PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS IN JAMAICAN EDUCATION: AN INQUIRY INTO RELATIONS BETWEEN IDEOLOGY AND EDUCATIONAL POLICY

by

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ABSTRACT

My main aim in this thesis is to apply philosophical analysis to
some of the central social and educational questions which were raised
by the emergence of the Jamaican variant of democratic socialism, and
by the attempt which was made at devising an educational policy as part
of its strategy of social reform.

I offer an account of the concept of ideology and then use it to
give accounts of the idea of democratic socialism, and of the Jamaican
variant of democratic socialism.

I then bring this conception of ideology to bear on the description
and discussion of three of the problems in Jamaican society which the
democratic socialists addressed, and on my examination of the related
problems of formulating educational policy aimed at their solution.

First, I examine the problem of negative attitudes to work in
Jamaican society, and the view that the solution is to be found in a
socialist ideology of work, and in educational policies based on this
ideology. A distinction between Labour and Work is introduced and used
to interpret aspects of Jamaican social and historical experience. I
argue that this distinction is a suitable basis for educational policy.

Second, I examine the problem of bringing educational arrange-
ments to bear on the pursuit of egalitarian ideals. I deny the view
that egalitarianism requires a unitary school system, and I argue
that a mixed school system is compatible with the pursuit of egalitarian
as well as important non-egalitarian objectives.

Third, I examine the problem of political development in Jamaica, and the view that in order to aid its development, political education should be made a part of schooling. The notion of political education is analysed. I also examine some of the arguments which might be brought to bear on the issue of political education in schools. I argue that formal political education is justified in the Jamaican context, and that a politically aware liberal arts curriculum is the approach to political education which is most likely to enrich the political life of a developing society.

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Acknowledgements

DEDICATION

To Adina and Wilmoth McKenzie, my mother and father.

INTRODUCTION

This thesis is a philosophic study of problems in modern Jamacian social and educational thought and of some of the relations between these problems. In 1974, two years after it was elected to office, the Manley Government announced its commitment to democratic socialism; it also tried to devise an educational policy as part of its strategy of social renewal. This wish to bring education to bear on a programme of social reform raised a number of what I regard as central questions in Jamaican educational philosophy. The main aim of this thesis is to apply philosophical analysis to a number of the questions which were raised, or revitalised, by these developments in Jamaican politics and education.

The Jamaican democratic socialists saw ideology -- especially their own -- as a requirement for the reform of Jamaican society, and they made the term an important one in the vocabulary of modern Jamaican politics. This concern with ideology is a widespread feature of reform movements throughout the Third World. These considerations led me to take the notion of ideology as the central concept of this inquiry; all the educational issues examined are related to problems in social and political ideology.

The study is divided into two main sections. The first three chapters are mainly expository: they are accounts of the background ideological issues, sources and contexts. In the final three chapters, philosophical analysis is applied to a number of practical social and educational questions which arise out of the issues discussed in the

earlier chapters.

The conception of ideology which is used in the study is introduced in chapter one. A number of ways of characterizing ideology are examined and rejected as unsatisfactory. The conception of ideology which is then offered is described as one which is within the conceptual boundaries of the existing concept of ideology, and which may also be brought to bear on discussion of the ideological movements in Third World contexts.

In chapter two, the conception of ideology which is introduced in chapter one is used to elucidate an interpretation of the idea of democratic socialism. Both the conception of ideology and the interpretation of democratic socialism are then used, in chapter three, to give an account of the Jamaican variant of democratic socialism. The chapter on democratic socialism is an account of the historical sources and of the general conceptual backdrop against which the Jamaican interpretation of the ideology might be viewed. The Jamaican variant of democratic socialism is then described as an interpretation and application of democratic socialist ideas in the Jamaican context.

Aspects of Jamaican educational policy under democratic socialism are examined in the second section of the study. The Jamaican democratic socialists faced the problem of deciding what should be done in education in order to advance their envisioned ideals of social transformation. They raised and gave their own answers to a number of normative questions in Jamaican education. Three of these questions are examined in the final chapters.

The problem of bringing education to bear on negative attitudes to work in Jamaican society is examined in chapter four. The conception of ideology employed in the study is used to describe the problematic

condition of work in Jamaican society, and to explicate the democratic socialist view that the solution is to be found in a socialist ideology of work and in its attendant educational policies. A distinction between Labour and Work which is inspired by, but which is different from that which Arendt draws between the animal laborans and homo faber is introduced. This distinction is used to interpret aspects of Jamaican social and historical experience. It is also defended as a basis for a policy of work education in the Jamaican context.

Egalitarianism was one of the main concerns of the Jamaican democratic socialists, and they believed that educational organization should be directed towards the achievement of egalitarian objectives. More specifically, it was argued that egalitarianism requires a unitary school system. In chapter five an account of egalitarianism is advanced, and relations between egalitarianism and education are explored. I defend the view that a mixed school system is compatible with the pursuit of egalitarian as well as important non-egalitarian objectives.

The term 'political education' was an important one in the vocabulary of Jamaican democratic socialism, and there were suggestions that political education should be made part of formal schooling. This proposal is examined in chapter six. I analyse the notion of political education. A distinction between an ideology of the state and an ideology of government is introduced and relations between these two kinds of ideology and political education are examined. I argue that formal political education is justified in the Jamaican context. I also argue that a politically aware liberal arts curriculum is the approach to political education which is most likely to resist the dangers feared by opponents of formal political education. This approach

to political education is also defended as a way of bringing the richness and diversity of the development of mind to bear on the life of the _polis_.

The thesis consists mostly of theoretical exposition and analysis, including conceptual analysis, the application of work already done in philosophy, and the producing and examination of arguments which might be brought to bear on specific policy issues. The problems are not, however, altogether abstracted from their social context; there is some description of the social and political setting in which these problems arose and in which they continue to exist. I draw from philosophical as well as non-philosophical sources; this is in keeping with my view that both political and educational philosophy should aim at close inter-relations with the social sciences. The problems examined are not, in their main features, peculiar to the Jamaican context; but I believe that the particularities of the Jamaican condition can add something of value to a more general understanding of them. The thesis was under-taken largely out of a felt need to seek a form of philosophical inquiry which is informed by awareness of the problems of the underdeveloped societies, and which, hopefully, may contribute something to the discussion of Third World affairs.

CHAPTER ONE

THE CONCEPT OF IDEOLOGY

In the nineteen fifties, and in a development described by its critics as itself ideological, a number of scholars in the industrialized west announced the 'end of ideology'. They were mistaken. Ideologies continue to exert considerable influence on the modern world and this seems to be especially the case in those countries that have come to be called the Third World.

This study is partly about ideology: it is about democratic socialism, one of the modern ideologies, and especially about its Jamaican variant; it is also about aspects of the relations between this ideology and educational policy in the Jamaican context, and about some of the philosophical problems posed by these relations. In the interest of clarity, I shall begin with an account of my understanding of the term 'ideology', and what I shall mean by it throughout the study.

I take as my starting point the view that ideologies are belief systems. The expression 'belief system' is one of the attempts at finding a non-evaluative way of describing them. This attempt at objectivity suits my purposes, for I do not intend my use of 'ideology' to be either pejorative or laudatory. I propose to use it in a way which is similar to that of some other writers who regard it as part of the working vocabulary of ordinary social and political life, as well as of social and political theory.

By ideologies I mean belief systems like socialism, liberalism, conservatism, or apartheid, nazism and facism. These kinds of belief

systems are sometimes contrasted with science, theories, and philosophies. Some accounts of ideology, for example those offered by Corbett (1965), and MacIntyre (1973), regard religions as ideologies; sometimes ideologies are said to be earthbound 'secular religions'. My own view is that while ideologies can be distinguished from other kinds of belief systems, ideological concerns sometimes overlap with those of science, theory, philosophy, and so on. Some of these areas of contrast will be noted as my account proceeds.

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I shall, first of all, note a few aspects of the history of the word. Following this I shall review a number of what I consider unsatisfactory ways of characterizing ideology. I shall then describe the conception of ideology which I think is most appropriate for this inquiry.

It is widely believed by those who have studied its etymology, including Lichtheim (1967), Drucker (1974) and Larrain (1979), that the word 'ideology' was first used by Destutt de Tracey near the beginning of the nineteenth century to mean 'the science of ideas'. Since then the notion of ideology has become one of the most disputed concepts in social theory, and is itself the subject of ideological disagreement.

After de Tracey, Marx used the word to refer to what he regarded as the 'false consciousness' of the bourgeoisie. Mannheim followed Marx but contrasted ideology with utopia, or the thinking of progressives. In many minds, the word is now associated with dogmatism, fanaticism, and the excesses of revolutionary upheavals. Those who

are opposed to ideology, make an evaluative distinction between ideological and non-ideological approaches to politics; their use of the word 'ideology' is intended to be pejorative. Others contend that all political doctrines are ideological. Some believe that in view of its long association with political concerns, use of the word should be restricted to the designation of political beliefs. Others contend that ideologies may be either political or non-political.

In some accounts, ideological beliefs are described as irrational, unverifiable, or habitual; some accounts, which also seek to discredit them, focus on their social causes. These are not central features of my own conception or interest. I shall consider each in turn.

Raphael, in search of a contrast with political philosophy, claims that ideology is "a prescriptive doctrine that is not supported by rational argument." In his view, "A set of value judgements which have not been subjected to rational scrutiny by the tests of consistency and accordance may be called ideological." He regards ideological doctrines as "non-rationally normative" (1976, pp. 17-20).

The gist of Raphael's view is that ideological beliefs are irrationally held. Part of what he might mean is that these beliefs are groundless, or that there are no good reasons for holding them. But suppose that one of the prescriptive doctrines of liberalism is, as Frankel suggests, the view that political organization should consist in "constitutionalism mediated by elections" (1978, p. 105). There are good reasons which can be offered in support of this view. It might be argued, for example, that this approach to political organization facilitates the peaceful transmission of authority. There are instances of class conflict, from history as well as the present, which Marxists

can and do offer as reasons for the belief that "The history of all exist-
ing society is the history of class struggles" (Marx and Engels, 1959,
p. 7). Similarly, conservatives offer the ongoing social and political
manifestations of human frailty as the grounds for the belief in what
Quinton calls the moral and intellectual "imperfection of human nature"
(1978, p. 13). Ideological beliefs are not necessarily without justi-
fication. Inquiry into the question of the alleged inconsistency be-
tween the pursuit of liberty and equality -- an undertaking which
Raphael regards as philosophical -- is one which is important for, and
which may also be undertaken within the context of democratic ideologies
like liberal democracy and democratic socialism. Beliefs in ideals like
liberty and equality may be ideological beliefs.

It is true, of course, that not all who hold ideological beliefs
also believe that, in principle, such beliefs should also be open to
rational scrutiny and assessment. Ideological beliefs, like other beliefs,
may be dogmatically and tenaciously held. Drucker, in his discussion
of ideological approaches to the definition of ideology suggests that
"For Liberals, any theory is ideological if it teaches intolerance of
other theories" (1974, p. 140). Even if there are good reasons which
might be offered in support of a particular ideological belief, not
everyone who holds it may have or be able to give these reasons for
believing it. Some ideological beliefs may well be without justifica-
tion, and there may be times when some ideological beliefs are irration-
ally held by those who believe them. But, in my view, irrationality is
not a necessary condition for beliefs being ideological.

Another approach is to claim that statements expressing ideological
beliefs cannot be verified, or as Popper would prefer, cannot be falsi-

fied. Ideologies are seen as systems of unverifiable or unfalsifiable beliefs. Positivists have made similar claims about religious and moral beliefs. Berlin has this characteristic of ideological beliefs in mind when he marks off those domains of inquiry which can establish the truth or falsity of their claims by formal or empirical means from those which cannot, and in his view ideologies belong in the second group:

> The principal candidates for inclusion into this charmed circle, who have not suceeded in passing the required tests, are the occupants of the large, rich and central, but unstable, volcanic and misty region of 'ideologies' (1962, p. 3).

Now it is true, I think, that many ideological beliefs, including some of the most important ones, are of this kind. They attempt, as MacIntyre puts it, "to delineate certain general characteristics of nature or society or both, characteristics which do not belong only to particular features of the changing world which can be investigated only by empirical inquiry" (1973, p. 5). In his view, the marxist doctrine of dialectical change, and the God-made character which Christians attribute to the world, are examples of such characteristics. Burke's view of political life as a contract between the living, the dead and the yet unborn, or conservative organicist views of society, may also be offered as examples. These beliefs are interpretative ways of comprehending natural or social phenomena; they are forms of metaphorical or analogous thinking based as much on what is observed as on what is created; they are, as Wolin (1960) would put it, acts of vision and imagination. They are found not only in ideology, but in theory and philosophy as well.

But even if it is granted that some ideological beliefs cannot be conclusively verified or falsified by empirical or formal means, not

all ideological beliefs are of this kind. Some, like marxist predictions, and the anthropological claims of nazism, have been falsified by experience, or shown to be untenable. Ideological beliefs are often about the history, economic structure, and social conditions of particular, existing societies. Their claims are open to investigation and are as verifiable or falsifiable as the claims of history, economics or sociology.

Another attempt at characterizing ideological beliefs thinks of them as being somehow below the level of reflective consciousness; they are acquired ways of looking at the world which function, as Robinson puts it, as "a substitute for instinct" (1962, p. 4). Gauthier has a similar view when, obviously employing a Chomskian analogy, he thinks of ideology as "part of the deep structure of self-consciousness" (1977, p. 131). These views regard ideologies as systems of habitual, pre-reflective beliefs.

This is also a claim which may be true of ideological beliefs. They can become settled, habitual, and taken for granted. But any kind of belief can sink to this level of consciousness; it is not a characteristic which distinguishes ideological from other kinds of beliefs. Bluhm has this possibility in mind, I think, when he distinguishes between what he calls forensic and latent ideologies:

> "Forensic ideologies" are the elaborate, self-conscious word systems, formulated at a rather abstract level, which constitute the language of political discussion in times of severe political stress and strain. "Latent ideologies" are the implicit sets of political words which are expressed in attitude and behaviour during more settled times, but which can be "excavated" -- that is, raised to the forensic level -- by social scientific research (1974, p. 10).

The views of Robinson and Gauthier resemble what Bluhm calls latent

ideologies. But, as these writers do not deny, ideological beliefs may also be self-consciously held and debated; in Oakeshott's phrase, they may be abstract principles which are "independently meditated" (1967, p. 5). They may function at the 'surface' of reflective consciousness. Ideological beliefs may be fresh and new as well as settled and habitual. Unlike Gauthier, I hold that conscious reflection is an important aspect of the function of ideological beliefs, and that this is especially so in Third World contexts. But I shall return to this later.

Some approaches to the definition of ideological beliefs focus on their social causes. These approaches, presumably, seek to distinguish between socially determined belief systems and those, like science, logic, mathematics, and so on, which are not believed to be socially determined, or which are believed to be less socially determined than others. Ideologies and religions are regarded as paradigms of those belief systems believed to be socially determined.

One apparently widespread approach is the view that ideological beliefs are caused by social illness. They are seen as symptoms of social disorder, or as forms of catharsis by which societies rid themselves of tension and discord. They are regarded as signs of a loss of social equilibrium.

Those who regard ideologies in this way do not deny that ideologies have social value. According to their view, ideologies are valuable as indicators of disorder, or because of the social evils they help to reduce. But like the symptoms of disease, ideologies are associated with the evils with which it is believed they are linked. This is, for the most part, a negative view of ideology. Ideologies are seen as having a secondary rather than a primary social function. It should be

noted that those who view ideology in this way usually have other people's ideological beliefs in mind. They would be less likely to regard their own ideological beliefs -- if they admit that they have them -- mainly as the symptoms or expressions of social infirmity.

The second of these two causal approaches is that associated with marxism. It is what Seliger (1977) calls a restrictive conception of ideology in that it includes only belief systems of a certain kind. Marx has been interpreted, by Singer for example, as believing in a materialist conception of history involving a three-tier process: "productive forces determine relations of production, which in turn determine the super-structure" (1980, p. 37). On the marxist view, ideology, philosophy, religion, art, and so on, are parts of the superstructure. Ideology is associated with the ruling class. Ideological beliefs are the distorted rationalizations, the 'false consciousness' by which the ruling class masks, protects, and promotes its self-interest. Habermas, who writes from a marxist perspective, offers the following account of ideology:

> From everyday experience we know that ideas serve often enough to furnish our actions with justifying motives in place of the real ones. What is called rationalization at this level is called ideology at the level of collec-tive action (1971, p. 311).

Both of these approaches make and emphasize the important observa-tion that ideological beliefs have causes and motives. They also draw attention to the importance of the relations between ideological beliefs and the social contexts in which they occur. But while I agree that ideological beliefs arise in response to social problems, I shall attri-bute a more positive role to them than do those who view them mainly as symptoms of social ailment, or forms of tension-relieving social

expression. It is also not part of my view that ideological beliefs are chiefly forms of self-interested rationalization.

There is a tendency in both of these approaches, at least according to some interpretations of them, to treat ideologies as if they were epiphenomenal, as if they lack primary, causal efficacy in determining social events. But why must the causal flow of influence be one-way and asymmetrical and not two-way and symmetrical? It can be argued that ideological beliefs also determine social reality by influencing what people do; they do not merely reflect and express it. In the account of ideology I shall offer, I do not attach any deterministic primacy to the society-to-belief causal relation against the belief-to-society relation. I am more interested in the effects, or the expected effects of ideological beliefs than I am in their causes. My approach is to view ideological beliefs as the bases, the preconditions of social and political action; they are part of what Aune, in his account of belief calls "the conscious springs of purposive behaviour" (1977, p. 107). I agree with Robinson (1962, p. 4) that ideological beliefs are socially indispensable. They may at times constitute the very framework on which social organization rests.

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I turn now to the conception of ideology which I wish to use in this study. It was devised mainly with the Jamaican experience and similar Third World contexts in mind. I believe that when Manley and other leaders of underdeveloped societies speak of an ideological approach to social reform they are thinking of some such conception of

ideology. At the same time I believe this conception is also broad enough to cover most of what is generally understood by the notion of ideology; it does not, I believe, go beyond the confines of the existing concept. The term "ideology', as I shall use it, is governed by four conditions which I shall now describe.

First, I regard ideologies as systems of shared beliefs. Ideological beliefs are shared by the members of some group. An individual may describe his belief as his theory or his philosophy even if he is the only one who believes it. Theoretical or philosophical beliefs may or may not be shared with others, but a belief is ideological only if it is shared with others. Just as one cannot say how many stones make a heap, one cannot say how many persons must share a belief before it becomes ideological. But a belief becomes ideological only if it is accepted by a significant number of people.

But the belief must be shared in some group-identifying sense. Not all shared beliefs are ideological. Ideological beliefs are taken seriously by the members of some group. The group is defined -- by its members as well as by others -- by reference to these beliefs; they give the group its social and political identity. A group is defined as marxist, liberal, conservative, and so on, by reference to certain shared beliefs. Ideological beliefs are sources of group self-identity, and it is also by reference to some set of shared beliefs that individuals define themselves as marxists, liberals, conservatives, and so on.

Second, I take ideologies to be belief systems which direct action in the social and political spheres. Ideological beliefs are sometimes beliefs about the principles which should guide conduct in these spheres:

proletarian freedom, mediation, skepticism, and the like. They are also beliefs about human nature and social reality -- actual or possible -- which, in the light of the relevant principles, require action. MacIntyre, who holds a similar view, comments on this relational quality as follows: ideology "does not merely tell us how the world is and how we ought to act, but is concerned with the bearing of the one upon the other" (1971, p. 6).

Ideological concerns are centrally moral ones. I mean moral as opposed to amoral or nonmoral, not immoral, for particular ideological beliefs may well be regarded as immoral. This moral dimension is frequently noted. Partridge sees "moral reflection" as the chief characteristic of the "ideological impulse" (1967, p. 34). On Geertz's account, ideological beliefs may be described as clusters of shared moral beliefs which create what he calls a "collective conscience" (1973, p. 220).

In saying that ideological beliefs direct social and political action, I am also identifying what seems to me to be the main focus and content of ideological beliefs. Those who contrast ideology with religion -- it is my own view that the two should be distinguished -- prefer to restrict ideological concerns to these earthbound spheres. Ideologies may, but need not be set in wider metaphysical, philosophical, or religious contexts. In restricting their concern to the direction of social and political action, I am also granting that ideologies may be social or political. The term 'social' has a wider reference than 'political'; whatever is political is necessarily social, but social concerns need not be political. Political ideologies usually embrace social concerns, but social ideologies need not address political questions.

Normative political theory and moral and political philosophy are also concerned with the principles which should direct conduct. Their concerns overlap with those of ideology. But there are at least three differences.

(a) There is a difference in the extent of their closeness to everyday social and political action. While they are all beliefs in society, to employ a phrase used by Harris (1968), ideological beliefs characteristically function closer to ordinary social and political reality than do the beliefs of academic theory and philosophy. Keohane has this closeness to practice in mind in attributing a practical, utilitarian character to ideology: "Ideologies are appropriate equipment for those who play the game, who combat and perform in the political arena. The actor needs an ideology not a theory or a philosophy" (1976, p. 82). Ideologies do not monopolize this concern with practice; the difference is one of degree. Ideological emphasis falls on practice while that of theory and philosophy falls chiefly on analysis, reflection and explanation. The nature of the relation between theory and practice is itself a problematic issue.

(b) Ideologies are as concerned with directing the means of social and political organization as they are with the ends of such organization. Unlike theories and philosophies -- contractarian theory and utilitarianism will do as examples -- ideologies are heavily programmatic. They prescribe, sometimes in considerable detail, the social, economic, political means by which the stated ends are to be achieved.

(c) The forms of social and political action they direct are advocated for popular acceptance, and they are usually zealously promoted.

This wide acceptance, I have already claimed, is a necessary feature of the character of ideological beliefs.

Third, I regard ideologies as systems of sense-making social and political beliefs. I use the expression 'sense-making' to refer to a variety of notions: explanation and justification, as well as the process by which intelligibility, meaning, order and coherence are given to experience. Ideological beliefs help people explain, justify, as well as give intelligibility, meaning, order and coherence to experience and action in the social and political spheres. Geertz, who regards ideologies as cultural symbol systems, captures aspects of this sense-making function when he describes ideologies as "extrinsic sources of information in terms of which human life can be patterned"; "schematic images of social order"; and as "maps of problematic social reality" (1973, pp. 216-220).

As part of this sense-making function, ideologies make knowledge claims; those who advocate ideological positions claim that they know that certain things are the case, and that they know how to realize certain ends. They promote values by advocating principles and by creating conceptions of the good life. Ideologies employ a variety of sense-making devices. They rely on the narrative, sense-making efficacy of history and myth. Linguistic as well as non-linguistic devices like slogans, mottoes, anthems, monuments and ceremonies are used to create the forms of emotional and intellectual understandings which give point to social organization and action.

The fourth feature of ideological beliefs concerns their systematic nature. Ideological beliefs are parts of a larger system or whole. It is sometimes said that in contrast with science, theory and philosophy,

there is less emphasis, in the case of ideology, on the logic of the relations between beliefs. This need not be the case, however, when the concerns of these areas overlap. Ideologists may also be concerned about the logical consistency of their views. Ideologies are also sometimes said to be 'closed' rather than 'open' belief systems, meaning that they are more resistant to change. The claim is not, of course, that ideologies do not change, but that they do not attach a positive value to internal change, or to the possibility of such change. But the chief feature of their systematic nature which I wish to note is that ideological beliefs, like other forms of systematic organization, are usually structurally organized around some central purpose; they are concentrated on some single unifying concern.

Ideological purpose is focused on some possible feature of the social and political landscape, like preservation or change. Ideologies are systems of problem-solving social and political beliefs; they are at any rate problem-solving in their intent. The purpose of the organization of ideological beliefs is, in Geertz's phrase, the solution of some problematic social reality.

In short, ideological beliefs (a) are shared by some group and help to define the social and political identity of that group; (b) direct and guide social and political action; (c) are sense-making in that they help to explain, justify, as well as give intelligibility, meaning, order and coherence to social and political experience, and (d) are focussed on the solution of some specific problem of social and political organization. In what follows, my use of 'ideology' will be governed by these four conditions. I turn now to some preliminary observations on the significance of this conception of ideology

in Third World contexts.

IV

"Compared to the classic revolutions of the seventeenth to nine-
teenth centures," writes MacPherson, "the revolutions of the under-
developed countries in our time depend to a much higher degree on
ideology" (1969, p. 303). He offers two main reasons. First, the
leaders of the underdeveloped countries face the enormous challenge of
taking backward often prepolitical peoples into the modern world.
Central to this task is the creation of political and national con-
sciousness, self-esteem, and faith and confidence in the future. This,
he suggests, is a task for ideology. The second reason concerns the
relation between ideology and economic development. In the absence of
an indigenous bourgeoisie -- where this is the case -- economic initia-
tive has to be taken by the state. To do so the state needs mass ideo-
logical support if it is to assume and maintain leadership in creating
and developing a modern labour force.

MacPherson is right, I believe, in attributing importance to the
role of ideology in the politics of the developing countries. The
account of ideology just offered is a way of bringing some of the
general issues he mentions into sharper focus; some of these issues bear
importantly on the questions to be later examined. In these societies,
the chief group which ideology seeks to define and give identity to, is
the state or body politic. Prepolitical groups like nations and
colonies have to be transformed into polities. There are also problems
concerning the relations between states and internal groups like political

parties. Ideologies seek to direct social, economic and political action towards social reform and development. They launch moral critiques of existing social and political conditions, and undertake re-evaluation of the principles which hitherto directed conduct. There is a search for the programmes which might effect change, and the acceptance of some scheme is widely advocated. In these societies there is an especially strong need for social and political sense-making. The former colonial experience, often traumatic and disorienting, has to be comprehended and made endurable in collective memory. There is a need to give intelligibility, order and coherence to the confusion of flux and transition. Point and meaning have to be given to the new polities they hope to create. These ideologies are attempts at solving the problematic social and political realities of neo-colonialism and under-development.

The underdeveloped countries, in their search for solutions, make ideological decisions which many social theorists worry about. Impatient with the slow process of incremental evolution, the leaders of these societies often attempt comprehensive, totalistic solutions to their problems, an approach criticized by those who hold organicist views of social development. In their attempts at advancing political consciousness, these leaders often seek to invest political life with a primordial communalism which some, like Shils, contend is not a characteristic of civil society (cited in Partridge 1967, p. 4).

Broadly tutelary in their intent, the exponents of these ideologies usually see education as one of the chief instruments of social reform. Education is to be an important part of the means by which the envisioned social and political order is to be realized. They incline to that view

of education -- central to the outlook of philosophers like Plato, Rousseau and Dewey -- which holds that the educational process can make vital, fundamental contributions to social reconstruction, and to the advancement of some ideal of human perfection.

In 1974, two years after he was elected to office, Michael Manley of Jamaica joined those Third World leaders who seek an ideological route to social reform. The movement spearheaded by Manley and his government was called democratic socialism. An attempt was made at devising an educational policy which would function as part of its strategy.

One of the most debated questions which followed Manley's announcement of the ideological path his government would follow was "What is democratic socialism?" After some preliminary observations on how this question might be answered, I shall give an account of the answer which the Jamaican adherents of democratic socialism gave to it. Following this I shall take up a number of questions posed by the ideologically oriented deliberations on educational policy, and the expectation which accompanied them that education can contribute to the solution of the problematic realities of the Jamaican experience.

CHAPTER TWO

THE IDEA OF DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISM

The Jamaican variant of democratic socialism was an interpretation of a more general idea. Questions about the Jamaican version inevitably converge on the general conception in which its historical and intellectual sources are to be found. This chapter is an attempt at elucidating this general conceptual backdrop against which the Jamaican interpretation of the ideology, and the educational questions posed by it, may be more clearly examined.

The aim is to state the basic ideological positions -- in the light of the account of ideology just given -- by identifying and making explicit some of the root assumptions on which the enterprise of democratic socialism rests. The key concepts are, of course, socialism and democracy, and a democratic socialist is one who believes that the two notions are compatible; he claims to be both a socialist and a democrat. In what follows I offer an introductory examination of the ideology by stating and commenting on what I think are some of the basic premisses of the arguments a democratic socialist might offer in support of his claims. I also make some introductory observations on the place of educational policy in the democratic socialist scheme.

The choice of the term 'democratic socialism' is in need of comment. There are a number of expressions used to describe the general ideological grouping which is here called 'democratic socialism'. These include 'social democracy', 'liberal socialism' and 'evolutionary socialism'. I shall, however, focus on the expression 'democratic socialism' since

this was the one used in the Jamaican context.

Those who, like Manley, choose 'democratic socialism' presumably wish to contrast their variant of socialism with totalitarian, 'undemocratic' approaches, by which they usually mean marxist-inspired or supposedly marxist-inspired communism. Some who see socialism as essentially democratic in spirit, regard the use of the word 'democratic' as part of the name of the ideology as a regrettable adjectival redundancy made necessary by the perversions of this ideal in the totalitarian, and in their view only so-called 'socialist' states. This redundancy functions partly as a rhetorical device: it is a reminder that democracy is supposed to be a part of the socialist ideal, and is a call for its restoration. Others may hold that socialism can be undemocratic but that it need not and should not be so.

The expression 'social democracy' is one of the oldest in use. The emphasis here is on the social aspect of the socialist ideal, and on the belief that democracy should be extended into the social domain; as Hook puts it, the emphasis is on "democracy as a way of life" (1980, p. 99).

Those who prefer 'liberal socialism' wish to emphasize the liberal origins of the ideals espoused by adherents of the ideology. For the most part they accept the traditions and principles of liberal civilization. Gallie observes that socialists seek "not simply to inherit these principles, but to generalize and fulfil them" (1967, p. 127). Liberal socialists disagree with liberals not so much over principles, but over the methods by which they are to be realized, and the scope of attainment envisaged.

The expression 'evolutionary socialism', with its biological con-

notation, emphasizes the belief that socialist society and culture should be realized through a process of gradual growth. Those who hold this view believe in piecemeal socialist development. The contrast sought is with revolutionary socialism.

The variety of expressions used is perhaps itself indicative of uncertainty concerning the identity of the movement. Democratic socialism is an evolving idea in search of a satisfactory way of characterizing its core conception. I shall take the term to refer to a variety of movements within socialism, especially those which seek alternatives to both marxism and capitalism. Whatever their differences, the basic position which unites them is the belief that socialism is a variant of democratic ideology. In what follows I state some of the reasons which I think those who hold this view might wish to offer in its defence.

II

What makes the democratic socialist a socialist? Socialists and students of socialist thought are often, and understandably, hesitant about saying what socialism is. To report on the use of the word 'socialism' is to report on vagueness, ambiguity and even contradiction. The word has been applied to belief systems as disparate as that of the early Christians and German National Socialism. Definitions are often, and perhaps inevitably, themselves ideologically influenced. Opponents of socialism define it in terms of atrocities committed in the name of socialism. Advocates define it in terms of ideals with which few would disagree. Some definitions emphasize the ends of socialism, while others emphasize the means by which it is believed these ends can be achieved.

·I shall approach socialism as a doctrine of ends as well as of means.
The democratic socialist is a socialist, I suggest, to the extent that
he holds beliefs of the kind I shall now describe.

Socialist ideologies have, as their fundamental assumption, an
optimistic -- and some would say mistaken -- belief in the possible
emancipation of human nature. Socialists pursue some vision of a 'new
socialist man' who can be liberated from the shackles imposed on him by
society, and especially by capitalist society. Parekh suggests that the
content of this vision of human development has centered on three main
themes: "During its not very long history, socialist thought has re-
tained its vision of man as an essentially social, rational and coopera-
tive being and has given its history coherence and continuity" (1975,
p. 6). Socialists believe that it is by giving expression to his social
nature, by exercising his capacity for self-improvement through rational
control of his circumstances, and by cooperating with his fellows in
their collective interest, that man realizes his uniquely human potential.

Socialist optimism has been fed by a number of sources, including
Christianity and the utopian tradition. Closely linked with the develop-
ment of the idea of modernization, it also had its roots, Taylor suggests,
in the Enlightenment and Romanticism. The first took a "Promethean
self-defining stance" in its approach to human nature. The second had
what Taylor, following Berlin, calls an 'expressivist' view of man,
according to which "The potential which a man expresses is very much
his own; it develops out of him, and is not defined by some relation of
harmony with a larger order" (1974, p. 49).

Two sets of arguments converge on the socialist position. The
first is offered in support of the view that capitalism is necessarily

destructive and restricts the development of man's sociality, rationality, cooperativeness, and the like. The second seeks justification for the claim that socialist modes of organization do, or can encourage the development of these aspects of human nature.

Socialism is historically rooted in the rise of the labour movement in eighteenth and nineteenth century Europe. It began as a moral critique of the dehumanizing effects of the industrial revolution and the emergence of industrial capitalism. These developments created the problematic features of human experience which its leaders sought to solve. Socialist response to these developments took two main forms: admiration for man's growing technological and wealth-creating powers, and moral indignation at the resulting dehumanization. The first led to the view that man is uniquely a working, self-improving economic animal; the second to the view that work has to be creative and productive if it is to have its humanizing and liberating effects. Marx saw work as the chief characteristic which distinguishes man from the non-human animals:

> Men can be distinguished from animals by consciousness,
> by religion or anything you like. They themselves begin
> to distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they
> begin to produce their means of subsistence, a step which
> is conditioned by their physical organization (Marx and
> Engels 1965, p. 31).

But Marx also argued that capitalism is a system which alienates the worker from the products and processes of his activities, as well as from his human essence and from his fellowmen (Marx 1961, pp. 93-109). To realize its liberating potential work must be socially useful and must be rationally organized to promote the collective interests of those who through work, transform nature and create wealth.

One consequence of this outlook is the tendency, among some socialists, to elevate the economic at the expense of the political. The unity of the political and economic domains, commonly urged in socialist thought and practice, is defended chiefly as a way of advancing economic welfare. It is sometimes argued that this tendency inevitably leads to totalitarian results. But it is worth noting that democratic socialists advocate only a partial merging of these domains.

Concerned as they are with the liberating potential of work, socialists have naturally aligned themselves with the working classes. Socialists attach importance to their views of themselves as members of the world's working community. Kolakowski observes that among students of socialist thought there is wide agreement that "any meaningful concept of socialism implies the ability of the working society to decide its own fate, which includes, in particular, control over the means of production" (1974, p. 10). Concerned chiefly with the emancipation of the working classes, socialism is chiefly the ideology of political parties and governments supposedly instituted to advance the interests of working people.

Notions like 'working class' and 'working society' are, of course, vague. But although socialism is traditionally associated with wage earners, and assigns a special role to this group, socialists have extended their concern to other groups as well. Bottomore, for example, argues that the quest for socialist society should be seen as an enterprise which embraces the aspirations of other groups as well as those of the labour movement (1974, p. 133).

The chief sense-making function which socialism attempts, I think, is the elaboration of a man-as-worker view of social and political

organization. It seeks to explain and justify as well as give intelligibility, point and meaning to working experience. With its ontological, historical and mythic dimensions, marxism is, in this respect, considerably richer than democratic socialism. It has a happy story about working-class destiny. But even if it is more sparing in these areas, I think democratic socialism nevertheless tries to fulfill the same function.

It is sometimes said that a moral approach to politics is one of the characteristics which distinguishes democratic socialism from marxism. Marxists prefer to describe their approach to socialism as 'scientific'. Hampshire thinks of socialism as "a set of moral injunctions" which require the abolition of poverty, the redressing of grave inequalities, and the giving of priority to the satisfaction of basic human needs (1974, p. 249). Gallie (1967) has a democratic socialist system in mind in distinguishing socialist morality from liberal morality.

The morality of democratic socialism centres on two main principles. In the literature of the ideology, equality and freedom are widely advocated as the principles which should guide social and political action. The ultimate aim of democratic socialism, according to the Founding Congress of the Socialist International, is the creation of " a community in which free men work together as equals" (1951, p. 216). A democratic socialist, writes Radice,

> is a person who believes in equality and freedom, and
> in the conscious, directed organization of political,
> economic and social machinery to change society in
> accordance with these ideals (1965, p. 1).

Democratic socialists deny that these are the principles which guide conduct in marxist and capitalist systems. These two principles comprise

what Dworkin (1978, p. 116) would call the constitutive morality of demo-
cratic socialism; they are the positions which are valued for their own
sake rather than as strategies.

There are important links between equality and freedom. Equality
is often a precondition for freedom. But the two notions are also often
in conflict. The promotion of equality sometimes results in the restric-
tion of freedom, and freedom may be promoted in ways which are detri-
mental to equality. The problem of finding sustaining relations between
these two principles is one of the main challenges of democratic socialism.

Equality is widely regarded by many socialists as the more funda-
mental of these two principles. It is the central component of the
socialist ideal of communal collectivism. The principle of equality
has been the chief basis of socialist critique of the inequalities of
capitalism and the unfair distribution of worker-created wealth.
Kolakowski sees equality as belonging to "the very core of all tradi-
tional socialist ideologies" (1974, p. 4). According to Berki, egali-
tarianism is "the harshest, and perhaps the most unpalatable tendency
we can encounter in socialism"; but he also regards it as "the most
heroic, most dynamic and noblest of all socialist principles" (1975,
p. 26). Arthur Lewis regards a "passion for equality" as the definitive
socialist point of view (quoted in Lichtheim 1970, p. 284).

It is believed that social inequalities hinder human development.
They restrict freedom and deny power to some. Tawney, one of the chief
theoreticians of democratic socialism, puts it this way:

> it is the mark of a civilized society to aim at eliminat-
> ing such inequalities as have their source, not in indi-
> vidual differences, but in its own organization, and ...
> individual differences, which are a source of social energy,

> are more likely to ripen and find expression if social
> inequalities are, as far as practicable, diminished
> (1964, p. 57).

Socialist egalitarianism, of course, has to meet the usual well-known objections. These include claims about biological inequalities and about individual rights. They include the claim that inequalities are functionally necessary in that social systems cannot function without hierarchy. They include arguments from utility and claims about the high cost of implementing egalitarian schemes.

There are long-standing reservations about the possibility of freedom in socialist society. Critics of socialism argue that individual freedom is inevitably restricted by the socialist emphasis on collectivism, working-class majoritarianism, the unity of the economic and the political domains, economic centralization, and the enlargement of the functions of government. But the grim record of totalitarian 'socialist' regimes notwithstanding, it is nevertheless debatable whether socialism and individual freedom are necessarily incompatible.

Freedom has, in fact, been one of the chief concerns of socialist theoreticians. It was the chief goal of Marx's radical humanism. Socialist theories of freedom have centered on the claim that for most workers a condition of unfreedom necessarily obtains under capitalism. It is only by controlling the economic forces existing in the society, it is held, that the worker can avoid becoming their victims. He can secure and maximize his freedom only by controlling the productive forces through ownership and other forms of control.

The socialist conception of freedom, according to Gallie, emphasizes "freedom to be" rather than freedom to get (1967, p. 128).

Harrington, in elaborating his conception of an ideal socialist society, argues that "Its most basic premise is that man's battle with nature has been completely won and there is therefore more than enough of material goods for everyone" (1970, p. 421). Harrington argues in favour of the plausibility of the socialist scheme by trying to show the human and social consequences which would follow from the realization of this imaginary condition. The claim is that material well-being -- the freedom to be -- is a precondition for the kinds of development which socialists envision. Poverty limits the freedom to carry out one's choices. Socialists believe that it is only through the conscious, rational organization of the world's resources that the 'freedom to be' can be made widely available. The unity of the political and economic domains is seen as a part of this process. "The special contribution of Socialists to the concept of freedom," writes Radice, "is their conviction that it is the government's task not only to preserve political freedoms but to widen the frontiers of freedom as a whole" (1965, p. 34).

I take the foregoing to be some of the chief ends of socialism with which a democratic socialist would concur. But there is generally more agreement among socialists about ends than about means. The most general area of agreement is that socialism requires the deliberate and planned reorganization of society. Socialism is rationalistic in its methodology in that, as Berki puts it, the emphasis is on "reason, knowledge, efficiency in production, the rational purposeful organization of human society in the interest of progress" (1975, p. 34).

Oakeshott (1962) in a conservative critique of rationalism in politics, argues that this approach is the politics of books; it is

based on knowledge which can be explained, and not, in his view, on the more important practical but inexplicable knowledge of accumulated experience. The socialist approach, he believes, is especially appealing to those who lack experience.

Democratic socialists also believe in a rationalistic methodology, but they are more moderate than marxists in the strategies they espouse. They believe in public ownership and social control of the major, but not all, of the means of production, distribution and exchange. They also emphasize trade unions and cooperatives, and advocate extensive government involvement in social services like education and culture, social security, health care, and the like. But they also encourage flexibility of means. They believe that the strategies employed -- what Dworkin would call the derivative rather than constitutive positions (1978, p. 116) -- should be suited to the contexts in which socialist ends are pursued.

III

But if the democratic socialist claims he is a socialist on the grounds that he hold beliefs of the kind just described, what are his reasons for claiming that the socialist enterprise, as he sees it, is also a democratic one? To this he might reply that he regards socialism as democratic in its ends as well as in its means. Two concepts of democracy are relevant to his point of view. The first sees democracy as an ideal, and involves a conception of a society which is egalitarian in its economic and social structure and libertarian in its way of life. On the second view, democracy is a procedural notion; the word refers to

certain procedures and institutions and involves the application of notions like self-determination, participation, and responsible representation to the workings of these procedures.

The democratic socialist might argue that both socialism and democracy are concerned with human development. He could agree with MacPherson that the aim of democracy "is to provide the conditions for the free development of human capacities, and to do this equally for all members of the society" (1965, p. 58). What distinguishes him as a socialist is that, to use Parekh's examples, he is chiefly interested in the development of social, rational, and cooperative capacities. Democracy can be regarded as an enterprise which depends on these capacities, and which is also concerned with their advancement.

His view of democracy as a characteristic of an ideal society centres chiefly on its social and economic structure. Wollheim (1975, p. 124) mentions some socialist arguments which bear on this approach to democracy. There is the Guild Socialist argument that a society is democratic only if all its institutions are also democratic. It is also argued that political democracy is unsafe without democracy in the economic domain. There is also the claim that it is morally inconsistent to apply democracy in one domain while excluding it from others. If democracy is good it should be given the widest possible application.

Given his special interest in man as worker, and in the economic foundations of his freedom and development, the democratic socialist has a special interest in the idea of economic democracy. In his view a democratic society is without great economic inequalities. He is also committed to working-class self-determination and believes that this requires a self-governed economy. The economy needs to be rationally

organized if it is to serve the collective interest. If the problem of worker-alienation is to be solved, and if the welfare of the worker is to be advanced, notions like participatory democracy and responsible representation should be brought to bear on the organization of the work-place. The worker needs to be able to influence the decision-making process at all levels of industrial organization.

The democratization of the economy may be carried out on a small scale through common ownership of cooperatives, through the decentraliza-tion of economic control, or on a large scale involving collective state ownership and control. Arneson, who believes that economic democracy is consistent with the preservation of freedom, argues that it need not involve more than investing a democratically elected authority with the responsibility for making decisions concerning "the management of produc-tion and the selection of rules of distribution" or "deciding what is to be done with the major means of production -- what goods are to be produced, in what manner, and for what purposes" (1979, pp. 235-236).

But the democratic socialist also wants democracy in the wider social domain. He thinks human social development requires social equality and social freedom. A society is democratic only if it has these characteristics. Thus the democratic socialist speaks of "social rights" and of the abolition of distinctions "between the sexes, between social groups, between town and countryside, between regional and racial groups" (Founding Congress of the Socialist International 1951, pp. 219-222).

Although chiefly aligned with the working-classes, the democratic socialist rejects a class interpretation of democracy. Many marxist states describe themselves as 'people's democracies'. This need not be

seen as an illegitimate use of the word. As MacPherson (1965) reminds us, the word 'democracy' originally meant rule by or on behalf of the poor and the oppressed; this usage dates back as far as Plato. When marxists say they believe in rule by or on behalf of the proletariat, it can be argued that they are employing a modern interpretation of the original meaning of the term. Like marxists, the democratic socialist envisions the ultimate disappearance of class divisions, but he rejects a class conflict view of how this might be realized. He prefers to ground his democratic ideals not in a social entity like class, or in socialist collectivism, but in the idea of individualism and individual rights, conjoined with notions like majority decision, and so on. Cole, who holds this view, defends it on the ground that "the individual is the final repository of ethical values" (1975, p. 104).

The democratic socialist believes in political democracy. It is required by the ideals to which he is committed. He rejects revolutionary violence. He is committed to the view that socialism should be achieved with the consent of the governed. According to Radice, democratic socialists "consider that the party system with competing political parties is the best way to ensure the possibility of a regular and peaceful change of power and to preserve the basic civil liberties" (1965, p. 75). This emphasis on competitive party politics presupposes a democratic state or body politic. It also assumes that the society has a considerable degree of communal solidarity and a deeply embedded set of consensual values. Cole observes that "Only stable societies possessing a sense of solidarity can in practice give ethical factors priority over considerations of power" (1975, p. 104).

It is of course debatable whether democratic socialism requires com-

petitive party politics. In Tanzania, for example, Nyerere had developed
a model, described as democratic socialist, in which a single ideology
functions as that of party, government and state; political choices are
allowed within a single ideological framework, but ideological pluralism
is not allowed within the polity. Some democratic socialists might
argue that this approach involves a restriction of freedom of choice.

The democratic socialist might wish to emphasize his commitment to
democracy by invoking his commitment to equality and freedom. The
democratic enterprise, whether viewed as an ideal of society or as a
set of institutions and procedures, assumes that there are respects in
which all persons are equal. It assumes, for instance, that they are
equal in having economic and social needs, and in having the right to
influence the political process. But equality is also necessary as a
way of preserving and advancing equality in these domains. The demo-
cratic enterprise also assumes freedom, just as it also seeks its pre-
servation and maximization. Lane, for example, in expanding on a view
attributed to Marx, sees autonomy as a precondition for democratic
socialism. Without the psychological readiness which consists in a wide-
spread capacity for autonomy, attempts at introducing socialist insti-
tutions into a society are likely to result in "degeneration into
poverty, stasis, or the abuse of power" (1979, p. 76). Thus the demo-
cratic socialist might argue that he is committed to democracy as a
way of maximizing the freedom which the development of human potential
requires, and as an important foundation for the workings of the entire
enterprise to which he is committed.

Gay, in offering an assessment of this overall enterprise, has some
observations on what he calls the 'dilemma' of democratic socialism:

> A democratic Socialist movement that attempts to transform
> a capitalist into a Socialist order is necessarily faced
> with the choice between two incompatibles - principles and
> power. Socialist parties that are dedicated to democracy
> proceed on the fundamental assumption that their enemies
> are human too, an assumption that limits the range of their
> weapons. Discussion, vote-getting, parliamentarism --
> rather than terrorism, violence, revolution -- constitute
> the arsenal of the democratic Socialist. Again, the Socialist
> who is also a democrat will eschew dictatorship to maintain
> himself in power and rely instead, on persuasion (1952,
> Preface).

Democratic socialists also face the prospect of never being elected, or

having their socialist achievements dismantled by succeeding governments.

They are sustained, however, by faith in what they regard as the ration-

ality of their cause. As Cole observes, their commitment to education

also proceeds from their belief about the rationality of their scheme,

and the need to persuade: "As socialism was generally believed to have

a strong rational basis, it was natural that all schools of socialists

should set great store by education, persuasion and propaganda" (1967,

p. 469). Socialists believe in what they often call 'political educa-

tion'.

IV

I shall be examining a number of educational issues arising out of

democratic socialism, and especially a number of problems posed by its

Jamaican variant. An ideology may perform an educational function by

bringing about new forms of awareness, or by keeping certain emphases

in the public consciousness. Some socialists regard education as an

important part of the quest for the emancipation of human nature; others,

like Marx, have not attached a primary role to the educational process.

But given its general outlook, there are a number of specific emphases which can be expected from a democratic socialist approach to education. Questions posed by three of these will be examined in detail. The first is the concern with man as worker, and with the related problem of educating people for the working life. Second, there is the problem of bringing egalitarian ideals to bear on the making of educational policy. Third, there is the wider question of the relations between ideology and the idea of political education.

The Jamaican variant of democratic socialism was a particularized interpretation of the general enterprise just described. The foregoing educational questions assume a special guise when examined in the light of the Jamican interpretation of the ideology. It is to this interpretation that I now turn.

CHAPTER THREE

THE JAMAICAN VARIANT OF DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISM

In this chapter I examine the Jamaican variant of democratic socialism. Democratic socialism is not the only socialist ideology with adherents in Jamaica, but it is the only one so far officially espoused by a government; it is also the one with the largest following, and the one which has had the greatest impact on Jamaican life. It is not my intention, however, to describe or evaluate the nature of this impact. My main concern is to give an account of what some of its main exponents meant by the term 'democratic socialism'.

The advocates of democratic socialism in Jamaica claimed they were in search of a distinctly Jamaican interpretation of the ideology, one which would be uniquely suited to Jamaican conditions and needs, and one which would be in some sense central to what Jamaican society is about. It is debatable whether or not there is anything significantly Jamaican about their conception of the ideology, but this nationalistic goal of theirs has to be kept in mind. Opponents of democratic socialism in Jamaica frequently referred to it as an 'alien ideology' and offered this as a reason for rejecting it. Their rejection was perhaps based on relative satisfaction with whatever ideology -- latent or perhaps insufficiently articulated -- they believed was already functioning in the society. Or it was perhaps based on the view that a Jamaican ideology should emerge from the inner logic of the society itself; it was mistaken to attempt to graft an 'alien' ideology onto the Jamaican political outlook; an ideology should emerge naturally, or not at all,

out of the Jamaican experience itself.

In his discussion of what he calls the 'lean and hungry socialists' of the Third World, Berki defends the variants of socialism in these societies against the charge that they are theoretically unsophisticated. He points out that these ideologies are concerned with urgent and practical issues and are mostly addressed to impoverished and uneducated people. But he also sees this as something of an asset: "There is in the Third World, one might suggest, a more convincing 'unity of theory and practice' in socialism than there ever was in Europe except perhaps at the height of revolutions" (1975, p. 123). Much of this is also true, I think, of the Jamaican variant of democratic socialism. Most of the material which will be examined here was ideological rather than theoretical in intent. But it may be the case that theoretical reflection can help clarify what the ideology was about. It may also suggest aspects which could benefit from further theoretical analysis.

Nettleford offers the following account of the origins of socialism in Jamaica:

> Socialism as understood in Jamaican politics may be said
> to have been the intellectual and moral 'creation' of the
> PNP egged on by a group of young nationalists and articu-
> lated in terms that suited the Jamaican palate by the
> liberal Norman Manley, the PNP leader. It underwent many
> changes between 1940 when it was first declared and 1955
> by which time it had become a mere label for 'progressive'
> ideas. It had had its motivation in the social and economic
> crises of the 'thirties, and the conditions of the masses,
> in the condition of colonial dependence, in the nature of
> the European conflict which offered at the time a choice
> between facism and the panacea of socialism, as well as
> in the exposure of a few bright self-made intellectuals
> to Fabian socialist thought then current in Britain
> (1971, p. liii).

In Nettleford's view, the adoption of socialism was the People's National Party's response to the labourism of the rival Jamaica Labour Party.

Nettleford describes Norman Manley as a rationalist and non-doctrinaire intellectual who wished to bring about fundamental social and economic changes in Jamaican society, and who found in socialism "the nearest thing to an all-embracing category of political thought and strategy that could cover notions of equality, working class participation in the social processes, and indigenous control (through collective action) of Jamaican society" (1971, pp. lii-liii).

In 1974, two years after he was elected to office, Michael Manley, son of Norman Manley, and now leader of the People's National Party and Prime Minister of Jamaica, decided to revive socialism as the official ideology of his party, and of the government which he now led. It is with this updated conception of socialism that I am primarily concerned. Manley described it as a modern interpretation developed in the context of the contemporary world, and in the light of the experience of the Jamaican people, especially over the previous forty years (People's National Party 1979, Foreward).

In choosing the term 'democratic socialism', adherents of the ideology wished to avoid some of the connotation of the term 'social democracy', perhaps what Berki calls its "past orthodox flavour" (1975, p. 91). In their view, social democracy is "a political process employing broad reforms of and controls over a capitalist system to create a more just and equitable society without changing the system itself fundamentally" (People's National Party, 1979, p. 66). They, however, rejected capitalism as the primary or dominant economic system. The Manley Government was explicit on this point: "We reject Capitalism as the system upon which to base the future of Jamaica" (Agency for Public Information n.d., p. 1). The People's National Party (1979)

also frequently expressed the view that capitalism is an evil system involving the exploitation of man by man and which should therefore be rejected. They were not interested in merely reforming capitalism, and they regarded gradual reform as insufficient. They wished to bring about a deep and fundamental transformation of the economic system, and indeed of the society as a whole.

II

Transferred to the Jamaican context, socialist optimism about the possible emancipation of human nature became a belief about the possibility of liberating the Jamaican from the debilitating social, economic and psychological legacies of his history. Socialism was viewed as a form of psycho-cultural therapy. While in Europe socialism emerged out of moral indignation against the effects of capitalist industrialization, in Jamaica, socialist moral rage was fed by the effects of both capitalism and colonialism. Jamaican democratic socialists linked capitalism not only with economic exploitation, but also with the destruction, uprooting and displacement of peoples and cultures. They linked capitalism with slavery. Along with its undesirable social and economic consequences, colonialism was seen as the cause of undesirable psychological consequences. In Manley's view, "the psychology of dependence ... is the most insidious, elusive and intractable of the problems" inherited from colonialism. In his view "If a man is denied both responsibility and power long enough he will lose the ability to respond to the challenge of the first and to grasp the opportunity of the second" (1974, p. 21). This historical experience, according to

Manley, nevertheless gave the Jamaican a rugged, pragmatic resilience
which is an asset, and which can be the basis for his development (1974,
pp. 135-136).

Since it was mostly non-white peoples who were the victims of white
capitalism and colonialism, attitudes to colour were seen as part of
this need for emancipation. Jamaica has a predominantly black population
which exists in a much proclaimed harmony with a number of minority
groups. But according to Manley, "While superficially accepting the
notion of a multi-racial society, the truth is that Jamaica is not yet
at peace with blackness or comfortable with its African heritage" (1974,
p. 57). While all groups have, to some degree, been victims of capitalism
and colonialism, blacks suffered the additional disadvantage of the exper-
ience of slavery. This resulted not only in a greater loss of culture,
but also in the lowering of the status of this culture. This cultural
loss was replaced by greater westernization on the part of blacks.
Another result is that there are greater extremes of poverty among blacks.
The group which makes up the majority of the population is therefore
beset with greater problems of identity combined with more severe
economic impoverishment. In the search for an identity, Jamaican blacks
vacillate between Europe and Africa. Fanon, the Caribbean-born student
of the psychology of colonialism, sees this as a choice between "the
great white error" and "the great black mirage" (1973, p. 275).
Nettleford, more positively, sees it as an attempt at harmonizing "the
melody of Europe and the rhythm of Africa" (1970, pp. 171-211). The
challenge is how to advance black economic and psychological liberation
while preserving what is seen as a so-far unusually successful applica-
tion of the multi-racial ethic in virtually all aspects of Jamaican life.

Adherents of the ideology sought justification and sustenance in Christianity. It may be too strong a claim to say that the Jamaican variant of democratic socialism was a variant of Christian Socialism, another group of socialist ideologies, but Christian influence on the ideology is obvious. Socialism was designated "the Christian way of life in action" (Agency for Public Information n.d., p. 1). Christian sources were commonly cited, especially in defense of egalitarianism. According to the Manley Government, "Socialism gives practical expression to the Christian belief in the equal value of human beings" (Agency for Public Informatin n.d., p. 1). Manley himself argued that "a moral God can only be responsible for equal children" (n.d., p. 4). It is true, of course, that in spite of differences of opinion about its interpretation -- especially over the question of its worldly or other-worldly implications -- the Christian doctrine of equality has neverthe-less been a major influence on modern egalitarian movements.

Its influence in Jamaica is hardly surprising. Jamaicans are often described as a religious people. Nettleford points out that the role of Christian missionaries in rehabilitating the Jamaican countryside out of slavery has left a strong impression on the Jamaican mind (1971, p. lx). The search for Christian legitimization of socialism was obviously partly intended as a way of gaining support in a predominantly Christian country.

A word should be said about Rastafarianism. Jamaican in origin, it is a religion with an increasing influence on the life of the society. It is a religious response to the condition of black people in Jamaican history which seeks, through affirmation of an African identity (especially Ethiopianism), to develop a theology and a way of life which re-

stores self-respect and dignity to Jamaicans of African descent. Not overtly political in the sense of having an official view about the form which social and political organization should take in Jamaica, it is nevertheless a movement which cannot be politically ignored. In the main they reject Jamaican society -- they denounce it as 'Babylon' -- because of the same evils which the Jamaican democratic socialists wished to eradicate. The political impulse of democratic socialism, and the religious impulse of Rastafarianism, both had their source in a common discontent with the society. Rastafarianism seeks a religious solution and undertakes much of the same psycho-cultural therapy I have claimed for democratic socialism. Barrett sees Rastafarian communalism -- as evidenced for example in the absence of "me" and "you" from their language -- as a precursor of the Jamaican variant of democratic socialism (1977, p. 145). A movement which is in favour of racial equality and which seeks to advance the interests of a disadvantaged group is obviously egalitarian in spirit. But Barrett claims that belief in black superiority is one of the basic Rastafarian beliefs (1977, p. 104). If this is so the movement is clearly not an egalitarian one, and is in conflict with both Christianity and socialism. There is some evidence, however, that secularization of the movement did, to some extent, move in the direction of socialism. Rastafarianism was one of the world-views from which Jamaican socialism was viewed. In many instances, Rastafarian culture -- especially its music, language and images -- became the vehicles through which socialist ideology was expressed.

Socialist belief in the links between creative work and human development took on a special significance in a society in which the

memory of coerced labour under slavery is still alive. The Jamaican exponents of democratic socialism saw, in the socialist approach to work, an antidote to the coerced labour of slavery and the exploited labour of capitalism. The immorality associated with slavery and the capitalist system was countered by a highly moralistic approach to work. It was widely believed, or assumed, I think, that an emphasis on voluntary, socially useful work was a way of restoring moral status and authority to work. It was felt that socialism provides an approach to work which satisfies the basic needs of all, offers scope for creative satisfaction, and which elevates its moral worth by substituting altruistic concern for the common good for the capitalist pursuit of self-interest.

As a socialist party, the People's National Party, naturally claims identification with the Jamaican working class. This is an identification which it shares with other Jamaican political parties. It competes for popular support with the Jamaica Labour Party, its chief rival, and the Worker's Party of Jamaica, a communist party. We recall Nettleford's claim that its adoption of socialism was a response to the popular but relatively unsystematized labourism of the Jamaica Labour Party. Daley rightly observes that "To a great extent, the two political parties are labor parties committed, as they profess, to working class solidarity" (1971, p. 154). Both emerged out of the labour unrest of the nineteen thirties and both are aligned with major trade unions, and both have been led by influential labour leaders. The outlook of the People's National Party has, however, been influenced by the greater support it has customarily received from the middle class and from intellectuals; the influence of the latter party explains its greater tendency towards theoretical reflection, social analysis, and ideological

ferment.

Part of this ideological activity consisted in a process of social stock-taking in which problematic areas of Jamaican social and economic experience were identified. Manley saw Jamaican society as one "disfigured by inequities that go too deep for tinkering" (1974, p. 16). It was not, in his view, a society organized for the purpose of serving the interests of its members. In short, the society was seen as an unjust one which lacked the influence of those values -- the values of democratic socialism -- which Jamaican adherents of the ideology believed were the values which should constitute the foundations of social and political organization. Some of their views on Jamaican social and economic structure will illustrate the general drift of their analysis.

The marxist view that class is to be defined in terms of ownership of the means of production, distribution and exchange was endorsed (People's National Party 1979, pp. 11-12). The party also believed that the economic structure (ownership of the means of production, distribution and exchange) determines production relations (relations at the workplace), which in turn determine social relations between people and classes (People's National Party 1979, p. 19). Although obviously inspired by marxism, it should be noted that these claims were offered as plain assertions; they were not explicitly advanced as interpretations of Marx. Applying the marxist view of class, Jamaican society was seen as consisting of a capitalist class, a working class, small farmers, a middle stratum and a lumpen proletariat. Jamaican equivalents were given for each of these categories (People's National Party 1979, pp. 11-16).

They described what they saw as the five main characteristics of

Jamaican economic structure. In some cases these characteristics were linked to specific social effects. (1) Traditionally, the best agricultural land has been externally owned. Small farmers, who make up the largest class in the society, have had to settle for the "marginal hillside land." This has resulted in alienation of people from the land. Agricultural workers have had to choose between subsistence farming on the hillsides, or selling their labour for low wages to the colonial owners of the flat lands. (2) Economic activity has consisted chiefly in the export of agricultural products and raw materials to the metropolitan centres in exchange for food and manufactured goods under "cruelly unequal terms of trade." (3) There has been an "enforced subservience of the local economy to the metropolis." This has resulted in the underdevelopment of Jamaican industry and technology, and has discouraged the development of managerial, entrepreneurial and technical skills. (4) The banking system has been foreign owned and controlled. As a result, Jamaican savings have been used to serve the interests of the metropolitan economies. (5) The means of distribution have been dominated by "a local merchant class that thrived as intermediaries (middlemen) in colonial trade." This group has discouraged the development of Jamaican industry (People's National Party 1979, pp. 20-21).

There is obviously more to the Jamaican economy than is presented here. But these were seen as the problematic features which were in need of change. These features were regarded as responsible for the exploitation, inequities, and injustices which were in need of remedy. It was, of course, believed that socialist economic structures would remove these evils, and would lead to an improvement in production rela-

tions and hence to an improvement in social relations generally.

This social analysis was part of an overall moral critique of the society, and a general re-evaluation of social and political principles. Like other democratic socialists, the Jamaican exponents of the ideology believed that politics should be rooted in morality. They promoted a particular moral point of view. The Manley Government claimed it wanted "to build a socialist society in which people will be motivated by the spirit of brotherhood and sisterhood and will build the nation through cooperation" (Agency for Public Information n.d., p. 4). The People's National Party included in its "tasks of ideological struggle," "the encouragement of the principles of socialist morality based on fraternal relations and cooperation in both work and social duties, in which service to community and nation comes before self-interest and is the path to the fullest expression of the human personality" (1979, pp. 16-17).

The Jamaican variant of democratic socialism was above all an egalitarian ideology. "The more that I have thought about the morality of politics," wrote Manley, "the more there has emerged for me a single touchstone of right and wrong; and the touchstone is to be found in the notion of equality" (1974, p. 10). He saw egalitarianism as "the enduring moral basis for social organization" (1974, p. 51). The Manley Government named equality as one of its basic principles: "We reaffirm the belief in the equality of every human being before God, the Government and the law and, therefore, of the right of every human being to equality of opportunity, equality of rights and entitlement to security and social justice" (Agency for Public Information n.d., p. 4). The People's National Party offered a similar view as one of the principles of democratic socialism (1979, p. 10). Manley frequently used the

analogy of parental care to illustrate the equal consideration and respect with which he felt the state should treat its citizens; in his view "a society is egalitarian when every single member feels instinctively, unhesitatingly and unreservedly that his or her essential worth is recognized and that there is a foundation of rights upon which his or her interests can safely rest" (1974, p. 38).

The principle of equality is the fundamental component in the concept of social justice, even if, as Frankena (1962) suggests, it may not be sufficient to cover all its constituent notions. Manley had a theory of social justice and his beliefs about equality were at the core of that conception:

> One then, might summarize social justice as being concerned with the organization of access. There must be equal access to jobs, to food, clothing and shelter; to social security; to the decision-making process; to the sense of belonging and being of equal value; to creative leisure; to the processes and remedies of the law and to education (1974, p. 60).

Manley was chiefly interested in the equal distribution of access to resources. It is by sharing equal access to resources, he believed, that the member comes to believe that his equal claim upon the polity is taken seriously, and that his right to equal consideration and respect is recognized.

Freedom, the second fundamental principle of democratic socialism, was less emphasized than equality. In this, the Jamaican democratic socialists followed the general socialist tendency. The following rather obscure view of freedom was attributed to Norman Manley: "Freedom is the expression of the creative in life. It is neither an inherent right nor a hard won value. It is a law of being, lacking

which there would be no evolution, no progress, no civilization, only primal chaos set in permanence" (Manley 1974, epigraph). The Manley Government claimed it wanted to pursue its goals "within the framework of free institutions" (Agency for Public Information n.d., p. 4). Manley argued that after the demands of equality are met, "Individual liberty ceases to be a petulant distraction and becomes the extent to which all men may pursue their creative potential within the framework of social survival" (1974, p. 18). His preference for multi-party politics, which will shortly be discussed, was defended on the grounds that it preserved liberty and the right to dissent. Of all the freedoms, the freedom to participate in political life was probably the one most widely and explicitly advocated. There are, of course, important connections between political freedom and other kinds of freedom.

Much was also said about freedom from exploitation, from external (foreign) interference and control, and from the obstacles to freedom of action imposed by poverty. The freedom to develop individual, creative potential was emphasized. But the exercise of freedom was seen as subject to the constraints of national goals, and these national goals were, of course, seen as the goals of democratic socialism.

The cooperative ethic was also seen as an important component of democratic socialist morality. Socialists often defend cooperation on moral as well as economic grounds. The Manley Government claimed that "cooperation is the basic method by which a society should be organized and that it is our duty to seek to replace the system of human exploitation with a system of human cooperation" (Agency for Public Information n.d., p. 4). I have already mentioned that the encouragement of "the principles of socialist morality based on fra-

ternal relations and co-operation" was seen as one of the tasks of "ideological struggle" (People's National Party 1979, pp. 16-17). Manley tried to identify those forces in the society which worked against, and those which encouraged cooperation. Colonialism, he argued, is necessarily divisive. Those who are ruled compete with each other for the favours of the rulers. Those who rule reward those who are ruled primarily in order to secure their acquiescence. The ruled unite only in order to overthrow their rulers. But in their struggles to survive, Jamaicans had nevertheless succeeded in developing a number of cooperative practices. He saw this as evidence that there was already a social basis for the development of a co-operative approach to national problems (1974, pp. 150-151).

It is easy to understand why socialist rationalism is likely to be attractive in a Third World context. The idea that a society can be improved through conscious, rational organization is attractive not only because it promises a better way of life, but because it offers an appealing way of restoring lost dignity. Rationalism suggests that there are political ways of doing things which are acceptable to all rational beings. Oakeshott's (1962) practical political knowledge born of experience, assuming it exists, is likely to be seen as the knowledge which has been used against the colonized society, and which has produced the very results which are now in need of change. Furthermore, it is knowledge which cannot be explained, which can only be acquired through trustful apprenticeship and association, neither of which are attractive prospects to those who have been colonized. Rationalism, however, suggests that rational, universalizable discourse between human equals is possible in the sphere of politics. It is as

a free rational being that the ex-colonial seeks the restoration or the creation of values. The appeal of rationalism is the appeal of the values and powers of the intellect, and these are not the kinds of values which are fostered under colonialism. But the values of the intellect are central to what it means to be human. They are therefore seen as central to the humanizing task of post-colonial reconstruction.

In Jamaica the ideal of self-reliance was also invoked as an important ingredient in this process of rationalist reconstruction. Against the background of a long period of colonial dependency -- some three hundred years in the case of Jamaica -- the notion of self-reliance takes on a special significance. According to Manley, "the first task that a post-colonial society must tackle is the development of a strategy designed to replace the psychology of dependence with the spirit of individual and collective self-reliance" (1974, p. 23). Manley observed that "In the immediate post-colonial period, a country may not have any single event in its history to which it can point with unqualified pride. Apart from the attainment of independence itself, it is in the nature of colonialism that it affords few opportunities for self-congratulation" (1974, p. 50). Self-reliance is necessary to develop confidence and remove self-doubt. The notion of 'self' has to be given individual as well as collective meaning. In Manley's view,

> The great challenge in a society like Jamaica is how
> to develop this sense of personal responsibility, for
> one's development subject only to the proviso: I am my
> brother's keeper. The lack of this spirit is the most
> difficult of the legacies of our past to undo. But our
> success here will determine whether anything else is
> possible (1974, p. 45).

Manley believed that when a society has little in its history to admire, government helps to advance the spirit of self-reliance by presenting

it with exceptional challenges for future accomplishment. It was the aim of democratic socialism to present such challenges.

Manley emphasized his view of socialism as "strategy" (n.d., p. 17) and he summarized the overall strategy as follows:

> The strategy of change must ... operate at the psycho-
> logical and attitudinal level which involves a concept
> of mass education; at the structural level which involves
> a concept of social and economic organization; at a politi-
> cal level which involves a concept of mobilization; and it
> must envisage the problems of transition which involves a
> capacity for tactical accommodation (1974, p. 66).

It was a strategy which attempted a fundamental restructuring of the economy; adjustments in foreign policy; as well as changes in the roles of the basic institutions and groups which make up the society.

The doctrine of public ownership of the basic means of production, distribution and exchange was generally endorsed. It was one of its chief roles, the Manley Government believed, to "supervise the running of the economy, by a combination of direct ownership, control by parti-cipation, regulatory machinery and by creation of appropriate incentives and opportunities" (Agency for Public Information n.d., p. 3). The People's National Party proposed

> The development of a dominant public sector in which the
> State owns and/or controls the commanding heights of the
> economy (i.e. mineral resources (e.g. bauxite and gypsum),
> strategic industries and enterprises (e.g. alumina,
> cement and sugar), public utilities, financial institu-
> tions and foreign trade... (1979, pp. 27-28).

Manley carefully distinguished between ownership and control, and con-tended that

> The Jamaican economy must grow and distribute its pro-
> ceeds equitably. To do this its system of ownership must
> be consistent with national objectives and its resources
> must be controlled to ensure that they are used to the
> full and in a manner consistent with social justice
> (1974, p. 78).

In accordance with the general democratic socialist approach, there was an expressed preference for a mixed economy. The Manley Government believed that "Jamaica will flourish best under a mixed economy in which there is a clear and honourable role for responsible private business working in partnership with the public sector of the economy" (Agency for Public Information n.d., p. 4). The People's National Party, while advocating that the state should own the commanding heights of the economy, also contended that "Every socialist economy (even the most advanced) retains areas of private enterprise. It is our policy to encourage efficient and socially responsible private enterprise" (1979, p. 29). Manley envisioned "an economy with a public, a private, a small business and a co-operative sector" (1974, p. 121).

The Manley Government attempted or proposed programmes of the following kind: direct ownership of a number of important companies; participation in others through the ownership of shares; and increased regulation of the operations of others. It was part of its function, it believed, to use incentives to encourage the development of businesses in what were regarded as priority areas, and to undertake pioneering work of its own in some of these spheres; to develop cooperatives; and to salvage companies in difficulty. These were combined with extensive Government involvement in education (including adult literacy), housing and nutrition; the development of mineral resources; as well as greater supervision and control of financial institutions (Agency for Public Information n.d., p. 3).

<center>III</center>

The Jamaican democratic socialists also saw their variant of socialism as a democratic ideology. They took the standard positions on democracy in the economic and social domains. While they regarded political democracy as an important starting point, they believed that it was by itself insufficient. Political equality, they believed, should be combined with economic and social equality.

The People's National Party defended the right of people to exercise control over the economy as a fundamental right (1979, p. 9). It claimed that the economy should be controlled by the working people. This control should be exercised directly, or indirectly through state representation, and it should be exercised in the private as well as in the public sector (1979, p. 26).

The ideal of social equality was an important part of the quest for an egalitarian and just society. There was a need, in Manley's view, "to dismantle the apparatus of privilege" (1974, p. 37). By 'the apparatus of privilege' he meant the special influence and status long enjoyed by the plantocracy and the merchant intermediaries created by colonialism. The abolition of class divisions and the advancement of sexual equality were among the ideals most widely avowed.

Jamaican democratic socialists also opted for parliamentary democracy. The People's National Party rejected a class interpretation of democracy and urged "the alliance of classes around clear objectives" (1979, p. 66). Manley saw the individual as the basic social unit and rejected social holism (1974, p. 52). The Manley Government claimed that it had "faith in the democratic system and the right of all

Jamaicans to form or join any political party they wish" (Agency for Public Information n.d., p. 4). The People's National Party included among its principles of democratic socialism, "The right of every Jamaican to form or join any political party of his/her choice, and to compete for state power in democratically contested elections" (1979, p. 10). Manley claimed that "the democratic system which places proper emphasis on the libertarian spirit is the political method which, wisely handled, is the most likely to supply the context within which men can achieve the best that is within themselves" (1974, p. 32). He also defended multi-party democracy as "a natural sociological tendency" of Jamaica (1974, pp. 27-28).

But there was also a yearning, it seems, after the ideal of a 'general will' democracy capable of national consensus. Manley saw the politics of mass mobilization as an important part of his strategy of change (1974, p. 66). The People's National Party wished, as part of this process of mobilization, to bring about "The deepening of the democratic process so that the collective wisdom and experience of the Jamaican working people can become the decisive factor in the decision-making process at all levels" (1979, p. 11). But there were reservations about whether this could be done through the institutions of multi-party democracy.

MacPherson believes that there is a tendency towards general will democracies in the countries of the Third World. These approaches are not only pre-liberal, he suggests, they are also closer than other conceptions to the original view of democracy as rule by or on behalf of the poor and the oppressed. These countries, in their search for their own solutions, often reject liberal as well as marxist views of democracy

(1965, pp. 23-34).

Manley believed that mass mobilization could be achieved through the existing institutions of Jamaican parliamentary democracy. He believed that the politics of participation -- a key notion in his conception of democracy -- could be achieved if government became more responsive to members of the polity and to leaders of institutions; if it decentralized its operations; and if it expressed the will of the political party which provided its main support. "Just as a one-party state can mobilize by abolishing dissent," he wrote, "equally, I suggest, multi-party democracy can mobilize by abolishing remoteness" (1974, p. 67). Manley believed that the old wine of the original conception of democracy could be put into the new wineskins of liberal democratic institutions.

IV

The Jamaican exponents of democratic socialism sought a man-as-worker view of social and political organization which would liberate the Jamaican personality by releasing creative working energy, and which would mobilize this working potential towards post-colonial reconstruction. The socialist route was promoted as a morally defensible alternative to past experience, as well as to existing contemporary options. Socialism was also advocated as a social and economic technique uniquely designed to bring just societies into being.

The mode of advocacy employed also had its mythic dimension. A political myth, according to Tudor (1972), is a story told about a particular people; it is a way of giving intelligibility and coherence to

their collective experience, and it is intended to function as a practical
argument. The Jamaican democratic socialists had an account of the
Jamaican story. In this story, the protaganists are the poor and the
oppressed of the society. The story has a beginning, a middle and an
end. It was offered as a way of making sense of the Jamaican experience,
and as a practical argument in support of the proposals of democratic
socialism.

The Jamaican story, according to the People's National Party, began
with the Arawaks, a people who "organized their society on simple communal
principles" (1979, p. 7). With the arrival of colonialism and capitalism,
both based on the exploitation of man by man, this 'socialist' society
was destroyed and replaced by slavery and the plantation system. After
the abolition of slavery, both colonialism and capitalism remained.
Capitalism became more advanced, but retained the exploitation which is
an essential part of its character. But all along there were those who,
on behalf of their fellow poor and oppressed, resisted these evils, and
the People's National Party is part of this tradition of resistance:

> Our party is the heir to and the torchbearers of, the fine
> revolutionary traditions of our people begun by Nanny,
> Tacky and Sam Sharpe in the struggle against slavery; con-
> tinued by Bogle and Gordon in the struggle for land against
> the plantocracy; continued by Garvey for national libera-
> tion, racial dignity and international solidarity of
> oppressed people; continued by A.G.S. Coombs, St. William
> Grant and Alexander Bustamante along with others, for the
> rights of the working people, and continued by Norman
> Manley and the other Founding Fathers and Mothers of the
> P.N.P. for the consolidation of these rights in the struggle
> for national democracy and socialism (1979, p. 1).

The primordial socialist spirit of the paradise lost in the destruction
of Arawak society, is to be regained and brought to fruition through the
modern ideology of democratic socialism.

<u>V</u>

Manley saw education as a central part of his strategy of change and he made it an important part of his deliberations. It was the strategy intended to function at "the psychological and attitudinal level" (1974, p. 66). Guided by the notion of "education for change," the Ministry of Education tried to devise an educational policy which it hoped would bring about the envisioned society (1977, p. 5).

I shall focus on three of the issues considered: (1) deciding on how to bring education to bear on the problem of attitudes to work in the society; (2) the problem of deciding on the kind of school system most suitable to the pursuit of egalitarian objectives; and (3) the problem of deciding whether or not political education should be a part of formal education in Jamaica. All three were rooted in the Manley Government's ideological policy. But they are also, in my view, three of the central issues in Jamaican educational philosophy. They are enduring issues which were re-awakened, re-interpreted, and answered anew during the ideological ferment of democratic socialism. It was a period during which fundamental questions were re-vitalized, and for this reason it will probably be remembered as an important one in the history of Jamaican educational thought.

Work is one of the central concepts in any culture. For this reason, preparation for work is generally seen as one of the chief ends of the educational enterprise. But there are problems in deciding on the relations which should hold between the two.

Work is widely regarded as one of the especially problematic areas of Jamaican society and culture. Slavery and colonization, it is said,

distorted people's conception of the working life. But the goals of nation building, modernization, and the creation of a better society, ultimately depend on the widespread existence, in the society, of the appropriate attitudes to work. But what should these attitudes be, and what should schools do to encourage their development?

Egalitarian ideology is understandable in a society in which inequality has long been a cardinal assumption and a fact of historical and social experience. Democratic socialism brought a new intensity to the attack on elitism and on the bearing of egalitarian ideals on educational policy. But how is egalitarian ideology to be brought to bear on the organization of the society's educational arrangements?

The development of political consciousness is one of the central challenges in emerging societies like Jamaica. The quality of political life, and all that depends on the nature of this life, rests on the extent to which those who leave school are prepared for the life of the polis. The relation between education and the life of the democratic state is well described by Tussman:

> A body politic which gives to each of its members a share
> in the governing process rests its fate upon the quality
> of participation. It commits itself not only to universal
> education but to education of a special character; not only
> to education for the private life but to education for the
> public role (1960, p. v).

The term 'political education' was an important one in the vocabulary of the Jamaican variant of democratic socialism. This interest in political education has its origin partly in the general socialist outlook, and partly in the democratic socialist reliance on persuasion as a substitute for revolutionary violence. In the Jamaican context it naturally became linked with the idea of politicization as part of the

process of decolonization and development.

But the idea of political education has also acquired sinister associations. This is especially the case when it is linked with the notion of ideology. Given the many objections which may be advanced against it, should the idea of political education be taken seriously by Jamaican schools?

I shall now turn to a more detailed examination of these questions. In each case the ideological dimensions of the issue will be explored, and the democratic socialist answers given to the questions will be critically appraised. I shall also offer and defend a position on each of the issues considered.

CHAPTER FOUR

EDUCATION AND THE IDEOLOGY OF WORK

The pathologies of work, to borrow an apt phrase from Thomas Green (1978), are a striking feature of Jamaican society. Work, we may say, is infected by disorders and diseases of various kinds inherited, scholars never tire in saying, from slavery and colonialism and, socialists add, from capitalism as well. Manley goes as far as to say that "Jamaica has never had a period of its history in which it has accepted the work ethic." There is in Jamaica, he thinks, something of a "neurotic attitude" towards work which he sees as a major obstacle to development (1974, pp. 152-153). The good reputation enjoyed by Jamaican workers overseas suggests that the causes are to be found in the nature of the society itself. In Manley's view, the negative attitudes to work in Jamaica are a reflection of its "internal social tensions" caused chiefly by its inegalitarian social structure:

> It is a brutal society that would condemn a man both to
> dirty work and to the feeling that the work itself be-
> littles the man. Yet this is the sort of social distor-
> tion to which we are condemned by the acquired attitudes
> and values of class-stratified elitist social forms
> (1974, p. 47).

But it is not a peculiarly Jamaican condition. Farrell (1979) who has studied the problem of work in the region, sees it as a characteristic of virtually all Caribbean societies.

This unhealthy state of work has found expression in the literature of the area. I can think of three examples. Orlando Patterson (1967), the Jamaican sociologist and novelist, entitled one of his novels An

absence of ruins. We think of ruins as the artifacts of civilization, as surviving evidence of productive work, and their absence may be interpreted as signifying the absence of both. But when we know that labour has been a dominant feature of the history of the society -- as we know in the case of Jamaica -- the absence of ruins suggests a tragic futility. It is not true, however, that ruins and artifacts of civilization are not to be found in Jamaica. What worries Patterson, it seems, is that these are largely the artifacts of a colonizing civilization, and not really the creations of the people whose labour went into producing them. In the second example, this absence of creativity is seen as a reason for denying the very existence of history. "History is built around achievement and creation;" writes V.S. Naipaul, the Trinidadian novelist, "and nothing was created in the West Indies" (1962, p. 29). This is part of Naipaul's pessimism about the prospects of the many 'half-made' societies brought into being by colonialism; Jamaican society, for example, was literally created by colonialism. The third example comes from Edward Brathwaite the Barbadian poet:

> For we
> who have cre
> ated nothing,
> must exist
>
> on nothing;
> (1967, p. 80).

It can be argued that these are excessively bleak views of the consequences of human effort in the Caribbean. But even if they overstate the case, and I think they do, they seem to me to be important reflections on what is at bottom the problem of work.

The problem, in Manley's view, is that a brutal social system has been

largely responsible for a widespread perversion of attitudes to work and
that these attitudes hinder national development. For Patterson, Naipaul
and Braithwaite, the problem is that work has not resulted in an enduring,
self-created and nurturing culture. Farrell mentions a number of specific
problems: people do not work enough; productivity is low; people seem
to lack pride in what they do; and there is an excessive distaste and
contempt for manual work.

In short, it may be said that Jamaica is without an adequate ideology
of work. An ideology of work, according to my account of ideology, is
a set of shared, action-directing beliefs by which people make sense of
working experience, and which they bring to bear on problematic aspects
of that experience. Ideologies of work may be secular as well as relig-
ious. The beliefs they contain are often moral ones and this is re-
flected, for example, in the expression 'work ethic'. An ideology of
work explains and justifies work; it tries to give intelligibility, co-
herence, order and meaning to the experience of work.

The Jamaican democratic socialists tried to bring the socialist
ideology of work to bear on the problem of work in Jamaican society.
This ideology, they believed, would satisfy the existing ideological
need by giving Jamaicans a satisfactory way of interpreting their his-
torical as well as contemporary working experience. They did not, as
far as I know, explicitly bring Marx's account of alienation to bear
on analysis of the condition of enslavement and colonization in
Jamaica. But they obviously believed that by elevating man as a worker,
and by stressing collectivistic altruism, the socialist ideology of
work provided a morally defensible alternative to the work pathologies
of the past as well as of the present. In their view, the socialist

approach was the answer to those factors which had paralysed the will to work. It put work on the moral foundations it previously lacked. Socialist moralism, they believed, would cure the society of the pathologies of work by animating it into the therapeutic, self-transforming and creative activities of social renewal.

It is necessary to distinguish between social and political ideologies of work. An ideology of work may be chiefly a social ideology, an historically acquired way by which a society has customarily justified, regulated, and given point to the working lives of its members. But an ideology of work is a political ideology if it is the ideology of a government or a political party. The marxist ideology of work, for example, is officially espoused by the governments of the Soviet Union, China and Cuba; most western governments espouse capitalist ideologies of work.

There may be important relations between an ideology of work and the political and non-political domains. A social ideology of work may be reflected in a society's political system. A society may, for example, use its political system to democratically legitimize, protect and advance its outlook on work. But an ideology of work may also have its origin in those who control the political system, and be promoted, with varying degrees of success, through the institutions of that system. It could become what Anthony calls an "ideology of management" (1977, p. 3); in his view, ideologies of work chiefly promote managerial self-interest.

In Jamaica, it is debatable how far the democratic socialist ideology of work reflected existing, and perhaps latent, ideologies of work in the society. The Manley Government announced its revival of democratic

socialist ideology two years after it was elected to office. Of course, only empirical studies can reveal what Jamaicans actually believe about work. But it seems reasonable to believe that the Jamaican case was mainly an example of the second kind of relation. The democratic socialist ideology of work was an ideology espoused by a government which also believed it should control the main sectors of the economy, and hence the working lives of people engaged in the main economic ventures in the society. In such circumstances, an ideology of work may be seen as a way of stimulating support for the kind of economic leadership which, it will be recalled, MacPherson (1969) suggests is often of special importance in underdeveloped societies. While the possibility of the entry of the kind of manipulative self-interest which Anthony discusses cannot be excluded, the programme which the Jamaican democratic socialists undertook may also be seen as a well-intentioned attempt at finding a political remedy for what they saw as an ideological defect in the society.

Education was seen as an important part of the search for a solution to the problems of work, and of the quest for a healthy condition of work in Jamaican society. The Manley Government made the exploration of the relations between education and work one of the priorities of its educational policy. The Ministry of Education claimed it wished to "develop, implement and expand productive work programmes at the primary and secondary stages as an essential part of school activities" (1977, p. 2). The People's National Party presented, as one of its educational goals, the wish to develop "a patriotic commitment to work as the basis of national viability and progress and a sense of the value of all forms of work by the development of the work-study method of education" (1979, p. 43).

In Manley's view, "one must strive consciously to create a general accept-
ance of the work ethic as both a means to personal satisfaction and the
personal investment that each man must make in the progress to which he
is committed by his ambition" (1974, p. 145). He used strong language
to describe what he felt education should try to do about attitudes to
work: "the educational process must be designed to incorporate an early
indoctrination of all children to accept the inherent worth of all types
of work" (1974, p. 47).

The nearby Cuban experiment in using the school as an instrument
of social reform exerted some influence. According to Castro, "Revolu-
tion and education are the same thing" (quoted in Bowles 1971, p 472).
This belief led to a radical reconstruction of the Cuban educational
system. The Cubans aimed at a society of student-workers and worker-
students. The school was taken to the workplace and the economic, pro-
ductive life of the society was integrated into the activities of the
school. Students spend part of each day in discussions and part learn-
ing practical skills on farms and workshops. As part of a programme
of cultural and technical exchange between the Cuban and Jamaican
governments, the Cuban Government donated and built an example of its
work-study schools in Jamaica. This school was intended as a pioneer-
ing, experimental model to be studied with a view to future expansion
of this approach to schooling.

Socialists, in their elevation of work, are reluctant to elevate
some forms of work above others. Consequently, socialist educators
customarily attack the distinction between manual and intellectual
labour. The denigration of manual labour is ancient, and perhaps uni-
versal. Plato, for example, who believed in the superiority of intel-

lectual labour, put it this way:

> Why, again, is mechanical toil discredited as debasing?
> It is not simply when the highest thing in a man's nature
> is so weak that it cannot control the animal parts but
> can only learn how to pamper them? (1967, BK IX, 590).

Socialists, however, object to this kind of evaluative distinction between manual and intellectual activities.

The socialist critique of the distinction between manual and intellectual labour may be based on monistic views of the nature of body and mind. But the distinction may also be regarded as objectionable because of its social and educational implications. As an evaluative distinction which usually ranks intellectual labour above manual labour, it leads to a discriminatory distinction between manual and intellectual workers, and between the manual and intellectual tasks necessary for social living. The emancipation of human nature, and the emergence of the 'new socialist man' requires the even development of human potential, and this development is possible only if manual and intellectual competencies are allowed to develop without fear of discriminatory regard.

Keith, who writes from a marxist perspective, believes that an educational policy based on a critique of the distinction between manual and intellectual labour should be pursued in the Jamaican context, and wishes that the Manley Government had made this a part of its educational policy. According to Keith, the colonial period in Jamaica set up "rigid barriers" between manual and intellectual labour. Keith believes that it is through "the re-unification of theory and practice in the educational system" that these barriers can be removed (1978, p. 51).

I am not aware that the Jamaican democratic socialists ever used the terminology of this distinction in expressing their point of view.

But they endorsed the view that all forms of work have value, and that, in Manley's phrase, they all possess "inherent worth" (1974, p. 47). The Ministry of Education tried to justify its work-study policy on the grounds that it was a way of balancing academic and practical development, forming positive attitudes to physical work, preparing students for the adult working world, giving students a sense of "direct involvement" in economic production, and developing artistic abilities (1977, pp. 7-8).

I believe the Jamaican democratic socialists made a valuable contribution to Jamaican public consciousness by raising the issue of work as a problematic area of Jamaican society and culture, and in trying to bring educational policy to bear on the possibility of finding solutions. Work is a central concept in human life. It is also the primary moving force of social reform. The improvement of the quality of working life is itself an important ideal of social and political organization. To a large extent, social reform is work improving the conditions and quality of its own performance.

But I think that as it stands, the doctrine concerning the value and inherent worth of all forms of work is an inadequate basis for educational policy and is in need of qualification and development. It is silent, for example, on the qualitative variation which is possible in the domain of work. Not all forms of work advance all, or even most of the worker's interests. For many people work is a violent and sometimes physically and psychologically destructive experience. There are also forms of work which cause social harm by injuring others. An uncritical idealization of all forms of work commits one to the unacceptable view that work is of value even if it is dehumanizing. A policy

of work-education, in my view, should not be indifferent to the question
of what is to be regarded as desirable work.

It is not clear what is to be understood by the claim about the in-
herent value of all forms of work. If it is taken to mean that all forms
of work give, or can give intrinsic satisfaction, it is easily falsified
by the experience of the many people for whom work is a painful ordeal,
made endurable only because it is viewed as an instrument which may bring
about other forms of satisfaction. Wollheim suggests, plausibly, I
think, that the socialist view of work has its basis in the fact that
intellectuals, who have contributed importantly to the development of
socialist thought, tend to "assimilate ordinary work to intellectual
work"; they incline to the mistaken view that all forms of work can give
the same kind of satisfaction that they themselves derive from intellec-
tual activity (1961a, p. 28). It is misleading to make general claims
about the possibility of finding intrinsic satisfaction in all forms of
work.

It is commonly believed, although the reasons are not always
explicitly stated, that a non-working state is a condition of moral
danger, or even moral turpitude. To those who hold this view, a non-
working state is not idyllic. In their view, a non-working condition
is never defensible except as restful reward for work. This view
easily leads to an idealization of the working condition, to attempts at
forming pure, pristine conceptions of it, and to abstract and unclear
claims about its inherent worth. But it is by its consequences for
the individual and society -- personal development, social utility, and
so on -- that the worth of work is determined. The doctrine concerning
the inherent worth of all forms of work is, in my view, a false one.

Work is usually evaluated according to educational, social, economic or moral criteria. It is of educational value, for example, if it contributes to the psychological, intellectual and spiritual development of the worker. The development of a policy of work-education requires inquiry into the ways in which work may advance these kinds of personal development; it needs to explore not only the notion of education for work, but of education through work. There is also need for inquiry into the links which can or ought to be established between work-education and specific ideals of social and economic development. Some forms of work are also morally more defensible than others. Work-education needs to be carried on in the context of discussion of questions concerning conceptions of the good life, and of the moral status of working actions.

The concept of work is, of course, rich and varied. This variety is partly reflected in the number of distinctions which it allows: manual and intellectual, skilled and unskilled, productive and unproductive, and so on. A policy of work-education may benefit from inquiry into the many components which constitute the concept of work.

In what follows, I shall give an account of one of the distinctions which the concept allows: that between what I shall later call Labour and Work. I shall try to show that it is a distinction which is especially illuminating in the Jamaican context. The distinction I have in mind is suggested by, but is not identical with that which Arendt (1958) draws between the _animal laborans_ and _homo faber_. To a large extent, the terms 'labour' and 'work' are inter-changeable in ordinary usage. But there are some uses of the terms which do not overlap, and my account is informed by a number of instances in which they may not, with-

out qualification, be substituted for each other. The claim is not that the terms refer to ontologically distinct classes of human actions, but that they are two concepts of work; they are two ways in which a worker might view his actions. After giving an account of the distinction, I shall use it to interpret aspects of Jamaican working experience. Following this, I shall suggest some ways in which it can be brought to bear on education, and I shall offer a defence of its suitability as a basis for educational policy.

II

The main use of the word 'labour' that I know about that may not be substituted for 'work' is its use to refer to the period and the activity of giving birth. While 'work' may, sometimes with qualification, be substituted for 'labour' on most, and perhaps all other occasions, there is nevertheless a tendency to use 'labour' and not 'work' in certain contexts. It is used to refer to especially painful, distressing or burdensome activities. Economists use it as a general term to refer to human power; labour is the human input into production and is distinguished from land and capital. There is also a tendency to use it to refer to bodily and unskilled activities, especially those associated with agriculture.

Two faces of labour may be noted. The first is its link with the body and its power, and especially with its productive, regenerative power. The second is its association with pain, toil and trouble.

Labour is linked with man's biological nature. It is linked with a condition which, to some degree, man shares with the nonhuman animals.

This fact tends to evoke two main responses. It may be regarded as itself a defect, a pathology of the human condition; it is something to be escaped. The Balinese, it is said, have such a horror of their animal nature they will not allow their babies to crawl. In the Judeo-Christian tradition man is viewed as being somehow above nature, and it is believed that he will eventually be released from it. In the meantime he makes a temporary rapprochement with natural demands. Until he shakes off the mortal yoke, labour is a curse to be endured with patience and discipline. He will eventually be nourished by higher things, but in the meantime it is by the sweat of his brow that he eats bread. That is the source of the ideology of the puritan ethic.

Another response is to view labour as an indication of man's vital, ecological link with the natural world. Man is inescapably a part of this natural world and the link cannot be broken; indeed attempts at breaking it can lead only to disaster. Man's survival depends on the establishment and the maintenance of a continuous, holistic harmony with the sources of his regeneration which are themselves an integral part of what he is. Labour is not an indication of a defect in the human condition. The condition which it reveals is permanent and desirable. It is a sign of man's enduring link with the cosmos.

But 'labour' is also used to refer to those activities which are especially painful, arduous, or burdensome. Pence, who ranks labour at the bottom of a tripartite heirarchy of work consisting of labour, workmanship and callings, uses 'labour' to refer to all unpleasant kinds of work. In his view,

> Laboring is generally: (1) repetitious; (2) not intrinsically satisfying; (3) done out of necessity; labour also involves (4) few higher human facilities, and (5) little choice about how and when the work is done (1978-79, p. 307).

Social organization, in his view, should aim at eliminating labour while advancing workmanship and callings.

Pence offers the foregoing as a set of sufficient conditions for defining labour, but grants rightly, I think, that none of them are necessary conditions. If my claim about the two faces of labour is correct, one inadequacy of Pence's theory is that it includes only one of them. In his wish to eliminate unpleasant activities, Pence overlooks the use of 'labour' to refer to activities linked with the body's productive and regenerative power. In my view there is more to the concept of labour than Pence's analysis suggests.

But the fact that 'labour' is used to refer to unpleasant activities is important, and any theory of labour which does not take this into account is inadequate. The activities of the dualistic view of labour just described are often unpleasant because they are linked with cyclic processes which are not subject to human will. Agricultural activities are linked with the seasons. The need for food is determined by necessity. The activities of labour often restrict freedom of choice; they are linked with what seems to be a continual bondage to natural necessity.

But labour need not be unpleasant; it may also be agreeable and satisfying. The unpleasant nature of labouring activities can sometimes be reduced, and where possible it should be reduced, even if it may be too optimistic to believe they can be entirely eliminated. It is chiefly to the pains associated with the dualistic conception of labour rather than to Pence's view of it that the Judeo-Christian ideal of fortitude is directed.

I shall use the term 'Labour' to refer to those forms of work which

are viewed by the worker chiefly as the means of sustaining his life.
This view takes the link with bodily regeneration into account. It also
admits that these forms of work may be burdensome in that the need to
work to sustain one's life, or the life of one's family, is the kind of
burden which many people would rather do without. But it is not part
of my view that Labour is necessarily burdensome.

Some characteristics of Labour may be noted. Labour may be direct
or indirect. The production of food for one's own consumption is an
example of direct Labour. But one may engage in indirect Labour by in-
directly acquiring the means of sustaining one's life; one can, for
example, acquire the means of obtaining food without directly producing
it. Labour may be manual or intellectual; it may involve the 'higher'
or the 'lower' faculties; it may demand sophisticated or unsophisticated
skills. Labour may be self-regarding or other-regarding, individual or
social. Just as individuals engage in Labour to sustain their own
lives, communities also organize Labour to sustain their collective
existence.

The objects of Labour are usually transient since they are produced
to be consumed. This transience is an important component in Green's
theory:

> This idea that human energy might be spent without any
> result in some durable work is the idea that defines
> the concept of labor. Labor is that kind of activity
> that never ends because it cannot result in any durable
> work itself (1978, p. 213).

In Green's view, labour is an expression of "human futility" (1978,
p. 213). While the notion of transience is a part of my view of Labour,
I do not conclude that its activities are futile because they lead to

transient results. It is partly by virtue of their transience that the objects of Labour achieve their effects. That their transience is often a cause of regret is well-known. But in my view, they are not to be regarded as futile if they succeed in sustaining life.

St. Paul's injunction, "If a man will not work, neither shall he eat" (2 Thess. 3: 7-10), stripped of its threatening tone, is close to my view of Labour. According to Sparshott, the word he uses for work -- ergazomai -- refers specifically to manual labour and husbandry (1973, p. 30). The emphasis, like mine, is on activities linked with bodily regeneration.

There are many conditions, natural as well as non-natural, which may render the activities of Labour ineffective or otherwise unacceptable. Natural processes may hinder Labour, and these are often beyond human control. But the pathologies of Labour may also have ideological sources. For example, the activities of Labour may be rendered ineffective by an ideology of work which encourages the destruction of the environment and the pollution of the earth. The condition of Labour in a society may also be regarded as unacceptable if it is based on an ideology of work which restricts Labour and its burdens to slaves, persons of a certain colour, or women. To a large extent, the quality of Labour in a society depends on the ideological beliefs according to which its activities are directed, and its place and status in the social order explained and justified.

Personal as well as social well-being rest on the foundations of Labour. But Labour is not sufficient for human welfare. Work is also an important human need. It is the superstructure, so to speak, which helps to give point to Labour; it is a way of making the burdens of Labour

endurable.

There are at least three uses of the word 'work' which may not be replaced with 'labour'. There may be others but I think these three are especially instructive. I shall bring all three to bear on the theory of work I wish to propose.

First, it is 'work' and not 'labour' which is used to denote objects, especially those of the fine arts, architecture, engineering, and so on. Expressions like 'works of art', the 'collected works of Dickens', and 'engineering works' designate objects of this kind. This use of 'work', it seems, has been influential in shaping the theories of work advanced by Arendt and Green. Arendt observes that unlike 'labour', 'work' is used to designate the products of human activity (1958, p. 80). According to Arendt, "Work provides an "artificial" world of things, distinctly different from all natural surroundings" (1958, p. 7). This notion of the creation of durable artifice is a central component in Arendt's concept of work. In Green's view, "what is essential to the concept of work itself is the connection between these two elements - the activity and the product or result of that activity" (1978, p. 212). Green, following Arendt, claims that the word 'work' refers to activities as well as the results of these activities, while 'labour' refers only to activities. I can find no counterexamples to this thesis. While he links labour with futility, Green links work with "human potency" (1978, p. 213). It is through work, he believes, that man produces durable results which will be of lasting consequence.

Second, it is 'work' and not 'labour' which is used to denote those activities linked with the institutionalized occupational culture. Some- one is said to be 'at work', 'out of work', 'looking for work', and so

on. To work is to perform some socially instituted role. Work may be for economic gain; it may also be voluntary and unpaid. A certain seriousness -- previously noted -- is attached to the condition of being 'in work'.

Third, it is 'work' and not 'labour' which is used to designate morally or religiously commendable actions. It will be granted that labour may have 'dignity' -- the non-human animals may also have dignity -- but expressions like 'great work' or 'good works' are used to commend outstanding moral actions. Moral or virtuous acts are called 'works' not 'labours'. In some interpretations of Christianity, works are paradigms of human moral excellence, but even so they are only reflections of divine grace and are not sufficient for human redemption.

I shall use the term 'Work' -- I can think of no acceptable alternative -- to refer to those forms of work which are viewed by the worker chiefly as the means of expanding and enriching his life. While it need not be restricted to them, the three uses of work just described bear importantly on this way of viewing human actions. First, the quest for permanence is often an important part of the wish to expand and enrich one's life; thus people often speak of 'making their mark', of making and leaving some enduring impression on human events. The aspect of the quest for permanence which I wish to stress is that it is chiefly by the making of enduring objects that man makes the earth, or some part of it, his home. Work, as Arendt would put it, is a way of housing individual and collective lives. Second, it is usually through some occupational role that one seeks to expand and enrich one's life. To work is usually to have a career or a profession. One may even have a calling. The term has a religious origin but may, as Pence suggests, be

given a secular meaning in the sense that one may think one is called by one's abilities to a particular vocation (1978-79, pp. 307-308). Plato thought of work as doing that for which one is most fitted. Aristotle saw it as realizing one's distinctly human function. Third, if it is assumed, against the tradition of moral skepticism -- Callicles, Thrasymachus, and so on --, that morality is a way of advancing individual and social interests, then moral considerations enter importantly into the conception of Work as a way of expanding and enriching one's life. The activities of Work are part of the process of self-actualization, of trying to do what, in Frankena's phrase, one would choose to do "if one clearly knew what one was about" (1980, p. 94). But Work is also social and hence subject to appraisal according to ideals and institutions of social morality. Without a social dimension Work may become mere self-indulgence. I agree with Armstrong who, in his critique of conventional liberal-democratic views of work, argues that a mature, rather than a childish conception of work encourages the worker to undertake those forms of work which are of benefit to the whole community as well as to himself (1972-73, p. 465).

Work is the exercise of the freedom which Labour makes possible. Work may take a wide variety of forms. The activities of Work are freely chosen and they involve the free development of one's faculties. Work is satisfying in its performance as well as in its consequences. The activities of Work are sources of pride and self-respect.

The pathologies of Work are those conditions which prevent people from viewing their actions as the means of expanding and enlarging their lives. These conditions may be social and economic. An unjust social system -- as Manley noted -- and dehumanizing working environ-

ments are well-known examples. But these pathologies may also have their sources in ideologies of work; they may be encouraged, for example, by an ideology of work which puts the quantity of economic production above general human welfare. In my view, an ideology of work is inadequate if it views the forms of work in society chiefly as economic instrumentalities, and not as the means by which persons may have good lives.

III

Observers of Caribbean politics often comment on the fact that an unusually large number of political parties in the Commonwealth Caribbean, even conservative ones, are called 'labour' parties. This popularity of the word 'labour' in the onomastic vocabulary of Caribbean politics is partly a reflection of the influence of the British Labour Party on the politics of the region. But it may also be seen as an indication of a widespread link between the word, in its general sense, and people's perceptions of themselves. Use of it is politically strategic in circumstances in which most people think of themselves as labourers; it is an effective way of eliciting wide response and identification. The politicisation of the term partly reflects a need to come to grips with, and to achieve recognition for this labouring condition.

But I also wish to suggest that Labour, in my sense of the term, has been one of the especially problematic areas of Jamaican experience. Labour has been problematic in two main ways: (1) there has been an abnormal imbalance between Labour and Work in the society; and (2) Labour has been dislocated from its natural life-sustaining function.

Jamaican society was artificially created by colonialism primarily

to produce agricultural products for the colonizing powers, first Spain, then England. The society was created for the purposes of direct Labour, and historically, most of its forms of work have been of this kind. Ideally, there should be a healthy balance between Labour and Work in a society. But in Jamaica Labour has dwarfed Work, creating an unhealthy imbalance between the two.

But this Labour was not directed chiefly at sustaining the lives of those who engaged in it. The products of Labour were mostly for export, not for the consumption of those who produced them; they consumed what was not considered good enough to be exported. Much of what they consumed was produced marginally outside of the dominant Labour system, or imported from the colonial or other metropolitan centres in exchange for some of what they produced. Jamaica, a fertile land with an excellent climate, still imports most of its food. For a long time, Labour was dislocated from its normal self-sustaining function to an other-sustaining function.

Often unpleasant in ordinary circumstances, the pains of Labour were compounded by their links with slavery. The links of Labour with slavery are ancient. But in Jamaica and other New World societies, and unlike in the ancient world, the activities of Labour were expanded on a massive scale for the purposes of the economic gain of the slave owners. This was another of the ways in which Labour was dislocated from its life-sustaining function. It became chiefly a form of wealth-seeking.

Christianity was introduced to slaves in Jamaica at the end of the eighteenth century. Viewed from their condition of servitude in the activities of other-sustaining Labour, the Judeo-Christian view of

labour as a curse must have seemed, not a remote theological possibility, but a present and convincing reality. The wish to escape the bondage of their circumstances also became the wish to escape the bondage of the activities of Labour; they sought escape from a condition of dual bondage. This tendency still persists in the society. The conviction that a curse of Labour has been lived deeply left its mark, not only on slaves, but also on their sometimes only slightly more fortunate descendants.

One of the chief challenges facing Jamaican society is how to restore Labour to its natural life-sustaining function. The aim of self-suffic-iency in food is a goal of Labour. The tendency to abandon Labour, how-ever understandable, undermines the regenerative, ecological foundations of the society. Jamaica is a society still in search of a respectful and sustaining link with the natural environment which is to be the home of its people.

IV

The preponderance of Labour in Jamaican society has hindered the development of Work. By producing chiefly transient objects, Labour led to the absence of ruins lamented by Patterson (1967). Forced Labour absorbed most of the society's energies and allowed few opportunities for Work; Labour left little energy for the expression of the creativity with which, according to Naipaul (1962), history is made. The tendency to identify Labour with Work, itself problematic, must have been especially easy in a situation in which there was so little Work to provide a con-trast with the overwhelming presence of Labour. The concept of Work is

more easily developed in situations in which there are examples of it in evidence.

For a long period, the only models of Work available were those brought by the colonists. They were, of course, chiefly interested in Labour, but they needed some Work to help them endure the long periods of sojourn from the life of Work in their homelands. For those born into the condition of colonization, Work inevitably begins as imitation of what is perceived as such in their surroundings, or what it is believed the colonists do as Work in their home countries. Transplanted peoples often lose touch with the Work of their ancestral societies. Many Jamaicans of African descent, for example, are still unaware that their ancestors produced Work of any kind; in their view they are, and have always been, a people of Labour. The imitation of colonial Work, valuable as a starting point, can itself become a pathology if it is not transformed into creative, self-actualizing expression.

There are important links between rootlessness and Work as the making of durable home-making artifice. Rootlessness may be a cause of the absence of Work. At the same time, Work is itself a cure for rootlessness. There is a need in Jamaica to resolve this somewhat paradoxical relation between the two.

Rootlessness is a familiar theme in Jamaican literature and music, and indeed in the artistic expression of the region as a whole. This rootlessness obviously has its origin in the fact that for the majority of the population, Jamaica was not, at the outset, a chosen place of habitation. It was literally a dungeon to which they were condemned. Work has lacked the will and energies of a settler tradition. Centuries of colonization during which they regarded a land other than that of

their historical origin as their 'mother country' merely compounded this sense of rootlessness and alienation. Unlike their counterparts elsewhere in the Americas, not even the colonists regarded Jamaica as their home; for them it was a temporary abode while they pursued the wealth which would be taken back to their real homes. Consequently the belief that Jamaica is the home of anyone -- except perhaps of the unfortunate Arawaks who were completely annihilated by the colonists -- has never been a deeply embedded aspect of the Jamaican world-view. The tendency to think of home as somewhere else -- Europe, Africa, India, China, or elsewhere -- seems to be an important part of the Jamaican mind. Rastafarianism is, of course, the chief expression of this sense of estrangement. But the Rastafarian may also be viewed as an important symbol of the Jamaican consciousness, and this probably partly explains the mixture of fascination and horror with which he is viewed by so many of his countrymen: somebody like him lurks near the surface of the lives of a great many people.

The Rastafarian has long been stereotyped, denigratingly, as a non-worker. But part of his criticism of the society -- and this is among his reasons for rejecting it -- is that it is one which hinders and frustrates Work, and hence restricts his human development. His anticipated alternative is that Work as home-making activity has to be done in Africa. Jamaicans are a migratory people and many have similar views of other parts of the world. Yet it is probably significant that Rastafarians have, in recent times, taken to being chiefly craftsmen, artists and musicians, and thus to producing what may be regarded as the paradigms of Work as home-making artifice. Works of art and other artifacts actualize as well as symbolize the process by which people

try to make a place their home. Whatever else it may be, Rastafarianism is also a search for Work, and for a place to be furnished with its objects.

One of the main challenges of post-colonial reconstruction, is how to create an occupational culture as an alternative to that which colonialism created to serve its own interests. Except to the extent to which it serves their own purposes, colonists are seldom interested in expanding and enriching the lives of the people who perform the roles of the colonial system. The political and economic successors of the colonists do not themselves always regard these as the priorities of social reform.

Manley opted for the occupational culture of industrial modernization. In his view, "Architects, engineers of all types, cost accountants, statisticians, computer analysts, radiologists, research scientists, soil chemists, agronomists, farm managers, business administrators: these are the kinds of skilled personnel indispensable to a modern economy" (1974, p. 142). But it may also be the case that to choose industrialization is also to choose much of the dehumanization associated with it. It was partly this realization which led Fanon (1963) to optimistically urge Third World leaders to seek new forms of humanism as alternatives to what he saw as the defects of European civilization. Countries like Jamaica, which are in search of the restoration of values, cannot risk losing them in too hasty imitation of the industralized world. The concept of Work has to be examined in the light of what is to be understood by notions like underdevelopment and development, and societies like Jamaica have to give their own answers to what they take these terms to mean.

The most notable expression, perhaps, of the Manley Government's
wish to place work at the centre of the idea of national solidarity and
social renewal, may be found in the Labour Day programme. After assum-
ing office, the Manley Government suggested that on Labour Day, voluntary
work on socially useful community projects should be substituted for
the customary marches by the two major political parties. These marches
traditionally commemorated the labour uprisings of 1938 which led to
the formation of the trade union movement, the founding of the main
political parties, and the birth of modern Jamaican political history.
A national committee was set up to co-ordinate these Labour Day projects.
The idea was enthusiastically received, indicating, perhaps, the exis-
tence of a widely based willingness among Jamaicans to view work as
nationalistic, altruistic action. The slogan "Put Work into Labour Day"
was used to promote the programme. In the language of my own account
of these terms, the slogan could also be interpreted as an appeal to
correct the imbalance between Labour and Work, and as a call for more
collective home-making Work in the society.

V

To be educated for Labour is to be educated for the most fundamental
of activities: it is to be educated into the direct or indirect means
of sustaining one's life, as well as the lives of others. There is some-
thing unfortunate about the idea of a so-called educated person who, as
Marx would put it, is unable to produce the means of his subsistence,
who cannot take care of his own body, and who lacks the elemental 'life-
skills' necessary for his survival. Education for Labour is central to

what most people think schools ought to be about.

In the Jamaican context, the problem is deciding what schools should do to provide this kind of basic education in ways which are responsive to the problems of Labour in the wider society. What should schools do to help remove the pathologies of Labour from the society, and to help promote the development of the required regenerative, ecological links between the society and its natural environment? My own view is that it is chiefly by bringing the liberal arts to bear on reflection of the practice of Labour that schools can hope to contribute to the possibility of finding solutions. It is this view that I shall now explore.

For reasons previously mentioned, any attempt at bringing education to bear on Labour, and especially on direct Labour, confronts the following problem: education is widely seen by students as well as by the society as itself the chief means of escaping these activities. Lack of education has succeeded colour and class as the characteristic which is to mark off those who should perform these activities from those who should not. The school is seen as a relatively insulated and unreal space where the students await their destinies. At the end of it those who are fortunate acquire the credentials which will spare them from direct Labour. For those students who are the children of parents who are chiefly engaged in direct Labour, and who themselves perform these activities out of school, the chief point of education is to escape them. For those who are the children of parents who Labour indirectly, the point of education is to maintain that status and, if possible, even widen the gap between direct and indirect Labour.

The most obvious, and in fact the most widespread response is the view that the activities of direct Labour should be made part of the life

of the school. It is believed that these activities will be more apprec-
iated if they are elevated, so to speak, into the educational space of
the school. This approach may also be informed by the Deweyan belief
that the way to change society is to make the school a model of the en-
visioned society. In this case, the assumption is that if the life of
Labour in the school is made qualitatively superior to that of the
society, the school will function like a leaven of wholesome Labour in
the wider social system.

A Deweyan approach probably over-estimates the heights of qualita-
tive Labour possible in the school. It may also under-estimate the in-
fluence of the society on the school rather than the other way around.
Societies tend to use schools to preserve the existing social order.
The pathologies of Labour in a society will influence the ways in which
that society runs its schools. There are limits to the extent to which
schools can successfully filter the defects of the societies which control
them. The approach may also under-estimate the extent to which non-
educational factors -- political, economic, social, and so on -- are the
forces which effect social change.

I accept the view that the practice of Labour should be part of
the life of the school. When such activities are made part of the life
of the school they often function chiefly in a symbolic way. It is a
form of ritualistic acceptance and endorsement of them. The school is,
of course, a suitable place for any symbolic procedure by which a society
reminds itself of the importance of Labour.

But the performance of Labour in the school need not be only
symbolic. The school lives the life of Labour by helping to sustain its
own life. But the school's performance of Labour will inevitably be

different from that of the natural society: it will lack its seriousness, variety, richness and complexity. At the same time it may also have a certain elemental purity not easily found in the outside world. Instead of being a defect, the artificiality of the school may well be a source of instructive contrasts with the natural society.

The practice of Labour need not be restricted to the life of the school; there is much to be said for encouraging the student to participate in the life of Labour in the wider society. The pathology of Labour in Jamaican society is nowhere more evident than in the fact that Jamaicans who will not perform these activities at home nevertheless do so in other countries; Labour is seen as so linked with shame it is to be performed only away from the eyes of one's countrymen. Unlike his North American counterpart, for example, who often performs these activities as a way of helping to pay for his education, the Jamaican student typically wants to maintain an almost superstitious distance from them. Yet it is by participating in the life of Labour in the society that the student may learn those skills of Labour which have helped the society survive its difficult history. With the estrangement of the young from the land, many of these skills are not being transmitted. Students are being educated away from the surviving regenerative bases of the society. The practice of Labour in the wider society is a way of directly experiencing its accomplishments as well as its pathologies.

But even if it is the most problematic area in the Jamaican context, education for direct Labour is only part of the process. Education for Labour also has to advance the kinds of knowledge, values and skills which may bear on indirect Labour. It has to introduce the student to a broader repertoire of means by which he may earn the material wherewithal of life;

it has to introduce him to, and prepare him for the life of jobs and employment. Jewish rabbinical tradition requires each student to learn a trade. One thinks of Spinoza grinding lenses -- this was his indirect Labour -- while devoting the rest of his time to philosophy, which was his Work. I believe there is much to learn from this rabbinical theory of education. I do not see that it is too much to expect that by the time he has completed all-age or secondary school, each student should have mastered at least one socially useful skill by which he might earn his living. This could be a gradual process which increases in seriousness over the years. The mechanics of such a programme should be within the competence of most schools.

But in my view, it is not chiefly by incorporating direct or indirect Labour into its activities that the school can make its most special contribution to their advancement. The activities of Labour may be found burdensome or rewarding anywhere, and this is also true of the school. Many of these skills may be better learned in the natural society. What the school can add -- along with the purity of experience, symbolic endorsement, and instructive contrast previously noted -- and what cannot be easily found elsewhere, is a liberal arts context in which Labour can be both practiced and reflected on. The practice of Labour can be enriched by the forms of knowledge and understanding which constitute the liberal arts.

In the interest of human survival nature has, in its wisdom, made many of the skills of direct Labour especially accessible. But unlike most non-human animals, man has to acquire, and may enlarge on the means of sustaining his life. Labour involves the acquisition of knowledge, skills and values which can be acquired only through some means of formal

or informal education.

Some subjects like agriculture, home economics, the health sciences, industrial arts, commerce, and so on, may seem like the natural habitat of direct and indirect Labour. But Labour may also be informed by the natural sciences, literature, the creative arts, and so on. In this context, man and his Labour may be seen as a central area of inquiry. It is not only by practising Labour, but by bringing rich forms of thought to systematically reflect on this practice that the appreciation of them might be deepened and enriched.

Through liberal studies the student may focus the content as well as the reflective methodology of the liberal arts on inquiry into the condition of Labour in his own society. This inquiry will help him uncover its pathologies as well as its achievements and insights. The insights are important. No expression of the Jamaican mind that I know about better sums up the guiding principle of education for Labour than the Jamaican proverb which means "No horse is too good to carry his own grass." To educate for Labour in the Jamaican context is to build on, and to seek application in the educational sphere, for the insight enshrined in this bit of folk wisdom.

But it is not only the content and the methodology of the liberal arts which may be brought to bear on education for Labour; it may also be informed by its ideals. The chief of these ideals is freedom; liberal education aims at educating free persons. Instead of the mistaken wish to be free from Labour, the required ideal is that of being free through Labour. To the extent that it liberates the student and the society from dependence and the pathologies of Labour, education for Labour is conducted in the spirit of liberal education. The problem in the

Jamaican context is how to get a society which has so long linked Labour with servitude to view it as a precondition for its own freedom.

<center>VI</center>

To educate for Work is to equip the student with the means of expanding and enriching his life. It is education for careers, professions and callings. Education for Work is education for the exercise of the freedom which Labour makes possible.

I believe liberal education is the most suitable introduction to the life of Work. The liberal arts may themselves be forms of Work. They also consist of the forms of knowledge and understanding which have wide application and which may therefore be brought to bear on the richness and variety of Work. The life of Work, in the various cultures, is itself a central part of the content of the liberal arts. Within the liberal arts the student will find models of the life of Work to be studied, evaluated, and at times rehearsed. The liberal arts offer the student a range of symbolic representation of forms of Work which is much richer than his ordinary experience is likely to provide.

As is the case with education for Labour, exploration of the life of Work in his own society may be an important part of the student's education. It gives him an opportunity to inquire into both its accomplishments and pathologies. He should, as soon as possible, be encouraged to experience the satisfaction of social Work.

I believe the study of the creative arts is an important part of education for Work. They are, perhaps, the purest expressions of enduring home-making artifice, the self-created and nurturing culture the absence

of which many of the region's writers have lamented, and have, by their own writings, tried to correct. Objects for use, such as those to be found in the Folk Museum, and objects for contemplation, such as those to be found in the National Gallery of Art, are among the objects by which Jamaicans have participated in and reflected on the enterprise of making the land their home. One of the pioneers of Jamaican sculpture was arrested for witchcraft when he displayed his first carving. It is in the field of sculpture that African peoples have produced some of their best known Work. But in Jamaica this tradition was almost entirely destroyed by slavery and colonialism. In the eyes of the colonists, African carvings were artifacts of evil to be destroyed. It is hardly surprising then, that an artisitic movement -- in which sculpture, incidentally, played a prominent role -- heralded the nationalist movement of the nineteen thirties. Nationalism is a quest for a home and for the objects with which to make it one.

The will to Work is usually expressed through the roles which constitute the socio-cultural system. Where this system is in a state of flux, disorder or radical review, education for Work has to stress adaptability, critical consciousness -- the phrase is from Freire (1973) -- and innovation. To educate for Work or Labour is not to prepare students to be mere tools for any given occupational culture; it is to educate them to shape that culture for their individual as well as collective ends.

Whatever may be said for or against the content of socialist morality, the moralism which the Jamaican democratic socialists took to the problem of work in Jamaica is understandable against the background of the dehumanization which has characterized so much of the working experience

in the society. To educate for Work, in this context, is to pursue some ideal of a morally more defensible future. As part of this quest, I think education for Work should be linked with moral education.

Two aspects of moral education may be noted. Both may be brought to bear on the development of attitudes to Work. First, it has an emotive component. Williams (1966) once remarked that moral education is partly educating people into what they should fear, be angry about, despise, or hope for. According to Wilson (1967), it is mainly concerned with improving and clarifying feelings. Viewed in this light, educating people for Work may be seen, in part, as the exploration of feelings about its activities, of what may with good reasons be feared, be angry about, and so on, and of how feelings linked with Work may themselves expand and enrich human life. Second, moral education is also concerned with what is rationally defensible in the moral domain. Education for Work, as a form of moral education, needs to encourage inquiry into and respect for those facts of working experience which bear on the making of moral judgements and decisions about it. It also needs to encourage inquiry into the rationality of the relations between moral principles and the conduct of Work.

The chief goal of education for Work is the rehumanization of the society. This goal is a moral one. It is by being a form of moral education that education for Work may keep this ideal alive in student consciousness; and it is to the extent that it succeeds in influencing student action that it is a force in the process of social renewal.

VII

I think the distinction between Labour and Work is a suitable basis for a policy of work-education for the following reasons: (1) Unlike the democratic socialist proposal, it is not silent on the qualitative variation possible in the domain of work; it allows the entry of normative considerations according to which working life may be discussed and appraised. (2) It is a distinction which accommodates some of the other distinctions which the concept of work allows. For example, by granting that both Labour and Work may be either manual or intellectual it does not discriminate unfavourably between them; it is the point of view of the worker which determines the value of the activity. Most important of all, (3) the distinction is easily linked with distinctly educational objectives; it offers the student two complementary ways of viewing the activities which contribute to his personal, educational development; and (4) the distinction may be brought to bear on the clearly definable social goals of material self-sufficiency and the creation of a fuller, richer and more humane society.

CHAPTER FIVE

EDUCATION AND EGALITARIAN IDEOLOGY

The Jamaican variant of democratic socialism was above all an egali-
tarian ideology. Not surprisingly, this egalitarianism was also brought
to bear on the making of educational policy. The principle of equality
of educational opportunity -- which is regarded by some as an egalitarian
principle -- was endorsed, in the same words, by both the Ministry of
Education (1977, p. 6) and the People's National Party (1979, p. 42).
More specifically, Manley, like egalitarians elsewhere, argued that "a
single educational system is critical for egalitarianism"; in his view
"those who seek an egalitarian society must first address their minds
to the question of the organization of one stream of education through
which all must pass" (1974, p. 39).

Manley's position on this issue has to be seen in its social and
historical context. The colonial rulers in Jamaica built the first
schools to educate their own children; these were mainly private, prepara-
tory and grammar schools modeled after the British system; their chief
purpose was to produce an educated class capable of managing and maintain-
ing a colonial society. After the abolition of slavery, the British in-
troduced elementary schools for the children of the freed slaves. It
has been argued, by Turner (1977) for example, that the chief purpose
of these schools was to socialize this newly freed population into the
values necessary for the maintenance of a colonial order. For the most
part, two unequal streams of education evolved from these beginnings.
From the first came a selective system of preparatory and academic high

schools; these feed the university and receive most of their teachers
from it. From the second came the state-controlled primary and all-age
schools, the junior secondary or recently renamed 'new secondary' schools;
as well as the comprehensive, technical and vocational schools; these
schools feed the teachers colleges and the technical vocational colleges
and receive most of their teachers from them. The first stream, in
general, has better physical facilities, teachers who are better trained,
and more desirable staff-student ratios. This sector also enjoys a high
status in the society. In the larger state-controlled sector, physical
conditions are often poor, the teachers receive less training -- and
are sometimes untrained, -- and the schools are often overcrowded. Less
status is attached to these institutions. It was against this historical
background and in this social context that Manley made his demand for a
unitary school system on the ground that egalitarianism requires it.

Manley contrasted egalitarianism with elitism (n.d., p. 4). But
in contemporary theoretical discussion, as Nagel observes, egalitarianism
is opposed not only by defenders of aristocracy, its traditional rival,
but also by those who defend other values like utility and individual
rights (1979, p. 109). The quest for egalitarianism may at times be
compatible with the pursuit of these and other values. But it is also
often in conflict with them. The pursuit of egalitarianism may at
times result in a loss of utility; it may also lead to the violation of
individual rights. An enlightened educational policy is not indifferent
to the question of what is likely to lead to the greatest overall benefit
for the society as a whole; such a policy is also responsive to the rights
and freedoms of the members of the society.

It is the question of the relation between particular school systems and egalitarianism which I wish to examine. The claim 'Egalitarianism requires a unitary school system' may be interpreted in two main ways. First it can be taken to mean that a society is egalitarian only if it is egalitarian in all respects, including in its educational system. Unitary systems, it is believed, are themselves egalitarian, and mixed systems are not. Thus having a unitary school system is seen as one of the conditions which a society must satisfy if it is to be regarded as generally egalitarian. The concern here is with egalitarianism in education. Second, the claim might be taken to mean that there is a causal relation between unitary school systems and social structure such that unitary systems -- unlike mixed systems -- result in the formation of egalitarian societies. This, I think, was Manley's view of it. He saw the establishment of a unitary system as a precondition for the creation of an egalitarian society. This is a concern with egalitarianism through education. Cooper who also distinguishes between equality in schooling and equality beyond schooling, claims that egalitarians are not sufficiently attentive to the first (1980, p. 9). I am, of course, interested in the bearing which egalitarian ideals might have on both domains.

I shall first of all describe some of the main features of both unitary and mixed school systems. Following this, I offer an account of egalitarianism as ideology. I shall then deny that egalitarianism requires a unitary school system. More specifically, I argue that a mixed school system is compatible with the pursuit of egalitarian objectives, and that a mixed school system also has a number of other advantages which are important for social reform.

II

I take it that while it will differ in its details from place to

place, the unitary school system which some egalitarians defend has the following main features: (a) It is totally controlled by the state; there is no independent educational sector. (b) It offers free education at most and perhaps at all levels. This might be based on the view that education is too important a good to be left to the vagaries of individual economic means. The view that education is a commodity which may be bought and sold is one which many have for various reasons found objectionable. (c) There is one kind of school at each level: primary, secondary and tertiary. It is never the case that some children go to one kind of primary school, for example, while others go to another. For the most part, each kind of school is simiarly furnished; schools of the same type use the same kinds of resources and materials. (d) There is a common curriculum at each level; even if some variation is allowed in order to adjust to differences in abilities and interests, there is a common and predominant component which must be shared by all. (e) This system aims at a high level of qualitative homogeneity; educational resources and the quality of instruction are as evenly distributed as possible; the same standards -- at least the same minimum standards -- are expected throughout.

A mixed system, in contrast, has the following main features: (a) It includes both a state as well as an independent sector; the size of each sector may vary, but usually the state sector is the larger of the two. (b) In this system members of the society have the option of paying for a preferred form of education. (c) The mixed system allows diversity in the kinds of schools which are available. All primary, secondary or other schools are not alike; alternative interpretations are allowed; there are differences in their modes of organization and

in their furnishings. (d) In a mixed system there may well be a common curriculum of some kind which is required by the state. Mill believed -- not without some unease -- that it is almost axiomatic that the state should "require and compel" all its citizens to be educated up to at least a minimum standard (1968, p. 160). But the state can do this without exercising total control over the school system. The state can require, and insist, that schools in the independent sector meet certain core requirements while allowing them to add their own curricular preferences to this basic core. Religious schools, for example, may add their religious concerns to what the state requires. (e) Mixed systems tend to be less qualitatively homogeneous. Some of the schools in the independent sector are often superior to those in the state sector. But, of course, this is not always the case. Some state schools may be better than some independent ones. Sometimes the schools in the two sectors will be very similar. A unitary system need not be qualitatively even, but it is, perhaps, more easily manipulated towards this ideal. A mixed system may well be monitored, by the state, in the interest of greater qualitative homogeneity. But in the absence of total state control, homogeneity of any kind may be less easily achieved in a mixed system.

There are other arguments, apart from egalitarian ones, which might be offered in support of a unitary school system. It might be argued, for example, that a unitary system is more efficiently or economically managed; that it is a way of cementing or giving coherence to a plural society; that it is more effectively directed in the interest of social reform, and so on. These claims, if true, may be good reasons for having such a system. But egalitarian arguments are of a different sort and these are the ones which will be considered. The claim that egali-

tarianism requires a particular kind of school system cannot be usefully discussed without some account of what is to be understood by 'egalitarianism'. It is to this question that I shall now turn.

III

To some of its critics, egalitarianism is a doctrine based on envy, worldliness, and blind disregard for what they see as the inevitable presence of inequality in human affairs. These are important objections to the egalitarian enterprise. But I shall try to give an account of egalitarianism which, while it is not indifferent to the objections of its critics, nevertheless seeks to capture something of those components of the egalitarian outlook which help to explain its appeal to those who profess it. My chief interest, of course, is in egalitarianism as ideology, and it is as such that I shall examine it.

According to my view of ideology, it will be recalled, ideological beliefs (a) are shared by some group and help to define the social and political identity of that group; (b) direct and guide social and political action; (c) are sense-making in that they help to explain, justify, as well as give intelligibility, meaning, order and coherence to social and political experience; and (d) are focused on the solution of specific problems of social and political organization.

(a) In some respects, egalitarianism is so widespread in the modern world it could be said that it is itself one of the dominant ideologies of the age. Egalitarianism cuts across ideological groupings. For example, Rawls (1971), a liberal egalitarian, is concerned with the equal distribution of basic liberties, as well as with the distribution

of other goods. Tawney (1964), a socialist egalitarian, saw egalitarianism as an outlook importantly linked with the idea of civilization, and saw the realization of egalitarian ideals as a precondition for the release of the finer aspects of human potential. Liberals and socialists need not disagree about these objectives, but the point is that however it is interpreted, and whatever their other differences, both see egalitarianism as an important part of their general outlook. But whether it occurs as a component of other ideological perspectives, or independently of them, egalitarianism is at the core of many of the various national, racial and sexual movements which characterize the modern era.

(b) Egalitarians, of course, believe that equality is the chief ideal which should direct and guide social and political action. But are all principles of equality egalitarian principles? Raz (1978) argues that only some principles of equality are egalitarian. In his view, egalitarianism is based on principles of equality of a special sort. This view merits some elaboration.

Principles of equality may be said to be principles of entitlement: they guarantee certain benefits to all who are covered by them. If this is so, the following are principles of equality: (1) To each according to his ability. (2) All without relevant differences are entitled to the same treatment. (3) All human beings are entitled to concern and respect. These are principles of equality, but are they egalitarian principles?

(1) The principle 'To each according to his ability' has a characteristic egalitarian principles are supposed to have: it grants entitlements to everyone, even if it does not guarantee everyone the same advantages. But this is a principle which non-egalitarians -- like Plato and

Burke for example -- would readily endorse. It is a meritocratic principle; meritocracy, according to Schaar, is a situation in which the "natural and social aristocracies" are identical (1967, p. 232); this is the result of a thorough-going application of this principle, and it is an end which is objectionable to egalitarians. If this is a principle of equality it seems to be true that not all principles of equality are egalitarian principles.

(2) The view that all are entitled to the same treatment unless it can be shown that there are relevant differences which warrant discrimination, is sometimes called the principle of impartiality. Some writers on egalitarianism, including Benn and Peters (1959, p. 153), and White and White (1980, pp. 247-248), regard the principle of impartiality as the basis of egalitarianism. But this seems to suggest that egalitarians espouse impartiality and that non-egalitarians do not. But many non-egalitarians -- Plato and Burke will again serve as examples -- defend aristocratic social systems on the ground that they are arrived at by impartial means. It can also be argued that the principle of impartiality is too widely accepted to be regarded as definitive of any particular moral or political point of view. It makes too many people egalitarians. According to this view of egalitarianism one is an egalitarian if one believes that a judicial system should be impartial. But I think it is possible to imagine non-egalitarians who regard the principle of judicial impartiality as an important part of their social and political outlook.

(3) Raz argues that principles of equal concern and respect are only rhetorically egalitarian. In his view "They are not designed to increase equality but to encourage recognition that the well-being of all human beings counts" (1978, p. 334). This in his view is humanism.

He concludes that these are humanistic principles expressed in the fashionable but unnecessary langauge of egalitarianism. Or, to put it another way, by introducing terms like 'equal' into them, egalitarians adorn humanistic principles with the linguistic insignia of their own creed. But he thinks that these principles would lose nothing if terms like 'equal' were removed from them. These principles merely utilize the prestige and rhetorical force of terms like 'equal' in western culture. Raz assumes that egalitarian principles are generally also humanistic. But he argues that while some non-egalitarian positions -- like racism and sexism -- are not compatible with humanism, some other non-egalitarian positions -- like Bentham's utilitarianism and varieties of meritocracy -- are compatible with humanism. It seems Raz wants to guard against egalitarian attempts at appropriating humanism. In short, if Raz is right, one does not have to be an egalitarian to believe that all human beings are entitled to concern and respect. This is a principle of equality, but according to Raz it is not a strict egalitarian principle.

What, then, are egalitarian principles of equality? At the core of the western egalitarian tradition, Raz suggests, are principles of non-discrimination like "All Fs who do not have G are entitled to G if some Fs have G" (1978, p. 332). Raz believes that there are other kinds of egalitarian principles, like what he calls "principles of equal distribution in conflict" (1978, p. 331); but in his view, principles of non-discrimination are of special importance; he thinks they are "omnipresent in the main line of egalitarian theories" (1978, p. 336). These principles are at the heartland of what Raz calls strict egalitarianism. They are designed to increase equality, and they offer the maximization of equality as the ground for action. According to Raz, a moral or

political theory is strictly egalitarian if it is dominated by principles of this kind; they dominate in that they are seldom overriden by other consideratons; they also regulate whatever basic principles of entitlement these theories contain. Raz believes that most popular egalitarian principles -- equality of opportunity, welfare, and so on -- have principles of non-discrimination as their dominant component. The principle of equality of opportunity, for example, is a combination of a basic principle of entitlement, "All are entitled to all the opportunities there can be," and a principle of non-discrimination, "If some have more opportunities than others then those who have less are entitled to additional opportunities to bring them to the level of those who have more" (1978, p. 337). The principle of non-discrimination regulates the principle of entitlement to opportunity. Raz describes the special character of principles of non-discrimination as follows:

> The sensitivity of principles of non-discrimination to existing distributions is the crucial pointer to their character as egalitarian principles. Being an F by itself does not qualify one to G. It is the actually existing inequality of distribution which creates the entitlement. The entitlement is designed to eliminate a specific kind of existing discrimination. Such principles reflect the view that it is wrong or unjust for some Fs to have G while others have not (1978, p. 332).

Now it is true, I believe, that not all who profess adherence to some principle of equality can be said to be egalitarians. Meritarians, utilitarians, libertarians, and others, believe that there are principles of equality which should direct social and political action. A moral or political theory may, by incorporating some conception of equality, contain an egalitarian component without itself being a predominantly egalitarian theory. Many widely accepted principles of equality, like legal and political equality, are not generally regarded as egalitarian

principles. I shall shortly have more to say about what I think is the place of principles of equal concern and respect in the egalitarian scheme.

But the principle of equality which Raz regards as the basis of strict egalitarianism is, in my view, an unsavoury one, and I think few who profess egalitarianism would agree that it is an adequate statement of the basis of their creed. This view of the egalitarian conception of equality is one which is most commonly found among critics of egalitarianism. Joseph and Sumption, for example, hold a similar view of the basis of egalitarianism:

> The assumption on which egalitarianism is based is
> that people want to have as much as their neighbour,
> that they measure their own status by his and feel
> entitled to have the difference made up to them
> (1979, p. 40).

If this is what egalitarianism is about, it is hardly surprising that Cooper, who believes that Raz is right, and who is himself a critic of egalitarianism, concludes that except per accidens a right policy or principle is never that which egalitarians advocate, and that a policy or principle "which it is of the essence of egalitarianism to pursue" is never right (1980, p. ix).

Yet it can hardly be denied that there is some force to these claims about the egalitarian view of equality. There is some sense in which egalitarianism is about the levelling of goods. Many who profess egalitarianism often perform actions which seem to be based on some principle of a Razian kind. The question is whether anything can be added to the insight in Raz's formulation which will help to make it more acceptable to those who are sympathetic to egalitarianism. As a move in this direction, I shall make three observations -- with which I think many egali-

tarians would agree -- which will help to fill out some other dimensions of the egalitarian outlook. My claim is that Raz is right in believing that a levelling ideal of some kind is at the core of the egalitarian point of view, but that this ideal is less objectionable if some other considerations are kept in mind.

First, egalitarians customarily base their claims about human entitlements on claims about human nature as well as on claims about social reality. Raz avoids discussion of the first, and contends that egalitarians regard what others have -- a social contingency -- as the source of human entitlements. Yet it seems to me that the kind of approach which is described by Williams, for example, is more characteristic of the kind of approach which egalitarians have customarily taken:

> The idea of equality is used in political discussion both
> in statements of fact -- that men are equal -- and in
> statements of political principles or aims -- that men
> should be equal, as at present they are not. The two can
> be, and often are, combined: the aim is then described
> as that of securing a state of affairs in which men are
> treated as the equal beings which they in fact already are,
> but are not already treated as being (1964, p. 110).

Egalitarians claim that there is some respect -- transcendental, natural and empirical, being members of the same species, and so on, -- in which all human beings are equal, and offer this as the reason for the claim that there should be a corresponding equality in social and political arrangements. As Williams observes, there are many difficulties in determining what is to be understood by both these claims, and the relation which is said to hold between them. But difficulties with these claims notwithstanding, many egalitarians regard human equality -- however it is to be understood -- as the ground for entitlements to equal treatment in social and political organization. Egalitarian humanism

involves more than the view that all should count; it involves the view that being human is the ground for certain entitlements; egalitarians add to this the view that human equality is the ground for equal human entitlements.

According to this approach to egalitarianism, the egalitarian response to social inequalities arises largely because these inequalities are perceived, at least by some people, as an infringement of the entitlement to equal treatment which it is assumed all human beings already have. Social inequalities only stimulate egalitarian responses. Few, if any, egalitarians would claim that existing social inequalities create entitlements. Raz offers no examples of egalitarians who believe this.

Most egalitarians, I believe, would deny holding the view -- which Raz takes to be part of the egalitarian outlook -- that "Being an F by itself does not qualify one to G" (1978, p. 332). I think that contrary to what Raz suggests, most egalitarians would contend that being a human being qualifies one to non-discriminatory treatment, and that one has this entitlement prior to, and independently of the actual existence of discriminatory conditions. Egalitarians believe that human equality is the ground of claims to equal entitlement to non-discrimination.

Raz assimilates the benefits which principles of entitlement guarantee and the conditions which bring these principles into play. This is in keeping with his view that "Principles are commonly described as normative statements specifying a condition of application and a normative consequence" (1978, p. 322). My own view is that in formulating principles, these two considerations should be carefully distinguished. By conflating them, in this case, Raz seems to be claiming that there can be egalitarian principles only when and where there are actual existing

inequalities. I find this view unconvincing.

It is by reference to claims about human equality that egalitarians defend what Raz calls humanism. According to Raz, "Humanism means that since all people count and since entitlements are for the good of the person concerned they must be such that none is excluded" (1978, p. 340). Raz does not say whether this view of humanism can be defended without appeals to equality. Principles of equal concern and respect may well be humanistic in Raz's sense of the term. But it seems to me that they function in the egalitarian scheme in two main ways. First, they promote recognition of the human equality on which, I have claimed, egalitarianism has been traditionally based. Second, they help to increase equality, but they do so indirectly: they do so by promoting the temporal and psychological conditions for the more tangible forms of equal treatment which other egalitarian principles -- those which specify particular benefits like opportunities, welfare, and so on -- are designed to achieve. I think these principles have a central and not merely rhetorical role in the egalitarian scheme.

Second, there are a number of considerations -- which are largely ignored by Raz -- which bear on egalitarian interest in advancing the well-being of those who are actually or potentially least favoured by natural or social contingencies. Critics of egalitarianism focus on notions like envy and resentment, and, to borrow a phrase from Nozick (1974, p. 240), attribute a "disreputable psychology" to egalitarians. But most egalitarians, I believe, would agree with Frankel's character-ization of egalitarianism as "a complaint expressed from below" (1973, p. 61), as the prudent protection of the less powerful against those who exercise more power and influence in society, and as a positive

appreciation of the ordinary man's way of life. The prudent protection of those who are actually or potentially 'below' need not have anything to do with envy, and may have much to do with the promotion of self-respect. The claims of the less advantaged may also be justified. Along with equality, notions like prudent self-interest and compassion are important categories in the egalitarian outlook, and in its conception of morality. However idealistic it may be, there is also a kind of heroism in the egalitarian quest for forms of social organization which can counter-balance the apparently cosmic lottery of natural and social circumstances. The egalitarian quest may also be part of a perceived need to redress collective wrongs.

Third, there may well be some egalitarians who believe in the mechanical and wasteful levelling of the world's goods which Raz's principle of non-discrimination requires. But the egalitarian need not be an insensitive and indiscretionary leveller. Egalitarianism need not exclude Aristotelian "practical wisdom" (1954, BK. VI, Sec. 5). To arbitrarily deprive an F of G, in the pursuit of levelling, may be in conflict with the view that all are entitled to equal concern and respect. In the pursuit of 'practical wisdom' the egalitarian may, for example, opt for the random distribution of scarce goods, for equality in the chance of receiving benefits. A rational egalitarian is not indifferent to the effect of his schemes on other values. The quest for egalitarianism may also be tempered by commitment to ideals like humanism and justice.

(c) I turn now to egalitarianism as a form of ideological sense-making. Berlin, in commenting on the difficulty of justifying equality, observes that equality "is itself that which justifies other acts" (1979, p. 102). Some egalitarians regard equality as an intrinsic good. But

equality is also defended as a requirement of justice, and as a precondition for other values like freedom, utility, and fraternity.

In post-colonial societies like Jamaica, egalitarianism is a way of trying to throw off the racial, social, political and other inferiorities of the past. Egalitarianism is a search for moral well-being. It is a quest for what Rawls, in his account of primary goods, calls the "social bases of self-respect" (1979, p. 11).

There are two related kinds of egalitarianism in these societies. The first seeks greater equality in internal social and political arrangements. The second seeks greater equality in external relations with other societies, especially those in the developed world. Egalitarianism is part of the process by which these societies pursue a sense of their own identities as autonomous political units; it is a search for orientation as members of the larger world order.

One of the most important functions of egalitarianism as ideology, is as a way of elaborating images of social possibility. Egalitarian ideals of society may differ in their details, but I think most egalitarians share Rousseau's view of a society in which "no citizen shall be rich enough to buy another, and none so poor as to be forced to sell himself" (1968, p. 96). The egalitarian society is also a just society. There are obviously different conceptions of what constitutes a just society. One view is what Bell calls a "just meritocracy" (1979, p. 49); it is just in that its positions of authority are earned, and not acquired by undesirable means. This was part of Manley's view of an egalitarian society (1974, p. 39). Egalitarians often deny that they value uniformity. But they do tend to dislike man-made barriers to social mobility, class divisions, and the trappings of background and status. The process

of trying to imagine what an egalitarian society might be like is obviously
an important part of the processes of self-transformation being attempted
in the societies of the Third World.

(d) Ideological beliefs, I have said, are centered on the solu-
tion of specific problems of social organization. Social inequalities
are, of course, the main problems which egalitarian movements seek to
solve. These inequalities vary in time and place, and the programmatic
content of egalitarianism varies accordingly. Benn (1967) believes that
egalitarianism is more a set of 'negative' responses to specific in-
equalities than a positive view of social organization. Cooper doubts
that there is any underlying unity in the historical diversity of egali-
tarian causes (1980, p. 15).

But however egalitarian discontent with inequality is explained,
few impulses have done more to shape the modern age. Egalitarians are
continually moving beyond the boundaries of consensual equality --
egalitarianism may also become what Bluhm (1974, p. 10) calls latent
ideology -- and challenging the defensibility of those inequalities
which are objectionable to egalitarian conscience.

Although more can obviously be said about it, I shall for present
purposes take egalitarianism to be a social and political outlook
characterized by at least the following features: First, egalitarianism
has a special interest in, and gives priority to advancing the well-being
of those who are actually or potentially least favoured by natural or
social contingencies. This emphasis is partly based on notions like
prudent self-interest, compassion, and the preservation of self-respect.
Second, egalitarianism is based on assumptions about human equality,
and on the equal entitlement to non-discriminatry treatment which,

regardless of existing conditions, it is believed that human equality requires. Third, I take principles of equal concern and respect to be a central part of the egalitarian scheme. I do not regard these principles as an expendable, marginal, or merely rhetorical component of the egalitarian outlook. Fourth, egalitarianism employs a levelling ideal of some kind, and this is expressed chiefly in its conception of forms of social organization which are without great and unreasonable inequalities of material condition, power, status and influence. But the pursuit of this ideal need not be mechanical and indiscretionary; it may be pursued with both rationality and sensitivity.

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IV

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I shall try to show that if the foregoing account of egalitarianism is correct, a mixed school system is compatible with the pursuit of egalitarian objectives. Earlier, I distinguished between egalitarianism in and through education. I shall argue that a mixed school system is compatible with the pursuit of both, and that there are also important non-egalitarian arguments which might be offered in support of a mixed system.

More needs to be said about the notion of egalitarianism in education. An egalitarian who believes that equality is worth pursuing for its own sake, may also believe that this is as true of the educational domain as of any other. His commitment to egalitarianism in education may be part of his view that ideally, a society is egalitarian only if it is egalitarian in all its respects. The egalitarian may also believe that egalitarianism in education is a precondition for the

realization of other values which are important for education. But it
is the notion of egalitarianism in education as an end in itself which
I wish to consider.

This approach to egalitarianism involves a largely non-intrumental
view of education. Education is regarded as a good which is worth
having regardless of any non-educational consequences it might have.
According to this view, being educated is in itself a condition of well-
being. Egalitarian promotion of education is part of its moral concern
about human welfare; since education is a good in itself, its equitable
distribution is a way of advancing human well-being.

Non-instrumental views of education are not easily defended. This
approach to education is perhaps even more difficult to defend in under-
developed societies where the pressures to take a utilitarian view of
the school are likely to be especially strong. Figueroa, for example,
laments the philistine approach to education in Caribbean societies
(1971, pp. 100-101). But underdevelopment is not only a lack of material
well-being; it is also a poverty of the things of the intellect and
the spirit. Many underdeveloped societies have inherited both forms
of deprivation from their historical experience; a balanced educational
policy aims at the removal of both.

One approach which might be taken to egalitarianism in education
is suggested by Dewey's view of experience as both the end and means
of education (1977, p. 89). Like the condition of being educated, the
experience of getting an education might also be regarded as an end
in itself, and not as a means to anything beyond it. Most people spend
a large portion of their lives in school; often they are compelled to
do so by the state. The quality of this experience is an important part

of the quality of each person's total life experience. Education might seek to have this portion of human experience worth having for its own sake. Egalitarianism in education is an attempt at removing inequalities in the quality of experience in the educational domain. If this is achieved it is seen as a good in itself, regardless of any post-educational consequences it might have.

Some radical egalitarian movements in education focus on inequalities in the status of students and teachers. Issues involving the democratization of the educational domain may also be part of an egalitarian programme. My main concern, of course, is with those kinds of inequalities which have their source, or expected solution, in particular kinds of school systems.

A mixed school system, I believe, is compatible with the pursuit of egalitarianism for the following reasons: (a) it may be a way of advancing the educational well-being of those who are least favoured; (b) it may be based on assumptions about human equality; (c) it may be a way of showing equal concern and respect; and (d) it allows the exercise of sensitivity and practical judgement in the removal of substantive inequalities in the educational domain. I shall now consider each of these in turn.

(a) The unitary school system is sometimes defended on the ground that it is a way of promoting fraternal relations and an appreciation of common humanity. It is believed that these values are advanced when those who are naturally or socially less endowed share the same educational environments with the more favoured. This kind of mixing is believed to be of educational value both to the less favoured and to the more advantaged: it encourages the development of self-respect

among the first, and it cures the second of snobbishness and conceit.

It is worth noting that this approach to educational mixing --
especially the mixing of the less able with the more able -- is more
widespread in the western democracies than it is in socialist-communist
societies. In communist societies, the tendency is to have special
schools for the more able. In spite of official commitment to radical
egalitarianism, utilitarian considerations generally prevail.

But a mixed system need not exclude the kind of mixing which is
promoted by advocates of a unitary system. In a mixed system, children
with different abilities and from different social and ethnic back-
grounds will often attend the same schools. Sometimes they will be
brought together by other bonds, like religious ones, for example.
Since educational mixing is not enforced in a mixed system, there may
be less homogeneity. But in a mixed system a considerable degree of
mixing is possible in both the state and the independent sectors.

Independent schools, especially religious ones, have a tradition
of interest in the educational well-being of the less favoured. In
many cases their concern has preceded that of the state; in some under-
developed countries the existence of these schools pre-dated the
development of the state and the subsequent expansion of state-
sponsored education. In many cases the state may well be justified
in taking over educational efforts of this kind. But in underdeveloped
societies, where the state's educational resources are likely to be
limited, there may well be good reasons for encouraging independent
educational action which may benefit the less favoured.

A unitary system benefits the socially less favoured only if the
quality of the education which if offers is high, and even then it does

not necessarily result in the equalization of educational advantages.
When a unitary system offers high quality education, the socially more
favoured receive the benefits of this system plus the advantages of
their social backgrounds; since the unitary system usually offers free
education, it is also to the economic advantage of the more favoured.
Even if the less favoured receive roughly the same benefits from a good
unitary system, they begin with the disadvantages of their less privi-
leged backgrounds. When the educational quality of a unitary system
is low -- which is very likely in a country with meagre educational
resources -- the more favoured have recourse to the educational resources
of their background. The less favoured only add an impoverished school-
ing experience onto their already educationally impoverished lives.

In Jamaica, the children of the socially and economically least
favoured generally attend the state schools. The least advantaged
of all are those who attend the state primary schools. What egali-
tarianism in education requires is that priority be given to the improve-
ment of the quality of the educational experience offered in the state
sector.

A word needs to be said about the fetishism of secondary education
in Jamaican society and culture. Long associated with exclusiveness,
and long regarded as the gateway to privilege, considerable attention
is attached to attendance -- even mere attendance -- at these schools.
Indeed the term 'secondary school' itself exerts such social power that
attendance at any institution so designated is regarded as desirable.
Much that has been done in modern Jamaican education, supposedly in the
interest of egalitarianism, has, I think, pandered to this fact of
Jamaican educational culture. The thinking seems to be close to Raz's

view of egalitarianism: since secondary education is the gateway to privilege, all who do not have access to secondary education are entitled to access to secondary education if some have access to secondary education. Expansion in secondary education has been the main area of modern educational development in Jamaica. Schools built for the less favoured were called 'junior secondary schools'; later they were re-named 'new secondary schools'. Critics of these schools claim that these schools are inferior to the traditional secondary schools, and that a deception is being perpetuated. The children of the least favoured, it seems, are either ignored or deceived.

A state which is serious about advancing the educational well-being of the less advantaged can do so through a mixed system. Where the inequality to be removed is that between a state sector and an independent sector -- and the least favoured are in the state sector -- the state improves the lot of the less favoured by improving its own sector. The alternative of diluting the educational quality of the independent sector could lead to a loss of utility. Where it has the necessary fiscal and educational resources, the state may also remove inequalities in the independent sector. It may do so by exercising its powers of supervision and licensing, and, where possible, through financial assistance.

(b) A mixed system may be based on assumptions about human equality. Two of the popular egalitarian candidates for a respect in which all human beings may be said to be equal will serve as examples. The first is a liberal egalitarian view. Rawls has advanced a neo-Kantian conception of human equality which, among other things, claims that human beings are equal in being able to rationally plan their lives (1971, p. 408).

This applies to all normal human beings and would to some degree obviously also include children.

An assumption of this kind obviously requires educational arrangements which allow a considerable degree of both parental and student autonomy. People can rationally plan their educational lives, or the educational lives of their children, only if they are free to consider alternatives, and to exercise their capacities for rational choice. A unitary system need not exclude choice: where the resources are available, and the appropriate intentions are in place, a unitary system may be varied. But however varied it may be, it excludes the important choice of opting out of the state's educational arrangements, a choice which in some circumstances may be an eminently rational one. The mixed system, however, aims at the maximization of choices.

It is sometimes said that human beings are equal in having certain basic needs. Raphael, for example, suggests that "The right to equality proper, as distinguished from equity as a whole, is a right to equal satisfaction of basic human needs, including the need to develop and use capacities which are specifically human" (1976, pp. 192-193). Raz, who regards egalitarianism as the levelling of insatiable consumerism, denies that there is any special connection between egalitarianism and the giving of priority to the satisfaction of needs. But many of the entitlements which egalitarians defend -- to medical care and education, for example -- are obviously needs in ways in which some goods, like property for instance, are not. Rawls regards his theory of social primary goods -- the distribution of these goods is to be regulated by his principles of justice -- as "an extension of the notion of needs, which are distinct from aspirations and desires" (1979, p. 15). The

principle 'To each according to his need' is a well-know communist ideal..

It can be argued that there is some sense in which education is one of the basic human needs. Unlike most non-human animals, man needs formal or informal education of some kind if he is to survive, and, it seems, if he is to become human at all. This view of education as need is one of the claims often offered in support of state-provided education.

A state which assumes that all its citizens have a right to equal satisfaction of basic educational needs may pursue the realization of this ideal through a mixed school system. A state can, in a mixed system, use its legal authority, its supervisory apparatus, as well as its fiscal and educational resources to insist that basic educational needs -- whatever these are taken to be -- are satisfied. Unitary systems can claim no special efficacy in the satisfaction of educational needs. Even if people have a right to equal satisfaction of basic educational needs, there will be variation in the actual needs themselves. A mixed school system may well allow more flexibility in making educational adjustments to this variation.

(c) Few in the modern world would deny that the state should treat all its citizens with equal concern and respect, and that this should be reflected in its attitude to the educational domain. Any school system which the state conducts or allows falls short of this ideal if its physical conditions are poor, if it is arbitrary and excessively authoritarian in its methods, and so on. As far as I can see, there is no kind of school system which can claim immunity from defects of this kind; they may occur in unitary and mixed systems alike.

Defenders of the unitary system believe that only this system can be a vehicle by which the state demonstrates its equal concern and respect.

According to this view, to show equal concern and respect is to regard the society's educational resources as a cake to be divided equally among its children. Showing equal concern and respect means pooling all the society's educational resources and giving all children equal access to them.

A mixed system, in my view, does not exclude the possibility of a considerable degree of equality in the distribution of educational resources. But a crucial difference between the two systems is that in a mixed system equal concern and respect are focused, not so much on resources, but on parental autonomy and parental rights. The view that parents should be the final authority in the making of decisions concerning the education of their children is traditional and widely held throughout the world. It is a right which, as Cohen (1978) reminds us, is enshrined in Article 26(3) of the United Nations' declaration of Human Rights. In the case of the mixed system, the concern is with the equal protection of parental autonomy, and the equal respect for parental rights.

(d) Earlier I said that there is some sense in which egalitarianism is about the levelling of goods; egalitarianism in education is about the removal of grave substantive inequalities in society's educational arrangements. But I have claimed that egalitarian levelling need not be mechanical and wasteful, and that it may be pursued with sensitivity and practical judgement. The mixed system, I believe, allows for the sensitive and discretionary removal of inequalities. Critics of egalitarianism often claim that the achievement of equality in some respect necessarily results in inequality in some other respect. Two examples from Cooper will illustrate the kind of claim which is being made:

> Tax people progressively, so that you make them more equal
> with respect to the amount they have left, and you thereby
> make them less equal with respect to the percentage they
> have left. Construct very expensive schools for million-
> aires' children, and you thereby, at one and the same time,
> create greater disparity in school fees but less disparity
> in the ratio of fees to parental income (1980, p. 13).

If this claim is generally true, an attempt at achieving a large amount
of equality in a single stroke -- by converting an unequal mixed system
into a presumably equal unitary system -- is likely to give rise to other
kinds of inequalities as objectionable as the ones it sought to remove.
In a mixed system, the state may monitor both the state and the independent educational sectors in order to identify such inequalities as are to
be found. Each inequality can be considered individually, and it can be
assessed in the light of other values which are relevant to its presence
or removal. Bedau's view, I believe, is as appropriate for egalitarianism
in general as it is for egalitarianism in education:

> The permanent task for the egalitarian remains one of
> scrutinizing existing inequalities among men in order
> to assure us that they are based on justifiable (or at
> least unavoidable) differences, and to eliminate those
> which are not (1967, p. 27).

<center>V</center>

Earlier I mentioned some of the features an egalitarian might expect
his ideal society to have. I have just discussed the view that he might
regard a society as egalitarian only if its school system is also egalitarian. But some egalitarians also believe that a unitary school system
is a precondition for the creation of a wider egalitarian society. They
believe that egalitarianism can be achieved through education.

Instrumental approaches to education are widespread, and unlike the

view that education is an intrinsic good, present little difficulty to most people. But the claim that there is a causal relation between unitary school systems and the formation of egalitarian societies is one which poses a number of problems. It is chiefly an empirical claim which can be verified or discredited only by reference to the historical experience of societies with such school systems. But while I shall not ignore a number of empirical considerations, it is not the empirical aspect of the problem which I wish to consider. My main aim is to examine some of the assumptions on which this egalitarian expectation rests.

The most important assumption, perhaps, is the general one concerning the power of education as an agent for social change. This faith in education is shared by egalitarians and non-egalitarians alike, and there have been some memorable expressions of it in philosophical literature. Plato saw education as "the one thing that is sufficient" in the quest for social reconstruction (1967, BK. IV, Sec. 423). According to Locke, education is "that which makes the great difference in mankind" (1964, p. 20). Dewey believed that "education is the fundamental method of social progress and reform" (1959, p. 30).

It is obviously true that education is one of the main forces which influence society. But it is also often observed that education is also a reflection of the society which gives it. A society which is already egalitarian -- having achieved its egalitarianism by whatever means -- is likely to have its egalitarianism reflected in its school system. Similarly, an inegalitarian society is also likely to reflect its in-egalitarianism in its educational arrangements. An egalitarian society will use its school system to maintain its egalitarianism, and an in-

egalitarian society will use its school system to perpetuate its inegalitarianism. Egalitarians believe that when inegalitarianism is being perpetuated, the cycle can be broken by altering the school system. They believe that by replacing a mixed system -- judged to be inegalitarian -- with a unitary system -- judged to be egalitarian -- they will bring about a corresponding change in social structure as the society gradually reflects the egalitarianism of the school. Those who believe that society exerts greater influence in shaping the school than vice versa, will set greater store on the achievement of egalitarianism by non-educational means. While most people probably regard education as a necessary condition for social reform, few would agree with Plato that it is a sufficient condition. Reform in education often depends on transformation in the wider society.

While there are often important relations between education and the post-educational achievements of persons, non-educational considerations -- at least considerations which have little to do with formal education -- are also important in influencing the nature of post-educational accomplishments. Although too much should not be made of its conclusions, a study conducted by Jencks and others (1972) in the United States found that family, status, personal qualities and luck were often more important than formal education in determining post-educational success. It is well known that persons with little formal education often achieve considerable success in society.

The problem for the egalitarian is how to get from the school system to the kind of society which he wants. For him, equality in post-educational outcome is an important aim of education. His search is for the kind of school system which is most likely to achieve this result,

and some egalitarians believe that the unitary school system is such a system.

One of the most important assumptions underlying egalitarian choice of the unitary school system, it seems, is the view that similar education is likely to lead to greater similarity in the levels of post-educational accomplishment, to fewer inequalities in accomplishment beyond the life of the school. But there is no conception of 'similar education' that I can think of which is likely to lead to this result. If the term is taken to mean equal access to the same educational resources -- and this, presumably, is what a unitary system allows -- differences in abilities, motivation, and interests will result in differences in the use which is made of these resources, differences in the degrees of educational attainment, and, perhaps, differences in the degrees of post-educational attainment. If the term is taken to mean similar levels of educational attainment, this view is also problematic. Attempts at restricting the more able can be regarded as objectionable on moral and other grounds; attempts at pushing the less able beyond their natural endowment are likely to be futile. If the term is taken to mean similar educational content, it is also hard to see why exposure to the same or similar educational content is likely to lead to equality beyond the life of the school. The most plausible view, perhaps, is that similar education leads to similar or equal opportunity for post-educational attainment, but, as we shall see, the relation between the unitary school system and the equality of opportunity ideal is itself problematic.

Another assumption is the previously mentioned view that the unitary system is a way of inculcating egalitarian values. In the unitary

system, it is believed, the young learn lessons in equality. It is assumed that if the unitary system succeeds in developing an appreciation for common humanity, and so on, those who are so educated will later wish to live in the kind of society in which these values prevail.

Few would deny the potential educational value of mixed schooling. But critics of enforced educational mixing do not believe that it necessarily leads to the results which egalitarians wish. Cooper, for example, argues that coerced educational mixing is just as likely to aggravate existing social friction, deepen mutual contempt, or incite individual rebelliousness (1980, pp. 94-97).

Another possible approach to the defence of the unitary school system is to regard it as a requirement of the principle of equality of educational opportunity. The unitary school system may be seen as a way of giving everyone a fair educational start in the quest for educational as well as post-educational benefits. Opportunity is seen as chiefly an environmental notion. Ennis holds a similar view of the nature of opportunity: "Only environmental, as contrasted with personal, factors are constitutive of having an opportunity" (1978, p. 176). Educational opportunity means the presence of those environmental factors which facilitate education, or the absence of those environmental factors which are obstacles to the pursuit of education. It is difficult to determine what those factors are, but a unitary system, it is assumed, comes closest to being an even spread of educational facilitators, and an even removal of obstacles to education. It is seen as the embodiment of the egalitarian ideal of the levelling of educational opportunities.

I have already suggested that where educational opportunities are

unequal outside of the school, a unitary system is not a way of levelling
opportunities. But even if a unitary system did ensure a fair and equal
educational start -- the view of life as a race for benefits is often
encountered in discussions of this issue -- it obviously is not a way
of ensuring equal results. Those who employ meritarian interpretations
of the equality of opportunity principle may also defend a unitary system
as a fair beginning. Those egalitarians who go along with the ideal of
'just' meritocratic arrangements in society may also defend a unitary
system on these grounds. For some egalitarians, like Manley, the social
consequences of natural endowment, wherever they may lead, are always
to be preferred to the social consequences of the exercise of parental
privilege. But these are other considerations which may be brought to
bear on defence of the unitary system. The point is that even if it
allows fair and equal access to education, there is little reason to
believe that it will therefore result in the removal of inequality in
the post-educational domain. Equal beginnings often lead to unequal
endings.

Even if the unitary system provides equality of educational oppor-
tunity, it is for this reason also open to some of the objections which
have been levelled against the equality of opportunity ideal. According
to Rawls, "Equality of opportunity means an equal chance to leave the
less fortunate behind in the personal quest for influence and social
position" (1971, pp. 106-107). Singer argues that equality of oppor-
tunity rewards the genetically fortunate and penalizes those who are less
endowed (1979, p. 35). Williams sums up objections of this kind as
follows: "a thorough-going emphasis on equality of opportunity must
deny a certain sense of common humanity which is itself an ideal of

equality" (1964, p. 129). In short, if it is an instrument of the equality of educational opportunity ideal, the unitary system may well lead to consequences which are contrary to the spirit of egalitarianism.

I have argued that a mixed school system is compatible with the quest for egalitarianism in education. If it is indeed true that egalitarianism in education leads to egalitarianism in society, a mixed school system is also defensible on instrumental egalitarian grounds. But it may well be the case that neither system, however egalitarian, is a major causal factor in bringing about the kind of society envisioned by egalitarians. If it is easier to alter school systems than it is to transform wider social and economic arrangements, egalitarianism in education is perhaps the more plausible of the two objectives. If a society succeeds in making the period of people's lives spent in tutelage one which is worth having for everyone, a good would have been achieved. The social consequences of this kind of start in life, whether egalitarian or not, are likely to be promising.

VI

I said earlier, that there are non-egalitarian arguments which might be offered in support of a unitary school system. The same is true of a mixed system. I shall conclude by mentioning some of them. The mixed school system is not only compatible with the pursuit of egalitarianism, it has a number of advantages which I believe are important in a society like Jamaica.

First, it encourages, in the educational sphere, the kind of self-reliance and initiative which the Jamaican democratic socialists saw as

an important part of social reform. Indeed many of the non-elitist
secondary schools in the society have been the products of this kind of
initiative, and have contributed to the welfare of the society, and
especially to the welfare of the socially less advantaged. Independent
educational efforts continue to provide most of the pre-primary educa-
tion in the society, and this is especially true in the rural areas.
Those educational arrangements and alternatives which people provide for
themselves can do much to advance the positive self-perception which Manley
and others claim is so needed in Jamaican society.

Second, I agree with Hare (1977) that educational resources are best
viewed, not as a good to be equally shared among children, but as an
asset to be used for the welfare of the total community. This is a
utilitarian perspective, and it involves a utilitarian conception of
equality: perhaps what Nagel calls "letting each person's interests con-
tribute in the same way to determining what in sum would be best overall"
(1979, p. 113). It seems to me that a society with a richly and diversely
educated population, in which -- to adapt a phrase from Mao -- a hundred
educational flowers are allowed to bloom, is one which is more likely
to maximize social utilities than is one with a largely similarly edu-
cated population. Mixed school systems encourage this kind of educational
richness and diversity. Social efficiency is advanced when the jobs to
be done are done by the most able. If the society is to produce the
educated personnel needed for social reform, there will be occasions
when utilitarian considerations will have more force than egalitarian
ones.

Third, by being responsive to autonomy and the exercise of parental
rights, the mixed system is a way of preserving freedom in the society.

The Jamaican democratic socialists saw equality as more important than
freedom. They would probably have agreed with Wollheim (1961b) that
the principle of equality renders the principle of liberty superflous.
I side with de Tocqueville (1980) and Rawls (1971) in giving primacy to
the protection of equal freedom. A commitment to the preservation of
freedom in the educational domain need not exclude the pursuit of other
objectives, and this includes the goal of egalitarianism.

CHAPTER SIX

IDEOLOGY AND POLITICAL EDUCATION

The term 'political education' appeared with some frequency in the literature of the Jamaican variant of democratic socialism, and especially, it seems, in the writings of Manley. He saw "a massive and persistent process of political education" as a way of persuading institutions to subject their sectional interests to larger national objectives (1974, p. 164). In commenting on the history of his party he claimed that "in the 1940's particularly, it carried out political education work of the greatest importance and the most profound kind" (People's National Party 1979, Foreword). "As soon as I became Prime Minister in 1972," he wrote, "we decided that the Government owed a great responsibility to embark upon programmes of Political Education" (Agency for Public Information n.d., p. 4). The People's National Party claimed it was committed to what it called "public education"; it believed it should "make a conscious effort, through programmes designed for public education, to inculcate new values and attitudes with the building of a Democratic Society" (1979, p. 42). Mass political education was seen as an important aspect of the strategy for change.

Political education was the strategy which, in Manley words, was to be carried out at "the psychological and attitudinal level" (1974, p. 66). By bringing about new forms of awareness, and by keeping certain emphases alive in the public consciousness, some ideologies may be said to be broadly educational. I have already commented on the importance of political education in the democratic socialist scheme. Here, the

belief was that a society can be changed by first changing its values, and that it is the task of ideology and political education to effect the value changes which are seen as the precondition for social change.

Presumably, this programme of political education was to be directed at the society as a whole, and especially perhaps, at the adult society. But were children to be politically educated as well? The People's National Party obviously believed that some form of political education should be a part of schooling since it proposed the broadening of the curricula to "include the teaching of all forms of political systems and ideologies" (1979, p. 43). The People's National Party Youth Organization went further than its parent body on this matter; it claimed that: "We must unapolegetically teach socialism in our classrooms from kindergarten right up to university level" (quoted in Maraire 1978, p. 65). Murray quotes Manley as advocating that schools "must be involved in the political process both internally and externally." Apparently by "the political process" Manley did not mean party politics, but "politics in the wider sense of how any group responds to its problems and arrives at decisions about these problems" (Murray 1979, p. 179).

In what follows I shall first of all examine three areas of inquiry which I think bear importantly on any scheme of political education. Following this, I shall examine some of the arguments which may be brought to bear on the issue of whether or not political education ought to be a part of schooling, especially schooling at the primary and secondary levels. I shall argue that political education at these levels, especially in the Jamaican context, is justified. Finally, I contend that a politically aware liberal arts curriculum is likely to be the most worthwhile kind of political education in a society like Jamaica.

<u>II</u>

Although they do not exhaust the field, I think the following spheres
of inquiry are crucial for any scheme of political education. First, it
needs an account of what is to be understood by the term 'political'.
A conception of what it is to be political may be presupposed or made
explicit by a programme of political education, but it cannot be avoided.
Second, a scheme of political education involves some ideal of what it
is to be a politically educated person. It employs criteria according
to which the politically educated person is to be distinguished from
the politically uneducated person. Third, given its general importance
in political affairs, and its special importance in the Jamaican con-
text, the place of ideology in any overall scheme of political education
is in need of careful consideration and explication. I shall examine
each of these spheres of inquiry in turn.

(1) If, as is traditionally done, we take 'political' to mean that
which concerns the state, we may take 'political education' to mean (a)
education which is sponsored, organized and carried out by the state;
or (b) education which is chiefly concerned with preparation for the
life of the state or body politic. According to (a) education is poli-
tical if it proceeds from a political source, if it is carried out by
a political authority. This distinguishes it from education which pro-
ceeds from a religious, industrial or other source. In the case of (b)
it is a possible function of education, and not its source, which is
stressed. Education is political if its function is to satisfy the
distinctly political requirements of the life of the body politic.
The notion of the state comes in if we take 'state' to be another name

for 'body politic'. A state or body politic is a group of persons organized for purposes of independent, autonomous government: it is not subject to any external, legal control, and has invested supreme legislative, executive and judicial authority within its own territory in a set of institutions by means of which its common intentions -- defence, unification and control of the population, and so on -- are to be carried out. Final power is centralized and monopolized in these institutions. The institutions of government are part of the state. But the state is the group as a whole, and statehood refers to its mode of organization. If the institutions are sometimes called the state this is because they represent or symbolize the group, and their existence indicates the mode of organization which characterizes the condition of being a body politic. The life of a body politic consists chiefly in the relations between the participants in such an arrangement. There is obviously more to 'state' and 'body politic' than I have mentioned here. But the point is that if we take 'political' to mean that which concerns the state, and if by 'state' we mean a body politic, or a group of a certain kind, then political education is education for the demands of the life of this kind of group whatever the characteristics of such a group are taken to be. My special interest here is in the self-governed or democratic state.

Important questions arise out of both these views of political education. The teaching power, to use a phrase of Tussman's, is one of the powers invested in the state, and one which is increasingly being monopolized by it. Tussman's use of the term 'teaching power' is to be understood in the light of the modern doctrine of the separation of the powers of the state into the legislative, executive, judicial, or other

powers. He offers the term as a name for a power which is widely assumed and exercised by modern states, but which is without a customary name. In his view the teaching power -- which may be strongly or weakly exercised -- is the often constitutional "authority of the state to establish and direct the teaching activity and institutions needed to ensure its continuity and further its legitimate general and special purposes" (1977, p. 54). Tussman believes the state has a natural right to exercise its teaching power in the interest of social preservation and renewal. He also believes that the entry of the state into the domain of the mind is inevitable. But even if it is granted that Tussman has named a power which exists and which is widely exercised, there are questions arising out of the difference between state sponsorship and state control of education, and the degree and scope of direct state entry, especially through the activity of partisan and self-interested governments, into the sphere of the public mind.

Even if the state has the legal authority and power to conduct and enforce teaching, the question of its ability and qualifications to teach remains. In commenting on the modern transition from religious to political control of education, Meiklejohn observes that "No institution can teach unless it is equipped with the ideas, the appreciations, the wisdom out of which alone teaching can be made" (1966, p. 4). Meiklejohn believes that the state is qualified for the role. The emerging states of the Third World, in exercising their re-gained or newly acquired teaching power, derive their teaching qualifications from the quality of their own experiences and accomplishments. Much obviously depends on the quality of the culture from which this teaching springs. Mead suggests that:

> Not until we realize that a poor culture will never become
> rich, though it be filtered through the expert methods of
> unnumbered pedagogues, and that a rich culture with no
> system of education at all will leave its children better
> off than a poor culture with the best system in the world,
> will we begin to solve our educational problems (1966,
> p. 277).

This view seems to equate education with enculturation. But it points
in the direction of what some of the educational limitations of the
state's teaching power might be.

Ways of characterizing the state, of giving substance to one's
understanding of 'political', give rise to another set of questions.
Merely marking off the political sphere conceptually, and defining
it in terms of the state, can only go so far in helping the would-be
political educator. Equally important for his task are his perceptions
of the life of the polity, his way of characterizing it, and the atti-
tudes and outlook he takes to it. These will influence the content
and the general approach which he takes to political education. Two
examples will illustrate what I mean.

According to Tussman, "The theory of education is essentially the
theory of the government of mind; it is hopeless when it is not at
the same time a theory of the state - a theory of political obligation"
(1960, p. 103). In his view, a theory of political obligation based
on contractarian theory is the theory of the state which should serve
as the basis for a programme of political education. His approach is
to select from a number of possible relationships within a polity one
which, in his view, best characterizes political life. He rejects the
relationship between ruler and ruled, and that between persons who
share common habits and traditions; in his view these ways of viewing

the state do not offer ways of making sense of important notions like the public interest, obligation, authority, rights, duties, and political freedom. But he believes that there is a relationship which is compatible with these notions; this relationship is agreement, especially agreement to subordinate private interest and private decision to the public interest and to public decision. A body politic, in his view, "is a group of persons related by a system of agreements; to be a member of a body politic is to be a party to the system of agreements" (1960, p. 7). An important part of his scheme of political education, therefore, is to advocate this way of viewing the state.

Crick and Porter (1978, pp. 4-6), in contrast, do not employ an ideal conception of the state. Like Tussman they single out one relationship, but their choice is decided on chiefly on the basis of empirical observation of political life; it is what they think political life is, rather than what they think it ought to be. In their view the political life is chiefly one of conflict. Political life consists mostly in dealing with conflicting alternatives, and its chief aim is to seek the "creative conciliation" of differing moral and material interests. Political education, on this view, is mainly education into knowing what the conflicts are, who believes what about them and why, what procedures for resolving them are available, the development of the appropriate conciliatory attitudes, and so on.

These approaches emphasize different kinds of agreement. Tussman employs the voluntary association model of the state and wants agreement to be the foundation of the body politic. In his view, agreement about how disagreement is to be resolved is prior to agreement about the transformation of particular conflicts. Crick and Porter focus on the

ongoing search for agreement on particular questions of social policy. Both are aware of the importance of conflict in political life. Tussman thinks conflict is best contained by stressing the underlying consensual elements which give cohesion to political life. Crick and Porter seem to think it is best contained by increasing understanding of the actual institutions and processes by which conflict is resolved.

My aim here is not to assess the merits or inadequacies of these approaches. The point of these examples is to show how the direction or slant of a programme of political education is determined by the underlying conception of the political. For the political educator, a conception of the political is an important tool. Both of these approaches, however, seem to me to omit at least one important consideration. If he wants to do more than employ a conception of the political, or be influenced by his educational actions by one, the political educator has to make inquiry into ways of characterizing the political a part of his educational task. My own view is that the imposition of a single conception of the political is inconsistent with the idea of a democratic society. In such a society, ways of interpreting the world emanate from its people. The young are to be educated to investigate whatever can be investigated, and the question of how the political is to be understood seems to me to be one of the central questions of any educational enterprise. If the democratic ideal is to be taken seriously, the political educator's conception of the political is to be itself the subject of critical inquiry.

(2) Another important sphere of inquiry which needs to be taken into account centres on the word 'education'. Any scheme of political education faces the problem of deciding what it is to be a politically educated person. In a general sense, to be educated is to possess

knowledge, values and skills of certain kinds; to be educated involves

cognitive, affective and behavioural considerations. A scheme of political

education, therefore, requires accounts of what is to be understood by

notions like political knowledge, political values, and political skills.

At the same time, just as conceptions of what it is to be political may

be brought to bear on what it is to be politically educated, conceptions

of what it is to be educated may be brought to bear on what it is to be

educated in relation to the political sphere. One may begin with a

theory of politics, or with a theory of education, but ultimately one

needs both. Where one starts may, of course, reflect one's main interest.

But a scheme of political education obviously involves an exploration of

the relations between the two. I shall briefly consider some of what

is involved in bringing chiefly educational perspectives to bear on the

life of the polis.

Take, first of all, the problem of knowledge. Political life

obviously depends on knowledge of various kinds. The polity brings its

knowledge to bear on the pursuit of its common interests. This knowledge

may be historical, economic, sociological, or indeed it may be knowledge

of any sort. But granted that any kind of knowledge may become politically

significant, are there kinds of knowledge which are unique to the political

sphere? According to Aristotle (1954, BK. I., Sec. 5), political studies

seek knowledge of the supreme good which men pursue; politics is a

'master science' which incorporates the knowledge and the ends of all

other sciences, and is concerned with the integration, application and

direction of these subsidiary ends towards the larger and finer end of

what is good for the polis as a whole. But however this question is

answered, political educators have to make up their minds about what kinds

of knowledge they believe political life requires. The forms of knowledge employed in the life of the polis have to be acquired. Those concerned with political education inquire into their nature and their modes of acquisition. They are committed to the view that this kind of understanding can lead to the improvement of political life.

Some examples of the kinds of knowledge which political educators -- at least those I know about -- typically take to be instances of political knowledge will indicate the general drift of their approach. Political knowledge is taken to be knowledge of the history, basic concepts, and constitutional basis of the polity; of governmental institutions and processes; of international affairs; of the political uses of research, and so on. To have knowledge of this kind is seen as a necessary, but of course not a sufficient condition for being a politically educated person.

Political education is also a species of values education. Here, the problem is deciding on what the political values are. Are there values which are a necessary part of the politically educated person's outlook? For one thing, political considerations are to a large extent territorial in nature: they are bound to particular polities. A multi-cultural polity, for example, may idealize multi-culturalism; a theocracy may stress religious values. Polities differ in the values they espouse and in the values they may wish to promote in their schools.

One approach, for example that suggested by Crick, is to promote those values which are applicable to political life everywhere. In his view, freedom, toleration, fairness, respect for truth, and respect for reasoning are examples of such values. He believes that these values -- he calls them "procedural values" -- are presupposed by the procedures

of civilized politics everywhere. He also believes that it is possible
to give universally acceptable accounts of them which are stripped of
any specific interpretations particular polities might give them (Crick
1978, pp. 63-72).

It can be agreed that political considerations are not necessarily
restricted to particular polities, and that there are political questions
and problems -- like the problem of political obligation for example --
which are common to all men. Apart from whether or not his claims are
true, Crick's approach is important in that it draws attention to poli-
tical life as a general human enterprise. But it can be argued that a
scheme of political education is inadequate if in its wish to escape the
possible excesses which may be linked with the territorial nature of
politics -- excesses like ethnocentrism, nationalism, chauvinism, and
so on -- it seeks to be indifferent or neutral with respect to the values
of the polity under whose auspices it is carried on, and whose interests
it presumably seeks to promote. Should a programme of political educa-
tion promote the values of the polity which sponsors it? My own view
is that it should, and that a polity's introduction of its political
values to its young is a central component of the educational process.
There are, of course, important questions about method, and I shall
shortly consider some of these. There is also the problem of the place
for those contrary political values which may be espoused by teachers
and students alike. What is clear is that a balanced programme of
political education combines concern with the particularities of the
polity which sponsors it -- including particularities of value -- with
interest in the universal questions in the field of politics.

But regardless of what one knows or values, it is the quality of one's political actions which is ultimately the measure of one's political education. As an enterprise, political education is justified only if it can make a positive qualitative difference at the behavioural level: if it improves the quality of the actor's role in the life of the polis.

It is necessary to be clear about what the political skills are supposed to be. We may employ a valuable distinction advanced by Tussman (1960) and say they are the skills of political membership and the skills of political agency. One may, of course, perform both roles. The skills of membership are the skills of citizenship: obeying the law, electoral duties, active involvement in political issues, and so on. The skills of agency are skills of leadership, representation, and the interpretation of the will of those represented. To educate for agency is to seek to improve the political actions of those who rule. Plato saw this as the most important educational enterprise of all. In Tussman's view, it is still the greatest unmet challenge of education.

This general view of education as an enterprise concerned with knowledge, values and skills may be considered in the light of particular conceptions of what it is to be an educated person. Approached from this angle, being politically educated is a facet of some larger view of what it means to say that someone is educated. It is a measure of the adequacy of any such conception of education if it may be usefully brought to bear on any facet of the educational enterprise; it could be considered a defect of any such theory if it had nothing to say about preparation for the life of the polis.

The following examples illustrate this approach. Rousseau (1962) believed that to be educated is to realize one's natural, human good-

ness by becoming free from the defects of society. On this view, to be politically educated is also to be educated for goodness and freedom, and Rousseau sought a theory of the state by which he thought men might realize their moral freedom through participation in political life. R.S. Peters (1963), to take a more recent example, sees education as initiation into intrinsically worthwhile modes of thought and conduct. The politically educated person, on this view, is someone who has been initiated -- by those already initiated -- into intrinsically valuable modes of political thought and action. This account does not give us a way of determining what forms of political thought and conduct are worthwhile. But the notion of initiation is a familiar one in the idea of political education and transition.

(3) The ideologies of politics and education involve conceptions of political life and education which often elicit broad allegiance, and which may therefore have considerable impact on society. They are liberal, socialist or other views of the state; they are traditional, progressive, or other ideologies of education. In most of the modern world the political ideologies dominate. In view of the importance of the influence which ideological considerations may have on political education -- they may for example influence its justification, its content or its methods -- the nature of the relation between the two is in need of careful examination.

It will be recalled that according to my view of ideology, ideological beliefs (a) are shared by some group and help to define the social and political identity of that group; (b) direct and guide social and political action; (c) are sense-making in that they help to explain, justify, as well as give intelligibility, meaning, order and coherence

to social and political experience; and (d) are focused on the solution of specific problems of social and political organization.

Fried claims that "No state known has ever been devoid of an ideology that consecrated its power and sanctioned its use" (1967, p. 238). It is important, I think, to distinguish between the ideology of the state and the ideology of government. This distinction is especially applicable to democratic polities; in these polities ideological pluralism is tolerated. I turn now to a fuller characterization of these two kinds of ideology.

The ideology of the state is a set of beliefs shared by members of the polity; these beliefs are the source of the polity's sense of identity and character. They are beliefs about the principles around which the life of the polity is organized; these are the principles which guide and direct its conduct. It is by reference to the beliefs constituting its ideology that the state explains its purposes, justifies its existence, and seeks to give meaning, order and coherence to the social and political experience of those who participate in its life. The ideology of a state is typically, and at least partially, expressed in its constitution. The ideology of the state aims at the creation and the maintenance of a political community.

When the state is a multi-party democracy, it is committed to allowing other ideological groupings within its borders. Williams (1961) suggests that liberal democracy is an ideology -- we hold similar but in some respects different views of ideology -- consisting mainly of beliefs about the importance of toleration, scepticism concerning the possession of certainty in political and related matters, and the belief in the importance of individual rights. These beliefs constitute

the ideological foundations for its characteristic institutions like universal suffrage, freedom of the press, the rule of law, and so on.

An ideology of government is a set of beliefs shared by those who, in a democratic state, have been elected to govern. In a multi-party democracy, these beliefs are generally drawn from the ideology of the political party with which the government is affiliated. These beliefs guide and direct its policies in the administration of the polity's affairs; they are a source of justification for these policies, and help to give them coherence and focus. They are responses to those kinds of problems -- change, conservation, and so on -- to which particular ideologies are most responsive.

In multi-party democracies, the ideology of the state usually sets the limits on the scope of governmental ideologies. Ideally, an ideology of government should never be in conflict with the ideology of the state which it represents. A state authorizes a government to manage its affairs for some period of time. The democratic state utilizes the ideological pluralism which it contains within its wider and more basic ideological framework. Governments, however, sometimes seek to make alterations in the ideology of the state. To be legitimate, such alterations need the authorization of the membership of the polity. The ideology of the state is usually expected to outlast particular governments.

There are different relations between these two kinds of ideology and political education. It can be argued that a polity has a right to use its public schools to promote the ideology on which its mode of political organization rests. To be aware, however critically, of what the ideology of one's polity is, seems to me to be an important part of

what it means to say someone is politically educated. I believe the relation between the ideology of the state and political education is of greater importance than the relation between an ideology of government and political education.

Obvious difficulties arise if changing governments -- even if they are legitimately elected in a multi-party democracy -- seek to use public schools to promote their own ideologies. The school becomes a place where governments compete for the allegiance of students; it becomes the proverbial football kicked around in the pursuit of partisan gains. Political education comes to mean education into the ideology of the government in power. The idea of the state as a shared, common and enduring entity is eroded.

But this is not to say that there may be no relation between an ideology of government and political education. A government is likely to bring its ideological outlook to bear on its administration of the polity's educational affairs. This ideological outlook may, for instance, influence its priorities and emphases in the educational domain. It may choose to emphasize political education if, given its ideological lights, this emphasis seems to be in the interest of the polity. It would be justified in doing so if this was part of the platform on which it was elected. But even if this is so, its chief business, I submit, is to arrange and administer political education on behalf of the state which it represents.

There are two aspects of the educational division of government -- both suggested by the writings of Tussman -- which, if insisted on, may help to limit the excesses of governmental ideologies. The first is from Tussman's account of the anatomy of the teaching power of govern-

ment. Consistent with the doctrine of the separation of powers, and
the relative independence of each of these powers, the teaching power
must also claim a degree of autonomy. This autonomy is analogous to
legislative privilege, executive prerogative, and judicial independence.
Thus, according to Tussman, as the academic branch of government, the
teaching power claims "within a system of due process, the freedom,
within its own domain, necessary for the integrity of its own function"
(1977, p. 58). Just as the judiciary is authorized to interpret the
laws made by government in accordance with its own ideals of justice,
the teaching power -- which is shared by administrators, education
officers, teachers, and so on -- is authorized to interpret the educa-
tional policies of government in the light of its own educational ideals.
This is an important part of Tussman's conception of academic freedom.

The second is a way of looking at the previously mentioned notion
of political agency. Those who exercise the teaching power are agents
of the state. They are not agents of governments or political parties.
Both those who make governmental policy, and those who interpret and
apply it, are ultimately responsible to the state which they represent,
and not to any sectional, partisan groups within it.

The perspective of the student also has to be considered, with
respect to both the ideology of the state and the ideology of the govern-
ment. The ideology of the state contains beliefs which will increasingly
influence his political life. How he makes up his mind about them will
play a central role in the evolution of his political self-hood, and
in his political coming of age. At the same time the educational
arrangements and emphases of particular governments may well influence
his perceptions of the political domain. If the student is not to be

manipulated by either, a degree of ideological transparency is necessary: he needs to 'see through' to the ideological foundations of the state in the background, and he needs to understand the nature and function of governmental ideologies in the polity.

The ideologies of state and government -- along with the ideologies of the wider political world -- need to enter schooling not only as influence, but as content to be reflected on. The ideologies operating behind the scenes need to be brought on stage to be examined in the company of others. The aim need not be to defend favoured ideologies while seeking to discredit others. The aim, rather, is to expand understanding of politics by attending to its ideological dimensions. Those who are to be educated need to understand the part which ideologies may play in personal political choice and commitment. I shall argue later that liberal education is the form of education most suited to this enterprise.

III

Is there justification for a programme of political education at the primary and secondary levels in Jamaica? In trying to answer this question I shall examine three general arguments against formal political education as a part of schooling which may be advanced by those who doubt the efficacy or advisability of such programmes. I shall try to assess the force of these arguments when applied to the Jamaican context. It needs to be shown that objections to formal political education can be met, and that a positive case can be made for it.

The first objection to formal political education arises out of

the fear of partisanship. It can be broken down into a number of specific claims. (a) Formal political education will make the school a platform for the promotion of partisan interests. (b) The entry of partisanship into schooling -- it is believed that with political education this entry is inevitable -- will lead to conflict which will divide and disrupt the life of the school. (c) Those who carry it out will use political education to indoctrinate the young into their own political beliefs. It is believed that in order to avoid these undesirable consequences, political education should be excluded from schooling.

A programme of political education which emphasizes the ideology of the state and which stresses consensual values may be able to avoid some of these objections. But a programme of political education -- indeed any programme of public schooling in general -- which ignores the issue of political partisanship altogether, ignores one of the important facts of social and political life; its effectiveness is likely to be reduced if this aspect of the life of the polity is not addressed. If it is not to retreat into academic quietism, the school needs to address whatever is important in people's lives.

A school will, of course, have fewer reasons to fear the dangers of partisanship if it insists on acting on principles like objectivity and fairness. These are some of the educational ideals which bear on the school's autonomous exercise of the teaching power, and on its interpretation and application of educational policy. The school is also committed to ideals like the free play of critical intelligence, intellectual rigour, and the treatment of issues at certain levels of abstraction. It may bring these ideals to bear on the issue of political partisanship, as on any other.

The aim is not to give partisanship an official voice in the school, but to educate the young into ways of listening to, and entering into dialogue with, the voice of partisanship in political as well as non-political matters. This is an enterprise which poses important methodological problems, and there may be doubts about its possible efficacy. The kind of programme I have in mind includes those activities aimed at the development of critical thinking, value reasoning, and the analysis of political arguments and decisions. It would also include inquiry into the value as well as the problems of partisanship in the affairs of the democratic state.

I think it is hardly possible, with or without formal political education, to prevent partisan preferences from entering the school. Like moral, aesthetic or other values, they enter the school by way of those who conduct its affairs, and they exert influence, even if they do so indirectly, by being a part of what is sometimes called the hidden curriculum. Opponents of political education prefer to keep this influence at this indirect level. In their view, the classroom is a public space and its public nature is dangerously violated if partisan political preference, considered a private matter, is allowed to surface in it. But it is with the public significance of political partisanship, and not with its private dimension, that a programme of political education would be chiefly concerned. The kinds of conflict which opponents of political education fear, may be reduced if this distinction is kept in mind. Partisanship, as a public issue, gives the school an opportunity to bring its resources to bear on one of the central and most difficult areas of political life.

The degree of dissidence which exists in some totalitarian states suggests that it might be more difficult to indoctrinate people than is commonly supposed. But the spectre of indoctrination haunts all would-be programmes of political education. Indoctrination and education are opposed notions, and a programme of political education is incorrectly named if it seeks to indoctrinate rather than educate. But how are the two to be distinguished? Without going too far afield into this much discussed issue, I shall mention what seems to me to be one important difference; it is a difference which I believe has an important bearing on political education.

Attempts at defining indoctrinatory teaching have customarily employed criteria like content, intention and method (Cooper 1973, p. 43). Those who stress content sometimes employ the distinction between belief and knowledge -- with belief taken to be the weaker of the two -- and indoctrinatory teaching is taken to be teaching which is chiefly concerned with the inculcation of beliefs. Political, religious and moral beliefs are regarded as paradigms of the content of indoctrinatory teaching. According to those who stress intention, teaching is indoctrinatory if those who conduct it intend to achieve results of a certain kind: they may, for instance, wish to have certain ideas so firmly implanted in the minds of those they teach, that these ideas are unlikely to be shaken by subsequent evidence of any kind. To those who stress method, teaching is indoctrinatory if it discourages the use of reason, if it does not respect the autonomy of the learner, if it is conducted without regard for principles of fair inquiry, and so on.

My own view is that an approach which stresses method is the most useful of the three. An approach which emphasizes content excludes too

much from the educational sphere, and from the responsibility of the school. Much of what, on some interpretations, it seeks to exclude -- like beliefs about values -- are such that they cannot be kept out of the educational domain. Even if the intention to indoctrinate is a necessary condition for indoctrinatory teaching -- and it seems to me that it may well be the case that it is not -- this intention is largely determined by inference from observable evidence, including, of course, methodological evidence. An emphasis on method does not restrict the scope of educational responsibility. Unlike intentions, methods con-stitute a directly observable domain. Using a methods approach one may, on the basis of observation, assess teaching according to criteria like respect for rationality, autonomy, and fair inquiry. A programme of political education may reduce the dangers of indoctrination if it is guided by ideals of this kind.

The fear of partisanship seems to be especially justified in a society like Jamaica. Fierce, partisan political conflict is one of the country's chief political problems. The tradition of multi-party demo-cracy inherited from Britain is carried out with almost tribal intensity. Near to elections -- the only time when, according to Rousseau, people in representative democracies are free -- this partisan conflict often erupts into violence. A Jamaican political scientist and newspaper columnist describes this conflict as follows:

> ...two-party competition in Jamaica has never been con-
> ducted like a tea party nor a Sunday school picnic. The
> rules of the game are rough indeed. Personal abuse, lies
> and fabrications, rumours, crude propaganda, aggression,
> violence, egocentric personality displays and personality
> cults, and intimidating demonstrations of power designed
> to bluff opponents and weaken their confidence are all
> mixed together in a very, very tough confrontation for
> power (Stone 1978, p. 11).

It is a society in which children develop strong political allegiances at an early age, and they are themselves often the victims of political violence.

In Jamaica, the option of stressing the ideology of the state is also beset with difficulties. Like most former colonies, the country is in the process of deciding what that ideology should be. One evidence of this is the dispute concerning the autochthony of the Jamaican Independence Constitution (Barnett 1977, pp. 28-33). It is viewed by some Jamaicans as a distillation of the country's experience, or of what Oakeshott (1967, pp. 10-11) in his view of ideology would call an abstract, abbreviation, or abridgement of Jamaican political traditions. Others contend that it was imposed by an elite and was tailored to protect their class interests. Some find its roots in European culture objectionable. It was unlikely that it would have been stressed by any programme of political education under the Manley Government since this government also believed that the Jamaican Independence Constitution lacks autochthony, and used this claim in its campaign for constitutional reform. Indeed the imprint of its governmental ideology -- including the wish to promote some socialist values in schools -- was evident in the educational policy of the Manley Government.

The fact that the Jamaican school is surrounded by such intense partisan conflict -- which may even be increasing its hold on it -- suggests that the school's commitment to objectivity and other non-political values may be in need of defence. But it also suggests that if the school can do anything to improve the quality of partisanship in the political sphere, the need to do so is just as pressing.

Nettleford had what I am calling the ideology of the state in mind when he suggested that political education should contribute to "reflection on the principle-foundations of the society" (1962, p. 211). The quest for a set of beliefs which can command greater allegiance than partisan loyalties is still, perhaps, the central enterprise in Jamaican politics. It seems to me that to suggest that this is a quest which students in schools should not be thinking about is to draw an unnecessarily hard line between education and life.

The second objection to political education is the view that political life is chiefly an adult concern. Because children are not full members of the polity until they reach a certain age, they have traditionally posed problems for political theory. The principles which are applicable to adults are not easily applied to them. There is a tendency, therefore, to exclude them from considerations of political affairs. Political life may also be seen as a rough business from which they should be protected. Like sex, the life of politics is seen as something into which they will gradually grow. Until they are of age they are better kept occupied with other things.

It is true that the political sphere is better known for its elder statesmen than for its prodigies. But whatever its psychological or ritualistic value, or its social convenience, a sharp distinction between the period of nonage and adulthood does not reflect the gradual nature of human maturation. As with most things, political perceptions begin early in children and evolve as they grow older. The gradual nature of this process requires gradual treatment. The arrangements of civil society, as I think Hobbes correctly observed, are largely artificial; they have to be learned, and it seems they are learned with

great difficulty. It may well be the case that the later stages of adult

political performance could be improved if conscious preparation began

earlier. Even if he restricted the art of rule to the wisest of those

of more advanced years, Plato who sensed the importance of early beginnings,

believed that education for political membership should begin very early

in life.

Jamaica, like other Third World societies, has certain features

which help to explain the concern with the politicisation of youth, and

which may also be offered as justification for this concern. Because of

a high rate of population growth, youth is not a small, sheltered minority,

but a large and restive section of the population which is rapidly swell-

ing the membership of the polity; the quality of the life of the polis

seems to be threatened by the masses of unprepared young people who are

coming of age politically. Everywhere, societies focus their optimism

on youth, but this is especially the case in societies which see youth

as the chief hope of major social reform. It is through the politicisa-

tion of youth that they hope to shed the old Adam of the inherited

political cultures they so often wish to discard. In the older and

more self-assured polities, political education may, in Oakeshott's

words, begin "in the enjoyment of a tradition" (1967, p. 17). In the

underdeveloped societies, however, political education is more likely

to begin in discontent with the inherited tradition, and in the

questioning of the existing political culture. In these societies,

faith in the politicisation of youth through political education is

part of their general faith in the liberating power of education in

general.

The third objection to political education is the view that informal

political socialization is sufficient. A polity has other ways -- includ-
ing its rituals, myths, heroes, the media, and so on -- by which it
may transmit its political outlook to its young. The view that the
school should also be used for this purpose is believed to be in need of
justification.

One possible response to this objection is to contend that there
is a difference between political socialization and political education.
Political socialization means the acquisition of the norms and values of
the existing culture, whatever these may be; usually this means doing
so to the satisfaction of the majority, or of those who exercise most
power and influence in the polity. Political socialization is conser-
vative rather than creative. Political education, however, requires
that a broad exposure combined with critical analysis and disciplined
inquiry are part of the process by which a political outlook is developed.
One may be socialized into undesirable aspects of a political culture.
Education however, involves a qualitative transformation for the better.
To be worthy of the name, political education must involve the conscious
search for quality and excellence in the political sphere.

Unlike informal socialization, schooling can be controlled. The
school can be selective; it can organize; it can conduct systematic
inquiry into political experience. Whatever its quality, political
socialization is likely to be random and uneven. Through the school,
a certain amount of political learning can be required of all those
who pass through it on their way to participation in the life of the
polity. Formal schooling is a way of carrying out preparation for the
public life in a public space which is accountable to the public which
sponsors it.

In a society like Jamaica, informal socialization alone is inadequate. To a large extent this means socialization into the defects of the culture. Furthermore, many of the informal means of socialization -- magazines, newspapers, television, and so on -- are unavailable to large sectors of the population. For the majority of the population, formal schooling at the elementaty levels provides the only opportunity for disciplined reflection on the nature and problems of the political order in which they will live.

Both informal socialization and conscious political education are, of course, subject to the limitations of the state's qualifications to conduct political education. The adult society has to improve the quality of its own political life if it is to improve its capacity to give a good political education to its young. To re-phrase Marx, the state, as political educator, is itself in need of educating.

In the Jamaican context, the dangers of partisanship in any attempt at political education are real. In the hasty and zealous quest for social reconstruction, the manipulative politicisation of youth through indoctrination is a temptation which many would-be social reformers find difficult to resist. It is difficult to bring educational ideals like objectivity and dispassionate inquiry to bear on political issues in a social and political atmosphere charged with intense partisanship and a sense of social urgency. The Jamaican school is delicately poised between the need for academic distance on the one hand, and the need for a positive political role on the other.

My own view is that if it insists on the autonomous exercise of the teaching power according to its own educational lights, the school can avoid the pitfalls of partisanship and indoctrination. The school

can contribute habits of disciplined reflection to the necessary but difficult processes of political learning, and it is only through formal political education at the early levels that these habits can be widely encouraged in the society. Formal political education may supplement informal socialization by encouraging creative reflection on the central questions concerning the life of the emerging Jamaican polity. There is a tradition in western political thought of regarding participation in the life of the _polis_ as one of the most important of the humanizing roles. If this is so, preparation for political life is one of the most important challenges facing the school in the quest for a re-humanized society.

IV

Finally, I suggest that in a society like Jamaica, the most worthwhile form of political education is likely to be achieved by means of a politically aware liberal arts curriculum. The kind of curriculum I have in mind is one which is aware of its relations with the polity which sponsors it, and with the nature, problems and aspirations of that polity. It is aware that preparation for the life of that polity is one of the chief reasons for its existence. But this awareness is also part of its wider inquiry into the nature of man as a political being.

The central ideal of liberal education is freedom: freedom from narrowness, dogmatism and crass utilitarian concerns. The liberally educated person is educated in a variety of disciplines, is accustomed to free, open inquiry, and does not believe that in its pursuit of excellence the imagination should be fettered by the practical demands

of the moment. He is also politically educated, in my view, if he is also aware of the political significance of the forms of knowledge, the values and the skills into which, to use Peters' term, he has been initiated, and if he can apply his ideals of free inquiry and unfettered reflection to the political sphere. There they may be brought to bear on his role as member or agent of the polity.

Without offering a complete political theory to satisfy the political half of the approach to political education I am advocating, I wish nevertheless to mention two aspects of political theory which I think are especially applicable in the Jamaican context. First, given the centrality of the idea of freedom, the liberal arts curriculum is in-compatible with any theory of the state which does not take freedom to be one of its chief ideals. Only states which take freedom seriously are likely to sponsor liberal education, or regard it as a way of enrich-ing its political life. Education and freedom need to be linked in a society which has known both servitude and colonial domination. Manley spoke of "the Jamaican's historical distrust of authority" (1974, p. 29). But it is power, and the abuses of power -- not authority -- which his experience has led him to fear. I do not believe that there is any political ideal which has greater meaning in the Jamaican experience than the ideal of freedom. Second, I think that social contract theory, as a heuristic device, may help to illuminate examination of some of the issues already mentioned. It is a doctrine concerned with political origins and the self-conscious basis of civil society. Such ideas are germane to young societies still in their political genesis, or societies undergoing reconstruction and radical re-assessment. Con-tractarian theory offers a model of the basis for the kind of obliga-

tions which, ideally, an educated polity might wish to accept.

My support for a politically aware liberal arts curriculum is partly
based on the view that there are a number of objections -- not easily
met -- to the idea of political education as a separate discipline.
For one thing empirical research suggests that compared with other in-
fluences, the effects of such programmes are marginal. After examining
a number of cross-national studies, Stacey concludes that "They have
far less influence than is generally appreciated by both their protago-
nists and critics" (1978, p. 67). Furthermore, while other combined
disciplines like science education, art education, and so on, draw from
a single parent discipline, political studies tend to draw from a variety
of disciplines. Attempts at making political education into a distinct
discipline tend to be either so narrow they miss much of the richness
of political life, or they become too broad to be manageable. Political
education also shares with other controversial areas, like sex educa-
tion, the difficult question of deciding on the qualifications of the
teacher. In spite of its obvious links with moral education -- both are
concerned with principles which should guide conduct -- it could become
too cloistered if it is viewed chiefly as a branch of ethical inquiry.
Even social studies, an already bulging field, does not seem to be broad
enough.

In contrast with political education as a separate field of study,
there is some cross-national empirical evidence which suggests that
general education does make a positive difference to the quality of
political life. According to Dawson and Prewitt, educated persons are,
among other things, more aware of the influence of government on the
lives of individuals, are politically more informed, tend to be more

active politically, and have greater confidence in their ability to in-
fluence the direction of governmental action (1969, pp. 175-178). The
variety of the liberal arts curriculum models the variety of the forms
of knowledge, values and skills which may be brought to bear on the life
of the polis. It makes political education the corporate responsibility
of the school and not that of a single teacher. The values of liberal
education -- freedom, objectivity, fairness, rationality, and so on,
offer the best defence against the dangers of partisanship, indoctrina-
tion, ethnocentrism, chauvinism, and the excesses of ideological influence.

The kind of programme I have in mind is one in which each discipline,
as part of its business, attends to the bearing it has on the life of
the polis. History examines the development of the polity's institu-
tions and traditions; geography considers the influences of land and
space on its life; religion explores the relations between church and
state; literature examines stories of its experience; art examines its
ways of visualizing its meanings; philosophy -- which some believe should
be taught in public schools -- critically examines its basic concepts
and assumptions; and so on. There is no discipline which has nothing
whatever to do with man as a political being. It is the business of
the school to see how the intelligence it is instituted to nurture
might be brought to bear on the life of the polity to which it is in-
escapably linked.

POSTSCRIPT

While this study was in progress the Manley Government was voted
from office. It lost the general election of October 1980, winning
only nine of the sixty parliamentary seats. The Jamaica Labour Party,
the traditional rival of the People's National Party, won all the remain-
ing seats.

The election was regarded by many Jamaicans as one of the most impor-
tant in the nation's history. Many believed that a victory for the
People's National Party would have set the country more firmly on a
socialist path, and would have led to a long-term, perhaps permanent,
alignment with the socialist bloc. The victory of the Jamaica Labour
Party has been interpreted by some observers as an indication that most
Jamaicans want to see their country become a liberal-capitalist state
aligned with the western democracies.

But it may well be the case that in its search for reform and
development the society has been experimenting with these alternatives,
and that it remains basically uncommitted to either of these options.
The defeated People's National Party received over forty percent of the
popular vote. Democratic socialism may be in retreat, but it is unlikely
that it has disappeared from the Jamaican political landscape. The
interpretation of democratic socialism examined in this study was itself
a revival of an earlier movement.

The election campaign of 1980 was the bloodiest so far in the
country's history; over five hundred persons died as victims of political
violence, and there were times when many feared a civil war. The elec-

tion was nevertheless conducted on the basis of electoral reforms agreed to by both parties and was administered by an independent commission. Many believe it was one of the fairest elections every held in the country.

For some, the fact that the election was held at all showed that the Manley Government was serious about its commitment to democracy. Parliamentary democracy seems to be still alive in Jamaica. Democratic ideology may be more deeply rooted in the culture than many suppose. Jamaica is at this time one of the few Third World countries with an unbroken -- even if severely tested -- history of parliamentary democracy.

The new government will introduce its own educational policies according to its own lights. But the problems examined in this study remain. Regardless of whether socialist or non-socialist approaches are taken to work and education, no strategy of social reform can succeed unless the will to work is released and creatively directed in the society. The pursuit of egalitarianism in or through education will be regarded by many as one of the main challenges inherited by the new administration. The unprecedented level of violence which accompanied the 1980 election emphasized the importance, in the Jamaican context, of inquiry into ideals of the politically educated society; it also re-awakened the expectation of those, like myself, who believe that formal political education in schools may contribute something towards the realization of the continuing Jamaican hope of a journey from the exper-ience of captivity to the achievement of political freedom.

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