ECOLOGY AND FREEDOM

by

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ABSTRACT

The so-called ecological crisis consists of the twin problems of resource exhaustion and pollution. The problems are largely the result of high and increasing levels of consumption and production, and do not lend themselves to a technological solution. Extensive political controls must be imposed to protect the environment, but these controls promise curtailment of traditional freedoms of property and lifestyle. But Rousseau has suggested a solution to the problem of the social need for control and freedom: participatory democracy. Participatory democracy achieves freedom and control because decisions are arrived at collectively and through persuasion, minimizing the need for coercive control, and giving each participant a sense of identification with the decision making process.

Participation also accords with our understanding of human nature once we free ourselves of the misleading psychologies of Hobbes and Adam Smith. Indeed Bishop Butler, famous for his refutation of Hobbes' egoism, has also suggested the alternative theory that people are socially motivated. John Adams extended this analysis to show the fundamental role that the human need for public esteem plays in political behavior. People need the experience of citizenship for their self esteem, and participation utilizes this need to encourage dedication to the public good.
Environmental protection is a paradigm public good and should, therefore, receive adequate support in a society with extensive participation. In addition, participation and public work provide satisfying alternatives to private consumption. Widespread participation in industry is a practical possibility as has been shown by various experiments in industrial democracy and can also work at a nationwide level as has been demonstrated in Yugoslavia. In addition there are other models for widespread participation such as that of the Guild Socialists and Frederic Thayer.
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INTRODUCTION
The ecology imperative is becoming clear. As more and more data accumulates it becomes increasingly obvious that a radical change in the North American lifestyle is necessary. The environment can no longer be expected to support the current rates of consumption, resource utilization and pollution. The rich nations cannot expect to continue to live at this scale, nor can the poor nations expect to attain it. It is not enough that we be technically sophisticated, we must also be restrained. While such claims are not uniformly supported by all engaged in research in ecology, they have received sufficient support from ecologists to have earned for it the name "subversive science".

In the body of my thesis, I take this ecological imperative for granted and set about finding the most desirable manner of dealing with its political implications. I assume that we must accept a lifestyle far less dependent on an abundance of private consumer goods for its satisfactions. While such an assumption is widely supported, it has also been questioned, and it seems appropriate in my introduction to explain why I ignore these objections.

Those who do not share this assumption have been called "technological optimists" because of their faith that there exists, or will exist, technologically feasible solutions to problems such as pollution and the exhaustion of fossil fuels.* The optimists argue that necessity is the mother of invention:

*A useful collection of optimists' writings is: Thinking About the Future: A Critique of the Limits to Growth, edited by H.S.D. Cole et al.
mother of invention: as one resource depletes or as one form of pollution becomes too horrible to bear, some technological wonder will be discovered or developed to deal with it. This position is also supported by many economists who point out that the mother of many inventions is money, and that, for example, as a resource becomes scarce, its price will rise, thereby encouraging greater resource conservation, and replacement by other formerly uneconomic solutions (e.g. the tar sands). Indeed, many economists see the problem of resource exhaustion in terms not of the disappearance of the resource, but rather its becoming financially prohibitive to use as the easily available supplies of it are exhausted.

The question boils down to what rate of technological advancement can be reasonably expected. If we expect a high rate of technological advance, then we can expect that technical solutions will emerge to solve the difficulties presented by the former technology. For example, the optimists argue that we can expect the development of a non-polluting and inexpensive energy source to replace oil before oil resources are exhausted. The optimists can point to the increasing ability to extract oil from formerly impossible sources such as the arctic and the sea, and increasing efficiency of oil use, and finally, the ace-in-the-hole
possibility of fusion. The pessimist points to the incredible level of oil use, the increasing problem of air and particularly water pollution, the increasing danger of catastrophe as oil is extracted from more difficult environments, and, finally the impossibility of technique matching the exponential growth rate in consumption.

While the debate seems to involve the issue of faith (in technology and the market economy) as much as it does reason, there do seem to me to be a number of arguments that tell decidedly against the optimists.

1. It was/is technology and the market economy that put us in the position that we are now in. This point can cut both ways and largely depends on how you feel about the current economic and social order. But clearly it is the scale of our current productive efforts that presents the kinds of significant problems that we have today. This is not to say that such a large scale productive apparatus could not develop the kinds of safeguards, pollution control devices, and alternative fuels necessary for the continued survival of this kind of order, but only to point out they have not done so so far. Nor has the impetus for the solutions come from those with economic and political power.

2. But even if we accept a willingness on the part of those in power to genuinely deal with the problems, the greater the size and complexity of the productive unit, the
more difficult the change is. In the same way, the larger the unit, the more extensive are the effects in the case of ecological error. For example, the larger the tanker, the greater the probability that a tanker collision will cause extensive environmental damage. In general, since pollution is essentially a problem of concentration, the more concentrated and intense production is, the greater the probability of pollution, i.e. the greater the probability of an environmentally intolerable concentration of any substance.

3. The most significant statement of the technological pessimists is to be found in *The Limits to Growth*. Most critics of this book have pointed out the paucity of the data from which its extrapolations were made and the questionable assumptions about the growth rate of technology. It can be shown in fact that the projections are extremely sensitive to changes in the technological growth rate, thereby supporting the claims of the technological optimists that *The Limits to Growth* is rather arbitrarily doom oriented. But the arguments for a more optimistic rate of technological growth are no better founded than those of the pessimists. Such a situation suggests to me a conservative stance toward the possibility of a technological solution and the exploration of alternative solutions.

4. In general, most ecologists admit that we are in a state of terrible ignorance about the complex systems
that characterize our environment. We just cannot say what effects various chemicals and processes will have on the short, and even more crucial, long run. Ignorance suggests that a conservative stance toward technological solutions is appropriate.

5. It should also be noted that even the critics of The Limits to Growth study agree that population control is fundamental to the maintenance and creation of any kind of quality of life for all countries. And population control, while it is facilitated by new technology, is essentially a political question: it involves forcing, and/or persuading people to change their reproductive patterns.

The above are my reasons for rejecting the optimists' optimism, but there is one other, equally fundamental reason, for my rejection of their faith: my dissatisfaction with the current social order. As a result of this dissatisfaction, any solution which offers a positive alternative to the current form of social and political organization and promises a solution to the ecological imperative is, to me, a far more desirable solution than one which promises to save the environment and maintain the status quo. Nor do I believe that the social problems associated with the current welfare state in North America are unrelated to the ecological problems we are facing. The general problem might be stated simply (and as a result, perhaps misleadingly) as the failure to provide for the creation of a general will. But such a claim needs elaboration,
and it will receive that in the body of the thesis.

II.

Such are the reasons for my ignoring the possibility of any technical solutions to the current problems of population, pollution, and resource exhaustion. In the place of this kind of hope, I will argue that a radical decentralization and democratization of both the economic and political realms is the most appropriate response to what I have called the ecological imperative. While there are many arguments that can be offered for a decentralizing and democratizing of our social system, I will focus primarily on those that are relevant to the ecological concern of my thesis. I will further limit myself to conceptual, psychological and sociological arguments about the possibility and desirability of such decentralization. In doing this, I will ignore many practical difficulties that are related to introducing such a scheme in our society. I do suggest some possible forms, but the details of such a project must inevitably be evolved as the program is implemented. My goal is to outline some of the principles of democratization and the reasons for believing such a project is worthwhile and in accord with human nature. In addition, I will focus primarily on the philosophical question of freedom and autonomy, ignoring other important concerns such as justice.

To begin my argument, I will discuss, in Chapter I, the excellent and extremely well known article by Gilbert
Hardin, "The Tragedy of the Commons". This article is itself a repudiation of technical solutions to the population problem and the proposal of a political solution. I will criticize Hardin's argument for its prefunctory treatment of the problem of freedom. In doing so, I will show how Hardin's "Tragedy of the Commons" is really the old tragedy of the state of nature described by social contract theorists. But the state of nature problem, the collective destruction of all by all, is not limited to some hypothetical pre-government state: the problem is ubiquitous. Ecology is just one area in which we are coming to realize that the activity of self-interested individuals can result in their collective self defeat if adequate provision for control is not made. The examples here are not only Hardin's farmers, but the average commuter. In coming to grips with this problem, Hardin offers what I consider a far too Hobbesian solution, and I offer in its place the more or less Rousseauean solution of participatory democracy.

In Chapter II, I elaborate the concept of participation indicating the way in which Rousseau thought a participatory democracy would protect us from collective self destruction and preserve our freedom. While Rousseau's account is very suggestive it is not finally convincing, and I develop my own elaboration of the virtues of participation, demonstrating a way in which participation expands the realm of freedom.
But freedom is not the only virtue possessed by participation, and in Chapter II I also outline the essential quality of collective respect for the individual that underlies a participatory government. In the remainder of the thesis I argue for decentralization and extensive participation as a means of meeting the ecological demand for greater control, diversity, and decentralization of industrial and agricultural activity. In addition I argue that participation would (1) encourage in individuals the kind of communal concern that is supportive of environmental protection, (2) provide alternative satisfactions to some of the current pleasures of private consumption, and (3) produce a happier and more humane social environment conducive to the fullest development of human capabilities.

These claims are summarized and elaborated in Chapter V, but before developing them I thought it wise to clear the ground. Chapter III is therefore an attack on the theory of psychological egoism and homo economicus which lies behind the ideology of the current economic order. I begin the attack with Bishop Butler's famous arguments against Hobbes, and also use some of his insights to start the development of an alternative view of human nature. Rather than take human wants as given (and infinite), I argue for the almost platitudinous position that wants are largely socially determined. The main mechanism of this determination, I argue, is the fundamental desire that humans have to be esteemed by their fellows, the desire to count in their social environment. Unlike the
desire for wealth, this desire is directly political, and in Chapter IV I proceed, with the help of John Adams, to develop an argument for participation on the basis of the desire for esteem. This desire I argue is largely misshaped by the current order into the phenomenon of conspicuous consumption, causing an endless demand on the system for the production of status symbols. By providing for extensive participation, my system would provide the genuine outlet for this desire and an ecologically useful and "light" one at that.

Resting on the argument of my political psychology, I then go on in Chapter V to develop the arguments cited above in favor of decentralization and participation as the means to environmental preservation and social well being.

In the subsequent chapter, I offer a summary of some of the recent research into industrial democracy which supports the claims made in Chapter II, III, IV, and V. The research clearly supports the position that industrial democracy is feasible and favored by the workers. There is also evidence to show that greater participation is correlated with a greater sense of self esteem—a result which supports my fundamental psychological claim.

And finally, in the last chapter, I suggest some possible ways of instituting widespread participation in an industrial society and review the schemes of the guild socialists, Yugoslavs, and Frederick Thayer.
The last two chapters constitute something of an effort to give empirical support to my thesis and probably need some justification for their place in a philosophy thesis. This justification comes, I believe, from the fact that I am making a "political argument". I see a political argument as inevitably involving a mixture of empirical and normative considerations, and as a result, inevitably falling into a kind of academic limbo between the social sciences and philosophy. Nonetheless, it is well within the tradition of political philosophy to mix just such considerations. All political philosophies of interest have had at their base certain assumptions about human nature, both as to its psychological constituents and its normative implications; all have rested on theories about the relationship of individual personalities to the social structure.

I have tried to keep these different aspects of the problem clear, but I did not wish to abandon the empirical one simply because I could actually call upon some sociological results. The only difference between my sociology and that of Hobbes or Mill, is that I can actually refer to some data where they were forced to use speculation and "casual empiricism". Any political theory must start with a psychological and normative theory of human nature. My fundamental normative assumption is that autonomy is crucial to any notion
of a truly human life. As to my psychological assumptions, I argue at length for the essentially social nature of the human psyche.
CHAPTER I

THE TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS
"The Tragedy of the Commons" by Garret Hardin has gained a good deal of eminence in ecology circles for its forceful pronouncements on the population problem, but the implications of this essay extend far beyond this issue. In his essay, Hardin argues for a legislative solution to the population problem and an end to the current moralizing approach. He argues against using moral persuasion to reduce the birth rate on the grounds that: (1) the moralizing approach is self-defeating in that those who are vulnerable to moral persuasion will under breed in relation to those who are morally indifferent; (2) whenever there is a conflict between a person's interest and the interest of the community, those who are persuaded to act for the good of the community are not supported by the community but are seen as foolish; and (3) control through moral pressure and guilt is anxiety producing and psychologically destructive.

Instead of trying to persuade people to restrict their procreation, Hardin recommends that we institute some form of mutually agreed upon coercion to ensure that they do. The alternative as he sees it is the "tragedy of the commons". The tragedy of the commons is the result of everyone acting "rationally" in their own self-interest and thereby destroying the commons through over use. To illustrate his point, Hardin cites the examples of over-grazing of a common pasture and the current world wide slaughter of whales to the point of extinction.

But one need hardly search abroad for problems of
this kind. I am reminded of a constantly recurring problem in my own home. Fruit, enormously popular with the children is bought in bulk once a week. If the fruit is to last to the end of the week, each person must restrain his or her consumption. On the other hand, even if only one person is unrestrained, the fruit will run out prematurely and everyone else will not get their share. So as soon as any individual starts "over-eating", there is a wholesale assault on the reserves. The result is that a supply of fruit which, if eaten moderately, would last the week, usually disappears in three or four days. Any child who is impressed with the moral arguments for moderation simply goes without his or her fair share of the fruit: a result that is hardly apt to encourage moral or community oriented behavior.

While Hardin's analysis is incisive, it is hardly a new one. He appeals to the whole gamut of arguments used by social contract theorists in the 18th century. To quote Rousseau (in a remarkably contemporary passage):

> This is my premise: men have reached a point where the obstacles hindering their preservation in the state of nature are so obstructive as to defy the resources that each individual, while in that state, can devote to his preservation. This being the case, that primitive condition cannot continue: human kind would perish if it did not change its way of life. (my italics) (Rousseau p.17)

The change that Rousseau sees as necessary is to leave the "state of nature" and to form a social contract. As he puts
Now unable as they are to add to their resources, men can only combine and channel those resources that are at hand. Thus their sole means of preserving themselves from now on is to create a pool of resources capable of surmounting the obstacles, to set those resources to work in response to one and the same purpose, and to see to it that they act in concert. (Ibid. pp. 17-18).

As I understand these two passages, Rousseau is arguing that the need for the social contract arise out of the impending destruction of all by all resulting from each person's acting in his own self or private interest. For Hardin, this is the tragedy of the commons; for Rousseau, this is the state of nature. For both of them, the solution is mutually agreed upon coercion.

But Rousseau and Hardin are hardly the only authors to note this problem. Besides being the fundamental argument in the social contract theorists' brief, it has received important and sophisticated analysis in economic theory. This problem is of great significance to economic theory because it is a fundamental claim of laissez faire economics that the market serves to co-ordinate (via the famous "invisible hand") people's pursuit of private interest in such a way that not only does this pursuit not result in the defeat of all by all, but rather in the betterment of all by all. Any argument which will show that in certain areas the market does not serve the
interests of its participants is of fundamental importance. And while economists have noted this problem, it has not received the attention that is appropriate to its significance. For the significance of this problem depends on what place in importance one gives to our common possessions. If well being is assessed in terms of the quality and value of personal possessions, then the commons becomes important only when its "destruction" threatens our personal goods, or finally in our case, our lives. But increasing production and increasing density of population has forced upon us the realization of the extent to which we live in a commons of air, water and community environment. The failure of the market looms larger and larger. But it is not only in this area that the market fails to co-ordinate individual behaviour in the interest of its participants.

Though hardly the first to point out that the free market will not serve the interest of the working class, J.S. Mill does offer an illuminating account of the way in which the free market will tend to frustrate workers' efforts to improve their condition. In a chapter on the areas of the economy in which government interference is justified Mill writes:

Let us suppose, what is at least supposeable, whether it be the fact or not--that a general reduction of
the hours of factory labour, say from
ten to nine, would be for the advantage
of the work-people: that they would
receive as high wages, or nearly as
high, for nine hours labour as they
receive for ten. If this would be the
result, and if the operatives generally
are convinced that it would, the limitation
some may say, will be adopted spontaneously.
I answer, that it will not be adopted unless
the body of operatives bind themselves to
one another to abide by it. A workman who
refused to work more than nine hours while
there were others who worked ten, would
either not be employed at all, or if employed
must submit to lose one-tenth of his wages.
However convinced, therefore, he may be that
it is the interest of the class to work
short time, it is contrary to his own
interest to set the example, unless he is
well assured that all or most others will
follow it. But suppose a general agreement
of the whole class: might not this be
effectual without the sanction of law? Not
unless enforced by opinion with a rigour
practically equal to that of law. For
however beneficial the observance of the
regulation might be to the class collectively,
the immediate interest of every individual
would lie in violating it: and the more
numerous those were who adhered to the rule,
the more would individuals gain by depart-
ing from it. If nearly all restricted
themselves to nine hours, those who chose
to work for ten would gain all the
advantages of the restriction together with
the profit of infringing it; they would get
ten hours' wage for nine hours work,
and 'an hour's' wages besides. I grant that
if a large majority adhered to the 'nine'
hours, there would be no harm done: the
benefit would be, in the main, secured to
the class, while those individuals who
preferred to work harder and earn more,
would have an opportunity of doing so. This
certainly would be the state of things to be
wished for; and assuming that a reduction of
hours without any diminution of wages could
take place without expelling the commodity
from some of its markets—which is in every
particular instance a question of fact, not
of principle—the manner in which it would be most desirable that this effect should be brought about, would be by a quiet change in the general custom of the trade; short hours becoming, by spontaneous choice, the general practice, but those who chose to deviate from it having the fullest liberty to do so. Probably, however, so many would prefer the ten hours work on the improved terms, that the limitation could not be maintained as a general practice: what some did from choice, others would soon be obliged to do from necessity, and those who had chosen long hours for the sake of increased wages, would be forced in the end to work long hours for no greater wages than before. Assuming then that it really would be the interest of each to work only nine hours if he could be assured that all others would do the same, there might be no means of their attaining this object but by converting their supposed mutual agreement into an engagement under penalty, by consenting to have it enforced by law. I am not expressing any opinion in favour of such an enactment, which has never in this country been demanded, and which I certainly should not, in present circumstances recommend: but it serves to exemplify the manner in which classes of persons may need the assistance of law, to give effect to their deliberate collective opinion of their own interest, by affording to every individual a guarantee that his competitors will pursue the same course, without which he cannot safely adopt it himself. (Mill, 1965, p. 956-8)

Mill's point extends far beyond the issue of closed shop as he is fully aware. He argues that there is a whole range of

...matter in which the interference of law is required, not to overrule the judgment of individuals respecting their own interest, but to give effect to that judgment: they being unable to give effect to it except by concert, which concert again cannot be effectual unless it receives validity and sanction from the law. (Ibid, p. 956)
And in support of this contention (which sounds remarkably Rousseauean), he also cites the problem presented by the free distribution of colonial lands (p. 958). As a result of this system there are no landless workers who can be exploited to provide for transportation facilities (and other public necessities), with the result that the owners have no adequate means of getting their goods to market, and all lose. This is the problem again of the under provision and protection of the public good that results from self-interest and a laissez faire market arrangement.

This problem has recently received the renewed attention of Western economists as the result of a number of papers by Paul Samuelson. * But the most useful treatment from my point of view is that by Mancur Olsen in his widely discussed book, The Logic of Collective Action. Olsen notes that while the concept of public good has been extensively used in the area of public finance few have realized the range of common goods that can be analyzed using this notion. (Olsen, p.15) While the notion of 'public good' has become a technical notion in economic theory, Olsen's work shows that its use extends far beyond the boundaries of traditional economic theory.

The technical notion of a 'public good' is: a good such that if it is provided to any member of a group it cannot feasibly be denied to any other member of that group.** This means that once a public good (e.g. defence or clean air) is provided

* See Bibliography

**Philosophers would undoubtedly note that being a public good is a relational property, i.e. "being a public good for some group".
to some members (who may have paid for it) it cannot (feasibly) be marketed to (or kept from) others who will still receive the benefit without the contribution. As a result, any individual contemplating the provision of some good to himself which inevitably involves supplying it to others, whether they contribute or not, is faced with two disincentives for doing so: 1. assuming that the costs of any good is a function of the numbers to which it is supplied, the costs of the "public good" will greatly exceed the anticipated benefits for any individual supplier; and 2. the individual may well gain the benefits without contribution should others choose to provide it. Indeed, if the group is of any size, the individual realizes that his contribution will have to be enormous (e.g. Martin Luther King), if its effect on the provision of the good (e.g. end to segregation) is to be more than negligible. On the other hand, he stands to realize the benefits (if there are any) without contribution.

The implications of this insight are quite extensive. Olsen uses his theory to destroy the latent group theories which are used to justify the pluralist society. These theories assume that if some of the group is suffering, it will spontaneously form an organization to protect its interest. They argue, therefore, that if there is no organization to which an individual belongs, then the individual is content. But the fact is, that while it might be in the group's interest to protect itself, it is not in any individual's interest to work for such a group unless he can be assured (as Mill points out) of similar action by everyone else in the group. And in most cases of latent groups, no such assurance is available.
As a result, collective action requires what Olsen calls selective incentives, e.g. penalties for non-cooperation, benefits from joining the group such as cheap auto insurance, or just plain social pressure. The effect of these selective incentives is to make it in each individual's interest to pay his share of the cost of the collective good since without these "selective incentives" the direct benefit to him of doing so does not exceed his cost. Penalties or rewards, such as the threat of jail terms in the case of taxes, are what finally make it in a person's interest to pay his share.

The apathy of the "silent majority" is not then a testimony to their contentment, but very probably a sign of the failure of current political organization to provide a framework in which the "silent" might express their opinions and desires in an effective manner. Given the choice of almost irrational self-sacrifice in the name of some group interest, or quiet acceptance of the status quo, most people will clearly and rationally, as Olsen points out, choose silence.

Olsen, as I also wish to, extends this argument into the moral realm, arguing that certain actions while morally admirable if engaged in by a large number become just plain silly if engaged in by a single individual.

Selfless behavior that has no perceptible effect is sometimes not even considered praiseworthy. A man who tried to hold back a flood with a pail would probably be considered more of a crank than a saint, even by those he was trying to help. It is no doubt possible infinitesimally to lower the level of a river in flood with a pail, just as it is possible for a single farmer infinitesimally to raise prices by limiting his production, but in both cases the effect is imperceptible, and those who sacrifice themselves in the interest of imperceptible improvements may not even receive the praise normally due selfless behavior. (Olsen, p. 64)
I think that Olsen is correct in saying that certain actions supposedly directed towards the common good, are so quixotic that they do not really deserve the praise reserved for moral actions. To see this take the case of the farmer who cuts back on production in the hopes of reducing supply and raising prices. He hopes to help his fellow farmers get more return for their production, but he is seen as foolish because he is completely ineffectual and only harmful to himself. He is just like a farmer in Hardin's story. If he wishes to preserve the commons, even with total disregard for himself, what actions are open to him? In Rousseau's state of nature, and Hardin's laissez faire period, the only action open to him is to reduce his own use of the commons. But this will not preserve the commons, it will only insure that he goes under before the others. He could of course exhort others to also refrain from over-using the commons, but as Hardin points out, the likely result of this is that the morally sensitive will perish prematurely and the commons will still go under. If he really wishes to help his fellow common users (and also himself), he must involve himself in some arrangement so that it is in the self interest of each individual to act in such a way as to preserve the commons. This could be a progressive tax system such that it became financially irrational to have more than a certain number of cows out on the commons, or it could be a law that prescribed the upper limit for the number of cows each farmer could have on the commons, or we could even, as Hardin suggests, introduce the unjust solution of private property. But this last solution is simply unavailable for the class of questions with which I wish to deal. We cannot turn the sea or air into private property. We cannot make the collective
environment that results from our private actions, private property. We must institute some collective control.*

In other words, nothing less than a political arrangement involving the other commons users will preserve the commons, and nothing less than working for such an arrangement (and working in such an arrangement) deserves to count as the morally praiseworthy action of working for the good of the community. To truly act for the common good, the individual must be willing to abandon his "natural" liberty for the benefits of "mutually agreed upon coercion".

Clearly such an argument has enormous implications for the traditional concern for individual and economic liberty: (1) As Mill points out, government involvement is justified in those areas where the interests of all are frustrated by the pursuit of immediate self-interest. (2) All provisions of public goods must be the perogative of a government or similar organization with the power to apply selective incentives. The only exception to this would be in the cases of small groups where social pressure may serve

*Economists treat this problem of common property or non-specific resources differently than the provision of public goods. Non-specific resources present the problem of providing incentives to conservation; and public goods present the problem of providing incentive for production or provision of the public good. But such problems seem to me to be two sides of the same coin: there are simply large areas of our life where there is no market mechanisms to direct the individuals' efforts towards the community's interest. For example: Is the provision of clean air a problem of resource use or the public good? At one point it's one, and later the other!
as the selective incentive. (3) The role of government must be seen not in the traditional liberal view as a policeman of the market place, but as a positive force providing for the welfare of all through the provision of public goods or constraint on resource exploitations.

The power of the preceding argument to cause us to radically alter our attitudes towards organization and government is limited only by the limits to the range of human endeavours that are subject to this co-ordination problem. Mill seems to feel that this area is not too extensive given the place he gives the argument in his whole work. And while Olsen certainly extends the range of its application, even he does not seem to fully realize its significance.

The range of its application is so broad that we are involved in it every time that we step outside our house or apartment. For we live primarily in a collective environment, and while in this environment we always face the possibility of collective defeat of all by all. We are involved in this problem when dealing with all the questions of ecology since ecology is essentially concerned with our collective environment. We are also involved in this area with almost any question of social organization, e.g. town planning and zoning, public amenities, and transportation (cf. traffic jams). The argument, in other words, totally undermines the traditional emphasis given to the free market as the primary producer of well being. The free market claim is only plausible if we conceive of collective well being as strictly involving
the provision and procurement of individual consumer goods. But if we identify well being with "goods" such as fresh air, an aesthetically pleasing city, convenient and efficient transportation, nice neighborhoods, and ecological preservation, then the free market and the pursuit of individual self-interest cannot be expected to produce general well being. Given a concern for ecology, this argument is obviously of enormous significance.

But what are we to do about the traditional fear and resentment of government activity? What about the loss of freedom that seems to be entailed by the provision and protection of the public good? Must we resign ourselves to the loss of freedom in order to secure social welfare or even possibly human survival?

II

The questions raised at the end of the previous section have been just those that have worried political theorists since Hobbes. Hobbes claimed that nothing less than an all powerful central government could save humans from self-destruction, and indeed, Hobbes' characterization of the human situation did not differ all that much from that offered by Hardin. But while Hardin does not accept Hobbes' dismal solution, his own solution seems to me equally unsatisfactory. I wish to argue, instead, for a solution much along the lines
proposed by Rousseau in his own argument with Hobbes. And in order to develop this argument I wish first to give Hardin's argument, compare it with Rousseau's, and finally use this comparison to bring out my own position.

Hardin argues:

"Every new enclosure of the commons involves the infringement of somebody's personal liberty. Infringements made in the distant past are accepted because no contemporary complains of a loss. It is the new proposed infringements that we vigorously oppose; cries of "rights" and "freedom" fill the air. But what does "freedom" mean? When men mutually agreed to pass laws against robbing, mankind became more free not less so. Individuals locked in the logic of the commons are free only to bring universal ruin; once they see the necessity of mutual coercion they become free to pursue other goals. I believe that it was Hegel who said, "Freedom is the recognition of necessity".

The most important aspect of necessity that we must now recognize, is the necessity of abandoning the commons in breeding.

...The only way we can preserve and nurture other and more precious freedoms is by relinquishing the freedom to breed, and that very soon." (Hardin, p. 1248)

In other words, while we give up certain personal freedoms, we in turn receive certain other freedoms, and in sum actually experience an increase in freedom. This claim, in slightly different language, is also made by Rousseau when he points out that one of the results of the social contract is a gain in "civil liberty" which replaces the loss of "natural liberty". As Rousseau puts it:

"Man loses, through the social contract, his
natural liberty, along with an unlimited right to anything that he is tempted by and can get. He gains civil liberty, along with ownership of all he possesses. Lest we fail to grasp the extent of his gains, however, we must distinguish sharply between natural liberty, which is limited only by the individual's own powers, and civil liberty, which is limited by the general will--as also between possession which rests either upon might or upon the right of the first occupant, and ownership, which can have no basis other than positive title." (Ibid. p. 26-27)

"Civil liberty" can be compared to Hardin's claim about the robber. By protecting everyone from robbery, the state provides us with, for example, the freedom to deposit our money in a bank for safe-keeping. The existence of the state assures that ownership rests on more than the power of the individual to protect his holding. Both Hardin and Rousseau are emphasizing what might be called the "constitutive" aspect of legislation: that laws can actually increase the range of choice open to individuals. The result of this constitutive aspect is that the implementation of a new law does not necessarily mean a decrease in freedom--it might well mean an increase. If a law facilitates certain desired activities (e.g. putting cows out to pasture, driving cars), by co-ordinating them in such a way as to make them possible to be engaged in without mutual inconvenience or destruction, then the law has clearly increased individual freedom, not lessened it.

This kind of talk is heady stuff, especially so since we have no calculus for comparing quantities of freedom. But the basic point would still seem to hold, viz. that some laws,
by restricting some behavior, can make possible or increase the safety and ease of other behavior. Indeed it is arguable that this is a characteristic of many laws including most of those found in the criminal code. One could argue that these laws are aimed at discouraging behavior which interferes with the justified activity of others and thereby facilitates these activities. But the paradigm case would not be the law against bank robbery (though it is important to see the role that the law plays in providing for the possibility of ownership), but something like the traffic laws.

The law which determines which side of the street people are to drive on enormously increases the ease and safety of travel compared to a situation in which there was no such law (or worse yet, no convention). This is a good example in part because the "freedom" lost is one which appeals to no known human desire. Who cares whether we drive on the right or left? But people do, of course, care to graze as many cattle as they wish, and they will experience restrictions on their grazing privileges as restrictions and loss of freedom.

Hardin chooses to deal with their complaints by suggesting that any new restriction raises the cry of freedom, but as long as the law is necessary it should not be considered a real loss of freedom. But if this is so, then why is "mutual agreement" important to the coercion? If a law will
increase freedom simply because it is necessary (a la Hegel) then from the point of view of freedom it should make no difference whether the people subject to the law agree to it or not. The only crucial point is that it is in their interest to do so. It is here that Rousseau and myself part company with Hardin.

Hardin chose Hegel for his definition of freedom because in his definition the source of the law was irrelevant to whether it enhanced or inhibited freedom. The law against theft to which Hardin refers increased freedom not because all agreed to it, but because the thief's activities interfered with the activities and freedoms of others. A law against theft declared by a dictator would have the same effect. We can see the extent to which Hardin unwittingly accepts such a notion of freedom by looking at his discussion of taxation.

To say that we mutually agree to

...coercion is not to say that we are required to enjoy it, or even to pretend we enjoy it. Who enjoys taxes? We all grumble about them. But we accept compulsory taxes because we recognize that voluntary taxes would favor the conscienceless. We institute and (grumblingly) support taxes and other coercive devices to escape the horror of the common. (Hardin, p. 1247)

While Hardin does not speak directly to the question, it seems clear that for him "mutual agreement" does not mean "self-legislation", but rather "grumbling acceptance", and grumbling acceptance is hardly freedom.

To underline this point it is useful to compare our attitude towards taxes to our attitude towards private
purchases. Taxes can theoretically be seen as the price we pay for purchases of public goods and, for this reason, as very similar to the prices we pay for private consumer items. Yet the experience of purchasing consumer items is usually one of freedom. Except in times of dramatic inflation, the payment of the price of an object is usually seen as fair and not experienced as an imposition. But taxes are always experienced as the imposition of an alien force. The reason for this is of course that, on the whole, they are the imposition of an alien force. While representative government provides the rationale for claiming that laws passed are the will of the people--this claim is patently false.

One effect of having this claim in such dramatic disagreement with the reality is the traditional skeptical attitude towards government that abounds in a representative democracy. The result is that freedom is almost entirely associated with freedom from government interference and the enabling and freeing aspect of government is overlooked. In particular the capacity of a form of collective decision making to provide us with choices about our collective environment is almost totally ignored in popular discussions about the relationship between freedom and government.

While many people will complain about the restrictions that zoning laws impose on the individual, they are ignoring the fact that such zoning laws make possible the choice of
neighborhood by assuring that there will be a certain amount of uniformity in the neighborhood. Indeed, some of this uniformity (usually informally arrived at) is exactly what constitutes a neighborhood. But even these kinds of choices (i.e. choices not only about our house, but also about our immediate environment) could also be provided by a tyranny. Because of zoning restrictions, we do have security and a certain amount of consumer choice, but we do not have the political freedom to actually decide upon the laws that should constitute our neighborhood.* This choice and this freedom can only be provided if those subject to laws are also those involved in their legislation. Only through actually participating in decisions made about the collective environment can one enter into collective arrangements and still maintain a sense of freedom. The solution to freedom lost in the name of better coordination is not simply acceptance of other options (like security or survival), but rather the replacement of this freedom with the freedom that comes from participation in collective decision making. And it is to the elaboration of the concept of participation that I must now turn.

*It has been brought to my attention that there is actually a good deal of participation in many zoning changes because in most cities such changes are preceded by local meetings. The citizens who attend these meetings do not actually have the power to decide on the changes, but they can use these occasions to influence their representatives. This is certainly a step in the right direction, but does not count, as I will make clear later, as genuine participation. There is of course no question that local decisions such as zoning readily lend themselves to participation, and most civic decisions could probably also be made in a decentralized and participative manner.
CHAPTER II

THE CONCEPT OF PARTICIPATION
What is participatory democracy? There is already a great deal of talk about this concept in the press and national politics, but the talk is vague and frequently rhetorical. How can participation achieve the seemingly incompatible goals of coordination and freedom? And even if this is possible, is not the concept of participation essentially archaic, suited at best for simple, pastoral communities of some probably imaginary past? Is not the belief in participatory democracy based on a naive view of human nature and people's ability to transcend their self-interest when participating in politics?

The skepticism evinced in the questions that immediately come to mind regarding participation is so widespread, even in the literature of political theory, that real participation has been dismissed before getting a hearing. We have become so accustomed to associating "democracy" with representative democracy that the very ideal of active citizen participation and self rule is not even associated with democracy. While the abandonment of the ideal of democracy as a means of active citizen involvement in self government dates back perhaps to the early utilitarians, most recent theorists take their lead from Joseph Schumpeter.

Schumpeter, in his famous work, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, claimed that the classical conception of democracy (i.e. genuine collective self rule) was utterly unrealistic, and that the advantage of democratic government is not that the
people rule, but that through periodic elections they are able to exert a certain kind of influence on the rulers. In particular, thanks to the competition among the elites for the votes of the masses, the elite are forced to give the majority of people more or less the kind of rule they desire. (Since Schumpeter was an economist, the similarity between his "logic of democracy" and the classic theory of a competitive market is clearly no accident.) Democracy then becomes "That institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote" (p. 269). Democracy's virtue under this view consists of it being a check on tyranny, not rule by the people.

But the ancient and true ideal of democracy is genuine rule by the people. This ideal has been revived under the term 'participatory democracy'. While this term has experienced a lot of vague usage recently I wish to use it in a very strong sense. By 'participatory democracy' I will mean that governmental arrangement whereby all those significantly affected by a decision are actively involved in the making of a decision through both discussion and voting." I wish also to outline a concept which I will call "ideal participatory democracy" which is: "a participatory democracy in which all significant decisions require consensus." I will argue that in such an ideal arrangement Rousseau's goal of freedom and coordination can be achieved.
The ideal version of participation serves to underline the goal of all forms of participatory democracy, viz. coordination and freedom, and also serves to suggest the essential means by which this goal is to be achieved -- discussion and persuasion. For in the ideal system each person must be persuaded of the reasonableness of a law or decision before he is required to submit to it. Ideally this process actively engages all members of the affected community in the discovery of the best decision while at the same time it promotes the conditions for willing adherence to whatever law is passed. Such an ideal underlying the notion of participatory democracy should serve to clearly demarcate this notion from that used in various so-called participatory schemes that have recently been discussed. In particular, the importance of persuasion and discussion serves to clearly distinguish genuine participation from the science fiction fantasy of TV voting. Under this scheme, the nations' citizens could engage in weekly voting through a device attached to their television after having heard the issues presented on the television. Such an arrangement could approximate the goal of universal voting which is certainly part of the notion of participation, but would be no more an effort in the direction of maintaining the condition of the rule by persuasion than the current representative system.
But how can the claim that participation can achieve coordination and freedom be maintained? Are you not unfree when a law prohibits you acting in a certain way regardless of whether you were involved in the legislation of this law, regardless of whether you supported the law?

The classic answers to this objection can be found in Rousseau, but before discussing his rather disappointing answers, I wish to elaborate my own argument that freedom and coordination can be achieved—at least in the ideal participatory system. To make this argument I must first introduce a rather contentious notion of freedom, which I will call "subjective freedom".

By 'subjective freedom' I will mean "the absence of coercive restraints on those actions which one actually desires to do". This freedom, unlike the one which has been described by Isaiah Berlin and others as negative freedom — the absence of coercion — is dependent on the persuasion of the subject. Whether a person is free or not then becomes a question not only about the boundaries of coercion, but also about the desires of the subject. It is interesting to note that while Berlin condemns the subjective notion of freedom, he himself on occasion confuses it with his "objective" negative freedom.* This confusion is tempting because the value of freedom depends pretty much on the desires of the subjects. We wish to be

*As he admits in his introduction to Four Essays on Liberty. P. xxxviii.
"free" because we wish to do what we want; we neither wish to be frustrated nor intimidated from doing what we want. And it is this subjective freedom which is provided to those who are subject to a self legislating assembly in which they are participants -- provided of course that they voted for the law to which they are subject.

For example. In the case of zoning (mentioned in the last chapter), participants in collective zoning legislation will not be able, say, to build their houses as high as they might individually wish, but they will be able to speak and vote on the allowed height for all neighbourhood houses. I may for example wish to build my house four stories high in order to get an even better view of the mountains, but at a meeting of the zoning legislature I may be persuaded to pass a law prohibiting building greater than two stories, recognizing that unlimited-height-building would not only destroy the neighbourhood, but would ultimately defeat my desire to improve my view as others built as high or higher. Such an example neatly illustrates Rousseau's views about the general and particular will. Each of us may well go into the legislature seeking to maximize our particular interest (get the best view for ourselves by building high), but such desires are so interrelated that each has an overlapping or general aspect. We each desire the best view for ourselves, but we can come to recognize in the assembly that this goal can only
be realized by collective control -- not by the anarchy of private wills. We must try to find a way of satisfying everyone's desire in as fair a manner as possible. If the process is successful the individual would leave the assembly not free to build to whatever height he might have chosen without thought to the behaviour and effects of others, but free to build to the height which he is now persuaded is the reasonable and fair one. This is the freedom of "self-prescription".

And this is no second-rate freedom. For surely the value of negative freedom comes primarily from being free to do what you want. And this is just the freedom that "subjective freedom" involves. When the subject is involved in the legislation of his laws, then there is a greatly increased possibility that the restraints imposed by law will not be experienced as subjective unfreedoms because the subject has been persuaded to abandon the relevant desires (if he ever had them). To see this point requires perhaps some reflection on the notion of desire.

Our wants are not all uniform in strength, nor are they free from conflict and contradiction. Part of the process of reflection that should go on in the assembly is the sorting out, not only of collective wants, but each individual's wants. And ideally what should happen is that most, or perhaps all, should be able to get what, on reflection, they want. This means of course taking into account that people not only wish to satisfy their
immediate desires, but also such long term desires as peace, security and community. These are also wants and have their place as we work out what "we really want". For example a person who wishes to build a tall house in order to have a good view is not, as a result of his legislative experience, persuaded to abandon the desire for a good view. Rather he is persuaded that in a community the only way to achieve this end is collective restraint. The experience is not one of external restraint, but a realization of necessity of compromise and the justice of other's claims. He is not free to satisfy his unreflective desire to build as high as he wishes, but he is able to satisfy his more fundamental desire to have some view and to live happily in a community. He is, through participation (and therefore on reflection) subjectively free.

Ironically, though Rousseau introduces a subjective definition of freedom in the passage where he defines moral freedom, he does not use this definition to defend his claim that participation provides a means of realizing freedom and coordination. In Book I of The Social Contract, Rousseau defines freedom (or moral freedom, the passage is unclear) as "obedience to a law one prescribes to oneself" (p.65). While this would seem to provide a vehicle for his argument, it has a crucial limitation. For unless Rousseau wishes to describe "self prescription" as simply being present and participating in the discussions of the assembly, those
who voted against a particular law would not be "self prescribing", and therefore would not be free. In other words, using his definition of freedom, only those who voted for a law would be free, and freedom for all could only be preserved with a consensus decision procedure. But Rousseau argues that such a procedure is neither necessary nor practical for the participatory system to preserve the freedom of its citizens.* Rather he argues that the fact that the assembly rules in accord with the general will is what preserves the freedom of the dissidents.

How can the opposing minority be both free and subject to laws to which they have not consented?

I answer that the question is badly formulated. The citizen consents to all the laws, even to those that are passed against his will, and even to those which punish him when he dares to break any one of them. The constant will of all the members of the state is the general will; it is through it that they are citizens and free. When a law is proposed in the people's assembly, what is asked of them is not precisely whether they approve of the proposition or reject it, but whether it is in conformity with the general will which is theirs; each by giving his vote gives his opinion on this question, and the counting of votes yields a declaration of the general will. When, therefore, the opinion contrary to my own prevails, this proves only that I have made a mistake, and that what I believed to be the general will was not so. If my particular opinion had prevailed against the general will, I should have done something other than what I had willed, and then I should not have been free. (P. 153)

*"There is only one law which by its nature requires unanimous assent. This is the social pact..." (p. 152)
Rousseau's account certainly seems unfortunate and sophisticated. It has been faulted on many grounds by his critics. One classic objection is that we simply cannot expect the majority to recognize and vote consistently for the general will -- an objection to which Rousseau actually has quite a powerful answer. (see Barry, 1967, p. 122). But the most important objection is that regardless of whether the majority are right or not, the minority are still forced to act against their will. Being forced is not being persuaded, regardless of whether one is being forced to do what is in one's own best interest, i.e. regardless of whether one actually, in some long term sense of 'want', wants to do the action or wants the results that come from the action. For the move to force undercuts the whole notion of participation as rule through reason and persuasion. Obviously, if we voted and lost we were not persuaded that we were wrong; though we were perhaps told that we were wrong. And, if we are required to accord our behaviour with this decision, we are being moved either by our previous commitment to obey the law, or by the threat of sanctions, or even by our respect for the majority's wisdom, but not because we see the wisdom and reasonableness of the law.

Rousseau's argument has some plausibility if voting is confused with a kind of opinion poll. If the question asked the assembly was "What do you want?" and while expressing
our opinion on this question we also voiced an opinion as to the probable result, then we could of course be wrong. And if we had agreed beforehand to do whatever the majority wished, we would not be forced in the relevant sense to go along with the majority. But this is crucially not the question asked. We are not asked about our desires, but about our judgement, and to be forced to act against one's judgement is to be made unfree in an extremely important sense.

By now it should be clear that I do not believe that a participative government can achieve both coordination and freedom without a consensus decision procedure. What then does participatory democracy offer the minority that is not available in a system of elite rule, whether popularly elected or not? Respect. Under the conditions of participation one has received the maximum amount of respect for one's rational capacity compatible with collective coordination. The essential quality the participatory democracy offers the minority is not, strictly speaking, one of freedom, but rather a fair consideration of its opinions, and an extensive possibility of influence. But this quality is not so far removed from the notion of freedom. As Berlin points out, the essential ingredient of what he calls the notion of "positive freedom" is the desire to be treated like a rational being:
The 'positive' sense of the word 'liberty' derives from the wish on the part of the individual to be his own master .... I wish to be a subject not an object; to be moved by reasons, by conscious purpose, which are my own, not by causes which affect me, as it were, from the outside. .... I wish to be a doer -- deciding, not being decided for, self-directed and not acted upon by external nature or by other men as if I were a thing, or an animal, or a slave incapable of playing a human role .... This is at least part of what I mean when I say that I am rational, and that it is my reason that distinguishes me as a human being from the rest of the world. (Berlin, p. 131)

Despite Berlin's efforts to deride this notion of freedom (and his complaint is largely about what has been done with it), it is important to note that this sense of the word is the most ancient. "Free" and 'freedom' were originally contrasted with slavery, not with the presence of governmental coercion. C.S. Lewis in his Studies in Words writes: "Like the Greek and Latin words (free) originally refers to legal status. The opposite is slave -- theow in classical Anglo-Saxon," (p. 114). In addition "freedom" has another original association with the concept of positive freedom.

Like eleutheria and libertas, freedom and franchise can of course mean the legal freedom of the community. But the ancient words are used chiefly, if not entirely, in reference to the freedom of a state. The contrast is sometimes between autonomy and subjection to foreign power; sometimes between the freedom of a republic and the rule of a despot. (Lewis, p. 124-5)

In a truly participatory democracy then all men must be treated as 'freemen'. They must not be used or coerced for the private ends of individuals. By extension, coercion even
for public purposes, requiring as it does the involuntary submission of a freeman, must be kept to an absolute minimum. A citizen must always be treated with maximum respect for his reasonableness and it is important, if this respectful relationship is to be maintained, that all deviations from the ideal rule of consensus be justified by the genuine exigencies of time. Conversely, the more important the decision, other things being equal, the less any deviation from consensus can be tolerated. The community's respect for individual integrity requires maximum consideration for individual objections in matters of importance.

Rousseau summarizes this point nicely:

first, the more important and serious the matter to be decided, the closer should the opinion which is to prevail approach unanimity; second the swifter the decision the question demands, the smaller the prescribed majority may be allowed to become; and in decisions which have to be given immediately a majority of one must suffice. The first of these maxims might seem to be more suited to the enactment of laws, the second to the dispatch of administrative business. At all events, it is by a combination of the two maxims that we can determine the right size for the majority that is to decide on any question. (p. 154)

Let me summarize the argument so far: The ideal of participatory democracy is to have all those subject to a collective decision present as active participants and voters in the assembly which makes the collective decision. Ideally, the assembly will attempt to achieve consensus on what is best for the community through the process of collective,rational reflection, as this preserves subjective freedom for all.
The rule of consensus is the procedural embodiment of the ideal of complete respect for the rationality and freedom of all citizens, and deviations from this rule should be as little as is required by the exigencies of decision-making.

But what reasons are there to think the participatory assembly would rule wisely? Can any collection of people be supposed capable of self-rule through assembly democracy? Rousseau did not think so. In fact, he believed that only under rather stringent conditions could the assembly be expected to rule reliably in the general interest, and therefore express the general will. First, he believed that the assembly should only turn its legislative attention to issues of broad generality. For under such conditions each submits himself to the same conditions which he imposes on others; this admirable harmony of interest and justice gives to social deliberations a quality of equity which disappears at once from the discussion of any individual dispute precisely because in these latter cases there is no common interest to unite and identify the decision of the judge with that of the contending parties.

(Rousseau, p. 76)

It is largely because of this restriction that Rousseau believed that in a well-run state the decisions of the assembly would tend to unanimity. For this arrangement provides a means by which all may maximize their self-interest. But this is only the case on the condition that the assembly is concerning itself with such issues of broad generality as
the criminal law or issues which have such optimal solutions as my zoning example. Unfortunately, if any government is to be relevant it must turn its attention to concerns and decisions which do not affect all equally. What then happens to Rousseau's argument that the assembly could be expected to rule wisely, what happens to the general will? What in fact happens to the very concept of "the public interest"? For, if a decision does not affect all more or less equally, what is the warrant for saying that this decision is in "the public interest"? Given that a decision of the assembly does not affect all equally, is it not more honest to say that the decision was in the interest of a large subset of the public, or perhaps that it was in the majority's interest?

Brian Barry, in a well known essay on the public interest (Barry, 1967) has used a version of Rousseau's account to defend the concept of public interest from detractors who claim (for reasons suggested above) that it plays an essentially ideological and obfuscatory role in public debate. Barry argued that we should think of the public interest not as serving the interest of all equally, but as serving us all equally in our role as citizens rather than as individuals in all our roles. As Barry puts it:

Instead of simply saying that some measure is 'in his interests' a man will often specify some role or capacity in which it is favourable to him: 'as a
parent', 'as a businessman', 'as a houseowner' and so on. One of the capacities in which everyone finds himself is that of 'a member of the public'. Some issues allow a policy to be produced which will affect everyone in this capacity. This is the pure 'Rousseau' situation.

(pp. 123-124)

Such a redescription of the "Rousseau situation" does, I think, save the concept of public interest, but at the expense of abandoning its automatic coincidence with justice. For under Rousseau's model, justice (taken apparently to mean equality) is supposedly the automatic result of discovering the general interest. But in Barry's account, justice is an additional consideration, for a law could well affect us all equally as citizens, but distribute greater benefits or losses to us as individuals (i.e. in the totality of our roles). For example: A law upgrading the standards for factory pollution emission is one that will benefit us all equally as citizens, but certain manufacturers will be forced to bear the cost of improving their factories. They can be expected to request assistance to meet these requirements or even to oppose the decision for, even though the decision is in the public interest and therefore in their interest, they are paying the cost. Whether their objections and requests for assistance are just or not is a different question than whether higher pollution standards are in the public interest. And while it is irrelevant to my concern at the moment, it is, I believe, appropriate to point out that such additional costs that high standards inflict on the producer are an internalization
of externalities (i.e. the producer is now having to pay costs which formerly were borne by the whole community) and if so are quite fair.

But given the abandonment of equal effects, is there any reason to think that participatory democracy would rule wisely?

Two arguments can be given here. First, the presence of those affected by a decision can be hoped to have an ameliorating affect on the willingness of the assembly to deal unjustly with their claims. But second, and more important, is the claim that participation not only provides a mechanism for self rule, it provides also a "school" for this rule. The advocates of participation, Rousseau included, have long argued that because participation requires participants to take other people's points of view into account, and to couch their arguments (and therefore finally their thoughts) in terms of the public interest, participants will become less egoistic and more moral in their concerns. Rousseau argues that the experience of participation gives man "moral freedom" "...which alone makes man the master of himself; for to be governed by appetite alone is slavery while obedience to a law one prescribes to oneself is freedom" (Rousseau, p.65).

Participation then not only provides a means for all to maximize their self interest, it also provides the moral education so that those required to sacrifice their interest
to that of the community do so willingly, and that the whole community consistently dedicates itself to justice and to deliberation genuinely concerned with the public good.

Ironically, the best statement of the claim that participation is morally educative is to be found in Mill's Representative Government. Mill argues:

Very different is the state of the human faculties where a human being feels himself under no other external restraint than the necessities of nature, or mandates of society which he has his share in imposing, and which it is open to him, if he thinks them wrong, publicly to dissent from, and exert himself actively to get altered. The maximum of the invigorating effect of freedom upon the character is only obtained when the person acted on either is, or is looking forward to becoming a citizen as fully privileged as any other. What is still more important than even this matter of feeling is the practical discipline which the character obtains from the occasional demand made upon the citizens to exercise, for a time and in their turn, some social function. It is not sufficiently considered how little there is in most men's ordinary life to give any largeness either to their conceptions or to their sentiments. Their work is a routine; not a labour of love, but of self-interest in the most elementary form, the satisfaction of daily wants; neither introduces the mind to thoughts or feelings extending beyond individuals; if instructive books are within their reach, there is no stimulus to read them; and in most cases the individual has no access to any person of cultivation much superior to his own. Giving him something to do for the public, supplies, in a measure, all these deficiencies. If circumstances allow the amount of public duty assigned him to be considerable; it makes him an educated man. Notwithstanding the defects of the social system and moral ideas of antiquity, the practice of the dicastery and the ecclesia raised the intellectual standard of an average Athenian citizen far beyond anything of which there is yet an example in any other mass of men, ancient or modern. A benefit of the same kind, though far less in degree, is produced
on Englishmen of the lower middle class by their liability to be placed on juries and to serve parish offices; which, though it does not occur to so many, nor is so continuous, nor introduces them to so great a variety of elevated considerations, as to admit of comparison with the public education which every citizen of Athens obtained from her democratic institutions, must make them nevertheless very different beings in range of ideas and development of faculties, from those who have done nothing in their lives but drive a quill, or sell goods over a counter. Still more salutary is the moral part of the instruction afforded by the participation of the private citizen, if even rarely, in public functions. He is called upon, while so engaged, to weigh interests not his own; to be guided, in case of conflicting claims, by another rule than his private partialities; to apply, at every turn, principles and maxims which have for their reason of existence the common good: and he usually finds associated with him in the same work minds more familiarized than his own with these ideas and operations, whose study it will be to supply reasons to his understanding, and stimulation to his feeling for the general interest. He is made to feel himself one of the public, and whatever is for their benefit to be for his benefit. Where this school of public spirit does not exist, scarcely any sense is entertained that private persons, in no eminent social situation, owe any duties to society, except to obey the laws and submit to the government. There is no unselfish sentiment of identification with the public. Every thought or feeling, either of interest or of duty, is absorbed in the individual and in the family. The man never thinks of any collective interest, of any objects to be pursued jointly with others, but only in competition with them, and in some measure at their expense. A neighbour, not being an ally or an associate, since he is never engaged in any common undertaking for joint benefits, is therefore only a rival. Thus even private morality suffers, while public is actually extinct. Were this the universal and only possible state of things, the utmost aspirations of the lawgiver or the moralist could only stretch to make the bulk of the community a flock of sheep innocently nibbling the grass side by side.

From these accumulated considerations it is evident that the only government which can fully satisfy all
the exigencies of the social state is one in which the whole people participate; that any participation, even in the smallest public function, is useful; that the participation should everywhere be as great as the general degree of improvement of the community will allow; and that nothing less can be ultimately desirable than the admission of all to a share in the sovereign power of the state. (1964, pp. 215-217)

I have argued that even though Rousseau's generality stricture (i.e. that the assembly must only concern itself with issues that equally affect all) cannot be maintained, we can still expect that assembly to rule wisely and justly because of the educative affects of participation.

In chapters III and IV I will develop a more general theory of human nature which supports my contention of people's fitness for participatory democracy. But for now I wish to note other restrictions that Rousseau placed on his assemblies.

Generality of concern was not the only restriction Rousseau imposed on his assemblies in an attempt to secure disinterested decision making. He also argued that the assembly should not be composed of interested factions. Each citizen must come to the assembly independent of previous commitments to groups smaller than the assembly. The purpose of this rule is obvious enough. It is well known that an organized minority can have influence far beyond its size or the value of its cause. In addition, Rousseau, like J.S. Mill, wishes to see the assembly be a place where people develop a sense of identity with the community
and its well-being. If one comes to the assembly already identified with a sub-group of the community (e.g. the chamber of commerce, the auto worker's union, or the Liberal Party), then the possibility of experiencing identity with the greater whole is reduced. For if one comes as a member of these groups, then one's primary commitment is to the sub-group's interest, not to the discovery of the public interest. On the other hand, Rousseau recognized that it would not be possible to eliminate interest groups in a state of any considerable size. He therefore recommended that as many interest groups as possible should be developed, so that the crisscrossing loyalties of these groups might cancel themselves out in each individual.

Thirdly, Rousseau requires that the background economic conditions of the assembly members be roughly equal so that "no citizen shall be rich enough to buy another and none so poor as to be forced to sell himself". The purpose of this requirement, besides eliminating the temptations of bribery, is also, I believe, to reduce the role of envy in blocking rational debate. An additional benefit would be that in a state made up of equals the decisions are more apt to fall on all equally. In my example above, I imagined a situation in which a factory owner objected to bearing the burden of pollution controls. But if the factory was collectively owned, then there would be no members of the assembly who would have, as a result of ownership, private interests opposed to that of the public. Inequalities tend to yield inequalities, and one hardly needs to read Marx to see this point.
Near the very end of the *Social Contract* Rousseau makes one last suggestion of a means of assuring a well run state: the institution of a kind of minimal religion whose dogmas he claimed should be

simple and few in number, expressed precisely and without explanations or commentaries. The existence of an omnipotent, intelligent, benevolent divinity that foresees and provides; the life to come; the happiness of the just; the punishment of sinners; the sanctity of the social contract and the law - these are the positive dogmas. As for the negative dogmas, I would limit them to a single one: no intolerance. Intolerance is something which belongs to the religions we have rejected. (p.186)

Such a minimal faith Rousseau apparently felt was a pre-condition for loyal citizenry: the final guarantee of uncoerced obedience. But such a condition seems clearly out of line with Rousseau's other conditions which seem clearly directed at a community of reason and public responsibility, not mindless terror of punishment in an after-life. It seems that in adding this last idea, Rousseau abandoned his faith that the structure of the assembly can produce rational adherence to the law. Perhaps the abandonment was occasioned by his frequently explicit, if contradictory, belief in psychological egoism* Regardless, it is my view that only the other conditions are appropriate and useful to participatory democracy.

* e.g. "We always want what is advantageous". (p.72)
But they do not state all the conditions that are probably necessary for a participatory democracy to achieve the rule of reason; in particular, the size of the assembly seems to be a critical factor. In fact, if participation is not to be reduced to mere attendance and voting, the size of the assembly must be severely restricted. As I will document below in chapter VI, all successful experiments in worker democracy seem to involve the possibility of small group participation. Groups larger than about 20 do not seem to provide the kind of intimate contact and possibility of extensive discussion for each individual. And such extensive discussions are necessary if individuals are actually to influence and be persuaded during the decision-making process. In China, for example, the basic participatory group is never more than 15, and many theorists have argued that a truly effective group or committee must be less than 7. (see Townsend, p. 175; Thayer, p. 7-8; Olsen, ch. 2)

The problem of providing for the extensive discussion necessary for the rule of reason is not necessarily solved in the classic town meeting situation, except in cases where there is a good deal of opportunity for informal small meetings which relate to the larger gatherings. Finley, in his book, *Democracy: Ancient and Modern*, argues that it was the daily discussion in the market place as much as the assembly meetings which enabled Athens to achieve a high degree of participatory democracy.
If the goal of participatory democracy is to be achieved, it would appear that the institutional arrangements must reflect the need for small group discussions, as much as the need for meeting and voting in the collective legislature. Under such conditions each individual can be expected to have the maximum influence and maximum attention to his point of view. And under such conditions the goal of having each member of the community governed by persuasion not force or obligation, has the greatest chance of success. In addition, the small group participation enables each individual's position, even if finally unpersuasive, to receive maximum attention and respect.

But subjective freedom and respectful treatment qua subject is not the only benefit of participation. While these aspects underline the freedom made available by participation in our role as subjects, they do not sufficiently underline the new and additional benefits or freedoms that come from being a participant.

While our range of individual choice is objectively restricted by legislation, participation in the legislative process increases our opportunity for involvement in an enormously greater range of choices. Not only does a well run assembly provide the benefit of encouraging people to think and act in a moral and public spirited manner, it also
increases their opportunity to do so. I think that it is appropriate to call this benefit "political freedom" -- the freedom to participate in and influence the collective decision making process. There are two ways in which participation can increase one's political freedom. First, the participant gains influence over areas of his life which were subject to government control, but not to his influence. Second, if the government extends the range of its decision making by legislating on areas formerly left to individual decision (as I have advocated), then the political freedom of a participant is increased because the range of "political choices" is increased. But it should also be noted that since the assembly must constantly turn its attention to concerns of a moral nature (the public interest and justice) the range of moral choices open to the individual who has political freedom is also greatly increased.

We can see how the political freedom and the range of moral choices of the participants can be increased by referring again to Hardin's story of the commons. Without a collective body with the power to enforce decisions, the farmer who wishes to make a positive contribution to the preservation of the commons is powerless. Left to his own activities, as we know from Hardin, Olsen and Mill, he has only the option of premature self-destruction. But with the existence of a self-legislating forum, the farmers then have together a
choice of preserving the commons: a choice they did not have as individuals. Since moral actions are characteristically those actions which are undertaken not for personal benefit, but for some collective good, the existence of a collective legislature means that the range of effective moral actions and choices open to the individual is likely to be greatly increased.

Rousseau seems more or less to ignore this point, but it is fundamental to the argument for participatory democracy, for here is a very real sense in which our political freedom is increased by conceding certain areas of individual behavior to collective control. Not only is there an increase in moral choices, but also there is just a simple increase in the range of choices we have about our environment. For unlike our homes and immediate possessions, our environment is essentially a collective possession. By dividing it up among ourselves and not subjecting ourselves to any collective control, we abandon the possibility of making decisions about our environment. The result of such abandonment is only too well known: environmental degradation and finally the possibility of collective self-destruction. Self-destruction is likely, not simply because we are all too selfish, too concerned with consumer goods or too indifferent to ecological considerations, but primarily because there is nothing or next to nothing that we, as individuals, can do about the environment. Only through concerted effort, only through some collective forum
can we make the kinds of decisions that have environmental impact.

A corollary of this argument is that the ecological crisis should not be seen, as some would have us believe, as resulting from our collective "will" to consume, but as a result of our failure to provide the democratic forums necessary for the creation of genuine collective decisions. Because there is no means for arriving at what we really want in the way of an environment, there is never any real choice between consumption and ecological preservation. The decision of whether to purchase something or not, is not a vote on the desirability of limited growth economy. A person buying a car no more wills the enormity of the auto industry and the concomitant pollution, than the farmer putting his cow to pasture wills the destruction of the commons or the commuter getting into his car votes for a traffic jam. The public is not responsible for the ecological crisis, because it does not have the collective organization to be responsible for it. A solution then to the ecological crisis is not "grumbling acceptance" of governmental expansion and centralization, but the renewal of public life. The rebirth of self-government is itself an intrinsic good and an obviously preferable way to deal with the increasing need for control.
But not all may see the attractiveness of such a solution, and even more may find such a proposal fantastically unrealistic. Those who find such a proposal neither attractive or possible may be objecting on the grounds that it conflicts with human nature. Such people may feel that humans are essentially selfish and desirous of ever increasing consumer goods, and that no government arrangement can change this. All that government can do is to recognize human nature for what it is and try to protect us from ourselves. On this theory (which might be called the Hobbesian objection), people are only brought together out of selfishness and the desire for protection, and are incapable of choosing the public interest over their private desires. Such tedious and potentially inefficient forms of government as participatory democracy conflicts with people's real desire to get on with their personal consumption.

Another objection might be that while such an arrangement is not in conflict with human nature, it is in conflict with the industrial order. It may be (the argument goes) that in a rural and economically simple society participation is possible, but there is no place for such extensive participation in the operation of an industrial society. The need for hierarchy, for efficient management, and the enormous time lost at meetings, completely conflicts with current arrangements and current expectations.
Lastly, a rather different kind of objection might come from the ecologically concerned. What reason they might ask, given what we know of human nature, is there to think that such an arrangement would result in ecological preservation? Why would not the participatory forums and local governments simply vote for more of the same? Why would they choose to preserve the natural environment and to restrict individual behavior?

All these questions and objections deserve answers, and it seems to me that the most persuasive way to go about doing so is to first develop an alternative to the theory of human nature presumed by my imaginary skeptics. This I do in chapter III, where I attempt to demonstrate the fundamental importance of the social rather than egoistic and individualistic aspects of human behavior. Such a theory lends itself to a rather different political theory and view of government, and this in turn is developed in chapter IV. Finally, I must show why it would be ecologically desirable to institute such arrangements in our current society (chapter V), and that such arrangements are indeed a real possibility in industrialized society (chapter VI, VII).
CHAPTER III

HUMAN NATURE AND SOCIAL NEEDS: The Repudiation of Homo Economicus
In this Chapter I wish to deal with two fundamental assumptions about human nature which stand in the way of the development of any radically optimistic political theory. These two views are:

1. That man is fundamentally selfish and seeks only his own benefit, and
2. That man has an innate and insatiable desire for goods, money or both.

This first assumption of man's selfishness has been given as the justification for a coercive government, a capitalist form of economic order, and the widespread cynicism about the possibility of change. The coercive government is needed because men's selfishness would lead them to injure one another; the capitalist form of economic organization is of value because it supposedly provides a means by which the selfishness of each individual is guided to contribute to the general well being of the community. This theory of "homo economicus" has recently been extended by political theorists who have attempted to show that the public good is served by the efforts of antagonistic self-interest groups which vie with each other in an effort to procure as much government assistance as they can. The pressures that these various interest groups apply to officials results in a kind of equilibrium which is supposed to represent, or at least approach, the common good.*

* The clearest account of this political theory is probably R.P. Wolff's account in The Poverty of Liberalism in his chapter on "Tolerance".
The second assumption also serves a justificatory role since capitalism is felt to be the most efficient means of continuing to satisfy the insatiable pursuit of wealth; given the power of this drive nothing less than a coercive government would be adequate to control people's rapaciousness and assure the safety of legitimate wealth.

All these theories gain their popularity from both the service they do to capitalist ideology (indeed they are the foundation) and the extent to which they seem to be based on accurate social observation. They are also part of the general atomistic view of human behaviour which ignores the extent to which humans are participants in a community and are shaped by this experience. As a result any refutation of these views must involve not only a philosophical attack on their substance, but the development of a more sociologically sophisticated alternative. Not surprisingly, this debate over human nature and politics took exactly this form at its very beginning—with Thomas Hobbes (1588-1669) articulating the atomistic theory of man's insatiable selfishness. Most philosophers at this time reacted with outrage to his doctrine, but it was Bishop Butler who most effectively attacked the psychological premises on which it was based. Because Butler's refutation is a classic of philosophic analysis and because Butler himself sketches an alternative theory of human motivation, it is well worth the effort to study Butler's work. Butler in turn leads us to other theorists of the 18th century whose interest in
"approbation" as a psychological force sets the groundwork for an alternative theory of human and specifically political motivation. My concern is not only with the question "do we always attempt to act in our own interest?", but also with the question "just what are our own interests?". But before moving on to these questions we need a fuller picture of Hobbes' view.

Hobbes was concerned to base his theory on a description of man in a state of nature, but he ended up, as C.B. MacPherson and others have pointed out, describing the main characteristic of the society of his own time. This society was characterized by a breaking down of the traditional constraints and obligatory systems. In the place of these restraints the market gained ascendancy under the increasing domination of people who were avaricious and ruthless in the pursuit of profit. That it was also a time of the first burgeoning of the poor seems to have escaped Hobbes' notice. It was, of course, the successful that gained Hobbes' attention, and who served as his example for people in the state of nature.

We may conjecture that the ease with which Hobbes attributed essentially market relations to all societies was due to his having shared the view, common to men of the Renaissance, that civilized society was limited to classical Greece and Rome and post-medieval western Europe. Since the classical societies were to some extent market societies they could easily be taken to fit a model drawn primarily from the more completely market society of his own time. And once the model was established it was not difficult to apply it to the most nearly civilized section of all other societies,
that is, to the active upper classes of other societies, for the relations between the men at the top in non-market societies tended to consist in a competitive struggle for power that approximated the market relation. Whether or not this was the order of Hobbes's thought, and however consciously he drew his model from his appreciation of the market attributes of seventeenth-century society, it is clear that his model approximates most nearly to the model of the possessive market society."

(Macpherson, 1962, p.67) *

There is no question that much of the plausibility of the proposition that all actions are selfish comes from the fact that there is a great deal of selfish activity in society as we know it. But the real staying power of this proposition comes from the ideology of capitalism, not simply from the fact that people are frequently selfish. In other words, it is not simply on the basis of "casual empiricism" that people conclude that most people are selfish, but rather on the basis of the ideological myth used to support capitalism. This is the myth that only a capitalistic order, which allows and encourages individuals to maximize their personal interest, is an efficient economic system. By accepting the selfish nature of man and allowing the invisible hand of the market mechanism to provide for the interests of the consumer, capitalism

* Macpherson on possessive market society. "If a single criterion of the possessive market society is wanted it is that man's labour is a commodity, i.e. that a man's energy and skill are his own yet are regarded not as integral parts of his personality, but as possessions, the use and disposal of which he is free to hand over to others for a price." (Ibid., p.48)
provides the only realistic form of economic order. (Of course this belief is to some extent self-perpetuating. "After all, if everyone else is out for number one, then what choice do I have?"). Because man's "natural" selfishness plays such a fundamental role in this ideology, it is not surprising to find the general claim that people are generally selfish, changed to the ideological claim of "psychological egoism", viz., that all human actions are selfish. It is this ideological claim that Butler so effectively refuted.

As an illustration of this view we can quote Hobbes' analysis of 'charity' as the delight in one's powers.

There is yet another passion sometimes called love, but more properly good will or charity. There can be no greater argument to a man, of his own power, than to find himself able not only to accomplish his own desires, but also to assist other men in theirs: and this is that conception wherein consisteth charity. (Hobbes, 1969, p. 17)

In a more contemporary idiom a person might argue that all actions are equally motivated by self-interest; a person who does good for the community or helps a friend is actually seeking appreciation and the reward one gets from this kind of activity. If he does some socially worthy activity he is sure to desire that it receive some public praise and, if he helps a friend, he realizes that in doing so he sets up a system of obligations such that his friend will be later required to help him. (Hobbes describes friendship as one of the sources of power in Ch. 9, Sec. 9 of Human Nature). On this view even in the case where there is no such obvious self-
interest a person who engages in a socially beneficial activity, such as donating anonymously to charity, is still seeking the pleasures and satisfaction that one gets from such praiseworthy activity.

The first objection that one is inclined to make to this view, since it involves an argument of principle not a generalization of fact, is to offer an obvious counter-example. We have all heard stories of the soldier who, by throwing himself on top of a hand grenade, assures his own death, but saves the lives of those near him. This is a counter-example because for it to fit into the framework of self interest, the soldier would need to live i.e. there would need to be a self which this action could benefit. Of course those who believe in an after life could well argue that it was in the interest of the self/soul of the soldier, but it is usually not these people who are putting forward the argument for man's inherent selfishness. While this counter-example greatly weakens the absolute argument, it does not do much for anyone who is hoping to weaken the argument sufficiently to put forth an alternative ideology. In order to sufficiently weaken the argument, we must show that non-selfish behaviour is widespread enough, or potentially widespread enough, to provide a basis on which to build a society. In order words, to truly counter the egoist's position, we must not only refute it (or display its weaknesses), but develop an alternative account that equally satisfies our intuitions. Fortunately Butler not only refutes Hobbes' view,
but he actually develops a powerfully positive view of the human situation and possibility. For this reason it is worth studying his arguments at length.

In the first of his famous Sermons Butler states that

"In these Sermons....the comparison will be between the nature of man as respecting self, and tending to private good, his own preservation and happiness; and the nature of man as having respect to society, and tending to promote public good, the happiness of that society. These ends do indeed perfectly coincide; and to aim at public and private good are so far from being inconsistent, that they mutually promote each other: yet in the following discourse they must be considered as entirely distinct; otherwise the nature of man as tending to one, or as tending to the other, cannot be compared. There can no comparison be made, without considering the things compared as distinct and different." (Butler, p. 18)

To support this claim, Butler argues that there is a natural principle of benevolence that has the same relation to society that self-love has to the individual. Having stated this principle he quickly adds a long polemical footnote refuting Hobbes' definition of 'charity' quoted above. He accuses Hobbes of misconstruing language in an effort to support his incredible theory that all human behaviour is motivated by a desire for power.*

*"So that in the first place, I put for a general inclination of all mankind, a perpetual and restless desire for power after power, that ceaseth only in death" (Hobbes, 1962, p. 80)

It is interesting to note that Hobbes did not really feel this motivation to be an absolute, but rather derived (for most people anyway) from a desire for security. As he puts it: "And the cause of this is not always that a man hopes for a more intensive delight, that he has already attained to; or that he cannot be content with a moderate power: but because he cannot assure the power and means to live well, which he hath present, without the acquisition of more". (ibid)
...And could any one be thoroughly satisfied, that what is commonly called benevolence or good-will was really the affection meant, but only by being made to understand that this learned person had a general hypothesis, to which the appearance of good-will could no otherwise be reconciled? That what has this appearance is often nothing but ambition; that delight in superiority often (suppose always) mixes itself with benevolence, only makes it more specious to call it ambition than hunger, of the two: but in reality that passion does no more account for the whole appearances of good-will, than this appetite does. Is there not often the appearance of one man's wishing that good to another, which he knows himself unable to procure him; and rejoicing in it, though bestowed by a third person? And can love of power any way possibly come in to account for this desire or delight? Is there not often the appearance of men's distinguishing between two or more persons, preferring one before another, to do good to, in cases where love of power cannot in the least account for the distinction and preference? For this principle can no otherwise distinguish between objects, than as it is a greater instance and exertion of power to do good to one rather than to another. Again, suppose good-will in the mind of man to be nothing but delight in the exercise of power: men might indeed be restrained by distant and accidental considerations; but these restraints being removed, they would have a disposition to and delight in mischief as an exercise and proof of power: and this disposition and delight would arise from, or be the same principle in the mind, as a disposition to, and delight in charity. Thus cruelty, as distinct from envy and resentment would be exactly the same in the mind of man as good-will: that one tends to the happiness, the other to the misery of our fellow-creatures, is, it seems, merely an accidental circumstance, which the mind has not the least regard to. These are the absurdities which even men of capacity run into, when they have occasion to belie their nature,...

(Butler, p. 19)

Butler's arguments are:

1. The fact that ambition can be related to benevolence,
far from establishing that these feelings are the same, presupposes that they are different.

2. People wish good for another even though they could not help this person realize his good, and

3. when such a person does receive the good he desires, the "spectator" takes delight in it which could not be explained by proof of his own success.

4. If the desire to be benevolent was simply the desire for pleasure of displaying and using one's power, then there would be no difference as far as this intention went between enjoying one's power in doing harm to people and enjoying it in doing good, i.e. between benevolence and maliciousness.

Butler explains the general error involved in Hobbes' analysis in sermon XII. The problem with Hobbes' analysis is that he overlooks the fact that while we seek our own pleasure or happiness, we also seek the pleasure or even unhappiness of others without regard to our own interest. That the satisfactions of these desires bring us happiness means that we do in fact have these other-directed desires distinct from simply desiring happiness. In fact personal happiness consists largely in the satisfaction of these desires, so that having other motives than our immediate happiness is actually a precondition for experiencing happiness, at least for experiencing the happiness of satisfaction (and think of the extent to which that is the primary source of happiness).
Having demonstrated one of the absurdities of Hobbes' psychology, Butler then goes on to complete his own theory. He distinguishes "passions and affections" from his two "principles" of "self-love and benevolence". The passions, he claims, may also lead to actions that are benevolent, contribute to self-interest, or may even result in harm to ourselves and others. Take a "typical passion" - hunger - it contributes to our well-being, indeed it helps sustain us, but equally, the passion for food may lead us to indigestion and gout. The same phenomenon holds for social passions such as the desire for esteem. While this desire may lead us to contribute to society and in that way serve the principle of benevolence, it too may lead us into disaster either for ourselves or for our society. Lastly, he outlines the principle of reflection by which we distinguish between, and approve and disapprove actions--this principle he calls conscience. This is a regulative principle which while tending toward the public good really serves both ourselves and others, helping to assure that we maintain our responsibilities in cases where our natural affections may be insufficient.

From this comparison of benevolence and self-love, of our public and private affections of the courses of life they lead to, and of the principle of reflection or conscience as respecting each of them, it is as manifest, that we were made for society, and to promote the happiness of it; as that we were intended to take care of our own life, and health, and private good. (Ibid, p.22)

While one may object to the design overtones in this quotation, there can be no question of the general point that
man is a social creature. As such we have inclinations and abilities to further and protect our community without which community life would not be possible. That this social side of our personality is frequently undernourished in our affluent culture does not refute Butler's claim. We can all realize that:

...There is such a natural principle of attraction in man towards man, that having trod the same tract of land, having breathed in the same climate, barely having been born in the same artificial district or division, becomes the occasion of contracting acquaintances and familiarities many years after: for anything may serve the purpose. Thus relations merely nominal are sought and invented, not by governors, but by the lowest of the people; which are found sufficient to hold mankind together in little fraternities and copartnerships: (Ibid p.23)

He continues, giving a final and devastating rebuke to the state-of-nature theorists:

...Men are so much one body, that in a peculiar manner they feel for each other, shame, sudden anger, resentment, honour, prosperity, distress; one or another, or all of these, from the social nature in general, from benevolence upon the occasion of natural relation, acquaintance, protection, dependence; each of these being distinct cements of society. And therefore to have no restraint from, no regard to others in our behaviour, is the speculative absurdity of considering ourselves as single and independent, as having nothing in our nature which has respect to our fellow creatures, reduced to action and practice. And this is the same absurdity as to suppose a hand, or any part to have no natural respect to any other, or to the whole body. (Ibid)

To the objection that he has not allowed for the obvious fact that people all too often do one another great
injury, Butler replies that people all too often do great injury to themselves. And

If it be said, that there are persons in the world, who are in great measure without the natural affections towards their fellow-creatures: there are likewise instances of persons without the common natural affections to themselves: but the nature of man is not to be judged of by either of these, but by what appears in the common world, in the bulk of mankind. (Ibid, p. 29)

He also points out the "accidental" quality of much evil.

...whereas there is plainly benevolence or good-will; there is no such thing as love of injustice, oppression, treachery, ingratitude; but only eager desires after such and such external goods; which, according to a very ancient observation, the most abandoned would choose to obtain by innocent means, if they were as easy, and as effectual to their end: that even emulation and resentment, by any one who will consider what these passions really are in nature, will be found nothing to the purpose of this objection: and that the principles and passions in the mind of man, which are distinct both from self-love and benevolence primarily and most directly lead to right behaviour with regard to others as well as himself, and only secondarily and accidentally to what is evil. (Ibid)

In a later Sermon "Upon the love of our neighbor", Butler provides a useful review of his argument and it is worth quoting at length here before exploring his position further.

Every particular affection, even the love of our neighbour, is as really our own affection, as self-love; and the pleasure arising from its gratification is as much my own pleasure, as the pleasure self-love would have, from knowing I myself should be happy some time hence, would be my own pleasure. And if, because every particular affection is a man's own, and the pleasure arising from its gratification his own pleasure, or pleasure to himself,
such particular affection must be called self-
love; according to this way of speaking, no
creature whatever can possibly act but merely
from self-love; and every action and every
affection whatever is to be resolved up into
this one principle. But then this is not the
language of mankind: or if it were, we should
want words to express the difference, between
the principle of an action, proceeding from
cool consideration that it will be to my own
advantage; and an action, suppose of revenge,
or of friendship, by which a man runs upon
certain ruin, to do evil or good to another.
It is manifest the principles of these actions
are totally different, and so want different
words to be distinguished by: all that they
agree in is, that they both proceed from, and
are done to gratify an inclination in a man's
self. But the principle or inclination in one
case is self-love; in the other, hatred or love
of another. There is then a distinction between
the cool principle of self-love, or general
desire of our happiness, as one part of our
nature, and one principle of action; and the
particular affections towards particular
external objects, as another part of our nature,
and another principle of action. How much
soever therefore is to be allowed to self-love,
yet it cannot be allowed to be the whole of
our inward constitution; because, you see, there
are other parts or principles which come into it.
(Ibid, p. 100-101)

Leaving the absolute argument for egoism, Butler
going on to deal with the supposed tension between self-love
and benevolence, as he remarks:

...there is generally thought to be some
peculiar kind of contrariety between self-love
and the love of our neighbour, between the
pursuit of public and of private good; insomuch
that when you are recommending one of these,
you are supposed to be speaking against the
other; and from hence arises a secret prejudice
against, and frequently open scorn of all talk
of public spirit, and real goodwill to our
fellow creatures; (Ibid, p.99)

To demonstrate the weakness of the supposition of "contrariety"
Butler repeatedly shows the extent to which the pursuit of private interest can lead to unhappiness (i.e. not serve the principle of self-love) and the extent to which concern for others can lead the individual to happiness. In addition he argues that when some pursuit of a private interest is frustrated there is only unhappiness, but when the pursuit of some other's interest is frustrated there is at least the satisfaction of knowing that one was trying to do good.

He then asks how it is that this belief about the opposition between self-love and benevolence arose.

The general mistake, that there is some greater inconsistence between endeavouring to promote the good of another and self-interest than between self-interest and pursuing anything else, seems, as hath already been hinted, to arise from our notions of property; and to be carried on by this property's being supposed to be itself our happiness or good. People are so very much taken up with this one subject that they seem from it to have formed a general way of thinking, which they apply to other things that they have nothing to do with. And so far as it is taken for granted, that barely having the means and materials of enjoyment is what constitutes interest and happiness; that our interest or good consists in possessions themselves, in having the property of riches, houses, lands, gardens, not in the enjoyment of them; so far it will even more strongly be taken for granted, in the way already explained, that an affection's conducing to the good of another, must even necessarily occasion it to conduce less to private good, if not to be positively detrimental to it. For, if property and happiness are one and the same thing, as by increasing the property of another, you must lessen your own happiness. But whatever occasioned the mistake, I hope it has been fully proved to be one; as it has been proved, that there is no peculiar rivalship or competition between self-love and benevolence: that as there may be a competition between the two, so there may also between any particular affection whatever and self-love; that every
particular affection, benevolence among the rest, is subservient to self-love by being the instrument of private enjoyment; and that in one respect benevolence contributes more to private interest, i.e. enjoyment or satisfaction, than any other of the particular common affections as it is in a degree its own gratification. (Ibid, p.108-109)

Unfortunately, Butler's hope to have destroyed the fallacious belief in the analogy between property and happiness was not realized. It has become all too widely accepted that happiness is to be equated with profit and private interest, and cool self-love with a balance sheet. The rational egoist has become a popular psychological model for the human being, even in the moral realm, to the more or less total elimination of the "benevolent" and public spirited side of humanity. But it appears that the ecological crisis which emphasizes the self-destructive nature of the belief in the private source of happiness may help eliminate this narrow conception of "interest" and the good life.

For we can not, I think, expect a more eloquent account than Butler's of the enormous error involved in equating human interests and values with property and money. But the widespread appreciation of this error requires more than incisive criticism. Indeed, despite Butler's work, this error has continued in dramatic form through the 19th and well into the 20th century. Some of the blame for the continuation of this unfortunate error can be ascribed to the early utilitarians, such as Bentham, who shared Hobbes' psychology. The likeness of Bentham's felicific calculus to a calculus of profit and loss made the utilitarian ethical system a natural tool for 19th and 20th century economists who had only to equate happiness with
increasing real income. And the crowning achievement of this misequation of wealth and well being was the placing of the GNP as the ultimate measure of social and national well being. The GNP came to play in the assessment of national success what the percent of profit traditionally played in the assessment of the firm.

What has become of the theory of human nature put forth by Hobbes now that it has gained the stature of a dominant ideology? Roughly, it has developed into the following set of propositions:

1. People have an essentially unlimited set of wants.
2. These wants are primarily for individual consumer goods.
3. Happiness consists in the satisfactions of these wants.

Therefore, the function of morality and government is to articulate and enforce those rules which would be most conducive to the maximization of aggregate satisfaction, i.e. to the maximization of national wealth.* In other words, the function of government should be to facilitate the co-operation of individuals in their pursuit of individual happiness so that the egoistic pursuit of each individual does not result in the

* At this point some pro forma mention is made of justice, but this is clearly not a dominant concern--there is no quarterly publication of the "justice index".
the defeat of all by all (cf. Rousseau and Hardin). The government has no responsibility for shaping or controlling people's wants. (Prohibition was the ultimate proof that such governmental efforts are disastrous.)

II

Clearly no ecologically radical thesis can be based on the above presuppositions. Either we look gloomily forward to a time when there will be a widespread lack of satisfaction because of a widespread lack of goods, or we must naively hope that technology will discover some way to satisfy the growing list of human wants against a background of diminishing resources. But despite the widespread popularity of the psychology on which this dichotomy is based, there is no need to accept these alternatives.

Humans simply do not fit the model. In fact we have a whole range of desires that do not require goods for their satisfactions, and that are more dependent on the quality of social life than the prevalence of wealth for their realization. These are the social desires that Butler elaborates: to be with friends, to display and share one's abilities, to work cooperatively and for the common good, to share ecstasy, delight, love and solidarity, to be someone in the community, to fulfill one's responsibilities, to gain honour, etc. Any theory which wishes to go beyond the narrow egoistic view expressed in the Utilitarian (and Hobbesian)
psychology must be able to take into account the wide variety of "altrusitic" motives which actually govern human behaviour. Not surprisingly other theories have been developed along the general lines sketched by Butler which refute that narrow view of motivation. One quite contemporary theory is put forth by R.P. Wolff in his essay "Community". (Wolff, pp. 162-195)

In this essay Wolff points out that these social desires differ from egoistic desires in that they involve the essential reference not only to the state of mind of the agent, but also to that of other members of his community. In elaborating his point, Wolff makes a number of distinctions: the first is between "private values" and "interpersonal values". The "private value" is "an object of interest whose definition makes essential reference to the occurrence of a state of consciousness in exactly one person". For example, a private value would be one which had as its object a certain pleasureable awareness in the person with the desire. This is the standard value of the egoist. There are, as Wolff points out, also "compound private values". We can, for example seek pleasureable states of consciousness in any number of people, and this is the object of our utilitarian interests. But there is another set of values that Wolff calls "interpersonal values" which he defines as "a possible object of interest whose definition makes essential reference to a thought about an actual state of consciousness in another person". For example: if Smith desires to make a gift to Jones and desires not only that Jones be happy, but that Smith knows that Jones is happy, then Smith holds an "interpersonal value". In this example Smith is interested not only in his own particular pleasure at
knowing: his pleasure was based upon knowing something about Jones' state of mind. Using his definition of interpersonal value, Wolff goes on to define a "social value", namely a state of affairs whose definition makes essential reference to a **reciprocal** state of awareness among two or more persons. To use the Smith and Jones example, this would be a case where Smith not only knew that Jones was made happy by his (Smith's) gift, but also that Jones was aware of the happiness which his own happiness brought to Smith. In spite of the linguistic complexity of expressing this thought, it is clear that social values are fundamental interpersonal values. We desire, as Wolff points out not simply happiness, but a communication of it, a sharing, a community. We desire to share, and to experience mutual awareness of this sharing.

It seems clear that this is a fairly insightful rendition of the pleasures of community. We might even say of someone who is lonely (or who feels the lack of community) that what he/she lacks is the possibility of mutual awareness or "reciprocal awareness". It is also clear that this range of social desires is a fundamental aspect of human nature, and is at least as crucial to a sense of well being (I would argue far more crucial) as is the satisfaction of simple private wants.

But even this criticism is inadequate in a fundamental way: it ignores the role played by people's self-conception. The effect of community on individuals manifests itself in the creation of a sense of self, of who one is and of who one
wishes to become. As Plamenatz states in his criticisms of the Utilitarians:

...Man is not just an animal who, unlike the others, is provident and calculating; who can forgo satisfying present wants in order to put himself in the way of getting more of what he wants in the future; who, in the process of working with others for mutual benefit, comes to have more and more wants; and who acquires a set of moral standards to restrain him as a competitor and encourage him as a collaborator with others. He is a self-conscious, self-communing, animal who sees his life in the round, who knows that he must die, who is his own most constant companion, whose desires are often fantasies, who wants to be one kind of person rather than another and to live one kind of life rather than another. He is, as Hegel might put it, 'his own object'; he has some image of himself, more or less variable, more or less obscure, Which it matters to him enormously should be true; some idea of what is proper to him or worthy of him. He is the happier and the more secure and easy in his mind, the more confident he is that the image is true and the better or the more impressive it appears to other people. Just as we are interested in ourselves as persons rather than as subjects of desire pursuing satisfactions, so too are we interested in others. It is as persons, much more than as competitors and collaborators for the satisfaction of wants, that we hate and love one another; that we feel pride, envy, and gratitude. Our wants flow largely from the ideas we have of ourselves and our neighbours, and the kind of life we want to live.* (Plamenatz, 1958, p.p. 174-175)

Plamenatz' theme has been elaborated in great detail by Arthur Lovejoy in his Reflections on Human Nature, and before trying to derive the political implications of this view it will be useful to study Lovejoy's account.

* See Ibid pp. 174-76 also for criticism of Utilitarians ignoring the value that individuals place on the kind of community in which they live, and community loyalty.
Lovejoy begins by distinguishing between two differing kinds of desires: desires for certain ends, and desires for what he calls "adjectival values". While we are all familiar with the desire for ends, the term "adjectival values", needs some explanation. These latter values or desires are very close to what we mean by the desire for certain roles. A person desires not only goods (e.g. the car), but to think of himself in certain ways (shrewd, kind, generous, quick, beautiful, etc.) and to be thought of in these ways by others. He also desires to avoid having to think of himself in certain ways (gluttonous, selfish, cowardly, ugly, etc.) and, once again, desires others not to see him in this way.

This grammar of motives, the concern for adjectival qualities as opposed to "nominal" ends, reflects the distinction in human motives made by Plamenatz in his argument with the utilitarians. Lovejoy expresses this distinction as the difference between "the wish to get, or achieve something by one's acts, and the wish to be something in one's acts,.... We must therefore distinguish--and the distinction is, I think, a fundamental but much neglected one--between what we may call terminal values and adjectival values." (Lovejoy, p.80) To illuminate this distinction, Lovejoy cites the example of the victims of the Inquisition who obviously had no desire for the "end" of their action (being burned was not a terminal value), but who "presumably shrank from abjuring
their actual beliefs and of thinking of themselves as renegades or cowards;...this motive being more powerful in them [than the aversion to the end state of being burned], they refused to recant their heresy". (Ibid)

It is interesting to compare this analysis to the type of analysis offered by Hobbes at the beginning of the chapter. Hobbes defines charity (or the desire to be charitable) as the desire of a person to prove to himself the magnitude of his power: a magnitude which allows him not only to accomplish his own project, but to facilitate those of others. What Butler points out is that this explanation ignored the obvious point that people desire just to be charitable; they may also desire simply to give to a particular charity. But what Lovejoy adds is that there is a very real pleasure that one can take in being the sort of person who is generous, and there is the avoidance of the displeasure in viewing oneself as cheap or selfish. It is not simply for ends, or for the exercise of our powers, that we do certain actions, rather it is because we have a certain view of ourselves as agents, as a certain kind of person, viz. generous, considerate of others, etc.

The economist and the individualistic social theorist usually ignore this fundamental motivation, or view it as an essentially irrational concern (such as envy). They in turn analyze human well-being in terms of maximizing pleasures or consumer satisfactions, i.e. in terms of "nominal or terminal ends". Fortunately, from the ecological point of view, the utilitarian
analysis of human motivation simply in terms of individualistic terminal values comes woefully short of being the complete account. "Fortunately," because had this been a true analysis, then the possibility of maintaining even the current level of human happiness in the face of economic restraint would be dim indeed. If the only way to make people happy was to continually satisfy their ever expanding lists of "needs" and wants, then happiness and ecological stability would be incompatible.

By understanding human behaviour in terms of self-consciousness, with the realization that much of our self-conception flows from the society in which we find ourselves, we lay the foundation for an alternative theory of human happiness which is not based on the possession of goods, but on the possession of self (and community) esteem. It is to the development of such a theory that we now turn.

III.

Historical credit for the development of a "social" theory of economic motivation is usually given to Thorstein Veblen, whose anthropological account of the behaviour of the American rich at the turn of the century gained great popularity. Veblen's thesis, frequently misstated, is that the rich in America act just like the rich in any "primitive" situation, that is, they use their wealth to establish their superior
social situation. The famous phrase "conspicuous consumption" merely refers to a part of the whole syndrome of behaviour (another aspect being, for example, manners) which the wealthy (mostly "nouveau riche") use to legitimate and display their social position. But the general claim, that a large part of people's motivation for the acquisition of wealth and the consumption of goods results from the desire for status, was made centuries ago by none other than Adam Smith. Not, of course, in his economic treatise, The Wealth of Nations, but rather in his earlier, more psychologically subtle work, the Theory of Moral Sentiments. Since Smith seems to be a proponent both of the view that man is an innate consumer seeking ever more goods (and ever more profit), and the view that man's consumption patterns are determined by considerations of prestige (i.e. are socially, not innately, determined), it is obviously worthwhile to review the two accounts that he offers.

While the supposition that humans are primarily consumers seeking a never ending collection of pleasurable consumer goods is never explicitly stated by Smith (the economist), it is clearly fundamental to his analysis. This is true despite his own claim that the fundamental principle for his analysis of the wealth of nations is the human tendency to "truck, barter and exchange". As he puts it: "whether this propensity be one of those original principles in human nature, of which no further account can be given: or whether, as seems more probable, it be the necessary consequence
of the facilities of reason and speech, it belongs not to our present subject to enquire." (Smith, 1948, p. 342)

But it seems clear that Smith did not believe that we had an innate "drive" to "truck, barter and exchange". And while there are no doubt certain pleasures involved in the activity of the market place, it is not these pleasures which bring most people to engage in "trucking, bartering and exchanging". In fact this "propensity" is not an urge, but a capacity based on man's ability, as Smith suggested, to use reason and speech in the pursuit of his economic interest. We need not, therefore, dwell on this propensity except to note that it is not in itself a constituent of human nature.

On the other hand, Smith does employ a theory of motivation in his work, viz. man's urge to pursue his own economic interest. As he says:

"Man has almost constant occasion for the help of his brethren, and it is in vain for him to expect it from their benevolence only. He will be more likely to prevail if he can interest their self-love in his favour, and show them that it is for their advantage to do for him what he requires of them. Whoever offers to another a bargain of any kind, proposes to do this: Give me that which I want and you shall have this which you want, is the meaning of every such offer; and it is in this manner that we obtain from one another the far greater part of those good offices which we stand in need of. It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity, but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities, but of their advantages." (Smith, 1948, p.343)
While never denying the basic assumption stated above, Smith does employ a sophisticated analysis of the notion of self-interest. An interesting example of his rejection of a "vulgar" understanding of self interest, i.e. the use of 'self interest' which equates it with monetary gain, is given by his analysis of the alternative schemes for paying university professors:

(In some)

...universities the teacher is prohibited from receiving any honorary of fee from his pupils, and his salary constitutes the whole of the revenue which he derives from his office. His interest is, in this case, set as directly in opposition to his duty as it is possible to set it. It is the interest of every man to live as much at his ease as he can; and if his emoluments are to be precisely the same, whether he does, or does not perform some very laborious duty, it is certainly his interest at least as interest is vulgarly understood, either to neglect it altogether, or, if he is subject to some authority which will not suffer him to do this, to perform it in as careless and slovenly a manner as that authority will permit. (Smith, 1957, p.110) (my emphasis)

Later he does admit that there are some social or "adjectival" pressures which encourage the salaried professors to do a good job.

If the teacher happens to be a man of sense, it must be an unpleasant thing to him to be conscious, while he is lecturing his students, that he is either speaking or reading nonsense, or what is very little better than nonsense. It must too be unpleasant to him to observe that the greater part of his students desert his lectures; or perhaps attend upon them with plain enough marks of neglect, contempt, and derision. If he is obliged, therefore, to give a certain number of lectures, these motives alone, without any other interest might dispose him to take some pains to give tolerably good ones."* (Ibid, p. 112-113)

*Nonetheless, Smith recommends the student pay system!
While his use of 'interest' in these passages indicates that he is aware of a non-"vulgar" sense of 'interest', The Wealth of Nations is clearly an exploration of the working out of the vulgar sense.

But it is important to note that even Smith, when he was reflecting seriously on human nature and not just being an economist, did not hold to the theory of man's basic and constant pursuit of his economic interest. In his Theory of Moral Sentiments, he argues that after essential needs are met, acquisition is motivated by the pursuit of status. As he puts it:

"It is chiefly from...regard to the sentiments of mankind that we pursue riches and avoid poverty. For to what purpose is all the toil and bustle of this world? What is the end of avarice and ambition, of the pursuit of wealth of power and pre-eminence? Is it to supply the necessities of nature? The wages of the meanest labourer can supply them... What then is the cause of our aversion to his situation? From whence, then, arises that emulation which runs through all the different ranks of men, and what are the advantages of that great purpose of human life which we call bettering our condition? To be observed, to be attended to, to be taken notice of with sympathy, complacency and approbation, are all the advantages which we can propose to derive from it. It is the vanity not the ease or the pleasure, which interests us. But vanity is always founded upon our belief of our being the object of attention and approbation. The rich man glories in his riches, because he feels that they naturally draw upon him the attention of the world...At the thoughts of this, his heart seems to swell and dilate itself within him, and he is fonder of his wealth upon this account than for all the other advantages it procures him. The poor man, on the contrary, is ashamed of his poverty. He feels that it either places him out sight of mankind, or that if they take any notice of him, they have, however scarcely any fellow-feeling with the misery and distress which he suffers. He is mortified and
distressed upon both accounts; for though to be overlooked and to be disapproved of, are things entirely different, yet as obscurity covers us from the daylight of honour and approbation, to feel that we are taken no notice of, necessarily damps the most agreeable hope, and disappoints the most ardent desire of human nature." (Smith, 1948, pp. 92-93)

While this theory can obviously be compared to Veblen's, an important distinction should be made. Veblen's theory was concentrated primarily on the consumption patterns of wealthy Americans, whereas Smith's theory is directed not towards consumption, but towards the drive for the accumulation of wealth. Indeed it would be surprising if the drive for the possession of wealth (e.g. money in the bank) was motivated simply by the pleasure such possession accords; accumulation is clearly an instrumental activity. But Smith held, according to Lovejoy, not only that accumulation was not motivated by the immediate pleasure it afforded but that:

"consumption of goods cannot be said to afford the incentive from which accumulation invariably" -or ever- "proceeds"; that "the motive which lies at the root of ownership is emulation," the feeling that "the possession of wealth confers honour"; and that there is "no other conceivable incentive to the accumulation of wealth." (Lovejoy, p.215)

Unfortunately, Lovejoy, usually an impeccable scholar, does not give a reference for these surprising remarks. But given Lovejoy's high level of scholarship, I am sure that we can trust that Smith did indeed make such remarks. While we may wish to differ with the absoluteness that Smith ascribes to the desire for honor as the motive to the accumulation of wealth, the long term discipline that traditionally is associated with the pursuit of capital could hardly be sustained
by the simple rational pursuit of far-off pleasure. None-
theless, Smith's theory is really a theory (like Veblen's) of
eminence: not of middle class frugality and planning. His
theory rings most true for people who wish to brag about their
yacht or their "holdings", not those who have carefully saved
for a small retirement home, or a merely functioning second
car. While both these latter items are far from necessities,
in our society, they are also far from prestige items and
their acquisition could hardly be explained in terms of the
desire for status or "emulation".

But Smith and Veblen have given us the basis for a
social account of consumption. The traditional assumption of
both the Utilitarians and contemporary welfare economist that
human wants are more or less given, or that if not given, they
should be taken as given, presents an enormous barrier to the
development of a political ecology.

The counter thesis, that most wants are socially
determined, presents an obvious solution for the problems of
people's wants exceeding the world's capacity to supply them--
change people's wants by changing the social environment. Such
a move makes consumption a political not a personal question.
But how true is the theory?

It is obvious that it is widely held. Much recent
animadversion against advertising, including the recent banning
of cigarette advertising from certain media, are based on the
premise that the techniques of advertising are capable not
only of creating wants in people, but of creating wants that
are clearly not in the interest of the consumer. Galbraith's well known thesis (developed in his book "The New Industrial State) that marketing is the backbone of the economy because it enables business to plan with assurance the enormous investments which are involved in current production, is also based on the belief in the great power of advertising to control consumer demand.

It should also be noted that advertising frequently plays on the "emulative" desire: the need to stand out in your crowd, be the first on your block, etc.—the ostentatious aspect of consumption noted by Smith and Veblen. But there is probably a more significant side of this same phenomenon illustrated by the cliche of "keeping up with the Joneses". Unlike Veblen's and Smith's theory, this remark implies that people desire merely to keep up, to maintain their community membership, not to get ahead and show off. While one may need to count in one's community, one also needs to be in the community. The extent to which "membership" requirements are attached to consumption undoubtedly determines the lifestyles of the vast majority of people. Perhaps what happens in the fashion-determined aspects of our lives is that some people (the eminent—leaving aside how they acquire this role) change their styles and everyone else (merely wishing to remain self-respecting) is "forced" to change theirs. This is reminiscent of Hobbes' suggestion that what drives most people to seek power is simply the desire to maintain their current position against those, always present, who are attempting to acquire more power.
But advertising is, of course, not the only social force affecting consumption. The general social patterns and social changes (e.g. high wages for craft labor, women's liberation) clearly affect expectations, desires, and lifestyles.

While it is more or less accepted that social pressures and social norms of well being determine our consumption patterns there is little acceptance of the possibility of consumer behavior being subject to self-conscious group control. One interesting exception to this claim is the recent moves, in the interest of health, to control the advertising of cigarettes and liquor. But in general, there is a widespread acceptance of people's "private" consumption patterns due to beliefs that either these patterns cannot be objects of self-conscious social control, or that they should not be because we should not make moral judgements about people's desires. I have tried to show the falseness of the first belief in my remarks above. In chapter VI, I will cite evidence regarding the power of small groups to alter people's consumption patterns to support my rejection of "social fatalism."

But perhaps the most fundamental reason for rejection of any collective effort to control people's consumption patterns is the problem of who will do the controlling. It is this worry, supported by the subjectivist view of values, that stands most in the way of the organized control of consumption. The cry of freedom reappears.

But there is, I believe, a way around this problem, a way which recognizes the difficulty of adjudicating between differing values and desires, and also recognizes the importance
of not allowing these decisions to be left to any specific agency. That way is real democratic policy making with full and active participation by all. Such a solution not only deals with the moral objection (since, in theory, no one will be "forced" to change their consumption patterns), but also plays upon the social motives of emulation and the desire for acceptance.

Most contemporary political theorists see politics as just another realm for the resolution of competing private desires with the result that they cannot provide the theoretical structure for the solution. Instead, we must have a theory of politics based on the social needs of individuals, not on their economic wants. And it is to the development of such a theory that I now wish to turn
CHAPTER IV

JOHN ADAMS: AN ALTERNATIVE POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY
Having argued the inadequacy of the "homo economicus" view of human nature, it is now appropriate to turn to the development of a new political theory based on a different view of human nature. This new view will emphasize the primacy of man's social needs; his need for approval, esteem, and community. These needs undercut any egoistic analysis of human motivation as Butler has shown. They also explain how various private wants are created and governed by the need for approval and community membership.

Butler believed such needs would lead almost inevitably to social cooperation,* but given Smith's remarks about the role of status seeking in the drive for consumption, and our own observations, we can hardly share Butler's optimism. For this was an optimism based on the plausible but false assumption that people will only esteem those actions which are publicly beneficial. But as Smith notes of Louis XIV, he was honored for his deportment, voice and

"Other frivolous accomplishments. Compared with these, in his own time and in his own presence, no other virtue it seems appeared to have any merit. Knowledge, industry, valour, and beneficence trembled, were abashed, and lost all dignity before them". (Smith, 1948, p. 96-97)

Veblen's extensive analysis of the behavior of the robber baron set in the late 19th century U.S. also serves to indicate the unfortunate moral neutrality of the passion for esteem. Clearly the determinant of what a person who is concerned for public attention and approval will do is simply what the public will attend to and approve. And attention, if not approval, is lavished on the ridiculous behavior of movie stars and the most

*See above, p. 70.
spectacular forms of criminal behavior. Success in achieving public eminence is largely unconnected in our society with success in achieving public benefit. Because our society places such fundamental importance on achieving financial success and the possession of items of personal consumption, it is not surprising that this "passion" works so little for the good of the community. In addition, the general corruption of the political space, the arena where there should be an opportunity to achieve publicity for actions and efforts in the public interest, means that there is no forum for this passion to work its good. Even if this public arena was more free from the taint of corruption and manipulation, its limited breadth would still not provide an opportunity for the vast numbers of people to achieve the recognition, esteem, and opportunity for participation that should characterize a public forum.

The only solution to the impoverishment of the public space is widespread participation in the work place and in the community. For the forum of self-government provides a place for public excellence, an opportunity to dedicate one's energy to the public good, and at the same time, provides an opportunity to discover and articulate this good. In doing so the public forum "exploits" the natural human desire for eminence and, in the case of face-to-face democracy, people have an opportunity to truly assess the motives and arguments of other participants; and because local decisions are about local issues, the people engaging in this
process should be well equipped to make the correct appraisal.

The reason the passion for eminence fails to achieve much in the way of social value in our society is that there is so little opportunity for any but a few to achieve any public eminence by participation in their government. It is not simply that "the people" have a perverse fascination with the behavior of the rich and famous regardless of their moral qualities. In fact this vicarious fascination might well be the result of the impoverishment of the "public" side of their own lives. The lack of opportunity to participate in government not only debilitates the political understanding of the people, it also undermines any attempt to encourage genuine public spiritedness. By not providing an opportunity for both discovering and willing the public good, the society turns the desire for public acclaim away from the public good to the selfish pursuit of private success. The much remarked upon apathy of the voting public can undoubtably be traced in large part not only to their actual powerlessness, but also to the lack of a public forum in which to develop the spirit of community dedication.

There is, in short, no opportunity for the experience of public happiness. What is missing is

...the freedom the colonists called later, when they had come to taste it, "public happiness", and it consisted in the citizen's right of access to the public realm, in his share in public power - to be "a participator in the government of affairs" in Jefferson's telling phrase - as distinct from the generally recognized rights of subjects to be protected by the government in the pursuit of private happiness even against public power, that is, distinct from rights which only tyrannical power would abolish. The very fact
that the word "happiness" was chosen in laying claim to a share in public power indicates strongly that there existed in the country, prior to the revolution, such a thing as "public happiness", and that men knew they could not be altogether "happy" if their happiness was located and enjoyed only in private life. (Arendt, p. 124)

It may be surprising to think of the American Revolution as originally dedicated to the establishment of participatory democracy, but Hannah Arendt does a masterful job of pointing out this tendency. Unfortunately, the founding fathers had a rather dim awareness of the notion of public happiness. In fact, most of them, when called upon to generalize about public life agreed with Jefferson when he said:

Happiness lies outside the public realm, "... in the lap and love of my family, in the society of my neighbours and my books in the wholesome occupation of my farms and my affairs", in short, in the privacy of a home upon whose life the public has no claim. (Arendt, p. 125)

The only exception to the general failure of the founding fathers to appreciate and articulate the delights of their public life was John Adams, and significantly enough it was John Adams, as mentioned above, who developed at length a theory of the political role played by the desire for "distinction". While I will cover Adam's theory in some detail, it is useful here to quote Hannah Arendt's summary:

The point is that the Americans knew that public freedom consisted in having a share in public business, and that the activities connected with this business by no means constituted a burden but gave those who discharged them in public a feeling of happiness they could acquire nowhere else. They knew very well, and John Adams was bold enough to formulate this knowledge time and again, that the people went to town assemblies, as their representatives later
were to go to the famous Conventions, neither exclusively because of duty nor, and even less, to serve their own interests but most of all because they enjoyed the discussions, the deliberations, and the making of decisions. What brought them together was "the world and the public interest of liberty" (Harrington), and what moved them was "the passion for distinction" which John Adams held to be "more essential and remarkable" than any other human faculty: "Wherever men, women, or children, are to be found, whether they be old or young, rich or poor, high or low, wise or foolish, ignorant or learned, every individual is seen to be strongly actuated by a desire to be seen, heard, talked of, approved and respected by the people about him, and within his knowledge". The virtue of this passion he called "emulation", the "desire to excel another", and its vice he called "ambition" because it "aims at power as a means of distinction". And, psychologically speaking, these are in fact the chief virtues and vices of political man. For the thirst and will to power as such, regardless of any passion for distinction, though characteristic of the tyrannical man, is no longer a typically political vice, but rather that quality which tends to destroy all political life, its vices no less than its virtues. It is precisely because the tyrant has no desire to excel and lacks all passion for distinction that he finds it so pleasant to rise above the company of all men; conversely, it is the desire to excel which makes men love the world and enjoy the company of their peers, and drives them into public business. (Arendt, p.125-26)

Unfortunately Adams did not have his own analysis as clear as Arendt has indicated, but he certainly had no doubt about the importance that the "desire for distinction" played in social life. As he stated "... the theory of education, and the science of government may be all reduced to the same principle, and be all comprehended in the knowledge of the means of actively conducting, controlling, and regulating the emulation and ambition of its citizens". (Adams, p.248)

He was also confident of its great extent, and begins
his long discourse on the passion for distinction with the following introduction.

Men, in their primitive conditions, however savage, were undoubtedly gregarious; and they continue to be social, not only in every stage of civilization, but in every possible situation in which they can be placed. As nature intended them for society, she has furnished them with passions, appetites, and propensities, as well as a variety of faculties, calculated both for their individual enjoyment, and to render them useful to each other in their social connections. There is none among them more essential or remarkable, than the passion for distinction. A desire to be observed, considered, esteemed, praised, beloved, and admired by his fellows, is one of the earliest, as well as keenest dispositions discovered in the heart of man. If any one should doubt the existence of this propensity, let him go and attentively observe the journeymen and apprentices in the first workshop, or the oarsmen in a cockboat, a family or a neighborhood, the inhabitants of a house or the crew of a ship, a school or a college, a city or a village, a savage or civilized people, a hospital or a church, the bar or the exchange, a camp or a court. Wherever men, women, or children, are to be found, whether they be old or young, rich or poor, high or low, wise or foolish, ignorant or learned, every individual is seen to be strongly actuated by a desire to be seen, heard, talked of, approved and respected, by the people about him, and within his knowledge. *(Adams, p.233)*

It is important to note two aspects of this long passage:

1. The repudiation that Adams makes of any pre-social state of nature, and

2. That the individuals' desire for distinction is the "desire to be seen, heard, talked of, approved, and respected, by the people about him, and within his knowledge. *

* This should be compared to Rousseau's state of nature theory with survival and economic well being as the motivation for political unity.
people about him, and within his knowledge". That is, it is a desire to achieve distinction among one's peers and should be distinguished (as Adams unfortunately does not) from the desire for fame which we might describe as "the desire to be seen, heard, talked of, approved and respected by people the vast number of whom are totally unknown". Adams' confusion of the desire for fame with the desire for "pure" esteem results in his overlooking the importance of the local assembly. this confusion results from his focusing his attention on his peers who combined both nation wide fame with the pleasure of excelling among themselves. Adams did, of course, make a distinction quoted above between 'ambition' and 'emulation', i.e. between the desire for power and the desire to excel. But he failed to notice that the amoral pursuit of fame like that of power is also a vice of the desire for distinction.

Adams also confuses two other distinct desires: the desire to excel among one's peers and the desire simply to be superior, i.e. the desire to be better than anyone regardless of whether the others are a fair match. Of course since 'excellent' like so many other descriptive words (e.g. 'big') embodies an unspoken comparison to relevant others, it almost necessarily involves one in a kind of relative achievement, i.e. superior accomplishment. Adams lapses into calling emulation "a desire to excel another by fair industry in the search of truth, and the practice of virtue" (Adams, p.233) overlooking in this definition the important condition that one's excellence must be in relation to one's equals. Mere success, even in the practice of virtue, is not what Adams had in mind. The notion of equality
is as important to the virtuous pursuit of distinction as is the notion of success, and it is this concern for excelling among one's peers which distinguishes the virtue emulation from the vice ambition. For the latter, concerned as it is with power in Adams' lexicography, shows no concern for equality. Indeed the pursuit of power rather than excellence is a pursuit of inequality, a drive to overwhelm rather than outshine one's peers.

The experience of "emulation" requires a forum where equals might meet, see and be seen. While both Adams and Arendt are concerned with the political realm and therefore most interested in writing and speaking, certainly the same desire for sharing and displaying one's skills is found among everyone from musicians to athletes. There is associated with the possession of any skill, a desire to display and share it with others, and, especially with others who are roughly equal. There is as much a desire to experience membership in a group defined by the possession of a skill as there is the desire to excel in this skill. One may wish to be outstanding in the group, but this still requires membership (acceptance by you of this group as your peer group and acceptance by them of you as a bona fide member). There is an almost ironic tension between the desire to excel and the desire for acceptance - a tension which is dangerous for the cohesiveness of the group should some of its members become "too good" for it.

All of this is intuitively understood in our daily socializing, but for many of us the opportunity for group sharing is woefully limited, and for almost all of us the possibility of genuine
participation in self-government is non-existent. Nonetheless, whole theories of government are based on the popular assumption that meeting to decide on matters of mutual interest (and even conflict) are disutilities, indicating the general loss of understanding of public happiness.*

Now Adams, while he was certainly aware of the importance of being excellent among equals, frequently lost tract of his intention and focused simply on success. He goes on at embarrassing length about the importance of marks of merit such as were used by the Romans to distinguish their distinguished,** and speculates that the lack of a hereditary aristocracy may be harmful to the new republic since the desire to establish one's family is of prime importance in motivating people to public action. And finally he even wonders whether a state does not need a monarchy.

*See for example Buchanan and Tullock, The Calculus of Consent, especially chapter VIII.

** Has there ever been a nation who understood the human heart better than the Romans, or made a better use of the passion for consideration, congratulation and distinction? ...Distinctions of conditions, as well as of ages, were made by difference of clothing....The chairs of ivory; the lictors; ...the crowns of gold, of ivory, of flowers; ...their orations; and their triumphs; everything in religion, government and common life, was parade, representation and ceremony. Everything was addressed to the emulation of the citizens, and everything was calculated to attract the attention, to allure the consideration, and excite the congratulations of the people; to attach their hearts to individual citizens according to their merit; and to their lawgivers, magistrates, and judges, according to their rank, station and importance to the state. And this was in the true spirit of republics, in which form of government there is no other consistent method of preserving order or procuring submission to the laws. (Adams, p. 243)
This is the true reason, why all civilized free nations have found, by experience, the necessity of separating from the body of the people, and even from the legislature, the distribution of honors, and conferring it on the executive authority of government. When the emulation of all the citizens looks up to one point, like the rays of a circle from all parts of the circumference, meeting and uniting in the centre, you may hope for uniformity, consistency, and subordination; but when they look up to different individuals, or assemblies, or councils, you may expect all the deformities, eccentricities, and confusion, of the Ptolemäic system (Adams, p. 256).

But these considerations came out of Adams' worries about how to control "emulation" so that it would genuinely serve the good of the state, for "it is the principal end of government to regulate this passion, which in its turn becomes a principal means of government". (Adams, p. 234)

Adams' constant worry about how to control the passion for distinction comes from his presupposition that 1. people are basically incompetent, and 2. government is basically a process of centralization, administration, and control. He rightly points out that the idea of a whole nation directly electing leaders will surely not produce the desired results.

When the government of a great nation is in question, shall the whole nation choose? Will such a choice be better than chance? Shall the whole nation vote for senators? Thirty millions of votes, for example, for each senator in France! It is obvious that this would be a lottery of millions of blanks to one prize, and that the chance of having wisdom and integrity in a senator by hereditary descent would be far better. There is no individual personally known to an hundredth part of the nation. The voters, then, must be exposed to deception, from intrigues and manoeuvres without number, that is to say, from all the chicanery, impostures, and falsehoods imaginable, with scarce a possibility of preferring real merit. (Adams, p. 240)
The problem, and it is certainly a very real and pressing problem, is that once government goes beyond the possibility of face-to-face democracy, people are highly susceptible to manipulation and deceit. Also by the time the power is centralized and elections turned into media circusses, the "ambition" for power and fame takes over from the desire to excel among one's peers as the primary political motive. And while Adams himself has trouble keeping the distinction between emulation and ambition clear, he does argue that the former can be a check on the later. He states:

There are no men who are not ambitious of distinguishing themselves and growing considerable among those with whom they converse. This ambition is natural to the human soul. And as, when it received a happy turn, it is the source of private felicity and public prosperity, and when it errs, produces private uneasiness and public calamities; it is the business and duty of private prudence, of private and public education, and of national policy, to direct it to right objects. For this purpose it should be considered, that to every man who is capable of a worthy conduct, the pleasure from the approbation of worthy men is exquisite and inexpressible. (Adams, p.241)

If I understand this passage correctly, Adams is suggesting that the healthy desire for "emulation" can be used to control the unhealthy ambition for fame and power. The solution, for which he searched with such agony and so little success, is to decentralize the state, putting control in the hands of groups of people who can control their leaders because of their leaders' desire for their approbation. In addition the desire for fame and power could be limited by simply eliminating the possibility of a great deal of power and nationwide fame. For Adams' dilemma resulted from the centralization of power, and with this
centralization came the populace's inevitable ignorance of the issues and representatives who were necessarily distant. In addition, the centralized state with its powerful executive and alienated legislature attracted those who were ambitious for fame and power, rather than those who sought simply to excel in virtue among their peers.

The problem for democratic theory of controlling the elite is certainly genuine enough, but it is caused by the dramatic inequalities concommittant with an elitist form of government (and of course a grossly unequal distribution of wealth). Creating an elite naturally causes the problem of controlling this elite because of the distortion of the desire for distinction into the vice of ambition.

The solution proposed by Adams and the other founding fathers is well enough known: the balance of power (see Adams, p. 280-81). Adams felt that the bicameral house, the executive, and the judiciary would all be motivated by emulation to check in each other the desire for dominance. But this is a solution to a problem that is largely of their own creating. Ologopo-listic competition for control is one fairly effective means of guarding against the extremes of individual tyranny, but it is hardly political freedom. Clearly the true solution is to return to the people the power which because of centralization is subject to abuse. Given a less hierarchical power structure, there is less of a problem of how to control the (in this case, not so powerful) elite.

Adams unfortunately was also concerned with the problem of controlling the people and was disturbed as were most of the
founding fathers with the widespread egalitarian sentiment. He even saw egalitarianism as a necessary failure because it did not make sufficient allowance for the passion for distinction (pp. 273-74). But in this argument, Adams is once again overlooking his own realization that the purest form of this passion requires equality: a background group which is as highly respected by the "distinguished" as he is by it. By encouraging local government, the founding fathers could have provided the opportunity for millions to have this experience. Instead, a system was devised in which only a few could experience "emulation" and public happiness, and as a result, many were attracted to the legislature and executive, not for the experience of freedom discussion and decision among equals - but for the power, fame and dominance. Such a system contributed not only to the impoverishment of the political life, but finally of the whole public space: environmental degradation, urban blight, and political apathy.

I believe that the most preferable solution in part or in whole to all these problems is the development of a mechanism to enable widespread participation in public affairs by all citizens. But given the focus of this thesis, I will attempt to argue only for participation as the best solution to the ecological imperative, and it is to this argument that I will now turn.
Adams failed to fully recognize the significance of his own psychological understanding and to generalize this understanding to the non-elite. This failure, which gave him constant difficulty in his political theory, derived not only from his distance from the people, but from the fear which he shared with many of the "founding fathers", of the people's actual political tendencies. Whether such a fear was well grounded, such fears no doubt still exist and account for a certain amount of the disparagement of citizen participation. The ecologically concerned might also (especially given the class bias of this group) be skeptical about the claim that active citizen participation would result in conservation and ecological preservation. Fortunately many arguments (and in the next chapter, some empirical research) can be presented that support the view that participation is not only a good in itself, but is the best means of protecting the environment and controlling the growth of the economy.

The first argument is that consumption patterns are largely dictated by community and peer group norms. This is Adam Smith's point, Veblen's point, and finds expression in the cliché of "keeping up with the Joneses". Community wide beliefs about the good life, about the style of life appropriate to someone in a certain position, along with peer group requirements (such as appearance requirements for acceptance) largely determine people's desires and
expectations for a wide variety of "inessential" goods. This obvious claim is supported by the widespread use of the notion of "relative deprivation" which embodies the belief that deprivation is not some absolute want of goods, but a want relative to the larger, more affluent community in which the poorer individual finds (or sees) himself. It also suggests that there is only one solution to the problem of feeling impoverished, namely equality: what appears as an economic problem is, once again, a political one. As long as the sense of deprivation is based not on some absolute lack, then the degrading sense of impoverishment can only be eliminated by reducing the financial distance between the wealthy and the poor.*

The community norms which articulate the notion of the good life are of course subject to change. In the current order these changes are governed to some extent by the efforts of the producers to encourage the desire for their goods. To what extent advertising actually controls these norms and therefore the behavior of people following them is notoriously hard to ascertain. But clearly they have an effect, as do other less self-consciously chosen factors such as changing economic conditions, (e.g. relative increase

* While the fact that people are participating in their government does not guarantee social justice, it does tend to eliminate one related injustice, viz, the lack of power associated with poverty. If the possibility to participate in one's government were widespread, then the indignity of political impotency would not be part of the general frustration of impoverishment.
in wealth among unionized workers) changing social conditions (e.g. the "liberation of women"), and a host of more or less unknown factors. One fact is quite clear: there is little in the way of an organized self-conscious effort on the part of people to change their own norms of the good life, to involve themselves in public and community wide discussions about life styles and values. There are of course no forums for this discussion. One of the possibilities which would be provided by a participatory form of self-government would be just such an opportunity to reflect not only on what the government should do, but on "private" values, private consumption patterns and individual lifestyles.

The participatory forum could provide an opportunity to commit oneself self-consciously and communally to a change in values and consumption habits. The effort, for example, of the Chinese to change century old attitudes toward the place and status of women has involved just such communal activity. Discussions are held to articulate the problem, women and men are encouraged to come forth and state their feelings, arguments are held, various people are persuaded and some pressured; finally a community wide sense of commitment to the liberation of women is developed, but in the area of private activity in the home. No one polices these areas, but the community wide commitment serves to "govern" the area of largely private activity. (see Townsend pp 110-115)
Granted that the participatory forum could provide the opportunity for self-conscious value and norm decisions, is there any reason to think that once people are brought together they would decide on values which would support ecological balance, which would change consumption production patterns dramatically in the direction of conservation? The answer I believe is yes, and it is here where the remarkable congruence between concern for ecological well being and social well being stands out.

Arguments in the public forum must be presented in terms of public interest. As a result, decisions made in such a forum should also reflect concern for the public good. This of course presupposes that the kinds of conditions suggested by Rousseau have been met: in particular, that there are no powerful 'sinister' interest groups at work. It is obviously in the interest of the public to see that its interest is protected. The danger is that some members will effectively delude the others. This is different from the representative situation, where discourse must also be in terms of the public interest, but where the absence of the public means that the interests of the representatives as distinct from that of the public might well prevail. In addition the existence of parties clearly violates Rousseau's condition for the absence of sinister interest groups.

Given that we can plausibly expect the participative
assembly to rule in the public interest, we can expect them to give a high priority to ecological concerns. For ecological well-being is a paradigm public good and therefore we can expect decisions made in this forum to respect the need for economic restraint, conservation of resources, pollution control, etc. The problem that faces current advocates of ecological concern is the lack of any natural interest group except the hunters. Ecological integrity, like consumer interests, has no active lobby (except the hunters) because no group stands to profit significantly from legislation which serves these community-wide needs.* But in the participatory democracy the need to turn their attention to the public interest should force the participants to give considerable attention to such a paradigm public good as the natural environment.

But it should be noted that 'public' is not, from the ecological point of view, the most accurate term for "general" interest: "community" interest would be much better. For concern for and commitment to a community is commitment to a body whose life span extends far beyond that of its members; and whose interest and well-being is assessed therefore against a far longer time span than that of its "temporary" members.

*See Olsen's general argument about the logic which "naturally" impoverishes the provision of public goods. (Olsen, Ch. 2)
Concerns about natural resource conservation, the preservation of species, etc. go way beyond concern for the interest of the currently existing population and involve concern for the (unrepresented) future generations. While there are obvious structural guarantees in the participatory forum to assure that decisions are made in the public interest (viz., the presence of the public), there is no obvious guarantee that such a legislative body will rule with a sensitivity to long term community interests. All that can be hoped is that the maturity and responsibility resulting from the participatory experience of concern for the public instead of private interest will yield a concern for long range over short range considerations. The enhanced awareness of community that will flow from active citizen participation should also contribute to a concern for the community long term interest as opposed to the immediate interests of its members. I have noted above, in Chapter II, the educative aspect of participation — its capacity to develop commitment and concern beyond one's immediate self-interest. I see little reason to think that this concern cannot be developed beyond that of the life of the immediate members of the community. We can also expect that the presence of people of various ages at an assembly should also contribute to the sense of temporal continuity that is so fundamental to the life of a genuine community.
In addition there is an inevitable amount of decision making that is going to involve rather distant representation regardless of political commitment to participation. This is because the effects of many activities extend over large distances, not only over large time spans. Once again the educative effect of participation must be relied on to enable people to see and accept the constraints necessary not only for their advantage or the advantage of their community, but also that of the world.

In the cases of long range effects and long time span for effects, we cannot expect the citizen to have the same claim to knowledge as the expert. And this presents a great threat to participation. This question requires rather extensive answers about the ways of applying the theory developed to actual industrial society. I deal with this question in Chapter V, but for now I wish only to point out that my argument does presuppose the possibility of extensive decentralization of both the political and economic order. Clearly only under these conditions can we expect to obtain the most desirable conditions for active participation.

It has also been noted above that one of the benefits of participation is the increased sense of self-esteem that comes from participation. This is part of the enabling effects of concerning oneself with more than one's own self-interest and the perfectly justifiable sense of greater self importance that
comes from being more important. Indeed, the increased sense of self-esteem justifies my claims that the participatory system accords to its citizens the highest respect for their opinions and desires compatible with the goal of collective coordination. And such high self-regard, based soundly as it is on the respect accorded by all to all in a truly democratic community, is almost sure to produce a sense of responsibility for the community. Especially so, since one's respect in the community will (ideally) be based on one's participation and contribution to the community. By encouraging a sense of collective identity and developing a kind of public conscience in the participants, participation* can also be expected to develop the necessary concern for the collective environment -- a kind of ecological conscience.

There are other benefits which come from participation in self-government which are largely ignored by contemporary theories of democracy and which are of great importance to the goal of changing people's lifestyle in non-consumptive

*Participation is the natural vehicle to develop such long term commitment. For example: one of the classic difficulties presented by high yield exploitation of non-renewable resource is that the communities which develop around these activities are constantly left high and dry when the resource is exhausted. It is reasonable to believe that if these resources were managed by the whole community, the rate of exploitation might be much slower so that the life of the community might be extended.
directions. For example, anywhere that worker participation has been tried it has enlisted great support from the workers*, seemingly confirming Hannah Arendt's remarks about the pleasure of "public happiness": the pleasure of reasoned discourse, of commitment to the public good, of solidarity, of public esteem and finally the pleasure of power, of communally willing a course of events which goes far beyond that that any individual could will. By providing such happiness, the public forum could serve as an alternative to private happiness. And since private happiness is frequently centered on private consumption (at least in our minds, though in fact private happiness comes from more immaterial sources), the renewed possibility and emphasis on public happiness could provide additional reasons for reducing our concern with consumption. There is also

*See below Chapter VI
a vast amount of empirical support for the proposition that participation in the workplace greatly increases worker satisfaction and frequently productivity, suggesting that participation could replace economic incentives and consequently reduce consumption. As Rousseau puts it:

The better the state is constituted the more does public business take precedence over private in the minds of the citizens. There is indeed much less private business, because the sum of public happiness furnishes a larger proportion of each individual's happiness, so there remains less for him to seek on his own. (Rousseau, p. 140)

In short, the participatory forum provides for the utilization of the public side of our personality; a place to be both sociable and socially useful. In providing such a place, the participatory forum supplies for our social nature the same kind of support now given to our private and self-interested nature by advertising and the standard norms of financial and individual success. As a result of such forums we can expect people to develop and manifest a genuine concern for one another and their community since the avenue for expression of this concern is now open.

We can expect decisions to actually place human and ecological priorities over those of finance and technology, since all the people will be there to see that they do. And because of the face-to-face nature of participation individuals will be forced to experience one another not as some unfortunate statistic but as real, equally human, members of the public whose concerns are as
real and pressing as their own. They will also be living in and with the immediate environment that their decisions create. (cf. decisions made by executives of multinationals where the decision maker does not need to live in the environment created by his decisions).

Lastly, the participatory forum provides an opportunity for decisions which are excluded by our current system of individualistic consumer "voting": it provides the opportunity that Marx discussed, for people to make their own history, not just be subject to it. This is again a claim that was developed in chapter II. The opportunity provided by collective self-government of the commons, instead of a laissez faire destruction of it, means that we can make decisions in the interest of the community that are simply not open to us as individuals. In this way the forum not only encourages us to be more moral, it actually creates the increased possibility of our acting more morally.

Decisions for example, of public transportation versus private could then be confronted not on the individual basis "should I take the car or wait twenty minutes for the bus?" but rather "do we want people to use cars or shall we provide an adequate transportation system which will actually encourage transit use?", or even "shall we ban cars and provide covered bicycle paths?" etc.* Ironically, it is the "centralization" of

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*I have read somewhere that this latter possibility has been realized in a Florida suburb totally given over to pedestrian and bicycle transport with simply no roadways for cars. Though undoubtedly in this case some individual entrepreneur developer made the decision.
such a traditionally private decision into the public forum, which makes possible such common interest decisions. But the only way that this centralization is compatible with autonomy is if the individual freedom that is lost is replaced (or reappears) in the legislature. Decentralization cannot mean individualistic anarchy, but rather decentralized communism.

The decentralization that is necessary for significant, universal participation itself yields many benefits from an ecological and social point of view. For local decisions to reflect any real autonomy there must also be a large amount of local economic self-sufficiency: this is simply the local version of the more common concern for national economic independence as a prerequisite of national political autonomy. Local decisions would have to be made not simply about the means to fill certain national quotas, but also about what goods to produce: decisions not only as to how to use existing capital, but whether to increase or decrease investments.

The ecological benefits of such self-sufficiency are numerous. Local production and consumption provide the means for linking production more directly to demand without intervening effort of advertising to assure that demand matches up to over-production. This would in turn reduce over-production and the encouragement of economically necessary but ecologically and socially unjustified consumption. Local production would also reduce transportation
costs with its concomitant ecological costs. Since local markets could not support large scale production, this form of production with its tendency to concentrate massive amounts of pollutants in the environment would also be reduced. Since pollution is largely a matter of concentration and poor distribution (what is fertilizer in one place is a sewage problem in another), a reduction in the scale of production and an increased diversity of industry could greatly reduce the build up of pollutants. Decentralization would also require diverse agriculture and a diverse use of energy sources greatly reducing the undesirable ecological effects that current mono-culture and large scale energy production entails.

Once again the by now unsurprising congruence between ecological and social scales can be noted: small scale for human contact, real participation and local control and small scale for minimal environmental impact, diverse agriculture and efficient recycling of waste, reduced transportation costs, diversity of energy sources and minimal pollution. The environmental scale is a human scale.
CHAPTER VI

EXPERIMENTS IN PARTICIPATION
Of all the propositions offered in the preceding chapter there is empirical support for the following:
1. local participation increases the desire to participate in the decisions of the larger organization, 2. work place participation increases worker satisfaction, suggesting that, in general, participation is an important part of life's satisfaction, 3. participation does provide an effective means for changing people's values, and behavior. Since the experiments reviewed in the sociological literature concern themselves primarily with productivity and worker satisfaction, the experiments do not fall neatly into the three categories above. But participation experiments do fall into two general categories: small and large scale. Small scale participation refers to the range of decisions open to a small sub-group. Small scale decision-making centers on concerns such as how a new assembly technique is to be applied, local control of assembly line procedures, speed, etc. Large scale decisions are those affecting the whole firm such as questions of capital investment, general plant policies and wide-ranging civic and national decisions. It is in the small scale area that most experiments have been run, and it is also in this area where the greatest degree of success has been achieved. The major "experiment" in large scale participation is Yugoslavia's organization of its industrial and political systems,
though the Chinese example might also be relevant if we had more information. In this chapter I will review the results of various small scale experiments, saving the various experiments in the total reorganization of society for the subsequent chapter.

Small scale participation has received the most attention because it lends itself readily to experimentation and does not threaten the basic industrial order. It can also draw on a whole range of small group experiments for generalizations of its conclusions. Though such experiments might seem to have a limited value to a theory of wide-ranging change, they are actually of great significance. For true participation is necessarily small scale—in fact, this is its virtue. We cannot have the same level of participation in large scale organizations as we can have on the shop floor or in the neighborhood government. These units must be the atoms of any greater political structure and the success at this level is a prerequisite not only for the educative effectiveness of participation, but for the social cement which will hold the larger structure together. It is also apparent from a review of the literature that even in the large scale experiments, the most significant form of participation for most of the participants is the one in which the worker or citizen makes decisions which affect the most immediate aspects of his life. It may be that decisions
as to capital allocation, no matter how significant in the long run, do not have enough immediacy to interest the average worker, or that the organizational form necessary for making such decisions is simply too large to allow for enough active participation by the workers to provide them with the kind of satisfaction they get from more local decisions. This is of course a significant problem for the ecologically concerned because environmental decisions almost inevitably involve considerations of large regions and long time spans. But while problems of scale are of crucial importance, it is first necessary to understand the effects that small scale participation has on its participants. Such an understanding not only underlines the importance of this possibility, it also serves as a natural introduction to theories of large scale participation.

The most significant experiments in small scale participation have been conducted in a variety of industrial situations. The most comprehensive and authoritative review of these experiments is Paul Blumberg's *Industrial Democracy: The Sociology of Participation*. Blumberg begins his review with an account of the famous Hawthorne experiments in the late 20's. These experiments are the classics of management theory which supposedly produced the unsurprising (except to the experimentors) result that workers work as a group, and that the informal
relations and norms of this group more than any other factors (including economic incentives) govern productivity. These results were arrived at after a wide range of variables, such as timing of breaks, intensity of light, etc. were all found to be unrelated to productivity. In fact, productivity within the small group that was being experimented with continued to increase despite unpleasant variations in the physical conditions of work.

The conclusion that was normally derived from this experiment was, in the words of C. W. Mills, that "...the industrial manager is to 'relax his authoritarian manner and widen his manipulative grip by understanding employees better and countering their informal solidarities against management by controlling and exploiting these solidarities for smoother and less troublesome managerial efficiency.'" (Blumberg, p. 45) But Blumberg points out that what was overlooked by these researchers was that the workers' increasing productivity resulted not simply from the friendly relationships they had developed from each other, but rather from the extraordinary relationships they had developed with management.

In an effort to make these experiments successful, the experimenters had involved the workers in the arranging of timing of operations and the introduction of other variables in a manner that the workers had never
previously experienced. The upshot of this was that the experimenters rather than eliminating the variable of worker hostility from their studies, introduced the variable of "participation"—an atmosphere where the worker's views were treated with unprecedented respect and consideration: an atmosphere in which in fact the workers decided which changes were to be introduced and when.

The Hawthorne experiments consisted basically of two different experiments. One, called the "relay test room experiment" involved six workers under a wide variety of conditions: variations in work week, rest time, meal schedule, lighting, etc. The second experiment, the "Bank wiring room experiment", involved fourteen workers divided by status and wages into three smaller groups. In the first experiment, productivity increased despite the wide variety of changes and this seemed to be due primarily (as Blumberg points out) to 1. the special relationship that workers had to the experimenters, one essentially of shared responsibility, 2. the creation among the workers of a sense of collectivity, and 3. an awareness among the workers of the importance of their experiment and peculiar status. This latter sense (3.) of specialness received much attention in managerial literature and became equated with the "Hawthorne effect". But as Blumberg points out when in the second experiment the experimenters failed to involve the workers in
the decisions as to how the experiment should run, the workers became disillusioned and disappointed and productivity declined. (Blumberg, pp 34-42)

Having provided this insightful review of the Hawthorne experiments, Blumberg goes on to review a number of alternative suggestions for the reduction of worker alienation. For our ecological point of view, it is interesting to note what alternatives are normally considered, and the manner in which Blumberg refutes them.

First is the suggestion that leisure can be used to make up for the failure to achieve satisfaction on the job. Blumberg's criticism of this possibility is based on the obvious observation of the importance of work in the life of nearly every person. Important not only to their sense of self, but also in the personality they develop and bring home from the work place. It is inconceivable that one could have a totally alienated work experience and become ("part-time") a full person off the job. From the ecological point of view, it seems clear that human labor will continue to constitute a large amount of the energy input into the economy because of a growing necessity to restrict our use of non-renewable energy sources. As a result, we will experience an increase in leisure only with a concomitant decrease in affluence. The same objection goes for the suggestion that automation could take over all "alienating" labor.
Automation is simply too expensive and the effect that it frequently has is to remove control from the worker, not to increase it—with a resultant increase in powerlessness and alienation.

Blumberg also dismisses the answer which he describes as anti-industrialism (a version of the current return to the land movement) on the grounds that the move towards industrialization cannot be stopped. Certainly from the point of view of our current ecological awareness, the increasing industrialization of the world must not only be stopped, it simply will (eventually) be stopped. Nevertheless, the question for us is how to control and exploit industrialization and technology in ecologically and socially useful ways, not simply to eliminate it. The last solution that he discusses, job enlargement, is becoming increasingly popular. Blumberg finds that the move towards job enlargement is largely overrated and is truly successful only to the extent that it actually increases worker control. Reviewing all of these proposals Blumberg points out that

All four, leisure, automation, anti-industrialism, and job enlargement, are based on a kind of technological determinism. That is, the premiss of each is that a given degree of job satisfaction (or job dissatisfaction) inevitably accompanies a certain technological level and that increased satisfaction with work is possible only by altering technology...All share the belief that the tendency to alienation is rooted in the technology of modern industrialism itself and that alienation--inherent in industry as we know it--is unaffected by any change in the social organization of industry. (Ibid p. 69, his emphasis)
In short, Blumberg finds that alienation and worker dissatisfaction is the result, not of the nature of work or the nature of a particular kind of work, but rather of the nature of the social organization and form of authority (characteristic of) the work environment. If this is true, it is clear that increasing human satisfaction is easily possible in a world of decreasing or stable wealth. This is all part of the general argument that happiness is not directly related to level of affluence, but really to social organization and community.

Since Blumberg's orientation towards worker control is characterized by an interest in the extent to which worker control can reduce alienation and work dissatisfaction, he does not share the concern of Mill and others for the educative effects of participation. Participation is successful from his point of view according to the extent to which it increases worker satisfaction. He finds the small scale experiments reviewed in his book uniformly supportive of the proposition that shop level participation reduces alienation and increases job satisfaction. As he says

There is hardly a study in the entire literature which fails to demonstrate that satisfaction in work is enhanced or that other generally acknowledged beneficial consequences accrue from a genuine increase in workers' decision-making power. Such a consistency of finding, I submit, is rare in social research. (Ibid, p. 123)
But Blumberg also reviews some experiments which go beyond the concern to eliminate work alienation into a general theory of participation. He reviews for example the famous experiments in the 30's under the direction of Kurt Lewin. These experiments were an attempt to study the effects of different social climates on the behavior of a group of young boys. These boys were organized in three different kinds of groups, democratic, authoritarian, and laissez faire. The differences were in the role played by the adult leader in each group. In the autocratic group, the adult leader played the typical role of the adult leader giving orders, articulating the projects, etc. in the democratic group, the leader played a self effacing role, one of cooperativeness giving advice when asked, but also encouraging group discussion and group decision-making; in the laissez faire group, the leader played a minimal role and took no part in discussions. We can of course wonder what such an experiment has to do with participatory democracy, but the results suggest the relevance. These results were summarized by the experimenters in the following chart:

1. Laissez faire was not the same as democracy
   (a) There was less work done in it, and poorer work.
   (b) It was more characterized by play.
   (c) In interviews, the boys expressed preference for their democratic leader.
2. Democracy can be efficient:
   (a) The quantity of work done in autocracy was somewhat greater.
   (b) Work motivation was stronger in democracy as shown, for instance, when the leader left the room.
   (c) Originality was greater in democracy.

3. Autocracy can create much hostility and aggression, including aggression against scapegoats:
   (a) In Experiment I, the autocratic group showed more dominating ascendance; much hostility (in a ratio of 30 to 1); more demands for attention; more destruction of own property; and more scapegoat behavior.
   (b) In Experiment II, one of the four clubs showed a similar reaction.

4. Autocracy can create discontent that does not appear on the surface:
   (a) Four boys dropped out, and all of them did so during autocratic club periods in which overt rebellion did not occur.
   (b) Nineteen out of 20 boys preferred their democratic leader.
   (c) There was more discontent expressed in autocracy—even when the general reaction was submissive—than in democracy.
   (d) "Release" behavior on the day of transition to a freer atmosphere suggested the presence of previous frustration.

5. There was more dependence and less individuality in autocracy:
   (a) There was more "submissive" or "dependent" behavior.
   (b) Conversation was less varied—more confined to the immediate situation.
   (c) In the submissive reaction to autocracy, there was an absolute (though not relative) reduction in statistical measures of individual differences.
   (d) The observers' impression was that in autocracy there is some loss of individuality.

6. There was more group-mindedness and more friendliness in democracy:
   (a) In Experiment I, the pronoun "I" was used relatively less frequently in the democratic group.
(b) Spontaneous subgroups were larger.
(c) In Experiment II, group-minded remarks were much more frequent in democracy.
(d) Friendly remarks were slightly more frequent.
(e) In Experiment I, mutual praise was more frequent in the democratic group.
(f) In Experiment II, friendly playfulness was more frequent in democracy.
(g) In Experiment I, the democratic group showed more readiness to share group property.

(Cartwright, pp. 552-553)*

It is interesting to note the way in which the authors distinguished between the laissez faire and democratic groups. In the democratic group, the leader did attempt to exert some influence especially to see that decisions were made in a genuinely democratic manner. Plans were subject to group discussion and group decision-making as opposed to the more less complete lack of structure that characterized the laissez faire group.

Despite the intuitively satisfying results, the fact that leadership is what determined the structure of the group, not the voting procedure or institutional structure, reduces its relevance to this study. None-theless, the fact that environments appropriately characterized as democratic produced such satisfying results both in terms of participant satisfaction and group

*Experiment I involved only two groups, the autocratic and democratic, Experiment II involved four groups of 5 boys each, each of which was subjected to the 3 styles of leadership as each of the four adult leaders shifted from group to group. (Ibid, p. 527)
solidarity goes some way towards supporting the propositions that 1. participation provides alternative satisfactions, and 2. participation helps develop a concern for community (and therefore ecological) well-being.

An even more interesting experiment from the point of view of changing values and patterns of consumption is that conducted under Kurt Lewin's direction by the Red Cross in an attempt to encourage home nursing volunteers to make greater use of unpopular organ meats such as hearts and kidneys. Two methods of persuasion were tried 1. a lecture situation where the informant did all or almost all of the talking, and 2. a discussion group where participation was encouraged by the discussion leader. It was found that the women in the discussion group were far more likely to buy these meats than those subject to the lecture methods (Blumberg, p. 77). A second experiment with housewives urging them to increase their consumption of milk achieved similar results. A third experiment is of additional interest because group participation was also compared to individual instruction. In these cases mothers were being persuaded to feed their infants cod liver oil and orange juice. Surprisingly, those subject to group discussion showed a much higher incidence of actually using the foods, than those subject to individual instruction. Of course the results are not really surprising if one holds to the argument that
consumption patterns are more or less socially determined.

An important limitation of these experiments was that the group was not really in the position to make a decision but was subject to the views of the informants and experimenters. It should not be concluded from these experiments that all it takes is an illusion of participation and a group environment to modify peoples' behavior. The literature is filled with examples which show that genuine decision-making power is an important factor in effectively involving people in change.

In one experiment workers were involved in long discussion and explanation of the productivity goals of their unit, but not given the power to decide on what these goals should be. Another group was not only involved in discussions, but after these discussions was allowed to set its own productivity goals. The results showed that those who were able to make the decisions achieved a significantly higher level of productivity than those who merely participated in discussions. (Blumberg p. 79)

While we are not concerned with productivity, the difference in productivity indicated in the above experiment would seem to indicate further differences in the morale of the decision-making group.

One extremely useful aspect of the various experiments in worker participation is their concern with the problem of change. A frequent problem for industry is that the
introduction of new techniques almost always results in a lowering of productivity despite the improved methods. Research has indicated that this is usually due to workers' resistance to change. As a result, great effort is expended in an attempt to discover ways of overcoming this resistance. In one famous experiment, workers were divided into four groups. The first was simply told what changes would be introduced (the standard procedure), the second were able to elect representatives who were involved in the working out of the actual details of the changes (though the whole group met to be informed of these changes) and in the third and fourth group each member was totally involved in discussion and decision as to implementation. As Blumberg, summarizing the experiment remarks:

Stated in the most general terms the researchers found that the "success" in bringing about job changes--defined both in terms of productivity and worker satisfaction--was directly proportional to the amount of worker participation. In the no participation group, for example, morale fell drastically right after the introduction of the changes and in the first forty days 17 per cent of the workers in the group had quit their jobs. (Ibid, p. 82)

As revealed by one chart from the experiment, the autocratic group never achieved the level of productivity they had attained before the changes were introduced, the representative group achieved the level of productivity
they had before in 2 1/2 weeks and then began to exceed it, but the participative group achieved in 2 weeks the pre-change level of production and then went on in the time of the experiment to exceed the former level by 14%. Since all the experiments cited by Blumberg show similar results it is not necessary to go into any further detail. But one "experiment" seems worth quoting at length because it dramatically illustrates the effect that even a small amount of worker control has on worker satisfaction and productivity, and also the enormous attraction that such control has for workers.

The dramatis personae here were not male white collar workers but eight young female manual workers in a factory producing small toys. Their job was a relatively simple and repetitive one: to spray paint on wooden toys placed before them. The job had recently been re-engineered and, according to the new system, each girl would take a toy from a tray next to her, place it in a jig inside her painting cubicle, and spray paint on it. Then she would place the toy on one of the overhead hooks which moved by her at a constant speed on an endless belt, and the hook then carried the toy into an adjacent drying oven. Wages for the job, apart from basic pay, were calculated according to a group bonus plan, and, because the job was new, this was supplemented by a learning bonus which decreased month by month.

The job described here seemed simple and clear, and management expected no trouble. But there was trouble: the girls' productivity was very low and was not increasing at the rate management had hoped or expected. Many hooks on the belt went by empty. Morale among the girls was very bad: there were complaints, resistance, excessive absenteeism, and much turnover which only complicated and lengthened
the learning process. Among the operators' most consistent complaints were, first, that the room was too hot due to the proximity of the drying oven and, secondly, that the speed of the belt, set by the engineers, was much too fast, and that it simply was impossible to keep up the pace.

In order to resolve these difficulties, management brought in a consultant and he advised the foreman, against the latter's better judgment, to confer with the operators. During a series of meetings which followed, the girls made a number of suggestions to the foreman. First, they requested that he install fans to ventilate the area. The engineer and the foreman were sceptical about the girls' complaint and didn't believe that the fans would appease them or cool their anger. Nevertheless, they agreed to try them, and when the fans were brought in the girls were delighted and took great pride in positioning and repositioning them until they found a satisfactory location for them. The experiment was a success and it was reflected in an immediate improvement in the relationship between the foreman and the workers.

At a subsequent meeting the focus of attention turned to the 'excess speed' of the belts, and here the operators made an heretical proposal: 'Let us adjust the speed of the belt faster or slower depending on how we feel'. The foreman was startled, the engineer aghast. But after lengthy discussion, arguments, and dire prophecies by the engineer, a control was installed at the group leader's booth which allowed her to adjust the speed of the belt slow, medium, or fast. After its installation, the girls immediately worked out an elaborate schedule of when during the day the belt would be operated slowly, when medium, and when fast. The results of this innovation were both ironic and significant. Although the girls' original complaint was that the belt moved impossibly fast, under their own control the average speed of the belt was actually increased. When the belt was running at a fixed speed determined by the engineer, it corresponded to low-medium on the operators' dial; under the girls' control, however, the average speed was up toward the high mark.
As a result of this surprising change, the girls' productivity increased between 30-50 per cent over expected levels; and, as their pay was tied to productivity, their earnings jumped enormously, for they were making basic pay, plus a learning bonus, plus a very high group bonus. Moreover, morale reached an all-time high and for the first time the girls seemed reasonably content with their work.

The story did not end happily here, however. These semi-skilled operators, their production at record levels, began to earn more than many of the highly skilled workers in the plant, and the latter complained vociferously. Furthermore, the extra production unbalanced the work of the other departments, leading to a vacuum behind and a pile-up in front of the girls' section. Equally disturbing, the impertinent success of the workers had undermined the prestige of the engineers by calling their competence into question, and had rudely challenged the whole system of managerial prerogatives.

The superintendent, engineer, and foreman were naturally very gravely disturbed over these developments. To resolve the 'problems' created by the success of the experiment, the superintendent unilaterally decided to return to the status quo ante. He had the girls' control dial removed and the belt adjusted to run at a constant speed as before. The general consequences of these acts are easily predictable for anyone remotely acquainted with the literature on participation. Production fell off immediately, and within a month six of eight girls had left the company. Several months later the foreman also resigned for reasons which were related to the experiment and its ultimate debacle.

In this entire situation we see a convergence of two kinds of workers' control which are crucial to job satisfaction. For simplicity's sake these two kinds might be roughly termed 'control over machinery' and 'control over authority'. In this case control over machinery was satisfying to the workers because it allowed them to regulate their own work pace by alternately increasing and decreasing the speed of the belt. This variety alleviated somewhat the boredom and monotony of what was essentially a repetitive job, and the workers became autonomous masters of a machine instead of passive extensions of it.
Supplementing the workers' control over machinery here was their control over authority which was, as the participation literature amply demonstrates, a formidable factor in increasing their satisfaction with work. The fact that management consulted the workers on changes to be made, that their 'superiors' had accepted their suggestions, and that these changes had been successful—all this undoubtedly helped to account for the remarkably improved climate in the workers' room and for the ironic increase in production.

This case also demonstrates that the factory is an integrated social (and economic) system and that changes in one department are likely to have repercussions elsewhere. It was clearly evident that the workers' control could not survive here in isolation in one part of the factory: inherent instability demanded that it be either expanded or eliminated altogether. Or, as a dogmatic industrial democrat might say, a factory, like a nation, cannot exist half slave, half free. (Blumberg, pp. 97-98)

These studies can be seen, not only as proof of the thesis that worker control is a perfectly viable alternative to the current hierachical organization of industry, but also, and what is more significant from our point of view, that the participative forum is an excellent means of introducing and effecting change. If we are to modify our lifestyles and our communities in response to the ecological imperative we will have to do more than just sermonize; participation is clearly the most effective means for achieving such changes. It should be noted again that the experiments seem to show that in order for participation to be effective the group must be small enough so that individuals have a real chance to voice their views and hear the views of others. Large scale meetings, (the assembly model of participation), democratic voting,
and the election of committees to do the actual planning is simply not sufficient as a means for producing the kind of effective and dramatic change that characterizes the results of most participation experiments.

While Blumberg's study does much to support the thesis that worker satisfaction can be dramatically increased through worker participation and that especially in the case of production change, worker productivity can be increased through participation, there is little in his research relating to the claim of Mill and others, that local participation will yield greater involvement and commitment to the larger community, nation, or the world. I was unfortunately unable to find any literature or experiments which related changes in a worker's position vis-a-vis industrial authority, and changes in the worker's attitudes toward political participation outside the work place.

There is, on the other hand, a well known correlation supported by many different studies, between a sense of political efficacy (a sense that one can affect the political scene, a sense that one's political efforts will count) and the nature of the work environment. Blauner, for example, in his book Alienation and Freedom, found that workers in the printing industry who have a high degree of individual control over their work also "had a highly developed sense of self-esteem and a sense of self-worth and were therefore ready to participate in the political institutions of the community." (Blauner, p. 176)
He also found that the situation in the chemical industry, where the workers exercise a large degree of collective responsibility over the processes of the plant, also contributed to high self-esteem and self-worth. And while he does not, in reviewing the chemical plant situation, make the inference to political activity he made in the previous example, it seems clear that he would hold the same position.

Blauner's inference from work autonomy to political activity is obviously based on the assumption that people with a high sense of self-worth and self-esteem will readily participate in the political arena. This assumption ties in directly with the claim in the chapters on the psychology of participation, that one need which is satisfied by participation in a public forum is the need for self-(and public) esteem. Autonomy is, of course, a source of status (and self-esteem) and in this way encourages people to a sense of political significance based on their sense of social importance. But this is not the only reason for assuming a higher amount of political activity among workers with greater autonomy.

As Milbrath points out in his book *Political Participation* "Persons who feel more effective in their everyday tasks and challenges are more likely to participate in politics." (Milbrath, p. 59)
Almond and Verba in their book, *The Civic Culture*, demonstrated that the highest feeling of political efficacy was associated with those countries, the U.S.A. and Britain, where the most institutional opportunities existed for local participation. In summary the authors argue:

If in most social situations the individual finds himself subservient to some authority figure, it is likely that he will expect such an authority relationship in the political sphere. On the other hand, if outside the political sphere he has opportunities to participate in a wide range of social decisions, he will probably expect to be able to participate in political decisions as well. Furthermore, participation in non-political decision making may give one the skills needed to engage in political participation: the skills of self-expression and a sense of effective political tactics.

(Almond, p. 272)

All this information would seem to substantiate Marx's claim about the importance of the individual's relationship to the means of production. What needs to be added to Marx is that the crucial ingredient in this relationship is not ownership, but control or autonomy. In summary, the evidence from studies relating varying degrees of workplace participation to such dependent variables as worker satisfaction, efficiency, receptivity to change, and a sense of political efficacy, indicate that participation is a powerful determinant in the
attainment of all these goals. From our point of view, we are concerned with 1. increasing satisfaction to offset generalized lowering of the standard of living, 2. the creation of new values, and 3. the increased preparedness to be self-legislating. What empirical information there is would seem to support the claim that participation in local government and industry is conducive to these goals. But as I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, there is an enormous problem of how to relate the satisfying results of small group participation to the practical problems of large scale decision-making. This is an area of concern for the small group theorist who wishes to generalize his results, for the ecologically concerned who wish to exploit the benefits of participation while maintaining regional decision making where it is ecologically relevant, and even to the radical democratic theorist who has faith in the Athenian form of crowd democracy (e.g. M. Bookchin in his *Post Scarcity Anarchism*). Obviously, if a group of 5 or 10 seems to be the best for developing in its members a real sense of significance and participation, allowing its members sufficient opportunity to be heard, to change and be changed, then there seem to be some very unfortunate implications for the possibility of democratizing (in the sense of providing genuine participation) any large scale organization. This objection has long been taken as the death blow to any attempt to
incorporate widespread participation in industrial society. As Mill puts it

...since all cannot, in a community exceeding a single small town, participate personally in any but some very minor portions of the public business, it follows that the ideal type of a perfect government must be representative. (Mill, 1964, p. 217)

While Mill's premiss is undoubtably true his conclusion is false. It is false because he assumed for his argument that there were only two alternatives for democratic organization: direct participatory democracy and representative government. Given the weaknesses and failures of representative government, it is fortunate that Mill's dichotomy is too limited. There are other alternatives both in theory and in practice and it is to these we must turn.
CHAPTER VII

LARGE SCALE PARTICIPATION
The seeming impossibility of involving citizens directly in the governing of the large scale organizations that characterize industrial society has led most democratic theorists (e.g. Mill) to dismiss the possibility of participatory democracy as imagined by Rousseau and others. Despite this skepticism, there have been a number of serious attempts both in theory and practice to develop alternatives to representative government and hierarchical management.

While this problem is of prime concern to anyone (like Blumberg, for example) who accepts the current order of industrialization and wishes to see it democratized, it may not seem of such pressing concern to those whose ecological sense leads them to actually attack the current level and form of production. Those who see the necessity of reduced and controlled productivity with far greater decentralization and local self-sufficiency can embrace the "practical" objections to participatory democracy in industrial society as just another argument in favor of the elimination of such a society. Such an extreme attitude may appear to border on Luddism or irrational romanticism, but it also has its adherents among the theorist of small scale (or as Bookchin calls it "liberatory") technology.* Greater and greater effort is

*see his book Post-Scarcity Anarchism, the chapter, "Liberatory Technology", E. F. Schumacher has also made the suggestion to me in conversation that small scale industry does not really require democratization in order to be humane.
being expended on the development of productive processes which do not require long production runs, high capital investment, and highly centralized production to be efficient. The recent dramatic increase in the price of oil and therefore of transportation has added enormous impetus to this effort.* Because centralized production is currently so dependent on inexpensive transport (especially in Canada) there is every reason to believe that decentralization of manufacturing may well be "inevitable"—beside being, as I have argued, desirable.

Such considerations may lead the ecological radical to dismiss the concern for democratizing large scale organizations:after all they are about to "wither away". But such a view is not really tenable. There are many limitations on decentralization both now and in the foreseeable future. First, while many organizations could certainly (and certainly should) be reduced in size, there must still be some regional and even world-wide coordination of activity. This need for large scale organizations flows not only from economic considerations, but also from ecological ones. We are inter-dependent. Pollutants know no local borders,

*This is because large scale production and its economy of scale exists only when either there is a large local market, or a market which can be inexpensively reached. Recently in Britain there has been a move away from the centralization of brick production towards local production because the price of transport over a relatively short distance exceeds the manufacturing cost of the bricks. (Schumacher, in a speech in Vancouver, Fall 1974)
fish swim thousands of miles, birds cross continents. Most crucial, of course, is organization within natural ecological regions where biological interrelationships are extensive. Such facts, plus the obvious requirement of some centralized production and trade no matter how reduced in scale, entail an inevitable amount of large scale organization. And surely, we cannot accept at the world-wide level the free market anarchy which we have rejected at the local level; the arguments for the social control of production are as applicable to the world as to a local commons.

Secondly, the fact that we already have such large organizations also presents a formidable barrier to decentralization. We will not be transformed overnight into decentralized communities with local self-sufficiency; we will in fact probably never be so "transformed". The "evolution" will be gradual if at all, and we must be able to find a means for democratizing these larger organizations.

In fact, one of the attractions of the idea that participation will remove much of the structural cause of environmental degradation is that such participation does not require a revolutionary upheaval to be brought into effect. (Of course it may result in such an upheaval, but that is irrelevant speculation.) What is important here is that the immediate introduction of participation into local communities and workplaces provides a first structural step towards the eventual realization of a political organization
that is appropriate to our level of population, industrial production, and ecological needs. For small scale participation to realize anything beyond local goals, a means of maintaining the benefits of participation, but extending the area of control, must be sought.

Finally, we should not be misled into thinking that there is no difficulty in developing participation in small communities of say 20,000 people. Even such a small community presents formidable problems if we take seriously the notion that people should legislate on all collective decisions which affect their lives. Groups larger than about 20 do not seem to provide for the intimate contact and extensive discussion that is necessary if individuals are to actually rule and be ruled by reason and persuasion. This means that any large scale arrangement must provide for extensive small group participation if the participation is to be maximally effective.

It seems clear enough that certain deviation from the ideal of participation (where all collective decisions are subject to discussion and consensus vote of all citizens) are required for any kind of practical system. I have already discussed the deviation from consensus in Chapter II because this deviation still remained within the basic notion of participation. But there are other necessary deviations for a practical system. Are these deviations destructive of the virtues of participation? Is J.S. Mill right that participation is appropriate only for minor local matters?

There are basically three parameters along which governmental arrangements can deviate from the participatory ideal:
1. **Range of decision.** The range of decisions which are subject to the collective order can vary from the trivial (where shall the town dance be held?) up to and including all decisions traditionally associated with national sovereignty such as the establishment of a criminal code, taxation, and the decision to wage war. Within economic units the range of decisions open to participants can vary (as noted above) from where to put the fans, to which markets to enter.

2. **Range of involvement in the decision making process.** This can range from complete involvement as found in small meetings where all get a real chance to discuss, persuade and decide (but the upper bound of the ideal seems to be only 5 or 10, certainly not much more than 20) to the town meeting situation of a few hundred (where there is still room for considerable input) to the science fiction story of TV voting where weekly plebiscites on issues discussed publicly on the television are then voted on directly and all national representative government is by-passed. Beyond universal mass democracy are various forms of representative government including thoroughly bound representatives, representatives subject to immediate recall or the "soviet" system of tiered groups, each group being made up of representatives from the lower groups.*

3. **Numbers involved in the voting.** This affects not only access to the decision-making process discussed

*cf. Thayer's scheme described below pp. 166-173.
previously, but finally, one's sense of political significance. The difficulty with the television voting scheme is not only that there is no real participation, merely passive voting, but also that one's vote is of so little significance as to give a sense of futility rather than a sense of political power and responsibility.

There is a natural difficulty in resolving these parameters in that there tends to be a tension between the first and the latter two. Usually, the greater the significance of the decision the greater the number of people that are affected by the decision. If this was an iron law, it would indeed place a formidable barrier to the ideal of participation though we would still have Mill's educative justification to warrant local participation. But this problem can be reduced by decentralizing both the economy and the political authority so that decisions of magnitude are left to local control. Especially within the work place, there is an enormous opportunity for increased worker control in areas of great significance to the worker, though perhaps of little importance to the society as a whole. We should not allow ourselves to become so bewitched by the fascination with large nation states that we fail to realize just how many decisions of great personal significance can and should be made locally.

Unfortunately, ecological considerations frequently involve ecological consequences over large areas and frequently therefore involve the lives of large numbers of people.
Some of these decisions it would appear must be made by a relatively alien body. How is this to be done in a fashion which adheres as closely to the ideal of participation as possible?

While the answers are complex, the following considerations must be kept in mind:

1. There must be opportunity for local, small group discussion and suggestion before a decision is made by the representative body, so that citizens can have a creative role in the decision making process.

2. The representatives must be kept closely tied to their constituency. This could be done for example by frequent meetings and immediate recall.

3. When a decision is made by the higher body, it must be brought back to the small local groups, ideally for ratification, but at least for extensive elaboration, so that those who are subject to the decision can have an opportunity to be persuaded of its reasonableness.

4. Extensive changing of representatives must be maintained to prevent the development of a political elite. A system such as the Athenians used of a lottery for various sub-administrative positions and place on a jury, might well be appropriate.

5. It also seems desirable that a rough financial equality exist among the citizens to prevent various forms of dominance by the wealthy.

6. Some method should be employed to reduce the natural tendencies for people to develop sub-loyalties.
which interfere with their participation and with the search for the best collective decisions. (e.g. a large number of such groups or perhaps just small group methods suggested by Thayer below.)

Keeping these considerations in mind, let us examine some practical proposals.

GUILD SOCIALISM

One of the first significant proposals for democratizing society was that of the Guild Socialists, and particularly that of G. D. H. Cole. The Guild Socialists attempted to offer a kind of middle ground between state socialism and Syndicalism by instituting political control over the economic sector, and providing extensive participation in both sectors.

The worker's position, the Guild Socialists argued, was that of a wage slave and this condition would not be alleviated by increased wages and the improved working conditions that the worker might expect if the state took over ownership of industry. For this reason, Cole claimed that the answer that most people would give to the question "what is the fundamental evil in our society?" would be the wrong one: "...they would answer POVERTY, when they ought to answer SLAVERY" (p. 38 Pateman). They emphasized that the position of the worker besides being incompatible with socialist and democratic ideals had the effect of
rendering the worker unfit for participation in democracy*, and that the notorious political apathy of the worker was the result of his generally passive role in industry. Worker participation would therefore serve the double function of providing the worker with immediate control over his work place and also provide the stimulus and experience for greater participation in matters of community and national importance.

The guild socialist developed two basic principles of democracy to incorporate in their conception of the state.

The essentials of democratic representation positively stated, are, first that the represented shall have free choice of, constant contact with, and considerable control over, his representative. The second is that he should not be called upon to choose someone to represent him as a man or as a citizen in all aspects of citizenship, but only to choose someone to represent his point of view in relation to some particular purposes, in other words, some particular function. All true and democratic representation is therefore functional representation. (Cole, G.D.H., p. 38)

*The effect that certain types of industrial processes had on those employed in them was noted by Adam Smith: he wrote, "in the progress of the division of labour, the employment...of the great body of the people comes to be confined to a few simple operations; frequently to one or two. But the understandings of the greater part of men are necessarily formed by their ordinary employments. The man whose whole life is spent in performing a few simple operations of which the effects too are, perhaps, always the same...has no occasion to exert his understanding or to exercise his invention in finding out expedients for removing difficulties which never occur. He naturally loses, therefore, the habit of such exertion and generally becomes as stupid and ignorant as it is possible for a human creature to become...(he is incapable) of forming any just judgment concerning many even of the ordinary duties of private life. Of the great and extensive interests of his country, he is altogether incapable of judging!. Smith, The Wealth of Nations, 1880, vol. II, pp. 365-6 quoted by Pateman p. 51.
Following their principles of decentralization of decision-making power, close contact with representatives, easy recall, and functional representation, the guild socialists developed the following general scheme of organization.

Each industry would be organized by a national guild composed of representatives from the various factories within the industry. The national guild would set general production standards and be responsible for the distribution of capital funds. The factories would have great freedom in setting of work patterns, allocation of responsibilities, etc. Individual communities would be organized around a "commune"—a representative body made up of representatives from the industrial guilds, from the various civic guilds (e.g. the health guild, cultural guild, utilities guild, etc.) and representatives elected on a geographic basis (proportional to population) who would represent the interests of the consumer. These representatives would have voting power equal to that of all the guilds. This commune would make all the major decisions of the community.

The planners waffled on describing how the power would be distributed between the local and national guilds, but since the motivation for the guild structure was the maximization of individual decision power, the emphasis would be placed on local decision-making.

It was the hope of the guild socialist that most decisions could be worked out between representatives of
the consumer and the guilds without resort to any coercion on the part of national government. The belief was that since much of the negotiating would be taking place at the community level, the personal contact involved would encourage people to act in the public interest rather than in selfish defense of their group interest. The belief that labor was really service to the community was in part the basis for the functional notion of representation, and it was hoped that the spirit of community service would become pervasive in a society so organized. But the plan does not seem to rest heavily on these "utopian" hopes, but rather on a kind of balance of power which itself would be conducive to protection of the public interest.

Cole thought, for example, that the problem of unequal status would be solved because there would no longer be a class of managers and a class of the managed, and that the other crucial source of inequality, insecurity of employment, would be eliminated for all. While this theory allowed for representation, it was felt that because representatives were representing someone functionally, the represented would have the competence to assess the activities of their representative. Immediate recall would also serve to keep the representatives responsive to the demands and needs of the represented. It should also be noted that the theory allowed for "indirect" representation: the representatives to higher levels of organization were elected by representatives to the lower levels rather than direct
election by the citizens. For example, the ward representatives to the local commune would elect a representative to the regional commune, rather than this representative being elected by all members of the local commune. This provided that those represented would have personal contact with their immediate representative.

It is also interesting to note that unlike the "unscientific utopian socialist" of the previous century, the guild socialist also had a plan for realizing their utopia in the larger society. The three elements of this plan were: 1. encroaching control of industry by organizing the unions along industrial rather than craft lines, and then forcing the employer to deal with union merely as an owner of capital devoid of managerial power (e.g. the owner would allot the union so much for pay, but could not decide on pay scales, nor choose the foreman), 2. working with the Labor party for nationalization with joint control (union and state), and 3. the creation of worker-run industries (i.e. guilds) to compete with already existent capitalist firms. The last method would mainly be a propaganda device, which could also be used for experimentation with various types of worker control. In fact, the guild socialists did manage to start a building guild which, with the help of low interest government loans, was moderately successful.

Historically, the main problem the guild socialists faced was organizing along industrial rather than craft
lines. This problem, along with a slump in England which forced the closing of the experimental guilds, resulted in the movement's collapse.

Nonetheless, the guild socialist movement does provide us with a model of what a practical participatory democracy in an industrial society might look like, and the sketch of a solution to the problem of regional coordination with regional autonomy. The guild socialist plan to have the primary form of government be made up of consumer and producer representatives deals with the problem of the "natural" consumer apathy that results from the fact that consumers do not spontaneously form into interest groups (see M. Olsen's argument cited above for the reason), but it posed the additional problem of emphasizing the opposition of consumer and producer interests. This emphasis is unfortunate from the point of view being developed in this thesis in that I am concerned with de-emphasizing the economic sources of satisfaction in part by providing the alternative satisfaction of community participation. By developing a representative system along economic lines, the guild socialists were recognizing what is surely a reality, but every effort must be made to shift the identification of people away from their economic roles towards a more holistic and community role. To do this, it would be necessary to provide for a more significant over-riding body, one which represented the community interest over and above the producers' and consumers'
interest. This of course presents problems for the very basis of the guild socialist system, namely functional representation.

The most fundamental failure of guild socialism, in view of the criteria for a truly participative system, is its acceptance and emphasis of economic differences so that the possibility of truly reflective and reasonable decision-making is limited by the very structure of the assemblies, viz. their division into economic interests.

The system may also be criticized for its extensive reliance on representation which reduces active involvement and the possibility of universal consent. But such a criticism is limited in that any practical proposal is going to have to allow for some representation, and the guild socialist notion of functional representation was a thoughtful attempt to have representation with the greatest possibility of acceptance and even active involvement by the represented. The theory was that functional representation provided for narrow enough representation that the representative had a plausible claim to being able to really know the views of his constituency. But, unfortunately, the organization of the constituencies into narrow economic interests is also the fundamental flaw of the system.

YUGOSLAVIA

The problems raised at the theoretical level in guild socialism have received extensive debate at the level of practice in Yugoslavia. In particular, the question of
the relationship between the economic units such as the worker controlled firm and political units such as the commune and federal government is a source of constant debate. This debate emphasizes the difficulty of assuring that the social property of the economic enterprises be used for social goods while maximizing the autonomy of the worker-operators. In addition, there is the question of small group participation and whether the system allows for sufficient input on a small scale to provide for the opportunity to persuade and be persuaded.

While the system has gone through many changes since its inauguration in 1950, it seems most appropriate to describe the current variation. The numerous constitutional changes, to say nothing of the proliferation of regulations, has resulted in the curious situation that western scholars frequently know more of the legal details than do local participants. But these changes have come from the necessity of experimenting with various forms and in response to the increasing demand for greater local control. As the system is currently organized the individual enterprises are governed by a worker's council elected by all the workers. These councils in turn appoint a management body and a director who exercise the most immediate day to day control of the enterprise. The director is usually hired from outside the firm for a four-year term, and is chosen
on the basis of his expertise. Recently, large firms have
developed smaller economic units within the firm which
develop almost autonomous contractual relationships with
other areas of the firm. This allows for even more
participant control. In addition, there are periodic
meetings of all the workers and important topics are
subject to worker referendum.

The workers' council is elected for two years and
subject to recall. This group meets usually monthly and
its managing board (essentially the executive of the
council) may meet several times a week. Much of the
administrative hierarchy functions as in a standard
enterprise with the manager and a "collegium" of department
heads responsible for day to day operations. As a result,
these directors exert a great deal of influence over the
direction and operation of the firm. It should be noted
however, that the managers do not have the power of dismissal;
this is allocated to a committee of the workers' council.
Workers seem clearly to perceive the power of the managers.
In one study reported, the workers indicated that the
managers have very great control while the workers have
only "a little".* However, in this same study, the workers
indicated that they thought the workers' councils had
almost as much power as the managers.

Much of the data on the effectiveness of the Yugoslav
system in providing workers with a real sense of participation

*Hunnius, p. 227
and control is weakened by the enormous regional differences in literacy and political competency. Workers show much less deference and much more enthusiasm for participation in the more highly industrialized areas than in those poorer regions which are only newly experiencing industrialization. Nonetheless, there seems to be an increasing demand for greater worker involvement. The recent restructuring of the larger firms allowing for greater decentralization of control within the firm would seem to indicate a growing realization that for participation to be effective it must provide for shop level control--i.e. small group participation.

The other problem of concern is the balancing of social responsibility against local autonomy. The Yugoslav economy seems to be drifting in the direction of a kind of democratic corporate capitalism as more power and authority is given to the local firm and more emphasis is being placed on profitability. This movement is being done in the name of local autonomy, but the decisions, for example, to allow the market to determine prices is clearly a move away from socialism. While autonomy is frequently given as the argument for allowing the market to "govern" the behavior of corporations, it is clear to many commentators that there is also a none-too-subtle drift towards competition and a kind of collective "free enterprise".* The ills of such an arrangement, of course, are apparent to many of the critics within Yugoslavia as they are also clear to many

*Thayer, pp. 105-110
of the blue collar workers. The workers have consistently opposed market pricing out of concern not only to control prices but also to assure job security.

Another interesting trend is that, as seems natural in a market economy, many of the small firms are finding it profitable not to compete but to unite together into conglomerates. Such moves, initially motivated by profit considerations, would simply mean a roundabout return to some kind of community control and elimination of competition.

While the actual historical behavior of Yugoslavia provides fascinating data for the democratic theorist, it is also limited by its particular under-development and recent history as a centralized satellite of the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, despite some indications of a move towards a kind of market socialism, all indications are that worker control, especially at the local and shop level, is both desired and valued when achieved. In addition, there is some evidence that the increasing participation of an enormous number of workers (well over one-fourth of the work force served on some governing body between 1950 and 1960) has resulted in greater political involvement in other areas (though the evidence here is far from sufficient).*

The greatest failure of the Yugoslav system from the point of view of true participation, is its acceptance of elected management far removed from the shop floor. While this arrangement allows for much more worker influence

*Thayer, pp. 105-110
then usually, it still does not allow for the active participation on the part of the workers. In addition, the ambiguous feelings about the market as a source of "freedom" threatens the principle of political control over the economy and the socialistic nature of the experiment.* Inevitably, such a return to competition would be destructive of reflective and reasonable decision-making as self-interest would become the dominant concern.

THAYER

The last theory that I wish to discuss is that of Fredrick Thayer as put forth in his book An End to Hierarchy, An End to Competition. Thayer, a former management consultant for the Pentagon, criticizes just about all the theorists of participation for their failure to democratize the administrative side of government. Most theorists, he complains, have only been interested in democratizing the legislative side of government, and have taken the stand, reminiscent of Rousseau, that only angels could democratize the administrative side of government. But as we all know, the legislative/administrative distinction is a tenuous one--especially given the current tendency to allow regulative agencies a great deal of (perhaps necessary) discretion. The result is that those most directly affected by the agencies, namely the consumer and the employee, have little or no say over the agencies' operations.

*Thayer, pp. 105-110
The solution, Thayer argues, is to employ the insights of the leading management theorist and the theory of small groups. Interestingly enough, theories developed in these fields are converging. The group size that small group theorist are finding most effective for democratic decision-making and acting is in the 5-10 range (Thayer prefers 5). At the same time, the size of the group that management theorist find most supervisors are capable of effectively managing (the so-called "span of control") is also in the 5 to 10 range. As Thayer summarizes "the size of effective small groups is precisely the same as that prescribed for vertical spans of control" (Thayer, p. 8). Using this observation, Thayer argues that the traditional arguments for vertical organizations have ignored the "democratic" reality that it was the size of the group, not the hierarchy that enables the organization to get something done.

The success of various interdepartmental groups in the public sector (he cites NASA as an example) comes not only from the realization that such holistic approaches to problems are necessary, but also from the non-hierarchical form of their organization. Since all departments enter these frequently ad hoc organizations as equals, no one in the "interdepartment" has authority over the others. The result is that decisions must be by consensus with the salutory effect that they must therefore be argued at some length.*

*Galbraith, in his New Industrial State, makes a similar point about the democratic nature of the large corporations. See especially chapter VI, "The Technostructure".
He also mentions a variety of experiments involving citizen participation in local planning which involve bringing all relevant public officials together with a large group of local citizens. But instead of having a mass meeting with the officials at the head table, the large group is broken down into smaller groups each containing representatives of different departments and various local factions. He claims that such experiments have been impressive not only from the point of view of the solutions proposed (e.g. using a school cafeteria as a local restaurant at night), but also from the ability of such a forum to generate consensus, both in the small sub-groups and finally in the large assembly. The theory is that such face to face confrontation reduces the emotional distance (alienation) in much the same way that Rousseau hoped a large assembly, devoid of antecedent interest grouping, would do. In a sense there are no interest groups within a small enough group, only other people. And the bringing together of people stripped of their extra-group labels in a small enough group that each must encounter the other seems to allow for a real possibility of discovering the "general will". (Thayer, pp. 28-33).

Thayer also reviews some of the experiments in Organizational Development, which seems to be a fancy name for the application of encounter group theory and practice to formal organizations. Such an application,
he argues, may be effective in helping workers and administrators relate to one another, but only if they are used in a non-hierarchical environment—otherwise they become tools of administrative manipulation. To the extent though that such techniques are effective, they could be a useful tool for resolving conflicts which emerge not from genuine conflicting interest, but from psychological barriers (e.g. "personality conflicts").

The problem for Thayer, having demonstrated the effectiveness and benefits of small group type organization, is to suggest a theory that will enable widespread participation in such small groups and yet provide for large scale organization. To solve this problem, Thayer appeals to Rene Likert's theory of "link pin" management. In this theory, various small groups are related by having an over-lapping membership, so that groups higher up in the organization are made up of representatives from groups lower down (see picture, next page). In Likert's model these groups are related by having the administrator of each group form the membership of the higher-up-group. In the picture, this means that each link pin is in a managerial relationship to the group below and a subordinate position in the over-riding group. Thayer suggests that this model can be democratized by two fundamental changes: 1. having the representative to the higher group be a representative not the administrator from the lower group.
(Thayer, p. 24)
that each group require consensus before instructing its representative. The first democratizes the individual groups (no member is the boss), and the second imposes the ideal rule of participation, viz. that each weighs the decisions to which they are subject. Should the representative to the higher group be unable to persuade the members of this group of his previous position, or become persuaded of a different point of view, then he must return to the lower group for consultation until unanimity is again reached. Such a system is surely rigorously democratic, but is it feasible?

Thayer points out that while such procedures may well seem tedious, and while such a process may involve a long decision time, once the proposals are decided on, the time of implementation is greatly reduced.* In addition, such a long thrashing out process means that many of the typical problems of unforeseen consequences can in fact be foreseen since all those affected by a decision really are involved in the decision. Thayer remarks that a very similar approach is actually employed by many Japanese companies (Thayer, pp. 40-41).

Thayer believes that such organizational arrangements which in many large organizations already have an informal reality (cf. Galbraith's The New Industrial State) could be used in the political realm also, centering on small

*This can be compared to Blumberg's information on the effectiveness of participation in instituting change.
neighborhood organizations. This would eliminate the need for representative government which Thayer argues should be eliminated not only because it is an essentially hierarchical (or in my terms, non-participative) form of government, but because it also legitimates this form of hierarchy by its claiming to be a truly democratic form of government.

We can wonder whether such an organizational form as that suggested by Thayer could really work in the political realm where there is much more conflict about the objectives of the organization than would be found in a large business corporation. And whether, therefore, the consensus rule which is so fundamental to the democratic character of his system could really be maintained. But even without such a rule, Thayer's system is still radically democratic and clearly comes closest to the attempt to provide for the opportunity of rational discussion and decision-making by all participants. For Thayer is certainly right in his assumption that the most meaningful form of participation is in the small non-hierarchial groups of his model. And he is certainly right, therefore, that for larger structures to be genuinely participative, they must be based on small group participation.

With an additional emphasis on decentralization (such as advocated in this thesis), such a plan may not be all that unrealistic. Thayer's claim that such forms, without their explicit egalitarian aspects, constitute the backbone
of current economic organizations is a bold claim. But his own role in management and as an organization theorist adds some weight to his claim. The theory is clearly in line with much current organizational thinking and would seem to be an imaginative and brilliant account of an alternative to all existing forms of economic and political organization.

One last point needs mentioning. Thayer emphasizes consensus and participation as the goal of politics. He feels this ideal is realizable only if 1. we make every effort to reduce competition in both the economic and the political sphere; and 2. we achieve economic abundancy* by divorcing income from work, eliminating advertising and encouraging alternative satisfactions (as has been argued in this thesis). I have said a great deal about advertising and the encouragement of alternative satisfactions, but some remarks are appropriate about reducing competition. Thayer holds that one of the primary evils of the representative system is its competitive nature: for a great deal of hostility must be created in order to move candidates and voters to the effort that such competition requires. Such activity is clearly incompatible with the goal of harmony, solidarity, and community concern that Thayer takes to be the ideal of politics.

In the economic sphere, about which I have said all too little, Thayer argues that 1. competition is

*I could have said here "a sense of economic abundancy" but this obscures the point that past a bare minimum "abundancy" is in the eye of the beholder.
gradually disappearing anyway because it is inefficient, 2. non-competitive organizations do not atrophy any more frequently than do competitive ones, and 3. competition produces the growth mentality which has become ecologically untenable. Thayer is extremely critical of both the guild socialist and Yugoslav experiments for their emphasis on economic divisions and acceptance of competition among producers. Although politics has the goal of unity, the emphasis in economics on individual or collective gain can only result in disunity—with an inevitable disruption of the political realm. Participation by itself cannot produce the ideals of cooperation and solidarity without a concomitant change in the economic structure.

This latter claim is dramatically supported by various accounts of "participative" experiments in attempts to reorganize and conserve farmland in the American midwest. These experiments inevitably resulted in the larger farmers having maximum input and influence. As a result, such attempts produced even greater destruction of farmlands and communities. As W. R. Burch remarks, summarizing a review of various political efforts for conservation, "The emphasis upon placing governance in local hand is likely to conserve prevailing patterns of distribution rather than resources..." (Burch, p. 132).

Even the Greeks recognized the problem which Burch is addressing, viz. that the economically eminent will have a preponderant influence in a democratic assembly.
In order to guard against this factor destroying the democratic character of their government, the Athenians chose their committees not by election, but by lot. This assured that everyone, not just the famous and rich, would serve in the government. They also provided a small stipend for attendance at the general assembly which both encouraged and facilitated attendance by the poorer citizens. While this is not the kind of solution that Thayer recommends, it does support his claim that the economic inequities and competition can serve to work against democratic institutions. As a result, mere reformation of the governmental sphere may not yield the hoped for benefits that participation promises. Indeed, like the use of gestalt techniques in business administration, the result of participation without economic reform might well be to further intrench the already existing imbalances of power.

Thayer's solution obviously comes closest to satisfying the ideal of participatory democracy. In fact, it meets all the criteria to an extent that seems unlikely for a practical proposal. As a result, the main objection that one is inclined to offer is that it simply could not work: the proliferation of committees would be astronomical, the decision procedure incredibly slow, and the result, total economic disintegration.

But Thayer's strength is in his claim that a very similar structure is currently utilized in many businesses
and high level government administration. If such a claim is true, then the efficiency argument can be refuted, leaving the extensive problem of interrelating economic and political units without involving everyone in continuous committee meetings.

CONCLUSION

The three plans offer good reason for rejecting Mill's dilemma* of the impossible ideal of small scale participation or the "practical" solution of representative government. Clearly there are a variety of ways for increasing participation and still having efficient government. While the Yugoslav system is most interesting because of its reality, the Thayer alternative provides the most exciting plan because it comes closest to satisfying the ideal of participation, and takes most thoroughly into account the current knowledge of psychological and sociological realities involved in group dynamics. Coupled with decentralization and socialism, a variant of Thayer's system has an excellent claim to being a plausible alternative to the alienating and undemocratic aspects of the current form of representative democracy.

*Cited at the end of ch. VI
CONCLUSION
The argument has taken us very far from considerations of global destruction to the possible structures of an industrial democracy. It is time to summarize. My basic concern has been the ecological preservation and the social structure which would be conducive to a happy and long enduring relationship with nature. While concentrating on participatory democracy, I have tried to work into my argument considerations of ecological well-being. I have tried, in a sense, to weave a solution to the ecological crisis with participatory democracy as the woof and ecological harmony as the warp: ecological considerations give the form to the argument; participation is the substance.

But another way to see the argument is to see that the environmental problems, so recently brought to our attention, are really instances of a more general problem: namely, the failure of western democracy to provide adequately for the public good. The ideology of individualism, laissez faire economics, representative democracy, and even our narrow conception of freedom have all contributed to the kinds of social and environmental ills to which we are currently subject. All these ideologies have largely ignored the public side of the human personality. The ills, of course, are many but the general problem of the failure to fully develop the public side of society affects them all. The failure to study
democratize the society is both a cause and an effect of this underdevelopment of the public space. Commitment to the public well being can only be expected when the public is adequately involved and when the commitment flows naturally from the organization of the society. Admittedly, irrational commitment such as is found in certain kinds of nationalism can be promoted without participation, but this is clearly irrelevant to any desirable solution. Why is participation the desirable solution?

The simplest argument is that which underlies the argument for all forms of democracy: people should not be subject to laws which they have not legislated. In representative democracy people are taken to have consented to the procedures and therefore the laws that flow from these procedures. But participatory democracy takes more seriously this basic democratic tenet and demands that people be involved in the decision processes to which they are subject. Participation leans towards Rousseau's ideal where coordination is achieved and yet each obeys only himself.

This traditional argument is supported by the claim explicity put forth by Mill and Rousseau that participation has an educative and morally uplifting effect on the participants: it creates a genuine concern for the community. I have focused on this claim, developing the psychological basis and details of it, and used it to support the claim that participation would make people sensitive to ecological
considerations. The argument is simply a variant of Mill's based on the claim that a healthy environment is a paradigm public good. The basis of this argument is the psychological claim that people have a strong need for public respect (esteem), and that this need can be used to promote social and ecological well being through the use of public forums where commitment to the public good earns its just esteem*.

In addition, I have stressed what is becoming increasingly clear to everyone: natural limitations will result in increased social control. If this is not to mean even more hierarchical government and the annihilation of freedom, then the personal freedom that is sacrificed to social and environmental preservation must be reinstituted in an assembly where all can participate. But participation does not simply provide for preservation of autonomy, it changes the whole quality of the freedom by forcing participants to subject themselves to considerations

FN * The idea of a community committed in its ideology and through its institutions to ecological well-being and economic frugality is being tried in many parts of North America at the moment. A recent article quotes a new member of one of these communities (not communes) in a clear articulation of the place that public esteem could play in reducing consumption.

"I think our changes have been normal for a family who has just moved to Secret Valley," say Joan. "It really isn't that hard to cut back on your expenses and live better when you live in a community where the keep up with the Joneses idea is reversed and all your neighbors are trying to find a way of saving money rather than spending it."

(Weekend Magazine, Nov. 29, 1975, Vol. 25, no. 48, p. 19)
of public and therefore ecological well being. There is no guarantee of course that the assembly will not constitute itself another "private" interest group. However it is arguable that the experience of participation as it turns one's focus away from personal concerns and on to larger issues of communal well being will cause people's concerns to go beyond even that of their community. But we cannot, as Gandhi once said, expect to have a political system where people will not need to be good. The goal is to organize the society in ways which will encourage as much goodness as possible.

Finally, I have claimed that participation is the appropriate form of government for a new, ecologically sensitive lifestyle. Self-government does require a good deal of human time and energy but organizes our lives on the truly human scale away from the large, inhuman scale of the current industrial order. Participation will provide one of the alternative satisfactions that are present in such a lifestyle: the satisfaction of public happiness.

It is also of interest to note that ecology itself focuses scientific attention away from the life of the individual organism towards that of the whole biological community and its environment. This concern for community also has its parallels in social theory where much of the social breakdown, as evidenced by high rates of crime,
mental illness, etc., is being correlated with the breakdown of community in large urban areas (see Blueprint for Survival). Small yet democratically active communities could be both intellectually and emotionally stimulating while still providing the community ties that seem crucial to social well being.

What reasons are there for believing that we could develop such a truly democratic society? First, there are a growing number of studies to show that worker participation is not only compatible with fairly large scale organization, it in fact constitutes an improvement in terms of worker satisfaction and productivity. While there are limits on the range of worker participation in large industry, the value of such democratization seems undeniable. Worker participation is the logical first step towards true democratization of society. Already this process is beginning in such advanced social democracies as Norway and Sweden.

Secondly, there has been a steady flow of urban dissidents out of the cities back into the rural areas of North America. And while it is taking some time for these ex-urbanites to find their roots, we can anticipate an increasingly vital rural culture and an increasing demand from the communities for local autonomy.
Lastly, and crucially, it is the inexorable press
of environmental constraints which is the most persuasive
reason to believe that we could develop a truly democratic
and participative society. Something is going to have
to be done. The press of history is on the side of there
being a radical change. As Murray Bookchin puts it:

Whatever may have been the validity of libertarian
and non-libertarian views a few years ago, historical development has rendered virtually
all objections to anarchist thought meaningless
today. The modern city and state, the massive
coal-steel technology of the Industrial Revolution,
the later, more rationalized, systems of mass
production and assembly line systems of labor
organization, the centralized nation, the state
and its bureaucratic apparatus—all have reached
their limits. Whatever progressive or liberatory
role they may have possessed, they have now
become entirely regressive and oppressive.
They are regressive not only because they erode
the human spirit and drain the community of all
its cohesiveness, solidarity and ethico-cultural
standards; they are regressive from an objective
standpoint, from an ecological standpoint. For
they undermine not only the human spirit and the
human community but also the viability of the
planet and all living things on it.

It cannot be emphasized too strongly that the
anarchist concepts of a balanced community,
a face-to-face democracy, a humanistic technology
and a decentralized society--these rich libertarian
concepts--are not only desirable, they are also
necessary. They belong not only to the great
visions of man's future, they now constitute
the preconditions for human survival.

Granting that Bookchin overstates the case, it is still
quite clear that the 21st century is not going to be more
of the same--"only bigger and better". The need to respond
to environmental constraints is almost certain to force some
dramatic change on industrial society. Of course these
changes could result in a variety of totalitarian solutions
to the problem of imposing the necessary social controls.
Or, it could result in the development of an economic and social order that is appropriate to the finitude of the earth's resources. Such an order would be characterized by economic decentralization and would provide an appropriate environment for truly democratic institutions. The objection that participation is impractical in the kind of industrial society to which we are accustomed loses its force when we realize that this kind of society itself is not practical in the (relatively short) long run. In fact, one could argue, rather than participation's incompatibility with large scale industrial society being an objection to participation it is really another objection to just such a society.

While I have not discussed China at length in this thesis (because China is not yet an industrialized society), it is extremely encouraging to note that China seems already committed to the kind of program outlined in my thesis. For example, she is working to preserve the rural distribution of her population by spreading her industrial advances throughout the countryside, and (most interestingly from my point of view) she is committed to preserving an active form of citizen participation in local government. The techniques of social management in China are not all in the tradition of western democracy, but given the level of her development, there is a remarkable and profoundly admirable emphasis on democracy and persuasion. Even if we in the west are unable to save ourselves from our own
destruction, there is in China (with one-quarter of the world's population) the hope that a large part of the world is not only committed to, but well on its way to achieving, participatory democracy and environmental harmony.

Of course, no one knows what will happen. I am not an historical determinist: history presents no guarantees. I have tried simply to present a plausible vision: the vision of a society adaptable both to human needs and the natural environment. I have tried to present the arguments for both the desirability and possibility of such a society. I have tried to make some contribution to the possibility that before the destruction of all by all might come ecologically sound communities and genuine democracy.
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