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The notion of order in R.W. Emerson and Chuang Tzu Hagiwara, Takao 1978

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THE NOTION OF ORDER IN R. W. EMERSON AND CHUANG TZU by TAKAO HAGIWARA B.A., Sophia University, 1971 THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES Programme i n Comparative Literature We accept th i s thesis as conforming to the required standard October, 1978 0 Takao Hagiwara, 1978 In presenting th i s thes is in pa r t i a l fu l f i lment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the Univers i ty of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree that the L ibrary sha l l make it f ree ly ava i l ab le for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of th is thesis for scho lar ly purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by his representat ives. It is understood that copying or pub l i ca t ion of this thes is for f inanc ia l gain sha l l not be allowed without my written permission. Department of Comparative Literature The Univers i ty of B r i t i s h Columbia 2075 Wesbrook Place Vancouver, Canada V6T 1W5 Date n^lQTM^Mt Z<£y /?7fi ABSTRACT This thesis i s a comparative study of the notion of order i n Emerson and Chuang' Tzu-... The notion of order seems to be s i g n i f i c a n t , because i t i s d i r e c t l y connected with what i s thought to be the most fundamental problem of human existence which seems to c r i t i c a l l y a f f e c t the t o t a l i t y of the modes and structures of human phenomena, including, of course, l i t e r a t u r e . This problem l i e s i n the relationships between dualism and non-dualism (cf. p. 12, n..1). Needless to say, one's concept of order varies greatly depending on the degree of one's i n c l i n a t i o n toward either of these two attitudes, because, as i s the case with any notion that has i t s opposite, order inevitably presupposes i t s opposite concept, disorder, thus putting the problem of order on the l e v e l of dualism. Therefore, by examining Emerson's and Chuang Tzu's notions of order, we can hope to c l a r i f y whether and how t h e i r attitudes toward the universe are d u a l i s t i c or non-dualistic. In order to achieve t h i s purpose we s h a l l divide t h i s thesis into three chapters. The f i r s t chapter compares Emerson's notion of order and boundaries with that of Chuang Tzu and reaches the conclusion that the former i s based on the dualism of the either/or type of l o g i c , while the l a t t e r i s based on the non-dualistic both/and type of l o g i c . In the second chapter we examine Emerson's and Chuang Tzu's concepts of order from the viewpoint of law and establish that Emerson's notion of law and order i s Logocen-t r i c , whereas that of Chuang Tzu i s Chaos-oriented. In the l a s t chapter we approach the theme of order from the perspective of l i f e . In t h i s chapter, too, our c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of Logos and Chaos, the l o g i c of either/or and that of both/and, becomes useful i n surveying Emerson's and Chuang Tzu's notion of l i f e , and order. This chapter aims to reach the same conclusions as those of the previous chapters, concerning the concepts of order and l i f e i n Emerson and Chuang Tzu. Our o v e r a l l aim i n th i s thesis i s to es t a b l i s h that Emerson's notion of order i s b a s i c a l l y Logocentric ( i . e . , d u a l i s t i c ) , while that of Chuang Tzu i s Chaos-oriented .. ( i . e . , n o n - d u a l i s t i c ) , and that both views are equally v a l i d and indispensable i n constituting the universe i n i t s entire t y . TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER PAGE INTRODUCTION . 1 NOTES TO INTRODUCTION 12 I. ORDER AND BOUNDARIES 15 NOTES.TO CHAPTER I . . . 55 II. ORDER AND LAW . 58 NOTES TO CHAPTER II 102 II I . ORDER AND LIFE 105 NOTES TO CHAPTER III . . . . 141 CONCLUSION 145 NOTES TO CONCLUSION 154 BIBLIOGRAPHY 155 i v ACKNOWLEDGEMENT I should l i k e to express my gratitude to Drs. B. Grenberg, D. Overmyer, and W. Nicholls for t h e i r encourage-ment, i n s t r u c t i o n , and c r i t i c i s m during my year of writing this thesis. My appreciation i s extended to Drs. S. I i d a , K. Takashima, and K. Tsuruta, and to fellow students and others who were so generous with assistance and valuable suggestions. My s p e c i a l gratitude goes to Dr. A. Wilden of Simon Fraser University, whose summer seminar i n 1977 at the University of B r i t i s h Columbia aroused my enthusiasm and my decision to choose the theme of t h i s thesis. v Therefore i s Space, and therefore Time, that man may know that things are not huddled and lumped, but sundered and i n d i v i d u a l . . . . The wise man shows his wisdom in separation, i n gradation, and his scale of creatures and of merits i s as wide as nature. (Emerson, Nature, ch. 5) At l a s t comes Plato, the d i s t r i b u t o r , who needs no barbaric paint, or tattoo, or whopping; for he can define. He leaves with Asia the vast and superlative; he i s the a r r i v a l of accuracy and i n t e l l i g e n c e . "He s h a l l be as a god to me, who can r i g h t l y divide and define." (Emerson, "Plato; or the Philosopher") The Way has never known boundaries; speech has no constancy. But because of [the recognition of a] " t h i s , " there came to be boundaries. Let me t e l l you what the boun-daries are. There i s l e f t , there i s r i g h t , there are theories, there are debates, there are d i v i s i o n s , there are discriminations, there are emulations, and there are conten-tions. These are c a l l e d the Eight Virtues. . . . So I say, those who divide f a i l to divide; those who discriminate f a i l to discriminate. (Chuang Tzu, ch. 2, t r . by B. Watson) v i INTRODUCTION Several books and a r t i c l e s have been written on the relationship between Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803-1882) and Eastern thought. These works include F. I. Carpenter's Emerson and Asia (Cambridge: 1930), A. Christy's The Orient  in American Transcendentalism (New York: 1932), V. M. Ames' Zen and American Thought (Honolulu: 1962), and S. Ando's Zen and American Transcendentalism (Tokyo: 1970). However, most of these studies tend to emphasize the s i m i l a r i t i e s rather than the differences between Emerson's transcendentalism and the East. Moreover, none of these books has attempted a di r e c t comparison between.Emerson and philosophical Taoism as represented by Chuang Tzu (c. 4th century B.C.). If such an attempt had been carried out, the comparatist might, have found a considerable degree of difference as well as resem-blance between the two thinkers. As w i l l become clear i n the following chapters, i n spite of the great tempo-spatial distance between Emerson and Chuang Tzu, they have many points i n common, and yet they d i f f e r on one c r u c i a l point which seems to be r e f l e c t e d p a r t i c u l a r l y i n . t h e i r notions of order: Emerson's notion of order i s d u a l i s t i c , whereas that of Chuang Tzu i s non-dualistic. This difference seems to originate i n the difference between t h e i r attitudes toward the two basic aspects of the 1 2 universe, which w i l l be discussed i n d e t a i l i n the l a s t chapter and conclusion of thi s thesis. These two approaches, also being the most fundamental attitudes toward human existence, seem to form, the two pre-propositional bases of a l l human a c t i v i t i e s , not to mention of l i t e r a t u r e . In t h i s sense, comparison,between Emerson and Chuang Tzu, with sp e c i a l reference to the differences between t h e i r concepts of order, can be said to be an investigation of one. of the ess e n t i a l problems i n comparative l i t e r a t u r e . To recapitulate, then, the aim of t h i s thesis i s to c l a r i f y . t h e nature of and the differences between the two basic world views ( i . e . , dualism and non-dualism) through a. comparison of Emerson's and Chuang Tzu's notions of order, and thus to lay a part of the foundation for comparative l i t e r a t u r e studies. Considering the nature of the goal of this paper, our approach to thi s task naturally becomes somewhat "philosophical" — p h i l o s o p h i c a l , however, i n the o r i g i n a l sense of the term, i . e . , philosophia (love of "wisdom" or "truth"). Ideally speaking, th i s k i n d of attempt should be all-comprehensive and i n t e r d i s c i p l i n a r y , but i f this be impossible, which i s rather l i k e l y . i n view of the scope of t h i s research as an M.A. the s i s , i t should at lea s t , be " e c l e c t i c . " Having stated our general d i r e c t i o n as above, l e t us further elaborate on i t . As i s mentioned above, the main purpose of thi s thesis i s to c l a r i f y the fundamental 3 differences between Emerson's and Chuang Tzu's.concepts of order. To achieve t h i s task we s h a l l employ the following three perspectives which seem to be clo s e l y interconnected: order and boundaries, order and law, and order and l i f e . One chapter w i l l be a l l o t t e d to each of these viewpoints. Thus, in the f i r s t chapter we s h a l l examine Emerson's and Chuang Tzu's notions of boundaries and t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p to t h e i r concepts of order. Through this examination we hope to es t a b l i s h that Emerson's notions of order and boundaries indicate a strong i n c l i n a t i o n toward dualism, i . e . , the either/or type of l o g i c , while those of Chuang Tzu tend toward non-dualism, i . e . , the both/and.type of l o g i c . These two types of l o g i c seem to correspond respec-t i v e l y to the logic of Logos arid that of Chaos (cf. p. .10), o for Logos i s a b i f u r c a t i n g p r i n c i p l e , whereas Chaos i s that of unity. The second chapter, then, aims to investigate Emerson's and Chuang Tzu's notions of law and order i n terms of Logos and Chaos. The ideas of Logos and Chaos w i l l further be developed in the l a s t chapter, where we s h a l l examine the notion of order i n Emerson and Chuang Tzu as r e f l e c t e d i n t h e i r concepts of l i f e . In t h i s chapter the notions of being and non-being w i l l also be introduced i n connection with Logos, Chaos, l i f e , death, order, disorder, etc. Through the survey of Emerson's and Chuang Tzu's notions of order as outlined above, this paper attempts to 4 show not only that the e s s e n t i a l difference between the two i s that between Logocentric ( i . e . ; d u a l i s t i c ) and Chaos-oriented ( i . e . , non-dualistic) world views, but also that these seeming incompatible standpoints can be harmonized from the vantage point of a wider perspective. Having b r i e f l y stated the rationale, aim, method,.and format of this thesis, i t would be appropriate to touch upon the range and the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of Emerson's and Chuang Tzu's texts used i n t h i s paper. As - for Emerson, considering the "philosophical" nature of t h i s paper and i t s size as an M.A. t h e s i s , i t would be reasonable to concentrate our atten-t i o n mainly on his most famous dozen essays and lectures, -with occasional references to his journals and well-known poems such as "The Rhodora," "Brahma," "Two Rivers," etc. As for Chuang Tzu, we s h a l l use both nei p' ien p*^  ^  (the so-c a l l e d inner chapters) and wai tsa p' ien yf ^ (the so-c a l l e d outer and miscellaneous chapters) with somewhat stronger emphasis on nei p 1 i e n than on wai tsa p'ien, for reasons that w i l l be c l a r i f i e d below. What we should note here i s that there seem to be some inconsistencies i n both Emerson's and Chuang Tzu's texts. As S. G. Brown points out, the ambiguities i n Emerson seem to- come from the following idea: . . . sometimes the world seemed to him to have independent material existence, colored and i n t e r -preted by mind, and sometimes i t seemed to him wholly dependent and i d e a l . He never could e n t i r e l y make up his mind, and hence i t i s that throughout 5 his w r i t i n g , and.whatever the s p e c i f i c problem under discussion, you w i l l f i n d him now on thi s side and now on that i n the fundamental question of metaphysics. A l l his contradictions and l i t t l e inconsistencies flow from th i s source.3 It i s int e r e s t i n g to note that Emerson himself seems to have been aware of t h i s , for i n his "Self-Reliance" he writes: But why should you keep your head over your shoul-der? Why drag about th i s corpse of your memory, l e s t you contradict somewhat you have stated i n this or that public place? Suppose you should contradict yourself; what then?^ Judging from these passages, i t seems that we must be•ready to face a considerable amount of d i f f i c u l t y i n dealing with Emerson's thought. However, looked at from a di f f e r e n t , angle, these inconsistencies themselves may prove to be the very consistency of Emerson, for as we can surmise from the above quotation from Brown, Emerson's inconsistencies seem, to arise from his o s c i l l a t i o n between materialism and i d e a l -ism. In other words, Emerson's world view i s d u a l i s t i c . I t seems that his description of Plato as a man who. "turns incessantly the obverse and the reverse of the medal of Jove" ("Plato; or the Philosopher," IV, 56) holds true of Emerson himself. Thus as f a r as dualism i s concerned, Emerson.seems to be rather consistent and we can keep t h i s i n mind as an important clue to understanding him. On the other hand, the Chuang Tzu i s also said to be inconsistent. Some of the reasons for thi s would be that i t is a compilation by many writers over a considerable period of time and thus some influences upon i t by other schools of 6 thought such as those of the Confucianists, Mo-ists, 5 L e g a l i s t s , and Logicians were unavoidable. As M. Fukunaga says, "Scholars have long been -debating over which parts of the 3 3 chapters of the Chuang Tzu are the o r i g i n a l work of Chuang Chou [ i . e . , Chuang Tzu] and which chapters convey his authentic teachings. . . . "^ Furthermore, as Watson writes i n his introduction to his t r a n s l a t i o n of the Chuang Tzu: A l l we know about the i d e n t i t y of Chuang Tzu, or Master Chuang, are the few facts recorded i n the b r i e f notice given him i n the Shih chi or,Records of the Historian (ch. 63) by Ssu-ma Ch'ien (145?-89? B.C.). According to t h i s account, his personal name was Chou, he was a native of a place c a l l e d Meng, and he once served as "an o f f i c i a l i n the lacquer garden" i n ,Meng. Ssu-ma Ch'ien adds that he l i v e d at the same time as King Hui (370-319 B.C.) of Liang and King.Hsuan (319-301 B.C.) of Ch'i, which would make him.a contemporary of Mencius, and that he wrote a work i n 100,000 words or more which was "mostly i n the nature of fable."7 Be that as i t may, a d i s t i n c t i o n has long been made between nei p'ien (the inner chapters) and wai t s a p'ien (the outer and miscellaneous chapters) and most scholars seem to agree i n concluding that the nei p'ien are r e l a t i v e l y old and e s p e c i a l l y the f i r s t two chapters, i . e . , Hsiao yao you ^Tjjf; (free and easy wandering) and Ch'i wu lun vj?'//] "1^  (discussion on making.all things equal) are the o o r i g i n a l concepts of Chuang Tzu. Then does this d i s t i n c t i o n between.the nei p'ien and wai tsa p'ien mean that only the former, and e s p e c i a l l y the f i r s t two chapters, are t r u s t -worthy in conveying Chuang Tzu's o r i g i n a l thought and a l l , or most of, the other chapters should be dismissed as 7 inauthentic or even contradictory to the inner chapters? As mentioned i n the above quotation from Fukunaga, scholars seem to disagree on t h i s point, but there seems to,be some kind of core notion i n the Chuang Tzu which may serve as a touch-. stone i n deciding whether a certain passage i s expressing Chuang Tzu's o r i g i n a l idea or not. Presumably th i s i s why Fukunaga states: However, recently I am becoming interested more in grasping the quintessence of Chuang Tzu's thought i n the context of his work as a whole, than in putting emphasis i n the formal d i s t i n c t i o n between n e i , wai, tsa p' ien ffcj . 5 ^ . jfe . . . . My opinion i s that the essence of Chuang Tzu's philos-ophy which i s unique and d i s t i n c t from other systems of thought l i e s i n the philosophy of wan wu chi  t'ung [the equality of a l l things] i n Ch'i wu Tun  p'ien and i n i t s development and variations as seen in the dialogues between Ho Po ;oT , and Po Hal Jo in , ch'iu shui p' ien jpz ^ [Autumn Floods] , Shao Chin iytf& and Ta Kung Tiao %ft i n Tse-yang  p' ien gi| f| ^  ,. and Chung Ni -fo fa and Jan Chiu 4±f- ~& i n Chih pei you p'ien ^ 0 iL2j| % [Knowledge Wandered North]. According to t h i s viewpoint, I interpreted Chuang Tzu's tao 3^ (the world of r e a l i t y ) and : explained wu hsin A;' (a liberated l i f e ) . In considering Chuang Tzu 1s philosophy, the idea of the equality of a l l things ( 7} & (s\ ) would be the most important touchstone i n judging the authen-t i c i t y of a certain passage.in the text. However, I do not intend by any means to ignore and omit the various descriptions i n the Chuang Tzu that do not conform to the idea of 7i& M (the equality of a l l things), as being non- or a n t i -Chuang T z u i s t i c . Even i f they are l a t e r interpola-tions , and even i f they d i f f e r from each other i n t h e i r importance as [Chuang Tzu's] thought, the contents of the ChUang Tzu as a whole ret a i n and express one coherent idea and c h a r a c t e r i s t i c . The various interpolations of l a t e r writers seem to serve as the basis of the philosophy of if'fj "f^ (discussion on making a l l things equal), and thus form the mental climate that nurtures Chuang T z u i s t i c thought.^ 8 In.this quotation Fukunaga seems to be expressing two important points: one i s that the idea of 77 is\ (equality of a l l things) i s the core of Chuang Tzu's thought; the other i s that there i s an i n t e g r i t y and consistency through-out the Chuang Tzu which appears to be a mere admixture of various ideas which are often contradictory to each other. This consistency, according to Fukunaga, centers on the tenet of Jo], which, otherwise expressed seems to correspond to the notion of non-dualism. In t h i s thesis we s h a l l follow-Fukunaga's opinion mentioned above and treat the book of Chuang Tzu as a consistent whole, with s p e c i a l emphasis, however, placed on the nei .p'ien ]^ \ ^  (the inner chapters), whose central tenet i s considered to be ^ ^ 5^ "/o\ or non-dualism not only by Fukunaga but by other scholars."*"^ From this standpoint i t follows naturally that the name "Chuang Tzu" used in this thesis does not refer to a s p e c i f i c i n d i v i d u a l whose h i s t o r i c a l i d e n t i t y i s very obscure, but "to the mind, or group of minds, revealed in the text c a l l e d Chuang Tzu, p a r t i c u l a r l y the f i r s t seven sections of that text.""'"'*' However, although we s h a l l regard the Chuang Tzu as a r e l a t i v e l y consistent whole and l e t the name Chuang Tzu stand for the group-of people who compiled i t , we are not to forget the fac t that after a l l i t i s a compilation by many hands oyer a considerable period of time and thus, depending on the commentator or the translator, the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of 9 the text may d i f f e r considerably. Taking this into consid-eration, we s h a l l make use of as many.interpreters and commentators as possible besides, Fukunaga and Watson, who are the. two main sources i n interpreting Chuang Tzu's thought 12 in this thesis. In spite of these precautions, however, i t may s t i l l be possible that our int e r p r e t a t i o n of the Chuang Tzu i s not completely free from some kind of "misin-terpretations" and even of " d i s t o r t i o n s . " But t h i s seems to be unavoidable, considering the nature of Chuang Tzu's thought. To quote Fukunaga again: In i t s freedom, far-reaching imagination, and novel yet o r i g i n a l expressions, Chuang Tzu's philosophy has unique c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s which are not comparable to other schools of thought. His philosophy has, so to say-, the freedom of "Pegasus galloping across heaven." I t i s an extremely d i f f i c u l t task to interpret such a philosophy exactly and explain i t to others in proper words. Needless.to say, my book Chuang Tzu i s a personal inte r p r e t a t i o n of this demanding task, and as such i t indicates only one of many p o s s i b i l i t i e s . The reader may naturally f i n d a number of dogmatic statements, d i s t o r t i o n s , and prejudices i n i t . . But for me there was no other way than to express what I understood about the Chuang Tzu i n my own language. Besides, I believe that the Chuang Tzu i s o r i g i n a l l y such,a book as allows people their.own interpretations and understandings of i t . To seek for only one,absolute authority outside one's s e l f and to become a slave to the ideas of the ancients — t h e s e were the things that Chuang Tzu denounced most.?-3 In other words, Chuang Tzu's thought seems to be very f l e x i b l e (but of course here i s also the danger of i t s e a s i l y degenerating into looseness and l a x i t y ) , and t h i s f l e x i b i l i t y seems to arise from his non-dualism which, in Chuang Tzu's terminology, may be-expressed i n such words-as 10 Hun-tun jjft >t (Chaos) and Wu 5* (Non-being or Nothingness) . In the following chapters, we s h a l l investigate the meanings of Hun-tun,and Wu and t h e i r implications i n Chuang Tzu's notion.of order as contrasted to that of Emerson which seems to be rather d u a l i s t i c and Logos-oriented. A few more words i n passing, however,,seem necessary here to prevent possible misunderstandings concerning the meanings of the terms Hun-tun a n c^ W u ^ which seem to be two of the basic notions of Chuang.Tzu's non-dualistic philosophy. In Chuang Tzu, Hun-tun y& , which we translate as "Chaos" for want of a better term, i s not mere confusion. or disorder. It surely has the implications of confusion and disorder,.at least to the human i n t e l l e c t , but i t i s , so to speak, the "Great Disorder," an "excess of o r d e r " 1 4 and therefore a " r i c h matrix replete with orders from which 15 limited orders a r i s e . " In t h i s thesis,.to imply t h i s "Great Disorder," which seems to be the true order i n Chuang Tzu, we s h a l l employ the word "Chaos" with a capital. "C," and chaos..to denote confusion and disorder i n the usual sense of the terms which are, i n a sense, alienated Chaos. A s i m i l a r d i s t i n c t i o n may apply to Non-being and non-being. Non-being or Nothingness i s a makeshift t r a n s l a t i o n for Chuang Tzu's Wu & which does not necessarily mean a mere three-dimensional empty space or void with no concrete object i n i t . This kind of non-being (or nothingness), as opposed to being, i s an "alienated" or "externalized" 11 Non-being and therefore should be distinguished from the Non-being of Chuang Tzu, which, l i k e the f i e l d s of energy i n modern physics, i s pregnant with p o t e n t i a l i t y (cf. p. 118). It i s , so to speak, the womb of beings, and as such i s a cognate of Hun-tun, the matrix of orders i n the world. What is noteworthy here i s that both beings and orders are incon-ceivable without boundaries, and so.we can suspect that both Hun-tun and Non-being have a close connection, or even connaturality, with the notion of boundaries which i s the main theme of Chapter I of t h i s thesis. NOTES TO INTRODUCTION Here, the term "non-dualistic" may be somewhat preferable to "monism," since the implications of the former are not so r e s t r i c t i v e as those of the l a t t e r , and because of t h i s the l a t t e r tends to be e a s i l y mistaken for something that i s opposed to "dualism," thus leading us to another dualism between "monism" and "dualism." In connection with t h i s , A. Watts writes: "But monism does not actually escape from dualism. Not only does i t f a i l to answer the question: 'What i s the o r i g i n of the seeming existence of the other side, i f only one side i s r e a l ? ' — but also the very notion of absolute oneness i s d u a l i s t i c because i t excludes and opposes the p o s s i b i l i t y of the many" (Watts, The Supreme, Identity: An Essay on Oriental Metaphysic and the C h r i s t i a n  Religion [New York, 1960], pp. 64-65). 2 To be sure, Logos has a unifying function, as i t s etymology indicates,. i . e. , iegein — to gather (cf. M. Miiller, The Science of Language, Vol. II [London, 1891], 71), but t h i s unifying power seems to be based upon sel e c t i o n and discrimination. Logos does not gather things at random, but i t c o l l e c t s things analogically ( i . e . , according to logos or ratio) so as to create a well-ordered.and well-proportioned cosmos out of chaotic matter. In connection with t h i s , A. Watts writes i n his Myth and R i t u a l i n C h r i s t i a n i t y : "The Divider ('I came not to bring peace, but a sword') i s the Logos, who 'set a compass on the face of the deep' [Proverbs 8:27], who 'divided the l i g h t from the darkness' [Genesis 1:4], and created the firmament to 'divide the waters from the waters' [Genesis 1:6]" (Watts, Myth and R i t u a l i n Chris-t i a n i t y [Boston, 1968], p. 108). In his Rogosu to remma" (Logos and Lemma), T. Yamauchi also writes, t h i s time i n the context of Greek philosophy: "Logos, i n the f i r s t place, starts with a d i s t i n c t i o n (l*J?i|) between the two [the subject and the predicate], and without t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n there can be no 'logos-like'' development. This i s i n t r i n s i c to the notion of logos and without i t logos cannot be logos. It i s because of t h i s that logos not only implies 'gathering,' but also 'distinguishing.' . . . Although logos involves, above a l l , the notion of c o l l e c t i n g , i t s manner of c o l l e c t i o n i s not l i n e a r [ i . e . , continuous] but discontinuous (#*[££.^ ) and i t s development i s based, more than anything else, on b i f u r c a t i o n . The connection of things by logos, so to speak, i s achieved through d i v i s i o n (^ 7" V\ ) ; i t i s a union reached through disruption (S^iGL)" (Yamauchi, Rogos to remma (Logos and Lemma) [Tokyo, 1974], pp. 21-26. Translation mine.) Cf. also p. 67 of t h i s thesis. 12 13 3 S. G. Brown, "Emerson's Platonism," The New England  Quarterly, 18 (1945), 336. 4 Emerson, "Self-Reliance" i n Cabot, ed., The Works of  Ralph Waldo Emerson, Vol. II (London and New YorkT 1883),58. Figures i n parentheses after the quotations from Emerson's writings refer to th i s e d i t i o n . 5 Cf. B. Watson, t r . , The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu (New York, 1968), p. 15. c M. Fukunaga, Soshi (Chuang Tzu) (Tokyo, 1971), p. 200. 7 Watson, p. 1. 8 Cf. Fukunaga, p. 200. 9 Ibid., pp. 200-201. Translation mine. "*"^ Cf. O. Kan ay a, Soshi, Vol. I, 12; M. Mori, Jodai  y o r i kandai n i i t a r u seimeikan no tenkai (The Development of the Concepts of Human Nature and Destiny from the Beginning to the Han Dynasty) (Tokyo, 1975), p. 81; W. T. Chan, A Source Book i n Chinese Philosophy (Princeton, 1973), p. 179; A. C. Graham, "Chuang-tzu's Essay on Seeing Things as Equal," History of Religion, 9 (1969-70), 137-159. "''"'"Watson, p. 3. 12 Some of the other references consulted are: 1) 0. Kanaya, t r . , Soshi (Chuang Tzu), 3 vols. (Tokyo, 1977), 2) M. Mori, t r . , Soshi (Chuang Tzu), 3 vols. (Tokyo, 1975). 3) H. G i l e s , t r . , Chuang Tzu: Mystic, Moralist and So c i a l Reformer (London, 1926). 4) W. T. Chan, A Source Book i n Chinese Philosophy (Princeton, 1973) . 5) H. Creel, What Is Taoism? and Other Studies i n Chinese C u l t u r a l History (Chicago and London, 1970). 6) T. Merton, The Way of Chuang Tzu (New York, 1969). 7) J. Needham, Science and C i v i l i s a t i o n i n China, Vol. II (Cambridge, 1962). 8) R. T. Ames, "An.Exegesis of the 'Ta Tsung Shih' Chapter of the Chuang Tzu" (M.A. thesis submitted to the 14 Department of Asian Studies, University.of B r i t i s h Columbia, 19 73) . 9) Y. L. Fung, t r . / Chuang-tzu; A New Selected Translation  with an Exposition of the Philosophy of Kuo Hslang (New York, 1964). 13 Fukunaga, p. 202. Translation mine. 14 Paul Weiss, "Some Paradoxes Relating to Order," The  Concept of Order, ed. P. G. Kuntz (Seattle and London, 1968), p. 16. 15 J. E. Feibleman, "Disorder," The Concept of Order, ed. P. G. Kuntz (Seattle and London, 1968) , p. 12. CHAPTER I ORDER AND BOUNDARIES Order, by.i t s very nature, sets boundaries to things. Therefore the f i r s t step i n our discussion of the notion of order i n Emerson and Chuang Tzu should be to s t a r t an examination of the meaning of boundaries i n t h e i r works. The concept of boundaries w i l l become useful i n considering the other•problems presented i n the following chapters, primarily "lav/" and " l i f e , " both of which-are, more or l e s s , variations on the problem of boundaries. Before we begin a further discussion of Emerson's and Chuang Tzu's notions of order and boundaries, we may f i r s t need to give some general d e f i n i t i o n s of the word "boundary." We may also need to est a b l i s h the general d i r e c t i o n i n which our argument w i l l proceed. The usual meaning of "boundary" would be "a l i n e which marks a l i m i t " or "a di v i d i n g l i n e between two objects." However, i n t h i s chapter we s h a l l extend the o r i g i n a l meaning of boundaries to some extent and re-define i t as "anything that separates and d i f f e r e n t i a t e s two things (whether physical or mental)." According to t h i s extended d e f i n i t i o n , such things as gaps, spaces, holes, and vacuums can be included as boundaries so long as they separate and d i f f e r e n t i a t e one thing from another. In other words, "boundary" i s the fundamental element that i s required 15 16 in the so-called d u a l i s t i c world view. It seems that, depending on how we approach the. notion of boundaries, our world view becomes either d u a l i s t i c or non-dualistic. Our aim i n t h i s chapter i s to c l a r i f y , on the one hand, that Emerson takes e s s e n t i a l l y a d u a l i s t i c attitude toward boundaries (we may c a l l t h i s . a t t i t u d e the either/or type o f . l o g i c ) , whereas Chuang Tzu, a non-dualistic approach (which may be named the both/and type of l o g i c ) , and, on the other hand, how the differences between the two world views are r e f l e c t e d in their.notions of order. To achieve these aims, we s h a l l set up four major perspectives: language, v i s i o n , the mirror, and transcendence. The f i r s t three are the elements of boundaries which seem to be common to both Emerson and Chuang Tzu. The l a s t viewpoint, i . e . , transcendence, concerns the way the two writers transcend boundaries. Having established these preliminary considerations on boundaries and the general orientation of this chapter, we are now ready to s t a r t a detailed examination of the notions of order and boundaries i n Emerson and Chuang Tzu through the four perspectives given above, of which language i s our f i r s t topic. A close connection between.language and boundaries can be surmised from the following reasons. F i r s t , language i s based on gaps that l i e between l e t t e r s , words> and phonemes, and gaps are nothing but boundaries. In his 17 System and Structure,. A. Wilden writes about the r e l a t i o n -ships between language and gaps: Thus, speech can be described as consisting of chain upon chain of words, a l l seeking to f i l l up the holes i n communication,, holes that cannot be f i l l e d . In communications terminology, these holes are i n e f f e c t the 'gaps' which d i g i t a l communication and s i g n i f i c a t i o n necessarily introduce into the analog continuum of ' l i f e , ' ' r e l a t i o n , ' and 'meaning.' Without these gaps — such .as those between the integers, between the l e t t e r s i n an alphabet, or between the 'on' and the ' o f f of the relays i n a d i g i t a l computer, or i n the genetic code — l a n g u a g e , as a p a r t i c u l a r system of the substitution and combination of discrete elements c a l l e d signs or s i g n i f i e r s , would not be p o s s i b l e . ! As i s implied i n this passage, language i s based on the dualism between negation and affirmation (e.g., "on" and " o f f " ) . This dualism seems to arise from the nature of the word "not." Through the d i v i d i n g function of "not" we can dis t i n g u i s h between an affirmative and a negative sentence, between the subject and the predicate, and determine word order and parts of speech. Another aspect of language i s that i t i s l i n e a r i n the sense that both i n spoken,and i n written form i t i s a succession of sounds or l e t t e r s . Taking a l l these facts into consideration, we can say that language i s an "order," which consists of the various boundaries c i t e d above. So by paying attention to Emerson's and Chuang Tzu's attitudes toward language, we can hope to c l a r i f y some aspects of th e i r notion of order. Let us take up Chuang Tzu f i r s t , since his position toward language seems to be rather simple compared with that 18 of Emerson. Throughout Chuang Tzu,. he takes a strongly 2 negative approach to language. For instance, he says: The Way has never known boundaries;.speech has no constancy. . . . So [I say,] those who divide f a i l to divide; those who discriminate f a i l to discrim-inate. . . . The Great Way i s not named; Great Discriminations are not spoken; . . . If discrim-inations are put into words, they do not s u f f i c e . ^ ^1L-4H& 4 % ... X4ntL&$£% To give another example of Chuang Tzu's negation of.language, we have the famous story about Hun-tun (Chaos) placed as the conclusion of the nei p'ien fa ^ (the inner chapters): The emperor of the South Sea was c a l l e d Shu [ B r i e f ] , the emperor of the North Sea was c a l l e d Hu [Sudden], and the emperor of the central region was c a l l e d Hun-tun [Chaos]. Shu and Hu from time to time came together for a meeting i n the t e r r i t o r y of Hun-tun, and Hun-tun treated them very generously. Shu and Hu discussed how they could repay his kind-ness. " A l l men," they said, "have seven openings so they can see, hear, eat, and breathe. But Hun-tun alone doesn't have any. Let's trying [sic] boring him some!" Every day they bored another hole, and on the seventh day Hun-tun died. (ch. 7, 97) 5t *, *fe 0 * * 6. » ^ & tt^K Hun— tun ; * l . ^ o r ^ l i ^ n a s such meanings as chaos,, d i s o r d e r l i -4 ness, ambiguity, u n d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n , homogeneity, and continuum. I t i s on the one hand the state of the Universe before heaven and earth were d i f f e r e n t i a t e d , and on the other 19 hand the primordial force that permeates the Universe aft e r i t s creation. Hun-tun i s another name for Tao (the ultimate p r i n c i p l e of the Universe), and i t can also corres-pond,, at lea s t on one l e v e l , to the analog continuum, to use the terminology of communications theory (cf. the above passage quoted from Wilden). This anecdote, then, t e l l s us how the natural flow. of. l i f e of Tao or Chaos was impeded and destroyed by the ...misdirected, kindness, of Shu and Hu, who represent the d i g i t a l aspect of human language and human notion of order. As we can guess from the passage, Chuang Tzu i s a great defender of Chaos or Disorder (with a c a p i t a l "D"). This Disorder, however, i s not disorder i n the usual sense of the word. It appears to be disorder by the stan-dards of human language, that i s based on analytic l o g i c or a d i g i t a l way of thinking, whereas to Chuang Tzu i t actually i s the ultimate order or p r i n c i p l e of the Universe. It i s , so to speak, the Great Disorder of the world. Now, what would be Emerson's attitude toward language? Here the s i t u a t i o n i s not as simple as i n the case of Chuang Tzu, for Emerson seems to take two apparently opposite attitudes toward language :i?sometimes he negates i t ; at other times he defends i t . His negation of language can be seen in such remarks as."Words are f i n i t e organs of the i n f i n i t e mind. They cannot cover the dimensions of what i s i n truth. They break, chop, and impoverish i t " (Nature, I, 50), and "The soul answers never by words, but by the thing i t s e l f 20 that i s inquired a f t e r . . . . An answer i n words i s delusive. . .." ("The Over-Soul," I I , 265), and "Books are for the scholar's i d l e times" ("The American Scholar," I, 92). These words would seem to indicate the same viewpoint on language as Chuang Tzu's. However,.in the same essays from which the above passages are taken, Emerson,.seems to.emphasize the importance of speech: i n Nature he a l l o t s one entire chapter to discus-sing the relationship between language and Nature; i n "The American Scholar" he says, "Books are the best of things, well used; abused, among the worst" (I, 91); and i n "The Over-Soul" we read, "Only i t s e l f can i n s p i r e whom i t [the soul] w i l l , and behold! t h e i r speech s h a l l be l y r i c a l , and sweet, and universal as the r i s i n g of the wind1' (II> 253). How are we to understand this?. As we can surmise from the above quotations, Emerson i s not t o t a l l y opposed to language, but rather he i s denying what he thinks to be a degenerate use of language cut o f f from i t s s p i r i t u a l fountainhead, namely, the Over-Soul. Human language, so far as i t comes d i r e c t l y from th i s source, i s good. This seems to be his conviction, and i t would also explain why he spent most of his l i f e as a lecturer and wrote two essays on.eloquence. It i s a well known fac t that as a young student at Harvard he was charmed by the speeches of W. E. Channing, D. Webster, and E. Everett. We can see his passion for eloquence i n his 5 journal for as early as February 1820. And late i n his journal he also writes, "Why has never the poorest country college offered me a professorship of rhetoric? I think I could have taught an orator, though I am none."^ Thus i t would be f a i r to say that, unlike Chuang Tzu, who i s extremely suspicious about the use of language, Emerson s t i l l retains a considerable amount of b e l i e f i n i t . However, as we saw above, language i s based on.gaps or boundaries, and so i t i s often very inadequate to cover the universe i n i t s e n t i r e t y . I t i s l i k e a net, and a net cannot scoop up water, which i s the universe. Language inevitably introduces a schism ( i . e . , dualism) between i t s e l f and the object which i t s p e c i f i e s , between the speaker and the objects spoken of, between man as mind and.Nature as a material world. So long as language i s a sort of order, we can achieve an order by applying i t to the Chaos of Nature, but the l i f e of Chaos tends to be l o s t , as we saw i n the story of Hun-tun. This i s the predicament of Emerson as an orator, and probably t h i s i s the reason.why he i s attracted by the p l a i n s t y l e of the language of the ordinary people who are closer to the concrete world of everyday l i f e than i n t e l l e c t u a l s . In his journal for June 24, 1840, he writes, "The language of the s t r e e t . i s always strong." He also writes i n his journal for October 27, 1831, "In good writing words become one with things." From these remarks we can see how Emerson.occupies himself with the task of f i l l i n g the gap between language and i t s objects, between man and Nature. Emerson's e f f o r t to overcome the boundary between language and things seems to have some relat i o n s h i p with his attempt to reconcile the schism between the seer and the seen, for as we s h a l l see below, language has a strong connection with v i s i o n . For further discussion on this point we need to examine the function of v i s i o n , which i n this thesis we s h a l l use b a s i c a l l y i n the usual sense of the term, i . e . , o p t i c a l v i s i o n as d i s t i n c t from "mystical v i s i o n . " Vision can be a boundary-maker i n several ways which are closely i n t e r r e l a t e d . F i r s t , v i s i o n i s a matter of the seer and the seen, i . e . , the subject and the object; hence a boundary i s presupposed between the two. What i s int e r e s t i n g here i s that there i s a close relationship between v i s i o n and language i n the sense that the object seen i s usually named and conceptualized. Needless to say, ;language i s based on conceptions and ideas. In fact,.the word "idea" i s derived from the Greek verb 7 idein (to. see). Since language i s a sort of boundaryjmaker, this would also support, even though i n d i r e c t l y , our assumption that v i s i o n can be a boundary-maker. If the primal meaning of eyesight•as .a boundary-maker l i e s i n the demarcation between the seer and the seen, a secondary meaning l i e s i n the fact that v i s i o n , i n conjunc-ti o n with the function of the mind, necessarily draws boundaries between the objects seen by the seer. V i s i o n 23 does not function normally unless i t distinguishes one thing from another, thus introducing order into things i n a state of confusion. Here again, we are reminded of the.story of Hun-tun. The actions of shu and Hu, who bored the holes (a metaphor for boundaries) i n the opaque face of Hun-tun (Chaos) can be said to symbolize the discriminating and "ordering" function of human v i s i o n . With these preliminary considerations on the r e l a t i o n -ships between v i s i o n , boundaries, and order, we are ready to examine the positions.toward v i s i o n adopted by Emerson and Chuang Tzu. Let us take Emerson f i r s t . As F.,0. Matthiessen writes i n his American Renaissance: He [Emerson] held i t the f i r s t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the a r t i s t to record adequately what he had observed; and he was reassured by the thought that 'our American character i s marked by a more than average delight i n accurate perception.' When he could believe himself to be not merely a reporter but a poet, he could phrase his conviction more intensely: the poet i s the man 'whose eye can integrate a l l the parts.'8 What Matthiessen c a l l s "his [Emerson's] almost exclusive 9 . absorption with seeing" elsewhere in.the same book i s not very d i f f i c u l t to prove. One of the best examples i s i n Nature: In the woods, we return to reason and f a i t h . There. I f e e l that nothing can b e f a l l me i n l i f e , no disgrace, no calamity (leaving me my eyes), which nature cannot repair. Standing on the bare ground, — m y head bathed by the b l i t h e a i r , and u p l i f t e d into i n f i n i t e space, — a l l mean egotism vanishes. I become a transparent eyeball; I am nothing; I see a l l ; the currents of the Universal Being c i r c u l a t e through me;. I am part or p a r t i c l e of God. (I, 15-16) 24 In this passage that i l l u s t r a t e s Emerson's preoccupation with v i s i o n , we see how he t r i e s to resolve the same prob-lem.we .saw/ e a r l i e r — the problem of the dichotomy between the seer and the seen, the subject and the object, man and Nature. He seems to think that he has succeeded i n over-coming this dualism by an n i h i l a t i n g his sense of i n d i v i d -uated consciousness and uniting with the Universal Being, God. We f i n d the same view echoed i n his poem "Brahma," where he says "the red slayer" and "the s l a i n " are one; and also i n his essay, "The Over-Soul," when he writes, ". . . the act of seeing and the thing seen, the seer and the spectacle* the subject and the object, are one" (II, 2 53), and "For they are poets by the free course which they allow to the informing soul, which through t h e i r eyes beholds again and.blesses the things which i t had made" (II, 271). However, i t seems that he does not, or rather cannot, stay i n such a non-dualistic state for long. Like Plato, whom Emerson describes.as a man who.ceaselessly turns a coin, he.also turns h i s . This i s seen, for example i n the l a t t e r part of his poem "The Rhodora":. Rhodora! i f the sages ask thee why This charm i s wasted on the earth and sky, <• T e l l them, dear, that i f eyes are made for seeing, Then Beauty i s i t s own excuse for being: Why thou wert there, 0 r i v a l of the rose! I never thought to ask, I never knew: But, in my simple ignorance suppose The self-same Power that brought me there brought you. (IX, 39) 25 Although he says "beauty i s i t s own excuse for being" and he never knew or thought.to ask why the flower was there, he. s t i l l cannot help supposing that the same "Power" i s working behind both the flower and himself. Thus we can t e l l that he i s on the verge of introducing a boundary between the "Power" and the flower, between the "Power" and himself. 1^ (Here seems to l i e one aspect of Emerson's dualism.) This seems to be an i n e v i t a b l e consequence of .his notion of beauty, which i s predominantly dependent on v i s i o n (a boun-dary-maker). In a sense, beauty i s a problem of how to draw boundaries between the objects perceived through the discrim-inating function of sight. So by examining his notion of beauty, we can hope to c l a r i f y his concepts of boundaries, and thus, of order. For better consideration of Emerson's idea of beauty, l e t us quote a passage from his Nature: The ancient Greeks c a l l e d the world Kp^/foJ, beauty. Such i s the constitution of a l l things, or such the p l a s t i c power of the human eye, that the primary forms, as the sky, the mountain, the tree, the animal, give us a delight i n and for.themselves; a, pleasure a r i s i n g from outline, color, motion,, and grouping. This seems partly owing to the eye i t s e l f . The eye i s the best of a r t i s t s . By the mutual action of i t s structure and.of the laws of l i g h t , perspective i s produced, which integrates every mass of objects, of what character soever t into a well colored and shaded globe, so that where the p a r t i c u l a r objects are mean and unaffecting, the landscape which they compose i s round and symmetrical. And as the eye i s the best composer, so l i g h t i s the f i r s t of painters. There i s no object so f o u l that intense l i g h t w i l l not make be a u t i f u l . And the stimulus i t affords to the sense, and a sort of i n f i n i t u d e which i t hath, l i k e space and time, make a l l matter gay. Even the corpse has i t s own beauty. (I,.21-22) In t h i s quotation we should f i r s t note the word "symmetrical which seems to be one of the key words for understanding Emerson's notions of beauty, v i s i o n , boundaries, and order. It i s almost a commonplace that Emerson,was greatly influenced by Plato, who i s said to have highly esteemed mathematics, esp e c i a l l y geometry, a system of theory about boundaries. So i t would not be very improper to look for a close r e l a t i o n between Emerson's notion of. beauty and the symmetry and proportion of geometry. For instance, he writes i n his journal for 1849: For we do not l i s t e n with much respect to the verses of a man who i s only a poet, nor to the calculations of a man who i s only an,algebraist, but i f the man i s at the same time acquainted with the geometrical foundations of things, and with t h e i r moral purposes, and sees the f e s t a l splendor of the day, his poetry i s exact, and his arithmetic musical. His poetry and his mathematics accredit each other. I look upon the stress l a i d by Plato on geometry as highly s i g n i f i c a n t H And again, i n his essays•"Circles" and "Plato; or the Philos opher," we read the following passages, respectively: The eye i s the f i r s t c i r c l e ; the horizon which i t forms i s the second; and throughout nature t h i s primary figure i s repeated without end. I t i s the highest emblem i n the cipher of the world. (II, 281) In the Timaeus he indicates the highest employ-ment of the eyes. "By us i t i s asserted that God invented and bestowed sight on us for t h i s pur-pose, — that on surveying the c i r c l e s of, i n t e l -ligence i n the heavens, we might.properly employ those of our.own minds, which, though disturbed when compared with the others that are uniform, are s t i l l a l l i e d to t h e i r c i r c u l a t i o n s ; and that having thus learned, and being naturally possessed of a correct reasoning faculty, we might, by imitating the uniform revolutions of d i v i n i t y , set right our own wanderings and blunders." (IV, 64-65) Thus i t would not be too much of an exaggeration to say that at the basis of Emerson's id e a l beauty l i e s the notion of geometrical symmetry and proportion which i s detected i n the external -world and integrated into unity by the ordering function of v i s i o n . Besides the word "symmetrical," we should not over-look the word " l i g h t , " on which Emerson puts a considerable degree of emphasis i n the above quotation from Nature (cf. p. 25). It i s not d i f f i c u l t to see that l i g h t plays an important role i n geometrical symmetry i n his notion.of beauty, for without l i g h t there can be no v i s i o n (in the usual sense of the term), which i s indispensable i n composing symmetry and proportion i n the outer world. As Emerson himself points out i n the above quotation, i t i s due to "mutual action of i t s [the eye's] structure and the laws of. l i g h t " that "the landscape i s round and symmetrical." "Light," he continues, " i s the f i r s t of painters" and "There i s no object so foul that intense l i g h t w i l l not make beauti-f u l . .•. . Even the corpse has i t s own beauty." Judging from these passages and his geometrical notion of beauty mentioned above, we can say that i n Emerson l i g h t has a spec i a l power to put into order such a fo u l thing.as a corpse 28 which has a strong association with corruption and disorder, i.e.,.confusion of boundaries. This seems to be one of.the reasons (for other reasons see pp. 65,.107-108) why he makes profuse use of the image of l i g h t i n his works. In f a c t , i t would be f a i r to say that his essay Nature, for instance, begins and ends with an adoration of the sun (e.g.> "The sun shines to-day also" i n the introduction, and "The sordor and f i l t h s of nature, the sun s h a l l dry up . . . " i n the con-cluding paragraph). This p r e d i l e c t i o n for l i g h t might also have come from Greek thought. Both Plato and Plotinus, who seem to have 13 influenced Emerson.to a considerable degree, compare t h e i r absolute being, the Idea and the One, to the sun (e.g.,.the parable of the cave i n Plato's Republic, Book VII; and Plotinus' emanation theory i n Enneads, V.I.6). Moreover, i n his Nature, Emerson mentions the well-known Greek idea of the t r i a d of truth, good, and beauty (cf. Phaedrus, 246e): "God i s the a l l - f a i r . Truth, and goodness, and beauty, are but d i f f e r e n t faces of the same A l l " (I, 30). If the source of beauty i s God (who i s often compared to the sun and i t s l i g h t , a s , for example, i n Plato, Plotinus, and Emerson for the reasons c i t e d above), and i f t h i s God i s also the source of the order which, as we have seen i n the above quotation, from Emerson (pp. 26-27), has a strong inclination,toward geometrical symmetry and proportion, then we can conclude t h a t . l i g h t , v i s i o n , and symmetry are closely interconnected elements i n Emerson's notions of beauty and order. In Emerson, beauty seems to mean order, e s p e c i a l l y that of geometrical symmetry and proportion, i . e . , well-ordered boun-daries, which can be re a l i z e d through the ordering function of v i s i o n and l i g h t which, in turn, come from God i n the id e a l world. On the other hand, we have'a rather d i f f e r e n t picture in Chuang Tzu's concepts of beauty, v i s i o n , boundaries; and order. Judging from the story of Hun-tun quoted e a r l i e r , we can easily.imagine that Chuang Tzu would have placed a low value on v i s i o n and seeing. This i s further supported by the abundant use of dark images i n his writi n g . This i s not to say, however, that he does not use the image of l i g h t at a l l . He does use i t sometimes,.. but, unlike Emerson, who seldom, gives a po s i t i v e meaning to darkness, Chuang Tzu t r i e s to.see a deep sig n i f i c a n c e i n darkness. Above a l l , the word hsiian £. would indicate t h i s . Hsu'an, which means "dark" and "mysterious," often appears i n the Chuang Tzu i n such expressions as hsuan ming \ ^ (the Dark Obscurity, chs. 6, 17), hsuan t'ung ^  }b\ (Mysterious Leveling, ch. 10) , hsuan t'ien j; ft. (Dark Heaven, ch. 11) , hsiian ku ^ (Dark Antiquity, ch. 1.2) , hsiian ohu j; (Dark Pearl, ch. 12) , hsuan te % (Dark Virtue, ch. 12) , hsiian  sheng %g (the Dark Sage, ch. 13) , and hsttan shui % (the Black Waters, ch. 22). Besides hsiian , we come across many other words that have much to do with darkness. To add 30 a few more,examples, we have: "The torch of chaos and doubt —- t h i s i s what the sage steers by" (ch. 2, 42) . " -|L$^ Jt, ftH^ A iL?ff ^  i" "For the Tao which shines fort h i s not Tao" (ch. 11, 119) " ft) T ^ ' " a n d : . . . The essence of the Perfect Way i s deep and darkly shrouded; the extreme of the Perfect Way i s mysterious and hushed i n sile n c e . Let there be no seeing, no hearing, enfold the s p i r i t i n quietude and the body w i l l r i ght i t s e l f . (ch'. 11, 119) On the basis of these examples t we can say that i n Chuang Tzu v i s i o n i n the usual sense of the term ( i . e . , seeing things under light) i s not valued; rather, darkness and the "confusion" of boundaries between things are highly esteemed. This tendency seems to have much to do with his idea of beauty, for Chuang Tzu finds a unique value i n what i s commonly thought to be deformed and abnormal, and deformities are nothing but the confusion of boundaries. A hunchback, a cr i p p l e , and other misshapen men are his favourite charac-ters. The following are two examples taken from chapter 5 of Chuang Tzu: Duke A i of Lu said.to Confucius, "In Wei there was an ugly man named A i T'ai-t'o. But when men were around him, they thought only of him and couldn't break away, and when women saw him, they ran begging to t h e i r fathers and mothers, saying, 'I'd rather be t h i s gentleman's concubine than another man's wife!' — t h e r e were more than ten such.cases and i t hasn't stopped yet. No one ever heard him take the lead — h e always just chimed i n in with other people. He wasn't i n the pos i t i o n of a r u l e r where he could save men's l i v e s , and.he had 31 no store of provisions to f i l l men's b e l l i e s . On top of that, he was ugly enough to astound the whole world, chimed i n but never led,. and. knew no more than what went on r i g h t around him. And yet. men and women flocked to him." (ch. 5, 72) Mr. Lame-Hunchback-No-Lips talked to Duke Ling of Wei, and Duke Ling was so pleased with him that when he looked at normal men he thought t h e i r necks looked too lean and skinny. Mr. Pitcher-sized-Wen talked to Duke Huan of Ch'i, and Duke Huan was so pleased with him that when he looked at normal men he thought t h e i r necks looked too lean and skinny. Therefore, i f v i r t u e i s preeminent, the body w i l l be forgotten., (ch. 5, 74-75) m £ %#T1L 4. "SU W ^ UMI One reason why Chuang Tzu shows such i n t e r e s t i n chaos and deformities may be that he i s well aware of the complementary and r e l a t i v e nature of beauty and ugliness, order and disorder. To him "[The Way] i s i n the piss and s h i t " (ch. 22, 241) " [jjt] 4L&%n and: "The ten thousand things are r e a l l y one. We look on some as b e a u t i f u l because they are rare or unearthly; we look on others as ugly because they are f o u l and rotten.. But the f o u l and rotten may turn into the rare and unearthly, and the rare and unearthly may turn into the f o u l and rotten. So i t i s said, You have only to comprehend the one breath that i s the world. The sage never ceases to value oneness." (ch. 22, 236) 32 To sum up f then, we can say that Emerson's geometrical notion of beauty i s d u a l i s t i c i n that i t i s based on the b i f u r c a t i n g function of v i s i o n which discriminates geometri-cal symmetry and proportion from asymmetry and disproportion, whereas Chuang Tzu's concept of beauty i s non-dualistic i n the sense that i t negates the discriminating function of v i s i o n and t r i e s to.see values even i n deformities and disorder. The difference between d u a l i s t i c and non-dualistic attitudes toward boundaries i n Emerson and Chuang Tzu may be further r e f l e c t e d i n another element of boundaries i n the two writers, namely, the image of the mirror. The mirror functions as a boundary because i t has a surface which separates the seer and the seen (the image).. This mirror surface i s i n .fact the embodiment of the imaginary boundary we.supposed between the seer.and the seen, the subject and the object i n dealing with the notion and the problem of v i s i o n . So by examining the functions of the image of the mirror in Emerson, and Chuang Tzu,. we may further c l a r i f y t h e i r concepts of boundaries and order. That Emerson sees the external world as a mirror-image i s evident from such passages as: "The laws of moral nature answer to those of matter as face to face i n a glass" (Nature, I, 38); "I look for the new Teacher, that . . . s h a l l see the world to be the mirror of the soul" ("Divinity School Address," I, 148); "As i n dreams so i n the scarcely less f l u i d events of the world every man sees himself i n c o l o s s a l , without knowing that i t i s himself" ("Spiritual Laws," I I , 141); and "For the truth was i n us before i t was re f l e c t e d to us from natural objects" ("Intellect," I I , 317). For Emerson the world i s a projection of that which i s inside himself, which he c a l l s the soul or s p i r i t . Therefore i t i s quite natural for him to conclude that the outer world i s an i l l u s i o n . As F. 0. Matthiessen points out, t h i s would be the main reason, why., his works abound i n the images of 14 flux and f l u i d i t y , e s p e c i a l l y thab of water. In this sense we can say that Emerson t r i e s to abolish the clear-cut boundaries between things,, and so comes quite close to Chuang.Tzu's world-view, whose fundamental tenet i s based on Tao or Hun-tun if^l^C, which has no boundaries and i s i n a state of chaos, of flux and f l u i d i t y . However, as i s usual with Emerson, t h i s i s only one side of the coin. The other side i s his individualism, which i s aptly r e f l e c t e d i n the t i t l e of his essay "Self-Reliance." Although we must not forget that what Emerson c a l l s " s e l f " i s not necessarily the same as the i n d i v i d u a l person separated . from the rest of the world, s t i l l Emerson's " s e l f " very e a s i l y comes to mean just that. One proof of this would be i n his s t y l e . According to S. G. Brown, "one 34 of the most inter e s t i n g c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of Emerson's essays 15 and lectures i s that they consist c h i e f l y of conclusions." An opinion relevant to this i s that of Matthiessen, who says: His work corresponds so naturally to his l i f e that i t constitutes the purest example of what indivi d u -alism could produce. The sentence was his u n i t , as he recognized when confessing sadly to C a r l y l e (1838) that his paragraphs were only c o l l e c t i o n s of ' i n f i n i t e l y repellent p a r t i c l e s . ' I t i s s i g n i f i c a n t that he said the same thing when r e f l e c t i n g on society.as 'an imperfect union': 'Every man i s an i n f i n i t e l y repellent orb, and holds his i n d i v i d u a l being on that condition.' The sentence was the ine v i t a b l e unit for:the man who could say, 'A single thought has no l i m i t to i t s value.'16 Another element of his individualism might be r e f l e e r . ted i n his notion of private property. I t • i s true that .in "Self-Reliance" Emerson f l a t l y denies private property i n such statements as, "And so the reliance on Property, including the reliance on governments which protect i t , i s the want of s e l f - r e l i a n c e " (II, 85). However, i t seems equally true that elsewhere he defends the concept of property. For instance, i n his rather optimistic and sim-p l i s t i c t r e a t i s e on wealth, Emerson advocates the p r i n c i p l e of free competition by independent i n d i v i d u a l s . He writes: The Saxons are the merchants of the world; now,.for a thousand years, the leading race, and by nothing more than t h e i r quality of personal independence, and i n i t s s p e c i a l modification, pecuniary indepen-dence. (VI, 89-90) Another example i s i n his "History," where he writes: Property also holds of the soul, covers great s p i r i t u a l f a c t s , and i n s t i n c t i v e l y we at f i r s t hold to i t with swords and laws and wide and complex combinations. . . . We honor the r i c h because they 35 have externally the freedom, power, and grace which we f e e l to be superior to man,, proper to us. (II, 11-12) This apparent inconsistency in his attitude toward property i s probably s i m i l a r to that encountered i n his approach toward language. As i n the case of language, property i s good as'long as i t contributes to the r e a l i z a t i o n of one's true " s e l f " which draws i t s l i f e and power from the s p i r i t u a l source, the "One" or the Over-Soul. Be that as i t may, judging from the two passages quoted above from "Wealth" and "History," we cannot .deny that Emerson's notion of " s e l f " retains an aspect of individualism in the usual sense of the term, and th i s makes us hesitate to jump to the conclusion that the flowing images i n Emerson's writings have the.same sig n i f i c a n c e as those we fi n d i n the Chuang Tzu. In t h i s regard, we must examine the images of the mirror and water i n Chuang Tzu. F i r s t , l e t us take up Chuang Tzu's mirror imagery, which appears i n such passages as: "Confucius said, .'Men do not mirror themselves i n running water — they mirror themselves i n s t i l l water'" (ch. 5, 69) " i^Ji 0 k^^%y^ S^7^ cfn ^ £.7& ^ ^ "; "Among l e v e l things, water at rest i s the most perfect, and therefore i t can serve as a standard" (ch. 5, 74) " ? M ^ £ ] ^ - ^ ~ * T >£. ^ "; "The Perfect Man uses his mind l i k e a mirror — going after/.nothing, welcoming nothing, responding but not storing" (ch. 7, 97) " £ A ffl / c * ft & fa T $ " 3 6 and "The sage's mind i s the mirror of s t i l l n e s s i n Heaven 17 ' and earth, the glass of the ten thousand things" (ch. 13, 142) " ^ t / e ^ / o ^ ^ T t ^ t t H ' C * ^ y H . -t, •" What we should note in these passages i s that Chuang Tzu seems to be interested i n the serene nature of the mirror surface (a boundary) rather than i n the images themselves i n the mirror. The t h i r d passage i n p a r t i c u l a r t e l l s us that the sage i s l i k e the surface of the mirror that neither welcomes nor goes after what.comes to and leaves i t . So i n a sense t h i s quotation i s saying that the sage must i d e n t i f y himself with the boundary (the mirror surface) i t s e l f that divides two things, the seer and the seen, i n t h i s case. This would be the main difference between Chuang Tzu's attitude toward the mirror and that of Emerson, who seems to be much more i n t e r -ested i n the contrast between the seer and the seen. (But more.on th i s w i l l be discussed l a t e r on i n t h i s chapter.) Our next step i s ,to examine the meanings of water symbolism i n Chuang Tzu and see how i t i s related to his notion of boundaries. Among many water images i n his work, the following would be useful i n considering the points i n question: Where the s w i r l i n g waves gather there i s an abyss; where the s t i l l water gather there i s an abyss;, where the running waters gather there i s an abyss. The abyss has nine names and I [the Taoist sage] have shown him three. (ch. 7, 96) 37 [The Way i s ] vast and ample, there i s nothing i t does not receive. Deep and profound, how can i t be fathomed? (ch. 13, 151) I go under with the swirls and come out with the eddies, following along the way the water goes and never thinking about myself. (ch. 19, 205) Knowledge wandering north to the banks of the Black Waters, climbed the Knoll of Hidden Heights, and there by chance came upon Do-Nothing-Say-Nothing. (ch. 22, 234) 5u m&tt •£* i - t . ^ z - ± . tin ftj8t % %*jf. But he who i s a Perfect Man l e t s his s p i r i t return to the Beginningless, to l i e down i n pleasant slumber i n the V i l l a g e of Not-Anything-At-All; l i k e water he flows through the Formless, or t r i c k l e s forth from the Great Purity. (ch. 32, 3 56) As we can surmise from these quotations, Chuang Tzu's sage seems to be the man who has become l i k e water. In the case of Emerson, as we saw i n the quotation from Nature (cf. p. • 23), his body becomes f l u i d and disappears, yet his eyes s t i l l remain to see things around him, while i n Chuang Tzu even the eyesight i s l o s t in the dark water ("£ ) of Tao (or Chaos). Chuang Tzu's Tao man ) becomes the water i t s e l f . Since we cannot draw any boundaries i n water,.that i s to say, there are innumerable ways to draw boundaries i n i t , can we not say that to become l i k e water i s to.become every boundary that exists i n the world? This may sound a 38 l i t t l e far-fetched at t h i s stage, but l a t e r on t h i s point w i l l become clearer. Another meaning of the water symbol i n Chuang Tzu seems to concern, as i n the case of Emerson, the problem of individualism and socio-economic structure. With respect to t h i s , J. Needham presents an i n t e r e s t i n g opinion i n his Science and C i v i l i z a t i o n in China. Afte r discussing a close relationship between the water and feminine symbols i n the 18 early Taoist schools, he proceeds to comment on the Taoists' attitude toward feudalism i n ancient China: What, then, did the Taoists propose as a n a l t e r n a - " t i v e to feudal society? They proposed nothing new, they did not look forward, and s t r i c t l y speaking, therefore, they were not revolutionary; they looked back, and the type of society to which they wished to return can have been nothing other than primitive t r i b a l c o l l e c t i v i s m . Their i d e a l was the Undif-ferentiated "natural" condition of l i f e , before the i n s t i t u t i o n of private property, before the appear-ance of proto-feudalism with i t s lords and "high kings," i t s p r i e s t s , artisans and augurs, at the beginning of the bronze age.19 Here, we should note the words " c o l l e c t i v e " and "undifferen-. t i a t e d , " both of which could also be applied to water. On the other hand, the feudal system and that of private prop-erty necessarily presuppose the introduction of boundaries between classes and between self-contained i n d i v i d u a l s . Therefore, underlining Chuang Tzu's water symbol can be seen an. impulse to abolish a l l such boundaries. On this point the function of the water image i n Chuang Tzu d i f f e r s diametrically from that in Emerson,.who, in spite of his e f f o r t to achieve unity by liquefying the world, s t i l l retains the idea of individualism that could induce the ideology of private property and free competition under a c a p i t a l i s t i c society. This difference i s related to the l a s t topic we are to deal with here in comparing the imp l i -cations of the mirror imagery i n Emerson and Chuang Tzu — the idea that the world, e s p e c i a l l y human society, i s an i l l u s i o n or dream. In Emerson one can see a d i r e c t r e l a t i o n -ship between the mirror symbol and the world as an i l l u s i o n , for he compares the external world to the mirror image. On the other hand, although the idea that the world i s an i l l u s i o n or dream i s prevalent i n Chuang Tzu's thought, i t seems d i f f i c u l t , at f i r s t glance, to find any d i r e c t connection between t h i s idea and the mirror symbol used by him, for i n Chuang Tzu the mirror mainly stands for the calm state of mind of the enlightened. However, we could also say that t h i s serene state of mind can be achieved by those who regard the world as i l l u s i o n and are not attached to i t . In f a c t , as i s clear from the above passages about the image of the mirror quoted from Chuang Tzu, the world i s a mirror image r e f l e c t e d on the mind of the sage, the only difference being that Chuang Tzu i s more interested i n the surface of the mirror i t s e l f , while Emerson tends to pay attention to the contrast between the image i t s e l f and the seer. (This dualism of the seer and the seen seems to be at the basis of Emerson's individualism.) Now, l e t us further examine Chuang.Tzu's attitude 40 toward the world. The idea that the world (as represented by human society) i s i l l u s i o n . i s rather prevalent i n the Chuang Tzu, especially i n the second chapter/ whose basic doctrine i s that every difference i n the world, including that between r e a l i t y and dreams, i s r e l a t i v e and ultimately a l l things are one and the same. For instance, i n t h i s chapter Chuang Tzu writes: : "He who dreams of drinking wine may weep when morning comes; he who dreams of weeping may i n the morning go off to hunt. While he is"dreaming he does not know i t i s a dream, and i n his dream he may even try to interpret a dream. Only after he wakes does he know i t was a dream. And someday there w i l l be a great'awakening when we know that this i s a l l a great dream. Yet the stupid believe they are awake, busily and b r i g h t l y assuming they understand things, c a l l i n g t h i s man r u l e r , that one herdsman — how dense! Confucius and you are both dreaming! And when I say you are dreaming, I'am dreaming, too." (ch. 2, 47-48) We see a s t r i k i n g s i m i l a r i t y between th i s passage and what Emerson says: " . . . the world i s a divine dream from which we may presently awake to the g l o r i e s and c e r t a i n t i e s of day" (Nature, I, 66). But what we must note here i s that Chuang Tzu writes: "Confucius and you. are both dreaming! And when I say you are dreaming, I am dreaming, too," thus, in a sense, contradicting his f i r s t statement that "someday there w i l l be a great awakening when we know that t h i s i s a l l a 41 great dream." We cannot see thi s kind of t o t a l negation i n Emerson's Idealism. For further examination on thi s point, l e t us quote another passage from Emerson. Just before the above quotation Emerson says: Idealism s a i t h ; Matter i s a phenomenon, not a sub-stance. Idealism acquaints us with t o t a l d i s p a r i t y between the evidence of our.own being, and the evidence of the world's being. The one i s perfect; the other, incapable of any assurance . . . (Nature, 1, 66), It would be in t e r e s t i n g to compare th i s with another story of Chuang Tzu's about a dream: Once Chuang Chou dreamt he was a b u t t e r f l y , a b u t t e r f l y f l i t t i n g and f l u t t e r i n g around, happy with himself and doing as he pleased. He didn't know he was Chuang Chou. Suddenly he woke up and there he was, s o l i d and unmistakable Chuang Chou. But.he didn't know i f he was Chuang Chou who had dreamt he was a b u t t e r f l y , or a b u t t e r f l y dreaming he was Chuang Chou. Between Chuang.Chou and a bu t t e r f l y there must be some d i s t i n c t i o n ! This i s ca l l e d the Transformation of Things. (ch. 2, 49) For Emerson the world i s a dream, but not the mind, so long as i t partakes of the realm of Ideas, whereas i n Chuang Tzu there i s no knowing which i s more r e a l , himself or the bu t t e r f l y i n : a dream. He says there must be some d i s t i n c t i o n between the two, but he freel y metamorphoses from one to the other, probably because he i d e n t i f i e s himself with the boundary i t s e l f between himself ("reality") and the b u t t e r f l y (a "dream"). In Emerson's attitude toward the world as i l l u s i o n there remains a shadow of an i n d i v i d u a l who tends to stand back from the world to watch i t , whereas Chuang Tzu's sage shows an i n c l i n a t i o n to immerse himself i n the world, or more exactly, to i d e n t i f y himself with the boundary between any.two objects i n the world, whether they are a b u t t e r f l y and a man or a dream.and r e a l i t y . Here i s i l l u s -trated the difference between Emerson and Chuang Tzu i n t h e i r approach to the problem of the world as an i l l u s i v e image i n the mirror: the former i s d u a l i s t i c , while the l a t t e r i s non-dualistic. This difference further leads us to another topic —-that of transcendence, which seems to be closely related to the topic of the mirror imagery surveyed above. In a sense, transcendence i s a problem of how to overcome the l i m i t a t i o n ( i . e . , boundaries) imposed upon human beings i n the form, for instance, of the i l l u s i v e idea of the world. Therefore, by examining the nature of transcendence i n Emerson and Chuang Tzu, we can hope to c l a r i f y t h e i r notions of boun-daries and order; We can look at the concept -of transcendence from two points of view: temporal and s p a t i a l . Let us f i r s t examine Emerson's notion of time and hi s t o r y , which i s expressed i n the following passages i n his writings: There i s one mind common to a l l i n d i v i d u a l men. . . . Of the works of th i s mind history i s the record. ("History," I I , 9) If the whole of history i s i n one man, i t i s a l l to be explained from i n d i v i d u a l experience. ("History," I I , 10) In the cycle of the universal man, from whom the known individuals proceed, centuries are points, and a l l history i s but the epoch of one degrada-t i o n . (Nature, I, 74) The s p i r i t sports with time, —-"Can crowd eternity into an,hour, Or. stretch an hour to eternit y . " ("The Over-Soul," I I , 256) According to these passages, Emerson seems to be saying that the i n d i v i d u a l can transcend his short l i f e span and at t a i n eternal l i f e by r e a l i z i n g i n himself the,power of the "one mind," the "universal man," or the " s p i r i t . " The same can be said of his notion of space: Man i s the dwarf of himself. Once he was permeated and dissolved by s p i r i t . He f i l l e d nature with his overflowing currents. Out from him sprang the sun and moon; from man, the sun; from woman, the moon. (Nature, I, 74-75) He [each man] must s i t s o l i d l y at home, and not suffer himself to be b u l l i e d by kings or empires, but know that he i s greater than a l l the geography and a l l the government of the world . . . ("History," I I , 14) By having recourse to the power of the s p i r i t or the Over-Soul, the i n d i v i d u a l can, transcend his individuated ego to become i n f i n i t e and eternal — thi s would be one aspect, i f not the ent i r e t y , of Emerson's notion of time and space. Chuang Tzu holds an extremely s i m i l a r viewpoint to t h i s . For example, he writes, "A man l i k e t h i s [the Perfect Man] rides the clouds and mist, straddles the sun and moon, and wanders beyond the four seas" (ch. 2, 46) " ^  \_fLA_~\ 44 J ^ T E f i fv&L%&:4z4[" and : There i s nothing i n the world bigger than the t i p of an autumn h a i r , and Mount T'ai i s t i n y . No one has l i v e d longer than a dead c h i l d , and P'eng-tsu died young.20 Heaven and earth were born at the same time I was, and the ten thousand things are one with me. (ch. 2, 43) Judging from these passages quoted above, we are tempted to conclude that both Emerson and Chuang Tzu are fundamentally the same i n t h e i r notion of tempo-spatial transcendence. However, a closer examination w i l l t e l l us that t h i s i s not necessarily true. The following are some examples which indicate other aspects of Emerson's concept ot time: Power ceases i n the instant of repose; i t resides i n the moment of t r a n s i t i o n from a past to a new state, i n the shooting of the gulf, i n the darting to an aim. ("Self-Reliance," I I , 69) The soul looketh steadily forwards, creating a -world before her, leaving worlds behind her. ("The Over-Soul," I I , 2 57) The gases gather to the s o l i d firmament: the chemic. lump arrives at the plant, and grows; arrives at the quadruped, and walks; arrives at the man, and thinks. ("Uses of Great Men," IV, 16-17) A subtle chain of countless rings The next unto the farthest brings;. The eye reads omens where i t goes, And speaks a l l languages the rose; And, s t r i v i n g to be man, the worm, Mounts through a l l the spires of form. (Nature, I, 7) Here we can detect a sense of progress and evolution, and i n t h i s sense Emerson's notion of time and history i s l i n e a r or at least s p i r a l , which, i n terms of space, i s directed upward. 45 In contrast to t h i s , Chuang Tzu's concept of time i s c y c l i c : "At the end no t a i l ; at the beginning, no head" (ch. 14, 156) "The Way i s without beginning or end. . . . Decay, growth, f u l l n e s s , and emptiness end : and then begin again" (ch. 17, 182) " jjGjgk j^-ifo . . . ^ j^LTst! /^\ "^n "; "Beginning and end are part of a single ring and no one can comprehend i t s p r i n c i p l e " (ch. 27, 305) | t S%[ % tifc •" What i s more in t e r e s t i n g i s that even though Chuang Tzu has an e v o l u t i o n i s t i c world-view, unlike that of Emerson, his does not place mankind at the summit. This would be a natural consequence of his notion of c y c l i c time. A good example of th i s i s i n chapter The seeds of things have mysterious workings. In the water they become Break Vine, on the edges of the water they become Frog's Robe. If they sprout on the slopes they become H i l l Slippers. If H i l l Slippers get r i c h s o i l , they turn into Crow's Feet. The roots of Crow's Feet turn into maggots and t h e i r leaves turn into b u t t e r f l i e s . Before long the b u t t e r f l i e s are transformed and turn into insects that l i v e under the stove; they look l i k e snakes and t h e i r name i s Ch'u-t'o. After a thou-sand days, the Ch'o-t'd insects become birds c a l l e d Dried Leftover Bones. The s a l i v a of the Dried Leftover Bones becomes Ssu-mi bugs and the Ssu-mi bugs become Vinegar Eaters. I-lo bugs are born from the Vinegar Eaters, and Huang-shuang bugs from Chiu-yu bugs. Chiu-yu bugs are born from Mou-jui bugs and Mou-jui bugs are born from Rot Grubs and Rot Grubs are born from Sheep's Groom. Sheep's Groom couples with bamboo that has not sprouted for a long while and produces Green Peace plants. Green Peace plants produce leopards and leopards produce horses and horses produce men. Men i n time return again to the mysterious workings. So a l l creatures come out of the mysterious workings and go back.into them again. (ch. 18, 195-196) If Emerson's time i s l i n e a r , at one l e v e l at l e a s t , or s p i r a l and that of Chuang Tzu i s c y c l i c , a s i m i l a r pattern seems to apply to t h e i r notion of space: Emerson's notion of space i s , so to say, l i n e a r ; that of Chuang Tzu, c i r c u l a r . This w i l l become clearer by examining the image of height used by them. Besides the.above-quoted poem used as an epigraph for Nature, we come across many other expressions of height i n Emerson's writings: "We ascend into t h e i r [Ideas'] region, and know that these are the thoughts of the Supreme Being" (Nature, I, 60-61); "Our being i s descending into us from we know not whence" ("The Over-Soul," I I , 252); " A l l things mount and mount" ('"Plato; or the Philosopher," IV, 68); " A l l things ascend, and the royal rule of economy i s that i t should ascend also, or, whatever we do must always have a higher aim" ("Wealth," VI, 121), Thus here again, as i n the case of the image of l i g h t , we can see the influence of 47 Platonism and Neo-Platonism working upon Emerson. Their favorite symbol for the absolute being i s the sun high up i n heaven,(cf. p. 28) and they often use the image of f l i g h t i n describing the soul's return from t h i s world to the realm of 21 the Idea or the One. The same can be said of Emerson, whose attention seems to be directed from one place (e.g., the earth) d i r e c t l y to another (e.g.,,the i d e a l world), thus making his notion of s p a t i a l transcendence l i n e a r . This w i l l become clearer i f we examine his concept of i n d i v i d u a l -ism i n terms of transcendence. F. 0. Matthiessen points out that one of the recurrent images i n Emerson i s taken from the l a s t sentence of P l o t i -nus' Enneads, which reads: "This, therefore, i s the l i f e of the Gods, and of divine and happy men; a l i b e r a t i o n from a l l terrene concerns, a l i f e unaccompanied with human pleasures, 22 and a f l i g h t of the alone to the alone." One of the best examples that r e f l e c t the image of "a f l i g h t of the alone to the alone" i n Emerson's writings would be the l a s t paragraph of his " I l l u s i o n s " : There i s no chance and no anarchy i n the universe. A l l i s system and gradation. Every god i s there s i t t i n g i n his sphere. The young mortal enters the h a l l of the firmament; there i s he alone with them alone, they pouring on him benedictions and g i f t s , and beckoning him up to t h e i r thrones. On the instant, and incessantly, f a l l snow-storms of i l l u s i o n s . . . . And when, by and by, for an instant, the a i r clears and the cloud l i f t s a l i t t l e , there are the gods s t i l l s i t t i n g around him on t h e i r thrones, — they alone with him alone. (VI, 308) It would not be d i f f i c u l t to replace Plotinus' "the alone" 48 and Emerson's "they alone" and "him alone" with "the i n d i -v i d ual." Thus we can see in.Emersonian transcendentalism a s t r a i g h t . l i n e stretching from one i n d i v i d u a l to another, from man as an i n d i v i d u a l on earth to the One, another i n d i v i d u a l , i n heaven or i n the noumenal world. Chuang Tzu's concept of space, i n contrast, seems to have a c i r c u l a r nature. I t i s true that, l i k e Emerson, he also uses the image of height to express his transcendence from the mundane world. Above a l l , the opening chapter of the nei p'ien ^ ^ (the inner chapters) starts with the story about the great b i r d P' eng which soars into the sky to move from the northern darkness to the southern darkness. Other examples are: "He [the Taoist sage] w i l l soon choose the day and ascend far o f f " (ch. 5, 69) "<$J_3^0(f] 7£.ft'L'" and "And after a thousand years, should he [the sage] weary of the world, he w i l l leave i t and ascend to the immortals, r i d i n g on those white clouds a l l the way up to the d i s t r i c t of God" 2 3 (ch., 12, 130) " [Z*lA^-fj%M i t ^ r f p - f c - ^ ^ k ^ ^ - ^ i ^ ^ ' " Moreover,. the word t'ien (-^ : l i t e r a l l y , 24 heaven) i s often used by Chuang Tzu. There are surely some evidences to show that Chuang Tzu's notion of space i s quite s i m i l a r to that of Emerson. However, we should also note that i n Chuang Tzu earthly images play an important r o l e . Before we give examples o f - t h i s , l e t us l i s t e n to what M. Fukunaga says about Chuang Tzu's transcendence. After describing the 49 unstable and miserable condition of the people i n the Warring States period i n ancient China, to which Chuang Tzu belonged, Fukunaga continues: The thought of Chuang Tzu and Lao Tzu ( j£$i ) was not that of hope and b e l i e f which praised the goodness and beauty of humanity, but rather i t was a philosophy of despair and unrest that lamented over the incurable grimness and darkness of the human condition. I t was also the philosophy of the oppressed who trembled with fear from poverty, shame, and punishments, rather than that of the rulers who were proud of t h e i r power and depended upon t h e i r wealth. It was not a quiet meditation, but a l i f e f u l l of v i c i s s i t u d e s that f i r s t existed in t h e i r thought. I t was not lib e r a t e d transcend-ence, but an inconvenient r e a l i t y that they had to deal with i n t h e i r philosophy at f i r s t . Their philosophy taught not the way to escape from the r e a l i t y of human society upward or outward, but the wisdom to pierce through down to the bottom of r e a l i t y . The freedom and transcendence of Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu l i e i n the action of going down to the bottom of r e a l i t y . Their transcendence was nothing but the f l i g h t toward the freedom that pierced through every l i m i t a t i o n on freedom 0#13») down to i t s bottom.25 This would be the nature of Chuang Tzu's transcendence, and probably t h i s i s why we often come across such paradoxical expressions as : "The sage leans on the sun and moon, tucks the universe under his arm, merges himself with things, leaves the confusion and muddle as i t i s , and looks on slaves as exalted" (ch. 2, 47) " % BR^fe t lB% $ ^  JiUfcfc ^ "; "His understanding was t r u l y trustworthy; his v i r t u e was perf e c t l y true. He never entered the realm of 'not-man'" (ch. 7, 92) " ^ ^ • ^ ^ ^ - S t f ? ^ : ^ \1&^k "; "He got r i d of the carving and polishing and returned to plainness, l e t t i n g his body stand alone l i k e a clod. In the midst of 50 entanglement he remained sealed, and i n t h i s oneness he ended his l i f e " (ch. 7, 97) " fli^Kfl^l^± & and "He [Chuang Tzu] came and went alone with the pure s p i r i t of Heaven and earth, yet he did not view the ten thousand things with arrogant eyes. He did not scold over 'right' and 'wrong,' but l i v e d with the age and i t s v u lgarity" (ch. 3 3 , 373) " >$fj ig. ^ \<L % iiC^^A.^^T^'Q^.." Chuang Tzu's transcendental man seems to f l y up into heaven on the back of the great b i r d P'eng to play with the sun and moon, yet as P'eng comes down to the southern darkness after the great f l i g h t , so does he come back to the earth (the s t a r t i n g point) to mingle with the s l a v e - l i k e l i f e of the ordinary people and to accept "the confusion and muddle as i t i s . " His goal i s his s t a r t i n g point; his i d e a l world i s right i n the middle of. the squalid r e a l i t y of everyday l i f e . Here i s the meaning of the c i r c u l a r nature of his space and transcendence. Both Emerson and Chuang Tzu regard the world as i l l u s i o n , the mirage of phenomena, but t h e i r approach toward i t i s d i f f e r e n t : Emerson sees a clear-cut d i s t i n c t i o n between this i l l u s i v e world and the r e a l world, the ordered realm of Idea where geometrical laws of necessity reign, and t r i e s to transcend the boundary to reach the l a t t e r once and for a l l . 2 6 For him "the v e i l of Maya must be pierced"; Chuang Tzu, on the contrary, finds his transcendence! by immersing himself in the confusion and entanglement of t h i s world ( i . e . , Chaos). 51 We have examined the notions of order and boundaries in Emerson and Chuang Tzu from the four points of view: language, v i s i o n , the mirror, and transcendence. We•have seen that although Emerson seemingly denies language, actually he i s attracted by i t and t r i e s to f i l l up the gaps brought about by language by using language. The same applies to v i s i o n and his notion of beauty. V i s i o n , l i k e language, i s a gap-maker, i . e . , a boundary-maker, i n this world. Out of the numerous boundaries, his v i s i o n chooses some and t r i e s to compose an order and harmony i n t h i s world. But this order and harmony, which i s his ideal,beauty, has a strong p r e d i l e c t i o n for geometrical symmetry and proportion and therefore leaves out those twisted and i r r e g u l a r bound-aries that do not f i t i n i t s geometric pattern. Because of th i s i r r e g u l a r i t y of the boundaries, he seems to conclude that this world i s imperfect.and i l l u s o r y . To him t h i s world i s a transient image r e f l e c t e d i n a mirror, and the r e a l world i s somewhere else or hidden behind the mirror,, the v e i l of Maya. Thus he has to choose either t h i s imper-fect world or that i d e a l world, and i f he would take the l a t t e r , he has to transcend t h i s world, that i s , he has to break through the mirror surface (the boundary) to reach the other world. In this sense Emerson's attitude toward order and boundaries can be said to be d u a l i s t i c and .following the either/or type of l o g i c . What would be the l o g i c of Chuang Tzu, then? To answer t h i s question l e t us b r i e f l y review his notion of order and boundaries. As i s clear from the story of Hun-tun (Chaos) quoted at the beginning of this chapter, Chuang Tzu strongly denies language, v i s i o n , and, for that matter, a l l other functions of the f i v e senses. His approach i s to be eyeless and immersed e n t i r e l y i n the speechless and b l i n d Chaos of Tao where.the boundaries among things are completely confused and disordered. Therefore he does not rej e c t what i s normally considered grotesque and ugly. I t looks ugly and disordered from the standpoint of the Emersonian notion of beauty and order that i s based on the symmetry and pro-portion of things. Actually for Chuang Tzu the true harmony and order may l i e i n asymmetry and disproportion. 1 As he says: He [the man of kingly Virtue] sees i n the darkest dark, hears where there i s no sound. In the midst of darkness, he alone sees the dawn; i n the midst of the soundless, he alone hears harmony. To see l i g h t i n the darkness ( i . e . , eyeless), to hear what i s soundless ( i . e . , speechless), and to hear harmony i n the soundless (Chaos) — these paradoxes are possible only when one places oneself at the boundary between two things such as l i g h t and darkness, speech and speechlessness, order and disorder. This would be what Chuang Tzu c a l l s l i a n g hsing 2 7 ^ (walking two roads) and he obviously i s following the (ch. 12, 128) 2- + *Bflf\**3t 53 non-dualistic both/and type of l o g i c . This i s a natural r e s u l t of his becoming one with Hun-tun, another name for the v e i l of Maya. To him, too, the world appears as Maya's v e i l , which i s woven with a countless number of threads ( i . e . , boundaries), some st r a i g h t , some entangled. However, unlike Emerson he does not pierce the v e i l ; he t r i e s to follow every thread in the v e i l whether i t i s twisted or s t r a i g h t . This seems to be his way of transcendence, and of finding order and harmony i n the universe. One of the good examples of t h i s kind of transcendental man would be Lord Wen-hui's cook in the t h i r d chapter of Chuang Tzu: Cook Ting was cutting up an ox for Lord Wen-hui. At every touch of his hand, every heave of his shoulder, every move of his feet, every thrust of his knee — z i p ! zoop! He s l i t h e r e d the knife along with a zing, and a l l was i n perfect rhythm, as though he were performing the dance of the Mulberry Grove or keeping time to the Ching-shou music. "Ah, t h i s i s marvelous!" said Lord Wen-hui. "Imagine s k i l l reaching such heights!" Cook Ting l a i d down his knife and r e p l i e d , "What I care about i s the Way, which goes beyond s k i l l . When I f i r s t began cutting up oxen, a l l I could see was the ox i t s e l f . A f t e r three years I no longer saw the whole ox. And now — now I go at i t by s p i r i t and don't look with my eyes. Perception and understanding have come to a stop and s p i r i t moves where i t wants. I go along with the natural makeup, s t r i k e i n the big hollows, guide the knife through the big openings, and follow things as they are. So I never touch the smallest-ligament or tendon, much less a main j o i n t . "A good cook changes his knife once a year because he cuts. A mediocre cook changes his knife once a month .— because he hacks* I've had t h i s . knife of mine for nineteen years and I've cut up thousands of oxen with i t , and yet the blade i s as good as though i t had just come from the grindstone. 54 There are spaces between the j o i n t s , and the blade of the knife has r e a l l y no thickness. If you in s e r t what has no thickness into such spaces, then there's plenty of room — more than enough for the blade to play about i t . That's why afte r nineteen years the blade of my knife i s s t i l l as good as when i t f i r s t came from the grindstone. "However, whenever I come to a complicated place, I size up the d i f f i c u l t i e s , t e l l myself.to watch out and be c a r e f u l , keep my eyes on what I'm doing, work very slowly, and move the knife with the greatest subtlety, u n t i l — f l o p ! the whole thing comes apart l i k e a clod of earth crumbling to the ground. I stand there holding the knife and look a l l around me, completely s a t i s f i e d and reluctant-to move on, and then I wipe off the knife and put i t away." "Excellent!" said Lord Wen-hui. "I have heard the words of Cook Ting and learned how to care for l i f e ! " (ch. 3, 50-51) + i t - f zA 5C QH £ L £ ^ L £ / | J 4$ n % a £ t ftmtf i t t i M j f o & i f t f ^ I L W ^ ffij ^ >«A I *L f k&-it.fr] ^  ^ / j ^4^31 *t**? ^  ^  ^ jfe s] & * i i t - r t flp jft * ^ ttfc + £4fr*£** NOTES TO CHAPTER I 115, "^ A. Wilden, System and Structure: Essays - i n Communi-cation and Exchange (London, 1977), p. 25. 2 There i s a n . i n t r i n s i c contradiction here, because Chuang Tzu i s negating language through language. Thus he i s at once denying and affirming language. This l o g i c a l inconsistency seems to come from the fundamentally contra-dictory nature of the universe. Further, discussion on t h i s point w i l l be done i n the following chapters (cf. pp. 67-68, 133). 3 Watson, t r . , The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, pp. 43-44. Figures i n parentheses after the quotations from the Chuang Tzu refer to t h i s e d i t i o n . 4 Needham, Science and C i v i l i s a t i o n m China, I I , p. 5 • -E. W.. Emerson and W. E. Forbes, eds. , The Journals  of Ralph Waldo Emerson, Vol. I (Boston and New York, 1909-1914), 14-15. ^F. O. Matthiessen, American Renaissance: Art and  Expression i n the Age of Emerson and Whitman (New York, 1966), p. 18. 7 With respect to t h i s , D. Ross says: "Both £ cS^J and [8£<i are derived from {.SfetV , 'to see,' and the o r i g i n a l meaning of both words i s no doubt ' v i s i b l e form,'" (Ross, Plato's Theory of Ideas [Oxford, 1951], p. 13) . g Matthiessen, p. 51 . 9 Ibid., p. 50. "^Cf. also Emerson's poem "Two Rivers." ^Emerson and Forbes, eds., Journals, VIII, 43-44. 12 I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note that immediately aft e r the passage quoted from Ross i n the above note (7), Ross continues: "Taylor made in Varia Socratica a comprehensive study of the usage of the words i n Greek l i t e r a t u r e before Plato, and came to the conclusion that the usage which we f i n d i n Plato and occasionally elsewhere has i t s o r i g i n i n a Pythagorean use of these terms i n the sense of geometrical 55 56 pattern or figure" (Ross, p. 13). Although C. M. G i l l e s p i e denies Taylor's conclusion, he s t i l l admits that Pythagorean elements i n Plato's idea seem to have been a " c o l l a t e r a l growth" (Ross, pp. 13-14). Ross also introduces H. C. Baldry's theory that "Plato's usage of the terms eUS"} and l£6<fi. , and indeed 'the fundamental p r i n c i p l e of Plato's meta-physics,' were reached by a fusion of Socrates' teaching about moral values with the Pythagorean teaching about number-patterns" (Ross, p. 14)>. Whether Plato's "idea" i s derived from Pythagorean geometrical{patterns or not, i t seems highly probable that Emerson's notion of v i s i o n and i t s cognate "idea" have a strong p r e d i l e c t i o n for geometry, judging from Emerson's remarks i n his journal for September, 1845: ". . . a n admirable passage concerning Plato's expres-sion that God geometrizes. — Morals, v o l . i i i " and from various other passages quoted from him;°in th i s thesis (cf. pp. 25-27, 76-78). I t i s i n th i s context that.we should interpret the word " c i r c l e " used by Emerson i n the quotations on page 2 6 of th i s t h esis, which, at f i r s t sight, seems to indicate his c i r c u l a r and c y c l i c notions of space and time. This int e r p r e t a t i o n may be v a l i d to some extent (cf. p. 81), but as we have seen above, Emerson's concept of c i r c l e seems to show a predominant i n c l i n a t i o n toward geometrical p r e c i -sion which seems to be inseparably connected with his concept of transcendence of the world, which, i n turn, makes his notion of space rather l i n e a r (cf. pp. 46-48). Cf. also F. Capra, The Tao of Physics (Berkeley, 1975), p. 257. 13 Cf. Brown, "Emerson's Platonism"; V. Hopkins, "Emerson and Cudworth: P l a s t i c Nature and Transcendental Art," American L i t e r a t u r e , 23 (1951), 80-98. 14 Matthiessen, pp. 68-70. 15 Brown, p. 326. "^Matthiessen, pp. 64-65. 17 My t r a n s l a t i o n based on Watson. 18 Needham, pp. 57ff. 1 9 I b i d . , p. 104. 20 Said to have l i v e d to an incredibly old age (Watson's note). 21 For example, in his Phaedrus, Plato writes: "The soul i n her t o t a l i t y has the care of inanimate being every-where, and traverses the whole heaven i n divers forms a p p e a r i n g ; — when perfect and f u l l y winged she soars 57 upward, and orders the whole world . . ." (B. Jowett, t r . , The Dialogues of Plato, Vol. I l l [Oxford, 1953], 153). And Plotinus writes i n his Enneads; "But how s h a l l we f i n d the way? What method can we devise? . . . This would be true advice, 'Let us f l y to our country 1" (A. H. Armstrong, Plotinus [London, 1953], p. 137). Cf. also .Plotinus' famous remarks at .the end of Enneads, quoted i n t h i s thesis (p. 47). 22 Matthiessen, p. 68. 23 My t r a n s l a t i o n , based on Watson. 24 Although the term t'ien l i t e r a l l y means heaven, i n r e a l i t y f or Chuang Tzu i t meant Nature. Cf. Chan,. A Source  Book i n Chinese Philosophy, pp. 190-193, 205-207; Watson, p. 25; Fung, Chuang Tzu, pp. 44-45. 25 M. Fukunaga, S5shi; Naihen (Tokyo, 1970), p. 153. Translation mine. A. Christy, The Orient i n American .Transcendentalism (New York, 1932), p. 123. Watson, p. 41. CHAPTER II ORDER AND LAW In the previous chapter we reached the conclusion that Emerson's notions of order and boundaries are e s s e n t i a l l y founded on the either/or type of l o g i c , whereas those of Chuang Tzu are founded on the both/and type,of l o g i c . These two types of lo g i c may also be c a l l e d the lo g i c of Logos and that of Chaos, respectively, and the difference between the two seems.to be re f l e c t e d i n Emerson's and Chuang Tzu's concepts of order and law. This chapter, then, w i l l attempt to show how Emerson's notions of law and order are fundamen-t a l l y Logocentric, while those of Chuang Tzu are Chaos-oriented. To further our discussion i t seem necessary to give a general d e f i n i t i o n of law i n i t s relationship to the notion of order. I t goes without saying that "law" i s an indispen-sable concept i n considering the notion of order, for the broadest d e f i n i t i o n of law i s that i t i s "a p r i n c i p l e that connotes order, whether t h i s be the order of the physical universe or that of mo r a l i t y . " 1 .It i s with t h i s basic d e f i -n i t i o n of law i n mind that we should begin our investigation of the concepts of law and order i n Emerson and Chuang Tzu. In the process of our examination we s h a l l focus our atten-ti o n on several aspects of law such as eternal law (divine 58 59 law), the laws of Nature (physical law), natural law (the law of reason), and human (positive) law. This chapter w i l l attempt to show how Emerson's notion of law and order i s e s s e n t i a l l y Logocentric, while that of Chuang Tzu i s Chaos-oriented. In the l a s t chapter we saw both Emerson's and Chuang Tzu's attitudes toward language: Emerson's approach toward language i s p o s i t i v e ; that of Chuang Tzu, negative. This difference seems to serve as a clue to understanding the notions of "divine law" i n the works of these two writers. In the Greco-philosophic and Judaeo-Christian t r a d i t i o n , t h i s divine law (principle) of the universe i s often expressed by the Greek word for language or speech, logos. Since Emerson shows a strong p r e d i l e c t i o n for speech, we may safely assume that his notion of-divine law would be Logos-oriented, whereas Chuang Tzu's negative approach to language requires us to search for another suitable term to describe 2 his concept.of "divine law;" The implications of such a term would of course be quite d i f f e r e n t from those of Logos. In order to continue our discussion of these points we need to c l a r i f y the meaning of the word logos. According to The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, the Greek noun logos, derived from the verb lego, "I say," has the following meanings : "word, speech, argument, explanation,. doctrine esteem, numerical computation, measure, proportion, plea, 3 p r i n c i p l e , and reason (whether human or d i v i n e ) . It i s 60 said that Heraclitus of Ephesus (c. 535-475 B.C.) f i r s t used the word logos to denote the divine law of the universe which i s i n a state of constant change. However, th i s i s refuted 4 by some scholars, and so i t may be safe not to draw any decisive conclusion concerning Heraclitus' "Logos-doctrine," except that Logos can mean "divine law" apart from the Heraclitean context. Logos has also been equated with Platonic Ideas, Neo-Platonic Nous (Reason), and with "the Word of God" i n the Gospel of St. John. The close relationship among Idea, Nous, and the Johannine Logos may be seen i n the following passage from F. C. Happold's Mysticism: A Study and an Anthology: It [Nous] i s the Divine Mind and also the World of Forms and Ideas i n the Platonic sense. . . . Chri s t i a n Neoplatonism equated the Logos of St. John's Gospel, the.Second Person of the T r i n i t y , the divine A c t i v i t y , the World P r i n c i p l e , the That which i s the basis of the manifold, and which was incarnate i n Jesus C h r i s t , with the Nous of Plotinus. Both Clement and Origen.call the Logos the Idea of Ideas.5 Needless to say, the connotations of Logos vary from one school to another. Nevertheless, as we can surmise from the above passage from Happold, there seems to be an obvious common denominator underlying these schools of thought and r e l i g i o n . As we have seen e a r l i e r (cf. p. 12, n. 2 ) , t h i s common feature seems to be the b i f u r c a t i n g as well as uniting function of Logos. We can see t h i s tendency toward d i v i s i o n underlying almost a l l the meanings of logos cited above. Furthermore, we should also remember.the following: Neo-Platonism i s derived from Platonism; many scholars agree that the author of the Johannine Gospel was well aware of, and most probably influenced by, the "Logos-doctrine" of Philo Judaeus, who attempted to synthesize Greek philosophy (especially that of Plato and the Stoics) and the B i b l i c a l t r a d i t i o n of the Word (Memra) of God through the doctrine of Logos. Thus we can say that Logos (Platonic and Neo-P l a t o n i c ) , Reason, language (word), and divine law are extremely close to each other in t h e i r connotations. With th i s preliminary consideration of Logos i n mind, l e t us f i r s t examine how closely i t i s related to the notion of order and divine law i n Emerson, who was both educated as-a C h r i s t i a n minister and influenced by Greek philosophy. Although Emerson seldom mentions the - term logos, he often uses other cognate words and expressions, such as reason, 7 8 i n t e l l e c t , idea, thoughts, the word, God, the Over-Soul, 9 Spxrxtual Laws, analogy, etc. The following two examples are from Nature and "Fate": Man i s conscious of a universal soul within or behind his i n d i v i d u a l l i f e , wherein, as in.a firma-ment, the natures of J u s t i c e , Truth, Love, Freedom, arise and shine. This universal soul he c a l l s — Reason. And the blue sky i n which the private earth i s buried, the sky with i t s eternal calm, and f u l l of everlasting orbs, i s the type.of Reason. That which i n t e l l e c t u a l l y considered we c a l l Reason, considered i n r e l a t i o n to nature, we c a l l S p i r i t . S p i r i t i s the Creator. S p i r i t hath >life i n i t s e l f . And man i n a l l ages and countries embodies i t i n his language as the Father. ( I , 33) History i s the action and reaction of these two — Nature and Thought; two boys pushing each other on the curbstone of the pavement. . . . Whilst the man i s weak, the earth takes up him. He plants his brain and affections. By and by he w i l l take up the earth, and have his gardens and vineyards i n the b e a u t i f u l order and productiveness of his thought. (VI, 46) Other examples are: "The i n t e l l e c t searches out the absolute order of things as they stand i n the mind of God, and without the colors of a f f e c t i o n " (Nature, I, 28); "In i n q u i r i e s respecting the laws of the world and the frame of things, the highest reason i s always the truest" (Ibid., 70); "But when the fact i s seen under the l i g h t of an idea, the gaudy fable fades and s h r i v e l s . We behold the r e a l higher law" (Ibid., 78); "That soul which within us i s a sentiment, outside of us i s a law" ("Compensation," I I , 99),; ". . . a man i s the word made f l e s h " ("Self-Reliance," I I , 75-76). Judging from these quotations, we can say that Emerson's notion of divine law and order i s best described by the term Logos, whose various meanings we have examined above. One things which should be noted i n passing, however, i s that although Logos has various connotations, most of them center around the mind or i n t e l l e c t . This i s c l e a r l y r e f l e c t e d i n the above passages quoted from Emerson, es p e c i a l l y i n the passage from "Fate." This p r e d i l e c t i o n for the mind would be the main reason why-, i n spite.of the considerable amount of emphasis placed on the importance of Nature,^ Emerson's notion of order and law tends to.be anthropocentric, and thus somewhat al i e n to the ideas of Chuang Tzu. Chuang Tzu's world view i s Nature-oriented, that i s , 63 Chaos-oriented. This becomes clearer when we examine his notion of "divine law" or "eternal law," and compare i t with Emerson's Logocentric concept of divine law. In the f i r s t place, l e t us determine whether Chuang Tzu's "eternal law" contains any elements that bear s i m i l a r -i t i e s with the concepts of Logos. One example would be the term l i _ , which Chuang Tzu often employs as an equivalent of Tao i n such expressions as t'ien l i (the p r i n c i p l e s of Heaven) , ta l i ££ (Great. Principle) , ch.'eng l i ifc £f. (the p r i n c i p l e s of growth) , wan wu chTh l i 7 f ^ $S£L (the p r i n c i p l e s of ten thousand things), and t'ien t i chih l i ^ - ^ t . 7L 5fL (the. p r i n c i p l e s of Heaven and Earth). According to Needham, the word l i . o r i g i n a l l y meant "the 'pattern' i n things, the markings i n jade or the fibrous texture of muscle, and only l a t e r acquired i t s standard dictionary meaning of ' p r i n c i -ple.'" 1"'" Later the concept of l_i was f u l l y developed by the Neo-Confucian,scholar Chu Hsi ^ . J - (1131-1200 A.D.), who attempted to r e v i t a l i z e the declining Confucianism of his time by borrowing various elements from Taoism and Buddhism. It i s beyond the scope of this thesis to present a detailed discussion of Chu Hsi's concept of L i here, but as Needham points out, i t i s obvious that a close connection exists between the Tao of the ancient Taoists and the L i of Chu 12 Hsi, and thus between the Taoist Lx and the L i of Chu Hsx. What i s notable here i s that, according to Needham, many occidental s i n o l o g i s t s translated Chu Hsi's L i into such Western terms as P l a t o n i c - A r i s t o t e l i a n Form, natural ( s c i e n t i f i c ) law, Vernunft (Reason), and the Stoic logos  spermatikos (the Seminal Logos) . Although Needham i s very-s k e p t i c a l about these translations and suggests his own 14 version " P r i n c i p l e of Organisation" instead, we cannot deny that the term l i £C has some elements that tempted Western scholars to equate i t with Logos, reason, form, and so on. Besides, the word l i i s used i n such a.modern Chinese expression as l i hsing ^•[t to mean " r a t i o n a l i t y " or "reason." Taking a l l these facts into consideration, i t seems that Chuang Tzu's L i , which doubtless i s one of the basic concepts for Chu Hsi's L i , has some aspects that remind us of the notion of Logos.. If we are to choose one concept from Chuang Tzu's terminology which would be s i m i l a r to the concept of Logos, then L i 2fL would be the best choice. In this sense we can say that Emerson's notion of eternal law and that of Chuang Tzu are s i m i l a r to each other. At the same time, however, we should not forget that L i i s subsumed i n Tao, which, i n Chuang Tzu, i s i d e n t i c a l with Hun-tun or Chaos —- the eyeless (dark), mouthless (speechless) primordial state of the universe. When dealt with on the same l e v e l , which Emerson often seems to do (cf. pp. 93 , 117 , 121-123-, 146-147 / 15Q-151-) , the two notions of Hun-tun (Chaos) and Logos seem to be incompatible, the prom-inent c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the l a t t e r being speech (whether human,or divine) and l i g h t (cf. Johannine Gospel). This i s one of the differences between Chuang Tzu's notion of eternal law and order represented by L i and Tao (Chaos), and the ideas of Emerson, which.are quite Logocentric, that i s , i n t e l l e c t u a l , speech-orientedand f u l l of images of l i g h t . There i s another difference between the two which seems to l i e i n the notion of Hun-tun. As we have seen i n the f i r s t chapter, Hun-tun i s a state of the universe i n which no clear-cut boundaries or d i s t i n c t i o n s . e x i s t s . Therefore, in a world view with Hun-tun as i t s center, no transcendental supreme being that exists apart from this world can be supposed, to say nothing of an anthropomorphic, c e l e s t i a l law-giver, whose vestiges are c l e a r l y seen in Emerson's notions of, a divine being and i t s law (cf. the 16 above quotation from Nature, I, 33). This seems to be another important difference between Chuang Tzu and Emerson concerning the notion of eternal law. The l a s t * but not l e a s t , difference between the two would be i n the anthropocentrism underlying the Logos-oriented notion of the divine law of Emerson. This anthro- . pocentrism seems to, have a close relationship with,the somewhat anthropomorphic nature of Emerson's c e l e s t i a l law-giver. If,.as i s the case with Emerson, there i s a d i r e c t connection between the divine law-giver (God) and man, even i f only i n the spheres of the mind, i n t e l l e c t , and s p i r i t , then i t i s quite natural that man i s considered to be the 66 center and the r u l e r of the universe. According to Emerson, ". . . a l l things preach the indifferency of circumstance. The man i s a l l " ("Compensation," I I , 116), and "He [man] i s placed i n the centre of beings,,and a ray of r e l a t i o n passes from every other being to him" (Nature, I, 33). This kind of anthropocentrism i s rarely seen in Chuang Tzu. One of the reasons for this can be seen i n the fact that Chuang Tzu's notion of eternal (or ultimate) law^ which i s based on Hun-tun (Chaos), does not presuppose any supreme being transcendent of t h i s world. Thus we can say that although Chuang Tzu's concept of eternal law resembles that of Emerson in i t s concept of L i , the resemblance i s a p a r t i a l one: the former i s Chaos-oriented, while the l a t t e r i s Logocentric. In order to further our discussion of the contrast between Chaos and Logos and i t s implications i n the notion of law and order in.the works of Emerson and Chuang Tzu, we need f i r s t to consider the attitude of each writer toward l o g i c . The word l o g i c (logikos) i s derived from logos which, as we saw above, means ordering p r i n c i p l e , and so, by examining.the nature of Emerson's and Chuang Tzu's l o g i c we can hope to c l a r i f y some aspects of t h e i r respective notions of order and law. In the l a s t chapter we reached the conclusion that Emerson's l o g i c shows an i n c l i n a t i o n toward the either/or type of l o g i c , whereas that of Chuang Tzu tends toward the both/and type of l o g i c . This difference seems to correspond to that between Logos and Chaos for the following reasons: since the etymological meanings of Logos are speech, word, gathering, counting, r a t i o , and measure, a l l of which are based on boundaries, Logos can be said to have a close 17 relationship with b i f u r c a t i o n , which i s the basis of the either/or type of l o g i c ; Chaos, on the other hand, has innumerable boundaries i n i t s e l f , and so by following every one of them, i . e . , by becoming one with Chaos, one can achieve cosmic harmony and order. This i s c a l l e d liang  hsing $\ <f=j (walking two roads) or the both/and type of l o g i c Thus we can say that Logos has a close r e l a t i o n to the l o g i c of either/or, and Chaos to that of both/and. It i s not d i f f i c u l t to see that the former type of l o g i c i s the basis for A r i s t o t e l i a n formal l o g i c which consists in the laws of i d e n t i t y , contradiction, and the excluded middle (thus we can see another correspondence between Logos and formal l o g i c ) , while the l a t t e r type of l o g i c leads us to a " l o g i c " which i s an exact reversal of formal l o g i c . (We may c a l l t his the l o g i c of Chaos.) In f a c t , i t i s not so much " l o g i c as a l o g i c a l contradiction by the standards.of formal l o g i c , as the following examples w i l l indicate. The f i r s t example can be seen i n Chuang Tzu's a t t i -tude toward language. In spite of his strong negation of language h e . s t i l l wrote a book, Chuang Tzu. Using language he denies language. Here we encounter a s i m i l a r inconsis-tency to that found i n such statements as-"I am l y i n g , " and 68 "Do not read t h i s sentence." This kind of paradox seems to l i e behind the so-called double binds (paradoxical injunc-tions) . Chuang Tzu had to commit t h i s l o g i c a l inconsistency, probably because, as w i l l become clearer i n the next chapter (cf. p. i33) , .the structure of the universe i t s e l f i s based on a double bind. For Chuang Tzu, one way to solve t h i s predicament i s to use the both/and type of l o g i c , which allows him to ignore what i s forbidden by the laws of contradiction and the excluded middle. By the standard of this l o g i c Chuang Tzu's attitude toward language i s not a contradiction. This l o g i c of Chuang Tzu seems to be r e f l e c t e d i n his l i t e r a r y device. Since he i s t r y i n g to express what i s e s s e n t i a l l y i n e f f a b l e , his language inevitably.becomes paradoxical and oblique. He usually does not make a s t r a i g h t -forward f r o n t a l attack on the point he intends to c l a r i f y , but rather employs' a negative approach using such means as the s a t i r i c a l yet humorous anecdote and the pseudological debate "that s t a r t s out sounding completely r a t i o n a l and sober, and ends by reducing language to a gibbering i n a n i t y . " 1 8 One of the examples of such pseudological discussions, which can also be another instance of Chuang Tzu's both/and type of l o g i c , . i s i n the well-known debate between Chuang Tzu and his f r i e n d , Hui Tzu %-\ ' Chuang Tzu and Hui Tzu were s t r o l l i n g along the 69 dam of the Hao River when Chuang Tzu said, "See how the minnows come out and dart around where they please! That's what f i s h r e a l l y enjoy!" Hui Tzu said, "You're not a f i s h — h o w do you know what f i s h enjoy?" Chuang Tzu said, "You're not I, so how do you know I don't know what f i s h enjoy?" Hui Tzu sai d , "I'm not you, so I ce r t a i n l y don't know what you know. On the other hand, you're c e r t a i n l y not a f i s h — so that s t i l l proves you don't know what f i s h enjoy!" Chuang Tzu said, "Let's go back to your o r i g i n a l question, please. You asked me how I know what f i s h enjoy —— so you already knew I knew i t when you asked the question. I know i t by standing here beside the Hao." (ch. 17, 188-189) To Hui Tzu, a renowned logican, Chuang Tzu's viewpoint i s sheer nonsense. I t vi o l a t e s the law of id e n t i t y (or contra-diction) by confusing subject and object, i . e . , Chuang Tzu and the f i s h , thus bringing disorder into the order of formal l o g i c . However, according,to Chuang Tzu, Hui Tzu's either/or type of l o g i c i s the very cause of the disorders brought about i n the Great Order of Nature or Hun-tun. The world of Hun-tun i s the place where the both/and type of epistemology holds true, where beings " f e e l " the inner correspondence and relationships among things rather than "speculate" or "ratiocinate" about the apparent d i s t i n c t i o n s 70 and oppositions between subject and object, man and Nature, God and the universe, etc. What Chuang Tzu i s interested i n seems to be the hidden relationships among things, the so-called " p a r t i c i p a t i o n mystique." Emerson's approach, i n contrast, seems to approximate that of Hui Tzu, but before we can reach t h i s conclusion we need to take a closer look at Emerson's l o g i c , for sometimes Emerson seems to assume exactly the same attitude as does Chuang Tzu toward the problem of l o g i c a l contradiction. For instance, i n "Self-Reliance" he writes: A f o o l i s h consistency i s the hobgoblin of l i t t l e minds, adored by l i t t l e statesmen and philosophers and divines. With consistency a great soul has simply nothing to do. He may as well concern himself with his shadow on the wall. Speak what you think now i n hard words and tomorrow speak what tomorrow thinks i n hard words again, though i t contradict every thing you said to-day. (II, 58) This would seem to be the source of the notorious i n c o n s i s t -ency i n Emerson's writings. It i s inevitable that they are inconsistent, because the author himself declares that he does not care about contradiction. And-this would also account for the rather rhapsodic and even fragmental tone often detectable i n his s t y l e . As 0. W. F i r k i n s points out, Emerson seems to have preferred short aphoristic sentences, 19 phrases, and anecdotes to long narratives. On t h i s point, too, Emerson seems to resemble Chuang Tzu, who seldom resorts to a long systematic exposition. In so far as we judge from the above consideration, i t seems that Emerson and Chuang Tzu agree with each other 71 in t h e i r attitude toward l o g i c : both seem to discard formal lo g i c i n favor of the both/and type of l o g i c . This assumption i s further strengthened when we read about the re v e l a t i o n a l experience Emerson had at the Zoological Garden i n Paris. In his journal for July 13, 1833, he writes about thie experience: Not a form so grotesque, so savage nor so b e a u t i f u l but i s an expression of some property inherent i n man the observer, — an occult r e l a t i o n between the very scorpions and man. I f e e l the centipede i n me —— cayman, a carp, eagle and fox. I am moved by strange sympathies, I say continually "I w i l l be a n a t u r a l i s t . " A s i m i l a r tenet echoes throughout Nature, which was published a few years aft e r his t r i p to Paris. For example, he says: The greatest delight which the f i e l d s and woods minister i s the suggestion.of an occult r e l a t i o n between man and the vegetable. I am not alone and unacknowledged. They nod to me and I to them. (I, 16) Reading these passages, we cannot help being convinced that Emerson, too, has a sort of " p a r t i c i p a t i o n mystique" which i s not unlike that of Chuang Tzu. But how can we reconcile this kind' of world view of Emerson, which seems to be based on the l o g i c of both/and, and the other aspect of Emerson's lo g i c — the l o g i c of either/or, which tends to separate man from Nature, and Nature from the divine being (the S p i r i t ) ? Is one of them our misinterpretation, or, considering Emerson's defiance of contradiction, are we to say that both of them are true? There seem to be two possible answers to this question, both of which are closely i n t e r r e l a t e d : the 72 f i r s t l i e s i n the way Emerson defines Nature; the second, i n his anthropocentrism. According to V. C. Hopkins, Emerson makes a d i s t i n c t i o n between two aspects of Nature: "Lower-case 'nature' (natura naturata), the material aspects, i n so far as they are unchanged by man, i s distinguished from 'Nature' i n upper case (natura naturans) , the S p i r i t which passes through material objects and also through man's 20 w i l l . " In Nature and "Nature," respectively, Emerson writes: Philosophically considered, the universe i s com-posed of Nature and the Soul. S t r i c t l y speaking, therefore, a l l that i s separate from us, a l l which Philosophy distinguishes as the NOT ME, that i s , both nature and art, a l l other men and my own body, must be ranked under th i s name, NATURE. (I, 10-11) At the gates of the forest, the surprised man of the world i s forced to leave his c i t y estimates of great and small, wise and f o o l i s h . . . . Here i s sanctity which shames our r e l i g i o n s , and r e a l i t y which d i s c r e d i t s our heroes. Here we f i n d Nature to be the circumstance which dwarfs every other circumstance, and judges l i k e a god a l l men that come to her. ( I l l , 163-164) "Nature" i n the f i r s t passage would correspond to the lower-case Nature, and "Nature" i n the second quotation, to the upper-case Nature. This d i s t i n c t i o n between the two kinds of Nature seems to be an inevitable consequence of Emerson's Idealism that separates the S p i r i t (or Soul) from matter and sets the former i n a higher po s i t i o n than the l a t t e r . From here arises his anthropocentrism, for according to Emerson ". . . within man i s the soul of the whole; . . . the eternal One" ("The Over-Soul," I I , 253), and "Ineffable i s the union of man and God i n every act of the soul" (Ibid., 274). We1 should also note "here that, as we have seen e a r l i e r , Emer-son's notion of the soul (or s p i r i t ) i s inseparable from that of Logos, which i s also the basis of the laws of formal lo g i c that exclude contradiction. From these considerations of Emerson's concepts of Nature, S p i r i t , Logos, and man, we may draw two assumptions which seem to provide answers to the question raised above: one i s that Emerson seems to consider the upper-case Nature (or the S p i r i t ) to be free from contradiction; the other i s that for him man as an embodiment of Logos and thus the center of the universe seems to have a s p e c i a l kind of r e l a t i o n to the universe, and th i s r e l a t i o n seems to be rather d i f f e r e n t from the " p a r t i c i p a t i o n mystique" we saw between Chuang Tzu and the f i s h i n the aforementioned anecdote. The f i r s t assumption can be proved by a passage Emerson wrote a few sentences aft e r his condemnation of con-sistency which we quoted above: In t h i s pleasing contrite wood-life which God allows me, l e t me record day by day my honest thought without prospect or retrospect, and, I cannot doubt, i t w i l l be found symmetrical, though I mean i t not and see i t not. ("Self-Reliance," I I , 59) Emerson can laugh away inconsistency, probably because he firmly believes i n the consistency of the S p i r i t or God that works through the human mind. What i s noteworthy here i s that his notion of God i s rather Logocentric, i . e . , l o g i c a l i n the sense of formal l o g i c . For a further i l l u s t r a t i o n of 74 this point l e t us quote another passage from "The American Scholar," where.Emerson describes the c l a s s i f y i n g function of the human mind which "goes on tying things together, diminishing anomalies, discovering.roots running under ground whereby contrary and remote things cohere and flower out from one stem." He continues: I t [the human mind] presently learns that since the dawn of history.there has been a constant accumulation and c l a s s i f y i n g of facts. But what i s c l a s s i f i c a t i o n but the perceiving that these objects are not chaotic, and are not foreign, but have a law which i s also a law of the human mind? ( I f 87) . Emerson believes that the human mind has a c l a s s i f y i n g and ordering power,.and that seemingly chaotic things can.be put into order by thi s power. Thus, we can say that Emerson's notion of order and divine law i s e s s e n t i a l l y based on the logic of Logos and not on that of Chaos. Emerson's idea that the human mind c l a s s i f i e s and un i f i e s things which are i n a chaotic state seems to have a close connection with the second assumption mentioned above — the assumption that Emerson's " p a r t i c i p a t i o n mystique" might be d i f f e r e n t from that of Chuang Tzu. Immediately af t e r the passage quoted above (cf. p. 61) concerning the analogies among Reason, sky, i n t e l l e c t , Nature, soul, Creator, and Father, Emerson continues: I t i s e a s i l y seen that there i s nothing lucky or capricious i n these analogies, but that they are constant, and pervade nature. These are not the dreams of a few poets, here and there, but man i s an analogist, and studies relations i n a l l objects. 75 He i s placed i n the centre of beings, and a ray of r e l a t i o n passes from every other being to him. And neither can man be understood without these -objects, nor these .objects without man. (Nature, I, .33) In t h i s quotation the word "analogies" seems to be important, for the word analogy i t s e l f comes from ana logon "according to logos ( r a t i o ) . " Thus, i t seems quite natural for Emerson, whose notion of human beings i s Logos-oriented, to state that "man i s an analogist." To Emerson, man i s an analogist who uses his reason (logos) to detect relations and ra t i o s (logos) among things and c l a s s i f i e s , u n i f i e s , and orders them. Therefore, as Emerson says i n the above quotation, "He i s placed i n the centre of beings, and a ray of r e l a t i o n passes from every other being to him." The r e l a t i o n which Emerson sees between himself and the.objects in the world seems to be an analogical one. He projects the logos (proportionate pattern, principle) i n his brain onto the outer world. I t seems that what Emerson, saw i n the insects and animals at the Zoological Garden i n Paris was nothing but the image of his own. face — a human face which was well-ordered and followed the laws of Logos. In his essay "Nature," he says, "Man imprisoned, man c r y s t a l l i z e d , man vegetative, speaks to man impersonated" (III, 188). I t i s a human being as Logos made fl e s h that i s central i n Emerson's idea of correspondence between man and Nature. This seems to be the difference between the " p a r t i c i p a t i o n mystique." of Emerson and that of Chuang Tzu, which i s based on the l o g i c of Chaos. 76 So far we have examined the notion of divine law and order i n Emerson and Chuang Tzu through the contrast between the l o g i c of Logos and that of Chaos. The difference between the two types of l o g i c i s r e f l e c t e d i n their.notion of " p a r t i c i p a t i o n mystique": Emerson tends to see an analogy between man and other objects i n the world and between man and a divine being, whereas th i s kind of correspondence can scarcely.be found i n Chuang Tzu who does not recognize any supreme being whether outside or inside the universe. If we look at the concept of analogy from a.different angle we may fi n d another contrast between Emerson and Chuang Tzu concerning t h e i r notions of divine law and order. As the etymology of ana logon (according to ratio) indicates, the word analogy i s o r i g i n a l l y a term of geometry. Therefore, i t i s quite probable that geometrical elements w i l l be found i n Emerson's notion of analogy, just as they are in. his-, concept Of beauty. For example, i n "Plato; or the Philosopher," Emerson quotes from Plato's analogy.of a l i n e divided into four proportionate parts which Plato used to explain the relationship between the phenomenal world and the idea world. After t h i s quotation Emerson comments: To these four sections, the four operations of the soul correspond, — conjecture, f a i t h , understanding, reason. As every pool r e f l e c t s the image of the sun, so every thought and thing restores us an image and creature of the supreme Good. The uni-verse i s perforated by a m i l l i o n channels for his a c t i v i t y . A l l things mount and mount. (IV, 68) Plato's geometrical analogy of the l i n e seems to have had an influence on Emerson and can be seen i n the following statements: "With a geometry of sunbeams the soul lays the foundations of nature" ("Intellect," I I , 322); "The astronomer discovers that geometry, a pure abstraction of the human mind, i s the measure of planetary motion" ("The American Scholar," I, 87); "A man does not t i e his shoe without recognizing laws which bind the farthest regions of nature: moon, plant, gas, c r y s t a l , are concrete geometry and numbers" ("Nature," I I I , 176); and "The American who has been confined, i n his own country, to the sight of buildings designed af t e r foreign models, i s surprised on entering York Minster or St. Peter's at Rome, by the f e e l i n g that these structures are imitations also, — f a i n t copies of an i n v i s i b l e archetype".(Nature, I, 71). Although Emerson does not use the word "geometry" i n the l a s t passage, i t i s obvious from the other passages quoted here that what he c a l l s "an i n v i s i b l e archetype" has a strong p r e d i l e c t i o n for geometrical symmetry and proportion, which are also important elements of architecture. Thus we can say that one of the aspects of Emerson's notion of law (especially that of divine law) i s i t s geometrical nature. Furhjtermore, we should note i n the l a s t passage quoted above the pragmatic and aesthetic nature of architecture. I t seems that in Emerson the laws of geometry which are a prominent feature of his notion of divine law underlie both his aesthetics and his pragmatism, namely, his notion of 78 fine and of useful a r t s . To give a few examples-of t h i s , we have: Thus architecture i s c a l l e d "frozen music," by De Stael and Goethe. Vitruvius thought an architect should be a musician. "A Gothic church," said Coleridge, " i s a p e t r i f i e d r e l i g i o n . " Michael Angelo maintained that, to an architect a knowledge of anatomy i s es s e n t i a l . (Nature, I, 49) Herein we have an.explanation of the necessity that reigns i n a l l the kingdom of Art. A r i s i n g out of eternal Reason, one and perfect,.whatever i s be a u t i f u l rests on the foundation of the necessary. Nothing i s ar b i t r a r y , nothing i s insulated i n beauty. It depends forever on the necessary and the useful. . . . Fitness i s so inseparable an accompaniment of beauty, that i t has been taken for i t . The most perfect form to answer an end i s so far b e a u t i f u l , ("Art," VII, 55) Moller, i n his Essay on Architecture, taught that the building which was f i t t e d accurately to answer i t s end would turn out to be be a u t i f u l though beauty had not been intended. I f i n d the l i k e unity i n human structures rather v i r u l e n t and pervasive; that a crudity in the blood w i l l appear in the argument; a hump i n the shoulder w i l l appear in the speech and handiwork. If his mind could be seen, the hump would be seen. ("Fate," VI, 47-48) In the f i r s t passage we should note the s i m i l a r i t i e s between music-and architecture in that both follow mathematical, geometrical laws (e.g., symmetry, proportion, harmony, rhythm, et c . ) . • In the second quotation the word necessity has a strong association with geometrical necessity, which i s based on reason ( r a t i o ) . And i n the l a s t passage our attention i s drawn to the fact that the (geometrical) exact-ness of architecture as well as usefulness and beauty are treated synonymously, while a hump, which reminds -us of the deformed sage i n Chuang Tzu's parable quoted i n Chapter I, 79 i s thought to symbolize inaccuracy, uselessness, and ugliness — a l l of which are negative q u a l i t i e s . As i s clear from the above examination, there seems to be a close connection between Emerson's pragmatism and the laws of geometry, which* according to him,.have t h e i r basis i n the realm of Ideas. On the other hand, i f Chuang Tzu's concept of "eternal law" i s Chaos-oriented, t h i s i s l i k e l y to be r e f l e c t e d i n his views on pragmatism (useful-ness) and geometrical law, thi s l a t t e r we have already considered i n connection with Chuang Tzu's notion of beauty in the l a s t chapter. The following are two examples taken from Chuang Tzu to c l a r i f y the point i n question:• Hui Tzu said to Chuang Tzu, "I have a big tree of the kind men c a l l shu. Its trunk i s too gnarled and bumpy to apply.a measuring l i n e to, i t s branches too bent and twisty to match up to a compass or square. You could stand i t by the road and no carpenter would look at i t twice. Your words, too, are big and useless, and so everyone ali k e spurns them!" Chuang Tzu said, ". . . Now you have this big tree and you're distressed because i t ' s useless. Why don't you plant i t i n Not-Even-Anything. V i l l a g e , or the f i e l d of Broad-and-Boundless,.relax and do nothing by i t s side* or l i e down for a-free and easy sleep under i t ? . Axes w i l l never shorten i t s l i f e , nothing can ever harm i t . If there's no use for i t , how can i t come to g r i e f or pain?" (ch. 1, 35) 80 If we must use curve and plumb l i n e , compass and square to make something r i g h t , this means cutting away i t s inborn nature; i f we must use cords and knots, glue and lacquer to make something firm, this means v i o l a t i n g i t s natural Virtue. So the crouchings and bendings of r i t e s and music, the smiles and beaming looks of benevolence and righteousness, which are intended to comfort the hearts of the world, i n fact destroy t h e i r constant naturalness. (ch. 8, 100) Thus we can say that i n Chuang Tzu geometrical laws and the usefulness associated with them are denied as being detrimental to the spontaneous outflow of the inborn, nature of things. I t seems that for Chuang Tzu geometrical laws are not the true laws of the universe, and usefulness which follows the laws of geometry i s not r e a l usefulness. For Chuang Tzu true usefulness seems t o . l i e i n what appears to be useless and meaningless, and the ultimate law of the uni-verse i s something quite d i f f e r e n t from the Logos-oriented laws of geometry. Emerson's notion of divine law which i s both Logocentric and geometric seems to be somewhat mechanical when compared with that of Chuang Tzu, which has close t i e s with Chaos. The elements of mechanical and deterministic laws of geometry seen i n Emerson's notion of divine law further lead us to another topic: causality and the laws of Nature (physical laws). Emerson seems to have two seemingly contradictory 81 views on causality. The f i r s t i s that things are so i n t e r -related and complicated that i t i s impossible to detect the f i r s t cause i n t h i s universe. The second i s that there i s an ultimate cause somewhere and by r e a l i z i n g t h i s cause one can.predict the future exactly. The f i r s t - k i n d of causality, which seems to.be close to that of Chuang Tzu, i s seen, for instance, i n such passages as: "This knot of nature i s so well t i e d that nobody was ever cunning enough to f i n d the two ends. Nature i s i n t r i c a t e , over-lapped, inter-weaved and endless" ("Fate," VI, 40); "The s i m p l i c i t y of nature i s not that which may e a s i l y be read, but i s inexhaustible" ("Spiritual Laws," I I , 131); and "What i s nature to him? There i s never a beginning, there i s never an end, to the inexplicable continuity of this web of God . . . " ("The American Scholar," I, 86-87). However, Emerson's f i n a l conclusion,about causality seems to be the second type mentioned above, for a few sentences after the l a s t passage quoted here Emerson writes, ". . . i n the mass and i n the p a r t i c l e , Nature hastens to render account of herself to the mind. C l a s s i f i c a t i o n begins" (I, 87). Here we can detect a sign of Emerson's Idealism. For him there seems to be nothing that cannot be known to the human mind which i s d i r e c t l y connected to the idea world, the realm of the eternal law. In the same essay quoted above, he says: He s h a l l see that nature i s the opposite of the soul, answering to i t part for part. One i s seal 82 and one i s p r i n t . Its beauty i s the beauty of h i s \ own mind. Its laws are the laws of his own mind. Nature then becomes to him the measure of his attainments. So much of nature as he i s ignorant of, so much of his own mind does he not yet possess. (I, 88) Needless to say, i n Emerson the human soul belongs-to God or the Over-Soul. This i s why he writes about the human soul ascending to the Supreme Mind, "the center of the world, where, as i n the closet of God, we see causes, and anticipate the universe, which i s but a slow e f f e c t " ("The Over-Soul," I I , 259). Another thing we should note about Emerson's causality i s that i s i s mechanistic and deterministic, that i s , i t i s "Newtonian." The following are a few examples which i l l u s t r a t e t h i s point: "The problem of philosophy," according to Plato, " i s , for a l l that exists c o n d i t i o n a l l y , to f i n d a ground unconditioned and absolute." It proceeds on the f a i t h that a law determines a l l phenomena, which being known, the phenomena can be predicted. . . . In physics, when thi s [to grasp the laws of Nature] i s attained, the memory disburdens i t s e l f of i t s cumbrous catalogues of p a r t i c u l a r s , and carries centuries of observation i n a single formula. (Nature, I,.59-60) That famous aboriginal push propagates i t s e l f through a l l the b a l l s of the system, and through every atom of every b a l l ; through a l l the races of creatures, and through the history and performances of every i n d i v i d u a l . ("Nature," I I I , 177) The world i s mathematical, and has no casualty i n a l l i t s vast and flowing curve. . . . A man hardly knows how much he i s a machine u n t i l he begins to make telegraphy, loom, press, and locomotive, in his own image.. ("Power," VI, 80-81) Besides these examples, we come across other passages, such 83 as: ". . . these ' f i t s of easy transmission and r e f l e c t i o n , ' as Newton c a l l e d them, — are the law of nature because they are the law of s p i r i t " ("The American Scholar," I, 99); "I look for the new Teacher that . . . s h a l l see the i d e n t i t y of the law of gravitation,with :purity of heart" ("Divinity School Address," I, 148); "What avails i t to f i g h t w i t h the eternal laws of mind, which adjust the r e l a t i o n of a l l persons to each other by the mathematical measure of t h e i r havings and beings?" ("Spiritual Laws," I I , 142); "These, [famine, typhus, f r o s t , war, etc.] are pebbles from the mountain, hints of the terms by which our l i f e i s walled up, and which show a kind of mechanical exactness" ("Fate," VI, 24); " A l l successful men have agreed i n one t h i n g — they were causationists" ("Power," VI, 56); and "There i s no chance and no anarchy i n the universe. A l l i s system and gradation" ("Illusions," VI, 308). Although,, i n the l a s t passage above, Emerson says that "there i s no chance and no anarchy i n the universe" and in "Fate" he describes the unsurmountable power of fate, circumstance, and the necessities of material Nature, he still.seems to believe in.the freedom of human beings. This i s clear from his b e l i e f i n the human hind and i t s d i r e c t r e l a t i o n with God or the S p i r i t which we have seen b r i e f l y above. For him, "Man i s not order of nature . . . but a stupendous antagonism, a dragging together of the poles of the Universe" ("Fate,""VI, 27), and "We are as law givers; 84 we speak for Nature; we prophesy and divine" (Ibid., 30). According to Emerson, i t i s because human beings have i n t e l -l e c t and s p i r i t that they do not belong to Nature, but stand above i t as lawgivers. This i s further i l l u s t r a t e d by other statements such as: " I n t e l l e c t annuls Fate. So far as a man thinks, he i s free" ("Fate," VI, 27); "Thought dissolves the material universe by.carrying the mind up into a sphere-where a l l i s p l a s t i c " (Ibid., 32); and "Fate then i s a name for facts.not yet passed under the f i r e of thought; for causes which are unpenetrated" (Ibid.,. 35). Thus we can say that i n Emerson's ideas.of causality and freedom, there i s a strong p r e d i l e c t i o n for a.bifurcation between s p i r i t and matter, between upper-case'Nature (natura  naturans) and lower-case Nature (natura naturata), and between man and material Nature. In Emerson human beings tend to.stand apart from material Nature i n order to observe and control i t by means of t h e i r own w i l l much as they would manipulate machinery. In this sense Emerson's notion of causality i s not far from that of Newton, who contends that there exists a r a t i o n a l order i n Nature and thus given certain conditions.(e.g., the aboriginal push) the future of the universe i s predictable through and through. Chuang Tzu, on the other hand, seems to have a rather d i f f e r e n t type of causality from that of Emerson. To put i t paradoxically yet more exactly, i n Chuang Tzu's world view there seems to be no such thing as causality i n the sense 85 that "a d e f i n i t e cause gives r i s e . t o a d e f i n i t e e f f e c t , so that the future of any part of a system can be predicted with absolute certainty i f i t s state at any time i s known i n 21 a l l d e t a i l s . " Chuang Tzu's notion of "causality" and "the laws of Nature" seems to be closer to that of the uncertainty p r i n c i p l e in modern physics rather than to the mechanistic determinism of Newton. There are at least three reasons for t h i s . In the f i r s t place, as we saw i n the l a s t chapter Chuang Tzu's concepts of space and time are c i r c u l a r and c y c l i c ; This means that the beginning (cause) and the end (effect) are ultimately one and the same, and so i t does not make.sense to t a l k about causality i n terms of l i n e a r notion of space and time, where cause and e f f e c t , the observer and the observed, man and the rest of the world, the supreme being and the universe, tend.to become-separated and independent from each other.. The second reason, which i s closely connected with the f i r s t , i s that i n Chuang Tzu we seldom come across-the notion of supreme being or of a creator of the universe. This has already been mentioned e a r l i e r i n t h i s chapter, but to add a few more examples, we have the following passages: Tzu-ch'i said, "The Great Clod belches out breath and i t s name i s wind. So long.as i t doesn't come forth , nothing happens. But when i t does, then ten thousand hollows begin crying w i l d l y . Can't you hear them,.long drawn out? . . . " Tzu-yu said, "By the piping of earth, then, you mean simply [the sound of] these hollows, and by the piping of man [the sound of] flu t e s and whis-. t i e s . But may I ask about the piping of Heaven?" 86 Tzu-ch'i said, "Blowing on the ten thousand things i n a d i f f e r e n t way, so that each can be i t s e l f — a l l take what they want for themselves, but who does the sounding?" 2 2 (ch. 2, 36-37) ^ ^ 4 ^ ; t f f 4- - - - 3- ^  s it $ m< Great Impartial Accord said, "Chickens squawk, dogs bark — t h i s i s something men understand. But no matter how great t h e i r understanding, they cannot explain in. words how the chicken and the dog have come to be what they are, nor can they imagine i n t h e i r minds what they w i l l become in.the future. You may pick apart and analyze t i l l you have reached what i s so minute that i t i s without form, what i s so large that i t cannot be encompassed. But whether you say that 'nothing does i t ' or that 'something makes i t l i k e t h i s , ' you have not yet escaped from.the realm of 'things,' and so i n the end you f a l l into error." (ch. 25, 292) In such a world view as we see i n these quotations there can. be no f i r s t cause or prime mover of the universe. Everything happens naturally and spontaneously. This i s what Chuang Tzu c a l l s tzu jan fe,^ (What-is-so-of-itself or a s - i t - i s -ness). The squawking of chickens and the barking of dogs are, as they are, Tao, and there i s no need to suppose a "prime mover" behind them such as i s seen behind the rhodora in Emerson's poem. (cf. p. 2 4). 87 The t h i r d reason-why Chuang Tzu does not have causal-i t y i n the usual sense seems to l i e i n the s o c i a l milieu i n which he l i v e d . We have seen i n the passage quoted from Fukunaga (cf. p. 49) that Chuang Tzu's times were those of . p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l upheaval. Wars, famine, heavy taxation, and every other conceivable disaster and misery assailed the people. I t i s not very d i f f i c u l t to imagine that these unstable s o c i a l conditions had a great e f f e c t upon people's minds. Unlike Emerson, who- seems to believe... in'the certainty and brightness of the human mind, Chuang Tzu seems to pay much more attention to i t s grimness and darkness. He writes, "The mind of man i s more perilous than mountains or r i v e r s , harder to understand than Heaven" (ch. 32, 358) " H / C - ' v j r ) ^ ^ JJA ^ ) f l ^ * u ," and "At r e s t , i t [the mind] i s deep-fathomed and s t i l l ; i n movement, i t i s far-flung as the heavens, racing and galloping out of reach of a l l bounds. This indeed i s the mind of manj" (ch. 11, 116) " ^ y ^ ^ i J ^ « ? P ^ $ M}^ ^ ^ ^ A ' H " •" m such a chaotic and unstable world, i t would be d i f f i c u l t to hold a view which presupposes a universe that i s well,ordered and mechan-i c a l l y determined by Newtonian causality. Such a causality can scarcely predict the exact course of a piece of paper blown i n a gust of wind or that of a microscopic p a r t i c l e i n the Brownian movement on the surface of water. The fate - of people i n the Warring States period i s l i k e l y to have been very much l i k e t h i s piece of paper or the minute p a r t i c l e . 88 Considering these reasons mentioned above, we may safely say. that Chuang Tzu's notions of "causality" and "the laws of. Nature" seem to be closer to that of the uncertainty p r i n -c i p l e which t e l l s us that the absolute precise location and d i r e c t i o n (velocity) of an object at a given moment cannot be determined simultaneously, because the observer (e.g., the ^-rays or the X-rays from an " i d e a l " microscope) inev-i t a b l y affects and changes the future course of the object 23 observed (e.g., photons or electrons). The nature of Chuang Tzu's "causality" seems to be r e f l e c t e d in. his notion of freedom. As we saw i n the quo-tatio n from Fukunaga i n Chapter I, Chuang Tzu sought freedom not outside t h i s world but inside i t . Perhaps t h i s attitude r e f l e c t s the severe conditions of his times, which were so pressing that he had l i t t l e opportunity to speculate upon, an i d e a l world transcendent of his society. I t seems that to Chuang Tzu human,existence was inescapably ensnared i n the v e i l of Maya or Fate, that i s , i n the uncertain state of the chaotic society of the time. I t would have been almost impossible for him to step out of the tangled net of Fate i n order to speculate upon ways to control the confusion and put i t into order. Instead, Chuang Tzu plunged into the chaos and followed every thread of the net. This seems to have been his transcendence and freedom. We saw t h i s kind of transcendental man i n the parable of the cook Ting quoted at the end of the previous chapter. The following i s another 89 example of a man of this type: [ A l l at once Master Ytf f e l l i l l and his body was completely deformed: his back st i c k s up l i k e a hunchback and his v i t a l organs are on top of him; his chin i s hidden i n his navel, his shoulders are up above his head and his pig t a i l points at the sky. His fr i e n d Master Ssu Comes and asks him i f he resents i t . Thereupon Master Yii answers: ]^4 "Why no, what would I resent? If the process continues, perhaps i n time h e ' l l [the Creator w i l l ] 2 5 transform my l e f t arm into a rooster. In that case I ' l l keep watch on the night. Or perhaps i n time h e ' l l transform my r i g h t arm into a crossbow p e l l e t and I ' l l shoot down an owl for roasting. Or perhaps i n time h e ' l l transform my buttocks into cartwheels. Then, with my s p i r i t for a horse, I ' l l climb up and go for a r i d e . What need w i l l I ever have for a carriage again? "I received l i f e because the time had come; I w i l l lose i t because the order of things passes on. Be.content with this time and dwell i n thi s order and then neither sorrow nor joy can touch you. In ancient times th i s was c a l l e d the 'freeing of the bound.' There are those who cannot free themselves, because they are bound by things. But nothing can ever win against Heaven — that's the way i t ' s always been. What would I have to resent?" (ch. 6, 84-85) m ^ T tfe % % <*• *n ^ J* ^ As we can see by the above consideration, the impor-tant differences between Emerson and Chuang Tzu concerning t h e i r notion of the laws of Nature are as follows: Emerson believes i n the r a t i o n a l order of Nature and the freedom of 90 human beings i n . i t ; Chuahg Tzu regards the universe as "chaotic," at least to the human mind, and the freedom of man as an i n d i v i d u a l to control the outer world i s incon-ceivable. These differences seem to be r e f l e c t e d i n t h e i r respective notions of p o s i t i v e (or human) law, for p o s i t i v e law i s based upon the freedom of the i n d i v i d u a l . At f i r s t sight, Emerson seems to be denying p o s i t i v e law. He says: ". . . the moment he [man] acts from himself, tossing the laws, the books, i d o l a t r i e s and customs out of the window, we pity, him no more but thank and revere him" ("Self-Reliance, I I , 76); ". . .no forms, neither constitu-t i o n , nor laws, no covenants, nor churches, nor b i b l e s , are of any use i n themselves" ("The Fugitive Slave Law," XI, 220-221); and "Every soul i s by th i s i n t r i n s i c necessity q u i t t i n g i t s whole system of things, i t s friends and home and laws and f a i t h . . . because i t no longer admits i t s growth" ("Compensation," I I , 119-120). On the .other hand, Emerson sometimes makes statements that suggest a favorable attitude toward s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s and t h e i r laws. We have already seen this i n his attitude toward private property i n Chapter I (pp. 34-35). He also shows the same viewpoint i n his "Wealth," where he advocates free competition under "equal laws" that "secure l i f e and property" (VI, 104). One of the reasons for th i s attitude . seems to be his "individualism" while another reason, 91 inseparable from the f i r s t , seems to l i e i n his firm b e l i e f 2 6 in the i n t r i n s i c goodness of human nature. The following passage from Emerson's journal for October, 1852, i l l u s t r a t e s both of these points: The laws f i n d t h e i r root i n the credence of the people. A two-foot stone wall guards my fin e pears and melons, a l l summer long, from droves of hungry boys & poor men & women. I f one of these people should question my. right & pluck my f r u i t , I should set the cumbrous machinery of the law slowly, i n motion, & by good luck of evidence & counsel, I might get my ri g h t asserted, & that p a r t i c u l a r offender daunted. But i f every passenger should make the l i k e attempt, though the law were perfect, my house would not be worth l i v i n g i n , nor my f i e l d s worth,planting. It i s the education of these people into the ideas & laws of property, & th e i r l o y a l t y , that makes those stones i n the low wall so virtuous. The low-stone-wall i n this quotation seems to symbolize Emerson's individualism,.and the o v e r a l l tone of the passage c l e a r l y - i n d i c a t e s his tr u s t i n humanity. For him the i n d i -vidual human being i s e s s e n t i a l l y trustworthy, because, as we have seen so f a r , his soul i s d i r e c t l y connected with the Over-Soul, the eternal Good. The posit i v e law of human, society i s good and necessary i n so f a r as i t f a i t h f u l l y r e f l e c t s - d i v i n e law — t h i s seems to be Emerson's message when he says: "See again the perfection of the Law as i t applies i t s e l f to the affect i o n s , and becomes the law of society" ("Divinity School Address," I, 123); "We adore an i n s t i t u t i o n , and do not see that i t i s founded on a.thought which we have" ("Spiritual Laws," I I , 152); and "Every law which the state enacts indicates a fact i n human nature" ("History," I I , 15-16). If Emerson's notion of p o s i t i v e law i s based on that of divine law, the same seems to apply to his concept of natural law. Natural law i s usually defined as "the laws ingrained by God i n man's nature but declared by men" or "the laws which everyone endowed with the faculty of reason can accept as un i v e r s a l l y true." On the basis of these d e f i n i t i o n s , we can say that natural law seems to be the norm for p o s i t i v e law, morality, s o c i a l mores, taboos, and customs. The v a l i d i t y of natural law has long been debated among j u r i s t s . But as f a r as Emerson i s concerned, there i s no doubt that, although he seldom uses the term "natural law" in his writings, he has the notion of t h i s kind of law. This i s because, as we have seen through the various examples ci t e d above, he believes i n human nature and divine law, the l a t t e r being the sole fountainhead of natural law. At t h i s point, by changing our viewpoint a l i t t l e , l e t us look at Emerson's notion of natural law from the angle of morality. His concept of morality can be seen i n such statements as: Sensible objects conform to the premonitions of Reason and r e f l e c t the conscience. A l l things are moral; and i n t h e i r boundless changes have an unceasing reference to s p i r i t u a l nature. (Nature, I, 46) It has already been i l l u s t r a t e d , . t h a t every natural process i s a version of a moral sentence. The moral law l i e s at the centre of nature and radiates to the circumference. (Ibid. , 47) Yesterday I was asked what I mean by morals. I reply that I cannot define, and care not to define. . . . Yet i n the morning watch on my berth I 93 thought that morals i s the science of the laws of human action as respects right and.wrong. Then I s h a l l be asked, and what i s Right? Right i s a conformity to the laws of nature as.far as they are known to the human mind. . . .27 The league between virtue and nature engages a l l things to assume a h o s t i l e front to vice. The be a u t i f u l laws and substances of the world perse-cute and whip the t r a i t o r . ("Compensation," I I , 111) A mob i s a society of bodies v o l u n t a r i l y bereaving themselves of reason and traversing i t s work. The mob i s man v o l u n t a r i l y descending to the nature of the beast. Its f i t hour of a c t i v i t y i s night. Its actions are insane, l i k e i t s whole constitution. (Ibid., 115). In a virtuous action I properly am;, i n a virtuous act I add to the world; I plant into deserts con-quered from Chaos and Nothing and see the darkness receding on the l i m i t s of the horizon., (Ibid., 117) Judging from these passages, we may safely conclude that Emerson's notion of morality i s based on the dualism between s p i r i t and matter, upper-case Nature and lower-case Nature, good and e v i l , sanity (reason) and insanity, man as the s p i r i t and man as the beast, l i g h t and darkness, order and chaos, etc. In other words,.for Emerson morality (good) seems to be on the side of Logos; and immorality (bad) belongs to.Chaos. This seems to be a.conspicuous aspect of Emerson's notion of natural law, and consequently of his notion of divine law. In Chuang Tzu., on the other hand, we can expect to fi n d a diametrically d i f f e r e n t attitude toward p o s i t i v e and natural law as his world view i s Chaos-oriented. We have seen e a r l i e r i n this chapter that Chuang Tzu's approach to Fate (Chaos) i s not to escape from or struggle against i t , but to follow and become one with i t . To do t h i s man must discard the sense of the individuated s e l f which tends to separate him from Fate and p i t him against i t . If he becomes " s e l f l e s s " or "egoless" i n t h i s way, there w i l l arise no problem of private property (for property must be possessed by a " s e l f " or an "ego"), and accordingly there w i l l be no necessity of p o s i t i v e laws to s e t t l e the disputes over property. This property includes one's own body which the " s e l f " or "ego" thinks i t possesses. . That the sense of " s e l f , " as set against the world, must be overcome seems to be the idea fundamental to Chuang Tzu's notion of Chaos, influencing his .attitude toward posit i v e law. Another interpretation of Chuang Tzu's Chaos, which i s closely connected to the f i r s t , would be to view i t from a s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l perspective. As the word Chaos implies, Chuang Tzu's views on p o l i t i c s seem to show a strong p r e d i l e c t i o n for "anarchism." We touched upon t h i s point i n the previous chapter when we dealt with his ."collec-t i v e primitivism," where no i n s t i t u t i o n of private property e x i s t s . I f private property.is denied, the necessity of posi t i v e law to defend i t would not a r i s e . Another c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of Chuang Tzu's primitivism i s i t s negation of i n t e l l e c t u a l s o p h i s t i c a t i o n which seems to be the basis for natural law — the law that anyone endowed with reason and i n t e l l e c t can recognize as u n i v e r s a l l y true. 95 According to Needham, i n the time of Chuang Tzu, Confucian l i (customs, mores) was closest to the Western concept of 2 8 natural law. Thus i n Chuang Tzu we often come across mild mockeries and sometimes even severe c r i t i c i s m s of Confucian-ism along with a denunciation of the system of private property and p o s i t i v e law: In the days of Ho Hsu, people stayed home but didn't know what they were doing, walked around but didn't know where they were going. Their mouths crammed with food, they were merry; drumming on t h e i r b e l l i e s , they passed the time. This was as much as they were able to do. Then the sage came along with the crouchings and bendings of r i t e s and music, which.were intended to reform.the bodies of the world; with the reaching-for-a-dangled-prize of benevolence and righteousness, which was intended to comfort the hearts of the world. Then for the f i r s t time people learned to stand on tiptoe and covet knowledge, to f i g h t to the death over p r o f i t , and there was no.stopping them. This i n the end was the f a u l t of the sage. (ch. 9, 10 6) fllf j&. & %. ^ *t-fc ft A % #f f$g E^T ^ If n * 1 % q Jt- ^  ufc. ^  =g. A. i ^ ^ Cut off sageliness, cast away wisdom, and then the great thieves w i l l cease. Break the jades, crush the pearls, and petty thieves w i l l no longer r i s e up. Burn the t a l l i e s , shatter the seals, and the people w i l l be simple and g u i l e l e s s . Hack up the bushels, snap the balances i n two, and the people w i l l no longer wrangle. Destroy and wipe out the laws that the sage has made for the world, and at l a s t you w i l l f i n d you can reason with the people. (ch. 10, 110-111) 96 As we can see i n the above passages, what Chuang Tzu intends by his negation of p o s i t i v e and natural law i s not to bring about anarchy i n the ordinary sense, but rather to generate the true order and harmony of Nature (Chaos), which:is l o s t through the sophistication and a r t i f i c i a l i t y of human i n t e l l e c t , which, as we have already seen, i s inseparably connected with Emerson's concepts of the s p i r i t , soul, idea, reason, and thus of Logos. Thus a sharp contrast i s exhibited between Emerson's notion of p o s i t i v e and natural law which i s rather Logocentric, and that.of Chuang Tzu which i s based on Chaos. In t h i s chapter, we have examined Emerson's and Chuang Tzu's notion of law and order from four viewpoints: divine law, the laws of Nature (physical law), p o s i t i v e law, and natural law. Through th i s examination i t has become clear that Emerson's notion of law and order i s fundamentally Logocentric, while that of Chuang.Tzu i s Chaos-oriented. One of the important c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of Logos i s its.dualism. I t separates S p i r i t (God) from matter, Nature (natura naturans) from Nature (natura naturata) ,. mind from body, r a t i o n a l from i r r a t i o n a l , man from Nature, the idea world from the phenom-enal world, order from Chaos, etc. The f i r s t part of each of these pairs belongs to divine law whereas the.second assumes the role of receiver of the law. The l o g i c of Logos i s formal l o g i c , which i s based on the either/or type,of l o g i c . Thus for Emerson, who often follows t h i s type of. 29 l o g i c , "either Chaos or Law i s at the base of things." And he chooses the l a t t e r . It i s true that Logos also has a unifying function, but i t i s a function based on discrimination, choice, and c l a s s i f i c a t i o n , and i t c l a s s i f i e s things into divine ( I n t e l l i g i b l e ) and mundane (Sensible) c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s . Thus the sensible world i s divided into i l l u s i o n and b e l i e f (common-sense assurance) and the i n t e l l i g e n t world into understanding (mathematical reasoning) and true knowledge of the Idea of the Good. Each of these four d i v i s i o n s i s a l l o t t e d to a,section of a l i n e divided into four propor-tionate parts. Thus the unifying function of Logos i s analogical and geometrical. We have seen t h i s kind of analogy r e f l e c t e d i n Emerson's notion of correspondence between man and Nature. The l o g i c a l and geometrical nature of Logos i s also seen i n his concept of causality (the laws of Nature). To Emerson the world i s a garden, well ordered with geometrical pr e c i s i o n . More p r e c i s e l y , this order i s a projection onto the outer world of the r a t i o n a l order of the human mind which i n turn receives i t s order from the idea world. So man i s the agent of the c e l e s t i a l law-giver, the supreme being, who i s e s s e n t i a l l y r a t i o n a l . This idea seems to have much to do with Emerson's notion of the freedom of man as an i n d i v i d u a l . To be the 98 executors of divine law, human beings must be individ u a l s both r a t i o n a l and independent from the world i n which they apply, the law. This kind of individualism i n Emerson leads us, on the one hand, to his concept of private property and positive law and, on the other hand, to his notion of natural law. The property of the i n d i v i d u a l , including the body of the i n d i v i d u a l , must be defended by posit i v e laws, but posi t i v e laws must draw t h e i r v a l i d i t y from the i n d i v i d -ual's moral consciousness or r a t i o n a l i t y , which i s capable of distinguishing good from e v i l , r i g h t from wrong. Needless to say, natural law, i n turn, has i t s source i n divine law. Reviewing Emerson's Logocentric notion of order and law i n th i s way, we can see i n i t an ordered hierarchy: the Logos-oriented supreme being at the summit, human beings i n the middle, and Nature as the material world at the bottom. In Chuang Tzu's notion of order and law, however, the converse seems to be true: Nature as Chaos appears on top, human beings i n the middle, and the supreme being at the bottom (e.g.> "the Way i s i n the piss and s h i t " [ch. 22, 241] " j^/^t- % A% ") . However, i f we want to be more accurate, this arrangement i s not quite correct, for Chuang Tzu does not discriminate between high and low, between the divine world and the mundane world, or between man and Nature, etc. Everything i s regarded as equal from the viewpoint of Tao (Chaos). By the standards of the either/or type of l o g i c this i s nonsense and i r r a t i o n a l . "A" (man) must be s t r i c t l y distinguished from "non-A" ( f i s h or b u t t e r f l y ) . "Yes" i s d i f f e r e n t from "No." But the both/and type of l o g i c says, that "A" i s equal to "non-A" and an answer can be both "Yes" and "No" at once.. The r i g i d l y - d e f i n e d geometrical l i n e that divides and c l a s s i f i e s things into the categories of either Yes-or No may be conceivable i n the mind, the i d e a l world, but i n the actual world every l i n e or boundary i s more or less twisted and crooked. This crookedness of boundaries seems to be the nature of "the pattern i n things" —- the o r i g i n a l meaning of l i . $|L , which i s employed by Chuang Tzu to indicate the Taoist notion of the ultimate p r i n c i p l e i n the universe. The crooked nature of boundaries seems also to apply to the boundary between cause and e f f e c t , between the ob-server and the object observed. One cannot draw a clear-cut, straight l i n e between one's " s e l f " (the observer) and the rest of the world (the observed) i n order to separate the former from the l a t t e r and fre e l y observe the l a t t e r from outside. One.cannot determine the exact difference between the observer and the observed i n order, to predict and control the future of the l a t t e r , but one can follow the boundary between the two — t h i s seems to be the attitude of Chuang Tzu toward the problem of causality and freedom. The idea that an individuated " s e l f " (a r a t i o n a l being) exists.independently from the world and possesses one thing or another gives r i s e to a meticulous system of 100 po s i t i v e laws and, as the basis for these laws, the concept of natural law which was embodied as l i (mores and customs) i n the time of Chuang Tzu. However, according to Chuang Tzu, these complicated systems of p o s i t i v e laws and l i TMJL which are supposed to harmonize a l l the controversies and confusions i n the world are the very cause of disorder i n the unsophisticated yet peaceful world of Nature (Chaos). As we have seen above, this diso.rder o r i g i n a l l y comes from the self-consciousness of human beings who tend to imagine that they are individuals transcendent of lower-case Nature. Emerson who shares t h i s world view says, " I t [Nature] i s made to serve [human beings]" (Nature,. 1, 45). But Chuang Tzu would say that there i s no such thing as a material world as opposed to a s p i r i t u a l world. Nor i s there a c e l e s t i a l law-giver that presides over the material world. There are only boundaries and we (human beings) are part of them, or rather we are the boundaries. But these boundaries are so numerous that they are equivalent to being.non-existent, i . e . , wu iSt (Nothingness) and hsfl FJL (Emptiness) . (Hence the state of so-called "egolessness.") In other words, they (the boundaries) are a conglomeration of one i n f i n i t e l y long boundary whose both ends are unknown (most probably they meet somewhere?) . Another name for wu or hs.u -jj^ would be Chaos (Tao) , the ultimate p r i n c i p l e or law of the universe. Thus in-Chuang Tzu the "divine law" as the ultimate p r i n c i p l e and human beings, to whom po s i t i v e and 101 natural laws belong, are a l l one i n the Boundary, Chaos, or Wu ^ t , the concepts of which w i l l be further surveyed i n the next chapter, from the perspective of l i f e and order i n Emerson and Chuang Tzu. NOTES TO CHAPTER II New Catholic Encyclopaedia, Vol. VIII (New York, 1967) , 545. 2 To apply the term "divine law" to Chuang Tzu's notion of the ultimate p r i n c i p l e may be rather incongruous here, as i t becomes clear l a t e r that he does not presuppose any supreme being as a divine law-giver. 3 P. Edwards, ed., The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, Vol. V (New York, 1967) , 83. 4 According to M. C. West, who has c a r e f u l l y gone over the fragments of Heraclitus, there is. no r e l a t i o n s h i p between Heraclitus' logos ("discourse" or "word") and the divine law of the "Logos." West writes: "Our review of the evidence therefore leads to the conclusion that Heraclitus uses only i n the ordinary senses of the word attested i n and before the f i f t h century, and that the Logos can be banished from our account of his philosophy" (West, Early Greek  Philosophy and the Orient [Oxford, 1971], pp. 128-129). Cf. also J. Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy. (London, 1908), pp. 146 n. 3, 153 n. 1, 157. 5 . . F. C. Happold, Mysticism: A Study and an Anthology (Baltimore, 1973), p. 204. ^Cf. J. Hastings, ed., Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, Vol. VIII (New York, 19 61), 136; New Catholic Ency-clopaedia, Vol. VIII, 968. 7 J. Hirschberger writes about the rel a t i o n s h i p between. Logos and Idea i n Plato: "The idea i s a universal concept {%o{oS) . . . . for him [Plato] a l l evolution must be guided from above by an a n t i c i p a t i o n of meaning and of purpose. Plato i s a representative of an i d e a l morphology. In t h i s respect the statement recorded i n the Prologue of St. John's Gospel: 'In the beginning was the word". (Logos) has a meaning and accords with the facts" (Hirschberger, The History of  Philosophy, Vol. I, t r . , A. Fuerst [Milwaukee, 1958], pp. 92-94). Cf. also note 12 to Chapter-1 of t h i s thesis, g In his The Philosophy of Plotinus, Inge writes about the notion of Logos i n Plotinus, whose concept of the World-Soul reminds us of Emerson's Over-Soul: " I t [Logos] i s that which, proceeding from S p i r i t , either d i r e c t l y or through the medium of the World-Soul, and i d e n t i c a l i n i t s nature 102 103 with Soul, conveys the energy of S p i r i t and Soul into Matter" (W. R. Inge, The Philosophy of Plotinus, Vol; I [London., 1918], 156). 9 Cf. the following passage from Emerson's journal for 1852: "The great words of the world such as analogy:— what a step mankind took when Plato f i r s t spoke tHat word! Analogy i s i d e n t i t y of r a t i o , and what c i v i l i z a t i o n , what mounting from savage beginnings does i t not require!" (Journals, VIII, 271-272). We can also suspect that there i s a close connection between Emerson's notion of analogy and geometrical symmetry and proportion (cf. note 12 to Chapter I of th i s t h e s i s ) . ^Emerson sees two d i f f e r e n t meanings i n the word Nature: the lower-case Nature (the so-called natura naturata); the upper-case Nature (the so-called natura naturans). The Nature that he holds i n higher esteem seems to be the l a t t e r . This point w i l l be further discussed l a t e r i n th i s chapter (see p. 72). ''""'"Needham, Science and C i v i l i s a t i o n i n China, Vol. II , 473. 1 2 I b i d . , 485. 1 3 I b i d . , 472-476. Cf. also Creel, What Is Taoism? pp. 29-30. 14 Needham, 475. 15 Cf. also the following passages from Watts and Berdyaev: " I t [a metaphysical doctrine] goes on to say that from this r e a l i t y a l l things ( i . e . , d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n s ) are produced out of that which i s 'no-thing' by the Logos, which i s word-and-thought" (Watts, Myth and R i t u a l i n C h r i s t i a n i t y , pp. 60-61); "In the beginning was the Logos, the Word, the Meaning, and the Light. But this eternal truth of r e l i g i o u s revelation only means that the kingdom of l i g h t and meaning has been r e a l i z e d i n i t i a l l y i n being and that the Logos triumphed from the beginning over darkness of every kind" (N. Berdyaev, Freedom and the S p i r i t [London, 1948], p. 165). 16 Cf. also the following passage from Backgrounds of  American L i t e r a r y Thought by R. W. Horton and H. W. Edwards: "Emerson's conception of the Oversoul i s of course pantheis-t i c , but his constant use of the word ' God1', i n r e f e r r i n g to the divine l i f e - p r i n c i p l e would seem to indicate e i t h e r that the habits of a l i f e t i m e were too strong for him, or that his actual idea, of the Deity was more personalized than his philosophy should l o g i c a l l y have permitted" (Horton and Edwards, Backgrounds of American L i t e r a r y Thought, [New York, 1967], pp. 116-117). 104 17 Cf. note 2 to the Introduction of t h i s t h e s i s . 18 Watson, t r . , The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, p.5. 19 0. W. F i r k i n s , Ralph Waldo Emerson (New York, 1965), pp. 230-231. 20 Hopkins, "Emerson and Cudworth: P l a s t i c Nature and Transcendental Art," 86. 21 The words adapted from Capra, The Tao of Physics, p. 56. 22 Heaven i s not something d i s t i n c t from earth and man, but a name applied to the natural and spontaneous functioning of the two (Watson's.note). Cf. also Chan's comment on t h i s passage i n his A Source Book i n Chinese Philosophy, p. 181. 23 For more detailed discussion on the rel a t i o n s h i p between the uncertainty p r i n c i p l e and philosophical Taoism, the reader i s referred to Capra, chs. 10-11. 24 My own paraphrasing of Watson's t r a n s l a t i o n . 2 5 Here Chuang Tzu uses the word Creator '^Jt'i]^. However, the implication of the word i s quite d i f f e r e n t from that which we encounter i n the Western t r a d i t i o n . As i n the case of t'ien , t h i s word means Nature or Fate. With respect to t h i s , Needham comments: "Examples can be found of thinkers i n China who maintained a b e l i e f i n the personality of 'Heaven' .•. . but they were exceptional. Chuang Tzu often speaks of the 'Author of Change' (tsao hua che* [-£aL4t> ^ ]) or 'of Things' (tsao wu che ['gijfy.ft ]) but the referen-ces are p o e t i c a l and even somewhat mocking" (Needham, p.581n), 2 6 In connection with t h i s , Horton and Edwards write i n t h e i r Backgrounds of American L i t e r a r y Thought: "Even i n his economics he resembled his forebears [the Puritans], for he believed that success consists i n close appliance, to the laws of the world, and since these laws are i n t e l l e c t u a l and moral, the acqu i s i t i o n of wealth i s necessarily moral. Just as the snow f a l l s l e v e l today and i s blown into d r i f t s tomor-row, so ine v i t a b l y are riches unequally d i s t r i b u t e d among the people" (Horton and Edwards, p. 117). 27 Emerson and Forbes, eds., Journals, I I I , 207-208. 2 8 Needham, 521. Christy, The Orient i n American Transcendentalism, p. 104. CHAPTER III ORDER AND LIFE Before s t a r t i n g our discussion on the notion of order and l i f e i n Emerson and Chuang Tzu, i t seems appropriate to examine b r i e f l y some general d e f i n i t i o n s of l i f e and i t s relationship to order. I t i s rather d i f f i c u l t to be exact and precise when defining the term " l i f e , " because the l i n e of demarcation between so-called l i v i n g organisms and dead matter becomes blurred when we consider such a.borderline case as a virus or, for that matter, subatomic, p a r t i c l e s ("dead matter") that constitute l i v i n g organisms. Moreover, we can detect " l i f e , " or rather a metaphor for " l i f e , " i n "inanimate" things such as the sea, r i v e r s , e l e c t r i c current, volcanic eruptions, etc. Presumably what we f e e l i n these "inanimate" objects i s a manifestation of so-called energy (or " l i f e force"), of which, according to modern physics, matter i s merely one form. .However, we do not immediately i d e n t i f y r i v e r s , e l e c t r i c i t y , volcanoes, and the sea with l i v i n g organisms, for something seems to be missing i n these things. They may stand for a primordial l i f e force, but they are somewhat amorphous and lacking i n organic structure — the structure which we may c a l l "order." This point w i l l become clearer i f we take a b r i e f look at some of the standard d e f i n i t i o n s of " l i f e . " " L i f e " 105 106 can be defined in various ways: genetically (evolution by natural s e l e c t i o n ) , biochemically (DNA and amino aci d s ) , p h y s i c a l l y (negative entropy), and in r e l i g i o u s or philosoph-i c a l terms ( s p i r i t , God, Idea). Underlying these d e f i n i t i o n s , however, seems to be one common feature, namely, order. Evolution i s based on the selection of the f i t t e s t and the elimination of anomalies caused by mutations; DNA and amino acids consist of a regular arrangement of molecules which, in terms of thermodynamics, can be interpreted as a decrease of entropy (negative entropy; and, as we have seen in the previous.chapters, such noumenal concepts as s p i r i t , God, and Idea, which are usually considered to be the source of " l i f e , " have ordering power. Thus we can say that " l i f e " i s a kind of order, or, to put i t in s t i l l another way, we can say that " l i f e , " e s p e c i a l l y that of a l i v i n g organism, i s a form of energy, ordered and regulated in, certain ways. In th i s chapter we s h a l l use the word " l i f e " b a s i c a l l y i n t h i s sense. If l i f e i s a kind of order, then death, the opposite concept of l i f e , can be defined as a kind of disorder. Since Logos i s e s s e n t i a l l y a p r i n c i p l e of order, and Chaos one.of disorder (or rather Disorder), we can see a strong connection between l i f e and Logos, and between death and Chaos. As we have seen e a r l i e r , Emerson's notion of order i s Logocentric, while that of Chuang Tzu i s Chaos-oriented. :. Therefore, we can expect to see t h i s difference r e f l e c t e d i n 107 t h e i r notion of l i f e and death. Conversely, by examining t h e i r concepts .of l i f e and death, we can shed some l i g h t upon some aspects of the i r notion of order. This chapter, then, w i l l attempt to c l a r i f y the relationships among l i f e , Death, Logos, and Chaos, and w i l l try to show how these are related to the notion of order i n Emerson and Chuang Tzu. To continue with our.discussion, l e t us f i r s t examine the relationship between l i f e and Logos. As for the connec-ti o n between Logos and the s p i r i t u a l aspect of l i f e , we need not spend many words here. I t i s a l l too clear that Logos, the key concept behind the various.terms that stand for noumenpn, i s thought to be the fountainhead of s p i r i t u a l l i f e . This i s . i p a r t i c u l a r l y true i n Emerson and w i l l be discussed shortly. At thi s stage, however, i t i s of primary importance to c l a r i f y the relationships between the physical aspects of l i f e and Logos. The f i r s t connection between Logos and (physical) l i f e i s that both have a close a f f i n i t y with l i g h t . As we have seen i n the l a s t chapter (cf. p. 65), Logos has a strong p r e d i l e c t i o n for l i g h t while l i f e on. earth i s supported by the l i g h t from the sun. This seems to. be the chief reason why l i g h t , e s p e c i a l l y that of the sun, i s often used as the symbol of s p i r i t , soul, l i f e (whether s p i r i t u a l or physical) and Logos. Another connection between Logos and (physical) l i f e can be seen i n the struc-ture of DNA,1 short for deoxyribonucleic acid, the c a r r i e r of the genetic code. DNA consists of four basic molecules 108 c a l l e d nucleotides, which are i d e n t i c a l except for the nitrogen bases they contain. These nitrogen bases are adenine, guanine, cytosine, and thymine, each abbreviated as A, G, C, and T. Because of the differences of the nitrogen bases, the nucleotides function as the "alphabet" of the genetic code. The genetic code i s a sequential arrangement. of "three-letter words'1 (codons) made up by taking three out of the.four nucleotide bases. What i s in t e r e s t i n g here i s the language-like nature of the genetic code. Although i t would be somewhat rash to c a l l DNA a language, we s t i l l can see a strong analogy between the two. In his System and, Structure, A. Wilden quotes from C. H. Waddington who says, "In f a c t why not think of DNA as the B i b l e , of messenger RNA as the preacher,.and of the proteins as the congregation o ready to perform the good works of the Word.of God?" Thus Logos (as words and the Word) and physical l i f e seem to be closely connected i n the nature of DNA. S t i l l another rela t i o n s h i p between.Logos and physical l i f e can be seen i n P l o t i n u s 1 doctrine of Logos. In his The Philosophy of Plotinus, W. R. Inge writes: L i f e , he [Plotinus] says, cannot be generated by an aggregation of l i f e l e s s p a r t i c l e s , nor can i n t e l -ligence be produced by things without understanding. If i t be suggested that when the molecules are arranged i n a certain order, l i f e r e s u l t s , then the p r i n c i p l e which produces, the order, and not the molecules which are so arranged, should be c a l l e d the Soul .or v i t a l p r i n c i p l e . Body i s produced, through the agency of the seminal Logoi,. by Soul, which gives form, to indeterminate "Matter. 13 As we can surmise from th i s quotation, there seems to be an 109 i n t r i n s i c connection between physical l i f e (of which DNA i s an important element) and Logos. According to Inge's interpretation of Plotinus' Logos-doctrine, i t i s due to the organizing power of Logos that DNA ( i . e . , "molecules arranged in a certain order") can function as DNA. With these preliminary considerations i n mind concern-ing the relationships between Logos and l i f e , l e t us examine the s ignificance of Logos in.Emerson's notion of l i f e and order. I t i s not d i f f i c u l t to suppose that since Emerson i s an i d e a l i s t , he considers the s p i r i t or soul, and thus Logos, as the only fountainhead of l i f e (both.spiritual and material). The following passages from his writings w i l l further i l l u s t r a t e this point:. " I t i s one l i g h t which beams out of a thousand stars. I t i s one soul which animates a l l men" ("The American Scholar," I, 108); "Nothing i s secure but l i f e , t r a n s i t i o n , the energizing s p i r i t " ("Circles," I I , 298): and "Through a l l i t s kingdoms, to the suburbs and outskirts of things,, i t [Nature] i s f a i t h f u l to the cause whence i t has i t s o r i g i n . I t always speaks of S p i r i t . . . . It i s a great shadow pointing always to the sun behind us" (Nature, I, 65). As we have seen e a r l i e r (cf. pp. 27-28, 65) and now i n the passages quoted here, Emerson seems to be preoccupied with the images of l i g h t , height, sky and the sun. This constitutes further proof that his notion of l i f e (both s p i r i t u a l and physical), i s Logos-oriented. Logos i s related to physical l i f e not only i n the 110 images of l i g h t and the sun, but also i n connection with DNA. We have seen this i n the above quotations from Wilden's System and Structure and Inge' s The Philosophy of Plotinus.. We are reminded here of Emerson's intere s t i n language and speech"(Logos) examined i n the f i r s t chapter (pp. 19-21). There may be some kind of hidden connection between Emerson's career as a minister and a le c t u r e r , i . e . , as a messenger of the Word (Logos) of God, and the function of DNA as the c a r r i e r of genetic information which i s compared to the Bible, by Waddington. Emerson's sermons and lectures could i n s p i r e , animate, and move his audience taking actions to bring harmony and order to the world, esp e c i a l l y into wild Nature. (In connection with t h i s we should note that Emerson l i v e d i n the age of expansionism, the age of c i v i l i z a t i o n of the wild West.) A sim i l a r movement toward harmony and order seems to take.place i n DNA and amino acids: according to the message from DNA, amino acids are arranged into an ordered structure of proteins which, i n turn, constitute a highly complicated yet well-harmonized l i v i n g organism. Thus i t may be possible to see a sort of analogical r e l a t i o n s h i p between Emerson's p r e d i l e c t i o n for language (Logos) and DNA which i s considered to be one of the basic elements of physical l i f e . Another aspect of DNA i s i t s unity and u n i v e r s a l i t y i n a l l l i v i n g organisms. This i s esp e c i a l l y i n t e r e s t i n g when we consider Emerson's idea that a Logos-oriented p r i n c i p l e I l l ( i . e . , S p i r i t ) permeates, animates, and controls the universe. He asserts this idea time and again i n his writings: "Each creature i s only a modification of the other; the,likeness in them i s more than the difference, and t h e i r r a d i c a l law i s one and the same" (Nature, I, 49); " A l l things proceed out of the same s p i r i t , and a l l things conspire with i t " ("Divinity School Address," I, 124); "Genius detects . through a l l the kingdoms of organized l i f e the eternal unity" ("History," I I , 18);."There i s , at the surface, i n f i n i t e variety of things; at the centre there i s s i m p l i c i t y of cause" (Ibid., 19); and "Nature i s an endless combination and r e p e t i t i o n of a very few laws" (Ibid.,.20). This kind of i n t u i t i v e experience of Emerson which we c a l l e d "partici-r pation mystique" i n Chapter II may be explained through the unity and s i m p l i c i t y of DNA i n a l l creatures on earth. In a sense, DNA functions .through a simple "combination and repe- . t i t i o n of a very few laws" which are common i n a l l l i v i n g organisms. Thus, there seems to be a close r e l a t i o n s h i p between the unity of DNA and that of the S p i r i t or Logos i n Emerson's notion of l i f e and order. Chuang Tzu, on the other hand, seems to f i n d the source of l i f e i n Hun-tun or Chaos which i s k i l l e d by Shu and Hu, who represent the Logos aspect of human beings.. It i s true that Chuang Tzu sometimes talks about s p i r i t as opposed to the body in such words and passages as shen ( s p i r i t ) , ching ( s p i r i t u a l essence, material force), 112 ching-shen ^ ftfy (pure s p i r i t , v i t a l s p i r i t ) ; "You now — you treat your s p i r i t l i k e an outsider. You wear out your energy . . ." (ch. 5, 76) " ^  ^ ^ 2, tfr % 3- ^ iff ". ... enfold the s p i r i t i n quietude and the body w i l l r i g h t i t s e l f (ch. 11, 119) " $ @ J $ yk.lffr SB- " ; and "Pure s p i r i t reaches i n the four d i r e c t i o n s , flows now t h i s way, now that — t h e r e i s no place i t does not extend to" (ch. 15, 169) " ^ -fjj? MS^jk-yk^^ ffj •" These passages seem to indicate that, l i k e Emerson, Chuang Tzu also distinguishes the s p i r i t from the body. However, i n Chuang Tzu i t i s extremely d i f f i c u l t to draw a clear-cut l i n e of demarcation between the s p i r i t and the body. Chuang Tzu's shen ^ and ching ^ merge inseparably with hsing $r-''j (body, form) through such notions as hsing >^ (inborn nature) and ch.' i ^ (breath, matter-energy) . Hsing v|>£_ i n Chuang Tzu seems to imply an orderly and harmonious function of body and s p i r i t ( ^ ). Chuang Tzu says? Out of the flow and flux , things were born, and as they grew they developed d i s t i n c t i v e shapes; these were ca l l e d forms. The forms and bodies held within them s p i r i t s , each with i t s own character-i s t i c s and l i m i t a t i o n s , and t h i s was c a l l e d the inborn nature. (ch. 12, 131-132) and "The inborn nature i s the substance of l i f e " (ch. 23, 259) " 'V^L^ Z_ ^  " Ch'.i ^ has connotations s i m i l a r to those of hsing i n that both are combination of matter 113 and s p i r i t which c o n s t i t u t e s the substance of l i f e . T h i s i s c l e a r from such passages as : "Man's l i f e i s a coming-together of b r e a t h [ch,* i ] ... I f i t comes t o g e t h e r , t h e r e i s l i f e ; i f i t s c a t t e r s , there , i s death" (ch . 22, 235) " / . J ^ ^ ^ J ' } J f e ? L " ; " N o , d o n ' t l i s t e n w i t h your mind, but l i s t e n w i t h your s p i r i t [ c h ' i ] " (ch. 4 , 58) " ^ V,^ <0 v ? f 3 - I j i - ^ " ; "And now —- now I go at i t by s p i r i t [shen ^ ] and d o n ' t look w i t h my eyes" (ch . 3 , 50-51) " % ^ i . f i ^ - ^ v 1 / ^ ^'^^f! % ^  S I I I " ; and " I n the midst of the jumble of -wonder and mystery a change took p l a c e and she had a s p i r i t [ c h ' i ] . Another change and she had a body" (ch . 18, 192) " jfefy^Jfa LT%\ ^ (V^k^m^^." In the l a s t passage quoted h e r e , Chuang Tzu says c h ' i ^ comes out of the s t a t e of c o n f u s i o n (^L^f ) which i s n o t h i n g but Chaos or H u n - t u n . Thus we can say t h a t i n Chuang T z u , Chaos (Disorder) l i e s under the concept of ch ' i $L . B e s i d e s , s i n c e ch'. i ik. i s , q u i t e c l o s e t o h s i n g , shen %^ , and c h i n g ^ , we can 5 a l s o conclude t h a t Chaos u n d e r l i e s a l l these n o t i o n s . What, t h e n , are the i m p l i c a t i o n s of t h i s , w i t h regard to the p h y s i c a l aspect of l i f e ? We can g i v e two examples h e r e . F i r s t , e v o l u t i o n by n a t u r a l s e l e c t i o n i s based on mutat ions i n the DNA. These mutat ions have been caused , a t l e a s t so f a r as i s known, by u n p r e d i c t a b l e d i s t u r b a n c e s i n the arrangement of the n u c l e o t i d e bases i n the g e n e t i c code and a l s o by mistakes i n the process of i n t e r p r e t i n g the g e n e t i c i n f o r m a t i o n . i n t o amino a c i d s . These d i s t u r b a n c e s 114 and mistakes can further be traced to the random movements and c o l l i s i o n s of "subatomic p a r t i c l e s " in the universe. As J. Monod points out, mutation i s e s s e n t i a l l y the incident that takes place at the l e v e l of quantum theory and so the uncertainty p r i n c i p l e can be applied to i t . Mutation i s a matter of chance. In this sense we can say that l i f e i s based on Chaos. Secondly, the sun, which i s the source of energy for a l l l i v i n g organisms on earth,, i s constantly moving toward so-called thermal death (the increase of entropy .or disorder) by emitting light•through i t s nuclear reactions. This i s another rela t i o n s h i p between l i f e and Chaos. Although Chaos i s usually associated with darkness, confusion, corruption and death by Emerson (cf. pp. 121-123) i t can also be the basis for l i f e . This seems to be one of the reasons why Chuang Tzu emphasizes the importance of Chaos rather than Logos. For Chuang Tzu, Chaos ("darkness," "death") seems to precede Logos ( " l i f e , " " l i g h t " ) . As he writes, "The bright and shining i s born out of deep darkness the ordered i s born out.of formlessness; pure s p i r i t i s born out of the Way" (ch. 22, 238) " ^ fc > £ . ^ \£ ^ j£ ^ ^ ^ • ^ ^ — i l L •" Here i s a sharp contrast between Emerson's Logocentric notion of l i f e and Chuang Tzu's Chaos-oriented concept of l i f e . In other words, Emerson's l i f e descends from above, from the s p i r i t u a l world of Ideas or Forms (cf. p. 46), whereas Chuang Tzu's l i f e arises from 115 below, from depth, darkness, and formlessness, i . e , , Tao or Hun-tun. This difference further leads us to.the topic of being and non-being, a v a r i a t i o n of the problem of l i f e and death. This i s because S p i r i t , Idea-and Form a l l seem to partake of being, while depth, darkness, and formlessness have much in common with.non-being. Although Parmenides,.Plato, and presumably Emerson would argue that actual existence i n t h i s world i s "phenom-enon" and "becoming" and thus cannot be i d e n t i f i e d with ultimate being (or rather Being), s t i l l there seems to exi s t an e s s e n t i a l connection between the two, because the sense of being obviously arises from the recognition of actual things i n t h i s world. I d e a l i s t s may assert that without mind (as opposed to matter) there can be no perception of the external world, but t h i s leads us to.an endless dispute between subjectivism ( s p i r i t ) and objectivism (matter). I t seems that neither a pure state of the mind.(i.e., subjec-t i v i t y ) nor that of matter ( i . e . , o b j e c t i v i t y ) i s conceivable, for both belong to the realm of the unconscious. The moment we have consciousness and s t a r t debating the p r i o r i t y of idealism over materialism or vice versa, we inevitably presuppose a boundary between subject ( s p i r i t or mind) and object (matter'-or body) and by extension between other things in the external world. This process i s nothing but the perception of actual existence by.our senses. Thus i t would 116 be safe to say that the conception of being (whether i t partakes of the i d e a l world or not) i s cl o s e l y linked to our recognition of the phenomena i n the outer world. It may s t i l l be possible to argue that the actual existence i n t h i s world i s a r e f l e c t i o n of true being i n the id e a l world, but as we have seen above, consciousness of being seems to be impossible.without actual perception of the phenomena i n the world. This i s equivalent to saying that the idea of-being presupposes-boundaries. As we have seen in the f i r s t chapter/ "idea," which i s inseparable from the concept of being, i s founded on sight.and boundaries. On the basis of the above considerations on being, we can say that a being i s , so to say, something which i s sur-rounded by a boundary and cut o f f from the rest of the world. It i s a figure defined against a set.ground. Non-being, then, can be defined as the boundary that separates the being from the ground and other things. (In f a c t , the.ground i s no other than the boundary, as w i l l become clear l a t e r on.) Absolute Being (or being-itself). i s said to comprehend both 9 i t s e l f and non-being,, but we should not forget that even behind the notion of absolute Being l i e s the concept of being discussed above. We could say that absolute Being i s an extension of being or, conversely, being.is an "alienated" Being. In any case, i t seems inevitable that boundaries - are involved i n the problem of being and a l i e n a t i o n . 1 ^ With these preliminary considerations.on being and 117 non-being in mind, l e t us f i r s t examine Emerson's notions of being and non-being. His attitude toward these concepts can be seen in the following passages: It [ i n t e l l e c t u a l science] fastens the attention upon . . . Ideas. . . . We ascent into t h e i r region, and know that these are the thoughts of the Supreme Being. . . . No man fears age or misfor-tune or death i n t h e i r company, for he i s trans-ported out of the d i s t r i c t of change. . . . We apprehend the absolute. As i t were, for the f i r s t time, we e x i s t . (Nature, I, 60-61) Good i s p o s i t i v e . E v i l i s merely p r i v a t i v e , not absolute:,it i s l i k e cold, which i s the privation of heat. A l l e v i l i s so much death or nonentity. Benevolence i s absolute and r e a l . So much benevolence as a man hath, so much l i f e hath he. For a l l things proceed out of t h i s same s p i r i t . . . ("Divinity School Address," I, 123) The soul i s not a compensation, but a l i f e . The soul i s . Under a l l th i s running,sea of circum-stance, whose waters ebb and flow with perfect balance, l i e s the aboriginal abyss of r e a l Being. Essence, or God, i s not a r e l a t i o n or a part, but the whole. Being i s the vast a f f i r m a t i v e e x c l u d -ing negation, self-balanced, and swallowing up a l l r e l a t i o n s , parts and times within i t s e l f . Nature, truth, v i r t u e , are the i n f l u x from thence. Vice i s the absence or departure of the same. Nothing, Falsehood, may indeed stand as the great Night or shade on which as a background the l i v i n g universe paints i t s e l f f o r t h , but no fact i s begotten by i t ; i t cannot work, for i t i s not. I t - cannot work any good; i t cannot work any harm. I t i s harm inasmuch as i t i s worse not to be than to be. ("Compensation," I I , 116) As we can see i n these passages, Emerson thinks that soul, s p i r i t , Good,.the Supreme Being, Ideas, and affirmation are on the side of l i f e and being, while nothing, e v i l , falsehood, night (darkness), p r i v a t i o n , negation, and "not" belong to death and non-being. What i s noteworthy here i s that Emerson says that non-being such as negation and "not" are 118 t o t a l l y excluded or alienated from Being and are regarded as a mere background. We should also note that, as we have seen i n Chapter I (cf. p. 17), negation or "not" i s a k i n d of boundary. Here i s the reason why we have supposed e a r l i e r that non-being, boundaries, and ground are synonymous and they are a l l alienated from Being. Now, i n Emerson, l i f e i s i d e n t i f i e d with being, or more exactly, Being. This idea seems to be supportable from a s c i e n t i f i c perspective. Although Being i s said to embrace both i t s e l f and non-being, s t i l l we cannot deny that i t e a s i l y tends to exclude non-being as i s seen in the above passages quoted from Emerson (e.g., "Being i s the vast affirmative, excluding negation"). This excluded non-being seems to function as the boundary that surrounds Being and beings. In this sense we can say that, at least i n Emerson, Being and beings are discrete "ind i v i d u a l s " separated from and set against non-being or background. The same may hold true of the structures of DNA and amino acids,, the two basic elements.of physical l i f e . As biochemistry and.modern physics t e l l us, both DNA and amino acids consist of " i n d i -vidual" molecules and these molecules, i n turn,rare an aggregate of the so-called subatomic p a r t i c l e s that "pop out" of the void, or to use the terminology of quantum theory, of a f i e l d of energy. Thus i t can be said that subatomic p a r t i c l e s are the prototypes of -beings, and that the void or the f i e l d of energy surrounding them corresponds to non-being. 119 Here i s i l l u s t r a t e d a close connection between physical l i f e and beings (and Being) i n Emerson's world view. At the same time, however, we should note that sub-atomic p a r t i c l e s (beings) come out of the vacuum (non-being) and vanish again into i t . In t h i s sense beings are dependent on non-being, or rather Non-being.' And presumably t h i s may be the reason, hidden even to Chuang Tzu himself, why he esteems Non-being or wu |Sfc (Nothingness) so highly. For instance, he writes, "In the Great Beginning, there was nonbeing; there was no being, no name. Out of i t arose One; there was One, but i t had no form. Things got hold of i t and came to l i f e . . ." (ch. 12, 131) "Jj.^^^fc J&LJft&% — )L fl[$3*fa -~ tff> M \% >k i£ • " F o r c h u a n 9 Tzu- l i f e comes not from being, but from non-being, or rather Non-being. However, as the supreme Being ultimately transcends the opposition between being and non-being, so does Chuang Tzu's absolute Non-being go beyond both being and non-being. The following quotation w i l l serve as a clue to understanding t h i s : There i s a beginning. There i s a not yet beginning to be a beginning. There i s a not yet beginning to be a not yet beginning to be a beginning. There i s being. There i s nonbeing.; : There i s a not yet beginning to be nonbeing. There.is a not yet begin-ning to be a not yet beginning to be nonbeing. Suddenly there i s nonbeing. But I do not know, when i t comes to nonbeing, which i s r e a l l y being and which i s nonbeing. Now I have just said some-things. But I don't know whether what I have said has r e a l l y said something or whether i t hasn't said something. (ch. 2, 43). 120 In the f i r s t passage quoted above, Chuang Tzu says, presumably for the sake of convenience and following the conventional way of argument, that there i s non-being i n the beginning. But this i s a contradiction, for r e a l non-being simply cannot exist-and true beginning must be beginningless. Therefore he says i n the second passage that after a l l he does not not know whether non-being r e a l l y exists or not, or whether what he has said r e a l l y means something (being) or nothing (another being). This shows that the true Non-being of Chuang Tzu i s the boundary between being and non-being, between.something and nothing. As we saw at the end of the previous chapter, Non-being i s the Great Boundary, Chaos, or W u ( N o t h i n g n e s s ) . Here i s a sharp contrast between Emerson's notion of l i f e which i s directed toward Logos and Being, and that of Chuang Tzu which i s based on Chaos and Non-being. This .difference seems to be r e f l e c t e d i n t h e i r attitudes toward w i l l , which i s closely connected with anthro-. pocentrism. As we have seen above, Emerson's concept of l i f e can be compared to that of quanta (packets of energy) that come out of and vanish into the physical f i e l d . Just as quanta are always exposed to the p o s s i b i l i t y of being 121 swallowed up by the void of the physical f i e l d , l i f e (being) is constantly confronted with the danger of being drowned i n the abyss of non-being (death or chaos). From here arises the w i l l to overcome the threat of chaos. We can detect this tendency i n Emerson's notion of w i l l . For example, to repeat the passage quoted e a r l i e r (p. 93), Emerson says, "In a virtuous action I properly am; in.a virtuous act I add to the world; I plant into deserts conquered from Chaos and Nothing and see the darkness receding on the l i m i t s of the horizon" ('Compensation," I I , 117). Besides t h i s example, we come across many passages with a si m i l a r tone: "I say to the Universe, Mighty one! thou art not my mother; return to chaos, i f thou w i l t , I s h a l l s t i l l e x i s t . I l i v e . I f I owe my being, i t i s to a destiny greater than thine" (Journal, December 21, 1823); "But every j e t of chaos which threatens to exterminate us i s convertible by i n t e l l e c t into wholesome force. Fate i n unpenetrated causes" ("Fate," VI, 35); "So much only of l i f e as I know by experience, so much of the wilderness have I vanquished and planted, or so far have I extended my being, my dominion" ("The American Scholar," I, 96); and "And we are now men . . . and not minors and inva-, l i d s . . . but guides, redeemers and benefactors, obeying the Almighty e f f o r t and advancing on Chaos and the Dark" ("Self-Reliance," I I , 49). From these passages we can safely i n f e r that i n Emerson l i f e i s a . w i l l to subdue the chaotic, wild gushing of Nature (or Fate). It i s a domination of 122 being over non-being , l i f e over death, and order (logos) over disorder (chaos). Emerson's ideas of this kind on l i f e and w i l l n a turally lead us to his anthropocentrism, which has been touched upon i n the l a s t chapter (cf. p. 65). For Emerson, man seems to be a t y p i c a l "being" as the expression "human beings" indicates. According to him, human beings are. d i r e c t l y connected to the Supreme Being i n the i d e a l world through Logos, i . e . , the s p i r i t , soul, i n t e l l e c t , reason, etc. Therefore " l i f e " means p a r t i c u l a r l y human l i f e . And needless to say, the most prominent feature of human l i f e i s c i v i l i z a t i o n , which i s man's cu l t i v a t i o n , . taming, and domination,of wild Nature which includes disease, death, madness, natural calamities, etc. Emerson.shows a strong i n c l i n a t i o n toward t h i s kind of c i v i l i z a t i o n . This has already been mentioned at several points throughout this t h e s i s , and es p e c i a l l y i n the passages just quoted above, but to i l l u s t r a t e the point further, we have the following examples: The exercise of the W i l l , or the lesson of power, is taught i n every event. From,the child's suc-cessive possession of his several senses up to the hour when he s a i t h , "Thy w i l l be done!" he i s learning the secret that he can reduce under his w i l l , not only p a r t i c u l a r events but great classes, nay, the whole series of events, and so conform.all facts to his character. Nature i s thoroughly mediate. It i s made to serve. . . . It offers a l l i t s kingdoms to.man as the raw material which he may mould into what i s useful. . . . One after another his victorious thought comes up with and reduces a l l things, u n t i l the world becomes at l a s t 123 only a r e a l i z e d w i l l , — the double of the man. (Nature ,. I, 45-46) A correspondent revolution i n things w i l l attend the i n f l u x of the s p i r i t . So fa s t w i l l disagree-able appearances, swine, spiders, snakes, pests, mad-houses, prisons, enemies, vanish; they are temporary and s h a l l be no more seen. The sordor and f i l t h s of nature, the sun s h a l l dry up and the wind exhale. . . . The kingdom of, man over nature, which cometh not with observation, — a dominion such as now i s beyond, his dream of God, — he s h a l l enter without more wonder than the b l i n d man feels who i s gradually restored to perfect sight. (Ibid., 79-80) The annual slaughter from typhus far exceeds that of war; but r i g h t drainage destroys typhus. The plague i n the sea-service from scurvy is.healed by lemon juice and other diets portable or procurable; the depopulation by cholera and small-pox i s ended by drainage and vaccination; and every, other pest i s not less i n the chain of cause and e f f e c t , and may be fought o f f . And whilst art draws out the venom, i t commonly extorts some benefit from the vanquished enemy. The mischievous torrent i s i taught to drudge for man; the wild.beast he makes useful for food, or dress, or labor; the chemic explosions are controlled l i k e his watch. These are now the steeds on which he r i d e s . ("Eate," VI, .36-37) He [man] looks l i k e a piece of luck, but i s a piece of causation; the mosaic, angulated and ground to f i t into the gap h e , f i l l s . Hence i n each town there i s some man who i s , in his brain and perform-ance, an explanation of the t i l l a g e , production, f a c t o r i e s , banks, churches, ways of l i v i n g and society of that town. . . . Each of these men, i f they were transparent, would seem to you not so much men as walking c i t i e s , and wherever you put them they would b u i l d one. (Ibid., 45) Thus i t i s clear that in Emerson order, l i f e , w i l l anthropo-centrism and c i v i l i z a t i o n are concepts inseparably linked to each other. They are connatural and subsumed i n the notion of Logos. At the same time, however, as i s always the case with 124 Emerson, there are some elements which seem to contradict what we have just seen as his notion of w i l l and anthropo-centrism. Here l e t us b r i e f l y examine these elements and see whether or not they f i t in with the conclusions reached above. In the f i r s t place, Emerson.sometimes appears to negate the human w i l l . This i s seen i n such statements as: "If i n the lea s t p a r t i c u l a r one could derange the order of nature, — who would accept the g i f t of l i f e ? " ("Fate," VI, 51) , and ". . . 1 say that the power of Nature predominates over the human w i l l in a l l works of even the fin e a r t s , i n a l l that respects t h e i r material and external circumstances" ("Art," VII, 50-51). At f i r s t glance, he seems to be negat-ing the human w i l l and praising the necessities of Nature or Fate. But this seeming contradiction - can be explained i f we remember that in Emerson there are two kinds of Nature: the upper-case Nature (the S p i r i t , Reason, Soul), and the lower-case Nature (matter), and when he g l o r i f i e s Nature, i t i s always the upper-case Nature. What he c a l l s the "human w i l l " here, then, seems to be the lowly, b r u t a l egoism that belongs to the lower-case Nature. This i s clear, i n the following passages: "So much as we can shove aside our egotism, our prejudice and w i l l , and bring the onmiscience of reason upon the subject before us, so pe r f e c t . i s the work" ("Art," VII, 52) ; "In l i k e manner our moral nature i s v i t i a t e d by any interference of our w i l l " ("Spiritual Laws," I I , 127); and ". . . a higher law than that of our w i l l regulates events. 125 . . . We need only obey. There i s guidance for each of us* and by lowly l i s t e n i n g we s h a l l hear the right word" (Ibid., 132) . It seems that the human w i l l which Emerson i s denying here i s that which i s cut off from s p i r i t u a l i t y . This kind of w i l l , which i s in fact no other than animal i n s t i n c t , must be discarded i n order to receive a higher w i l l from the i d e a l world — t h i s seems to be his point. The same d i s t i n c t i o n between s p i r i t u a l i t y and bru t a l Nature might be useful i n explaining his non-anthropocentric remarks such as: "Youhave just dined, and however scrupu-lously the slaughter-house i s concealed i n the graceful distance of miles> there i s complicity expensive races — r a c e - l i v i n g at. the expense of.race" ("Fate," VI, .12-13), and "Let us b u i l d a l t a r s to the Beautiful Necessity, which secures that a l l i s made of one piece; that p l a i n t i f f and defendant, friend and enemy, animal and plant, food and eater are of one kind" (Ibid., 51). Here again he seems to be contradicting his anthropocentric and c i v i l i z a t i o n -oriented attitude seen in the passages quoted e a r l i e r . The-key to t h i s problem seems to l i e in the words "the Beautiful Necessity" i n the l a s t passage. According to Emerson, Nature, however chaotic i t may seem, i s b a s i c a l l y governed by this Beautiful Necessity which i s the law of the S p i r i t . As we have seen i n the previous chapter, he maintains that human beings embody this law and thus can control the outside 126 phenomena or fate at t h e i r w i l l . In fa c t , for him phenomena are nothing but the projection of what i s inside the human mind. Hence his remarks that " a l l i s made one piece" and "Fate then i s a name for facts not yet passed under the f i r e of thought; for causes which are unpenetrated" ("Fate," VI, 35). There i s very l i t t l e distance between t h i s kind of view on fate and Emerson's anthropocentrism mentioned above. In connection with t h i s we should also note what he writes in h is journal for A p r i l 7 (?), 1840: "In a l l my lectures,.I have taught one doctrine, namely, the i n f i n i t u d e of the private man." Thus we can say that although Emerson sometimes appears to be denying the w i l l and power of human beings he i s always f a i t h f u l to his anthropocentrism. In contrast to t h i s , Chuang Tzu employs a negative approach to the human w i l l and anthropocentrism. This point has already been discussed in Chapter II (cf. pp. 66, 76), but there s t i l l remains room for further discussion, espe-c i a l l y from the viewpoint of l i f e , death, and c i v i l i z a t i o n . The following passages w i l l i l l u s t r a t e t h i s point further: The True Man of ancient times knew nothing of loving l i f e , knew nothing of hating death. He emerged without delight; he went back i n without a fuss. He came b r i s k l y , he went b r i s k l y , and that was a l l . He didn't forget where he began; he didn't try to f i n d out where he would end. He received something and took pleasure i n i t ; he forgot about i t and handed i t back again. This i s what I c a l l not using the mind to repel.the Way, not using man to help out Heaven. This i s what I c a l l the True Man. (ch. 6, 78) 127 This t o t a l negation of the human w i l l seems to be r e f l e c t e d in Chuang.Tzu's attitude toward anthropocentrism. He writes: You have had the audacity to take on human form and you are delighted. But the human form has ten thousand changes that never come to an end. Your joys, then, must be uncountable. Therefore, the sage wanders i n the realm where things cannot get away from him, and a l l are preserved. He delights in early death; he .delights in old age; he delights i n the beginning; he delights i n the end. If he can serve as a model for men, how much more so that which the ten thousand things are t i e d to and a l l changes al i k e wait upon! (ch. 6, 81) and: If a man sleeps in a damp place, his back aches and he ends up half paralyzed, but i s t h i s true of a loach? I f he l i v e s i n a tree, he i s t e r r i f i e d and shakes with f r i g h t , but i s this true of a monkey? Of these three creatures, then, which one knows the proper place t o . l i v e ? Men eat the f l e s h of grass-fed and grain-fed animals, deer eat grass, c e n t i -pedes f i n d snakes tasty, and hawks and falcons-r e l i s h mice. Of these four, which knows how food ought to taste? Monkeys pair with monkeys, deer go out with deer, and f i s h play around with f i s h . Men claim that Mao-ch'iang and Lady Li.were b e a u t i f u l , but i f f i s h saw them they would dive to the bottom of the stream, i f birds saw them they would f l y away, and i f deer saw them they would break into a run. Of these four, which knows how to f i x the standard of beauty for the world? (ch. 2, 45-46) 128 * if %m* and: When Chuang Tzu was about to die, his d i s c i p l e s expressed a desire to give him a sumptuous b u r i a l . Chuang Tzu said, "I w i l l have heaven and earth for my c o f f i n and c o f f i n s h e l l , the sun and moon for my pair of jade di s c s , the stars and constellations for my pearls and beads, and the ten thousand things for my parting g i f t s . The furnishings for my funeral are allready prepared — what i s there to add?" "But we're a f r a i d the crows and kites w i l l eat you, Master!" said his d i s c i p l e s . Chuang Tzu said, "Above ground I ' l l be eaten by crows and k i t e s , below ground I ' l l be eaten by mole crickets and ants. Wouldn't i t be rather bigoted to deprive one group i n order to supply the other?" (ch. 32, 361) ^-r> fcMH %tiL*£ .tt*r* i l e I t seems that for Chuang Tzu l i f e i s not necessarily r e s t r i c t e d to human l i f e , i t includes every l i v i n g thing i n the world. Not only does i t include a l l the creatures on the earth, but also what i s normally thought to be inanimate matter. Chuang Tzu does not make value judgments concerning l i f e and death. Human l i f e i s only a part of the great cycle of Nature, the great flow of Tao (Chaos) that embraces 129 both l i f e and death. The following quotation seems to i l l u s t r a t e this point: Chuang Tzu's wife died. When Hui Tzu went to convey his condolences, he found Chuang Tzu s i t t i n g with his legs sprawled out, pounding on a tub and singing. "You l i v e d with her, she brought up your children and grew old," said Hui Tzu. " I t should be enough simply not to weep at her death. But pounding.on a tub and singing — this i s going too f a r , i s n ' t i t ? " Chuang Tzu said, "You're wrong. When ;she f i r s t died, do you think I didn't grieve l i k e anyone else? But I looked back to her beginning and the time before she was born. Not only the time before she was born, but the time before she had a body. Not only the time before she had a body, but the time before she had a s p i r i t . In the midst of the jumble of wonder and mystery a change took place and she had a s p i r i t . Another change and she had a body. Another change and she was born. Now there's been another change and she's dead. It's just l i k e the progression of the four seasons, spring, summer, f a l l , winter. "Now she's going to l i e down peacefully i n a vast room. If I were to follow after her bawling and sobbing, i t would show that I don't understand anything about fate. So I stopped." (ch. 18, 191-192) ^ # 3 - S » \ t o i & J k . f a 3 f c %3>B^k fciUL 3eft j£ fip ^  fr£ 4f 2£ 3- 0 ^ t ^ M A - M E ^ £ £ Another aspect which naturally results from th i s kind 130 of attitude toward the human w i l l , l i f e , and death i s a considerable degree of doubt concerning the progress of culture and c i v i l i z a t i o n . This can be surmised from his c r i t i c i s m of Confucianism, which tends to ignore Nature and i s completely occupied with the advancement of humanism and c i v i l i z a t i o n . C i v i l i z a t i o n has an i n t r i n s i c p r e d i l e c t i o n for the domination and exploitation of Nature by human beings. It i s e s s e n t i a l l y based on anthropocentrism. C i v i l i z a t i o n declares that i t w i l l tame and put into order the dangerous chaos of primitive Nature, both inside and outside human beings, by means of human w i l l and reason, and that t h i s w i l l bring about the true happiness of human kind. However,. this kind of " i d e a l i s t i c " approach to Na'ture:does not always work. I t i s even possible that because of the i d e a l i s t i c and anthropocentric nature and attitude of c i v i l i z a t i o n the true order and harmony of Nature are disturbed and lo s t * thus making the ring-leader of the disturbance extremely unhappy. One glance at human history w i l l prove t h i s . Environmental disruption i s one of the miseries brought about by the pride of human c i v i l i z a t i o n . We can interpret the following story from Chuang Tzu. i n th i s l i g h t : The Yellow Emperor had ruled as Son of Heaven for nineteen years and his commands were heeded throughout the world, when he heard that Master Kuang Ch'eng was l i v i n g on top of the Mountain of Emptiness and Identity. He therefore went to v i s i t him. "I have heard that you, S i r , have mastered the Perfect Way. May I venture to ask about the essence of the Perfect Way?" he said. "I would l i k e to get hold of the essence of Heaven and earth 131 and use i t to aid the f i v e grains and to nourish the common people. I would also l i k e to control the yin and yang in order to insure the growth of a l l l i v i n g things. How may t h i s be done?" Master Kuang Ch'eng said, "What you say you want to learn about pertains to the true substance of things, but what you say you want to control per-tains to things in t h e i r divided s t a t e . H Ever since you began to govern the world, rain f a l l s before the cloud vapors have even gathered, the plants and trees shed t h e i r leaves before they have even turned yellow, and the l i g h t of the sun and moon grows more and more s i c k l y . Shallow and vapid, with the mind of a p r a t t l i n g knave — what good would i t do to t e l l you about the Perfect Way!" (ch. 11, 118-119) & U. s 2« an ^5LftJif[ *LiLi%k % W f«s $ v ft zJU& ^% \^ <f>C Reading this story, we have to say that Chuang Tzu was well aware of the.dangerous aspects of science and c i v i l i z a t i o n more than two thousand years ago. Through the above examination of Emerson's and Chuang Tzu's notions of order, l i f e , w i l l , and anthropocentrism, i t can be said that Emerson's notion of order and l i f e i s e s s e n t i a l l y anthropocentric ( i . e . , Logocentric), while that of Chuang Tzu i s Chaos-centered. This difference seems to come from the two d i f f e r e n t ways of dealing with the 132 apparently contradictory nature of l i f e which seems to be a t y p i c a l example of so-called double-bind s i t u a t i o n s . In order to c l a r i f y this point, we need to review the concept of entropy and i t s r e l a t i o n to l i f e . In his book on cybernetics, A. M. Kondratov quotes N. Wiener's remarks on 12 l i f e : " L i f e contradicts the other parts of the universe." When Wiener said t h i s he must have had i n mind the notion of entropy, the second law of thermodynamics. Simply stated, entropy i s a measurement of disorder. This law t e l l s us that the universe i s , as a whole, tending toward a state of 13 disorder, because a state of chaos i s s t a t i s t i c a l l y much more, probably than that of order. As we have seen e a r l i e r , DNA and amino acids, the two bases.of physical l i f e , are a kind of-order, and according to biochemistry, the f i r s t formation.of the systematic combination of these basic elements of l i f e i s a phenomenon of such extremely small 14 p r o b a b i l i t y that we can l i t e r a l l y c a l l i t a miracle. I t 15 appears to be against the law of entropy. Therefore, i t is quite understandable for Wiener to say that l i f e contra-dicts the rest of the universe. " L i f e " i s on.the side of order, while the rest of the world i s governed by the law of entropy, namely, disorder. In other words, l i f e i s a self-negation of the universe. And this seems to be the fundamental reason.why l i f e i s caught i n the predicament and paradox of a double bind. The i n d i v i d u a l organism must take i n other l i v i n g 133 organisms to preserve i t s own l i f e . To preserve l i f e , then, means to destroy l i f e . To maintain order i s to destroy order. The universe orders l i f e to l i v e and to k i l l ( i . e . , to die) at once. This seems to be the way the universe i s made. I t i s self-contradictory and puts one into the predic-ament of a double bind. Needless to say, human existence i s not an exception. It seems that whatever wevsmay do or say automatically leads us to s e l f - c o n t r a d i c t i o n . Chuang Tzu's l o g i c a l inconsistency mentioned i n the previous chapter (cf. p. 67) seems to be one example of t h i s . As f o r Emerson, he seems to have been aware of t h i s but, as we saw e a r l i e r , he f l a t l y ignores i t . Be that as i t may, there s t i l l remains the question of how to reconcile i n d i v i d u a l l i f e with l i f e as a whole, human beings with the rest of the universe ( i . e . , Nature), order (negative entropy) with disorder (entropy),,"logos" with "chaos." These problems cannot e a s i l y be,dismissed with such remarks as "a f o o l i s h consistency i s the hobgoblin of l i t t l e minds" ("Self-Reliance," I I , 58). They are l i t e r a l l y a matter of l i f e and death. And what i s worse, they are based on an insoluble double-bind s i t u a t i o n . This i s probably the reason why, i n s p i t e of t h e i r disdain for l o g i c a l inconsistencies, both Emerson and Chuang Tzu employed numerous words in t h e i r e f f o r t to explain something. This something seems to be the way to freedom, to deliverance from this double bind. Their problem i s one 134 and the same, but, as we have seen above, their.answers d i f f e r from each other: in the case of Emerson, a strong anthropocentric w i l l dominates Nature or Fate; in Chuang Tzu there i s a complete abandonment of the human w i l l and a t o t a l immersion i n Nature. Let us further examine the differences i n t h e i r approach to the double-bind s i t u a t i o n of human existence. We can see how Emerson faces t h i s predicament i n the following passage from his "Fate":, One key, one solution to the mysteries of human condition, one solution to the old knots of fate, freedom, and foreknowledge, e x i s t s ; the propounding, namely of the double consciousness. A man must ride alternately on the horses of his private and his public nature, as the equestrians i n the circus throw themselves nimbly from horse to horse, or plant one foot on the back of one and the other foot on the back of the other. So when a man i s the victim of his fate> has s c i a t i c a i n his loins and cramp i n his mind; a club-foot and a club i n his wit; a sour face and a s e l f i s h temper; a s t r u t in his gait and a conceit i n his a f f e c t i o n ; or i s ground to powder by the vice of his race;,—- he i s to r a l l y on his r e l a t i o n to the Universe, which his ruin benefits. Leaving the daemon who s u f f e r s , he i s to take sides with the Deity who secures universal benefit by his pain. (VI, 49-50) Emerson's notion of the "double consciousness" i n t h i s passage reminds us of Chuang Tzu's l i n g hsing f£f /yf\ (walking two roads). But a careful reading of the quotation w i l l reveal that Emerson's "double consciousness" i s e s s e n t i a l l y d u a l i s t i c . He v a c i l l a t e s between two p o l a r i t i e s : the i n d i v i d u a l and the whole. This dualism seems to be a f f e c t i n g the l a t t e r part of the above passage which, at f i r s t glance, carries exactly the same implication as Chuang Tzu's- attitude 13 5 toward w i l l . Emerson presupposes the difference between the daemon and the Deity and places importance on the l a t t e r . Here he i s discriminating between good and e v i l . This becomes more obvious i n the paragraph that follows immedi-ately after the one just quoted: To o f f s e t the drag of temperament and race, which p u l l s down, learn this lesson, namely that by the cunning co-presence of two elements which i s throughout nature, whatever • lames or paralyzes you draws i n with i t the d i v i n i t y , i n some form,:to repay. A good intention clothes i t s e l f with sudden power. When a god wishes to r i d e , any chip or pebble w i l l bud and shoot out winged feet and serve him for a horse. (VI, 50) In t h i s passage we can detect a w i l l to overpower e v i l by the "good intention" of the divine. Considering Emerson's -b e l i e f i n the d i v i n i t y of human beings, i t i s not very d i f f i c u l t to replace "a god" i n the l a s t sentence of t h i s passage with "man." From here arises his anthropocentrism which we have examined e a r l i e r . Thus we can say that the "double consciousness" of Emerson does not r e a l l y solve the double bind underlying the problem of l i f e —- the dilemma between the i n d i v i d u a l and the whole, between human beings and the universe (Nature). It seems that Emerson attempts to overcome t h i s problem by i d e n t i f y i n g the i n d i v i d u a l with the whole, man with Nature, but through his anthropocentric s p i r i t u a l i s m he creates another Nature that confronts-and menaces human l i f e . (Thus he has another double bind.) He regards t h i s Nature as chaotic, e v i l , and dangerous, and so i t must be subjugated and put into order by divine Reason 136 (Logos, the eternal Good) that works through human beings. This seems to be Emerson's "solution" of the double-bind s i t u a t i o n of human existence. However, i t i s clear that as long as he maintains a d u a l i s t i c viewpoint he w i l l keep on creating an i n f i n i t e series of double binds. In other words, by proposing "double consciousness" Emerson endlessly o s c i l -lates between the i n d i v i d u a l and the whole, between human l i f e and other l i v i n g things, between order and disorder, between " l i f e " and "death," and between "logos" and "chaos" in a vain attempt to have the former dominate the l a t t e r i n these groups of opposite p a i r s . Chuang Tzu, on the other hand, seems to take quite the opposite attitude toward the double-bind condition i n which human beings are caught. As has been pointed out so f a r , Chuang Tzu does not p a r t i c u l a r l y condemn entropy (disorder) as represented by death, deformity, disease, insanity, e v i l , darkness, and non-being. According to Chuang Tzu, these are not antagonistic so much as complementary to negative entropy (order) which includes l i f e , symmetry, health, sanity, good, l i g h t , and being. The following i s the f i r s t h a l f of a para-graph from the Chuang Tzu i n which he discusses t h i s point: Everything has i t s "that," everything has i t s " t h i s . " From the point of view of "that" you cannot see i t , but through understanding you can know i t . So I say, "that" comes out of " t h i s " and " t h i s " depends on "that" — w h i c h i s to say that " t h i s " and "that" give b i r t h to each other. But where there i s b i r t h there must be death; where there i s death there must be b i r t h . Where there i s acce p t a b i l i t y there must be unacceptability; where 137 there i s unacceptability there must be acceptabil-i t y . Where there i s recognition of right there must be recognition of wrong; where there i s recog-n i t i o n of wrong there must be recognition of r i g h t . Therefore the sage does not proceed i n such a way, but illuminates a l l i n the l i g h t of Heaven.16 (ch. 2, 39-40) 2- % ffft. 73 ^ _ ^ -Tf f ^ -si *T ^3^. © ^ flip #AJL^^LA-* & <?b s* l ^ r L i f e and death are opposite and even contradictory when looked at from the viewpoint of formal l o g i c , i . e . , the either/or type of l o g i c . However, at the l e v e l of the both/ and type of l o g i c the opposition and contradiction between the two can be transcended without eliminating either one of the two contradictory terms. Chuang Tzu c a l l s t h i s i l l u m i -nating " a l l i n the l i g h t of Heaven" which i s nothing but Nature or Chaos. As we have already seen, Chaos (Hun-tun) i s the Boundary or Void that exists (and does not exist) between any given opposite terms. This Boundary seems to be expressed as a hinge {%%.) or a socket ($f[ ) i n the l a t t e r h a l f of the paragraph just quoted above: He [the sage] too recognizes a " t h i s , " but a " t h i s " which i s also "that," a "that" which i s also " t h i s . " His "that" has both a right and a wrong in i t ; his " t h i s " too has both a right and a wrong in i t . So, i n . f a c t , does he s t i l l have a " t h i s " and "that"? Or does he i n fact no longer have a " t h i s " and "that"? A state in which " t h i s " and "that" no longer find t h e i r opposites i s c a l l e d the hinge of the Way. When the hinge i s f i t t e d into the socket, i t can respond endlessly. Its r i g h t then i s a single endlessness and i t s wrong too i s a single 13 8 endlessness. So, I say, the best thing to use i s c l a r i t y . (ch. 2, 40) j^&^Jt ikfr&C ft* - I L Thus i t can be said that Chuang Tzu's way to overcome the problem of the double bind of l i f e and death i s to have recourse i n the Boundary (Chaos, Non-being) between such pairs as l i f e and death, being and non-being, the i n d i v i d u a l and the whole, human beings and Nature, order and disorder, "logos" and "chaos," etc. Here seems to be one major difference between Emerson and Chuang Tzu. In facing the double-bind s i t u a t i o n , Emerson.bases his ideas on Being (Logos) which i s supposed to include both being ( l i f e ) and . non-being (death) yet tends to alienate and dominate non-being (the alienated non-being becomes e v i l , death, disorder, boundaries, e t c . ) ; Chuang Tzu, on the other hand, i s oriented to Chaos (Non-being) which i s the Boundary and therefore subsumes within i t s e l f both being and non-being, l i f e and death, order and disorder, human beings and the rest of the world, etc. In this chapter we have examined Emerson's and Chuang Tzu's notions of order and l i f e from several viewpoints such as Logos, Chaos, Being, Non-being, w i l l , anthropocentrism, 139 and double binds. Through these examinations we have shown that for Emerson l i f e i s a sort of order (which i s quite close to the usual sense of the term) and so i s clos e l y a l l i e d , both s p i r i t u a l l y and phy s i c a l l y , with the notion of Logos which i n turn has an inseparable relationship with Being, w i l l , and-anthropocentrism. L i f e , p a r t i c u l a r l y that of human beings, i s a w i l l to overcome death which, in Emerson, i s expressed through various terms such as chaos (disorder), darkness, e v i l , fate, disease, insanity, etc. From here arises Emerson's anthropocentrism which i s another name for Logocentrism. At the same time, however, t h i s gives r i s e to an unsolvable problem of the double-bind s i t u a t i o n — the dilemma between l i f e and death, order and disorder,.each and a l l , man and Nature, "logos" and "chaos," etc. As a solution for th i s predicament Emerson proposes the "double consciousness" which, however, i s e s s e n t i a l l y based on the either/or type of l o g i c , and thus naturally - leads him to the very cause of the double-bind s i t u a t i o n , namely, the human w i l l (logos) to overcome death and non-being (chaos). In other words, Logos alienates Chaos (Non-being) and makes i t into the boundary between every conceivable pair of opposites. In t h i s way Emerson endlessly v a c i l l a t e s between logos and chaos, l i f e and death, order and.disorder, being and non-being, ete. On the other hand, Chuang Tzu's approach i s based on the both/and type of l o g i c . He does not s t r i c t l y separate 140 l i f e from death, order from disorder, being from non-being, "logos" from "chaos." He seems to see how the terms of these pairs are r e l a t i v e and dependent on each other. This idea seems to be re f l e c t e d in his notions of ch'i and hsing , both of which are a harmonious and organic combi-nation of l i f e and death, energy and matter, s p i r i t and body.> Needless to say, the concepts of ch' i ^ f L and hsing are included i n Tao or Hun-tun (Chaos) which i s the Boundary. By i d e n t i f y i n g himself with the boundaries among things,. Chuang Tzu t r i e s to restore the alienated Boundary (Chaos) and thus transcend the insoluble question of the double bind. In the process of this transcendence, the human w i l l to alienate and, i f possible, eliminate death and disorder i s naturally considered to be unnecessary and even harmful. Hence his doubts about the anthropocentrism and c i v i l i z a t i o n which inevitably r e s u l t from the human w i l l to overcome death and non-being. In Chuang Tzu the human w i l l , both of the i n d i v i d u a l and of the whole, must be emptied i n order that one can tune into the great flow of L i f e , of Chaos, which includes both l i f e and death. In thi s way one can preserve both one's i n d i v i d u a l l i f e and the L i f e of the universe. This seems to be Chuang Tzu's method of dealing with the predicament of the double bind. NOTES TO CHAPTER III In.this thesis we s h a l l use DNA theory, and for that matter other s c i e n t i f i c theories, as a convenient means of interpreting and explaining Emerson's and Chuang Tzu's notion of l i f e and order. This does not necessarily imply that we take t h i s and other theories as fact with absolute v a l i d i t y and r e a l i t y . I t i s almost a.truism that a certain s c i e n t i f i c theory i s not t o t a l l y free from i t s hypothetical nature and thus i s quite often superseded by other new theories with a deeper and broader perspective. However/ at least for the present, DNA theory seems to have a v a l i d i t y to the extent that man can actually control mutations by using i t . Ac-cording to David Suzuki, a Canadian g e n e t i c i s t , "In humans, genetic and medical techniques already exist that can be used to detect and i n some instances r e c t i f y undesirable c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s i n unborn children" (Dennis B e l l , "Talking to . . . Dr. Quirks and Quarks," The Province, 26 November 1977, p. 5, c o l . 6). Cf. also J . F. D a n i e l l i , " A r t i f i c i a l Synthesis of New L i f e Forms," i n C. C. Pri c e , ed., Synthesis of L i f e (Stroudsburg, 1974), pp. 287-291. 2 -Wilden,.System and Structure, p. 3 97. 3 Inge, The Philosophy of Plotinus, Vol. I, 125. 4 C f . Fukunaga, Soshi: Gaihen (f\.\>i\-% ) (Tokyo, 1970), pp. 4-5; Mori ,. JS d a i y o r i kandai.ni i t a r u seimeikan.no  tenkai (The Development of the Concepts of Human Nature and Destiny from the Beginning to the Han Dynasty), p. 92. 5 In connection with t h i s we should note the following passage from Lieh Tzu, another Taoist text whose tenets have much i n common with those of Chuang Tzu: "My body i s one with the mind, the mind wit for c e ] , ch'i %L with shen [nothingness]" (ch. 4) " 4& ... - - .... ^ , ffc^ " ( , *f %\® ) . Wu ^ i n t h i s passage no doubt corresponds to Tao or Hun-tun. ^Cf. J . Monod, Chance and Necessity: An Essay on the Natural Philosophy of Modern Biology, t r . , Austryn Wainhouse (New York, 1971), ch. 6. 7 Cf. also Hesiod, Theogony, 118-125; Ovid, Metamor-phoses , I, 1-87; Milton, Paradise Lost, I, 9-22; Hastings, Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, I I I , 363. h ch ' i f£ [matter-energy , v i t a l ) [ s p i r i t ] , shen %fo with wu 141 142 g Cf. Emerson's following remarks on reason, which seems to be closely connected with the notion of being: "The authority of Reason cannot be separated from i t s v i s i o n . They are not two acts, but one. The sight commands, & the command sees" (journal for June, 1835). i 9 Cf. Paul T i l l i c h , The Courage to Be (London and Glasgow, 1967), p. 43; Masao Abe, "Non-being and Mu: The Metaphysical Nature of Negativity i n the East and the West," Religious Studies, 2 (1975) , 181-192. •^Cf. the following passage from Parmenides: "And remaining the same in the same place, i t [Being] rests by i t s e l f and thus remains there fixed; for powerful Necessity holds i t i n the bonds of a Limit, which constrains i t round about, because i t i s decreed by divine law that Being s h a l l not be without boundary. . . . But since there i s a (spatial) Limit, i t [Being] i s complete on every side, l i k e the mass of a well-rounded sphere, equally balanced from i t s centre i n every d i r e c t i o n ...... ." (K. Freeman, t r . , A n c i l l a to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers [Oxford, 1948] , p. 44) . "^'i.e., the yin and yang, being two, already represent a departure from the primal unity of the Way. What Master Kuang Ch'eng i s objecting to, of course, i s the fact that the Yellow Emperor wishes to "control" them (Watson's note, p. 119). 12 A. M. Kondratov, Saibanetikkuse nyumon (Introduction to Cybernetics), t r . , Yoshio Akita (Tokyo, 1975) , p. 16. 13 To be more precise, t h i s i s not quite correct, for the law.of entropy holds true only i n a closed system, whereas no,one knows whether the universe i s closed or open, i . e . , f i n i t e or i n f i n i t e . It seems f a i r l y plausible to hypothesize that so-called entropic doom i s only one phase of the universe and somewhere unknown to our science there exists a larger law that comprehends both entropy (e.g., so-c a l l e d death) and negative entropy -(e.g., so-called l i f e ) . The notion of such a law seems to.approximate Chuang Tzu's Tao and, to some extent, Emerson's Over-Soul (the S p i r i t u a l Law). However, as i s the case with Newtonian physics, the law of entropy seems to apply to the universe, at least within a certain framework. 14 Cf. Monod, ch. 8. Although Monod,,who wrote th i s book i n 1970, cannot have been as s i m p l i s t i c as F. R. Japp and du Noiiy, who asserted the improbability of l i f e a r i s i n g from inorganic matter without taking into consideration the chemico-physical laws working among p a r t i c l e s and molecules (see M. Gardner, The Ambidextrous Universe [New York and 143 London, 1964], ch. 15), he may s t i l l be open to the same kind of c r i t i c i s m directed toward Japp and du Nouy by many s c i e n t i s t s of today who tend to support the idea of the " i n e v i t a b i l i t y of the o r i g i n of l i f e " (cf. E. Samuel, Order:  in L i f e [Englewood C l i f f s , N. J . , 1972], pp. 261-271; Gardner, ch. 15). However, there seem to be at least two reasons for which Monod's position can be defended:.one i s that he does not say that the formation of amino acids and DNA out of inanimate matter i s improbable (for the former were synthesized by S. L. M i l l e r i n 1952, and adenine, one of the four bases of DNA, by C. Ponnamperuma, a Ceylonese biochemist, i n 1963), but that how the coupled system of amino, acids and DNA, which i s v i r t u a l l y a l i v i n g organism i t s e l f , came into being has been unknown u n t i l today, and this phenomenon seems to be much more improbable than the formation of DNA or amino acids, because i t i s considered to be a matter of evolution, which i s based on the i n t e r a c t i o n of chance and the laws of Nature ranging over a long period of time. The other reason, which i s closely related to the f i r s t , i s that, even i f the coupling system of DNA and amino acids i s an inevitable consequence brought about by unknown laws i n the universe (which Emerson would ascribe to the S p i r i t [Logos], and Chuang Tzu to Tao or Chaos), s t i l l i t appears to be a rare and somewhat miraculous phenomenon, considering the tendency of the universe which i s moving, at least for the present, toward a chaotic state, according to the p r i n c i p l e of entropy. 1 5 0 f course, i t i s not against the law of entropy, because l i f e on earth i s supported by the l i g h t of the sun which increases the net entropy of the universe as a whole by i t s combustion. However, as was mentioned i n note 14 of this chapter, the phenomenon of " l i f e " seems to be a p a r t i a l v i o l a t i o n of the law of entropy prevalent i n the universe. According to E. Samuel,.this seeming contradiction raises "the rather uncomfortable problem of explaining how l o c a l 'energy sinks' exist i n the universe, where coupled reactions can compound the dispersive tendency of other reactions and esta b l i s h an ordered structure of matter, e s p e c i a l l y when the system i s a dynamic one l i k e the c e l l " (Samuel, Order:  in L i f e , p. 261). "^T'ien, which for Chuang Tzu means Nature or the Way (Watson's note). Cf. also notes 24 (p. 57) and 25 (p. 10 4) of t h i s thesis. See next page. 144 -or too 17 An i n t e r e s t i n g analogy which i l l u s t r a t e s this point may be seen i n the graph of the function y=l/x. As the graph indicates, when x actually has the value of zero, the results are unpredictable. Perhaps because of t h i s , x i s not allowed to assume the value zero. S t i l l , i t i s possible to imagine that + 0 0 and - OO meet at the point x=0. Mathematicians usually set y=0 at x=0 to complete the function y=l/x (x=^ 0) , thereby giving i t well-defined values at a l l points on the x-axis. This also suggests that the two extremes ( i . e . , + 00 and meet at zero. Zero, the boundary between the po s i t i v e numbers and the negative numbers, can be compared to (the hinge) or (the socket) i n the l a s t passage quoted from Chuang Tzu. We should also note that i n the same passage Chuang Tzu writes, "Its r i g h t then i s a single endlessness and i t s wrong too i s a single endlessness." The two arms of the graph which extend i n f i n i t e l y toward +00 and -CO may correspond respectively to the right (a single end-lessness) and the wrong (another endlessness), and these by extension to being and non-being, "logos" and "chaos," l i f e and.death, etc. These seemingly opposite pairs may indeed meet somewhere, subsumed i n Zero, the Boundary, Non-being, Chaos. -x -> 0~ CONCLUSION Through the examination of Emerson's and Chuang Tzu's notions of order we have established that Emerson's concepts of order are rather Logocentric ( i . e . , d u a l i s t i c ) , whereas those of Chuang Tzu are. b a s i c a l l y Chaos-oriented ( i . e . , non-d u a l i s t i c ) . This difference may be best symbolized i n the story of Hun-tun quoted from the Chuang Tzu on page 18 of this t h e s i s . Shu and Hu i n thi s anecdote seem to represent the fundamental aspects of Logos such as consciousness, reason, 1 language, v i s i o n 1 (as connected with l i g h t ) , l i f e ( s p i r i t u a l and physical), s p i r i t , law, symmetry, proportion ( r a t i o ) , harmony, etc., a l l of which, as we have seen are important elements i n Emerson's notion of order. In the f i r s t place they (Shu and Hu) stand outside of Hun-tun (Nature) and look at i t from that perspective, thus symbolizing human consciousness as opposed to Hun-tun which has none of the f i v e senses and can, therefore, be a metaphor for the unconscious. Here.is the f i r s t sign of duality that l i e s between man as consciousness (subject) and Nature as unconscious matter (object). Then Shu and Hu bore eyes, a mouth, a nose, etc., i n the amorphous face of Hun-tun. This would mean th e i r attempt or w i l l to subjugate the seeming chaos and disorder (lawlessness) of material Nature through the ordering power of v i s i o n (light) and speech (language). (Here i s another duality introduced among the objects of vis i o n and language.) We can see a p a r a l l e l between this 146 process and Emerson's attitude toward untamed Nature men-tioned e a r l i e r : "So much only of l i f e as I know by experience, so much of the wilderness have I vanquished and planted, or so far have I extended my being, my dominion" ("The American Scholar," I, 96). Emerson, as well as Shu and Hu, seems to think that the seeming chaos and wilderness of Hun-tun (Nature) mean death and darkness, and so by imposing.a human face (a symbol of Logos)-upon Hun-tun he believes that he has succeeded i n giving l i f e (light) and order (law) to i t . But his notions of l i f e and order seem to be rather r e s t r i c t e d compared with those of Chuang Tzu, which are-based on non-dualistic Hun^tun, the matrix of l i f e and order. Moreover, Emerson's concepts of l i f e and order are somewhat mechanical and geometrical as the well-proportioned symmetry of the human face symbolizes. It i s true that Emerson expounded the so-called organic theory, which regards art as an organic process of Nature and maintains that an a r t i s t i c work must develop i t s own form,from within as i f i t were a seed growing into a tree. However, this theory should also be interpreted i n the l i g h t of Emerson's Idealism or s p i r i t -ualism. Needless to say, Nature i n his theory.means s p i r i t u a l Nature (natura naturans) and as we have already seen, this s p i r i t u a l Nature i s rather Logocentric ( i . e . , d u a l i s t i c , symmetrical, and geometrical). His "organicism," then, seems to be quite d i f f e r e n t from that of Chuang Tzu, whose notion of Nature i s based on Hun-tun which includes 147 such things as chaos, disease* death, darkness, e v i l , etc., a l l of which are rejected by Emerson. Compared with Chuang Tzu's "organicism," Emerson's organic theory i s s t i l l somewhat geometric and mechanical. I t i s founded on the either/or type of l o g i c and so i t tends to discriminate between l i f e (order) and death (disorder) and choose the former, thus r e j e c t i n g , alienating, and k i l l i n g the seemingly chaotic yet v i v i d and spontaneous l i f e of Hun-tun. . This seems to be what Chuang Tzu fears most, for th i s would also mean the death of Shu and Hu (human beings), who, according to Chuang Tzu's viewpoint, originate not i n the supernatural, i d e a l world beyond material Nature, but i n Hun-tun (Nature) i t s e l f . Shu and Hu (human beings) and Hun-tun (Nature) are not two separate things, but the former should be regarded as the embryos i n the womb of the l a t t e r . However, once they are born of Hun-tun and become conscious of themselves, they try to sever the umbilical cord between Hun-tun (the mother) and themselves (the children). They draw a clear-cut boundary.between themselves as human beings and Nature as matter ( i . e . , mater or mother) and then try to control the l a t t e r from without. To repeat the passage quoted from Emerson i n the second chapter: Whilst the man i s weak, the earth takes up-him. He plants his brain and affections. By and by he w i l l take up the earth, and have his gardens and vine-yards in the b e a u t i f u l order and productiveness of his thought ["Fate," VI, 46]. The earth i n t h i s passage could correspond to Nature or 148 Hun-tun (Tao), which i s sometimes expressed as ta k'uai •7C (the Great Clod) i n the Chuang Tzu (ch. 6) . Emer-son's Logocentric notion of order tends to bifurcate into man and Nature (Hun-tun) and place the former i n the higher position. We saw thi s kind of b i f u r c a t i o n i n Hui Tzu's either/or type of l d g i c , which separates Chuang Tzu (man) from the f i s h (Nature) i n another anecdote mentioned i n the second chapter. Emerson, who b a s i c a l l y follows the l o g i c of either/or, shows a strong i n c l i n a t i o n toward an anthropocen-t r i c idea i n which human beings as the embodiment of Logos s t i c k out from the material Nature (Chaos) to consciously control and order i t . Human beings (a t y p i c a l example of "being") stand out of the Non-being of Hun-tun, just as subatomic p a r t i c l e s emerge from the void of energy, which can be a metaphor for Hun-tun. Here i s a sharp contrast between Emerson's consciousness-oriented ( i . e . , anthropocen-t r i c ) notion of order and that of Chuang Tzu, which has a pred i l e c t i o n for immersion i n the unconscious of Hun-tun. This contrast between consciousness and unconscious-ness can also be expressed as that between action (will) and non-action (non-will). In his journal for 1835, Emerson writes, "To think i s to act," and i n "The American Scholar," he further develops th i s idea: Action i s with the scholar subordinate, but i t i s ess e n t i a l . . . . Inaction i s cowardice. . . . The preamble of thought, the t r a n s i t i o n through which i t passes from the unconscious to the conscious, i s action. Only so much do I know, as I have l i v e d [I, 95-96]. A few sentences after t h i s comes the passage quoted above i n which Emerson equates experience (consciousness) with man's domination of wild Nature. But the w i l l to dominate Nature (Hun-tun) by human beings inevitably alienates i t , for domination presupposes the externalization of the object dominated>and, as we saw above, e a s i l y brings about the death of Nature (Hun-tun) and, consequently, human beings themselves. In Emerson, alienated Nature seems to appear as non-being, chaos, disorder, disease, death, darkness, e v i l , insanity, fate, etc. In other words, these states are the voids or holes (a metaphor for boundaries) bored into the face of Hun-tun, which turn out to be enormous and threaten to engulf Shu and Hu (human beings). Here i s the predicament of Emerson's notion of w i l l and action. As the concept of the "double consciousness," presumably his f i n a l solution to th i s problem, aptly indicates, he v a c i l l a t e s and o s c i l l a t e s between the material Nature (the unconscious, Chaos) and Logos (consciousness or reason). For Emerson Nature some-times appears to be r e a l (natura naturans) and sometimes unreal (natura naturata), an illusory,and chaotic v e i l of Maya. When the o s c i l l a t i o n between the two becomes greater and gets to i t s maximum, he breaks through the v e i l (the boundary) to reach the eternal realm of the Idea (or order) once and for a l l . This seems to be a natural consequence of Emerson's notion of order, which i s e s s e n t i a l l y Logocentric and i s 150 based on the either/or type of l o g i c . However, t h i s i s , of course, merely a negative aspect of his d u a l i s t i c notion of order. I t has a p o s i t i v e side, too, as w i l l be c l a r i f i e d shortly. At this stage, however, we need to spend a few more words on the negative elements i n Emerson's Logocentrism. For further i l l u s t r a t i o n of t h i s point, l e t us return to the anecdote of Hun-tun mentioned e a r l i e r . As we have seen, Shu and Hu are o r i g i n a l l y one with Hun-tun. The former are immersed and embedded in the l a t t e r . Therefore, t h e i r action of boring holes i n the face of Hun-tun (which eventually causes death to i t ) i s , in a sense, a self-negation or s e l f -destruction of and by Hun-tun i t s e l f . Here seems to l i e the fundamental cause of the double binds between such pairs as l i f e and death, order arid disorder, etc., discussed i n the preceding chapters. This self-negation of Hun-tun (the universe, Nature) can be compared.to the structure of the Mobius s t r i p , the half-twisted c i r c u l a r s t r i p with only one side. The twist i n the s t r i p may correspond to the s e l f -negating nature of the universe. Because of t h i s twist (or negation) the slayer and the s l a i n , the eater and the eaten, the stealer and the stolen become one and the same. Emerson seems to be aware of t h i s and expresses t h i s kind of idea i n his poems and essays such as "Brahma," "Fate," and "Compen-sation." But at the same time, he has a strong p r e d i l e c t i o n for dualism. He tends to pay attention only to the two sides 151 of the s t r i p and regards i t as an ordinary, straightforward strip-without a twist (negation). This means a denial (alienation) of the twist, whose other names are negation, "not," non-being, the boundary. He stands on th i s side of the boundary where logos, order, law, l i f e and being are to be found and he sees chaos, disorder, death, and non-being on the other side. He has to choose either this side or that, but actually both are one and the same. And t h i s causes him to make a repetitious movement between t h i s side and the other side of the s t r i p . This seems to be the nature of what he c a l l s the "double consciousness." which, as we have seen above, causes him to step over the boundary to the realm of Ideas i n the end. This i s Emerson's transcen-dence , which i s rather active and i s directed outward and upward. In contrast to t h i s , Chuang Tzu t r i e s to immerse himself i n the boundary between the two sides of the s t r i p . By following the boundary of the Mobius s t r i p , which can be seen as a metaphor for Chaos,.he transcends the dilemma of the double bind between order and disorder. His transcen-dence i s , so to speak, inward and downward. However, herein seems to l i e the danger of his transcendence, for i t i s e a s i l y misunderstood for quietism, an inactive t o t a l regres-sion into the womb of Hun-tun. Although such i s not the case, as we can see, for instance, i n the anecdote of cook Ting quoted at the.end of the f i r s t chapter, we cannot deny 152 the fact that Chuang Tzu's notion of order., which i s based on the non-dualistic Chaos or Hun-tun (the unconscious) has an element that leads one to licentiousness or to a s e l f -s a t i s f i e d t o t a l seclusion from society, both of which seem to be negative aspects of Hun-tun as the unconscious. On the other hand, Emerson's Logocentric ( i . e . , dual-i s t i c ) notion of order, which i s b a s i c a l l y consciousness-and action-oriented and thus tends to lead one to an endless o s c i l l a t i o n between any two opposite pairs or else to an i d e a l i s t i c f l i g h t into the noumenal world, may merely be a negative side of the coin. Needless to say, i t must also have a positive aspect. This may be i l l u s t r a t e d through the two aspects of the Mobius s t r i p : on one l e v e l this side of the s t r i p i s .completely d i f f e r e n t and distinguishable from the other.side; on another l e v e l the two sides are one and the same. Generally speaking, Emerson seems to take the former view, while Chuang Tzu takes, the l a t t e r . However, both views are v a l i d and both are indispensable as they constitute the entirety of the Mobius s t r i p , namely* the universe. Because of the twist ( i . e . , self-negation) i n the universe the two viewpoints may appear to be contradictory, but in r e a l i t y they are complementary. The same can be said of the parable mentioned e a r l i e r of Hun-tun and the " p a r t i c i p a t i o n mystique" between Chuang Tzu and the f i s h . Hun-tun (the unconscious) would not be able to r e a l i z e i t s own value without the consciousness 153 (Logos) of Shu and Hu, just as Chuang Tzu would not be able to recognize the pleasure of the f i s h without f i r s t separat-ing himself from i t . We are reminded here of Emerson's remarks concerning the joy he experiences i n his " p a r t i c i p a -t i o n mystique" with Nature: "Yet i t i s certain.that the power, to produce t h i s delight does, not reside i n nature, but in man, or i n a harmony of both" (Nature, I, 16). Therefore,, from the vantage point of a wider perspective, we can say that BOTH either/or AND both/and are necessary, BOTH Logos AND Chaos, BOTH Emerson AND Chuang Tzu are required to complete the universe. NOTES TO CONCLUSION Cf. note 8 to Chapter III of thi s thesis. 154 BIBLIOGRAPHY Abe, Masao. "Non-being and Mu: The Metaphysical Nature of Negativity i n the East and the West." Religious  Studies, 2 ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 1 8 1 - 1 9 2 . Ames, R. T. 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