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UBC Theses and Dissertations

Reason and fiat in law Cornett, Russell Walter 1978

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REASON AND FIAT IN LAV/ by RUSSELL WALTER CORNETT B.A., Brandon University, 1973 THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (Department of Philosophy) We accept t h i s thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA A p r i l , 1978 (c) Russell Walter Cornett, 1978 In p r e s e n t i n g t h i s t h e s i s in p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t o f the r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r an advanced degree at the U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h C o lum b i a , I a g ree that the L i b r a r y s h a l l make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r r e f e r e n c e and s tudy . I f u r t h e r agree t h a t p e r m i s s i o n f o r e x t e n s i v e c o p y i n g o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r s c h o l a r l y purposes may be g r a n t e d by the Head o f my Department o r by h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . It i s u n d e r s t o o d that c o p y i n g o r p u b l i c a t i o n o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r f i n a n c i a l g a i n s h a l l not be a l l o w e d w i thout my w r i t t e n p e r m i s s i o n . Department o f PHILOSOPHY  The U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Co lumbia 2075 Wesbrook P l a c e V a n c o u v e r , Canada V6T 1W5 Date APRIL, l t 1978 REASON AND FIAT IN LAW ABSTRACT In t h i s thesis I argue that contemporary legal philoso-phy provides an inadequate analysis of central indeterminacies i n law. I focus on " j u d i c i a l d i s c r e t i o n " as central to current analysis. P o s i t i v i s t s , such as H.L.A. Hart, argue that i t i s the contingencies of human society that give r i s e to uncertain-ty i n the application of law. Therefore, they believe that judges must be given discretionary powers. Ronald Dworkin, an American philosopher, believes that judges should not be given such powers. For him, i t i s the p o s i t i v i s t s ' conception of law that i s amiss. He believes that once the i n s t i t u t i o n s of law are c o r r e c t l y appraised, the need f o r j u d i c i a l d i s c r e t i o n w i l l be seen as a conceptual f a u l t a r i s i n g from a p o s i t i v i s t analy-s i s . In order to provide a c r i t i c a l framework in which to as-sess t h i s debate, I outline the Causal Theory of Law developed by Professors S.C. Coval and J.C. Smith. I f the attention giv-en the concept of j u d i c i a l d i s c r e t i o n represents a concern with subjective elements i n law, then the attention given the conc-ept of a rule represents a concern with objective elements i n law. In a tentative way, one might interpret the question at issue as being: "Is law ultimately an a f f a i r of reason or w i l l ? " Other questions follow: "Is t h i s a f a l s e dichotomy?" "Must law be a combination of both authority and power, r a t i o n -a l argument and o f f i c i a l f i a t ? " I address these questions i n -d i r e c t l y through an examination of Ronald Dworkin's le g a l p h i l -osophy. I f i n d that Dworkin f a i l s to understand the nature and complexity of the problems that he confronts. He believes that le g a l systems can be designed so that authority and power, leg-itimacy and e f f i c a c y never compromise each other. He does t h i s , however, by giving precedence authority. The causal Theory i n -terprets such resolutions as "dis j u n c t i v e " . Dworkin's resolu-t i o n betrays his i n a b i l i t y to appreciate the complexity of the problem. He also obscures the nature of the problem by his "rights thesis", wich interprets the issue involved as primar-i l y a question of normative p o l i t i c a l theory. However, his conception of normativeness i s ambiguous and requires analysis. I argue, against Dworkin, f i r s t , that indeterminacy i n law i s a problem f o r i n s t i t u t i o n a l design, and second, that to argue that t h i s design problem i s normative i s to take a view that i s overly narrow and ultimately misleading. I conclude that those involved i n the philosophical debate surrounding indeterminacy i n law erroneously think that the solution w i l l take a disjunctive form: One side or the other, of the antin-omy between reason and f i a t i n law must be rejected. In l i n e with the Causal Theory, I argue that once t h i s problem i s seen as one of i n s t i t u t i o n a l design, the problem takes on an e n t i r e -l y new shape. I t becomes one of management and experiment. The function of the law i s to help manage the p o l i t i c a l a f f a i r s of society, and also to provide opportunities f o r i n d i v i d u a l and group i n i t i a t i v e s . Man i s limited i n his experience and knowledge. In the design of le g a l i n s t i t u t i o n s man's a b i l i t i e s are not i n f i n i t e ; he can hardly be expected to foresee a l l ev-e n t u a l i t i e s . But such indeterminacy remains a matter of degree, r e l a t i v e to man's knowledge and his a b i l i t y to use i t . The legal enterprise, as does the s c i e n t i f i c , can proceed without a completely worked out set of agreements, or system of b e l i e f s . What i s ess e n t i a l i s an understanding among;;the par t i c i p a n t s as to how such sets w i l l be developed. The core remains empirical. i v REASON AND FIAT IN LAV/ TABLE OF CONTENTS I n t r o d u c t i o n '. 1. PART ONE: The Causal Theory; 4. PART TWO: J u d i c i a l D i s c r e t i o n . 1 1 . PART THREE: Hard Cases 23. A. R i g h t s T h e s i s .; 23. ( i ) P r i n c i p l e s and P o l i c i e s 23. ( i i ) M a j o r i t i e s and M i n o r i t i e s 27. ( i i i ) The C o l l a p s a b l i t y o f P r i n c i p l e s and P o l i c i e s 3 1 . ( i v ) Background Rig h t s and I n s t i t u t i o n a l R i g h t s . . . 3 8 . B. Open Concepts and Indeterminacy i n Law 46. C. Uniqueness of D e c i s i o n s and the Design of Legal I n s t i t u t i o n s 52. PART FOUR: Reason and O b l i g a t i o n i n Law 68. A. The R e c o g n i t i o n Feature i n Law 68. B. L e g a l Obligations'^ 7 1 . C. One Righ t Answer 7 6 . C o n c l u s i o n 8 1 . Footnotes 93. B i b l i o g r a p h y 100. V ACKNOWLEDGEMENT I would l i k e to thank the Department of Philosophy and, i n p a r t i c u l a r , Professor S.C. Coval, f o r support and guidance given me i n writing t h i s t h e s i s . REASON AND FIAT IN LAW The casus improvisus i s always w i t h us: and i n n i n e t y - n i n e cases out of a hundred i t must be s e t t l e d b efore P a r l i a m e n t can a c t . The appeal i s not made to laws, f o r there are none, but to law: c a l l i t what you l i k e — the common law, the p r i n c i p l e s o f j u r i s p r u d -e n c e — anything from j u s divinum to common sense, from r e c t a r a t i o t o a square d e a l : i t i s one and by and w i t h that s t u f f t h a t judges have to worK, and they must do so not as bond-men but as f r e e . 1 — L o r d Shaw I n t r o d u c t i o n : •Hard cases', d i f f i c u l t cases where n e i t h e r s t a t u t e , precedent, nor custom p r o v i d e c l e a r d i r e c t i o n , t h r e a t e n the i m p a r t i a l i t y and o b j e c t i v i t y o f the j u d i c i a r y . Hard cases p o i n t to the i n e v i t a b l e indeterminacy of law. I f the task of j u d g i n g i s to s e t t l e d i s p u t e s i n accordance w i t h the law i n f o r c e , then i n some sense the law must e x i s t p r i o r t o a j u d -i c i a l d e c i s i o n . Some p h i l o s o p h e r s argue t h a t s i n c e the law i not c l e a r i n hard cases , i t makes no sense to c a l l upon i t t j u s t i f y any d e c i s i o n — v a g u e d i r e c t i o n s are no d i r e c t i o n s . Such p h i l o s o p h e r s argue that i t would be more honest to admit t h a t d i s c r e t i o n i s i n f a c t being e x e r c i s e d . L o u i s L. J a f f e i s o f the o p i n i o n t h a t , "judges, what-ever t h e i r p h i l o s o p h y , w i l l . . . o c c a s i o n a l l y i n n o v a t e . I f the judges can be persuaded to allow u n d e r l y i n g p o l i c y q u e s t i o n s to be brought out i n t o the l i g h t , these q u e s t i o n s would then become arguable and, i n t h a t way, s u b j e c t to a h i g h e r degree of r a t i o n a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n and c o n t r o l . " The r a t i o n a l s t a t u s of a l e g a l system has g e n e r a l l y de pended on an assessment of the judge's reasoning i n making de c i s i o n s . More s p e c i f i c a l l y , the focus of a t t e n t i o n i s on the way d e c i s i o n s are j u s t i f i e d . I t has been g e n e r a l l y assumed that to admit d i s c r e t i o n i n t o the l e g a l system would u l t i m a t e 2 l y undermine i t s r a t i o n a l i t y and o b j e c t i v i t y . T h i s assumption i s i m p l i c i t i n the phi l o s o p h y o f Ronald Dworkin. H i s task has been to demonstrate, appearances to the c o n t r a r y , t h a t law i s a determinate s t r u c t u r e w h i c h has no p l a c e f o r d i s c r e t i o n . The admission of d i s c r e t i o n i n t o law i s , 8 t o Dworkin, a matter f o r normative p o l i t i c a l t heory. D i s c r e t i o n i n law i s p a r t o f the l a r g e r problem of i n s t i t u t i o n a l d e s i g n . Dworkin*s argument c o u l d be extended; he c o u l d argue t h a t q u e s t i o n s of i n s t i t u t i o n a l design are themselves p a r t d>f normative p o l i t i c -a l theory. To take a p o s i t i o n on the e s s e n t i a l nature o f law i s , i n Dworkin's eyes, t o take a normative p o s i t i o n . On t h i s i s s u e there i s , s t r i c t l y speaking, only an i n t e r n a l p o i n t of view. Dworkin t h e r e f o r e c r i t i c i z e s the assumption of Bentha-mite p h i l o s o p h y t h a t the q u e s t i o n of what the law i s and the q u e s t i o n o f what the law ought to be are independent of one another. Having questioned t h i s assumption, Dworkin b e l i e v e s t h a t there are good grounds f o r g e t t i n g from the premiss t h a t the law ought not to be d i s c r e t i o n a r y and indeterminate t o the c o n c l u s i o n t h a t the law can and does i n f a c t operate without being d i s c r e t i o n a r y and in d e t e r m i n a t e . I propose t o examine 3 Dworkin*s ph i l o s o p h y o f law i n order to determine the c o r ^ r e c t n e s s o f h i s r e j e c t i o n o f Bentham's d i s t i n c t i o n . I w i l l argue t h a t Dworkin f i n a l l y abandons t h i s p o s i t i o n but t h a t he does not r e a l i z e i t . Dworkin 1s c h i e f a n t a g o n i s t i s H.L.A. Hart. Hart has argued t h a t q u e s t i o n s o f what the law i s and what the law ought to be are s e p a r a b l e . He argues t h a t the e x i g e n c i e s o f human l i f e make i t i m p r a c t i c a b l e to p r o v i d e a l e g a l system t h a t denies d i s c r e t i o n t o judges. In the end, the d i s p u t e be-tween Dworkin and Hart can be reduced t o the q u e s t i o n o f how the law i s t o be augmented and e l a b o r a t e d i n s i t u a t i o n s where the law p r o v i d e s o n l y vague d i r e c t i o n s . Dworkin argues t h a t law i s to be extended by judges only on the b a s i s of arguments o f p r i n c i p l e . Hart argues t h a t such e x t e n s i o n s w i l l a l s o nec-e s s a r i l y i n v o l v e p o l i c y q u e s t i o n s at some l e v e l o f a n a l y s i s . 3 I argue t h a t u l t i m a t e l y Dworkin's d i s t i n c t i o n between argu-ments of p o l i c y and arguments of p r i n c i p l e breaks down; and I argue, f u r t h e r , t h a t law can remain a r a t i o n a l and o b j e c t i v e e n t e r p r i s e even when p o l i c y arguments are p e r m i t t e d i n adjud-i c a t i o n . PART ONE o f t h i s t h e s i s o u t l i n e s the C a u s a l Theory of 4 Law , developed by P r o f e s s o r s S.C. C o v a l and J.C. Smith. T h i s theory p r o v i d e s the necessary context i n which to analyze Dworkin's arguments. When Dworkin's arguments are r e f o r m u l -ated i n terms of the language of the Causal Theory, i t i s eas-i e r to demonstrate t h e i r weakness. PART TWO of t h i s t h e s i s examines the s u b j e c t i v e element i n law — j u d i c i a l d i s c r e t i o n . An a n a l y s i s o f Dworkin's paper " J u d i c i a l D i s c r e t i o n " , i s used t o develop the ph i l o s o p h y o f law r e g a r d i n g t h i s s u b j e c t . PART THREE p r i m a r i l y concerns the problem posed by j u d -i c i a l d i s c r e t i o n i n the design o f l e g a l i n s t i t u t i o n s . Dworkin would r e s o l v e t h i s problem by denying d i s c r e t i o n t o judges and by augmenting the system w i t h " p r i n c i p l e s " . The i m p l i c a t i o n s o f such a r e s o l u t i o n are examined. PART FOUR, c o n s i d e r s whether o r not a l e g a l system can be designed i n a a way t h a t does not permit d i s c r e t i o n and s t i l l remain a p r a c t i c a l and r e a l i s t i c e n t e r p r i s e . The core of Dworkin's l e g a l p h i l o s o p h y , h i s r i g h t s t h e s i s , i s c h a l l e n g e d . I t i s found t o be ambiguous and fragmentary. 4 PART ONE: The Ca u s a l Theory-I t i s b a s i c to the j u d i c i a l p r o c e s s to d e c l a r e whether or not a c e r t a i n l i n e of conduct i s p e r m i t t e d , f o r b i d d e n , ob-l i g a t o r y o r o p t i o n a l . I f the law i s to f a c i l i t a t e t h i s p r o -cess i t must p r o v i d e l e g a l m a t e r i a l s which are c o n s i s t e n t , complete, and independent. The t r a d i t i o n a l 'sources' o f law ( s t a t u t e s , precedents, customs, and procedures) o f t e n p r o v i d e m a t e r i a l s which are n e i t h e r c o n s i s t e n t , complete, nor i n d e -pendent. C o n s i s t e n c y i s a necessary c o n d i t i o n f o r coherence, and t h e r e f o r e f o r c o m p r e h e n s i b i l i t y . L o g i c a l n e c e s s i t y forms the parameters of the comprehensible; i t forms the b a s i c syn-tax o f one's c o n c e p t u a l language. L e g a l m a t e r i a l s framed i n a c o n t r a d i c t o r y f a s h i o n can h a r d l y hope to d i r e c t the j u d i c i a l p r o c e s s . Completeness i s a l s o a requirement of l e g a l mater-i a l s : I f judges are r e q u i r e d t o to ground t h e i r d e c i s i o n s on the law then the law must, i n some sense, p r o v i d e judges w i t h m a t e r i a l s s u f f i c i e n t to r e s o l v e a l l cases; otherwise, they must r e s o l v e such cases a c c o r d i n g t o t h e i r own l i g h t s . Inde-pendence i s a l s o a requirement of l e g a l m a t e r i a l s , f o r w i t h -out i t a case c o u l d never be s e t t l e d o t h e r than through the a r b i t r a r y e x e r c i s e of j u d i c i a l power: At some p o i n t a l i n e must be drawn between law and other s o c i a l p r a c t i c e s . Ques-t i o n s of l e g a l e n t i t l e m e n t should be r e s o l v a b l e without the involvement of e x t r a - l e g a l i s s u e s . C o n s i s t e n c y , completeness, and independence are formal p r o p e r t i e s o r v i r t u e s o f system. Without them, systems p r o v i d e incomprehensible, i n s u f f i c i e n t , and indeterminate guidance. The t r a d i t i o n a l sources o f law, i n s o f a r as they p r o v i d e i n c o n s i s t e n t , incomplete, and co n t i n g e n t m a t e r i a l s , can not serve s a t i s f a c t o r i l y as the b a s i s f o r a l e g a l system. One can t r y to rearrange these l e g a l m a t e r i a l s ; but then the c h o i c e of c r i t e r i a a r i s e s which, i n t u r n , may l e a d t o the charge t h a t one i s us u r p i n g the t r a d i t i o n a l l e g a l a u t h o r i t i e s and sources o f law. L e g i s l a t i o n , precedent, and custom can not be b a s i c t o the conception o f how law works, how i t f a c -5 i l i t a t e s the normative q u a l i f i c a t i o n of conduct. Even under " i d e a l " c o n d i t i o n s o f an e n l i g h t e n e d despot, laws are not l i k e l y to always p r o v i d e d i r e c t i o n i n a c o n s i s t e n t , complete, and independent way. Laws can h a r d l y be expected t o d i s p l a y these systematic v i r t u e s , g i v e n the u s u a l c o n d i t i o n s under which they a r i s e : c o n d i t i o n s of (a) l e g i s l a t i v e change and compromise, (b) j u d i c i a l d i s s e n t and f l u x i n j u d i c i a l o p i n i o n , and (;c) ambiguity i n custom's u n w r i t t e n p r e s c r i p t i o n s . Given c o n s i d e r a t i o n s such as these, i t i s d e s i r a b l e t o develop an a l t e r n a t i v e t o the view that l e g a l s c i e n c e i s concerned only w i t h the systematic rearrangement of. these m a t e r i a l s . The Causal Theory o f Law, developed by P r o f e s s o r s S.C. Coval and J.C. Smith, p r o v i d e s one such a l t e r n a t i v e . I t a r -gues t h a t the t r a d i t i o n a l sources of law w i l l be i n c o n s i s t e n t , incomplete and c o n t i n g e n t . T h i s i s perhaps an i n f e l i c i t o u s way of c h a r a c t e r i z i n g the argument of t h i s theory. What the theory argues i s t h a t there are mechanisms i n t e r n a l to the law which enable i t t o generate d e c i s i o n s even when the m a t e r i a l i n p u t o f the system can not help but be i n c o n s i s t e n t , incom-p l e t e , and i n d e t e r m i n a t e . The C a u s a l Theory o f f e r s "a model o f j u d i c i a l d e c i s i o n -making where the judge i s e n t i t l e d t o r e l y on e x i s t i n g r u l e s of law u n t i l they r e s u l t i n an anomaly i n terms of the v a r i o u s g o a l s r e f l e c t e d i n the l e g a l o r d e r . I f the s o - c a l l e d p o l i c i e s f u n c t i o n as standards, they f u n c t i o n as second order r u l e s i n a l o g i c a l manner, much the same as f i r s t - o r d e r r u l e s . When the p o l i c i e s do not f u n c t i o n as standards, they are merely h i g h order d e s c r i p t i v e statements o f the t e l e o l o g y o f the law which f u r n i s h the c r i t e r i a o f r e l e v a n c y i n a p p l y i n g the e x i s t -5 i n g r u l e s o f law." The model of l e g a l reasoning advanced by the Causal Theory i s e x p l i c a t e d through i t s concept o f a r u l e . T h i s con-cept o f a r u l e i s conceived as a "theory" o f how j u d i c i a l i n -f e r e n c e s should be made, a c c o r d i n g to the l e g a l system. The formal s t r u c t u r e o f a r u l e i s e l i c i t e d by arguing t h a t law, 6 conceived as a public and purposive i n s t i t u t i o n , w i l l maximize certai n values. These values w i l l thus f i n d expression i n terms of the o f f i c i a l p o l i c y and theory of the system. The Causal Theory elucidates the p r e s c r i p t i v e element i n law. Value and p o l i c y are embedded i n the concept of a ru l e . I t i s by extending the concept of a rule i n t h i s way that the theory i s able to provide a model of law and l e g a l reasoning which i s an advance over theories which must posit the "black box mechanism" of d i s c r e t i o n i n order to augment the rule struc-ture of law. The following diagram i s the Causal Theory's schematiz-ation of the form of a rule: R L Cgi Vb; unless I, I I , I I I , or IV. R = a regulation (with (a)-type properties). C = behavior prescribed or proscribed by R. b = substantive goal of the l e g a l system. = causal r e l a t i o n . = t e l e o l o g i c a l or b i c o n d i t i o n a l r e l a t i o n . I. I I , I I I , or IV = a set of c e t e r i s paribus or exception gen-erating clauses. The fundamental or basic form of a rule i s bicondition-a l : " (a)^z^ST(b)". This i s the schematic form of the basic p o l i c y or strategy of law. The basic p o l i c y of law i s to ex-clude from i t s purview those cases i n which (a)-type and (b)-type considerations are incompatible and to license only those cases i n which (a)-goals and (b)-goals are compatible. (b)-type considerations involve the i n t e r e s t s and values embodied in the law of a community; (a)-type considerations involve the methods and practices used to s a t i s f y and r e a l i z e such i n t e r -ests and values. The Causal Theory argues that i t i s the nat-ure of the l e g a l enterprise to systematically avoid disjunc-t i v e c o n f l i c t s between the (a)-goals and the (b)-goals of the system. Regulations (R's) are i n s t i t u t e d i n order to achieve 7 ( b ) - g o a l s , by p r e s c r i b i n g and p r o s c r i b i n g behavior (C) which, other t h i n g s being equal ( c e t e r i s p a r i b u s ) , i s necessary f o r the achievement of those ( b ) - g o a l s . T h i s p r a c t i c e o f i n s t i t -u t i n g (R's) i s seen as necessary, given the nature of the world and the nature o f human beings; i t i s necessary f o r the achievement of fundamental human needs and i n t e r e s t s . There-f o r e , t h i s p r a c t i c e and i t s " i n v o k i n g r u l e s " must be p r o t e c t e d from other s o c i a l p r a c t i c e s and v a r i a n t s which serve o t h e r Ic b a s i c i n t e r e s t s , which at times c o n f l i c t w i t h the i n t e r e s t s embedded i n law. The law must t h e r e f o r e be separable from o t h e r s o c i a l p r a c t i c e s such as p o l i t i c s , m o r a l i t y , and r e l i g i o n , i f i t i s to f u n c t i o n . I t i s thus a fundamental p r e c e p t of law t h a t value s h a l l be ordered i n a way t h a t serves the b a s i c i n t e r -e s t s and g o a l s o f the s o c i e t y , as embodied i n i t s b a s i c law. The l e g a l system can not e f f e c t i v e l y f u l f i l l t h i s p r e c e p t i f i t a llows i t s i n v o c a t i o n procedures to be c o n t r o l l e d i n an ex-t r a - s y s t e m a t i c f a s h i o n or allows d i s j u n c t i v e s i t u a t i o n s t o a r -i s e which c o u l d undermine those procedures. The body o f a p r a c t i c e ( i t s a p p l i c a t i o n ) and i t s i n v o c a t i o n are managed sep-a r a t e l y , a c c o r d i n g to the Causal Theory. The theory argues t h a t one can expect t o f i n d , i n t e r n a l t o the law, procedures f o r c l e a r l y determining the e x i s t e n c e of a law ( i t s r u l e o f i n v o c a t i o n ) and procedures f o r c o n f l i c t r e s o l u t i o n ( i t s c e t e r -i s p a r i b u s c l a u s e s ) . While the i n v o k i n g r u l e only allows one to i d e n t i f y law, no matter how anomalous, i t i s the g e n e r a t i v e s t r u c t u r e of law ( c e t e r i s p a r i b u s c l a u s e s and anomaly r e s o l v -i n g r u l e s ) t h a t p r o v i d e s the remedy f o r such d e f e c t s . Obscur-i t i e s a r i s e when one argues t h a t gaps o r d e f e c t s (hard cases) do not exisi? because the law has the means to remedy them. The g e n e r a t i v e s t r u c t u r e of law would not make sense u n l e s s anomalies were d e t e c t a b l e at some l e v e l i n the s t r u c t u r e ex-h i b i t e d by the t r a d i t i o n a l sources o f law. The important i s -sue f o r the Causal Theory i s the d i f f e r e n c e between how the l e g i s l a t u r e and the j u d i c i a r y m o d i f i e s l e g a l p r e s c r i p t i o n s 8 r a t h e r than whether o r not the j u d i c i a r y i s to be allowed to modify the law. By adding another dimension to law, the deep (second-order) s t r u c t u r e of g e n e r a t i v e r u l e s , the theory i s able to account f o r c e r t a i n systematic d e f e c t s such as i n c o n -s i s t e n c y ( c o n f l i c t ) and incompleteness ( r e l e v a n c y ; d e c i d a b i l i -t y ) i n terms of s u r f a c e s t r u c t u r e , w h i l e a t the same time m a i n t a i n i n g the i n t e g r i t y of the system as a whole. By m a i n t a i n i n g a c l e a r i n v o k i n g r u l e , the system can always answer the q u e s t i o n "What i s law?" — e . g . , t h a t which i s enacted by the Queen i n P a r l i a m e n t . By e s t a b l i s h i n g a s e t o f e x c e p t i o n g e n e r a t i n g c l a u s e s , the system can accommodate i t s e l f t o unforseen c o n t i n g e n c i e s i n a systematic and o r d e r l y way ( t h a t i s , i n an ( a ) - l i k e f a s h i o n ) . The b a s i c law o r con-s t i t u t i o n a l law of a community r e p r e s e n t s the b a s i c p o l i c y of t h a t community. I t i s the f u n c t i o n o f the c o u r t s to see t h a t t h i s b a s i c law i s s y s t e m a t i c a l l y a p p l i e d and e l a b o r a t e d . The c e t e r i s p a r i b u s c l a u s e s ensure t h a t the law w i l l promote the ( b ) - g o a l s of the system maximally, i n an ( a ) - l i k e way. The exceptions generated by these c l a u s e s are thus the p a r t i c u l a r -i z a t i o n s of the b a s i c p o l i c y of the l e g a l system. The m a t r i x o f h i e r a r c h i c a l l y ordered v a l u e s of a l e g a l system r e p r e s e n t s the product of a p p l y i n g and e l a b o r a t i n g s o c i a l p o l i c y . The m a t r i x a l s o p l a y s a c e n t r a l r o l e i n the process of p o l i c y ap-p l i c a t i o n and f o r m a t i o n . The Causal Theory transforms the p r o c e s s of r e s o l v i n g c o n f l i c t s between r u l e s i n t o a p r o c e s s of o r d e r i n g g o a l s w i t h i n the matrix of the l e g a l system. Or even more p r e c i s e l y , the theory makes more perspicuous the p r o f i l e and nature of the matters a c t u a l l y at i s s u e i n such c o n f l i c t s . The b a s i c law can not a n t i c i p a t e a l l e v e n t u a l i t i e s ; the g e n e r a l i t y o f i t s language i s a f u n c t i o n of i t s purpose. The c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o c e s s can do l i t t l e more than s t a t e g e n e r a l p o l i c y . L e g i s l a t u r e s must augment t h i s s t r u c t u r e . The con-c r e t e e x p r e s s i o n of t h i s i s the matrix of v a l u e s embedded i n the workings of law. The m a t r i x i n v o l v e s both a s t a t i c and a dynamic o r d e r i n g of g o a l s . The b a s i c g o a l s have a more i n -9 t r i n s i c value and t h e r e f o r e a c q u i r e a p l a c e i n the h i g h e r p a r t of the matrix and are found to be more s t a b l y ordered; o t h e r g o a l s have a more i n s t r u m e n t a l nature and t h e r e f o r e a c q u i r e a p l a c e i n the lower p a r t of the matrix and are found to be more dynamically ordered. Instrumental g o a l s tend to be p a r -t i c u l a r i z a t i o n s of h i g h e r g o a l s i n the matrix; f o r example: The r i g h t to p i c k e t by a worker on s t r i k e can be seen as a p a r t i c u l a r i z a t i o n or e x t e n s i o n of h i s l i b e r t y i n the p u r s u i t of happiness (economic w e l l - b e i n g ) . The Causal Theory r e v e a l s a systematic development, a p p l i c a t i o n , and i n c l u s i o n and ex~v e l u s i o n of g o a l s i n the p r a c t i c e of law. 'Order 1 i s the key-note of t h i s theory: ( b ) - g o a l s are ordered ( a ) - l y , u n l e s s I -IV; t h e r e f o r e , the l e g a l system must order i t s ( b ) - g o a l s ; the r e s u l t i s the matrix of ordered g o a l s ( i n c l u d i n g second-order g o a l s ) and the anomaly-resolving r u l e s . Since the p r a c t i c e of law depends on both the nature of the world and the nature of man, i t f o l l o w s that the p r a c t i c e c o u l d break down when the nature of e i t h e r changes i n a man-ner t h a t was not a n t i c i p a t e d when the law was formulated. However, the law can a n t i c i p a t e the g e n e r a l k i n d s of break-down that w i l l occur, thus reducing the indeterminacy of such proceedings. The C a u s a l Theory p r o v i d e s f o r t h i s " h i g h l y f o r -seeable""matter by embedding c e t e r i s p a r i b u s c l a u s e s i n the s t r u c t u r e of a r u l e : C e t e r i s p a r i b u s c l a u s e I, " - ( R — ^ C ) " , excludes those cases where the nature o f man i s i n v o l v e d i n a way which makes the demand t h a t one comply w i t h the r u l e , (R — =*C), i r r a t i o n a l , g iven the c a u s a l r a t i o n a l e of the system — e . g . , i n f a n c y , i n s a n i t y , and desuetude. C e t e r i s p a r i b u s c l a u s e I I , " - ( C — * - b ) " , excludes those cases where the nature of the world i s i n v o l v e d — e . g . , p h y s i c a l i m p o s s i b i l i t y . C e t e r i s p a r i b u s c l a u s e I I I , "(C »-b), but a l s o something worse than b", excludes those cases where s e r v i n g the ( b ) -g o a l i n v o l v e d , j e o p a r d i z e s a h i g h e r ( b ) - g o a l i n the m a t r i x — e.g., a c o n f l i c t between the law of crimes and the law o f w i l l s r e g a r d i n g someone who had mugde r.e <ff*. tfofe'/jfeheupua?p © se of 10 t a k i n g more q u i c k l y under the w i l l of the v i c t i m . C e r t a i n forms of o f f i c i a l abuse may a l s o be c o n s t r u e d as cases of t h i s form. R a d i c a l abuse, such as the c o r r u p t i o n o f an e n t i r e r e g -ime, may c a l l f o r another e x c e p t i n g c l a u s e : C e t e r i s p a r i b u s c l a u s e IV, " R — 3 » C — 5 » - b " , excludes those cases where the p r a c t i c e , as a whole, i s s e r v i n g a ( b ) - g o a l not wanted by the community — e . g . , cases such as the Nazi regime i n Germany. The Causal Theory of Law p r o v i d e s l e g a l p h i l o s o p h y w i t h s t r o n g grounds f o r b e l i e v i n g t h a t the d i v i s i o n between n a t u r a l lawyers and p o s i t i v i s t s r e s t s , to some extent , upon t h e i r d i s -r e g a r d i n g the g e n e r a t i v e s t r u c t u r e of law. T h i s f o r c e d n a t u r -a l law t h e o r i e s to argue t h a t " t r u e " law has no d e f e c t s or gaps; w h i l e i t f o r c e d p o s i t i v i s t t h e o r i e s to grant broad d i s -c r e t i o n a r y powers to judges. The C a u sal Theory avoids both extremes. 11 PART TWO: J u d i c i a l D i s c r e t i o n Considered s e p a r a t e l y , the f o l l o w i n g demands (A, B, and C) are o f t e n p l a c e d upon a l e g a l system — t h e y are thought to be, at l e a s t prima f a c i e , necessary f o r the completeness of the l e g a l system, e n a b l i n g the s t a n d a r d i z a t i o n o f s o c i a l l y r e -q u i r e d conduct: "(A) P r i n c i p l e o f u n a v o i d a b i l i t y : Judges must r e s o l v e a l l cases submitted to them w i t h i n the sphere of t h e i r compet-ence." "(B) P r i n c i p l e of j u s t i f i c a t i o n : A j u d i c i a l d e c i s i o n r e q u i r e s a ground or reason and judges must s t a t e the reasons 9 f o r t h e i r d e c i s i o n s . " "(C) P r i n c i p l e o f l e g a l i t y : J u d i c i a l d e c i s i o n s must be 10 grounded on l e g a l norms." These three demands canbbe summarized as: "(D) Judges must r e s o l v e a l l cases submitted to them w i t h i n the l i m i t s o f t h e i r competence by means of d e c i s i o n s 11 grounded on l e g a l norms." "(E) Every o b l i g a t i o n i m p l i e s the p o s s i b i l i t y of p e r -12 forming the o b l i g a t o r y a c t i o n . " By adding (E) to (D) the f o l l o w i n g p r o p o s i t i o n can be i n f e r r e d : "(F) Judges can r e s o l v e a l l cases submitted t o "them w i t h i n the l i m i t s o f t h e i r competence by means of d e c i s i o n s 13 grounded on l e g a l norms." But (F) i m p l i e s : "(G) The set of a l l l e g a l norms c o n t a i n s normative 14 grounds f o r the s o l u t i o n o f any case submitted to a judge." C a r l o s E. A l c h o u r r o n and Eugenio B u l y g i n argue t h a t from (A), (B), and (C) the P o s t u l a t e o f Completeness, (G), can be deduced. " T h i s means," they argue, " t h a t the requirement (which p o s i t i v i s t s ) express ( i n (A), (B), and (C)) presuppose the t r u t h o f t h i s p o s t u l a t e . But the p o s t u l a t e i s t r u e only i n e x c e p t i o n a l i n s t a n c e s ; t h a t i s , i n r e l a t i o n to c l o s e d s y s -tems, such as pena l law, t h a t c o n t a i n the r u l e of c l o s u r e n u l -lum crimen. When applied to the majority of l e g a l systems, the postulate (G)....is f a l s e . Hence i t follows that the 15 three p r i n c i p l e s (A,B, and C) are j o i n t l y inconsistent." I t i s demand (C), the p r i n c i p l e of l e g a l i t y , that these authors f i n d vulnerable. This p r i n c i p l e , they argue, " i s 1 fi bound up with the ideologies of Positivism and Liberalism." Early p o s i t i v i s t s t r i e d to provide l e g a l systems with exten-sive c o d i f i c a t i o n . L e g i s l a t i o n could not, however, anticipate every contingency and therefore could not provide a •complete* leg a l code. Without such a code, the p r i n c i p l e of l e g a l i t y could hardly be i n s i s t e d upon. "Indeed, many an attack on positivism,V write Alchourron and Bulygin, "has had as i t s sole aim widening the set of admissable (valid) norms by i n -tegrating i t with customary law, moral p r i n c i p l e s , natural law j u d i c i a l precedent and the l i k e . But the next step i s to as-cribe to the set that has been enlarged i n t h i s way the same ch a r a c t e r i s t i c that i t had before — i n the p o s i t i v i s t concep-17 t i o n — that of bexng closed". Such enlargements add to the normative completeness of the law but they do not necessarily close i t to the p o s s i b i l i t y of j u d i c i a l d i s c r e t i o n . Dworkin 1s objective i s to put forward a " l i b e r a l " 18 theory of law. In his paper, " J u d i c i a l Discretion", he i s primarily concerned with the problem of normative complete-^ ness. Even here a species of *disjunctivism* arises between Dworkin and the p o s i t i v i s t s (Hart i n p a r t i c u l a r ) : Dworkin prizes completeness above coherence. He would rather ensure that the system be e f f i c i e n t to i t s assigned tasks — t h e achievement of j u s t i c e — against the p o s s i b i l i t y that the sys-tem would thereby be reduced to incoherence and to the danger of inconsistency through the vagueness of i t s operations. Hart, however, would prefer consistency over and against com-pleteness when the two come into c o n f l i c t . I f one i s to make any sense out of Hart's introduction of j u d i c i a l d i s c r e t i o n into his theory of the legal system, then i t must be viewed as an attempt to augment his basic system. His basic system emphasizes the virtue of consistency. This emphasis threatens the completeness of the system; therefore, the system i s aug-mented by j u d i c i a l d i s c r e t i o n . Such augmentation, of course, threatens to set up a r i v a l authority to that of the l e g a l order. I t i s at t h i s point that Hart's theory i s most v u l -nerable; and i t i s here that Dworkin begins his attack. I t i s worth stating, i n broad terms, the nature of the dispute: The demand for consistency i s often expressed i n the negative the-s i s that the rule of law i s not rule by f i a t ; i t i s not a r b i t -rary. A r b i t r a r y rule i s most l i k e l y to re s u l t in an incoher-ent authority. The p o s i t i v e thesis i s extremely hard to ex-p l i c a t e , and l e g a l systems seem to come short of the (ideal) goals set f o r them — j u s t i c e , f o r examble. Completeness would seem to be the harder virtue to achieve; but t h i s i s not v. c l e a r l y so, e s p e c i a l l y i f one i s w i l l i n g to reduce one's stan-dards of consistency. Both the p o s i t i v e and negative theses are expressed i n the opening l i n e s of Dworkin's paper, and which i f not c a r e f u l l y considered almost alone allow him to win the case f o r completeness as against consistency: "To the layman", writes Dworkin, "a lawsuit or a t r i a l i s an event i n which a judge determines a controversy by ap-p l i c a t i o n of established p r i n c i p l e s / t h i s i s his p o s i t i v e the-s i s / , rather than new p r i n c i p l e s to dispose of the case / t h i s -» 19 i s his negative t h e s i s / . " The i d e a l of completeness i s emphasized in the very next sentence: "He /the laymari7 knows that i n d i v i d u a l judges may f a i l 20 t h i s i d e a l of j u s t i c e . . . . " "Ideals" are the parameters of completeness f o r a sys-tem. Also i n speaking of " t h i s " i d e a l , Dworkin does not seem to appreciate the complexity of his f i r s t sentence, specif-i c a l l y i t s negative th e s i s . In the abstract of his paper, "Dworkin on J u d i c i a l Discretion", G.C. MacCallum sees Dwor-kin's basic argument to be as follows: " I f persons subject to an o f f i c i a l ' s decision are en-14 t i t l e d as of r i g h t t o some p a r t i c u l a r d e c i s i o n — v i z . , the ' c o r r e c t ' d e c i s i o n — , then the o f f i c i a l has no d i s c r e t i o n . There are such e n t i t l e m e n t s i n a l l r e l e v a n t j u d i c i a l cases. 21 T h e r e f o r e , judges have no d i s c r e t i o n i n these cases." " I n t e r e s t " i s a r e l a t i v e t h i n g . The most f r u i t f u l i n -t e r p r e t a t i o n of MacCallum's remarks i s t h a t he sees Dworkin's main concern to be the problem of normative completeness i n a l e g a l system. When viewed a g a i n s t the backdrop of the prob-lem of c o n s i s t e n c y and Hart's p o s i t i o n , one wonders i f any a r -gument f o r the completeness of a l e g a l system can be coherent-l y e s t a b l i s h e d : namely, t h a f ' t h e r e are such e n t i t l e m e n t s i n a l l j u d i c i a l c a ses.% I t must be i n t h i s sense that t h i s a r -gument i s the only " i n t e r e s t i n g " one to be found i n Dworkin's paper. The " r a t i o n a l i t y " of a system which c l a i m s such"com-p l e t e n e s s " i s being questioned. Dworkin's main t a r g e t i s ' j u d i c i a l d i s c r e t i o n ' . T h i s suggests t h a t he does not see the l a r g e r g e n e r i c and system-a t i c problem o f indeterminacy i n law. In h i s p r e f e r e n c e f o r completeness ( t r y i n g t o assure j u s t i c e , t o assure t h a t one's r i g h t s and e n t i t l e m e n t s are recognized) Dworkin f a i l s to r e a l -i z e t h a t Hart's emphasis on c o n s i s t e n c y ( i n c o n f l i c t s between the two) i s , i n i t s own way, t r y i n g to assure these very same ends. He demands c o n t r o l of d e c i s i o n s by p u b l i c standards, developed i n the community and the p r o f e s s i o n over time, r a -t h e r than c o n t r o l by the systematic d e v i c e of a r u l e of r e c o g -22 n i t i o n . T h i s demand may merely exchange p r i v a t e p r e j u d i c e f o r p u b l i c p r e j u d i c e , j u d i c i a l d i s c r e t i o n f o r p u b l i c d i s c r e -t i o n . T h i s again suggests t h a t Dworkin does not f u l l y appre-c i a t e the l a r g e r systematic q u e s t i o n s of i n s t i t u t i o n a l d e s i g n . Dworkin can not see how g o a l s " e n t e r " the l e g a l system. Hart's use of h i s r u l e o f r e c o g n i t i o n w i l l not do — o t h e r w i s e , he would not have allowed judges d i s c r e t i o n . The r e c o g n i t i o n procedures f o r g o a l s and t h e i r r a n k i n g i n law, becomes the c e n t r a l p r e o c c u p a t i o n of Dworkin 1s l e g a l p h i l o s o p h y . P o s i t i v -i s t s b e l i e v e d t h a t i n a d m i t t i n g goals i n t o law (other than under the d i s c r e t i o n of judges) one j e o p a r d i z e d other highly-v a l u e d aspects of the system; namely, the p r i n c i p l e of demo-c r a t i c theory t h a t p o p u l a r r u l e i s r e q u i r e d because o b l i g a t i o n must be based on some form of consent, and the r a t i o n a l i t y t h a t f i n d s r e t r o a c t i v e laws e s s e n t i a l l y absurd. P o s i t i v i s t s t h e r e f o r e argued f o r j u d i c i a l s u b o r d i n a t i o n and the r e j e c t i o n of vague law. The c e n t r a l i s s u e concerns the development or d i s c o v -ery of a systematic s t r u c t u r e t h a t w i l l r e s o l v e c o n f l i c t s which a r i s e out of the need f o r both c o n s i s t e n c y ( c l a r i t y ) and completeness ( d e c i d a b i l i t y ) i n a l e g a l system. I t i s d e s i r -able both t o achieve one's goals and to know when they have been achieved: these are the reasons why completeness and c o n s i s t e n c y are accounted v i r t u o u s , Both are h i g h l y p r i z e d , and any theory t h a t a l l o w s one to be traded o f f a g a i n s t the othe r w i l l f a i l to be f u l l y s a t i s f a c t o r y i n p r a c t i c e . Thus Hart and Dworkin f a i l i n d i f f e r e n t d i r e c t i o n s . The form o f an acceptable theory i s thus more complex than i s contemplat-ed by e i t h e r o f these authors. They b e l i e v e t h a t a s t a t i c , o n c e - a n d - f o r - a l l r e s o l u t i o n i s p o s s i b l e . What i s i n f a c t r e -q u i r e d i s the development of the i n n e r dynamic of the law. The Causal Theory, o u t l i n e d i n PART ONE, o f f e r s a r e a l i s t i c a l t e r n a t i v e . I t i s t o the c r e d i t o f Common Sense brands of p h i l o s o -phy t h a t the z e a l f o r l o g i c a l c o n s i s t e n c y i s tempered. Dwor-k i n ' s "layman" r e p r e s e n t s t h i s p o i n t of view. However, a b e t -t e r way of e x h i b i t i n g the f u l l f o r c e o f such common sense a r -guments i s to take them t o be a s s e r t i n g the e x i s t e n c e of a prima f a c i e case. With such cases argument beg i n s . Presump-t i o n of c o r r e c t n e s s i s e s t a b l i s h e d , and the burden o f pr o o f i s p l a c e d upon those who would c h a l l e n g e t h a t c o r r e c t n e s s . The prima f a c i e case behind much of Dworkin's "layman" i s t h a t i n combining both the f u n c t i o n o f l e g i s l a t i o n and the f u n c t i o n o f a d j u d i c a t i o n one th r e a t e n s the l e g a l system w i t h a form of incoherence, the p o s s i b i l i t y o f i n c o n s i s t e n c y . To es-16 t a b l i s h t h i s p o s i t i o n one need only imagine a two-person s o c i -ety: The C i t i z e n could hardly be expected to follow the or-ders of the Governor i f i t were not possible to discover what those orders were u n t i l a f t e r he had 'disobeyed' them. The language in which normative discourse i s framed i s severely strained i n such contexts. From t h i s prima f a c i e position the argument would continue: This incoherence i s the threat posed by j u d i c i a l d i s c r e t i o n . In order to prevent i t , the judge must be supplied with s u f f i c i e n t l e g a l materials to provide a leg a l remedy f o r each case brought before his court. This i s to say, that the generic case must be resolved i n the l e g a l system (that i s , elaborated i n a general and abstract way), so that the judge, through the exercise of his s k i l l and t r a i n i n g need only apply i t to the s p e c i f i c concrete case: i . e . , the system must be complete. J u d i c i a l d i s c r e t i o n thus seems, par-adoxically, to threaten the completeness of the system, when i n i t i a l l y i t was introduced by Hart primarily to augment an incomplete structure. Thus one arri v e s again at Dworkin's c r u c i a l second premiss and must ask: How can one e s t a b l i s h that there are always s u f f i c i e n t l e g a l materials (a body of entitlements) such that the system need never be augmented by j u d i c i a l discretion? (Remember, that the prima f a c i e argument i s that introducing ' j u d i c i a l d i s c r e t i o n ' into a l e g a l system can r e s u l t i n i n t e r n a l contra-dictions through the creation of a competing authority.) Dwor-kin's argument i n " J u d i c i a l Discretion" seems to be singularly unhelpful. I t i s i n his paper, "Hard Cases", that one finds Dworkin',s answer. "Hard Cases" w i l l be considered i n PART THREE of t h i s t h e s i s . At t h i s point, my primary concern i s Dworkin's conception of the differences between his and Hart's positions and the character of the general problem with which they are involved. P o s i t i v i s t s c o r r e c t l y argue that t h e i r system does not  necessarily lead to i n t e r n a l contradictions. In t h i s way, p o s i t i v i s t s manage to r e s i s t increasing t h e i r system's com-p l e x i t y , and thereby maintain a degree of s i m p l i c i t y i n the design o f t h e i r l e g a l system while a c h i e v i n g a form of com-p l e t e n e s s . S i m p l i c i t y of design i s of course d e s i r e a b l e , be-cause i t makes i t e a s i e r to comprehend and to apply the system i n p r a c t i c e . To r e j e c t j u d i c i a l d i s c r e t i o n because i t has the p o s s i b i l i t y of l e a d i n g to an i n c o h e r e n t s t r u c t u r e seems ex-, treme to p o s i t i v i s t s — e s p e c i a l l y when such a r e j e c t i o n t h r e a t e n s to erode the b a s i c c o n s i s t e n c y o f t h e i r system and i t s attendant c l a r i t y through the e r e c t i o n of vague and pos-s i b l y i ncoherent standards. Dworkin argues t h a t j u d i c i a l d i s c r e t i o n should be r e -j e c t e d , even i f t h i s i n v o l v e s s a c r i f i c i n g a degree of c o n s i s -tency by a l l o w i n g p u b l i c standards to a f f e c t j u d i c i a l decis£ i o n s . In the a n a l y s i s of t h i s p o s i t i o n i t w i l l be c r u c i a l t o understand e x a c t l y how Dworkin would have such " p u b l i c stand-ards" determined and e l a b o r a t e d i n a d j u d i c a t i o n . In f a c t , Dworkin would want to argue that he s a c r i f i c e s none of the v i r t u e s of c o n s i s t e n c y found i n the p o s i t i v i s t model of law, but r a t h e r p r o v i d e s a more c o n s i s t e n t s t r u c t u r e without s a c r i -f i c i n g the elements og law v a l u e d by p o s i t i v i s t s . But the a r -gument i s long and q u i t e i n v o l v e d . At t h i s p o i n t , i t would seem t h a t at best Dworkin has only s u b s t i t u t e d p u b l i c f o r j u -d i c i a l d i s c r e t i o n — as was s a i d b e f o r e . Yet, by a l l o w i n g such vague standards a role.; i n a d j u d i c a t i o n , he has assured the judge s u f f i c i e n t m a t e r i a l s to r e s o l v e a l l cases brought before him. But t h i s i n c r e a s e s the u n c e r t a i n t y as to what those d e c i s i o n s w i l l be, and so j e o p a r d i z e s the coherence and c o n s i s t e n c y of the l e g a l system. Dworkin has y e t to e s t a b l i s h h i s second premiss. T h i s premiss amounts to the c l a i m t h a t judges never make law but only f i n d i t . Embedded i n t h i s c l a i m i s the prima f a c i e case about the u l t i m a t e incoherence of combining the f u n c t i o n s of l e g i s l a t i o n and a d j u d i c a t i o n . "Ultimate":'.in the sense t h a t i t cannot serve as the b a s i s of a s y s t e m a t i c p r e s e n t a t i o n ; i . e . , i t a t t a c k s the 'independence 1 of the system. Dworkin, how^ 18 ever, does not e s t a b l i s h i n any s i g n i f i c a n t way,that his sec-ond premiss i s correct. He says that judges say they f i n d law and do not make i t . He says that "laymen" expect judges to f i n d law and not to make i t . He argues, along with Hart, that our normative language would not be applicable to a sys-tem that generally had judges making rather than applying law — e v e n f o r Hart, judge-made law i s the exception and not the rule. Of course, the correctness of a l l that Dworkin says de-pends on the correctness of his second premiss; mainly, that there are always s u f f i c i e n t l e g a l materials to resolve any case. Granted, mankind has a l o t invested in the correctness of these views. The r a d i c a l argument of the R e a l i s t , however, i s s t i l l possible: The layman and the judge are mistaken and normative language i s i n fact not applicable to l e g a l systems. A l l that Dworkin has done i s to show the i n t e r n a l connections ofi a structure that i s questioned as a whole. He has shown that i f cert a i n items are to be removed from the concept of law then t h i s e n t a i l s that other items must also go. The ra-d i c a l argument continues: What must be produced i s a system which can e f f e c t i v e l y achieve i t s goals without s a c r i f i c i n g either consistency or completeness. Neither Hart nor Dworkin, so f a r i n t h i s analysis, produces such a system. At best, Dworkin reduces the persuasiveness of some of the Realist's more posit i v e programs (for example, those which emphasize the descriptive-empirical study of the j u d i c i a l process). What i s i n s t r u c t i v e i s that the r a d i c a l , Realist re-je c t i o n of system, opposed by both Hart and Dworkin, has led to a deeper understanding of the complexities involved i n de-signing a l e g a l system. In rejecting the theory f o r the prac-t i c e of law, the Rea l i s t has challenged theory to respond sat-i s f a c t o r i l y to p r a c t i c e . Of course, the complete re j e c t i o n of theory on the part of some Realists consigns that view ultim-ately to dogmatic i s o l a t i o n . The work of theori s t s who reject p r a c t i c a l problems, on the other hand, can expect to suffer from neglect. Dworkin does not f u l l y appreciate the issue behind the Realist's position (the r a d i c a l argument*)1 or Hart's po s i t i o n (the argument from hard cases). E s p e c i a l l y when his argument f o r his second premiss seems to amount to the follow-ing: 'We have a l o t invested i n the view that persons sub-ject to an o f f i c i a l ' s decision are e n t i t l e d as of right to some p a r t i c u l a r decision i n a l l relevant j u d i c i a l cases. This i s a view as to what the law i s and ought to be l i k e . Because we have so much invested i n t h i s view, we can not give i t up. 1 In f a c t , Dworkin's l a t e s t defence of his theory ends i n 23 a s i m i l a r stance. But t h i s i s not the issue. It i s rather the correctness (the r a t i o n a l i t y ) of t h i s view that i s ques-tioned. Even though some Realists, i n t h e i r enthusiasm to show that law was not the embodiment of. Necessity, may have suggested or even openly advocated the f e a s i b i l i t y of r a d i c a l a lternatives, t h e i r c r i t i c i s m of ex i s t i n g theory was to the point. Theory to the Realist did not have any apparent ap-p l i c a t i o n , and i n fact often retarded the practice of law. 24 In Dworkin's l a t e r paper, "The Model of Rules", the problem of whether or not normative completeness can serve as a r e a l i s t i c i d e a l takes on a d i f f e r e n t shape. The problem that begins to emerge i s not so much whether or not the l e g a l system must be augmented but rather how i t i s to be augmented. Dworkin's arguments, however, are not d e f i n i t e enough , In t h i s paper, to resolve t h i s issue. But he does refine his concept of d i s c r e t i o n and thus his dispute with Hart. He ar-gues that judges exercise d i s c r e t i o n i n two senses only. He distinguishes among three senses of j u d i c i a l d i s c r e t i o n : ' d i -scretion-1', that judges must exercise judgement; 'discretion-2', that judges have the l a s t word; 'discretion-3, that judges are not controlled by standards d i c t a t i n g a p a r t i c u l a r d e c i s i s 25 ion. He finds that l e g a l philosophers have a d i f f i c u l t time distinguishing between discretion-1 and d i s c r e t i o n - 3 . 2 6 This i s hardly surprising, f o r t h i s ' i n a b i l i t y ' i s i n fact part of Dworkin's substantive argument. This i s brought out c l e a r l y i f one interprets Dworkin as arguing that i n order to make sense out of p o s i t i v i s t claims one must posit a t h i r d sense of d i s c r e t i o n . Unless Dworkin i s understood i n t h i s way, a contradiction seems to arise i n his presentation of the term • d i s c r e t i o n 1 . F i r s t , h e writes: "The concept of d i s c r e t i o n i s at home i n only one sort of context: when someone i s i n general charged with making decisions subject to standards set by a p a r t i c u l a r authority." 27 But when he writes about discretion-3, he says: "We use 'discretion' sometimes ... to say that an of-f i c i a l ...... one some issue ... i s simply not bound by stand-ards set by the authority i n question." In order to make sense of these passages, one must un-derstand Dworkin to be arguing that i f ' d i s c r e t i o n 1 , as used by p o s i t i v i s t s , i s to make any sense then i t must be used i n the sense of discretion-3. I t does not seem to make sense to speak of"law" where there i s no authority purporting to govern decisions. And j u d i c i a l action, as j u d i c i a l action, does not make sense other than as the application of law. I t would therefore seem to follow that j u d i c i a l discretion-3 i s not ex-ercised by judges — simply because there i s no such t h i r d sense. The argument seems to be that the p o s i t i v i s t thesis, which amounts to establishing j u d i c i a l discretion-3, can only make sense i n terms of the other two senses of d i s c r e t i o n ; senses which i n no way attack the fundamentals of the l e g a l system. Thus, adapting Dworkin*s argument, the p o s i t i v i s t thesis i s either t r i v i a l or incoherent. I t i s of course i n -cumbent upon Dworkin to demonstrate that i t i s possible to ex-p l a i n the phenomenology of j u d i c i a l decision without po s i t i n g discretion-3. In part, Dworkin i s challenging the p o s i t i v i s t b e l i e f that there i s no alternative to admitting j u d i c i a l d i s -cretion-3 into the l e g a l system. PART THREE of t h i s thesis considers Dworkin*s al t e r n a t i v e . The more d i f f i c u l t part of Dworkin*s argument, i n "The 21 Model of Rules", i s his claim that i t i s the p o s i t i v i s t con-ception of law as a "system of rules" which leads the p o s i t i v -i s t to the error of supposing that judges must exercise d i s -2 9 cretion-3. The nerve of his argument i s that law, conceived as a system of rules, i s i n s u f f i c i e n t to the task of explain-ing how judges decide questions of law, especially i n hard cases; such a system must be augmented by the p o s i t i v i s t with some form of j u d i c i a l l e g i s l a t i o n . Dworkin, however, augments rules by p r i n c i p l e s and pictures law as a system of e n t i t l e -ments. Dworkin's d i s t i n c t i o n between rules and p r i n c i p l e s i s c r u c i a l to his account. P r i n c i p l e s , unlike rules, Dworkin ar-gues, have a dimension of weight and therefore do not function l i k e rules i n an "all-or-nothing" way, but are balanced one 30 against the other. Dworkin's conception of a rule i s that of a rule-of-thumb. P r i n c i p l e s and not rmles are central to his concept of law. He rejects the view that his and Hart's 31 positions d i f f e r only i n emphasis. He believes that there are fundamental differences between t h e i r views. He rejects the p o s i t i v i s t concern with the "independence" of law, arguing f o r a "connection" between "law" and "morality". In r e j e c t i n g discretion-3, Dworkin has had to supply the judge with s u f f i c -ient l e g a l materials of a type (pr i n c i p l e s ) which would allow the judge to provide a " l e g a l " remedy f o r each case brought before the court. In order to do t h i s he has had to question Hart's conclusions which were supposedly based on standards of c l a r i t y and decisiveness. Thus, his attack on Hart's rule of recognition and i t s role i n the leg a l system. Hart's and Dworkin's approaches are the same i n t h i s respect: each i s w i l l i n g to s a c r i f i c e certain featuresof the legal system i n order to achieve the goals of the l e g a l system. They d i f f e r i n respect to the features each i s w i l l i n g to s a c r i f i c e . Dworkin's p r e s c r i p t i o n would d e l i v e r a shabby product. Hart's pres c r i p t i o n would d e l i v e r a better product; however, delivery would not be assured. The issue that emerges between Hart and Dworkin does 22 not so much concern the completeness of the l e g a l system, as i t does i t s augmentation. It i s only i n his paper, "Hard Cas-es", that t h i s issue c l e a r l y emerges. 23 PART THREE: Hard Cases A. The Rights Thesis ( i ) P r i n c i p l e s and P o l i c i e s Dworkin's paper, "The Model of Rules", provided p h i l o -sophy with a strong c r i t i q u e of positivism, but i t did not of-f e r an adequate al t e r n a t i v e . There were c r u c i a l questions, but no sound answers. Of the p o s i t i v i s t theory of obligation Dworkin writes: This theory holds that a l e g a l o b l i -gation exists when (and only when) an es-tablished rule of law imposes such an ob-l i g a t i o n . I t follows from t h i s that i n a hard case -when no such established rule can be found- there i s no l e g a l obligation u n t i l the judge creates a new rule f o r the future. The judge may apply that new rule to the parties i n the case, but t h i s i s ex post facto l e g i s l a t i o n , not the enforcement of e x i s t i n g obligation. The p o s i t i v i s t s ' doctrine of d i s c r e t -ion ( i n the strong sense) required t h i s view of l e g a l obligation, because i f the judge has di s c r e t i o n there i s no l e g a l right or obligation -no entitlement- that he must enforce. Once we abandon that doctrine, however, and treat p r i n c i p l e s as law, we raise the p o s s i b i l i t y that a le g a l o b l i -gation may be imposed by a co n s t e l l a t i o n of pr i n c i p l e s as well as by an established r u l e . We might want to say that l e g a l ob-l i g a t i o n exists whenever the case support-ing such an obligation, i n terms of bind-ing l e g a l p r i n c i p l e s of d i f f e r e n t sorts, i s stronger than the case against i t , Of course, many questions would have to be answered before we could accept that view of l e g a l obligation. I f there i s no rule of recognition, no test f o r law i n that sense, how do we decide which p r i n c i p l e s are to count, and how much, i n making such a case? How do we decide whether one case i s better than another? I f leg a l obligation rests on an undemonstrable judgement of that sort, how can i t provide a j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r a j u d i c i a l decision that one party had a lega l obligation? Does t h i s view of o b l i -gation square with the way lawyers, judges and laymen speak, and i s i t consistent with 24 our attitudes about moral obligation? Does t h i s analysis help us to deal with the c l a s -s i c a l j u r i s p r u d e n t i a l puzzles about the nat-ure of law? These questions must be faced, but even the questions promise more than positivism provides. Positivism, on i t s own thesis, stops short of just those puzzling, hard cas-es that send us to look f o r theories of law. When we reach these cases, the p o s i t i v i s t remits us to a doctrine of d i s c r e t i o n that leads nowhere and t e l l s nothing. His p i c -ture of law as a system of rules has exer-cised a tenacious hold on our own imagin-ation, perhaps through i t s very s i m p l i c i t y . I f we shake ourselves loose from t h i s model of rules, we may be able to b u i l d a model truer to the complexly and sophistication of our own practices. Dworkin's most complete answer to these questions i s to 3 3 be found i n his paper, "Hard Cases". His alternative to the p o s i t i v i s t model of law i s based on his "Rights Thesis". The thesis holds"that j u d i c i a l decisions i n c i v i l cases ... char-a c t e r i s t i c a l l y are and should be generated by p r i n c i p l e not p o l i c y " . According to the rights thesis, " j u d i c i a l decis-ions enforce e x i s t i n g p o l i t i c a l r i g h t s . . . . P o l i t i c a l r i g h t s are creatures of both history and morality: what an i n d i v i d u a l i s e n t i t l e d to have, i n c i v i l society, depends upon both the : 3 5 practice and the j u s t i c e of i t s p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s . " Coval and Smith argue that Dworkin's conception of a p r i n c i p l e i s ambiguous between that of a second-order rule and a value or goal of the l e g a l system. I t i s t h i s confusion that leads Dworkin to d i s t i n g u i s h between p r i n c i p l e s and rules on the basis of t h e i r mode of a f f e c t i n g decisions: "Rules" oper-ate i n an "all-or-nothing" fashion and at c e r t a i n points they do not o f f e r any further guidance. Conversely, " p r i n c i p l e s " can always provide d i r e c t i o n ; however, t h e i r influence dep-ends on t h e i r weight and they must be balanced against com-peting p r i n c i p l e s . Dworkin believes that rules can not provide s u f f i c i e n t guidance i n a l l cases because there i s always the p o s s i b i l i t y o f vagueness and the need f o r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . When the word-i n g of a r u l e p r o v i d e s vague or ambiguous d i r e c t i o n s , quest-Ions a r i s e as t o how judges should and do proceed. The work-i n g assumption i s t h a t the guidance p r o v i d e d by r u l e s comes t o an end i n a s p e c i f i e d way, w h i l e the guidance p r o v i d e d by p r i n c i p l e s i s p e r v a s i v e . Law i s not p r i m a r i l y an a f f a i r of r u l e s to Dworkin, but 37 r a t h e r one o f p r i n c i p l e s ; r u l e s can be "generated" by e i t h e r arguments of p o l i c y o r arguments of p r i n c i p l e . While i t i s p e r m i s s i b l e f o r r u l e s to be generated i n the l e g i s l a t u r e by both s o r t s o f argument, i t i s only p e r m i s s i b l e f o r r u l e s t o be generated i n the c o u r t s by arguments o f p r i n c i p l e . The con-c e p t i o n o f a r u l e i n "Hard Cases" i s t h a t of a rule-of-thumb: In most s i t u a t i o n s , f o l l o w i n g the exact wording of the r u l e i s more-or-less s u c c e s s f u l , more-or-less a c c e p t a b l e . T h i s con-c e p t i o n o f a r u l e d e f i n i t e l y does not have the systematic c h a r a c t e r of the r u l e s found i n the C a u s a l Theory. In the Cau s a l Theory, a r u l e i s r e l a t e d t o the l e g a l system as a whole. I n Dworkin's theory r u l e s are merely convenient d e v i c -es. They can not be f l e x i b l y adapted t o new s i t u a t i o n s , but must be r e p l a c e d by e n t i r e l y new r u l e s . Dworkin i s r e s i s t a n t t o t h e o r i e s t h a t attempt a syst e m a t i c e x p l i c a t i o n of law. H i s reasoning i s not c l e a r — p e r h a p s i t a r i s e s from h i s b e l i e f i n the v i a b i l i t y o f h i s own theory o f law as an a f f a i r o f p r i n -c i p l e s . On Dworkin's theory, r u l e s and standards ( p o l i c i e s or p r i n c i p l e s ) are separate and are not seen as p a r t of an i n -t e g r a l u n i t . H i s treatment o f r u l e s as rules-of-thumb r e -q u i r e s no e x p l i c a t i o n because of i t s s i m p l i c i t y ; but h i s treatment o f p r i n c i p l e s does r e q u i r e e x p l i c a t i o n — h e must show how the a b s t r a c t i o n s o f p r i n c i p l e can p r o v i d e c o n c r e t e guidance, s p e c i f i c a l l y i n "hard c a s e s " . ( I t i s worth vememh b e r i n g t h a t Dworkin's co n c e p t i o n of p r i n c i p l e s i s ambiguous between second-order r u l e s and v a l u e s , and h i s c o n c e p t i o n o f a r u l e i s so crude t h a t i t can not but f a i l t o p r o v i d e a c h a l -26 lenge to h i s c o n c e p t i o n of p r i n c i p l e s . The concept of a r u l e developed by the C a u s a l Theory i s a s u b s t a n t i a l c h a l l e n g e to Dworkin 1s t h e s i s . ) I t i s to s i m p l i s t i c t o say merely that Hart i n h i s the-ory augments r u l e s by d i s c r e t i o n or p o l i c y , while Dworkin aug-ments r u l e s by p r i n c i p l e s . T h e i r d i f f e r e n c e s seem t o be mere-l y a matter of emphasis — both see the need f o r augmentation. They d i f f e r i n t h e i r c onception of how law i s to be extended i n hard cases. For Hart, the concept of r u l e s , and i t s a t t e n -dant u t i l i t i e s of c l a r i t y . , d a t a b i l i t y , and r e g u l a r i t y , r e p r e -sents t h a t f e a t u r e of law t h a t should have p r i o r i t y i n hard cases. T h i s i s not to say t h a t he does not see law as a pur-p o s i v e s t r u c t u r e . He argues t h a t the g o a l s of a complex sy s -tem such as law w i l l v a n e c e s s a r i l y i n v o l v e i n d e t e r m i n a c i e s i n t h e i r a p p l i c a t i o n . T h i s shows i n d i r e c t l y t h a t c l a r i t y i s one of the d e s i d e r a t a o f the u t i l i t i e s v a lued i n law. F o r Dworkin, r u l e s are secondary and dependent a r t i f a c t s of the law; l e g a l standards are primary. Dworkin sees the u t i l i t i e s o f having c l e a r and datable r e g u l a t i o n s . Yet Dworkin sees h i s d i f f e r -ences wi t h Hart as more than a matter of emphasis. In order to s u b s t a n t i a t e h i s c l a i m he f u r t h e r r e f i n e s h i s c o n c e p t i o n of p o s i t i v i s m . Where p o s i t i v i s m would allow r u l e s to be augment-ed by c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of " p o l i c y " , Dworkin would only allow c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of " p r i n c i p l e " to a f f e c t d e c i s i o n s i n hard cases. T h i s d i s t i n c t i o n between p r i n c i p l e and p o l i c y must be c a r e f u l l y a p p r a i s e d . " P r i n c i p l e s , " w r i t e s Dworkin, "are p r o p o s i t i o n s t h a t d e s c r i b e r i g h t s ; p o l i c i e s are p r o p o s i t i o n s t h a t d e s c r i b e g o a l s . But what are r i g h t s and g o a l s and what i s the d i f f e r -ence between them? / R i g h t s can be d i s t i n g u i s h e d from g o a l s / by f i x i n g flj on the d i s t r i b u t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r of c l a i m s about r i g h t s , and fiij on the f o r c e of these c l a i m s , i n p o l i t i c a l argument, a g a i n s t competing c l a i m s of a d i f f e r e n t d i s t r i b u t i o n -a l c h a r a c t e r . . . . / T h i s / formal d i s t i n c t i o n does suggest ... that we d i s c o v e r what r i g h t s people a c t u a l l y have by l o o k i n g f o r arguments t h a t would j u s t i f y c l a i m s having the a p p r o p r i a t e 27 d i s t r i b u t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r . But t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n does not i t -3 8 s e l f supply any such arguments." Dworkin has re v e r s e d the n a t u r a l order of a n a l y s i s : Cer-t a i n s t a t e s o f a f f a i r s are t r e a t e d as " r i g h t s " , not, as Dworkin would argue, because the b e n e f i t s and burdens of m a i n t a i n i n g them are u n i v e r s a l l y d i s t r i b u t e d , but r a t h e r because they are valued so h i g h l y . I t i s because they are val u e d so h i g h l y t h a t they are t r e a t e d as " r i g h t s " , and demand u n i v e r s a l support. Of course Dworkin r e c o g n i z e s t h i s when he says t h a t h i s " d i s t i n c -t i o n does not i t s e l f supply any such arguments." But i f i t does not, then what i s i t s use? Perhaps one can use h i s d i s t -i n c t i o n to i d e n t i f y the r i g h t s persons " b e l i e v e " they have, but s u r e l y not to i d e n t i f y the r i g h t s they do have. R i g h t s must be based on those s t a t e s o f a f f a i r s t h a t are i n f a c t h i g h l y regarded by the community. Thus, a person may be mis-taken about h i s r i g h t s and so mistakenly a t t r i b u t e a u n i v e r s a l d i s t r i b u t i o n a l p a t t e r n t o them. The s u b s t a n t i v e p r i n c i p l e s must be e s t a b l i s h e d b e f o r e the fo r m a l a n a l s i s can make sense. Human and c i v i l r i g h t s would be such p r i n c i p l e s and c o u l d be i d e n t i f i e d w i t h the h i g h e s t aims of a s o c i e t y ' s m o r a l i t y . T h i s would g i v e good reasons f o r a t t a c h i n g a u n i v e r s a l d i s t r i b u t i o n -a l c h a r a c t e r t o such aims. For Dworkin, the d i s t r i b u t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r o f " g o a l s " i s not u n i v e r s a l , but d i f f e r e n t i a l . "In each case d i s t r i b u t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e s are subordinate t o some c o n c e t i o n of aggregate c o l -l e c t i v e good, so t h a t o f f e r i n g l e s s o f some b e n e f i t t o one man can be j u s t i f i e d simply by showing t h a t t h i s w i l l l e a d t o a 39 g r e a t e r b e n e f i t o v e r a l l . " ( i i ) M a j o r i t i e s and M i n o r i t i e s U n l i k e l e g i s l a t o r s , who must stand f o r e l e c t i o n , judges are r e l a t i v e l y independent o f such democratic c o n t r o l s . Leg-i s l a t i o n ean always be supported by some such argument as the f o l l o w i n g : I t i s r e a d i l y concededt.tliat, o t h e r t h i n g s being e q u a l , there i s a need f o r the procedure of m a j o i t y - v o t i n g as a minimally a c c e p t a b l e decision-making d e v i c e ; t h e r e f o r e , 28 there are sound reasons f o r demanding compliance w i t h majority-programs, o t h e r t h i n g s being e q u a l . I t i s Dworkin's view t h a t such arguments are not a v a i l a b l e to support the d e c i s i o n s of an independent j u d i c i a r y , e s p e c i a l l y i n hard cases. When que-s t i o n s of r i g h t s a r i s e , he b e l i e v e s t h a t judges may have to decide a g a i n s t a m a j o r i t y b e n e f i t . I t i s never c l e a r , however, th a t the p r o t e c t i o n of r i g h t s i s not i n f a c t a great b e n e f i t t o the m a j o r i t y , r e p r e s e n t i n g h i g h e r , more long-term, i n t e r e s t s . Dworkin f a i l s t o e l a b o r a t e h i s examples o f " p o l i c y " arguments to the degree where such i s s u e s c o u l d be c l a r i f i e d . Some mech-anism, such as m a j o r i t y - v o t i n g , i s c e n t r a l to Dworkin's con-c e p t i o n of how "arguments of p o l i c y " generate d e c i s i o n s r e g a r d -i n g s o c i a l w e l f a r e . The r e s u l t of such a procedure i s not a l -ways a c c e p t a b l e . N e v e r t h e l e s s , i t forms the c e n t r a l d e c i s i o n -making procedure i n a democracy. Through t h i s mechanism the o f f i c i a l p o l i c y of a s o c i e t y i s c r e a t e d , and the s o c i e t y ' s c o r -porate w i l l f i n d s e x p r e s s i o n . The r a t i o n a l i t y o f such a p r o -cedure, and the p o l i c y a r i s i n g from i t s use, w i l l depend on how i t i s l i m i t e d ; t h a t i s , how p o l i c y i s allowed to be modi-f i e d i n i t s a p p l i c a t i o n . "Arguments o f p o l i c y " e s s e n t i a l l y serve to e s t a b l i s h a m a j o r i t y b e n e f i t . P o l i c i e s are programs or standards which a r i s e from s o c i a l p r a c t i c e s based on major-i t y - r u l e . Such p r a c t i c e s would be l e g i s l a t u r e s , e l e c t i o n s , and referendums. A "sound" p o l i c y argument would advance a standard a c c e p t a b l e t o a m a j o r i t y o f c i t i z e n s . In democratic theory standards e f f e c t e d on the b a s i s of arguments of p o l i c y have a s t r o n g prima f a c i e a p p eal. Ye t , g iven the nature of the human c o n d i t i o n , such m a j o r i t y d e c i s i o n w i l l not always be " c o r r e c t " . Normally judges can f o l l o w the wording of a s t a t u t e , arguing t h a t i t r e p r e s e n t s o f f i c i a l p o l -i c y . Simply f o l l o w i n g o f f i c i a l p o l i c y i n cases where the p o l -i c y i s uncontested can be based, argues Dworkin, on an "argu-ment of p r i n c i p l e " . He w r i t e s t h a t " u n o r i g i n a l j u d i c i a l d e c i -s i o n s t h a t merely enforce the c l e a r terms of some p l a i n l y v a l -i d s t a t u t e are always j u s t i f i e d on arguments of p r i n c i p l e , 40 even i f the s t a t u t e i t s e l f was generated by p o l i c y . " The 29 " p r i n c i p l e " i n v o l v e d must be t h i s : I f a standard i s generated by a " r e c o g n i z e d " s o c i a l mechanism and i s uncontested, the judge can i n f e r t h a t to f o l l o w the standard i s to produce a m a j o r i t y b e n e f i t . He may a l s o assume the system, as a whole, i s sound and h e a l t h y . But what makes t h i s a " p r i n c i p l e " ? In an adversary system, such as common law, judges t r a d i t i o n a l l y do not i n i t i a t e new l i n e s of i n v e s t i g a t i o n , The judge decides between the p a r t i e s to a d i s p u t e , on the b a s i s f a c t and the law as presented by competent advocates. To designate such stand-ards as p r i n c i p l e s , r a t h e r than as p o l i c i e s , has no v i r t u e . In hard cases standards would be c h a l l e n g e d ; consequently, the i n f e r e n c e s and assumptions they allow would a l s o be c h a l l e n g e d . I t i s r e c o g n i z e d i n democratic theory t h a t m a j o r i t y - p r o -cedures w i l l not always p r o v i d e c o r r e c t d e c i s i o n s . C o n d i t i o n s of u n c e r t a i n t y and b i a s can l e a d t o honest e r r o r or o u t r i g h t abuse. M a j o r i t y r u l e can degenerate i n t o m a j o r i t y tyranny. I f the p r a c t i c e of m a j o r i t y r u l e i s to be r a t i o n a l l y a c c e p t a b l e , i t must be w i l l i n g to be openly c h a l l e n g e d . A f t e r a l l , o f f i c -i a l p o l i c y i s only g i v e n the presumption of c o r r e c t n e s s . The c r i t e r i o n Dworkin uses to i d e n t i f y "arguments of p r i n c i p l e " would seem to be those arguments t h a t seek to e s t a -b l i s h a c c e p t a b l e grounds f o r l i m i t i n g m a j o i t y r u l e and f o r aug-menting i t . Dworkin f i n d s t h i s p r a c t i c e i n the i n s t i t u t i o n of r i g h t s . A p p a r e n t l y , arguments which seek to l i m i t m a j o r i t y r u l e demand a b a s i s independent of the m a j o r i t y decision-making procedure. I n i t i a l l y , the demands of j u s t i c e , human d i g n i t y , and e q u a l i t y seem t o p r o v i d e a l t e r n a t i v e grounds f o r d e c i d i n g c a s e s . Perhaps i n normal cases, the j u s t i c e , f a i r n e s s , r e s p e c t f o r human d i g n i t y and e q u a l i t y of democratic proceedings are i m p l i c i t and unchallenged. In hard cases the c a r a c t e r of p r o -ceeding i n accordance w i t h m a j o r i t y r u l e i s c a l l e d i n t o quest-i o n . I t appears t h a t the d i s t i n c t i o n between " r i g h t s " and " g o a l s " reduces t o the d i f f e r e n c e between normal cases and hard cases. What i s i m p l i c i t i n the j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f normal cases i s f o r c e d t o become e x p l i c i t i n hard c a s e s . Legal p r a c t i c e s and i n s t i t u t i o n s are premissed on the 30 b e l i e f t h a t they should and do pursue g e n e r a l l y a c c e p t a b l e ends through g e n e r a l l y a c c e p t a b l e means. The l e g a l e n t e r p r i s e open-l y admits to i t s l i m i t a t i o n s and i s amenable to m o d i f i c a t i o n . Perhaps one of the reasons f o r apprehension over j u d i c i a l d i s -c r e t i o n i s t h a t i t does not seem open to c h a l l e n g e . As p r e v i -o u s l y mentioned, the Causal Theory argues t h a t the law can be s y s t e m a t i c a l l y c h a l l e n g e d a t f o u r p o i n t s . At these p o i n t s the law allows e x c e p t i o n s to be w r i t t e n , thus a l l o w i n g change w h i l e p r e s e r v i n g the i n t e g r i t y of the system. Dworkin, i n arguing f o r the i n s t i t u t i o n of r i g h t s , suggests t h a t some extra-system-a t i c c h a l l e n g e to a r u l e of r e c o g n i t i o n , which i s i n the form of m a j o r i t y standards, i s not only p o s s i b l e but must be r e c o g -n i z e d . To be c r i t i c a l and j u s t i f i c a t o r y of m a j o r i t y p r a c t i c e s , Dworkin b e l i e v e s , the i n s t i t u t i o n of r i g h t s must have a m o r a l l y independent b a s i s . The p o s i t i v i s t c l o c t r i n e , which separates law as i t i s from law as i t ought to be, prevents the e l a b o r -a t i o n of the law's j u s t i f i c a t o r y t h e o r y . I n s o f a r as the p r a c -t i c e of r i g h t s can be c l a r i f i e d , and i t s e f f e c t s on the g e n e r a l system of law p r e d i c t e d , there i s n o t h i n g p r e v e n t i n g i t s i n t e -g r a t i o n w i t h the b a s i c system of r u l e s . M a j o r i t y r u l e w i l l not always produce d e c i s i o n s i n accord w i t h s o c i e t y ' s more b a s i c program. T h i s r e q u i r e s judges to f i n d a l t e r n a t i v e grounds f o r t h e i r d e c i s i o n s . T h i s i s a very g e n e r a l form of the problem of indeterminacy i n the a p p l i c a t i o n of any system of standards. The c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o c e s s i s the fundamental l e v e l o f p o l i t -i c a l a c t i v i t y ; i t f i n d s i t s e x p r e s s i o n i n the b a s i c g o a l s and o r d e r i n g of the m a t r i x . One's l e g i s l a t i v e r i g h t s and a d j u d i c a -t i v e r i g h t s are d e r i v e d from t h i s p r o c e s s . Dworkin argues t h a t the q u e s t i o n of r i g h t s i s i n t e g r a l t o the j u d i c i a l p r o c e s s . The " i n t e g r a l n e s s " , however, i s made ambiguous by h i s d e n i a l of a c l e a r and s y s t e m a t i c e n t r y procedure. O b s c u r i t y a r i s e s from h i s view t h a t a r u l e of r e c o g n i t i o n i s i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h a system which a l l o w s c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of r i g h t s and p r i n c i p l e s f u l l p l a y . Apparenly he b e l i e v e s t h a t , by a c c e p t i n g a r u l e of r e c o g n i t i o n , one i s comitted to the requirement that b a s i c r u l e s e f l o g i c and e t h i c s be r u l e d upon by p o s i t i v e law. 31 ( i i i ) The C o l l a p a b i l i t y o f P r i n c i p l e s and P o l i c i e s Dworkin d i s t i n g u i s h e s p r i n c i p l e s f romp.policies i n t h r e e ways. They d i f f e r i n d i s t r i b u t i o n a l c h a r a t e r , i n f o r c e , and i n the d i r e c t i o n o f f e r e d i n a d j u d i c a t i o n . P r i n c i p l e s and r i g -h t s , u n l i k e p o l i c i e s and g o a l s , promote s t a t e s of a f f a i r s which are d i s t r i b u t e d u n i v e r s a l l y . T h i s asymmetry becomes a major b i f u r c a t i o n i n Dworkin's philosophy of law: "The bulk of the law — t h a t p a r t which d e f i n e s and impements s o c i a l , economic, and f o r e i g n p o l i c y — can not be n e u t r a l . I t must s t a t e , i n i t s g r e a t e s t p a r t , the m a j o r i t y ' s view o f the common good. The i n s i t u t i o n of r i g h t s i s t h e r e f o r e c r u c i a l because i t rep-r e s e n t s the m a j o r i t y ' s promise t o the m i n o r i t i e s t h a t t h e i r 41 d i g n i t y and e q u a l i t y w i l l be r e s p e c t e d . " T h i s does not seem so c r u t i a l once one remembers t h a t there are s e v e r a l m a j o r i t i e s and m i n o r i t i e s i n modern democra-t i c s t a t e s . A man can belong to s e v e r a l m a j o r i t i e s and minor-i t i e s s i m u l t a n e o u s l y . What Dworkin d e s c r i b e s as the p r a c t i c e of r i g h t s i s i n f a c t p a r t of the d e f e a s i b l e c o n d i t i o n s used i n e l a b o r a t i n g the s o c i e t y ' s o f f i c i a l p o l i c y . Common go a l s do not compete w i t h i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s because a l l p o l i c y i s con-s t i t u t i o n a l l y premised on a r e c o g n i t i o n of r i g h t s . The C a u s al Theory shows t h a t such " c o n f l i c t s " can be reduced to an o r d e r -i n g problem, c o n t i n g e n c i e s which the system has p r o v i d e d f o r . The c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o t e c t i o n of r i g h t s r e p r e s e n t s a b a s i c government p o l i c y . Thus, i t i s proper to demand s p e c i a l argu-ments to circumvent i t . For Dworkin, there are " o n l y three s o r t s of grounds t h a t can be c o n s i s t e n t l y used to l i m i t the 42 d e f i n i t i o n o f a p a r t i c u l a r r i g h t . " Such l i m i t a t i o n s must be c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the e s s e n t i a l nature and purpose o f the i n s t i -t u t i o n , which i s t o p r o t e c t human d i g n i t y and e q u a l i t y . He does not see, however, t h a t these l i m i t a t i o n s c a l l i n t o ques-t i o n h i s c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n of r i g h t s and g o a l s . T h i s d i s t r i -b u t i o n a l asymmetry between r i g h t s and g o a l s can be reduced to the r e l a t i v e o r d e r o f these standards i n the m a t r i x . There 32 are three s p e c i f i c grounds upon which r i g h t s can be l e g i t i m -a t e l y compromised. " F i r s t , the government might show that the v a l u e s pro-t e c t e d by the o r i g i n a l r i g h t s are not r e a l l y at stake i n the marginal case (non-paradigm c a s e ) , or are at stake i n some a t -tenuated form. Second, i t might show t h a t i f the r i g h t i s i n -clude the marginal case, then some competing r i g h t i n the st r o n g sense...would be abridged. (Dworkin d i s t i n g u i s h e s be-tween r i g h t s i n s t r o n g and weak senses. In the former, i n t e r -f e r e n c e i s wrong. Perhaps one has a r i g h t , i n the s t r o n g sense, t o d r i n k o n e s e l f t o death, and i t would be wrong f o r oth e r s t o i n t e r f e r e . As a p r i s o n e r - o f - w a r , one has a r i g h t , i n the weak sense, t o attempt escape. One has no duty to not t r y , and ot h e r s have no duty to not i n t e r f e r e . ) T h i r d , i t might show t h a t , i f the r i g h t were so d e f i n e d , then the c o s t t o s o c i e t y would not be simply i n c r e m e n t a l but would be of a deg-ree f a r beyond the c o s t p a i d to grant the o r i g i n a l r i g h t (par-adigm r i g h t ) , a degree enough to j u s t i f y whatever a s s a u l t on 43 d i g n i t y o r e q u a l i t y might be i n v o l v e d . " The m a t r i x of v a l u e s exposed by the Causal Theory p r o -v i d e s a g e n e r a l account of these three "grounds", f o r they touch upon standard adjustments o c c u r r i n g w i t h i n the l e g a l system. The f i r s t argues t h a t a r i g h t i s not compromised i f the v a l u e s the r i g h t seeks to promote are not r e a l l y being a t -tacked. In e f f e c t , the government's a c t i o n i s more or l e s s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the ( b ) - g o a l s of the system. The second a r -gues t h a t c e r t a i n v a l u e s can not be compromised merely by a c l a i m equal i n weight. That c l a i m must a l s o be equal i n k i n d i f i t i s to succeed. T h i s a u t h o r i z e s the government to r e s -t r i c t the r i g h t s of i n d i v i d u a l s to p r o t e c t equal d i s t r i b u t i o n of such r i g h t s throughout the p o p u l a t i o n . There i s no t h i n g magical i n such a u t h o r i z a t i o n ; i n a l l o w i n g governments such l i c e n c e , c i t i z e n s are i n d i c a t i n g t h e i r h i g h regard f o r c e r t a i n standards. " E q u a l i t y i n k i n d " between standards can be equat-ed w i t h "having the same r e l a t i v e s t a n d i n g i n the matrix", v ; r i g h t s . The " f o r c e " of such c l a i m s must g e n e r a l l y d e f e a t ap-p e a l s "to any of the o r d i n a r y g o a l s of p o l i t i c a l a d m i n i s t r a -46 t i o n . " Again, t h i s " f o r c e " can be e x p l a i n e d by e x p l i c a t i n g the r e l a t i v e p o s i t i o n of v a l u e s i n the matrix of the l e g a l system. There does not appear to be any s u b s t a n t i a l d i f f e r -ence i n the nature of these two s o r t s of p o l i t i c a l aims as Dworkin t r i e s to argue. Besides the d i f f e r e n c e i n d i s t r i b u t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r and the f o r c e of c l a i m s to r i g h t s and g o a l s , a t h i r d d i s t i n c t i o n remains to be examined. Dworkin argues t h a t i f a l l judgements made by c o u r t s were e n t i r e l y j u s t i f i e d on arguments of p o l i c y , the " g r a v i t a t i o n a l f o r c e " of the p r a c t i c e of precedent c o u l d 47 not be accounted f o r . Dworkin d i s t i n g u i s h e s between the "enactment f o r c e " and the " g r a v i t a t i o n a l f o r c e " of p o l i t i c a l d e c i s i o n s . D e c i s i o n s based on p o l i c y have only "enactment f o r c e " , w h i l e d e c i s i o n s based on p r i n c i p l e a l s o have " g r a v i t -a t i o n a l f o r c e " . The enactment f o r c e i s l i m i t e d to the words of a d e c i s i o n . Dworkin argues t h a t i t i s too s i m p l i s t i c an account of precedent to say t h a t judges, "when they decide p a r t i c u l a r cases at common law, l a y down g e n e r a l r u l e s t h a t are intended to b e n e f i t the community i n some way. Other j u d -ges, d e c i d i n g l a t e r cases, must t h e r e f o r e enforce the r u l e so 48 t h a t the b e n e f i t may be achieved." He i s vague about the way i n which such p o l i c y arguments e s t a b l i s h the e x i s t e n c e of a community " b e n e f i t " . He i s not t h i n k i n g about arguments which c l a i m t h a t a p a r t i c u l a r d e c i s i o n i s i n accord w i t h the system's matrix of v a l u e s . Thus, i t i s not c l e a r what he means by a " b e n e f i t " . He w r i t e s : "The g r a v i t a t i o n a l f o r c e o f a precedent may be e x p l a i n e d by appeal not to the wisdom of e n f o r c i n g enactments, but to the f a i r n e s s of t r e a t i n g l i k e c a -49 ses a l i k e . " I f the enactment f o r c e of a d e c i s i o n means th a t the de-c i s i o n e n f o r c e s a p r e - e x i s t i n g o r d e r i n g of v a l u e s i n the mat-r i x , then what i s added by i n s i s t i n g t h a t l i k e cases ought to be t r e a t e d a l i k e ? Is t h i s not j u s t to r e i t e r a t e t h a t a l l c a s -When seen i n terms of p o s i t i o n w i t h i n the matrix, the t h i r d ground becomes more i n t e l l i g i b l e . The t h i r d ground demands th a t i f the v a l u e s p r o t e c t e d by the i n s t i t u t i o n o f r i g h t s are to be s a c r i f i c e d t o o t h e r " k i n d s " of v a l u e s represented i n the l e g a l system, then the compromise must be one of s i g n i f i c a n c e . T h i s t h i r d argument demands t h a t simple u t i l i t a r i a n f u n c t i o n s be r e s t r i c t e d w i t h regard to these v a l u e s . T h i s t h i r d ground r e v e a l s a concern w i t h systematic adjustments t a k i n g p l a c e w i t h i n the l e g a l system. T h i s i n n e r s t r u c t u r e i s made e x p l i c -i t i n the Causal Theory. Measurement of v a r i o u s u t i l i t i e s i n -v o l v e d w i l l have to be cognizant of the s t r u c t u r a l r e l a t i o n -s h i p s of the l e g a l system, and s p e c i f i c a l l y the o r d e r i n g of g o a l s w i t h i n the m a t r i x . Dworkin argues t h a t r i g h t s , u n l i k e g o a l s , are not "sub-4 4 o r d i n a t e to some co n c e p t i o n of aggregate c o l l e c t i v e good." But t h i s i s not c l e a r l y so: F i r s t , one can see t h a t " g o a l s " are p o l i t i c a l aims low i n the matrix of the l e g a l system, and t h e r e f o r e more dy n a m i c a l l y ordered and l e s s s t a b l e than aims c h a r a c t e r i z e d d a s " r i g h t s " . Second, i f c e r t a i n r i g h t s are granted, on the mere con t i n g e n t ground that one i s human, then (other t h i n g s being equal) there i s l i t t l e t h a t c o u l d happen th a t would r e q u i r e the o r i g i n a l grant to be r e v i s e d . Since the a t t r i b u t e of "humanness" i s d i s t r i b u t e d u n i v e r s a l l y throughout the c l a s s of agents addressed by the l e g a l system, d i f f e r e n t i a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s r a r e l y , i f ever, a r i s e . The " r i g h t s " of animals, the unborn, the insane, and demigods r a i s e embedded qu e s t i o n s of p o l i c y . T h i s suggests t h a t Dwor-k i n ' s d i s t i n c t i o n can not bear c l o s e s c r u t i n y , f o r upon c l o s -e r examination the u n i v e r s a l i t y of the r i g h t s i n v o l v e d depend upon i m p l i c i t c o n t i n g e n t premises. He argues that r i g h t s may be compromised by p o l i c y when "a g o a l of s p e c i a l urgency" i s 4 5 i n v o l v e d . However, i t i s never c l e a r how such "compromises" are s e t t l e d on the b a s i s o f p r i n c i p l e r a t h e r than p o l i c y . A t such j u n c t u r e s , he contends t h a t he i s arguing not about the " d i s t r i b u t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r " but about the " f o r c e " of c l a i m s to es ought to be determined a c c o r d i n g to the o r d e r i n g og v a l u e s as s e t out i n the matrix? Questios of f a i r n e s s can be reduced to q u e s t i o n s concerning the system's c r i t e r i o n of r e l e v a n c e : I t was mentioned t h a t , a c c o r d i n g to the Causal Theory, stand-ards ( p o l i c i e s and p r i n c i p l e s ) can f u n c t i o n as e i t h e r second-order anomaly r e s o l v i n g r u l e s or as h i g h order d e s c r i p t i v e statements o f the t e l e o l o g y of the law p r o v i d i n g the c r i t e r i a of r e l e v a n c e o f the l e g a l system. I t i s ambiguous between these two f u n c t i o n s to simply argue t h a t c o u r t s must apply the p r i n c i p l e of f a i r n e s s , t h a t l i k e cases be t r e a t e d a l i k e . The system must supply examples or paradigms of what c o n s t i t u t e s f a i r and equal treatment, and what c o n s t i t u t e s v a l i d excep-t i o n s to such c e n t r a l c a ses. I f i t does not, standards o f f a i r n e s s w i l l have no content. Even here, where the i s s u e seems most c l e a r l y one of " p r i n c i p l e " , p o l i c y c o n s i d e r a t i o n s are n e c e s s a r i l y i n v o l v e d . Once one sees t h a t p o l i c i e s (lower-order aims) r e l a t e to p r i n -c i p l e s ( h i g h e r - o r d e r aims), the d i f f e r e n c e between the g r a v i t -a t i o n a l f o r c e and the enactment f o r c e of a p o l i t i c a l d e c i s i o n c o l l a p s e s . Behind the q u e s t i o n of " g r a v i t a t i o n a l f o r c e " i s the g e n e r a l matter of r e l e v a n c e and the t e l e o l o g y o f the s y s -tem. Dworkin t h i n k s the enactment f o r c e i s found i n d e c i s i o n s based only on p o l i c y because he can not see the connections between such lower-order aims as " g o a l s " and such h i g h e r - o r d -e r aims as " r i g h t s " . Since Dworkin's d i s t i n c t i o n between p o l -i c y and p r i n c i p l e f a i l s to maintain i t s b a s i s i n d i s t r i b u t i o n -a l c h a r a c t e r , i n the f o r c e of a c l a i m , and i n the g r a v i t a t i o n -al/enactment dichotomy, h i s r i g h t s t h e s i s , t h a t judges decide only on the b a s i s of p r i n c i p l e , i s s e r i o u s l y undermined. The way he a r r i v e s a t h i s r i g h t s t h e s i s i s i n s t r u c t i v e . "Arguments of p o l i c y " , w r i t e s Dworkin, " j u s t i f y a p o l -i t i c a l d e c i s i o n by showing t h a t the d e c i s i o n advances o r p r o -t e c t s some c o l l e c t i v e g o a l of the community as a whole. The argument i n f a v o r of a subsidy f o r a i r c r a f t manufacturers, t h a t the subsidy w i l l p r o t e c t n a t i o n a l defense, i s an argument o f p o l i c y . Arguments of p r i n c i p l e j u s t i f y a p o l i t i c a l d e c i s -io n by showing t h a t the d e c i s i o n r e s p e c t s or secures some i n -d i v i d u a l o r group r i g h t . The argument i n f a v o r of a n t i d i s -c r i m i n a t i o n s t a t u t e s , t h a t a m i n o r i t y has a r i g h t t o equal 50 r e s p e c t and concern, i s an argument of p r i n c i p l e . " The mechanism of m a j o r i t y - r u l e i s c e n t r a l t o Dworkin 1s conception o f a common g o a l . The core i d e a i s t h a t a subsidy to a i r c r a f t manufacturers must be based, e i t h e r d i r e c t l y o r i n d i r e c t l y , on a working p o l i t i c a l m a j o r i t y . The w i l l o f a m a j o r i t y can change, or a new m a j o r i t y can be formed on the b a s i s o f a d i f f e r e n t program. Thus co n c e i v e d , the ground of p o l i c y i s f o r e v e r s h i f t i n g . But r i g h t s appear to have a f i r m -e r b a s i s , b e i ng embedded i n such concepts as f a i r n e s s and eq-u a l i t y . "Judges do not decide hard cases i n two stages," w r i t e s Dworkin, " f i r s t c hecking to see where the i n d i v i d u a l cone s t r a i n t s end then s e t t i n g the books a s i d e t o s t r i d e o f f on t h e i r own. The i n s t i t u t i o n a l c o n s t r a i n t s they sense are p e r -51 v a s i v e and endure to the d e c i s i o n i t s e l f . " Goals, which are generated by arguments of p o l i c y , f a i l to p r o v i d e i n s t i t u t i o n s a l c o n s t r a i n t s which "endure t o the d e c i s i o n i t s e l f " , because judges are not equipped t o assess the mood of the p o l i t i c a l m a j o r i t y . A l s o , the g o a l s cC a m a j o r i t y would accept can not be p r e d i c t e d a c c u r a t e l y enough t o p r o v i d e the guidance r e -q u i r e d to decide hard c a s e s . T h i s l e a d s him to adopt a gen-e r a l theory o f law which holds t h a t the a d j u d i c a t i o n i s prim-a r i l y concerned w i t h r i g h t s o r p r i n c i p l e s , and only second-a r i l y w i t h g o a l s o r p o l i c y . Dworkin's examples are o v e r l y complex; as an a l t e r n a t i v e , the f o l l o w i n g s i t u a t i o n f o c u s e s on e s s e n t i a l s : Imagine a community developing standards f o r a l l o c a t -i n g i t s e d u c a t i o n a l tax money. F i f t y - o n e percent might vote i n b l o ck t o a p p r o p r i a t e a l l funds f o r t h e i r neighborhood o n l y , l e a v i n g n o t h i n g f o r oth e r neighborhoods. T h i s would be a " p o l i c y " . One can e a s i l y imagine o t h e r forms o f d i s t r i b u t i o n . 3 7 The community can a l s o develop a " d i f f e r e n t " standard. I t may put the i s s u e b e f o r e i t s members i n a r e s t r i c t e d form. I t may h o l d t h a t the money f o r education i s to be d i s t r i b u t e d e q u a l l y to a l l neighborhoods, and the m a j o r i t y determines only the " l e v e l " of spending. T h i s would be a " p r i n c i p l e " . The c r u c ^ a i a l q u e s t i o n remains: how does a community determine whether a p a r t i c u l a r vote w i l l be a q u e s t i o n of " p o l i c y " or one of " p r i n c i p l e " ? The answer must be i n the r e l a t i v e importance of the standard i n v o l v e d ; thus, i t s p o s i t i o n i n the matrix w i l l determine i t s s t a n d i n g as a " p r i n c i p l e " or a " p o l i c y " . When Dworkin a s s e r t s t h a t judges must decide on the b a s i s of p r i n c -i p l e , the most he can mean i s t h a t they must c o n s i d e r the q u a l i t y of t h e i r d e c i s i o n s as c o n t r o l l e d by standards very h i g h i n the m a t r i x . Consequently, any d e c i s i o n a judge makes i n one case w i l l r e q u i r e him, and o t h e r judges i n l a t e r c a s e s , to show r e l e v a n t cause f o r any departures from an e s t a b l i s h e d l i n e of judgement. When c o n s i d e r i n g c o n f l i c t s i n " p o l i c i e s " (lower-order v a l u e s ) , r e s o l u t i o n w i l l o b v i o u s l y be found by r e f e r r i n g to " p r i n c i p l e s " ( h i g h e r - o r d e r v a l u e s ) . L i t t l e more i s i n v o l v e d i n Dworkin's c l a i m t h a t the i s s u e i s one of p r i n c -i p l e r a t h e r than p o l i c y . I t makes good sense to argue t h a t judges w i l l a l s o have to e l a b o r a t e s t r o n g l i n e s of p o l i c y . But how are r e s t r i c t i o n s p l a c e d on m a j o r i t i e s ? I f one looks at the h i e r a r c h y o f c o u r t s , a d m i n i s t r a t i v e bodies and l e g i s -l a t u r e s c u l m i n a t i n g i n the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o c e s s , i t i s c l e a r t h a t u l t i m a t e l y there i s no r e s t r i c t i o n on the " m a j o r i t y " . . The more important the standard, the h i g h e r and more i n t r a n s -i g e n t i s the mechanism by which i t can be a l t e r e d . The r e s t -r i c t i o n p l a c e d on the m a j o r i t y i s one of form: I t must con-s i d e r g o a l s i n a c e r t a i n order. C e r t a i n changes must ' i n e v i t -ably be c o n s t i t u t i o n a l or r e v o l u t i o n a r y . The i n s t i t u t i o n of r i g h t s i s more tham a "promise" of r e s p e c t by the m a j o r i t y to the m i n o r i t i e s . I t i s based on the r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t m i n o r i t y r e s i s t a n c e and v i o l e n c e can i r r e p a r a b l y a l t e r the body p o l i t -i c . I t i s good p o l i c y f o r s o c i e t y to p l a c e h i g h value on 38 peace and harmony among i t s c i t i z e n s — t o a t t e n d to what has t r a d i t i o n a l l y been c a l l e d f r a t e r n i t y . ( i v ) Background Ri g h t s and I n s t i t u t i o n a l R i g h t s "The r i g h t s t h e s i s has two a s p e c t s , " w r i t e s Dworkin. " I t s d e s c r i p t i v e a spects e x p l a i n s the present s t r u c t u r e of the i n s t i t u t i o n of a d j u d i c a t i o n . I t s normative aspect o f f e r s a 52 p o l i t i c a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r t h a t s t r u c t u r e . " These two asp-e c t s of Dworkin's t h e s i s are not s e p a r a b l e : The r i g h t s t h e s i s h olds t h a t judges should, and i n f a c t do, c a r r y out t h e i r e a l -cattatsbans w i t h the " i n t e n t i o n " of e n f o r c i n g the genuine i n -53 s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s of those who -come to t h e i r c o u r t s . For Dworkin, the judge can not simply accept l e g i s l a t -i v e announcements as unquestioned a r t i c l e s of f a i t h . I t ' i s g e n e r a l l y h e l d t h a t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r one's b e l i e f s i s not t r a n s f e r r a b l e . The judge must have good grounds f o r a p p l y i n g s t a t u t e s . When those grounds no l o n g e r h o l d , then a good case e x i s t s f o r not a p p l y i n g l e g i s l a t i v e s t a t u t e s . Judges take o f -f i c e , b e l i e v i n g i n the g e n e r a l j u s t i c e and a c c e p t a b i l i t y of l e g a l i n s t i t u t i o n s . They t h e r e f o r e presume t h a t there i s a prima f a c i e cas-eefor both the procedures of law and the gener-a l body o f s t a t u t e s , precedents, and customs. In hard cases judges are c a l l e d upon to make the grounds f o r t h i s prima f a c -i e case e x p l i c i t . In hard cases i t i s these grounds t h a t are questioned. I t would seem t h a t i f a judge could be shown t h a t a p a r t i c u l a r r u l e of law was c o n t r a r y to the assumed grounds t h a t motivated him to accept h i s o f f i c e , then he c o u l d be f o r c e d e i t h e r t o apply the r u l e , t o r e s i g n h i s o f f i c e , or to r e v i s e h i s c o n c e p t i o n and j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f h i s o f f i c e . The or c r u c i a l q u e s t i o n i s : How are such arguments to be -advanced and defended? Dworkin argues t h a t such q u e s t i o n s can not be answered independently of some p a r t i c u l a r c o n c e p t i o n of m o r a l i t y . — p o -l i t i c a l , r e l i g i o u s , or p e r s o n a l . T h i s i s p a r t Of h i s r e j e c t i o n of p o s i t i v i s m and u t i l i t a r i a n i s m , which he i n t e r p r e t s as t r y -i n g t o answer these q u e s t i o n s independently of a moral con-t e x t . The most g e n e r a l c r i t e r i o n of c o r r e c t n e s s a r i s i n g from Dworkin's a n a l y s i s of the j u d i c i a l p r o c e s s i s one of coher-ence; The theory t h a t can j u s t i f y the l a r g e s t body of l e g a l 5 4 m a t e r i a l s c o h e r e n t l y i s to be p r e f e r r e d . The assumption i s that s u b s t a n t i a l p o r t i o n s of the l e g a l system are c o r r e c t l y d ecided. The judge thus begins by a c c e p t i n g the l e g a l i n s t i t u -t i o n s of h i s s o c i e t y as j u s t , thereby assuming t h a t there i s a prima f a c i e normative case f o r j u s t i f y i n g t h e i r e x i s t e n c e . I f there i s g e n e r a l acceptance then the judge has good cause to b e l i e v e t h a t the m o r a l i t y of e n f o r c i n g s o c i e t y ' s laws i s sound. The g e n e r a l s t r a t e g y of Dworkin's judge i s to use ex-i s t i n g laws and l e g a l i n s t i t u t i o n s as grounds f o r e s t a b l i s h i n g a g e n e r a l theory which i n t u r n can be used to j u s t i f y such laws and i n s t i t u t i o n s . The c i r c u l a r i t y i s s u p e r f i c i a l , be-cause o f the p r e s u p p o s i t i o n a l nature of the argument. I t p r e -supposes t h a t there i s a j u s t i f i c a t i o n , a sound normative case f o r a c c e p t i n g the i n s t i t u t i o n and a p p l y i n g i t s laws. ItL1 s t i l l remains prob l e m a t i c as to j u s t how such " i n s t i t u t i o n a l support i s t o be c o n c e i v e d . Dworkin w r i t e s t h a t : " I f a theory of law i s to p r o v i d e a b a s i s f o r j u d i c i a l duty, then the p r i n c i p l e s i t s e t s out must t r y to j u s t i f y the s e t t l e d r u l e s by i d e n t i f y i n g the p o l i t i c a l o r moral concerns and t r a d i t i o n s of the community which, i n the o p i n i o n of the lawyer whose theory i t i s , do i n f a c t support the r u l e s . T h i s process of j u s t i f i c a t i o n must c a r r y the lawyer very deep i n t o p o l i t i c a l and moral theory, and w e l l p a s t the p o i n t where i t would be accurate to say t h a t any ' t e s t ' of 'pedigree' e x i s t s f o r d e c i d i n g which of two d i f f e r e n t j u s t i f i c a t i o n s of our p o l -55 i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s i s s u p e r i o r . " Eor Dworkin, such a ' t e s t ' i s a problem of normative p o l i t i c a l theory: "The t e s t of i n s t i t u t i o n a l support p r o v i d e s no mechanical o r h i s t o r i c a l or m o r a l l y n e u t r a l b a s i s f o r es-t a b l i s h i n g one theory of law as the s o u n d e s t . " 5 6 He sees him-40 s e l f as arguing a g a i n s t the assumption of moral p h i l o s o p h y 57 " t h a t d u t i e s can not be c o n t r o v e r s i a l ^ i n p r i n c i p l e . " I f a judges d u t i e s are vague and c o n t r o v e r s i a l , i t does not f o l l o w t h a t he has no d u t i e s , such t h a t he may e x e r c i s e d i s c r e t i o n - 3 . I n t e r p r e t i n g t h i s ' t e s t 1 as one of normative p o l i t i c a l theory, Dworkin can not accept Hart's p o s i t i o n as n e u t r a l . Dworkin's "theory i d e n t i f i e s a p a r t i c u l a r c o n c e p t i o n of the community's m o r a l i t y as d e c i s i v e of l e g a l i s s u e s : t h a t c o n c e p t i o n holds t h a t community m o r a l i t y presupposed by the laws and i n s t i t u t -5 8 ions of the community." "The C o n s t i t u t i o n , " w r i t e s Dworkin, " f u s e s l e g a l and . moral i s s u e s , by making the v a l i d i t y of a law depend on the answer to complex moral problems, l i k e whether a p a r t i c u l a r 59 s t a t u t e r e s p e c t s the i n h e r e n t e q u a l i t y of a l l men." Since m a j o r i t y r u l e can become m a j o r i t y tyranny, i t i s always p o s s i b l e t h a t one d i s s e n t i n g i n d i v i d u a l may be " c o r r e c t " as to h i s r i g h t s and the l e g i s l a t u r e and the j u d i c i a r y "wrong". In a r e s p o n s i b l e and r e p r e s e n t a t i v e democracy there i s h a r d l y any reason to deny t h a t p o s s i b i l i t y . In terms of the C a u s a l Theory, the c o n s i d e r a t i o n s i n v o l v e d here are of the f o l l o w i n g form: M a j o r i t y p r a c t i c e s are accepted ways of e s t a b l i s h i n g ac-c e p t a b l e s o c i a l p o l i c y ( b - g o a l s ) . In e f f e c t , i t i s an (a) t h a t tends to get a ( b ) . Dworkin b e l i e v e s t h a t when i t gets a non-(b) or a n e t - n e g a t i v e - ( b ) , the m a j o r i t y p r a c t i c e (the i n v o k i n g f e a t u r e of the system) must be circumvented by c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of r i g h t s . T h i s appeal to r i g h t s , the g e n e r a l body of p r i n c i -p l e s , i s never e l a b o r a t e d i n a systematic way. How s e r i o u s l y can r i g h t s be taken? S u r e l y r i g h t s can not be taken so s e r i -o u s l y as to a l l o w i n d i v i d u a l s a veto. When there i s a c o n f l i c t o f conceptions as to what an i n d i v i d u a l ' s r i g h t s are, i t i s the s o c i e t y i n the form of i t s o f f i c i a l s t h a t must make the f i n a l judgement. The a l t e r n a t i v e i s anarchy. At the same time t h i s i s not t o deny t h a t any s o c i e t y must base i t s i n s t i -t u t i o n s on the c o n c e p t i o n of what the g r e a t e r p a r t of i t s mem-bers c o n s i d e r good government. An i n d i v i d u a l ' s sense of r i g h t 41 and good, however , i s n o t a lway s p r o p e r l y i n f o r m e d and one must a l s o no t assume t h a t an i n d i v i d u a l ' s v a l u e s can be f i x e d i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f t he i n s t i t u t i o n s and p r a c t i c e s o f h i s commun-i t y . There a r e i n d i v i d u a l i n t e r e s t s t o be s u r e ; but o n e ' s c o n c e p t i o n o f what i s t o be a v a l u e d s o c i a l o r d e r must be t he p r o d u c t o f i n t e r p e r s o n a l exchange. I t can no t r ema in a m a t t e r o f p u r e l y i n d i v i d u a l c h o i c e , bu t must i n v o l v e some e x t r a p e r s o n -a l c o n c e p t i o n o f s o c i a l m o r a l i t y . A c l a i m t o someth ing as o f r i g h t i s c o n d i t i o n a l upon a c -c e p t i n g t h a t anyone i n s i m i l a r c i r c u m s t a n c e s wou ld a l s o have a s i m i l a r r i g h t . T h i s v i e w however i s s p u r i o u s i f i t i s t a k e n t o sugges t more than t h a t o n e ' s s e t o f r i g h t s must be i n t e r n -a l l y c o n s i s t e n t . I f o n e ' s c l a i m t o a r i g h t i s based on t he g round t h a t one i s "human" o r a " c i t i z e n " t hen i t wou ld be s e l f - c o n t r a d i c t o r y t o deny r e s p e c t t o a n o t h e r who was mak ing a s i m i l a r c l a i m on s i m i l a r (bona f i d e ) g r ound s . I t seems t o be a p a r t o f t he ' g rammar 1 o f r i g h t s t o a rgue t h a t once t he g r o u -nds o r s t a n d a r d s f o r mak ing a c l a i m a re met, t he r i g h t must be g r a n t e d . But t h e b u s i n e s s o f r e c o g n i z i n g r i g h t s becomes com-p l i c a t e d once one d i s c o v e r s t h a t r i g h t s and o t h e r g o a l s o f s p e -c i a l u r gency can come i n t o c o n f l i c t . C l a i m s t o a r i g h t can a l -so be f ramed i n more n e g a t i v e t e rms : t he c l a i m t o e q u a l i t y b e -f o r e the law m igh t be i n t e r p r e t e d as a demand t h a t a l l d i s c r i m -i n a t i o n s between p e r s o n s i n a c o u r t be ba sed o n l y on the l a w ' s c r i t e r i o n o f d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n and t h a t a l l o t h e r c r i t e r i a be c o n s i d e r e d i r r e l e v a n t . C r i m i n a l a c t i v i t y , as d e f i n e d i n l a w , becomes a s u f f i c i e n t c r i t e r i o n t o d i f f e r e n t i a t e a p e r s o n f rom o t h e r s . The r e l e v a n c e o f a d i s t i n c t i o n depends on t he p a r t i c -u l a r c o n t e x t and pu rpo se o f t he p r a c t i c e i n v o l v e d . The r i g h t t o a f a i r t r i a l has two s i d e s : (1) That t he law be a p p l i e d f a i r l y . (2) That t he law be f a i r . The f i r s t r e q u i r e s t h a t d e c i s i o n s be j u s t i f i e d i m t e r m s o f the r u l e s o f t he p r a c t i c e . The second demand has a lway s been more c o n t r o -v e r s i a l i n t h e p h i l o s o p h y o f l a w . The p r a c t i c e o f r i g h t s a l s o has t h e s e two f a c e t s : F i r s t , i t a l l o w s one t o j u s t i f y c l a i m s 42 to a r i g h t by r e f e r r i n g to what ot h e r s are c l a i m i n as of r i g h t . (Dworkin's formal d e f i n i t i o n seems to be of t h i s s o r t . ) Sec-ond, i t allows one to j u s t i f y c l a i m s to a r i g h t by arguing t h a t the p r a c t i c e of r i g h t s , i f i t i s to make sense at a l l , depends on g r a n t i n g t h a t r i g h t . The former j u s t i f i c a t i o n i s given i n terms of the p r a c t i c e , w hile the l a t t e r i s g i v e n as a j u s t i f i c a t i o n of a p r a c t i c e . To say that someone has a r i g h t to something, i n law, i s to say t h a t someone has a j u s t i f i a b l e c l a i m according to the r u l e s and p r a c t i c e s of the l e g a l system. Dworkin wants t h i s to be a normative c l a i m . He makes a c l a i m to a r i g h t i n law p a r a s i t i c or c o n t i n g e n t upon the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of the e n t i r e p r a c t i c e , as i t bears upon the p a r t i c u l a r case be-f o r e the c o u r t . He i s not denying t h a t one can j u s t i f y a c l a i m r e l a t i v e t o a p r a c t i c e , but he does not d i s t i n q u i s h i t from the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of a p r a c t i c e . . Thus, he f a i l s t o show t h a t he i s p r i m a r i l y concerned w i t h the normative weight being a t t a c h e d to p a r t i c u l a r c l a i m s . I t i s t h i s t h a t suggests t h a t Dworkin i s p r i m a r i l y s e t t i n g f o r t h a normative r a t h e r than a d e s c r i p t -i v e theory of law. When judges answer the question :"What i s law?" t h e i r answer i s normative and not d e s c r i p t i v e : judges must judge. To deny judges the power to e x e r c i s e judgement i s to usurp the f u n c t i o n of j u d i c i a l o f f i c e . T h i s i s a t a u t o l o g y ; the i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r law i n havirag judges are oten obscured. To say, as Dworkin does, t h a t a judge "must...rely upon the substance of h i s own judgement at some p o i n t , i n order to make 6 0 any judgement at a l l , " o r t h a t a judge most r e l y on h i s own 61 judgement i s " a t some l e v e l i n e v i t a b l e , " i s to p o i n t to the t a u t o l o g y t h a t judges must be allowed to e x e r c i s e judgement. What Dworkin i s p o i n t i n g to i s the problem o f j u s t i f y i n g a p r a -c t i c e , and he i s arguing that c e r t a i n c r i t i c i s m s of j u d g i n g are not c r i t i c a l o f a p a r t i c u l a r performance r e l a t i v e to the p r a c t i c e , but r a t h e r s t r i k e s at t h a t which c o n s i t u t e s the p r a -c t i c e i t s e l f . That judges must at some p o i n t e x e r c i s e judge-ment i s a c o n s i t u t i v e p r i n c i p l e of the p r a c t i c e of having judges. The standards which d i f f e r e n t i a t e judgements as good, 43 bad, poor, r i g h t , wrong are i n d i v i d u a t i n g p r i n c i p l e s of the p r a c t i c e . That judges must decide normative q u e s t i o n s means t h a t they must make normative judgements. Dworkin b e l i e v e s t h a t the c r u c i a l q u e s t i o n i s not the i d e a t h a t the community's m o r a l i t y counts but the i d e a of "what counts as the community's moral-6 2 i t y " i n j u d i c i a l d e c i s i o n s . I t i s c o n s i d e r a t i o n s such as these t h a t l e d Dworkin t o develop a normative theory of law. Appearances t o the c o n t r a r y , the j u d i c i a l s e a rch f o r the law as i t i s , i s su b j e c t to the norms of j u d i c i a l o f f i c e t h a t judges are o b l i g e d , through a c c e p t i n g and h o l d i n g o f f i c e , t o apply the law i n accordance w i t h , what Dworkin c a l l s , the p o l i t i c a l m o r a l i t y o f the community. Dworkin i n t h i s matter accepts a " c o n s t r u c t i o n i s t approach". Such an approach argues f o r maximum i n t e g r a t i o n and c o n s i s t e n c y i n a person's c o n c e p t u a l framework. T h i s framework i s to gi v e precedence to one's s t r -ongest i n t u i t i o n s r e g a r d i n g the c o r r e c t n e s s of s p e c i f i c b e l i e f s and a c t i o n s . I n t u i t i o n s which are i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h i s b a s i c framework are not to be acted upon u n t i l they can be c o n s i s t e n -t l y i n t e g r a t e d . Dworkin i s never c l e a r about the mechanism f o r such adjustment. Dworkin does, however, admit t h a t j u d i c i a l "mistakes" w i l l be a f a c t o r i n such conceptual i n t e g r a t i o n . But i f such j u d i c i a l e r r o r s are to be s e n s i b l y construed, there must be some account of what judges should do and what the e r r a n t judge f a i l e d to do. I t would thus appear t h a t any examination o f "the nature of the j u d i c i a l p r o c e s s " must make some assumption concerning the c o n s t i t u t i o n o f c o r r e c t j u d i c i a l b e h avior. Such b a s i c assumptions w i l l have to r e s t on some a p r i o r i c o n c e p t i o n of i n s t i t u t i o n a l purpose and c h a r a c t e r ; Dworkin does n o t i c e t h i s . Such assumptions, t h e r e f o r e , can not be p u r e l y observa-t i o n a l , and thus not d e s c r i p t i v e — some premisses must be as-sumed. Dworkin endorses the view t h a t , i n some sense, a s o c i -e t y ' s p o l i t i c a l and l e g a l i n s t i t u t i o n s must be embedded i n the moral and p o l i t i c a l conscience of i t s c i t i z e n s . He i s never 44 e x p l i c i t about how exactly such "embedding" i s to take place. One must assume that the processes of l e g i s l a t i o n and the con-s t i t u t i o n a l process does not represent a form of embedding s u f f i c i e n t f o r his purposes. Dworkin i s led to argue that law, at least i n western democracies, i s based on a " r i g h t s - based deep theory of p o l i t i c a l morality": He writes that "on the constructive model, at l e a s t , the assumption of natural rights i s not a metaphysically ambitious one. I t requires no more than the hypothesis that the best po-l i t i c a l program, i s one that takes the protection of c e r t a i n i n d i v i d u a l choices as fundamental, and not properly subordinate to a goal or duty or combination of these. This requires no ontology more dubious or controversial than any contrary choice of fundamental concepts would be, and, i n p a r t i c u l a r , no more than the hypothesis of a fundamental goal that underlies the various popular u t i l i t a r i a n theories would require. ...fAjny rights-based theory must presume rights that are not simply the product of deliberate l e g i s l a t i o n or e x p l i c i t s o c i a l cus-tom, but are independent grounds f o r judging l e g i s l a t i o n and custom. On the constructive model, the assumption that r i g h t s are i n t h i s sense natural i s one assumption to be made and ex-amined fo r i t s power to unite and explain our moral convictions, one basic progrmmatic decision to submit to the test of coher-• 64 ence and experience." Using the language of the Causal Theory, one might think that i n advancing the practice of r i g h t s over that of majority practices, Dworkin was taking a disjunctive p o s i t i o n : i . e . , that when the morality of the l e g a l i n s t i t u t i o n (b-goals) c o n f l i c t with c l e a r procedural requirements (a-goals) then the morality must be given precedence. Fundamentally, there i s no reason why any (b)-goal (right) can not be incorporated into the practice of law, given that the society i s w i l l i n g to make the necessary adjustments of p r i o r i t i e s i n the matrix. A more cogent interpretation of Dworkin's argument for the practice of r i g h t s , however, i s that he i s arging that the (a)-goals of 45 the system should be designed i n such a way as to leave the l e g a l system open t o the p o s i b i l i t y o f e x t r a - s y s t e m a t i c change. In order to do t h i s Dworkin wants the b a s i c c r i t e r i a o f law to be embedded i n the c i t i z e n r y ' s p o l i t i c a l c o n s c i e n c e . A meta-t h e o r e t i c q u e s t i o n would be whether a s o c i e t y would ever want such a theory; would i t want to arrange i t s i n s t i t u t i o n s i n t h i s way? The more c r u c i a l q u e s t i o n i s : How would such an em-bedding be c a r r i e d out? One would t h i n k t h a t a l l r e v o l u t i o n a r y governments are premissed on the grounds they used to j u s t i f y t h e i r own government. I f u l t i m a t e l y judges are to j u s t i f y t h e i r d e c i s i o n s on a hypothesis of the c i t i z e n s ' p o l i t i c a l m o r a l i t y , e x t r a c t e d from the s t r u c t u r e and the w r i t t e n r e c o r d of the s o c i e t y ' s l e g a l i n s t i t u t i o n s , then, u n l e s s one i s able to l e a d a s u c c e s s f u l r e v o l u t i o n , such d e c i s i o n s are the subst-ance of one's r i g h t to a p a r t i c u l a r judgement. T h i s i s not to say t h a t a l l judges would n e c e s s a r i l y a r r i v e at the same con-c l u s i o n on any p a r t i c u l a r case. The q u e s t i o n of the uniqueness of j u d i c i a l d e c i s i o n s w i l l be c o n s i d e r e d i n PART THREE (B). In PART FOUR the r a t i o n a l i t y o f Dworkin's "de s i g n " w i l l be exam-in e d . Legal i n s t i t u t i o n s , a s s e r t s Dworkin, are only p a r t i a l l y autonomous. In c e r t a i n cases, c i t i z e n s "are expected to r e p a i r t o g e n e r a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s o f p o l i t i c a l m o r a l i t y when they argue 65 f o r . . . r i g h t s . " Because of t h i s , Dworkin d i s t i n g u i s h e s between background r i g h t s , which "provide a j u s t i f i c a t i o n of p o l i t i c a l s o c i e t y i n the a b s t r a c t , and i n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s , /which_7 p r o v i d e a j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r a d e c i s i o n by some p a r t i c u l a r and 6 6 s p e c i f i c p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s " Since Dworkin argues t h a t p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s are ' p a r t i a l l y autonomous', i t f o l l o w s t h a t i t i s always p o s s i b l e t o have an i n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t ov-ert u r n e d by some background r i g h t . One would a l s o t h i n k t h a t when Dworkin develops a theory which p u r p o r t s t o ensure t h a t one's " r i g h t s " would be rec o g n i z e d , t h a t he was o f f e r i n g a s u b s t a n t i v e r a t h e r than a formal c r i t e r i o n . He only o f f e r s a program f o r e l a b o r a t i n g the b a s i c p o l i t i c a l m o r a l i t y of a 46 s o c i e t y ; i t does not guarantee t h a t t h a t " m o r a l i t y " w i l l be acc e p t a b l e t o more than a working p o l i t i c a l m a j o r i t y . He l a c k s a f i r m c o n c e p t i o n of the c a u s a l b a s i s animating the l e g a l en-t e r p r i s e . Dworkin has at best exchanged one b l a c k box mechanism, the d i s c r e t i o n of the judge, f o r another, the conscience o f the c i t i z e n r y . The theory i s u l t i m a t e l y s u b j e c t i v e i n s p i r i t . The standard of what c o n s t i t u t e s a ' c o r r e c t ' d e c i s i o n i s so vague and nebulous as to h a r d l y supply any dat a b l e and e f f e c t i v e pub-l i c c o n t r o l of the j u d i c i a l p r o c e s s . I t i s q u e s t i o n a b l e whe-t h e r a s o c i e t y would want to c r e a t e an o f f i c e w i t h such respon-s i b i l i t i e s , e s p e c i a l l y when i t does not seem t h a t i t c o u l d r e a l i s t i c a l l y be performed. I f there i s any such o f f i c e , i t i s not j u d i c i a l but l e g i s l a t i v e . In i n t e r p r e t i n g the f u n c t i o n of the l e g i s l a t u r e and the j u d i c i a r y , a judge may have to de-velop a c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o f the s o c i e t y ' s p o l i t i c a l c onscience i n order to r e s o l v e the case before him. But t h i s does not e l i m i n a t e the d i s c r e t i o n a r y aspect of the system. M e c h a n i s t i c r u l e s may s t i l l operate i n j u d i c i a l d e c i s i o n s , but i t i s ques-t i o n a b l e i f he has t o t a l l y e l i m i n a t e d them. One must ask: I f mechanical procedures are admitted i n t o law, does t h i s e n t a i l t h a t judges must have d i s c r e t i o n ? B. Open Concepts and Ideterminacy i n Law "About seventeen y e a r s ago," w r i t e s Noel B. Reynolds, "Edgar Bodenheimer prophesied t h a t both the p o s i t i v i s t and the r e a l i s t p o s i t i o n on u n c e r t a i n t y i n law were ' l e a d i n g the s c i e n -6 7 ce of law i n t o a b l i n d a l l e y ' . . . . " I t i s important t o un-derstand how Dworkin and Hart p e r c e i v e the nature of such ' u n c e r t a i n t y i n law'. Otherwise, t h e i r p u rported s o l u t i o n s to t h i s problem make l i t t l e sense. To Hart, such u n c e r t a i n t y can only be e l i m i n a t e d by g i v i n g judges d i s c r e t i o n a r y powers. To Dworkin, u n c e r t a i n t y r e s u l t s from the p o s i t i v i s t a n a l y s i s which assumes t h a t , i f a qu e s t i o n i s c o n t r o v e r s i a l , then i t can only be r e s o l v e d by the e x e r c i s e of d i s c r e t i o n . 4 7 In Hart's view, i t i s the "human i a b l i l i t y to a n t i c i p a t e the f u t u r e which i s at the root of /the law*s_7 indeterminacy.. 6 8 .." For Hart, " u n c e r t a i n t y at the b o r d e r l i n e i s the p r i c e to be p a i d f o r the use of ge n e r a l c l a s s i f y i n g terms i n a form of communication concerning matters of f a c t . N a t u r a l languages, l i k e E n g l i s h , are, when so used, i r r e d u c i b l y open t e x t u r e d . I t i s , however important t o a p p r e c i a t e why, apart from i t s depend-ence on language as i t a c t u a l l y i s , w i t h i t s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of open t e x t u r e , we should not c h e r i s h , even as an i d e a l , the con c e p t i o n o f a r u l e so d e t a i l e d t h a t the q u e s t i o n whether i t a p p l i e d or not to a p a r t i c u l a r case was always s e t t l e d i n ad-vance, and never i n v o l v e d , at the p o i n t of a p p l i c a t i o n , a f r e s h c h o i c e between open a l t e r n a t i v e s . Put s h o r t l y , the reason i s th a t the n e c e s s i t y f o r such c h o i c e i s t h r u s t upon us because we are men, not gods. .. ./W_7e l a b o r under two connected han-dycaps.... The f i r s t handycap i s our r e l a t i v e ignorance of 69 f a c t : the second i s our r e l a t i v e id/eterminacy of aim." Hart's c o u r t s must, as a matter of m a t e r i a l n e c e s s i t y , e x e r c i s e a c r e a t i v e f u n c t i o n very much " l i k e the e x e r c i s e o f 7 0 delegated rule-making powers by an a d m i n i s t r a t i v e body." A theory t h a t denies such d i s c r e t i o n to judges would, i n Hart ' s eyes, be u n r e a l i s t i c , i m p r a c t i c a l , and i r r a t i o n a l . " I t may w e l l be," w r i t e s Hart, " t h a t terms l i k e ''choice*, ' d i s c r e t i o n * , and ' j u d i c i a l l e g i s l a t i o n * f a i l to do j u s t i c e t o the phenomenology of c o n s i d e r e d d e c i s i o n s : i t s f e l t i n v o l u n t a r y o r even i n e v i t a b l e c h a r a c t e r which o f t e n marks the t e r m i n a t i o n of d e l i b e r a t i o n on c o n f l i c t i n g c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . Very o f t e n the d e c i s i o n t o i n c l u d e a new case i n the scope of a r u l e o r t o ex-clude i t i s guided by the sense t h a t t h i s i s the ' n a t u r a l ' c o n t i n u a t i o n of a l i n e of d e c i s i o n s or c a r r i e s out the ' s p i r i t ' of a r u l e . I t i s a l s o t r u e t h a t i f there were not a l s o c o n s i d -e r a b l e agreement i n judgement among lawyers who approached de-c i s i o n s i n these ways, we should not a t t a c h s i g n i f i c a n c e and * value to them or t h i n k of such d e c i s i o n s as reached through a r a t i o n a l p r o c e s s . Yet however i t may be i n moral argument, i n 48 the law i t seems d i f f i c u l t to substantiate the claim that a judge confronted with a set of c o n f l i c t i n g considerations must always assume that there i s a single unique, correct resolut-ion of the c o n f l i c t and attempt to demonstrate that he has 71 discovered i t . " -' This i s the core of Hart's theory of adjudication that Dworkin wishes to challenge. Dworkin believes that i t i s a l -ways meaningful to speak of such decisions as judgemental rath-er than as discretionary. In a mature legal order, he bel^-r -ieves that i t i s always reasonable to assume that there i s an unique correct resolution of any c o n f l i c t i n law. Central to resolving the deadlock between Hart and Dworkin i s the notion that laws are 'indeterminate 1. Dworkin argues that judges i n d i f f i c u l t cases w i l l base t h e i r decisions on a characteriz-ation of the legal enterprise as a whole. However, t h i s char-act e r i z a t i o n w i l l be 'contested'. Both Hart and Dworkin are looking at the same phenomenon and both see a certain 'indet-erminacy 1 or 'contestedness 1: But Hart i s led to posit jud-i c i a l d i s c r e t i o n , while Dworkin denies i t . The contestedness of a concept i s central to Dworkin's d i s t i n c t i o n between ab-stract and concrete r i g h t s . Abstract rights are concepts which admit to more than one conception. Therefore, the users of such concepts can entertain r i v a l conceptions. Concrete rights are concepts which admit to only one conception. I t i s never clear, however, i f the abstractness or concreteness of a concept, and consequently i t s degree of contestedness, i s a feature of the concept i t s e l f or a function of the context i n which i t i s used, and the purpose f o r which i t i s used. Dwork-in writes: I f the rights thesis i s to succeed i t must demostrate how the general d i s t i n c t i o n between arguments of p r i n c i p l e an p o l i c y can be maintained between arguments of the char-acter and d e t a i l that do figure i n l e g a l ar-guments. . . ./The_/ d i s t i n c t i o n between ab-stract and concrete right s , suitably elabor-ated, i s s u f f i c i e n t f o r that purpose. ... An abstract right i s a general p o l i t i -c a l aim the statement of which does not i n -dicate how the general aim i s to be weighed or compromised in p a r t i c u l a r circumstances against other p o l i t i c a l aims. The grand rights of p o l i t i c a l rhetoric are in t h i s way abstract. P o l i t i c i a n s speak of a right to free speech or dignity or dignity or equality, with no suggestion that these rights are absolute, but with no attempt to suggest t h e i r impact on p a r t i c u l a r com-plex s o c i a l s i t u a t i o n s . Concrete rights , on the other hand, are p o l i t i c a l aims that are more precise-ly defined so as to express more d e f i n i t e -ly the weight they have against other p o l -i t i c a l aims on p a r t i c u l a r occassions. Sup-pose I say, not simply that c i t i z e n s have a right to free speech, but that a news-paper has a right to publish defense plans c l a s s i f i e d as secret provided t h i s p u b l i -cation w i l l not create an immediate phys-i c a l danger to troops. My p r i n c i p l e de-clares f o r a p a r t i c u l a r resolution of the c o n f l i c t i t acknowledges between the ab-stract right of free speech on the one hand, and competing rights of soldiers to security or the urgent needs of defense on the other. Abstract rights i n t h i s way pro-vide arguments for concrete r i g h t s , but the .^ -v^ -.s claims of a concrete right i s more d e f i n i t -ive than any claim of abstract right that supports it,72 In what sense are concrete rights more " d e f i n i t i v e " ? The concrete right of the newspaper to p r i n t such materials i s not as c l e a r l y acceptable as the abstract right of free speech. Dworkin must mean more than that concrete rights are more "de-t a i l e d " and therefore t h e i r relevance to various fact s i t u a -tions are clearer. Also, i t i s not c l e a r that the resolution of the abstract right of free speech and "the urgent needs of defense" i n the form of a "concrete r i g h t " constitutes a p r i n -c i p l e as opposed to a p o l i c y . As Dworkin would have i t , "what an i n d i v i d u a l i s e n t i t -led to have, i n c i v i l society, depends on both the practice 73 and the j u s t i c e of i t s p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s . " Ultimately, one's legal rights are embedded in the p o l i t i c a l morality pre-supposed by the laws and legal i n s t i t u t i o n s of one's society. 50 T h i s p o l i t i c a l m o r a l i t y i s , f o r Dworkin, a co n t e s t e d concept t h a t admits t o v a r i o u s conceptions. Thus the r i g h t s embedded i n t h a t m o r a l i t y would a l s o be co n t e s t e d . I f t h i s p o s i t i o n i s to serve as a touchstone f o r h i s theory, one wonders how Dworkin c o u l d argue that a l l d i s p u t e s i n ( c i v i l ) law are questions of the r i g h t s of i n d i v i d u a l p a r t i e s i n v o l v e d , such t h a t each case has an unique s o l u t i o n . WV G a l l i e , whom Dworkin c i t e s f o r sup-p o r t , argues " t h a t there are d i s p u t e s centered on /con t e s t e d concepts^...which are p e r f e c t l y genuine: which, although not r e s o l v a b l e by arguments of any k i n d , are n e v e r t h e l e s s s u s t a i n e d by p e r f e c t l y r e s p e c t a b l e arguments and evidence. T h i s i s what I mean by saying that there are concepts which are e s s e n t i a l l y c o n t e s t e d , concepts the proper use of which i n e v i t a b l y i n v o l v e s endless d i s p u t e s about t h e i r proper uses on the p a r t of t h e i r ..74 u s e r s . " Dworkin's example of a d i s p u t e centered on a c o n t e s t e d concept i s t h a t of a chess o f f i c i a l who must decide i f a c e r t -a i n p l a y e r ' s b e h a v i o r c o n s t i t u t e s an infringement of the r u l e t h a t p l a y e r s who annoy other p l a y e r s must f o r f e i t the game. To determine i f p a r t i c u l a r conduct c o n s t i t u t e s a breach of t h i s r u l e , the judge must c h a r a c t e r i z e the game i n a way t h a t ex-clud e s c e r t a i n behavior as unacceptable under the r u l e . I f the game i s c h a r a c t e r i z e d as one of i n t e l l i g e n c e , then can i t be f u r t h e r c h a r a c t e r i z e d as a game l i k e poker which i n c l u d e s psy-c h o l o g i c a l i n t i m i d a t i o n ? The o f f i c i a l must p o s t u l a t e a theory of the game's c h a r a c t e r , d e t a i l e d enough to help him d i s t i n g u i s h between a l t e r n a t i v e conceptions of the game. "The hard case," w r i t e s Dworkin, "puts a quest i o n of po-l i t i c a l theory. I t askes what i t i s f a i r to suppose t h a t the p l a y e r s have done i n consenting to the f o r f e i t u r e r u l e . The concept of a games c h a r a c t e r i s a conceptual device f o r framing t h a t q u e s t i o n . I t i s a contested concept t h a t i n t e r n a l i z e s the gen e r a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n of the i n s t i t u t i o n so as to make i t a v a i l -able f o r d i s c r i m i n a t i o n s w i t h i n the i n s t i t u t i o n i t s e l f . I t supposes t h a t a p l a y e r consents not simply to a set of r u l e s , but to an e n t e r p r i s e that may be s a i d t o have a c h a r a c t e r of 51 i t s own; so t h a t when the qu e s t i o n i s put — to what d i d he consent to i n consenting to tha t ? — the answer may study the 75 e n t e r p r i s e as a whole and not j u s t the r u l e s . " I f one c h a r a c t e r i z e s , as do Dworkin and G a l l i e , the cen-t r a l normative and a p p r a i s i v e concepts of p o l i t i c a l and moral p h i l o s o p h y as e s s e n t i a l l y contested, then the assumption that these concepts are such as to command u n i v e r s a l assent and are uni q u e l y d e s c r i b a b l e i s q u e s t i o n a b l e : "To do one's duty i n a p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n i n v o l v e s , " w r i t e s G a l l i e , "some r e f e r e n c e to what any other r a t i o n a l being would do 1 i n a s i m i l a r s i t u a t i o n 1 . But many of our d u t i e s a r i s e out of our adherence to one p a r t i c u l a r use of an e s s e n t i a l l y c o n t e s t e d concept, e.g., s o c i a l j u s t i c e . Now the q u e s t i o n a r i s e s : S h a l l r e f e r e n c e to such adherence be counted as a nece-ssary p a r t of any ' s i m i l a r s i t u a t i o n ' ? I f so, then the u n i v e r -s a l i t y c r i t e r i o n of duty i s rendered t r i v i a l : i f no, anyhow i n 7 6 many very important i s s u e s , i t becomes i n a p p l i c a b l e . " G a l l i e d i s t i n g u i s h e s two senses i n which we may be s a i d to understand a concept or theory: " F i r s t , the ' l o g i c a l ' sense, i n which to understand i t means (a) to conform t o , and (b) to be able to s t a t e , the r u l e s governing i t s proper use; and sec-ond, the ' h i s t o r i c a l ' sense, i n which to understand i t means to know (something about) the whole gamut of c o n d i t i o n s t h a t have l e d to, and th a t now s u s t a i n , the way we use i t . ... "The connection /between these two senses_7 i s most t e n -uous, when the a p p r o p r i a t e use of a concept would appear to mean simply, i t s use f o r deductive purposes.... In t h i s k i n d of case c l a r i f i c a t i o n or improved understanding of a concept would n a t u r a l l y be taken to mean improvement i n one's s k i l l and confidence i n u s i n g i t — thanks t o, e.g., a f u l l and c l e a r statement of the r u l e s governing i t s use. But c l e a r l y t h i s account w i l l not serve f o r a l l concepts, and i n p a r t i c u l a r not f o r a p p r a i s i v e concepts. ../To/ a p p r a i s e something p o s i t i v e l y i s to a s s e r t t h a t i t f u l f i l l s c e r t a i n g e n e r a l l y r e c o g n i z e d standards. . . . / C l a r i f i c a t i o n of a p p r a i s i v e concepts_7 must 52 i n c l u d e , not simply c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of d i f f e r e n t uses of a given a p p r a i s i v e concept as we use i t to-day, but c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of 77 such i n s t a n c e s as d i s p l a y i t s growth and development." There i s an ambiguity i n t h i s a n a l y s i s between a term's c l a s s i f i c a t o r y and e v a l u a t i v e uses. A r t , s o c i a l j u s t i c e , dem-ocracy, and law can be ambiguous between these two uses. While Hart emphasizes the c l a s s i f i c a t o r y use of concepts, Dworkin and G a l l i e emphasize the e v a l u a t i v e use. A judge, i n a p p l y i n g law, must do both. He must c o n s i d e r whether c e r t a i n conduct f a l l s w i t h i n a given c l a s s of a c t i o n s and whether such conduct f a l l s below a given standard of r e q u i r e d b ehavior. Contested concepts are c o n t e s t e d not simply because t h e i r vague or ambiguous mean-i n g (or u s e ) , but a l s o because the r e f e r e n t s of these terms are complex s o c i a l phenomena, h i s t o r i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s , p r a c t i c e s and movements. A l s o , one i s tempted to b e l i e v e that beneath the s o p h i s t i c a t i o n of Dworkin's and G a l l i e ' s analyses there i s merely a p l e a f o r t o l e r a n c e . At best , they f o r s t a l l the r a d i c a l argument t h a t d i f f e r e n c e s i n e v a l u a t i o n are u l t i m a t e l y r e d u c i b l e to a c o n f l i c t of t a s t e , * temperament, and i n t e r e s t . At most, Dworkin succeeds i n showing that the indeterminacy o f l e g a l standards i s not as gre a t as the j u r i s p r u d e n t a l l i t e r a t u r e sug-g e s t s . But he has not e l i m i n a t e d the p o s i b i l i t y f o r c h o i c e s l e a d i n g to d i s c r e t i o n . In f a c t the judge's d e c i s i o n t o ac-cept Dworkin's r i g h t s t h e s i s i s i t s e l f a p o l i c y d e c i s i o n — a n act c o n t r a d i c t o r y to the r i g h t s t h e s i s i t s e l f . P o l i c y d e c i s i o n s are i n e v i t a b l e at some p o i n t i n the j u d i c i a l process; even i f i t i s taken t o the extreme of arguing that judges make p o l i c y d e c i s i o n s only concerning the qu e s t i o n of t h e i r acceptance or r e s i g n a t i o n of o f f i c e — as judges, judges can not re f u s e to judge. The i s s u e of the system's e f f i c a c y , and t h u s . : p o l i c y q u e s t i o n s , i n e v i t a b l y a r i s e s . But i s t h i s an i s s u e f o r the j u -d i c i a r y , r a t h e r than the l e g i s l a t u r e o r the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o -cess? C. Uniqueness of D e c i s i o n s and the Design of Legal I n s t i t u t i o n s How i s l e g i s l a t i o n to be d i s t i n g u i s h e d from a d j u d i c a t i o n ; 53 the l e g i s l a t o r from the judge? Dworkin argues from democratic theory that judges are " p o l i t i c a l l y " subordinate to l e g i s l a t o r s . He argues further, contrary to some theories of law, that judges are not "conceptually" suborninate i n t h e i r manner of 7 8 decision-making to l e g i s l a t o r s ; t h i s i s his rights thesis. When judges decide on the basis of p r i n c i p l e , Dworkin believes that they can act independently of the l e g i s l a t u r e . But once the d i s t i n c t i o n between p r i n c i p l e and p o l i c y i s colapsed, the d i s t i n c t i o n between judges and l e g i s l a t o r s can not rest on a conceptual basis. Perhaps one might dis t i n g u i s h between them on the basis of the administrative f a c i l i t i e s available to each. Such a d i v i s i o n does not imply fundamentally d i f f e r e n t modes of decision. Rolf Sartorius writes: "The view that judges are e n t i t l e d to exercise l e g i s l a t i v e d i s c r e t i o n implies that judges are en-t i t l e d to bse t h e i r decisions on t h e i r own perceptions of desi-rable s o c i a l p o l i c y . .../A7 ' l e g i s l a t o r ' who i s not e n t i t l e d to appeal to anything other than pre-established authoritative 79 standards i s simply not a l e g i s l a t o r . " I t xs not always easy to grasp the implications of such arguments. Both l e g i s l a t o r s and judges hold o f f i c i a l positions, which have r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s f o r which they are accountable. Both must exercise 'judgement' in performing t h e i r o f f i c i a l r oles. Views l i k e those held by Sartorius and Dworkin s t i l l harbor the b e l i e f that l e g i s l a t i o n i s e s s e n t i a l l y a r b i t r a r y — an expression of w i l l rather than an exercise of reason. Dworkin dedicates a major part of the section, "Hard Cases", to the argument that a judge must depend on "the substance of his own judgement at some point i n order 80 to make any judgement at a l l . " The judge's function i s to judge. This function i s constitutive of the o f f i c e of judge-ship. Those who argue against j u d i c i a l activism sometimes go to the extreme of arguing that judges, on s p e c i f i c issues, should defer t h e i r judgemnts to some other body. At t h i s ex-treme, such arguments deny judges t h e i r very o f f i c e . I f i t i s t h e i r o f f i c e to apply the law, then they must exercise judge-5 4 ment as to i t s nature. To deny judges such a role i s either to usurp t h e i r o f f i c e or to deny certain p r i n c i p l e s the status of law. Perhaps constitutions and b i l l s of rights are merely guides and reminders to l e g i s l a t o r s of the possible consequen-ces of t h e i r acts. But t h i s i s not, as Dworkin r i g h t l y claims, "a r e a l i s t i c piece of common sense, but a competitive claim 81 about the true content of a contested event." In short, i t amounts to being a judgement, a l b e i t at a very high l e v e l . Of importance i s t h i s : at what point must a judge rely on the sub-stance of his own judgement? Admittedly the constraint - placed on judges i s greater than on l e g i s l a t o r s . But t h i s i s a d i f -ference of degree,"not kind. These doubts are raised by Hart in his consideration of Dworkin 1s philosophy. Hart writes: Much that Professor Dworkin says in de-veloping t h i s conception of the unity of law with i t s j u s t i f i c a t o r y theory seems to me well taken against some incautious descript-ions of what judges do, and against some hasty claims as to what they should do, i n those cases where p a r t i c u l a r parts of the law o f f e r no clear guidance. ... Nonetheless, anyone considering t h i s theory...must, I think, be v i s i t e d by doubts on two main scores. The f i r s t i s the l a t i t u d e that Pro-fessor Dworkin permits himself, and which he would allow to courts, in drawing the l i n e of d i s t i n c t i o n between what i s to be taken as s e t t l e d law from which the guiding j u s t -i f i c a t o r y p r i n c i p l e s are to be derived and what i s to be taken as unsettled law which provides the hard cases to be decided by reference to the p r i n c i p l e s so derived. ... More important i s the doubt whether Professor Dworkin has established something which i s central to his case: that a judge w i l l not frequently be faced with alterna-t i v e equally correct ways of applying Pro-fessor Dworkin's theory when...he t r i e s to extract from the existing law the p r i n c i p l e or p r i n c i p l e s that w i l l y i e l d the correct decision i n a hard case. ...I f i n d i t d i f -f i c u l t to believe that...just one p r i n c i p l e or-set of p r i n c i p l e s can be shown to f i t theQ^ e x i s t i n g s e t t l e d law better than any other." The answer to Hart's f i r s t doubt i s : the c r i t e r i o n Dworkin uses to d i s t i n g u i s h between s e t t l e d and u n s e t t l e d law i s simply a theory which r e c o g n i z e s t h a t a l a r g e r segment of the law as s e t t l e d i s to be p r e f e r r e d over a theory that recog-n i z e s a s m a l l e r segment as s e t t l e d . T h i s c r i t e r i o n i s i m p l i c i t i n Dworkin"s a n a l y s i s of "mistakes" i n law. He b e l i e v e s t h a t judges "must l i m i t the number of events disposed of i n t h i s 83 way." S a r t o r i u s , who b e l i e v e s t h a t he i s developing a l e g a l theory s i m i l a r to Dworkin's, p r o v i d e s a more e x p l i c i t c r i t e r i o n . "The o b l i g a t i o n of the judge i s to reach t h a t d e c i s i o n which coheres best w i t h the t o t a l body of a u t h o r i t a t i v e l e g a l stand-ards which he i s bound to apply. The c o r r e c t d e c i s i o n i n a given case i s t h a t which achieves 'the best r e s o l u t i o n * of ex-i s t i n g standards i n terms of systematic coherence as f o r m a l l y determined...by some supreme s u b s t a n t i v e p r i n c i p l e . . . . I t i s the d i s t i n c t i v e f e a t u r e of the i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d r o l e of the j u d i c i a r y , i n c o n t r a s t to the l e g i s l a t i v e branch, t h a t i t may not d i r e c t l y base i t s d e c i s i o n s on s u b s t a n t i v e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s 84 of the value of competing s o c i a l p o l i c i e s . " S a r o t i u s p o s i t s a " r e c u r s i v e " d e f i n i t i o n of the r u l e of r e c o g n i t i o n , i d e n t i f y i n g a u t h o r i t a t i v e l e g a l standards as: "(1) The s t a t u t e s enacted by a p a r t i c u l a r l e g i s l a t i v e body; (2) The p r i n c i p l e s and p o l i c i e s embedded i n ( l ) ; (3) ' E x t r a l e g a l ' p r i n c i p l e s and p o l i c i e s d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y i n c o r p o r a t e d i n -to the law by e i t h e r (1) or ( 2 ) . ...The a c t u a l f i l l i n g out of such an u l t i m a t e c r i t e r i o n would be complex and demanding, ... 85 i f i t i s indeed a p r a c t i c a l p o s s i b i l i t y at a l l . . . . " I t i s s u f f i c i e n t f o r S a r t o r i u s t h a t t h i s d e f i n i t i o n make t h e o r e t i c a l sense. But he does not a p p r e c i a t e f u l l y t h a t the t r a n s a c t i o n s between the theory and the p r a c t i c e of any i n s t i t u t i o n are i n -t i m a t e l y i n t e r t w i n e d . The Causal Theory argues that laws are w r i t t e n i n such a way as to prevent d i s j u n c t i v e c h o i c e s a r i s i n g between an i n s t i t u t i o n ' s theory and p r a c t i c e . Both Dworkin and S a r t o r i u s assume t h a t the bulk of the law i s j u s t i f i a b l e and a c c e p t a b l e . Even i f Dworkin's theory were e l a b o r a t e d i n t h i s manner, Hart's second doubt c o u l d s t i l l be r a i s e d . Hart c o u l d 56 argue as follows: What does the judge do when he has to choose between two decisons, both of which achieve equally "the best resolution" of existing standards? What are the arguments to show that t h i s situation never, or rarely, arises in mature legal systems? If Dworkin has addressed t h i s issue, then i t must arise from his argument that l e g a l concepts are often "contested concepts". Concepts, such as the "purpose" of a l e g i s l a t i v e statute and the " p r i n c i p l e s " embedded in the p o s i t i v e rules of law, are es-s e n t i a l l y contested. He argues that the manner i n which judges arrive at one conception as the 'true' content of a contested concept i s an exercise of judgement and not d i s c r e t i o n . The exact manner i s not mechanical and requires a certain amount of t r a i n i n g and a degree of s k i l l . Dworkin descibes the devel-opment of such j u s t i f i c a t o r y theory as the process of "referr-^-ing a l t e r n a t i v e l y to p o l i t i c a l philosophy and i n s t i t u t i o n a l d e t a i l . /The judge7 must generate possible theories against the broader i n s t i t u t i o n . When the discriminating power of that test i s exhausted, he must elaborate the contested con-86 cepts that the successful theory employs." "It i s important to see, however," writes Dworkin, "that the conventions run out i n a p a r t i c u l a r way. They are not incomplete, l i k e a book whose l a s t page i s missing, but abstract, so that t h e i r f u l l force can be captured i n a con-87 cept that admits of d i f f e r e n t conceptions...." The j u s t i f i c a t i o n of decisions based on contested con-cepts are l i k e l y to be controversial. Neither are such judge-ments l i k e l y to be unique, i n the sense that other judges might plausibly come to a d i f f e r e n t decision. This difference i s ascribed, not to the exercise of d i s c r e t i o n , but to the ex-ercise of judgement. One suspects that, f o r Dworkin, i t i s more important, f o r determining the propriety of a p a r t i c u l a r decision, to know how the judge made his decision than to know what decision he made. One wonders i f the assumption behind Hart's doubts i s not that a "correct" decision i s one that i s "unique", in the sense that a l l judges would arrive at the 57 same conclusion. Continuing the argument, how could one c r i t -i c i z e a decision as being "incorrect" i f there were no unique solutions i n t h i s sense? Since a choice would exist how could discretion be denied? Sartorius argues that "the issue about the existence of uniquely correct decisions i s to some extent a red herring. For the argument to the conclusion that judges must exercise discretion in the strong sense can just as well be made, not in terms of cases in which there does not exist a uniquely cor-rect decision, but simply in terms of cases were afte r honest i n t e l l e c t u a l e f f o r t the judge has been unable to i d e n t i f y a uniquely correct decision. The judge must decide in one way — he can not suspend judgement and, by hypothesis, i n such a case authoritative guidance i s not s u f f i c i e n t to lead him to a p a r t i c u l a r decision. This i s a problem of i n s t i t u t i o n a l design: law must be designed with the capacities of c i t i z e n s and o f f i c i a l s i n mind. I t does not seem f a r or just to place obligations on judges which they could hardly f u l f i l l . Yet t h i s i s what Sartorius would argue. " I n s t i t u t i o n a l norms which channel j u d i c i a l de-cision-making behavior into l i n e s that i t would otherwise not take are means for assuring that such e f f o r t s w i l l be maximal, and that the consequences of f a i l u r e to exert them w i l l be 89 minimal." By not admitting d i s c r e t i o n to judges (even i n cases which render the practice of adjudication, in terms of pre-existing standards, absurd or perverse) Sartorius believes errors w i l l be minimized and successes maximized. Just as the system w i l l imprison a number of innocent persons and allow a number of g u i l t y ones to escape, i t w i l l also allow a few judges to be censured even when they could not possibly have done better. The question of d i s c r e t i o n to Sartorius i s not one of purely 'fact', nor i s i t one of s t r i c t l y 'value'. Ra-ther, i t i s a question of ' i n s t i t u t i o n a l design'. Just as one can not expect large i n d u s t r i a l projects to be engineered to avoid every possible accident, so one can not expect to have 58 s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s designed to avoid a l l possible error. One may, however, demand a more precise d e f i n i t i o n of what c o n s t i -tutes a " f a i r r i s k " i n such forms of employment. A certain degree of c i r c u l a r i t y may foe attached to t h i s demand. Quest-ions of fairness are r e l a t i v e to the c r i t e r i o n of relevance used in such decisions. At t h i s point, Dworkin's argument can be illuminating. Judges do not decide on the basis of a v a i l -able l e g a l materials and then ask i f i t i s f a i r ; rather, f a i r -90 ness i s i n t e g r a l to t h e i r decisions. Yet, Dworkin obscures t h i s point by his general theory of law. He believes that the p r i n c i p l e or doctrine of fairness i s formally independent of questions of i n s t i t u t i o n a l design and of a practice's general c r i t e r i a of relevance. One might argue f o r a policy of f a i r -ness: that d i s t i n c t i o n s used i n making judgements be substan-t i a t e d by arguments that support the c r i t e r i a of relevance. To i n s i s t that questions of "fairness" point at the consisten-cy of application, not the c r i t e r i a of relevance, adds nothing to the analysis. I f case A and case B are exactly the same, but are decided d i f f e r e n t l y , then the question i s not "Is i t unfair?" so much as, "Why i s i t unfair?". It i s unfai r be-cause there i s no relevant c r i t e r i a mentioned i n the l a t t e r case to support distinguishing the two cases. The demand f o r relevant c r i t e r i a in distinguishing between cases which are decided d i f f e r e n t l y follows from the judge's obligation to ap-ply the law. How could he be applying the same law, i n two ca ses which are decided d i f f e r e n t l y , i f he can give no relevant d i s t i n c t i o n ? Dworkin's emphasis on fairness obscures more pre cise questions of i n s t i t u t i o n a l design and reasoned argument in j u d i c i a l decisions. The ultimate form of Hart's c r i t i c i s m of Dworkin's theory i s that, from Dworkin's description, there i s no evid-ence that a case w i l l not arise which i s undecidable. In fact at some point, Hart would argue, di s c r e t i o n w i l l have to be ex ercised — a choice w i l l e x ist. Hart would concede that Dwor-kin' s c r i t i c i s m of his position, i n The Concept of Law, regard 59 i n g s p e c i f i c " i n c a u t i o u s d e s c r i p t i o n s of what judges do" as j u s t i f i e d . But he would argue t h a t h i s p o s i t i o n i s e s s e n t i a l -l y c o r r e c t ; only that the area of d i s c r e t i o n i s much narrower than he had imagined. I t a l l depends, w r i t e s Hart, "on the c l a i m which P r o f e s s o r Dworkin makes... t h a t when hard cases a-r i s e , e q u a l l y p l a u s i b l e hypotheses as to what the l a t e n t law 91 i s w i l l not be a v a i l a b l e . " What i s the judge to do at t h i s p o i n t ? Must he not t u r n to h i s own sense of r i g h t , e q u i t y , f a i r n e s s , and j u s t i c e ? Dworkin might respond that a judge i n such a p o s i t i o n i s informed by the community's sense of j u s -t i c e i n reviewing e x i s t i n g l e g a l m a t e r i a l s and i n s t i t u t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e . I f any c h o i c e i s l e f t to the judge then i t would be m i s l e a d i n g to c a l l i t an e x e r c i s e of d i s c r e t i o n r a t h e r than one of judgement. But i n what way would c a l l i n g such choice " d i s c r e t i o n " , be m i s l e a d i n g ; f o r by h y p o t h e s i s , the judge has exhausted a l l standards of what c o n s t i t u t e s a j u s t d e c i s i o n , and t h e r e f o r e the judgement can not be one of p r i n c i p l e . For behind Dworkin's c l a i m ( t h a t when a judge f o l l o w s the r i g h t s thesis"'he w i l l be able to decide on the r i g h t s of the p a r t i e s i n v o l v e d ) i s the broader c l a i m t h a t the law i s always able to p r o v i d e guidance s u f f i c i e n t to make each d e c i s i o n s t r i c t l y de-terminable. Hart p o i n t s out that Bentham would i n t e r p r e t Dwor-k i n ' s t h e s i s as a c o n t i n u a t i o n of B l a c k s t o n e ' s f i c t i o n — t h a t judges do not make law but only apply i t . S a r t o r i u s would a r -gue that the q u e s t i o n i s s t r u c t u r a l , and i s p a r t of the prob-lem of i n s t i t u t i o n a l design. At best, the law can only p r o v i d e very g e n e r a l and ab-s t r a c t p r i n c i p l e s to a i d '.the judge i n such cases. The g u i d -ance they p r o v i d e can be, i n p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n s , i n s u f f i c -i e n t and incomplete. Hart f i n d s . . . " i t d i f f i c u l t to b e l i e v e that among these, j u s t one p r i n c i p l e or set of p r i n c i p l e s can be shown to f i t the e x i s t i n g s e t t l e d law b e t t e r than any o t h -92 e r . " Dworkin's technique of a d j u d i c a t i o n e s s e n t i a l l y pro-v i d e s a method of " c l o s u r e " . I t allows judges to " c l o s e " op-enings i n the f a b r i c of law where gaps or c o n f l i c t s appear. 6 0 Hart tends to argue that Dworkin 1s technique does not provide any assurance that i t w i l l be able to clo s e every opening, and that the f o l l o w i n g "entitlement" i s not w e l l founded: "The law may not be a seamless web", w r i t e s Dworkin, "but the p l a i n -t i f f i s e n t i t l e d to ask (the judge) to t r e a t i t as i f i t were". 9 3 Hart's argument assumes that a judge's i m p a r t i a l i t y and ob-j e c t i v i t y r e q u i r e that he not be a p o l i t i c a l or moral a c t o r . But t h i s i s one of Dworkin's c e n t r a l claims. I t i s not so much that judges must supplement laws, but how and when they do t h i s . The law provides s u f f i c i e n t guidance ( p r i n c i p l e s ) to at l e a s t inform the judge how he may execute such t a s k s , so i t i s suf-f i c i e n t to say such judgements are 'substantiated by the l e g a l system. To Dworkin's mind, how the judge a r r i v e s at the junc-ture of choice determines whether that choice w i l l be an exer-c i s e of judgement or one of d i s c r e t i o n . That any j u d i c i a l choice i s c r i t i c i z a b l e i s evidence of i t s judgemental charac-t e r ; but by hypothesis d i s c r e t i o n i s n o n - c r i t i c i z a b l e . That the law f i n d s a d e c i s i o n between two sides of a case equ a l l y acceptable (or eq u a l l y unacceptable) i s problematic f o r the judge, e s p e c i a l l y since he can not suspend judgement. The d i -lemma i t poses f o r the theory of a d j u d i c a t i o n i s w e l l known. In f a c t , i t i s the problem posed by the three premisses e l a b -orated i n PART TWO: "(A) P r i n c i p l e of u n a v o i d a b i l i t y : Judges must res o l v e a l l the cases submitted to them." "(B) P r i n c i p l e of j u s t i f i c a t i o n : A j u d i c i a l d e c i s i o n acquires a ground or reason and judges must s t a t e the reasons f o r t h e i r d e c i s i o n . " "(C) P r i n c i p l e of l e g a l i t y : Judges must ground t h e i r d e c i s i o n on l e g a l norms." In PART TWO i t was argued that these three p r i n c i p l e s are j o i n t l y i n c o n s i s t e n t , and that the p r i n c i p l e of l e g a l i t y was vulnerable and rooted i n a l i b e r a l ideology. Dworkin b e l -ieves t h a t , once p r i n c i p l e s are admitted i n t o the framework of law, the p r i n c i p l e of l e g a l i t y w i l l be r a t i o n a l l y acceptable. 61 Hart i s not convinced by t h i s addition, Dworkin's emphasis on how decisions are grounded seems misplaced, f o r what i s at i s -sue i s the question of i n s t i t u t i o n a l design, which can not be reduced e n t i r e l y to a question of normative p o l i t i c a l theory. Dworkin w i l l not acknowledge a need f o r some formal rule of recognition. He does not see how p r i n c i p l e s can be "recog-nized" i n a formal sense by t h e i r "pedigree", because he b e l -ieves such questions are e s s e n t i a l l y normative, not mechanical. Sartorius says that, with regard to acts such as c i v i l disobed-ience, Dworkin w i l l not admit that "the interface between i n -dividual moral judgement and j u s t i f i e d i n s t i t u t i o n a l response 94 ...may not be able to be closed." He continues: "In most general terms the picture here i s that of men deliberately cre-ating a legal system (norms plus o f f i c i a l s c arged with t h e i r application) with the intent of putting others i n the p o s i t i o n of having to make second-order decisions about t h e i r behavior which w i l l channel that behavior into desirable directions 95 that i t would not otherwise take." To Sartorius, the dilemma of adjudication posed by en-dorsing p r i n c i p l e s (A), (B), and (C), i s one of i n s t i t u t i o a l design. To Sartorius, i t i s more secure to i n s i s t on a l l three p r i n c i p l e s , including the p r i n c i p l e of l e g a l i t y . The generalization that a judge w i l l be able to determine when the law creates a s i t u a t i o n requiring him to exercise d i s c r e t i o n i s not empirically sound. The argument i s s i m i l a r to M i l l ' s argument against paternalism: since most interferences with another person's l i b e r t y , on the ground that one was protect-ing that person from harming himself, are often i l l - c o n c e i v e d or ill-founded, i t i s best not to allow any interference at a l l . With t h i s i n mind, one could imagine a case a r i s i n g wherein one "could" not i n t e r f e r e because of the pr o h i b i t i o n against paternalism (supported perhaps by law), while in fact one "ought" to i n t e r f e r e . This i s the reasoning behind Sartor-ius' argument. I n s t i t u t i o n a l norms which channel jud-i c i a l decision-making behavior into l i n e s 62 that i t would not otherwise take are means f o r a s s u r i n g t h a t such e f f o r t s w i l l be maximal, and t h a t the consequences of a f a i l u r e to exert them w i l l be minimal. I thus conclude that i t i s always a p p r o p r i -ate to c r i t i c i z e a j u d i c i a l d e c i s i o n which cannot be j u s t i f i e d i n termi of extant l e g -a l s t a n d a r d s e v e n one reached i n a case where, by h y p o t h e s i s , no one d e c i s i o n c o u l d be j u s t i f i e d i n t h i s manner. Rather than being perverse or absurd, t h i s p o s i t i o n i s merely a s p e c i a l , and e s p e c i a l l y important a p p l i c a t i o n of my g e n e r a l s t r u c t u r a l ac-count of r e l a t i o n s h i p s between i n d i v i d u a l conduct and s o c i a l norms....(T)here i s a sense i n which the p r i n c i p l e t h a t 'ought i m p l i e s can' breaks down....It a l l hinges upon the judge being able to r e l i a b l y i d e n -t i f y ... exceptions to the i n s t i t u t i o n a l de-c i s i o n t h a t a j u d i c i a l d e c i s i o n i s to be j u s t i f i e d s o l e l y i n terms of p r e - e x i s t i n g l e g a l standards . . . . ( i f ) i t i s . . . admitted that attempts to i d e n t i f y cases f o r which there i s no one l e g a l l y c o r r e c t r e s u l t would more o f t e n than not be mistaken, then i t makes good sense never to permit appeals to the e x c e p t i o n a l case to j u s t i f y o vert j u d i c i a l l e g i s l a t i o n . I n s o f a r , as there are cases where judges c o u l d not, or, on d i r e c t u t i l i t a r i a n grounds, should not, conform t h e i r behavior to t h e i r i n s t i t u t i o n -a l r o l e , they are, or should be, c r e a t o r s as w e l l as a p p l i e r s of law. But to d e s c r i b e them i n the l a t t e r way i s to d e s c r i b e t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l conduct as p o l i t i c a l a c t o r s , not t h e i r i n s t i t u t i o n a l r o l e as members of the j u d i c i a r y . 9 6 97 S a r t o r i u s sees too l i t t l e f ormal s t r u c t u r e i n law. Coval and Smith w r i t e : "Unless the l e g i s l a t u r e i s to pre-empt the f u n c t i o n of the c o u r t s , some means have to be p r o v i d e d w i t h i n the l e g a l system to d e a l w i t h these h i g h l y f o r s e e a b l e matters. Otherwise the law w i l l be a t o t a l l y i r r e s o l u t e i n -s t i t u t i o n at these p o i n t s . Conversely, where the c o u r t s do not f u l l y r e c o g n i z e the h i g h l y s t r u c t u r e d d e c i s i o n - s y s t e m , i n -t e g r a l t o the law, from which anomaly r e s o l v i n g d e c i s i o n s come, then the c o u r t s are i n danger of not seeing the l i m i t s of the 98 law and thus are i n danger of pre-empting the l e g i s l a t u r e . " To these authors, i t i s enough of a problem of i n s t i t -u t i o n a l design "to w r i t e laws which d e a l w i t h known and q u i t e probable e v e n t u a l i t i e s — b u t not necessary, although p o s s i b l e , t o w r i t e ones which do d e a l w i t h every c o n c e i v a b l e c h o i c e which c o u l d f a c e us. We f o r e c l o s e upon too much when we w r i t e 99 such laws. D e c i d a b i l i t y i s not worth that much." D e c i d a b i l i t y i s a desideratum i n the design of a system of a d j u d i c a t i o n , but not an absolute requirement. Another des-it e r a t u m i s t h a t j u d i c i a l d e c i s i o n s conform to our c o n s i d e r e d and most s t r o n g l y h e l d moral views; perhaps, as Dworkin would have i t , the p o l i t i c a l m o r a l i t y i m p l i c i t i n the system as a whole. Dworkin i n f a c t s u p p l i e s h i s theory w i t h a s u b s t a n t i v e "grundnorm". He suggests "one f a v o r e d form of argument f o r po-l i t i c a l r i g h t s , which i s the d e r i v a t i o n of p a r t i c u l a r r i g h t s from the a b s t r a c t r i g h t to concern and r e s p e c t taken to be fu n -damental and a x i o m a t i c . " ^ Dworkin even argues that "the i d e a of a c o l l e c t i v e g o a l may i t s e l f be d e r i v e d from t h a t fundament-1 0 1 a l r i g h t " . C l e a r l y both S a r t o r i u s and Dworkin continue to take a d i s j u n c t i v e p o s i t i o n : d e c i d a b i l i t y versus m o r a l i t y , one or the other. Hart i s not convinced by Dworkin's approach. He b e l i e v e s t h a t cases would s t i l l a r i s e which were undecidable. Dworkin f i n d s l e g a l systems which admit such cases m o r a l l y ob-j e c t i o n a b l e . Hart i s f o r c i n g him toward a N a t u r a l Law p o s i -t i o n and, i n s o f a r as Dworkin accepts such a p o s i t i o n , Dworkin becomes h e i r to the t r a d i t i o n a l c r i t i q u e . U n l i k e Hart and Dworkin, S a r t o r i u s takes the middle ground. To him the prob-lem i s one of i n s t i t u t i o n a l design, but he i s o v e r s i m p l i f y i n g . The Causal Theory i s a b e t t e r t h e o r e t i c a l response as i t r e c -ognizes the nature and complexity of the task . In r e a c t i n g to Hart's c r i t i c i s m , Dworkin has recently-accepted a s o l u t i o n s i m i l a r to that of S a r t o r i u s . Dworkin a r -gues t h a t , i n a mature l e g a l system, the p r o b a b i l i t y of a t i e case w i l l be very low. Mature l e g a l systems, he argues, are " t h i c k w i t h c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r u l e s and p r a c t i c e s , and dense w i t h precedents and s t a t u t e s . . . . ( G ) i v e n the complexity of l e g a l ma-64 t e r i a l s at hand, judges w i l l , i f they t h i n k long and hard en-ough, come to th i n k t h a t one side or the other has, a l l t h i n g s c o n s i d e r e d and m a r g i n a l l y , the b e t t e r case. T h i s f u r t h e r i n -s t r u c t i o n w i l l be r a t i o n a l i f the antecedent p r o b a b i l i t y o f e r -r o r i n a j u d i c i a l d e c i s i o n seems to be g r e a t e r than the ante-cedent p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t some case w i l l indeed be, i n f a c t , a t i e , and i f there are advantages of f i n a l i t y or other p o l i t i c -a l advantages to be gained by denying the p o s s i b i l i t y of the cases i n law," Dworkin concludes t h a t "judges might do w e l l to r e j e c t (the recommendation that the l e g a l e n t e r p r i s e be am-ended to allow f o r t i e cases) i f t h e i r system i s s u f f i c i e n t l y .,102 complex." Perhaps Dworkin has f i n a l l y accepted the problem as one of i n s t i t u t i o n a l d e s i g n . But i f so, he does not seem to r e a l -i z e t h a t he has undercut h i s r i g h t s t h e s i s and i t s d i s t i n c t i o n between p o l i c y and p r i n c i p l e . A judge must c o n s i d e r arguments of p o l i c y to determine i f h i s system i s "complex" enough to deny the p o s s i b l e e x i s t e n c e of a t i e case. A f t e r the d i s t i n c -t i o n between p r i n c i p l e s and p o l i c i e s c o l l a p s e s , the r i g h t s the-s i s i s seen as a c l a i m about the h i g h r e l a t i v e o r d e r i n g of standards c o n t r o l l i n g the j u d i c i a l p r o c e s s . . The r i g h t s t h e s i s i s a p a r t i a l e x p l i c a t i o n of those standards. The f o l l o w i n g s t o r y i l l u m i n a t e s a d i s t i n c t i o n t h a t Dworkin's a n a l y s i s seems to c l o u d . M a r t i n P. Goldberg w r i t e s : "There i s a sad t a l e about two farmers d i s p u t i n g the ownership of a bean patch. They appeared before the Emir, who summarily ordered t h a t the farmers be d e c a p i t a t e d and took the land f o r h i m s e l f . Now the Emir brought the matter to an end, 103 but he d i d not s e t t l e the farmers 1 d i s p u t e . " There i s a d i f f e r e n c e between ' s e t t l i n g ' and 'ending' a d i s p u t e . Consider a h y p o t h e t i c a l l e g a l system that has only one r u l e : (Rl) decide i n f a v o r of the s i d e who pr e s e n t s the b e t t e r case r e l a t i v e to the two goals p and q. That i s , f o r any case, i f the value of q minus the value of p y i e l d s a neg-a t i v e number, then p wins. The f o l l o w i n g diagram c o u l d r e p r e -6 5 sent t h i s l e g a l system. Such a system would have a d e c i s i o n procedure f o r any p o i n t (case) not on the d i a g o n a l , f o r a l l cases which do not y i e l d zero (0) as a r e s u l t . Any s i d e f a v o r i n g p would win i n cases whice f e l l below the d i a g o n a l , but would l o s e i n cases appear-in g above the d i a g o n a l . I t would be able to " s e t t l e " such d i s p u t e s on the b a s i s of the r u l e . Cases which f e l l on the di a g o n a l c o u l d not be " s e t t l e d " . Hart argues t h a t no matter how 'mature' the l e g a l system, such cases w i l l be r a r e . So he b e l i e v e s i t i s reasonable to deny such cases e x i s t . One can e a s i l y produce r u l e s which cover every e v e n t u a l i t y . In terms of the a r t i f i c i a l example s t a t e d , one c o u l d say, " i n case of a t i e , always choose p". Or, one c o u l d w r i t e i n t o Dworkin's l e g -a l system: "Always choose the more important 'standard' ; i n case of a t i e between a ' r i g h t ' and a 'goal', choose the ' r i g h t ' . " Coval/Smith f i n d such " f u l l - b o a r d s o l u t i o n s " so ob-v i o u s and so easy to produce t h a t one can expect such s o l u t i o n s to e x i s t i n any l e g a l system. But such s o l u t i o n s do not nec-e s s a r i l y ' s e t t l e ' d i s p u t e s , although they c e r t a i n l y 'end' them. I f the r u l e (Rl) (that the case s u p p o r t i n g p wins only when i t outweighs q) i s e s t a b l i s h e d from e m p i r i c a l evidence, then " f u l l board s o l u t i o n s " do not n e c e s s a r i l y have t h a t r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n . In f a c t , such r u l e s as "choose p i n a t i e " are m e c h a n i c a l — 66 they allow the judge to avoid questions he i s neither adminis-t r a t i v e l y nor p o l i t i c a l l y equipped to address. The case f o r having mechanical rules can have an empirical basis, but the rules themselves are mechanical and t h e i r r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n i s p a r a s i t i c on an empirical argument f o r the system as a whole. I f Hart i s correct, then i t must be i n regard to the necessity f o r such mechanical rules at some point i n the system. Such rules w i l l not ' s e t t l e ' cases, but w i l l only 'end' them—to that extent the law w i l l be 'discretionary' or 'arbitrary'. But Hart does not appreciate that such mechanical rules make j u d i c i a l d i s c r e t i o n unnecessary—their application remains a matter f o r judgement. Dworkin recognizes that such mechanical rules w i l l be required in practice less frequently than Hart had thought. But Dworkin believes that, by denying d i s c r e t i o n to judges, he has eliminated d i s c r e t i o n from the leg a l system. Mechanical rules just transfer the issue to the l e g i s l a t i v e or con s t i t u t i o n a l l e v e l s of the system; they do not 's e t t l e ' any problem. Legal systems are a compromise between authority and power. A c o n s t i t u t i o n a l amending mechanism keeps authority (government) i n l i n e with power (people). A poorly designed amending formula may resu l t i n revolution. I f one finds a cer-t a i n government empirically and e t h i c a l l y sound, then i t des-erves support. But the amending mechanism can be quite amoral and completely formal, remaining purely a question of pedigree. The Constitution of the United States has no normative r e s t r i c -t i o n attached to i t s amending formula. I t s people can inaug-urate a system as virtuous or as vicious as they please. The question of good reasoning i n the design of l e g a l i n s t i t u t i o n s w i l l be considered i n the next part of t h i s thes-i s . But presently certain conclusions can be formed. P o s i t i v -i s t s argue erroneously that,; once indeterminacy i s admitted i n -to law, then judges must be given discretionary power to close gaps as they a r i s e . However, those who agree with Dworkin do not appreciate the larger systematic problem of indeterminacy. 67 They f e e l they have resolved i t by showing how the system a-voids j u d i c i a l d i s c r e t i o n . Judges provide a consolidating function in the law by organizing law into a consistent and co-herent whole. When questions of 'obligation' arise, moral-like considerations w i l l become relevant. But to simply say that the issue i s 'normative' only scratches the surface. The Cau-sa l Theory c l e a r l y shows that the law provides much more defin-i t i v e and detailed guidance. At some point the judge may face a question concerning the general j u s t i c e of the legal system; the mechanical amending formula would take i t out of the judge's hands and put i t i n the co n s t i t u t i o n a l process. The judge can not r e s t r i c t what the co n s t i t u t i o n a l process i s a l -lowed to declare. Dworkin's rights thesis would argue that the judge must e s t a b l i s h a theory ' j u s t i f y i n g ' why i t i s ever proper to follow rules inaugurated by such a process. But one must recognize a fin e d i s t i n c t i o n here. This " j u s t i f y i n g theory" does not j u s t i f y the decision. I t i s a way of a r r i v -ing at a decision; i t provides the system* s ultimate j u s t i f i -cation. I t does not foreclose on co n s t i t u t i o n a l change. I t can not l i f t i t s e l f up by i t s own boot-straps. When Hart ar-gues thot such ' f i n a l p r i n c i p l e s ' must be simply 'accepted 1, he must have something l i k e t h i s i n mind. A legal system i s not viable i f i t i s nowhere open to co n s t i t u t i o n a l change and c r i t i c i s m . I f a system were closed so t i g h t l y , i t would open-ly i n v i t e revolution. 68 PART FOUR: Reason and Objectivity i n Law A. The Recognition Feature i n Law A detailed analysis of r a t i o n a l i t y and o b j e c t i v i t y i n law would be extremely complex. However, the essential func-tion of such considerations can be simply indicated by consid-ering t h e i r role i n simpler proceedings. The game of baseball i s structured so as to allow the operations of the game to be documented and are thus reviewable. One can not imagine any game or practice enduring i f the central decisions of i t s of-f i c i a l s were not reviewable. The correctness of a decision must be determinable by the p a r t i c i p a n t s . Although the umpire makes the o f f i c i a l determination as to whether or not a player i s "out", i t s t i l l remains true that the correctness of his " c a l l s " i s determinable (excepting borderline s i t u a t i o n s ) . Calculations as to whether the b a l l or the player made i t to f i r s t base before the other, i s a public event. The major ob-ject i o n to d i s c r e t i o n - 3 in law i s that, unless i t i s narrowly r e s t r i c t e d , i t threatens the o b j e c t i v i t y of the practice. The writing and the application of laws are public and datable ev-ents. From the perspective of the Causal Theory, i t i s c l e a r that such considerations are r e f l e c t e d i n the (a)-goals of the biconditional p o l i c y basic to any rule-governed enterprise. From such a causal perspective, one can see that unless those who are to come under some practice have some assurance that they w i l l be able to make reasonable determinations regarding the correctness of o f f i c i a l " c a l l s " , then the agreement neces-sary to inaugurate and to maintain that practice w i l l not ex-i s t . Examples of central " c a l l s " i n law would be: "Guilty", "X has a right to Y", "X has an obligation to Y to do Z". How reviewable are such determinations? I f one remembers that Dworkin believes that even at the highest j u d i c i a l l e v e l there can be legitimate disagreement, then one must wonder how such a system manages to maintain i t s "objectivity". In such contro-v e r s i a l contexts, how can the rights t h e s i s — t h a t there i s one right answer (obligatory answer) to a question of law—be true? Dworkin asks: "Why do we c a l l what 'the law' says a matter of le g a l 'obligation'? Is 'obligation' here just a term of art, meaning only what the law says? Or does legal o b l i -104 gation have something to do with moral obligation?" Dwor-kin i s concerned with central legal decisions ( c a l l s ) . One might ask Dworkin: Is 'out' just "a term of art", meaning only what the rules of baseball say? Dworkin i s challenging a con-ception central to Hart's legal theory. On Hart's view, " i t i s important to see that one who says that 'A has a right' does not state the relevant rule of law; and that though, given cer-t a i n f acts, i t i s correct to say 'A has a ri g h t ' , one who says t h i s does not state or describe those f a c t s . He has done some-thing d i f f e r e n t from either of these two things: he has drawn a conclusion from the relevant but unstated rule, and from the relevant but unstated facts of the case. 'A has a r i g h t ' , l i k e 'He i s out' i s therefore the t a i l - e n d of a simple l e g a l ca l c u l a t i o n : i t records a result and may well be c a l l e d a con-105 elusion of law." To ask what a right or an obligation i s , i s to ask f o r the truth-conditions under which i t arises. I t would be a category mistake to confuse a "r i g h t " , with a "fact',' of a (legal) "standard". The central legal standard of a le g a l system i s , f o r Hart, i t s rule of recognition. Ultimately, to say that one has a legal obligation, i s to say that, given a p a r t i c u l a r f a c t - s i t u a t i o n , one can conclude from the rule of recognition that certain conduct i s obligatory i n that p a r t i c u l a r situa-^ t i o n . That i s , according to the practice, such a c a l l would be correct. The rule of recognition, according to Hart's p h i l -osophy, i s accepted as a standard of obligation and r i g h t . Dworkin wants to challenge t h i s conception. He challenges the illumination t h i s 'deductive schema1 brings to the concept of legal o b l i g a t i o n . Hart, one should remember, admits that the rule of recognition must be supplem-ented by d i s c r e t i o n - 3 . Dworkin asserts that i f the introduc-70 tion of the rule of recognition i s to be illuminating as to the nature of central legal " c a l l s " then i t must cover most of the decisions made by the courts. But Dworkin shows that the role of " d i s c r e t i o n " i n law i s much greater than Hart had thought. The recognition of p r i n c i p l e s and p o l i c i e s as part of the law (even under the aegis of j u d i c i a l discretion) would, Dworkin argues, "very sharply reduce the area of the law over which (Hart' s) master rule held any dominion." Dworkin's point i s that, one way or the o t h e r — e i t h e r by bolting p r i n c i p -les to the master rule or by increasing the role played by d i s -c r e t i o n — H a r t ' s rule of recognition does not illuminate, as f u l l y as he had thought, the truth-conditions under which l e -gal ' c a l l s ' can be made. The Causal Theory also recognizes l i m i t a t i o n s of the rule of recognition's function i n the l e g a l system: "Even more powerful and relevant than a rule of rec-ognition f o r second-order rules, however, i s what we might 107 c a l l t h e i r generative rule." The recognition of t h i s gen-erative structure again allows one to see that central l e g a l c a l l s are conclusions drawn from le g a l standards and fact s i t -uations. Dworkin's point i s , nevertheless, good: The rule of recognition has a narrower u t i l i t y than Hart had thought. Dworkin 1s attempt to replace d i s c r e t i o n - 3 by a set of p r i n c i p -les i s an attempt to make the truth-conditions.behind l e g a l de-c i s i o n s more perspicuous. He could "accept" a rule of recog-n i t i o n as part of his theory of law once i t s limited function were c l a r i f i e d . He does as much, when he discusses the func-tion played by the doctrines of parliamentary supremacy and precedent i n law. The important question to ask i s : What could Dworkin not accept without r a d i c a l l y a l t e r i n g his central rights thesis? One thing that Dworkin can not accept i s a con-ception of a rule of recognition s i m i l a r to the "rule of i n -vocation" developed i n the Causal Theory. Unlike Hart's and Dworkin's understanding of such a standard, the Causal Theory-develops i t s invoking rule as basic to most any e f f i c a c i o u s s o c i a l p r a c t i c e . Such a rule emerges from a causal analysis r e f l e c t i n g (a)-type considerations basic to law. In f a c t , the considerations w i l l be more complex; they w i l l be "q^ ^bCcet-e r i s paribus)". Once one sees what the invocation rule of the Causal Theory presupposes, then one must r e a l i z e that Dworkin could not accept such a rule without giving up his l e g a l theory. In the next section, I w i l l try to show t h i s i n d e t a i l . B. Legal Obligations Remember, the rights thesis i s Dworkin's theory of how judges should and do decide a l l questions of law. In other words, i t i s his explication of the truth-conditions necessary to make claims as to 'right' or 'obligation'. The rights the-s i s can equally be considered an "obligations thesis", once one remembers that rights and obligations are j u r a l l y related. Compare the passage i n section A, quoted from Hart, with the following passage. Dworkin argues that i n any practice the participants are e n t i t l e d to the o f f i c i a l ' s "best judgement about what t h e i r rights are. The proposition that there i s some 'right' answer to the question does not mean that the rules (of the practice) are exhaustive and unambiguous; rather i t i s a complex statement about the r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s (duties 108 and obligations) 6f i t s o f f i c i a l s and p a r t i c i p a n t s . " Is Dworkin asking what an "out" i s ? "Responsible", "due1; "obligation", " r i g h t " , "out", and " g u i l t y " have the function explicated i n the passage quoted from Hart. Yet, Dworkin b e l -ieves that he i s , i n his rights thesis, adding something to Hart's analysis. He believes that Hart has not f u l l y captured the meaning of "X has a r i g h t " or "X has an obligation". In order to show t h i s , he draws a d i s t i n c t i o n between normative rules and s o c i a l rules. Dworkin summarizes Hart's p o s i t i o n as follows: "Duties ex i s t when s o c i a l rules exist providing f o r such duties. Such s o c i a l rules exist when the practice-conditions 109 f o r such rules are met." Dworkin uses as an example the no-hat-in-church rule. A s o c i o l o g i s t may describe the behavior of a community as following such a rule but in doing so he does not assert that they have a duty to obey such a rule. However, when a churchgoer appeals to the rule, he does not mean "simply that others believe that they have a duty, but that they do have that duty. ...The s o c i o l o g i s t . . . i s asserting a s o c i a l rule, but the churchgoer i s asserting a normative rule. ...The judge tr y i n g a law s u i t _ i s in the position of the churchgoer, n o not the s o c i o l o g i s t . " Dworkin therefore argues that j u d i c i a l decisions are not judgements of s o c i a l fact but of the normative s i t u a t i o n . In Hart's theory, the legitimacy of the ultimate rule — the rule of recognition — i s based on i t s acceptance by the ( o f f i c i a l s of the) community. Dworkin seems to be putting f o r t h the view that the correctness of the analysis of the concept of (legal) obligation must be in terms of acceptabi11ty and not acceptance. I f one looks closely at t h i s claim, i t can be seen as another form of the general argument that p r i n c i p l e s must be accounted a central part of j u d i c i a l decisions. When one remembers that " p r i n c i p l e s " , f o r Dworkin, are "propositions 111 that describe r i g h t s " (and duties) then one can see that his d i s t i n c t i o n between s o c i a l and normative rules p a r a l l e l s his d i s t i n c t i o n between policy and p r i n c i p l e , and furthermore, both d i s t i n c t i o n s can be seen as a p a r t i c u l a r i z a t i o n of the rights thesis. Thus, i t becomes c r u c i a l to determine what Dworkin means by a normative judgement. He asserts that Hart "believes that the s o c i a l practice constitutes a rule which the normative judgement accepts; i n fact the s o c i a l practice helps to j u s t i f y a rule which the normative judgement states. The fact that a practice of removing hats in church exists j u s t i f i e s asserting a normative rule to that e f f e c t — not because the practice constitutes a rule which the normative ; judgement describes and endorses, but because the practice creates ways of giving offense and gives r i s e to expectations of the sort that are good grounds f o r asserting a duty to take off one's hat i n church or f o r asserting a normative rule that 73 112 one must." For Dworkin, the inauguration of s o c i a l practices have a normative import because they create new forms of action whereby others may be insulted or degraded. A l l s o c i a l pract-ices must conform to t h i s basic demand fo r equal respect and concern of those who come under i t . I t i s t h i s "morality of 113 duty" that Dworkin believes i s missing i n Hart's account of obligation in general and j u d i c i a l duty i n p a r t i c u l a r . This argument i s central to the rights t h e s i s . The rights thesis i s a refinement of Dworkin's e a r l i e r claim that the law i s a system of entitlements. It i s here that an a l t e r a t i o n i n the thesis whould constitute a t h e o r e t i c a l change. Dworkin i s r e a l l y only t a l k i n g about various fragments of the Causal Theory. His argument amounts to saying that soc-i a l practices must be designed so as not to offend two (b)-goals — the goal of equal respect and concern f o r those who come under s o c i a l practices. Although very important goals i n the matrix, these goals do not represent the whole structure. The Causal Theory gives a much ri c h e r and more illuminating picture of how claims regarding the promotion and derrogation of (b)-goals proceed, and i t gives the systematic and r u l e -governed nature of such proceedings and also the basic causal r a t i o n a l animating the system. One can see what Dworkin i s talking about i n terms of the Causal Theory: one can see that his 'rights thesis' r e a l l y does not come to grips with the re-quirements of l e g a l theory. Dworkin 1s theory i s r a d i c a l l y sur-passed at t h i s point and i s beyond repair. The Causal Theory demands a change i n the conception of the problem with which Hart and Dworkin were contending. "Morality" in the Causal Theory refers to considerations about (b)-goals, with lower-order goals playing a more prudential r o l e . The scale i s one of importance. Dworkin confuses a fragment of t h i s structure f o r the whole. The charge that Dworkin's rights thesis collapses at t h i s point can be made even more v i v i d by considering his 74 theory of adjudication, which i s an application of the r i g h t s thesis. This theory involves confusion and ambiguity.. F i r s t , he believes that j u d i c i a l duty i s subsumed under the fragment of equal respect and concern, his 'morality of duty'. Second, another fragment of the matrix, ..namely, broad presuppositional standards, which Dworkin interprets as inferable from 'the general character of the enterprise', plays a nebulous role i n his theory of adjudication. Third, the concepts " p r i n c i p l e " and "obligation" tend to be confused. Fourth, there are i n f e -l i c i t i e s i n the conception of the r e l a t i o n betv/een generic and p a r t i c u l a r obligations. For Dworkin, the argument fo r a l e g a l duty or right w i l l be a theory of " i n s t i t u t i o n a l support". Even a single lawyer's theory of law, on Dworkin's account, " w i l l usually include the f u l l set of moral and p o l i t i c a l p r i n c i p l e s to which he subscribes; indeed i t i s hard to think of a single p r i n c i p l e of s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l morality that has currency in his com-munity and that he personally accepts... that would not f i n d some place and have some weight in the elaborate scheme of 114 j u s t i f i c a t i o n required to j u s t i f y the body of laws." This argument i s somewhat of a reductio ad absurdum: Such arguments f o r i n s t i t u t i o n a l support are impractical. He therefore writes: "Jurisprudence poses the question: what i s law? Most legal philosophers have t r i e d to answer t h i s ques-ti o n by distinquishing the standards that properly figure i n arguments on behalf of l e g a l rights and duties. But i f no such l i s t of standards can be made, then some other way of d i s t i n g -uishing l e g a l rights and duties from other rights and duties 115 must be found." Once the generic structure of law i s exhibited most of the force of Dworkin's theory of adjudication i s l o s t . Deduc-ti v e inferences from standards through the facts of the case s to a judgement become more perspicuous. However, Dworkin would press the argument: Why, even i n a c l e a r case i s there an ob-l i g a t i o n to follow the standard, even i f i t c l e a r l y applies? The answer, he believes, must be one of "principle 1, 1. But t h i s i s c i r c u l a r . The term " p r i n c i p l e " , as used here, i s ambiguous and can at most mean "obligation" or " r i g h t " . The question thus reverts back to his claim about the morality of duty which he claims to be embedded i n the law. This collapses, remember, once t h i s morality i s seen as merely a fragment of the (b)-goals of the system's matrix. The general collapse of Dworkin's rights thesis i s made even clearer when one remembers that i n s t i t u t i o n a l support (his j u s t i f i c a t o r y theory) i s construed by him as a contested con^. cept. The 'character' of a game i s an analogous contested concept. One .-wants to ask: What i s Dworkin talking about at t h i s point i n terms of the language of the Causal Theory? He may be t a l k i n g about very general and superior (b)-goals of the matrix. Once t h i s i s r e a l i z e d , much of his talk about contested concepts and differences in j u d i c i a l opinions take : upon a new form. From the perspective of the Causal Theory, nothing i s e s s e n t i a l l y contested — though there may be r a d i c a l confusion. The existence of a l e g a l system assumes basic agree-ments. If the basic premisses of the legal system are contest-ed by more than a few m i s f i t s then i t i s unlike l y that a system l i k e law would e x i s t . The existence of a legal system presup-poses a non-revolutionary s i t u a t i o n . Dworkin has a very hard time seeing t h i s . One might expect him to ask: At what point i s s u f f i c i e n t agreement achieved? At 49%, 50%, 75%, or 100%? Practices such as law and morality arise supposedly because unanimity can not be achieved. This, however, i s not the place to erect Dworkin's normative thesis. There are two general considerations regarding the shape of the required agreement. F i r s t , the s p e c i f i c goals, and second, t h e i r ordering. The main source of disagreement w i l l not be about what goals are to count but f o r how much they are to count. The Causal Theory makes a very clear d i s t i n c t i o n between stable higher-order goals and dynamic lower-order goals. A practice can maintain i t s e l f i f i t s central and most superior goals are the most important 76 goals of those who come under the practi c e . One needs no neb-ulous theory to see that a s o c i a l practice could hardly be created, nevertheless maintained, whose sole purpose i s to de-grade and i n s u l t i t s members. "I f i n d t h i s rule, order, or regulation personally i n s u l t i n g or degrading," w i l l therefore be a legitimate charge against any s o c i a l p r a c t i c e . Such goals as equal respect and concern are i m p l i c i t i n any s o c i a l prac-t i c e . There w i l l be complete agreement about certain goals, both as to t h e i r inclusion and p r i o r i t y in a practice. In fact, disagreement may even constitute grounds f o r questioning a d i s -senter's r a t i o n a l i t y . One can therefore expect that mass d i s -agreement and demonstration w i l l represent a reaction against abuse of a practice rather than simply a reaction against a practice i t s e l f . Various forms of colonization, slavery, and segregation constitute practices of i n s u l t and disconcern. An o f f i c i a l of such i n s t i t u t i o n s can not use the concept of o b l i -gation i n the same sense as i t i s used in a free and open soc-iet y of adults. But the Causal Theory makes t h i s story f a m i l -i a r . I t i s a tale which Dworkin can not t e l l . C. One Right Answer Besides interpreting Dworkin 1s references to the "char-acter" of a practice as considerations regarding (b)-goals, i t i s also possible to interpret such references as generic con-siderations under which obligations a r i s e . One can di s t i n g u i s h between talk about p a r t i c u l a r obligations and obligations i n general. Nevertheless, one must be careful not to think that just because one can talk about obligations at a generic l e v e l independently of p a r t i c u l a r s o c i a l practices, that t h i s c o n s t i -tutes a t h e o r e t i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t category of investigation. One might think that questions of law and morality i n t e r s e c t , or that the practice of creating promises and the practice of creating rights/obligations intersect, perhaps overlapping as two c i r c l e s in a Venn diagram. This would give the impression that there are two independent centers of gravity or areas of 77 concern which have common interests in certain contexts. When in fact certain questions of morality, valuation, and obliga-tion refer to a way of talking about s o c i a l practices at a very general l e v e l . One can consider how rights are determined i n a game l i k e baseball. But talk about how rights are determ-ined i n general, very often takes place in the context of i n -augurating or c r i t i c i z i n g a p a r t i c u l a r p r a c t i c e . At t h i s l e v e l one i s concerned with very general s o c i a l p o l i c y and the s t r a -tegy of very general ways of proceeding. At such l e v e l s , "po-l i c y " very often becomes platitudinous: "What should I do?" "Take the most worthwhile alternative." But i n cases of gross abuse, such considerations become relevant. Questions of ob-l i g a t i o n at t h i s l e v e l of generality become questions of gen-eral i n s t i t u t i o n a l design: How ought s o c i a l practices to be designed? How should one proceed? Should unanimity be re-quired? Can a person be expected to accept obligations which he finds i n s u l t i n g or degrading? Obligations seem to involve the experience of doing what one does not want. The truer p i c -ture, i n f a c t , i s that a person's (b)-goals can not, in t h i s world, a l l be equally s a t i s f i e d , and therefore some order of preference must be assigned to them. One can expect that so-c i a l practices w i l l respect (accept) and protect a person's most important i n t e r e s t s . This i s a central assumption of the Causal Theory. The existence of a l e g a l system implies such agreement. This seems to be a part of the kernel of truth be-hind s o c i a l contract theories of state and society. But once one sees that such talk i s r e a l l y a generic consideration of p a r t i c u l a r s o c i a l practices, then confusion as to reference does not a r i s e — t h e center of gravity of analysis i s no longer s p l i t . There i s a d e f i n i t e problem of reference in Dworkin's philosophy of law. He recognizes that questions of l e g a l ob-l i g a t i o n must remain in t e g r a l to legal decisions. But, he f a i l s to recognize the role of the rule-governed generative structure in such determinations. He does not see that t a l k 78 about 'obligation i n general i s a generic way of talking about conclusions as r e s u l t i n g from p a r t i c u l a r legal rules. Quest-ions regarding rights and obligations are not peculiar to law, and thus the experiences of managing and designing other prac-t i c e s becomes relevant to law, and vice versa. But t h i s does not amount to a collapse of practices into one mega-practice or theory. To develop such a practice i s the Herculean task Dworkin's theory assigns to judges. The question of obligation, f o r Dworkin, becomes the problem of providing a j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r forcing others to act i n ways they f e e l to be not in t h e i r i n t e r e s t . For the Causal Theory, the issue behind questions of obligation i s one of i n s t i t u t i o n a l design: How should prac-t i c e s be designed, when one wants e s s e n t i a l l y voluntary i n v o l -vement? This leads d i r e c t l y to the causal basis of the theory. Knowing a rule (moral l e g a l , or otherwise) i s knowing how to proceed. Rules proscribe and prescribe behavior. Moral rules t e l l one how to get along with one's fellows. To be admonished f o r misbehaving i s to be informed as to the rule and warned as to the consequences of being one who does not know how to get along with others. To know the rule i s to be able to put i t into practice. This requires t r a i n i n g and d i s c i p l i n e , the ra-tionale of which i s causal. For Dworkin, however, the central consideration i s an obscure conception of moral rectitude. Perhaps the idea i s that i f those who come under the rules of law believe that they have a moral obligation to follow them, then legal obligation w i l l be that much more e f f i c a c i o u s . This, however, i s only a fragment of the required analysis of law. The central argument of Dworkin 1s legal theory i s that the law i s a set of entitlements (his rights t h e s i s ) . He ar-gues that there i s always one right answer to a question of law. Though such answers are often controversial, judges can make such determinations by r e f e r r i n g to the general character of the practice. The character of a practice i s a conceptual device "that i n t e r n a l i z e s the general j u s t i f i c a t i o n of the 79 i n s t i t u t i o n so as to make .it available f o r discriminations 116 within the i n s t i t u t i o n . " In terms of the Causal Theory, t h i s appeal to a game's character i s an appeal to very general and superior goals of the matrix, many of which can be expect-ed to be there, by implication. To say that there i s always one right answer, i s to say that unless a certain l e v e l of agreement can be assumed, i t i s unl i k e l y that a practice l i k e law w i l l be inaugurated or maintained. A practice whose con-clusions were grossly indeterminate could hardly expect to fi n d support. The rights thesis can thus be reduced to a claim about the maturity of a society's legal i n s t i t u t i o n s , the l e v e l of agreement needed to maintain i t (Dworkin's descriptive the-s i s ) , and a claim about i n s t i t u t i o n a l design (his normative t h e s i s ) . The Causal Theory argues that the central rationale of s o c i a l practices l i k e law i s causal i n nature. Thus, such proceedings are much more empirically grounded than philoso-phers l i k e Dworkin and Hart have thought; and therefore, much more determinate and datable. Those who come under a practice expect to be able to make r e l i a b l e determinations as to what the consequences of t h e i r p a r t i c i p a t i o n under the practice w i l l be. Such security of expectations i s central to the generic concern f o r o b j e c t i v i t y i n law. The o b j e c t i v i t y of law was threatened by Hart's i n t r o -duction of d i s c r e t i o n . Dworkin's introduction of p r i n c i p l e s (normative considerations) made the law more determinate but involved obscurities of i t s own. The Causal Theory's i n t r o -duction of a generative structure and a causal rationale en-abled legal proceedings to achieve a precision in i t s oper-ations comparable to that of science. The r a t i o n a l i t y and ob-j e c t i v i t y of the leg a l enterprise l i e s in i t s openness to re-view and reform, and the public nature of i t s decisions. These desiderata f i n d t h e i r expression i n the e l e c t o r a l , and the l e g i s l a t i v e processes of government. Dworkin's " i n s t i t u t i o n of rights" represents an e s s e n t i a l l y vague and grossly indet-erminate practice which threatens to retard and obscure the 80 c a u s a l dynamic of s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l development. T h i s i s not to say t h a t ' r i g h t s ' are not i n t e g r a l t o the l e g a l e n t e r -p r i s e but i t i s d o u b t f u l that they are to be found i n the es-s e n t i a l l y a n a r c h i s t i c form Dworkin's argues f o r . "X has a r i g h t to Y", i s s t i l l best construed as a " c a l l " i n law. "What i s a r i g h t / o b l i g a t i o n ? " , i s s t i l l b est construed as a request f o r an e x p l i c a t i o n of the t r u t h - c o n d i t i o n s under which such " c a l l s " can be made. The Causal Theory p r o v i d e s a c l e a r -e r and much r i c h e r p i c t u r e o f these t r u t h - c o n d i t i o n s than i s to be found i n e i t h e r Hart's or Dworkin's a n a l y s i s . P h i l o s o p h e r s such as Dworkin who c o n s i d e r such i s s u e s as c i v i l d i s o b e d i e n c e , o f t e n f a i l to d i s t i n g u i s h between r e -a c t i o n s a g a i n s t the system, s i m p l i c i t e r , and r e a c t i o n s a g a i n s t abuses of the system. Consider the p r a c t i c e of c o n v e r s i n g . I t i s i m p l i e d by the p r a c t i c e that those who proceed to t a l k w i t h others accept the maxim: "Do not be i n c o n s i s t e n t when speaking." Would the f o l l o w i n g r e t o r t be l e g i t i m a t e ? "I d i d not agree to t a l k i n a c o n s i s t e n t f a s h i o n . " I f not, why not? Is i t not th a t the p r a c t i c e i s co n t i n g e n t upon the p r a c t i c e of some such maxim? To speak i s to agree to f o l l o w i t . Thus, e v e r y t h i n g Dworkin has to say i s captured by the Causal Theory. Of course, i t has more to say i n many oth e r d i r e c t i o n s to which Dworkin's theory i s mute. 81 C o n c l u s i o n : In a recent defense of h i s theory, "Can Rights be Con-117 t r o v e r s i a l " , one can f i n d Dworkin responding to the theory's e a r l i e s t c r i t i q u e s . G e r a l d C. MacCallum asks: "(1) To what might we reasonably be e n t i t l e d i n the way of j u d i c i a l d e c i s -i o n s , , given the c o n d i t i o n s under which judges do t h e i r work? and (2) what i s the connection between t h i s and what we are 118 e n t i t l e d to as of r i g h t ? " He w r i t e s f u r t h e r t h a t "a system which f a i l s to p r o v i d e adequate arrangements f o r a c h i e v i n g x does not, d e s p i t e g e n e r a l b e l i e f s about the matter, p r o v i d e 119 f o r e n t i t l e m e n t t o x." Dworkin r e a l i z e s t h a t p o s i t i v i s t p h i l osophy can be understood, i n p a r t , as "a profound a t t a c k on the very r a t i o n a l i t y o f the e n t e r p r i s e " that denies the 120 need i n a d j u d i c a t i o n f o r j u d i c i a l d i s c r e t i o n . At the c e n t e r of Dworkin 1s l e g a l theory and i t s defence i s h i s j u s t i f i c a t o r y theory and i t s r o l e i n a d j u d i c a t i o n . T h i s theory r e f i n e s h i s e a r l i e r c l a i m t h a t some conception of 'com-munity m o r a l i t y ' f u n c t i o n s i n j u d i c i a l d i s p u t e - s e t t l i n g . T h i s theory i s f u r t h e r r e f i n e d by h i s n o t i o n of a "con t e s t e d con-cept", which i s the spearhead of h i s a t t a c k on p o s i t i v i s m . A co n t e s t e d concept d i s t i n g u i s h e s between a "concept" and i t s v a r i o u s "conceptions". At t h i s p o i n t , there i s a very s t r o n g analogy to be drawn between the r i g h t s t h e s i s and the Causal Theory. Both the c o n t e s t e d concept device and the "a«<—>b, c e t -e r i s p a r i b u s " p o l i c y have s i m i l a r f u n c t i o n s and i n v o l v e s i m i l -ar assumptions. Each attempts to p r o t e c t valued f e a t u r e s of law ( s t a b i l i t y , f l e x i b i l i t y , democratic c o n t r o l , ( a ) - g o a l s ) , while maximizing i t s aims ( a c h i e v i n g j u s t i c e , e q u a l i t y , f a i r -ness, s e c u r i t y , ( b ) - g o a l s ) . Both t h e o r i e s assume t h a t b e f o r e any l e g a l system c o u l d get o f f the ground, some n a t u r a l p r o -p e n s i t y toward some group of aims would have to be at work. (Formal p r a c t i c e s presuppose i n f o r m a l beginnings.) The Causal Theory's p o s i t i o n i s t h a t the formal s t r u c t u r e of law presup-poses a c a u s a l b a s i s . In Dworkin's theory i t i s found i n h i s argument f o r n a t u r a l r i g h t s . These r i g h t s are " n a t u r a l " i n the 82 sense t h a t they must be presupposed by the formal mechanisms of law ( i n p a r t i c u l a r , the mechanism of the r u l e of r e c o g n i -t i o n ; or as Dworkin r e f e r s to i t , the standard of l e g i s l a t i v e supremacy). As such, these i n f o r m a l elements of lav/ can not o r i g i n a t e w i t h the formal elements of law. The " o r i g i n " of these elements has been c e n t r a l to the d i s p u t e between Dworkin and the p o s i t i v i s t s . For Dworkin, i t makes b e t t e r sense to say t h a t these i n f o r m a l elements are " d i s c o v e r e d " r a t h e r than "invented"; they are not human a r t i f a c t s . But how are they to be " i s o l a t e d " , "ordered", and e x a c t l y what s o r t of " r e l a t i o n ( s ) ' h o l d between these ( b ) - g o a l s ( n a t u r a l r i g h t s ) and i n s t i t u t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e and h i s t o r y of l a w ' ( s t a t u t e s , decided cases, j u d i c i a l o p i n i o n s , a l l of which are v a l u e d because they promote the ( a ) - g o a l s ) ? Dworkin's answer i s t h a t the judge p r o j e c t s a j u s t i f i c -a t o r y / e x p l a n a t o r y "conception" of a "concept" t h a t he b e l i e v e s to be animating the law. T h i s c o n c e p t i o n i s used to r e s o l v e the case at bar. The f o l l o w i n g s t o r y i s used by Dworkin to sharpen one's understanding of the d i s t i n c t i o n between "con-cept" and " c o n c e p t i o n " . He w r i t e s : "Suppose I t e l l my c h i l d r e n simply t h a t I expect them not to t r e a t o t h ers u n f a i r l y . I no doubt have i n mind exam-p l e s of the conduct I mean to discourage, but I would not ac-cept t h a t my'meaning' was l i m i t e d to these examples, f o r two reasons. F i r s t , I would expect my c h i l d r e n to apply my i n -s t r u c t i o n s t o s i t u a t i o n s I had not and c o u l d not have thought about. Second I stand ready to admit t h a t some p a r t i c u l a r act I had thought was f a i r when I spoke was i n f a c t u n f a i r , or v i c e v e r s a , i f one of my c h i l d r e n i s able to convince me of that l a t t e r ; i n t h a t case I should want to say t h a t my i n -s t r u c t i o n s covered the case he c i t e d , not t h a t I had changed my i n s t r u c t i o n s . I might say t h a t I meant the f a m i l y to be guided by the concept of f a i r n e s s , not by any s p e c i f i c concep-t i o n of f a i r n e s s I might have had i n mind. ... When I appeal to the concept of f a i r n e s s I appeal to what f a i r n e s s means, 83 and I give my views on t h i s issue no special standing. When I lay down a conception of fairness I lay down what I mean by fairness, and my view i s therefore the heart of the matter. When I appeal to fairness I pose a moral issue; when I lay down 1 2 1 my conception of fairness I try to answer i t . " On Dworkin's view a concept i s not i d e n t i c a l with i t s various conceptions. In f a c t , the set of examples that are generally referred to by agents when using a concept i s often incomplete, inconsistent, and contingent. The use of a con-cept must be mediated by a theory that allows one to generate coherent rules or principles„(inference warrants) from a set of controversial conceptions. The story i s f a m i l i a r ; i t i s just a more abstract presentation of Dworkin's theory of ad-judication. However, i t begins to y i e l d a theory of p r a c t i c a l reason. The analogy with the Causal Theory i s clear: Inter-pretations of a rule or regulation (R) must appeal to concepts (b-goals) which control i t s meaning. The meaning of a rule i s controlled by (b)-goals most d i r e c t l y connected with the rule, and controlled more i n d i r e c t l y by the system i n the form of the Matrix (theory). Ultimateny, the general canons of reason (sense) and fairness (justice) of the system would be involved i n determining the meaning of any ru l e . Given the nature and the complexity of the enterprise, p a r t i c u l a r conceptions (the content) of the rule or concept w i l l be controversial and w i l l have to be l e f t "open". In the language of the Causal Theory, reference i s supplied by the world (the relationship i s empir-i c a l ) . Hard cases are produced when the world presents cases that produce anomalies that were not contemplated by the set-t l e d meanings of law. These " s e t t l e d meanings" are theoretic-a l or hypothetical constructs regarding the content and the ordering of the Matrix. Ambiguities and c o n f l i c t s of r e f e r -ence inevitably a r i s e . In such cases h i e r a r c h i c a l consider-ations come into play. Dworkin's procedure i s correct in form; hov/ever, the d e t a i l s are obscure. He r i g h t l y recognizes that some hypotheses or theory, both general and s p e c i f i c , w i l l be 84 c a l l e d i n t o p l a y . These elements are c l e a r l y d e s c r i b e d i n the Causal Theory as the M a t r i x of ordered g o a l s . V a r i o u s d e c i s -i o n s can be construed as hypotheses r e g a r d i n g the c o r r e c t con-t e n t and o r d e r i n g of t h i s M a t r i x . R e s o l u t i o n of anomalies w i l l c a l l f o r more d e t a i l e d r e s o l v i n g r u l e s than the g e n e r a l canons of sense and f a i r n e s s . Dworkin i d e n t i f i e s these r u l e s as " p r i n c i p l e s " . The Causal Theory, however, p r e s e n t s a much r i c h e r p i c t u r e : producing second-order r u l e s and anomaly r e -s o l v i n g r u l e s . The g r e a t e r t e r m i n o l o g i c a l p r e c i s i o n of the Causal Theory p r o v i d e s l e g a l p h i l o s o p h y w i t h a c l e a r e r under-standing of law, and p r o v i d e s l e g a l s c i e n c e w i t h a more soph-i s t i c a t e d mechanism f o r e f f e c t i n g s o c i a l p o l i c y . The Causal Theory makes e x p l i c i t t h a t which i s only i m p l i c i t i n the r i g h t s t h e s i s . Dworkin*s p i c t u r e i s o v e r l y condensed: He w r i t e s t h a t judges i n d i s p u t e as to what the law i s , "are con-t e s t i n g d i f f e r e n t c o nceptions of a concept they suppose they h o l d i n common; they are debating which of d i f f e r e n t t h e o r i e s of the concept best e x p l a i n s the s e t t l e d cases t h a t f i x the concept. ...(The) community's m o r a l i t y ... i s not some sum or combination or f u n c t i o n of the competing c l a i m s of i t s members; i t i s r a t h e r what each of the competing c l a i m s claims to be." 122 The concept of r i g h t s r e c o g n i z e d i n law, p l a c e s judges i n a very demanding r o l e . The very l u x u r i o u s n e s s of the p r a c -t i c e causes one to wonder about i t s p r a c t i c a l i t y . U n d e r l y i n g the p r a c t i c e of j u s t i f y i n g d e c i s i o n s i n c o n t r o v e r s i a l cases by a p p e a l i n g to c o n t e s t e d concepts, Dworkin f i n d s such u n d e r l y i n g purposes as an e f f o r t towards "the development and t e s t i n g of law through experiment by c i t i z e n s and through the adversary 123 process". Such a l u x u r i a n t p r a c t i c e c o u l d h a r d l y deny the r a t i o n a l i t y of disagreement, or the v i r t u e of t o l e r a n c e . F a i r -ness n e c e s s a r i l y demands these as fundamental elements of an e n t e r p r i s e t h a t takes r i g h t s s e r i o u s l y . T h i s r a i s e s the c r u -c i a l q u e s t i o n f o r Dworkin's r i g h t s t h e s i s : I f reasonable law-y e r s (men competent i n the law) can d i s a g r e e i n such cases, 85 then i n what sense i s there always "one r i g h t answer" to a qu e s t i o n of law? Human beings can s u f f e r , and can make pl a n s based on t h e i r own conception of the good and can act upon them. Dwor-k i n b e l i e v e s t h a t a fundamental r i g h t to equal concern and r e s -p ect, r e s p e c t i v e l y r e c o g n i z e s these fundamental c h a r a c t e r i s -t i c s of human p e r s o n a l i t y . Dworkin wants p a r t i c u l a r r i g h t s ( o r l i b e r t i e s ) t o be granted to i n d i v i d u a l s when necessary to r e i n f o r c e t h e i r r i g h t to e q u a l i t y . T h i s would be necessary when i t seemed, anteced e n t l y , l i k e l y t h a t s o c i a l p r e f e r e n c e s determined by u t i l i t a r i a n c a l c u l a t i o n s would l i k e l y be contam-i n a t e d by b i a s or p r e j u d i c e as r e v e a l e d by experience w i t h an 124 open and democratic s o c i e t y . The r i g h t to e q u a l i t y (b-goal) i s l i k e l y to be s e t t l e d n a t u r a l l y long b e f o r e any formal i n -s t i t u t i o n a r i s e s to give i t e f f e c t ; thus, i t would be both f a i r and s e n s i b l e to say th a t a l l p a r t i c i p a n t s i n the p r a c t i c e are appe a l i n g to some common concept of e q u a l i t y , even though they h o l d d i f f e r e n t c o nceptions of i t . ( T h i s c o n c l u s i o n i s c r u c i a l to Dworkin's argument). I t i s worth n o t i n g i n p a s s i n g , t h a t Dworkin does not seem to be f u l l y aware of the i n f o r m a l mech-anisms (a-goals) which a l s o a r i s e n a t u r a l l y t o gi v e i n f o r m a l e f f e c t to such n a t u r a l aims and p r o p e n s i t i e s ( b - g o a l s ) . The key d i s c r i m i n a t i n g concept f o r Dworkin's theory of a d j u d i c a -t i o n i s not " r a t i o n a l i t y " , but " f a i r n e s s " . And the c e n t e r p i e c e of t h i s concept i s the r i g h t to e q u a l i t y . He, however, defends both the reasonableness and the f a i r n e s s , the sense and the j u s t i c e , of h i s theory a g a i n s t the p o s i t i v i s t s . T h i s emphasis i s important, f o r Dworkin seeks to c r i t i c i z e p o s i t i v i s m i n i t s own terms. T h i s r e s t r i c t i o n produces a t e r m i n o l o g i c a l (per-haps, a l s o a conceptual) cramp when he t r i e s to e l a b o r a t e h i s a l t e r n a t e t h e s i s that there i s always one r i g h t answer t o ev-ery q u e s t i o n of l e g a l r i g h t s . Dworkin i n s i s t s t h a t a d j u d i c a t i o n , "even i n hard cases, can s e n s i b l y be s a i d to be aimed at d i s c o v e r y , r a t h e r than i n -125 v e n t i n g , the r i g h t s of the p a r t i e s concerned." The p o s i t -86 ivist,most c e r t a i n l y , would want to ask: How are such rig h t s "there", i n the sense that they could be "discoverable" — a f t -er a l l , they do not c l e a r l y arise from the p o s i t i v e law, which in some p l a i n sense i s c l e a r l y "there"? Is a right "there", i n the sense that a certain gustatory experience i s "there" i n a mass of raw ingredients (perhaps only awaiting the chef's art to bring i t forth)? "Discovery" or "invention" may simply be an inadequate dichotomy fo r dealing with the issues being raised in t h i s debate. Dworkin gives the impression that the schema of p r i n c i p l e s to be "discovered" i s i n some sense f u l l y worked out previous to a (series of) j u d i c i a l decision(s). How else i s one to understand Dworkin's claim that, i f someone i s e n t i t l e d to something, then a judge deciding the case must presuppose "that there i s a single right answer to the question 126 he must decide"? Dworkin seems to i n s i s t on discussing these issues i n the overly s i m p l i f i e d terms set out by p o s i t i v i s t s , of " d i s -covery" or "invention". Dworkin, though, has always been more subtle in his views than i s allowed by t h i s simple dichotomy. 127 He has argued that even " i f " he i s only allowed the vocab-ulary of positivism (discovery or invention), even "then" he finds what judges do and should do, more reasonably and j u s t l y described as discovery rather than as invention, as applying law rather than creating law, and as finding decisions "there" in the law rather than as finding decisions l e f t to j u d i c i a l d i s c r e t i o n . Dworkin i s trying to elaborate something which can be displayed in a much better way i n the language of the Causal Theory: The application of any regulation must be med-iated i n p a r t i c u l a r by a s p e c i f i c (b)-goal and in general by the system i n the form of hypotheses regarding the order and the content of the Matrix. The exact content of any r u l i n g , however, w i l l be contingent upon causal r e l a t i o n empirically established. The exact transactions are displayed i n the log-i c a l and causal relations elaborated by the b i c o n d i t i o n a l po-l i c y : "a.< 1J, c e t e r i s paribus". The meaning of any rule i s l o g i c a l l y closed by t h i s policy, while i t s reference i s empir-i c a l l y open. Both the need f o r s t a b i l i t y and the need f o r f l e x i b i l i t y are systematically accommodated. It i s Dworkin's self-imposed constraint of using p o s i t i v i s t terminology that obscures the issues at stake. He t r i e s to refute positivism in i t s own terms. When he t r i e s to provide a better theory of adjudication and law, he barely escapes from the inadequacies of the p o s i t i v i s t vocabulary. This "leads Dworkin to such con-clusions as: "But of course the two (judges) who debate cannot look upon t h e i r argument (as implying that there i s no "ri g h t " ans-wer i n hard cases), because that analysis leaves each with a theory about nothing. ... But each nevertheless thinks his answer i s a superior answer to the question that divides them: i f he does not think t h i s , then what does he think?" Such conclusions i l l u s t r a t e how Dworkin's terminology impoverishes his argument. One can not claim (unless, as a p o s i t i v i s t , one holds that "positive law" i s to be equated with "law") that since a judge's theory i n a hard case i s not a claim about "positive law", then i t must be a claim about "nothing" i n law. I t i s the standard of sense i n law that i s at stake. I f natural law theory can be faulted f o r the equa-tion of law and good law, then p o s i t i v i s t s can be faulted f o r the equation of law and clear law. This emerges i n t h e i r "tests" f o r law: P o s i t i v i s t s argue f o r a c l e a r rule of recog-n i t i o n . Dworkin rests his case upon what the "reasonable and competent" lawyer (person learned i n the law) would agree to 129 accept as law. There are several possible confusions im-p l i c i t i n these two approaches. Since the inauguration of law(s) i s a form of standardization, two major problems a r i s e . F i r s t , how i s the standard to be adjusted in controversial ca-ses so as to preserve i t s usefulness as a standard? Second, what i s to count as the standard, a f t e r i t i s agreed that some standard i s needed (or i s in force)? A f t e r a l l , there i s a fundamental or natural agreement as to the need f o r law (for 88 some form of standardization or s t a b i l i t y ) , and also agreement as to the need f o r accommodation :(for some form of adjustment or f l e x i b i l i t y ) . In order to provide f o r f l e x i b i l i t y i n lav/, p o s i t i v i s t s introduce"discretion". This, of course, jeopardi-zes the law's s t a b i l i t y . Dworkin 1s introduction of "contested concepts" into law responds i n a manner superior to the p o s i t -i v i s t mechanism of rule of recognition-plus-discretion; i t responds to the demand f o r a standard and the need f o r i t s eventual adjustment. Dworkin's concept-conception mechanism i s superior, because i t recognizes that the transactions be-tween what i s i n fact the standard and the adjustments that are in fact made, w i l l be determinate i n a sense not captured by adjustments made through a discretionary device. However, there i s a di f f e r e n t claim that p o s i t i v i s t s may be making: They may be saying, that i n making adjustments, the c l a r i t y of the standard must be protected i f i t i s to re-main useful as a standard. This assertion may simply follow as a truism from a formal understanding of a need f o r some such "standard/adjuster" mechanism. But substantively, a pra-c t i c e would not inaugurate a standard unless there were alread-y wide agreement (empirically established) as to what were to count as clear central cases of the standard. (Sense must be controlled by reference.) This sort of thinking leads Dworkin to argue that in some s i g n i f i c a n t sense, certain standards are natural, or p r e - i n s t i t u t i o n a l . The dispute between p o s i t i v -i s t s and Dworkin has not mainly been concerned with the need for standards (laws)nor with the need f o r t h e i r adjustment i n use, but rather with how they are to be adjusted. Dworkin has consistently i n s i s t e d that such questions are substantive and not formal, and that they are best provided f o r not by a gen-er a l grant of dis c r e t i o n to judges, but by charging them with the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to consistently elaborate the po s i t i v e law in accordance with the community's general p r i n c i p l e s of right and sense. Dworkin also r e a l i z e s that even these broad p r i n -c i p l e s are standards, and as such w i l l require adjustment. The 89 demands that standards bereasonable and moral can thus be seen as systematic ways of r a i s i n g questions of sense and r i g h t , to which the law must always remain "open". In law, as i n other practices, standards can be assessed ultimately only in regard to the general ends to which t h e i r users put them. The Causal Theory i d e n t i f i e s a set of bic o n d i t i o n a l transactions between p a r t i c u l a r and general ends: p a r t i c u l a r ends to which i n d i v i d -ual users put standards to use; and general ends to which com-munity i n s t i t u t i o n s develop general standards. P o s i t i v i s t s i g -nore such complexities. The p o s i t i v i s t claims, regarding the " c l a r i t y " of stan-dards, must be erroneous, because they disregard the rationale f o r establishing standards. I f i t were to be accepted that a standard would be mechanically applied (and in the event that t h i s were not possible, discretion invoked), then users would be less i n c l i n e d to e s t a b l i s h such a standard. " C l a r i t y " counts, but not i n the way that p o s i t i v i s t s have argued. "Cla-r i t y " counts as part of a biconditional complex (judging i n ac-cordance with law). This must be kept i n mind when assessing p o s i t i v i s t claims. There i s a d i s t i n c t i o n made between a pra-c t i c e (language., morality, law) and i t s use; and unless the transactions between the two are c l e a r l y spelled out, stand-ards are i n danger of becoming tyrannical, while usage i s i n danger of becoming anarchical. Standards should be i n s t r u c t i v e repositories of c o l l e c t i v e experience w i l l i n g l y employed by t h e i r users. Dworkin's question i s always: Is i t f a i r and sensible to i n s i s t that the judge proceed as i f there i s always 'one right answer', or as i f there i s always, 'no right answer' to hard cases i n law? I t i s t h e o r e t i c a l l y possible, Dworkin con-cedes, that "the right answer" may be to leave the judge an 130 option or choice i n " t i e cases". However, i n a mature l e -gal system, Dworkin believes t h i s would p r a c t i c a l l y never hap-pen, making i t reasonable ( t h e o r e t i c a l l y sensible) to deny that i t never happens, thus making the rights thesis always 90 the correct way f o r judges to proceed. The p o s i t i v i s t attack on the rights thesis can therefore be seen as an atta'ck on the resonableness of the Rule of Law (or judging only in accordance with law) . Dworkin assumes that the conception of lav/ must be changed ( p o s i t i v i s t s interpret t h i s as a move towards a natural law theory). What i s i n fact required, i s a revised conception of what "judging according to law" actually e n t a i l s , and espec-i a l l y what i t s reasonable l i m i t s are. Can judges be permitted to 'develop' the standards of sense and right that they are 'bound' to apply? A simple yes or no, does not come to grips with the issue latent i n thi s question. The bico n d i t i o n a l p o l -icy of the Causal Theory contends with the complications which arise in t h i s context. This would seem to be the only way to escape, f i r s t , the p o s i t i v i s t conclusion that the rule of law (minus discretion) i s i r r a t i o n a l : second, the natural law con-clusion that an ideal body of law does e x i s t . Dworkin r e a l i z e s that one might understand the p o s i t i v -i s t position as a "profound attack on the very r a t i o n a l i t y of 131 a enterprise" that does not allow judges d i s c r e t i o n . The . positivist's introduction of discretion can be seen as a measure (i) to protect the standard, and ( i i ) to provide adjustment (not necessarily of the standard, but of the practice in gener-a l ) . These two sides of the p o s i t i v i s t coin are accountable 132 for "the astonishing volte face among the c r i t i c s . " Hart believes that "the new c r i t i q u e of positivism...reverses the accusations... and holds p o s i t i v i s t s " cardinal sin no longer to be 'formalism' or b e l i e f in a 'mechanical' theory of j u d i c i a l decision, but to consist i n a mistaken assimilation of the judge's task i n deciding hard cases to a l e g i s l a t i v e or law-133 making /discretionary/ choice." Dworkin's c r i t i q u e i s less of a "reverse" than Hart r e a l i z e s . Hart's reaction suggests he does not r e a l i z e the complexity of the p o s i t i v i s t p o s i t i o n — i . e . , i t s i m p l i c i t claim about an i n s t i t u t i o n which i s es-s e n t i a l l y a practice f o r standardizing conduct. This oversim-p l i f i c a t i o n i s also to be found expressed i n Dworkin's question 91 "Is there any way to take the / p o s i t i v i s t 7 philosopher's claim other than as a claim within the judge's enterprise?" 'Within' or 'without', in what sense can the law be 'open' or 'closed' to modification? Are p o s i t i v i s t arguments, asks Dwo-rkin, to be understood as claims about the 'real world'? Or are they reports about, "not another enterprise, but objective f a c t 135 that any enterprise must face i f i t i s to be r e a l i s t i c " ? Dworkin's response betrays the terminological and conceptual poverty of his analysis: This objective r e a l i t y , he argues, "must contain rights and duties, as objective facts independ-136 ent of the structure and content of conventional systems." The most illuminating c r i t i c i s m of positivism i s to regard i t as an inadequate response to the central i n s t i t u t i o n a l problems of ( i ) whether there i s a need f o r a standard, ( i i ) what i s to count as the standard, ( i i i ) how the formal properties of any standard/adjuster mechanism figure i n such substantive consid-erations. The introduction to save the rule model of law (dom-inated by a rule of recognition) i s inadequate on each point. Dworkin's response betrays an underestimation of the complexity of the mechanism i m p l i c i t i n any standardization. The law w i l l have devices i n t e r n a l to i t , allowing f o r and c o n t r o l l i n g the elaboration and development of law. To say that there i s always one right answer in law can not sim-ply mean, as p o s i t i v i s t s assert, that antecedent data existed in.a clear and precise way that would s a t i s f y any claimant. The system must be worked out over time. Adjudication, the determination of r i g h t , or the provision f o r a l e g a l resolu-t i o n of a dispute, i s distorted and overly s i m p l i f i e d by pos-i t i v i s t claims regarding "sense" and " r i g h t " . I f they use, as t h e i r sole c r i t e r i a , decisions s t r i c t l y derived from c l e a r l y pre-existing statute, precedent, or custom, then adjudication becomes woefully d e b i l i t a t i n g as a t o o l of s o c i a l management. The positivist'move" of distinguishing "ought" from " i s " , was made in order to expose covert judgements of value expressed in descriptive terms. The descriptive and normative uses of a term, i n certain contexts, can be confused. P o s i t i v i s t s 92 found i t offensive to have judges making any value judgements, covert or overt. For Dworkin, judging necessarily involves judgements of values, but i t i s the order of judgement which i s r e a l l y at stake i n adjudication: Value judgement i s neces-s a r i l y involved in determining what judges must and what jud-ges must not take into account i n making decisions. The i n -s t i t u t i o n of adjudication presupposes a theory of p o l i t i c a l morality. "Controversial propositions of law either assert or de-ny the existence of a legal right or some other legal r e l a t i o n . " 137 Either they are invented or discovered. The "existence" of law, i n Dworkin's philosophy, remains inadequately analysed. In law, as i n other practices, there are experts as well as laymen. On occassion, the onus must be on the layman to seek expert guidance. Law i s a cooperative venture. Even though he may have the f i r s t word, the man on the Clapham omnibus does not necessarily have the l a s t word. 93 Footnotes: A Lord Shaw, L e g i s l a t u r e and J u d i c i a r y , .(1914.)..- Quoted i n L o u i s L. J a f f e , E n g l i s h and American Judges as Lawmakers ( Oxford: Clarendon P r e s s , 1969), p. 21. H e r e i n a f t e r , c i t e d as J a f f e . 2 J a f f e , p. 92. 3 - - -Ronald Dworkin, " J u d i c i a l D i s c r e t i o n " , The J o u r n a l of Philosophy, 60 (1963), 624-38. Ronald Dworkin, Taking R i g h t s  S e r i o u s l y ( Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1977). H e r e i n a f t e r , c i t e d , r e s p e c t i v e l y , as D i s c r e t i o n and R i g h t s . 4 "In t h i s t h e s i s "The Causal Theory" r e f e r s t o the the-ory o f law developed i n the f o l l o w i n g papers: S.C. Coval and J.C. Smith, "Some S t r u c t u r a l P r o p e r t i e s o f L e g a l D e c i s i o n s " , The Cambridge Law J o u r n a l , 32 (1973), 81-103. Coval and Smith, "The Causal Theory o f Law", C.L.J., 36 (1977), 110-51. Coval and Smith, "The Completeness o f Rules", C,L.J., 36 (1977), 364-8. H e r e i n a f t e r , c i t e d c e s p e c t i v e l y as S t r u c t u r a l , C a u s a l , and Rules. 5 S t r u c t u r a l , p. 102. 6 C a u s a l , p. 124. 7 Cau s a l , p. 113. Q C a r l o s E. A l c h o u r r o n and Eugenio B u l y g i n , Normative  Systems ( New/York: Springen-Verlag, 1971 ), p. 176. H e r e i n -a f t e r , c i t e d as Normative. Normative, p. 176. 10 Normative, P. 176. 11 Normative, P. 177. 12 Normative. P. 177. 13 Normative, P. 177. 14 Normative, P. 177. 94 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 Normative, pp. 177-8. Normative, p. 179. Normative, p. 180. R i g h t s , p. v i i . D i s c r e t i o n , p. 624. D i s c r e t i o n , p. 624. G.C. MacCallum, "Dworkin on J u d i c i a l D i s c r e t i o n " , The J o u r n a l o f Ph i l o s o p h y , 60 (1963), 638-41; p. 641.. H e r e i n -a f t e r , c i t e d as J u d i c i a l . 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 Ri g h t s R i g h t s R i g h t s R i g h t s R i g h t s R i g h t s R i g h t s R i g h t s R i g h t s R i g h t s R i g h t s R i g h t s R i g h t s R i g h t s p. 40. p. 290. pp. 14-45. pp. 31-2, and p. 69. p. 70. p. 31. p. 32. p. 22, and pp. 38-9; D i s c r e t i o n , p. 634. p. 24. p. 58. pp. 44-5. pp. 81-130. p. 84. p. 87. 3 6 s t r u c t u r a l , p. 3 7 Rights, p. 8 8 • 3 8 Rights, pp. 90-1. 3 9 Rights, p. 4 0 Rights, p. 4 1 Rights, p. 4 2 Rights, p. 4 3 Rights, p. 4 4 Rights 4 5 Rights 4 6 Rights 4 7 Right; 102. 4 8 R i g h t s , p, 110 4 9 R i g h t s , p. 113 Rxghts, p. 51 ° Right! 52 R i g h t s , p. 5 3 R i g h t s , p. 123 5 4 R i g h t s , p. 121 R i g h t s , p. R i g h t s , p. 55 56 91. 83. 205. 200. 200. 91. 92. p. 92. p.. 113. s, pp 82. . 86-7, 123. 67. 68. 96 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 Rights Rights Rights Rights Rights Rights Rights Rights Rights Rights p. 63. p. 126. p. 185. p. 124. p. 126. pi 255. p. 162. pp. 176-7. p. 101. p. 93. Noel B. Reynolds, "The Concept of Objectivity i n J u d i c i a l Reasoning", Western Ontario Law Review, 14 (1975), 1-30; p. 4. 6 8 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law ( Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961 ), p. 127. Hereinafter, c i t e d as Concept. 69 70 71 Concept, p. 125. Concept, p. 125. H.L.A. Hart, "Philosophy of Law, Problems of", i n The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed., Paul Edwards ( New York: C o l l i e r Macmillan Pub., 1967 ). VI, 264-76, p. 271. 72 73 74 Rights, p. 89, and pp. 93-4. Rights, p. 87. W.B. G a l l i e , " E s s e n t i a l l y Contested Concepts", Pro-ceedings of the A r i s t o t e l i a n Society, New Series, LVI (1955-6), 167-98; p. 169. Hereinafter, c i t e d as Contested. 75 Rights, pp. 104-5. 97 Contested, p. 195. 7 7 Contested, pp. 196-8. 78 R i g h t s , p. 82. 7 9 R o l f E. S a r t o r i u s , I n d i v i d u a l Conduct and S o c i a l Norms ( E n c i o , C a l i f o r n i a : Dickenson P u b l i s h i n g Company, 1975), pp. 203-4. H e r e i n a f t e r , c i t e d as I n d i v i d u a l . 8 0 R i g h t s , p. 124. 8 1 R i g h t s , p. 109. 8 2 H.L.A. Hart, "Law i n the P e r s p e c t i v e o f Ph i l o s o p h y : 1776-1976", New York U n i v e r s i t y Law Review, 51 (1976), 538-51; pp. 549-50. H e r e i n a f t e r , c i t e d as Law. 8 3 R i g h t s , p. 121. R4 I n d i v i d u a l , pp. 196-7. 8 5 I n d i v i d u a l , p. 192. 8 6 R i g h t s , p. 107. 8 7 R i g h t s , p. 103. 8 8 I n d i v i d u a l , p. 202. 8 9 I n d i v i d u a l , p. 203. 90 R i g h t s , pp. 86-7. 91 Law, p. 551. Q? Law, p. 550. 93 R i g h t s , p. 116. 94 I n d i v i d u a l , p. 115. 3 0 I n d i v i d u a l , p. 57. 98 96 97 98 99 I n d i v i d u a l , p. 203. Cf . S t r u c t u r a l , p. 103. S t r u c t u r a l , p. 103. Rules, p. 368. 100,, 101 102 103 "Rights, pp. x i v - x v . R i g h t s , p. xv. R i g h t s , pp. 286-7. M a r t i n P. G o l d i n g , P h i l o s o p h y of Law ( Englewood C l i f f s : P r e n t i c e - H a l l , Inc., 1975 ), p. 108. 104 105 R i g h t s , p. 14. H.L.A. Hart, D e f i n i t i o n and Theory i n J u r i s p r u d e n c e ( Oxford: The Clarendon P r e s s , 1953 ), p. 10. 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 R i g h t s , p. 43. S t r u c t u r a l , p. 100. R i g h t s R i g h t s R i g h t s Rights R i g h t s 113 R i g h t s 114 115 116 Ri g h t s R i g h t s R i g h t s p. 104. p. 49. pp.. 50-1. - p. 90. p. 57. p. 80. p. 68. p. 68. p. 105. 1 1 7 R i g h t s , p. 279ff. 1 1 8 J u d i c i a l , p. 640. 119 J u d i c i a l , p. 641. 120 R i g h t s , p. 287. 1 2 1 R i g h t s , pp. 134-5. 1 2 2 R i g h t s , pp. 128-9. 1 ? ^ R i g h t s , pp. 216-7. 1 2 4 R i g h t s , p. 277. 1 2 5 R i g h t s , p. 278. 1 2 6 R i g h t s , p. 278. 127 See p a r t i c u l a r l y , R i g h t s 1 2 8 R i g h t s , p. 282. 1 2 9 R i g h t s , p. 280. 1 "30 R i g h t s , p. 285. R i g h t s , p. 287. 132 T C / 1 C Law, p. 545. ^ 3 3 Law, p. 546. 1 3 4 R i g h t s , p. 287. R i g h t s , p. 288. 1 3 6 R i g h t s , pp. 288-9. R i g h t s , p. 290. 100 B i b l i o g r a p h y : A l c h o u r r o n , C a r l o s , and B u l y g i n , Eugenio. Normative Systems. New York: S r i n g e n - V e r l a g , 1971. C o v a l , S.C., and Smith, J.C. "Some S t r u c t u r a l P r o p e r t i e s of Legal D e c i s i o n s " , The Cambridge Law J o u r n a l , 32 (1973), 81-103. . "The Ca u s a l Theory of Law", The Cambridge Law J o u r n a l , 36 <a977<);, 110-51. : . "The Completeness of Rules", The Cambridge Law J o u r -n a l , 36 (1977), 364-8. Dworkin, Ronald. " E q u a l i t y before the Law", i n Whatever hap-pened t o e q u a l i t y ? Ed. John V a i z e y . Wiham, Essex: E.T. Heron and Co., 1975. Pp. 84-8. — . " J u d i c i a l D i s c r e t i o n " , The J o u r n a l 5f Philosophy, 60 (1963) , 624-3 8. . "Philosophy and the C r i t i q u e of Law", i n The Rule o f Law. Ed. R. Wolf. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1971. — — — . "Seven C r i t i c s " , G e o r g i a Law Review, 11 (1977), 1201-67. . Taking R i g h t s S e r i o u s l y . Cambridge: Harvard U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1977. :. 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