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The politics of language education : a case study of West Malaysia, 1930-1971 Kalimuthu, K. Ramanathan 1979

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THE POLITICS OF LANGUAGE EDUCATION: A CASE STUDY OF WEST MALAYSIA, 1930 - 1971 by K.RAMA.NATHAN (KALIMUTHU B. Soc. S c i . (Honours), 1977 U n i v e r s i t i Sains Malaysia A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF •MASTER OF ARTS i n THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (Department of P o l i t i c a l Science) We accept t h i s t h e s i s as conforming to the req u i r e d standard THE UNIVERSITY OF January, (S) K. Ram ana than BRITISH COLUMBIA 1979 Kalimuthu, 1979 In presenting th i s thesis in pa r t i a l fu l f i lment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the Univers ity of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree that the Library shal l make i t f ree ly avai lable for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of th i s thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by his representatives. It i s understood that copying or publ icat ion of th i s thesis for f inanc ia l gain shal l not be allowed without my written permission. Department of P o l i t i c a l Scdience The Univers ity of B r i t i s h Columbia 2075 Wesbrook Place Vancouver, Canada V6T 1W5 Date 1. 2. 1979 I E - 6 B P 7 5 - 5 1 1 E TO MY FATHER ABSTRACT In J u l y , 1969, the Malaysian M i n i s t e r of Education announced 'a new education p o l i c y ' under which E n g l i s h , Chinese and Tamil schools were req u i r e d to begin the process of conversion to Malay medium i n s t r u c t i o n i n stages, beginning i n 1970. This p o l i c y to introduce Malay as the medium of i n s t r u c t i o n took roughly f o r t y years to evolve. The aim of t h i s study i s to examine how t h i s was achieved through four phases of p o l i t i c s and government i n West Ma l a y s i a : ( i ) The B r i t i s h C o l o n i a l A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , 1930-1941; ( i i ) The Post-War C o l o n i a l A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , 1945-1954; ( i i i ) The A l l i a n c e Government, 1955-1961, and ( i v ) The A l l i a n c e Government, 1962-1971 I t was observed i n t h i s study that though non-Malay demands f o r the p r e s e r v a t i o n of t h e i r vernacular schools were p e r s i s t e n t and c o n s i s t e n t they lacked p o l i t i c a l u n i t y and cohesiveness i n s u c c e s s f u l l y pursuing t h e i r demands. The Malays, i n c o n t r a s t were i n i t i a l l y a p a t h e t i c towards the language question. They became p o l i t i c i z e d during the period preceding Independence, however and were able to e s t a b l i s h t h e i r p o l i t i c a l supremacy. A consequence of t h i s was that they were able to pursue a communally o r i e n t e d language p o l i c y w i t h great e f f e c t i v e n e s s so that Malay became e s t a b l i s h e d as the medium of i n s t r u c t i o n . The p o l i c y was s u c c e s s f u l l y pursued by a s e r i e s of Government Ordinances and Acts that were designed to ensure that the p r o v i s i o n s of the C o n s t i t u t i o n w i t h regards to the Malay language were adhered to while p e r m i t t i n g f l e x i b i l i t y i n t h e i r implementation. However, i t was found that the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c o ntract between the Malays and the non-Malays was an important and i n t e g r a l aspect of the p o l i c y making Malay the medium of i n s t r u c t i o n . Perhaps the most important reason f o r the s u c c e s s f u l establishment of the p o l i c y l i e s i n the g r a d u a l i s t i c and incremental nature i n which the p o l i c y was implemented. i i i TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER PAGE I - INTRODUCTION 1 Some Contemporary Case Studies .. .. . . . . 3 Review of L i t e r a t u r e 13 Methodology .. .... .. .. .. .. .. 15 Notes to Chapter I 18 I I BRITISH COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION, 1930-1941 .. .. 21 The P l u r a l Society and the C o l o n i a l Government " . . . . 21 Communal Demands .. .. .. .. .. .. 26 Motives and Aims of the P o l i c y Makers .. .. 28 P o l i c y Impact and Communal Responses .. .. 30 Aftermath 32 Conclusion .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 34 Notes to Chapter I I 36 I I I POST-WAR COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION UP TO 1954 .. .. 41 P o l i t i c a l Developments Leading to the F i r s t A l l i a n c e Government 41 Educational Development 45 Communal Demands 50 Motives and Aims of the P o l i c y Makers .. .. 51 P o l i c y Impact and Communal Responses .. .. 54 Aftermath 61 Conclusion .. . . . . .. .. .. .. .. 62 Notes to Chapter I I I 64 i v CHAPTER PAGE IV THE ALLIANCE GOVERNMENT, 1955-1961 68 Major P o l i t i c a l Events 68 Educational Development .. . . 71 Communal Demands 76 Motives and Aims of the P o l i c y Makers .. .. 79 P o l i c y Impact and Communal Responses . . .. 82 Aftermath 98 Conclusion 99 Notes to Chapter IV 101 V THE ALLIANCE GOVERNMENT, 1962-1971 105 Major P o l i t i c a l Events 106 Communal Demands and Educational Development . . • . 110 Motives and Aims of the P o l i c y Makers .. .. 116 P o l i c y Impact and Communal Responses .. .. 118 Conclusion . . .... . . .. 128 Notes to Chapter V 130 VI CONCLUSION .:. 135 Notes to Chapter VI 146 APPENDIX . I The Time-Schedule f o r the Implementation of the Teaching i n Bahasa M a l a y s i a of a l l subjects other than E n g l i s h Language and the P u p i l s ' Own Languages i n National-Type E n g l i s h Schools 147 I I Subjects to be Taught i n Bahasa Malaysia i n National-Type E n g l i s h Primary Schools i n 1970 148 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 149 v LIST OF TABLES TABLE PAGE I P a r a l l e l Growth of Malays, Chinese 9 and Indians, 1911-1941 v i ABBREVIATIONS BARJASA Bersatu Ra'ayat J a t i Sarawak BBBK B a r i s a n Bertindak Bahasa Kebangsaan CACE C e n t r a l Advisory Committee on Education CLC Communities L i a i s o n Committee CSMC A l l Malaya Chinese School Management Committee A s s o c i a t i o n DAP Democratic A c t i o n P a r t y FMCE Federation of Malaya C e r t i f i c a t e of Education Gerakan Gerakan Rakyat M a l a y s i a IMP Independence of Malaya Part y KMT Kuomintang LCE Lower C e r t i f i c a t e of Education MCA Malaysian Chinese A s s o c i a t i o n MCP Malayan Communist P a r t y MIC Malaysian Indian Congress NOC N a t i o n a l Operations C o u n c i l PAP People's A c t i o n Party PMIP Pan Malaysian I s l a m i c Party PN P a r t y Negara PPP People's P r o g r e s s i v e P a r t y SNAP Sarawak N a t i o n a l P a r t y SUPP Sarawak United People's P a r t y UCSTA United Chinese School Teachers' A s s o c i a t i o n UDP United Democratic Part y UMNO United Malays N a t i o n a l Organization v i i ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS My deepest g r a t i t u d e i s to my t h e s i s s u p e r v i s o r , P r o f e s s o r Paul R. Tennant, without whose constant encouragement and guidance t h i s t h e s i s would have not been completed. I am a l s o very t h a n k f u l to Pr o f e s s o r s R. S. Mil n e and John R. Wood f o r t h e i r v a l u a b l e c o n s t r u c t i v e c r i t i c i s m s . I am p a r t i c u l a r l y indebted to S y l v i a Woodcock f o r her many act s of kindness and f o r her warm f r i e n d s h i p . My f r i e n d s Ishak Lebbe, Donald Crone and Jim Gansner a l s o helped me at v a r i o u s stages i n w r i t i n g t h i s t h e s i s . Not to be f o r g o t t e n , my thanks to Mrs. Grace Cross f o r doing an e x c e l l e n t job of typ i n g t h i s t h e s i s . Above a l l I would l i k e to thank my f r i e n d s Mohd. Noor b i n , Mohd. Tahir and R. Siddharthan f o r t h e i r generosity. L a s t l y I would l i k e to record my a p p r e c i a t i o n to Jack Gegenberg, Mohammad Ghulam K a b i r , Evelyn R i e d i g e r and Mrs. O l i v e Cuthbert f o r making my stay i n Vancouver e v e n t f u l . v i i i CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION Malaysia's education system i s o f t e n considered to be one of the best i n South-east A s i a i f not i n the developing world.''" Enrollment and r e t e n t i o n through primary and secondary c y c l e s are high. In comparison w i t h other T h i r d World systems, the q u a l i t y of teaching i s h i g h , the system i s w e l l organized, and the supply of r e l a t e d f a c i l i t i e s and t e x t s i s adequate i n most inst a n c e s . Yet the education system has been burdened w i t h a recurrent problem - the language of i n s t r u c t i o n . The i n s t i t u t i n g of Malay as the medium of i n s t r u c t i o n has been a co n t i n u i n g p o i n t of controversy and c o n f l i c t between the indigenous Malays and the non-Malays f o r w e l l over f o r t y years. This t h e s i s w i l l d e a l w i t h the e v o l u t i o n of n a t i o n a l language p o l i c y i n the primary and secondary school systems and the v a r i o u s c o n t r o v e r s i e s a r i s i n g from i t . I t i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of n a t i o n a l movements that success i n gaining p o l i t i c a l independence from the c o l o n i a l power i s followed by 2 e f f o r t s to regenerate and g l o r i f y the l o c a l c u l t u r a l h e r i t a g e . But i n a m u l t i - e t h n i c (or m u l t i - c u l t u r a l ) s o c i e t y there are bound to be co n t r o v e r s i e s over the r e l a t i v e p o s i t i o n of one s o c i e t y as opposed to another. Some iss u e s - such as language, r e l i g i o n , and c u l t u r e - are f a r more important than others and, become the i g n i t i o n p o i n t s i n i n t e r - e t h n i c c o n t r o v e r s i e s . There are bound to be b i t t e r c o n f l i c t s over the i n s t i t u t i n g of the language of one p a r t i c u l a r community as 2 opposed to that of another. Throughout recorded h i s t o r y Governments appear to have manipulated 3 the education system to s u i t t h e i r p r e v a i l i n g p o l i t i c a l o b j e c t i v e s . When the school system i s d i s p a r a t e or independent of government c o n t r o l , e f f e c t i v e c o n t r o l of the school system i s nevertheless o f t e n pursued by government p o l i c y makers i n an attempt to ensure u n i f o r m i t y of a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and as a step toward n a t i o n a l u n i t y . Many new s t a t e s i n c l u d e language p o l i c i e s as an important aspect of t h e i r n a t i o n a l development program. The o s t e n s i b l e reason f o r such a program i s f a c i l i t a t i n g n a t i o n a l communication and f o s t e r i n g n a t i o n a l i d e n t i f i c a t i o n ; yet those in v o l v e d i n the formulat i o n and r e a l i z a t i o n of language p o l i c i e s are quick to recognize that to give precedence to one p a r t i c u l a r language i n a m u l t i - e t h n i c s o c i e t y may n e g a t i v e l y a f f e c t i n t e r - e t h n i c r e l a t i o n s . E v i d e n t l y , the language of one group cannot be e s t a b l i s h e d as the n a t i o n a l or o f f i c i a l language without s e r i o u s l y i n f r i n g i n g upon or a f f e c t i n g the perceived language r i g h t s of other communities. In a d d i t i o n to the m a t e r i a l advantages and disadvantages between the competing communities, which are c l e a r l y i m p l i e d , the s i t u a t i o n i s f u r t h e r complicated by c o n s i d e r a t i o n s p e r t a i n i n g to c u l t u r a l values. The question of n a t i o n a l language i s d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d to education. What language (or languages) s h a l l be used as the medium of i n s t r u c t i o n ? What s h a l l be the o f f i c i a l language or languages f o r the purposes of 3 a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ? E d ucational p o l i c y must square w i t h the d e c i s i o n taken i n regards to the language of a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . The Government must c r i t i c a l l y evaluate the adequacy of the indigenous language r e l e v a n t to the requirements of the present; as w e l l as assess the a v a i l a b i l i t y of personnel and f a c i l i t i e s f o r i n s t r u c t i o n i n the language chosen. I f these i s s u e s are r a i s e d as an immediate r e s u l t of the w i t h -drawal of c o l o n i a l r u l e , the nature of the p o l i t i c a l c o n f l i c t s surrounding them can be appreciated f u l l y only i n terms of h i s t o r i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e . Such c o n f l i c t s r e v e a l many complex aspects of these s o c i e t i e s ; t h e i r sense of c u l t u r a l l y d i s t i n c t i v e n e s s , the posture towards c o l o n i a l r u l e , the p a t t e r n of e x i s t i n g s o c i a l i n e q u a l i t i e s and the means advocated f o r l e v e l l i n g them. Such c o n f l i c t s a l s o g r e a t l y i n f l u e n c e the present course of p o l i t i c s and s o c i a l change. Thus, the choice of a n a t i o n a l language o f t e n i n v o l v e s so many values that convenience, r a t i o n a l i t y , and e f f i c i e n c y are not n e c e s s a r i l y the d e c i s i v e c r i t e r i a . I t i s , t h e r e f o r e , necessary to consider the problem of language p o l i c y more from a p o l i t i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e than from a predominantly t e c h n i c a l viewpoint. Some Contemporary Case Studies An h i s t o r i c a l overview of events i n I n d i a and S r i Lanka, which have c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s comparable to those found i n Malaysia - i . e . l i n g u i s t i c and ethnic cleavages and concomitant p o l i t i c a l problems -w i l l serve to i l l u s t r a t e the complexity of n a t i o n a l language p o l i c y formation. In both these c o u n t r i e s , there were problems of d i s s e n t 4 when the government attempted to i n s t i t u t e a s i n g l e n a t i o n a l or o f f i c i a l language. The choice of a n a t i o n a l language i n I n d i a and consequently of a s i n g l e medium of i n s t r u c t i o n f o r a l l schools was complicated by the f a c t that no s i n g l e language could c l a i m an overwhelming s u p e r i o r i t y . There were more than ten languages that were r e g i o n a l l y and demographically 4 s a l i e n t . Thus when H i n d i , a language predominantly used i n the North, was adopted as the ' o f f i c i a l language' of the Union, i t was decided that E n g l i s h would continue to be used u n t i l 1965, a f t e r which Parliament would review the s i t u a t i o n . However, w i t h the date due f o r the changeover to H i n d i f a s t approaching r e g i o n a l i d e n t i t i e s were s u f f i c i e n t l y a r t i c u l a t e d that the B e n g a l i , M a r a t h i , P u n j a b i , Tamil, and Telegu speaking regions were not prepared to accept H i n d i as the o f f i c i a l l a n g u a g e . T h e problem was f u r t h e r compounded by the f a c t that " H i n d i f a n a t i c s " at the Centre had pushed t h e i r case i n an e x c l u s i v i s t and zealous manner thus a l i e n a t i n g other language groups even f u r t h e r . The O f f i c i a l Language Commission and the Committee of Members of Parliament on the i s s u e had o r i g i n a l l y decided that the p o s i t i o n which E n g l i s h education had perpetuated produced an unwholesome s o c i a l d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n and s t r a t i f i c a t i o n . The Commission consequently recommended that H i n d i should p r o g r e s s i v e l y replace E n g l i s h as the O f f i c i a l language and the main media of i n s t r u c t i o n i n a l l s c h o o l s , p o s s i b l y w i t h e f f e c t i v e changeover i n 1965. 5 The Report immediately aroused great anxiety i n the non-Hindi speaking areas where a g i t a t i o n s were mounted to r e g i s t e r p r o t e s t s against the recommended course of a c t i o n . The Prime M i n i s t e r , Jawaharlal Nehru, was quick to sense the magnitude of the p r o t e s t s and t h e r e f o r e pledged that non-Hindi areas could continue to use E n g l i s h f o r an i n d e f i n i t e p e r i o d . To a l a r g e extent the assurance r e s t r a i n e d f u r t h e r p r o t e s t s . But w i t h the demise of Nehru i n 1964, i t was apparent that h i s pledge would not be honoured by the new Prime M i n i s t e r , L a i Bahadur S h a s t r i , and h i s Government. On Republic Day, January 26, 1965, i n pursuance of the l i t e r a l p r o v i s i o n s of the C o n s t i t u t i o n , H i n d i was promulgated as the o f f i c i a l language of the Union. This sparked two months of a n t i - H i n d i a g i t a t i o n s and r i o t s a l l over I n d i a , the most v i o l e n t ones were i n Tamil Nadu, where more than 60 people were k i l l e d by p o l i c e b u l l e t s , and two youths performed an unprecedemted act of s e l f - i m m o l a t i o n ('Vietnamese s t y l e ' ) . Students, whose i n t e r e s t s were the most a f f e c t e d by the l e g i s l a t i o n , j o i n e d i n the f r a y and o f f e r e d the s t i f f e s t r e s i s t a n c e . The support of the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam was e s p e c i a l l y potent i n f o r c i n g the C e n t r a l Government to back down on i t s p o l i c y d e c i s i o n . ^ The C e n t r a l Government agreed to a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l amendment. I t f u r t h e r consented to a 'three-language formula' under which each s t a t e ' s language, as w e l l as H i n d i and E n g l i s h , were adopted as o f f i c i a l languages i n that s t a t e . In r e t r o s p e c t , the new formula, which f i n a l l y 6 became the o f f i c i a l language p o l i c y , has been honoured only i n the breach. Tamil Nadu and other south Indian s t a t e s v i r t u a l l y have e l i m i n a t e d H i n d i from the school c u r r i c u l u m , while the H i n d i heartland of North I n d i a has remained almost mono-lingual. E n g l i s h continues to remain throughout I n d i a as the l i n k language and i n the school system. S r i Lanka seems to have weathered a s i m i l a r storm. Before Independence, the Sinhalese made up about 61 percent of the p o p u l a t i o n g while t h e i r nearest r i v a l s , the Tamils, made up 23 percent. Under B r i t i s h c o l o n i a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , extending from the l a t e eighteenth u n t i l 1948, E n g l i s h had become the language of the government, the p r o f e s s i o n s , 9 modern commerce, higher education and to a c e r t a i n extent of p o l i t i c s . Just before Independence, there was a resurgence of S i n h a l a and of Tamil n a t i o n a l i s m . An offshoot of t h i s was the "Swabhasha" ("own language") movement which sought to replace E n g l i s h as the o f f i c i a l language of the country by both S i n h a l a and T a m i l . ^ However, w i t h the achievement of Independence, a n a t i o n a l resurgence among the Sinhalese gained prominence. As a r e s u l t , "the demand among the m a j o r i t y of the community turned from 'swabhasa' to 'Sinhala only' as the o f f i c i a l l a n g u a g e . T h u s , the o f f i c i a l language controversy q u i c k l y s h i f t e d from an a t t a c k on the p r i v i l e g e d p o s i t i o n of E n g l i s h to a c l a s h between the e t h n i c communities. In 1956, the United N a t i o n a l P a r t y government was defeated at the p o l l s and was replaced by a group of o p p o s i t i o n p o l i t i c i a n s under the l e a d e r s h i p of the S r i Lanka Freedom Pa r t y . The f i r s t l e g i s l a t i v e task 7 of the new government was the enactment of an O f f i c i a l Language Act d e c l a r i n g "the S i n h a l a language s h a l l be the one o f f i c i a l language of 12 Ceylon." Understandably the Act was much resented by the E n g l i s h - -educated but even more vehemently by the Tamils. The Tamils i n p a r t i c u l a r f e l t that the u n q u a l i f i e d d e c l a r a t i o n of Sinhalese was a r e a l i z a t i o n of t h e i r worst f e a r s that t h e i r language would be rel e g a t e d to a p o s i t i o n of i n f e r i o r i t y w i t h a subsequent d e c l i n e i n both language and c u l t u r e . The Federal P a r t y which had emerged from the 1956 e l e c t i o n s as the p r i n c i p a l Tamil p a r t y assumed the mantle of p r o t e s t f o r the Tamils. To counter the language a c t , the party claimed equal s t a t u s w i t h the Sinhalese. In August, 1956, the Federal P a r t y issued an ultimatum that i f the party's language and other demands were not met w i t h i n a year i t 13 would launch a "non-violent d i r e c t a c t i o n campaign to achieve i t s aim." This .prompted..Prime M i n i s t e r Bandarnaike to have d i s c u s s i o n s w i t h the leaders of the Federal P a r t y . On J u l y 26, 1957, a formal w r i t t e n agreement between the Prime M i n i s t e r and the Fede r a l P a r t y leader S. J . V. Chelvanagam was achieved. On the language question a formula was agreed upon f o r l e g i s l a t i o n c o n t a i n i n g " r e c o g n i t i o n of Tamil as the language of the m i n o r i t y " and p r o v i d i n g that "the language of a d m i n i s t r a t i o n /and 14 education/ of the Northern and Eastern Provinces should be Tamil." But before t h i s agreement could reach f o r m a l i z a t i o n , v o c i f e r o u s o p p o s i t i o n developed. The uncompromising 'Sinhala-only' advocates attacked the agreement as a b e t r a y a l of the Sinhalese community. The Tamil i n turn began to p r o t e s t the use of Sinhalese i n the Northern and Eastern Provinces 8 and they were backed by the Federal P a r t y i n t h e i r quest. Under the weight of heavy pressures from the opponents of the pact, the Prime M i n i s t e r was moved to abrogate the pact - c i t i n g the F e d e r a l P a r t y . . . . 15 a c t x v i t x e s as the reason. Immediately communal tensions spewed i n t o open c o n f l i c t . A f t e r four days of u t t e r chaos, a s t a t e of emergency was declared by the Govern-ment. Many members of parliament belonging to the F e d e r a l P a r t y , i n c l u d i n g the leader of a minor inflammatory Sinhalese p a r t y , the J a t h i k a Vimukthi Peramuna ( N a t i o n a l L i b e r a t i o n F r o n t ) , were placed under house 16 a r r e s t . When the r i o t i n g was brought under c o n t r o l , the Government used the opportunity of the absence of the F e d e r a l P a r t y members to enact a Tamil Language Act. The new Act was intended to define at l a s t the 'reasonable use' of Tamil. The Act provided f o r the use of Tamil i n education, p u b l i c s e r v i c e entrance examinations, and " p r e s c r i b e d a d m i n i s t r a t i v e purposes" ."^ However, i t was more than seven years before the f i r s t r e g u l a t i o n s necessary f o r the Act were put i n t o e f f e c t . Nevertheless, the b a s i c tenets of the Act were adhered to even a f t e r the SLFP was defeated i n the 1965 e l e c t i o n s . Thus the Act managed to reverse the extremes of both Sinhalese and Tamil n a t i o n a l i s m and managed to found a tenuous but seemingly workable measure of compromise between the Sinhalese and the Tamil language i n t e r e s t s . While I n d i a and S r i Lanka seemed to have worked out a 'three-language' formula only as an a l t e r n a t i v e to open c o n f l i c t , M a l a y s i a was able to i n s t i t u t e a s i n g l e language as the o f f i c i a l and language of 9 i n s t r u c t i o n i n schools. In order to b e t t e r understand how t h i s was achieved i t i s necessary to say something of the B r i t i s h c o l o n i a l r u l e i n Malaya. Rupert Emerson best describes pre-war C o l o n i a l Malaya when he s t a t e s that " d i v i d e d from each other i n almost every aspect, the peoples of Malaya have i n common e s s e n t i a l l y only the f a c t that they l i v e i n the „18 same country. Ethnic groups were d i v i d e d p r i m a r i l y along r a c i a l , c u l t u r a l and l i n g u i s t i c l i n e s . The Malays, who formed the m a j o r i t y , were u s u a l l y considered the indigenous people of the country. The Chinese and Indians, who immigrated to Malaya i n search of b e t t e r prospects, formed the remainder of the po p u l a t i o n . Table I shows the p a r a l l e l growth of the three main r a c i a l groups during the years 1911 to 1941: TABLE I P a r a l l e l Growth of Malays, Chinese and I n d i a n s , 1911-1941  Year Malays Chinese Indians 1911 1,437,000 916,000 267,000 471,000 624,000 744,000 1921 1,651,000 1,962,000 2,278,000 1,174,000 1,709,000 2,379,000 1931 1941 (Note: These f i g u r e s probably i n c l u d e the popu l a t i o n of Singapore, though t h i s i s not i n d i c a t e d by D. G. E. H a l l . ) Source: D. G. E. H a l l , A H i s t o r y of South-East A s i a . London: Macmillan, 1964. p. 750. 10 Each group had c e r t a i n s p e c i a l i z e d economic f u n c t i o n s i n the pr o d u c t i v e process. Within each e t h n i c group there were d i f f e r e n c e s such as l i n g u i s t i c , r e g i o n a l and c u l t u r a l . In sum, pre-war Malaya was the i d e a l 19 type of a p l u r a l s o c i e t y i n the sense o u t l i n e d by J . S. F u r n i v a l l . E n g l i s h language education began w i t h the mi s s i o n schools i n the e a r l y 19th Century. L a t e r the Government i n an e f f o r t to f u l f i l l the requirements of an expanding economy and the d i c t a t e s of the a d m i n i s t r a -t i v e system introduced p u b l i c non-sectarian schools. These schools were lo c a t e d i n the urban centres and were l a r g e l y p a t ronized by the non-Malays, who were quick to r e a l i z e the importance of E n g l i s h education as a means f o r securing employment w i t h the Government and commercial houses. These schools were a l s o p a t r o n i z e d by a segment of Malay s o c i e t y , namely the a r i s t o c r a t s , i n order to be t r a i n e d to f i l l the requirements of the 20 Malayan C i v i l S e r v i c e at j u n i o r and middle l e v e l a d m i n i s t r a t o r s . As a d i r e c t consequence, w h i l e a s u b s t a n t i a l number of non-Malays were c a p i t a l i s i n g on the a v a i l a b i l i t y of E n g l i s h education, the predominantly r u r a l based Malays were being pushed back even f u r t h e r i n the moderniza-t i o n process. A few mission schools d i d o f f e r i n s t r u c t i o n i n Malay. However, 21 the p r i n c i p a l root of Malay education was i n the Koranic schools. 22 With the i n t r o d u c t i o n of ' i n d i r e c t Rule', these Koranic schools formed the nucleus from which evolved the Government Malay school system.' However, t h i s extension of Government sponsorship d i d not b r i n g about d r a s t i c changes i n the nature and content of vernacular education. 11 The Malay schools continued to remain backward i n terms of the q u a l i t y of teachers, content of s y l l a b u s and b a s i c amenities such as textbooks. The Government made no secret of the f a c t that the aim of the Malay vernacular education was to keep the Malays i n t h e i r v i l l a g e s and thus 23 avoid "economic d i s l o c a t i o n and s o c i a l u n r e s t . " While the r e s t of the country was undergoing d r a s t i c s o c i a l and economic change, the Malays were burdened by a system of school i n g that sought to i n c l u c a t e " h a b i t s 24 of order, p u n c t u a l i t y and obedience" more than anything e l s e . E a r l y Chinese education was provided f o r by c o n t r i b u t i o n s from the Chinese community. The B r i t i s h a d m i n i s t r a t o r s were supportive of t h i s arrangement, o s t e n s i b l y on the ground of cost. This non-interference of the Government enabled the Chinese to use the schools as centres to teach t h e i r c h i l d r e n "how to remain Chinese outside the homeland", and 25 o f t e n as staging p o i n t s of anti-government a c t i v i t i e s . In 1924, the Government introduced the system of g r a n t s - i n - a i d as a means to reduce the independence of these schools. This was g r a d u a l l y extended u n t i l by e a r l y 1960s most Chinese schools were e i t h e r p a r t i a l l y or f u l l y a s s i s t e d . The Indian p o p u l a t i o n , l a r g e l y of Tamil e x t r a c t i o n , came to Malaya o r i g i n a l l y as indentured labourers to work mostly i n the rubber p l a n t a t i o n s . Indian vernacular education developed i n f o r m a l l y on the p l a n t a t i o n and was of poor q u a l i t y . In 1923, a law r e q u i r i n g the p l a n t a t i o n management to provide adequate primary education l e d to some growth of Tamil schools but there was no change whatsoever i n the q u a l i t y of education. I t was only i n 1956 that f u l l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the 12 Tamil schools was assumed by the Government, but t h i s change could not a l t e r the years of n e g l e c t . From the end of the Second World War u n t i l 1954 there have been s e v e r a l Government sponsored s t u d i e s and r e p o r t s on the problems of the Malayan educational system. But most of the Reports were seen as being e i t h e r too r a d i c a l i n t h e i r content or f a i l i n g to take i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n the p r e v a i l i n g communal sentiments w i t h regards to implementing one language as the medium of i n s t r u c t i o n as opposed to another. Thus i t became the task of the successor A l l i a n c e Governments to work out a compromise s o l u t i o n . With the achievement of Independence and the i n s t i t u t i n g of inter-communal cooperation i n the form of a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c o n t r a c t the problem of the language of i n s t r u c t i o n was solved not by enacting a s i n g l e piece of all-encompassing l e g i s l a t i o n but i n a gradual manner s t r e t c h i n g over a decade. But there continued to be inter-communal disagreements which o f t e n tested the A l l i a n c e concept of communal coope-r a t i o n . I t was only i n 1971 that the Government was able to make a f i r m commitment towards implementing the s i n g l e medium of the i n s t r u c t i o n p o l i c y . 13 Review of Literature It is frequently assumed in the literature on p o l i t i c a l develop-ment that linguistic diversity is an obstacle to efficient government. Language is believed to be the major cause of numerous day-to-day d i f f i c u l t i e s faced by the governments of many ethnically and li n g u i s t i c a l l y 2 6 complex countries. Solving the linguistic problem either by elimina-ting or restricting the use of the minority languages would, i t is held, 27 help in the development of a more viable national p o l i t i c a l system. Although such speculations about the probable effects of linguistic diversity on p o l i t i c a l development have been frequent, there have been virtually no attempts to demonstrate how this diversity actually 28 complicates the business of government. The study of language and politics is of potential interest to most social scientists, to development planners and to those whose primary interest center on the pol i t i c s of linguistic nationalism. Yet none of these specialists seem to have devoted enough attention to the language-politics relationship for the subject to achieve subdisciplinary prominence. There is no important theory about how language is different from other p o l i t i c a l issues ( i f indeed i t i s ) , or about how language factors intervene and thus affect the outcome of p o l i t i c a l process or the policy making process. Thus a coherent framework which examines the problem of language education policies and their evolution is needed. Many analysts of government and pol i t i c s in Malaysia have expended a great deal of research on the various national elections, the economy, the problems of integration, the role of the p o l i t i c a l e l i t e , 14 and p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s among others. Yet only a minimal amount of a t t e n t i o n has been paid to the problem of language education. The problem of language education i s t r e a t e d as p a r t of the o v e r a l l problem of the process of government and thus the i s s u e i s t r e a t e d as an 29 i n c i d e n t a l one. Cynthia Enloe's p e n e t r a t i n g a r t i c l e , "Issues and I n t e g r a t i o n i n 30 M a l a y s i a , " and her book M u l t i - e t h n i c P o l i t i c s : The Case of M a l a y s i a , both deal w i t h the problems of i n s t i t u t i n g Malay as the medium of i n s t r u c t i o n , but p o l i t i c a l events s i n c e then have made some of her observations out of date. The i n t e r n a l s e c u r i t y s i t u a t i o n and the p o l i c y on secondary schools have changed a good d e a l s i n c e the book was w r i t t e n . In the same token, Margaret Roff's a r t i c l e , "The P o l i t i c s of Language i n Malaya," deals p r i m a r i l y w i t h the c r i s i s of the 1967 p e r i o d . K. J . Ratnam's Communalism and the P o l i t i c a l Process i n Malaya, t r e a t s language of education at some length but i s p r i m a r i l y devoted to the i n i t i a l communal compromises of 1956-1961. S t i l l others l i k e K a r l von Vorys' 34 Democracy Without Consensus, and B. Simandjuntak's Malayan Federalism, 35 1945-1963, t r e a t the problem i n c i d e n t a l l y . On the other hand w r i t i n g s of e d u c a t i o n i s t s , such as T. R. F e n n e l l ' s t h e s i s "Commitment to Change: A H i s t o r y of Malayan Educational P o l i c y , 1945-1957," and Paul Chang Ming Phang's Educational Development i n a P l u r a l Scoiety - A 37 Malayan Case Study, examine the problem i n i s o l a t i o n without making references to the o v e r a l l p o l i t i c s of the period concerned. In sum, the p o l i t i c s of language education i s one of the areas that needs more research and t h i s study w i l l endeavour to f i l l the gap. 15 Methodology This study r e l i e s a great deal on secondary source m a t e r i a l . In a d d i t i o n Malayan newspapers r e l a t i n g to the 1957-1960 period have been consulted. This study a l s o r e l i e s on my own personal experience -f i r s t as a product of the Malayan school system and next as a school teacher f o r w e l l over seven years i n Mal a y s i a . In a d d i t i o n , I have drawn inferences from s t u d i e s of the p o l i t i c a l e l i t e , of p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s , and of Malaysian general e l e c t i o n s . This study i s perhaps the f i r s t to i d e n t i f y the B r i t i s h C o l o n i a l A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s attempt i n e a r l y 1930 to introduce Malay as the medium of i n s t r u c t i o n . Even though the p o l i c y was a f a i l u r e , i t nevertheless demonstrates that the B r i t i s h d i d d e s i r e to have a u n i f i e d school system, (though t h e i r primary i n t e n t i o n was to make education somewhat cheaper f o r the c o l o n i a l c o f f e r ) . In view of an absence of a s u i t a b l e theory on the nature of the p o l i t i c s of language education, t h i s t h e s i s w i l l examine the f o l l o w i n g questions: What was the nature and o r i g i n of the p o l i c y to introduce Malay as the medium of i n s t r u c t i o n i n Malaysian schools? How determinedly and p e r s i s t e n t l y was t h i s p o l i c y pursued by the various a d m i n i s t r a t i o n or governments between the p e r i o d 1930 to 1971? To f u r t h e r elaborate the main questions the f o l l o w i n g questions w i l l be d e a l t w i t h i n t h i s t h e s i s : 1. What were the demands (concerning Malay as the medium of i n s t r u c t i o n ) of the Malay and non-Malay communities during each a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ? How d i d the E n g l i s h -educated e l i t e and the non-English educated masses d i f f e r on the issue? 16 2. What were the motives and aims of the p o l i c y makers i n pursuing the p o l i c y of Malay as the main medium of i n s t r u c t i o n ? 3. What e f f e c t , e i t h e r a c t u a l or perceived, d i d the proposed p o l i c y have on the Malay and non-Malay communities? 4. What were the r e a c t i o n s of the Malay and non-Malay communities to the p o l i c y ? 5. What part d i d the i s s u e play i n the o v e r a l l p o l i t i c s of the p e r i o d mentioned? The time p e r i o d of the study i s from 1930 to 1971. The s t a r t i n g p o i n t of 1930 has been chosen because i t was at t h i s time that Malay as the medium of i n s t r u c t i o n was f i r s t proposed. S i m i l a r l y , the year 1971 has been chosen because i t marked a d e f i n i t e and fundamental change i n the r u l e s of the game i n the country. I t was i n t h i s year that the C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Amendment Ac t , 1971 was enacted thereby removing from the realm of p u b l i c d i s c u s s i o n issues p e r t a i n i n g to the N a t i o n a l Language and i t s s t a t u s i n the Government and i n primary and secondary education. The time p e r i o d between 1930 and 1971 has been d i v i d e d i n t o four phases according to the cl i m a t e of p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the country. Chapter I I w i l l deal w i t h pre-War Malaya between the years 1930 and 1941 during which the B r i t i s h c o l o n i a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n had complete c o n t r o l of the d e c i s i o n making powers of the government. I t i s a l s o c h a r a c t e r i s e d by a marked absence of communal inputs i n the d e c i s i o n making process. Chapter I I I w i l l examine the second phase on the e v o l u t i o n of the p o l i c y to make Malay the medium of i n s t r u c t i o n . During 17 the p e r i o d between 1945 to 1954 there were important c o n s t i t u t i o n a l and educational changes undertaken by the c o l o n i a l government i n an e f f o r t to prepare the country f o r independence. Chapter IV w i l l r e l a t e to the per i o d between 1955 and 1961 during which the A l l i a n c e Party assumed power and during which inter-communal cooperation was the keynote i n the policymaking process. Chapter V w i l l examine the pe r i o d between 1962 and 1971 during which there was intense p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y and during which the basic tenets agreed upon during the e a r l y years of Independence were subjected to intense controversy by a new generation of s u b - e l i t e s who were not party to the o r i g i n a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l compro-mises. L a s t l y , Chapter VI w i l l provide a summary and p r e s e n t a t i o n of the f i n d i n g s of t h i s t h e s i s . 18 Notes 1. Robert W. McMeekin, J r . Educational Planning and Expenditure Decision i n Developing Countries: With a Malysian Case  Study, New York: Praeger Publishers, Inc., 1975. p. 142. 2. K. J. Ratnam, Communalism and the P o l i t i c a l Process i n Malaya, Singapore: University of Malaya Press, 1965. p. 126. 3. William M. O'Barr and Jean F. O'Barr (eds), Language and P o l i t i c s The Hague: Mouton and Co., 1976. p. 6. 4. J y o t i r i n d r a Das Gupta, Language C o n f l i c t and National Development, Berkeley: University of C a l i f o r n i a Press, 1970. pp. 45-68. 5. Ibid. Chap. V. 6. Ibid. Passim; Rajni Kothari, P o l i t i c s i n India, L i t t l e , Brown and Co., 1970. pp. 326-330; Robert L, Hardgrave, J r . India, Government and P o l i t i c s i n a Developing Nation, (2nd e d i t i o n ) . New York: Harcourt Brace Javanovich, Inc., 1975. pp. 93-96. 7. Y. Mansoor Marican, "The P o l i t i c a l Accommodation of Primordial P a r t i e s : DMK (India) and PAS (Malaysia)," Ph.D. D i s s e r t a t i o n , Vancouver: Uni v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1976. p. 123; Robert L. Hardgrave, J r . , The Dravidian Movement, Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1965; P h i l i p Spratt, DMK i n Power, Bombay: Nachiketa Publishers, 1970; Sagar Ahluwalia, Anna - The  Tempest and the Sea, New Delhi: Young Asia P u b l i c a t i o n 1969. Chapter 3. 8. J . D. Gupta, op. c i t . , p. 24. 9. Robert N. Kearney, "Language and the Rise of Tamil Separatism i n S r i Lanka," Asian Survey, Vol. XVIII, No. 5, (May, 1978) p. 526. 10. Ibid., p. 527. 11. Ibid. 12. O f f i c i a l Language Act, No. 33 of 1956, as c i t e d i n Robert N. Kearney Communalism and Language i n the P o l i t i c s of Ceylon, Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1967. p. 143. 13. Ibid., p. 85. 19 14. I b i d . ( f o r a f u l l t e x t of the "Bandaranaike - Chelvanayagam Pact," J u l y 26, 1957, see pages 145-146.) 15. I b i d . , p. 86. 16. I b i d . 17. I b i d . , pp. 147-149 (Appendix I I I ) . 18. Rupert Emerson, Foreword to Frank H. H. King, The Malayan Nation, New York: I n s t i t u t e of P a c i f i c R e l a t i o n s , 1957. p. V. 19. J . S. F u r n i v a l , C o l o n i a l P o l i c y and P r a c t i c e . Cambridge, England: Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1948. p. 304. 20. W i l l i a m R. Roff, The O r i g i n s of Malay Nationalism, New Haven: Yale U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1967. Chapter 7. 21. I b i d . 22. Rupert Emerson, Malaysia: A Study of D i r e c t and I n d i r e c t Rule, Kuala Lumpur: U n i v e r s i t y of Malaya Press, 1964. 23. R. 0. Winstedt, i n Education i n Malaya. B r i t i s h Empire E x h i b i t i o n : Malayan Series (London: 1924) p. 15 as c i t e d i n W. R. Roff, op. c i t . , p. 141. 24. Frank Swettenham, B r i t i s h Malaya, London: A l l e n and Unwin, 1948, p. 258. 25. W. C. S. Corry, Malaya To-day. B r i t i s h Commonwealth A f f a i r s , No. 9. London: Longmans, Green and Co. 1957. p. 42. 26. G a b r i e l Almond and James Coleman, The P o l i t i c s of Developing Area, P r i n c e t o n : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1960; passim. Lucien W. Pye, Aspects of P o l i t i c a l Development, Boston: L i t t l e , Brown and Co., 1966, passim. 27. I b i d . 28. W i l l i a m M. O'Barr and Jean F. O'Barr, (eds.) op. c i t . , p. 14. 29. See D a n i e l Eldredge Moore, "The United Malay N a t i o n a l O r g a n i z a t i o n and : the 1959 Malayan E l e c t i o n s : A Study of P o l i t i c a l Party i n A c t i o n i n a newly Independent S o c i e t y , " Berkeley: Ph.D. Thesis, U n i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a , 1960; S. Arasaratnam, Indian i n  Malaysia and Singapore, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1970; V i c t o r P u r c e l l , The Chinese i n Malaya, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1967. 20 30. Cynthia Enloe, "Issues and I n t e g r a t i o n i n M a l a y s i a , " P a c i f i c A f f a i r s , V o l . XLI, No. 3, ( F a l l , 1968) pp. 372-385. 31. Cynthia Enloe, M u l t i - e t h n i c P o l i t i c s : The Case Study of M a l a y s i a , Berkeley: U n i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a Press, 1970. 32. Margaret Roff, "The P o l i t i c s of Language i n Malaya," Asi a n Survey, V o l . V I I , No. 5 (May, 1967), pp. 316-328. 33. K. J . Ratnam, op. c i t . , pp. 126-141. 34. K a r l von Vorys, Democracy Without Consensus, P r i n c e t o n : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1975. 35. B. Simandjuntak, Malayan Federalism, 1945-1963, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1969. 36. T. R. F e n n e l l , "Commitment to Change: A H i s t o r y of Malayan Educational P o l i c y , 1945-1957," Ph.D. Thesis, U n i v e r s i t y of Hawaii, 1968. 37. Paul Chang Ming Phang, Educational Development i n a P l u r a l S o c i e t y , A Malaysian Case Study, Singapore: Academia P u b l i c a t i o n s , 1973. 21 CHAPTER I I BRITISH COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION, 1930-1941 The P l u r a l Society and the C o l o n i a l Government The Malay community during t h i s era was complacent and p o l a r i z e d between the a r i s t o c r a t i c r u l i n g c l a s s and the rakyat (or s u b j e c t s ) . The absence of an a r t i c u l a t e middle-class was distinct.''" The main u n i f y i n g f o r c e s f o r the Malays were the common bonds of race, r e l i g i o n and language. Yet these f a c t o r s were complicated by the presence of 2 harrow p r o v i n c i a l i s m and l o y a l t i e s . This f a c t o r was instrume n t a l i n preventing a w i l l i n g n e s s to organize and cooperate f o r the good of the 3 community as a whole. Under B r i t i s h t u t e l a g e and p r o t e c t i o n i s m the members of the a r i s t o c r a c y were able to get E n g l i s h education i n Malaya and England, were f r e q u e n t l y r e c r u i t e d i n t o the c i v i l s e r v i c e and these acquired p o s i t i o n s of some r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . On the other hand, the t r a d i t i o n a l peasantry were encouraged to remain i n t h e i r v i l l a g e s . As a consequence, the Malay a r i s t o c r a c y remained the p o l i t i c a l e l i t e of Malay s o c i e t y . During t h i s p e r i o d the term " p o l i t i c s " was understood by the Malays to mean "treason". The people g e n e r a l l y remained wholly l o y a l 4 and submissive to the Government, to the a u t h o r i t i e s and the Ruler s . As a r e s u l t , Malay n a t i o n a l i s m and p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y "seemed twenty-f i v e years behind the r e s t of Southeast Asia.""' There were very few p o l i t i c a l l y motivated a c t i v i t i e s undertaken by the Malay community and 22 even these few were i n s p i r e d by Isla m i c c u l t u r a l r e v i v a l i s m i n the middle-east and by n a t i o n a l i s t movements i n the Dutch East In d i e s . The f i r s t p o l i t i c a l o r g a n i z a t i o n of the Malays occurred under the a r i s t o c r a t i c c onservative l e a d e r s h i p of the Malay s u l t a n s to p r o t e c t the i n t e r e s t of the r u l i n g c l a s s . Popular support "was granted not to new s o c i a l and economic goals, but to the p r e s e r v a t i o n of Malay i n s t i t u t i o n s and to the safeguarding of Malay p r i v i l e g e s . . . " ^ I t appears that Malay p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y was g r e a t l y s t i m u l a t e d by the Depression of the 1930's. The Depression transformed p r o s p e r i t y over-night i n t o widespread poverty, and t h i s i n tu r n t r i g g e r e d p u b l i c p r o t e s t s . To the immigrant groups, Malaya was an E l Dorado. The most important concern of the Chinese and the Indians seems to have been to make enough money to r e t i r e to t h e i r n a t i v e land. Economic o p p o r t u n i t i e s i n B r i t i s h Malaya contrasted sharply w i t h the ever present spectre of poverty, war or famine i n the homelands. A f t e r l i v i n g i n Malaya f o r a number of years, many immigrants l o s t contact w i t h t h e i r homeland. Others were forced to remain because of debts, vested economic i n t e r e s t s g or adverse c o n d i t i o n s i n t h e i r homeland. There were s u b s t a n t i a l d i f f e r e n c e s w i t h i n both the Chinese and Indian communities. For example, there were sharp cleavages between the r i c h and poor, the E n g l i s h -educated and non-English educated, the l o c a l and the f o r e i g n born 9 immigrants, and between the various d i a l e c t groups. A l l these d i f f e r e n c e s made the achievement of p o l i t i c a l u n i t y a d i f f i c u l t task. 23 Nevertheless, there were frequent upsurges of Chinese and Indian n a t i o n a l i s m i n s p i r e d and o f t e n nurtured by l o c a l branches of the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Indian n a t i o n a l i s t movements. Chinese and Indian p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n was at best l i m i t e d and e p i s o d i c . G e n e r a l l y , these upsurges of n a t i o n a l i s m were not o r i e n t e d so much towards the l o c a l environment as they were r e a c t i o n s to e x t e r n a l forces and developments, l i k e the Chinese n a t i o n a l i s t movement and the Indian independence movement i n China and I n d i a r e s p e c t i v e l y . " ^ Such f o r e i g n based and i n s p i r e d movements f a i l e d to u n i t e the people i n a common cause and f a i l e d to produce any profound e f f e c t s i n the p o l i t i c s of B r i t i s h Malaya. The main feat u r e of B r i t i s h c o n t r o l of the Malay peninsula was the r e s i d e n t system which was designed p r i m a r i l y as a means of b r i n g i n g law and order to the Federated Malay states."'""'" Malay su l t a n s remained sovereign but were re q u i r e d to adhere to the "advice" given 12 by the B r i t i s h Residents or B r i t i s h A d v i s e r s . In t h i s manner the B r i t i s h assumed almost complete c o n t r o l of the d e c i s i o n making powers of the government. The government " r e t a i n e d t h e i r Malay trappings, the f u n c t i o n s of government were c a r r i e d on w i t h a f a i r l y e f f i c i e n t b u r e a u c r a t i c a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s t a f f e d i n the higher p o s i t i o n s by B r i t i s h 13 o f f i c i a l s . " The B r i t i s h recognized the Malays as the indigenous people, and the government accepted s p e c i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e i r w e l f are and the p r e s e r v a t i o n of t h e i r r i g h t s as the subject of the s u l t a n . In a d d i t i o n , the B r i t i s h adopted a "pro-Malay" stance to 24 help preserve the t r a d i t i o n a l patterns of Malay s o c i e t y and economy. Even education, a p o t e n t i a l l y modernizing agent, was geared to meet t h i s goal. In S i r George Maxwell's memorable phrase, "The aim of the Government i s . . . to make the son of a fisherman or a peasant a more i n t e l l i g e n t fisherman or peasant than h i s f a t h e r had been and a man whose education would enable him to understand how h i s own l o t of l i f e f i t s i n w i t h the scheme of l i f e around him.""'""' Although these p o l i c i e s seemed s o l i c i t i o u s and appropriate, at t h i s time they d i d not help the Malays to come to terms w i t h the r e a l i t i e s of the modern world. In a d d i t i o n , the p r i v i l e g e d p o s i t i o n of the Malays helped to nurture an undercurrent of resentment among the other r a c i a l communities. The B r i t i s h c o l o n i a l a d m i n i s t r a t o r s g e n e r a l l y adopted a l a i s s e z - f a i r e approach i n governing. The t r a n s i e n t nature of the immigrant p o p u l a t i o n made the task of the a d m i n i s t r a t o r somewhat e a s i e r i n that l i t t l e was necessary except to t r y to provide marginal c o n d i -t i o n s of law and order. Generally, the c o l o n i a l government remained a l o o f from the immigrant communities u n t i l there were outstanding issues r e q u i r i n g immediate a t t e n t i o n . For example, Chinese vernacular education was permitted to evolve on i t s own without any d i r e c t i o n from the c o l o n i a l government. However, as soon as i t was apparent that the schools were being used by KMT sympathisers to i n c u l c a t e a n t i -government ideology, the government promptly stepped i n to enforce l e g i s l a t i o n c o n t r o l l i n g such a c t i v i t i e s . " * " ^ In sum, the f a i l u r e to act 25 e a r l i e r does not i n d i c a t e the l a c k of a p o l i c y but r a t h e r i n d i c a t e s that B r i t i s h p o l i c y was to have no o p e r a t i v e r e g u l a t i o n s or c o n t r o l s as long as they could be avoided. I t must be mentioned at t h i s j u n c t u r e that the B r i t i s h never c o n s c i o u s l y p r a c t i s e d a p o l i c y of ' d i v i d e and r u l e ' . "The d i v i s i o n s were already there" and these d i v i s i o n s r e q u i r e d no B r i t i s h i n i t i a t i v e s . " ^ B r i t i s h r u l e was however instrumental i n minimizing the o f f i c i a l contacts between the two communities. In the process of government, "the e l i t e s , or n e a r - e l i t e s , of each of the r a c i a l groups d e a l t w i t h 18 the B r i t i s h r a t h e r than d i r e c t l y w i t h each other". By the same token, the p l u r a l s o c i e t y permitted the B r i t i s h an opportunity to perpetuate i n s t i t u t i o n a l p l u r a l i s m i n the various vernacular schools, the system of communal r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , the s e t t i n g up of a s p e c i a l 19 20 "Chinese P r o t e c t o r a t e " and the Indian Immigration Committee. The B r i t i s h were without doubt p a t e r n a l i s t i c towards the Malays but t h i s d i d not commit them to a p o l i c y of o p p o s i t i o n to the immigrant races. But the B r i t i s h d i d t r y to hold the balance as the p r o t e c t i n g power between the various races. Very o f t e n i n making of p u b l i c p o l i c i e s , the B r i t i s h d i d take the view of the other communities i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n , and i f l e g i s l a t i o n or proposed p o l i c y goals d i d not meet w i t h the approval of the community or i t s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s i t was always delayed 21 or reconsidered. In sum, B r i t i s h c o l o n i a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n d i d not completely e l i m i n a t e the p o s s i b i l i t y of i n t e r - r a c i a l c lashes, but r a t h e r postponed t h e i r a r r i v a l . 26 Communal Demands The most important f e a t u r e of the p e r i o d was the l a c k of u n i t y w i t h i n the i n d i v i d u a l communities concerned. Generally each of the communal groups was s t i l l i n a s t a t e of infancy as f a r as i t s s p i r i t of n a t i o n a l i s m was concerned. There were very few Malay e l i t e s t r u l y concerned w i t h the long term development of the community. Many of the embryo p o l i t i c a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s were s t i l l f i n d i n g t h e i r d i r e c t i o n s and were l a r g e l y r e s t r i c t e d to a handful of Malay educated r a d i c a l i n t e l l e c t u a l s . The A r a b i c educated r e l i g i o u s r e f o r m i s t s were p r i m a r i l y i n t e r e s t e d i n r e l i g i o u s a f f a i r s and d i d not command enough support to a r t i c u l a t e demands r e l a t i n g to s o c i a l issues as y e t . The more i n f l u e n t i a l E n g l i s h educated a d m i n i s t r a t o r s r e c r u i t e d l a r g e l y from the t r a d i t i o n a l a r i s t o c r a c y were not prepared to make demands on behalf of the masses. There were some Malay r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i n the Federal L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l , but these p o s i t i o n s were monopolised by f a v o u r i t e s or r e l a t i v e s of the Malay r u l e r s and p o l i c i e s promoting 22 Malay welfare were s i d e t r a c k e d i n the p u r s u i t of p r i v a t e i n t e r e s t s . There were four Malay members i n the Federal l e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l a f t e r 1927. They were Raja Chulan, Tengku Musa'eddin, Dato Abdullah b i n H a j i Dahan and Tengku Sulaiman; a l l of them c l e a r l y belonged to the a r i s t o c r a c y . Of these members Raja Chulan was perhaps the most vo c a l i n issues p e r t a i n i n g to Malay i n t e r e s t s such as 23 education. Yet even he f e l t i t was a mistake to extend E n g l i s h 27 education to the r u r a l areas, "because Malay youths who gain a smattering of E n g l i s h at these schools do not take k i n d l y to the 24 p u r s u i t s of t h e i r f o r e f a t h e r s " . In other words even the most out-standing spokesman of Malay i n t e r e s t s merely r e f l e c t e d the o f f i c i a l t h i n k i n g of the c o l o n i a l government. As mentioned e a r l i e r the Chinese and Indian communities were preoccupied w i t h events i n t h e i r homeland. The Chinese school system had evolved independently, outside the o r b i t of the Education Department. The Chinese t r i e d as f a r as p o s s i b l e to preserve t h e i r c u l t u r e and language. Thus, when the B r i t i s h moved i n to provide f i n a n c i a l a s s i s t a n c e to the Chinese schools, the Chinese were r e l u c t a n t to accept such a s s i s t a n c e as t h i s would b r i n g i n s t r i c t e r measures of 25 government c o n t r o l . Needless to say they d i d not make any demands to introduce Malay as the medium of i n s t r u c t i o n i n t h e i r schools. There were eq u a l l y few demands from the Indian community to make Malay the medium of i n s t r u c t i o n i n Indian schools. F i r s t l y , the p l a n t a t i o n Tamil schools x^ere t a c i t l y i n the hands of the p l a n t a t i o n management and as such there was very l i t t l e i n t e r f e r e n c e from the government. Secondly, the t r a n s i t o r y nature of the p l a n t a t i o n workers i n the p l a n t a t i o n made education an unwanted luxury. L i k e the Malays, the Chinese and the Indians were not at a l l i n t e r e s t e d i n the government's d e c i s i o n to make Malay the medium of i n s t r u c t i o n i n t h e i r schools. 28 Motives and Aims of the P o l i c y Makers The key p o l i c y maker of the p e r i o d and of the B r i t i s h c o l o n i a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n was the Governor. The Governors of the Malay States ^ seem to have had much more autonomy than t h e i r counterparts elsewhere. They o f t e n acted w i t h a great deal of l a t i t u d e and o f t e n on t h e i r own i n i t i a t i v e s without d i r e c t orders. The motives and aims of the Governor i n proposing a p o l i c y to make Malay the medium of i n s t r u c t i o n f o r a l l Malayan schools seem to have been d i c t a t e d by two b a s i c c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . The f i r s t was the economic imperative of the Great Depression which n e c e s s i t a t e d a r e d u c t i o n of c o s t s . The second reason was the need to reduce the i n f l u e n c e of the Kuomintang (KMT) and other elements i n the Chinese schools. At the same time an attempt was made to c o n t r o l the autonomous Chinese schools. In 1931 the Great Depression reduced the revenue of the Colony to the lowest l e v e l s i n c e 1918 and i n the same year the colony had the second highest expenditure i n i t s h i s t o r y . This conjunction produced a 27 d e f i c i t of M$20,201,030. This was a severe blow to the cost conscious a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and t h e r e f o r e immediate steps were taken to reduce expenditure. A Retrenchment Committee composed of members of the L e g i s -l a t i v e C o uncil was appointed to i n v e s t i g a t e and recommend remedial measures. Among i t s f i n d i n g s was that c e r t a i n departments had "expanded 28 out of a l l r e l a t i o n to the p o p u l a t i o n and p u b l i c revenue". The p r i n c i p a l o f f e n d i n g departments were i d e n t i f i e d as Education, Medical 29 and the P o l i c e departments. The committee recommended retrenchment 29 of s t a f f and r e d u c t i o n i n p u b l i c expenditure. J u s t at the onset of the Depression, S i r C e c i l Clementi was appointed as the High Commissioner (to the Malay States) and Governor (of the S t r a i t s Settlement). He had e a r l i e r served as Governor of Hong Kong and had witnessed a n t i - B r i t i s h a c t i v i t i e s i n s t i g a t e d by KMT 30 sympathisers. He was w e l l aware of the problems faced by the C o l o n i a l Government i n Malaya, p a r t i c u l a r l y w i t h regards to the problem of "teachings manifestedly p r e j u d i c i a l to the Welfare of the Colony 31 and B r i t i s h Empire". I t i s t h e r e f o r e p o s s i b l e that h i s experience i n Hong Kong may have c o n t r i b u t e d to h i s anti-Kuomintang p o l i c i e s i n 32 Malaya. In proposing to introduce Malay as the medium of i n s t r u c t i o n i n a l l schools Clementi and h i s a d m i n i s t r a t o r s may have taken i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n the nature of the English-educated unemployed c l e r k s . Clementi i n p a r t i c u l a r f e l t that " i t i s i d l e to educate youths up to Cambridge School C e r t i f i c a t e standard mainly at p u b l i c cost i f there i s 33 no prospect of employment f o r them". Thus, Clementi proposed a twenty-five to a hundred percent increase i n E n g l i s h secondary school 34 fees i n an attempt to discourage the heavy enrollment i n the schools. In a d d i t i o n , i n promoting Malay as the medium of i n s t r u c t i o n i n primary schools one of dementi's major motives was very l i k e l y to create among the Chinese a commitment to the Malay States - c e r t a i n l y Lennox M i l l s i s emphatic o i l t h i s p o i n t , s t a t i n g that Clementi " b e l i e v e d that the c h i l d r e n of the Chinese l i v i n g i n Malaya should be taught to regard the J 30 Peninsula /Malaya7 and not China as t h e i r n a t i v e country and should 35 develop a Malayan p a t r i o t i s m . " In a d d i t i o n , Clementi argued that s i n c e Malay was "already the l i n g u a franca of the country . . . i t i s j u s t i f i e d that the Government only provide f r e e primary education i n the Malay language f o r a l l c h i l d r e n whose parents are domiciled e i t h e r 36 i n the colony or i n the Malay S t a t e s . " In a d d i t i o n he announced that Chinese and Tamil schools already i n r e c e i p t of grants might continue to r e c e i v e them but no new a p p l i c a t i o n s would be e n t e r t a i n e d . Thus Clementi b e l i e v e d that the i n t r o d u c t i o n of the Malay language as the medium of i n s t r u c t i o n i n a l l Malayan schools would serve as a cure f o r the economic problems posed by the Great Depression and create a sense of l o y a l t y towards Malaya among the c h i l d r e n of the immigrants. P o l i c y Impact and Communal Responses The l i t t l e p o l i t i c a l o r g a n i z a t i o n and a g i t a t i o n that there was 37 during t h i s p e r i o d was Chinese, r a t h e r than Malay. The Indian commu-n i t y was quiescent, preoccupied w i t h events i n I n d i a and i n s u l a t e d from the mainstream of p o l i t i c s due to the nature of the p l a n t a t i o n 38 s o c i a l and economic s t r u c t u r e . The m a j o r i t y of the English-educated Malays d i d not p r o t e s t as they were e i t h e r i n agreement w i t h the governmental p o l i c i e s or were not organized as a potent f o r c e . The English-educated group among the Chinese and Indians d i d p r o t e s t m i l d l y but these p r o t e s t s were muffled compared to those of the Chinese educated s e c t o r . 31 The groups that vehemently opposed dementi's proposals were the Chinese-educated and i n t h i s they found a u s e f u l a l l y i n the 39 Kuomintang. The Chinese community had h i t h e r t o r e j e c t e d Government g r a n t s - i n - a i d because they meant increased government s u p e r v i s i o n and c o n t r o l . Furthermore, the Chinese community regarded the i n t r o d u c t i o n of Malay i n t h e i r schools as an attempt to downgrade and d i l u t e t h e i r c u l t u r e . They a c c o r d i n g l y p r o t e s t e d that Malay might be the l i n g u a 40 franca of the country, "but c u l t u r a l l y i t had l i t t l e to o f f e r " . They accused the Government of f a v o r i t i s m towards the Malays and c i t e d d i s c r i m i n a t o r y p r a c t i c e s such as the p r o v i s i o n of f r e e and compulsory Malay vernacular education and s c h o l a r s h i p s f o r them i n E n g l i s h s c h o o l s . They a c c o r d i n g l y demanded that the Government should s u b s i d i z e Chinese vernacular education as w e l l and that elementary E n g l i s h education be 41 provided " f r e e or at a nominal c o s t . " The Chinese members i n the L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l , who i n e f f e c t represented Chinese p u b l i c o p i n i o n to the C o l o n i a l government, were the f i r s t to p r o t e s t . They were j o i n e d by the more a r t i c u l a t e Chinese press, business g u i l d s and a s s o c i a t i o n s of various denominations. In a d d i t i o n , a new found sense of p r i d e and r a c i a l s u p e r i o r i t y , as a r e s u l t of KMT propaganda, strengthened t h e i r r e s o l u t i o n . I n c r e a s i n g l y , the C o u n c i l members' speeches and the vernacular press e d i t o r i a l s bor-dered on r a c i a l chauvinism. They made statements to the e f f e c t that t h e i r c u l t u r e was s u p e r i o r , of ancient o r i g i n , and that the Malay language was i n f e r i o r to t h e i r s . A few extremists even claimed that they would 32 not intermarry w i t h the Malays because t h e i r c h i l d r e n would be "degenerate and worthless h y b r i d s . " Malay members i n the Co u n c i l were much perturbed by such open expressions of r a c i a l b i g o t r y . The most v o c a l p r o t e s t s came from the Malay-educated r a d i c a l i n t e l l e c t u a l s and to a c e r t a i n extent from the English-educated e l i t e s . They reacted sharply to the claims of Chinese r a c i a l s u p e r i o r i t y and had misgivings over B r i t i s h immigration p o l i c y 4 3 which was r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the i n f l u x of the Chinese. A few became i n c r e a s i n g l y aware that "the immigrant was i n a f a i r way to become the 44 economic master of the o r i g i n a l i n h a b i t a n t . " Others p r o t e s t e d that r e f u s a l to teach E n g l i s h , "the bread-earning language of Malaya," i n the Malay vernacular schools was proof that the r e a l p o l i c y of the Government was to t r a i n the students "how not to get employment . . . /an<17 to make room f o r o u t s i d e r s . However, most of the emotionally charged counter attacks were l a r g e l y r e s t r i c t e d to the debates i n the Co u n c i l . In sum, dementi's education p o l i c y helped aggravate the i l l - f e e l i n g between the Chinese and the Malays, and t h i s aroused a c e r t a i n amount of apprehension as to the p o s i t i o n of the Chinese i n Malaya and i l l - w i l l towards B r i t i s h r u l e . Aftermath Within a span of two years the s i t u a t i o n s t a b i l i z e d . There were s e v e r a l reasons f o r t h i s . F i r s t l y , the economy began to p i c k up because the Depression d i d not have a prolonged impact on the production of rubber and t i n . Secondly, S i r C e c i l d ementi's tenure as Governor 33 46 was never a popular one. Several of h i s proposals had aroused strong o p p o s i t i o n from both Europeans and Chinese. Most of h i s p o l i c i e s were brought forward w i t h i n two years of h i s a r r i v a l from the governorship of Hong Kong, where he had acquired a d i s t a s t e f o r the Chinese and the 47 KMT i n p a r t i c u l a r . Many b e l i e v e d that he had acted too h a s t i l y and without adequate knowledge of the c o n d i t i o n s of Malaya. T h i r d l y , S i r C e c i l Clementi gave p r i o r i t y to checking the powers of the Chinese community rather than to the promotion of communal cooperation i n matters of p o l i t i c s and a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . Consequently, the Chinese i n the Malay Peninsula regarded the Government as a l i e n and unsympathetic to Chinese 48 demands. F o u r t h l y , there were strong r e a c t i o n s i n China to Clementi's 'anti-Chinese' p o l i c i e s . The KMT Government lodged a strong p r o t e s t w i t h Great B r i t a i n . F i f t h l y , the "Manchurian I n c i d e n t " of 49 September 18, 1931, and Japanese designs i n China prompted the KMT to s o f t e n i t s a n t i - B r i t i s h propaganda. A l l these f a c t o r s had an e f f e c t on the education p o l i c y . Since the economy had begun to improve once more there was a renewed need f o r E n g l i s h educated c l e r k s , teachers, and other p r o f e s s i o n a l s . The p o l i c y to introduce Malay i n a l l schools was no longer tenable and was t h e r e f o r e dropped. C o r d i a l r e l a t i o n s between China and B r i t a i n made S i r C e c i l Clementi's seeming anti-Chinese p o l i c y unnecessary aspect of B r i t i s h p o l i c y i n Malaysia. In any event, h i s tenure as Governor came to a r a t h e r abrupt end i n 1934. 34 Conclusion I t i s apparent that the p o l i c y to introduce Malay as the medium of i n s t r u c t i o n was a p o l i c y d i c t a t e d by the economic imperatives of the s i t u a t i o n as w e l l as one d i c t a t e d by the Governor's a n t i - C h i n e s e ' f e e l i n g s . The c o l o n i a l a d m i n i s t r a t o r s ' response to the problem of the E n g l i s h -educated unemployed was to r a i s e the fees to make E n g l i s h education a r e l a t i v e l y expensive a f f a i r . However, once the economy improved the d e c i s i o n to increase the fees was dropped. R e s t r i c t i o n s on the p r o v i s i o n of new g r a n t s - i n - a i d were removed and grants were extended to Chinese and Indian vernacular schools. The i s s u e of Malay as the medium of i n s t r u c t i o n demonstrates that major d e c i s i o n s made by the B r i t i s h i n the p o l i t i c a l or s o c i a l f i e l d had to deal w i t h the d i f f i c u l t and dangerous cr o s s c u r r e n t s of r a c i a l d i f f e r e n c e s . The attempt to make the p o l i c y acceptable demonstrated B r i t i s h f l e x i b i l i t y and w i l l i n g n e s s to consider the views of the immigrant communities. The Chinese community c l e a r l y demonstrated a semblance of u n i t y and was b e t t e r placed to make i t s demands acceptable. On the other hand, there was a conspicuous absence of any s u b s t a n t i a l Malay n a t i o n a -l i s t movement. There were extremely rare instances when Malay e l i t e s v oiced a concern to safeguard t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r need. Thus i t i s evident that the p o l i c y to introduce Malay as the medium of i n s t r u c t i o n was one based purely on B r i t i s h i n i t i a t i v e s . As i n d i c a t e d , the p o l i c y was p a r t l y to encourage the use of Malay b e f i t t i n g i t s p o s i t i o n as the l i n g u a franca of the country and probably to make the Chinese and 35 Indians pay for t h e i r own education. The next chapter w i l l examine the post-war attempts of the B r i t i s h government to introduce the p o l i c y i n a remarkably changed p o l i t i c a l environment. 36 Notes 1. Gordon P. Means, Malaysian P o l i t i c s , 2nd ed., London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1976. Chapter 1; J . M. G u l l i c k , Indigenous P o l i t i c a l System of Western Malaya, London: Athlone P r e s s , 1958; Khoo Kay Kim, "Malay S o c i e t y , 1874-1920s," J o u r n a l of Southeast Asian S t u d i e s , V o l . V, No. 2 (September, 1974) pp. 179-198; Radin Soenarno, "Malay N a t i o n a l i s m , 1896-1941", J o u r n a l of Southeast  Asian H i s t o r y , V o l . 1, No. 1 (March 1960) pp. 1-28; R. 0. Winstedt, The Malays: A C u l t u r a l H i s t o r y , 3rd ed., rev. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul L t d . , 1953; W i l l i a m R. R o f f , The O r i g i n s of Malay N a t i o n a l i s m , New Haven: Yale U n i v e r s i t y P ress, 1967. Chapter I . 2. V i r g i n i a Thompson, Postmortem on Malaya, New York: The Macmillan Co., 1943. p. 308. 3. I b i d . 4. Cf. M a j l i s (August 7, 1939); W. R. Roff, op_. e x t . , f n . 16, p. 218. 5. John Kerry King, Southeast A s i a i n P e r s p e c t i v e , New York: 1957. p. 43. c i t e d by R. S. Milne and Diane K. Mauzy, P o l i t i c s and Government i n M a l a y s i a , Singapore: F e d e r a l P u b l i c a t i o n s , 1978. p. 23. 6. Radin Soenarno, op_. c i t . 7. Y a e l Levy, Malaysia and Ceylon: A Study of Two Developing Centres. Beverley H i l l s : Sage P u b l i c a t i o n s , 1974. p. 23. 8. For a more d e t a i l e d d i s c u s s i o n of t h i s matter see the f o l l o w i n g books: Gordon P. Means, op. c i t . , Chap. 2 and 3. S. Arasaratnam, Indians i n Malaysia and Singapore. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P ress, 1970; K e r n i a l Singh Sandhu, Indians i n Malaya: Some Aspects of the Immigration  and Settlement, Cambridge: Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y Press; V i c t o r P u r c e l l , The Chinese i n Malaya, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1967. 9. V i c t o r P u r c e l l , The P o s i t i o n of the Chinese i n Southeast A s i a , New York: I n s t i t u t e of P a c i f i c R e l a t i o n s , 1950. pp. 32-33; Gordon P. Means, op_. c i t . , p. 35; V i c t o r P u r c e l l , op. c i t . , Chap. XI. 37 10. S. Arasaratnam, passim; V i c t o r P u r c e l l , (1967) op. c i t . , Chap. XI ; Gordon P. Means, op_. c i t . , Chap. 3 11. A divergence of development arose i n the Malay P e n i n s u l a because of d i f f e r e n t sets of r e l a t i o n s h i p between B r i t a i n and the Malay States. In 1896 the four Malay s t a t e s of Selangor, Perak Pahang and Negri Sembilan were j o i n e d i n an a s s o c i a t i o n c a l l e d the Federated Malay States (FMS) i n a move designed to f u r t h e r c e n t r a l i z e the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e process. In 1909 f i v e other Malay S t a t e s , Johore and P e r l i s , Kedah, Kelantan and Trengganu, which had gained t h e i r freedom from Siamese Suzerainty were brought under B r i t i s h c o n t r o l . Since the f i v e new s t a t e s refused to p a r t i c i p a t e i n a s i n g l e c e n t r a l i z e d p o l i t i c a l e n t i t y they were designated as the Unfederated Malay States (UMS). Each of the f i v e s t a t e s (UMS) operated more or l e s s independently of each other; and only cooperated i f there were any t h r e a t s from Kuala Lumpur towards t h e i r semi-autonomous s t a t u s . Each Unfederated Malay State had entered i n t o a t r e a t y agreement w i t h the B r i t i s h as the ' p r o t e c t i n g power'; each Sultan had a B r i t i s h Adviser (not a Resident as i n the FMS) a c c r e d i t e d to h i s court and a small number of B r i t i s h o f f i c i a l s at each l e v e l of State machinery. The Unfederated States r e t a i n e d a greater degree of autonomy than d i d those i n the FMS, but t h e i r s t a t e s were not as advanced p o l i t i c a l l y and economically as were the FMS. The S t r a i t s Settlements of Penang, Malacca and Singapore were administered d i r e c t l y by the B r i t i s h as a Crown Colony w i t h a Governor as the head. For a more d e t a i l e d d i s c u s s i o n see Lennox A. M i l l s , B r i t i s h  Rule i n East A s i a , London: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1942. Chap. I I ; and Stanley S. B e d l i n g t o n , Malaysia and Singapore. C o r n e l l : I t h a c a : C o r n e l l U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1978. p. 32 f f . 12. Gordon P. Means, op_. c i t . , p. 42. 13. I b i d . , p. 43. 14. I b i d . 15. George Maxwell, i n Annual Report of 1920. p. 13, as c i t e d i n P h i l i p Loh Fook Seng, The Malay States 1877-1895, P o l i t i c a l Changes and S o c i a l P o l i c i e s , Singapore: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1969. p. 173. 16. For example the Government introduced the R e g i s t r a t i o n of Schools Ordinance, 1920, a f t e r i t became apparent that subversion was being taught i n the Chinese schools by teachers r e c r u i t e d from China. 38 17. R. S. Milne and Diane K. Mauzy, P o l i t i c s and Government i n Malaysia. Singapore: F e d e r a l P u b l i c a t i o n s , 1978. p. 23. 18. I b i d . , p. 23. 19. V i c t o r P u r c e l l , op. c i t . , Chap. X. 20. Lennox A. M i l l s , B r i t i s h Rule i n Eastern A s i a , London: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1942. p. 220 and Chap. IV. 21. Frank H. H. King, The New Malayan Nation, A Study of Communalism and Nationalism. New York: I n s t i t u t e of P a c i f i c R e l a t i o n s , 1957. p. 47. 22. W. R. Roff, op. c i t . , Chap. 7 23. I b i d . , p. 201. 24. I b i d . 25. V i c t o r P u r c e l l , o^. c i t . , p. 230. 26. Ernest Chew, "Swettenham and B r i t i s h R e s i d e n t i a l Rule i n West Malaya", J o u r n a l of Southeast Asian S t u d i e s , V o l . V, No. 2 (September, 1974). p. 170; C. D. Cowan, Nineteenth Century  Malaya, London: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P r ess, 1961. Chap. 4. 27. L. A. M i l l s , o_p_. c i t . , p. 84. 28. I b i d . 29. Generally very l i t t l e was spent on the p r o v i s i o n of education by the c o l o n i a l government. For example, expenditures on education i n Malaya i s as f o l l o w s : 1918 - 2.1% 1920 - 1.4% 1925 - 3.8% 1930 - 3.9% 1935 - 5.7% 1937 - 5.3% (Compiled from L. A. M i l l s , op_. c i t . ) 30. L. A. M i l l s , op_. c i t . , pp. 406-414. 31. Lennox A. M i l l s , op. c i t . , p. 347. 39 32, 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. For a more d e t a i l e d study of S i r C e c i l Clementi's Governship of Hong Kong and the problems he encountered see I b i d . , pp. 406-414, and pp. 458-476; f o r an i n depth a n a l y s i s of dementi's anti-Koumintang p o l i c i e s see I b i d . , pp. 37 f f . Lennox A. M i l l s , op_. c i t . , p. 357. I b i d . I b i d . , p. 358. I b i d . K. Jeyaratnam, " R a c i a l Factors i n the P o l i t i c a l Development of the Federation of Malaya," (M.A. Thesis, U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1958), p. 33; Lennox A. M i l l s , op. c i t . , p. 63. S. Arasaratnam, op_. c i t . , Chap. IV; Ravindra K. J a i n , South Indians on the P l a n t a t i o n F r o n t i e r i n Malaya. New Haven: Yale U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1970; Usha Mahajani, The Role of Indian M i n o r i t i e s i n Burma and Malaya, Bombay: Vora and Co., 1960; K e r n i a l Singh Sandhu, Indians i n Malaya: Some Aspects of t h e i r Immigration and  Settlement, 1786-1957. Cambridge: U n i v e r s i t y P ress, 1969. P'ng Poh Seng, "The Kuomintang i n Malaya, 1912-1941", Jo u r n a l of Southeast Asian H i s t o r y , V o l . 2, No. 1, (March 1961) pp. 1-32; Yen Ching Hwang, The Overseas  Chinese and the 1911 Rev o l u t i o n. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1976. Lennox A. M i l l s , op. c i t . 358. I b i d . 359. Proceeding of the L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l of the S.S., 1930. pp. B. 173, B. 177, as c i t e d i n Lennox A. M i l l s , o p . , c i t . , p. 359. 43. I b i d . , p. 359. 40 44. I b i d . , p. 360. 45 . I b i d . 46. I b i d . , pp. 56 f f . 47 . I b i d . , Chap. XI. 48 . Gordon P. Means, op_. c i t . , p. 32 . 49. For a more thorough examination of t h i s i n c i d e n t that f i n a l l y l e d to the P a c i f i c War, see Saburo Lenaga, The P a c i f i c War. Trans. Frank Baldwin, New York: Pathenon A s i a L i b r a r y , 1978. A l CHAPTER I I I POST WAR COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION TO 195A This chapter examines the post-war r e v i v a l of the p o l i c y to introduce Malay as the medium of i n s t r u c t i o n . A b r i e f overview of p o l i t i c a l events and major e d u c a t i o n a l developments of t h i s p e riod i s u s e f u l i f one i s to understand the nature of communal demands, the motives and aims of the p o l i c y makers, the impact of the p o l i c y , and the communal responses. P o l i t i c a l Developments l e a d i n g to the F i r s t A l l i a n c e Government In September 19A5, the B r i t i s h returned to war ravaged Malaya w i t h a commitment to prepare the country f o r self-government and eventual f u l l independence. I t was apparent to the B r i t i s h that the pre-war m u l t i -a d m i n i s t r a t i v e set up of the Malay s t a t e s and the S t r a i t s Settlements required r e o r g a n i z a t i o n i n order to cope w i t h the new p o l i t i c a l , economic and s o c i a l demands. The B r i t i s h Government however, without c o n s u l t i n g any of the Sultans or the people, formed a "Malayan Union" c o n s i s t i n g of the Malay States and the two S t r a i t s Settlements of Penang and Malacca, w i t h a d m i n i s t r a t i v e a u t h o r i t y c e n t r a l i z e d i n Kuala Lumpur. The Malayan Union proposals furthermore granted equal c i t i z e n s h i p r i g h t s to a l l r e s i d e n t s i n the country. There was considerable apprehension over what was perceived to be a p o t e n t i a l d e p r i v a t i o n of t r a d i t i o n a l Malay p r i v i l e g e s and sovereign 42 r i g h t s of t h e i r Rulers. The Malays were p a r t i c u l a r l y d i s t u r b e d over the extension of c i t i z e n s h i p to the Chinese community whom they had come to f e a r as a r e s u l t of a month long ' r e i g n of t e r r o r ' between the time 2 the Japanese surrendered and the establishment of B r i t i s h c o n t r o l . Thus to the Malays the proposals were a b e t r a y a l and i t was evident that the B r i t i s h could no longer be r e l i e d upon to serve as a dependable bulwark against the more aggressive non-Malay communities. Reaction to the Malayan Union proposal was unusually s w i f t and vehement, e s p e c i a l l y when viewed against the background of seventy years of complacent Malay s o c i e t y . Suddenly the Malays were no longer "sleepy b e n e f i c i a r i e s of a p r i v e l e g e d p o s i t i o n " , i n s t e a d they were transformed i n t o "champions of t h e i r r i g h t s /against enemiesV" who t r i e d 3 to destroy them". The Malayan Union proposals provided a r a l l y i n g p o i n t and a c a t a l y s t f o r the Malay community against the B r i t i s h , and l e d to the formation of the United Malays N a t i o n a l Organization (UMNO) 4 i n March of 1946 under the leadership of Dato Onn b i n J a a f a r . W h i t e h a l l was quick to sense the g r a v i t y of the s i t u a t i o n and i n i t i a t e d n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h the Malay l e a d e r s . In February of 1948, the Malayan Union proposal was replaced by a newly c o n s t i t u t e d Federation of Malaya, r e s t o r i n g the sovereign r i g h t s of the Rulers and the s p e c i a l p r i v i l e g e s of the Malays. Conditions governing the a c q u i s i t i o n of c i t i z e n s h i p by the non-Malays were made more r e s t r i c t i v e . The net r e s u l t of the new p o l i t i c a l arrangements was the r e s t o r a t i o n of Malaya as p r i m a r i l y a Malay country. 43 In e a r l y 1948, the Malayan Communist P a r t y (MCP) e s c a l a t e d i t s t e r r o r i s t campaign and the B r i t i s h C o l o n i a l Government declared the "Emergency".^ The B r i t i s h then began s u c c e s s f u l l y to combat the insurgency by a s e r i e s of m i l i t a r y , s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l measures. In 1949 the B r i t i s h helped form the Communities L i a i s o n Committee (CLC) i n an attempt to b r i n g the leaders of the main communities together. The B r i t i s h regarded the CLC as the appropriate arena f o r n e g o t i a t i o n s of compromise s o l u t i o n s to outstanding communal iss u e s and perhaps a way 8 of paving the way f o r a non-communal approach to p o l i t i c s . However, the recommendations of the CLC were not always w e l l r e c e i v e d by the communal o r g a n i z a t i o n s . In f a c t , committee members often found them-selves i n c o n f l i c t between t h e i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s as leaders of communal or g a n i z a t i o n s to promote communal i n t e r e s t s , and t h e i r i m p l i e d r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s as members of the committee to seek "non-communal" 9 answers to vexing p o l i t i c a l i s s u e s . Such was the case when Dato Onn proposed the i n c l u s i o n of non-Malays as members of UMNO. Meeting o p p o s i t i o n to t h i s idea Dato Onn promptly resigned as head of the party i n 1951, and founded the non-communal Independence of Malaya P a r t y (IMP)."^ However, UMNO survived the le a d e r s h i p c r i s i s and chose as i t s new p r e s i d e n t , the p r i n c e from Kedah, Tunku Abdul Rahman. An e s s e n t i a l p r e r e q u i s i t e to independence was the e x i s t e n c e of a p o l i t i c a l p a r t y to which the B r i t i s h could hand over the government. In view of the r a c i a l composition of the country, i t was necessary that the successor government should at l e a s t represent the two major races. 44 Thus, the B r i t i s h began to support Dato Onn's Independence of Malaya Party (IMP) which "was the f i r s t major attempt to b r i n g together the people of d i f f e r e n t r a c i a l o r i g i n s i n t o one non-communal p o l i t i c a l o r g a n i z a t i o n " . But the IMP f a i l e d to secure the support of the Malays and non-Malays. The B r i t i s h thus began l o o k i n g f o r some other p o l i t i c a l party to whom they could hand over power. Since UMNO had emerged as a w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d and e n t i r e l y Malay-based p a r t y , i t was f e l t an a l l i a n c e of some s o r t w i t h a l e a d i n g Chinese party would be a s u i t a b l e arrangement. Thus, when UMNO teamed up w i t h the Malayan Chinese A s s o c i a t i o n (MCA) the B r i t i s h f u l l y endorsed the arrangement. The MCA was founded i n February of 1949 w i t h B r i t i s h support. I t was founded to perform s e v e r a l r o l e s . B a s i c a l l y i t r i v a l l e d the MCP i n p r o v i d i n g an a l t e r n a t e focus f o r Chinese l o y a l t i e s . S o c i a l l y i t r a i s e d funds to help i n the resettlement of the Chinese squatters. I t a l s o emerged as a respectable instrument embodying Chinese i n t e r e s t i n any 12 f u r t h e r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l or p o l i t i c a l changes. The Kuala Lumpur M u n i c i p a l E l e c t i o n i n February, 1952, saw the formation of an ad hoc a l l i a n c e between the UMNO and the MCA. They 13 c o n f i d e n t l y defeated the IMP by nine seats to two. This p u r e l y l o c a l i z e d pact was l a t e r extended t o other l o c a l e l e c t i o n s a l l over Malaya. Following t h i s s u c c e s s f u l formula a n a t i o n a l A l l i a n c e o r g a n i -z a t i o n was set up i n 1953 w i t h the UMNO assuming the r o l e of a senior partner. The next year, the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC) j o i n e d the A l l i a n c e , thereby making the A l l i a n c e a l e g i t i m a t e spokesman f o r a l l 45 three major communities. In the case of the IMP, the e l e c t o r a l r e b u f f of the party caused the d i s g r u n t l e d Dato Onn to abandon the non-communal stance of the party. In l a t e r 1953 he founded the predominantly Malay-based Part y Negara (PN). The A l l i a n c e confounded many p o l i t i c a l pundits who had p r e d i c t e d that the arrangement would not l a s t long. The Malay and non-Malay leaders of the A l l i a n c e i n most instances adopted moderate p o s i t i o n s as f a r as communal iss u e s were concerned. In many instances there was a convergence of i n t e r e s t s between the Malay and non-Malay members of the A I T 1 4 A l l i a n c e . E d u c a t i o n a l Development Side by s i d e w i t h the p o l i t i c a l changes, e f f o r t s were made by the C o l o n i a l Government to reorganize the education system. The Federation of Malaya Agreement of 1948 provided f r e s h impetus f o r the re-examination of the education p o l i c y . The task was entrusted to a l a r g e l y m u l t i -r a c i a l but English-educated committee known as the ^ ±rstj C e n t r a l Advisory Committee on Education. In i t s report i t agreed that the i d e a l system of education should be i n the mother-tongue but i t pointed out that only the E n g l i s h schools c o n t r i b u t e d to a common 'Malayan i d e n t i t y ' . I t proposed that "the teaching of the Malay and E n g l i s h language should be compulsory i n a l l Government-aided primary schools". Furthermore, i t more cogently argued "that the u l t i m a t e d e s i r a b l e o b j e c t i v e s h a l l be f r e e (and f i n a l l y compulsory) primary education i n the medium of E n g l i s h " . However, t h i s report provoked so much o b j e c t i o n i n the L e g i s l a t i v e C ouncil 46 that i t was shelved. The next step was the s e t t i n g up of a committee to i n q u i r e i n t o the adequacy of the "educational f a c i l i t i e s a v a i l a b l e f o r the Malays"."^ This committee, under the chairmanship of Leonard J . Barnes, D i r e c t o r of S o c i a l T r a i n i n g , U n i v e r s i t y of Oxford, included nine Malays and f i v e Europeans. The committee's recommendations were sweeping and f a r exceeded i t s terms of reference. I t q u i t e c o r r e c t l y f e l t that i t was unable to propose improvements i n the Malay schools which d i d not i n v o l v e the whole education system. The most c o n t r o v e r s i a l aspect of the Barnes Committee's report was the clause which advocated "that two languages, and only two languages should be taught i n the N a t i o n a l schools, and these two must be the 18 o f f i c i a l languages of the country, namely Malay and E n g l i s h " . As the committee could not decide which of the two languages would be the medium of i n s t r u c t i o n , i t recommended a b i - l i n g u a l N a t i o n a l school system, which would u t i l i z e both Malay and E n g l i s h as media of i n s t r u c t i o n . The r e p o r t i n e f f e c t suggested that the Chinese and Indian schools should cease to operate as should s t r i c t l y E n g l i s h schools. In summarizing i t s recommendations, the committee r e i t e r a t e d : We have set up b i l i n g u a l i s m i n Malay and E n g l i s h as i t s /the N a t i o n a l schools? o b j e c t i v e , because we b e l i e v e that a l l parents who regard Malaya as t h e i r permanent home and the o b j e c t i v e of t h e i r undivided l o y a l t y w i l l be happy to have t h e i r c h i l d r e n educated i n those languages /Malay and E n g l i s h . I f any parents were not happy about t h i s , t h e i r unhappiness would p r o p e r l y be taken as an i n d i c a t i o n that they d i d not so regard Malaya.19 47 Even before the report of the Barnes Committee was prepared, the non-Malays, p a r t i c u l a r l y the Chinese, expressed grave r e s e r v a t i o n s regarding the composition of the committee and i t s expected pro-Malay stand. The B r i t i s h High Commissioner, S i r Henry Gurney, a n t i c i p a t i n g a need to d e a l w i t h the Barnes Report as w e l l as to m o l l i f y the mounting Chinese p r o t e s t s , i n v i t e d two experts on Chinese education, Dr. W i l l i a m 20 P. Fenn and Dr. Wu Teh-Yao, to make a " p r e l i m i n a r y survey of the 21 whole f i e l d of Chinese education . . . " Un l i k e the Barnes Committee, the Fenn-Wu Mi s s i o n sought the opinion of r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s from a l l communities. The Report, which was published i n June of 1951, was broadly sympathetic towards Chinese education. I t warned against t u r n i n g Malaya " i n t o a c o c k p i t of aggressive c u l t u r e s " , and decl a r e d that any r e s t r i c t i v e i m p o s i t i o n of one or two languages upon the people of Malaya was i n i m i c a l to communal to l e r a n c e and n a t i o n a l u n i t y , s i n c e the u n i t y of a n a t i o n "depends not upon the singleness of tongue or s i m p l i c i t y of c u l t u r e s " but upon 22 "the hearts of i t s c i t i z e n s " . I t recommended that "Chinese schools should form an i n t e g r a l part of any e d u c a t i o n a l program of the f u t u r e 23 of Malaya". I t u l t i m a t e l y recommended that Chinese be r e t a i n e d as the medium of i n s t r u c t i o n while i n c l u d i n g E n g l i s h and Malay as subject languages. In sum, a t r i l i n g u a l eduation was proposed f o r the Chinese schools. The divergent views of the Barnes Committee and the Fenn-Wu Mi s s i o n r e p o r t s made i t impossible f o r the Government to implement the 48 recommendations of e i t h e r of the r e p o r t s , e s p e c i a l l y so since supporting e i t h e r would mean supporting one communal group against another. A compromise s o l u t i o n was worked out whereby an independent and m u l t i - r a c i a l ^>econd7 C e n t r a l Advisory Committee on Education (CACE) was set up to study both the r e p o r t s and come up w i t h a report that would form the b a s i s f o r any l e g i s l a t i o n on education. The /j3econd7 C e n t r a l Advisory Committee came out i n f u l l support of the p r o v i s i o n s of the Barnes Committee Report. Contrary to the Fenn-Wu report the CACE report argued that i n t e r - r a c i a l n a t i o n a l schools would e v e n t u a l l y replace a l l r a c i a l l y segregated vernacular schools. I t f u r t h e r modified the Barnes Report and recommended that a l l p u p i l s i n primary, schools study Malay and E n g l i s h throughout t h e i r s i x years of schooling and that Chinese and Indian p u p i l s be provided w i t h an opportunity to study e i t h e r Kuo Yu or Tamil as a subject language. I t al s o suggested that the medium of i n s t r u c t i o n be e i t h e r E n g l i s h or Malay i n the N a t i o n a l schools r a t h e r than both as suggested by the Barnes Report. I t furthermore suggested that the Government give assurance that f i n a n c i a l a i d f o r the Chinese and Indian schools would not be withdrawn. In sum, the CACE report f o r the most part r e j e c t e d the Fenn-Wu Report and g e n e r a l l y agreed w i t h the concept of N a t i o n a l schools as proposed by the Barnes Committee Report. On the 19th and 20th of September of 1951, the Council debated the Barnes, Fenn-Wu and the CACE Reports. They were l a t e r r e f e r r e d to 49 a s e l e c t committee of eleven members of the Council which was to d r a f t s u i t a b l e l e g i s l a t i o n . L i k e i t s predecessor, the s e l e c t committee agreed w i t h the p r o v i s i o n s of the Barnes Committee Report. The f i n a l r e s u l t of a l l these d e l i b e r a t i o n s was the Education Ordinance, 1952. The Education Ordinance, 1952 a l t e r e d the idea of a s i n g l e b i -l i n g u a l n a t i o n a l school to that of p r o v i d i n g two types of n a t i o n a l schools. E i t h e r Malay or E n g l i s h would be the medium of i n s t r u c t i o n , w h i l e at the same time f a c i l i t i e s would be provided f o r the study of Kuo Yu or Tamil as a subject i f f i f t e e n or more p u p i l s of any grade requested i t . The E n g l i s h medium schools would have Malay as a compulsory subject from the beginning of the t h i r d year of sc h o o l i n g . On the other hand, the Malay medium schools would have E n g l i s h as a compulsory subject language from the f i r s t year onwards. In a d d i t i o n the Malay medium p u p i l s would be provided w i t h a ' s p e c i a l Malay c l a s s ' to enable them to make an easy t r a n s i t i o n from the Malay medium schools to the E n g l i s h medium secondary schools. As i n the case of the primary schools, f a c i l i t i e s f o r the l e a r n i n g of the three vernacular languages would be 24 made a v a i l a b l e i n the secondary schools. However, the Ordinance was never f u l l y implemented by the C o l o n i a l Government because of o p p o s i t i o n to many of the p r o v i s i o n s . f r o m the Malays as w e l l as non-Malays, and because i t was too expensive to undertake. Nevertheless many of the p r o v i s i o n s of the Ordinance found places i n subsequent e d u c a t i o n a l reforms f o l l o w i n g Independence. 50 Communal Demands The unusually strong p r o t e s t from the Malay community as a r e s u l t of the Malayan Union proposal marked the end of Malay complacency and brought about a new r e a l i z a t i o n of t h e i r p o l i t i c a l s t r e n g t h . Encouraged by the success i n re g a i n i n g t h e i r s p e c i a l p r i v i l e g e s , the Malays continued to press f o r a b e t t e r d e a l i n other s e c t o r s , i n c l u d i n g education. UMNO le a d e r s , e d i t o r s of the Malay ve r n a c u l a r press, school teachers and others who were concerned w i t h Malay backwardness c a l l e d f o r increased o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r Malay c h i l d r e n to gain access to secondary schools. The f a c t o r that immediately sparked Malay p r o t e s t w i t h regard to Malay education was the Report of the / J F i r s t 7 C e n t r a l Advisory Committee on Education. The Malays r e j e c t e d the Committee's l i n e of reasoning and f e l t that the Malay language should occupy a p o s i t i o n s i m i l a r t o that of E n g l i s h i n the school c u r r i c u l u m . This debate culminated i n e a r l y 1949 when the Secretary General of UMNO, Dato Z a i n a l A b i d i n b i n A l i proposed, "that the teaching of Malay and E n g l i s h should be compulsory i n a l l Government-aided primary 25 schools". Other members of the L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l argued that more concern should be shown f o r Malay education and that the CACE report was unacceptable as i t doomed the f u t u r e development of the Malay language. Malay newspapers a l s o took up the i s s u e and argued along 2 6 s i m i l a r l i n e s . Thus, the Government was forced to set up a committee to study the problem of Malay education i n e a r l y 1950. Communal demands from the non-Malays were unleashed p a r t l y as a 51 r e s u l t of leakages to the Chinese vernacular press that the Barnes Committee had exceeded i t s terms of reference and that the r e p o r t was 27 being w r i t t e n from an e x c l u s i v e l y Anglo-Malay point of view. Secondly, the MCP's propaganda argued r a t h e r p l a u s i b l y that the B r i t i s h had the l e a s t i n t e r e s t i n the a f f a i r s of the Chinese. In view of t h i s , there was an upsurge of Chinese p r o t e s t even before the Barnes Report was o f f i c i a l l y r e l e a s e d . The MCA, together w i t h the vernacular press and other i n t e r e s t e d groups pressed the Government f o r a f a i r and e q u i t a b l e deal regarding t h e i r vernacular schools. In sum, w h i l e the Malays protested the inadequacies of the CACE Report, the non-Malays protested the yet-to-be released Barnes Report. Both the communities wanted a b e t t e r d e a l f o r t h e i r own education. Motives and Aims of the P o l i c y Makers The Barnes and the Fenn-Wu Reports were prepared during the height of the Emergency. I t i s t h e r e f o r e not s u r p r i s i n g to note that the sponsors of the r e p o r t s were p r i n c i p a l l y concerned w i t h i n s u r i n g Malayan i n t e r n a l s e c u r i t y . This f i r s t meant the n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of the schools and the u n i f i c a t i o n of the e x i s t i n g p o l y g l o t schools i n t o a coherent system. Secondly, there was the need f o r preparing the country and the education system to be capable of p r o v i d i n g the necessary q u a l i f i e d manpower. L a s t l y , there was a need to m o l l i f y the newly e s t a b l i s h e d s p i r i t of communalism, which was manifested i n demands to upgrade the v a r i o u s vernacular schools. 52 Chinese schools had long been a constant source of t r o u b l e f o r the Government. Since the establishment of KMT r u l e i n China the government had had to handle the problem of subversion i n Chinese schools. The problem was f u r t h e r complicated because a l a r g e number of teachers were r e c r u i t e d , or t r a i n e d , i n China and presumably schooled 28 i n KMT or Communist d o c t r i n e s . Several attempts to provide g r a n t s -i n - a i d and then to increase v i g i l a n c e i n the Chinese schools met w i t h l i m i t e d success. Furthermore, a s u b s t a n t i a l number of r e c r u i t s to the MCP's cause had come from the Chinese schools. A l l these f a c t s only helped to confirm that the Chinese schools were indeed a hotbed f o r the spread of anti-government ideology. Thus i t i s not s u r p r i s i n g that the government was determined to d e a l w i t h the problem by u t i l i z i n g the education p o l i c y as "an instrument of c o n t r o l and a s s i m i l a t i o n " and there-29 by to reduce the autonomy of these schools. Though the Barnes Committee's terms of reference d i d not i n c l u d e anything s p e c i f i c a l l y d e a l i n g w i t h the need to invoke a sense of l o y a l t y , the report s t r e s s e d "that primary s c h o o l i n g should be purposely used to b u i l d up a common Malay n a t i o n a l i t y . . . . Our scheme would be s e r i o u s l y weakened i f any l a r g e p r o p o r t i o n of Chinese, Indians, and other non-Malay communities were to choose to provide t h e i r own primary 30 c l a s s e s independently of the N a t i o n a l schools". The reason f o r t h i s recommendation i s not hard to see. Of the 13 members of the Barnes Committee nine were from the Malayan teaching s e r v i c e . Thus i t i s reasonable to assume that the current government's t h i n k i n g must have been a guiding f o r c e . 53 The Fenn-Wu mission's terms of reference were more e x p l i c i t however. I t was encouraged to survey the Chinese school system and propose changes that would serve to bridge "the gap between the present communal system of schools" so that i n f u t u r e "education w i l l be on a non-communal b a s i s w i t h E n g l i s h or Malay as the medium of i n s t r u c t i o n . In a d d i t i o n , the mission was a l s o asked to look i n t o the " p r e p a r a t i o n of textbooks f o r present use w i t h a Malayan as d i s t i n c t from a Chinese 31 background and content". By consenting to the F e d e r a t i o n Agreement (1948) the B r i t i s h Government had acknowledged Malaya as p r i m a r i l y a 'Malay country'. This c l e a r l y meant that the f i r s t duty of the Government was to enable the Malays to achieve a r i g h t f u l p lace as the indigenous people of the country. Since education was an important element i n the modernization process, the B r i t i s h f e l t that they had "to b r i n g the c u l t u r e up to date" and make them capable of p r o v i d i n g s k i l l s and l e a d e r s h i p i n the era of 32 modernization. This task was made even more urgent by the pressures of Malay charges of neglect on the part of the B r i t i s h c o l o n i a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . By the same token, the B r i t i s h had to take i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n the growing wave of p r o t e s t s from the non-Malay communities. The Chinese were p a r t i c u l a r l y e f f e c t i v e i n r e g i s t e r i n g t h e i r d i s i l l u s i o n m e n t w i t h the B r i t i s h pro-Malay p o l i c i e s . The government a l s o had to prove that i t was concerned w i t h the w e l f a r e of the Chinese and that the MCP's c r i t i c i s m was not v a l i d . Furthermore, s i n c e the B r i t i s h had 54 helped create and s u s t a i n the MCA, they had to consent to the demand of the le a d i n g spokesman of Chinese i n t e r e s t . The B r i t i s h , w h i l e supporting the Malay demands, had a l s o to consider the demands of the non-Malays i n order to ensure the l o y a l t y and support of the Chinese. P o l i c y Impact and Communal Responses The schools hardest h i t by the recommendations of the Barnes Committee and the Education Ordinance (1952) were the Chinese vernacular schools which were the most s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t . The p o l i c y of l i m i t i n g i n s t r u c t i o n to the Malay and E n g l i s h languages i n the N a t i o n a l schools meant that Chinese language would only be taught f o r a d a i l y h a l f hour p e r i o d . The p o l i c y i n e f f e c t meant that the Chinese had to r e l i n q u i s h a medium of i n s t r u c t i o n that had helped maintain t h e i r d i s t i n c t e t h n i c and c u l t u r a l i d e n t i t y . In a d d i t i o n , i t was p a r t i c u l a r l y d i s q u i e t i n g to be t o l d that i f they were u n w i l l i n g to give 33 up t h e i r schools then they would be regarded as d i s l o y a l . The acceptance of the Barnes Committee and the Education Ordinance (1952) was a major success f o r the Malays. For the f i r s t time t h e i r language was accorded the s t a t u s of " o f f i c i a l language" and more importantly the l e a r n i n g of the Malay language was made compulsory f o r a l l communities. In making Malay the one other medium of i n s t r u c t i o n the Government accorded i t a p o s i t i o n s u p e r i o r to that of the other languages. The Ordinance a l s o set the trend f o r f u t u r e development of the Malay language which was to become the backbone of any attempt to 55 i n s t i l the s p i r i t of Malayan n a t i o n a l i s m . In sum, the Ordinance provided f u r t h e r proof to the Malays that t h e i r p o s i t i o n as the i n d i -genous people was safeguarded and the immigrant communities had no choice but to conform to the p o l i t i c a l r e a l i t i e s of the s i t u a t i o n . Communal responses to the Barnes Report and the Ordinance was e s s e n t i a l l y of a p a r t i s a n nature, w i t h the Malays consenting and the non-Malays d i s s e n t i n g . The Fenn-Wu Report, though i t met w i t h general Chinese support, was nevertheless r e j e c t e d because most of the proposals were not i n l i n e w i t h current government t h i n k i n g . However, w h i l e the Malay responses to the Ordinance tended to f i r s t be one of f u l l support and l a t e r v a c i l l a t i o n , the Chinese p r o t e s t was not only c o n s i s t e n t but p e r s i s t e n t as w e l l . . The Indian communal p r o t e s t s were g e n e r a l l y m i l d apart from an inc o n s e q u e n t i a l study of the problems of Indian 34 education undertaken by the MIC. The immediate Malay response to the Barnes Report was one of f u l l support. The UMNO leaders welcomed i t as a r i g h t step i n the d i r e c t i o n of the modernization of the Malay c u l t u r e . Therefore when the Report was discussed i n the 1951 UMNO Annual General Meeting there was unanimous support f o r i t . When the Barnes Report was presented i n the L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l UMNO leaders and the Malay leaders of the IMP came out i n f u l l support of i t s recommendations. Tunku Abdul Rahman, f o r example, completely agreed w i t h the p r o v i s i o n s of the Barnes Report, and suggested that the Government take immediate steps to implement i t . Dato Razak, while 56 agreeing w i t h the p r o v i s i o n s of the Barnes Report, disagreed w i t h the implementation of the s l i g h t l y watered down CACE Report. He f i r m l y supported the p r o v i s i o n that only Malay and E n g l i s h be taught i n the N a t i o n a l schools. He agreed w i t h the Tunku that the Chinese and Tamil 36 languages could be taught p r i v a t e l y i f so d e s i r e d . However, i n e a r l y 1954, the moderate Malay leaders who had e a r l i e r favoured the Barnes Report and the Education Ordinance, 1952, suddenly reversed t h e i r stand. This was probably due to the p r o t e s t s from the grassroots and notably from the Malay school teachers who objected to the Ordinance. The i n t r o d u c t i o n of the Ordinance and the N a t i o n a l schools s o l i d i f i e d o p p o s i t i o n to the Government's p o l i c y among the Malay school teachers. They were i n f a c t one of the f i r s t groups to be p o l i t i c a l l y aware and, u n l i k e the Malay a d m i n i s t r a t i v e e l i t e , were drawn from the 37 general Malay community. They had been UMNO's staunchest supporters 38 ever s i n c e the e a r l y days of Malay n a t i o n i s t a g i t a t i o n . Thus they evolved i n t o "one of the most a c t i v e i n t e r e s t groups operating i n and 39 out of UMNO p o l i t i c s " . The Malay school teachers were p a r t i c u l a r l y apprehensive over the emphasis of the Barnes Committee, the CACE and the Ordinance which gave E n g l i s h a much s u p e r i o r p o s i t i o n to Malay, which ceased to be a medium of i n s t r u c t i o n beyond the primary schools. They expressed p a r t i c u l a r f e a r s of being retrenched or of being replaced by the b e t t e r t r a i n e d E n g l i s h school teachers who were being sent to the United Kingdom f o r t r a i n i n g . Thus, the Malay school teachers argued that the Na t i o n a l type c l a s s e s "would stagnate the Malay education and c u l t u r e " . 57 In a d d i t i o n the Federation of Malay School Teachers' A s s o c i a t i o n (FMSTA) which by then had become the le a d i n g spokesman of Malay school teachers unanimously r e j e c t e d the n a t i o n a l schools. F o l l o w i n g the establishment of the more i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d form of the A l l i a n c e , the UMNO leaders were c o n c i l i a t o r y towards the Chinese stand. They began to support the Chinese f o r a f a i r and eq u i t a b l e deal i n the education p o l i c y . With the assumption of the e d i t o r i a l p o s i t i o n of the Utusan Melayu by an UMNO member the newspaper began to p r i n t a s e r i e s of a r t i c l e s and e d i t o r i a l s c l a i m i n g that the Education Ordinance endangered the development of Malay and Chinese languages. In an e d i t o r i a l on September 9, 1954 the Utusan Melayu f u r t h e r elaborated i t s p o s i t i o n by d e c l a r i n g that the "proposals of the Barnes Committee were not only i n i m i c a l to the educational i n t e r e s t s of the Malays, but to the e d u c a t i o n a l needs of the Chinese, because t h e i r proposal only attached importance to 41 the E n g l i s h language." Chinese p r o t e s t s were p r e d i c t a b l y strong over the Reports and Ordinance. They were p a r t i c u l a r l y apprehensive over the f a c t that not a s i n g l e Chinese or Indian had been included i n the Barnes committee. In a d d i t i o n to that the recommendations of the Fenn-Wu M i s s i o n were r e j e c t e d out of hand by the Government. Thus, most of the Chinese p r o t e s t s were d i r e c t e d against the Government f o r i t s i n a b i l i t y to assure a f a i r d e a l f o r the Chinese. The debates i n the L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l mentioned e a r l i e r r e f l e c t e d the inherent communal d i f f e r e n c e s . While Indian members chose to adopt a midway p o s i t i o n and be m i l d i n t h e i r c r i t i c i s m s , i t was the MCA and i t s 58 r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s who c l e a r l y emerged as spokesmen of the non-Malay i n t e r e s t s . The most notable champion of Chinese i n t e r e s t was Tan Siew Sin, the son of the MCA p r e s i d e n t . He s t r o n g l y c r i t i c i s e d the f i n d i n g s of the Barnes committee. He furthermore expressed great r e s e r v a t i o n s over the clause i n the Barnes Report which suggested that persons who were not happy with the two languages, i . e . E n g l i s h and Malay, were not happy i n Malaya. He remarked "these few words are s u r e l y unique i n t h i s country. Seldom i f ever, i n the past h i s t o r y of t h i s country has the maximum of r a c i a l b i g o t r y , r a c i a l i n t o l e r a n c e and deep seated ignorance 42 of fundamental p o l i t i c a l p r i n c i p l e s been compressed i n so few words." Other members c a l l e d f o r assurances and guarantees f o r the p r e s e r v a t i o n of the Chinese vernacular schools. But i t must be mentioned that the p r o t e s t emanating from the MCA was g e n e r a l l y r e s t r a i n e d perhaps because the moderates feared to be i d e n t i f i e d as d i s l o y a l . However, the most vehement p r o t e s t s were taki n g place outside the arena of party p o l i t i c s . The groups that most protested the Barnes Report and the ensuing Ordinance were the Chinese e d u c a t i o n i s t s - notably the members of the Chinese School Management Committees and the Chinese school teachers. They took great pains to show that they were p r i m a r i l y moved to p r o t e s t out of the d e s i r e to p r o t e c t the mainstay of t h e i r c u l t u r e , • though i t was apparent that t h e i r primary concern was to prevent the c l o s u r e of the Chinese schools. In a d d i t i o n , the Chinese vernacular press, notably Nanyang Siang Pau and Sing Ping J i h Poh, was a l s o committed to the goal of preventing the c l o s u r e of Chinese schools and began a c t i v e l y to make demands f o r some a c t i o n from the Government. 59 In view of the ongoing p r o t e s t s , the MCA could no longer remain detached. In November, 1952, the MCA i n s t i t u t e d a Chinese Education C e n t r a l Advisory Committee i n an apparent move to r e s t r a i n the d i s s a t i s -f i e d Chinese e d u c a t i o n i s t s and the vernacular press. The committee functioned e s s e n t i a l l y to represent the Chinese schools i n any n e g o t i a t i o n s 43 w i t h the Government concerning Chinese education. To no a v a i l i t submitted p e t i t i o n a f t e r p e t i t i o n to High Commissioner S i r Gerald Templer. I t was confronted w i t h the Business L i c e n s i n g and R e g i s t r a t i o n Ordinance which had been passed together w i t h the Education Ordinance, 1952, to help 44 finance the expansion of the Malayan education program. The leaders of MCA considered t h i s as adding i n s u l t to i n j u r y , f o r they were being r coerced to finance an education system which they opposed b i t t e r l y . The MCA countered t h i s w i t h a thr e a t to send a deputation to London to appeal to the Secretary of State f o r Colonies. The MCA a l s o i n v i t e d Dr. V i c t o r P u r c e l l , the renowned Chinese s c h o l a r , to prepare a rep o r t on the Chinese i n August and September of 1952. The Malay e l i t e were thoroughly d i s p l e a s e d w i t h t h i s and Tunku Abdul Rahman i n h i s capacity as the UMNO Presi d e n t forbade UMNO o f f i c i a l s to provide a s s i s t a n c e . This to an extent caused a severe s t r a i n on the newly forged a l l i a n c e between the UMNO and the MCA. In apparent r e t a l i a t i o n , MCA withdrew i t s o f f e r of M$500,000 which had been earmarked 45 f o r the s e t t i n g up of a Malay Welfare Fund to be administered j o i n t l y . Nevertheless, the MCA presented i t s f i n d i n g s on the education of the Chinese i n the form of the Memorandum on Chinese Education i n the  Federation of Malaya i n March of 1954. 60 The Memorandum expressed "the fear s created i n the Chinese Community of the Federation of Malaya by the p r o v i s i o n s of Education Ordinance, 1952", and s t a t e d "that the establishment of the proposed N a t i o n a l schools" would be "the forerunner of the c l o s u r e of Chinese 4 vernacular schools, and the end of Chinese education i n the Federation". The Memorandum wanted the High Commissioner to help guarantee the p r e s e r v a t i o n of Chinese c u l t u r e and schools and Kuo Yu to be accorded the sta t u s of ' o f f i c i a l language'. I t f u r t h e r s t r e s s e d : Let us once and f o r a l l make i t abundantly c l e a r that the Chinese community has never sought, i s not seeking and w i l l never seek an e x c l u s i v e and s e p a r a t i s t p o s i t i o n i n the Malayan s o c i e t y . They are merely asking f o r e q u a l i t y and j u s t i c e . 4 1 The trademark of the Chinese e d u c a t i o n i s t s was much i n evidence, i n that the Memorandum was j o i n t l y signed by the MCA President as w e l l as the Chairman of the MCA's Chinese Education C e n t r a l Committee. In A p r i l of 1953, the MCA sponsored a conference of Chinese School Management Committees and teachers. The MCA P r e s i d e n t , Tan Cheng Lock gave f u l l support to the e f f o r t s of the conference to b r i n g about a b e t t e r deal i n Chinese education and to ensure that the Chinese language 48 needs should be protected. ' In a d d i t i o n to t h i s , the MCA a l s o l e n t support to the proposed Chinese-run Nanyang U n i v e r s i t y announced i n 1953 by a group of wealthy Chinese. A l l these e f f o r t s on the par t of the MCA seemed obviously intended to convince the Government and the Malays of t h e i r i n t e n t to pursue a commitment to Chinese education. This p a t t e r n of p r o t e s t from the Chinese community continued up 61 u n t i l e a r l y 1955 when the A l l i a n c e began gearing i t s machinery to face the forthcoming e l e c t i o n s . The promise of the A l l i a n c e i n i t s manifesto released i n e a r l y 1954 to reexamine the Education Ordinance, 1952, the Business L i c e n s i n g and R e g i s t r a t i o n Ordinance, and the Fed e r a l L e g i s l a t i v e C ouncil Paper No. 67 of 1954 on Education, to a l a r g e extent helped soothe frayed nerves. The outcome of the e l e c t i o n and the subsequent education reports w i l l be d e a l t w i t h i n the next chapter. Aftermath Few of the ambitious plans contained i n the Ordinance were ever implemented. The p o l i c y of n a t i o n a l schools d i d not appeal to a l a r g e s e c t i o n of the Malay community, p a r t i c u l a r l y the i n f l u e n t i a l Malay school teachers. They f e l t that the Ordinance "was a d e l i b e r a t e attempt by 49 the C o l o n i a l Government to oust the Malay language ( s i c ) " . S i m i l a r l y , the non-Malays opposed the Ordinance because i t endangered t h e i r language and c u l t u r e . Furthermore, the withdrawal of support f o r the p l a n by the moderate A l l i a n c e leaders f i n a l l y caused the Ordinance to be w i t h -drawn by the B r i t i s h Government. Dato Onn's support of education f o r the Malays v i a the N a t i o n a l schools and h i s f e e l i n g s that the Malays should not p r o t e s t l e d the Malays to r e j e c t h i s party at the p o l l s . A yet more se r i o u s problem was the p r o h i b i t i v e cost of the plan. Government expenditure on education had s p i r a l l e d from M$11.5 m i l l i o n i n 1946 to M$95.68 m i l l i o n i n 1953, and t h i s was i n the face of a govern-ment d e f i c i t of over M$200 m i l l i o n i n the same year."'"'" In a d d i t i o n , the cost of f i n a n c i n g the ongoing Emergency and the d e c l i n i n g p r i c e of 62 rubber and t i n made i t a b s o l u t e l y necessary f o r the government to reconsider plans to implement the Education Ordinance, 1952. The Government set up another committee to study t h i s problem. I t s report was published i n the form of a Government White Paper which concluded that " m u l t i - r a c i a l schools were ' e s s e n t i a l ' but out of the 52 question because of the l a c k of funds to pay f o r them". A l l these f a c t o r s had the net e f f e c t of s c u t t l i n g the C o l o n i a l Government's plan to introduce Malay and E n g l i s h as the medium of i n s t r u c t i o n f o r a l l Malayan schools. I t now became the task of the A l l i a n c e government t o dea l w i t h the s i t u a t i o n a r i s i n g from these circumstances. Conclusion The Education Ordinance was the f i r s t concrete attempt to l e g i s l a t e a n a t i o n a l education p o l i c y . The problem of i n t e r n a l s e c u r i t y seemed to be the most outstanding i s s u e and i n f l u e n t i a l f a c t o r i n the two major r e p o r t s on education - the Barnes Committee Report and the Fenn-Wu M i s s i o n Report. The government was determined to use education p o l i c y as an instrument of c o n t r o l and a s s i m i l a t i o n as f a r as the Chinese schools were concerned. The ascendancy of Malay p o l i t i c a l s t r e n g t h made the B r i t i s h c o l o n i a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n aware of the n e c e s s i t y of upgrading the Malay vernacular education. I n i t i a l l y Malay support f o r the p o l i c y to introduce Malay as the medium of i n s t r u c t i o n was very strong. I t began to wane as i t 63 became clear that t h e i r language would not be the medium of i n s t r u c t i o n a f t e r post primary l e v e l . In addition, the s p i r i t of cooperation forged between the UMNO and the MCA enabled many Malay leaders to support the Chinese i n t h e i r opposition to the Party Negara p o l i c y with regard to the education p o l i c y . The issue of the medium of i n s t r u c t i o n also brought to the front the school teachers who emerged both as sub-elites and as an important pressure group. Since they had been the ardent supporters of the UMNO and the MCA, t h e i r desires and concerns could not be overlooked. In the ensuing protests t h e i r voices were loud and c l e a r . Indeed, they would soon become a potent force i n safe-guarding t h e i r respective i n t e r e s t s once the A l l i a n c e government was formed. The question of medium of i n s t r u c t i o n served as an important t e s t i n g ground for the v i a b i l i t y of the A l l i a n c e formula. The Malay component of the A l l i a n c e , UMNO, c l e a r l y emerged as the senior partner and Malay communal i n t e r e s t s superceded a l l other communal i n t e r e s t s . The p o s i t i o n of the Malay language as the basis f o r future educational system was thus c l e a r l y established. 64 Notes 1. For a more i n depth a n a l y s i s of the Malayan Union proposal see James de V. A l l e n , The Malayan Union, New Haven: Yale Southeast A s i a S t u d i e s , 1967. (Monograph S e r i e s no. 10.) 2. The Japanese surrender i n l a t e August, 1945 was r a t h e r sudden and almost a month elapsed before the a r r i v a l of B r i t i s h troops i n Malaya. During t h i s p e r i o d , the MPAJA, which had waged a g u e r i l l a war against the Japanese emerged from the j u n g l e s i n t o Malayan towns and v i l l a g e s and assumed power. Immediately they began executing many Malays who had been d e t e c t i v e s and informers to the Japanese. This r e s u l t e d i n b i t t e r i n t e r - r a c i a l clashes and r i o t i n g i n many s t a t e s . The r e t u r n of the B r i t i s h troops f o r t u n a t e l y prevented f u r t h e r i n c i d e n t s of v i o l e n c e . 3. S. W. Jones, P u b l i c A d m i n i s t r a t i o n i n Malaya, London: Royal I n s t i t u t e of I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s , 1953. p. 139. 4. For a more i n depth a n a l y s i s of the formation of the UMNO see: D a n i e l Eldredge Moore, "The United Malay N a t i o n a l Organization and the 1959 E l e c t i o n s , " Ph.D. D i s s e r t a t i o n , U n i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a , Berkeley, 1960; Ishak b. Tadin, "Dato Onn and Malay N a t i o n a l i s m , 1946-1951," J o u r n a l of  Southeast Asian H i s t o r y , V o l . 1, No. 1 (March 1960). pp. 56-88. 5. Gordon P. Means, Malaysian P o l i t i c s , London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1976. pp. 5 6 f f . ; B. Simandjuntak, op_. c i t . , pp. 178-82. 6. V i c t o r P u r c e l l , The Chinese i n Modern Malaya, Singapore: Donald Moore, 1956. p. 41. 7. For more d e t a i l e d a n a l y s i s of the Emergency see the f o l l o w i n g books: Anthony Short, The Communist I n s u r r e c t i o n i n Malaya 1948-1960, London: F r e d e r i c k M u l l e r L t d . , 1975; Gene Z. Hanrahan, The Communist Struggle i n Malaya, New York: I n s t i t u t e of P a c i f i c Pvelations, 1954; Harry M i l l e r , Menace  i n Malaya, London: George G. Harrap & Co., 1950; Justus M. Van der Kroef, Communism i n Malaysia and Singapore, The Hague: Martinus N i j h o f f , 1967; Lucian Pye, G u e r i l l a  Communism i n Malaya: I t s S o c i a l and P o l i t i c a l Meaning, P r i n c e t o n : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y P ress, 1956; V i c t o r P u r c e l l , Malaya: Communist or Free? S t a n f o r d , C a l i f o r n i a : C a l i f o r n i a U n i v e r s i t y P ress, 1954. 65 8. Gordon P. Means, op_. c i t . , pp. 122-124. 9. I b i d . 10. Ishak Tadin, op_. c i t . , pp. 81 f f . 11. R. K. V a s i l , P o l i t i c s i n a P l u r a l S o c i e t y , Kuala Lumpur: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1971. p. 37. 12. R. S. Milne and Diane K. Mauzy, P o l i t i c s and Government i n M a l a y s i a , Singapore: Federal P u b l i c a t i o n s , 1978, p. 34; Chan Heng Chee, "The Malayan Chinese A s s o c i a t i o n , " M.A. t h e s i s , U n i v e r s i t y of Singapore, Singapore, 1965; Margaret R o f f , "The Malayan Chinese A s s o c i a t i o n 1948-1965," Jo u r n a l of Southeast Asian H i s t o r y , V o l . 6, no. 2 (1965), pp. 40-53. 13. R. K. V a s i l , op_. c i t . , pp. 48-49. 14. R. S. Milne and D. K. Mauzy, op_. c i t . , p. 35. 15. Gordon P. Means, op_. c i t . , p. 24; T. R. Fennel, "Commitment t o Change: A H i s t o r y of Malayan E d u c a t i o n a l P o l i c y , 1945-1957," Ph.D. D i s s e r t a t i o n , U n i v e r s i t y of Hawaii, 1968. p. 95. 16. I b i d . , p. 119. 17. Federation of Malaya, Report of the Committee on Malay Education, Kuala Lumpur: Government P r i n t e r s , 1951. p. v. Quoted i n B. Simandjuntak, ^p_. c i t . , p. 195. •18. Federation of Malaya, Report of the Committee on Malay Education. Kuala Lumpur: Government P r i n t e r s , 1951, p. 21. Quoted i n T. R. Fennel, op_. c i t . , p. 155. 19. I b i d . , Chap. IV para 8. Quoted i n B. Simandjuntak, op. c i t . , p. 196. 20. Dr. W i l l i a m P. Fenn was A s s o c i a t e Executive Secretary of the Board of Trustees of a dozen higher i n s t i t u t i o n s i n China. He was an American c i t i z e n and h i s s e r v i c e s were sought through o f f i c i a l channels. However, he f e l t that he could not f a i r l y do the job unless he had a n a t i v e Chinese speaker i n the m i s s i o n . Thus, Dr. Wu Teh Yao's s e r v i c e s were sought. He was then a United Nations O f f i c i a l . He had studied f o r a w h i l e i n Malaya and had a thorough knowledge of the problems faced by the Chinese i n Malaya. 21. T. R. Fennel, op_. c i t . , p. 173. 66 22. Federation of Malaya, Chinese Schools and the Education of Chinese Malayans: The Report of a M i s s i o n I n v i t e d to Study the  Problem of the Education of the Chinese i n Malaya, Kuala Lumpur: Government P r i n t e r s , 1951. Chap. I I , para. 15, as quoted i n B. Simandjuntak, op. c i t . , p. 197. 23. - I b i d . 24. Federation of Malaya, Report of the S p e c i a l Committee Appointed on the 20th Day of September, 1951 to Recommend L e g i s l a t i o n  to cover a l l aspects of Education P o l i c y f o r the Federation  of Malaya, No. 70, 1952, 3 October, 1952, para. 15 and Section 21 of the Education Ordinance appended t h e r e t o , as quoted i n B. Simandjuntak, op. c i t . , p. 199. 25. T. R. Fennel, op_. c i t . , p. 119. 26. I b i d . , p. 97. 27. V i c t o r P u r c e l l , "The C r i s i s of Malayan Education," P a c i f i c A f f a i r s , V o l . XXVI, No. 1 (March, 1953) p. 71. 28. Gordon P. Means, op. c i t . , pp. 173-377; V i c t o r P u r c e l l , The Chinese i n Malaya, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1967. pp. 232-233. 29. Cynthia H. Enloe, M u l t i - e t h n i c P o l i t i c s : The Case Study of M a l a y s i a. Berkeley, C a l i f o r n i a : Center f o r South and Southeast A s i a S t u d i e s , U n i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a , 1970. p. 47. 30. Report of the Committee on Malay Education, as c i t e d i n V. P u r c e l l , "The C r i s i s i n Malayan Education," p. 71. 31. I b i d . , p. 72. 32.. C. H. Enloe, op_. c i t . , p. 47. 33. Gayl D. Ness, Bureaucracy and R u r a l Development i n M a l a y s i a , Berkeley, C a l i f o r n i a : U n i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a P r ess, 1967. pp. 66-67. 34. S. Arasaratnam, Indians i n M a l a y s i a and Singapore, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1970. p. 187. 35. S t r a i t s Times, August 27, 1951, as quoted i n T. R. Fennel, p. 183. 36. T. R. Fennel, op. c i t . , p. 202. 37. W i l l i a m R. R o f f , O r i g i n s of Malay N a t i o n a l i s m , New Haven: Y a l e U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1967. Chap. V. 67 38. C. H. Enloe, op_. e l t . , p. 156. 39. Gordon P. Means, op. c i t . , p. 196. 40. Malay M a i l , February 10, 1955, as c i t e d i n T. R. Fennel op. c i t . , p. 385. 41. Utusan Melayu, September 9, 1954, as c i t e d i n T. R. Fennel, p. 328. 42. T. R. Fennel, op_. c i t . , p. 200. 43. Chan Heng Chee, op_. c i t . , p. 60. 44. I b i d . , pp. 60-61; T. R. Fennel, op. c i t . , p. 269 f f . 45. Gordon P. Means, c>p_. c i t . , p. 135. 46. T. R. Fennel, op_. c i t . , p. 310. 47. I b i d . , p. 319. 48. I b i d . , pp. 305-306. 49. S t r a i t s Times, February 5, 1954, as c i t e d i n B. Simandjuntak, op. c i t . , p. 199. 50. M a j l i s , February 28, 1955, as c i t e d i n Fennel, cip. c i t . , p. 404. 68 CHAPTER IV THE ALLIANCE GOVERNMENT 1955-1961 This period i s c h a r a c t e r i s e d by intense p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y e s p e c i a l l y w i t h regard to the adoption of Malay as the main medium of i n s t r u c t i o n i n a l l Malayan schools. The p e r i o d witnessed the e v o l u t i o n of the education p o l i c y i n the form of two o f f i c i a l r e p o r t s which served as p o l i t i c a l benchmarks and which i r r e v o c a b l y set the trend f o r the f u t u r e educational p o l i c y . This chapter w i l l examine the major p o l i t i c a l events and educational development, and analyze the communal demands, the motives and aims of the p o l i c y makers, the p o l i c y impact, and the communal responses. Major P o l i t i c a l Events The s i n g l e most important event of t h i s period was the overwhel-ming v i c t o r y of the A l l i a n c e party i n the 1955 Federal L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l E l e c t i o n . The A l l i a n c e party won 51 out of the 52 seats and p o l l e d ten times as many votes as a l l the other p a r t i e s and independents combined."'" Thus the A l l i a n c e party f i r m l y e s t a b l i s h e d i t s e l f as the l e g i t i m a t e successor to the C o l o n i a l Government. The A l l i a n c e v i c t o r y was followed by a C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Conference, held i n London e a r l y i n 1956, and attended by r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the Rulers and the A l l i a n c e . I t was decided that Malaya should become f u l l y independent w i t h i n the Commonwealth by August, 1957. I t was a l s o agreed that a C o n s t i t u t i o n a l 69 Commission should be appointed to draw up a d r a f t c o n s t i t u t i o n . The C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Commission soon set about c o l l e c t i n g memoranda from the v a r i o u s i n t e r e s t groups and p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s . In a l l i t r e c e i v e d 131 memoranda. However, the submissions of the A l l i a n c e "had excep-t i o n a l importance i n view of t h e i r p r o s p e c t i v e r o l e as the f u t u r e 2 government . . . ." E a r l i e r , the three components of the A l l i a n c e , the UMNO, the MCA, and the MIC, had determined the r e l a t i v e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p o s i t i o n of the three races. The A l l i a n c e "bargain", concluded between the Malay and the non-Malay components, i n e f f e c t represented a p r i c e paid by the non-Malays f o r f u l l p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s of the F ederation. The f u n c t i o n s assigned to the Malay R u l e r s , the e n s h r i n i n g of Islam as the s t a t e r e l i g i o n , the " S p e c i a l p o s i t i o n of the Malays", and the r e c o g n i t i o n of the Malay language as the N a t i o n a l language and the s o l e o f f i c i a l language a f t e r 1967, were a l l agreed upon by the non-Malays. In exchange, the non-Malays enjoyed the b e n e f i t s of f u r t h e r r e l a x a t i o n 3 i n the c i t i z e n s h i p q u a l i f i c a t i o n s . In a d d i t i o n , c i t i z e n s h i p was extended to any person born i n the country a f t e r August 31, 1957, p r o v i d i n g the parents were domiciled there. This p r o v i s i o n recognized the claims of the non-Malays to the s t a t u s of c i t i z e n by v i r t u e of 4 j u s s o l i , not r e t r o s p e c t i v e l y but only f o r those born a f t e r independence. Another important aspect of the "bargain" not s t a t e d e x p l i c i t l y i n the C o n s t i t u t i o n was that the Chinese would be allowed to play a 70 dominant r o l e i n business " f r e e from the hindrances or p e r s e c u t i o n to which they /the Chinese/ have been subjected i n some other Southeast Asian countries.""' The 1955 E l e c t i o n s represented a v i c t o r y f o r the A l l i a n c e and the f o r c e s of communal cooperation. Nevertheless, i t a l s o unleashed the f o r c e s of communal chauvinism. The more communally i n c l i n e d and l a r g e l y Chinese supported Labour P a r t y , the People's Progressive Party (PPP), the Malay based Pan Malayan I s l a m i c Party (PMIP) and Dato Onn's Party Negara (PN), a l l concentrated on issues p e r t a i n i n g to t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e c l i e n t e l e s . In the process these p a r t i e s a l s o claimed that they had been short-changed by the p r o v i s i o n s of the A l l i a n c e "bargain". Thus, f o l l o w i n g the e l e c t i o n s , the burden of having to prove that the accusations of the o p p o s i t i o n were i n c o r r e c t caused considerable s t r a i n and s t r e s s e s w i t h i n the A l l i a n c e . However, UMNO was now b e t t e r able to cope w i t h the pressures because of the t i g h t c o n t r o l e x e r c i s e d by i t s moderate Malay l e a d e r s , namely Tunku Abdul Rahman, Dato Abdul Razak, and Dr. I s m a i l . W i t h i n the MCA the troubles were more open. A s e c t i o n of younger and more a r t i c u l a t e members who had not been a party to the o r i g i n a l bargain and hence to the s p i r i t of compromise and concession, emerged as a new f a c t i o n i n e a r l y 1958. This group which s t y l e d i t s e l f as the "Young Turks" defeated the "Old Guards" of Tan Cheng Lock and h i s son Tan Siew S i n i n the 1958 MCA e l e c t i o n s . The new P r e s i d e n t , Dr. Lim Chong Eu, and h i s f a c t i o n attempted to wring more concessions from the 71 UMNO and the Malays, but f a i l e d . In the process they a l i e n a t e d Tunku Abdul Rahman, and he was f i r m i n demanding that the trouble-makers be expel l e d from the MCA. Foll o w i n g t h i s c r i s i s many of the Young Turks l e f t the party i n l a t e 1958. However, when Tan Siew Sin was e l e c t e d as the new MCA President i n 1961, UMNO re s t o r e d i t s f u l l confidence i n the Party. This c r i s i s w i l l be examined i n greater d e t a i l l a t e r i n the chapter. Educational Development In September, 1955, j u s t one month a f t e r the A l l i a n c e assumed the r e i n s of government, a 15 member committee under the chairmanship of Dato Abdul Razak, the M i n i s t e r of Education, was drawn from the Federal L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l . I t was empowered to: examine the present e d u c a t i o n a l p o l i c y of the F e d e r a t i o n of Malaya and to recommend any a l t e r a t i o n s or adaptations that are necessary w i t h a view to e s t a b l i s h i n g a n a t i o n a l system of education acceptable to the people of the Federation as a whole which w i l l s a t i s f y t h e i r needs and promote t h e i r c u l t u r a l , s o c i a l , economic and p o l i t i c a l development as a n a t i o n , having regard to the i n t e n t i o n to make Malay as the n a t i o n a l language of the country w h i l s t p r e s e r v i n g and s u s t a i n i n g the growth of the languages and c u l t u r e of other communities l i v i n g i n the country.6 The Razak Report, which was published i n August, 1956, was subsequently l e g i s l a t e d as the Education Ordinance, 1957, a f t e r undergoing minor amendments. The Committee recognized the magnitude of i t s task of planning f o r a m u l t i - r a c i a l s o c i e t y . In view of t h i s , they considered t h e i r task a pragmatic one "of planning f o r the immediate f u t u r e , which 72 might be defined as the next ten years, a pe r i o d which may be regarded as t r a n s i t i o n a l i n Malayan e d u c a t i o n . T h e Committee f u r t h e r recommended that the p o l i c i e s proposed i n the rep o r t should - i f adopted -8 be reexamined i n the l i g h t of experience not l a t e r than 1959. The Razak Report abandoned the idea of a n a t i o n a l school system, and agreed that c h i l d r e n should continue to r e c e i v e t h e i r primary education i n the separate vernacular schools. However, i t b e l i e v e d t h a t : the u l t i m a t e o b j e c t i v e of edu c a t i o n a l p o l i c y of t h i s country must be to br i n g together the c h i l d r e n of a l l races under a n a t i o n a l educational system i n which the n a t i o n a l language i s the main medium of i n s t r u c t i o n , though we recognize that progress towards t h i s goal cannot be rushed and must be gradual.9 Furthermore, i n order to accord Malay a p o s i t i o n worthy of a n a t i o n a l language, i t was f e l t that i t : must be l e a r n t i n a l l schools and ... that the teaching of Malay to and the l e a r n i n g of Malay by a l l p u p i l s s h a l l be the c o n d i t i o n of Government a s s i s t a n c e i n a l l schools.10 The Report, i n a d d i t i o n , suggested i n c e n t i v e s f o r the l e a r n i n g of the Malay language. R e i t e r a t i n g that i n c e n t i v e s were necessary " f o r reaching adequate standards i n Malay", the Committee suggested the f o l l o w i n g measures: a. Malay could be made a q u a l i f i c a t i o n f o r entry i n t o the Government s e r v i c e s ; b. i t could be made a f a c t o r to be taken i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n i n s e l e c t i o n f o r secondary education, and could be made compulsory i n a l l government examinations; 73 c. i t could be made a requirement f o r the one seeking a s c h o l a r s h i p from p u b l i c funds; d. g r a n t s - i n - a i d could be made to depend i n part on the s u c c e s s f u l l e a r n i n g of Malay as and when s u f f i c i e n t f a c i l i t i e s were a v a i l a b l e . i l The Report gave separate treatment to the primary and secondary schools. I t suggested that the primary schools would f a l l i n t o two broad c a t e g o r i e s . 1. Standard Primary schools, i n which the medium of i n s t r u c t i o n would be the Malayan n a t i o n a l language; and 2. Standard-type Primary schools, i n which the medium of i n s t r u c t i o n would be i n Kuo Yu or Tamil or E n g l i s h . The Report recommended that E n g l i s h should be made a compulsory subject i n a l l primary schools. With regard to i n s t r u c t i o n i n Tamil or Kuo Yu, i t was proposed that such i n s t r u c t i o n should be made a v a i l a b l e 12 at the request of parents of f i f t e e n c h i l d r e n from any one sch o o l . With regard to secondary schools, the Report recognized that the aim of secondary education was to t r a i n employable and l o y a l c i t i z e n s , and that "one of i t s primary f u n c t i o n s i s to f o s t e r and encourage the c u l t u r e s and languages of the Malayan community . . . ." Thus, the Report recommended that the aim "should be to e s t a b l i s h one type of n a t i o n a l secondary school were the p u p i l s work towards a common f i n a l examination, but where there i s s u f f i c i e n t f l e x i b i l i t y i n the c u r r i c u -lum to a l l o w schools or part of schools to give p a r t i c u l a r a t t e n t i o n to 13 various languages and c u l t u r e s . " In e f f e c t , Malay was made a compulsory language to be learned i n order to pass the two p u b l i c 74 examinations of the Lower C e r t i f i c a t e of Education (LCE), at the end of the t h i r d year and the Federation of Malaya C e r t i f i c a t e (FMCE), at the end of f i v e or s i x years of secondary s c h o o l i n g . E n g l i s h was r e t a i n e d as a language to be studi e d i n n a t i o n a l secondary schools because, "no secondary school p u p i l s h a l l be at a disadvantage i n the matter e i t h e r of employment or of higher education i n Malaya or over-seas as long as i t i s necessary to use the E n g l i s h language f o r these 14 purposes." Concerning the medium of i n s t r u c t i o n i n Chinese secondary schools, the Committee saw "no reason f o r a l t e r i n g the p r a c t i c e . . ." provided other c o n d i t i o n s mentioned e a r l i e r were met."'""' In accordance w i t h the p r o v i s i o n s of the Razak Report, a Committee under the chairmanship of Abdul Rahman b i n T a l i b was formed "to review" the Report and make recommendations concerning implementation."*"^ The Review Committee presented i t s r e p o r t i n June, 1960, and agreed that the p o l i c y o u t l i n e d i n the Razak Report had been " f a i t h f u l l y and s u c c e s s f u l l y c a r r i e d out . . . . T h e Committee reviewed the Education Ordinance, 1957, and formulated what became the Education Act of 1961. As f a r as the st a t u s of the Malay language was concerned the p o l i c y as enunciated i n the Ordinance of 1957 remained unchanged. The Rahman T a l i b Report concluded that p u b l i c primary Chinese and Tamil schools should be t o l e r a t e d - at l e a s t " f o r the time being", but not the secondary schools. " I t would be incompatible w i t h an education p o l i c y designed to create n a t i o n a l consciousness and having 75 the i n t e n t i o n of making the Malay language the n a t i o n a l language of the country," the Committee a s s e r t e d , "to extend and perpetuate a language and r a c i a l d i f f e r e n t i a l throughout the p u b l i c l y financed 18 educational system". The Rahman T a l i b Report f u r t h e r proposed a number of changes to f u r t h e r the process of implementing Malay as the medium of i n s t r u c t i o n . The more notable were as f o l l o w s : 1. Secondary schools r e c e i v i n g p a r t i a l a s s i s t a n c e from the Government which f a i l e d to make arrangements to conform f u l l y w i t h a l l the s t a t u t o r y requirements as from the beginning of 1962 or e a r l i e r , "should be regarded as independent schools i n e l i g i b l e f o r any a s s i s t a n c e from Government funds as from the beginning of 1962." 2 A l l the " o f f i c i a l , n a t i o n a l , p u b l i c examinations -the Lower C e r t i f i c a t e of Education and the Federation of Malaya C e r t i f i c a t e of Education Examinations - should be held only i n the nation's two o f f i c i a l languages, Malay and English."19 Furthermore, the Committee was r e s o l u t e i n i t s recommendations that the M i n i s t r y of Education should cease to organize examinations i n Chinese, i . e . the Ju n i o r Middle I I I , the Chinese Secondary School Promotion, and the Chinese Secondary School Leaving C e r t i f i c a t e 20 Examinations, w i t h e f f e c t from 1961. The Report provided some i n c e n t i v e s f o r the e f f e c t i v e implementation of the p o l i c y . From 1962 onwards f r e e primary education, h i t h e r t o enjoyed only by the Malay and Tamil schools, was extended to E n g l i s h and Chinese medium schools. However, no changes were proposed 76 w i t h regard to the medium of i n s t r u c t i o n i n Malay, Chinese, Tamil or E n g l i s h medium schools. In order to give greater prominence to the use of the n a t i o n a l language, i t was suggested that the standard and standard-type schools be redesignated as N a t i o n a l and National-type schools thus emphasising the n a t i o n a l character of the school system. In respect to the secondary schools, "the C h i l d r e n of Malayan communities who opt to o b t a i n t h e i r education i n the medium of Malay w i l l from 1962 onwards o b t a i n . . . f r e e education i n a l l /JialayT* secondary 21 schools". In sum, the Rahman T a l i b Report f u r t h e r removed c e r t a i n loopholes inherent i n the Razak Report. I t guaranteed the p o s i t i o n of the Malay language and at the same time threatened the e x t i n c t i o n of the non-Malay secondary schools. Communal Demands As mentioned i n the previous chapter the vernacular school teachers were the most p e r s i s t e n t i n r e g i s t e r i n g t h e i r o b j e c t i o n s to the Education Ordinance, 1952. Thus many moderate A l l i a n c e leaders who favoured the E n g l i s h b i a s of the Ordinance had to stop supporting i t and come out i n support of the school teachers f o r guarantees f o r the vernacular education. I t was i n d i c a t e d i n the previous chapter that the Malay school teachers were an important p o l i t i c a l f o r c e w i t h i n UMNO. They commanded much support from a l a r g e number of Malays who had attended only Malay schools, and who were keenly conscious of job 77 o p p o r t u n i t i e s . In a d d i t i o n to t h i s was the f a c t that many leaders of the UMNO were former school teachers or e d u c a t i o n i s t s (notable among whom was Ghafar Baba, Mohamad K h i r J o h a r i , and Syed N a s i r b i n I s m a i l ) . Thus i t i s apparent that t h e i r demands could not e a s i l y be r e j e c t e d by the moderate Malay l e a d e r s . The Malay school teachers pressured the government f o r the e x c l u s i v e use of Malay i n the Government, f o r r a p i d expansion of a Malay medium school system, and f o r equal s t a t u s and pay f o r Malay 23 school teachers. They al s o objected to the promoting of E n g l i s h as the medium of i n s t r u c t i o n i n Secondary schools and to the scheme of teacher t r a i n i n g which saw a l a r g e number of non-Malays being sent to the United Kingdom during the m i d - f i f t i e s . The Malay school teachers continued t h e i r p r o t e s t s both w i t h i n UMNO and by e n l i s t i n g the support of the Malay vernacular press f o r t h e i r cause. In view of these developments, the A l l i a n c e p a r t y , had promised to review the educational system once i t gained v i c t o r y i n the 1955 e l e c t i o n . The Chinese school teachers, l i k e t h e i r Malay counterparts, were an important p o l i t i c a l f o r c e both w i t h i n the MCA and without. They were o f t e n i d e n t i f i e d as the f i r s t Chinese communal leaders and were a c t i v e i n a r t i c u l a t i n g Chinese communal i n t e r e s t s long before MCA was 24 formed. T r a d i t i o n a l reverence to the Chinese school teachers made t h e i r p o s i t i o n a l l the more c r e d i b l e . The c r e a t i o n of the N a t i o n a l schools as envisaged i n the Education Ordinance, 1952 sparked f e a r s among the Chinese school teachers and the Chinese school management 78 committee members. Both of these groups had e a r l i e r formed the United Chinese School Teachers' A s s o c i a t i o n (UCSTA) and the A l l - M a l a y a Chinese School Management Committee A s s o c i a t i o n (CSMS) to serve j o i n t l y as single-purpose i n t e r e s t a s s o c i a t i o n s . Both the UCSTA and the CSMC members feared that the Chinese schools were being threatened as the p o s s i b i l i t y of withdrawal of finances loomed l a r g e . Understandably, the Chinese school teachers were much d i s t r e s s e d over any perceived threat of c l o s u r e f o r that would mean only one t h i n g - the l o s s of a formerly secure job. Thus they began to p r o t e s t and demanded that the Chinese vernacular schools must be safeguarded at a l l c o s t s . Beginning i n e a r l y 1954 the MCA defended the p o s i t i o n of the UCSTA and the CSMC. Tan Cheng Lock explained that the Chinese were "genuinely f r i g h t e n e d that i t i s the Government's idea to e l i m i n a t e Chinese s c h o o l s . " He was furthermore quoted as saying that "the Chinese s t r o n g l y object to having E n g l i s h and Malay c l a s s e s i n Chinese schools. They say i t i s the t h i n edge of the wedge towards the c l o s i n g of 25 Chinese schools". E a r l y i n January, 1955, the MCA leaders took up the matter w i t h the UMNO lea d e r s . In a meeting between the representa-t i v e s of the MCA's C e n t r a l Advisory Committee on Education, the UCSTA, the CSMC, the MIC's Malayan Indian Education Committee and the UMNO, the f u t u r e of the Chinese and Tamil schools was discussed. I t was als o agreed that the Chinese would drop t h e i r demands to have Chinese made the t h i r d o f f i c i a l language i n r e t u r n f o r a promise that the A l l i a n c e would continue to support the non-government schools when a n a t i o n a l 79 school was a v a i l a b l e a f t e r the e l e c t i o n s . Thus, f o r these f u r t h e r reasons, the A l l i a n c e went to the e l e c t i o n s w i t h a promise to review the e x i s t i n g school system. Motives and Aims of the P o l i c y Makers The major p r i o r i t y of the A l l i a n c e government i n 1955 was to e s t a b l i s h a n a t i o n a l education system. In August of that year the Tunku i n d i c a t e d that the Government would examine new ideas f o r n a t i o n a l education because the e x i s t i n g " n a t i o n a l schools had not been found 27 popular". Obviously, the task must have been viewed as one of great . importance, judging from the f a c t that UMNO's second senior-most l e a d e r , Dato Abdul Razak, was appointed to the post of M i n i s t e r of Education. Two f a c t o r s seem to have been paramount i n the minds of the p o l i c y makers w i t h regard to the education p o l i c y . F i r s t l y , there was the need to upgrade the Malay language b e f i t t i n g i t s s t a t u s as the n a t i o n a l language. Secondly, i n view of the ongoing Emergency and the th r e a t i t posed on the f u t u r e of the country there was a f e e l i n g that the school system should be used to s o c i a l i z e f u t u r e Malayan c i t i z e n s and i n c u l c a t e a sentiment of l o y a l t y towards the country. The d e s i r e to make Malay the medium of i n s t r u c t i o n i n a l l Malay schools represents an attempt to f o r c e f u l l y persuade the non-Malays to accept "a c u l t u r a l u n i f o r m i t y 28 based on Malay c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s " . Without doubt the language i s s u e i s a s i g n i f i c a n t aspect of Malay n a t i o n a l i s m . There was an awareness among the Malay leaders that the d i v e r s e school system was d i r e c t l y 80 r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the conti n u i n g d i v i s i o n of the Malayan s o c i e t y i n t o communal compartments. Since i t was evident that Malay p o l i t i c a l supremacy was the backbone of the system, i t was f e l t that the Malay language should serve as a b a s i s on which c u l t u r a l u n i f o r m i t y would be b u i l t . The Malay leaders were w e l l aware of the pressure from the Malay community f o r a more Malay based education system. By advocating a Malay-oriented education system, i t was f e l t that there would be greater m a t e r i a l advantage f o r the Malays, and more avenues would be opened f o r the h i t h e r t o disadvantaged Malays. There was a profound d e s i r e among the moderate A l l i a n c e leaders 29 to " b r i n g the d i f f e r e n t races i n the country together . . . ," a l i n e of reasoning not hard to fathom. A s u b s t a n t i a l l y l a r g e number of the 30 • A l l i a n c e leaders were English-educated. They were c e r t a i n that the cosmopolitan i n f l u e n c e had been r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e i r seemingly moderate stand i n a system wrought w i t h extreme communal cleavages. There was p a r t i c u l a r s t r e s s on the need to b r i n g a l l the races together to s o c i a l i z e f u t u r e c i t i z e n s w i t h values compatible w i t h the i d e a l s of a u n i f i e d Malayan n a t i o n . The Government was a l s o determined to g a in e f f e c t i v e c o n t r o l of the education system. The Chinese schools p a r t i c u l a r l y had remained independent of the mainstream of educational development i n Malaya. This independence without doubt had l e d a s u b s t a n t i a l l y l a r g e number of schools to be used as the r e c r u i t i n g 31 ground f o r subversive elements. In view of the Emergency, t h i s t h r e a t must have been very r e a l . The Government d e c i s i o n to withdraw 81 f i n a n c i a l a s s i s t a n c e to independent Chinese schools, to impose s t r i c t e r c o n t r o l of the r e g i s t r a t i o n of schools and of the members of the teaching p r o f e s s i o n a l l seem to conform to the need to have a c t u a l extension of Federal Government c o n t r o l . There were, however, c e r t a i n c r u c i a l p o i n t s l e f t ambiguous. For example, the question of languages to be used i n the examinations was not c l e a r l y defined. S i m i l a r l y , the type of common content s y l l a b u s and standardized examinations that were to be encouraged remained unclear. The A l l i a n c e leaders who formulated the Razak Report must have been aware of these a m b i g u i t i e s . The moderate western educated e l i t e such as Tunku,Dato Razak, Mohd. K h i r J o h a r i , Tan Siew S i n , V. T. Sambanthan and Dr. Lim Chong Eu, had simultaneously posed as n a t i o n a l spokesmen, ethnic agents and a r t i c u l a t o r s of western values which they f e l t were u s e f u l f o r the country. The m u l t i p l i c i t y of r o l e s of the p o l i c y makers could e a s i l y p a r a l y z e the working of the system, but the Malayan leaders were able to leave c e r t a i n c o n t r o v e r s i a l i s s u e s s u i t a b l y ambiguous so that the machinery of government could solve them as they were a p p l i e d or when they become c o n t r o v e r s i a l . As i d e n t i f i e d 32 by Cynthia Enloe, the " p o l i t i c s of ambiguity" i s i d e a l l y s u i t e d f o r a government to cope w i t h problems posed by p o t e n t i a l l y d i v i s i v e f orces of e t h n i c h o s t i l i t i e s . However, the many ambiguities inherent i n the 1957 Ordinance were g r a d u a l l y tightened i n the subsequent education r e p o r t of 1961 under the chairmanship of the new M i n i s t e r of Education, Abdul Rahman b i n T a l i b . 82 P o l i c y Impact and Communal Responses The acceptance of the Razak Report demonstrated a t y p i c a l A l l i a n c e s t y l e of p o l i t i c s . Much of the p o l i t i c a l disagreement w i t h i n the A l l i a n c e was resolved behind closed doors and thus p u b l i c v o t i n g i n the Assembly was g e n e r a l l y u n i f i e d , even though i n d i v i d u a l members tended to express t h e i r concern over p a r t i c u l a r aspects of the p o l i c y being debated. The va r i o u s p o s i t i o n s of the three communal p a r t i e s were made known to the pr e s s , and members l e t t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l p o s i t i o n be known to the p u b l i c by means of the u s u a l o f f - t h e - r e c o r d technique. U s u a l l y a barrage of claims and counter-claims preceded the making of the compromises. These c l a i m s , however, d i d not seem to a f f e c t the o v e r a l l outcome of the p o l i c y . There was always the danger that i n c l o s e personal contacts between the members of the three p a r t i e s , agreements, would be reached that were at times too compromising f o r the more c h a u v i n i s t i c a l l y i n c l i n e d members of the party. This p a t t e r n was c l e a r l y i n evidence when the Razak Report was presented i n the L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l f o r approval. The o n l y persons who objected to the report were those who had not been i n v o l v e d i n i t s p r e p a r a t i o n or were not part of the top echelon of the components of the A l l i a n c e p a r t y . Whatever d i s s a t i s -f a c t i o n there was among the C o u n c i l members was l a r g e l y contained by 33 Dr. I s m a i l b i n Dato Abdul Rahman's c a l l f o r communal t o l e r a n c e . Thus, when the votes were counted there was unanimous support f o r the Report and t h i s Report subsequently became the Education Ordinance, 1957. 83 Outside the Legislative Council, Malay school teachers generally were jubilant with the expansion of Malay educational opportunities and the prospect of improved income and rapid promotion. However, in less than two years the FMSTA and its members became disillusioned over what they considered was an excessive delay on the part of the Government in implementing the provisions of the Razak Report. First, they had hoped that their status would be enhanced without additional qualifications being imposed. They were thus much perturbed when the Government announced in July, 1956, that they would have to sit for an examination equivalent to the Lower Certificate of Education in order to become qualified to teach in the national schools. They were also dissatisfied that Malay secondary schools were not being set up as promised. As a result, the FMSTA submitted a memorandum to the Minister of Education calling for the immediate implementation of Malay as the sole medium of instruction in a l l Malayan schools, and requesting that a l l Malay schools be automatically converted into standard or national schools. In addition, they demanded withdrawal of the directive making the Malay school teachers sit for the LCE examination. The memorandum furthermore wanted an immediate establishment of Malay secondary 35 schools. The FMSTA gave the Government t i l l February, 1958 to meet the demands after which i t announced that i t would call on its 10,000 36 members to withdraw their support from the UMNO. The Malay press too 84 j o i n e d the v o l l e y of p r o t e s t . Utusan Melayu, f o r example, reminded Dato Razak that since he was a Malay he should act i n such a way to 37 make the Malay school teachers happy. The top UMNO leaders were apparently i n no p o s i t i o n t o be adamant i n t h e i r stand. In June, 1957, the Government announced that i t was postponing the s p e c i a l examinations f o r the Malay teachers u n t i l 1958. The Tunku then began a long process of p l a c a t i n g the Malay school teachers. He explained that the reason f o r the delay i n s e t t i n g up secondary schools was a l a c k of teachers, and that the schools would be set up as soon as the teachers sent abroad to be t r a i n e d returned. In a d d i t i o n , the new Education M i n i s t e r , Mohd. K h i r b i n J o h a r i , gave assurance that Malay medium c l a s s e s would be s t a r t e d i n e x i s t i n g E n g l i s h schools w i t h i n the next three months. But a l l these moves to pl a c a t e the school teachers were i n v a i n . In e a r l y February of 1958, the FMSTA organized s e v e r a l r a l l i e s and demonstrations against the Government. In Kota Baru, the demonstra-38 t i o n s r e s u l t e d i n student r i o t s . Furthermore, the Pan Malayan I s l a m i c P a r t y (PMIP) and Dato Onn's P a r t y Negara (PN) a c t i v e l y supported the FMSTA i n i t s stand. UMNO leaders were understandably d i s t u r b e d over a l l these developments. As a r e f l e c t i o n of the .concern the 1958 UMNO General Assembly accepted a motion presented by the Penang de l e g a t i o n which c a l l e d f o r "a peac e f u l s o l u t i o n to those members who had 39 resigned over the Malay education row to r e t u r n to UMNO." 85 Following the UMNO Annual General Meeting, Tunku t r i e d t o come to an agreement w i t h the Malay school teachers f o r he was c e r t a i n that t h e i r support would determine UMNO's success at the forthcoming 1959 E l e c t i o n s . In September 21, 1958. a de l e g a t i o n representing the FMSTA, headed by i t s President Mohamad Noor b i n Ahmad, met w i t h the Tunku, Dato Abdul Razak and Mohd. K h i r J o h a r i i n a round t a b l e conference. In the ensuing d i s c u s s i o n s , Tunku agreed to the demands of the FMSTA that Malay be made the medium of i n s t r u c t i o n i n a l l primary and standard-type schools by January, 1959. However, he f e l t t hat Malay could only be introduced 40 i n stages. Soon a f t e r , the Government e s t a b l i s h e d f i f t y - o n e Malay-medium secondary c l a s s e s i n e x i s t i n g secondary schools f o r those c h i l d r e n whose parents had i n d i c a t e d that they wished to attend. In a d d i t i o n , the Government opened the f i r s t Malay medium secondary school at Ipoh i n May, 1959. I t was named the Sekolah Tunku Abdul Rahman. Nevertheless, the a g i t a t i o n s of the Malay school teachers were indeed d i f f i c u l t to be assuaged. UMNO's poor showing i n the East Coast s t a t e s of Kelantan and Trengganu during the 1959 e l e c t i o n s , while c e r t a i n l y not wholly a t t r i b u t a b l e to the teachers' d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n , 41 cannot e n t i r e l y be explained i n terms of other causes. However, w i t h the implementation of the Rahman T a l i b Report there was a marked redu c t i o n i n Malay d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n e s p e c i a l l y from the Malay school teachers. In regard to the question of a q u a l i f y i n g examination, the M i n i s t r y of Education permitted the Malay teachers to be employed as 86 teachers by p l a c i n g them i n a separate category, and made the LCE the minimum q u a l i f i c a t i o n f o r new r e c r u i t s to the teaching p r o f e s s i o n . As mentioned e a r l i e r , the Education Ordinance, 1957, ended Government ambivalence regarding the p o s i t i o n of Malay i n the education system. Following the enactment of the Ordinance, a l l schools had to teach the Malay language e i t h e r as the medium of i n s t r u c t i o n or as a subject language i n order to q u a l i f y f o r government a s s i s t a n c e . The Malay language a l s o became a compulsory language f o r a l l government run examinations. Thus, the Chinese schools which had h i t h e r t o avoided teaching the Malay language were now forced to teach i t or face the withdrawal of government funding. When the Razak p l a n was f i r s t presented, i t won the approval of a l l communities. There were s e v e r a l reasons f o r t h i s . F i r s t , the Committee which had d r a f t e d the Report was composed of r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s from the three p a r t i e s of the A l l i a n c e . Secondly, many Chinese f e l t that the MCA would adequately represent Chinese i n t e r e s t s and seek to safeguard the p r a c t i c e of Chinese secondary schools i n using Kuo Yu as the general medium of i n s t r u c t i o n . T h i r d l y , when the A l l i a n c e contested i t s f i r s t f e d e r a l e l e c t i o n i n 1955, i t s manifesto pledged that i t would " r e o r i e n t a t e education to a Malayan outlopk" and i t hastened to add that the A l l i a n c e would " a l l o w v e r n a c u l a r schools t h e i r normal 42 expansion". In other words, the emphasis was on the content of education r a t h e r than making Malay the medium of i n s t r u c t i o n f o r a l l Malayan schools. Thus, the non-Malays had no reason to be apprehensive over the Report and t h e r e f o r e granted i t unanimous support. The 87 Chinese were impressed that the p o l i c y agreed upon d i d not c a l l f o r any immediate or s u b s t a n t i a l concessions. The Chinese school system d i d not appear to be i n any danger. But the Chinese mistook f l e x i b i l i t y of methods f o r u n c e r t a i n goals. Perhaps the ambiguous nature of the document was p a r t l y the reason f o r t h i s question. The timing of the r e l e a s e of the Report was an important f a c t o r . At the time the Report was being prepared and when i t was r e l e a s e d , n e g o t i a t i o n s were underway between the members of the A l l i a n c e regarding the A l l i a n c e bargain and the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c o n t r a c t . The non-Malay members of the A l l i a n c e r i g h t l y f e l t that a concession on the medium of i n s t r u c t i o n was indeed a small p r i c e to pay f o r the extension of c i t i z e n s h i p r i g h t s . Thus, the MCA and the MIC e l i t e chose not to r a i s e any o b j e c t i o n s to the p r o v i s i o n s of the Razak Report when i t was re l e a s e d . However, o b j e c t i o n s to the p r o v i s i o n s of the Report i n t e n s i f i e d when i t became c l e a r that the Chinese medium schools would have to administer the LCE examinations i n e i t h e r E n g l i s h or Malay, not i n Chinese as had p r e v i o u s l y been done. The UCSTA i n p a r t i c u l a r argued that since t h e i r p u p i l s knew very l i t t l e E n g l i s h or Malay they should be allowed to take t h e i r examination i n the medium i n which they had been i n s t r u c t e d . They a l s o maintained that the way the examination was being conducted v i o l a t e d the A l l i a n c e e l e c t i o n promises made i n 1955. Thus, they were moved to submit a memorandum o u t l i n i n g t h e i r grievances, but i t made no headway. Next they threatened a boycott of a l l Chinese students s i t t i n g f o r the examination and t h i s seemed to work. Dato Razak, who had e a r l i e r 88 been f i r m , r e l e n t e d and agreed to a temporary postponement of the examination and to the use of Kuo Yu f o r another year as the medium of i n s t r u c t i o n and examination. This unexpected success of the UCSTA was viewed as a v i c t o r y of a s o r t f o r i t s Pre s i d e n t Lim Lean Geok, whom Tan Siew S i n had 43 i d e n t i f i e d as "the most powerful man i n Malaya today . . . ." Encouraged by t h i s Lim began clamouring f o r even more changes i n the Education Ordinance, 1957. More s p e c i f i c a l l y , he and h i s o r g a n i z a t i o n r e j e c t e d the p a r t of the Report that s t r e s s e d that e v e n t u a l l y Malay would be the medium of i n s t r u c t i o n i n a l l schools. They wanted the Chinese language to be taught f o r at l e a s t a t h i r d of the time and more imp o r t a n t l y to have the LCE and the FMCE examinations conducted i n the language of i n s t r u c t i o n f o r e v e r . The mounting d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n and p r o t e s t s by a prominent and i n f l u e n t i a l sector of the Chinese community obviously alarmed the MCA l e a d e r s . In an apparent attempt to make a d i s p l a y of o r g a n i z i n g the Chinese to consider the Razak Report, the MCA r e v i v e d the C e n t r a l Education Committee which had remained dormant since the 1954 White Paper p r o t e s t s . In February of 1957, the MCA sponsored a conference of Chinese e d u c a t i o n i s t s of which the UCSTA and the CSMC were the most prominent. Much to the c o n s t e r n a t i o n of the moderate MCA l e a d e r s , the Conference promptly " r e j e c t e d " as "unacceptable" the A l l i a n c e Government's education p o l i c y as a p p l i e d to the Chinese schools. I t 89 a l s o appointed a de l e g a t i o n on i t s own t o approach the Government t o 44 secure r e v i s i o n s to the Razak p l a n . The MCA's lea d e r s h i p suddenly found i t s e l f i n a s i t u a t i o n of c o n t r a d i c t i o n and confusion. On the one hand, they were an i n t e g r a l part of the A l l i a n c e Government and wanted to be counted as l o y a l Malayans supporting and i d e n t i f y i n g themselves c l o s e l y w i t h the A l l i a n c e p o l i c y . Yet,on the other hand, the MGA's lea d e r s h i p had to act as the custodian of Chinese language and c u l t u r e and consequently moved to pressure the Government to act to safeguard the i n t e r e s t s of the Chinese community. However, the moderate MCA leaders c l e a r l y perceived a p o s s i b l e break i n c o r d i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h the UMNO i f th'ey questioned the p r o v i s i o n s of the Razak Report which was part of the A l l i a n c e bargain. Thus, the MCA leaders chose not to press the i s s u e and adopted a non-committal stand. The MCA le a d e r s h i p ' s d e c i s i o n not t o rock the A l l i a n c e boat created an impression among the more c h a u v i n i s t i c a l l y i n c l i n e d members of the s o c i e t y that the p a r t y was c a p i t u l a t i n g to the more aggressive Malay l e a d e r s . Since the MCA could not push f o r a more p o s i t i v e stand i n safeguarding Chinese i n t e r e s t s , many Chinese i n c r e a s i n g l y turned to the PPP and the Labour P a r t y to a r t i c u l a t e i s s u e s p e r t a i n i n g to Chinese i n t e r e s t s . W i t h i n the MCA i t s e l f , there was i n c r e a s i n g 45 d i s i l l u s i o n m e n t w i t h the 'Old Guards.' This d i s i l l u s i o n m e n t u l t i m a t e l y l e d to the formation of a new f a c t i o n i n the MCA which, while r e c o g n i z i n g the merit of remaining w i t h the A l l i a n c e , was a l s o 90 sympathetic to the p o l i t i c a l demands a r t i c u l a t e d by the more communal elements of the Chinese s o c i e t y . S t a r t i n g i n mid-November, 1957, there were se r i o u s disturbances i n Malay Chinese schools i n Penang, Ipoh, Kuala Lumpur and Seremban, over the question of the language to be used i n the Government examinations. The students who took to r i o t i n g were l a r g e l y backed by t h e i r teachers, o b j e c t i n g to the p r i n c i p l e that Malay should be the medium f o r the Government sponsored LCE examinations f o r a l l students, even those educated i n the Chinese medium schools. In the face of mounting v i o l e n c e , the Government closed a l l Chinese schools f o r a 46 week beginning November 17, 1957. The MCA as a member of the A l l i a n c e was i n no p o s i t i o n e i t h e r to condone the a c t i o n of the students or to take up a defensive p o s i t i o n i n t h e i r favour. Thus, the MCA leadership chose to weather the storm without doing anything. The non-action of the MCA contrasted sharply w i t h the way the PPP went to the rescue of the students a r r e s t e d by the p o l i c e . D. R. Seenivasagam and h i s brother S. P. Seenivasagam, the two leaders of the PPP, p e r s o n a l l y helped b a i l them out en masse i n Ipoh. In 47 a d d i t i o n , they promised to defend them when formal charges were l a i d . The prompt a c t i o n by the PPP immediately began to pay dividends to the p a r t y . At t h i s time there was a vacancy f o r the Federal L e g i s l a t i v e seat i n the Ipoh-Menglembu c o n s t i t u e n c y , and the PPP promptly contested i t . The leaders of s e v e r a l powerful Chinese 48 A s s o c i a t i o n s and Guilds swung i n favour of the PPP. On November 91 23, 1957, the PPP candidate, D. R. Seenivasagam scored a resounding v i c t o r y when he defeated Yap Y i n Fah (MCA). This v i c t o r y was indeed a sweet one f o r him, f o r only two years e a r l i e r he had p o l l e d a mere 49 808 votes and had l o s t h i s d e p o s i t . The v i c t o r y of D. R. Seenivasagam gave him a n a t i o n a l p l a t f o r m to argue that the MCA could no longer be r e l i e d upon as the spokesman of Chinese i n t e r e s t s . I n c r e a s i n g l y h i s speeches and deeds were given f r o n t page coverage i n the Chinese press and he became a s o r t of n a t i o n a l hero f o r the Chinese. A l l these developments profoundly d i s t u r b e d the MCA l e a d e r s . The events i n Ipoh d i r e c t l y c o n t r i b u t e d to i n c r e a s i n g r e s t l e s s -ness among the younger Chinese-educated members. They were determined to do something to a r r e s t the sagging support f o r the MCA. Thus, there was a c o a l e s c i n g of v a r i o u s i n t e r e s t groups such as UCSTA, the CSMC, the Federation G u i l d and A s s o c i a t i o n , a group of young vaguely s o c i a l i s t o r i e n t e d MCA members, and others. They chose the A l l i a n c e Whip, Dr. Lim Chong Eu, who had by then d i s t i n g u i s h e d himself by countering most of D. R. Seenivasagam's c r i t i c i s m , as t h e i r leader. The ' c o a l i t i o n ' soon challenged the incumbent Tan Cheng Lock and h i s group f o r the l e a d e r s h i p of the MCA. In the process they a l s o declared that they were determined "to p r o t e c t more s t r o n g l y the i n t e r e s t s of the Chinese.""^ This only helped to alarm the moderate Malay leaders. Neither t h e i r support f o r the incumbent MCA leader nor a warning that " A l l i a n c e u n i t y depends on the type of leaders [of. the MCA/ who took 92 o f f i c e , " was able to prevent the defeat of Tan Cheng Lock and h i s f a c t i o n . The Young Turks under Dr. Lim's l e a d e r s h i p captured almost a l l the major posts and Dr. Lim himself was e l e c t e d as the new Presid e n t i n March, 1958. In one of h i s f i r s t p o l i c y statements Dr. Lim dec l a r e d : " F i r s t , we want e q u a l i t y i n t h i s country. Secondly, we are f o r an assurance 52 of our way of l i f e , our language and our schools." He a l s o began c o n s u l t a t i o n s w i t h the M i n i s t e r of Education over the problems of Chinese education. Furthermore, he was able to convince Dato Razak, w i t h whom he had c l o s e r a p p o r t , to head a committee to reexamine the Razak Report i n 1959. However c a u t i o u s , the step-by-step approach was not to the l i k i n g of the UCSTA, and was subjected to r i d i c u l e by the PPP members as w e l l as from the members of the Old Guards. In p a r t i c u l a r , Tan Siew S i n and Ong Yoke L i n were the'most e f f e c t i v e i n p r e s s u r i n g Dr. Lim to take a more d e f i n i t e stand over the education and language i s s u e . In view of a l l these pressures, the MCA was moved i n t o p o s i t i v e a c t i o n . Without w a i t i n g f o r the 1959 e l e c t i o n , a f t e r which the Razak Report would be reviewed, the MCA c a l l e d f o r a n a t i o n a l conference on 54 Chinese education. The meeting was attended by about a thousand r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s from the v a r i o u s g u i l d s and a s s o c i a t i o n s , the members of the UCSTA and the CSMC A c a l l was made at the conference f o r a f a i r and e q u i t a b l e deal f o r Chinese education. While agreeing that compulsory teaching of Malay as a subject i n a l l v e r nacular schools was commendable, 93 the meeting l i s t e d the f o l l o w i n g demands: a. that the mother tongue should be the main medium of i n s t r u c t i o n i n the vernacular schools, b. that the medium of examination should be the same as the medium of i n s t r u c t i o n , c. that the renumeration f o r Chinese school teachers should be on par w i t h o t h e r s , d. that budgeting should give a f a i r share to the Chinese schools, e. that the Government should increa s e the e x i s t i n g grant to the Chinese schools by 100 per cent.55 Dr. Lim, apparently r e a l i s i n g the t h r e a t to the harmonious r e l a t i o n s between UMNO and the MCA posed by the conference, cautioned the conference members to broaden t h e i r view and urged them that " a l l those i n t e r e s t e d 56 i n Chinese education keep i n mind the problems of other communities." But before h i s pleas of c a u t i o n could have any e f f e c t on the UCSTA, the M i n i s t e r of Education, Mohd. K h i r J o h a r i , i n an attempt to get tough w i t h the Chinese school teachers, issued a d i r e c t i v e that Chinese school teachers, r e g a r d l e s s of t h e i r t r a i n i n g or experience, must s i t f o r an examination (equivalent to the LCE) i n the Malay language i n order to be considered f o r entrance i n t o the proposed U n i f i e d Teaching Scheme. The UCSTA and i t s 7,000 strong members were now i n a s t a t e of great apprehension. In an e x t r a o r d i n a r y delegates conference, they decided to boycott the examinations. In an apparent move to f o r c e the issue on the MCA, they c a l l e d on the p a r t y t o i n c o r p o r a t e i n t o the 94 A l l i a n c e E l e c t i o n Manifesto t h e i r demands concerning Chinese education i n c l u d i n g the p r o v i s i o n that examinations be given i n the Chinese 58 language. In a d d i t i o n , Lim Lean Geok and Chin Chee Meow, the CSMC r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , presented Dr. Lim w i t h an ultimatum that only " i f t h e i r demands were included i n the A l l i a n c e Manifesto, . . . would they c a l l 59 upon the Chinese i n the country to vote f o r the A l l i a n c e . " In an apparent move to show the UCSTA and the CSMC that the MCA had i n f a c t approached the Tunku w i t h a s i m i l a r demand, the p a r t y ' s P u b l i c i t y Chairman Yung Pung How made p u b l i c a c o n f i d e n t i a l l e t t e r dated June 24, 1958, from Dr. Lim to the Tunku which'had remained unanswered. In the l e t t e r Dr. Lim, among other t h i n g s , had asked that "The A l l i a n c e manifesto should i n d i c a t e c l e a r l y that the party intends to review i n general the implementation of i t s education p o l i c y i n the l i g h t of experiences over the past two y e a r s . T h i s l e t t e r was followed by a statement by Yung Pung How t h a t : I f we do not succeed i n g e t t i n g what we t h i n k i s f a i r the MCA General Committee w i l l decide on J u l y 12, whether we f i g h t under the A l l i a n c e banner or on our own . . . . The MCA w i l l stand a b s o l u t e l y f i r m on the i s s u e of Chinese education and the a l l o c a t i o n of seats f o r the MCA . . . .61 The Tunku was i n f u r i a t e d by the imprudent a c t i o n , and f e l t that the u p s t a r t MCA leader had breached mutual t r u s t and l o y a l t y . He t h e r e f o r e r e p l i e d i n a scathing l e t t e r thus: I t i s obvious that your i n t e n t i o n i s to break from the A l l i a n c e and i t o f f e r s me and others i n the A l l i a n c e no room f o r d i s c u s s i o n , p a r t i c u l a r l y as 95 you have made the terms of your demands p u b l i c and unequivocal . . . . Undeterred, we w i l l f i g h t the e l e c t i o n s as the A l l i a n c e w i t h the MIC and those members of the MCA, who do not support your stand and b e l i e v e i n the honest i n t e n t i o n s and i n t e g r a t i o n of the A l l i a n c e Party.62 Dr. Lim immediately reacted to t h i s move by approaching the Tunku to make amends, but the Tunku was determined to deal w i t h the breach of c o n t r a c t . F o l l o w i n g an Emergency UMNO General Assembly meeting on J u l y 12, to d i s c u s s the c r i s i s , the Tunku l a i d down h i s c o n d i t i o n s f o r readmi t t i n g the MCA. He f e l t , "We cannot end t h i s c r i s i s i f £5r. L i m 7 does not withdraw the threat e n i n g l e t t e r and expel those i r r e s p o n s i b l e 63 members who created the c r i s i s . " Dr. Lim then took these terms to the Emergency meeting of the MCA C e n t r a l Working Committee. He r e i t e r a t e d t h a t : I t i s not l i k e l y we w i l l be a l l o c a t e d 32 seats . . . /the education/clause w i l l not be included i n the manifesto. The Government w i l l implement i t by a d m i n i s t r a t i v e d i r e c t i v e as soon as possible.64 Dr. Lim a l s o f e l t the shortcoming of the MCA during the J u l y c r i s i s was the l a c k of u n i t y among the members of the MCA. " I f today the 65 MCA had s o l i d l y u n i t e d , the problem would be very much e a s i e r . " The MCA C e n t r a l Working Committee conceded to the terms put forward 66 by the Tunku by a vote of 89 to 60. Following t h i s v i r t u a l surrender and the defeat of the 'ultra-communal f a c t i o n ' there was a f l o o d of r e s i g n a t i o n s from the rank and f i l e of the MCA. Yong Pung How, the P u b l i c i t y Chairman, Too Joon Hing, the Secretary General, Chin See Y i n and S. M. Yong, among others tendered r e s i g n a t i o n s . In 96 d i s g u s t over the manner i n which MCA had c a p i t u l a t e d to the Tunku, Yong Pung How suggested that the "MCA had o u t l i v e d i t s usefulness and i s no longer able to c a r r y out even the main ob j e c t s f o r which i t „67 was formed. The p o s i t i o n of Dr. Lim was now tenuous e s p e c i a l l y w i t h the resurgence of the Old Guards under the stewardship of Tari Siew Sin and Ong Yoke L i n . I n c r e a s i n g l y he was i s o l a t e d from the the mainstream of MCA-UMNO l i a i s o n . To make matters even worse, h i s name was conspicuously absent from the l i s t of candidates f o r the forthcoming e l e c t i o n s . Following t h i s Dr. Lim tendered h i s r e s i g n a t i o n as MCA Pres i d e n t and l e f t f o r medical treatment i n the United Kingdom. Dr. Cheah Toon Lok, a c l o s e f r i e n d of the Tunku, was now chosen as the i n t e r i m P r e s i d e n t of the MCA. Without doubt the c r i s i s enhanced the st a t u s of the Tunku, and o p p o s i t i o n to him was thoroughly d i s c r e d i t e d . The A l l i a n c e P a r t y machinery became more coherent and c e n t r a l i z e d than ever before. When the e l e c t i o n r e s u l t s were t a b u l a t e d , i t was apparent that the MCA was the hardest h i t as a r e s u l t of the J u l y c r i s i s . Of the 31 seats i t contested i t won only 19. On the other hand, the PPP and the S o c i a l i s t Front which had championed the Chinese education i s s u e were able to increase t h e i r seats i n the « i • *. 6 8 Parliament. A f t e r the 1959 e l e c t i o n , the MCA's c l a i m of being the only r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of the Chinese community was thoroughly shattered. The p o s i t i o n of UMNO was f u r t h e r strengthened. I t a l s o became apparent that the MCA and the MIC would now have to r e l y on the benevolence of 97 the UMNO to ensure t h e i r continued p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the Government. Since the UMNO was the custodian of Malay i n t e r e s t s i t was now able to a r t i c u l a t e them i n a more f o r c e f u l manner and thereby assure a primacy of Malay i n t e r e s t s . This primacy of Malay i n t e r e s t i n the Government was a l l the more apparent w i t h the r e l e a s e of the Rahman T a l i b Report. Even though there was grassroots d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n over the p r o v i s i o n to end Government a s s i s t a n c e t o Chinese medium secondary schools, the i n t e r i m MCA President declared that i t was "one of the best r e p o r t s to 69 come out of the Government . . . ." Once again the UCSTA and the CSMC prote s t e d the apparent anti-Chinese school p r o v i s i o n s of the Rahman T a l i b report and submitted a memorandum o u t l i n i n g t h e i r disagreements. They a l s o organized a p r o t e s t meeting to which the Chinese G u i l d s , A s s o c i a t i o n s and the MCA were i n v i t e d . But the MCA was not prepared to be put i n an embarrassing p o s i t i o n once again. Therefore the top echelon of the MCA decided not to attend the meeting. In p a r t i c u l a r , Tan Siew S i n argued that the MCA could not support the meeting because "the u l t i m a t e object of the two bodies /JJCSTA and CSMC7 was the r e c o g n i t i o n of Chinese as the o f f i c i a l language." He r e i t e r a t e d h i s party's p o s i t i o n by s t r e s s i n g that the MCA's " p o s i t i o n would be pre j u d i c e d i f we were to j o i n them."^ The UCSTA and the CSMC continued t h e i r p r o t e s t r e g a r d l e s s of the MCA's l a c k of endorsement f o r t h e i r stand. Nevertheless, they were able to get support from the PPP and the S o c i a l i s t Front. But the p r o t e s t s came to an abrupt end when Lim Lean Geok's l i c e n s e to teach was withdrawn. 98 To make matters even more d i f f i c u l t f o r him, the R e g i s t r a r General of C i t i z e n s h i p issued a n o t i c e on August 12, 1961, a n n u l l i n g h i s c i t i z e n s h i p because he had "shown himself by act and speech to be d i s l o y a l or d i s a f f e c t e d to the Federation of Malaya."^"'" Following t h i s , i n October, 1961, the Rahman T a l i b Report was passed w i t h unanimous approval on the p a r t of the A l l i a n c e members but w i t h non-Malay o p p o s i t i o n members d i s s e n t i n g . Aftermath The Rahman T a l i b Report pushed the process of s t a n d a r d i z a t i o n and n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n s e v e r a l steps f u r t h e r and r e a f f i r m e d the bas i c c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c o n t r a c t . The Chinese secondary schools now had no choice but to comply w i t h Government d i r e c t i v e s or face d e r e g i s t r a t i o n . Many were forced to convert to an English-medium as those proved to be more p l a t a b l e than to convert to a Malay-medium of i n s t r u c t i o n . Also the p r o v i s i o n of the Rahman T a l i b Report was s u f f i c i e n t l y ambiguous i n not s t i p u l a t i n g how much E n g l i s h must be used i n the Chinese schools choosing i t as the medium of i n s t r u c t i o n . Many schools continued to use the Chinese language as much as p o s s i b l e . This s i t u a t i o n continued u n t i l 1970 when the new education p o l i c y came i n t o e f f e c t . This w i l l be discussed i n d e t a i l i n the next chapter. Many of the def e c t o r s from the MCA subsequently stood as 99 independent candidates or j o i n e d the PPP or the Labour P a r t y . Too Joon Hing, f o r example, was able to win a Parliamentary seat i n a b y - e l e c t i o n p u r e l y on the i s s u e of the Chinese language and education. His success was followed by the r e t u r n of Dr. Lim from B r i t a i n , t h e i r f r i e n d s h i p was r e v i v e d , and t h i s u l t i m a t e l y l e d to the formation of a new p o l i t i c a l p a r t y , the United Democratic P a r t y (UDP), i n A p r i l , 1962. The UDP stated as i t s p r i n c i p l e "to f i g h t f o r the r i g h t s of non-Malays, e s p e c i a l l y education based on a more reasonable p o l i c y 72 than the Razak Report." As f o r the MCA, i t s leaders chose not to r a i s e the i s s u e i n p u b l i c any more. Perhaps the leaders f e l t t hat the A l l i a n c e bargain was sacrosanct. Of course, there were rumblings of d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n from w i t h i n the rank and f i l e , but these never reached the i n t e n s i t y of the J u l y C r i s i s of 1959. With the MCA choosing not to a r t i c u l a t e the language and education issues f u r t h e r , the o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s adopted them as the l e a d i n g p l a t f o r m planks. Conclusion The language question and the r e l a t e d i s s u e of the medium of i n s t r u c t i o n i n Malayan schools profoundly t e s t e d the v i a b i l i t y of inter-communal cooperation w i t h i n the A l l i a n c e . I t was a serious issue because i t l e d to the r e s i g n a t i o n of a l a r g e number of ' u l t r a -communal' elements from the MCA. While the UMNO emerged stronger out of the c r i s i s , the MCA and, to a l e s s e r e x t e n t , the MIC d e c l i n e d i n t h e i r s t a t u r e as the s o l e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of non-Malay i n t e r e s t . A l s o , the teacher's union emerged as an important p o l i t i c a l f o r c e 1 0 0 as a r e s u l t of the i n t r o d u c t i o n of the medium of i n s t r u c t i o n question. To a c e r t a i n extent both the Malay and Chinese school teachers were important i n ensuring the e l e c t o r a l success of the o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s , notably the PMIP, the PPP and the Labour P a r t y , because these p a r t i e s were more ready to champion the i s s u e p e r t a i n i n g to the i n t e r e s t s of the FMSTA, the UCSTA and the CSMC r e s p e c t i v e l y . The Rahman T a l i b Report by no means ended the controversy over the medium of i n s t r u c t i o n . On the c o n t r a r y , many of the p r o v i s i o n s i n the report caused even more d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n and p r o t e s t s e s p e c i a l l y from the non-Malay. The repercussions of the rep o r t w i l l be d e a l t w i t h i n the the next chapter. 101 Notes 1. F r a n c i s G. C a r n e l l , "The Malayan E l e c t i o n s , " P a c i f i c A f f a i r s V o l . XXVIII (December, 1955), pp. 315-350. 2. R. S. M i l n e , Government and P o l i t i c s i n M a l a y s i a . Boston: Houghton M i f f l i n , 1967, p. 87. 3. Gordon P. Means, op. c i t . , Chapter 12; R. S. M i l n e and Diane K. Mauzy, P o l i t i c s and Government i n M a l a y s i a , Vancouver: U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia P r e s s , 1978, pp. 36-42. 4. Mohamed S u f f i a n b. Hashim, An I n t r o d u c t i o n to the C o n s t i t u t i o n of M a l a y s i a . Kuala Lumpur: Jabatan Chetak Kerajaan, 1972, Chapter 16. 5. R. S. M i l n e and Diane K. Mauzy, op_. c i t . , p. 39. 6. Federation of Malaya, Report of the Education Committee, 1956. Kuala Lumpur: Government P r i n t e r s , 1956, p. 1, as c i t e d i n K. J . Ratnam, Communalism and the  P o l i t i c a l Process i n Malaya, Singapore: U n i v e r s i t y of Malaya P r e s s , 1965, p. 127. 7. Paul Chang Ming Phang, E d u c a t i o n a l Development i n a P l u r a l S o c i e t y : A Malaysian Case Study, Singapore: Academia P u b l i c a t i o n s , 1973, p. 4TTI 8. I b i d . 9. Razak Report, p. 10. I b i d . , p. 4. 11. I b i d . , p. 128. 12. I b i d . , pp. 9-10. 13. I b i d . , p. 12 14. I b i d . 15. I b i d . As c i t e d i n K. J . Ratnam, op. c i t . , p. 127. 16. I b i d . 102 17. Federation of Malaya, Report of the Education Review Committee, (he r e a f t e r c i t e d as Rahman T a l i b Report) Kuala Lumpur: Government P r i n t e r s , 1960, paras. 57 and 61,as c i t e d i n B. Simandjuntak, op_. c i t . , p. 203. 18. Rahman T a l i b Report, p. 3, as c i t e d i n von Vorys, op_. c i t . 19. Rahman T a l i b Report, pp. 29-31, as c i t e d i n R. K. V a s i l , op. c i t . , p. 135. 20. I b i d . 21. Abdul Rahman b i n T a l i b , M i n i s t e r of Education i n a Radio Broad-c a s t , October 23, 1961, Quoted from M i n i s t r y of Information B o o k l e t , (n.d.) p. 5. 22. D a n i e l E. Moore, "The United Malays N a t i o n a l Organization and the 1959 Malayan E l e c t i o n s : A Study of a P o l i t i c a l P a r t y i n A c t i o n i n a Newly Independent S o c i e t y , " Ph.D. D i s s e r t a t i o n , U n i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a , Berkeley, 1960. p. 95 f f . 23. T. R. Fennel, p. 402. 24. Chan Heng Chee, cip_. c i t . , p. 68. 25. Malay M a i l , November 8, 1954, as c i t e d i n T. R. Fennel, op_. c i t . , p. 407. 26. T. R. Fennel, op_. c i t . , pp. 414-415. 27. Malay M a i l , August 11, 1955, as c i t e d i n T. R. Fennel, p. 422. 28. K. J . Ratnam, op_. c i t . , p. 132. 29. Abdul Rahman b. T a l i b , M i n i s t e r of Education, Radio Broadcast, p. 1. 30. Leo Ah Bang, " E l i t e Cohesion i n Ma l a y s i a : A Study of A l l i a n c e Leadership," M.S.Sc. T h e s i s , U n i v e r s i t y of Singapore, 1972. 31. Gordon P. Means, op_. c i t . , p. 273 f f . 32. Cynthia H. Enloe, "Issues and I n t e g r a t i o n i n M a l a y s i a , " P a c i f i c A f f a i r s , V o l . X L I , No. 3 ( F a l l 1968), p. 375 f f . 103 33. Federation of Malaya, L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l Debates, 16 May, 1956, Col . 1144-1205 and 1193, as c i t e d i n B. Simandjuntak, p. 201. 34. Gordon P. Means, op_. c i t . , p. 196. 35. Utusan Melayu, A p r i l 22, 1957, and Malay M a i l , A p r i l 22, 1957, as c i t e d i n T. R. Fennel, p. 484. 36. Margaret Roff, "The P o l i t i c s of Language i n Malaya," Asian Survey, V o l . V I I , No. 5(May 1967), p. 321. 37. Malay M a i l , May 27, 1957, as c i t e d i n T. R. Fennel, p. 486. 38. S t r a i t s Times, February 3, 1958, and March 31, 1958. 39. Malay M a i l , May 12, 1958, as c i t e d i n D. E. Moore, p. 97. 40. D a n i e l E. Moore, c>p_. c i t . , p. 97. 41. I b i d . , p. 95 f f . 42. Margaret Roff, "The Malayan Chinese A s s o c i a t i o n , 1948-1965," J o u r n a l of Southeast Asian H i s t o r y , V o l . 6, No. 2 (1965) p. 50. 43. Frank H. H. King, op_. c i t . , p. 40. 44. S t r a i t s Times, February 4, 1957, and February 25, 1957. 45. J . D. Vaughan, The Manner and Customs of the Chinese of the S t r a i t s Settlements. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1971. passim. 46. S t r a i t s Times, November 18, 1957. 47. R. K. V a s i l , op_. c i t . , p. 232. 48. I b i d . , p. 233. 49. I b i d . , p. 232. 50. S t r a i t s Times, March 3, 1958. 51. I b i d . , March 22, 1958. 104 52. LbisL , December 1, 1958. 53. D a n i e l E. Moore, op. c i t . , p. 235. 54. S t r a i t s Times. March 24, 1958. 55. I b i d . . A p r i l 27, 1959. 56. Malay M a i l . A p r i l 28, 1959. 57. Singapore Standard. June 2, 1959, as c i t e d i n D a n i e l E.. Moore, op. c i t . , p. 2 06. 58. S t r a i t s Times. J u l y 6, 1959. 59. D a n i e l E. Moore, op_. c i t . , p. 207. 60. S t r a i t s Times, J u l y 10, 1959. 61. I b i d . 62. I b i d . , J u l y 11, 1959. 63. I b i d . , J u l y 13, 1959. 64. I b i d . 65. I b i d . , J u l y 14, 1959. 66. I b i d . 67. I b i d . 68. T.\ ,E. Smith, "The Malayan General E l e c t i o n of 1959," P a c i f i c A f f a i r s , V o l . 33, No. 1, (March 1960), p. 46. 69. S t r a i t s Times, August 6, 1960. 70. Quoted from the Minutes of the MCA C e n t r a l Working Committee, November 4, 1960, as c i t e d i n Chan Heng Chee, p. 71. 71. Chan Heng Chee, op_. £it•, p. 141; R. K. V a s i l , op. £it. , p. 243. 72. Gordon P. Means, op. c i t . , p. 247. 105 CHAPTER V THE ALLIANCE GOVERNMENT, 1962-1971 This period was a tu r b u l e n t one i n the p o l i t i c s of Malaysia. A r a p i d s e r i e s of events profoundly a f f e c t e d the f u t u r e p o l i t i c s of the n a t i o n . In 1963, the Federation was enlarged to in c l u d e the Borneo T e r r i t o r i e s and Singapore."'" Two years l a t e r Singapore was ex p e l l e d from the Federation. B r i e f but traumatic r a c i a l r i o t s occurred i n Kuala Lumpur f o l l o w i n g the May 1969 e l e c t i o n s . Then followed twenty months of emergency r u l e by the N a t i o n a l Operations Co u n c i l (NOC). Parliament was reconvened under a new Prime M i n i s t e r i n 1971, and issues that had caused c o n t r o v e r s i e s were removed from the realm of p u b l i c d i s c u s s i o n by a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l amendment i n the same year. Education and the medium of i n s t r u c t i o n questions were important issues interwoven i n the f a b r i c of the p o l i t i c s of t h i s p e r i o d , e s p e c i a l l y during the l a t t e r h a l f of the p e r i o d . There- were p r o t e s t s over the implementation of the Rahman T a l i b Report. But t h i s time the MCA was c a r e f u l not to be i d e n t i f i e d w i t h any such p r o t e s t s . The iss u e was th e r e f o r e taken over and a m p l i f i e d by the non-Malay opposi-t i o n p a r t i e s . The Government a l s o undertook c e r t a i n measures to lessen the ambiguities inherent i n the education system and u l t i m a t e l y ended i t s ambivalence w i t h regard to the question of the medium of i n s t r u c t i o n i n Malaysian schools. 106 Major P o l i t i c a l Events In P e n i n s u l a r M a l a y s i a , the A l l i a n c e Government, whose term of o f f i c e d i d not e x p i r e u n t i l August 1964, decided to hold s t a t e and Federal e l e c t i o n s on A p r i l 25th, 1964. The o v e r r i d i n g i s s u e of the 2 e l e c t i o n was Indonesia's c o n f r o n t a t i o n over the formation of M a l a y s i a . The e l e c t i o n f o rced the a n t i - M a l a y s i a o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s , n o t a b l y the Pan Malayan I s l a m i c P a r t y (PMIP), the S o c i a l i s t F ront, the United Democratic P a r t y (UDP) and the People's P r o g r e s s i v e P a r t y , to choose between supporting Malaysia as a f a i t accompli or g i v i n g the appearance of rendering support to Malaysia's f o r e i g n aggressor. A s u r p r i s i n g development of the e l e c t i o n was the entry of the People's A c t i o n P a r t y (PAP), c a s t i n g i t s e l f i n the mould of a " f r i e n d , l o y a l o p p o s i t i o n and 3 c r i t i c . " The e l e c t i o n brought a resounding v i c t o r y f o r the A l l i a n c e Government,for i t won 80 of 104 seats contested. However, the entry of the PAP i n t o the p o l i t i c s of the p e n i n s u l a had important r a m i f i c a t i o n s . At f i r s t i t s l e a d e r s , such as Lee Kuan Yew, portrayed themselves as f a r b e t t e r partners than the MCA. Next, the PAP coined a r a t h e r catchy phrase 'Malaysian M a l a y s i a ' b a s i c a l l y meaning r a c i a l e q u a l i t y and i n the process began c h a l l e n g i n g the concept of the 'bargain'. This created a whole new p e r s p e c t i v e and s t i r r e d up o l d f e a r s . The UMNO leaders were quick to sense the dangers of reopening 107 o l d wounds and d w e l l i n g on i s s u e s that had seemingly been solved once and f o r a l l w i t h the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c o n t r a c t . Thus UMNO spurned the PAP's advances and at the same time t r i e d to shore up the MCA w i t h some concessions, but w i t h l i m i t e d success. Once the PAP was repudiated by the Tunku, the PAP r e s o r t e d to p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n , and formed a u n i t e d o p p o s i t i o n f r o n t w i t h the Sarawak United People's P a r t y , the UDP, the PPP, and Machinda of Sarawak. With the exception of the Machinda P a r t y , a l l were known f o r t h e i r preponderant Chinese composition. By inid-1965 what began as a f r i e n d l y contest soon degenerated i n t o an undisguised e f f o r t to m o b i l i z e the non-Malays w i t h a promise of e q u a l i t y and an end to "Malay M a l a y s i a " , and a 4 b i d to s e i z e the r e i n s of the government from the A l l i a n c e . On May 27, 1965, Lee Kuan Yew moved an amendment f o l l o w i n g the Yang-di-Pertuan Agong's speech f o r not i n c l u d i n g the 'Malaysian M a l a y s i a ' matter. And t h a t , i n Tunku's own words, was the "straw that broke the camel's back."^ On J u l y 25, a d e c i s i o n to expel Singapore from Malaysia was made by Tunku w h i l e convalescing i n London a f t e r an o p e r a t i o n . ^ Then on August 9, 1965, the C o n s t i t u t i o n Amendment B i l l e x p e l l i n g Singapore was passed unanimously.^ However, the i s s u e s r a i s e d by the PAP continued under the banner of a new party formed from i t s Malayan wing. This p a r t y , which was named the Democratic A c t i o n Party (DAP), together w i t h the PPP and newly formed Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia (Gerakan) continued w i t h the b a s i c theme of r a c i a l e q u a l i t y . 108 I n c r e a s i n g l y the non-Malay components of the A l l i a n c e seemed unable to defend themselves against the charge of having c a p i t u l a t e d to the Malays. On the other hand, UMNO was subjected to c r i t i c i s m from the more communally o r i e n t e d ' u l t r a s ' . The PMIP's accusations that the UMNO could no longer be r e l i e d upon to advance Malay i n t e r e s t s f u r t h e r l e n t c r e d i b i l i t y to the arguments of the ' u l t r a s ' . In essence there was a growing d i s i l l u s i o n m e n t w i t h the way the A l l i a n c e operated, and a d e f i n i t e swing of vo t e r sentiment away from the party was i n the o f f i n g . The A l l i a n c e Government declared general e l e c t i o n s f o r May 10, 1969. U n l i k e previous e l e c t i o n s , t h i s e l e c t i o n was c h a r a c t e r i -sed by the absence of any s i n g l e o v e r r i d i n g new p o l i t i c a l i s s u e . The A l l i a n c e chose to stand on the b a s i s of i t s past record and t h i s contrasted sharply w i t h the Opposition p a r t i e s who re s o r t e d to a i r i n g 8 p e r e n n i a l communal i s s u e s . The continuous d w e l l i n g on the theme of r a c i a l e q u a l i t y and of having been short changed by the A l l i a n c e bargain sent communal tensions s o a r i n g . The e l e c t i o n r e s u l t s were shocking to the A l l i a n c e P a r t y . I t s f e d e r a l parliamentary s t r e n g t h was reduced to 66 sea t s , and i t 9 p o l l e d only 48.5 percent of the popular vote. The MCA was badly defeated and won only 13 of the 33 seats i t contested. In the State Assembly e l e c t i o n s , the l o s s e s were even more d r a s t i c . The A l l i a n c e once again l o s t Kelantan to the PMIP and t h i s time Penang to the Gerakan. In Perak and Selangor, i t appeared i t could l o s e c o n t r o l , 109 thus r a i s i n g the spectre of a p o s s i b l e non-Malay Menteri Besar (Chief M i n i s t e r ) . In Kedah and Trengganu, the A l l i a n c e won by a reduced margin. The Opposition p a r t i e s , w i t h a strengthened p o s i t i o n , were j u b i l a n t . In an atmosphere of exuberance, the DAP and the Gerakan held s e v e r a l ' v i c t o r y processions'. The Malays i n r e t a l i a t i o n organized a procession on t h e i r own. R a c i a l v i o l e n c e broke out on the n i g h t s of 13 and 14 May, ,1969. The Government took immediate a c t i o n and proclaimed a State of Emergency. Executive a u t h o r i t y normally e x e r c i s e d by the Cabinet was delegated to the D i r e c t o r of Operations, Tun Razak, who a l s o headed the N a t i o n a l Operations C o u n c i l (NOC). 1 0 The MCA at f i r s t d e c l i n e d p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the government owing to i t s r e j e c t i o n by the Chinese e l e c t o r a t e , but l a t e r was coaxed i n t o accepting m i n i s t e r i a l posts/without p o r t f o l i o but w i t h ' S p e c i a l R e s p o n s i b i l i t y ' during the emergency. Several members of the ' u l t r a ' f a c t i o n w i t h i n the UMNO who attempted an ' i n t e r n a l coup' against the Tunku were e x p e l l e d or sent abroad on 'study l e a v e ' . Nonetheless, many of t h e i r demands were subsequently incorporated i n the government's "New Economic P o l i c y " to upgrade the Malays, and a l s o i n the "new education p o l i c y " enunciated j u s t two months a f t e r the r i o t s . The Tunku i n an Independence Day broadcast on August 30, 1970, announced he would r e t i r e . He was replaced by Tun Razak as Prime M i n i s t e r soon a f t e r . I n e a r l y 1 9 7 1 > t h e G o v e r n m e n t issued a White 110 Paper e n t i t l e d Towards N a t i o n a l Harmony, which s t a t e d : I f important s e c t i o n s of the C o n s t i t u t i o n -s e c t i o n s p e r t a i n i n g to the d e l i c a t e compromises among the major races - are attacked . . . i t w i l l c e r t a i n l y arouse f e a r s and emotions I t i s obvious that these v i t a l clauses must, i n the n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t , be protected from the k i n d of debate that questions the very p r i n c i p l e on which the n a t i o n was founded . . . . In order to ensure that i n the f u t u r e the democratic processes w i l l not be used to arouse r a c i a l f e e l i n g s , i t i s proposed that A r t i c l e 10 be amended to give power to the Parliament to pass laws p r o h i b i t i n g the questioning of any matter, r i g h t , s t a t u s , p o s i t i o n , p r i v i l e g e , sovereignty or perogative e s t a b l i s h e d or protected by the P r o v i -sions of Part I I I ( p r o v i s i o n s r e l a t i n g to c i t i z e n s h i p ) ; A r t i c l e 152 (the N a t i o n a l language and the languages of other communities), A r t i c l e 153 ( s p e c i a l p o s i t i o n of the Malay and the l e g i t i m a t e i n t e r e s t s of other communities) or A r t i c l e 181 (the Sovereignty of the r u l e r s . Tun Razak stat e d soon a f t e r : "I. hope the amendments w i l l be approved, 12 otherwise I r e g r e t we cannot r e t u r n t o the parliamentary democracy." When the votes were taken on the C o n s t i t u t i o n a l (Amendment) B i l l , the Gerakan, the PMIP, SUPP, SNAP and the A l l i a n c e voted i n favour of the B i l l ; the only o p p o s i t i o n to i t came from the PPP and the DAP. Thus, the White Paper's proposed amendments to the C o n s t i t u t i o n were passed 13 by a vote of 125 to 17. Communal Demands and Education Developments The Education A c t , 1961, to a l a r g e extent s a t i s f i e d the more communally o r i e n t e d ' u l t r a s ' i n the UMNO and other i n t e r e s t groups a l i g n e d w i t h the p a r t y . However, d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n among the non-Malays and i n p a r t i c u l a r the Chinese was intense and widespread. F i r s t , I l l many Chinese f e l t that the Act was the t h i n edge of the wedge designed untimately to f o r c e the e l i m i n a t i o n of Chinese medium education. Secondly, there was a general apprehension over the manner i n which the MCA and the MIC had c a p i t u l a t e d to the UMNO over the Act, and i n the process were regarded as having s o l d out non-Malay i n t e r e s t s to the Malays. The Opposition p a r t i e s , on the other hand, continued to demand a b e t t e r d e a l , i n p a r t i c u l a r over p r o v i s i o n s of the education p o l i c y . The Labour Party, f o r example, had the support of the Chinese-educated and i t o f t e n argued that the A l l i a n c e Government was attempting to destroy the Chinese language. The PPP i n the same manner argued that the A l l i a n c e Government, and e s p e c i a l l y the MCA could no longer be 14 r e l i e d upon to safeguard Chinese education. The UDP s p e c i f i c a l l y expressed d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n over the Government's education p o l i c y . In f a c t , one of the major p l a t f o r m planks of the party was "to f i g h t f o r the r i g h t s of non-Malays, e s p e c i a l l y i n education which should be based on a more reasonable p o l i c y than the Razak Report.""'""' Thus, the Opposition, i n unison, demanded a revamping of the e n t i r e education system and a f a i r deal f o r the Chinese medium schools. As mentioned e a r l i e r on, these developments were a r e s u l t of the r a c i a l e q u a l i t y theme of the PAP i n i t s b r i e f i n t r u s i o n i n t o the p o l i t i c s of the P e n i n s u l a . Understandably, these incessant demands f o r e q u a l i t y and the questioning of the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c o n t r a c t by the non-Malays sparked a mood of m i l i t a n c y among the more communally i n c l i n e d Malays. They were i n c r e a s i n g l y alarmed over the p o s s i b i l i t y of a fundamental 112 realignment of Malaysian p o l i t i c s . In response to the qu e s t i o n i n g of the status of the Malay language i n the school system, t h i s group of m i l i t a n t Malays formed the B a r i s a n Bertindak Bahasa Kebangsaan (BBBK) or the N a t i o n a l Language A c t i o n Front, under the e r s t w h i l e Chairman of the Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, Syed N a s i r b i n I s m a i l , i n mid 1964. The BBBK had the support of many UMNO members, A l l i a n c e P a r l i a m e n t a r i a n s , Malay school teachers, t h e i r Union, j o u r n a l i s t s and U n i v e r s i t y students. There was now an added impetus among Malay p o l i t i c i a n s i n t h e i r a g i t a t i o n f o r speedier implementation of the d e c i s i o n to make Malay the sole medium of i n s t r u c t i o n . I n c r e a s i n g l y , Syed Nasi r emerged as the champion of the Malay language. He even proposed that the Government should abandon English-medium i n s t r u c t i o n i n E n g l i s h primary schools. He c a l l e d on a l l c i t i z e n s to "accept the n a t i o n a l language whole-hear t e d l y as the language of t h e i r b i r t h p l a c e ; and /jtc£7 show t h e i r 16 l o y a l t y and s i n c e r i t y . " He was c a r e f u l and e f f e c t i v e i n a r t i c u l a t i n g Malay communal op i n i o n so that i t was w i t h i n the bounds of the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c o n t r a c t . To a l a r g e extent Syed Nasir's p r o t e s t s only helped to f u r t h e r r a i s e non-Malay apprehensions w i t h regards to the language i s s u e i n the Malaysian schools. The MCA had a b r i e f r e s p i t e w i t h the ex p u l s i o n of Singapore from the Federation. But w i t h the assumption of the r a c i a l e q u a l i t y "Malaysian M a l a y s i a " theme by the DAP and other o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s , the MCA was once again i n a dilemma. Added to t h i s was the r e v i v a l of 113 the UCSTA and CSMC which both began to a c t i v e l y court the o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s , the Chinese Chambers of Commerce, and the Guilds and A s s o c i a t i o n s f o r support to t h e i r cause. Once again the MCA l e a d e r -ship chose to remain out of the controversy and be d i s c r e e t . This was n a t u r a l l y not enough to s a t i s f y the UCSTA and the CSMC. They showed t h e i r disgust w i t h the MCA when i t sponsored an assembly to pledge support f o r the Tunku i n 1965, - about 400 r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s from 187 bodies walked out a f t e r f a i l i n g to b r i n g about a d i s c u s s i o n on the Chinese language i s s u e . ^ W ithin the MCA i t s e l f there was a growing element of d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n . With the due date f o r the proclamation of Malay as the s o l e o f f i c i a l language f a s t approaching t h i s d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n increased. The Youth Wing of the MCA soon became embroiled over the i s s u e . I t spearheaded a movement urging the Government to provide f o r a wider use of the Chinese language, to make i t an o f f i c i a l language and f o r more a s s i s t a n c e to Chinese education. The MCA Youth Chairman, Lee San Choon, most notably wanted "a more l i b e r a l stand 18 on the Chinese language e s p e c i a l l y as regards education." But he a l s o cautioned the MCA Youth not to i n s i s t on Chinese as an o f f i c i a l language, and when i t looked l i k e h i s cauti o n would not be heeded, he threatened to r e s i g n i f h i s demands were not met. However, the MCA P r e s i d e n t , Tan Siew S i n , t r i e d to be d i s c r e e t . He warned that i t would take a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l amendment to make Chinese the o f f i c i a l language, and t h i s was impossible. He a l s o 114 argued that i f the MCA "backs t h i s demand there w i l l be a head on 19 c o l l i s i o n w i t h the UMNO and t h i s w i l l mean the end of the A l l i a n c e . " In a d d i t i o n , the MCA's high command took pains to deal w i t h s t r a g g l e r s such as the Youth V i c e - P r e s i d e n t and Presid e n t of the Federation of Chinese School Teachers' A s s o c i a t i o n , Sim Mow Yo. He was l a t e r 20 e x p e l l e d f o r "defying party l e a d e r s h i p . " Likewise, a r e s o l u t i o n from the Penang Branch of the MCA c a l l e d f o r acceptance of the Chinese 21 language " f o r o f f i c i a l and extensive use thoroughout the country." Thus, the MCA expected the UMNO to l i k e w i s e m o b i l i z e and r e s t r a i n the Malay community and the ' u l t r a s ' e s p e c i a l l y . Syed N a s i r nonetheless was a c t i v e i n h i s p r o t e s t s . In e a r l y November, 1966, Syed N a s i r i s s u e d a 13 page c o n f i d e n t i a l memorandum to the Prime M i n i s t e r , the Deputy Prime M i n i s t e r , a l l Cabinet members, a l l Menteri Besar (Chief M i n i s t e r s ) and a l l members 22 of the UMNO Executive C o u n c i l . In the memorandum Syed N a s i r s t r e s s e d that "Malay must become the s o l e n a t i o n a l language w i t h no f u r t h e r concession to other communities." In a d d i t i o n , Syed N a s i r defined the r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of the A l l i a n c e l e a d e r s . They "must not be i n -d e c i s i v e . . . . The language p o l i c y of t h i s country i s one and f i n a l " to repl a c e E n g l i s h w i t h the N a t i o n a l Language as the s o l e o f f i c i a l language i n t h i s country. There are other questions, problems 23 or issues on t h i s , and {the^J cannot be r a i s e d . . . ." His arguments gained a wide deal of support among many young UMNO members, who had not been party to the o r i g i n a l A l l i a n c e bargain. In a d d i t i o n , Dr. Mahathir b i n Mohammad, a person known f o r "strong Malay views on 115 c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c o n t r a c t , " Dato Harun b i n H a j i I d r i s , the Menteri Besar of Selangor, and Dato Abdul Rahman b i n Yakub, M i n i s t e r of Land and Mines, were a l l sympathetic to the main t h r u s t of Syed N a s i r ' s argument. Thus, i n view of t h i s accumulated d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n the top echelon A l l i a n c e l e a d e r s h i p were forced to weigh a l l the p o s s i b l e consqeuences before a r r i v i n g at a s u i t a b l e n a t i o n a l language p o l i c y . The N a t i o n a l Language B i l l was introduced by the Prime M i n i s t e r , Tunku Abdul Rahman, on February 24, 196?. I t s p r o v i s i o n s were voted upon and the b i l l was passed w i t h a resounding 95 ayes against 11 2 6 nays. The Act f i r s t l y provided that "the n a t i o n a l language s h a l l be used f o r o f f i c i a l purposes . . ."on and a f t e r September 1, 1967. Sectio n 3 of the Act affirmed that "Nothing i n t h i s Act s h a l l a f f e c t the r i g h t of the Fede r a l Government or any State Government to use any t r a n s l a t i o n of o f f i c i a l documents or communications i n the language of any other community i n the Federation f o r such purposes as may be deemed necessary i n the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t . " S e c t i o n 4, allowed the Yang d i -Pertuan Agong to "permit the continued use of the E n g l i s h language f o r 27 such o f f i c i a l purposes as may be deemed f i t . " His Majesty soon made an order p e r m i t t i n g the continued use of E n g l i s h " t r a i n i n g or examination where the approved course or the approved t e x t of any subject 28 i s E n g l i s h . " The Act i n e f f e c t declared Malay as the O f f i c i a l Language and safeguarded the p o s i t i o n of E n g l i s h as the second language i n Malay-medium secondary schools. The Act f u r t h e r guaranteed the continued operation of the English-medium schools f o r an a d d i t i o n a l p e r i o d . In essence, the Act served to r e a f f i r m the pa r t of the A l l i a n c e 116 bargain on matters of language and education. Nevertheless, f o l l o w i n g the passage of the Act i n Parliament, the Government began the gradual process of transformation by i n t r o d u c i n g the teaching of a r t s subjects such as h i s t o r y , p h y s i c a l education, geography, and a r t s and c r a f t s i n 29 Malay. A f t e r the May 13th i n c i d e n t of 1969, the transformation process was c a r r i e d out w i t h more vigo u r . A 'new education p o l i c y ' was declared by the new Education M i n i s t e r , Dato Abdul Rahman b i n Yakub, i n J u l y , 1969. This p o l i c y enunciated two major changes i n the education system. F i r s t , a l l i n s t r u c t i o n i n the Standard One clas s e s of Malaysian schools (except during E n g l i s h , Chinese and Tamil language sessions) "would be 30 wholly conducted i n Malay." Thence forward conversion would be made standard by standard one year at a time. Thus by 1983 i n s t r u c t i o n i n the U n i v e r s i t y would be e n t i r e l y i n Malay. Secondly, h i s t o r y , geography, and c i v i c s would be taught i n Standard Four i n Malay. This would mean that only mathematics and science would continue to be taught i n E n g l i s h 31 i n Standard Four. In sum, the new p o l i c y adhered to that of the Education Act of 1961 and, at the same time, set the conversion process moving and ended i n due course the operation of the English-medium primary and secondary schools. Motives and Aims of P o l i c y Makers By mid-1966 the pressures exerted by Syed Nas i r and h i s supporters as w e l l as t h e i r Chinese counterparts were viewed w i t h a great deal of 117 apprehension by the moderate A l l i a n c e l e a d e r s h i p . The moderate Malay leaders were not prepared to make any f u r t h e r concession to the non-Malays but they were a l s o concerned that due to the e f f o r t s of Syed N a s i r the establishment of Malay as the s o l e o f f i c i a l language would be 32 perceived as "a Malay communal v i c t o r y . " The Tunku i n p a r t i c u l a r f o r e -saw a d i s t u r b i n g prospect of communal passions being u n n e c e s s a r i l y inflamed and the p o s s i b i l i t y of the MCA becoming even more vul n e r a b l e as a r e s u l t . The moderate A l l i a n c e leaders were c l e a r l y concerned that the o p e r a t i o n of the Government, e s p e c i a l l y that of the courts and schools, would be s e r i o u s l y a f f e c t e d or impaired by the t o t a l e l i m i n a t i o n of E n g l i s h as demanded by the ' u l t r a s ' . Thus, they were ambivalent about the p o s i t i o n of the E n g l i s h language i n the school system. This was apparent from the frequent p o l i c y speeches made by bureaucrats and m i n i s t e r s . For example, the permanent head of the Education Department, H a j i Hamdan b i n Sheikh T h i r , urged the p u p i l s of a l a r g e Malay-medium secondary school "not to l o s e s i g h t of the importance of the E n g l i s h 33 language." Lik e w i s e , the Education M i n i s t e r , Mohd. K h i r b i n J o h a r i o f t e n lauded the E n g l i s h language and i t s r o l e i n the progress and p r o s p e r i t y of the country and i n p a r t i c u l a r the r o l e of the English-medium schools as the "only i n s t i t u t i o n to b r i n g together the c h i l d r e n of a l l 34 races." The Tunku i n h i s Deepavali message to the n a t i o n on November 1966, summarized the Government's a t t i t u d e towards the proposed language b i l l i n t h i s manner: " A l l that i s intended i s to put Malay as the n a t i o n a l 118 and o f f i c i a l language, and E n g l i s h as the second language, w h i l e the 35 languages of others w i l l go on as they have been going on." Thus, the language b i l l was balanced to counteract s e r i o u s l y d e s t a b i l i s i n g pressures exerted by the ' u l t r a s ' and at the same time soothe the non-Malay demands f o r guarantees f o r t h e i r languages. P o l i c y Impact and Communal Responses As i n d i c a t e d e a r l i e r the N a t i o n a l Language Act of 1967 aff i r m e d that Malay would become "the s o l e o f f i c i a l language" although the E n g l i s h language could be used by the Federal and State Governments " f o r such o f f i c i a l purposes as may be deemed f i t . " In.other words, the Act permitted the continued use of E n g l i s h as a supplementary language f o r the conduct of Governmental business and education. I t was t h i s p r o v i s i o n that sparked p r o t e s t s . On the one hand the r a d i c a l Malays thought that the B i l l was too moderate and compromising; and on the other, the non-Malays f e l t that i t was not enough to guarantee and preserve t h e i r c u l t u r e and language. The t r i u m v i r a t e of Tunku Abdul Rahman, Tun Abdul Razak and Tun Dr. I s m a i l were determined to avoid what they f e l t would be dramatic v i c t o r i e s i n the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c o n t r a c t by any of the communities l e s t they t r i g g e r p u b l i c i n t e r -communal c o n f r o n t a t i o n reminiscent of the J u l y c r i s i s of 1959. There-f o r e , they began to persuade the UMNO members from t a k i n g open o p p o s i t i o n . Thus, when the B i l l came f o r debate i n Parliament, the theme of the argument advanced by the A l l i a n c e leaders and i n p a r t i c u l a r the UMNO 119 leaders was one of "inter-communal peace." The most e f f e c t i v e spokesman f o r the A l l i a n c e was Tun Dr. I s m a i l and he countered most of the a t t a c k by the PMIP and the PPP. About to r e t i r e , he r e f u t e d the rumour b e l i e v e d by many Malays that he had disagreed w i t h the p r o v i s i o n s of the B i l l . He s t a t e d : "Not only do I support the B i l l , but . . . . 37 I played a major r o l e i n for m u l a t i n g i t . " He acknowledged that the B i l l w i l l not convert those who are wedded to the p o l i c y of e s t a b l i s h i n g languages other than the N a t i o n a l Language to be the o f f i c i a l language, or those who are s t r o n g l y convinced that the N a t i o n a l Language should be the only language of communication between the Government and the p u b l i c . " He f u r t h e r argued that the B i l l , " w i l l appeal to those Malaysians - Malays, Chinese, Indians and others - who take a n a t i o n a l p r i d e i n the n a t i o n a l language to be the s o l e o f f i c i a l language w h i l e at the same time r e a l i z i n g that at the present stage of Malaysia's h i s t o r y the languages of other communities too must be used f o r t r a n s l a -t i o n s of o f f i c i a l documents and communication, so that a l l c i t i z e n s can 38 understand what i s going on i n t h e i r country." A f t e r t h i s speech by a much respected Malay l e a d e r , the outcome of the v o t i n g was never i n 39 doubt. There were 95 votes f o r the B i l l and 9 votes a g a i n s t . While most of the o p p o s i t i o n to the B i l l w i t h i n UMNO was contained, much o p p o s i t i o n was manifested outside the party. The BBBK and i t s a l l i e s at f i r s t attempted to persuade the Government to change the B i l l once i t was announced that i t would be table d i n Parliament. Sensing the dangers of the demands being made, Tun Razak attempted to p l a c a t e them by d e c l a r i n g that the Government would "take a c t i v e steps 1 2 0 4 0 to widen the use of the national language i n a l l f i e l d s next year," but that was not enough. The BBBK's protests continued to grow i n volume. Even while the A l l i a n c e National Council was meeting at the Prime Minister's house to discuss the B i l l before t a b l i n g i t i n P a r l i a -ment, three hundred banner-waving Malays demonstrated at the gates 41 against what they f e l t to be a compromise formula f or multi-lingualism. 42 In another demonstration e f f i g i e s of the Prime Minister were burned. 4 3 It was the PMIP which gave the most support to the demands of the BBBK. In one of the longest speeches ever made i n Parliament, Dato A s r i , the PMIP leader, launched a scathing attack on the B i l l . He accused the 44 Tunku of "wounding the heart of h i s own race." He claimed that the A l l i a n c e Government was dooming the Malays to backwardness and that the nationa l language did not have and would not have "economic value." He f e l t that the Malays would continue to remain backward since the only 45 schools generally a v a i l a b l e to t h e i r c h i l d r e n were Malay schools. But this was a voice i n the wilderness, and did not a f f e c t the outcome of the voting on the B i l l . Following the. passage of the B i l l a f u l l scale p u b l i c education campaign concerning i t s provisions was mounted by A l l i a n c e members, by Minis t e r s , by Menteri Besars and by the Malay sultans. But this was r e a l l y not necessary as there was not much opposition to the Act -at l east at that time. The Utusan Melayu which had e a r l i e r said " i t would be f a r better to wait u n t i l Tunku had given an explanation," now came out s o l i d l y i n support of Tunku. I t c r i t i c i s e d those who 121 opposed the Act and argued that they "must be motivated by a d e s i r e 46 to cause t r o u b l e . " The UMNO leaders began d i s c i p l i n a r y proceedings against those who had e a r l i e r dissented. For example, the Deputy Chairman of Penang State UMNO was dismissed f o r supporting the d i s s e n t e r s . As f o r Syed N a s i r , he was quick to sense the troubles ahead. He immediately dispatched a personal l e t t e r of apology and o f f e r e d to r e s i g n from the Executive C o u n c i l of UMNO. However, he was saved from the wrath of Tunku by the tim e l y i n t e r v e n t i o n of Tun Razak. Though i t appeared that most of the outstanding: issues were s e t t l e d amicably w i t h i n the UMNO, the Language Act 1967 had s e v e r a l repercussions. F i r s t , the moderate features were e v e n t u a l l y perceived by many Malays as a concession to the non-Malays. These moderate features were i d e n t i f i e d w i t h the Tunku and thus weakened h i s s t a t u r e and p o s i t i o n among the r a d i c a l and communally-oriented Malays. As a r e s u l t of the Act and the manner he handled the s t r a g g l e r s w i t h i n the ranks of UMNO the Tunku was d i s t r u s t e d by the ' u l t r a s ' . The forc e s that had come together to challenge the B i l l p e r s i s t e d and gained even more support among the l e a d e r s , and as a r e s u l t Tunku was "never again 47 the unchallenged l e a d e r " of the Malays. Secondly, many d i s g r u n t l e d elements w i t h i n UMNO f l o c k e d to the more aggressive spokesmen of Malay i n t e r e s t s such as Dr. Mahathir, Harun I d r i s , Syed N a s i r I s m a i l , Syed 48 J a ' a f a r Albar among others. T h i r d l y , the p o s i t i o n of the PMIP was f u r t h e r enhanced and i t was viewed as a more dynamic proponent of Malay 49 i n t e r e s t s . In f a c t the PMIP was s u c c e s s f u l l y able to m o b i l i s e 122 grievances p e r t a i n i n g to the question of the Malay language i n schools and to draw p r o t e s t votes to i t s cause. The more m i l i t a n t s e c t o r of the Malay s o c i e t y had hoped that the conversion to the s o l e n a t i o n a l language would create r a p i d economic o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r the Malays i n both the p r i v a t e and p u b l i c s e c t o r s . They had al s o hoped the government would u t i l i z e the n a t i o n a l language l e g i s l a t i o n as an e f f e c t i v e instrument to break non-Malay c o n t r o l of the v a r i o u s s e c t o r s of the economy. They argued that t o l e r a t i n g continued use of other languages, e s p e c i a l l y E n g l i s h , would ensure the continued preponderance of the non-Malays i n the economic and p r o f e s s i o n a l s e c t o r s . Nor had the ' s p e c i a l r i g h t s ' helped the Malays d r a m a t i c a l l y . Consequently, many of these elements f e l t that the UMNO lead e r s h i p had conceded too much to the non-Malays and thus had permenently re l e g a t e d the Malay language to a p o s i t i o n of i n f e r i o r i t y . The PMIP entered the e l e c t i o n campaign of 1969 by r e a s s e r t i n g i t s pledge f o r the r e s t o r a t i o n of Malay supremacy i n a l l aspects of the country. Much of i t s campaign a c t i v i t y centered on the p e r e n n i a l communal issues of language and e d u c a t i o n . T h u s , presenting i t s e l f as a dogmatic communalist p a r t y , i t was c l e a r l y able to draw the d i s g r u n t l e d elements i n Malay s o c i e t y as i t s cause. This contrasted sharply w i t h the UMNO which chose to stand on i t s past record. UMNO leaders were determined to avoid c u l t u r a l i s s u e s . Malay was enshrined as the o f f i c i a l and n a t i o n a l language, the education system was adopting i t as f a s t as p o s s i b l e and the moderate leaders f e l t t h i s 123 i t s e l f was enough to p a c i f y the r a d i c a l elements i n Malay s o c i e t y , but then the votes were counted f o l l o w i n g the 1969 E l e c t i o n s i t was apparent that the PMIP's l i n e of reasoning had gained wide currency. U n l i k e the UMNO, the MCA and the MIC d i d gain a great deal of p r e s t i g e as a r e s u l t of the Language Act. S e c t i o n Three of the Act permitted the continued use of E n g l i s h and the r i g h t to maintain the English-medium schools, i n which non-Malays tended to do w e l l . In e f f e c t , the MCA and the MIC f e l t r e l i e v e d and g r a t e f u l that t h e i r u ' i n t e r e s t s w i t h regards to Education had been safeguarded by the moderate Malay l e a d e r s . Whatever p r o t e s t there was w i t h i n the MCA and the MIC was brought t i g h t l y under c o n t r o l ; when the B i l l was presented f o r debate i n Parliament, there was unequivocal support by the MCA and the MIC f o r i t . Tan Siew Sin lauded the B i l l as an "achievement of some s i g n i f i c a n c e f o r the Alliance.""'''" V. T. Sambanthan, the MIC P r e s i d e n t , reassured the non-Malays thus: "Today, when we replace E n g l i s h w i t h the Malay language as the o f f i c i a l language, i t i s w e l l known that i t i s being done hot by compulsion but by the process of f r e e acceptance -acceptance w i l l i n g l y and v o l u n t a r i l y by the non-Malay i n t h i s country." He f u r t h e r reassured the d i s g r u n t l e d Malays by s t a t i n g : "Let me s t a t e c l e a r l y and c a t e g o r i c a l l y that t h i s i s not the i n t e n t i o n and we do not 52 seek and we do not want m u l t i - l i n g u a l i s m i n t h i s country." While the A l l i a n c e partners applauded the B i l l as a hallmark of the s p i r i t of t o l e r a n c e , the Chinese o r i e n t e d o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s , notably the PPP and the Labour Party, d i s a s s o c i a t e d themselves from these claims. D. R. Seenivasagam i n p a r t i c u l a r f e l t that the B i l l was "one 124 of the g r e a t e s t acts of treachery and b e t r a y a l on one h a l f almost of 53 the p o p u l a t i o n of West M a l a y s i a . " However, other o p p o s i t i o n leaders such as Dr. Tan Chee Khoon and Dr. Lim Chong Eu were w e l l aware of the s p i r i t of compromise e n t a i l e d i n the B i l l and t h e r e f o r e o f f e r e d only moderate c r i t i c i s m . Dr. Tan even d e f i e d party d i r e c t i v e s and supported 54 the B i l l . Thus, when the B i l l was passed Dr. Tan and Dr. Lim p r e f e r r e d to be absent and l e f t Parliamentary o p p o s i t i o n to the B i l l to the PPP. 5 5 However, w i t h the approach of the 1969 e l e c t i o n s the i s s u e of language and education once again gained prominence. Several f a c t o r s were r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h i s . Beginning i n 1968, the Government, as has been i n d i c a t e d , began to push f o r the gradual conversion of the medium of i n s t r u c t i o n f o r c e r t a i n a r t s subjects i n the E n g l i s h medium primary schools. To the exponents of p o l i t i c a l o utbidding such as the PPP, the DAP and the Labour Party, t h i s move served as a convincing argument that the f u t u r e of the non-Malays were being j e o p a r d i z e d . In the e l e c t i o n campaigns of 1969, the DAP, the PPP and the Gerakan s p e c i f i c a l l y presented p o l i c i e s on language education i n t h e i r e l e c t i o n p l a t f o r m . The DAP was the most v o c i f e r o u s i n a r t i c u l a t i n g the i s s u e . In i t s e l e c t i o n manifesto i t promised the adoption of an i n t e g r a t e d education system, where schools would use the major languages, and p u b l i c examinations would be i n the media of i n s t r u c t i o n . Furthermore, i t sought to r e l e g a t e the Malay ..language to the status of compulsory 5 6 second language. In the f i e l d i t s promises were even more aggressive; 125 one DAP candidate i n the Selangor even promised that i f h i s party were to succeed i n the e l e c t i o n s he would "make the Malays l e a r n Chinese i n two m o n t h s . T h u s i t was c l e a r that the DAP aimed to p r o j e c t an image that i t was t r u l y the champion of the r i g h t s and i n t e r e s t s of the non-Malay community. The Gerakan, on the other hand, took a compromise posture balancing the demands of the Malays w i t h those of the non-Malays. The party was convinced that the exi s t e n c e of Chinese and Tamil education up to Higher School C e r t i f i c a t e l e v e l was i n no way i n i m i c a l to the c r e a t i o n of a u n i t e d Malaysian n a t i o n and the development of Malay as 58 the s o l e n a t i o n a l language. L i k e w i s e , the PPP supported the c o n t i n u a t i o n of the four language streams of education, and "equal 59 treatment f o r a l l educational i n s t i t u t i o n s i r r e s p e c t i v e of race." Regarding the p r o v i s i o n of g r a n t s - i n - a i d , these schools should be continued without g i v i n g up the Chinese or Tamil medium of i n s t r u c t i o n . The DAP was al s o bent on d i s c r e d i t i n g the MCA as the l e g i t i m a t e spokesman of Chinese i n t e r e s t . I t t h e r e f o r e began supporting a 1967 Malaysian Chinese Guilds and A s s o c i a t i o n and the Chinese language Press c a l l f o r a Chinese language U n i v e r s i t y modeled along the l i n e s of the 60 Nanyang U n i v e r s i t y of Singapore. The MCA denounced t h i s scheme and in s t e a d d e f l e c t e d t h i s movement f o r the Merdeka U n i v e r s i t y (as the proposed U n i v e r s i t y was to be c a l l e d ) i n t o the establishment of a pre-61 u n i v e r s i t y Tunku Abdul Rahman College f o r Chinese students. But w i t h 126 the mounting pressure f o r p o s i t i v e a c t i o n , the MCA l a t e r reversed i t s stand and supported the Merdeka U n i v e r s i t y . Without doubt the MCA's i n d e c i s i o n on the language i s s u e caused many vot e r s to support the • • 62 Opposition. F o l l o w i n g the May 13th I n c i d e n t , some r a d i c a l Malays were moved to make a more d e f i n i t e pro-Malay stand on matters concerning t h e i r community. The May 13th Incident they argued had confirmed t h e i r diagnosis that not enough was being done f o r the Malays economically, that the Language Act (1967) had been too favourable to the non-Malays, and that the Tunku's s t y l e of p o l i t i c s was too 'fe u d a l ' , emphasizing l o y a l t y r a t h e r than a b i l i t y or a c h i e v e l e n t . Their a c t i v i t i e s were r e s t r i c t e d by the Government although many of t h e i r p o l i c y demands were subsequently i n c o r p o r a t e d i n the "New Economic P o l i c y " and the "new education p o l i c y " . W i t h i n UMNO, the group which had c r i t i c i z e d the Tunku were subjected to d i s c i p l i n a r y a c t i o n s . Dr. Mahathir, was ex p e l l e d from the pa r t y . Others l i k e the newly appointed A s s i s t a n t M i n i s t e r to Tun Razak, Musa Hitam were "sent on study l e a v e " to the United Kingdom. A notable exception was Abdul Rahman Yakub, who, though he had 6 3 emerged as a h a r d - l i n e r , "abstained from open support f o r Dr. Mahathir," and was appointed as the new M i n i s t e r of Education. In June 1969, Abdul Rahman Yakub assumed o f f i c e and immediately he l e t i t be known that he recognised only Malay as the l e g i t i m a t e language f o r h i s m i n i s t r y . On J u l y 10, 1969, j u s t two months a f t e r the r i o t s and before normalcy had returned, Abdul Rahman Yakub announced a 'new education p o l i c y ' 127 "without the Tengku's knowledge or a u t h o r i z a t i o n . " According to Goh Cheng Teik, "This u n i l a t e r a l d e c l a r a t i o n of p o l i c y made at the peak of the anti-Tengku campaign and on the eve of Dr. Mahathir's e x p u l s i o n . . . suddenly d e f l a t e d the h i g h l y charged atmosphere and 65 rendered the Tengku's task l e s s c h a l l e n g i n g . " Abdul Rahman Yakub was able to do what other M i n i s t e r s of Education had f a i l e d to do. He was f i r m i n h i s stand, s t a t i n g that although there were s t i l l "a very small percentage of the people who do not l i k e t h i s , but such i s t h e i r a t t i t u d e there i s nothing we can do to please them."^ But he c l e a r l y s t a t e d that he had not the s l i g h t e s t i n t e n t i o n of withdrawing from the s t a t e d goals. He argued that the Government "has been very l e n i e n t persuading c e r t a i n sectors to l e a r n and use Bahasa Malaysia //the N a t i o n a l language/ . . . . But i f persuasion s t i l l do_es not provide r e s u l t s then we must r e s o r t to the whip. The human psychology i s such that . i f \<re leave i t to t h e i r i n t e l l i g e n c e to 6 7 choose, they do not make the c o r r e c t choice." Having s e t t l e d the matter of primary and secondary education, Dato Rahman Yakub l e f t f o r Indonesia to r e c r u i t s t a f f f o r the schools and f o r the newly e s t a b l i s h e d 68 U n i v e r s i t y Kebangsaan ( N a t i o n a l U n i v e r s i t y ) . Thus, a f t e r contro-v e r s i e s , p r o c r a s t i n a t i o n s and i n d e c i s i o n s l a s t i n g almost f o r t y years the Malay language f i n a l l y was scheduled to become the medium of i n s t r u c t i o n . 128 Conclusion The problem of language education was once again p a r t l y the reason f o r inter-communal c o n f l i c t , but w h i l e the p o l i c y makers of e a r l i e r periods were able to postpone making d e f i n i t e d e c i s i o n s on the question of the s t a t u s of the Malay language i n the school c u r r i c u l u m t h i s time they were able to i r r e v o c a b l y end Government ambivalence w i t h regard to the p o l i c y . The b u i l d i n g up of communal d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n as a r e s u l t of the v a r i o u s p r o v i s i o n s of the Education A c t , 1961, and the N a t i o n a l Language Act, 1967, had serious consequences w i t h regards to the moderate and o f t e n ambiguous p o l i c i e s pursued by the A l l i a n c e Government. Fol l o w i n g the May 13th I n c i d e n t , the Government undertook s e v e r a l important and b i n d i n g measures to end u n b r i d l e d questioning of the education p o l i c y . The cautious nature of non-Malay a g i t a t i o n f o l l o w i n g the Incident helped the Government to push forward i t s p o l i c y to s t a n d a r d i z e , end a m b i g u i t i e s , and upgrade the s t a t u s of Malay as the s o l e medium of i n s t r u c t i o n . In attempting to s t r i k e a moderate stand the moderate Malay and non-Malay e l i t e s of the A l l i a n c e s u f f e r e d the most because they were not able to continue t h e i r c o n t r o l of the party machinery as w e l l as to command the continued high support of the e l e c t o r a t e . The Malay l e a d e r s , notably Tunku, l o s t p r e s t i g e i n UMNO. This l o s s of s t a t u r e c o n t r i b u t e d to h i s e a r l y retirement. L i k e w i s e , the MCA and the MIC both had t h e i r own share of l e a d e r s h i p c r i s e s and the d e c l i n e i n grassroots 129 support. F o l l o w i n g the May 13th I n c i d e n t , Malay p o l i t i c a l supremacy i n the Government was c l e a r l y e s t a b l i s h e d , enabling them to push f o r an even more determined pro-Malay p o l i c y w i t h regard to the question of the Malay language i n schools. Thus, a p o l i c y which was f i r s t conceived i n 1930 reached i t s f u l l s t a t e of growth i n 1971. From now on the p r o t e s t s were not to be over the s t a t u s of Malay i n Malaysian schools as i t has become a f a i t accompli, but there were to be i n d i r e c t p r o t e s t s such as when the Merdeka U n i v e r s i t y i s s u e was again r a i s e d by the DAP. 130 Notes 1. For a more i n depth study of the formation of Malaysia see the the f o l l o w i n g books: Mohamed Noordin Sopiee, From  Malayan Union to Singapore Separation, Kuala Lumpur: Penerbit U n i v e r s i t i Malaya, 1974; Gordon P. Means, op. c i t . , Chapter 16, 17, 18 and 19; James P. O n g k i l i , The Borneo Response to M a l a y s i a , 1961-1963, Singapore: Donald Moore Press, 1967; James P. O n g k i l i , Modernization i n East Malaysia 1960-1970, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1972; Margaret C. R o f f , The  P o l i t i c s of Belonging: P o l i t i c a l Change i n Sabah and  Sarawak, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P ress, 1974; R. S. M i l n e and K. J . Ratnam, Malaysia: New States i n a  New Nation, London: Frank Cass, 1974. 2. K. J . Ratnam and R. S. M i l n e , The Malayan Parliamentary E l e c t i o n of 1964, Singapore: U n i v e r s i t y of Malaya Press, 1967, p. 110 and Chap. VI. 3. S t r a i t s Budget, November 6, 1963, as c i t e d i n Gordon P. Means, o p . c i t . , p. 337. 4. Gordon P. Means, op. c i t . , p. 347. 5. Tunku Abdul Rahman, "Looking Back," The Star, A p r i l 7, 1975, as c i t e d i n R. S. Milne and Diane K. Mauzy, op. c i t . , p. 73. 6. Gordon P. Means, op_. c i t . , p. 354. 7. I b i d . 8. M a r t i n Rudner, "The Malaysian General E l e c t i o n of 1969: A P o l i t i c a l A n a l y s i s , " Modern Asian S t u d i e s , V o l . 1, No. 4, (1970), pp. 1-21; Nancy L, Snider, "Race, L e i t m o t i v of the Malayan E l e c t i o n Drama," Asia n Survey, V o l . X, No. 12, (December, 1970), pp. 1070-1080; R. S. M i l n e and Diane K. Mauzy, op_. c i t . , p. 161. 9. R. K. V a s i l , The Malaysian General E l e c t i o n of 1969, Singapore: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y . Press, 1972, p. 46; K. J . ]&tnam, and R. S. M i l n e , "The 1969 Parliamentary E l e c t i o n s i n West M a l a y s i a , " P a c i f i c A f f a i r s , V o l . X L I I I , No. 2 (Summer, 1970), pp. 203-226. 10. K a r l von Vorys, op. c i t . , P art I I I ; R . S. Milne and Diane K. Mauzy, op. c i t . , pp. 84 f f . 131 11. K a r l von Vorys, op_. c i t . , p. 418. 12. S t r a i t s Times, February 4, 1971, as c i t e d i n K a r l von Vorys, op. c i t . , p. 418. 13. I b i d . , March 4, 1971, as c i t e d i n Gordon P. Means, op. c i t . , p. 403. 14. I b i d . , p. 243. 15. I b i d . , p. 249. 16. K a r l von Vorys, op. c i t . , p. 202. 17. S t r a i t s Times, June 21, 1965 as c i t e d i n Chan Heng Chee, op. c i t . , p. 108. 18. S t r a i t s Times, August 18, September 4, 1965, and September 8, 1965, as c i t e d i n R. S. M i l n e , op_. c i t . , p. 90. 19. S t r a i t s Times, August 2, 1965, as c i t e d i n R. S. Milne and Diane K. Mauzy, op_. c i t . , p. 141. 20. Margaret Roff, op c i t . , p. 32. 21. K a r l von Vorys, op_. c i t . , p. 202. 22. I b i d . , p. 203. 23. I b i d . , p. 205. 24. I b i d . See a l s o Mahathir b. Mohamad, The Malay Dilemma, Singapore: The Asian P a c i f i c Press, 1970. Chapters 4 and 4, passim. 25. Abdul Rahman b i b Yakub was a Muslim Malay/Melanau from Sarawak. He was a member of the P a r t i BARJASA. He entered Parliament i n 1963, and was appointed M i n i s t e r of Land and Mines i n 1965. A f t e r the May 13th Incident he was appointed M i n i s t e r of Education. He was w e l l known as a f i e r y speaker and o f t e n expressed strong pro-Malay views. This earned him the admiration of Malay students i n i n s t i t u t i o n s of higher l e a r n i n g . He was p r i m a r i l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the p o l i c y of converting English-medium i n t o Malay-medium schools. 26. K a r l von Vorys, op_. ext., p. 210. 27. I b i d . , p. 206 f f . 132 28. S u f f i a n , op_. c i t . , p. 280. 29. See Appendix I on the Schedule f o r the subjects taught i n Malaysian Primary Schools as of 1970. 30. Goh Cheng Tiek, The May T h i r t e e n t h Incident and Democracy i n Malay s i a , Kuala Lumput: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1971, p. 32. 31. F r a n c i s Wong Hoy Kee and Ee Tiang Hong, Education i n Ma l a y s i a (2d e d i t i o n ) , Kuala Lumpur: Heinemann Educational Books (Asia) L t d . 1975. p. 180. 32. I b i d . 33. S t r a i t s Times, October 15, 1966, as c i t e d i n Margaret R o f f , op. c i t . , p. 324. 34. Margaret Roff, op_. c i t . , p. 324. 35. I b i d . 36. M a l a y s i a , Dewan Ra'ayat, Parliamentary Debates, V o l . I l l , No. 45, March 2, 1967, C o l . 6004, as c i t e d i n K a r l von Vorys, p. 207. 37. Margaret Roff, op_. c i t . , p. 326. 38. Parliamentary Debates, March 3, 1967, C o l . 6138 and 6144, 6145, as c i t e d i n K a r l von Vorys, op_. c i t . , p. 209. 39. K a r l von Vorys, op_. c i t . , p. 210. 40. S t r a i t s Times, December 2, 1966, as c i t e d i n Margaret R o f f , op. c i t . , p. 325. 41. Margaret Roff, op. c i t . , p. 325. 42. Y. Mansoor Marican, "The P o l i t i c a l Accommodation of P r i m o r d i a l P a r t i e s : D.M.K. (India) and PAS (M a l a y s i a ) , Ph.D. D i s s e r t a t i o n , U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, Vancouver, 1976. p. 161. 43. I b i d . 44. Parliamentary Debates, Dewan Ra'ayat, T h i r d Session, 2nd Parliament, Kuala Lumpur: Government P r i n t e r s , 1968, C o l . 6020-6048, as c i t e d i n I b i d . , p. 70. 133 45. Y. Mansoor Marican, op_. c i t . , p. 161 f f . 46. Margaret Roff, op_. c i t . , p. 326. 47. R. K. V a s i l (1972), op_. c i t . , p. 15. 48. Goh Cheng Tiek, op. c i t . , Chap. 4. 49. Y. Mansoor Marican, op_. c i t . , p. 161 f f . 50. Nancy Snider, op_. c i t . ; M a r t i n Rudner, op_. c i t . 51. K a r l von Vorys, op_. c i t . , p. 207. 52. Parliamentary Debates, C o l . 6012, as c i t e d i n K a r l von Vorys, op. c i t . , p. 208. 53. I b i d . C o l . 6059, as c i t e d i n I b i d . , p. 208. 54. R. K. V a s i l , op. c i t . , p. 156. 55. K a r l von Vorys, op_. c i t . , p. 210. 56. R. K. V a s i l , j3p. c i t . , p. 303. 57. K a r l von Vorys, op_. c i t . , p. 285. 58. R. K. V a s i l , op_. c i t . , p. 305 f f . 59. Gordon P. Means, op. c i t . , p. 394. 60. K a r l von Vorys, op_. c i t . , pp. 283-287. 61. Peter Pendersen, " P o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r V i o l e n c e i n M a l a y s i a , " Current H i s t o r y , 61 (364), (December, 1971), pp. 339-367. 62. M a r t i n Rudner, op_. c i t . , pp. 9-15. 63. Goh Cheng Tiek, op_. c i t . , p. 31. 64. I b i d . , p. 32. 65. I b i d . 66. Malay M a i l , J u l y 21, 1969, as c i t e d i n K a r l von Vorys, op_. c i t . , p. 397. 134 67. Utusan Melayu, J u l y 19, 1969, as c i t e d i n K a r l von Vorys, op. c i t . , p. 397. 68. The idea of the U n i v e r s i t i Kebangsaan was f i r s t announced i n September of 1968, by the then M i n i s t e r of Education, Mohd. K h i r J o h a r i i n an apparent attempt to show that the Government was indeed concerned about the s t a t u s of higher education f o r the Malays. See: Stuart Drummond and David Hawkins, "The Malaysian E l e c t i o n s of 1969: An A n a l y s i s of the the Campaign and the R e s u l t s , " Asian Survey, V o l . X, No. 4, ( A p r i l , 1970), pp. 320-335. 135 CHAPTER VI CONCLUSIONS C h a r a c t e r i s t i c of n a t i o n a l i s t movements f o l l o w i n g independence i s the e f f o r t to regenerate and g l o r i f y the n a t i o n a l h e r i t a g e . This i s g e n e r a l l y achieved i n pa r t through c u r r i c u l u m m o d i f i c a t i o n i n the school system and, i n m u l t i - l i n g u a l s o c i e t i e s , by the i n t r o d u c t i o n of a s i n g l e language to serve as an instrument of s o c i a l i z a t i o n i n the p u b l i c education i n s t i t u t i o n s . The task has u s u a l l y proven d i f f i c u l t . I n d i a and S r i Lanka are c h a r a c t e r i z e d by l i n g u i s t i c d i v e r s i t y , i n both c o u n t r i e s the demands of the v a r i o u s regions and l i n g u i s t i c groups forced the adoption of a three-language formula as a compromise s o l u t i o n . In the case of I n d i a , a l l the r e g i o n a l languages were e s s e n t i a l l y indigenous and t h e r e f o r e the i m p o s i t i o n of H i n d i , a language belonging to one p a r t i c u l a r r e g i o n , was not acceptable to the country as a whole. In the case of S r i Lanka, most of the Tamils were concentrated i n the northern p o r t i o n of the I s l a n d ( J a f f n a ) , w h i l e the r e s t of the country c o n s i s t e d of the Sinhalese. The case of M a l a y s i a i s d i f f e r e n t from both I n d i a and S r i Lanka. Only one group - the Malays - may be considered as the indigenous people. Secondly, there i s no geographical concentration among the v a r i o u s groups. In a d d i t i o n , only i n Malaysia i s there a system of c o n s t i t u -136 t i o n a l c o n t r a c t , as epitomized by the A l l i a n c e bargain. The r e l a t i v e cohesiveness of the Malay community and UMNO as opposed to fragmen-t a t i o n of the non-Malay community and consequently the A l l i a n c e partners (MCA and MIC), al s o f a c i l i t a t e d the formulat i o n of a p o l i c y which made Malay the n a t i o n a l language and the main medium of i n s t r u c t i o n . Communal Demands During the four phases i n the e v o l u t i o n of the p o l i c y which made Malay the medium of i n s t r u c t i o n , communal demands v a r i e d as d i d the type of p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the.policy making i s s u e s . During the f i r s t phase of the i n t r o d u c t i o n of Malay as the medium of i n s t r u c t i o n , the Malays were not yet p o l i t i c i z e d or touched by the s p i r i t of n a t i o n a l i s m . Neither the masses nor the English-educated Malay e l i t e were i n a p o s i t i o n to demand that Malay be e s t a b l i s h e d as the medium of i n s t r u c t i o n . The non-Malays, e s p e c i a l l y the Chinese, were i n t e r e s t e d i n safeguarding t h e i r own schools and were not at a l l i n t e r e s t e d i n a l l o w i n g Malay to be e i t h e r a subject language or the medium of i n s t r u c t i o n . During the second phase of the p o l i c y , i . e . 1946 through 1954, the s i t u a t i o n had changed d r a s t i c a l l y . The Malays were no longer sleepy b e n e f i c i a r i e s of s p e c i a l p r i v i l e g e s but were a c t i v e i n making demands p e r t a i n i n g to t h e i r i n t e r e s t s . The resurgent Malay community f o r c e f u l l y made demands f o r the extension of b e t t e r i n f r a s t r u c t u r a l 137 f a c i l i t i e s i n t h e i r v ernacular schools i n a d d i t i o n f o r making Malay the one other main medium of i n s t r u c t i o n . They were not s a t i s f i e d w i t h the p r o v i s i o n making Malay the medium of i n s t r u c t i o n i n stages only up to primary l e v e l . The Chinese community was s t a r t l e d by these Malay demands. They wanted assurances that the Chinese language i n s t r u c t i o n i n t h e i r v ernacular schools would be p r o t e c t e d . The Chinese a l s o wanted the Government to continue supporting t h e i r schools f i n a n c i a l l y . The English-educated Malay e l i t e supported Malay and E n g l i s h as the medium of i n s t r u c t i o n , but were l a t e r forced to give support to the more communally based demands. The same may be s a i d of the Chinese and Indian English-educated e l i t e s . During the t h i r d phase of the e v o l u t i o n of the p o l i c y , i . e . 1955 through 1962, the demands from the Malay community were to accord Malay the status b e f i t t i n g the n a t i o n a l language i n the school system. The more communally i n c l i n e d Malays, such as the ve r n a c u l a r school teachers, wanted to see Malay immediately i n s t i t u t e d as the medium of i n s t r u c t i o n . Moderate leaders of the community p r e f e r r e d a gradual approach to implementing the p o l i c y . In a d d i t i o n , they wanted the r e t e n t i o n of E n g l i s h as an a l t e r n a t e medium of i n s t r u c t i o n . Members of the non-Malay community, p a r t i c u l a r l y the Chinese, wanted to r e t a i n t h e i r schools and opposed any p o l i c y that would r e s u l t i n t h e i r a b o l i t i o n . The moderate non-Malay leaders were t h r u s t i n t o a dilemma. They were wedded to the A l l i a n c e b a r g a i n , and d i d not want to upset t h e i r UMNO f r i e n d s by making extremist communal demands and th e r e f o r e they chose to be moderate and even not to a r t i c u l a t e such 138 i s s u e s . During the f o u r t h phase of the e v o l u t i o n of the p o l i c y , i . e . 1962 up to 1971, Malay views d e f i n i t e l y p r e v a i l e d . They demanded a rat h e r e x c l u s i v e s t a t u s f o r t h e i r language; they demanded that the Government stop supporting E n g l i s h , Chinese and Indian vernacular schools. The moderate leaders of UMNO would have p r e f e r r e d a l e s s e x t remist p o s i t i o n i n v o l v i n g a g r a d u a l i s t p o l i c y w i t h regards to the medium of i n s t r u c t i o n and t h i s meant r e t a i n i n g the other languages and p a r t i c u l a r l y E n g l i s h . The Chinese community n a t u r a l l y d i d not want the Malay medium i n t h e i r schools as i t meant the end of the Chinese system. In sum, the Malay demands f o r a p o l i c y which made Malay the medium of i n s t r u c t i o n evolved through three stages: (1) pre-war apathy w i t h l i t t l e concern f o r language p o l i c y , (2) moderate n a t i o n a l i s t f e r v o r and demands to make Malay the other medium of i n s t r u c t i o n besides E n g l i s h , and (3) extreme n a t i o n a l i s m and demands that i t be the only medium of i n s t r u c t i o n . The non-Malay communities wanted to r e t a i n E n g l i s h , Chinese and Tamil medium schools and were not very e n t h u s i a s t i c about the r i s i n g t i d e of Malay n a t i o n a l i s m which made Malay the medium of i n s t r u c t i o n . The A l l i a n c e leaders g e n e r a l l y p r e f e r r e d a dual Malay-English p o l i c y , but the aggressive demands of the Opposition p a r t i e s and from a new generation of s u b - e l i t e s w i t h i n UMNO, MCA and the MIC forced the leaders to u l t i m a t e l y agree to almost complete i n s t r u c t i o n i n Malay. 139 Motives and Aims of the P o l i c y Makers During the f i r s t phase of the e v o l u t i o n of the p o l i c y , the C o l o n i a l Government t r i e d to introduce Malay as the medium of i n s t r u c t i o n i n an e f f o r t t o provide an education that would be cheaper to the c o l o n i a l c o f f e r s and which would r e s t r i c t the English-educated unemployed. Secondly, the Government wished to u t i l i z e Malay as the medium of i n s t r u c t i o n to i n c u l c a t e a sense of l o y a l t y towards Malaya and to reduce the subversive i n f l u e n c e s of the Kuomintang i n Chinese schools. However, before the p o l i c y could be implemented, the Malayan economy began to recover from the depression. Thus the p o l i c y was no longer necessary because there was once again a demand f o r E n g l i s h -educated j u n i o r o f f i c i a l s . In a d d i t i o n , the anti-Kuomintang p o l i c y advocated by the Governor was no longer tenable i n view of the c o r d i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p between the B r i t i s h Government and the Kuomintang Chinese Government. During the second phase, the Emergency was the a l l encompassing i s s u e . The p o l i c y makers were determined to reduce the independence of the Chinese schools and a l s o f e l t that by i n t r o d u c i n g Malay as the medium of i n s t r u c t i o n a sense of l o y a l t y towards Malaya would be i n c u l c a t e d . Secondly, the B r i t i s h , by v i r t u e of the Federation of Malaya Agreement, 1948, had acknowledged that Malaya was i n f a c t a "Malay country" and thus that they owed the Malays an o b l i g a t i o n . Now the B r i t i s h sought to provide ways and means to p r o t e c t the status of the Malay as the indigenous people of the country. The 1 4 0 question of making Malay the medium of i n s t r u c t i o n n a t u r a l l y followed -p a r t i c u l a r l y i n view of the f a c t that there were p e r s i s t e n t demands from the Malayan community f o r i t . In the t h i r d phase of the e v o l u t i o n of the p o l i c y UMNO and Malay i n t e r e s t s were paramount by v i r t u e of the f a c t that the non-Malays had bound themselves to the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c ontract agreeing to c e r t a i n fundamental f a c t o r s of Malay c u l t u r a l and p o l i t i c a l dominance. The A l l i a n c e p a r ty and the s p i r i t of intercommunal cooperation l e g i t i m i z e d by the overwhelming support f o r the p a r t y during the i n i t i a l p e r i o d of i t s establishment. Thus, when the Razak Report was presented the p o s i t i o n of Malay i n the schools was not objected to by the non-Malay A l l i a n c e leaders because i t was part of the C o n s t i t u t i o n a l c o n t r a c t already agreed upon. Since the threat of communist subversion was s t i l l r e a l , the Government f e l t j u s t i f i e d i n extending i t s c o n t r o l of the Chinese schools and f i r m l y s e t t i n g the d i r e c t i o n f o r a f i n a l conversion to e i t h e r E n g l i s h or Malay as the medium i n the Chinese schools. In sum, the p o l i c y makers were o b l i g a t e d to uphold the status of Malay as the medium of i n s t r u c t i o n b e f i t t i n g i t s s t a t u s as the N a t i o n a l language and as a means to i n c u l c a t e a sense of l o y a l t y to the country. During the f o u r t h phase, the p o l i c y makers were o b v i o u s l y concerned about the continued use of the E n g l i s h language i n the business of government and a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . At the same time they were concerned over the p e r s i s t e n t demand from the more 141 c h a u v i n i s t i c a l l y i n c l i n e d ' u l t r a s ' , t o upgrade the Malay language as the only medium of i n s t r u c t i o n . The p o l i c y makers i n proposing the Language Act, 1967 were i n f a c t seeking to c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y guarantee the p o s i t i o n of E n g l i s h as the second laneuaae. The demands of the non-Malav communities were al s o a c o n s t r a i n i n g f o r c e as the same act a l s o guaranteed the continued use of Chinese and Tamil as u n o f f i c i a l languages. P o l i c y Impact and Communal Responses During the f i r s t phase of the language education p o l i c y i t was the Chinese schools which were a f f e c t e d the most and thus i t was the Chinese who pro t e s t e d the most. On the other hand, the Malays were not consulted l e t alone a f f e c t e d by the p o l i c y i n a s u b s t a n t i a l manner. During the second phase, the Education Ordinance, 1952, d i d upgrade the Malay language to the status of a second important medium of i n s t r u c t i o n , but there were p r o t e s t s from the Malay community because the Government was prepared to provide Malay vernacular education only up to Primary l e v e l . Thus, the Malays q u i c k l y became d i s -i l l u s i o n e d and demanded a b e t t e r d e a l . With the f o r g i n g of a s p i r i t of cooperation there was a c o a l e s c i n g of i n t e r e s t between the Malay and the non-Malays which was u l t i m a t e l y . r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the withdrawal of the p o l i c y . During the t h i r d phase the f u t u r e of the Malayan school system was i r r e v o c a b l y set i n motion by the adoption of the Education Ordinance, 1957, and the Education Act, 1961. By a gradual 142 process of a d m i n i s t r a t i v e implementation Malay was f i n a l l y and f i r m l y v to become the medium of i n s t r u c t i o n . I n i t i a l l y there was unanimous support f o r t h i s p o l i c y but once i t reached the implementation stage there were incessant p r o t e s t s . The Malays wanted r a p i d implementation of the p r o v i s i o n of the ordinances. The non-Malays wanted r e s t r a i n t i n the implementation. Since the MCA and MIC leaders could not and d i d not back the p r o t e s t o r s , the o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s assumed the task of p r o t e s t i n g . I n c r e a s i n g l y , the non-Malays became d i s i l l u s i o n e d w i t h the MCA and the MIC f o r what was perceived an excessive c a p i t u l a t i o n to the UMNO. This l e d to a gradual but sure e r o s i o n of support f o r the non-Malay p a r t i e s of the A l l i a n c e . Between 1962 and 1971, a number of younger and more a r t i c u l a t e Malays who had not been party to the o r i g i n a l A l l i a n c e bargain emerged as a p o l i t i c a l f o r c e w i t h i n UMNO. This group, o f t e n c a l l e d the ' U l t r a s , ' was opposed to any f u r t h e r concessions to non-Malays. In p a r t i c u l a r , they protested that the N a t i o n a l Language Act (1967) had been too c o n c i l i a t o r y towards the non-Malays and i n the process had f u r t h e r disadvantaged the Malays. Within two years these p r o t e s t o r s had gained enough support from w i t h i n UMNO and without to challenge the l e a d e r s h i p of the Tunku. Though they f a i l e d i n t h e i r e f f o r t s , they nevertheless c o n t r i b u t e d to the e a r l y retirement of the Tunku, The moderate non-Malay leaders i n the A l l i a n c e were g r a t e f u l f o r the guarantees provided by the N a t i o n a l Language Act (1967) w i t h 143 regard to the st a t u s of the E n g l i s h , Chinese and Tamil languages. But to the non-Malays outside the narrow c i r c l e of the A l l i a n c e l e a d e r s h i p . t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l guarantees were too l i t t l e . I n a d d i t i o n to the language q u e s t i o n , the non-Malays a l s o p r o t e s t e d against other p r o v i s i o n s favouring the Malays. Thus, there was a marked growth of a n t i - A l l i a n c e sentiments among both the Malays and the non-Malay v o t e r s . These sentiments manifested themselves i n the severe set back the A l l i a n c e experienced i n the 1969 E l e c t i o n s . UMNO escaped r e l a t i v e l y unscathed w h i l e the MCA and the MIC were h i t by the d e f e c t i o n of the v o t e r s to the more a r t i c u l a t e o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s . Following the May 13th I n c i d e n t , i t was apparent to the Government that the u n b r i d l e d questioning of s e n s i t i v e issues (of which the medium of i n s t r u c t i o n was one) had c o n t r i b u t e d to r a c i a l r i o t s and a d e c l i n e i n support f o r the A l l i a n c e . In view of t h i s a C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Amendment Act was introduced as the f i r s t act of Parliament a f t e r 20 months of Emergency r u l e . This C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Amendment Act, 1971 e f f e c t i v e l y c u r t a i l e d f u t u r e d i s c u s s i o n on the s e n s i t i v e i s s u e s . The st a t u s of Malay as the medium of i n s t r u c t i o n thus became a f a i t accompli. Nevertheless, there were i n d i r e c t p r o t e s t s from the non-Malay community, p a r t i c u l a r l y from the Chinese. F i r s t , there was an increase i n enrollment to Chinese-medium primary schools but a f t e r a while t h i s trend tapered o f f . Secondly, the issu e of Merdeka U n i v e r s i t y 144 was r e v i v e d and p e r s i s t e n t l y pursued by the DAP. Only i n December, 1978 was t h i s i s s u e s e t t l e d a f t e r the Government had s k i l l f u l l y argued against the i d e a . T h i r d l y , there has been a p e r c e p t i b l e d e c l i n e i n support f o r the MCA which i t has been p e r s i s t e n t l y c r i t i -c i s e d from a l l sides f o r l a c k of e f f e c t i v e l e a d e r s h i p and f o r being unable to echo the more extremist complaints and demands of the Chinese community. In e f f e c t communal response to the p o l i c y which made Malay the medium of i n s t r u c t i o n evolved i n three stages f o r the Malay community: (1) Pre-War Malay communal apathy and l a c k of n a t i o n a l i s t i c demands, (2) Post war resurgence of communal demands and p r o t e s t s over the r e l a t i v e backwardness of the community and, (3) mass p r o t e s t f o r a more d e f i n i t e stand without any f u r t h e r concessions w i t h regards to the status of E n g l i s h language. The non-Malays were b a s i c a l l y c o n s i s t e n t i n t h e i r p r o t e s t , from 1930 onwards wanting to safeguard t h e i r schools and the p o s t i o n of the E n g l i s h medium schools. I t i s the case that the issue of Malay as the.medium of i n s t r u c t i o n was one of the fundamental issues that a f f e c t e d inter-communal r e l a t i o n s h i p s i n Malaysia. In the s u c c e s s f u l e v o l u t i o n of a p o l i c y favouring the Malay language, the most important c o n s t r a i n i n g f a c t o r was the r e l a t i v e cohesiveness of the Malay community as opposed to fragmentation and d i s u n i t y among the non-Malays. The p o l i c y was a success i n that the major education r e p o r t s were c a r e f u l l y designed to ensure the dominance of the Malay language, w h i l e p e r m i t t i n g some f l e x i b i l i t y i n the implementation of the p o l i c y . F i n a l l y , the p o l i c y 145 was implemented i n a g r a d u a l i s t i c and incremental fashion thus promoting natio n a l unity and a reduction i n primordial l o y a l t i e s over the long term. Dato Musa Hitam, the present Minister of Education, best sums up the whole controversy with regards to language education: "Bahasa Malaysia / J l a l a y language/ i s a means to an end. I t i s a means of creating n a t i o n a l unity. English i s widely spoken but i t i s e l i t i s t . Chinese i s l i m i t e d and /the Indian d i a l e c t o f 7 Tamil i s small.""'" 146 Notes 1. Far Eastern Economic Review, June 23, 1978, p.16. APPENDIX I 147 The Time-Schedule f o r the Implementation of the Teaching i n Bahasa M a l a y s i a of a l l Subjects other than E n g l i s h Language and the P u p i l s ' Own Languages i n National-Type E n g l i s h Schools Year Subjects to be Taught i n Bahasa Malaysia (Primary Level) 1970 In a l l subjects other than E n g l i s h Language Standard 1 1971 - d i t t o - Standard 2 1972 In a l l subjects other than E n g l i s h Language and P u p i l s ' Own Languages Standard 3 1973 - d i t t o - Standard 4 1974 - d i t t o - Standard 5 1975 - d i t t o - Standard 6 (Secondary Level) 1976 - d i t t o - Form I 1977 - d i t t o Form I I 1978 - d i t t o ( S i j i l Rendah P e l a j a r a n Examination only, 1978) Form I I I 1979 - d i t t o - Form IV 1980 - d i t t o -( S i j i l P e l a j a r a n M a laysia Examination o n l y , 1980) Form V 1981 - d i t t o - Form VI (Lower) 1982 - d i t t o -( S i j i l T i n g g i Persekolahan Examination only, 1982) Form VI (Upper) P r o f e s s i o n a l C i r c u l a r No. 8/1969, M i n i s t r y of Education, Kuala Lumpur, 10 J u l y 1969. Source: F r a n c i s Wong Hoy Kee and Ee Tiang Hong, Education i n  Malaysia (2nd e d i t i o n ) , Kuala Lumpur: Heinemann Educational Books (Asia) L t d . 1975. p. 180. APPENDIX I I Subjects to be taught i n Bahasa Malaysia i n National-Type E n g l i s h Primary Schools i n 1970 Standard Subjects i n Bahasa Malaysia Subjects i n E n g l i s h P u p i l s ' Own Language Standard 1 A l l Subjects E n g l i s h Language N i l Standard 2 A r t s and C r a f t s , P h y s i c a l and Health Education, L o c a l Studies, Music, Bahasa Mal a y s i a , Islamic R e l i g i o u s Knowledge Mathematics, Science, E n g l i s h Language N i l Standard 3 As above As above P u p i l s ' Own Language Standard 4 H i s t o r y , Geography, C i v i c s , A r t and C r a f t s , P h y s i c a l and Health Educa-t i o n , Music, Bahasa Mal a y s i a , I s l a m i c R e l i g i o u s Knowledge As above - d i t t o -Standard 5 C i v i c s , Bahasa M a l a y s i a , Islamic R e l i g i o u s Knowledge A l l other subjects - d i t t o -Standard 6 Bahasa M a l a y s i a , I s l a m i c R e l i g i o u s Knowledge A l l other subjects - d i t t o -Source: F r a n c i s Wong Hoy Kee and Ee_Tiang Hong, op. c i t . , p. 181. 149 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY BOOKS Abdul Rahman, Tunku. 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