx, have not attached a primary role to the educational process. 38 But given i ts general outlook, there are a number of specif ic emphases which can be expected from a democratic soc ia l i s t approach to education. Questions posed by three of these wil l be examined in deta i l . The f i r s t is the concern with man as worker, and with the related problem of educating people for the working l i f e . Second, there is the problem of bringing egalitarian ideals to bear on the making of educational pol icy. Third, there is the wider question of the relations between ideology and the idea of po l i t i ca l education. The Jamaican variant of democratic socialism was a particularized interpretation of the general enterprise just described. The foregoing educational questions assume a special guise when examined in the l ight of the Jamican interpretation of the ideology. It is to this interpre-tation that I now turn. 39 CHAPTER THREE THE JAMAICAN VARIANT OF DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISM In this chapter I examine the Jamaican variant of democratic socialism. Democratic socialism is not the only soc ia l i s t ideology with adherents in Jamaica, but i t is the only one so far o f f i c i a l l y espoused by a government; i t is also the one with the largest following, and the one which has had the greatest impact on Jamaican l i f e . It is not my intention, however, to describe or evaluate the nature of this impact. My main concern is to give an account of what some of i ts main exponents meant by the term 'democratic soc ia l ism' . The advocates of democratic socialism in Jamaica claimed they were in search of a d ist inct ly Jamaican interpretation of the ideology, one which would be uniquely suited to Jamaican conditions and needs, and one which would be in some sense central to what Jamaican society is about. It is debatable whether or not there is anything s igni f icant ly Jamaican about their conception of the ideology, but this nat ional ist ic goal of theirs has to be kept in mind. Opponents of democratic socialism in Jamaica frequently referred to i t as an 'al ien ideology' and offered this as a reason for rejecting i t . Their rejection was perhaps based on relative satisfaction with whatever ideology - - latent or perhaps insuff ic ient ly articulated - - they believed was already functioning in the society. Or i t was perhaps based on the view that a Jamaican ideology should emerge from the inner logic of the society i t s e l f ; i t was mistaken to attempt to graft an 'a l ien ' ideology onto the Jamaican po l i t ica l outlook; an ideology should emerge naturally, or not at a l l , 40 out of the Jamaican experience i t s e l f . In his discussion of what he cal ls the 'lean and hungry soc ia l i s ts ' of the Third World, Berki defends the variants of socialism in these societies against the charge that they are theoretically unsophisticated. He points out that these ideologies are concerned with urgent and pract i -cal issues and are mostly addressed to impoverished and uneducated people. But he also sees this as something of an asset: "There is in the Third World, one might suggest, a more convincing 'unity of theory and practice' in socialism than there ever was in Europe except perhaps at the height of revolutions" (1975, p. 123). Much of this is also true, I think, of the Jamaican variant of democratic socialism. Most of the material which wil l be examined here was ideological rather than theoretical in intent. But i t may be the case that theoretical ref lec -tion can help c la r i f y what the ideology was about. It may also suggest aspects which could benefit from further theoretical analysis. Nettleford offers the following account of the origins of socialism in Jamaica: Socialism as understood in Jamaican po l i t i cs may be said to have been the intel lectual and moral 'creation' of the PNP egged on by a group of young nationalists and art icu -lated in terms that suited the Jamaican palate by the l iberal Norman Manley, the PNP leader. It underwent many changes between 1940 when i t was f i r s t declared and 1955 by which time i t had become a mere label for 'progressive' ideas. It had had i ts motivation in the social and economic crises of the ' t h i r t i e s , and the conditions of the masses, in the condition of colonial dependence, in the nature of the European conf l ict which offered at the time a choice between facism and the panacea of social ism, as well as in the exposure of a few bright self-made intel lectuals to Fabian soc ia l i s t thought then current in Britain (1971, p. l i i i ) . In Nettleford's view, the adoption of socialism was the People's National Party's response to the labourism of the r ival Jamaica Labour Party. 41 Nettleford describes Norman Manley as a rat ional ist and non-doctrinaire intel lectual who wished to bring about fundamental social and economic changes in Jamaican society, and who found in socialism "the nearest thing to an all-embracing category of po l i t i ca l thought and strategy that could cover notions of equality, working class participation in the social processes, and indigenous control (through col lect ive action) of Jamaican society" (1971, pp. l i i - l i i i ) . In 1974, two years after he was elected to o f f i ce , Michael Manley, son of Norman Manley, and now leader of the People's National Party and Prime Minister of Jamaica, decided to revive socialism as the o f f i c ia l ideology of his party, and of the government which he now led. It is with this updated conception of socialism that I am primarily con-cerned. Manley described i t as a modern interpretation developed in the context of the contemporary world, and in the l ight of the experience of the Jamaican people, especially over the previous forty years (People's National Party 1979, Foreward). In choosing the term 'democratic soc ia l ism' , adherents of the ideology wished to avoid some of the connotation of the term 'social democracy', perhaps what Berki cal ls i ts "past orthodox flavour" (1975, p. 91). In their view, social democracy is "a pol i t ica l process employ-ing broad reforms of and controls over a capi ta l is t system to create a more just and equitable society without changing the system i t s e l f fundamentally" (People's National Party, 1979, p. 66). They, however, rejected capitalism as the primary or dominant economic system. The Manley Government was expl ic i t on this point: "We reject Capitalism as the system upon which to base the future of Jamaica" (Agency for Public Information n .d . , p. 1). The People's National Party (1979) 42 also frequently expressed the view that capitalism is an evi l system i n -volving the exploitation of man by man and which should therefore be rejected. They were not interested in merely reforming capital ism, and they regarded gradual reform as insuf f ic ient . They wished to bring about a deep and fundamental transformation of the economic system, and indeed of the society as a whole. II Transferred to the Jamaican context, soc ia l i s t optimism about the possible emancipation of human nature became a bel ief about the possi-b i l i t y of l iberating the Jamaican from the debi l i tat ing s o c i a l , economic and psychological legacies of his history. Socialism was viewed as a form of psycho-cultural therapy. While in Europe socialism emerged out of moral indignation against the effects of capi ta l is t industr ia l i za -t ion , in Jamaica, soc ia l i s t moral rage was fed by the effects of both capitalism and colonialism. Jamaican democratic socia l ists linked capitalism not only with economic exploitation, but also with the destruction, uprooting and displacement of peoples and cultures. They linked capitalism with slavery. Along with i ts undesirable social and economic consequences, colonialism was seen as the cause of undesirable psychological consequences. In Manley's view, "the psychology of de-pendence . . . is the most insidious, elusive and intractable of the problems" inherited from colonialism. In his view "If a man is denied both responsibi l i ty and power long enough he wil l lose the ab i l i t y to respond to the challenge of the f i r s t and to grasp the opportunity of the second" (1974, p. 21). This histor ical experience, according to 43 Manley, nevertheless gave the Jamaican a rugged, pragmatic resi l ience which is an asset, and which can be the basis for his development (1974, pp. 135-136). Since i t was mostly non-white peoples who were the victims of white capitalism and colonialism, attitudes to colour were seen as part of this need for emancipation. Jamaica has a predominantly black population which exists in a much proclaimed harmony with a number of minority groups. But according to Manley, "While superf ic ia l ly accepting the notion of a mult i - racial society, the truth is that Jamaica is not yet at peace with blackness or comfortable with i ts African heritage" (1974, p. 57). While a l l groups have, to some degree, been victims of capitalism and colonialism, blacks suffered the additional disadvantage of the exper-ience of slavery. This resulted not only in a greater loss of culture, but also in the lowering of the status of this culture. This cultural loss was replaced by greater westernization on the part of blacks. Another result is that there are greater extremes of poverty among blacks. The group whiich makes up the majority of the population is therefore beset with greater problems of identity combined with more severe economic impoverishment. In the search for an ident i ty , Jamaican blacks vaci l late between Europe and Af r i ca . Fanon, the Caribbean-born student of the psychology of colonialism, sees this as a choice between "the great white error" and "the great black mirage" (1973, p. 275). Nettleford, more posit ively , sees i t as an attempt at harmonizing "the melody of Europe and the rhythm of Afr ica" (1970, pp. 171-211). The challenge is how to advance black economic and psychological l iberation while preserving what is seen as a so-far unusually successful applica-tion of the mult i - racial ethic in v i r tual ly a l l aspects of Jamaican l i f e . 44 Adherents of the ideology sought just i f icat ion and sustenance in Christ ianity . It may be too strong a claim to say that the Jamaican variant of democratic socialism was a variant of Christian Socialism, another group of soc ia l i s t ideologies, but Christian influence on the ideology is obvious. Socialism was designated "the Christian way of l i f e in action" (Agency for Public Information n .d . , p. 1). Christian sources were commonly c i ted , especially in defense of egalitarianism. According to the Manley Government, "Socialism gives practical expression to the Christian bel ief in the equal value of human beings" (Agency for Public Informatin n .d . , p. 1). Manley himself argued that "a moral God can only be responsible for equal children" (n .d . , p. 4). It is true, of course, that in spite of differences of opinion about i ts interpretation - - especially over the question of i ts worldly or other-worldly implications - - the Christian doctrine of equality has neverthe-less been a major influence on modern egalitarian movements. Its influence in Jamaica is hardly surprising. Jamaicans are often described as a religious people. Nettleford points out that the role of Christian missionaries in rehabil i tat ing the Jamaican countryside out of slavery has le f t a strong impression on the Jamaican mind (1971, p. Ix). The search for Christian legitimization of socialism was obviously partly intended as a way of gaining support in a predominantly Christian country. A word should be said about Rastafarianism. Jamaican in or ig in , i t is a rel igion with an increasing influence on the l i f e of the society. It i s a religious response to the condition of black people in Jamaican history which seeks, through affirmation of an African identity (espec-i a l l y Ethiopianism), to develop a theology and a way of l i f e which re-45 stores self -respect and dignity to Jamaicans of African descent. Not overtly po l i t ica l in the sense of having an o f f i c ia l view about the form which social and po l i t ica l organization should take in Jamaica, i t is nevertheless a movement which cannot be po l i t i ca l l y ignored. In the main they reject Jamaican society - - they denounce i t as 'Babylon' - -because of the same evi ls which the Jamaican democratic socia l ists wished to eradicate. The pol i t ica l impulse of democratic socialism, and the religious impulse of Rastafarianism, both had their source in a common discontent with the society. Rastafarianism seeks a religious solution and undertakes much of the same psycho-cultural therapy I have claimed for democratic socialism. Barrett sees Rastafarian communal ism - - as evidenced for example in the absence of "me" and "you" from their language - - as a precursor of the Jamaican variant of democratic socialism (1977, p. 145). A movement which is in favour of racial equality and which seeks to advance the interests of a disadvantaged group is obviously egalitarian in s p i r i t . But Barrett claims that bel ief in black superiority is one of the basic Rastafarian beliefs (1977, p. 104). If this is so the movement is clearly not an ega l i -tarian one, and is in conf l ict with both Christ ianity and socialism. There is some evidence, however, that secularization of the movement d id , to some extent, move in the direction of socialism. Rastafarianism was one of the world-views from which Jamaican socialism was viewed. In many instances, Rastafarian culture - - especially i ts music, language and images - - became the vehicles through which soc ia l i s t ideology was expressed. Socia l is t bel ief in the links between creative work and human development took on a special significance in a society in which the 46 memory of coerced labour under slavery is s t i l l a l i ve . The Jamaican exponents of democratic socialism saw, in the soc ia l i s t approach to work, an antidote to the coerced labour of slavery and the exploited labour of capitalism. The immorality associated with slavery and the capi ta l is t system was countered by a highly moralistic approach to work. It was widely believed, or assumed, I think, that an emphasis on voluntary, social ly useful work was a way of restoring moral status and authority to work. It was f e l t that socialism provides an approach to work which sat isf ies the basic needs of a l l , offers scope for creative sat isfac-t ion , and which elevates i ts moral worth by substituting a l t ru i s t i c concern for the common good for the capi ta l is t pursuit of se l f - in terest . As a soc ia l i s t party, the People's National Party, naturally claims identi f icat ion with the Jamaican working class. This is an ident i f i ca -tion which i t shares with other Jamaican po l i t i ca l parties. It com-petes for popular support with the Jamaica Labour Party, i ts chief r i v a l , and the Worker's Party of Jamaica, a communist party. We recall Nettleford's claim that i ts adoption of socialism was a response to the popular but relat ively unsystematized labourism of the Jamaica Labour Party. Daley r ightly observes that "To a great extent, the two pol i t ica l parties are labor parties committed, as they profess, to working class sol idar i ty" (1971, p. 154). Both emerged out of the labour unrest of the nineteen thi r t ies and both are aligned with major trade unions, and both have been led by inf luential labour leaders. The outlook of the People's National Party has, however, been influenced by the greater support i t has customarily received from the middle class and from i n -te l lectuals ; the influence of the latter party explains i ts greater tendency towards theoretical ref lect ion, social analysis, and ideological 47 ferment. Part of this ideological act iv i ty consisted in a process of social stock-taking in which problematic areas of Jamaican social and economic experience were ident i f ied. Manley saw Jamaican society as one "dis-figured by inequities that go too deep for tinkering" (1974, p. 16). It was not, in his view, a society organized for the purpose of serving the interests of i ts members. In short, the society was seen as an unjust one which lacked the influence of those values - - the values of democratic socialism - - which Jamaican adherents of the ideology believed were the values which should constitute the foundations of social and pol i t ica l organization. Some of their views on Jamaican social and economic structure wil l i l lust rate the general d r i f t of their analysis. The marxist view that class is to be defined in terms of ownership of the means of production, distr ibution and exchange was endorsed (People's National Party 1979, pp. 11-12). The party also believed that the economic structure (ownership of the means of production, d is -tr ibution and exchange) determines production relations (relations at the workplace), which in turn determine social relations between people and classes (People's National Party 1979, p. 19). Although obviously inspired by marxism, i t should be noted that these claims were offered.: as plain assertions; they were not exp l ic i t l y advanced as interpreta-tions of Marx. Applying the marxist view of c lass , Jamaican society was seen as consisting of a capi ta l is t c lass , a working c lass , small farmers, a middle stratum and a lumpen proletariat . Jamaican equiva-lents were given for each of these categories (People's National Party 1979, pp. 11-16). They described what they saw as the five main characteristics of 48 Jamaican economic structure. In some cases these characteristics were linked to specif ic social ef fects . (1) Tradit ional ly , the best agr i -cultural land has been externally owned. Small farmers, who make up the largest class in the society, have had to settle for the "marginal h i l l s ide land:" This has resulted in alienation of people from the land. Agricultural workers have had to choose between subsistence farm-ing on the h i l l s i d e s , or sel l ing their labour for low wages to the colonial owners of the f l a t lands. (2) Economic act iv i ty has consisted chiefly in the export of agricultural products and raw materials to the metropolitan centres in exchange for food and manufactured goods under "cruelly unequal terms of trade." (3) There has been an "enforced subservience of the local economy to the metropolis." This has resulted in the underdevelopment of Jamaican industry and technology, and has discouraged the development of managerial, entrepreneurial and tech-nical s k i l l s . (4) The banking system has been foreign owned and con-t ro l led . As a result , Jamaican savings have been used to serve the interests of the metropolitan economies. (5) The means of distr ibution have been dominated by "a local merchant class that thrived as inter-mediaries (middlemen) in colonial trade." This group has discouraged the development of Jamaican industry (People's National Party 1979, pp. 20-21). There is obviously more to the Jamaican economy than is presented here. But these were seen as the problematic features which were in need of change. These features were regarded as responsible for the exploitation, inequit ies, and injustices which were in need of remedy. It was, of course, believed that soc ia l i s t economic structures would remove these e v i l s , and would lead to an improvement in production re la -49 tions and hence to an improvement in social relations generally. This social analysis was part of an overall moral crit ique of the society, and a general re-evaluation of social and pol i t ica l pr inciples. Like other democratic soc ia l i s ts , the Jamaican exponents of the ideology believed that po l i t ics should be rooted in morality. They promoted a particular moral point of view. The Manley Government claimed i t wanted "to build a soc ia l i s t society in which people wil l be motivated by the sp i r i t of brotherhood and sisterhood and wi l l build the nation through cooperation" (Agency for Public Information n .d . , p. 4). The People's National Party included in i ts "tasks of ideological struggle," "the encouragement of the principles of soc ia l i s t morality based on fraternal relations and cooperation in both work and social duties, in which ser-vice to community and nation comes before se l f - in terest and is the path to the fu l les t expression of the human personality" (1979, pp. 16-17). The Jamaican variant of democratic socialism was above a l l an egalitarian ideology. "The more that I have thought about the morality of p o l i t i c s , " wrote Manley, "the more there has emerged for me a single touchstone of right and wrong; and the touchstone is to be found in the notion of equality" (1974, p. 10). He saw egalitarianism as "the enduring moral basis for social organization" (1974, p. 51). The Manley Government named equality as one of i ts basic pr inciples: "We reaffirm the bel ief in the equality of every human being before God, the Govern-ment and the law and, therefore, of the right of every human being to equality of opportunity, equality of rights and entitlement to security and social just ice" (Agency for Public Information n .d . , p. 4). The People's National Party offered a similar view as one of the principles of democratic socialism (1979, p. 10). Manley frequently used the 50 analogy of parental care to i l lust rate the equal consideration and respect with which he fe l t the state should treat i ts c i t i zens ; in his view "a society is egalitarian when every single member feels inst inct ive ly , un-hesitatingly and unreservedly that his or her essential worth is recog-nized and that there is a foundation of rights upon which his or her interests can safely rest" (1974, p. 38). The principle of equality is the fundamental component in the con-cept of social just ice , even i f , as Frankena (1962) suggests, i t may not be suff ic ient to cover a l l i ts constituent notions. Manley had a theory of social justice and his beliefs about equality were at the core of that conception: One then, might summarize social justice as being concerned with the organization of access. There must be equal access to jobs, to food, clothing and shelter; to social security; to the decision-making process; to the sense of belonging and being of equal value; to creative le isure ; to the pro-cesses and remedies of the law and to education (1974, p. 60). Manley was chief ly interested in the equal distribution of access to resources. It is by sharing equal access to resources, he believed, that the member comes to believe that his equal claim upon the polity is taken seriously, and that his right to equal consideration and respect is recognized. Freedom, the second fundamental principle of democratic social ism, was less emphasized than equality. In th is , the Jamaican democratic socia l ists followed the general soc ia l i s t tendency. The following rather obscure view of freedom was attributed to Norman Manley: "Freedom is the expression of the creative in l i f e . It is neither an inherent right nor a hard won value. It is a law of being, lacking 51 which there would be no evolution, no progress, no c i v i l i z a t i o n , only primal chaos set in permanence" (Manley 1974, epigraph). The Manley Government claimed i t wanted to pursue i ts goals "within the framework of free inst i tut ions" (Agency for Public Information n .d . , p. 4). Manley argued that after the demands of equality are met, "Individual l iberty ceases to be a petulant distraction and becomes the extent to which a l l men may pursue their creative potential within the framework of social survival" (1974, p. 18). His preference for multi-party po l i t i cs , which wil l shortly be discussed, was defended on the grounds that i t preserved l iberty and the right to dissent. Of a l l the freedoms, the freedom to participate in po l i t i ca l l i f e was probably the one most widely and exp l ic i t l y advocated. There are, of course, important con-nections between pol i t ica l freedom and other kinds of freedom. Much was also said about freedom from exploitation, from external (foreign) interference and control , and from the obstacles to freedom of action imposed by poverty. The freedom to develop indiv idual , creative potential was emphasized. But the exercise of freedom was seen as subject to the constraints of national goals, and these national goals were, of course, seen as the goals of democratic socialism. The cooperative ethic was also seen as an important component of democratic soc ia l i s t morality. Social ists often defend cooperation on moral as well as economic grounds. The Manley Government claimed that "cooperation is the basic method by which a society should be organized and that i t is our duty to seek to replace the system of human exploitation with a system of human cooperation" (Agency for Public Information n .d . , p. 4). I have already mentioned that the encouragement of "the principles of soc ia l i s t morality based on f ra -52 ternal relations and co-operation" was seen as one of the tasks of "ideological struggle" (People's National Party 1979, pp. 16-17). Manley tr ied to identify those forces in the society which worked against, and those which encouraged cooperation. Colonialism, he argued, is neces-sar i ly d iv is ive . Those who are ruled compete with each other for the favours of the rulers . Those who rule reward those who are ruled p r i -marily in order to secure their acquiescence. The ruled unite only in order to overthrow their rulers. But in their struggles to survive, Jamaicans had nevertheless succeeded in developing a number of coopera-tive practices. He saw this as evidence that there was already a social basis for the development of a co-operative approach to national problems (1974, pp. 150-151). It is easy to understand why soc ia l i s t rationalism is l ike ly to be attractive in a Third World context. The idea that a society can be improved through conscious, rational organization is attractive not only because i t promises a better way of l i f e , but because i t offers an appealing way of restoring lost dignity. Rationalism suggests that there are po l i t i ca l ways of doing things which are acceptable to a l l rational beings. Oakeshott's (1962) practical po l i t ica l knowledge born of experience, assuming i t ex ists , is l ike ly to be seen as the knowledge which has been used against the colonized society, and which has produced the very results which are now in need of change. Further-more, i t is knowledge which cannot be explained, which can only be acquired through trustful apprenticeship and association, neither of which are attractive prospects to those who have been colonized. Rationalism, however, suggests that rat ional , universalizable discourse between human equals is possible in the sphere of po l i t i cs . It is as 53 a free rational being that the ex-colonial seeks the restoration or the creation of values. The appeal of rationalism is the appeal of the values and powers of the in te l l ec t , and these are not the kinds of values which are fostered under colonialism. But the values of the inte l lect are central to what i t means to be human. They are therefore seen as central to the humanizing task of post-colonial reconstruction. In Jamaica the ideal of se l f - re l iance was also invoked as an impor-tant ingredient in this process of rat ional ist reconstruction. Against the background of a long period of colonial dependency - - some three hundred years in the case of Jamaica - - the notion of sel f - re l iance takes on a special s ignif icance. According to Manley, "the f i r s t task that a post-colonial society must tackle is the development of a strategy designed to replace the psychology of dependence with the sp i r i t of individual and col lect ive se l f - re l iance" (1974, p. 23). Manley observed that "In the immediate post-colonial period, a country may not have any single event in i ts history to which i t can point with unqualified pride. Apart from the attainment of independence i t s e l f , i t is in the nature of colonialism that i t affords few opportunities for self -congratulation" (1974, p. 50). Self - re l iance is necessary to develop confidence and remove self-doubt. The notion of ' s e l f has to be given individual as well as col lect ive meaning. In Manley's view, The great challenge in a society l ike Jamaica is how to develop this sense of personal responsibi l i ty , for one's development subject only to the proviso: I am my brother's keeper. The lack of this sp i r i t i s the most d i f f i c u l t of the legacies of our past to undo. But our success here wi l l determine whether anything else is possible (1974, p. 45). Manley believed that when a society has l i t t l e in i ts history to admire, government helps to advance the sp i r i t of se l f - re l iance by presenting 54 i t with exceptional challenges for future accomplishment. It was the aim of democratic socialism to present such challenges. Manley emphasized his view of socialism as "strategy" (n .d . , p. 17) and he summarized the overall strategy as follows: The strategy of change must . . . operate at the psycho-logical and attitudinal level which involves a concept of mass education; at the structural level which involves a concept of social and economic organization; at a p o l i t i -cal level which involves a concept of mobilization; and i t must envisage the problems of transition which involves a capacity for tact ical accommodation (1974, p. 66). It was a strategy which attempted a fundamental restructuring of the economy; adjustments in foreign policy; as well as changes in the roles of the basic institutions and groups which make up the society. The doctrine of public ownership of the basic means of production, distr ibution and exchange was generally endorsed. It was one of i ts chief roles, the Manley Government believed, to "supervise the running of the economy, by a combination of direct ownership, control by part i -c ipation, regulatory machinery and by creation of appropriate incen-tives and opportunities" (Agency for Public Information n .d . , p. 3). The People's National Party proposed The development of a dominant public sector in which the State owns and/or controls the commanding heights of the economy ( i . e . mineral resources (e.g. bauxite and gypsum), strategic industries and enterprises (e.g. alumina, cement and sugar), public u t i l i t i e s , financial ins t i tu -tions andiforeign t rade . . . (1979, pp. 27-28). Manley careful ly distinguished between ownership and control , and con-tended that The Jamaican economy must grow and distribute i ts pro-ceeds equitably. To do this i ts system of ownership must be consistent with national objectives and i ts resources must be controlled to ensure that they are used to the fu l l and in a manner consistent with social justice (1974, p. 78). 55 In accordance with the general democratic soc ia l i s t approach, there was an expressed preference for a mixed economy. The Manley Government believed that "Jamaica wi l l f lourish best under a mixed economy in which there is a clear and honourable role for responsible private business working in partnership with the public sector of the economy" (Agency for Public Information n .d . , p. 4). The People's National Party, while advocating that the state should own the commanding heights of the economy, also contended that "Every soc ia l i s t economy (even the most advanced) retains areas of private enterprise. It is our policy to encourage ef f ic ient and social ly responsible private enterprise" (1979, p. 29). Manley envisioned "an economy with a public, a private, a small business and a co-operative sector" (1974, p. 121). The Manley Government attempted or proposed programmes of the following kind: direct ownership of a number of important companies; participation in others through the ownership of shares; and increased regulation of the operations of others. It was part of i ts function, i t believed, to use incentives to encourage the development of businesses in what were regarded as pr ior i ty areas, and to undertake pioneering work of i ts own in some of these spheres; to develop cooperatives; and to salvage companies in d i f f i cu l t y . These were combined with extensive Government involvement in education (including adult l i te racy ) , housing and nutr i t ion; the development of mineral resources; as well as greater supervision and control of f inancial institutions (Agency for Public Information n .d . , p. 3). 56 III The Jamaican democratic soc ia l is ts also saw their variant of socialism as a democratic ideology. They took the standard positions on democracy in the economic and social domains. While they regarded po l i t ica l democracy as an important starting point, they believed that i t was by i t s e l f insuf f ic ient . Pol i t ica l equality, they believed, should be combined with economic and social equality. The People's National Party defended the right of people to exercise control over the economy as a fundamental right (1979, p. 9). It claimed that the economy should be controlled by the working people. This con-trol should be exercised d i rect ly , or indirect ly through state represen-tat ion, and i t should be exercised in the private as well as in the public sector (1979, p. 26). The ideal of social equality was an important part of the quest for an egalitarian and just society. There was a need, in Manley's view, "to dismantle the apparatus of privi lege" (1974, p. 37). By 'the appara-tus of pr iv i lege' he meant the special influence and status long enjoyed by the plantocracy and the merchant intermediaries created by colonial -ism. The abolit ion of class divisions and the advancement of sexual equality were among the ideals most widely avowed. Jamaican democratic socia l ists also opted for parliamentary demo-cracy. The People's National Party rejected a class interpretation of democracy and urged "the all iance of classes around clear objectives" (1979, p. 66). Manley saw the individual as the basic social unit and rejected social holism (1974, p. 52). The Manley Government claimed that i t had "faith in the democratic system and the right of a l l 57 Jamaicans to form or join any po l i t ica l party they wish" (Agency for Public Information n .d . , p. 4). The People's National Party included among i ts principles of democratic socialism, "The right of every Jamaican to form or join any po l i t ica l party of his/her choice, and to compete for state power in democratically contested elections" (1979, p. 10). Manley claimed that "the democratic system which places proper emphasis on the l ibertarian s p i r i t is the pol i t ica l method which, wisely handled, is the most l ikely to supply the context within which men can achieve the best that is within themselves" (1974, p. 32). He also defended multi-party democracy as "a natural sociological tendency" of Jamaica (1974, pp. 27-28). But there was also a yearning, i t seems, after the ideal of a 'general w i l l ' democracy capable of national consensus. Manley saw the pol i t ics of mass mobilization as an important part of his strategy of change (1974, p. 66). The People's National Party wished, as part of this process of mobilization, to bring about "The deepening of the democratic process so that the col lect ive wisdom and experience of the Jamaican working people can become the decisive factor in the decision-making process at a l l levels" (1979, p. 11). But there were reserva-tions about whether this could be done through the institutions of multi-party democracy. MacPherson believes that there is a tendency towards general wil l democracies in the countries of the Third World. These approaches are not only p r e - l i b e r a l , he suggests, they are also closer than other con-ceptions to the original view of democracy as rule by or on behalf of the poor and the oppressed. These countries, in their search for their own solutions, often reject l iberal as well as marxist views of democracy 58 (1965, pp. 23-34). Manley believed that mass mobilization could be achieved through the existing institutions of Jamaican parliamentary democracy. He believed that the pol i t ics of participation - - a key notion in his con-ception of democracy - - could be achieved i f government became more responsive to members of the polity and to leaders of inst i tut ions; i f i t decentralized i ts operations; and i f i t expressed the wil l of the pol i t ica l party which provided i ts main support. "Just as a one-party state can mobilize by abolishing dissent," he wrote, "equally, I suggest, multi-party democracy can mobilize by abolishing remoteness" (1974, p. 67). Manley believed that the old wine of the original conception of democracy could be put into the new wineskins of l iberal democratic inst i tut ions. 11 The Jamaican exponents of democratic socialism sought a man-as-worker view of social and po l i t ica l organization which would liberate the Jamaican personality by releasing creative working energy, and which would mobilize this working potential towards post-colonial reconstruc-t ion. The soc ia l i s t route was promoted as a morally defensible alterna-tive to past experience, as well as to existing contemporary options. Socialism was also advocated as a social and economic technique uniquely designed to bring just societies into being. The mode of advocacy employed also had i ts mythic dimension. A po l i t ica l myth, according to Tudor (1972), is a story told about a par-t icu lar people; i t is a way of giving i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y and coherence to 59 their col lective experience, and i t is intended to function as a practical argument. The Jamaican democratic socia l ists had an account of the Jamaican story. In this story, the protaganists are the poor and the oppressed of the society. The story has a beginning, a middle and an end. It was offered as a way of making sense of the Jamaican experience, and as a practical argument in support of the proposals of democratic socialism. The Jamaican story, according to the People's National Party, began with the Arawaks, a people who "organized their society on simple communal principles" (1979, p. 7). With the arrival of colonialism and capitalism, both based on the exploitation of man by man, this ' soc ia l i s t ' society was destroyed and replaced by slavery and the plantation system. After the abolit ion of slavery, both colonialism and capitalism remained. Capitalism became more advanced, but retained the exploitation which is an essential part of i ts character. But a l l along there were those who, on behalf of their fellow poor and oppressed, resisted these e v i l s , and the People's National Party is part of this tradition of resistance: Our party is the heir to and the torchbearers of, the fine revolutionary traditions of our people begun by Nanny, Tacky and Sam Sharpe in the struggle against slavery; con-tinued by Bogle arid Gordon in the struggle for land against the plantocracy; continued by Garvey for national l ibera -t ion , racial dignity and international sol idar i ty of oppressed people; continued by A.G.S. Coombs, St. William Grant and Alexander Bustamante along with others, for the rights of the working people, and continued by Norman Manley and the other Founding Fathers and Mothers of the P.N.P. for the consolidation of these rights in the struggle for national democracy and socialism (1979, p. 1). The primordial soc ia l i s t sp i r i t of the paradise lost in the destruction of Arawak society, is to be regained and brought to f ruit ion through the modern ideology of democratic socialism. 60 V Manley saw education as a c e n t r a l part of h i s st r a t e g y of change and he made i t an important part of h i s d e l i b e r a t i o n s . I t was the strat e g y intended to f u n c t i o n a t "the psychological and a t t i t u d i n a l l e v e l " (1974, p. 66). Guided by the notion of "education f o r change," the M i n i s t r y of Education t r i e d to devise an educational p o l i c y which i t hoped would b r i n g about the envisioned s o c i e t y (1977, p. 5). I s h a l l focus on three of the issues considered: (1) de c i d i n g on how to b r i n g education to bear on the problem of a t t i t u d e s to work i n the s o c i e t y ; (2) the problem of deciding on the kind of school system most s u i t a b l e to the p u r s u i t of e g a l i t a r i a n o b j e c t i v e s ; and (3) the problem of deciding whether or not p o l i t i c a l education should be a part of formal education i n Jamaica. A l l three were rooted i n the Manley Government's i d e o l o g i c a l p o l i c y . But they are a l s o , i n my view, three of the c e n t r a l issues i n Jamaican educational philosophy. They are en-during issues which were re-awakened, r e - i n t e r p r e t e d , and answered anew during the i d e o l o g i c a l ferment of democratic s o c i a l i s m . I t was a period during which fundamental questions were r e - v i t a l i z e d , and f o r t h i s reason i t w i l l probably be remembered as an important one i n the h i s t o r y of Jamaican educational thought. Work i s one of the c e n t r a l concepts i n any c u l t u r e . For t h i s reason, preparation f o r work i s g e n e r a l l y seen as one of the c h i e f ends of the educational e n t e r p r i s e . But there are problems i n de c i d i n g on the r e l a t i o n s which should hold between the two. Work i s widely regarded as one of the e s p e c i a l l y problematic areas of Jamaican s o c i e t y and c u l t u r e . Slavery and c o l o n i z a t i o n , i t i s s a i d , 61 distorted people's conception of the working l i f e . But the goals of nation building, modernization, and the creation of a better society, ultimately depend on the widespread existence, in the society, of the appropriate attitudes to work. But what should these attitudes be, and what should schools do to encourage their development? Egalitarian ideology is understandable in a society in which i n -equality has long been a cardinal assumption and a fact of historical and social experience. Democratic socialism brought a new intensity to the attack on el i t ism and on the bearing of egalitarian ideals on educational pol icy. But how is egalitarian ideology to be brought to bear on the organization of the society's educational arrangements? The development of po l i t ica l consciousness is one of the central challenges in emerging societies l ike Jamaica. The quality of po l i t ica l l i f e , and al l that depends on the nature of this l i f e , rests on the extent to which those who leave school are prepared for the l i f e of the po l is . The relation between education and the l i f e of the democratic state is well described by Tussman: A body po l i t i c which gives to each of i ts members a share in the governing process rests i ts fate upon the quality of part ic ipat ion. It commits i t s e l f not only to universal education but to education of a special character; not only to education for the private l i f e but to education for the public role (1960, p. v). The term 'po l i t i ca l education' was an important one in the vocabulary of the Jamaican variant of democratic socialism. This interest in po l i t i ca l education has i ts origin partly in the general soc ia l i s t out-look, and partly in the democratic soc ia l i s t reliance on persuasion as a substitute for revolutionary violence. In the Jamaican context i t naturally became linked with the idea of po l i t ic i zat ion as part of the 62 process of decolonization and development. But the idea of po l i t i ca l education has also acquired s in ister associa-t ions. This is especially the case when i t is linked with the notion of ideology. Given the many objections which may be advanced against i t , should the idea of po l i t ica l education be taken seriously by Jamaican schools? I shall now turn to a more detailed examination of these questions. In each case the ideological dimensions of the issue wil l be explored, and the democratic soc ia l i s t answers given to the questions wil l be c r i t i c a l l y appraised. I shall also offer and defend a position on each of the issues considered. 63 CHAPTER FOUR EDUCATION AND THE IDEOLOGY OF WORK The pathologies of work, to borrow an apt phrase from Thomas Green (1978), are a str iking feature of Jamaican society. Work, we may say, is infected by disorders and diseases of various kinds inherited, scholars never t i re in saying, from slavery and colonialism and, soc ia l is ts add, from capitalism as well . Manley goes as far as to say that "Jamaica has never had a period of i ts history in which i t has accepted the work eth ic . " There is in Jamaica, he thinks, something of a "neurotic attitude" towards work which he sees as a major obstacle to development (1974, pp. 152-153). The good reputation enjoyed by Jamaican workers overseas suggests that the causes are to be found in the nature of the society i t s e l f . In Manley1s view, the negative attitudes to work in Jamaica are a ref lect ion of i t s "internal social tensions" caused chiefly by i ts inegalitarian social structure: It is a brutal society that would condemn a man both to dirty work and to the feeling that the work i t s e l f be-l i t t l e s the man. Yet this is the sort of social distor -tion to which we are condemned by the acquired attitudes and values of c lass -s t ra t i f ied e l i t i s t social forms (1974, p. 47). But i t is not a peculiarly Jamaican condition. Farrell (1979) who has studied the problem of work in the region, sees i t as a characterist ic of v i r tual ly a l l Caribbean societ ies. This unhealthy state of work has found expression in the l i terature of the area. I can think of three examples. Orlando Patterson (1967), the Jamaican sociologist and novelist , entit led one of his novels An 64 absence of ruins. We think of ruins as the art i facts of c i v i l i z a t i o n , as surviving evidence of productive work, and their absence may be inter -preted as signifying the absence of both. But when we know that labour has been a dominant feature of the history of the society — as we know in the case of Jamaica - - the absence of ruins suggests a tragic f u t i l i t y . It is not true, however, that ruins and art i facts of c i v i l i z a -tion are not to be found in Jamaica. What worries Patterson, i t seems, is that these are largely the art i facts of a colonizing c i v i l i z a t i o n , and not really the creations of the people whose labour went into pro-ducing them. In the second example, this absence of creativity is seen as a reason, for denying the very existence of history. "History is bui l t around achievement and creation-," writes V.S. Naipaul, the Trinidadian novel ist , "and nothing was created in the West Indies" (1962, p. 29). This is part of Naipaul's pessimism about the prospects of the many 'half-made1 societies brought into being by colonialism; Jamaican society, for example, was l i t e r a l l y created by colonialism. The third example comes from Edward Brathwaite the Barbadian poet: For we who have ere ated nothing, must exist on nothing; (1967, p. 80). It can be argued that these are excessively bleak views of the conse-quences of human effort in the Caribbean. But even i f they overstate the case, and I think they do, they seem to me to be important ref lec -tions on what is at bottom the problem of work. The problem, in Manley's view, is that a brutal social system has been 65 largely responsible for a widespread perversion of attitudes to work and that these attitudes hinder national development. For Patterson, Naipaul and Braithwaite, the problem is that work has not resulted in an enduring, self -created and nurturing culture. Farrell mentions a number of specif ic problems: people do not work enough; productivity is low; people seem to lack pride in what they do; and there is an excessive distaste and contempt for manual work. In short, i t may be said that Jamaica is without an adequate ideology of work. An ideology of work, according to my account of ideology, is a set of shared, action-directing beliefs by which people make sense of working experience, and which they bring to bear on problematic aspects of that experience. Ideologies of work may be secular as well as re l i g -ious. The bel iefs they contain are often moral ones and this is re-f lected, for example, in the expression 'work e t h i c ' . An ideology of work explains and jus t i f ies work; i t tr ies to give i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y , co-herence, order and meaning to the experience of work. The Jamaican democratic soc ia l is ts tr ied to bring the soc ia l i s t ideology of work to bear on the problem of work in Jamaican society. This ideology, they believed, would satisfy the existing ideological need by giving Jamaicans a satisfactory way of interpreting their h is -tor ical as well as contemporary working experience. They did not, as far as I know, exp l ic i t l y bring Marx's account of alienation to bear on analysis of the condition of enslavement and colonization in Jamaica. But they obviously believed that by elevating man as a worker, and by stressing co l l ec t i v i s t i c altruism, the soc ia l i s t ideology of work provided a morally defensible alternative to the work pathologies of the past as well as of the present. In their view, the soc ia l i s t 66 approach was the answer to those factors which had paralysed the wil l to work. It put work on the moral foundations i t previously lacked. Social ist moral ism, they believed, would cure the society of the pathol-ogies of work by animating i t , i n t o the therapeutic, self-transforming and creative act iv i t ies of social renewal. It is necessary to distinguish between social and po l i t i ca l ideologies of work. An ideology of work may be chiefly a social ideology, an h is -tor ica l ly acquired way by which a society has customarily j us t i f i ed , regulated, and given point to the working l ives of i ts members. But an ideology of work is a po l i t i ca l ideology i f i t i s the ideology of a government or a po l i t i ca l party. The marxist ideology of work, for example, is o f f i c i a l l y espoused by the governments of the Soviet Union, China and Cuba; most western governments espouse capi ta l is t ideologies of work. There may be important relations between an ideology of work and the po l i t ica l and non-pol it ical domains. A social ideology of work may be reflected in a society's po l i t i ca l system. A society may, for example, use i ts po l i t i ca l system to democratically legit imize, protect and advance i ts outlook on work. But an ideology of work may also have i ts origin in those who control the po l i t ica l system, and be promoted, with varying degrees of success, through the institutions of that system. It could become what Anthony ca l ls an "ideology of management" (1977, p. 3) ; in his view, ideologies of work chief ly promote managerial se l f -interest. In Jamaica, i t is debatable how far the democratic soc ia l i s t ideology of work reflected exist ing, and perhaps latent , ideologies of work in the society. The Manley Government announced i ts revival of democratic 67 soc ia l is t ideology two years after i t was elected to o f f i ce . Of course, only empirical studies can reveal what Jamaicans actually believe about work. But i t seems reasonable to believe that the Jamaican case was mainly an example of the second kind of re lat ion. The democratic soc ia l is t ideology of work was an ideology espoused by a government which also believed i t should control the main sectors of the economy, and hence the working l ives of people engaged in the main economic ventures in the society. In such circumstances, an ideology of work may be seen as a way of stimulating support for the kind of economic leadership which, i t wil l be recal led, MacPherson (1969) suggests is often of special importance in underdeveloped societ ies . While the possib i l i ty of the entry of the kind of manipulative se l f - in terest which Anthony discusses cannot be excluded, the programme which the Jamaican demo-crat ic soc ia l is ts undertook may also be seen as a well-intentioned attempt at finding a pol i t ica l remedy for what they saw as an ideological defect in the society. Education was seen as an important part of the search for a solution to the problems of work, and of the quest for a healthy condition of work in Jamaican society. The Manley Government made the exploration of the relations between education and work one of the pr ior i t ies of i ts educa-tional pol icy. The Ministry of Education claimed i t wished to "develop, implement and expand productive work programmes at the primary and second-ary stages as an essential part of school act i v i t ies" (1977, p. 2). The People's National Party presented, as one of i ts educational goals, the wish to develop "a patr iot ic commitment to work as the basis of national v iab i l i t y and progress and a sense of the value of a l l forms of work by the development of the work-study method of education" (1979, p. 43). 68 In Manley's view, "one must strive consciously to create a general accept-ance of the work ethic as both a means to personal satisfaction and the personal investment that each man must make in the progress to which he is committed by his ambition" (1974, p. 145). He used strong language to describe what he fe l t education should try to do about attitudes to work: "the educational process must be designed to incorporate an early indoctrination of a l l children to accept the inherent worth of a l l types of work" (1974, p. 47). The nearby Cuban experiment in using the school as an instrument of social reform exerted some influence. According to Castro, "Revolu-tion and education are.the same thing" (quoted in Bowles 1971, p 472). This bel ief led to a radical reconstruction of the Cuban educational system. The Cubans aimed at a society of student-workers and worker-students. The school was taken to the workplace and the economic, pro-ductive l i f e of the society was integrated into the act iv i t ies of the school. Students spend part of each day in discussions and part learn-ing practical s k i l l s on farms and workshops. As part of a programme of cultural and technical exchange between the Cuban and Jamaican governments, the Cuban Government donated and bui l t an example of i ts work-study schools in Jamaica. This school was intended as a pioneer-ing, experimental model to be studied with a view to future expansion of this approach to schooling. Soc ia l i s ts , in their elevation of work, are reluctant to elevate some forms of work above others. Consequently, soc ia l i s t educators customarily attack the dist inct ion between manual and intel lectual labour. The denigration of manual labour is ancient, and perhaps uni -versal . Plato, for example, who believed in the superiority of i n t e l -69 lectual labour, put i t this way: Why, again, is mechanical to i l discredited as debasing? It is not simply when the highest thing in a man's nature is so weak that i t cannot control the animal parts but can only learn how to pamper them? (1967, BK IX, 590). Soc ia l i s ts , however, object to this kind of evaluative dist inction between manual and intel lectual ac t i v i t i es . The soc ia l i s t crit ique of the dist inction between manual and in -tel lectual labour may be based on monistic views of the nature of body and mind. But the dist inction may also be regarded as objectionable because of i ts social and educational implications. As an evaluative dist inction which usually ranks intel lectual labour above manual labour, i t leads to a discriminatory dist inction between manual and intel lectual workers, and between the manual and intel lectual tasks necessary for social l i v ing . The emancipation of human nature, and the emergence of the 'new soc ia l i s t man1 requires the even development of human potential , and this development is possible only i f manual and intel lectual com-petencies are allowed to develop without fear of discriminatory regard. Keith, who writes from a marxist perspective, believes that an educational policy based on a crit ique of the dist inction between manual and intel lectual labour should be pursued in the Jamaican context, and wishes that the Manley Government had made this a part of i ts educational policy. According to Keith, the colonial period in Jamaica set up "r igid barriers" between manual and intel lectual labour. Keith believes that i t is through "the re-unif icat ion of theory and practice in the educa-tional system" that these barriers can be removed (1978, p. 51). I am not aware that the Jamaican democratic socia l ists ever used the terminology of this dist inction in expressingr.their point of view. 70 But they endorsed the view that a l l forms of work have value, and that, in Manley's phrase, they al l possess "inherent worth" (1974, p. 47). The Ministry of Education tried to just i fy i ts work-study policy on the grounds that i t was a way of balancing academic and practical develop-ment, forming positive attitudes to physical work, preparing students for the adult working world, giving students a sense of "direct involve-ment" in economic production, and developing a r t i s t i c ab i l i t i es (1977, pp. 7-8). I believe the Jamaican democratic soc ia l is ts made a valuable contr i -bution to Jamaican public consciousness by raising the issue of work as a problematic area of Jamaican society and culture, and in trying to bring educational policy to bear on the poss ib i l i ty of finding solu-t ions. Work is a central concept in human l i f e . It is also the primary moving force of social reform. The improvement of the quality of work- . ing l i f e is i t s e l f an important ideal of social and po l i t ica l organiza-t ion . To a large extent, social reform is work improving the conditions and quality of i ts own performance. But I think that as i t stands, the doctrine concerning the value and inherent worth of a l l forms of work is an inadequate basis for educa-tional policy and is in need of qual i f icat ion and development. It is s i l en t , for example, on the qualitative variation which is possible in the domain of work. Not a l l forms of work advance a l l , or even most of the worker's interests. For many people work is a violent and some-times physically and psychologically destructive experience. There are also forms of work which cause social harm by injuring others. An un-c r i t i ca l idealization of a l l forms of work commits one to the unaccept-able view that work is of value even i f . i t is dehumanizing. A policy 71 of work-education, in my view, should not be indifferent to the question of what is to be regarded as desirable work. It is not clear what is to be understood by the claim about the i n -herent value of a l l forms of work. If i t is taken to mean that a l l forms of work give, or can give int r ins ic sat isfact ion, i t is easily f a l s i f i e d by the experience of the many people for whom work is a painful ordeal, made endurable only because i t is viewed as an instrument which may bring about other forms of sat isfact ion. Wollheim suggests, plausibly, I think, that the soc ia l i s t view of work has i ts basis in the fact that inte l lectuals , who have contributed importantly to the development of soc ia l i s t thought, tend to "assimilate ordinary work to intel lectual work"; they incl ine to the mistaken view that a l l forms of work can give the same kind of satisfaction that they themselves derive from in te l lec -tual act iv i ty (1961a, p. 2 8 ) . It is misleading to make general claims about the poss ib i l i ty of finding int r ins ic satisfaction in a l l forms of work. It is commonly believed, although the reasons are not always exp l ic i t l y stated, that a non-working state is a condition of moral danger, or even moral turpitude. To those who hold this view, a non-working state is not i d y l l i c . In their view, a non-working condition is never defensible except as restful reward for work. This view easi ly leads to an idealization of the working condition, to attempts at forming pure, pristine conceptions of i t , and to abstract and unclear claims about i ts inherent worth. But i t is by i ts consequences for the individual and society - - personal development, social u t i l i t y , and so on - - that the worth of work is determined. The doctrine concerning the inherent worth of a l l forms of work i s , in my view, a false one. 72 Work is usually evaluated according to educational, s o c i a l , economic or moral c r i t e r i a . It is of educational value, for example, i f i t con-tributes to the psychological, intel lectual and spir i tual development of the worker. The development of a policy of work-education requires inquiry into the ways in which work may advance these kinds of personal development; i t needs to explore not only the notion of education for work, but of education through work. There is also need for inquiry into the links which can or ought to be established between work-educa-tion and specif ic ideals of social and economic development. Some forms of work are also morally more defensible than others. Work-education needs to be carried on in the context of discussion of questions con-cerning conceptions of the good l i f e , and of the moral status of working actions. The concept of work i s , of course, r ich and varied.. This variety is partly reflected in the number of distinctions which i t allows: manual and in te l lec tua l , sk i l led and unski l led, productive and unproduc-t i ve , and so on. A policy of work-education may benefit from inquiry into the many components which constitute the concept of work. In what follows, I shall give an account of one of the distinctions which the concept allows: that between what I shall later cal l Labour and Work. I shall try to show that i t is a dist inction which is espec-i a l l y i l luminating in the Jamaican context. The dist inction I have in mind is suggested by, but is not identical with that which Arendt (1958) draws between the animal laborans and homo faber. To a large extent, the terms 'labour' and 'work' are inter-changeable in ordinary usage. But there are some uses of the terms which do not overlap, and my account is informed by a number of instances in which they may not, with-73 out qual i f icat ion , be substituted for each other. The claim is not that the terms refer to ontologically d ist inct classes of human actions, but that they are two concepts of work; they are two ways in which a worker might view his actions. After giving an account of the d ist inct ion, I shall use i t to interpret aspects of Jamaican working experience. Following th i s , I shall suggest some ways in which i t can be brought to bear on education, and I shall offer a defence of i ts su i tab i l i t y as a basis for educational policy. The main use of the word 'labour' that I know about that may not be substituted for 'work' is i ts use to refer to the period and the a c t i -vity of giving b i r th . While 'work' may, sometimes with qual i f icat ion , be substituted for 'labour' on most, and perhaps a l l other occasions, there is nevertheless a tendency to use 'labour' and not 'work' in cer-tain contexts. It is used to refer to especially painful , distressing or burdensome act i v i t ies . Economists use i t as a general term to refer to human power; labour is the human input into production and is d is -tinguished from land and capi ta l . There is also a tendency to use i t to refer to bodily and unskilled a c t i v i t i e s , especially those associated with agriculture. Two faces of labour may be noted. The f i r s t is i ts link with the body and i ts power, and especially with i ts productive, regenerative power. The second is i ts association with pain, to i l and trouble. Labour is linked with man's biological nature. It is linked with a condition which, to some degree, man shares with the nonhuman animals. 74 This fact tends to evoke two main responses. It may be regarded as i t -sel f a defect, a pathology of the human condition; i t is something to be escaped. The Balinese, i t is sa id , have such a horror of their animal nature they wil l not allow their babies to crawl. In the Judeo-Christian tradition man is viewed as being somehow above nature, and i t is believed that he wi l l eventually be released from i t . In the meantime he makes a temporary rapprochement with natural demands. Until he shakes off the mortal yoke, labour is a curse to be endured with patience and d is -c ip l ine . He wi l l eventually be nourished by higher things, but in the meantime i t is by the sweat of his brow that he eats bread: That is the source of the ideology of the puritan ethic . Another response is to view labour as an indication of man's v i t a l , ecological l ink with the natural world. Man is inescapably a part of this natural world and the link cannot be broken; indeed attempts at breaking i t can lead only to disaster. Man's survival depends on the establishment and the maintenance of a continuous, ho l i s t i c harmony with the sources of his regeneration which are themselves an integral part of what he i s . Labour is not an indication of a defect in the human condition. The condition which i t reveals is permanent and desir -able. It is a sign of man's enduring link with the cosmos. But 'labour' is also used to refer to those act iv i t ies which are especially painful , arduous, or burdensome. Pence, who ranks labour at the bottom of a t r ipar t i te heirarchy of work consisting of labour, workmanship and ca l l ings , uses 'labour1 to refer to a l l unpleasant kinds of work. In his view, Laboring is generally: (1) repetit ious; (2) not i n t r i n s i -cal ly sat isfy ing; (3) done out of necessity; labour also involves (4) few higher human f a c i l i t i e s , and (5) l i t t l e choice about how and when the work is done (1978-79, p. 307). 75 Social organization, in his view, should aim at eliminating labour while advancing workmanship and cal l ings . Pence offers the foregoing as a set of suff ic ient conditions for defining labour, but grants r ight ly , I think, that none of them are neces-sary conditions. If my claim about the two faces of labour is correct, one inadequacy of Pence's theory is that i t includes only one of them. In his wish to eliminate unpleasant ac t i v i t i es , Pence overlooks the use of 'labour' to refer to act iv i t ies linked with the body's productive and regenerative power. In my view there is more to the concept of labour than Pence's analysis suggests. But the fact that 'labour' i s used to refer to unpleasant act iv i t ies is important, and any theory of labour which does not take this into account is inadequate. The act iv i t ies of the dual ist ic view of labour just described are often unpleasant because they are linked with cycl ic processes which are not subject to human w i l l . Agricultural act iv i t ies are linked with the seasons. The need for food is determined by neces-s i ty . The act iv i t ies of labour often rest r ic t freedom of choice; they are linked with what seems to be a continual bondage to natural neces-s i t y . But labour need not be unpleasant; i t may also be agreeable and sat isfy ing. The unpleasant nature of labouring act iv i t ies can sometimes be reduced, and where possible i t should be reduced, even i f i t may be too optimistic to believe they can be entirely eliminated. It is chiefly to the pains associated with the dual ist ic conception of labour rather than to Pence's view of i t that the Judeo-Christian ideal of fortitude is directed. I shall use the term 'Labour' to refer to those forms of work which 76 are viewed by the worker chiefly as the means of sustaining his l i f e . This view takes the link with bodily regeneration into account. It also admits that these forms of work may be burdensome in that the need to work to sustain one's l i f e , or the l i f e of one's family, is the kind of burden which many people would rather do without. But i t is not part of my view that Labour is necessarily burdensome. Some characteristics of Labour may be noted. Labour may be direct or indirect . The production of food for one's own consumption is an example of direct Labour. But one may engage in indirect Labour by i n -direct ly acquiring the means of sustaining one's l i f e ; one can, for example, acquire the means of obtaining food without directly producing i t . Labour may be manual or in te l lec tua l ; i t may involve the 'higher' or the 'lower' facu l t ies ; i t may demand sophisticated or unsophisticated s k i l l s . Labour may be self-regarding or other-regarding, individual or soc ia l . Just as individuals engage in Labour to sustain their own l i ves , communities also organize Labour to sustain their col lect ive existence. The objects of Labour are usually transient since they are produced to be consumed. This transience is an important component in Green's theory: This idea that human energy might be spent without any result in some durable work is the idea that defines the concept of labor. Labor is that kind of act iv i ty that never ends because i t cannot result in any durable work i t s e l f (1978, p. 213). In Green's view, labour is an expression of "human f u t i l i t y " (1978, p. 213). While the notion of transience is a part of my view of Labour, I do not conclude that i ts act iv i t ies are fu t i le because they lead to 77 transient results. It is partly by virtue of their transience that the objects of Labour achieve their ef fects . That their transience is often a cause of regret is well-known. But in my view, they are not to be regarded as fu t i le i f they succeed in sustaining l i f e . St. Paul's injunction, "If a man will not work, neither shall he eat" (2 Thess. 3: 7-10), stripped of i ts threatening tone, is close to my view of Labour. According to Sparshott, the word he uses for work - -ergazomai - - refers speci f ica l ly to manual labour and husbandry (1973, p. 30). The emphasis, l ike mine, is on act iv i t ies linked with bodily regeneration. There are many conditions, natural as well as non-natural, which may render the act iv i t ies of Labour ineffective or otherwise unacceptable. Natural processes may hinder Labour, and these are often beyond human control . But the pathologies of Labour may also have ideological sources. For example, the act iv i t ies of Labour may be rendered ineffective by an ideology of work which encourages the destruction of the environment and the pollution of the earth. The condition of Labour in a society may also be regarded as unacceptable i f i t is based on an ideology of work which restr icts Labour and i ts burdens to slaves, persons of a certain colour, or women. To a large extent, the quality of Labour in a society depends on the ideological beliefs according to which i ts act iv i t ies are directed, and i ts place and status in the social order explained and jus t i f i ed . Personal as well as social wel l -be ingrest on the foundations of Labour. But Labour is not suff ic ient for human welfare. Work is also an important human need. It is the superstructure, so to speak, which helps to give point to Labour; i t is a way of making the burdens of Labour 78 endurable. There are at least three uses of the word 'work' which may not be replaced with ' labour 1 . There may be others but I think these three are especially instruct ive. I shall bring a l l three to bear on the theory of work I wish to propose. F i rs t , i t is 'work' and not 'labour' which is used to denote objects, especially those of the fine arts , architecture, engineering, and so on. Expressions l ike 'works of a r t ' , the 'collected works of Dickens', and 'engineering works' designate objects of this kind. This use of 'work', i t seems, has been inf luential in shaping the theories of work advanced by Arendt and Green. Arendt observes that unlike ' labour' , 'work' is used to designate the products of human act iv i ty (1958, p. 80). According to Arendt, "Work provides an " a r t i f i c i a l " world of things, d ist inct ly different from a l l natural surroundings" (1958, p. 7). This notion of the creation of durable a r t i f i ce is a central component in Arendt's concept of work. In Green's view, "what is essential to the concept of work i t s e l f is the connection between these two elements -the act iv i ty and the product or result of that act iv i ty" (1978, p. 212). Green, following Arendt, claims that the word 'work' refers to act iv i t ies as well as the results of these ac t i v i t i es , while 'labour' refers only to ac t i v i t i es . I can find no counterexamples to this thesis. While he links labour with f u t i l i t y , Green links work with "human potency" (1978, p. 213). It is through work, he believes, that man produces durable results which wil l be of lasting consequence. Second, i t is 'work' and not 'labour' which is used to denote those act iv i t ies linked with the inst i tut ional ized occupational culture. Some-one is said to be 'at work', 'out of work', 'looking for work', and so 79 on. To work is to perform some social ly instituted role. Work may be for economic gain; i t may also be voluntary and unpaid. A certain seriousness - - previously noted - - is attached to the condition of being ' in work'. Third, i t is 'work' and not 'labour' which is used to designate morally or rel igiously commendable actions. It will be granted that labour may have 'dignity' ~ the non-human animals may also have dignity - -but expressions l ike 'great work' or 'good works' are used to commend outstanding moral actions. Moral or virtuous acts are called 'works' not ' labours ' . In some interpretations of Christ ianity , works are para-digms of human moral excellence, but even so they are only reflections of divine grace and are not suff ic ient for human redemption. I shall use the term 'Work' — I can think of no acceptable a l ter -native - - to refer to those forms of work which are viewed by the worker chiefly as the means of expanding and enriching his l i f e . While i t need not be restricted to them, the three uses of work just described bear importantly on this way of viewing human actions. F i r s t , the quest for permanence is often an important part of the wish to expand and enrich one's l i f e ; thus people often speak of 'making their mark', of making and leaving some enduring impression on human events. The aspect of the quest for permanence which I wish to stress is that i t is chiefly by the making of enduring objects that man makes the earth, or some part of i t , his home. Work, as Arendt would put i t , is a way of housing individual and col lective l i ves . Second, i t is usually through some occupational role that one seeks to expand and enrich one's l i f e . To work is usually to have a career or a profession. One may even have a ca l l ing . The term has a religious origin but may, as Pence suggests, be 80 given a secular meaning in the sense that one may think one is called by one's ab i l i t i es to a particular vocation (1978-79, pp. 307-308). Plato thought of work as doing that for which one is most f i t ted . Aristotle saw i t as real iz ing one's d ist inct ly human function. Third, i f i t is assumed, against the tradit ion of moral skepticism - - C a l l i c l e s , Thrasymachus, and so on - - , that morality is a way of advancing ind i -vidual and social interests, then moral considerations enter importantly into the conception of Work as a way of expanding and enriching one's l i f e . The act iv i t ies of Work are part of the process of se l f -ac tua l i za -t ion , of trying to do what, in Frankena's phrase, one would choose to do " i f one clearly knew what one was about" (1980, p. 94). But Work is also social and hence subject to appraisal according to ideals and institutions of social morality. Without a social dimension Work may become mere self- indulgence. I agree with Armstrong who, in his crit ique of conventional liberal-democratic views of work, argues that a mature, rather than a chi ldish conception of work encourages the worker to undertake those forms of work which are of benefit to the whole community as well as to himself (1972-73, p. 465). Work is the exercise of the freedom which Labour makes possible. Work may take a wide variety of forms. The act iv i t ies of Work are freely chosen and they involve the free development of one's facul t ies . Work is satisfying in i ts performance as well as in i ts consequences. The act iv i t ies of Work are sources of pride and sel f - respect . The pathologies of Work are those conditions which prevent people from viewing their actions as the means of expanding and enlarging their l i ves . These conditions may be social and economic. An unjust social system - - as Manley noted - - and dehumanizing working environ-81 merits are well-known examples. But these pathologies may also have their sources in ideologies of work; they may be encouraged, for example, by an ideology of work which puts the quantity of economic production above general human welfare. In my view, an ideology of work is inadequate i f i t views the forms of work in society chiefly as economic instrumen-t a l i t i e s , and not as the means by which persons may have good l i ves . I l l Observers of Caribbean pol i t ics often comment on the fact that an unusually large number of po l i t i ca l parties in the Commonwealth Caribbean, even conservative ones, are called 'labour' parties. This popularity of the word 'labour' in the onomastic vocabulary of Caribbean pol i t ics is partly a ref lection of the influence of the Bri t ish Labour Party on the po l i t i cs of the region. But i t may also be seen as an i n d i -cation of a widespread link between the word, in i ts general sense, and people's perceptions of themselves. Use of i t is po l i t i ca l l y strategic in circumstances in which most people think of themselves as labourers; i t is an effective way of e l i c i t i n g wide response and ident i f icat ion. The po l i t ic isat ion of the term partly ref lects a need to come to grips with, and to achieve recognition for this labouring condition. But I also wish to suggest that Labour, in my sense of the term, has been one of the especially problematic areas of Jamaican experience. Labour has been problematic in two main ways: (1) there has been an abnormal imbalance between Labour and Work in the society; and (2) Labour has been dislocated from i ts natural l i fe -sustain ing function. Jamaican society was a r t i f i c i a l l y created by colonialism primarily 82 to produce agricultural products for the colonizing powers, f i r s t Spain, then England. The. society was created for the purposes of direct Labour, and h is tor ica l l y , most of i t s forms of work have been of this kind. Ideally, there should be a healthy balance between Labour and Work in a society. But in Jamaica Labour has dwarfed Work, creating an unhealthy imbalance between the two. But this Labour was not directed chiefly at sustaining the l ives of those who engaged in i t . The products of Labour were mostly for export, not for the consumption of those who produced them; they con-sumed what was not considered good enough to be exported. Much of what they consumed was produced marginally outside of. the dominant Labour system, or imported from the colonial or other metropolitan centres in exchange for some of what they produced. Jamaica, a f e r t i l e land with an excellent climate, s t i l l imports most of i ts food. For a long time, Labour was dislocated from i ts normal self -sustaining function to an other-sustaining function. Often unpleasant in ordinary circumstances, the pains of Labour were compounded by their l inks with slavery. The links of Labour with slavery are ancient. But in Jamaica and other New World societ ies , and unlike in the ancient world, the act iv i t ies of Labour were expanded on a massive scale for the purposes of the economic gain of the slave owners. This was another of the ways in which Labour was dislocated from i ts l i fe -sustain ing function. It became chiefly a form of wealth-seeking. Christianity was introduced to slaves in Jamaica at the end of the eighteenth century. Viewed from their condition of servitude in the act iv i t ies of other-sustaining Labour, the Judeo-Christian view of 83 labour as a curse must have seemed, not a remote theological poss ib i l i t y , but a present and convincing rea l i ty . The wish to escape the bondage of their circumstances also became the wish to escape the bondage of the act iv i t ies of Labour; they sought escape from a condition of dual bondage. This tendency s t i l l persists in the society. The conviction that a curse of Labour has been lived deeply le f t i ts mark, not only on slaves, but also on their sometimes only s l ight ly more fortunate descendants. One of the chief challenges facing Jamaican society is how to restore Labour to i ts natural l i fe -sustain ing function. The aim of s e l f - s u f f i c -iency in food is a goal of Labour. The tendency to abandon Labour, how-ever understandable, undermines the regenerative, ecological foundations of the society. Jamaica is a society s t i l l in search of a respectful and sustaining l ink with the natural environment which is to be the home of i ts people. 11 The preponderance of Labour in Jamaican society has hindered the development of Work. By producing chiefly transient objects, Labour . led to the absence of ruins lamented by Patterson (1967). Forced Labour absorbed most of the society's energies and allowed few opportunities for Work; Labour le f t l i t t l e energy for the expression of the creativity with which, according to Naipaul (1962), history is made. The tendency to identify Labour with Work, i t s e l f problematic, must have been especially easy in a situation in which there was so l i t t l e Work to provide a con-trast with the overwhelming presence of Labour. The concept of Work is 84 more easily developed in situations in which there are examples of i t in evidence. For a long period, the only models of Work available were those brought by the colonists. They were, of course, chiefly interested in Labour, but they needed some Work to help them endure the long periods of sojourn from the l i f e of Work in their homelands. For those born into the condition of colonization, Work inevitably begins as imitation of what is perceived as such in their surroundings, or what i t is believed the colonists do as Work in their home countries. Transplanted peoples often lose touch with the Work of their ancestral societ ies. Many Jamaicans of African descent, for example, are s t i l l unaware that their ancestors produced Work of any kind; in their view they are, and have always been, a people of Labour. The imitation of colonial Work, valu-able as a starting point, can i t s e l f become a pathology i f i t is not transformed into creative, se l f -actual iz ing expression. There are important links between rootlessness and Work as the making of durable home-making a r t i f i c e . Rootlessness may be a cause of the absence of Work. At the same time, Work is i t s e l f a cure for rootlessness. There is a need in Jamaica to resolve this somewhat paradoxical relation between the two. Rootlessness is a famil iar theme in Jamaican l i terature and music, and indeed in the a r t i s t i c expression of the region as a whole. This rootlessness obviously has i ts origin in the fact that for the majority of the population, Jamaica was not, at the outset, a chosen place of habitation. It was l i t e r a l l y a dungeon to which they were condemned. Work has lacked the wil l and energies of a sett ler t radi t ion. Centuries of colonization during which they regarded a land other than that of 85 their historical origin as their 'mother country' merely compounded this sense of rootlessness and al ienation. Unlike their counterparts e lse -where in the Americas, not even the colonists regarded Jamaica as their home; for them i t was a temporary abode while they pursued the wealth which would be taken back to their real homes. Consequently the bel ief that Jamaica is the home of anyone - - except perhaps of the unfortunate Arawaks who were completely annihilated by the colonists - - has never been a deeply embedded aspect of the Jamaican world-view. The tendency to think of home as somewhere else - - Europe, Af r ica , India, China, or elsewhere - - seems to be an important part of the Jamaican mind. Rastafarianism i s , of course, the chief expression of this sense of estrangement. But the Rastafarian may also be viewed as an important symbol of the Jamaican consciousness, and this probably partly explains the mixture of fascination and horror with which he is viewed by so many of his countrymen: somebody l ike him lurks near the surface of the l ives of a great many people. The Rastafarian has long been stereotyped, denigratingly, as a non-worker. But part of his cr i t ic ism of the society - - and this is among his reasons for rejecting i t - - is that i t is one which hinders and frustrates Work, and hence restr icts his human development. His anticipated alternative is that Work as home-making act iv i ty has to be done in Af r ica . Jamaicans are a migratory people and many have similar views of other parts of the world. Yet i t is probably s ignif icant that Rastafarians have, in recent times, taken to being chiefly craftsmen, art ists and musicians, and thus to producing what may be regarded as the paradigms of Work as home-making a r t i f i c e . Works of art and other art i facts actualize as well as symbolize the process by which people 86 try to make a place their home. Whatever else i t may be, Rastafarianism is also a search for Work, and for a place to be furnished with i ts objects. One of the main challenges of post-colonial reconstruction, is how to create an occupational culture as an alternative to that which colonialism created to serve i ts own interests. Except to the extent to which i t serves their own purposes, colonists are seldom interested in expanding and enriching the l ives of the people who perform the roles of the colonial system. The po l i t ica l and economic successors of the colonists do not themselves always regard these as the pr ior i t ies of social reform. Manley opted for the occupational culture of industrial moderniza-t ion. In his view, "Architects, engineers of al l types, cost accountants, s ta t i s t i c ians , computer analysts, radiologists , research sc ient is ts , soi l chemists, agronomists, farm managers, business administrators: these are the kinds of sk i l led personnel indispensable to a modern economy" (1974, p. 142). But i t may also be the case that to choose industr ia l i za -tion is also to choose much of the dehumanization associated with i t . It was partly this real ization which led Fanon (1963) to optimist ical ly urge Third World leaders to seek new forms of humanism as alternatives to what he saw as the defects of European c i v i l i z a t i o n . Countries l ike Jamaica, which are in search of the restoration of values, cannot risk losing them in too hasty imitation of the industralized world. The concept of Work has to be examined in the l ight of what is to be understood by notions l ike underdevelopment and development, and societies l ike Jamaica have to give their own answers to what they take these terms to mean. 87 The most notable expression, perhaps, of the Manley Government's wish to place work at the centre of the idea of national sol idar i ty and social renewal, may be found in the Labour Day programme. After assum-ing o f f i ce , the Manley Government suggested that on Labour Day, voluntary work on soc ia l ly useful community projects should be substituted for the customary marches by the two major po l i t i ca l parties. These marches tradit ional ly commemorated the labour uprisings of 1938 which led to the formation of the trade union movement, the founding of the main pol i t ica l part ies, and the birth of modern Jamaican po l i t ica l history. A national committee was set up to co-ordinate these Labour Day projects. The idea was enthusiastically received, indicating, perhaps, the exis-tence of a widely based willingness among Jamaicans to view work as nat ional is t ic , a l t ru i s t i c action. The slogan "Put Work into Labour Day" was used to promote the programme. In the language of my own account of these terms, the slogan could also be interpreted as an appeal to correct the imbalance between Labour and Work, and as a cal l for more col lect ive home-making Work in the society. V To be educated for Labour is to be educated for the most fundamental of ac t i v i t i es : i t is to be educated into the direct or indirect means of sustaining one's l i f e , as well as the l ives of others. There is some-thing unfortunate about the idea of a so-cal led educated person who, as Marx would put i t , is unable to produce the means of his subsistence, who cannot take care of his own body, and who lacks the elemental ' l i f e -s k i l l s ' necessary for his survival . Education for Labour is central to 88 what most people think schools ought to be about. In the Jamaican context, the problem is deciding what schools should do to provide this kind of basic education in ways which are responsive to the problems of Labour in the wider society. What should schools do to help remove the pathologies of Labour from the society, and to help promote the development of the required regenerative, ecological links between the society and its natural environment? My own view is that i t is chiefly by bringing the l iberal arts to bear on reflection of the practice of Labour that schools can hope to contribute to the possib i l i ty of finding solutions. It is this view that I shall now explore. For reasons previously mentioned, any attempt at bringing education to bear on Labour, and especially on direct Labour, confronts the follow-ing problem: education is widely seen by students as well as by the society as i t s e l f the chief means of escaping these ac t i v i t ies . Lack of education has succeeded colour and class as the characteristic which is to mark off those who should perform these act iv i t ies from those who should not. The school is seen as a relat ively insulated and unreal space where the students await their destinies. At the end of i t those who are fortunate acquire the credentials which wi l l spare them from direct Labour. For those students who are the children of parents who are chiefly engaged in direct Labour, and who themselves perform these act iv i t ies out of school, the chief point of education is to escape them. For those who are the children of parents who Labour indi rect ly , the point of education is to maintain that status and, i f possible, even widen the gap between direct and indirect Labour. The most obvious, and in fact the most widespread response is the view that the act iv i t ies of direct Labour should be made part of the l i f e 89 of the school. It is believed that these act iv i t ies wi l l be more apprec-iated i f they are elevated, so to speak, into the educational space of the school. This approach may also be informed by the Deweyan bel ief that the way to change society is to make the school a model of the en-visioned society. In this case, the assumption is that i f the l i f e of Labour in the school is made qual i tat ively superior to that of the society, the school wi l l function l ike a leaven of wholesome Labour in the wider social system. A Deweyan approach probably over-estimates the heights of qual i ta -tive Labour possible in the school. It may also under-estimate the in -fluence of the society on the school rather than the other way around. Societies tend to use schools to preserve the existing social order. The pathologies of Labour in a society wi l l influence the ways in which that society runs i ts schools. There are l imits to the extent to which schools can successfully f i l t e r the defects of the societies which control them. The approach may also under-estimate the extent to which non-educational factors - - p o l i t i c a l , economic, soc ia l , and so on - - are the forces which effect social change. I accept the view that the practice of Labour should be part of the l i f e of the school. When such act iv i t ies are made part of the l i f e of the school they often function chiefly in a symbolic way. It is a form of r i t u a l i s t i c acceptance and endorsement of them. The school i s , of course, a suitable place for any symbolic procedure by which a society reminds i t s e l f of the importance of Labour. But the performance of Labour in the school need not be only symbolic. The school l ives the l i f e of Labour by helping to sustain i ts own l i f e . But the school's performance of Labour wil l inevitably be 90 different from that of the natural society: i t wi l l lack i ts seriousness, variety, richness and complexity. At the same time i t may also have a certain elemental purity not easily found in the outside world. Instead of being a defect, the a r t i f i c i a l i t y of the school may well be a source of instructive contrasts with the natural society. The practice of Labour need not be restricted to the l i f e of the school; there is much to be said for encouraging the student to participate in the l i f e of Labour in the wider society. The pathology of Labour in Jamaican society is nowhere more evident than in the fact that Jamaicans who wil l not perform these act iv i t ies at home nevertheless do so in other countries; Labour is seen as so linked with shame i t is to be per-formed only away from the eyes of one's countrymen. Unlike his North American counterpart, for example, who often performs these act iv i t ies as a way of helping to pay for his education, the Jamaican student typical ly wants to maintain an almost superstitious distance from them. Yet i t is by participating in the l i f e of Labour in the society that the student may learn those s k i l l s of Labour which have helped the society survive i ts d i f f i c u l t history. With the estrangement of the young from the land, many of these s k i l l s are not being transmitted. Students are being educated away from the surviving regenerative bases of the society. The practice of Labour in the wider society is a way of direct ly exper-iencing i ts accomplishments as well as i ts pathologies. But even i f i t is the most problematic area in the Jamaican context, education for direct Labour is only part of the process. Education for Labour also has to advance the kinds of knowledge, values and s k i l l s which may bear on indirect Labour. It has to introduce the student to a broader repertoire of means by which he may earn the material wherewithal of l i f e ; 91 i t has to introduce him to, and prepare him for the l i f e of jobs and employment. Jewish rabbinical tradit ion requires each student to learn a trade. One thinks of Spinoza grinding lenses - - this was his indirect Labour - - while devoting the rest of his time to philosophy, which was his Work. I believe there is much to learn from this rabbinical theory of education. I do not see that i t is too much to expect that by the time he has completed al l -age or secondary school, each student should have mastered at least one social ly useful sk i l l by which he might earn his l i v ing . This could be a gradual process which increases in seriousness over the years. The mechanics of such a programme should be within the competence of most schools. But in my view, i t is not chiefly by incorporating direct or indirect Labour into i ts act iv i t ies that the school can make i ts most special con-tribution to their advancement. The act iv i t ies of Labour may be found burdensome or rewarding anywhere, and this is also true of the school. Many of these s k i l l s may be better learned in the natural society. What the school can add - - along with the purity of experience, symbolic endorsement, and instructive contrast previously noted - - and what cannot be easi ly found elsewhere, is a l iberal arts context in which Labour can be both practiced and reflected on. The practice of Labour can be enriched by the forms of knowledge and understanding which consti -tute the l iberal arts. In the interest of human survival nature has, in i ts wisdom, made many of the s k i l l s of direct Labour especially accessible. But unlike most non-human animals, man has to acquire, and may enlarge on the means of sustaining his l i f e . Labour involves the acquisition of knowledge, s k i l l s and values which can be acquired only through some means of formal or informal education. Some subjects l ike agriculture, home economics, the health sciences industrial ar ts , commerce, and so on, may seem l ike the natural habitat of direct and indirect Labour. But Labour may also be informed by the natural sciences, l i terature , the creative arts , and so on. In this con text, man and his Labour may be seen as a central area of inquiry. It is not only by practising Labour, but by bringing rich forms of thought to systematically ref lect on this practice that the appreciation of them might be deepened and enriched. Through l iberal studies the student may focus the content as well as the ref lect ive methodology of the l iberal arts on inquiry into the condition of Labour in his own society. This inquiry wil l help him un-cover i ts pathologies as well as i ts achievements and insights. The in -sights are important. No expression of the Jamaican mind that I know about better sums up the guiding principle of education for Labour than the Jamaican proverb which means "No horse is too good to carry his own grass." To educate for Labour in the Jamaican context is to build on, and to seek application in the educational sphere, for the insight enshrined in this bit of folk wisdom. But i t is not only the content and the methodology of the l iberal arts which may be brought to bear on education for Labour; i t may also be informed by i ts ideals. The chief of these ideals is freedom; l ibera education aims at educating free persons. Instead of the mistaken wish to be free from Labour, the required ideal is that of being free through Labour. To the extent that i t l iberates the student and the society from dependence and the pathologies of Labour, education for Labour is conducted in the sp i r i t of l iberal education. The problem in the 93 Jamaican context is how to get a society which has so long linked Labour with servitude to view i t as a precondition for i ts own freedom. VI To educate for Work is to equip the student with the means of expand-ing and enriching his l i f e . It is education for careers, professions and cal l ings . Education for Work is education for the exercise of the freedom which Labour makes possible. I believe l iberal education is the most suitable introduction to the l i f e of Work. The l iberal arts may themselves be forms of Work. They also consist of the forms of knowledge and understanding which have wide application and which may therefore be brought to bear on the r i ch -ness and variety of Work. The l i f e of Work, in the various cultures, is i t s e l f a central part of the content of the l iberal arts . Within the l iberal arts the student wil l f ind models of the l i f e of Work to be studied, evaluated, and at times rehearsed. The l iberal arts offer the student a range of symbolic representation of forms of Work which is much richer than his ordinary experience is l ike ly to provide. As is the case with education for Labour, exploration of the l i f e of Work in his own society may be an important part of the student's education. It gives him an opportunity to inquire into both i ts accom-plishments and pathologies. He should, as soon as possible, be encouraged to experience the satisfaction of social Work. I believe the study of the creative arts is an important part of education for Work. They are, perhaps, the purest expressions of enduring home-making a r t i f i c e , the self -created and nurturing culture the absence of which many of the region's writers have lamented, and have, by their own writings, tr ied to correct. Objects for use, such as those to be found in the Folk Museum, and objects for contemplation, such as those to be found in the National Gallery of Art, are among the objects by which Jamaicans have participated in and reflected on the enterprise of making the land their home. One of the pioneers of Jamaican sculpture was arrested for witchcraft when he displayed his f i r s t carving. It is in the f i e ld of sculpture that African peoples have produced some of their best known Work. But in Jamaica this tradition was almost entirely de-stroyed by slavery and colonialism. In the eyes of the colonists, African carvings were art i facts of evil to be destroyed. It is hardly surprising then, that an a r t i s i t i c movement - - in which sculpture, incidental ly , played a prominent role - - heralded the nationalist movement of the nine-teen th i r t ies . Nationalism is a quest for a home and for the objects with which to make i t one. The wil l to Work is usually expressed through the roles which con-st itute the socio-cultural system. Where this system is in a state of f lux , disorder or radical review, education for Work has to stress adaptabil ity, c r i t i c a l consciousness - - the phrase is from Freire (1973) - - and innovation. To educate for Work or Labour is not to prepare students to be mere tools for any given occupational culture; i t is to educate them to shape that culture for their individual as well as col lect ive ends. Whatever may be said for or against the content of soc ia l i s t morality, the moral ism which the Jamaican democratic socia l ists took to the pro-blem of work in Jamaica is understandable against the background of the -dehumanization which has characterized so much of the working experience 95 in the society. To educate for Work, in this context, is to pursue some ideal of a morally more defensible future. As part of this quest, I think education for Work should be linked with moral education. Two aspects of moral education may be noted. Both may be brought to bear on the development of attitudes to Work. F i r s t , i t has an emo-tive component. Williams (1966) once remarked that moral education is partly educating people into what they should fear, be angry about, despise, or hope for . According to Wilson (1967), i t is mainly concerned with improving and c lar i fy ing feelings. Viewed in this l ight , educating people for Work may be seen, in part, as the exploration of feelings about i ts a c t i v i t i e s , of what may with good reasons be feared, be angry about, and so on, and of how feelings linked with Work may themselves expand and enrich human l i f e . Second, moral education is also concerned with what is rationally defensible in the moral domain. Education for Work, as a form of moral education, needs to encourage inquiry into and respect for those facts of working experience which bear on the making of moral judgements and decisions about i t . It also needs to encourage inquiry into the rat ional i ty of the relations between moral principles and the conduct of Work. The chief goal of education for Work is the rehumanization of the society. This goal is a moral one. It is by being a form of moral educa-tion that education for Work may keep this ideal alive in student con-sciousness; and i t is to the extent that i t succeeds in influencing student action that i t is a force in the process of social renewal. 96 VII I think the dist inction between Labour and Work is a suitable basis for a policy of work-education for the following reasons: (1) Unlike the democratic soc ia l i s t proposal, i t is not s i lent on the qualitative variation possible in the domain of work; i t allows the entry of normative considerations according to which working l i f e may be discussed and appraised. (2) It is a dist inction which accommodates some of the other distinctions which the concept of work allows. For example, by granting that both Labour and Work may be either manual or intel lectual i t does not discriminate unfavourably between them; i t is the point of view of the worker which determines the value of the act iv i ty . Most important of a l l , (3) the dist inction is easi ly linked with d ist inct ly educational objectives; i t offers the student two complementary ways of viewing the act iv i t ies which contribute to his personal, educational development; and (4) the.dist inct ion may be brought to bear on the clearly definable social goals of material se l f -suf f ic iency and the creation of a f u l l e r , richer and more humane society. 97 CHAPTER FIVE EDUCATION AND EGALITARIAN IDEOLOGY The Jamaican variant of democratic socialism was above a l l an ega l i -tarian ideology. Not surprisingly, this egalitarianism was also brought to bear on the making of educational pol icy. The principle of equality of educational opportunity - - which is regarded by some as an egalitarian principle - - was endorsed, in the same words, by both the Ministry of Education (1977, p. 6) and the People's National Party (1979, p. 42). More spec i f i ca l l y , Manley, l ike egalitarians elsewhere, argued that "a single educational system is c r i t i ca l for egalitarianism"; in his view "those who seek an egalitarian society must f i r s t address their minds to the question of the organization of one stream of education through which a l l must pass" (1974, p. 39). Manley's position on this issue has to be seen in i ts social and historical context. The colonial rulers in Jamaica bui l t the f i r s t schools to educate their own children; these were mainly private, prepara-tory and grammar schools modeled after the Brit ish system; their chief purpose was to produce an educated class capable of managing and maintain-ing a colonial society. After the abolition of slavery, the Bri t ish i n -troduced elementary schools for the children of the freed slaves. It has been argued, by Turner (1977) for example, that the chief purpose of these schools was to social ize this newly freed population into the values necessary for the maintenance of a colonial order. For the most part, two unequal streams of education evolved from these beginnings. From the f i r s t came a selective system of preparatory and academic high 98 schools; these feed the university and receive most of their teachers from i t . From the second came the state-controlled primary and al l -age schools, the junior secondary or recently renamed 'new secondary' schools; as well as the comprehensive, technical and vocational schools; these schools feed the teachers colleges and the technical vocational colleges and receive most of their teachers from them. The f i r s t stream, in general, has better physical f a c i l i t i e s , teachers who are better trained, and more desirable staff-student rat ios. This sector also enjoys a high status in the society. In the larger state-controlled sector, physical conditions are often poor, the teachers receive less training - - and are sometimes untrained, - - and the schools are often overcrowded. Less status is attached to these inst i tut ions. It was against this historical background and in this social context that Manley made his demand for a unitary school system on the ground that egalitarianism requires i t . Manley contrasted egalitarianism with e l i t ism (n .d . , p. 4). But in contemporary theoretical discussion, as Nagel observes, egalitarianism is opposed not only by defenders of aristocracy, i ts traditional r i v a l , but also by those who defend other values l ike u t i l i t y and individual rights (1979, p. 109). The quest for egalitarianism may at times be compatible with the pursuit of these and other values. But i t is also often in conf l ict with them. The pursuit of egalitarianism may at times result in a loss of u t i l i t y ; i t may also lead to the violation of individual r ights. An enlightened educational policy is not indifferent to the question of what is l ike ly to lead to the greatest overall benefit for the society as a whole; such a policy is also responsive to the rights and freedoms of the members of the society. 99 It is the question of the relation between particular school systems and egalitarianism which I wish to examine. The claim 'Egalitarianism re-quires a unitary school system' may be interpreted in two main ways. F i rst i t can be taken to mean that a society is egalitarian only i f i t is ega l i -tarian in a l l respects, including in i ts educational system. Unitary systems, i t is believed, are themselves egal i tar ian, and mixed systems are not. Thus having a unitary school system is seen as one of the conditions which a society must satisfy i f i t is to be regarded as generally ega l i -tar ian. The concern here is with egalitarianism in education. Second, the claim might be taken to mean that there is a causal relation between unitary school systems and social structure such that unitary systems - -unlike mixed systems - - result in the formation of egalitarian societ ies . This, I think, was Manley's view of i t . He saw the establishment of a unitary system as a precondition for the creation of an egalitarian society. This is a concern with egalitarianism through education. Cooper who also distinguishes between equality in schooling and equality beyond s c h o o l i n g » claims that egalitarians are not suff ic ient ly attentive to the f i r s t (1980, p. 9). I am, of course, interested in the bearing which egalitarian ideals might have on both domains. I shall f i r s t of a l l describe some of the main features of both unitary and mixed school systems. Following th is , I offer an account of egal i tar -ianism as ideology. I shall then deny that egalitarianism requires a unitary school system. More spec i f i ca l l y , I argue that a mixed school system is compatible with the pursuit of egalitarian objectives, and that a mixed school system also has a number of other advantages which are important for social reform. II_ I take i t that while i t wil l d i f fer in i ts details from place to 1 place, the unitary school system which some egalitarians defend has the following main features: (a) It is total ly controlled by the state; there is no independent educational sector, (b) It offers free education at most and perhaps at a l l levels. This might be based on the view that education is too important a good to be le f t to the vagaries of individual economic means. The view that education is a commodity which may be bought and sold is one which many have for various reasons found objection able, (c) There is one kind of school at each level : primary, secondary and tert iary . It is never the case that some children go to one kind of primary school, for example, while others go to another. For the most part, each kind of school is simiarly furnished; schools of the same type use the same kinds of resources and materials, (d) There is a common curriculum at each leve l ; even i f some variation is allowed in order to adjust to differences in a b i l i t i e s and interests, there is a common and predominant component which must be shared by a l l . (e) This system aims at a high level of qualitative homogeneity; educational resources and the quality of instruction are as evenly distributed as possible; the same standards - - at least the same minimum standards - -are expected throughout. A mixed system, in contrast, has the following main features: (a) It includes both a state as well as an independent sector; the size of each sector may vary, but usually the state sector is the larger of the two. (b) In this system members of the society have the option of paying for a preferred form of education, (c) The mixed system allows diversity in the kinds of schools which are available. All primary, secondary or other schools are not a l ike ; alternative interpretations are allowed; there are differences in their modes of organization and 101 in their furnishings, (d) In a mixed system there may well be a common curriculum of some kind which is required by the state. Mil l believed - -not without some unease - - that i t is almost axiomatic that the state should "require and compel" a l l i ts citizens to be educated up to at least a minimum standard (1968, p. 160). But the state can do this with-out exercising total control over the school system. The state can require, and i n s i s t , that schools in the independent sector meet certain core requirements while allowing them to add their own curricular preferences to this basic core. Religious schools, for example, may add their religious concerns to what the state requires, (e) Mixed systems tend to be less qual i tat ively homogeneous. Some of the schools in the inde-pendent sector are often superior to those in the state sector. But, of course, this is not always the case. Some state schools may be better than some independent ones. Sometimes the schools in the two sectors wil l be very similar . A unitary system need not be qualitatively even, but i t i s , perhaps, more easily manipulated towards this ideal . A mixed system may well be monitored, by the state, in the interest of greater qualitative homogeneity. But in the absence of total state control , homogeneity of any kind may be less easily achieved in a mixed system. There are other arguments, apart from egalitarian ones, which might be offered in support of a unitary school system. It might be argued, for example, that a unitary system is more e f f i c ient ly or economically managed; that i t is a way of cementing or giving coherence to a plural society; that i t is more effect ively directed in the interest of social reform, and so on. These claims, i f true, may be good reasons for having such a system. But egalitarian arguments are of a different sort and these are the ones which wil l be considered. The claim that ega l i -102 tarianism requires a particular kind of school system cannot be usefully discussed without some account of what is to be understood by ' ega l i -tarianism' . It is to this question that I shall now turn. I l l To some of i ts c r i t i c s , egalitarianism is a doctrine based on envy, worldliness, and blind disregard for what they see as the inevitable presence of inequality in human a f fa i r s . These are important objections to the egalitarian enterprise. But I shall try to give an account of egalitarianism which, while i t is not indifferent to the objections of i ts c r i t i c s , nevertheless seeks to capture something of those components of the egalitarian outlook which help to explain i ts appeal to those who profess i t . My chief interest, of course, is in egalitarianism as ideology, and i t is as such that I shall examine i t . According to my view of ideology, i t wil l be recal led, ideological beliefs (a) are shared by some group and help to define the social and po l i t ica l identity of that group; (b) direct and guide social and p o l i -t ical action; (c) are sense-making in that they help to explain, jus t i f y , as well as give i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y , meaning, order and coherence to social and po l i t ica l experience; and (d) are focused on the solution of specif ic problems of social and po l i t ica l organization. (a) In some respects, egalitarianism is so widespread in the modern world i t could be said that i t is i t s e l f one of the dominant ideologies of the age. Egalitarianism cuts across ideological groupings. For example, Rawls (1971), a l iberal egal i tar ian, is concerned with the equal distr ibution of basic l i be r t ies , as well as with the distribution 103 of other goods. Tawney (1964), a soc ia l i s t egal i tar ian, saw egalitarianism as an outlook importantly linked with the idea of c i v i l i z a t i o n , and saw the realization of egalitarian ideals as a precondition for the release of the f iner aspects of human potential . Liberals and social ists need not disagree about these objectives, but the point is that however i t is interpreted, and whatever their other differences, both see egalitarianism as an important part of their general outlook. But whether i t occurs as a component of other ideological perspectives, or independently of them, egalitarianism is at the core of many of the various national, racial and sexual movements which characterize the modern era. (b) Egalitarians, of course, believe that equality is the chief ideal which should direct and guide social and po l i t i ca l action. But are a l l principles of equality egalitarian principles? Raz (1978) argues that only some principles of equality are egal i tar ian. In his view, egalitarianism is based on principles of equality of a special sort. This view merits some elaboration. Principles of equality may be said to be principles of entitlement: they guarantee certain benefits to a l l who are covered by them. If this is so, the following are principles of equality: (1) To each according to his ab i l i t y . (2) All without relevant differences are entit led to the same treatment. (3) All human beings are entit led to concern and respect. These are principles of equality, but are they egalitarian principles? (1) The principle 'To each according to his ab i l i t y ' has a charac-t e r i s t i c egalitarian principles are supposed to have: i t grants ent i t le -ments to everyone, even i f i t does not guarantee everyone the same advan-tages. But this is a principle which non-egalitarians - - l ike Plato and 104 Burke for example — would readily endorse. It is a meritocratic pr inciple ; meritocracy, according to Schaar, is a situation in which the "natural and social aristocracies" are identical (1967, p. 232); this is the result of a thorough-going application of this pr inc ip le , and i t is an end which is objectionable to egal itar ians. If this is a principle of equality i t seems to be true that not a l l principles of equality are egalitarian pr inciples. (2) The view that a l l are entit led to the same treatment unless i t can be shown that there are relevant differences which warrant discrimina-t ion , is sometimes called the principle of impart ial i ty . Some writers on egalitarianism, including Benn and Peters (1959, p. 153), and White and White (1980, pp. 247-248), regard the principle of impartial ity as the basis of egalitarianism. But this seems to suggest that egalitarians espouse impartial ity and that non-egalitarians do not. But many non-egalitarians - - Plato and Burke wil l again serve as examples - - defend ar istocrat ic social systems on the ground that they are arrived at by impartial means. It can also be argued that the principle of impartial ity is too widely accepted to be regarded as definit ive of any particular moral or po l i t i ca l point of view. It makes too many people egal itar ians. According to this view of egalitarianism one is an egalitarian i f one believes that a judicial system should be impartial . But I think i t is possible to imagine non-egalitarians who regard the principle of judicial impartial ity as an important part of their social and pol i t ica l outlook. (3) Raz argues that principles of equal concern and respect are only rhetorical ly egal i tar ian. In his view "They are not designed to increase equality but to encourage recognition that the well-being of a l l human beings counts" (1978, p. 334). This in his view is humanism. 105 He concludes that these are humanistic principles expressed in the fashionable but unnecessary langauge of egalitarianism. Or, to put i t another way, by introducing terms l ike 'equal' into them, egalitarians adorn humanistic principles with the l inguist ic insignia of their own creed. But he thinks that these principles would lose nothing i f terms l ike 'equal' were removed from them. These principles merely u t i l i ze the prestige and rhetorical force of terms l ike 'equal' in western culture. Raz assumes that egalitarian principles are generally also humanistic. But he argues that while some non-egalitarian positions - - l ike racism and sexism - - are not compatible with humanism, some other non-egalitarian positions — l ike Bentham's ut i l i tar ianism and varieties of meritocracy are compatible with humanism. It seems Raz wants to guard against egalitarian attempts at appropriating humanism. In short, i f Raz is r ight , one does not have to be an egalitarian to believe that a l l human beings are entit led to concern and respect. This is a principle of equality, but according to Raz i t is not a s t r i c t egalitarian pr inciple. What, then, are egalitarian principles of equality? At the core of the western egalitarian t radi t ion, Raz suggests, are principles of non-discrimination l ike "All Fs who do not have G are entit led to G i f some Fs have G" (1978, p. 332). Raz believes that there are other kinds of egalitarian pr inciples, l ike what he cal ls "principles of equal d is -tribution in conf l ict" (1978, p. 331); but in his view, principles of non-discrimination are of special importance; he thinks they are "omni-present in the main l ine of egalitarian theories" (1978, p. 336). These principles are at the heartland of what Raz cal ls s t r i c t egalitarianism. They are designed to increase equality, and they offer the maximization of equality as the ground for action. According to Raz, a moral or 106 po l i t i ca l theory is s t r i c t l y egalitarian i f i t is dominated by principles of this kind; they dominate in that they are seldom overriden by other consideratons; they also regulate whatever basic principles of ent i t le -ment these theories contain. Raz believes that most popular egalitarian principles - - equality of opportunity, welfare, and so on - - have pr in-ciples of non-discrimination as their dominant component. The principle of equality of opportunity, for example, is a combination of a basic principle of entitlement, "All are entit led to a l l the opportunities there can be," and a principle of non-discrimination, "If some have more opportunities than others then those who have less are entit led to addi-tional opportunities to bring them to the level of those who have more" (1978, p. 337). The principle of non-discrimination regulates the principle of entitlement to opportunity. Raz describes the special character of principles of non-discrimination as follows: The sensit iv i ty of principles of non-discrimination to existing distributions is the crucial pointer to their character as egalitarian pr inciples. Being an F by i t s e l f does not qualify one to G. It is the actually existing inequality of distr ibution which creates the entitlement. The entitlement is designed to eliminate a specif ic kind of existing discrimination. Such principles ref lect the view that i t is wrong or unjust for some Fs to have G while others have not (1978, p. 332). Now i t is true, I believe, that not a l l who profess adherence to some principle of equality can be said to be egal itar ians. Meritarians, u t i l i ta r ians , l ibertar ians, and others, believe that there are principles of equality which should direct social and po l i t i ca l action. A moral or po l i t i ca l theory may, by incorporating some conception of equality, con-tain an egalitarian component without i t s e l f being a predominantly egalitarian theory. Many widely accepted principles of equality, l ike legal and po l i t ica l equality, are not generally regarded as egalitarian 107 pr inciples. I shall shortly have more to say about what I think is the place of principles of equal concern and respect in the egalitarian scheme. But the principle of equality which Raz regards as the basis of s t r i c t egalitarianism i s , in my view, an unsavoury one, and I think few who profess egalitarianism would agree that i t is an adequate statement of the basis of their creed. This view of the egalitarian conception of equality is one which is most commonly found among c r i t i cs of egal i tar ian-ism. Joseph and Sumption, for example, hold a similar view of the basis of egalitarianism: The assumption on which egalitarianism is based is that people want to have as much as their neighbour, that they measure their own status by his and feel entit led to have the difference made up to them (1979, p. 40). If this is what egalitarianism is about, i t is hardly surprising that Cooper, who believes that Raz is r ight , and who is himself a c r i t i c of egalitarianism, concludes that except per accidens a right policy or principle is never that which egalitarians advocate, and that a policy or principle "which i t is of the essence of egalitarianism to pursue" is never right (1980, p. ix ) . Yet i t can hardly be denied that there is some force to these claims about the egalitarian view of equality. There is some sense in which egalitarianism is about the level l ing of goods. Many who profess ega l i -tarianism often perform actions which seem to be based on some principle of a Razian kind. The question is whether anything can be added to the insight in Raz's formulation which wil l help to make i t more acceptable to those who are sympathetic to egalitarianism. As a move in this direc-t ion , I shall make three observations - - with which I think many ega l i -108 tarians would agree - - which wil l help to f i l l out some other dimensions of the egalitarian outlook. My claim is that Raz is right in believing that a level l ing ideal of some kind is at the core of the egalitarian point of view, but that this ideal is less objectionable i f some other considerations are kept in mind. F i r s t , egalitarians customarily base their claims about human ent i t le -ments on claims about human nature as well as on claims about social rea l i t y . Raz avoids discussion of the f i r s t , and contends that ega l i -tarians regard what others have - - a social contingency - - as the source of human entitlements. Yet i t seems to me that the kind of approach which is described by Williams, for example, is more characterist ic of the kind of approach which egalitarians have customarily taken: The idea of equality is used in pol i t ica l discussion both in statements of fact - - that men are equal - - and in statements of po l i t ica l principles or aims - - that men should be equal, as at present they are not. The two can be, and often are, combined: the aim is then described as that of securing a state of affai rs in which men are treated as the equal beings which they in fact already are, but are not already treated as being (1964, p. 110). Egalitarians claim that there is some respect - - transcendental, natural and empirical , being members of the same species, and so.on, - - in which a l l human beings are equal, and offer this as the reason for the claim that there should be a corresponding equality in social and pol i t ica l arrangements. As Williams observes, there are many d i f f i cu l t i es in determining what is to be understood by both these claims, and the re la -tion which is said to hold between them. But d i f f i cu l t i es with these claims notwithstanding, many egalitarians regard human equality - - how-ever i t is to be understood - - as the ground for entitlements to equal treatment in social and po l i t ica l organization. Egalitarian humanism involves more than the view that a l l should count; i t involves the view that being human is the ground for certain entitlements; egalitarians add to this the view that human equality is the ground for equal human entitlements. According to this approach to egalitarianism, the egalitarian response to social inequalities arises largely because these inequalities are perceived, at least by some people, as an infringement of the ent i t le ment to equal treatment which i t is assumed al l human beings already have Social inequalit ies only stimulate egalitarian responses. Few, i f any, egalitarians would claim that existing social inequalities create ent i t le ments. Raz offers no examples of egalitarians who believe th is . Most egal i tar ians, I believe, would deny holding the view - - which Raz takes to be part of the egalitarian outlook - - that "Being an F by i t s e l f does not qualify one to G" (1978, p. 332). I think that contrary to what Raz suggests, most egalitarians would contend that being a human being qualif ies one to non-discriminatory treatment, and that one has this entitlement prior to , and independently of the actual existence of discriminatory conditions. Egalitarians believe that human equality is the ground of claims to equal entitlement to non-discrimination. Raz assimilates the benefits which principles of entitlement guaran-tee and the conditions which bring these principles into play. This is in keeping with his view that "Principles are commonly described as normative statements specifying a condition of application and a norma-tive consequence" (1978, p. 322). My own view is that in formulating pr inciples, these two considerations should be carefully distinguished. By conflating them, in this case, Raz seems to be claiming that there can be egalitarian principles only when and where there are actual existing n o inequal i t ies. I f ind this view unconvincing. It is by reference to claims about human equality that egalitarians defend what Raz cal ls humanism. According to Raz, "Humanism means that since a l l people count and since entitlements are for the good of the person concerned they must be such that none is excluded" (1978, p. 340). Raz does not say whether this view of humanism can be defended without appeals to equality. Principles of equal concern and respect may well be humanistic in Raz's sense of the term. But i t seems to me that they function in the egalitarian scheme in two main ways. F i r s t , they promote recognition of the human equality on which, I have claimed, egalitarianism has been tradit ional ly based. Second, they help to increase equality, but they do so indirect ly : they do so by promoting the temporal and psychological conditions for the more tangible forms of equal treatment which other egalitarian principles - - those which specify particular benefits l ike opportunities, welfare, and so on - - are designed to achieve. I think these principles have a central and not merely rhetor i -cal role in the egalitarian scheme. Second, there are a number of considerations - - which are largely ignored by Raz - - which bear on egalitarian interest in advancing the well-being of those who are actually or potentially least favoured by natural or social contingencies. Cr i t ics of egalitarianism focus on notions l ike envy and resentment, and, to borrow a phrase from Nozick (1974, p. 240), attribute a "disreputable psychology" to egal itar ians. But most egal i tar ians, I believe, would agree with Frankel's character-ization of egalitarianism as "a complaint expressed from below" (1973, p. 61), as the prudent protection of the less powerful against those who exercise more power and influence in society, and as a positive in appreciation of the ordinary man's way of l i f e . The prudent protection of those who are actually or potentially 'below' need not have anything to do with envy, and may have much to do with the promotion of sel f - respect . The claims of the less advantaged may also be jus t i f i ed . Along with equality, notions l ike prudent se l f - in terest and compassion are important categories in the egalitarian outlook, and in i ts conception of morality. However idea l i s t i c i t may be, there is also a kind of heroism in the egalitarian quest for forms of social organization which can counter-balance the apparently cosmic lottery of natural and social circumstances. The egalitarian quest may also be part of a perceived need to redress col lect ive wrongs. Third, there may well be some egalitarians who believe in the mechanical and wasteful level l ing of the world's goods which Raz's principle of non-discrimination requires. But the egalitarian need not be an insensitive and indiscretionary leve l le r . Egalitarianism need not exclude Aristotel ian "practical wisdom" (1954, BK. VI, Sec. 5). To arb i t rar i l y deprive an F of 6, in the pursuit of leve l l ing , may be in conf l ict with the view that a l l are entit led to equal concern and respect. In the pursuit of 'practical wisdom1 the egalitarian may, for example, opt for the random distr ibution of scarce goods, for equality in the chance of receiving benefits. A rational egalitarian is not indifferent to the effect of his schemes on other values. The quest for egalitarianism may also be tempered by commitment to ideals l ike humanism and just ice. (c) I turn now to egalitarianism as a form of ideological sense-making. Ber l in , in commenting on the d i f f i cu l t y of just i fy ing equality, observes that equality " is i t s e l f that which jus t i f ies other acts" (1979, p. 102). Some egalitarians regard equality as an in t r ins ic good. But 112 equality is also defended as a requirement of just ice , and as a precondi-tion for other values l ike freedom, u t i l i t y , and fraternity . In post-colonial societies l ike Jamaica, egalitarianism is a way of trying to throw off the r a c i a l , s o c i a l , po l i t i ca l and other i n f e r i o r i -t ies of the past. Egalitarianism is a search for moral well-being. It is a quest for what Rawls, in his account of primary goods, cal ls the "social bases of self - respect" (1979, p. 11). There are two related kinds of egalitarianism in these societ ies. The f i r s t seeks greater equality in internal social and pol i t ica l arrange-ments. The second seeks greater equality in external relations with other societ ies , especially those in the developed world. Egalitarianism is part of the process by which these societies pursue a sense of their own identit ies as autonomous pol i t ica l units; i t is a search for orientation as members of the larger world order. One of the most important functions of egalitarianism as ideology, is as a way of elaborating images of social poss ib i l i t y . Egalitarian ideals of society may d i f fer in their deta i ls , but I think most ega l i -tarians share Rousseau's view of a society in which "no cit izen shall be rich enough to buy another, and none so poor as to be forced to sel l himself" (1968, p. 96). The egalitarian society is also a just society. There are obviously different conceptions of what constitutes a just society. One view is what Bell cal ls a "just meritocracy" (1979, p. 49); i t is just in that i ts positions of authority are earned, and not acquired by undesirable means. This was part of Manley's view of an egalitarian society (1974, p. 39). Egalitarians often deny that they value uni-formity. But they do tend to d is l ike man-made barriers to social mobil ity, class div is ions, and the trappings of background and status. The process 113 of trying to imagine what an egalitarian society might be l ike is obviously an important part of the processes of self-transformation being attempted in the societies of the Third World. (d) Ideological be l ie fs , I have said , are centered on the solu-tion of specif ic problems of social organization. Social inequalities are, of course, the main problems which egalitarian movements seek to solve. These inequalities vary in time and place, and the programmatic content of egalitarianism varies accordingly. Benn (1967) believes that egalitarianism is more a set of 'negative' responses to specif ic i n -equalit ies than a positive view of social organization. Cooper doubts that there is any underlying unity in the histor ical diversity of ega l i -tarian causes (1980, p. 15). But however egalitarian discontent with inequality is explained, few impulses have done more to shape the modern age. Egalitarians are continually moving beyond the boundaries of consensual equality - -egalitarianism may also become what Bluhm (1974, p. 10) cal ls latent ideology — and challenging the defensibi l i ty of those inequalities which are objectionable' to egalitarian conscience. Although more can obviously be said about i t , I shall for present purposes take egalitarianism to be a social and po l i t i ca l outlook characterized by at least the following features: F i r s t , egalitarianism has a special interest i n , and gives pr ior i ty to advancing the well-being of those who are actually or potentially least favoured by natural or social contingencies. This emphasis is partly based on notions l ike prudent se l f - in te res t , compassion, and the preservation of sel f - respect . Second, egalitarianism is based on assumptions about human equality, and on the equal entitlement to non-discriminatry treatment which, 114 regardless of existing conditions, i t is believed that human equality requires. Third, I take principles of equal concern and respect to be a central part of the egalitarian scheme. I do not regard these principles as an expendable, marginal, or merely rhetorical component of the egalitarian outlook. Fourth, egalitarianism employs a level l ing ideal of some kind, and this is expressed chiefly in i ts conception of forms of social organization which are without great and unreasonable i n -equalit ies of material condition, power, status and influence. But the pursuit of this ideal need not be mechanical and indiscretionary, i t may be pursued with both rat ional i ty and sensi t iv i ty . 11 I shall try to show that i f the foregoing account of egalitarianism is correct, a mixed school system is compatible with the pursuit of egalitarian objectives. Ear l ier , I distinguished between egalitarianism in and through education. I shall argue that a mixed school system is compatible with the pursuit of both, and that there are also important non-egalitarian arguments which might be offered in support of a mixed system. More needs to be said about the notion of egalitarianism in educa-t ion. An egalitarian who believes that equality is worth pursuing fori i ts own sake, may also believe that this is as true of the educa-tional domain as of any other. His commitment to egalitarianism in education may be part of his view that ideally^, a society is egalitarian only i f i t is egalitarian in al l i ts respects. The egalitarian may also believe that egalitarianism in education is a precondition for the 115 real ization of other values which are important for education. But i t is the notion of egalitarianism in education as an end in i t s e l f which I wish to consider. This approach to egalitarianism involves a largely non-intrumental view of education. Education is regarded as a good which is worth having regardless of any non-educational consequences i t might have. According to this view, being educated is in i t s e l f a condition of well -being. Egalitarian promotion of education is part of i ts moral concern about human welfare; since education is a good in i t s e l f , i ts equitable distr ibution is a way of advancing human well -being. Non-instrumental views of education are not easily defended. This approach to education is perhaps even more d i f f i c u l t to defend in under-developed societies where the pressures to take a u t i l i ta r ian view of the school are l ike ly to be especially strong. Figueroa, for example, laments the phi l is t ine approach to education in Caribbean societies (1971, pp. 100-101). But underdevelopment is not only a lack of material well -being; i t is also a poverty of the things of the inte l lect and the s p i r i t . Many underdeveloped societies have inherited both forms of deprivation from their histor ical experience; a balanced educational policy aims at the removal of both. One approach which might be taken to egalitarianism in education is suggested by Dewey's view of experience as both the end and means of education (1977, p. 89). Like the condition of being educated, the experience of getting an education might also be regarded as an end in i t s e l f , and not as a means to anything beyond i t . Most people spend a large portion of their l ives in school; often they are compelled to do so by the state. The quality of this experience is an important part 116 of the quality of each person's total l i f e experience. Education might seek to have this portion of human experience worth having for i ts own sake. Egalitarianism in education is an attempt at removing inequalities in the quality of experience in the educational domain. If this is achieved i t is seen as a good in i t s e l f , regardless of any post-educa-tional consequences i t might have. Some radical egalitarian movements in education focus on inequalities in the status of students and teachers. Issues involving the democratiza-tion of the educational domain may also be part of an egalitarian pro-gramme. My main concern, of course, is with those kinds of inequalities which have their source, or expected solution, in particular kinds of school systems. A mixed school system, I believe, is compatible with the pursuit of egalitarianism for the following reasons: (a) i t may be a way of advancing the educational well-being of those who are least favoured; (b) i t may be based on assumptions about human equality; (c) i t may be a way of showing equal concern and respect; and (d) i t allows the exercise of sensi t iv i ty and practical judgement in the removal of sub-stantive inequalities in the educational domain. I shall now consider each of these in turn. (a) The unitary school system is sometimes defended on the ground that i t is a way of promoting fraternal relations and an appreciation of common humanity. It is believed that these values are advanced when those who are naturally or social ly less endowed share the same educational environments with the more favoured. This kind of mixing is believed to be of educational value both to the less favoured and to the more advantaged: i t encourages the development of self -respect among the f i r s t , and i t cures the second of snobbishness and conceit. It is worth noting that this approach to educational mixing - -especially the mixing of the less able with the more able - - is more widespread in the western democracies than i t is in socialist-communist societ ies. In communist societ ies , the tendency is to have special schools for the more able. In spite of o f f i c i a l commitment to radical egalitarianism, u t i l i ta r ian considerations generally prevai l . But a mixed system need not exclude the kind of mixing which is promoted by advocates of a unitary system. In a mixed system, children with different ab i l i t i es and from different social and ethnic back-grounds wil l often attend the same schools. Sometimes they wi l l be brought together by other bonds, l ike religious ones, for example. Since educational mixing is not enforced in a mixed system, there may be less homogeneity. But in a mixed system a considerable degree of mixing is possible in both the state and the independent sectors. Independent schools, especially religious ones, have a tradition of interest in the educational well-being of the less favoured. In many cases their concern has preceded that of the state; in some under-developed countries the existence of these schools pre-dated the development of the state and the subsequent expansion of state-sponsored education. In many cases the state may well be just i f ied in taking over educational efforts of this kind. But in underdeveloped societ ies , where the state's educational resources are l ikely to be l imited, there may well be good reasons for encouraging independent educational action which may benefit the less favoured. A unitary system benefits the social ly less favoured only i f the quality of the education which i f offers is high, and even then i t does 118 not necessarily result in the equalization of educational advantages. When a unitary system offers high quality education, the social ly more favoured receive the benefits of this system plus the advantages of their social backgrounds; since the unitary system usually offers free education, i t is also to the economic advantage of the more favoured. Even i f the less favoured receive roughly the same benefits from a good unitary system, they begin with the disadvantages of their less p r i v i -leged backgrounds. When the educational quality of a unitary system is low - - which is very l ikely in a country with meagre educational resources — the more favoured have recourse to the educational resources of their background. The less favoured only add an impoverished school-ing experience onto their already educationally impoverished l i ves . In Jamaica, the children of the socia l ly and economically least favoured generally attend the state schools. The least advantaged of a l l are those who attend the state primary schools. What ega l i -tarianism in education requires is that pr ior i ty be given to the improve-ment of the quality of the educational experience offered in the state sector. A word needs to be said about the fetishism of secondary education in Jamaican society and culture. Long associated with exclusiveness, and long regarded as the gateway to pr iv i lege, considerable attention is attached to attendance - - even mere attendance — at these schools. Indeed the term 'secondary school' i t s e l f exerts such social power that attendance at any inst i tut ion so designated is regarded as desirable. Much that has been done in modern Jamaican education, supposedly in the interest of egalitarianism, has, I think, pandered to this fact of Jamaican educational culture. The thinking seems to be close to Raz's 119 view of egalitarianism: since secondary education is the gateway to pr iv i lege, a l l who do not have access to secondary education are entit led to access to secondary education i f some have access to secondary educa-t ion. Expansion in secondary education has been the main area of modern educational development in Jamaica. Schools bui l t for the less favoured were called ' junior secondary schools ' ; later they were re-named 'new secondary schools' . Cr i t ics of these schools claim that these schools are infer ior to the traditional secondary schools, and that a deception is being perpetuated. The children of the least favoured, i t seems, are either ignored or deceived. A state which is serious about advancing the educational well-being of the less advantaged can do so through a mixed system. Where the inequality to be removed is that between a state sector and an indepen-dent sector — and the least favoured are in the state sector - - the state improves the lot of the less favoured by improving i ts own sector. The alternative of di luting the educational quality of the independent sector could lead to a loss of u t i l i t y . Where i t has the necessary f iscal and educational resources, the state may also remove inequalities in the independent sector. It may do so by exercising i ts powers of supervision and l icensing, and, where possible, through financial ass is -tance . (b) A mixed system may be based on assumptions about human equality. Two of the popular egalitarian candidates for a respect in which a l l human beings may be said to be equal wil l serve as examples. The f i r s t is a l iberal egalitarian view. Rawls has advanced a neo-Kantian conception of human equality which, among other things, claims that human beings are equal in being able to rationally plan their l ives (1971, p. 408). This applies to a l l normal human beings and would to some degree obvious also include children. An assumption of this kind obviously requires educational arrange-ments which allow a considerable degree of both parental and student autonomy. People can rationally plan their educational l i ves , or the educational l ives of their chi ldren, only i f they are free to consider alternatives, and to exercise their capacities for rational choice. A unitary system need not exclude choice: where the resources are ava i l -able, and the appropriate intentions are in place, a unitary system may be varied. But however varied i t may be, i t excludes the important choice of opting out of the state's educational arrangements, a choice which in some circumstances may be an eminently rational one. The mixed system, however, aims at the maximization of choices. It is sometimes said that human beings are equal in having certain basic needs. Raphael, for example, suggests that "The right to equality proper, as distinguished from equity as a whole, is a right to equal satisfaction of basic human needs, including the need to develop and use capacities which are speci f ica l ly human" (1976, pp. 192-193). Raz, who regards egalitarianism as the level l ing of insatiable consumerism, denies that there is any special connection between egalitarianism and the giving of pr ior i ty to the satisfaction of needs. But many of the entitlements which egalitarians defend - - to medical care and education, for example - - are obviously needs in ways in which some goods, l ike property for instance, are not. Rawls regards his theory of social primary goods - - the distribution of these goods is to be regulated by his principles of justice — as "an extension of the notion of needs, which are dist inct from aspirations and desires" (1979, p. 15). The 121 principle 'To each according to his need' is a well-know communist i d e a l . -It can be argued that there is some sense in which education is one of the basic human needs. Unlike most non-human animals, man needs formal or informal education of some kind i f he is to survive, and, i t seems, i f he is to become human at a l l . This view of education as need is one of the claims often offered in support of state-provided education. A state which assumes that a l l i ts cit izens have a right to equal satisfaction of basic educational needs may pursue the realization of this ideal through a mixed school system. A state can, in a mixed system, use i ts legal authority, i ts supervisory apparatus, as well as i ts f iscal and educational resources to ins ist that basic educational needs - - whatever these are taken to be - - are sat is f ied . Unitary systems can claim no special eff icacy in the satisfaction of educational needs. Even i f people have a right to equal satisfaction of basic educational needs, there wil l be variation in the actual needs themselves. A mixed school system may well allow more f l e x i b i l i t y in making educational adjustments to this variat ion. (c) Few in the modern world would deny that the state should treat a l l i ts cit izens with equal concern and respect, and that this should be reflected in i ts attitude to the educational domain. Any school system which the state conducts or allows f a l l s short of this ideal i f i ts physical conditions are poor, i f i t is arbitrary and excessively authoritarian in i ts methods, and so on. As far as I can see, there is no kind of school system which can claim immunity from defects of this kind; they may occur in unitary and mixed systems a l ike . Defenders of the .unitary system believe that only this system can be a vehicle by which the state demonstrates i ts equal concern and respect. 122 According to this view, to show equal concern and respect is to regard the society's educational resources as a cake to be divided equally among i ts children. Showing equal concern and respect means pooling a l l the society's educational resources and giving a l l children equal access to them. A mixed system, in my view, does not exclude the poss ib i l i ty of a considerable degree of equality in the distr ibution of educational resources. But a crucial difference between the two systems is that in a mixed system equal concern and respect are focused, not so much on resources, but on parental autonomy and parental r ights. The view that parents should be the f inal authority in the making of decisions con-cerning the education of their children is tradit ional and widely held throughout the world. It is a right which, as Cohen (1978) reminds us, is enshrined in Art ic le 26(3) of the United Nations' declaration of Human Rights. In the case of the mixed system, the concern is with the equal protection of parental autonomy, and the equal respect for parental r ights. (d) Ear l ier I said that there is some sense in which egalitarianism is about the level l ing of goods; egalitarianism in education is about the removal of grave substantive inequalit ies in society's educational arrangements. But I have claimed that egalitarian level l ing need not be mechanical and wasteful, and that i t may be pursued with sensit iv i ty and practical judgement. The mixed system, I believe, allows for the sensitive and discretionary removal of inequalit ies. Cr i t ics of ega l i -tarianism often claim that the achievement of equality in some respect necessarily results in inequality in some other respect. Two examples from Cooper wil l i l lust rate the kind of claim which is being made: 123 Tax people progressively, so that you make them more equal with respect to the amount they have l e f t , and you thereby make them less equal with respect to the percentage they have l e f t . Construct very expensive schools for mi l l ion -aires' chi ldren, and you thereby, at one and the same time, create greater disparity in school fees but less disparity in the ratio of fees to parental income (1980, p. 13). If this claim is generally true, an attempt at achieving a large amount of equality in a single stroke - - by converting an unequal mixed system into a presumably equal unitary system — is l ike ly to give r ise to other kinds of inequalities as objectionable as the ones i t sought to remove. In a mixed system, the state may monitor both the state and the!indepen-dent educational sectors in order to identify such inequalities as are to be found. Each inequality can be considered individual ly , and i t can be assessed in the l ight of other values which are relevant to i ts presence or removal. Bedau's view, I believe, is as appropriate for egalitarianism in general as i t is for egalitarianism in education: The permanent task for the egalitarian remains one of scrutinizing existing inequalities among men in order to assure us that they are based on just i f iab le (or at least unavoidable) differences, and to eliminate those which are not (1967, p. 27). V Earl ier I mentioned some of the features an egalitarian might expect his ideal society to have. I have just discussed the view that he might regard a society as egalitarian only i f i ts school system is also ega l i -tar ian. But some egalitarians also believe that a unitary school system is a precondition for the creation of a wider egalitarian society. They believe that egalitarianism can be achieved through education. Instrumental approaches to education are widespread, and unlike the 124 view that education is an int r ins ic good, present l i t t l e d i f f i cu l t y to most people. But the claim that there is a causal relation between unitary school systems and the formation of egalitarian societies is one which poses a number of problems. It is chiefly an empirical claim which can be ver i f ied or discredited only by reference to the historical experience of societies with such school systems. But while I shall not ignore a number of empirical considerations, i t is not the empirical aspect of the problem which I wish to consider. My main aim is to examine some of the assumptions on which this egalitarian expectation rests. The most important assumption, perhaps, is the general one concern-ing the power of education as an agent for social change. This faith in education is shared by egalitarians and non-egalitarians a l ike , and there have been some memorable expressions of i t in philosophical l i terature. Plato saw education as "the one thing that is suff ic ient" in the quest for social reconstruction (1967, BK. IV, Sec. 423). According to Locke, education is "that which makes the great difference in mankind" (1964, p. 20). Dewey believed that "education is the fundamental method of social progress and reform" (1959, p. 30). It is obviously true that education is one of the main forces which influence society. But i t is also often observed that education is also a ref lect ion of the society which gives i t . A society which is already egalitarian - - having achieved i ts egalitarianism by whatever means - -is l ike ly to have i ts egalitarianism reflected in i ts school system. Similar ly , an inegalitarian society is also l ike ly to ref lect i ts i n -egalitarianism in i ts educational arrangements. An egalitarian society wil l use i ts school system to maintain i t s egalitarianism, and an i n -125 egalitarian society wil l use i ts school system to perpetuate i ts inegal i -tarianism. Egalitarians believe that when inegalitarianism is being per-petuated, the cycle can be broken by altering the school system. They believe that by replacing a mixed system - - judged to be inegalitarian - -with a unitary system - - judged to be egalitarian - - they wil l bring about a corresponding change in social structure as the society gradually re-f lects the egalitarianism of the school. Those who believe that society exerts greater influence in shaping the school than vice versa, wil l set greater store on the achievement of egalitarianism by non-educational means. While most people probably regard education as a necessary condi-tion for social reform, few would agree with Plato that i t is a suff ic ient condition. Reform in education often depends on transformation in the wider society. While there are often important relations between education and the post-educational achievements of persons, non-educational considera-tions - - at least considerations which have l i t t l e to do with formal education - - are also important in influencing the nature of post-educa-tional accomplishments. Although too much should not be made of i ts conclusions, a study conducted by Jencks and others (1972) in the United States found that family, status, personal qual it ies and luck were often more important than formal education in determining post-educational success. It is well known that persons with l i t t l e formal education often achieve considerable success in society. The problem for the egalitarian is how to get from the school system to the kind of society which he wants. For him, equality in post-educational outcome is an important aim of education. His search is for the kind of school system which is most l ike ly to achieve this result , 126 and some egalitarians believe that the unitary school system is such a system. One of the most important assumptions underlying egalitarian choice of the unitary school system, i t seems, is the view that similar educa-tion is l ike ly to lead to greater s imilar i ty in the levels of post-educational accomplishment, to fewer inequalities in accomplishment beyond the l i f e of the school. But there is no conception of 's imilar education' that I can think of which is l ike ly to lead to this result . If the term is taken to mean equal access to the same educational re-sources — and th is , presumably, is what a unitary system allows - -differences in a b i l i t i e s , motivation, and interests will result in differences in the use which is made of these resources, differences in the degrees of educational attainment, and, perhaps, differences in the degrees of post-educational attainment. If the term is taken to mean similar levels of educational attainment, this view is also problematic. Attempts at restr ict ing the more able can be regarded as objectionable on moral and other grounds; attempts at pushing the less able beyond their natural endowment are l ike ly to be f u t i l e . If the term is taken to mean similar educational content, i t is also hard to see why exposure to the same or similar educational content is l ike ly to lead to equality beyond the l i f e of the school. The most plausible view, perhaps, is that similar education leads to similar or equal opportunity for post-educational attainment, but, as we shall see, the relation between the unitary school system and the equality of opportunity ideal is i t s e l f problematic. Another assumption is the previously mentioned view that the unitary system is a way of inculcating egalitarian values. In the unitary 127 system, i t is believed, the young learn lessons in equality. It is assumed that i f the unitary system succeeds in developing an appreciation for common humanity, and so on, those who are so educated wil l later wish to l ive in the kind of society in which these values prevai l . Few would deny the potential educational value of mixed schooling. But c r i t i cs of enforced educational mixing do not believe that i t neces-sar i ly leads to the results which egalitarians wish. Cooper, for example, argues that coerced educational mixing is just as l ike ly to aggravate existing social f r i c t i o n , deepen mutual contempt, or incite individual rebelliousness (1980, pp. 94-97). Another possible approach to the defence of the unitary school system is to regard i t as a requirement of the principle of equality of educa-tional opportunity. The unitary school system may be seen as a way of giving everyone a f a i r educational start in the quest for educational as well as post-educational benefits. Opportunity is seen as chiefly an environmental notion. Ennis holds a similar view of the nature of opportunity: "Only environmental, as contrasted with personal, factors are constitutive of having an opportunity" (1978, p. 176). Educational opportunity means the presence of those environmental factors which fac i l i ta te education, or the absence of those environmental factors which are obstacles to the pursuit of education. It is d i f f i c u l t to determine what those factors are, but a unitary system, i t is assumed, comes closest to being an even spread of educational f a c i l i t a t o r s , and an even removal of obstacles to education. It is seen as the embodi-ment of the egalitarian ideal of the level l ing of educational oppor-tunities . I have already suggested that where educational opportunities are 128 unequal outside of the school, a unitary system is not a way of level l ing opportunities. But even i f a unitary system did ensure a fa i r and equal educational start - - the view of l i f e as a race for benefits is often encountered in discussions of this issue - - i t obviously is not a way of ensuring equal results . Those who employ meritarian interpretations of the equality of opportunity principle may also defend a unitary system as a fa i r beginning. Those egalitarians who go along with the ideal of ' just ' meritocratic arrangements in society may also defend a unitary system on these grounds. For some egal i tar ians, l ike Manley, the social consequences of natural endowment, wherever they may lead, are always to be preferred to the social consequences of the exercise of parental pr iv i lege. But these are other considerations which may be brought to bear on defence of the unitary system. The point is that even i f i t allows f a i r and equal access to education, there is l i t t l e reason to believe that i t wil l therefore result in the removal of inequality in the post-educational domain. Equal beginnings often lead to unequal endings. Even i f the unitary system provides equality of educational oppor-tunity, i t is for this reason also open to some of the objections which have been levelled against the equality of opportunity ideal . According to Rawls, "Equality of opportunity means an equal chance to leave the less fortunate behind in the personal quest for influence and social position" (1971, pp. 106-107). Singer argues that equality of oppor-tunity rewards the genetically fortunate and penalizes those who are less endowed (1979, p. 35). Williams sums up objections of this kind as follows: "a thorough-going emphasis on equality of opportunity must deny a certain sense of common humanity which is i t s e l f an ideal of 129 equality" (1964, p. 129). In short, i f i t is an instrument of the equality of educational opportunity idea l , the unitary system may well lead to consequences which are contrary to the sp i r i t of egalitarianism. I have argued that a mixed school system is compatible with the quest for egalitarianism in education. If i t is indeed true that ega l i -tarianism in education leads to egalitarianism in society, a mixed school system is also defensible on instrumental egalitarian grounds. But i t may well be the case that neither system, however egal i tar ian, is a major causal factor in bringing about the kind of society envisioned by ega l i -tarians. If i t is easier to alter school systems than i t is to transform wider social and economic arrangements, egalitarianism in education is perhaps the more plausible of the two objectives. If a society succeeds in making the period of people's l ives spent in tutelage one which is worth having for everyone, a good would have been achieved. The social consequences of this kind of start in l i f e , whether egalitarian or not, are l ikely to be promising. VI_ I said ear l ie r , that there are non-egalitarian arguments which might be offered in support of a unitary school system. The same is true of a mixed system. I shall conclude by mentioning some of them. The mixed school system is not only compatible with the pursuit of egalitarianism, i t has a number of advantages which I believe are important in a society l ike Jamaica. F i r s t , i t encourages, in the educational sphere, the kind of se l f -reliance and in i t ia t i ve which the Jamaican democratic soc ia l is ts saw as 130 an important part of social reform. Indeed many of the non-e l i t i s t secondary schools in the society have been the products of this kind of i n i t i a t i v e , and have contributed to the welfare of the society, and especially to the welfare of the social ly less advantaged. Independent educational efforts continue to provide most of the pr.e-primary educa-tion in the society, and this is especially true in the rural areas. Those educational arrangements and alternatives which people provide for themselves can do much to advance the positive self-perception which Manley and others claim is so needed in Jamaican society. Second, I agree with Hare (1977) that educational resources are best viewed, not as a good to be equally shared among chi ldren, but as an asset to be used for the welfare of the total community. This is a u t i l i ta r ian perspective, and i t involves a u t i l i ta r ian conception of equality: perhaps what Nagel cal ls " lett ing each person's interests con-tribute in the same way to determining what in sum would be best overall" (1979, p. 113). It seems to me that a society with a r ichly and diversely educated population, in which - - to adapt a phrase from Mao - - a hundred educational flowers are allowed to bloom, is one which is more l ikely to maximize social u t i l i t i e s than is one with a largely similarly edu-cated population. Mixed school systems encourage this kind of educational richness and diversi ty . Social eff iciency is advanced when the jobs to be done are done by the most able. If the society is to produce the educated personnel needed for social reform, there wil l be occasions when u t i l i ta r ian considerations wil l have more force than egalitarian ones. Third, by being responsive to autonomy and the exercise of parental r ights, the mixed system is a way of preserving freedom in the society. The Jamaican democratic soc ia l is ts saw equality as more important than freedom. They would probably have agreed with Wollheim (1961b) that the principle of equality renders the principle of l iberty superflous. I side with de Tocqueville (1980) and Rawls (1971) in giving primacy to the protection of equal freedom. A commitment to the preservation of freedom in the educational domain need not exclude the pursuit of other objectives, and this includes the goal of egalitarianism. 132 CHAPTER SIX IDEOLOGY AND POLITICAL EDUCATION The term 'po l i t i ca l education' appeared with some frequency in the l i terature of the Jamaican variant of democratic socialism, and especial ly , i t seems, in the writings of Manley. He saw "a massive and persistent process of po l i t i ca l education" as a way of persuading institut ions to subject their sectional interests to larger national objectives (1974, p. 164). In commenting on the history of his party he claimed that "in the 1940's part icular ly , i t carried out po l i t i ca l education work of the greatest importance and the most profound kind" (People's National Party 1979, Foreword). "As soon as I became Prime Minister in 1972," he wrote, "we decided that the Government owed a great responsibi l i ty to embark upon programmes of Pol i t ical Education" (Agency for Public Information n .d . , p. 4). The People's National Party claimed i t was committed to what i t called "public education"; i t believed i t should "make a conscious e f for t , through programmes designed for public education, to inculcate new values and attitudes with the building of a Democratic Society" (1979, p. 42). Mass po l i t ica l education was seen as an important aspect of the strategy for change. Pol i t ica l education was the strategy which, in Manley words, was to be carried out at "the psychological and attitudinal level" (1974, p. 66). By bringing about new forms of awareness, and by keeping certain emphases alive in the public consciousness, some ideologies may be said to be broadly educational. I have already commented on the importance of po l i t i ca l education in the democratic soc ia l i s t scheme. Here, the 133 bel ief was that a society can be changed by f i r s t changing i ts values, and that i t is the task of ideology and po l i t i ca l education to effect the value changes which are seen as the precondition for social change. Presumably, this programme of po l i t ica l education was to be directed at the society as a whole, and especially perhaps, at the adult society. But were children to be po l i t i ca l l y educated as well? The People's National Party obviously believed that some form of po l i t ica l education should be a part of schooling since i t proposed the broadening of the curricula to "include the teaching of a l l forms of po l i t i ca l systems and ideologies" (1979, p. 43). The People's National Party Youth Organ-ization went further than i ts parent body on this matter; i t claimed that: "We must unapolegetically teach socialism in our classrooms from kinder-garten right up to university level" (quoted in Maraire 1978, p. 65). Murray quotes Manley as advocating that schools "must be involved in the po l i t i ca l process both internally and externally." Apparently by "the po l i t i ca l process" Manley did not mean party p o l i t i c s , but "pol i t ics in the wider sense of how any group responds to i ts problems and arrives at decisions about these problems" (Murray 1979, p. 179). In what follows I shall f i r s t of a l l examine three areas of inquiry which I think bear importantly on any scheme of po l i t ica l education. Following th i s , I shall examine some of the arguments which may be brought to bear on the issue of whether or not po l i t i ca l education ought to be a part of schooling, especially schooling at the primary and secondary levels . I shall argue that po l i t i ca l education at these levels , especially in the Jamaican context, is j u s t i f i e d . F inal ly , I contend that a p o l i t i -ca l ly aware l iberal arts curriculum is l ike ly to be the most worthwhile kind of po l i t ica l education in a society l ike Jamaica. 134 Although they do not exhaust the f i e l d , I think the following spheres of inquiry are crucial for any scheme of po l i t i ca l education. F i r s t , i t needs an account of what is to be understood by the term ' p o l i t i c a l ' . A conception of what i t is to be pol i t ica l may be presupposed or made expl ic i t by a programme of po l i t i ca l education, but i t cannot be avoided. Second, a scheme of po l i t ica l education involves some ideal of what i t is to be a p o l i t i c a l l y educated person. It employs c r i te r ia according to which the po l i t i ca l l y educated person is to be distinguished from the po l i t i ca l l y uneducated person. Third, given its general importance in pol i t ica l a f f a i r s , and i ts special importance in the Jamaican con-text, the place of ideology in any overall scheme of po l i t i ca l education is in need of careful consideration and expl ication. I shall examine each of these spheres of inquiry in turn. (1) If, as is t radit ional ly done, we take ' p o l i t i c a l ' to mean that which concerns the state, we may take 'po l i t i ca l education' to mean (a) education which is sponsored, organized and carried out by the state; or (b) education which is chiefly concerned with preparation for the l i f e of the state or body p o l i t i c . According to (a) education is p o l i -t ical i f i t proceeds from a po l i t i ca l source, i f i t is carried out by a po l i t i ca l authority. This distinguishes i t from education which pro-ceeds from a rel ig ious, industrial or other source. In the case of (b) i t is a possible function of education, and not i ts source, which is stressed. Education is po l i t i ca l i f i ts function is to satisfy the d ist inct ly po l i t i ca l requirements of the l i f e of the body p o l i t i c . The notion of the state comes in i f we take 'state' to be another name 135 for 'body p o l i t i c 1 . A state or body po l i t i c is a group of persons organ-ized for purposes of independent, autonomous government: i t is not sub-ject to any external, legal control , and has invested supreme leg is lat ive , executive and judic ial authority within i ts own terr i tory in a set of institutions by means of which i ts common intentions - - defence, uni f ica -tion and control of the population, and so on - - are to be carried out. Final power is centralized and monopolized in these inst i tut ions. The institutions of government are part of the state. But the state is the group as a whole, and statehood refers to i ts mode of organization. If the institutions are sometimes called the state this is because they represent or symbolize the group, and their existence indicates the mode of organization which characterizes the condition of being a body p o l i t i c . The l i f e of a body po l i t i c consists chiefly in the relations between the participants in such an arrangement. There is obviously more to 'state' and 'body p o l i t i c ' than I have mentioned here. But the point is that i f we take 'pol ; i t ical ' to mean that which concerns the state, and i f by 'state' we mean a body p o l i t i c , or a group of a certain kind, then po l i t i ca l education is education for the demands of the l i f e of this kind of group whatever the characteristics of such a group are taken to be. My special interest here is in the self-governed or democratic state. Important questions arise out of both these views of po l i t ica l educa-t ion. The teaching power, to use a phrase of Tussman's, is one of the powers invested in the state, and one which is increasingly being monopolized by i t . Tussman's use of the term 'teaching power' is to be understood in the l ight of the modern doctrine of the separation of the powers of the state into the leg is lat ive , executive, j u d i c i a l , or other 136 powers. He offers the term as a name for a power which is widely assumed and exercised by modern states, but which is without a customary name. In his view the teaching power - - which may be strongly or weakly exer-cised - - is the often constitutional "authority of the state to establish and direct the teaching act iv i ty and institutions needed to ensure i ts continuity and further i ts legitimate general and special purposes" (1977, p. 54). Tussman believes the state has a natural right to exercise i ts teaching power in the interest of social preservation and renewal. He also believes that the entry of the state into the domain of the mind is inevitable. But even i f i t is granted that Tussman has named a power which exists and which is widely exercised, there are questions arising out of the difference between state sponsorship and state control of education, and the degree and scope of direct state entry, especially through the act iv i ty of partisan and self - interested governments, into the sphere of the public mind. Even i f the state has the legal authority and power to conduct and enforce teaching, the question of i ts ab i l i t y and qualif ications to teach remains. In commenting on the modern transition from religious to pol i t ica l control of education, Meiklejohn observes that "No ins t i tu -tion can teach unless i t is equipped with the ideas, the appreciations, the wisdom out of which alone teaching can be made" (1966, p. 4). Meiklejohn believes that the state is qual if ied for the role. The emerg-ing states of the Third World, in exercising their re-gained or newly acquired teaching power, derive their teaching qualif ications from the quality of their own experiences and accomplishments. Much obviously depends on the quality of the culture from which this teaching springs. Mead suggests that: Not until we realize that a poor culture wil l never become r i ch , though i t be f i l te red through the expert methods of unnumbered pedagogues, and that a rich culture with no system of education at a l l will leave i ts children better off than a poor culture with the best system in the world, wil l we begin to solve our educational problems (1966, p. 277). This view seems to equate education with enculturation. But i t points in the direction of what some of the educational l imitations of the state's teaching power might.be. Ways of characterizing the state, of giving substance to one's understanding of ' p o l i t i c a l ' , give rise to another set of questions. Merely marking off the pol i t ica l sphere conceptually, and defining i t in terms of the state, can only go so far in helping the would-be po l i t ica l educator. Equally important for his task are his perceptions of the l i f e of the pol i ty , his way of characterizing i t , and the a t t i -tudes and outlook he takes to i t . These wil l influence the content and the general approach which he takes to po l i t ica l education. Two examples wil l i l lust rate what I mean. According to Tussman, "The theory of education is essential ly the theory of the government of mind; i t is hopeless when i t is not at the same time a theory of the state - a theory of po l i t ica l obligation" (1960, p. 103). In his view, a theory of po l i t i ca l obligation based on contractarian theory is the theory of the state which should serve as the basis for a programme of po l i t ica l education. His approach is to select from a number of possible relationships within a polity one which, in his view, best characterizes po l i t ica l l i f e . He rejects the relationship between ruler and ruled, and that between persons who share common habits and tradit ions; in his view these ways of viewing 138 the state do not offer ways of making sense of important notions l ike the public interest, obl igation, authority, r ights , duties, and pol i t ica l freedom. But he believes that there is a relationship which is com-patible with these notions; this relationship is agreement, especially agreement to subordinate private interest and private decision to the public interest and to public decision. A body p o l i t i c , in his view, " is a group of persons related by a system of agreements; to be a member of a body po l i t i c is to be a party to the system of agreements" (1960, p. 7). An important part of his scheme of po l i t ica l education, there-fore, is to advocate this way of viewing the state. Crick and Porter (1978, pp. 4 -6) , in contrast, do not employ an ideal conception of the state. Like Tussman they single out one re la -tionship, but their choice is decided on chiefly on the basis of empirical observation of po l i t ica l l i f e ; i t is what they think pol i t ica l l i f e i s , rather than what they think i t ought to be. In their view the pol i t ica l l i f e is chiefly one of conf l i c t . Pol i t ica l l i f e consists mostly in dealing with conf l ict ing alternatives, and i ts chief aim is to seek the "creative conci l iat ion" of d i f fer ing moral and material interests. Pol i t ica l education, on this view, is mainly education into knowing what the confl icts are, who believes what about them and why, what procedures for resolving them are avai lable, the development of the appropriate concil iatory att itudes, and so on. These approaches emphasize different kinds of agreement. Tussman employs the voluntary association model of the state and wants agreement to be the foundation of the body p o l i t i c . In his view, agreement about how disagreement is to be resolved is prior to agreement about the transformation of particular conf l ic ts . Crick and Porter focus on the 139 ongoing search for agreement on particular questions of social policy. Both are aware of the importance of conf l ict in po l i t ica l l i f e . Tussman thinks conf l ict is best contained by stressing the underlying consensual elements which give cohesion to pol i t ica l l i f e . Crick and Porter seem to think i t is best contained by increasing understanding of the actual institutions and processes by which conf l ict is resolved. My aim here is not to assess the merits or inadequacies of these approaches. The point of these examples is to show how the direction or slant of a programme of po l i t ica l education is determined by the underlying conception of the p o l i t i c a l . For the pol i t ica l educator, a conception of the po l i t ica l is an important tool . Both of these approaches, however, seem to me to omit at least one important consideration. If he wants to do more than employ a conception of the p o l i t i c a l , or be influenced by his educational actions by one, the po l i t ica l educator has to make inquiry into ways of characterizing the pol i t ica l a part of his educational task. My own view is that the imposition of a single conception of the pol i t ica l is inconsistent with the idea of a democratic society. In such a society, ways of interpreting the world emanate from i ts people. The young are to be educated to investigate whatever can be investigated, and the question of how the po l i t ica l is to be understood seems to me to be one of the central questions of any educational enterprise. If the democratic ideal is to be taken seriously, the po l i t i ca l educator's conception of the po l i t i ca l is to be i t s e l f the subject of c r i t i c a l inquiry. (2) Another important sphere of inquiry which needs to be taken into account centres on the word 'education'. Any scheme of po l i t i ca l education faces the problem of deciding what i t is to be a po l i t i ca l l y educated person. In a general sense, to be educated is to possess 140 knowledge, values and s k i l l s of certain kinds; to be educated involves cognitive, affective and behavioural considerations. A scheme of po l i t ica l education, therefore, requires accounts of what is to be understood by notions l ike po l i t ica l knowledge, po l i t ica l values, and pol i t ica l s k i l l s . At the same time, just as conceptions of what i t is to be po l i t ica l may be brought to bear on what i t is to be po l i t i ca l l y educated, conceptions of what i t is to be educated may be brought to bear on what i t is to be educated in relation to the po l i t ica l sphere. One may begin with a theory of p o l i t i c s , or with a theory of education, but ultimately one needs both. Where one starts may, of course, ref lect one's main interest. But a scheme of po l i t i ca l education obviously involves an exploration of the relations between the two. I shall br ief ly consider some of what is involved in bringing chief ly educational perspectives to bear on the l i f e of the po l is . Take, f i r s t of a l l , the problem of knowledge. Pol i t ica l l i f e obviously depends on knowledge of various kinds. The polity brings i ts knowledge to bear on the pursuit of i ts common interests. This knowledge may be h i s to r i ca l , economic, sociological , or indeed i t may be knowledge of any sort. But granted that any kind of knowledge may become po l i t i ca l l y s igni f icant , are there kinds of knowledge which are unique to the pol i t ica l sphere? According to Aristot le (1954, BK. I., Sec. 5) , po l i t ica l studies seek knowledge of the supreme good which men pursue; po l i t ics is a 'master science' which incorporates the knowledge and the ends of al l other sciences, and is concerned with the integration, application and direction of these subsidiary ends towards the larger and f iner end of what is good for the polis ;as a whole. But however this question is answered, po l i t ica l educators have to make up their minds about what kinds 141 of knowledge they believe pol i t ica l l i f e requires. The forms of knowledge employed in the l i f e of the polis have to be acquired. Those concerned with po l i t ica l education inquire into their nature and their modes of acquisit ion. They are committed to the view that this kind of understand-ing can lead to the improvement of po l i t ica l l i f e . Some examples of the kinds of; knowledge which pol i t ica l educators - - at least those I know about - - typical ly take to be instances of po l i t i ca l knowledge wil l indicate the general d r i f t of their approach. Pol i t ical knowledge is taken to be knowledge of the history, basic con-cepts, and constitutional basis of the pol i ty ; of governmental ins t i tu -tions and processes; of international a f f a i r s ; of the po l i t ica l uses of research, and so on. To have knowledge of this kind is seen as a necessary, but of course not a suff ic ient condition for being a po l i t i ca l l y educated person. Pol i t ica l education is also a species of values education. Here, the problem is deciding on what the po l i t ica l values are. Are there values which are a necessary part of the po l i t i ca l l y educated person's outlook? For one thing, po l i t i ca l considerations are to a large extent ter r i tor ia l in nature: they are bound to particular po l i t ies . A mult i -cultural po l i ty , for example, may idealize mult i -cultural ism; a theocracy may stress religious values. Pol i t ies d i f fe r in the values they espouse and in the values they may wish to promote in their schools. One approach, for example that suggested by Crick, is to promote those values which are applicable to pol i t ica l l i f e everywhere. In his view, freedom, tolerat ion, fairness, respect for truth, and respect for reasoning are examples of such values. He believes that these values - -he cal ls them "procedural values" - - are presupposed by the procedures 142 of c i v i l i zed pol i t ics everywhere. He also believes that i t is possible to give universally acceptable accounts of them which are stripped of any specif ic interpretations particular pol i t ies might give them (Crick 1978, pp. 63-72). It can be agreed that po l i t ica l considerations are not necessarily restricted to particular po l i t i es , and that there are pol i t ica l questions and problems - - l ike the problem of po l i t i ca l obligation for example - -which are common to a l l men. Apart from whether or not his claims are true, Crick's approach is important in that i t draws attention to p o l i -t ica l l i f e as a general human enterprise. But i t can be argued that a scheme of po l i t ica l education is inadequate i f in i ts wish to escape the possible excesses which may be linked with the ter r i to r ia l nature of po l i t ics - - excesses l ike ethnocentrism, nationalism, chauvinism, and so on - - i t seeks to be indifferent or neutral with respect to the values of the polity under whose auspices i t is carried on, and whose interests i t presumably seeks to promote. Should a programme of po l i t ica l educa-tion promote the values of the polity which sponsors i t? My own view is that i t should, and that a pol i ty 's introduction of i ts po l i t ica l values to i t s young is a central component of the educational process. There are, of course, important questions about method, and I shall shortly consider some of these. There is also the problem of the place for those contrary po l i t ica l values which may be espoused by teachers and students a l ike . What is clear is that a balanced programme of po l i t i ca l education combines concern with the part icular i t ies of the polity which sponsors i t - - including part icular i t ies of value - - with interest in the universal questions in the f i e ld of p o l i t i c s . 143 But regardless of what one knows or values, i t is the quality of one's po l i t ica l actions which is ultimately the measure of one's po l i t ica l education. As an enterprise, po l i t ica l education is jus t i f ied only i f i t can make a positive qualitative difference at the behavioural leve l : i f i t improves the quality of the actor's role in the l i f e of the pol is . It is necessary to be clear about what the po l i t ica l s k i l l s are supposed to be. We may employ a valuable dist inction advanced by Tussman (1960) and say they are the s k i l l s of po l i t i ca l membership and the s k i l l s of po l i t ica l agency. One may, of course, perform both roles. The sk i l l s of membership are the sk i l l s of c i t izenship: obeying the law, electoral duties, active involvement in po l i t ica l issues, and so on. The s k i l l s of agency are s k i l l s of leadership, representation, and the interpreta-tion of the wil l of those represented. To educate for agency is to seek to improve the pol i t ica l actions of those who rule. Plato saw this as the most important educational enterprise of a l l . In Tussman's view, i t is s t i l l the greatest unmet challenge of education. This general view of education as an enterprise concerned with knowledge, values and s k i l l s may be considered in the l ight of particular conceptions of what i t is to be an educated person. Approached from this angle, being po l i t i ca l l y educated is a facet of some larger view of what i t means to say that someone is educated. It is a measure of the adequacy of any such conception of education i f i t may be usefully brought to bear on any facet of the educational enterprise; i t could be considered a defect of any such theory i f i t had nothing to say about preparation for the l i f e of the pol is . The following examples i l lus t rate this approach. Rousseau (1962) believed that to be educated i s to realize one's natural, human good-144 ness by becoming free from the defects of society. On this view, to be po l i t i ca l l y educated is also to be educated for goodness and freedom, and Rousseau sought a theory of the state by which he thought men might realize their moral freedom through participation in pol i t ica l l i f e . R.S. Peters (1963), to take a more recent example, sees education as in i t ia t ion into in t r ins ica l l y worthwhile modes of thought and conduct. The po l i t i ca l l y educated person, on this view, is someone who has been in i t iated - - by those already in i t iated - - into in t r ins ica l l y valuable modes of po l i t i ca l thought and action. This account does not give us a way of determining what forms of po l i t i ca l thought and conduct are worthwhile. But the notion of in i t ia t ion is a familiar one in the idea of po l i t ica l education and transit ion. (3) The ideologies of po l i t ics and education involve conceptions of po l i t ica l l i f e and education which often e l i c i t broad allegiance, and which may therefore have considerable impact on society. They are l i b e r a l , soc ia l i s t or other views of the state; they are t rad i t ional , progressive, or other ideologies of education. In most of the modern world the pol i t ica l ideologies dominate. In view of the importance of the influence which ideological considerations may have on pol i t ica l education - - they may for example influence i ts jus t i f i ca t ion , i ts con-tent or i ts methods - - the nature of the relation between the two is in need of careful examination. It wil l be recalled that according to my view of ideology, ideologi -cal beliefs (a) are shared by some group and help to define the social and po l i t ica l identity of that group; (b) direct and guide social and po l i t ica l action; (c) are sense-making in that they help to explain, jus t i f y , as well as give i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y , meaning, order and coherence 145 to social and po l i t i ca l experience; and (d) are focused on the solution of specif ic problems of social and po l i t ica l organization. Fried claims that "No state known has ever been devoid of an ideology that consecrated i ts power and sanctioned i ts use" (1967, p. 238). It is important, I think, to distinguish between the ideology of the state and the ideology of government. This dist inction is especially applicable to democratic po l i t ies ; in these pol i t ies ideological pluralism is tolerated. I turn now to a fu l ler characterization of these two kinds of ideology. The ideology of the state is a set of beliefs shared by members of the pol i ty ; these beliefs are the source of the pol i ty 's sense of identity and character. They are beliefs about the principles around which the l i f e of the polity is organized; these are the principles which guide and direct i ts conduct. It is by reference to the beliefs constituting i ts ideology that the state explains i ts purposes, jus t i f ies i ts existence, and seeks to give meaning, order and coherence to the social and po l i t i ca l experience of those who participate in i ts l i f e . The ideology of a state is typ ica l ly , and at least par t ia l l y , expressed in i ts constitution. The ideology of the state aims at the creation and the maintenance of a pol i t ica l community. When the state is a multi-party democracy, i t is committed to allow-ing other ideological groupings within i ts borders. Williams (1961) suggests that l iberal democracy is an ideology - - we hold similar but in some respects different views of ideology — consisting mainly of bel iefs about the importance of tolerat ion, scepticism concerning the possession of certainty in pol i t ica l and related matters, and the bel ief in the importance of individual r ights. These beliefs constitute 146 the ideological foundations for i t s characteristic institutions l ike universal suffrage, freedom of the press, the rule of law, and so on. An ideology of government is a set of beliefs shared by those who, in a democratic state, have been elected to govern. In a multi-party democracy, these beliefs are generally drawn from the ideology of the po l i t ica l party with which the government is a f f i l i a t e d . These beliefs guide and direct i ts policies in the administration of the pol i ty 's a f f a i r s ; they are a source of just i f icat ion for these po l ic ies , and help to give them coherence and focus. They are responses to those kinds of problems - - change, conservation, and so on - - to which particular ideologies are most responsive. In multi-party democracies, the ideology of the state usually sets the l imits on the scope of governmental ideologies. Ideally, an ideology of government should never be in conf l ict with the ideology of the state which i t represents. A state authorizes a government to manage i ts af fa i rs for some period of time. The democratic state ut i l i zes the ideological pluralism which i t contains within i ts wider and more basic ideological framework. Governments, however, sometimes seek to make alterations in the ideology of the state. To be legitimate, such alterations need the authorization of the membership of the pol i ty . The ideology of the state is usually expected to outlast particular govern-ments . There are different relations between these two kinds of ideology and po l i t ica l education. It can be argued that a polity has a right to use i ts public schools to promote the ideology on which i ts mode of po l i t i ca l organization rests. To be aware, however c r i t i c a l l y , of what the ideology of one's polity i s , seems to me to be an important part of 147 what i t means to say someone is po l i t i ca l l y educated. I believe the re la -tion between the ideology of the state and po l i t ica l education is of greater importance than the relation between an ideology of government and pol i t ica l education. Obvious d i f f i c u l t i e s arise i f changing governments - - even i f they are legitimately elected in a multi-party democracy - - seek to use public schools to promote their own ideologies. The school becomes a place where governments compete for the allegiance of students; i t becomes the proverbial football kicked around in the pursuit of partisan gains. Pol i t ica l education comes to mean education into the ideology of the government in power. The idea of the state as a shared, common and enduring entity is eroded. But this is not to say that there may be no relation between an ideology of government and po l i t ica l education. A government is l ikely to bring i ts ideological outlook to bear on i ts administration of the pol i ty 's educational a f fa i r s . This ideological outlook may, for instance, influence i ts pr ior i t ies and emphases in the educational domain. It may choose to emphasize po l i t ica l education i f , given i ts ideological l ights , this emphasis seems to be in the interest of the pol i ty . It would be just i f ied in doing so i f this was part of the platform on which i t was elected. But even i f this is so, i ts chief business, I submit, is to arrange and administer po l i t i ca l education on behalf of the state which i t represents. There are two aspects of the educational division of government - -both suggested by the writings of Tussman - - which, i f insisted on, may help to l imit the excesses of governmental ideologies. The f i r s t is from Tussman's account of the anatomy of the teaching power of govern-148 ment. Consistent with the doctrine of the separation of powers, and the relative independence of each of these powers, the teaching power must also claim a degree of autonomy. This autonomy is analogous to legis lat ive pr iv i lege, executive prerogative, and judicial independence. Thus, according to Tussman, as the academic branch of government, the teaching power claims "within a system of due process, the freedom, within i ts own domain, necessary fori the integrity of i ts own function" (1977, p. 58). Just as the judiciary is authorized to interpret the laws made by government in accordance with i ts own ideals of just ice , the teaching power - - which is shared by administrators, education o f f i ce rs , teachers, and so on - - is authorized to interpret the educa-tional pol icies of government in the l ight of i ts own educational ideals. This is an important part of Tussman's conception of academic freedom. The second is a way of looking at the previously mentioned notion of po l i t i ca l agency. Those who exercise the teaching power are agents of the state. They are not agents of governments or po l i t ica l parties. Both those who make governmental pol icy, and those who interpret and apply i t , are ultimately responsible to the state which they represent, and not to any sect ional , partisan groups within i t . The perspective of the student also has to be considered, with respect to both the ideology of the state and the ideology of the govern-ment. The ideology of the state contains beliefs which wi l l increasingly influence his po l i t ica l l i f e . How he makes up his mind about them wil l play a central role in the evolution of his po l i t ica l self -hood, and in his po l i t ica l coming of age. At the same time the educational arrangements and emphases of particular governments may well influence his perceptions of the pol i t ica l domain. If the student is not to be 149 manipulated by either , a degree of ideological transparency is necessary: he needs to 'see through' to the ideological foundations of the state in the background, and he needs to understand the nature and function of governmental ideologies in the pol i ty . The ideologies of state and government - - along with the ideologies of the wider po l i t i ca l world - - need to enter schooling not only as influence, but as content to be reflected on. The ideologies operating behind the scenes need to be brought on stage to be examined in the company of others. The aim need not be to defend favoured ideologies while seeking to discredit others. The aim, rather, is to expand under-standing of po l i t i cs by attending to i ts ideological dimensions. Those who are to be educated need to understand the part which ideologies may play in personal po l i t ica l choice and commitment. I shall argue later that l iberal education is the form of education most suited to this enterprise. I l l Is there just i f icat ion for a programme of po l i t ica l education at the primary and secondary levels in Jamaica? In trying to answer this question I shall examine three general arguments against formal pol i t ica l education as a part of schooling which may be advanced by those who doubt the eff icacy or advisabi l i ty of such programmes. I shall try to assess the force of these arguments when applied to the Jamaican con-text. It needs to be shown that objections to formal po l i t ica l educa-tion can be met, and that a positive case can be made for i t . The f i r s t objection to formal po l i t ica l education arises out of 150 the fear of partisanship. It can be broken down into a number of specif ic claims, (a) Formal po l i t i ca l education wil l make the school a platform for.the promotion of partisan interests, (b) The entry of partisanship into schooling — i t is believed that with po l i t ica l education this entry is inevitable — wil l lead to conf l ict which wil l divide and d is -rupt the l i f e of the school, (c) Those who carry i t out wi l l use pol i t ical education to indoctrinate the young into their own pol i t ica l be l ie fs . It is believed that in order to avoid these undesirable consequences, po l i t ica l education should be excluded from schooling. A programme of po l i t ica l education which emphasizes the ideology of the state and which stresses consensual values may be able to avoid some of these objections. But a programme of po l i t ica l education — indeed any programme of public schooling in general - - which ignores the issue of po l i t ica l partisanship altogether, ignores one of the important facts of social and po l i t i ca l l i f e ; i ts effectiveness is l ike ly to be reduced i f this aspect of the l i f e of the polity is not addressed. If i t is not to retreat into academic quietism, the school needs to address whatever is important in people's l i ves . A school w i l l , of course, have fewer reasons to fear the dangers of partisanship i f i t insists on acting on principles l ike objectivity and fairness. These are some of the educational ideals which bear on the school's autonomous exercise of the teaching power, and on i ts inter-pretation and application of educational pol icy. The school is also committed to ideals l ike the free play of c r i t i ca l intel l igence, i n -tel lectual rigour, and the treatment of issues at certain levels of abstraction. It may bring these ideals to bear on the issue of po l i t ica l partisanship, as on any other. 151 The aim is not to give partisanship an o f f i c i a l voice in the school, but to educate the young into ways of l istening to, and entering into dialogue with, the voice of partisanship in pol i t ica l as well as non-pol i t ica l matters. This is an enterprise which poses important methodo-logical problems, and there may be doubts about i ts possible eff icacy. The kind of programme I have in mind includes those act iv i t ies aimed at the development of c r i t i c a l thinking, value reasoning, and the analysis of po l i t ica l arguments and decisions. It would also include inquiry into the value as well as the problems of partisanship in the affai rs of the democratic state. I think i t is hardly possible, with or without formal pol i t ica l education, to prevent partisan preferences from entering the school. Like moral, aesthetic or other values, they enter the school by way of those who conduct i ts a f f a i r s , and they exert influence, even i f they do so indi rect ly , by being a part of what is sometimes called the hidden curriculum. Opponents of po l i t i ca l education prefer to keep this influence at this indirect leve l . In their view, the classroom is a public space and i ts public nature is dangerously violated i f partisan pol i t ica l preference, considered a private matter, is allowed to sur-face in i t . But i t is with the public significance of po l i t ica l partisanship, and not with i ts private dimension, that a programme of po l i t ica l education would be chiefly concerned. The kinds of conf l ict which opponents of po l i t ica l education fear, may be reduced i f this d is -t inction is kept in mind. Partisanship, as a public issue, gives the school an opportunity to bring i ts resources to bear on one of the central and most d i f f i c u l t areas of po l i t i ca l l i f e . 152 The degree of dissidence which exists in some total i tar ian states suggests that i t might be more d i f f i c u l t to indoctrinate people than is commonly supposed. But the spectre of indoctrination haunts a l l would-be programmes of po l i t ica l education. Indoctrination and educa-tion are opposed notions, and a programme of po l i t i ca l education is i n -correctly named i f i t seeks to indoctrinate rather than educate. But how are the two to be distinguished? Without going too far af ie ld into this much discussed issue, I shall mention what seems to me to be one important difference; i t is a difference which I believe has an impor-tant bearing on pol i t ica l education. Attempts at defining indoctrinatory teaching have customarily employed c r i te r ia l ike content, intention and method (Cooper 1973, p. 43). Those who stress content sometimes employ the dist inction between bel ief and knowledge - - with bel ief taken to be the weaker of the two - - a n d indoctrinatory teaching is taken to be teaching which is chiefly con-cerned with the inculcation of bel iefs . P o l i t i c a l , religious and moral beliefs are regarded as paradigms of the content of indoctrinatory teaching. According to those who stress intention, teaching is indoc-trinatory i f those who conduct i t intend to achieve results of a certain kind: they may, for instance, wish to have certain ideas so firmly implanted in the minds of those they teach, that these ideas are unlikely to be shaken by subsequent evidence of any kind. To those who stress method, teaching is indoctrinatory i f i t discourages the use of reason, i f i t does not respect the autonomy of the learner, i f i t is conducted without regard for principles of f a i r inquiry, and so on. My own view is that an approach which stresses method is the most useful of the three. An approach which emphasizes content excludes too 153 much from the educational sphere, and from the responsibi l i ty of the school. Much of what, on some interpretations, i t seeks to exclude - -l ike beliefs about values - - are such that they cannot be kept out of the educational domain. Even i f the intention to indoctrinate is a necessary condition for indoctrinatory teaching — and i t seems to me that i t may well be the case that i t is not - - this intention is largely determined by inference from observable evidence, including, of course, methodological evidence. An emphasis on method does not rest r ic t the scope of educational responsibi l i ty . Unlike intentions, methods con-stitute a direct ly observable domain. Using a methods approach one may, on the basis of observation, assess teaching according to c r i te r ia l ike respect for rat ional i ty , autonomy, and fa i r inquiry. A programme of po l i t ica l education may reduce the dangers of indoctrination i f i t is guided by ideals of this kind. The fear of partisanship seems to be especially just i f ied in a society l ike Jamaica. Fierce, partisan po l i t ica l conf l ict is one of the country's chief po l i t ica l problems. The tradit ion of multi-party demo-cracy inherited from Britain is carried out with almost tr ibal intensity. Near to elections - - the only time when, according to Rousseau, people in representative democracies are free - - this partisan conf l ict often erupts into violence. A Jamaican pol i t ica l scientist and newspaper columnist describes this conf l ict as follows: . . .two-party competition in Jamaica has never been con-ducted l ike a tea party nor a Sunday school picnic. The rules of the game are rough indeed. Personal abuse, l ies and fabrications, rumours, crude propaganda, aggression, violence, egocentric personality displays and personality cu l ts , and intimidating demonstrations of power designed to bluff opponents and weaken their confidence are a l l mixed together in a very, very tough confrontation for power (Stone 1978, p. 11). 154 It is a society in which children develop strong pol i t ica l allegiances at an early age, and they are themselves often the victims of po l i t ica l violence. In Jamaica, the option of stressing the ideology of the state is also beset with d i f f i c u l t i e s . Like most former colonies, the country is in the process of deciding what that ideology should be. One evidence of this is the dispute concerning the autochthony of the Jamaican Inde-pendence Constitution (Barnett 1977, pp. 28-33). It is viewed by some Jamaicans as a d i s t i l l a t i o n of the country's experience, or of what Oakeshott (1967, pp. 10-11) in his view of ideology would cal l an abstract, abbreviation, or abridgement of Jamaican po l i t i ca l t radit ions. Others contend that i t was imposed by an e l i te and was tailored to pro-tect their class interests. Some find i ts roots in European culture objectionable. It was unlikely that i t would have been stressed by any programme of po l i t ica l education under the Manley Government since this government also believed that the Jamaican Independence Constitution lacks autochthony, and used this claim in i ts campaign for constitutional reform. Indeed the imprint of i ts governmental ideology — including the wish to promote some soc ia l i s t values in schools - - was evident in the educational policy of the Manley Government. The fact that the Jamaican school is surrounded by such intense partisan conf l ict — which may even be increasing i ts hold on i t — suggests that the school's commitment to objectivity and other non-po l i t i ca l values may be in need of defence. But i t also suggests that i f the school can do anything to improve the quality of partisanship in the po l i t i ca l sphere, the need to do so is just as pressing. 155 Nettleford had what I am cal l ing the ideology of the state in mind when he suggested that pol i t ica l education should contribute to " ref lec - tion on the principle-foundations of the society" (1962, p. 211). The quest for a set of bel iefs which can command greater allegiance than partisan loyalt ies is s t i l l , perhaps, the central enterprise in Jamaican po l i t i cs . It seems to me that to suggest that this is a quest which students in schools should not be thinking about is to draw an unneces-sar i ly hard l ine between education and l i f e . The second objection to po l i t ica l education is the view that pol i t ica l l i f e is chiefly an adult concern. Because children are not fu l l members of the polity until they reach a certain age, they have tradit ional ly posed problems for po l i t ica l theory. The principles which are appl i -cable to adults are not easily applied to them. There is a tendency, therefore, to exclude them from considerations of po l i t ica l a f fa i r s . Po l i t ica l l i f e may also be seen as a rough business from which they should be protected. Like sex, the l i f e of po l i t ics is seen as something into which they wil l gradually grow. Until they are of age they are better kept occupied with other things. It is true that the pol i t ica l sphere is better known for i ts elder statesmen than for i ts prodigies. But whatever i ts psychological or r i t u a l i s t i c value, or i ts social convenience, a sharp dist inct ion between the period of nonage and adulthood does not ref lect the gradual nature of human maturation. As with most things, po l i t ica l perceptions begin early in children and evolve as they grow older. The gradual nature of this process requires gradual treatment. The arrangements of c i v i l society, as I think Hobbes correctly observed, are largely a r t i f i c i a l ; they have to be learned, and i t seems they are learned with 156 great d i f f i cu l t y . It may well be the case that the later stages of adult po l i t ica l performance could be improved i f conscious preparation began ear l ie r . Even i f he restr icted the art of rule to the wisest of those of more advanced years, Plato who sensed the importance of early beginnings, believed that education for po l i t i ca l membership should begin very early in l i f e . Jamaica, l ike other Third World societ ies , has certain features which help to explain the concern with the pol i t ic isat ion of youth, and which may also be offered as just i f icat ion for this concern. Because of a high rate of population growth, youth is not a small, sheltered minority, but a large and restive section of the population which is rapidly swell-ing the membership of the pol i ty ; the quality of the l i f e of the polis seems to be threatened by the masses of unprepared young people who are coming of age p o l i t i c a l l y . Everywhere, societies focus their optimism on youth, but this is especially the case in societies which see youth as the chief hope of major social reform. It is through the p o l i t i c i s a -tion of youth that they hope to shed the old Adam of the inherited po l i t i ca l cultures they so often wish to discard. In the older and more self-assured po l i t i es , po l i t ica l education may, in Oakeshott's words, begin "in the enjoyment of a tradit ion" (1967, p. 17). In the underdeveloped societ ies , however, po l i t ica l education is more l ike ly to begin in discontent with the inherited t radi t ion , and in the questioning of the existing po l i t i ca l culture. In these societ ies, fa i th in the pol i t ic isat ion of youth through pol i t ica l education is part of their general faith in the l iberating power of education in general. The third objection to po l i t ica l education is the view that informal 157 po l i t i ca l social izat ion is suf f ic ient . A polity has other ways - - includ-ing i ts r i tua ls , myths, heroes, the media, and so on •-- by which i t may transmit i ts po l i t ica l outlook to i ts young. The view that the school should also be used for this purpose is believed to be in need of jus t i f i ca t ion . One possible response to this objection is to contend that there is a difference between po l i t i ca l social izat ion and pol i t ica l education. Pol i t ica l social izat ion means the acquisition of the norms and values of the existing culture, whatever these may be; usually this means doing so to the satisfaction of the majority, or of those who exercise most power and influence in the pol i ty . Pol i t ical social izat ion is conser-vative rather than creative. Pol i t ical education, however, requires that a broad exposure combined with c r i t i c a l analysis and discipl ined inquiry are part of the process by which a po l i t ica l outlook is developed. One may be socialized into undesirable aspects of a po l i t ica l culture. Education however, involves a qualitative transformation for the better. To be worthy of the name, po l i t ica l education must involve the conscious search for quality and excellence in the pol i t ica l sphere. Unlike informal soc ia l i zat ion , schooling can be controlled. The school can be select ive; i t can organize; i t can conduct systematic inquiry into po l i t ica l experience. Whatever i ts qual ity , po l i t ica l social izat ion is l ike ly to be random and uneven. Through the school, a certain amount of po l i t ica l learning can be required of a l l those who pass through i t on their way to participation in the l i f e of the pol i ty . Formal schooling is a way of carrying out preparation for the public l i f e in a public space which is accountable to the public which sponsors i t . 158 In a society l ike Jamaica, informal social izat ion alone is inadequate. To a large extent this means social izat ion into the defects of the culture. Furthermore, many of the informal means of social izat ion — magazines, newspapers, te lev is ion, and so on - - are unavailable to large sectors of the population. For the majority of the population, formal schooling at the elementaty levels provides the only opportunity for discipl ined reflection on the nature and problems of the pol i t ica l order in which they wil l l i v e . Both informal social izat ion and conscious po l i t i ca l education are, of course, subject to the l imitations of the state's qualif ications to conduct pol i t ica l education. The.adult society has to improve the quality of i ts own po l i t i ca l l i f e i f i t is to improve i ts capacity to give a good pol i t ica l education to i ts young. To re-phrase Marx, the state, as po l i t ica l educator, is i t s e l f in need of educating. In the Jamaican context, the dangers of partisanship in any attempt at po l i t i ca l education are rea l . In the hasty and zealous quest for social reconstruction, the manipulative po l i t ic isat ion of youth through indoctrination is a temptation which many would-be social reformers find d i f f i c u l t to res is t . It is d i f f i c u l t to bring educational ideals l ike objectivity and dispassionate inquiry to bear on po l i t ica l issues in a social and po l i t ica l atmosphere charged with intense partisanship and a sense of social urgency. The Jamaican school is delicately poised between the need for academic distance on the one hand, and the need for a positive po l i t ica l role on the other. My own view is that i f i t insists on the autonomous exercise of the teaching power according to i ts own educational l ights , the school can avoid the p i t f a l l s of partisanship and indoctrination. The school 159 can contribute habits of discipl ined reflection to the necessary but d i f f i c u l t processes of po l i t ica l learning, and i t is only through formal pol i t ica l education at the early levels that these habits can be widely encouraged in the society. Formal po l i t ica l education may supplement informal social izat ion by encouraging creative ref lection on the central questions concerning the l i f e of the emerging Jamaican pol i ty . There is a tradit ion in western po l i t ica l thought of regarding participation in the l i f e of the polis as one of the most important of the humanizing roles. If this is so, preparation for po l i t i ca l l i f e is one of the most important challenges facing the school in the quest for a re-humanized society. 11 Final ly , I suggest that in a society l ike Jamaica, the most worth-while form of po l i t i ca l education is l ike ly to be achieved by means of a po l i t i ca l l y aware l iberal arts curriculum. The kind of curriculum I have in mind is one which is aware of i ts relations with the polity which sponsors i t , and with the nature, problems and aspirations of that pol i ty . It is aware that preparation for the l i f e of that polity is one of the chief reasons for i t s existence. But this awareness is also part of i t s wider inquiry into the nature of man as a po l i t ica l being. The central ideal of l iberal education is freedom: freedom from narrowness, dogmatism and crass u t i l i ta r ian concerns. The l ibera l l y educated person is educated in a variety of d isc ip l ines , is accustomed to f ree, open inquiry, and does not believe that in i ts pursuit of excellence the imagination should be fettered by the practical demands 160 of the moment. He is also po l i t i ca l l y educated, in my view, i f he is also aware of the po l i t i ca l significance of the forms of knowledge, the values and the s k i l l s into which, to use Peters' term, he has been in i t ia ted , and i f he can apply his ideals of free inquiry and unfettered reflection to the po l i t ica l sphere. There they may be brought to bear on his role as member or agent of the pol i ty . Without offering a complete po l i t ica l theory to satisfy the pol i t ica l half of the approach to po l i t ica l education I am advocating, I wish nevertheless to mention two aspects of po l i t i ca l theory which I think are especially applicable in the Jamaican context. F i r s t , given the centrality of the ideaiof freedom, the l iberal arts curriculum is in -compatible with any theory of the state which does not take freedom to be one of i ts chief ideals. Only states which take freedom seriously are l ike ly to sponsor l iberal education, or regard i t as a way of enrich-ing i ts po l i t ica l l i f e . Education and freedom need to be linked in a society which has known both servitude and colonial domination. Manley spoke of "the Jamaican's historical distrust of authority" (1974, p. 29). But i t is power, and the abuses of power - - not authority - - which his experience has led him to fear. I do not believe that there is any pol i t ica l ideal which has greater meaning in the Jamaican experience than the ideal of freedom. Second, I think that social contract theory, as a heuristic device, may help to illuminate examination of some of the issues already mentioned. It is a doctrine concerned with pol i t ica l origins and the self-conscious basis of c i v i l society. Such ideas are germane to young societies s t i l l in their po l i t ica l genesis, or societies undergoing reconstruction and radical re-assessment. Con-tractarian theory offers a model of the basis for the kind of obl iga-161 tions which, ideal ly , an educated polity might wish to accept. My support for a po l i t i ca l l y aware l iberal arts curriculum is partly based on the view that there are a number of objections - - not easily met - - to the idea of po l i t ica l education as a separate d isc ip l ine . For one thing empirical research suggests that compared with other in -fluences, the effects of such programmes are marginal. After examining a number of cross-national studies, Stacey concludes that "They have far less influence than is generally appreciated by both their protago-nists and c r i t i c s " (1978, p. 67). Furthermore, while other combined discipl ines l ike science education, art education, and so on, draw from a single parent d isc ip l ine , po l i t i ca l studies tend to draw from a variety of d isc ip l ines . Attempts at making po l i t ica l education into a dist inct discipl ine tend to be either so narrow they miss much of the richness of po l i t ica l l i f e , or they become too broad to be manageable. Pol i t ical education also shares with other controversial areas, l ike sex educa-t ion , the d i f f i c u l t question of deciding on the qualif ications of the teacher. In spite of i ts obvious links with moral education - - both are concerned with principles which should guide conduct - - i t could become too cloistered i f i t is viewed chiefly as a branch of ethical inquiry. Even social studies, an already bulging f i e l d , does not seem to be broad enough. In contrast with po l i t ica l education as a separate f i e ld of study, there is some cross-national empirical evidence which suggests that general education does make a positive difference to the quality of po l i t i ca l l i f e . According to Dawson and Prewitt, educated persons are, among other things, more aware of the influence of government on the l ives of individuals, are p o l i t i c a l l y more informed, tend to be more 162 active p o l i t i c a l l y , and have greater confidence in their ab i l i t y to i n -fluence the direction of governmental action (1969, pp. 175-178). The variety of the l iberal arts curriculum models the variety of the forms of knowledge, values and s k i l l s which may be brought to bear on the l i f e of the po l is . It makes po l i t ica l education the corporate responsibi l i ty of the school and not that of a single teacher. The values of l iberal education - - freedom, object iv i ty , fairness, rat ional i ty , and so on, offer the best defence against the dangers of partisanship, indoctrina-tion, ethnocentrism, chauvinism, and the excesses of ideological influence. The kind of programme I have in mind is one in which each d isc ip l ine , as part of i ts business, attends to the bearing i t has on the l i f e of the pol is . History examines the development of the pol i ty 's ins t i tu -tions and tradit ions; geography considers the influences of land and space on i ts l i f e ; rel igion explores the relations between church and state; l i terature examines stories of i ts experience; art examines i ts ways of visualizing i ts meanings; philosophy - - which some believe should be taught in public schools - - c r i t i c a l l y examines i ts basic concepts and assumptions; and so on. There is no discipl ine which has nothing whatever to do with man as a po l i t ica l being. It is the business of the school to see how the intell igence i t is instituted to nurture might be brought to bear on the l i f e of the polity to which i t is i n -escapably l inked. 163 POSTSCRIPT While this study was in progress the Manley Government was voted from of f i ce . It lost the general election of October 1980, winning only nine of the sixty parliamentary seats. The Jamaica Labour Party, the traditional r ival of the People's National Party, won al l the remain-ing seats. The election was regarded by many Jamaicans as one of the most impor-tant in the nation's history. Many believed that a victory for the People's National Party would have set the country more firmly on a soc ia l i s t path, and would have led to a long-term, perhaps permanent, alignment with the soc ia l i s t bloc. The victory of the Jamaica Labour Party has been interpreted by some observers as an indication that most Jamaicans want to see their country become a 1 ibera l -capi ta l is t state aligned with the western democracies. But i t may well be the case that in i t s search for reform and development the society has been experimenting with these alternatives, and that i t remains basically uncommitted to either of these options. The defeated People's National Party received over forty percent of the popular vote. Democratic socialism may be in retreat, but i t is unlikely that i t has disappeared from the Jamaican pol i t ica l landscape. The interpretation of democratic socialism examined in this study was i t s e l f a revival of an ear l ier movement. The election campaign of 1980,was the bloodiest so far in the country's history; over five hundred persons died as victims of po l i t ica l violence, and there were times when many feared a c i v i l war. The elec-164 tion was nevertheless conducted on the basis of electoral reforms agreed to by both parties and was administered by an independent commission. Many believe i t was one of the fa i rest elections every held in the country. For some, the fact that the election was held at a l l showed that the Manley Government was serious about i ts commitment to democracy. Parliamentary democracy seems to be s t i l l alive in Jamaica. Democratic ideology may be more deeply rooted in the culture than many suppose. Jamaica is at this time one of the few Third World countries with an unbroken - - even i f severely tested - - history of parliamentary democracy. The new government wil l introduce i ts own educational pol icies according to i ts own l ights . But the problems examined in this study remain. Regardless of whether soc ia l i s t or non-social ist approaches are taken to work and education, no strategy of social reform can succeed unless the wil l to work is released and creatively directed in the society. The pursuit of egalitarianism in or through education wil l be regarded by many as one of the main challenges inherited by the new administration. The unprecedented level of violence which accompanied the 1980 election emphasized the importance, in the Jamaican context, of inquiry into ideals of the po l i t i ca l l y educated society; i t also re-awakened the expectation of those, l ike myself, who believe that formal po l i t ica l education in schools may contribute something towards the realization of the continuing Jamaican hope of a journey from the exper-ience of captivity to the achievement of po l i t ica l freedom. 165 REFERENCES Agency for Public Information, n.d. Democratic Socialism for Jamaica. Kingston, Jamaica. Anthony, P.D. 1977. The Ideology of Work. 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