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Self-production and freedom Gordon, Richard Douglas 1981

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SELF-PRODUCTION AND FREEDOM by RICHARD DOUGLAS GORDON B.A. , The University of B r i t i s h , Columbia, 1968 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES Department of Philosophy The University of B r i t i s h Columbia We accept t h i s thesis as conforming to the required standards THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA February 1981 Richard Douglas Gordon, 1981 In presenting th is thesis in pa r t i a l fu l f i lment of the requirements for an advanced degree at. the Univers i ty of B r i t i s h Co I umb i a, «-;l , ag ree that the L ibrary shal l make it f ree ly ava i lab le for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of th is thesis fo r scho lar ly purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by his representat ives. It is understood that copying or pub l i ca t ion of th is thes is for f inanc ia l gain sha l l not be allowed without my wri t ten permission. Department of ^ W l U W r f j The Univers i ty of B r i t i s h Columbia 2075 Wesbrook Place ' — — - , , : . y. ,, Vancouver, Canada V6T 1WS Date njlfV - i i -ABSTRACT Philosophical anthropology holds the key to the resolution of the paradoxes of freedom and necessity. Through i t s investigations the genesis of the main features of human freedom can be accounted for and the whole f i e l d given a systematic order. Yet while we see, by t h i s approach, the evolution of consciousness, s e l f - c r e a t i v i t y , transcendence, and the l i k e - the very s t u f f of freedom -we also witness the determinate nature of freedom's emergence. Marx's conception of freedom depended heavily on the Hegelian view of history. But Marx "materialized" Hegel's d i a l e c t i c , supplanting the primacy of Logos, or pure thought, i n favour of production. In production he saw arise a series of unique oppositions: i n i t i a l l y , the opposition of man to his product, and eventually of man to himself. Through these oppositions there developed, Marx f e l t , the uniquely human s e l f - c r i t i c a l capacity on which he believed freedom to be founded. Herein, t h i s approach i s extended. The fundamental structure of s e l f and the capacity to c r i t i c i z e and reform s e l f are explained as evolutionary r e l a t i v e s of production. - i i i -Recent work on freedom of the w i l l has focussed on the s u s c e p t i b i l i t y of human w i l l to i t s e l f : on the capacity for s e l f - c o n t r o l which has been termed "Hierarchical Motivation". This approach points to the roots of c r e a t i v i t y i n e f f e c t i v e self-evaluation. Herein, that thesis i s extended by approaching the issues from an anthropological rather than, as i s more normal, a psychological d i r e c t i o n . Thereby i t i s indicated that the most s a t i s f y i n g account of freedom requires more than phenomenological-conceptual analysis: i t requires s o c i o l o g i c a l and anthropological insi g h t s . - i v -TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION 1 CHAPTER I. MARX'S VIEW OF FREEDOM: AN INTERPRETATION 4 The Importance of the Early Work 4. Hegel's Influence 5 The Primacy of Production 9 The O b j e c t i f i c a t i o n of Human Being 12 O b j e c t i f i c a t i o n and Consciousness 15 The German Ideology: The Significance of Production 17 Subje c t i v i t y and Obje c t i v i t y 17 So c i a l Production and Consciousness 19 Reflexive Subjectivity 21 CHAPTER I I . THE ROLE OF PRODUCTION IN THE ORIGINATION OF CONSCIOUSNESS 2 3 Direct and Indirect Origination 2 3 Production and Consciousness 2 3 Penetration of Causality 2 4 Vocabulary of Ends and Means 25 The P o s s i b i l i t y of Opposition 32 Production and Subj e c t i v i t y 33 Cooperation and Communication 34 Conscious Reproduction 35 Some Common Features of Consciousness 37 Control of My L i f e i, 41 - v -TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER I I I . SELF-PRODUCTION AND HIERARCHICAL WILL * 43 Frankfurt's Concept of Freedom 43 Hie r a r c h i c a l W i l l and Freedom 44 Objections to the Frankfurt Theory 47 D e s i r e a b i l i t y of Free W i l l 55 Intuitions of Uniqueness 5 6 An Alternate to the Frankfurt Theory 57 Production 57 Several Forms of Hiera r c h i c a l W i l l 59 The Insufficiency of Integrity 65 A Stronger Theory of Freedom 65 Taking Our Lives i n Hand 73 CONCLUSION 76 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 78 INTRODUCTION The history of the Freedom and Necessity debate has frequently had recourse to one or another variant of the "i n t e r n a l strategy". By t h i s phrase I denote those diverse arguments designed to show that the i n d i v i d u a l has "within" a creative capacity i n the exercise of which there originates a unique, personal contribution to the causal flow. Of course, the rudimentary opening gambit of determinism i s the simple depiction of the present as the c h i l d of the past. On t h i s simple view one's being "caused" e n t a i l s one's being "made to do" whatever range of practices comprise one's l i f e . There can be about me nothing not previously present in embryo i n my cradling conditions. In response, i t can readi l y be suggested that insofar as every e f f e c t i s i n turn a cause, no deep metaphysical p r i n c i p l e bars the compatability of what i s at once the "caused" nature of humanity from being, next, an "effectuating" nature. I can be both constituted and have, accordingly, a certain determinate w i l l , and be the embodiment of a w i l l that i s uniquely con s t i t u t i v e of my own practice. Yet this schema of response seems purely formal and unpersuasive when we step back and consider the agent being impinged upon and i n turn impinging uniquely on the a f f a i r s of his l i f e . - 1 -- 2 -For, i t leaves the agent i n the flow of causation; a unique formula for the conversion of causes into e f f e c t s , perhaps, but yet the bearer of a purely mediant causal status and, i t would seem, a purely passive, epiphenomenal consciousness. A more s a t i s f y i n g response has followed out the idea that i f anything i s to be asserted on freedom's behalf i f must somehow make something of c r e a t i v i t y ; must make a case for the s e l f as the source of s e l f . C r e a t i v i t y cannot simply be the flow of self-expressive practice which, when pressed, points back over its.shoulder to p r i o r conditions. Somehow the s e l f expressed i n action must be of "inner" o r i g i n . Thus, we have seen "self-determination", "contra-causal egoism", "emergentism", and, most recently, " h i e r a r c h i c a l motivationismV. This l a t t e r variant has appeared quite r i c h i n explanatory p o s s i b i l i t i e s yet i t i s not clear that i t does not bear the same b l i g h t as contra-causal egoism; namely, that once an account of the constitution or engendering of the prime source of s e l f (contra-causal]me, or top t i e r s of motivation) i s supplied, the strategy seems toothless. Depiction of inner creative structures whose highest terms are yet caused can only be viewed as a s t a l l , one which can only put o f f the inevitable by chasing i t around a broader t h e o r e t i c a l c i r c u i t . Yet what other d i r e c t i o n i s there to go? I f we take t h i s emphasis on c r e a t i v i t y to be the c r u c i a l step; i e . , i f we adopt a broadly self-determin-i s t i c approach, i t seems we have, i n pure conceptual terms, two l o g i c a l l y exhaustive alternatives. Either (a) there i s some i n t e r n a l master-slave r e l a t i o n such that the s e l f i s - 3 -backed up by a meta-self or (b) s e l f just creates s e l f l i k e leavened dough expanding without benefit of yeast. Followed out rigorously (b) simply replaces mystery with mystery while (a) seems to f a l l prey to the just c i t e d objection: : i t merely transfers the o r i g i n a l questions regarding the constitution of human practice to a new location. I think the h i e r a r c h i c a l w i l l approach is_ flawed i n th i s way but s t i l l useful. In t h i s paper I expose a broad t h e o r e t i c a l context for h i e r a r c h i c a l motivation which ob-viates the c r i t i c i s m suggested above. That c r i t i c i s m , i t i s argued, can be avoided i f we view the s e l f i n question i n a broad context of human s o c i a l causation. We envisage thereby, i t i s claimed, a causal nexus i n which r e a l f l e s h and blood human freedom i s v i s i b l e . The main outlines of t h i s suggestion were f i r s t explored by Marx i n the early 1840's as he attempted to persuade him-s e l f that the Hegelian account of freedom could be translated into a natural idiom i n l i n e with the materialism of the day. Through t h i s period the key ingredients of Marxism were staked out. These are exposed, insofar as they bear on the question of freedom, i n Chapter I. In Chapter II the primary Marxist idea for our purposes - that humanity c o l l e c t i v e l y and i n d i v i d u a l l y i s capable of self-production - i s explored f u l l y . F i n a l l y , i n Chapter I I I , we see how t h i s conception both locates and repairs the main li n e s of argument i n the h i e r a r c h i c a l motivation theory. CHAPTER I: MARX'S VIEW OF FREEDOM AN INTERPRETATION The Importance of the Early Work Paris, the summer months of 1844, and Marx i s busy squaring accounts with Hegel. A year from now he and Engels w i l l be consolidating a draft of the new world outlook to bear Marx's name and, i n t h e i r application of i t to the day's main trends of s o c i a l thought/ w i l l produce what might be termed 'the f i r s t Manifesto 1: The German Ideology. But now Marx i s struggling to kni t several strands of his i n t e l -l e c t u a l heritage into a consistent whole. In his doctoral thesis, just four, years on the shelf, he had taken freedom's side i n the debate between freedom and necessity. He recognizes Hegel's analysis of the l o g i c of freedom as adequate, but only i n abstract terms. In his work on the Rheinish Zeitung he has seen the class nature of society and, i n two subsequent works, he has c l a r i f i e d the 2 necessity of social-economic freedom to p o l i t i c a l freedom. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Karl Marx, Frederick  Engels: Collected Works, ed. N.P. Karmanova and others, v o l . 5: The German Ideology. (New York: International Publishers, 1976). Page references i n brackets, following references to the Collected Works, are to: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The German Ideology (New York: International Publishers, 1970), ed. C.J. Arthur. The tra n s l a t i o n i n t h i s l a t t e r volume i s superior and a l l quotations are from i t . 2Marx contributed to, then edited the Rheinische Zeitung, organ of the Rheinish bourgeoisie, from March 1842 (when his academic prospects evaporated) to January 1843 - :4 -- 5 -By the time he publishes (or, non-publishes) Contribution  to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right i n the Deutsch-Franzosiche Jahrbucher (1844), the f i r s t and l a s t volume of which was immediately confiscated, he has grasped the s i g n i -ficance of alienated labour and, i n consequence, the h i s -t o r i c s i gnificance of the p r o l e t a r i a t e . While he i s e d i t i n g the Jahrbucher, Engels' "Contribution to a Critique of P o l i t i c a l Economy" arrives and Marx sees i n i t the main themes of the science of the human condition. It i s p o l i t i c a l -economy which w i l l be the proving groitd of s o c i a l and p o l i -t i c a l theory. "Production" and i t s cognate, "labour", i s to be the organizing concept of the new outlook and we fi n d Marx exploring i t thoroughly i n The Economic and Philosophic 3 Manuscripts of 1844. Hegel's Influence Just what debts Marx owes to Hegel i s a matter of con-siderable debate i n the secondary l i t e r a t u r e . . However much of his student Hegelianism Marx did r e j e c t i n the eventual (when the journal was suppressed). Through th i s work Marx saw that the law was e s s e n t i a l l y p a r t i a l and that various l e g a l struggles symbolized the competing aspirations of various classes. In two subsequent works, "Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right", and "On the Jewish Question", (included i n the Deutsch-Franzosiche Jahrbucher) Marx explored the r e l a t i o n of the State to c i v i l society and concluded that p o l i t i c a l freedom was n u l l i f i e d by s o c i a l inequality. 3Karl Marx, Karl Marx, Frederick Engels: Collected  Works, ed. N.P. Karmanova and others, v o l . 3: Economic and  Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. (New York: International references to the Collected Works, are to: Karl Marx, The  Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. (New York: International Publishers, 1964), ed. D.J. Struik. The tra n s l a t i o n i n t h i s l a t t e r volume i s superior and a l l quo-tations are from i t . - 6 -construction of h i s own theories, it.seems quite implausible to suppose that, t h i s i n t e l l e c t u a l revolution took place wholly between Marx's student days and 1844. We are best o f f re-garding Marx as i n t r a n s i t i o n i n the period under review. Beyond what I l a t e r suggest was the prime step taken by Marx i n t h i s period, i t i s best simply to be aware of some of the key elements of Hegel's thought with which Marx was doubtlessly engaged. Hegel's work, l i k e that of the Romantic movement with which he was associated, was a reaction to the Enlightenment In p a r t i c u l a r , t h i s movement believed Enlightenment theory had fragmented the world; d i v i d i n g God from the universe, man from nature, and, most e s p e c i a l l y , the human subject from i t s phy-s i c a l nature. (This l a t t e r p a r t i t i o n was well represented by Descartes wherein the body was reduced to a machine while the soul was given the status of a quasi-mathematical e n t i t y bearing some unfathomable r e l a t i o n to the body.) What the Romantic movement, of which Hegel was the culmin-ating term, t r i e d to achieve, accordingly, was a synthesis of the subjective s e l f and the s c i e n t i f i c a l l y observable objective being. I t i s t h i s synthetic endeavor which led the pre-Hegel-ians, and Hegel as the most systematic t h e o r i s t , to experiment with various d i a l e c t i c a l formulations. What they recognized was that two d i s t i n c t and opposed e n t i t i e s could be u n i f i e d through t h e i r mutual struggles. For example, the a r t i s t as an aesthetic subject stood opposed to an objective world of canvas and pigment. The artist.: had to struggle against the inherent physical and sensual q u a l i t i e s of the a r t i s t i c medium in order to shape i t into an art object. Yet just as the a r t i s t ' s w i l l - 7 -was the premise of the art object, so too was the a r t i s t i c medium the indispensable premise of a r t i s t i c capacity. The a r t i s t depended upon such objects and indeed could only l i v e , qua artist,, i n and through them. The completed canvas was a moment i n the a r t i s t i c career, the developing s e n s i b i l i t y to one side and the advancing refinement of objective expressions to the other forming an evolving whole. This i s but one of a number of formulae for embodiment and mutual int e r a c t i o n of which Hegel was considered to have offered the most thorough analysis. For Hegel the development of a l l phenomena was founded upon oppositions i n t e r n a l to them. In the evident contrariety of the thoughtprocess, he held, for example, one merely ex-perienced d i r e c t l y t h i s unity of opposites. Thus i n the Hegelian system was there unity i n opposition between God and the uni-verse, the human s p i r i t and history, the. State and c i v i l society, the human subject and i t s material p r a c t i c e . From the general t h e o r e t i c a l standpoint t h i s d i a l e c t i c a l approach was deemed to hold the prospect of the u n i f i c a t i o n of the free, confrontative 4 s e l f and the natural o b j e c t i v i t y i n which.it expressed „itself. Given that these ideas were in the a i r at the University of B e r l i n , did Marx in f a c t retain the ingredient most synony-mous with Hegel: namely, d i a l e c t i c s ? The debate over Marx's i n t e l l e c t u a l heritage has been made more complex by the fact that competing p o l i t i c a l licences are sought v i a varying i n t e r -pretations of Marx's Hegelianism. Timpanaro has suggested, for example, that a complex of motives has recently led to a reconstruction of Marx along d i a l e c t i c a l l i n e s . ^ F i r s t , ^See Charles Taylor, Hegel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 19.75), pp.. 3-124. ^Sebastiano Timpanaro, On Materialism, New Left Books and Verso, 1980. - 8 -Timpanaro claims, d i a l e c t i c s has been set in;.opposition to determinism i n Marx's thought so as. to give support to the v o l u n t a r i s t p o l i t i c s of the 60's and 70's. As a c o r r o l l a r y , he f e e l s , there has been a tendency to downplay the r e a l mat-e r i a l constraints on p o l i t i c a l movements and the corresponding need for r e a l s o c i a l science by giving d i a l e c t i c s an i d e a l i s t reading. How far t h i s i s true of recent l i t e r a t u r e I cannot say nor do I want to o f f e r herein any detailed theory of Marx's i n t e l l e c t u a l inheritance. However, as I make clear i n what follows, Marx should be at very least viewed as a "materializer" of Hegel. The Manuscripts The Manuscripts while rewarding are not easy reading. Here we see Marx materializing Hegel; bringing the ethereal l o g i c of the Phenomenology down to earth, and he i s only p a r t l y suc-c e s s f u l . These are notebooks and fragmentary into the bargain. Summation i s out of the question here. An adequate interpre-tation i s the best we can hope for. In t h i s regard, what we can see i s that Marx rewrites the Phenomenology i n terms of production. Whereas for Hegel history's prime mover was Logos, pure thought progressively transforming f.itself through the d i a l e c t i c and i n c i d e n t a l l y churning an accompaniment of material expression, for Marx i t i s material production which i s the red thread i n the tapestry of history. Our f i r s t task i s to out-l i n e t h i s " t r a n s l a t i o n " . The Ideology i s a completely d i f f e r e n t sort of text. I t i s a piece of l i v i n g polemic and t h i s gives i t some opacity, but as a d i s t i l l a t i o n of the philosophical basis of Marxism - 9 -i t i s almost as serviceable as the Communist Manifesto i s for the key p o l i t i c a l theses. We w i l l use the Ideology secon-d a r i l y to consolidate the p r i o r interpretation developed i n the Manuscripts. But why i s this area of Marx's work f r u i t f u l for us? The Primacy of Production What Marx achieves i n h i s labouring to bring Hegel down to earth i s a demonstration that the contrapuntal labours of i d e a l i s t d i a l e c t i c can be rewritten i n the language of prac-t i c a l , material labour. In fact i t can be said without exaggeration that what i s for Marx Hegel's most s i g n i f i c a n t achievement, the explication of history i n terms of the d i a l e c -t i c , becomes i n the Marxist system the demonstration of the role of production. Production i s born with H. sapiens and therein i s found the cradle of everything that follows including the growing capacity of humanity to have rel a t i o n s with them-selves, to be aware of themselves, to make themselves. Freedom i t s e l f , i t transpires, i s i m p l i c i t i n production. The materialization of Hegel y i e l d s a new theory as to the roots of freedom. I t i s no accident, accordingly, that a theory asserting the close r e l a t i o n between production and freedom should give o f f as a theorem the formulation that the alienation of production i s of necessity the alienation of freedom, indeed that i t involves the very severing of man from himself. I t would be d i f f i c u l t to give a quick yet accurate account of that Hegelian conception against which Marx honed his own outlook, yet such would seem to be the most natural introduction - 10 -to Marx's philosophy i n the period i n question. I t w i l l have to s u f f i c e that we begin here with what Marx took to be the heart of Hegelianism. Marx had re-read the Phenomenology just p r i o r to the wrestlings recorded i n the Manuscripts and therein he gives us the following succinct account of the mother lode, as i t were, of Marxism: The outstanding achievement of Hegel's Phenomenology and of i t s f i n a l outcome, the d i a l e c t i c of negativity as the moving and generating p r i n c i p l e , i s thus f i r s t that Hegel conceives of the s e l f - c r e a t i o n of man as a process, conceives o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n as loss of the object, as alienation and as transcendence of t h i s a l i e n a t i o n ; that he thus grasps the.essence of labor and comprehends objective man - true, because r e a l man - as the outcome of man's own labor. The r e a l , active orientation of man to himself as a species-being, or his manifestation, as a r e a l species-being- ( i . e . , as a human being), i s only possible by the u t i l i z a t i o n of a l l the powers he has i n himself and which are his as belonging to the species - something which i n turn i s only possible through the cooperative action of a l l mankind, as the re s u l t of history - i s only possible by man's treating these generic powers as objects: and t h i s , to begin g with, i s again only possible i n the form of estrangement. Marx does not c r e d i t Hegel with an understanding of labour in the material-productive sense. Hegel only understands an "abstraction" of the r e a l process. Nonetheless, he does, Marx f e e l s , command the l o g i c of the matter conceived abstractly and t h i s Marx w i l l r e t a i n . The problem with Hegel i s that he sees the generating d i a l e c t i c as having Geist, and i t s human expression, Logos, as i t s f i r s t moment and prime antipode. I t i s the struggle of Geist for embodiment that leads to i t s a l i e n a t i o n i n the material world and to the appearance of s e l f -consciousness (a t r a i t of Geist) within substantial r e a l i t y Karl Marx, The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 (New York: International Publishers, 1964), ed. D.J. Struik, pp.332-333, (p.177). - 11 -where i t surfaces as the r a t i o n a l essence of humanity. Thus, when Hegel conceives of the d i a l e c t i c insofar as i t i s mani-fest i n human a f f a i r s , he conjures f i r s t an i d e a l , r a t i o n a l process whose clothing of human fl e s h i s but a secondary feature. "The only labour which Hegel knows and recognizes 7 i s abstractly mental labour", Marx says by way of reproach. For Hegel, r e a l material labour can be at best a secondary phenomenon, at worst a curse; a f a l l from grace. This skew i s i nevitable given Hegel's theological premises. Marx's pro-j e c t i s to reassert the c e n t r a l i t y of productive labour to the main d i a l e c t i c of history. Again reproaching Hegel, Marx contends: In the act of establishing [producing], therefore, t h i s objective being [man] does not f a l l from his state of "pure a c t i v i t y " into a creating of the object; on the contrary, his objective product only confirms his objective a c t i v i t y , establishing his a c t i v i t y as the a c t i v i t y of an objective material being.8 There follows a paean to human embodiment and corporeal a c t i -v i t y , of which the following fragment i s i n d i c a t i v e : To say that man i s a corporeal, l i v i n g , r e a l , sensuous, objective being f u l l of natural vigor i s to say that he has r e a l , sensuous, objects as the objects of his being or of his l i f e , or that he can only express his l i f e i n r e a l sensuous objects.^ Thus we see that Geist i s dethroned. The Hegelian deity i s replaced by r e a l l i v i n g humanity to whom now f a l l s the role of history's prime mover. While we have here begun with Marx's elevation of the role of productive labour, t h i s i s but an expository conven-ience. In the Manuscripts i t comes as the conclusion of an Ibid., p.333 (p.177). Ibid., p.336 (p.180). Ibid., p.336 (p.181). - 12 -investigation; an investigation into the general significance of labour and into the, perhaps, more pressing question as to why i t appears everywhere as a curse. The l a t t e r does not concern us here. The significance of production, however, i s c r u c i a l , for i t i s production which takes the place of the protean s t r i v i n g s of Geist and i t s contrapuntal determination of i t s e l f , through s e l f - a l i e n a t i o n , i n the s t u f f of the universe. The O b j e c t i f i c a t i o n of Human Being In the Ideology Marx and Engels refer to "the o r i g i n a l men produced by generatio aequivoca".^ This seems to be simply a current s c i e n t i f i c view of human origi n s and, indeed, i t i s clear from t h e i r reaction to The Origin of the Species some years l a t e r that they thought Darwin had charted generatio. But i t should also be viewed as an anti-Hegelian thrust insofar as i t denies Geist any role i n the o r i g i n a l process. Not only i s the supernatural not a prime mover in th i s regard, i t i s no mover at a l l : the whole of human development i s a thoroughly natural a f f a i r : "History i t s e l f i s a r e a l part of natural Op. c i t . , p.40 (p.63). Generatio aequivoca translates "spontaneous generation". Marx and Engels are not here taking sides i n the o r i g i n of l i f e debate which had see-sawed vigorously pro and con during the 18th century and continued i n t h e i r day. True, Pasteur's decisive experiments d i s c r e d i t i n g the spontan-eous generation view lay 17 years (in 1862) downstream from the Ideology. So i t might be thought that Marx and Engels here give evidence of having a foot i n the wrong camp. I t seems more l i k e l y , however, that they are using "spontaneous genera-ti o n " somewhat p o e t i c a l l y . (Notice that there are two d i s t i n c t doctrines of. spontaneous generation:, contemporary".generation and o r i g i n a t i v e generation. > >The most -hotly-- debated was..the claim that l i f e i s contemporarily generated spontaneously. The other i s that l i f e originated (whenever) spontaneously. The former i s fal s e (rotting f e c a l matter does not generate f l i e s , eg.) while the l a t t e r i s true ( l i v i n g substance was, o r i g i n a l l y , generated from an inanimate bio-molecular "soup").) In the 1840's t h i s term would have referred to both contemporary and o r i g i n a t i v e generation. (Darwin had not yet made the c r u c i a l - 13 -history - of nature developing into man." Or again: "...man creates or establishes only objects, because he i s established 12 by objects - because at bottom he i s nature." Of course the naturalism here i s contrasted with super-naturalism and not humanism. Humanity does have a d i s t i n c t i v e non-natural nature: i t has consciousness and freedom or, rather, freedom because i t i s conscious. The animal i s immediately one with i t s l i f e a c t i v i t y . I t does not distinguish i t s e l f from i t . I t i s i t s l i f e  a c t i v i t y . Man makes his l i f e a c t i v i t y i t s e l f the object of h i s w i l l and of his consciousness ... Conscious l i f e a c t i v i t y distinguishes man immediately from animal l i f e a c t i v i t y . I t i s just because of t h i s that he i s a species being. Or rather, i t i s only because he i s a species being that he i s a conscious being, i . e . , that his own l i f e i s an object for him. Only because of that i s his a c t i v i t y free activity.13 Thus, from the f i r s t appearance of H. sapiens by generatio aequivoca, from being thrust onstage by "objects", there evolve free conscious beings. How i s t h i s t r a n s i t i o n wrought? The organizing concept i s production. Production i s central for Marx because i t casts i n material form the fundamental l o g i c of the i d e a l Hegelian d i a l e c t i c . Hegel, i t w i l l be r e c a l l e d , thought that the genius of Zeno was that he showed that motion was a contradiction. But not a surmise that once l i f e had been spontaneously originated cannibalism would prevent further (contemporary) o r i g i n a t i o n . Nonetheless, the primary reference of the term at t h i s time was to the 18th century sequence of contemporary generation experiments (Leeuwenhoek, Joblot, Needham, Spallanzani...). Marx and Engels appropriate t h i s term and apply i t to what i s e s s e n t i a l l y a matter of speciation. Here.: i t means, i n effect,, (correctly) that no sp e c i a l s p i r i t u a l i n f e c t i o n was needed to set humanity o f f from i t s precursors. ^Manuscripts, pp.303-304 (p.143). 1 2 I b i d . , p.336 (p.180). 1 3 I b i d . , p.276 (p.113). - 14 -contradiction i n terms. Rather, as Hegel saw i t , r e a l p a l -pable motion was rooted i n the opposition of subterranean 14 forces. Where Zeno appears to have concluded the impossi-b i l i t y of motion, Hegel interprets the paradoxes to show that r e a l motion i s the resultant of fundamental forces' mutual repugnance. To s t a r t the universal evolutionary process i n motion Hegel thought, Geist or universal mind had to oppose i t s e l f by f i r s t a l ienating i t s e l f i n the substance of r e a l i t y so that i t might return to i t s e l f with refined self-awareness. This cosmological process, Hegel termed " d i a l e c t i c " . Real human i n t e l l e c t u a l d i a l e c t i c was, accordingly, a derivative. The Hegelian d e t a i l s are not important here. What i s important i s that for Marx the process of human establishment of objects of production stands as a cypher for the Hegelian d i a l e c t i c . I t i s the Hegelian l o g i c of opposition made substantial i n the parry and thrust of human labour. If there i s to be a " r e a l , active orientation of man to himself", t h i s " i s only possible by man's treating his generic 15 powers as objects." Human being must be "established", i e . , extracted from r e a l people and thus rendered opposable or corir-frontable i n r e a l terms. Thus a certain distance between man and product must be established: "An animal's product belongs immediately to i t s physical body, whilst man f r e e l y confronts 16 his product." Marx takes over the Hegelian idea of " o b j e c t i -f i c a t i o n 1 1 (a term which, i n Hegel, stood for the process whereby Geist embodies i t s e l f i n r e a l i t y ) and shows that i t i s but an 14 G.W.F. Hegel, Hegel's Science of Logic (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1969), p.67. 1 5Manuscripts, p.333 (p.177). 1 6 I b i d . , pp.276-277 (p.113). - 15 -abstraction from r e a l work. Thus i n economic terms the valuation of products i s a facet of o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n : "The product of labour i s labour which has been embodied i n an object, which has become material: i t i s the o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n 17 of labour." But o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n stands for much more than the d i s -t i l l a t i o n of work energy i n the increased u t i l i t y or " f i n i s h " of products. I t represents the actual extrusion of s e l f such that man can take up his own being as an object and deal with i t c r e a t i v e l y : The object of labour i s , therefore, the o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n  of man's species l i f e : for he duplicates himself not only, as i n consciousness, i n t e l l e c t u a l l y , but also a c t i v e l y , i n r e a l i t y , and therefore he confronts himself i n a world that he has created. 1° So we see that Marx adopts as the recipe for human evo-lu t i o n the fundamental Hegelian formula for evolution, per se. The motion of human development begins with the appearance within a natural species of a certain opposition: humanity confronts i t s e l f i n objects of i t s own making. Man becomes an active agency on the stage of history, as opposed to a spon-taneously generated being, when he begins to produce. O b j e c t i f i c a t i o n and Consciousness The expansion of human consciousness i s predicated upon production. Human progress away from purely animal premises 19 advances "the more universal i s the sphere of inorganic j^Ibid., p.272 (p.108). ^ I b i d . , p.277 (p.114) . The concept of "uni v e r s a l i z a t i o n " i s quite r i c h i n Hegel. Here Marx uses the term under Hegelian influence but i n the more common sense where i t refers to the broadening consumption patterns of H. sapiens. - 16 -nature on which he [man] l i v e s . i i 20 This brings as i t s natural complement the broadening of human awareness and understanding: Plants, animals, stones, a i r , l i g h t , etc.,... are part of human consciousness ... his s p i r i t u a l inorganic nature, s p i r i t u a l nourishment which he must f i r s t prepare to make palatable and d i g e s t i b l e . The embryonic, proto-human, senses (sight, taste,...) are ex-panded and refined i n labour. As labour advances i n s o p h i s t i -cation, various e s s e n t i a l powers are drawn out and the senses are educated. The palate of audition i s enriched, for example: The most be a u t i f u l music has no sense for the non-musical ear - i s no object f o r i t , because any object can only be the confirmation of one of my es s e n t i a l powers.22 Only with the extrusion, of the power - to produce music i n th i s instance - can the sensual range be humanized. I t i s obvious that the human eye enjoys things i n a way d i f f e r e n t from the crude, non-human eye; the human ear d i f f e r e n t from the crude ear Only through the o b j e c t i v i t y unfolded richness of man's e s s e n t i a l being i s the richness of subjective s e n s i b i l i t y (a musical ear, an eye for beauty of form, - i n short, senses capable of human g r a t i f i c a t i o n , senses affirming themselves as es s e n t i a l powers of men) eithe r c u l t i v a t e d or brought into being.2 3 We have been dealing thus far with the f i r s t formulations of Marx's outlook as they appear i n the Manuscripts. Here, unfortunately, the central themes suffen some obscurity from being written between the l i n e s , as i t were, of the Hegel-ian conception. Nonetheless, the following main points can be discerned: a) The central moving d i a l e c t i c of human history i s labour. b) Human consciousness i s broadened and refined through productive a c t i v i t y . c) Through the o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n 20 21 22 23 Ibid Ibid Ibid Ibid p.275 (p.112). p.275 (p.112). p.301 (p.140). p.301 (pp.140-41). - 17 -of i t s e l f humanity i s able to be self-conscious. The German Ideology Formulation: The Significance of Production Things are much clearer i n the Ideology. The struggle to "translate" Hegel has subsided and the useful elements have been consolidated. The premise of history i s "r e a l i n d i v i d u a l s , t h e i r a c t i v i t y and the material conditions under which they l i v e , both those which they f i n d already e x i s t i n g and those 24 produced by t h e i r a c t i v i t y . " Production i s s t i l l the cen-t r a l term but the formulation i s more brisk: They themselves begin to distinguish themselves from the animals as soon as they begin to produce t h e i r means of subsistence, a step which i s conditioned by th e i r physical organization. By reproducing t h e i r means of subsistence men are"indirectly producing t h e i r actual material l i f e the f i r s t h i s t o r i c a l act i s thus the production of the means to s a t i s f y these needs, the production of material l i f e i t s e l f . * " The nature and role of the material d i a l e c t i c i n a l l t h i s i s now given a precise formulation. In a t e r r a i n strewn with d i a l e c -t i c just one key p o l a r i t y i s thrust forward as c r u c i a l : the counterpoint of need and a r t i f a c t . I t i s not just production for need that generates progress, i t i s production of need: The s a t i s f a c t i o n of the f i r s t need (the action of s a t i s f y i n g , and the instrument of s a t i s f a c t i o n which has been acquired) leads to new needs: and t h i s Pro-duction of new needs i s the f i r s t h i s t o r i c a l act.26 Sub j e c t i v i t y and Obje c t i v i t y The secret of production, therefore, i s that i t u n i f i e s the i d e a l and the material, d i a l e c t i c a l l y . For i t takes up 2.4 25 26 Ideology, p.31 (p.42). Ibid., pp.31-42 (pp.42-28). Ibid., p.42 (p.49). - 18 -both humanity's subjective side (needs, ideas, goals, etc.) and humanity's objective side (the givens of nature and the physical world of human accoutrement) and brings them under the umbrella of a single equation. At f i r s t the i d e a l and the material sides of human nature must march i n lock-step: The production of ideas, of conceptions, of conscious-ness, i s at f i r s t d i r e c t l y interwoven with material a c t i v i t y and the material intercourse of men, the language of re a l l i f e . Conceiving, thinking, the mental intercourse of men, appear at thi s stage as the d i r e c t e f f l u x of t h e i r material behaviour. 2^ In f a c t t h i s material behaviour w i l l always be the governing r e l a t i o n for:the production of ideas. I t w i l l "appear" that ideas can be produced i n other ways at that stage of history where d i f f e r e n t persons are engaged i n the mental and manual aspects of production, but t h i s i s i l l u s i o n : D i v i s i o n of labour only becomes t r u l y such from the moment when a d i v i s i o n of material and mental labour appears. (The f i r s t form of id e o l o g i s t s , p r i e s t s , i s concurrent). From t h i s moment onwards consciousness can r e a l l y f l a t t e r i t s e l f that i t i s something other than consciousness of e x i s t i n g practice, that i t r e a l l y represents something without representing something real'.. (Herein also - i n the mental/manual d i v i s i o n of labour - w i l l be born the ground of the t h e o r e t i c a l antagonism between sub-j e c t i v i t y and o b j e c t i v i t y ; between i d e a l i t y and ma t e r i a l i t y . Ideologues w i l l now see to one side the idea and to the other matter, as independent forces. Marx relegates the whole debate to the status of an i l l u s i o n . See i n t h i s regard Marx's formulation i n the Manuscripts: "... naturalism or humanism distinguishes i t s e l f both from idealism and materialism, con-29 s t i t u t i n g at the same time the unifying truth of both." 27 28 29, Ibid., p.36 ( p . 4 7 ) . Ibid., pp.44-45 ( p p . 5 1 - 5 2 ) . Manuscripts, p.334 ( p . 1 8 1 ) . - 19 -Despite i t s apparent abandonment i n the s u b - t i t l e to the f i r s t chapter of the Ideology - "Feuerbach, Opposition of the Mater-i a l i s t and I d e a l i s t Outlook" - thi s formulation i s retained throughout the Marxist corpus.) Social Production and Consciousness Not only i s the nature and role of material production c l a r i f i e d here, but as well the s o c i a l dimension of conscious-ness and self-consciousness i s elaborated through the explora-tion of certain ramifications of s o c i a l production. Compli-mentary to production, as an a c t i v i t y , i s the s o c i a l mode i n which i t transpires: A certain mode of production, or i n d u s t r i a l stage, i s always combined with a certain mode of co-operation, or s o c i a l stage, and t h i s mode of co-operation i s i t s e l f a "productive force". 30 It follows that the task of maintaining a given mode of pro-duction e n t a i l s the reproduction of i t s cooperative structures and t h i s involves an (at f i r s t minimal), and then increasing) endeavor i n the creation of persons; i n t h e i r s o c i a l i z a t i o n : " ...men, who d a i l y remake t h e i r own l i f e , begin to make other men, to propagate t h e i r kind: The r e l a t i o n between man and woman, 31 parents and children, the family." What begins as the simple f a m i l i a l r e l a t i o n grows apace with the mode of production and structure of needs. Eventually production qua s o c i a l i z a t i o n w i l l be a complex a n d . d i f f i c u l t task, corresponding to the richness of structure of the s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s within which i t i s located. Imp l i c i t i n thi s new task i s both a d i s t i n c t i v e form of consciousness and a new mode of r e l a t i o n to human being. For now, the subjective side of human nature can develop not 30 3 1Ideology, p.43 (p.50). Ibid., pp.42-43 (p.49). - 20 -simply i n d i r e c t l y , i n partnership with the p r a c t i c a l i t i e s of production, i e . , as a wing of the material d i a l e c t i c , but, as well, as the d i r e c t object of a s p e c i f i c repertoire of human capacities. This d i r e c t relationship i s only hinted at i n the Ideology 32 ("men ... begin to make other men." ). But Marx and Engels are c l e a r l y aware of i t s significance as we see when we turn to the question of consciousness. For here i n the Ideology consciousness i s more or less defined s o c i a l l y : as an adjunct of human intercourse: Only now, af t e r having considered the s o c i a l concommit-ants of production do we f i n d that man also possesses "consciousness", but, even so, not inherent, not "pure" consciousness. From the st a r t the " s p i r i t " i s a f f l i c t e d with the curse of being "burdened" with matter, which here makes i t s appearance i n the form of agitated layers of a i r , sounds, i n short, of language. Language i s as old as consciousness, language _is p r a c t i c a l consciousness that e x i s t s also for other men, and for that reason alone i t r e a l l y exists for me personally as well: language, l i k e consciousness, only arrives from the need, the necessity, of intercourse with other men."33 We see here the second of two d i s t i n c t i v e l y human forms of consciousness. We have already examined that self-conscious-ness which i s the d i a l e c t i c a l partner of the objective world of human a r t i f a c t . Now we have a new mode of self-conscious-ness. I t i s consciousness, f i r s t , of being a pa r t i c i p a n t i n s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s . "Where there exists a rel a t i o n s h i p , i t exists 34 for me; the animal does not enter into " r e l a t i o n s " . " I t i s also, by extension, consciousness of others as being either i n or not i n a certain r e l a t i o n to me. And, i h ~ i t s most igenefalized form, i t i s consciousness of s e l f , my own or others', as being 32 33 Ibid Ibid Ibid p.42 (p.49). pp.43-44 (pp.50-51). p.44 (p.51). 34 defined by a range of r e l a t i o n s . Such, i t seems to me, i s the picture of the development and nature of human freedom which emerges i n the early Marx. Human being i s permeable to i t s e l f both i n the sense that i t s own d i s t i n c t i v e productive a b i l i t i e s engender a develop-ing corpus of s u b j e c t i v i t y and i n the sense that the co-oper-ative nature of production demands the d i r e c t communal capa-c i t y to induce s p e c i f i c s u b j e c t i v i t y within i t s e l f . Reflexive S u b j e c t i v i t y The i n d i v i d u a l stands the gainer i n t h i s evolutionary process, a l b e i t one i n which the s o c i a l elements preponderate i n i t i a l l y . For what i n the hands of the person can be exer-cised as a s o c i a l force toward others can also be r e f l e x i v e l y exercized. Every s o c i a l relationship (educator, l i a r , i n t e r -rogator, etc.) can also be employed within the personal s e l f -r e l a t i o n : " ...every relationship i n which man stands to himself, i s f i r s t r e a l i z e d and expressed i n the r e l a t i o n s h i p 35 i n which man stands to other men." Production and the attendant production of s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s , thus establishes certain broad categories of s e l f or s u b j e c t i v i t y which sketch i n a palate of personal p o t e n t i a l i t i e s comprising part of the s o c i a l endowment of i n d i v i d u a l s . What one can make of oneself i s thus a function of production and i t s attendant r e l a t i o n s . For instance, i n some sense i t i s obvious that one cannot de-ceive oneself u n t i l l ying exists as a s o c i a l r e l a t i o n and l y i n g has no rationale outside of a circumstance where secrecy i s 35 Manuscripts, p.277 (pp.114-115). - 22 -functional. Some degree of s o c i a l antagonism, therefore, i s the ground of s e l f - d e c e i t . But s o c i a l antagonism presupposes not only a certain r e l a t i v e material s c a r c i t y but also the r e a l perception that one can meet one's need independently of the well-being of the community. This, i n i t s turn, pre-supposes a d e f i n i t e s o c i a l d i v i s i o n of productive a c t i v i t y . We have, here arrived at the s e l f - r e l a t i o n i n personal or r e f l e x i v e terms, and such t h e o r e t i c a l location of i t (as a relation) as I think i s to be found, i n basic terms at least, i n the early Marx. In the next chapter we explore certain facets of t h i s interpretation i n philosophical-anthropological terms before shining .the resultant theory on some recent work on the nature of freedom i n Chapter I I I . CHAPTER I I : THE ROLE OF PRODUCTION IN THE ORIGINATION OF CONSCIOUSNESS Direct and Indirect Origination What i s the r e l a t i o n between production and conscious-ness? We can grasp the various threads under two simple heads: d i r e c t r e l a t i o n s and indirect.. For, production d i r e c t l y demands the expansion of consciousness i n p r a c t i c a l ways. The world, that i s , can only be transformed to the degree that i t "appears" i n the hungry eye of the consumer. As well, production engenders forms of human l i f e which are themselves new "appearances" to be understood and transformed. Among the objects of cognitive metabolism can be numbered the other members of the community and a l l those forms by which they co-ordinate t h e i r l i v e s . In p a r t i c u l a r , s o c i a l process and structure, as a product, i s a special r e f l e x i v e e n t i t y . For, not only i s i t an external, public e n t i t y of independent status, but i t i s also the s t u f f of i n t e r n a l i t y : the "subject" whose nature i s cast within a locus of s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s . Production and Consciousness The r i s e to production, from proto-human ancestral forms of d i r e c t consumption, brings with i t of necessity an exten-sion of consciousness. This can be readi l y grasped i f we consider the t r a n s i t i o n between two c l a s s i c a l stages of c u l -t u r a l development: hunter-gatherers and h o r t i c u l t u r i s t s . - 23 -Of course, hunter-gatherers are not purely consumptive i n nature. For instance, they gather with tools and these must be themselves produced. (In fact, production at some l e v e l pre-dates a l l the c u l t u r a l stages known to ethnography. We f i n d control of f i r e some 400,000 years ago and shaped stone implements running back several m i l l i o n s of years.) The point i n considering t h i s p a r t i c u l a r c u l t u r a l t r a n s i t i o n i s that i t i s a marked step forward i n productive capacity and yet extremely simple i n i t s outline. Penetration of Causality H o r t i c u l t u r i s t s reap what they have sown but hunter-gatherers reap what whey have not sown. How do gatherers come to understand sowing and thus elevate themselves to a new c u l t u r a l status, ie., achieve a rudimentary agency? Suppose a wild grain f i e l d i s harvested early, before f u l l maturation of the heads. The stalks are taken whole and there i s l i t t l e i f any s p i l l a g e of mature, loose kernels. Next year there w i l l be no granary i n t h i s meadow. Now consider the next f i e l d to which the semi-migratory gatherers move. I t w i l l be more mature. Here kernels w i l l be s p i l l e d more p l e n t i f u l l y and perhaps, on yet the next gathering ground, f u l l y h a l f the p o t e n t i a l harvest w i l l f a l l back to the s o i l . Next year the l a t e r reaped granaries w i l l f l o u r i s h . Once noted, t h i s simple r u l e : late reaping fosters renewal, lays the founda-tion for human control of the granary. A h e u r i s t i c taboo may be retained: "Harvest only when the r i v e r s run shallow". There i s understanding here but i t i s purely h e u r i s t i c insofar as the r e a l r e l a t i o n , the r e l a t i o n of seed to plant, i s overlooked. Only the temporal dimension of the r e l a t i o n has been grasped here, and even that not f u l l y . Yet by a pro-cess of successive approximation the actual causal structure of the granary can be grasped. The significance of r a i n (then, more abstractly, water) sun, s o i l condition, etc., w i l l follow i n t r a i n . As i n the harvest, so i n a l l other aspects of the primi-t i v e economy; control over the c u l t u r a l metabolism demands penetration of causal structure. Every fortuitous observa-ti o n i s taken up into the cognitive repertoire of the culture and the urge i s to look "deeper, ever deeper!" In t h i s manner, the culture extends i t s capacity for s e l f - c o n t r o l . I t i s no longer led by the nose from natural necessity to natural necessity. Instead, the very seasonal nature of the environ-ment now appears as an object against which an extended regime of human intentions can be defined. From being led by the seasons, the species moves to the ambit of i t s own s p e c i f i c ends. Vocabulary of Ends and Means  and Expanded Present Cu l t u r a l advance from consumptive to productive pro-fessions i s , thus, the root of an expanding vocabulary of ends-means r e l a t i o n s . We see here a prime human d i a l e c t i c established wherein to one side we have an increasingly sophisticated human economy and to the other an advancing in t e n t i o n a l a r t i c u l a c y . In the ancient dialogue with nature the human voice i s amplified and increasingly the ambient conditions resonate to human pronouncement. The r e l e n t l e s s - 26 -c r i t i c i s m by the environment which has hitherto l a b e l l e d " u n f i t " every l i n k i n the hominid ancestral chain grows mute as ambient nature i t s e l f i s f i t t e d more and-more into a body of human design. C r i t i c a l Capacity This s h i f t from being the object of natural c r i t i c i s m to being the subject of a c r i t i c a l repertoire i s one of the important steps which carry man out of his purely bio-deter-minate state and onto the stage of history. The s h i f t i n question presupposes both causal penetration and a counter-part ends-means sophistication. At issue here i s the emergence, i n part, of the d i s -t i n c t i v e l y human understanding. This understanding i s a counterpart of "causal grasp" or comprehension of natural forms of determination. Notice that Hume saw c l e a r l y the re l a t i o n i n question: "uniformity" - the l o g i c a l root (con-stant conjunction) of causation - was impressed upon the understanding mind: Why i s the aged husbandman more s k i l l f u l l i n his c a l l i n g than the young beginner but because there i s a certain uniformity i n the operation of the sun, rain and earth towards the production of vegetables; and experience teaches the old p r a c t i t i o n e r the rules by which th i s operation i s governed and directed.1 (my emphasis) Notice too that, almost i n spite of himself, Hume relates the development of the understanding to intervention i n nature. He locates, that i s , the es s e n t i a l r e l a t i o n (natural regular-i t y and understanding) as an aspect of human action i n the "*"David Hume, An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding, i n Determinism, Free W i l l , and Moral Responsibility, ed. G. Dworkin: (Prentice-Hall Inc. 1970), p.17. transformation of natural premises into human premises -i n this case, i n the management and amplification of the land's productivity. The d i s t i n c t i v e , analytic gaze of man - the gaze capable of d i s s o l v i n g phenomena into t h e i r factors, etc. - i s most aptly described as a correlate of natural intervention. In order to appreciate more f u l l y t h i s human c r i t i c a l capacity we might f i r s t consider a natural c r i t i c a l r e l a -tionship such as i s i m p l i c i t i n natural selection. XPart of the semantic secret of "natural s e l e c t i o n " i s the fact that i t i s a capacity transferred from man to nature. What 19th century biology meant to indicate by the term was simply that i t had located the p r i n c i p l e known to breeders i n nature: the breeder "selects" for advantageous t r a i t s and so does nature.) Two main forces are conceived at work i n b i o l o g i c a l evolution. There i s a force for v a r i a t i o n whereby at some de f i n i t e frequency new t r a i t s appear i n a natural population. Confronting t h i s force there i s what i s often referred to as "selection pressure". The l a t t e r pressure suppresses untoward novelties while allowing those which better equip the species as a whole for s u r v i v a l to be retained. So a species i n i t s r e l e n t l e s s and b l i n d thrusting forward of new t r a i t s i s subject to a r e l e n t l e s s c r i t i c i s m . An exam-ple makes t h i s c l e a r . A species of moth common to the Liverpool, England region, the Biston b e t u l a r i a or peppered moth, i s well known to geneticists because i n i t can be seen the natural selec-tion mechanism " i n the wild". Over a century or so the - 28 -population has s h i f t e d i t s colouration from l i g h t to dark and back to l i g h t . This chameleon motion i s driven by two environmental factors: a change i n habitat colouration and the predation of l o c a l b i r d s . As the habitat became indus-t r i a l l y sooted the l i g h t moths, outstanding against the soot, were consumed by the birds. Now, as changing indus-t r i a l techniques reduce the sooting i t i s genes for darkness which are being devoured. In t h i s l a t t e r case, then, we may say that i t i s the r e l a t i v e maladaptiveness of darkness that i s being c r i t i c i z e d by predation. That c r i t i c i s m , therefore, known f i r s t to the breeders, whereby scant fleece, i n s u f f i c i e n t milk, s o f t - s h e l l e d eggs, etc., are c r i t i c i z e d i n domestic species, i s - on evolutionary theory's account - found operative i n nature. But the natural c r i t i q u e was, i n fact, of course, temporally p r i o r . Human pra c t i t i o n e r s arrived late on the scene and acquired t h i s capacity f o r se l e c t i o n c r i t i q u e as a part of a broad spec-trum of c r i t i c a l s k i l l s which demanded of the environment -animate or otherwise - that i t measure up against benchmarks of human need. This l a t t e r c r i t i c a l capacity i s not simply an analog of the c r i t i c a l role of predation or of any other environ-mental pressure. The human ro l e v i s - a - v i s the environment i s not merely to act upon nature i n meeting i t s needs and thereby change nature. The natural species can never pro-duce a change i n nature such that i t gets a new lease on l i f e . That i s , i t can never, i n meeting i t s needs, change the en-vironment i n such a way that new v i s t a s of sustenance are opened up. For such a change to take place the natural species must wait on mutation and, i n fa c t , speciation. On the other hand, the human species can retain i t s b i o l o -g i c a l species i d e n t i t y a l l the while using changes i t renders in nature as a lever toward a new l i f e - s t y l e . I t i s t h i s l i b e r t y which marks the o r i g i n of the uniquely human c r i t -i c a l role i n the natural f i e l d . There are r e a l elements of human freedom to be d i r e c t l y discerned here. What i s entailed i n t h i s growing human vocabulary i s an expansion of the human present. For, not only does the gaze of consciousness penetrate more deeply i t s conditions, i t views, thereby, the ramifications of the immediate for distant points in time. Humanity appears foresighted insofar as i t i s able to sight down the bar r e l of causation and render "objective" that structure of branch and trunk relations which conduces towards i t s goals. As a s t r i c t c o r o l l a r y to t h i s foresightedness, the immediate, the world of ambient objects present to consciousness, i s ordered and given a human shape. What before was but a Kantian manifold now has a structure of motivational valency. There i s here the hot sun and the pleasures of the shade, but there i s the f i e l d whose t i l l a g e presses forward toward the coming harvest and the secure winter beyond. Moreover, the old d i a l e c t i c of t r i a l and error wherein fortuitous accidents accumulate with p a i n f u l slowness into an ever more r a t i o n a l practice i s now i t s e l f relegable to the background. - For now t h i s f l i n t shard, struck into an arrowhead of t h i s size can be "seen" i n advance to be un-workable. The t r i a l thus i s made to the side of consciousness - 30 -before the labour i s expended. Conscious Pre-production This freedom from t r i a l and error i s most re a d i l y describable as the adoption of forms of pre-production. For, possession of an expanded present means having the ramifications of various human ef f e c t s (alterations grounded in human causes) gathered together i n consciousness. A m i s t r i a l , accordingly, need not be committed (or not f u l l y committed at least) i n order to be "seen" to be u n f r u i t f u l or counter-productive. Every carpenter knows that many mistakes are corrected in the blueprint stage. But blueprinting i s only the grand form of an otherwise natural process of imagination whereby an action and i t s consequences are layed out i n the mind p r i o r to the taking of the action i n question. What else i s t h i s but an elaboration of the simple process wherein causal, say seed to plant, relationships are present i n consciousness, into a more rounded a c t i v i t y where an action i s examined i n the l i g h t of several cause and e f f e c t relations? This imaginative, pre-production capacity would be, i t would seem, urged on by simple forms of a r t i f a c t produc-ti o n , eg., the shaping of f l i n t t o o l s . Take an arrowhead for instance. Such an a r t i f i c a t d i s t i l l s i n i t s e l f a number of needs, some of them c o n f l i c t i n g . I t must be l i g h t , for i t i s a p r o j e c t i l e , yet, i f i t i s too small i t i s d i f f i c u l t to fashion by chipping. I t must hold i t s edge, yet a more durable edge i s best produced i n heavier stone that i s - 31 -harder to work, etc. Even i n production of an extremely rudimentary a r t i -f a c t , thus, i t i s b e n e f i c i a l to be able to look past the immediate creative process to the eventual act of usage. Now i t seems unlikely that very much of the repertoire of the stone age had t h i s degree of expanded present. T r i a l and error was no doubt the task-master to countless gener-ations of spear-makers. S t i l l , a premium would attach to the capacity to compare u t i l i t y i n manufacture with u t i l i t y i n the hunt and thus circumvent lengthy, and hungry, t r i a l periods. Such a system of pre-production represents a c r u c i a l form of freedom. For i t would allow the producer to get free of any current project and examine i t from a l l sides: to consider f i r s t one, then another, e f f e c t of a given modi-f i c a t i o n . The downstream returns to alternative courses of action can now be juxtaposed and the immediate commitment of labour can be deliberate; i e . , be f i l l e d with significance by v i r t u e of being located i n a broad f i e l d of natural action "present" to consciousness. As the causal richness of con-sciousness advances new r a t i o n a l s k i l l s - at f i r s t rudimen-tary - must be c a l l e d forth. For example, the greater size and weight of an implement conduces at once to a cer t a i n implemental e f f i c a c y , to a certain d i f f i c u l t y of production, to a c e r t a i n rate of depletion of raw stocks, etc. Just which structure of strategy and t a c t i c i s best? New p r i n -c i p l e s must be conjured which set the r i g h t r e l a t i o n between heft, cutting power, ease of manufacture, raw resource, etc. - 32 -Getting these r i g h t l y aligned amounts to building a structure of t a c t i c and strategy i n which grasped cause and e f f e c t r e lations are arranged under hierarchies of p r a c t i c a l human ends. (At a l a t e r stage the objective representation of strategy allows i t to be c r i t i c i z e d as a product i n i t s own rig h t with higher order q u a l i t i e s and evaluations being applied to i t , eg., elegance, s i m p l i c i t y , etc.) The con-sciousness depicted here i s recognizably t h e o r e t i c a l i n a rudimentary way: i t has a h i e r a r c h i c a l structure insofar as i t i s organized around ends d i f f e r i n g i n degree of moti-vation. As a r a t i o n a l method for the achievement of a de-f i n i t e goal, i t constitutes the theory of that p r a c t i c e . Corresponding to t h i s inner structure there appears a public regimen; a systematic q u a l i t y to the form of l i f e : the o l d h i t and miss f o r t u i t y subsides as the bass continuo of seasonal rhythm i s embellished with overtones and synco-pations. V i s i b l e human practice i s organized just to the extent that there appears, to the side of consciousness, a h i e r a r c h i c a l integration of various needs (in the case at hand: n e o l i t h i c mining, manufacture and hunting). The P o s s i b i l i t y of Opposition Through the expansion of the present, thus, there i s achieved a certain aloofness from conditioning. Between stimulus and response there i s interposed a growing concep-tua l vocabulary and the human agent i s thereby "distanced" from, the basic material premises of his l i f e . In fact, only now^through the expanded present, do we begin to see some-thing recognizab1e as a human l i f e . There can be, that i s , - 33 -no object of which I am conscious as "my l i f e to be l i v e d " u n t i l consciousness has achieved t h i s temporal reach. Notice, however, that what appears here s u p e r f i c i a l l y as a growing distance from natural conditions i s r e a l l y pre-mised by being ever,more deeply k n i t into those conditions. Paradoxically, human aloofness from nature appears i n the integration with nature. Opposition and unity appear Janus-faced i n production. Production and Subjectivity S o c i a l Production I t i s not only s c i e n t i f i c consciousness, consciousness which penetrates the natural properties of seed and stone, that i s leavened by production. I n d i r e c t l y , i t i s produc-ti o n which engenders the s o c i a l p r o f i l e of the subject; that c o l l e c t i o n of t r a i t s loosely indicated by the term "character". This elusive being, too, i s expanded and o b j e c t i f i e d i n the march of human economy and thereby i s layed the foundation of the subjective capacity of self-consciousness - among other capacities. The archaeological lay-out of human middens dating back m i l l i o n s of years makes i t clear that the e a r l i e s t man had s o c i a l structures based on the sharing of food. We do not proceed very far down the human lineage before the e v i -dence indicates that quite large animals, such as could only have been hunted and dragged co-operatively, were shared at these s i t e s . From the e a r l i e s t time, thus, we can suppose we were not only producers but s o c i a l producers. - 34 -It seems an obvious move to suppose that communal action would have placed a premium on communication. Early hominid brains were small, and there i s no reason why there should not have been a selection advantage to c o r t i c a l innovations which advanced communications and, thereby, co-operation. In urging forward a more productive brain, natural forces would be nudging into existence the s o c i a l brain. Co-operation and Communication But communication i s more than i n t e r - s u b j e c t i v i t y -though i t i s that. I t i s also the cradle of d i s t i n c t i v e e l e -ments of s u b j e c t i v i t y i t s e l f . For, while i n simple produc-ti o n we can see the premises of the understanding, we see here, with production of the terms of communication, the exte r n a l i z a t i o n of the understanding. At very least a new modelling relationship i s now possible: This or that element of the f a b r i c of understanding becomes a public object, discussable ( i f only r i t u a l i s t i c a l l y ) , r e f i n a b l e , etc. Thus the phrase "consciousness of consciousness" comes to have i t s prime referent. I t makes sense to regard the species as p e c u l i a r l y self-conscious through t h i s co-operatively i n -duced i n t e r - s u b j e c t i v i t y . Much more i s i m p l i c i t here than a mere shared vocabu-lary of c o l l e c t i v e procedures. For, by t h i s expanding machinery of co-operation members of the culture are able to see them-selves as standing i n t h i s or that r e l a t i o n to others. Gradu-a l l y a f a b r i c of perceived r e l a t i o n s comes to e x i s t whereby the main outlines of the individual's s o c i a l existence are marked and these have an objective qu a l i t y insofar as they - 35 -can themselves be objects of the understanding. The culture i s now marked by a nexus of s o c i a l r e lations d e f i n i t i v e of the o v e r a l l s o c i a l p r a c t i c e . Within t h i s nexus various forms of personal existence may be discerned as dormant potentials; "roles", as we might say, into which developing individuals may, within the l i m i t s of c u l t u r a l p l a s t i c i t y , insinuate themselves. Conscious Reproduction Yet the existence of a nexus of s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s i s not a passive or automatic given of human l i f e . The f a b r i c must be maintained as a more or less stable configuration conforming to p r e v a i l i n g natural circumstances, technique, sensuous endowment, etc., a l l the while the human incum-bents are flowing through the structure. This i s completely analogous to the metabolic flow i n a natural, organic body wherein there i s a turn-over of actual substance below the apparent r e l a t i v e s t a b i l i t y of the bodily form. 2 The form of the inorganic body , i t s organizing structure of s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s , exists i n a purely conscious manner. "I adopt here a term from the Manuscripts• Marx talks about the inorganic body as, roughly, the net c i v i l a r c h i -tecture of a culture: i t s matrix of product defined i n the broadest terms by humanly imposed geographic structure. The Fraser Valley, for example, has a natural topology. Super-imposed on that natural form there i s a structure of highways, sideroads, f i e l d s , townsites, etc. At a f i n e r degree of resolution, the architecture of schools, homes, shopping centers and so on comes into view. Marx's usage suggests that we could view th i s structure as a sort of exo-skeleton within which we dwell as the enlivening s p i r i t : the o v e r a l l form of the inorganic body bearing testimony to the o v e r a l l structure of human intention. Further, the suggestion i s of the p o s s i b i l i t y of re c i p r o c a l action: i e . , the person i s s o c i a l i z e d , i n the sense of being endowed with s e l f , j ust through the e f f o r t to construct a "theory", as i t were, that - 36 -It "is a s o c i a l e n t i t y passed on only by s o c i a l means. I t can only be reproduced from moment to moment through the im-press of conscious communication. Thereby are the r i s i n g tide of new members introduced to t h e i r s o c i a l being and thereby i s the s t a b i l i t y through time of the s o c i a l whole maintained. So a culture that i s , through language, co-opera-t i v e l y involved i n production i s also i n the business of " s e l f " production; i e . , i s continuously confronted with the task of generating s o c i a l nexus. But even here with t h i s conscious s e l f - i d e n t i t y we have not met the f u l l e s t p l a s t i c i t y i n which the i n d i v i d u a l may share. For the very repertoire of s o c i a l r e l ations into which the person may f i t i s i t s e l f permeable to his or her own creative exertions. This can be seen quite r e a d i l y . As we have noted, the s o c i a l f a b r i c must not only be maintained, i t must .evolve. For the inorganic s o c i a l body stands i n the same r e l a t i o n to i t s circumstances that an organic body does. I t i s more or less " f i t " according to how i t s capacities meet the givens of the natural environment. But the genotype which backs t h i s s o c i a l phenotype i s conscious, i e . , i t i s activated only to the extent that the language of the culture i s maintained. And there are no other sources for i t s mutation but the c r i t i c a l permits a good " f i t " with the inorganic body. The growing i n d i v i d u a l , that i s , must continually seek to structure i t s own intentions i n such a way that his or her actual practice i s harmonized with the p o s s i b i l i t i e s allowed by the inorganic body's form. This suggests a wing of self-production not developed at length herein. We might give t h i s aspect a Chomskian flavour: Much of one's inte n t i o n a l structure i s not "taught", i e . , not conveyed s o c i a l l y . Instead one has, as a given, the capacity to generate strings of practice which makes sense i n the given inorganic body of one's culture. judgment of persons. The same s k i l l s which allow an adult member of the culture to impress the t y p i c a l s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s upon s o c i a l i z a b l e novitiates also allow for the permeability of the o v e r a l l genotype to the i n d i v i d u a l understanding. The person may have impact on i t s pure s o c i a l conditions. F i n a l l y , a l l of thi s supposes that the person has, as i t were, t h e i r nature outside themselves: that who they are as incumbents i n s o c i a l relationships i s but the reverse side of t h e i r natures as s o c i a l beings. The permeability, there-fore, of t h e i r s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s to t h e i r judgment i s the permeability of th e i r selves to t h e i r selves. Some Common Features of Consciousness We have just examined a range of features of human con-sciousness which have h i s t o r i c a l l y concerned philosophy. We have dealt with them s y n t h e t i c a l l y i n the sense that we have stitched them a l l together i n an integrated whole by the a r t i f i c e of considering them from a genetic standpoint. The major features of consciousness have been brought into theore-t i c a l alignment i n part because we have swept through them quickly and presented them as acts i n a constructive scenario. No great e f f o r t has been made to square t h i s scenario with empirical data, though i n those few places where hypotheses might be forthcoming the facts are, to my knowledge, as alleged. Among the most straightforward features of consciousness with which we have dealt are found penetration and foresight. We do, of course, look into things, not merely i n the sense of investigation but i n that sense we designate by the notion - 38 -of seeing "deeply". The world of appearance i s for us more or less an organized whole i n which we recognize basic phenomena and those features which stand on t h e i r shoulders. Foresight i s almost too obvious to need comment, except that i t might be confused with expectation. What we need to i n d i -cate more i n t h i s regard i s the intimate connection between a foreseen future and the endowing of our present conditions with significance and structure. Valuation and organization of appearance i s achieved through, i n part, the grasp of "trees" of cause and effect/ends and means structures whereby the manifold of the present i s seen to conduce to a certain future. Constructed upon these categories of understanding, i t has been suggested, are both the consciousness of s e l f -i d e n t i t y and the even more diaphanous consciousness of s o c i a l belonging. When one experiences culture shock, just what i s i t which i s knocked out of alignment? This account suggests a f a i r l y elaborate structure of s k i l l s , s e n s i b i l i t y , s o c i a l p r i n c i p l e , etc., which would s t r i k e a dissonance with a marked s h i f t i n s o c i a l conditions. F i n a l l y , we have gained some insight into that sense of personal "open-endedness" so commonly thought by l i b e r t a r i a n s to demand a breakdown i n causation. The advantage of treating such a consciousness as a matter to be constituted i n r e a l terms, as opposed to divined phenomenologically i s that we have on the one hand a l l the richness needed to r e a l l y cap-ture the s e l f and yet the matter of constitution or produc-ti o n i s always to the fore, underscoring the determinateness of the whole matter. - 39 -We have seen how many of the key features of human consciousness can be e f f e c t i v e l y depicted and ordered by considering their r e lations to the fundamentals of human pro-duction. Given the persuasiveness of such an approach, i t i s time to summarize our results and put them i n a form adequate to the tasks of the next chapter. Accordingly, I now proceed to lay out a three-termed schema r e l a t i n g major elements of conscious i d e n t i t y to production. The idea of production c a r r i e s with i t , as implicated concepts, both the idea of an a r t i f a c t or object of labour and the idea of a need that i s met through the labour. We have then two terms of production, one external - from the production agent's point of view - and the other i n t e r n a l . Further, these terms are related i n a d i a l e c t i c a l fashion such that any given a r t i f a c t can be scrutinized i n terms of i t s s a t i s f a c t o r i n e s s to the needs which prompted i t and thereby a new need can be produced. The significance of pro-duction, thus, i s that i t brings into d i a l e c t i c a l unity to one side a material and to the other an i d e a l term. Corres-ponding, therefore, to the h i s t o r i c s ophistication of the a r t i f a c t side of the equation there runs a p a r a l l e l advance i n finesse and organization of human intentions, needs, or what have you. Impli c i t i n production, therefore, i s a: rudimentary form of self-production. The significance of t h i s fact can be brought out by considering three forms of "self-pro-duction", forms which though d i s t i n c t are nonetheless cousins. - 40 -Three Forms of Self-Production We might mark out the f i r s t form of self-production by the phrase c r a f t self-production. What I mean to indicate here i s simply the f a c t , just discussed, that i n the business of creating a world of a r t i f a c t the human species gradually-created i t s e l f . We may suppose without damage that a l l animals have a certain structure of needs: a p r o f i l e of motivation i n which tropism, r e f l e x , and genetically stored routine are ordered and harmonized. At some s u f f i c i e n t l y remote point i n time t h i s would have been true of hominids. The significance of production i s that i t marks the genetic point wherein the structure of need i s shorn free of simple bio-determination and comes to have i t s own, as we might say, laws of motion. I t i s the possession of t h i s new form of determination which gives us an "expanded present" and certain motivational forms proper to i t . The expanded present, i t w i l l be r e c a l l e d , was akin to a structure of ends and means and bore with i t a certain freedom from immediate influence. Clearly i t i s within t h i s expanded present that we discover our " s e l f " , i e . , a unique p r o f i l e of motivation whose struc-ture i s determined by the conceptual a b i l i t y to conceive oneself i n the midst of a . l i f e structured according to s t r a t -egies of ends and means. Thus i t becomes proper to say that as an aspect of human c r a f t we produce s e l f i n some.broad generic sense. There i s , secondly, an a n c i l l a r y form of " s e l f " creation which we can c a l l s o c i a l self-production. This form follows on the heels, as i t were, of c r a f t self-production. For, once the species has begun to accumulate s e l f , qua the expanded present, there must be devised means to pass on the accumulation generation by generation. The greater the developed body of s e l f , the more sophisticated the task of reproducing s e l f ; of s o c i a l i z a t i o n . This brings out the fact that human reproduction i s s o c i a l and, more important, that i t i s self-production: i t i s the production i n o f f -spring of such s e l f as has already been knitted together v i a the progress of c r a f t self-production. Thirdly,' we have as a c o r r o l l a r y to s o c i a l self-produc-t i o n , what might be termed r e f l e x i v e self-production. S o c i a l i z a t i o n i s achieved, i n part, by p a r t i c u l a r persons passing evaluative and c r i t i c a l judgment on others: coaxing, persuading, nudging, reasoning, and so on. This a b i l i t y to s c r u t i n i z e and influence the s e l f of another i s at once the a b i l i t y to put one's s e l f under the microscope and the basis of the a b i l i t y to engage i n self-persuasion. With age, one increasingly appropriates p r e v a i l i n g evaluative and c r i t i c a l methods and, i n proportion as one becomes ever more s k i l l e d as a participant i n the s o c i a l evaluative endeavor, turns t h i s evaluative machinery upon oneself. Control of My l i f e We have given short s h r i f t i n the above to the i n t e r e s t i n g question of s e l f - c o n t r o l . Just what capacities do I have with regard to my s e l f ? In p a r t i c u l a r , not much has been said about our sense of "free w i l l " by which i s meant here the common conviction that what I want out of my l i f e or as my - 42 -l i f e i s , i d e a l l y , an issue confronting my own reasoning and w i l l . This pertinent theme i s best treated by contrast to another approach to the matter and t h i s i s the subject of the next chapter. CHAPTER I I I : SELF-PRODUCTION AND HIERARCHICAL WILL Frankfurt's Concept of Freedom In order to set i n r e l i e f the main elements of the foregoing account of the: nature and ground of human freedom, I want now to expose and analyze a quite d i f f e r e n t alternate proposal. Harry Frankfurt's thesis as to the roots of freedom i s the case i n point. I w i l l be r e f e r r i n g through-out to his "Freedom of the W i l l and the Concept of the Person"."1" Of course, i n a l l t h i s I w i l l r e s t r i c t myself to his core thesis and omit much that i s i n t r i q u i n g i n 2 Frankfurt's work and that of his not insubstantial following. I have chosen to discuss his thesis that i t i s " h i e r a r c h i c a l motivation" (as i t has been termed by one of his commentators) which constitutes freedom. We s h a l l argue that Frankfurt i s r i g h t i n t h i s ... but only p a r t i a l l y . """Harry G. Frankfurt, "Freedom of the W i l l and the Concept of a Person," Journal of Philosophy 68 (January 1971): 5-20. 2A p a r t i a l l i s t of works that extend Frankfurt's germinal ideas includes: W.P. Alston, "Self-Intervention and the Structure of Motivation," i n The S e l f : Philosophical and  Psychological Issues, edited by T. Mischel ( Oxford:Oxford. University, 1977), pp. 65-102; Charles Taylor, "What i s Human Agency?" i n The S e l f : Philosophical and Psychological Issues, edited by T. Mischel (Oxford: Oxford University., 1977) , pp.103-135: G. Dworkin, "Acting Freely," Nous 4 (1970), pp.367-383: P.S. Greenspan, "Behavior Control and Freedom of Action," Philosophical Review 87 (1978), pp. 225-240; S. S c h i f f e r , "A Paradox of Desire," American Philosophical Quarterly 13 (1976), pp. 195-203; David Zimmerman, "Hierarchical Motivation and Freedom of the W i l l , " Unpublished. Draft c i r c u l a t e d : Simon Fraser University, May, 1979. - 43 -- 44 -H i e r a r c h i c a l W i l l and Human Freedom Frankfurt's main theme i s that i t i s through discerning a certain personal structure that we are able to give an account of freedom of the w i l l and, hence, since t h i s i s but one of two exhaustive elements of freedom, freedom i t s e l f . I t i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of persons, he claims, to have a certain h i e r a r c h i c a l structure of w i l l . AndJ.it i s by dint of being h i e r a r c h i c a l l y motivated that persons are able to display the capacities they do, account for themselves i n d i s t i n c t i v e ways, possess certain phenomenological t r a i t s , indeed be "free". What interests us here i s an analysis of freedom. As Frankfurt's t i t l e suggests, i t i s a certain s p e c i f i c a t i o n of the concept of the person that i s deemed f r u i t f u l for the understanding of freedom of the w i l l . This h i e r a r c h i c a l structure i s most e a s i l y grasped i f we conceive the i n d i v i d u a l w i l l as a population of desires. Of course, as we a l l know desires are quite various. Some are l o f t y and others mundane, some r e l a t i v e and conditional while others are absolute, some s o c i a l l y convenient while others are an embarrassment, etc. Within t h i s d i v e r s i t y cer-t a i n basic d i s t i n c t i o n s stand out. In p a r t i c u l a r , a l l desires can be c l a s s i f i e d according to t h e i r objects: Some (perhaps most) desires gaze outward, toward the immediate or long-range conditons of t h e i r possessors, while others are more ego-centric i n that they take other desires as t h e i r work-pieces. For example: the object of a smoker's desires, qua smoker, i s tobacco. Such desires gaze outward. But the smoker may f i n d the craving for cigarettes i t s e l f undesirable. - 4 5 -This aversion marks a self-regarding desire. I t i s a motiva-t i o n a l element which takes another motivational element as i t s object. A fundamental b i f u r c a t i o n of motivation, then, can be readily invoked. There are " f i r s t - o r d e r " urges, dispositions, tastes, etc., among which number t h i r s t s for alcohol or pen-chants for l o g i c a l puzzles, and there are "second-order" desires which take a roughly evaluative stance toward other desires. This basic d i s t i n c t i o n i s the heart of Frankfurt's th e s i s . I t i s a further feature of t h i s c l a s s i f i c a t i o n that the h i e r a r c h i c a l relationship among motives need not be one-on-one. A second-order motive, or several thereof, might as well take whole constellations of primary desires under scrutiny. One co r r o l l a r y of t h i s schema i s the conceptual consequence that a l l i s not f u l l y democratic among desires. Some function to immediately coordinate i n d i v i d u a l and environment. To them f a l l the routine labours of day-to-day getting and spending. Higher order desires, however, effectuate themselves v i a the mediation of the lower classes. How extensive t h i s hierarch-i c a l pyramid i s i s not a se t t l e d question among h i e r a r c h i c a l motivationists. Yet i t seems to be a working assumption that f i r s t and second order w i l l are but the f i r s t two of many possible t i e r s . C l e a r l y what the h i e r a r c h i c a l motivationists are dr i v i n g at i s important. The main target i s the human capacity f o r , variously, self-evaluation, self-formation, s e l f - c o n t r o l or, perhaps, self-determination a l a Reid. The hope seems to be that by plumbing some of the more s t r i k i n g cases of the s e l f - r e l a t i o n we might lay bare the e s s e n t i a l l o g i c of the whole phenomenon. I t i s a signal fact that the majority of cases under discussion are drawn from marked disfunctions: cases of addiction, neurotic compulsion, i r r a t i o n a l loathing, etc. More of t h i s l a t e r . Nonetheless, we are assured, these serve only to help us recognize a more ubiquitous phenomenon: namely our r e l a t i o n s with ourselves i n general and, more p a r t i c u l a r l y , the capacity we have for an evaluative stance toward our own p r o f i l e of motivation. A l l the varied cases of desires chasing desires serve to bring one point into focus: i t i s a. unique t r a i t of a person that the form of the w i l l can be for that person a problem. I t i s Frankfurt's thesis that t h i s sort of problem i s best analyzed as a c o n f l i c t between leve l s of w i l l . By extension, t h i s analysis promises to y i e l d an account of freedom of the w i l l . As a f i r s t approach, that i s , freedom of the w i l l i s construable as the absence of such problematic structures of desire. I t i s unfortunately never completely clear i n Frankfurt just what freedom of the w i l l i s . At times i t seems the f i r s t - o r d e r w i l l i s free provided i t i s the subject of r i g h t governance by the second-order w i l l . Other times i t appears the second-order w i l l i s free to the extent that the f i r s t - o r d e r w i l l i s tractable. I suspect t h i s ambivalence reveals a deep problem for Frankfurt. But be that as i t may, we can make out a clear and i n t e r e s t i n g thesis about human freedom that i s defensibly Frankfurtian. - 47 -According to Frankfurt human freedom i s a conjunction, under the best of circumstances, of two sorts of freedom. One, the, freedom of the f i r s t - o r d e r desires, we share with animals: "We recognize that an animal may be able to run in whatever d i r e c t i o n i t wants." Freedom of the second-order desires alone, however, deserves to be c a l l e d freedom of the w i l l , and t h i s freedom i s unique to the human species. We may designate these freedoms, then, freedom of action and freedom of the w i l l respectively. The l a t t e r free-dom, Frankfurt holds, i s to be understood by analogy with the f i r s t : Freedom of action i s (roughly, at least) the freedom to do what one wants to do. Analogously, then, the statement that a person enjoys freedom of the w i l l means (roughly) that he i s free to want what he wants to want. More pre c i s e l y , i t means that he i s free to w i l l what he wants to w i l l , or to have the w i l l he wants.^ From the human standpoint, then, being f u l l y free i s a matter of possessing both sorts of freedom: A person who i s free to do what he wants to do may yet not be i n a position to have the w i l l he wants. Suppose, however, that he enjoys both freedom of action and freedom of the w i l l ... I t seems to me that he has; i n that case, a l l the freedom i t i s  possible to desire or conceive. There are other good things i n l i f e , and he may not possess some of them. But there i s nothing i n the way of freedom that  he lacks.5 (My emphasis) Objections to the Frankfurt Theory Having drawn t h i s s t r i k i n g conclusion, Frankfurt's account of freedom i s complete. Frank f u r t , p.14. Ibid., p.15. Ibid., p.17. Yet we are i n c l i n e d to pause and wonder i f an account so sparsely furnished can accommodate freedom. The question that suggests i t s e l f i s : Is i t not conceivable that an i n d i v i d u a l enjoy t h i s compound freedom and yet not be, on some reasonable construal of the term, free? The answer, I believe, i s yes. For, as i t happens, nothing about t h i s rudimentary, schematic structure of freedom precludes common garden variety sub-conscious manipulation: i e . , any a l i e n control not perceived as r e s t r a i n t by the agent i n question. Such subtle coercion i s well' known, widespread, and of numerous forms. I t may take the form of subliminal advertising. It may take the form of deliberate miseducation. I t may even take the form of systematic i d e o l o g i c a l constraint by p o l i t i c a l authority with or without intent. A person's second order w i l l we may suppose groups i t s e l f around certain fundamental convictions of p r i n c i p l e . What of t h e i r origin? Suppose they are induced by a manipu-l a t i o n that f a l l s below the l e v e l of immediate recognition. Clearly i f such induction prevails i t does so at s e l f - c o n t r o l ' s expense. I t i s , of course, p e r f e c t l y reasonable to suppose that being free i s , as Frankfurt's thesis urges, a matter of s e l f - c o n t r o l . To a r r i v e therefore at a conception of " a l l of the freedom i t i s possible to desire or conceive" which leaves room for massive, though subtle, intervention by a l i e n and possibly h o s t i l e interests can only indicate a serious shortcoming. - 49 -To obviate such complaints a theory of freedom, I should think, must make es s e n t i a l reference to the context of the w i l l i n g and desiring under scrutiny. This comes out c l e a r l y i f we suppose, as Frankfurt suggests, that'..the heart g of the h i e r a r c h i c a l relationship i s self-evaluation. Of course, the self-evaluative project i s i t s e l f an elusive matter of some complexity as i s discussed l a t e r i n thi s chapter. I t i s clear nonetheless that at any moment the ' substance of the process must generally contain a goodly amount of what we might c a l l Background input: fundamental givens of custom or p r e v a i l i n g c u l t u r a l tone, a certain horizon of ambition, etc. The second order function, that i s , does not proceed ex h i h i l o . Rather, the capacity for self-evaluation e n t a i l s d e f i n i t e s k i l l s i n forming and organizing judgments and the reliance on a range of know-ledge and value. These must be either of d i r e c t s o c i a l o r i g i n and customary or i n d i v i d u a l re-workings of such givens of culture and custom. In general terms, of course, t h i s can be no cause for complaint: These background s k i l l s , knowledge, etc., form a poten t i a l take-off point which per-mits the i n d i v i d u a l to, as i t were, stand on the shoulders of past generations' achievements. Nonetheless, while s o c i a l -i z a t i o n cannot be considered vicious per se, neither can i t be regarded as unive r s a l l y benign. Some people's heritage enhances t h e i r capacity for second order w i l l while others are thereby truncated i n t h e i r a b i l i t y for self-evaluation and have less freedom for i t . ^Ibid., p.7. - 50 -Imagine i n t h i s regard a woman l i v i n g i n the early 19th century who, as i s urged by the most prevalent standards of the day, i s convinced that democracy i s inherently a process involving males; that'.this i s d i v i n e l y ordained and for the best; and, accordingly, that female suffrage i s not desirable. Such an e l e c t o r a l attitude w i l l no doubt be compounded with numerous a n c i l l a r y convictions regarding male leadership i n personal a f f a i r s , proper treatment of children of d i f f e r i n g sex, etc. Nothing prevents such a person from enjoying free-dom of action with regard to her desires and convictions nor that insofar as she dwells on her i d e n t i t y as a p r o f i l e of desires she finds them s a t i s f a c t o r y . Now contrast such a person with Harriet Taylor. Through her s o c i a l environment, her association with M i l l , etc., Taylor l i v e d at the heart of the i n t e l l e c t u a l milieu of her day. U n t i l t h e i r l a t e r ostracism, she and M i l l enjoyed the company of the most sophisticated minds of the era and of t h e i r outlook. Thus located, Taylor was party to the most penetrating conception of democratic l i f e .and,.conse-quently, the need for sexual equality. The methods and premises of the day's philosophical radicalism were an open book to her. The upshot of such a background was Taylor's staunch defence of avant-garde s o c i a l reforms; what one biographer has termed "her emphatic unconventionality." She was a l e f t l i b e r a l with strong s o c i a l i s t sympathies and not passive i n her convictions: She was active among London p o l i t i c a l refugees and instigated M i l l to greater e f f o r t s 7 Ruth Borchard, John Stuart M i l l : The Man (London: C.A. Watts, 1957), p.66. - 51 -on behalf of women's suffrage, the need for sexual equality, g and the importance of socialism. Nonetheless, there were clear f r o n t i e r s of her inde-pendence from the norms of her times where her a b i l i t y to r e s i s t custom f a i l e d . While she was, for instance, resolute i n her insistence on the rightness of her extra-marital rela t i o n s h i p with M i l l - a relationship purchased at the price of increasing ostracism - she was nonetheless unable to r e s i s t the impress of the adultery taboo and kept with M i l l a relati o n s h i p , apparently, wholly platonic. Again, in spite of her convictions on the imprisonment of women within marriage she was unable to ever f u l l y abdicate her role as wife and mother. There i s much evidence that Taylor's reformist strengths were for her the source of a l i f e pervaded by inner struggle, tension, f r u s t r a t i o n and doubt - a l b e i t punctuated p e r i o d i -c a l l y by the e l a t i o n of success. Her l u c i d i t y about herself and her s o c i a l circumstances was a matter of pa i n f u l c l a r i t y . Her apparent reformative determination beli e d an inner turmoil of w i l l . In spite of a l l t h i s personal discord, she scores well on commonly agreed c r i t e r i a of freedom. Insofar as her doubts regarding p r e v a i l i n g standards brought her to purposefully stand apart and challenge them, we are i n c l i n e d to c r e d i t her with autonomy. Moreover, even though she may f a i l often i n her attempts to take her own character i n hand and make i t the most f u l l y e f f e c t i v e agency of reform, these f a i l u r e s are judged r e l a t i v e to high standards and g F.A... Hayek, John S t u a r t ' M i l l and: Harriet Taylor" (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951). - 52 -frequent successes. From place to place her reach exceeds her grasp, yet viewed broadly she possesses a high degree of s e l f - c o n t r o l . In sum then, despite a thoroughly pre-carious problematic of s e l f - a r t i c u l a t i o n , Taylor was her own person i n a way that her conventional contemporary -granting a l l the l a t t e r ' s f i t with her circumstances and equanimity of desires - was not. This brings into r e l i e f , then, a further c l e a r standard of freedom beyond the doubtless c r u c i a l a b i l i t y to pursue one's own happiness according to one's l i g h t s . In any.age there are state-of-the-art methods of evaluation and know-ledge and values r e l a t i v e to s e l f - i d e n t i t y . Degree of sophis-t i c a t i o n i n such matters must be, i t seems to me, f a i r l y strongly t i e d to the kinds of p r a c t i c a l tasks confronting society and the repertoire of material s k i l l s created and deployed i n t h e i r d i r e c t i o n . Be that as i t may, the struc-turing of s o c i a l l i f e may be such as .to enfranchise, as i t were, only some of society with the r a t i o n a l i t y and breadth of conception which are representative of the achievements of t h e i r era. These endowments may or may not be t i e d to the good l i f e i n the sense of a l i f e of variety and reward. It i s easy for confusion to arise here; that i s , for i t to be supposed that i t i s j u s t because of t h i s possible extra richness i n l i f e that a person i s more free. But not just any elaboration of personal practice and mentality i s con-s t i t u t i v e of greater freedom. What concerns us, rather, i s the intimate connection between a repertoire of evaluative s k i l l s and the capacity for c r i t i c a l independence they make - 53 -possible. As the contrast between Taylor and her contem-porary shows, the lack of such enfranchisement can actually reduce one's p o s s i b i l i t i e s for autonomy, s e l f - c o n t r o l , stead-fas t independence and the l i k e : i n short, for being one's own person and having one's own l i f e i n hand. If I am r i g h t about how we would, i n f a c t , regard Taylor and her contemporary v i s - a - v i s freedom, then one deep conse-quence suggested i s that Frankfurt i s wrong to i d e n t i f y free-dom with " s a t i s f a c t i o n " as against " f r u s t r a t i o n " . I t cannot, of course, be denied that sating of desire i s an ingredient i n the compound freedom. And, as well, we must agree that i t i s e s s e n t i a l to the idea of a person that we d i f f e r e n t i a t e l e v e l s of s a t i a t i o n : f i r s t , second, perhaps more. But free-dom i s also t i e d to c r e a t i v i t y : i n the case at hand, to s e l f -c r e a t i v i t y . I t i s noteworthy that by i t s own testimony the creative process has always been tension ridden. Thus, i f we are to give play to the role of skepticism and c r i t i q u e -ideas which have an oppositional connotation - i n the matter of being free, we cannot make any o v e r - f a c i l e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of freedom of w i l l - even second order w i l l - with mere sat i e t y . Now at t h i s point, i t seems to me, we have drawn close to the heart of the matter: I t i s not just Taylor's "con-ceptions" of sexual role and democratic l i f e which d i f f e r e n -t i a t e her from her contemporary but equally the very attitude she bears to the tension ridden oppositions which undergird c r e a t i v i t y . I t i s not unreasonable to suppose that c r u c i a l to the autonomy she evidences i s a higher order affirmation - 54 -of skepticism and c r i t i c a l stance such as was part of the i n t e l l e c t u a l ferment of the early 19th century. I t i s Taylor's d i f f e r e n t i a l exposure, we may suppose, to a con-ception of v i r t u e i n which creative struggle of thought plays a key role which grounds her capacity for autonomy. Having regard to the contrast between Taylor and her contemporary, we can see that f u l l and unproblematic posses-sion of Frankfurtian w i l l does not rule out the p o s s i b i l i t y that the second order w i l l might be, as we say, " f o i s t e d " upon i t s possessor. Nothing prevents a person who has been systematically miseducated from possessing a h i e r a r c h i c a l w i l l and freedom at both l e v e l s . Yet c l e a r l y a person who regards, evaluates, and transforms t h e i r f i r s t order w i l l according to the debased postulates of such a system i s lacking i n freedom. Enough has been said to show that there i s a certain narrowness i n Frankfurt's account. While he has, i n the notion of h i e r a r c h i c a l w i l l , a theory of freedom, he lacks a theory explaining just what h i e r a r c h i c a l w i l l i t s e l f i s . We can agree the s e l f - r e l a t i o n i s r e a l and that understanding i t i s important to the elucidation of the concept of freedom. S t i l l the v i r t u a l l y exclusive focus on the psychological facts of second order motivation leads Frankfurt to disregard e n t i r e l y a whole wing of the problem of human freedom; i t s s o c i a l conditions. Two further d i f f i c u l t i e s with Frankfurt's account de-serve mention, not because they s t r i k e at the heart of the main theme - to which he makes informative and e s s e n t i a l l y correct contributions - but because t h e i r r e c t i f i c a t i o n , as - 55 -peripheral issues, i s a strength of the theory presented herein. I n a b i l i t y to Account for the D e s i r e a b i l i t y of Free W i l l Frankfurt himself posts two c r i t e r i a of adequacy for any theory of freedom. Such a theory must accord with our sense of free w i l l ' s importance and i t must y i e l d grounds for the common conviction that our freedom i s not enjoyed by other species. A theory of freedom must, he claims, "meet these elementary but es s e n t i a l conditions: that i t be understandable why we desire t h i s freedom and why we 9 refuse to ascribe i t to animals. Frankfurt's attempts to square his theory with these c r i t e r i a seems to me on the f i r s t count t r i v i a l while on the second he f a i l s by default. His application of the f i r s t c r i t e r i o n seems l i t t l e more than tautoligizing. Why i s freedom desirable? Because i t e n t a i l s the sating of desires: "The enjoyment of freedom of the w i l l means the s a t i s f a c t i o n of certain desires -desires of the second or higher orders - whereas i t s absence means t h e i r f r u s t r a t i o n . " ^ Where there i s more than tauto-logy here, the "more" turns on the idea of being.actively s e l f - c o n t r o l l i n g rather than h e l p l e s s l y passive: The s a t i s f a c t i o n at stake are those which accrue to a person of whom i t be said that \his w i l l i s his own. The corresponding frustrations are those suffered by a person of whom i t may be said that he i s estranged from himself, or that he finds himself a helpless or a passive bystander to the forces that move him.H Yet, as we have seen, the possession of the freedom i n question does not guarantee that the agent's " w i l l i s his own." Rather 9,10,Hpj-ankfuj-tr p. 17, i t merely ascribes the possession of a rudimentary sort of personal i n t e g r i t y which may be i t s e l f circumscribed by a background manipulation. F a i l s to Explain Intuitions of Uniqueness As to the second condition. Frankfurt claims, "My theory concerning freedom of the w i l l accounts e a s i l y for our d i s i n c l i n a t i o n to allow that t h i s freedom i s enjoyed 12 by the members of species i n f e r i o r to our own." While most of us are, perhaps, thus d i s i n c l i n e d , i t i s hard to see what i n Frankfurt's account serves to deepen our d i s i n -c l i n a t i o n . Frankfurt t e l l s us ri g h t o f f the bat that i t appears we alone have h i e r a r c h i c a l w i l l : "No other animal than man, however, appears to have the capacity for r e f l e c t i v e self-evaluation that i s manifested i n the formation of 13 second-order desires.'.1 However, no supporting evidence for t h i s claim i s immediately given and so we read on, ant i c i p a t i n g that t h i s burden of persuasion w i l l be taken up i n a l a t e r section of the work. What i s needed i s some argument that w i l l add backbone to our i n t u i t i o n s i n t h i s regard about animals. Yet thi s argumentation never a r r i v e s . I t would be quite wrong to make overmuch of these two d i f f i c u l t i e s . The working heart of his paper i s the e l u c i -dation of the c e n t r a l i t y of heirarchy of desire. In thi s he i s f u l l y e f f e c t i v e . Beyond" t h i s there are implications for a f u l l theory of freedom to which Frankfurt adverts 12 ^ 3 I b i d . , p.17. Ibid., p.7. - 57 -somewhat parenthetically. As w i l l be seen, i n t h i s regard his intentions serve him well provided only that certain intermediate steps between the t h e o r e t i c a l core and i t s implications are f i l l e d i n . The self-productive theory, as we s h a l l see, does so. An Alternate to the Frankfurt Theory Production Frankfurt's account does i s o l a t e a r e l a t i o n - the h i e r a r c h i c a l motivation r e l a t i o n - central to human freedom. Yet he does so i n such a manner that various objections perennially lodged against theories of freedom remain. As well, the account f a i l s to provide a context of comprehen-sion. By t h i s I mean we s t i l l f i n d ourselves curious as to just why t h i s r e l a t i o n should be operative at a l l . The fact of h i e r a r c h i c a l w i l l , and such i t i s I think, seems an unfortunately bald fa c t . Certain s o c i a l aspects of the h i e r a r c h i c a l r e l a t i o n go unobserved i n Frankfurt's account. This, of course, i s no serious complaint i n i t s e l f . However, the f a i l u r e to note, for example, that the second order of w i l l proper to one person may bear on the second or f i r s t order w i l l of another person i s not inc i d e n t a l to the fact that Frankfurt's account makes no provision against untoward s o c i a l interven-tions i n personal w i l l . I t i s , i n fac t the p o s s i b i l i t y of se l f - c r e a t i o n i n s o c i a l contexts which allows for s e l f -d i s t o r t i o n qua s o c i a l imposition. A theory which omits an account of the former cannot f o r e s t a l l the l a t t e r . - 58 -I am led to suppose, then, that the problem here i s that Frankfurt has i s o l a t e d the h i e r a r c h i c a l w i l l r e l a t i o n too much. Accordingly, what follows i s an attempt to broaden the account of h i e r a r c h i c a l w i l l and freedom by considering them both as r e l a t i v e s of production. The secret, i t i s claimed, of understanding that w i l l can be produced i n some uniquely human way, l i e s i n understanding that anything at a l l can be produced humanly. Referring to what occurs through the action of h i e r a r c h i c a l w i l l as ' "self-production" i s not merely a matter of bringing i t under the same l e x i c a l heading as what occurs through common and f a m i l i a r labour. Rather there i s a re a l r e l a t i o n between the phenomena, as was asserted i n Chapter I I . As Taylor has explained, the phenomenon of h i e r a r c h i c a l 14 w i l l i s s t r u c t u r a l l y complex. We can d i f f e r e n t i a t e within i t both "simple weighing" and "strong evaluation". The account offered herein explains why t h i s should be the case. For, simple weighing i n Taylor's terms amounts to the common r e f e r r a l of both alternatives of deliberation to the judgment of desires "given" by one's nature. Strong evaluation, on the other hand, involves the challenging of that nature i n an act of r a d i c a l appraisal. I should think that'these two phenomena should be set i n a continuum of appraisal running from simple to strong. In any event, on the present s e l f -productive model, simple weighing corresponds to a more primitive p r e - r e f l e c t i v e form of appraisal, while the strong evaluation mode would only become possible once s o c i a l 14 Taylor, "What i s Human Agency?" - 59 -self-production had b u i l t up the vocabulary of appraisal appropriate to abstract generalizations on subjective character. By a reverse form of argument we arrive at the conclusion that the e f f i c a c y of the self-production model i n explaining both the grounds of h i e r a r c h i c a l w i l l and i t s noted structure proves the c e n t r a l i t y of the concept of production. In the previous chapter we constructed a three-termed typology of self-production. I t allowed us to see that the linkage between the sort of self-production one does when one exercises Frankfurtian w i l l and the h i s t o r i c a l genera-tion by the human species of i t s own repertoire of talents, sensuality, cognitive a b i l i t y , etc., i s , for lack of a better term, a r e a l r e l a t i o n . In a l l three instances we are dealing with forms of freedom: f i r s t , freedom as power of understanding; second, freedom as s o c i a l l y based, humanly driven change; t h i r d , freedom as personal transformation. This self-production typology allows us a window into the genesis of the Frankfurtian h i e r a r c h i c a l r e l a t i o n and allows us a r i c h e r appreciation of i t . Several Forms of Hie r a r c h i c a l W i l l In accordance with Chapter II*s t r i p a r t i t e discussion of self-production, we can now discern three facets of the h i e r a r c h i c a l w i l l r e l a t i o n . F i r s t , there i s that h i e r a r c h i c a l w i l l n aturally associated with the understanding. We have seen that the breadth of the expanded present accords with depth of analytic penetration of ambient causal structure. There are numerous causes which press toward any given natural e f f e c t . I f we are to take up the e f f e c t (say, a bumper crop) as our own end, we must grasp the "tree" (a structure of cause and e f f e c t relations) of causal means which con-duces thereto and intervene e f f e c t i v e l y . Coming to a pos i -t i o n of command over our l i v e s as producers means coming to possess a consciousness structured i n a s t r a t e g i c - t a c t i c a l fashion. What i s true for a single ends-means process -grain production, say - i s true of the whole structure of l i f e processes: the potency and s t a b i l i t y of human l i f e grows to the extent that the breadth of strategy and speci-f i c i t y of t a c t i c advance. "Having a l i f e " , i n other words, and the extent to which one does so, i s a matter, i n part, of gaining an expanded present. Humanity comes to.have a measure of conscious s e l f - i d e n t i t y f i r s t and foremost i n regard to the c r u c i a l l y important regimen of material sustenance. The l i b e r a t i o n from a l i f e of v i s c e r a l response and i n s t i n c t , from a l i f e l i v e d of necessity "for the moment", i s purchased at the price of constantly extending the horizon on one's ambitions and intentions. How much "distance" there i s between one and one's immediate circumstances i s measured in terms of the richness of the l i f e one has as a s e l f -i d e n t i t y or in t e n t i o n a l structure or strategic p r o f i l e . As a f i r s t approximation, therefore, h i e r a r c h i c a l w i l l -the a b i l i t y to bring one low valency motivational element within the ambit of a higher one - i s part and parcel of c r a f t self-production. - 61 -So the most elementary sort of freedom involved i n distancing oneself from the immediate i s an accomplice of that rudimentary structuring of the w i l l which attends the causal penetration demanded by production. The motivational appeals of the moment are u t i l i z e d or discarded as they are judged conducive to various goals, each of which i s some future e f f e c t taken up as an end embedded i n a structure of end and means. S t i l l , there i s more to h i e r a r c h i c a l w i l l than t h i s simple counter-positioning of various goals embedded i n the expanded present. Let us begin with an i l l u s t r a t i o n of t h i s simple form of h i e r a r c h i c a l w i l l . Consider the exercise of s e l f - c o n t r o l by a smoker who wants to quit. Smoking has certain short term motivational elements going for i t : a mild euphoriant e f f e c t , a release for nervous energy, a p a l l i a t i v e to s o c i a l stress. These can be "controlled", when they can, by bringing them under the sway of the long term. One looks forward and regards the eventual loss of a t h l e t i c prowess, the deterioration of health, possibly s o c i a l ostracism. This i s the type of h i e r -15 a r c h i c a l w i l l Taylor has dubbed "simple weighing". Simple weighing, i t should be noted, can be carried out i n a s o c i a l manner. Ty p i c a l l y , here, one person adopts the standpoint of, eg., the future benefits of q u i t t i n g smoking and argues them against the f i r s t - o r d e r i n c l i n a t i o n s of an acquaintance who smokes. This i s but a,.special case of the broader phenomenon of s o c i a l i z a t i o n insofar as i t i s 15 Taylor, "What i s Human Agency?", pp.110-115. - 62 -by such means that "values" (think, perhaps, of l i f e s t y l e s ) are created and dispersed through a culture. But there i s much more to s o c i a l i z a t i o n than simple weighing placed on a s o c i a l footing. By dint of the i n s t i t u t i o n of s o c i a l i z a -t i o n , what almost amounts to a new l e v e l of h i e r a r c h i c a l w i l l i s brought into being. I t i s worth pausing, before moving onto the second as-pect of h i e r a r c h i c a l w i l l , to underscore the simple p a r a l l e l being asserted here. We have discussed, r e c a l l , how a key aspect of human consciousness, understanding, i s founded upon the causal penetration a n c i l l a r y to craft-production. Con-sciousness, i n one of i t s f a m i l i a r modes, grows i n proportion as i t extends the matrix of cause and e f f e c t r e l a t i o n s grasped. But t h i s way of depicting consciousness seems purely contem-pl a t i v e and passive. To give i t the dynamic q u a l i t y f a m i l i a r to us as i n t e n t i o n a l i t y we need f i r s t to recognize that the whole matrix of cause and e f f e c t can be rewritten as a matrix of means and ends. In t h i s l i g h t we now see that consciousness affirms some portions of what i s present to i t as a mere causal ins i g h t . Some, possibly a l l , of what i s present to consciousness as causal structure i s i n t e n t i o n a l l y i r r i d e s c e n t , as i t were; i s taken to be a pathway to the future. Thus i s the manifold, of the environment given a structure of meaning as conducing or not to t h i s or that goal. So far as I can see the two structures, that of causal penetration and that of ends and means must always be schema-t i c a l l y superimposable with some rough degree of f i t . For, the two phenomena, consciousness as understanding and as i n t e n t i o n a l thrust, develop i n chicken-and-egg fashion. That i s , what drives understanding i s the thrust of i n -tending to meet needs. What drives the i n t e n t i o n a l structure i s the new horizons opened up by the expanding understanding. If t h i s i s correct, then nothing i s more straightforward than the r e a l i z a t i o n that what appears i n understanding as a ramified structure of axiom and theorem should be paralled i n w i l l as a structure of strategy and t a c t i c . Thus we have the h i e r a r c h i c a l nature of w i l l at i t s most fundamental l e v e l . The second aspect of h i e r a r c h i c a l w i l l presupposes the structure just discussed. For, the s o c i a l i z a t i o n function of human w i l l i s < exercised to the extent that these very structures are themselves conscious objects. Whereas i n the h i e r a r c h i c a l form proper to c r a f t s e l f -production the transformation of s e l f occurs more or less as a by-product of the productive d i a l e c t i c , here, i n s o c i a l i z a -t i o n , we have increasingly, a new and higher order of s e l f -production, one that must be taken on as a task i n i t s own r i g h t . I f s o c i a l i z a t i o n i s to be understood and organized as a process, i t must be imbued with consciousness. That i s , i t s . own structure of causation must be plumbed and an operational strategy mapped out. Like a l l jobs, of course, t h i s one gives r i s e to shop t a l k . A vocabulary s p e c i f i c to the object of production - the s e l f - i s developed (eg., inattentiveness, perseverence, resoluteness, d i s s i p a t i o n , etc.) as i s a vocabulary of production method (eg., i n d i g -nance, congratulation, etc.) and t r i c k s of the trade are swapped back and forth. Now the conceptual mapping of t h i s new productive t e r r a i n can begin. For one i s not here simply concerned with arguing t h i s s p e c i f i c motive over that, less g a i n f u l , desire (although one i s concerned with such). Whole cate-gories of motivation can now be discerned. "Perseverence" for instance i s not so much an intention as a mode'of acti v a t i o n of intention. Gradually by the progress of the s o c i a l self-production lexicon there i s brought into being 16 a new l e v e l of a r t i c u l a c y r e l a t i v e to self-production. We f i n d s p e c i f i c forms of h i e r a r c h i c a l w i l l attached, then, to both production and s o c i a l reproduction. Thirdly, i t remains to mention the h i e r a r c h i c a l w i l l associated with r e f l e x i v e self-production. This i s , of course, Frankfurtian h i e r a r c h i c a l w i l l , but i t comes into view i n the most theore-t i c a l l y graceful manner at the end of the road we have just trod. We can now see, f i r s t , that s o c i a l i z a t i o n i s not merely a matter of receiving the h i s t o r i c a l l y available store of accumulated s e l f through subjection to s o c i a l h i e r a r c h i c a l w i l l . I t i s also a matter of coming to p a r t i c i p a t e i n the project insofar as we are able to appropriate the vocabulary of s o c i a l self-production. But no s e l f i s more susceptible to such a vocabulary than our own s e l f . Insofar, therefore, as we have achieved p a r t i c i p a t o r y status i n the s o c i a l task of self-production we become, w i l l y n i l l y , e f f e c t i v e agents of personal or r e f l e x i v e s e l f - c r e a t i o n . 16 I am indebted to Taylor for t h i s usage of "a r t i c u l a c y " . I t i s unique to the present paper that i t gives the above account of the foundations of what Taylor terms "deep evaluation" which i s , on his account, a matter of a r t i c u l a t i n g a self-concept. See "What i s Human Agency?", Loc. c i t . - 65 -A Stronger Theory of Freedom Having given Frankfurt's h i e r a r c h i c a l w i l l r e l a t i o n an explanatory t h e o r e t i c a l context, we can now proceed to various implications t h i s broader account has for the theory of freedom. The Insufficiency of Integrity As we have seen, Frankfurt portrays freedom as con-s t i t u t e d by the correspondence of levels of motivation. In fact, t h i s consistency between orders of motivation i s well captured i n the c o l l o q u i a l notion of a person's being a very "together" i n d i v i d u a l . But one can be together i n various ways. One's togetherness may be purchased at the price of irresponsible unconcern for the implications of one's l i f e and practices, for example. A shallow together-ness i s as possible as a profound one. Most important, one's i n t e g r i t y may be broadly circumscribed by constraints such that we would be unprepared to grant that even the most rigorous consistency might add up to freedom. The t r a d i t i o n a l l i b e r t a r i a n response to such considera-tions has been to propose that i n t e g r i t y i s at best secondary, at worst i r r e l e v a n t to freedom. Instead, i t has been urged, the key to freedom i s the absolute independence of the structure of motivation from circumscribing conditions. The search for the grounds of freedom has accordingly been de-picted as a quest for such personhood as i s surrounded by a moat across which no social forces (among others) can forge without personal co-operation at the drawbridge. Yet t h i s freedom seems more akin to being layed siege than to l i b e r t y - 66 -and seems to make of a l l s o c i a l influence a prima f a c i e insurgent e v i l . In c o n t r a d i s t i n c t i o n , the deep dependence of the i n -di v i d u a l upon society for s e l f and for the i n t e l l e c t u a l equipment that makes freedom opportune has been portrayed with undeniable force. Francois Truffaut's L:'.Enfant Sauvage provides as good a case i n t h i s regard as can be found. It i s worth pausing for a moment to dwell on i t s central lesson. The f i l m dramatizes the events surrounding the d i s -covery i n the 19th century of a "wild boy" i n the woods of France. When he i s f i r s t discovered, the f e r a l youth lacks not only language and learning but even such f a m i l i a r human t r a i t s as bi-pedal gai t and erect posture. He survives, apparently by whatever l i v i n g he can scratch out with his bare hands and he has the cunning and ferocious temperment which are functional to a naked denizen of the forest f l o o r . He snarls and f l a i l s and lashes out with teeth and n a i l s . It i s the f i r s t stages of L'Enfant's c i v i l transforma-t i o n which comprise the film's story l i n e . As we watch we begin to see him change under the patient yet unabashed tutelage of h i s captors. What gives the f i l m i t s peculiar gravity i s the compression i n time of normally s n a i l ' s pace events. The force of human influence i n c h i l d - r a i s i n g i s normally made i n v i s i b l e by i t s slow cumulative progress. In the f i l m what normally takes years takes only months and i s portrayed i n a few hours. The wild boy's f e r o c i t y i s peeled o f f just as he i s clothed i n the style of the day and - 67 -as the months r o l l by he i s introduced to the comportment and supporting routines of his contemporaries. As we leave him at the film's end he i s uttering his f i r s t p a i n f u l words and i s beginning to enjoy the sympa-th e t i c emotions. He has been and i s being, raised up from the squalor of the forest f l o o r , from servitude to the iron regimen of the struggle for sustenance, from the shackles of prudence which keep him within easy reach of those few f a m i l i a r grottos where he can enjoy a safe sleep. The conclusion i s clear: L'Enfant's c a p t i v i t y i s l i b e r a -t i o n : the often harsh checks imposed on his animus exalt him; he i s being forced to be free. Such a scenario goes a long way to explaining why i t i s not only necessary but also s a t i s f y i n g to abandon the siege mentality of r a d i c a l l i b e r t a r i a n i s m . One, of course, wants a culture which i s permeable to one's w i l l . To sup-pose a freedom along the l i n e s of l i b e r t a r i a n independence whose ..terrain of action stopped short at the gates to the c i v i c arena would hardly s u f f i c e . Yet t h i s desirable per-meability of one's culture to one's w i l l i s but the reverse side of one's own permeability ;to the w i l l of one's culture. Thus we are naturally led to the conclusion that i f freedom i s a certain status vis-a-vis' influences l i t must.exhibit i t s potency against only some influences. And there's the rub. Just how to draw the l i n e between manipulative and educative influence? Despair i n regard to any r a t i o n a l demarcation of influences has f u e l l e d the s i m p l i s t i c f i r e s of, to one side, r a d i c a l l i b e r t a r i a n i s m (Reid) and, to the - 68 -other, vulgar determinism (Spinoza). In l i n e with the more complex picture of the w i l l we now have at hand we can i n d i -cate just how such a d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n might be achieved. We might consider the relevant information under the heads of the form and content of freedom. The form of free-dom i s , roughly, p a r t i c i p a t o r y s o c i a l l i f e . That i s , i t has the shape of s o c i a l d i a l e c t i c i n which one wields i n co-opera-tion with others a certain vocabulary. One par t i c i p a t e s i n the h i s t o r i c a l l y achieved l e v e l of ar t i c u l a c y proper to one's culture. This implies at once that being free i s , broadly speaking, a public a f f a i r i n the sense that a l l the cards that effectuate w i l l are on the table. As regards the content of freedom we might begin with the idea that the c r u c i a l element i n manipulation i s the r e l a t i v e helplessness of the subject. In p a r t i c u l a r , that supposition i s that i f the content of one's w i l l i s estab-lis h e d sub rosa; outside the pa r t i c i p a t o r y space, say by subliminal suggestion, one i s riot free. We have seen that Frankfurt's model of freedom contains no elements which would obviate t h i s sort of helplessness. We are now i n a position to see that cert a i n s p e c i f i c a t i o n s of the content of influence can sort out manipulation from education. For i f we suppose a person whose convictions, desires, p r i n c i p l e s , etc. are induced v i a a minute speaker placed beneath t h e i r pillow, we are supposing events that have the form of manipulation. Yet suppose, now, further, that the content of such suggestions was such as to deepen the subject's a r t i -culacy i n s e l f - e v a l u t i o n , to reinforce the s o c i a l l y and - 69 -personally wieldable c r i t i c a l s k i l l s of the subject, to broaden the conceptual vocabulary applicable to the sub-ject's and other's l i v e s , etc. We are, i n fact, supposing a l i b e r a t i o n a l b e i t oddly packaged. To return to Frankfurt: The central objection to Frankfurt's theory of freedom was one of i n s u f f i c i e n c y . One could, i t was indicated, be e f f e c t i v e i n achieving harmony between orders of w i l l yet be subject at the higher levels to sub-conscious forces of such nature that we would want to say one was enslaved. This .objection might be put a p h o r i s t i c a l l y : "Integrity i s not enough!" For example, we have supposed that h i e r a r c h i c a l w i l l and the freedom i t grounds has been around for a long time -ever since production got under way. I f we now suppose, then, a 20th century i n d i v i d u a l with perfect i n t e g r i t y of w i l l yet with the understanding and evaluative vocabulary proper to early metal culture, i t i s p l a i n that such a per-son i s less than f u l l y free. One must possess or at least have had reasonable access to the state-of-the-art s e l f of one's culture. But even t h i s further condition w i l l not secure the broadest possible freedom. I t must be further stipulated that one not be subject to subliminal influence and that.one's whole c u l t u r a l context not be i n the hands (perceived or not) of a l i e n w i l l . How many further s t i p u -lati o n s are needed to secure freedom cannot, i t seems to me, be fixed. Indeed, the very idea of "securing" freedom stems, I think, from the conviction that, whatever freedom - 70 -i s , we must have i t . The approach elaborated here suggests otherwise. I t suggests that numerous elements comprise freedom and that advances i n any one element might lead i n future to the emergence of new human capacities which would, i n t h e i r turn react back upon already e x i s t i n g "cradle" conditions. Meanwhile, here, i n regard to Frankfurt, the point i s not to provide an alternate account of the broadest  possible freedom but rather to indicate that the inherently s o c i a l nature of humanity precludes any characterization of freedom i n purely i n d i v i d u a l terms. Freedom has to do with the production of w i l l . To the extent that t h i s i s true we are pointed toward an account of both i n d i v i d u a l and culture for the roots of a theory of freedom. For no i n d i v i d u a l ever gets to churn w i l l from thin a i r . One's w i l l i s worked out against one's culture by the reshaping of c u l t u r a l givens using given equipment. This partnership extends to the very deepest lev e l s of s e l f ; to the s t r u c t u r a l t r a i t s of consciousness; to that p r o f i l e of motivation that defines our subjective sense of a l i f e of our own to be l i v e d . I f s o c i a l givens are part and parcel of the very capa-c i t i e s whereby we are able to deal with our w i l l s , and i f freedom resides i n large measure i n the exercise of that capacity, an adequate concept of freedom must make e s s e n t i a l reference to c u l t u r a l forces. To put i t another way: i f the concept of freedom demands an account of education, i t also demands, of necessity, an account of the education of the educator. One further strength of an account of freedom that takes production as a key ingredient should be explained. We saw e a r l i e r that Frankfurt i s at best unpersuasive when he wields his theory of freedom to d i f f e r e n t i a t e man from the animals. The following argument can be made on his behalf: I f we suppose animals free we are driven to the conviction that they possess h i e r a r c h i c a l w i l l . This seems preposter-ous, so the d i s i n c l i n a t i o n to grant animals freedom gains support. The argument i s formally sound. But i s i t prepos-terous to suppose that animals possess a suitably structured w i l l ? I already accepted that animals are not free (in the relevant sense) before t h i s argument was made and I now f i n d myself i n no stronger p o s i t i o n when i t comes to mustering evidence for my view. Supposedly i f I want to materially conclude v i a t h i s argument that animals aren't free, I must unearth "evidence that they are somehow unidimensional. How to do t h i s i s not obvious because the whole account i s cast i n psychological terms or i n terms of i n t e r n a l i t i e s and needs a supplement of behaviorist premises i f the p r a c t i c a l a f f a i r s of, say, chimps are to count for or against t h e i r freedom. My alternate approach has the advantage that i t incor-porates as an i n t e g r a l component a thoroughly v i s i b l e element; namely, production. We can thus begin to tackle immediately the question of d i f f e r e n t i a l freedom across the spectrum of species by comparing production capacities. I don't propose to take up t h i s task here. But i t can be indicated that, on the truth of t h i s view, the e d i f i c e of human a r t i f a c t stands testimony to a unique freedom. Other species do things that look l i k e production. Rabbits and robins, of course, have the i r own e d i f i c e s i n burrow and nest. Ants, bees and beaver even have s o c i a l l y constructed e d i f i c e s . But these are s t a t i c i n form over time within a given species The p l a s t i c i t y engendered by the c r i t i c a l capacity evidently i s not there. Certain birds use straws to f e r r e t out i n -sects. But the practice i s niche-bound: not only i s the t r i c k never generalized, i t i s hard to say just how i t ever could be. Thus, however the s i t u a t i o n may i n fact be with non-human labour, i t i s clear that the account of free-dom which t i e s freedom to production sets up useful empirical i n t u i t i o n s and t h i s must be counted as a t h e o r e t i c a l strength F i n a l l y , an aside should be made concerning the e a r l i e r c r i t i c i s m of Frankfurt on the matter of the d e s i r e a b i l i t y of freedom. I say "aside" because i t seems cle a r that any explanation of why freedom i s a pressing concern i s somewhat a n c i l l a r y to both Frankfurt's prime concerns and to what has been developed herein. Within i t s terms of reference I have nothing more to add than what Frankfurt has stated. Frankfurt t r i e d the impossible and I won't. Roughly speaking Frankfurt posted the question "Why the desire for freedom?", then formulated freedom i n terms of desire, and, naturaily enough, could o f f e r only tautologous answers to his own question. Within the framework of a theory such as Frankfurt and I are attempting there i s no answer to the question because, i n fact, people do not desire freedom per se. Instead a l l people have t h i s freedom as Homo sapiens. What they lack i s the opportunity for freedom's exercise. Where there i s an awareness of the lack and, accordingly, where freedom looms as a pressing concern, i t i s because as a species and from case to case humanity's reach exceeds i t s grasp. No one longs for freedom i n the abstract. Rather, having legs we hunger for space to run. In short, the t h i r s t for freedom i s not a longing after human nature but a desire not to be alienated from our humanity. And that, as Marx pointed out, i s not a philosophic but a p r a c t i c a l problem. Taking Our Lives i n Hand One f i n a l point rounds out the advantages of the ap-proach espoused here. I t i s a point about having a " l i f e to be l i v e d " and what i t i s to "make one's l i f e " . We do not construct l i f e atomically. Rather, our l i v e s appear to us and are comprised i n terms of wholes. My sharpening t h i s p e n c i l i s writing the thesis which i s refuting behaviorism. The part i s made meaningful by the whole. We do, of course, make somewhat unitary decisions, often p a i n f u l l y . But conceptions of freedom which r e l y for t h e i r evidence on motivational c r i s e s give the impression that the creative i n human a f f a i r s i s bunched up i n nodes of sharp deliberation surrounded by vast tracts of moral lethargy. While there are revolutions i n personal a f f a i r s where leaves are turned d e c i s i v e l y , much of s e l f - c r e a t i o n goes on i n the interregna and the theory at hand helps bring t h i s t e r r a i n into focus. I t was suggested e a r l i e r that the reliance of the h i e r -a r c h i c a l motivationist l i t e r a t u r e on peculiar dilemmas such as neurotic aversion, compulsive cravings and the l i k e was a t e l l i n g sign. Not a l l the post-Frankfurtian l i t e r a t u r e can be so neatly compartmentalized. In p a r t i c u l a r , Taylor's work breaks t h i s mould and engages less c r i s i s - r i d d e n , more ubiquitous, and therefore more important aspects of s e l f -construction. But even here Taylor seems to f a l l prey to the tyranny of the deliberated decision, I think, perhaps, t h i s i s p a r a l l e l to the i n a b i l i t y of much of early 20th cen-tum ethics to raise the question "What i s i t to l i v e a good l i f e ? " I t seemed no one dared b i t e o f f anything larger than the "act" as an item of moral inspection. The buried and highly dubious premise i n a l l t h i s myopia was the convic-t i o n that enough good acts lashed together would give a good l i f e . Neither sort of atomism r e a l l y promises an account of our l i v i n g sense of ourselves, i t seems to me and, perhaps more important, i n neither schema are the r e a l l y pressing issues of human a f f a i r s stateable. The theory of freedom at hand accounts for "having a l i f e " i n terms, i n part, of the expanded present or dimensions of understanding. This allows us to see how the t e r r a i n of one's l i f e can be, on the other hand, a matter of week-by-week engrossment or, on the other, of such an extent as to surpass altogether the bounds of one's span of years. I t shows as well the appear-ance of s e l f i n a nexus of s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s . On t h i s view one's very continuity depends upon the d u r a b i l i t y of one's - 75 -culture; a d u r a b i l i t y which ceaselessly beckons our p a r t i c i -patory support. F i n a l l y , i t reveals the person as a i n -dwelling substance making sense of and given sense by the in t e n t i o n a l structure of the inorganic body. Hence, l i v i n g our l i v e s can have a dimension of defining ourselves within or against the cityscape and the towering monopolies of production. Both i n large and small ways our l i v e s are given form by the architecture that contains them. In short, the hierarcy of w i l l i s both d i f f u s e , v a r i e -gated i n form, and ubiquitous. Its sharper cri s e s are im-portant, but these by no means set the benchmark of "problems of the w i l l " which confront us. The most profound problems of w i l l only confront us to the extent that we are able to conceive ourselves as custodians of l i v e s and are only soluble within such conceptions. CONCLUSION The method i n t h i s essay has been to follow Marx i n the materializing of the question of the nature of human freedom. We have treated the issues as evolutionary ones; as problems in t e r a c t i n g f r u i t f u l l y with the anthropology of human development. The basic methodological argument has been that i f we are not to assume super-natural pre-mises then the actual capacities of persons, freedom among them, must appear as evolutionary acquisitions: developing i n response to ambient conditions among which must be numbered the very conditions created by human nature. Two main nodes appear i n our account. F i r s t , produc-t i o n i t s e l f , the uniquely human response to s u r v i v a l demands, comes r i c h l y laden with consequences for mentality, for consciousness, for the root p o s s i b i l i t y of a s e l f - r e l a t i o n . Second, the creation of an ever larger scale of a speci-f i c a l l y human environment brings with i t a unique phenonmen: culture. This new l i n e of being presupposes a new range of capacities among which are recognizable the main foundations of freedom. S p e c i f i c a l l y , the creation and maintenance of culture demands a consciousness of a new type: human s e l f -awareness i n the form of c r i t i c a l and s e l f - c r i t i c a l powers which can be turned to the task of appraising l i v e s and t h e i r s u i t a b i l i t y to s o c i a l i n t e g r i t y . What t h i s whole picture suggests as one of i t s most f r u i t f u l implications i s the extremely t i g h t r e l a t i o n which holds between personal and s o c i a l i n t e g r i t y . I t does at once away, i t seems to me, with extreme forms of l i b e r a l individualism; making clear a personal s o c i a l indebtedness far beyond the normal v i s i o n of material and educative nurture. We now see the person appear i n a deep-seated in t e r a c t i o n with the s o c i a l m i l i e u . I t does away, by the same token, with extreme orga n i c i s t views of s o c i a l role wherein the person can r i g h t l y be accorded the status of a mere c e l l . Freedom on t h i s account demands f u l l p a r t i -cipation: the appropriation of r a t i o n a l powers and a palate of sensual finesse and the a b i l i t y to wield them c r i t i c a l l y i n the production of the advancing s o c i a l genotype. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. 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