

THE POLITICS OF LANGUAGE EDUCATION:
A CASE STUDY OF WEST MALAYSIA, 1930 - 1971

by

K. RAMANATHAN (KALIMUTHU

B. Soc. Sci. (Honours), 1977
Universiti Sains Malaysia

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS

in

THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES
(Department of Political Science)

We accept this thesis as conforming
to the required standard

THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA
January, 1979

© K. Ramanathan Kalimuthu, 1979

In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study.

I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by his representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission.

Department of Political Science

The University of British Columbia
2075 Wesbrook Place
Vancouver, Canada
V6T 1W5

Date 1. 2. 1979

TO MY FATHER

ABSTRACT

In July, 1969, the Malaysian Minister of Education announced 'a new education policy' under which English, Chinese and Tamil schools were required to begin the process of conversion to Malay medium instruction in stages, beginning in 1970. This policy to introduce Malay as the medium of instruction took roughly forty years to evolve. The aim of this study is to examine how this was achieved through four phases of politics and government in West Malaysia: (i) The British Colonial Administration, 1930-1941; (ii) The Post-War Colonial Administration, 1945-1954; (iii) The Alliance Government, 1955-1961, and (iv) The Alliance Government, 1962-1971.

It was observed in this study that though non-Malay demands for the preservation of their vernacular schools were persistent and consistent, they lacked political unity and cohesiveness in successfully pursuing their demands. The Malays, in contrast were initially apathetic towards the language question. They became politicized during the period preceding Independence, however and were able to establish their political supremacy. A consequence of this was that they were able to pursue a communally oriented language policy with great effectiveness so that Malay became established as the medium of instruction.

The policy was successfully pursued by a series of Government Ordinances and Acts that were designed to ensure that the provisions of the Constitution with regards to the Malay language were adhered to while permitting flexibility in their implementation. However, it was found that the constitutional contract between the Malays and the non-Malays was an important and integral aspect of the policy making Malay the medium

of instruction. Perhaps the most important reason for the successful establishment of the policy lies in the gradualistic and incremental nature in which the policy was implemented.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
I INTRODUCTION	1
Some Contemporary Case Studies	3
Review of Literature	13
Methodology	15
Notes to Chapter I	18
II BRITISH COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION, 1930-1941	21
The Plural Society and the Colonial Government	21
Communal Demands	26
Motives and Aims of the Policy Makers	28
Policy Impact and Communal Responses	30
Aftermath	32
Conclusion	34
Notes to Chapter II	36
III POST-WAR COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION UP TO 1954	41
Political Developments Leading to the First Alliance Government	41
Educational Development	45
Communal Demands	50
Motives and Aims of the Policy Makers	51
Policy Impact and Communal Responses	54
Aftermath	61
Conclusion	62
Notes to Chapter III	64

CHAPTER	PAGE
IV THE ALLIANCE GOVERNMENT, 1955-1961	68
Major Political Events	68
Educational Development	71
Communal Demands	76
Motives and Aims of the Policy Makers	79
Policy Impact and Communal Responses	82
Aftermath	98
Conclusion	99
Notes to Chapter IV	101
V THE ALLIANCE GOVERNMENT, 1962-1971	105
Major Political Events	106
Communal Demands and Educational Development	110
Motives and Aims of the Policy Makers	116
Policy Impact and Communal Responses	118
Conclusion	128
Notes to Chapter V	130
VI CONCLUSION	135
Notes to Chapter VI	146
APPENDIX	
I The Time-Schedule for the Implementation of the Teaching in Bahasa Malaysia of all subjects other than English Language and the Pupils' Own Languages in National-Type English Schools	147
II Subjects to be Taught in Bahasa Malaysia in National-Type English Primary Schools in 1970	148
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY	149

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE		PAGE
I	Parallel Growth of Malays, Chinese and Indians, 1911-1941	9

ABBREVIATIONS

BARJASA	Bersatu Ra'ayat Jati Sarawak
BBBK	Barisan Bertindak Bahasa Kebangsaan
CACE	Central Advisory Committee on Education
CLC	Communities Liaison Committee
CSMC	All Malaya Chinese School Management Committee Association
DAP	Democratic Action Party
FMCE	Federation of Malaya Certificate of Education
Gerakan	Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia
IMP	Independence of Malaya Party
KMT	Kuomintang
LCE	Lower Certificate of Education
MCA	Malaysian Chinese Association
MCP	Malayan Communist Party
MIC	Malaysian Indian Congress
NOC	National Operations Council
PAP	People's Action Party
PMIP	Pan Malaysian Islamic Party
PN	Party Negara
PPP	People's Progressive Party
SNAP	Sarawak National Party
SUPP	Sarawak United People's Party
UCSTA	United Chinese School Teachers' Association
UDP	United Democratic Party
UMNO	United Malays National Organization

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My deepest gratitude is to my thesis supervisor, Professor Paul R. Tennant, without whose constant encouragement and guidance this thesis would have not been completed. I am also very thankful to Professors R. S. Milne and John R. Wood for their valuable constructive criticisms.

I am particularly indebted to Sylvia Woodcock for her many acts of kindness and for her warm friendship. My friends Ishak Lebbe, Donald Crone and Jim Gansner also helped me at various stages in writing this thesis.

Not to be forgotten, my thanks to Mrs. Grace Cross for doing an excellent job of typing this thesis.

Above all I would like to thank my friends Mohd. Noor bin, Mohd. Tahir and R. Siddharthan for their generosity. Lastly I would like to record my appreciation to Jack Gegenberg, Mohammad Ghulam Kabir, Evelyn Riediger and Mrs. Olive Cuthbert for making my stay in Vancouver eventful.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Malaysia's education system is often considered to be one of the best in South-east Asia if not in the developing world.¹ Enrollment and retention through primary and secondary cycles are high. In comparison with other Third World systems, the quality of teaching is high, the system is well organized, and the supply of related facilities and texts is adequate in most instances. Yet the education system has been burdened with a recurrent problem - the language of instruction. The instituting of Malay as the medium of instruction has been a continuing point of controversy and conflict between the indigenous Malays and the non-Malays for well over forty years. This thesis will deal with the evolution of national language policy in the primary and secondary school systems and the various controversies arising from it.

It is characteristic of national movements that success in gaining political independence from the colonial power is followed by efforts to regenerate and glorify the local cultural heritage.² But in a multi-ethnic (or multi-cultural) society there are bound to be controversies over the relative position of one society as opposed to another. Some issues - such as language, religion, and culture - are far more important than others and, become the ignition points in inter-ethnic controversies. There are bound to be bitter conflicts over the instituting of the language of one particular community as

opposed to that of another.

Throughout recorded history Governments appear to have manipulated the education system to suit their prevailing political objectives.³ When the school system is disparate or independent of government control, effective control of the school system is nevertheless often pursued by government policy makers in an attempt to ensure uniformity of administration and as a step toward national unity.

Many new states include language policies as an important aspect of their national development program. The ostensible reason for such a program is facilitating national communication and fostering national identification; yet those involved in the formulation and realization of language policies are quick to recognize that to give precedence to one particular language in a multi-ethnic society may negatively affect inter-ethnic relations. Evidently, the language of one group cannot be established as the national or official language without seriously infringing upon or affecting the perceived language rights of other communities. In addition to the material advantages and disadvantages between the competing communities, which are clearly implied, the situation is further complicated by considerations pertaining to cultural values.

The question of national language is directly related to education. What language (or languages) shall be used as the medium of instruction? What shall be the official language or languages for the purposes of

administration? Educational policy must square with the decision taken in regards to the language of administration. The Government must critically evaluate the adequacy of the indigenous language relevant to the requirements of the present; as well as assess the availability of personnel and facilities for instruction in the language chosen.

If these issues are raised as an immediate result of the withdrawal of colonial rule, the nature of the political conflicts surrounding them can be appreciated fully only in terms of historical perspective. Such conflicts reveal many complex aspects of these societies; their sense of culturally distinctiveness, the posture towards colonial rule, the pattern of existing social inequalities and the means advocated for levelling them. Such conflicts also greatly influence the present course of politics and social change. Thus, the choice of a national language often involves so many values that convenience, rationality, and efficiency are not necessarily the decisive criteria. It is, therefore, necessary to consider the problem of language policy more from a political perspective than from a predominantly technical viewpoint.

Some Contemporary Case Studies

An historical overview of events in India and Sri Lanka, which have characteristics comparable to those found in Malaysia - i.e. linguistic and ethnic cleavages and concomitant political problems - will serve to illustrate the complexity of national language policy formation. In both these countries, there were problems of dissent

when the government attempted to institute a single national or official language.

The choice of a national language in India and consequently of a single medium of instruction for all schools was complicated by the fact that no single language could claim an overwhelming superiority. There were more than ten languages that were regionally and demographically salient.⁴ Thus when Hindi, a language predominantly used in the North, was adopted as the 'official language' of the Union, it was decided that English would continue to be used until 1965, after which Parliament would review the situation.

However, with the date due for the changeover to Hindi fast approaching regional identities were sufficiently articulated that the Bengali, Marathi, Punjabi, Tamil, and Telegu speaking regions were not prepared to accept Hindi as the official language.⁵ The problem was further compounded by the fact that "Hindi fanatics" at the Centre had pushed their case in an exclusivist and zealous manner thus alienating other language groups even further.

The Official Language Commission and the Committee of Members of Parliament on the issue had originally decided that the position which English education had perpetuated produced an unwholesome social differentiation and stratification. The Commission consequently recommended that Hindi should progressively replace English as the Official language and the main media of instruction in all schools, possibly with effective changeover in 1965.

The Report immediately aroused great anxiety in the non-Hindi speaking areas where agitations were mounted to register protests against the recommended course of action. The Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, was quick to sense the magnitude of the protests and therefore pledged that non-Hindi areas could continue to use English for an indefinite period. To a large extent the assurance restrained further protests.

But with the demise of Nehru in 1964, it was apparent that his pledge would not be honoured by the new Prime Minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri, and his Government. On Republic Day, January 26, 1965, in pursuance of the literal provisions of the Constitution, Hindi was promulgated as the official language of the Union. This sparked two months of anti-Hindi agitations and riots all over India, the most violent ones were in Tamil Nadu, where more than 60 people were killed by police bullets, and two youths performed an unprecedented act of self-immolation ('Vietnamese style'). Students, whose interests were the most affected by the legislation, joined in the fray and offered the stiffest resistance.⁶ The support of the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam was especially potent in forcing the Central Government to back down on its policy decision.⁷

The Central Government agreed to a constitutional amendment. It further consented to a 'three-language formula' under which each state's language, as well as Hindi and English, were adopted as official languages in that state. In retrospect, the new formula, which finally

became the official language policy, has been honoured only in the breach. Tamil Nadu and other south Indian states virtually have eliminated Hindi from the school curriculum, while the Hindi heartland of North India has remained almost mono-lingual. English continues to remain throughout India as the link language and in the school system.

Sri Lanka seems to have weathered a similar storm. Before Independence, the Sinhalese made up about 61 percent of the population while their nearest rivals, the Tamils, made up 23 percent.⁸ Under British colonial administration, extending from the late eighteenth until 1948, English had become the language of the government, the professions, modern commerce, higher education and to a certain extent of politics.⁹

Just before Independence, there was a resurgence of Sinhala and of Tamil nationalism. An offshoot of this was the "Swabhasha" ("own language") movement which sought to replace English as the official language of the country by both Sinhala and Tamil.¹⁰ However, with the achievement of Independence, a national resurgence among the Sinhalese gained prominence. As a result, "the demand among the majority of the community turned from 'swabhasa' to 'Sinhala only' as the official language."¹¹ Thus, the official language controversy quickly shifted from an attack on the privileged position of English to a clash between the ethnic communities.

In 1956, the United National Party government was defeated at the polls and was replaced by a group of opposition politicians under the leadership of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party. The first legislative task

of the new government was the enactment of an Official Language Act declaring "the Sinhala language shall be the one official language of Ceylon."¹² Understandably the Act was much resented by the English-educated but even more vehemently by the Tamils. The Tamils in particular felt that the unqualified declaration of Sinhalese was a realization of their worst fears that their language would be relegated to a position of inferiority with a subsequent decline in both language and culture.

The Federal Party which had emerged from the 1956 elections as the principal Tamil party assumed the mantle of protest for the Tamils. To counter the language act, the party claimed equal status with the Sinhalese. In August, 1956, the Federal Party issued an ultimatum that if the party's language and other demands were not met within a year it would launch a "non-violent direct action campaign to achieve its aim."¹³ This prompted Prime Minister Bandarnaike to have discussions with the leaders of the Federal Party. On July 26, 1957, a formal written agreement between the Prime Minister and the Federal Party leader S. J. V. Chelvanagam was achieved. On the language question a formula was agreed upon for legislation containing "recognition of Tamil as the language of the minority" and providing that "the language of administration [and education] of the Northern and Eastern Provinces should be Tamil."¹⁴ But before this agreement could reach formalization, vociferous opposition developed. The uncompromising 'Sinhala-only' advocates attacked the agreement as a betrayal of the Sinhalese community. The Tamil in turn began to protest the use of Sinhalese in the Northern and Eastern Provinces

and they were backed by the Federal Party in their quest. Under the weight of heavy pressures from the opponents of the pact, the Prime Minister was moved to abrogate the pact - citing the Federal Party activities as the reason.¹⁵

Immediately communal tensions spewed into open conflict. After four days of utter chaos, a state of emergency was declared by the Government. Many members of parliament belonging to the Federal Party, including the leader of a minor inflammatory Sinhalese party, the Jathika Vimukthi Peramuna (National Liberation Front), were placed under house arrest.¹⁶ When the rioting was brought under control, the Government used the opportunity of the absence of the Federal Party members to enact a Tamil Language Act.

The new Act was intended to define at last the 'reasonable use' of Tamil. The Act provided for the use of Tamil in education, public service entrance examinations, and "prescribed administrative purposes".¹⁷ However, it was more than seven years before the first regulations necessary for the Act were put into effect. Nevertheless, the basic tenets of the Act were adhered to even after the SLFP was defeated in the 1965 elections. Thus the Act managed to reverse the extremes of both Sinhalese and Tamil nationalism and managed to found a tenuous but seemingly workable measure of compromise between the Sinhalese and the Tamil language interests.

While India and Sri Lanka seemed to have worked out a 'three-language' formula only as an alternative to open conflict, Malaysia was able to institute a single language as the official and language of

instruction in schools. In order to better understand how this was achieved it is necessary to say something of the British colonial rule in Malaya. Rupert Emerson best describes pre-war Colonial Malaya when he states that "divided from each other in almost every aspect, the peoples of Malaya have in common essentially only the fact that they live in the same country."¹⁸ Ethnic groups were divided primarily along racial, cultural and linguistic lines. The Malays, who formed the majority, were usually considered the indigenous people of the country. The Chinese and Indians, who immigrated to Malaya in search of better prospects, formed the remainder of the population. Table I shows the parallel growth of the three main racial groups during the years 1911 to 1941:

TABLE I

Parallel Growth of Malays, Chinese
and Indians, 1911-1941

<u>Year</u>	<u>Malays</u>	<u>Chinese</u>	<u>Indians</u>
1911	1,437,000	916,000	267,000
1921	1,651,000	1,174,000	471,000
1931	1,962,000	1,709,000	624,000
1941	2,278,000	2,379,000	744,000

(Note: These figures probably include the population of Singapore, though this is not indicated by D. G. E. Hall.)

Source: D. G. E. Hall, A History of South-East Asia.
London: Macmillan, 1964. p. 750.

Each group had certain specialized economic functions in the productive process. Within each ethnic group there were differences such as linguistic, regional and cultural. In sum, pre-war Malaya was the ideal type of a plural society in the sense outlined by J. S. Furnivall.¹⁹

English language education began with the mission schools in the early 19th Century. Later the Government in an effort to fulfill the requirements of an expanding economy and the dictates of the administrative system introduced public non-sectarian schools. These schools were located in the urban centres and were largely patronized by the non-Malays, who were quick to realize the importance of English education as a means for securing employment with the Government and commercial houses. These schools were also patronized by a segment of Malay society, namely the aristocrats, in order to be trained to fill the requirements of the Malayan Civil Service at junior and middle level administrators.²⁰ As a direct consequence, while a substantial number of non-Malays were capitalising on the availability of English education, the predominantly rural based Malays were being pushed back even further in the modernization process.

A few mission schools did offer instruction in Malay. However, the principal root of Malay education was in the Koranic schools.²¹ With the introduction of 'Indirect Rule',²² these Koranic schools formed the nucleus from which evolved the Government Malay school system. However, this extension of Government sponsorship did not bring about drastic changes in the nature and content of vernacular education.

The Malay schools continued to remain backward in terms of the quality of teachers, content of syllabus and basic amenities such as textbooks. The Government made no secret of the fact that the aim of the Malay vernacular education was to keep the Malays in their villages and thus avoid "economic dislocation and social unrest."²³ While the rest of the country was undergoing drastic social and economic change, the Malays were burdened by a system of schooling that sought to inculcate "habits of order, punctuality and obedience" more than anything else.²⁴

Early Chinese education was provided for by contributions from the Chinese community. The British administrators were supportive of this arrangement, ostensibly on the ground of cost. This non-interference of the Government enabled the Chinese to use the schools as centres to teach their children "how to remain Chinese outside the homeland", and often as staging points of anti-government activities.²⁵ In 1924, the Government introduced the system of grants-in-aid as a means to reduce the independence of these schools. This was gradually extended until by early 1960s most Chinese schools were either partially or fully assisted.

The Indian population, largely of Tamil extraction, came to Malaya originally as indentured labourers to work mostly in the rubber plantations. Indian vernacular education developed informally on the plantation and was of poor quality. In 1923, a law requiring the plantation management to provide adequate primary education led to some growth of Tamil schools but there was no change whatsoever in the quality of education. It was only in 1956 that full responsibility for the

Tamil schools was assumed by the Government, but this change could not alter the years of neglect.

From the end of the Second World War until 1954 there have been several Government sponsored studies and reports on the problems of the Malayan educational system. But most of the Reports were seen as being either too radical in their content or failing to take into consideration the prevailing communal sentiments with regards to implementing one language as the medium of instruction as opposed to another. Thus it became the task of the successor Alliance Governments to work out a compromise solution.

With the achievement of Independence and the instituting of inter-communal cooperation in the form of a constitutional contract the problem of the language of instruction was solved not by enacting a single piece of all-encompassing legislation but in a gradual manner stretching over a decade. But there continued to be inter-communal disagreements which often tested the Alliance concept of communal cooperation. It was only in 1971 that the Government was able to make a firm commitment towards implementing the single medium of the instruction policy.

Review of Literature

It is frequently assumed in the literature on political development that linguistic diversity is an obstacle to efficient government. Language is believed to be the major cause of numerous day-to-day difficulties faced by the governments of many ethnically and linguistically complex countries.²⁶ Solving the linguistic problem either by eliminating or restricting the use of the minority languages would, it is held, help in the development of a more viable national political system.²⁷ Although such speculations about the probable effects of linguistic diversity on political development have been frequent, there have been virtually no attempts to demonstrate how this diversity actually complicates the business of government.²⁸

The study of language and politics is of potential interest to most social scientists, to development planners and to those whose primary interest center on the politics of linguistic nationalism. Yet none of these specialists seem to have devoted enough attention to the language-politics relationship for the subject to achieve subdisciplinary prominence. There is no important theory about how language is different from other political issues (if indeed it is), or about how language factors intervene and thus affect the outcome of political process or the policy making process. Thus a coherent framework which examines the problem of language education policies and their evolution is needed.

Many analysts of government and politics in Malaysia have expended a great deal of research on the various national elections, the economy, the problems of integration, the role of the political elite,

and political parties among others. Yet only a minimal amount of attention has been paid to the problem of language education. The problem of language education is treated as part of the overall problem of the process of government and thus the issue is treated as an incidental one.²⁹

Cynthia Enloe's penetrating article, "Issues and Integration in Malaysia,"³⁰ and her book Multi-ethnic Politics: The Case of Malaysia, both deal with the problems of instituting Malay as the medium of instruction, but political events since then have made some of her observations out of date. The internal security situation and the policy on secondary schools have changed a good deal since the book was written. In the same token, Margaret Roff's article, "The Politics of Language in Malaya," deals primarily with the crisis of the 1967 period. K. J. Ratnam's Communalism and the Political Process in Malaya, treats language of education at some length but is primarily devoted to the initial communal compromises of 1956-1961. Still others like Karl von Vorys' Democracy Without Consensus,³⁴ and B. Simandjuntak's Malayan Federalism, 1945-1963,³⁵ treat the problem incidentally. On the other hand writings of educationists, such as T. R. Fennell's thesis "Commitment to Change: A History of Malayan Educational Policy, 1945-1957," and Paul Chang Ming Phang's Educational Development in a Plural Society - A Malayan Case Study,³⁷ examine the problem in isolation without making references to the overall politics of the period concerned. In sum, the politics of language education is one of the areas that needs more research and this study will endeavour to fill the gap.

Methodology

This study relies a great deal on secondary source material. In addition Malayan newspapers relating to the 1957-1960 period have been consulted. This study also relies on my own personal experience - first as a product of the Malayan school system and next as a school teacher for well over seven years in Malaysia. In addition, I have drawn inferences from studies of the political elite, of political parties, and of Malaysian general elections.

This study is perhaps the first to identify the British Colonial Administration's attempt in early 1930 to introduce Malay as the medium of instruction. Even though the policy was a failure, it nevertheless demonstrates that the British did desire to have a unified school system, (though their primary intention was to make education somewhat cheaper for the colonial coffer).

In view of an absence of a suitable theory on the nature of the politics of language education, this thesis will examine the following questions: What was the nature and origin of the policy to introduce Malay as the medium of instruction in Malaysian schools? How determinedly and persistently was this policy pursued by the various administration or governments between the period 1930 to 1971? To further elaborate the main questions the following questions will be dealt with in this thesis:

1. What were the demands (concerning Malay as the medium of instruction) of the Malay and non-Malay communities during each administration? How did the English-educated elite and the non-English educated masses differ on the issue?

2. What were the motives and aims of the policy makers in pursuing the policy of Malay as the main medium of instruction?
3. What effect, either actual or perceived, did the proposed policy have on the Malay and non-Malay communities?
4. What were the reactions of the Malay and non-Malay communities to the policy?
5. What part did the issue play in the overall politics of the period mentioned?

The time period of the study is from 1930 to 1971. The starting point of 1930 has been chosen because it was at this time that Malay as the medium of instruction was first proposed. Similarly, the year 1971 has been chosen because it marked a definite and fundamental change in the rules of the game in the country. It was in this year that the Constitutional Amendment Act, 1971 was enacted thereby removing from the realm of public discussion issues pertaining to the National Language and its status in the Government and in primary and secondary education.

The time period between 1930 and 1971 has been divided into four phases according to the climate of political participation in the country. Chapter II will deal with pre-War Malaya between the years 1930 and 1941 during which the British colonial administration had complete control of the decision making powers of the government. It is also characterised by a marked absence of communal inputs in the decision making process. Chapter III will examine the second phase on the evolution of the policy to make Malay the medium of instruction. During

the period between 1945 to 1954 there were important constitutional and educational changes undertaken by the colonial government in an effort to prepare the country for independence. Chapter IV will relate to the period between 1955 and 1961 during which the Alliance Party assumed power and during which inter-communal cooperation was the keynote in the policymaking process. Chapter V will examine the period between 1962 and 1971 during which there was intense political activity and during which the basic tenets agreed upon during the early years of Independence were subjected to intense controversy by a new generation of sub-elites who were not party to the original constitutional compromises. Lastly, Chapter VI will provide a summary and presentation of the findings of this thesis.

Notes

1. Robert W. McMeekin, Jr. Educational Planning and Expenditure Decision in Developing Countries: With a Malaysian Case Study, New York: Praeger Publishers, Inc., 1975. p. 142.
2. K. J. Ratnam, Communalism and the Political Process in Malaya, Singapore: University of Malaya Press, 1965. p. 126.
3. William M. O'Barr and Jean F. O'Barr (eds), Language and Politics The Hague: Mouton and Co., 1976. p. 6.
4. Jyotirindra Das Gupta, Language Conflict and National Development, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970. pp. 45-68.
5. Ibid. Chap. V.
6. Ibid. Passim; Rajni Kothari, Politics in India, Little, Brown and Co., 1970. pp. 326-330; Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr. India, Government and Politics in a Developing Nation, (2nd edition). New York: Harcourt Brace Javanovich, Inc., 1975. pp. 93-96.
7. Y. Mansoor Marican, "The Political Accommodation of Primordial Parties: DMK (India) and PAS (Malaysia)," Ph.D. Dissertation, Vancouver: University of British Columbia, 1976. p. 123; Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr., The Dravidian Movement, Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1965; Philip Spratt, DMK in Power, Bombay: Nachiketa Publishers, 1970; Sagar Ahluwalia, Anna - The Tempest and the Sea, New Delhi: Young Asia Publication 1969. Chapter 3.
8. J. D. Gupta, op. cit., p. 24.
9. Robert N. Kearney, "Language and the Rise of Tamil Separatism in Sri Lanka," Asian Survey, Vol. XVIII, No. 5, (May, 1978) p. 526.
10. Ibid., p. 527.
11. Ibid.
12. Official Language Act, No. 33 of 1956, as cited in Robert N. Kearney Communalism and Language in the Politics of Ceylon, Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1967. p. 143.
13. Ibid., p. 85.

14. Ibid. (for a full text of the "Bandaranaike - Chelvanayagam Pact," July 26, 1957, see pages 145-146.)
15. Ibid., p. 86.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid., pp. 147-149 (Appendix III).
18. Rupert Emerson, Foreword to Frank H. H. King, The Malayan Nation, New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1957. p. V.
19. J. S. Furnival, Colonial Policy and Practice. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1948. p. 304.
20. William R. Roff, The Origins of Malay Nationalism, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967. Chapter 7.
21. Ibid.
22. Rupert Emerson, Malaysia: A Study of Direct and Indirect Rule, Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press, 1964.
23. R. O. Winstedt, in Education in Malaya. British Empire Exhibition: Malayan Series (London: 1924) p. 15 as cited in W. R. Roff, op. cit., p. 141.
24. Frank Swettenham, British Malaya, London: Allen and Unwin, 1948, p. 258.
25. W. C. S. Corry, Malaya To-day. British Commonwealth Affairs, No. 9. London: Longmans, Green and Co. 1957. p. 42.
26. Gabriel Almond and James Coleman, The Politics of Developing Area, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960; passim. Lucien W. Pye, Aspects of Political Development, Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1966, passim.
27. Ibid.
28. William M. O'Barr and Jean F. O'Barr, (eds.) op. cit., p. 14.
29. See Daniel Eldredge Moore, "The United Malay National Organization and the 1959 Malayan Elections: A Study of Political Party in Action in a newly Independent Society," Berkeley: Ph.D. Thesis, University of California, 1960; S. Arasaratnam, Indian in Malaysia and Singapore, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1970; Victor Purcell, The Chinese in Malaya, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1967.

30. Cynthia Enloe, "Issues and Integration in Malaysia," Pacific Affairs, Vol. XLI, No. 3, (Fall, 1968) pp. 372-385.
31. Cynthia Enloe, Multi-ethnic Politics: The Case Study of Malaysia, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970.
32. Margaret Roff, "The Politics of Language in Malaya," Asian Survey, Vol. VII, No. 5 (May, 1967), pp. 316-328.
33. K. J. Ratnam, op. cit., pp. 126-141.
34. Karl von Vorys, Democracy Without Consensus, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975.
35. B. Simandjuntak, Malayan Federalism, 1945-1963, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1969.
36. T. R. Fennell, "Commitment to Change: A History of Malayan Educational Policy, 1945-1957," Ph.D. Thesis, University of Hawaii, 1968.
37. Paul Chang Ming Phang, Educational Development in a Plural Society, A Malaysian Case Study, Singapore: Academia Publications, 1973.

CHAPTER II

BRITISH COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION, 1930-1941

The Plural Society and the Colonial Government

The Malay community during this era was complacent and polarized between the aristocratic ruling class and the rakyat (or subjects). The absence of an articulate middle-class was distinct.¹ The main unifying forces for the Malays were the common bonds of race, religion and language. Yet these factors were complicated by the presence of narrow provincialism and loyalties.² This factor was instrumental in preventing a willingness to organize and cooperate for the good of the community as a whole.³ Under British tutelage and protectionism the members of the aristocracy were able to get English education in Malaya and England, were frequently recruited into the civil service and these acquired positions of some responsibility. On the other hand, the traditional peasantry were encouraged to remain in their villages. As a consequence, the Malay aristocracy remained the political elite of Malay society.

During this period the term "politics" was understood by the Malays to mean "treason". The people generally remained wholly loyal and submissive to the Government, to the authorities and the Rulers.⁴ As a result, Malay nationalism and political activity "seemed twenty-five years behind the rest of Southeast Asia."⁵ There were very few politically motivated activities undertaken by the Malay community and

even these few were inspired by Islamic cultural revivalism in the middle-east and by nationalist movements in the Dutch East Indies.⁶ The first political organization of the Malays occurred under the aristocratic conservative leadership of the Malay sultans to protect the interest of the ruling class. Popular support "was granted not to new social and economic goals, but to the preservation of Malay institutions and to the safeguarding of Malay privileges..."⁷ It appears that Malay political activity was greatly stimulated by the Depression of the 1930's. The Depression transformed prosperity overnight into widespread poverty, and this in turn triggered public protests.

To the immigrant groups, Malaya was an El Dorado. The most important concern of the Chinese and the Indians seems to have been to make enough money to retire to their native land. Economic opportunities in British Malaya contrasted sharply with the ever present spectre of poverty, war or famine in the homelands. After living in Malaya for a number of years, many immigrants lost contact with their homeland. Others were forced to remain because of debts, vested economic interests or adverse conditions in their homeland.⁸ There were substantial differences within both the Chinese and Indian communities. For example, there were sharp cleavages between the rich and poor, the English-educated and non-English educated, the local and the foreign born immigrants, and between the various dialect groups.⁹ All these differences made the achievement of political unity a difficult task.

Nevertheless, there were frequent upsurges of Chinese and Indian nationalism inspired and often nurtured by local branches of the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Indian nationalist movements. Chinese and Indian political participation was at best limited and episodic. Generally, these upsurges of nationalism were not oriented so much towards the local environment as they were reactions to external forces and developments, like the Chinese nationalist movement and the Indian independence movement in China and India respectively.¹⁰ Such foreign based and inspired movements failed to unite the people in a common cause and failed to produce any profound effects in the politics of British Malaya.

The main feature of British control of the Malay peninsula was the resident system which was designed primarily as a means of bringing law and order to the Federated Malay states.¹¹ Malay sultans remained sovereign but were required to adhere to the "advice" given by the British Residents or British Advisers.¹² In this manner the British assumed almost complete control of the decision making powers of the government. The government "retained their Malay trappings, the functions of government were carried on with a fairly efficient bureaucratic administration staffed in the higher positions by British officials."¹³ The British recognized the Malays as the indigenous people, and the government accepted special responsibility for their welfare and the preservation of their rights as the subject of the sultan. In addition, the British adopted a "pro-Malay" stance to

help preserve the traditional patterns of Malay society and economy.¹⁴ Even education, a potentially modernizing agent, was geared to meet this goal. In Sir George Maxwell's memorable phrase, "The aim of the Government is. . . to make the son of a fisherman or a peasant a more intelligent fisherman or peasant than his father had been and a man whose education would enable him to understand how his own lot of life fits in with the scheme of life around him."¹⁵ Although these policies seemed solicitous and appropriate, at this time they did not help the Malays to come to terms with the realities of the modern world. In addition, the privileged position of the Malays helped to nurture an undercurrent of resentment among the other racial communities.

The British colonial administrators generally adopted a laissez-faire approach in governing. The transient nature of the immigrant population made the task of the administrator somewhat easier in that little was necessary except to try to provide marginal conditions of law and order. Generally, the colonial government remained aloof from the immigrant communities until there were outstanding issues requiring immediate attention. For example, Chinese vernacular education was permitted to evolve on its own without any direction from the colonial government. However, as soon as it was apparent that the schools were being used by KMT sympathisers to inculcate anti-government ideology, the government promptly stepped in to enforce legislation controlling such activities.¹⁶ In sum, the failure to act

earlier does not indicate the lack of a policy but rather indicates that British policy was to have no operative regulations or controls as long as they could be avoided.

It must be mentioned at this juncture that the British never consciously practised a policy of 'divide and rule'. "The divisions were already there" and these divisions required no British initiatives.¹⁷ British rule was however instrumental in minimizing the official contacts between the two communities. In the process of government, "the elites, or near-elites, of each of the racial groups dealt with the British rather than directly with each other".¹⁸ By the same token, the plural society permitted the British an opportunity to perpetuate institutional pluralism in the various vernacular schools, the system of communal representation, the setting up of a special "Chinese Protectorate"¹⁹ and the Indian Immigration Committee.²⁰

The British were without doubt paternalistic towards the Malays but this did not commit them to a policy of opposition to the immigrant races. But the British did try to hold the balance as the protecting power between the various races. Very often in making of public policies, the British did take the view of the other communities into consideration, and if legislation or proposed policy goals did not meet with the approval of the community or its representatives it was always delayed or reconsidered.²¹ In sum, British colonial administration did not completely eliminate the possibility of inter-racial clashes, but rather postponed their arrival.

Communal Demands

The most important feature of the period was the lack of unity within the individual communities concerned. Generally each of the communal groups was still in a state of infancy as far as its spirit of nationalism was concerned. There were very few Malay elites truly concerned with the long term development of the community. Many of the embryo political organizations were still finding their directions and were largely restricted to a handful of Malay educated radical intellectuals. The Arabic educated religious reformists were primarily interested in religious affairs and did not command enough support to articulate demands relating to social issues as yet. The more influential English educated administrators recruited largely from the traditional aristocracy were not prepared to make demands on behalf of the masses. There were some Malay representation in the Federal Legislative Council, but these positions were monopolised by favourites or relatives of the Malay rulers and policies promoting Malay welfare were sidetracked in the pursuit of private interests.²²

There were four Malay members in the Federal legislative Council after 1927. They were Raja Chulan, Tengku Musa'eddin, Dato Abdullah bin Haji Dahan and Tengku Sulaiman; all of them clearly belonged to the aristocracy. Of these members Raja Chulan was perhaps the most vocal in issues pertaining to Malay interests such as education.²³ Yet even he felt it was a mistake to extend English

education to the rural areas, "because Malay youths who gain a smattering of English at these schools do not take kindly to the pursuits of their forefathers".²⁴ In other words even the most outstanding spokesman of Malay interests merely reflected the official thinking of the colonial government.

As mentioned earlier the Chinese and Indian communities were preoccupied with events in their homeland. The Chinese school system had evolved independently, outside the orbit of the Education Department. The Chinese tried as far as possible to preserve their culture and language. Thus, when the British moved in to provide financial assistance to the Chinese schools, the Chinese were reluctant to accept such assistance as this would bring in stricter measures of government control.²⁵ Needless to say they did not make any demands to introduce Malay as the medium of instruction in their schools.

There were equally few demands from the Indian community to make Malay the medium of instruction in Indian schools. Firstly, the plantation Tamil schools were tacitly in the hands of the plantation management and as such there was very little interference from the government. Secondly, the transitory nature of the plantation workers in the plantation made education an unwanted luxury. Like the Malays, the Chinese and the Indians were not at all interested in the government's decision to make Malay the medium of instruction in their schools.

Motives and Aims of the Policy Makers

The key policy maker of the period and of the British colonial administration was the Governor. The Governors of the Malay States seem to have had much more autonomy than their counterparts elsewhere. They often acted with a great deal of latitude and often on their own initiatives without direct orders. The motives and aims of the Governor in proposing a policy to make Malay the medium of instruction for all Malayan schools seem to have been dictated by two basic considerations. The first was the economic imperative of the Great Depression which necessitated a reduction of costs. The second reason was the need to reduce the influence of the Kuomintang (KMT) and other elements in the Chinese schools. At the same time an attempt was made to control the autonomous Chinese schools.

In 1931 the Great Depression reduced the revenue of the Colony to the lowest level since 1918 and in the same year the colony had the second highest expenditure in its history. This conjunction produced a deficit of M\$20,201,030.²⁷ This was a severe blow to the cost conscious administration and therefore immediate steps were taken to reduce expenditure. A Retrenchment Committee composed of members of the Legislative Council was appointed to investigate and recommend remedial measures. Among its findings was that certain departments had "expanded out of all relation to the population and public revenue".²⁸ The principal offending departments were identified as Education, Medical and the Police departments.²⁹ The committee recommended retrenchment

of staff and reduction in public expenditure.

Just at the onset of the Depression, Sir Cecil Clementi was appointed as the High Commissioner (to the Malay States) and Governor (of the Straits Settlement). He had earlier served as Governor of Hong Kong and had witnessed anti-British activities instigated by KMT sympathisers.³⁰ He was well aware of the problems faced by the Colonial Government in Malaya, particularly with regards to the problem of "teachings manifestedly prejudicial to the Welfare of the Colony and British Empire".³¹ It is therefore possible that his experience in Hong Kong may have contributed to his anti-Kuomintang policies in Malaya.³²

In proposing to introduce Malay as the medium of instruction in all schools Clementi and his administrators may have taken into consideration the nature of the English-educated unemployed clerks. Clementi in particular felt that "it is idle to educate youths up to Cambridge School Certificate standard mainly at public cost if there is no prospect of employment for them".³³ Thus, Clementi proposed a twenty-five to a hundred percent increase in English secondary school fees in an attempt to discourage the heavy enrollment in the schools.³⁴ In addition, in promoting Malay as the medium of instruction in primary schools one of Clementi's major motives was very likely to create among the Chinese a commitment to the Malay States - certainly Lennox Mills is emphatic on this point, stating that Clementi "believed that the children of the Chinese living in Malaya should be taught to regard the

Peninsula [Malaya] and not China as their native country and should develop a Malayan patriotism."³⁵ In addition, Clementi argued that since Malay was "already the lingua franca of the country . . . it is justified that the Government only provide free primary education in the Malay language for all children whose parents are domiciled either in the colony or in the Malay States."³⁶ In addition he announced that Chinese and Tamil schools already in receipt of grants might continue to receive them but no new applications would be entertained. Thus Clementi believed that the introduction of the Malay language as the medium of instruction in all Malayan schools would serve as a cure for the economic problems posed by the Great Depression and create a sense of loyalty towards Malaya among the children of the immigrants.

Policy Impact and Communal Responses

The little political organization and agitation that there was during this period was Chinese, rather than Malay.³⁷ The Indian community was quiescent, preoccupied with events in India and insulated from the mainstream of politics due to the nature of the plantation social and economic structure.³⁸ The majority of the English-educated Malays did not protest as they were either in agreement with the governmental policies or were not organized as a potent force. The English-educated group among the Chinese and Indians did protest mildly but these protests were muffled compared to those of the Chinese educated sector.

The groups that vehemently opposed Clementi's proposals were the Chinese-educated and in this they found a useful ally in the Kuomintang.³⁹ The Chinese community had hitherto rejected Government grants-in-aid because they meant increased government supervision and control. Furthermore, the Chinese community regarded the introduction of Malay in their schools as an attempt to downgrade and dilute their culture. They accordingly protested that Malay might be the lingua franca of the country, "but culturally it had little to offer".⁴⁰ They accused the Government of favoritism towards the Malays and cited discriminatory practices such as the provision of free and compulsory Malay vernacular education and scholarships for them in English schools. They accordingly demanded that the Government should subsidize Chinese vernacular education as well and that elementary English education be provided "free or at a nominal cost."⁴¹

The Chinese members in the Legislative Council, who in effect represented Chinese public opinion to the Colonial government, were the first to protest. They were joined by the more articulate Chinese press, business guilds and associations of various denominations. In addition, a new found sense of pride and racial superiority, as a result of KMT propaganda, strengthened their resolution. Increasingly, the Council members' speeches and the vernacular press editorials bordered on racial chauvinism. They made statements to the effect that their culture was superior, of ancient origin, and that the Malay language was inferior to theirs. A few extremists even claimed that they would

not intermarry with the Malays because their children would be "degenerate and worthless hybrids."⁴²

Malay members in the Council were much perturbed by such open expressions of racial bigotry. The most vocal protests came from the Malay-educated radical intellectuals and to a certain extent from the English-educated elites. They reacted sharply to the claims of Chinese racial superiority and had misgivings over British immigration policy which was responsible for the influx of the Chinese.⁴³ A few became increasingly aware that "the immigrant was in a fair way to become the economic master of the original inhabitant."⁴⁴ Others protested that refusal to teach English, "the bread-earning language of Malaya," in the Malay vernacular schools was proof that the real policy of the Government was to train the students "how not to get employment . . . [and] to make room for outsiders."⁴⁵ However, most of the emotionally charged counter attacks were largely restricted to the debates in the Council. In sum, Clementi's education policy helped aggravate the ill-feeling between the Chinese and the Malays, and this aroused a certain amount of apprehension as to the position of the Chinese in Malaya and ill-will towards British rule.

Aftermath

Within a span of two years the situation stabilized. There were several reasons for this. Firstly, the economy began to pick up because the Depression did not have a prolonged impact on the production of rubber and tin. Secondly, Sir Cecil Clementi's tenure as Governor

was never a popular one. Several of his proposals⁴⁶ had aroused strong opposition from both Europeans and Chinese. Most of his policies were brought forward within two years of his arrival from the governorship of Hong Kong, where he had acquired a distaste for the Chinese and the KMT in particular.⁴⁷ Many believed that he had acted too hastily and without adequate knowledge of the conditions of Malaya. Thirdly, Sir Cecil Clementi gave priority to checking the powers of the Chinese community rather than to the promotion of communal cooperation in matters of politics and administration. Consequently, the Chinese in the Malay Peninsula regarded the Government as alien and unsympathetic to Chinese demands.⁴⁸ Fourthly, there were strong reactions in China to Clementi's 'anti-Chinese' policies. The KMT Government lodged a strong protest with Great Britain. Fifthly, the "Manchurian Incident" of September 18, 1931, and Japanese designs in China⁴⁹ prompted the KMT to soften its anti-British propaganda.

All these factors had an effect on the education policy. Since the economy had begun to improve once more there was a renewed need for English educated clerks, teachers, and other professionals. The policy to introduce Malay in all schools was no longer tenable and was therefore dropped. Cordial relations between China and Britain made Sir Cecil Clementi's seeming anti-Chinese policy unnecessary aspect of British policy in Malaysia. In any event, his tenure as Governor came to a rather abrupt end in 1934.

Conclusion

It is apparent that the policy to introduce Malay as the medium of instruction was a policy dictated by the economic imperatives of the situation as well as one dictated by the Governor's anti-Chinese feelings. The colonial administrators' response to the problem of the English-educated unemployed was to raise the fees to make English education a relatively expensive affair. However, once the economy improved the decision to increase the fees was dropped. Restrictions on the provision of new grants-in-aid were removed and grants were extended to Chinese and Indian vernacular schools.

The issue of Malay as the medium of instruction demonstrates that major decisions made by the British in the political or social field had to deal with the difficult and dangerous crosscurrents of racial differences. The attempt to make the policy acceptable demonstrated British flexibility and willingness to consider the views of the immigrant communities. The Chinese community clearly demonstrated a semblance of unity and was better placed to make its demands acceptable. On the other hand, there was a conspicuous absence of any substantial Malay nationalist movement. There were extremely rare instances when Malay elites voiced a concern to safeguard their particular need. Thus it is evident that the policy to introduce Malay as the medium of instruction was one based purely on British initiatives. As indicated, the policy was partly to encourage the use of Malay befitting its position as the lingua franca of the country and probably to make the Chinese and

Indians pay for their own education. The next chapter will examine the post-war attempts of the British government to introduce the policy in a remarkably changed political environment.

Notes

1. Gordon P. Means, Malaysian Politics, 2nd ed., London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1976. Chapter 1; J. M. Gullick, Indigenous Political System of Western Malaya, London: Athlone Press, 1958; Khoo Kay Kim, "Malay Society, 1874-1920s," Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. V, No. 2 (September, 1974) pp. 179-198; Radin Soenarno, "Malay Nationalism, 1896-1941", Journal of Southeast Asian History, Vol. 1, No. 1 (March 1960) pp. 1-28; R. O. Winstedt, The Malays: A Cultural History, 3rd ed., rev. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1953; William R. Roff, The Origins of Malay Nationalism, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967. Chapter I.
2. Virginia Thompson, Postmortem on Malaya, New York: The Macmillan Co., 1943. p. 308.
3. Ibid.
4. Cf. Majlis (August 7, 1939); W. R. Roff, op. cit., fn. 16, p. 218.
5. John Kerry King, Southeast Asia in Perspective, New York: 1957. p. 43. cited by R. S. Milne and Diane K. Mauzy, Politics and Government in Malaysia, Singapore: Federal Publications, 1978. p. 23.
6. Radin Soenarno, op. cit.
7. Yael Levy, Malaysia and Ceylon: A Study of Two Developing Centres. Beverley Hills: Sage Publications, 1974. p. 23.
8. For a more detailed discussion of this matter see the following books: Gordon P. Means, op. cit., Chap. 2 and 3. S. Arasaratnam, Indians in Malaysia and Singapore. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1970; Kernial Singh Sandhu, Indians in Malaya: Some Aspects of the Immigration and Settlement, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Victor Purcell, The Chinese in Malaya, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1967.
9. Victor Purcell, The Position of the Chinese in Southeast Asia, New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1950. pp. 32-33; Gordon P. Means, op. cit., p. 35; Victor Purcell, op. cit., Chap. XI.

10. S. Arasaratnam, passim; Victor Purcell, (1967) op. cit., Chap. XI; Gordon P. Means, op. cit., Chap. 3

11. A divergence of development arose in the Malay Peninsula because of different sets of relationship between Britain and the Malay States. In 1896 the four Malay states of Selangor, Perak Pahang and Negri Sembilan were joined in an association called the Federated Malay States (FMS) in a move designed to further centralize the administrative process. In 1909 five other Malay States, Johore and Perlis, Kedah, Kelantan and Trengganu, which had gained their freedom from Siamese Suzerainty were brought under British control. Since the five new states refused to participate in a single centralized political entity they were designated as the Unfederated Malay States (UMS). Each of the five states (UMS) operated more or less independently of each other; and only cooperated if there were any threats from Kuala Lumpur towards their semi-autonomous status. Each Unfederated Malay State had entered into a treaty agreement with the British as the 'protecting power'; each Sultan had a British Adviser (not a Resident as in the FMS) accredited to his court and a small number of British officials at each level of State machinery. The Unfederated States retained a greater degree of autonomy than did those in the FMS, but their states were not as advanced politically and economically as were the FMS. The Straits Settlements of Penang, Malacca and Singapore were administered directly by the British as a Crown Colony with a Governor as the head. For a more detailed discussion see Lennox A. Mills, British Rule in East Asia, London: Oxford University Press, 1942. Chap. II; and Stanley S. Bedlington, Malaysia and Singapore. Cornell: Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978. p. 32 ff.

12. Gordon P. Means, op. cit., p. 42.

13. Ibid., p. 43.

14. Ibid.

15. George Maxwell, in Annual Report of 1920. p. 13, as cited in Philip Loh Fook Seng, The Malay States 1877-1895, Political Changes and Social Policies, Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1969. p. 173.

16. For example the Government introduced the Registration of Schools Ordinance, 1920, after it became apparent that subversion was being taught in the Chinese schools by teachers recruited from China.

17. R. S. Milne and Diane K. Mauzy, Politics and Government in Malaysia. Singapore: Federal Publications, 1978. p. 23.
18. Ibid., p. 23.
19. Victor Purcell, op. cit., Chap. X.
20. Lennox A. Mills, British Rule in Eastern Asia, London: Oxford University Press, 1942. p. 220 and Chap. IV.
21. Frank H. H. King, The New Malayan Nation, A Study of Communalism and Nationalism. New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1957. p. 47.
22. W. R. Roff, op. cit., Chap. 7
23. Ibid., p. 201.
24. Ibid.
25. Victor Purcell, op. cit., p. 230.
26. Ernest Chew, "Swettenham and British Residential Rule in West Malaya", Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. V, No. 2 (September, 1974). p. 170; C. D. Cowan, Nineteenth Century Malaya, London: Oxford University Press, 1961. Chap. 4.
27. L. A. Mills, op. cit., p. 84.
28. Ibid.
29. Generally very little was spent on the provision of education by the colonial government. For example, expenditures on education in Malaya is as follows:

1918 - 2.1%
1920 - 1.4%
1925 - 3.8%
1930 - 3.9%
1935 - 5.7%
1937 - 5.3%

(Compiled from L. A. Mills, op. cit.)
30. L. A. Mills, op. cit., pp. 406-414.
31. Lennox A. Mills, op. cit., p. 347.

32. For a more detailed study of Sir Cecil Clementi's Governorship of Hong Kong and the problems he encountered see Ibid., pp. 406-414, and pp. 458-476; for an in depth analysis of Clementi's anti-Koumintang policies see Ibid., pp. 37 ff.
33. Lennox A. Mills, op. cit., p. 357.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid., p. 358.
36. Ibid.
37. K. Jeyaratnam, "Racial Factors in the Political Development of the Federation of Malaya," (M.A. Thesis, University of British Columbia, 1958), p. 33; Lennox A. Mills, op. cit., p. 63.
38. S. Arasaratnam, op. cit., Chap. IV; Ravindra K. Jain, South Indians on the Plantation Frontier in Malaya. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970; Usha Mahajani, The Role of Indian Minorities in Burma and Malaya, Bombay: Vora and Co., 1960; Kernial Singh Sandhu, Indians in Malaya: Some Aspects of their Immigration and Settlement, 1786-1957. Cambridge: University Press, 1969.
39. P'ng Poh Seng, "The Kuomintang in Malaya, 1912-1941", Journal of Southeast Asian History, Vol. 2, No. 1, (March 1961) pp. 1-32; Yen Ching Hwang, The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1976.
40. Lennox A. Mills, op. cit., p. 358.
41. Ibid., p. 359.
42. Proceeding of the Legislative Council of the S.S., 1930. pp. B. 173, B. 177, as cited in Lennox A. Mills, op. cit., p. 359.
43. Ibid., p. 359.

44. Ibid., p. 360.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid., pp. 56 ff.
47. Ibid., Chap. XI.
48. Gordon P. Means, op. cit., p. 32.
49. For a more thorough examination of this incident that finally led to the Pacific War, see Saburo Lenaga, The Pacific War. Trans. Frank Baldwin, New York: Pathenon Asia Library, 1978.

CHAPTER III

POST WAR COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION TO 1954

This chapter examines the post-war revival of the policy to introduce Malay as the medium of instruction. A brief overview of political events and major educational developments of this period is useful if one is to understand the nature of communal demands, the motives and aims of the policy makers, the impact of the policy, and the communal responses.

Political Developments leading to the First Alliance Government

In September 1945, the British returned to war ravaged Malaya with a commitment to prepare the country for self-government and eventual full independence. It was apparent to the British that the pre-war multi-administrative set up of the Malay states and the Straits Settlements required reorganization in order to cope with the new political, economic and social demands. The British Government however, without consulting any of the Sultans or the people, formed a "Malayan Union" consisting of the Malay States and the two Straits Settlements of Penang and Malacca, with administrative authority centralized in Kuala Lumpur. The Malayan Union proposals furthermore granted equal citizenship rights to all residents in the country.¹

There was considerable apprehension over what was perceived to be a potential deprivation of traditional Malay privileges and sovereign

rights of their Rulers. The Malays were particularly disturbed over the extension of citizenship to the Chinese community whom they had come to fear as a result of a month long 'reign of terror' between the time the Japanese surrendered and the establishment of British control.² Thus to the Malays the proposals were a betrayal and it was evident that the British could no longer be relied upon to serve as a dependable bulwark against the more aggressive non-Malay communities.

Reaction to the Malayan Union proposal was unusually swift and vehement, especially when viewed against the background of seventy years of complacent Malay society. Suddenly the Malays were no longer "sleepy beneficiaries of a privileged position", instead they were transformed into "champions of their rights [against enemies] who tried to destroy them".³ The Malayan Union proposals provided a rallying point and a catalyst for the Malay community against the British, and led to the formation of the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) in March of 1946 under the leadership of Dato Onn bin Jaafar.⁴

Whitehall was quick to sense the gravity of the situation and initiated negotiations with the Malay leaders. In February of 1948, the Malayan Union proposal was replaced by a newly constituted Federation of Malaya, restoring the sovereign rights of the Rulers and the special privileges of the Malays. Conditions governing the acquisition of citizenship by the non-Malays were made more restrictive.⁵ The net result of the new political arrangements was the restoration of Malaya as primarily a Malay country.⁶

In early 1948, the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) escalated its terrorist campaign and the British Colonial Government declared the "Emergency".⁷ The British then began successfully to combat the insurgency by a series of military, social and political measures. In 1949 the British helped form the Communities Liaison Committee (CLC) in an attempt to bring the leaders of the main communities together. The British regarded the CLC as the appropriate arena for negotiations of compromise solutions to outstanding communal issues and perhaps a way of paving the way for a non-communal approach to politics.⁸ However, the recommendations of the CLC were not always well received by the communal organizations. In fact, committee members often found themselves in conflict between their responsibilities as leaders of communal organizations to promote communal interests, and their implied responsibilities as members of the committee to seek "non-communal" answers to vexing political issues.⁹ Such was the case when Dato Onn proposed the inclusion of non-Malays as members of UMNO. Meeting opposition to this idea Dato Onn promptly resigned as head of the party in 1951, and founded the non-communal Independence of Malaya Party (IMP).¹⁰ However, UMNO survived the leadership crisis and chose as its new president, the prince from Kedah, Tunku Abdul Rahman.

An essential prerequisite to independence was the existence of a political party to which the British could hand over the government. In view of the racial composition of the country, it was necessary that the successor government should at least represent the two major races.

Thus, the British began to support Dato Onn's Independence of Malaya Party (IMP) which "was the first major attempt to bring together the people of different racial origins into one non-communal political organization".¹¹ But the IMP failed to secure the support of the Malays and non-Malays. The British thus began looking for some other political party to whom they could hand over power. Since UMNO had emerged as a well established and entirely Malay-based party, it was felt an alliance of some sort with a leading Chinese party would be a suitable arrangement. Thus, when UMNO teamed up with the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) the British fully endorsed the arrangement.

The MCA was founded in February of 1949 with British support. It was founded to perform several roles. Basically it rivalled the MCP in providing an alternate focus for Chinese loyalties. Socially it raised funds to help in the resettlement of the Chinese squatters. It also emerged as a respectable instrument embodying Chinese interest in any further constitutional or political changes.¹²

The Kuala Lumpur Municipal Election in February, 1952, saw the formation of an ad hoc alliance between the UMNO and the MCA. They confidently defeated the IMP by nine seats to two.¹³ This purely localized pact was later extended to other local elections all over Malaya. Following this successful formula a national Alliance organization was set up in 1953 with the UMNO assuming the role of a senior partner. The next year, the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC) joined the Alliance, thereby making the Alliance a legitimate spokesman for all

three major communities. In the case of the IMP, the electoral rebuff of the party caused the disgruntled Dato Onn to abandon the non-communal stance of the party. In later 1953 he founded the predominantly Malay-based Party Negara (PN).

The Alliance confounded many political pundits who had predicted that the arrangement would not last long. The Malay and non-Malay leaders of the Alliance in most instances adopted moderate positions as far as communal issues were concerned. In many instances there was a convergence of interests between the Malay and non-Malay members of the Alliance.¹⁴

Educational Development

Side by side with the political changes, efforts were made by the Colonial Government to reorganize the education system. The Federation of Malaya Agreement of 1948 provided fresh impetus for the re-examination of the education policy. The task was entrusted to a largely multi-racial but English-educated committee known as the First Central Advisory Committee on Education. In its report it agreed that the ideal system of education should be in the mother-tongue but it pointed out that only the English schools contributed to a common 'Malayan identity'. It proposed that "the teaching of the Malay and English language should be compulsory in all Government-aided primary schools".¹⁵ Furthermore, it more cogently argued "that the ultimate desirable objective shall be free (and finally compulsory) primary education in the medium of English".¹⁶ However, this report provoked so much objection in the Legislative Council

that it was shelved.

The next step was the setting up of a committee to inquire into the adequacy of the "educational facilities available for the Malays".¹⁷ This committee, under the chairmanship of Leonard J. Barnes, Director of Social Training, University of Oxford, included nine Malays and five Europeans. The committee's recommendations were sweeping and far exceeded its terms of reference. It quite correctly felt that it was unable to propose improvements in the Malay schools which did not involve the whole education system.

The most controversial aspect of the Barnes Committee's report was the clause which advocated "that two languages, and only two languages should be taught in the National schools, and these two must be the official languages of the country, namely Malay and English".¹⁸ As the committee could not decide which of the two languages would be the medium of instruction, it recommended a bi-lingual National school system, which would utilize both Malay and English as media of instruction. The report in effect suggested that the Chinese and Indian schools should cease to operate as should strictly English schools. In summarizing its recommendations, the committee reiterated:

We have set up bilingualism in Malay and English as its [the National schools] objective, because we believe that all parents who regard Malaya as their permanent home and the objective of their undivided loyalty will be happy to have their children educated in those languages [Malay and English]. If any parents were not happy about this, their unhappiness would properly be taken as an indication that they did not so regard Malaya.¹⁹

Even before the report of the Barnes Committee was prepared, the non-Malays, particularly the Chinese, expressed grave reservations regarding the composition of the committee and its expected pro-Malay stand. The British High Commissioner, Sir Henry Gurney, anticipating a need to deal with the Barnes Report as well as to mollify the mounting Chinese protests, invited two experts on Chinese education, Dr. William P. Fenn and Dr. Wu Teh-Yao,²⁰ to make a "preliminary survey of the whole field of Chinese education . . ."²¹

Unlike the Barnes Committee, the Fenn-Wu Mission sought the opinion of representatives from all communities. The Report, which was published in June of 1951, was broadly sympathetic towards Chinese education. It warned against turning Malaya "into a cockpit of aggressive cultures", and declared that any restrictive imposition of one or two languages upon the people of Malaya was inimical to communal tolerance and national unity, since the unity of a nation "depends not upon the singleness of tongue or simplicity of cultures" but upon "the hearts of its citizens".²² It recommended that "Chinese schools should form an integral part of any educational program of the future of Malaya".²³ It ultimately recommended that Chinese be retained as the medium of instruction while including English and Malay as subject languages. In sum, a trilingual education was proposed for the Chinese schools.

The divergent views of the Barnes Committee and the Fenn-Wu Mission reports made it impossible for the Government to implement the

recommendations of either of the reports, especially so since supporting either would mean supporting one communal group against another. A compromise solution was worked out whereby an independent and multi-racial [Second] Central Advisory Committee on Education (CACE) was set up to study both the reports and come up with a report that would form the basis for any legislation on education.

The [Second] Central Advisory Committee came out in full support of the provisions of the Barnes Committee Report. Contrary to the Fenn-Wu report the CACE report argued that inter-racial national schools would eventually replace all racially segregated vernacular schools. It further modified the Barnes Report and recommended that all pupils in primary schools study Malay and English throughout their six years of schooling and that Chinese and Indian pupils be provided with an opportunity to study either Kuo Yu or Tamil as a subject language. It also suggested that the medium of instruction be either English or Malay in the National Schools rather than both as suggested by the Barnes Report. It furthermore suggested that the Government give assurance that financial aid for the Chinese and Indian schools would not be withdrawn. In sum, the CACE report for the most part rejected the Fenn-Wu Report and generally agreed with the concept of National schools as proposed by the Barnes Committee Report.

On the 19th and 20th of September of 1951, the Council debated the Barnes, Fenn-Wu and the CACE Reports. They were later referred to

a select committee of eleven members of the Council which was to draft suitable legislation. Like its predecessor, the select committee agreed with the provisions of the Barnes Committee Report. The final result of all these deliberations was the Education Ordinance, 1952.

The Education Ordinance, 1952 altered the idea of a single bilingual national school to that of providing two types of national schools. Either Malay or English would be the medium of instruction, while at the same time facilities would be provided for the study of Kuo Yu or Tamil as a subject if fifteen or more pupils of any grade requested it. The English medium schools would have Malay as a compulsory subject from the beginning of the third year of schooling. On the other hand, the Malay medium schools would have English as a compulsory subject language from the first year onwards. In addition the Malay medium pupils would be provided with a 'special Malay class' to enable them to make an easy transition from the Malay medium schools to the English medium secondary schools. As in the case of the primary schools, facilities for the learning of the three vernacular languages would be made available in the secondary schools.²⁴ However, the Ordinance was never fully implemented by the Colonial Government because of opposition to many of the provisions from the Malays as well as non-Malays, and because it was too expensive to undertake. Nevertheless many of the provisions of the Ordinance found places in subsequent educational reforms following Independence.

Communal Demands

The unusually strong protest from the Malay community as a result of the Malayan Union proposal marked the end of Malay complacency and brought about a new realization of their political strength. Encouraged by the success in regaining their special privileges, the Malays continued to press for a better deal in other sectors, including education. UMNO leaders, editors of the Malay vernacular press, school teachers and others who were concerned with Malay backwardness called for increased opportunities for Malay children to gain access to secondary schools. The factor that immediately sparked Malay protest with regard to Malay education was the Report of the [First] Central Advisory Committee on Education. The Malays rejected the Committee's line of reasoning and felt that the Malay language should occupy a position similar to that of English in the school curriculum.

This debate culminated in early 1949 when the Secretary General of UMNO, Dato Zainal Abidin bin Ali proposed, "that the teaching of Malay and English should be compulsory in all Government-aided primary schools".²⁵ Other members of the Legislative Council argued that more concern should be shown for Malay education and that the CACE report was unacceptable as it doomed the future development of the Malay language. Malay newspapers also took up the issue and argued along similar lines.²⁶ Thus, the Government was forced to set up a committee to study the problem of Malay education in early 1950.

Communal demands from the non-Malays were unleashed partly as a

result of leakages to the Chinese vernacular press that the Barnes Committee had exceeded its terms of reference and that the report was being written from an exclusively Anglo-Malay point of view.²⁷

Secondly, the MCP's propaganda argued rather plausibly that the British had the least interest in the affairs of the Chinese. In view of this, there was an upsurge of Chinese protest even before the Barnes Report was officially released. The MCA, together with the vernacular press and other interested groups pressed the Government for a fair and equitable deal regarding their vernacular schools. In sum, while the Malays protested the inadequacies of the CACE Report, the non-Malays protested the yet-to-be released Barnes Report. Both the communities wanted a better deal for their own education.

Motives and Aims of the Policy Makers

The Barnes and the Fenn-Wu Reports were prepared during the height of the Emergency. It is therefore not surprising to note that the sponsors of the reports were principally concerned with insuring Malayan internal security. This first meant the nationalization of the schools and the unification of the existing polyglot schools into a coherent system. Secondly, there was the need for preparing the country and the education system to be capable of providing the necessary qualified manpower. Lastly, there was a need to mollify the newly established spirit of communalism, which was manifested in demands to upgrade the various vernacular schools.

Chinese schools had long been a constant source of trouble for the Government. Since the establishment of KMT rule in China the government had had to handle the problem of subversion in Chinese schools. The problem was further complicated because a large number of teachers were recruited, or trained, in China and presumably schooled in KMT or Communist doctrines.²⁸ Several attempts to provide grants-in-aid and then to increase vigilance in the Chinese schools met with limited success. Furthermore, a substantial number of recruits to the MCP's cause had come from the Chinese schools. All these facts only helped to confirm that the Chinese schools were indeed a hotbed for the spread of anti-government ideology. Thus it is not surprising that the government was determined to deal with the problem by utilizing the education policy as "an instrument of control and assimilation" and thereby to reduce the autonomy of these schools.²⁹

Though the Barnes Committee's terms of reference did not include anything specifically dealing with the need to invoke a sense of loyalty, the report stressed "that primary schooling should be purposely used to build up a common Malay nationality Our scheme would be seriously weakened if any large proportion of Chinese, Indians, and other non-Malay communities were to choose to provide their own primary classes independently of the National schools".³⁰ The reason for this recommendation is not hard to see. Of the 13 members of the Barnes Committee nine were from the Malayan teaching service. Thus it is reasonable to assume that the current government's thinking must have been a guiding force.

The Fenn-Wu mission's terms of reference were more explicit however. It was encouraged to survey the Chinese school system and propose changes that would serve to bridge "the gap between the present communal system of schools" so that in future "education will be on a non-communal basis with English or Malay as the medium of instruction. In addition, the mission was also asked to look into the "preparation of textbooks for present use with a Malayan as distinct from a Chinese background and content".³¹

By consenting to the Federation Agreement (1948) the British Government had acknowledged Malaya as primarily a 'Malay country'. This clearly meant that the first duty of the Government was to enable the Malays to achieve a rightful place as the indigenous people of the country. Since education was an important element in the modernization process, the British felt that they had "to bring the culture up to date" and make them capable of providing skills and leadership in the era of modernization.³² This task was made even more urgent by the pressures of Malay charges of neglect on the part of the British colonial administration.

By the same token, the British had to take into consideration the growing wave of protests from the non-Malay communities. The Chinese were particularly effective in registering their disillusionment with the British pro-Malay policies. The government also had to prove that it was concerned with the welfare of the Chinese and that the MCP's criticism was not valid. Furthermore, since the British had

helped create and sustain the MCA, they had to consent to the demand of the leading spokesman of Chinese interest. The British, while supporting the Malay demands, had also to consider the demands of the non-Malays in order to ensure the loyalty and support of the Chinese.

Policy Impact and Communal Responses

The schools hardest hit by the recommendations of the Barnes Committee and the Education Ordinance (1952) were the Chinese vernacular schools which were the most self-sufficient. The policy of limiting instruction to the Malay and English languages in the National schools meant that Chinese language would only be taught for a daily half hour period. The policy in effect meant that the Chinese had to relinquish a medium of instruction that had helped maintain their distinct ethnic and cultural identity. In addition, it was particularly disquieting to be told that if they were unwilling to give up their schools then they would be regarded as disloyal.³³

The acceptance of the Barnes Committee and the Education Ordinance (1952) was a major success for the Malays. For the first time their language was accorded the status of "official language" and more importantly the learning of the Malay language was made compulsory for all communities. In making Malay the one other medium of instruction the Government accorded it a position superior to that of the other languages. The Ordinance also set the trend for future development of the Malay language which was to become the backbone of any attempt to

instil the spirit of Malayan nationalism. In sum, the Ordinance provided further proof to the Malays that their position as the indigenous people was safeguarded and the immigrant communities had no choice but to conform to the political realities of the situation.

Communal responses to the Barnes Report and the Ordinance was essentially of a partisan nature, with the Malays consenting and the non-Malays dissenting. The Fenn-Wu Report, though it met with general Chinese support, was nevertheless rejected because most of the proposals were not in line with current government thinking. However, while the Malay responses to the Ordinance tended to first be one of full support and later vacillation, the Chinese protest was not only consistent but persistent as well. The Indian communal protests were generally mild apart from an inconsequential study of the problems of Indian education undertaken by the MIC.³⁴

The immediate Malay response to the Barnes Report was one of full support. The UMNO leaders welcomed it as a right step in the direction of the modernization of the Malay culture. Therefore when the Report was discussed in the 1951 UMNO Annual General Meeting there was unanimous support for it.³⁵

When the Barnes Report was presented in the Legislative Council UMNO leaders and the Malay leaders of the IMP came out in full support of its recommendations. Tunku Abdul Rahman, for example, completely agreed with the provisions of the Barnes Report, and suggested that the Government take immediate steps to implement it. Dato Razak, while

agreeing with the provisions of the Barnes Report, disagreed with the implementation of the slightly watered down CACE Report. He firmly supported the provision that only Malay and English be taught in the National schools. He agreed with the Tunku that the Chinese and Tamil languages could be taught privately if so desired.³⁶ However, in early 1954, the moderate Malay leaders who had earlier favoured the Barnes Report and the Education Ordinance, 1952, suddenly reversed their stand. This was probably due to the protests from the grassroots and notably from the Malay school teachers who objected to the Ordinance. The introduction of the Ordinance and the National schools solidified opposition to the Government's policy among the Malay school teachers. They were in fact one of the first groups to be politically aware and, unlike the Malay administrative elite, were drawn from the general Malay community.³⁷ They had been UMNO's staunchest supporters ever since the early days of Malay nationalist agitation.³⁸ Thus they evolved into "one of the most active interest groups operating in and out of UMNO politics".³⁹

The Malay school teachers were particularly apprehensive over the emphasis of the Barnes Committee, the CACE and the Ordinance which gave English a much superior position to Malay, which ceased to be a medium of instruction beyond the primary schools. They expressed particular fears of being retrenched or of being replaced by the better trained English school teachers who were being sent to the United Kingdom for training. Thus, the Malay school teachers argued that the National type classes "would stagnate the Malay education and culture".⁴⁰

In addition the Federation of Malay School Teachers' Association (FMSTA) which by then had become the leading spokesman of Malay school teachers unanimously rejected the national schools.

Following the establishment of the more institutionalized form of the Alliance, the UMNO leaders were conciliatory towards the Chinese stand. They began to support the Chinese for a fair and equitable deal in the education policy. With the assumption of the editorial position of the Utusan Melayu by an UMNO member the newspaper began to print a series of articles and editorials claiming that the Education Ordinance endangered the development of Malay and Chinese languages. In an editorial on September 9, 1954 the Utusan Melayu further elaborated its position by declaring that the "proposals of the Barnes Committee were not only inimical to the educational interests of the Malays, but to the educational needs of the Chinese, because their proposal only attached importance to the English language."⁴¹

Chinese protests were predictably strong over the Reports and Ordinance. They were particularly apprehensive over the fact that not a single Chinese or Indian had been included in the Barnes committee. In addition to that the recommendations of the Fenn-Wu Mission were rejected out of hand by the Government. Thus, most of the Chinese protests were directed against the Government for its inability to assure a fair deal for the Chinese.

The debates in the Legislative Council mentioned earlier reflected the inherent communal differences. While Indian members chose to adopt a midway position and be mild in their criticisms, it was the MCA and its

representatives who clearly emerged as spokesmen of the non-Malay interests. The most notable champion of Chinese interest was Tan Siew Sin, the son of the MCA president. He strongly criticised the findings of the Barnes committee. He furthermore expressed great reservations over the clause in the Barnes Report which suggested that persons who were not happy with the two languages, i.e. English and Malay, were not happy in Malaya. He remarked "these few words are surely unique in this country. Seldom if ever, in the past history of this country has the maximum of racial bigotry, racial intolerance and deep seated ignorance of fundamental political principles been compressed in so few words."⁴² Other members called for assurances and guarantees for the preservation of the Chinese vernacular schools. But it must be mentioned that the protest emanating from the MCA was generally restrained perhaps because the moderates feared to be identified as disloyal.

However, the most vehement protests were taking place outside the arena of party politics. The groups that most protested the Barnes Report and the ensuing Ordinance were the Chinese educationists - notably the members of the Chinese School Management Committees and the Chinese school teachers. They took great pains to show that they were primarily moved to protest out of the desire to protect the mainstay of their culture, though it was apparent that their primary concern was to prevent the closure of the Chinese schools. In addition, the Chinese vernacular press, notably Nanyang Siang Pau and Sing Ping Jih Poh, was also committed to the goal of preventing the closure of Chinese schools and began actively to make demands for some action from the Government.

In view of the ongoing protests, the MCA could no longer remain detached. In November, 1952, the MCA instituted a Chinese Education Central Advisory Committee in an apparent move to restrain the dissatisfied Chinese educationists and the vernacular press. The committee functioned essentially to represent the Chinese schools in any negotiations with the Government concerning Chinese education.⁴³ To no avail it submitted petition after petition to High Commissioner Sir Gerald Templer. It was confronted with the Business Licensing and Registration Ordinance which had been passed together with the Education Ordinance, 1952, to help finance the expansion of the Malayan education program.⁴⁴ The leaders of MCA considered this as adding insult to injury, for they were being coerced to finance an education system which they opposed bitterly. The MCA countered this with a threat to send a deputation to London to appeal to the Secretary of State for Colonies.

The MCA also invited Dr. Victor Purcell, the renowned Chinese scholar, to prepare a report on the Chinese in August and September of 1952. The Malay elite were thoroughly displeased with this and Tunku Abdul Rahman in his capacity as the UMNO President forbade UMNO officials to provide assistance. This to an extent caused a severe strain on the newly forged alliance between the UMNO and the MCA. In apparent retaliation, MCA withdrew its offer of M\$500,000 which had been earmarked for the setting up of a Malay Welfare Fund to be administered jointly.⁴⁵ Nevertheless, the MCA presented its findings on the education of the Chinese in the form of the Memorandum on Chinese Education in the Federation of Malaya in March of 1954.

The Memorandum expressed "the fears created in the Chinese Community of the Federation of Malaya by the provisions of Education Ordinance, 1952", and stated "that the establishment of the proposed National schools" would be "the forerunner of the closure of Chinese vernacular schools, and the end of Chinese education in the Federation".⁴⁶ The Memorandum wanted the High Commissioner to help guarantee the preservation of Chinese culture and schools and Kuo Yu to be accorded the status of 'official language'. It further stressed:

Let us once and for all make it abundantly clear that the Chinese community has never sought, is not seeking and will never seek an exclusive and separatist position in the Malayan society. They are merely asking for equality and justice.⁴⁷

The trademark of the Chinese educationists was much in evidence, in that the Memorandum was jointly signed by the MCA President as well as the Chairman of the MCA's Chinese Education Central Committee.

In April of 1953, the MCA sponsored a conference of Chinese School Management Committees and teachers. The MCA President, Tan Cheng Lock gave full support to the efforts of the conference to bring about a better deal in Chinese education and to ensure that the Chinese language needs should be protected.⁴⁸ In addition to this, the MCA also lent support to the proposed Chinese-run Nanyang University announced in 1953 by a group of wealthy Chinese. All these efforts on the part of the MCA seemed obviously intended to convince the Government and the Malays of their intent to pursue a commitment to Chinese education.

This pattern of protest from the Chinese community continued up

until early 1955 when the Alliance began gearing its machinery to face the forthcoming elections. The promise of the Alliance in its manifesto released in early 1954 to reexamine the Education Ordinance, 1952, the Business Licensing and Registration Ordinance, and the Federal Legislative Council Paper No. 67 of 1954 on Education, to a large extent helped soothe frayed nerves. The outcome of the election and the subsequent education reports will be dealt with in the next chapter.

Aftermath

Few of the ambitious plans contained in the Ordinance were ever implemented. The policy of national schools did not appeal to a large section of the Malay community, particularly the influential Malay school teachers. They felt that the Ordinance "was a deliberate attempt by the Colonial Government to oust the Malay language (sic)".⁴⁹ Similarly, the non-Malays opposed the Ordinance because it endangered their language and culture. Furthermore, the withdrawal of support for the plan by the moderate Alliance leaders finally caused the Ordinance to be withdrawn by the British Government. Dato Onn's support of education for the Malays via the National schools and his feelings that the Malays should not protest led the Malays to reject his party at the polls.⁵⁰

A yet more serious problem was the prohibitive cost of the plan. Government expenditure on education had spiralled from M\$11.5 million in 1946 to M\$95.68 million in 1953, and this was in the face of a government deficit of over M\$200 million in the same year.⁵¹ In addition, the cost of financing the ongoing Emergency and the declining price of

rubber and tin made it absolutely necessary for the government to reconsider plans to implement the Education Ordinance, 1952. The Government set up another committee to study this problem. Its report was published in the form of a Government White Paper which concluded that "multi-racial schools were 'essential' but out of the question because of the lack of funds to pay for them".⁵² All these factors had the net effect of scuttling the Colonial Government's plan to introduce Malay and English as the medium of instruction for all Malayan schools. It now became the task of the Alliance government to deal with the situation arising from these circumstances.

Conclusion

The Education Ordinance was the first concrete attempt to legislate a national education policy. The problem of internal security seemed to be the most outstanding issue and influential factor in the two major reports on education - the Barnes Committee Report and the Fenn-Wu Mission Report. The government was determined to use education policy as an instrument of control and assimilation as far as the Chinese schools were concerned.

The ascendancy of Malay political strength made the British colonial administration aware of the necessity of upgrading the Malay vernacular education.

Initially Malay support for the policy to introduce Malay as the medium of instruction was very strong. It began to wane as it

became clear that their language would not be the medium of instruction after post primary level. In addition, the spirit of cooperation forged between the UMNO and the MCA enabled many Malay leaders to support the Chinese in their opposition to the Party Negara policy with regard to the education policy. The issue of the medium of instruction also brought to the front the school teachers who emerged both as sub-elites and as an important pressure group. Since they had been the ardent supporters of the UMNO and the MCA, their desires and concerns could not be overlooked. In the ensuing protests their voices were loud and clear. Indeed, they would soon become a potent force in safeguarding their respective interests once the Alliance government was formed.

The question of medium of instruction served as an important testing ground for the viability of the Alliance formula. The Malay component of the Alliance, UMNO, clearly emerged as the senior partner and Malay communal interests superceded all other communal interests. The position of the Malay language as the basis for future educational system was thus clearly established.

Notes

1. For a more in depth analysis of the Malayan Union proposal see James de V. Allen, The Malayan Union, New Haven: Yale Southeast Asia Studies, 1967. (Monograph Series no. 10.)
2. The Japanese surrender in late August, 1945 was rather sudden and almost a month elapsed before the arrival of British troops in Malaya. During this period, the MPAJA, which had waged a guerilla war against the Japanese emerged from the jungles into Malayan towns and villages and assumed power. Immediately they began executing many Malays who had been detectives and informers to the Japanese. This resulted in bitter inter-racial clashes and rioting in many states. The return of the British troops fortunately prevented further incidents of violence.
3. S. W. Jones, Public Administration in Malaya, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1953. p. 139.
4. For a more in depth analysis of the formation of the UMNO see: Daniel Eldredge Moore, "The United Malay National Organization and the 1959 Elections," Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1960; Ishak b. Tadin, "Dato Onn and Malay Nationalism, 1946-1951," Journal of Southeast Asian History, Vol. 1, No. 1 (March 1960). pp. 56-88.
5. Gordon P. Means, Malaysian Politics, London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1976. pp. 56ff.; B. Simandjuntak, op. cit., pp. 178-82.
6. Victor Purcell, The Chinese in Modern Malaya, Singapore: Donald Moore, 1956. p. 41.
7. For more detailed analysis of the Emergency see the following books: Anthony Short, The Communist Insurrection in Malaya 1948-1960, London: Frederick Muller Ltd., 1975; Gene Z. Hanrahan, The Communist Struggle in Malaya, New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1954; Harry Miller, Menace in Malaya, London: George G. Harrap & Co., 1950; Justus M. Van der Kroef, Communism in Malaysia and Singapore, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1967; Lucian Pye, Guerilla Communism in Malaya: Its Social and Political Meaning, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956; Victor Purcell, Malaya: Communist or Free? Stanford, California: California University Press, 1954.

8. Gordon P. Means, op. cit., pp. 122-124.
9. Ibid.
10. Ishak Tadin, op. cit., pp. 81 ff.
11. R. K. Vasil, Politics in a Plural Society, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1971. p. 37.
12. R. S. Milne and Diane K. Mauzy, Politics and Government in Malaysia, Singapore: Federal Publications, 1978, p. 34; Chan Heng Chee, "The Malayan Chinese Association," M.A. thesis, University of Singapore, Singapore, 1965; Margaret Roff, "The Malayan Chinese Association 1948-1965," Journal of Southeast Asian History, Vol. 6, no. 2 (1965), pp. 40-53.
13. R. K. Vasil, op. cit., pp. 48-49.
14. R. S. Milne and D. K. Mauzy, op. cit., p. 35.
15. Gordon P. Means, op. cit., p. 24; T. R. Fennel, "Commitment to Change: A History of Malayan Educational Policy, 1945-1957," Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Hawaii, 1968. p. 95.
16. Ibid., p. 119.
17. Federation of Malaya, Report of the Committee on Malay Education, Kuala Lumpur: Government Printers, 1951. p. v. Quoted in B. Simandjuntak, op. cit., p. 195.
18. Federation of Malaya, Report of the Committee on Malay Education. Kuala Lumpur: Government Printers, 1951, p. 21. Quoted in T. R. Fennel, op. cit., p. 155.
19. Ibid., Chap. IV para 8. Quoted in B. Simandjuntak, op. cit., p. 196.
20. Dr. William P. Fenn was Associate Executive Secretary of the Board of Trustees of a dozen higher institutions in China. He was an American citizen and his services were sought through official channels. However, he felt that he could not fairly do the job unless he had a native Chinese speaker in the mission. Thus, Dr. Wu Teh Yao's services were sought. He was then a United Nations Official. He had studied for a while in Malaya and had a thorough knowledge of the problems faced by the Chinese in Malaya.
21. T. R. Fennel, op. cit., p. 173.

22. Federation of Malaya, Chinese Schools and the Education of Chinese Malaysians: The Report of a Mission Invited to Study the Problem of the Education of the Chinese in Malaya, Kuala Lumpur: Government Printers, 1951. Chap. II, para. 15, as quoted in B. Simandjuntak, op. cit., p. 197.
23. Ibid.
24. Federation of Malaya, Report of the Special Committee Appointed on the 20th Day of September, 1951 to Recommend Legislation to cover all aspects of Education Policy for the Federation of Malaya, No. 70, 1952, 3 October, 1952, para. 15 and Section 21 of the Education Ordinance appended thereto, as quoted in B. Simandjuntak, op. cit., p. 199.
25. T. R. Fennel, op. cit., p. 119.
26. Ibid., p. 97.
27. Victor Purcell, "The Crisis of Malayan Education," Pacific Affairs, Vol. XXVI, No. 1 (March, 1953) p. 71.
28. Gordon P. Means, op. cit., pp. 173-377; Victor Purcell, The Chinese in Malaya, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1967. pp. 232-233.
29. Cynthia H. Enloe, Multi-ethnic Politics: The Case Study of Malaysia. Berkeley, California: Center for South and Southeast Asia Studies, University of California, 1970. p. 47.
30. Report of the Committee on Malay Education, as cited in V. Purcell, "The Crisis in Malayan Education," p. 71.
31. Ibid., p. 72.
32. C. H. Enloe, op. cit., p. 47.
33. Gayl D. Ness, Bureaucracy and Rural Development in Malaysia, Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1967. pp. 66-67.
34. S. Arasaratnam, Indians in Malaysia and Singapore, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1970. p. 187.
35. Straits Times, August 27, 1951, as quoted in T. R. Fennel, p. 183.
36. T. R. Fennel, op. cit., p. 202.
37. William R. Roff, Origins of Malay Nationalism, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967. Chap. V.

38. C. H. Enloe, op. cit., p. 156.
39. Gordon P. Means, op. cit., p. 196.
40. Malay Mail, February 10, 1955, as cited in T. R. Fennel
op. cit., p. 385.
41. Utusan Melayu, September 9, 1954, as cited in T. R. Fennel, p. 328.
42. T. R. Fennel, op. cit., p. 200.
43. Chan Heng Chee, op. cit., p. 60.
44. Ibid., pp. 60-61; T. R. Fennel, op. cit., p. 269 ff.
45. Gordon P. Means, op. cit., p. 135.
46. T. R. Fennel, op. cit., p. 310.
47. Ibid., p. 319.
48. Ibid., pp. 305-306.
49. Straits Times, February 5, 1954, as cited in B. Simandjuntak,
op. cit., p. 199.
50. Majlis, February 28, 1955, as cited in Fennel, op. cit., p. 404.

CHAPTER IV

THE ALLIANCE GOVERNMENT 1955-1961

This period is characterised by intense political activity especially with regard to the adoption of Malay as the main medium of instruction in all Malayan schools. The period witnessed the evolution of the education policy in the form of two official reports which served as political benchmarks and which irrevocably set the trend for the future educational policy. This chapter will examine the major political events and educational development, and analyze the communal demands, the motives and aims of the policy makers, the policy impact, and the communal responses.

Major Political Events

The single most important event of this period was the overwhelming victory of the Alliance party in the 1955 Federal Legislative Council Election. The Alliance party won 51 out of the 52 seats and polled ten times as many votes as all the other parties and independents combined.¹ Thus the Alliance party firmly established itself as the legitimate successor to the Colonial Government. The Alliance victory was followed by a Constitutional Conference, held in London early in 1956, and attended by representatives of the Rulers and the Alliance. It was decided that Malaya should become fully independent within the Commonwealth by August, 1957. It was also agreed that a Constitutional

Commission should be appointed to draw up a draft constitution. The Constitutional Commission soon set about collecting memoranda from the various interest groups and political parties. In all it received 131 memoranda. However, the submissions of the Alliance "had exceptional importance in view of their prospective role as the future government"² Earlier, the three components of the Alliance, the UMNO, the MCA, and the MIC, had determined the relative constitutional position of the three races.

The Alliance "bargain", concluded between the Malay and the non-Malay components, in effect represented a price paid by the non-Malays for full participation in the political activities of the Federation. The functions assigned to the Malay Rulers, the enshrining of Islam as the state religion, the "Special position of the Malays", and the recognition of the Malay language as the National language and the sole official language after 1967, were all agreed upon by the non-Malays. In exchange, the non-Malays enjoyed the benefits of further relaxation in the citizenship qualifications.³ In addition, citizenship was extended to any person born in the country after August 31, 1957, providing the parents were domiciled there. This provision recognized the claims of the non-Malays to the status of citizen by virtue of jus soli, not retrospectively but only for those born after independence.⁴ Another important aspect of the "bargain" not stated explicitly in the Constitution was that the Chinese would be allowed to play a

dominant role in business "free from the hindrances or persecution to which they [the Chinese] have been subjected in some other Southeast Asian countries."⁵

The 1955 Elections represented a victory for the Alliance and the forces of communal cooperation. Nevertheless, it also unleashed the forces of communal chauvinism. The more communally inclined and largely Chinese supported Labour Party, the People's Progressive Party (PPP), the Malay based Pan Malayan Islamic Party (PMIP) and Dato Onn's Party Negara (PN), all concentrated on issues pertaining to their respective clienteles. In the process these parties also claimed that they had been short-changed by the provisions of the Alliance "bargain". Thus, following the elections, the burden of having to prove that the accusations of the opposition were incorrect caused considerable strain and stresses within the Alliance. However, UMNO was now better able to cope with the pressures because of the tight control exercised by its moderate Malay leaders, namely Tunku Abdul Rahman, Dato Abdul Razak, and Dr. Ismail.

Within the MCA the troubles were more open. A section of younger and more articulate members who had not been a party to the original bargain and hence to the spirit of compromise and concession, emerged as a new faction in early 1958. This group which styled itself as the "Young Turks" defeated the "Old Guards" of Tan Cheng Lock and his son Tan Siew Sin in the 1958 MCA elections. The new President, Dr. Lim Chong Eu, and his faction attempted to wring more concessions from the

UMNO and the Malays, but failed. In the process they alienated Tunku Abdul Rahman, and he was firm in demanding that the trouble-makers be expelled from the MCA. Following this crisis many of the Young Turks left the party in late 1958. However, when Tan Siew Sin was elected as the new MCA President in 1961, UMNO restored its full confidence in the Party. This crisis will be examined in greater detail later in the chapter.

Educational Development

In September, 1955, just one month after the Alliance assumed the reins of government, a 15 member committee under the chairmanship of Dato Abdul Razak, the Minister of Education, was drawn from the Federal Legislative Council. It was empowered to:

examine the present educational policy of the Federation of Malaya and to recommend any alterations or adaptations that are necessary with a view to establishing a national system of education acceptable to the people of the Federation as a whole which will satisfy their needs and promote their cultural, social, economic and political development as a nation, having regard to the intention to make Malay as the national language of the country whilst preserving and sustaining the growth of the languages and culture of other communities living in the country.⁶

The Razak Report, which was published in August, 1956, was subsequently legislated as the Education Ordinance, 1957, after undergoing minor amendments. The Committee recognized the magnitude of its task of planning for a multi-racial society. In view of this, they considered their task a pragmatic one "of planning for the immediate future, which

might be defined as the next ten years, a period which may be regarded as transitional in Malayan education."⁷ The Committee further recommended that the policies proposed in the report should - if adopted - be reexamined in the light of experience not later than 1959.⁸

The Razak Report abandoned the idea of a national school system, and agreed that children should continue to receive their primary education in the separate vernacular schools. However, it believed that:

the ultimate objective of educational policy of this country must be to bring together the children of all races under a national educational system in which the national language is the main medium of instruction, though we recognize that progress towards this goal cannot be rushed and must be gradual.⁹

Furthermore, in order to accord Malay a position worthy of a national language, it was felt that it:

must be learnt in all schools and ... that the teaching of Malay to and the learning of Malay by all pupils shall be the condition of Government assistance in all schools.¹⁰

The Report, in addition, suggested incentives for the learning of the Malay language. Reiterating that incentives were necessary "for reaching adequate standards in Malay", the Committee suggested the following measures:

- a. Malay could be made a qualification for entry into the Government services;
- b. it could be made a factor to be taken into consideration in selection for secondary education, and could be made compulsory in all government examinations;

- c. it could be made a requirement for the one seeking a scholarship from public funds;
- d. grants-in-aid could be made to depend in part on the successful learning of Malay as and when sufficient facilities were available.¹¹

The Report gave separate treatment to the primary and secondary schools. It suggested that the primary schools would fall into two broad categories.

- 1. Standard Primary schools, in which the medium of instruction would be the Malayan national language; and
- 2. Standard-type Primary schools, in which the medium of instruction would be in Kuo Yu or Tamil or English.

The Report recommended that English should be made a compulsory subject in all primary schools. With regard to instruction in Tamil or Kuo Yu, it was proposed that such instruction should be made available at the request of parents of fifteen children from any one school.¹²

With regard to secondary schools, the Report recognized that the aim of secondary education was to train employable and loyal citizens, and that "one of its primary functions is to foster and encourage the cultures and languages of the Malayan community" Thus, the Report recommended that the aim "should be to establish one type of national secondary school where the pupils work towards a common final examination, but where there is sufficient flexibility in the curriculum to allow schools or part of schools to give particular attention to various languages and cultures."¹³ In effect, Malay was made a compulsory language to be learned in order to pass the two public

examinations of the Lower Certificate of Education (LCE), at the end of the third year and the Federation of Malaya Certificate (FMCE), at the end of five or six years of secondary schooling. English was retained as a language to be studied in national secondary schools because, "no secondary school pupil shall be at a disadvantage in the matter either of employment or of higher education in Malaya or overseas as long as it is necessary to use the English language for these purposes."¹⁴ Concerning the medium of instruction in Chinese secondary schools, the Committee saw "no reason for altering the practice . . ." provided other conditions mentioned earlier were met.¹⁵

In accordance with the provisions of the Razak Report, a Committee under the chairmanship of Abdul Rahman bin Talib was formed "to review" the Report and make recommendations concerning implementation.¹⁶ The Review Committee presented its report in June, 1960, and agreed that the policy outlined in the Razak Report had been "faithfully and successfully carried out"¹⁷ The Committee reviewed the Education Ordinance, 1957, and formulated what became the Education Act of 1961. As far as the status of the Malay language was concerned the policy as enunciated in the Ordinance of 1957 remained unchanged.

The Rahman Talib Report concluded that public primary Chinese and Tamil schools should be tolerated - at least "for the time being", but not the secondary schools. "It would be incompatible with an education policy designed to create national consciousness and having

the intention of making the Malay language the national language of the country," the Committee asserted, "to extend and perpetuate a language and racial differential throughout the publicly financed educational system".¹⁸

The Rahman Talib Report further proposed a number of changes to further the process of implementing Malay as the medium of instruction. The more notable were as follows:

1. Secondary schools receiving partial assistance from the Government which failed to make arrangements to conform fully with all the statutory requirements as from the beginning of 1962 or earlier, "should be regarded as independent schools ineligible for any assistance from Government funds as from the beginning of 1962."
- 2 All the "official, national, public examinations - the Lower Certificate of Education and the Federation of Malaya Certificate of Education Examinations - should be held only in the nation's two official languages, Malay and English."¹⁹

Furthermore, the Committee was resolute in its recommendations that the Ministry of Education should cease to organize examinations in Chinese, i.e. the Junior Middle III, the Chinese Secondary School Promotion, and the Chinese Secondary School Leaving Certificate Examinations, with effect from 1961.²⁰

The Report provided some incentives for the effective implementation of the policy. From 1962 onwards free primary education, hitherto enjoyed only by the Malay and Tamil schools, was extended to English and Chinese medium schools. However, no changes were proposed

with regard to the medium of instruction in Malay, Chinese, Tamil or English medium schools. In order to give greater prominence to the use of the national language, it was suggested that the standard and standard-type schools be redesignated as National and National-type schools thus emphasising the national character of the school system.

In respect to the secondary schools, "the Children of Malayan communities who opt to obtain their education in the medium of Malay will from 1962 onwards obtain . . . free education in all [Malay] secondary schools".²¹ In sum, the Rahman Talib Report further removed certain loopholes inherent in the Razak Report. It guaranteed the position of the Malay language and at the same time threatened the extinction of the non-Malay secondary schools.

Communal Demands

As mentioned in the previous chapter the vernacular school teachers were the most persistent in registering their objections to the Education Ordinance, 1952. Thus many moderate Alliance leaders who favoured the English bias of the Ordinance had to stop supporting it and come out in support of the school teachers for guarantees for the vernacular education. It was indicated in the previous chapter that the Malay school teachers were an important political force within UMNO. They commanded much support from a large number of Malays who had attended only Malay schools, and who were keenly conscious of job

opportunities.²² In addition to this was the fact that many leaders of the UMNO were former school teachers or educationists (notable among whom was Ghafar Baba, Mohamad Khir Johari, and Syed Nasir bin Ismail). Thus it is apparent that their demands could not easily be rejected by the moderate Malay leaders.

The Malay school teachers pressured the government for the exclusive use of Malay in the Government, for rapid expansion of a Malay medium school system, and for equal status and pay for Malay school teachers.²³ They also objected to the promoting of English as the medium of instruction in Secondary schools and to the scheme of teacher training which saw a large number of non-Malays being sent to the United Kingdom during the mid-fifties. The Malay school teachers continued their protests both within UMNO and by enlisting the support of the Malay vernacular press for their cause. In view of these developments, the Alliance party, had promised to review the educational system once it gained victory in the 1955 election.

The Chinese school teachers, like their Malay counterparts, were an important political force both within the MCA and without. They were often identified as the first Chinese communal leaders and were active in articulating Chinese communal interests long before MCA was formed.²⁴ Traditional reverence to the Chinese school teachers made their position all the more credible. The creation of the National schools as envisaged in the Education Ordinance, 1952 sparked fears among the Chinese school teachers and the Chinese school management

committee members. Both of these groups had earlier formed the United Chinese School Teachers' Association (UCSTA) and the All-Malaya Chinese School Management Committee Association (CSMS) to serve jointly as single-purpose interest associations. Both the UCSTA and the CSMC members feared that the Chinese schools were being threatened as the possibility of withdrawal of finances loomed large. Understandably, the Chinese school teachers were much distressed over any perceived threat of closure for that would mean only one thing - the loss of a formerly secure job. Thus they began to protest and demanded that the Chinese vernacular schools must be safeguarded at all costs.

Beginning in early 1954 the MCA defended the position of the UCSTA and the CSMC. Tan Cheng Lock explained that the Chinese were "genuinely frightened that it is the Government's idea to eliminate Chinese schools." He was furthermore quoted as saying that "the Chinese strongly object to having English and Malay classes in Chinese schools. They say it is the thin edge of the wedge towards the closing of Chinese schools".²⁵ Early in January, 1955, the MCA leaders took up the matter with the UMNO leaders. In a meeting between the representatives of the MCA's Central Advisory Committee on Education, the UCSTA, the CSMC, the MIC's Malayan Indian Education Committee and the UMNO, the future of the Chinese and Tamil schools was discussed. It was also agreed that the Chinese would drop their demands to have Chinese made the third official language in return for a promise that the Alliance would continue to support the non-government schools when a national

school was available after the elections.²⁶ Thus, for these further reasons, the Alliance went to the elections with a promise to review the existing school system.

Motives and Aims of the Policy Makers

The major priority of the Alliance government in 1955 was to establish a national education system. In August of that year the Tunku indicated that the Government would examine new ideas for national education because the existing "national schools had not been found popular".²⁷ Obviously, the task must have been viewed as one of great importance, judging from the fact that UMNO's second senior-most leader, Dato Abdul Razak, was appointed to the post of Minister of Education. Two factors seem to have been paramount in the minds of the policy makers with regard to the education policy. Firstly, there was the need to upgrade the Malay language befitting its status as the national language. Secondly, in view of the ongoing Emergency and the threat it posed on the future of the country there was a feeling that the school system should be used to socialize future Malayan citizens and inculcate a sentiment of loyalty towards the country. The desire to make Malay the medium of instruction in all Malay schools represents an attempt to forcefully persuade the non-Malays to accept "a cultural uniformity based on Malay characteristics".²⁸ Without doubt the language issue is a significant aspect of Malay nationalism. There was an awareness among the Malay leaders that the diverse school system was directly

responsible for the continuing division of the Malayan society into communal compartments. Since it was evident that Malay political supremacy was the backbone of the system, it was felt that the Malay language should serve as a basis on which cultural uniformity would be built. The Malay leaders were well aware of the pressure from the Malay community for a more Malay based education system. By advocating a Malay-oriented education system, it was felt that there would be greater material advantage for the Malays, and more avenues would be opened for the hitherto disadvantaged Malays.

There was a profound desire among the moderate Alliance leaders to "bring the different races in the country together . . . ,"²⁹ a line of reasoning not hard to fathom. A substantially large number of the Alliance leaders were English-educated.³⁰ They were certain that the cosmopolitan influence had been responsible for their seemingly moderate stand in a system wrought with extreme communal cleavages. There was particular stress on the need to bring all the races together to socialize future citizens with values compatible with the ideals of a unified Malayan nation. The Government was also determined to gain effective control of the education system. The Chinese schools particularly had remained independent of the mainstream of educational development in Malaya. This independence without doubt had led a substantially large number of schools to be used as the recruiting ground for subversive elements.³¹ In view of the Emergency, this threat must have been very real. The Government decision to withdraw

financial assistance to independent Chinese schools, to impose stricter control of the registration of schools and of the members of the teaching profession all seem to conform to the need to have actual extension of Federal Government control.

There were, however, certain crucial points left ambiguous. For example, the question of languages to be used in the examinations was not clearly defined. Similarly, the type of common content syllabus and standardized examinations that were to be encouraged remained unclear. The Alliance leaders who formulated the Razak Report must have been aware of these ambiguities. The moderate western educated elite such as Tunku, Dato Razak, Mohd. Khir Johari, Tan Siew Sin, V. T. Sambanthan and Dr. Lim Chong Eu, had simultaneously posed as national spokesmen, ethnic agents and articulators of western values which they felt were useful for the country. The multiplicity of roles of the policy makers could easily paralyze the working of the system, but the Malayan leaders were able to leave certain controversial issues suitably ambiguous so that the machinery of government could solve them as they were applied or when they become controversial. As identified by Cynthia Enloe,³² the "politics of ambiguity" is ideally suited for a government to cope with problems posed by potentially divisive forces of ethnic hostilities. However, the many ambiguities inherent in the 1957 Ordinance were gradually tightened in the subsequent education report of 1961 under the chairmanship of the new Minister of Education, Abdul Rahman bin Talib.

Policy Impact and Communal Responses

The acceptance of the Razak Report demonstrated a typical Alliance style of politics. Much of the political disagreement within the Alliance was resolved behind closed doors and thus public voting in the Assembly was generally unified, even though individual members tended to express their concern over particular aspects of the policy being debated. The various positions of the three communal parties were made known to the press, and members let their individual position be known to the public by means of the usual off-the-record technique. Usually a barrage of claims and counter-claims preceded the making of the compromises. These claims, however, did not seem to affect the overall outcome of the policy. There was always the danger that in close personal contacts between the members of the three parties, agreements, would be reached that were at times too compromising for the more chauvinistically inclined members of the party. This pattern was clearly in evidence when the Razak Report was presented in the Legislative Council for approval. The only persons who objected to the report were those who had not been involved in its preparation or were not part of the top echelon of the components of the Alliance party. Whatever dissatisfaction there was among the Council members was largely contained by Dr. Ismail bin Dato Abdul Rahman's call for communal tolerance.³³ Thus, when the votes were counted there was unanimous support for the Report and this Report subsequently became the Education Ordinance, 1957.

Outside the Legislative Council, Malay school teachers generally were jubilant with the expansion of Malay educational opportunities and the prospect of improved income and rapid promotion. However, in less than two years the FMSTA and its members became disillusioned over what they considered was an excessive delay on the part of the Government in implementing the provisions of the Razak Report. First, they had hoped that their status would be enhanced without additional qualifications being imposed. They were thus much perturbed when the Government announced in July, 1956, that they would have to sit for an examination equivalent to the Lower Certificate of Education in order to become qualified to teach in the national schools. They were also dissatisfied that Malay secondary schools were not being set up as promised.³⁴

As a result, the FMSTA submitted a memorandum to the Minister of Education calling for the immediate implementation of Malay as the sole medium of instruction in all Malayan schools, and requesting that all Malay schools be automatically converted into standard or national schools. In addition, they demanded withdrawal of the directive making the Malay school teachers sit for the LCE examination. The memorandum furthermore wanted an immediate establishment of Malay secondary schools.³⁵ The FMSTA gave the Government till February, 1958 to meet the demands after which it announced that it would call on its 10,000 members to withdraw their support from the UMNO.³⁶ The Malay press too

joined the volley of protest. Utusan Melayu, for example, reminded Dato Razak that since he was a Malay he should act in such a way to make the Malay school teachers happy.³⁷

The top UMNO leaders were apparently in no position to be adamant in their stand. In June, 1957, the Government announced that it was postponing the special examinations for the Malay teachers until 1958. The Tunku then began a long process of placating the Malay school teachers. He explained that the reason for the delay in setting up secondary schools was a lack of teachers, and that the schools would be set up as soon as the teachers sent abroad to be trained returned. In addition, the new Education Minister, Mohd. Khir bin Johari, gave assurance that Malay medium classes would be started in existing English schools within the next three months. But all these moves to placate the school teachers were in vain.

In early February of 1958, the FMSTA organized several rallies and demonstrations against the Government. In Kota Baru, the demonstrations resulted in student riots.³⁸ Furthermore, the Pan Malayan Islamic Party (PMIP) and Dato Onn's Party Negara (PN) actively supported the FMSTA in its stand. UMNO leaders were understandably disturbed over all these developments. As a reflection of the concern the 1958 UMNO General Assembly accepted a motion presented by the Penang delegation which called for "a peaceful solution to those members who had resigned over the Malay education row to return to UMNO."³⁹

Following the UMNO Annual General Meeting, Tunku tried to come to an agreement with the Malay school teachers for he was certain that their support would determine UMNO's success at the forthcoming 1959 Elections. In September 21, 1958, a delegation representing the FMSTA, headed by its President Mohamad Noor bin Ahmad, met with the Tunku, Dato Abdul Razak and Mohd. Khir Johari in a round table conference. In the ensuing discussions, Tunku agreed to the demands of the FMSTA that Malay be made the medium of instruction in all primary and standard-type schools by January, 1959. However, he felt that Malay could only be introduced in stages.⁴⁰ Soon after, the Government established fifty-one Malay-medium secondary classes in existing secondary schools for those children whose parents had indicated that they wished to attend. In addition, the Government opened the first Malay medium secondary school at Ipoh in May, 1959. It was named the Sekolah Tunku Abdul Rahman.

Nevertheless, the agitations of the Malay school teachers were indeed difficult to be assuaged. UMNO's poor showing in the East Coast states of Kelantan and Trengganu during the 1959 elections, while certainly not wholly attributable to the teachers' dissatisfaction, cannot entirely be explained in terms of other causes.⁴¹ However, with the implementation of the Rahman Talib Report there was a marked reduction in Malay dissatisfaction especially from the Malay school teachers. In regard to the question of a qualifying examination, the Ministry of Education permitted the Malay teachers to be employed as

teachers by placing them in a separate category, and made the LCE the minimum qualification for new recruits to the teaching profession.

As mentioned earlier, the Education Ordinance, 1957, ended Government ambivalence regarding the position of Malay in the education system. Following the enactment of the Ordinance, all schools had to teach the Malay language either as the medium of instruction or as a subject language in order to qualify for government assistance. The Malay language also became a compulsory language for all government run examinations. Thus, the Chinese schools which had hitherto avoided teaching the Malay language were now forced to teach it or face the withdrawal of government funding.

When the Razak plan was first presented, it won the approval of all communities. There were several reasons for this. First, the Committee which had drafted the Report was composed of representatives from the three parties of the Alliance. Secondly, many Chinese felt that the MCA would adequately represent Chinese interests and seek to safeguard the practice of Chinese secondary schools in using Kuo Yu as the general medium of instruction. Thirdly, when the Alliance contested its first federal election in 1955, its manifesto pledged that it would "reorientate education to a Malayan outlook" and it hastened to add that the Alliance would "allow vernacular schools their normal expansion".⁴² In other words, the emphasis was on the content of education rather than making Malay the medium of instruction for all Malayan schools. Thus, the non-Malays had no reason to be apprehensive over the Report and therefore granted it unanimous support. The

Chinese were impressed that the policy agreed upon did not call for any immediate or substantial concessions. The Chinese school system did not appear to be in any danger. But the Chinese mistook flexibility of methods for uncertain goals. Perhaps the ambiguous nature of the document was partly the reason for this question.

The timing of the release of the Report was an important factor. At the time the Report was being prepared and when it was released, negotiations were underway between the members of the Alliance regarding the Alliance bargain and the constitutional contract. The non-Malay members of the Alliance rightly felt that a concession on the medium of instruction was indeed a small price to pay for the extension of citizenship rights. Thus, the MCA and the MIC elite chose not to raise any objections to the provisions of the Razak Report when it was released. However, objections to the provisions of the Report intensified when it became clear that the Chinese medium schools would have to administer the LCE examinations in either English or Malay, not in Chinese as had previously been done. The UCSTA in particular argued that since their pupils knew very little English or Malay they should be allowed to take their examination in the medium in which they had been instructed. They also maintained that the way the examination was being conducted violated the Alliance election promises made in 1955. Thus, they were moved to submit a memorandum outlining their grievances, but it made no headway. Next they threatened a boycott of all Chinese students sitting for the examination and this seemed to work. Dato Razak, who had earlier

been firm, relented and agreed to a temporary postponement of the examination and to the use of Kuo Yu for another year as the medium of instruction and examination.

This unexpected success of the UCSTA was viewed as a victory of a sort for its President Lim Lean Geok, whom Tan Siew Sin had identified as "the most powerful man in Malaya today" ⁴³ Encouraged by this Lim began clamouring for even more changes in the Education Ordinance, 1957. More specifically, he and his organization rejected the part of the Report that stressed that eventually Malay would be the medium of instruction in all schools. They wanted the Chinese language to be taught for at least a third of the time and more importantly to have the LCE and the FMCE examinations conducted in the language of instruction forever. The mounting dissatisfaction and protests by a prominent and influential sector of the Chinese community obviously alarmed the MCA leaders. In an apparent attempt to make a display of organizing the Chinese to consider the Razak Report, the MCA revived the Central Education Committee which had remained dormant since the 1954 White Paper protests. In February of 1957, the MCA sponsored a conference of Chinese educationists of which the UCSTA and the CSMC were the most prominent.

Much to the consternation of the moderate MCA leaders, the Conference promptly "rejected" as "unacceptable" the Alliance Government's education policy as applied to the Chinese schools. It

also appointed a delegation on its own to approach the Government to secure revisions to the Razak plan.⁴⁴ The MCA's leadership suddenly found itself in a situation of contradiction and confusion. On the one hand, they were an integral part of the Alliance Government and wanted to be counted as loyal Malaysians supporting and identifying themselves closely with the Alliance policy. Yet, on the other hand, the MCA's leadership had to act as the custodian of Chinese language and culture and consequently moved to pressure the Government to act to safeguard the interests of the Chinese community. However, the moderate MCA leaders clearly perceived a possible break in cordial relationship with the UMNO if they questioned the provisions of the Razak Report which was part of the Alliance bargain. Thus, the MCA leaders chose not to press the issue and adopted a non-committal stand.

The MCA leadership's decision not to rock the Alliance boat created an impression among the more chauvinistically inclined members of the society that the party was capitulating to the more aggressive Malay leaders. Since the MCA could not push for a more positive stand in safeguarding Chinese interests, many Chinese increasingly turned to the PPP and the Labour Party to articulate issues pertaining to Chinese interests. Within the MCA itself, there was increasing disillusionment with the 'Old Guards.'⁴⁵ This disillusionment ultimately led to the formation of a new faction in the MCA which, while recognizing the merit of remaining with the Alliance, was also

sympathetic to the political demands articulated by the more communal elements of the Chinese society.

Starting in mid-November, 1957, there were serious disturbances in Malay Chinese schools in Penang, Ipoh, Kuala Lumpur and Seremban, over the question of the language to be used in the Government examinations. The students who took to rioting were largely backed by their teachers, objecting to the principle that Malay should be the medium for the Government sponsored LCE examinations for all students, even those educated in the Chinese medium schools. In the face of mounting violence, the Government closed all Chinese schools for a week beginning November 17, 1957.⁴⁶ The MCA as a member of the Alliance was in no position either to condone the action of the students or to take up a defensive position in their favour. Thus, the MCA leadership chose to weather the storm without doing anything.

The non-action of the MCA contrasted sharply with the way the PPP went to the rescue of the students arrested by the police. D. R. Seenivasagam and his brother S. P. Seenivasagam, the two leaders of the PPP, personally helped bail them out en masse in Ipoh. In addition, they promised to defend them when formal charges were laid.⁴⁷ The prompt action by the PPP immediately began to pay dividends to the party. At this time there was a vacancy for the Federal Legislative seat in the Ipoh-Menglembu constituency, and the PPP promptly contested it. The leaders of several powerful Chinese Associations and Guilds swung in favour of the PPP.⁴⁸ On November

23, 1957, the PPP candidate, D. R. Seenivasagam scored a resounding victory when he defeated Yap Yin Fah (MCA). This victory was indeed a sweet one for him, for only two years earlier he had polled a mere 808 votes and had lost his deposit.⁴⁹ The victory of D. R. Seenivasagam gave him a national platform to argue that the MCA could no longer be relied upon as the spokesman of Chinese interests. Increasingly his speeches and deeds were given front page coverage in the Chinese press and he became a sort of national hero for the Chinese. All these developments profoundly disturbed the MCA leaders.

The events in Ipoh directly contributed to increasing restlessness among the younger Chinese-educated members. They were determined to do something to arrest the sagging support for the MCA. Thus, there was a coalescing of various interest groups such as UCSTA, the CSMC, the Federation Guild and Association, a group of young vaguely socialist oriented MCA members, and others. They chose the Alliance Whip, Dr. Lim Chong Eu, who had by then distinguished himself by countering most of D. R. Seenivasagam's criticism, as their leader. The 'coalition' soon challenged the incumbent Tan Cheng Lock and his group for the leadership of the MCA. In the process they also declared that they were determined "to protect more strongly the interests of the Chinese."⁵⁰ This only helped to alarm the moderate Malay leaders. Neither their support for the incumbent MCA leader nor a warning that "Alliance unity depends on the type of leaders [of the MCA] who took

office,"⁵¹ was able to prevent the defeat of Tan Cheng Lock and his faction. The Young Turks under Dr. Lim's leadership captured almost all the major posts and Dr. Lim himself was elected as the new President in March, 1958.

In one of his first policy statements Dr. Lim declared: "First, we want equality in this country. Secondly, we are for an assurance of our way of life, our language and our schools."⁵² He also began consultations with the Minister of Education over the problems of Chinese education. Furthermore, he was able to convince Dato Razak, with whom he had close rapport, to head a committee to reexamine the Razak Report in 1959. However cautious, the step-by-step approach was not to the liking of the UCSTA, and was subjected to ridicule by the PPP members as well as from the members of the Old Guards. In particular, Tan Siew Sin and Ong Yoke Lin were the most effective in pressuring Dr. Lim to take a more definite stand over the education and language issue.⁵³

In view of all these pressures, the MCA was moved into positive action. Without waiting for the 1959 election, after which the Razak Report would be reviewed, the MCA called for a national conference on Chinese education.⁵⁴ The meeting was attended by about a thousand representatives from the various guilds and associations, the members of the UCSTA and the CSMC. A call was made at the conference for a fair and equitable deal for Chinese education. While agreeing that compulsory teaching of Malay as a subject in all vernacular schools was commendable,

the meeting listed the following demands:

- a. that the mother tongue should be the main medium of instruction in the vernacular schools,
- b. that the medium of examination should be the same as the medium of instruction,
- c. that the remuneration for Chinese school teachers should be on par with others,
- d. that budgeting should give a fair share to the Chinese schools,
- e. that the Government should increase the existing grant to the Chinese schools by 100 per cent.⁵⁵

Dr. Lim, apparently realising the threat to the harmonious relations between UMNO and the MCA posed by the conference, cautioned the conference members to broaden their view and urged them that "all those interested in Chinese education keep in mind the problems of other communities."⁵⁶ But before his pleas of caution could have any effect on the UCSTA, the Minister of Education, Mohd. Khir Johari, in an attempt to get tough with the Chinese school teachers, issued a directive that Chinese school teachers, regardless of their training or experience, must sit for an examination (equivalent to the LCE) in the Malay language in order to be considered for entrance into the proposed Unified Teaching Scheme.⁵⁷

The UCSTA and its 7,000 strong members were now in a state of great apprehension. In an extraordinary delegates conference, they decided to boycott the examinations. In an apparent move to force the issue on the MCA, they called on the party to incorporate into the

Alliance Election Manifesto their demands concerning Chinese education including the provision that examinations be given in the Chinese language.⁵⁸ In addition, Lim Lean Geok and Chin Chee Meow, the CSMC representative, presented Dr. Lim with an ultimatum that only "if their demands were included in the Alliance Manifesto, . . . would they call upon the Chinese in the country to vote for the Alliance."⁵⁹ In an apparent move to show the UCSTA and the CSMC that the MCA had in fact approached the Tunku with a similar demand, the party's Publicity Chairman Yung Pung How made public a confidential letter dated June 24, 1958, from Dr. Lim to the Tunku which had remained unanswered. In the letter Dr. Lim, among other things, had asked that "The Alliance manifesto should indicate clearly that the party intends to review in general the implementation of its education policy in the light of experiences over the past two years."⁶⁰ This letter was followed by a statement by Yung Pung How that:

If we do not succeed in getting what we think is fair the MCA General Committee will decide on July 12, whether we fight under the Alliance banner or on our own The MCA will stand absolutely firm on the issue of Chinese education and the allocation of seats for the MCA⁶¹

The Tunku was infuriated by the imprudent action, and felt that the upstart MCA leader had breached mutual trust and loyalty. He therefore replied in a scathing letter thus:

It is obvious that your intention is to break from the Alliance and it offers me and others in the Alliance no room for discussion, particularly as

you have made the terms of your demands public and unequivocal Undeterred, we will fight the elections as the Alliance with the MIC and those members of the MCA, who do not support your stand and believe in the honest intentions and integration of the Alliance Party.⁶²

Dr. Lim immediately reacted to this move by approaching the Tunku to make amends, but the Tunku was determined to deal with the breach of contract. Following an Emergency UMNO General Assembly meeting on July 12, to discuss the crisis, the Tunku laid down his conditions for readmitting the MCA. He felt, "We cannot end this crisis if [Dr. Lim] does not withdraw the threatening letter and expel those irresponsible members who created the crisis."⁶³ Dr. Lim then took these terms to the Emergency meeting of the MCA Central Working Committee. He reiterated that:

It is not likely we will be allocated 32 seats [the education] clause will not be included in the manifesto. The Government will implement it by administrative directive as soon as possible.⁶⁴

Dr. Lim also felt the shortcoming of the MCA during the July crisis was the lack of unity among the members of the MCA. "If today the MCA had solidly united, the problem would be very much easier."⁶⁵ The MCA Central Working Committee conceded to the terms put forward by the Tunku by a vote of 89 to 60.⁶⁶ Following this virtual surrender and the defeat of the 'ultra-communal faction' there was a flood of resignations from the rank and file of the MCA. Yong Pung How, the Publicity Chairman, Too Joon Hing, the Secretary General, Chin See Yin and S. M. Yong, among others tendered resignations. In

disgust over the manner in which MCA had capitulated to the Tunku, Yong Pung How suggested that the "MCA had outlived its usefulness and is no longer able to carry out even the main objects for which it was formed."⁶⁷ The position of Dr. Lim was now tenuous especially with the resurgence of the Old Guards under the stewardship of Tan Siew Sin and Ong Yoke Lin. Increasingly he was isolated from the the mainstream of MCA-UMNO liaison. To make matters even worse, his name was conspicuously absent from the list of candidates for the forthcoming elections. Following this Dr. Lim tendered his resignation as MCA President and left for medical treatment in the United Kingdom. Dr. Cheah Toon Lok, a close friend of the Tunku, was now chosen as the interim President of the MCA. Without doubt the crisis enhanced the status of the Tunku, and opposition to him was thoroughly discredited. The Alliance Party machinery became more coherent and centralized than ever before. When the election results were tabulated, it was apparent that the MCA was the hardest hit as a result of the July crisis. Of the 31 seats it contested it won only 19. On the other hand, the PPP and the Socialist Front which had championed the Chinese education issue were able to increase their seats in the Parliament.⁶⁸

After the 1959 election, the MCA's claim of being the only representative of the Chinese community was thoroughly shattered. The position of UMNO was further strengthened. It also became apparent that the MCA and the MIC would now have to rely on the benevolence of

the UMNO to ensure their continued participation in the Government. Since the UMNO was the custodian of Malay interests it was now able to articulate them in a more forceful manner and thereby assure a primacy of Malay interests. This primacy of Malay interest in the Government was all the more apparent with the release of the Rahman Talib Report. Even though there was grassroots dissatisfaction over the provision to end Government assistance to Chinese medium secondary schools, the interim MCA President declared that it was "one of the best reports to come out of the Government" ⁶⁹ Once again the UCSTA and the CSMC protested the apparent anti-Chinese school provisions of the Rahman Talib report and submitted a memorandum outlining their disagreements. They also organized a protest meeting to which the Chinese Guilds, Associations and the MCA were invited. But the MCA was not prepared to be put in an embarrassing position once again. Therefore the top echelon of the MCA decided not to attend the meeting. In particular, Tan Siew Sin argued that the MCA could not support the meeting because "the ultimate object of the two bodies [UCSTA and CSMC] was the recognition of Chinese as the official language." He reiterated his party's position by stressing that the MCA's "position would be prejudiced if we were to join them." ⁷⁰ The UCSTA and the CSMC continued their protest regardless of the MCA's lack of endorsement for their stand. Nevertheless, they were able to get support from the PPP and the Socialist Front. But the protests came to an abrupt end when Lim Lean Geok's license to teach was withdrawn.

To make matters even more difficult for him, the Registrar General of Citizenship issued a notice on August 12, 1961, annulling his citizenship because he had "shown himself by act and speech to be disloyal or disaffected to the Federation of Malaya."⁷¹ Following this, in October, 1961, the Rahman Talib Report was passed with unanimous approval on the part of the Alliance members but with non-Malay opposition members dissenting.

Aftermath

The Rahman Talib Report pushed the process of standardization and nationalization several steps further and reaffirmed the basic constitutional contract. The Chinese secondary schools now had no choice but to comply with Government directives or face deregistration. Many were forced to convert to an English-medium as those proved to be more palatable than to convert to a Malay-medium of instruction. Also the provision of the Rahman Talib Report was sufficiently ambiguous in not stipulating how much English must be used in the Chinese schools choosing it as the medium of instruction. Many schools continued to use the Chinese language as much as possible. This situation continued until 1970 when the new education policy came into effect. This will be discussed in detail in the next chapter.

Many of the defectors from the MCA subsequently stood as

independent candidates or joined the PPP or the Labour Party. Too Joon Hing, for example, was able to win a Parliamentary seat in a by-election purely on the issue of the Chinese language and education. His success was followed by the return of Dr. Lim from Britain, their friendship was revived, and this ultimately led to the formation of a new political party, the United Democratic Party (UDP), in April, 1962. The UDP stated as its principle "to fight for the rights of non-Malays, especially education based on a more reasonable policy than the Razak Report."⁷² As for the MCA, its leaders chose not to raise the issue in public any more. Perhaps the leaders felt that the Alliance bargain was sacrosanct. Of course, there were rumblings of dissatisfaction from within the rank and file, but these never reached the intensity of the July Crisis of 1959. With the MCA choosing not to articulate the language and education issues further, the opposition parties adopted them as the leading platform planks.

Conclusion

The language question and the related issue of the medium of instruction in Malayan schools profoundly tested the viability of inter-communal cooperation within the Alliance. It was a serious issue because it led to the resignation of a large number of 'ultra-communal' elements from the MCA. While the UMNO emerged stronger out of the crisis, the MCA and, to a lesser extent, the MIC declined in their stature as the sole representatives of non-Malay interest. Also, the teacher's union emerged as an important political force

as a result of the introduction of the medium of instruction question. To a certain extent both the Malay and Chinese school teachers were important in ensuring the electoral success of the opposition parties, notably the PMIP, the PPP and the Labour Party, because these parties were more ready to champion the issue pertaining to the interests of the FMSTA, the UCSTA and the CSMC respectively. The Rahman Talib Report by no means ended the controversy over the medium of instruction. On the contrary, many of the provisions in the report caused even more dissatisfaction and protests especially from the non-Malay. The repercussions of the report will be dealt with in the the next chapter.

Notes

1. Francis G. Carnell, "The Malayan Elections," Pacific Affairs Vol. XXVIII (December, 1955), pp. 315-350.
2. R. S. Milne, Government and Politics in Malaysia. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967, p. 87.
3. Gordon P. Means, op. cit., Chapter 12; R. S. Milne and Diane K. Mauzy, Politics and Government in Malaysia, Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1978, pp. 36-42.
4. Mohamed Suffian b. Hashim, An Introduction to the Constitution of Malaysia. Kuala Lumpur: Jabatan Chetak Kerajaan, 1972, Chapter 16.
5. R. S. Milne and Diane K. Mauzy, op. cit., p. 39.
6. Federation of Malaya, Report of the Education Committee, 1956. Kuala Lumpur: Government Printers, 1956, p. 1, as cited in K. J. Ratnam, Communalism and the Political Process in Malaya, Singapore: University of Malaya Press, 1965, p. 127.
7. Paul Chang Ming Phang, Educational Development in a Plural Society: A Malaysian Case Study, Singapore: Academia Publications, 1973, p. 46.
8. Ibid.
9. Razak Report, p. 3. As cited in K. J. Ratnam, op. cit., p. 127.
10. Ibid., p. 4.
11. Ibid., p. 128.
12. Ibid., pp. 9-10.
13. Ibid., p. 12
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.

17. Federation of Malaya, Report of the Education Review Committee, (hereafter cited as Rahman Talib Report) Kuala Lumpur: Government Printers, 1960, paras. 57 and 61, as cited in B. Simandjuntak, op. cit., p. 203.
18. Rahman Talib Report, p. 3, as cited in von Vorys, op. cit.
19. Rahman Talib Report, pp. 29-31, as cited in R. K. Vasil, op. cit., p. 135.
20. Ibid.
21. Abdul Rahman bin Talib, Minister of Education in a Radio Broadcast, October 23, 1961, Quoted from Ministry of Information Booklet, (n.d.) p. 5.
22. Daniel E. Moore, "The United Malays National Organization and the 1959 Malayan Elections: A Study of a Political Party in Action in a Newly Independent Society," Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1960. p. 95 ff.
23. T. R. Fennel, p. 402.
24. Chan Heng Chee, op. cit., p. 68.
25. Malay Mail, November 8, 1954, as cited in T. R. Fennel, op. cit., p. 407.
26. T. R. Fennel, op. cit., pp. 414-415.
27. Malay Mail, August 11, 1955, as cited in T. R. Fennel, p. 422.
28. K. J. Ratnam, op. cit., p. 132.
29. Abdul Rahman b. Talib, Minister of Education, Radio Broadcast, p. 1.
30. Leo Ah Bang, "Elite Cohesion in Malaysia: A Study of Alliance Leadership," M.S.Sc. Thesis, University of Singapore, 1972.
31. Gordon P. Means, op. cit., p. 273 ff.
32. Cynthia H. Enloe, "Issues and Integration in Malaysia," Pacific Affairs, Vol. XLI, No. 3 (Fall 1968), p. 375 ff.

33. Federation of Malaya, Legislative Council Debates, 16 May, 1956, Col. 1144-1205 and 1193, as cited in B. Simandjuntak, p. 201.
34. Gordon P. Means, op. cit., p. 196.
35. Utusan Melayu, April 22, 1957, and Malay Mail, April 22, 1957, as cited in T. R. Fennel, p. 484.
36. Margaret Roff, "The Politics of Language in Malaya," Asian Survey, Vol. VII, No. 5 (May 1967), p. 321.
37. Malay Mail, May 27, 1957, as cited in T. R. Fennel, p. 486.
38. Straits Times, February 3, 1958, and March 31, 1958.
39. Malay Mail, May 12, 1958, as cited in D. E. Moore, p. 97.
40. Daniel E. Moore, op. cit., p. 97.
41. Ibid., p. 95 ff.
42. Margaret Roff, "The Malayan Chinese Association, 1948-1965," Journal of Southeast Asian History, Vol. 6, No. 2 (1965) p. 50.
43. Frank H. H. King, op. cit., p. 40.
44. Straits Times, February 4, 1957, and February 25, 1957.
45. J. D. Vaughan, The Manner and Customs of the Chinese of the Straits Settlements. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1971. passim.
46. Straits Times, November 18, 1957.
47. R. K. Vasil, op. cit., p. 232.
48. Ibid., p. 233.
49. Ibid., p. 232.
50. Straits Times, March 3, 1958.
51. Ibid., March 22, 1958.

52. Ibid., December 1, 1958.
53. Daniel E. Moore, op. cit., p. 235.
54. Straits Times, March 24, 1958.
55. Ibid., April 27, 1959.
56. Malay Mail, April 28, 1959.
57. Singapore Standard, June 2, 1959, as cited in Daniel E. Moore, op. cit., p. 206.
58. Straits Times, July 6, 1959.
59. Daniel E. Moore, op. cit., p. 207.
60. Straits Times, July 10, 1959.
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid., July 11, 1959.
63. Ibid., July 13, 1959.
64. Ibid.
65. Ibid., July 14, 1959.
66. Ibid.
67. Ibid.
68. T. E. Smith, "The Malayan General Election of 1959," Pacific Affairs, Vol. 33, No. 1, (March 1960), p. 46.
69. Straits Times, August 6, 1960.
70. Quoted from the Minutes of the MCA Central Working Committee, November 4, 1960, as cited in Chan Heng Chee, p. 71.
71. Chan Heng Chee, op. cit., p. 141; R. K. Vasil, op. cit., p. 243.
72. Gordon P. Means, op. cit., p. 247.

CHAPTER V

THE ALLIANCE GOVERNMENT, 1962-1971

This period was a turbulent one in the politics of Malaysia. A rapid series of events profoundly affected the future politics of the nation. In 1963, the Federation was enlarged to include the Borneo Territories and Singapore.¹ Two years later Singapore was expelled from the Federation. Brief but traumatic racial riots occurred in Kuala Lumpur following the May 1969 elections. Then followed twenty months of emergency rule by the National Operations Council (NOC). Parliament was reconvened under a new Prime Minister in 1971, and issues that had caused controversies were removed from the realm of public discussion by a constitutional amendment in the same year. Education and the medium of instruction questions were important issues interwoven in the fabric of the politics of this period, especially during the latter half of the period. There were protests over the implementation of the Rahman Talib Report. But this time the MCA was careful not to be identified with any such protests. The issue was therefore taken over and amplified by the non-Malay opposition parties. The Government also undertook certain measures to lessen the ambiguities inherent in the education system and ultimately ended its ambivalence with regard to the question of the medium of instruction in Malaysian schools.

Major Political Events

In Peninsular Malaysia, the Alliance Government, whose term of office did not expire until August 1964, decided to hold state and Federal elections on April 25th, 1964. The overriding issue of the election was Indonesia's confrontation over the formation of Malaysia.² The election forced the anti-Malaysia opposition parties, notably the Pan Malayan Islamic Party (PMIP), the Socialist Front, the United Democratic Party (UDP) and the People's Progressive Party, to choose between supporting Malaysia as a fait accompli or giving the appearance of rendering support to Malaysia's foreign aggressor. A surprising development of the election was the entry of the People's Action Party (PAP), casting itself in the mould of a "friend, loyal opposition and critic."³

The election brought a resounding victory for the Alliance Government, for it won 80 of 104 seats contested. However, the entry of the PAP into the politics of the peninsula had important ramifications. At first its leaders, such as Lee Kuan Yew, portrayed themselves as far better partners than the MCA. Next, the PAP coined a rather catchy phrase 'Malaysian Malaysia' basically meaning racial equality and in the process began challenging the concept of the 'bargain'. This created a whole new perspective and stirred up old fears.

The UMNO leaders were quick to sense the dangers of reopening

old wounds and dwelling on issues that had seemingly been solved once and for all with the constitutional contract. Thus UMNO spurned the PAP's advances and at the same time tried to shore up the MCA with some concessions, but with limited success. Once the PAP was repudiated by the Tunku, the PAP resorted to political action, and formed a united opposition front with the Sarawak United People's Party, the UDP, the PPP, and Machinda of Sarawak. With the exception of the Machinda Party, all were known for their preponderant Chinese composition. By mid-1965 what began as a friendly contest soon degenerated into an undisguised effort to mobilize the non-Malays with a promise of equality and an end to "Malay Malaysia", and a bid to seize the reins of the government from the Alliance.⁴ On May 27, 1965, Lee Kuan Yew moved an amendment following the Yang-di-Pertuan Agong's speech for not including the 'Malaysian Malaysia' matter. And that, in Tunku's own words, was the "straw that broke the camel's back."⁵ On July 25, a decision to expel Singapore from Malaysia was made by Tunku while convalescing in London after an operation.⁶ Then on August 9, 1965, the Constitution Amendment Bill expelling Singapore was passed unanimously.⁷ However, the issues raised by the PAP continued under the banner of a new party formed from its Malayan wing. This party, which was named the Democratic Action Party (DAP), together with the PPP and newly formed Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia (Gerakan) continued with the basic theme of racial equality.

Increasingly the non-Malay components of the Alliance seemed unable to defend themselves against the charge of having capitulated to the Malays. On the other hand, UMNO was subjected to criticism from the more communally oriented 'ultras'. The PMIP's accusations that the UMNO could no longer be relied upon to advance Malay interests further lent credibility to the arguments of the 'ultras'. In essence there was a growing disillusionment with the way the Alliance operated, and a definite swing of voter sentiment away from the party was in the offing. The Alliance Government declared general elections for May 10, 1969. Unlike previous elections, this election was characterised by the absence of any single overriding new political issue. The Alliance chose to stand on the basis of its past record and this contrasted sharply with the Opposition parties who resorted to airing perennial communal issues.⁸ The continuous dwelling on the theme of racial equality and of having been short changed by the Alliance bargain sent communal tensions soaring.

The election results were shocking to the Alliance Party. Its federal parliamentary strength was reduced to 66 seats, and it polled only 48.5 percent of the popular vote.⁹ The MCA was badly defeated and won only 13 of the 33 seats it contested. In the State Assembly elections, the losses were even more drastic. The Alliance once again lost Kelantan to the PMIP and this time Penang to the Gerakan. In Perak and Selangor, it appeared it could lose control,

thus raising the spectre of a possible non-Malay Menteri Besar (Chief Minister). In Kedah and Trengganu, the Alliance won by a reduced margin. The Opposition parties, with a strengthened position, were jubilant. In an atmosphere of exuberance, the DAP and the Gerakan held several 'victory processions'. The Malays in retaliation organized a procession on their own. Racial violence broke out on the nights of 13 and 14 May, 1969. The Government took immediate action and proclaimed a State of Emergency. Executive authority normally exercised by the Cabinet was delegated to the Director of Operations, Tun Razak, who also headed the National Operations Council (NOC).¹⁰

The MCA at first declined participation in the government owing to its rejection by the Chinese electorate, but later was coaxed into accepting ministerial posts without portfolio but with 'Special Responsibility' during the emergency. Several members of the 'ultra' faction within the UMNO who attempted an 'internal coup' against the Tunku were expelled or sent abroad on 'study leave'. Nonetheless, many of their demands were subsequently incorporated in the government's "New Economic Policy" to upgrade the Malays, and also in the "new education policy" enunciated just two months after the riots.

The Tunku in an Independence Day broadcast on August 30, 1970, announced he would retire. He was replaced by Tun Razak as Prime Minister soon after. In early 1971, the Government issued a White

Paper entitled Towards National Harmony, which stated:

If important sections of the Constitution - sections pertaining to the delicate compromises among the major races - are attacked . . . it will certainly arouse fears and emotions It is obvious that these vital clauses must, in the national interest, be protected from the kind of debate that questions the very principle on which the nation was founded In order to ensure that in the future the democratic processes will not be used to arouse racial feelings, it is proposed that Article 10 be amended to give power to the Parliament to pass laws prohibiting the questioning of any matter, right, status, position, privilege, sovereignty or prerogative established or protected by the Provisions of Part III (provisions relating to citizenship); Article 152 (the National language and the languages of other communities), Article 153 (special position of the Malay and the legitimate interests of other communities) or Article 181 (the Sovereignty of the rulers).¹¹

Tun Razak stated soon after: "I hope the amendments will be approved, otherwise I regret we cannot return to the parliamentary democracy."¹²

When the votes were taken on the Constitutional (Amendment) Bill, the Gerakan, the PMIP, SUPP, SNAP and the Alliance voted in favour of the Bill; the only opposition to it came from the PPP and the DAP. Thus, the White Paper's proposed amendments to the Constitution were passed by a vote of 125 to 17.¹³

Communal Demands and Education Developments

The Education Act, 1961, to a large extent satisfied the more communally oriented 'ultras' in the UMNO and other interest groups aligned with the party. However, dissatisfaction among the non-Malays and in particular the Chinese was intense and widespread. First,

many Chinese felt that the Act was the thin edge of the wedge designed ultimately to force the elimination of Chinese medium education.

Secondly, there was a general apprehension over the manner in which the MCA and the MIC had capitulated to the UMNO over the Act, and in the process were regarded as having sold out non-Malay interests to the Malays. The Opposition parties, on the other hand, continued to demand a better deal, in particular over provisions of the education policy.

The Labour Party, for example, had the support of the Chinese-educated and it often argued that the Alliance Government was attempting to

destroy the Chinese language. The PPP in the same manner argued that

the Alliance Government, and especially the MCA could no longer be

relied upon to safeguard Chinese education.¹⁴ The UDP specifically

expressed dissatisfaction over the Government's education policy. In

fact, one of the major platform planks of the party was "to fight for

the rights of non-Malays, especially in education which should be based

on a more reasonable policy than the Razak Report."¹⁵ Thus, the

Opposition, in unison, demanded a revamping of the entire education

system and a fair deal for the Chinese medium schools. As mentioned

earlier on, these developments were a result of the racial equality theme

of the PAP in its brief intrusion into the politics of the Peninsula.

Understandably, these incessant demands for equality and

the questioning of the constitutional contract by the non-Malays sparked

a mood of militancy among the more communally inclined Malays. They

were increasingly alarmed over the possibility of a fundamental

realignment of Malaysian politics. In response to the questioning of the status of the Malay language in the school system, this group of militant Malays formed the Barisan Bertindak Bahasa Kebangsaan (BBBK) or the National Language Action Front, under the erstwhile Chairman of the Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, Syed Nasir bin Ismail, in mid 1964. The BBBK had the support of many UMNO members, Alliance Parliamentarians, Malay school teachers, their Union, journalists and University students.

There was now an added impetus among Malay politicians in their agitation for speedier implementation of the decision to make Malay the sole medium of instruction. Increasingly, Syed Nasir emerged as the champion of the Malay language. He even proposed that the Government should abandon English-medium instruction in English primary schools. He called on all citizens to "accept the national language wholeheartedly as the language of their birth place; and [to] show their loyalty and sincerity."¹⁶ He was careful and effective in articulating Malay communal opinion so that it was within the bounds of the constitutional contract. To a large extent Syed Nasir's protests only helped to further raise non-Malay apprehensions with regards to the language issue in the Malaysian schools.

The MCA had a brief respite with the expulsion of Singapore from the Federation. But with the assumption of the racial equality "Malaysian Malaysia" theme by the DAP and other opposition parties, the MCA was once again in a dilemma. Added to this was the revival of

the UCSTA and CSMC which both began to actively court the opposition parties, the Chinese Chambers of Commerce, and the Guilds and Associations for support to their cause. Once again the MCA leadership chose to remain out of the controversy and be discreet. This was naturally not enough to satisfy the UCSTA and the CSMC. They showed their disgust with the MCA when it sponsored an assembly to pledge support for the Tunku in 1965, - about 400 representatives from 187 bodies walked out after failing to bring about a discussion on the Chinese language issue.¹⁷

Within the MCA itself there was a growing element of dissatisfaction. With the due date for the proclamation of Malay as the sole official language fast approaching this dissatisfaction increased. The Youth Wing of the MCA soon became embroiled over the issue. It spearheaded a movement urging the Government to provide for a wider use of the Chinese language, to make it an official language and for more assistance to Chinese education. The MCA Youth Chairman, Lee San Choon, most notably wanted "a more liberal stand on the Chinese language especially as regards education."¹⁸ But he also cautioned the MCA Youth not to insist on Chinese as an official language, and when it looked like his caution would not be heeded, he threatened to resign if his demands were not met.

However, the MCA President, Tan Siew Sin, tried to be discreet. He warned that it would take a constitutional amendment to make Chinese the official language, and this was impossible. He also

argued that if the MCA "backs this demand there will be a head on collision with the UMNO and this will mean the end of the Alliance."¹⁹ In addition, the MCA's high command took pains to deal with stragglers such as the Youth Vice-President and President of the Federation of Chinese School Teachers' Association, Sim Mow Yo. He was later expelled for "defying party leadership."²⁰ Likewise, a resolution from the Penang Branch of the MCA called for acceptance of the Chinese language "for official and extensive use throughout the country."²¹ Thus, the MCA expected the UMNO to likewise mobilize and restrain the Malay community and the 'ultras' especially.

Syed Nasir nonetheless was active in his protests. In early November, 1966, Syed Nasir issued a 13 page confidential memorandum to the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister, all Cabinet members, all Menteri Besar (Chief Ministers) and all members of the UMNO Executive Council.²² In the memorandum Syed Nasir stressed that "Malay must become the sole national language with no further concession to other communities." In addition, Syed Nasir defined the responsibilities of the Alliance leaders. They "must not be indecisive The language policy of this country is one and final" to replace English with the National Language as the sole official language in this country. There are other questions, problems or issues on this, and [they] cannot be raised"²³ His arguments gained a wide deal of support among many young UMNO members, who had not been party to the original Alliance bargain. In addition, Dr. Mahathir bin Mohammad, a person known for "strong Malay views on

constitutional contract,"²⁴ Dato Harun bin Haji Idris, the Menteri Besar of Selangor, and Dato Abdul Rahman bin Yakub, Minister of Land and Mines, were all sympathetic to the main thrust of Syed Nasir's argument. Thus, in view of this accumulated dissatisfaction the top echelon Alliance leadership were forced to weigh all the possible consequences before arriving at a suitable national language policy.

The National Language Bill was introduced by the Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, on February 24, 1967. Its provisions were voted upon and the bill was passed with a resounding 95 ayes against 11 nays.²⁶ The Act firstly provided that "the national language shall be used for official purposes . . ." on and after September 1, 1967. Section 3 of the Act affirmed that "Nothing in this Act shall affect the right of the Federal Government or any State Government to use any translation of official documents or communications in the language of any other community in the Federation for such purposes as may be deemed necessary in the public interest." Section 4, allowed the Yang di-Pertuan Agong to "permit the continued use of the English language for such official purposes as may be deemed fit."²⁷ His Majesty soon made an order permitting the continued use of English "training or examination where the approved course or the approved text of any subject is English."²⁸ The Act in effect declared Malay as the Official Language and safeguarded the position of English as the second language in Malay-medium secondary schools. The Act further guaranteed the continued operation of the English-medium schools for an additional period. In essence, the Act served to reaffirm the part of the Alliance

bargain on matters of language and education. Nevertheless, following the passage of the Act in Parliament, the Government began the gradual process of transformation by introducing the teaching of arts subjects such as history, physical education, geography, and arts and crafts in Malay.²⁹

After the May 13th incident of 1969, the transformation process was carried out with more vigour. A 'new education policy' was declared by the new Education Minister, Dato Abdul Rahman bin Yakub, in July, 1969. This policy enunciated two major changes in the education system. First, all instruction in the Standard One classes of Malaysian schools (except during English, Chinese and Tamil language sessions) "would be wholly conducted in Malay."³⁰ Thence forward conversion would be made standard by standard one year at a time. Thus by 1983 instruction in the University would be entirely in Malay. Secondly, history, geography, and civics would be taught in Standard Four in Malay. This would mean that only mathematics and science would continue to be taught in English in Standard Four.³¹ In sum, the new policy adhered to that of the Education Act of 1961 and, at the same time, set the conversion process moving and ended in due course the operation of the English-medium primary and secondary schools.

Motives and Aims of Policy Makers

By mid-1966 the pressures exerted by Syed Nasir and his supporters as well as their Chinese counterparts were viewed with a great deal of

apprehension by the moderate Alliance leadership. The moderate Malay leaders were not prepared to make any further concession to the non-Malays but they were also concerned that due to the efforts of Syed Nasir the establishment of Malay as the sole official language would be perceived as "a Malay communal victory."³² The Tunku in particular foresaw a disturbing prospect of communal passions being unnecessarily inflamed and the possibility of the MCA becoming even more vulnerable as a result. The moderate Alliance leaders were clearly concerned that the operation of the Government, especially that of the courts and schools, would be seriously affected or impaired by the total elimination of English as demanded by the 'ultras'. Thus, they were ambivalent about the position of the English language in the school system. This was apparent from the frequent policy speeches made by bureaucrats and ministers. For example, the permanent head of the Education Department, Haji Hamdan bin Sheikh Thir, urged the pupils of a large Malay-medium secondary school "not to lose sight of the importance of the English language."³³ Likewise, the Education Minister, Mohd. Khir bin Johari often lauded the English language and its role in the progress and prosperity of the country and in particular the role of the English-medium schools as the "only institution to bring together the children of all races."³⁴ The Tunku in his Deepavali message to the nation on November 1966, summarized the Government's attitude towards the proposed language bill in this manner: "All that is intended is to put Malay as the national

and official language, and English as the second language, while the languages of others will go on as they have been going on."³⁵ Thus, the language bill was balanced to counteract seriously destabilising pressures exerted by the 'ultras' and at the same time soothe the non-Malay demands for guarantees for their languages.

Policy Impact and Communal Responses

As indicated earlier the National Language Act of 1967 affirmed that Malay would become "the sole official language" although the English language could be used by the Federal and State Governments "for such official purposes as may be deemed fit." In other words, the Act permitted the continued use of English as a supplementary language for the conduct of Governmental business and education. It was this provision that sparked protests. On the one hand the radical Malays thought that the Bill was too moderate and compromising; and on the other, the non-Malays felt that it was not enough to guarantee and preserve their culture and language. The triumvirate of Tunku Abdul Rahman, Tun Abdul Razak and Tun Dr. Ismail were determined to avoid what they felt would be dramatic victories in the constitutional contract by any of the communities lest they trigger public inter-communal confrontation reminiscent of the July crisis of 1959. Therefore, they began to persuade the UMNO members from taking open opposition. Thus, when the Bill came for debate in Parliament, the theme of the argument advanced by the Alliance leaders and in particular the UMNO

leaders was one of "inter-communal peace."³⁶ The most effective spokesman for the Alliance was Tun Dr. Ismail and he countered most of the attack by the PMIP and the PPP. About to retire, he refuted the rumour believed by many Malays that he had disagreed with the provisions of the Bill. He stated: "Not only do I support the Bill, but I played a major role in formulating it."³⁷ He acknowledged that the Bill will not convert those who are wedded to the policy of establishing languages other than the National Language to be the official language, or those who are strongly convinced that the National Language should be the only language of communication between the Government and the public." He further argued that the Bill, "will appeal to those Malaysians - Malays, Chinese, Indians and others - who take a national pride in the national language to be the sole official language while at the same time realizing that at the present stage of Malaysia's history the languages of other communities too must be used for translations of official documents and communication, so that all citizens can understand what is going on in their country."³⁸ After this speech by a much respected Malay leader, the outcome of the voting was never in doubt. There were 95 votes for the Bill and 9 votes against.³⁹

While most of the opposition to the Bill within UMNO was contained, much opposition was manifested outside the party. The BBBK and its allies at first attempted to persuade the Government to change the Bill once it was announced that it would be tabled in Parliament. Sensing the dangers of the demands being made, Tun Razak attempted to placate them by declaring that the Government would "take active steps

to widen the use of the national language in all fields next year,"⁴⁰ but that was not enough. The BBBK's protests continued to grow in volume. Even while the Alliance National Council was meeting at the Prime Minister's house to discuss the Bill before tabling it in Parliament, three hundred banner-waving Malays demonstrated at the gates against what they felt to be a compromise formula for multi-lingualism.⁴¹ In another demonstration effigies of the Prime Minister were burned.⁴² It was the PMIP which gave the most support to the demands of the BBBK.⁴³ In one of the longest speeches ever made in Parliament, Dato Asri, the PMIP leader, launched a scathing attack on the Bill. He accused the Tunku of "wounding the heart of his own race."⁴⁴ He claimed that the Alliance Government was dooming the Malays to backwardness and that the national language did not have and would not have "economic value." He felt that the Malays would continue to remain backward since the only schools generally available to their children were Malay schools.⁴⁵ But this was a voice in the wilderness, and did not affect the outcome of the voting on the Bill.

Following the passage of the Bill a full scale public education campaign concerning its provisions was mounted by Alliance members, by Ministers, by Menteri Besars and by the Malay sultans. But this was really not necessary as there was not much opposition to the Act - at least at that time. The Utusan Melayu which had earlier said "it would be far better to wait until Tunku had given an explanation," now came out solidly in support of Tunku. It criticised those who

opposed the Act and argued that they "must be motivated by a desire to cause trouble."⁴⁶ The UMNO leaders began disciplinary proceedings against those who had earlier dissented. For example, the Deputy Chairman of Penang State UMNO was dismissed for supporting the dissenters. As for Syed Nasir, he was quick to sense the troubles ahead. He immediately dispatched a personal letter of apology and offered to resign from the Executive Council of UMNO. However, he was saved from the wrath of Tunku by the timely intervention of Tun Razak.

Though it appeared that most of the outstanding issues were settled amicably within the UMNO, the Language Act 1967 had several repercussions. First, the moderate features were eventually perceived by many Malays as a concession to the non-Malays. These moderate features were identified with the Tunku and thus weakened his stature and position among the radical and communally-oriented Malays. As a result of the Act and the manner he handled the stragglers within the ranks of UMNO the Tunku was distrusted by the 'ultras'. The forces that had come together to challenge the Bill persisted and gained even more support among the leaders, and as a result Tunku was "never again the unchallenged leader" of the Malays.⁴⁷ Secondly, many disgruntled elements within UMNO flocked to the more aggressive spokesmen of Malay interests such as Dr. Mahathir, Harun Idris, Syed Nasir Ismail, Syed Ja'afar Albar among others.⁴⁸ Thirdly, the position of the PMIP was further enhanced and it was viewed as a more dynamic proponent of Malay interests.⁴⁹ In fact the PMIP was successfully able to mobilise

grievances pertaining to the question of the Malay language in schools and to draw protest votes to its cause.

The more militant sector of the Malay society had hoped that the conversion to the sole national language would create rapid economic opportunities for the Malays in both the private and public sectors. They had also hoped the government would utilize the national language legislation as an effective instrument to break non-Malay control of the various sectors of the economy. They argued that tolerating continued use of other languages, especially English, would ensure the continued preponderance of the non-Malays in the economic and professional sectors. Nor had the 'special rights' helped the Malays dramatically. Consequently, many of these elements felt that the UMNO leadership had conceded too much to the non-Malays and thus had permanently relegated the Malay language to a position of inferiority.

The PMIP entered the election campaign of 1969 by reasserting its pledge for the restoration of Malay supremacy in all aspects of the country. Much of its campaign activity centered on the perennial communal issues of language and education.⁵⁰ Thus, presenting itself as a dogmatic communalist party, it was clearly able to draw the disgruntled elements in Malay society as its cause. This contrasted sharply with the UMNO which chose to stand on its past record. UMNO leaders were determined to avoid cultural issues. Malay was enshrined as the official and national language, the education system was adopting it as fast as possible and the moderate leaders felt this

itself was enough to pacify the radical elements in Malay society, but then the votes were counted following the 1969 Elections it was apparent that the PMIP's line of reasoning had gained wide currency.

Unlike the UMNO, the MCA and the MIC did gain a great deal of prestige as a result of the Language Act. Section Three of the Act permitted the continued use of English and the right to maintain the English-medium schools, in which non-Malays tended to do well. In effect, the MCA and the MIC felt relieved and grateful that their interests with regards to Education had been safeguarded by the moderate Malay leaders. Whatever protest there was within the MCA and the MIC was brought tightly under control; when the Bill was presented for debate in Parliament, there was unequivocal support by the MCA and the MIC for it. Tan Siew Sin lauded the Bill as an "achievement of some significance for the Alliance."⁵¹ V. T. Sambanthan, the MIC President, reassured the non-Malays thus: "Today, when we replace English with the Malay language as the official language, it is well known that it is being done not by compulsion but by the process of free acceptance - acceptance willingly and voluntarily by the non-Malay in this country." He further reassured the disgruntled Malays by stating: "Let me state clearly and categorically that this is not the intention and we do not seek and we do not want multi-lingualism in this country."⁵²

While the Alliance partners applauded the Bill as a hallmark of the spirit of tolerance, the Chinese oriented opposition parties, notably the PPP and the Labour Party, disassociated themselves from these claims. D. R. Seenivasagam in particular felt that the Bill was "one

of the greatest acts of treachery and betrayal on one half almost of the population of West Malaysia."⁵³ However, other opposition leaders such as Dr. Tan Chee Khoon and Dr. Lim Chong Eu were well aware of the spirit of compromise entailed in the Bill and therefore offered only moderate criticism. Dr. Tan even defied party directives and supported the Bill.⁵⁴ Thus, when the Bill was passed Dr. Tan and Dr. Lim preferred to be absent and left Parliamentary opposition to the Bill to the PPP.⁵⁵

However, with the approach of the 1969 elections the issue of language and education once again gained prominence. Several factors were responsible for this. Beginning in 1968, the Government, as has been indicated, began to push for the gradual conversion of the medium of instruction for certain arts subjects in the English medium primary schools. To the exponents of political outbidding such as the PPP, the DAP and the Labour Party, this move served as a convincing argument that the future of the non-Malays were being jeopardized. In the election campaigns of 1969, the DAP, the PPP and the Gerakan specifically presented policies on language education in their election platform. The DAP was the most vociferous in articulating the issue. In its election manifesto it promised the adoption of an integrated education system, where schools would use the major languages, and public examinations would be in the media of instruction. Furthermore, it sought to relegate the Malay language to the status of compulsory second language.⁵⁶ In the field its promises were even more aggressive;

one DAP candidate in the Selangor even promised that if his party were to succeed in the elections he would "make the Malays learn Chinese in two months."⁵⁷ Thus it was clear that the DAP aimed to project an image that it was truly the champion of the rights and interests of the non-Malay community.

The Gerakan, on the other hand, took a compromise posture balancing the demands of the Malays with those of the non-Malays. The party was convinced that the existence of Chinese and Tamil education up to Higher School Certificate level was in no way inimical to the creation of a united Malaysian nation and the development of Malay as the sole national language.⁵⁸ Likewise, the PPP supported the continuation of the four language streams of education, and "equal treatment for all educational institutions irrespective of race."⁵⁹ Regarding the provision of grants-in-aid, these schools should be continued without giving up the Chinese or Tamil medium of instruction.

The DAP was also bent on discrediting the MCA as the legitimate spokesman of Chinese interest. It therefore began supporting a 1967 Malaysian Chinese Guilds and Association and the Chinese language Press call for a Chinese language University modeled along the lines of the Nanyang University of Singapore.⁶⁰ The MCA denounced this scheme and instead deflected this movement for the Merdeka University (as the proposed University was to be called) into the establishment of a pre-university Tunku Abdul Rahman College for Chinese students.⁶¹ But with

the mounting pressure for positive action, the MCA later reversed its stand and supported the Merdeka University. Without doubt the MCA's indecision on the language issue caused many voters to support the Opposition.⁶²

Following the May 13th Incident, some radical Malays were moved to make a more definite pro-Malay stand on matters concerning their community. The May 13th Incident they argued had confirmed their diagnosis that not enough was being done for the Malays economically, that the Language Act (1967) had been too favourable to the non-Malays, and that the Tunku's style of politics was too 'feudal', emphasizing loyalty rather than ability or achievement. Their activities were restricted by the Government although many of their policy demands were subsequently incorporated in the "New Economic Policy" and the "new education policy". Within UMNO, the group which had criticized the Tunku were subjected to disciplinary actions. Dr. Mahathir, was expelled from the party. Others like the newly appointed Assistant Minister to Tun Razak, Musa Hitam were "sent on study leave" to the United Kingdom. A notable exception was Abdul Rahman Yakub, who, though he had emerged as a hard-liner, "abstained from open support for Dr. Mahathir,"⁶³ and was appointed as the new Minister of Education. In June 1969, Abdul Rahman Yakub assumed office and immediately he let it be known that he recognised only Malay as the legitimate language for his ministry. On July 10, 1969, just two months after the riots and before normalcy had returned, Abdul Rahman Yakub announced a 'new education policy'

"without the Tengku's knowledge or authorization."⁶⁴ According to Goh Cheng Teik, "This unilateral declaration of policy made at the peak of the anti-Tengku campaign and on the eve of Dr. Mahathir's expulsion . . . suddenly deflated the highly charged atmosphere and rendered the Tengku's task less challenging."⁶⁵

Abdul Rahman Yakub was able to do what other Ministers of Education had failed to do. He was firm in his stand, stating that although there were still "a very small percentage of the people who do not like this, but such is their attitude there is nothing we can do to please them."⁶⁶ But he clearly stated that he had not the slightest intention of withdrawing from the stated goals. He argued that the Government "has been very lenient persuading certain sectors to learn and use Bahasa Malaysia [the National language] But if persuasion still does not provide results then we must resort to the whip. The human psychology is such that if we leave it to their intelligence to choose, they do not make the correct choice."⁶⁷ Having settled the matter of primary and secondary education, Dato Rahman Yakub left for Indonesia to recruit staff for the schools and for the newly established University Kebangsaan (National University).⁶⁸ Thus, after controversies, procrastinations and indecisions lasting almost forty years the Malay language finally was scheduled to become the medium of instruction.

Conclusion

The problem of language education was once again partly the reason for inter-communal conflict, but while the policy makers of earlier periods were able to postpone making definite decisions on the question of the status of the Malay language in the school curriculum this time they were able to irrevocably end Government ambivalence with regard to the policy. The building up of communal dissatisfaction as a result of the various provisions of the Education Act, 1961, and the National Language Act, 1967, had serious consequences with regards to the moderate and often ambiguous policies pursued by the Alliance Government. Following the May 13th Incident, the Government undertook several important and binding measures to end unbridled questioning of the education policy. The cautious nature of non-Malay agitation following the Incident helped the Government to push forward its policy to standardize, end ambiguities, and upgrade the status of Malay as the sole medium of instruction.

In attempting to strike a moderate stand the moderate Malay and non-Malay elites of the Alliance suffered the most because they were not able to continue their control of the party machinery as well as to command the continued high support of the electorate. The Malay leaders, notably Tunku, lost prestige in UMNO. This loss of stature contributed to his early retirement. Likewise, the MCA and the MIC both had their own share of leadership crises and the decline in grassroots

support. Following the May 13th Incident, Malay political supremacy in the Government was clearly established, enabling them to push for an even more determined pro-Malay policy with regard to the question of the Malay language in schools. Thus, a policy which was first conceived in 1930 reached its full state of growth in 1971. From now on the protests were not to be over the status of Malay in Malaysian schools as it has become a fait accompli, but there were to be indirect protests such as when the Merdeka University issue was again raised by the DAP.

Notes

1. For a more in depth study of the formation of Malaysia see the the following books: Mohamed Noordin Sopiee, From Malayan Union to Singapore Separation, Kuala Lumpur: Penerbit Universiti Malaya, 1974; Gordon P. Means, op. cit., Chapter 16, 17, 18 and 19; James P. Ongkili, The Borneo Response to Malaysia, 1961-1963, Singapore: Donald Moore Press, 1967; James P. Ongkili, Modernization in East Malaysia 1960-1970, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1972; Margaret C. Roff, The Politics of Belonging: Political Change in Sabah and Sarawak, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1974; R. S. Milne and K. J. Ratnam, Malaysia: New States in a New Nation, London: Frank Cass, 1974.
2. K. J. Ratnam and R. S. Milne, The Malayan Parliamentary Election of 1964, Singapore: University of Malaya Press, 1967, p. 110 and Chap. VI.
3. Straits Budget, November 6, 1963; as cited in Gordon P. Means, op.cit., p. 337.
4. Gordon P. Means, op. cit., p. 347.
5. Tunku Abdul Rahman, "Looking Back," The Star, April 7, 1975, as cited in R. S. Milne and Diane K. Mauzy, op. cit., p. 73.
6. Gordon P. Means, op. cit., p. 354.
7. Ibid.
8. Martin Rudner, "The Malaysian General Election of 1969: A Political Analysis," Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 1, No. 4, (1970), pp. 1-21; Nancy L. Snider, "Race, Leitmotiv of the Malayan Election Drama," Asian Survey, Vol. X, No. 12, (December, 1970), pp. 1070-1080; R. S. Milne and Diane K. Mauzy, op. cit., p. 161.
9. R. K. Vasil, The Malaysian General Election of 1969, Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1972, p. 46; K. J. Ratnam, and R. S. Milne, "The 1969 Parliamentary Elections in West Malaysia," Pacific Affairs, Vol. XLIII, No. 2 (Summer, 1970), pp. 203-226.
10. Karl von Vorys, op. cit., Part III; R. S. Milne and Diane K. Mauzy, op. cit., pp. 84 ff.

11. Karl von Vorys, op. cit., p. 418.
12. Straits Times, February 4, 1971, as cited in Karl von Vorys, op. cit., p. 418.
13. Ibid., March 4, 1971, as cited in Gordon P. Means, op. cit., p. 403.
14. Ibid., p. 243.
15. Ibid., p. 249.
16. Karl von Vorys, op. cit., p. 202.
17. Straits Times, June 21, 1965 as cited in Chan Heng Chee, op. cit., p. 108.
18. Straits Times, August 18, September 4, 1965, and September 8, 1965, as cited in R. S. Milne, op. cit., p. 90.
19. Straits Times, August 2, 1965, as cited in R. S. Milne and Diane K. Mauzy, op. cit., p. 141.
20. Margaret Roff, op cit., p. 32.
21. Karl von Vorys, op. cit., p. 202.
22. Ibid., p. 203.
23. Ibid., p. 205.
24. Ibid. See also Mahathir b. Mohamad, The Malay Dilemma, Singapore: The Asian Pacific Press, 1970. Chapters 4 and 4, passim.
25. Abdul Rahman bib Yakub was a Muslim Malay/Melanau from Sarawak. He was a member of the Parti BARJASA. He entered Parliament in 1963, and was appointed Minister of Land and Mines in 1965. After the May 13th Incident he was appointed Minister of Education. He was well known as a fiery speaker and often expressed strong pro-Malay views. This earned him the admiration of Malay students in institutions of higher learning. He was primarily responsible for the policy of converting English-medium into Malay-medium schools.
26. Karl von Vorys, op. cit., p. 210.
27. Ibid., p. 206 ff.

28. Suffian, op. cit., p. 280.
29. See Appendix I on the Schedule for the subjects taught in Malaysian Primary Schools as of 1970.
30. Goh Cheng Tiek, The May Thirteenth Incident and Democracy in Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1971, p. 32.
31. Francis Wong Hoy Kee and Ee Tiang Hong, Education in Malaysia (2d edition), Kuala Lumpur: Heinemann Educational Books (Asia) Ltd. 1975. p. 180.
32. Ibid.
33. Straits Times, October 15, 1966, as cited in Margaret Roff, op. cit., p. 324.
34. Margaret Roff, op. cit., p. 324.
35. Ibid.
36. Malaysia, Dewan Ra'ayat, Parliamentary Debates, Vol. III, No. 45, March 2, 1967, Col. 6004, as cited in Karl von Vorys, p. 207.
37. Margaret Roff, op. cit., p. 326.
38. Parliamentary Debates, March 3, 1967, Col. 6138 and 6144, 6145, as cited in Karl von Vorys, op. cit., p. 209.
39. Karl von Vorys, op. cit., p. 210.
40. Straits Times, December 2, 1966, as cited in Margaret Roff, op. cit., p. 325.
41. Margaret Roff, op. cit., p. 325.
42. Y. Mansoor Marican, "The Political Accommodation of Primordial Parties: D.M.K. (India) and PAS (Malaysia), Ph.D. Dissertation, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, 1976. p. 161.
43. Ibid.
44. Parliamentary Debates, Dewan Ra'ayat, Third Session, 2nd Parliament, Kuala Lumpur: Government Printers, 1968, Col. 6020-6048, as cited in Ibid., p. 70.

45. Y. Mansoor Marican, op. cit., p. 161 ff.
46. Margaret Roff, op. cit., p. 326.
47. R. K. Vasil (1972), op. cit., p. 15.
48. Goh Cheng Tiek, op. cit., Chap. 4.
49. Y. Mansoor Marican, op. cit., p. 161 ff.
50. Nancy Snider, op. cit.; Martin Rudner, op. cit..
51. Karl von Vorys, op. cit., p. 207.
52. Parliamentary Debates, Col. 6012, as cited in Karl von Vorys, op. cit., p. 208.
53. Ibid. Col. 6059, as cited in Ibid., p. 208.
54. R. K. Vasil, op. cit., p. 156.
55. Karl von Vorys, op. cit., p. 210.
56. R. K. Vasil, op. cit., p. 303.
57. Karl von Vorys, op. cit., p. 285.
58. R. K. Vasil, op. cit., p. 305 ff.
59. Gordon P. Means, op. cit., p. 394.
60. Karl von Vorys, op. cit., pp. 283-287.
61. Peter Pendersen, "Possibilities for Violence in Malaysia," Current History, 61 (364), (December, 1971), pp. 339-367.
62. Martin Rudner, op. cit., pp. 9-15.
63. Goh Cheng Tiek, op. cit., p. 31.
64. Ibid., p. 32.
65. Ibid.
66. Malay Mail, July 21, 1969, as cited in Karl von Vorys, op. cit., p. 397.

67. Utusan Melayu, July 19, 1969, as cited in Karl von Vorys, op. cit., p. 397.
68. The idea of the Universiti Kebangsaan was first announced in September of 1968, by the then Minister of Education, Mohd. Khir Johari in an apparent attempt to show that the Government was indeed concerned about the status of higher education for the Malays. See: Stuart Drummond and David Hawkins, "The Malaysian Elections of 1969: An Analysis of the the Campaign and the Results," Asian Survey, Vol. X, No. 4, (April, 1970), pp. 320-335.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS

Characteristic of nationalist movements following independence is the effort to regenerate and glorify the national heritage. This is generally achieved in part through curriculum modification in the school system and, in multi-lingual societies, by the introduction of a single language to serve as an instrument of socialization in the public education institutions. The task has usually proven difficult. India and Sri Lanka are characterized by linguistic diversity, in both countries the demands of the various regions and linguistic groups forced the adoption of a three-language formula as a compromise solution. In the case of India, all the regional languages were essentially indigenous and therefore the imposition of Hindi, a language belonging to one particular region, was not acceptable to the country as a whole. In the case of Sri Lanka, most of the Tamils were concentrated in the northern portion of the Island (Jaffna), while the rest of the country consisted of the Sinhalese. The case of Malaysia is different from both India and Sri Lanka. Only one group - the Malays - may be considered as the indigenous people. Secondly, there is no geographical concentration among the various groups. In addition, only in Malaysia is there a system of constitu-

tional contract, as epitomized by the Alliance bargain. The relative cohesiveness of the Malay community and UMNO as opposed to fragmentation of the non-Malay community and consequently the Alliance partners (MCA and MIC), also facilitated the formulation of a policy which made Malay the national language and the main medium of instruction.

Communal Demands

During the four phases in the evolution of the policy which made Malay the medium of instruction, communal demands varied as did the type of political participation in the policy making issues. During the first phase of the introduction of Malay as the medium of instruction, the Malays were not yet politicized or touched by the spirit of nationalism. Neither the masses nor the English-educated Malay elite were in a position to demand that Malay be established as the medium of instruction. The non-Malays, especially the Chinese, were interested in safeguarding their own schools and were not at all interested in allowing Malay to be either a subject language or the medium of instruction.

During the second phase of the policy, i.e. 1946 through 1954, the situation had changed drastically. The Malays were no longer sleepy beneficiaries of special privileges but were active in making demands pertaining to their interests. The resurgent Malay community forcefully made demands for the extension of better infrastructural

facilities in their vernacular schools in addition for making Malay the one other main medium of instruction. They were not satisfied with the provision making Malay the medium of instruction in stages only up to primary level. The Chinese community was startled by these Malay demands. They wanted assurances that the Chinese language instruction in their vernacular schools would be protected. The Chinese also wanted the Government to continue supporting their schools financially. The English-educated Malay elite supported Malay and English as the medium of instruction, but were later forced to give support to the more communally based demands. The same may be said of the Chinese and Indian English-educated elites.

During the third phase of the evolution of the policy, i.e. 1955 through 1962, the demands from the Malay community were to accord Malay the status befitting the national language in the school system. The more communally inclined Malays, such as the vernacular school teachers, wanted to see Malay immediately instituted as the medium of instruction. Moderate leaders of the community preferred a gradual approach to implementing the policy. In addition, they wanted the retention of English as an alternate medium of instruction. Members of the non-Malay community, particularly the Chinese, wanted to retain their schools and opposed any policy that would result in their abolition. The moderate non-Malay leaders were thrust into a dilemma. They were wedded to the Alliance bargain, and did not want to upset their UMNO friends by making extremist communal demands and therefore they chose to be moderate and even not to articulate such

issues.

During the fourth phase of the evolution of the policy, i.e. 1962 up to 1971, Malay views definitely prevailed. They demanded a rather exclusive status for their language; they demanded that the Government stop supporting English, Chinese and Indian vernacular schools. The moderate leaders of UMNO would have preferred a less extremist position involving a gradualist policy with regards to the medium of instruction and this meant retaining the other languages and particularly English. The Chinese community naturally did not want the Malay medium in their schools as it meant the end of the Chinese system. In sum, the Malay demands for a policy which made Malay the medium of instruction evolved through three stages:

(1) pre-war apathy with little concern for language policy, (2) moderate nationalist fervor and demands to make Malay the other medium of instruction besides English, and (3) extreme nationalism and demands that it be the only medium of instruction. The non-Malay communities wanted to retain English, Chinese and Tamil medium schools and were not very enthusiastic about the rising tide of Malay nationalism which made Malay the medium of instruction. The Alliance leaders generally preferred a dual Malay-English policy, but the aggressive demands of the Opposition parties and from a new generation of sub-elites within UMNO, MCA and the MIC forced the leaders to ultimately agree to almost complete instruction in Malay.

Motives and Aims of the Policy Makers

During the first phase of the evolution of the policy, the Colonial Government tried to introduce Malay as the medium of instruction in an effort to provide an education that would be cheaper to the colonial coffers and which would restrict the English-educated unemployed. Secondly, the Government wished to utilize Malay as the medium of instruction to inculcate a sense of loyalty towards Malaya and to reduce the subversive influences of the Kuomintang in Chinese schools. However, before the policy could be implemented, the Malayan economy began to recover from the depression. Thus the policy was no longer necessary because there was once again a demand for English-educated junior officials. In addition, the anti-Kuomintang policy advocated by the Governor was no longer tenable in view of the cordial relationship between the British Government and the Kuomintang Chinese Government.

During the second phase, the Emergency was the all encompassing issue. The policy makers were determined to reduce the independence of the Chinese schools and also felt that by introducing Malay as the medium of instruction a sense of loyalty towards Malaya would be inculcated. Secondly, the British, by virtue of the Federation of Malaya Agreement, 1948, had acknowledged that Malaya was in fact a "Malay country" and thus that they owed the Malays an obligation. Now the British sought to provide ways and means to protect the status of the Malay as the indigenous people of the country. The

question of making Malay the medium of instruction naturally followed - particularly in view of the fact that there were persistent demands from the Malayan community for it.

In the third phase of the evolution of the policy UMNO and Malay interests were paramount by virtue of the fact that the non-Malays had bound themselves to the constitutional contract agreeing to certain fundamental factors of Malay cultural and political dominance. The Alliance party and the spirit of intercommunal cooperation legitimized by the overwhelming support for the party during the initial period of its establishment. Thus, when the Razak Report was presented the position of Malay in the schools was not objected to by the non-Malay Alliance leaders because it was part of the Constitutional contract already agreed upon. Since the threat of communist subversion was still real, the Government felt justified in extending its control of the Chinese schools and firmly setting the direction for a final conversion to either English or Malay as the medium in the Chinese schools. In sum, the policy makers were obligated to uphold the status of Malay as the medium of instruction befitting its status as the National language and as a means to inculcate a sense of loyalty to the country.

During the fourth phase, the policy makers were obviously concerned about the continued use of the English language in the business of government and administration. At the same time they were concerned over the persistent demand from the more

chauvinistically inclined 'ultras', to upgrade the Malay language as the only medium of instruction. The policy makers in proposing the Language Act, 1967 were in fact seeking to constitutionally guarantee the position of English as the second language. The demands of the non-Malay communities were also a constraining force as the same act also guaranteed the continued use of Chinese and Tamil as unofficial languages.

Policy Impact and Communal Responses

During the first phase of the language education policy it was the Chinese schools which were affected the most and thus it was the Chinese who protested the most. On the other hand, the Malays were not consulted let alone affected by the policy in a substantial manner. During the second phase, the Education Ordinance, 1952, did upgrade the Malay language to the status of a second important medium of instruction, but there were protests from the Malay community because the Government was prepared to provide Malay vernacular education only up to Primary level. Thus, the Malays quickly became disillusioned and demanded a better deal. With the forging of a spirit of cooperation there was a coalescing of interest between the Malay and the non-Malays which was ultimately responsible for the withdrawal of the policy. During the third phase the future of the Malayan school system was irrevocably set in motion by the adoption of the Education Ordinance, 1957, and the Education Act, 1961. By a gradual

process of administrative implementation Malay was finally and firmly to become the medium of instruction. Initially there was unanimous support for this policy but once it reached the implementation stage there were incessant protests. The Malays wanted rapid implementation of the provision of the ordinances. The non-Malays wanted restraint in the implementation. Since the MCA and MIC leaders could not and did not back the protestors, the opposition parties assumed the task of protesting. Increasingly, the non-Malays became disillusioned with the MCA and the MIC for what was perceived an excessive capitulation to the UMNO. This led to a gradual but sure erosion of support for the non-Malay parties of the Alliance.

Between 1962 and 1971, a number of younger and more articulate Malays who had not been party to the original Alliance bargain emerged as a political force within UMNO. This group, often called the 'Ultras,' was opposed to any further concessions to non-Malays. In particular, they protested that the National Language Act (1967) had been too conciliatory towards the non-Malays and in the process had further disadvantaged the Malays. Within two years these protestors had gained enough support from within UMNO and without to challenge the leadership of the Tunku. Though they failed in their efforts, they nevertheless contributed to the early retirement of the Tunku,

The moderate non-Malay leaders in the Alliance were grateful for the guarantees provided by the National Language Act (1967) with

regard to the status of the English, Chinese and Tamil languages. But to the non-Malays outside the narrow circle of the Alliance leadership, the constitutional guarantees were too little. In addition to the language question, the non-Malays also protested against other provisions favouring the Malays. Thus, there was a marked growth of anti-Alliance sentiments among both the Malays and the non-Malay voters. These sentiments manifested themselves in the severe set back the Alliance experienced in the 1969 Elections.

UMNO escaped relatively unscathed while the MCA and the MIC were hit by the defection of the voters to the more articulate opposition parties. Following the May 13th Incident, it was apparent to the Government that the unbridled questioning of sensitive issues (of which the medium of instruction was one) had contributed to racial riots and a decline in support for the Alliance. In view of this a Constitutional Amendment Act was introduced as the first act of Parliament after 20 months of Emergency rule. This Constitutional Amendment Act, 1971 effectively curtailed future discussion on the sensitive issues. The status of Malay as the medium of instruction thus became a fait accompli.

Nevertheless, there were indirect protests from the non-Malay community, particularly from the Chinese. First, there was an increase in enrollment to Chinese-medium primary schools but after a while this trend tapered off. Secondly, the issue of Merdeka University

was revived and persistently pursued by the DAP. Only in December, 1978 was this issue settled after the Government had skillfully argued against the idea. Thirdly, there has been a perceptible decline in support for the MCA which it has been persistently criticised from all sides for lack of effective leadership and for being unable to echo the more extremist complaints and demands of the Chinese community.

In effect communal response to the policy which made Malay the medium of instruction evolved in three stages for the Malay community: (1) Pre-War Malay communal apathy and lack of nationalistic demands, (2) Post war resurgence of communal demands and protests over the relative backwardness of the community and, (3) mass protest for a more definite stand without any further concessions with regards to the status of English language. The non-Malays were basically consistent in their protest, from 1930 onwards wanting to safeguard their schools and the position of the English medium schools. It is the case that the issue of Malay as the medium of instruction was one of the fundamental issues that affected inter-communal relationships in Malaysia. In the successful evolution of a policy favouring the Malay language, the most important constraining factor was the relative cohesiveness of the Malay community as opposed to fragmentation and disunity among the non-Malays. The policy was a success in that the major education reports were carefully designed to ensure the dominance of the Malay language, while permitting some flexibility in the implementation of the policy. Finally, the policy

was implemented in a gradualistic and incremental fashion thus promoting national unity and a reduction in primordial loyalties over the long term. Dato Musa Hitam, the present Minister of Education, best sums up the whole controversy with regards to language education: "Bahasa Malaysia [Malay language] is a means to an end. It is a means of creating national unity. English is widely spoken but it is elitist. Chinese is limited and [the Indian dialect of] Tamil is small."¹

Notes

1. Far Eastern Economic Review, June 23, 1978, p.16.

The Time-Schedule for the Implementation of the Teaching
in Bahasa Malaysia of all Subjects other than English Language
and the Pupils' Own Languages in National-Type English Schools

Year	Subjects to be Taught in Bahasa Malaysia	(Primary Level)
1970	In all subjects other than English Language	Standard 1
1971	-ditto-	Standard 2
1972	In all subjects other than English Language and Pupils' Own Languages	Standard 3
1973	-ditto-	Standard 4
1974	-ditto-	Standard 5
1975	-ditto-	Standard 6
		(Secondary Level)
1976	-ditto-	Form I
1977	-ditto-	Form II
1978	-ditto- (Sijil Rendah Pelajaran Examination only, 1978)	Form III
1979	-ditto-	Form IV
1980	-ditto- (Sijil Pelajaran Malaysia Examination only, 1980)	Form V
1981	-ditto-	Form VI (Lower)
1982	-ditto- (Sijil Tinggi Persekolahan Examination only, 1982)	Form VI (Upper)

Professional Circular No. 8/1969, Ministry of Education,
Kuala Lumpur, 10 July 1969.

Source: Francis Wong Hoy Kee and Ee Tiang Hong, Education in
Malaysia (2nd edition), Kuala Lumpur: Heinemann
Educational Books (Asia) Ltd. 1975. p. 180.

APPENDIX II

Subjects to be taught in Bahasa Malaysia
in National-Type English Primary Schools in 1970

Standard	Subjects in Bahasa Malaysia	Subjects in English	Pupils' Own Language
Standard 1	All Subjects	English Language	Nil
Standard 2	Arts and Crafts, Physical and Health Education, Local Studies, Music, Bahasa Malaysia, Islamic Religious Knowledge	Mathematics, Science, English Language	Nil
Standard 3	As above	As above	Pupils' Own Language
Standard 4	History, Geography, Civics, Art and Crafts, Physical and Health Education, Music, Bahasa Malaysia, Islamic Religious Knowledge	As above	-ditto-
Standard 5	Civics, Bahasa Malaysia, Islamic Religious Knowledge	All other subjects	-ditto-
Standard 6	Bahasa Malaysia, Islamic Religious Knowledge	All other subjects	-ditto-

Source: Francis Wong Hoy Kee and Ee Tiang Hong, op. cit., p. 181.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKS

- Abdul Rahman, Tunku. May 13: Before and After. Kuala Lumpur: Utusan Melayu Press, 1969.
- Allen, James de V. The Malayan Union. New Haven: Yale Southeast Asia Studies, 1967 (Monograph Series, No. 10).
- Almond, Gabriel A. and James S. Coleman (eds.) The Politics of Developing Areas. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960.
- Almond, G. A. and S. Verba. The Civic Culture. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963.
- Almond, Gabriel A. and Powell, G. Bingham. Comparative Politics, A Developmental Approach. New Delhi. Amerind Publishing Co., 1972.
- Arasaratnam, Sinnappah. Indians in Malaysia and Singapore. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1970.
- Barber, Noel. The War of the Running Dogs. The Malayan Emergency 1948-1960. New York: Weybright and Talley, Inc., 1972.
- Bastin, John and Winks, Robin W. Compiled Malaysia: Selected Historical Readings. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1966.
- Brackman, Arnold C. Southeast Asia's Second Front. New York: Fredrick A. Praeger, 1966.
- Brass, Paul R. Language, Religion and Politics in North India. London: Cambridge University Press, 1974.
- Chai Hon-Chan. The Development of British Malaya 1896-1909. (2nd edition) Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1967.
- Cheng Tiek, Goh. The May Thirteenth Incident and Democracy in Malaysia. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1971.
- Ching Hwang, Yen. The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1976.

- Coleman, James S. (ed) Education and Political Development.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965.
- Corry, W.C.S. Malaya Today. British Commonwealth Affairs No. 9.
London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1955.
- Cowan, C.D. Nineteenth Century Malaya. (The Origins of British
Political Control) London: Oxford University
Press, 1961.
- Deutsch, Karl W. Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry
into the Foundations of Nationality. New York:
John Wiley and Sons, 1953.
- Dye, Thomas R. Understanding Public Policy. (third edition)
Englewood Cliffs, NJ.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1978.
- Elegant, Robert S. The Dragon's Seed. New York: St. Martin's
Press, 1959.
- Elsbree, W.H. Japan's Role in Southeast Asian Nationalist Movements.
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1953
- Eddy Lee. Educational Planning in West Malaysia. Singapore:
Oxford University Press, 1972.
- Egerton, Hugh Edward. British Colonial Policy in the XXth Century.
London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1922.
- Emerson, Rupert, Mills, Lennox A. and Thompson, Virginia. Government
and Nationalism in Southeast Asia. New York:
Institute of Pacific Relations, 1942.
- Emerson, Rupert. Representative Government in Southeast Asia.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955.
- Emerson, Rupert. Malaysia: A study in Direct and Indirect Rule.
Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press, 1964.
- Enloe, Cynthia H. Multi-Ethnic Politics: The Case Study of
Malaysia. Berkeley, California: Center for
South and Southeast Asia Studies, University of
California, 1970.
- Enloe, Cynthia H. Ethnic Conflict and Political Development.
Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1973.
- Esman, Milton J. Administration and Development in Malaysia.
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972.

- Fishman, Joshua A., Charles A. Ferguson and Jyotirindra Das Gupta (eds). Language Problems of Developing Nations. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1968.
- Furnivall, J.S. Colonial Policy and Practice. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1948.
- Ginsburg, Norton and Roberts, Jr. Chester F. Malaya. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1958.
- Gullick, J.M. Indigenous Political System of Western Malaysia. London: Athlone Press, 1958.
- Gupta, Jyotirindra Das. Language Conflict and National Development. Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1970.
- Hall, D.G.E. A History of Southeast Asia. London: MacMillan, 1964.
- Hanrahan, Gene Z. The Communist Struggle in Malaya. New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1954.
- Hardgrave, Robert L. Jr. The Dravidian Movement. Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1965.
- Hardgrave, Robert L. Jr. India Government and Politics in a Developing Nation. (2nd edition) New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1975.
- Heidhues, Mary F. Somers. Southeast Asia's Chinese Minorities. Victoria, Australia: Longman Australia, 1974.
- Henderson, John W., Barth, Helen A. et al. Area Handbook for Malaysia. Washington D.C. Foreign Area Studies of the American University, 1970.
- Huntington, Samuel P. Political Order in Changing Society. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968.
- Husin Ali, Syed. Malay Peasant Society and Leadership. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1975.
- Ienaga, Saburo. The Pacific War: World War II and the Japanese. Frank Baldwin. New York: Pathenon, 1978..
- Jain, Ravindra K. South Indians on the Plantation Frontier in Malaya. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970.
- Jessy, Joghinder Singh. History of Malaya (1400-1959). Penang: United Publishers and Penninsular Publications, 1961.

- Jones, S.W. Public Administration in Malaya. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1953.
- Kearney, Robert. Communalism and Language in the Politics of Ceylon. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1967.
- Kearney, Robert.N. The Politics of Ceylon (Srilanka). Ithaca London: Cornell University Press, 1973.
- Kee, Francis Wong Hoy and Hong, Ee Tiang. Education in Malaysia. (second edition) Kuala Lumpur: Heinmann Educational Books (Asia) Ltd., 1975.
- Kennedy, J. A History of Malaya. (2nd edition) London: MacMillan & Co. Ltd., 1970.
- Khoo, Kay Kim. The Western Malay States, 1850-1873. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1972.
- King, Frank H.H. The New Malayan Nation, A Study of Communalism and Nationalism. New York: Institute of Pacific Realations, 1957.
- Laponce, J.A. The Protection of Minorities. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1960.
- Le Page, R.B. The National Language Question. London: Oxford University Press, 1964.
- Levy, Yael. Malaysia and Ceylon: A Study of Two Developing Centres. Beverley Hills: Sage Publications, 1974.
- Lindblom, Charles E. The Policy Making Process. Englewood-Cliffs, NJ.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968.
- Lock, Tan Cheng. Malayan Problems from a Chinese Point of View. Singapore: A.H.Kiat, 1947.
- Low, Patrick ed. Proceedings and Background Papers of Seminar on Trends in Malaysia. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1971.
- Mahajani, Usha. The Role of Indian Minorities in Burma and Malaya. Bombay: Vora and Co. Publishers Private Ltd., 1960.
- Mahathir, B. Mohamad. The Malay Dilemma. (Singapore: The Asia Pacific Press, 1970).

- Malaysian Indian Congress, The New Economic Policy and Malaysian Indians: MIC Blueprint. Kuala Lumpur: MIC Headquarters, 1974.
- Malayan Indian Congress, Ulangtahun Ketigapuluh 1946-1976: Cenderamata. Kuala Lumpur: MIC Headquarters, 1976.
- Mason, Fredrick. The Schools of Malaya. Rev. ed. Singapore: Donald Moore, 1957.
- Means, Gordon P. Malaysian Politics. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1976.
- Middlebrook, S.M., A.W. Pinnick. How Malaya is Governed. London: 1949.
- Miller, Harry. Menace in Malaya. London: George A. Harrap and Co., 1954.
- Miller, Harry. Prince and Premier. London: George A. Harrap and Co. Ltd., 1959.
- Mills, Lennox A. British Rule in Eastern Asia. London: Oxford University Press, 1942.
- Mills, Lennox A. Malaya: A Political and Economic Appraisal. Minniapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1958.
- Milne, R.S. Government and Politics In Malaysia. Boston: Houghton Muffin, 1967.
- Milne, R.S. and Mauzy, Diane K. Politics and Government in Malaysia. Singapore: Federal Publications, 1978.
- Milne, R.S. and Ratnam, K.J. Malaysia - New States in a New Nation. London: Frank Cass, 1974.
- Mitchison, Lois. The Overseas Chinese. London: The Bodley Head, 1961.
- Mohamed Suffian Bin Hashim. An Introduction to the Constitution of Malaysia. Kuala Lumpur: Jabatan Chetah Kerajian, 1972.
- McMeekin, Jr. Robert W. Educational Planning and Expenditure Decision in Developing Countries: with a Malaysian Case Study. New York: Praeger Publishers, Inc., 1975.
- Nam, Tae Y. Racism, Nationalism and Nation-Building in Malaysia and Singapore. Meerut: Sadhina Prakashan, 1973.

- Ness, Gayl D. Bureaucracy and Rural Development in Malaysia. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967.
- O'Barr, William M. and O'Barr, Jean F. (ed.) Language and Politics; The Hague: Mouton and Co., 1976.
- Ongkili, James P. Modernization in East Malaysia 1960-1970. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1972.
- Ongkili, James P. The Borneo Response to Malaysia, 1961-1963. Singapore: Donald Moore, 1967.
- Peet, A.L. Political Question of Malaya. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1949.
- Phang, Paul Chang Ming. Educational Development in a Plural Society A Malaysian Case Study. Singapore: Academia Publications, 1973.
- Philip Loh Fook Seng. The Malay States 1877-1895 Political Changes and Social Policy. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1969.
- Purcell, Victor. The Chinese in Malaya. London: Oxford University Press, 1948.
- Purcell, Victor. The Position of the Chinese in Southeast Asia. New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1950.
- Purcell, Victor. Malaya: Communist or Free? Stanford, California: California University Press, 1954.
- Purcell, Victor. The Chinese in Southeast Asia. (second edition) London: Oxford University Press, 1965.
- Purcell, Victor. The Chinese in Malaya. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1967.
- Pye, Lucian W. Guerilla Communism in Malaya. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1956.
- Pye, Lucian W. Aspects of Political Development. Boston; Little, Brown and Company, 1966.
- Ratnam, K.J. and Milne, R.S. The Malayan Parliamentary Election of 1964. Singapore: University of Malaya Press, 1967.
- Ratnam, K.J. Communalism and the Political Process in Malaya. Singapore and Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press, 1965.

- Reddi, A. Sundra (ed.) The Language Problem in India. Delhi: National Publishing House, 1973.
- Roff, Margret Clarke. The Politics of Belonging: Political Change in Sabah and Suranak. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1974.
- Roff, William R. The Origins of Malay Nationalism. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967.
- Roff, William R. (ed.) Kelantan, Religion, Society and Politics in a Malay State. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1974.
- Ryan, N.J. The Making of Modern Malaysia. Kuala Lumpur and Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1969.
- Sagar, Ahluwalia. Anna - The Tempest and the Sea. New Delhi: Young Asia Publications, 1969.
- Sandhu, Kernial Singh. Indians in Malaya. Cambridge; at the University Press, 1969.
- Shaw, William. Tun Razak: His Life and Times. London: Longman 1976.
- Sheridan, L.A. and Groves, Harry E. The Constitution of Malaysia. New York: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1967.
- Short, Anthony. The Communist Insurrection in Malaya 1948-1960. London: Fredrich Muller Ltd., 1975.
- Silcock, T.H. and Ungku, Abdul Aziz. Nationalism in Malaya. Eleventh Conference, Institute of Pacific Relations, Lucknow, India, October 3-15, 1950. New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1950.
- Silcock, T.H. Towards a Malayan Nation. Singapore: Donald Moore for Eastern Universities Press Ltd., 1961.
- Simandjuntak, B. Malayan Federalism, 1945-1963. (A Study of Federal Problems in a Plural Society). Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1969.
- Skinner, A. William. Report on the Chinese in Southeast Asia. Ithaca: Southeast Asia Program, Department of Far Eastern Studies, Cornell University, 1950.
- Slimming, John. Malaysia: Death of a Democracy. London: John Murray, 1969.
- Smith, T.E. The Background to Malaysia. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1963.

- Sopiee, Mohamed Noordin. From Malayan Union to Singapore Separation. Kuala Lumpur: Penerbit University Malaya, 1974.
- Spratt, Philip. D.M.K. in Power. Bombay: Nachiketa Publishers, 1970.
- Swettenham, Frank. British Malaya. London: Allen & Unwin, 1948.
- Takei, Yoshimitsu, Bock, John C. and Saunders, Bruce. Educational Sponsorship by Ethnicity: A preliminary Analysis of the West Malaysian Experience. Ohio: Center for International Studies, Ohio University, 1973.
- Tarling, Nicholas. British Policy in the Malay Peninsula and Archipelago 1824-1871. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1969.
- Thompson, Virginia. Post Mortem on Malaya. New York: The MacMillan Company, 1943.
- Thompson, Virginia and Adloff, Richard. Minority Problems in Southeast Asia. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1955.
- Tilman, Robert O. Bureaucratic Transition in Malaysia. Durham: Duke University Press, 1966.
- Van der Kroef, Justus M. Communism in Malaysia and Singapore. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1967.
- Vasil, R.K. Politics in a Plural Society. (A Study of Non-Communal Political Parties in West Malaysia). Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1971.
- Vasil, R.K. The Malaysian General Elections of 1969. Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1972.
- Vaughan, J.D. The Manners and Customs of the Chinese of the Straits Settlements. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1971.
- Von Vorys, Karl. Democracy Without Consensus. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975.
- Wang Gung Wu (ed.) Malaysia: A Survey. New York: Fredrick A. Praeger, 1964.
- Wriggins, Howard. Ceylon: Dilemmas of a New Nation. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press,

ARTICLES

- Bass, Jerome R. "Malaysia: Continuity and Change," Asian Survey, Vol. X, No. 2 (February, 1970), pp. 152-160.
- Bass, Jerome R. "The New Malaysian Government," Asian Survey, Vol. XI, No. 10 (October, 1971), pp. 970-984.
- Butwell, Richard. "A Chinese University for Malaya," Pacific Affairs, Vol. XXVI, No. 4 (December 1953), pp. 344-347.
- Carnell, Francis G. "Communalism and Communism in Malaya," Pacific Affairs, Vol. XXVI, No. 2 (June 1953), pp. 99-117.
- Carnell, Francis G. "The Malayan Elections," Pacific Affairs, Vol. XXVIII, (December 1955), pp. 315-330.
- Chew, Ernest. "Swettenham and British Residential Rule in West Malaysia," Journal of South East Asian History, Vol. V, No. 2 (September 1974), pp. 166-178.
- Colletta, N. J. "Malaysia's Forgotten People: Education, Cultural Identity and Socio-Economic Mobility among South Indian Plantation Workers," Contributions to Asian Studies, Vol. 7, 1975, pp. 87-112.
- Dore, R. P. "Schools and States in Asia and Africa: Review Article," Pacific Affairs, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 3 and 4 (Fall and Winter 1965-1966), pp. 345-353.
- Drabble, J. H. "Some Thoughts on the Economic Development of Malaya under British Administration," Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. V, No. 2 (September 1974), pp. 199-208.
- Drummond, Stuart and Hawkins David. "The Malaysian Elections of 1969: An Analysis of the Campaign and the Results," Asian Survey, Vol. X, No. 4 (April 1970), pp. 320-335.
- Emerson, Rupert. "Problems of Representative Government in Southeast Asia," Pacific Affairs, Vol. XXVI, No. 4 (December 1953), pp. 291-302.
- Enloe, Cynthia, "Issues and Integration in Malaysia," Pacific Affairs, Vol. XLI, No. 3 (Fall 1968), pp. 372-385.
- Fookseng, Philip Loh. "A Review of the Educational Development in the Federated Malay States to 1939," Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. V, No. 2 (September 1974), pp. 225-238.

- Forrester, Duncan B. "The Madras Anti-Hindi Agitation, 1965: Political Protest and its Effects on Language Policy in India," Pacific Affairs, Vol. XXXIX, No. 1 & 2 (Spring-Summer 1962), pp. 19-36.
- Friedrich, Paul. "Language and Politics in India," Daedalus (Summer), 1962, pp. 543-559.
- Garner, Robert E. "Southeast Asia's Political Systems, An Overview," Journal of Southeast Asian History, Vol. 8, No. 1, March 1967, pp. 139-185.
- Goldman, Judith. "Party Support in Western Malaysia: Results of the First Stage of an Ecological Enquiry," Asian Survey, Vol. XI, No. 6 (June 1971), pp. 582-609.
- Groves, H. E. "Constitutional Problems, in Wang Gungwu (ed.) Malaysia a Survey, N.Y.: Fredrick A. Praeger, 1964. pp. 356-364.
- Hardgrave, Jr., Robert L. "The Riots in Tamliland: Problems and Prospects of India's Language Crisis," Asian Survey, Vol. V, No. 8, August, 1965, pp. 399-407.
- Hardgrave, Jr., Robert L. "The D.M.K. and the Politics of Tamil Nationalism," Pacific Affairs, Vol. XXXVII, No. 4, (Winter 1964-1965), pp. 412-425.
- Hawkins, Gerald. "Reactions to the Malayan Union," Pacific Affairs, Vol. XIX, (September 1946), pp. 155-158.
- Hunt, Chester L. "Language Choice in a Multilingual Society," Sociological Inquiry, No. 36, pp. 240-253.
- Ishak b. Tadin, "Dato Onn and Malay Nationalism, 1946-1951," Journal of Southeast Asian History, Vol. 1, No. 1 (March 1960), pp. 56-88.
- Kay Kim, Khoo, "Malay Society, 1874-1920s," Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. V, No. 2 (September 1974), pp. 179-199.
- Kershaw, Roger, "Of Race, Class, and Clientship in Malaysia - A Review Article," The Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, Vol. XIV, No. 3, November 1976, pp. 298-303.
- Kessler, Clive S. "Muslim Identity and Political Behaviour in Kelantan," in William R. Roff (ed.) Kelantan: Religion, Society and Politics in a Malay State. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1974. pp. 272-313.

- Kim Wah, Yeo. "The Anti-Federation Movement in Malaya, 1946-48," Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. IV, No. 1 (March 1973), pp. 31-51.
- Kuper, Leo. "Plural Societies: Perspectives and Problems," in Leo Kuper and M. G. Smith (ed.) Pluralism in Africa. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969. pp. 7-26.
- Le Page, Robert B. "Problems to be Faced in the Use of English as the Medium of Education in Four West Indian Territories," in Joshua A. Fishman, Charles A. Ferguson, Jyotirindra Das Gupta (eds.) Language Problems of Developing Nations. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 1968.
- Liu, William T. "Achievement Motivation Among Chinese Youth in Southeast Asia," Asian Survey, Vol. V, No. 4, (April 1965), pp. 186-196.
- Marynor, Gerald S. "Political Parties in Mainland Malaya," Journal of Southeast Asian History, Vol. 8, No. 1, (March 1967) pp. 99-110.
- McGee, T. E. "The Malayan Elections of 1959, A Study in Electoral Geography," The Journal of Tropical Geography, Vol. XVI, (October 1962) pp. 70-99.
- Means, Gordon P. "Special Rights as a Strategy for Development: The Case of Malaysia," Comparative Politics, Vol. V, No. 1 (October 1972), pp. 29-61.
- Melson, Robert & Wolpe, Howard. "Modernization and the Politics of Communalism," The American Political Science Review, Vol. LXIV, No. 4 (1970).
- Milne, R. S. "Political Finance in South East Asia," Pacific Affairs, Vol. XLI, No. 4 (Winter 1968-69), pp. 491-510.
- Milne, R. S. "Political Modernization in Malaysia," Journal of Commonwealth Studies, Vol. VII, No. 1, 1969, pp. 3-20.
- Milne, R. S. "National Ideology and Nation-Building in Malaysia," Asian Survey, X, No. 7 (July 1970), pp. 563-573.
- Milne, R. S. "Decision-Making in Developing Countries," Journal of Comparative Administration, Vol. 3, No. 4, (February 1972), pp. 387-404.

- Milne, R. S. "Ethnicity, Democracy and Political Development - Review Article," Pacific Affairs, Vol. 46, No. 3, (Fall 1973), pp. 435-444.
- Morrison, Ian. "Aspects of the Racial Problems in Malaysia," Pacific Affairs, Vol. 26, No. 1, 1953.
- Mujeeb, M. "Indian Education: Retrospect and Prospect," Pacific Affairs, Vol. XXVI, No. 3 (September 1953), pp. 208-219.
- Murray, Douglas P. "Chinese Education in Southeast Asia," China Quarterly, No. 20 (October-December, 1964).
- Ness, Gayl D. "Economic Development and the Goals of Government in Malaya," in Wang Gungwu ed. Malaysia: A Survey. New York: Fredrick A. Praeger, 1964. pp. 307-320.
- Ness, Gayl D. "Modernization and Indigenous Control of the Bureaucracy in Malaysia," Asian Survey, V. No. 9 (September 1965), pp. 465-473.
- Ongkili, James P. "The British and Malayan Nationalism, 1946-1957," Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. V, No. 2, (September 1974), pp. 255-277.
- Omar, Elyas. "Policy Analysis and Development in Malaysia". (Mimeo)
- Ott, Marvin, "Malaysia: The Search for Solidarity and Security," Asian Survey, Vol. VIII, No. 2 (February 1968), pp. 127-132.
- Parkinson, Brian K. "Noneconomic Factors in the Economic Retardation of the Rural Malays," Modern Asian Studies, 1, 1(1967), pp. 31-46.
- Parkinson, Brian K. "The Economic Retardation of the Malays - A Rejoinder," Modern Asian Studies, 11, 3 (1968) pp. 267-272.
- Parmer, J. Norman. "Malaysia 1965: challenging the Term of 1957," Asian Survey, Vol. VI, No. 2 (February 1966), pp. 111-118.
- Parmer, J. Norman. "Malaysia Changing a Little to Keep Pace," Asian Survey, Vol. VII, No. 2 (February 1967), pp. 131-137.

- Pendersen, Peter. "Possibilities for Violence in Malaysia," Current History, 61 (364), (December, 1971), pp. 339-367.
- Png Poh Seng. "The Kuomintang in Malaya, 1912-1941," Journal of Southeast Asian History. Vol. 2, No. 1 (March 1961), pp. 1-32.
- Purcell, Victor. "The Crisis in Malayan Education," Pacific Affairs, Vol. XXVI, No. 1 (March 1953), pp. 70-76.
- Ratnam, K. J. "Political Parties and Pressure Groups," in Wang Gungwu (ed.), Malaysia: A Survey. New York: Fredrick A. Praeger, 1964, pp. 346-355.
- Ratnam, K. J. and Milne R. S. "The 1969 Parliamentary Election in West Malaysia," Pacific Affairs, Vol. XLIII, No. 2 (Summer 1970), pp. 203-226.
- Ratnam, K. J. "Constitutional Government and the 'Plural Society'," Journal of Southeast Asian History, Vol. 2, No. 3 (October 1961), pp. 1-10.
- Rabushka, Alvin and Shepsle "Political Entrepreneurship and Pattern of Democratic Instability in Plural Societies," Race, XII (April 1970)
- Rabushka, Alvin. "The Manipulation of Ethnic Politics in Malaya," Polity, (Vol. 11, 3) (Spring 1970), pp. 345-356.
- Rabushka, Alvin. "Racial Stereotypes in Malaysia," Asian Survey, Vol. XI, No. 7 (July 1971), pp. 709-716.
- Roff, Margaret, "The Malayan Chinese Association, 1948-1965," Journal of Southeast Asian History, Vol. 6, No. 2, (1965), pp. 40-53.
- Roff Margaret, "The Politics of Language in Malaya," Asian Survey, Vol. VII, No. 5 (May 1967), pp. 316-328.
- Roff, William R. "The Persatuan Melayu Selangor: An Early Malayan Political Association," Journal of Southeast Asian History, Vol. IX, No. 1 (March 1968), pp. 117-146.
- Rogers, Marvin L. "Malaysia / Singapore: Problems and Challenges of the Seventies," Asian Survey, Vol. II, No. 2, (February 1971), pp. 121.
- Rogers, Marvin L. "Malaysia and Singapore: 1971, Developments." Asian Survey, Vol. XII, No. 2 (February 1972), pp. 168-176.

- Rudner, Martin. "The Organization of the British Military Administration in Malaya, 1946-1948," Journal of Southeast Asian History, Vol. IX, No. 1 (March 1968), pp. 95-106.
- Rudner, Martin. "The Malaysian General Election of 1969: A Political Analysis," Modern Asian Studies, Vol. I, No. 4 (1970), pp. 1-21.
- Short, Anthony. "Communism, Race and Politics in Malaysia," Asian Survey, Vol. X, No. 12 (December 1970), pp. 1081-1089.
- Short, Anthony. "The Communist Party of Malaya: In Search of Revolutionary Situations," World Today, XXVI, No. 12 (December 1970), pp. 529-535.
- Smith, T. E. "The Malayan General Elections of 1959", Pacific Affairs, Vol. 33, No. 1, (March 1960), pp. 38-47.
- Snider, Nancy L. "What Happened in Penang?" Asian Survey, Vol. VIII, No. 12 (December 1968), pp. 960-975.
- Snider, Nancy L. "Race , Leitmotiv of the Malayan Election Drama," Asian Survey, Vol. X, No. 12 (December 1970) pp. 1070-1080.
- Soenarno, Radin. "Malay Nationalism, 1896-1941," Journal of Southeast Asian History. Vol. I, No. 1 (March 1960), pp. 1-28.
- Soo Ann, Lee. "Fiscal Policy and Political Transition: The Case of Malaysia, 1948-1960," Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. V, No. 1 (March 1974), pp. 102-114.
- Soo Eng Lim, "Tan Cheng Lock," Journal of Southeast Asian History, Vol. I, No. 1 (March 1960), pp. 29-55.
- Sopiee, Mohd. Noordin. "The Penang Secession Movement, 1948-1951," Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. IV, No. 1, (March 1973).
- Sutton, Francis X. "Education in the Making of Modern Nations," in James S. Coleman ed., Education and Political Development. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965. pp. 51-74.
- Tambiah, S. J. "The Politics of Language in India and Ceylon," Modern Asian Studies, I, 3 (1967), pp. 215-240.

- Tennant, Paul. "Pluralism in West Malaysian Politics," Contributions to Asian Studies, Vol. 7, 1975, pp. 79-86.
- Tilman, Robert O. "Education and Political Development in Malaysia," in Robert O. Tilman (ed.) Man, State and Society in Contemporary Southeast Asia. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1969.
- Tilman, Robert O. "Policy Formulation, Policy Execution and the Political Elite Structure of Contemporary Malaya," in Wang Gungwu (ed.), Malaysia, A Survey. New York: Fredrick A. Praeger, 1964, pp. 346-355.
- Turnbull, C. M. "British Planning for Post-War Malaya," Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. V, No. 2 (September 1974), pp. 239-254.
- van der Kroef, Justus M. "Nanyang University and the Dilemmas of Overseas Chinese Education," China Quarterly, No. 20 (October - December 1964) pp. 96-127.
- Wang Gungwu. "Political Change in Malaysia," Pacific Community, I No. 4 (July 1970), pp 687-696.
- Wang Gungwu. "Chinese Politics in Malaya," China Quarterly, XLIII, (July/September 1970), pp. 1-30.
- Wang Gungwu. "Malaysia: Contending Elites," Current Affairs Bulletin, 47, No. 3 (December 1970), pp. 35-48.
- Whitely, W. H. "Ideal and Reality in National Language Policy: A Case Study from Tanzania," In Joshua A. Fishman, Charles A. Ferguson, Jyotirindra Das Gupta, (eds.) Language Problems of Developing Nations. New York. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 1968. pp. 327-345.
- Wilder, William. "Islam, Other Factors and Malay Backwardness: Comments on an Argument," Modern Asian Studies, 11, 2, (1968), pp. 155-164.
- Willmott, William E. "The Overseas Chinese Today and Tomorrow, A Review Article," Pacific Affairs, Vol. XLIII, No. 2 (Summer 1969), pp. 206-214.
- Wong, R. H. K. "Education and Problems of Nationhood," in Wang Gungwu (ed.), Malaysia: A Survey. New York: Fredrick A. Praeger, 1964. pp. 199-209.

UNPUBLISHED THESES

- Ah-Bang Leo. "Elite Cohesion in Malaysia: A Study of Alliance Leadership." M.A. Thesis, University of Singapore, 1972.
- Chen, Joseph Tao. "Postwar Problems of the Chinese in Malaya." M.A. Thesis. University of California, Berkeley, 1958.
- Fennell, T. R. "Commitment to Change: A History of Malayan Educational Policy, 1945-1957. Ph.D. Dissertation. University of Hawaii, 1968.
- Haas, Roy H. "The Malayan Chinese Association, 1958-1959: An Analysis of Differing Conceptions of the Malayan Chinese Role in Independent Malaya." M.A. Thesis. Northern Illinois University, 1967.
- Heng Chee, Chan. "The Malayan Chinese Association." M.A. Thesis. University of Singapore, 1965.
- Jeyaratnam, K. "Racial Factors in the Political Development of the Federation of Malaya," M.A. Thesis, University of British Columbia, 1958.
- Marican, Y. Mansoor. "The Political Accommodation of Primordial Parties: DMK (India) and PAS (Malaysia)." Ph.D. Dissertation, University of British Columbia, 1976.
- Means, Gordon Paul. "Malayan Government and Politics in Transition." Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Washington, 1961.
- Moore, Daniel Eldredge. "The United Malay National Organization and the 1959 Malayan Elections: A Study of a Political Party in Action in a Newly Independent Society." Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1960.

GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS

Colonial Office, Report of the Federation of Malaya Constitutional Commission, 1957. London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1957.

Colonial Report - Annual Rederated Malay States Report for 1923. London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1924.

Colonial Report - Annual Report on the Social and Economic Progress of the Federated Malay States, 1938. London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1939.

Colonial Report - Annual Federated Malay States Report for 1929. H.M. Stationery Office, 1930.

Malaya, "The Prospect of Malay Medium Education," Information Services, Federation of Malaya, (Pamphlet) 1961.

Malaysia. Bahagian Peranchang dan Penyelidekan Pelajaran. Educational Statistics of Malaysia 1970. Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1972.

Malaysia. The Educational Planning and Research Division Ministry of Education, Malaysia. Educational Statistics of Malaysia, 1938-1967.

Malaysia. The Educational Planning and Research Division Ministry of Education, Malaysia. Educational Statistics of Malaysia, 1969. Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1971.

Malaysia. National Operations Council. The May 13 Tragedy, A Report.

NEWSPAPERS

New Straits Times

Straits Times (Malaysia)

Straits Times (Singapore)

PERIODICALS

Far Eastern Economic Review