UBC Theses and Dissertations

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UBC Theses and Dissertations

Ecology and freedom Battersby, Mark E. 1978

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ECOLOGY AND FREEDOM by MARK E. • BATTERSBY B.A. (Honours), New York U n i v e r s i t y , 1967  A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE  REQUIREMENTS EOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY  i n  THE  FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY  We accept t h i s t h e s i s as conforming to the r e q u i r e d s t a n d a r d  THE  UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA June, 19 7 8  ©  Mark E. B a t t e r s b y  In p r e s e n t i n g t h i s  thesis  in p a r t i a l  f u l f i l m e n t o f the requirements f o r  an advanced degree at the U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, the L i b r a r y s h a l l I  f u r t h e r agree  make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e  that permission  I agree  that  f o r r e f e r e n c e and study.  f o r e x t e n s i v e copying o f t h i s  thesis  f o r s c h o l a r l y purposes may be g r a n t e d by the Head o f my Department o r by h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . of  this  written  thesis  It  i s u n d e r s t o o d that c o p y i n g o r p u b l i c a t i o n  for financial  gain s h a l l  not be allowed without my  permission.  MARK E. BATTERSBY  Department o f  PHILOSOPHY  The U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h  2075 Wesbrook Place Vancouver, Canada V6T 1W5  Columbia  (ii)  •  ABSTRACT  The s o - c a l l e d e c o l o g i c a l c r i s i s  consists  o f the  twin problems o f r e s o u r c e e x h a u s t i o n and p o l l u t i o n .  The  problems a r e l a r g e l y t h e r e s u l t o f h i g h and i n c r e a s i n g of  consumption and p r o d u c t i o n , and do n o t l e n d  a technological  solution.  be imposed t o p r o t e c t promise c u r t a i l m e n t lifestyle.  Extensive p o l i t i c a l  controls  t h e environment, b u t t h e s e  must  controls  o f t r a d i t i o n a l freedoms o f p r o p e r t y and  o f t h e s o c i a l need f o r c o n t r o l  decisions  themselves t o  But Rousseau has s u g g e s t e d a s o l u t i o n  Participatory  levels  democracy  t o t h e problem  and freedom: p a r t i c i p a t o r y  a c h i e v e s freedom and c o n t r o l  democracy.  because  a r e a r r i v e d a t c o l l e c t i v e l y and through p e r s u a s i o n ,  m i n i m i z i n g the need f o r c o e r c i v e participant  control,  and g i v i n g each  a sense o f i d e n t i f i c a t i o n w i t h t h e d e c i s i o n  making  process. P a r t i c i p a t i o n a l s o accords with our understanding o f human n a t u r e once we f r e e o u r s e l v e s o f t h e m i s l e a d i n g p s y c h o l o g i e s o f Hobbes and Adam Smith. r e f u t a t i o n o f Hobbes theory that this  1  Indeed B i s h o p B u t l e r ,  egoism, has a l s o s u g g e s t e d the a l t e r n a t i v e  p e o p l e are s o c i a l l y m o t i v a t e d .  analysis  John Adams extended  t o show t h e fundamental r o l e t h a t  f o r p u b l i c esteem p l a y s i n p o l i t i c a l b e h a v i o r . the  famous f o r h i s  the human need People need  e x p e r i e n c e o f c i t i z e n s h i p f o r t h e i r s e l f esteem, and  participation utilizes public  good.  t h i s need t o encourage d e d i c a t i o n  t o the  (iii)  Environmental p r o t e c t i o n good and s h o u l d , t h e r e f o r e ,  receive  i s a paradigm p u b l i c adequate s u p p o r t i n a  society with extensive p a r t i c i p a t i o n . and  In a d d i t i o n , p a r t i c i p a t i o n  p u b l i c work p r o v i d e s a t i s f y i n g a l t e r n a t i v e s t o p r i v a t e  consumption.  Widespread p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n i n d u s t r y  practical possibility  as has been shown by v a r i o u s  isa experiments  i n i n d u s t r i a l democracy and can a l s o work a t a n a t i o n w i d e as has been demonstrated i n Y u g o s l a v i a .  In a d d i t i o n  level  there are  o t h e r models f o r w i d e s p r e a d p a r t i c i p a t i o n such as t h a t o f the G u i l d S o c i a l i s t s and F r e d e r i c  Thayer.  (iv)  TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Introduction  1  Chapter I.  The Tragedy o f the Commons  13  II.  The Concept o f P a r t i c i p a t i o n  3-3/  I I I . Human Nature and S o c i a l Needs P o l i t i c a l Psychology  62  IV.  John Adams: An A l t e r n a t i v e  . 95  V.  P a r t i c i p a t i o n and Ecology  109  VI.  Experiments i n P a r t i c i p a t i o n s  12 3  V I I . Large S c a l e P a r t i c i p a t i o n  147  VIII. Conclusion  177  IX.  186  Bibliography  (v)  ACKNOWLEDGEMENT  Primary acknowledgement f o r a s s i s t a n c e and encouragement  must be given t o my w i f e Diana Davidson  without whom t h i s t h e s i s would never have been  started  or f i n i s h e d . I a l s o received a s s i s t a n c e and advice from my t h e s i s A d v i s o r , D.G. Brown and from the members o f my committee E a r l W i n k l e r and Ed Levy.  Thanks a l s o t o  Andrew Levine f o r h i s h e l p i n g me understand Rousseau and to E l r i d g e Rand f o r i n t r o d u c i n g t o the problem o f p a r t i cipation.  1  I N T R O D U C T I O N  The  ecology imperative  i s becoming c l e a r .  As more and more  data accumulates i t becomes i n c r e a s i n g l y obvious t h a t a r a d i c a l change i n the North American l i f e s t y l e i s necessary.  The e n v i r o n -  ment can no longer be expected to support the c u r r e n t r a t e s o f consumption, resource u t i l i z a t i o n  and p o l l u t i o n .  The r i c h  nations  cannot expect to continue t o . l i v e a t t h i s s c a l e , n o r can the poor nations  expect t o a t t a i n i t .  I t i s not enough t h a t we be t e c h n i -  c a l l y s o p h i s t i c a t e d , we must a l s o be r e s t r a i n e d . claims  are not u n i f o r m l y  While such  supported by a l l engaged i n r e s e a r c h i n  ecology, they have r e c e i v e d s u f f i c i e n t support from e c o l o g i s t s to have earned f o r i t the name "subversive  science".  In the body o f my t h e s i s , I take t h i s e c o l o g i c a l  imperative  f o r granted and s e t about f i n d i n g the most d e s i r a b l e manner o f d e a l i n g with i t s p o l i t i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s .  I assume t h a t we must  accept a l i f e s t y l e f a r l e s s dependent on an abundance o f p r i v a t e consumer goods f o r i t s s a t i s f a c t i o n s .  While such an assumption  i s w i d e l y supported, i t has a l s o been q u e s t i o n e d , and i t seems appropriate  i n my i n t r o d u c t i o n t o e x p l a i n why I ignore  these  objections. Those who do not share t h i s assumption have been c a l l e d " t e c h n o l o g i c a l o p t i m i s t s " because o f t h e i r f a i t h t h a t  there  e x i s t s , or w i l l e x i s t , t e c h n o l o g i c a l l y f e a s i b l e s o l u t i o n s to problems such as p o l l u t i o n and the exhaustion o f f o s s i l f u e l s . * The - o p t i m i s t s  argue t h a t n e c e s s i t y  i s the mother o f i n v e n t i o n :  *A u s e f u l c o l l e c t i o n o f o p t i m i s t s ' w r i t i n g s i s : T h i n k i n g About the F u t u r e : A C r i t i q u e o f the L i m i t s to Growth, e d i t e d by H.S.D. Cole e t a l .  3  mother o f i n v e n t i o n : as one resource d e p l e t e s o r as one form o f p o l l u t i o n becomes too h o r r i b l e t o bear, some t e c h n o l o g i c a l wonder w i l l be d i s c o v e r e d o r developed t o deal with i t . economists  T h i s p o s i t i o n i s a l s o supported by many  who p o i n t out t h a t the mother o f many i n v e n t i o n s  i s money, and t h a t , f o r example, as a resource becomes s c a r c e , i t s p r i c e w i l l r i s e t h e r e b y encouraging /  resource Conservation,and replacement  by o t h e r f o r m e r l y  uneconomic s o l u t i o n s (e.g. the t a r sands). economists  greater  Indeed, many  see the problem o f resource exhaustion i n terms  not o f the disappearance  of the r e s o u r c e , but r a t h e r i t s  becoming f i n a n c i a l l y p r o h i b i t i v e t o use as the e a s i l y a v a i l a b l e s u p p l i e s o f i t are'exhausted. The q u e s t i o n b o i l s down t o what r a t e o f t e c h n o l o g i c a l advancement can be reasonably expected.  I f we expect a high  r a t e o f t e c h n o l o g i c a l advance, then we can expect t h a t t e c h n i c a l s o l u t i o n s w i l l emerge t o s o l v e the d i f f i c u l t i e s presented by the former technology.  F o r example, the  o p t i m i s t s argue t h a t we can expect the development o f a nonp o l l u t i n g and inexpensive energy source t o r e p l a c e o i l b e f o r e o i l resources are exhausted. increasing a b i l i t y  The o p t i m i s t s can p o i n t t o the  t o e x t r a c t o i l from f o r m e r l y i m p o s s i b l e  sources such as the a r c t i c and the sea, and i n c r e a s i n g e f f i c i e n c y o f o i l use, and f i n a l l y ,  the a c e - i n - t h e - h o l e  4  p o s s i b i l i t y of f u s i o n .  The  p e s s i m i s t p o i n t s to  i n c r e d i b l e l e v e l of o i l use,  the  the i n c r e a s i n g problem of a i r  and p a r t i c u l a r l y water p o l l u t i o n , the i n c r e a s i n g danger of c a t r astrophe as o i l i s e x t r a c t e d and  /  from more d i f f i c u l t  environments,  f i n a l l y the i m p o s s i b i l i t y of technique matching the expo-  nential  growth r a t e i n consumption.  While the debate seems to i n v o l v e the i s s u e of ( i n technology and reason, there do t e l l decidedly 1.  the market economy) as much as i t does  seem to me  a g a i n s t the  to be a number of arguments t h a t optimists.  I t was/is technology and  us i n the p o s i t i o n t h a t we both ways and  the market economy t h a t  are now  in.  l a r g e l y depends on how  c u r r e n t economic and  s o c i a l order.  s c a l e of our c u r r e n t p r o d u c t i v e kinds  faith  T h i s p o i n t can  you But  f e e l about  cut  the  c l e a r l y i t i s the  e f f o r t s t h a t presents  of s i g n i f i c a n t problems t h a t we  have today.  not to say t h a t such a l a r g e s c a l e p r o d u c t i v e  the  This i s  apparatus c o u l d  not develop the kinds of safeguards, p o l l u t i o n c o n t r o l and  put  a l t e r n a t i v e f u e l s necessary f o r the continued  devices  survival  of t h i s k i n d of o r d e r , but only to p o i n t out they have not done so so f a r .  Nor  has  the impetus f o r the  from those with economic and 2.  But even i f we  the  s i z e and  p o l i t i c a l power.  accept a w i l l i n g n e s s on the p a r t  those i n power to genuinely greater  s o l u t i o n s come  d e a l w i t h the problems,  complexity of the p r o d u c t i v e  of  the  u n i t , the  /  5  more d i f f i c u l t the  the  change i s .  u n i t , t h e more e x t e n s i v e  of e c o l o g i c a l e r r o r . the g r e a t e r will  For  In the  are  same way,  larger  the e f f e c t s i n the  example, the  l a r g e r the  the p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t a tanker  cause e x t e n s i v e  the  case tanker,  collision  e n v i r o n m e n t a l damage.  In  general,  since p o l l u t i o n i s e s s e n t i a l l y a problem of  concentration,  t h e more c o n c e n t r a t e d  i s , the  the  and  intense  production  p r o b a b i l i t y of p o l l u t i o n , i . e . the g r e a t e r  o f an  environmentally  greater  the p r o b a b i l i t y  intolerable concentration  of  any  substance. 3.  The  pessimists critics  most s i g n i f i c a n t s t a t e m e n t of the i s t o be  f o u n d i n The  technological  L i m i t s t o Growth.  o f t h i s book h a v e p o i n t e d  out  the p a u c i t y of  d a t a f r o m w h i c h i t s e x t r a p o l a t i o n s w e r e made and questionable  assumptions about the growth r a t e  technology.  I t can  are  be  shown i n f a c t t h a t t h e  e x t r e m e l y s e n s i t i v e t o changes i n the  growth rate,thereby logical  supporting  o p t i m i s t s t h a t The  a r b i t r a r i l y doom o r i e n t e d .  the claims  the  of projections  technological of the  founded than those of the p e s s i m i s t s .  rather  better  Such a s i t u a t i o n  a conservative' stance toward the  o f a t e c h n o l o g i c a l s o l u t i o n and  the  techno-  a r g u m e n t s f o r a more  o p t i m i s t i c r a t e o f t e c h n o l o g i c a l g r o w t h a r e no  s u g g e s t s t o me  the  the  L i m i t s t o Growth i s But  Most  exploration  possibility of  alternative solutions. 4.  I n g e n e r a l , m o s t e c o l o g i s t s a d m i t t h a t we  a s t a t e of t e r r i b l e  are  in  i g n o r a n c e about the complex systems  6 that c h a r a c t e r i z e our environment. e f f e c t s various  We  j u s t cannot say what  chemicals and processes w i l l have on the  s h o r t , and even more c r u c i a l , long run. that a conservative  V.;  Ignorance suggests  stance toward t e c h n o l o g i c a l s o l u t i o n s i s  appropriate. 5.  I t should  a l s o be noted t h a t even the c r i t i c s o f  L i m i t s to Growth study agree t h a t p o p u l a t i o n fundamental to the maintenance and  w h i l e i t i s f a c i l i t a t e d by new p o l i t i c a l question:  And  f o r my  patterns.  reasons f o r r e j e c t i n g the  i s one  As  optimists'  other, e q u a l l y fundamental reason,  r e j e c t i o n of t h e i r f a i t h :  c u r r e n t s o c i a l order. any  control,  i t i n v o l v e s f o r c i n g , and/or persuading  above are my  optimism, but there  population  my  d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n with  a r e s u l t of t h i s  c u r r e n t form o f s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l o r g a n i z a t i o n promises a s o l u t i o n to the e c o l o g i c a l imperative  the  and i s , to  a f a r more d e s i r a b l e s o l u t i o n than one which promises to save the environment and m a i n t a i n the s t a t u s quo.  Nor  do I b e l i e v e t h a t the s o c i a l problems a s s o c i a t e d with s t a t e i n North America are  to the e c o l o g i c a l problems we problem might be misleadingly)  s t a t e d simply  are f a c i n g .  of a general w i l l .  But  The  unrelated general  (and as a r e s u l t , perhaps  as the f a i l u r e to p r o v i d e  the  dissatisfaction,  s o l u t i o n which o f f e r s a p o s i t i v e a l t e r n a t i v e to  the c u r r e n t w e l f a r e  of  technology, i s e s s e n t i a l l y a  people to change t h e i r r e p r o d u c t i v e The  control i s  c r e a t i o n of any k i n d  quality of l i f e f o r a l l countries.  The  f o r the  creation  such a c l a i m needs e l a b o r a t i o n ,  me,  7  and  i t w i l l r e c e i v e t h a t i n the body o f the t h e s i s .  II. Such are the reasons f o r my i g n o r i n g the p o s s i b i l i t y of any t e c h n i c a l s o l u t i o n s t o the c u r r e n t problems o f population,  pollution and /  resource  exhaustion.  In the  p l a c e of t h i s k i n d of hope, I w i l l argue t h a t a r a d i c a l d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n and d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n and  o f both the economic  p o l i t i c a l realms i s the most a p p r o p r i a t e  response  to what I have c a l l e d the e c o l o g i c a l i m p e r a t i v e .  While  there a r e many arguments t h a t can be o f f e r e d f o r a d e c e n t r a l i z i n g and democratizing  o f our s o c i a l system, I w i l l  focus  p r i m a r i l y on those t h a t a r e r e l e v a n t t o the e c o l o g i c a l concern o f my t h e s i s . conceptual,  I will  f u r t h e r l i m i t myself t o  p s y c h o l o g i c a l and s o c i o l o g i c a l arguments  about the p o s s i b i l i t y and d e s i r a b i l i t y o f such decentralization.  In doing t h i s , I w i l l  ignore many p r a c t i c a l  d i f f i c u l t i e s t h a t a r e r e l a t e d t o i n t r o d u c i n g such a scheme i n our s o c i e t y .  I do suggest some p o s s i b l e forms,  but the d e t a i l s o f such a p r o j e c t must i n e v i t a b l y be evolved  as the program i s implemented.  My g o a l i s t o  o u t l i n e some o f the p r i n c i p l e s o f d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n  and the  reasons f o r b e l i e v i n g such a p r o j e c t i s worthwhile and i n accord w i t h human nature.  In a d d i t i o n , I w i l l  p r i m a r i l y on the p h i l o s o p h i c a l q u e s t i o n autonomy, i g n o r i n g other  focus  o f freedom and  important concerns such as j u s t i c e .  To b e g i n my argument, I w i l l d i s c u s s , i n Chapter I , the e x c e l l e n t and extremely w e l l known a r t i c l e  ;  by G i l b e r t  8  H a r d i n , "The Tragedy itself  o f the Commons".  This a r t i c l e i s  a r e p u d i a t i o n o f t e c h n i c a l s o l u t i o n s t o the  p o p u l a t i o n problem and the p r o p o s a l o f a p o l i t i c a l solution.  I w i l l c r i t i c i z e Hardin's argument f o r i t s  p r e f u n c t o r y treatment o f the problem o f freedom. so, I w i l l  show how  Hardin's "Tragedy  i s r e a l l y the o l d tragedy  o f the Commons"  o f the s t a t e o f n a t u r e d e s c r i b e d  by s o c i a l c o n t r a c t t h e o r i s t s . problem,  7  But the s t a t e o f n a t u r e  the c o l l e c t i v e d e s t r u c t i o n o f a l l by a l l ,  l i m i t e d t o some h y p o t h e t i c a l pre-government problem we  In d o i n g  i s ubiquitous.  i s not  s t a t e : the  E c o l o g y i s j u s t one area i n which  are coming to r e a l i z e t h a t the a c t i v i t y o f s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d  i n d i v i d u a l s can r e s u l t i n t h e i r c o l l e c t i v e s e l f d e f e a t i f adequate  p r o v i s i o n f o r c o n t r o l i s not made.  The  examples  here a r e not o n l y Hardin's farmers, but the average  commutor.  In coming t o g r i p s w i t h t h i s problem, H a r d i n o f f e r s what I c o n s i d e r a f a r too Hobbesian  s o l u t i o n , and I o f f e r i n  i t s p l a c e the more o r l e s s Rousseauean s o l u t i o n o f p a r t i c i p a t o r y democracy. In Chapter I I , I e l a b o r a t e the concept o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n d i c a t i n g the way  i n which Rousseau thought a p a r t i c i p a t o r y  democracy would p r o t e c t us from c o l l e c t i v e s e l f and p r e s e r v e our freedom.  destruction  While Rousseau's account i s v e r y  s u g g e s t i v e i t i s not f i n a l l y c o n v i n c i n g , and I develop my e l a b o r a t i o n o f the v i r t u e s o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n , a way  demonstrating  i n which p a r t i c i p a t i o n expands t h e realm o f  freedom.  own  9 But freedom i s n o t the only v i r t u e possessed by p a r t i c i p a t i o n , and i n Chapter I I I a l s o o u t l i n e the e s s e n t i a l  quality  of c o l l e c t i v e r e s p e c t f o r the i n d i v i d u a l t h a t u n d e r l i e s a p a r t i c i p a t o r y government.  In the remainder o f the t h e s i s I  argue f o r d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n and e x t e n s i v e p a r t i c i p a t i o n as a means o f meeting the e c o l o g i c a l demand f o r g r e a t e r c o n t r o l , d i v e r s i t y , a n d ! d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n o f i n d u s t r i a l and a r g r i c u l t u r a l activity.  In a d d i t i o n I argue t h a t p a r t i c i p a t i o n would (1)  encourage i n i n d i v i d u a l s the k i n d of communal concern t h a t i s s u p p o r t i v e o f environmental p r o t e c t i o n ,  (2) p r o v i d e  alter-  n a t i v e s a t i s f a c t i o n s t o some of the c u r r e n t p l e a s u r e s o f p r i v a t e consumption, and (3) produce a h a p p i e r and more humane s o c i a l environment conducive to the f u l l e s t development o f human c a p a b i l i t i e s . These claims are summarized  and e l a b o r a t e d i n Chapter V,  but b e f o r e d e v e l o p i n g them I thought i t wise t o c l e a r the ground.  Chapter I I I i s t h e r e f o r e an a t t a c k on the theory  of p s y c h o l o g i c a l egoism and homo economicus which  lies  behind t h e i d e o l o g y o f the c u r r e n t economic order. g i n the a t t a c k w i t h Bishop  B u t l e r ' s famous  I be-  arguments  a g a i n s t Hobbes, and.also use some o f h i s i n s i g h t s t o s t a r t the development o f an a l t e r n a t i v e view of human nature.  Rather than take human wants as given  (and i n f i n i t e ) ,  I argue f o r t h e almost p l a t i t u d i n o u s p o s i t i o n t h a t wants are l a r g e l y s o c i a l l y determined.  The main mechanism  of t h i s d e t e r m i n a t i o n , I argue, i s the fundamental d e s i r e t h a t humans have t o be esteemed by t h e i r f e l l o w s , the d e s i r e t o count i n t h e i r s o c i a l environment.  U n l i k e the  10  d e s i r e f o r wealth, t h i s d e s i r e i s d i r e c t l y p o l i t i c a l , and i n Chapter IV I proceed, w i t h the h e l p o f John Adams, t o develop an argument f o r p a r t i c i p a t i o n on the b a s i s o f the d e s i r e f o r esteem. misshaped  T h i s d e s i r e I argue i s l a r g e l y  by the c u r r e n t o r d e r i n t o the phenomenon o f  conspicuous consumption,  c a u s i n g an endless demand on the  system f o r the p r o d u c t i o n o f s t a t u s symbols.  By p r o v i d i n g  f o r e x t e n s i v e p a r t i c i p a t i o n , my system would p r o v i d e the genuine o u t l e t f o r t h i s d e s i r e and an e c o l o g i c a l l y  useful  and " l i g h t " one a t t h a t . R e s t i n g on the argument o f my p o l i t i c a l  psychology,  I then go on i n Chapter V t o develop the arguments c i t e d above i n f a v o r o f d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n and p a r t i c i p a t i o n as the means t o environmental p r e s e r v a t i o n and s o c i a l w e l l b e i n g . In the subsequent  chapter, I o f f e r a summary o f some  of the r e c e n t r e s e a r c h i n t o i n d u s t r i a l democracy which supports the c l a i m s made i n Chapter I I , I I I , IV, and V. The r e s e a r c h c l e a r l y supports the p o s i t i o n t h a t  industrial  democracy i s f e a s i b l e and f a v o r e d by the workers.  There  i s a l s o evidence t o show t h a t g r e a t e r p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s c o r r e l a t e d with a g r e a t e r sense o f s e l f e s t e e m — a which  supports my fundamental And  result  psychological claim.  f i n a l l y . i n the l a s t chapter, I suggest some  p o s s i b l e ways o f i n s t i t u t i n g widespread p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n an i n d u s t r i a l s o c i e t y and review the schemes o f the g u i l d s o c i a l i s t s , Yugoslavs, and F r e d e r i c k Thayer.  11  The  l a s t two chapters c o n s t i t u t e something o f an  e f f o r t to g i v e e m p i r i c a l support t o my t h e s i s and probably need some j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r t h e i r p l a c e i n a thesis.  philosophy  T h i s j u s t i f i c a t i o n comes, I b e l i e v e , from t h e  f a c t t h a t I am making a " p o l i t i c a l argument".  I see a  p o l i t i c a l argument as i n e v i t a b l y i n v o l v i n g a mixture o f e m p i r i c a l and normative c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ,  and as a r e s u l t , ,  i n e v i t a b l y f a l l i n g i n t o a k i n d o f academic limbo between the s o c i a l s c i e n c e s  and philosophy.  Nonetheless, i t i s  w e l l w i t h i n the t r a d i t i o n o f p o l i t i c a l philosophy j u s t such c o n s i d e r a t i o n s .  A l l political  t o mix  philosophies  of i n t e r e s t have had a t t h e i r base c e r t a i n assumptions about human nature, both as t o i t s p s y c h o l o g i c a l constituents  and i t s normative i m p l i c a t i o n s ; a l l have  r e s t e d on t h e o r i e s about the r e l a t i o n s h i p o f i n d i v i d u a l p e r s o n a l i t i e s t o the s o c i a l  structure.  I have t r i e d t o keep these d i f f e r e n t aspects o f the problem c l e a r , but I d i d n o t wish t o abandon the e m p i r i c a l one- simply  because I c o u l d a c t u a l l y c a l l upon  some s o c i o l o g i c a l r e s u l t s .  The o n l y d i f f e r e n c e between  my s o c i o l o g y and t h a t o f Hobbes o r M i l l , i s t h a t I can a c t u a l l y r e f e r t o some data where they were f o r c e d t o use  s p e c u l a t i o n and " c a s u a l empiricism".  Any p o l i t i c a l  theory must s t a r t w i t h a p s y c h o l o g i c a l and normative theory  o f human nature.  My fundamental normative  assumption i s t h a t autonomy i s c r u c i a l t o any n o t i o n  12  of a t r u l y human l i f e .  As t o my p s y c h o l o g i c a l assumptions,  I argue a t l e n g t h f o r the e s s e n t i a l l y human psyche.  s o c i a l nature o f the  13  C H A P T E R  I  THE TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS  14  I  "The gained  a good  forceful the In  Tragedy deal  h i s essay,  Hardin  He  birth  rate  essay  argues  argues  circles  f a rbeyond  fora legislative  on t h e grounds  to  persuasion  are morally  extend  against using  i s self-defeating  who  i n ecology  will  that:  i n that  under  indifferent;  moral  those  breed  who  (2) w h e n e v e r  a r e persuaded  (3) c o n t r o l  producing  procreation, of  mutually  The  tragedy  of  recommends upon  commons  i n their through  cites  wide  to  those conflict  o f t h e community as  and g u i l t  foolish,'  i s anxiety  destructive. people  t h a t we  to restrict  institute that  i t i s the "tragedy i s the result  use.  t h e examples  the current world  pressure  own s e l f - i n t e r e s t  over  reduce  o f t h e community,  c o e r c i o n t o ensure  as he s e e s  to  i s a  b u t a r e seen  t o persuade  o f t h e commons  "rationally"  and  moral  of trying  agreed  alternative  Hardin  through  Hardin  The  the  by t h e community  and p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y  Instead  issue.  are vulnerable  there  t o a c t f o r t h e good  and  this  solution to  i n relation  those  not supported  for i t s  (1) t h e m o r a l i z i n g  and t h e i n t e r e s t  1  are  has  persuasion  between a p e r s o n s ' i n t e r e s t who  Hardin  and an end t o t h e c u r r e n t m o r a l i z i n g  approach moral  by G a r r e t  on t h e p o p u l a t i o n problem, b u t  of this  population problem  approach. the  o f eminence  pronouncements  implications  the  o f t h e Commons"  some they  o f t h e commons".  and thereby  of over-grazing  form  do.  o f everyone  To i l l u s t r a t e  their  acting destroying  h i s point,  o f a common  slaughter o f whales  pasture  to the point  extinction. But  one need  hardly  search  abroad  f o r problems o f  15  this  kind.  in  my  is  bought  the  own  I am  reminded  home.  Fruit,  i n bulk  once  e n d o f t h e week,  each  On  unrestrained,  the f r u i t  will  starts  in  moderately,  three  moral fair  or four  arguments share  encourage  by  even  i f only  one. social  Rousseau  last  He  a supply  appeals  ( i n a remarkably  one p e r s o n i s and  as any  individual  assault  of fruit  everyone  on t h e  which, i f disappears  i s impressed  with the  simply  goes w i t h o u t  h i s or her  that  oriented  i s hardly  gamut  i t i s hardly  o f arguments  i n the 18th century.  contemporary  apt to  behavior.  i s incisive,  t o t h e whole  contract theorists  to  who  a result  analysis  children  h i s or her  t h e week, u s u a l l y  Any c h i l d  o r community  Hardin's  So a s s o o n  i s a wholesale  f o r moderation  moral  the  run out prematurely  share.  problem  i s to last  hand,  will  of the f r u i t :  While new  days.  I f the f r u i t  restrain  i s that  would  with  must  "over-eating", there The r e s u l t  popular  person  the other  not get their  reserves. eaten  enormously a week.  consumption.  else  of a constantly recurring  a  used  To  quote  passage):  T h i s i s my p r e m i s e : men h a v e r e a c h e d a p o i n t where t h e o b s t a c l e s h i n d e r i n g their preservation i n the state of nature a r e so o b s t r u c t i v e as t o d e f y the resources t h a t each i n d i v i d u a l , while i n t h a t s t a t e , can devote t o h i s preservation. This being the case, that p r i m i t i v e c o n d i t i o n cannot continue: human k i n d w o u l d p e r i s h i f i t d i d n o t c h a n g e i t s way o f l i f e , (my i t a l i c s ) (Rousseau p.17) The  change  "state  that  Rousseau  of nature"  sees  and t o form  as necessary a social  i s to leave the  contract.  As he  puts  16  it: Now u n a b l e as t h e y a r e t o add t o t h e i r r e s o u r c e s , men can o n l y combine and c h a n n e l t h o s e r e s o u r c e s t h a t a r e at hand. T h u s t h e i r s o l e means o f preserving themselves f r o m now o n i s to create a pool of resources capable of surmounting the o b s t a c l e s , to set t h o s e r e s o u r c e s t o work i n r e s p o n s e t o o n e a n d t h e same p u r p o s e , and t o see t o i t t h a t they a c t i n c o n c e r t . ( I b i d . pp.. 1 7 - 1 8 ) . As  I  the  understand need  f o r the  destruction in  h i s own  tragedy  of  the  For  to  note  in  the  and  Besides  sophisticated: great  to  pursuit  rather  Hardin  are  the  that  impending  person's  Hardin,  acting  this  i s the  is  state  i s mutually  this  private  pursuit  i n the  show t h a t  co-ordinate of  not  the  of  agreed  of  areas  i t has  famous i n such  a l l by  authors  theory.  theory  market  This  because i t  that  the  "invisible  hand")  a way  not  defeat  all.  argument  received  economics  i n the  the  only  fundamental  economic  ( v i a the  result  the  i n economic  faire  interest  betterment  in certain  to  laissez  the  brief,  analysis  significance  claim of  hardly  being  contract theorists'  serves  does  and  problem.  i s of  people's  will  of  this  solution  i s arguing  each  For  f o r Rousseau, the  out  from  interest.  them,  Rousseau  fundamental  market  but  a l l resulting  private  of  Rousseau  contract arise  commons;  social  problem  only  or  both  this  important  a  social  passages,  coercion. But  is  two  a l l by  self  of  nature. upon  these  Any does  of  that  a l l by a l l ,  argument not  serve  which the  i n t e r e s t s o f i t s p a r t i c i p a n t s i s o f fundamental importance. And w h i l e economists have noted  t h i s problem., i t has n o t  r e c e i v e d the a t t e n t i o n t h a t i s a p p r o p r i a t e t o i t s s i g n i f i cance.  F o r the s i g n i f i c a n c e o f t h i s problem depends on what  p l a c e i n importance one gives t o our common p o s s e s s i o n s .  If  w e l l b e i n g i s assessed i n terms o f t h e q u a l i t y and value o f p e r s o n a l p o s s e s s i o n s , then the commons becomes  important  only when i t s " d e s t r u c t i o n " threatens our p e r s o n a l goods, o r finally  i n our case, our l i v e s .  But i n c r e a s i n g p r o d u c t i o n  and i n c r e a s i n g d e n s i t y o f p o p u l a t i o n has f o r c e d upon us the r e a l i z a t i o n o f the e x t e n t t o which we l i v e a i r , water and community environment. market looms l a r g e r and l a r g e r .  i n a commons o f  The f a i l u r e o f the  But i t i s n o t only i n t h i s  area t h a t t h e market f a i l s to c o - o r d i n a t e i n d i v i d u a l behav i o u r i n the i n t e r e s t o f i t s p a r t i c i p a n t s . Though h a r d l y the f i r s t to p o i n t p u t t h a t the f r e e market w i l l n o t serve the i n t e r e s t of the working c l a s s , J.S. M i l l  does o f f e r an illuminating;- account o f the way i n  which the f r e e market w i l l tend t o f r u s t r a t e workers' e f f o r t s to  improve t h e i r c o n d i t i o n .  In a chapter on the areas o f the  economy i n which government i n t e r f e r e n c e i s j u s t i f i e d  Mill  writes: L e t us suppose, what i s a t l e a s t supposeable, whether i t be the f a c t or n o t - - t h a t a general r e d u c t i o n o f  18  the hours o f f a c t o r y l a b o u r , say from t e n t o n i n e , w o u l d be f o r t h e a d v a n t a g e of the work-people: that they would r e c e i v e a s h i g h w a g e s , .or n e a r l y a s h i g h , f o r n i n e h o u r s l a b o u r as they receive for ten. I f t h i s w o u l d be the r e s u l t , and i f t h e o p e r a t i v e s g e n e r a l l y are convinced t h a t i t would, the limitation some may s a y , w i l l be a d o p t e d spontaneously. I a n s w e r , t h a t i t w i l l n o t be a d o p t e d u n l e s s the body of o p e r a t i v e s b i n d t h e m s e l v e s t o one a n o t h e r t o a b i d e by i t . A workman who r e f u s e d t o work more t h a n nine hours while t h e r e w e r e o t h e r s who w o r k e d ten , would e i t h e r n o t be e m p l o y e d a t a l l , o r i f e m p l o y e d must submit t o l o s e o n e - t e n t h o f h i s wages. H o w e v e r c o n v i n c e d , t h e r e f o r e , h e may be t h a t i t i s t h e i n t e r e s t o f the c l a s s t o work short time, i t i s c o n t r a r y to h i s own i n t e r e s t t o s e t t h e e x a m p l e , u n l e s s he i s w e l l a s s u r e d t h a t a l l or most o t h e r s w i l l f o l l o w i t . But suppose a g e n e r a l agreement of the whole c l a s s : might not t h i s be e f f e c t u a l w i t h o u t the s a n c t i o n o f law? Not u n l e s s e n f o r c e d b y o p i n i o n :,with a r i g o u r p r a c t i c a l l y e q u a l t o t h a t o f law. For however b e n e f i c i a l the o b s e r v a n c e of the r e g u l a t i o n m i g h t be t o t h e c l a s s collectively, the immediate i n t e r e s t of every individual w o u l d l i e i n v i o l a t i n g i t : and t h e more n u m e r o u s t h o s e w e r e who adhered to the rule, the more w o u l d i n d i v i d u a l s g a i n by departing from i t . I f n e a r l y a l l r e s t r i c t e d themselves to nine hours, those who chose t o work f o r ten would gain a l l the advantages of the r e s t r i c t i o n together with the p r o f i t of i n f r i n g i n g i t ; they would get ten h o u r s ' wage f o r n i n e h o u r s work, a n d 'an h o u r ' s ' w a g e s b e s i d e s . I grant that i f a large majority adhered to the 'nine' h o u r s , t h e r e w o u l d be no h a r m d o n e : t h e b e n e f i t would be, i n the main, s e c u r e d to the c l a s s , while those i n d i v i d u a l s who p r e f e r r e d t o work h a r d e r and e a r n more, w o u l d h a v e an o p p o r t u n i t y o f d o i n g s o . This c e r t a i n l y w o u l d be t h e s t a t e o f t h i n g s t o be w i s h e d f o r ; and a s s u m i n g t h a t a r e d u c t i o n o f h o u r s w i t h o u t any d i m i n u t i o n o f wages c o u l d take p l a c e w i t h o u t e x p e l l i n g the commodity f r o m some o f i t s m a r k e t s - w h i c h i s i n e v e r y p a r t i c u l a r instance a question of fact, not 1  19  of p r i n c i p l e - t h e manner i n which i t would be most d e s i r a b l e t h a t t h i s e f f e c t should be brought about, would be by a q u i e t change i n the g e n e r a l custom of the t r a d e ; s h o r t hours becoming, by spontaneous c h o i c e , the g e n e r a l p r a c t i c e , but those who chose t o d e v i a t e from i t having the f u l l e s t l i b e r t y to do so. Probably, however, so many would p r e f e r the ten hours work on the improved terms, t h a t the l i m i t a t i o n c o u l d not be maintained as a g e n e r a l p r a c t i c e : what some d i d from c h o i c e , others would soon be o b l i g e d to do from n e c e s s i t y , and those who had chosen l o n g hours f o r the sake of i n c r e a s e d wages, would be f o r c e d i n the end to work long hours f o r no g r e a t e r wages than b e f o r e . Assuming then t h a t i t r e a l l y would be the i n t e r e s t of each to work o n l y nine hours i f he c o u l d be assured t h a t a l l o t h e r s would do the same, there might be no means o f t h e i r a t t a i n i n g t h i s o b j e c t but by c o n v e r t i n g t h e i r supposed mutual agreement i n t o an engagement under p e n a l t y , by consenting to have i t e n f o r c e d by law. I am not expressi n g any o p i n i o n i n favour of such an enactment, which has never i n t h i s country been demanded, and which I c e r t a i n l y should not, i n present circumstances recommend: but i t serves to exemplify the manner i n which c l a s s e s of persons may need the a s s i s t a n c e of law, t o g i v e e f f e c t to t h e i r d e l i b e r a t e c o l l e c t i v e o p i n i o n of t h e i r own i n t e r e s t , by a f f o r d i n g to every i n d i v i d u a l a guarantee t h a t h i s competitors w i l l pursue the same course, without which he cannot s a f e l y adopt i t h i m s e l f . ( M i l l , 1965, p.  956-8)  M i l l ' s p o i n t extends f a r beyond the i s s u e of c l o s e d shop as he i s f u l l y aware.  He  argues t h a t there i s a whole range of  ...matter i n which the i n t e r f e r e n c e of law i s r e q u i r e d , not to o v e r r u l e the judgment of i n d i v i d u a l s r e s p e c t i n g t h e i r own i n t e r e s t , but to g i v e e f f e c t to t h a t judgment: they being unable t o give e f f e c t to i t except by c o n c e r t , which c o n c e r t again cannot be e f f e c t u a l unless i t r e c e i v e s v a l i d i t y and s a n c t i o n from the law. ( I b i d , p. 956)  20 And  i n support of t h i s c o n t e n t i o n  remarkably Rousseauean), he  (which sounds  a l s o c i t e s the problem p r e s e n t e d  by-the f r e e d i s t r i b u t i o n of c o l o n i a l lands r e s u l t o f t h i s system there e x p l o i t e d t o provide  are no  (p. 95 8).  As  l a n d l e s s workers who  for transportation f a c i l i t i e s  a can  (and  be  other  p u b l i c n e c e s s i t i e s ) , with the r e s u l t t h a t the owners have no adequate means of g e t t i n g t h e i r goods t o market, and  a l l lose.  This i s the problem again o f the under p r o v i s i o n and  protection  o f the p u b l i c good t h a t r e s u l t s from s e l f - i n t e r e s t and  a laissez  f a i r e market arrangement. T h i s problem has  r e c e n t l y r e c e i v e d the renewed a t t e n t i o n  of Western economists as the r e s u l t of a number o f papers by Paul Sarauelson. '•' * But  the most u s e f u l treatment from my  p o i n t of  view i s t h a t by Mancur Olsen i n h i s w i d e l y d i s c u s s e d book, L o g i c of C o l l e c t i v e A c t i o n . of p u b l i c good has finance  Olsen notes t h a t w h i l e the  been e x t e n s i v e l y used i n the  concept  area of p u b l i c "•::>.  few have r e a l i z e d the range o f commom goods t h a t can  analyzed  using this notion.  ' p u b l i c good  1  (Olsen, p.15)  o f t r a d i t i o n a l economic The  While the n o t i o n  has become a t e c h n i c a l n o t i o n i n economic  Olsen's work shows that i t s use  be of  theory,  extends f a r beyond the boundaries  theory.  t e c h n i c a l n o t i o n o f a ' p u b l i c good' i s : a good such  that i f i t i s provided be denied t o any  to any member o f a group i t cannot f e a s i b l y  o t h e r member o f t h a t group.**  This means t h a t  once a p u b l i c good (e.g. defence o r clean a i r ) i s  * See  The  provided  Bibliography  **Philosophers would undoubtedly note t h a t b e i n g a p u b l i c good i s a r e l a t i o n a l p r o p e r t y , i . e . "being a p u b l i c good f o r some group".  21  t o some members (who be marketed to  may  have p a i d f o r i t ) i t cannot ( f e a s i b l y )  (or kept from) others who  b e n e f i t without the c o n t r i b u t i o n .  As  will still  receive  the  a r e s u l t , any i n d i v i d u a l  contemplating the p r o v i s i o n o f some good to h i m s e l f which i n e v i t a b l y involves supplying bute or not,  i t to o t h e r s , whether they  i s f a c e d w i t h two  assuming t h a t the costs o f any  contri-  d i s i n c e n t i v e s f o r doing so:  1.  good i s a f u n c t i o n of the numbers  t o which i t i s s u p p l i e d , the c o s t s of the " p u b l i c good" w i l l g r e a t l y exceed the a n t i c i p a t e d b e n e f i t s f o r any i n d i v i d u a l s u p p l i e r ; and  2 . the i n d i v i d u a l may  w e l l gain the b e n e f i t s without  c o n t r i b u t i o n should  others  choose to provide  it.  the group i s of any  s i z e , the i n d i v i d u a l r e a l i z e s t h a t h i s  c o n t r i b u t i o n w i l l have to be enormous (e.g. M a r t i n  Indeed, i f o  Luther K i n g ) ,  i f i t s e f f e c t on the p r o v i s i o n o f the good (e.g. end gation)  i s to be more than n e g l i g i b l e .  stands t o r e a l i z e the b e n e f i t s  On  ( i f there  to  segre-  the other hand, he  are any)  without  contribution. The  i m p l i c a t i o n s o f t h i s i n s i g h t are q u i t e  Olsen uses h i s theory  to destroy  which are used to j u s t i f y  extensive.  the l a t e n t group t h e o r i e s  the p l u r a l i s t  society.  These  t h e o r i e s assume t h a t i f some o f the group i s s u f f e r i n g , i t w i l l spontaneously form an o r g a n i z a t i o n  to protect i t s i n t e r e s t .  They argue, t h e r e f o r e , t h a t i f there i s no o r g a n i z a t i o n  to  which an i n d i v i d u a l belongs, then the i n d i v i d u a l i s content. But  the f a c t i s , that w h i l e i t might be  to p r o t e c t i t s e l f ,  i t i s not i n any  work f o r such a group unless he out)  i n the group's i n t e r e s t  i n d i v i d u a l ' s i n t e r e s t to  can be  assured  (as M i l l  of s i m i l a r a c t i o n by everyone e l s e i n the group.  points And  in  most cases of l a t e n t groups, no such assurance i s a v a i l a b l e .  22 As a r e s u l t , c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n r e q u i r e s what Olsen c a l l s t i v e i n c e n t i v e s , e.g. p e n a l t i e s f o r non-cooperation,  selec-  benefits  i  from j o i n i n g the group such as cheap auto i n s u r a n c e , o r j u s t p l a i n s o c i a l pressure.  The e f f e c t of these s e l e c t i v e  incentives  i s to make i t i n each i n d i v i d u a l ' s i n t e r e s t to pay h i s share o f the c o s t of the c o l l e c t i v e good s i n c e without these  "selective  i n c e n t i v e s " the d i r e c t b e n e f i t t o him of doing so does not exceed h i s c o s t . jail  P e n a l t i e s o r rewards,  such as the t h r e a t - 6 f  terms i n the case o f t a x e s , are what f i n a l l y make i t i n a  person's  i n t e r e s t to pay h i s share.  The apathy  of the " s i l e n t m a j o r i t y " i s not then a testimony  to t h e i r contentment, but very probably a s i g n of the f a i l u r e of c u r r e n t p o l i t i c a l o r g a n i z a t i o n to p r o v i d e a framework i n which the " s i l e n t " might express t h e i r o p i n i o n s and d e s i r e s i n an e f f e c t i v e manner.  Given the choice o f almost i r r a t i o n a l  s a c r i f i c e i n the name of some group i n t e r e s t , or q u i e t o f the s t a t u s quo, most people w i l l  self-  acceptance  c l e a r l y and r a t i o n a l l y ,  as  Olsen p o i n t s out, choose s i l e n c e . Olsen, as I a l s o wish t o , extends  t h i s argument i n t o the  moral realm, a r g u i n g t h a t c e r t a i n a c t i o n s w h i l e m o r a l l y  admirable  i f engaged i n by a l a r g e number become j u s t p l a i n s i l l y  i f engaged  i n by a s i n g l e i n d i v i d u a l . S e l f l e s s b e h a v i o r t h a t has no p e r c e p t i b l e e f f e c t i s sometimes not even c o n s i d e r e d praiseworthy. A man who t r i e d t o h o l d back a f l o o d w i t h a p a i l would probably be c o n s i d e r e d more of a crank than a s a i n t , even by those he was t r y i n g t o h e l p . I t i s no doubt p o s s i b l e i n f i n i t e s i m a l l y t o lower: the l e v e l o f a r i v e r i n f l o o d w i t h a p a i l , j u s t as i t i s p o s s i b l e f o r a s i n g l e farmer i n f i n i t e s i m a l l y t o r a i s e p r i c e s by l i m i t i n g h i s p r o d u c t i o n , but i n both cases the e f f e c t i s i m p e r c e p t i b l e , and those who s a c r i f i c e themselves i n the i n t e r e s t o f imperc e p t i b l e improvements may not even r e c e i v e the p r a i s e normally due s e l f l e s s b e h a v i o r . (Olsen, p. 64)  I t h i n k t h a t Olsen i s c o r r e c t i n s a y i n g t h a t c e r t a i n a c t i o n s supposedly d i r e c t e d towards t h e common good, are so q u i x o t i c t h a t they do n o t r e a l l y deserve the p r a i s e r e s e r v e d To see t h i s take the case o f the farmer who t i o n i n the hopes o f r e d u c i n g  supply  f o r moral a c t i o n s .  cuts back on produc-  and r a i s i n g p r i c e s .  to h e l p h i s f e l l o w farmers g e t more r e t u r n f o r t h e i r but he i s seen as f o o l i s h because he i s completely only harmful t o h i m s e l f . story.  production,  i n e f f e c t u a l and  He i s j u s t l i k e a farmer i n Hardin's  I f he wishes t o preserve  the commons, even with  d i s r e g a r d f o r h i m s e l f , what a c t i o n s are open t o him? s t a t e o f nature,  before  and Hardin's l a i s s e z f a i r e p e r i o d , the o n l y  the commons,  the o t h e r s .  from o v e r - u s i n g  He c o u l d o f course exhort  t h e commons, b u t as Hardin  the commons w i l l s t i l l  h i s f e l l o w common users  action  But t h i s  will  i t w i l l only i n s u r e t h a t he goes under  r e s u l t o f t h i s i s t h a t the m o r a l l y and  total  In Rousseau's  open t o him i s t o reduce h i s own use o f the commons. not preserve  He hopes  others  to also refrain  p o i n t s out,  the l i k e l y  s e n s i t i v e w i l l p e r i s h prematurely  go under.  I f he r e a l l y wishes to help  (and a l s o h i m s e l f ) , he must i n v o l v e ' h i m s e l f  i n some arrangement so t h a t i t i s i n the s e l f i n t e r e s t o f each i n d i v i d u a l to  a c t i n such a way as t o preserve  c o u l d be a p r o g r e s s i v e  the commons.  This  t a x system such t h a t i t became f i n a n c i a l l y  i r r a t i o n a l t o have more than a c e r t a i n number o f cows o u t on the commons, o r i t could be a law t h a t p r e s c r i b e d the upper l i m i t f o r the number o f cows each farmer c o u l d have on the commons, o r we c o u l d even, as Hardin p r i v a t e property.  suggests,  introduce  the u n j u s t s o l u t i o n o f  But t h i s l a s t s o l u t i o n i s simply  the c l a s s o f q u e s t i o n s  w i t h which I wish t o d e a l .  sea o r a i r i n t o p r i v a t e p r o p e r t y .  unavailable f o r We cannot turn the  We cannot make t h e c o l l e c t i v e  24  environment t h a t r e s u l t s from our p r i v a t e a c t i o n s , p r i v a t e property.  We must i n s t i t u t e some c o l l e c t i v e  control.*  In other words, nothing l e s s than a p o l i t i c a l  arrange-  ment i n v o l v i n g the other commons users w i l l p r e s e r v e the commons, and nothing l e s s than working (and working  i n such an arrangment) deserves t o count as the  m o r a l l y praiseworthy a c t i o n of working community.  f o r such an arrangement  f o r the good ,of the  To t r u l y a c t f o r the common good, the i n d i v i d u a l  must be w i l l i n g t o abandon h i s " n a t u r a l " l i b e r t y  f o r the  b e n e f i t s o f "mutually agreed upon c o e r c i o n " . C l e a r l y such an argument has enormous i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r the t r a d i t i o n a l concern liberty:  f o r i n d i v i d u a l and economic  (1) As M i l l p o i n t s o u t , government involvement i s  j u s t i f i e d i n those areas where the i n t e r e s t s o f a l l are f r u s t r a t e d by the p u r s u i t o f immediate s e l f - i n t e r e s t . All  (2)  p r o v i s i o n s of p u b l i c goods must be the p e r o g a t i v e o f a  government o r s i m i l a r o r g a n i z a t i o n w i t h the power t o apply selective incentives.  The only e x c e p t i o n t o t h i s would be  i n the cases o f s m a l l groups where s o c i a l p r e s s u r e may serve  *Economists t r e a t t h i s problem o f common p r o p e r t y o r nons p e c i f i c resources d i f f e r e n t l y than the p r o v i s i o n o f p u b l i c goods. ' /Non-specific resources present., the problem o f p r o v i d i n g i n c e n t i v e s t o c o n s e r v a t i o n ;and p u b l i c goods ^present the problem o f p r o v i d i n g i n c e n t i v e f o r p r o d u c t i o n or p r o v i s i o n of the p u b l i c good. But such problems seem t o me t o be two s i d e s . o f the same c o i n : there are simply l a r g e areas o f our l i f e where there i s no market mechanisms t o d i r e c t the i n d i v i d u a l s ' e f f o r t s towards the community's i n t e r e s t . F o r ^example: Is the p r o v i s i o n o f c l e a n a i r a problem o f r e s o u r c e use or the p u b l i c good? A t one p o i n t i t ' s one, and l a t e r the otherI  25 as the s e l e c t i v e i n c e n t i v e .  (3)  The r o l e o f government must  be seen n o t i n the t r a d i t i o n a l l i b e r a l view as a policeman o f the market p l a c e , b u t as a p o s i t i v e f o r c e p r o v i d i n g f o r the welfare  o f a l l through t h e p r o v i s i o n o f p u b l i c goods o r  c o n s t r a i n t on resource The  exploitations.  power o f t h e p r e c e d i n g  argument t o cause us t o  r a d i c a l l y a l t e r our a t t i t u d e s towards o r g a n i z a t i o n and government i s l i m i t e d only by the l i m i t s to.the  range o f human endea-  vours t h a t are s u b j e c t t o t h i s c o - o r d i n a t i o n problem. seems t o f e e l t h a t t h i s area i s n o t too e x t e n s i v e p l a c e he gives  the argument i n h i s whole work.  Mill  given the  And w h i l e Olsen  c e r t a i n l y extends t h e range o f i t s a p p l i c a t i o n , even he does not seem t o f u l l y r e a l i z e i t s s i g n i f i c a n c e . The  range o f i t s a p p l i c a t i o n i s so broad t h a t we are  i n v o l v e d i n i t every time t h a t we step o u t s i d e apartment.  our house o r  F o r we l i v e p r i m a r i l y i n a c o l l e c t i v e environment,  and w h i l e i n t h i s environment we always face the p o s s i b i l i t y of c o l l e c t i v e d e f e a t o f a l l by a l l .  We are i n v o l v e d i n t h i s  problem when d e a l i n g w i t h a l l the questions  o f ecology  ecology i s e s s e n t i a l l y concerned w i t h our c o l l e c t i v e ment.  environ-  We are a l s o i n v o l v e d i n t h i s area w i t h almost any  question  o f s o c i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n , e.g. town p l a n n i n g  p u b l i c amenities, The  since  and t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  (cf. t r a f f i c  and zoning,  jams).  argument, i n o t h e r words, t o t a l l y undermines the  t r a d i t i o n a l emphasis given producer o f w e l l being.  t o t h e f r e e market as the primary  The f r e e market c l a i m i s o n l y p l a u s i b l e  i f we conceive o f c o l l e c t i v e w e l l b e i n g  as s t r i c t l y i n v o l v i n g  26 the p r o v i s i o n  and procurement o f i n d i v i d u a l consumer goods.  But i f we i d e n t i f y w e l l b e i n g with "goods" such as f r e s h a i r , an a e s t h e t i c a l l y p l e a s i n g  c i t y , convenient and  e f f i c i e n t t r a n s p o r t a t i o n , n i c e neighborhoods, preservation,  and e c o l o g i c a l  then the f r e e market and the p u r s u i t o f  i n d i v i d u a l s e l f - i n t e r e s t cannot be expected t o produce general w e l l being. argument i s o b v i o u s l y  Given a concern  f o r ecology, t h i s  o f enormous s i g n i f i c a n c e .  But what are we t o do about the t r a d i t i o n a l f e a r and resentment o f government a c t i v i t y ?  What about the  l o s s o f freedom t h a t seems t o be e n t a i l e d by the p r o v i s i o n and p r o t e c t i o n o f the p u b l i c good?  Must we  resign  o u r s e l v e s t o the l o s s o f freedom i n order t o secure s o c i a l w e l f a r e o r even p o s s i b l y human s u r v i v a l ?  II The q u e s t i o n s r a i s e d a t the end o f the p r e v i o u s s e c t i o n have been j u s t those t h a t have w o r r i e d t h e o r i s t s s i n c e Hobbes.  political  Hobbes claimed t h a t n o t h i n g l e s s  than an a l l powerful c e n t r a l government c o u l d save humans from s e l f - d e s t r u c t i o n , and indeed, Hobbes' c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o f the human s i t u a t i o n d i d not d i f f e r a l l t h a t much from t h a t o f f e r e d by H a r d i n . does n o t accept Hobbes  1  But w h i l e  Hardin  dismal s o l u t i o n , h i s own  s o l u t i o n seems t o me e q u a l l y  unsatisfactory.  I wish t o  argue, i n s t e a d , f o r a s o l u t i o n much a l o n g the l i n e s  27  proposed  by  Rousseau  in  to  develop  order  argument,  compare  comparison  to  in his this  Hardin  argument  argument  i t with  b r i n g out  own  my  I wish  Rousseau's and /  own  with  Hobbes.  first  to  finally  And  give use  Hardin's  this  position.  argues: " E v e r y new e n c l o s u r e o f t h e commons i n v o l v e s the i n f r i n g e m e n t o f somebody's p e r s o n a l liberty. I n f r i n g e m e n t s made i n t h e d i s t a n t p a s t a r e a c c e p t e d b e c a u s e no contemporary complains of a l o s s . I t i s t h e new proposed i n f r i n g e m e n t s t h a t we v i g o r o u s l y o p p o s e ; c r i e s o f " r i g h t s " and " f r e e d o m " f i l l t h e a i r . B u t w h a t d o e s " f r e e d o m " mean? When men m u t u a l l y agreed t o pass laws a g a i n s t r o b b i n g , mankind became more f r e e n o t l e s s so. I n d i v i d u a l s l o c k e d i n the l o g i c of the commons a r e f r e e o n l y t o b r i n g u n i v e r s a l r u i n ; once they see the n e c e s s i t y o f mutual c o e r c i o n t h e y become f r e e t o p u r s u e o t h e r g o a l s . I b e l i e v e t h a t i t was H e g e l who s a i d , "Freedom, i s the r e c o g n i t i o n of n e c e s s i t y " . The m o s t i m p o r t a n t a s p e c t o f n e c e s s i t y t h a t we m u s t now recognize, i s the n e c e s s i t y of a b a n d o n i n g t h e commons i n b r e e d i n g . . . . T h e o n l y way we c a n p r e s e r v e and n u r t u r e o t h e r and more p r e c i o u s f r e e d o m s i s by r e l i n q u i s h i n g t h e f r e e d o m t o b r e e d , and t h a t v e r y s o o n . " ( H a r d i n , p. 1248)  In freedoms, sum  other we  words,  i n turn  actually slightly  he  points  out  that  is  a  in  "civil  gain  "natural  different  liberty". "Man  we  give  receive certain  experience  in  while  one  an  increase  language's of  the  liberty" As  which  certain  other in  freedom.  of  the  replaces  personal  freedoms,  a l s o made b y  results  Rousseau  loses,  up  and  This  claim,  Rousseau  social the  loss  in  when  contract of  puts i t :  through  the  social  contract,  his  28  n a t u r a l l i b e r t y , a l o n g w i t h an u n l i m i t e d r i g h t t o a n y t h i n g t h a t he i s t e m p t e d by and c a n get. He g a i n s c i v i l l i b e r t y , a l o n g w i t h o w n e r s h i p o f a l l he p o s s e s s e s . L e s t we f a i l to grasp t h e e x t e n t o f h i s g a i n s , h o w e v e r , we must d i s t i n g u i s h s h a r p l y between n a t u r a l liberty, w h i c h i s l i m i t e d o n l y by t h e i n d i v i d u a l ' s own powers, and c i v i l l i b e r t y , w h i c h i s l i m i t e d by t h e g e n e r a l w i l l - - a s a l s o b e t w e e n possession which r e s t s e i t h e r upon m i g h t o r upon the r i g h t o f the f i r s t o c c u p a n t , and ownership, w h i c h c a n h a v e no b a s i s o t h e r t h a n p o s i t i v e title." ( I b i d . p. 26-27)  "Civil the  robber.  provides  us  money  a  in  assures  that  range  of of  for  what  his  to  putting  cows o u t  ating  them  such  in has  in  without  mutual  clearly  the  have  no  basic  kind  more  of  than  the  in  the  of  Hardin  actually The  or  r e s u l t of of  a  new  might  i s heady  comparing  still  seem  by  possible  to  stuff,  not  hold,  this  con-  law  does  well  then  be  engaged  the  lessened  of  mean  co-ordin-  freedom.  v i z . that  law  i t .  e s p e c i a l l y so  quantities to  the  activities  cars),  destruction,  i n d i v i d u a l freedom,  Rousseau  increase  driving  make t h e m  the  "constitutive"  to  to  state  of  and  certain desired  as  our  the  power  about  state  deposit  freedom--it  pasture,  claim  the  facilitates  talk  would  can  to  implementation  decrease  for  robbery,  existence  Both  called  inconvenience  calculus point  the  way  increased  This we  a  The  laws  Hardin's  freedom  individuals.  law  (e.g.  on  be  that  is that  a  the  to  from  holding.  might  open  If  everyone  rests  n e c e s s a r i l y mean a increase.  compared  safe-keeping.  to.protect  aspect  be  example,  legislation:  stitutive  an  for  ownership  choice  can  protecting  with,  emphasizing  aspect  not  By  bank  individual are  liberty"  some  since But laws,  29  by r e s t r i c t i n g some behavior^ can make p o s s i b l e or i n c r e a s e the s a f e t y and ease of other b e h a v i o r .  Indeed i t i s arguable t h a t  t h i s i s a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f many laws i n c l u d i n g most o f those found i n the c r i m i n a l code.  One c o u l d argue  t h a t these laws  are aimed a t d i s c o u r a g i n g behavior which i n t e r f e r e s w i t h the j u s t i f i e d a c t i v i t y o f o t h e r s and thereby f a c i l i t a t e s  these  activities.  But the paradigm case would not be the law a g a i n s t  bank robbery  (though i t i s important t o see the r o l e t h a t the  law p l a y s i n p r o v i d i n g f o r the p o s s i b i l i t y o f ownership), but something  l i k e the t r a f f i c  The  laws.  law which determines which s i d e o f the s t r e e t  people  are to d r i v e on enormously i n c r e a s e s the ease and s a f e t y o f t r a v e l compared t o a s i t u t a t i o n i n which t h e r e was no such law (or worse y e t , no c o n v e n t i o n ) .  T h i s i s a good example i n p a r t  because the "freedom" l o s t i s one which appeals t o no known human d e s i r e .  Who c a r e s whether we d r i v e on the r i g h t o r l e f t ?  But people do, o f course, care t o graze as many c a t t l e as they wish, and they w i l l experience r e s t r i c t i o n s on t h e i r g r a z i n g p r i v i l e g e s as r e s t r i c t i o n s and l o s s o f freedom. Hardin chooses  t o d e a l w i t h t h e i r complaints by  suggesting t h a t any new r e s t r i c t i o n r a i s e s the c r y o f freedom, but as long as the law i s necessary i t should not be c o n s i d e r e d a r e a l l o s s o f freedom.  But i f t h i s i s so, then why i s  "mutual agreement" important t o the c o e r c i o n ?  I f a law w i l l  30  i n c r e a s e freedom simply because i t i s necessary (a l a Hegel) then from the p o i n t o f view o f freedom i t should make no d i f f e r e n c e whether the people s u b j e c t t o the law agree t o i t or not.  The only c r u c i a l p o i n t i s t h a t i t i s i n t h e i r  to do so.  interest  I t i s here t h a t Rousseau and myself p a r t company  with Hardin. Hardin chose Hegel f o r h i s d e f i n i t i o n of freedom because i n h i s d e f i n i t i o n the source o f the law was to whether i t enhanced o r i n h i b i t e d freedom.  irrelevant  The law a g a i n s t  t h e f t t o which Hardin r e f e r s i n c r e a s e d freedom not because all  agreed t o i t ,  but because the t h i e f ' s a c t i v i t i e s  f e r r e d w i t h the a c t i v i t i e s and freedoms of o t h e r s .  interA law  a g a i n s t t h e f t d e c l a r e d by a d i c t a t o r would have the same effect.  We  can see the e x t e n t t o which Hardin u n w i t t i n g l y  accepts such a n o t i o n o f freedom by l o o k i n g a t h i s d i s c u s s i o n of t a x a t i o n . To say t h a t we mutually agree t o . . . c o e r c i o n i s not to say that, we are r e q u i r e d t o enjoy i t , o r even to pretend we enjoy i t . Who enjoys taxes? We a l l grumble about them. But we accept compulsory taxes because we r e c o g n i z e t h a t v o l u n t a r y taxes would f a v o r the c o n s c i e n c e l e s s . We i n s t i t u t e and (grumb l i n g l y ) support taxes and o t h e r c o e r c i v e d e v i c e s to escape the h o r r o r of the common. (Hardin, p. 12 4 7) While Hardin does not speak d i r e c t l y t o the q u e s t i o n , i t seems c l e a r t h a t f o r him "mutual agreement" does n o t mean " s e l f - l e g i s l a t i o n " , but r a t h e r "grumbling acceptance":, and grumbling acceptance i s h a r d l y freedom. To u n d e r l i n e t h i s p o i n t i t i s u s e f u l t o compare our a t t i t u d e towards taxes t o our a t t i t u d e towards p r i v a t e  31  purchases. pay  Taxes can t h e o r e t i c a l l y be seen as the p r i c e we  f o r purchases  o f p u b l i c goods and, f o r t h i s - r e a s o n ,  as v e r y s i m i l a r t o the p r i c e s we pay f o r p r i v a t e consumer items.  Yet the e x p e r i e n c e o f p u r c h a s i n g consumer items  i s u s u a l l y one o f freedom.  Except i n times o f dramatic  i n f l a t i o n , t h e payment o f t h e p r i c e o f an o b j e c t i s u s u a l l y seen as f a i r and n o t e x p e r i e n c e d as an i m p o s i t i o n . But taxes are always e x p e r i e n c e d as t h e i m p o s i t i o n o f an a l i e n force.  The reason f o r t h i s i s o f course t h a t , on t h e whole,  they a r e t h e i m p o s i t i o n o f an a l i e n f o r c e .  While r e p r e s e n t a -  t i v e government p r o v i d e s t h e r a t i o n a l e f o r c l a i m i n g t h a t laws passed a r e the w i l l o f t h e p e o p l e —  this claim i s patently  false. One  e f f e c t o f h a v i n g t h i s c l a i m i n such dramatic  dis-  agreement w i t h the r e a l i t y i s the " t r a d i t i o n a l s k e p t i c a l a t t i t u d e towards government t h a t abounds i n a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e democracy.  The r e s u l t i s t h a t freedom i s almcst  entirely  a s s o c i a t e d w i t h freedom from government i n t e r f e r e n c e and the e n a b l i n g and f r e e i n g a s p e c t o f government i s o v e r l o o k e d . In p a r t i c u l a r t h e c a p a c i t y o f a form o f c o l l e c t i v e  decision  making t o p r o v i d e us w i t h c h o i c e s about our c o l l e c t i v e environment about  i s almost t o t a l l y i g n o r e d i n p o p u l a r d i s c u s s i o n s  the r e l a t i o n s h i p between freedom and government. While many people w i l l  complain about the r e s t r i c t i o n s  t h a t zoning laws impose on t h e i n d i v i d u a l , they a r e i g n o r i n g the f a c t t h a t such zoning laws make p o s s i b l e the c h o i c e o f  32 neighborhood by a s s u r i n g t h a t there w i l l be a c e r t a i n amount o f u n i f o r m i t y i n the neighborhood. t h i s uniformity  ( u s u a l l y i n f o r m a l l y a r r i v e d at) i s e x a c t l y  what c o n s t i t u t e s a neighborhood. choices  Indeed,-some o f  But even these kinds of  ( i . e . choices n o t o n l y about our house, b u t also-"!  about o u r immediate environment) c o u l d a l s o be p r o v i d e d a tyranny.  by - i  Because o f zoning r e s t r i c t i o n s , we do have  s e c u r i t y and a c e r t a i n amount o f consumer c h o i c e , b u t we do n o t have the p o l i t i c a l , freedom t o a c t u a l l y decide the laws t h a t should  c o n s t i t u t e our neighborhood.*  choice and t h i s freedom can only be p r o v i d e d  upon This  i f those .  s u b j e c t t o laws are a l s o those i n v o l v e d i n t h e i r  legislation.  Only through a c t u a l l y p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n d e c i s i o n s made about the c o l l e c t i v e environment can one e n t e r i n t o c o l l e c t i v e arrangements and s t i l l m a i n t a i n  a sense o f freedom.  s o l u t i o n to freedom l o s t i n the name of b e t t e r i s n o t simply  acceptance o f o t h e r o p t i o n s  The  coordination  (like security or  s u r v i v a l ) , but r a t h e r the replacement o f t h i s freedom with the freedom t h a t comes from p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n c o l l e c t i v e d e c i s i o n making.  And i t i s t o the e l a b o r a t i o n o f the concept  of p a r t i c i p a t i o n t h a t I must now t u r n .  * I t has been brought to my a t t e n t i o n t h a t there i s a c t u a l l y a good d e a l o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n many zoning changes because i n most c i t i e s such changes are preceded by l o c a l meetings. The c i t i z e n s who attend these meetings do n o t a c t u a l l y have the power t o decide on the changes, but they can use these occasions t o i n f l u e n c e t h e i r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . This i s c e r t a i n l y a step i n the r i g h t d i r e c t i o n , but does not count, as I w i l l make c l e a r l a t e r , as genuine p a r t i c i p a t i o n . There i s of course no q u e s t i o n t h a t l o c a l d e c i s i o n s such as z o i n g r e a d i l y l e n d themselves t o p a r t i c i p a t i o n , and most c i v i c d e c i s i o n s c o u l d probably a l s o be made i n a d e c e n t r a l i z e d and p a r t i c i p a t i v e manner.  33  C H A P T E R  II  THE CONCEPT OF PARTICIPATION  34  What i s p a r t i c i p a t o r y democracy? g r e a t d e a l o f t a l k about t h i s concept  There i s a l r e a d y a i n the p r e s s and n a t i o n a l  p o l i t i c s , b u t t h e t a l k i s vague and f r e q u e n t l y r h e t o r i c a l . How can p a r t i c i p a t i o n a c h i e v e t h e seemingly of c o o r d i n a t i o n and freedom?  incompatible goals  And even i f t h i s i s p o s s i b l e ,  i s not the concept o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n e s s e n t i a l l y a r c h a i c , s u i t e d a t b e s t f o r s i m p l e , p a s t o r a l communities o f some p r o b a b l y imaginary p a s t ? based  I s n o t the b e l i e f i n p a r t i c i p a t o r y democracy  on a n a i v e view o f human n a t u r e and people's a b i l i t y t o  t r a n s c e n d t h e i r s e l f - i n t e r e s t when p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n p o l i t i c s ? The  skepticism evinced i n the questions that  immediately  come t o mind r e g a r d i n g p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s so widespread, the l i t e r a t u r e o f p o l i t i c a l  theory, that r e a l  even i n  participation  has been d i s m i s s e d b e f o r e g e t t i n g a h e a r i n g .  We have become  so accustomed t o a s s o c i a t i n g "democracy" w i t h r e p r e s e n t a t i v e ? democracy t h a t the very i d e a l o f a c t i v e c i t i z e n  participation  and s e l f r u l e i s n o t even a s s o c i a t e d w i t h democracy.  While  the abandonment o f the i d e a l o f democracy as a means o f a c t i v e c i t i z e n involvement  i n s e l f government dates back perhaps t o  the e a r l y u t i l i t a r i a n s , most r e c e n t t h e o r i s t s take t h e i r from Joseph  lead  Schumpeter.  Schumpeter, i n h i s famous work, C a p i t a l i s m , S o c i a l i s m and Democracy, c l a i m e d t h a t the c l a s s i c a l c o n c e p t i o n o f democracy ( i . e . genuine c o l l e c t i v e s e l f r u l e ) was u t t e r l y and t h a t the advantage o f democratic  unrealistic,  government i s n o t t h a t the  35  people r u l e ., but t h a t through p e r i o d i c e l e c t i o n s they are t o e x e r t a c e r t a i n k i n d o f i n f l u e n c e on the r u l e r s . p a r t i c u l a r , thanks t o the c o m p e t i t i o n v o t e s o f the masses, the e l i t e are  Schumpeter was  an economist, the  o f democracy" and c l e a r l y no  f o r c e d t o g i v e the .  of a competitive  Democracy then becomes"That  the  majority (Since  s i m i l a r i t y between h i s  the c l a s s i c theory  accident.)  In  among the e l i t e s f o r  of people more o r l e s s the k i n d o f r u l e they d e s i r e  able  "logic  market i s institut-  i o n a l arrangement f o r a r r i v i n g a t p o l i t i c a l d e c i s i o n s i n which i n d i v i d u a l s acquire  the power to d e c i d e by means of a compet-  i t i v e s t r u g g l e f o r the p e o p l e ' s v o t e "  (p. 269).  v i r t u e under t h i s view c o n s i s t s o f i t b e i n g not r u l e by But  the  the a n c i e n t and  tyranny,  t r u e i d e a l o f democracy i s genuine  T h i s i d e a l has  term ' p a r t i c i p a t o r y democracy'.  been r e v i v e d under  While t h i s term has  a l o t o f vague usage r e c e n t l y I wish t o use By  a check on  people.  r u l e by the people.  sense.  Democracy's  experienced  i t i n a very  strong  ' p a r t i c i p a t o r y democracy' I w i l l meanj^that  governmental arrangement whereby a l l those s i g n i f i c a n t l y by  the  a d e c i s i o n are a c t i v e l y i n v o l v e d  through both d i s c u s s i o n and concept which I w i l l c a l l  voting."  i n the making o f a d e c i s i o n I wish a l s o t o o u t l i n e a  " i d e a l p a r t i c i p a t o r y democracy" which  isi'a p a r t i c i p a t o r y democracy i n which a l l s i g n i f i c a n t r e q u i r e consensus."  affected  decisions  I w i l l argue t h a t i n such an i d e a l  ment Rousseau's g o a l of freedom and  coordination  can be  arrangeachieved.  36  The-ideal  version of participation  serves  to'underline  t h e - g o a l o f a l l f o r m s o f p a r t i c i p a t o r y ::democracy,. v i z . c o o r d i n a t i o n -and—freedom,- a n d a l s o s e r v e s — t o e s s e n t i a l means by—which discussion  t h i s — g o a l - i s t o be a c h i e v e d  and p e r s u a s i o n .  p e r s o n must b e p e r s u a d e d or decision before this  community  F o r i n "the  whatever-law'---is p a s s e d . - -  of the best  decision while  forwilling  S u c h ^an i d e a l  o f p a r t i c i p a t o r y - democracy should" s e r v e from  that-used  the~notion  to;clearly  -  d i s t i n g u i s h -genuine- p a r t i c i p a t i o n  attached-to  In p a r t i c u l a r ,  presented  on-the - t e l e v i s i o n .  approximate  the goal  part o f the notion effort  Under - t h i s  television  scheme, t h e n a t i o n s '  r u l e by p e r s u a s i o n  device  a f t e r . having_ heard-,.theiissues-S u c h an a r r a n g e m e n t  o f u n i v e r s a l v o t i n g which  of participation,  i n the d i r e c t i o n  to clearly  from t h e s c i e n c e f i c t i o n  engage i n w e e k l y v o t i n g t h r o u g h a  their  demarcate  i n various so-called participatory  the-..-importance~o.f -^persuasion:- a n d . _ ~ d i s c u s s i o n - s e r v e s  fantasy o f T V voting.-  at the  adherence t o  underlying  schemes t h a t -have r e c e n t l y " - b e e n — d i s c u s s e d . - -  citizens=could  Ideally  e n g a g e s a l l members o f t h e a f f e c t e d  i n the discovery  notion  o f a law  t o submit t o i t .  same t i m e i t p r o m o t e s t h e c o n d i t i o n s  this  —  ideal-system-each-*  o f the reasonableness  he i s r e q u i r e d  process -actively  suggest-_-the- —  i s certainly  b u t w o u l d be no more an  of maintaining-the  than the c u r r e n t  could  condition" of the -  representative  system.  37  But how can the c l a i m t h a t p a r t i c i p a t i o n can achieve c o o r d i n a t i o n and freedom be maintained?  7Are you n o t unfree  when a law p r o h i b i t s you a c t i n g i n a c e r t a i n way  regardless  of whether you were i n v o l v e d i n the l e g i s l a t i o n o f t h i s law, regardless  o f whether you supported the law?  The  c l a s s i c answers t o t h i s o b j e c t i o n can be found i n  Rousseau, but before  ^discussing his rather  answers, I wish t o e l a b o r a t e coordination patory  By  l e a s t i n the i d e a l  To make t h i s argument I must f i r s t  r a t h e r contentious "subjective  my own argument t h a t freedom and  can be a c h i e v e d - - a t  system.  disappointing  partici-  introduce  n o t i o n o f freedom, which I w i l l  a  call  freedom".  ' s u b j e c t i v e freedom  1  I w i l l mean "the absence o f  c o e r c i v e r e s t r a i n t s on those a c t i o n s which one a c t u a l l y d e s i r e s to do".  This freedom, u n l i k e the one which has been  by I s a i a h B e r l i n and others of c o e r c i o n —  as negative  freedom —  i s dependent on the persuasion  described  the absence  o f the s u b j e c t .  Whether a person i s f r e e o r n o t then becomes a q u e s t i o n  n o t only  about the boundaries o f c o e r c i o n , b u t a l s o about t h e d e s i r e s of the s u b j e c t .  I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o note t h a t w h i l e B e r l i n condemns  the s u b j e c t i v e n o t i o n of freedom, he h i m s e l f on o c c a s i o n i t with h i s " o b j e c t i v e " negative i s tempting because the value  freedom.*  This  confuses  confusion  o f freedom depends p r e t t y  much on the d e s i r e s o f the s u b j e c t s .  We wish t o be  *7As he admits i n h i s i n t r o d u c t i o n t o Four Essays on L i b e r t y . P. x x x v i i i .  38  " f r e e " because we wish t o do what we want;  we n e i t h e r wish t o  be f r u s t r a t e d n o r i n t i m i d a t e d from doing what we want.  And  it  who  i s t h i s s u b j e c t i v e freedom which i s p r o v i d e d t o those  are s u b j e c t t o a s e l f l e g i s l a t i n g assembly i n which they aire participants — law  p r o v i d e d o f course  t h a t they v o t e d  t o which they are s u b j e c t . For example.  In the case o f zoning  (mentioned i n the  l a s t c h a p t e r ) , p a r t i c i p a n t s i n c o l l e c t i v e zoning will  f o r the  legislation  n o t be a b l e , say, t o b u i l d t h e i r houses as h i g h as they  might i n d i v i d u a l l y wish, b u t they w i l l be a b l e t o speak and vote on t h e allowed h e i g h t f o r a l l neighbourhood houses. may  I  f o r example wish t o b u i l d my house f o u r s t o r i e s h i g h i n  o r d e r t o g e t an even b e t t e r view o f the mountains, b u t a t a meeting o f the zoning l e g i s l a t u r e I may be persuaded t o pass a law p r o h i b i t i n g b u i l d i n g g r e a t e r than two s t o r i e s  , recogn-  i z i n g t h a t u n l i m i t e d — h e i g h t — b u i l d i n g would n o t o n l y  destroy  the neighbourhood, but would u l t i m a t e l y d e f e a t my d e s i r e t o improve my view as o t h e r s b u i l t as h i g h o r h i g h e r .  Such an  example n e a t l y i l l u s t r a t e s Rousseau's views about the g e n e r a l and p a r t i c u l a r w i l l .  Each o f us may w e l l go i n t o the  l e g i s l a t u r e s e e k i n g t o maximize our p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t (get the b e s t view f o r o u r s e l v e s by b u i l d i n g high), but such d e s i r e s are so i n t e r r e l a t e d t h a t each has an o v e r l a p p i n g o r g e n e r a l aspect.  We each d e s i r e the b e s t view f o r o u r s e l v e s , but we  can come t o r e c o g n i z e i n t h e assembly t h a t t h i s g o a l can o n l y  39 be r e a l i z e d by private w i l l s .  collective control — We  not by the anarchy o f  must t r y to f i n d a way  of  satisfying  everyone's d e s i r e i n as f a i r a manner as p o s s i b l e . process i s s u c c e s s f u l the i n d i v i d u a l would leave  I f the  the  assembly  not f r e e to b u i l d to whatever h e i g h t he might have chosen without thought to the behaviour and e f f e c t s o f o t h e r s , f r e e to b u i l d to the h e i g h t which he i s now reasonable and  f a i r one-v  but  persuaded i s the  This i s the freedom o f  "self-  prescription" . And  t h i s i s no second-rate freedom.  value o f negative do what you want. freedom" i n v o l v e s .  For s u r e l y  freedom comes p r i m a r i l y from b e i n g And  t h i s i s j u s t the freedom t h a t  the  f r e e to "subjective  When the s u b j e c t i s i n v o l v e d i n the  l e g i s l a t i o n o f h i s laws, then there i s a g r e a t l y p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t the r e s t r a i n t s imposed by  increased  law w i l l not  be  experienced as s u b j e c t i v e unfreedoms because the s u b j e c t been persuaded to abandon the r e l e v a n t d e s i r e s had  them).  To see  ( i f he  has  ever  t h i s p o i n t r e q u i r e s perhaps some  r e f l e c t i o n on the n o t i o n o f d e s i r e . Our wants are not a l l uniform i n s t r e n g t h , nor f r e e from c o n f l i c t and  contradiction.  r e f l e c t i o n t h a t should  go on i n the  are  they  P a r t o f the process o f  assembly i s the s o r t i n g out,  not only o f c o l l e c t i v e wants, but each i n d i v i d u a l ' s wants.  And  i d e a l l y what should happen i s t h a t most, o r perhaps a l l , should be  able to get what, on r e f l e c t i o n , they want.  T h i s means o f course  t a k i n g i n t o account t h a t people not only wish to s a t i s f y  their  40  immediate d e s i r e s , but a l s o such l o n g term d e s i r e s as peace, security  and community.  These are a l s o wants and have  p l a c e as we work out what "we  r e a l l y want".  For  their  example  a person who wishes t o b u i l d a t a l l house i n o r d e r t o have a good view i s not, as a r e s u l t o f h i s l e g i s l a t i v e e x p e r i e n c e , persuaded t o abandon the d e s i r e f o r a good view.  Rather  he i s persuaded t h a t i n a community t h e o n l y way  to achieve  t h i s end i s c o l l e c t i v e r e s t r a i n t . of  external r e s t r a i n t ,  The e x p e r i e n c e i s n o t one  but a r e a l i z a t i o n  of n e c e s s i t y of  compromise and the j u s t i c e o f o t h e r ' s c l a i m s . t o s a t i s f y h i s unrefiectivebut  desire to b u i l d  He i s not  free  as h i g h as he wishes,  he i s a b l e t o s a t i s f y h i s more fundamental d e s i r e t o have  some view and t o l i v e h a p p i l y i n a community. participation  (and t h e r e f o r e on r e f l e c t i o n )  Ironically,  though Rousseau  He i s , through  subjectively  free.  introduces a subjective  d e f i n i t i o n of freedom i n the passage where he d e f i n e s moral freedom, he does not use t h i s d e f i n i t i o n that p a r t i c i p a t i o n  t o defend h i s c l a i m  p r o v i d e s a means o f r e a l i z i n g  freedom and  coordination.  In Book I o f The S o c i a l  C o n t r a c t , Rousseau .  d e f i n e s freedom  (or moral freedom, the passage i s u n c l e a r ) as  "obedience t o a law one p r e s c r i b e s t o o n e s e l f "  (p.65).  While t h i s would seem t o p r o v i d e a v e h i c l e f o r h i s argument, i t has a c r u c i a l l i m i t a t i o n . describe " s e l f prescription" participating  F o r u n l e s s Rousseau wishes t o as simply b e i n g p r e s e n t and  i n the d i s c u s s i o n s of t h e assembly, those  41  who voted a g a i n s t a p a r t i c u l a r law would n o t be " s e l f p r e s c r i b i n g " , and t h e r e f o r e would n o t be f r e e .  In other  words, u s i n g h i s d e f i n i t i o n o f freedom, o n l y those who v o t e d for  a law would be f r e e , and freedom f o r a l l c o u l d o n l y be  p r e s e r v e d w i t h a consensus d e c i s i o n procedure. argues t h a t such a procedure for  But Rousseau  i s n e i t h e r n e c e s s a r y nor p r a c t i c a l  the p a r t i c i p a t o r y system t o p r e s e r v e t h e freedom o f i t s  citizens.*  Rather he argues t h a t t h e f a c t t h a t t h e assembly  r u l e s i n accord with the general w i l l  i s what p r e s e r v e s t h e  freedom o f t h e d i s s i d e n t s . How can-the opposing m i n o r i t y be both f r e e and s u b j e c t t o laws t o which they have n o t consented? I answer t h a t t h e q u e s t i o n i s b a d l y f o r m u l a t e d . The c i t i z e n consents t o a l l t h e laws, even t o those t h a t a r e passed a g a i n s t h i s w i l l , and even t o those which p u n i s h him when he dares t o break any one o f them. The c o n s t a n t w i l l o f a l l t h e members o f t h e s t a t e i s the general w i l l ; i t i s through i t t h a t they a r e c i t i z e n s and f r e e . When a law i s proposed i n t h e people's assembly, what i s asked o f them i s not p r e c i s e l y whether they approve o f t h e p r o p o s i t i o n or r e j e c t i t , b u t whether i t i s i n c o n f o r m i t y w i t h the g e n e r a l w i l l which i s t h e i r s ; each by g i v i n g h i s vote g i v e s h i s o p i n i o n on t h i s q u e s t i o n , and t h e c o u n t i n g o f votes y i e l d s a d e c l a r a t i o n o f t h e g e n e r a l will. When, t h e r e f o r e , t h e o p i n i o n c o n t r a r y t o my own p r e v a i l s , t h i s proves o n l y t h a t I have made a mistake, and t h a t what I b e l i e v e d t o be t h e g e n e r a l w i l l was. not so. I f my p a r t i c u l a r o p i n i o n had p r e v a i l e d a g a i n s t t h e g e n e r a l w i l l , I s h o u l d have done something o t h e r than what I had w i l l e d , and then I s h o u l d n o t have been f r e e . (P. 153) '  *»There i s o n l y one law which by i t s n a t u r e r e q u i r e s unanimous assent. T h i s i s t h e s o c i a l paqt. ... (p. 152)  42  Rousseau's account c e r t a i n l y seems u n f o r t u n a t e and sophisiticdi.  I t has been f a u l t e d on many grounds by h i s c r i t i c s -  One c l a s s i c o b j e c t i o n i s t h a t we simply majority to recognize will —  cannot expect the  and vote c o n s i s t e n t l y f o r the g e n e r a l  an o b j e c t i o n t o which Rousseau a c t u a l l y has q u i t e a  powerful important  answer.  (see B a r r y ,  1967, p. 122).  But the most  o b j e c t i o n i s t h a t r e g a r d l e s s o f whether the m a j o r i t y  are r i g h t o r not, their w i l l .  the m i n o r i t y a r e s t i l l  Being  forced i s not being  of whether one i s b e i n g  forced to a c t against persuaded, r e g a r d l e s s  f o r c e d t o do what i s i n one's own b e s t  i n t e r e s t , i . e . r e g a r d l e s s o f whether one actually,, i n some l o n g term sense o f 'want'^ wants t o do the a c t i o n o r wants t h e r e s u l t s t h a t come from the a c t i o n .  F o r t h e move t o f o r c e  undercuts the whole n o t i o n o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n as r u l e through reason  and p e r s u a s i o n .  Obviously  ;  i f we v o t e d  and l o s t we  were not persuaded t h a t we were wrong; though we were perhaps t o l d t h a t we were wrong.  7And, i f we a r e r e q u i r e d t o a c c o r d  our behaviour w i t h t h i s d e c i s i o n , we a r e b e i n g moved e i t h e r by our p r e v i o u s  commitment. t o obey the law, o r by the t h r e a t  of s a n c t i o n s , o r even by our r e s p e c t f o r t h e m a j o r i t y ' s wisdom, but not because we see the wisdom and reasonableness  o f the  law. Rousseau's argument has some p l a u s i b i l i t y confused  with a kind of opinion p o l l .  the assembly was "What do you want?"  i f voting i s  I f the q u e s t i o n asked and w h i l e  expressing  43  o u r o p i n i o n on t h i s q u e s t i o n we a l s o v o i c e d an o p i n i o n as t o the p r o b a b l e r e s u l t , then we c o u l d o f c o u r s e be wrong.  And  i f we had a g r e e d b e f o r e h a n d t o do whatever t h e m a j o r i t y w i s h e d , we would n o t be f o r c e d i n t h e r e l e v a n t sense t o go along with the majority. question  asked.  But t h i s i s c r u c i a l l y n o t t h e  We a r e n o t asked about o u r d e s i r e s , b u t  about o u r judgement, and t o be f o r c e d t o a c t a g a i n s t judgement i s t o be made u n f r e e  By  one's  i n an e x t r e m e l y i m p o r t a n t  sense.  now i t s h o u l d be c l e a r t h a t I do n o t b e l i e v e t h a t a  p a r t i c i p a t i v e government can a c h i e v e  both c o o r d i n a t i o n and  freedom w i t h o u t a consensus d e c i s i o n p r o c e d u r e .  What then  does p a r t i c i p a t o r y democracy o f f e r t h e m i n o r i t y  that i s not  a v a i l a b l e i n a system o f e l i t e or not? has  Respect.  r u l e , whether p o p u l a r l y  elected  Under t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n one  r e c e i v e d t h e maximum amount o f r e s p e c t  c a p a c i t y compatible with  f o r one's r a t i o n a l  c o l l e c t i v e coordination.  The  e s s e n t i a l q u a l i t y t h e p a r t i c i p a t o r y democracy o f f e r s ..the. . minority  i s not,  strictly  s p e a k i n g , one o f freedom, b u t r a t h e r  a f a i r consideration of i t s opinions, ility  of influence.  and an e x t e n s i v e  possib-  But t h i s q u a l i t y i s n o t so far.removed  from the n o t i o n o f freedom.  As B e r l i n p o i n t s out, the  e s s e n t i a l i n g r e d i e n t o f what he c a l l s the n o t i o n o f "positive  freedom" i s the d e s i r e t o be t r e a t e d l i k e a r a t i o n a l  being  44  T h e ' p o s i t i v e ' sense o f t h e word ' l i b e r t y ' d e r i v e s from t h e wish on the p a r t o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l t o be h i s own master .... I w i s h t o be a s u b j e c t n o t an object; t o be moved by r e a s o n s , by c o n s c i o u s purpose, which are my own, n o t by causes which a f f e c t me, as i t were, from t h e o u t s i d e . ... I w i s h . t o be a doer — d e c i d i n g , n o t b e i n g d e c i d e d f o r , s e l f - d i r e c t e d and not acted upon by e x t e r n a l n a t u r e o r by o t h e r men as i f I were a t h i n g , o r an a n i m a l , o r a s l a v e i n c a p a b l e o f p l a y i n g a human r o l e ... T h i s i s a t l e a s t p a r t o f what I mean when I say t h a t I am r a t i o n a l , and t h a t i t i s my r e a s o n t h a t d i s t i n g u i s h e s me as a human b e i n g from t h e r e s t o f the w o r l d . ( B e r l i n , p. 131) Despite  Berlin's e f f o r t s to deride  t h i s n o t i o n o f freedom  (and h i s complaint i s l a r g e l y about what has been done w i t h it),  i t i s important t o note t h a t t h i s sense o f t h e word i s  the most a n c i e n t .  "Free"  and 'freedom' were o r i g i n a l l y  c o n t r a s t e d w i t h s l a v e r y , n o t w i t h t h e p r e s e n c e o f governmental coercion.  C.S. Lewis i n h i s S t u d i e s  the Greek and L a t i n words status. Saxon,"  The o p p o s i t e (p. 114).  i n Words w r i t e s :  "Like  (free) o r i g i n a l l y r e f e r s , t o l e g a l  i s slave —  theow i n c l a s s i c a l A n g l o -  In a d d i t i o n "freedom" has another  original  a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h the concept o f p o s i t i v e freedom. L i k e e l e u t h e r i a and l i b e r t a s , freedom and f r a n c h i s e can o f course mean the l e g a l freedom o f the community. But the a n c i e n t words a r e used c h i e f l y , i f not e n t i r e l y , .' i n r e f e r e n c e t o t h e freedom o f a s t a t e . The c o n t r a s t i s sometimes between autonomy and s u b j e c t i o n t o f o r e i g n power; sometimes between t h e freedom o f a r e p u b l i c and the r u l e o f a despot. (Lewis, p. 12 4-5) In a t r u l y p a r t i c i p a t o r y democracy then a l l men must be t r e a t e d as 'freemen'.  They must n o t be used o r c o e r c e d f o r  the p r i v a t e ends o f i n d i v i d u a l s . By e x t e n s i o n ,  coercion  even  45  f o r " p u b l i c purposes, r e q u i r i n g  as i t does t h e i n v o l u n t a r y  s u b m i s s i o n - o f ~ a freemany-must be k e p t " t o an a b s o l u t e minimum. A c i t i z e n . m u s t _ a l w a y s . b e treated--with-maximum_respect reasonableness  and i t i s i m p o r t a n t , i f t h i s  for..his  respectful  r e l a t i o n s h i p i s t o be m a i n t a i n e d , t h a t a l l d e v i a t i o n s t h e i d e a l r u l e o f consensus e x i g e n c i e s o f time.  be  justified  by the  genuine  C o n v e r s e l y , the more i m p o r t a n t t h e  d e c i s i o n , o t h e r t h i n g s b e i n g e q u a l , the "less any from consensus  from  can be tolerated:-  deviation  The community's r e s p e c t  for  i n d i v i d u a l i n t e g r i t y r e q u i r e s maximum c o n s i d e r a t i o n  for  i n d i v i d u a l o b j e c t i o n s i n matters of  Rousseau summarizes t h i s p o i n t  importance.  nicely:  f i r s t , the more i m p o r t a n t and s e r i o u s the matter t o be d e c i d e d , the c l o s e r s h o u l d the o p i n i o n which i s t o p r e v a i l approach u n a n i m i t y ; second the s w i f t e r the d e c i s i o n t h e q u e s t i o n demands, the s m a l l e r t h e p r e s c r i b e d m a j o r i t y : may .be a l l o w e d t o become; and i n d e c i s i o n s .which-have-±o b e - g i v e n .immediately-,-" a majority.".Df-one.: must s u f f i c e . TheT.first of these maxims might seem t o be more s u i t e d t o the enactment laws, the second t o - t h e d i s p a t c h o f a d m i n i s t r a t i v e business.- - A t a l l e v e n t s , i t i s by a" c o m b i n a t i o n of the two maxims t h a t we can determine the r i g h t s i z e f o r the m a j o r i t y t h a t i s t o d e c i d e on any question/ (p. 154) Let  me  summarize the argument so .far:  The  i d e a l of  p a r t i c i p a t o r y democracy i s t o have a l l t h o s e s u b j e c t t o a c o l l e c t i v e d e c i s i o n p r e s e n t as a c t i v e p a r t i c i p a n t s and v o t e r s i n t h e assembly the,assembly for  which makes the c o l l e c t i v e d e c i s i o n .  w i l l attempt  t o a c h i e v e consensus  t h e community through t h e p r o c e s s o f  Ideally,  on what i s b e s t  collective rational  r e f l e c t i o n , as t h i s p r e s e r v e s subjective-, freedom  r  for a l l .  46  The  r u l e o f consensus i s t h e p r o c e d u r a l  i d e a l o f complete r e s p e c t  embodiment o f t h e  f o r t h e r a t i o n a l i t y and freedom o f  a l l citizens,and deviations  from t h i s r u l e should  as i s r e q u i r e d by t h e e x i g e n c i e s  But what reasons a r e t h e r e assembly would r u l e w i s e l y ?  be as l i t t l e  of decision-making.  to think the p a r t i c i p a t o r y  Can any c o l l e c t i o n o f p e o p l e  be supposed c a p a b l e o f s e l f - r u l e through assembly democracy? Rousseau d i d n o t t h i n k so.  In f a c t , he .believed t h a t  under r a t h e r s t r i n g e n t c o n d i t i o n s could. -the assembly expected t o r u l e r e l i a b l y i n t h e g e n e r a l f o r e express t h e g e n e r a l the assembly s h o u l d  will.  only  be  i n t e r e s t , and t h e r e - -  F i r s t , he b e l i e v e d  that  only turn i t s l e g i s l a t i v e a t t e n t i o n t o  i s s u e s o f broad g e n e r a l i t y .  F o r under such c o n d i t i o n s  each  submits h i m s e l f t o the same c o n d i t i o n s which he imposes on o t h e r s ; t h i s admirable harmony o f i n t e r e s t and j u s t i c e g i v e s t o s o c i a l d e l i b e r a t i o n s a q u a l i t y o f e q u i t y which d i s a p p e a r s a t once from the d i s c u s s i o n o f any i n d i v i d u a l d i s p u t e p r e c i s e l y because i n these l a t t e r cases t h e r e i s no common i n t e r e s t t o u n i t e and i d e n t i f y the d e c i s i o n o f the : judge w i t h t h a t o f the c o n t e n d i n g p a r t i e s . (Rousseau, p. 76) I t i s l a r g e l y because o f t h i s r e s t r i c t i o n t h a t Rousseau b e l i e v e d t h a t i n a w e l l run s t a t e t h e d e c i s i o n s o f the assembly would tend t o unanimity. provides But  For t h i s  arrangement  a means by which a l l may maximize t h e i r  self-interest.  t h i s is. o n l y t h e case on the c o n d i t i o n t h a t t h e assembly  i s concerning  i t s e l f w i t h such i s s u e s o f broad g e n e r a l i t y as  47  the c r i m i n a l law o r i s s u e s which have such o p t i m a l as my zoning  example.  Unfortunately,  solutions -  i f any "government i s  t o be r e l e v a n t i t must t u r n i t s a t t e n t i o n t o concerns and d e c i s i o n s which do n o t a f f e c t a l l e q u a l l y .  What then  happens t o Rousseau's argument t h a t the assembly c o u l d be expected t o r u l e w i s e l y , what happens t o the g e n e r a l  will?  What i n f a c t happens t o the v e r y concept o f "the p u b l i c interest"?  For, i f a d e c i s i o n does n o t a f f e c t a l l more o r  l e s s e q u a l l y , what i s the warrant f o r s a y i n g i s i n "the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t " ?  that t h i s  decision  Given t h a t a d e c i s i o n o f the  assembly does n o t a f f e c t a l l e q u a l l y , i s i t not more honest t o say t h a t the d e c i s i o n was i n the i n t e r e s t o f a  large~subset  o f the p u b l i c , o r perhaps t h a t i t was i n the m a j o r i t y ' s interest? Brian Barry, (Barry,  '•  :  i n a w e l l known essay on the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t "  1967) has used a v e r s i o n o f Rousseau's account t o  defend the concept o f p u b l i c i n t e r e s t from d e t r a c t o r s who claim ally Barry  ( f o r reasons suggested above) t h a t i t p l a y s an e s s e n t i i d e o l o g i c a l and o b f u s c a t o r y argued t h a t we should  r o l e i n p u b l i c debate.  think of the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t not  as s e r v i n g t h e i n t e r e s t o f a l l e q u a l l y , b u t as s e r v i n g us a l l e q u a l l y i n o u r r o l e as c i t i z e n s r a t h e r than as i n d i v i d u a l s i n a l l our r o l e s .  As B a r r y puts i t :  - :  I n s t e a d o f simply s a y i n g t h a t some measure i s i n h i s i n t e r e s t s ' a man w i l l o f t e n s p e c i f y some r o l e o r c a p a c i t y i n which i t i s f a v o u r a b l e t o him: 'as-a 1  48 parent' , as a businessman' , 'as a houseowner and so on. One o f t h e c a p a c i t i e s i n which everyone f i n d s h i m s e l f i s t h a t o f 'a member o f the p u b l i c ' . Some i s s u e s allow a p o l i c y t o be produced which w i l l a f f e c t everyone i n t h i s capacity. This i s the pure 'Rousseau' s i t u a t i o n , (pp. 123-124) 1  1  Such a r e d e s c r i p t i o n o f the "Rousseau s i t u a t i o n " does, I t h i n k , save t h e concept o f p u b l i c i n t e r e s t , but a t the expense o f abandoning i t s automatic c o i n c i d e n c e Rousseau's model, j u s t i c e  (taken  with j u s t i c e .  apparently  F o r under  t o mean e q u a l i t y )  i s supposedly the automatic r e s u l t o f d i s c o v e r i n g the g e n e r a l interest.  But i n Barry's  account, j u s t i c e i s an a d d i t i o n a l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n , f o r a law c o u l d w e l l a f f e c t us a l l e q u a l l y as c i t i z e n s , b u t d i s t r i b u t e g r e a t e r b e n e f i t s o r l o s s e s t o us as individuals  ( i . e . i n the t o t a l i t y o f our r o l e s ) .  F o r example:  A law upgrading the standards f o r f a c t o r y p o l l u t i o n emission::., i s one t h a t w i l l b e n e f i t us a l l e q u a l l y as c i t i z e n s , b u t c e r t a i n manufacturers w i l l be f o r c e d t o bear the c o s t o f improving t h e i r f a c t o r i e s .  They can be expected t o request  a s s i s t a n c e t o meet these requirements o r even t o oppose the d e c i s i o n f o r , even though the d e c i s i o n i s i n the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t and  t h e r e f o r e i n t h e i r i n t e r e s t , they are p a y i n g the c o s t .  Whether t h e i r o b j e c t i o n s  and requests  or n o t i s a d i f f e r e n t q u e s t i o n  for assistance  are j u s t  than whether h i g h e r p o l l u t i o n  standards are i n the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t .  And w h i l e i t i s  i r r e l e v a n t t o my concern a t the moment, i t i s , I b e l i e v e , appropriate  t o p o i n t out t h a t such a d d i t i o n a l costs t h a t  standards i n f l i c t on the producer are an i n t e r n a l i z a t i o n  high -  H  49  of e x t e r n a l i t i e s  ( i . e . the p r o d u c e r i s now  having  t o pay  which f o r m e r l y were borne by the whole community) and i i f are q u i t e  so  fair.  But g i v e n the abandonment o f equal any  costs  e f f e c t s , i s there  reason t o t h i n k t h a t p a r t i c i p a t o r y democracy would r u l e  wisely? Two  arguments can be g i v e n h e r e .  F i r s t , the  presence  o f those a f f e c t e d by a d e c i s i o n can be hoped to have an a m e l i o r a t i n g a f f e c t on the w i l l i n g n e s s o f the assembly t o deal u n j u s t l y with important,is  t h e i r claims.  But  the c l a i m t h a t p a r t i c i p a t i o n not o n l y p r o v i d e s  mechanism f o r s e l f r u l e , i t p r o v i d e s rule.  The  second, and more a  also a "school" f o r t h i s  advocates o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n , Rousseau i n c l u d e d ,  have long argued t h a t because p a r t i c i p a t i o n r e q u i r e s  partici-  pants t o take o t h e r people's p o i n t s o f view i n t o account, t o couch t h e i r arguments  (and t h e r e f o r e f i n a l l y t h e i r  and  thoughts)  i n terms o f the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t , p a r t i c i p a n t s w i l l become l e s s e g o i s t i c and more moral i n t h e i r c o n c e r n s . t h a t the experience  of p a r t i c i p a t i o n  "...which alone makes man governed by a p p e t i t e alone law one  Rousseau argues  g i v e s man  the master of h i m s e l f ;  f o r to  be  i s s l a v e r y w h i l e obedience to a  p r e s c r i b e s t o o n e s e l f i s freedom"  P a r t i c i p a t i o n then not o n l y p r o v i d e s  (Rousseau, p.65). a means f o r a l l to  maximize t h e i r s e l f i n t e r e s t , i t a l s o p r o v i d e s education  "moral freedom"  the moral  so t h a t those r e q u i r e d t o s a c r i f i c e t h e i r i n t e r e s t  50  t o t h a t o f t h e community do s o w i l l i n g l y , community c o n s i s t e n t l y d e d i c a t e s  itself  deliberation  with  genuinely concerned  Ironically, participation Representative  the best  i s morally  statement educative  G o v e r n m e n t.  Mill  and t h a t t h e whole  to justice  and t o  t h e p u b l i c good.  of the claim that i s t o be f o u n d  in Mill's  argues:  V e r y d i f f e r e n t i s t h e s t a t e o f t h e human f a c u l t i e s w h e r e J a human b e i n g f e e l s h i m s e l f u n d e r no o t h e r e x t e r n a l r e s t r a i n t than the n e c e s s i t i e s of nature, o r mandates o f s o c i e t y w h i c h he has h i s s h a r e i n i m p o s i n g , and w h i c h i t i s o p e n t o h i m , i f h e t h i n k s them wrong, p u b l i c l y t o d i s s e n t f r o m , a n d e x e r t h i m s e l f actively to get altered. T h e maximum o f t h e i n v i g o r a t i n g e f f e c t o f freedom upon t h e c h a r a c t e r i s o n l y o b t a i n e d when t h e p e r s o n a c t e d o n e i t h e r i s , o r i s - l o o k i n g -forward=ito-3becoming^a- c i t i z e n a s f u l - l y p r i v i l e g e d a s any o t h e r . What i s s t i l l more i m p o r t a n t than even t h i s m a t t e r o f f e e l i n g i s t h e p r a c t i c a l d i s c i p l i n e which the c h a r a c t e r o b t a i n s f r o m - t h e o c c a s i o n a l " demand-made upon" the" c i t i z e n s t o e x e r c i s e 7 " f o r a t i m e a n d i n t h e i r t u r n , some . social;:function..: It---i-s - n o t — s u f f i c i e n t l y c o n s i d e r e d h o w . _ - l i t t - l e — t h e r e i s i n most men's o r d i n a r y l i f e t o g i v e -any— L a r g e n e s s s e i t h e r ^ - t o - t h e i r — c o n c e p t i o n s — o r - " t o t h e i r sentiments.. Their_.work- i s . - a r o u t i n e ; n o t - a l a b o u r - o f — l o v e , b u t o f s e l f - i n t e r e s t i n t h e most elementary form, t h e s a t i s f a c t i o n o f d a i l y wants; n e i t h e r f ^ i n t r o d u c e s - - t h e mind" t o - t h o u g h t s o r " f e e l i n g s ^ e x t e n d i n g beyond i n d i v i d u a l s ; i f i n s t r u c t i v e books" a r e - w i t h i n t h e i r .reach.,-rthere i s no s t i m u l u s to---r e a d "them;" ~ a n d i n most c a s e s t h e i n d i v i d u a l h a s no access—to-any—person o f c u l t i v a t i o n much s u p e r i o r t o h i s •owff; ' GiVingi"him_.something- t o do f o r t h e - p u b l i c s s u p p l i e s : , - - ! n;a-_ m e a s u r e , a l l t h e s e d e f i c i e n c i e s . If c i r c u m s t a n c e s a l l o w t h e amount o f p u b l i c d u t y a s s i g n e d him- t o -be - c o n s i d e r a b l e v - i t makes- h i m an- e d u c a t e d man. N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h e d e f e c t s o f t h e s o c i a l , system and m o r a l i d e a s o f a n t i q u i t y , -the - p r a c t i c e — o f t h e — d i c a s t e r y and t h e e c c l e s i a r a i s e d t h e i n t e l l e c t u a l s t a n d a r d o f an a v e r a g e A t h e n i a n c i t i z e n f a r beyond a n y t h i n g o f w h i c h t h e r e i s y e t an e x a m p l e i n a n y o t h e r mass o f men, a n c i e n t o r m o d e r n . A benefit of t h e same k i n d , t h o u g h f a r l e s s i n d e g r e e , i s p r o d u c e d  51  on Englishmen o f the lower m i d d l e c l a s s by t h e i r l i a b i l i t y t o be p l a c e d on j u r i e s and t o serve p a r i s h offices; which, though i t does not occur t o so many, nor i s so c o n t i n u o u s , nor i n t r o d u c e s them t o so g r e a t a v a r i e t y o f e l e v a t e d c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , as t o admit o f comparison w i t h the p u b l i c e d u c a t i o n which every c i t i z e n of Athens o b t a i n e d from her democratic i n s t i t u t i o n s , must make them n e v e r t h e l e s s v e r y d i f f e r e n t beings i n range o f i d e a s and development o f f a c u l t i e s , from those who have done n o t h i n g i n t h e i r l i v e s but d r i v e a q u i l l , or s e l l goods over a counter. S t i l l more s a l u t a r y i s the moral p a r t o f the i n s t r u c t i o n a f f o r d e d by the p a r t i c i p a t i o n o f the p r i v a t e c i t i z e n , i f even r a r e l y , i n p u b l i c f u n c t i o n s . He i s c a l l e d upon, w h i l e so engaged, t o weigh i n t e r e s t s not h i s own; t o be guided, i n case o f c o n f l i c t i n g c l a i m s , by another r u l e than h i s p r i v a t e p a r t i a l i t i e s ; t o a p p l y , a t every t u r n , p r i n c i p l e s and maxims which have f o r t h e i r reason o f e x i s t e n c e the common good: and he u s u a l l y f i n d s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h him i n the same work minds more f a m i l i a r i z e d than h i s own w i t h these i d e a s and o p e r a t i o n s , whose study i t w i l l be t o supply reasons t o h i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g , and s t i m u l a t i o n t o h i s f e e l i n g f o r the g e n e r a l i n t e r e s t . He i s made t o f e e l h i m s e l f one o f the p u b l i c , and whatever i s f o r t h e i r b e n e f i t t o be f o r h i s b e n e f i t . Where t h i s s c h o o l of p u b l i c s p i r i t does not e x i s t , s c a r c e l y any sense i s e n t e r t a i n e d t h a t p r i v a t e persons, i n no eminent s o c i a l s i t u a t i o n , owe any d u t i e s t o s o c i e t y , except t o obey the laws and submit t o the government. There i s no u n s e l f i s h sentiment of i d e n t i f i c a t i o n w i t h the p u b l i c . Every thought or f e e l i n g , e i t h e r o f i n t e r e s t or o f duty, i s absorbed i n the i n d i v i d u a l and i n the f a m i l y . The man never t h i n k s of any c o l l e c t i v e i n t e r e s t , o f any o b j e c t s t o be pursued j o i n t l y w i t h o t h e r s , but o n l y i n c o m p e t i t i o n w i t h them, and i n some measure a t t h e i r expense. A neighbour, not b e i n g an a l l y o r an a s s o c i a t e , s i n c e he i s never engaged i n any common u n d e r t a k i n g f o r j o i n t b e n e f i t s , i s therefore only a r i v a l . Thus even p r i v a t e m o r a l i t y s u f f e r s , while public i s a c t u a l l y extinct. Were t h i s the u n i v e r s a l and o n l y p o s s i b l e s t a t e o f t h i n g s , the utmost a s p i r a t i o n s of the l a w g i v e r or the m o r a l i s t c o u l d o n l y s t r e t c h t o make the b u l k o f the community a f l o c k o f sheep i n n o c e n t l y n i b b l i n g the g r a s s s i d e by s i d e . From these accumulated c o n s i d e r a t i o n s i t i s e v i d e n t t h a t the o n l y government which can f u l l y s a t i s f y a l l  52  the e x i g e n c i e s o f the s o c i a l s t a t e i s one i n w h i c h the whole p e o p l e p a r t i c i p a t e ; t h a t any p a r t i c i p a t i o n , even i n the s m a l l e s t p u b l i c f u n c t i o n , i s u s e f u l ; t h a t the p a r t i c i p a t i o n s h o u l d everywhere be as g r e a t as the g e n e r a l degree o f improvement o f the community w i l l a l l o w ; and t h a t n o t h i n g l e s s can be u l t i m a t e l y d e s i r a b l e than the a d m i s s i o n o f a l l t o a s h a r e i n the s o v e r e i g n power o f t h e s t a t e . ( 1 9 6 4 , pp. 2 1 5 - 2 1 7 ) I have argued t h a t even though Rousseau's stricture  (i.e.  generality  t h a t t h e assembly must o n l y concern i t s e l f w i t h  issues that equally affect all)  cannot be m a i n t a i n e d , we  s t i l l e x p e c t t h a t assembly t o r u l e w i s e l y and j u s t l y of  can  because  the e d u c a t i v e a f f e c t s of p a r t i c i p a t i o n . In  rchapters  I I I and IV I w i l l d e v e l o p a more g e n e r a l  t h e o r y o f human n a t u r e w h i c h s u p p o r t s my c o n t e n t i o n of p e o p l e ' s f i t n e s s f o r p a r t i c i p a t o r y democracy.  But f o r now  I wish to  note o t h e r r e s t r i c t i o n s t h a t Rousseau p l a c e d on h i s a s s e m b l i e s . G e n e r a l i t y o f concern was n o t t h e o n l y r e s t r i c t i o n  •  Rousseau imposed on h i s a s s e m b l i e s i n an attempt t o s e c u r e d i s i n t e r e s t e d d e c i s i o n making.  He a l s o argued t h a t t h e  assembly s h o u l d riot be composed o f i n t e r e s t e d  factions.  Each c i t i z e n must come t o t h e assembly independent of p r e v i o u s commitments t o groups s m a l l e r than the assembly. The purpose o f t h i s r u l e i s o b v i o u s enough.  I t i s well  known t h a t an o r g a n i z e d m i n o r i t y can have i n f l u e n c e f a r beyond i t s s i z e o r t h e v a l u e o f i t s cause.  In a d d i t i o n ,  Rousseau, l i k e J.S. M i l l , w i s h e s t o see t h e assembly be a p l a c e where p e o p l e d e v e l o p a sense o f i d e n t i t y w i t h t h e community  53  and  i t s well-being.  I f one  comes t o the  assembly  i d e n t i f i e d w i t h a sub-group o f t h e community  already  Ce.'g. the  chamber  o f commerce, the auto worker's u n i o n , o r the L i b e r a l P a r t y ) , then the p o s s i b l i t y o f e x p e r i e n c i n g whole i s reduced.  For  i f one  i d e n t i t y w i t h the  greater  comes as a member o f these groups,  then one's primary commitment i s t o the sub-group's i n t e r e s t , not  t o the d i s c o v e r y  Rousseau r e c o g n i z e d  o f the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t . On  the o t h e r  t h a t i t would not be p o s s i b l e t o  i n t e r e s t groups i n a s t a t e o f  any  considerable  should  eliminate  size.  t h e r e f o r e recommended t h a t as many i n t e r e s t groups as  hand,  He possible  be developed, so t h a t the c r i s s c r o s s i n g l o y a l t i e s  these groups might c a n c e l  themselves out  i n each  of  individual.  T h i r d l y , Rousseau r e q u i r e s t h a t the background economic c o n d i t i o n s o f the assembly members be "no  citizen  roughly  s h a l l b e . r i c h enough t o buy  poor as t o be  forced to s e l l himself".  requirement, b e s i d e s  e l i m i n a t i n g the  e q u a l so  a n o t h e r and The  that  none so  purpose o f  this  temptations of b r i b e r y , i s  a l s o , I b e l i e v e , t o r e d u c e the r o l e o f envy i n b l o c k i n g r a t i o n a l debate.  An  a d d i t i o n a l b e n e f i t would be  up o f e q u a l s the d e c i s i o n s a r e more apt In my  1  t o f a l l on a l l e q u a l l y .  example above, I imagined a s i t u a t i o n i n which a f a c t o r y  owner o b j e c t e d But  t h a t i n a s t a t e made  i f the  to bearing  f a c t o r y was  the burden o f p o l l u t i o n c o n t r o l s .  c o l l e c t i v e l y owned, then t h e r e would  no members of the assembly who'would have, as a r e s u l t of ownership, p r i v a t e i n t e r e s t s opposed t o t h a t o f the p u b l i c . I n e q u a l i t i e s tend to read  to y i e l d  Marx to see  this  i n e q u a l i t i e s , and  point.  one  hardly  needs  be  54"  Near the v e r y one  end  l a s t suggestion  of the S o c i a l C o n t r a c t  of a means o f a s s u r i n g  Rousseau makes  a well  run:state:  the i n s t i t u t i o n o f a k i n d o f minimal r e l i g i o n whose dogmas he claimed  should  be  simple and few i n number, expressed p r e c i s e l y and w i t h o u t e x p l a n a t i o n s or commentaries. The e x i s t e n c e o f an omnipotent, i n t e l l i g e n t , b e n e v o l e n t d i v i n i t y t h a t f o r e s e e s and p r o v i d e s ; the l i f e t o come; the happiness o f the j u s t ; the punishment of sinners; the s a n c t i t y o f the s o c i a l c o n t r a c t and the law - these are the p o s i t i v e dogmas. As f o r the n e g a t i v e dogmas, I would l i m i t them t o a s i n g l e one: no i n t o l e r a n c e . I n t o l e r a n c e i s something which belongs t o the r e l i g i o n s we have r e j e c t e d , (p.186) Such a minimal f a i t h Rousseau a p p a r e n t l y pre-condition  for loyal citizenry:  uncoerced obedience.  But  f e l t was  a  the f i n a l guarantee o f  such a c o n d i t i o n seems c l e a r l y  o f l i n e w i t h Rousseau's o t h e r  out  c o n d i t i o n s which seem c l e a r l y  d i r e c t e d a t a community of reason and  p u b l i c r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , not  mindless t e r r o r o f punishment i n an a f t e r — l i f e .  I t seems t h a t  i n adding t h i s l a s t i d e a , Rousseau abandoned h i s f a i t h  that  the s t r u c t u r e o f the assembly can produce r a t i o n a l adherence to the law.  Perhaps the abandonment was  occasioned  by  his  frequently e x p l i c i t . i f contradictory, b e l i e f i n psychological egoism*  R e g a r d l e s s , i t i s my  i o n s are a p p r o p r i a t e  *  e.g.  "We  and  view t h a t o n l y the o t h e r  condit-  u s e f u l t o p a r t i c i p a t o r y democracy.  always want what i s advantageous".  (p.72)  55 But  they do not s t a t e a l l the c o n d i t i o n s t h a t are  probably  necessary f o r a p a r t i c i p a t o r y democracy t o achieve the  rule  o f reason; i n p a r t i c u l a r , the s i z e of the assembly seems t o be a c r i t i c a l f a c t o r .  In f a c t , i f p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s not  be reduced to mere attendance and v o t i n g , the s i z e of assembly must be  severely r e s t r i c t e d .  As  to  the  I w i l l document  below i n chapter VI, a l l s u c c e s s f u l experiments i n worker democracy seem to i n v o l v e the p o s s i b i l i t y of s m a l l group participation. provide  Groups l a r g e r than about 20 do not seem to  the k i n d of i n t i m a t e  contact  and p o s s i b i l i t y  extensive  d i s c u s s i o n f o r each i n d i v i d u a l .  extensive  discussions  And  of  such  are necessary i f i n d i v i d u a l s are  a c t u a l l y to i n f l u e n c e and be persuaded d u r i n g the  decision-  making process.  partici-  patory  In China, f o r example, the b a s i c  group i s never more than 15,  and many t h e o r i s t s have  argued t h a t a t r u l y e f f e c t i v e group o r committee must be than 7. The  (see Townsend, p. ..175;  Thayer, p.  problem of p r o v i d i n g f o r the e x t e n s i v e  7-8;  O l s e n , ch.  town meeting s i t u a t i o n , except i n cases where there  i s a good  F i n l e y , i n h i s book, Democracy:  and Modern, argues t h a t i t was  i n the market p l a c e  classic  f o r i n f o r m a l small meetings which r e l a t e  to the l a r g e r gatherings. Ancient  2)  d i s c u s s i o n necessary  f o r the r u l e o f reason i s not n e c e s s a r i l y s o l v e d i n the  deal of opportunity  less  the d a i l y  discussion  as much as the assembly meetings which  enabled Athens t o achieve a h i g h degree o f p a r t i c i p a t o r y democracy.  56  I f the g o a l o f p a r t i c i p a t o r y democracy i s t o be a c h i e v e d , i t would appear t h a t t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l  arrangements  must r e f l e c t the need f o r s m a l l group d i s c u s s i o n s , as much as the need f o r meeting and v o t i n g i n the c o l l e c t i v e U n der  such  legislature.  c o n d i t i o n s each i n d i v i d u a l can be e x p e c t e d  t o have t h e maximum i n f l u e n c e and maximum a t t e n t i o n t o h i s p o i n t o f view.  And under such c o n d i t i o n s  the goal o f having  each member o f the community governed by p e r s u a s i o n  not force  or o b l i g a t i o n / h a s  In  a d d i t i o n , the  the g r e a t e s t chance o f s u c c e s s .  s m a l l group p a r t i c i p a t i o n e n a b l e s each i n d i v i d u a l ' s  p o s i t i o n , even i f f i n a l l y u n p e r s u a s i v e , t o r e c e i v e maximum a t t e n t i o n and r e s p e c t .  But  s u b j e c t i v e freedom and r e s p e c t f u l treatment qua  s u b j e c t i s n o t the o n l y b e n e f i t o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n . these a s p e c t s u n d e r l i n e  t h e freedom made a v a i l a b l e by p a r t -  i c i p a t i o n i n o u r r o l e as s u b j e c t s , underline  While  they do n o t s u f f i c i e n t l y  the new and a d d i t i o n a l b e n e f i t s o r freedoms t h a t  come from b e i n g  a participant..  While our range o f i n d i v i d u a l c h o i c e  i s objectively  r e s t r i c t e d by l e g i s l a t i o n , p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e l e g i s l a t i v e process increases enormously g r e a t e r  our o p p o r t u n i t y  f o r involvement i n an  range o f c h o i c e s .  run assembly p r o v i d e  Not o n l y does a w e l l  the b e n e f i t o f encouraging people t o  t h i n k and a c t i n a moral and p u b l i c s p i r i t e d manner, i t a l s o  57  increases  t h e i r opportunity  appropriate  to call  t o do s o .  this benefit  I think  "political  that  i t i s  freedom"  -— t h e  freedom t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n and i n f l u e n c e t h e c o l l e c t i v e d e c i s i o n making p r o c e s s .  T h e r e a r e two ways i n w h i c h  participation  one's p o l i t i c a l  the  can increase  p a r t i c i p a n t gains  were s u b j e c t  which  t o government c o n t r o l , b u t n o t t o h i s i n f l u e n c e .  making by l e g i s l a t i n g  on a r e a s  (as I h a v e a d v o c a t e d ) ,  a participant i s increased choices"  First,  influence over.areas of h i s l i f e  Second, i f t h e government extends  decision  freedom.  i s increased.  the range o f i t s d e c i s i o n  formerly then  left  to individual  the p o l i t i c a l  because t h e range o f But i t should  s i n c e t h e a s s e m b l y must c o n s t a n t l y  turn  freedom o f  "political  a l s o be n o t e d  that  i t s attention to  concerns o f a moral nature  ( t h e p u b l i c i n t e r e s t and j u s t i c e )  the  o p e n t o t h e i n d i v i d u a l who h a s  range o f moral c h o i c e s  political  freedom i s a l s o g r e a t l y  We c a n s e e how t h e p o l i t i c a l moral choices again  increased. freedom and t h e range o f  o f t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s c a n be i n c r e a s e d  t o H a r d i n ' s s t o r y o f t h e commons.  collective  body w i t h  t h e power t o e n f o r c e  by r e f e r r i n g  Without a d e c i s i o n s , the farmer  who w i s h e s t o make a p o s i t i v e c o n t r i b u t i o n t o t h e p r e s e r v a t i o n of  t h e commons i s p o w e r l e s s .  we know f r o m H a r d i n ,  Olsen  and M i l l ,  of premature s e l f - d e s t r u c t i o n . a self-legislating  L e f t t o h i s own a c t i v i t i e s , he h a s o n l y  But with  as  the option  the existence of  forum, t h e f a r m e r s then have t o g e t h e r  a  58  c h o i c e o f p r e s e r v i n g t h e commons;as i n d i v i d u a l s . those  a c h o i c e they d i d n o t have  Since moral actions are c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y  a c t i o n s which a r e u n d e r t a k e n n o t f o r p e r s o n a l b e n e f i t ,  b u t f o r some c o l l e c t i v e good, t h e e x i s t e n c e o f a c o l l e c t i v e l e g i s l a t u r e means t h a t t h e range o f e f f e c t i v e moral a c t i o n s and i c h o i c e s open t o t h e i n d i v i d u a l i s l i k e l y t o be g r e a t l y i n c r e a s e d . Rousseau seems more o r l e s s t o i g n o r e t h i s p o i n t , - b u t i t i s fundamental t o t h e argument f o r p a r t i c i p a t o r y  democracy,  f o r h e r e i s a v e r y r e a l s e n s e i n which our p o l i t i c a l i s i n c r e a s e d by c o n c e d i n g to c o l l e c t i v e c o n t r o l .  c e r t a i n areas o f i n d i v i d u a l  freedom behavior  Not o n l y i s t h e r e an i n c r e a s e i n m o r a l  choices, but a l s o there i s j u s t a simple  i n c r e a s e i n the  range o f c h o i c e s we have about o u r environment.  For unlike  our homes and immediate p o s s e s s i o n s , o u r environment i s e s s e n t i a l l y a c o l l e c t i v e possession.  By d i v i d i n g i t up among  o u r s e l v e s and n o t s u b j e c t i n g o u r s e l v e s t o any c o l l e c t i v e  control,  we abandon the p o s s i b i l i t y o f making d e c i s i o n s about our environment. known:  The r e s u l t o f such abandonment i s o n l y t o o w e l l  environmental  degradation  of c o l l e c t i v e s e l f - d e s t r u c t i o n . ^  and f i n a l l y  the p o s s i b i l i t y  Self-destruction i s likely,  n o t simply because we a r e a l l t o o s e l f i s h ,  t o o concerned w i t h  consumer goods o r t o o i n d i f f e r e n t t o e c o l o g i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , b u t p r i m a r i l y because t h e r e i s n o t h i n g  o r next  to nothing  we, as i n d i v i d u a l s , can do about t h e environment. through concerted  that  Only  e f f o r t , o n l y through some c o l l e c t i v e  forum  59  can we  make the k i n d s o f d e c i s i o n s t h a t have e n v i r o n m e n t a l —  —.  impact. A c o r o l l a r y o f t h i s argument i s t h a t the e c o l o g i c a l crisis  should  not be  r e s u l t i n g from our  seen, as some would have us b e l i e v e , as  collective "will"  r e s u l t o f our f a i l u r e t o p r o v i d e  t o consume,-but as a  the democratic forums  n e c e s s a r y f o r the c r e a t i o n o f genuine c o l l e c t i v e d e c i s i o n s . Because t h e r e i s no means f o r a r r i v i n g a t what we i n the way  o f an environment, t h e r e i s never any  between consumption and  r e a l l y want r e a l choice  ecological preservation.  The  d e c i s i o n o f whether t o purchase something o r not,  is., n o t •  a vote on the d e s i r a b i l i t y o f l i m i t e d growth economy.  -  A person -  b u y i n g a c a r no more w i l l s the enormity o f the auto i n d u s t r y and  the concommitant p o l l u t i o n , than--the- farmer.:putting::.hi.s_-r-—=  cow  to pasture  w i l l s the d e s t r u c t i o n o f the commons o r  commuter g e t t i n g i n t o h i s c a r v o t e s  the  for- a t r a f f i c a m . - — -The-=^  p u b l i c i s not r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the e c o l o g i c a l - c r i s i s , - b e c a u s e i t does not have the c o l l e c t i v e o r g a n i z a t i o n t o be it.  A s o l u t i o n then t o the e c o l o g i c a l c r i s i s  responsible for. i s not  "grumbling  acceptance" o f governmental e x p a n s i o n . a n d - c e n t r a l i z a t i o n , the renewal of p u b l i c l i f e . itself  an i n t r i n s i c good and  deal with  The  but.  r e b i r t h of-self-government i s  an o b v i o u s l y p r e f e r a b l e way  the i n c r e a s i n g need f o r c o n t r o l  t  o  —  60  But n o t a l l may see t h e a t t r a c t i v e n e s s o f such a s o l u t i o n , and even more may f i n d such a p r o p o s a l f a n t a s t i c a l l y stic.  unreali-  Those who f i n d such a p r o p o s a l n e i t h e r a t t r a c t i v e  o r p o s s i b l e may be o b j e c t i n g on the grounds t h a t i t c o n f l i c t s w i t h human nature.  Such people may f e e l t h a t humans a r e  e s s e n t i a l l y s e l f i s h and d e s i r o u s o f ever i n c r e a s i n g consumer goods, and t h a t no government arrangement can change t h i s . All  t h a t government can do i s t o r e c o g n i z e human nature f o r  what i t i s and t r y t o p r o t e c t us from o u r s e l v e s . theory  On t h i s  (which might be c a l l e d t h e Hobbesian o b j e c t i o n ) ,  are o n l y brought  people  t o g e t h e r o u t o f s e l f i s h n e s s and t h e d e s i r e  f o r p r o t e c t i o n , and a r e i n c a p a b l e o f c h o o s i n g t h e p u b l i c i n t e r e s t over t h e i r p r i v a t e d e s i r e s .  ^  Such t e d i o u s and  p o t e n t i a l l y i n e f f i c i e n t forms o f government as p a r t i c i p a t o r y democracy c o n f l i c t s w i t h people's  r e a l d e s i r e t o g e t on w i t h  t h e i r p e r s o n a l consumption. Another o b j e c t i o n might be t h a t w h i l e such an arrangement i s n o t " i n c o n f l i c t w i t h human n a t u r e , i t i s i n c o n f l i c t the i n d u s t r i a l " o r d e r .  with  I t may be (the argument goes) t h a t i n  a r u r a l and economically"Simple" s o c i e t y p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s p o s s i b l e , but t h e r e i s no p l a c e f o r such e x t e n s i v e p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the o p e r a t i o n o f an i n d u s t r i a l s o c i e t y .  The need f o r h i e r a r c h y  f o r e f f i c i e n t management, and t h e enormous time l o s t a t meetings,  completely c o n f l i c t s w i t h c u r r e n t arrangements and  current expectations.  /  61  L a s t l y , a r a t h e r d i f f e r e n t k i n d o f o b j e c t i o n might .come from the e c o l o g i c a l l y  concerned.  What reason  they  might ask, given what we know o f human n a t u r e , i s there t o t h i n k t h a t such an arrangement would r e s u l t i n e c o l o g i c a l preservation?  Why  would not the p a r t i c i p a t o r y forums and  l o c a l governments simply vote f o r more of the same? would they choose to preserve the n a t u r a l environment  Why and to  r e s t r i c t i n d i v i d u a l behavior? All  these q u e s t i o n s and o b j e c t i o n s deserve  and i t seems to me  t h a t the most p e r s u a s i v e way  answers, t o go  about  doing so i s t o f i r s t develop an a l t e r n a t i v e to the theory of human nature presumed by my  imaginary s k e p t i c s .  i n chapter I I I , where I attempt mental  importance  to demonstrate  the funda-  o f the s o c i a l r a t h e r than e g o i s t i c  i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c aspects o f human behavior. lends i t s e l f  This I do  and  Such a theory  to a r a t h e r d i f f e r e n t p o l i t i c a l theory and view  of government, and t h i s i n t u r n i s developed i n chapter IV. F i n a l l y , I must show why  i t would be e c o l o g i c a l l y  desirable  to i n s t i t u t e such arrangements i n our c u r r e n t s o c i e t y (chapter V) , and t h a t such arrangements are indeed a r e a l p o s s i b i l i t y in industrialized society  (chapter VI, V I I ) .  C H A P T E R  III  HUMAN NATURE AND SOCIAL NEEDS: The Repudiation o f Homo Economicus  63  In  this  Chapter  I wish  assumptions  about  development  o f any r a d i c a l l y  These  That his  2.  man  That  the  man  first  has an i n n a t e  money o r  assumption  o f economic possibility  because the  of the  theory.  men's  capitalist  being  attempted  only  form  would  i s guided  extended  in  an e f f o r t  t o procure  to  officials  to  represent,  results  to injure  about i s needed one  another; value  the selfishness  to contribute to the general  these  i n a kind  or at least  capitalist  cynicism  a means by w h i c h  This  theory  groups  a s much  that  a  given  organization i s of  t h e p u b l i c good  antagonistic self-interest  has been  government  them  by p o l i t i c a l  of  The p r e s s u r e s  lead  o f economic  provides  t o show t h a t  desire f o r  government,  The c o e r c i v e  o f t h e community.  r e c e n t l y been  selfishness  and t h e widespread  selfishness  individual  each  and seeks  and i n s a t i a b l e  o f man's  o f change.  of  can.  i n t h e way  both.  order,  i t supposedly  has  fundamental  political  selfish  f o ra coercive  because  well  stand  optimistic  i s fundamentally  the j u s t i f i c a t i o n  form  which  two  own b e n e f i t , a n d  goods,  as  human n a t u r e  with  two v i e w s a r e :  1.  This  to deal  i s served  government  economicus" who  v i e with  each  assistance  interest  t h e common  have  by t h e e f f o r t s  groups  o f e q u i l i b r i u m which  approach,  * The c l e a r e s t a c c o u n t o f t h i s W o l f f ' s account i n The P o v e r t y "Tolerance".  theorists  which  various  o f '"homo  as  other they  apply  i s supposed  good.*  p o l i t i c a l theory i s probably o f L i b e r a l i s m i n h i s chapter  R.P. on  64  The  second assumption a l s o serves a j u s t i f i c a t o r y  c a p i t a l i s m i s f e l t t o be  role  since  t h e m o s t e f f i c i e n t means o f c o n t i n u i n g  to s a t i s f y the i n s a t i a b l e p u r s u i t of wealth;  g i v e n t h e power  o f t h i s d r i v e n o t h i n g l e s s than a c o e r c i v e government would adequate t o c o n t r o l people's  rapaciousness  and  assure  be  the  safety of l e g i t i m a t e wealth. All  these t h e o r i e s g a i n t h e i r p o p u l a r i t y from  t h e s e r v i c e t h e y do t o c a p i t a l i s t i d e o l o g y foundation)  and  the e x t e n t t o which they  accurate s o c i a l observation.  (indeed they are  seem t o be b a s e d  They a r e a l s o p a r t o f t h e  a t o m i s t i c v i e w o f human b e h a v i o u r  which ignores the  t o w h i c h humans a r e p a r t i c i p a n t s i n a c o m m u n i t y and by  this experience.  As  both the  on  general  extent are  shaped  a r e s u l t any r e f titration o f t h e s e  must i n v o l v e n o t o n l y a p h i l o s o p h i c a l a t t a c k on t h e i r  views substance,,  b u t t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f a more s o c i o l o g i c a l l y s o p h i s t i c a t e d alternative. and p o l i t i c s  Not  s u r p r i s i n g l y , t h i s d e b a t e o v e r human n a t u r e  took e x a c t l y t h i s  w i t h Thomas Hobbes  (158 8-1669) a r t i c u l a t i n g  t h e o r y o f man's i n s a t i a b l e  selfishness.  t h i s time r e a c t e d w i t h outrage Bishop  B u t l e r who  premises  sketches  based.  beginning—  the a t o m i s t i c  Most p h i l o s o p h e r s  at  t o h i s d o c t r i n e , b u t i t was  most e f f e c t i v e l y  on w h i c h i t was  is a classic  form a t i t s v e r y  a t t a c k e d the p s y c h o l o g i c a l  Because B u t l e r ' s r e f u t a t i o n  o f p h i l o s o p h i c a n a l y s i s and  because B u t l e r h i m s e l f  an a l t e r n a t i v e t h e o r y o f human m o t i v a t i o n , i t i s w e l l  w o r t h the e f f o r t t o study B u t l e r ' s work.  Butler i n turn  leads  us t o o t h e r t h e o r i s t s o f t h e 1 8 t h c e n t u r y whose i n t e r e s t i n  65  "approbation" as a p s y c h o l o g i c a l f o r c e s e t s the qgro.uridwork f o r an a l t e r n a t i v e theory of human and s p e c i f i c a l l y motivation.  My  always attempt  concern i s not only w i t h the q u e s t i o n "do t o a c t i n our own  moving on to these q u e s t i o n s we  interests?".  But b e f o r e  need a f u l l e r p i c t u r e of  view.  1  Hobbes was of man  we  i n t e r e s t ? " , but a l s o with  the q u e s t i o n " j u s t what are our own  Hobbes  political  concerned  to base h i s theory on a d e s c r i p t i o n  i n a s t a t e of nature, but he ended up, as C.B.  MacPherson  and others have p o i n t e d out, d e s c r i b i n g the main c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the s o c i e t y of h i s own  time.  T h i s s o c i e t y was c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by a b r e a k i n g down of the t r a d i t i o n a l c o n s t r a i n t s and systems.  In the p l a c e of these r e s t r a i n t s the market gained  ascendancy under the i n c r e a s i n g domination  of people who  a v a r i c i o u s and r u t h l e s s i n the p u r s u i t o f p r o f i t . a l s o a time of the f i r s t burgeoning escaped  obligatory  Hobbes' n o t i c e .  I t was,  were  That i t was  of the poor seems to have  of course, the s u c c e s s f u l  t h a t gained Hobbes' a t t e n t i o n , and who  served as h i s example  f o r people i n the s t a t e of nature. We may c o n j e c t u r e t h a t the ease w i t h which Hobbes a t t r i b u t e d e s s e n t i a l l y market r e l a t i o n s to a l l s o c i e t i e s was due to h i s having shared the view, common t o men of the Renaissance, t h a t c i v i l i z e d s o c i e t y was l i m i t e d to c l a s s i c a l Greece and Rome and post-medieval western Europe. Since the c l a s s i c a l s o c i e t i e s were to some extent market s o c i e t i e s they c o u l d e a s i l y be taken to f i t a model drawn p r i m a r i l y from the more completely market s o c i e t y of h i s own time. And once the model was e s t a b l i s h e d i t was not d i f f i c u l t t o apply i t t o the most n e a r l y c i v i l i z e d s e c t i o n of a l l o t h e r s o c i e t i e s ,  66  t h a t i s , t o the a c t i v e upper c l a s s e s o f other s o c i e t i e s , f o r the r e l a t i o n s between the men at the top i n non-market s o c i e t i e s tended t o c o n s i s t i n a competitive s t r u g g l e f o r power t h a t approximated the market r e l a t i o n . Whether or not t h i s was the order o f Hobbes s thought, and however c o n s c i o u s l y he drew h i s model from h i s a p p r e c i a t i o n o f the market a t t r i b u t e s o f seventeenth-century s o c i e t y , i t i s c l e a r t h a t h i s model approximates most n e a r l y t o the model o f the p o s s e s s i v e market s o c i e t y . ' (Macpherson, 1962, p.67) * 1  There i s no q u e s t i o n  t h a t much o f the p l a u s i b i l i t y o f  the p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t a l l a c t i o n s a r e s e l f i s h comes from the f a c t t h a t there  i s a great d e a l o f s e l f i s h a c t i v i t y i n s o c i e t y  as we know i t .  But the r e a l s t a y i n g power o f t h i s p r o p o s i t i o n  comes from the ideology  of c a p i t a l i s m , not simply  f a c t t h a t people are f r e q u e n t l y s e l f i s h . i s not simply  from the  In other words, i t  on the b a s i s o f " c a s u a l empiricism"  t h a t people  conclude t h a t most people are s e l f i s h , but r a t h e r on the b a s i s of the i d e o l o g i c a l myth used t o support c a p i t a l i s m .  This i s  the myth t h a t only a c a p i t a l i s t i c order,which allows and encourages i n d i v i d u a l s t o maximize t h e i r p e r s o n a l an e f f i c i e n t economic system.  By a c c e p t i n g  interest,is  the s e l f i s h nature  of man and a l l o w i n g the i n v i s i b l e hand o f the market mechanism to provide  f o r the i n t e r e s t s o f the consumer, c a p i t a l i s m  * Macpherson on p o s s e s s i v e market s o c i e t y . "If a single c r i t e r i o n o f the p o s s e s s i v e market s o c i e t y i s wanted i t i s t h a t man's labour i s a commodity, i . e . t h a t a man's energy and s k i l l are h i s own y e t are regarded not as i n t e g r a l p a r t s of h i s p e r s o n a l i t y , but as p o s s e s s i o n s , the use and d i s p o s a l of which he i s f r e e t o hand over t o others f o r a p r i c e . " ( I b i d . , p.48)  67  provides  the only r e a l i s t i c  form of economic order.  course t h i s b e l i e f i s to some extent "After a l l ,  (Of  self-perpetuating.  i f everyone e l s e i s out f o r number one,  what choice do I have?").  Because man's " n a t u r a l "  then selfish-  ness p l a y s such a fundamental r o l e i n t h i s i d e o l o g y ,  i t is  not  are  s u r p r i s i n g to f i n d the general  c l a i m t h a t people  g e n e r a l l y s e l f i s h , changed.to the i d e o l o g i c a l c l a i m of " p s y c h o l o g i c a l egoism", v i z . , t h a t a l l human a c t i o n s selfish.  I t i s this i d e o l o g i c a l claim that Butler  effectively  so  refuted.  As an i l l u s t r a t i o n of t h i s view we a n a l y s i s of  are  can quote Hobbes'  ' c h a r i t y ' as the d e l i g h t i n one's powers. There i s y e t another p a s s i o n sometimes c a l l e d l o v e , but more p r o p e r l y good w i l l or c h a r i t y . There can be no g r e a t e r argument to a man, of h i s own power, than to f i n d h i m s e l f able not only to accomplish h i s own d e s i r e s , but a l s o to a s s i s t other men i n t h e i r s : and t h i s i s t h a t conception wherein c o n s i s t e t h c h a r i t y . (Hobbes, 1969, p. 17)  In a more contemporary idiom a person might argue t h a t a l l a c t i o n s are e q u a l l y motivated by who  s e l f - i n t e r e s t ; a person  does good f o r the community or helps  seeking  a p p r e c i a t i o n and  of a c t i v i t y .  the reward one  a friend i s actually gets from t h i s  I f he does some s o c i a l l y worthy a c t i v i t y  kind he  i s sure to d e s i r e that i t r e c e i v e some p u b l i c p r a i s e and, he helps  a f r i e n d , he r e a l i z e s t h a t i n doing so he  system of o b l i g a t i o n s such t h a t h i s f r i e n d w i l l be r e q u i r e d to help him.  (Hobbes d e s c r i b e s  sets up  a  later  f r i e n d s h i p as  of the sources of power in Gh. 9 ,Sec. 9 of Human Nature) . view even i n the case where there  if  i s no such obvious  one On  self-  this  68  i n t e r e s t a person who activity, seeking  such as d o n a t i n g anonymously t o c h a r i t y , i s  the p l e a s u r e s  such p r a i s e w o r t h y The  engages i n a s o c i a l l y b e n e f i c i a l  and  s a t i s f a c t i o n t h a t one  still  gets from  activity.  f i r s t o b j e c t i o n t h a t one  i s i n c l i n e d t o make t o  view, s i n c e i t i n v o l v e s an argument of p r i n c i p l e not a  this  general-  i z a t i o n of f a c t , i s to o f f e r an obvious counter-example. have a l l heard s t o r i e s of the s o l d i e r who, on top of a hand grenade, a s s u r e s h i s own l i v e s o f those near him. f o r i t to f i t i n t o the would need to l i v e  i . e . t h e r e would need t o be Of course those who  s o l d i e r , but  are p u t t i n g forward the  ness.  saves  i n the  i t i s u s u a l l y not  a s e l f which b e l i e v e i n an i n t e r e s t of  argument f o r man's i n h e r e n t  argument, i t does not do much f o r anyone who weaken the argument s u f f i c i e n t l y t o put In o r d e r  the  these people  While t h i s counter-example g r e a t l y weakens the  ideology.  the  framework of s e l f i n t e r e s t , the s o l d i e r  a f t e r l i f e . c o u l d w e l l argue t h a t i t was  who  death, but  himself  T h i s i s a counter-example because  t h i s action could benefit.  s e l f / s o u l of the  by throwing  We  selfishabsolute  i s hoping t o  f o r t h an a l t e r n a t i v e  t o s u f f i c i e n t l y weaken the argument,  we  must show t h a t n o n - s e l f i s h b e h a v i o u r i s widespread enough, o r p o t e n t i a l l y widespread enough, to p r o v i d e build a society. p o s i t i o n , we but  a b a s i s on which to  In order words, t o t r u l y counter the  must not o n l y r e f u t e i t for d i s p l a y i t s weaknesses),  develop an a l t e r n a t i v e account t h a t e q u a l l y  intuitions.  egoist's  Fortunately  B u t l e r not o n l y  satisfies  our  r e f u t e s Hobbes' view,  69  but  he  human  a c t u a l l y develops': a p o w e r f u l l y s i t u a t i o n and p o s s i b i l i t y .  studying  h i s arguments In  the f i r s t  at  p o s i t i v e view  o f the  For this  reason  i t i s worth  Sermons  Butler  states  length.  o f h i s famous  that  "In these Sermons.... the comparison w i l l be b e t w e e n t h e n a t u r e o f man a s r e s p e c t i n g self, a n d t e n d i n g t o p r i v a t e g o o d , h i s own p r e s e r v a t i o n a n d h a p p i n e s s ; a n d t h e n a t u r e o f man as h a v i n g r e s p e c t t o s o c i e t y , a n d t e n d i n g t o promote p u b l i c good, t h e h a p p i n e s s o f t h a t society. T h e s e ends do i n d e e d p e r f e c t l y c o i n c i d e ; and t o aim a t p u b l i c and p r i v a t e good a r e so f a r from b e i n g inconsistent, t h a t they m u t u a l l y promote each o t h e r : y e t i n t h e f o l l o w i n g d i s c o u r s e t h e y must be c o n s i d e r e d as e n t i r e l y d i s t i n c t ; otherwise t h e n a t u r e o f man a s t e n d i n g t o o n e , o r a s t e n d i n g t o t h e o t h e r , c a n n o t be compared. T h e r e c a n n o c o m p a r i s o n b e made, w i t h o u t c o n s i d e r i n g t h e t h i n g s compared as d i s t i n c t and d i f f e r e n t . " ( B u t l e r , p . 18) To  support  principle that  this  claim,  Butler  of benevolence  that  argues  that  h a s t h e same  s e l f - l o v e has t o the i n d i v i d u a l .  principle Hobbes Hobbes  1  definition  adds  theory  a long  of 'charity'  of misconstruing  incredible desire  he q u i c k l y  that  language a l l human  stated  footnote  above.  i n an e f f o r t behaviour  i s a  relation  Having  polemical quoted  there  He  natural to society this refuting  accuses  to support h i s  i s motivated  by  a  f o r power.*  *"So that i n the f i r s t place, I put f o r a general inclination o f a l l mankind, a p e r p e t u a l and r e s t l e s s d e s i r e f o r power a f t e r p o w e r , t h a t c e a s e t h o n l y i n d e a t h " ( H o b b e s , 1 9 6 2 , p . 80) I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o note t h a t Hobbes d i d n o t r e a l l y f e e l t h i s motivation t o be an a b s o l u t e , b u t r a t h e r d e r i v e d ( f o r most p e o p l e anyway) f r o m a d e s i r e f o r s e c u r i t y . As he p u t s i t : "And t h e c a u s e o f t h i s i s n o t a l w a y s t h a t a man h o p e s f o r a more i n t e n s i v e d e l i g h t , t h a t he h a s a l r e a d y a t t a i n e d t o ; o r t h a t he cannot be c o n t e n t w i t h a moderate power: b u t because he c a n n o t a s s u r e t h e power a n d means t o l i v e w e l l , w h i c h he hath present, without the a c q u i s i t i o n of more".(ibid)  70  ...And c o u l d any one be t h o r o u g h l y satisfied, t h a t w h a t i s commonly c a l l e d b e n e v o l e n c e or g o o d - w i l l was r e a l l y the a f f e c t i o n meant, b u t o n l y b y b e i n g made t o u n d e r s t a n d t h a t t h i s l e a r n e d person had a g e n e r a l h y p o t h e s i s , t o w h i c h t h e a p p e a r a n c e o f g o o d - w i l l c o u l d no o t h e r w i s e be r e c o n c i l e d ? T h a t what has this appearance i s o f t e n nothing but ambition; that delight in superiority often (suppose always) mixes i t s e l f w i t h benevolence, only makes i t more s p e c i o u s t o c a l l i t a m b i t i o n t h a n h u n g e r , o f t h e two: b u t i n r e a l i t y t h a t p a s s i o n d o e s no more a c c o u n t f o r t h e w h o l e appearances o f g o o d - w i l l , than t h i s a p p e t i t e does. I s t h e r e n o t o f t e n t h e a p p e a r a n c e o f one man's w i s h i n g t h a t g o o d t o a n o t h e r , w h i c h he knows h i m s e l f unable t o p r o c u r e him; and r e j o i c i n g i n i t , t h o u g h b e s t o w e d by a t h i r d p e r s o n ? And can l o v e o f p o w e r a n y way p o s s i b l y come i n t o account for this desire or delight? Is there not often t h e a p p e a r a n c e o f men's d i s t i n g u i s h i n g b e t w e e n two o r m o r e p e r s o n s , p r e f e r r i n g o n e before a n o t h e r , t o do g o o d t o , i n c a s e s w h e r e l o v e o f power cannot i n the l e a s t a c c o u n t f o r the d i s t i n c t i o n and p r e f e r e n c e ? For this p r i n c i p l e c a n no o t h e r w i s e d i s t i n g u i s h b e t w e e n o b j e c t s , t h a n as i t i s a g r e a t e r i n s t a n c e a n d e x e r t i o n o f p o w e r t o do g o o d t o o n e r a t h e r t h a n t o another. Again, suppose g o o d - w i l l i n the mind o f man t o be n o t h i n g b u t d e l i g h t i n t h e e x e r c i s e o f p o w e r ; men m i g h t i n d e e d b e restrained by d i s t a n t and a c c i d e n t a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ; b u t t h e s e r e s t r a i n t s b e i n g removed, they would have a d i s p o s i t i o n t o a n d d e l i g h t i n m i s c h i e f a s an e x e r c i s e and p r o o f o f power: and t h i s disposition a n d d e l i g h t w o u l d a r i s e f r o m , o r b e t h e same p r i n c i p l e i n t h e mind, as a d i s p o s i t i o n t o , and delight in charity. T h u s c r u e l t y , as d i s t i n c t from envy and r e s e n t m e n t w o u l d be e x a c t l y the same i n t h e m i n d o f man as g o o d - w i l l : t h a t one tends to the happiness, the o t h e r to the misery o f o u r f e l l o w - c r e a t u r e s , i s , i t seems, m e r e l y an a c c i d e n t a l c i r c u m s t a n c e , w h i c h t h e m i n d h a s n o t the l e a s t r e g a r d t o . These are the absurdi t i e s w h i c h e v e n men o f c a p a c i t y r u n . i n t o , when they have o c c a s i o n to b e l i e t h e i r n a t u r e , . . . ' (Butler,  1.  p.  Butler's  arguments  The  that  fact  19) are:  ambition  can  be  related  to  benevolence,  71  f a r from e s t a b l i s h i n g t h a t these f e e l i n g s are the same, presupposes 2.  t h a t they are  different.  People wish good f o r another even thoughv.they c o u l d not h e l p t h i s person r e a l i z e h i s good, and  3.  when such a person does r e c e i v e the good he  desires,  t h e " S p e c t a t o r " takes d e l i g h t i n i t which c o u l d not be e x p l a i n e d by p r o o f of h i s own 4.  success.  I f the d e s i r e to be b e n e v o l e n t was  simply the d e s i r e  f o r p l e a s u r e o f d i s p l a y i n g and u s i n g one's power, then t h e r e would be no d i f f e r e n c e as f a r as t h i s  intention  went between e n j o y i n g one's power i n doing harm t o people and e n j o y i n g i t i n doing good, i . e . between benevolence  and m a l i c i o u s n e s s .  B u t l e r e x p l a i n s the g e n e r a l e r r o r i n v o l v e d i n Hobbes' a n a l y s i s i n sermon  XII.  The problem w i t h Hobbes'  a n a l y s i s i s t h a t he o v e r l o o k s the f a c t t h a t w h i l e we own  p l e a s u r e o r h a p p i n e s s , we  unhappiness  seek  our  a l s o seek the p l e a s u r e o r even  o f o t h e r s w i t h o u t r e g a r d to our own  interest.  That  the s a t i s f a c t i o n s o f these d e s i r e s b r i n g us happiness means t h a t we do i n f a c t have these o t h e r - r e d i r e c t e d d e s i r e s  distinct  from simply d e s i r i n g happiness. In f a c t p e r s o n a l happiness  con-  sists largely  i n the s a t i s f a c t i o n of these d e s i r e s , so t h a t having  o t h e r motives  than our immediate happiness  i s actually  a  p r e c o n d i t i o n f o r e x p e r i e n c i n g h a p p i n e s s , a t l e a s t f o r experi e n c i n g the happiness o f s a t i s f a c t i o n  (and t h i n k of the e x t e n t  to which t h a t i s the primary source o f h a p p i n e s s . ) .  72  Having psychology, He  Butler  distinguishes  "principles" he  of  claims,  may  contribute  to  ourselves it  demonstrated  and  gout.  selves  The  desire  of  to  is  public  a  assure  natural  our  actions  from  his  for  esteem.  our  and  are  even  result  indeed may  may  While  lead  society. which  we  distinguish  we  maintain  affections  may  be  our  may the  between, calls  while  ourselves  harm  to  hunger  -  sustain  us,  indigestion  lead  the  us  to  for  of our-  principle  and  approve  conscience.  tending  and  such  principle  either  outlines  p r i n c i p l e he  both  in -  to  disaster he  two  s o c i a l passions  serve  into  principle_.which  serves  us  desire  way  Lastly,  actions--this  really  this  that us  for  theory.  passions,  i t helps  lead  Hobbes'  benevolent,  " t y p i c a l passion"  food  in  The  that  same p h e n o m e n o n h o l d s  i t too  that  a  may  well-being,  passion  regulative  good  to  Take  society  for  own  benevolence".  lead  of  his  and  for  disapprove  This  complete  "self-love  r e f l e c t i o n by  and  to  or  to  affections"  to  and  benevolence,  on  goes  absurdities  and  others.  e q u a l l y , the  contribute  the  s e l f - i n t e r e s t , or  contributes  the  of  "passions  also  but  as  then  one  toward  others,  responsibilities in  the  helping  cases  where  insufficient.  " v " i From t h i s c o m p a r i s o n o f b e n e v o l e n c e and s e l f - l o v e , o f our p u b l i c and p r i v a t e affections o f the c o u r s e s o f l i f e t h e y l e a d t o , and o f the p r i n c i p l e o f r e f l e c t i o n o r c o n s c i e n c e as r e s p e c t i n g e a c h o f t h e m , i t i s as m a n i f e s t , t h a t we w e r e made f o r s o c i e t y , a n d t o p r o m o t e t h e h a p p i n e s s o f i t ; a s t h a t we w e r e i n t e n d e d t o t a k e c a r e o f o u r own l i f e , and h e a l t h , and p r i v a t e good. (Ibid, p.22) While quotation,  one  there  may can  object be  no  to  the  question  design  overtones  of  general  the  in  point  this that  our  73  man i s a s o c i a l c r e a t u r e .  As such we have i n c l i n a t i o n s and  a b i l i t i e s to f u r t h e r and p r o t e c t our community w i t h o u t which community l i f e would not be p o s s i b l e .  That t h i s s o c i a l  side  of our p e r s o n a l i t y i s f r e q u e n t l y undernourished i n our a f f l u e n t c u l t u r e does not r e f u t e B u t l e r ' s c l a i m .  We can a l l r e a l i z e  that: ...There i s such a n a t u r a l p r i n c i p l e o f a t t r a c t i o n i n man towards man, t h a t having t r o d the same t r a c t o f land, having breathed i n the same c l i m a t e , b a r e l y having been born i n the same a r t i f i c i a l d i s t r i c t o r d i v i s i o n , becomes the o c c a s i o n o f c o n t r a c t i n g acquaintances and f a m i l i a r i t i e s many years a f t e r : f o r anything may serve the purpose. Thus r e l a t i o n s merely nominal are sought and i n v e n t e d , not by governors, b u t by the lowest o f the people; which are found s u f f i c i e n t to h o l d mankind., together i n l i t t l e f r a t e r n i t i e s and c o p a r t n e r s h i p s : ( I b i d p.23) ;  He continues,  g i v i n g a f i n a l and d e v a s t a t i n g  state-of-nature  rebuilt® t o the  theorists: ...Men are so much one body, t h a t i n a p e c u l i a r manner they f e e l f o r each o t h e r , shame, sudden anger, resentment, honour, p r o s p e r i t y , d i s t r e s s ; one o r another, o r a l l o f these, from the s o c i a l nature i n g e n e r a l , from benevolence upon the o c c a s i o n o f n a t u r a l r e l a t i o n , acquaintance, p r o t e c t i o n , dependence; each o f these being d i s t i n c t cements o f s o c i e t y . And t h e r e f o r e t o have no r e s t r a i n t from, no regard t o others i n our behaviour, i s the s p e c u l a t i v e a b s u r d i t y o f c o n s i d e r i n g o u r s e l v e s as s i n g l e and independent, as having nothing i n our nature which has r e s p e c t to our f e l l o w c r e a t u r e s , reduced to a c t i o n and p r a c t i c e . And t h i s i s the same a b s u r d i t y as to suppose a hand, o r any p a r t to have no n a t u r a l r e s p e c t to any o t h e r , or t o the whole body. (Ibid)  To the o b j e c t i o n t h a t he has not allowed f o r the obvious f a c t t h a t people a l l  too o f t e n do one another  great  74  injury, injury  Butler to  replies  that  themselves.  people  a l l too  often  do  great  7And  i , . : ~ I f i t be s a i d , t h a t t h e r e a r e p e r s o n s i n t h e w o r l d , who are i n g r e a t measure without the n a t u r a l a f f e c t i o n s towards t h e i r f e l l o w c r e a t u r e s : there are l i k e w i s e i n s t a n c e s of p e r s o n s w i t h o u t t h e common n a t u r a l a f f e c t i o n s t o t h e m s e l v e s : b u t t h e n a t u r e o f man i s not to be j u d g e d o f by e i t h e r o f t h e s e , b u t by w h a t a p p e a r s i n t h e common w o r l d , i n t h e bulk of mankind. ( I b i d , p. 29) %  He  also  points  v  out  the  "accidental" quality of  much  evil.  . . .whereas t h e r e i s p l a i n l y b e n e v o l e n c e o r g o o d - w i l l ; t h e r e i s no', s u c h t h i n g a s l o v e o f injustice, oppression, treachery, ingratitude; b u t o n l y e a g e r d e s i r e s a f t e r s u c h and such e x t e r n a l goods; which, a c c o r d i n g to a very a n c i e n t o b s e r v a t i o n , the most abandoned would c h o o s e t o o b t a i n by i n n o c e n t means, i f t h e y were as e a s y , and a s e f f e c t u a l t o t h e i r end: t h a t even emulation a n d r e s e n t m e n t , by any one who w i l l c o n s i d e r what these p a s s i o n s really a r e i n n a t u r e , w i l l be f o u n d n o t h i n g t o the p u r p o s e o f t h i s o b j e c t i o n : and t h a t the princ i p l e s a n d p a s s i o n s i n t h e m i n d o f man, which a r e d i s t i n c t b o t h from s e l f - l o v e and b e n e v o l e n c e p r i m a r i l y and most d i r e c t l y l e a d t o r i g h t b e h a v i o u r w i t h r e g a r d t o o t h e r s as w e l l as h i m s e l f , and o n l y s e c o n d a r i l y and a c c i d e n t a l l y to what i s e v i l . " (Ibid) In Butler worth  a  later  provides quoting  a  at  Sermon useful  length  "Upon review  here  the of  before  love his  of  our  argument  exploring  neighbor", and  his  i t is  position  further. ''''VH E v e r y p a r t i c u l a r a f f e c t i o n , e v e n t h e love o f o u r n e i g h b o u r , i s a s r e a l l y o u r own affection, as s e l f - l o v e ; and t h e p l e a s u r e a r i s i n g f r o m i t s g r a t i f i c a t i o n i s a s m u c h my own pleasure, as t h e p l e a s u r e s e l f - l o v e w o u l d h a v e , f r o m k n o w i n g I m y s e l f s h o u l d b e h a p p y some t i m e h e n c e , w o u l d b e my own pleasure. /And i f , b e c a u s e e v e r y p a r t i c u l a r a f f e c t i o n i s a man's own, and t h e p l e a s u r e a r i s i n g f r o m i t s g r a t i f i c a t i o n h i s own p l e a s u r e , or pleasure to himself,  75  such p a r t i c u l a r a f f e c t i o n must be c a l l e d s e l f l o v e ; a c c o r d i n g to t h i s way o f speaking, no creature whatever can p o s s i b l y a c t b u t merely from s e l f - l o v e ; and every a c t i o n and every a f f e c t i o n whatever i s to be r e s o l v e d up i n t o t h i s one p r i n c i p l e . But then t h i s i s n o t the language o f mankind: o r i f i t were, we should want words t o express the d i f f e r e n c e , between the p r i n c i p l e o f an a c t i o n , proceeding from c o o l c o n s i d e r a t i o n t h a t i t w i l l be t o my own advantage; and an a c t i o n , suppose o f revenge, or o f f r i e n d s h i p , by which a man runs upon c e r t a i n r u i n , t o do e v i l o r good to another. I t i s manifest the p r i n c i p l e s o f these a c t i o n s are t o t a l l y d i f f e r e n t , and so want d i f f e r e n t words t o be d i s t i n g u i s h e d by: a l l that they agree i n i s , t h a t they both proceed from, and are done t o g r a t i f y an i n c l i n a t i o n i n a man's self. But the p r i n c i p l e o r i n c l i n a t i o n i n one case i s s e l f - l o v e ; i n the o t h e r , h a t r e d o r love o f another. There i s then a d i s t i n c t i o n between the c o o l p r i n c i p l e o f s e l f - l o v e , o r g e n e r a l d e s i r e o f our happiness, as one p a r t o f our nature, and one p r i n c i p l e o f a c t i o n ; and the p a r t i c u l a r a f f e c t i o n s towards p a r t i c u l a r e x t e r n a l o b j e c t s , as another p a r t o f our n a t u r e , and another p r i n c i p l e o f a c t i o n . How much soever t h e r e f o r e i s to be allowed to s e l f - l o v e , y e t i t cannot be allowed to be the whole o f our inward c o n s t i t u t i o n ; because, you see, there are other p a r t s o r p r i n c i p l e s which come i n t o i t . ( I b i d , p. 1 0 0 - 1 0 1 ) Leaving  the absolute  goes on to deal with  argument f o r egoism, B u t l e r  the supposed t e n s i o n between s e l f - l o v e  and benevolence, as he remarks: ...there i s g e n e r a l l y thought.to be some p e c u l i a r k i n d o f c o n t r a r i e t y between s e l f - l o v e and the l o v e o f our neighbour, between the p u r s u i t o f p u b l i c and of p r i v a t e good; insomuch t h a t when you are recommending one o f these, you are supposed to be speaking a g a i n s t the other; and from hence a r i s e s a s e c r e t p r e j u d i c e a g a i n s t , and f r e q u e n t l y open scorn o f a l l t a l k of p u b l i c s p i r i t , and r e a l g o o d w i l l to our fellow creatures; ( I b i d , p.99) To demonstrate the weakness o f the s u p p o s i t i o n o f " c o n t r a r i e t y "  76  Butler  repeatedly  private  interest  principle  can lead  argues  t h a t when i s only  interest knowing  the extent  can l e a d  of self-love)  others  there  shows  to unhappiness  and the e x t e n t  the i n d i v i d u a l  i s frustrated  ( i . e . not serve  to which  to happiness.  trying  He  how  asks  between  b u t when  there  t h a t o n e was  opposition  the pursuit of  I n a d d i t i o n he  t o do  other's  the s a t i s f a c t i o n  of  good.  i t i s that  self-love  i s frustrated  t h e p u r s u i t o f some  i s at least  the  concern f o r  some p u r s u i t o f a p r i v a t e i n t e r e s t  unhappiness,  then  to which  this  belief  and benevolence  about the  arose.  The g e n e r a l m i s t a k e , t h a t t h e r e i s some g r e a t e r i n c o n s i s t e n c e between endeavouring to promote t h e good o f another and s e l f - i n t e r e s t than between s e l f - i n t e r e s t and p u r s u i n g anything e l s e , seems, as h a t h a l r e a d y b e e n hinted', t o a r i s e from o u r n o t i o n s o f p r o p e r t y ; and t o be c a r r i e d on by t h i s p r o p e r t y ' s b e i n g supposed to be i t s e l f o u r h a p p i n e s s o r good. People are s o v e r y much t a k e n u p w i t h t h i s o n e s u b j e c t t h a t t h e y seem f r o m i t t o h a v e f o r m e d a g e n e r a l way o f t h i n k i n g , w h i c h t h e y a p p l y t o o t h e r t h i n g s t h a t t h e y have n o t h i n g t o do w i t h . A n d s o f a r as i t i s t a k e n f o r g r a n t e d , t h a t b a r e l y h a v i n g t h e means a n d m a t e r i a l s o f e n j o y m e n t i s w h a t c o n s t i t u t e s i n t e r e s t and happiness; t h a t o u r i n t e r e s t o r good c o n s i s t s i n p o s s e s s i o n s themselves, i n having the property o f r i c h e s , houses, l a n d s , g a r d e n s , n o t i n t h e e n j o y m e n t o f them; so f a r i t w i l l even more s t r o n g l y be t a k e n f o r g r a n t e d , i n t h e way a l r e a d y e x p l a i n e d , t h a t an a f f e c t i o n ' s c o n d u c i n g t o t h e good o f another, must even n e c e s s a r i l y o c c a s i o n i t t o conduce l e s s t o p r i v a t e good, i f n o t t o be p o s i t i v e l y d e t r i m e n t a l t o i t . F o r , i f p r o p e r t y and happiness a r e o n e a n d t h e same t h i n g , a s b y i n c r e a s i n g t h e p r o p e r t y o f a n o t h e r , y o u must l e s s e n y o u r own h a p p i n e s s . But whatever occasioned the mistake, I hope i t has been f u l l y p r o v e d t o be one; as i t h a s b e e n p r o v e d , that t h e r e i s no p e c u l i a r r i v a l s h i p o r c o m p e t i t i o n between s e l f - l o v e and benevolence: t h a t as t h e r e may b e a c o m p e t i t i o n b e t w e e n t h e t w o , s o t h e r e may a l s o b e t w e e n a n y p a r t i c u l a r a f f e c t i o n whatever and s e l f - l o v e ; t h a t every  77  p a r t i c u l a r a f f e c t i o n , benevolence among the r e s t , i s s u b s e r v i e n t t o s e l f - l o v e by b e i n g the instrument of p r i v a t e enjoyment; and t h a t i n one r e s p e c t benevolence c o n t r i b u t e s more t o p r i v a t e i n t e r e s t , i . e . enjoyment o r s a t i s f a c t i o n , than any o t h e r of the p a r t i c u l a r common a f f e c t i o n s as i t i s i n a degree i t s own g r a t i f i c a t i o n . ( I b i d , p.108-109) U n f o r t u n a t e l y ^ B u t l e r ' s hope t o have d e s t r o y e d  the  f a l l a c i o u s b e l i e f i n the analogy between p r o p e r t y and was  not r e a l i z e d .  happiness  happiness  I t has become a l l t o o w i d e l y accepted t h a t  i s t o be equated  w i t h p r o f i t and p r i v a t e i n t e r e s t ,  and c o o l s e l f - l o v e w i t h a b a l a n c e sheet.  The r a t i o n a l  M  egoist  has become a p o p u l a r p s y c h o l o g i c a l model f o r the human b e i n g , even i n the moral realm, t o the more or l e s s t o t a l of  the "benevolent"  it  appears  elimination  and p u b l i c s p i r i t e d s i d e of humanity. But  t h a t the e c o l o g i c a l c r i s i s which emphasizes the  d e s t r u c t i v e n a t u r e of the b e l i e f p i n e s s may  i n the p r i v a t e source of hap-  h e l p e l i m i n a t e t h i s narrow c o n c e p t i o n of  and the good For we  self-  "interest"  life. can not, I t h i n k , expect a more eloquent  account  than B u t l e r ' s o f the enormous e r r o r i n v o l v e d i n e q u a t i n g human i n t e r e s t s and v a l u e s w i t h p r o p e r t y and money.  But the  widespread  a p p r e c i a t i o n o f t h i s e r r o r r e q u i r e s more than i n c i s i v e  criticism.  Indeed, d e s p i t e B u t l e r ' s work, t h i s e r r o r has c o n t i n u e d i n dramatic  form through  the 19th and well, i n t o the 2 0th c e n t u r y .  Some of the blame f o r the continunace of t h i s u n f o r t u n a t e can be a s c r i b e d t o the e a r l y u t i l i t a r i a n s , s u c h as Bentham, shared Hobbes' psychology.  The  l i k e n e s s of Bentham's  c a l c u l u s t o a c a l c u l u s of p r o f i t and  l o s s made the  e t h i c a l system a n a t u r a l t o o l f o r 19th and m i s t s who  had o n l y t o equate happiness  with  error who  felicific  utilitarian  20th c e n t u r y econo-  78  i n c r e a s i n g r e a l income.  And the crowning  achievement o f  t h i s misequation o f wealth and w e l l being was the p l a c i n g of the GN.P. as the u l t i m a t e measure o f s o c i a l and n a t i o n a l well being.  The GNP. 'came to p l a y i n the assessment  of nation-  a l success what the percent o f p r o f i t t r a d i t i o n a l l y p l a y e d i n the assessment  o f the f i r m .  What has become o f the theory o f human nature put f o r t h by Hobbes now t h a t i t - h a s gained the stature; o f a dominant-ideology? Roughly,  i t has developed i n t o the f o l l o w i n g s e t o f propos-  itions: 1.  People have an e s s e n t i a l l y u n l i m i t e d s e t o f wants.  2.  These wants are p r i m a r i l y f o r i n d i v i d u a l consumer goods.  3.  Happiness  c o n s i s t s i n the s a t i s f a c t i o n s o f these  wants. T h e r e f o r e , t h e f u n c t i o n o f m o r a l i t y and government i s to articulate  and e n f o r c e those r u l e s which would be most conducive  to t h e maximization o f aggregate maximization o f n a t i o n a l wealth.*  s a t i s f a c t i o n , i . e . t o :the In other words, the f u n c t i o n  of government should be to f a c i l i t a t e the c o - o p e r a t i o n o f i n d i v i d u a l s i n t h e i r p u r s u i t o f i n d i v i d u a l happiness so t h a t the e g o i s t i c p u r s u i t o f each i n d i v i d u a l does n o t r e s u l t i n the  * At t h i s p o i n t some pro forma mention i s made o f j u s t i c e , but t h i s i s c l e a r l y n o t a dominant c o n c e r n — t h e r e i s no q u a r t e r l y p u b l i c a t i o n o f the " j u s t i c e index".  79  the d e f e a t o f a l l by  all  ( c f . Rousseau and Hardin).  government has no r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r shaping  or  The  controlling *  p e o p l e ' s wants.  ( P r o h i b i t i o n was  such governmental e f f o r t s are  the u l t i m a t e p r o o f  that  disastrous.)  II C l e a r l y no e c o l o g i c a l l y r a d i c a l t h e s i s can be based the above p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s .  E i t h e r we  look g l o o m i l y  a time when t h e r e w i l l be a widespread l a c k of  on  forward  to  satisfaction  because o f a widespread l a c k of goods,-or we must n a i v e l y hope t h a t technology list  w i l l d i s c o v e r some way  t o s a t i s f y the growing  of human wants a g a i n s t a background of d i m i n i s h i n g  resources.  But d e s p i t e the widespread p o p u l a r i t y of the p s y c h o l o g y on which t h i s dichotomy i s based, t h e r e i s norneed t o accept  \i these  alternatives. Humans simply  do not f i t the model.  In f a c t we  have  a whole range o f d e s i r e s t h a t do not r e q u i r e goods f o r t h e i r s a t i s f a c t i o n s , and t h a t are more dependent on the q u a l i t y of s o c i a l l i f e ization.  than the p r e v a l e n c e  real-  These are the s o c i a l d e s i r e s t h a t B u t l e r e l a b o r a t e s :  t o be w i t h  f r i e n d s , to d i s p l a y and  work c o o p e r a t i v e l y and delight,  o f wealth f o r t h e i r  l o v e and  to f u l f i l l  share one's a b i l i t i e s ,  f o r the common good, to share  solidarity,  t o be someone i n the  ectasy,  community,  one's r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s , t o g a i n honour, e t c .  t h e o r y which wishes t o go beyond the narrow e g o i s t i c view expressed  i n the U t i l i t a r i a n  (and Hobbesian)  to  Any  80 psychology must be able to take i n t o account the wide v a r i e t y o f " a l t r u s i t i c " motives which a c t u a l l y govern human behaviour. Not  s u r p r i s i n g l y other t h e o r i e s have been developed along  general  l i n e s sketched by B u t l e r which r e f u t e t h a t narrow view  of m o t i v a t i o n . R.P.  the  One  q u i t e contemporary theory  W o l f f i n h i s essay "Community".  i s put f o r t h by  (Wolff, pp.  In t h i s essay W o l f f p o i n t s out t h a t these  162-195) social  d e s i r e s d i f f e r from e g o i s t i c d e s i r e s i n t h a t they i n v o l v e e s s e n t i a l reference  not only t o the s t a t e o f mind o f the  but a l s o to t h a t o f o t h e r members o f h i s community.  In  the agent,  elab-  o r a t i n g h i s p o i n t , W o l f f makes a number o f d i s t i n c t i o n s : the f i r s t i s between " p r i v a t e v a l u e s " The  " p r i v a t e value"  i s "an  makes e s s e n t i a l r e f e r e n c e  and  "interpersonal  o b j e c t of i n t e r e s t whose d e f i n i t i o n t o the occurrence of a s t a t e  consciousness i n e x a c t l y one  person".  value would be  as i t s o b j e c t a c e r t a i n  one which had  value  of the e g o i s t .  a l s o "compound p r i v a t e v a l u e s " . pleasureable and  pleasure-  T h i s i s the  There are, as W o l f f p o i n t s We  can,  out,  f o r example seek  s t a t e s o f consciousness i n any  number o f people,  t h i s i s the o b j e c t of our u t i l i t a r i a n i n t e r e s t s .  i s another s e t o f values  of  For example, a p r i v a t e  able awareness i n the person w i t h the d e s i r e . standard  values".  that Wolff c a l l s  But  "interpersonal  there values"  which he d e f i n e s as "a p o s s i b l e o b j e c t of i n t e r e s t whose d e f i n i t i o n makes e s s e n t i a l r e f e r e n c e  to a thought about an  a c t u a l s t a t e o f consciousness i n another person". i f Smith d e s i r e s to make a g i f t t o Jones and  For example:  d e s i r e s not  only  t h a t Jones be happy, but t h a t Smith knows t h a t Jones i s happy, then Smith holds an  11  i n t e r p e r s o n a l value".  Smith i s i n t e r e s t e d not only i n h i s own  In t h i s example  p a r t i c u l a r pleasure  at  81  knowing: Jones  1  h i s p l e a s u r e was based upon knowing  s t a t e of mind.  something about  Using h i s d e f i n i t i o n of interpersonal  v a l u e , W o l f f goes on to d e f i n e a " s o c i a l v a l u e " , namely a s t a t e of  a f f a i r s whose d e f i n i t i o n makes e s s e n t i a l r e f e r e n c e t o a  r e c i p r o c a l s t a t e o f awareness  among two o r more persons.  use the Smith and Jones example,  To  t h i s would be a case where  Smith not only knew t h a t Jones was made happy by h i s (Smith's) g i f t , but a l s o t h a t Jones was  aware of the happiness which h i s  own happiness brought to Smith.  In s p i t e of the l i n g u i s t i c  complexity o f e x p r e s s i n g t h i s thought, i t i s c l e a r t h a t values are fundamental i n t e r p e r s o n a l v a l u e s .  We  social  d e s i r e , as  W o l f f p o i n t s out not simply happiness, but a communication it,  a s h a r i n g , a community.  experience mutual awareness  We  d e s i r e to share, and to  of t h i s  sharing.  I t seems c l e a r t h a t t h i s i s a f a i r l y t i o n o f the p l e a s u r e s o f community. someone who  i s lonely  (or who  of  insightful  rendi-  We might even say o f  f e e l s the l a c k o f community)  t h a t what he/she l a c k s i s the p o s s i b i l i t y of mutual  awareness  or  " r e c i p r o c a l awareness".  I t i s a l s o c l e a r t h a t t h i s range  of  s o c i a l d e s i r e s i s a fundamental a s p e c t o f human n a t u r e , and  i s a t l e a s t as c r u c i a l t o a sense o f w e l l b e i n g (I would  argue  f a r more c r u c i a l ) as i s the s a t i s f a c t i o n o f simple p r i v a t e  wants.  But even t h i s c r i t i c i s m i s inadequate i n a fundamental way:  i t ignores the r o l e p l a y e d by people's s e l f - c o n c e p t i o n .  The e f f e c t of community on i n d i v i d u a l s m a n i f e s t s i t s e l f i n the c r e a t i o n of a sense o f s e l f , o f who  one i s and of who  one  82  wishes to become.  As Plamenatz s t a t e s i n h i s c r i t i c i s m s of  the  Utilitarians: ...Man i s not j u s t an animal who, u n l i k e the o t h e r s , i s p r o v i d e n t and c a l c u l a t i n g ; who can forgo s a t i s f y i n g present wants i n order to put h i m s e l f i n the way of g e t t i n g more of what he wants i n the f u t u r e ; who, i n the process o f working with others f o r mutual b e n e f i t , comes to have more and more wants; and who acquires a s e t of moral standards t o r e s t r a i n him as a competitor and encourage him as a c o l l a b o r a t o r with o t h e r s . He i s a s e l f - c o n s c i o u s , s e l f communing, animal who sees h i s l i f e i n the round, who knows t h a t he must d i e , who i s h i s own most constant companion, whose d e s i r e s are o f t e n f a n t a s i e s , who wants to be one k i n d of person r a t h e r than another and to l i v e one k i n d of l i f e r a t h e r than another. He i s , as Hegel might put i t , 'his own o b j e c t ' ; he has some image of h i m s e l f , more or l e s s variable,, more or l e s s obscure, which i t matters to him' Enormous should be t r u e ; some i d e a o f what i s proper to him or worthy of him. He i s the happier and the more secure and easy i n h i s mind, the more c o n f i dent he i s t h a t the image i s t r u e and the b e t t e r or the more impressive i t appears to other people. J u s t as we are i n t e r e s t e d i n o u r s e l v e s as persons r a t h e r than as s u b j e c t s of d e s i r e pursuing s a t i s f a c t i o n s , so too are we i n t e r e s t e d in others. I t i s as persons, much more than as competitors and c o l l a b o r a t o r s f o r the s a t i s f a c t i o n of wants, t h a t we hate and l o v e one another; t h a t we f e e l p r i d e , envy, and g r a t i t u d e . Our wants flow l a r g e l y from the ideas we have of o u r s e l v e s and our neighbours, and the k i n d of l i f e we want to l i v e . '* (Plamenatz, 1958, p.p. 174-175) Plamenatz' theme has been e l a b o r a t e d by A r t h u r before  i n great  Lovejoy i n h i s R e f l e c t i o n s on Human Nature,  t r y i n g t o d e r i v e the p o l i t i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s of  detail and this  view i t w i l l be u s e f u l to study Lovejoy's account. * See I b i d pp.. 174-76 a l s o f o r c r i t i c i s m of U t i l i t a r i a n s i g n o r i n g the value t h a t i n d i v i d u a l s p l a c e on the k i n d of community i n which they l i v e , and community l o y a l t y .  83  Lovejoy  begins  by d i s t i n g u i s h i n g between two  i n g kinds of d e s i r e s : d e s i r e s f o r c e r t a i n ends, and f o r what he c a l l s " a d j e c t i v a l v a l u e s " .  While we  f a m i l i a r with the d e s i r e f o r ends, the term v a l u e s " , needs some e x p l a n a t i o n .  differdesires  are a l l  "adjectival  These l a t t e r values  or  d e s i r e s are very c l o s e to what we mean by the d e s i r e f o r certain roles.  A person d e s i r e s not only goods  (e.g. the c a r ) ,  but to t h i n k of h i m s e l f i n c e r t a i n ways (shrewd, k i n d , generous, quick, b e a u t i f u l , etc.) and by o t h e r s .  to be thought o f i n these ways  He a l s o d e s i r e s to avoid having  to t h i n k of  h i m s e l f i n c e r t a i n ways (gluttonous, s e l f i s h , cowardly, ugly, etc.) and,  once again, d e s i r e s o t h e r s not to see him  in this  way. This grammar of motives, the concern f o r a d j e c t i v a l q u a l i t i e s as opposed to "nominal" ends, r e f l e c t s the  distinc-  t i o n i n human motives made by Flamenatz i n h i s argument with the u t i l i t a r i a n s .  Lovejoy  expresses  t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n as  d i f f e r e n c e between "the wish to get, or achieve one's a c t s , and  the  something Jay  the wish to be something i n one's a c t s , . . . .  V/e must t h e r e f o r e d i s t i n g u i s h — a n d the d i s t i n c t i o n i s , I t h i n k , a fundamental but much n e g l e c t e d one—between what may  c a l l t e r m i n a l values and  p.80)  a d j e c t i v a l values."  To i l l u m i n a t e t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n , Lovejoy  example of the v i c t i m s of the I n q u i s i t i o n who no d e s i r e f o r the "end"  of t h e i r a c t i o n  a t e r m i n a l v a l u e ) , but who  we  .(Lovejoy,  cites  the  obviously  (being burned was  had not  "presumably shrank from a b j u r i n g  84  their or  aversion recant  and  motive  the  end  of  his  power:  a magnitude  his  own  points  take  there as  out  people  simply  Lovejoy  but  adds  to  i s that  i s the or  selfish.  exercise  of  our  it  i s because  as  a  certain kind  others,  consumer  of  them  (than  they  to  to  be  himself him  refused  of  explanation to  be  is a  we  very  who  only  to  chapter. as of  accomplish  others.  What  But  pleasure  obvious  may  also  what that  one  i s generous,  and  i n viewing  onself  for  of  type  magnitude  ends,  or  certain actions,  c e r t a i n view  person,  real  simply do  the  ignored the  displeasure  i s not  the  c h a r i t a b l e ; they  person  the  to  charitable) the  not  those  of  particular charity.  that  a  economist  ignore  essentially analyze  have  renegades  ourselves  v i z . generous,  as  for  the  rather agents,  considerate  of  etc. The  usually  a  It  as  analysis  beginning  desire  this just  of  in  burned],  this  the  allows  sort of  powers,  we  the  there  avoidance  cheap  at  facilitate  to  the  compare  which  desire  powerful  being  prove  i s that  give  i n being  to  to  themselves  (Ibid)  (or  person  project,  desire  can  a  of  more  of  Hobbes  charity  desire  that  state  by  the  point  thinking  being  heresy".  offered  defines  Butler  of  i s interesting to  analysis  Hobbes  to  their  It of  beliefs  c o w a r d s t h i s  the to  actual  this  and  irrational  concern  satisfactions, from  individualistic  fundamental  human w e l l - b e i n g  Fortunately,  the  the  in  motivation, (such  terms  i.e. in  of  as  social  or  envy).  maximizing  terms  ecological point  of of  view They  i t as in  pleasures  "nominal or view,  theorist  the  an  turn or  terminal  ends".  utilitarian  85  a n a l y s i s o f human m o t i v a t i o n simply  i n terms o f i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c  t e r m i n a l v a l u e s comes w o e f u l l y s h o r t o f b e i n g the complete account.  "Fortunately',' because had t h i s been a t r u e a n a l y s i s ,  then t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f m a i n t a i n i n g even t h e c u r r e n t l e v e l o f human happiness indeed.  i n the f a c e o f economic r e s t r a i n t would be dim  I f t h e o n l y way t o make people happy, was t o c o n t i n u a l l y  s a t i s f y t h e i r ever expanding l i s t s o f "needs" and wants, then happiness  and e c o l o g i c a l s t a b i l i t y would be i n c o m p a t i b l e .  By u n d e r s t a n d i n g  human b e h a v i o u r  i n terms Of s e l f -  c o n s c i o u s n e s s , w i t h t h e r e a l i z a t i o n t h a t much o f our s e l f conception  flows from the s o c i e t y i n which we f i n d o u r s e l v e s ,  we l a y t h e f o u n d a t i o n f o r an a l t e r n a t i v e theory o f human happiness  which i s n o t based on t h e p o s s e s s i o n o f goods, but  on t h e p o s s e s s i o n o f s e l f  (and community) esteem.  I t i s to  the development o f such a t h e o r y t h a t we now t u r n .  III.. H i s t o r i c a l c r e d i t f o r t h e development o f . a " s o c i a l " of economic m o t i v a t i o n i s u s u a l l y whose a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l account  given  theory  t o T h o r s t e i n Veblen,  o f t h e behaviour  o f the American  r i c h a t t h e t u r n o f the c e n t u r y g a i n e d g r e a t p o p u l a r i t y . Veblen's  thesis,  f r e q u e n t l y m i s s t a t e d , i s t h a t the r i c h i n  America a c t j u s t l i k e the r i c h i n any " p r i m i t i v e " t h a t i s , they use t h e i r wealth  situation,  to e s t a b l i s h t h e i r superior  86  social situation.  The famous phrase "conspicuous  consumption"  merely r e f e r s t o a p a r t o f the whole syndrome o f behaviour (another a s p e c t b e i n g , f o r example, manners) which the wealthy (mostly "nouveau r i c h e " ) use t o l e g i t i m a t e and d i s p l a y social position.  their  But the g e n e r a l c l a i m , t h a t a l a r g e p a r t  o f p e o p l e ' s m o t i v a t i o n f o r the a c q u i s i t i o n o f wealth and the consumption  o f goods r e s u l t s from the d e s i r e f o r s t a t u s ,  made c e n t u r i e s ago by none o t h e r than Adam Smith.  was  Not, o f  c o u r s e , i n h i s economic t r e a t i s e , The Wealth o f N a t i o n s , but r a t h e r i n h i s e a r l i e r , more p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y s u b t l e work, the Theory of Moral Sentiments. S i n c e Smith seems t o be a proponent b o t h o f the view t h a t man more goods consumption prestige  (and ever  i s an i n n a t e consumer seeking ever  more p r o f i t ) ,  and the view t h a t man's  patterns, are determined by c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of  ( i . e . a r e s o c i a l l y , not i n n a t e l y , determined), i t  i s o b v i o u s l y worthwhile t o review the two accounts t h a t he offers. While the s u p p o s i t i o n t h a t humans a r e p r i m a r i l y .consumers s e e k i n g a never ending c o l l e c t i o n o f p l e a s u r a b l e consumer goods i s never e x p l i c i t l y  s t a t e d by Smith  e c o n o m i s t ) , i t i s c l e a r l y fundamental i s t r u e d e s p i t e h i s own  (the  to h i s analysis.  c l a i m t h a t the fundamental  This  principle  f o r h i s a n a l y s i s o f the wealth o f n a t i o n s i s the human tendency t o " t r u c k , b a r t e r and exchange". this propensity  be  As he puts i t :  "whether  ' one o f those o r i g i n a l p r i n c i p l e s i n  human n a t u r e , o f which no f u r t h e r account can be g i v e n : o r whether, as seems more p r o b a b l e , i t be the necessary  consequence  87  of the f a c i l i t i e s of reason and speech, i t belongs not to our present s u b j e c t t o e n q u i r e . " (Smith, 19-48;, p. But i t seems c l e a r  342)  t h a t Smith d i d not b e l i e v e t h a t  had an i n n a t e " d r i v e " t o " t r u c k , b a r t e r and exhange". w h i l e t h e r e are no doubt c e r t a i n activity  we  And  p l e a s u r e s i n v o l v e d i n the  of the market p l a c e , i t i s not these p l e a s u r e s which  b r i n g most people to engage i n " t r u c k i n g , b a r t e r i n g exchanging".  In f a c t t h i s  and  " p r o p e n s i t y " i s not an urge, but  a c a p a c i t y based on man's a b i l i t y , as Smith suggested, to use reason and speech i n the p u r s u i t o f h i s economic  interest.  We need not, t h e r e f o r e , d w e l l on t h i s p r o p e n s i t y except to note t h a t i t i s not i n " i t s e l f a c o n s t i t u e n t of human nature. On the o t h e r hand, Smith does employ a theory o f m o t i v a t i o n i n h i s work, v i z . man's urge t o pursue h i s own  economic  interest.  As he says: "Man has almost constant o c c a s i o n f o r the h e l p of h i s b r e t h r e n , and i t i s i n v a i n f o r him to expect i t from t h e i r benevolence o n l y . He w i l l be more l i k e l y t o p r e v a i l i f he can i n t e r e s t t h e i r s e l f - l o v e i n h i s favour, and show them t h a t i t i s f o r t h e i r advantage t o do f o r him what he r e q u i r e s of them. Whoever o f f e r s to another a b a r g a i n o f any k i n d , proposes t o do t h i s : Give me t h a t which I want and you s h a l l have t h i s which you want, i s the meaning o f every such o f f e r ; and i t i s i n t h i s manner that we o b t a i n from one another the f a r g r e a t e r p a r t o f those good o f f i c e s which we stand i n need of. I t i s not from the benevolence o f the butcher, the brewer, or the baker t h a t we expect our d i n n e r , but from t h e i r r e g a r d to t h e i r own i n t e r e s t . We address o u r s e l v e s , not to t h e i r humanity, but to t h e i r s e l f - l o v e , and never t a l k t o them of our own necessities, but of t h e i r advantages." (Smith, 1948, p.343)  88 While never denying the b a s i c asumption  s t a t e d above,  Smith does employ a s o p h i s t i c a t e d a n a l y s i s of the n o t i o n of self-interest.  An i n t e r e s t i n g example o f h i s r e j e c t i o n of a  "vulgar" understanding of s e l f i n t e r e s t , i . e . the use o f  'self  i n t e r e s t ' which equates i t w i t h monetary g a i n , i s given by h i s a n a l y s i s of the a l t e r n a t i v e schemes f o r p a y i n g u n i v e r s i t y professors: (In some) . . . u n i v e r s i t i e s the t e a c h e r i s p r o h i b i t e d from r e c e i v i n g any honorary of fee from h i s p u p i l s , and h i s s a l a r y c o n s t i t u t e s the whole of the revenue which he d e r i v e s from h i s o f f i c e . His i n t e r e s t i s , i n t h i s case, s e t as d i r e c t l y i n o p p o s i t i o n to h i s duty as i t i s p o s s i b l e t o s e t it. I t i s the i n t e r e s t of every man to l i v e as much a t h i s ease as he can; and i f h i s emoluments are to be p r e c i s e l y the same, whether he does, o r does not perform some very l a b o r i o u s duty, i t i s c e r t a i n l y h i s i n t e r e s t a t l e a s t as i n t e r e s t i s v u l g a r l y understood, e i t h e r t o n e g l e c t i t a l t o g e t h e r , o r , i f he i s s u b j e c t to some author i t y which w i l l not s u f f e r him t o do t h i s , to perform i t i n as c a r e l e s s and s l o v e n l y a manner as t h a t a u t h o r i t y w i l l permit. (Smith, 1957, p.110) (my emphasis) L a t e r he does admit  t h a t there are some s o c i a l or  " a d j e c t i v a l " p r e s s u r e s which encourage  the s a l a r i e d p r o f e s s o r s  to do a good job. I f the t e a c h e r happens t o be a man o f sense, i t must be an unpleasant t h i n g t o him t o be •• c o n s c i o u s , w h i l e he i s l e c t u r i n g h i s s t u d e n t s , t h a t he i s e i t h e r speaking o r r e a d i n g nonsense, or what i s very l i t t l e b e t t e r than nonsense. I t must too be unpleasant t o him to observe t h a t the g r e a t e r p a r t o f h i s students d e s e r t h i s l e c t u r e s ; o r perhaps a t t e n d upon them w i t h p l a i n enough marks o f n e g l e c t , contempt, and derision. I f he i s o b l i g e d , t h e r e f o r e , t o give a c e r t a i n number o f l e c t u r e s , these motives alone, without any o t h e r i n t e r e s t might dispose him to take some p a i n s to g i v e t o l e r a b l y good ones.""* ( I b i d , p. 112-113) *Nonetheless, Smith recommends the student pay  system!  89  While he  h i s use  i s aware  of  of  'interest'  a non  -  i n these  "vulgar"  Wealth  of Nations  is clearly  out  the  vulgar  sense.  But  i t i s important  was an  of  reflecting economist,  seriously d i d not  hold  note  to  the  of  Moral  Sentiments,  he  met,  acquisition  i s motivated  he  that  h i s economic argues  even and  theory of interest.  that by  after the  indicates  'interest',  human n a t u r e  pursuit  As  of  exploration  constant  are  of  on  sense  an  to  passages  of  the  Smith, not  The  working  when  just  his  essential pursuit  of  he  being  man's b a s i c In  that  and  Theory needs status.  puts i t : "It i s c h i e f l y from...regard to the sentiments o f m a n k i n d t h a t we p u r s u e r i c h e s a n d a v o i d poverty. F o r t o what purpose i s a l l t h e toil and b u s t l e o f t h i s w o r l d ? What i s t h e e n d o f a v a r i c e and a m b i t i o n , o f t h e p u r s u i t o f w e a l t h of power and p r e - e m i n e n c e ? Is, i t t o s u p p l y t h e necessities of nature? The wages o f t h e m e a n e s t l a b o u r e r c a n s u p p l y them... What t h e n i s the cause of our a v e r s i o n to h i s s i t u a t i o n ? From whence, then, a r i s e s t h a t e m u l a t i o n which runs... t h r o u g h a l l t h e d i f f e r e n t r a n k s o f men, and what a r e the a d v a n t a g e s o f t h a t g r e a t p u r p o s e o f human l i f e w h i c h we c a l l bettering our c o n d i t i o n ? To be o b s e r v e d , t o be a t t e n d e d t o , t o be t a k e n n o t i c e o f w i t h sympathy, complacency and a p p r o b a t i o n , a r e a l l t h e a d v a n t a g e s w h i c h we can propose t o d e r i v e from i t . I t i s the vanity not the ease o r the p l e a s u r e , which i n t e r e s t s us. But v a n i t y i s always founded upon our b e l i e f of our b e i n g the o b j e c t o f a t t e n t i o n and approbation. T h e r i c h man g l o r i e s i n h i s r i c h e s , b e c a u s e he f e e l s t h a t t h e y n a t u r a l l y draw u p o n him the a t t e n t i o n o f the w o r l d . . . A t the thoughts o f t h i s , h i s h e a r t seems t o s w e l l and d i l a t e i t s e l f w i t h i n h i m , and he i s f o n d e r o f h i s w e a l t h upon t h i s a c c o u n t t h a n f o r a l l t h e o t h e r advantages i t p r o c u r e s h i m . T h e p o o r man, on t h e c o n t r a r y , i s ashamed o f h i s p o v e r t y . He f e e l s t h a t i t e i t h e r p l a c e s him out s i g h t o f mankind, or t h a t i f they t a k e any n o t i c e o f him, t h e y h a v e , however s c a r c e l y any f e l l o w - f e e l i n g w i t h t h e m i s e r y and d i s t r e s s w h i c h he s u f f e r s . He i s m o r t i f i e d and  90  d i s t r e s s e d upon both accounts; f o r though t o be overlooked and t o be disapproved o f , a r e t h i n g s e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t , y e t as o b s c u r i t y covers us from the d a y l i g h t o f honour and approbation, to f e e l t h a t we a r e taken no n o t i c e o f , necess a r i l y damps the most agreeable hope, and d i s appoints the most ardent d e s i r e o f human nature." (Smith, 1948, pp. 92-93) While t h i s theory can o b v i o u s l y be compared t o Veblen's, an important d i s t i n c t i o n should be made.  Veblen's theory was  concentrated p r i m a r i l y on the consumption p a t t e r n s o f wealthy Americans,  whereas Smith's theory i s d i r e c t e d not towards  consumption, but towards the d r i v e f o r the accumulation o f wealth.  Indeed  i t would be s u r p r i s i n g i f the d r i v e f o r the  p o s s e s s i o n o f wealth  (e.g. money i n the bank) was motivated  simply by the p l e a s u r e such p o s s e s s i o n accords; i s c l e a r l y an i n s t r u m e n t a l a c t i v i t y .  accumulation  But Smith h e l d , a c c o r d i n g  to Lovejoy, not o n l y t h a t accumulation was not motivated by the immediate p l e a s u r e i t a f f o r d e d but t h a t : "consumption of goods cannot be s a i d t o a f f o r d the i n c e n t i v e from which accumulation i n v a r i a b l y " -or ever- "proceeds"; t h a t "the motive which l i e s a t the r o o t o f ownership i s emulation," the f e e l i n g t h a t "the p o s s e s s i o n o f wealth c o n f e r s honour"; and t h a t there i s "no other c o n c e i v a b l e i n c e n t i v e t o the accumulation o f wealth.'- * (Lovejoy, p. 215) 1  U n f o r t u n a t e l y , Lovejoy, u s u a l l y an impeccable  schola-ry'-'does  not give a . r e f e r e n c e f o r these s u r p r i s i n g remarks.  But g i v e n  Lovejoy's high l e v e l o f s c h o l o a r s h i p , I am sure t h a t we can t r u s t t h a t Smith d i d indeed make such remarks.  While we may  wish .to d i f f e r w i t h the absoluteness t h a t Smith a s c r i b e s t o the d e s i r e f o r honor as the motive t o the accumulation o f wealth, the long term d i s c i p l i n e t h a t t r a d i t i o n a l l y i s a s s o c i a t e d with the p u r s u i t o f c a p i t a l c o u l d h a r d l y be s u s t a i n e d  91  by t h e simple r a t i o n a l p u r s u i t o f f a r - o f f p l e a s u r e . t h e l e s s , Smith's  theory i s r e a l l y a theory  None-  ( l i k e VeblenVs) o f  eminence: n o t o f m i d d l e c l a s s f r u g a l i t y and p l a n n i n g . H i s t h e o r y r i n g s most t r u e f o r people who wish t o brag about y a c h t o r t h e i r " h o l d i n g s " , n o t those who have c a r e f u l l y f o r a s m a l l r e t i r e m e n t home, o r a merely car.  functioning  While both these l a t t e r items a r e f a r from  their saved  second  necessities,  i n our s o c i e t y , they a r e a l s o f a r from p r e s i t g e items and t h e i r a c q u i s i t i o n c o u l d h a r d l y be e x p l a i n e d i n terms o f the d e s i r e f o r s t a t u s o r "emulation". But Smith and Veblen have g i v e n us t h e b a s i s f o r a s o c i a l account o f consumption.  The t r a d i t i o n a l assumption o f  both t h e U t i l i t a r i a n s and contemporary  w e l f a r e economist  that  human wants a r e more o r l e s s g i v e n , o r t h a t i f not g i v e n , they s h o u l d be taken as g i v e n , p r e s e n t s an development o f a p o l i t i c a l  enormous b a r r i e r t o the  ecology.  The c o u n t e r t h e s i s , t h a t most wants a r e s o c i a l l y determined,  p r e s e n t s an obvious s o l u t i o n f o r the problems o f  p e o p l e ' s wants exceeding t h e world's c a p a c i t y t o supply t h e m — change p e o p l e ' s wants by changing t h e s o c i a l environment. a move makes consumption  Such  a p o l i t i c a l not a personal question.  But how t r u e i s t h e theory? I t i s obvious t h a t i t i s w i d e l y h e l d .  Much r e c e n t  animadversion a g a i n s t a d v e r t i s i n g , i n c l u d i n g t h e r e c e n t banning of c i g a r e t t e a d v e r t i s i n g from c e r t a i n media, a r e based on the premise  t h a t t h e t e c h n i q u e s o f a d v e r t i s i n g a r e capable n o t  o n l y o f c r e a t i n g wants i n p e o p l e , b u t o f c r e a t i n g wants t h a t  92  are c l e a r l y not i n the i n t e r e s t of the.consumer. w e l l known t h e s i s  Galbraith's  (developed i n h i s book "The New  t r i a l - S t a t e ) t h a t marketing  Indus-  i s the backbone of the economy-.,  because i t enables b u s i n e s s t o p l a n w i t h assurance  the enormous  investments which are i n v o l v e d i n c u r r e n t p r o d u c t i o n , i s a l s o based  on the b e l i e f i n the g r e a t power of a d v e r t i s i n g t o  c o n t r o l consumer demand.  .  I t s h o u l d a l s o be noted t h a t a d v e r t i s i n g f r e q u e n t l y p l a y s on the "emulative" d e s i r e : the need t o stand out i n your crowd, be the f i r s t on your b l o c k , e t c . — t h e o s t e n t a t i o u s a s p e c t o f consumption noted by Smith and V e b l e n .  But t h e r e i s  p r o b a b l y a more s i g n i f i c a n t s i d e o f t h i s same phenomen i l l u s t r a t e d by the c l i c h e of "keeping up w i t h the U n l i k e Veblen*s d e s i r e merely  and Smith's t h e o r y , t h i s remark i m p l i e s t h a t people  t o keep up,  to maintain t h e i r  membership, not t o get ahead and  show o f f .  need t o count i n one's community, one community.  Joneses"..  community While one  may  a l s o needs t o be i n the  The e x t e n t t o which ^membership" requirements  a t t a c h e d t o consumption undoubtedly of the v a s t m a j o r i t y of p e o p l e . fashion-determined  the  lifestyles  Perhaps what happens i n the  aspects of our l i v e s i s t h a t some people  (the e m i n e n t — l e a v i n g  a s i d e how  t h e i r s t y l e s and everyone e l s e self-respecting)  determines  are  they a c q u i r e t h i s -role) change (merely w i s h i n g t o remain  i s " f o r c e d " t o change t h e i r s .  T h i s i s rem-  i n i s c e n t of Hobbes' s u g g e s t i o n t h a t what d r i v e s most people  to  seek power i s simply the d e s i r e t o m a i n t a i n t h e i r c u r r e n t posi t i o n a g a i n s t those, always p r e s e n t , who a c q u i r e more power.  are attempting  to  93  But a d v e r t i s i n g i s , a f f e c t i n g consumption. changes  o f course, not the  only s o c i a l  The g e n e r a l s o c i a l p a t t e r n s and s o c i a l  (e.g. h i g h wages f o r c r a f t l a b o r , women's  clearly affect  force  liberation)  •• e x p e c t a t i o n s , d e s i r e s , and l i f e s t y l e s .  While i t i s more o r l e s s a c c e p t e d t h a t s o c i a l  pressures  and s o c i a l norms o f w e l l b e i n g determine our consumption p a t t e r n s t h e r e i s l i t t l e acceptance o f the p o s s i b i l i t y o f consumer b e h a v i o r b e i n g s u b j e c t t o s e l f - c o n s c i o u s group c o n t r o l . One i n t e r e s t i n g e x c e p t i o n t o t h i s c l a i m i s the r e c e n t moves,in t h e i n t e r e s t o f h e a l t h , t o c o n t r o l the adv e r t i s i n g o f c i g a r e t t e s and l i q u o r .  But i n g e n e r a l , t h e r e i s  a widespread acceptance o f p e o p l e ' s " p r i v a t e "  consumption  p a t t e r n s due t o b e l i e f s t h a t e i t h e r t h e s e patterns, cannot be objects of self-conscious s o c i a l c o n t r o l / not  be because we should n o t make moral judgements  d e s i r e s . . I have t r i e d t o show lief  o r t h a t they should  i n my remarks above.  :  about p e o p l e ' s  t h e f a l s e n e s s o f t h e f i r s t be-  In c h a p t e r V I , I w i l l c i t e evidence  r e g a r d i n g t h e power o f s m a l l groups t o a l t e r people's consumption  p a t t e r n s t o support my r e j e c t i o n o f " s o c i a l  fatalism."  But perhaps t h e most fundamental reason f o r r e j e c t i o n o f any c o l l e c t i v e e f f o r t t o c o n t r o l p e o p l e ' s consumption p a t t e r n s i s the  problem o f who w i l l do t h e c o n t r o l l i n g .  I t i s t h i s worry,  supported by t h e s u b j e c t i v i s t view o f v a l u e s , t h a t stands most i n the way o f t h e o r g a n i z e d c o n t r o l o f consumption. cry  The  o f freedom r e a p p e a r s . But t h e r e i s , I b e l i e v e , a way around t h i s problem, a  way which r e c o g n i z e s the d i f f i c u l t y  o f a d j u d i c a t i n g between  d i f f e r i n g v a l u e s and d e s i r e s , and a l s o r e c o g n i z e s the importance  94  of not a l l o w i n g these d e c i s i o n s t o be l e f t agency.  That way  to any  specific  i s r e a l d e m o c r a t i c p o l i c y making w i t h  and a c t i v e p a r t i c i p a t i o n by a l l " . d e a l s w i t h the moral o b j e c t i o n  full  Such a s o l u t i o n not o n l y  ( s i n c e , i n t h e o r y , ho one  be ."forced" t o change t h e i r consumption  will  p a t t e r n s ) , but a l s o  p l a y s upon the s o c i a l motives o f e m u l a t i o n and the d e s i r e for  acceptance. Most contemporary  p o l i t i c a l t h e o r i s t s see  as j u s t another realm f o r the r e s o l u t i o n o f  politics  competing  p r i v a t e d e s i r e s w i t h the r e s u l t t h a t they cannot p r o v i d e the t h e o r e t i c a l s t r u c t u r e f o r the s o l u t i o n .  I n s t e a d , we must have  a t h e o r y of p o l i t i c s based on the s o c i a l needs of i n d i v i d u a l s , not on t h e i r economic wants. such a t h e o r y t h a t I now  And  i t i s t o the  wish t o t u r n  development'of  95  C H A P T E R  JOHN ADAMS:  AN A L T E R N A T I V E  IV  POLITICAL  PSYCHOLOGY  96  Having argued the inadequacy o f t h e "homo economicus" view o f human nature, i t i s now a p p r o p r i a t e t o t u r n t o the development o f a new p o l i t i c a l theory based on a d i f f e r e n t view o f human n a t u r e .  T h i s new view w i l l emphasize t h e  primacy of man's s o c i a l needs; h i s need f o r a p p r o v a l , and community. of  These needs undercut any e g o i s t i c  human m o t i v a t i o n as B u t l e r has shown.  esteem,  analysis  They a l s o  explain  how v a r i o u s p r i v a t e wants a r e c r e a t e d and governed by the need f o r a p p r o v a l and community membership. B u t l e r b e l i e v e d such needs would l e a d almost i n e v i t a b l y to  s o c i a l c o o p e r a t i o n * but g i v e n Smith's remarks about the r o l e  of  s t a t u s seeking i n the d r i v e f o r consumption, and our own  o b s e r v a t i o n s , we can h a r d l y share B u t l e r ' s optimism. was an optimism based on the p l a u s i b l e but f a l s e  For t h i s  assumption  t h a t people w i l l o n l y esteem those a c t i o n s which a r e p u b l i c l y beneficial. for  But as Smith notes o f L o u i s XIV, he was honored  h i s deportment, v o i c e and "Other f r i v o l o u s accomplishments. Compared w i t h these, i n h i s own time and i n h i s own presence, no o t h e r v i r t u e i t seems appeared t o have any merit. Knowledge, i n d u s t r y , v a l o u r , and b e n e f i c i e n c e trembled, were abashed, and l o s t a l l d i g n i t y b e f o r e them". (Smith, 1948, p. 96-97)  Veblen's e x t e n s i v e a n a l y s i s of the behavior o f the robber baron set  i n the l a t e 19th c e n t u r y U.S. a l s o serves t o i n d i c a t e the  u n f o r t u n a t e moral n e u t r a l i t y o f the p a s s i o n f o r esteem. the  Clearly  determinant o f what a person who i s concerned f o r p u b l i c  a t t e n t i o n and a p p r o v a l w i l l do i s simply what the p u b l i c a t t e n d t o and approve.  will  And a t t e n t i o n , i f not a p p r o v a l , i s  l a v i s h e d on the r i d i c u l o u s b e h a v i o r of movie s t a r s and the most *See above, p. 70.  97  s p e c t a c u l a r forms of c r i m i n a l behavior.  Success i n a c h i e v i n g  p u b l i c eminence i s l a r g e l y unconnected i n our s o c i e t y w i t h success  i n achieving public benefit.  Because our s o c i e t y  p l a c e s such fundamental importance on a c h i e v i n g  financial  success and the p o s s e s s i o n of items of p e r s o n a l consumption, it  i s not s u r p r i s i n g t h a t t h i s "passion" works so l i t t l e f o r  the good of the community.  In a d d i t i o n , the g e n e r a l c o r -  r u p t i o n o f the p o l i t i c a l space, the arena where t h e r e  should  be an o p p o r t u n i t y to achieve p u b l i c i t y f o r a c t i o n s and  efforts  i n the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t , means t h a t t h e r e i s no forum f o r t h i s p a s s i o n to work i t s good.  Even i f t h i s p u b l i c arena was  f r e e from the t a i n t of c o r r u p t i o n and m a n i p u l a t i o n , breadth would s t i l l numbers of people  more  i t s limited  not p r o v i d e an ' o p p o r t u n i t y f o r the v a s t  to a c h i e v e the r e c o g n i t i o n , esteem,  and  o p p o r t u n i t y f o r p a r t i c i p a t i o n t h a t should c h a r a c t e r i z e a p u b l i c forum. The o n l y s o l u t i o n to the impoverishment of the p u b l i c space i s widespread p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the work p l a c e and community.  For the forum of self-government  i n the  provides a place  f o r p u b l i c e x c e l l e n c e , an o p p o r t u n i t y to d e d i c a t e one's energy to the p u b l i c good and at the same time, p r o v i d e s /  o p p o r t u n i t y to d i s c o v e r and a r t i c u l a t e t h i s good.  an In doing  so the p u b l i c forum " e x p l o i t s " the n a t u r a l human d e s i r e f o r eminence and, people  i n the case of f a c e - t o - f a c e democracy,  have an o p p o r t u n i t y to t r u l y assess the motives  and arguments o f other p a r t i c i p a n t s ; and because l o c a l d e c i s i o n s are about l o c a l i s s u e s , the people  engaging i n t h i s  98 process should be w e l l equipped t o make the c o r r e c t The  reason the p a s s i o n f o r eminence f a i l s  appraisal.  to achieve  much i n the way o f s o c i a l value i n our s o c i e t y i s t h a t  there  i s so l i t t l e o p p o r t u n i t y f o r any but a few t o achieve any p u b l i c eminence by p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e i r government.  It is  not simply t h a t "the people" have a p e r v e r s e f a s c i n a t i o n w i t h the b e h a v i o r o f the r i c h and famous r e g a r d l e s s qualities.  o f t h e i r moral  In f a c t t h i s v i c a r i o u s f a s c i n a t i o n might w e l l be  the r e s u l t o f the impoverishment o f the " p u b l i c " s i d e o f t h e i r own l i v e s .  The lack o f o p p o r t u n i t y to p a r t i c i p a t e i n govern-  ment n o t only  d e b i l i t a t e s the p o l i t i c a l understanding o f the  people, i t a l s o undermines any attempt t o encourage genuine public spiritedness. discovering  By n o t p r o v i d i n g  an o p p o r t u n i t y f o r both  and w i l l i n g the p u b l i c good, the s o c i e t y turns the  desire f o r p u b l i c acclaim  away from the p u b l i c good t o the  s e l f i s h p u r s u i t o f p r i v a t e success.  The much remarked upon  apathy of the v o t i n g p u b l i c can undoubtably be t r a c e d i n l a r g e p a r t n o t only  to t h e i r a c t u a l powerlessness, b u t a l s o t o the  lack of a p u b l i c forum i n which t o develop the s p i r i t o f community  dedication.  There i s , i n s h o r t , no o p p o r t u n i t y f o r the experience of p u b l i c happiness.  What i s m i s s i n g i s  . . . t h e freedom the c o l o n i s t s c a l l e d l a t e r , when they had come t o t a s t e i t , " p u b l i c happiness", and i t c o n s i s t e d i n the c i t i z e n ' s r i g h t o f access t o the p u b l i c realm, i n h i s share i n p u b l i c power - t o be "a p a r t i c i p a t o r i n the government o f a f f a i r s " i n J e f f e r s o n ' s t e l l i n g phrase - as d i s t i n c t from the g e n e r a l l y r e c o g n i z e d r i g h t s o f s u b j e c t s t o be p r o t e c t e d by the government i n the p u r s u i t o f p r i v a t e happiness even a g a i n s t p u b l i c power, t h a t i s , d i s t i n c t from r i g h t s which only t y r a n n i c a l power would a b o l i s h . The very f a c t ;  99 t h a t the word "happiness"was chosen i n l a y i n g c l a i m t o a share i n p u b l i c power i n d i c a t e s s t r o n g l y t h a t there e x i s t e d i n the country, p r i o r t o the r e v o l u t i o n , such a t h i n g a s . " p u b l i c happiness", and t h a t men knew they c o u l d not be a l t o g e t h e r "happy" i f t h e i r happiness was l o c a t e d and enjoyed o n l y i n p r i v a t e l i f e . (Arendt, p. 124) I t may be s u r p r i s i n g t o t h i n k of the American Revolution  as o r i g i n a l l y d e d i c a t e d  to the establishment  of  p a r t i c i p a t o r y democracy, but: Hannah Arendt does a ' < masterf u'lb job of p o i n t i n g out t h i s tendency.  Unfortunately,  the founding  f a t h e r s had a r a t h e r dim awareness of the n o t i o n o f p u b l i c happiness.  In f a c t , most o f them, when c a l l e d upon t o  g e n e r a l i z e about p u b l i c l i f e agreed w i t h J e f f e r s o n when he said: Happiness l i e s o u t s i d e the p u b l i c realm, " . . . i n the l a p and love o f my f a m i l y , i n the s o c i e t y o f my neighbours and my books i n the wholesome occupation o f my farms and my a f f a i r s " , i n s h o r t , i n the p r i v a c y of a home upon whose l i f e the p u b l i c has no c l a i m . (Arendt, p. 125) The  o n l y exception  t o the g e n e r a l  fathers to appreciate  f a i l u r e o f the founding  and a r t i c u l a t e the d e l i g h t s o f t h e i r  p u b l i c l i f e was John Adams,  iclnd s i g n i f i c a n t l y enough i t was  John Adams, as mentioned above, who developed a t l e n g t h a theory  o f the p o l i t i c a l r o l e played  "distinction".  by the d e s i r e f o r  While I w i l l cover Adam's theory  i n some  d e t a i l , i t i s u s e f u l here t o quote Hannah Arendt's summary: The p o i n t i s t h a t the Americans knew t h a t p u b l i c freedom c o n s i s t e d i n having a share i n p u b l i c business, and t h a t the a c t i v i t i e s connected w i t h t h i s b u s i n e s s by no means c o n s t i t u t e d a burden but gave those who discharged them i n p u b l i c a f e e l i n g o f happiness they c o u l d a c q u i r e nowhere e l s e . They knew very w e l l , and John Adams was b o l d enough t o formulate t h i s knowledge time and again, t h a t the people went t o town assemblies, as t h e i r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s l a t e r  100  were t o go t o the famous Conventions, n e i t h e r e x c l u s i v e l y because of duty nor, and even l e s s , to serve t h e i r own i n t e r e s t s but most of a l l because they enjoyed the d i s c u s s i o n s , the d e l i b e r a t i o n s , and the making of d e c i s i o n s . What brought them together was "the world and the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t of l i b e r t y " ( H a r r i n g t o n ) , and what moved them was "the p a s s i o n f o r d i s t i n c t i o n " which John Adams h e l d t o be "more e s s e n t i a l and remarkable" than any other human f a c u l t y : "Wherever men, women, or c h i l d r e n , are to be found, whether they be o l d or young, r i c h or poor, h i g h or low, wise or f o o l i s h , i g n o r a n t or l e a r n e d , every i n d i v i d u a l i s seen to be s t r o n g l y a c t u a t e d by a d e s i r e t o be seen, heard, t a l k e d o f , approved and r e s p e c t e d by the people about him, and w i t h i n h i s knowledge". The v i r t u e of t h i s p a s s i o n he c a l l e d "emulation", the " d e s i r e t o e x c e l another", and i t s v i c e he. c a l l e d "ambition" because i t "aims a t power as a means o f d i s t i n c t i o n " . And, psycholog i c a l l y speaking, these are i n f a c t the c h i e f v i r t u e s and v i c e s of p o l i t i c a l man. For the t h i r s t and w i l l t o power as such, r e g a r d l e s s of any p a s s i o n f o r d i s t i n c t i o n , though c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the t y r a n n i c a l man, i s no longer a t y p i c a l l y p o l i t i c a l v i c e , but r a t h e r t h a t q u a l i t y which tends t o d e s t r o y a l l p o l i t i c a l l i f e , i t s v i c e s no l e s s than i t s virtues. I t i s p r e c i s e l y because the t y r a n t has no d e s i r e t o e x c e l and l a c k s a l l p a s s i o n for d i s t i n c t i o n t h a t he f i n d s i t so p l e a s a n t to r i s e above the company o f a l l men; conversely,, i t i s the d e s i r e to e x c e l which makes men l o v e the world and enjoy the company of t h e i r peers, and d r i v e s them i n t o p u b l i c b u s i n e s s . (Arendt, p.125U n f o r t u n a t e l y Adams d i d not have h i s own  a n a l y s i s as  c l e a r as Arendt has i n d i c a t e d , but he c e r t a i n l y had no doubt about the importance in  social l i f e .  t h a t the " d e s i r e f o r d i s t i n c t i o n " p l a y e d  As he s t a t e d "... the theory of e d u c a t i o n , and  the s c i e n c e of government may  be a l l reduced t o the same  p r i n c i p l e , and be a l l comprehended i n the knowledge of the means of  a c t i v e l y conducting, c o n t r o l l i n g , and r e g u l a t i n g the emulation  and ambition of i t s c i t i z e n s " . He was  (Adams, p.248)  a l s o c o n f i d e n t of i t s great extent, and  begins  101  his  long  discourse  on  the  passion  for distinction  with  the  following introduction. Men, i n t h e i r p r i m i t i v e c o n d i t i o n s , however savage, were u n d o u b t e d l y g r e g a r i o u s ; and t h e y c o n t i n u e t o be s o c i a l , n o t o n l y i n e v e r y stage of c i v i l i z a t i o n , but i n every p o s s i b l e s i t u a t i o n i n w h i c h t h e y can be p l a c e d . As n a t u r e i n t e n d e d them f o r s o c i e t y , she has f u r n i s h e d them w i t h p a s s i o n s , a p p e t i t e s , and p r o p e n s i t i e s , as w e l l as a v a r i e t y o f f a c u l t i e s , c a l c u l a t e d both f o r t h e i r individual e n j o y m e n t , and t o r e n d e r them u s e f u l t o e a c h other i n t h e i r s o c i a l connections. There i s n o n e among t h e m m o r e e s s e n t i a l o r remarkable, than the passion f o r d i s t i n c t i o n . A desire t o be o b s e r v e d , c o n s i d e r e d , e s t e e m e d , p r a i s e d , b e l o v e d , and a d m i r e d by h i s f e l l o w s , i s one of t h e e a r l i e s t , as w e l l as k e e n e s t dispositions d i s c o v e r e d i n t h e h e a r t o f man. I f any one should doubt the e x i s t e n c e o f t h i s p r o p e n s i t y , l e t h i m go a n d a t t e n t i v e l y o b s e r v e the journeymen and a p p r e n t i c e s i n the f i r s t workshop, o r the oarsmen i n a cockboat, a family or a neighborhood, the i n h a b i t a n t s of a house o r the crew o f a s h i p , a s c h o o l o r a c o l l e g e , a c i t y or a v i l l a g e , a savage or c i v i l i z e d people,a h o s p i t a l or a church, the bar or the e x c h a n g e , a camp o r a c o u r t . Wherever men, women, o r c h i l d r e n , a r e t o b e f o u n d , whether t h e y be o l d o r y o u n g , r i c h o r p o o r , h i g h o r low, wise or f o o l i s h , ignorant or learned, every i n d i v i d u a l i s s e e n t o be s t r o n g l y a c t u a t e d by a d e s i r e t o be s e e n , h e a r d , t a l k e d o f , a p p r o v e d a n d r e s p e c t e d , b y t h e p e o p l e a b o u t him,, a n d w i t h i n h i s k n o w l e d g e . * (Adams, p . 2 3 3 ) It  i s important  to  note  two  aspects  of  this  long  passage: 1.  The  of  nature,  2. to  *  That be  seen,  repudiation that  Adams  makes o f  any  pre-social  state  and the  individuals'  heard,  talked of,  desire  for distinction  a p p r o v e d , and  i s the  respected,  by  "desire the  T h i s s h o u l d be c o m p a r e d t o R o u s s e a u ' s s t a t e o f n a t u r e theory w i t h s u r v i v a l and e c o n o m i c w e l l b e i n g as t h e m o t i v a t i o n f o r p o l i t i c a l unity.  102 people about him,  and w i t h i n h i s knowledge".  That i s , i t i s  a d e s i r e to achieve d i s t i n c t i o n among one's peers and be  distinguished  (as Adams u n f o r t u n a t e l y  d e s i r e f o r frame which we  might d e s c r i b e  does not) as "the  seen, heard, t a l k e d o f , approved and r e s p e c t e d v a s t number of whom are t o t a l l y unknown".  should  from the  d e s i r e to be  by people  Adams'  the  confusion  of the d e s i r e f o r ©ame w i t h the d e s i r e f o r "pure" esteem r e s u l t s i n his overlooking t h i s confusion peers who  the importance of the l o c a l  r e s u l t s from h i s f o c u s i n g h i s a t t e n t i o n on h i s  combined both n a t i o n wide fame w i t h the p l e a s u r e  e x c e l l i n g among themselves.  of  Adams d i d , o f course, make a  d i s t i n c t i o n quoted above between 'ambition' and i . e . between the d e s i r e f o r power and But he  assembly,  'emulation , 1  the d e s i r e t o e x c e l .  f a i l e d to n o t i c e t h a t the amoral p u r s u i t of fame l i k e  t h a t of power i s a l s o a v i c e of the d e s i r e f o r d i s t i n c t i o n . Adams a l s o confuses two  other  d i s t i n c t d e s i r e s : the  d e s i r e to e x c e l among one's peers and  the d e s i r e simply  s u p e r i o r , i . e . the d e s i r e to be b e t t e r than anyone of whether the others  are a f a i r match.  to be  regardless  Of course s i n c e  ' e x c e l l e n t ' l i k e so many other d e s c r i p t i v e words (e.g.  'big')  embodies an unspoken comparison to r e l e v a n t o t h e r s , i t almost n e c e s s a r i l y i n v o l v e s one  i n a k i n d of r e l a t i v e  i . e . s u p e r i o r accomplishment.  Adams lapses  achievement,  into calling  emulation "a d e s i r e to e x c e l another by f a i r i n d u s t r y i n the search  of t r u t h , and  overlooking  the p r a c t i c e o f v i r t u e " XAdams, p.233)  i n t h i s d e f i n i t i o n the important c o n d i t i o n  one's e x c e l l e n c e must be success, had  i n r e l a t i o n t o one's equals.  that Mere  even i n the p r a c t i c e of v i r t u e , i s not what Adams  i n mind.  The. .notion of e q u a l i t y  103  i s as important t o the v i r t u o u s p u r s u i t o f d i s t i n c t i o n as i s the n o t i o n of s u c c e s s , and i t i s t h i s concern f o r e x c e l l i n g among one's peers which d i s t i n g u i s h e s the v i r t u e from the v i c e a m b i t i o n .  emulation  For the l a t t e r , c o n c e r n e d as i t i s  w i t h power i n Adams' l e x i c o g r a p h y , shows no concern f o r equality.  Indeed  the p u r s u i t of power r a t h e r than e x c e l l e n c e  i s a p u r s u i t of i n e q u a l i t y , a d r i v e t o overwhelm r a t h e r than o u t s h i n e one's p e e r s . The e x p e r i e n c e o f "emulation" r e q u i r e s a forum where equals might meet, see and be seen.  While both Adams and  Arendt are concerned w i t h the p o l i t i c a l  realm and t h e r e f o r e  most i n t e r e s t e d i n w r i t i n g and speaking, c e r t a i n l y the same d e s i r e f o r s h a r i n g and d i s p l a y i n g one's s k i l l s everyone  from m u s i c i a n s to a t h l e t e s .  the p o s s e s s i o n of any s k i l l ,  There  i s associated with  a d e s i r e t o d i s p l a y and share i t  w i t h o t h e r s , and, e s p e c i a l l y w i t h o t h e r s who There  i s found among  are roughly e q u a l .  i s as much a d e s i r e t o e x p e r i e n c e membership i n a group  d e f i n e d by the p o s s e s s i o n of a s k i l l may  as t h e r e i s the d e s i r e t o  excel i n this s k i l l .  One  wish t o be o u t s t a n d i n g i n the  group, but t h i s s t i l l  r e q u i r e s membership  (acceptance by you of  t h i s group as your peer group and acceptance by them o f you a-• b o n a f i d e member). s  There  as  i s an almost i r o n i c t e n s i o n between  the d e s i r e t o e x c e l and the d e s i r e f o r acceptance  - a tension  which i s dangerous f o r the c o h e s i v e n e s s o f the group should some o f i t s members become "too good" f o r i t . All  of t h i s i s i n t u i t i v e l y understood  i n our d a i l y  socializing,  but f o r many of us the o p p o r t u n i t y f o r group s h a r i n g i s w o e f u l l y l i m i t e d , and f o r almost a l l of us the p o s s i b i l i t y o f  genuine  104  p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n self-government i s n o n - e x i s t e n t .  Nonetheless,  whole t h e o r i e s o f government are based on the p o p u l a r assumption t h a t meeting t o decide on matters o f mutual i n t e r e s t (and even c o n f l i c t ) are d i s u l t i l i t i e s , i n d i c a t i n g the general  loss of  understanding o f p u b l i c happiness.* Now Adams, w h i l e he was c e r t a i n l y aware o f the importance of b e i n g e x c e l l e n t among equals, i n t e n t i o n and focused  simply  frequently l o s t tract of h i s  on success.  He goes on a t  embarrassing l e n g t h about the importance of marks o f m e r i t as were used by the Romans t o d i s t i n g u i s h t h e i r and  speculates  such  distinguished,**  t h a t t h e lack o f a h e r e d i t a r y a r i s t o c r a c y may  be harmful t o the new r e p u b l i c s i n c e the d e s i r e t o e s t a b l i s h one's f a m i l y i s o f prime importance i n m o t i v a t i n g public action.  And f i n a l l y  people t o  he even wonders whether a s t a t e  does n o t need a monarchy.  *See f o r example Buchanan and T u l l o c k , The C a l c u l u s o f Consent, e s p e c i a l l y chapter V I I I . * Has there ever been a n a t i o n who understood t h e human h e a r t b e t t e r than t h e Romans, o r made a b e t t e r u s e o f t h e p a s s i o n f o r c o n s i d e r a t i o n , c o n g r a t u l a t i o n and d i s t i n c t i o n ? ... D i s t i n c t i o n s o f c o n d i t i o n s , as w e l l as o f ages, were made by d i f f e r e n c e o f c l o t h i n g . . . . The c h a i r s o f i v o r y ; the l i c t o r s ; ...the crowns of g o l d , o f i v o r y , o f f l o w e r s ; ... t h e i r o r a t i o n s ; and t h e i r triumphs; e v e r y t h i n g i n r e l i g i o n , government and common l i f e , was parade, r e p r e s e n t a t i o n and ceremony. E v e r y t h i n g was addressed t o the emulation o f the c i t i z e n s , and e v e r y t h i n g was c a l c u l a t e d t o a t t r a c t the a t t e n t i o n , t o a l l u r e the c o n s i d e r a t i o n , and e x c i t e the c o n g r a t u l a t i o n s o f the people; to a t t a c h t h e i r h e a r t s t o i n d i v i d u a l c i t i z e n s a c c o r d i n g t o t h e i r m e r i t ; and t o t h e i r l a w g i v e r s , m a g i s t r a t e s , and judges, a c c o r d i n g t o t h e i r rank, s t a t i o n and importance t o t h e s t a t e . And t h i s was i n the , true s p i r i t o f r e p u b l i c s , i n which form o f government there i s no other c o n s i s t e n t method o f p r e s e r v i n g order o r p r o c u r i n g submission t o the laws. (Adams, p. 2 43) -  105  T h i s i s the t r u e reason, why a l l c i v i l i z e d f r e e n a t i o n s have found, by experience, the n e c e s s i t y of s e p a r a t i n g from the body of the people, and even from the l e g i s l a t u r e , the d i s t r i b u t i o n o f honors, and c o n f e r r i n g i t on the executive a u t h o r i t y of government. When the emulation of a l l the c i t i z e n s looks up to one p o i n t , l i k e the rays of a c i r c l e from a l l p a r t s of the circumf e r e n c e , meeting and u n i t i n g i n the c e n t r e , you may hope f o r u n i f o r m i t y , c o n s i s t e n c y , and s u b o r d i n a t i o n ; but when they look up to d i f f e r e n t i n d i v i d u a l s , or assemblies, or c o u n c i l s , you may expect a l l the d e f o r m i t i e s , e c c e n t r i c i t i e s , and c o n f u s i o n , of the.Ptolemaic system(Adams,p.256). But these c o n s i d e r a t i o n s came out of Adams' w o r r i e s how  to c o n t r o l "emulation" so t h a t i t would genuinely  good of the s t a t e , f o r " i t i s the p r i n c i p a l end  about  serve  the  of government  to r e g u l a t e t h i s p a s s i o n , which i n i t s t u r n becomes a p r i n c i p a l means of government". (Adams, p.2 34) Adams' constant worry about how  to c o n t r o l the  f o r d i s t i n c t i o n comes from h i s p r e s u p p o s i t i o n are b a s i c a l l y incompetent, and process  t h a t 1. people  2. government i s b a s i c a l l y a  o f c e n t r a l i z a t i o n , a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , and  control.  r i g h t l y p o i n t s out t h a t the idea of a whole n a t i o n e l e c t i n g leaders w i l l  passion  He  directly  s u r e l y not produce the d e s i r e d  results.  When the government of a g r e a t n a t i o n i s i n q u e s t i o n , s h a l l the whole n a t i o n choose? W i l l such a c h o i c e be b e t t e r than chance? S h a l l the whole n a t i o n vote f o r senators? T h i r t y m i l l i o n s of v o t e s , f o r example, f o r each senator i n France! I t i s obvious t h a t t h i s would be a l o t t e r y of m i l l i o n s of blanks to one p r i z e , and t h a t the chance of having wisdom and i n t e g r i t y i n a senator by h e r e d i t a r y descent would be f a r b e t t e r . There i s no i n d i v i d u a l p e r s o n a l l y known to an hundredth p a r t of the n a t i o n . The v o t e r s , then, must be exposed to d e c e p t i o n , from i n t r i g u e s and manoeuvres without number, t h a t i s t o say, from a l l the c h i c a n e r y , impostures, and falsehoods imaginable, with scarce a p o s s i b i l i t y of p r e f e r r i n g r e a l merit. (-Adams, p. 2 40)^  106  The  problem, and i t i s c e r t a i n l y a very r e a l and p r e s s i n g  problem, i s t h a t once government goes beyond the p o s s i b i l i t y of face-to-face  democracy, people a r e h i g h l y s u s c e p t i b l e t o  m a n i p u l a t i o n and d e c e i t .  A l s o by the time the power i s  c e n t r a l i z e d and e l e c t i o n s turned i n t o media c i r c u s s e s , the "ambition" f o r power and fame takes over from the d e s i r e t o e x c e l among one's peers as the primary p o l i t i c a l motive. w h i l e Adams h i m s e l f  And  has t r o u b l e keeping the d i s t i n c t i o n between  emulation and ambition c l e a r , he does argue t h a t the former can be a check on the l a t e r .  He s t a t e s :  There are no men who are not ambitious o f d i s t i n g u i s h i n g themselves and growing c o n s i d e r a b l e among those w i t h whom they converse. T h i s ambition i s n a t u r a l t o the human s o u l . And as, when i t r e c e i v e d a happy t u r n , i t i s the source o f p r i v a t e f e l i c i t y and p u b l i c p r o s p e r i t y , and when i t e r r s , produces p r i v a t e uneasiness and p u b l i c c a l a m i t i e s ; i t i s the business and duty o f p r i v a t e prudence, o f p r i v a t e and p u b l i c e d u c a t i o n , and of n a t i o n a l p o l i c y , to d i r e c t i t to r i g h t objects. For t h i s purpose i t should be c o n s i dered, t h a t t o every man who i s capable o f a worthy conduct, the p l e a s u r e from the approbation o f worthy men i s e x q u i s i t e and i n e x p r e s s i b l e . (Adams, p.241) I f I understand t h i s passage c o r r e c t l y , Adams i s suggesting  t h a t the healthy  d e s i r e f o r "emulation" can be used t o  c o n t r o l the unhealthy ambition f o r fame and power.  The s o l u t i o n  for  success, i s  which he searched with such agony and so l i t t l e  to d e c e n t r a l i z e the s t a t e , p u t t i n g c o n t r o l i n the hands o f group of people who can c o n t r o l t h e i r l e a d e r s because o f t h e i r d e s i r e f o r t h e i r approbation.  leaders  In a d d i t i o n the d e s i r e f o r fame  and power c o u l d be l i m i t e d by simply e l i m i n a t i n g the p o s s i b i l i t y o f a great d e a l o f power and nationwide fame.  For Adams' dilemm  r e s u l t e d from the c e n t r a l i z a t i o n o f power, and with t h i s  107  c e n t r a l i z a t i o n came the populace's i n e v i t a b l e  ignorance o f the  i s s u e s and r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s who were n e c e s s a r i l y addition, and  the c e n t r a l i z e d  alienated  distant.  In  s t a t e w i t h i t s powerful e x e c u t i v e  legislature attracted  those who were ambitious  f o r fame and power, r a t h e r than those who sought simply t o e x c e l i n v i r t u e among t h e i r peers. The elite  problem f o r democratic theory o f c o n t r o l l i n g the  i s c e r t a i n l y genuine enough, but i t i s caused by the  dramatic i n e q u a l i t i e s concommittant w i t h an e l i t i s t government wealth).  (and o f course a g r o s s l y  form o f  unequal d i s t r i b u t i o n o f  C r e a t i n g an e l i t e n a t u r a l l y  causes the problem o f  c o n t r o l l i n g t h i s e l i t e because o f the d i s t o r t i o n o f the desire  f o r d i s t i n c t i o n i n t o the v i c e o f ambition. The  fathers p. and  solution  i s well  proposed by Adams and the o t h e r founding  enough known: the balance of power  280-81). Adams f e l t that  (see Adams,  the b i c a m e r a l house, the e x e c u t i v e ,  the j u d i c i a r y would a l l be motivated by emulation t o check  i n each o t h e r the d e s i r e to a problem t h a t  f o r dominance.  But t h i s i s a s o l u t i o n  i s l a r g e l y o f t h e i r own c r e a t i n g .  l i s t i c competition f o r control  Ologopo-  i s one f a i r l y e f f e c t i v e means  of guarding a g a i n s t the extremes o f i n d i v i d u a l tyranny, but i t i s hardly p o l i t i c a l  freedom.  Clearly  the t r u e s o l u t i o n  i s to  r e t u r n to the people the power which because o f c e n t r a l i z a t i o n i s s u b j e c t t o abuse.  Given a l e s s h i e r a r c h i c a l power  there i s l e s s o f a problem of how t o c o n t r o l case, not so powerful)  structure,  the ( i n t h i s  elite.  Adams u n f o r t u n a t e l y was a l s o concerned with the problem of c o n t r o l l i n g the people and was d i s t u r b e d as were most o f the  108  founding f a t h e r s with the widespread e g a l i t a r i a n He even saw e g a l i t a r i a n i s m as a necessary did  not make s u f f i c i e n t allowance  distinction  (pp. 273-74).  sentiment.  f a i l u r e because i t  f o r the p a s s i o n f o r  But i n t h i s argument, Adams i s  once again o v e r l o o k i n g h i s own r e a l i z a t i o n t h a t the p u r e s t form o f t h i s p a s s i o n r e q u i r e s e q u a l i t y : a background group which i s as h i g h l y r e s p e c t e d by the " d i s t i n g u i s h e d " as he i s it.  By encouraging  l o c a l government, the founding f a t h e r s  c o u l d have provided the o p p o r t u n i t y f o r m i l l i o n s t o have t h i s experience.  Instead, a system was devised i n which o n l y  a few c o u l d experience  "emulation"  and p u b l i c happiness,  and as a r e s u l t , many were a t t r a c t e d t o the l e g i s l a t u r e and e x e c u t i v e , not f o r the experience o f freedom  d i s c u s s i o n and  d e c i s i o n among equals - b u t f o r the power, fame and dominance Such a system c o n t r i b u t e d not o n l y to the impoverishment of  the p o l i t i c a l  environmental  life,  but f i n a l l y o f the whole p u b l i c space:  degradation, urban b l i g h t , and p o l i t i c a l  apathy  I b e l i e v e t h a t the most p r e f e r a b l e s o l u t i o n i n p a r t o r i n whole to a l l these problems i s the development of a mechanism to enable widespread p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n p u b l i c a f f a i r s by a l l c i t i z e n s .  But g i v e n the focus of t h i s  t h e s i s , I w i l l attempt t o argue o n l y f o r p a r t i c i p a t i o n as the best s o l u t i o n t o the e c o l o g i c a l i m p e r a t i v e , and i t i s t o t h i s argument t h a t I w i l l now t u r n .  109  C H A P T E R  PARTICIPATION  AND  V  ECOLOGY  110  Adams f a i l e d to f u l l y r e c o g n i z e the s i g n i f i c a n c e o f h i s own  p s y c h o l o g i c a l understanding and to g e n e r a l i z e  understanding to the n o n - e l i t e . him constant d i f f i c u l t y  this  T h i s f a i l u r e , which gave  i n h i s p o l i t i c a l theory, d e r i v e d  not o n l y from h i s d i s t a n c e from the people, but from the f e a r which he shared with many o f the "founding fathers", o f the people's a c t u a l p o l i t i c a l t e n d e n c i e s . was w e l l grounded,  Whether such a f e a r  such f e a r s no doubt s t i l l e x i s t  account f o r a c e r t a i n amount o f the disparagement participation.  The e c o l o g i c a l l y concerned might  and of c i t i z e n  also  ( e s p e c i a l l y g i v e n the c l a s s b i a s o f t h i s group) be  skeptical  about the c l a i m that a c t i v e c i t i z e n p a r t i c i p a t i o n would r e s u l t i n c o n s e r v a t i o n and e c o l o g i c a l p r e s e r v a t i o n . t u n a t e l y many arguments e m p i r i c a l research)  For-  (and i n the next chapter, some.  can be p r e s e n t e d t h a t support the view  that p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s not only a good i n i t s e l f , but i s the b e s t means o f p r o t e c t i n g the environment  and c o n t r o l l i n g the  growth of the economy.. The f i r s t argument i s that consumption  p a t t e r n s are  l a r g e l y d i c t a t e d by community and peer group norms.  This  i s Adam Smith's p o i n t , Veblen's p o i n t , and f i n d s e x p r e s s i o n i n the c l i c h e o f "keeping up w i t h the Joneses". wide b e l i e f s about the good l i f e ,  Community  about the s t y l e o f  life  a p p r o p r i a t e t o someone i n a c e r t a i n p o s i t i o n , along with ' peer group requirements f o r acceptance)  (such as appearance  requirements  l a r g e l y determine people's d e s i r e s  and  Ill  expectations  for  This  claim  the  obvious notion  belief but in  a  of  that want  which  also  of  variety of  i s supported  "relative  relative  to  poorer  suggests  that  i s not the  the  sense  then  the  of  there  eliminated wealthy  and The  the  good  life  are  order  efforts  of  the  goods.  To  what  and  these  do  which  the  sees)  solution  a  political not  on  the  of  goods,  community  to  the  appears  one.  can  distance  It  problem  As  as  only  an  long  some a b s o l u t e  impoverishment financial  of  himself.  e q u a l i t y : what  again,  of  want  affluent  (or  use  embodies  absolute  one  i s based  norms  changes  extent  hard  as  other  such  changing  which  course  producers  effect, as  of  therefore  notoriously  widespread  as  lack,  be  between  the  poor.*  community  current  norms  namely  sense  reducing  the  some  i s only  deprivation  by  the  l a r g e r , more  i s , once  degrading  by  individual finds  f e e l i n g impoverished, problem  " i n e s s e n t i a l " goods.  deprivation"  deprivation  the  economic  is  a wide  subject are  encourage  behavior ascertain.  less  economic  to  of  to  the  In  people  by  the  their  controls  these  following  clearly  (e.g.  the  for  they  s e l f - c o n s c i o u s l y chosen conditions,  of  some e x t e n t  desire  actually  But  notion  change.  governed  advertising  the to  to  a r t i c u l a t e the  them have  an  factors  relative  increase  * While the f a c t t h a t people are p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n t h e i r government does n o t g u a r a n t e e s o c i a l j u s t i c e , i t does t e n d t o e l i m i n a t e one r e l a t e d i n j u s t i c e , v i z , t h e l a c k o f power associated with poverty. I f the p o s s i b i l i t y to p a r t i c i p a t e i n one's government were w i d e s p r e a d , t h e n the i n d i g n i t y o f p o l i t i c a l i m p o t e n c y w o u l d n o t be p a r t o f t h e general f r u s t r a t i o n of impoverishment.  112  i n wealth  among u n i o n i z e d workers) changing  s o c i a l conditions  (e.g. the " l i b e r a t i o n o f women"), and a h o s t o f more o r l e s s unknown f a c t o r s .  One f a c t /is q u i t e c l e a r : there i s l i t t l e  in  the way o f an o r g a n i z e d s e l f - c o n s c i o u s e f f o r t on the p a r t  of  people t o change t h e i r own norms o f the good l i f e , t o  i n v o l v e themselves i n p u b l i c and community wide d i s c u s s i o n s about l i f e for  s t y l e s and v a l u e s .  this discussion.  There a r e o f course no forums  One o f the p o s s i b i l i t i e s which would  be p r o v i d e d by a p a r t i c i p a t o r y form o f self-government  would  be j u s t such an o p p o r t u n i t y t o r e f l e c t not only on what the government should do, b u t on " p r i v a t e " v a l u e s , p r i v a t e consumption p a t t e r n s and i n d i v i d u a l The  lifestyles.  p a r t i c i p a t o r y forum c o u l d provide an o p p o r t u n i t y  to  commit o n e s e l f s e l f - c o n s c i o u s l y and communally t o a change  in  values and consumption h a b i t s .  of  the Chinese  The e f f o r t ,  t o change century o l d a t t i t u d e s toward the  p l a c e and s t a t u s o f women has i n v o l v e d j u s t such activity.  f o r example,  communal  D i s c u s s i o n s are h e l d t o a r t i c u l a t e the problem,  women and men a r e encouraged t o come f o r t h and s t a t e t h e i r f e e l i n g s , arguments are h e l d , v a r i o u s people a r e persuaded and some pressured;  finally  a community wide sense o f  commitment t o t h e l i b e r a t i o n o f women i s developed, the area o f p r i v a t e a c t i v i t y i n the home.  but i n  No one p o l i c e s  these areas, b u t the community wide commitment serves to "govern" the area o f l a r g e l y p r i v a t e a c t i v i t y , ppp  110-115)  (see Townsend  113  Granted t h a t the p a r t i c i p a t o r y forum c o u l d provide the opportunity  f o r s e l f - c o n s c i o u s value  and norm d e c i s i o n s , i s  there any reason t o think t h a t once people a r e brought  together  they would decide on values which would support e c o l o g i c a l balance, which would change consumption p r o d u c t i o n d r a m a t i c a l l y i n the d i r e c t i o n o f conservation?  patterns  The answer I  b e l i e v e i s y e s , and i t i s here where the remarkable congruence between concern f o r e c o l o g i c a l w e l l being  and s o c i a l w e l l  being  stands o u t . Arguments i n the p u b l i c forum must be presented i n terms of p u b l i c i n t e r e s t . forum should  As a r e s u l t , d e c i s i o n s made i n such a  a l s o r e f l e c t concern f o r the p u b l i c good.  o f course presupposes t h a t the kinds o f c o n d i t i o n s by Rousseau have been met:  This  suggested  i n p a r t i c u l a r , t h a t there are no  powerful ' s i n i s t e r ' i n t e r e s t groups a t work.  I t i s obviously  i n the i n t e r e s t o f the p u b l i c to see t h a t i t s i n t e r e s t i s protected.  The danger i s t h a t some members w i l l  delude the o t h e r s .  effectively  T h i s i s d i f f e r e n t from the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  s i t u a t i o n , where d i s c o u r s e must a l s o be i n terms o f the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t , b u t where the absence o f the p u b l i c means t h a t the i n t e r e s t s o f the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s p u b l i c might w e l l p r e v a i l .  as d i s t i n c t from t h a t o f the  In a d d i t i o n the e x i s t e n c e  of parties  c l e a r l y v i o l a t e s Rousseau's c o n d i t i o n f o r the absence o f s i n i s t e r i n t e r e s t groups. Given t h a t we can p l a u s i b l y expect the p a r t i c i p a t i v e  114  assembly t o r u l e i n the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t , we can expect them to g i v e a high p r i o r i t y t o e c o l o g i c a l concerns.  For e c o l o g i c a l  w e l l - b e i n g i s a paradigm p u b l i c good and t h e r e f o r e we can expect d e c i s i o n s made i n t h i s forum to r e s p e c t the need f o r economic r e s t r a i n t , c o n s e r v a t i o n of r e s o u r c e s , p o l l u t i o n control, etc.  The problem t h a t faces c u r r e n t advocates  of e c o l o g i c a l concern i s the l a c k of any n a t u r a l group except the h u n t e r s .  interest  Ecological integrity,  like  consumer i n t e r e s t s , has no a c t i v e lobby (except the hunters) because no group stands to p r o f i t s i g n i f i c a n t l y from l e g i s * l a t i o n which serves these community-wide needs.  But i n  the p a r t i c i p a t o r y democracy  attention  the need to t u r n t h e i r  to the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t should f o r c e the p a r t i c i p a n t s to g i v e c o n s i d e r a b l e a t t e n t i o n to such a paradigm p u b l i c good as the n a t u r a l environment. But i t should be noted t h a t  ' p u b l i c ' i s not, from the  e c o l o g i c a l p o i n t o f view, the most accurate term f o r "general" interest:  "community" i n t e r e s t would be much b e t t e r .  For  concern f o r and commitment . to a community i s commitment . to a body whose l i f e span extends f a r beyond t h a t o f i t s members; and whose i n t e r e s t and w e l l - b e i n g i s assessed t h e r e f o r e a g a i n s t a f a r longer time span than t h a t o f i t s "temporary" members. *See Olsen's g e n e r a l argument about the l o g i c which " n a t u r a l l y " impoverishes the p r o v i s i o n o f p u b l i c goods. (Olsen, Ch. 2 )  115  Concerns  about n a t u r a l . r e s o u r c e  conservation, the -  p r e s e r v a t i o n o f s p e c i e s , e t c . .goway b e y o n d - . c o n c e r n . f o r t h e i n t e r e s t o f t h e " c u r r e n t l y e x i s t i n g p o p u l a t i o n and i n v o l v e c o n c e r n f o r the~ (unrepresented) f u t u r e g e n e r a t i o n s . obvious ^structural^guarantees  While there are  i n the-~part±cipatory—forum~to~  a s s u r e t h a t d e c i s i o n s a r e made i n t h e p u b l i c i n t e r e s t ( v i z . , t h e p r e s e n c e o f t h e p u b l i c ) , t h e r e _ . i s no o b v i o u s g u a r a n t e e t h a t such a l e g i s l a t i v e body w i l l r u l e w i t h a s e n s i t i v i t y t o l o n g term community i n t e r e s t s . .  A l l t h a t can  be hoped i s t h a t t h e m a t u r i t y and r e s p o n s i b l i t y r e s u l t i n g from the p a r t i c i p a t o r y experience o f concern f o r the p u b l i c . i n s t e a d o f p r i v a t e i n t e r e s t . w i l l _ - y i e l d - a-concern- -for---long---range—.o v e r s h o r t range  considerations.  The enhanced awareness o f community t h a t w i l l  f l o w from a c t i v e  c i t i z e n - p a r t i c i p a t i o n should a l s o c o n t r i b u t e t o a concern f o r the- commundt-y--iong"term i n t e r e s t as opposed-^to i n t e r e s t s o f i t s Z members:.-the educative  aspect-of  I have n o t e d above -in C h a p t e r I I , y  participation —  i t s capacity, t o develop  commitments, and c o n c e r n beyond one's immediate little  the "immediate -  s e l f - i n t e r e s t . I see  r e a s o n t o t h i n k . t h a t . t h i s c o n c e r n cannot  beyond " t h a t " o f t h e l i f e " o f t h e immediate community.  be-developed—.  members o f t h e  We can a l s o e x p e c t t h a t t h e p r e s e n c e . o f p e o p l e o f  v a r i o u s ages a t an assembly  s h o u l d a l s o c o n t r i b u t e t o t h e sense  o f t e m p o r a l c o n t i n u i t y t h a t i s so f u n d a m e n t a l o f a genuine community.  to the l i f e  116  In a d d i t i o n there i s an i n e v i t a b l e amount of d e c i s i o n making that.'.is going  to i n v o l v e r a t h e r d i s t a n t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  r e g a r d l e s s of p o l i t i c a l commitment  to p a r t i c i p a t i o n .  This  i s because the e f f e c t s of many a c t i v i t i e s extend over l a r g e d i s t a n c e s , not only over l a r g e time spans. educative  Once again  the  e f f e c t of p a r t i c i p a t i o n must be r e l i e d on to enable  people to see and  accept  the c o n s t r a i n t s necessary hot  only  f o r t h e i r advantage or the advantage o f t h e i r community, but a l s o t h a t of the world. In the cases of long range e f f e c t s and e f f e c t s , we  long time span f o r  cannot expect the c i t i z e n to have the same c l a i m  to knowledge as the expert. to p a r t i c i p a t i o n .  And  This question  t h i s presents  a great  requires rather  threat  extensive  answers about the ways o f a p p l y i n g the theory developed to actual i n d u s t r i a l society. Chapter Vf: but f o r now f  I d e a l with t h i s q u e s t i o n  I wish o n l y to p o i n t out t h a t  argument does presuppose the p o s s i b i l i t y of  in  my  extensive  d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of both the p o l i t i c a l and  economic order.  C l e a r l y only under these c o n d i t i o n s can we  expect to o b t a i n  the  most d e s i r a b l e c o n d i t i o n s f o r a c t i v e p a r t i c i p a t i o n . I t has  a l s o been noted above t h a t one  of the b e n e f i t s of  p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s the i n c r e a s e d sense o f s e l f - e s t e e m from p a r t i c i p a t i o n . concerning  t h a t comes  T h i s i s p a r t of the ^ermoblJSigj e f f e c t s of  o n e s e l f with more than one's own  s e l f - i n t e r e s t and  p e r f e c t l y j u s t i f i a b l e sense of g r e a t e r s e l f importance t h a t  the  117  comes from b e i n g more important. of s e l f - e s t e e m j u s t i f i e s my  Indeed,  the i n c r e a s e d sense  c l a i m s t h a t the p a r t i c i p a t o r y  system accords to i t s c i t i z e n s the h i g h e s t r e s p e c t f o r t h e i r o p i n i o n s and d e s i r e s compatible w i t h the g o a l of c o l l e c t i v e coordination.  And  such h i g h s e l f - r e g a r d , based soundly as i t  i s on the r e s p e c t accorded by a l l to a l l i n a t r u l y community, i s almost sure to produce f o r the community. community w i l l  democratic  a sense of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  E s p e c i a l l y so, s i n c e one's r e s p e c t i n the  ( i d e a l l y ) be based on one's p a r t i c i p a t i o n  c o n t r i b u t i o n to the community.  and  By encouraging a sense of  c o l l e c t i v e i d e n t i t y and d e v e l o p i n g a k i n d of p u b l i c conscience i n the p a r t i c i p a n t s , p a r t i c i p a t i o n *  can a l s o be expected to  develop the necessary concern f o r the c o l l e c t i v e environment  —  a k i n d of e c o l o g i c a l c o n s c i e n c e . There are o t h e r b e n e f i t s which come from p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n self-government which are l a r g e l y i g n o r e d by  contemporary  t h e o r i e s o f democracy and which are of g r e a t importance  to the  g o a l of changing people's l i f e s t y l e i n non-consumptive  * P a r t i c i p a t i o n i s the n a t u r a l v e h i c l e to develop such long term commitment. For example: one of the c l a s s i c d i f f i c u l t i e s presented by h i g h y i e l d e x p l o i t a t i o n of non-renewable resource i s t h a t the communities which develop around these a c t i v i t i e s are c o n s t a n t l y l e f t h i g h and dry when the resource i s exhausted. I t i s reasonable to b e l i e v e t h a t i f these resources were managed by the whole community, the r a t e of e x p l o i t a t i o n might be much slower so t h a t the l i f e of the community might be extended.  118  directions.  For example, anywhere t h a t worker p a r t i c i p a t i o n  has been t r i e d i t has e n l i s t e d , g r e a t support from the workers*, seemingly c o n f i r m i n g Hannah Arendt's remarks about the p l e a s u r e o f " p u b l i c happiness": d i s c o u r s e , o f commitment of p u b l i c esteem  the p l e a s u r e of reasoned  to the p u b l i c good, o f s o l i d a r i t y ,  and f i n a l l y the p l e a s u r e o f power, o f  communally w i l l i n g a course of events which goes f a r beyond t h a t t h a t any i n d i v i d u a l c o u l d w i l l .  By p r o v i d i n g such  happiness, the p u b l i c forum c o u l d serve, as an a l t e r n a t i v e to p r i v a t e happiness. frequently centered  And s i n c e p r i v a t e happiness i s on  p r i v a t e consumption  (at l e a s t  i n our minds, though i n f a c t p r i v a t e happiness comes from more immaterial s o u r c e s ) , the renewed p o s s i b i l i t y  and  emphasis on p u b l i c happiness c o u l d p r o v i d e • a d d i t i o n a l reasons f o r r e d u c i n g our concern w i t h consumption.  *See below Chapter VI  There i s a l s o  ; .  119  a v a s t amount of e m p i r i c a l support f o r the  proposition  t h a t p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the work p l a c e g r e a t l y worker s a t i s f a c t i o n and  increases  frequently productivity,  suggesting  t h a t p a r t i c i p a t i o n c o u l d r e p l a c e economic i n c e n t i v e s consequently reduce consumption.  and  As Rousseau puts i t :  The b e t t e r the s t a t e i s c o n s t i t u t e d the more does p u b l i c b u s i n e s s take precedence over p r i v a t e i n the minds of the c i t i z e n s . There i s indeed much l e s s p r i v a t e b u s i n e s s , because the sum of p u b l i c happiness f u r n i s h e s a l a r g e r p r o p o r t i o n of each i n d i v i d u a l ' s happiness, so there remains l e s s f o r him  to seek on h i s own.  (Rousseau, p.  140)  In s h o r t , the p a r t i c i p a t o r y forum p r o v i d e s  f o r the  u t i l i z a t i o n of the p u b l i c s i d e of our p e r s o n a l i t y ; a p l a c e to be both s o c i a b l e and  socially useful.  In p r o v i d i n g  such a p l a c e , the p a r t i c i p a t o r y forum s u p p l i e s f o r our s o c i a l nature the same k i n d of support now p r i v a t e and  s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d nature by a d v e r t i s i n g  the standard As  g i v e n to  norms of f i n a n c i a l and  a r e s u l t o f such forums we  can expect people to another  t h e i r community s i n c e the avenue f o r e x p r e s s i o n  We and  and  i n d i v i d u a l success.  develop and m a n i f e s t a genuine concern f o r one  concern i s now  our  of  this  open.  can expect d e c i s i o n s to a c t u a l l y p l a c e human  e c o l o g i c a l p r i o r i t i e s over those of f i n a n c e  and  technology, s i n c e a l l the people w i l l be there to see they do.  and  And  that  because of the f a c e - t o - f a c e nature of par-  t i c i p a t i o n i n d i v i d u a l s w i l l be f o r c e d to experience another not as some u n f o r t u n a t e s t a t i s t i c but as  one  real,  e q u a l l y human, members of the p u b l i c whose concerns are  as  120  r e a l and p r e s s i n g as t h e i r own.  They w i l l a l s o be  living in  and w i t h the immediate environment t h a t t h e i r  decisions  create.  multinationals  ( c f . d e c i s i o n s made by e x e c u t i v e s  where the  of  d e c i s i o n maker does not need to l i v e i n the  environ-  ment c r e a t e d by h i s decisions)L a s t l y , the p a r t i c i p a t o r y forum provides  an  oppor-  t u n i t y f o r d e c i s i o n s which are excluded by our c u r r e n t of i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c consumer " v o t i n g " : i t p r o v i d e s opportunity own  t h a t Marx d i s c u s s e d ,  h i s t o r y , not  c l a i m t h a t was provided  by  system  the  f o r people to make t h e i r  j u s t be s u b j e c t to i t .  developed i n chapter I I .  T h i s i s again The  a  opportunity  c o l l e c t i v e self-government of the commons,  i n s t e a d o f a l a i s s e z f a i r e d e s t r u c t i o n of i t , means t h a t can make d e c i s i o n s i n the i n t e r e s t of the community are simply  not open to us as i n d i v i d u a l s .  In t h i s  we  that way  the forum not only encourages us to be more moral, i t a c t u a l l y creates  the i n c r e a s e d p o s s i b i l i t y of our  acting  more m o r a l l y . Decisions  f o r example, of p u b l i c t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  versus p r i v a t e c o u l d then be i n d i v i d u a l - basis  "should  minutes f o r the bus?" but use  cars or s h a l l we  confronted  not on  the  I take the car o r wait twenty r a t h e r "do we want people to  provide  an adequate t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  system which w i l l a c t u a l l y encourage t r a n s i t use?", or even " s h a l l we  ban  cars and provide  paths?" e t c . *  I r o n i c a l l y , i t i s the  covered b i c y c l e " c e n t r a l i z a t i o n " of  *I have read somewhere t h a t t h i s l a t t e r p o s s i b i l i t y has been r e a l i z e d i n a F l o r i d a suburb t o t a l l y given over to p e d e s t r i a n and b i c y c l e t r a n s p o r t w i t h simply no roadways f o r c a r s . Though undoubtedly i n t h i s case some i n d i v i d u a l entrepreneur developer made the d e c i s i o n .  121  such a t r a d i t i o n a l l y p r i v a t e d e c i s i o n i n t o the p u b l i c forum, which makes p o s s i b l e such common i n t e r e s t d e c i s i o n s . But  the only way  t h a t t h i s c e n t r a l i z a t i o n i s compatible  w i t h autonomy i s i f the i n d i v i d u a l freedom t h a t i s l o s t i s replaced  (or reappears) i n the l e g i s l a t u r e .  Decen-  t r a l i z a t i o n cannot mean i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c anarchy,  but  r a t h e r d e c e n t r a l i z e d communism. The  d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n t h a t i s necessary f o r  s i g n i f i c a n t , u n i v e r s a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n i t s e l f y i e l d s many b e n e f i t s from an e c o l o g i c a l and  s o c i a l p o i n t of view.  For l o c a l d e c i s i o n s to r e f l e c t any  r e a l autonomy there must  a l s o be a l a r g e amount of l o c a l economic s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y : t h i s i s simply for  the l o c a l v e r s i o n of the more common concern  n a t i o n a l economic independence as a p r e r e q u i s i t e of  n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l autonomy. to be made not simply  L o c a l d e c i s i o n s would have  about the means to f i l l  certain  n a t i o n a l quotas, but a l s o about what goods to produce: d e c i s i o n s not o n l y as to how  to use  existing capital,  but  whether to i n c r e a s e or decrease c a p i t a l ' : investments. The numerous.  e c o l o g i c a l b e n e f i t s of such s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y Local production  means f o r l i n k i n g p r o d u c t i o n  and  consumption p r o v i d e  are  the  more d i r e c t l y to demand without  i n t e r v e n i n g e f f o r t of a d v e r t i s i n g to assure t h a t demand matches up to o v e r - p r o d u c t i o n . over—production  and  the encouragement of  necessary^but e c o l o g i c a l l y and sumption.  T h i s would i n t u r n reduce  Local production  economically  s o c i a l l y u n j u s t i f i e d con-  would a l s o reduce t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  ' '«  12 2  costs with i t s concomitant  e c o l o g i c a l costs.  l o c a l markets c o u l d n o t support l a r g e s c a l e t h i s form o f p r o d u c t i o n  Since  —  production,  w i t h i t s tendency to concentrate  massive amounts o f p o l l u t a n t s i n the environment would a l s o be reduced. of c o n c e n t r a t i o n i n one place  v  Since p o l l u t i o n i s l a r g e l y a matter and poor d i s t r i b u t i o n (what i s f e r t i l i z e r  i s a sewage problem i n another), a r e d u c t i o n  i n the s c a l e o f p r o d u c t i o n of i n d u s t r y  and an i n c r e a s e d d i v e r s i t y  could g r e a t l y reduce the b u i l d up o f p o l l u t a n t s .  D e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n would a l s o r e q u i r e d i v e r s e and  agriculture  a d i v e r s e use o f energy sources g r e a t l y reducing the  undesirable . ecological e f f e c t s that c u r r e n t mono-culture and  l a r g e s c a l e energy p r o d u c t i o n  entails.  Once again the by now unsurprising  congruence between  e c o l o g i c a l and s o c i a l s c a l e s can be noted; s m a l l s c a l e f o r human contact,  r e a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n and l o c a l c o n t r o l and  s m a l l s c a l e f o r minimal environmental impact,  diverse  a g r i c u l t u r e and e f f i c i e n t r e c y c l i n g o f waste, reduced t r a n s p o r t a t i o n c o s t s , d i v e r s i t y o f energy sources and minimal p o l l u t i o n .  The environmental s c a l e i s a human s c a l e .  12 3  C H A P T E R  EXPERIMENTS  IN  VI  PARTICIPATION  12 4  Of a l l the p r o p o s i t i o n s o f f e r e d i n the chapter there i s e m p i r i c a l support f o r the 1. l o c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n c r e a s e s  preceding  following:  the d e s i r e to p a r t i c i p a t e  i n the d e c i s i o n s of the l a r g e r o r g a n i z a t i o n ,  2. work p l a c e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n c r e a s e s worker s a t i s f a c t i o n ,  suggesting  that, i n g e n e r a l , p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s an important p a r t o f life's satisfaction,  3. p a r t i c i p a t i o n does provide  e f f e c t i v e means f o r changing people's v a l u e s , havior. ical  Since  and  an be-  the experiments reviewed i n the s o c i o l o g -  l i t e r a t u r e concern themselves p r i m a r i l y with pro-  d u c t i v i t y and worker s a t i s f a c t i o n , the experiments do fall  n e a t l y i n t o the three c a t e g o r i e s  t i c i p a t i o n experiments do f a l l s m a l l and  large scale.  above.  i n t o two  general  Small s c a l e decision-making c e n t e r s a new  par-  categories:  Small s c a l e p a r t i c i p a t i o n r e f e r s  to the range of d e c i s i o n s open to a s m a l l  how  But  not  sub-group.  on concerns such as  assembly technique i s to be a p p l i e d ,  local  c o n t r o l o f assembly l i n e procedures, speed, e t c .  Large  s c a l e d e c i s i o n s are those a f f e c t i n g the whole f i r m such as questions  of c a p i t a l investment, general  plant  p o l i c i e s and wide-ranging c i v i c and n a t i o n a l d e c i s i o n s . I t i s i n the small s c a l e area t h a t most experiments have been run,  and  i t i s a l s o i n t h i s area where the  degree of success has  been achieved.  iment" i n l a r g e s c a l e p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s o r g a n i z a t i o n of i t s i n d u s t r i a l and  greatest  The major "experYugoslavia's  political  systems,  125  though the Chinese example might a l s o be r e l e v a n t i f we had  more i n f o r m a t i o n .  r e s u l t s of various various  In t h i s c h a p t e r I w i l l review  s m a l l s c a l e experiments, s a v i n g  chapter.  S m a l l s c a l e p a r t i c i p a t i o n has a t t e n t i o n because i t lends t a t i o n and  itself  does not t h r e a t e n  received  the most  r e a d i l y t o experimen-  the b a s i c i n d u s t r i a l  Though such exper-  iments might seem to have a l i m i t e d v a l u e  t o a theory  w i d e - r a n g i n g change, they are a c t u a l l y of g r e a t icance.  For  fact, this  is i t s virtue.  We  can have on  government. political  s t r u c t u r e and  p r e r e q u i s i t e not o n l y p a r t i c i p a t i o n , but  the  scale—  cannot have the same l e v e l  the shop f l o o r or i n the  These u n i t s must be  of  signif-  true p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s necessarily small  of p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n l a r g e s c a l e o r g a n i z a t i o n s we  order.  a l s o draw on a whole range o f s m a l l group experiments  f o r g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s of i t s c o n c l u s i o n s .  in  the  experiments i n the t o t a l r e o r g a n i z a t i o n of s o c i e t y  f o r the subsequent  I t can  the  as  neighborhood  the atoms of any  greater  success a t t h i s l e v e l i s a  f o r the e d u c a t i v e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s of  f o r the s o c i a l cement which w i l l  the l a r g e r s t r u c t u r e t o g e t h e r .  hold  I t i s a l s o apparent from  a r e v i e w o f the l i t e r a t u r e t h a t even i n the l a r g e s c a l e experiments, the most s i g n i f i c a n t form o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n f o r most o f the p a r t i c i p a n t s i s the one  i n which  the  worker o r c i t i z e n makes d e c i s i o n s which a f f e c t the most immediate a s p e c t s o f h i s l i f e .  I t may  be  that  decisions  126  as to c a p i t a l a l l o c a t i o n , no matter how  significant in  the  long run, do not have enough immediacy to i n t e r e s t  the  average worker, o r t h a t the o r g a n i z a t i o n a l form  neccessary f o r making such d e c i s i o n s i s simply too l a r g e to  a l l o w f o r enough a c t i v e p a r t i c i p a t i o n by the workers t o  p r o v i d e them w i t h the k i n d o f s a t i s f a c t i o n they get from more l o c a l d e c i s i o n s .  T h i s i s o f course a s i g n i f i c a n t  problem f o r the e c o l o g i c a l l y concerned because environmental d e c i s i o n s almost i n e v i t a b l y i n v o l v e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s o f l a r g e r e g i o n s and long time spans.  But w h i l e problems o f s c a l e  are  o f c r u c i a l importance, i t i s f i r s t necessary to understand i-  the  e f f e c t s t h a t s m a l l s c a l e p a r t i c i p a t i o n has on i t s  participants. the  Such an understanding not o n l y u n d e r l i n e s  importance o f t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y , i t a l s o serves as a  n a t u r a l i n t r o d u c t i o n to t h e o r i e s of l a r g e s c a l e  partici-  pation . The most s i g n i f i c a n t experiments i n small  scale  p a r t i c i p a t i o n have been conducted i n a v a r i e t y of i n d u s trial  situations.  The most comprehensive  and a u t h o r i t a t i v e  review o f these experiments i s Paul Blumberg's I n d u s t r i a l Democracy: The S o c i o l o g y o f P a r t i c i p a t i o n .  Blumberg  begins h i s review w i t h an account o f the famous Hawthorne experiments i n the l a t e 2 0's.  These experiments are the  c l a s s i c s o f management theory which supposedly produced the  unsurprising  (except to the experimentors) r e s u l t  t h a t workers work as a group, and t h a t the i n f o r m a l  127  r e l a t i o n s and norms o f t h i s group more than any other f a c t o r s ( i n c l u d i n g economic i n c e n t i v e s ) productivity.  govern  These r e s u l t s were a r r i v e d a t a f t e r a  wide range o f v a r i a b l e s , such as t i m i n g  o f breaks,  i n t e n s i t y o f l i g h t , e t c . were a l l found to be to p r o d u c t i v i t y .  unrelated  In f a c t , p r o d u c t i v i t y w i t h i n  the small  group t h a t was being experimented w i t h continued t o increase  despite  conditions The  unpleasent v a r i a t i o n s i n the p h y s i c a l  of work. conclusion  t h a t was normally d e r i v e d  from t h i s  experiment was, i n the words o f C. W. M i l l s , t h a t " . . . the i n d u s t r i a l manager i s to 'relax h i s a u t h o r i t a r i a n manner and widen h i s m a n i p u l a t i v e g r i p by understanding employees b e t t e r and c o u n t e r i n g t h e i r i n f o r m a l  solidarities  against  management by c o n t r o l l i n g and e x p l o i t i n g these s o l i d a r i t i e s f o r smoother and l e s s troublesome managerial efficiency.'"  (Blumberg, p. 4 5 ) But Blumberg  points  out t h a t what was overlooked by these r e s e a r c h e r s was t h a t the workers' i n c r e a s i n g p r o d u c t i v i t y r e s u l t e d not simply from the f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s h i p s they had developed from each o t h e r , but r a t h e r ordinary  from the e x t r a -  r e l a t i o n s h i p s they had developed w i t h  management. In an e f f o r t t o make these experiments the experimenters had i n v o l v e d i n g o f timing  successful,  the workers i n the a r r a n g -  o f o p e r a t i o n s and the i n t r o d u c t i o n o f other  v a r i a b l e s i n a manner t h a t the workers had never  12 8  previously experienced.  The upshot of t h i s was  t h a t the  experimenters r a t h e r than e l i m i n a t i n g the v a r i a b l e o f worker h o s t i l i t y from t h e i r s t u d i e s , i n t r o d u c e d variable of "participation"--an  the  .atmosphere where the  worker's views were t r e a t e d w i t h unprecedented and c o n s i d e r a t i o n : an /'atmosphere  respect  i n which i n f a c t the  workers d e c i d e d which changes were to be i n t r o d u c e d  and  when. The Hawthorne experiments c o n s i s t e d b a s i c a l l y of two d i f f e r e n t experiments.  One,  c a l l e d the " r e l a y  t e s t room experiment" i n v o l v e d s i x workers under a wide v a r i e t y of c o n d i t i o n s : v a r i a t i o n s i n work week, r e s t time, meal schedule, l i g h t i n g , e t c .  The second experiment,  the "Bank w i r i n g room experiment", i n v o l v e d  fourteen  workers d i v i d e d by s t a t u s and wages i n t o three  smaller  groups.  increased  despite  In the f i r s t experiment, p r o d u c t i v i t y  the wide v a r i e t y o f changes and t h i s seemed to  be due p r i m a r i l y (as Blumberg  p o i n t s out) to 1. the  s p e c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p t h a t workers had t o the experimenters, one e s s e n t i a l l y o f shared r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , 2. the c r e a t i o n among the workers o f a sense o f c o l l e c t i v i t y , and 3. an awareness  among the workers of the importance o f t h e i r  experiment and p e c u l i a r s t a t u s .  T h i s l a t t e r sense  (3.)  of s p e c i a l n e s s r e c e i v e d much a t t e n t i o n i n managerial l i t e r a t u r e and became equated w i t h the "Hawthorne e f f e c t " . But as Blumberg  p o i n t s out when i n the second experiment,  the experimenters f a i l e d to i n v o l v e the workers i n  129  the  d e c i s i o n s as t o how the experiment should run, the  workers became d i s i l l u s i o n e d and d i s a p p o i n t e d and productivity declined.  (Blumberg, pp 34-42)  Having p r o v i d e d t h i s i n s i g h t f u l review o f the Hawthorne experiments, Blumberg  goes on t o review a  number o f a l t e r n a t i v e suggestions f o r the r e d u c t i o n o f worker a l i e n a t i o n .  F o r our e c o l o g i c a l p o i n t o f view,  i t i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o note what a l t e r n a t i v e s are normally c o n s i d e r e d , and the manner i n which Blumberg  r e f u t e s them.  F i r s t i s the s u g g e s t i o n t h a t l e i s u r e can be used to the  make up f o r the f a i l u r e to achieve s a t i s f a c t i o n on j o b . Blumberg's c r i t i c i s m o f t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y i s  based on the obvious o b s e r v a t i o n o f the importance of work i n the l i f e o f n e a r l y every person.  Important not  only t o t h e i r sense o f s e l f , but a l s o i n the p e r s o n a l i t y they develop and b r i n g home from the work p l a c e . i n c o n c e i v a b l e t h a t one c o u l d have a t o t a l l y work experience and become off  the j o b .  It is  alienated  ("part-time") a f u l l  person  From the e c o l o g i c a l p o i n t o f view, i t seems  c l e a r t h a t human l a b o r w i l l c o n t i n u e t o c o n s t i t u t e a l a r g e amount o f the energy i n p u t i n t o the economy because of  a growing n e c e s s i t y t o r e s t r i c t our use o f  energy s o u r c e s .  non-renewable  As a r e s u l t , we w i l l experience an  i n c r e a s e i n l e i s u r e only w i t h a concomitant decrease i n affluence.  The same o b j e c t i o n goes f o r the s u g g e s t i o n  t h a t automation c o u l d take over a l l " a l i e n a t i n g "  labor.  130  Automation i s simply  t o o expensive and the e f f e c t t h a t i t  f r e q u e n t l y has i s t o remove c o n t r o l from t h e worker, n o t to i n c r e a s e  i t — w i t h a r e s u l t a n t increase  i n powerlessness  and a l i e n a t i o n . Blumberg a l s o d i s m i s s e s describes  t h e answer which he  as a n t i - i n d u s t r i a l i s m (a v e r s i o n o f the c u r r e n t  r e t u r n t o the l a n d movement) on the grounds t h a t the move towards i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n cannot be stopped.  Certainly  from t h e p o i n t o f view o f o u r c u r r e n t e c o l o g i c a l awareness, the i n c r e a s i n g i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n o f the w o r l d must n o t o n l y be  stopped, i t simply  Nevertheless,  will  the q u e s t i o n  ( e v e n t u a l l y ) be stopped. f o r us i s how t o c o n t r o l and  e x p l o i t i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n and t e c h n o l o g y i n e c o l o g i c a l l y and  s o c i a l l y u s e f u l ways, n o t simply  to eliminate i t .  The  l a s t s o l u t i o n t h a t he d i s c u s s e s ,  j o b enlargement, i s  becoming i n c r e a s i n g l y p o p u l a r .  Blumberg f i n d s t h a t the  move towards j o b enlargement i s l a r g e l y o v e r r a t e d t r u l y successful only  t o the e x t e n t  i n c r e a s e s worker c o n t r o l .  and i s  that i t a c t u a l l y  Reviewing a l l o f these  proposals  Blumberg p o i n t s o u t t h a t A l l f o u r , l e i s u r e , automation, a n t i - i n d u s t r i a l i s m , and j o b enlargement, a r e based on a k i n d o f t e c h n o l o g i c a l d e t e r minism. That i s , the premiss o f each i s t h a t a g i v e n degree o f j o b s a t i s f a c t i o n (or j o b d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n ) i n e v i t a b l y a c companys a c e r t a i n t e c h n o l o g i c a l l e v e l and t h a t i n c r e a s e d s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h work i s p o s s i b l e o n l y by a l t e r i n g t e c h nology. . . A l l share the b e l i e f t h a t the tendency t o a l i e n a t i o n i s r o o t e d i n the t e c h n o l o g y o f modern i n d u s t r i a l i s m i t s e l f and t h a t a l i e n a t i o n — i n h e r e n t i n i n d u s t r y as we know i t — i s u n a f f e c t e d by any change i n the s o c i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n o f i n d u s t r y . ( I b i d p. 69, h i s emphasis)  131  In s h o r t , Blumberg f i n d s t h a t a l i e n a t i o n and  worker  d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n i s the r e s u l t , n o t o f the nature o f work o r the nature of a p a r t i c u l a r k i n d of work, but of the nature of the s o c i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n and authority  rather  form of  ( c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of) the work environment.  If  t h i s i s t r u e , i t i s c l e a r t h a t i n c r e a s i n g human s a t i s f a c t i o n i s e a s i l y p o s s i b l e i n a world of d e c r e a s i n g s t a b l e wealth.  T h i s i s a l l p a r t o f the general  or  argument  t h a t happiness i s not d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d to l e v e l  of  a f f l u e n c e , but r e a l l y to s o c i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n and  community.  Since Blumberg's o r i e n t a t i o n towards worker c o n t r o l i s c h a r a c t e r i z e d by an i n t e r e s t i n the extent  to which  worker c o n t r o l can reduce a l i e n a t i o n and work d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n , he does not share the concern o f M i l l and educative  e f f e c t s of p a r t i c i p a t i o n .  others  f o r the  Participation is  s u c c e s s f u l from h i s p o i n t of view a c c o r d i n g  to the  to which i t i n c r e a s e s worker s a t i s f a c t i o n .  He  small s c a l e experiments reviewed i n h i s book supportive  finds  the  uniformly  o f the p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t shop l e v e l p a r t i c i p a t i o n  reduces a l i e n a t i o n and he  extent  increases  job s a t i s f a c t i o n .  says There i s h a r d l y a study i n the e n t i r e l i t e r a t u r e which f a i l s to demonstrate t h a t s a t i s f a c t i o n i n work i s enhanced or t h a t other g e n e r a l l y acknowledged b e n e f i c i a l consequences accrue from a genuine i n c r e a s e i n workers' decision-making power. Such a c o n s i s t e n c y o f f i n d i n g , I submit, i s r a r e i n s o c i a l r e s e a r c h . ( I b i d , p. 123)  As  132  But Blumberg  a l s o reviews some experiments which go  beyond the concern t o e l i m i n a t e work a l i e n a t i o n i n t o a g e n e r a l theory o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n .  He reviews f o r example  the famous experiments i n the 30's under the d i r e c t i o n of K u r t Lewin.  These experiments were an attempt t o  study the e f f e c t s of d i f f e r e n t s o c i a l c l i m a t e s on the b e h a v i o r o f a group o f young boys.  These boys were o r g a -  n i z e d i n three d i f f e r e n t kinds of groups, democratic, a u t h o r i t a r i a n , and l a i s s e z f a i r e .  The d i f f e r e n c e s were  i n the r o l e p l a y e d by the a d u l t l e a d e r i n each group. In the a u t o c r a t i c group, the a d u l t l e a d e r played the t y p i c a l r o l e o f the a d u l t l e a d e r g i v i n g o r d e r s ,  artic-  u l a t i n g the p r o j e c t s , e t c . i n the democratic group, the l e a d e r played a s e l f e f f a c i n g r o l e , one o f c o o p e r a t i v e n e s s g i v i n g advice when asked, but a l s o encouraging group d i s c u s s i o n and group decision-making; i n the l a i s s e z f a i r e group, the l e a d e r p l a y e d a minimal r o l e and took no p a r t i n d i s c u s s i o n s .  We can o f course wonder what  such an experiment has t o do w i t h p a r t i c i p a t o r y but the r e s u l t s suggest the r e l e v a n c e . were summarized  These  democracy,  results  by the experimenters i n the f o l l o w i n g  chart: 1. L a i s s e z f a i r e was not the same as democracy (a) There was l e s s work done i n i t , and poorer work. (b) I t was more c h a r a c t e r i z e d by p l a y . (c) In i n t e r v i e w s , the boys expressed p r e f e r e n c e f o r t h e i r democratic leader.  133  2. Democracy can be e f f i c i e n t : (a) The q u a n t i t y o f work done i n autocracy was somewhat g r e a t e r . (b) Work m o t i v a t i o n was s t r o n g e r i n democracy as shown, f o r i n s t a n c e , when the l e a d e r l e f t the room. (c) O r i g i n a l i t y was g r e a t e r i n democracy. 3. Autocracy can c r e a t e much h o s t i l i t y and aggression, i n c l u d i n g aggression against scapegoats: (a) In Experiment I , the a u t o c r a t i c group showed more dominating ascendance; much h o s t i l i t y ( i n a r a t i o o f 30 t o 1) ; more demands f o r a t t e n t i o n ; more d e s t r u c t i o n o f own p r o p e r t y ; and more scapegoat b e h a v i o r . (b) In Experiment I I , one o f the f o u r c l u b s showed a s i m i l a r r e a c t i o n . 4. Autocracy can c r e a t e d i s c o n t e n t t h a t does not_.appei.ar on the s u r f a c e : (a) Four boys dropped out, and a l l o f them d i d so d u r i n g a u t o c r a t i c c l u b p e r i o d s i n which o v e r t r e b e l l i o n d i d not occur. (b) Nineteen out o f 20 boys p r e f e r r e d t h e i r democratic l e a d e r . (c) There was more d i s c o n t e n t expressed i n a u t o c r a c y — e v e n when the g e n e r a l r e a c t i o n was s u b m i s s i v e — t h a n i n democracy. (d) "Release" behavior on the day o f t r a n s i t i o n t o a f r e e r atmosphere suggested the presence o f p r e v i o u s frustration. 5. There was more dependence and l e s s i n d i v i d u a l i t y i n autocracy: (a) There was more "submissive" or "dependent" b e h a v i o r . (b) C o n v e r s a t i o n was l e s s v a r i e d — m o r e c o n f i n e d t o the immediate s i t u a t i o n . (c) In the submissive r e a c t i o n t o autocracy, there was an a b s o l u t e (though not relative) reduction i n s t a t i s t i c a l measures o f i n d i v i d u a l d i f f e r e n c e s . (d) The o b s e r v e r s ' impression was t h a t i n autocracy there i s some l o s s o f individuality. 6. There was more group-mindedness and more f r i e n d l i n e s s i n democracy: (a) In Experiment'.!, the pronoun " I " was used r e l a t i v e l y l e s s f r e q u e n t l y i n the democratic group.  134  (b) Spontaneous subgroups were l a r g e r . (c) In Experiment I I , group-minded remarks were much more frequent i n democracy. (d) F r i e n d l y remarks were s l i g h t l y more frequent. (e) In Experiment I, mutual p r a i s e was more frequent i n the democratic group. (f) In Experiment I I , f r i e n d l y p l a y f u l n e s s was more frequent i n democracy. (g) In Experiment I, the democratic group showed more r e a d i n e s s to share group property. (Cartwright, I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o note the way  pp. 552-553)* i n which  the  authors d i s t i n g u i s h e d between the l a i s s e z f a i r e and democ r a t i c groups.  In the democratic group, the l e a d e r d i d  attempt to e x e r t some i n f l u e n c e e s p e c i a l l y to see t h a t .. d e c i s i o n s were made i n a genuinely  democratic manner.  Plans were s u b j e c t to group d i s c u s s i o n and group d e c i s i o n or making as opposed  to the more l e s s complete l a c k o f  s t r u c t u r e t h a t c h a r a c t e r i z e d the l a i s s e z f a i r e Despite  group.  the i n t u i t i v e l y s a t i s f y i n g r e s u l t s , the  f a c t t h a t l e a d e r s h i p i s what determined the s t r u c t u r e of the group, not the v o t i n g procedure or i n s t i t u t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e , reduces i t s relevance  to t h i s study.  t h e l e s s , the f a c t t h a t environments  None-  appropriately  c h a r a c t e r i z e d as democratic produced such s a t i s f y i n g r e s u l t s both i n terms o f p a r t i c i p a n t s a t i s f a c t i o n and  group  *Experiment I i n v o l v e d o n l y two groups, the a u t o c r a t i c and democratic, Experiment I I i n v o l v e d four groups of 5 boys each, each o f which was s u b j e c t e d t o the 3 s t y l e s of l e a d e r s h i p as each o f the four a d u l t l e a d e r s s h i f t e d from group to group. ( I b i d , p. 527)  135  s o l i d a r i t y goes some way towards s u p p o r t i n g the p r o p o s i tions  that  factions,  1. p a r t i c i p a t i o n p r o v i d e s a l t e r n a t i v e  satis-  and 2. p a r t i c i p a t i o n h e l p s develop a concern  f o r community  (and t h e r e f o r e e c o l o g i c a l )  well-being.  An even more i n t e r e s t i n g experiment from the p o i n t of view of changing v a l u e s and p a t t e r n s o f consumption i s that  conducted under K u r t Lewin's d i r e c t i o n by the Red  Cross i n an attempt t o encourage home n u r s i n g v o l u n t e e r s to make g r e a t e r use o f unpopular organ meats such as h e a r t s and k i d n e y s . 1. a l e c t u r e  Two methods o f p e r s u a s i o n were t r i e d  s i t u a t i o n where the informant d i d a l l or  almost a l l o f the t a l k i n g , and 2. a d i s c u s s i o n where p a r t i c i p a t i o n was encouraged by the leader.  I t was found t h a t  group  discussion  the women i n the  discussion  group were f a r more l i k e l y to buy these meats thaii those s u b j e c t to the l e c t u r e methods (Blumberg, p. 7 7) .  A  second experiment with housewives u r g i n g them to i n c r e a s e t h e i r consumption o f m i l k achieved s i m i l i a r r e s u l t s . t h i r d experiment i s o f a d d i t i o n a l  i n t e r e s t because group  p a r t i c i p a t i o n was a l s o compared to i n d i v i d u a l  instruction.  In these cases mothers were being persuaded t o feed infants  cod l i v e r o i l and orange j u i c e .  those s u b j e c t to group d i s c u s s i o n incidence of actually  their  Surprisingly,  showed a much h i g h e r  u s i n g the foods, than those s u b j e c t  to i n d i v i d u a l i n s t r u c t i o n . really surprising  A  Of course the r e s u l t s are not  i f one holds t o the argument t h a t  136  consumption p a t t e r n s are more o r l e s s s o c i a l l y  determined.  An important l i m i t a t i o n o f these experiments was t h a t the group was n o t r e a l l y i n the p o s i t i o n to make a d e c i s i o n b u t was s u b j e c t t o the views of the informants and experimenters. experiments  I t should n o t be concluded from  these  t h a t a l l i t takes i s an i l l u s i o n o f p a r t i c i -  p a t i o n and a group environment  t o modify peoples' b e h a v i o r .  The l i t e r a t u r e i s f i l l e d with examples which show t h a t genuine  decision-making power  i s an important  factor  i n e f f e c t i v e l y i n v o l v i n g people i n change. In one experiment  workers were i n v o l v e d i n long  d i s c u s s i o n and e x p l a n a t i o n of the p r o d u c t i v i t y g o a l s o f t h e i r u n i t , b u t n o t g i v e n the power to decide on what these g o a l s should be.  Another group was n o t only i n v o l v e d  i n d i s c u s s i o n s , b u t a f t e r these d i s c u s s i o n s was allowed t o s e t i t s own p r o d u c t i v i t y g o a l s .  The r e s u l t s showed t h a t  those who were able t o make the d e c i s i o n s achieved a s i g n i f i c a n t l y h i g h e r l e v e l o f p r o d u c t i v i t y than those who merely p a r t i c i p a t e d i n d i s c u s s i o n s .  (Blumberg  p.  79)  While we a r e n o t concerned with p r o d u c t i v i t y , the d i f f e r e n c e i n p r o d u c t i v i t y i n d i c a t e d i n the above experiment  would  seem t o i n d i c a t e f u r t h e r d i f f e r e n c e s i n the morale o f the decision-making  group.  One extremely u s e f u l a s p e c t o f the v a r i o u s  experiments  i n worker p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s t h e i r concern with t h e problem of change.  A frequent problem  f o r i n d u s t r y i s t h a t the  137  i n t r o d u c t i o n o f new  techniques almost always r e s u l t s i n  a l o w e r i n g o f p r o d u c t i v i t y d e s p i t e the improved methods. Research has i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h i s i s u s u a l l y due t o workers' r e s i s t a n c e to change.  As a r e s u l t , g r e a t e f f o r t i s ex-  pended i n an attempt to d i s c o v e r ways of overcoming t h i s resistance.  In one famous experiment, workers were  d i v i d e d i n t o f o u r groups. changes would be i n t r o d u c e d  The f i r s t was  simply t o l d what  (the standard p r o c e d u r e ) , the  second were a b l e to e l e c t r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s who were i n v o l v e d i n the working out o f the a c t u a l d e t a i l s o f the changes  (though the whole group met to be informed o f  these changes) and i n the t h i r d and f o u r t h group each member was  t o t a l l y i n v o l v e d i n d i s c u s s i o n and d e c i s i o n  as to implementation.  As Blumberg,  summarizing the  experiment remarks, S t a t e d i n the most g e n e r a l terms the r e s e a r c h e r s found t h a t the "success" i n b r i n g i n g about job c h a n g e s — d e f i n e d both i n terms o f p r o d u c t i v i t y and worker s a t i s faction—was directly proportional to the amount o f worker p a r t i c i p a t i o n . In the no p a r t i c i p a t i o n group, f o r example, morale f e l l d r a s t i c a l l y r i g h t a f t e r the i n t r o d u c t i o n of the changes and i n the f i r s t f o r t y days 17 per cent of the workers i n the group had q u i t t h e i r j o b s . ( I b i d , p. 82) As r e v e a l e d by one c h a r t from the experiment, the autoc r a t i c group never achieved the l e v e l of p r o d u c t i v i t y they had a t t a i n e d b e f o r e the changes were i n t r o d u c e d , the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e group achieved the l e v e l of p r o d u c t i v i t y  138  they had b e f o r e i n 2 1/2 it,  weeks and then began to exceed  but the p a r t i c i p a t i v e group achieved i n 2 weeks the  pre-change l e v e l of p r o d u c t i o n and  then went on i n the  time of the experiment to exceed the former l e v e l 14%.  by  Since a l l the experiments c i t e d by Blumberg show  s i m i l i a r r e s u l t s i t i s not necessary further d e t a i l .  But one  to go i n t o  any  "experiment" seems worth  q u o t i n g a t l e n g t h because i t d r a m a t i c a l l y i l l u s t r a t e s the e f f e c t t h a t even a small amount of worker c o n t r o l has on worker s a t i s f a c t i o n and p r o d u c t i v i t y , and a l s o the enormous a t t r a c t i o n t h a t such c o n t r o l has  f o r workers.  The dramatis personae here were not male white c o l l a r workers but e i g h t young female manual workers i n a f a c t o r y producing small t o y s . T h e i r job was a r e l a t i v e l y simple and r e p e t i t i v e one; to spray p a i n t on wooden toys p l a c e d b e f o r e them. The job had r e c e n t l y been re-engineered and, a c c o r d i n g to the new system, each g i r l would take a toy from a t r a y next to her, p l a c e i t i n a j i g i n s i d e her p a i n t i n g c u b i c l e , and spray p a i n t on i t . Then she would p l a c e the toy on one of the overhead hooks which moved by her a t a constant speed on an endless b e l t , and the hook then c a r r i e d the toy i n t o an a d j a c e n t d r y i n g oven. Wages f o r the j o b , a p a r t from b a s i c pay, were c a l c u l a t e d a c c o r d i n g t o a group bonus p l a n , and, because the job was new, t h i s was supplemented by a l e a r n i n g bonus which decreased month by month. The job d e s c r i b e d here seemed simple and c l e a r , and management expected no t r o u b l e . But there was t r o u b l e : the g i r l s ' p r o d u c t i v i t y was very low and was not i n c r e a s i n g a t the r a t e management had hoped or expected. Many hooks on the b e l t went by empty. Morale among the g i r l s was very bad: there were complaints, r e s i s t a n c e , e x c e s s i v e absenteeism, and much turnover which o n l y complicated and lengthened  139  the l e a r n i n g p r o c e s s . Among the o p e r a t o r s ' most c o n s i s t e n t complaints were, f i r s t , t h a t the room was too hot due t o the p r o x i m i t y of the d r y i n g oven and, secondly, t h a t the speed of the b e l t , s e t by the e n g i n e e r s , was much too f a s t , and t h a t i t simply was i m p o s s i b l e to keep up the pace. In order to r e s o l v e these d i f f i c u l t i e s , management brought i n a c o n s u l t a n t and he a d v i s e d the foreman, a g a i n s t the l a t t e r ' s b e t t e r judgment, to c o n f e r w i t h the o p e r a t o r s . During a s e r i e s of meetings which f o l l o w e d , the g i r l s made a number of suggestions to the foreman. F i r s t , they requested t h a t he i n s t a l l fans t o v e n t i l a t e the a r e a . The engineer and the foreman were s c e p t i c a l about the g i r l s ' complaint and d i d n ' t b e l i e v e t h a t the fans would appease them or c o o l t h e i r anger. N e v e r t h e l e s s , they agreed to t r y them, and when the fans were brought i n the g i r l s were d e l i g h t e d and took g r e a t p r i d e i n p o s i t i o n i n g and r e p o s i t i o n i n g them u n t i l they found a s a t i s f a c t o r y l o c a t i o n f o r them. The e x p e r i ment was a success and i t was r e f l e c t e d i n an immediate improvement i n the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the foreman and the workers. A t a subsequent meeting the focus of a t t e n t i o n turned t o the "excess speed' o f the b e l t s , and here the o p e r a t o r s made an h e r e t i c a l p r o p o s a l : 'Let us a d j u s t the speed of the b e l t f a s t e r or slower depending on how we f e e l " . The foreman was s t a r t l e d , the engineer aghast. But a f t e r l e n g t h y d i s c u s s i o n , arguments, and d i r e prophecies by the engineer, . a. control..was i n s t a l l e d a t the group l e a d e r ' s booth which allowed her to a d j u s t the speed of the b e l t slow, medium, or f a s t . A f t e r i t s i n s t a l l a t i o n , the g i r l s immediately worked out an e l a b o r a t e schedule of when d u r i n g the day the b e l t would be operated s l o w l y , when medium, and when f a s t . The r e s u l t s of t h i s i n n o v a t i o n were both i r o n i c and s i g n i f i c a n t . Although the g i r l s ' o r i g i n a l complaint was t h a t the b e l t moved i m p o s s i b l y f a s t , under t h e i r own c o n t r o l the average speed of the b e l t was a c t u a l l y i n c r e a s e d . When the b e l t was running a t a f i x e d speed determined by the engineer, i t corresponded to low-medium on the o p e r a t o r s ' d i a l ; under the g i r l s ' c o n t r o l , however, the average speed was up toward the h i g h mark.  140  As a r e s u l t of t h i s s u r p r i s i n g change, the g i r l s ' p r o d u c t i v i t y i n c r e a s e d between 30-50 per cent over expected l e v e l s ; and, as t h e i r pay was t i e d to p r o d u c t i v i t y , t h e i r earnings jumped enormously, f o r they were making b a s i c pay, p l u s a l e a r n i n g bonus, p l u s a very h i g h group bonus. Moreover, morale reached an a l l - t i m e h i g h and f o r the f i r s t time the g i r l s seemed reasonably content with t h e i r work. The s t o r y d i d not end h a p p i l y here, however. These s e m i - s k i l l e d o p e r a t o r s , t h e i r p r o d u c t i o n a t r e c o r d l e v e l s , began to earn more than many o f the h i g h l y s k i l l e d workers i n the p l a n t , and the l a t t e r complained v o c i f e r o u s l y . Furthermore, the e x t r a p r o d u c t i o n unbalanced the work o f the other departments, l e a d i n g to a vacuum behind and a p i l e - u p i n f r o n t of the g i r l s ' s e c t i o n . E q u a l l y d i s t u r b i n g , the i m p e r t i n e n t success of the workers had undermined the p r e s t i g e of the engineers by c a l l i n g t h e i r competence i n t o q u e s t i o n , and had r u d e l y c h a l l e n g e d the whole system of managerial p r e r o g a t i v e s . The superintendent, engineer, and foreman were n a t u r a l l y very g r a v e l y d i s t u r b e d over these developments. To r e s o l v e the 'problems' c r e a t e d by the success o f the experiment, the superintendent u n i l a t e r a l l y decided to r e t u r n to the s t a t u s quo ante. He had the g i r l s ' c o n t r o l d i a l removed and the b e l t a d j u s t e d to run a t a constant speed as b e f o r e . The g e n e r a l consequences o f these a c t s are e a s i l y p r e d i c t a b l e f o r anyone remotely acquainted with the l i t e r a t u r e on p a r t i c i p a t i o n . P r o d u c t i o n f e l l o f f immediately, and w i t h i n a month s i x o f e i g h t g i r l s had l e f t the company. S e v e r a l months l a t e r the foreman a l s o r e s i g n e d f o r reasons which were r e l a t e d to the experiment and i t s u l t i m a t e debacle. In t h i s e n t i r e s i t u a t i o n we see a convergence of two kinds of workers' c o n t r o l which are c r u c i a l to job s a t i s f a c t i o n . For s i m p l i c i t y ' s sake these two kinds might be roughly termed ' c o n t r o l over machinery' and ' c o n t r o l over a u t h o r i t y ' . In t h i s case c o n t r o l over machinery was s a t i s f y i n g to the workers because i t allowed them to r e g u l a t e t h e i r own work pace by a l t e r n a t e l y i n c r e a s i n g and d e c r e a s i n g the speed o f the b e l t . This v a r i e t y a l l e v i a t e d somewhat the boredom and monotony of what was e s s e n t i a l l y a r e p e t i t i v e job, and the workers became autonomous masters of a machine i n s t e a d o f p a s s i v e e x t e n s i o n s of i t .  141  Supplementing the workers' c o n t r o l over machinery here was t h e i r c o n t r o l over a u t h o r i t y which was, as the p a r t i c i p a t i o n l i t e r a t u r e amply demonstrates, a formidable f a c t o r i n i n c r e a s i n g t h e i r s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h work. The f a c t t h a t management c o n s u l t e d the workers on changes to be made, t h a t t h e i r ' s u p e r i o r s ' had accepted t h e i r suggestions, and t h a t these changes had been s u c c e s s f u l — a l l t h i s undoubtedly helped to account f o r the remarkably improved c l i m a t e i n the workers' room and f o r the i r o n i c i n c r e a s e i n production. T h i s case a l s o demonstrates t h a t the f a c t o r y i s an i n t e g r a t e d s o c i a l (and economic) system and t h a t changes i n one department are l i k e l y to have r e p e r c u s s i o n s elsewhere. I t was c l e a r l y e v i d e n t t h a t the workers' c o n t r o l could not s u r v i v e here i n i s o l a t i o n i n one p a r t of the f a c t o r y : i n h e r e n t i n s t a b i l i t y demanded t h a t i t be e i t h e r expanded or e l i m i n a t e d a l t o g e t h e r . Or, as a dogmatic i n d u s t r i a l democrat might say, a f a c t o r y , l i k e a n a t i o n , cannot e x i s t h a l f s l a v e , h a l f f r e e . (Blumberg, pp. 97-98) These s t u d i e s can be seen, not o n l y as proof o f the t h e s i s t h a t worker c o n t r o l i s a p e r f e c t l y v i a b l e a l t e r n a t i v e to the c u r r e n t h i e r a c h i c a l o r g a n i z a t i o n o f i n d u s t r y , but a l s o , and what i s more s i g n i f i c a n t from our p o i n t o f view, t h a t the p a r t i c i p a t i v e forum i s an e x c e l l e n t means o f i n t r o d u c i n g and e f f e c t i n g change.  I f we are t o modify  our  i n response to the  l i f e s t y l e s and our communities  e c o l o g i c a l imperative  we w i l l have to do more than j u s t  sermonize; p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s c l e a r l y the most e f f e c t i v e means f o r a c h i e v i n g again  such changes.  I t should  be noted  t h a t the experiments seem to show t h a t i n order f o r  p a r t i c i p a t i o n t o be e f f e c t i v e the group must be  small  enough so t h a t i n d i v i d u a l s have a r e a l chance to v o i c e views and hear the views o f o t h e r s .  their  Large s c a l e meetings,  (the assembly model of p a r t i c i p a t i o n ) , democratic v o t i n g ,  142  and is  the e l e c t i o n of committees t o do the a c t u a l simply  not  planning  s u f f i c i e n t as a means f o r p r o d u c i n g the  o f e f f e c t i v e and  dramatic change t h a t c h a r a c t e r i z e s  kind  the  r e s u l t s o f most p a r t i c i p a t i o n experiments. While Blumberg's study does much t o s u p p o r t t h e s i s tha't worker s a t i s f a c t i o n can be increased  be his  increased research  that especially  change, worker p r o d u c t i v i t y  through p a r t i c i p a t i o n , t h e r e  is little  r e l a t i n g to the c l a i m o f M i l l  l o c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n w i l l y i e l d greater commitment t o the I was  dramatically  through worker p a r t i c i p a t i o n and  i n the case o f p r o d u c t i o n  the  and  in  others,  involvement  unable t o f i n d any  that  and  l a r g e r community, n a t i o n , o r the  unfortunately  can  world.  l i t e r a t u r e or experiments  which r e l a t e d changes i n a worker's p o s i t i o n v i s - a - v i s i n d u s t r i a l a u t h o r i t y , and toward p o l i t i c a l  changes i n the worker's a t t i t u d e s  p a r t i c i p a t i o n outside  the work p l a c e .  There i s , on the o t h e r hand, a w e l l known c o r r e l a t i o n supported by many d i f f e r e n t s t u d i e s , between a sense o f political  e f f i c a c y (a sense t h a t one  political  scene, a sense t h a t one's p o l i t i c a l  count) and for  can  a f f e c t the efforts will  the nature o f the work environment.  example, i n h i s book A l i e n a t i o n and  Blauner,  Freedom, found  t h a t workers i n the p r i n t i n g i n d u s t r y who  have a  high  degree o f i n d i v i d u a l c o n t r o l over t h e i r work a l s o a h i g h l y developed sense o f s e l f - e s t e e m  and  "had  a sense of  worth and  were t h e r e f o r e ready to p a r t i c i p a t e i n  political  i n s t i t u t i o n s o f the community."  self-  the  (Blauner,  p.  176)  143  He a l s o found t h a t the s i t u a t i o n i n the chemical i n d u s t r y , where the workers e x e r c i s e a l a r g e degree o f c o l l e c t i v e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y over the processes o f the p l a n t , a l s o c o n t r i b u t e d t o h i g h s e l f - e s t e e m and s e l f - w o r t h .  And w h i l e  he does n o t , i n r e v i e w i n g the chemical p l a n t s i t u a t i o n , make the i n f e r e n c e to p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y he made i n the p r e v i o u s example, i t seems c l e a r t h a t he would h o l d the same p o s i t i o n . Blauner's i n f e r e n c e from work autonomy t o p o l i t i c a l activity  Vis o b v i o u s l y based on the assumption  t h a t people  with a h i g h sense of s e l f - w o r t h and s e l f - e s t e e m w i l l r e a d i l y p a r t i c i p a t e i n the p o l i t i c a l arena. assumption  This  t i e s i n d i r e c t l y w i t h the c l a i m i n the chapters  on the psychology is satisfied  o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n , t h a t one need which  by p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n a p u b l i c forum i s the  need f o r s e l f - ^ a h d a p u b l i d ) esteem.  Autonomy i s , o f  course,  a source o f s t a t u s (and self-esteem) and i n t h i s way encourages people t o a sense o f p o l i t i c a l  significance  based on t h e i r sense o f s o c i a l importance.  But t h i s i s  not the o n l y reason f o r assuming a h i g h e r amount o f p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y among workers w i t h g r e a t e r autonomy. As M i l b r a t h p o i n t s out i n h i s book P o l i t i c a l  Participation  "Persons who f e e l more e f f e c t i v e i n t h e i r everyday  tasks  and c h a l l e n g e s are more l i k e l y t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n p o l i t i c s . " ( M i l b r a t h , p. 5 9 )  144  Almond and Verba i n t h e i r book, The C i v i c  Culture,  demonstrated  t h a t the h i g h e s t  f e e l i n g of p o l i t i c a l  e f f i c a c y was  a s s o c i a t e d w i t h those c o u n t r i e s , the U.S.A.  and B r i t a i n , where the most i n s t i t u t i o n a l existed for local p a r t i c i p a t i o n .  opportunities  In summary the authors  argue I f i n most s o c i a l s i t u a t i o n s the i n d i v i d u a l finds himself subservient to some a u t h o r i t y f i g u r e , i t i s l i k e l y t h a t he w i l l expect such an a u t h o r i t y r e l a t i o n s h i p i n the p o l i t i c a l sphere. On the o t h e r hand, i f o u t s i d e the p o l i t i c a l sphere he has o p p o r t u n i t i e s to p a r t i c i p a t e i n a wide range o f s o c i a l d e c i s i o n s , he w i l l probably expect to be able to p a r t i c i p a t e i n p o l i t i c a l d e c i s i o n s as w e l l . Furthermore, p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n nonp o l i t i c a l d e c i s i o n making may g i v e one the s k i l l s needed to engage i n p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n : the s k i l l s of s e l f - e x p r e s s i o n and a sense o f effective political tactics. (Almond, p. 2 72) A l l t h i s information  would seem t o  substantiate  Marx's c l a i m about the importance o f the i n d i v i d u a l ' s r e l a t i o n s h i p to the means o f p r o d u c t i o n .  What needs to  be added to Marx i s t h a t the c r u c i a l i n g r e d i e n t i n t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p i s not ownership, but c o n t r o l o r autonomy. In summary, the evidence from s t u d i e s r e l a t i n g degrees of workplace p a r t i c i p a t i o n to such  varying  dependent  v a r i a b l e s as worker s a t i s f a c t i o n , e f f i c i e n c y , r e c e p t i v i t y to change, and a sense o f p o l i t i c a l e f f i c a c y , i n d i c a t e t h a t p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s a powerful determinant i n the  145  attainment of a l l these g o a l s . we  are concerned  From our p o i n t of view,  w i t h 1. i n c r e a s i n g s a t i s f a c t i o n to o f f s e t  g e n e r a l i z e d l o w e r i n g of the standard of l i v i n g , creation  of new  v a l u e s , and  to be s e l f - l e g i s l a t i n g .  3. the i n c r e a s e d  2.  the  preparedness  What e m p i r i c a l i n f o r m a t i o n there  i s would seem to support the c l a i m t h a t p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n l o c a l government and  i n d u s t r y i s conducive  to these g o a l s .  But as I mentioned a t the b e g i n n i n g of t h i s chapter, i s an enormous problem o f how  to r e l a t e the  there  satisfying  r e s u l t s of small group p a r t i c i p a t i o n to the p r a c t i c a l problems of l a r g e s c a l e decision-making. of concern  T h i s i s an area  f o r the small group t h e o r i s t r who  wishes to  g e n e r a l i z e h i s r e s u l t s , f o r the e c o l o g i c a l l y  concerned  who  wish t o e x p l o i t the b e n e f i t s of p a r t i c i p a t i o n  while  m a i n t a i n i n g r e g i o n a l d e c i s i o n ^ making where i t i s e c o l o g i c a l l y r e l e v a n t , and even to the r a d i c a l t h e o r i s t who democracy  has  f a i t h i n the Athenian  democratic  form of crowd  (e.g. M. Bookchin i n h i s Post S c a r c i t y  Anarchism).  Obviously, i f a group o f 5 or 10 seems to be the b e s t f o r d e v e l o p i n g i n i t s members a r e a l sense of s i g n i f i c a n c e  and  p a r t i c i p a t i o n , a l l o w i n g i t s members s u f f i c i e n t o p p o r t u n i t y to be heard,  t o change and be changed, then there seem' to  be some very u n f o r t u n a t e i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r the p o s s i b i l i t y of democratizing  ( i n the sense of p r o v i d i n g genuine  p a r t i c i p a t i o n ) any l a r g e s c a l e o r g a n i z a t i o n . has  This objection  long been taken as the death blow to any attempt to  146  i n c o r p o r a t e widespread p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n i n d u s t r i a l s o c i e t y . As M i l l puts i t . . . s i n c e a l l cannot, i n a community exceeding a s i n g l e small town, part i c i p a t e p e r s o n a l l y i n any but some v e r y minor p o r t i o n s of the p u b l i c b u s i n e s s , i t f o l l o w s t h a t the i d e a l type of a p e r f e c t government must be r e p r e s e n t a t i v e . ( M i l l , 1964, p. 217) While M i l l ' s premiss i s undoubtably t r u e h i s conclusion i s false. his  I t i s f a l s e because he assumed f o r  argument t h a t there were o n l y two  alternatives for  democratic o r g a n i z a t i o n : d i r e c t p a r t i c i p a t o r y democracy and  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e government.  Given the weaknesses  and  f a i l u r e s o f r e p r e s e n t a t i v e government, i t i s f o r t u n a t e t h a t M i l l ' s dichotomy i s too l i m i t e d . a l t e r n a t i v e s both i n theory these we  must t u r n .  and  There are  other  i n p r a c t i c e and i t i i s  to  147  C H A P T E R  LARGE  SCALE  VII  PARTICIPATION  148  The  seeming i m p o s s i b i l i t y o f i n v o l v i n g c i t i z e n s  d i r e c t l y i n the governing  o f the l a r g e s c a l e o r g a n i z a t i o n s  t h a t c h a r a c t e r i z e i n d u s t r i a l s o c i e t y has theorists  l e d most d e m o c r a t i c  (e.g. M i l l ) t o d i s m i s s the p o s s i b i l i t y of p a r t i c i p a t o r y  democracy as imagined by Rousseau and o t h e r s .  Despite  t h i s s k e p t i c i s m , t h e r e have been a number o f s e r i o u s attempts both i n theory  and p r a c t i c e to develop a l t e r n a t i v e s  to r e p r e s e n t a t i v e government and h i e r a r c h i c a l management. - While t h i s problem i s o f prime concern t o anyone ( l i k e Blumberg, f o r example) who  accepts  the c u r r e n t  order  of i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n and wishes to see i t d e m o c r a t i z e d , i t may  not seem o f such p r e s s i n g concern to those whose  e c o l o g i c a l sense l e a d s them to a c t u a l l y a t t a c k the l e v e l and  form of p r o d u c t i o n .  o f reduced and  Those who  see  c o n t r o l l e d p r o d u c t i v i t y with  d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n and  current  the n e c e s s i t y far greater  l o c a l s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y can  embrace  the " p r a c t i c a l " o b j e c t i o n s to p a r t i c i p a t o r y democracy i n i n d u s t r i a l s o c i e t y as j u s t another argument i n f a v o r of the e l i m i n a t i o n o f such a s o c i e t y . a t t i t u d e may  appear  Such an extreme  to border on Luddism or  romanticism, but i t a l s o has t h e o r i s t of small s c a l e  irrational  i t s adherents among the  (or as Bookchin c a l l s i t  " l i b e r a t o r y " ) technology.*  Greater  and  greater e f f o r t i s  *see h i s book P o s t - S c a r c i t y Anarchism, the c h a p t e r , " L i b e r a t o r y Technology", E. F. Schumacher has a l s o made the s u g g e s t i o n t o me i n c o n v e r s a t i o n t h a t s m a l l s c a l e i n d u s t r y does not r e a l l y r e q u i r e d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n i n o r d e r to be humane.  149  being expended on the development o f p r o d u c t i v e  processes  which do n o t r e q u i r e long p r o d u c t i o n  capital  runs,  high  investment, and h i g h l y c e n t r a l i z e d p r o d u c t i o n efficient.  t o be .  The r e c e n t dramatic i n c r e a s e i n the p r i c e o f  o i l and t h e r e f o r e o f t r a n s p o r t a t i o n has added enormous 4  impetus t o t h i s e f f o r t . * Because c e n t r a l i z e d p r o d u c t i o n i s c u r r e n t l y so dependent on i n e x p e n s i v e i n Canada) t h e r e  transport (especially  i s every reason t o b e l i e v e t h a t d e c e n t r a l -  i z a t i o n o f m a n u f a c t u r i n g may w e l l be " i n e v i t a b l e " — b e s i d e being,  as I have argued, d e s i r a b l e . Such c o n s i d e r a t i o n s may l e a d the e c o l o g i c a l r a d i c a l  to d i s m i s s  t h e concern f o r d e m o c r a t i z i n g  large scale  o r g a n i z a t i o n s r a f t e r a l l they a r e about t o "wither But  such a view i s n o t r e a l l y t e n a b l e .  away".  There a r e many  l i m i t a t i o n s on d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n both now and i n the foreseeable f u t u r e . certainly must s t i l l  F i r s t , w h i l e many o r g a n i z a t i o n s  could  (and c e r t a i n l y should) be reduced i n s i z e ,  there  be some r e g i o n a l and even world-wide c o o r d i n a t i o n  of a c t i v i t y .  T h i s need f o r l a r g e s c a l e o r g a n i z a t i o n s  flows  not o n l y from economic c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , but a l s o from e c o l o g i c a l one We a r e i n t e r - d e p e n d e n t .  P o l l u t a n t s know no l o c a l  borders,  * T h i s i s because l a r g e s c a l e p r o d u c t i o n and i t s economy o f s c a l e e x i s t s o n l y when e i t h e r t h e r e i s a l a r g e l o c a l market, o r a market which can be i n e x p e n s i v e l y reached. Recently i n B r i t a i n t h e r e has been a move away from the c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of b r i c k p r o d u c t i o n towards l o c a l p r o d u c t i o n because the p r i c e o f t r a n s p o r t over a r e l a t i v e l y s h o r t d i s t a n c e exceeds the m a n u f a c t u r i n g c o s t o f the b r i c k s . (Schumacher/ i n a speech i n Vancouver, F a l l 197 4)  150  f i s h swim thousands o f m i l e s ,  b i r d s cross continents.  Most  c r u c i a l , o f course, i s o r g a n i z a t i o n w i t h i n n a t u r a l e c o l o g i c a l r e g i o n s where b i o l o g i c a l i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s a r e e x t e n s i v e . Such f a c t s , p l u s production an  t h e o b v i o u s r e q u i r e m e n t o f some c e n t r a l i z e d  and t r a d e  no m a t t e r how reduced i n s c a l e ,  i n e v i t a b l e amount o f l a r g e s c a l e o r g a n i z a t i o n .  entail  And s u r e l y ,  we cannot a c c e p t a t t h e world-wide l e v e l t h e f r e e market anarchy which we have r e j e c t e d a t t h e l o c a l l e v e l ; s o c i a l control of production to a l o c a l  t h e arguments f o r t h e  a r e as a p p l i c a b l e t o t h e w o r l d as  commons.  S e c o n d l y , t h e f a c t t h a t we a l r e a d y organizations  a l s o presents  decentralization.  a formidable  have such  b a r r i e r to  We w i l l n o t be t r a n s f o r m e d  i n t o d e c e n t r a l i z e d communities w i t h l o c a l  overnight  self-sufficiency;  we w i l l i n f a c t p r o b a b l y n e v e r be so " t r a n s f o r m e d " . " e v o l u t i o n " w i l l be g r a d u a l  i fat a l l ,  t o f i n d a means f o r d e m o c r a t i z i n g  The  and we must be a b l e  these l a r g e r  organizations.  In f a c t , one o f t h e a t t r a c t i o n s o f the i d e a participation w i l l  large  that  remove much o f the s t r u c t u r a l cause o f  e n v i r o n m e n t a l d e g r a d a t i o n i s t h a t such p a r t i c i p a t i o n does not r e q u i r e a r e v o l u t i o n a r y u p h e a v e l t o be brought i n t o e f f e c t . (Of course i t may r e s u l t i n such an: upheaval,, b u t thath.is i r r e l e v a n t s p e c u l a t i o n . ) is  What i s i m p o r t a n t here  t h a t the immediate i n t r o d u c t i o n o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t o  l o c a l communities and w o r k p l a c e s p r o v i d e s s t e p towards the e v e n t u a l  a f i r s t structural  r e a l i z a t i o n of a p o l i t i c a l  organization  151  that i s appropriate production, pation  and e c o l o g i c a l needs.  to r e a l i z e anything  maintaining the  t o our l e v e l o f p o p u l a t i o n ,  beyond l o c a l g o a l s , a means of  area of c o n t r o l , must be  there  F o r small s c a l e p a r t i c i -  the b e n e f i t s o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n , but  F i n a l l y , we  should not be m i s l e d  communities of say 2 0 , 0 0 0 people.  the n o t i o n  formidable  t h a t people should  into thinking that  p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n small  Even such a small  problems i f we  take s e r i o u s l y  l e g i s l a t e on a l l c o l l e c t i v e  d e c i s i o n s which a f f e c t t h e i r l i v e s . 2 0 do not seem to provide  extending  sought.  i s no d i f f i c u l t y i n developing  community presents  industrial  Groups l a r g e r than about  f o r the i n t i m a t e  contact  and  s i v e d i s c u s s i o n t h a t i s necessary i f i n d i v i d u a l s are  to  a c t u a l l y r u l e and be r u l e d by reason and p e r s u a s i o n . means t h a t any extensive  l a r g e s c a l e arrangement must provide  exten-  This for  s m a l l group p a r t i c i p a t i o n i f the p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s  to be maximally e f f e c t i v e . I t seems c l e a r enough t h a t c e r t a i n d e v i a t i o n from the i d e a l o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n (where a l l c o l l e c t i v e d e c i s i o n s s u b j e c t t o d i s c u s s i o n and  consensus vote of a l l c i t i z e n s ) are  r e q u i r e d f o r any k i n d of p r a c t i c a l system. discussed  are  I have  already  the d e v i a t i o n from consensus i n Chapter I I because  this deviation s t i l l participation.  But  remained w i t h i n the b a s i c n o t i o n there  a p r a c t i c a l system.  Are  are other necessary d e v i a t i o n s these d e v i a t i o n s  the v i r t u e s of p a r t i c i p a t i o n ? pation i s appropriate  of  Is J.S.  for  destructive of  M i l l r i g h t that p a r t i c i -  only f o r minor l o c a l matters?  There are b a s i c a l l y three parameters along which governmental arrangements can  deviate  from the p a r t i c i p a t o r y i d e a l :  152  1. Range o f d e c i s i o n . The  range o f  decisions  which are s u b j e c t to the c o l l e c t i v e o r d e r can vary the t r i v i a l  from  (where s h a l l the town dance be held?) up t o  i n c l u d i n g a l l d e c i s i o n s t r a d i t i o n a l l y a s s o c i a t e d with sovereignty a t i o n , and  such the e s t a b l i s h m e n t  national  of a c r i m i n a l code, t a x -  the d e c i s i o n t o wage war.  Within  economic u n i t s  the range of d e c i s i o n s open t o p a r t i c i p a n t s can vary above) from where t o put the  and  (as noted  f a n s , tb; which markets to Center.  2..'Range o f involvement i n the d e c i s i o n making  process.  T h i s can range from complete i n v o l v m e n t as found i n s m a l l meetings where a l l get a r e a l chance to d i s c u s s , persuade and  decide  5 or 10,  (but the upper bound of the i d e a l seems to be  c e r t a i n l y not much more than 20)  s i t u a t i o n of a few hundred s i d e r a b l e input)  to the town meeting  (where there i s s t i l l  t o the s c i e n c e  only  room f o r con-  f i c t i o n s t o r y o f TV  voting  where weekly p l e b i s c i t e s on i s s u e s d i s c u s s e d p u b l i c l y on t e l e v i s i o n are then voted  on d i r e c t l y and  government i s by-passed.  Beyond u n i v e r s a l mass democracy are  various  a l l national  the  representative  forms o f r e p r e s e n t a t i v e government i n c l u d i n g  thoroughly, bound r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s to immediate r e c a l l or the  subject  " s o v i e t " system o f '•-•.'tiered  groups, each group b e i n g made up o f r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  from  the lower groups.* 3. Numbers i n v o l v e d i n the v o t i n g . not o n l y access t o the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s * c f . Thayer's scheme d e s c r i b e d below pp.  This a f f e c t s discussed  166-173.  153  previously, but f i n a l l y , The  one's sense o f p o l i t i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e .  d i f f i c u l t y w i t h t h e t e l e v i s i o n v o t i n g scheme i s n o t o n l y  t h a t t h e r e i s no r e a l  participation,  merely passive  but a l s o t h a t one's v o t e i s o f so l i t t l e to g i v e a sense o f f u t i l i t y  voting,  s i g n i f i c a n c e as  r a t h e r than a sense o f p o l i t i c a l  power and r e s p o n s i b l i t y . There i s a n a t u r a l d i f f i c u l t l y parameters i n t h a t t h e r e first  tends t o be a t e n s i o n between t h e  and t h e l a t t e r two.  U s u a l l y , t h e g r e a t e r the s i g n i f i c a n c e  of the d e c i s i o n the greater  the number o f people t h a t  are a f f e c t e d by t h e d e c i s i o n . i t would i n d e e d p l a c e  I f t h i s was an i r o n law,  a formidable  b a r r i e r to the i d e a l  of p a r t i c i p a t i o n though we would s t i l l educative But  justification  i n r e s o l v i n g these  have M i l l ' s  to warrant l o c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n .  t h i s problem can be r e d u c e d by d e c e n t r a l i z i n g b o t h t h e  economy and t h e p o l i t i c a l  a u t h o r i t y so t h a t d e c i s i o n s o f  magnitude a r e l e f t t o l o c a l work p l a c e ,  there  c o n t r o l . E s p e c i a l l y w i t h i n the  i s an enormous o p p o r t u n i t y . f o r  increased  worker c o n t r o l i n a r e a s o f g r e a t  s i g n i f i c a n c e t o the  worker, though perhaps o f l i t t l e  importance t o the s o c i e t y  as a whole.  ourselves  We s h o u l d  not allow  t o become so  bewitched by t h e f a s c i n a t i o n w i t h l a r g e n a t i o n we f a i l  to r e a l i z e  states  j u s t how many d e c i s i o n s o f g r e a t  s i g n i f i c a n c e c a n and s h o u l d Unfortunately,  that  personal  be made l o c a l l y .  e c o l o g i c a l considerations  frequently  i n v o l v e e c o l o g i c a l consequences o v e r l a r g e areas and frequently  t h e r e f o r e i n v o l v e the l i v e s of. l a r g e numbers o f p e o p l e .  15 4  Some o f these d e c i s i o n s i t would appear must be made by a r e l a t i v e l y a l i e n body.  How i s t h i s t o be done i n a f a s h i o n  which adheres as c l o s e l y t o the i d e a l o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n as possible? While the answers are complex, the f o l l o w i n g c o n s i d e r a t i o n s must be kept i n mind: 1.  There must be o p p o r t u n i t y  group d i s c u s s i o n and suggestion  before  for local,  small  a d e c i s i o n i s made by  the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e body, so t h a t c i t i z e n s can have a c r e a t i v e r o l e i n the d e c i s i o n making process. 2.  The r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s must be kept c l o s e l y  to t h e i r c o n s t i t u e n c y .  T h i s c o u l d be done f o r example by  frequent meetings and immediate 3.  tied  recall.  When a d e c i s i o n i s made by the h i g h e r body,  i t must be brought back to the s m a l l l o c a l groups, i d e a l l y f o r r a t i f i c a t i o n , but a t l e a s t f o r e x t e n s i v e e l a b o r a t i o n , so t h a t those who are s u b j e c t t o the d e c i s i o n can have an opport u n i t y t o be persuaded o f i t s 4. maintained  Extensive  t o prevent  reasonableness.  changing o f r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s must be  t h e development o f a p o l i t i c a l e l i t e . A  system such as t h e Athenians used o f a l o t t e r y f o r v a r i o u s sub-administrative be  p o s i t i o n s and p l a c e on a j u r y , might w e l l  a p p r o p r i ate. 5.  I t a l s o seems d e s i r a b l e t h a t a rough f i n a n c i a l  e q u a l i t y e x i s t among t h e c i t i z e n s t o prevent  v a r i o u s forms o f  dominance by the wealthy. 6.  Some method should be employed t o reduce the  n a t u r a l tendencies  f o r people t o develop s u b - l o y a l t i e s .  155  which i n t e r f e r e w i t h t h e i r p a r t i c i p a t i o n and -with"the "search f o r the b e s t  c o l l e c t i v e decisions.  (e.g. a l a r g e number o f  such groups or perhaps j u s t small group methods suggested by Thayer below;.) Keeping these c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  i n mind, l e t us  examine some p r a c t i c a l p r o p o s a l s . GUILD SOCIALISM One  of the f i r s t  d e m o c r a t i z i n g s o c i e t y was and  s i g n i f i c a n t proposals for t h a t of the G u i l d  p a r t i c u l a r l y t h a t of G.  D. H.  Cole.  Socialists,  The  Guild  Socialisisattempted  to o f f e r a k i n d o f middle ground between  s t a t e s o c i a l i s m and  Syndicalism  by  instituting  c o n t r o l over the economic s e c t o r , and p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n both The was  providing  extensive  sectors.  worker's p o s i t i o n , the G u i l d S o c i a l i s t s argued,  t h a t o f a wage s l a v e and  a l l e v i a t e d by conditions  political  increased  t h i s c o n d i t i o n would not  wages and  be  the improved working  t h a t the worker might expect i f the s t a t e took  over ownership of i n d u s t r y .  For t h i s reason, Cole claimed  t h a t the answer t h a t most people would g i v e to the "what i s the  fundamental e v i l i n our  the wrong one:  question  s o c i e t y ? " would be  "... they would answer POVERTY, when they  ought to answer SLAVERY"  (p. 38 Pateman).  They.emphasized  t h a t the p o s i t i o n of the worker b e s i d e s b e i n g w i t h s o c i a l i s t and  democratic i d e a l s had  incompatible  the e f f e c t of  156  r e n d e r i n g the worker u n f i t for. p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n democracy*, and t h a t the n o t o r i o u s p o l i t i c a l apathy of the worker  was  the r e s u l t of h i s g e n e r a l l y p a s s i v e r o l e i n i n d u s t r y . Worker p a r t i c i p a t i o n would t h e r e f o r e serve the double f u n c t i o n of p r o v i d i n g the worker w i t h immediate c o n t r o l over h i s work p l a c e and a l s o p r o v i d e the stimulus and  experience  for  g r e a t e r p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n matters of community and n a t i o n a l importance. The  g u i l d s o c i a l i s t developed two b a s i c p r i n c i p l e s of  democracy to i n c o r p o r a t e i n t h e i r conception  of the s t a t e .  The e s s e n t i a l s of democratic r e p r e s e n t a t i o n p o s i t i v e l y s t a t e d , are, f i r s t t h a t the r e p r e sented s h a l l have f r e e c h o i c e o f , constant c o n t a c t with, and c o n s i d e r a b l e c o n t r o l over, h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e . The second i s t h a t he should not be c a l l e d upon to choose someone to r e p r e s e n t him as a man or as a c i t i z e n i n a l l aspects of c i t i z e n s h i p , but o n l y to choose someone to r e p r e s e n t h i s p o i n t o f view i n r e l a t ion to some p a r t i c u l a r purposes, i n other words, some p a r t i c u l a r f u n c t i o n . A l l t r u e and democratic r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i s t h e r e f o r e f u n c t i o n a l represent a t i o n . (Cole, .•JS.D.H; , p. 38) *The e f f e c t t h a t c e r t a i n types of i n d u s t r i a l processes had on those employed i n them was noted by Adam Smith: he wrote, " i n the progress of the d i v i s i o n of labour, the employment...of the g r e a t body of the people comes to be c o n f i n e d to a few simple o p e r a t i o n s ; f r e q u e n t l y to one or two. But the understandings of . the g r e a t e r p a r t of men are n e c e s s a r i l y formed by t h e i r o r d i n a r y employments. The man whose whole l i f e i s spent i n performing a few simple o p e r a t i o n s of which the e f f e c t s too are, perhaps, always the same...has no o c c a s i o n to e x e r t h i s understanding or to e x e r c i s e h i s i n v e n t i o n i n f i n d i n g out expedients f o r removing d i f f i c u l t i e s which never occur. He natur a l l y 'loses.,; t h e r e f o r e t h e h a b i t of such e x e r t i o n and g e n e r a l l y becomes as s t u p i d and i g n o r a n t as i t i s p o s s i b l e f o r a human c r e a t u r e to become... (he i s incapable) o f forming any :j.ust judgment concerning many even of the o r d i n a r y d u t i e s of p r i v a t e l i f e . Of the g r e a t and e x t e n s i v e i n t e r e s t s of h i s country, he i s a l t o g e t h e r i n c a p a b l e of judging,',. Smith, The Wealth of Nations, 1880, v o l . I I , pp. 365-6 quoted by Pateman p. 51.  157  Following  t h e i r p r i n c i p l e s of d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of  decision-making power, c l o s e c o n t a c t with  representatives,  easy r e c a l l , and f u n c t i o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , the g u i l d s o c i a l i s t s developed t h e f o l l o w i n g g e n e r a l  scheme o f  organization. Each i n d u s t r y would be organizaed g u i l d composed  o f r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s from the v a r i o u s f a c t o r i e s  w i t h i n the i n d u s t r y . production  by a n a t i o n a l  The n a t i o n a l g u i l d would s e t g e n e r a l  standards and be r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the d i s t r i b u t i o n  of c a p i t a l funds.  The f a c t o r i e s would have g r e a t freedom  i n s e t t i n g o f work p a t t e r n s , a l l o c a t i o n o f r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s , etc..  I n d i v i d u a l communities would be organized  around a  "commune"—a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e body made up o f r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s from the i n d u s t r i a l g u i l d s , from the v a r i o u s c i v i c g u i l d s (e.g. the h e a l t h g u i l d , c u l t u r a l g u i l d , u t i l i t i e s  guild,  etc.) and r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s e l e c t e d on a geographic b a s i s ( p r o p o r t i o n a l t o population) i n t e r e s t s o f the consumer. have v o t i n g power equal  who would r e p r e s e n t the These r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s would  t o t h a t o f a l l the g u i l d s .  This  commune would make a l l the major d e c i s i o n s o f the community. The planners  w a f f l e d on d e s c r i b i n g how the power would  be d i s t r i b u t e d between the l o c a l and n a t i o n a l g u i l d s , but s i n c e the m o t i v a t i o n  f o r the g u i l d s t r u c t u r e was the  maximization o f i n d i v i d u a l d e c i s i o n power, the emphasis would be p l a c e d on l o c a l decision-making. I t was the hope o f the g u i l d s o c i a l i s t t h a t most d e c i s i o n s c o u l d be worked out between r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f  15 8  the consumer and  the g u i l d s without r e s o r t to any  on the p a r t of n a t i o n a l government.  The  coercion  b e l i e f was  that  s i n c e much of the n e g o t i a t i n g would be t a k i n g p l a c e a t community l e v e l , the p e r s o n a l  contact  the  i n v o l v e d would  encourage people to a c t i n the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t r a t h e r than i n s e l f i s h defense of t h e i r group i n t e r e s t . l a b o r was  r e a l l y s e r v i c e to the community was  The  belief  i n part  b a s i s f o r the f u n c t i o n a l n o t i o n of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , was  hoped t h a t the s p i r i t  pervasive  that  the  and i t  of community s e r v i c e would become  i n a s o c i e t y so o r g a n i z e d .  But  the p l a n does  not seem to r e s t h e a v i l y on these "Utopian" hopes, but r a t h e r on a k i n d of balance o f power which i t s e l f would be conducive to p r o t e c t i o n o f the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t . Cole thought^ f o r example^ t h a t the problem o f unequal s t a t u s would be  s o l v e d because t h e r e would no longer be  c l a s s of managers and other  a c l a s s of the managed, and  that  the  c r u c i a l source of i n e q u a l i t y , i n s e c u r i t y of employment,  would be e l i m i n a t e d  for a l l .  for  i t was  representation,  were r e p r e s e n t i n g  While t h i s theory  f e l t t h a t because  someone f u n c t i o n a l l y , the  allowed  representatives represented  would have the competence to assess the a c t i v i t i e s of representative,  immediate:-recall  would a l s o serve  their  to keep  the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  responsive  to the demands and  needs  o f the represented.  I t should  a l s o be noted t h a t  the  theory  a  allowed f o r " i n d i r e c t " r e p r e s e n t a t i o n :  s e n t a t i v e s to higher by r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  the  repre-  l e v e l s of o r g a n i z a t i o n were e l e c t e d  to the lower l e v e l s r a t h e r than d i r e c t  159  e l e c t i o n by the c i t i z e n s .  F o r example, the ward  represent-  a t i v e s t o the l o c a l commune would e l e c t a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e to the r e g i o n a l commune, r a t h e r than t h i s  representative  being e l e c t e d by a l l members o f the l o c a l commune.  This  provided  contact  t h a t those represented  would have p e r s o n a l  w i t h t h e i r immediate r e p r e s e n t a t i v e . I t i s a l s o i n t e r e s t i n g t o note t h a t u n l i k e the " u n s c i e n t i f i c Utopian s o c i a l i s t " o f the previous  century,  the g u i l d s o c i a l i s t a l s o had a p l a n f o r r e a l i z i n g Utopia  i n the l a r g e r s o c i e t y .  plan were: 1. encroaching the unions along  their  The three elements o f t h i s  c o n t r o l o f i n d u s t r y by o r g a n i z i n g  i n d u s t r i a l r a t h e r than c r a f t l i n e s , and  then f o r c i n g the employer t o d e a l w i t h union merely as an owner o f c a p i t a l devoid  o f managerial power (e.g. the  owner would a l l o t the union so much f o r pay, b u t c o u l d not decide on pay s c a l e s , nor choose the foreman), 2. working w i t h the Labor p a r t y f o r n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n with  joint control  (union and s t a t e ) , and 3. the c r e a t i o n o f worker-run industries  ( i . e . g u i l d s ) t o compete with a l r e a d y e x i s t e n t  c a p i t a l i s t firms.  The l a s t method would mainly be a  propaganda d e v i c e , which c o u l d a l s o be used f o r e x p e r i mentation with v a r i o u s types o f worker c o n t r o l .  In f a c t ,  the g u i l d s o c i a l i s t s d i d manage t o s t a r t a b u i l d i n g g u i l d which, with the h e l p o f low i n t e r e s t government loans, was moderately s u c c e s s f u l . H i s t o r i c a l l y , the main problem the g u i l d faced was o r g a n i z i n g along  socialists  i n d u s t r i a l r a t h e r than c r a f t  160  lines.  T h i s problem,  a l o n g w i t h a slump i n England which  f o r c e d the c l o s i n g o f the e x p e r i m e n t a l g u i l d s ,  resulted  i n the movement's c o l l a p s e . N o n e t h e l e s s , t h e g u i l d s o c i a l i s t movement does p r o v i d e us w i t h a model o f what a p r a c t i c a l democracy i n an i n d u s t r i a l s o c i e t y might  participatory  look l i k e , and  the s k e t c h o f a s o l u t i o n t o the problem o f r e g i o n a l c o o r d i n a t i o n w i t h r e g i o n a l autonomy.  The g u i l d  socialist  p l a n t o have t h e p r i m a r y form o f government be made up o f consumer and p r o d u c e r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s d e a l s w i t h the problem o f t h e " n a t u r a l " consumer apathy t h a t r e s u l t s from the f a c t t h a t consumers do n o t spontaneously form i n t o groups  interest  (see M. O l s e n ' s argument c i t e d above f o r the r e a s o n ) ,  but i t posed t h e a d d i t i o n a l problem o f emphasizing the o p p o s i t i o n o f consumer and p r o d u c e r i n t e r e s t s .  This  emphasis i s u n f o r t u n a t e from t h e p o i n t o f view b e i n g developed i n t h i s t h e s i s i n t h a t I am concerned w i t h de-emphasizing  t h e economic s o u r c e s o f s a t i s f a c t i o n i n  p a r t by p r o v i d i n g t h e a l t e r n a t i v e s a t i s f a c t i o n o f community participation.  By d e v e l o p i n g a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e system  a l o n g economic l i n e s , t h e g u i l d s o c i a l i s t s were r e c o g n i z i n g what i s s u r e l y a r e a l i t y , b u t every e f f o r t must be made t o s h i f t the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f people away from  their  economic r o l e s towards a more h o l i s t i c and community  role.  To do t h i s , i t would be n e c e s s a r y t o p r o v i d e f o r a more s i g n i f i c a n t o v e r - r i d i n g body, one which r e p r e s e n t e d t h e communi i n t e r e s t over and above t h e p r o d u c e r s ' and consumers'  161  interest.  T h i s o f course presents  problems f o r the very  b a s i s o f the g u i l d s o c i a l i s t system, namely f u n c t i o n a l representation. The most fundamental f a i l u r e o f g u i l d s o c i a l i s m , i n view o f the c r i t e r i a f o r a t r u l y p a r t i c i p a t i v e system, i s i t s acceptance and emphasis o f economic d i f f e r e n c e s so t h a t the p o s s i b i l i t y o f t r u l y r e f l e c t i v e and reasonable decision-making i s l i m i t e d by the very s t r u c t u r e o f the assemblies, The  v i z . t h e i r . d i v i s i o n i n t o economic i n t e r e s t s .  system may a l s o be c r i t i c i z e d  f o r i t s extensive  r e l i a n c e on r e p r e s e n t a t i o n which reduces a c t i v e involvement and  the p o s s i b i l i t y o f u n i v e r s a l consent.  But such a  c r i t i c i s m i s l i m i t e d i n t h a t any p r a c t i c a l p r o p o s a l i s going t o have t o allow f o r some r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , and the g u i l d s o c i a l i s t n o t i o n o f f u n c t i o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n was a t h o u g h t f u l attempt t o have r e p r e s e n t a t i o n with  the g r e a t e s t  p o s s i b i l i t y o f acceptance and even a c t i v e involvement by the r e p r e s e n t e d . s e n t a t i o n provided  The theory was t h a t f u n c t i o n a l r e p r e f o r narrow enough r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  that  the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e had a p l a u s i b l e c l a i m t o being able t o r e a l l y know the views o f h i s c o n s t i t u e n c y .  But^unfortunately,  the o r g a n i z a t i o n o f the c o n s t i t u e n c i e s i n t o narrow economic i n t e r e s t s i s also, the fundamental flaw o f the system. YUGOSLAVIA The  problems r a i s e d a t the t h e o r e t i c a l l e v e l i n g u i l d  s o c i a l i s m have r e c e i v e d e x t e n s i v e debate a t the l e v e l o f p r a c t i c e i n Yugoslavia.  In p a r t i c u l a r , the q u e s t i o n o f  162  the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the economic u n i t s such as worker c o n t r o l l e d f i r m and commune and  p o l i t i c a l u n i t s such as  f e d e r a l government i s a source of  the the  constant  debate.  T h i s debate emphasizes the d i f f i c u l t y of  t h a t the  s o c i a l property  assuring  o f the economic e n t e r p r i s e s  be  used f o r s o c i a l goods w h i l e maximizing the autonomy of worker-operators.  In a d d i t i o n , t h e r e  i s the q u e s t i o n  group p a r t i c i p a t i o n and whether the sustem a l l o w s i e n t i n p u t on a s m a l l s c a l e t o p r o v i d e t o persuade and  be  describe  i n 1950,  But  The  l e g a l d e t a i l s than do  these changes have come from  i n c r e a s i n g demand f o r g r e a t e r  the system i s c u r r e n t l y o r g a n i z e d  exercise  c o n t r o l o f the e n t e r p r i s e . from o u t s i d e  the  i n response As  the i n d i v i d u a l e n t e r p r i s e s a l l the  a management body  the most immediate day The  local  local control.  These c o u n c i l s i n t u r n a p p o i n t  a d i r e c t o r who  scholars  the  forms and  are governed by a worker's c o u n c i l e l e c t e d by  and  regulations,  s i t u a t i o n t h a t western  n e c e s s i t y of experimenting with various  workers.  to  numerous c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  o f the p r o l i f e r a t i o n o f  f r e q u e n t l y know more o f the  t o the  suffic-  opportunity  i t seems most a p p r o p r i a t e  r e s u l t e d i n the c u r i o u s  participants.  for  gone through many changes s i n c e  the c u r r e n t v a r i a t i o n .  changes, to say n o t h i n g has  o f smai:  persuaded.  While the system has i t s inauguration  f o r the  the  to  day  director i s usually hired  firm for a four-year  term, and  i s chosen  16 3  on the b a s i s of h i s e x p e r t i s e .  Recently,  l a r g e firms have  developed s m a l l e r economic u n i t s w i t h i n the f i r m which develop almost autonomous c o n t r a c t u a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s w i t h other  areas of the f i r m .  participant control.  T h i s allows  f o r even more  In a d d i t i o n , there are p e r i o d i c  meetings of a l l the workers and  important t o p i c s  are  s u b j e c t to worker referendum. The  workers' c o u n c i l  s u b j e c t to r e c a l l . i t s managing board c o u n c i l ) may  , i s e l e c t e d f o r two  years  and  T h i s group meets u s u a l l y monthly  and  ( e s s e n t i a l l y the e x e c u t i v e  meet s e v e r a l times a week.  administrative hierarchy  the  Much of  the  f u n c t i o n s as i n a  e n t e r p r i s e w i t h the manager and heads r e s p o n s i b l e  of  f o r day  to day  standard  a "collegium" operations.  of department As a r e s u l t ,  these d i r e c t o r s e x e r t a g r e a t d e a l of i n f l u e n c e over d i r e c t i o n and  operation  o f the f i r m .  I t should be  the  noted  however, t h a t the managers do not have the power of d i s m i s s a l ; t h i s i s a l l o c a t e d to a committee of the workers' c o u n c i l . Workers seem c l e a r l y to p e r c e i v e In one  study r e p o r t e d ,  the power of the managers.  the workers i n d i c a t e d t h a t  the  managers have very g r e a t c o n t r o l w h i l e the workers have only  "a l i t t l e " . *  However, i n t h i s same study, the workers  i n d i c a t e d t h a t they thought the workers' c o u n c i l s  had  almost as much power as the managers. Much of the data on the e f f e c t i v e n e s s of the Yugoslav system i n p r o v i d i n g workers w i t h a r e a l sense of p a r t i c i p a t i o n  *Hunnius, p.  227  164  and c o n t r o l i s weakened by the enormous r e g i o n a l d i f f e r e n c e s i n l i t e r a c y and p o l i t i c a l competency. l e s s deference  and much more enthusiasm f o r p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n the more h i g h l y i n d u s t r i a l i z e d areas poorer  Workers show much  r e g i o n s which are o n l y newly  industrialization.  than i n those  experiencing  Nonetheless, there seems to be  i n c r e a s i n g demand f o r g r e a t e r worker involvement.  an The  r e c e n t r e s t r u c t u r i n g of the l a r g e r f i r m s a l l o w i n g f o r g r e a t e r d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of c o n t r o l w i t h i n the f i r m would seem to i n d i c a t e a growing r e a l i z a t i o n t h a t f o r p a r t i c i p a t i o n to be e f f e c t i v e i t must p r o v i d e f o r shop l e v e l  control—i.e.  s m a l l group p a r t i c i p a t i o n . The  other problem of concern i s the b a l a n c i n g  s o c i a l r e s p o n s b i l i t y a g a i n s t l o c a l autonomy.  The  of Yugoslav  economy seems to be d r i f t i n g i n the d i r e c t i o n of a k i n d of democratic c o r p o r a t e  c a p i t a l i s m as more power and  authority  i s g i v e n to the l o c a l f i r m and more emphasis i s being on p r o f i t a b i l i t y .  placed  T h i s movement i s being done i n the name  of l o c a l autonomy, but the d e c i s i o n s , f o r example, to allow the market to determine p r i c e s i s c l e a r l y a move away from socialism.  While autonomy i s f r e q u e n t l y g i v e n as  argument f o r a l l o w i n g the market to "govern" the  the behavior  of c o r p o r a t i o n s , i t i s c l e a r to many commentators t h a t . t h e r e i s a l s o a none-too-subtle and  d r i f t towards  a k i n d of c o l l e c t i v e " f r e e e n t e r p r i s e " * .  competition The  ills  such an arrangement, of course, are apparent to many of  of the  c r i t i c s w i t h i n Y u g o s l a v i a as they are a l s o c l e a r to many *Thayer, pp.  105-110  165  o f the b l u e c o l l a r w o r k e r s .  The  w o r k e r s have c o n s i s t e n t l y  opposed market p r i c i n g out o f c o n c e r n not p r i c e s but  a l s o t o a s s u r e job  to  control  security.  Another i n t e r e s t i n g t r e n d  i s t h a t , as seems n a t u r a l  i n a market economy, many o f the p r o f i t a b l e not  only  t o compete but  small  to unite  f i r m s are  finding i t  together i n t o  conglomerates.  Such moves, i n i t i a l l y m o t i v a t e d by  considerations,  would s i m p l y mean a roundabout r e t u r n  some k i n d o f community c o n t r o l and While the  i s a l s o l i m i t e d by  Union.  competition.  democratic t h e o r i s t , i t  i t s p a r t i c u l a r under-development  h i s t o r y as a c e n t r a l i z e d s a t e l l i t e •'••.of the Nonetheless, despite  some i n d i c a t i o n s o f a move  t h a t worker c o n t r o l , e s p e c i a l l y a t the i s both d e s i r e d  addition,  and  l o c a l and  v a l u e d when a c h i e v e d .  t h e r e i s some e v i d e n c e t h a t  the  o n e - f o u r t h o f the work f o r c e s e r v e d on  political  the  1960)  has  greatest  shop In  (well o v e r  some g o v e r n i n g  resulted  involvement i n other areas  h e r e i s f a r from The  and  are  increasing  p a r t i c i p a t i o n o f an enormous number o f workers  body between 1950  and  Soviet  towards a k i n d o f market s o c i a l i s m , a l l i n d i c a t i o n s  level,  to  a c t u a l h i s t o r i c a l b e h a v i o r of Y u g o s l a v i a  p r o v i d e s f a s c i n a t i n g d a t a f o r the  recent  e l i m i n a t i o n of  profit  in  greater  (though the  evidence  sufficient).* f a i l u r e o f the  Y u g o s l a v system from  p o i n t o f view o f t r u e p a r t i c i p a t i o n , i s i t s acceptance  o f e l e c t e d management f a r removed from the  shop f l o o r .  While t h i s arrangement a l l o w s f o r much more worker *Thayer, pp.  105-110  influence  166  then u s u a l y , i t s t i l l  does not a l l o w f o r the a c t i v e  participation  /  on the p a r t o f the workers.  In a d d i t i o n , the ambiguous  feelings  about the market as a s o u r c e o f "freedom" t h r e a t e n s the p r i n c i p l e o f p o l i t i c a l c o n t r o l over 'the economy and the n a t u r e o f the experiment.*  socialistic  I n e v i t a b l y , such a r e t u r n t o  c o m p e t i t i o n would be d e s t r u c t i v e o f r e f l e c t i v e  and  r e a s o n a b l e d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g as s e l f - i n t e r e s t would become the dominant concern. THAYER The  l a s t t h e o r y t h a t I wish t o d i s c u s s i s t h a t o f  F r e d r i c k Thayer as put f o r t h i n h i s book An End t o H i e r a r c h y , An End t o C o m p e t i t i o n .  Thayer,  a former management con-  s u l t a n t f o r the Pentagon, c r i t i c i z e s  j u s t about a l l the  t h e o r i s t s of p a r t i c i p a t i o n f o r t h e i r f a i l u r e t o democratize the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e s i d e o f government.  Most t h e o r i s t s , I  he complains, have o n l y been i n t e r e s t e d .inti'de.mpcratizing the l e g i s l a t i v e s i d e o f government, and have taken the stand, r e m i n i s c e n t o f Rousseau, t h a t o n l y a n g e l s c o u l d democratize the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e s i d e o f government.  But as we  the l e g i s l a t i v e / a d m i n i s t r a t i v e d i s t i n c t i o n i s a o n e — e s p e c i a l l y g i v e n the c u r r e n t tendency r e g u l a t i v e agencies a great deal o f discretion.  a l l know, tenuous  to allow  (perhaps  necessary)  The r e s u l t i s t h a t those most d i r e c t l y  a f f e c t e d by the a g e n c i e s , namely the consumer and employee, have l i t t l e tions . *Thayer, pp.  105-110  the  or no say over the a g e n c i e s ' opera-  167  The  s o l u t i o n , Thayer argues, i s t o employ the i n s i g h t s  o f the l e a d i n g management t h e o r i s t and the theory groups.  o f small  I n t e r e s t i n g l y enough, t h e o r i e s developed i n  these f i e l d s a r e converging.  The group s i z e t h a t  small  group t h e o r i s t a r e f i n d i n g most e f f e c t i v e f o r democratic decision-making and a c t i n g i s i n the 5-10 range  (Thayer  p r e f e r s 5 ) . At the same time, the s i z e o f the group t h a t management t h e o r i s t f i n d most s u p e r v i s o r s e f f e c t i v e l y managing  a r e capable o f  (the s o - c a l l e d "span o f c o n t r o l " ) i s  a l s o i n the 5 to 10 range.  As Thayer summarizes "the s i z e  of e f f e c t i v e small groups i s p r e c i s e l y the same as t h a t p r e s c r i b e d f o r v e r t i c a l spans of c o n t r o l " (Thayer, p. 8). Using t h i s o b s e r v a t i o n ,  Thayer argues t h a t the t r a d i t i o n a l  arguments f o r v e r t i c a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s  have ignored the  "democratic" r e a l i t y t h a t i t was the s i z e o f the group, not the h i e r a r c h y  t h a t enables the o r g a n i z a t i o n  to g e t something  done. The  success o f v a r i o u s  public sector  interdepartmental  groups i n the  (he c i t e s NASA as an example) comes not o n l y  from the r e a l i z a t i o n t h a t such h o l i s t i c approaches t o problems are necessary, but a l s o from the n o n - h i e r a r c h i c a l form o f t h e i r o r g a n i z a t i o n .  Since a l l departments  these f r e q u e n t l y ad hoc o r g a n i z a t i o n s the  as equals,  enter  no one i n  "interdepartment" has a u t h o r i t y over the o t h e r s .  The  r e s u l t i s t h a t d e c i s i o n s must be by consensus w i t h the s a l u t o r y e f f e c t t h a t they must t h e r e f o r e  be argued a t  some l e n g t h . * * G a l b r a i t h , i n h i s New I n d u s t r i a l S t a t e , makes a s i m i l a r p o i n t about the democratic nature o f the l a r g e c o r p o r a t i o n s . See e s p e c i a l l y chapter VT, "The Technostructure".  168  He a l s o mentions  a v a r i e t y of experiments  c i t i z e n p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n l o c a l p l a n n i n g which  involving  involve  bringing a l l relevant p u b l i c o f f i c i a l s together with a l a r g e group o f l o c a l c i t i z e n s .  But i n s t e a d of having a  mass meeting w i t h the o f f i c i a l s a t the head t a b l e , the l a r g e group i s broken down i n t o s m a l l e r groups each cont a i n i n g r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f d i f f e r e n t departments local factions.  and v a r i o u s  He c l a i m s t h a t such experiments have been  impressive not o n l y from the p o i n t o f view o f the s o l u t i o n s proposed  (e.g. u s i n g a s c h o o l c a f e t e r i a as a l o c a l  r e s t a u r a n t a t n i g h t ) , but a l s o from the a b i l i t y o f such a forum t o generate consensus, both i n the small and f i n a l l y i n the l a r g e assembly.  sub-groups  The theory i s t h a t such  face t o face c o n f r o n t a t i o n reduces the emotional d i s t a n c e ( a l i e n a t i o n ) i n much the same way  t h a t Rousseau  hoped a  l a r g e assembly, d e v o i d o f antecedent i n t e r e s t grouping, would do.  In a sense t h e r e are no i n t e r e s t groups w i t h i n  a s m a l l enough group, o n l y o t h e r people.  And the b r i n g i n g  together o f people s t r i p p e d of t h e i r extra-group l a b e l s i n a s m a l l enough group t h a t each must encounter the o t h e r seems t o a l l o w f o r a r e a l p o s s i b i l i t y of d i s c o v e r i n g the "general w i l l " , ( T h a y e r , pp.  28-33).  Thayer a l s o reviews some o f the experiments i n O r g a n i z a t i o n a l Development, which seems to be a fancy name f o r the a p p l i c a t i o n o f encounter group t h e o r y and p r a c t i c e to formal o r g a n i z a t i o n s .  Such an a p p l i c a t i o n ,  169  he argues, may  be e f f e c t i v e i n h e l p i n g workers  and  a d m i n i s t r a t o r s r e l a t e t o one another, but only i f they are used i n a n o n - h i e r a r c h i c a l environment'—otherwise they become t o o l s of a d m i n i s t r a t i v e m a n i p u l a t i o n .  To the  e x t e n t though t h a t such techniques are e f f e c t i v e , they could  be  a useful tool for resolving conflicts  which  emerge not from genuine c o n f l i c t i n g i n t e r e s t , but from psychological barriers  (e.g. " p e r s o n a l i t y  conflicts").  The problem f o r Thayer, having demonstrated the e f f e c t i v e n e s s and b e n e f i t s o f s m a l l group type o r g a n i z a t i o n , i s to suggest a theory t h a t w i l l enable widespread part i c i p a t i o n i n such s m a l l groups and y e t p r o v i d e f o r l a r g e scale organization.  To s o l v e t h i s problem, Thayer appeals  to Rene L i k e r t ' s theory of " l i n k p i n " management.  In t h i s  theory, v a r i o u s small groups are r e l a t e d by having an o v e r - l a p p i n g membership, so t h a t groups h i g h e r up i n the o r g a n i z a t i o n are made up o f r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s from groups lower down.(see p i c t u r e , next page).  In L i k e r t ' s model  these groups are r e l a t e d by having the a d m i n i s t r a t o r of each group form the membership o f the higher-up-group. In the p i c t u r e , t h i s means t h a t each l i n k p i n i s i n a manageral r e l a t i o n s h i p to the group below and a s u b o r d i n a t e p o s i t i o n i n the o v e r - r i d i n g group.  Thayer suggests t h a t  t h i s model can be democratized by two fundamental  changes:  1. having the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e to the h i g h e r group be a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e not the a d m i n s t r a t o r from the lower.group.  170  ( T h e arrows indicate the l i n k i n g - p i n f u n c t i o n )  (Thayer,, p. 24)  171  2. t h a t each group r e q u i r e consensus b e f o r e i n s t r u c t i n g i t s representative. groups  The f i r s t democratizes t h e i n d i v i d u a l  (no member i s the b o s s ) , and the second imposes  the i d e a l r u l e o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n , v i z . t h a t eacjh"w'silTs the d e c i s i o n s t o which they a r e s u b j e c t . representative  t o the higher  Should the  group be unable t o persuade  the members o f t h i s group o f h i s previous  position, or  become persuaded of a d i f f e r e n t p o i n t o f view, then he must r e t u r n to the lower group f o r c o n s u l t a t i o n u n t i l i s again reached.  unanimity  Such a system i s s u r e l y r i g o r o u s l y  democratic, but i s i t f e a s i b l e ? Thayer p o i n t s o u t t h a t w h i l e such procedures may w e l l seem t e d i o u s , and w h i l e such a process may i n v o l v e a long d e c i s i o n time, once the proposals  a r e decided  on, the time  of implementation i s g r e a t l y reduced.* In a d d i t i o n , such a long t h r a s h i n g out process means t h a t many of the t y p i c a l problems of unforeseen consequences can i n f a c t be  foreseen  s i n c e a l l those a f f e c t e d by a d e c i s i o n r e a l l y a r e i n v o l v e d i n the d e c i s i o n .  Thayer remarks t h a t a very s i m i l a r  approach i s a c t u a l l y employed by many Japanese companies (Thayer, pp. 40-41). Thayer b e l i e v e s t h a t such o r g a n i z a t i o n a l arrangements which i n many l a r g e o r g a n i z a t i o n s reality  a l r e a d y have an i n f o r m a l  ( c f . G a l b r a i t h ' s The New I n d u s t r i a l State)  c o u l d be  used i n the p o l i t i c a l realm a l s o , c e n t e r i n g o n " . ; small *This can be compared t o Blumberg's i n f o r m a t i o n on the e f f e c t i v e n e s s o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n i n s t i t u t i n g change.  172  neighborhood o r g a n i z a t i o n s .  T h i s would e l i m i n a t e the need  f o r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e government which Thayer argues  should  be e l i m i n a t e d not o n l y because i t i s an e s s e n t i a l l y hierarchical  Cor i n my  terms, n o n - p a r t i c i p a t i v e ) form o f  government, but because i t a l s o l e g i t i m a t e s t h i s form of h i e r a r c h y by i t s c l a i m i n g to be a t r u l y democratic form of government. We  can wonder whether such an o r g a n i z a t i o n a l form  as t h a t suggested by Thayer c o u l d r e a l l y work i n the p o l i t i c a l realm where there i s much more c o n f l i c t  about  the o b j e c t i v e s o f the o r g a n i z a t i o n than would be found i n a large business corporation.  And whether,  therefore,  the consensus r u l e which i s so fundamental to the democratic c h a r a c t e r of h i s system c o u l d r e a l l y be maintained. even without such a r u l e , Thayer's system i s s t i l l  But radically  democratic and c l e a r l y comes c l o s e s t t o the attempt t o provide  f o r the o p p o r t u n i t y  o f r a t i o n a l d i s c u s s i o n and  decision-making by a l l p a r t i c i p a n t s .  For Thayer i s  c e r t a i n l y r i g h t i n h i s assumption t h a t the most meaningful form of p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s i n the small n o n - h i e r a r c h i a l groups of h i s model.  And he i s c e r t a i n l y r i g h t ,  t h a t f o r l a r g e r s t r u c t u r e s to be genuinely they must be based on s m a l l group With an a d d i t i o n a l emphasis  participative,  participation. on d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n (such  as advocated i n t h i s thesis)] such a p l a n may that u n r e a l i s t i c .  therefore,  not be a l l  Thayer's c l a i m t h a t such forms, without  t h e i r e x p l i c i t e g a l i t a r i a n aspects,  c o n s t i t u t e the backbone  173 of c u r r e n t economic o r g a n i z a t i o n s i s a b o l d c l a i m .  But  h i s own r o l e i n management and as an o r g a n i z a t i o n t h e o r i s t adds some weight t o h i s c l a i m .  The theory i s c l e a r l y i n  l i n e with much c u r r e n t o r g a n i z a t i o n a l t h i n k i n g and would seem t o be an i m a g i n a t i v e and b r i l l i a n t account o f ah a l t e r n a t i v e to a l l e x i s t i n g forms o f economic and p o l i t i c a l organization. One l a s t p o i n t needs mentioning.  Thayer emphasizes  consensus and p a r t i c i p a t i o n as the goal o f p o l i t i c s . f e e l s t h i s ideal' i s r e a l i z a b l e only i f 1. e f f o r t t o reduce competition i n both p o l i t i c a l sphere;  and  2.  He  we make every  the economic and the  we achieve economic abundancy*  by d i v o r c i n g income from work, e l i m i n a t i n g a d v e r t i s i n g and encouraging  alternative satisfactions  in this thesis).  (as has been argued  I have s a i d a great d e a l about a d v e r t i s i n g  and the encouragement o f a l t e r n a t i v e s a t i s f a c t i o n s , b u t some remarks a r e a p p r o p r i a t e about r e d u c i n g c o m p e t i t i o n . holds t h a t one of the primary  Thayer  e v i l s o f the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  system i s i t s competitive n a t u r e :  f o r a g r e a t deal of h o s t i -  l i t y must be c r e a t e d i n o r d e r t o move candidates t o the e f f o r t t h a t such competition r e q u i r e s .  and v o t e r s  Such a c t i v i t y  i s c l e a r l y incompatible with the goal o f harmony, s o l i d a r i t y , and community concern  t h a t Thayer takes t o be the i d e a l o f  politics. In the economic sphere, too l i t t l e ,  about which I have s a i d a l l  Thayer argues t h a t '  1.  competition i s  *I c o u l d have s a i d here "a sense o f economic abundancy" but t h i s obscures the p o i n t t h a t past a bare minimum "abundancy" i s i n the eye o f the beholder.  174  g r a d u a l l y d i s a p p e a r i n g anyway because i t i s i n e f f i c i e n t , 2. non-competitive o r g a n i z a t i o n s do not atrophy any more f r e q u e n t l y than do c o m p e t i t i v e ones, and 3. c o m p e t i t i o n produces the growth m e n t a l i t y which has become e c o l o g i c a l l y untenable.  Thayer i s extremely c r i t i c a l o f both the g u i l d  s o c i a l i s t and Yugoslav experiments f o r t h e i r emphasis on economic  d i v i s i o n s and acceptance o f c o m p e t i t i o n among  producers. thee, emphasis  Although p o l i t i c s has the g o a l o f u n i t y , \ . i n economics  on i n d i v i d u a l o r c o l l e c t i v e  can o n l y r e s u l t i n d i s u n i t y — w i t h an i n e v i t a b l e of the p o l i t i c a l realm.  gain  disruption  P a r t i c i p a t i o n by i t s e l f  cannot  produce the i d e a l s o f c o o p e r a t i o n and s o l i d a r i t y without a concomitant change i n the economic  structure.  T h i s l a t t e r c l a i m i s d r a m a t i c a l l y supported by v a r i o u s accounts o f " p a r t i c i p a t i v e " experiments i n attempts t o r e o r g a n i z e and conserve farmland i n the American midwest. These experiments i n e v i t a b l y r e s u l t e d i n the l a r g e r farmers having maximum i n p u t and i n f l u e n c e .  As a r e s u l t ,  such  attempts produced even g r e a t e r d e s t r u c t i o n of farmlands and communities.  As W. R. Burch remarks,  summarizing  a review o f v a r i o u s p o l i t i c a l e f f o r t s f o r c o n s e r v a t i o n , "The emphasis  upon p l a c i n g governance  i n l o c a l hand i s  l i k e l y t o conserve p r e v a i l i n g p a t t e r n s o f d i s t r i b u t i o n r a t h e r than r e s o u r c e s . . . " (Burch, p. 132). Even the Greeks r e c o g n i z e d the problem which i s a d d r e s s i n g , v i z . t h a t the e c o n o m i c a l l y eminent have a preponderant i n f l u e n c e i n a democratic  Burch will  assembly.  175  In order  to guard a g a i n s t t h i s f a c t o r d e s t r o y i n g  democratic c h a r a c t e r  the  of t h e i r government, the Athenians  chose t h e i r committees not by e l e c t i o n , but by  lot.  assured t h a t everyone, not  r i c h , would  serve  i n the government.  j u s t the famous and They a l s o p r o v i d e d  f o r attendance a t the g e n e r a l and  This  a small  stipend  assembly which both encouraged  f a c i l i t a t e d attendance by the poorer c i t i z e n s .  While  t h i s i s not the k i n d o f s o l u t i o n t h a t Thayer recommends, i t does support h i s c l a i m t h a t the economic i n e q u i t i e s and  competition  institutions.  can As  serve  to work a g a i n s t  democratic  a r e s u l t , mere r e f o r m a t i o n  governmental sphere may  of  the  not y i e l d the hoped f o r b e n e f i t s  t h a t p a r t i c i p a t i o n promises.  Indeed, l i k e the use  g e s t a l t techniques i n b u s i n e s s a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  of  the r e s u l t  of p a r t i c i p a t i o n without economic reform might w e l l be f u r t h e r i n t r e n c h the a l r e a d y  e x i s t i n g imbalances of power.  Thayer's s o l u t i o n o b v i o u s l y s a t i s f y i n g the.  „ ideal .of'  comes c l o s e s t to  .'."" ,] p a r t i c i p a t o r y democracy.  In f a c t , i t meets a l l the c r i t e r i a to an extent u n l i k e l y for a p r a c t i c a l proposal. o b j e c t i o n t h a t one  to  t h a t seems  As a r e s u l t , the main  i s i n c l i n e d to o f f e r i s t h a t i t simply  c o u l d not work: the p r o l i f e r a t i o n of committees would be astronomical,  the d e c i s i o n procedure i n c r e d i b l y slow,  and  the r e s u l t , t o t a l economic d i s i n t e g r a t i o n . But Thayer's s t r e n g t h  i s i n h i s c l a i m t h a t a very  s i m i l a r s t r u c t u r e i s c u r r e n t l y u t i l i z e d i n many b u s i n e s s e s  176  and  h i g h l e v e l government a d m i n i s t r a t i o n .  i s true, the  then the  I f such a  e f f i c i e n c y argument can  be  refuted,  e x t e n s i v e problem of i n t e r r e l a t i n g economic and  u n i t s without i n v o l v i n g  claim leaving political  everyone i n continuous committee  meetings. CONCLUSION The  t h r e e plans o f f e r good reason f o r r e j e c t i n g M i l l ' s  dilemma* of the or the  i m p o s s i b l e i d e a l of small s c a l e  participation  " p r a c t i c a l " s o l u t i o n of r e p r e s e n t a t i v e government.  C l e a r l y there are t i c i p a t i o n and  a v a r i e t y of ways f o r i n c r e a s i n g  s t i l l having e f f i c i e n t government.  parWhile  the Yugoslav system i s most i n t e r e s t i n g because of i t s r e a l i t y , the Thayer a l t e r n a t i v e p r o v i d e s the most e x c i t i n g p l a n because i t comes c l o s e s t to s a t i s f y i n g the p a r t i c i p a t i o n , and  takes most thoroughly i n t o account  c u r r e n t knowledge of p s y c h o l o g i c a l r e a l i t i e s involved i z a t i o n and  claim  a l i e n a t i n g and  a variant  Coupled w i t h  of ch.  VI  decentralhas  a l t e r n a t i v e to  undemocratic aspects of the  end  the  sociological  of Thayer's system  t o being a p l a u s i b l e  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e democracy.  * C i t e d a t the  and  i n group dynamics.  socialism,  an e x c e l l e n t  i d e a l of  the  c u r r e n t form of  177  CONCLUSION  178  The argument has taken us very f a r from of g l o b a l d e s t r u c t i o n t r i a l democracy.  considerations  to the p o s s i b l e s t r u c t u r e s o f an  I t i s time t o summarize.  has been the e c o l o g i c a l p r e s e r v a t i o n  My b a s i c  and the s o c i a l  indus-  concern structure  which would be conducive t o a happy and long enduring '• r e l a t i o n s h i p with nature.  While c o n c e n t r a t i n g  patory democracy, I have t r i e d to work i n t o my considerations  of e c o l o g i c a l well-being.  on p a r t i c i argument  I have  tried,  i n a sense, t o weave a s o l u t i o n t o the e c o l o g i c a l c r i s i s with p a r t i c i p a t o r y democracy as the woof and e c o l o g i c a l harmony as the warp: e c o l o g i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  give the  form t o the argument; p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s the substance. But  another way  to see the argument i s t o see t h a t  the environmental problems-, so r e c e n t l y brought t o our a t t e n t i o n , are r e a l l y i n s t a n c e s  o f a more  general  problem: namely, t h e " f a i l u r e o f western democracy to p r o v i d e adequately f o r the p u b l i c good.  The  ideology  of i n d i v i d u a l i s m , l a i s s e z f a i r e economics, r e p r e s e n t a t i v e democracy, and even our narrow conception o f freedom have a l l c o n t r i b u t e d and environmental i l l s All  to the k i n d s o f s o c i a l  to which we are c u r r e n t l y  these i d e o l o g i e s have l a r g e l y ignored  s i d e of the human p e r s o n a l i t y . but  the general  The i l l s ,  subject.  the p u b l i c of course, are many  problem of the f a i l u r e t o f u l l y develop the  p u b l i c s i d e o f s o c i e t y a f f e c t s them a l l .  The f a i l u r e t o study  179  democratize the s o c i e t y i s both a cause and an e f f e c t of t h i s underdevelopment of the p u b l i c space.  Commitment  to the p u b l i c w e l l being can o n l y be expected when the p u b l i c i s adequately i n v o l v e d and when the commitment flows n a t u r a l l y from the o r g a n i z a t i o n of the s o c i e t y .  Admittedly,  i r r a t i o n a l commitment such as i s found i n c e r t a i n k i n d s of n a t i o n a l i s m can be promoted without p a r t i c i p a t i o n , but i s c l e a r l y i r r e l e v a n t t o any d e s i r a b l e s o l u t i o n . p a r t i c i p a t i o n the d e s i r a b l e  Why  this is  solution?  The V simplest^V- argument i s t h a t which u n d e r l i e s the argument f o r a l l forms of democracy: people should not be s u b j e c t t o laws v.which they have  not l e g i s l a t e d .  In  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e democracy people are taken to have consented to the procedures and t h e r e f o r e the laws t h a t flow from these procedures.  But p a r t i c i p a t o r y democracy takes more s e r i o u s l y  t h i s b a s i c democratic t e n e t and demands t h a t people be i n v o l v e d i n the d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s e s to which  they are s u b j e c t .  P a r t i c i p a t i o n leans towards Rousseau's i d e a l where co- . o r d i n a t i o n i s a c h i e v e d and y e t each obeys o n l y h i m s e l f . T h i s t r a d i t i o n a l argument i s supported by the c l a i m e x p l i c i t y put f o r t h  by M i l l and Rousseau t h a t  participation  has an.educative and m o r a l l y u p l i f t i n g e f f e c t on the part i c i p a n t s : : i t c r e a t e s a genuine concern f o r the community. I have focused on t h i s c l a i m , d e v e l o p i n g the p s y c h o l o g i c a l b a s i s and d e t a i l s of i t ,  and "used  i t to support the c l a i m  t h a t p a r t i c i p a t i o n would make people s e n s i t i v e t o e c o l o g i c a l  180  considerations.  The argument i s simply  a. y a r i a n t of M i l l ' s  based on the c l a i m t h a t .ahhealthy environment i s a'paradigm p u b l i c goodn.  The b a s i s of t h i s argument i s the  p s y c h o l o g i c a l c l a i m t h a t people have a strong need f o r public respect  (esteem), and t h a t t h i s need can be used to  promote s o c i a l and e c o l o g i c a l w e l l being  through the use  of p u b l i c forums where commitment to the p u b l i c good earns its  j u s t esteem*. In a d d i t i o n , I have s t r e s s e d what i s becoming  i n c r e a s i n g l y c l e a r t o everyone: n a t u r a l l i m i t a t i o n s T. will  . r e s u l t i n increased  social control.  If this i s  not to mean even more h i e r a r c h i c a l government and the a n n i h i l a t i o n of freedom,then the p e r s o n a l  freedom t h a t i s  s a c r i f i c e d t o s o c i a l and environmental p r e s e r v a t i o n must be r e i n s t i t u t e d i n an assembly where a l l can p a r t i c i p a t e . But p a r t i c i p a t i o n does not simply  provide  for preservation  of autonomy, i t changes the whole q u a l i t y o f the freedom by f o r c i n g p a r t i c i p a n t s to s u b j e c t themselves to c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  FN * The i d e a of a community commited i n i t s i d e a l o g y and through i t s i n s t i t u t i o n s t o e c o l o g i c a l w e l l - b e i n g and economic f r u g a l i t y i s being t r i e d i n many p a r t s of North America a t the moment. A r e c e n t a r t i c l e quotes a new member of one o f these communities (not communes) i n a c l e a r a r t i c u l a t i o n o f the p l a c e t h a t p u b l i c esteem c o u l d p l a y i n reducing consumption. "I t h i n k our changes have been normal f o r a f a m i l y who has j u s t moved to S e c r e t V a l l e y , " say Joan. " I t r e a l l y i s n ' t t h a t hard t o c u t back on your expenses and l i v e b e t t e r when you l i v e i n a community where the keep up w i t h the Joneses i d e a i s r e v e r s e d and a l l your neighbors are t r y i n g to f i n d a way of saving money r a t h e r than spending i t . " (. . .... (Weekend Magazine, Nov. 2 9 , 1 9 7 5 , V o l . 2 5 , no.48., p. 19) .  ;  181  of p u b l i c and t h e r e f o r e e c o l o g i c a l w e l l b e i n g ,  There i s no  guarantee of; course t h a t the assembly w i l l not c o n s t i t u t e i t s e l f another " p r i v a t e " i n t e r e s t group. However i t i s arguable  t h a t the experience of p a r t i c i p a t i o n as i t t u r n s  one's focus away from p e r s o n a l concerns and on t o l a r g e r i s s u e s o f communal w e l l b e i n g w i l l  cause people's concerns  to go beyond even t h a t o f t h e i r community.  But we cannot,  as Gandhi once s a i d , expect t o have a p o l i t i c a l where people w i l l not need t o be good.  system  The g o a l i s t o  o r g a n i z e the s o c i e t y i n ways which w i l l encourage as much goodness  as p o s s i b l e .  F i n a l l y , I have claimed t h a t p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s the a p p r o p r i a t e form o f government f o r a new, e c o l o g i c a l l y sensitive l i f e s t y l e .  Self-government does r e q u i r e a good  d e a l o f human time and energy but o r g a n i z e s our l i v e s on the of  t r u l y human s c a l e away from the l a r g e , inhuman s c a l e the c u r r e n t i n d u s t r i a l o r d e r .  Participation  will  p r o v i d e one o f the a l t e r n a t i v e s a t i s f a c t i o n s t h a t a r e present i n such a l i f e s t y l e :  the s a t i s f a c t i o n o f p u b l i c  happiness. I t i s a l s o o f i n t e r e s t to note t h a t ecology i t s e l f focuses s c i e n t i f i c  a t t e n t i o n away from the l i f e o f the  i n d i v i d u a l organism towards t h a t o f the whole b i o l o g i c a l community and i t s environment.  T h i s concern f o r community  a l s o has i t s p a r a l l e l s i n s o c i a l theory where much o f the s o c i a l breakdown, as evidenced by h i g h r a t e s o f crime,  182  mental i l l n e s s , .etc, i s  being  c o r r e l a t e d w i t h the .breakdown  of; community i n l a r g e urban areas . Csee B l u e p r i n t f o r S u r v i v a l ) . Small y e t d e m o c r a t i c a l l y i n t e l l e c t u a l l y and  a c t i v e communities c o u l d be  emotionally  stimulating while  still  p r o v i d i n g the community t i e s t h a t seem c r u c i a l to well  both  social  being.  ... t h a t we  j  What reasons are there  for believing  c o u l d develop such a t r u l y democratic  society?  F i r s t , there are a growing number of s t u d i e s to show t h a t worker p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s not o n l y compatible w i t h  fairly  large scale organization,  an  i t i n fact constitutes  improvement i n terms of worker s a t i s f a c t i o n and While there are l i m i t s on the range of  productivity.  worker participation c  i n l a r g e i n d u s t r y , the value of such d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n undeniable.  Worker participation."is.• the'-..logical f i r s t  step towards, t r u e d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n process  seems  of s o c i e t y .  Already  -' this  i s • b e g i n n i n g i n such advanced s o c i a l democracies  as Norway and  Sweden.  Secondly, there has been a steady flow of urban d i s s i d e n t s out of the c i t i e s back i n t o the r u r a l areas of North America. ex-urbanites  And  w h i l e i t i s t a k i n g some time f o r these  to f i n d t h e i r r o o t s , we  i n c r e a s i n g l y v i t a l r u r a l c u l t u r e and  can a n t i c i p a t e an an i n c r e a s i n g demand  from the communities f o r l o c a l autonomy.  183  L a s t l y , and  crucially,  i t i s the i n e x o r a b l e  of environmental c o n s t r a i n t s which i s the most reason t o b e l i e v e t h a t we and  c o u l d develop a t r u l y  participative society.  t o be done. being  The  press  press  persuasive democratic  Something i s going t o have  of h i s t o r y i s on the s i d e of  a r a d i c a l change.  •  there  As Murray Bookchin puts i t :  Whatever may have been the v a l i d i t y of l i b e r t a r i a n and n o n - l i b e r t a r i a n views a few y e a r s ago, h i s t o r i c a l development has rendered v i r t u a l l y a l l o b j e c t i o n s to a n a r c h i s t thought meaningless today. The modern c i t y and s t a t e , the massive c o a l - s t e e l t e c h n o l o g y of the I n d u s t r i a l R e v o l u t i o n , the l a t e r , more r a t i o n a l i z e d , systems of mass p r o d u c t i o n and assembly l i n e systems o f l a b o r o r g a n i z a t i o n , the c e n t r a l i z e d n a t i o n , the s t a t e and i t s b u r e a u c r a t i c a p p a r a t u s — a l l have reached their limits. Whatever p r o g r e s s i v e o r l i b e r a t o r y r o l e they may have p o s s e s s e d , they have now become e n t i r e l y r e g r e s s i v e and o p p r e s s i v e . They are r e g r e s s i v e not o n l y because they erode the human s p i r i t and d r a i n the community of a l l i t s c o h e s i v e n e s s , s o l i d a r i t y and e t h i c o - c u l t u r a l s t a n d a r d s ; they are r e g r e s s i v e from an o b j e c t i v e s t a n d p o i n t , from an e c o l o g i c a l s t a n d p o i n t . For they undermine not o n l y the human s p i r i t and the human community but a l s o the v i a b i l i t y of the p l a n e t and a l l l i v i n g t h i n g s on i t . I t cannot be emphasized too s t r o n g l y t h a t the a n a r c h i s t concepts o f a b a l a n c e d community, a f a c e - t o - f a c e democracy, a h u m a n i s t i c t e c h n o l o g y and a d e c e n t r a l i z e d s o c i e t y — t h e s e r i c h l i b e r t a r i a n c o n c e p t s — a r e not o n l y d e s i r a b l e , they are a l s o necessary. They b e l o n g not o n l y to the g r e a t v i s i o n s of man's f u t u r e , they now c o n s t i t u t e the p r e c o n d i t i o n s f o r human s u r v i v a l . Granting  t h a t Bookchin o v e r s t a t e s  q u i t e c l e a r t h a t the  21st  o f the s a m e — " o n l y b i g g e r  and  the case, i t &>s s t i l l  century  i s not going t o be more  better".  The  need to respond  to environmental c o n s t r a i n t s i s almost c e r t a i n to f o r c e some dramatic change on  industrial society.  Of course these  changes c o u l d r e s u l t i n a v a r i e t y of t o t a l i t a r i a n  solutions  t o the problem of imposing the n e c e s s a r y s o c i a l c o n t r o l s .  184  Or, i t c o u l d r e s u l t i n the development o f an economic and s o c i a l order';'that i s a p p r o p r i a t e earth's  resources.  t o the f i n i t u d e o f the  Such an order would be c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by economic d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n and would p r o v i d e an appropriate The  environment f o r t r u l y democratic  institutions.  o b j e c t i o n t h a t p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s i m p r a c t i c a l i n the k i n d  of i n d u s t r i a l s o c i e t y to which we are accustomed  loses  i t s f o r c e when we r e a l i z e t h a t t h i s k i n d o f s o c i e t y i s not p r a c t i c a l i n the ( r e l a t i v e l y short)  itself  long r u n . In  f a c t , one c o u l d argue, r a t h e r than p a r t i c i p a t i o n ' s incomp a t i b i l i t y w i t h l a r g e s c a l e i n d u s t r i a l s o c i e t y being an o b j e c t i o n to p a r t i c i p a t i o n i t i s r e a l l y another o b j e c t i o n to j u s t such a s o c i e t y . While I have not d i s c u s s e d thesis it  China a t l e n g t h i n t h i s  (because China i s not y e t an i n d u s t r a l i z e d society)',  i s extremely encouraging to note t h a t China seems  already thesis.  commited t o the k i n d o f program o u t l i n e d i n my F o r example, she i s working t o p r e s e r v e the r u r a l  d i s t r i b u t i o n o f her p o p u l a t i o n  by spreading  advances throughout the c o u n t r y s i d e ,  her i n d u s t r i a l  and (most i n t e r e s t i n g l y  from my p o i n t :of view) she i s commited t o p r e s e r v i n g an a c t i v e form o f c i t i z e n p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n l o c a l government. The  techniques of s o c i a l management i n China a r e not a l l  i n the t r a d i t i o n o f western democracy, but given of her development, there  i s a remarkable and  admirable emphasis on democracy and p e r s u a s i o n . we i n the west are unable t o save o u r s e l v e s  the l e v e l  profoundly Even i f  from our own  185  d e s t r u c t i o n , there i s i n China  (with one-quarter o f the  world's p o p u l a t i o n ) the hope t h a t a l a r g e p a r t o f the world i s n o t only committed t o , b u t w e l l on i t s way t o a c h i e v i n g , p a r t i c i p a t o r y democracy and environmental harmony. Of course, no one knows what w i l l happen. not an h i s t o r i c a l guarantees. vision:  I am  d e t e r m i n i s t : h i s t o r y presents no  I have t r i e d simply t o p r e s e n t a p l a u s i b l e  the v i s i o n of a s o c i e t y adaptable both t o human  needs and the n a t u r a l environment.  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