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SELF-PRODUCTION AND FREEDOM

by

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ABSTRACT

Philosophical anthropology holds the key to the resolution of the paradoxes of freedom and necessity. Through its investigations the genesis of the main features of human freedom can be accounted for and the whole field given a systematic order. Yet while we see, by this approach, the evolution of consciousness, self-creativity, transcendence, and the like - the very stuff of freedom - we also witness the determinate nature of freedom's emergence.

Marx's conception of freedom depended heavily on the Hegelian view of history. But Marx "materialized" Hegel's dialectic, supplanting the primacy of Logos, or pure thought, in favour of production. In production he saw arise a series of unique oppositions: initially, the opposition of man to his product, and eventually of man to himself. Through these oppositions there developed, Marx felt, the uniquely human self-critical capacity on which he believed freedom to be founded. Herein, this approach is extended. The fundamental structure of self and the capacity to criticize and reform self are explained as evolutionary relatives of production.

Recent work on freedom of the will has focussed on the susceptibility of human will to itself: on the capacity for self-control which has been termed "Hierarchical Motivation". This approach points to the roots of creativity in effective self-evaluation. Herein, that thesis is extended by approaching the issues from an anthropological rather than, as is more normal, a psychological direction. Thereby it is indicated that the most satisfying account of freedom requires more than phenomenological-conceptual analysis: it requires sociological and anthropological insights.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION.....	1.
CHAPTER I. MARX'S VIEW OF FREEDOM: AN INTERPRETATION.....	4.
The Importance of the Early Work.....	4.
Hegel's Influence.....	5.
The Primacy of Production.....	9.
The Objectification of Human Being.....	12.
Objectification and Consciousness.....	15.
The <u>German Ideology</u> :	
The Significance of Production.....	17.
Subjectivity and Objectivity.....	17.
Social Production and Consciousness.....	19.
Reflexive Subjectivity.....	21.
CHAPTER II. THE ROLE OF PRODUCTION IN THE ORIGINATION OF CONSCIOUSNESS.....	23.
Direct and Indirect Origination.....	23.
Production and Consciousness.....	23.
Penetration of Causality.....	24.
Vocabulary of Ends and Means.....	25.
The Possibility of Opposition.....	32.
Production and Subjectivity.....	33.
Cooperation and Communication.....	34.
Conscious Reproduction.....	35.
Some Common Features of Consciousness.....	37.
Control of My Life.....	41.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER III. SELF-PRODUCTION AND HIERARCHICAL WILL.....	43.
Frankfurt's Concept of Freedom.....	43.
Hierarchical Will and Freedom.....	44.
Objections to the Frankfurt Theory.....	47.
Desireability of Free Will.....	55.
Intuitions of Uniqueness.....	56.
An Alternate to the Frankfurt Theory.....	57.
Production.....	57.
Several Forms of Hierarchical Will.....	59.
The Insufficiency of Integrity.....	65.
A Stronger Theory of Freedom.....	65.
Taking Our Lives in Hand.....	73.
CONCLUSION	76.
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY	78.

INTRODUCTION

The history of the Freedom and Necessity debate has frequently had recourse to one or another variant of the "internal strategy". By this phrase I denote those diverse arguments designed to show that the individual has "within" a creative capacity in the exercise of which there originates a unique, personal contribution to the causal flow. Of course, the rudimentary opening gambit of determinism is the simple depiction of the present as the child of the past. On this simple view one's being "caused" entails one's being "made to do" whatever range of practices comprise one's life. There can be about me nothing not previously present in embryo in my cradling conditions. In response, it can readily be suggested that insofar as every effect is in turn a cause, no deep metaphysical principle bars the compatability of what is at once the "caused" nature of humanity from being, next, an "effectuating" nature. I can be both constituted and have, accordingly, a certain determinate will, and be the embodiment of a will that is uniquely constitutive of my own practice. Yet this schema of response seems purely formal and unpersuasive when we step back and consider the agent being impinged upon and in turn impinging uniquely on the affairs of his life.

For, it leaves the agent in the flow of causation; a unique formula for the conversion of causes into effects, perhaps, but yet the bearer of a purely mediant causal status and, it would seem, a purely passive, epiphenomenal consciousness.

A more satisfying response has followed out the idea that if anything is to be asserted on freedom's behalf it must somehow make something of creativity; must make a case for the self as the source of self. Creativity cannot simply be the flow of self-expressive practice which, when pressed, points back over its shoulder to prior conditions. Somehow the self expressed in action must be of "inner" origin. Thus, we have seen "self-determination", "contra-causal egoism", "emergentism", and, most recently, "hierarchical motivationism". This latter variant has appeared quite rich in explanatory possibilities yet it is not clear that it does not bear the same blight as contra-causal egoism; namely, that once an account of the constitution or engendering of the prime source of self (contra-causal me, or top tiers of motivation) is supplied, the strategy seems toothless.

Depiction of inner creative structures whose highest terms are yet caused can only be viewed as a stall, one which can only put off the inevitable by chasing it around a broader theoretical circuit. Yet what other direction is there to go? If we take this emphasis on creativity to be the crucial step; ie., if we adopt a broadly self-deterministic approach, it seems we have, in pure conceptual terms, two logically exhaustive alternatives. Either (a) there is some internal master-slave relation such that the self is

backed up by a meta-self or (b) self just creates self like leavened dough expanding without benefit of yeast. Followed out rigorously (b) simply replaces mystery with mystery while (a) seems to fall prey to the just cited objection: it merely transfers the original questions regarding the constitution of human practice to a new location.

I think the hierarchical will approach is flawed in this way but still useful. In this paper I expose a broad theoretical context for hierarchical motivation which obviates the criticism suggested above. That criticism, it is argued, can be avoided if we view the self in question in a broad context of human social causation. We envisage thereby, it is claimed, a causal nexus in which real flesh and blood human freedom is visible.

The main outlines of this suggestion were first explored by Marx in the early 1840's as he attempted to persuade himself that the Hegelian account of freedom could be translated into a natural idiom in line with the materialism of the day. Through this period the key ingredients of Marxism were staked out. These are exposed, insofar as they bear on the question of freedom, in Chapter I.

In Chapter II the primary Marxist idea for our purposes - that humanity collectively and individually is capable of self-production - is explored fully.

Finally, in Chapter III, we see how this conception both locates and repairs the main lines of argument in the hierarchical motivation theory.

CHAPTER I: MARX'S VIEW OF FREEDOM AN INTERPRETATION

The Importance of the Early Work

Paris, the summer months of 1844, and Marx is busy squaring accounts with Hegel. A year from now he and Engels will be consolidating a draft of the new world outlook to bear Marx's name and, in their application of it to the day's main trends of social thought, will produce what might be termed 'the first Manifesto': The German Ideology.¹ But now Marx is struggling to knit several strands of his intellectual heritage into a consistent whole.

In his doctoral thesis, just four years on the shelf, he had taken freedom's side in the debate between freedom and necessity. He recognizes Hegel's analysis of the logic of freedom as adequate, but only in abstract terms. In his work on the Rheinish Zeitung he has seen the class nature of society and, in two subsequent works, he has clarified the necessity of social-economic freedom to political freedom.²

¹Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Karl Marx, Frederick Engels: Collected Works, ed. N.P. Karmanova and others, vol. 5: The German Ideology. (New York: International Publishers, 1976). Page references in brackets, following references to the Collected Works, are to: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The German Ideology (New York: International Publishers, 1970), ed. C.J. Arthur. The translation in this latter volume is superior and all quotations are from it.

²Marx contributed to, then edited the Rheinische Zeitung, organ of the Rheinish bourgeoisie, from March 1842 (when his academic prospects evaporated) to January 1843

By the time he publishes (or, non-publishes) Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right in the Deutsch-Franzosiche Jahrbucher (1844), the first and last volume of which was immediately confiscated, he has grasped the significance of alienated labour and, in consequence, the historic significance of the proletariat. While he is editing the Jahrbucher, Engels' "Contribution to a Critique of Political Economy" arrives and Marx sees in it the main themes of the science of the human condition. It is political-economy which will be the proving ground of social and political theory. "Production" and its cognate, "labour", is to be the organizing concept of the new outlook and we find Marx exploring it thoroughly in The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844.³

Hegel's Influence

Just what debts Marx owes to Hegel is a matter of considerable debate in the secondary literature. However much of his student Hegelianism Marx did reject in the eventual

(when the journal was suppressed). Through this work Marx saw that the law was essentially partial and that various legal struggles symbolized the competing aspirations of various classes. In two subsequent works, "Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right", and "On the Jewish Question", (included in the Deutsch-Franzosiche Jahrbucher) Marx explored the relation of the State to civil society and concluded that political freedom was nullified by social inequality.

³Karl Marx, Karl Marx, Frederick Engels: Collected Works, ed. N.P. Karmanova and others, vol. 3: Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. (New York: International references to the Collected Works, are to: Karl Marx, The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. (New York: International Publishers, 1964), ed. D.J. Struik. The translation in this latter volume is superior and all quotations are from it.

construction of his own theories, it seems quite implausible to suppose that this intellectual revolution took place wholly between Marx's student days and 1844. We are best off regarding Marx as in transition in the period under review. Beyond what I later suggest was the prime step taken by Marx in this period, it is best simply to be aware of some of the key elements of Hegel's thought with which Marx was doubtlessly engaged.

Hegel's work, like that of the Romantic movement with which he was associated, was a reaction to the Enlightenment. In particular, this movement believed Enlightenment theory had fragmented the world; dividing God from the universe, man from nature, and, most especially, the human subject from its physical nature. (This latter partition was well represented by Descartes wherein the body was reduced to a machine while the soul was given the status of a quasi-mathematical entity bearing some unfathomable relation to the body.)

What the Romantic movement, of which Hegel was the culminating term, tried to achieve, accordingly, was a synthesis of the subjective self and the scientifically observable objective being. It is this synthetic endeavor which led the pre-Hegelians, and Hegel as the most systematic theorist, to experiment with various dialectical formulations. What they recognized was that two distinct and opposed entities could be unified through their mutual struggles. For example, the artist as an aesthetic subject stood opposed to an objective world of canvas and pigment. The artist had to struggle against the inherent physical and sensual qualities of the artistic medium in order to shape it into an art object. Yet just as the artist's will

was the premise of the art object, so too was the artistic medium the indispensable premise of artistic capacity. The artist depended upon such objects and indeed could only live, qua artist, in and through them. The completed canvas was a moment in the artistic career, the developing sensibility to one side and the advancing refinement of objective expressions to the other forming an evolving whole. This is but one of a number of formulae for embodiment and mutual interaction of which Hegel was considered to have offered the most thorough analysis. For Hegel the development of all phenomena was founded upon oppositions internal to them. In the evident contrariety of the thoughtprocess, he held, for example, one merely experienced directly this unity of opposites. Thus in the Hegelian system was there unity in opposition between God and the universe, the human spirit and history, the State and civil society, the human subject and its material practice. From the general theoretical standpoint this dialectical approach was deemed to hold the prospect of the unification of the free, confrontative self and the natural objectivity in which it expressed itself.⁴

Given that these ideas were in the air at the University of Berlin, did Marx in fact retain the ingredient most synonymous with Hegel: namely, dialectics? The debate over Marx's intellectual heritage has been made more complex by the fact that competing political licences are sought via varying interpretations of Marx's Hegelianism. Timpanaro has suggested, for example, that a complex of motives has recently led to a reconstruction of Marx along dialectical lines.⁵ First,

⁴See Charles Taylor, Hegel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), pp.3-124.

⁵Sebastiano Timpanaro, On Materialism, New Left Books and Verso, 1980.

Timpanaro claims, dialectics has been set in opposition to determinism in Marx's thought so as to give support to the voluntarist politics of the 60's and 70's. As a corollary, he feels, there has been a tendency to downplay the real material constraints on political movements and the corresponding need for real social science by giving dialectics an idealist reading. How far this is true of recent literature I cannot say nor do I want to offer herein any detailed theory of Marx's intellectual inheritance. However, as I make clear in what follows, Marx should be at very least viewed as a "materializer" of Hegel.

The Manuscripts

The Manuscripts while rewarding are not easy reading. Here we see Marx materializing Hegel; bringing the ethereal logic of the Phenomenology down to earth, and he is only partly successful. These are notebooks and fragmentary into the bargain. Summation is out of the question here. An adequate interpretation is the best we can hope for. In this regard, what we can see is that Marx rewrites the Phenomenology in terms of production. Whereas for Hegel history's prime mover was Logos, pure thought progressively transforming itself through the dialectic and incidentally churning an accompaniment of material expression, for Marx it is material production which is the red thread in the tapestry of history. Our first task is to outline this "translation".

The Ideology is a completely different sort of text. It is a piece of living polemic and this gives it some opacity, but as a distillation of the philosophical basis of Marxism

it is almost as serviceable as the Communist Manifesto is for the key political theses. We will use the Ideology secondarily to consolidate the prior interpretation developed in the Manuscripts.

But why is this area of Marx's work fruitful for us?

The Primacy of Production

What Marx achieves in his labouring to bring Hegel down to earth is a demonstration that the contrapuntal labours of idealist dialectic can be rewritten in the language of practical, material labour. In fact it can be said without exaggeration that what is for Marx Hegel's most significant achievement, the explication of history in terms of the dialectic, becomes in the Marxist system the demonstration of the role of production. Production is born with H. sapiens and therein is found the cradle of everything that follows including the growing capacity of humanity to have relations with themselves, to be aware of themselves, to make themselves. Freedom itself, it transpires, is implicit in production.

The materialization of Hegel yields a new theory as to the roots of freedom. It is no accident, accordingly, that a theory asserting the close relation between production and freedom should give off as a theorem the formulation that the alienation of production is of necessity the alienation of freedom, indeed that it involves the very severing of man from himself.

It would be difficult to give a quick yet accurate account of that Hegelian conception against which Marx honed his own outlook, yet such would seem to be the most natural introduction

to Marx's philosophy in the period in question. It will have to suffice that we begin here with what Marx took to be the heart of Hegelianism.

Marx had re-read the Phenomenology just prior to the wrestlings recorded in the Manuscripts and therein he gives us the following succinct account of the mother lode, as it were, of Marxism:

The outstanding achievement of Hegel's Phenomenology and of its final outcome, the dialectic of negativity as the moving and generating principle, is thus first that Hegel conceives of the self-creation of man as a process, conceives objectification as loss of the object, as alienation and as transcendence of this alienation; that he thus grasps the essence of labor and comprehends objective man - true, because real man - as the outcome of man's own labor. The real, active orientation of man to himself as a species-being, or his manifestation as a real species-being (i.e., as a human being), is only possible by the utilization of all the powers he has in himself and which are his as belonging to the species - something which in turn is only possible through the cooperative action of all mankind, as the result of history - is only possible by man's treating these generic powers as objects: and this, to begin with, is again only possible in the form of estrangement.⁶

Marx does not credit Hegel with an understanding of labour in the material-productive sense. Hegel only understands an "abstraction" of the real process. Nonetheless, he does, Marx feels, command the logic of the matter conceived abstractly and this Marx will retain. The problem with Hegel is that he sees the generating dialectic as having Geist, and its human expression, Logos, as its first moment and prime antipode. It is the struggle of Geist for embodiment that leads to its alienation in the material world and to the appearance of self-consciousness (a trait of Geist) within substantial reality

⁶Karl Marx, The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 (New York: International Publishers, 1964), ed. D.J. Struik, pp.332-333, (p.177).

where it surfaces as the rational essence of humanity. Thus, when Hegel conceives of the dialectic insofar as it is manifest in human affairs, he conjures first an ideal, rational process whose clothing of human flesh is but a secondary feature. "The only labour which Hegel knows and recognizes is abstractly mental labour", Marx says by way of reproach.⁷ For Hegel, real material labour can be at best a secondary phenomenon, at worst a curse; a fall from grace. This skew is inevitable given Hegel's theological premises. Marx's project is to reassert the centrality of productive labour to the main dialectic of history. Again reproaching Hegel, Marx contends:

In the act of establishing [producing], therefore, this objective being [man] does not fall from his state of "pure activity" into a creating of the object; on the contrary, his objective product only confirms his objective activity, establishing his activity as the activity of an objective material being.⁸

There follows a paean to human embodiment and corporeal activity, of which the following fragment is indicative:

To say that man is a corporeal, living, real, sensuous, objective being full of natural vigor is to say that he has real, sensuous, objects as the objects of his being or of his life, or that he can only express his life in real sensuous objects.⁹

Thus we see that Geist is dethroned. The Hegelian deity is replaced by real living humanity to whom now falls the role of history's prime mover.

While we have here begun with Marx's elevation of the role of productive labour, this is but an expository convenience. In the Manuscripts it comes as the conclusion of an

⁷Ibid., p.333 (p.177).

⁸Ibid., p.336 (p.180).

⁹Ibid., p.336 (p.181).

investigation; an investigation into the general significance of labour and into the, perhaps, more pressing question as to why it appears everywhere as a curse. The latter does not concern us here. The significance of production, however, is crucial, for it is production which takes the place of the protean strivings of Geist and its contrapuntal determination of itself, through self-alienation, in the stuff of the universe.

The Objectification of Human Being

In the Ideology Marx and Engels refer to "the original men produced by generatio aequivoca".¹⁰ This seems to be simply a current scientific view of human origins and, indeed, it is clear from their reaction to The Origin of the Species some years later that they thought Darwin had charted generatio. But it should also be viewed as an anti-Hegelian thrust insofar as it denies Geist any role in the original process. Not only is the supernatural not a prime mover in this regard, it is no mover at all: the whole of human development is a thoroughly natural affair: "History itself is a real part of natural

¹⁰Op. cit., p.40 (p.63). Generatio aequivoca translates "spontaneous generation". Marx and Engels are not here taking sides in the origin of life debate which had see-sawed vigorously pro and con during the 18th century and continued in their day. True, Pasteur's decisive experiments discrediting the spontaneous generation view lay 17 years (in 1862) downstream from the Ideology. So it might be thought that Marx and Engels here give evidence of having a foot in the wrong camp. It seems more likely, however, that they are using "spontaneous generation" somewhat poetically. (Notice that there are two distinct doctrines of spontaneous generation: contemporary generation and originative generation. The most hotly debated was the claim that life is contemporarily generated spontaneously. The other is that life originated (whenever) spontaneously. The former is false (rotting fecal matter does not generate flies, eg.) while the latter is true (living substance was, originally, generated from an inanimate bio-molecular "soup").) In the 1840's this term would have referred to both contemporary and originative generation. (Darwin had not yet made the crucial

history - of nature developing into man."¹¹ Or again: "...man creates or establishes only objects, because he is established by objects - because at bottom he is nature."¹²

Of course the naturalism here is contrasted with supernaturalism and not humanism. Humanity does have a distinctive non-natural nature: it has consciousness and freedom or, rather, freedom because it is conscious.

The animal is immediately one with its life activity. It does not distinguish itself from it. It is its life activity. Man makes his life activity itself the object of his will and of his consciousness ... Conscious life activity distinguishes man immediately from animal life activity. It is just because of this that he is a species being. Or rather, it is only because he is a species being that he is a conscious being, i.e., that his own life is an object for him. Only because of that is his activity free activity.¹³

Thus, from the first appearance of H. sapiens by generatio aequivoca, from being thrust onstage by "objects", there evolve free conscious beings. How is this transition wrought? The organizing concept is production.

Production is central for Marx because it casts in material form the fundamental logic of the ideal Hegelian dialectic. Hegel, it will be recalled, thought that the genius of Zeno was that he showed that motion was a contradiction. But not a

surmise that once life had been spontaneously originated cannibalism would prevent further (contemporary) origination. Nonetheless, the primary reference of the term at this time was to the 18th century sequence of contemporary generation experiments (Leeuwenhoek, Joblot, Needham, Spallanzani...). Marx and Engels appropriate this term and apply it to what is essentially a matter of speciation. Here it means, in effect, (correctly) that no special spiritual infection was needed to set humanity off from its precursors.

¹¹Manuscripts, pp.303-304 (p.143).

¹²Ibid., p.336 (p.180).

¹³Ibid., p.276 (p.113).

contradiction in terms. Rather, as Hegel saw it, real palpable motion was rooted in the opposition of subterranean forces.¹⁴ Where Zeno appears to have concluded the impossibility of motion, Hegel interprets the paradoxes to show that real motion is the resultant of fundamental forces' mutual repugnance. To start the universal evolutionary process in motion Hegel thought, Geist or universal mind had to oppose itself by first alienating itself in the substance of reality so that it might return to itself with refined self-awareness. This cosmological process, Hegel termed "dialectic". Real human intellectual dialectic was, accordingly, a derivative. The Hegelian details are not important here. What is important is that for Marx the process of human establishment of objects of production stands as a cypher for the Hegelian dialectic. It is the Hegelian logic of opposition made substantial in the parry and thrust of human labour.

If there is to be a "real, active orientation of man to himself", this "is only possible by man's treating his generic powers as objects."¹⁵ Human being must be "established", ie., extracted from real people and thus rendered opposable or confrontable in real terms. Thus a certain distance between man and product must be established: "An animal's product belongs immediately to its physical body, whilst man freely confronts his product."¹⁶ Marx takes over the Hegelian idea of "objectification" (a term which, in Hegel, stood for the process whereby Geist embodies itself in reality) and shows that it is but an

¹⁴G.W.F. Hegel, Hegel's Science of Logic (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1969), p.67.

¹⁵Manuscripts, p.333 (p.177).

¹⁶Ibid., pp.276-277 (p.113).

abstraction from real work. Thus in economic terms the valuation of products is a facet of objectification: "The product of labour is labour which has been embodied in an object, which has become material: it is the objectification of labour."¹⁷

But objectification stands for much more than the distillation of work energy in the increased utility or "finish" of products. It represents the actual extrusion of self such that man can take up his own being as an object and deal with it creatively:

The object of labour is, therefore, the objectification of man's species life: for he duplicates himself not only, as in consciousness, intellectually, but also actively, in reality, and therefore he confronts himself in a world that he has created.¹⁸

So we see that Marx adopts as the recipe for human evolution the fundamental Hegelian formula for evolution, per se. The motion of human development begins with the appearance within a natural species of a certain opposition: humanity confronts itself in objects of its own making. Man becomes an active agency on the stage of history, as opposed to a spontaneously generated being, when he begins to produce.

Objectification and Consciousness

The expansion of human consciousness is predicated upon production. Human progress away from purely animal premises advances "the more universal"¹⁹ is the sphere of inorganic

¹⁷Ibid., p.272 (p.108).

¹⁸Ibid., p.277 (p.114).

¹⁹The concept of "universalization" is quite rich in Hegel. Here Marx uses the term under Hegelian influence but in the more common sense where it refers to the broadening consumption patterns of H. sapiens.

nature on which he [man] lives."²⁰ This brings as its natural complement the broadening of human awareness and understanding:

Plants, animals, stones, air, light, etc.,... are part of human consciousness ... his spiritual inorganic nature, spiritual nourishment which he must first prepare to make palatable and digestible.²¹

The embryonic, proto-human, senses (sight, taste,...) are expanded and refined in labour. As labour advances in sophistication, various essential powers are drawn out and the senses are educated. The palate of audition is enriched, for example:

The most beautiful music has no sense for the non-musical ear - is no object for it, because any object can only be the confirmation of one of my essential powers.²²

Only with the extrusion of the power - to produce music in this instance - can the sensual range be humanized.

It is obvious that the human eye enjoys things in a way different from the crude, non-human eye; the human ear different from the crude ear ... Only through the objectivity unfolded richness of man's essential being is the richness of subjective sensibility (a musical ear, an eye for beauty of form, - in short, senses capable of human gratification, senses affirming themselves as essential powers of men) either cultivated or brought into being.²³

We have been dealing thus far with the first formulations of Marx's outlook as they appear in the Manuscripts. Here, unfortunately, the central themes suffer some obscurity from being written between the lines, as it were, of the Hegelian conception. Nonetheless, the following main points can be discerned: a) The central moving dialectic of human history is labour. b) Human consciousness is broadened and refined through productive activity. c) Through the objectification

²⁰Ibid., p.275 (p.112).

²¹Ibid., p.275 (p.112).

²²Ibid., p.301 (p.140).

²³Ibid., p.301 (pp.140-41).

of itself humanity is able to be self-conscious.

The German Ideology Formulation:

The Significance of Production

Things are much clearer in the Ideology. The struggle to "translate" Hegel has subsided and the useful elements have been consolidated. The premise of history is "real individuals, their activity and the material conditions under which they live, both those which they find already existing and those produced by their activity."²⁴ Production is still the central term but the formulation is more brisk:

They themselves begin to distinguish themselves from the animals as soon as they begin to produce their means of subsistence, a step which is conditioned by their physical organization. By reproducing their means of subsistence men are indirectly producing their actual material life... ...the first historical act is thus the production of the means to satisfy these needs, the production of material life itself.²⁵

The nature and role of the material dialectic in all this is now given a precise formulation. In a terrain strewn with dialectic just one key polarity is thrust forward as crucial: the counterpoint of need and artifact. It is not just production for need that generates progress, it is production of need:

The satisfaction of the first need (the action of satisfying, and the instrument of satisfaction which has been acquired) leads to new needs: and this production of new needs is the first historical act.²⁶

Subjectivity and Objectivity

The secret of production, therefore, is that it unifies the ideal and the material, dialectically. For it takes up

²⁴Ideology, p.31 (p.42).

²⁵Ibid., pp.31-42 (pp.42-28).

²⁶Ibid., p.42 (p.49).

both humanity's subjective side (needs, ideas, goals, etc.) and humanity's objective side (the givens of nature and the physical world of human accoutrement) and brings them under the umbrella of a single equation. At first the ideal and the material sides of human nature must march in lock-step:

The production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness, is at first directly interwoven with material activity and the material intercourse of men, the language of real life. Conceiving, thinking, the mental intercourse of men, appear at this stage as the direct efflux of their material behaviour.²⁷

In fact this material behaviour will always be the governing relation for the production of ideas. It will "appear" that ideas can be produced in other ways at that stage of history where different persons are engaged in the mental and manual aspects of production, but this is illusion:

Division of labour only becomes truly such from the moment when a division of material and mental labour appears. (The first form of ideologists, priests, is concurrent). From this moment onwards consciousness can really flatter itself that it is something other than consciousness of existing practice, that it really represents something without representing something real...²⁸

(Herein also - in the mental/manual division of labour - will be born the ground of the theoretical antagonism between subjectivity and objectivity; between ideality and materiality. Ideologues will now see to one side the idea and to the other matter, as independent forces. Marx relegates the whole debate to the status of an illusion. See in this regard Marx's formulation in the Manuscripts: "... naturalism or humanism distinguishes itself both from idealism and materialism, constituting at the same time the unifying truth of both."²⁹

²⁷Ibid., p.36 (p.47).

²⁸Ibid., pp.44-45 (pp.51-52).

²⁹Manuscripts, p.334 (p.181).

Despite its apparent abandonment in the sub-title to the first chapter of the Ideology - "Feuerbach, Opposition of the Materialist and Idealist Outlook" - this formulation is retained throughout the Marxist corpus.)

Social Production and Consciousness

Not only is the nature and role of material production clarified here, but as well the social dimension of consciousness and self-consciousness is elaborated through the exploration of certain ramifications of social production. Complementary to production, as an activity, is the social mode in which it transpires:

A certain mode of production, or industrial stage, is always combined with a certain mode of co-operation, or social stage, and this mode of co-operation is itself a "productive force". ³⁰

It follows that the task of maintaining a given mode of production entails the reproduction of its cooperative structures and this involves an (at first minimal), and then increasing) endeavor in the creation of persons; in their socialization:

" ...men, who daily remake their own life, begin to make other men, to propagate their kind: The relation between man and woman, parents and children, the family."³¹ What begins as the simple familial relation grows apace with the mode of production and structure of needs. Eventually production qua socialization will be a complex and difficult task, corresponding to the richness of structure of the social relations within which it is located. Implicit in this new task is both a distinctive form of consciousness and a new mode of relation to human being. For now, the subjective side of human nature can develop not

³⁰Ideology, p.43 (p.50).

³¹Ibid., pp.42-43 (p.49).

simply indirectly, in partnership with the practicalities of production, ie., as a wing of the material dialectic, but, as well, as the direct object of a specific repertoire of human capacities.

This direct relationship is only hinted at in the Ideology ("men ... begin to make other men."³²). But Marx and Engels are clearly aware of its significance as we see when we turn to the question of consciousness. For here in the Ideology consciousness is more or less defined socially: as an adjunct of human intercourse:

Only now, after having considered the social concomitants of production do we find that man also possesses "consciousness", but, even so, not inherent, not "pure" consciousness. From the start the "spirit" is afflicted with the curse of being "burdened" with matter, which here makes its appearance in the form of agitated layers of air, sounds, in short, of language. Language is as old as consciousness, language is practical consciousness that exists also for other men, and for that reason alone it really exists for me personally as well: language, like consciousness, only arrives from the need, the necessity, of intercourse with other men."³³

We see here the second of two distinctively human forms of consciousness. We have already examined that self-consciousness which is the dialectical partner of the objective world of human artifact. Now we have a new mode of self-consciousness. It is consciousness, first, of being a participant in social relations. "Where there exists a relationship, it exists for me; the animal does not enter into "relations"."³⁴ It is also, by extension, consciousness of others as being either in or not in a certain relation to me. And, in its most generalized form, it is consciousness of self, my own or others', as being

³²Ibid., p.42 (p.49).

³³Ibid., pp.43-44 (pp.50-51).

³⁴Ibid., p.44 (p.51).

defined by a range of relations.

Such, it seems to me, is the picture of the development and nature of human freedom which emerges in the early Marx. Human being is permeable to itself both in the sense that its own distinctive productive abilities engender a developing corpus of subjectivity and in the sense that the co-operative nature of production demands the direct communal capacity to induce specific subjectivity within itself.

Reflexive Subjectivity

The individual stands the gainer in this evolutionary process, albeit one in which the social elements preponderate initially. For what in the hands of the person can be exercised as a social force toward others can also be reflexively exercised. Every social relationship (educator, liar, interrogator, etc.) can also be employed within the personal self-relation: " ...every relationship in which man stands to himself, is first realized and expressed in the relationship in which man stands to other men."³⁵ Production and the attendant production of social relations, thus establishes certain broad categories of self or subjectivity which sketch in a palette of personal potentialities comprising part of the social endowment of individuals. What one can make of oneself is thus a function of production and its attendant relations. For instance, in some sense it is obvious that one cannot deceive oneself until lying exists as a social relation and lying has no rationale outside of a circumstance where secrecy is

³⁵ Manuscripts, p.277 (pp.114-115).

functional. Some degree of social antagonism, therefore, is the ground of self-deceit. But social antagonism presupposes not only a certain relative material scarcity but also the real perception that one can meet one's need independently of the well-being of the community. This, in its turn, presupposes a definite social division of productive activity.

We have here arrived at the self-relation in personal or reflexive terms, and such theoretical location of it (as a relation) as I think is to be found, in basic terms at least, in the early Marx. In the next chapter we explore certain facets of this interpretation in philosophical-anthropological terms before shining the resultant theory on some recent work on the nature of freedom in Chapter III.

CHAPTER II: THE ROLE OF PRODUCTION IN THE ORIGINATION OF CONSCIOUSNESS

Direct and Indirect Origination

What is the relation between production and consciousness? We can grasp the various threads under two simple heads: direct relations and indirect. For, production directly demands the expansion of consciousness in practical ways. The world, that is, can only be transformed to the degree that it "appears" in the hungry eye of the consumer. As well, production engenders forms of human life which are themselves new "appearances" to be understood and transformed. Among the objects of cognitive metabolism can be numbered the other members of the community and all those forms by which they co-ordinate their lives. In particular, social process and structure, as a product, is a special reflexive entity. For, not only is it an external, public entity of independent status, but it is also the stuff of internality: the "subject" whose nature is cast within a locus of social relations.

Production and Consciousness

The rise to production, from proto-human ancestral forms of direct consumption, brings with it of necessity an extension of consciousness. This can be readily grasped if we consider the transition between two classical stages of cultural development: hunter-gatherers and horticulturists.

Of course, hunter-gatherers are not purely consumptive in nature. For instance, they gather with tools and these must be themselves produced. (In fact, production at some level pre-dates all the cultural stages known to ethnography. We find control of fire some 400,000 years ago and shaped stone implements running back several millions of years.) The point in considering this particular cultural transition is that it is a marked step forward in productive capacity and yet extremely simple in its outline.

Penetration of Causality

Horticulturists reap what they have sown but hunter-gatherers reap what they have not sown. How do gatherers come to understand sowing and thus elevate themselves to a new cultural status, ie., achieve a rudimentary agency? Suppose a wild grain field is harvested early, before full maturation of the heads. The stalks are taken whole and there is little if any spillage of mature, loose kernels. Next year there will be no granary in this meadow. Now consider the next field to which the semi-migratory gatherers move. It will be more mature. Here kernels will be spilled more plentifully and perhaps, on yet the next gathering ground, fully half the potential harvest will fall back to the soil. Next year the later reaped granaries will flourish. Once noted, this simple rule: late reaping fosters renewal, lays the foundation for human control of the granary. A heuristic taboo may be retained: "Harvest only when the rivers run shallow". There is understanding here but it is purely heuristic insofar as the real relation, the relation of seed to plant, is

overlooked. Only the temporal dimension of the relation has been grasped here, and even that not fully. Yet by a process of successive approximation the actual causal structure of the granary can be grasped. The significance of rain (then, more abstractly, water) sun, soil condition, etc., will follow in train.

As in the harvest, so in all other aspects of the primitive economy; control over the cultural metabolism demands penetration of causal structure. Every fortuitous observation is taken up into the cognitive repertoire of the culture and the urge is to look "deeper, ever deeper!" In this manner, the culture extends its capacity for self-control. It is no longer led by the nose from natural necessity to natural necessity. Instead, the very seasonal nature of the environment now appears as an object against which an extended regime of human intentions can be defined. From being led by the seasons, the species moves to the ambit of its own specific ends.

Vocabulary of Ends and Means and Expanded Present

Cultural advance from consumptive to productive professions is, thus, the root of an expanding vocabulary of ends-means relations. We see here a prime human dialectic established wherein to one side we have an increasingly sophisticated human economy and to the other an advancing intentional articulacy. In the ancient dialogue with nature the human voice is amplified and increasingly the ambient conditions resonate to human pronouncement. The relentless

criticism by the environment which has hitherto labelled "unfit" every link in the hominid ancestral chain grows mute as ambient nature itself is fitted more and more into a body of human design.

Critical Capacity

This shift from being the object of natural criticism to being the subject of a critical repertoire is one of the important steps which carry man out of his purely bio-determinate state and onto the stage of history. The shift in question presupposes both causal penetration and a counterpart ends-means sophistication.

At issue here is the emergence, in part, of the distinctively human understanding. This understanding is a counterpart of "causal grasp" or comprehension of natural forms of determination. Notice that Hume saw clearly the relation in question: "uniformity" - the logical root (constant conjunction) of causation - was impressed upon the understanding mind:

Why is the aged husbandman more skillfull in his calling than the young beginner but because there is a certain uniformity in the operation of the sun, rain and earth towards the production of vegetables; and experience teaches the old practitioner the rules by which this operation is governed and directed.¹ (my emphasis)

Notice too that, almost in spite of himself, Hume relates the development of the understanding to intervention in nature. He locates, that is, the essential relation (natural regularity and understanding) as an aspect of human action in the

¹David Hume, An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding, in Determinism, Free Will, and Moral Responsibility, ed. G. Dworkin: (Prentice-Hall Inc. 1970), p.17.

transformation of natural premises into human premises - in this case, in the management and amplification of the land's productivity. The distinctive, analytic gaze of man - the gaze capable of dissolving phenomena into their factors, etc. - is most aptly described as a correlate of natural intervention.

In order to appreciate more fully this human critical capacity we might first consider a natural critical relationship such as is implicit in natural selection. (Part of the semantic secret of "natural selection" is the fact that it is a capacity transferred from man to nature. What 19th century biology meant to indicate by the term was simply that it had located the principle known to breeders in nature: the breeder "selects" for advantageous traits and so does nature.)

Two main forces are conceived at work in biological evolution. There is a force for variation whereby at some definite frequency new traits appear in a natural population. Confronting this force there is what is often referred to as "selection pressure". The latter pressure suppresses untoward novelties while allowing those which better equip the species as a whole for survival to be retained. So a species in its relentless and blind thrusting forward of new traits is subject to a relentless criticism. An example makes this clear.

A species of moth common to the Liverpool, England region, the Biston betularia or peppered moth, is well known to geneticists because in it can be seen the natural selection mechanism "in the wild". Over a century or so the

population has shifted its colouration from light to dark and back to light. This chameleon motion is driven by two environmental factors: a change in habitat colouration and the predation of local birds. As the habitat became industrially sooted the light moths, outstanding against the soot, were consumed by the birds. Now, as changing industrial techniques reduce the sooting it is genes for darkness which are being devoured. In this latter case, then, we may say that it is the relative maladaptiveness of darkness that is being criticized by predation.

That criticism, therefore, known first to the breeders, whereby scant fleece, insufficient milk, soft-shelled eggs, etc., are criticized in domestic species, is - on evolutionary theory's account - found operative in nature. But the natural critique was, in fact, of course, temporally prior. Human practitioners arrived late on the scene and acquired this capacity for selection critique as a part of a broad spectrum of critical skills which demanded of the environment - animate or otherwise - that it measure up against benchmarks of human need.

This latter critical capacity is not simply an analog of the critical role of predation or of any other environmental pressure. The human role vis-a-vis the environment is not merely to act upon nature in meeting its needs and thereby change nature. The natural species can never produce a change in nature such that it gets a new lease on life. That is, it can never, in meeting its needs, change the environment in such a way that new vistas of sustenance are

opened up. For such a change to take place the natural species must wait on mutation and, in fact, speciation. On the other hand, the human species can retain its biological species identity all the while using changes it renders in nature as a lever toward a new life-style. It is this liberty which marks the origin of the uniquely human critical role in the natural field.

There are real elements of human freedom to be directly discerned here. What is entailed in this growing human vocabulary is an expansion of the human present. For, not only does the gaze of consciousness penetrate more deeply its conditions, it views, thereby, the ramifications of the immediate for distant points in time. Humanity appears foresighted insofar as it is able to sight down the barrel of causation and render "objective" that structure of branch and trunk relations which conduces towards its goals. As a strict corollary to this foresightedness, the immediate, the world of ambient objects present to consciousness, is ordered and given a human shape. What before was but a Kantian manifold now has a structure of motivational valency. There is here the hot sun and the pleasures of the shade, but there is the field whose tillage presses forward toward the coming harvest and the secure winter beyond.

Moreover, the old dialectic of trial and error wherein fortuitous accidents accumulate with painful slowness into an ever more rational practice is now itself relegable to the background. For now this flint shard, struck into an arrowhead of this size can be "seen" in advance to be unworkable. The trial thus is made to the side of consciousness

before the labour is expended.

Conscious Pre-production

This freedom from trial and error is most readily describable as the adoption of forms of pre-production. For, possession of an expanded present means having the ramifications of various human effects (alterations grounded in human causes) gathered together in consciousness. A mistrial, accordingly, need not be committed (or not fully committed at least) in order to be "seen" to be unfruitful or counter-productive.

Every carpenter knows that many mistakes are corrected in the blueprint stage. But blueprinting is only the grand form of an otherwise natural process of imagination whereby an action and its consequences are layed out in the mind prior to the taking of the action in question. What else is this but an elaboration of the simple process wherein causal, say seed to plant, relationships are present in consciousness, into a more rounded activity where an action is examined in the light of several cause and effect relations?

This imaginative, pre-production capacity would be, it would seem, urged on by simple forms of artifact production, eg., the shaping of flint tools. Take an arrowhead for instance. Such an artificat distills in itself a number of needs, some of them conflicting. It must be light, for it is a projectile, yet, if it is too small it is difficult to fashion by chipping. It must hold its edge, yet a more durable edge is best produced in heavier stone that is

harder to work, etc.

Even in production of an extremely rudimentary artifact, thus, it is beneficial to be able to look past the immediate creative process to the eventual act of usage. Now it seems unlikely that very much of the repertoire of the stone age had this degree of expanded present. Trial and error was no doubt the task-master to countless generations of spear-makers. Still, a premium would attach to the capacity to compare utility in manufacture with utility in the hunt and thus circumvent lengthy, and hungry, trial periods.

Such a system of pre-production represents a crucial form of freedom. For it would allow the producer to get free of any current project and examine it from all sides: to consider first one, then another, effect of a given modification. The downstream returns to alternative courses of action can now be juxtaposed and the immediate commitment of labour can be deliberate; ie., be filled with significance by virtue of being located in a broad field of natural action "present" to consciousness. As the causal richness of consciousness advances new rational skills - at first rudimentary - must be called forth. For example, the greater size and weight of an implement conduces at once to a certain implemental efficacy, to a certain difficulty of production, to a certain rate of depletion of raw stocks, etc. Just which structure of strategy and tactic is best? New principles must be conjured which set the right relation between heft, cutting power, ease of manufacture, raw resource, etc.

Getting these rightly aligned amounts to building a structure of tactic and strategy in which grasped cause and effect relations are arranged under hierarchies of practical human ends. (At a later stage the objective representation of strategy allows it to be criticized as a product in its own right with higher order qualities and evaluations being applied to it, eg., elegance, simplicity, etc.) The consciousness depicted here is recognizably theoretical in a rudimentary way: it has a hierarchical structure insofar as it is organized around ends differing in degree of motivation. As a rational method for the achievement of a definite goal, it constitutes the theory of that practice.

Corresponding to this inner structure there appears a public regimen; a systematic quality to the form of life: the old hit and miss fortuity subsides as the bass continuo of seasonal rhythm is embellished with overtones and syncopations. Visible human practice is organized just to the extent that there appears, to the side of consciousness, a hierarchical integration of various needs (in the case at hand: neolithic mining, manufacture and hunting).

The Possibility of Opposition

Through the expansion of the present, thus, there is achieved a certain aloofness from conditioning. Between stimulus and response there is interposed a growing conceptual vocabulary and the human agent is thereby "distanced" from the basic material premises of his life. In fact, only now through the expanded present, do we begin to see something recognizable as a human life. There can be, that is,

no object of which I am conscious as "my life to be lived" until consciousness has achieved this temporal reach. Notice, however, that what appears here superficially as a growing distance from natural conditions is really premised by being ever more deeply knit into those conditions. Paradoxically, human aloofness from nature appears in the integration with nature. Opposition and unity appear Janus-faced in production.

Production and Subjectivity

Social Production

It is not only scientific consciousness, consciousness which penetrates the natural properties of seed and stone, that is leavened by production. Indirectly, it is production which engenders the social profile of the subject; that collection of traits loosely indicated by the term "character". This elusive being, too, is expanded and objectified in the march of human economy and thereby is laid the foundation of the subjective capacity of self-consciousness - among other capacities.

The archaeological lay-out of human middens dating back millions of years makes it clear that the earliest man had social structures based on the sharing of food. We do not proceed very far down the human lineage before the evidence indicates that quite large animals, such as could only have been hunted and dragged co-operatively, were shared at these sites. From the earliest time, thus, we can suppose we were not only producers but social producers.

It seems an obvious move to suppose that communal action would have placed a premium on communication. Early hominid brains were small, and there is no reason why there should not have been a selection advantage to cortical innovations which advanced communications and, thereby, co-operation. In urging forward a more productive brain, natural forces would be nudging into existence the social brain.

Co-operation and Communication

But communication is more than inter-subjectivity - though it is that. It is also the cradle of distinctive elements of subjectivity itself. For, while in simple production we can see the premises of the understanding, we see here, with production of the terms of communication, the externalization of the understanding. At very least a new modelling relationship is now possible: This or that element of the fabric of understanding becomes a public object, discussable (if only ritualistically), refinable, etc. Thus the phrase "consciousness of consciousness" comes to have its prime referent. It makes sense to regard the species as peculiarly self-conscious through this co-operatively induced inter-subjectivity.

Much more is implicit here than a mere shared vocabulary of collective procedures. For, by this expanding machinery of co-operation members of the culture are able to see themselves as standing in this or that relation to others. Gradually a fabric of perceived relations comes to exist whereby the main outlines of the individual's social existence are marked and these have an objective quality insofar as they

can themselves be objects of the understanding. The culture is now marked by a nexus of social relations definitive of the overall social practice. Within this nexus various forms of personal existence may be discerned as dormant potentials; "roles", as we might say, into which developing individuals may, within the limits of cultural plasticity, insinuate themselves.

Conscious Reproduction

Yet the existence of a nexus of social relations is not a passive or automatic given of human life. The fabric must be maintained as a more or less stable configuration conforming to prevailing natural circumstances, technique, sensuous endowment, etc., all the while the human incumbents are flowing through the structure. This is completely analogous to the metabolic flow in a natural, organic body wherein there is a turn-over of actual substance below the apparent relative stability of the bodily form.

The form of the inorganic body², its organizing structure of social relations, exists in a purely conscious manner.

²I adopt here a term from the Manuscripts. Marx talks about the inorganic body as, roughly, the net civil architecture of a culture: its matrix of product defined in the broadest terms by humanly imposed geographic structure. The Fraser Valley, for example, has a natural topology. Superimposed on that natural form there is a structure of highways, sideroads, fields, townsites, etc. At a finer degree of resolution, the architecture of schools, homes, shopping centers and so on comes into view. Marx's usage suggests that we could view this structure as a sort of exo-skeleton within which we dwell as the enlivening spirit: the overall form of the inorganic body bearing testimony to the overall structure of human intention. Further, the suggestion is of the possibility of reciprocal action: ie., the person is socialized, in the sense of being endowed with self, just through the effort to construct a "theory", as it were, that

It is a social entity passed on only by social means. It can only be reproduced from moment to moment through the impress of conscious communication. Thereby are the rising tide of new members introduced to their social being and thereby is the stability through time of the social whole maintained. So a culture that is, through language, co-operatively involved in production is also in the business of "self" production; ie., is continuously confronted with the task of generating social nexus. But even here with this conscious self-identity we have not met the fullest plasticity in which the individual may share. For the very repertoire of social relations into which the person may fit is itself permeable to his or her own creative exertions.

This can be seen quite readily. As we have noted, the social fabric must not only be maintained, it must evolve. For the inorganic social body stands in the same relation to its circumstances that an organic body does. It is more or less "fit" according to how its capacities meet the givens of the natural environment. But the genotype which backs this social phenotype is conscious, ie., it is activated only to the extent that the language of the culture is maintained. And there are no other sources for its mutation but the critical

permits a good "fit" with the inorganic body. The growing individual, that is, must continually seek to structure its own intentions in such a way that his or her actual practice is harmonized with the possibilities allowed by the inorganic body's form. This suggests a wing of self-production not developed at length herein. We might give this aspect a Chomskian flavour: Much of one's intentional structure is not "taught", ie., not conveyed socially. Instead one has, as a given, the capacity to generate strings of practice which makes sense in the given inorganic body of one's culture.

judgment of persons. The same skills which allow an adult member of the culture to impress the typical social relations upon socializable novitiates also allow for the permeability of the overall genotype to the individual understanding.

The person may have impact on its pure social conditions.

Finally, all of this supposes that the person has, as it were, their nature outside themselves: that who they are as incumbents in social relationships is but the reverse side of their natures as social beings. The permeability, therefore, of their social relations to their judgment is the permeability of their selves to their selves.

Some Common Features of Consciousness

We have just examined a range of features of human consciousness which have historically concerned philosophy. We have dealt with them synthetically in the sense that we have stitched them all together in an integrated whole by the artifice of considering them from a genetic standpoint. The major features of consciousness have been brought into theoretical alignment in part because we have swept through them quickly and presented them as acts in a constructive scenario. No great effort has been made to square this scenario with empirical data, though in those few places where hypotheses might be forthcoming the facts are, to my knowledge, as alleged.

Among the most straightforward features of consciousness with which we have dealt are found penetration and foresight. We do, of course, look into things, not merely in the sense of investigation but in that sense we designate by the notion

of seeing "deeply". The world of appearance is for us more or less an organized whole in which we recognize basic phenomena and those features which stand on their shoulders. Foresight is almost too obvious to need comment, except that it might be confused with expectation. What we need to indicate more in this regard is the intimate connection between a foreseen future and the endowing of our present conditions with significance and structure. Valuation and organization of appearance is achieved through, in part, the grasp of "trees" of cause and effect/ends and means structures whereby the manifold of the present is seen to conduce to a certain future.

Constructed upon these categories of understanding, it has been suggested, are both the consciousness of self-identity and the even more diaphanous consciousness of social belonging. When one experiences culture shock, just what is it which is knocked out of alignment? This account suggests a fairly elaborate structure of skills, sensibility, social principles, etc., which would strike a dissonance with a marked shift in social conditions.

Finally, we have gained some insight into that sense of personal "open-endedness" so commonly thought by libertarians to demand a breakdown in causation. The advantage of treating such a consciousness as a matter to be constituted in real terms, as opposed to divined phenomenologically is that we have on the one hand all the richness needed to really capture the self and yet the matter of constitution or production is always to the fore, underscoring the determinateness of the whole matter.

We have seen how many of the key features of human consciousness can be effectively depicted and ordered by considering their relations to the fundamentals of human production. Given the persuasiveness of such an approach, it is time to summarize our results and put them in a form adequate to the tasks of the next chapter. Accordingly, I now proceed to lay out a three-termed schema relating major elements of conscious identity to production.

The idea of production carries with it, as implicated concepts, both the idea of an artifact or object of labour and the idea of a need that is met through the labour. We have then two terms of production, one external - from the production agent's point of view - and the other internal. Further, these terms are related in a dialectical fashion such that any given artifact can be scrutinized in terms of its satisfactoriness to the needs which prompted it and thereby a new need can be produced. The significance of production, thus, is that it brings into dialectical unity to one side a material and to the other an ideal term. Corresponding, therefore, to the historic sophistication of the artifact side of the equation there runs a parallel advance in finesse and organization of human intentions, needs, or what have you.

Implicit in production, therefore, is a rudimentary form of self-production. The significance of this fact can be brought out by considering three forms of "self-production", forms which though distinct are nonetheless cousins.

Three Forms of Self-Production

We might mark out the first form of self-production by the phrase craft self-production. What I mean to indicate here is simply the fact, just discussed, that in the business of creating a world of artifact the human species gradually created itself. We may suppose without damage that all animals have a certain structure of needs: a profile of motivation in which tropism, reflex, and genetically stored routine are ordered and harmonized. At some sufficiently remote point in time this would have been true of hominids. The significance of production is that it marks the genetic point wherein the structure of need is shorn free of simple bio-determination and comes to have its own, as we might say, laws of motion. It is the possession of this new form of determination which gives us an "expanded present" and certain motivational forms proper to it. The expanded present, it will be recalled, was akin to a structure of ends and means and bore with it a certain freedom from immediate influence. Clearly it is within this expanded present that we discover our "self", ie., a unique profile of motivation whose structure is determined by the conceptual ability to conceive oneself in the midst of a life structured according to strategies of ends and means. Thus it becomes proper to say that as an aspect of human craft we produce self in some broad generic sense.

There is, secondly, an ancillary form of "self" creation which we can call social self-production. This form follows on the heels, as it were, of craft self-production. For,

once the species has begun to accumulate self, qua the expanded present, there must be devised means to pass on the accumulation generation by generation. The greater the developed body of self, the more sophisticated the task of reproducing self; of socialization. This brings out the fact that human reproduction is social and, more important, that it is self-production: it is the production in offspring of such self as has already been knitted together via the progress of craft self-production.

Thirdly, we have as a corollary to social self-production, what might be termed reflexive self-production. Socialization is achieved, in part, by particular persons passing evaluative and critical judgment on others: coaxing, persuading, nudging, reasoning, and so on. This ability to scrutinize and influence the self of another is at once the ability to put one's self under the microscope and the basis of the ability to engage in self-persuasion. With age, one increasingly appropriates prevailing evaluative and critical methods and, in proportion as one becomes ever more skilled as a participant in the social evaluative endeavor, turns this evaluative machinery upon oneself.

Control of My life

We have given short shrift in the above to the interesting question of self-control. Just what capacities do I have with regard to my self? In particular, not much has been said about our sense of "free will" by which is meant here the common conviction that what I want out of my life or as my

life is, ideally, an issue confronting my own reasoning and will. This pertinent theme is best treated by contrast to another approach to the matter and this is the subject of the next chapter.

CHAPTER III: SELF-PRODUCTION AND HIERARCHICAL WILL

Frankfurt's Concept of Freedom

In order to set in relief the main elements of the foregoing account of the nature and ground of human freedom, I want now to expose and analyze a quite different alternate proposal. Harry Frankfurt's thesis as to the roots of freedom is the case in point. I will be referring throughout to his "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of the Person".¹ Of course, in all this I will restrict myself to his core thesis and omit much that is intriguing in Frankfurt's work and that of his not insubstantial following.² I have chosen to discuss his thesis that it is "hierarchical motivation" (as it has been termed by one of his commentators) which constitutes freedom. We shall argue that Frankfurt is right in this ... but only partially.

¹Harry G. Frankfurt, "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person," Journal of Philosophy 68 (January 1971): 5-20.

²A partial list of works that extend Frankfurt's germinal ideas includes: W.P. Alston, "Self-Intervention and the Structure of Motivation," in The Self: Philosophical and Psychological Issues, edited by T. Mischel (Oxford: Oxford University, 1977), pp. 65-102; Charles Taylor, "What is Human Agency?" in The Self: Philosophical and Psychological Issues, edited by T. Mischel (Oxford: Oxford University, 1977), pp. 103-135; G. Dworkin, "Acting Freely," Nous 4 (1970), pp. 367-383; P.S. Greenspan, "Behavior Control and Freedom of Action," Philosophical Review 87 (1978), pp. 225-240; S. Schiffer, "A Paradox of Desire," American Philosophical Quarterly 13 (1976), pp. 195-203; David Zimmerman, "Hierarchical Motivation and Freedom of the Will," Unpublished. Draft circulated: Simon Fraser University, May, 1979.

Hierarchical Will and Human Freedom

Frankfurt's main theme is that it is through discerning a certain personal structure that we are able to give an account of freedom of the will and, hence, since this is but one of two exhaustive elements of freedom, freedom itself. It is characteristic of persons, he claims, to have a certain hierarchical structure of will. And it is by dint of being hierarchically motivated that persons are able to display the capacities they do, account for themselves in distinctive ways, possess certain phenomenological traits, indeed be "free".

What interests us here is an analysis of freedom. As Frankfurt's title suggests, it is a certain specification of the concept of the person that is deemed fruitful for the understanding of freedom of the will.

This hierarchical structure is most easily grasped if we conceive the individual will as a population of desires. Of course, as we all know desires are quite various. Some are lofty and others mundane, some relative and conditional while others are absolute, some socially convenient while others are an embarrassment, etc. Within this diversity certain basic distinctions stand out. In particular, all desires can be classified according to their objects: Some (perhaps most) desires gaze outward, toward the immediate or long-range conditions of their possessors, while others are more ego-centric in that they take other desires as their work-pieces. For example: the object of a smoker's desires, qua smoker, is tobacco. Such desires gaze outward. But the smoker may find the craving for cigarettes itself undesirable.

This aversion marks a self-regarding desire. It is a motivational element which takes another motivational element as its object.

A fundamental bifurcation of motivation, then, can be readily invoked. There are "first-order" urges, dispositions, tastes, etc., among which number thirsts for alcohol or penchants for logical puzzles, and there are "second-order" desires which take a roughly evaluative stance toward other desires. This basic distinction is the heart of Frankfurt's thesis.

It is a further feature of this classification that the hierarchical relationship among motives need not be one-on-one. A second-order motive, or several thereof, might as well take whole constellations of primary desires under scrutiny. One corollary of this schema is the conceptual consequence that all is not fully democratic among desires. Some function to immediately coordinate individual and environment. To them fall the routine labours of day-to-day getting and spending. Higher order desires, however, effectuate themselves via the mediation of the lower classes. How extensive this hierarchical pyramid is is not a settled question among hierarchical motivationists. Yet it seems to be a working assumption that first and second order will be but the first two of many possible tiers.

Clearly what the hierarchical motivationists are driving at is important. The main target is the human capacity for, variously, self-evaluation, self-formation, self-control or, perhaps, self-determination à la Reid. The hope seems to be

that by plumbing some of the more striking cases of the self-relation we might lay bare the essential logic of the whole phenomenon. It is a signal fact that the majority of cases under discussion are drawn from marked disfunctions: cases of addiction, neurotic compulsion, irrational loathing, etc. More of this later. Nonetheless, we are assured, these serve only to help us recognize a more ubiquitous phenomenon: namely our relations with ourselves in general and, more particularly, the capacity we have for an evaluative stance toward our own profile of motivation.

All the varied cases of desires chasing desires serve to bring one point into focus: it is a unique trait of a person that the form of the will can be for that person a problem. It is Frankfurt's thesis that this sort of problem is best analyzed as a conflict between levels of will. By extension, this analysis promises to yield an account of freedom of the will. As a first approach, that is, freedom of the will is construable as the absence of such problematic structures of desire. It is unfortunately never completely clear in Frankfurt just what freedom of the will is. At times it seems the first-order will is free provided it is the subject of right governance by the second-order will. Other times it appears the second-order will is free to the extent that the first-order will is tractable. I suspect this ambivalence reveals a deep problem for Frankfurt. But be that as it may, we can make out a clear and interesting thesis about human freedom that is defensibly Frankfurtian.

According to Frankfurt human freedom is a conjunction, under the best of circumstances, of two sorts of freedom. One, the freedom of the first-order desires, we share with animals: "We recognize that an animal may be able to run in whatever direction it wants."³ Freedom of the second-order desires alone, however, deserves to be called freedom of the will, and this freedom is unique to the human species.

We may designate these freedoms, then, freedom of action and freedom of the will respectively. The latter freedom, Frankfurt holds, is to be understood by analogy with the first:

Freedom of action is (roughly, at least) the freedom to do what one wants to do. Analogously, then, the statement that a person enjoys freedom of the will means (roughly) that he is free to want what he wants to want. More precisely, it means that he is free to will what he wants to will, or to have the will he wants.⁴

From the human standpoint, then, being fully free is a matter of possessing both sorts of freedom:

A person who is free to do what he wants to do may yet not be in a position to have the will he wants. Suppose, however, that he enjoys both freedom of action and freedom of the will ... It seems to me that he has; in that case, all the freedom it is possible to desire or conceive. There are other good things in life, and he may not possess some of them. But there is nothing in the way of freedom that he lacks.⁵ (My emphasis)

Objections to the Frankfurt Theory

Having drawn this striking conclusion, Frankfurt's account of freedom is complete.

³Frankfurt, p.14.

⁴Ibid., p.15.

⁵Ibid., p.17.

Yet we are inclined to pause and wonder if an account so sparsely furnished can accommodate freedom. The question that suggests itself is: Is it not conceivable that an individual enjoy this compound freedom and yet not be, on some reasonable construal of the term, free? The answer, I believe, is yes.

For, as it happens, nothing about this rudimentary, schematic structure of freedom precludes common garden variety sub-conscious manipulation: ie., any alien control not perceived as restraint by the agent in question. Such subtle coercion is well known, widespread, and of numerous forms. It may take the form of subliminal advertising. It may take the form of deliberate miseducation. It may even take the form of systematic ideological constraint by political authority with or without intent.

A person's second order will we may suppose groups itself around certain fundamental convictions of principle. What of their origin? Suppose they are induced by a manipulation that falls below the level of immediate recognition. Clearly if such induction prevails it does so at self-control's expense. It is, of course, perfectly reasonable to suppose that being free is, as Frankfurt's thesis urges, a matter of self-control. To arrive therefore at a conception of "all of the freedom it is possible to desire or conceive" which leaves room for massive, though subtle, intervention by alien and possibly hostile interests can only indicate a serious shortcoming.

To obviate such complaints a theory of freedom, I should think, must make essential reference to the context of the willing and desiring under scrutiny. This comes out clearly if we suppose, as Frankfurt suggests, that the heart of the hierarchical relationship is self-evaluation.⁶ Of course, the self-evaluative project is itself an elusive matter of some complexity as is discussed later in this chapter. It is clear nonetheless that at any moment the substance of the process must generally contain a goodly amount of what we might call background input: fundamental givens of custom or prevailing cultural tone, a certain horizon of ambition, etc. The second order function, that is, does not proceed ex nihilo. Rather, the capacity for self-evaluation entails definite skills in forming and organizing judgments and the reliance on a range of knowledge and value. These must be either of direct social origin and customary or individual re-workings of such givens of culture and custom. In general terms, of course, this can be no cause for complaint: These background skills, knowledge, etc., form a potential take-off point which permits the individual to, as it were, stand on the shoulders of past generations' achievements. Nonetheless, while socialization cannot be considered vicious per se, neither can it be regarded as universally benign. Some people's heritage enhances their capacity for second order will while others are thereby truncated in their ability for self-evaluation and have less freedom for it.

⁶Ibid., p.7.

Imagine in this regard a woman living in the early 19th century who, as is urged by the most prevalent standards of the day, is convinced that democracy is inherently a process involving males; that this is divinely ordained and for the best; and, accordingly, that female suffrage is not desirable. Such an electoral attitude will no doubt be compounded with numerous ancillary convictions regarding male leadership in personal affairs, proper treatment of children of differing sex, etc. Nothing prevents such a person from enjoying freedom of action with regard to her desires and convictions nor that insofar as she dwells on her identity as a profile of desires she finds them satisfactory.

Now contrast such a person with Harriet Taylor. Through her social environment, her association with Mill, etc., Taylor lived at the heart of the intellectual milieu of her day. Until their later ostracism, she and Mill enjoyed the company of the most sophisticated minds of the era and of their outlook. Thus located, Taylor was party to the most penetrating conception of democratic life and, consequently, the need for sexual equality. The methods and premises of the day's philosophical radicalism were an open book to her. The upshot of such a background was Taylor's staunch defence of avant-garde social reforms; what one biographer has termed "her emphatic unconventionality."⁷ She was a left liberal with strong socialist sympathies and not passive in her convictions: She was active among London political refugees and instigated Mill to greater efforts

⁷ Ruth Borchard, John Stuart Mill: The Man (London: C.A. Watts, 1957), p.66.

on behalf of women's suffrage, the need for sexual equality, and the importance of socialism.⁸

Nonetheless, there were clear frontiers of her independence from the norms of her times where her ability to resist custom failed. While she was, for instance, resolute in her insistence on the rightness of her extra-marital relationship with Mill - a relationship purchased at the price of increasing ostracism - she was nonetheless unable to resist the impress of the adultery taboo and kept with Mill a relationship, apparently, wholly platonic. Again, in spite of her convictions on the imprisonment of women within marriage she was unable to ever fully abdicate her role as wife and mother.

There is much evidence that Taylor's reformist strengths were for her the source of a life pervaded by inner struggle, tension, frustration and doubt - albeit punctuated periodically by the elation of success. Her lucidity about herself and her social circumstances was a matter of painful clarity. Her apparent reformatory determination belied an inner turmoil of will. In spite of all this personal discord, she scores well on commonly agreed criteria of freedom. Insofar as her doubts regarding prevailing standards brought her to purposefully stand apart and challenge them, we are inclined to credit her with autonomy. Moreover, even though she may fail often in her attempts to take her own character in hand and make it the most fully effective agency of reform, these failures are judged relative to high standards and

⁸ F.A. Hayek, John Stuart Mill and Harriet Taylor (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951).

frequent successes. From place to place her reach exceeds her grasp, yet viewed broadly she possesses a high degree of self-control. In sum then, despite a thoroughly precarious problematic of self-articulation, Taylor was her own person in a way that her conventional contemporary - granting all the latter's fit with her circumstances and equanimity of desires - was not.

This brings into relief, then, a further clear standard of freedom beyond the doubtless crucial ability to pursue one's own happiness according to one's lights. In any age there are state-of-the-art methods of evaluation and knowledge and values relative to self-identity. Degree of sophistication in such matters must be, it seems to me, fairly strongly tied to the kinds of practical tasks confronting society and the repertoire of material skills created and deployed in their direction. Be that as it may, the structuring of social life may be such as to enfranchise, as it were, only some of society with the rationality and breadth of conception which are representative of the achievements of their era. These endowments may or may not be tied to the good life in the sense of a life of variety and reward. It is easy for confusion to arise here; that is, for it to be supposed that it is just because of this possible extra richness in life that a person is more free. But not just any elaboration of personal practice and mentality is constitutive of greater freedom. What concerns us, rather, is the intimate connection between a repertoire of evaluative skills and the capacity for critical independence they make

possible. As the contrast between Taylor and her contemporary shows, the lack of such enfranchisement can actually reduce one's possibilities for autonomy, self-control, steadfast independence and the like: in short, for being one's own person and having one's own life in hand.

If I am right about how we would, in fact, regard Taylor and her contemporary vis-a-vis freedom, then one deep consequence suggested is that Frankfurt is wrong to identify freedom with "satisfaction" as against "frustration". It cannot, of course, be denied that sating of desire is an ingredient in the compound freedom. And, as well, we must agree that it is essential to the idea of a person that we differentiate levels of satiation: first, second, perhaps more. But freedom is also tied to creativity: in the case at hand, to self-creativity. It is noteworthy that by its own testimony the creative process has always been tension ridden. Thus, if we are to give play to the role of skepticism and critique - ideas which have an oppositional connotation - in the matter of being free, we cannot make any over-facile identification of freedom of will - even second order will - with mere satiety.

Now at this point, it seems to me, we have drawn close to the heart of the matter: It is not just Taylor's "conceptions" of sexual role and democratic life which differentiate her from her contemporary but equally the very attitude she bears to the tension ridden oppositions which undergird creativity. It is not unreasonable to suppose that crucial to the autonomy she evidences is a higher order affirmation

of skepticism and critical stance such as was part of the intellectual ferment of the early 19th century. It is Taylor's differential exposure, we may suppose, to a conception of virtue in which creative struggle of thought plays a key role which grounds her capacity for autonomy.

Having regard to the contrast between Taylor and her contemporary, we can see that full and unproblematic possession of Frankfurtian will does not rule out the possibility that the second order will might be, as we say, "foisted" upon its possessor. Nothing prevents a person who has been systematically miseducated from possessing a hierarchical will and freedom at both levels. Yet clearly a person who regards, evaluates, and transforms their first order will according to the debased postulates of such a system is lacking in freedom.

Enough has been said to show that there is a certain narrowness in Frankfurt's account. While he has, in the notion of hierarchical will, a theory of freedom, he lacks a theory explaining just what hierarchical will itself is. We can agree the self-relation is real and that understanding it is important to the elucidation of the concept of freedom. Still the virtually exclusive focus on the psychological facts of second order motivation leads Frankfurt to disregard entirely a whole wing of the problem of human freedom; its social conditions.

Two further difficulties with Frankfurt's account deserve mention, not because they strike at the heart of the main theme - to which he makes informative and essentially correct contributions - but because their rectification, as

peripheral issues, is a strength of the theory presented herein.

Inability to Account for the Desirability of Free Will

Frankfurt himself posts two criteria of adequacy for any theory of freedom. Such a theory must accord with our sense of free will's importance and it must yield grounds for the common conviction that our freedom is not enjoyed by other species. A theory of freedom must, he claims, "meet these elementary but essential conditions: that it be understandable why we desire this freedom and why we refuse to ascribe it to animals."⁹ Frankfurt's attempts to square his theory with these criteria seems to me on the first count trivial while on the second he fails by default.

His application of the first criterion seems little more than tautologizing. Why is freedom desirable? Because it entails the sating of desires: "The enjoyment of freedom of the will means the satisfaction of certain desires - desires of the second or higher orders - whereas its absence means their frustration."¹⁰ Where there is more than tautology here, the "more" turns on the idea of being actively self-controlling rather than helplessly passive:

The satisfaction at stake are those which accrue to a person of whom it be said that his will is his own. The corresponding frustrations are those suffered by a person of whom it may be said that he is estranged from himself, or that he finds himself a helpless or a passive bystander to the forces that move him.¹¹

Yet, as we have seen, the possession of the freedom in question does not guarantee that the agent's "will is his own." Rather

^{9,10,11} Frankfurt, p.17.

it merely ascribes the possession of a rudimentary sort of personal integrity which may be itself circumscribed by a background manipulation.

Fails to Explain Intuitions of Uniqueness

As to the second condition. Frankfurt claims, "My theory concerning freedom of the will accounts easily for our disinclination to allow that this freedom is enjoyed by the members of species inferior to our own."¹² While most of us are, perhaps, thus disinclined, it is hard to see what in Frankfurt's account serves to deepen our disinclination.

Frankfurt tells us right off the bat that it appears we alone have hierarchical will: "No other animal than man, however, appears to have the capacity for reflective self-evaluation that is manifested in the formation of second-order desires."¹³ However, no supporting evidence for this claim is immediately given and so we read on, anticipating that this burden of persuasion will be taken up in a later section of the work. What is needed is some argument that will add backbone to our intuitions in this regard about animals. Yet this argumentation never arrives.

It would be quite wrong to make overmuch of these two difficulties. The working heart of his paper is the elucidation of the centrality of hierarchy of desire. In this he is fully effective. Beyond this there are implications for a full theory of freedom to which Frankfurt adverts

¹²Ibid., p.17.

¹³Ibid., p.7.

somewhat parenthetically. As will be seen, in this regard his intentions serve him well provided only that certain intermediate steps between the theoretical core and its implications are filled in. The self-productive theory, as we shall see, does so.

An Alternate to the Frankfurt Theory

Production

Frankfurt's account does isolate a relation - the hierarchical motivation relation - central to human freedom. Yet he does so in such a manner that various objections perennially lodged against theories of freedom remain. As well, the account fails to provide a context of comprehension. By this I mean we still find ourselves curious as to just why this relation should be operative at all. The fact of hierarchical will, and such it is I think, seems an unfortunately bald fact.

Certain social aspects of the hierarchical relation go unobserved in Frankfurt's account. This, of course, is no serious complaint in itself. However, the failure to note, for example, that the second order of will proper to one person may bear on the second or first order will of another person is not incidental to the fact that Frankfurt's account makes no provision against untoward social interventions in personal will. It is, in fact the possibility of self-creation in social contexts which allows for self-distortion qua social imposition. A theory which omits an account of the former cannot forestall the latter.

I am led to suppose, then, that the problem here is that Frankfurt has isolated the hierarchical will relation too much. Accordingly, what follows is an attempt to broaden the account of hierarchical will and freedom by considering them both as relatives of production. The secret, it is claimed, of understanding that will can be produced in some uniquely human way, lies in understanding that anything at all can be produced humanly. Referring to what occurs through the action of hierarchical will as "self-production" is not merely a matter of bringing it under the same lexical heading as what occurs through common and familiar labour. Rather there is a real relation between the phenomena, as was asserted in Chapter II.

As Taylor has explained, the phenomenon of hierarchical will is structurally complex.¹⁴ We can differentiate within it both "simple weighing" and "strong evaluation". The account offered herein explains why this should be the case. For, simple weighing in Taylor's terms amounts to the common referral of both alternatives of deliberation to the judgment of desires "given" by one's nature. Strong evaluation, on the other hand, involves the challenging of that nature in an act of radical appraisal. I should think that these two phenomena should be set in a continuum of appraisal running from simple to strong. In any event, on the present self-productive model, simple weighing corresponds to a more primitive pre-reflective form of appraisal, while the strong evaluation mode would only become possible once social

¹⁴Taylor, "What is Human Agency?"

self-production had built up the vocabulary of appraisal appropriate to abstract generalizations on subjective character. By a reverse form of argument we arrive at the conclusion that the efficacy of the self-production model in explaining both the grounds of hierarchical will and its noted structure proves the centrality of the concept of production.

In the previous chapter we constructed a three-termed typology of self-production. It allowed us to see that the linkage between the sort of self-production one does when one exercises Frankfurtian will and the historical generation by the human species of its own repertoire of talents, sensuality, cognitive ability, etc., is, for lack of a better term, a real relation. In all three instances we are dealing with forms of freedom: first, freedom as power of understanding; second, freedom as socially based, humanly driven change; third, freedom as personal transformation. This self-production typology allows us a window into the genesis of the Frankfurtian hierarchical relation and allows us a richer appreciation of it.

Several Forms of Hierarchical Will

In accordance with Chapter II's tripartite discussion of self-production, we can now discern three facets of the hierarchical will relation.

First, there is that hierarchical will naturally associated with the understanding. We have seen that the breadth of the expanded present accords with depth of analytic penetration of ambient causal structure. There

are numerous causes which press toward any given natural effect. If we are to take up the effect (say, a bumper crop) as our own end, we must grasp the "tree" (a structure of cause and effect relations) of causal means which conduces thereto and intervene effectively. Coming to a position of command over our lives as producers means coming to possess a consciousness structured in a strategic-tactical fashion. What is true for a single ends-means process - grain production, say - is true of the whole structure of life processes: the potency and stability of human life grows to the extent that the breadth of strategy and specificity of tactic advance.

"Having a life", in other words, and the extent to which one does so, is a matter, in part, of gaining an expanded present. Humanity comes to have a measure of conscious self-identity first and foremost in regard to the crucially important regimen of material sustenance.

The liberation from a life of visceral response and instinct, from a life lived of necessity "for the moment", is purchased at the price of constantly extending the horizon on one's ambitions and intentions. How much "distance" there is between one and one's immediate circumstances is measured in terms of the richness of the life one has as a self-identity or intentional structure or strategic profile. As a first approximation, therefore, hierarchical will - the ability to bring one low valency motivational element within the ambit of a higher one - is part and parcel of craft self-production.

So the most elementary sort of freedom involved in distancing oneself from the immediate is an accomplice of that rudimentary structuring of the will which attends the causal penetration demanded by production. The motivational appeals of the moment are utilized or discarded as they are judged conducive to various goals, each of which is some future effect taken up as an end embedded in a structure of end and means.

Still, there is more to hierarchical will than this simple counter-positioning of various goals embedded in the expanded present. Let us begin with an illustration of this simple form of hierarchical will.

Consider the exercise of self-control by a smoker who wants to quit. Smoking has certain short term motivational elements going for it: a mild euphoriant effect, a release for nervous energy, a palliative to social stress. These can be "controlled", when they can, by bringing them under the sway of the long term. One looks forward and regards the eventual loss of athletic prowess, the deterioration of health, possibly social ostracism. This is the type of hierarchical will Taylor has dubbed "simple weighing".¹⁵

Simple weighing, it should be noted, can be carried out in a social manner. Typically, here, one person adopts the standpoint of, eg., the future benefits of quitting smoking and argues them against the first-order inclinations of an acquaintance who smokes. This is but a special case of the broader phenomenon of socialization insofar as it is

¹⁵Taylor, "What is Human Agency?", pp.110-115.

by such means that "values" (think, perhaps, of lifestyles) are created and dispersed through a culture. But there is much more to socialization than simple weighing placed on a social footing. By dint of the institution of socialization, what almost amounts to a new level of hierarchical will is brought into being.

It is worth pausing, before moving onto the second aspect of hierarchical will, to underscore the simple parallel being asserted here. We have discussed, recall, how a key aspect of human consciousness, understanding, is founded upon the causal penetration ancillary to craft-production. Consciousness, in one of its familiar modes, grows in proportion as it extends the matrix of cause and effect relations grasped. But this way of depicting consciousness seems purely contemplative and passive. To give it the dynamic quality familiar to us as intentionality we need first to recognize that the whole matrix of cause and effect can be rewritten as a matrix of means and ends. In this light we now see that consciousness affirms some portions of what is present to it as a mere causal insight. Some, possibly all, of what is present to consciousness as causal structure is intentionally iridescent, as it were; is taken to be a pathway to the future. Thus is the manifold of the environment given a structure of meaning as conducing or not to this or that goal.

So far as I can see the two structures, that of causal penetration and that of ends and means must always be schematically superimposable with some rough degree of fit. For, the two phenomena, consciousness as understanding and as

intentional thrust, develop in chicken-and-egg fashion. That is, what drives understanding is the thrust of intending to meet needs. What drives the intentional structure is the new horizons opened up by the expanding understanding. If this is correct, then nothing is more straightforward than the realization that what appears in understanding as a ramified structure of axiom and theorem should be paralleled in will as a structure of strategy and tactic. Thus we have the hierarchical nature of will at its most fundamental level.

The second aspect of hierarchical will presupposes the structure just discussed. For, the socialization function of human will is exercised to the extent that these very structures are themselves conscious objects.

Whereas in the hierarchical form proper to craft self-production the transformation of self occurs more or less as a by-product of the productive dialectic, here, in socialization, we have increasingly, a new and higher order of self-production, one that must be taken on as a task in its own right. If socialization is to be understood and organized as a process, it must be imbued with consciousness. That is, its own structure of causation must be plumbed and an operational strategy mapped out. Like all jobs, of course, this one gives rise to shop talk. A vocabulary specific to the object of production - the self - is developed (eg., inattentiveness, perseverance, resoluteness, dissipation, etc.) as is a vocabulary of production method (eg., indignance, congratulation, etc.) and tricks of the trade are swapped back and forth.

Now the conceptual mapping of this new productive terrain can begin. For one is not here simply concerned with arguing this specific motive over that, less gainful, desire (although one is concerned with such). Whole categories of motivation can now be discerned. "Perseverance" for instance is not so much an intention as a mode of activation of intention. Gradually by the progress of the social self-production lexicon there is brought into being a new level of articulacy¹⁶ relative to self-production.

We find specific forms of hierarchical will attached, then, to both production and social reproduction. Thirdly, it remains to mention the hierarchical will associated with reflexive self-production. This is, of course, Frankfurtian hierarchical will, but it comes into view in the most theoretically graceful manner at the end of the road we have just trod. We can now see, first, that socialization is not merely a matter of receiving the historically available store of accumulated self through subjection to social hierarchical will. It is also a matter of coming to participate in the project insofar as we are able to appropriate the vocabulary of social self-production. But no self is more susceptible to such a vocabulary than our own self. Insofar, therefore, as we have achieved participatory status in the social task of self-production we become, willy nilly, effective agents of personal or reflexive self-creation.

¹⁶I am indebted to Taylor for this usage of "articulacy". It is unique to the present paper that it gives the above account of the foundations of what Taylor terms "deep evaluation" which is, on his account, a matter of articulating a self-concept. See "What is Human Agency?", Loc. cit.

A Stronger Theory of Freedom

Having given Frankfurt's hierarchical will relation an explanatory theoretical context, we can now proceed to various implications this broader account has for the theory of freedom.

The Insufficiency of Integrity

As we have seen, Frankfurt portrays freedom as constituted by the correspondence of levels of motivation. In fact, this consistency between orders of motivation is well captured in the colloquial notion of a person's being a very "together" individual. But one can be together in various ways. One's togetherness may be purchased at the price of irresponsible unconcern for the implications of one's life and practices, for example. A shallow togetherness is as possible as a profound one. Most important, one's integrity may be broadly circumscribed by constraints such that we would be unprepared to grant that even the most rigorous consistency might add up to freedom.

The traditional libertarian response to such considerations has been to propose that integrity is at best secondary, at worst irrelevant to freedom. Instead, it has been urged, the key to freedom is the absolute independence of the structure of motivation from circumscribing conditions. The search for the grounds of freedom has accordingly been depicted as a quest for such personhood as is surrounded by a moat across which no social forces (among others) can forge without personal co-operation at the drawbridge. Yet this freedom seems more akin to being layed siege than to liberty

and seems to make of all social influence a prima facie insurgent evil.

In contradistinction, the deep dependence of the individual upon society for self and for the intellectual equipment that makes freedom opportune has been portrayed with undeniable force. Francois Truffaut's L'Enfant Sauvage provides as good a case in this regard as can be found. It is worth pausing for a moment to dwell on its central lesson.

The film dramatizes the events surrounding the discovery in the 19th century of a "wild boy" in the woods of France. When he is first discovered, the feral youth lacks not only language and learning but even such familiar human traits as bi-pedal gait and erect posture. He survives, apparently by whatever living he can scratch out with his bare hands and he has the cunning and ferocious temperment which are functional to a naked denizen of the forest floor. He snarls and flails and lashes out with teeth and nails.

It is the first stages of L'Enfant's civil transformation which comprise the film's story line. As we watch we begin to see him change under the patient yet unabashed tutelage of his captors. What gives the film its peculiar gravity is the compression in time of normally snail's pace events. The force of human influence in child-raising is normally made invisible by its slow cumulative progress. In the film what normally takes years takes only months and is portrayed in a few hours. The wild boy's ferocity is peeled off just as he is clothed in the style of the day and

as the months roll by he is introduced to the comportment and supporting routines of his contemporaries.

As we leave him at the film's end he is uttering his first painful words and is beginning to enjoy the sympathetic emotions. He has been and is being, raised up from the squalor of the forest floor, from servitude to the iron regimen of the struggle for sustenance, from the shackles of prudence which keep him within easy reach of those few familiar grottos where he can enjoy a safe sleep. The conclusion is clear: L'Enfant's captivity is liberation: the often harsh checks imposed on his animus exalt him; he is being forced to be free.

Such a scenario goes a long way to explaining why it is not only necessary but also satisfying to abandon the siege mentality of radical libertarianism. One, of course, wants a culture which is permeable to one's will. To suppose a freedom along the lines of libertarian independence whose terrain of action stopped short at the gates to the civic arena would hardly suffice. Yet this desirable permeability of one's culture to one's will is but the reverse side of one's own permeability to the will of one's culture.

Thus we are naturally led to the conclusion that if freedom is a certain status vis-a-vis influences it must exhibit its potency against only some influences. And there's the rub. Just how to draw the line between manipulative and educative influence? Despair in regard to any rational demarcation of influences has fuelled the simplistic fires of, to one side, radical libertarianism (Reid) and, to the

other, vulgar determinism (Spinoza). In line with the more complex picture of the will we now have at hand we can indicate just how such a differentiation might be achieved.

We might consider the relevant information under the heads of the form and content of freedom. The form of freedom is, roughly, participatory social life. That is, it has the shape of social dialectic in which one wields in co-operation with others a certain vocabulary. One participates in the historically achieved level of articulacy proper to one's culture. This implies at once that being free is, broadly speaking, a public affair in the sense that all the cards that effectuate will are on the table.

As regards the content of freedom we might begin with the idea that the crucial element in manipulation is the relative helplessness of the subject. In particular, that supposition is that if the content of one's will is established sub rosa; outside the participatory space, say by subliminal suggestion, one is not free. We have seen that Frankfurt's model of freedom contains no elements which would obviate this sort of helplessness. We are now in a position to see that certain specifications of the content of influence can sort out manipulation from education. For if we suppose a person whose convictions, desires, principles, etc. are induced via a minute speaker placed beneath their pillow, we are supposing events that have the form of manipulation. Yet suppose, now, further, that the content of such suggestions was such as to deepen the subject's articulacy in self-evaluation, to reinforce the socially and

personally wieldable critical skills of the subject, to broaden the conceptual vocabulary applicable to the subject's and other's lives, etc. We are, in fact, supposing a liberation albeit oddly packaged.

To return to Frankfurt:

The central objection to Frankfurt's theory of freedom was one of insufficiency. One could, it was indicated, be effective in achieving harmony between orders of will yet be subject at the higher levels to sub-conscious forces of such nature that we would want to say one was enslaved. This objection might be put aphoristically: "Integrity is not enough!"

For example, we have supposed that hierarchical will and the freedom it grounds has been around for a long time - ever since production got under way. If we now suppose, then, a 20th century individual with perfect integrity of will yet with the understanding and evaluative vocabulary proper to early metal culture, it is plain that such a person is less than fully free. One must possess or at least have had reasonable access to the state-of-the-art self of one's culture. But even this further condition will not secure the broadest possible freedom. It must be further stipulated that one not be subject to subliminal influence and that one's whole cultural context not be in the hands (perceived or not) of alien will. How many further stipulations are needed to secure freedom cannot, it seems to me, be fixed. Indeed, the very idea of "securing" freedom stems, I think, from the conviction that, whatever freedom

is, we must have it. The approach elaborated here suggests otherwise. It suggests that numerous elements comprise freedom and that advances in any one element might lead in future to the emergence of new human capacities which would, in their turn react back upon already existing "cradle" conditions. Meanwhile, here, in regard to Frankfurt, the point is not to provide an alternate account of the broadest possible freedom but rather to indicate that the inherently social nature of humanity precludes any characterization of freedom in purely individual terms.

Freedom has to do with the production of will. To the extent that this is true we are pointed toward an account of both individual and culture for the roots of a theory of freedom. For no individual ever gets to churn will from thin air. One's will is worked out against one's culture by the reshaping of cultural givens using given equipment. This partnership extends to the very deepest levels of self; to the structural traits of consciousness; to that profile of motivation that defines our subjective sense of a life of our own to be lived.

If social givens are part and parcel of the very capacities whereby we are able to deal with our wills, and if freedom resides in large measure in the exercise of that capacity, an adequate concept of freedom must make essential reference to cultural forces. To put it another way: if the concept of freedom demands an account of education, it also demands, of necessity, an account of the education of the educator.

One further strength of an account of freedom that takes production as a key ingredient should be explained. We saw earlier that Frankfurt is at best unpersuasive when he wields his theory of freedom to differentiate man from the animals. The following argument can be made on his behalf: If we suppose animals free we are driven to the conviction that they possess hierarchical will. This seems preposterous, so the disinclination to grant animals freedom gains support. The argument is formally sound. But is it preposterous to suppose that animals possess a suitably structured will? I already accepted that animals are not free (in the relevant sense) before this argument was made and I now find myself in no stronger position when it comes to mustering evidence for my view. Supposedly if I want to materially conclude via this argument that animals aren't free, I must unearth evidence that they are somehow unidimensional. How to do this is not obvious because the whole account is cast in psychological terms or in terms of internalities and needs a supplement of behaviorist premises if the practical affairs of, say, chimps are to count for or against their freedom.

My alternate approach has the advantage that it incorporates as an integral component a thoroughly visible element; namely, production. We can thus begin to tackle immediately the question of differential freedom across the spectrum of species by comparing production capacities. I don't propose to take up this task here. But it can be indicated that, on the truth of this view, the edifice of human artifact

stands testimony to a unique freedom. Other species do things that look like production. Rabbits and robins, of course, have their own edifices in burrow and nest. Ants, bees and beaver even have socially constructed edifices. But these are static in form over time within a given species. The plasticity engendered by the critical capacity evidently is not there. Certain birds use straws to ferret out insects. But the practice is niche-bound: not only is the trick never generalized, it is hard to say just how it ever could be. Thus, however the situation may in fact be with non-human labour, it is clear that the account of freedom which ties freedom to production sets up useful empirical intuitions and this must be counted as a theoretical strength.

Finally, an aside should be made concerning the earlier criticism of Frankfurt on the matter of the desireability of freedom. I say "aside" because it seems clear that any explanation of why freedom is a pressing concern is somewhat ancillary to both Frankfurt's prime concerns and to what has been developed herein. Within its terms of reference I have nothing more to add than what Frankfurt has stated. Frankfurt tried the impossible and I won't. Roughly speaking Frankfurt posted the question "Why the desire for freedom?", then formulated freedom in terms of desire, and, naturally enough, could offer only tautologous answers to his own question.

Within the framework of a theory such as Frankfurt and I are attempting there is no answer to the question because, in fact, people do not desire freedom per se.

Instead all people have this freedom as Homo sapiens. What they lack is the opportunity for freedom's exercise. Where there is an awareness of the lack and, accordingly, where freedom looms as a pressing concern, it is because as a species and from case to case humanity's reach exceeds its grasp. No one longs for freedom in the abstract. Rather, having legs we hunger for space to run. In short, the thirst for freedom is not a longing after human nature but a desire not to be alienated from our humanity. And that, as Marx pointed out, is not a philosophic but a practical problem.

Taking Our Lives in Hand

One final point rounds out the advantages of the approach espoused here. It is a point about having a "life to be lived" and what it is to "make one's life".

We do not construct life atomically. Rather, our lives appear to us and are comprised in terms of wholes. My sharpening this pencil is writing the thesis which is refuting behaviorism. The part is made meaningful by the whole. We do, of course, make somewhat unitary decisions, often painfully. But conceptions of freedom which rely for their evidence on motivational crises give the impression that the creative in human affairs is bunched up in nodes of sharp deliberation surrounded by vast tracts of moral lethargy. While there are revolutions in personal affairs where leaves are turned decisively, much of self-creation goes on in the interregna and the theory at hand helps bring this terrain into focus.

It was suggested earlier that the reliance of the hierarchical motivationist literature on peculiar dilemmas such as neurotic aversion, compulsive cravings and the like was a telling sign. Not all the post-Frankfurtian literature can be so neatly compartmentalized. In particular, Taylor's work breaks this mould and engages less crisis-ridden, more ubiquitous, and therefore more important aspects of self-construction. But even here Taylor seems to fall prey to the tyranny of the deliberated decision, I think, perhaps, this is parallel to the inability of much of early 20th century ethics to raise the question "What is it to live a good life?" It seemed no one dared bite off anything larger than the "act" as an item of moral inspection. The buried and highly dubious premise in all this myopia was the conviction that enough good acts lashed together would give a good life.

Neither sort of atomism really promises an account of our living sense of ourselves, it seems to me and, perhaps more important, in neither schema are the really pressing issues of human affairs stateable. The theory of freedom at hand accounts for "having a life" in terms, in part, of the expanded present or dimensions of understanding. This allows us to see how the terrain of one's life can be, on the other hand, a matter of week-by-week engrossment or, on the other, of such an extent as to surpass altogether the bounds of one's span of years. It shows as well the appearance of self in a nexus of social relations. On this view one's very continuity depends upon the durability of one's

culture; a durability which ceaselessly beckons our participatory support. Finally, it reveals the person as a indwelling substance making sense of and given sense by the intentional structure of the inorganic body. Hence, living our lives can have a dimension of defining ourselves within or against the cityscape and the towering monopolies of production. Both in large and small ways our lives are given form by the architecture that contains them.

In short, the hierarchy of will is both diffuse, variegated in form, and ubiquitous. Its sharper crises are important, but these by no means set the benchmark of "problems of the will" which confront us. The most profound problems of will only confront us to the extent that we are able to conceive ourselves as custodians of lives and are only soluble within such conceptions.

CONCLUSION

The method in this essay has been to follow Marx in the materializing of the question of the nature of human freedom. We have treated the issues as evolutionary ones; as problems interacting fruitfully with the anthropology of human development. The basic methodological argument has been that if we are not to assume super-natural premises then the actual capacities of persons, freedom among them, must appear as evolutionary acquisitions: developing in response to ambient conditions among which must be numbered the very conditions created by human nature.

Two main nodes appear in our account. First, production itself, the uniquely human response to survival demands, comes richly laden with consequences for mentality, for consciousness, for the root possibility of a self-relation. Second, the creation of an ever larger scale of a specifically human environment brings with it a unique phenomenon: culture. This new line of being presupposes a new range of capacities among which are recognizable the main foundations of freedom. Specifically, the creation and maintenance of culture demands a consciousness of a new type: human self-awareness in the form of critical and self-critical powers which can be turned to the task of appraising lives and their suitability to social integrity.

What this whole picture suggests as one of its most fruitful implications is the extremely tight relation which holds between personal and social integrity. It does at once away, it seems to me, with extreme forms of liberal individualism; making clear a personal social indebtedness far beyond the normal vision of material and educative nurture. We now see the person appear in a deep-seated interaction with the social milieu. It does away, by the same token, with extreme organicist views of social role wherein the person can rightly be accorded the status of a mere cell. Freedom on this account demands full participation: the appropriation of rational powers and a pâlalte of sensual finesse and the ability to wield them critically in the production of the advancing social genotype.

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