THE NOTION OF ORDER
IN
R. W. EMERSON AND CHUANG TZU
by
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This thesis is a comparative study of the notion of order in Emerson and Chuang Tzu. The notion of order seems to be significant, because it is directly connected with what is thought to be the most fundamental problem of human existence which seems to critically affect the totality of the modes and structures of human phenomena, including, of course, literature. This problem lies in the relationships between dualism and non-dualism (cf. p. 12, n. 1). Needless to say, one's concept of order varies greatly depending on the degree of one's inclination toward either of these two attitudes, because, as is the case with any notion that has its opposite, order inevitably presupposes its opposite concept, disorder, thus putting the problem of order on the level of dualism. Therefore, by examining Emerson's and Chuang Tzu's notions of order, we can hope to clarify whether and how their attitudes toward the universe are dualistic or non-dualistic.

In order to achieve this purpose we shall divide this thesis into three chapters. The first chapter compares Emerson's notion of order and boundaries with that of Chuang Tzu and reaches the conclusion that the former is based on the dualism of the either/or type of logic, while the latter is based on the non-dualistic both/and type of logic.

In the second chapter we examine Emerson's and Chuang
Tzu's concepts of order from the viewpoint of law and establish that Emerson's notion of law and order is Logocentric, whereas that of Chuang Tzu is Chaos-oriented.

In the last chapter we approach the theme of order from the perspective of life. In this chapter, too, our classification of Logos and Chaos, the logic of either/or and that of both/and, becomes useful in surveying Emerson's and Chuang Tzu's notion of life and order. This chapter aims to reach the same conclusions as those of the previous chapters, concerning the concepts of order and life in Emerson and Chuang Tzu.

Our overall aim in this thesis is to establish that Emerson's notion of order is basically Logocentric (i.e., dualistic), while that of Chuang Tzu is Chaos-oriented (i.e., non-dualistic), and that both views are equally valid and indispensable in constituting the universe in its entirety.
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My special gratitude goes to Dr. A. Wilden of Simon Fraser University, whose summer seminar in 1977 at the University of British Columbia aroused my enthusiasm and my decision to choose the theme of this thesis.
Therefore is Space, and therefore Time, that man may know that things are not huddled and lumped, but sundered and individual. . . . The wise man shows his wisdom in separation, in gradation, and his scale of creatures and of merits is as wide as nature.

(Emerson, *Nature*, ch. 5)

At last comes Plato, the distributor, who needs no barbaric paint, or tattoo, or whooping; for he can define. He leaves with Asia the vast and superlative; he is the arrival of accuracy and intelligence. "He shall be as a god to me, who can rightly divide and define."

(Emerson, "Plato; or the Philosopher")

The Way has never known boundaries; speech has no constancy. But because of [the recognition of a] "this," there came to be boundaries. Let me tell you what the boundaries are. There is left, there is right, there are theories, there are debates, there are divisions, there are discriminations, there are emulations, and there are contentions. These are called the Eight Virtues. . . . So I say, those who divide fail to divide; those who discriminate fail to discriminate.

(Chuang Tzu, ch. 2, tr. by B. Watson)
INTRODUCTION

Several books and articles have been written on the relationship between Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803-1882) and Eastern thought. These works include F. I. Carpenter's *Emerson and Asia* (Cambridge: 1930), A. Christy's *The Orient in American Transcendentalism* (New York: 1932), V. M. Ames' *Zen and American Thought* (Honolulu: 1962), and S. Ando's *Zen and American Transcendentalism* (Tokyo: 1970). However, most of these studies tend to emphasize the similarities rather than the differences between Emerson's transcendentalism and the East. Moreover, none of these books has attempted a direct comparison between Emerson and philosophical Taoism as represented by Chuang Tzu (c. 4th century B.C.). If such an attempt had been carried out, the comparatist might have found a considerable degree of difference as well as resemblance between the two thinkers. As will become clear in the following chapters, in spite of the great tempo-spatial distance between Emerson and Chuang Tzu, they have many points in common, and yet they differ on one crucial point which seems to be reflected particularly in their notions of order: Emerson's notion of order is dualistic, whereas that of Chuang Tzu is non-dualistic.  

This difference seems to originate in the difference between their attitudes toward the two basic aspects of the
universe, which will be discussed in detail in the last chapter and conclusion of this thesis. These two approaches, also being the most fundamental attitudes toward human existence, seem to form the two pre-propositional bases of all human activities, not to mention of literature. In this sense, comparison between Emerson and Chuang Tzu, with special reference to the differences between their concepts of order, can be said to be an investigation of one of the essential problems in comparative literature.

To recapitulate, then, the aim of this thesis is to clarify the nature of and the differences between the two basic world views (i.e., dualism and non-dualism) through a comparison of Emerson's and Chuang Tzu's notions of order, and thus to lay a part of the foundation for comparative literature studies. Considering the nature of the goal of this paper, our approach to this task naturally becomes somewhat "philosophical" — philosophical, however, in the original sense of the term, i.e., philosophia (love of "wisdom" or "truth"). Ideally speaking, this kind of attempt should be all-comprehensive and interdisciplinary, but if this be impossible, which is rather likely in view of the scope of this research as an M.A. thesis, it should at least be "eclectic."

Having stated our general direction as above, let us further elaborate on it. As is mentioned above, the main purpose of this thesis is to clarify the fundamental
differences between Emerson's and Chuang Tzu's concepts of order. To achieve this task we shall employ the following three perspectives which seem to be closely interconnected: order and boundaries, order and law, and order and life. One chapter will be allotted to each of these viewpoints. Thus, in the first chapter we shall examine Emerson's and Chuang Tzu's notions of boundaries and their relationship to their concepts of order. Through this examination we hope to establish that Emerson's notions of order and boundaries indicate a strong inclination toward dualism, i.e., the either/or type of logic, while those of Chuang Tzu tend toward non-dualism, i.e., the both/and type of logic.

These two types of logic seem to correspond respectively to the logic of Logos and that of Chaos (cf. p. 10), for Logos is a bifurcating principle, whereas Chaos is that of unity. The second chapter, then, aims to investigate Emerson's and Chuang Tzu's notions of law and order in terms of Logos and Chaos.

The ideas of Logos and Chaos will further be developed in the last chapter, where we shall examine the notion of order in Emerson and Chuang Tzu as reflected in their concepts of life. In this chapter the notions of being and non-being will also be introduced in connection with Logos, Chaos, life, death, order, disorder, etc.

Through the survey of Emerson's and Chuang Tzu's notions of order as outlined above, this paper attempts to
show not only that the essential difference between the two
is that between Logocentric (i.e., dualistic) and Chaos-
oriented (i.e., non-dualistic) world views, but also that
these seeming incompatible standpoints can be harmonized
from the vantage point of a wider perspective.

Having briefly stated the rationale, aim, method, and
format of this thesis, it would be appropriate to touch upon
the range and the characteristics of Emerson's and Chuang
Tzu's texts used in this paper. As for Emerson, considering
the "philosophical" nature of this paper and its size as an
M.A. thesis, it would be reasonable to concentrate our atten­
tion mainly on his most famous dozen essays and lectures,
with occasional references to his journals and well-known
poems such as "The Rhodora," "Brahma," "Two Rivers," etc.
As for Chuang Tzu, we shall use both nei p'ien 内篇 (the so-
called inner chapters) and wai tsa p'ien 外集篇 (the so-
called outer and miscellaneous chapters) with somewhat
stronger emphasis on nei p'ien than on wai tsa p'ien, for
reasons that will be clarified below.

What we should note here is that there seem to be
some inconsistencies in both Emerson's and Chuang Tzu's
texts. As S. G. Brown points out, the ambiguities in Emerson
seem to come from the following idea:

... sometimes the world seemed to him to have
independent material existence, colored and inter­
preted by mind, and sometimes it seemed to him
wholly dependent and ideal. He never could entirely
make up his mind, and hence it is that throughout
his writing, and whatever the specific problem under discussion, you will find him now on this side and now on that in the fundamental question of metaphysics. All his contradictions and little inconsistencies flow from this source.3

It is interesting to note that Emerson himself seems to have been aware of this, for in his "Self-Reliance" he writes:

But why should you keep your head over your shoulder? Why drag about this corpse of your memory, lest you contradict somewhat you have stated in this or that public place? Suppose you should contradict yourself; what then?4

Judging from these passages, it seems that we must be ready to face a considerable amount of difficulty in dealing with Emerson's thought. However, looked at from a different angle, these inconsistencies themselves may prove to be the very consistency of Emerson, for as we can surmise from the above quotation from Brown, Emerson's inconsistencies seem to arise from his oscillation between materialism and idealism. In other words, Emerson's world view is dualistic. It seems that his description of Plato as a man who "turns incessantly the obverse and the reverse of the medal of Jove" ("Plato; or the Philosopher," IV, 56) holds true of Emerson himself. Thus as far as dualism is concerned, Emerson seems to be rather consistent and we can keep this in mind as an important clue to understanding him.

On the other hand, the Chuang Tzu is also said to be inconsistent. Some of the reasons for this would be that it is a compilation by many writers over a considerable period of time and thus some influences upon it by other schools of
thought such as those of the Confucianists, Mo-ists, Legalists, and Logicians were unavoidable. As M. Fukunaga says, "Scholars have long been debating over which parts of the 33 chapters of the *Chuang Tzu* are the original work of Chuang Chou [i.e., Chuang Tzu] and which chapters convey his authentic teachings. . . ." Furthermore, as Watson writes in his introduction to his translation of the *Chuang Tzu*:

All we know about the identity of Chuang Tzu, or Master Chuang, are the few facts recorded in the brief notice given him in the *Shih chi* or *Records of the Historian* (ch. 63) by Ssu-ma Ch'ien (145?-89? B.C.). According to this account, his personal name was Chou, he was a native of a place called Meng, and he once served as "an official in the lacquer garden" in Meng. Ssu-ma Ch'ien adds that he lived at the same time as King Hui (370-319 B.C.) of Liang and King Hsuan (319-301 B.C.) of Ch'i, which would make him a contemporary of Mencius, and that he wrote a work in 100,000 words or more which was "mostly in the nature of fable."

Be that as it may, a distinction has long been made between nei p'ien (the inner chapters) and wai tsa p'ien (the outer and miscellaneous chapters) and most scholars seem to agree in concluding that the nei p'ien are relatively old and especially the first two chapters, i.e., *Hsiao yao you* (free and easy wandering) and *Ch'i wu lun* (discussion on making all things equal) are the original concepts of Chuang Tzu. Then does this distinction between the nei p'ien and wai tsa p'ien mean that only the former, and especially the first two chapters, are trustworthy in conveying Chuang Tzu's original thought and all, or most of, the other chapters should be dismissed as
inauthentic or even contradictory to the inner chapters? As mentioned in the above quotation from Fukunaga, scholars seem to disagree on this point, but there seems to be some kind of core notion in the Chuang Tzu which may serve as a touchstone in deciding whether a certain passage is expressing Chuang Tzu's original idea or not. Presumably this is why Fukunaga states:

However, recently I am becoming interested more in grasping the quintessence of Chuang Tzu's thought in the context of his work as a whole, than in putting emphasis in the formal distinction between nei, wai, tsa p'ien 内外推簡.... My opinion is that the essence of Chuang Tzu's philosophy which is unique and distinct from other systems of thought lies in the philosophy of wan wu chi t'ung [the equality of all things] in Ch' u wu lun p'ien and in its development and variations as seen in the dialogues between Ho Po 河伯, and Po Hai Jo 北海若 in ch'iu shui p' ien 秋水篇 [Autumn Floods], Shao Chin 少知 and Ta Kung Tiao 太公調 in Tse-yang p' ien 则陽篇, and Chung Ni 仲尼 and Jan Chiu 季牟 in Chih pei you p' ien 知北遊篇 [Knowledge Wandered North]. According to this viewpoint, I interpreted Chuang Tzu's tao 道 (the world of reality) and explained wu hsin 忘心 (a liberated life). In considering Chuang Tzu's philosophy, the idea of the equality of all things (万物皆同) would be the most important touchstone in judging the authenticity of a certain passage in the text.

However, I do not intend by any means to ignore and omit the various descriptions in the Chuang Tzu that do not conform to the idea of万物皆同 (the equality of all things), as being non- or anti-Chuang Tzuistic. Even if they are later interpolations, and even if they differ from each other in their importance as [Chuang Tzu's] thought, the contents of the Chuang Tzu as a whole retain and express one coherent idea and characteristic. The various interpolations of later writers seem to serve as the basis of the philosophy of 万物論 (discussion on making all things equal), and thus form the mental climate that nurtures Chuang Tzuistic thought. 9
In this quotation Fukunaga seems to be expressing two important points: one is that the idea of 万物者同 (equality of all things) is the core of Chuang Tzu's thought; the other is that there is an integrity and consistency throughout the Chuang Tzu which appears to be a mere admixture of various ideas which are often contradictory to each other. This consistency, according to Fukunaga, centers on the tenet of 万物者同, which, otherwise expressed seems to correspond to the notion of non-dualism.

In this thesis we shall follow Fukunaga's opinion mentioned above and treat the book of Chuang Tzu as a consistent whole, with special emphasis, however, placed on the nei p'ien 内篇 (the inner chapters), whose central tenet is considered to be 万物者同 or non-dualism not only by Fukunaga but by other scholars. From this standpoint it follows naturally that the name "Chuang Tzu" used in this thesis does not refer to a specific individual whose historical identity is very obscure, but "to the mind, or group of minds, revealed in the text called Chuang Tzu, particularly the first seven sections of that text."^11

However, although we shall regard the Chuang Tzu as a relatively consistent whole and let the name Chuang Tzu stand for the group of people who compiled it, we are not to forget the fact that after all it is a compilation by many hands over a considerable period of time and thus, depending on the commentator or the translator, the interpretation of
the text may differ considerably. Taking this into consideration, we shall make use of as many interpreters and commentators as possible besides Fukunaga and Watson, who are the two main sources in interpreting Chuang Tzu's thought in this thesis. In spite of these precautions, however, it may still be possible that our interpretation of the Chuang Tzu is not completely free from some kind of "misinterpretations" and even of "distortions." But this seems to be unavoidable, considering the nature of Chuang Tzu's thought. To quote Fukunaga again:

In its freedom, far-reaching imagination, and novel yet original expressions, Chuang Tzu's philosophy has unique characteristics which are not comparable to other schools of thought. His philosophy has, so to say, the freedom of "Pegasus galloping across heaven." It is an extremely difficult task to interpret such a philosophy exactly and explain it to others in proper words. Needless to say, my book Chuang Tzu is a personal interpretation of this demanding task, and as such it indicates only one of many possibilities. The reader may naturally find a number of dogmatic statements, distortions, and prejudices in it. But for me there was no other way than to express what I understood about the Chuang Tzu in my own language. Besides, I believe that the Chuang Tzu is originally such a book as allows people their own interpretations and understandings of it. To seek for only one absolute authority outside one's self and to become a slave to the ideas of the ancients — these were the things that Chuang Tzu denounced most.

In other words, Chuang Tzu's thought seems to be very flexible (but of course here is also the danger of its easily degenerating into looseness and laxity), and this flexibility seems to arise from his non-dualism which, in Chuang Tzu's terminology, may be expressed in such words as
Hun-tun 混沌 (Chaos) and Wu 無 (Non-being or Nothingness). In the following chapters, we shall investigate the meanings of Hun-tun and Wu and their implications in Chuang Tzu's notion of order as contrasted to that of Emerson which seems to be rather dualistic and Logos-oriented.

A few more words in passing, however, seem necessary here to prevent possible misunderstandings concerning the meanings of the terms Hun-tun 混沌 and Wu 無 which seem to be two of the basic notions of Chuang Tzu's non-dualistic philosophy. In Chuang Tzu, Hun-tun 混沌, which we translate as "Chaos" for want of a better term, is not mere confusion or disorder. It surely has the implications of confusion and disorder, at least to the human intellect, but it is, so to speak, the "Great Disorder," an "excess of order" and therefore a "rich matrix replete with orders from which limited orders arise." In this thesis, to imply this "Great Disorder," which seems to be the true order in Chuang Tzu, we shall employ the word "Chaos" with a capital "C," and chaos to denote confusion and disorder in the usual sense of the terms which are, in a sense, alienated Chaos.

A similar distinction may apply to Non-being and non-being. Non-being or Nothingness is a makeshift translation for Chuang Tzu's Wu 無 which does not necessarily mean a mere three-dimensional empty space or void with no concrete object in it. This kind of non-being (or nothingness), as opposed to being, is an "alienated" or "externalized"
Non-being and therefore should be distinguished from the Non-being of Chuang Tzu, which, like the fields of energy in modern physics, is pregnant with potentiality (cf. p. 118). It is, so to speak, the womb of beings, and as such is a cognate of Hun-tun, the matrix of orders in the world. What is noteworthy here is that both beings and orders are inconceivable without boundaries, and so we can suspect that both Hun-tun and Non-being have a close connection, or even connaturalty, with the notion of boundaries which is the main theme of Chapter I of this thesis.
NOTES TO INTRODUCTION

1 Here, the term "non-dualistic" may be somewhat preferable to "monism," since the implications of the former are not so restrictive as those of the latter, and because of this the latter tends to be easily mistaken for something that is opposed to "dualism," thus leading us to another dualism between "monism" and "dualism." In connection with this, A. Watts writes: "But monism does not actually escape from dualism. Not only does it fail to answer the question: 'What is the origin of the seeming existence of the other side, if only one side is real?' — but also the very notion of absolute oneness is dualistic because it excludes and opposes the possibility of the many" (Watts, The Supreme Identity: An Essay on Oriental Metaphysic and the Christian Religion [New York, 1960], pp. 64-65).

2 To be sure, Logos has a unifying function, as its etymology indicates, i.e., λέγειν — to gather (cf. M. Müller, The Science of Language, Vol. II [London, 1891], 71), but this unifying power seems to be based upon selection and discrimination. Logos does not gather things at random, but it collects things analogically (i.e., according to logos or ratio) so as to create a well-ordered and well-proportioned cosmos out of chaotic matter. In connection with this, A. Watts writes in his Myth and Ritual in Christianity: "The Divider ('I came not to bring peace, but a sword') is the Logos, who 'set a compass on the face of the deep' [Proverbs 8:27], who 'divided the light from the darkness' [Genesis 1:4], and created the firmament to 'divide the waters from the waters' [Genesis 1:6] (Watts, Myth and Ritual in Christianity [Boston, 1968], p. 108). In his Rogosu to remma (Logos and Lemma), T. Yamauchi also writes, this time in the context of Greek philosophy: "Logos, in the first place, starts with a distinction (區別) between the two [the subject and the predicate], and without this distinction there can be no 'logos-like' development. This is intrinsic to the notion of logos and without it logos cannot be logos. It is because of this that logos not only implies 'gathering,' but also 'distinguishing.' . . . Although logos involves, above all, the notion of collecting, its manner of collection is not linear [i.e., continuous] but discontinuous (斷絕的) and its development is based, more than anything else, on bifurcation. The connection of things by logos, so to speak, is achieved through division (分別); it is a union reached through disruption (斷絶)" (Yamauchi, Rogosu to remma (Logos and Lemma) [Tokyo, 1974], pp. 21-26. Translation mine.) Cf. also p. 67 of this thesis.


7 Watson, p. 1.


9 Ibid., pp. 200-201. Translation mine.


11 Watson, p. 3.

12 Some of the other references consulted are:


3) H. Giles, tr., Chuang Tzu: Mystic, Moralist and Social Reformer (London, 1926).


8) R. T. Ames, "An Exegesis of the 'Ta Tsung Shih' Chapter of the Chuang Tzu" (M.A. thesis submitted to the


CHAPTER I

ORDER AND BOUNDARIES

Order, by its very nature, sets boundaries to things. Therefore the first step in our discussion of the notion of order in Emerson and Chuang Tzu should be to start an examination of the meaning of boundaries in their works. The concept of boundaries will become useful in considering the other problems presented in the following chapters, primarily "law" and "life," both of which are, more or less, variations on the problem of boundaries.

Before we begin a further discussion of Emerson's and Chuang Tzu's notions of order and boundaries, we may first need to give some general definitions of the word "boundary." We may also need to establish the general direction in which our argument will proceed. The usual meaning of "boundary" would be "a line which marks a limit" or "a dividing line between two objects." However, in this chapter we shall extend the original meaning of boundaries to some extent and re-define it as "anything that separates and differentiates two things (whether physical or mental)." According to this extended definition, such things as gaps, spaces, holes, and vacuums can be included as boundaries so long as they separate and differentiate one thing from another. In other words, "boundary" is the fundamental element that is required
in the so-called dualistic world view.

It seems that, depending on how we approach the notion of boundaries, our world view becomes either dualistic or non-dualistic. Our aim in this chapter is to clarify, on the one hand, that Emerson takes essentially a dualistic attitude toward boundaries (we may call this attitude the either/or type of logic), whereas Chuang Tzu, a non-dualistic approach (which may be named the both/and type of logic), and, on the other hand, how the differences between the two world views are reflected in their notions of order. To achieve these aims, we shall set up four major perspectives: language, vision, the mirror, and transcendence. The first three are the elements of boundaries which seem to be common to both Emerson and Chuang Tzu. The last viewpoint, i.e., transcendence, concerns the way the two writers transcend boundaries.

Having established these preliminary considerations on boundaries and the general orientation of this chapter, we are now ready to start a detailed examination of the notions of order and boundaries in Emerson and Chuang Tzu through the four perspectives given above, of which language is our first topic.

A close connection between language and boundaries can be surmised from the following reasons. First, language is based on gaps that lie between letters, words, and phonemes, and gaps are nothing but boundaries. In his
System and Structure, A. Wilden writes about the relationships between language and gaps:

Thus, speech can be described as consisting of chain upon chain of words, all seeking to fill up the holes in communication, holes that cannot be filled. In communications terminology, these holes are in effect the 'gaps' which digital communication and signification necessarily introduce into the analog continuum of 'life,' 'relation,' and 'meaning.' Without these gaps — such as those between the integers, between the letters in an alphabet, or between the 'on' and the 'off' of the relays in a digital computer, or in the genetic code — language, as a particular system of the substitution and combination of discrete elements called signs or signifiers, would not be possible.¹

As is implied in this passage, language is based on the dualism between negation and affirmation (e.g., "on" and "off"). This dualism seems to arise from the nature of the word "not." Through the dividing function of "not" we can distinguish between an affirmative and a negative sentence, between the subject and the predicate, and determine word order and parts of speech. Another aspect of language is that it is linear in the sense that both in spoken and in written form it is a succession of sounds or letters. Taking all these facts into consideration, we can say that language is an "order," which consists of the various boundaries cited above. So by paying attention to Emerson's and Chuang Tzu's attitudes toward language, we can hope to clarify some aspects of their notion of order.

Let us take up Chuang Tzu first, since his position toward language seems to be rather simple compared with that
of Emerson. Throughout *Chuang Tzu*, he takes a strongly negative approach to language. For instance, he says:

The Way has never known boundaries; speech has no constancy. . . . So [I say,] those who divide fail to divide; those who discriminate fail to discriminate. . . . The Great Way is not named; Great Discriminations are not spoken; . . . If discriminations are put into words, they do not suffice.

夫道未始有封，言未始有常。故分也者，不分也者，辨也者，不辨也。……夫大道不稱，大辨不言，……言辨而不及

To give another example of Chuang Tzu's negation of language, we have the famous story about Hun-tun (Chaos) placed as the conclusion of the *nei p'ien* 内篇 (the inner chapters):

The emperor of the South Sea was called Shu [Brief], the emperor of the North Sea was called Hu [Sudden], and the emperor of the central region was called Hun-tun [Chaos]. Shu and Hu from time to time came together for a meeting in the territory of Hun-tun, and Hun-tun treated them very generously. Shu and Hu discussed how they could repay his kindness. "All men," they said, "have seven openings so they can see, hear, eat, and breathe. But Hun-tun alone doesn't have any. Let's try boring him some!"

Every day they bored another hole, and on the seventh day Hun-tun died. (ch. 7, 97)

Hun—tun 混沌 or 混沌 has such meanings as chaos, disorderliness, ambiguity, undifferentiation, homogeneity, and continuum. It is on the one hand the state of the Universe before heaven and earth were differentiated, and on the other
hand the primordial force that permeates the Universe after its creation. *Hun-tun* is another name for Tao (the ultimate principle of the Universe), and it can also correspond, at least on one level, to the analog continuum, to use the terminology of communications theory (cf. the above passage quoted from Wilden). This anecdote, then, tells us how the natural flow of life of Tao or Chaos was impeded and destroyed by the misplaced kindness of Shu and Hu, who represent the digital aspect of human language and human notion of order. As we can guess from the passage, Chuang Tzu is a great defender of Chaos or Disorder (with a capital "D"). This Disorder, however, is not disorder in the usual sense of the word. It appears to be disorder by the standards of human language, that is based on analytic logic or a digital way of thinking, whereas to Chuang Tzu it actually is the ultimate order or principle of the Universe. It is, so to speak, the Great Disorder of the world.

Now, what would be Emerson's attitude toward language? Here the situation is not as simple as in the case of Chuang Tzu, for Emerson seems to take two apparently opposite attitudes toward language: sometimes he negates it; at other times he defends it. His negation of language can be seen in such remarks as "Words are finite organs of the infinite mind. They cannot cover the dimensions of what is in truth. They break, chop, and impoverish it" (*Nature*, I, 50), and "The soul answers never by words, but by the thing itself
that is inquired after. . . . An answer in words is
delusive. . . ." ("The Over-Soul," II, 265), and "Books are
for the scholar's idle times" ("The American Scholar," I,
92). These words would seem to indicate the same viewpoint
on language as Chuang Tzu's.

However, in the same essays from which the above
passages are taken, Emerson seems to emphasize the importance
of speech: in Nature he allots one entire chapter to discus­
sing the relationship between language and Nature; in "The
American Scholar" he says, "Books are the best of things,
well used; abused, among the worst" (I, 91); and in "The
Over-Soul" we read, "Only itself can inspire whom it [the
soul] will, and behold! their speech shall be lyrical, and
sweet, and universal as the rising of the wind" (II, 253).
How are we to understand this? As we can surmise from the
above quotations, Emerson is not totally opposed to language,
but rather he is denying what he thinks to be a degenerate
use of language cut off from its spiritual fountainhead,
namely, the Over-Soul. Human language, so far as it comes
directly from this source, is good. This seems to be his
conviction, and it would also explain why he spent most of
his life as a lecturer and wrote two essays on eloquence.
It is a well known fact that as a young student at Harvard
he was charmed by the speeches of W. E. Channing, D. Webster,
and E. Everett. We can see his passion for eloquence in his
journal for as early as February 1820. And late in his
journal he also writes, "Why has never the poorest country
college offered me a professorship of rhetoric? I think I
could have taught an orator, though I am none." Thus it
would be fair to say that, unlike Chuang Tzu, who is
extremely suspicious about the use of language, Emerson
still retains a considerable amount of belief in it.

However, as we saw above, language is based on gaps
or boundaries, and so it is often very inadequate to cover
the universe in its entirety. It is like a net, and a net
cannot scoop up water, which is the universe. Language
inevitably introduces a schism (i.e., dualism) between
itself and the object which it specifies, between the speaker
and the objects spoken of, between man as mind and Nature as
a material world. So long as language is a sort of order,
we can achieve an order by applying it to the Chaos of
Nature, but the life of Chaos tends to be lost, as we saw in
the story of Hun-tun. This is the predicament of Emerson as
an orator, and probably this is the reason why he is attracted
by the plain style of the language of the ordinary people
who are closer to the concrete world of everyday life than
intellectuals. In his journal for June 24, 1840, he writes,"The language of the street is always strong." He also
writes in his journal for October 27, 1831, "In good writing
words become one with things." From these remarks we can
see how Emerson occupies himself with the task of filling
the gap between language and its objects, between man and
Nature.

Emerson's effort to overcome the boundary between language and things seems to have some relationship with his attempt to reconcile the schism between the seer and the seen, for as we shall see below, language has a strong connection with vision.

For further discussion on this point we need to examine the function of vision, which in this thesis we shall use basically in the usual sense of the term, i.e., optical vision as distinct from "mystical vision." Vision can be a boundary-maker in several ways which are closely interrelated. First, vision is a matter of the seer and the seen, i.e., the subject and the object; hence a boundary is presupposed between the two. What is interesting here is that there is a close relationship between vision and language in the sense that the object seen is usually named and conceptualized. Needless to say, language is based on conceptions and ideas. In fact, the word "idea" is derived from the Greek verb idein (to see). Since language is a sort of boundary-maker, this would also support, even though indirectly, our assumption that vision can be a boundary-maker.

If the primal meaning of eyesight as a boundary-maker lies in the demarcation between the seer and the seen, a secondary meaning lies in the fact that vision, in conjunction with the function of the mind, necessarily draws boundaries between the objects seen by the seer. Vision
does not function normally unless it distinguishes one thing from another, thus introducing order into things in a state of confusion. Here again, we are reminded of the story of Hun-tun. The actions of shu and Hu, who bored the holes (a metaphor for boundaries) in the opaque face of Hun-tun (Chaos) can be said to symbolize the discriminating and "ordering" function of human vision.

With these preliminary considerations on the relationships between vision, boundaries, and order, we are ready to examine the positions toward vision adopted by Emerson and Chuang Tzu. Let us take Emerson first. As F. O. Matthiessen writes in his American Renaissance:

He [Emerson] held it the first responsibility of the artist to record adequately what he had observed; and he was reassured by the thought that 'our American character is marked by a more than average delight in accurate perception.' When he could believe himself to be not merely a reporter but a poet, he could phrase his conviction more intensely: the poet is the man 'whose eye can integrate all the parts.'

What Matthiessen calls "his [Emerson's] almost exclusive absorption with seeing" elsewhere in the same book is not very difficult to prove. One of the best examples is in Nature:

In the woods, we return to reason and faith. There I feel that nothing can befall me in life, — no disgrace, no calamity (leaving me my eyes), which nature cannot repair. Standing on the bare ground, — my head bathed by the blithe air, and uplifted into infinite space, — all mean egotism vanishes. I become a transparent eyeball; I am nothing; I see all; the currents of the Universal Being circulate through me; I am part or particle of God.

(I, 15-16)
In this passage that illustrates Emerson's preoccupation with vision, we see how he tries to resolve the same problem we saw earlier — the problem of the dichotomy between the seer and the seen, the subject and the object, man and Nature. He seems to think that he has succeeded in overcoming this dualism by annihilating his sense of individuated consciousness and uniting with the Universal Being, God. We find the same view echoed in his poem "Brahma," where he says "the red slayer" and "the slain" are one; and also in his essay, "The Over-Soul," when he writes, ". . . the act of seeing and the thing seen, the seer and the spectacle, the subject and the object, are one" (II, 253), and "For they are poets by the free course which they allow to the informing soul, which through their eyes beholds again and blesses the things which it had made" (II, 271).

However, it seems that he does not, or rather cannot, stay in such a non-dualistic state for long. Like Plato, whom Emerson describes as a man who ceaselessly turns a coin, he also turns his. This is seen, for example in the latter part of his poem "The Rhodora":

Rhodora! if the sages ask thee why
This charm is wasted on the earth and sky,
Tell them, dear, that if eyes are made for seeing,
Then Beauty is its own excuse for being:
Why thou wert there, 0 rival of the rose!
I never thought to ask, I never knew:
But, in my simple ignorance suppose
The self-same Power that brought me there brought you.

(IX, 39)
Although he says "beauty is its own excuse for being" and he never knew or thought to ask why the flower was there, he still cannot help supposing that the same "Power" is working behind both the flower and himself. Thus we can tell that he is on the verge of introducing a boundary between the "Power" and the flower, between the "Power" and himself. (Here seems to lie one aspect of Emerson's dualism.) This seems to be an inevitable consequence of his notion of beauty, which is predominantly dependent on vision (a boundary-maker). In a sense, beauty is a problem of how to draw boundaries between the objects perceived through the discriminating function of sight. So by examining his notion of beauty, we can hope to clarify his concepts of boundaries, and thus, of order.

For better consideration of Emerson's idea of beauty, let us quote a passage from his Nature:

The ancient Greeks called the world \( \Kappa\delta\mu\alpha \), beauty. Such is the constitution of all things, or such the plastic power of the human eye, that the primary forms, as the sky, the mountain, the tree, the animal, give us a delight in and for themselves; a pleasure arising from outline, color, motion, and grouping. This seems partly owing to the eye itself. The eye is the best of artists. By the mutual action of its structure and of the laws of light, perspective is produced, which integrates every mass of objects, of what character soever, into a well colored and shaded globe, so that where the particular objects are mean and unaffected, the landscape which they compose is round and symmetrical. And as the eye is the best composer, so light is the first of painters. There is no object so foul that intense light will not make beautiful. And the stimulus it affords to the sense, and a sort of infinitude which it hath, like
space and time, make all matter gay. Even the corpse has its own beauty. (I, 21-22)

In this quotation we should first note the word "symmetrical," which seems to be one of the key words for understanding Emerson's notions of beauty, vision, boundaries, and order.

It is almost a commonplace that Emerson was greatly influenced by Plato, who is said to have highly esteemed mathematics, especially geometry, a system of theory about boundaries. So it would not be very improper to look for a close relation between Emerson's notion of beauty and the symmetry and proportion of geometry. For instance, he writes in his journal for 1849:

For we do not listen with much respect to the verses of a man who is only a poet, nor to the calculations of a man who is only an algebraist, but if the man is at the same time acquainted with the geometrical foundations of things, and with their moral purposes, and sees the festal splendor of the day, his poetry is exact, and his arithmetic musical. His poetry and his mathematics accredit each other.

I look upon the stress laid by Plato on geometry as highly significant.

And again, in his essays "Circles" and "Plato; or the Philosopher," we read the following passages, respectively:

The eye is the first circle; the horizon which it forms is the second; and throughout nature this primary figure is repeated without end. It is the highest emblem in the cipher of the world.

In the Timaeus he indicates the highest employment of the eyes. "By us it is asserted that God invented and bestowed sight on us for this purpose, — that on surveying the circles of intelligence in the heavens, we might properly employ those of our own minds, which, though disturbed
when compared with the others that are uniform, are still allied to their circulations; and that having thus learned, and being naturally possessed of a correct reasoning faculty, we might, by imitating the uniform revolutions of divinity, set right our own wanderings and blunders." (IV, 64-65)

Thus it would not be too much of an exaggeration to say that at the basis of Emerson's ideal beauty lies the notion of geometrical symmetry and proportion which is detected in the external world and integrated into unity by the ordering function of vision. 12

Besides the word "symmetrical," we should not overlook the word "light," on which Emerson puts a considerable degree of emphasis in the above quotation from Nature (cf. p. 25). It is not difficult to see that light plays an important role in geometrical symmetry in his notion of beauty, for without light there can be no vision (in the usual sense of the term), which is indispensable in composing symmetry and proportion in the outer world. As Emerson himself points out in the above quotation, it is due to "mutual action of its [the eye's] structure and the laws of light" that "the landscape is round and symmetrical."

"Light," he continues, "is the first of painters" and "There is no object so foul that intense light will not make beautiful... Even the corpse has its own beauty." Judging from these passages and his geometrical notion of beauty mentioned above, we can say that in Emerson light has a special power to put into order such a foul thing as a corpse
which has a strong association with corruption and disorder, i.e., confusion of boundaries. This seems to be one of the reasons (for other reasons see pp. 65, 107-108) why he makes profuse use of the image of light in his works. In fact, it would be fair to say that his essay *Nature*, for instance, begins and ends with an adoration of the sun (e.g., "The sun shines to-day also" in the introduction, and "The sordor and filths of nature, the sun shall dry up . . ." in the concluding paragraph).

This predilection for light might also have come from Greek thought. Both Plato and Plotinus, who seem to have influenced Emerson to a considerable degree,\(^{13}\) compare their absolute being, the Idea and the One, to the sun (e.g., the parable of the cave in Plato's *Republic*, Book VII; and Plotinus' emanation theory in *Enneads*, V.I.6). Moreover, in his *Nature*, Emerson mentions the well-known Greek idea of the triad of truth, good, and beauty (cf. *Phaedrus*, 246e): "God is the all-fair. Truth, and goodness, and beauty, are but different faces of the same All" (I, 30). If the source of beauty is God (who is often compared to the sun and its light as, for example, in Plato, Plotinus, and Emerson for the reasons cited above), and if this God is also the source of the order which, as we have seen in the above quotation from Emerson (pp. 26-27), has a strong inclination toward geometrical symmetry and proportion, then we can conclude that light, vision, and symmetry are closely interconnected.
elements in Emerson's notions of beauty and order. In Emerson, beauty seems to mean order, especially that of geometrical symmetry and proportion, i.e., well-ordered boundaries, which can be realized through the ordering function of vision and light which, in turn, come from God in the ideal world.

On the other hand, we have a rather different picture in Chuang Tzu's concepts of beauty, vision, boundaries, and order. Judging from the story of Hun-tun quoted earlier, we can easily imagine that Chuang Tzu would have placed a low value on vision and seeing. This is further supported by the abundant use of dark images in his writing. This is not to say, however, that he does not use the image of light at all. He does use it sometimes, but, unlike Emerson, who seldom gives a positive meaning to darkness, Chuang Tzu tries to see a deep significance in darkness.

Above all, the word hsiian would indicate this. Hsüan, which means "dark" and "mysterious," often appears in the Chuang Tzu in such expressions as hsüan ming (the Dark Obscurity, chs. 6, 17), hsüan t'ung (Mysterious Leveling, ch. 10), hsüan t'ien (Dark Heaven, ch. 11), hsüan ku (Dark Antiquity, ch. 12), hsüan ohu (Dark Pearl, ch. 12), hsüan te (Dark Virtue, ch. 12), hsüan sheng (the Dark Sage, ch. 13), and hsüan shui (the Black Waters, ch. 22). Besides hsüan, we come across many other words that have much to do with darkness. To add
a few more examples, we have: "The torch of chaos and doubt — this is what the sage steers by" (ch. 2, 42). For the Tao which shines forth is not Tao" (ch. 11, 119) "道昭而不道," and:

... The essence of the Perfect Way is deep and darkly shrouded; the extreme of the Perfect Way is mysterious and hushed in silence. Let there be no seeing, no hearing, enfold the spirit in quietude and the body will right itself. (ch. 11, 119)

On the basis of these examples, we can say that in Chuang Tzu vision in the usual sense of the term (i.e., seeing things under light) is not valued; rather, darkness and the "confusion" of boundaries between things are highly esteemed.

This tendency seems to have much to do with his idea of beauty, for Chuang Tzu finds a unique value in what is commonly thought to be deformed and abnormal, and deformities are nothing but the confusion of boundaries. A hunchback, a cripple, and other misshapen men are his favourite characters. The following are two examples taken from chapter 5 of Chuang Tzu:

Duke Ai of Lu said to Confucius, "In Wei there was an ugly man named Ai T'ai-t'ō. But when men were around him, they thought only of him and couldn't break away, and when women saw him, they ran begging to their fathers and mothers, saying, 'I'd rather be this gentleman's concubine than another man's wife!' — there were more than ten such cases and it hasn't stopped yet. No one ever heard him take the lead — he always just chimed in with other people. He wasn't in the position of a ruler where he could save men's lives, and he had
no store of provisions to fill men's bellies. On
top of that, he was ugly enough to astound the
whole world, chimed in but never led, and knew no
more than what went on right around him. And yet,
men and women flocked to him." (ch. 5, 72)

Mr. Lame-Hunchback-No-Lips talked to Duke Ling
of Wei, and Duke Ling was so pleased with him that
when he looked at normal men he thought their necks
looked too lean and skinny. Mr. Pitcher-sized-Wen
talked to Duke Huan of Ch'i, and Duke Huan was so
pleased with him that when he looked at normal men
he thought their necks looked too lean and skinny.
Therefore, if virtue is preeminent, the body will
be forgotten. (ch. 5, 74-75)

One reason why Chuang Tzu shows such interest in chaos and
deformities may be that he is well aware of the complementary
and relative nature of beauty and ugliness, order and
disorder. To him "[The Way] is in the piss and shit" (ch.
22, 241) "[道]在屎溺" and:

"The ten thousand things are really one. We look
on some as beautiful because they are rare or
unearthly; we look on others as ugly because they
are foul and rotten. But the foul and rotten may
turn into the rare and unearthly, and the rare and
unearthly may turn into the foul and rotten. So it
is said, You have only to comprehend the one breath
that is the world. The sage never ceases to value
oneness." (ch. 22, 236)
To sum up, then, we can say that Emerson's geometrical notion of beauty is dualistic in that it is based on the bifurcating function of vision which discriminates geometrical symmetry and proportion from asymmetry and disproportion, whereas Chuang Tzu's concept of beauty is non-dualistic in the sense that it negates the discriminating function of vision and tries to see values even in deformities and disorder.

The difference between dualistic and non-dualistic attitudes toward boundaries in Emerson and Chuang Tzu may be further reflected in another element of boundaries in the two writers, namely, the image of the mirror. The mirror functions as a boundary because it has a surface which separates the seer and the seen (the image). This mirror surface is in fact the embodiment of the imaginary boundary we supposed between the seer and the seen, the subject and the object in dealing with the notion and the problem of vision. So by examining the functions of the image of the mirror in Emerson and Chuang Tzu, we may further clarify their concepts of boundaries and order.

That Emerson sees the external world as a mirror-image is evident from such passages as: "The laws of moral nature answer to those of matter as face to face in a glass".
"I look for the new Teacher, that shall see the world to be the mirror of the soul" ("Divinity School Address," I, 148); "As in dreams so in the scarcely less fluid events of the world every man sees himself in colossal, without knowing that it is himself" ("Spiritual Laws," II, 141); and "For the truth was in us before it was reflected to us from natural objects" ("Intellect," II, 317). For Emerson the world is a projection of that which is inside himself, which he calls the soul or spirit. Therefore it is quite natural for him to conclude that the outer world is an illusion. As F. O. Matthiessen points out, this would be the main reason why his works abound in the images of flux and fluidity, especially that of water. In this sense we can say that Emerson tries to abolish the clear-cut boundaries between things, and so comes quite close to Chuang Tzu's world-view, whose fundamental tenet is based on Tao 道 or Hun-tun 混沌 which has no boundaries and is in a state of chaos, of flux and fluidity.

However, as is usual with Emerson, this is only one side of the coin. The other side is his individualism, which is aptly reflected in the title of his essay "Self-Reliance." Although we must not forget that what Emerson calls "self" is not necessarily the same as the individual person separated from the rest of the world, still Emerson's "self" very easily comes to mean just that. One proof of this would be in his style. According to S. G. Brown, "one
of the most interesting characteristics of Emerson's essays and lectures is that they consist chiefly of conclusions.\textsuperscript{15} An opinion relevant to this is that of Matthiessen, who says:

His work corresponds so naturally to his life that it constitutes the purest example of what individualism could produce. The sentence was his unit, as he recognized when confessing sadly to Carlyle (1838) that his paragraphs were only collections of 'infinitely repellent particles.' It is significant that he said the same thing when reflecting on society as 'an imperfect union': 'Every man is an infinitely repellent orb, and holds his individual being on that condition.' The sentence was the inevitable unit for the man who could say, 'A single thought has no limit to its value.'\textsuperscript{16}

Another element of his individualism might be reflected in his notion of private property. It is true that in "Self-Reliance" Emerson flatly denies private property in such statements as, "And so the reliance on Property, including the reliance on governments which protect it, is the want of self-reliance" (II, 85). However, it seems equally true that elsewhere he defends the concept of property. For instance, in his rather optimistic and simplistic treatise on wealth, Emerson advocates the principle of free competition by independent individuals. He writes:

The Saxons are the merchants of the world; now, for a thousand years, the leading race, and by nothing more than their quality of personal independence, and in its special modification, pecuniary independence. (VI, 89-90)

Another example is in his "History," where he writes:

Property also holds of the soul, covers great spiritual facts, and instinctively we at first hold to it with swords and laws and wide and complex combinations. ... We honor the rich because they
have externally the freedom, power, and grace which we feel to be superior to man, proper to us.

(II, 11-12)

This apparent inconsistency in his attitude toward property is probably similar to that encountered in his approach toward language. As in the case of language, property is good as long as it contributes to the realization of one's true "self" which draws its life and power from the spiritual source, the "One" or the Over-Soul.

Be that as it may, judging from the two passages quoted above from "Wealth" and "History," we cannot deny that Emerson's notion of "self" retains an aspect of individualism in the usual sense of the term, and this makes us hesitate to jump to the conclusion that the flowing images in Emerson's writings have the same significance as those we find in the Chuang Tzu.

In this regard, we must examine the images of the mirror and water in Chuang Tzu. First, let us take up Chuang Tzu's mirror imagery, which appears in such passages as: "Confucius said, 'Men do not mirror themselves in running water — they mirror themselves in still water'" (ch. 5, 69) "仲尼曰人莫鑑於流水而鑑於止水"; "Among level things, water at rest is the most perfect, and therefore it can serve as a standard" (ch. 5, 74) "平者水停之盈也其可以為法也"; "The Perfect Man uses his mind like a mirror — going after nothing, welcoming nothing, responding but not storing" (ch. 7, 97) "至人之心若鏡不將不迎應而不藏"
and "The sage's mind is the mirror of stillness in Heaven and earth, the glass of the ten thousand things"\(^\text{17}\) (ch. 13, 142) "聖人之心靜乎天地之鑒也萬物之鏡也." What we should note in these passages is that Chuang Tzu seems to be interested in the serene nature of the mirror surface (a boundary) rather than in the images themselves in the mirror. The third passage in particular tells us that the sage is like the surface of the mirror that neither welcomes nor goes after what comes to and leaves it. So in a sense this quotation is saying that the sage must identify himself with the boundary (the mirror surface) itself that divides two things, the seer and the seen, in this case. This would be the main difference between Chuang Tzu's attitude toward the mirror and that of Emerson, who seems to be much more interested in the contrast between the seer and the seen. (But more on this will be discussed later on in this chapter.)

Our next step is to examine the meanings of water symbolism in Chuang Tzu and see how it is related to his notion of boundaries. Among many water images in his work, the following would be useful in considering the points in question:

Where the swirling waves gather there is an abyss;
where the still water gather there is an abyss;
where the running waters gather there is an abyss.
The abyss has nine names and I [the Taoist sage] have shown him three.\(^\text{(ch. 7, 96)}\)

麟桓之窪為淵止水之窪為淵流水之窪為淵淵有九名此處之三焉
[The Way is] vast and ample, there is nothing it does not receive. Deep and profound, how can it be fathomed? (ch. 13, 151)

I go under with the swirls and come out with the eddies, following along the way the water goes and never thinking about myself. (ch. 19, 205)

Knowledge wandering north to the banks of the Black Waters, climbed the Knoll of Hidden Heights, and there by chance came upon Do-Nothing-Say-Nothing. (ch. 22, 234)

But he who is a Perfect Man lets his spirit return to the Beginningless, to lie down in pleasant slumber in the Village of Not-Anything-At-All; like water he flows through the Formless, or trickles forth from the Great Purity. (ch. 32, 356)

As we can surmise from these quotations, Chuang Tzu's sage seems to be the man who has become like water. In the case of Emerson, as we saw in the quotation from Nature (cf. p. 23), his body becomes fluid and disappears, yet his eyes still remain to see things around him, while in Chuang Tzu even the eyesight is lost in the dark water (玄水) of Tao (or Chaos). Chuang Tzu's Tao man (道人) becomes the water itself. Since we cannot draw any boundaries in water, that is to say, there are innumerable ways to draw boundaries in it, can we not say that to become like water is to become every boundary that exists in the world? This may sound a
little far-fetched at this stage, but later on this point will become clearer.

Another meaning of the water symbol in Chuang Tzu seems to concern, as in the case of Emerson, the problem of individualism and socio-economic structure. With respect to this, J. Needham presents an interesting opinion in his *Science and Civilization in China*. After discussing a close relationship between the water and feminine symbols in the early Taoist schools, he proceeds to comment on the Taoists' attitude toward feudalism in ancient China:

> What, then, did the Taoists propose as an alternative to feudal society? They proposed nothing new, they did not look forward, and strictly speaking, therefore, they were not revolutionary; they looked back, and the type of society to which they wished to return can have been nothing other than primitive tribal collectivism. Their ideal was the undifferentiated "natural" condition of life, before the institution of private property, before the appearance of proto-feudalism with its lords and "high kings," its priests, artisans and augurs, at the beginning of the bronze age.19

Here, we should note the words "collective" and "undifferentiated," both of which could also be applied to water. On the other hand, the feudal system and that of private property necessarily presuppose the introduction of boundaries between classes and between self-contained individuals. Therefore, underlining Chuang Tzu's water symbol can be seen an impulse to abolish all such boundaries. On this point the function of the water image in Chuang Tzu differs diametrically from that in Emerson, who, in spite of his effort to achieve unity by liquefying the world, still
retains the idea of individualism that could induce the ideology of private property and free competition under a capitalistic society. This difference is related to the last topic we are to deal with here in comparing the implications of the mirror imagery in Emerson and Chuang Tzu — the idea that the world, especially human society, is an illusion or dream. In Emerson one can see a direct relationship between the mirror symbol and the world as an illusion, for he compares the external world to the mirror image.

On the other hand, although the idea that the world is an illusion or dream is prevalent in Chuang Tzu's thought, it seems difficult, at first glance, to find any direct connection between this idea and the mirror symbol used by him, for in Chuang Tzu the mirror mainly stands for the calm state of mind of the enlightened. However, we could also say that this serene state of mind can be achieved by those who regard the world as illusion and are not attached to it. In fact, as is clear from the above passages about the image of the mirror quoted from Chuang Tzu, the world is a mirror image reflected on the mind of the sage, the only difference being that Chuang Tzu is more interested in the surface of the mirror itself, while Emerson tends to pay attention to the contrast between the image itself and the seer. (This dualism of the seer and the seen seems to be at the basis of Emerson's individualism.)

Now, let us further examine Chuang Tzu's attitude
toward the world. The idea that the world (as represented by human society) is illusion is rather prevalent in the Chuang Tzu, especially in the second chapter, whose basic doctrine is that every difference in the world, including that between reality and dreams, is relative and ultimately all things are one and the same. For instance, in this chapter Chuang Tzu writes:

"He who dreams of drinking wine may weep when morning comes; he who dreams of weeping may in the morning go off to hunt. While he is dreaming he does not know it is a dream, and in his dream he may even try to interpret a dream. Only after he wakes does he know it was a dream. And someday there will be a great awakening when we know that this is all a great dream. Yet the stupid believe they are awake, busily and brightly assuming they understand things, calling this man ruler, that one herdsman — how dense! Confucius and you are both dreaming! And when I say you are dreaming, I am dreaming, too." (ch. 2, 47-48)

We see a striking similarity between this passage and what Emerson says: "... the world is a divine dream from which we may presently awake to the glories and certainties of day" (Nature, I, 66). But what we must note here is that Chuang Tzu writes: "Confucius and you are both dreaming! And when I say you are dreaming, I am dreaming, too," thus, in a sense, contradicting his first statement that "someday there will be a great awakening when we know that this is all a
great dream." We cannot see this kind of total negation in Emerson's Idealism. For further examination on this point, let us quote another passage from Emerson. Just before the above quotation Emerson says:

Idealism saith; Matter is a phenomenon, not a substance. Idealism acquaints us with total disparity between the evidence of our own being, and the evidence of the world's being. The one is perfect; the other, incapable of any assurance . . .

(Nature, I, 66)

It would be interesting to compare this with another story of Chuang Tzu's about a dream:

Once Chuang Chou dreamt he was a butterfly, a butterfly flitting and fluttering around, happy with himself and doing as he pleased. He didn't know he was Chuang Chou. Suddenly he woke up and there he was, solid and unmistakable Chuang Chou. But he didn't know if he was Chuang Chou who had dreamt he was a butterfly, or a butterfly dreaming he was Chuang Chou. Between Chuang Chou and a butterfly there must be some distinction! This is called the Transformation of Things. (ch. 2, 49)

For Emerson the world is a dream, but not the mind, so long as it partakes of the realm of Ideas, whereas in Chuang Tzu there is no knowing which is more real, himself or the butterfly in a dream. He says there must be some distinction between the two, but he freely metamorphoses from one to the other, probably because he identifies himself with the boundary itself between himself ("reality") and the butterfly
(a "dream"). In Emerson's attitude toward the world as illusion there remains a shadow of an individual who tends to stand back from the world to watch it, whereas Chuang Tzu's sage shows an inclination to immerse himself in the world, or more exactly, to identify himself with the boundary between any two objects in the world, whether they are a butterfly and a man or a dream and reality. Here is illustrated the difference between Emerson and Chuang Tzu in their approach to the problem of the world as an illusive image in the mirror: the former is dualistic, while the latter is non-dualistic.

This difference further leads us to another topic—that of transcendence, which seems to be closely related to the topic of the mirror imagery surveyed above. In a sense, transcendence is a problem of how to overcome the limitation (i.e., boundaries) imposed upon human beings in the form, for instance, of the illusive idea of the world. Therefore, by examining the nature of transcendence in Emerson and Chuang Tzu, we can hope to clarify their notions of boundaries and order.

We can look at the concept of transcendence from two points of view: temporal and spatial. Let us first examine Emerson's notion of time and history, which is expressed in the following passages in his writings:

There is one mind common to all individual men. . . . Of the works of this mind history is the record.  

("History," II, 9)
If the whole of history is in one man, it is all to be explained from individual experience.

("History," II, 10)

In the cycle of the universal man, from whom the known individuals proceed, centuries are points, and all history is but the epoch of one degradation.

(Nature, I, 74)

The spirit sports with time, —
"Can crowd eternity into an hour,
Or stretch an hour to eternity."

("The Over-Soul," II, 256)

According to these passages, Emerson seems to be saying that the individual can transcend his short life span and attain eternal life by realizing in himself the power of the "one mind," the "universal man," or the "spirit."

The same can be said of his notion of space:

Man is the dwarf of himself. Once he was permeated and dissolved by spirit. He filled nature with his overflowing currents. Out from him sprang the sun and moon; from man, the sun; from woman, the moon.

(Nature, I, 74-75)

He [each man] must sit solidly at home, and not suffer himself to be bullied by kings or empires, but know that he is greater than all the geography and all the government of the world . . .

("History," II, 14)

By having recourse to the power of the spirit or the Over-Soul, the individual can transcend his individuated ego to become infinite and eternal — this would be one aspect, if not the entirety, of Emerson's notion of time and space.

Chuang Tzu holds an extremely similar viewpoint to this. For example, he writes, "A man like this [the Perfect Man] rides the clouds and mist, straddles the sun and moon, and wanders beyond the four seas" (ch. 2, 46) "若然者 [至人]
There is nothing in the world bigger than the tip of an autumn hair, and Mount T'ai is tiny. No one has lived longer than a dead child, and P'eng-tsu died young. Heaven and earth were born at the same time I was, and the ten thousand things are one with me. (ch. 2, 43)

Judging from these passages quoted above, we are tempted to conclude that both Emerson and Chuang Tzu are fundamentally the same in their notion of tempo-spatial transcendence. However, a closer examination will tell us that this is not necessarily true. The following are some examples which indicate other aspects of Emerson's concept of time:

Power ceases in the instant of repose; it resides in the moment of transition from a past to a new state, in the shooting of the gulf, in the darting to an aim. ("Self-Reliance," II, 69)

The soul looketh steadily forwards, creating a world before her, leaving worlds behind her. ("The Over-Soul," II, 257)

The gases gather to the solid firmament: the chemic lump arrives at the plant, and grows; arrives at the quadruped, and walks; arrives at the man, and thinks. ("Uses of Great Men," IV, 16-17)

Here we can detect a sense of progress and evolution, and in this sense Emerson's notion of time and history is linear or at least spiral, which, in terms of space, is directed upward.
In contrast to this, Chuang Tzu's concept of time is cyclic: "At the end no tail; at the beginning, no head" (ch. 14, 156) "其卒無尾且始無首"; "The Way is without beginning or end. . . . Decay, growth, fullness, and emptiness end and then begin again" (ch. 17, 182) "道無終始 . . . 消息盈虛終則有始 "; "Beginning and end are part of a single ring and no one can comprehend its principle" (ch. 27, 305) "始卒若環莫得其端 " What is more interesting is that even though Chuang Tzu has an evolutionistic worldview, unlike that of Emerson, his does not place mankind at the summit. This would be a natural consequence of his notion of cyclic time. A good example of this is in chapter 18:

The seeds of things have mysterious workings. In the water they become Break Vine, on the edges of the water they become Frog's Robe. If they sprout on the slopes they become Hill Slippers. If Hill Slippers get rich soil, they turn into Crow's Feet. The roots of Crow's Feet turn into maggots and their leaves turn into butterflies. Before long the butterflies are transformed and turn into insects that live under the stove; they look like snakes and their name is Ch'u-t'o. After a thousand days, the Ch'o-t'o insects become birds called Dried Leftover Bones. The saliva of the Dried Leftover Bones becomes Ssu-mi bugs and the Ssu-mi bugs become Vinegar Eaters. I-lo bugs are born from the Vinegar Eaters, and Huang-shuang bugs from Chiu-yu bugs. Chiu-yu bugs are born from Mou-jui bugs and Mou-jui bugs are born from Rot Grubs and Rot Grubs are born from Sheep's Groom. Sheep's Groom couples with bamboo that has not sprouted for a long while and produces Green Peace plants. Green Peace plants produce leopards and leopards produce horses and horses produce men. Men in time return again to the mysterious workings. So all creatures come out of the mysterious workings and go back into them again. (ch. 18, 195-196)
If Emerson's time is linear, at one level at least, or spiral and that of Chuang Tzu is cyclic, a similar pattern seems to apply to their notion of space: Emerson's notion of space is, so to say, linear; that of Chuang Tzu, circular. This will become clearer by examining the image of height used by them.

Besides the above-quoted poem used as an epigraph for *Nature*, we come across many other expressions of height in Emerson's writings: "We ascend into their [Ideas'] region, and know that these are the thoughts of the Supreme Being" (*Nature*, I, 60-61); "Our being is descending into us from we know not whence" ("The Over-Soul," II, 252); "All things mount and mount" ("Plato; or the Philosopher," IV, 68); "All things ascend, and the royal rule of economy is that it should ascend also, or, whatever we do must always have a higher aim" ("Wealth," VI, 121), Thus here again, as in the case of the image of light, we can see the influence of
Platonism and Neo-Platonism working upon Emerson. Their favorite symbol for the absolute being is the sun high up in heaven (cf. p. 28) and they often use the image of flight in describing the soul's return from this world to the realm of the Idea or the One. The same can be said of Emerson, whose attention seems to be directed from one place (e.g., the earth) directly to another (e.g., the ideal world), thus making his notion of spatial transcendence linear. This will become clearer if we examine his concept of individualism in terms of transcendence.

F. O. Matthiessen points out that one of the recurrent images in Emerson is taken from the last sentence of Plotinus' *Enneads*, which reads: "This, therefore, is the life of the Gods, and of divine and happy men; a liberation from all terrene concerns, a life unaccompanied with human pleasures, and a flight of the alone to the alone." One of the best examples that reflect the image of "a flight of the alone to the alone" in Emerson's writings would be the last paragraph of his "Illusions":

> There is no chance and no anarchy in the universe. All is system and gradation. Every god is there sitting in his sphere. The young mortal enters the hall of the firmament; there is he alone with them alone, they pouring on him benedictions and gifts, and beckoning him up to their thrones. On the instant, and incessantly, fall snow-storms of illusions. . . . And when, by and by, for an instant, the air clears and the cloud lifts a little, there are the gods still sitting around him on their thrones, — they alone with him alone. (VI, 308)

It would not be difficult to replace Plotinus' "the alone"
and Emerson's "they alone" and "him alone" with "the individual." Thus we can see in Emersonian transcendentalism a straight line stretching from one individual to another, from man as an individual on earth to the One, another individual, in heaven or in the noumenal world.

Chuang Tzu's concept of space, in contrast, seems to have a circular nature. It is true that, like Emerson, he also uses the image of height to express his transcendence from the mundane world. Above all, the opening chapter of the nei p'ien 内篇 (the inner chapters) starts with the story about the great bird P'eng 鹰, which soars into the sky to move from the northern darkness to the southern darkness. Other examples are: "He [the Taoist sage] will soon choose the day and ascend far off" (ch. 5, 69) "彼且摶日而登彼," and "And after a thousand years, should he [the sage] weary of the world, he will leave it and ascend to the immortals, riding on those white clouds all the way up to the district of God" (ch. 12, 130) "[夫聖人]千載厭世而去而上儼乘白雲至于帝鄉." Moreover, the word t'ien 天 (literally, heaven) is often used by Chuang Tzu. There are surely some evidences to show that Chuang Tzu's notion of space is quite similar to that of Emerson.

However, we should also note that in Chuang Tzu earthly images play an important role. Before we give examples of this, let us listen to what M. Fukunaga says about Chuang Tzu's transcendence. After describing the
unstable and miserable condition of the people in the
Warring States period in ancient China, to which Chuang Tzu
belonged, Fukunaga continues:

The thought of Chuang Tzu and Lao Tzu was not that of hope and belief which praised the
goodness and beauty of humanity, but rather it was
a philosophy of despair and unrest that lamented
over the incurable grimness and darkness of the
human condition. It was also the philosophy of the
oppressed who trembled with fear from poverty,
shame, and punishments, rather than that of the
rulers who were proud of their power and depended
upon their wealth. It was not a quiet meditation,
but a life full of vicissitudes that first existed
in their thought. It was not liberated transcende­
ce, but an inconvenient reality that they had to
deal with in their philosophy at first. Their
philosophy taught not the way to escape from the
reality of human society upward or outward, but the
wisdom to pierce through down to the bottom of
reality. The freedom and transcendence of Lao Tzu
and Chuang Tzu lie in the action of going down to
the bottom of reality. Their transcendence was
nothing but the flight toward the freedom that
pierced through every limitation on freedom (自由) down to its bottom.25

This would be the nature of Chuang Tzu's transcendence, and
probably this is why we often come across such paradoxical
expressions as: "The sage leans on the sun and moon, tucks
the universe under his arm, merges himself with things,
leaves the confusion and muddle as it is, and looks on slaves
as exalted" (ch. 2, 47) "聖人仰眉宇宙為。英胸含玉穴滑浮以棘相
尊"; "His understanding was truly trustworthy; his virtue
was perfectly true. He never entered the realm of 'not-man'" (ch. 7, 92) "其知情信其德，甚莫而未始入於非人"; "He got rid
of the carving and polishing and returned to plainness,
letting his body stand alone like a clod. In the midst of
entanglement he remained sealed, and in this oneness he ended his life" (ch. 7, 97) "雕琢復朴傀然獨以其形立紛而欽成一以是終"; and "He [Chuang Tzu] came and went alone with the pure spirit of Heaven and earth, yet he did not view the ten thousand things with arrogant eyes. He did not scold over 'right' and 'wrong,' but lived with the age and its vulgarity" (ch. 33, 373) "獨與天地精神往來而不敢侫於萬物不譏是非以樂世俗處." Chuang Tzu's transcendental man seems to fly up into heaven on the back of the great bird P'eng to play with the sun and moon, yet as P'eng comes down to the southern darkness after the great flight, so does he come back to the earth (the starting point) to mingle with the slave-like life of the ordinary people and to accept "the confusion and muddle as it is." His goal is his starting point; his ideal world is right in the middle of the squalid reality of everyday life. Here is the meaning of the circular nature of his space and transcendence.

Both Emerson and Chuang Tzu regard the world as illusion, the mirage of phenomena, but their approach toward it is different: Emerson sees a clear-cut distinction between this illusive world and the real world, the ordered realm of Idea where geometrical laws of necessity reign, and tries to transcend the boundary to reach the latter once and for all. For him "the veil of Maya must be pierced";26 Chuang Tzu, on the contrary, finds his transcendence by immersing himself in the confusion and entanglement of this world (i.e., Chaos).
We have examined the notions of order and boundaries in Emerson and Chuang Tzu from the four points of view: language, vision, the mirror, and transcendence. We have seen that although Emerson seemingly denies language, actually he is attracted by it and tries to fill up the gaps brought about by language by using language. The same applies to vision and his notion of beauty. Vision, like language, is a gap-maker, i.e., a boundary-maker, in this world. Out of the numerous boundaries, his vision chooses some and tries to compose an order and harmony in this world. But this order and harmony, which is his ideal beauty, has a strong predilection for geometrical symmetry and proportion and therefore leaves out those twisted and irregular boundaries that do not fit in its geometric pattern. Because of this irregularity of the boundaries, he seems to conclude that this world is imperfect and illusory. To him this world is a transient image reflected in a mirror, and the real world is somewhere else or hidden behind the mirror, the veil of Maya. Thus he has to choose either this imperfect world or that ideal world, and if he would take the latter, he has to transcend this world, that is, he has to break through the mirror surface (the boundary) to reach the other world. In this sense Emerson's attitude toward order and boundaries can be said to be dualistic and following the either/or type of logic.

What would be the logic of Chuang Tzu, then? To
answer this question let us briefly review his notion of order and boundaries. As is clear from the story of Hun-tun (Chaos) quoted at the beginning of this chapter, Chuang Tzu strongly denies language, vision, and, for that matter, all other functions of the five senses. His approach is to be eyeless and immersed entirely in the speechless and blind Chaos of Tao where the boundaries among things are completely confused and disordered. Therefore he does not reject what is normally considered grotesque and ugly. It looks ugly and disordered from the standpoint of the Emersonian notion of beauty and order that is based on the symmetry and proportion of things. Actually for Chuang Tzu the true harmony and order may lie in asymmetry and disproportion. As he says:

He [the man of kingly Virtue] sees in the darkest dark, hears where there is no sound. In the midst of darkness, he alone sees the dawn; in the midst of the soundless, he alone hears harmony.  
(ch. 12, 128)

To see light in the darkness (i.e., eyeless), to hear what is soundless (i.e., speechless), and to hear harmony in the soundless (Chaos) — these paradoxes are possible only when one places oneself at the boundary between two things such as light and darkness, speech and speechlessness, order and disorder. This would be what Chuang Tzu calls liang hsing (walking two roads)27 and he obviously is following the
non-dualistic both/and type of logic. This is a natural result of his becoming one with Hun-tun, another name for the veil of Maya. To him, too, the world appears as Maya's veil, which is woven with a countless number of threads (i.e., boundaries), some straight, some entangled. However, unlike Emerson he does not pierce the veil; he tries to follow every thread in the veil whether it is twisted or straight. This seems to be his way of transcendence, and of finding order and harmony in the universe. One of the good examples of this kind of transcendental man would be Lord Wen-hui's cook in the third chapter of Chuang Tzu:

Cook Ting was cutting up an ox for Lord Wen-hui. At every touch of his hand, every heave of his shoulder, every move of his feet, every thrust of his knee — zip! zoop! He slithered the knife along with a zing, and all was in perfect rhythm, as though he were performing the dance of the Mulberry Grove or keeping time to the Ching-shou music.

"Ah, this is marvelous!" said Lord Wen-hui. "Imagine skill reaching such heights!"

Cook Ting laid down his knife and replied, "What I care about is the Way, which goes beyond skill. When I first began cutting up oxen, all I could see was the ox itself. After three years I no longer saw the whole ox. And now — now I go at it by spirit and don't look with my eyes. Perception and understanding have come to a stop and spirit moves where it wants. I go along with the natural makeup, strike in the big hollows, guide the knife through the big openings, and follow things as they are. So I never touch the smallest ligament or tendon, much less a main joint.

"A good cook changes his knife once a year — because he cuts. A mediocre cook changes his knife once a month — because he hacks. I've had this knife of mine for nineteen years and I've cut up thousands of oxen with it, and yet the blade is as good as though it had just come from the grindstone."
There are spaces between the joints, and the blade of the knife has really no thickness. If you insert what has no thickness into such spaces, then there's plenty of room — more than enough for the blade to play about it. That's why after nineteen years the blade of my knife is still as good as when it first came from the grindstone.

"However, whenever I come to a complicated place, I size up the difficulties, tell myself to watch out and be careful, keep my eyes on what I'm doing, work very slowly, and move the knife with the greatest subtlety, until — flop! the whole thing comes apart like a clod of earth crumbling to the ground. I stand there holding the knife and look all around me, completely satisfied and reluctant to move on, and then I wipe off the knife and put it away."

"Excellent!" said Lord Wen-hui. "I have heard the words of Cook Ting and learned how to care for life!"

(ch. 3, 50-51)
NOTES TO CHAPTER I


2. There is an intrinsic contradiction here, because Chuang Tzu is negating language through language. Thus he is at once denying and affirming language. This logical inconsistency seems to come from the fundamentally contradictory nature of the universe. Further discussion on this point will be done in the following chapters (cf. pp. 67-68, 133).

3. Watson, tr., The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, pp. 43-44. Figures in parentheses after the quotations from the Chuang Tzu refer to this edition.


7. With respect to this, D. Ross says: "Both ἀρχαιολογία and ἀρχαιολογικός are derived from ἀρχαιολόγος, 'to see,' and the original meaning of both words is no doubt 'visible form!'" (Ross, Plato's Theory of Ideas [Oxford, 1951], p. 13).


9. Ibid., p. 50.

10. Cf. also Emerson's poem "Two Rivers."


12. It is interesting to note that immediately after the passage quoted from Ross in the above note (7), Ross continues: "Taylor made in Varia Socratia a comprehensive study of the usage of the words in Greek literature before Plato, and came to the conclusion that the usage which we find in Plato and occasionally elsewhere has its origin in a Pythagorean use of these terms in the sense of geometrical
pattern or figure" (Ross, p. 13). Although C. M. Gillespie
denies Taylor's conclusion, he still admits that Pythagorean
elements in Plato's idea seem to have been a "collateral
growth" (Ross, pp. 13-14). Ross also introduces H. C.
Baldry's theory that "Plato's usage of the terms \( \xi \xi \xi \) and
\( \xi \xi \xi \), and indeed 'the fundamental principle of Plato's meta-
physics,' were reached by a fusion of Socrates' teaching
about moral values with the Pythagorean teaching about
number-patterns" (Ross, p. 14). Whether Plato's "idea" is
derived from Pythagorean geometrical patterns or not, it
seems highly probable that Emerson's notion of vision and
its cognate "idea" have a strong predilection for geometry,
judging from Emerson's remarks in his journal for September,
1845: ". . . an admirable passage concerning Plato's expres-
sion that God geometrizes. — Morals, vol. iii" and from
various other passages quoted from him in this thesis (cf.
pp. 25-27, 76-78). It is in this context that we should
interpret the word "circle" used by Emerson in the quotations
on page 26 of this thesis, which, at first sight, seems to
indicate his circular and cyclic notions of space and time.
This interpretation may be valid to some extent (cf. p. 81),
but as we have seen above, Emerson's concept of circle seems
to show a predominant inclination toward geometrical preci-
sion which seems to be inseparably connected with his concept
of transcendence of the world, which, in turn, makes his
notion of space rather linear (cf. pp. 46-48). Cf. also F.

13 Cf. Brown, "Emerson's Platonism"; V. Hopkins,
"Emerson and Cudworth: Plastic Nature and Transcendental
Art," American Literature, 23 (1951), 80-98.
14 Matthiessen, pp. 68-70.
15 Brown, p. 326.
16 Matthiessen, pp. 64-65.
17 My translation based on Watson.
18 Needham, pp. 57ff.
19 Ibid., p. 104.
20 Said to have lived to an incredibly old age
(Watson's note).
21 For example, in his Phaedrus, Plato writes: "The
soul in her totality has the care of inanimate being every-
where, and traverses the whole heaven in divers forms
appearing; — when perfect and fully winged she soars

22 Matthiessen, p. 68.

23 My translation, based on Watson.


27 Watson, p. 41.
CHAPTER II

ORDER AND LAW

In the previous chapter we reached the conclusion that Emerson's notions of order and boundaries are essentially founded on the either/or type of logic, whereas those of Chuang Tzu are founded on the both/and type of logic. These two types of logic may also be called the logic of Logos and that of Chaos, respectively, and the difference between the two seems to be reflected in Emerson's and Chuang Tzu's concepts of order and law. This chapter, then, will attempt to show how Emerson's notions of law and order are fundamentally Logocentric, while those of Chuang Tzu are Chaos-oriented.

To further our discussion it seem necessary to give a general definition of law in its relationship to the notion of order. It goes without saying that "law" is an indispensable concept in considering the notion of order, for the broadest definition of law is that it is "a principle that connotes order, whether this be the order of the physical universe or that of morality."¹ It is with this basic definition of law in mind that we should begin our investigation of the concepts of law and order in Emerson and Chuang Tzu. In the process of our examination we shall focus our attention on several aspects of law such as eternal law (divine
law), the laws of Nature (physical law), natural law (the law of reason), and human (positive) law. This chapter will attempt to show how Emerson's notion of law and order is essentially Logocentric, while that of Chuang Tzu is Chaos-oriented.

In the last chapter we saw both Emerson's and Chuang Tzu's attitudes toward language: Emerson's approach toward language is positive; that of Chuang Tzu, negative. This difference seems to serve as a clue to understanding the notions of "divine law" in the works of these two writers. In the Greco-philosophic and Judaeo-Christian tradition, this divine law (principle) of the universe is often expressed by the Greek word for language or speech, logos. Since Emerson shows a strong predilection for speech, we may safely assume that his notion of divine law would be Logos-oriented, whereas Chuang Tzu's negative approach to language requires us to search for another suitable term to describe his concept of "divine law."

The implications of such a term would of course be quite different from those of Logos.

In order to continue our discussion of these points we need to clarify the meaning of the word logos. According to The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, the Greek noun logos, derived from the verb lego, "I say," has the following meanings: "word, speech, argument, explanation, doctrine, esteem, numerical computation, measure, proportion, plea, principle, and reason (whether human or divine)."
said that Heraclitus of Ephesus (c. 535-475 B.C.) first used the word logos to denote the divine law of the universe which is in a state of constant change. However, this is refuted by some scholars, and so it may be safe not to draw any decisive conclusion concerning Heraclitus' "Logos-doctrine," except that Logos can mean "divine law" apart from the Heraclitean context.

Logos has also been equated with Platonic Ideas, Neo-Platonic Nous (Reason), and with "the Word of God" in the Gospel of St. John. The close relationship among Idea, Nous, and the Johannine Logos may be seen in the following passage from F. C. Happold's Mysticism: A Study and an Anthology:

It [Nous] is the Divine Mind and also the World of Forms and Ideas in the Platonic sense. . . . Christian Neoplatonism equated the Logos of St. John's Gospel, the Second Person of the Trinity, the divine Activity, the World Principle, the That which is the basis of the manifold, and which was incarnate in Jesus Christ, with the Nous of Plotinus. Both Clement and Origen call the Logos the Idea of Ideas.

Needless to say, the connotations of Logos vary from one school to another. Nevertheless, as we can surmise from the above passage from Happold, there seems to be an obvious common denominator underlying these schools of thought and religion. As we have seen earlier (cf. p. 12, n. 2), this common feature seems to be the bifurcating as well as uniting function of Logos. We can see this tendency toward division underlying almost all the meanings of logos cited above. Furthermore, we should also remember the following: Neo-
Platonism is derived from Platonism; many scholars agree that the author of the Johannine Gospel was well aware of, and most probably influenced by, the "Logos-doctrine" of Philo Judaeus, who attempted to synthesize Greek philosophy (especially that of Plato and the Stoics) and the Biblical tradition of the Word (Memra) of God through the doctrine of Logos. Thus we can say that Logos (Platonic and Neo-Platonic), Reason, language (word), and divine law are extremely close to each other in their connotations.

With this preliminary consideration of Logos in mind, let us first examine how closely it is related to the notion of order and divine law in Emerson, who was both educated as a Christian minister and influenced by Greek philosophy. Although Emerson seldom mentions the term logos, he often uses other cognate words and expressions, such as reason, intellect, idea, thoughts, the word, God, the Over-Soul, Spiritual Laws, analogy, etc. The following two examples are from *Nature* and "Fate":

Man is conscious of a universal soul within or behind his individual life, wherein, as in a firmament, the natures of Justice, Truth, Love, Freedom, arise and shine. This universal soul he calls Reason. And the blue sky in which the private earth is buried, the sky with its eternal calm, and full of everlasting orbs, is the type of Reason. That which intellectually considered we call Reason, considered in relation to nature, we call Spirit. Spirit is the Creator. Spirit hath life in itself. And man in all ages and countries embodies it in his language as the Father. (I, 33)

History is the action and reaction of these two — Nature and Thought; two boys pushing each other on
the curbstone of the pavement. . . . Whilst the man is weak, the earth takes up him. He plants his brain and affections. By and by he will take up the earth, and have his gardens and vineyards in the beautiful order and productiveness of his thought. (VI, 46)

Other examples are: "The intellect searches out the absolute order of things as they stand in the mind of God, and without the colors of affection" (Nature, I, 28); "In inquiries respecting the laws of the world and the frame of things, the highest reason is always the truest" (Ibid., 70); "But when the fact is seen under the light of an idea, the gaudy fable fades and shrivels. We behold the real higher law" (Ibid., 78); "That soul which within us is a sentiment, outside of us is a law" ("Compensation," II, 99); "... a man is the word made flesh" ("Self-Reliance," II, 75-76).

Judging from these quotations, we can say that Emerson's notion of divine law and order is best described by the term Logos, whose various meanings we have examined above. One things which should be noted in passing, however, is that although Logos has various connotations, most of them center around the mind or intellect. This is clearly reflected in the above passages quoted from Emerson, especially in the passage from "Fate." This predilection for the mind would be the main reason why, in spite of the considerable amount of emphasis placed on the importance of Nature, Emerson's notion of order and law tends to be anthropocentric, and thus somewhat alien to the ideas of Chuang Tzu.

Chuang Tzu's world view is Nature-oriented, that is,
Chaos-oriented. This becomes clearer when we examine his notion of "divine law" or "eternal law," and compare it with Emerson's Logocentric concept of divine law.

In the first place, let us determine whether Chuang Tzu's "eternal law" contains any elements that bear similarities with the concepts of Logos. One example would be the term li, which Chuang Tzu often employs as an equivalent of Tao in such expressions as t'ien li (the principles of Heaven), ta li (Great Principle), ch'eng li (the principles of growth), wan wu chih li (the principles of ten thousand things), and t'ien ti chih li (the principles of Heaven and Earth). According to Needham, the word li originally meant "the 'pattern' in things, the markings in jade or the fibrous texture of muscle, and only later acquired its standard dictionary meaning of 'principle.'"11 Later the concept of li was fully developed by the Neo-Confucian scholar Chu Hsi (1131-1200 A.D.), who attempted to revitalize the declining Confucianism of his time by borrowing various elements from Taoism and Buddhism. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to present a detailed discussion of Chu Hsi's concept of Li here, but as Needham points out, it is obvious that a close connection exists between the Tao of the ancient Taoists and the Li of Chu Hsi,12 and thus between the Taoist Li and the Li of Chu Hsi.

What is notable here is that, according to Needham, many occidental sinologists translated Chu Hsi's Li into
such Western terms as Platonic-Aristotelian Form, natural (scientific) law, Vernunft (Reason), and the Stoic logos spermatikos (the Seminal Logos). Although Needham is very skeptical about these translations and suggests his own version "Principle of Organisation"\textsuperscript{14} instead, we cannot deny that the term li 理 has some elements that tempted Western scholars to equate it with Logos, reason, form, and so on. Besides, the word li 理 is used in such a modern Chinese expression as li hsing 理性 to mean "rationality" or "reason."

Taking all these facts into consideration, it seems that Chuang Tzu's Li, which doubtless is one of the basic concepts for Chu Hsi's Li, has some aspects that remind us of the notion of Logos. If we are to choose one concept from Chuang Tzu's terminology which would be similar to the concept of Logos, then Li 理 would be the best choice. In this sense we can say that Emerson's notion of eternal law and that of Chuang Tzu are similar to each other.

At the same time, however, we should not forget that Li is subsumed in Tao, which, in Chuang Tzu, is identical with Hun-tun or Chaos — the eyeless (dark), mouthless (speechless) primordial state of the universe. When dealt with on the same level, which Emerson often seems to do (cf. pp. 93, 117, 121-123, 146-147, 150-151), the two notions of Hun-tun (Chaos) and Logos seem to be incompatible, the prominent characteristics of the latter being speech (whether...
human or divine) and light (cf. Johannine Gospel). This is one of the differences between Chuang Tzu's notion of eternal law and order represented by Li and Tao (Chaos), and the ideas of Emerson, which are quite Logocentric, that is, intellectual, speech-oriented, and full of images of light.

There is another difference between the two which seems to lie in the notion of Hun-tun. As we have seen in the first chapter, Hun-tun is a state of the universe in which no clear-cut boundaries or distinctions exists. Therefore, in a world view with Hun-tun as its center, no transcendental supreme being that exists apart from this world can be supposed, to say nothing of an anthropomorphically, celestial law-giver, whose vestiges are clearly seen in Emerson's notions of a divine being and its law (cf. the above quotation from Nature, I, 33). This seems to be another important difference between Chuang Tzu and Emerson concerning the notion of eternal law.

The last, but not least, difference between the two would be in the anthropocentrism underlying the Logos-oriented notion of the divine law of Emerson. This anthropocentrism seems to have a close relationship with the somewhat anthropomorphically nature of Emerson's celestial law-giver. If, as is the case with Emerson, there is a direct connection between the divine law-giver (God) and man, even if only in the spheres of the mind, intellect, and spirit, then it is quite natural that man is considered to be the
center and the ruler of the universe. According to Emerson, "... all things preach the indifferency of circumstance. The man is all" ("Compensation," II, 116), and "He [man] is placed in the centre of beings, and a ray of relation passes from every other being to him" (Nature, I, 33). This kind of anthropocentrism is rarely seen in Chuang Tzu. One of the reasons for this can be seen in the fact that Chuang Tzu's notion of eternal (or ultimate) law, which is based on Hun-tun (Chaos), does not presuppose any supreme being transcendent of this world. Thus we can say that although Chuang Tzu's concept of eternal law resembles that of Emerson in its concept of Li, the resemblance is a partial one: the former is Chaos-oriented, while the latter is Logocentric.

In order to further our discussion of the contrast between Chaos and Logos and its implications in the notion of law and order in the works of Emerson and Chuang Tzu, we need first to consider the attitude of each writer toward logic. The word logic (logikos) is derived from logos which, as we saw above, means ordering principle, and so, by examining the nature of Emerson's and Chuang Tzu's logic we can hope to clarify some aspects of their respective notions of order and law.

In the last chapter we reached the conclusion that Emerson's logic shows an inclination toward the either/or type of logic, whereas that of Chuang Tzu tends toward the both/and type of logic. This difference seems to correspond
to that between Logos and Chaos for the following reasons: since the etymological meanings of Logos are speech, word, gathering, counting, ratio, and measure, all of which are based on boundaries, Logos can be said to have a close relationship with bifurcation, which is the basis of the either/or type of logic; Chaos, on the other hand, has innumerable boundaries in itself, and so by following every one of them, i.e., by becoming one with Chaos, one can achieve cosmic harmony and order. This is called liang hsing (walking two roads) or the both/and type of logic. Thus we can say that Logos has a close relation to the logic of either/or, and Chaos to that of both/and. It is not difficult to see that the former type of logic is the basis for Aristotelian formal logic which consists in the laws of identity, contradiction, and the excluded middle (thus we can see another correspondence between Logos and formal logic), while the latter type of logic leads us to a "logic" which is an exact reversal of formal logic. (We may call this the logic of Chaos.) In fact, it is not so much "logic" as a logical contradiction by the standards of formal logic, as the following examples will indicate.

The first example can be seen in Chuang Tzu's attitude toward language. In spite of his strong negation of language he still wrote a book, Chuang Tzu. Using language he denies language. Here we encounter a similar inconsistency to that found in such statements as "I am lying," and
"Do not read this sentence." This kind of paradox seems to lie behind the so-called double binds (paradoxical injunctions). Chuang Tzu had to commit this logical inconsistency, probably because, as will become clearer in the next chapter (cf. p. 133), the structure of the universe itself is based on a double bind. For Chuang Tzu, one way to solve this predicament is to use the both/and type of logic, which allows him to ignore what is forbidden by the laws of contradiction and the excluded middle. By the standard of this logic Chuang Tzu's attitude toward language is not a contradiction.

This logic of Chuang Tzu seems to be reflected in his literary device. Since he is trying to express what is essentially ineffable, his language inevitably becomes paradoxical and oblique. He usually does not make a straightforward frontal attack on the point he intends to clarify, but rather employs a negative approach using such means as the satirical yet humorous anecdote and the pseudological debate "that starts out sounding completely rational and sober, and ends by reducing language to a gibbering inanity."18

One of the examples of such pseudological discussions, which can also be another instance of Chuang Tzu's both/and type of logic, is in the well-known debate between Chuang Tzu and his friend, Hui Tzu: 

Chuang Tzu and Hui Tzu were strolling along the
dam of the Hao River when Chuang Tzu said, "See how the minnows come out and dart around where they please! That's what fish really enjoy!"

Hui Tzu said, "You're not a fish — how do you know what fish enjoy?"

Chuang Tzu said, "You're not I, so how do you know I don't know what fish enjoy?"

Hui Tzu said, "I'm not you, so I certainly don't know what you know. On the other hand, you're certainly not a fish — so that still proves you don't know what fish enjoy!"

Chuang Tzu said, "Let's go back to your original question, please. You asked me how I know what fish enjoy — so you already knew I knew it when you asked the question. I know it by standing here beside the Hao." (ch. 17, 188-189)

To Hui Tzu, a renowned logician, Chuang Tzu's viewpoint is sheer nonsense. It violates the law of identity (or contradiction) by confusing subject and object, i.e., Chuang Tzu and the fish, thus bringing disorder into the order of formal logic. However, according to Chuang Tzu, Hui Tzu's either/or type of logic is the very cause of the disorders brought about in the Great Order of Nature or Hun-tun. The world of Hun-tun is the place where the both/and type of epistemology holds true, where beings "feel" the inner correspondence and relationships among things rather than "speculate" or "ratiocinate" about the apparent distinctions
and oppositions between subject and object, man and Nature, God and the universe, etc. What Chuang Tzu is interested in seems to be the hidden relationships among things, the so-called "participation mystique."

Emerson's approach, in contrast, seems to approximate that of Hui Tzu, but before we can reach this conclusion we need to take a closer look at Emerson's logic, for sometimes Emerson seems to assume exactly the same attitude as does Chuang Tzu toward the problem of logical contradiction. For instance, in "Self-Reliance" he writes:

A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, adored by little statesmen and philosophers and divines. With consistency a great soul has simply nothing to do. He may as well concern himself with his shadow on the wall. Speak what you think now in hard words and tomorrow speak what tomorrow thinks in hard words again, though it contradict every thing you said to-day. (II, 58)

This would seem to be the source of the notorious inconsistency in Emerson's writings. It is inevitable that they are inconsistent, because the author himself declares that he does not care about contradiction. And this would also account for the rather rhapsodic and even fragmental tone often detectable in his style. As O. W. Firkins points out, Emerson seems to have preferred short aphoristic sentences, phrases, and anecdotes to long narratives. On this point, too, Emerson seems to resemble Chuang Tzu, who seldom resorts to a long systematic exposition.

In so far as we judge from the above consideration, it seems that Emerson and Chuang Tzu agree with each other
in their attitude toward logic: both seem to discard formal logic in favor of the both/and type of logic. This assumption is further strengthened when we read about the revelational experience Emerson had at the Zoological Garden in Paris. In his journal for July 13, 1833, he writes about the experience:

> Not a form so grotesque, so savage nor so beautiful but is an expression of some property inherent in man the observer, — an occult relation between the very scorpions and man. I feel the centipede in me — cayman, a carp, eagle and fox. I am moved by strange sympathies, I say continually "I will be a naturalist."

A similar tenet echoes throughout *Nature*, which was published a few years after his trip to Paris. For example, he says:

> The greatest delight which the fields and woods minister is the suggestion of an occult relation between man and the vegetable. I am not alone and unacknowledged. They nod to me and I to them.  

(I, 16)

Reading these passages, we cannot help being convinced that Emerson, too, has a sort of "participation mystique" which is not unlike that of Chuang Tzu. But how can we reconcile this kind of world view of Emerson, which seems to be based on the logic of both/and, and the other aspect of Emerson's logic — the logic of either/or, which tends to separate man from Nature, and Nature from the divine being (the Spirit)? Is one of them our misinterpretation, or, considering Emerson's defiance of contradiction, are we to say that both of them are true? There seem to be two possible answers to this question, both of which are closely interrelated: the
first lies in the way Emerson defines Nature; the second, in his anthropocentrism. According to V. C. Hopkins, Emerson makes a distinction between two aspects of Nature: "Lower-case 'nature' (natura naturata), the material aspects, in so far as they are unchanged by man, is distinguished from 'Nature' in upper case (natura naturans), the Spirit which passes through material objects and also through man's will." In *Nature* and "Nature," respectively, Emerson writes:

Philosophically considered, the universe is composed of Nature and the Soul. Strictly speaking, therefore, all that is separate from us, all which Philosophy distinguishes as the NOT ME, that is, both nature and art, all other men and my own body, must be ranked under this name, NATURE. (I, 10-11)

At the gates of the forest, the surprised man of the world is forced to leave his city estimates of great and small, wise and foolish. . . . Here is sanctity which shames our religions, and reality which discredits our heroes. Here we find Nature to be the circumstance which dwarfs every other circumstance, and judges like a god all men that come to her. (III, 163-164)

"Nature" in the first passage would correspond to the lower-case Nature, and "Nature" in the second quotation, to the upper-case Nature. This distinction between the two kinds of Nature seems to be an inevitable consequence of Emerson's Idealism that separates the Spirit (or Soul) from matter and sets the former in a higher position than the latter. From here arises his anthropocentrism, for according to Emerson "...within man is the soul of the whole; . . . the eternal One" ("The Over-Soul," II, 253), and "Ineffable is the union
of man and God in every act of the soul" (Ibid., 274). We should also note here that, as we have seen earlier, Emerson's notion of the soul (or spirit) is inseparable from that of Logos, which is also the basis of the laws of formal logic that exclude contradiction.

From these considerations of Emerson's concepts of Nature, Spirit, Logos, and man, we may draw two assumptions which seem to provide answers to the question raised above: one is that Emerson seems to consider the upper-case Nature (or the Spirit) to be free from contradiction; the other is that for him man as an embodiment of Logos and thus the center of the universe seems to have a special kind of relation to the universe, and this relation seems to be rather different from the "participation mystique" we saw between Chuang Tzu and the fish in the aforementioned anecdote. The first assumption can be proved by a passage Emerson wrote a few sentences after his condemnation of consistency which we quoted above:

In this pleasing contrite wood-life which God allows me, let me record day by day my honest thought without prospect or retrospect, and, I cannot doubt, it will be found symmetrical, though I mean it not and see it not.

("Self-Reliance," II, 59)

Emerson can laugh away inconsistency, probably because he firmly believes in the consistency of the Spirit or God that works through the human mind. What is noteworthy here is that his notion of God is rather Logocentric, i.e., logical in the sense of formal logic. For a further illustration of
this point let us quote another passage from "The American Scholar," where Emerson describes the classifying function of the human mind which "goes on tying things together, diminishing anomalies, discovering roots running under ground whereby contrary and remote things cohere and flower out from one stem." He continues:

It [the human mind] presently learns that since the dawn of history there has been a constant accumulation and classifying of facts. But what is classification but the perceiving that these objects are not chaotic, and are not foreign, but have a law which is also a law of the human mind? (I, 87)

Emerson believes that the human mind has a classifying and ordering power, and that seemingly chaotic things can be put into order by this power. Thus, we can say that Emerson's notion of order and divine law is essentially based on the logic of Logos and not on that of Chaos.

Emerson's idea that the human mind classifies and unifies things which are in a chaotic state seems to have a close connection with the second assumption mentioned above — the assumption that Emerson's "participation mystique" might be different from that of Chuang Tzu. Immediately after the passage quoted above (cf. p. 61) concerning the analogies among Reason, sky, intellect, Nature, soul, Creator, and Father, Emerson continues:

It is easily seen that there is nothing lucky or capricious in these analogies, but that they are constant, and pervade nature. These are not the dreams of a few poets, here and there, but man is an analogist, and studies relations in all objects.
He is placed in the centre of beings, and a ray of relation passes from every other being to him. And neither can man be understood without these objects, nor these objects without man. (Nature, I, 33)

In this quotation the word "analogies" seems to be important, for the word analogy itself comes from ana logon "according to logos (ratio)." Thus, it seems quite natural for Emerson, whose notion of human beings is Logos-oriented, to state that "man is an analogist." To Emerson, man is an analogist who uses his reason (logos) to detect relations and ratios (logos) among things and classifies, unifies, and orders them. Therefore, as Emerson says in the above quotation, "He is placed in the centre of beings, and a ray of relation passes from every other being to him." The relation which Emerson sees between himself and the objects in the world seems to be an analogical one. He projects the logos (proportionate pattern, principle) in his brain onto the outer world. It seems that what Emerson saw in the insects and animals at the Zoological Gärden in Paris was nothing but the image of his own face — a human face which was well-ordered and followed the laws of Logos. In his essay "Nature," he says, "Man imprisoned, man crystallized, man vegetative, speaks to man impersonated" (III, 188). It is a human being as Logos made flesh that is central in Emerson's idea of correspondence between man and Nature. This seems to be the difference between the "participation mystique" of Emerson and that of Chuang Tzu, which is based on the logic of Chaos.
So far we have examined the notion of divine law and order in Emerson and Chuang Tzu through the contrast between the logic of Logos and that of Chaos. The difference between the two types of logic is reflected in their notion of "participation mystique": Emerson tends to see an analogy between man and other objects in the world and between man and a divine being, whereas this kind of correspondence can scarcely be found in Chuang Tzu who does not recognize any supreme being whether outside or inside the universe. If we look at the concept of analogy from a different angle we may find another contrast between Emerson and Chuang Tzu concerning their notions of divine law and order.

As the etymology of \textit{ana logon} (according to ratio) indicates, the word analogy is originally a term of geometry. Therefore, it is quite probable that geometrical elements will be found in Emerson's notion of analogy, just as they are in his concept of beauty. For example, in "Plato; or the Philosopher," Emerson quotes from Plato's analogy of a line divided into four proportionate parts which Plato used to explain the relationship between the phenomenal world and the idea world. After this quotation Emerson comments:

\begin{quote}
To these four sections, the four operations of the soul correspond, — conjecture, faith, understanding, reason. As every pool reflects the image of the sun, so every thought and thing restores us an image and creature of the supreme Good. The universe is perforated by a million channels for his activity. All things mount and mount. \hfill (IV, 68)
\end{quote}

Plato's geometrical analogy of the line seems to have had an
influence on Emerson and can be seen in the following statements: "With a geometry of sunbeams the soul lays the foundations of nature" ("Intellect," II, 322); "The astronomer discovers that geometry, a pure abstraction of the human mind, is the measure of planetary motion" ("The American Scholar," I, 87); "A man does not tie his shoe without recognizing laws which bind the farthest regions of nature: moon, plant, gas, crystal, are concrete geometry and numbers" ("Nature," III, 176); and "The American who has been confined, in his own country, to the sight of buildings designed after foreign models, is surprised on entering York Minster or St. Peter's at Rome, by the feeling that these structures are imitations also,—faint copies of an invisible archetype." (Nature, I, 71). Although Emerson does not use the word "geometry" in the last passage, it is obvious from the other passages quoted here that what he calls "an invisible archetype" has a strong predilection for geometrical symmetry and proportion, which are also important elements of architecture. Thus we can say that one of the aspects of Emerson's notion of law (especially that of divine law) is its geometrical nature.

Furthermore, we should note in the last passage quoted above the pragmatic and aesthetic nature of architecture. It seems that in Emerson the laws of geometry which are a prominent feature of his notion of divine law underlie both his aesthetics and his pragmatism, namely, his notion of
Thus architecture is called "frozen music," by De Staël and Goethe. Vitruvius thought an architect should be a musician. "A Gothic church," said Coleridge, "is a petrified religion." Michael Angelo maintained that, to an architect a knowledge of anatomy is essential.

(Nature, I, 49)

Möller, in his Essay on Architecture, taught that the building which was fitted accurately to answer its end would turn out to be beautiful though beauty had not been intended. I find the like unity in human structures rather virulent and pervasive; that a crudity in the blood will appear in the argument; a hump in the shoulder will appear in the speech and handiwork. If his mind could be seen, the hump would be seen. ("Fate," VI, 47-48)

In the first passage we should note the similarities between music and architecture in that both follow mathematical, geometrical laws (e.g., symmetry, proportion, harmony, rhythm, etc.). In the second quotation the word necessity has a strong association with geometrical necessity, which is based on reason (ratio). And in the last passage our attention is drawn to the fact that the (geometrical) exactness of architecture as well as usefulness and beauty are treated synonymously, while a hump, which reminds us of the deformed sage in Chuang Tzu's parable quoted in Chapter I,
is thought to symbolize inaccuracy, uselessness, and ugliness — all of which are negative qualities.

As is clear from the above examination, there seems to be a close connection between Emerson's pragmatism and the laws of geometry, which, according to him, have their basis in the realm of Ideas. On the other hand, if Chuang Tzu's concept of "eternal law" is Chaos-oriented, this is likely to be reflected in his views on pragmatism (usefulness) and geometrical law, this latter we have already considered in connection with Chuang Tzu's notion of beauty in the last chapter. The following are two examples taken from Chuang Tzu to clarify the point in question:

Hui Tzu said to Chuang Tzu, "I have a big tree of the kind men call shu. Its trunk is too gnarled and bumpy to apply a measuring line to, its branches too bent and twisty to match up to a compass or square. You could stand it by the road and no carpenter would look at it twice. Your words, too, are big and useless, and so everyone alike spurns them!"

Chuang Tzu said, "... Now you have this big tree and you're distressed because it's useless. Why don't you plant it in Not-Even-Anything Village, or the field of Broad-and-Boundless, relax and do nothing by its side, or lie down for a free and easy sleep under it? Axes will never shorten its life, nothing can ever harm it. If there's no use for it, how can it come to grief or pain?"

(ch. 1, 35)
If we must use curve and plumb line, compass and square to make something right, this means cutting away its inborn nature; if we must use cords and knots, glue and lacquer to make something firm, this means violating its natural Virtue. So the crouchings and bendings of rites and music, the smiles and beaming looks of benevolence and righteousness, which are intended to comfort the hearts of the world, in fact destroy their constant naturalness.

Thus we can say that in Chuang Tzu geometrical laws and the usefulness associated with them are denied as being detrimental to the spontaneous outflow of the inborn nature of things. It seems that for Chuang Tzu geometrical laws are not the true laws of the universe, and usefulness which follows the laws of geometry is not real usefulness. For Chuang Tzu true usefulness seems to lie in what appears to be useless and meaningless, and the ultimate law of the universe is something quite different from the Logos-oriented laws of geometry. Emerson's notion of divine law which is both Logocentric and geometric seems to be somewhat mechanical when compared with that of Chuang Tzu, which has close ties with Chaos.

The elements of mechanical and deterministic laws of geometry seen in Emerson's notion of divine law further lead us to another topic: causality and the laws of Nature (physical laws).

Emerson seems to have two seemingly contradictory
views on causality. The first is that things are so interrelated and complicated that it is impossible to detect the first cause in this universe. The second is that there is an ultimate cause somewhere and by realizing this cause one can predict the future exactly. The first kind of causality, which seems to be close to that of Chuang Tzu, is seen, for instance, in such passages as: "This knot of nature is so well tied that nobody was ever cunning enough to find the two ends. Nature is intricate, over-lapped, inter-weaved and endless" ("Fate," VI, 40); "The simplicity of nature is not that which may easily be read, but is inexhaustible" ("Spiritual Laws," II, 131); and "What is nature to him? There is never a beginning, there is never an end, to the inexplicable continuity of this web of God . . ." ("The American Scholar," I, 86-87).

However, Emerson's final conclusion about causality seems to be the second type mentioned above, for a few sentences after the last passage quoted here Emerson writes, ". . . in the mass and in the particle, Nature hastens to render account of herself to the mind. Classification begins" (I, 87). Here we can detect a sign of Emerson's Idealism. For him there seems to be nothing that cannot be known to the human mind which is directly connected to the idea world, the realm of the eternal law. In the same essay quoted above, he says:

He shall see that nature is the opposite of the soul, answering to it part for part. One is seal
and one is print. Its beauty is the beauty of his own mind. Its laws are the laws of his own mind. Nature then becomes to him the measure of his attainments. So much of nature as he is ignorant of, so much of his own mind does he not yet possess. (I, 88)

Needless to say, in Emerson the human soul belongs to God or the Over-Soul. This is why he writes about the human soul ascending to the Supreme Mind, "the center of the world, where, as in the closet of God, we see causes, and anticipate the universe, which is but a slow effect" ("The Over-Soul," II, 259).

Another thing we should note about Emerson's causality is that it is mechanistic and deterministic, that is, it is "Newtonian." The following are a few examples which illustrate this point:

"The problem of philosophy," according to Plato, "is, for all that exists conditionally, to find a ground unconditioned and absolute." It proceeds on the faith that a law determines all phenomena, which being known, the phenomena can be predicted. . . . In physics, when this [to grasp the laws of Nature] is attained, the memory disburdens itself of its cumbrous catalogues of particulars, and carries centuries of observation in a single formula. (Nature, I, 59-60)

That famous aboriginal push propagates itself through all the balls of the system, and through every atom of every ball; through all the races of creatures, and through the history and performances of every individual. ("Nature," III, 177)

The world is mathematical, and has no casualty in all its vast and flowing curve. . . . A man hardly knows how much he is a machine until he begins to make telegraphy, loom, press, and locomotive, in his own image. ("Power," VI, 80-81)

Besides these examples, we come across other passages, such
as: "... these 'fits of easy transmission and reflection,' as Newton called them, — are the law of nature because they are the law of spirit" ("The American Scholar," I, 99); "I look for the new Teacher that ... shall see the identity of the law of gravitation with purity of heart" ("Divinity School Address," I, 148); "What avails it to fight with the eternal laws of mind, which adjust the relation of all persons to each other by the mathematical measure of their havings and beings?" ("Spiritual Laws," II, 142); "These [famine, typhus, frost, war, etc.] are pebbles from the mountain, hints of the terms by which our life is walled up, and which show a kind of mechanical exactness" ("Fate," VI, 24); "All successful men have agreed in one thing — they were causationists" ("Power," VI, 56); and "There is no chance and no anarchy in the universe. All is system and gradation" ("Illusions," VI, 308).

Although, in the last passage above, Emerson says that "there is no chance and no anarchy in the universe" and in "Fate" he describes the unsurmountable power of fate, circumstance, and the necessities of material Nature, he still seems to believe in the freedom of human beings. This is clear from his belief in the human hind and its direct relation with God or the Spirit which we have seen briefly above. For him, "Man is not order of nature ... but a stupendous antagonism, a dragging together of the poles of the Universe" ("Fate," VI, 27), and "We are as law givers;
we speak for Nature; we prophesy and divine" (Ibid., 30). According to Emerson, it is because human beings have intellect and spirit that they do not belong to Nature, but stand above it as lawgivers. This is further illustrated by other statements such as: "Intellect annuls Fate. So far as a man thinks, he is free" ("Fate," VI, 27); "Thought dissolves the material universe by carrying the mind up into a sphere where all is plastic" (Ibid., 32); and "Fate then is a name for facts not yet passed under the fire of thought; for causes which are unpenetrated" (Ibid., 35).

Thus we can say that in Emerson's ideas of causality and freedom, there is a strong predilection for a bifurcation between spirit and matter, between upper-case Nature (natura naturans) and lower-case Nature (natura naturata), and between man and material Nature. In Emerson human beings tend to stand apart from material Nature in order to observe and control it by means of their own will much as they would manipulate machinery. In this sense Emerson's notion of causality is not far from that of Newton, who contends that there exists a rational order in Nature and thus given certain conditions (e.g., the aboriginal push) the future of the universe is predictable through and through.

Chuang Tzu, on the other hand, seems to have a rather different type of causality from that of Emerson. To put it paradoxically yet more exactly, in Chuang Tzu's world view there seems to be no such thing as causality in the sense
that "a definite cause gives rise to a definite effect, so that the future of any part of a system can be predicted with absolute certainty if its state at any time is known in all details." Chuang Tzu's notion of "causality" and "the laws of Nature" seems to be closer to that of the uncertainty principle in modern physics rather than to the mechanistic determinism of Newton. There are at least three reasons for this. In the first place, as we saw in the last chapter, Chuang Tzu's concepts of space and time are circular and cyclic. This means that the beginning (cause) and the end (effect) are ultimately one and the same, and so it does not make sense to talk about causality in terms of linear notion of space and time, where cause and effect, the observer and the observed, man and the rest of the world, the supreme being and the universe, tend to become separated and independent from each other.

The second reason, which is closely connected with the first, is that in Chuang Tzu we seldom come across the notion of supreme being or of a creator of the universe. This has already been mentioned earlier in this chapter, but to add a few more examples, we have the following passages:

Tzu-ch'i said, "The Great Clod belches out breath and its name is wind. So long as it doesn't come forth, nothing happens. But when it does, then ten thousand hollows begin crying wildly. Can't you hear them, long drawn out? . . ."

Tzu-yu said, "By the piping of earth, then, you mean simply [the sound of] these hollows, and by the piping of man [the sound of] flutes and whistles. But may I ask about the piping of Heaven?"
Tzu-ch' i said, "Blowing on the ten thousand things in a different way, so that each can be itself— all take what they want for themselves, but who does the sounding?" (ch. 2, 36-37)

Great Impartial Accord said, "Chickens squawk, dogs bark — this is something men understand. But no matter how great their understanding, they cannot explain in words how the chicken and the dog have come to be what they are, nor can they imagine in their minds what they will become in the future. You may pick apart and analyze till you have reached what is so minute that it is without form, what is so large that it cannot be encompassed. But whether you say that 'nothing does it' or that 'something makes it like this,' you have not yet escaped from the realm of 'things,' and so in the end you fall into error." (ch. 25, 292)

In such a world view as we see in these quotations there can be no first cause or prime mover of the universe. Everything happens naturally and spontaneously. This is what Chuang Tzu calls *tzu jan* (What-is-so-of-itself or as-it-is-ness). The squawking of chickens and the barking of dogs are, as they are, Tao, and there is no need to suppose a "prime mover" behind them such as is seen behind the rhodora in Emerson's poem (cf. p. 24).
The third reason why Chuang Tzu does not have causality in the usual sense seems to lie in the social milieu in which he lived. We have seen in the passage quoted from Fukunaga (cf. p. 49) that Chuang Tzu's times were those of political and social upheaval. Wars, famine, heavy taxation, and every other conceivable disaster and misery assailed the people. It is not very difficult to imagine that these unstable social conditions had a great effect upon people's minds. Unlike Emerson, who seems to believe in the certainty and brightness of the human mind, Chuang Tzu seems to pay much more attention to its grimness and darkness. He writes, "The mind of man is more perilous than mountains or rivers, harder to understand than Heaven" (ch. 32, 358) "凡人心險於山川難於知天," and "At rest, it [the mind] is deep-fathom ed and still; in movement, it is far-flung as the heavens, racing and galloping out of reach of all bounds. This indeed is the mind of man!" (ch. 11, 116) "其居也淵而靜其動也騁而天僃驕而不可係者其唯人心乎." In such a chaotic and unstable world, it would be difficult to hold a view which presupposes a universe that is well ordered and mechanically determined by Newtonian causality. Such a causality can scarcely predict the exact course of a piece of paper blown in a gust of wind or that of a microscopic particle in the Brownian movement on the surface of water. The fate of people in the Warring States period is likely to have been very much like this piece of paper or the minute particle.
Considering these reasons mentioned above, we may safely say that Chuang Tzu's notions of "causality" and "the laws of Nature" seem to be closer to that of the uncertainty principle which tells us that the absolute precise location and direction (velocity) of an object at a given moment cannot be determined simultaneously, because the observer (e.g., the \( \gamma \)-rays or the X-rays from an "ideal" microscope) inevitably affects and changes the future course of the object observed (e.g., photons or electrons).\(^{23}\)

The nature of Chuang Tzu's "causality" seems to be reflected in his notion of freedom. As we saw in the quotation from Fukunaga in Chapter I, Chuang Tzu sought freedom not outside this world but inside it. Perhaps this attitude reflects the severe conditions of his times, which were so pressing that he had little opportunity to speculate upon an ideal world transcendent of his society. It seems that to Chuang Tzu human existence was inescapably ensnared in the veil of Maya or Fate, that is, in the uncertain state of the chaotic society of the time. It would have been almost impossible for him to step out of the tangled net of Fate in order to speculate upon ways to control the confusion and put it into order. Instead, Chuang Tzu plunged into the chaos and followed every thread of the net. This seems to have been his transcendence and freedom. We saw this kind of transcendental man in the parable of the cook Ting quoted at the end of the previous chapter. The following is another
example of a man of this type:

[All at once Master Yü fell ill and his body was completely deformed: his back sticks up like a hunchback and his vital organs are on top of him; his chin is hidden in his navel, his shoulders are up above his head and his pig tail points at the sky. His friend Master Ssu comes and asks him if he resents it. Thereupon Master Yü answers:]

"Why no, what would I resent? If the process continues, perhaps in time he'll transform my left arm into a rooster. In that case I'll keep watch on the night. Or perhaps in time he'll transform my right arm into a crossbow pellet and I'll shoot down an owl for roasting. Or perhaps in time he'll transform my buttocks into cartwheels. Then, with my spirit for a horse, I'll climb up and go for a ride. What need will I ever have for a carriage again?

"I received life because the time had come; I will lose it because the order of things passes on. Be content with this time and dwell in this order and then neither sorrow nor joy can touch you. In ancient times this was called the 'freeing of the bound.' There are those who cannot free themselves, because they are bound by things. But nothing can ever win against Heaven — that's the way it's always been. What would I have to resent?"

(ch. 6, 84-85)

As we can see by the above consideration, the important differences between Emerson and Chuang Tzu concerning their notion of the laws of Nature are as follows: Emerson believes in the rational order of Nature and the freedom of
human beings in it; Chuahg Tzu regards the universe as "chaotic," at least to the human mind, and the freedom of man as an individual to control the outer world is inconceivable.

These differences seem to be reflected in their respective notions of positive (or human) law, for positive law is based upon the freedom of the individual.

At first sight, Emerson seems to be denying positive law. He says: ". . . the moment he [man] acts from himself, tossing the laws, the books, idolatries and customs out of the window, we pity him no more but thank and revere him" ("Self-Reliance, II, 76); ". . . no forms, neither constitution, nor laws, no covenants, nor churches, nor bibles, are of any use in themselves" ("The Fugitive Slave Law," XI, 220-221); and "Every soul is by this intrinsic necessity quitting its whole system of things, its friends and home and laws and faith . . . because it no longer admits its growth" ("Compensation," II, 119-120).

On the other hand, Emerson sometimes makes statements that suggest a favorable attitude toward social institutions and their laws. We have already seen this in his attitude toward private property in Chapter I (pp. 34-35). He also shows the same viewpoint in his "Wealth," where he advocates free competition under "equal laws" that "secure life and property" (VI, 104). One of the reasons for this attitude seems to be his "individualism" while another reason,
inseparable from the first, seems to lie in his firm belief in the intrinsic goodness of human nature. The following passage from Emerson's journal for October, 1852, illustrates both of these points:

The laws find their root in the credence of the people. A two-foot stone wall guards my fine pears and melons, all summer long, from droves of hungry boys & poor men & women. If one of these people should question my right & pluck my fruit, I should set the cumbrous machinery of the law slowly in motion, & by good luck of evidence & counsel, I might get my right asserted, & that particular offender daunted. But if every passenger should make the like attempt, though the law were perfect, my house would not be worth living in, nor my fields worth planting. It is the education of these people into the ideas & laws of property, & their loyalty, that makes those stones in the low wall so virtuous.

The low stone wall in this quotation seems to symbolize Emerson's individualism, and the overall tone of the passage clearly indicates his trust in humanity. For him the individual human being is essentially trustworthy, because, as we have seen so far, his soul is directly connected with the Over-Soul, the eternal Good. The positive law of human society is good and necessary in so far as it faithfully reflects divine law — this seems to be Emerson's message when he says: "See again the perfection of the Law as it applies itself to the affections, and becomes the law of society" ("Divinity School Address," I, 123); "We adore an institution, and do not see that it is founded on a thought which we have" ("Spiritual Laws," II, 152); and "Every law which the state enacts indicates a fact in human nature"
If Emerson's notion of positive law is based on that of divine law, the same seems to apply to his concept of natural law. Natural law is usually defined as "the laws ingrained by God in man's nature but declared by men" or "the laws which everyone endowed with the faculty of reason can accept as universally true." On the basis of these definitions, we can say that natural law seems to be the norm for positive law, morality, social mores, taboos, and customs. The validity of natural law has long been debated among jurists. But as far as Emerson is concerned, there is no doubt that, although he seldom uses the term "natural law" in his writings, he has the notion of this kind of law. This is because, as we have seen through the various examples cited above, he believes in human nature and divine law, the latter being the sole fountainhead of natural law. At this point, by changing our viewpoint a little, let us look at Emerson's notion of natural law from the angle of morality. His concept of morality can be seen in such statements as:

Sensible objects conform to the premonitions of Reason and reflect the conscience. All things are moral; and in their boundless changes have an unceasing reference to spiritual nature. (Nature, I, 46)

It has already been illustrated, that every natural process is a version of a moral sentence. The moral law lies at the centre of nature and radiates to the circumference. (Ibid., 47)

Yesterday I was asked what I mean by morals. I reply that I cannot define, and care not to define. . . . Yet in the morning watch on my berth I
thought that morals is the science of the laws of human action as respects right and wrong. Then I shall be asked, and what is Right? Right is a conformity to the laws of nature as far as they are known to the human mind. . . . 27

The league between virtue and nature engages all things to assume a hostile front to vice. The beautiful laws and substances of the world persecute and whip the traitor.

("Compensation," II, 111)

A mob is a society of bodies voluntarily bereaving themselves of reason and traversing its work. The mob is man voluntarily descending to the nature of the beast. Its fit hour of activity is night. Its actions are insane, like its whole constitution.

(Ibid., 115)

In a virtuous action I properly am; in a virtuous act I add to the world; I plant into deserts conquered from Chaos and Nothing and see the darkness receding on the limits of the horizon.

(Ibid., 117)

Judging from these passages, we may safely conclude that Emerson's notion of morality is based on the dualism between spirit and matter, upper-case Nature and lower-case Nature, good and evil, sanity (reason) and insanity, man as the spirit and man as the beast, light and darkness, order and chaos, etc. In other words, for Emerson morality (good) seems to be on the side of Logos; and immorality (bad) belongs to Chaos. This seems to be a conspicuous aspect of Emerson's notion of natural law, and consequently of his notion of divine law.

In Chuang Tzu, on the other hand, we can expect to find a diametrically different attitude toward positive and natural law as his world view is Chaos-oriented. We have seen earlier in this chapter that Chuang Tzu's approach to
Fate (Chaos) is not to escape from or struggle against it, but to follow and become one with it. To do this man must discard the sense of the individuated self which tends to separate him from Fate and pit him against it. If he becomes "selfless" or "egoless" in this way, there will arise no problem of private property (for property must be possessed by a "self" or an "ego"), and accordingly there will be no necessity of positive laws to settle the disputes over property. This property includes one's own body which the "self" or "ego" thinks it possesses.

That the sense of "self," as set against the world, must be overcome seems to be the idea fundamental to Chuang Tzu's notion of Chaos, influencing his attitude toward positive law. Another interpretation of Chuang Tzu's Chaos, which is closely connected to the first, would be to view it from a socio-political perspective. As the word Chaos implies, Chuang Tzu's views on politics seem to show a strong predilection for "anarchism." We touched upon this point in the previous chapter when we dealt with his "collective primitivism," where no institution of private property exists. If private property is denied, the necessity of positive law to defend it would not arise.

Another characteristic of Chuang Tzu's primitivism is its negation of intellectual sophistication which seems to be the basis for natural law — the law that anyone endowed with reason and intellect can recognize as universally true.
According to Needham, in the time of Chuang Tzu, Confucian li (customs, mores) was closest to the Western concept of natural law. Thus in Chuang Tzu we often come across mild mockeries and sometimes even severe criticisms of Confucianism along with a denunciation of the system of private property and positive law:

In the days of Ho Hsu, people stayed home but didn't know what they were doing, walked around but didn't know where they were going. Their mouths crammed with food, they were merry; drumming on their bellies, they passed the time. This was as much as they were able to do. Then the sage came along with the crouchings and bendings of rites and music, which were intended to reform the bodies of the world; with the reaching-for-a-dangled-prize of benevolence and righteousness, which was intended to comfort the hearts of the world. Then for the first time people learned to stand on tiptoe and covet knowledge, to fight to the death over profit, and there was no stopping them. This in the end was the fault of the sage. (ch. 9, 106)

Cut off sageliness, cast away wisdom, and then the great thieves will cease. Break the jades, crush the pearls, and petty thieves will no longer rise up. Burn the tallies, shatter the seals, and the people will be simple and guileless. Hack up the bushels, snap the balances in two, and the people will no longer wrangle. Destroy and wipe out the laws that the sage has made for the world, and at last you will find you can reason with the people. (ch. 10, 110-111)
As we can see in the above passages, what Chuang Tzu intends by his negation of positive and natural law is not to bring about anarchy in the ordinary sense, but rather to generate the true order and harmony of Nature (Chaos), which is lost through the sophistication and artificiality of human intellect, which, as we have already seen, is inseparably connected with Emerson's concepts of the spirit, soul, idea, reason, and thus of Logos. Thus a sharp contrast is exhibited between Emerson's notion of positive and natural law which is rather Logocentric, and that of Chuang Tzu which is based on Chaos.

In this chapter, we have examined Emerson's and Chuang Tzu's notion of law and order from four viewpoints: divine law, the laws of Nature (physical law), positive law, and natural law. Through this examination it has become clear that Emerson's notion of law and order is fundamentally Logocentric, while that of Chuang Tzu is Chaos-oriented. One of the important characteristics of Logos is its dualism. It separates Spirit (God) from matter, Nature (natura naturans) from Nature (natura naturata), mind from body, rational from irrational, man from Nature, the idea world from the phenomenal world, order from Chaos, etc. The first part of each of these pairs belongs to divine law whereas the second assumes the role of receiver of the law. The logic of Logos
is formal logic, which is based on the either/or type of logic. Thus for Emerson, who often follows this type of logic, "either Chaos or Law is at the base of things." And he chooses the latter.

It is true that Logos also has a unifying function, but it is a function based on discrimination, choice, and classification, and it classifies things into divine (Intelligible) and mundane (Sensible) classifications. Thus the sensible world is divided into illusion and belief (common-sense assurance) and the intelligent world into understanding (mathematical reasoning) and true knowledge of the Idea of the Good. Each of these four divisions is allotted to a section of a line divided into four proportionate parts. Thus the unifying function of Logos is analogical and geometrical. We have seen this kind of analogy reflected in Emerson's notion of correspondence between man and Nature. The logical and geometrical nature of Logos is also seen in his concept of causality (the laws of Nature). To Emerson the world is a garden, well ordered with geometrical precision. More precisely, this order is a projection onto the outer world of the rational order of the human mind which in turn receives its order from the idea world. So man is the agent of the celestial law-giver, the supreme being, who is essentially rational.

This idea seems to have much to do with Emerson's notion of the freedom of man as an individual. To be the
executors of divine law, human beings must be individuals both rational and independent from the world in which they apply the law. This kind of individualism in Emerson leads us, on the one hand, to his concept of private property and positive law and, on the other hand, to his notion of natural law. The property of the individual, including the body of the individual, must be defended by positive laws, but positive laws must draw their validity from the individual's moral consciousness or rationality, which is capable of distinguishing good from evil, right from wrong. Needless to say, natural law, in turn, has its source in divine law. Reviewing Emerson's Logocentric notion of order and law in this way, we can see in it an ordered hierarchy: the Logos-oriented supreme being at the summit, human beings in the middle, and Nature as the material world at the bottom.

In Chuang Tzu's notion of order and law, however, the converse seems to be true: Nature as Chaos appears on top, human beings in the middle, and the supreme being at the bottom (e.g., "the Way is in the piss and shit" [ch. 22, 241] "道在屎溺"). However, if we want to be more accurate, this arrangement is not quite correct, for Chuang Tzu does not discriminate between high and low, between the divine world and the mundane world, or between man and Nature, etc. Everything is regarded as equal from the viewpoint of Tao (Chaos). By the standards of the either/or type of logic this is nonsense and irrational. "A" (man) must be strictly
distinguished from "non-A" (fish or butterfly). "Yes" is different from "No." But the both/and type of logic says that "A" is equal to "non-A" and an answer can be both "Yes" and "No" at once. The rigidly-defined geometrical line that divides and classifies things into the categories of either Yes or No may be conceivable in the mind, the ideal world, but in the actual world every line or boundary is more or less twisted and crooked. This crookedness of boundaries seems to be the nature of "the pattern in things" — the original meaning of li, which is employed by Chuang Tzu to indicate the Taoist notion of the ultimate principle in the universe.

The crooked nature of boundaries seems also to apply to the boundary between cause and effect, between the observer and the object observed. One cannot draw a clear-cut, straight line between one's "self" (the observer) and the rest of the world (the observed) in order to separate the former from the latter and freely observe the latter from outside. One cannot determine the exact difference between the observer and the observed in order to predict and control the future of the latter, but one can follow the boundary between the two — this seems to be the attitude of Chuang Tzu toward the problem of causality and freedom.

The idea that an individuated "self" (a rational being) exists independently from the world and possesses one thing or another gives rise to a meticulous system of
positive laws and, as the basis for these laws, the concept of natural law which was embodied as li (mores and customs) in the time of Chuang Tzu. However, according to Chuang Tzu, these complicated systems of positive laws and li which are supposed to harmonize all the controversies and confusions in the world are the very cause of disorder in the unsophisticated yet peaceful world of Nature (Chaos). As we have seen above, this disorder originally comes from the self-consciousness of human beings who tend to imagine that they are individuals transcendent of lower-case Nature. Emerson who shares this world view says, "It [Nature] is made to serve [human beings]" (Nature, I, 45). But Chuang Tzu would say that there is no such thing as a material world as opposed to a spiritual world. Nor is there a celestial law-giver that presides over the material world. There are only boundaries and we (human beings) are part of them, or rather we are the boundaries. But these boundaries are so numerous that they are equivalent to being non-existent, i.e., wu (Nothingness) and hsü (Emptiness). (Hence the state of so-called "egolessness.") In other words, they (the boundaries) are a conglomeration of one infinitely long boundary whose both ends are unknown (most probably they meet somewhere?). Another name for wu or hsü would be Chaos (Tao), the ultimate principle or law of the universe. Thus in Chuang Tzu the "divine law" as the ultimate principle and human beings, to whom positive and
natural laws belong, are all one in the Boundary, Chaos, or Wu, the concepts of which will be further surveyed in the next chapter, from the perspective of life and order in Emerson and Chuang Tzu.
NOTES TO CHAPTER II


2. To apply the term "divine law" to Chuang Tzu's notion of the ultimate principle may be rather incongruous here, as it becomes clear later that he does not presuppose any supreme being as a divine law-giver.


4. According to M. C. West, who has carefully gone over the fragments of Heraclitus, there is no relationship between Heraclitus' logos ("discourse" or "word") and the divine law of the "Logos." West writes: "Our review of the evidence therefore leads to the conclusion that Heraclitus uses \( \lambda \delta \rho \varsigma \) only in the ordinary senses of the word attested in and before the fifth century, and that the Logos can be banished from our account of his philosophy" (West, Early Greek Philosophy and the Orient [Oxford, 1971], pp. 128-129). Cf. also J. Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy (London, 1908), pp. 146 n. 3, 153 n. 1, 157.


7. J. Hirschberger writes about the relationship between Logos and Idea in Plato: "The idea is a universal concept (\( \lambda \delta \rho \varsigma \)). . . . for him [Plato] all evolution must be guided from above by an anticipation of meaning and of purpose. Plato is a representative of an ideal morphology. In this respect the statement recorded in the Prologue of St. John's Gospel: 'In the beginning was the word' (Logos) has a meaning and accords with the facts" (Hirschberger, The History of Philosophy, Vol. I, tr., A. Fuerst [Milwaukee, 1958], pp. 92-94). Cf. also note 12 to Chapter I of this thesis.

8. In his The Philosophy of Plotinus, Inge writes about the notion of Logos in Plotinus, whose concept of the World-Soul reminds us of Emerson's Over-Soul: "It [Logos] is that which, proceeding from Spirit, either directly or through the medium of the World-Soul, and identical in its nature

\[9\] Cf. the following passage from Emerson's journal for 1852: "The great words of the world such as analogy:— what a step mankind took when Plato first spoke that word! Analogy is identity of ratio, and what civilization, what mounting from savage beginnings does it not require!" (*Journals*, VIII, 271-272). We can also suspect that there is a close connection between Emerson's notion of analogy and geometrical symmetry and proportion (cf. note 12 to Chapter I of this thesis).

\[10\] Emerson sees two different meanings in the word Nature: the lower-case Nature (the so-called *natura naturata*); the upper-case Nature (the so-called *natura naturans*). The Nature that he holds in higher esteem seems to be the latter. This point will be further discussed later in this chapter (see p. 72).


\[12\] Ibid., 485.


\[14\] Needham, 475.

\[15\] Cf. also the following passages from Watts and Berdyaev: "It [a metaphysical doctrine] goes on to say that from this reality all things (i.e., differentiations) are produced out of that which is 'no-thing' by the Logos, which is word-and-thought" (Watts, *Myth and Ritual in Christianity*, pp. 60-61); "In the beginning was the Logos, the Word, the Meaning, and the Light. But this eternal truth of religious revelation only means that the kingdom of light and meaning has been realized initially in being and that the Logos triumphed from the beginning over darkness of every kind" (N. Berdyaev, *Freedom and the Spirit* [London, 1948], p. 165).

\[16\] Cf. also the following passage from Backgrounds of American Literary Thought by R. W. Horton and H. W. Edwards: "Emerson's conception of the Oversoul is of course pantheistic, but his constant use of the word 'God' in referring to the divine life-principle would seem to indicate either that the habits of a lifetime were too strong for him, or that his actual idea of the Deity was more personalized than his philosophy should logically have permitted" (Horton and Edwards, Backgrounds of American Literary Thought, [New York, 1967], pp. 116-117).
Cf. note 2 to the Introduction of this thesis.

Watson, tr., The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, p. 5.


The words adapted from Capra, The Tao of Physics, p. 56.

Heaven is not something distinct from earth and man, but a name applied to the natural and spontaneous functioning of the two (Watson's note). Cf. also Chan's comment on this passage in his A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, p. 181.

For more detailed discussion on the relationship between the uncertainty principle and philosophical Taoism, the reader is referred to Capra, chs. 10-11.

My own paraphrasing of Watson's translation.

Here Chuang Tzu uses the word Creator. However, the implication of the word is quite different from that which we encounter in the Western tradition. As in the case of t'ien, this word means Nature or Fate. With respect to this, Needham comments: "Examples can be found of thinkers in China who maintained a belief in the personality of 'Heaven'...but they were exceptional. Chuang Tzu often speaks of the 'Author of Change' (tsao hua chê [道化者]) or 'of Things' (tsao wu chê [道物者]) but the references are poetical and even somewhat mocking" (Needham, p. 581n).

In connection with this, Horton and Edwards write in their Backgrounds of American Literary Thought: "Even in his economics he resembled his forebears [the Puritans], for he believed that success consists in close appliance to the laws of the world, and since these laws are intellectual and moral, the acquisition of wealth is necessarily moral. Just as the snow falls level today and is blown into drifts tomorrow, so inevitably are riches unequally distributed among the people" (Horton and Edwards, p. 117).


Needham, 521.

Christy, The Orient in American Transcendentalism, p. 104.
CHAPTER III
ORDER AND LIFE

Before starting our discussion on the notion of order and life in Emerson and Chuang Tzu, it seems appropriate to examine briefly some general definitions of life and its relationship to order. It is rather difficult to be exact and precise when defining the term "life," because the line of demarcation between so-called living organisms and dead matter becomes blurred when we consider such a borderline case as a virus or, for that matter, subatomic particles ("dead matter") that constitute living organisms. Moreover, we can detect "life," or rather a metaphor for "life," in "inanimate" things such as the sea, rivers, electric current, volcanic eruptions, etc. Presumably what we feel in these "inanimate" objects is a manifestation of so-called energy (or "life force"), of which, according to modern physics, matter is merely one form. However, we do not immediately identify rivers, electricity, volcanoes, and the sea with living organisms, for something seems to be missing in these things. They may stand for a primordial life force, but they are somewhat amorphous and lacking in organic structure — the structure which we may call "order."

This point will become clearer if we take a brief look at some of the standard definitions of "life." "Life"
can be defined in various ways: genetically (evolution by natural selection), biochemically (DNA and amino acids), physically (negative entropy), and in religious or philosophical terms (spirit, God, Idea). Underlying these definitions, however, seems to be one common feature, namely, order.

Evolution is based on the selection of the fittest and the elimination of anomalies caused by mutations; DNA and amino acids consist of a regular arrangement of molecules which, in terms of thermodynamics, can be interpreted as a decrease of entropy (negative entropy; and, as we have seen in the previous chapters, such noumenal concepts as spirit, God, and Idea, which are usually considered to be the source of "life," have ordering power. Thus we can say that "life" is a kind of order, or, to put it in still another way, we can say that "life," especially that of a living organism, is a form of energy, ordered and regulated in certain ways. In this chapter we shall use the word "life" basically in this sense.

If life is a kind of order, then death, the opposite concept of life, can be defined as a kind of disorder. Since Logos is essentially a principle of order, and Chaos one of disorder (or rather Disorder), we can see a strong connection between life and Logos, and between death and Chaos. As we have seen earlier, Emerson's notion of order is Logocentric, while that of Chuang Tzu is Chaos-oriented. Therefore, we can expect to see this difference reflected in
their notion of life and death. Conversely, by examining their concepts of life and death, we can shed some light upon some aspects of their notion of order. This chapter, then, will attempt to clarify the relationships among life, Death, Logos, and Chaos, and will try to show how these are related to the notion of order in Emerson and Chuang Tzu.

To continue with our discussion, let us first examine the relationship between life and Logos. As for the connection between Logos and the spiritual aspect of life, we need not spend many words here. It is all too clear that Logos, the key concept behind the various terms that stand for noumenon, is thought to be the fountainhead of spiritual life. This is particularly true in Emerson and will be discussed shortly. At this stage, however, it is of primary importance to clarify the relationships between the physical aspects of life and Logos. The first connection between Logos and (physical) life is that both have a close affinity with light. As we have seen in the last chapter (cf. p. 65), Logos has a strong predilection for light while life on earth is supported by the light from the sun. This seems to be the chief reason why light, especially that of the sun, is often used as the symbol of spirit, soul, life (whether spiritual or physical) and Logos. Another connection between Logos and (physical) life can be seen in the structure of DNA, short for deoxyribonucleic acid, the carrier of the genetic code. DNA consists of four basic molecules
called nucleotides, which are identical except for the nitrogen bases they contain. These nitrogen bases are adenine, guanine, cytosine, and thymine, each abbreviated as A, G, C, and T. Because of the differences of the nitrogen bases, the nucleotides function as the "alphabet" of the genetic code. The genetic code is a sequential arrangement of "three-letter words" (codons) made up by taking three out of the four nucleotide bases. What is interesting here is the language-like nature of the genetic code. Although it would be somewhat rash to call DNA a language, we still can see a strong analogy between the two. In his System and Structure, A. Wilden quotes from C. H. Waddington who says, "In fact why not think of DNA as the Bible, of messenger RNA as the preacher, and of the proteins as the congregation ready to perform the good works of the Word of God?" Thus Logos (as words and the Word) and physical life seem to be closely connected in the nature of DNA.

Still another relationship between Logos and physical life can be seen in Plotinus' doctrine of Logos. In his The Philosophy of Plotinus, W. R. Inge writes:

Life, he [Plotinus] says, cannot be generated by an aggregation of lifeless particles, nor can intelligence be produced by things without understanding. If it be suggested that when the molecules are arranged in a certain order, life results, then the principle which produces the order, and not the molecules which are so arranged, should be called the Soul or vital principle. Body is produced, through the agency of the seminal Logoi, by Soul, which gives form to indeterminate Matter.

As we can surmise from this quotation, there seems to be an
intrinsic connection between physical life (of which DNA is an important element) and Logos. According to Inge's interpretation of Plotinus' Logos-doctrine, it is due to the organizing power of Logos that DNA (i.e., "molecules arranged in a certain order") can function as DNA.

With these preliminary considerations in mind concerning the relationships between Logos and life, let us examine the significance of Logos in Emerson's notion of life and order. It is not difficult to suppose that since Emerson is an idealist, he considers the spirit or soul, and thus Logos, as the only fountainhead of life (both spiritual and material). The following passages from his writings will further illustrate this point: "It is one light which beams out of a thousand stars. It is one soul which animates all men" ("The American Scholar," I, 108); "Nothing is secure but life, transition, the energizing spirit" ("Circles," II, 298); and "Through all its kingdoms, to the suburbs and outskirts of things, it [Nature] is faithful to the cause whence it has its origin. It always speaks of Spirit. . . . It is a great shadow pointing always to the sun behind us" (Nature, I, 65). As we have seen earlier (cf. pp. 27-28, 65) and now in the passages quoted here, Emerson seems to be preoccupied with the images of light, height, sky and the sun. This constitutes further proof that his notion of life (both spiritual and physical) is Logos-oriented.

Logos is related to physical life not only in the
images of light and the sun, but also in connection with DNA. We have seen this in the above quotations from Wilden's 
*System and Structure* and Inge's *The Philosophy of Plotinus*. We are reminded here of Emerson's interest in language and 
speech (Logos) examined in the first chapter (pp. 19-21). There may be some kind of hidden connection between Emerson's 
career as a minister and a lecturer, i.e., as a messenger of 
the Word (Logos) of God, and the function of DNA as the 
carrier of genetic information which is compared to the 
Bible by Waddington. Emerson's sermons and lectures could 
inspire, animate, and move his audience taking actions to 
bring harmony and order to the world, especially into wild 
Nature. (In connection with this we should note that Emerson 
lived in the age of expansionism, the age of civilization of 
the wild West.) A similar movement toward harmony and order 
seems to take place in DNA and amino acids: according to the 
message from DNA, amino acids are arranged into an ordered 
structure of proteins which, in turn, constitute a highly 
complicated yet well-harmonized living organism. Thus it 
may be possible to see a sort of analogical relationship 
between Emerson's predilection for language (Logos) and DNA 
which is considered to be one of the basic elements of 
physical life.

Another aspect of DNA is its unity and universality 
in all living organisms. This is especially interesting when 
we consider Emerson's idea that a Logos-oriented principle
(i.e., Spirit) permeates, animates, and controls the universe. He asserts this idea time and again in his writings: "Each creature is only a modification of the other; the likeness in them is more than the difference, and their radical law is one and the same" (Nature, I, 49); "All things proceed out of the same spirit, and all things conspire with it" ("Divinity School Address," I, 124); "Genius detects ... through all the kingdoms of organized life the eternal unity" ("History," II, 18); "There is, at the surface, infinite variety of things; at the centre there is simplicity of cause" (Ibid., 19); and "Nature is an endless combination and repetition of a very few laws" (Ibid., 20). This kind of intuitive experience of Emerson which we called "participation mystique" in Chapter II may be explained through the unity and simplicity of DNA in all creatures on earth. In a sense, DNA functions through a simple "combination and repetition of a very few laws" which are common in all living organisms. Thus, there seems to be a close relationship between the unity of DNA and that of the Spirit or Logos in Emerson's notion of life and order.

Chuang Tzu, on the other hand, seems to find the source of life in Hun-tun or Chaos which is killed by Shu and Hu, who represent the Logos aspect of human beings. It is true that Chuang Tzu sometimes talks about spirit as opposed to the body in such words and passages as shen 神 (spirit), ching 精 (spiritual essence, material force),
ching-shen 精神 (pure spirit, vital spirit); "You now — you treat your spirit like an outsider. You wear out your energy . . ." (ch. 5, 76) "今子外子之神勞子之精"; ". . . enfold the spirit in quietude and the body will right itself (ch. 11, 119) "抱神以靜形將自正"; and "Pure spirit reaches in the four directions, flows now this way, now that — there is no place it does not extend to" (ch. 15, 169) "精神四達並流無所不極." These passages seem to indicate that, like Emerson, Chuang Tzu also distinguishes the spirit from the body. However, in Chuang Tzu it is extremely difficult to draw a clear-cut line of demarcation between the spirit and the body. Chuang Tzu's shen 神 and ching 精 merge inseparably with hsing 形 (body, form) through such notions as hsing 性 (inborn nature) and ch'i 氣 (breath, matter-energy). Hsing 性 in Chuang Tzu seems to imply an orderly and harmonious function of body and spirit (精神). 4

Chuang Tzu says:

Out of the flow and flux, things were born, and as they grew they developed distinctive shapes; these were called forms. The forms and bodies held within them spirits, each with its own characteristics and limitations, and this was called the inborn nature. (ch. 12, 131-132)

and "The inborn nature is the substance of life" (ch. 23, 259) "性者生之質也." Ch'i 氣 has connotations similar to those of hsing 性 in that both are combination of matter
and spirit which constitutes the substance of life. This is clear from such passages as: "Man's life is a coming-together of breath [ch'i]. If it comes together, there is life; if it scatters, there is death" (ch. 22, 235) "人之生氣之聚也聚則為生散則為死"; "No, don't listen with your mind, but listen with your spirit [ch'i]" (ch. 4, 58) "無聴之以心而聴之以氣"; "And now — now I go at it by spirit [shen 神] and don't look with my eyes" (ch. 3, 50-51) "方今之時臣以神遇而 不以目視"; and "In the midst of the jumble of wonder and mystery a change took place and she had a spirit [ch'i]. Another change and she had a body" (ch. 18, 192) "在雜乎芒芴之間變而有氣氣變而有形." In the last passage quoted here, Chuang Tzu says ch'i 氣 comes out of the state of confusion (芒芴) which is nothing but Chaos or Hun-tun. Thus we can say that in Chuang Tzu, Chaos (Disorder) lies under the concept of ch'i 氣. Besides, since ch'i 氣 is quite close to hsing 性, shen 神, and ching 精, we can also conclude that Chaos underlies all these notions.\(^5\)

What, then, are the implications of this, with regard to the physical aspect of life? We can give two examples here. First, evolution by natural selection is based on mutations in the DNA. These mutations have been caused, at least so far as is known, by unpredictable disturbances in the arrangement of the nucleotide bases in the genetic code and also by mistakes in the process of interpreting the genetic information into amino acids. These disturbances
and mistakes can further be traced to the random movements and collisions of "subatomic particles" in the universe. As J. Monod points out, mutation is essentially the incident that takes place at the level of quantum theory and so the uncertainty principle can be applied to it.\(^6\) Mutation is a matter of chance. In this sense we can say that life is based on Chaos. Secondly, the sun, which is the source of energy for all living organisms on earth, is constantly moving toward so-called thermal death (the increase of entropy or disorder) by emitting light through its nuclear reactions. This is another relationship between life and Chaos.

Although Chaos is usually associated with darkness, confusion, corruption and death by Emerson (cf. pp. 121-123),\(^7\) it can also be the basis for life. This seems to be one of the reasons why Chuang Tzu emphasizes the importance of Chaos rather than Logos. For Chuang Tzu, Chaos ("darkness," "death") seems to precede Logos ("life," "light"). As he writes, "The bright and shining is born out of deep darkness; the ordered is born out of formlessness; pure spirit is born out of the Way" (ch. 22, 238) "夫昭昭生于冥冥有條生於無形精神生于道." Here is a sharp contrast between Emerson's Logocentric notion of life and Chuang Tzu's Chaos-oriented concept of life. In other words, Emerson's life descends from above, from the spiritual world of Ideas or Forms (cf. p. 46), whereas Chuang Tzu's life arises from
below, from depth, darkness, and formlessness, i.e., Tao or Hun-tun.

This difference further leads us to the topic of being and non-being, a variation of the problem of life and death. This is because Spirit, Idea and Form all seem to partake of being, while depth, darkness, and formlessness have much in common with non-being.

Although Parmenides, Plato, and presumably Emerson would argue that actual existence in this world is "phenomenon" and "becoming" and thus cannot be identified with ultimate being (or rather Being), still there seems to exist an essential connection between the two, because the sense of being obviously arises from the recognition of actual things in this world. Idealists may assert that without mind (as opposed to matter) there can be no perception of the external world, but this leads us to an endless dispute between subjectivism (spirit) and objectivism (matter). It seems that neither a pure state of the mind (i.e., subjectivity) nor that of matter (i.e., objectivity) is conceivable, for both belong to the realm of the unconscious. The moment we have consciousness and start debating the priority of idealism over materialism or vice versa, we inevitably presuppose a boundary between subject (spirit or mind) and object (matter or body) and by extension between other things in the external world. This process is nothing but the perception of actual existence by our senses. Thus it would
be safe to say that the conception of being (whether it partakes of the ideal world or not) is closely linked to our recognition of the phenomena in the outer world.

It may still be possible to argue that the actual existence in this world is a reflection of true being in the ideal world, but as we have seen above, consciousness of being seems to be impossible without actual perception of the phenomena in the world. This is equivalent to saying that the idea of being presupposes boundaries. As we have seen in the first chapter, "idea," which is inseparable from the concept of being, is founded on sight and boundaries. 8

On the basis of the above considerations on being, we can say that a being is, so to say, something which is surrounded by a boundary and cut off from the rest of the world. It is a figure defined against a set ground. Non-being, then, can be defined as the boundary that separates the being from the ground and other things. (In fact, the ground is no other than the boundary, as will become clear later on.) Absolute Being (or being-itself) is said to comprehend both itself and non-being, 9 but we should not forget that even behind the notion of absolute Being lies the concept of being discussed above. We could say that absolute Being is an extension of being or, conversely, being is an "alienated" Being. In any case, it seems inevitable that boundaries are involved in the problem of being and alienation. 10

With these preliminary considerations on being and
non-being in mind, let us first examine Emerson's notions of being and non-being. His attitude toward these concepts can be seen in the following passages:

It [intellectual science] fastens the attention upon . . . Ideas. . . . We ascent into their region, and know that these are the thoughts of the Supreme Being. . . . No man fears age or misfortune or death in their company, for he is transported out of the district of change. . . . We apprehend the absolute. As it were, for the first time, we exist. (Nature, I, 60-61)

Good is positive. Evil is merely privative, not absolute: it is like cold, which is the privation of heat. All evil is so much death or nonentity. Benevolence is absolute and real. So much benevolence as a man hath, so much life hath he. For all things proceed out of this same spirit. . . . ("Divinity School Address," I, 123)

The soul is not a compensation, but a life. The soul is. Under all this running sea of circumstance, whose waters ebb and flow with perfect balance, lies the aboriginal abyss of real Being. Essence, or God, is not a relation or a part, but the whole. Being is the vast affirmative, excluding negation, self-balanced, and swallowing up all relations, parts and times within itself. Nature, truth, virtue, are the influx from thence. Vice is the absence or departure of the same. Nothing, Falsehood, may indeed stand as the great Night or shade on which as a background the living universe paints itself forth, but no fact is begotten by it; it cannot work, for it is not. It cannot work any good; it cannot work any harm. It is harm inasmuch as it is worse not to be than to be. ("Compensation," II, 116)

As we can see in these passages, Emerson thinks that soul, spirit, Good, the Supreme Being, Ideas, and affirmation are on the side of life and being, while nothing, evil, falsehood, night (darkness), privation, negation, and "not" belong to death and non-being. What is noteworthy here is that Emerson says that non-being such as negation and "not" are
totally excluded or alienated from Being and are regarded as a mere background. We should also note that, as we have seen in Chapter I (cf. p. 17), negation or "not" is a kind of boundary. Here is the reason why we have supposed earlier that non-being, boundaries, and ground are synonymous and they are all alienated from Being.

Now, in Emerson, life is identified with being, or more exactly, Being. This idea seems to be supportable from a scientific perspective. Although Being is said to embrace both itself and non-being, still we cannot deny that it easily tends to exclude non-being as is seen in the above passages quoted from Emerson (e.g., "Being is the vast affirmative, excluding negation"). This excluded non-being seems to function as the boundary that surrounds Being and beings. In this sense we can say that, at least in Emerson, Being and beings are discrete "individuals" separated from and set against non-being or background. The same may hold true of the structures of DNA and amino acids, the two basic elements of physical life. As biochemistry and modern physics tell us, both DNA and amino acids consist of "individual" molecules and these molecules, in turn, are an aggregate of the so-called subatomic particles that "pop out" of the void, or to use the terminology of quantum theory, of a field of energy. Thus it can be said that subatomic particles are the prototypes of beings, and that the void or the field of energy surrounding them corresponds to non-being.
Here is illustrated a close connection between physical life and beings (and Being) in Emerson's world view.

At the same time, however, we should note that subatomic particles (beings) come out of the vacuum (non-being) and vanish again into it. In this sense beings are dependent on non-being, or rather Non-being. And presumably this may be the reason, hidden even to Chuang Tzu himself, why he esteems Non-being or 无 (Nothingness) so highly. For instance, he writes, "In the Great Beginning, there was nonbeing; there was no being, no name. Out of it arose One; there was One, but it had no form. Things got hold of it and came to life..." (ch. 12, 131) "泰初有無,無有無名一之生,有一而未形,物得以生." For Chuang Tzu, life comes not from being, but from non-being, or rather Non-being. However, as the supreme Being ultimately transcends the opposition between being and non-being, so does Chuang Tzu's absolute Non-being go beyond both being and non-being.

The following quotation will serve as a clue to understanding this:

There is a beginning. There is a not yet beginning to be a beginning. There is a not yet beginning to be a not yet beginning to be a beginning. There is being. There is nonbeing. There is a not yet beginning to be nonbeing. There is a not yet beginning to be a not yet beginning to be nonbeing. Suddenly there is nonbeing. But I do not know, when it comes to nonbeing, which is really being and which is nonbeing. Now I have just said something. But I don't know whether what I have said has really said something or whether it hasn't said something. (ch. 2, 43)
In the first passage quoted above, Chuang Tzu says, presumably for the sake of convenience and following the conventional way of argument, that there is non-being in the beginning. But this is a contradiction, for real non-being simply cannot exist and true beginning must be beginningless. Therefore he says in the second passage that after all he does not not know whether non-being really exists or not, or whether what he has said really means something (being) or nothing (another being). This shows that the true Non-being of Chuang Tzu is the boundary between being and non-being, between something and nothing. As we saw at the end of the previous chapter, Non-being is the Great Boundary, Chaos, or Wu (Nothingness). Here is a sharp contrast between Emerson's notion of life which is directed toward Logos and Being, and that of Chuang Tzu which is based on Chaos and Non-being.

This difference seems to be reflected in their attitudes toward will, which is closely connected with anthropocentrism. As we have seen above, Emerson's concept of life can be compared to that of quanta (packets of energy) that come out of and vanish into the physical field. Just as quanta are always exposed to the possibility of being
swallowed up by the void of the physical field, life (being)
is constantly confronted with the danger of being drowned in
the abyss of non-being (death or chaos). From here arises
the will to overcome the threat of chaos. We can detect
this tendency in Emerson's notion of will. For example, to
repeat the passage quoted earlier (p. 93), Emerson says, "In
a virtuous action I properly am; in a virtuous act I add to
the world; I plant into deserts conquered from Chaos and
Nothing and see the darkness receding on the limits of the
horizon" ("Compensation," II, 117). Besides this example, we
come across many passages with a similar tone: "I say to the
Universe, Mighty one! thou art not my mother; return to
chaos, if thou wilt, I shall still exist. I live. If I owe
my being, it is to a destiny greater than thine" (Journal,
December 21, 1823); "But every jet of chaos which threatens
to exterminate us is convertible by intellect into wholesome
force. Fate in unpenetrated causes" ("Fate," VI, 35); "So
much only of life as I know by experience, so much of the
wilderness have I vanquished and planted, or so far have I
extended my being, my dominion" ("The American Scholar," I,
96); and "And we are now men . . . and not minors and inva-
lids . . . but guides, redeemers and benefactors, obeying
the Almighty effort and advancing on Chaos and the Dark"
("Self-Reliance," II, 49). From these passages we can safely
infer that in Emerson life is a will to subdue the chaotic,
wild gushing of Nature (or Fate). It is a domination of
being over non-being, life over death, and order (logos) over disorder (chaos).

Emerson's ideas of this kind on life and will naturally lead us to his anthropocentrism, which has been touched upon in the last chapter (cf. p. 65). For Emerson, man seems to be a typical "being" as the expression "human beings" indicates. According to him, human beings are directly connected to the Supreme Being in the ideal world through Logos, i.e., the spirit, soul, intellect, reason, etc. Therefore "life" means particularly human life. And needless to say, the most prominent feature of human life is civilization, which is man's cultivation, taming, and domination of wild Nature which includes disease, death, madness, natural calamities, etc. Emerson shows a strong inclination toward this kind of civilization. This has already been mentioned at several points throughout this thesis, and especially in the passages just quoted above, but to illustrate the point further, we have the following examples:

The exercise of the Will, or the lesson of power, is taught in every event. From the child's successive possession of his several senses up to the hour when he saith, "Thy will be done!" he is learning the secret that he can reduce under his will, not only particular events but great classes, nay, the whole series of events, and so conform all facts to his character. Nature is thoroughly mediate. It is made to serve. . . . It offers all its kingdoms to man as the raw material which he may mould into what is useful. . . . One after another his victorious thought comes up with and reduces all things, until the world becomes at last
only a realized will, — the double of the man.
(Nature, I, 45-46)

A correspondent revolution in things will attend the influx of the spirit. So fast will disagreeable appearances, swine, spiders, snakes, pests, mad-houses, prisons, enemies, vanish; they are temporary and shall be no more seen. The sordor and filths of nature, the sun shall dry up and the wind exhale. . . . The kingdom of man over nature, which cometh not with observation, — a dominion such as now is beyond his dream of God, — he shall enter without more wonder than the blind man feels who is gradually restored to perfect sight.
(Ibid., 79-80)

The annual slaughter from typhus far exceeds that of war; but right drainage destroys typhus. The plague in the sea-service from scurvy is healed by lemon juice and other diets portable or procurable; the depopulation by cholera and small-pox is ended by drainage and vaccination; and every other pest is not less in the chain of cause and effect, and may be fought off. And whilst art draws out the venom, it commonly extorts some benefit from the vanquished enemy. The mischievous torrent is taught to drudge for man; the wild beast he makes useful for food, or dress, or labor; the chemic explosions are controlled like his watch. These are now the steeds on which he rides.
("Fate," VI, 36-37)

He [man] looks like a piece of luck, but is a piece of causation; the mosaic, angulated and ground to fit into the gap he fills. Hence in each town there is some man who is, in his brain and performance, an explanation of the tillage, production, factories, banks, churches, ways of living and society of that town. . . . Each of these men, if they were transparent, would seem to you not so much men as walking cities, and wherever you put them they would build one.
(Ibid., 45)

Thus it is clear that in Emerson order, life, will anthropocentrism and civilization are concepts inseparably linked to each other. They are connatural and subsumed in the notion of Logos.

At the same time, however, as is always the case with
Emerson, there are some elements which seem to contradict what we have just seen as his notion of will and anthropocentrism. Here let us briefly examine these elements and see whether or not they fit in with the conclusions reached above. In the first place, Emerson sometimes appears to negate the human will. This is seen in such statements as: "If in the least particular one could derange the order of nature, — who would accept the gift of life?" ("Fate," VI, 51), and "... I say that the power of Nature predominates over the human will in all works of even the fine arts, in all that respects their material and external circumstances" ("Art," VII, 50-51). At first glance, he seems to be negating the human will and praising the necessities of Nature or Fate. But this seeming contradiction can be explained if we remember that in Emerson there are two kinds of Nature: the upper-case Nature (the Spirit, Reason, Soul), and the lower-case Nature (matter), and when he glorifies Nature, it is always the upper-case Nature. What he calls the "human will" here, then, seems to be the lowly, brutal egoism that belongs to the lower-case Nature. This is clear in the following passages: "So much as we can shove aside our egotism, our prejudice and will, and bring the onmiscience of reason upon the subject before us, so perfect is the work" ("Art," VII, 52); "In like manner our moral nature is vitiated by any interference of our will" ("Spiritual Laws," II, 127); and "... a higher law than that of our will regulates events."
... We need only obey. There is guidance for each of us, and by lowly listening we shall hear the right word" (Ibid., 132).

It seems that the human will which Emerson is denying here is that which is cut off from spirituality. This kind of will, which is in fact no other than animal instinct, must be discarded in order to receive a higher will from the ideal world — this seems to be his point.

The same distinction between spirituality and brutal Nature might be useful in explaining his non-anthropocentric remarks such as: "You have just dined, and however scrupulously the slaughter-house is concealed in the graceful distance of miles, there is complicity — expensive races — race living at the expense of race" ("Fate," VI, 12-13), and "Let us build altars to the Beautiful Necessity, which secures that all is made of one piece; that plaintiff and defendant, friend and enemy, animal and plant, food and eater are of one kind" (Ibid., 51). Here again he seems to be contradicting his anthropocentric and civilization-oriented attitude seen in the passages quoted earlier. The key to this problem seems to lie in the words "the Beautiful Necessity" in the last passage. According to Emerson, Nature, however chaotic it may seem, is basically governed by this Beautiful Necessity which is the law of the Spirit. As we have seen in the previous chapter, he maintains that human beings embody this law and thus can control the outside
phenomena or fate at their will. In fact, for him phenomena are nothing but the projection of what is inside the human mind. Hence his remarks that "all is made one piece" and "Fate then is a name for facts not yet passed under the fire of thought; for causes which are unpenetrated" ("Fate," VI, 35). There is very little distance between this kind of view on fate and Emerson's anthropocentrism mentioned above. In connection with this we should also note what he writes in his journal for April 7 (?), 1840: "In all my lectures, I have taught one doctrine, namely, the infinitude of the private man." Thus we can say that although Emerson sometimes appears to be denying the will and power of human beings he is always faithful to his anthropocentrism.

In contrast to this, Chuang Tzu employs a negative approach to the human will and anthropocentrism. This point has already been discussed in Chapter II (cf. pp. 66, 76), but there still remains room for further discussion, especially from the viewpoint of life, death, and civilization. The following passages will illustrate this point further:

The True Man of ancient times knew nothing of loving life, knew nothing of hating death. He emerged without delight; he went back in without a fuss. He came briskly, he went briskly, and that was all. He didn't forget where he began; he didn't try to find out where he would end. He received something and took pleasure in it; he forgot about it and handed it back again. This is what I call not using the mind to repel the Way, not using man to help out Heaven. This is what I call the True Man. (ch. 6, 78)
This total negation of the human will seems to be reflected in Chuang Tzu's attitude toward anthropocentrism. He writes:

You have had the audacity to take on human form and you are delighted. But the human form has ten thousand changes that never come to an end. Your joys, then, must be uncountable. Therefore, the sage wanders in the realm where things cannot get away from him, and all are preserved. He delights in early death; he delights in old age; he delights in the beginning; he delights in the end. If he can serve as a model for men, how much more so that which the ten thousand things are tied to and all changes alike wait upon! (ch. 6, 81)

and:

If a man sleeps in a damp place, his back aches and he ends up half paralyzed, but is this true of a loach? If he lives in a tree, he is terrified and shakes with fright, but is this true of a monkey? Of these three creatures, then, which one knows the proper place to live? Men eat the flesh of grass-fed and grain-fed animals, deer eat grass, centipedes find snakes tasty, and hawks and falcons relish mice. Of these four, which knows how food ought to taste? Monkeys pair with monkeys, deer go out with deer, and fish play around with fish. Men claim that Mao-ch'iang and Lady Li were beautiful, but if fish saw them they would dive to the bottom of the stream, if birds saw them they would fly away, and if deer saw them they would break into a run. Of these four, which knows how to fix the standard of beauty for the world? (ch. 2, 45-46)
When Chuang Tzu was about to die, his disciples expressed a desire to give him a sumptuous burial. Chuang Tzu said, "I will have heaven and earth for my coffin and coffin shell, the sun and moon for my pair of jade discs, the stars and constellations for my pearls and beads, and the ten thousand things for my parting gifts. The furnishings for my funeral are already prepared — what is there to add?"

"But we're afraid the crows and kites will eat you, Master!" said his disciples.

Chuang Tzu said, "Above ground I'll be eaten by crows and kites, below ground I'll be eaten by mole crickets and ants. Wouldn't it be rather bigoted to deprive one group in order to supply the other?"

It seems that for Chuang Tzu life is not necessarily restricted to human life, it includes every living thing in the world. Not only does it include all the creatures on the earth, but also what is normally thought to be inanimate matter. Chuang Tzu does not make value judgments concerning life and death. Human life is only a part of the great cycle of Nature, the great flow of Tao (Chaos) that embraces...
both life and death. The following quotation seems to illustrate this point:

Chuang Tzu's wife died. When Hui Tzu went to convey his condolences, he found Chuang Tzu sitting with his legs sprawled out, pounding on a tub and singing. "You lived with her, she brought up your children and grew old," said Hui Tzu. "It should be enough simply not to weep at her death. But pounding on a tub and singing — this is going too far, isn't it?"

Chuang Tzu said, "You're wrong. When she first died, do you think I didn't grieve like anyone else? But I looked back to her beginning and the time before she was born. Not only the time before she was born, but the time before she had a body. Not only the time before she had a body, but the time before she had a spirit. In the midst of the jumble of wonder and mystery a change took place and she had a spirit. Another change and she had a body. Another change and she was born. Now there's been another change and she's dead. It's just like the progression of the four seasons, spring, summer, fall, winter.

"Now she's going to lie down peacefully in a vast room. If I were to follow after her bawling and sobbing, it would show that I don't understand anything about fate. So I stopped."

(ch. 18, 191-192)

Another aspect which naturally results from this kind
of attitude toward the human will, life, and death is a considerable degree of doubt concerning the progress of culture and civilization. This can be surmised from his criticism of Confucianism, which tends to ignore Nature and is completely occupied with the advancement of humanism and civilization. Civilization has an intrinsic predilection for the domination and exploitation of Nature by human beings. It is essentially based on anthropocentrism. Civilization declares that it will tame and put into order the dangerous chaos of primitive Nature, both inside and outside human beings, by means of human will and reason, and that this will bring about the true happiness of human kind. However, this kind of "idealistic" approach to Nature does not always work. It is even possible that because of the idealistic and anthropocentric nature and attitude of civilization the true order and harmony of Nature are disturbed and lost, thus making the ring-leader of the disturbance extremely unhappy. One glance at human history will prove this. Environmental disruption is one of the miseries brought about by the pride of human civilization. We can interpret the following story from Chuang Tzu in this light:

The Yellow Emperor had ruled as Son of Heaven for nineteen years and his commands were heeded throughout the world, when he heard that Master Kuang Ch'eng was living on top of the Mountain of Emptiness and Identity. He therefore went to visit him. "I have heard that you, Sir, have mastered the Perfect Way. May I venture to ask about the essence of the Perfect Way?" he said. "I would like to get hold of the essence of Heaven and earth
and use it to aid the five grains and to nourish the common people. I would also like to control the yin and yang in order to insure the growth of all living things. How may this be done?"

Master Kuang Ch'eng said, "What you say you want to learn about pertains to the true substance of things, but what you say you want to control pertains to things in their divided state. Ever since you began to govern the world, rain falls before the cloud vapors have even gathered, the plants and trees shed their leaves before they have even turned yellow, and the light of the sun and moon grows more and more sickly. Shallow and vapid, with the mind of a prattling knave — what good would it do to tell you about the Perfect Way!"

(ch. 11, 118-119)

Reading this story, we have to say that Chuang Tzu was well aware of the dangerous aspects of science and civilization more than two thousand years ago.

Through the above examination of Emerson's and Chuang Tzu's notions of order, life, will, and anthropocentrism, it can be said that Emerson's notion of order and life is essentially anthropocentric (i.e., Logocentric), while that of Chuang Tzu is Chaos-centered. This difference seems to come from the two different ways of dealing with the
apparently contradictory nature of life which seems to be a
typical example of so-called double-bind situations.

In order to clarify this point, we need to review the
concept of entropy and its relation to life. In his book on
cybernetics, A. M. Kondratov quotes N. Wiener's remarks on
life: "Life contradicts the other parts of the universe."  When Wiener said this he must have had in mind the notion of
entropy, the second law of thermodynamics. Simply stated,
entropy is a measurement of disorder. This law tells us
that the universe is, as a whole, tending toward a state of
disorder,  because a state of chaos is statistically much
more probably than that of order. As we have seen earlier,
DNA and amino acids, the two bases of physical life, are a
kind of order, and according to biochemistry, the first
formation of the systematic combination of these basic
elements of life is a phenomenon of such extremely small
probability that we can literally call it a miracle.  It
appears to be against the law of entropy.  Therefore, it
is quite understandable for Wiener to say that life contra-
dicts the rest of the universe. "Life" is on the side of
order, while the rest of the world is governed by the law of
entropy, namely, disorder.

In other words, life is a self-negation of the
universe. And this seems to be the fundamental reason why
life is caught in the predicament and paradox of a double
bind. The individual organism must take in other living
organisms to preserve its own life. To preserve life, then, means to destroy life. To maintain order is to destroy order. The universe orders life to live and to kill (i.e., to die) at once. This seems to be the way the universe is made. It is self-contradictory and puts one into the predicament of a double bind. Needless to say, human existence is not an exception. It seems that whatever we may do or say automatically leads us to self-contradiction. Chuang Tzu's logical inconsistency mentioned in the previous chapter (cf. p. 67) seems to be one example of this. As for Emerson, he seems to have been aware of this but, as we saw earlier, he flatly ignores it.

Be that as it may, there still remains the question of how to reconcile individual life with life as a whole, human beings with the rest of the universe (i.e., Nature), order (negative entropy) with disorder (entropy), "logos" with "chaos." These problems cannot easily be dismissed with such remarks as "a foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds" ("Self-Reliance," II, 58). They are literally a matter of life and death. And what is worse, they are based on an insoluble double-bind situation.

This is probably the reason why, in spite of their disdain for logical inconsistencies, both Emerson and Chuang Tzu employed numerous words in their effort to explain something. This something seems to be the way to freedom, to deliverance from this double bind. Their problem is one
and the same, but, as we have seen above, their answers differ from each other: in the case of Emerson, a strong anthropocentric will dominates Nature or Fate; in Chuang Tzu there is a complete abandonment of the human will and a total immersion in Nature.

Let us further examine the differences in their approach to the double-bind situation of human existence. We can see how Emerson faces this predicament in the following passage from his "Fate":

One key, one solution to the mysteries of human condition, one solution to the old knots of fate, freedom, and foreknowledge, exists; the propounding, namely of the double consciousness. A man must ride alternately on the horses of his private and his public nature, as the equestrians in the circus throw themselves nimbly from horse to horse, or plant one foot on the back of one and the other foot on the back of the other. So when a man is the victim of his fate, has sciatica in his loins and cramp in his mind; a club-foot and a club in his wit; a sour face and a selfish temper; a strut in his gait and a conceit in his affection; or is ground to powder by the vice of his race; — he is to rally on his relation to the Universe, which his ruin benefits. Leaving the daemon who suffers, he is to take sides with the Deity who secures universal benefit by his pain. (VI, 49-50)

Emerson's notion of the "double consciousness" in this passage reminds us of Chuang Tzu's ling hsing 行行 (walking two roads). But a careful reading of the quotation will reveal that Emerson's "double consciousness" is essentially dualistic. He vacillates between two polarities: the individual and the whole. This dualism seems to be affecting the latter part of the above passage which, at first glance, carries exactly the same implication as Chuang Tzu's attitude
toward will. Emerson presupposes the difference between the daemon and the Deity and places importance on the latter. Here he is discriminating between good and evil. This becomes more obvious in the paragraph that follows immediately after the one just quoted:

To offset the drag of temperament and race, which pulls down, learn this lesson, namely that by the cunning co-presence of two elements which is throughout nature, whatever lames or paralyzes you draws in with it the divinity, in some form, to repay. A good intention clothes itself with sudden power. When a god wishes to ride, any chip or pebble will bud and shoot out winged feet and serve him for a horse. (VI, 50)

In this passage we can detect a will to overpower evil by the "good intention" of the divine. Considering Emerson's belief in the divinity of human beings, it is not very difficult to replace "a god" in the last sentence of this passage with "man." From here arises his anthropocentrism which we have examined earlier. Thus we can say that the "double consciousness" of Emerson does not really solve the double bind underlying the problem of life — the dilemma between the individual and the whole, between human beings and the universe (Nature). It seems that Emerson attempts to overcome this problem by identifying the individual with the whole, man with Nature, but through his anthropocentric spiritualism he creates another Nature that confronts and menaces human life. (Thus he has another double bind.) He regards this Nature as chaotic, evil, and dangerous, and so it must be subjugated and put into order by divine Reason
(Logos, the eternal Good) that works through human beings. This seems to be Emerson's "solution" of the double-bind situation of human existence. However, it is clear that as long as he maintains a dualistic viewpoint he will keep on creating an infinite series of double binds. In other words, by proposing "double consciousness" Emerson endlessly oscillates between the individual and the whole, between human life and other living things, between order and disorder, between "life" and "death," and between "logos" and "chaos" in a vain attempt to have the former dominate the latter in these groups of opposite pairs.

Chuang Tzu, on the other hand, seems to take quite the opposite attitude toward the double-bind condition in which human beings are caught. As has been pointed out so far, Chuang Tzu does not particularly condemn entropy (disorder) as represented by death, deformity, disease, insanity, evil, darkness, and non-being. According to Chuang Tzu, these are not antagonistic so much as complementary to negative entropy (order) which includes life, symmetry, health, sanity, good, light, and being. The following is the first half of a paragraph from the Chuang Tzu in which he discusses this point:

"everything has its "that," everything has its "this." From the point of view of "that" you cannot see it, but through understanding you can know it. So I say, "that" comes out of "this" and "this" depends on "that" — which is to say that "this" and "that" give birth to each other. But where there is birth there must be death; where there is death there must be birth. Where there is acceptability there must be unacceptability; where
there is unacceptability there must be acceptability. Where there is recognition of right there must be recognition of wrong; where there is recognition of wrong there must be recognition of right. Therefore the sage does not proceed in such a way, but illuminates all in the light of Heaven.16
(ch. 2, 39-40)

物無非彼物無非是自彼則不見自知則知之故曰彼出於是是亦因彼彼是方生之說也。雖然方生方死方生方死方生方不可方不可方不可方不可方因是因非因是因是以聖人不由而照之于天

Life and death are opposite and even contradictory when looked at from the viewpoint of formal logic, i.e., the either/or type of logic. However, at the level of the both/and type of logic the opposition and contradiction between the two can be transcended without eliminating either one of the two contradictory terms. Chuang Tzu calls this illuminating "all in the light of Heaven" which is nothing but Nature or Chaos. As we have already seen, Chaos (Hun-tun) is the Boundary or Void that exists (and does not exist) between any given opposite terms. This Boundary seems to be expressed as a hinge (樞) or a socket (環) in the latter half of the paragraph just quoted above:

He [the sage] too recognizes a "this," but a "this" which is also "that," a "that" which is also "this." His "that" has both a right and a wrong in it; his "this" too has both a right and a wrong in it. So, in fact, does he still have a "this" and "that"? Or does he in fact no longer have a "this" and "that"? A state in which "this" and "that" no longer find their opposites is called the hinge of the Way. When the hinge is fitted into the socket, it can respond endlessly. Its right then is a single endlessness and its wrong too is a single
endlessness. So, I say, the best thing to use is clarity. (ch. 2, 40)

Thus it can be said that Chuang Tzu's way to overcome the problem of the double bind of life and death is to have recourse in the Boundary (Chaos, Non-being) between such pairs as life and death, being and non-being, the individual and the whole, human beings and Nature, order and disorder, "logos" and "chaos," etc. Here seems to be one major difference between Emerson and Chuang Tzu. In facing the double-bind situation, Emerson bases his ideas on Being (Logos) which is supposed to include both being (life) and non-being (death) yet tends to alienate and dominate non-being (the alienated non-being becomes evil, death, disorder, boundaries, etc.); Chuang Tzu, on the other hand, is oriented to Chaos (Non-being) which is the Boundary and therefore subsumes within itself both being and non-being, life and death, order and disorder, human beings and the rest of the world, etc. 17

In this chapter we have examined Emerson's and Chuang Tzu's notions of order and life from several viewpoints such as Logos, Chaos, Being, Non-being, will, anthropocentrism,
and double binds. Through these examinations we have shown that for Emerson life is a sort of order (which is quite close to the usual sense of the term) and so is closely allied, both spiritually and physically, with the notion of Logos which in turn has an inseparable relationship with Being, will, and anthropocentrism. Life, particularly that of human beings, is a will to overcome death which, in Emerson, is expressed through various terms such as chaos (disorder), darkness, evil, fate, disease, insanity, etc. From here arises Emerson's anthropocentrism which is another name for Logocentrism. At the same time, however, this gives rise to an unsolvable problem of the double-bind situation — the dilemma between life and death, order and disorder, each and all, man and Nature, "logos" and "chaos," etc. As a solution for this predicament Emerson proposes the "double consciousness" which, however, is essentially based on the either/or type of logic, and thus naturally leads him to the very cause of the double-bind situation, namely, the human will (logos) to overcome death and non-being (chaos). In other words, Logos alienates Chaos (Non-being) and makes it into the boundary between every conceivable pair of opposites. In this way Emerson endlessly vacillates between logos and chaos, life and death, order and disorder, being and non-being, etc.

On the other hand, Chuang Tzu's approach is based on the both/and type of logic. He does not strictly separate
life from death, order from disorder, being from non-being, "logos" from "chaos." He seems to see how the terms of these pairs are relative and dependent on each other. This idea seems to be reflected in his notions of ch'i and hsing, both of which are a harmonious and organic combination of life and death, energy and matter, spirit and body. Needless to say, the concepts of ch'i and hsing are included in Tao or Hun-tun (Chaos) which is the Boundary. By identifying himself with the boundaries among things, Chuang Tzu tries to restore the alienated Boundary (Chaos) and thus transcend the insoluble question of the double bind. In the process of this transcendence, the human will to alienate and, if possible, eliminate death and disorder is naturally considered to be unnecessary and even harmful. Hence his doubts about the anthropocentrism and civilization which inevitably result from the human will to overcome death and non-being. In Chuang Tzu the human will, both of the individual and of the whole, must be emptied in order that one can tune into the great flow of Life, of Chaos, which includes both life and death. In this way one can preserve both one's individual life and the Life of the universe. This seems to be Chuang Tzu's method of dealing with the predicament of the double bind.
NOTES TO CHAPTER III

In this thesis we shall use DNA theory, and for that matter other scientific theories, as a convenient means of interpreting and explaining Emerson's and Chuang Tzu's notion of life and order. This does not necessarily imply that we take this and other theories as fact with absolute validity and reality. It is almost a truism that a certain scientific theory is not totally free from its hypothetical nature and thus is quite often superseded by other new theories with a deeper and broader perspective. However, at least for the present, DNA theory seems to have a validity to the extent that man can actually control mutations by using it. According to David Suzuki, a Canadian geneticist, "In humans, genetic and medical techniques already exist that can be used to detect and in some instances rectify undesirable characteristics in unborn children" (Dennis Bell, "Talking to... Dr. Quirks and Quarks," The Province, 26 November 1977, p. 5, col. 6). Cf. also J. F. Danielli, "Artificial Synthesis of New Life Forms," in C. C. Price, ed., Synthesis of Life (Stroudsburg, 1974), pp. 287-291.

2 Wilden, System and Structure, p. 397.


4 Cf. Fukunaga, Sōshi: Gaihen (草子外篇) (Tokyo, 1970), pp. 4-5; Mori, Jōdai yori kandai ni itaru seimeikan no tenkai (The Development of the Concepts of Human Nature and Destiny from the Beginning to the Han Dynasty), p. 92.

5 In connection with this we should note the following passage from Lieh Tzu, another Taoist text whose tenets have much in common with those of Chuang Tzu: "My body is one with the mind, the mind with ch'i [matter-energy, vital force], ch'i with shen [spirit], shen with wu [nothingness]" (ch. 4). "我體是心, 心是形貎, 形貎是無" (列子, 神怪第四). Wu in this passage no doubt corresponds to Tao or Hun-tun.


7 Cf. also Hesiod, Theogony, 118-125; Ovid, Metamorphoses, I, 1-87; Milton, Paradise Lost, I, 9-22; Hastings, Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, III, 363.
Cf. Emerson's following remarks on reason, which seems to be closely connected with the notion of being: "The authority of Reason cannot be separated from its vision. They are not two acts, but one. The sight commands, & the command sees" (journal for June, 1835).


Cf. the following passage from Parmenides: "And remaining the same in the same place, it [Being] rests by itself and thus remains there fixed; for powerful Necessity holds it in the bonds of a Limit, which constrains it round about, because it is decreed by divine law that Being shall not be without boundary. . . . But since there is a (spatial) Limit, it [Being] is complete on every side, like the mass of a well-rounded sphere, equally balanced from its centre in every direction . . . ." (K. Freeman, tr., Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers [Oxford, 1948], p. 44).

I.e., the yin and yang, being two, already represent a departure from the primal unity of the Way. What Master Kuang Ch'eng is objecting to, of course, is the fact that the Yellow Emperor wishes to "control" them (Watson's note, p. 119).

A. M. Kondratov, Saibanetikkuse nyūmon (Introduction to Cybernetics), tr., Yoshio Akita (Tokyo, 1975), p. 16.

To be more precise, this is not quite correct, for the law of entropy holds true only in a closed system, whereas no one knows whether the universe is closed or open, i.e., finite or infinite. It seems fairly plausible to hypothesize that so-called entropic doom is only one phase of the universe and somewhere unknown to our science there exists a larger law that comprehends both entropy (e.g., so-called death) and negative entropy (e.g., so-called life). The notion of such a law seems to approximate Chuang Tzu's Tao and, to some extent, Emerson's Over-Soul (the Spiritual Law). However, as is the case with Newtonian physics, the law of entropy seems to apply to the universe, at least within a certain framework.

Cf. Monod, ch. 8. Although Monod, who wrote this book in 1970, cannot have been as simplistic as F. R. Japp and du Nouy, who asserted the improbability of life arising from inorganic matter without taking into consideration the chemico-physical laws working among particles and molecules (see M. Gardner, The Ambidextrous Universe [New York and
London, 1964], ch. 15), he may still be open to the same kind of criticism directed toward Japp and du Noüy by many scientists of today who tend to support the idea of the "inevitability of the origin of life" (cf. E. Samuel, Order in Life [Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1972], pp. 261-271; Gardner, ch. 15). However, there seem to be at least two reasons for which Monod's position can be defended: one is that he does not say that the formation of amino acids and DNA out of inanimate matter is improbable (for the former were synthesized by S. L. Miller in 1952, and adenine, one of the four bases of DNA, by C. Ponnamperuma, a Ceylonese biochemist, in 1963), but that how the coupled system of amino acids and DNA, which is virtually a living organism itself, came into being has been unknown until today, and this phenomenon seems to be much more improbable than the formation of DNA or amino acids, because it is considered to be a matter of evolution, which is based on the interaction of chance and the laws of Nature ranging over a long period of time. The other reason, which is closely related to the first, is that even if the coupling system of DNA and amino acids is an inevitable consequence brought about by unknown laws in the universe (which Emerson would ascribe to the Spirit [Logos], and Chuang Tzu to Tao or Chaos), still it appears to be a rare and somewhat miraculous phenomenon, considering the tendency of the universe which is moving, at least for the present, toward a chaotic state, according to the principle of entropy.

Of course, it is not against the law of entropy, because life on earth is supported by the light of the sun which increases the net entropy of the universe as a whole by its combustion. However, as was mentioned in note 14 of this chapter, the phenomenon of "life" seems to be a partial violation of the law of entropy prevalent in the universe. According to E. Samuel, this seeming contradiction raises "the rather uncomfortable problem of explaining how local 'energy sinks' exist in the universe, where coupled reactions can compound the dispersive tendency of other reactions and establish an ordered structure of matter, especially when the system is a dynamic one like the cell" (Samuel, Order in Life, p. 261).

\textsuperscript{15} \textsuperscript{16}_T\textsuperscript{i}en, which for Chuang Tzu means Nature or the Way (Watson's note). Cf. also notes 24 (p. 57) and 25 (p. 104) of this thesis.

\textsuperscript{17} See next page.
An interesting analogy which illustrates this point may be seen in the graph of the function $y = \frac{1}{x}$. As the graph indicates, when $x$ actually has the value of zero, the results are unpredictable. Perhaps because of this, $x$ is not allowed to assume the value zero. Still, it is possible to imagine that $+\infty$ and $-\infty$ meet at the point $x=0$. Mathematicians usually set $y=0$ at $x=0$ to complete the function $y = \frac{1}{x}$ ($x \neq 0$), thereby giving it well-defined values at all points on the $x$-axis. This also suggests that the two extremes (i.e., $+\infty$ and $-\infty$) meet at zero. Zero, the boundary between the positive numbers and the negative numbers, can be compared to (the hinge) or (the socket) in the last passage quoted from Chuang Tzu. We should also note that in the same passage Chuang Tzu writes, "Its right then is a single endlessness and its wrong too is a single endlessness." The two arms of the graph which extend infinitely toward $+\infty$ and $-\infty$ may correspond respectively to the right (a single endlessness) and the wrong (another endlessness), and these by extension to being and non-being, "logos" and "chaos," life and death, etc. These seemingly opposite pairs may indeed meet somewhere, subsumed in Zero, the Boundary, Non-being, Chaos.
CONCLUSION

Through the examination of Emerson's and Chuang Tzu's notions of order we have established that Emerson's concepts of order are rather Logocentric (i.e., dualistic), whereas those of Chuang Tzu are basically Chaos-oriented (i.e., non-dualistic). This difference may be best symbolized in the story of Hun-tun quoted from the Chuang Tzu on page 18 of this thesis. Shu and Hu in this anecdote seem to represent the fundamental aspects of Logos such as consciousness, reason, language, vision (as connected with light), life (spiritual and physical), spirit, law, symmetry, proportion (ratio), harmony, etc., all of which, as we have seen are important elements in Emerson's notion of order.

In the first place they (Shu and Hu) stand outside of Hun-tun (Nature) and look at it from that perspective, thus symbolizing human consciousness as opposed to Hun-tun which has none of the five senses and can, therefore, be a metaphor for the unconscious. Here is the first sign of duality that lies between man as consciousness (subject) and Nature as unconscious matter (object). Then Shu and Hu bore eyes, a mouth, a nose, etc., in the amorphous face of Hun-tun. This would mean their attempt or will to subjugate the seeming chaos and disorder (lawlessness) of material Nature through the ordering power of vision (light) and speech (language). (Here is another duality introduced among the objects of vision and language.) We can see a parallel between this
process and Emerson's attitude toward untamed Nature mentioned earlier: "So much only of life as I know by experience, so much of the wilderness have I vanquished and planted, or so far have I extended my being, my dominion" ("The American Scholar," I, 96). Emerson, as well as Shu and Hu, seems to think that the seeming chaos and wilderness of Hun-tun (Nature) mean death and darkness, and so by imposing a human face (a symbol of Logos) upon Hun-tun he believes that he has succeeded in giving life (light) and order (law) to it.

But his notions of life and order seem to be rather restricted compared with those of Chuang Tzu, which are based on non-dualistic Hun-tun, the matrix of life and order. Moreover, Emerson's concepts of life and order are somewhat mechanical and geometrical as the well-proportioned symmetry of the human face symbolizes. It is true that Emerson expounded the so-called organic theory, which regards art as an organic process of Nature and maintains that an artistic work must develop its own form from within as if it were a seed growing into a tree. However, this theory should also be interpreted in the light of Emerson's Idealism or spiritualism. Needless to say, Nature in his theory means spiritual Nature (natura naturans) and as we have already seen, this spiritual Nature is rather Logocentric (i.e., dualistic, symmetrical, and geometrical). His "organicism," then, seems to be quite different from that of Chuang Tzu, whose notion of Nature is based on Hun-tun which includes
such things as chaos, disease, death, darkness, evil, etc., all of which are rejected by Emerson. Compared with Chuang Tzu's "organicism," Emerson's organic theory is still somewhat geometric and mechanical. It is founded on the either/or type of logic and so it tends to discriminate between life (order) and death (disorder) and choose the former, thus rejecting, alienating, and killing the seemingly chaotic yet vivid and spontaneous life of Hun-tun.

This seems to be what Chuang Tzu fears most, for this would also mean the death of Shu and Hu (human beings), who, according to Chuang Tzu's viewpoint, originate not in the supernatural, ideal world beyond material Nature, but in Hun-tun (Nature) itself. Shu and Hu (human beings) and Hun-tun (Nature) are not two separate things, but the former should be regarded as the embryos in the womb of the latter. However, once they are born of Hun-tun and become conscious of themselves, they try to sever the umbilical cord between Hun-tun (the mother) and themselves (the children). They draw a clear-cut boundary between themselves as human beings and Nature as matter (i.e., mater or mother) and then try to control the latter from without. To repeat the passage quoted from Emerson in the second chapter:

Whilst the man is weak, the earth takes up him. He plants his brain and affections. By and by he will take up the earth, and have his gardens and vineyards in the beautiful order and productiveness of his thought ["Fate," VI, 46].

The earth in this passage could correspond to Nature or
Hun-tun (Tao), which is sometimes expressed as ta k'uai 大塊 (the Great Clod) in the Chuang Tzu (ch. 6). Emerson's Logocentric notion of order tends to bifurcate into man and Nature (Hun-tun) and place the former in the higher position. We saw this kind of bifurcation in Hui Tzu's either/or type of logic, which separates Chuang Tzu (man) from the fish (Nature) in another anecdote mentioned in the second chapter. Emerson, who basically follows the logic of either/or, shows a strong inclination toward an anthropocentric idea in which human beings as the embodiment of Logos stick out from the material Nature (Chaos) to consciously control and order it. Human beings (a typical example of "being") stand out of the Non-being of Hun-tun, just as subatomic particles emerge from the void of energy, which can be a metaphor for Hun-tun. Here is a sharp contrast between Emerson's consciousness-oriented (i.e., anthropocentric) notion of order and that of Chuang Tzu, which has a predilection for immersion in the unconscious of Hun-tun.

This contrast between consciousness and unconsciousness can also be expressed as that between action (will) and non-action (non-will). In his journal for 1835, Emerson writes, "To think is to act," and in "The American Scholar," he further develops this idea:

Action is with the scholar subordinate, but it is essential. . . . Inaction is cowardice. . . . The preamble of thought, the transition through which it passes from the unconscious to the conscious, is action. Only so much do I know, as I have lived [I, 95-96].
A few sentences after this comes the passage quoted above in which Emerson equates experience (consciousness) with man's domination of wild Nature. But the will to dominate Nature (Hun-tun) by human beings inevitably alienates it, for domination presupposes the externalization of the object dominated and, as we saw above, easily brings about the death of Nature (Hun-tun) and, consequently, human beings themselves. In Emerson, alienated Nature seems to appear as non-being, chaos, disorder, disease, death, darkness, evil, insanity, fate, etc. In other words, these states are the voids or holes (a metaphor for boundaries) bored into the face of Hun-tun, which turn out to be enormous and threaten to engulf Shu and Hu (human beings). Here is the predicament of Emerson's notion of will and action. As the concept of the "double consciousness," presumably his final solution to this problem, aptly indicates, he vacillates and oscillates between the material Nature (the unconscious, Chaos) and Logos (consciousness or reason). For Emerson Nature sometimes appears to be real (natura naturans) and sometimes unreal (natura naturata), an illusory and chaotic veil of Maya. When the oscillation between the two becomes greater and gets to its maximum, he breaks through the veil (the boundary) to reach the eternal realm of the Idea (or order) once and for all.

This seems to be a natural consequence of Emerson's notion of order, which is essentially Logocentric and is
based on the either/or type of logic. However, this is, of course, merely a negative aspect of his dualistic notion of order. It has a positive side, too, as will be clarified shortly.

At this stage, however, we need to spend a few more words on the negative elements in Emerson's Logocentrism. For further illustration of this point, let us return to the anecdote of Hun-tun mentioned earlier. As we have seen, Shu and Hu are originally one with Hun-tun. The former are immersed and embedded in the latter. Therefore, their action of boring holes in the face of Hun-tun (which eventually causes death to it) is, in a sense, a self-negation or self-destruction of and by Hun-tun itself. Here seems to lie the fundamental cause of the double binds between such pairs as life and death, order and disorder, etc., discussed in the preceding chapters. This self-negation of Hun-tun (the universe, Nature) can be compared to the structure of the Möbius strip, the half-twisted circular strip with only one side. The twist in the strip may correspond to the self-negating nature of the universe. Because of this twist (or negation) the slayer and the slain, the eater and the eaten, the stealer and the stolen become one and the same. Emerson seems to be aware of this and expresses this kind of idea in his poems and essays such as "Brahma," "Fate," and "Compensation." But at the same time, he has a strong predilection for dualism. He tends to pay attention only to the two sides
of the strip and regards it as an ordinary, straightforward strip without a twist (negation). This means a denial (alienation) of the twist, whose other names are negation, "not," non-being, the boundary. He stands on this side of the boundary where logos, order, law, life and being are to be found and he sees chaos, disorder, death, and non-being on the other side. He has to choose either this side or that, but actually both are one and the same. And this causes him to make a repetitious movement between this side and the other side of the strip. This seems to be the nature of what he calls the "double consciousness" which, as we have seen above, causes him to step over the boundary to the realm of Ideas in the end. This is Emerson's transcendence, which is rather active and is directed outward and upward.

In contrast to this, Chuang Tzu tries to immerse himself in the boundary between the two sides of the strip. By following the boundary of the Möbius strip, which can be seen as a metaphor for Chaos, he transcends the dilemma of the double bind between order and disorder. His transcendence is, so to speak, inward and downward. However, herein seems to lie the danger of his transcendence, for it is easily misunderstood for quietism, an inactive total regression into the womb of Hun-tun. Although such is not the case, as we can see, for instance, in the anecdote of cook Ting quoted at the end of the first chapter, we cannot deny
the fact that Chuang Tzu's notion of order, which is based on the non-dualistic Chaos or Hun-tun (the unconscious) has an element that leads one to licentiousness or to a self-satisfied total seclusion from society, both of which seem to be negative aspects of Hun-tun as the unconscious.

On the other hand, Emerson's Logocentric (i.e., dualistic) notion of order, which is basically consciousness-and action-oriented and thus tends to lead one to an endless oscillation between any two opposite pairs or else to an idealistic flight into the noumenal world, may merely be a negative side of the coin. Needless to say, it must also have a positive aspect. This may be illustrated through the two aspects of the Möbius strip: on one level this side of the strip is completely different and distinguishable from the other side; on another level the two sides are one and the same. Generally speaking, Emerson seems to take the former view, while Chuang Tzu takes the latter. However, both views are valid and both are indispensable as they constitute the entirety of the Möbius strip, namely, the universe. Because of the twist (i.e., self-negation) in the universe the two viewpoints may appear to be contradictory, but in reality they are complementary.

The same can be said of the parable mentioned earlier of Hun-tun and the "participation mystique" between Chuang Tzu and the fish. Hun-tun (the unconscious) would not be able to realize its own value without the consciousness
(Logos) of Shu and Hu, just as Chuang Tzu would not be able to recognize the pleasure of the fish without first separating himself from it. We are reminded here of Emerson's remarks concerning the joy he experiences in his "participation mystique" with Nature: "Yet it is certain that the power to produce this delight does not reside in nature, but in man, or in a harmony of both" (*Nature*, I, 16). Therefore, from the vantage point of a wider perspective, we can say that BOTH either/or AND both/and are necessary, BOTH Logos AND Chaos, BOTH Emerson AND Chuang Tzu are required to complete the universe.
NOTES TO CONCLUSION

1 Cf. note 8 to Chapter III of this thesis.


Bell, Dennis. "Talking to . . . Dr. Quirks and Quarks." The Province, 26 November 1977, p. 5.


