UBC Theses and Dissertations

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UBC Theses and Dissertations

Malthusianism and nationalism in republican China White, Gary Richard 1978

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M A L T H U S I A N I S M A N D N A T I O N A L I S M IN R E P U B L I C A N C H I N A by G A R Y R I C H A R D W H I T E B . A . , University of Cal i fornia , Berkeley, 1974 A THESIS S U B M I T T E D IN P A R T I A L F U L F I L L M E N T O F T H E R E Q U I R E M E N T S F O R T H E D E G R E E O F M A S T E R O F A R T S in T H E F A C U L T Y O F G R A D U A T E STUDIES D E P A R T M E N T O F HISTORY We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard T H E U N I V E R S I T Y O F BRITISH C O L U M B I A Gary Richard White A p r i l , 1978 In presenting th i s thes is in p a r t i a l fu l f i lment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the Univers i ty of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree that the L i b r a r y sha l l make it f ree ly ava i lab le for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of th is thesis for s cho lar ly purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by his representat ives . It is understood that copying or pub l i ca t ion of this thes is for f inanc ia l gain sha l l not be allowed without my written permission. Department of H i s t o r y  The Univers i ty of B r i t i s h Columbia 2075 Wesbrook P l a c e Vancouver, Canada V6T 1WS Date April 20, 1978 i Abstract This study deals with the debate over Malthusianism and .population control in China within the context of the growing sense of national awareness which characterized the May Fourth period. Beginning with Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, this controversy was closely linked to the issues of national strength and Social Darwinism by botn the opponents and proponents of population control. The proponents of population control tended to be Western-educated intel-lectuals who believed in the tenets of classical Western liberalism. To them, population control was a means of achieving a better environment for individual development and economic laissez faire. In their opinion, population pressures had more to do with China's woes than exploitation by any nation or economic class. They attempted to justify their views on nationalist grounds by pointing out that the emancipation of the individual was the key to the strength of the Western powers. The opposition to population control viewed population growth as proof of a race's fitness for survival and felt that China faced the threat of eventual national extinction if the rate of population growth in Western countries and Japan continued to be much higher than that in China. Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and Sun Yat-sen shared this appraisal of population growth in China. By studying the books and magazine articles that were written on this question during the period following the May Fourth Incident, it becomes evident that the opponents of population control enjoyed the advantage in harnessing the nationalist sentiments of the Chinese public against population control. This was not the result of any overpowering logic in their arguments. Events in China and around the world tended to confirm the original fears of - Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, and more Chinese grew convinced that China needed to match the population growth of other countries in order to survive in a world i i of nation-states that they envisioned to be governed by the forces of natural selection as outlined by Charles Darwin's theory of evolution. The advocates of population control grew more defensive in their appeals as their ideas were increasingly portrayed as defeatist and unprogressive. Also, many Chinese nationalists firmly believed in the contradictory nature of individualism and nationalism. To them, Malthusianism was one of the most harmful manifes-tations of excessive individualism. Although early Marxists such as L i Ta-chao did not oppose Malthusianism on nationalist grounds, later Marxists were able to tap some of the nationalist resentment toward imperialism by arguing that Malthusianism was a great lie promoted by the imperialist powers to avoid responsibility for the economic disruptions that they created in China. i i i Table of Contents I. Introduction 1 II. M a l t h u s i a n i s m ' s Introduction to China v i a S o c i a l D a r w i n i s m : 4 The L i n k between the Mal thus i an Con t rove r sy and Nat iona l Strength III. The M a y Four th Mal thus ians : The P r o m o t i o n of Popula t ion 10 C o n t r o l Takes Shape I V . The M a r x i s t Response to Ma l thus i an i sm 34 V . The Nat ional i s t Response to Ma l thus i an i sm 43 V I . The At tempt to Reconc i le Popula t ion C o n t r o l with N a t i o n a l i s m : Ma l thus i an i sm on the Defensive i n the Late Twenties and 61 Th i r t i e s VI I . Conc lus ion 83 B ib l iog raphy 87 1 I. Introduction M a l t h u s i a n i s m has achieved the dubious d i s t inc t ion of being vehemently-attacked by both M a r x i s t in te l lec tuals and K M T na t iona l i s t s . Nonetheless, the l i v e l y and prot rac ted debate over M a l t h u s i a n i s m and the need for population con t ro l in China dur ing the M a y F o u r t h per iod demonstrated that this i ssue was never resolved f rom the s tar t . B y examining the h i s t o r i c a l o r ig ins and development of the cont roversy over M a l t h u s i a n i s m , this study intends to shed some l ight on the reasons why population con t ro l became unpalatable to many Chinese of d ive r se ploliticaL persuas ions . It must be remembered that the i n i t i a l concern over M a l t h u s i a n i s m and its re levance to the population si tuat ion i n China was contemporaneous wi th the increas ing inab i l i ty of the Chinese to reconc i l e Confuc ian ism, i n i ts decaying f o r m , wi th the growing na t iona l i sm of the t i m e . The in te l l ec tua l ferment of the M a y F o u r t h per iod took place i n the mids t of a search for the fundamental changes needed to achieve modern iza t ion and nat ional s trength. A s i n the case of other ideo log ica l i ssues , the goal of nat ional strength was the c r i t e r i o n by which M a l t h u s i a n i s m was eitrier promoted or condemned. A s has been pointed out by Chow Tse- t sung i n h is work on the M a y Fou r th per iod , Chinese in te l lec tuals who promoted the tenets of Wes te rn l i b e r a l i s m were d i s t inc t ly less able to convince the growing nat ional is t public of their dedicat ion to the acheivement of nat ional strength than those who promoted some sor t of c o l l e c t i v i s m , be i t genuine s o c i a l i s m or some vague k ind of nat ional s o c i a l i s m . ^  In dealing wi th the re la t ionship of the Ma l thus i an cont roversy wi th Chinese na t iona l i sm and the confl ict between the ideo log ica l p re fe rences of the M a y F o u r t h per iod , this study intends to demonstrate that M a l t h u s i a n i s m tended to confl ic t wi th the nat ional is t sentiments of the t ime i n spite of the nervous efforts by the promoters of population con t ro l z to combine the two. F u r t h e r m o r e , an examinat ion of the debate over • population con t ro l indicates that the di f f icul t ies of M a l t h u s i a n i s m i n Ch ina can be l inked to the fa i lure of Chinese l i b e r a l i s m as a whole to gain acceptance as an ideology consistent with nat ional is t goals . Wi th respect to Wes te rn h i s to ry , tne t e rm ' l i b e r a l ' i s often used wi th a great dea l of i m p r e c i s i o n , but i n the context of modern Chinese in te l l ec tua l h i s to ry the concept of l i b e r a l i s m is a great dea l more d is t inc t and tangible. Often educated i n Wes te rn countr ies , the Chinese l i b e r a l s were a c l e a r l y identif iable body of in te l lec tuals who s t ressed the importance of ind iv idua l l i be r ty and economic l a i s s e z - f a i r e as the v i t a l elements lack ing i n t r ad i t iona l China which were the key to the success of the powerful Wes t e rn nat ions. In doing so, they put themselves at odds witftimany of their nat ional is t contempo-r a r i e s as w e l l as Ch ina ' s Confucian t r ad i t ion . In arguing the va l id i ty of M a l t h u s i a n i s m i n China ' s case, Chinese l i b e r a l s d id not tend t©> perce ive China ' s s o c i a l p roblems to be a mat ter of exploi ta t ion by either economic c lasses , or i m p e r i a l i s t nations, but instead the resul t of a ha rmfu l set of s o c i a l and economic condifltions which prevented the ind iv idua l f rom developing the capabi l i ty successful ly to protect h i s own in te res t s . To be sure, many Chinese l i b e r a l s went to great pains i n order to demonstrate that ind iv idua l l i be r ty and economic laissez-.jfaire, when unharnessed, were great sources of nat ional wealth and power . However , i n examining the debate over M a l t h u s i a n i s m , the seemingly cont radic tory nature of pr iva te freedom and modern na t iona l i sm looms as one of the greatest b a r r i e r s to the acceptance of c l a s s i c a l l i b e r a l i s m and, i n turn, the acceptance of population con t ro l . Both M a l t h u s i a n i s m and l i b e r a l i s m remained tainted wi th this image of ind iv idua l se l f i shness . 3 Notes to Chapter I 1. Chow Tse- t sung, The M a y F o u r t h Movement : Inte l lectual Revolu t ion i n  M o d e r n China (Cambridge , I960), p . 3 6 l . 4 II. M a l t h u s i a n i s m ' s Introduction to China v i a S o c i a l D a r w i n i s m : The L i n k between the Mal thus i an Con t rove r sy and Nat iona l Strength Nothing better underscored the connection between na t iona l i sm and the population issue i than Chinese in te l lec tua ls ' i n i t i a l percept ion of M a l t h u s i a n i s m as an int imate component of S o c i a l D a r w i n i s m . L i a n g C ' h i - c h ' a o was an ear ly example of such an in te l lec tua l . It was not dif f icul t to understand why much of the d i scus s ion over the population issue was generated by the interest of many Chinese intel lectuals in S o c i a l D a r w i n i s m . The u t i l i z a t i on of Da rwin ' s b io log i ca l theory of na tura l se lec t ion to por t ray var ious societ ies as b io log ica l species struggling to s su iv ive and constantly developing t ra i ts which best served them i n this struggle had a powerful logic at the t ime . L i a n g and later nat ional is ts bel ieved that such logic explained the nature of both Wes te rn s o c i a l p rogress and internat ional confl ic t . In this respect, Thomas Mal thus ' theory of population growth was i n i t i a l l y u t i l i z e d as an explanation of the impera t ives behind this struggle to surv ive rather .tharua so l id rat ionale for population con t ro l . L i a n g , for instance, perce ived population growth as p r i m a r i l y being the reason for which var ious nat ional i t ies had mutual 1 contact resul t ing in confl ic t . F u r t h e r m o r e , he perce ived i m p e r i a l i s m to be an attempt by the s t ronger Wes te rn countr ies to prepare for future population 2 growth. In an essay entitled "On the Great T rend of Compet i t ion between Nat ions" , L i a n g most c l e a r l y stated this re la t ionship between M a l t h u s i a n i s m and S o c i a l D a r w i n i s m : A m o n g the theories of the modern scho la r s , there is no 'sTingJre (theory of any one) scholar that has nourished nat ional i m p e r i a l i s m , but (the theories of) Mal thus and D a r w i n have been the two most forceful . ^ It is important to understand that in using the t e rm "nat ional i m p e r i a l i s m " L i a n g wished to d is t inguish modern i m p e r i a l i s m f rom the i m p e r i a l i s m of 5 the t r a d i t i o n a l e m p i r e s , both E a s t e r n and W e s t e r n . The e x p a n s i o n i s m of the t r a d i t i o n a l e m p i r e s a i m e d at c r e a t i n g a p o l i t i c a l state that e n c o m p a s s e d a v a r i e t y of n a t i o n a l i t i e s and r a c e s . To L i a n g , the i n a b i l i t y of such states to h a r n e s s the f o r c e of n a t i o n a l i s m e x p l a i n e d t h e i r f a i l u r e to s u r v i v e i n the m o d e r n w o r l d of n a t i o n - s t a t e s . However, i n Liang's eyes, the m o d e r n n a t i o n - s t a t e that p r a c t i c e d " n a t i o n a l i m p e r i a l i s m " sought to m a i n t a i n n a t i o n a l h o mogeneity w i t h t e r r i t o r i a l e x p a n s i o n e i t h e r by the c u l t u r a l a s s i m i l a t i o n of w e a k e r 4 peoples or by t h e i r d i s p l a c e m e n t f r o m t h e i r h omelands. W i t h t h i s concept of S o c i a l D a r w i n i s m i n m i n d , L i a n g v i e w e d p o p u l a t i o n t r e n d s as a b a r o m e t e r of the s o c i a l p r o g r e s s a c h i e v e d by the v a r i o u s n a t i o n s of the w o r l d . A c c o r d i n g to L i a n g , . . . how c a n i t be n e c e s s a r y to d i s c u s s anything e l s e other than p o p u l a t i o n alone (to see that) W e s t e r n h i s t o r y has c o n s i s t e d of p r o g r e s s w h i l e our own country's h i s t o r y has c o n s i s t e d of c y c l e s . T h i s i s how i t i s . O t h e r w i s e , how c o u l d a c o u n t r y have ... a p o p u l a t i o n of 130, 000, 000 to 140, 000, 000 nine h u n dred y e a r s ago and today be known f o r (a p o p u l a t i o n of) m e r e l y 400, 000, 000. 5 It was the t r e n d of; p o p u l a t i o n g r o w t h r a t h e r than the a b s o l u t e n u m b e r s to w h i c h L i a n g attached the m o s t s i g n i f i c a n c e . The steady s o c i a l p r o g r e s s w h i c h L i a n g a t t r i b u t e d to the W est was supposedly m a r k e d by a stgedy r i s e i n p o p u l a t i o n , w h i l e , concomitantly, China's c y c l i c a l and u n p r o g r e s s i v e h i s t o r y was r e f l e c t e d i n m e r e c y c l i c a l v a r i a t i o n s i n p o p u l a t i o n . I r o n i c a l l y enough, t h i s p a r t i c u l a r use of M a l t h u s i a n i s m d i s c o u r a g e d the p r o m o t i o n of p o p u l a t i o n c o n t r o l . A l t h o u g h p o p u l a t i o n c o n t r o l c o u l d have some c o n c e i v a b l e advantages, i t would be a d i s a s t r o u s . p o l i c y f o r a n a t i o n to f o l l o w u n i l a t e r a l l y b ecause the expanding pop u l a t i o n s of other c o u n t r i e s would c o n s t a n t l y t h r e a t e n one's own people w i t h d i s p l a c e m e n t o r a s s i m i l a t i o n . L i a n g p a i d l i t t l e a t t e n t i o n to M a l t h u s 1 point that o v e r p o p u l a t i o n was a constant cause of p o v e r t y w i t h i n a n a t i o n r e g a r d l e s s of i t s p r o d u c t i v i t y , but l i n s t e a d p e r c e i v e d h i s t h e o r y as a cogent e x p l a n a t i o n of the f u n d a m e n t a l cause of c o n f l i c t s between n a t i o n s . ^ 6 Hence, in L i a n g ' s view, a growing population signif ied success in the struggle to surv ive , whi le a stagnant population, no mat ter how large, could only i m p l y the opposite. L i ang ' s a p p r a i s a l of the s ignif icance of population trends was to be echoed by other nat ional is ts including Sun Y a t - s e n . However , L i a n g did not seem to be concerned wi th promoting population growth i n i t se l f . A s L iang pointed out, the de s i r ab i l i t y off a large population was nothing new in Chinese h i s to ry . In The Mencius, K i n g H u i of L iang expressed great vexat ion over the s m a l l s ize 7 of his k ingdom's population when compared wi th neighbouring states. In dec la r ing t_ata_h_na_Si Jafckuo-Upo-p:^ the absence of a p rogres s ive h is tory , L i a n g , no doubt, felt the promot ion of population growth to be a va in hope i f not accompanied by a method. He bel ieved that a sense of na t ional i sm among the Chinese people was the one most fundamental factor g that would enable China to expand its population. Wi th respect to the l i m i t of Ch ina ' s a g r i c u l t u r a l potential to support population growth, L iang had a l ready stated at the c lose of the nineteenth century that by using Wes te rn a g r i c u l t u r a l techniques and opening new lands China ' s population could increase s e v e r a l fold without fear of famine. In L i a n g ' s view, China was no more densely populated than most European countries but far behind in ag r i cu lh tu r a l science because education and fa rming 9 had become "two separate paths" in t r ad i t iona l Chinese socie ty . The l i m i t of China ' s potential for increases in a g r i c u l t u r a l product ion was a lso to become an issue hotly disputed and more carefu l ly examined as the debate over popula-t ion con t ro l unfolded in la ter yea r s . Yen F u , who more deeply explored the var ious theories of S o c i a l D a r w i n i s m and their appl ica t ion to China ' s d i f f icul t ies as a nation, did not see a la rge population as being proof of or an asset for a nation's success i n the struggle to p rogress and sur:v,dive in a w o r l d of competing nat ion-states: 7 E v e r since human s p i r i t s have been- made the (object of worship in) r e l i g i o n , there has been no gr e a t e r s i n than not offering s a c r i f i c e s (to one's a n c e s t o r s ) . T h e r e f o r e , our people take m a r r i a g e to be a n a t u r a l duty, and China's overpopulation a r i s e s f r o m this. Although the population is extensive, the teachings of wealth have not been extended. T h e r e f o r e , their l a r g e numbers a r e p r e c i s e l y the r e a s o n for su f f e r i n g . . . . A s for the r a p i d propagation (of people) i n China, only the labouring society and p r o p e r t y l e s s people have i n c r e a s e d i n number. C e r t a i n l y , if the uneducated and i n f e r i o r people a r e gathered together in a w o r l d of competition, i t is obvious that they w i l l not be able to s u r v i v e by v i r t u e of the i r f i t n e s s . U n l i k e Liang, Y e n F u p e r c e i v e d China's population as indeed growing, but it was the wealth of the country and the quality of the people that he fel t deter-mined a nation's fitness, and a la r g e population was c e r t a i n l y ho proof of th i s . To him, it was quite p o s s i b l e f o r a w e l l populated country to be eliminated i n the p r o c e s s of n a t u r a l s e l e c t i o n if the teachings of wealth (fu chiao ) were lacking. Y e n F u probably envisioned a p r o c e s s of c u l t u r a l a s s i m i l a t i o n by a stronger nation such as what many Chinese be l i e v e d to be o c c u r r i n g i n B r i t i s h - r u l e d India rather than outright annihilation. However, in Y-en Fu's eyess the sou r c e of China's problems was a combination of the l a c k of m a t e r i a l p r o g r e s s and a l a r g e population. F r o m thi=s perspective, Y e n F u did not c l e a r l y delineate the extent to which the lack of m a t e r i a l p r o g r e s s could be attributed to China's large population. In spite of a completely d i f f e r e n t a p p r a i s a l of Chinese population trends and the different s i g n i f i c a n c e which Y e n F u attributed to a l a r g e population, both he and L i a n g Ch'i-ch'ao were p r i m a r i l y motivated to c o n s i d e r the popula-tion question byr a nati o n a l i s t c o n c e r n over China's fate in a w o r l d that they felt was governed by the f o r c e s of n a t u r a l s e l e c t i o n as outlined by S o c i a l D a r w i n i s m . The i m p l i c i t b e l i e f i n S o c i a l D a r w i n i s m was to continue to be a common denominator among both the proponents and opponents of population c o n t r o l throughout the M a y F o u r t h p e r i o d . Although the population i s s u e d i d not r e c e i v e a great d e a l of attention i n the y e a r s p r i o r to the M a y F o u r t h Movement, most i m p r e s s i o n s of China's 8 population si tuation seemed roughly s i m i l a r to L i a n g ' s v iew. In one a r t i c l e which appeared in a Chinese r e fo rmis t p e r i o d i c a l in 1901, population increases and the resul t ing compet i t ion for the necess i t ies of l ife were ci ted as major 11 reasons for the i m p e r i a l i s t expansion of Wes te rn nations. E leven years la ter , a Chinese w r i t e r t ransla ted the a r t i c l e s of an A m e r i c a n diplomat and a Japanese scholar in which the est imates of Ch ina ' s population were only 270, 000, 000 and 260, 000, 000 ' respec t ive ly . The w r i t e r , Ch 'en Y i i - c h i n g , feared that the often ci ted figure of 400, 000, 000 was a co l l ec t ive ly held myth created by Ch ' ing off ic ia ls who used inflated census f igures in order to br ing credi t to 'themselves.' W i t h this in mind , he saw m o r e than coincidence in the s i m i l a r estimates of two unconnected sources . In enti t l ing his a r t i c l e "The Chinese Populat ion P r o b l e m " , Ch ' en Y i i - c h i n g seemed assured that the l i te ra te Chinese public would understand any 'population p r o b l e m ' in China to be one of sparse -1Z ness . 9 Notes to Chapter II I. Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, "Chung-kuo shih-shang jen-k'ou chih t'ung-chi" (Historical statistics of China's population), Hsin-min ts'ung-pao (The new people's miscellany), vols. 46-48 (January 1904), reprinted in Yin-ping shih wen-chi (Collected essays of Liang Ch'i-ch'ao), ed. Liang T'ing-ch'an (Shanghai, 1926), ehiian 35, p. 54. Z. Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, "Lun min-tsu ching-cheng chih ta shih" (190Z), reprinted in Ym-ping shih ho-chi (Collected works of Liang Ch'i-ch'ao), ed. L i n Chih-chiin (Shanghai, 1936), vol. 4, chap. 10, p. 13. 3. Ibid., p. 11. 4. Ibid., p. 10. 5. Liang-, "Chung-kuo shih-shang jen-k'ou chih t'ung-chi", p. 61. 6. Although Malthus certainly made the point that overpopulation was one. of the causes of war, it was far from being the main thrust of his work. 7. Luang,1'Chung-kuo shih-shang jen-k'ou chih t'ung-chi", p. 54. 8. Liang, "Lun min-tsu ching-cheng chih ta shih", p. 35. 9. Liang Ch'n- ch'ao, "Nung-hui pao-hsu" (Preface to the report on agricul-tural organizations) (1896), reprinted in Yin-ping shih ho-chi, vol. 4, pp. 130-131. 10. As quoted by Yang Hsiao-ch'un, "Tui-yii shih-lun 'Chung-kuo jen-k'ou wen-t'i'te ta-pien" ( A rebuttal to the currently discussed 'population problem'), Tung-fang tsa-chih ,(The Eastern miscellany), vol.Z4, no. 22 (November 25, 19Z7), p. 1Z. II. "Lun ti-kuo chu-i chih fa-ta chi erh-shih shih-chi shih-chieh chih ch'ien-t'u" (On the development of imperialism and the future of the world in the twentieth century), K'ai -chih lu ( The enlightenment record), reprinted in Hsin-hai ko-ming ch'icn shih nien lun hsuan-chi (Selected essays of ten years before the 1911 Revolution), ed. Chang Nan (Hong Kong, 196Z), vol. 1, book 1, p. 54. The author and the precise date were not given. 12. Ch'en Yii-ching, "Chung-kuo hu-k'ou wen-t'i", Tung-fang tsa-chih, vol. 1, no. 4, (Q^eto'beMlO, 1912), pp. 7-14. 10 III. The M a y F o u r t h M a l t h u s i a n s : The P r o m o t i o n of Population C o n t r o l Takes Shape By the time of the M a y F o u r t h p e r i o d the debate over the population question had become a great d e a l m o r e s p e c i a l i z e d , and there was a g r e a t e r awareness of the i d e o l o g i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s involved i n the i s s u e . The s c h o l a r s of the M a y F o u r t h generation did not m e r e l y make g e n e r a l r e f e r e n c e s to China's population situation, but authored lengthy books dealing with it e x c l u s i v e l y . It was during this p e r i o d that a definable group of i n t e l l e c t u a l s who promoted population c o n t r o l took shape. With great r e g u l a r i t y , these i n t e l l e c t u a l s tended to be Western-educated s c h o l a r s with economics or sociology as their academic discipline. On the whole, they may be a c c u r a t e l y d e s c r i b e d as Neo-Malthusians in that they g e n e r a l l y understood Malthus' population theory as a r a t i o n a l e for population c o n t r o l and supported it as such without n e c e s s a r i l y adhering to the portions of Malthus' a n a l y s i s that were p a r o c h i a l to eighteenth century England. F o r example, many of the Chinese who promoted population control, unlike Malthus, did not view 'moral, r e s t r a i n t ' a s the sole acceptable method of b i r t h c o n t r o l . A nother d i f f e r e n c e which was m o r e of emphasis than of substance was that the Chinese supporters of population c o n t r o l did not emphasize the p e s s i m i s t i c c h a r a c t e r of M a l t h u s i a n i s m as a theory which b e l i t t l e d human efforts at i m p r o v i n g society. Instead, they promoted population c o n t r o l in positive t e r m s as part of an entire package of needed s o c i a l r e f o r m s , some of which would be the d i r e c t r e s u l t of a lower b i r t h rate. T h i s d i f f e r e n c e had l e s s substance than f i r s t met the eye, because one could e a s i l y argue that Malthus, by promoting a f o r m of population control, demonstrated an i m p l i c i t l y o p t i m i s t i c view of mankind's a b i l i t y to overcome b a r r i e r s to e f f i c a c i o u s s o c i a l r e f o r m . 11 Harvard-educa ted Ch ' en Ch'ang-heng was perhaps the most wide ly published author who promoted the Mal thus ian population theory and a nat ional po l i cy of population con t ro l . H i s a r t i c l e s on the population question appeared r egu la r ly i n var ious newspapers and journa ls , and seven different editions of his major work , On the Popula t ion of China , were published between 1918 and 1926. To C h ' e n Ch'ang-heng, Mal thus was a "benevolent economist and s o c i a l r e f o r m e r " who t r i ed to show people how they could avoid the tragedies inf l ic ted by the 1 natura l controls on excess ive population growth. In l ink ing the poverty of China d i r e c t l y to overpopulation, Ch ' en Ch ' ang -heng ci ted it as proof i n i t se l f that Ch ina ' s b i r t h rate was too h igh . He attacked the parents of ch i l d r en who were sold to serve as s laves and prost i tutes for being i r r e spons ib l e and for m e r e l y viewing their ch i ld ren as disposable i tems of t emporary u t i l i t y . L i k e Mal thus , Ch ' en Ch'ang-heng felt that the solut ion to the poverty in China rested i n encouraging people to calculate their means 2 of making a l i v ing before having ch i ld ren . In examining the development of Wes te rn nations, C h ' e n Ch'ang-heng disputed the notion that the increase i n both their p rosper i ty and their popula-t ion could be so le ly attr ibuted to sc ient i f ic and technica l p rog re s s . He did this by spec i f i ca l ly examining the b i r th rate f igures of Wes te rn count r ies . In his book, Ch ' en Ch'ang-heng produced a table i l l u s t r a t ing the rather d ramat ic drop in the b i r th rate of var ious Wes te rn nations f rom 1870 to 1910. The b i r t h rate in England, for example, dropped f rom 35. 4per thousand during 3 the decade beginning in 1870 to 25. 9 per thousand by 1910. The people of the West , he argued, had indeed followed the tenets of M a l t h u s i a n i s m i n planning 4 for the p rosper i ty of their pos ter i ty . The aggregate increase in the population of Wes te rn countr ies was at tr ibuted to the low death rate and longer l i fe span of the average person which accompanied i t . Ch ' en Ch'ang-heng argued that 5 this was l a rge ly brought about by the decreasing b i r th rate . Hence, in his 12 view the rate of increase in population alone was insufficient to determine the nature of the re la t ionship between population trends and s o c i a l p rogress in the West . Based on the opinions of s eve ra l fore ign doctors stationed in China , Ch ' en Ch'ang-heng est imated the b i r t h rate in China to be over fifty per thousand 6 people, twice the birth, rate of the West . He viewed this difference as the cause of China ' s poverty and the West ' s p rospe r i ty . A c c o r d i n g to h i m , there existed an inverse ra t io between ind iv idua l development, , to which he at tr ibuted the v i t a l i ty of the Wes te rn people, and the b i r th rate. To prove this point, he produced s ta t is t ics which showed that col lege-educated women in the United States m o r e often than not had:A two or less ch i ld ren after m a r r i a g e . C h ' e n Ch'ang-heng attributed this to their greater in te l l igence and des i r e to secure 7 the proper educational opportunities for their ch i l d r en . T i n China , by contrast , he por t rayed the prospects for ind iv idua l development as bleak because people 8 often gave b i r th to m o r e ch i ld ren than they had means to care for or educate. In addit ion to this, he pointed out, it was more diff icul t for ind iv idua ls to obtain the years of t ra in ing needed to develop var ious s k i l l s because the combined effect of the high b i r t h rate and high death rate made l i fe spans shor te r . Because he bel ieved the ignorant and use less elements of society were p r e c i s e l y the ones most l i k e l y i r r e s p o n s i b l y to give b i r t h to many ch i ld ren , Ch ' en Ch'ang-heng felt that the ser iousness of this p rob lem was compounded 9 by its c y c l i c a l nature. Ch ' en Ch'ang-heng was not obl ivious to sources of poverty other than over -population, but he cha rac te r i zed a l l such phenomenan as m e r e l y manifestat ions of the m o r e basic p r o b l e m . F o r example, hhe did not deny that w a r l o r d i s m and corrupt government created many of the problems both for ind iv idua l welfare and nat ional strength. However , according to h i m ins t i tu t ional r e fo rm alone could never b r ing competent government and enlightened leadership to 13 China unless the qual i ty of the e lec tors , the people, could be r a i s e d . He considered it ax iomat ic that the government could be no good i f the people were no good and, in turn, t raced this p rob lem of quali ty back to the population 10 i s sue . To h i m , the problems that a high b i r th rate and overpopulat ion entailed for ind iv idua l development a lso d i r e c t l y affected the qual i ty of China ' s population as a whole . Ch ' en Ch'ang-heng por t rayed the quali ty of a nation's population as the most c r u c i a l factor that influenced nat ional strength. A c c o r d -ing to this view, recent advances i n c i v i l i z a t i o n and the refinement of m i l i t a r y techniques enabled s m a l l countries wi th enlightened peoples to gain con t ro l over large backward count r ies . England 's ab i l i ty to conquer India, a nation 11 of 300, 000, 000, wi th ease was proof of this in his opinion. In the-modern w o r l d of nation-states, Ch ' en Ch'ang-heng felt that the advantage i n power f o r m e r l y enjoyed by the populous empi res was no longer assured . He argued that a population of 400, 000, 000 was of no advantage to China ' s struggle for nat ional existence i f the vast major i ty of people lacked 12 strength, m o r a l i t y , and knowledge. Al though the Chinese government ru led over a vast population, he pointed out that i t experienced much m o r e dif f icul ty than any of the s m a l l Wes te rn nations i n taxing people to support an a r m y . In r a i s ing the i ssue of taxation, Ch ' en Ch'ang-heng, l i ke Y e n F u , s t ressed the important connection between ind iv idua l wealth and nat ional 13 strength. In this manner Ch ' en Ch'ang-heng made the case that China ' s quest for nat ional power hinged on improving t the opportunity for ind iv idua l development by decreas ing the b i r th rate and r e l i ev ing the p ressures of overpopulat ion. To strengthen this argument, he was able to ci te none other than H e r b e r t Spencer, one of the major a rchi tec ts of the theory of S o c i a l D a r w i n i s m . Spencer ' s theory, as outlined by Ch ' en Ch'ang-heng, stated that a lower b i r t h rate and a lower population density existed among higher forms of b i o l o g i c a l 14 species and m o r e sophist icated c i v i l i z a t i o n s . Spencer at tr ibuted this to the evolution of more complex t ra i t s which requi red notably more t ime for ind iv idua l .members of a society or species to develop. :,I_i':':theis:trw_ig'le .to progress and survive, , a high rate of reproduct ion was less v i t a l than the development of these t r a i t s . Hence, i n Ch ' en Ch'ang-heng's eyes, a p rogramme of population con t ro l was complete ly consistent wi th sc ient i f ic na t iona l i sm 14' based on S o c i a l D a r w i n i s m . The major point repeatedly s t ressed by Ch ' en Ch'ang-heng in .promot ing Ma l thus i an i sm as a means of achieving ind iv idua l p rosper i ty and nat ional strength was that there was a fundamental harmony, between the government 's 14 efforts to enr ich the nation and the ind iv idua l ' s efforts to enr ich h imse l f . L i k e Y e n F u , he felt that the strength of the Wes te rn nations was due to their wealth, and their weal th was due to the freedom with w-haehpea-eh .pursued his own in te res t s . The aggregate effect of this freedom was not the chaos that a Confucian might expect, but a coordinat ion of ac t iv i ty s i m i l a r to the a r range-15 ment of spokes around the centre of a whee l . Both he and Y e n F u felt that there was l i t t l e advantage in numbersr i f people lacked the capabi l i t ies needed to achieve m a t e r i a l p rog re s s . However , Ch ' en Ch'ang-heng was exp l ic i t i n stating that this l ack of capabi l i t ies was d i r e c t l y related to population p r e s s u r e s . However , there were a number of instances i n which Ch ' en Ch'ang-heng perce ived a basic confl ict between ind iv idua l freedom and nat ional in teres ts , and in such cases his p r i m a r y concern was with the la t te r . I ron i ca l ly enough, he pic tured such a confl ic t over the issue of a r t i f i c i a l b i r th con t ro l . He opposed a r t i f i c i a l b i r t h con t ro l as a "pass ive ly des t ruc t ive" measure that could cause a nation's people to be lost in their own bodily-odes ires and convenience to the extent that the s u r v i v a l of the race could be endangered, and ci ted the F r e n c h 16 as an example of such nat ional decadence. A l s o , Ch 'en Ch'ang-heng's dedicat ion to the emancipat ion of the ind iv idua l d id not prevent h i m f rom 15 s u p p o r t i n g a go v e r n m e n t s p o n s o r e d p o l i c y of eugenics w h i c h would i m p r o v e the q u a l i t y o f the people by e l i m i n a t i n g the o p p o r t u n i t i e s to propagate of those 17 who w e r e weak and d e f i c i e n t . A l t h o u g h Ch'en Ch'ang-heng c o n s t a n t l y s t r e s s e d the i m p o r t a n c e of the q u a l i t y of the p o p u l a t i o n o v e r the quantity, he s t i l l h a stened to point out that a- l o w e r - b i r t h r a t e w o u l d not have the effect of r e d u c i n g China's a g g r e g a t e p o p u l a t i o n o r even the effect of h a l t i n g f u t u r e i n c r e a s e s i f l o n g e r l i f e spans c o u l d be a c h i e v e d . The W e s t e r n c o u n t r i e s , w i t h the e x c e p t i o n of F r a n c e , w e r e p r o o f of t h i s . In fact , a s e c o n d a r y a r g u m e n t that Ch'en Ch'ang-heng u t i l i z e d a g a i n s t a h i g h b i r t h r a t e was that i t c o u l d not even a c h i e v e the n a r r o w g o a l of po p u l a t i o n growth. T h i s suggested that he was a w a r e of the a t t r a c t i v e n e s s that a l a r g e p o p u l a t i o n h e l d f o r many C h i n e s e n a t i o n a l i s t s . In opposing a r t i f i c i a l b i r t h c o n t r o l , Ch'en Ch'ang-heng a r g u e d that the C o n f u c i a n v a l u e s and i n s t i t u t i o n s r o o t e d i n C h i n e s e t r a d i t i o n w e r e the b a s i c cause of the u n a c c e p t a b l y h i g h b i r t h r a t e . Hence, i n h i s v i e w the m o s t a p p r o p r i a t e means of a c h i e v i n g a l o w e r b i r t h r a t e was to e l i m i n a t e p r e c i s e l y those b a c k w a r d a s p e c t s of China's t r a d i t i o n a l s o c i a l s y s t e m w h i c h n e a r l y a l l M a y F o u r t h i n t e l l e c t u a l s opposed. T h e s e s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s had a l r e a d y been c h a r a c t e r i z e d as g r e a t b a r r i e r s to both e c o n o m i c $rogixes:s>--ari'd^indivldual d evelopment i n t h e m s e l v e s . The c l a n s y s t e m of C h i n a , f o r example, was l a b e l l e d a cause of China's h i g h b i r t h r a t e b e c ause m a r r i a g e s took p l a c e at a m u c h e a r l i e r age than w o u l d be the ca s e i f m o s t co u p l e s w a i t e d u n t i l they 18 c o u l d e s t a b l i s h independent h o u s e h o l d s . Ch'en Ch'ang-heng a l s o d e c l a r e d that the extended f a m i l y w i t h i t s c o m p l e x s y s t e m of c o l l e c t i v e p r o p e r t y made the m a t e r i a l advantages of f e w e r c h i l d r e n l e s s obvious to i n d i v i d u a l c o u p l e s and g e n e r a l l y d i s c o u r a g e d tEve independence, m o b i l i t y , and i n d i v i d u a l i n c e n t i v e w h i c h he f e l t w e r e v i t a l f o r s o c i a l p r o g r e s s . He c i t e d the i n d i v i d u a l ' s dependence on and o b l i g a t i o n s t o w a r d the extended f a m i l y as one of the m a j o r b a r r i e r s to 19 Chinese colonization of the sparsely populated border regions. By breaking with Confucian tradition and supporting equality for women as well as marriages based on free choice, Ch'en Ch'ang-heng believed that the late marriage and the nuclear family would become the norm throughout China and, in turn, lead to the lower birth rate which he felt was characteristic 20 of a more advanced society. In addition, he portrayed the broader social contacts made possible by the emancipation of the individual from the tyranny of the clan as a means by which a national sense of identity among Chinese 21 could be forged. To a great extent, Ch'en Ch'ang-heng1 s arguments effectively utilized the widely held vision of a discredited Confucian tradition as a foil for his own vision of an enlightened liberal society that was free from the pressuresof un-controlled population growth. By portraying the question of social progress in China in terms of a simple dichotomy between Confucianism and liberalism, h e no doubt, was aiming at harnessing the abundance of hostility toward traditional social values in order to gain support for some form of population control. Ch'en Ch'ang-heng probably believed that any initial nationalist apprehensions concerning population control could be overcome if he could successfully demonstrate that the path to a lower birth rate coincided with the efforts to destroy the backward Confucian social institutions that numbed the national consciousness of the Chinese. A r t i f i c i a l birth control, a far more controversial method, received his unequivocal condemnation. However, the initial advantages of linking population control entirely to an attack on Confucian traditions were to be shortlived as later research on the population situation in China was to make many of Ch'en Ch'ang-heng's original arguments obsolete. The difficulties entailed in modifying his arguments favouring population control were to contribute to the growing defensiveness on the part "of those who' expressed a belief in Malthusianism. t 17 K u M _ n g - y u wa s ano the r p r o f e s s i o n a l s c h o l a r of the M a y F o u r t h g e n e r a -t i o n who v o i c e d s u p p o r t f o r s o m e f o r m of p o p u l a t i o n c o n t r o l , a l t hough he d i d not b e c o m e i n v o l v e d i n the debate o v e r the i s s u e to the s a m e extent as o the r s c h o l a r s . E d u c a t e d i n G e r m a n y f r o m 1906 to 1911, K u l a t e r headed the e c o n o m i c s depar t r re nt at the U n i v e r s i t y of P e k i n g . In 1924, he j o i n e d the K M T and b e c a m e a n a s s o c i a t e of W a n g C h i n g - w e i . B y the t i m e of the c i v i l w a r , K u Meng.yu had b e c o m e a n i n f o r m a l s p o k e s m a n f o r a s h o r t l i v e d " t h i r d f o r c e " p o l i t i c a l m o v e m e n t w h i c h w a s b a c k e d by a n i n e f f e c t u a l g r o u p of C h i n e s e l i b e r a l s b a s e d i n H o n g K o n g who opposed the a u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m of bo th the 22 K u o m i n t a n g and C h i n e s e C o m m u n i s t P a r t y . In 1920, fou r y e a r s b e f o r e he b e c a m e i n v o l v e d i n p o l i t i c a l a f f a i r s , K u a u t h o r e d a n a r t i c l e w h i c h echoed m a n y of the o b s e r v a t i o n s e x p r e s s e d by C h ' e n C h ' a n g - h e n g . K u fe l t that M a l t h u s ' t h e o r y , a l t h o u g h often m i s r e p r e s e n t e d , d e m o n s t r a t e d a h u m a n e c o n c e r n f o r p e o p l e ' s l i v e l i h o o d w h i c h w a s absen t i n the p o l i t i c a l e l i t e s of the pas t who w e r e c o n s t a n t l y p r o m o t i n g p o p u l a t i o n 23 g r o w t h i n o r d e r to i n c r e a s e t h e i r s u p p l y of d r a f t l a b o u r . I n e x p l a i n i n g the l i n k b e t w e e n o v e r p o p u l a t i o n and p o v e r t y , K u M e n g - y i l " r e fu ted the a r g u m e n t that p o v e r t y i n C h i n a w a s the r e s u l t of e x p l o i t a t i o n . A c c o r d i n g to K u , C h i n a ' s p o v e r t y r . r e s u l t e d f r o m a h i g h l y u n f a v o u r a b l e r a t i o of c a p i t a l to p o p u l a t i o n . B e c a u s e of t h i s l a c k of c a p i t a l , the o p p o r t u n i t i e s to w o r k w e r e l i m i t e d , the c o m p e t i t i o n for a v a i l a b l e j obs w a s f i e r c e , and p e r c a p i t a p r o d u c t i v i t y wa s l ow b e c a u s e t h e r e was l i t t l e e c o n o m i c i n c e n t i v e fo r 24 c a p i t a l i n t e n s i v e p r o d u c t i o n t e c h n i q u e s . T h i s s i t u a t i o n , K u a r g u e d , w a s not the w o r k of a n y g r o u p of c a p i t a l i s t s b e c a u s e e v e n those w i l l i n g to w o r k f o r the m o s t m e a g e r remuimie r a t i o n c o u l d not f i n d e m p l o y m e n t . H e n c e , e v e n i f one w e r e to v i e w the p o v e r t y of C h i n a i n t e r m s of e x p l o i t a t i o n , i n K u ' s o p i n i o n the o n l y e f f ec t ive r e m e d y s t i l l i n v o l v e d s o l v i n g the p o p u l a t i o n p r o b l e m w h i c h c r e a t e d the a p p a l l i n g l y e x c e s s i v e s u p p l y of l a b o u r i n r e l a t i o n to the 18 25 demand for it. 1 Naturally, Ku did not limit his concern to the issue of poverty. He further stated that overpopulation and the-poverty that accompanied it adversely affected the quality of society as a whole both physically and morally. According to Ku, education could not become widespread because of the lack of capital in relation to the size of the population, and, hence, the uncontrolled increases in the population would consist of ignorant scoundrels without moral or physical value. Moreover, he argued that the 'good' elements of society who make the sacrifices necessary for social progress could not develop or survive amid the fierce struggle for survival in an overpopulated country. Using an interest-ing metaphor, Ku compared an overpopulated society to an unfair official who 1 26 rewards the evil and punishes the good. According to Ku's analysis, survival was so paramount in an overpopulated society that those who robbed and cheated were respected as standards so long as they provided for their families. This kind of competition resulting from population pressure, in Ku's eyes, destroyed all motives for mutual love and cooperation. .Instead of identifying with the nation, people developed a perverse conception of self-interest which Ku characterized by the phrase^, "whatever is of benefit to the people, most 27 likely entails a loss for me". It is important to understand that Ku did not object to competition or. the pursuit of selft-interest per se. He simply wanted to point out how their character changed in an overpopulated country like China where the province of Shantung alone was more densely populated than any European country including industrialized England. According to Ku , the competition in less populated countries was less fierce and of a more healthy nature. Because life was easier, the 'good' elements had a chance to develop and exist 28 independently. In Ku's estimation, no attempt to improve the moral or material quality 19 of Chinese society would be of any use unless it addressed the basic problem of disequil ibrium between population and capital. L ike Ch'en Ch'ang-heng, Ku felt that efforts to bring good honest government to China could not, by themselves, accomplish much, because poor government itself was one of the symptoms of an overpopulated nation. Neither, according to this view, could industry develop so long;= as population pressures inhibited capital formation and the economic incentives for capital intensive techniques. In this respect, Ku ie.vend hinted that aid to the poor accomplished more harm than good, because a greater share of a certain sum of money would be devoted to social development if it were concentrated in the hands of a single 29 person instead of many. Throughout Ku Meng-yu's discussion of the population problem in China, the topic of art i f ic ia l birtkcontrol was conspicuously avoided. Like Ch'en Ch'ang-heng, he portrayed the traditional cultural values and social institutions that were already under attack from nearly a l l intellectual c irc les as the source of China's population problem. Although he did not expressly condemn art i f ic ia l contraception, Ku's proposals for population control were l imited to the destruction of already discredited social practices . These included early-marriage , concubinage, and 'the religious customs and moral i ty which cause 30 overpopulation'. Hence, Ku's position on the appropriate means of population control was roughly s imi lar to that of Ch'en Ch'ang-heng, and probably for the same reasons. Hsii Shih-lien was another promoter of population control whose educational background was characterist ic of most Chinese l iberals of the May Fourth era . Hsu attended Stanford University and afterwards successfully studied for a P h . D, at the University of Iowa. In 1923, he began teaching at Wuchang^Normal University and later taught at the University of Peking and Tsinghua University 31 where he lectured on sociology. 20 In a n a r t i c l e w r i t t e n i n 1926, H s u stated that the o v e r a l l p o p u l a t i o n p r o b l e m i n C h i n a was one w h i c h i n v o l v e d c o n c e n t r a t i o n , q u a l i t y , the d i s t r i b u t i o n of w e a l t h , and the b i r t h r a t e as w e l l as aggregate n u m b e r s . U s i n g a l i n e of a r g u m e n t s i m i l a r to that of Ch'en Ch'ang-heng and K u M e n g - y i i , H s u d e c l a r e d that t h e q u a l i t y of a s o c i e t y was, to a g r e a t extent, d e t e r m i n e d by p o p u l a t i o n p r e s s u r e s . In Hsu's eyes, the unemployment, s i c k n e s s , p o v e r t y , p r o s t i t u t i o n , i n f l a t i o n , and w a r l o r d i s m w h i c h c h a r a c t e r i z e d China's s o r r y 32 state c o u l d a l l be t r a c e d to o v e r p o p u l a t i o n . P r o d u c t i o n was hampered, a c c o r d i n g to Hsu, by the f a c t that r e l a t i v e l y few people r e a c h e d the o p t i m u m p r o d u c t i v e age of between t h i r t y and f o r t y y e a r s because of p o p u l a t i o n p r e s s u r e s . In u n d e r s c o r i n g the c y c l i c a l n a ture of the p o p u l a t i o n p r o b l e m , H s u a l s o a r g u e d that the m a t e r i a l and i n t e l l e c t u a l b a c k w a r d n e s s of the p o p u l a t i o n as a whole h a m p e r e d the o p p o r t u n i t y of c h i l d r e n f u l l y to develop. E v e n i f they p h y s i c a l l y 33 s u r v i v e d c h i l d h o o d , H s u f e l t that m o s t w e r e l i k e l y to become l i s t l e s s z o m b i e s . In c o m p a r i n g the q u a l i t y of the C h i n e s e people w i t h the W e s t e r n e r s , H s u p e r c e i v e d the g r e a t e s t d i s p a r i t y to e x i s t among what he t e r m e d 'people of m i d d l e i n t e l l i g e n c e ' . The advantage that C h i n a s u p p o s e d l y enjoyed among 'the people of h i g h e s t i n t e l l i g e n c e ' was, to Hsu, of l i t t l e advantage i n t e r m s of n a t i o n a l : ; v i t a l i t y . B e c a u s e the q u a l i t y of the C h i n e s e people, was the m o s t v i t a l f a c t o r that a f f e c t e d n a t i o n a l s t r e n g t h , H s u e x h o r t e d h i s c o u n t r y m e n to f u l f i l l t h e i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to the n a t i o n by having f e w e r c h i l d r e n and a v o i d i n g the c o n d i t i o n s w h i c h c r e a t e d the s o c i a l d r e g s that' plagmed C h i n a . Hsu. d i d not e l a b o r a t e on the means by w h i c h a l o w e r b i r t h r a t e c o u l d be a c h i e v e d . He r a t h e r w e a k l y e x p r e s s e d d i s a g r e e m e n t w i t h M a r g a r e t Sanger who had e a r l i e r v i s i t e d C h i n a , but he d i d not e x p l i c i t l y condemn a r t i f i c i a l c o n t r a c e p t i o n i n u n e q u i v o c a l t e r m s 34 as had C h en C h ang-heng. N o r . d i d he a r g u e that a l o w e r b i r t h r a t e would r e s u l t f r o m an a l l - o u t a t t a c k on the C o n f u c i a n s o c i a l s y s t e m a s i d e f r o m a 21 brief comment on the ability of Western women successfully to secure a productive occupation without marry ing . Although Hsu did not dwell on the role of social reform in reducing China's birth rate, he did devote a considerable amount of attention to problems which aggravated the population situation. Basical ly , these were the unbalanced distribution of China's population, an archaic mode of agriculture, and the existence of too many consuming elements in society. Hsu admitted that the population density of China's twenty-one provinces, 238 people per square mile , was not particularly high when compared with certain European countries. This figure, Hsu pointed out, would be even be lower if Tibet and other border 35 regions that were nominally under Chinese sovereignty were included. By promoting migration from the densely populated areas to the sparsely popu-lated regions, Hsll felt that this aggravating factor to China's population situation could be ameliorated. However, Hsu scoffed at any suggestion that the aggregate-, population density of China was too low by pointing out that many of the relatively densely populated countries in Europe were industrial powers that could trade manufactured products for agricultural goods. As ide from that, Hsu noted that China's population was s t i l l greater than ; that of a l l the white imperial ist nations combined. Hsu also stressed the need to reform agriculture, but did not propose anything concrete. The other factor which intensified population pressure, according to Hsu, was the large, proportion of China's potential workforce which was not productively uti l ized. These included what Hsu termed the 36 'concentration of unproductive people in the cities' . However, labouring under the impress ion that the upper-class ideal of womenfolk who were restricted to the home held true for Chinese society as a whole, Hsu felt that women were the largest single source of unproductive consumers of the country's resources . The 'surplus' women who could not become, members 22 o f any h o u s e h o l d w e r e , i n H s u ' s v i e w , f o r c e d b y s o c i a l c i r c u m s t a n c e s to b e c o m e p r o s t i t u t e s and the l i k e who o n l y c o n t r i b u t e d to a ' p o i s o n o u s c o n s u m i n g e l e m e n t 1 i n the c i t i e s . O b v i o u s l y , w o m e n ' s r i g h t s h e l d a h i g h p r i o r i t y / f o r H s u i n e a s i n g C h i n a ' s p o p u l a t i o n c r i s i s . In r a i s i n g a n u m b e r of s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l i s s u e s w h i l e a d d r e s s i n g the p o p u l a t i o n q u e s t i o n , H s u d i d not d i f f e r f r o m C h ' e n C h ' a n g - h e n g o r K u M e n g y i i . H o w e v e r , K u and C h ' e n a l w a y s l i n k e d s u c h i s s u e s d i r e c t l y to the p o p u l a t i o n q u e s t i o n . F o r e x a m p l e , C h ' e n C h ' a n g - h e n g , l i k e H s u , f a v o u r e d m i g r a t i o n to the b o r d e r r e g i o n s , but he a l s o a r g u e d that m o s t i n d i v i d u a l s w e r e u n l i k e l y to b e c o m e s e l f - r e l i a n t p i o n e e r s i f they d e v e l o p e d i n an e n v i r o n m e n t c h a r a c t e r -i z e d by m a t e r i a l d e p r i v a t i o n and c l a n t y r a n n y . H s u , on the o t h e r hand , d e a l t w i t h s u c h i s s u e s as e n t i r e l y e x t r a n e o u s f a c t o r s w h i c h a g g r a v a t e d the b a s i c p r o b l e m of o v e r p o p u l a t i o n . B y d o i n g so , H s u b e c a m e p r o n e to the c h a r g e that he a r b i t r a r i l y f o c u s e d on o v e r p o p u l a t i o n as the m a j o r p r o b l e m i n C h i n a w h i l e f a i l i n g to c o n s i d e r the p o s s i b i l i t y that t he se ' a g g r a v a t i n g ' f a c t o r s a l o n e w e r e the c a u s e of C h i n a ' s s o r r y c o n d i t i o n . A s s h a l l be d e m o n s t r a t e d l a t e r , m a n y of the C h i n e s e opponents of M a l t h u s i a n i s m c i t e d these s a m e a g g r a v a t i n g f a c t o r s m e n t i o n e d by Hsu. to a r g u e that no p r o b l e m of o v e r p o p u l a t i o n e v e r r e a l l y e x i s t e d i n the f i r s t p l a c e . N o b i o g r a p h i c a l i n f o r m a t i o n i s a v a i l a b l e on L o H u n g - s h u n who a l s o e x p r e s s e d s t r o n g s u p p o r t f o r population e®nt<roirMcael'^2;6t-afKtiMel.9M .tefrrrs of l o g i c a l o n e , L o ' s r e a s o n i n g w a s r o u g h l y s i m i l a r to that of C h ' e n C h ' a n g - h e n g and K u M e n g ^ y u . H o w e v e r , L o ' s a p p e a l for p o p u l a t i o n c o n t r o l had a l r e a d y a s s u m e d s o m e of the d e f e n s i v e n e s s w h i c h w a s to b e c o m e m o r e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of C h i n a ' s s u p p o r t e r s of p o p u l a t i o n c o n t r o l i n the la te t w e n t i e s and t h i r t i e s . D e s p i t e the m u l t i p l i c i t y of p r o b l e m s that plaigued C h i n a , L o fe l t that t h e i r c o m m o n r o o t w a s o v e r p o p u l a t i o n . A f t e r c o m m e n t i n g on how n u m e r o u s C h i n e s e s o c i a l r e f o r m e r s and i n t e l l e c t u a l s had w a s t e d a g r e a t d e a l 01 t i m e and e f for t 23 i n attempting to formulate solutions to China ' s numerous soc ia l , economic, and p o l i t i c a l p roblems, L o stated: In researching s o c i a l p roblems, f rom each cause one can find another cause, and f rom each root can be t raced another root. (By using such means of research) one can d i scove r the population p rob lem to be what affects, society as the basic p rob lem and what forms the s o c i a l and l ive l ihood si tuat ions. 37 This r e m a r k d r ama t i ca l l y i l lu s t r a t ed the extent to which the debate over Mal thus i an i sm involved a fundamental disagreement concerning the causa l re la t ionships of China ' s var ious d i f f i cu l t i es . L i k e Ch ' en Ch'ang-heng, L o focused on the adverse effect of a high bir th rate on ind iv idua l development which, in turn, adverse ly affected the quali ty of the country 's people. In making this argument, L o quoted E n g l i s h popula-t ion expert H a r o l d Cox . A c c o r d i n g to Cox, a high b i r th rate was the cause of poor health standards i n backward countr ies , and because of this their people were often deficient i n phys i ca l and menta l development. Na tu ra l ly , L o pointed out theS de t r imenta l effects that this entailed l o r society in te rms of low - i ind iv idua l efficiency and soc i a l d i so rde r s rooted in poverty. However , L o a lso drew attention to another ha rmfu l resul t of a high b i r t h rate hitherto unmentioned by his contemporar ies . This was the great squandering of what he termed ' s o c i a l energy' that was used to give b i r th to and r a i se vast numbers of ch i ld ren whom" L o felt had no chance of s u r v i v a l . A c c o r d i n g to L o , this constituted a great loss to society of energy that could have been channeled 38 e lsewhere . L o r e fe r red to C o x ' s analysisIa:s as'seientif-ictirexplanation of the re la t ionship between the quali ty of a people and a hign b i r t h rate . L o had a specif ic .purpose i n mind when he used the t e rm ' scen t i f i c ' , because immedia te ly thereafter he attacked those who opposed population con t ro l on the grounds that science and Socia l p rogress could overcome the na tura l obstacles to un l imi t ed population growth that were cited by Ma l thus . To L o , the ul t imate i rony of such op t imis t ic 24 faith in the power of science to solve a l l problems was that it, .itself, was unscientific. Moreover , social progress, Lo argued, could not be viewed as an extraneous factor that was not related to the cycle of causes and effects which involved the birth rate. To portray a concrete image of this relationship, L o used a diagram in which "the necessary conditions for social progress" were traced to a "low rate of propagation". Concomitantly, the "causes of a lack of social progress" were a l l traced to a "high rate of propagation" in a 39 companion diagram. Hence, in Lo's view, a high birth rate was an obstacle to social progress and, at the same time, a result of the lack of it. L ike Ch'en Ch'ang-heng and Ku Meng-yii , Lo singled out China's backward social and cultural traditions as the major factors in China which contributed to a high birth rate and avoided mention of art i f ic ia l birth control as a potential solution to the population problem. These backward traditions were a l l connected with the Confucian virtue of f i l ia l piety. Lo's argument concerning the harmful effects of the extended family and early marr iage on individual incentive was remarkably s imi lar to that articulated by Ch'en Ch'ang-heng 40 and was without, any noteworthy differences. , The issue of national strength was the ultimate concern of Lo in promoting population control. Lo acknowledged that, "Since ancient times, before science and today's types of weapons, the rise and fall , andisur-vival and annihilation of a people were determined by their numbers (vis-a-vis other nations). " However, according to L o , to persist in such an anachronistic attitude toward 41 national strength was to remain "unenlightened of world trends". By letting a high birth rate remain unchecked, L o feared that China would lose interna-42 tional footing and r i s k "being trampled upon by other races". However, Lo's appeal for population control on nationalist grounds was marked bly a rather defensive tone that suggested he was cognizant of a hostile attitude toward Malthusianism on the part of a nationalist readership. Lo 25 l i terally pleaded with his readers not to misunderstand his position by believing that he was opposed to the increase of good elements in the population that were beneficial to society. A l so , Lo flatly declared that he did not promote individualism in promoting population control. His only goal was to seek good fortune for society through the individual on up. Although this was roughly s imi lar to Ch'en Ch'ang-heng's position, Ch'en attempted to establish a much stronger link between individualism and nationalism so that such a d i sc la imer was unnecessary. The inability to reconcile individualism, however qualified, and nationalism was to prove to be a major difficulty for the promoters of population control in later years . Although most of the promoters of population control went to great pains in order to dem'onstrate that their views, in the long run, were consistent with China's national interests, there were exceptions to this pattern such as P'eng I-hu. In a 1920 article , P'eng attacked the arguments against Malthusianism posed by various European socialists, many of which were later utilized by the Chinese opponents of population control. . P'eng challenged the commonly held assumption in socialist c irc les that any increase in population could be offset by the increase in production due to an expanded supply of labour. Agr icu l tura l products, argued P'eng, were the most obvious example of a basic necessity that could not be manufactured in ever increasing amounts by 43 industrial factories no matter how progressive tne society. This argument, of course, was nothing more than a paraphrase of the principle of--the d iminish-ing returns on land as outlined by Malthus in his essay. P'eng never became a major figure in the debate over population control in later years. He was untypical of most of the advocates of population control in that he addressed the question of population growth in theoretical terms without referring to conditions particular to China or any nationalist asp ira-tions for his country. The universal nature of population growth was the only 26 concern of P ' eng , and he made no attempt to make his views more palatable to a nationalist readership beyond presenting a l og i ca l l y consistent argument. Hence, P 'eng had no qualms about supporting a r t i f i c i a l contraception as a solution to the Mal thus ian d i l e m m a of population growth. P 'eng was more typ ica l of the cosmopol i tan in te l lec tua l than the ma jo r i ty of Chinese thinkers who found themselves deeply moved by the nat ional is t i ssues of the M a y Fou r th per iod . The educational ^background of T 'ao Meng-ho was roughly s i m i l a r to that of the broad c lass of in te l lec tuals who tended to be China ' s l i b e r a l s . Af te r attending Tokyo N o r m a l U n i v e r s i t y , T 'ao studied economics at London U n i v e r s i t y and later taught at Na t iona l Peking N o r m a l U n i v e r s i t y and the U n i v e r s i t y of Peking where he was an ins t ruc tor of p o l i t i c a l sc ience . However , T'ao's posi t ion on the population question differed great ly f rom that of most supporters of popula-t ion cont ro l i n both logic and emphasis . It was only unwi l l ing ly that he was lumped with the Chinese Mal thus ians and Neo-Mal thus ians by later opponents 44 of population con t ro l . In a 1920 a r t i c l e , T 'ao dec la red that the problem of poverty i n Ch ina and most places on the globe was the resul t of an unequal d i s t r ibu t ion of weal th . To T 'ao , Ma l thus i an i sm m e r e l y u t i l i zed the theore t ica l ly poss ib le capabi l i ty of reproduct ion to ra t iona l ize the existence of pover ty . He attr ibuted the existence of poverty i n even wealthy nations to the 'd isease ' of M a l t h u s i a n i s m and ci ted f igures that i l lus t ra ted the unequal d i s t r ibu t ion of wealth i n two of the w o r l d ' s most powerful i ndus t r i a l countr ies , the United States and the United K i n g d o m . Accordihgt toT 'ao , the tendency of wealth to concentrate into the hands of a few was becoming more pronounced i n the modern w o r l d . Hence, T 'ao felt that poverty had l i t t le connection with overpopulat ion and, instead, l inked it with t-heiJexplbiitati'onl and unequal d i s t r ibu t ion which charac te r i zed a country 's p o l i t i c a l and economic sys tem. 27 However, while attacking Malthusianism, T'ao envisioned an eventual drop in the birth rate as inevitable if China were effectively to deal with the problem of poverty. He concentrated on the distribution of wealth as the cause of poverty because he strongly opposed Malthus' assumption that poor people, if given a greater share of society's wealth, would simply propagate in greater numbers until the same degree of poverty existed among a larger population. On the contrary, T'ao portrayed a r i se in living standards as an effective means of achieving a lower birth rate. He argued that as a society becomes more developed its birth rate declines, and that within the society the upper-classes experience an even sharper decline in the birth rate. A lower birth rate, according to T'ao, was the natural 'impulse' of a more enlightened society and of more enlightened individuals. Hence, in concentrating exclusively on the unequal distribution of wealth, T'ao argued that overpopulation among the poor was, itself, a byproduct of unequal distribution, exploitation, and 45 poverty. T'ao differed from the promoters of population control in that he felt poverty 46 was the product of overpopulation and not the other way around. He did not advocate population control at the time he wrote this article only because he felt that the population situation would correct itself without any special effort once economic justice was achieved. However, like the proclaimed supporters of population control, T'ao certainly had no illusions about China's ability to achieve social progress and, at the same time, accommodate an ever growing population. In this sense, hfe had more in common with the advocates of population control than most of the Chinese opponents of Malthusianism. A l s o , later research on population trends in China was to destroy his overly sanguine hopes that the population problem required no other solution beyond raising the living standards. The majority of the Chinese proponents of Malthusianism tended to demonstrate 28 a belief in the tenets of c lass ica l l iberal i sm and viewed China's problems in terms of the individual's inability to develop or care for his own needs. To them, exploitation constituted only a secondary cause of poverty and social d isorder . The basic solution to China's problems, in their view, involved the creation of an environment in which individuals could develop the ability to protect and further their own interests. In this respect, a national programme of population control played a major role in China's progress along the path of economic laissez faire as envisioned by Chinese l iberals . Ku Meng-yu, for instance, 'saw. population control as vital to correct the glut in the labour market which, more than any profit-minded capitalists, drove wages down and discouraged investment in capital intensive enterprises. Obviously, the advocates of population control were not unconcerned with the collective interests of China as a nation. If anything, that was their ultimate concern! It was the fundamental position of Chinese l iberals that the lack of individual emancipation harmed the nation's collective interests above a l l else, and their greatest challenge was to convince the Chinese public of the comple-mentary nature of individual freedom and national strength. Because their devotion to nationalism was the ultimate justification for their ideological preferences, the Chinese promoters of population control were quite capable of selectively supporting certain kinds of state power that many of the defenders of individual liberty in Western countries found to be anathemas. In spite of the issue of individual choice and his own l iberal inclinations, Ch'en Ch'ang-heng, for example, opposed art i f ic ia l contraception as an evil practice which could bring about the general m o r a l decline of the nation. A n even more poignant example of the subordinate role that their support of individual l iberty assumed in relation to nationalism was their interest in the study of eugenics as a means of improving the quality of China's population. However, such authors as Lo Hung-shun and Ch'en Ch'ang-heng 29 believed that under the circumstances of the time, a policy of eugenics was much less vital for developing national strength than population control. Lo, for instance, felt that artificial selection was an impossibility in China at that time because the high rate of births allowed so few to reach their natural 47 potential that there was no way of determining who were genetically superior. Nonetheless, their interest in eugenics alone illustrated the qualified nature of their belief in the emancipation of the individual. The nationalism of those who advocated population control, like those who felt that China's population was not growing fast enough, was based on a firm belief in Social Darwinism. To them, the quality of China's people was more vital in the struggle for national survival than their quantity. However, this notion of struggle and competition was confined to the level of the nation-state. Unlike Herbert Spencer, these Chinese Social Darwinists did not apply the doctrine of the survival of the fittest to individuals or social classes within the nation. Their conception of individual development and self-interest did not include anything so inconsistent with the collective interests of the nation as competitive struggle between compatriots. In their eyes, the fierce struggle to survive within the nation was part of the unhealthy syndrome which character-ized China's condition at the time. Ch'en Ch'ang-heng, for instance, virtually dichotomized the social objectives of the country into the categories of inter-national (kuo-wai) and intranational (kuo-nei). In his view, the goal of the country in international relations was to avenge disgraces at the hands of foreigners and to be fully prepared to engage in the ruthless struggle that would entail extinction for the 'inferior' nations. In stark contrast to this, he portrayed the internal duties of the nation to include 'restraining the strong' 48 and 'supporting the weak'. Although the Chinese supporters of population control promoted the emancipation of the individual and the pursuit of self-interest as cultural traits 30 consistent with the achievement of national'strength, they felt obliged to modify these principles in cases where the seeming contradiction with nationalist goals was hard to dispute. Lo Hung-shun even felt compelled to apologize for the overtones of individualism in his argument. Clear ly , their belief in certain tenets of c lass ica l l ibera l i sm was not based upon a belief in any transcendental or natural origin of the individual's conscience or rights within the group. In understanding the Chinese l iberals ' rather pragmatic attitude toward the emancipation of the individual, one must remember that some of the intellectuals whose wo>r:Rs formed the foundation of c lass ica l l iberal i sm in the West were also aware of the advantages that .greater human ffveedom entailed for national strength. Adam Smith, for instance, argued that a country whose economy flourished from unfettered commerce would be material ly capable 49 of waging prolonged wars and emerging victorious. Nonetheless, the l imi ta-tions that the Chinese advocates of population control felt complelled to place on excessive individualism foreshadowed the defensive stance that they were forced to take in later years as the debate over the population issue unfolded. The opponents of population control were to focus on the contradictory nature of any sort of individualism and dedication to the nation in the eyes of the Chinese public as a vulnerable area in the arguments of t h e ; a d „ e r - e n t s of Malthusianism. Up through the mid-twenties, reliable population figures for China were conspicuously lacking in the various works on the population issue, and the lack of accurate methods for taking censuses was decried by nearly a l l the promoters of population control. Their theories on birth rate trends were a l l based on figures for Western countries, and they had to spend no little effort in trying to convince their readership that China's population was increas-ing. Only .inflate r years were they able to cite extensive surveys and accurately 31 adjusted census f igures more conc lus ive ly to demonstrate that Ch ina ' s population was indeed growing . 32 Notes to Chapter III 1. Ch'en Ch'ang-heng, Chung-kuo jen-k'ou lun (On the population of China) (Shanghai, 1926), pp. 7-10. 2. Ibid., p. 55. 3. Ibid., pp. 35-36. 4. Ibid., p. 6. 5. Ibid., p. 42. 6. Ibid., p. 55. 7. Ibid. , pp. 40-42. 8. Ibid. , pp. 107-110. 9. Ibid. , pp. 74-76. 10. Ibid. , pp. 139-140. 11. Ibid., p. 72. 12. Ibid. , pp. 73-74. 13. Ibid. , p. 80. 14. Ibid. , p. 137. 15. Ibid., p. 4. 16. Ibid. , pp. 22, 68. 17. Although he used the term 'eugenics', Ch'en Ch'ang-heng did not expressly promote any attempt at selective breeding. Ibid. , p. 143. 18. Ibid. , p. 54. 19. Ibid. , pp. 118-119, 218. 20. Ibid., pp. 86-106. 21. Ibid. , pp. 127-133. 22. Howard L . Boorman, Biographical Dictionary of Republican China (New York, 1971), vol. II, pp. 251-255. . 23. Ku Meng-yu, "Jen-k'ou wen-t'i, she-hui wen-t'i te so-yao" (The population problem, the key to the social problem), Hsin ch'ing-nien (New youth), vol. 7, no. 4 (April, 1920), p. 7. 24. This particular point was demonstrated by the coal mining industry in Shantung. The traditional labour intensive methods used by the Chinese produced coal more cheaply than the capital intensive mines operated by the Germans. John E . Schrecker, Imperialism and Chinese Nationalism (Cambridge, 1971), p. 188. . 25. Ku, "Jen-k'ou wen-t'i, she-hui wen-t'i te so-yao", p. 10. 26. Ibid. , pp. 11-12. 27. Ibid:, p. 13. 28. Ibid. , pp. 8, 14. 29. Ku felt that "benefiting society" was an appropriate euphemism for investing capital. Ibid. , pp. 9-10. 30. Ibid., p. 15. 31. Hashikawa Tokio, Chugoku bunkakai jimbutsu soran (A guide to cultural figures in China) (Peking, 1940), p. 524, 32i Hsu Shih-lien, "Min-tsu chu-i hsia te jen-k'ou wen-t'i" (The population problem under nationalism), Tung-fang, tsa-chih (The Eastern miscellany), vol. 23, no. 16 (August 25, 1926)7 pp. 31, 33. 33. Ibid., p. 34. 34. Ibid., p. 35. 35. Ibid., p. 31. 36. Ibid., p. 35. 37. Lo Hung-shun, "Kao sheng-chih Iii de Chung-kuo jen-k'ou wen-t'i yu min-tsu ch'ien-t'u" (The Chinese population problem of a high birth rate and the nation's future), Tung-fang tsa-chih, vol. 23, no. 23 (December 10, 1926), p. 40. 33 38. Lo , "Kao sheng-chih Iii te Chung-kuo jen-k'ou wen-t'i yii min-tsu ch'ien-t'u", pp. 42-43. 39. Ibid. , p. 44. 40. Ibid. , p. 40. 41. Ibid. , p. 41. 42. Ibid. , p. 46. 43. P'eng I-hu, "Lun jen-k'ou yu tseng-chia yii sheng-huo tsu-liao i-shang te heng-ch'ang ch'ing-hsiang" (On the constant tendency of population growth to outstrip the necessities of life), Hs in ch'ing-nien, vol . 7, no. 4 (Apr i l 1920), pp. 6-7. 44. Hashikawa, Chugoku bunkakai jimbutsu soran," p. k9Z, 45. T'ao Meng-ho^ "P'm-ch'iung yii jen-k'ou wen-t'i" (Poverty and the popula-tion problem), Hs in ch'ing-nien , vol . 7, no. 4 (Apr i l 1920), pp. 10-14. 46. A recent A m e r i c a n writer virtually recreated T'ao's argument on this point. B a r r y Commoner, "How poverty breeds overpopulation (and not the other way around)", Ramparts , September 1975. 47. L o , "Kao sheng-chih Iii te Chung-kuo jen-k'ou wen-t'i yu min-tsu ch'ien-t'u", p. 42. 48. Ch'en Ch'ang-heng, Chung-kuo jen-k'ou lun , p. 139. 49. Adam Smith, A n Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations , 2nd ed. (1778; rpt. New York: Random House, 1937), pp7~h59-6W. 34 IV. The Marxis t Response to Malthusianism Marxis t ideology has long provided intellectuals with grounds for opposing Malthus ianism or any programme of population control. However, at the time of the May Fourth period and afterwards, Marxis ts such as L i Ta-chao and Ch'en Tu-hs iu formed only a smal l portion of the bulk of Chinese cr i t i ca l of Malthusianism. Although some of their arguments were shared by non-Marxists opposed to Malthusianism, Marxis ts formed an independent group of intellectuals who 'E'evjie:et;edpthie)(hotion of overpopulation on non-nationalist grounds. There were also significant differences among the Marxists on this issue which deserve attention. In a sense, the Chinese Marx i s t response to Malthusianism antedates Chinese M a r x i s m . Neither Ch'en Tu-hs iu nor L i Ta-chao were declared Marxis t s at the time they first spoke out against Malthusianism. Nevertheless, their rationales for opposing Malthusianism were entirely consistent with the ideology that they adopted later and are st i l l used by Peking today. In spite of completely different appraisals of Chinese population trends and the different significance which they attached to a large population, both opponents and proponents of population control in China were pr imar i ly motivated to consider the population question by a nationalist concern over China's fate in a world that they-felt was governed by the forces of natural selection as outlined by Social Darwinism. ./In l y l ? L i Ta-chao felt compelled by his revulsion toward the horrors of the F i r s t World War to refute Malthus' theory of population growth. His pr imary goal in doing so was to debunk Social Darwinism which he felt was merely providing a pretext for needless aggression. When reconstructing the logic used by the polit ical leaders of various nations to justify aggression, L i portrayed a kind of reasoning very s imi lar to that of Liang Ch' i -ch'ao in which the link between Maltnusianism 35 and Social Darwinism was quite clear: j ; i In arousing their fellow countrymen, they constantly raise two things of which to be alert. They say, "The surface of the earth is l imited, and population's (capacity of) increasing is inexhaustible. If our people intend to plan for survival , it is impossible not to rely on mi l i tary strength in order to expand outwards. The survival of the fittest and the perishing of the unfit, the weak becoming food for the strong, the principle of evolution, (these are realities whichj cannot be escaped by any means." This (kind of logic) is based completely upon ^Malthus' theory of population and Darwin's theory of evolution. 1 In challenging the validity of Malthusianism, L i f irst asserted that most European countries were more concerned about their population decreasing rather than increasing. According to Li> statistics from countries such as England, France , and the United States a l l showed this trend, but none were cited in his art ic le . It was probably more likely that the polit ical leadership of various countries waseconcerned about the slowness of the population growth within their respective countries when compared with that of other nations, and expressed the same fears as Liang Ch'i—ch'ao about the future of their countries. This particular point, however, did not play a central role in L i ' s argument. He further claimed that even if the population of the' iwoieldaaisva • whole was growing, mankind had an unlimited natural capacity with which to exploit the resources of the 'universe' in order to survive and develop. The level of civil ization itself, L i argued, was determined by the extent to which mankind was able to harness its natural talents to resist the forces of nature. It was the constant progress of civil ization which L i felt could overcome the law of • diminishing returns of land, the cornerstone of Malthus' theory: The forces of mankind's ability are daily increasing while the forces of nature are daily diminishing. This is simply the advance in the level of civi l ization. The transmission of sound, light, electricity, and steam are a l l the captured products obtained by mankind's relying on its own ability to develop (things) in order to defeat the forces of nature. If there were no progress in civil ization, then how would the unchallengeable forces involved in the inability to transmit sound, the inability 36 to transmit illumination, the inability to utilize electricity to condense time and space be any different from the law of diminishing returns of land? 2 In other words, the law of diminishing returns of land was, to L i , simply another 'natural' obstacle which could be overcome by man's increasing capacity to control his environment (not mere ly to adapt to it) just as other natural obstacles had been overcome with the mater ia l innovations of the twentieth century. Although L i ' s portrayal of human progress in terms of 'conquering nature 1 was of questionable validity in disproving the law of diminishing returns, he perceived the harmful influence of Social Darwinism in causing people to take on an overly pragmatic attitude toward war. Perhaps as a result of the world war, L i c learly saw the danger in promoting national interests at' the expense of international ethics and refused to view the population question from a nationalist perspective. He attributed an international character to progress , and this set him apart from most of his notable contemporaries. To L i , the real struggle for survival consisted of the whole of mankind's struggle against nature, not of nations struggling against one another. According to L i , if nations persisted in justifying war on the grounds of national survival , then there was nothing to distinguish mankind from the animal kingdom. In L i ' s eyes, then, Malthusianism and Social Darwinism encouraged the development of the greedy and lazy nature of mankind, causing it to substitute amoral warfare for the development of its civil ization, the true solution to any population problem. Act_al ly , L i spent little effort disputing Malthus' promotion of population control. Instead, he focused most of his attention on this relation-ship between Malthusianism, Social Darwinism, and war. In an article that appeared in 1920, Ch'en Tu-hs iu pointed out that the populations of other countries with much higher living standards were growing even faster than China's population. He cited this seeming paradox as proof 37 that the real cause of poverty in China was the unequal distribution of wealth and the lack of scientific and technical progress in production techniques. To him, the fact that European countries were devising ways to increase their populations one hundred years after Malthus' essay was proof enough that the increase in food production could outstrip the real (not theoretically possible) increase in population. F r o m Ch'en Tu-hsiu's point of view, Malthus' theory had an essentially negative character in that it sought to explain the reasons for poverty instead of the reasons for wealth. In this respect, he found the doctrines of A d a m Smith to be far less objectionable. Because of its negative character, argued Ch'en Tu-hs iu , Malthusianism neglected the lack of scientific advances, refine-ment in production techniques, full utilization of the work force, equitable distribution of wealth, and adequate transportation systems as a cause of 3 poverty. Hence, according to Ch'en Tu-hs iu , the real source of poverty in China was to be found in those cultural traits which inhibited scientific and technical progress, not in a large population: With the present methods of increasing the supply of materials necessary for life.and a social system that honours idleness, if there is no reform, then half of the present population can be eliminated and we wi l l st i l l be unable to avoid the phenomenon of poverty. He acknowledged that overpopulation could be a source of difficulties in the remote future, but to be concerned about it before making any attempt to reform society was, in his opinion, like worrying about how to prepare for the eventual destruction of the planet. Although both Ch'en Tu-hs iu and L i Ta-chao demonstrated the same t e c h -nological and material ist optimism common among Chinese Marxis t s , Ch'en Tu-hs iu was specifically concerned with refuting the notion that population control was the key to China's problems. His arguments also revealed a 38 much stronger emphasis on a Marxis t class analysis . He saw Malthusianism as mere ly a biased theory used by capitalists to conceal the evils of an unequal distribution of wealth which was created by the system of private property. He placed great importance on the equal distribution of wealth, because he felt that the F i r s t World War was the result of industrial countries attempting to protect markets for an art i f ic ia l surplus of goods. Hence, an increase in productivity without an increase in the labourer's purchasing power was worse than useless in alleviating human suffering. The crowning injustice of Malthusianism, in the eyes of Ch'en Tu-hs iu , was its special emphasis on limiting the birth rate of the poor. To him, it was the increase among the 5 idle r ich which posed a greater problem for society. In 1931, an author named Feng Ho-fa made the Marx i s t case against Malthusianism in which he debated the significance of the population figures that were increasingly becoming available by that time. Feng's appeal also demonstrated a greater tendency to incorporate nationalist themes with the traditional Marxis t arguments against Malthusianism and population control. According to Feng, the census figures concerning population density that were gathered by local officials could not be trusted because of the extensive corruption in a l l levels of the bureaucracy. In order to conceal the embezzle-ment of tax revenues, government officials, argued Feng, tended to under-estimate the amount of land under cultivation in reports to higher authorities. He also pointed out the peasants' own inclination to conceal the actual amount of land under cultivation for fear of exploitation at the hands of these same officials,fiawSicli-re"vi^b;-ifji-».tHer compounded this problem. According to Feng, there were great inconsistencies in the figures of various government bureaus 6 from year to year. Feng conceded that surveys of population density in representative areas which were conducted by private groups and universities tended to be more 39 consistent, but he st i l l doubted their accuracy. To him, the areas surveyed were not truly representative of the entire country, and the researchers overlooked a variety of factors which influenced the rel iabil ity of their findings. One such factor, according to Feng, was the lack of popular acceptance of a 7 national standard for the basic unit of land measurement, the Chinese mou . In the eyes of Feng, such weaknesses in government censuses and private surveys a l l contributed to the tendency of population experts to overestimate the population density on cultivated land. Feng also challenged the notion that China's population was increasing as fast as calculated by some population experts at the time. One such expert was Ch'iao Ch' i -ming , a professor at Nanking University. According to a survey conducted by Ch'iao, China's population was increasing at a rate of >'.* 1. 43 percent a year with a birth rate of 42. 2 per thousand and a death rate of 27.9 per thousand. However, Feng claimed that the areas which Ch'iao surveyed were relatively free of catastrophes, both natural and human. Although he did not attempt to argue that China's population was decreasing, Feng declared that the rate of increase calculated by Ch'iao could not possibly be accurate 8 for the aggregate population. Oddly enough, Feng seemed oblivious to the arguments of the proponents of population control, including Malthus himself, that the calamities to which he referred were directly related to the tendency of population to grow quickly under ideal conditions. It was as though Feng thought that the inability of a population to grow in spite of a high birth rate was a phenomenon inconsistent with Malthusian logic. Although Feng's logic was not particularly strong on a number of points, he cited some figures produced by Ch'iao Ch' i -ming which severely weakened the theory that the extended family as idealized by Confucian tradition was responsible for the high birth rate and poverty among peasants. According 40 to Feng , Ch ' i ao ' s r e sea rch indicated that the average Chinese fami ly consisted of 5. 7 m e m b e r s . Although this was somewhat higher than in Wes te rn countr ies , it was w e l l wi th in the range of the nuclear fami ly . - C h ' i a o ' s f igures a lso showed that the weal th ier landlord fami l ies tended to be the la rges t . In Feng ' s view, this vindicated the M a r x i s t posi t ion that the advocates of population con t ro l and the doctr ine of Mal thus i an i sm i t se l f m e r e l y used the poor as a scapegoat for the injustices of the s o c i a l sys tem. Instead of breeding more poverty by increas ing in s ize , Feng argued that the average poor fami ly was col laps ing in s ize due to the des t ruct ion of the r u r a l economy brought on by 9 c o m m e r c i a l capi ta l and the greater concentrat ion of landlord ownership . In focusing on what he felt were the r e a l sources of China ' s problems which created the phenomenon of ' r e la t ive overpopulat ion ' , Feng ' s pos i t ion was roughly consistent wi th that of C h ' e n T u - h s i u . Feng , however, devoted a great deal more attention to specif ic examples of peasant exploitat ion by landlords and u s u r e r s . He viewed i m p e r i a l i s m and w a r l o r d i s m as great burdens for the Chinese peasantry as w e l l . Instead of the opponents of a corrupt Confucian t radi t ion which sanctioned the extended fami ly , Feng por t rayed the promoters of population cont ro l as apologists for the t r ad i t iona l exploi t ive 10 s o c i a l sys tem as w e l l as foreign i m p e r i a l i s m . When Feng Ho- fa ' s c r i t ique of Ma l thus i an i sm is compared wi th that of L i Ta-chao fourteen years e a r l i e r , the most noticeable change in the M a r x i s t posi t ion was a greater u t i l i za t ion of nat ional is t sentiments against population con t rg l . One aspect of this was evidenced in the c r i t i c i s m d i rec ted at M a l t h u s i a n i s m for i ts ro le in de-emphas iz ing the harmful effects of foreign i m p e r i a l i s m on Ch ina . L i Ta-chao had viewed i m p e r i a l i s m as an in ternat ional force that was de t r imenta l to a l l nations and did not dwe l l on its ha rmfu l presence i n China i n pa r t i cu l a r . A l s o , Feng felt that the promot ion of population cont ro l obscured the issue of populating China ' s border regions , an issue of 41 great n a t i o n a l i s t s i g n i f i c a n c e at the time. A c c o r d i n g to him, the system of private property as it existed i n China not only r e p r e s e n t e d economic exploita-tion in an extreme form, it also constituted a m a j o r b a r r i e r to the establishment 11 of w e l l populated and secure f r o n t i e r s . The i n c o r p o r a t i o n of na t i o n a l i s t themes in the M a r x i s t case against M a l t h u s i a n i s m was e n t i r e l y consistent with the development of M a r x i s t d o c t r i n e as a whole after Lenin's theory on i m p e r i a l i s m . To M a r x i s t s around the world, n a t i o n a l i s m in exploited col'oniafcicountries became a p r o g r e s s i v e f o r c e that had to be distinguished f r o m the n a t i o n a l i s m of i n d u s t r i a l countries which only s e r v e d to numb the c l a s s consciousness of the p r o l e t a r i a t . Hence, although the M a r x i s t s constituted a d i s t i n c t source of opposition to population control, in later y e a r s they did not e n t i r e l y neglect the na t i o n a l i s t resentment toward M a l t h u s i a n i s m i n their arguments. In t e r m s of putting the promotion of population c o n t r o l on the defensive in the eyes of the public, the a s s o c i a t i o n of M a l t h u s i a n i s m with the success of i m p e r i a l i s m i n China played a f a r m o r e important r o l e than the i s s u e of c l a s s exploitation as envisioned by M a r x i s t s . 42 Notes to Chapter IV I. L i Ta-chao, "Chan-cheng yii jen-k'ou wen-t'i" (War and the population problem), Chia-yin jih-k'an (Tiger daily), March 29, 1917, reprinted in L i Ta-chao hsuan-chi (Selected works, of L i Ta-chao) (Peking, 1959), p- 83. 27 Ibid., p. 84. 3. Ch'en Tu-hsiu, "Ma-erh-sai-ssu jen-k'ou lun yii Chung-kuo jen-k'ou wen-t'i" (Malthus' population theory and China's population problem), Hsin ch'ing-nien, vol. 7, no. 4 (April 1920), pp. 5, 11-12. 4. Ibid., p. 10. 5. Ibid. , pp. 8, 12-13. 6. Feng Ho-fa, "Chung-kuo nung-ts'un te jen-k'ou wen-t'i" (The population problem in Chinese peasant villages), Chung-hua nung-hsueh-hui pao (The journal of the Chinese agricultural association), nos. 89-90 (June-July 1931), no. 89, pp. 34-35. 7. Feng attributed this lack of a nationally accepted standard of land measure-ment to the fact that China had not yet entered the period of industrial capitalism. Ibid., pp. 35-37. "BTTBid. , no. 90, pp. 71-74. 9. Ibid. , no. 90, pp. 55-61. 10. Ibid. , no. 90, pp. 61-62. II. Ibid. , no. 90, p. 65. 43 V. The N a t i o n a l i s t Response to M a l t h u s i a n i s m The bulk of the debate over M a l t h u s i a n i s m as it unfolded i n the popular p r e s s took place within the ranks of the nati o n a l i s t b e l i e v e r s i n S o c i a l D a r w i n i s m . M o s t of the opponents of M a l t h u s i a n i s m objected to population c o n t r o l f or the same reasons that Ch'en Ch'ang-heng and others supported i t . They p e r c e i v e d population c o n t r o l to be h a r m f u l to China's national i n t e r e s t s and s u r v i v a l in a w o r l d of expanding nation-states. In denouncing M a l t h u s i a n i s m , their arguments tended not to be of an academic nature. T h e i r opinions were u s u a l l y e x p r e s s e d i n short a r t i c l e s that appeared i n popularly c i r c u l a t e d p e r i o d i c a l s such as The E a s t e r n M i s c e l l a n y . Some of the arguments posed against Malthus' population theory had a l r e a d y been anticipated i n his o r i g i n a l essay, and one is tempted to conclude that many of these authors had only a vague understanding of M a l t h u s i a n i s m without ever having read the o r i g i n a l work. E a r l y i n the May F o u r t h period, Yen Chih-chung, a graduate of the M e d i c a l D i v i s i o n of the Japanese I m p e r i a l U n i v e r s i t y with a background i n h e r e d i t a r y di s e a s e s , e x p r e s s e d the view that the s i z e of China's population did not affect its quality. ^  T o him, the tendency of a population to '< propagate beyond the number that can be supported by the environment^was m e r e l y a b i o l o g i c a l p r o c e d u r e by which the s u r v i v a l of any species i s guaranteed. Beyond this b i o l o g i c a l observation, Yen Chih-chung did not seem to p e r c e i v e any s o c i a l s i g n i f i c a n c e i n the tendency of the population to outs t r i p food supplies. L i k e L i a n g Ch'i-ch'ao, he viewed the a b i l i t y of a ra c e to propagate steadily as b i b l o g i c a l proof of its f i t n e s s . L i k e L i Ta-chao, he could not env i s i o n any 2 l i m i t to the cap a b i l i t y of te c h n i c a l innovations to i n c r e a s e food production. Yen Chin-Chung's m a i n c o n c e r n was the improvement of the quality of the Chinese people, and this, he felt, could not be achieved by a programme of population c o n t r o l . P r o b a b l y due to the nature of his academic training, he 44 argued that the development of a eugenics policy could best remedy the qualitative deficiencies of the population. Although Yen Chih-chung did not detail t h e-'Specific measures he desired to see implemented, he felt that the main thrust of such a policy should be to protect and encourage the good elements to multiply while decreasing the number of those who constituted burdens to society by somehow preventing their propagation. The almost exclusively biological emphasis of Yen Chih-chung's arguments was some-what untypical of most of the nationalist opposition to population control. However, his views dramatical ly illustrated the importance that Social Darwinism often assumed in the debate over Malthusianism. Perhaps the most influential opponent to population control was the uncontested leader of China's nationalist movement, Sun Yat-sen. His personal opposition to Malthusianism alone created many difficulties for the promoters of population control who were determined to reconcile their views with the nationalist cause in the eyes of the Chinese public. L ike Liang Ch' i -ch'ao , Sun could take little solace in the size of China's vast population while population trends around the world indicated faster rates of growth in Western countries and Japan. In his lecture on nationalism, Sun was quite explicit in viewing these population trends as a great threat to China's future as a nation: Let us now compare the rates of increase among the populations around the world. In the last century, A m e r i c a has increased tenfold, England has increased threefold as has Japan, Russia (has increased) by four times, Germany by two and a half times, and France by one fourth. The numerous reasons for these increases are due to the yearly improvements in scientific advances, the development of medicine, and the establishment of health facil it ies. Hence, deaths have been decreased and births increased. What relationship does this kind of speed in the increase of their populations have with China? When/comparing their increase in numbers to China's population, I am quite h o r r o r -stricken! F o r example, one hundred years ago A m e r i c a ' s population was no more than nine mil l ion, and now it is over one hundred mi l l ion . In another hundred years, at the same rate of increase, (the U . S . ) wi l l have a population of over a 45 bil l ion. China often prides herself on having so many people that it would be difficult for anyone else to annihilate her. After the Yuan dynasty seized control of China, not only could not the Mongolian race annihilate the Chinese, but instead they were assimilated by the Chinese. . . . The Manchu race also failed to annihilate the Chinese,, Instead they were assimilated by the Han race. . . . In the past, the reason why the Manchus could not conquer the Chinese race was because they numbered only one mi l l ion and several hundred thousand and were too few when compared with the Chinese population. So naturally they were absorbed by the Chinese. Now if the Amer icans come to conquer China and after one hundred years there are only four Chinese to be mixed among ten Amer icans , then China wi l l be assimilated by the A m e r i c a n s . . . . (F)rom the time of Ch'ien Lung, it has been nearly two hundred years and (the population of China) is st i l l four hundred mi l l ion . (The population of China) was four hundred mi l l ion one hundred years ago, and, naturally, it wi l l be four hundred mi l l ion another hundred years from now. ^ Sun's views were strikingly s imi lar to those of Liang Ch' i -ch 'ao . He viewed population growth as proof of social progress and held the same Social Darwinist conception of the modern international order into which China had been thrust. However, Sun recognized Malthusianism as a doctrine which justified population control, and he condemned it as such. Sun's impressions of population trends in the West were confined to the increase in aggregate numbers. He made no effort to study the birth rate trends and even wrongly assumed that the number of births in Western countries was increasing. Sun was also concerned with the individual cases of Western countries. Specifically, he was interested in their respective strength v i s -a -v i s their neighbours and the relationship of this with population trends. Naturally, the United States and Germany , two of the fastest growing countries, were prime examples of this relationship in the eyes of Sun. He viewed France , on the other hand, as an example of national decadence resulting from inadequate population growth: Although France's population is certa>inly;;no:jtqdecreasing, the rate of increase is not nearly as great as the other countries. Moreover , France is an agricultural country that is prosperous and whose people are affluent and particular about pleasure. A hundred years ago there was a scholar named Malthus who . . . established the theory that 'the increase in population is 46 geometric while the increase in the production of necessities is arithmetic' . Because the F r e n c h were so concerned with pleasure, (this theory) was quite fitting for their mentality. Thereupon, they welcomed Malthus' theory with great enthusiasm and advocated that men not assume the responsibility of a family and that women need not give birth to chi ldren. Their methods of decreasing the population not only included natural means but also art i f ic ia l means. A century ago, France ' s population was larger than a l l the other (European) countries. However, because Malthus' theory was widely welcomed after being transmitted to France , a l l the people took measures to decrease the population. Therefore, the reasons that France today suffers from having too few people is entirely due to the poisonous effect of Malthus 1 theory. . . . Now they have implemented a new government policy to encourage population growth and preserve their race. ^ Sun quite c learly connected any form of art i f ic ia l birth control with an i m m o r a l and selfish individualism which, in France , had run wild at the expense of national interests. Unlike Chinese l iberals , Sun did not view individual self-interest as a positive force that could enhance a country's national strength. His views also contrasted quite markedly with those of the advocates of population control who attempted to link a high birth rate with a lack of m o r a l commitment to the good of the-nation. The concern over the lack of population growth in certain European countries had provided L i Ta-chao with ammunition against Malthusianism as early as the F i r s t World W a r . By the mid-twenties, a great deal of attention was being directed to the population race in Europe. The number and nature of the articles in the popular Chinese press which dealt with this subject suggested that it must have been very difficult for Chinese to picture their nation outside of this worldwide struggle to achieve national strength by means of greater population growth. One such article by a writer named Chou Kuang-chao depicted the predica-ment of modern France in Europe, and to the Chinese readership France 's problems must have strongly resembled China's situation in A s i a . According to Chou, France was once a powerful nation due to a high birth rate and a population that kept increasing in spite of famines and plagues. France ' s 47 huge proportion of the entire population of Europe was, in his eyes, the main reason for her domination of that continent at the time of Napoleon. A l so , Chou felt that it was not coincidental that France 's birth rate was the highest 5 in Europe precisely at that period. However, since 188 6 France's birth rate had been steadily decreasing. Chou cited figures showing that the number of births in 1922 was 760, 000 compared with over a mil l ion in 1880 and that in 1911 deaths exceeded births by thirty thousand. Hence, Chou believed that France was in danger of becoming a 'small and insignificant nation'. He felt that the most significant source of danger for France was the rapid increase in the population of her r iva l nations, particularly Germany whose population had tripled in the years between 1846 6 and 1914. In discussing the population situation in Europe, Chou was pre-occupied with the effects on the relative mi l i tary strength of various nations. He even used drawings of soldiers to represent the sizes of various countries' 7 population in a diagram. Although Chou did not deny that the birth rates of a l l European countries were declining, he was p r i m a r i l y concerned with explaining why the decline in France's birth rate was particularly fast. Echoing the sentiments of Sun Yat-sen, Chou blamed what he imagined to be the excessive individualism that was running rampant in France . The French people were portrayed as so concerned with their individual self-interest that even the r ich avoided the responsibility of raising a family so that they would not have to share the enjoyment of their wealth. According to Chou, the more mountainous farmland in France was largely populated by foreign immigrants because F r e n c h peasants i did not want to support more children than needed to take over the family holdings. It was no accident that the population situation in France attracted the attention of many Chinese. Many striking parallels existed between the decline of France as the major power in Europe and the decline of China as the centre 48 of A s i a . In the past, both countries had based their power on a r ich and extensive agricultural economy, but became relatively stagnant in the last hundred years as their neighbours became industrialized nations with expanding populations. In the eyes of many Chine.se nationalists, Japan posed the same threat to China that Germany posed to France . Although China's numerical superiority-over Japan was unquestioned, many nationalists perceived the much higher rate of increase in Japan's population as an immediate threat to China. In an article entitled "Overpopulation in Japan add their Pol icy toward China", the author, Tang I-kiang, declared that the Japanese looked toward China like a "fine piece of meat" in considering the need for colonies to absorb their excess 9 population. Later events were to strengthen this conviction among Chinese opponents of population control. A s the foreign threats to China's border regions increased, migration to the unsettled frontiers became a major nationalist issue in the debate over population control. In 1925, an agricultural expert named P'eng Chia-y'uan emphasized both the potential of the border areas to absorb more people and their vulnerability to foreign encroachments to argue that migration was the fundamental solution to the poverty in the densely settled portions of China. According to P'eng, much of China's poverty resulted from ninety-six percent of the population being concentrated in the eighteen main provinces while only four percent inhabited two-thirds of China's total area . P'eng argued that such an unequal distribution of population was unprecedented for any country, and he attributed it to China's Confucian social customs and the Ch'ing govern-10 merit's h is torical neglect of the need to populate the border regions. P'eng was highly cr i t i ca l of those who held that these areas were 'deserts' unsuitable for agriculture and pointed out that one hundred years ago many people thought that a l l of western North A m e r i c a was one such vast 'desert'. 49 He felt that much of the border territories could either be irrigated or used for raising , Livestock, and that much of land already used for livestock, such as in Sinkiang, could be cultivated as farmland if Han peasants occupied such regions instead of the natives who were exclusively shepherds. Many of these 11 areas, according to P'eng, had great industrial potential as well . P'eng deemed it extremely important that China develop these border, areas as soon as possible before any foreign power could preempt such efforts. Russia had already seized the mining rights in Outer Mongolia, and P'eng was alarmed that many of the people in Sinkiang used Russian currency as their medium of exchange. He was also very much concerned with the inroads 12 that the Engl ish were making in Tibet. P'eng quite clearly viewed the development of the border areas as a major goal that would determine China's national survival and not merely as a means to solve overpopulation in the heart of China. He also felt that the source of the problem was a lack of wi l l on the part of the Chinese: "I am not worried about the tiger(like) looks of strong neighbours, overpopulation in the interior, or the handicaps of livelihood, but am worried about the lack of determination 13 to salvage these areas. " Although P'eng did not comment on Malthusianism, his arguments contained an implicit hostility toward population control which was to be articulated by many other Chinese nationalists. To them, the promotion of population control was an example of precisely the same lack of determination among Chinese tf'ha'thwas so caustically cr i t ic ized by P'eng. In 1927, a writer named Yang Hsiao-ch'un very effectively utilized the emotional strength of nationalism to express his opposition to population control. According to Yang, Malthusianism was only appropriate for a nonprogressive society. Echoing the arguments of Ch'en Tu-hs iu , Yang declared that the population of Europe had more than doubled since the time of Malthus, and yet no one there claimed that people's lives were more miserable or that some 50 sort of birth control programme was necessary. A l s o like Ch'en Tu-hs iu , Yang expressed an impatience .with people who would promote population control before making any attempt to reform society in order to increase production 15 and equalize distribution. However, Yang did not mention private property as a source of the social evils that kept people mired in poverty. To Yang, a large population was st i l l the ultimate source of national strength. With a large population, he argued, a country could raise a powerful army, the people could shoulder a heavy tax burden, and overseas colonies could more easily be established. After making this case, he further argued that even if a well- populated country was conquered, there was always the hope of recovering its independence and its lost terr i tor ies . Such would not be the 16-case, Yang felt, if the population were too sparse. Yang also realized that the quality of a nation's people was important for national strength, but like Yen Chih-chung he felt that this was not related to the population question and that measures to improve the quality of the Chinese people need not include any population policy. In this respect, Yang's promotion of the study of eugenics as a means of improving the Chinese population most 17 clearly demonstrated the influence of Social Darwinism. Yang's ability to tailor his appeal to the nationalist sentiments of a popular readership is worthyy of attention, because in many ways it characterized the upper hand enjoyed by the nationalist opponents of population control in gaining public support for their position. After introducing the topic, Yang quoted several foreigners who felt that China was overpopulated. Among Bertrand Russe l l and John Dewey, Yang included some less renowned individuals who, while pointing out the population problem, demonstrated a cultural arrogance by painting a less than flattering picture of the Chinese people. Among these were a Roman Catholic priest who said that China actually needed a famine to reach a more reasonable ratio of land to population, a Japanese 51 scholar who declared that the Chinese had a poor people's mentality, and another person who commented that the Chinese were a lazy people accustomed 18 to living on very little. This , no doubt, failed to give the readers a favour-able disposition toward the Chinese promoters of population control whom he mentioned next. Throughout Yang's art icle the resort to population control was equated with defeatism. One proposal that was often put forward by the opponents of population control was the development of industry so that China could trade manufactured goods for agricultural goods whose production was l imited by the amount of arable land. To Yang, the suggestion that industry alone could not alleviate China's poverty was an admission of inferiority to Europe, and the promotion of population control was tantamount to writing off the possibility 19 of China becoming a manufacturing nation. Yang associated population control with defeatism in the area of national defense as well, and poignantly cr i t ic ized the advocates of population control for ignoring the need to resist foreign imper ia l i sm in a l l its facets as an important factor in the solution to 20 China's difficulties. Yang attributed the encroachment upon Chinese terr i tory by the Soviet Union and Japan to the sparseness of the Chinese population in the border areas. With the populations of Japan and Russia rapidly growing and both countries demonstrating a keen interest in China's frontier regions, Yang argued that population control was diametrical ly opposed to the interests 21 of Chinese terr i tor ia l integrity. In opposing population control, Yang st i l l supported certain kinds of social reform that he admitted would result in a lower birth rate. L ike Ch'en Ch'ang-heng, Yang supported the nuclear family based on free marr iage and opposed both polygamy and early marr iage . However, he presented his proposals for social reform as direct measures to improve the quality of the Chinese people 22 and strictly viewed their effect on population trends as incidental. To Yang } 52 the overt promotion of population control was so distasteful that such a distinction in motives was important; In 1931, Fan Shih-jen, another foe of population control, focused on the same nationalist themes as Yang Hsiao-ch'un. Fan cited a number of reasons why the statistics on the population of China could not be trusted, and also argued that the possible annual rates of population growth that could be deduced from these figures, . 13 percent to . 6 percent, were st i l l quite low when 23 compared with the world average of 1. 2 percent. Fan , of course, viewed this as a dangerous trend for China's national survival . A s for the argument that China's population had already reached a saturation point, Fan pointed out that Japan, a country with a population density far greater that China's, was increasing at 1. 08,percent a year and was consequently threatening China's northe/a?stern provinces. Fan attributed this to Japan's enjoyment of polit ical stability, the absence of which, in his view, brought about the high death rate 24 in China. According to Fan, the confusion among scholars as to the total area under cultivation in China indicated that there was great potential for the development of new agricultural lands, part icularly in. the border regions where a greater population was needed for reasons of national security anyway. He envisioned 'science' as the key to realizing this potential which he felt the advocates of 25 population control ignored. The most serious charge that Fan leveled against Malthusianism was that the imperial ists used it as an 'amulet' to protect themselves from accepting responsibility for the harm they brought to China. Constructing an argument s imi lar to that of Feng Ho-fa , Fan contended that imperial is t encroachments destroyed the handicraft industries, disrupted the agrarian economy, and contributed to the general polit ical d isorder . A s a result, large numbers of people who would otherwise live in the countryside or have productive roles 53 in China's 'old' cities drifted into the 'new' cities that were created by foreign imper ia l i sm. In these cities, F a n argued, they became a lawless and non-productive burden to the nation as a whole or even became a destructive force 26 -upon joining warlord armies . To further tarnish the image of Malthusianism, F a n quoted a warlord who utilized overpopulation as a crude justification for 27 the widespread killings that resulted from China's internal warfare. Unlike most of the opponents of population control, F a n Shih-jen seemed to acknowledge the distinction between actual population growth and a high birth rate. He even echoed T'ao Meng-ho's belief that the combination of a high birth rate and a high death rate was the result and not the cause of China's 28 social backwardness. However, unlike T'ao, F a n did not believe that China would eventually depend on achi&ving a balance of a low birth rate and a low death rate once the social system was reformed. F a n believed that China 29 should strive to achieve both a high birth rate and a low death rate. He declared that history had amply demonstrated that population does not increase geometrically, otherwise mankind would have died from hunger long ago. According to him, Malthus had ignored the more hopeful possibility that increases in food production were the result of increases in the population 30 and not the other way around. In 1936, Hsiao Cheng, a contributor to the Eastern Miscel lany and several major Chinese newspapers, became involved in a public debate with Ch'en Ch'ang-heng and others over the issue of population and agricultural" produc-tivity. Challenging the relationship that Ch'en Ch'ang-heng portrayed between low living standards and high population density, Hsiao pointed out that many sparsely populated countries such as Spain suffered greater degrees of poverty 31 and backwardness than densely populated countries such as Great Br i ta in . Hsiao's most basic cobj-ec.tion to the promotion of population control, however, was its seemingly pessimistic nature. In stating the essential points 54 of disagreement, Hsiao attempted to recreate Ch'en Ch'ang-heng's arguments in their most negative nuance. According to Hsiao, Ch'en Ch'ang-heng believed that the productive capability of man was limited and that the supply of the essentials of life had already reached their highest l imit . To Hsiao, the advocation of population control implied a belief that agriculture could not be reformed and that land utilization had already reached its most concentrated 32 form. Hsaio was also annoyed that the promoters of population control implici t ly assigned a secondary role to imper ia l i sm, foreign economic penetration, and China's own internal corruption as causes of the nation's social chaos. To him, this was tantamount to ignoring them altogether. In response to the argument of many of the Chinese believers in Malthusianism that efforts at social reform could not succeed without a l imit to population growth, Hsiao ridiculed the notion that population control alone could solve China's difficulties. If one ignored the importance of social and scientific progress in this way, he argued, then one would have to admit that the human race suffered from over-34 population the very moment it came into existence. Although Hsiao's faith in the ability of human progress to accommodate an increasing population m i r r o r e d the technological optimism of L i Ta-chao, he did not utilize it as an appeal for internationalism. Hsiao, no doubt, did not envision himself a Marx i s t when he declared that the pessimist ic doctrine of Malthusianism was a form of mater ia l i sm which he could not accept. He, like most of the opponents of population control, was very much preoccupied with the population question as a nationalist issue. Hsiao expressed agree-ment with a fellow opponent of Malthusianism that the Chinese promoters of population control implici t ly belittled their own race. To Hsiao, the native inhabitants of Austra l ia , Canada, and New Zealand were practicing Ch'en Ch'ang-heng's population policy as they were gradually heading for extinction 55 in the struggle to survive. The distinction between the nationalist opposition to population control and that of their Marxis t contemporaries was by no means absolute. Both voiced some of the same objections to Malthusianism. Since Lenin's theory of imper ia l i sm in underdeveloped countries had gained popularity among many of the nationalists in colonial countries around the world including China's Sun Yat-sen, Marxis ts could easily harness the nationalist resentment toward imperial is t exploitation to denounce the validity of Malthusianism as an explanation for China's woes. However, class analysis was distinctly absent in the arguments of the nationalists who were determined to debunk Malthusian^ i sm. In this respect, it was ironic that among the Marxis ts L i Ta-chao stood apartumbst distinctly from the nationalist foes of Malthusianism. Although L i , like the nationalists, did not focus attention on a class analysis of the population issue, he explicitly attacked nationalism based on Social Darwinism as one of the evils that, in his eyes, developed from the doctrine of Malthus-r ianism. The nationalist opponents of population control of the May Fourth period continued to voice the same apprehensions as Liang Ch' i -ch'ao had ear l i er . In addition to their loyalty to the national entity, they expressed a belief in Social Darwinism as the natural force ^that determined the fate of individual countries in a world of competing nation-states. L ike Liang Ch' i -ch'ao , they felt that population growth was a barometer of both social progress and the fitness of the race to survive. In their eyes, population control was as h a r m -ful to a nation's interests as unilateral mi l i tary disarmament. The growing threats to China's border regions in the late twenties confirmed fears concern-ing the expanding populations of other countries. To most nationalists opposed to Malthusianism, the populating of the border regions was not mere ly a solution to overpopulation in the interior . They viewed it as an immediate 56 g o a l v i t a l to C h i n a ' s n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y , and any p r o g r a m m e of p o p u l a t i o n c o n t r o l , i n t h e i r o p i n i o n , w o u l d r e t a r d i t s r e a l i z a t i o n . A l t h o u g h bo th the opponents and p r o p o n e n t s of p o p u l a t i o n c o n t r o l a g r e e d on m a n y s p e c i f i c m e a s u r e s needed to s t r e n g t h e n C h i n a , s u c h as e d u c a t i o n a l and a g r a r i a n r e f o r m , t h i s w a s o v e r s h a d o w e d by the p r o f o u n d d i s a g r e e m e n t o v e r the c a u s e and effect r e l a t i o n s h i p of C h i n a ' s v a r i o u s d i f f i c u l t i e s . A c c o r d -i n g to the e n e m i e s of M a l t h u s i a n i s m , b o t h M a r x i s t a n d n a t i o n a l i s t , s c i e n t i f i c and s o c i a l p r o g r e s s w o u l d end any need to l i m i t p o p u l a t i o n g r o w t h . B e c a u s e the s u p p o r t e r s of M a l t h u s i a n i s m v i e w e d o v e r p o p u l a t i o n as the b a s i c p r o b l e m that w a s at the roo t of a l l o t h e r s , the foes of p o p u l a t i o n c o n t r o l d e c l a r e d that t h e i r d e d i c a t i o n to r e f o r m i n g C h i n a w a s s u p e r f i c i a l and i n g e n u i n e . S o m e , l i k e Y a n g H s i a o - c h ' u n , e v e n d e n o u n c e d M a l t h u s i a n i s m as a d e f e a t i s t i d e o l o g y of s e l f - d o u b t . T h e i n d i v i d u a l i s m that the C h i n e s e l i b e r a l s t r i e d to p o r t r a y as a c o m p l i -m e n t a r y i n g r e d i e n t to n a t i o n a l s t r e n g t h w a s r e j e c t e d by the n a t i o n a l i s t opponents of p o p u l a t i o n c o n t r o l as p r e c i s e l y the o p p o s i t e . B o t h Sun Y a t - s e n and C h o u K u a n g - c h a o c i t e d the F r e n c h e x p e r i e n c e i n E u r o p e as a n e x a m p l e of i n d i v i d u a l -i s m ' s t endency to s u b v e r t n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s . Y a n g H s i a o - c h ' u n a l s o d e c l a r e d that i n d i v i d u a l i s m w a s s e l f - d e f e a t i n g i n the end, b e c a u s e the i n d i v i d u a l depended 36 on a s t r o n g n a t i o n to a v o i d the m i s e r i e s of f o r e i g n d o m i n a t i o n . M a l t h u s i a n -i s m ' s n a t i o n a l i s t foes i m a g i n e d the h a r m f u l effects of i n d i v i d u a l i s m to be t w o -f o l d . I n t h e i r e y e s , i t c a u s e d p e o p l e to a v o i d r a i s i n g the c h i l d r e n n e e d e d to s e c u r e the n a t i o n ' s fu tu re i n the w o r l d , and i t e n c o u r a g e d a n a t i o n ' s peop l e to b e c o m e m o r a l l y decaden t i n t h e i r o w n b e h a v i o u r as they p u r s u e d s e x u a l g r a t -i f i c a t i o n f o r i t s o w n s a k e . A l t h o u g h m a n y M a y F o u r t h n a t i o n a l i s t s who d e s i r e d to r e f o r m C h i n a in to a p r o g r e s s i v e n a t i o n found M a l t h u s i a n i s m ' s s e e m i n g l y n e g a t i v e n a t u r e a p o w e r f u l m o t i v e to oppose i t , t h e i r a r g u m e n t s often f e l l qu i t e s h o r t of r e f u t i n g 57 the logic behind Malthus' essay on population growth. F o r example, both Marxis ts and nationalists cited the history of actual population growth in the the world as proof that population does not increase geometrically while food production increases arithmetically. However, Malthus had originally stated that population tends to increase geometrically and that such increases are restricted to unusual circumstances for l imited periods of time such as in North A m e r i c a after the initial period of colonization. According to Malthus, the failure of actual increases to reach geometric levels for a sustained period was simply indicative of the natural forces that l imited population growth taking effect. In attacking Malthusianism as a doctrine which threatened to diminish China's population, most of the opponents of population control never even acknowledged the distinction between the birth rate and the actual rate of population increase which was pointed out time and again by people such as Ch'en Ch'ang-heng in discussing the population trends in Western countries. In their use of statistics, the Chinese foes of Malthusianism selectively uti l ized the available figures to suit their arguments. Sometimes their use of statistics was nothing short of sloppy. Fan Shih-jen, for example, made the following remark in his art ic le: These figures represent the (population) density of farmland, not a l l land put together. Naturally, they are higher than the (population) density calculated for the aggregate amount of land (in China). But the researchers did not include the (population) density of the cities. These two factors should balance one another. ^ 7 In another instance, Hsiao Cheng admitted that while arguing that the popula-tion density of several other countries was much higher than China's, he had confused square miles with square ki lometers . Nonetheless, in Hsiao's opinion the indefinite potential for progress to bring about production increases 38 left his basic argument intact despite such an e r r o r . To understand the defensiveness on the part of the supporters of Malthusianism in China in spite 58 of such e r r o r s on the p a r t of t h e i r o p p o s i t i o n , i t i s i m p o r t a n t to r e a l i z e that the s e l f - c o n f i d e n t and p r o g r e s s i v e tone of su c h a r g u m e n t s m o r e than compen-sated f o r t h e i r l o g i c a l i n a d e q u a c i e s i n the eyes of the n a t i o n a l i s t C h i n e s e p u b l i c . 59 Notes to Chapter V 1. Hashikawa, Chugoku bunkakai jimbutsu soran, p. 2. Yen Chih-chung, "Shu yao to chih yao hao" (The quantity must be great, the quality must be good), Hsin ch'ing-nien, vol. 7, no. 4 (April 1920), pp. 2, 5, 10. 3. Sun Yat-sen, San min chu-i (The three people's principles) (1924; rpt. Taipei: Wen-hua t'u-shu kung-szu, 1974), pp. 9-10. 4. Ibid., pp. 10-11. 5. Chou Kuang-chao, "Fa-lan-hsi jen-k'ou wen-t'i chih hsien-tsai yii chiang-l a i " (The'present and future of the French population problem), Tung - fang tsa-chih, vol. 21, no. 11 (June 10, 1924), pp. 35, 46. 6. Ibid., p. 45. 7. Ibid., p. 44. 8. Ibid., p. 40. 9- Tang I-k'ang, "Jih-pen jen-k'ou kuo-ch'eng yii tui Hua cheng-ts'e", Tung-fang tsa-chih, vol. 21, no'. 15 (August 28, 1924), p. 157. 10. P'eng Chia-yiian, "Chung-kuo pien-ti chih hsien-k'uang yii i-min" (Migra-tion and the present situation of China's border territories), Tung-fang tsa-chih, vol. 22, no. 6 (March 25, 1925), pp. 40-41. 11. Ibid., p. 43. 12. Ibid. , p. 44. 13. Ibid., p. 45. 14. Yang, "Tui-yii shih-lun 'Chung-kuo jen-k'ou wen-t'i' te ta-pien", pp. 14-15. 15. Ibid. , pp. 15-16. 16. Ibid. , pp. 16-17. 17. Ibid. , p. 30. 18. Ibid. , pp. 9-12. 19- Ibid. , pp. 14-15, 23. 20. Ibid. , p. 25. 21. Ibid. , pp. 17-18. 22. Ibid. , pp. 27-28. 23. Fan;referred to estimates made by Ch'en Ch'ang-heng . Fan Shih-jen, "Tsui-chin erh-shih nien-lai Chung-kuo jen Lk'ou wen-t'i chih yen-chiu" (The research on the Chinese population problem in the last twenty years), Kuang-ming chih lu (The road of sincerity), vol 1, no. 7/8 (June 16, 1931), p. 11. 24. IbldT,~pp. 12-13, 17. 25. Ibid. , pp. 28, 38. 26. Ibid., pp. 32-33, 37. 27. Ibid., p. 22. 28. Ibid., pp. 13, 37. 29- Ibid". , p. 39-30. Ibid., p. 37. 31. Hsiao Cheng, "Chung-kuo t'u-ti yii jen-k'ou wen-t'i tsai chien-t'ao" (Another review of the Cinese land and population problem), Tung - fang tsa-chih , vol. 33, no. 21 (January 1936), reprinted in Chung-kuo l i - t a i jen-k'ou"wen-?! lun-chi (Collected essays<on China's historical population problem) (Hong Kong, 1965), p. 162. 32. Ibid. , pp. 168-169-33. Ibid. , pp. 167-168. 34. Ibid. , p. 165. 35. Ibid., pp. 162-163. 36. Yang, "Tui-yii shih-lun 'Chung-kuo jen-k'ou wen-t'i' te.ta-pien", pp. 17-18. 37. Fan, "Tsui-chin erh-shih nien-lai Chung-kuo jen-k'ou wen-t'i chih yen-chiu", p. 29-60 38. Hsiao, "Chung-kuo t'u-ti yu jen-k'ou wen-t'i tsai chien-t'ao", pp. 165-166. 61 VI . The Attempt to Reconcile Population Control with Nationalism: Malthusianism on the Defensive in the Late Twenties and Thirt ies In the twenties, many of the supporters of population control such as Ch'en Ch'ang-heng were engaged in an effort to combine their own qualified vers ion of individualism and l iberal i sm with nationalist goals. Others, like Lo Hung-shun, denied the involvement of individualism with Malthusianism altogether and portrayed giving birth to fewer children as a national duty. To them, having large families was an example of individual selfishness at the expense of the nation. A s demonstrated by the articles authored by the opponents of population control , both of these positions were becoming harder to maintain in the face of events which tended to confirm Liang Ch'i -ch'ao's original appraisal of the significance of population growth. More significantly, the advocates of population control demonstrated a growing defensiveness as they made greater efforts to prove that their theories were neither defeatist nor in conflict with China's national interests. The difficulties of those who defended population control were not confined to answering the charges of their antagonists. Quite a few of the original arguments for population control, became obsolete as a result of the research on population trends in China by demographers within the ranks of those who advocated some form of programme to l imit population growth. This was particularly crippling to the efforts to popularize population control, because many of these arguments were designed to link attempts to lower the birth rate with other causes that were popular among the May Fourth generation of Chinese nationalists. One such demographic expert was Yale-educated Ch'iao C h ' i - m i n g . Ch'iao was determined to lay to rest the notion that China's population was shrinking. Based upon changes between 1924 and 1925 in various areas of 62 four provinces that were surveyed by him, Ch'iao calculated an annual rate 1 of increase of 1.43 percent. Seven years later in 1935, Ch'iao used a number of surveys of r u r a l villages throughout China conducted by himself and several other researchers between 1929 and 1931 to calculate an annual 2 rate of increase of 1. 07 percent for China s agrarian population. However, Ch'iao viewed the high birth rate and high death rate as more significant than the actual rate of growth. Like most of the supporters of population control, Ch'iao believed that they were mutually supportive and that the various disasters that plagued China were indirect manifestations of the population problem. While conducting this research, Ch'iao found early marriages to be a widespread phenomenon in China, but his studies indicated that the extended family was not nearly as common in China as many had thought. The average size of the families in most of the areas surveyed was somewhat greater 3 than five. Nonetheless, Ch'iao st i l l seemed somewhat reluctant to rule out the extended family as one of the contributing factors to China's high birth rate. He stated that the size of the average family in China was st i l l larger than its A m e r i c a n counterpart and that smaller Chinese families were the result of only recent trends. Even with these qualifications, however, the nuclear family was clearly the predominant form of family organization throughout China, and it was impossible for Ch'iao to portray population control simply in terms of discouraging the Confucian ideal of the extended family. Ch'iao Ch' i -ming also expressed the need to encourage migration into barren areas, to develop industry, and to reform agriculture. Unlike the opponents of population control, he viewed these goals as solutions to the population problem. Moreover , he characterized them as measures which dealt only with the'symptoms' of the basic problem, overpopulation, over 63 the short run. The loss of Manchuria to Japan also gave him doubts about the efficacy of a large-scale colonization policy. The 'basic' solution, in his eyes, involved lowering the birth rate by promoting late marriages and birth control. Like the earl ier proponents of population control, Ch'iao felt that this, more than anything else, would contribute to a better environment for 4 individual development and result in a population of a higher quality. In 1937, Ch'iao authored a lengthy book entitled China's Population and  Food Problems in which he discussed in greater detail the potential for a variety of reforms in agraman technology and land tenure to increase China's food output. Ostensibly, Ch'iao seemed to concentrate a great deal more attention on what the foes of Malthusianism termed 'positive' measures to increase production than the'passive 1 measures to control population growth. Ch'iao carefully calculated the nutritional needs of each province by determining the minimum number of calories required by various age groups among both sexes and the percentage of the aggregate population that they constituted. He then calculated the total number of calories in a l l the major crops harvested in the various provinces to determine the deficiency or surplus of food output in each province. According to Ch'iao, only three. provinces in China enjoyed a surplus in food production, and the country as a whole produced seven percent less than the minimum amount of calories required by its population. This meant that China lacked food for roughly thirty-three mi l l ion people. To achieve self-sufficiency, Ch'iao estimated that China needed to harvest at least seventy percent of her crop potential at a time when sixty-five percent was considered a very remarkable achieve-5 ment. In spite of this, however, Ch'iao believed that China was in easy reach of self-sufficiency, which he viewed as cruc ia l for national survival in the event of war. In his opinion, many of the nation's economic problems arose 64 from the historical tendency of Chinese governments to adopt inappropriate 6 policies toward agriculture which lacked effective coordination. As an example of this, he cited government price controls on rice and other grains in the cities while allowing foreign imports. Because no cheap r a i l transportation existed, Ch'iao argued that there was little economic incentive for peasants in the interior to produce for the market when grain could be imported from North America, which was undergoing an agricultural depression, at a frac-tion of the cost. And yet, he noted, the government was spending a great deal on building roads for trucks and automobiles. Ch'iao also cited examples of local governments preventing internal free trade and the movement of grain • 7 to other counties in need. In his eyes, it was pointless for the KMT govern-ment to attempt to revive morality through the New Life Movement while 8 neglecting the problems that vexed China's agrarian economy. By giving true encouragement to the opening of new territories alone, Ch'iao believed that China could increase agricultural productivity by ten 9 percent and achieve self-sufficiency. Further increases were possible, according to him, if Chinese peasants more carefully selected the most appropriate crop for their area, used better seeds and fertilizer, and employed 10 ' • a modicum of mechanization. Ch iao also pointed out the waste of 2. 1 11 percent of China's arable land which was used for opium and grave sites. Ch'iao attempted to present some concrete figures on how much of an increase in production could be expected from implementing these measures. In discussing the use of better seed, for instance, he cited experiments by agricultural experts which indicated that wet rice production could be increased thirty-four to forty-six percent and the production of wheat by twenty percent or more. Ch'iao declared that China was fully capable of achieving Sun Yat-sen's goal of a population of eight hundred million if technological improve-ments were implemented and waste eliminated. Naturally, he felt that much 65 of this progress could take place only if the government pursued efforts to return ownership of farmland to the cultivator and to encourage the formation of agricultural cooperatives. It was the government's national responsibility, in Ch'iao's view, to make capital available to these cooperatives and to contribute to an economic environment that provided incentives for peasants 12 to implement these improvements. Although by 1937 Ch'iao had become a great deal more articulate in out-lining the 'positive' measures which could increase China's agricultural production, he did not view the potential for progress as unlimited at a steady pace. In the case of fertilizers , for instance, he noted that their extended use could cause soil acidity and that the greatest increases in yields would occur upon their initial application. In spite of the relatively few pages devoted to population control at the end of the book, Ch'iao sti l l portrayed it as the 'fundamental' solution to the food problem in China. Like the early promoters of Malthusianism in China, Ch'iao declared that a nation's strength was not related to yearly increases in population. He viewed the quality of a nation's people as much more crucial, and population control was the means of achieving this end. To further defend a policy of population control in terms of Social Darwinism, Ch'iao, like Ch'en Ch'ang-heng, cited Herbert Spencer's theory on the declining birth rate among higher and more successful orders 13 of biological species and social groups. Ch'iao's affirmation of Sun Yat-sen's goal of doubling the Chinese popula-tion and the relatively little attention he devoted to population control even though he portrayed it as the fundamental solution to China's difficulties suggested that he was aware of a nationalist sentiment among the Chinese public that was hostile to population control. Concomitantly, his concentra-tion on the 'positive' methods of increasing production while avoiding an open rejection of Sun's views on population growth was likely designed to present 66 an optimistic plan of action that would counteract any negative impressions of his ca l l for population control. Although a supporter of population control himself, Ch'en Cheng-mo, a Chicago-educated student of T'ao Meng-ho who taught at the philosophy depart-ment of A m o y University, felt compelled to challenge some of the assumptions 14 of the earl ier supporters of population control. According to him, various studies by Chinese and Western sociologists and economists indicated that in China the relationship between family size and social status was the opposite of that in Western countries. In applying Herbert Spencer's theory to China, Ch'en Ch'ang-heng and others simply assumed that the Western pattern was ubiquitous because of the close relationship that they envisioned between a low birth rate and individual development. However, Ch'en Cheng-mo noted that a study by a Westerner named Griffings, for instance, indicated that female graduates of Nanking University tended to have more children than peasant women. According to Ch'en Cheng-mo, academicians in China tended to have the largest families, followed by business managers and entrepreneurs, self-employed professionals, and public servants. He also noted that even overseas Chinese, who were exposed to what Ch'en Ch'ang-heng viewed as 15 the progressive culture of the West, tended to have very large famil ies . Hence, contrary to earl ier expectations, those successful and productive members of society who were supposed to be the product of a reduced birth rate seemed to be more committed to the Confucian ideal of an extensive posterity than the ignorant and poverty-striken masses . If Herbert Spencer's theory that those who used their minds had a lower birth rate were true, Ch'en Cheng-mo rather facetiously added, then those in China who were supposed to utilize their intelligence did not actually do so. In spite of this, Ch'en Cheng-mo st i l l maintained that overpopulation was the cause of backward production methods and low living standards which 67 contributed to the inadequacies of the Chinese people. Westerners, he observed, were more skilled and of a higher physical calibre than Chinese, and this, in turn, contributed to the higher living standards of the West. Fa r from being concerned about China losing her advantage in numbers, he express-ed alarm that a mere handful of Japanese soldiers could routinely rout Chinese troops that were already vastly superior in numbers. To Ch'en Cheng-mo, it was futile to be concerned about inadequate population growth while the 16 quality of the Chinese people remained so low. In advocating population control, Ch'en Cheng-mo did not single out the poor for causing China's difficulties. He also criticized the affluent members of Chinese society for their wasteful extravagance and did not ignore their 17 contribution to the population problem. He also hastened to demonstrate that he did not take foreign imperialism lightly as a cause of China's woes. In addition to hurting the economy, Ch'en Cheng-mo declared that imperialism brought about the large ratio of males to females in China's population. According to him, the ratio of male births increased as people shifted to 18 foodstuffs of a lower quality. Clearly, Ch'en Cheng-mo did not want his fellow Chinese to interpret his position on the population question as hostile toward the poor or as tolerant of imperialism. In 1932, Weng Wen-hao, an expert in soil science and geography who later became head of the Social Science Research Centre at the Peking Research Institute, questioned the optimism of the opponents of Malthusianism concerning the potential of the border regions to absorb any significant increase 19 in population. While acknowledging that the bulk of China's population was located on less than twenty percent of the land, Weng criticized the popular notion that a l l land was the same and only required new immigrants to develop 20 it. However, Weng recognized the strategic need to settle China's border 68 regions. He examined the the geographical characteristics of the various areas of China's vast unpopulated territories, and made an appraisal of each area's potential for agricultural development within the scope of existing technology. From this, he roughly calculated the number of people that could be absorbed in each region. According to Weng, a l l of the northwestern regions could only accommo-date eight million more people because of the scarcity of rainfall, high altitude, and poor soil. He felt that the areas in north central China that had some . agricultural potential were merely isolated valleys with a very limited capacity to absorb new immigrants. In Weng's opinion, the northeast contained the richest farmland of a l l the frontier regions. Although the northeast: was long closed to. settlement by order of the Manchu rulers, Weng pointed out that the population there had already increased from fifteen million to thirty million since the overthrow of the Ch'ing dynasty. The population 'density there was still only eighty persons per square mile, but Weng noted that most of the immigrants were flowing into certain fertile valleys where the population density had already reached three hundred per square mile. In his opinion, the population density of these areas could increase by two hundred people per square mile without becoming a serious problem on the scale of what existed in the old agricultural regions of China. Hence, he estimated that the northeast could absorb twenty million more people. Although many of the opponents of population control based their hopes for densely populating the frontier regions on future technological progress, Weng declared that goals such as moving ninety million Chinese into the northeast were pitifully 21 unrealistic. A few years earlier, Cornell-educated Tung Shih-chin expressed some 22 different reasons why the border regions could not become densely populated. Like the opponents of population control, Tung was optimistic about the 69 a g r i c u l t u r a l p o t e n t i a l of the s p a r s e l y p o p u l a t e d b o r d e r r e g i o n s . H o w e v e r , a c c o r d i n g to T u n g i t w a s i m p o r t a n t that any new a g r i c u l t u r a l a r e a s be d e v e l o p e d w i t h o u t a l l o w i n g the p o p u l a t i o n d e n s i t y to r e a c h the s a m e l e v e l a s that of the i n t e r i o r . T u n g wan ted to see a f o r m of p l a n n e d a g r i c u l t u r e i n the b o r d e r r e g i o n s w i t h N o r t h A m e r i c a n s t y l e f a r m s of s e v e r a l t housand m o u on w h i c h c a p i t a l i n t e n s i v e m e t h o d s c o u l d be u t i l i z e d . In h i s v i e w , t h e r e w o u l d be no a g r i c u l t u r a l s u r p l u s f r o m the b o r d e r r e g i o n s i f v i r g i n t e r r i t o r i e s w e r e g r a d u a l l y s e t t l e d by t r a d i t i o n a l s m a l l s c a l e p r o d u c e r s who w o u l d o n l y i n c r e a s e 23 i n n u m b e r s u n t i l t h e i r needs p a s s e d the c a p a c i t y of the new l a n d s to p r o d u c e . T u n g d i d not want to see p o p u l a t i o n g r o w t h i n the f r o n t i e r a r e a s p r e c l u d e the p o s s i b i l i t y of d e v e l o p i n g a c a p i t a l i n t e n s i v e f o r m of a g r i c u l t u r e w h i c h w o u l d enab le c u l t i v a t o r s to a c h i e v e h i g h p e r c a p i t a y i e l d s that w e r e a l r e a d y i m p o s -s i b l e f o r pea san t s i n C h i n a ' s w e l l s e t t l e d r e g i o n s . A l t h o u g h o p t i m i s t i c that C h i n a w a s f a r f r o m r e a c h i n g h e r p r o d u c t i o n p o t e n t i a l , T u n g b e l i e v e d i n the p r i n c i p l e of d i m i n i s h i n g r e t u r n s on l a n d , and , l i k e K u M e n g - y i i , r e a l i z e d that l a b o u r i n t e n s i v e m e t h o d s and c a p i t a l i n t e n s i v e m e t h o d s tended to be m u t u a l l y e x c l u s i v e . H e n c e , he v i e w e d o v e r p o p u l a t i o n as the b a s i c c a u s e of C h i n a ' s t r o u b l e s and p o p u l a t i o n c o n t r o l as a r e q u i s i t e f o r p l a n n e d e c o n o m i c 24 p r o g r e s s . T u n g a l s o a r g u e d that i n d u s t r i a l g r o w t h c o u l d not c o m p e n s a t e f o r a l a c k of s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y i n a g r i c u l t u r e . H e no ted that the f i r s t i n d u s t r i a l p o w e r s w e r e a b l e to t r a d e m a n u f a c t u r e d goods f o r f a r m p r o d u c t s on f a v o u r a b l e t e r m s b e c a u s e of the r e l a t i v e s c a r c i t y of s u c h c o m m o d i t i e s i n a w o r l d that w a s o v e r w h e l m i n g l y ag-r.arian. H o w e v e r , a c c o r d i n g to T u n g th i s t r a d e advan tage w a s p r o g r e s s i v e l y d i m i n i s h i n g as i n d u s t r y w a s b e c o m i n g m o r e w i d e s p r e a d e v e n a m o n g a g r a r i a n c o u n t r i e s . T u n g thought that s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y i n food w o u l d e v e n t u a l l y b e c o m e the m o s t i m p o r t a n t e l e m e n t of a n a t i o n ' s s t r e n g t h i n the not too d i s t a n t f u t u r e . H e even d e c l a r e d that i m p e r i a l i s m w a s a p o l i c y 70 of desperation on the-part of the early industrial countries whose populations had expanded far beyond the bounds of their agricultural production. Because countries with agricultural surpluses were going to have an industrial work-force of their own to support, Tung pictured a bleak future for countries like Great Britain. With this in mind, he thought it foolish to think that China 25 could avoid the need for population control by becoming an industrial nation. As a holder of an M.A. degree from the University of California and a member of both the Chinese Sociological Society and the Chinese Statistical Society, Yen Hsin-che was another proponent of population control whose 26 background matched that of most Chinese liberal intellectuals. In 1934, he attempted to rebut many of the Marxist and nationalist challenges to Malthusianism. Although his arguments were often roughly similar to those of his Chinese colleagues, Yen Hsin-che attempted to disassociate himself from many of the Western scholars who promoted population control as an appropriate policy for China. Yen Hsin-che argued that a comparison of Chinese population density with that of isolated European countries was meaningless because eighty percent of China's people lived in r u r a l villages while the countries most often cited by the opponents of Malthusianism were predominantly industrial 27 or commercial nations. This kind of reasoning must have seemed somewhat defeatist to the popular readership because he implicitly assumed that China could not become an industrial-nation without explaining why industrial growth could not be expected to ameliorate population pressure as had Tung Shih-chin. Citing research by Ch'iao Ch'i-ming and another scholar, L i Ching-han, Yen Hsin-che acknowledged that the extended family was ..nonexistent as a common phenomenon in rural China. However, like many others who argued for population control, he refused to dismiss this despised symbol of China's Confucian tradition as a cause of the high birth rate. According to him, the 71 widespread existence of the nuclear family throughout rural China merely reflected the inability of most households to achieve the economic position needed to support more than a few. members. In addition, he noted that wealthy families tended to be a great deal larger. Hence, in Yen Hsin-che's view, the large extended family remained as an ideal to most Chinese peasants, 28 and as such it s t i l l contributed to the high birth rate. Yen Hsin-che criticized Westerners who, while arguing for population control, tended to exaggerate the backwardness of Chinese society. Although he opposed early marriages as a harmful custom which increased the birth rate and lowered the quality of the population, he viewed as slanderous the claims of some Westerners that marriage at the age of twelve or fourteen was common. He indicated that it was necessary to defend China from foreign insults in the case of such excessive claims. Although he was probably genuinely concerned with the inaccuracies of such claims, Yen Hsin-che, no doubt, also realized that the tactless arguments for population control by many Westerners were offensive to the national pride of the Chinese public and that this hampered the efforts of Chinese scholars to demonstrate that population control was not 29 a defeatist admission of inferiority to the West. In 1936, L i u Jan-chang seemed to take the offensive in attacking the opponents of population control by comparing the policy of promoting more births to develop national strength with the efforts of the legendary foolish farmer to speed the growth of his seedlings by pulling them up. In making this case, he repeated the arguments of other supporters of population control on the rapid cycle of births and deaths and its harmful effects on the quality of the people. L i u also called for Chinese to realize that birth control and eugenics were two interdependent measures needed to raise the quality of 30 the nation's population. Obviously, Soci al Darwinism was sti l l a powerful force in the debate over Malthusianism. 72 However, in discounting migration to the border regions as a real solution to the population problem, Liu's tone became a great deal more defensive. Although Manchuria could absorb at least twenty million more Chinese, Liu questioned China's ability to retake this territory from Japan. Population increases, L i u argued, would eat away at any increases in cultivated land anyway. Typical of many of the advocates of population control, L i u lamely denied that he was opposed to the settlementrof the border regions or scientific progress in expressing agreement with Malthus population theory. In the early stages of the debate over Malthusianism, the support of population control by no means entailed approval of arti f i c i a l contraception. Moreover, some promoters of population control such as Ch'en Ch'ang-heng even felt it necessary to vehemently denounce arti f i c i a l birth control in order to allay public apprehension of their views. By the thirties it became increas-ingly impractical for scholars to call for a national programme of population control without condoning artificial contraception. While most of these scholars simply ceased to condemn artificial birth control, Ch'en Ta, a sociologist-who graduated from the University of Washington, spelled out the reasons why any meaningful efforts to control population growth had to include arti f i c i a l 32 contraception. Ch'en Ta acknowledged the study of Herbert Lamson and other evidence which indicated that the relationship between family size and social status in China was the opposite of that, in the West. To him, there was no doubt that wealthy Chinese families tended to be larger than poor ones. Although Ch'en Ta did not deny that there were many social reasons for a low birth rate among affluent families in the West such as late marriages and greater social mobility for women, he argued that the practice of ar t i f i c i a l birth control was the most basic missing ingredient which accounted for the opposite pattern 33 in China: 73 The birth rate in our country seems to be in a corresponding ratio with wealth and social prestige. The reason is this: our society has yet to use birth control methods. Whatever birth ratio that exists represents the natural high productivity of the people. The intellectual classes are relatively prosperous and have better health standards. Hence, their birth rate is rather high. ^4 As a supporter of population control, Ch'en Ta, therefore,, advocated the practice of artificial birth control as the means necessary to create a better 35 social environment for individual development and social mobility. Since the various works on population control by Ch'en Ch'ang-heng stretched from the time of the May Fourth Incident through the thirties, an examination of his later appeals for population control can best illustrate the areas in which Malthusianism became particularly vulnerable to c r i t i c a l popular opinion. Also, Ch'en Ch'ang-heng demonstrated a keen awareness of the need to tailor Malthusianism to the tastes of a nationalist public which was lacking in some of his colleagues. This adds to his works' value as a barometer of popular attitudes toward population control. One of the most noticeable changes in Ch'en Ch'ang-heng's position was the acceptance of arti f i c i a l birth control. As early as 1927, he declared that selecting an appropriate means of birth control was the joint responsibility 36 of the individual and his or her doctor. This shift in position, however, was due to the unanticipated discovery that the number of extended families in China was insignificant and not to any sudden popularity of ar t i f i c i a l contra-ception. Ch'en Ch'ang-heng could no longer depict the destruction of the tyranny of the clan and the establishment of the nuclear family as means of population control. His assumption that a lower birth rate would coincide with a greater sense of individual incentive, which he attributed to nuclear i families, was irreparably shattered when demographic research established that the nuclear family was already the norm throughout China. In his book, On the Population of China, Ch'en Ch'ang-heng did not deal 74 at length wi th the issue of m i g r a t i o n to the border reg ions . In his view, the settlement of the border regions was dependent on efforts to improve the quali ty of the Chinese people by cont ro l l ing population growth. However , in his la ter works he devoted a great dea l more attention to the need to populate the border regions and a lmost treated it as an equal of the population i s sue . L i k e many of the opponents of population contro l , he noted that ninety- three percent of the population l i ved i n the eighteen m a i n provinces and that e m i g r a -t ion to the f ront ier regions would both ease population p ressu re in China and 37 help the nation p rese rve i ts t e r r i t o r i a l in tegr i ty . Af te r Japan had seized Manchur i a , Ch ' en Ch'ang-heng strongly s t ressed the need for rousing the nationalistwiath of a l l Chinese i n order to recover what he viewed as the most 38 promis ing of Ch ina ' s border regions . He a lso l i s t ed i n de ta i l the specif ic measures that the government could implement i n order to give the needed support to those w i l l i n g to pioneer new regions . These included the granting of government loans and tax exemptions, and the const ruct ion of water projects and new schools . This change i n C h ' e n Ch'ang-heng 's appeal was m o r e of emphasis than of substance. L i k e Ch ' i ao C h ' i - m i n g , he s t i l l bel ieved that population con t ro l was the fundamental solut ion to China ' s d i f f i cu l t i es . He expressed some skep t i c i sm that any large scale emigra t ion was poss ib le and ci ted the study of Weng Wen-hao to argue that the development of China ' s f ront iers could 39 only s l ight ly improve China ' s population predicament . M o r e s ignif icant ly , in spite of the fact that C h ' e n Ch'ang-heng, h imsel f , had mentioned the uneven d i s t r ibu t ion of China ' s population i n arguing for emigra t ion to the f ront ier regions, he chided the opponents of population con t ro l for t reat ing the concen-t ra t ion of people i n the most fe r t i l e areas of China as though it were a c o i n c i -40 denoeor the resul t of some oversight on the part of the government. A s foreign encroachments inc reas ing ly became a paramount issue of nat ional 75 significance, Ch'en Ch'ang-heng probably had felt it necessary explicitly to promote the development of the frontier regions in order to discourage any popular notion that the support of population control implied capitu.lation to foreign aggression. However, it was Ch'en Ch'ang-heng's nervous attempts to reconcile his views with Sun Yat-sen's position on population growth that most clearly i l l u s -trated the difficulty involved in proving that there was no fundamental contra-diction between population control and Chinese nationalism. In 1932, seven years after Sun's death, Ch'en Ch'ang-heng claimed that Sun's fear of displace-ment by the growing populations of foreign countries only applied to the remote future. According to him, the foreign encroachments it'ha.t:: plagued China at the time were not the result of population pressures in the imperialist nations. 41 Rather, he viewed them as attempts to establish hegemony for its own sake. Obviously, he wanted to discredit the belief that China was losing its territories because its population was not growing as fast as other nations' without openly rejecting Sun's views. He also extensively quoted Sun on the need to develop the quality of the Chinese people in order to increase national strength, and incorporated this with his own proposals for population control. As in his early works, Ch'en Ch'ang-heng portrayed population control as the funda-mental means of achieving the goal of a more enlightened and healthier Chinese 42 people. Although he referred to the projected growth of various nations over a period of one hundred years, Sun Yat--sen never implied that the threat posed by their expanding population was not of immediate significance. In his article attacking population control, Fan Shih-jen had a comparatively easy task in demonstrating that Sun was indeed concerned about the lack of population 43 growth in China and its immediate implications. Ch'en Ch'ang-heng's efforts to reinterpret Sun's words were performed out of desperation and 76 could not have been very successful. The research indicating that professional and middle class families tended to have more children than peasant families also discredited T'ao Meng-ho's theory that social reform and rising living standards alone were capable of decreasing the birth rate. As a result, T'ao expressed agreement with John Maynard Keynes that Malthus had revealed a dangerous demon to the day-44 dreamers of the scientific revolution in the eighteenth century. To T'ao, overpopulation was no longer the manifestation of a more fundamental ailment, but a serious problem in its own right. T'ao, unlike most of his colleagues , portrayed population growth as an international problem. He felt that the velocity of scientific progress and the development of new lands which characterized the industrial revolution was a unique phenomenon that could not continue indefinitely. In the same manner, he argued that the rapid growth of the world's population was also subject to to the inevitable limitation of land. According to T'ao, most of the earth's surface was unsuitable for agriculture and most of the world's population was confined to the few areas where adverse conditions did not prevail. T'ao felt that the population density of any individual nation-state was of no signifi-cance in estimating the agricultural potential of another country. Responding to those who compared the population density of England or Holland with that of China, T'ao stated that Europe as a whole, with its 175, 000, 000 people, 45 was a more meaningful object of comparison. In spite of his concern over the world population situation, T'ao Meng-ho was sti l l reticent about the need for a programme of population control in China. T'ao noted that the 'white nations' were responding to the future threat of a population c r i s i s by seizing as colonies all the territories of the world that were not yet densely populated. He also underscored Japan's population's direct threat to China by rhetorically asking, "Aside from trading manufactured 77 goods for food, has not Japan, who has already expressed concern over over-population, also used other methods and looked toward other places to develop 46 the new farmland she needs?" Hence, T'ao sensed the same kind of inter-national struggle over the world's resources as envisioned by Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and Sun Yat-sen. He found it difficult to call for population control in China while the nation was losing its territories to other nations bent on solving their population problems by means of aggression. In making a very grave assessment of the population problem, T'ao seemed uncertain that any real solution existed. His dilemma demonstrated how nationalist considerations based on Social Darwinism created difficulties for even a believer in Malthus-ianism to ca l l for population control. In 1930, four years after his article appeared in The Eastern Miscellany, Hsu Shih-lien authored a fairly lengthy book dealing with the population situa-tion in China. Strangely enough, Hsu began to devote more attention to the role of the extended family as a cause of China's high birth rate at a time when his colleagues were discovering that the nuclear family was already the norm. Hsu attempted to contrast the traditional tyranny of the clan with the freedoms of a liberal society in which each individual had the 'sacred 47 right' of choice concerning parenthood. Naturally, this argument was already becoming obsolete. Hsu was primarily concerned with attracting a nationalist following for population control. In attempting to do so, Hsu frankly admitted that Chinese nationalism and support of population control seemed to constitute two mutually exclusive sentiments: As far as the Chinese population problem is concerned, two general views prevail. The firs t promotes increasing the Chinese population in order to resist the encroachments of strong population pressures (abroad). The second promotes birth control as a fundamental solution to the various social and economic maladies that occur as the result of population pressures within the country. 48 78 Hsu even referred to the two groups which held these views as the 'school of overpopulationism' and the 'school of nationalism 1. However, Hsu also argued: Although the nationalists' and Malthusians' positions appear to conflict on the surface, they actually correspond in substance. ... In order to resist foreign dangers some Chinese fear that they will not be able to overcome (the) large numbers (of foreigners), and consequently must encourage population increases. But if a l l things (population increases and produc-tion increases) do not correspond, a large population will be of no use; the many will not be capable of resisting the few. The nationalists emphasize collective strength while Malthus-ians emphasize individual value. But if individual value is low, then collective strength is insufficient. Conversely, if collective strength is incomplete, then the individual cannot exist. Therefore, in order to plan for social construction, the theories of the two schools must be harmoniously blended and grasped thbhoroughly. 4 9 Ch'en Ch'ang-heng and other Chinese liberals had expressed this argument many times before, and there is no reason to believe that Hsu was any more convincing. In fact, Hsu's candid admission that population control seemed injurious to the cause of Chinese nationalism in the eyes of the public was proof that this kind of argument had already failed to take hold. Responding to the fears of the 'nationalist school', Hsu argued that, with the exception of France, the greatest increases in the population of the white race coincided with a decline in the birth rate. Still, he noted, many nine-teenth century scholars such as Lathrop Stoddard had unfounded fears that the white race was headed for extinction because of Malthusianism. Accord-ing to Hsu, Stoddard instinctively feared that a lower birth rate entailed a decrease in the white population, which was in danger of being displaced by the ever expanding 'coloured' races. Because Stoddard's fears were so remarkably similar to those of Sun Yat-sen, Hsu probably intended these 50 observations to be a veiled criticism of Sun's views on population growth. Hsu acknowledged that China would eventually have to limit the aggregate growth of its population as well as lower the birth rate. However, Hsu attempted to remove the defeatist connotations of such a proposal by portraying overpop-79 u l a t i o n as an i n t e r n a t i o n a l p r o b l e m . A c c o r d i n g to t h i s v i e w , i t w a s a m a t t e r of e n l i g h t e n e d s e l f - i n t e r e s t f o r e a c h n a t i o n to p a r t i c i p a t e i n m u l t i l a t e r a l e f fo r t s to r e d u c e p o p u l a t i o n g r o w t h : A f t e r c o m p a r i n g t o x l a y ' s p o p u l a t i o n w i t h the s u r f a c e a r e a of the e a r t h , m a n y of the w o r l d ' s f a m o u s e c o n o m i c e x p e r t s c l a i m that the p h e n o m e n o n of o v e r p o p u l a t i o n a l r e a d y e x i s t s . T h i s o v e r -p o p u l a t i o n i s the c a u s e of the w o r l d ' s p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l d i s o r d e r . H o w e v e r , wha t i s m o r e f r i g h t e n i n g i s that a l t hough a l l the na t i ons know about the o v e r p o p u l a t i o n c r i s i s , they c o n s t a n t l y e n c o u r a g e i n c r e a s e s i n the r a t e of p o p u l a t i o n g r o w t h i n o r d e r to s eek v i c t o r y i n the f i n a l w a r . If no m e t h o d i s d e v e l o p e d (to c o m b a t o v e r p o p u l a t i o n ) , w o r l d w a r s w i l l n e v e r c e a s e and m a n k i n d and i t s c i v i l i z a t i o n w i l l s i n k in to t o t a l d i s i n t e g r a t i o n . F o r the s a k e of s a v i n g m a n k i n d and c i v i l i z a t i o n f r o m s e l f -d e s t r u c t i o n , e v e r y c o u n t r y m u s t c o o p e r a t e to s o l v e the w o r l d p o p u l a t i o n p r o b l e m . T o s o l v e t h i s p r o b l e m , b i r t h c o n t r o l m u s t be u t i l i z e d . 1^ Hsu. even d e c l a r e d that C h i n a s h o u l d not c o m m i t i t s e l f to l i m i t i n g p o p u l a t i o n g r o w t h i f i t b e c a m e c l e a r that s u c h e f fo r t s w e r e m e r e l y u n i l a t e r a l : . . . (T)he p o p u l a t i o n p r o b l e m i s a w o r l d p r o b l e m and ha s a d i r e c t r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h w o r l d p e a c e . If the C h i n e s e (popu la t ion) p r o b -l e m i s s o l v e d and the o t h e r c o u n t r i e s s t i l l su f fe r f r o m o v e r p o p -u l a t i o n , they w i l l p r o m o t e i m p e r i a l i s m . . . to e n c r o a c h upon C h i n a and s a c r i f i c e o u r l a b o u r and a g r i c u l t u r a l w e a l t h w h i l e s e e k i n g s o u r c e s of food f o r t h e i r own p e o p l e . (Under these c i r c u m s t a n c e s ) C h i n a w o u l d be f o r c e d to e n c o u r a g e b i r t h s and p o p u l a t i o n i n c r e a s e s i n o r d e r to p r e v e n t the d e s t r u c t i o n of the n a t i o n and the a n n i h i l a t i o n of the r a c e j u s t a s S u n Y a t - s e n s t a t e d . 5 2 U n w i t t i n g l y o r not , H s u v i r t u a l l y u n d e r m i n e d h i s a p p e a l f o r l i m i t i n g p o p u l a -t i o n g r o w t h by a r g u i n g that C h i n a ' s e f fo r t s s h o u l d be p a r t of a n i n t e r n a t i o n a l p r o g r a m m e . B a s e d on the even ts of the t i m e , the C h i n e s e p u b l i c had no r e a s o n to b e l i e v e that o the r n a t i o n s w e r e r e a d y f o r any m u l t i l a t e r a l e f fo r t s to a c h i e v e w o r l d p e a c e . The w a y i n w h i c h the C h i n e s e b e l i e v e r s i n M a l t h u s i a n i s m and N e o - M a l t h u s -i a n i s m r e s p o n d e d to the c h a r g e s of t h e i r opponents g r e w m o r e d e f e n s i v e as s u p p o r t f o r p o p u l a t i o n c o n t r o l i n c r e a s i n g l y b e c a m e g r o u n d s f o r c h a l l e n g i n g a s c h o l a r ' s d e d i c a t i o n to the n a t i o n a l i s t c a u s e . T h e y s e e m e d c o m p e l l e d c o n s i s t e n t l y to a r g u e that p o p u l a t i o n c o n t r o l of any s o r t w o u l d not l e a d to 80 decreases in the aggregate population. Judging from this, the public's attach-ment to a large population as a source of national strength could not be dimin-ished. Also, the number of times this argument was repeated suggested that the Chinese public was not convinced. In later years, the promoters of population control also made greater efforts to demonstrate their support for populating the border regions and attempted to reconcile this with their proposals for population control. As in the case of Ch'en Ch'ang-heng, these attempts^ often seemed half-hearted and clacked the genuine sense of conviction that the opponents of Malthusian-ism conveyed in promoting migration to the frontier regions. The superficial logic that migration would occur faster under pressure gaveYthe opponents of population control more assertiveness in their arguments. Many of the difficulties that plagued the advocates of population control who tried to link their cause with Chinese nationalism resulted from their own research. Detailed studies indicated that the traditional extended family, if it ever was common in the first place, no longer existed to any significant extent. Thus, Chinese liberals who supported population control could no longer use China's jaded Confucian tradition as a straw man for their own vision of a liberal society in which greater individual responsibility would result in a lower birth rate. If anything, their research tended to vindicate the Marxists who held that the rich posed more problems for the nation than the poor. 81 Notes to Chapter VI 1. Ch'iao Ch'i-ming, "Chung-kuo jen-k'ou wen-t'i chih yen-chiu" (Research on the Chinese population problem), Tung-fang tsa-chih, vol. 25, no. 21 (October 1928), cited by Feng Ho-fa, "Chung-kuo nung-ts 'un te jen-k'ou wen-t'i", p. 73 2. Ch'iao Ch'i-ming, "Chung-kuo nung-ts'un jen-k'ou chih chieh-kou chi ch'i hsiao-chang" (The structure and fluctuations of the Chinese agrarian popula-tion), Tung-fang tsa-chih, Vol. 32, no. 1 (January 1935), reprinted in Chung-kuo l i - t a i jen-k'ou wen-t'i lun-chi, p. 202. 3. Ch^iao, "Chung-kuo nung-ts 'un jen-k'ou chih chieh-kou chi ch'i hsiao-chang", p. 207. 4. Ibid. , pp. 205-208. 5. Ch'iao Ch'i-ming, Chung-kuo jen-k'ou yii shih-liang wen-t'i (Shanghai, 1937), pp. 60-65, 93. 6. Ibid. , pp. 5-6. 7. Ibid. , pp. 111-117. 8. Ibid. , p. 2. 9. TbidT, p. 61. 10. Ibid. , pp. 94-104. 11. Ibid. , p. 109. 12. Ibid. , pp. 110, 132, 135. 13. Ibid. , pp. 123-130. 14. Hashikawa, Chugoku bunkakai jimbutsu soran, p. 441. 15. Much of Ch'en's information probably came from Herbert Lamson, "Pop-ulation Studies: Size of Chinese Family in relation to Age, Occupation, and Education", Chinese Economic Journal, December 1932. Ch'en Cheng-mo, "Wo kuo jen-k'ou chih yen-chiu" (Research on our nation's population), T'ung -chi yueh-k'an (Statistics monthly), December 1933, pp. 32-34. ToT Ibid. , pp. 43-44. 17. Ibid., p. 41. 18. Ch'en Cheng-mo seemed to fear the economic disruptions of imperialism more than the actual occupation of Chinese territory. He believed that the Japanese presence in Manchuria was of no long term significance because the 'Japanese race' was unsuited to the climate of that region. Ibid. , pp. 15, 23-25. 19. Hashikawa, Chugoku bunkakai jimbutsu soran, p. 366. Boorman, Biograph- ical Dictionary of Republican China, vol. 3, pp. 411-412. 20. Weng Wen-hao, "Chung-kuo jen-k'ou fen-pu yii t'u-ti li-yung" (Chinese population distribution and land utilization), T u - l i p'ing-lun (Independent commentary), nos. 3-4 (June-July 1932), pp. 9, 15. 21. Ibid. , pp. 12-15. 22. Hashikawa, Chugoku bunkakai jimbutsu soran, p. 624. 23. Tung Shih-chin, "Min shih k'un-nan chih chieh-shih yu chieh-chueh" (An explanation of and a solution to the people's food problem), Tung-fang tsa-chih, vol. 23, no. 17 (September 10, 1926), pp. 8-11; Shih-liao yii jen-k'ou (Food and population) (Shanghai, 1929), pp. 137-138. 24. Tung, Shih-liao yii jen-k'ou, p. 142. 25. Ibid. , pp. 16~2^174. 26. Hashikawa, Chugoku bunkakai jimbutsu soran, p. 216. 27. Yen Hsin-che, Chung-kuo t s ^ n jen-k'ou wen-t'i chih fen-hsi (An analysis of the Chinese village population problem) (Shanghai, 1934), pp. 1-3. 28. Ibid. , pp. 12-17. 29. Ibid. , pp. 40-43. 30. L i u Jan-chang, "Chung-kuo jen-k'ou chih yen-chiu", Min-chung chi-k'an (The people's quarterly), vol. 2, no. 4 (January 1936), reprinted in Chung-kuo 82 l i - t a i j e n - k ' o u w e n - t ' i l u n - c h i , pp . 144-157. 31 . I b i d . , pp . 120-T31": 32. B o o r m a n , B i o g r a p h i c a l D i c t i o n a r y - of R e p u b l i c a n C h i n a , v o l . 1, p p . 235-239. 33. C h ' e n T a , " J e n - k ' o u p i e n - c h ' i e n te y u a n - s u " ( E l e m e n t s beh ind p o p u l a t i o n changes ) , T s i n g h u a h s i i e h - p a o ( T s i n g h u a s c h o l a r l y j o u r n a l ) , D e c e m b e r 1933, pp. 30-33. 34. C h ' e n T a , " J e n - k ' o u w e n - t ' i " (The p o p u l a t i o n p r o b l e m ) (Shangha i , 1934), p . 296, c i t e d by S u n P e n - w e n , H s i e n - t a i C h u n g - k u o s h e - h u i w e n - t ' i : J e n - k ' o u w e n - t ' i ( C u r r e n t C h i n e s e s o c i a l p r o b l e m s : The p o p u l a t i o n p r o b l e m } ( C h u n g -k i n g , 1943), p . 41. 35. C h ' e n T a , " J e n - k ' o u p i e n - c h ' i e n te y u a n - s u " , p p . 35-36. 36. C h ' e n C h ' a n g - h e n g , " C h u n g - k u o c h i n p a i - p a - s h i h - y i i n i e n - l a i j e n - k ' o u t s e n g - c h i a c h i h h s u - s u c h i c h i n - h o u c h i h t ' i a o - c h i f a n g - f a " ( T h e s p e e d of p o p -u l a t i o n g r o w t h i n C h i n a o v e r the l a s t one h u n d r e d and e igh ty y e a r s and fu ture a d a p t i v e m e a s u r e s ) , T u n g - f a n g t s a - c h i h , v o l . 24, n o . 18 (1927), ( r p t . H o n g K o n g : C h u n g S h a n t ' u - s h u k u n g - s z u , 1973), p . 54. 37. I b i d . , p p . 36-40. 38. C h ' e n C h ' a n g - h e n g , " W o kuo j e n - k ' o u s an chung y a - p ' o y i i c h i e h - c h i i e h f a n g - f a " ( T h r e e k i n d s of p o p u l a t i o n p r e s s u r e i n o u r c o u n t r y a n d the m e a n s to r e l i e v e them) , S h e n - p a o y i i e h - k ' a n ( T h e m o n t h l y r e p o r t ) , v o l . 1, no . 4 ( O c t o b e r 15, 1932), p . 52. 39. I b i d . , p p . 48-49; C h ' e n C h ' a n g - h e n g , " C h u n g - k u o c h i n p a i - p a - s h i h - y i i n i e n - l a i j e n - k ' o u t s e n g - c h i a c h i h h s u - s u c h i c h i n - h o u t i a o - c h i f a n g - f a " , pp . 36, 41-42. 40. C h ' e n C h ' a n g - h e n g , " W o kuo j e n - k ' o u s a n chung y a - p ' o y i i c h i e h - c h u e h f a n g - f a " , pp . 49-50. 4 1 . I b i d . , p p . 46-47. 42. I b i d . , pp . 52-55. 43. F a n , " T s u i - c h i n e r h - s h i h n i e n - l a i C h u n g - k u o j e n - k ' o u w e n - t ' i c h i h y e n -c h i u " , pp . 34-37. 44. T ' a o M e n g - h o , " S h i h - c h i e h j e n - k ' o u y i i c h i a n g - l a i " ( W o r l d p o p u l a t i o n and the fu tu re ) , r e p r i n t e d i n J e n - k ' o u w e n - t ' i (The p o p u l a t i o n p r o b l e m ) , e d s . Wang Y i i n - w u , L i S h e n g - w u (Shangha i , 1933), p . 1. T h i s w a s a c o l l e c t i o n of a r t i c l e s that had a p p e a r e d i n T u n g - f a n g t s a - c h i h , but the e d i t o r s d i d not g i v e the date that e a c h w a s o r i g i n a l l y p u b l i s h e d . 45 . Ib id . , pp . 2-5, 12-13. 46. I b i d . , p . 18. 47. H s u S h i h - l i e n , C h u n g - k u o s h e - h u i w e n - t ' i c h i h i : C h u n g - k u o j e n - k ' o u w e n -t ' i (One of C h i n a ' s s o c i a l p r o b l e m s : The C h i n e s e p o p u l a t i o n p r o b l e m ] (Shanghai , T930), pp . 78, 128. 48. I b i d . , p . 1. 49. "Ibid*". , p . 7 . 50. I b i d . , pp . 20-31. 51. I b i d . , p . 129. 52. I b i d . , p . 121. 83 VII. Conclusion Because nationalism and Social Darwinism were so intimately involved in the Chinese debate over the population question after the turn of the century, the theories of earlier Chinese intellectuals on population growth received little attention. According to a Chinese writer named Chang Yin-lin, Hung Liang-chi, a Chinese contemporary of Malthus, was never mentioned by Liang Ch'i-ch'ao even though his observations on population growth were 1 remarkably similar to those of the eighteenth century clergyman. Chang treated Hung Liang-chi's writings as though they were a significant discovery, and found it characteristic of the difference between Chinese and Western civilization that Malthus' theory had such an impact on Western political and economic thought while Hung remained virtually unknown to later Chinese thinkers. Indeed, Chang's own interest in Hung's writings was primarily motivated by their similarity to Malthus' works on population growth. When the discussion over Malthusianism began in earnest during the May Fourth period, Chinese writers initially responded to the arguments of various Westerners before they began debating among themselves. However, a figure from China's past who was quoted time and again by the advocates of popula-tion control was Han Fei, the Legalist from the ancient state of Ch'in. Han Fei's observation that a state with a people of low calibre is no better than a state without people seemed to express the sentiments of many of the 2 Chinese who advocated population control. To them, the struggle of the Warring States Period probably contained many parallels to the modern world of competing nation-states in which China was fighting for survival. In the course of the debate over the population,issuejdthe advocates of population control were never able to dispell the unprogressive image that many Chinese attached to Malthusianism. The theme of progress was com-84 mon to both the M a r x i s t and nat ionalis t opposit ion to population con t ro l . The issue of p rogress had ve ry strong nat ionalis t impl ica t ions because many Chinese felt that M a l t h u s i a n i s m was a doctr ine that fore ign in te l lec tuals se lec t ive ly appl ied to Ch ina as a nation incapable of achieving the same kind of s o c i a l p rogress that cha rac te r i zed Wes te rn c i v i l i z a t i o n . Hence, many Chinese perce ived i n M a l t h u s i a n i s m and population c o n t r o l an a d m i s s i o n of China ' s i n f e r i o r i t y in pa r t i cu l a r as w e l l as a p e s s i m i s t i c outlook toward the human potential for p rogress in genera l . Yang H s i a o - c h ' u n ' s appeal demon-strated how eas i ly the tact less promot ion of population con t ro l i n Ch ina by a few foreigners could be used to make things di f f icul t for the Chinese advo-cates of M a l t h u s i a n i s m . The M a r x i s t opposit ion a lso tapped some of this nat ional is t hos t i l i ty to population con t ro l . Al though the ea r ly Chinese M a r x i s t s express ly rejected the theory of Soc i a l D a r w i n i s m , the p o r t r a y a l of M a l t h u s -i a n i s m as a smokesc reen for the exploitat ion of the i m p e r i a l i s t powers had a strong nat ional is t appeal which even n o n - M a r x i s t s u t i l i z e d . Hence, to achieve an understanding of the Chinese Communis t opposit ion to M a l t h u s i a n i s m , one must not view the M a r x i s t opposition to population con t ro l as en t i re ly d is t inct f rom its nat ional is t counterpart . In t e rms of logic alone, many of the arguments favouring population cont ro l were quite forceful and were never sa t i s fac to r i ly refuted by the opposit ion. However , us ing the metaphor of a f o r m a l debate, the promoters of population con t ro l were i n the unenviable pos i t ion of scor ing debating points whi le , at the same t ime, los ing the sympathy of the i r audience. The debate over population con t ro l in China o c c u r r e d at a t ime of growing nat ional awareness and provides a useful mode l for understanding the t h i rd w o r l d resentment toward population cont ro l , p a r t i c u l a r l y when promoted by major w o r l d powers . The continuing opposit ion to f o r m a l p rog rammes of population con t ro l i n the Peoples Republic of China today i n spite of the wide -85 spread p r a c t i c e of b i r t h c o n t r o l f o r i d e o l o g i c a l l y acceptable reasons only u n d e r s c o r e s the nature of this resentment toward M a l t h u s i a n i s m . 86 Notes to Chapter VII 1. Chang Yin-lin, "Hung Liang-chi chi ch'i jen-k'ou lun" (Hung Liang-chi and his population theory), Tung-fang tsa-chih, vol. 23, no. 2 (January 25, 1926), pp. 69-73. 2. An example of this appears in Ch'en Ch'ang-heng, Chung-kuo jen-k'ou lun, p. 75. 87 Bibliography Boorman, Howard L. , Biographical Dictionary of Republican China (New York, 1971). 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