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UBC Theses and Dissertations

Ecology and freedom Battersby, Mark E. 1978

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ECOLOGY AND FREEDOM by MARK E. • BATTERSBY B.A. (Honours), New York University, 1967 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS EOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY i n THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY We accept t h i s thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA June, 19 7 8 © Mark E. Battersby In present ing th i s thes i s in p a r t i a l f u l f i lmen t o f the requirements for an advanced degree at the Un ive r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree that the L ibrary sha l l make i t f r e e l y ava i l ab l e for reference and study. I fu r ther agree that permission for extens ive copying of th i s thes i s fo r s cho la r l y purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by h i s representat ives . It i s understood that copying or pub l i c a t i on of th i s thes i s f o r f i nanc i a l gain sha l l not be allowed without my wr i t ten permiss ion. Department of PHILOSOPHY The Un iver s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia 2075 Wesbrook Place Vancouver, Canada V6T 1W5 MARK E. BATTERSBY ( i i ) • ABSTRACT The s o - c a l l e d e c o l o g i c a l c r i s i s c o n s i s t s of the twin problems o f resource exhaustion and p o l l u t i o n . The problems are l a r g e l y the r e s u l t of high and inc r e a s i n g l e v e l s of consumption and production, and do not lend themselves to a t e c h n o l o g i c a l s o l u t i o n . Extensive p o l i t i c a l controls must be imposed to protect the environment, but these controls promise curtailment of t r a d i t i o n a l freedoms of property and l i f e s t y l e . But Rousseau has suggested a s o l u t i o n to the problem of the s o c i a l need f o r co n t r o l and freedom: p a r t i c i p a t o r y democracy. P a r t i c i p a t o r y democracy achieves freedom and cont r o l because decisions are a r r i v e d at c o l l e c t i v e l y and through persuasion, minimizing the need f o r coercive c o n t r o l , and gi v i n g each p a r t i c i p a n t a sense of i d e n t i f i c a t i o n with the deci s i o n making process. P a r t i c i p a t i o n also accords with our understanding of human nature once we free ourselves of the misleading psychologies of Hobbes and Adam Smith. Indeed Bishop Butler, famous f o r h i s r e f u t a t i o n of Hobbes 1 egoism, has also suggested the a l t e r n a t i v e theory that people are s o c i a l l y motivated. John Adams extended t h i s a n alysis to show the fundamental r o l e that the human need f o r p u b l i c esteem plays i n p o l i t i c a l behavior. People need the experience of c i t i z e n s h i p f o r t h e i r s e l f esteem, and p a r t i c i p a t i o n u t i l i z e s t h i s need to encourage dedication to the p u b l i c good. ( i i i ) Environmental p r o t e c t i o n i s a paradigm p u b l i c good and should, therefore, receive adequate support i n a society with extensive p a r t i c i p a t i o n . In a d d i t i o n , p a r t i c i p a t i o n and p u b l i c work provide s a t i s f y i n g a l t e r n a t i v e s to pr i v a t e consumption. Widespread p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n industry i s a p r a c t i c a l p o s s i b i l i t y as has been shown by various experiments i n i n d u s t r i a l democracy and can also work at a nationwide l e v e l as has been demonstrated i n Yugoslavia. In additi o n there are other models f o r widespread p a r t i c i p a t i o n such as that of the Gui l d S o c i a l i s t s and F r e d e r i c Thayer. (iv) TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Introduction 1 Chapter I. The Tragedy of the Commons 13 II . The Concept of P a r t i c i p a t i o n 3-3/ III . Human Nature and Soc i a l Needs 62 IV. John Adams: An Alternative P o l i t i c a l Psychology . 95 V. P a r t i c i p a t i o n and Ecology 109 VI. Experiments i n Par t i c i p a t i o n s 12 3 VII. Large Scale P a r t i c i p a t i o n 147 VIII. Conclusion 177 IX. Bibliography 186 (v) ACKNOWLEDGEMENT Primary acknowledgement for assistance and encouragement must be given to my wife Diana Davidson without whom this thesis would never have been started or f i n i s h e d . I also received assistance and advice from my thesis Advisor, D.G. Brown and from the members of my committee E a r l Winkler and Ed Levy. Thanks also to Andrew Levine for his helping me understand Rousseau and to Elridge Rand f o r introducing to the problem of p a r t i -cipation. 1 I N T R O D U C T I O N The ecology imperative i s becoming clear. As more and more data accumulates i t becomes increasingly obvious that a r a d i c a l change i n the North American l i f e s t y l e i s necessary. The environ-ment can no longer be expected to support the current rates of consumption, resource u t i l i z a t i o n and p o l l u t i o n . The r i c h nations cannot expect to continue t o . l i v e at this scale, nor can the poor nations expect to attain i t . I t i s not enough that we be techni-c a l l y sophisticated, we must also be restrained. While such claims are not uniformly supported by a l l engaged i n research i n ecology, they have received s u f f i c i e n t support from ecologists to have earned for i t the name "subversive science". In the body of my thesis, I take this e c o l o g i c a l imperative for granted and set about finding the most desirable manner of dealing with i t s p o l i t i c a l implications. I assume that we must accept a l i f e s t y l e f a r less dependent on an abundance of private consumer goods f o r i t s s a t i s f a c t i o n s . While such an assumption i s widely supported, i t has also been questioned, and i t seems appropriate i n my introduction to explain why I ignore these objections. Those who do not share t h i s assumption have been c a l l e d "technological optimists" because of t h e i r f a i t h that there e x i s t s , or w i l l e x i s t , technologically feasible solutions to problems such as p o l l u t i o n and the exhaustion of f o s s i l fuels.* The - optimists argue that necessity i s the mother of invention: *A useful c o l l e c t i o n of optimists' writings i s : Thinking About  the Future: A Critique of the Limits to Growth, edited by H.S.D. Cole et a l . 3 mother of invention: as one resource depletes or as one form of p o l l u t i o n becomes too ho r r i b l e to bear, some technological wonder w i l l be discovered or developed to deal with i t . This p o s i t i o n i s also supported by many economists who point out that the mother of many inventions i s money, and that, for example, as a resource becomes scarce, i t s price w i l l r ise /thereby encouraging greater resource Conservation,and replacement by other formerly uneconomic solutions (e.g. the tar sands). Indeed, many economists see the problem of resource exhaustion i n terms not of the disappearance of the resource, but rather i t s becoming f i n a n c i a l l y p r o h i b i t i v e to use as the e a s i l y available supplies of i t are'exhausted. The question b o i l s down to what rate of technological advancement can be reasonably expected. I f we expect a high rate of technological advance, then we can expect that technical solutions w i l l emerge to solve the d i f f i c u l t i e s presented by the former technology. For example, the optimists argue that we can expect the development of a non-po l l u t i n g and inexpensive energy source to replace o i l before o i l resources are exhausted. The optimists can point to the increasing a b i l i t y to extract o i l from formerly impossible sources such as the ar c t i c and the sea, and increasing e f f i c i e n c y of o i l use, and f i n a l l y , the ace-in-the-hole 4 p o s s i b i l i t y of fusion. The pessimist points to the incredible l e v e l of o i l use, the increasing problem of a i r and p a r t i c u l a r l y water p o l l u t i o n , the increasing danger of catr astrophe as o i l i s extracted from more d i f f i c u l t environments, and/ f i n a l l y the i m p o s s i b i l i t y of technique matching the expo-nen t i a l growth rate i n consumption. While the debate seems to involve the issue of f a i t h (in technology and the market economy) as much as i t does reason, there do seem to me to be a number of arguments that t e l l decidedly against the optimists. 1. It was/is technology and the market economy that put us i n the position that we are now i n . This point can cut both ways and l a r g e l y depends on how you f e e l about the current economic and s o c i a l order. But c l e a r l y i t i s the scale of our current productive e f f o r t s that presents the kinds of s i g n i f i c a n t problems that we have today. This i s not to say that such a large scale productive apparatus could not develop the kinds of safeguards, p o l l u t i o n control devices / and alternative fuels necessary for the continued s u r v i v a l of t h i s kind of order, but only to point out they have not done so so far. Nor has the impetus for the solutions come from those with economic and p o l i t i c a l power. 2. But even i f we accept a willingness on the part of those i n power to genuinely deal with the problems, the greater the size and complexity of the productive unit, the 5 more d i f f i c u l t t h e change i s . I n t h e same way, t h e l a r g e r t h e u n i t , t h e more e x t e n s i v e a r e t h e e f f e c t s i n t h e case o f e c o l o g i c a l e r r o r . For example, the l a r g e r t h e t a n k e r , t h e g r e a t e r t h e p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t a t a n k e r c o l l i s i o n w i l l cause e x t e n s i v e e n v i r o n m e n t a l damage. I n g e n e r a l , s i n c e p o l l u t i o n i s e s s e n t i a l l y a problem o f c o n c e n t r a t i o n , t h e more c o n c e n t r a t e d and i n t e n s e p r o d u c t i o n i s , t h e g r e a t e r t h e p r o b a b i l i t y o f p o l l u t i o n , i . e . the g r e a t e r t h e p r o b a b i l i t y o f an e n v i r o n m e n t a l l y i n t o l e r a b l e c o n c e n t r a t i o n o f any s u b s t a n c e . 3. The most s i g n i f i c a n t s t a t e m e n t o f the t e c h n o l o g i c a l p e s s i m i s t s i s t o be found i n The L i m i t s t o Growth. Most c r i t i c s o f t h i s book have p o i n t e d o u t t h e p a u c i t y o f t h e d a t a from w h i c h i t s e x t r a p o l a t i o n s were made and t h e q u e s t i o n a b l e assumptions about the growth r a t e o f t e c h n o l o g y . I t can be shown i n f a c t t h a t t h e p r o j e c t i o n s a r e e x t r e m e l y s e n s i t i v e t o changes i n t h e t e c h n o l o g i c a l growth r a t e , t h e r e b y s u p p o r t i n g t h e c l a i m s o f the t e c h n o -l o g i c a l o p t i m i s t s t h a t The L i m i t s t o Growth i s r a t h e r a r b i t r a r i l y doom o r i e n t e d . But the arguments f o r a more o p t i m i s t i c r a t e o f t e c h n o l o g i c a l growth a r e no b e t t e r founded t h a n t h o s e o f the p e s s i m i s t s . Such a s i t u a t i o n s u g g e s t s t o me a c o n s e r v a t i v e ' s t a n c e toward t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f a t e c h n o l o g i c a l s o l u t i o n and the e x p l o r a t i o n o f a l t e r n a t i v e s o l u t i o n s . 4. I n g e n e r a l , most e c o l o g i s t s admit t h a t we a r e i n a s t a t e o f t e r r i b l e i g n o r a n c e about th e complex systems 6 that characterize our environment. We j u s t cannot say what effects various chemicals and processes w i l l have on the V.; short, and even more c r u c i a l , long run. Ignorance suggests that a conservative stance toward technological solutions i s appropriate. 5. I t should also be noted that even the c r i t i c s of The Limits to Growth study agree that population control i s fundamental to the maintenance and creation of any kind of quality of l i f e f o r a l l countries. And population control, while i t i s f a c i l i t a t e d by new technology, i s essentially a p o l i t i c a l question: i t involves f o r c i n g , and/or persuading people to change t h e i r reproductive patterns. The above are my reasons for r e j e c t i n g the optimists' optimism, but there i s one other, equally fundamental reason, for my r e j e c t i o n of t h e i r f a i t h : my d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n with the current s o c i a l order. As a r e s u l t of this d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n , any solution which offers a p o s i t i v e alternative to the current form of s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l organization and promises a solution to the e c o l o g i c a l imperative i s , to me, a f a r more desirable solution than one which promises to save the environment and maintain the status quo. Nor do I believe that the s o c i a l problems associated with the current welfare state i n North America are unrelated to the e c o l o g i c a l problems we are facing. The general problem might be stated simply (and as a r e s u l t , perhaps misleadingly) as the f a i l u r e to provide f o r the creation of a general w i l l . But such a claim needs elaboration, 7 and i t w i l l receive that i n the body of the thesis. I I . Such are the reasons for my ignoring the p o s s i b i l i t y of any technical solutions to the current problems of population, pollution /and resource exhaustion. In the place of t h i s kind of hope, I w i l l argue that a r a d i c a l decentralization and democratization of both the economic and p o l i t i c a l realms i s the most appropriate response to what I have c a l l e d the ecological imperative. While there are many arguments that can be offered for a decentral i z i n g and democratizing of our s o c i a l system, I w i l l focus primarily on those that are relevant to the ecological concern of my thesis. I w i l l further l i m i t myself to conceptual, psychological and s o c i o l o g i c a l arguments about the p o s s i b i l i t y and d e s i r a b i l i t y of such decen-t r a l i z a t i o n . In doing t h i s , I w i l l ignore many p r a c t i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s that are related to introducing such a scheme i n our society. I do suggest some possible forms, but the d e t a i l s of such a project must in e v i t a b l y be evolved as the program i s implemented. My goal i s to outline some of the p r i n c i p l e s of democratization and the reasons for b e l i e v i n g such a project i s worthwhile and in accord with human nature. In addition, I w i l l focus primarily on the philosophical question of freedom and autonomy, ignoring other important concerns such as j u s t i c e . To begin my argument, I w i l l discuss, i n Chapter I, the excellent and extremely well known a r t i c l e ; by G i l b e r t 8 Hardin, "The Tragedy of the Commons". This a r t i c l e i s i t s e l f a repudiation of t e c h n i c a l solutions to the population problem and the proposal of a p o l i t i c a l s o l u t i o n . I w i l l c r i t i c i z e Hardin's argument for i t s prefunctory treatment of the problem of freedom. In doing so, I w i l l show how Hardin's "Tragedy 7 of the Commons" i s r e a l l y the old tragedy of the state of nature described by s o c i a l contract t h e o r i s t s . But the state of nature problem, the c o l l e c t i v e destruction of a l l by a l l , i s not l i m i t e d to some hypothetical pre-government state: the problem i s ubiquitous. Ecology i s j u s t one area i n which we are coming to r e a l i z e that the a c t i v i t y of s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d i n d i v i d u a l s can r e s u l t i n t h e i r c o l l e c t i v e s e l f defeat i f adequate provision for control i s not made. The examples here are not only Hardin's farmers, but the average commutor. In coming to grips with t h i s problem, Hardin o f f e r s what I consider a f a r too Hobbesian so l u t i o n , and I o f f e r i n i t s place the more or less Rousseauean so l u t i o n of par-t i c i p a t o r y democracy. In Chapter I I , I elaborate the concept of p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n d i c a t i n g the way i n which Rousseau thought a p a r t i c i p a t o r y democracy would protect us from c o l l e c t i v e s e l f destruction and preserve our freedom. While Rousseau's account i s very suggestive i t i s not f i n a l l y convincing, and I develop my own elaboration of the virtues of p a r t i c i p a t i o n , demonstrating a way i n which p a r t i c i p a t i o n expands the realm of freedom. 9 But freedom i s not the only virt u e possessed by p a r t i c i -pation, and i n Chapter II I also outline the es s e n t i a l q u a l i t y of c o l l e c t i v e respect for the in d i v i d u a l that underlies a parti c i p a t o r y government. In the remainder of the thesis I argue f o r decentralization and extensive p a r t i c i p a t i o n as a means of meeting the eco l o g i c a l demand f o r greater control, diversity,and!decentralization of i n d u s t r i a l and a r g r i c u l t u r a l a c t i v i t y . In addition I argue that p a r t i c i p a t i o n would (1) encourage i n individuals the kind of communal concern that i s supportive of environmental protection, (2) provide a l t e r -native s a t i s f a c t i o n s to some of the current pleasures of private consumption, and (3) produce a happier and more humane s o c i a l environment conducive to the f u l l e s t development of human c a p a b i l i t i e s . These claims are summarized and elaborated i n Chapter V, but before developing them I thought i t wise to clear the ground. Chapter III i s therefore an attack on the theory of psychological egoism and homo economicus which l i e s behind the ideology of the current economic order. I be-gin the attack with Bishop Butler's famous arguments against Hobbes, and.also use some of his insights to s t a r t the development of an alternative view of human nature. Rather than take human wants as given (and i n f i n i t e ) , I argue for the almost platitudinous position that wants are largely s o c i a l l y determined. The main mechanism of this determination, I argue, i s the fundamental desire that humans have to be esteemed by th e i r fellows, the desire to count i n t h e i r s o c i a l environment. Unlike the 10 desire for wealth, t h i s desire i s d i r e c t l y p o l i t i c a l , and in Chapter IV I proceed, with the help of John Adams, to develop an argument for p a r t i c i p a t i o n on the basis of the desire for esteem. This desire I argue i s la r g e l y misshaped by the current order into the phenomenon of conspicuous consumption, causing an endless demand on the system for the production of status symbols. By providing for extensive p a r t i c i p a t i o n , my system would provide the genuine out l e t f o r t h i s desire and an e c o l o g i c a l l y useful and " l i g h t " one at that. Resting on the argument of my p o l i t i c a l psychology, I then go on i n Chapter V to develop the arguments c i t e d above i n favor of decentralization and p a r t i c i p a t i o n as the means to environmental preservation and s o c i a l well being. In the subsequent chapter, I o f f e r a summary of some of the recent research into i n d u s t r i a l democracy which supports the claims made i n Chapter I I , I I I , IV, and V. The research c l e a r l y supports the position that i n d u s t r i a l democracy i s feasi b l e and favored by the workers. There i s also evidence to show that greater p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s correlated with a greater sense of s e l f esteem—a r e s u l t which supports my fundamental psychological claim. And f i n a l l y . i n the l a s t chapter, I suggest some possible ways of i n s t i t u t i n g widespread p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n an i n d u s t r i a l society and review the schemes of the gu i l d s o c i a l i s t s , Yugoslavs, and Frederick Thayer. 11 The l a s t two chapters constitute something of an e f f o r t to give empirical support to my thesis and probably need some j u s t i f i c a t i o n for t h e i r place i n a philosophy thesis. This j u s t i f i c a t i o n comes, I believe, from the fact that I am making a " p o l i t i c a l argument". I see a p o l i t i c a l argument as in e v i t a b l y involving a mixture of empirical and normative considerations, and as a r e s u l t , , i n e v i t a b l y f a l l i n g into a kind of academic limbo between the s o c i a l sciences and philosophy. Nonetheless, i t i s well within the t r a d i t i o n of p o l i t i c a l philosophy to mix just such considerations. A l l p o l i t i c a l philosophies of i n t e r e s t have had at t h e i r base c e r t a i n assumptions about human nature, both as to i t s psychological constituents and i t s normative implications; a l l have rested on theories about the re l a t i o n s h i p of i n d i v i d u a l p e r s o n a l i t i e s to the s o c i a l structure. I have t r i e d to keep these d i f f e r e n t aspects of the problem clear, but I did not wish to abandon the empirical one- simply because I could actually c a l l upon some s o c i o l o g i c a l r e s u l t s . The only difference between my sociology and that of Hobbes or M i l l , i s that I can actually refer to some data where they were forced to use speculation and "casual empiricism". Any p o l i t i c a l theory must s t a r t with a psychological and normative theory of human nature. My fundamental normative assumption i s that autonomy i s c r u c i a l to any notion 12 of a t r u l y human l i f e . As to my psychological assumptions, I argue at length for the e s s e n t i a l l y s o c i a l nature of the human psyche. 13 C H A P T E R I THE TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS 14 I "The T r a g e d y o f t h e Commons" by G a r r e t H a r d i n h as g a i n e d a good d e a l o f eminence i n e c o l o g y c i r c l e s f o r i t s f o r c e f u l p r o n o u n c e m e n t s on t h e p o p u l a t i o n p r o b l e m , b u t t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s o f t h i s e s s a y e x t e n d f a r b e y o n d t h i s i s s u e . I n h i s e s s a y , H a r d i n a r g u e s f o r a l e g i s l a t i v e s o l u t i o n t o t h e p o p u l a t i o n p r o b l e m and an end t o t h e c u r r e n t m o r a l i z i n g a p p r o a c h . He a r g u e s a g a i n s t u s i n g m o r a l p e r s u a s i o n t o r e d u c e t h e b i r t h r a t e on t h e g r o u n d s t h a t : (1) t h e m o r a l i z i n g a p p r o a c h i s s e l f - d e f e a t i n g i n t h a t t h o s e who a r e v u l n e r a b l e t o m o r a l p e r s u a s i o n w i l l u n d e r b r e e d i n r e l a t i o n t o t h o s e who a r e m o r a l l y i n d i f f e r e n t ; (2) whenever t h e r e i s a c o n f l i c t between a person 1 s ' i n t e r e s t and t h e i n t e r e s t o f t h e community, t h o s e who a r e p e r s u a d e d t o a c t f o r t h e good o f t h e community a r e n o t s u p p o r t e d by t h e community b u t a r e s e e n as f o o l i s h , ' and (3) c o n t r o l t h r o u g h m o r a l p r e s s u r e and g u i l t i s a n x i e t y p r o d u c i n g and p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y d e s t r u c t i v e . I n s t e a d o f t r y i n g t o p e r s u a d e p e o p l e t o r e s t r i c t t h e i r p r o c r e a t i o n , H a r d i n recommends t h a t we i n s t i t u t e some f o r m o f m u t u a l l y a g r e e d upon c o e r c i o n t o e n s u r e t h a t t h e y do. The a l t e r n a t i v e as he s e e s i t i s t h e " t r a g e d y o f t h e commons". The t r a g e d y o f t h e commons i s t h e r e s u l t o f e v e r y o n e a c t i n g " r a t i o n a l l y " i n t h e i r own s e l f - i n t e r e s t and t h e r e b y d e s t r o y i n g t h e commons t h r o u g h o v e r u s e . To i l l u s t r a t e h i s p o i n t , H a r d i n c i t e s t h e examples o f o v e r - g r a z i n g o f a common p a s t u r e and t h e c u r r e n t w o r l d w ide s l a u g h t e r o f w h a l e s t o t h e p o i n t o f e x t i n c t i o n . B u t one need h a r d l y s e a r c h a b r o a d f o r p r o b l e m s o f 15 t h i s k i n d . I am r e m i n d e d o f a c o n s t a n t l y r e c u r r i n g p r o b l e m i n my own home. F r u i t , e n o r m o u s l y p o p u l a r w i t h t h e c h i l d r e n i s b o u g h t i n b u l k once a week. I f t h e f r u i t i s t o l a s t t o t h e end o f t h e week, e a c h p e r s o n must r e s t r a i n h i s o r h e r c o n s u m p t i o n . On t h e o t h e r hand, e v e n i f o n l y one p e r s o n i s u n r e s t r a i n e d , t h e f r u i t w i l l r u n o u t p r e m a t u r e l y and e v e r y o n e e l s e w i l l n o t g e t t h e i r s h a r e . So as so o n as any i n d i v i d u a l s t a r t s " o v e r - e a t i n g " , t h e r e i s a w h o l e s a l e a s s a u l t on t h e r e s e r v e s . The r e s u l t i s t h a t a s u p p l y o f f r u i t w h i c h , i f e a t e n m o d e r a t e l y , w o u l d l a s t t h e week, u s u a l l y d i s a p p e a r s i n t h r e e o r f o u r d a y s . Any c h i l d who i s i m p r e s s e d w i t h t h e m o r a l arguments f o r m o d e r a t i o n s i m p l y goes w i t h o u t h i s o r h e r f a i r s h a r e o f t h e f r u i t : a r e s u l t t h a t i s h a r d l y a p t t o e n c o u r a g e m o r a l o r community o r i e n t e d b e h a v i o r . W h i l e H a r d i n ' s a n a l y s i s i s i n c i s i v e , i t i s h a r d l y a new one. He a p p e a l s t o t h e who l e gamut o f arguments u s e d by s o c i a l c o n t r a c t t h e o r i s t s i n t h e 1 8 t h c e n t u r y . To q u o t e R o u s s e a u ( i n a r e m a r k a b l y c o n t e m p o r a r y p a s s a g e ) : T h i s i s my p r e m i s e : men have r e a c h e d a p o i n t where t h e o b s t a c l e s h i n d e r i n g t h e i r p r e s e r v a t i o n i n t h e s t a t e o f n a t u r e a r e so o b s t r u c t i v e as t o d e f y t h e r e s o u r c e s t h a t e a c h i n d i v i d u a l , w h i l e i n t h a t s t a t e , c a n d e v o t e t o h i s p r e s e r v a t i o n . T h i s b e i n g t h e c a s e , t h a t p r i m i t i v e c o n d i t i o n c a n n o t c o n t i n u e : human k i n d w o u l d p e r i s h i f i t d i d n o t change i t s way o f l i f e , (my i t a l i c s ) ( R o u sseau p.17) The change t h a t R o u s s e a u s e e s as n e c e s s a r y i s t o l e a v e t h e " s t a t e o f n a t u r e " and t o f o r m a s o c i a l c o n t r a c t . As he p u t s 16 i t : Now u n a b l e as t h e y a r e t o add t o t h e i r r e s o u r c e s , men c a n o n l y combine and c h a n n e l t h o s e r e s o u r c e s t h a t a r e a t h a nd. Thus t h e i r s o l e means o f p r e s e r v i n g t h e m s e l v e s f r o m now on i s t o c r e a t e a p o o l o f r e s o u r c e s c a p a b l e o f s u r m o u n t i n g t h e o b s t a c l e s , t o s e t t h o s e r e s o u r c e s t o work i n r e s p o n s e t o one and t h e same p u r p o s e , and t o see t o i t t h a t t h e y a c t i n c o n c e r t . ( I b i d . pp.. 17-18). As I u n d e r s t a n d t h e s e two p a s s a g e s , R o u s s e a u i s a r g u i n g t h a t t h e n e e d f o r t h e s o c i a l c o n t r a c t a r i s e o u t o f t h e i m p e n d i n g d e s t r u c t i o n o f a l l by a l l r e s u l t i n g f r o m e a c h p e r s o n ' s a c t i n g i n h i s own s e l f o r p r i v a t e i n t e r e s t . F o r H a r d i n , t h i s i s t h e t r a g e d y o f t h e commons; f o r R o u s s e a u , t h i s i s t h e s t a t e o f n a t u r e . F o r b o t h o f them, t h e s o l u t i o n i s m u t u a l l y a g r e e d upon c o e r c i o n . B u t R o u s s e a u and H a r d i n a r e h a r d l y t h e o n l y a u t h o r s t o n o t e t h i s p r o b l e m . B e s i d e s b e i n g t h e f u n d a m e n t a l argument i n t h e s o c i a l c o n t r a c t t h e o r i s t s ' b r i e f , i t has r e c e i v e d i m p o r t a n t and sophisticated: a n a l y s i s i n e c o n o m i c t h e o r y . T h i s p r o b l e m i s o f g r e a t s i g n i f i c a n c e t o e c o n o m i c t h e o r y b e c a u s e i t i s a f u n d a m e n t a l c l a i m o f l a i s s e z f a i r e e c o n o m i c s t h a t t h e m a r k e t s e r v e s t o c o - o r d i n a t e ( v i a t h e famous " i n v i s i b l e hand") p e o p l e ' s p u r s u i t o f p r i v a t e i n t e r e s t i n s u c h a way t h a t n o t o n l y does t h i s p u r s u i t n o t r e s u l t i n t h e d e f e a t o f a l l by a l l , b u t r a t h e r i n t h e b e t t e r m e n t o f a l l by a l l . Any argument w h i c h w i l l show t h a t i n c e r t a i n a r e a s t h e m a r k e t d o e s n o t s e r v e t h e interests of i t s participants i s of fundamental importance. And while economists have noted this problem., i t has not received the attention that i s appropriate to i t s s i g n i f i -cance. For the significance of this problem depends on what place i n importance one gives to our common possessions. I f well being i s assessed i n terms of the qual i t y and value of personal possessions, then the commons becomes important only when i t s "destruction" threatens our personal goods, or f i n a l l y i n our case, our l i v e s . But increasing production and increasing density of population has forced upon us the r e a l i z a t i o n of the extent to which we l i v e i n a commons of a i r , water and community environment. The f a i l u r e of the market looms larger and larger. But i t i s not only i n this area that the market f a i l s to co-ordinate i n d i v i d u a l beha-viour i n the i n t e r e s t of i t s pa r t i c i p a n t s . Though hardly the f i r s t to point put that the free market w i l l not serve the in t e r e s t of the working class, J.S. M i l l does o f f e r an illuminating;- account of the way i n which the free market w i l l tend to frustrate workers' e f f o r t s to improve t h e i r condition. In a chapter on the areas of the economy i n which government interference i s j u s t i f i e d M i l l writes: Let us suppose, what i s at le a s t supposeable, whether i t be the fa c t or not--that a general reduction of 18 t h e h o u r s o f f a c t o r y l a b o u r , s a y f r o m t e n t o n i n e , w o u l d be f o r t h e a d v a n t a g e o f t h e w o r k - p e o p l e : t h a t t h e y w o u l d r e c e i v e as h i g h wages, .or n e a r l y as h i g h , f o r n i n e h o u r s l a b o u r as t h e y r e c e i v e f o r t e n . I f t h i s w o u l d be t h e r e s u l t , and i f t h e o p e r a t i v e s g e n e r a l l y a r e c o n v i n c e d t h a t i t w o u l d , t h e l i m i t a t i o n some may s a y , w i l l be a d o p t e d s p o n t a n e o u s l y . I answer, t h a t i t w i l l n o t be a d o p t e d u n l e s s t h e body o f o p e r a t i v e s b i n d t h e m s e l v e s t o one a n o t h e r t o a b i d e by i t . A workman who r e f u s e d t o work more t h a n n i n e h o u r s w h i l e t h e r e were o t h e r s who w o rked t e n , w o u l d e i t h e r n o t be e m p l o y e d a t a l l , o r i f e m p l o y e d must s u b m i t t o l o s e o n e - t e n t h o f h i s wages. However c o n v i n c e d , t h e r e f o r e , he may be t h a t i t i s t h e i n t e r e s t o f t h e c l a s s t o work s h o r t t i m e , i t i s c o n t r a r y t o h i s own i n t e r e s t t o s e t t h e example, u n l e s s he i s w e l l a s s u r e d t h a t a l l o r most o t h e r s w i l l f o l l o w i t . B u t s u p p o s e a g e n e r a l a greement o f t h e whole c l a s s : m i g h t n o t t h i s be e f f e c t u a l w i t h o u t t h e s a n c t i o n o f law? Not u n l e s s e n f o r c e d by o p i n i o n :,with a r i g o u r p r a c t i c a l l y e q u a l t o t h a t o f law. F o r however b e n e f i c i a l t h e o b s e r v a n c e o f t h e r e g u l a t i o n m i g h t be t o t h e c l a s s c o l l e c t i v e l y , t h e i m m e d i a t e i n t e r e s t o f e v e r y i n d i v i d u a l w o u l d l i e i n v i o l a t i n g i t : and t h e more numerous t h o s e were who a d h e r e d t o t h e r u l e , t h e more w o u l d i n d i v i d u a l s g a i n by d e p a r t -i n g f r o m i t . I f n e a r l y a l l r e s t r i c t e d t h e m s e l v e s t o n i n e h o u r s , t h o s e who c h o s e t o work f o r t e n w o u l d g a i n a l l t h e a d v a n t a g e s o f t h e r e s t r i c t i o n t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e p r o f i t o f i n f r i n g i n g i t ; t h e y w o u l d g e t t e n h o u r s ' wage f o r 1 n i n e h o u r s work, and 'an h o u r ' s ' w a g e s b e s i d e s . I g r a n t t h a t i f a l a r g e m a j o r i t y a d h e r e d t o t h e ' n i n e ' h o u r s , t h e r e w o u l d be no harm done: t h e b e n e f i t w o u l d be, i n t h e main, s e c u r e d t o t h e c l a s s , w h i l e t h o s e i n d i v i d u a l s who p r e f e r r e d t o work h a r d e r and e a r n more, w o u l d have an o p p o r t u n i t y o f d o i n g s o . T h i s c e r t a i n l y w o u l d be t h e s t a t e o f t h i n g s t o be w i s h e d f o r ; and a s s u m i n g t h a t a r e d u c t i o n o f h o u r s w i t h o u t any d i m i n u t i o n o f wages c o u l d t a k e p l a c e w i t h o u t e x p e l l i n g t h e commodity f r o m some o f i t s m a r k e t s - w h i c h i s i n e v e r y p a r t i c u l a r i n s t a n c e a q u e s t i o n o f f a c t , n o t 19 of principle-the manner i n which i t would be most desirable that t h i s e f f e c t should be brought about, would be by a quiet change i n the general custom of the trade; short hours becoming, by spontaneous choice, the general practice, but those who chose to deviate from i t having the f u l l e s t l i b e r t y to do so. Probably, however, so many would prefer the ten hours work on the improved terms, that the l i m i t a t i o n could not be maintained as a general p r a c t i c e : what some did from choice, others would soon be obliged to do from necessity, and those who had chosen long hours for the sake of increased wages, would be forced i n the end to work long hours for no greater wages than before. Assuming then that i t r e a l l y would be the i n t e r e s t of each to work only nine hours i f he could be assured that a l l others would do the same, there might be no means of t h e i r a t t a i n i n g t h i s object but by converting t h e i r supposed mutual agreement into an engagement under penalty, by consenting to have i t enforced by law. I am not express-ing any opinion i n favour of such an enactment, which has never i n t h i s country been demanded, and which I c e r t a i n l y should not, i n present circumstances recommend: but i t serves to exemplify the manner i n which classes of persons may need the assistance of law, to give e f f e c t to t h e i r deliberate c o l l e c t i v e opinion of t h e i r own i n t e r e s t , by affording to every i n d i v i d u a l a guarantee that his competitors w i l l pursue the same course, without which he cannot safely adopt i t himself. ( M i l l , 1965, p. 956-8) M i l l ' s point extends far beyond the issue of closed shop as he i s f u l l y aware. He argues that there i s a whole range of ...matter i n which the interference of law i s required, not to overrule the judgment of individuals respecting t h e i r own i n t e r e s t , but to give e f f e c t to that judgment: they being unable to give e f f e c t to i t except by concert, which concert again cannot be e f f e c t u a l unless i t receives v a l i d i t y and sanction from the law. (Ibid, p. 956) 20 And i n support of t h i s contention (which sounds remarkably Rousseauean), he also c i t e s the problem presented by-the free d i s t r i b u t i o n of c o l o n i a l lands (p. 95 8). As a r e s u l t of this system there are no landless workers who can be exploited to provide for transportation f a c i l i t i e s (and other public n e c e s s i t i e s ) , with the r e s u l t that the owners have no adequate means of getting t h e i r goods to market, and a l l lose. This i s the problem again of the under provision and protection of the public good that results from s e l f - i n t e r e s t and a l a i s s e z f a i r e market arrangement. This problem has recently received the renewed attention of Western economists as the r e s u l t of a number of papers by Paul Sarauelson. '•' * But the most useful treatment from my point of view i s that by Mancur Olsen i n his widely discussed book, The  Logic of C o l l e c t i v e Action. Olsen notes that while the concept of public good has been extensively used i n the area of public "•::>. finance few have r e a l i z e d the range of commom goods that can be analyzed using this notion. (Olsen, p.15) While the notion of 'public good1 has become a technical notion i n economic theory, Olsen's work shows that i t s use extends f a r beyond the boundaries of t r a d i t i o n a l economic theory. The technical notion of a 'public good' i s : a good such that i f i t i s provided to any member of a group i t cannot fe a s i b l y be denied to any other member of that group.** This means that once a public good (e.g. defence or clean air) i s provided * See Bibliography **Philosophers would undoubtedly note that being a public good i s a r e l a t i o n a l property, i . e . "being a public good for some group". 2 1 to some members (who may have paid f o r i t ) i t cannot (feasibly) be marketed to (or kept from) others who w i l l s t i l l receive the benefit without the contribution. As a r e s u l t , any i n d i v i d u a l contemplating the provision of some good to himself which inevitably involves supplying i t to others, whether they c o n t r i -bute or not, i s faced with two disincentives f o r doing so: 1. assuming that the costs of any good i s a function of the numbers to which i t i s supplied, the costs of the "public good" w i l l greatly exceed the anticipated benefits for any i n d i v i d u a l supplier; and 2. the i n d i v i d u a l may well gain the benefits without contribution should others choose to provide i t . Indeed, i f o the group i s of any s i z e , the i n d i v i d u a l r e a l i z e s that his contribution w i l l have to be enormous (e.g. Martin Luther King), i f i t s e f f e c t on the provision of the good (e.g. end to segre-gation) i s to be more than n e g l i g i b l e . On the other hand, he stands to r e a l i z e the benefits ( i f there are any) without contribution. The implications of t h i s i n s i g h t are quite extensive. Olsen uses his theory to destroy the latent group theories which are used to j u s t i f y the p l u r a l i s t society. These theories assume that i f some of the group i s s u f f e r i n g , i t w i l l spontaneously form an organization to protect i t s i n t e r e s t . They argue, therefore, that i f there i s no organization to which an i n d i v i d u a l belongs, then the i n d i v i d u a l i s content. But the f a c t i s , that while i t might be i n the group's i n t e r e s t to protect i t s e l f , i t i s not i n any individual's i n t e r e s t to work fo r such a group unless he can be assured (as M i l l points out) of s i m i l a r action by everyone else i n the group. And i n most cases of latent groups, no such assurance i s available. 22 As a r e s u l t , c o l l e c t i v e action requires what Olsen c a l l s selec-tive incentives, e.g. penalties f o r non-cooperation, benefits i from j o i n i n g the group such as cheap auto insurance, or just p l a i n s o c i a l pressure. The e f f e c t of these s e l e c t i v e incentives i s to make i t i n each individual's i n t e r e s t to pay his share of the cost of the c o l l e c t i v e good since without these "selective incentives" the d i r e c t benefit to him of doing so does not exceed his cost. Penalties or rewards, such as the threat-6f j a i l terms i n the case of taxes, are what f i n a l l y make i t i n a person's i n t e r e s t to pay his share. The apathy of the " s i l e n t majority" i s not then a testimony to t h e i r contentment, but very probably a sign of the f a i l u r e of current p o l i t i c a l organization to provide a framework i n which the " s i l e n t " might express t h e i r opinions and desires i n an e f f e c t i v e manner. Given the choice of almost i r r a t i o n a l s e l f -s a c r i f i c e i n the name of some group i n t e r e s t , or quiet acceptance of the status quo, most people w i l l c l e a r l y and r a t i o n a l l y , as Olsen points out, choose silence. Olsen, as I also wish to, extends t h i s argument into the moral realm, arguing that certain actions while morally admirable i f engaged i n by a large number become just p l a i n s i l l y i f engaged in by a single i n d i v i d u a l . S e l f l e s s behavior that has no perceptible e f f e c t i s sometimes not even considered praiseworthy. A man who t r i e d to hold back a flood with a p a i l would probably be considered more of a crank than a saint, even by those he was t r y i n g to help. I t i s no doubt possible i n f i n i t e s i m a l l y to lower: the l e v e l of a r i v e r i n flood with a p a i l , just as i t i s possible f o r a single farmer i n f i n i t e s i m a l l y to rais e prices by l i m i t i n g his production, but i n both cases the e f f e c t i s imperceptible, and those who s a c r i f i c e themselves i n the i n t e r e s t of imper-ceptible improvements may not even receive the praise normally due s e l f l e s s behavior. (Olsen, p. 64) I think that Olsen i s correct i n saying that certain actions supposedly directed towards the common good, are so quixotic that they do not r e a l l y deserve the praise reserved for moral actions. To see this take the case of the farmer who cuts back on produc-tion i n the hopes of reducing supply and r a i s i n g p r i c e s . He hopes to help his fellow farmers get more return f o r t h e i r production, but he i s seen as f o o l i s h because he i s completely i n e f f e c t u a l and only harmful to himself. He i s just l i k e a farmer i n Hardin's story. I f he wishes to preserve the commons, even with t o t a l disregard f o r himself, what actions are open to him? In Rousseau's state of nature, and Hardin's l a i s s e z f a i r e period, the only action open to him i s to reduce his own use of the commons. But this w i l l not preserve the commons, i t w i l l only insure that he goes under before the others. He could of course exhort others to also r e f r a i n from over-using the commons, but as Hardin points out, the l i k e l y r e s u l t of thi s i s that the morally s e n s i t i v e w i l l perish prematurely and the commons w i l l s t i l l go under. I f he r e a l l y wishes to help his fellow common users (and also himself), he must involve'himself in some arrangement so that i t i s i n the s e l f i n t e r e s t of each i n d i v i d u a l to act i n such a way as to preserve the commons. This could be a progressive tax system such that i t became f i n a n c i a l l y i r r a t i o n a l to have more than a certain number of cows out on the commons, or i t could be a law that prescribed the upper l i m i t f or the number of cows each farmer could have on the commons, or we could even, as Hardin suggests, introduce the unjust solution of private property. But this l a s t solution i s simply unavailable for the class of questions with which I wish to deal. We cannot turn the sea or a i r into private property. We cannot make the c o l l e c t i v e 24 environment that results from our private actions, private property. We must i n s t i t u t e some c o l l e c t i v e control.* In other words, nothing less than a p o l i t i c a l arrange-ment involving the other commons users w i l l preserve the commons, and nothing less than working for such an arrangement (and working in such an arrangment) deserves to count as the morally praiseworthy action of working for the good ,of the community. To t r u l y act for the common good, the i n d i v i d u a l must be w i l l i n g to abandon his "natural" l i b e r t y for the benefits of "mutually agreed upon coercion". Clearly such an argument has enormous implications for the t r a d i t i o n a l concern for in d i v i d u a l and economic l i b e r t y : (1) As M i l l points out, government involvement i s j u s t i f i e d i n those areas where the interests of a l l are frustrated by the pursuit of immediate s e l f - i n t e r e s t . (2) A l l provisions of public goods must be the perogative of a government or similar organization with the power to apply selective incentives. The only exception to t h i s would be in the cases of small groups where s o c i a l pressure may serve *Economists treat t h i s problem of common property or non-s p e c i f i c resources d i f f e r e n t l y than the provision of public goods. ' /Non-specific resources present., the problem of providing incentives to conservation ;and public goods ^ present the problem of providing incentive for production or provision of the public good. But such problems seem to me to be two sides.of the same coin: there are simply large areas of our l i f e where there i s no market mechanisms to d i r e c t the indi v i d u a l s ' e f f o r t s towards the community's i n t e r e s t . For ^example: Is the provision of clean a i r a problem of resource use or the public good? At one point i t ' s one, and l a t e r the otherI 25 as the se l e c t i v e incentive. (3) The role of government must be seen not i n the t r a d i t i o n a l l i b e r a l view as a policeman of the market place, but as a po s i t i v e force providing f o r the welfare of a l l through the provision of public goods or constraint on resource exploitations. The power of the preceding argument to cause us to r a d i c a l l y a l t e r our attitudes towards organization and govern-ment i s l i m i t e d only by the l i m i t s to.the range of human endea-vours that are subject to thi s co-ordination problem. M i l l seems to f e e l that this area i s not too extensive given the place he gives the argument i n his whole work. And while Olsen cert a i n l y extends the range of i t s application, even he does not seem to f u l l y r e a l i z e i t s s i g n i f i c a n c e . The range of i t s application i s so broad that we are involved i n i t every time that we step outside our house or apartment. For we l i v e primarily i n a c o l l e c t i v e environment, and while i n this environment we always face the p o s s i b i l i t y of c o l l e c t i v e defeat of a l l by a l l . We are involved i n thi s problem when dealing with a l l the questions of ecology since ecology i s e s s e n t i a l l y concerned with our c o l l e c t i v e environ-ment. We are also involved i n this area with almost any question of s o c i a l organization, e.g. town planning and zoning, public amenities, and transportation (cf. t r a f f i c jams). The argument, i n other words, t o t a l l y undermines the t r a d i t i o n a l emphasis given to the free market as the primary producer of well being. The free market claim i s only plausible i f we conceive of c o l l e c t i v e well being as s t r i c t l y involving 26 the provision and procurement of i n d i v i d u a l consumer goods. But i f we i d e n t i f y well being with "goods" such as fresh a i r , an a e s t h e t i c a l l y pleasing c i t y , convenient and e f f i c i e n t transportation, nice neighborhoods, and eco l o g i c a l preservation, then the free market and the pursuit of in d i v i d u a l s e l f - i n t e r e s t cannot be expected to produce general well being. Given a concern for ecology, t h i s argument i s obviously of enormous sig n i f i c a n c e . But what are we to do about the t r a d i t i o n a l fear and resentment of government a c t i v i t y ? What about the loss of freedom that seems to be entai l e d by the provision and protection of the public good? Must we resign ourselves to the loss of freedom i n order to secure s o c i a l welfare or even possibly human survival? II The questions raised at the end of the previous section have been just those that have worried p o l i t i c a l theorists since Hobbes. Hobbes claimed that nothing less than an a l l powerful central government could save humans from s e l f - d e s t r u c t i o n , and indeed, Hobbes' characteri-zation of the human s i t u a t i o n did not d i f f e r a l l that much from that offered by Hardin. But while Hardin does not accept Hobbes1 dismal solution, his own solution seems to me equally unsatisfactory. I wish to argue, instead, for a solution much along the lines 27 p r o p o s e d by R o u s s e a u i n h i s own argument w i t h Hobbes. And i n o r d e r t o d e v e l o p t h i s argument I w i s h f i r s t t o g i v e H a r d i n ' s argument, compare i t w i t h R o u s s e a u ' s / a n d f i n a l l y u s e t h i s c o m p a r i s o n t o b r i n g o u t my own p o s i t i o n . H a r d i n a r g u e s : " E v e r y new e n c l o s u r e o f t h e commons i n v o l v e s t h e i n f r i n g e m e n t o f somebody's p e r s o n a l l i b e r t y . I n f r i n g e m e n t s made i n t h e d i s t a n t p a s t a r e a c c e p t e d b e c a u s e no c o n t e m p o r a r y c o m p l a i n s o f a l o s s . I t i s t h e new p r o p o s e d i n f r i n g e m e n t s t h a t we v i g o r o u s l y o p p o s e ; c r i e s o f " r i g h t s " and " f r e e d o m " f i l l t h e a i r . B u t what do e s " f r e e d o m " mean? When men m u t u a l l y a g r e e d t o p a s s laws a g a i n s t r o b b i n g , mankind became more f r e e n o t l e s s s o . I n d i v i d u a l s l o c k e d i n t h e l o g i c o f t h e commons a r e f r e e o n l y t o b r i n g u n i v e r s a l r u i n ; once t h e y s e e t h e n e c e s s i t y o f m u t u a l c o e r c i o n t h e y become f r e e t o p u r s u e o t h e r g o a l s . I b e l i e v e t h a t i t was H e g e l who s a i d , "Freedom, i s t h e r e c o g n i t i o n o f n e c e s s i t y " . The most i m p o r t a n t a s p e c t o f n e c e s s i t y t h a t we must now r e c o g n i z e , i s t h e n e c e s s i t y o f a b a n d o n i n g t h e commons i n b r e e d i n g . ...The o n l y way we c a n p r e s e r v e and n u r t u r e o t h e r and more p r e c i o u s f r e e d o m s i s by r e l i n q u i s h i n g t h e f r e e d o m t o b r e e d , and t h a t v e r y s o o n . " ( H a r d i n , p. 1248) I n o t h e r words, w h i l e we g i v e up c e r t a i n p e r s o n a l f r e e d o m s , we i n t u r n r e c e i v e c e r t a i n o t h e r f r e e d o m s , and i n sum a c t u a l l y e x p e r i e n c e an i n c r e a s e i n f r e e d o m . T h i s c l a i m , i n s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t l a n g u a g e ' s a l s o made by R o u s s e a u when he p o i n t s o u t t h a t one o f t h e r e s u l t s o f t h e s o c i a l c o n t r a c t i s a g a i n i n " c i v i l l i b e r t y " w h i c h r e p l a c e s t h e l o s s o f " n a t u r a l l i b e r t y " . As R o u s s e a u p u t s i t : "Man l o s e s , t h r o u g h t h e s o c i a l c o n t r a c t , h i s 28 n a t u r a l l i b e r t y , a l o n g w i t h an u n l i m i t e d r i g h t t o a n y t h i n g t h a t he i s t e m p t e d by and c a n g e t . He g a i n s c i v i l l i b e r t y , a l o n g w i t h o w n e r s h i p o f a l l he p o s s e s s e s . L e s t we f a i l t o g r a s p t h e e x t e n t o f h i s g a i n s , however, we must d i s t i n g u i s h s h a r p l y between n a t u r a l l i b e r t y , w h i c h i s l i m i t e d o n l y by t h e i n d i v i d u a l ' s own powers, and c i v i l l i b e r t y , w h i c h i s l i m i t e d by t h e g e n e r a l w i l l - - a s a l s o between p o s s e s s i o n w h i c h r e s t s e i t h e r upon m i g h t o r upon t h e r i g h t o f t h e f i r s t o c c u p a n t , and o w n e r s h i p , w h i c h c a n h a v e no b a s i s o t h e r t h a n p o s i t i v e t i t l e . " ( I b i d . p. 26-27) " C i v i l l i b e r t y " c a n be compared t o H a r d i n ' s c l a i m a b o u t t h e r o b b e r . By p r o t e c t i n g e v e r y o n e f r o m r o b b e r y , t h e s t a t e p r o v i d e s us w i t h , f o r example, t h e f r e e d o m t o d e p o s i t o u r money i n a bank f o r s a f e - k e e p i n g . The e x i s t e n c e o f t h e s t a t e a s s u r e s t h a t o w n e r s h i p r e s t s on more t h a n t h e power o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l t o . p r o t e c t h i s h o l d i n g . B o t h H a r d i n and R o u s s e a u a r e e m p h a s i z i n g what m i g h t be c a l l e d t h e " c o n s t i t u t i v e " a s p e c t o f l e g i s l a t i o n : t h a t laws c a n a c t u a l l y i n c r e a s e t h e r a n g e o f c h o i c e open t o i n d i v i d u a l s . The r e s u l t o f t h i s c o n -s t i t u t i v e a s p e c t i s t h a t t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f a new law does n o t n e c e s s a r i l y mean a d e c r e a s e i n f r e e d o m - - i t m i g h t w e l l mean an i n c r e a s e . I f a law f a c i l i t a t e s c e r t a i n d e s i r e d a c t i v i t i e s ( e . g . p u t t i n g cows o u t t o p a s t u r e , d r i v i n g c a r s ) , by c o - o r d i n -a t i n g them i n s u c h a way as t o make them p o s s i b l e t o be engaged i n w i t h o u t m u t u a l i n c o n v e n i e n c e o r d e s t r u c t i o n , t h e n t h e law has c l e a r l y i n c r e a s e d i n d i v i d u a l f r e e d o m , n o t l e s s e n e d i t . T h i s k i n d o f t a l k i s h eady s t u f f , e s p e c i a l l y so s i n c e we have no c a l c u l u s f o r c o m p a r i n g q u a n t i t i e s o f f r e e d o m . B u t t h e b a s i c p o i n t w o u l d s t i l l seem t o h o l d , v i z . t h a t some laws, 29 by r e s t r i c t i n g some behavior^ can make possible or increase the safety and ease of other behavior. Indeed i t i s arguable that t h i s i s a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of many laws including most of those found i n the criminal code. One could argue that these laws are aimed at discouraging behavior which in t e r f e r e s with the j u s t i f i e d a c t i v i t y of others and thereby f a c i l i t a t e s these a c t i v i t i e s . But the paradigm case would not be the law against bank robbery (though i t i s important to see the role that the law plays i n providing for the p o s s i b i l i t y of ownership), but something l i k e the t r a f f i c laws. The law which determines which side of the street people are to drive on enormously increases the ease and safety of tr a v e l compared to a s i t u t a t i o n i n which there was no such law (or worse yet, no convention). This i s a good example i n part because the "freedom" l o s t i s one which appeals to no known human desire. Who cares whether we drive on the right or l e f t ? But people do, of course, care to graze as many c a t t l e as they wish, and they w i l l experience r e s t r i c t i o n s on t h e i r grazing p r i v i l e g e s as r e s t r i c t i o n s and loss of freedom. Hardin chooses to deal with t h e i r complaints by suggesting that any new r e s t r i c t i o n raises the cry of freedom, but as long as the law i s necessary i t should not be considered a r e a l loss of freedom. But i f t h i s i s so, then why i s "mutual agreement" important to the coercion? If a law w i l l 30 increase freedom simply because i t i s necessary (a l a Hegel) then from the point of view of freedom i t should make no difference whether the people subject to the law agree to i t or not. The only c r u c i a l point i s that i t i s i n t h e i r i n t e r e s t to do so. I t i s here that Rousseau and myself part company with Hardin. Hardin chose Hegel for his d e f i n i t i o n of freedom because i n his d e f i n i t i o n the source of the law was i r r e l e v a n t to whether i t enhanced or i n h i b i t e d freedom. The law against theft to which Hardin refers increased freedom not because a l l agreed to i t , but because the t h i e f ' s a c t i v i t i e s i n t e r -ferred with the a c t i v i t i e s and freedoms of others. A law against t h e f t declared by a d i c t a t o r would have the same ef f e c t . We can see the extent to which Hardin unwittingly accepts such a notion of freedom by looking at his discussion of taxation. To say that we mutually agree to ...coercion i s not to say that, we are required to enjoy i t , or even to pretend we enjoy i t . Who enjoys taxes? We a l l grumble about them. But we accept compulsory taxes because we recognize that voluntary taxes would favor the conscienceless. We i n s t i t u t e and (grum-blingly) support taxes and other coercive devices to escape the horror of the common. (Hardin, p. 12 4 7) While Hardin does not speak d i r e c t l y to the question, i t seems clear that f o r him "mutual agreement" does not mean " s e l f - l e g -i s l a t i o n " , but rather "grumbling acceptance":, and grumbling acceptance i s hardly freedom. To underline t h i s point i t i s useful to compare our attitude towards taxes to our attitude towards private 31 purchases. Taxes can t h e o r e t i c a l l y be seen as the pri c e we pay for purchases of public goods and, for this-reason, as very s i m i l a r to the p r i c e s we pay for private consumer items. Yet the experience of purchasing consumer items i s usually one of freedom. Except i n times of dramatic i n f l a t i o n , the payment of the pri c e of an object i s usually seen as f a i r and not experienced as an imposition. But taxes are always experienced as the imposition of an a l i e n force. The reason for t h i s i s of course that, on the whole, they are the imposition of an a l i e n force. While representa-t i v e government provides the ra t i o n a l e for claiming that laws passed are the w i l l of the p e o p l e — t h i s claim i s patently f a l s e . One e f f e c t of having t h i s claim i n such dramatic d i s -agreement with the r e a l i t y i s the " t r a d i t i o n a l s k e p t i c a l at-titude towards government that abounds i n a representative democracy. The r e s u l t i s that freedom i s almcst e n t i r e l y associated with freedom from government interference and the enabling and freeing aspect of government i s overlooked. In p a r t i c u l a r the capacity of a form of c o l l e c t i v e decision making to provide us with choices about our c o l l e c t i v e en-vironment i s almost t o t a l l y ignored i n popular discussions about the r e l a t i o n s h i p between freedom and government. While many people w i l l complain about the r e s t r i c t i o n s that zoning laws impose on the i n d i v i d u a l , they are ignoring the f a c t that such zoning laws make possible the choice of 32 neighborhood by assuring that there w i l l be a certain amount of uniformity i n the neighborhood. Indeed,-some of th i s uniformity (usually informally arrived at) i s exactly what constitutes a neighborhood. But even these kinds of choices ( i . e . choices not only about our house, but also-"! about our immediate environment) could also be provided by - i a tyranny. Because of zoning r e s t r i c t i o n s , we do have security and a certain amount of consumer choice, but we do not have the p o l i t i c a l , freedom to actually decide upon the laws that should constitute our neighborhood.* This choice and this freedom can only be provided i f those . subject to laws are also those involved i n t h e i r l e g i s l a t i o n . Only through actually p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n decisions made about the c o l l e c t i v e environment can one enter into c o l l e c t i v e arrangements and s t i l l maintain a sense of freedom. The solution to freedom l o s t i n the name of better coordination i s not simply acceptance of other options (l i k e security or s u r v i v a l ) , but rather the replacement of thi s freedom with the freedom that comes from p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n c o l l e c t i v e decision making. And i t i s to the elaboration of the concept of p a r t i c i p a t i o n that I must now turn. *I t has been brought to my attention that there i s actually a good deal of p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n many zoning changes because i n most c i t i e s such changes are preceded by l o c a l meetings. The c i t i z e n s who attend these meetings do not actually have the power to decide on the changes, but they can use these occasions to influence t h e i r representatives. This i s cert a i n l y a step i n the r i g h t d i r e c t i o n , but does not count, as I w i l l make clear l a t e r , as genuine p a r t i c i p a t i o n . There i s of course no question that l o c a l decisions such as zoing read i l y lend themselves to p a r t i c i p a t i o n , and most c i v i c decisions could probably also be made i n a decentralized and p a r t i c i p a t i v e manner. 33 C H A P T E R II THE CONCEPT OF PARTICIPATION 34 What i s p a r t i c i p a t o r y democracy? There i s already a great deal of t a l k about t h i s concept i n the press and national p o l i t i c s , but the tal k i s vague and frequently r h e t o r i c a l . How can p a r t i c i p a t i o n achieve the seemingly incompatible goals of coordination and freedom? And even i f t h i s i s possible, i s not the concept of p a r t i c i p a t i o n e s s e n t i a l l y archaic, suited at best for simple, pastoral communities of some probably imaginary past? Is not the b e l i e f i n p a r t i c i p a t o r y democracy based on a naive view of human nature and people's a b i l i t y to transcend t h e i r s e l f - i n t e r e s t when p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n p o l i t i c s ? The skepticism evinced i n the questions that immediately come to mind regarding p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s so widespread, even i n the l i t e r a t u r e of p o l i t i c a l theory, that r e a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n has been dismissed before getting a hearing. We have become so accustomed to associating "democracy" with representative ? democracy that the very i d e a l of active c i t i z e n p a r t i c i p a t i o n and s e l f r u l e i s not even associated with democracy. While the abandonment of the i d e a l of democracy as a means of active c i t i z e n involvement i n s e l f government dates back perhaps to the early u t i l i t a r i a n s , most recent t h e o r i s t s take t h e i r lead from Joseph Schumpeter. Schumpeter, i n his famous work, Capitalism, Socialism and  Democracy, claimed that the c l a s s i c a l conception of democracy ( i . e . genuine c o l l e c t i v e s e l f rule) was u t t e r l y u n r e a l i s t i c , and that the advantage of democratic government i s not that the 35 people r u l e ., but that through p e r i o d i c e l e c t i o n s they are able to exert a c e r t a i n kind of influence on the r u l e r s . In p a r t i c u l a r , thanks to the competition among the e l i t e s for the votes of the masses, the e l i t e are forced to give the majority of people more or less the kind of r u l e they desire . (Since Schumpeter was an economist, the s i m i l a r i t y between his " l o g i c of democracy" and the c l a s s i c theory of a competitive market i s c l e a r l y no accident.) Democracy then becomes"That i n s t i t u t -i o n a l arrangement for a r r i v i n g at p o l i t i c a l decisions i n which i n d i v i d u a l s acquire the power to decide by means of a compet-i t i v e struggle for the people's vote" (p. 269). Democracy's v i r t u e under t h i s view consists of i t being a check on tyranny, not r u l e by the people. But the ancient and true i d e a l of democracy i s genuine rul e by the people. This i d e a l has been revived under the term ' p a r t i c i p a t o r y democracy'. While t h i s term has experienced a l o t of vague usage recently I wish to use i t i n a very strong sense. By 'participatory democracy' I w i l l meanj^that governmental arrangement whereby a l l those s i g n i f i c a n t l y affected by a decision are a c t i v e l y involved i n the making of a decision through both discussion and voting." I wish also to o u t l i n e a concept which I w i l l c a l l " i d e a l p a r t i c i p a t o r y democracy" which isi'a p a r t i c i p a t o r y democracy i n which a l l s i g n i f i c a n t decisions require consensus." I w i l l argue that i n such an i d e a l arrange-ment Rousseau's goal of freedom and coordination can be achieved. 36 T h e - i d e a l v e r s i o n o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n s e r v e s t o ' u n d e r l i n e the - g o a l o f a l l forms of p a r t i c i p a t o r y ::democracy,. v i z . c o o r d i n a t i o n -and—freedom,- and a l s o s e r v e s — t o suggest-_-the- — e s s e n t i a l means by—which t h i s — g o a l - i s t o be a c h i e v e d — d i s c u s s i o n and p e r s u a s i o n . F o r i n "the ideal-system-each-* person must be persuaded o f the reasona b l e n e s s o f a law o r d e c i s i o n b e f o r e he i s r e q u i r e d t o submit t o i t . I d e a l l y t h i s p r o c e s s - a c t i v e l y engages a l l members o f the a f f e c t e d community i n the d i s c o v e r y o f the b e s t d e c i s i o n w h i l e a t the same time i t promotes the c o n d i t i o n s f o r w i l l i n g adherence t o whatever-law'---is passed.-- Such ^an i d e a l u n d e r l y i n g t h e ~ n o t i o n of p a r t i c i p a t o r y - democracy should" s e r v e t o ; c l e a r l y demarcate t h i s n o t i o n from t h a t - u s e d i n v a r i o u s - s o - c a l l e d p a r t i c i p a t o r y schemes t h a t -have r e c e n t l y " -been—discussed.-- In p a r t i c u l a r , the-..-importance~o.f -^persuasion:- and._~discussion-serves t o c l e a r l y d i s t i n g u i s h -genuine- p a r t i c i p a t i o n from the s c i e n c e f i c t i o n f a n t a s y o f T V v o t i n g . - Under - t h i s scheme, the n a t i o n s ' c i t i z e n s = c o u l d engage i n weekly v o t i n g through a d e v i c e a t t a c h e d - t o t h e i r t e l e v i s i o n af t e r . having_ heard-,.theiissues--p r e s e n t e d on-the - t e l e v i s i o n . Such an arrangement c o u l d approximate the g o a l o f u n i v e r s a l v o t i n g which i s c e r t a i n l y p a r t o f the n o t i o n o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n , but would be no more an e f f o r t i n the d i r e c t i o n o f m a i n t a i n i n g - t h e c o n d i t i o n " o f the -r u l e by p e r s u a s i o n than the c u r r e n t r e p r e s e n t a t i v e system. 37 But how can the claim that p a r t i c i p a t i o n can achieve coordination and freedom be maintained? 7Are you not unfree when a law prohibits you acting i n a certain way regardless of whether you were involved i n the l e g i s l a t i o n of this law, regardless of whether you supported the law? The c l a s s i c answers to this objection can be found i n Rousseau, but before ^discussing his rather disappointing answers, I wish to elaborate my own argument that freedom and coordination can be a chieved--at l e a s t i n the i d e a l p a r t i c i -patory system. To make thi s argument I must f i r s t introduce a rather contentious notion of freedom, which I w i l l c a l l "subjective freedom". By 'subjective freedom 1 I w i l l mean "the absence of coercive r e s t r a i n t s on those actions which one actually desires to do". This freedom, unlike the one which has been described by Isaiah B e r l i n and others as negative freedom — the absence of coercion — i s dependent on the persuasion of the subject. Whether a person i s free or not then becomes a question not only about the boundaries of coercion, but also about the desires of the subject. I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note that while B e r l i n condemns the subjective notion of freedom, he himself on occasion confuses i t with his "objective" negative freedom.* This confusion i s tempting because the value of freedom depends pretty much on the desires of the subjects. We wish to be *7As he admits i n his introduction to Four Essays on Liberty. P. x x x v i i i . 38 "free" because we wish to do what we want; we neither wish to be f r u s t r a t e d nor intimidated from doing what we want. And i t i s t h i s subjective freedom which i s provided to those who are subject to a s e l f l e g i s l a t i n g assembly i n which they aire p a r t i c i p a n t s — provided of course that they voted for the law to which they are subject. For example. In the case of zoning (mentioned i n the l a s t chapter), p a r t i c i p a n t s i n c o l l e c t i v e zoning l e g i s l a t i o n w i l l not be able, say, to b u i l d t h e i r houses as high as they might i n d i v i d u a l l y wish, but they w i l l be able to speak and vote on the allowed height f o r a l l neighbourhood houses. I may for example wish to b u i l d my house four s t o r i e s high i n order to get an even better view of the mountains, but at a meeting of the zoning l e g i s l a t u r e I may be persuaded to pass a law p r o h i b i t i n g b u i l d i n g greater than two s t o r i e s , recogn-i z i n g that unlimited—height—building would not only destroy the neighbourhood, but would ultimately defeat my desire to improve my view as others b u i l t as high or higher. Such an example neatly i l l u s t r a t e s Rousseau's views about the general and p a r t i c u l a r w i l l . Each of us may well go into the l e g i s l a t u r e seeking to maximize our p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t (get the best view for ourselves by b u i l d i n g high), but such desires are so i n t e r r e l a t e d that each has an overlapping or general aspect. We each desire the best view for ourselves, but we can come to recognize i n the assembly that t h i s goal can only 39 be r e a l i z e d by c o l l e c t i v e control — not by the anarchy of private w i l l s . We must try to f i n d a way of s a t i s f y i n g everyone's desire i n as f a i r a manner as possible. I f the process i s successful the i n d i v i d u a l would leave the assembly not free to b u i l d to whatever height he might have chosen without thought to the behaviour and e f f e c t s of others, but free to b u i l d to the height which he i s now persuaded i s the reasonable and f a i r one-v This i s the freedom of " s e l f -p r e s c r i p t i o n " . And this i s no second-rate freedom. For surely the value of negative freedom comes primarily from being free to do what you want. And t h i s i s just the freedom that "subjective freedom" involves. When the subject i s involved i n the l e g i s l a t i o n of his laws, then there i s a greatly increased p o s s i b i l i t y that the r e s t r a i n t s imposed by law w i l l not be experienced as subjective unfreedoms because the subject has been persuaded to abandon the relevant desires ( i f he ever had them). To see this point requires perhaps some r e f l e c t i o n on the notion of desire. Our wants are not a l l uniform i n strength, nor are they free from c o n f l i c t and contradiction. Part of the process of r e f l e c t i o n that should go on i n the assembly i s the sorting out, not only of c o l l e c t i v e wants, but each ind i v i d u a l ' s wants. And i d e a l l y what should happen i s that most, or perhaps a l l , should be able to get what, on r e f l e c t i o n , they want. This means of course taking into account that people not only wish to s a t i s f y t h e i r 40 immediate desires, but also such long term desires as peace, security and community. These are also wants and have t h e i r place as we work out what "we r e a l l y want". For example a person who wishes to b u i l d a t a l l house i n order to have a good view i s not, as a r e s u l t of h i s l e g i s l a t i v e experience, persuaded to abandon the desire f o r a good view. Rather he i s persuaded that i n a community the only way to achieve t h i s end i s c o l l e c t i v e r e s t r a i n t . The experience i s not one of external r e s t r a i n t , but a r e a l i z a t i o n of necessity of compromise and the j u s t i c e of other's claims. He i s not free to s a t i s f y h i s unrefiective- desire to b u i l d as high as he wishes, but he i s able to s a t i s f y h i s more fundamental desire to have some view and to l i v e happily i n a community. He i s , through p a r t i c i p a t i o n (and therefore on r e f l e c t i o n ) s u b j e c t i v e l y free. I r o n i c a l l y , though Rousseau introduces a subjective d e f i n i t i o n of freedom i n the passage where he defines moral freedom, he does not use t h i s d e f i n i t i o n to defend his claim that p a r t i c i p a t i o n provides a means of r e a l i z i n g freedom and coordination. In Book I of The S o c i a l Contract, Rousseau . defines freedom (or moral freedom, the passage i s unclear) as "obedience to a law one prescribes to oneself" (p.65). While t h i s would seem to provide a v e h i c l e f o r his argument, i t has a c r u c i a l l i m i t a t i o n . For unless Rousseau wishes to describe " s e l f p r e s c r i p t i o n " as simply being present and p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n the discussions of the assembly, those 41 who voted against a p a r t i c u l a r law would not be " s e l f prescribing", and therefore would not be free. In other words, using h i s d e f i n i t i o n of freedom, only those who voted f o r a law would be free, and freedom f o r a l l could only be preserved with a consensus d e c i s i o n procedure. But Rousseau argues that such a procedure i s neither necessary nor p r a c t i c a l for the p a r t i c i p a t o r y system to preserve the freedom of i t s c i t i z e n s . * Rather he argues that the f a c t that the assembly rules i n accord with the general w i l l i s what preserves the freedom of the dis s i d e n t s . How can-the opposing minority be both free and subject to laws to which they have not consented? I answer that the question i s badly formulated. The c i t i z e n consents to a l l the laws, even to those that are passed against h i s w i l l , and even to those which punish him when he dares to break any one of them. The constant w i l l of a l l the members of the state i s the general w i l l ; i t i s through i t that they are c i t i z e n s and fr e e . When a law i s proposed i n the people's assembly, what i s asked of them i s not p r e c i s e l y whether they approve of the proposition or r e j e c t i t , but whether i t i s i n conformity with the general w i l l which i s t h e i r s ; each by givin g h is vote gives his opinion on t h i s question, and the counting of votes y i e l d s a decla r a t i o n of the general w i l l . When, therefore, the opinion contrary to my own p r e v a i l s , t h i s proves only that I have made a mistake, and that what I believed to be the general w i l l was. not so. If my p a r t i c u l a r opinion had preva i l e d against the general w i l l , I should have done something other than what I had w i l l e d , and then I should not have been free. (P. 153) ' *»There i s only one law which by i t s nature requires unanimous assent. This i s the s o c i a l paqt. ... (p. 152) 42 Rousseau's account c e r t a i n l y seems unfortunate and so p h i s i t i c d i . I t has been f a u l t e d on many grounds by h i s c r i t i c s -One c l a s s i c objection i s that we simply cannot expect the majority to recognize and vote c o n s i s t e n t l y for the general w i l l — an objection to which Rousseau a c t u a l l y has quite a powerful answer. (see Barry, 1967, p. 122). But the most important objection i s that regardless of whether the majority are right or not, the minority are s t i l l forced to act against t h e i r w i l l . Being forced i s not being persuaded, regardless of whether one i s being forced to do what i s i n one's own best i n t e r e s t , i . e . regardless of whether one actually,, i n some long term sense of 'want'^ wants to do the action or wants the re s u l t s that come from the a c t i o n . For the move to force undercuts the whole notion of p a r t i c i p a t i o n as rule through reason and persuasion. Obviously ; i f we voted and l o s t we were not persuaded that we were wrong; though we were perhaps t o l d that we were wrong. 7And, i f we are required to accord our behaviour with t h i s d e c i s i o n , we are being moved eithe r by our previous commitment. to obey the law, or by the threat of sanctions, or even by our respect f o r the majority's wisdom, but not because we see the wisdom and reasonableness of the law. Rousseau's argument has some p l a u s i b i l i t y i f voting i s confused with a kind of opinion p o l l . I f the question asked the assembly was "What do you want?" and while expressing 43 our opinion on t h i s question we also voiced an opinion as to the probable r e s u l t , then we could of course be wrong. And i f we had agreed beforehand to do whatever the majority wished, we would not be forced i n the relevant sense to go along with the majority. But t h i s i s c r u c i a l l y not the question asked. We are not asked about our desi r e s , but about our judgement, and to be forced to act against one's judgement i s to be made unfree i n an extremely important sense. By now i t should be c l e a r that I do not believe that a p a r t i c i p a t i v e government can achieve both coordination and freedom without a consensus d e c i s i o n procedure. What then does p a r t i c i p a t o r y democracy o f f e r the minority that i s not a v a i l a b l e i n a system of e l i t e r u l e , whether popularly e l e c t e d or not? Respect. Under the conditions of p a r t i c i p a t i o n one has received the maximum amount of respect f o r one's r a t i o n a l capacity compatible with c o l l e c t i v e coordination. The e s s e n t i a l q u a l i t y the p a r t i c i p a t o r y democracy o f f e r s ..the. . minority i s not, s t r i c t l y speaking, one of freedom, but rather a f a i r c onsideration of i t s opinions, and an extensive possib-i l i t y of i n f l u e n c e . But t h i s q u a l i t y i s not so far.removed from the notion of freedom. As B e r l i n points out, the e s s e n t i a l ingredient of what he c a l l s the notion of "pos-i t i v e freedom" i s the desire to be treated l i k e a r a t i o n a l being 44 The'positive' sense of the word ' l i b e r t y ' derives from the wish on the part of the i n d i v i d u a l to be his own master .... I wish to be a subject not an object; to be moved by reasons, by conscious purpose, which are my own, not by causes which a f f e c t me, as i t were, from the outside. ... I wish.to be a doer — deciding, not being decided f o r , s e l f - d i r e c t e d and not acted upon by external nature or by other men as i f I were a thing, or an animal, or a slave incapable of playing a human r o l e ... This i s at leas t part of what I mean when I say that I am r a t i o n a l , and that i t i s my reason that distinguishes me as a human being from the r e s t of the world. ( B e r l i n , p. 131) Despite B e r l i n ' s e f f o r t s to deride t h i s notion of freedom (and h i s complaint i s l a r g e l y about what has been done with i t ) , i t i s important to note that t h i s sense of the word i s the most ancient. "Free" and 'freedom' were o r i g i n a l l y contrasted with slavery, not with the presence of governmental coercion. C.S. Lewis i n his Studies i n Words writes: "Like the Greek and L a t i n words (free) o r i g i n a l l y r e f e r s , to l e g a l status. The opposite i s slave — theow i n c l a s s i c a l Anglo-Saxon," (p. 114). In addition "freedom" has another o r i g i n a l a s s ociation with the concept of p o s i t i v e freedom. Like eleutheria and l i b e r t a s , freedom and franchise can of course mean the l e g a l freedom of the community. But the ancient words are used c h i e f l y , i f not e n t i r e l y , .' i n reference to the freedom of a state. The contrast i s sometimes between autonomy and subjection to foreign power; sometimes between the freedom of a republic and the r u l e of a despot. (Lewis, p. 12 4-5) In a t r u l y p a r t i c i p a t o r y democracy then a l l men must be treated as 'freemen'. They must not be used or coerced f o r the private ends of i n d i v i d u a l s . By extension, coercion even 45 f o r " p u b l i c purposes, r e q u i r i n g as i t does the involuntary submission-of~a freemany-must be kept"to an absolute minimum. A citizen.must_always.be treated--with-maximum_respect for..his reasonableness and i t i s important, i f t h i s r e s p e c t f u l r e l a t i o n s h i p i s to be maintained, that a l l deviations from the i d e a l r u l e of consensus be j u s t i f i e d by the genuine exigencies of time. Conversely, the more important the decision, other things being equal, the "less any deviation from consensus can be tolerated:- The community's respect for i n d i v i d u a l i n t e g r i t y requires maximum consideration for i n d i v i d u a l objections i n matters of importance. Rousseau summarizes t h i s point n i c e l y : f i r s t , the more important and serious the matter to be decided, the c l o s e r should the opinion which i s to p r e v a i l approach unanimity; second the swifter the decision the question demands, the smaller the prescribed majority: may .be allowed to become; and i n decisions .which-have-±o be-given .immediately-,-" a majority.".Df-one.: must s u f f i c e . TheT.first of these maxims might seem to be more sui t e d to the enactment laws, the second to-the dispatch of administrative business.- - At a l l events, i t i s by a" combination of the two maxims that we can determine the r i g h t s i z e for the majority that i s to decide on any question/ (p. 154) Let me summarize the argument so .far: The i d e a l of p a r t i c i p a t o r y democracy i s to have a l l those subject to a c o l l e c t i v e d e c i s i o n present as a c t i v e p a r t i c i p a n t s and voters i n the assembly which makes the c o l l e c t i v e d e c i s i o n . I d e a l l y , the,assembly w i l l attempt to achieve consensus on what i s best fo r the community through the process of c o l l e c t i v e r r a t i o n a l r e f l e c t i o n , as t h i s preserves subjective-, freedom for a l l . 46 The r u l e of consensus i s the procedural embodiment of the i d e a l of complete respect f o r the r a t i o n a l i t y and freedom of a l l citizens,and deviations from t h i s r u l e should be as l i t t l e as i s required by the exigencies of decision-making. But what reasons are there to think the p a r t i c i p a t o r y assembly would r u l e wisely? Can any c o l l e c t i o n of people be supposed capable of s e l f - r u l e through assembly democracy? Rousseau d i d not think so. In f a c t , he .believed that only under rather stringent conditions could. -the assembly be expected to r u l e r e l i a b l y i n the general i n t e r e s t , and there- -fore express the general w i l l . F i r s t , he believed that the assembly should only turn i t s l e g i s l a t i v e a t t e n t i o n to issues of broad g e n e r a l i t y . For under such conditions each submits himself to the same conditions which he imposes on others; t h i s admirable harmony of i n t e r e s t and j u s t i c e gives to s o c i a l d e l i b e r a t i o n s a q u a l i t y of equity which disappears at once from the discussion of any i n d i v i d u a l dispute p r e c i s e l y because i n these l a t t e r cases there i s no common in t e r e s t to unite and i d e n t i f y the decision of the : judge with that of the contending p a r t i e s . (Rousseau, p. 76) I t i s l a r g e l y because of t h i s r e s t r i c t i o n that Rousseau believed that i n a well run state the decisions of the assembly would tend to unanimity. For t h i s arrangement provides a means by which a l l may maximize t h e i r s e l f - i n t e r e s t . But t h i s is. only the case on the condition that the assembly i s concerning i t s e l f with such issues of broad g e n e r a l i t y as 47 the c r i m i n a l law or issues which have such optimal solutions -as my zoning example. Unfortunately, i f any "government i s to be relevant i t must turn i t s attention to concerns and decisions which do not a f f e c t a l l equally. What then happens to Rousseau's argument that the assembly could be expected to r u l e wisely, what happens to the general w i l l ? What i n f a c t happens to the very concept of "the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t " ? For, i f a decision does not a f f e c t a l l more or less equally, what i s the warrant for saying that t h i s decision i s i n "the public i n t e r e s t " ? Given that a decision of the assembly does not a f f e c t a l l equally, i s i t not more honest to say that the decision was i n the i n t e r e s t of a large~subset of the p u b l i c , or perhaps that i t was i n the majority's i n t e r e s t ? '• : Brian Barry, i n a well known essay on the public i n t e r e s t " (Barry, 1967) has used a version of Rousseau's account to defend the concept of public i n t e r e s t from detractors who claim (for reasons suggested above) that i t plays an e s s e n t i -a l l y i d e o l o g i c a l and obfuscatory r o l e i n public debate. Barry argued that we should think of the public i n t e r e s t not as serving the i n t e r e s t of a l l equally, but as serving us a l l equally i n our r o l e as c i t i z e n s rather than as i n d i v i d u a l s i n a l l our r o l e s . As Barry puts i t : - : Instead of simply saying that some measure i s 1 i n h i s i n t e r e s t s ' a man w i l l often specify some r o l e or capacity i n which i t i s favourable to him: 'as-a 48 parent' , 1 as a businessman' , 'as a houseowner1 and so on. One of the capacities i n which everyone finds himself i s that of 'a member of the public'. Some issues allow a p o l i c y to be produced which w i l l a f f e c t everyone i n this capa-c i t y . This i s the pure 'Rousseau' s i t u a t i o n , (pp. 123-124) Such a redescription of the "Rousseau s i t u a t i o n " does, I think, save the concept of public i n t e r e s t , but at the expense of abandoning i t s automatic coincidence with j u s t i c e . For under Rousseau's model, j u s t i c e (taken apparently to mean equality) i s supposedly the automatic r e s u l t of discovering the general i n t e r e s t . But i n Barry's account, j u s t i c e i s an additional consideration, for a law could well a f f e c t us a l l equally as c i t i z e n s , but d i s t r i b u t e greater benefits or losses to us as individuals ( i . e . i n the t o t a l i t y of our r o l e s ) . For example: A law upgrading the standards for factory p o l l u t i o n emission::., i s one that w i l l benefit us a l l equally as c i t i z e n s , but certain manufacturers w i l l be forced to bear the cost of improving t h e i r f a c t o r i e s . They can be expected to request assistance to meet these requirements or even to oppose the decision for, even though the decision i s i n the public i n t e r e s t and therefore i n t h e i r i n t e r e s t , they are paying the cost. Whether t h e i r objections and requests for assistance are just or not i s a d i f f e r e n t question than whether higher p o l l u t i o n standards are i n the public i n t e r e s t . And while i t i s ir r e l e v a n t to my concern at the moment, i t i s , I believe, appropriate to point out that such additional costs that high standards i n f l i c t on the producer are an i n t e r n a l i z a t i o n H-49 of e x t e r n a l i t i e s ( i . e . the producer i s now having to pay costs which formerly were borne by the whole community) and i i f so are quite f a i r . But given the abandonment of equal e f f e c t s , i s there any reason to think that p a r t i c i p a t o r y democracy would r u l e wisely? Two arguments can be given here. F i r s t , the presence of those affected by a decision can be hoped to have an ameliorating a f f e c t on the willingness of the assembly to deal unjustly with t h e i r claims. But second, and more important,is the claim that p a r t i c i p a t i o n not only provides a mechanism f o r s e l f r u l e , i t provides also a "school" f o r t h i s r u l e . The advocates of p a r t i c i p a t i o n , Rousseau included, have long argued that because p a r t i c i p a t i o n requires p a r t i c i -pants to take other people's points of view into account, and to couch t h e i r arguments (and therefore f i n a l l y t h e i r thoughts) i n terms of the public i n t e r e s t , p a r t i c i p a n t s w i l l become less e g o i s t i c and more moral i n t h e i r concerns. Rousseau argues that the experience of p a r t i c i p a t i o n gives man "moral freedom" "...which alone makes man the master of himself; for to be governed by appetite alone i s slavery while obedience to a law one prescribes to oneself i s freedom" (Rousseau, p.65). P a r t i c i p a t i o n then not only provides a means for a l l to maximize t h e i r s e l f i n t e r e s t , i t also provides the moral education so that those required to s a c r i f i c e t h e i r i n t e r e s t 50 t o t h a t o f the community do so w i l l i n g l y , and t h a t the whole community c o n s i s t e n t l y d e d i c a t e s i t s e l f t o j u s t i c e and t o d e l i b e r a t i o n g e n u i n e l y concerned w i t h the p u b l i c good. I r o n i c a l l y , the b e s t statement o f the c l a i m t h a t p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s m o r a l l y e d u c a t i v e i s t o be found i n M i l l ' s R e p r e s e n t a t i v e Government. M i l l argues: Very d i f f e r e n t i s the s t a t e o f the human f a c u l t i e s whereJa human b e i n g f e e l s h i m s e l f under no o t h e r e x t e r n a l r e s t r a i n t than the n e c e s s i t i e s o f n a t u r e , o r mandates o f s o c i e t y which he has h i s share i n imposing, and which i t i s open t o him, i f he t h i n k s them wrong, p u b l i c l y t o d i s s e n t from, and e x e r t h i m s e l f a c t i v e l y t o get a l t e r e d . The maximum of the i n v i g o r a t i n g e f f e c t o f freedom upon the c h a r a c t e r i s o n l y o b t a i n e d when the person a c t e d on e i t h e r i s , o r i s - l o o k i n g -forward=ito-3becoming^a- c i t i z e n as f u l - l y p r i v i l e g e d as any o t h e r . What i s s t i l l more important than even t h i s matter o f f e e l i n g i s the p r a c t i c a l d i s c i p l i n e which the c h a r a c t e r o b t a i n s from-the o c c a s i o n a l " demand-made upon" the" c i t i z e n s t o exercise7" f o r a time and i n t h e i r t u r n , some . social;:function..: It---i-s -not— s u f f i c i e n t l y c o n s i d e r e d how._-litt-le—there i s i n most men's o r d i n a r y l i f e t o g i v e -any— L a r g e n e s s s e i t h e r ^ - t o - t h e i r — c o n c e p t i o n s — o r - " t o t h e i r sentiments.. Their_.work- is.-a r o u t i n e ; n o t - a l a b o u r - o f — l o v e , but o f s e l f - i n t e r e s t i n the most elementary form, the s a t i s f a c t i o n o f d a i l y wants; neitherf^introduces--the mind" t o -thoughts o r " f e e l i n g s ^ e x t e n d i n g beyond i n d i v i d u a l s ; i f i n s t r u c t i v e books" a r e - w i t h i n t h e i r .reach.,-rthere i s no s t i m u l u s to----r e a d "them;" ~ and i n most cases the i n d i v i d u a l has no access—to-any—person o f c u l t i v a t i o n much s u p e r i o r t o h i s •owff; ' GiVingi"him_.something- t o do f o r t h e -publics-supplies:,--! n;a-_ measure, a l l t h e s e d e f i c i e n c i e s . I f circumstances a l l o w the amount o f p u b l i c duty a s s i g n e d him- t o -be -considerablev - i t makes- him an- educated man. Not w i t h s t a n d i n g the d e f e c t s o f the s o c i a l , system and moral i d e a s o f a n t i q u i t y , -the - p r a c t i c e — o f t h e — -d i c a s t e r y and the e c c l e s i a r a i s e d the i n t e l l e c t u a l s t a n d a r d o f an average A t h e n i a n c i t i z e n f a r beyond a n y t h i n g o f which t h e r e i s y e t an example i n any o t h e r mass of men, a n c i e n t o r modern. A b e n e f i t o f the same k i n d , though f a r l e s s i n degree, i s produced 51 on Englishmen of the lower middle class by t h e i r l i a b i l i t y to be placed on j u r i e s and to serve parish o f f i c e s ; which, though i t does not occur to so many, nor i s so continuous, nor introduces them to so great a v a r i e t y of elevated considerations, as to admit of comparison with the public education which every c i t i z e n of Athens obtained from her democratic i n s t i t u t i o n s , must make them nevertheless very d i f f e r e n t beings i n range of ideas and development of f a c u l t i e s , from those who have done nothing i n t h e i r l i v e s but drive a q u i l l , or s e l l goods over a counter. S t i l l more salutary i s the moral part of the i n s t r u c t i o n afforded by the p a r t i c i p a t i o n of the privat e c i t i z e n , i f even r a r e l y , i n public functions. He i s c a l l e d upon, while so engaged, to weigh i n t e r e s t s not h i s own; to be guided, i n case of c o n f l i c t i n g claims, by another r u l e than h i s private p a r t i a l i t i e s ; to apply, at every turn, p r i n c i p l e s and maxims which have f o r t h e i r reason of existence the common good: and he usually finds associated with him i n the same work minds more f a m i l i a r i z e d than his own with these ideas and operations, whose study i t w i l l be to supply reasons to his understanding, and stimulation to h i s f e e l i n g for the general i n t e r e s t . He i s made to f e e l himself one of the p u b l i c , and whatever i s f o r t h e i r b e n e f i t to be for h i s benefit. Where t h i s school of public s p i r i t does not e x i s t , scarcely any sense i s entertained that private persons, i n no eminent s o c i a l s i t u a t i o n , owe any duties to society, except to obey the laws and submit to the government. There i s no u n s e l f i s h sentiment of i d e n t i f i c a t i o n with the p u b l i c . Every thought or f e e l i n g , e i t h e r of i n t e r e s t or of duty, i s absorbed i n the i n d i v i d u a l and i n the family. The man never thinks of any c o l l e c t i v e i n t e r e s t , of any objects to be pursued j o i n t l y with others, but only i n competition with them, and i n some measure at t h e i r expense. A neighbour, not being an a l l y or an associate, since he i s never engaged i n any common undertaking for j o i n t benefits, i s therefore only a r i v a l . Thus even private morality s u f f e r s , while public i s a c t u a l l y extinct. Were t h i s the universal and only p o s s i b l e state of things, the utmost aspirations of the lawgiver or the moralist could only s t r e t c h to make the bulk of the community a flock of sheep innocently nibbling the grass side by side. From these accumulated considerations i t i s evident that the only government which can f u l l y s a t i s f y a l l 52 the e x igencies of the s o c i a l s t a t e i s one i n which the whole people p a r t i c i p a t e ; t h a t any p a r t i c i p a t i o n , even i n the s m a l l e s t p u b l i c f u n c t i o n , i s u s e f u l ; t h a t the p a r t i c i p a t i o n should everywhere be as great as the general degree of improvement of the community w i l l a l l ow; and t h a t nothing l e s s can be u l t i m a t e l y d e s i r a b l e than the admission of a l l to a share i n the sovereign power of the s t a t e . (1964, pp. 215-217) I have argued t h a t even though Rousseau's g e n e r a l i t y s t r i c t u r e ( i . e . t h a t the assembly must only concern i t s e l f w i t h i s s u e s t h a t e q u a l l y a f f e c t a l l ) cannot be maintained, we can s t i l l expect t h a t assembly t o r u l e w i s e l y and j u s t l y because of the educative a f f e c t s of p a r t i c i p a t i o n . In rchapters I I I and IV I w i l l develop a more general theory of human nature which supports my contention of people's f i t n e s s f o r p a r t i c i p a t o r y democracy. But f o r now I wish t o note other r e s t r i c t i o n s t h a t Rousseau placed on h i s assemblies. G e n e r a l i t y of concern was not the only r e s t r i c t i o n • Rousseau imposed on h i s assemblies i n an attempt t o secure d i s i n t e r e s t e d d e c i s i o n making. He a l s o argued t h a t the assembly should riot be composed of i n t e r e s t e d f a c t i o n s . Each c i t i z e n must come to the assembly independent of previous commitments to groups s m a l l e r than the assembly. The purpose of t h i s r u l e i s obvious enough. I t i s w e l l known t h a t an organized m i n o r i t y can have i n f l u e n c e f a r beyond i t s s i z e or the value of i t s cause. In a d d i t i o n , Rousseau, l i k e J.S. M i l l , wishes to see the assembly be a place where people develop a sense of i d e n t i t y w i t h the community 53 and i t s well-being. I f one comes to the assembly already i d e n t i f i e d with a sub-group of the community Ce.'g. the chamber of commerce, the auto worker's union, or the L i b e r a l Party), then the p o s s i b l i t y of experiencing i d e n t i t y with the greater whole i s reduced. For i f one comes as a member of these groups, then one's primary commitment i s to the sub-group's i n t e r e s t , not to the discovery of the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t . On the other hand, Rousseau recognized that i t would not be possible to eliminate i n t e r e s t groups i n a state of any considerable s i z e . He therefore recommended that as many i n t e r e s t groups as possible should be developed, so that the c r i s s c r o s s i n g l o y a l t i e s of these groups might cancel themselves out i n each i n d i v i d u a l . T h i r d l y , Rousseau requires that the background economic conditions of the assembly members be roughly equal so that "no c i t i z e n s h a l l b e . r i c h enough to buy another and none so poor as to be forced to s e l l himself". The purpose of t h i s requirement, besides e l i m i n a t i n g the temptations of b r i b e r y , i s a l s o , I b e l i e v e , to reduce the r o l e of envy i n blocking r a t i o n a l debate. An a d d i t i o n a l b e n e f i t would be t h a t 1 i n a state made up of equals the decisions are more apt to f a l l on a l l equally. In my example above, I imagined a s i t u a t i o n i n which a factory owner objected to bearing the burden of p o l l u t i o n c o n t r o l s . But i f the f a c t o r y was c o l l e c t i v e l y owned, then there would be no members of the assembly who'would have, as a r e s u l t of ownership, priva t e i n t e r e s t s opposed to that of the p u b l i c . In e q u a l i t i e s tend to y i e l d i n e q u a l i t i e s , and one hardly needs to read Marx to see t h i s point. 54" Near the very end of the S o c i a l Contract Rousseau makes one l a s t suggestion of a means of assuring a well run:state: the i n s t i t u t i o n of a kind of minimal r e l i g i o n whose dogmas he claimed should be simple and few i n number, expressed p r e c i s e l y and without explanations or commentaries. The existence of an omnipotent, i n t e l l i g e n t , benevolent d i v i n i t y that foresees and provides; the l i f e to come; the happiness of the just; the punishment of sinners; the s a n c t i t y of the s o c i a l contract and the law - these are the p o s i t i v e dogmas. As fo r the negative dogmas, I would l i m i t them to a sing l e one: no intolerance. Intolerance i s something which belongs to the r e l i g i o n s we have rejected, (p.186) Such a minimal f a i t h Rousseau apparently f e l t was a pre-condition f o r l o y a l c i t i z e n r y : the f i n a l guarantee of uncoerced obedience. But such a condition seems c l e a r l y out of l i n e with Rousseau's other conditions which seem c l e a r l y directed at a community of reason and public r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , not mindless t e r r o r of punishment i n an a f t e r — l i f e . I t seems that i n adding t h i s l a s t idea, Rousseau abandoned h i s f a i t h that the structure of the assembly can produce r a t i o n a l adherence to the law. Perhaps the abandonment was occasioned by h i s frequently e x p l i c i t . i f contradictory, b e l i e f i n psychological egoism* Regardless, i t i s my view that only the other condit-ions are appropriate and useful to p a r t i c i p a t o r y democracy. * e.g. "We always want what i s advantageous". (p.72) 55 But they do not state a l l the conditions that are probably necessary for a p a r t i c i p a t o r y democracy to achieve the rule of reason; i n p a r t i c u l a r , the size of the assembly seems to be a c r i t i c a l factor. In f a c t , i f p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s not to be reduced to mere attendance and voting, the size of the assembly must be severely r e s t r i c t e d . As I w i l l document below i n chapter VI, a l l successful experiments i n worker democracy seem to involve the p o s s i b i l i t y of small group p a r t i c i p a t i o n . Groups larger than about 20 do not seem to provide the kind of intimate contact and p o s s i b i l i t y of extensive discussion f o r each i n d i v i d u a l . And such extensive discussions are necessary i f individuals are actually to influence and be persuaded during the decision-making process. In China, for example, the basic p a r t i c i -patory group i s never more than 15, and many theorists have argued that a t r u l y e f f e c t i v e group or committee must be less than 7. (see Townsend, p. ..175; Thayer, p. 7-8; Olsen, ch. 2) The problem of providing for the extensive discussion necessary for the rule of reason i s not necessarily solved i n the c l a s s i c town meeting s i t u a t i o n , except i n cases where there i s a good deal of opportunity for informal small meetings which relate to the larger gatherings. F i n l e y , i n his book, Democracy: Ancient and Modern, argues that i t was the d a i l y discussion in the market place as much as the assembly meetings which enabled Athens to achieve a high degree of p a r t i c i p a t o r y democracy. 56 If the goal of p a r t i c i p a t o r y democracy i s to be achieved, i t would appear that the i n s t i t u t i o n a l arrangements must r e f l e c t the need for small group discussions, as much as the need fo r meeting and voting i n the c o l l e c t i v e l e g i s l a t u r e . U n der such conditions each i n d i v i d u a l can be expected to have the maximum influence and maximum attention to h i s point of view. And under such conditions the goal of having each member of the community governed by persuasion not force or obligation/has the greatest chance of success. In addition, the small group p a r t i c i p a t i o n enables each i n d i v i d u a l ' s p o s i t i o n , even i f f i n a l l y unpersuasive, to receive maximum attention and respect. But subjective freedom and respe c t f u l treatment qua subject i s not the only b e n e f i t of p a r t i c i p a t i o n . While these aspects underline the freedom made ava i l a b l e by part-i c i p a t i o n i n our role as subjects, they do not s u f f i c i e n t l y underline the new and ad d i t i o n a l benefits or freedoms that come from being a participant.. While our range of i n d i v i d u a l choice i s o b j e c t i v e l y r e s t r i c t e d by l e g i s l a t i o n , p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the l e g i s l a t i v e process increases our opportunity for involvement i n an enormously greater range of choices. Not only does a well run assembly provide the b e n e f i t of encouraging people to think and act i n a moral and public s p i r i t e d manner, i t also 57 i n c r e a s e s t h e i r o p p o r t u n i t y t o do so. I t h i n k t h a t i t i s a p p r o p r i a t e t o c a l l t h i s b e n e f i t " p o l i t i c a l freedom" -— the freedom t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n and i n f l u e n c e the c o l l e c t i v e d e c i s i o n making p r o c e s s . There are two ways i n which p a r t i c i p a t i o n can i n c r e a s e one's p o l i t i c a l freedom. F i r s t , the p a r t i c i p a n t g a i n s i n f l u e n c e o v e r . a r e a s o f h i s l i f e which were s u b j e c t t o government c o n t r o l , b u t not t o h i s i n f l u e n c e . Second, i f the government extends the range of i t s d e c i s i o n making by l e g i s l a t i n g on areas f o r m e r l y l e f t t o i n d i v i d u a l d e c i s i o n (as I have advocated), then the p o l i t i c a l freedom of a p a r t i c i p a n t i s i n c r e a s e d because the range of " p o l i t i c a l c h o i c e s " i s i n c r e a s e d . But i t sh o u l d a l s o be noted t h a t s i n c e the assembly must c o n s t a n t l y t u r n i t s a t t e n t i o n t o concerns o f a moral nature (the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t and j u s t i c e ) the range o f moral c h o i c e s open t o the i n d i v i d u a l who has p o l i t i c a l freedom i s a l s o g r e a t l y i n c r e a s e d . We can see how the p o l i t i c a l freedom and the range of moral c h o i c e s o f the p a r t i c i p a n t s can be i n c r e a s e d by r e f e r r i n g a g a i n t o Hardin's s t o r y o f the commons. Without a c o l l e c t i v e body w i t h the power t o e n f o r c e d e c i s i o n s , the farmer who wishes t o make a p o s i t i v e c o n t r i b u t i o n t o the p r e s e r v a t i o n o f the commons i s powerless. L e f t t o h i s own a c t i v i t i e s , as we know from Hardin, Olsen and M i l l , he has o n l y the o p t i o n of premature s e l f - d e s t r u c t i o n . But w i t h the e x i s t e n c e o f a s e l f - l e g i s l a t i n g forum, the farmers then have t o g e t h e r a 58 choice of preserving the commons;- a choice they d i d not have as i n d i v i d u a l s . Since moral actions are c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y those actions which are undertaken not f o r personal b e n e f i t , but f o r some c o l l e c t i v e good, the existence of a c o l l e c t i v e l e g i s l a t u r e means that the range of e f f e c t i v e moral actions and i choices open to the i n d i v i d u a l i s l i k e l y to be gre a t l y increased. Rousseau seems more or l e s s to ignore t h i s point,-but i t i s fundamental to the argument f o r p a r t i c i p a t o r y democracy, f o r here i s a very r e a l sense i n which our p o l i t i c a l freedom i s increased by conceding c e r t a i n areas of i n d i v i d u a l behavior to c o l l e c t i v e c o n t r o l . Not only i s there an increase i n moral choices, but a l s o there i s j u s t a simple increase i n the range of choices we have about our environment. For unlike our homes and immediate possessions, our environment i s e s s e n t i a l l y a c o l l e c t i v e possession. By d i v i d i n g i t up among ourselves and not subjecting ourselves to any c o l l e c t i v e c o n t r o l , we abandon the p o s s i b i l i t y of making decisions about our environment. The r e s u l t of such abandonment i s only too w e l l known: environmental degradation and f i n a l l y the p o s s i b i l i t y of c o l l e c t i v e s e l f - d e s t r u c t i o n . ^ S e l f - d e s t r u c t i o n i s l i k e l y , not simply because we are a l l too s e l f i s h , too concerned with consumer goods or too i n d i f f e r e n t to e c o l o g i c a l considerations, but p r i m a r i l y because there i s nothing or next to nothing that we, as i n d i v i d u a l s , can do about the environment. Only through concerted e f f o r t , only through some c o l l e c t i v e forum 59 can we make the kinds of decisions that have environmental — —. impact. A c o r o l l a r y of t h i s argument i s that the e c o l o g i c a l c r i s i s should not be seen, as some would have us b e l i e v e , as r e s u l t i n g from our c o l l e c t i v e " w i l l " to consume,-but as a r e s u l t of our f a i l u r e to provide the democratic forums necessary f o r the creation of genuine c o l l e c t i v e decisions. Because there i s no means f o r a r r i v i n g at what we r e a l l y want -i n the way of an environment, there i s never any r e a l choice between consumption and e c o l o g i c a l preservation. The decision of whether to purchase something or not, is., not • -a vote on the d e s i r a b i l i t y of l i m i t e d growth economy. A person -buying a car no more w i l l s the enormity of the auto industry and the concommitant p o l l u t i o n , than--the- farmer.:putting::.hi.s_-r-—= cow to pasture w i l l s the destruction of the commons or the commuter getting i n t o h i s car votes for- a t r a f f i c a m . - — -The-=^  public i s not responsible f o r the e c o l o g i c a l - c r i s i s , - b e c a u s e i t does not have the c o l l e c t i v e organization to be responsible f o r . i t . A s o l u t i o n then to the e c o l o g i c a l c r i s i s i s not "grumbling acceptance" of governmental expansion.and-centralization, but. the renewal of p u b l i c l i f e . The r e b i r t h of-self-government i s i t s e l f an i n t r i n s i c good and an obviously preferable way t o — deal with the increasing need for c o n t r o l 60 But not a l l may see the attractiveness of such a s o l u t i o n , and even more may f i n d such a proposal f a n t a s t i c a l l y u n r e a l i -s t i c . Those who f i n d such a proposal neither a t t r a c t i v e or possible may be objecting on the grounds that i t c o n f l i c t s with human nature. Such people may f e e l that humans are e s s e n t i a l l y s e l f i s h and desirous of ever increasing consumer goods, and that no government arrangement can change t h i s . A l l that government can do i s to recognize human nature for what i t i s and try to protect us from ourselves. On t h i s theory (which might be c a l l e d the Hobbesian objection), people are only brought together out of self i s h n e s s and the desire f o r protection, and are incapable of choosing the public ^ i n t e r e s t over t h e i r private desires. Such tedious and p o t e n t i a l l y i n e f f i c i e n t forms of government as p a r t i c i p a t o r y democracy c o n f l i c t s with people's r e a l desire to get on with t h e i r personal consumption. Another objection might be that while such an arrangement i s not"in c o n f l i c t with human nature, i t i s i n c o n f l i c t with the i n d u s t r i a l " order. I t may be (the argument goes) that i n a r u r a l and economically"Simple" s o c i e t y p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s possible, but there i s no place for such extensive p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the operation of an i n d u s t r i a l society. The need f o r hierarchy / f o r e f f i c i e n t management, and the enormous time l o s t at meetings, completely c o n f l i c t s with current arrangements and current expectations. 61 Lastly, a rather d i f f e r e n t kind of objection might .-come from the e c o l o g i c a l l y concerned. What reason they might ask, given what we know of human nature, i s there to think that such an arrangement would r e s u l t i n eco l o g i c a l preservation? Why would not the pa r t i c i p a t o r y forums and l o c a l governments simply vote for more of the same? Why would they choose to preserve the natural environment and to r e s t r i c t i n d i v i d u a l behavior? A l l these questions and objections deserve answers, and i t seems to me that the most persuasive way to go about doing so i s to f i r s t develop an alternative to the theory of human nature presumed by my imaginary skeptics. This I do i n chapter I I I , where I attempt to demonstrate the funda-mental importance of the s o c i a l rather than e g o i s t i c and i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c aspects of human behavior. Such a theory lends i t s e l f to a rather d i f f e r e n t p o l i t i c a l theory and view of government, and this i n turn i s developed i n chapter IV. F i n a l l y , I must show why i t would be e c o l o g i c a l l y desirable to i n s t i t u t e such arrangements i n our current society (chapter V) , and that such arrangements are indeed a r e a l p o s s i b i l i t y i n i n d u s t r i a l i z e d society (chapter VI, VII). C H A P T E R III HUMAN NATURE AND SOCIAL NEEDS: The Repudiation of Homo Economicus 63 I n t h i s C h a p t e r I w i s h t o d e a l w i t h two f u n d a m e n t a l a s s u m p t i o n s a b o u t human n a t u r e w h i c h s t a n d i n t h e way o f t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f any r a d i c a l l y o p t i m i s t i c p o l i t i c a l t h e o r y . T h e s e two v i e w s a r e : 1. T h a t man i s f u n d a m e n t a l l y s e l f i s h a nd s e e k s o n l y h i s own b e n e f i t , and 2. T h a t man has an i n n a t e and i n s a t i a b l e d e s i r e f o r goods, money o r b o t h . T h i s f i r s t a s s u m p t i o n o f man's s e l f i s h n e s s h as been g i v e n as t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r a c o e r c i v e g overnment, a c a p i t a l i s t f o r m o f e c o n o m i c o r d e r , and t h e w i d e s p r e a d c y n i c i s m a b o u t t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f change. The c o e r c i v e government i s needed b e c a u s e men's s e l f i s h n e s s w o u l d l e a d them t o i n j u r e one a n o t h e r ; t h e c a p i t a l i s t f o r m o f e c o n o m i c o r g a n i z a t i o n i s o f v a l u e b e c a u s e i t s u p p o s e d l y p r o v i d e s a means by w h i c h t h e s e l f i s h n e s s o f e a c h i n d i v i d u a l i s g u i d e d t o c o n t r i b u t e t o t h e g e n e r a l w e l l b e i n g o f t h e community. T h i s t h e o r y o f '"homo e c o n o m i c u s " has r e c e n t l y been e x t e n d e d by p o l i t i c a l t h e o r i s t s who have a t t e m p t e d t o show t h a t t h e p u b l i c good i s s e r v e d by t h e e f f o r t s o f a n t a g o n i s t i c s e l f - i n t e r e s t g r o u p s w h i c h v i e w i t h e a c h o t h e r i n an e f f o r t t o p r o c u r e as much government a s s i s t a n c e as t h e y c a n . The p r e s s u r e s t h a t t h e s e v a r i o u s i n t e r e s t g r o u p s a p p l y t o o f f i c i a l s r e s u l t s i n a k i n d o f e q u i l i b r i u m w h i c h i s s u p p o s e d t o r e p r e s e n t , o r a t l e a s t a p p r o a c h , t h e common good.* * The c l e a r e s t a c c o u n t o f t h i s p o l i t i c a l t h e o r y i s p r o b a b l y R.P. W o l f f ' s a c c o u n t i n The P o v e r t y o f L i b e r a l i s m i n h i s c h a p t e r on " T o l e r a n c e " . 64 The second assumption a l s o s e r v e s a j u s t i f i c a t o r y r o l e s i n c e c a p i t a l i s m i s f e l t t o be the most e f f i c i e n t means o f c o n t i n u i n g t o s a t i s f y t h e i n s a t i a b l e p u r s u i t o f w e a l t h ; g i v e n t h e power o f t h i s d r i v e n o t h i n g l e s s t h a n a c o e r c i v e government would be adequate t o c o n t r o l p e o p l e ' s r a p a c i o u s n e s s and a s s u r e t h e s a f e t y o f l e g i t i m a t e w e a l t h . A l l t h e s e t h e o r i e s g a i n t h e i r p o p u l a r i t y from b o t h the s e r v i c e they do t o c a p i t a l i s t i d e o l o g y ( i n d e e d t h e y are t h e f o u n d a t i o n ) and the e x t e n t t o which they seem t o be based on a c c u r a t e s o c i a l o b s e r v a t i o n . They are a l s o p a r t o f t h e g e n e r a l a t o m i s t i c view of human b e h a v i o u r which i g n o r e s the e x t e n t t o which humans are p a r t i c i p a n t s i n a community and are shaped by t h i s e x p e r i e n c e . As a r e s u l t any r e f titration o f t h e s e views must i n v o l v e not o n l y a p h i l o s o p h i c a l a t t a c k on t h e i r substance,, b u t t h e development o f a more s o c i o l o g i c a l l y s o p h i s t i c a t e d a l t e r n a t i v e . Not s u r p r i s i n g l y , t h i s debate o v e r human n a t u r e and p o l i t i c s took e x a c t l y t h i s form a t i t s v e r y b e g i n n i n g — w i t h Thomas Hobbes (158 8-1669) a r t i c u l a t i n g t h e a t o m i s t i c t h e o r y o f man's i n s a t i a b l e s e l f i s h n e s s . Most p h i l o s o p h e r s a t t h i s time r e a c t e d w i t h o u t r a g e t o h i s d o c t r i n e , b u t i t was B i s h o p B u t l e r who most e f f e c t i v e l y a t t a c k e d t h e p s y c h o l o g i c a l p r e m i s e s on which i t was based. Because B u t l e r ' s r e f u t a t i o n i s a c l a s s i c o f p h i l o s o p h i c a n a l y s i s and because B u t l e r h i m s e l f s k e t c h e s an a l t e r n a t i v e t h e o r y o f human m o t i v a t i o n , i t i s w e l l w o r t h the e f f o r t t o s t u d y B u t l e r ' s work. B u t l e r i n t u r n l e a d s us t o o t h e r t h e o r i s t s o f the 18th c e n t u r y whose i n t e r e s t i n 65 "approbation" as a psychological force sets the qgro.uridwork for an alternative theory of human and s p e c i f i c a l l y p o l i t i c a l motivation. My concern i s not only with the question "do we always attempt to act i n our own in t e r e s t ? " , but also with the question "just what are our own i n t e r e s t s ? " . But before moving on to these questions we need a f u l l e r picture of Hobbes1 view. Hobbes was concerned to base his theory on a description of man i n a state of nature, but he ended up, as C.B. MacPherson and others have pointed out, describing the main c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the society of his own time. This society was characterized by a breaking down of the t r a d i t i o n a l constraints and obligatory systems. In the place of these r e s t r a i n t s the market gained ascendancy under the increasing domination of people who were avaricious and ruthless i n the pursuit of p r o f i t . That i t was also a time of the f i r s t burgeoning of the poor seems to have escaped Hobbes' notice. I t was, of course, the successful that gained Hobbes' attention, and who served as his example for people i n the state of nature. We may conjecture that the ease with which Hobbes attributed e s s e n t i a l l y market relations to a l l s o c i e t i e s was due to his having shared the view, common to men of the Renaissance, that c i v i l i z e d society was li m i t e d to c l a s s i c a l Greece and Rome and post-medieval western Europe. Since the c l a s s i c a l s o c i e t i e s were to some extent market so c i e t i e s they could e a s i l y be taken to f i t a model drawn primarily from the more completely market society of his own time. And once the model was established i t was not d i f f i c u l t to apply i t to the most nearly c i v i l i z e d section of a l l other s o c i e t i e s , 66 that i s , to the active upper classes of other s o c i e t i e s , for the relations between the men at the top i n non-market s o c i e t i e s tended to consist i n a competitive struggle for power that approximated the market r e l a t i o n . Whether or not thi s was the order of Hobbes 1s thought, and however consciously he drew his model from his appreciation of the market attributes of seventeenth-century society, i t i s clear that his model approximates most nearly to the model of the possessive market society. ' (Macpherson, 1962, p.67) * There i s no question that much of the p l a u s i b i l i t y of the proposition that a l l actions are s e l f i s h comes from the fact that there i s a great deal of s e l f i s h a c t i v i t y i n society as we know i t . But the re a l staying power of t h i s proposition comes from the ideology of capitalism, not simply from the fact that people are frequently s e l f i s h . In other words, i t i s not simply on the basis of "casual empiricism" that people conclude that most people are s e l f i s h , but rather on the basis of the id e o l o g i c a l myth used to support capitalism. This i s the myth that only a c a p i t a l i s t i c order,which allows and encourages individuals to maximize t h e i r personal i n t e r e s t , i s an e f f i c i e n t economic system. By accepting the s e l f i s h nature of man and allowing the i n v i s i b l e hand of the market mechanism to provide for the interests of the consumer, capitalism * Macpherson on possessive market society. "If a single c r i t e r i o n of the possessive market society i s wanted i t i s that man's labour i s a commodity, i . e . that a man's energy and s k i l l are his own yet are regarded not as in t e g r a l parts of his personality, but as possessions, the use and disposal of which he i s free to hand over to others for a pric e . " (Ibid., p.48) 67 provides the only r e a l i s t i c form of economic order. (Of course t h i s b e l i e f i s to some extent self-perpetuating. "After a l l , i f everyone else i s out for number one, then what choice do I have?"). Because man's "natural" s e l f i s h -ness plays such a fundamental role i n t h i s ideology, i t i s not surprising to f i n d the general claim that people are generally s e l f i s h , changed.to the i d e o l o g i c a l claim of "psychological egoism", v i z . , that a l l human actions are s e l f i s h . I t i s t h i s i d e o l o g i c a l claim that Butler so e f f e c t i v e l y refuted. As an i l l u s t r a t i o n of t h i s view we can quote Hobbes' analysis of 'charity' as the delight i n one's powers. There i s yet another passion sometimes c a l l e d love, but more properly good w i l l or charity. There can be no greater argument to a man, of his own power, than to f i n d himself able not only to accomplish his own desires, but also to a s s i s t other men i n t h e i r s : and t h i s i s that conception wherein consisteth charity. (Hobbes, 1969, p. 17) In a more contemporary idiom a person might argue that a l l actions are equally motivated by s e l f - i n t e r e s t ; a person who does good for the community or helps a f r i e n d i s actually seeking appreciation and the reward one gets from t h i s kind of a c t i v i t y . I f he does some s o c i a l l y worthy a c t i v i t y he i s sure to desire that i t receive some public praise and, i f he helps a f r i e n d , he r e a l i z e s that i n doing so he sets up a system of obligations such that his f r i e n d w i l l be l a t e r required to help him. (Hobbes describes friendship as one of the sources of power in Gh. 9 ,Sec. 9 of Human Nature) . On t h i s view even i n the case where there i s no such obvious s e l f -68 i n t e r e s t a person who engages i n a s o c i a l l y b e n e f i c i a l a c t i v i t y , such as donating anonymously to c h a r i t y , i s s t i l l seeking the pleasures and s a t i s f a c t i o n that one gets from such praiseworthy a c t i v i t y . The f i r s t objection that one i s i n c l i n e d to make to t h i s view, since i t involves an argument of p r i n c i p l e not a general-i z a t i o n of f a c t , i s to o f f e r an obvious counter-example. We have a l l heard s t o r i e s of the s o l d i e r who, by throwing himself on top of a hand grenade, assures his own death, but saves the l i v e s of those near him. This i s a counter-example because for i t to f i t i n t o the framework of s e l f i n t e r e s t , the s o l d i e r would need to l i v e i . e . there would need to be a s e l f which t h i s action could b e n e f i t . Of course those who believe i n an a f t e r l i f e . c o u l d well argue that i t was i n the i n t e r e s t of the s e l f / s o u l of the s o l d i e r , but i t i s usually not these people who are putting forward the argument for man's inherent s e l f i s h -ness. While t h i s counter-example gre a t l y weakens the absolute argument, i t does not do much for anyone who i s hoping to weaken the argument s u f f i c i e n t l y to put f o r t h an a l t e r n a t i v e ideology. In order to s u f f i c i e n t l y weaken the argument, we must show that non-selfish behaviour i s widespread enough, or p o t e n t i a l l y widespread enough, to provide a basis on which to b u i l d a society. In order words, to t r u l y counter the egoist's p o s i t i o n , we must not only refute i t for d i s p l a y i t s weaknesses), but develop an a l t e r n a t i v e account that equally s a t i s f i e s our i n t u i t i o n s . Fortunately Butler not only refutes Hobbes' view, 69 b u t he a c t u a l l y d e v e l o p s ' : a p o w e r f u l l y p o s i t i v e v i e w o f t h e human s i t u a t i o n and p o s s i b i l i t y . F o r t h i s r e a s o n i t i s w o r t h s t u d y i n g h i s arguments a t l e n g t h . I n t h e f i r s t o f h i s famous Sermons B u t l e r s t a t e s t h a t " I n t h e s e Sermons.... t h e c o m p a r i s o n w i l l be between t h e n a t u r e o f man as r e s p e c t i n g s e l f , and t e n d i n g t o p r i v a t e good, h i s own p r e s e r -v a t i o n and h a p p i n e s s ; and t h e n a t u r e o f man as h a v i n g r e s p e c t t o s o c i e t y , and t e n d i n g t o promote p u b l i c good, t h e h a p p i n e s s o f t h a t s o c i e t y . T hese ends do i n d e e d p e r f e c t l y c o i n c i d e ; and t o aim a t p u b l i c and p r i v a t e good a r e so f a r f r o m b e i n g i n c o n s i s t e n t , t h a t t h e y m u t u a l l y promote e a c h o t h e r : y e t i n t h e f o l l o w i n g d i s c o u r s e t h e y must be c o n s i d e r e d as e n t i r e l y d i s t i n c t ; o t h e r w i s e t h e n a t u r e o f man as t e n d i n g t o one, o r as t e n d i n g t o t h e o t h e r , c a n n o t be compared. T h e r e c a n no c o m p a r i s o n be made, w i t h o u t c o n s i d e r i n g t h e t h i n g s compared as d i s t i n c t and d i f f e r e n t . " ( B u t l e r , p. 18) To s u p p o r t t h i s c l a i m , B u t l e r a r g u e s t h a t t h e r e i s a n a t u r a l p r i n c i p l e o f b e n e v o l e n c e t h a t has t h e same r e l a t i o n t o s o c i e t y t h a t s e l f - l o v e has t o t h e i n d i v i d u a l . H a v i n g s t a t e d t h i s p r i n c i p l e he q u i c k l y adds a l o n g p o l e m i c a l f o o t n o t e r e f u t i n g H o b b e s 1 d e f i n i t i o n o f ' c h a r i t y ' q u o t e d a b o v e . He a c c u s e s Hobbes o f m i s c o n s t r u i n g l a n g u a g e i n an e f f o r t t o s u p p o r t h i s i n c r e d i b l e t h e o r y t h a t a l l human b e h a v i o u r i s m o t i v a t e d by a d e s i r e f o r power.* *"So t h a t i n t h e f i r s t p l a c e , I p u t f o r a g e n e r a l i n c l i n a t i o n o f a l l mankind, a p e r p e t u a l and r e s t l e s s d e s i r e f o r power a f t e r power, t h a t c e a s e t h o n l y i n d e a t h " ( H o b b e s , 1 9 6 2 , p. 80) I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o n o t e t h a t Hobbes d i d n o t r e a l l y f e e l t h i s m o t i v a t i o n t o be an a b s o l u t e , b u t r a t h e r d e r i v e d ( f o r most p e o p l e anyway) f r o m a d e s i r e f o r s e c u r i t y . As he p u t s i t : "And t h e ca u s e o f t h i s i s n o t a l w a y s t h a t a man hopes f o r a more i n t e n s i v e d e l i g h t , t h a t he has a l r e a d y a t t a i n e d t o ; o r t h a t he c a n n o t be c o n t e n t w i t h a m o d e r a t e power: b u t b e c a u s e he c a n n o t a s s u r e t h e power and means t o l i v e w e l l , w h i c h he h a t h p r e s e n t , w i t h o u t t h e a c q u i s i t i o n o f m o r e " . ( i b i d ) 70 ...And c o u l d any one be t h o r o u g h l y s a t i s f i e d , t h a t what i s commonly c a l l e d b e n e v o l e n c e o r g o o d - w i l l was r e a l l y t h e a f f e c t i o n meant, b u t o n l y by b e i n g made t o u n d e r s t a n d t h a t t h i s l e a r n e d p e r s o n h a d a g e n e r a l h y p o t h e s i s , t o w h i c h t h e a p p e a r a n c e o f g o o d - w i l l c o u l d no o t h e r w i s e be r e c o n c i l e d ? T h a t what has t h i s a p p e a r a n c e i s o f t e n n o t h i n g b u t a m b i t i o n ; t h a t d e l i g h t i n s u p e r i o r i t y o f t e n ( s u p p o s e a l w a ys) m i x e s i t s e l f w i t h b e n e v o l e n c e , o n l y makes i t more s p e c i o u s t o c a l l i t a m b i t i o n t h a n h u n g e r , o f t h e two: b u t i n r e a l i t y t h a t p a s s i o n does no more a c c o u n t f o r t h e whole a p p e a r a n c e s o f g o o d - w i l l , t h a n t h i s a p p e t i t e d o e s . I s t h e r e n o t o f t e n t h e a p p e a r a n c e o f one man's w i s h i n g t h a t good t o a n o t h e r , w h i c h he knows h i m s e l f u n a b l e t o p r o c u r e him; and r e j o i c i n g i n i t , t h o u g h b e s t o w e d by a t h i r d p e r s o n ? And c a n l o v e o f power any way p o s s i b l y come i n t o a c c o u n t f o r t h i s d e s i r e o r d e l i g h t ? I s t h e r e n o t o f t e n t h e a p p e a r a n c e o f men's d i s t i n g u i s h i n g b etween two o r more p e r s o n s , p r e f e r r i n g one b e f o r e a n o t h e r , t o do good t o , i n c a s e s where l o v e o f power c a n n o t i n t h e l e a s t a c c o u n t f o r t h e d i s t i n c t i o n and p r e f e r e n c e ? F o r t h i s p r i n c i p l e can no o t h e r w i s e d i s t i n g u i s h b etween o b j e c t s , t h a n as i t i s a g r e a t e r i n s t a n c e a n d e x e r t i o n o f power t o do g o od t o one r a t h e r t h a n t o a n o t h e r . A g a i n , s u p p o s e g o o d - w i l l i n t h e m i n d o f man t o be n o t h i n g b u t d e l i g h t i n t h e e x e r c i s e o f power; men m i g h t i n d e e d be r e s t r a i n e d by d i s t a n t and a c c i d e n t a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ; b u t t h e s e r e s t r a i n t s b e i n g removed, t h e y w o u l d have a d i s p o s i t i o n t o and d e l i g h t i n m i s c h i e f as an e x e r c i s e and p r o o f o f power: and t h i s d i s p o s i t i o n and d e l i g h t w o u l d a r i s e from, o r be t h e same p r i n c i p l e i n t h e mind, as a d i s p o s i t i o n t o , and d e l i g h t i n c h a r i t y . Thus c r u e l t y , as d i s t i n c t f r o m envy and r e s e n t m e n t w o u l d be e x a c t l y t h e same i n t h e mind o f man as g o o d - w i l l : t h a t one t e n d s t o t h e h a p p i n e s s , t h e o t h e r t o t h e m i s e r y o f o u r f e l l o w - c r e a t u r e s , i s , i t seems, m e r e l y an a c c i d e n t a l c i r c u m s t a n c e , w h i c h t h e mind has n o t t h e l e a s t r e g a r d t o . T h e s e a r e t h e a b s u r d -i t i e s w h i c h even men o f c a p a c i t y r u n . i n t o , when t h e y h a v e o c c a s i o n t o b e l i e t h e i r n a t u r e , . . . ' ( B u t l e r , p. 19) B u t l e r ' s arguments a r e : 1. The f a c t t h a t a m b i t i o n can be r e l a t e d t o b e n e v o l e n c e , 71 f a r from e s t a b l i s h i n g that these feelings are the same, presupposes that they are d i f f e r e n t . 2. People wish good for another even thoughv.they could not help t h i s person r e a l i z e h i s good, and 3. when such a person does receive the good he desires, the"Spectator" takes delight i n i t which could not be explained by proof of h i s own success. 4. I f the desire to be benevolent was simply the desire for pleasure of displaying and using one's power, then there would be no difference as f a r as t h i s i n t e n t i o n went between enjoying one's power i n doing harm to people and enjoying i t i n doing good, i . e . between benevolence and maliciousness. Bu t l e r explains the general error involved i n Hobbes' analysis i n sermon XII. The problem with Hobbes' analysis i s that he overlooks the f a c t that while we seek our own pleasure or happiness, we also seek the pleasure or even unhappiness of others without regard to our own i n t e r e s t . That the s a t i s f a c t i o n s of these desires bring us happiness means that we do i n f a c t have these o t h e r - r e d i r e c t e d desires d i s t i n c t from simply d e s i r i n g happiness. In f a c t personal happiness con-s i s t s l a r g e l y in the s a t i s f a c t i o n of these desires, so that having other motives than our immediate happiness i s actually a precondition for experiencing happiness, at l e a s t for exper-iencing the happiness of s a t i s f a c t i o n (and think of the extent to which that i s the primary source of happiness.). 72 H a v i n g d e m o n s t r a t e d one o f t h e a b s u r d i t i e s o f Hobbes' p s y c h o l o g y , B u t l e r t h e n goes on t o c o m p l e t e h i s own t h e o r y . He d i s t i n g u i s h e s " p a s s i o n s and a f f e c t i o n s " f r o m h i s two " p r i n c i p l e s " o f " s e l f - l o v e and b e n e v o l e n c e " . The p a s s i o n s , he c l a i m s , may a l s o l e a d t o a c t i o n s t h a t a r e b e n e v o l e n t , c o n t r i b u t e t o s e l f - i n t e r e s t , o r may e v e n r e s u l t i n harm t o o u r s e l v e s and o t h e r s . Take a " t y p i c a l p a s s i o n " - h u n g e r -i t c o n t r i b u t e s t o o u r w e l l - b e i n g , i n d e e d i t h e l p s s u s t a i n u s , b u t e q u a l l y , t h e p a s s i o n f o r f o o d may l e a d us t o i n d i g e s t i o n and g o u t . The same phenomenon h o l d s f o r s o c i a l p a s s i o n s s u c h as t h e d e s i r e f o r esteem. W h i l e t h i s d e s i r e may l e a d us t o c o n t r i b u t e t o s o c i e t y and i n t h a t way s e r v e t h e p r i n c i p l e o f b e n e v o l e n c e , i t t o o may l e a d us i n t o d i s a s t e r e i t h e r f o r o u r -s e l v e s o r f o r o u r s o c i e t y . L a s t l y , he o u t l i n e s t h e p r i n c i p l e o f r e f l e c t i o n by w h i c h we d i s t i n g u i s h between, and a p p r o v e and d i s a p p r o v e a c t i o n s - - t h i s p r i n c i p l e he c a l l s c o n s c i e n c e . T h i s i s a r e g u l a t i v e p r i n c i p l e _ . w h i c h w h i l e t e n d i n g t o w a r d t h e p u b l i c g o od r e a l l y s e r v e s b o t h o u r s e l v e s and o t h e r s , h e l p i n g t o a s s u r e t h a t we m a i n t a i n o u r r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s i n c a s e s where o u r n a t u r a l a f f e c t i o n s may be i n s u f f i c i e n t . " v " i From t h i s c o m p a r i s o n o f b e n e v o l e n c e and s e l f - l o v e , o f o u r p u b l i c and p r i v a t e a f f e c t i o n s o f t h e c o u r s e s o f l i f e t h e y l e a d t o , and o f t h e p r i n c i p l e o f r e f l e c t i o n o r c o n s c i e n c e as r e s p e c t i n g e a c h o f t h e m , i t i s as m a n i f e s t , t h a t we were made f o r s o c i e t y , and t o promote t h e h a p p i n e s s o f i t ; as t h a t we were i n t e n d e d t o t a k e c a r e o f o u r own l i f e , and h e a l t h , and p r i v a t e g o od. ( I b i d , p.22) W h i l e one may o b j e c t t o t h e d e s i g n o v e r t o n e s i n t h i s q u o t a t i o n , t h e r e c a n be no q u e s t i o n o f t h e g e n e r a l p o i n t t h a t 73 man i s a s o c i a l creature. As such we have i n c l i n a t i o n s and a b i l i t i e s to further and protect our community without which community l i f e would not be possible. That th i s s o c i a l side of our personality i s frequently undernourished i n our affluent culture does not refute Butler's claim. We can a l l r e a l i z e that: ...There i s such a natural p r i n c i p l e of attra c t i o n i n man towards man, that having trod the same tra c t of land, having breathed i n the same climate, barely having been born i n the same a r t i f i c i a l d i s t r i c t or d i v i s i o n , becomes the occasion of contracting acquaintances and f a m i l i a r i t i e s many years a f t e r : for anything may serve the purpose. Thus relations merely nominal are sought and invented, not by gover-nors, but by the lowest of the people; which are found s u f f i c i e n t to hold mankind., together i n l i t t l e f r a t e r n i t i e s and copartnerships: ; (Ibid p.23) He continues, giving a f i n a l and devastating rebuilt® to the state-of-nature t h e o r i s t s : ...Men are so much one body, that i n a peculiar manner they f e e l for each other, shame, sudden anger, resentment, honour, prosperity, d i s t r e s s ; one or another, or a l l of these, from the s o c i a l nature i n general, from benevolence upon the occasion of natural r e l a t i o n , acquaint-ance, protection, dependence; each of these being d i s t i n c t cements of society. And there-fore to have no r e s t r a i n t from, no regard to others i n our behaviour, i s the speculative absurdity of considering ourselves as single and independent, as having nothing i n our nature which has respect to our fellow creatures, reduced to action and practice. And this i s the same absurdity as to suppose a hand, or any part to have no natural respect to any other, or to the whole body. (Ibid) To the objection that he has not allowed for the obvious fact that people a l l too often do one another great 74 i n j u r y , B u t l e r r e p l i e s t h a t p e o p l e a l l t o o o f t e n do g r e a t i n j u r y t o t h e m s e l v e s . 7And % i , . v : ~ I f i t be s a i d , t h a t t h e r e a r e p e r s o n s i n t h e w o r l d , who a r e i n g r e a t measure w i t h o u t t h e n a t u r a l a f f e c t i o n s t o w a r d s t h e i r f e l l o w -c r e a t u r e s : t h e r e a r e l i k e w i s e i n s t a n c e s o f p e r s o n s w i t h o u t t h e common n a t u r a l a f f e c t i o n s t o t h e m s e l v e s : b u t t h e n a t u r e o f man i s n o t t o be j u d g e d o f by e i t h e r o f t h e s e , b u t by what a p p e a r s i n t h e common w o r l d , i n t h e b u l k o f m a n k i n d . ( I b i d , p. 29) He a l s o p o i n t s o u t t h e " a c c i d e n t a l " q u a l i t y o f much e v i l . . . .whereas t h e r e i s p l a i n l y b e n e v o l e n c e o r g o o d - w i l l ; t h e r e i s no', s u c h t h i n g as l o v e o f i n j u s t i c e , o p p r e s s i o n , t r e a c h e r y , i n g r a t i t u d e ; b u t o n l y e a g e r d e s i r e s a f t e r s u c h and s u c h e x t e r n a l goods; w h i c h , a c c o r d i n g t o a v e r y a n c i e n t o b s e r v a t i o n , t h e most abandoned w o u l d c h o o s e t o o b t a i n by i n n o c e n t means, i f t h e y were as e a s y , and as e f f e c t u a l t o t h e i r e n d : t h a t even e m u l a t i o n and r e s e n t m e n t , by any one who w i l l c o n s i d e r what t h e s e p a s s i o n s r e a l l y a r e i n n a t u r e , w i l l be f o u n d n o t h i n g t o t h e p u r p o s e o f t h i s o b j e c t i o n : and t h a t t h e p r i n -c i p l e s and p a s s i o n s i n t h e mind o f man, w h i c h a r e d i s t i n c t b o t h f r o m s e l f - l o v e and b e n e v o l e n c e p r i m a r i l y and most d i r e c t l y l e a d t o r i g h t b e h a v i o u r w i t h r e g a r d t o o t h e r s as w e l l as h i m s e l f , and o n l y s e c o n d a r i l y and a c c i d e n t a l l y t o what i s e v i l . " ( I b i d ) I n a l a t e r Sermon "Upon t h e l o v e o f o u r n e i g h b o r " , B u t l e r p r o v i d e s a u s e f u l r e v i e w o f h i s argument and i t i s w o r t h q u o t i n g a t l e n g t h h e r e b e f o r e e x p l o r i n g h i s p o s i t i o n f u r t h e r . ''''VH E v e r y p a r t i c u l a r a f f e c t i o n , e v e n t h e l o v e o f o u r n e i g h b o u r , i s as r e a l l y o u r own a f f e c t i o n , as s e l f - l o v e ; and t h e p l e a s u r e a r i s i n g f r o m i t s g r a t i f i c a t i o n i s as much my own p l e a s u r e , as t h e p l e a s u r e s e l f - l o v e w o u l d h a v e , f r o m knowing I m y s e l f s h o u l d be happy some t i m e h e n c e , w o u l d be my own p l e a s u r e . /And i f , b e c a u s e e v e r y p a r t i c u l a r a f f e c t i o n i s a man's own, and t h e p l e a s u r e a r i s i n g f r o m i t s g r a t i f i -c a t i o n h i s own p l e a s u r e , o r p l e a s u r e t o h i m s e l f , 75 such p a r t i c u l a r a f f e c t i o n must be c a l l e d s e l f -love; according to thi s way of speaking, no creature whatever can possibly act but merely from s e l f - l o v e ; and every action and every a f f e c t i o n whatever i s to be resolved up into this one p r i n c i p l e . But then t h i s i s not the language of mankind: or i f i t were, we should want words to express the difference, between the p r i n c i p l e of an action, proceeding from cool consideration that i t w i l l be to my own advantage; and an action, suppose of revenge, or of friendship, by which a man runs upon certain ruin, to do e v i l or good to another. It i s manifest the p r i n c i p l e s of these actions are t o t a l l y d i f f e r e n t , and so want d i f f e r e n t words to be distinguished by: a l l that they agree in i s , that they both proceed from, and are done to g r a t i f y an i n c l i n a t i o n i n a man's s e l f . But the p r i n c i p l e or i n c l i n a t i o n i n one case i s s e l f - l o v e ; i n the other, hatred or love of another. There i s then a d i s t i n c t i o n between the cool p r i n c i p l e of s e l f - l o v e , or general desire of our happiness, as one part of our nature, and one p r i n c i p l e of action; and the pa r t i c u l a r affections towards p a r t i c u l a r external objects, as another part of our nature, and another p r i n c i p l e of action. How much soever therefore i s to be allowed to s e l f - l o v e , yet i t cannot be allowed to be the whole of our inward constitution; because, you see, there are other parts or p r i n c i p l e s which come into i t . (Ibid, p. 100-101) Leaving the absolute argument for egoism, Butler goes on to deal with the supposed tension between s e l f - l o v e and benevolence, as he remarks: ...there i s generally thought.to be some peculiar kind of contrariety between s e l f - l o v e and the love of our neighbour, between the pursuit of public and of private good; insomuch that when you are recommending one of these, you are supposed to be speaking against the other; and from hence arises a secret prejudice against, and frequently open scorn of a l l talk of public s p i r i t , and real goodwill to our fellow creatures; (Ibid, p.99) To demonstrate the weakness of the supposition of "contrariety" 76 B u t l e r r e p e a t e d l y shows t h e e x t e n t t o w h i c h t h e p u r s u i t o f p r i v a t e i n t e r e s t c an l e a d t o u n h a p p i n e s s ( i . e . n o t s e r v e t h e p r i n c i p l e o f s e l f - l o v e ) and t h e e x t e n t t o w h i c h c o n c e r n f o r o t h e r s c an l e a d t h e i n d i v i d u a l t o h a p p i n e s s . I n a d d i t i o n he a r g u e s t h a t when some p u r s u i t o f a p r i v a t e i n t e r e s t i s f r u s t r a t e d t h e r e i s o n l y u n h a p p i n e s s , b u t when t h e p u r s u i t o f some o t h e r ' s i n t e r e s t i s f r u s t r a t e d t h e r e i s a t l e a s t t h e s a t i s f a c t i o n o f knowing t h a t one was t r y i n g t o do good. He t h e n a s k s how i t i s t h a t t h i s b e l i e f a b o u t t h e o p p o s i t i o n between s e l f - l o v e and b e n e v o l e n c e a r o s e . The g e n e r a l m i s t a k e , t h a t t h e r e i s some g r e a t e r i n c o n s i s t e n c e between e n d e a v o u r i n g t o promote t h e good o f a n o t h e r and s e l f - i n t e r e s t t h a n between s e l f - i n t e r e s t and p u r s u i n g a n y t h i n g e l s e , seems, as h a t h a l r e a d y b e e n h i n t e d ' , t o a r i s e f r o m o u r n o t i o n s o f p r o p e r t y ; and t o be c a r r i e d on by t h i s p r o p e r t y ' s b e i n g s u p p o s e d t o be i t s e l f o u r h a p p i n e s s o r good. P e o p l e a r e so v e r y much t a k e n up w i t h t h i s one s u b j e c t t h a t t h e y seem f r o m i t t o have f o r m e d a g e n e r a l way o f t h i n k i n g , w h i c h t h e y a p p l y t o o t h e r t h i n g s t h a t t h e y have n o t h i n g t o do w i t h . And so f a r as i t i s t a k e n f o r g r a n t e d , t h a t b a r e l y h a v i n g t h e means and m a t e r i a l s o f e n j o y m e n t i s what c o n s t i t u t e s i n t e r e s t and h a p p i n e s s ; t h a t o u r i n t e r e s t o r good c o n s i s t s i n p o s s e s s i o n s them-s e l v e s , i n h a v i n g t h e p r o p e r t y o f r i c h e s , h o u s e s , l a n d s , g a r d e n s , n o t i n t h e e n j o y m e n t o f them; so f a r i t w i l l e v e n more s t r o n g l y be t a k e n f o r g r a n t e d , i n t h e way a l r e a d y e x p l a i n e d , t h a t an a f f e c t i o n ' s c o n d u c i n g t o t h e good o f a n o t h e r , must e v e n n e c e s s a r i l y o c c a s i o n i t t o condu c e l e s s t o p r i v a t e good, i f n o t t o be p o s i t i v e l y d e t r i m e n t a l t o i t . F o r , i f p r o p e r t y and h a p p i n e s s a r e one and t h e same t h i n g , as by i n c r e a s i n g t h e p r o p e r t y o f a n o t h e r , y o u must l e s s e n y o u r own h a p p i n e s s . B u t w h a t e v e r o c c a s i o n e d t h e m i s t a k e , I hope i t has b e e n f u l l y p r o v e d t o be one; as i t has b e e n p r o v e d , t h a t t h e r e i s no p e c u l i a r r i v a l s h i p o r c o m p e t i t i o n b etween s e l f - l o v e and b e n e v o l e n c e : t h a t as t h e r e may be a c o m p e t i t i o n between t h e two, so t h e r e may a l s o between any p a r t i c u l a r a f f e c t i o n w h a t e v e r and s e l f - l o v e ; t h a t e v e r y 77 p a r t i c u l a r a f f e c t i o n , benevolence among the re s t , i s subservient to s e l f - l o v e by being the instrument of private enjoyment; and that i n one respect benevolence contributes more to private i n t e r e s t , i . e . enjoyment or s a t i s f a c t i o n , than any other of the p a r t i c u l a r common affe c t i o n s as i t i s i n a degree i t s own g r a t i f i c a t i o n . (Ibid, p.108-109) Unfortunately^ Butler' s hope to have destroyed the f a l l a c i o u s b e l i e f i n the analogy between property and happiness was not r e a l i z e d . I t has become a l l toowidely accepted that happiness i s to be equated with p r o f i t and private i n t e r e s t , M and cool s e l f - l o v e with a balance sheet. The r a t i o n a l egoist has become a popular psychological model for the human being, even i n the moral realm, to the more or less t o t a l elimination of the "benevolent" and public s p i r i t e d side of humanity. But i t appears that the e c o l o g i c a l c r i s i s which emphasizes the s e l f -destructive nature of the b e l i e f i n the private source of hap-piness may help eliminate t h i s narrow conception of " i n t e r e s t " and the good l i f e . For we can not, I think, expect a more eloquent account than Butler's of the enormous error involved i n equating human int e r e s t s and values with property and money. But the widespread appreciation of t h i s error requires more than i n c i s i v e c r i t i c i s m . Indeed, despite Butler's work, t h i s error has continued i n dramatic form through the 19th and well, into the 2 0th century. Some of the blame for the continunace of t h i s unfortunate error can be ascribed to the early u t i l i t a r i a n s , s u c h as Bentham, who shared Hobbes' psychology. The likeness of Bentham's f e l i c i f i c c alculus to a calculus of p r o f i t and loss made the u t i l i t a r i a n e t h i c a l system a natural t o o l f o r 19th and 20th century econo-mists who had only to equate happiness with 78 increasing r e a l income. And the crowning achievement of this misequation of wealth and well being was the placing of the GN.P. as the ultimate measure of s o c i a l and national well being. The GNP. 'came to play in the assessment of nation-a l success what the percent of p r o f i t t r a d i t i o n a l l y played in the assessment of the firm. What has become of the theory of human nature put forth by Hobbes now that it-has gained the stature; of a dominant-ideology? Roughly, i t has developed into the following set of propos-i t i o n s : 1. People have an e s s e n t i a l l y unlimited set of wants. 2. These wants are primarily for i n d i v i d u a l consumer goods. 3. Happiness consists i n the s a t i s f a c t i o n s of these wants. Therefore, the function of morality and government i s to art i c u l a t e and enforce those rules which would be most conducive to the maximization of aggregate s a t i s f a c t i o n , i . e . to :the maximization of national wealth.* In other words, the function of government should be to f a c i l i t a t e the co-operation of individuals in t h e i r pursuit of i n d i v i d u a l happiness so that the e g o i s t i c pursuit of each i n d i v i d u a l does not re s u l t i n the * At this point some pro forma mention i s made of j u s t i c e , but this i s c l e a r l y not a dominant concern—there i s no quarterly publication of the "j u s t i c e index". 79 the defeat of a l l by a l l (cf. Rousseau and Hardin). The government has no r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r shaping or c o n t r o l l i n g * people's wants. (Prohibition was the ultimate proof that such governmental e f f o r t s are disastrous.) II C l e a r l y no e c o l o g i c a l l y r a d i c a l thesis can be based on the above presuppositions. Either we look gloomily forward to a time when there w i l l be a widespread lack of s a t i s f a c t i o n because of a widespread lack of goods,-or we must naively hope that technology w i l l discover some way to s a t i s f y the growing l i s t of human wants against a background of diminishing resources. But despite the widespread popularity of the psychology on \ i which t h i s dichotomy i s based, there i s norneed to accept these a l t e r n a t i v e s . Humans simply do not f i t the model. In f a c t we have a whole range of desires that do not require goods for t h e i r s a t i s f a c t i o n s , and that are more dependent on the q u a l i t y of s o c i a l l i f e than the prevalence of wealth f o r t h e i r r e a l -i z a t i o n . These are the s o c i a l desires that B u t l e r elaborates: to be with friends, to display and share one's a b i l i t i e s , to work cooperatively and for the common good, to share ectasy, d e l i g h t , love and s o l i d a r i t y , to be someone i n the community, to f u l f i l l one's r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s , to gain honour, etc. Any theory which wishes to go beyond the narrow e g o i s t i c view expressed i n the U t i l i t a r i a n (and Hobbesian) 80 psychology must be able to take into account the wide variety of " a l t r u s i t i c " motives which actually govern human behaviour. Not s u r p r i s i n g l y other theories have been developed along the general l i n e s sketched by Butler which refute that narrow view of motivation. One quite contemporary theory i s put forth by R.P. Wolff i n his essay "Community". (Wolff, pp. 162-195) In this essay Wolff points out that these s o c i a l desires d i f f e r from e g o i s t i c desires i n that they involve the e s s e n t i a l reference not only to the state of mind of the agent, but also to that of other members of his community. In elab-orating his point, Wolff makes a number of d i s t i n c t i o n s : the f i r s t i s between "private values" and "interpersonal values". The "private value" i s "an object of i n t e r e s t whose d e f i n i t i o n makes es s e n t i a l reference to the occurrence of a state of consciousness i n exactly one person". For example, a private value would be one which had as i t s object a certain pleasure-able awareness i n the person with the desire. This i s the standard value of the egoist. There are, as Wolff points out, also "compound private values". We can, f o r example seek pleasureable states of consciousness i n any number of people, and this i s the object of our u t i l i t a r i a n i n t e r e s t s . But there i s another set of values that Wolff c a l l s "interpersonal values" which he defines as "a possible object of i n t e r e s t whose d e f i n i t i o n makes e s s e n t i a l reference to a thought about an actual state of consciousness i n another person". For example: i f Smith desires to make a g i f t to Jones and desires not only that Jones be happy, but that Smith knows that Jones i s happy, then Smith holds an 11 interpersonal value". In this example Smith i s interested not only i n his own p a r t i c u l a r pleasure at 81 knowing: his pleasure was based upon knowing something about Jones 1 state of mind. Using his d e f i n i t i o n of interpersonal value, Wolff goes on to define a " s o c i a l value", namely a state of a f f a i r s whose d e f i n i t i o n makes e s s e n t i a l reference to a r e c i p r o c a l state of awareness among two or more persons. To use the Smith and Jones example, this would be a case where Smith not only knew that Jones was made happy by his (Smith's) g i f t , but also that Jones was aware of the happiness which his own happiness brought to Smith. In spite of the l i n g u i s t i c complexity of expressing t h i s thought, i t i s clear that s o c i a l values are fundamental interpersonal values. We desire, as Wolff points out not simply happiness, but a communication of i t , a sharing, a community. We desire to share, and to experience mutual awareness of this sharing. I t seems clear that t h i s i s a f a i r l y i n s i g h t f u l rendi-tion of the pleasures of community. We might even say of someone who i s lonely (or who feels the lack of community) that what he/she lacks i s the p o s s i b i l i t y of mutual awareness or " r e ciprocal awareness". I t i s also clear that this range of s o c i a l desires i s a fundamental aspect of human nature, and i s at least as c r u c i a l to a sense of well being (I would argue fa r more crucial) as i s the s a t i s f a c t i o n of simple private wants. But even this c r i t i c i s m i s inadequate i n a fundamental way: i t ignores the role played by people's self-conception. The e f f e c t of community on individuals manifests i t s e l f i n the creation of a sense of s e l f , of who one i s and of who one 82 wishes to become. As Plamenatz states i n his c r i t i c i s m s of the U t i l i t a r i a n s : ...Man i s not just an animal who, unlike the others, i s provident and c a l c u l a t i n g ; who can forgo s a t i s f y i n g present wants i n order to put himself i n the way of getting more of what he wants i n the future; who, i n the process of working with others for mutual benefit, comes to have more and more wants; and who acquires a set of moral standards to r e s t r a i n him as a competitor and encourage him as a collaborator with others. He i s a self-conscious, s e l f -communing, animal who sees his l i f e i n the round, who knows that he must die, who i s his own most constant companion, whose desires are often fantasies, who wants to be one kind of person rather than another and to l i v e one kind of l i f e rather than another. He i s , as Hegel might put i t , 'his own object'; he has some image of himself, more or less variable,, more or less obscure, which i t matters to him' Enormous should be true; some idea of what i s proper to him or worthy of him. He i s the happier and the more secure and easy i n his mind, the more c o n f i -dent he i s that the image i s true and the better or the more impressive i t appears to other people. Just as we are interested i n ourselves as persons rather than as subjects of desire pursuing s a t i s f a c t i o n s , so too are we interested i n others. I t i s as persons, much more than as competitors and collaborators for the s a t i s f a c -tion of wants, that we hate and love one another; that we f e e l pride, envy, and gratitude. Our wants flow l a r g e l y from the ideas we have of ourselves and our neighbours, and the kind of l i f e we want to l i v e . '* (Plamenatz, 1958, p.p. 174-175) Plamenatz' theme has been elaborated i n great d e t a i l by Arthur Lovejoy i n his Reflections on Human Nature, and before trying to derive the p o l i t i c a l implications of t h i s view i t w i l l be useful to study Lovejoy's account. * See Ibid pp.. 174-76 also for c r i t i c i s m of U t i l i t a r i a n s ignoring the value that individuals place on the kind of community i n which they l i v e , and community l o y a l t y . 83 Lovejoy begins by distinguishing between two d i f f e r -ing kinds of desires: desires for c e r t a i n ends, and desires for what he c a l l s " a d j e c t i v a l values". While we are a l l fa m i l i a r with the desire for ends, the term "a d j e c t i v a l values", needs some explanation. These latter values or desires are very close to what we mean by the desire for certain roles. A person desires not only goods (e.g. the car), but to think of himself i n certain ways (shrewd, kind, generous, quick, b e a u t i f u l , etc.) and to be thought of i n these ways by others. He also desires to avoid having to think of himself i n certain ways (gluttonous, s e l f i s h , cowardly, ugly, etc.) and, once again, desires others not to see him i n t h i s way. This grammar of motives, the concern for a d j e c t i v a l q u a l i t i e s as opposed to "nominal" ends, r e f l e c t s the d i s t i n c -t i o n i n human motives made by Flamenatz i n his argument with the u t i l i t a r i a n s . Lovejoy expresses t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n as the difference between "the wish to get, or achieve something Jay one's acts, and the wish to be something i n one's acts,.... V/e must therefore d i s t i n g u i s h — a n d the d i s t i n c t i o n i s , I think, a fundamental but much neglected one—between what we may c a l l terminal values and a d j e c t i v a l values." .(Lovejoy, p.80) To illuminate t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n , Lovejoy c i t e s the example of the victims of the In q u i s i t i o n who obviously had no desire for the "end" of t h e i r action (being burned was not a terminal value), but who "presumably shrank from abjuring 84 t h e i r a c t u a l b e l i e f s and o f t h i n k i n g o f t h e m s e l v e s as r e n e g a d e s o r c o w a r d s t h i s m o t i v e b e i n g more p o w e r f u l i n them ( t h a n t h e a v e r s i o n t o t h e end s t a t e o f b e i n g b u r n e d ] , t h e y r e f u s e d t o r e c a n t t h e i r h e r e s y " . ( I b i d ) I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o compare t h i s a n a l y s i s t o t h e t y p e o f a n a l y s i s o f f e r e d by Hobbes a t t h e b e g i n n i n g o f t h e c h a p t e r . Hobbes d e f i n e s c h a r i t y ( o r t h e d e s i r e t o be c h a r i t a b l e ) as t h e d e s i r e o f a p e r s o n t o p r o v e t o h i m s e l f t h e m a g n i t u d e o f h i s power: a m a g n i t u d e w h i c h a l l o w s him n o t o n l y t o a c c o m p l i s h h i s own p r o j e c t , b u t t o f a c i l i t a t e t h o s e o f o t h e r s . What B u t l e r p o i n t s o u t i s t h a t t h i s e x p l a n a t i o n i g n o r e d t h e o b v i o u s p o i n t t h a t p e o p l e d e s i r e j u s t t o be c h a r i t a b l e ; t h e y may a l s o d e s i r e s i m p l y t o g i v e t o a p a r t i c u l a r c h a r i t y . B u t what L o v e j o y adds i s t h a t t h e r e i s a v e r y r e a l p l e a s u r e t h a t one c a n t a k e i n b e i n g t h e s o r t o f p e r s o n who i s g e n e r o u s , and t h e r e i s t h e a v o i d a n c e o f t h e d i s p l e a s u r e i n v i e w i n g o n s e l f as c h e a p o r s e l f i s h . I t i s n o t s i m p l y f o r e n d s , o r f o r t h e e x e r c i s e o f o u r powers, t h a t we do c e r t a i n a c t i o n s , r a t h e r i t i s b e c a u s e we have a c e r t a i n v i e w o f o u r s e l v e s as a g e n t s , as a c e r t a i n k i n d o f p e r s o n , v i z . g e n e r o u s , c o n s i d e r a t e o f o t h e r s , e t c . The e c o n o m i s t and t h e i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c s o c i a l t h e o r i s t u s u a l l y i g n o r e t h i s f u n d a m e n t a l m o t i v a t i o n , o r v i e w i t as an e s s e n t i a l l y i r r a t i o n a l c o n c e r n ( s u c h as e n v y ) . They i n t u r n a n a l y z e human w e l l - b e i n g i n t e r m s o f m a x i m i z i n g p l e a s u r e s o r consumer s a t i s f a c t i o n s , i . e . i n t e r m s o f " n o m i n a l o r t e r m i n a l e n d s " . F o r t u n a t e l y , f r o m t h e e c o l o g i c a l p o i n t o f v i e w , t h e u t i l i t a r i a n 85 analysis of human motivation simply i n terms of i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c terminal values comes woefully short of being the complete account. "Fortunately',' because had t h i s been a true analysis, then the p o s s i b i l i t y of maintaining even the current l e v e l of human happiness i n the face of economic r e s t r a i n t would be dim indeed. I f the only way to make people happy, was to continually s a t i s f y t h e i r ever expanding l i s t s of "needs" and wants, then happiness and e c o l o g i c a l s t a b i l i t y would be incompatible. By understanding human behaviour i n terms Of s e l f -consciousness, with the r e a l i z a t i o n that much of our s e l f -conception flows from the society i n which we f i n d ourselves, we lay the foundation for an a l t e r n a t i v e theory of human happiness which i s not based on the possession of goods, but on the possession of s e l f (and community) esteem. I t i s to the development of such a theory that we now turn. I I I . . H i s t o r i c a l c r e d i t f or the development of.a"social" theory of economic motivation i s usually given to Thorstein Veblen, whose anthropological account of the behaviour of the American r i c h at the turn of the century gained great popularity. Veblen's t h e s i s , frequently misstated, i s that the r i c h i n America act ju s t l i k e the r i c h i n any "pr i m i t i v e " s i t u a t i o n , that i s , they use t h e i r wealth to e s t a b l i s h t h e i r superior 86 s o c i a l s i t u a t i o n . The famous phrase "conspicuous consumption" merely ref e r s to a part of the whole syndrome of behaviour (another aspect being, f o r example, manners) which the wealthy (mostly "nouveau riche") use to legitimate and display t h e i r s o c i a l p o s i t i o n . But the general claim, that a large part of people's motivation f o r the a c q u i s i t i o n of wealth and the consumption of goods r e s u l t s from the desire for status, was made centuries ago by none other than Adam Smith. Not, of course, i n his economic t r e a t i s e , The Wealth of Nations, but rather i n h i s e a r l i e r , more psyc h o l o g i c a l l y subtle work, the Theory of Moral Sentiments. Since Smith seems to be a proponent both of the view that man i s an innate consumer seeking ever more goods (and ever more p r o f i t ) , and the view that man's consumption patterns, are determined by considerations of prestige ( i . e . are s o c i a l l y , not innately, determined), i t i s obviously worthwhile to review the two accounts that he o f f e r s . While the supposition that humans are primarily .consumers seeking a never ending c o l l e c t i o n of pleasurable consumer goods i s never e x p l i c i t l y stated by Smith (the economist), i t i s c l e a r l y fundamental to his analysis. This i s true despite his own claim that the fundamental p r i n c i p l e for his analysis of the wealth of nations i s the human tendency to "truck, barter and exchange". As he puts i t : "whether t h i s propensity be ' one of those o r i g i n a l p r i n c i p l e s i n human nature, of which no further account can be given: or whether, as seems more probable, i t be the necessary consequence 87 of the f a c i l i t i e s of reason and speech, i t belongs not to our present subject to enquire." (Smith, 19-48;, p. 342) But i t seems clear that Smith did not believe that we had an innate "drive" to "truck, barter and exhange". And while there are no doubt certa i n pleasures involved i n the a c t i v i t y of the market place, i t i s not these pleasures which bring most people to engage i n "trucking, bartering and exchanging". In fact t h i s "propensity" i s not an urge, but a capacity based on man's a b i l i t y , as Smith suggested, to use reason and speech i n the pursuit of his economic i n t e r e s t . We need not, therefore, dwell on t h i s propensity except to note that i t i s not i n " i t s e l f a constituent of human nature. On the other hand, Smith does employ a theory of motivation in his work, v i z . man's urge to pursue his own economic in t e r e s t . As he says: "Man has almost constant occasion for the help of his brethren, and i t i s i n vain for him to expect i t from t h e i r benevolence only. He w i l l be more l i k e l y to p r e v a i l i f he can in t e r e s t t h e i r s e l f - l o v e i n his favour, and show them that i t i s for t h e i r advantage to do for him what he requires of them. Whoever offers to another a bargain of any kind, proposes to do t h i s : Give me that which I want and you s h a l l have th i s which you want, i s the meaning of every such o f f e r ; and i t i s i n th i s manner that we obtain from one another the far greater part of those good o f f i c e s which we stand i n need of. It i s not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from t h e i r regard to t h e i r own i n t e r e s t . We address ourselves, not to t h e i r humanity, but to t h e i r s e l f - l o v e , and never talk to them of our own necessities, but of t h e i r advantages." (Smith, 1948, p.343) 88 While never denying the basic asumption stated above, Smith does employ a sophisticated analysis of the notion of s e l f - i n t e r e s t . An i n t e r e s t i n g example of his r e j e c t i o n of a "vulgar" understanding of s e l f i n t e r e s t , i . e . the use of ' s e l f i n t e r e s t ' which equates i t with monetary gain, i s given by his analysis of the alternative schemes for paying university professors: (In some) ...u n i v e r s i t i e s the teacher i s prohibited from receiving any honorary of fee from his pu p i l s , and his salary constitutes the whole of the revenue which he derives from his o f f i c e . His  i n t e r e s t i s , i n this case, set as d i r e c t l y i n opposition to his duty as i t i s possible to set i t . I t i s the i n t e r e s t of every man to l i v e as much at his ease as he can; and i f his emoluments are to be p r e c i s e l y the same, whether he does, or does not perform some very laborious duty, i t i s ce r t a i n l y his i n t e r e s t at least as i n t e r e s t i s  vulgarly understood, e i t h e r to neglect i t altogether, or, i f he i s subject to some autho-r i t y which w i l l not s u f f e r him to do t h i s , to perform i t i n as careless and slovenly a manner as that authority w i l l permit. (Smith, 1957, p.110) (my emphasis) Later he does admit that there are some s o c i a l or " a d j e c t i v a l " pressures which encourage the s a l a r i e d professors to do a good job. If the teacher happens to be a man of sense, i t must be an unpleasant thing to him to be •• conscious, while he i s l e c t u r i n g his students, that he i s e i t h e r speaking or reading nonsense, or what i s very l i t t l e better than nonsense. I t must too be unpleasant to him to observe that the greater part of his students desert his lectures; or perhaps attend upon them with p l a i n enough marks of neglect, contempt, and derision. I f he i s obliged, therefore, to give a certain number of lectures, these motives alone, without any other i n t e r e s t might dispose him to take some pains to give tolerably good ones.""* (Ibid, p. 112-113) *Nonetheless, Smith recommends the student pay system! 89 W h i l e h i s u s e o f ' i n t e r e s t ' i n t h e s e p a s s a g e s i n d i c a t e s t h a t he i s aware o f a non - " v u l g a r " s e n s e o f ' i n t e r e s t ' , The  W e a l t h o f N a t i o n s i s c l e a r l y an e x p l o r a t i o n o f t h e w o r k i n g o u t o f t h e v u l g a r s e n s e . B u t i t i s i m p o r t a n t t o n o t e t h a t e v e n S m i t h , when he was r e f l e c t i n g s e r i o u s l y on human n a t u r e and n o t j u s t b e i n g an e c o n o m i s t , d i d n o t h o l d t o t h e t h e o r y o f man's b a s i c and c o n s t a n t p u r s u i t o f h i s e c o n o m i c i n t e r e s t . I n h i s T h e o r y  o f M o r a l S e n t i m e n t s , he a r g u e s t h a t a f t e r e s s e n t i a l needs a r e met, a c q u i s i t i o n i s m o t i v a t e d by t h e p u r s u i t o f s t a t u s . As he p u t s i t : " I t i s c h i e f l y f r o m . . . r e g a r d t o t h e s e n t i m e n t s o f mankind t h a t we p u r s u e r i c h e s and a v o i d p o v e r t y . F o r t o what p u r p o s e i s a l l t h e t o i l and b u s t l e o f t h i s w o r l d ? What i s t h e end o f a v a r i c e and a m b i t i o n , o f t h e p u r s u i t o f w e a l t h o f power and p r e - e m i n e n c e ? Is, i t t o s u p p l y t h e n e c e s s i t i e s o f n a t u r e ? The wages o f t h e meanest l a b o u r e r c a n s u p p l y them... What t h e n i s t h e c a u s e o f o u r a v e r s i o n t o h i s s i t u a t i o n ? From whence, t h e n , a r i s e s t h a t e m u l a t i o n w h i c h runs... t h r o u g h a l l t h e d i f f e r e n t r a n k s o f men, and what a r e t h e a d v a n t a g e s o f t h a t g r e a t p u r p o s e o f human l i f e w h i c h we c a l l b e t t e r i n g o u r c o n d i t i o n ? To be o b s e r v e d , t o be a t t e n d e d t o , t o be t a k e n n o t i c e o f w i t h sympathy, c o m p l a c e n c y and a p p r o b a t i o n , a r e a l l t h e a d v a n t a g e s w h i c h we c a n p r o p o s e t o d e r i v e f r o m i t . I t i s t h e v a n i t y n o t t h e e a s e o r t h e p l e a s u r e , w h i c h i n t e r e s t s u s . B u t v a n i t y i s a l w a y s f o u n d e d upon o u r b e l i e f o f o u r b e i n g t h e o b j e c t o f a t t e n t i o n and a p p r o b a t i o n . The r i c h man g l o r i e s i n h i s r i c h e s , b e c a u s e he f e e l s t h a t t h e y n a t u r a l l y draw upon h i m t h e a t t e n t i o n o f t h e w o r l d . . . A t t h e t h o u g h t s o f t h i s , h i s h e a r t seems t o s w e l l and d i l a t e i t s e l f w i t h i n him, and he i s f o n d e r o f h i s w e a l t h upon t h i s a c c o u n t t h a n f o r a l l t h e o t h e r a d v a n t a g e s i t p r o c u r e s him. The p o o r man, on t h e c o n t r a r y , i s ashamed o f h i s p o v e r t y . He f e e l s t h a t i t e i t h e r p l a c e s h i m o u t s i g h t o f mankind, o r t h a t i f t h e y t a k e any n o t i c e o f him, t h e y h a v e , however s c a r c e l y any f e l l o w - f e e l i n g w i t h t h e m i s e r y and d i s t r e s s w h i c h he s u f f e r s . He i s m o r t i f i e d and 90 distressed upon both accounts; for though to be overlooked and to be disapproved of, are things e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t , yet as obscurity covers us from the daylight of honour and approbation, to f e e l that we are taken no notice of, neces-s a r i l y damps the most agreeable hope, and d i s -appoints the most ardent desire of human nature." (Smith, 1948, pp. 92-93) While t h i s theory can obviously be compared to Veblen's, an important d i s t i n c t i o n should be made. Veblen's theory was concentrated primarily on the consumption patterns of wealthy Americans, whereas Smith's theory i s directed not towards consumption, but towards the drive for the accumulation of wealth. Indeed i t would be surprising i f the drive for the possession of wealth (e.g. money i n the bank) was motivated simply by the pleasure such possession accords; accumulation i s c l e a r l y an instrumental a c t i v i t y . But Smith held, according to Lovejoy, not only that accumulation was not motivated by the immediate pleasure i t afforded but that: "consumption of goods cannot be said to afford the incentive from which accumulation invariably" -or ever- "proceeds"; that "the motive which l i e s at the root of ownership i s emulation," the feeling that "the possession of wealth confers honour"; and that there i s "no other conceivable incentive to the accumulation of wealth.'-1* (Lovejoy, p. 215) Unfortunately, Lovejoy, usually an impeccable schola-ry'-'does not give a.reference for these surprising remarks. But given Lovejoy's high l e v e l of scholoarship, I am sure that we can trust that Smith did indeed make such remarks. While we may wish .to d i f f e r with the absoluteness that Smith ascribes to the desire for honor as the motive to the accumulation of wealth, the long term d i s c i p l i n e that t r a d i t i o n a l l y i s associated with the pursuit of c a p i t a l could hardly be sustained 91 by the simple r a t i o n a l pursuit of f a r - o f f pleasure. None-theless, Smith's theory i s r e a l l y a theory ( l i k e VeblenVs) of eminence: not of middle c l a s s f r u g a l i t y and planning. His theory rings most true f o r people who wish to brag about t h e i r yacht or t h e i r "holdings", not those who have c a r e f u l l y saved for a small retirement home, or a merely functioning second car. While both these l a t t e r items are f a r from n e c e s s i t i e s , i n our society, they are also f a r from presitge items and t h e i r a c q u i s i t i o n could hardly be explained i n terms of the desire for status or "emulation". But Smith and Veblen have given us the basis for a s o c i a l account of consumption. The t r a d i t i o n a l assumption of both the U t i l i t a r i a n s and contemporary welfare economist that human wants are more or less given, or that i f not given, they should be taken as given, presents an enormous b a r r i e r to the development of a p o l i t i c a l ecology. The counter t h e s i s , that most wants are s o c i a l l y determined, presents an obvious s o l u t i o n for the problems of people's wants exceeding the world's capacity to supply them— change people's wants by changing the s o c i a l environment. Such a move makes consumption a p o l i t i c a l not a personal question. But how true i s the theory? I t i s obvious that i t i s widely held. Much recent animadversion against advertising, i n c l u d i n g the recent banning of c i g a r e t t e a d v e r t i s i n g from c e r t a i n media, are based on the premise that the techniques of advertising are capable not only of creating wants i n people, but of creating wants that 92 are c l e a r l y not i n the i n t e r e s t of the.consumer. Galbraith's well known thesis (developed i n his book "The New Indus-t r i a l - S t a t e ) that marketing i s the backbone of the economy-., because i t enables business to plan with assurance the enormous investments which are involved i n current production, i s also based on the b e l i e f i n the great power of advertising to control consumer demand. . I t should also be noted that adv e r t i s i n g frequently plays on the "emulative" d e s i r e : the need to stand out i n your crowd, be the f i r s t on your block, e t c . — t h e ostentatious aspect of consumption noted by Smith and Veblen. But there i s probably a more s i g n i f i c a n t side of t h i s same phenomen i l l u s t r a t e d by the c l i c h e of "keeping up with the Joneses".. Unlike Veblen*s and Smith's theory, t h i s remark implies that people desire merely to keep up, to maintain t h e i r community membership, not to get ahead and show o f f . While one may need to count i n one's community, one also needs to be i n the community. The extent to which ^membership" requirements are attached to consumption undoubtedly determines the l i f e s t y l e s of the vast majority of people. Perhaps what happens i n the fashion-determined aspects of our l i v e s i s that some people (the eminent—leaving aside how they acquire t h i s -role) change t h e i r s t y l e s and everyone else (merely wishing to remain self-respecting) i s " f o r c e d " to change t h e i r s . This i s rem-in i s c e n t of Hobbes' suggestion that what drives most people to seek power i s simply the desire to maintain t h e i r current pos-i t i o n against those, always present, who are attempting to acquire more power. 93 But advertising i s , of course, not the only s o c i a l force a f f e c t i n g consumption. The general s o c i a l patterns and s o c i a l changes (e.g. high wages fo r c r a f t labor, women's li b e r a t i o n ) c l e a r l y a f f e c t •• expectations, desires, and l i f e s t y l e s . While i t i s more or l e s s accepted that s o c i a l pressures and s o c i a l norms of well being determine our consumption patterns there i s l i t t l e acceptance of the p o s s i b i l i t y of consumer behavior being subject to self-conscious group c o n t r o l . One i n t e r e s t i n g exception to t h i s claim i s the recent moves,in the i n t e r e s t of health,to control the ad-v e r t i s i n g of ciga r e t t e s and l i q u o r . But i n general, there i s a widespread acceptance of people's "private" consumption patterns due to b e l i e f s that e i t h e r these patterns, cannot be objects of self-conscious s o c i a l control/ or that they should not be because we should not make moral judgements about people's desires. . I have t r i e d to show : the falseness of the f i r s t be-l i e f i n my remarks above. In chapter VI, I w i l l c i t e evidence regarding the power of small groups to a l t e r people's con-sumption patterns to support my r e j e c t i o n o f " s o c i a l fatalism." But perhaps the most fundamental reason for r e j e c t i o n of any c o l l e c t i v e e f f o r t to control people's consumption patterns is the problem of who w i l l do the c o n t r o l l i n g . I t i s t h i s worry, supported by the s u b j e c t i v i s t view of values, that stands most i n the way of the organized control of consumption. The cry of freedom reappears. But there i s , I believe, a way around t h i s problem, a way which recognizes the d i f f i c u l t y of adjudicating between d i f f e r i n g values and desires, and also recognizes the importance 94 of not allowing these decisions to be l e f t to any s p e c i f i c agency. That way i s r e a l democratic p o l i c y making with f u l l and active p a r t i c i p a t i o n by a l l " . Such a s o l u t i o n not only deals with the moral objection (since, i n theory, ho one w i l l be ."forced" to change t h e i r consumption patterns), but also plays upon the s o c i a l motives of emulation and the desire for acceptance. Most contemporary p o l i t i c a l t h e o r i s t s see p o l i t i c s as j u s t another realm for the r e s o l u t i o n of competing privat e desires with the r e s u l t that they cannot provide the t h e o r e t i c a l structure for the s o l u t i o n . Instead, we must have a theory of p o l i t i c s based on the s o c i a l needs of i n d i v i d u a l s , not on t h e i r economic wants. And i t i s to the development'of such a theory that I now wish to turn 95 C H A P T E R I V JOHN ADAMS: AN ALTERNATIVE POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY 96 Having argued the inadequacy of the "homo economicus" view of human nature, i t i s now appropriate to turn to the development of a new p o l i t i c a l theory based on a d i f f e r e n t view of human nature. This new view w i l l emphasize the primacy of man's s o c i a l needs; his need for approval, esteem, and community. These needs undercut any e g o i s t i c analysis of human motivation as Butler has shown. They also explain how various private wants are created and governed by the need for approval and community membership. Butler believed such needs would lead almost i n e v i t a b l y to s o c i a l cooperation* but given Smith's remarks about the role of status seeking i n the drive for consumption, and our own observations, we can hardly share Butler's optimism. For thi s was an optimism based on the plausible but fa l s e assumption that people w i l l only esteem those actions which are p u b l i c l y b e n e f i c i a l . But as Smith notes of Louis XIV, he was honored for his deportment, voice and "Other f r i v o l o u s accomplishments. Compared with these, i n his own time and i n his own presence, no other v i r t u e i t seems appeared to have any merit. Knowledge, industry, valour, and beneficience trembled, were abashed, and l o s t a l l dignity before them". (Smith, 1948, p. 96-97) Veblen's extensive analysis of the behavior of the robber baron set i n the late 19th century U.S. also serves to indicate the unfortunate moral n e u t r a l i t y of the passion for esteem. C l e a r l y the determinant of what a person who i s concerned for public attention and approval w i l l do i s simply what the public w i l l attend to and approve. And attention, i f not approval, i s lavished on the ri d i c u l o u s behavior of movie stars and the most *See above, p. 70. 97 spectacular forms of criminal behavior. Success i n achieving public eminence i s l a r g e l y unconnected i n our society with success i n achieving public benefit. Because our society places such fundamental importance on achieving f i n a n c i a l success and the possession of items of personal consumption, i t i s not surprising that t h i s "passion" works so l i t t l e for the good of the community. In addition, the general cor-ruption of the p o l i t i c a l space, the arena where there should be an opportunity to achieve p u b l i c i t y for actions and e f f o r t s i n the public i n t e r e s t , means that there i s no forum for t h i s passion to work i t s good. Even i f t h i s public arena was more free from the t a i n t of corruption and manipulation, i t s l i m i t e d breadth would s t i l l not provide an ' opportunity for the vast numbers of people to achieve the recognition, esteem, and opportunity for p a r t i c i p a t i o n that should characterize a public forum. The only solution to the impoverishment of the public space i s widespread p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the work place and i n the community. For the forum of self-government provides a place for public excellence, an opportunity to dedicate one's energy to the public good /and at the same time, provides an opportunity to discover and a r t i c u l a t e t h i s good. In doing so the public forum "exploits" the natural human desire for eminence and, i n the case of face-to-face democracy, people have an opportunity to t r u l y assess the motives and arguments of other participants; and because l o c a l decisions are about l o c a l issues, the people engaging i n t h i s 98 process should be well equipped to make the correct appraisal. The reason the passion f o r eminence f a i l s to achieve much i n the way of s o c i a l value i n our society i s that there i s so l i t t l e opportunity f o r any but a few to achieve any public eminence by p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e i r government. I t i s not simply that "the people" have a perverse fascination with the behavior of the r i c h and famous regardless of t h e i r moral q u a l i t i e s . In fa c t t h i s vicarious fascination might well be the r e s u l t of the impoverishment of the "public" side of t h e i r own l i v e s . The lack of opportunity to pa r t i c i p a t e i n govern-ment not only d e b i l i t a t e s the p o l i t i c a l understanding of the people, i t also undermines any attempt to encourage genuine public spiritedness. By not providing an opportunity f o r both discovering and w i l l i n g the public good, the society turns the desire f o r public acclaim away from the public good to the s e l f i s h pursuit of private success. The much remarked upon apathy of the voting public can undoubtably be traced i n large part not only to t h e i r actual powerlessness, but also to the lack of a public forum i n which to develop the s p i r i t of community dedication. There i s , i n short, no opportunity f o r the experience of public happiness. What i s missing i s ;...the freedom the colonists c a l l e d l a t e r , when they had come to taste i t , "public happiness", and i t consisted i n the c i t i z e n ' s r i g h t of access to the public realm, i n his share i n public power - to be "a p a r t i c i p a t o r i n the government of a f f a i r s " i n Jefferson's t e l l i n g phrase - as d i s t i n c t from the generally recognized rights of subjects to be protected by the government i n the pursuit of private happiness even against public power, that i s , d i s t i n c t from rights which only tyrannical power would abolish. The very f a c t 99 that the word "happiness"was chosen i n laying claim to a share i n public power indicates strongly that there existed i n the country, p r i o r to the revolution, such a thing as."public happiness", and that men knew they could not be altogether "happy" i f th e i r happiness was located and enjoyed only i n private l i f e . (Arendt, p. 124) It may be surprising to think of the American Revolution as o r i g i n a l l y dedicated to the establishment of part i c i p a t o r y democracy, but: Hannah Arendt does a '< masterf u'lb job of pointing out thi s tendency. Unfortunately, the founding fathers had a rather dim awareness of the notion of public happiness. In fact, most of them, when c a l l e d upon to generalize about public l i f e agreed with Jefferson when he said: Happiness l i e s outside the public realm, " . . . i n the lap and love of my family, i n the society of my neighbours and my books i n the wholesome occupation of my farms and my a f f a i r s " , i n short, i n the privacy of a home upon whose l i f e the public has no claim. (Arendt, p. 125) The only exception to the general f a i l u r e of the founding fathers to appreciate and a r t i c u l a t e the delights of t h e i r public l i f e was John Adams, iclnd s i g n i f i c a n t l y enough i t was John Adams, as mentioned above, who developed at length a theory of the p o l i t i c a l r o le played by the desire for " d i s t i n c t i o n " . While I w i l l cover Adam's theory i n some d e t a i l , i t i s useful here to quote Hannah Arendt's summary: The point i s that the Americans knew that public freedom consisted i n having a share i n public business, and that the a c t i v i t i e s connected with t h i s business by no means constituted a burden but gave those who discharged them i n public a f e e l i n g of happiness they could acquire nowhere else. They knew very well, and John Adams was bold enough to formulate t h i s knowledge time and again, that the people went to town assemblies, as t h e i r representatives l a t e r 100 were to go to the famous Conventions, neither exclusively because of duty nor, and even le s s , to serve t h e i r own interests but most of a l l because they enjoyed the discussions, the deliberations, and the making of decisions. What brought them together was "the world and the public i n t e r e s t of l i b e r t y " (Harrington), and what moved them was "the passion for d i s t i n c t i o n " which John Adams held to be "more esse n t i a l and remarkable" than any other human faculty: "Wherever men, women, or children, are to be found, whether they be old or young, r i c h or poor, high or low, wise or f o o l i s h , ignorant or learned, every in d i v i d u a l i s seen to be strongly actuated by a desire to be seen, heard, talked of, approved and respected by the people about him, and within his knowledge". The virt u e of t h i s passion he c a l l e d "emulation", the "desire to excel another", and i t s vice he. c a l l e d "ambition" because i t "aims at power as a means of d i s t i n c t i o n " . And, psycholo-g i c a l l y speaking, these are i n fact the chief virtues and vices of p o l i t i c a l man. For the t h i r s t and w i l l to power as such, regardless of any passion for d i s t i n c t i o n , though c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the tyrannical man, i s no longer a t y p i c a l l y p o l i t i c a l vice, but rather that q u a l i t y which tends to destroy a l l p o l i t i c a l l i f e , i t s vices no less than i t s virtues. It i s precisely because the tyrant has no desire to excel and lacks a l l passion for d i s t i n c t i o n that he finds i t so pleasant to r i s e above the company of a l l men; conversely,, i t i s the desire to excel which makes men love the world and enjoy the company of t h e i r peers, and drives them into public business. (Arendt, p.125-Unfortunately Adams did not have his own analysis as clear as Arendt has indicated, but he c e r t a i n l y had no doubt about the importance that the "desire for d i s t i n c t i o n " played in s o c i a l l i f e . As he stated "... the theory of education, and the science of government may be a l l reduced to the same p r i n c i p l e , and be a l l comprehended i n the knowledge of the means of a c t i v e l y conducting, c o n t r o l l i n g , and regulating the emulation and ambition of i t s c i t i z e n s " . (Adams, p.248) He was also confident of i t s great extent, and begins 101 h i s l o n g d i s c o u r s e on t h e p a s s i o n f o r d i s t i n c t i o n w i t h t h e f o l l o w i n g i n t r o d u c t i o n . Men, i n t h e i r p r i m i t i v e c o n d i t i o n s , however s a v a g e , were u n d o u b t e d l y g r e g a r i o u s ; and t h e y c o n t i n u e t o be s o c i a l , n o t o n l y i n e v e r y s t a g e o f c i v i l i z a t i o n , b u t i n e v e r y p o s s i b l e s i t u a t i o n i n w h i c h t h e y c a n be p l a c e d . As n a t u r e i n t e n d e d them f o r s o c i e t y , she has f u r n i s h e d them w i t h p a s s i o n s , a p p e t i t e s , and p r o p e n s i t i e s , as w e l l as a v a r i e t y o f f a c u l -t i e s , c a l c u l a t e d b o t h f o r t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l e n j o y m e n t , and t o r e n d e r them u s e f u l t o e a c h o t h e r i n t h e i r s o c i a l c o n n e c t i o n s . T h e r e i s none among them more e s s e n t i a l o r r e m a r k a b l e , t h a n t h e p a s s i o n f o r d i s t i n c t i o n . A d e s i r e t o be o b s e r v e d , c o n s i d e r e d , e s t e e m e d , p r a i s e d , b e l o v e d , and a d m i r e d by h i s f e l l o w s , i s one o f t h e e a r l i e s t , as w e l l as k e e n e s t d i s p o s i t i o n s d i s c o v e r e d i n t h e h e a r t o f man. I f any one s h o u l d d o u b t t h e e x i s t e n c e o f t h i s p r o p e n s i t y , l e t h i m go and a t t e n t i v e l y o b s e r v e t h e j o u r n eymen and a p p r e n t i c e s i n t h e f i r s t work-shop, o r t h e oarsmen i n a c o c k b o a t , a f a m i l y o r a n e i g h b o r h o o d , t h e i n h a b i t a n t s o f a h o u s e o r t h e crew o f a s h i p , a s c h o o l o r a c o l l e g e , a c i t y o r a v i l l a g e , a s a v a g e o r c i v i l i z e d p e o p l e , a h o s p i t a l o r a c h u r c h , t h e b a r o r t h e e x c h a n g e , a camp o r a c o u r t . W herever men, women, o r c h i l d r e n , a r e t o be f o u n d , w h e t h e r t h e y be o l d o r y oung, r i c h o r p o o r , h i g h o r low, w i s e o r f o o l i s h , i g n o r a n t o r l e a r n e d , e v e r y i n d i v i d u a l i s s e e n t o be s t r o n g l y a c t u a t e d by a d e s i r e t o be s e e n , h e a r d , t a l k e d o f , a p p r o v e d and r e s p e c t e d , by t h e p e o p l e a b o u t him,, and w i t h i n h i s k n o w l edge. * (Adams, p.233) I t i s i m p o r t a n t t o n o t e two a s p e c t s o f t h i s l o n g p a s s a g e : 1. The r e p u d i a t i o n t h a t Adams makes o f any p r e - s o c i a l s t a t e o f n a t u r e , and 2. T h a t t h e i n d i v i d u a l s ' d e s i r e f o r d i s t i n c t i o n i s t h e " d e s i r e t o be s e e n , h e a r d , t a l k e d o f , a p p r o v e d , and r e s p e c t e d , by t h e * T h i s s h o u l d be compared t o R o u s s e a u ' s w i t h s u r v i v a l and e c o n o m i c w e l l b e i n g p o l i t i c a l u n i t y . s t a t e o f n a t u r e t h e o r y as t h e m o t i v a t i o n f o r 102 people about him, and within his knowledge". That i s , i t i s a desire to achieve d i s t i n c t i o n among one's peers and should be distinguished (as Adams unfortunately does not) from the desire f o r frame which we might describe as "the desire to be seen, heard, talked of, approved and respected by people the vast number of whom are t o t a l l y unknown". Adams' confusion of the desire f o r ©ame with the desire f o r "pure" esteem results i n his overlooking the importance of the l o c a l assembly, this confusion r e s u l t s from his focusing his attention on his peers who combined both nation wide fame with the pleasure of e x c e l l i n g among themselves. Adams did, of course, make a d i s t i n c t i o n quoted above between 'ambition' and 'emulation 1, i . e . between the desire f o r power and the desire to excel. But he f a i l e d to notice that the amoral pursuit of fame l i k e that of power i s also a vice of the desire for d i s t i n c t i o n . Adams also confuses two other d i s t i n c t desires: the desire to excel among one's peers and the desire simply to be superior, i . e . the desire to be better than anyone regardless of whether the others are a f a i r match. Of course since 'excellent' l i k e so many other descriptive words (e.g. 'big') embodies an unspoken comparison to relevant others, i t almost necessarily involves one i n a kind of r e l a t i v e achievement, i . e . superior accomplishment. Adams lapses into c a l l i n g emulation "a desire to excel another by f a i r industry i n the search of truth, and the practice of v i r t u e " XAdams, p.233) overlooking i n this d e f i n i t i o n the important condition that one's excellence must be i n r e l a t i o n to one's equals. Mere success, even i n the practice of v i r t u e , i s not what Adams had i n mind. The. .notion of equality 103 i s as important to the virtuous pursuit of d i s t i n c t i o n as i s the notion of success, and i t i s t h i s concern for e x c e l l i n g among one's peers which distinguishes the v i r t u e emulation from the vice ambition. For the latter,concerned as i t i s with power i n Adams' lexicography, shows no concern for equality. Indeed the pursuit of power rather than excellence i s a pursuit of i n e q u a l i t y , a drive to overwhelm rather than outshine one's peers. The experience of "emulation" requires a forum where equals might meet, see and be seen. While both Adams and Arendt are concerned with the p o l i t i c a l realm and therefore most interested i n w r i t i n g and speaking, c e r t a i n l y the same desire for sharing and displaying one's s k i l l s i s found among everyone from musicians to athletes. There i s associated with the possession of any s k i l l , a desire to display and share i t with others, and, e s p e c i a l l y with others who are roughly equal. There i s as much a desire to experience membership i n a group defined by the possession of a s k i l l as there i s the desire to excel i n t h i s s k i l l . One may wish to be outstanding i n the group, but t h i s s t i l l requires membership (acceptance by you of t h i s group as your peer group and acceptance by them of you as a-• bona sfide member). There i s an almost i r o n i c tension between the desire to excel and the desire for acceptance - a tension which i s dangerous for the cohesiveness of the group should some of i t s members become "too good" for i t . A l l of t h i s i s i n t u i t i v e l y understood i n our d a i l y s o c i a l i z i n g , but for many of us the opportunity for group sharing i s woefully l i m i t e d , and for almost a l l of us the p o s s i b i l i t y of genuine 104 p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n self-government i s non-existent. Nonetheless, whole theories of government are based on the popular assumption that meeting to decide on matters of mutual i n t e r e s t (and even c o n f l i c t ) are d i s u l t i l i t i e s , i n d i c a t i n g the general loss of understanding of public happiness.* Now Adams, while he was ce r t a i n l y aware of the importance of being excellent among equals, frequently l o s t t r a c t of his intention and focused simply on success. He goes on at embarrassing length about the importance of marks of merit such as were used by the Romans to distinguish t h e i r distinguished,** and speculates that the lack of a hereditary aristocracy may be harmful to the new republic since the desire to esta b l i s h one's family i s of prime importance in motivating people to public action. And f i n a l l y he even wonders whether a state does not need a monarchy. *See for example Buchanan and Tullock, The Calculus of Consent, es p e c i a l l y chapter VIII. * Has there ever been a nation who understood the human heart better than the Romans, or made a better -use of the passion f o r consideration, congratulation and d i s t i n c t i o n ? ... Distinctions of conditions, as well as of ages, were made by difference of clothing.... The chairs of ivory; the l i c t o r s ; ...the crowns of gold, of ivory, of flowers; ... th e i r orations; and t h e i r triumphs; everything i n r e l i g i o n , government and common l i f e , was parade, representation and ceremony. Everything was addressed to the emulation of the c i t i z e n s , and everything was calculated to a t t r a c t the attention, to a l l u r e the consideration, and excite the congratulations of the people; to attach t h e i r hearts to ind i v i d u a l c i t i z e n s according to t h e i r merit; and to t h e i r lawgivers, magistrates, and judges, according to t h e i r rank, st a t i o n and importance to the state. And thi s was i n the , true s p i r i t of republics, i n which form of government there i s no other consistent method of preserving order or procuring submission to the laws. (Adams, p. 2 43) 105 This i s the true reason, why a l l c i v i l i z e d free nations have found, by experience, the necessity of separating from the body of the people, and even from the l e g i s l a t u r e , the d i s t r i b u t i o n of honors, and conferring i t on the executive authority of government. When the emulation of a l l the c i t i z e n s looks up to one point, l i k e the rays of a c i r c l e from a l l parts of the circum-ference, meeting and uniting i n the centre, you may hope for uniformity, consistency, and subordination; but when they look up to d i f f e r e n t i n d i v i d u a l s , or assemblies, or councils, you may expect a l l the deformities, e c c e n t r i c i t i e s , and confusion, of the.Ptolemaic system(Adams,p.256). But these considerations came out of Adams' worries about how to control "emulation" so that i t would genuinely serve the good of the state, for " i t i s the p r i n c i p a l end of government to regulate t h i s passion, which i n i t s turn becomes a p r i n c i p a l means of government". (Adams, p.2 34) Adams' constant worry about how to control the passion for d i s t i n c t i o n comes from his presupposition that 1. people are b a s i c a l l y incompetent, and 2. government i s b a s i c a l l y a process of c e n t r a l i z a t i o n , administration, and control. He r i g h t l y points out that the idea of a whole nation d i r e c t l y e l e c t i n g leaders w i l l surely not produce the desired r e s u l t s . When the government of a great nation i s i n question, s h a l l the whole nation choose? W i l l such a choice be better than chance? Shall the whole nation vote for senators? Thirty m i l l i o n s of votes, for example, for each senator i n France! It i s obvious that th i s would be a l o t t e r y of m i l l i o n s of blanks to one p r i z e , and that the chance of having wisdom and i n t e g r i t y i n a senator by hereditary descent would be far better. There i s no i n d i -vidual personally known to an hundredth part of the nation. The voters, then, must be exposed to deception, from intrigues and manoeuvres without number, that i s to say, from a l l the chicanery, impostures, and falsehoods imaginable, with scarce a p o s s i b i l i t y of preferring r e a l merit. (-Adams, p. 2 40)^ 106 The problem, and i t i s ce r t a i n l y a very r e a l and pressing problem, i s that once government goes beyond the p o s s i b i l i t y of face-to-face democracy, people are highly susceptible to manipulation and deceit. Also by the time the power i s centralized and elections turned into media circusses, the "ambition" for power and fame takes over from the desire to excel among one's peers as the primary p o l i t i c a l motive. And while Adams himself has trouble keeping the d i s t i n c t i o n between emulation and ambition clear, he does argue that the former can be a check on the l a t e r . He states: There are no men who are not ambitious of distinguishing themselves and growing considerable among those with whom they converse. This ambition i s natural to the human soul. And as, when i t received a happy turn, i t i s the source of private f e l i c i t y and public prosperity, and when i t errs, produces private uneasiness and public cala-mities; i t i s the business and duty of private prudence, of private and public education, and of national p o l i c y , to d i r e c t i t to r i g h t objects. For th i s purpose i t should be consi-dered, that to every man who i s capable of a worthy conduct, the pleasure from the approbation of worthy men i s exquisite and inexpressible. (Adams, p.241) If I understand this passage c o r r e c t l y , Adams i s suggest-ing that the healthy desire for "emulation" can be used to control the unhealthy ambition for fame and power. The solution for which he searched with such agony and so l i t t l e success, i s to decentralize the state, putting control i n the hands of group of people who can control t h e i r leaders because of t h e i r leaders desire for t h e i r approbation. In addition the desire for fame and power could be lim i t e d by simply eliminating the p o s s i b i l i t y of a great deal of power and nationwide fame. For Adams' dilemm resulted from the c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of power, and with t h i s 107 ce n t r a l i z a t i o n came the populace's inevitable ignorance of the issues and representatives who were necessarily distant. In addition, the centralized state with i t s powerful executive and alienated l e g i s l a t u r e attracted those who were ambitious for fame and power, rather than those who sought simply to excel i n virtue among t h e i r peers. The problem for democratic theory of c o n t r o l l i n g the e l i t e i s ce r t a i n l y genuine enough, but i t i s caused by the dramatic i n e q u a l i t i e s concommittant with an e l i t i s t form of government (and of course a grossly unequal d i s t r i b u t i o n of wealth). Creating an e l i t e naturally causes the problem of co n t r o l l i n g t h i s e l i t e because of the d i s t o r t i o n of the desire for d i s t i n c t i o n into the vice of ambition. The solution proposed by Adams and the other founding fathers i s well enough known: the balance of power (see Adams, p. 280-81). Adams f e l t that the bicameral house, the executive, and the j u d i c i a r y would a l l be motivated by emulation to check i n each other the desire for dominance. But t h i s i s a solution to a problem that i s largely of t h e i r own creating. Ologopo-l i s t i c competition for control i s one f a i r l y e f f e c t i v e means of guarding against the extremes of in d i v i d u a l tyranny, but i t i s hardly p o l i t i c a l freedom. Clearly the true solution i s to return to the people the power which because of c e n t r a l i z a t i o n i s subject to abuse. Given a less h i e r a r c h i c a l power structure, there i s less of a problem of how to control the (in t h i s case, not so powerful) e l i t e . Adams unfortunately was also concerned with the problem of c o n t r o l l i n g the people and was disturbed as were most of the 108 founding fathers with the widespread e g a l i t a r i a n sentiment. He even saw egalitarianism as a necessary f a i l u r e because i t did not make s u f f i c i e n t allowance for the passion for d i s t i n c t i o n (pp. 273-74). But i n t h i s argument, Adams i s once again overlooking his own r e a l i z a t i o n that the purest form of this passion requires equality: a background group which i s as highly respected by the "distinguished" as he i s i t . By encouraging l o c a l government, the founding fathers could have provided the opportunity for m i l l i o n s to have thi s experience. Instead, a system was devised i n which only a few could experience "emulation" and public happiness, and as a r e s u l t , many were attracted to the l e g i s l a t u r e and executive, not for the experience of freedom discussion and decision among equals - but for the power, fame and dominance Such a system contributed not only to the impoverishment of the p o l i t i c a l l i f e , but f i n a l l y of the whole public space: environmental degradation, urban b l i g h t , and p o l i t i c a l apathy I believe that the most preferable solution i n part or in whole to a l l these problems i s the development of a mechanism to enable widespread p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n public a f f a i r s by a l l c i t i z e n s . But given the focus of thi s thesis, I w i l l attempt to argue only for p a r t i c i p a t i o n as the best solution to the ecological imperative, and i t i s to thi s argument that I w i l l now turn. 109 C H A P T E R V PARTICIPATION AND ECOLOGY 110 Adams f a i l e d to f u l l y recognize the significance of his own psychological understanding and to generalize this understanding to the non-elite. This f a i l u r e , which gave him constant d i f f i c u l t y i n his p o l i t i c a l theory, derived not only from his distance from the people, but from the fear which he shared with many of the "founding fathers", of the people's actual p o l i t i c a l tendencies. Whether such a fear was well grounded, such fears no doubt s t i l l e x i s t and account for a certain amount of the disparagement of c i t i z e n p a r t i c i p a t i o n . The e c o l o g i c a l l y concerned might also (especially given the class bias of this group) be skeptical about the claim that active c i t i z e n p a r t i c i p a t i o n would re-s u l t i n conservation and e c o l o g i c a l preservation. For-tunately many arguments (and in the next chapter, some. empirical research) can be presented that support the view that p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s not only a good i n i t s e l f , but i s the best means of protecting the environment and c o n t r o l l i n g the growth of the economy.. The f i r s t argument i s that consumption patterns are largely dictated by community and peer group norms. This i s Adam Smith's point, Veblen's point, and finds expression i n the cliche of "keeping up with the Joneses". Community wide b e l i e f s about the good l i f e , about the s t y l e of l i f e appropriate to someone i n a certain position, along with ' peer group requirements (such as appearance requirements for acceptance) largely determine people's desires and I l l e x p e c t a t i o n s f o r a w i de v a r i e t y o f " i n e s s e n t i a l " g o o d s . T h i s o b v i o u s c l a i m i s s u p p o r t e d by t h e w i d e s p r e a d use o f t h e n o t i o n o f " r e l a t i v e d e p r i v a t i o n " w h i c h embodies t h e b e l i e f t h a t d e p r i v a t i o n i s n o t some a b s o l u t e want o f g o o d s , b u t a want r e l a t i v e t o t h e l a r g e r , more a f f l u e n t community i n w h i c h t h e p o o r e r i n d i v i d u a l f i n d s ( o r s e e s ) h i m s e l f . I t a l s o s u g g e s t s t h a t t h e r e i s o n l y one s o l u t i o n t o t h e p r o b l e m o f f e e l i n g i m p o v e r i s h e d , namely e q u a l i t y : what a p p e a r s as an e c o n o m i c p r o b l e m i s , o nce a g a i n , a p o l i t i c a l one. As l o n g as t h e s e n s e o f d e p r i v a t i o n i s b a s e d n o t on some a b s o l u t e l a c k , t h e n t h e d e g r a d i n g s e n s e o f i m p o v e r i s h m e n t c a n o n l y be e l i m i n a t e d by r e d u c i n g t h e f i n a n c i a l d i s t a n c e between t h e w e a l t h y and t h e p o o r . * The community norms w h i c h a r t i c u l a t e t h e n o t i o n o f t h e g o od l i f e a r e o f c o u r s e s u b j e c t t o c hange. I n t h e c u r r e n t o r d e r t h e s e c h a n ges a r e g o v e r n e d t o some e x t e n t by t h e e f f o r t s o f t h e p r o d u c e r s t o e n c o u r a g e t h e d e s i r e f o r t h e i r g o ods. To what e x t e n t a d v e r t i s i n g a c t u a l l y c o n t r o l s t h e s e norms and t h e r e f o r e t h e b e h a v i o r o f p e o p l e f o l l o w i n g them i s n o t o r i o u s l y h a r d t o a s c e r t a i n . B u t c l e a r l y t h e y have an e f f e c t , as do o t h e r l e s s s e l f - c o n s c i o u s l y c h o s e n f a c t o r s s u c h as c h a n g i n g e c o n o m i c c o n d i t i o n s , ( e . g . r e l a t i v e i n c r e a s e * W h i l e t h e f a c t t h a t p e o p l e a r e p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n t h e i r g overnment does n o t g u a r a n t e e s o c i a l j u s t i c e , i t does t e n d t o e l i m i n a t e one r e l a t e d i n j u s t i c e , v i z , t h e l a c k o f power a s s o c i a t e d w i t h p o v e r t y . I f t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n one's government were w i d e s p r e a d , t h e n t h e i n d i g n i t y o f p o l i t i c a l i m p o t e n c y w o u l d n o t be p a r t o f t h e g e n e r a l f r u s t r a t i o n o f i m p o v e r i s h m e n t . 112 i n wealth among unionized workers) changing s o c i a l conditions (e.g. the " l i b e r a t i o n of women"), and a host of more or less unknown factors. One fact /is quite c l e a r : there i s l i t t l e i n the way of an organized self-conscious e f f o r t on the part of people to change t h e i r own norms of the good l i f e , to involve themselves i n public and community wide discussions about l i f e styles and values. There are of course no forums for t h i s discussion. One of the p o s s i b i l i t i e s which would be provided by a part i c i p a t o r y form of self-government would be just such an opportunity to r e f l e c t not only on what the government should do, but on "private" values, private con-sumption patterns and in d i v i d u a l l i f e s t y l e s . The participatory forum could provide an opportunity to commit oneself self-consciously and communally to a change in values and consumption habits. The e f f o r t , for example, of the Chinese to change century old attitudes toward the place and status of women has involved just such communal a c t i v i t y . Discussions are held to a r t i c u l a t e the problem, women and men are encouraged to come forth and state t h e i r feelings, arguments are held, various people are persuaded and some pressured; f i n a l l y a community wide sense of commitment to the l i b e r a t i o n of women i s developed, but i n the area of private a c t i v i t y i n the home. No one polices these areas, but the community wide commitment serves to "govern" the area of largely private a c t i v i t y , (see Townsend ppp 110-115) 113 Granted that the par t i c i p a t o r y forum could provide the opportunity for self-conscious value and norm decisions, i s there any reason to think that once people are brought together they would decide on values which would support ecological balance, which would change consumption production patterns dramatically i n the d i r e c t i o n of conservation? The answer I believe i s yes, and i t i s here where the remarkable congruence between concern for ecological well being and s o c i a l well being stands out. Arguments i n the public forum must be presented i n terms of public i n t e r e s t . As a r e s u l t , decisions made i n such a forum should also r e f l e c t concern for the public good. This of course presupposes that the kinds of conditions suggested by Rousseau have been met: i n p a r t i c u l a r , that there are no powerful ' s i n i s t e r ' i n t e r e s t groups at work. It i s obviously i n the in t e r e s t of the public to see that i t s i n t e r e s t i s protected. The danger i s that some members w i l l e f f e c t i v e l y delude the others. This i s d i f f e r e n t from the representative s i t u a t i o n , where discourse must also be i n terms of the public i n t e r e s t , but where the absence of the public means that the interests of the representatives as d i s t i n c t from that of the public might well p r e v a i l . In addition the existence of parties c l e a r l y v i o l a t e s Rousseau's condition for the absence of s i n i s t e r i n t e r e s t groups. Given that we can plausibly expect the p a r t i c i p a t i v e 114 assembly to rule i n the public i n t e r e s t , we can expect them to give a high p r i o r i t y to ecological concerns. For ecological well-being i s a paradigm public good and therefore we can expect decisions made i n th i s forum to respect the need for economic r e s t r a i n t , conservation of resources, p o l l u t i o n control, etc. The problem that faces current advocates of ecological concern i s the lack of any natural i n t e r e s t group except the hunters. Ecological i n t e g r i t y , l i k e consumer in t e r e s t s , has no active lobby (except the hunters) because no group stands to p r o f i t s i g n i f i c a n t l y from l e g i s -* l a t i o n which serves these community-wide needs. But i n the participatory democracy the need to turn t h e i r attention to the public i n t e r e s t should force the participants to give considerable attention to such a paradigm public good as the natural environment. But i t should be noted that 'public' i s not, from the ecological point of view, the most accurate term for "general" i n t e r e s t : "community" in t e r e s t would be much better. For concern for and commitment . to a community i s commitment . to a body whose l i f e span extends far beyond that of i t s members; and whose i n t e r e s t and well-being i s assessed therefore against a far longer time span than that of i t s "temporary" members. *See Olsen's general argument about the l o g i c which "naturally" impoverishes the provision of public goods. (Olsen, Ch. 2) 115 Concerns about n a t u r a l . r e s o u r c e c o n s e r v a t i o n , the -p r e s e r v a t i o n o f s p e c i e s , e t c . .goway beyond-.concern.forthe i n t e r e s t of the " c u r r e n t l y e x i s t i n g p o p u l a t i o n and i n v o l v e concern f o r the~ (unrepresented) f u t u r e generations. While there are obvious ^ s t r u c t u r a l ^ g u a r a n t e e s i n the-~part±cipatory—forum~to~ assure t h a t d e c i s i o n s are made i n the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t ( v i z . , the presence of the p u b l i c ) , there_.is no obvious guarantee t h a t such a l e g i s l a t i v e body w i l l r u l e w i t h a s e n s i t i v i t y to long term community i n t e r e s t s . . A l l t h a t can be hoped i s t h a t the ma t u r i t y and r e s p o n s i b l i t y r e s u l t i n g from the p a r t i c i p a t o r y experience of concern f o r the p u b l i c . i n s t e a d of p r i v a t e i n t e r e s t . w i l l _ - y i e l d - a-concern- -for---long---range—.-over short range c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . The enhanced awareness of community t h a t w i l l flow from a c t i v e c i t i z e n - p a r t i c i p a t i o n should a l s o c o n t r i b u t e to a concern f o r the- commundt-y--iong"term i n t e r e s t as opposed-^to the "immediate -i n t e r e s t s of itsZ members:.-- I have noted above y-in Chapter I I , -the educative aspect-of p a r t i c i p a t i o n — i t s capacity, to develop commitments, and concern beyond one's immediate s e l f - i n t e r e s t . I see l i t t l e reason t o t h i n k . t h a t . t h i s concern cannot be-developed—. beyond "that"of the l i f e " of the immediate members of the community. We can a l s o expect t h a t the presence.of people of v a r i o u s ages a t an assembly should a l s o c o n t r i b u t e to the sense of temporal c o n t i n u i t y t h a t i s so fundamental to the l i f e of a genuine community. 116 In addition there i s an inevitable amount of decision making that.'.is going to involve rather distant representation regardless of p o l i t i c a l commitment to p a r t i c i p a t i o n . This i s because the e f f e c t s of many a c t i v i t i e s extend over large distances, not only over large time spans. Once again the educative e f f e c t of p a r t i c i p a t i o n must be r e l i e d on to enable people to see and accept the constraints necessary hot only for t h e i r advantage or the advantage of t h e i r community, but also that of the world. In the cases of long range e f f e c t s and long time span for e f f e c t s , we cannot expect the c i t i z e n to have the same claim to knowledge as the expert. And t h i s presents a great threat to p a r t i c i p a t i o n . This question requires rather extensive answers about the ways of applying the theory developed to actual i n d u s t r i a l society. I deal with t h i s question i n Chapter Vf: f but for now I wish only to point out that my argument does presuppose the p o s s i b i l i t y of extensive decentralization of both the p o l i t i c a l and economic order. Clearly only under these conditions can we expect to obtain the most desirable conditions for active p a r t i c i p a t i o n . I t has also been noted above that one of the benefits of p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s the increased sense of self-esteem that comes from p a r t i c i p a t i o n . This i s part of the ^ermoblJSigj e f f e c t s of concerning oneself with more than one's own s e l f - i n t e r e s t and the p e r f e c t l y j u s t i f i a b l e sense of greater s e l f importance that 117 comes from being more important. Indeed, the increased sense of self-esteem j u s t i f i e s my claims that the participatory system accords to i t s c i t i z e n s the highest respect for t h e i r opinions and desires compatible with the goal of c o l l e c t i v e coordination. And such high self-regard, based soundly as i t i s on the respect accorded by a l l to a l l i n a t r u l y democratic community, i s almost sure to produce a sense of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for the community. Es p e c i a l l y so, since one's respect i n the community w i l l (ideally) be based on one's p a r t i c i p a t i o n and contribution to the community. By encouraging a sense of c o l l e c t i v e i d e n t i t y and developing a kind of public conscience in the participants, p a r t i c i p a t i o n * can also be expected to develop the necessary concern for the c o l l e c t i v e environment — a kind of ecological conscience. There are other benefits which come from p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n self-government which are larg e l y ignored by contemporary theories of democracy and which are of great importance to the goal of changing people's l i f e s t y l e i n non-consumptive *Pa r t i c i p a t i o n i s the natural vehicle to develop such long term commitment. For example: one of the c l a s s i c d i f f i c u l t -ies presented by high y i e l d e xploitation of non-renewable resource i s that the communities which develop around these a c t i v i t i e s are constantly l e f t high and dry when the resource i s exhausted. I t i s reasonable to believe that i f these resources were managed by the whole community, the rate of exp l o i t a t i o n might be much slower so that the l i f e of the community might be extended. 118 directions. For example, anywhere that worker p a r t i c i p a t i o n has been t r i e d i t has enlisted, great support from the workers*, seemingly confirming Hannah Arendt's remarks about the pleasure of "public happiness": the pleasure of reasoned discourse, of commitment to the public good, of s o l i d a r i t y , of public esteem and f i n a l l y the pleasure of power, of communally w i l l i n g a course of events which goes far beyond ; . that that any i n d i v i d u a l could w i l l . By providing such happiness, the public forum could serve, as an alternative to private happiness. And since private happiness i s frequently centered on private consumption (at least i n our minds, though i n fact private happiness comes from more immaterial sources), the renewed p o s s i b i l i t y and emphasis on public happiness could provide•additional reasons for reducing our concern with consumption. There i s also *See below Chapter VI 119 a vast amount of empirical support for the proposition that p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the work place greatly increases worker s a t i s f a c t i o n and frequently productivity, suggesting that p a r t i c i p a t i o n could replace economic incentives and consequently reduce consumption. As Rousseau puts i t : The better the state i s constituted the more does public business take precedence over private i n the minds of the c i t i z e n s . There i s indeed much less private business, because the sum of public happiness furnishes a larger proportion of each individual's happiness, so there remains less for him to seek on his own. (Rousseau, p. 140) In short, the p a r t i c i p a t o r y forum provides for the u t i l i z a t i o n of the public side of our personality; a place to be both sociable and s o c i a l l y useful. In providing such a place, the p a r t i c i p a t o r y forum supplies for our s o c i a l nature the same kind of support now given to our private and s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d nature by advertising and the standard norms of f i n a n c i a l and i n d i v i d u a l success. As a r e s u l t of such forums we can expect people to develop and manifest a genuine concern for one another and t h e i r community since the avenue for expression of t h i s concern i s now open. We can expect decisions to a c t u a l l y place human and ecological p r i o r i t i e s over those of finance and technology, since a l l the people w i l l be there to see that they do. And because of the face-to-face nature of par-t i c i p a t i o n i n d i v i d u a l s w i l l be forced to experience one another not as some unfortunate s t a t i s t i c but as r e a l , equally human, members of the public whose concerns are as 120 r e a l and pressing as t h e i r own. They w i l l also be l i v i n g i n and with the immediate environment that t h e i r decisions create. (cf. decisions made by executives of multinationals where the decision maker does not need to l i v e i n the environ-ment created by h i s decisions)-Lastly, the p a r t i c i p a t o r y forum provides an oppor-tunity for decisions which are excluded by our current system of i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c consumer "voting": i t provides the opportunity that Marx discussed, f o r people to make t h e i r own history, not just be subject to i t . This i s again a claim that was developed i n chapter II. The opportunity provided by c o l l e c t i v e self-government of the commons, instead of a l a i s s e z f a i r e destruction of i t , means that we can make decisions i n the i n t e r e s t of the community that are simply not open to us as i n d i v i d u a l s . In this way the forum not only encourages us to be more moral, i t actually creates the increased p o s s i b i l i t y of our acting more morally. Decisions f o r example, of public transportation versus private could then be confronted not on the i n d i v i d u a l - basis "should I take the car or wait twenty minutes f o r the bus?" but rather "do we want people to use cars or s h a l l we provide an adequate transportation system which w i l l actually encourage t r a n s i t use?", or even " s h a l l we ban cars and provide covered b i c y c l e paths?" etc.* I r o n i c a l l y , i t i s the " c e n t r a l i z a t i o n " of *I have read somewhere that t h i s l a t t e r p o s s i b i l i t y has been r e a l i z e d i n a F l o r i d a suburb t o t a l l y given over to pedestrian and b i c y c l e transport with simply no roadways for cars. Though undoubtedly i n t h i s case some i n d i v i d u a l entrepreneur developer made the decision. 121 such a t r a d i t i o n a l l y private decision into the public forum, which makes possible such common in t e r e s t decisions. But the only way that t h i s c e n t r a l i z a t i o n i s compatible with autonomy i s i f the i n d i v i d u a l freedom that i s l o s t i s replaced (or reappears) i n the l e g i s l a t u r e . Decen-t r a l i z a t i o n cannot mean i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c anarchy, but rather decentralized communism. The decentralization that i s necessary for s i g n i f i c a n t , universal p a r t i c i p a t i o n i t s e l f y i e l d s many benefits from an e c o l o g i c a l and s o c i a l point of view. For l o c a l decisions to r e f l e c t any r e a l autonomy there must also be a large amount of l o c a l economic s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y : t h i s i s simply the l o c a l version of the more common concern for national economic independence as a prerequisite of national p o l i t i c a l autonomy. Local decisions would have to be made not simply about the means to f i l l c e r t a i n national quotas, but also about what goods to produce: decisions not only as to how to use e x i s t i n g c a p i t a l , but whether to increase or decrease c a p i t a l ' : investments. The ecological benefits of such s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y are numerous. Local production and consumption provide the means for l i n k i n g production more d i r e c t l y to demand without intervening e f f o r t of advertising to assure that demand matches up to over-production. This would i n turn reduce over—production and the encouragement of economically necessary^but e c o l o g i c a l l y and s o c i a l l y u n j u s t i f i e d con-sumption. Local production would also reduce transportation ' '« 12 2 costs with i t s concomitant e c o l o g i c a l costs. Since — l o c a l markets could not support large scale production, this form of production with i t s tendency to concentrate massive amounts of pollutants in the environment would also be reduced. v Since p o l l u t i o n i s largely a matter of concentration and poor d i s t r i b u t i o n (what i s f e r t i l i z e r i n one place i s a sewage problem in another), a reduction in the scale of production and an increased d i v e r s i t y of industry could greatly reduce the b u i l d up of pollutants. Decentralization would also require diverse agriculture and a diverse use of energy sources greatly reducing the undesirable . ecological e f f e c t s that current mono-culture and large scale energy production e n t a i l s . Once again the by now unsurprising congruence between ecolo g i c a l and s o c i a l scales can be noted; small scale for human contact, r e a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n and l o c a l control and small scale for minimal environmental impact, diverse agriculture and e f f i c i e n t recycling of waste, reduced transportation costs, d i v e r s i t y of energy sources and minimal p o l l u t i o n . The environmental scale i s a human scale. 12 3 C H A P T E R VI EXPERIMENTS IN PARTICIPATION 12 4 Of a l l the propositions offered i n the preceding chapter there i s empirical support for the following: 1. l o c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n increases the desire to p a r t i c i p a t e i n the decisions of the larger organization, 2. work place p a r t i c i p a t i o n increases worker s a t i s f a c t i o n , suggesting that, i n general,participation i s an important part of l i f e ' s s a t i s f a c t i o n , 3. p a r t i c i p a t i o n does provide an e f f e c t i v e means for changing people's values, and be-havior. Since the experiments reviewed i n the sociolog-i c a l l i t e r a t u r e concern themselves primarily with pro-d u c t i v i t y and worker s a t i s f a c t i o n , the experiments do not f a l l neatly into the three categories above. But par-t i c i p a t i o n experiments do f a l l into two general categories: small and large scale. Small scale p a r t i c i p a t i o n refers to the range of decisions open to a small sub-group. Small scale decision-making centers on concerns such as how a new assembly technique i s to be applied, l o c a l control of assembly l i n e procedures, speed, etc. Large scale decisions are those a f f e c t i n g the whole firm such as questions of c a p i t a l investment, general plant p o l i c i e s and wide-ranging c i v i c and national decisions. It i s i n the small scale area that most experiments have been run, and i t i s also i n t h i s area where the greatest degree of success has been achieved. The major "exper-iment" i n large scale p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s Yugoslavia's organization of i t s i n d u s t r i a l and p o l i t i c a l systems, 125 though the Chinese example might also be relevant i f we had more information. In t h i s chapter I w i l l review the r e s u l t s of various small scale experiments, saving the various experiments i n the t o t a l reorganization of society fo r the subsequent chapter. Small scale p a r t i c i p a t i o n has received the most attention because i t lends i t s e l f r e a d i l y to experimen-t a t i o n and does not threaten the basic i n d u s t r i a l order. I t can also draw on a whole range of small group experiments for generalizations of i t s conclusions. Though such exper-iments might seem to have a l i m i t e d value to a theory of wide-ranging change, they are a c t u a l l y of great s i g n i f -icance. For true p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s necessarily small s c a l e — i n f a c t , t h i s i s i t s v i r t u e . We cannot have the same l e v e l of p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n large scale organizations as we can have on the shop f l o o r or i n the neighborhood government. These units must be the atoms of any greater p o l i t i c a l structure and the success at t h i s l e v e l i s a p r e r e q u i s i t e not only f o r the educative effectiveness of p a r t i c i p a t i o n , but for the s o c i a l cement which w i l l hold the l a r g e r structure together. I t i s also apparent from a review of the l i t e r a t u r e that even i n the large scale experiments, the most s i g n i f i c a n t form of p a r t i c i p a t i o n f o r most of the p a r t i c i p a n t s i s the one i n which the worker or c i t i z e n makes decisions which a f f e c t the most immediate aspects of h i s l i f e . I t may be that decisions 126 as to c a p i t a l a l l o c a t i o n , no matter how s i g n i f i c a n t i n the long run, do not have enough immediacy to i n t e r e s t the average worker, or that the organizational form neccessary for making such decisions i s simply too large to allow for enough active p a r t i c i p a t i o n by the workers to provide them with the kind of s a t i s f a c t i o n they get from more l o c a l decisions. This i s of course a s i g n i f i c a n t problem for the e c o l o g i c a l l y concerned because environmental decisions almost ine v i t a b l y involve considerations of large regions and long time spans. But while problems of scale are of c r u c i a l importance, i t i s f i r s t necessary to understand i-the e f f e c t s that small scale p a r t i c i p a t i o n has on i t s par t i c i p a n t s . Such an understanding not only underlines the importance of t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y , i t also serves as a natural introduction to theories of large scale p a r t i c i -pation . The most s i g n i f i c a n t experiments i n small scale p a r t i c i p a t i o n have been conducted i n a variety of indus-t r i a l s i t u a t i o n s . The most comprehensive and authoritative review of these experiments i s Paul Blumberg's Industrial  Democracy: The Sociology of P a r t i c i p a t i o n . Blumberg begins his review with an account of the famous Hawthorne experiments i n the l a t e 2 0's. These experiments are the c l a s s i c s of management theory which supposedly produced the unsurprising (except to the experimentors) r e s u l t that workers work as a group, and that the informal 127 r e l a t i o n s and norms of th i s group more than any other factors (including economic incentives) govern productivity. These re s u l t s were arrived at a f t e r a wide range of variables, such as timing of breaks, i n t e n s i t y of l i g h t , etc. were a l l found to be unrelated to productivity. In fact, productivity within the small group that was being experimented with continued to increase despite unpleasent variations i n the physical conditions of work. The conclusion that was normally derived from t h i s experiment was, i n the words of C. W. M i l l s , that"... the i n d u s t r i a l manager i s to 'relax h i s authoritarian manner and widen his manipulative grip by understanding employees better and countering t h e i r informal s o l i d a r i t i e s against management by c o n t r o l l i n g and ex p l o i t i n g these s o l i d a r -i t i e s for smoother and less troublesome managerial e f f i c i e n c y . ' " (Blumberg, p. 45) But Blumberg points out that what was overlooked by these researchers was that the workers' increasing productivity resulted not simply from the f r i e n d l y relationships they had developed from each other, but rather from the extra-ordinary relationships they had developed with management. In an e f f o r t to make these experiments successful, the experimenters had involved the workers i n the arrang-ing of timing of operations and the introduction of other variables i n a manner that the workers had never 12 8 previously experienced. The upshot of th i s was that the experimenters rather than eliminating the variable of worker h o s t i l i t y from t h e i r studies, introduced the variable of "participation"--an .atmosphere where the worker's views were treated with unprecedented respect and consideration: an /'atmosphere i n which i n fa c t the workers decided which changes were to be introduced and when. The Hawthorne experiments consisted b a s i c a l l y of two d i f f e r e n t experiments. One, c a l l e d the "relay test room experiment" involved s i x workers under a wide variety of conditions: variations i n work week, rest time, meal schedule, l i g h t i n g , etc. The second experiment, the "Bank wiring room experiment", involved fourteen workers divided by status and wages into three smaller groups. In the f i r s t experiment, productivity increased despite the wide variety of changes and th i s seemed to be due primarily (as Blumberg points out) to 1. the special r e l a t i o n s h i p that workers had to the experimenters, one e s s e n t i a l l y of shared r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , 2. the creation among the workers of a sense of c o l l e c t i v i t y , and 3. an awareness among the workers of the importance of t h e i r experiment and peculiar status. This l a t t e r sense (3.) of specialness received much attention i n managerial l i t e r a t u r e and became equated with the "Hawthorne e f f e c t " . But as Blumberg points out when i n the second experiment, the experimenters f a i l e d to involve the workers i n 129 the decisions as to how the experiment should run, the workers became d i s i l l u s i o n e d and disappointed and pro-d u c t i v i t y declined. (Blumberg, pp 34-42) Having provided th i s i n s i g h t f u l review of the Hawthorne experiments, Blumberg goes on to review a number of alternative suggestions for the reduction of worker a l i e n a t i o n . For our ecological point of view, i t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note what alternatives are normally considered, and the manner i n which Blumberg refutes them. F i r s t i s the suggestion that l e i s u r e can be used to make up for the f a i l u r e to achieve s a t i s f a c t i o n on the job. Blumberg's c r i t i c i s m of th i s p o s s i b i l i t y i s based on the obvious observation of the importance of work i n the l i f e of nearly every person. Important not only to the i r sense of s e l f , but also i n the personality they develop and bring home from the work place. I t i s inconceivable that one could have a t o t a l l y alienated work experience and become ("part-time") a f u l l person off the job. From the ecological point of view, i t seems clear that human labor w i l l continue to constitute a large amount of the energy input into the economy because of a growing necessity to r e s t r i c t our use of non-renewable energy sources. As a r e s u l t , we w i l l experience an increase i n l e i s u r e only with a concomitant decrease i n affluence. The same objection goes for the suggestion that automation could take over a l l "alienating" labor. 130 Automation i s simply too expensive and the e f f e c t that i t frequently has i s to remove control from the worker, not to increase i t — w i t h a r e s u l t a n t increase i n powerlessness and a l i e n a t i o n . Blumberg also dismisses the answer which he describes as a n t i - i n d u s t r i a l i s m (a version of the current return to the land movement) on the grounds that the move towards i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n cannot be stopped. C e r t a i n l y from the point of view of our current e c o l o g i c a l awareness, the increasing i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n of the world must not only be stopped, i t simply w i l l (eventually) be stopped. Nevertheless, the question for us i s how to control and ex p l o i t i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n and technology i n e c o l o g i c a l l y and s o c i a l l y u s e f u l ways, not simply to eliminate i t . The l a s t s o l u t i o n that he discusses, job enlargement, i s becoming i n c r e a s i n g l y popular. Blumberg finds that the move towards job enlargement i s l a r g e l y overrated and i s t r u l y successful only to the extent that i t a c t u a l l y increases worker c o n t r o l . Reviewing a l l of these proposals Blumberg points out that A l l four, l e i s u r e , automation, a n t i - i n -d u s t r i a l i s m , and job enlargement, are based on a kind of technological deter-minism. That i s , the premiss of each i s that a given degree of job s a t i s f a c t i o n (or job d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n ) i n e v i t a b l y ac-companys a c e r t a i n technological l e v e l and that increased s a t i s f a c t i o n with work i s possible only by a l t e r i n g tech-nology. . . A l l share the b e l i e f that the tendency to a l i e n a t i o n i s rooted i n the technology of modern i n d u s t r i a l i s m i t s e l f and that a l i e n a t i o n — i n h e r e n t i n industry as we know i t — i s unaffected by any change i n the s o c i a l organization of industry. (Ibid p. 69, h i s emphasis) 131 In short, Blumberg finds that a l i e n a t i o n and worker d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n i s the result,not of the nature of work or the nature of a p a r t i c u l a r kind of work, but rather of the nature of the s o c i a l organization and form of authority ( c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of) the work environment. If this i s true, i t i s clear that increasing human s a t i s -f a c tion i s e a s i l y possible i n a world of decreasing or stable wealth. This i s a l l part of the general argument that happiness i s not d i r e c t l y related to l e v e l of affluence, but r e a l l y to s o c i a l organization and community. Since Blumberg's orientation towards worker control i s characterized by an i n t e r e s t i n the extent to which worker control can reduce al i e n a t i o n and work d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n , he does not share the concern of M i l l and others for the educative e f f e c t s of p a r t i c i p a t i o n . P a r t i c i p a t i o n i s successful from his point of view according to the extent to which i t increases worker s a t i s f a c t i o n . He finds the small scale experiments reviewed i n h i s book uniformly supportive of the proposition that shop l e v e l p a r t i c i p a t i o n reduces alienation and increases job s a t i s f a c t i o n . As he says There i s hardly a study i n the entire l i t e r a t u r e which f a i l s to demonstrate that s a t i s f a c t i o n i n work i s enhanced or that other generally acknowledged b e n e f i c i a l consequences accrue from a genuine increase i n workers' decision-making power. Such a consistency of finding, I submit, i s rare i n s o c i a l research. (Ibid, p. 123) 132 But Blumberg also reviews some experiments which go beyond the concern to eliminate work ali e n a t i o n into a general theory of p a r t i c i p a t i o n . He reviews for example the famous experiments i n the 30's under the d i r e c t i o n of Kurt Lewin. These experiments were an attempt to study the e f f e c t s of d i f f e r e n t s o c i a l climates on the behavior of a group of young boys. These boys were orga-nized i n three d i f f e r e n t kinds of groups, democratic, authoritarian, and l a i s s e z f a i r e . The differences were i n the role played by the adult leader i n each group. In the autocratic group, the adult leader played the t y p i c a l role of the adult leader giving orders, a r t i c -u l a t i n g the projects, etc. i n the democratic group, the leader played a s e l f effacing r o l e , one of cooperativeness giving advice when asked, but also encouraging group discussion and group decision-making; i n the l a i s s e z f a i r e group, the leader played a minimal role and took no part i n discussions. We can of course wonder what such an experiment has to do with par t i c i p a t o r y democracy, but the r e s u l t s suggest the relevance. These r e s u l t s were summarized by the experimenters i n the following chart: 1. Laissez f a i r e was not the same as democracy (a) There was less work done i n i t , and poorer work. (b) I t was more characterized by play. (c) In interviews, the boys expressed preference for t h e i r democratic leader. 133 2. Democracy can be e f f i c i e n t : (a) The quantity of work done i n autocracy was somewhat greater. (b) Work motivation was stronger i n democracy as shown, for instance, when the leader l e f t the room. (c) O r i g i n a l i t y was greater i n democracy. 3. Autocracy can create much h o s t i l i t y and aggression, including aggression against scapegoats: (a) In Experiment I, the autocratic group showed more dominating ascendance; much h o s t i l i t y (in a r a t i o of 30 to 1) ; more demands for attention; more destruction of own property; and more scapegoat behavior. (b) In Experiment I I , one of the four clubs showed a si m i l a r reaction. 4. Autocracy can create discontent that does not_.appei.ar on the surface: (a) Four boys dropped out, and a l l of them did so during autocratic club periods i n which overt r e b e l l i o n did not occur. (b) Nineteen out of 20 boys preferred their democratic leader. (c) There was more discontent expressed i n autocracy—even when the general reaction was submissive—than i n democracy. (d) "Release" behavior on the day of t r a n s i t i o n to a freer atmosphere suggested the presence of previous f r u s t r a t i o n . 5. There was more dependence and less i n d i v i d u a l i t y i n autocracy: (a) There was more "submissive" or "dependent" behavior. (b) Conversation was less varied—more confined to the immediate s i t u a t i o n . (c) In the submissive reaction to autocracy, there was an absolute (though not rel a t i v e ) reduction i n s t a t i s t i c a l measures of i n d i v i d u a l differences. (d) The observers' impression was that i n autocracy there i s some loss of i n d i v i d u a l i t y . 6. There was more group-mindedness and more fr i e n d l i n e s s i n democracy: (a) In Experiment'.!, the pronoun " I " was used r e l a t i v e l y less frequently i n the democratic group. 134 (b) Spontaneous subgroups were larger. (c) In Experiment II, group-minded remarks were much more frequent i n democracy. (d) Friendly remarks were s l i g h t l y more frequent. (e) In Experiment I, mutual praise was more frequent i n the democratic group. (f) In Experiment I I , f r i e n d l y playfulness was more frequent i n democracy. (g) In Experiment I, the democratic group showed more readiness to share group property. (Cartwright, pp. 552-553)* I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note the way i n which the authors distinguished between the l a i s s e z f a i r e and demo-c r a t i c groups. In the democratic group, the leader did attempt to exert some influence e s p e c i a l l y to see that .. decisions were made i n a genuinely democratic manner. Plans were subject to group discussion and group decision-or making as opposed to the more less complete lack of structure that characterized the l a i s s e z f a i r e group. Despite the i n t u i t i v e l y s a t i s f y i n g r e s u l t s , the f a c t that leadership i s what determined the structure of the group, not the voting procedure or i n s t i t u t i o n a l structure, reduces i t s relevance to th i s study. None-theless, the fa c t that environments appropriately characterized as democratic produced such s a t i s f y i n g r esults both i n terms of pa r t i c i p a n t s a t i s f a c t i o n and group *Experiment I involved only two groups, the autocratic and democratic, Experiment II involved four groups of 5 boys each, each of which was subjected to the 3 styles of leadership as each of the four adult leaders s h i f t e d from group to group. (Ibid, p. 527) 135 s o l i d a r i t y goes some way towards supporting the proposi-tions that 1. p a r t i c i p a t i o n provides alternative s a t i s -factions, and 2. p a r t i c i p a t i o n helps develop a concern for community (and therefore ecological) well-being. An even more in t e r e s t i n g experiment from the point of view of changing values and patterns of consumption i s that conducted under Kurt Lewin's d i r e c t i o n by the Red Cross i n an attempt to encourage home nursing volunteers to make greater use of unpopular organ meats such as hearts and kidneys. Two methods of persuasion were t r i e d 1. a lecture s i t u a t i o n where the informant did a l l or almost a l l of the talking, and 2. a discussion group where p a r t i c i p a t i o n was encouraged by the discussion leader. I t was found that the women i n the discussion group were far more l i k e l y to buy these meats thaii those subject to the lecture methods (Blumberg, p. 7 7) . A second experiment with housewives urging them to increase t h e i r consumption of milk achieved s i m i l i a r r e s u l t s . A t h i r d experiment i s of additional i n t e r e s t because group p a r t i c i p a t i o n was also compared to in d i v i d u a l i n s t r u c t i o n . In these cases mothers were being persuaded to feed t h e i r infants cod l i v e r o i l and orange j u i c e . Surprisingly, those subject to group discussion showed a much higher incidence of actually using the foods, than those subject to i n d i v i d u a l i n s t r u c t i o n . Of course the results are not r e a l l y surprising i f one holds to the argument that 136 consumption patterns are more or less s o c i a l l y determined. An important l i m i t a t i o n of these experiments was that the group was not r e a l l y i n the position to make a decision but was subject to the views of the informants and experimenters. I t should not be concluded from these experiments that a l l i t takes i s an i l l u s i o n of p a r t i c i -pation and a group environment to modify peoples' behavior. The l i t e r a t u r e i s f i l l e d with examples which show that genuine decision-making power i s an important factor i n e f f e c t i v e l y involving people i n change. In one experiment workers were involved i n long discussion and explanation of the productivity goals of th e i r unit, but not given the power to decide on what these goals should be. Another group was not only involved i n discussions, but afte r these discussions was allowed to set i t s own productivity goals. The re s u l t s showed that those who were able to make the decisions achieved a s i g n i f i c a n t l y higher l e v e l of productivity than those who merely participated i n discussions. (Blumberg p. 79) While we are not concerned with productivity, the difference in productivity indicated i n the above experiment would seem to indicate further differences i n the morale of the decision-making group. One extremely useful aspect of the various experiments i n worker p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s t h e i r concern with the problem of change. A frequent problem f o r industry i s that the 137 introduction of new techniques almost always r e s u l t s i n a lowering of productivity despite the improved methods. Research has indicated that t h i s i s usually due to workers' resistance to change. As a r e s u l t , great e f f o r t i s ex-pended i n an attempt to discover ways of overcoming t h i s resistance. In one famous experiment, workers were divided into four groups. The f i r s t was simply t o l d what changes would be introduced (the standard procedure), the second were able to e l e c t representatives who were involved i n the working out of the actual d e t a i l s of the changes (though the whole group met to be informed of these changes) and i n the t h i r d and fourth group each member was t o t a l l y involved i n discussion and decision as to implementation. As Blumberg, summarizing the experiment remarks, Stated i n the most general terms the researchers found that the "success" i n bringing about job changes—defined both i n terms of productivity and worker s a t i s -faction—was d i r e c t l y proportional to the amount of worker p a r t i c i p a t i o n . In the no p a r t i c i p a t i o n group, for example, morale f e l l d r a s t i c a l l y r i g h t a f t e r the introduction of the changes and i n the f i r s t f o rty days 17 per cent of the workers i n the group had quit t h e i r jobs. (Ibid, p. 82) As revealed by one chart from the experiment, the auto-c r a t i c group never achieved the l e v e l of productivity they had attained before the changes were introduced, the representative group achieved the l e v e l of productivity 138 they had before i n 2 1/2 weeks and then began to exceed i t , but the p a r t i c i p a t i v e group achieved i n 2 weeks the pre-change l e v e l of production and then went on i n the time of the experiment to exceed the former l e v e l by 14%. Since a l l the experiments c i t e d by Blumberg show s i m i l i a r r e s u l t s i t i s not necessary to go into any further d e t a i l . But one "experiment" seems worth quoting at length because i t dramatically i l l u s t r a t e s the e f f e c t that even a small amount of worker control has on worker s a t i s f a c t i o n and productivity, and also the enormous a t t r a c t i o n that such control has for workers. The dramatis personae here were not male white c o l l a r workers but eight young female manual workers i n a factory producing small toys. Their job was a r e l a t i v e l y simple and r e p e t i t i v e one; to spray paint on wooden toys placed before them. The job had recently been re-engineered and, according to the new system, each g i r l would take a toy from a tray next to her, place i t i n a j i g inside her painting cubicle, and spray paint on i t . Then she would place the toy on one of the overhead hooks which moved by her at a constant speed on an endless b e l t , and the hook then c a r r i e d the toy into an adjacent drying oven. Wages for the job, apart from basic pay, were calculated according to a group bonus plan, and, because the job was new, t h i s was supplemented by a learning bonus which decreased month by month. The job described here seemed simple and clear, and management expected no trouble. But there was trouble: the g i r l s ' productivity was very low and was not increasing at the rate management had hoped or expected. Many hooks on the b e l t went by empty. Morale among the g i r l s was very bad: there were complaints, resistance, excessive absenteeism, and much turnover which only complicated and lengthened 139 the learning process. Among the operators' most consistent complaints were, f i r s t , that the room was too hot due to the proximity of the drying oven and, secondly, that the speed of the b e l t , set by the engineers, was much too f a s t , and that i t simply was impossible to keep up the pace. In order to resolve these d i f f i c u l t i e s , management brought i n a consultant and he advised the foreman, against the l a t t e r ' s better judgment, to confer with the operators. During a series of meetings which followed, the g i r l s made a number of suggestions to the foreman. F i r s t , they requested that he i n s t a l l fans to v e n t i l a t e the area. The engineer and the foreman were s c e p t i c a l about the g i r l s ' complaint and didn't believe that the fans would appease them or cool t h e i r anger. Nevertheless, they agreed to try them, and when the fans were brought i n the g i r l s were delighted and took great pride i n positioning and repositioning them u n t i l they found a s a t i s f a c t o r y location for them. The experi-ment was a success and i t was r e f l e c t e d i n an immediate improvement i n the relationship between the foreman and the workers. At a subsequent meeting the focus of attention turned to the "excess speed' of the b e l t s , and here the operators made an h e r e t i c a l proposal: 'Let us adjust the speed of the b e l t faster or slower depending on how we f e e l " . The foreman was s t a r t l e d , the engineer aghast. But a f t e r lengthydiscussion, arguments, and dire prophecies by the engineer, . a. control..was i n s t a l l e d at the group leader's booth which allowed her to adjust the speed of the b e l t slow, medium, or f a s t . A f t e r i t s i n s t a l l a t i o n , the g i r l s immediately worked out an elaborate schedule of when during the day the b e l t would be operated slowly, when medium, and when f a s t . The r e s u l t s of this innovation were both i r o n i c and s i g n i f i c a n t . Although the g i r l s ' o r i g i n a l complaint was that the b e l t moved impossibly f a s t , under t h e i r own control the average speed of the b e l t was actually increased. When the b e l t was running at a fixed speed determined by the engineer, i t corresponded to low-medium on the operators' d i a l ; under the g i r l s ' control, however, the average speed was up toward the high mark. 140 As a r e s u l t of t h i s surprising change, the g i r l s ' productivity increased between 30-50 per cent over expected l e v e l s ; and, as t h e i r pay was t i e d to productivity, t h e i r earnings jumped enormously, for they were making basic pay, plus a learning bonus, plus a very high group bonus. Moreover, morale reached an all - t i m e high and for the f i r s t time the g i r l s seemed reasonably content with t h e i r work. The story did not end happily here, however. These semi-skilled operators, t h e i r production at record l e v e l s , began to earn more than many of the highly s k i l l e d workers i n the plant, and the l a t t e r complained vociferously. Furthermore, the extra production unbalanced the work of the other departments, leading to a vacuum behind and a pile-up i n front of the g i r l s ' section. Equally disturbing, the impertinent success of the workers had undermined the prestige of the engineers by c a l l i n g t h e i r competence into question, and had rudely challenged the whole system of managerial prerogatives. The superintendent, engineer, and foreman were naturally very gravely disturbed over these developments. To resolve the 'problems' created by the success of the experiment, the superintendent u n i l a t e r a l l y decided to return to the status quo ante. He had the g i r l s ' control d i a l removed and the b e l t adjusted to run at a constant speed as before. The general consequences of these acts are e a s i l y predictable for anyone remotely acquainted with the l i t e r a t u r e on p a r t i c i p a t i o n . Production f e l l o f f immediately, and within a month s i x of eight g i r l s had l e f t the company. Several months l a t e r the foreman also resigned for reasons which were related to the experiment and i t s ultimate debacle. In t h i s entire s i t u a t i o n we see a convergence of two kinds of workers' control which are c r u c i a l to job s a t i s f a c t i o n . For s i m p l i c i t y ' s sake these two kinds might be roughly termed 'control over machinery' and 'control over authority'. In t h i s case control over machinery was s a t i s f y i n g to the workers because i t allowed them to regulate t h e i r own work pace by al t e r n a t e l y increasing and decreasing the speed of the b e l t . This variety a l l e v i a t e d somewhat the boredom and monotony of what was e s s e n t i a l l y a r e p e t i t i v e job, and the workers became autonomous masters of a machine instead of passive extensions of i t . 141 Supplementing the workers' control over machinery here was t h e i r control over authority which was, as the p a r t i c i p a t i o n l i t e r a t u r e amply demonstrates, a formidable factor i n increasing t h e i r s a t i s f a c t i o n with work. The fa c t that management consulted the workers on changes to be made, that t h e i r 'superiors' had accepted the i r suggestions, and that these changes had been s u c c e s s f u l — a l l t h i s undoubtedly helped to account for the remarkably improved climate i n the workers' room and for the i r o n i c increase i n production. This case also demonstrates that the factory i s an integrated s o c i a l (and economic) system and that changes i n one department are l i k e l y to have repercussions elsewhere. I t was c l e a r l y evident that the workers' control could not survive here i n i s o l a t i o n i n one part of the factory: inherent i n s t a b i l i t y demanded that i t be eith e r expanded or eliminated altogether. Or, as a dogmatic i n d u s t r i a l democrat might say, a factory, l i k e a nation, cannot e x i s t half slave, hal f free. (Blumberg, pp. 97-98) These studies can be seen, not only as proof of the thesis that worker control i s a p e r f e c t l y viable alternative to the current h i e r a c h i c a l organization of industry, but also, and what i s more s i g n i f i c a n t from our point of view, that the p a r t i c i p a t i v e forum i s an excellent means of introducing and e f f e c t i n g change. I f we are to modify our l i f e s t y l e s and our communities i n response to the ecological imperative we w i l l have to do more than just sermonize; p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s c l e a r l y the most e f f e c t i v e means for achieving such changes. I t should be noted again that the experiments seem to show that i n order for p a r t i c i p a t i o n to be e f f e c t i v e the group must be small enough so that individuals have a r e a l chance to voice t h e i r views and hear the views of others. Large scale meetings, (the assembly model of p a r t i c i p a t i o n ) , democratic voting, 142 and the e l e c t i o n of committees to do the actual planning i s simply not s u f f i c i e n t as a means f o r producing the kind of e f f e c t i v e and dramatic change that characterizes the r e s u l t s of most p a r t i c i p a t i o n experiments. While Blumberg's study does much to support the thesis tha't worker s a t i s f a c t i o n can be dramatically increased through worker p a r t i c i p a t i o n and that e s p e c i a l l y i n the case of production change, worker p r o d u c t i v i t y can be increased through p a r t i c i p a t i o n , there i s l i t t l e i n his research r e l a t i n g to the claim of M i l l and others, that l o c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n w i l l y i e l d greater involvement and commitment to the larger community, nation, or the world. I was unfortunately unable to f i n d any l i t e r a t u r e or experiments which r e l a t e d changes i n a worker's p o s i t i o n v i s - a - v i s i n d u s t r i a l authority, and changes i n the worker's attitudes toward p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n outside the work place. There i s , on the other hand, a well known c o r r e l a t i o n supported by many d i f f e r e n t studies, between a sense of p o l i t i c a l e f f i c a c y (a sense that one can a f f e c t the p o l i t i c a l scene, a sense that one's p o l i t i c a l e f f o r t s w i l l count) and the nature of the work environment. Blauner, for example, i n h i s book A l i e n a t i o n and Freedom, found that workers i n the p r i n t i n g industry who have a high degree of i n d i v i d u a l control over t h e i r work also "had a highly developed sense of self-esteem and a sense of s e l f -worth and were therefore ready to p a r t i c i p a t e i n the p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s of the community." (Blauner, p. 176) 143 He also found that the s i t u a t i o n i n the chemical industry, where the workers exercise a large degree of c o l l e c t i v e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y over the processes of the plant, also contributed to high self-esteem and self-worth. And while he does not, i n reviewing the chemical plant s i t u a t i o n , make the inference to p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y he made i n the previous example, i t seems clear that he would hold the same po s i t i o n . Blauner's inference from work autonomy to p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y Vis obviously based on the assumption that people with a high sense of self-worth and self-esteem w i l l r e a d i l y p a r t i c i p a t e i n the p o l i t i c a l arena. This assumption t i e s i n d i r e c t l y with the claim i n the chapters on the psychology of p a r t i c i p a t i o n , that one need which i s s a t i s f i e d by p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n a public forum i s the need for self-^ahdapublid) esteem. Autonomy i s , o f course, a source of status (and self-esteem) and i n thi s way encourages people to a sense of p o l i t i c a l s i gnificance based on t h e i r sense of s o c i a l importance. But th i s i s not the only reason for assuming a higher amount of p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y among workers with greater autonomy. As Milbrath points out i n his book P o l i t i c a l P a r t i c i p a t i o n "Persons who f e e l more e f f e c t i v e i n t h e i r everyday tasks and challenges are more l i k e l y to p a r t i c i p a t e i n p o l i t i c s . " (Milbrath, p. 59) 144 Almond and Verba i n t h e i r book, The C i v i c Culture, demonstrated that the highest f e e l i n g of p o l i t i c a l e f f i c a c y was associated with those countries, the U.S.A. and B r i t a i n , where the most i n s t i t u t i o n a l opportunities existed for l o c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n . In summary the authors argue If i n most s o c i a l situations the i n d i v i d u a l finds himself subservi-ent to some authority figure, i t i s l i k e l y that he w i l l expect such an authority r e l a t i o n s h i p i n the p o l i t i c a l sphere. On the other hand, i f outside the p o l i t i c a l sphere he has opportunities to p a r t i c i p a t e i n a wide range of s o c i a l decisions, he w i l l probably expect to be able to p a r t i c i p a t e i n p o l i t i c a l decisions as well. Furthermore, p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n non-p o l i t i c a l decision making may give one the s k i l l s needed to engage i n p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n : the s k i l l s of self-expression and a sense of e f f e c t i v e p o l i t i c a l t a c t i c s . (Almond, p. 2 72) A l l t h i s information would seem to substantiate Marx's claim about the importance of the individual's r e l a t i o n s h i p to the means of production. What needs to be added to Marx i s that the c r u c i a l ingredient i n t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p i s not ownership, but control or autonomy. In summary, the evidence from studies r e l a t i n g varying degrees of workplace p a r t i c i p a t i o n to such dependent variables as worker s a t i s f a c t i o n , e f f i c i e n c y , r e c e p t i v i t y to change, and a sense of p o l i t i c a l e f f i c a c y , indicate that p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s a powerful determinant i n the 145 attainment of a l l these goals. From our point of view, we are concerned with 1. increasing s a t i s f a c t i o n to o f f s e t generalized lowering of the standard of l i v i n g , 2. the creation of new values, and 3. the increased preparedness to be s e l f - l e g i s l a t i n g . What empirical information there i s would seem to support the claim that p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n l o c a l government and industry i s conducive to these goals. But as I mentioned at the beginning of t h i s chapter, there i s an enormous problem of how to r e l a t e the s a t i s f y i n g r e s u l t s of small group p a r t i c i p a t i o n to the p r a c t i c a l problems of large scale decision-making. This i s an area of concern for the small group the o r i s t r who wishes to generalize h i s r e s u l t s , for the e c o l o g i c a l l y concerned who wish to exploit the benefits of p a r t i c i p a t i o n while maintaining regional decision^ making where i t i s e c o l o g i c a l l y relevant, and even to the r a d i c a l democratic th e o r i s t who has f a i t h i n the Athenian form of crowd democracy (e.g. M. Bookchin i n h i s Post Scarcity Anarchism). Obviously, i f a group of 5 or 10 seems to be the best for developing i n i t s members a r e a l sense of significance and p a r t i c i p a t i o n , allowing i t s members s u f f i c i e n t opportunity to be heard, to change and be changed, then there seem' to be some very unfortunate implications for the p o s s i b i l i t y of democratizing (in the sense of providing genuine participation) any large scale organization. This objection has long been taken as the death blow to any attempt to 146 incorporate widespread p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n i n d u s t r i a l society. As M i l l puts i t ...since a l l cannot, i n a community exceeding a single small town, par-t i c i p a t e personally i n any but some very minor portions of the public business, i t follows that the i d e a l type of a perfect government must be representative. ( M i l l , 1964, p. 217) While M i l l ' s premiss i s undoubtably true his con-clusion i s f a l s e . I t i s f a l s e because he assumed fo r his argument that there were only two alternatives for democratic organization: d i r e c t p a r t i c i p a t o r y democracy and representative government. Given the weaknesses and f a i l u r e s of representative government, i t i s fortunate that M i l l ' s dichotomy i s too l i m i t e d . There are other alternatives both i n theory and i n practice and i t i i s to these we must turn. 147 C H A P T E R V I I LARGE SCALE PARTICIPATION 148 The seeming i m p o s s i b i l i t y of i n v o l v i n g c i t i z e n s d i r e c t l y i n the governing of the large scale organizations that characterize i n d u s t r i a l society has led most democratic t h e o r i s t s (e.g. M i l l ) to dismiss the p o s s i b i l i t y of p a r t i c i p a t o r y democracy as imagined by Rousseau and others. Despite t h i s skepticism, there have been a number of serious attempts both i n theory and practice to develop a l t e r n a t i v e s to representative government and h i e r a r c h i c a l management. - While t h i s problem i s of prime concern to anyone (l i k e Blumberg, for example) who accepts the current order of i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n and wishes to see i t democratized, i t may not seem of such pressing concern to those whose ec o l o g i c a l sense leads them to a c t u a l l y attack the current l e v e l and form of production. Those who see the necessity of reduced and c o n t r o l l e d p r o d u c t i v i t y with far greater d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n and l o c a l s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y can embrace the " p r a c t i c a l " objections to p a r t i c i p a t o r y democracy i n i n d u s t r i a l society as j u s t another argument i n favor of the elimination of such a society. Such an extreme attitude may appear to border on Luddism or i r r a t i o n a l romanticism, but i t also has i t s adherents among the t h e o r i s t of small scale (or as Bookchin c a l l s i t "libe r a t o r y " ) technology.* Greater and greater e f f o r t i s *see h i s book Post-Scarcity Anarchism, the chapter, "Liberatory Technology", E. F. Schumacher has also made the suggestion to me i n conversation that small scale industry does not r e a l l y require democratization i n order to be humane. 149 being expended on the development of productive processes which do not require long production runs, high c a p i t a l investment, and highly c e n t r a l i z e d production to be . e f f i c i e n t . The recent dramatic increase i n the p r i c e of o i l and therefore of transportation has added enormous 4 impetus to t h i s e f f o r t . * Because c e n t r a l i z e d production i s currently so dependent on inexpensive transport (especially i n Canada) there i s every reason to believe that decentral-i z a t i o n of manufacturing may well be " i n e v i t a b l e " — b e s i d e being, as I have argued, desirable. Such considerations may lead the e c o l o g i c a l r a d i c a l to dismiss the concern f o r democratizing large scale organizations rafter a l l they are about to "wither away". But such a view i s not r e a l l y tenable. There are many l i m i t a t i o n s on dec e n t r a l i z a t i o n both now and i n the foreseeable future. F i r s t , while many organizations could c e r t a i n l y (and c e r t a i n l y should) be reduced i n s i z e , there must s t i l l be some regional and even world-wide coordination of a c t i v i t y . This need for large scale organizations flows not only from economic considerations, but also from e c o l o g i c a l one We are inter-dependent. Pollutants know no l o c a l borders, *This i s because large scale production and i t s economy of scale e x i s t s only when ei t h e r there i s a large l o c a l market, or a market which can be inexpensively reached. Recently i n B r i t a i n there has been a move away from the c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of brick production towards l o c a l production because the price of transport over a r e l a t i v e l y short distance exceeds the manufacturing cost of the b r i c k s . (Schumacher/ i n a speech i n Vancouver, F a l l 197 4) 150 f i s h swim thousands of miles, b i r d s cross continents. Most cr u c i a l , of course, i s organization within n a t u r a l e c o l o g i c a l regions where b i o l o g i c a l i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s are extensive. Such f a c t s , plus the obvious requirement of some c e n t r a l i z e d production and trade no matter how reduced i n sca l e , e n t a i l an i n e v i t a b l e amount of large s c a l e organization. And surely, we cannot accept at the world-wide l e v e l the fre e market anarchy which we have r e j e c t e d at the l o c a l l e v e l ; the arguments f o r the s o c i a l c o n t r o l of production are as ap p l i c a b l e to the world as to a l o c a l commons. Secondly, the f a c t that we already have such large organizations a l s o presents a formidable b a r r i e r to d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n . We w i l l not be transformed overnight i n t o d e c e n t r a l i z e d communities with l o c a l s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y ; we w i l l i n f a c t probably never be so "transformed". The "evolution" w i l l be gradual i f at a l l , and we must be able to f i n d a means f o r democratizing these l a r g e r organizations. In f a c t , one of the a t t r a c t i o n s of the idea that p a r t i c i p a t i o n w i l l remove much of the s t r u c t u r a l cause of environmental degradation i s that such p a r t i c i p a t i o n does not require a rev o l u t i o n a r y upheavel to be brought i n t o e f f e c t . (Of course i t may r e s u l t i n such an: upheaval,, but thath.is i r r e l e v a n t speculation.) What i s important here i s that the immediate i n t r o d u c t i o n of p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t o l o c a l communities and workplaces provides a f i r s t s t r u c t u r a l step towards the eventual r e a l i z a t i o n of a p o l i t i c a l organization 151 that i s appropriate to our l e v e l of population, i n d u s t r i a l production, and e c o l o g i c a l needs. For small scale p a r t i c i -pation to r e a l i z e anything beyond l o c a l goals, a means of maintaining the benefits of p a r t i c i p a t i o n , but extending the area of control, must be sought. F i n a l l y , we should not be misled into thinking that there i s no d i f f i c u l t y i n developing p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n small communities of say 2 0 , 0 0 0 people. Even such a small community presents formidable problems i f we take seriously the notion that people should l e g i s l a t e on a l l c o l l e c t i v e decisions which a f f e c t t h e i r l i v e s . Groups larger than about 20 do not seem to provide for the intimate contact and exten-sive discussion that i s necessary i f individuals are to actually rule and be ruled by reason and persuasion. This means that any large scale arrangement must provide for extensive small group p a r t i c i p a t i o n i f the p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s to be maximally e f f e c t i v e . I t seems clear enough that certain deviation from the i d e a l of p a r t i c i p a t i o n (where a l l c o l l e c t i v e decisions are subject to discussion and consensus vote of a l l citizens) are required for any kind of p r a c t i c a l system. I have already discussed the deviation from consensus i n Chapter II because thi s deviation s t i l l remained within the basic notion of p a r t i c i p a t i o n . But there are other necessary deviations f o r a p r a c t i c a l system. Are these deviations destructive of the virtues of p a r t i c i p a t i o n ? Is J.S. M i l l r i g ht that p a r t i c i -pation i s appropriate only for minor l o c a l matters? There are b a s i c a l l y three parameters along which govern-mental arrangements can deviate from the p a r t i c i p a t o r y i d e a l : 152 1. Range of d e c i s i o n . The range of decisions which are subject to the c o l l e c t i v e order can vary from the t r i v i a l (where s h a l l the town dance be held?) up to and including a l l decisions t r a d i t i o n a l l y associated with national sovereignty such the establishment of a criminal code, tax-ation, and the d e c i s i o n to wage war. Within economic units the range of decisions open to p a r t i c i p a n t s can vary (as noted above) from where to put the fans, tb; which markets to Center. 2..'Range o f involvement i n the decision making process. This can range from complete involvment as found i n small meetings where a l l get a r e a l chance to discuss, persuade and decide (but the upper bound of the i d e a l seems to be only 5 or 10, c e r t a i n l y not much more than 20) to the town meeting s i t u a t i o n of a few hundred (where there i s s t i l l room for con-siderable input) to the science f i c t i o n story of TV voting where weekly p l e b i s c i t e s on issues discussed p u b l i c l y on the t e l e v i s i o n are then voted on d i r e c t l y and a l l national representative government i s by-passed. Beyond universal mass democracy are various forms of representative government including thoroughly, bound representatives, representatives subject to immediate r e c a l l or the "soviet" system of '•-•.'tiered groups, each group being made up of representatives from the lower groups.* 3. Numbers involved i n the voting. This a f f e c t s not only access to the decision-making process discussed * c f . Thayer's scheme described below pp. 166-173. 153 previously, but f i n a l l y , one's sense of p o l i t i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e . The d i f f i c u l t y with the t e l e v i s i o n voting scheme i s not only that there i s no r e a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n , merely passive v o t i n g , but also that one's vote i s of so l i t t l e s ignificance as to give a sense of f u t i l i t y rather than a sense of p o l i t i c a l power and r e s p o n s i b l i t y . There i s a natural d i f f i c u l t l y i n resolving these parameters i n that there tends to be a tension between the f i r s t and the l a t t e r two. Usually, the greater the significance of the decision the greater the number of people that are a f f e c t e d by the d e c i s i o n . I f t h i s was an i r o n law, i t would indeed place a formidable b a r r i e r to the i d e a l of p a r t i c i p a t i o n though we would s t i l l have M i l l ' s educative j u s t i f i c a t i o n to warrant l o c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n . But t h i s problem can be reduced by d e c e n t r a l i z i n g both the economy and the p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y so that decisions of magnitude are l e f t to l o c a l c o n t r o l . E s p e c i a l l y within the work place, there i s an enormous opportunity.for increased worker c o n t r o l i n areas of great s i g n i f i c a n c e to the worker, though perhaps of l i t t l e importance to the society as a whole. We should not allow ourselves to become so bewitched by the f a s c i n a t i o n with large nation states that we f a i l to r e a l i z e j u s t how many decisions of great personal s i g n i f i c a n c e can and should be made l o c a l l y . Unfortunately, e c o l o g i c a l considerations frequently involve e c o l o g i c a l consequences over large areas and frequently therefore involve the l i v e s of. large numbers of people. 15 4 Some of these decisions i t would appear must be made by a r e l a t i v e l y a l i e n body. How i s thi s to be done i n a fashion which adheres as closely to the id e a l of p a r t i c i p a t i o n as possible? While the answers are complex, the following consider-ations must be kept i n mind: 1. There must be opportunity f o r l o c a l , small group discussion and suggestion before a decision i s made by the representative body, so that c i t i z e n s can have a creative role i n the decision making process. 2. The representatives must be kept closely t i e d to t h e i r constituency. This could be done fo r example by frequent meetings and immediate r e c a l l . 3. When a decision i s made by the higher body, i t must be brought back to the small l o c a l groups, i d e a l l y f o r r a t i f i c a t i o n , but at lea s t f o r extensive elaboration, so that those who are subject to the decision can have an oppor-tunity to be persuaded of i t s reasonableness. 4. Extensive changing of representatives must be maintained to prevent the development of a p o l i t i c a l e l i t e . A system such as the Athenians used of a l o t t e r y f o r various sub-administrative positions and place on a jury, might well be appropri ate. 5. I t also seems desirable that a rough f i n a n c i a l equality e x i s t among the c i t i z e n s to prevent various forms of dominance by the wealthy. 6. Some method should be employed to reduce the natural tendencies f o r people to develop sub-loyalties. 155 which i n t e r f e r e with t h e i r p a r t i c i p a t i o n and -with"the "search for the best c o l l e c t i v e decisions. (e.g. a large number of such groups or perhaps just small group methods suggested by Thayer below;.) Keeping these considerations i n mind, l e t us examine some p r a c t i c a l proposals. GUILD SOCIALISM One of the f i r s t s i g n i f i c a n t proposals for democratizing society was that of the Guild S o c i a l i s t s , and p a r t i c u l a r l y that of G. D. H. Cole. The Guild Socialisisattempted to o f f e r a kind of middle ground between state socialism and Syndicalism by i n s t i t u t i n g p o l i t i c a l control over the economic sector, and providing extensive p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n both sectors. The worker's p o s i t i o n , the Guild S o c i a l i s t s argued, was that of a wage slave and t h i s condition would not be a l l e v i a t e d by increased wages and the improved working conditions that the worker might expect i f the state took over ownership of industry. For t h i s reason, Cole claimed that the answer that most people would give to the question "what i s the fundamental e v i l i n our society?" would be the wrong one: "... they would answer POVERTY, when they ought to answer SLAVERY" (p. 38 Pateman). They.emphasized that the position of the worker besides being incompatible with s o c i a l i s t and democratic ideals had the e f f e c t of 156 rendering the worker u n f i t for. p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n democracy*, and that the notorious p o l i t i c a l apathy of the worker was the r e s u l t of his generally passive role i n industry. Worker p a r t i c i p a t i o n would therefore serve the double function of providing the worker with immediate control over h i s work place and also provide the stimulus and experience for greater p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n matters of community and national importance. The g u i l d s o c i a l i s t developed two basic p r i n c i p l e s of democracy to incorporate i n t h e i r conception of the state. The essentials of democratic representation p o s i t i v e l y stated, are, f i r s t that the repre-sented s h a l l have free choice of, constant contact with, and considerable control over, his representative. The second i s that he should not be c a l l e d upon to choose someone to represent him as a man or as a c i t i z e n i n a l l aspects of c i t i z e n s h i p , but only to choose someone to represent his point of view i n r e l a t -ion to some p a r t i c u l a r purposes, i n other words, some p a r t i c u l a r function. A l l true and democratic representation i s therefore functional represen-ta t i o n . (Cole, .•JS.D.H; , p. 38) *The e f f e c t that certain types of i n d u s t r i a l processes had on those employed i n them was noted by Adam Smith: he wrote, " i n the progress of the d i v i s i o n of labour, the employment...of the great body of the people comes to be confined to a few simple operations; frequently to one or two. But the understandings of . the greater part of men are necessarily formed by t h e i r ordinary employments. The man whose whole l i f e i s spent i n performing a few simple operations of which the e f f e c t s too are, perhaps, always the same...has no occasion to exert h i s understanding or to exercise h i s invention i n finding out expedients for removing d i f f i c u l t i e s which never occur. He natu-r a l l y 'loses.,; t h e r e f o r e t h e habit of such exertion and generally becomes as stupid and ignorant as i t i s possible for a human creature to become... (he i s incapable) of forming any :j.ust judgment concerning many even of the ordinary duties of private l i f e . Of the great and extensive interests of his country, he i s altogether incapable of judging,',. Smith, The Wealth of  Nations, 1880, v o l . I I , pp. 365-6 quoted by Pateman p. 51. 157 Following t h e i r p r i n c i p l e s of decentralization of decision-making power, close contact with representatives, easy r e c a l l , and functional representation, the g u i l d s o c i a l i s t s developed the following general scheme of organization. Each industry would be organizaed by a national g u i l d composed of representatives from the various f a c t o r i e s within the industry. The national g u i l d would set general production standards and be responsible for the d i s t r i b u t i o n of c a p i t a l funds. The fac t o r i e s would have great freedom i n setting of work patterns, a l l o c a t i o n of r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s , etc.. Individual communities would be organized around a "commune"—a representative body made up of representatives from the i n d u s t r i a l guilds, from the various c i v i c guilds (e.g. the health g u i l d , c u l t u r a l g u i l d , u t i l i t i e s g u i l d , etc.) and representatives elected on a geographic basis (proportional to population) who would represent the interests of the consumer. These representatives would have voting power equal to that of a l l the guilds. This commune would make a l l the major decisions of the community. The planners waffled on describing how the power would be d i s t r i b u t e d between the l o c a l and national guilds, but since the motivation for the g u i l d structure was the maximization of i n d i v i d u a l decision power, the emphasis would be placed on l o c a l decision-making. I t was the hope of the g u i l d s o c i a l i s t that most decisions could be worked out between representatives of 15 8 the consumer and the guilds without resort to any coercion on the part of national government. The b e l i e f was that since much of the negotiating would be taking place at the community l e v e l , the personal contact involved would encourage people to act i n the public i n t e r e s t rather than i n s e l f i s h defense of t h e i r group i n t e r e s t . The b e l i e f that labor was r e a l l y service to the community was i n part the basis for the functional notion of representation, and i t was hoped that the s p i r i t of community service would become pervasive i n a society so organized. But the plan does not seem to rest heavily on these "Utopian" hopes, but rather on a kind of balance of power which i t s e l f would be conducive to protection of the public i n t e r e s t . Cole thought^ for example^ that the problem of unequal status would be solved because there would no longer be a class of managers and a class of the managed, and that the other c r u c i a l source of inequality, i n s e c u r i t y of employment, would be eliminated for a l l . While th i s theory allowed for representation, i t was f e l t that because representatives were representing someone functionally, the represented would have the competence to assess the a c t i v i t i e s of t h e i r representative, immediate:-recall would also serve to keep the representatives responsive to the demands and needs of the represented. I t should also be noted that the theory allowed for " i n d i r e c t " representation: the repre-sentatives to higher levels of organization were elected by representatives to the lower levels rather than d i r e c t 159 e l e c t i o n by the c i t i z e n s . For example, the ward represent-atives to the l o c a l commune would e l e c t a representative to the regional commune, rather than t h i s representative being elected by a l l members of the l o c a l commune. This provided that those represented would have personal contact with t h e i r immediate representative. I t i s also i n t e r e s t i n g to note that unlike the " u n s c i e n t i f i c Utopian s o c i a l i s t " of the previous century, the g u i l d s o c i a l i s t also had a plan for r e a l i z i n g t h e i r Utopia i n the larger society. The three elements of t h i s plan were: 1. encroaching control of industry by organizing the unions along i n d u s t r i a l rather than c r a f t l i n e s , and then forcing the employer to deal with union merely as an owner of c a p i t a l devoid of managerial power (e.g. the owner would a l l o t the union so much for pay, but could not decide on pay scales, nor choose the foreman), 2. working with the Labor party for n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n with j o i n t control (union and state), and 3. the creation of worker-run industries ( i . e . guilds) to compete with already existent c a p i t a l i s t firms. The l a s t method would mainly be a propaganda device, which could also be used for experi-mentation with various types of worker control. In fact, the g u i l d s o c i a l i s t s did manage to s t a r t a building g u i l d which, with the help of low i n t e r e s t government loans, was moderately successful. H i s t o r i c a l l y , the main problem the g u i l d s o c i a l i s t s faced was organizing along i n d u s t r i a l rather than c r a f t 160 l i n e s . This problem, along with a slump i n England which forced the c l o s i n g of the experimental g u i l d s , r e s u l t e d i n the movement's co l l a p s e . Nonetheless, the g u i l d s o c i a l i s t movement does provide us with a model of what a p r a c t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t o r y democracy i n an i n d u s t r i a l society might look l i k e , and the sketch of a s o l u t i o n to the problem of regional coordination with regional autonomy. The g u i l d s o c i a l i s t plan to have the primary form of government be made up of consumer and producer representatives deals with the problem of the "natural" consumer apathy that r e s u l t s from the fa c t that consumers do not spontaneously form into i n t e r e s t groups (see M. Olsen's argument c i t e d above f o r the reason), but i t posed the a d d i t i o n a l problem of emphasizing the opposition of consumer and producer i n t e r e s t s . This emphasis i s unfortunate from the point of view being developed i n t h i s thesis i n that I am concerned with de-emphasizing the economic sources of s a t i s f a c t i o n i n part by providing the a l t e r n a t i v e s a t i s f a c t i o n of community p a r t i c i p a t i o n . By developing a representative system along economic l i n e s , the g u i l d s o c i a l i s t s were recognizing what i s surely a r e a l i t y , but every e f f o r t must be made to s h i f t the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of people away from t h e i r economic roles towards a more h o l i s t i c and community r o l e . To do t h i s , i t would be necessary to provide for a more s i g -n i f i c a n t o v e r - r i d i n g body, one which represented the communi i n t e r e s t over and above the producers' and consumers' 161 i n t e r e s t . This of course presents problems for the very basis of the g u i l d s o c i a l i s t system, namely functional representation. The most fundamental f a i l u r e of g u i l d socialism, i n view of the c r i t e r i a for a t r u l y p a r t i c i p a t i v e system, i s i t s acceptance and emphasis of economic differences so that the p o s s i b i l i t y of t r u l y r e f l e c t i v e and reasonable decision-making i s li m i t e d by the very structure of the assemblies, v i z . t h e i r . d i v i s i o n into economic i n t e r e s t s . The system may also be c r i t i c i z e d for i t s extensive reliance on representation which reduces active involvement and the p o s s i b i l i t y of universal consent. But such a c r i t i c i s m i s li m i t e d i n that any p r a c t i c a l proposal i s going to have to allow for some representation, and the gu i l d s o c i a l i s t notion of functional representation was a thoughtful attempt to have representation with the greatest p o s s i b i l i t y of acceptance and even active involvement by the represented. The theory was that functional repre-sentation provided for narrow enough representation that the representative had a plausible claim to being able to r e a l l y know the views of his constituency. But^unfortunately, the organization of the constituencies into narrow economic interests i s also, the fundamental flaw of the system. YUGOSLAVIA The problems raised at the t h e o r e t i c a l l e v e l i n g u i l d socialism have received extensive debate at the l e v e l of practice i n Yugoslavia. In p a r t i c u l a r , the question of 162 the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the economic units such as the worker c o n t r o l l e d firm and p o l i t i c a l units such as the commune and federal government i s a source of constant debate. This debate emphasizes the d i f f i c u l t y of assuring that the s o c i a l property of the economic enterprises be used f o r s o c i a l goods while maximizing the autonomy of the worker-operators. In addition, there i s the question of smai: group p a r t i c i p a t i o n and whether the sustem allows for s u f f i c -i e nt input on a small scale to provide f o r the opportunity to persuade and be persuaded. While the system has gone through many changes since i t s inauguration i n 1950, i t seems most appropriate to describe the current v a r i a t i o n . The numerous c o n s t i t u t i o n a l changes, to say nothing of the p r o l i f e r a t i o n of regulations, has r e s u l t e d i n the curious s i t u a t i o n that western scholars frequently know more of the l e g a l d e t a i l s than do l o c a l p a r t i c i p a n t s . But these changes have come from the necessity of experimenting with various forms and i n response to the increasing demand for greater l o c a l c o n t r o l . As the system i s cur r e n t l y organized the i n d i v i d u a l enterprises are governed by a worker's c o u n c i l elected by a l l the workers. These councils i n turn appoint a management body and a d i r e c t o r who exercise the most immediate day to day c o n t r o l of the enterprise. The d i r e c t o r i s usually hired from outside the firm for a four-year term, and i s chosen 16 3 on the basis of his expertise. Recently, large firms have developed smaller economic units within the firm which develop almost autonomous contractual relationships with other areas of the firm. This allows for even more participant control. In addition, there are periodic meetings of a l l the workers and important topics are subject to worker referendum. The workers' council ,is elected for two years and subject to r e c a l l . This group meets usually monthly and i t s managing board (essentially the executive of the council) may meet several times a week. Much of the administrative hierarchy functions as i n a standard enterprise with the manager and a "collegium" of department heads responsible for day to day operations. As a r e s u l t , these directors exert a great deal of influence over the d i r e c t i o n and operation of the firm. I t should be noted however, that the managers do not have the power of dismissal; t h i s i s allocated to a committee of the workers' council. Workers seem c l e a r l y to perceive the power of the managers. In one study reported, the workers indicated that the managers have very great control while the workers have only "a l i t t l e " . * However, i n t h i s same study, the workers indicated that they thought the workers' councils had almost as much power as the managers. Much of the data on the effectiveness of the Yugoslav system i n providing workers with a r e a l sense of p a r t i c i p a t i o n *Hunnius, p. 227 164 and control i s weakened by the enormous regional differences i n l i t e r a c y and p o l i t i c a l competency. Workers show much less deference and much more enthusiasm for p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the more highly i n d u s t r i a l i z e d areas than i n those poorer regions which are only newly experiencing i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n . Nonetheless, there seems to be an increasing demand for greater worker involvement. The recent restructuring of the larger firms allowing for greater decentralization of control within the firm would seem to indicate a growing r e a l i z a t i o n that for p a r t i c i p a t i o n to be e f f e c t i v e i t must provide for shop l e v e l c o n t r o l — i . e . small group p a r t i c i p a t i o n . The other problem of concern i s the balancing of s o c i a l r e s p o n s b i l i t y against l o c a l autonomy. The Yugoslav economy seems to be d r i f t i n g i n the d i r e c t i o n of a kind of democratic corporate capitalism as more power and authority i s given to the l o c a l firm and more emphasis i s being placed on p r o f i t a b i l i t y . This movement i s being done i n the name of l o c a l autonomy, but the decisions, for example, to allow the market to determine prices i s c l e a r l y a move away from socialism. While autonomy i s frequently given as the argument for allowing the market to "govern" the behavior of corporations, i t i s clear to many commentators that. there i s also a none-too-subtle d r i f t towards competition and a kind of c o l l e c t i v e "free enterprise"*. The i l l s of such an arrangement, of course, are apparent to many of the c r i t i c s within Yugoslavia as they are also clear to many *Thayer, pp. 105-110 165 of the blue c o l l a r workers. The workers have c o n s i s t e n t l y opposed market p r i c i n g out of concern not only to c o n t r o l p r i c e s but also to assure job s e c u r i t y . Another i n t e r e s t i n g trend i s that, as seems natural i n a market economy, many of the small firms are f i n d i n g i t p r o f i t a b l e not to compete but to u n i t e together i n t o conglomerates. Such moves, i n i t i a l l y motivated by p r o f i t considerations, would simply mean a roundabout return to some kind of community c o n t r o l and e l i m i n a t i o n of competition. While the actual h i s t o r i c a l behavior of Yugoslavia provides f a s c i n a t i n g data f o r the democratic t h e o r i s t , i t i s also l i m i t e d by i t s p a r t i c u l a r under-development and recent h i s t o r y as a c e n t r a l i z e d s a t e l l i t e •'••.of the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, despite some i n d i c a t i o n s of a move towards a kind of market s o c i a l i s m , a l l i n d i c a t i o n s are t h a t worker c o n t r o l , e s p e c i a l l y a t the l o c a l and shop l e v e l , i s both desired and valued when achieved. In a d d i t i o n , there i s some evidence that the increasing p a r t i c i p a t i o n of an enormous number of workers (well over one-fourth of the work force served on some governing body between 1950 and 1960) has r e s u l t e d i n greater p o l i t i c a l involvement i n other areas (though the evidence here i s f a r from s u f f i c i e n t ) . * The greatest f a i l u r e of the Yugoslav system from the point of view of true p a r t i c i p a t i o n , i s i t s acceptance of e l e c t e d management f a r removed from the shop f l o o r . While t h i s arrangement allows f o r much more worker influence *Thayer, pp. 105-110 166 then usualy, i t s t i l l does not allow for the active p a r t i c i p a t i o n / on the part of the workers. In addition, the ambiguous feelings about the market as a source of "freedom" threatens the p r i n c i p l e of p o l i t i c a l c o n t r o l over 'the economy and the s o c i a l i s t i c nature of the experiment.* Inevitably, such a return to competition would be destructive of r e f l e c t i v e and reasonable decision-making as s e l f - i n t e r e s t would become the dominant concern. THAYER The l a s t theory that I wish to discuss i s that of Fredrick Thayer as put f o r t h i n h i s book An End to Hierarchy, An End to Competition. Thayer, a former management con-sultant for the Pentagon, c r i t i c i z e s j u s t about a l l the t h e o r i s t s of p a r t i c i p a t i o n for t h e i r f a i l u r e to democratize the administrative side of government. Most t h e o r i s t s , I he complains, have only been i n t e r e s t e d .inti'de.mpcratizing the l e g i s l a t i v e side of government, and have taken the stand, reminiscent of Rousseau, that only angels could democratize the administrative side of government. But as we a l l know, the l e g i s l a t i v e / a d m i n i s t r a t i v e d i s t i n c t i o n i s a tenuous o n e — e s p e c i a l l y given the current tendency to allow regulative agencies a great deal of (perhaps necessary) d i s c r e t i o n . The r e s u l t i s that those most d i r e c t l y a f f e c t e d by the agencies, namely the consumer and the employee, have l i t t l e or no say over the agencies' opera-tions . *Thayer, pp. 105-110 167 The solution, Thayer argues, i s to employ the insights of the leading management th e o r i s t and the theory of small groups. Interestingly enough, theories developed i n these f i e l d s are converging. The group size that small group t h e o r i s t are finding most e f f e c t i v e for democratic decision-making and acting i s i n the 5-10 range (Thayer prefers 5). At the same time, the size of the group that management the o r i s t f i n d most supervisors are capable of e f f e c t i v e l y managing (the so-called "span of control") i s also i n the 5 to 10 range. As Thayer summarizes "the size of e f f e c t i v e small groups i s pr e c i s e l y the same as that prescribed for v e r t i c a l spans of control" (Thayer, p. 8). Using t h i s observation, Thayer argues that the t r a d i t i o n a l arguments for v e r t i c a l organizations have ignored the "democratic" r e a l i t y that i t was the size of the group, not the hierarchy that enables the organization to get something done. The success of various interdepartmental groups i n the public sector (he c i t e s NASA as an example) comes not only from the r e a l i z a t i o n that such h o l i s t i c approaches to problems are necessary, but also from the non-hierarchical form of t h e i r organization. Since a l l departments enter these frequently ad hoc organizations as equals, no one i n the "interdepartment" has authority over the others. The r e s u l t i s that decisions must be by consensus with the salutory e f f e c t that they must therefore be argued at some length.* *Galbraith, i n his New Ind u s t r i a l State, makes a sim i l a r point about the democratic nature of the large corporations. See e s p e c i a l l y chapter VT, "The Technostructure". 168 He also mentions a variety of experiments involving c i t i z e n p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n l o c a l planning which involve bringing a l l relevant public o f f i c i a l s together with a large group of l o c a l c i t i z e n s . But instead of having a mass meeting with the o f f i c i a l s at the head table, the large group i s broken down into smaller groups each con-taining representatives of d i f f e r e n t departments and various l o c a l factions. He claims that such experiments have been impressive not only from the point of view of the solutions proposed (e.g. using a school c a f e t e r i a as a l o c a l restaurant at night), but also from the a b i l i t y of such a forum to generate consensus, both i n the small sub-groups and f i n a l l y i n the large assembly. The theory i s that such face to face confrontation reduces the emotional distance (alienation) i n much the same way that Rousseau hoped a large assembly, devoid of antecedent i n t e r e s t grouping, would do. In a sense there are no i n t e r e s t groups within a small enough group, only other people. And the bringing together of people stripped of t h e i r extra-group labels i n a small enough group that each must encounter the other seems to allow for a re a l p o s s i b i l i t y of discovering the "general will",(Thayer, pp. 28-33). Thayer also reviews some of the experiments i n Organizational Development, which seems to be a fancy name for the application of encounter group theory and practice to formal organizations. Such an application, 169 he argues, may be e f f e c t i v e i n helping workers and administrators r e l a t e to one another, but only i f they are used i n a non-hierarchical environment'—otherwise they become tools of administrative manipulation. To the extent though that such techniques are e f f e c t i v e , they could be a useful tool for resolving c o n f l i c t s which emerge not from genuine c o n f l i c t i n g i n t e r e s t , but from psychological bar r i e r s (e.g. "personality c o n f l i c t s " ) . The problem for Thayer, having demonstrated the effectiveness and benefits of small group type organization, i s to suggest a theory that w i l l enable widespread par-t i c i p a t i o n i n such small groups and yet provide for large scale organization. To solve t h i s problem, Thayer appeals to Rene Li k e r t ' s theory of " l i n k pin" management. In t h i s theory, various small groups are related by having an over-lapping membership, so that groups higher up i n the organization are made up of representatives from groups lower down.(see picture, next page). In Li k e r t ' s model these groups are related by having the administrator of each group form the membership of the higher-up-group. In the picture, t h i s means that each l i n k pin i s i n a manageral re l a t i o n s h i p to the group below and a subordinate pos i t i o n i n the over-riding group. Thayer suggests that t h i s model can be democratized by two fundamental changes: 1. having the representative to the higher group be a representative not the adminstrator from the lower.group. 170 (The arrows indicate the l inking-pin function) (Thayer,, p. 24) 171 2. that each group require consensus before i n s t r u c t i n g i t s representative. The f i r s t democratizes the i n d i v i d u a l groups (no member i s the boss), and the second imposes the i d e a l rule of p a r t i c i p a t i o n , v i z . that eacjh"w'silTs the decisions to which they are subject. Should the representative to the higher group be unable to persuade the members of t h i s group of his previous position, or become persuaded of a d i f f e r e n t point of view, then he must return to the lower group for consultation u n t i l unanimity i s again reached. Such a system i s surely rigorously democratic, but i s i t feasible? Thayer points out that while such procedures may well seem tedious, and while such a process may involve a long decision time, once the proposals are decided on, the time of implementation i s greatly reduced.* In addition, such a long thrashing out process means that many of the t y p i c a l problems of unforeseen consequences can i n fact be foreseen since a l l those affected by a decision r e a l l y are involved i n the decision. Thayer remarks that a very s i m i l a r approach i s actually employed by many Japanese companies (Thayer, pp. 40-41). Thayer believes that such organizational arrangements which i n many large organizations already have an informal r e a l i t y (cf. Galbraith's The New Indu s t r i a l State) could be used i n the p o l i t i c a l realm also, centering on" . ; small *This can be compared to Blumberg's information on the effectiveness of p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n i n s t i t u t i n g change. 172 neighborhood organizations. This would eliminate the need for representative government which Thayer argues should be eliminated not only because i t i s an e s s e n t i a l l y h i e r a r c h i c a l Cor i n my terms, non-participative) form of government, but because i t also legitimates t h i s form of hierarchy by i t s claiming to be a t r u l y democratic form of government. We can wonder whether such an organizational form as that suggested by Thayer could r e a l l y work i n the p o l i t i c a l realm where there i s much more c o n f l i c t about the objectives of the organization than would be found i n a large business corporation. And whether, therefore, the consensus rule which i s so fundamental to the democratic character of his system could r e a l l y be maintained. But even without such a rule, Thayer's system i s s t i l l r a d i c a l l y democratic and c l e a r l y comes closest to the attempt to provide for the opportunity of r a t i o n a l discussion and decision-making by a l l participants. For Thayer i s c e r t a i n l y r i g h t i n his assumption that the most meaningful form of p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s i n the small non-hierarchial groups of his model. And he i s c e r t a i n l y r i g h t , therefore, that for larger structures to be genuinely p a r t i c i p a t i v e , they must be based on small group p a r t i c i p a t i o n . With an additional emphasis on decentralization (such as advocated i n t h i s thesis)] such a plan may not be a l l that u n r e a l i s t i c . Thayer's claim that such forms, without t h e i r e x p l i c i t e g a l i t a r i a n aspects, constitute the backbone 173 of current economic organizations i s a bold claim. But his own role i n management and as an organization t h e o r i s t adds some weight to his claim. The theory i s c l e a r l y i n li n e with much current organizational thinking and would seem to be an imaginative and b r i l l i a n t account of ah alternative to a l l e x i s t i n g forms of economic and p o l i t i c a l organization. One l a s t point needs mentioning. Thayer emphasizes consensus and p a r t i c i p a t i o n as the goal of p o l i t i c s . He feels t h i s ideal' is r e a l i z a b l e only i f 1. we make every e f f o r t to reduce competition i n both the economic and the p o l i t i c a l sphere; and 2. we achieve economic abundancy* by divorcing income from work, eliminating advertising and encouraging alternative s a t i s f a c t i o n s (as has been argued in this t h e s i s ) . I have said a great deal about advertising and the encouragement of alternative s a t i s f a c t i o n s , but some remarks are appropriate about reducing competition. Thayer holds that one of the primary e v i l s of the representative system i s i t s competitive nature: for a great deal of h o s t i -l i t y must be created i n order to move candidates and voters to the e f f o r t that such competition requires. Such a c t i v i t y i s c l e a r l y incompatible with the goal of harmony, s o l i d a r i t y , and community concern that Thayer takes to be the i d e a l of p o l i t i c s . In the economic sphere, about which I have said a l l too l i t t l e , Thayer argues that ' 1. competition i s *I could have said here "a sense of economic abundancy" but th i s obscures the point that past a bare minimum "abundancy" i s i n the eye of the beholder. 174 gradually disappearing anyway because i t i s i n e f f i c i e n t , 2. non-competitive organizations do not atrophy any more frequently than do competitive ones, and 3. competition produces the growth mentality which has become e c o l o g i c a l l y untenable. Thayer i s extremely c r i t i c a l of both the g u i l d s o c i a l i s t and Yugoslav experiments for t h e i r emphasis on economic d i v i s i o n s and acceptance of competition among producers. Although p o l i t i c s has the goal of unity, \ . thee, emphasis i n economics on in d i v i d u a l or c o l l e c t i v e gain can only r e s u l t i n d i s u n i t y — w i t h an inevi t a b l e disruption of the p o l i t i c a l realm. P a r t i c i p a t i o n by i t s e l f cannot produce the ideals of cooperation and s o l i d a r i t y without a concomitant change i n the economic structure. This l a t t e r claim i s dramatically supported by various accounts of " p a r t i c i p a t i v e " experiments i n attempts to reorganize and conserve farmland i n the American midwest. These experiments i n e v i t a b l y resulted i n the larger farmers having maximum input and influence. As a r e s u l t , such attempts produced even greater destruction of farmlands and communities. As W. R. Burch remarks, summarizing a review of various p o l i t i c a l e f f o r t s for conservation, "The emphasis upon placing governance i n l o c a l hand i s l i k e l y to conserve p r e v a i l i n g patterns of d i s t r i b u t i o n rather than resources..." (Burch, p. 132). Even the Greeks recognized the problem which Burch i s addressing, v i z . that the economically eminent w i l l have a preponderant influence i n a democratic assembly. 175 In order to guard against t h i s factor destroying the democratic character of t h e i r government, the Athenians chose t h e i r committees not by e l e c t i o n , but by l o t . This assured that everyone, not just the famous and r i c h , would serve i n the government. They also provided a small stipend for attendance at the general assembly which both encouraged and f a c i l i t a t e d attendance by the poorer c i t i z e n s . While t h i s i s not the kind of solution that Thayer recommends, i t does support his claim that the economic inequities and competition can serve to work against democratic i n s t i t u t i o n s . As a r e s u l t , mere reformation of the governmental sphere may not y i e l d the hoped for benefits that p a r t i c i p a t i o n promises. Indeed, l i k e the use of ge s t a l t techniques i n business administration, the r e s u l t of p a r t i c i p a t i o n without economic reform might well be to further intrench the already e x i s t i n g imbalances of power. Thayer's solution obviously comes closest to s a t i s f y i n g the. „ i d e a l . o f ' .'."" ,] p a r t i c i p a t o r y democracy. In fact, i t meets a l l the c r i t e r i a to an extent that seems unli k e l y for a p r a c t i c a l proposal. As a r e s u l t , the main objection that one i s i n c l i n e d to o f f e r i s that i t simply could not work: the p r o l i f e r a t i o n of committees would be astronomical, the decision procedure i n c r e d i b l y slow, and the r e s u l t , t o t a l economic di s i n t e g r a t i o n . But Thayer's strength i s i n his claim that a very si m i l a r structure i s currently u t i l i z e d i n many businesses 176 and high l e v e l government administration. If such a claim i s true, then the e f f i c i e n c y argument can be refuted, leaving the extensive problem of i n t e r r e l a t i n g economic and p o l i t i c a l units without involving everyone i n continuous committee meetings. CONCLUSION The three plans o f f e r good reason for r e j e c t i n g M i l l ' s dilemma* of the impossible i d e a l of small scale p a r t i c i p a t i o n or the " p r a c t i c a l " solution of representative government. Clearly there are a variety of ways for increasing par-t i c i p a t i o n and s t i l l having e f f i c i e n t government. While the Yugoslav system i s most in t e r e s t i n g because of i t s r e a l i t y , the Thayer al t e r n a t i v e provides the most exc i t i n g plan because i t comes closest to s a t i s f y i n g the i d e a l of p a r t i c i p a t i o n , and takes most thoroughly into account the current knowledge of psychological and s o c i o l o g i c a l r e a l i t i e s involved i n group dynamics. Coupled with decentral-i z a t i o n and socialism, a variant of Thayer's system has an excellent claim to being a plausible alternative to the a l i e n a t i n g and undemocratic aspects of the current form of representative democracy. *Cited at the end of ch. VI 177 CONCLUSION 178 The argument has taken us very f a r from considerations of global destruction to the possible structures of an indus-t r i a l democracy. I t i s time to summarize. My basic concern has been the ecol o g i c a l preservation and the s o c i a l structure which would be conducive to a happy and long enduring '• relat i o n s h i p with nature. While concentrating on p a r t i c i -patory democracy, I have t r i e d to work int o my argument considerations of ec o l o g i c a l well-being. I have t r i e d , i n a sense, to weave a solution to the ec o l o g i c a l c r i s i s with p a r t i c i p a t o r y democracy as the woof and ecol o g i c a l harmony as the warp: e c o l o g i c a l considerations give the form to the argument; p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s the substance. But another way to see the argument i s to see that the environmental problems-, so recently brought to our attention, are r e a l l y instances of a more general problem: namely, t h e " f a i l u r e of western democracy to provide adequately f o r the public good. The ideology of individualism, l a i s s e z f a i r e economics, represen-tative democracy, and even our narrow conception of freedom have a l l contributed to the kinds of s o c i a l and environmental i l l s to which we are currently subject. A l l these ideologies have largely ignored the public side of the human personality. The i l l s , of course, are many but the general problem of the f a i l u r e to f u l l y develop the public side of society affects them a l l . The f a i l u r e to study 179 democratize the society i s both a cause and an e f f e c t of this underdevelopment of the public space. Commitment to the public well being can only be expected when the public i s adequately involved and when the commitment flows naturally from the organization of the society. Admittedly, i r r a t i o n a l commitment such as i s found i n cert a i n kinds of nationalism can be promoted without p a r t i c i p a t i o n , but t h i s i s c l e a r l y i r r e l e v a n t to any desirable solution. Why i s p a r t i c i p a t i o n the desirable solution? The V simplest^V- argument i s that which underlies the argument for a l l forms of democracy: people should not be subject to laws v.which they have not l e g i s l a t e d . In representative democracy people are taken to have consented to the procedures and therefore the laws that flow from these procedures. But p a r t i c i p a t o r y democracy takes more seriously t h i s basic democratic tenet and demands that people be involved i n the decision processes to which they are subject. P a r t i c i p a t i o n leans towards Rousseau's id e a l where co- . ordination i s achieved and yet each obeys only himself. This t r a d i t i o n a l argument i s supported by the claim e x p l i c i t y put f o r t h by M i l l and Rousseau that p a r t i c i p a t i o n has an.educative and morally u p l i f t i n g e f f e c t on the par-ticipants:: i t creates a genuine concern for the community. I have focused on t h i s claim,developing the psychological basis and d e t a i l s of i t , and "used i t to support the claim that p a r t i c i p a t i o n would make people sensitive to ecological 180 considerations. The argument i s simply a. yariant of M i l l ' s based on the claim that .ahhealthy environment i s a'paradigm public goodn. The basis of t h i s argument i s the psychological claim that people have a strong need for public respect (esteem), and that t h i s need can be used to promote s o c i a l and ecological well being through the use of public forums where commitment to the public good earns i t s just esteem*. In addition, I have stressed what i s becoming increasingly clear to everyone: natural l i m i t a t i o n s T. w i l l . r e s u l t i n increased s o c i a l control. If t h i s i s not to mean even more h i e r a r c h i c a l government and the ann i h i l a t i o n of freedom,then the personal freedom that i s s a c r i f i c e d to s o c i a l and environmental preservation must be r e i n s t i t u t e d i n an assembly where a l l can p a r t i c i p a t e . But p a r t i c i p a t i o n does not simply provide for preservation of autonomy, i t changes the whole quality of the freedom by forcing participants to subject themselves to considerations FN * The idea of a community commited i n i t s idealogy and through i t s i n s t i t u t i o n s to ecological well-being and economic f r u g a l i t y i s being t r i e d i n many parts of North America at the moment. A recent a r t i c l e quotes a new member of one of these communities (not communes) i n a clear a r t i c u l a t i o n of the place that public esteem could play i n reducing consumption. "I think our changes have been normal for a family who has just moved to Secret Valley," say Joan. " I t r e a l l y i s n ' t that hard to cut back on your expenses and l i v e better when you l i v e i n a community where the keep up with the Joneses idea i s reversed and a l l your neighbors are trying to f i n d a way of saving money rather than spending i t . " (. . .... (Weekend Magazine, Nov. 29, 1975, Vol. 25, no.48., p. 19) .; 181 of public and therefore e c o l o g i c a l well being, There i s no guarantee of; course that the assembly w i l l not constitute i t s e l f another "private" i n t e r e s t group. However i t i s arguable that the experience of p a r t i c i p a t i o n as i t turns one's focus away from personal concerns and on to larger issues of communal well being w i l l cause people's concerns to go beyond even that of t h e i r community. But we cannot, as Gandhi once said, expect to have a p o l i t i c a l system where people w i l l not need to be good. The goal i s to organize the society i n ways which w i l l encourage as much goodness as possible. F i n a l l y , I have claimed that p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s the appropriate form of government for a new, e c o l o g i c a l l y sensitive l i f e s t y l e . Self-government does require a good deal of human time and energy but organizes our l i v e s on the t r u l y human scale away from the large, inhuman scale of the current i n d u s t r i a l order. P a r t i c i p a t i o n w i l l provide one of the alternative s a t i s f a c t i o n s that are present i n such a l i f e s t y l e : the s a t i s f a c t i o n of public happiness. I t i s also of i n t e r e s t to note that ecology i t s e l f focuses s c i e n t i f i c attention away from the l i f e of the ind i v i d u a l organism towards that of the whole b i o l o g i c a l community and i t s environment. This concern for community also has i t s p a r a l l e l s i n s o c i a l theory where much of the s o c i a l breakdown, as evidenced by high rates of crime, 182 mental i l l n e s s , .etc, i s being correlated with the .breakdown of; community i n large urban areas . Csee Blueprint for Survival). Small yet democratically active communities could be both i n t e l l e c t u a l l y and emotionally stimulating while s t i l l providing the community t i e s that seem c r u c i a l to s o c i a l well being. ... j What reasons are there for believing that we could develop such a t r u l y democratic society? F i r s t , there are a growing number of studies to show that worker p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s not only compatible with f a i r l y large scale organization, i t i n fact constitutes an improvement i n terms of worker s a t i s f a c t i o n and productivity. While there are l i m i t s on the range of worker cparticipation i n large industry, the value of such democratization seems undeniable. Worker participation."is.• the'-..logical f i r s t -' step towards, true democratization of society. Already t h i s process i s • beginning i n such advanced s o c i a l democracies as Norway and Sweden. Secondly, there has been a steady flow of urban dissidents out of the c i t i e s back into the r u r a l areas of North America. And while i t i s taking some time for these ex-urbanites to f i n d t h e i r roots, we can anticipate an increasingly v i t a l r u r a l culture and an increasing demand from the communities for l o c a l autonomy. 183 Lastly, and c r u c i a l l y , i t i s the inexorable press • of environmental constraints which i s the most persuasive reason to believe that we could develop a t r u l y democratic and p a r t i c i p a t i v e society. Something i s going to have to be done. The press of h i s t o r y i s on the side of there being a r a d i c a l change. As Murray Bookchin puts i t : Whatever may have been the v a l i d i t y of l i b e r t a r i a n and n o n - l i b e r t a r i a n views a few years ago, h i s t o r i c a l development has rendered v i r t u a l l y a l l objections to anarchist thought meaningless today. The modern c i t y and state, the massive c o a l - s t e e l technology of the I n d u s t r i a l Revolution, the l a t e r , more r a t i o n a l i z e d , systems of mass production and assembly l i n e systems of labor organization, the c e n t r a l i z e d nation, the state and i t s bureaucratic a p p a r a t u s — a l l have reached t h e i r l i m i t s . Whatever progressive or l i b e r a t o r y r o l e they may have possessed, they have now become e n t i r e l y regressive and oppressive. They are regressive not only because they erode the human s p i r i t and drain the community of a l l i t s cohesiveness, s o l i d a r i t y and e t h i c o - c u l t u r a l standards; they are regressive from an objective standpoint, from an e c o l o g i c a l standpoint. For they undermine not only the human s p i r i t and the human community but also the v i a b i l i t y of the planet and a l l l i v i n g things on i t . I t cannot be emphasized too strongly that the anarchist concepts of a balanced community, a face-to-face democracy, a humanistic technology and a decentralized s o c i e t y — t h e s e r i c h l i b e r t a r i a n c oncepts—are not only desirable, they are also necessary. They belong not only to the great v i s i o n s of man's future, they now constitute the preconditions for human s u r v i v a l . Granting that Bookchin overstates the case, i t &>s s t i l l quite c l e a r that the 21st century i s not going to be more of the same—"only bigger and better". The need to respond to environmental constraints i s almost c e r t a i n to force some dramatic change on i n d u s t r i a l society. Of course these changes could r e s u l t i n a v a r i e t y of t o t a l i t a r i a n solutions to the problem of imposing the necessary s o c i a l controls. 184 Or, i t could r e s u l t i n the development of an economic and s o c i a l order';'that i s appropriate to the f i n i t u d e of the earth's resources. Such an order would be characterized by economic decentralization and would provide an appropriate environment for t r u l y democratic i n s t i t u t i o n s . The objection that p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s impractical i n the kind of i n d u s t r i a l society to which we are accustomed loses i t s force when we r e a l i z e that t h i s kind of society i t s e l f i s not p r a c t i c a l i n the ( r e l a t i v e l y short) long run. In fact, one could argue, rather than p a r t i c i p a t i o n ' s incom-p a t i b i l i t y with large scale i n d u s t r i a l society being an objection to p a r t i c i p a t i o n i t i s r e a l l y another objection to just such a society. While I have not discussed China at length i n t h i s thesis (because China i s not yet an in d u s t r a l i z e d society)', i t i s extremely encouraging to note that China seems already commited to the kind of program outlined i n my thesis. For example, she i s working to preserve the r u r a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of her population by spreading her i n d u s t r i a l advances throughout the countryside, and (most i n t e r e s t i n g l y from my point :of view) she i s commited to preserving an active form of c i t i z e n p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n l o c a l government. The techniques of s o c i a l management i n China are not a l l i n the t r a d i t i o n of western democracy, but given the l e v e l of her development, there i s a remarkable and profoundly admirable emphasis on democracy and persuasion. Even i f we i n the west are unable to save ourselves from our own 185 destruction, there i s i n China (with one-quarter of the world's population) the hope that a large part of the world i s not only committed to, but well on i t s way to achieving, participatory democracy and environmental harmony. Of course, no one knows what w i l l happen. I am not an h i s t o r i c a l determinist: history presents no guarantees. I have t r i e d simply to present a plausible v i s i o n : the v i s i o n of a society adaptable both to human needs and the natural environment. I have t r i e d to present the arguments for both the d e s i r a b i l i t y and ; p o s s i b i l i t y of such a society. 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