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Farmers’ political belief systems Skogstad, Grace Darlene 1976

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FARMERS' POLITICAL BELIEF SYSTEMS by GRACE DARLENE SKOGSTAD M.A., University of Alberta, 1971 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY i n THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (Department of P o l i t i c a l Science) We accept t h i s thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA F a l l , 1976 Grace Darlene Skogstad, 1976 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of Brit ish Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by his representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Department of The University of Brit ish Columbia 2075 Wesbrook Place Vancouver, Canada V6T 1W5 Date /Idlj-t^J^y ^ / l i t ? TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER PAGE 1 INTRODUCTION 1 Theoretical Underpinnings 3 The Specific Study of Farmers' P o l i t i c a l Belief Systems 12 Chapter Contents 19 Notes to Chapter 1 23 2 AGRICULTURAL POLICY AS AN OBJECT OF FARMERS' POLITICAL BELIEF SYSTEMS 25 The Federal Government and Agricultural Policy 26 Provincial Agricultural Policy 37 A Framework for Mapping Farmers' P o l i t i c a l Attitudes 39 Notes to Chapter 2 51 3 THE STUDY GROUPS 55 Selection of the Study Groups 56 Comparability of Study Groups 65 Notes to Chapter 3 70 4 COGNITIVE BELIEFS: HOW THE SYSTEM WORKS 71 The Perceived Locus of Control 72 Distribution of Influence in the P o l i t i c a l System 91 Class Structure of Society 101 The Structure of Cognitive Beliefs 104 Notes to Chapter 4 115 5 EVALUATIVE BELIEFS: HOW THE SYSTEM OUGHT TO WORK 120 Evaluative Beliefs Regarding Regulation of Agricultural 120 Production, Pricing, and Marketing Values and Goals 145 Notes to Chapter 5 165 iv CHAPTER PAGE 6 THE STRUCTURE OF FARMERS' BELIEF SYSTEMS AND A TYPOLOGY OF ACTIVITY AND BELIEF 169 Structure of Belief Systems 170 Consensual and Pa r t i c u l a r i s t i c Belief Sets in the Two Study Groups 183 A Typology of the Congruence of Belief and Activity 192 Notes to Chapter 6 199 7 CORRELATES OF BELIEF AND ACTIVITY 200 Antecedent Attributes 201 P o l i t i c a l Alienation and the Four Farmer Types 224 Behavioral Implications 246 Notes to Chapter 7 256 8 THE PATHS TO IDEOLOGY AND ACTION 260 The Links with Belief Adherence 261 The Links to NFU Membership 278 Notes to Chapter 8 291 9 CONCLUSION 293 Farmers' P o l i t i c a l Belief Systems 293 Farmers' P o l i t i c a l Activity 300 Research Implications 304 Notes to Chapter 9 307 APPENDIX A INTER-ITEM ASSOCIATION OF LOCUS OF CONTROL MEASURES B PROGRAMS OF BENEFIT, HARMFUL PROGRAMS, MEDIAN AND IMPORTANCE RANKINGS OF EDMONTON SAMPLE C CONSTRUCTION OF MEASURES D ROKEACH VALUE PROFILES OF FOUR FARMER TYPES E CANONICAL CORRELATION ANALYSES F CORRELATION MATRICES OF PREDICTOR VARIABLES SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 308 315 318 324 325 332 341 v LIST OF TABLES TABLE PAGE 2.1 Government Assistance Programs 29 3.1 A Comparison of Census Division 13 and the Province as a Whole 60-61 3.2 A Comparison of the Interview and Mail Groups 66 3.3 Mean Market Value, Income, Farm Size, Years of School and Age of NFU, Non-NFU, Interview and Mail Question-naire Groups 66 3.4 Comparison of NFU and Non-NFU Study Groups 68 4.1 Individual versus Systemic Blame Regarding the Cost-Price Squeeze: NFU and Non-NFU Groups 76 4.2 Attribution of Blame for the Disappearance of the Family Farm: NFU and Non-NFU Groups 77 4.3 Attribution of Blame for Farmers' Relative Lack of Success with Governments: NFU and Non-NFU Groups 78 4.4 Individualist versus C o l l e c t i v i s t Action on the Cost-Price Squeeze: NFU and Non-NFU Groups 80 4.5 A b i l i t y of Farmers to Organize as a P o l i t i c a l Group: NFU and Non-NFU Groups 81 4.6 Perceived Locus of Control over Farm Prices: NFU and Non-NFU Groups 86 4.7 Locus of Control over Input Supplies Costs 87 4.8 Perceived Beneficiary of the Open Marketing System: NFU and Non-NFU Groups 90 4.9 Mean Influence Ratings of Selected P o l i t i c a l Actors: NFU and Non-NFU Groups 93-94 4.10 Assessments of Appropriateness of Distribution of P o l i t i c a l Influence: NFU and Non-NFU Groups (%'s) 97 4.11 The F i r s t Factor of the Unrotated Matrix of Potential P o l i t i c a l Actors: NFU and Non-NFU Groups (Factor Loadings) 99 v i TABLE PAGE 4.13 Summary Indices of Appropriateness of P o l i t i c a l Influence Distribution: NFU and Non-NFU Groups 101 4.14 Perception and Appropriateness of Class Nature of Canadian Society: NFU and Non-NFU Groups 103 4.15 Ideological Perspective on Class Nature of Canadian Society: NFU and Non-NFU Groups 103 4.16 Inter-Item Association (Pearson r) of Locus of Control Measures: NFU Group 107 4.17 Inter-Item Association ( Pearson r) of Locus of Control Measures: Non-NFU Group 108 5.1 Recommendations Regarding Governmental Production Roles: NFU and Non-NFU Groups 123 5.2 Types of Beneficial Programs Mentioned: NFU and Non-NFU Groups 130 5.3 Types of Harmful Programs Mentioned: NFU and Non-NFU Groups 131 5.4 Regulation of Farm Size and Ownership: NFU and Non-NFU Groups 135 5.5 Pricing Controls on Farm Produce and Input Supplies: NFU and Non-NFU Groups 136 5.6 Body Recommended to Set Price Controls: NFU and Non-NFU Groups 137 5.7 Preferred Type of Marketing: NFU and Non-NFU Groups 138 5.8 Inter-Item Association of Evaluative Beliefs: NFU Group (N=37) 141 5.9 Inter-Item Association of Evaluative Beliefs: Non-NFU Group (N=96) 143 5.10 Median Value, Importance and Consensus Rankings of the 18 Terminal Values: NFU and Non-NFU Differences 151 5.11 Desirable Aspects of Farming: NFU and Non-NFU Groups 154 5.12 Reasons for Disliking the Disappearance of the Family Farm: NFU and Non-NFU Groups 161 6.1 Gamma Measure of Association Between Cognitive Beliefs Regarding the Pricing and Marketing Sectors and Evalu-ations Regarding the Pricing, Marketing, and Production Sectors: NFU 173 v i i TABLE PAGE 6.2 Class Structure View and Evaluations Regarding the Pricing, Marketing, and Production Sectors: NFU %'s 174 6.3 Pearson Correlations of Distribution of Decision-Making Influence and Radical Class View with Evaluations Regarding Pricing, Marketing, and Production Sectors: NFU 174 6.4 Gamma Measure of Association Between Cognitive Beliefs Regarding the Pricing and Marketing Sectors and Evaluations Regarding the Pricing, Marketing, and Production Sectors: Non-NFU 179 6.5 Class Structure View and Evaluations Regarding the Pricing, Marketing, and Production Sectors: Non-NFU %'s 180 6.6 Pearson Correlations of Distribution of Decision-Making Influence and Radical Class View with Evaluations Regarding Pricing, Marketing, and Production Sectors: Non-NFU 180 6.7 Incidence of Joint Occurrence of Cognitive and Evaluative Belief Elements Regarding the Pricing, Marketing and Production Sectors: %'s 184 6.8 Consensual Beliefs of NFU and Non-NFU Farmers 187 6.9 Item-Test Correlations of NFU Belief Index Components 194 6.10 NFU Belief Index and Probability of NFU Membership 195 6.11 Farmer Types and Subjective Measures of Ideological Perspective: %'s 198 7.1 Situational Characteristics of the Four Farmer Types: %'s 217 7.2 Standard Scores'of Four Farmer Types on Situational Characteristics 218-219 7.3 Personality and Background Characteristics of the Four Farmer Types: %'s 223 7.4 Standard Scores of Four Farmer Types on Personality and Background Characteristics 223 7.5 P o l i t i c a l Alienation and the Four Farmer Types: %'s 234-235 7.6 P o l i t i c a l Alienation and Farmer Types: Standard Scores 236 v i i i TABLE PAGE 7.7 Reality-Testing and P o l i t i c a l Alienation Among the Four Farmer Types: %'s 239 7.8 Behavioral Attributes of the Four Farmer Types:%'s 247 7.9 Behavioral Attributes of the Four Farmer Types: Standard Scores 248 8.1 Regression of NFU Belief Index on Independent Variables 264 8.2 Regression of Powerlessness on Predictor Variables Including Other Alienation Measures 269 8.3 Regression of Powerlessness on Predictor Variables Minus Alienation Measures 270 8.4 Pearson r's of Predictor Variables with Powerlessness and the NFU Belief Index 275 8.5 Regression of Present Unfair Return on Predictor Variables with Economic Discontent Variables 277 8.6 Regression of Present Unfair Return on Predictor Variables Minus Economic Discontent Variables 277 8.7 Regression of NFU Membership Among Believers on Predictor Variables 282 8.8 Regression of NFU Membership Among Non-Believers on Predictor Variables 285 8.9 Pearson Correlations of Selected Rokeach Values and P o l i t i c a l Alienation and Economic Discontent 288 ix LIST OF CHARTS AND DIAGRAMS Chart 2.1 L e f t , Right and Centre P o s i t i o n s on Scale and Extent of Government Planning and Control Diagram 3.1 The Geographical Location of Census D i v i s i o n 13 and NFU D i s t r i c t 3 Diagram 8.1 The Hypothesized Links Between Independent and Dependent Variables ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The assistance of a number of people i n the preparation of t h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n i s g r a t e f u l l y acknowledged. F i r s t l y , the constructive and i n c i s i v e comments of Donald E. Blake, David J . E l k i n s , and Alan C. Cairns on e a r l y d r a f t s of the th e s i s were invaluable. Secondly, the Canada Council and Izaak Walton K i l l a m Foundation provided f i n a n c i a l assistance during the doctoral study period. The Canada Council Foundation also supported the t r a v e l expenses incurred i n the interviews with the study groups. T h i r d l y , I should l i k e to thank the A l b e r t a farmers who comprise the study groups i n the d i s s e r t a t i o n . Their cooperation enabled the study to proceed; t h e i r generous h o s p i t a l i t y made the process of gathering the data upon which the d i s s e r t a t i o n i s based an enjoyable one. Fourthly, I owe an important debt to members of my family. Their voluntary labour, advice, and encouragement throughout have hastened the t h e s i s ' conclusion. Above a l l , two i n d i v i d u a l s made v i t a l contributions to the preparation of the f i n a l manuscript. Sharon Sutherland's enthusiasm and cooperation was c r i t i c a l i n the analyses of the data. Her e x c e l l e n t advice steered the researcher c l e a r of innumerable p i t f a l l s . One other person made a s i n g u l a r l y important contribution. My husband, Richard, unflagging i n hi s f a i t h and constructive i n h i s c r i t i c i s m , improved s i g n i f i c a n t l y the q u a l i t y of the d i s s e r t a t i o n . x i Chapter 1 Introduction The p o l i t i c a l m o b i l i z a t i o n of p r a i r i e farmers i n the f i r s t h a l f of t h i s century i s i n stark contrast to t h e i r r e l a t i v e p o l i t i c a l i n a c t i v i t y since. In A l b e r t a , Saskatchewan, and Manitoba, farmers united together over the period 1900 - 1950 to obtain a more equitable marketing system and generally a greater say i n the important decisions a f f e c t i n g them. Their c o l l e c t i v e strength enabled them to e l e c t and defeat govern-ments: the United Farmers of A l b e r t a and S o c i a l Credit administrations i n A l b e r t a and the CCF government i n Saskatchewan were a l l farmer-based. This period was thus one when farmer p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y enabled, farmers to obtain s p e c i f i c p o l i c y successes. In contrast, although the s t r u c t u r e of the a g r i c u l t u r a l economy has undergone massive changes i n the second h a l f of t h i s century, the post-1950 period has been one of r e l a t i v e p o l i t i c a l quiescence on the part of p r a i r i e farmers. Intensive c a p i t a l i z a t i o n of a g r i c u l t u r e has meant l a r g e r farms, fewer farmers, and l e s s i n t e r a c t i o n among them. Growing economic d i s p a r i t i e s separate farmers who have not engaged i n c a p i t a l i n t e n s i v e a g r i c u l t u r e from those who have. At the same time, the penetration of agribusiness i n t o the a g r i c u l t u r a l sector has severely l i m i t e d the economic c o n t r o l of the farmer over the p r i c e s of both a g r i c u l t u r a l supplies and commodities. The continuing s h i f t of the population from r u r a l to urban centers, already underway by 1950, has meant a concomitant decline of farmers as a proportion of the population. These far-reaching changes i n a g r i c u l t u r e have been unaccompanied by any 2. major p o l i t i c a l mobilization of farmers. Collective farmer demonstrations and protestations have been the exception rather than the rule. Since 1969, however, when a national farmers union committed to procuring a larger voice for farmers in the p o l i t i c a l and economic decisions affecting them was formed, the possibility has existed that this period of inactivity might be ending. The National Farmers Union has engaged in a number of a c t i v i t i e s reminiscent of the populism of farmers in the early years of this century. However, membership in the National Farmers Union remains today limited to a small minority of farmers. Hence, while the presence.of the NFU ensures the a v a i l a b i l i t y of a vehicle for collective p o l i t i c a l action by farmers, i t s limited membership base suggests the reluctance of most farmers to u t i l i z e this channel. The dual phenomena of the existence of the organiza-tion and i t s restricted membership base provide the specific impetus for the research reported in this thesis. Both inevitably stimulate curiosity as to why some farmers should, in the h i s t o r i c a l tradition of Canadian agrarian p o l i t i c s , be collectively engaging in p o l i t i c a l action while others are not. In seeking to satisfy that curiosity, the research here focuses upon farmers' p o l i t i c a l belief systems. More precisely, the thesis i s an empirical study of the p o l i t i c a l belief systems of two groups of Alberta farmers: the one, members of the National Farmers Union; the other, non-members of that organization. Two objectives guide the research. The f i r s t goal i s an essentially descriptive one. It is to inquire into the content, structure, and context of Alberta farmers' p o l i t i c a l belief systems. At this stage, the research seeks answers to questions lik e the following. F i r s t l y , how do the two groups of farmers perceive and appraise the p o l i t i c a l and economic systems 3. i n which they function? Secondly, how ( i f at a l l ) are those percep-tions and evaluations i n t e r - r e l a t e d ? Are the d i f f e r e n t measures of perceptions and evaluations s u f f i c i e n t l y i n t e r - r e l a t e d that they can be s a i d to be measuring p o l i t i c a l a t titudes? And t h i r d l y , what are the bases of the p o l i t i c a l a t t i t u d e s of the two groups of farmers? The second research obj e c t i v e i s to examine the r o l e of farmers' p o l i t i c a l b e l i e f systems i n the s p e c i f i c p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y of belonging to the National Farmers Union. At t h i s l e v e l , the i n t e n t i s to s p e c i f y at l e a s t some of the conditions under which farmers' p o l i t i c a l b e l i e f s are congruent with t h e i r p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y . A sampling design that d e l i b e r a t e l y includes members of the National Farmers Union makes t h i s task p o s s i b l e . In t h i s introductory chapter, the t h e o r e t i c a l underpinnings of the research and t h e i r a p p l i c a t i o n to sections of the d i s s e r t a t i o n are i n d i c a t e d . More s p e c i f i c a l l y , a concept of a t t i t u d e and a t t i t u d i n a l formation i s outlined; a theory of behavior which places an important focus on s i t u a t i o n a l f a c t o r s i s stressed; and the reader i s generally prepared for what follows i n the d i s s e r t a t i o n . T h e o r e t i c a l Underpinnings The study of p o l i t i c a l b e l i e f systems r e s t s upon a p a r t i c u l a r theory of a t t i t u d e s , a t t i t u d i n a l formation, a t t i t u d i n a l c o n s t r a i n t , and the r o l e of a t t i t u d e s i n behavior. P r i o r to examining each of these aspects, i t should be noted that " p o l i t i c a l b e l i e f system" and " p o l i t i c a l a t t i t u d e system" are interchangeable terms i n the d i s s e r t a -t i o n as are " p o l i t i c a l b e l i e f s " and " p o l i t i c a l a t t i t u d e s " . P o l i t i c a l 4. belief systems are constellations of p o l i t i c a l beliefs (attitudes). 1. What are beliefs/attitudes? A belief or attitude i s defined here as the probability of certain responses recurring with respect to certain objects. (DeFleur and Westie, 1963; Campbell, 1963; Bern, 1968) An attitude i s thus a consistent predisposition to respond i n a certain way toward a specific object or situation. Although the primary interest i s in the attitudes or beliefs which constitute farmers' ideologies, the evidence from which we infer these attitudes consists entirely of statements i n an interview situation. The inferences from such state-ments to attitudes must meet certain scholarly c r i t e r i a of r e l i a b i l i t y and v a l i d i t y . These matters w i l l be dealt with at appropriate points throughout the thesis. In this chapter, however, phrases such as "verbal behavior", "verbal responses", and "questionnaire responses" should be understood as referring to the underlying beliefs. Since p o l i t i c a l behavior may, of course, be verbal, one kind of verbal behavior i s used to predict another kind of verbal behavior. It is hoped, however, that the type of verbal behavior w i l l be clear from the context. Given a probabilistic conceptualization of attitude, the researcher interested i n p o l i t i c a l attitudes looks for response consistency across behaviors over time. "Response consistency across behaviors over time" entails that the term "attitude" be restricted a to statements which reveal enduring assessments with respect to a certain object. This definition focuses the search for attitudes 5. outside the individual to his environment. A r e i f i e d 'inner mechanism' motivating the individual to respond in a given way to a specific stimulus need not be postulated.*" 2. How are beliefs/attitudes formed? There are two questions here. One, what i s the source of an individual's beliefs (attitudes)? Two, how does the individual make those beliefs known to the researcher? F i r s t l y , the source of an individual's attitudes l i e s i n his past experiences; his attitudes and the verbal statements from 2 which we infer them refle c t his environmental history. The probabili-s t i c definition of attitude embraces a generally recognized principle of human behavior: an individual's current pattern of behavior toward a certain object is shaped by his past behavior toward that object. Accordingly, responses which have been positively reinforced in the past w i l l tend to recur i n the future; those which have been negatively reinforced w i l l not. Consistent reinforcements should also result in a positive correlation between questionnaire behavior and behavior in other settings. The suggestion that "residues of experience" (Campbell, 1963) with respect to an object guide future behavior towards that object entails the conclusion that the more frequent and more consistent an individual's contact with a given object, the more probable his behavior towards that object w i l l exhibit a recurring pattern. An individual i s , therefore, more l i k e l y to have attitudes toward objects in his environment with which he has had frequent interaction. This p r o p o s i t i o n leads the researcher of p o l i t i c a l a t t i t u d e s to focus on the p o l i t i c a l obj ects with which the i n d i v i d u a l has i n t e r a c t e d i n the past. Secondly, an i n d i v i d u a l makes h i s a t t i t u d e s known to others as w e l l as to himself by r e f l e c t i n g upon and evaluating h i s past 3 behavior. T y p i c a l l y , the researcher acquires knowledge of an i n d i v i -dual's a t t i t u d e s by asking the i n d i v i d u a l what they are. In r e p l y i n g to the researcher, the respondent r e l a t e s h i s " s e l f - e v a l u a t i o n s of h i s own behavior" - "observations of h i s own overt behavior and the stimulus conditions under which i t occurs". (Bern, 1968: 204) In short, the i n d i v i d u a l "knows" h i s a t t i t u d e s towards a given object by 4 looking at h i s past behavior toward that object. The a b i l i t y of the i n d i v i d u a l to make h i s b e l i e f s and a t t i t u d e s known to the researcher i s thus contingent upon at l e a s t three f a c t o r s : one, h i s awareness of h i s own behavior and thoughts; two, h i s capacity to r e l a t e h i s thoughts to another person; and three, the extent to which he i s allowed to c l a r i f y and elaborate upon h i s thoughts. 3. How are c o n s t e l l a t i o n s of b e l i e f s / a t t i t u d e s structured? The concern i n p o l i t i c a l b e l i e f system research extends beyond i s o l a t i n g d i s c r e t e p o l i t i c a l a t t i t u d e s to uncovering the st r u c t u r i n g among c o n s t e l l a t i o n s of p o l i t i c a l a t t i t u d e s . While an a t t i t u d e by d e f i n i t i o n implies a degree of s t r u c t u r i n g among assess-ments with respect to a c e r t a i n object, the s t r u c t u r a l character of a b e l i e f system i s an empirical question not a def i n i n g c h a r a c t e r i s t i c . While i n i t i a l research i n t o p o l i t i c a l b e l i e f systems tended 7. to search f o r one s i n g l e dimension that constrained an i n d i v i d u a l ' s p o l i t i c a l b e l i e f s , i t i s now assumed that p o l i t i c a l b e l i e f sets are not so simply structured. I t i s accepted that most b e l i e f c l u s t e r s are complex and multi-dimensional. What are some of the dimensions upon which mass p o l i t i c a l b e l i e f s are structured? Under what conditions are such dimensions l i k e l y to occur? F i r s t l y , empirical research has revealed the r a r i t y of l o g i c a l c o n s t r a i n t s among most i n d i v i d u a l ' s p o l i t i c a l b e l i e f s . E a r l y i n the study of p o l i t i c a l b e l i e f systems, P h i l i p Converse (1964) suggested that l o g i c a l l y consistent sets of b e l i e f s were c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of only the b e t t e r educated and p o l i t i c a l l y aware. Secondly, the assumption of a t t i t u d e s as "residues of exper-ience" means that consistency of c o n s t e l l a t i o n s of a t t i t u d e s i s i n part a function of the consistency of i n d i v i d u a l s ' environmental h i s t o r i e s . When consistent messages from several aspects of an i n d i v i d u a l ' s environ-ment r e i n f o r c e one another, h i s a t t i t u d e s toward d i f f e r e n t objects are more l i k e l y to be integrated than when h i s experiences have l e f t c o n f l i c t i n g messages. T h i r d l y , l i b e r a l and conservative ( l e f t and r i g h t ) a t t i t u d e s may co-occur w i t h i n a given b e l i e f system. To the extent that t h i s happens, the l e f t - r i g h t dimension i s not a s i g n i f i c a n t organizing p r i n c i p l e . In a c l u s t e r a n a l y s i s of responses of Americans to sixteen p o l i c y statements, Robert Axelrod (1967: 57-59) discerned three d i s t i n c t c l u s t e r s , one of which he l a b e l l e d "Populism". He described the c l u s t e r i n these terms: "Agreement with the f i r s t three items r e f l e c t s a l i b e r a l a t t i t u d e on the welfare s c a l e , while agreement with 8. the second three r e f l e c t s what i s c u r r e n t l y regarded as a conservative p o s i t i o n . Thus the scale measures something very d i f f e r e n t from the l e f t - r i g h t dimension that i s so frequently used i n commentary on the structure of American p u b l i c opinion." (1973: 57) Furthermore, according to Axelrod, the l e f t - r i g h t dimension i s the s o l e organizing p r i n c i p l e f o r neither the uneducated and uninformed nor the informed and educated. In a d d i t i o n , interviews with over one hundred American blue c o l l a r workers l e d Litwak et a l . (1973) to conclude that the predominant ideology of the group, which they described as "Middle American", was a "noncorrelated multi-causal ideology"."* This ideology, suggest the authors, does not f i t along the l i b e r a l - c o n s e r v a t i v e continuum i n s o f a r as the Middle American ideology i s opposed to both the very r i c h and the very poor. They argue that a noncorrelated multi-causal b e l i e f system i s not i n t r i n s i c a l l y i r r a t i o n a l because i t may be a r a t i o n a l response to c o n f l i c t i n g elements i n the p o l i t i c a l system. And f i n a l l y , a recent smallest space a n a l y s i s by Gerald H i k e l of the " i d e o l o g i c a l " and " s t y l i s t i c " aspects of b e l i e f systems l e d to the conclusion that "... the data do not appear to support the assump-t i o n of a liberalism-conservatism dimension f o r ideologues any more than f o r nonideologues" given that "... s o c i a l welfare and c i v i l r i g h t s a t t i t u d e s are p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t i a t e d f o r both groups". (1973: 80) Empirical evidence thus suggests the nature of the m u l t i -dimensional s t r u c t u r i n g of mass b e l i e f systems. In l i g h t of these f i n d i n g s , the assumption throughout t h i s research i s that farmers' p o l i t i c a l belief systems w i l l be structured i n a relatively complex fashion. 4. What kinds of beliefs are relevant to action? Empirical and theoretical research suggests important lessons for the researcher intent on e l i c i t i n g statements which adequately reveal stable orientations toward particular objects. Such verbal responses have a high probability of recurring when the search i s for specific attitudes towards specific objects i n issue areas defined by the respondent as salient and i n c r i s i s situations when those responses are being challenged. Attitudes and attitudinal constraint are more noticeable when there i s a heightened salience of p o l i t i c s i n the system as a whole. Each of these conditions w i l l be dealt with i n turn. DeFleur and Westie (1968: 30) emphasize that attitudes must be defined as "specific forms of response to specific social objects, or specific classes of social objects". In a similar vein, Ehrlich prescribes that i f we are ever to isolate verbal responses that are consistent across behaviors, the search must be for verbal and behav-i o r a l responses jo i n t l y towards specific objects: "... either we measure an attitude toward a specific person and then predict a subject's behavior toward that person, or we measure attitudes towards a class of people and predict a subject's behavior to some (perhaps phenomeno-logically) representative sample of that class". (1972: 497) The merit of the f i r s t strategy Ehrlich suggests i s seen i n Crespi's a b i l i t y to improve predictions of behavior from "specific dimensions 10. of a t t i t u d e s with respect to a s p e c i f i c point i n time among persons with a high l i k e l i h o o d of having to make a behavioral d e c i s i o n (1971: 333) Searching f o r s p e c i f i c questionnaire or interview responses towards p a r t i c u l a r objects i n areas important to the i n d i v i d u a l f u r t h e r maximizes the chances of i s o l a t i n g a t t i t u d e s . McKennell argues that the s a l i e n c e of an area must be determined by the respondent since what i s relevant f o r the i n v e s t i g a t o r may not be f o r the respond-ent: "the d e f i n i t i o n of relevance r e s t s at l e a s t i n part with inform-ants". (1974: 207) When opinions are s o l i c i t e d on matters of p u b l i c a f f a i r s s a l i e n t to them, i t has been shown that members of the p u b l i c have b e l i e f systems characterized by s u b s t a n t i a l informational support and organization. (Litwak et a l . , 1973) Moreover, t h e i r a b i l i t y to a r t i c u l a t e ideas about s a l i e n t issues i s a l s o high. Luttbeg (1968), i n a f a c t o r a n a l y s i s of ten s p e c i f i c issues of concern i n a two to three year period p r i o r to h i s study, found that the b e l i e f systems of the mass p u b l i c were only s l i g h t l y l e s s constrained than those of t h e i r leaders. Through the use of open-ended questions,which allowed the voter "to define h i s own issue space by naming the issues that were most s a l i e n t to him" (1971: 391), RePass d i s c l o s e d that s a l i e n t issues were almost as s i g n i f i c a n t a f a c t o r as party i d e n t i f i c a t i o n i n p r e d i c t i n g voting choice. Heightened p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y i n the system i t s e l f appears to f o s t e r a t t i t u d i n a l c o n s t r a i n t . F i e l d and Anderson (1969) found that more people made i d e o l o g i c a l evaluations of the p a r t i e s and p r e s i d e n t i a l candidates i n the 1964 campaign which Senator-Goldwater contested as 11. a P r e s i d e n t i a l candidate than they d i d i n 1960. They conclude that the data support "the relevance of the environment" (1969: 396) to i d e o l o g i c a l thinking on the part of the p u b l i c . Nie and Andersen (1974), examining increases i n l e v e l s of a t t i t u d e consistency over a sixteen year period, reached a s i m i l a r conclusion: "inherent c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the mass p u b l i c are l e s s important as determinants of mass ideology than are v a r i a t i o n s i n the nature and s a l i e n c e of p o l i t i c a l s t i m u l i " . (1974: 544) And l a s t l y , there i s some evidence that v e r b a l and behavioral responses w i l l be more consistent with each other i n a s i t u a t i o n which threatens the b e l i e f . ( H o l s t i et a l . , 1964) The importance of a c r i s i s s i t u a t i o n f o r motivating i n d i v i d u a l s to act on t h e i r b e l i e f s i s w e l l known to students of mass movements. (Smelser, 1962). The l a t t e r two optimal measurement conditions - a c r i s i s s i t u a t i o n and/or heightened p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y i n the system - are generally outside the researcher's c o n t r o l but co n s t i t u t e circumstances to be exploited i f p o s s i b l e . 5. What are the l i n k s between p o l i t i c a l b e l i e f s and p o l i t i c a l behavior? While a proper answer to the above question e n t a i l s a theory of human behavior and a determination of the r o l e of p o l i t i c a l b e l i e f s i n that theory, i t i s po s s i b l e here to suggest some fa c t o r s that need to be considered i n postulating l i n k s between p o l i t i c a l b e l i e f s and p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y . As a general consideration, an i n d i v i d u a l ' s behavior i s a function of h i s s i t u a t i o n a l context. Behavior always occurs w i t h i n a 12. p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n a l context characterized by s o c i a l norms and cons t r a i n t s . Jeanne Knutson hypothesizes that "under usual conditions" as much as h a l f the variance i n behavior i s accounted f o r by the ac t u a l f i e l d s i t u a t i o n . (1973: 38) Hunt, suggesting that the f i g u r e would vary depending upon the i n d i v i d u a l and the s i t u a t i o n , ^ reduces the proportion to about one t h i r d . (1965: 83) From the perspective of drawing l i n k s between p o l i t i c a l b e l i e f s and p o l i t i c a l behavior, two aspects of the p o l i t i c a l or s o c i a l s e t t i n g are important. The f i r s t of these i s the opportunity the s e t t i n g a ffords f o r a t t i t u d e s to be expressed b e h a v i o r a l l y . Whether an a t t i t u d e has behavioral consequences w i l l depend i n part upon opportunities to act on that a t t i t u d e . The second important c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the p o l i t i c a l or s o c i a l s e t t i n g i s the opportunity i t allows f o r a c t i o n congruent with a t t i t u d e s . For example, a s i t u a t i o n where habits or norms govern what i s appropriate behavior i n h i b i t s the t r a n s l a t i o n of non-modal a t t i t u d e s i n t o p o l i t i c a l behavior. Hence, there may be good reasons not to expect a strong l i n k between b e l i e f s and behavior. However, i f the research can be conducted i n a manner and at a time when the s i t u a t i o n does provide an opportunity f o r a c t i o n , these l i n k s are more l i k e l y . S p e c i f i c a l l y , i f farmers' p o l i t i c a l a t t i t u d e s can be tapped at a time when those a t t i t u d e s can be acted upon, then i t may be pos s i b l e to a r r i v e at some understanding of the l i n k s - i f any - between farmers' p o l i t i c a l b e l i e f s and t h e i r p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y . The S p e c i f i c Study of Farmers' P o l i t i c a l B e l i e f Systems The foregoing considerations guide the empirical i n q u i r y 13. i n t o the content, structure, and source of farmers' p o l i t i c a l a t t i t u d e s , and the implications of these a t t i t u d e s f o r membership i n the National Farmers Union. More s p e c i f i c a l l y , they have d i r e c t e d t h i s research in t o farmers' b e l i e f s i n three ways: f i r s t l y , i n terms of what kinds of responses are tapped; secondly, regarding the strategy used to tap them; and t h i r d l y , by determining what a d d i t i o n a l f a c t o r s are considered i n e f f o r t s to l i n k b e l i e f s with behavior. Both the data-gathering and data analyses stages have been a f f e c t e d by these d i r e c t i v e s . The general e f f e c t s w i l l be outlined, followed by a more d e t a i l e d d i s c u s s i o n . With regard to the kinds of responses tapped, at the data gathering l e v e l the concern has been to i s o l a t e f a i r l y s p e c i f i c responses towards s p e c i f i c objects or issues s a l i e n t to the respondent, rather than general responses to l e s s s p e c i f i c and le s s relevant objects or issues. A major thrust of the data analyses i s d i r e c t e d to ensuring the enduring nature of these responses. The search f o r s a l i e n t enduring responses has e n t a i l e d a research strategy designed to e l i c i t s a l i e n t responses and to procure information necessary to uncover the meaning of these responses. At the l e v e l of data gathering, the respondent i s given great l a t i t u d e to define the relevant p o l i t i c a l a t t i t u d e domain. Aspects of h i s environ-mental h i s t o r y that have r e s u l t e d i n those a t t i t u d e s are e l i c i t e d . The data analyses include a three step process which focuses i n turn upon perceptions, evaluations, and the c o g n i t i v e bases of evaluative judge-ments to uncover the "meaning" of p o l i t i c a l b e l i e f s . A major focus of the t h e s i s i s on describing the past and present s i t u a t i o n a l context of the farmer. The questionnaire e l i c i t s 14. information regarding these aspects; the analyses d i r e c t paramount at t e n t i o n to contextual aspects i n drawing l i n k s between p o l i t i c a l b e l i e f s and p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y . A more d e t a i l e d d i s c u s s i o n of the data gathering and data analyses procedures c l a r i f i e s the t h e o r e t i c a l underpinnings of the d i s s e r t a t i o n . 1. Data Gathering Both the timing and method of data gathering were designed to e x p l o i t and maximize optimal conditions f o r tapping s a l i e n t p o l i -t i c a l b e l i e f s and f o r uncovering t h e i r underlying s t r u c t u r e . The timing of the study coincides with a c r i s i s i n the western Canadian farming community and hence with a period wherein p o l i t i c s should be s a l i e n t to farmers. The research method affords respondents ample scope to define the relevant p o l i t i c a l a t t i t u d e domain by r e l y i n g extensively upon open-ended questions. Data were c o l l e c t e d at a time when a number of A l b e r t a farmers were facing a c o s t - p r i c e squeeze. I t was also a time when farmers were fac i n g the prospect of the decline of the family farm as the major u n i t of a g r i c u l t u r a l production i n Canada. The s i g n i f i c a n c e of the c o s t - p r i c e squeeze i s best i l l u s t r a t e d s t a t i s t i c a l l y . Over the period 1962 to 1969, the t o t a l cash r e c e i p t s of p r a i r i e farmers increased by 32% while t h e i r operating and depreciation costs climbed by 76%. (Bronson: 124) In more stark terms, t h i s cost-p r i c e squeeze meant that i n 1969 approximately one-third of Canadian farmers were estimated to be below the poverty l i n e — that i s , earning 15. le s s than $3,000 annually. (Canadian A g r i c u l t u r e i n the Seventies: 7) Translated i n t o terms of a weekly income, i n 1970 the Canadian farmer netted an average income of $66.00 per week. This contrasted with an average composite i n d u s t r i a l wage and s a l a r y of $126.77 per week. (Bronson: 124) Over the period 1966 - 1971, the average net income of an A l b e r t a farmer declined from $5,600 to $5,000. (The Family Farm, 1974: 18) In 1974, at the time the data were gathered, the s i t u a t i o n of farmers i n A l b e r t a who were producing anything other than g r a i n had not improved and may w e l l have deteriorated from the 1971 s i t u a t i o n . D e c l i n i n g net farm incomes f o r many farmers have p a r a l l e l e d and i n part, contributed to a growing trend whereby the family farm i s gradually being replaced by agribusiness and large commercial farms. Between 1962 and 1972, farmers i n Canada were leaving the land at the r a t e of 1,000 per month. This process of r u r a l depopulation has been underway since at l e a s t 1940. In 1939, the farm population constituted 31.7% of the t o t a l population; i n 1966, i t comprised 9.8%. (Canadian A g r i c u l t u r e i n the Seventies: 6) The Federal Task Force on A g r i c u l t u r e has estimated that by 1990 the f i g u r e w i l l be 3 or 4%. (Canadian A g r i c u l t u r e i n the Seventies: 9) The province of A l b e r t a has not escaped the n a t i o n a l pattern of r u r a l depopulation. In 1951, the A l b e r t a farm population numbered 345,222; i n 1971, i t t o t a l l e d 237,924. (The  Family Farm, 1974: 18) There appears to be no move on the government's part to stop t h i s trend. The Federal Task Force on A g r i c u l t u r e approved of the current decline of the farm population and the existence of fewer family farms, and welcomed the development of farm mergers and c o n s o l i -16. dations. I t projected that s i n g l e operator farms (family farms) would be phased out "as a high and r i s i n g proportion" of present farm operators would become "employees working f o r s a l a r i e s and wages", (p. 9) If the p r o j e c t i o n s of the Task Force are correct, the farmer as an indepen-dent entrepreneur, farming h i s land with l i t t l e external help save the voluntary labour of members of h i s family, w i l l be a rare phenomenon by 1990. The present economic s i t u a t i o n which Canadian farmers as a whole face i s one with which A l b e r t a farmers i n p a r t i c u l a r are also grappling. L i k e farmers throughout the country, the goals and l i f e s t y l e of a number of A l b e r t a farmers are threatened. Given that b e l i e f s are most s a l i e n t when being challenged, i t appears to be an opportune time to i n v e s t i g a t e the farmer's a t t i t u d i n a l and behavioral response to t h i s " c r i s i s " . If the timing of the study i s more f o r t u i t o u s than contrived, the method of research has been d e l i b e r a t e l y designed to locate s a l i e n t p o l i t i c a l a t t i t u d e s and to uncover t h e i r l i n k s with one form of p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y . This applies with respect to both the sampling design and questionnaire format. A s t r a t i f i e d sampling design was chosen to allow the i n c l u s i o n of two groups of farmers: one, members of the National Farmers Union; the other,non-members of t h i s n a t i o n a l farm protest organization. Both study groups include farmers r e c r u i t e d from the same geographical area i n order that the f i e l d s i t u a t i o n of the farmers might be "equalized" to some extent. The existence of the farm organization means that the f i e l d s i t u a t i o n does o f f e r the opportunity f o r p o l i t i c a l a t t i t u d e s conducive to the goals and objectives of the National Farmers Union to be expressed i n p o l i t i c a l behavior. The o r g a n i z a t i o n a l channel of the National Farmers Union was a v a i l a b l e f o r over h a l f the farmers i n the two study groups. The s t r a t i f i e d sampling design allows a d e l i n e a t i o n of the conditions under which farmers' a t t i t u d e s and t h e i r organization membership are congruent. The data gathering technique u t i l i z e d here represents a compromise between McKennell's plea f o r " i n t e n s i v e q u a l i t a t i v e exploration" (1974: 206) and the general p r a c t i c e of using closed-ended scales i n standardized interview schedules. Aubrey McKennell suggests that i d e a l l y Informants must be given maximum opportunity f o r revealing the 'reasons' underlying t h e i r evaluations, f o r saying what, i n t h e i r view, i s r e l a t e d to what i n the a t t i t u d e domain. ... the work should be both thorough yet conducted i n a way that the elements that informants introduce stem n a t u r a l l y from t h e i r own a t t i t u d e s . Standardised schedules presenting questions with f i x e d choice a l t e r n a t i v e s minimise the opportunity f o r such contributions by informants, and are therefore t o t a l l y unsuited f o r t h i s i n i t i a l phase of exploration. Nondirected approaches which do not r e l y on a f i x e d schedule of questions i s ( s i c ) what i s required. (1974: 222) F i n a n c i a l constraints necessitated a r e t r e a t from t h i s i d e a l of mapping an a t t i t u d e domain by r e l y i n g upon the respondent's d e f i n i t i o n of s a l i e n t cognitions and evaluations i n that domain. The compromise which has been struck here i s an extensive r e l i a n c e upon open-ended items i n tapping cognitive and evaluative o r i e n t a t i o n s i n s p e c i f i c issue areas that touch the respondent's everyday l i f e . ^ Thus, while the respondent i s not 1 8 . completely free to define what i s relevant c o g n i t i v e l y f or him, the open-ended item does allow a c e r t a i n f l e x i b i l i t y f o r presenting a view-point unanticipated by the researcher. The hope i s that, i n being f r e e to r e f l e c t upon h i s behavior with respect to a c e r t a i n object, the i n d i v i d u a l himself can describe h i s probable response toward that object. 2. Data Analyses The data analyses are guided by a t t i t u d i n a l theory presented e a r l i e r i n three ways: f i r s t l y , i n the emphasis placed upon i s o l a t i n g s table responses; secondly, i n t r a c i n g those responses to the respondent's environmental h i s t o r y ; and t h i r d l y , i n the focus on the s i t u a t i o n a l f a c t o r i n accounting for. p o l i t i c a l behavior. A broad overview of the form of the d i s s e r t a t i o n followed by a more d e t a i l e d examination of the chapter contents i n d i c a t e s t h i s more c l e a r l y . The thesis i s i n three parts. The f i r s t part, Chapters 2 and 3, lays the groundwork for the analyses that follow. Chapter 2, " A g r i c u l -t u r a l P o l i c y as an Object of Farmers' P o l i t i c a l B e l i e f Systems", provides the basis for i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of subsequent thesis f i n d i n g s . I t reviews Canadian a g r i c u l t u r a l p o l i c y for the purpose of summarizing some aspects of the h i s t o r y of i n t e r a c t i o n of farmers with f e d e r a l and p r o v i n c i a l a u t h o r i t i e s . The chapter i n d i c a t e s that governments have undertaken a l i b e r a l p o l i c y with respect to a g r i c u l t u r e . P r o v i n c i a l and f e d e r a l governments have r e s t r i c t e d t h e i r involvement i n a g r i c u l t u r e to f i n d i n g markets, leaving the p r i c i n g and production sectors generally unregulated except for p e r i o d i c e f f o r t s to shore up farmers' incomes i n emergency s i t u a t i o n s . Given the underlying premise that farmers' 19. p o l i t i c a l a t t i t u d e s are "residues" of t h e i r experiences, t h i s chapter provides a benchmark by which farmers' perceptions of the governmental record with respect to a g r i c u l t u r e can be checked. Chapter 3, "The Study Groups", describes the aggregate c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the two study groups and assesses the extent to which they are representative of farmers i n the province as a whole. The chapter i n d i c a t e s that the group of NFU members operates s l i g h t l y l e s s p r o f i t a b l e farms than the non-NFU farmers. However, being l e s s Eastern-European born and more orthodox i n t h e i r r e l i g i o u s a f f i l i a t i o n , they may be more s o c i a l l y i n the mainstream. The second part of the thesis i s e s s e n t i a l l y d e s c r i p t i v e . I t documents the content and structure of the p o l i t i c a l b e l i e f s of the two groups of farmers. I t i s guided by two concerns: one, to i s o l a t e consistent perceptions and evaluations; two, to determine the a s s o c i a t i o n between the two and thereby the cogn i t i v e bases of farmers' evaluative judgements. The relevant d i s s e r t a t i o n chapters are 4, 5, and 6. Chapter 4, "Cognitive B e l i e f s : How the System Works", describes how farmers perceive the operation of aspects of the p o l i t i c a l and economic systems. Chapter 5, "Evaluative B e l i e f s : How the System Ought to Work", traces the manner i n which farmers evaluate the operation of aspects of those systems. In both chapters, the importance of e s t a b l i s h i n g the s t a b i l i t y of farmers' responses e n t a i l s examining the c o v a r i a t i o n among d i f f e r e n t measures of a given b e l i e f . In Chapter 6, "The Structure of Farmers' B e l i e f Systems and a Typology of A c t i v i t y and B e l i e f " , the i n t e r - i t e m a s s o c i a t i o n of cogn i t i v e and evaluative 20. elements i s examined i n order to determine the view of r e a l i t y on which a t t i t u d e s are held. These analyses buttress respondent volunteered suggestions ( i n open ended questions) as to the formative character of the p o l i t i c a l system i n shaping the p o l i t i c a l evaluations. Chapter 4, "Cognitive B e l i e f s : How the System Works", establishes the s t a b i l i t y of two perceptions of the p o l i t i c a l and economic systems. Farmers i n both groups view the external world as relevant to t h e i r l i v e s and assess t h e i r p o s i t i o n i n the p r i c i n g and p o l i t i c a l systems as l a c k i n g any appreciable degree of c o n t r o l over e i t h e r sector. Both groups view power concentrated i n a few top governmental o f f i c i a l s and i n an economic sector which includes large corporations and middlemen^ Farmers' unions and elected rep-resentatives are excluded from t h i s c i r c l e . Differences between the two groups of farmers are apparent. NFU farmers are more e n t h u s i a s t i c about the p o s s i b i l i t y of c o l l e c t i v e farmer a c t i o n to achieve t h e i r goals, and t h e i r a p p r a i s a l of the p o l i t i c a l and economic sectors i s more integrated along r a d i c a l l i n e s . Chapter 5, "Evaluative B e l i e f s : How the System Ought to Work", reveals that both NFU and non-NFU farmers are opposed to more govern-mental involvement i n production, but w i l l i n g to have controls over the p r i c i n g sector. NFU members are more i n favor of r e g u l a t i n g the marketing system and the s i z e and ownership of farms. Farmers i n both groups value a combination of personal and a l t r u i s t i c goals. Again s t r u c t u r a l d i f f e r e n c e s emerge: NFU members are more consistent i n recommending r e g u l a t i o n of both the p r i c i n g and marketing sectors. Chapter 6, "The Structure of Farmers-' B e l i e f Systems and a 21. Typology of A c t i v i t y and B e l i e f " , shows that the evaluations of both NFU and non-NFU farmers f o r regulating the p r i c i n g , marketing, and production sectors are associated with perceptions of c o n t r o l i n one or more of the p r i c i n g , marketing, and p o l i t i c a l decision-making sectors as externalized from farmers. The consensual b e l i e f s of the two groups of farmers include a mixture of r a d i c a l and conservative b e l i e f elements with the bias toward r a d i c a l i s m . The majority of NFU members subscribe to a more p a r t i c u l a r i s t i c set of b e l i e f s which i s properly l a b e l l e d " p o p u l i s t " . Four types of farmers are a n a l y t i c a l l y defined i n terms of the two c r i t e r i a of b e l i e f and a c t i v i t y . Farmers whose p o l i t i c a l behavior i s consistent with t h e i r interview responses comprise two of the farmer types, and farmers whose b e l i e f s and behavior (membership or non-membership i n the National Farmers Union) d i f f e r comprise the other two types. The t h i r d section of the thesis i s more explanatory. Chapters 7 and 8 assess the r o l e of farmers' p o l i t i c a l b e l i e f s i n f o s t e r i n g or thwarting membership i n the National Farmers Union and other p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s . The search f o r the source of both farmers' p o l i t i c a l b e l i e f s and p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y focuses upon the farmers' past and immediate s i t u a t i o n a l context. Chapter 7, e n t i t l e d "The Correlates of B e l i e f and A c t i v i t y " , establishes the importance of the immediate s i t u a t i o n and of a l i e n a t i o n rooted i n more d i s t a n t s i t u a t i o n a l f a c t o r s for recruitment to the National Farmers Union. The data i n d i c a t e that a longer experience with a disadvantageous farming s i t u a t i o n promotes protest p o l i t i c s and a left-wing ideology; s a t i s f a c t i o n with farming and governmental 22. performance is associated with non-protest conservative p o l i t i c s . In Chapter 8, "The Paths to Ideology and Action", multi-variate analyses reinforce the findings of Chapter 7. Frustration with one's current financial return and occupation, combined with a belief in the v i a b i l i t y of joint farmer action are shown to foster membership in a protest organization in the absence of conducive beliefs. The importance of the immediate situation to p o l i t i c a l activity i s thus established. At the same time, the independent effect of beliefs on activity i s reiterated. The close association of the NFU Belief Cluster, p o l i t i c a l alienation, and general economic discontent confirm that most farmers' understanding of their place in the p o l i t i c a l and economic system i s grounded in their experiences as farmers functioning in that system. The concluding chapter, Chapter 9, reiterates the necessity to examine situational and environmental factors in seeking to understand both p o l i t i c a l beliefs and activity. 23. Notes to Chapter 1 1 DeFleur and Westie (1963) review the l i t e r a t u r e which describes an a t t i t u d e as a 'latent process' and o u t l i n e the d i s t i n c t i o n s between t h i s conceptualization of a t t i t u d e and the p r o b a b i l i s t i c notion. 2 B.F. Skinner i s the foremost proponent of the idea that an i n d i v i d u a l ' s environmental h i s t o r y (and genetic h i s t o r y ) c o n t r o l h i s current behavior: "A s c i e n t i f i c a n a l y s i s of behavior must, I b e l i e v e , assume that a person's behavior i s c o n t r o l l e d by h i s genetic and environmental h i s t o r i e s rather than by the person himself as an i m i t a t i n g , c r e a t i v e agent, (1974: 189) Skinner argues that expressions r e f e r r i n g to "the i n t e l l e c t u a l side of the l i f e of the mind - ... one's i n t e n t i o n s , purposes, ideas" a l l r e f e r to "aspects of human behavior a t t r i b u t a b l e to contingencies of reinforcement - or, ... to the subtle and complex r e l a t i o n s among three things: the s i t u a t i o n i n which behavior occurs, the behavior i t s e l f , and i t s consequences". (1974: 148) 3 The idea that an i n d i v i d u a l knows what he thinks by r e f l e c t i n g upon h i s behavior i s found i n the work of the a t t r i b u t i o n t h e o r i s t s . See Jones and Davis (1965), Bern (1965, 1968, 1970), and Sutherland (1975); the f i r s t two for the theory i t s e l f ; the l a t t e r , for an adaptation of a t t r i b u t i o n theory to a t t i t u d i n a l measurement. 4 Skinner (1953, 1957) discusses the r o l e of stimulus g e n e r a l i z a t i o n and metaphor i n enabling the i n d i v i d u a l to develop response patterns towards objects with which he has had no previous encounter. An i n d i v i d u a l reacting to a stimulus on the basis of h i s past encounters with " s i m i l a r " s t i m u l i w i l l "waste" responses u n t i l one i s r e i n -forced. Behavior shaped by " d e s c r i p t i o n s " of contingencies rather than the contingencies themselves i s r u l e governed behavior and i s l e s s under con t r o l than contingency shaped behavior. (1969: 144-146) 5 A "noncorrelated multicausal ideology" appears to be any m u l t i -causal explantion. See page 324 e s p e c i a l l y of Litwak et_ a l . 6 Hunt's s t a t i s t i c i s based upon c l i n i c a l experiments which examined behavior as a function of p e r s o n a l i t y t r a i t s , the s i t u a t i o n , and ( p h y s i o l o g i c a l ) modes-of-response. His conclusion i s that "... i t i s neither the i n d i v i d u a l d i f f e r e n c e s among subjects, per se, nor the v a r i a t i o n s among s i t u a t i o n s , per se, that produce the v a r i a t i o n s i n behavior. I t i s , rather, the i n t e r a c t i o n s among these which are important." (1965: 83) He recommends that students of behavior develop and use instruments that c l a s s i f y people according to t h e i r responses i n various categories of s i t u a t i o n s . . 24. McKennell recommends a more "extensive i n i t i a l exploratory phase" that would e n t a i l "a s e r i e s of free-ranging, unstructured i n d i v i d u a l interviews i n c l u d i n g perhaps other non-directive techniques, the material from which i s content-analysed to provide a source of hypotheses and questionnaire items phrased i n 'natural population language'. (1974: 206) This recommendation e n t a i l s a p r i o r step to the act u a l c o l l e c t i o n of the data f o r analyses. Chapter 2 25. A g r i c u l t u r a l P o l i c y as an Object of Farmers" P o l i t i c a l B e l i e f Systems In order to map an a t t i t u d e as an e v a l u a t i v e - b e l i e f structure....we are not i n t e r e s t e d i n sampling from anything and everything that might be s a i d about the a t t i t u d e object, but only from those aspects that are s a l i e n t i n determining the evaluation placed upon i t ; we are i n t e r e s t e d i n sampling....not any cognitions but only the "hot cognitions". (McKennell, 197^ :221) The t h e o r e t i c a l and empirical framework postulated here with-i n which farmers' b e l i e f sets w i l l be examined i s exploratory i n every sense. Two f a c t o r s necessitate t h i s . F i r s t l y , i n the absence of any previous empiri c a l research i n t o the p o l i t i c a l a t t i t u d e s of farmers -and indeed of any systematic documentation of the i d e o l o g i c a l d i s p o s i t i o n s of Canadian c i t i z e n s as a whole"'' - there are no a v a i l a b l e a t t i t u d i n a l scales capable of being adapted to t h i s study group. Secondly, while r e l i a b l e measures have been developed by s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s studying American public a t t i t u d e s , the researcher's skepticism of the u t i l i t y of adopting wholesale American a t t i t u d i n a l and p s y c h o l o g i c a l measures to the Canadian context precludes t h e i r use. This reluctance i s grounded i n the b e l i e f that there are important c u l t u r a l d i f f e r e n c e s between Canada and the United States; accordingly, measures predicated on assumptions regarding American c u l t u r a l patterns would not be r e l i a b l e i n a context where those assumptions may be weakly.adhered to or not at a l l . 2 There are therefore few tangible guidelines as to how and where to begin to map e m p i r i c a l l y farmers' s a l i e n t p o l i t i c a l cognitions and evaluations. I t thus becomes necessary to extrapolate from t h e o r e t i c a l 26. guidelines l a i d down by p o l i t i c a l b e l i e f system research generally to the p a r t i c u l a r empirical study of farmers' b e l i e f sets. As o u t l i n e d i n the introductory chapter, the p o s s i b i l i t y of s u c c e s s f u l l y mapping an i n d i v i d u a l ' s conceptual arena i s maximized when the search i s f o r stable opinions i n issue relevant areas. I n the case of farmers, matters r e l a t e d to a g r i c u l t u r e and farming must surely demarcate relevant i s s u e s . A primary focus upon farmers' appraisals and reactions to problems and issues i n areas i n which a g r i c u l t u r e and p o l i t i c s impinge upon one another should enhance the chances of tapping s a l i e n t opinions that e i t h e r d i r e c t j y or i n d i r e c t l y describe the way i n which the farmer orients himself i d e o l o g i c a l l y to the p o l i t i c a l and economic systems. I t i s therefore important to peruse the h i s t o r i c a l and contemporary stance of Canadian f e d e r a l governments with regard t o the a g r i c u l t u r a l sector. Once the areas of i n t e r f a c e of farmers and the p o l i t i c a l system have been delineated, i t w i l l then be possible to p o s i t an i d e o l o g i c a l framework w i t h i n which to examine the appropriate organization of the farming and a g r i c u l t u r a l sectors. I. The Federal Government and A g r i c u l t u r a l P o l i c y ^ A. A g r i c u l t u r a l P o l i c y i n the Pre-1970 Period The d i s c u s s i o n of f e d e r a l a g r i c u l t u r a l p o l i c y w i l l be f a c i l i -t a t e d by examining separately i t s r o l e i n the marketing of a g r i c u l t u r a l produce and i n the production of f o o d s t u f f s . However, the f o l l o w i n g g e n e r a l i z a t i o n recurs so frequently i n the l i t e r a t u r e and appears to apply equally to the two sectors as to provide the theme f o r the d i s c u s s i o n : 27. Canadian farm policy since 1930...has been largely one of providing expedient measures to meet crises of depression, drought, war inflation and surpluses .... There is l i t t l e evidence that Canada has had any overall national policy based on clear thinking and economic and sociological research facts. (Hurd, i960) 1. The Marketing Sector Federal agricultural policy until 1970 can be characterized as one consonant with a liberal economic philosophy. (Crown and Heady, 1972:82; Fowke and Powke, 1968:289) Rather than attempting to regulate domestic marketing, the federal government's record in the marketing of foodstuffs included a concern with transportation costs; a response to farmers' demands in the early 1900's to operate terminal elevator facilities; the establishment of the Canadian Wheat Board; market promotion; and grading and inspection duties including controlling handling, storage, and processing of export grains and foodstuffs. The one exception to a general policy of non-interference with the "free market of supply and demand" has, of course, been the Canadian Wheat Board, the exclusive marketing agency for wheat, and until recently for barley and oats. The Canadian Wheat Board, established as a mono-poly in the marketing of Canadian Wheat in 19^ 3> i - 3 a clear anomaly in an otherwise consistent policy of non-interference with the free market and the grain exchange system of pricing in which prices float daily (hourly, indeed by the minute) in response to "demand". It is an intervention in at least two senses: one, i t is a compulsory board -the sole agency to which wheat growers may sell; and two, i t establishes delivery quotas which equalize the amount of-and opportunities for sales. 28. Vernon Powke contends, as do v i r t u a l l y a l l other analysts, that the Federal Government permitted the Canadian Wheat Board to continue a f t e r 1939 only "under d i r e c t and i n d i r e c t p o l i t i c a l pressure rather than out of government c o n v i c t i o n . " And, i n 19^3> when the Canadian Wheat Board became the monopoly agency f o r the sale of wheat, i t was i n order to ensure a continuous supply of wheat at n o n - i n f l a t i o n a r y p r i c e s . (Fowke, 1957: 294-5) Hence, i t was not out of v o l i t i o n but of p o l i t i c a l n e c e s s i t y that the Canadian Wheat Board was born. In short, with the exception of the Canadian Wheat Board, f e d e r a l governments have abstained from r e g u l a t i o n of the marketing of f o o d s t u f f s . 2. The Production Sector I f f i n a n c i a l assistance were taken as an i n d i c a t o r of degree of government involvement i n the production of f o o d s t u f f s , then the Canadian governments' involvement would be extensive. When an examination i s undertaken, however, of the nature of the f i n a n c i a l assistance, then, once again, i t must be concluded that f e d e r a l governments have been extremely•loath to depart from the assumptions of economic l i b e r a l i s m . The major t h r u s t of f i n a n c i a l support i n the production sphere has been to enable the farmer to increase h i s p r o d u c t i v i t y and e f f i c i e n c y , "the assumption being, apparently, that i f a g r i c u l t u r a l output could but be doubled the farmer would be twice as w e l l o f f as before." (Fowke,1957: 292) A study commissioned by the Federal Task Force on A g r i c u l t u r e to appraise government involvement i n a g r i c u l t u r e proposed the f o l l o w i n g t r i p a r t i t e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of government assistance programs: a) those • 29. intended to f a c i l i t a t e the production and marketing of farm products; b) those whose goal was to support farm p r i c e s and maintain farm income; and c) research, education, and extension programs•. (Garland and Hudson, 1968: 336) Table 2.1 l i s t s various government programs under each of the three broad headings: production assistance; p r i c e and income main-tenance; and research, education and extension. Table 2.1 Government Assistance Programs  A. Production Assistance 1. Livestock improvement - q u a l i t y improvement 2. Crop improvement - disease and pest c o n t r o l ; research i n t o new v a r i -e t i e s ; informational e f f o r t s to increase p r o d u c t i v i t y by encouraging new p r a c t i c e s and techniques 3. Grants to a g r i c u l t u r a l organizations, f a i r s and e x h i b i t i o n s 4. Resource development - programs to increase number of acres of farm land and r e h a b i l i t a t e unproductive farms e.g. PFRA (1935) ARDA (1966) FRED (1966) P r a i r i e Grain Advance Payments (1957-62) 5. Farm C r e d i t - Farm C r e d i t Corporation (1959) Farm Improvement Loans (1944) 6. A g r i c u l t u r a l manpower B. P r i c e and Income Maintenance 1. Producer marketing operations - cooperatives; producer marketing boards, statutory marketing boards (Canadian Wheat Board) 2. P r i c e support programs - A g r i c u l t u r a l P r i c e s Support Board (1944-1958) A g r i c u l t u r a l Products Board (1947-1951) A g r i c u l t u r a l S t a b i l i z a t i o n Board (1958) Canadian Dairy Commission (1966- ) 3. Supplementary income assistance - crop insurance; f r e i g h t and storage subsidies; d i s a s t e r aids; acreage payments (1957-62) C. Research, Education and Extension I t i s the area of p r i c e and income maintenance that has received the bulk of government money. In 1966-67 more money was channelled i n t o t h i s sector than i n t o programs d i r e c t e d toward an expansion of a g r i c u l t u r a l output. (Garland and Hudson, 1968: Table 82, 3l8) I t i s important to examine more c l o s e l y these programs to see j u s t how much they meant an e f f o r t to c o n t r o l production. 30. Programs which represent the greatest opportunity f o r govern-mental c o n t r o l include those r e l a t e d to resource development (A4), producer marketing boards ( B l ) , and p r i c e support programs (B2). The P r a i r i e Farm Assistance Administration (PFAA) and the P r a i r i e Farm R e h a b i l i t a t i o n Administration (PFRA) were programs est a b l i s h e d i n the 1930's, the former an income maintenance scheme which protected farmers against losses from t o t a l crop d i s a s t e r s through minimum acreage payments; the l a t t e r , a conservation and r e h a b i l i t a t i o n of land p r o j e c t . In 1960-1, the f e d e r a l and p r o v i n c i a l governments agreed to cooperate i n ARDA ( A g r i c u l t u r a l and Rural Development A c t ) , a scheme to attack r u r a l poverty on a r e g i o n a l basis and thereby secure a more equitable d i s t r i b u t i o n of income w i t h i n the farm sector. A second program, FRED (Fund f o r Regional Economic Development), was s p e c i f i c a l l y concerned with the farm poor. There has been much controversy concerning the e f f i c a c y of both programs. (Buckley and Tihanyi, 1967) P r i c e support programs were begun i n the e a r l y war years by the f e d e r a l government to stimulate war production. These programs esta b l i s h e d c e i l i n g as w e l l as f l o o r p r i c e s on food products. The A g r i c u l t u r a l P r i c e s Support Board, set up i n 19kk, was empowered with supporting base p r i c e s on eleven farm commodities, e i t h e r by d i r e c t l y buying farm products (where there was a surplus) or by underwriting the market with w r i t t e n guarantees to support the p r i c e s . Because of farmer demand, the p r i c e supports continued i n the post war era. In 1958, pursuant to campaign promises by the Progressive Conservative Party and John Diefenbaker, the A g r i c u l t u r a l S t a b i l i z a t i o n Board replaced the A g r i c u l t u r a l P r i c e s Support Board. The new board made p r i c e support 31. mandatory f o r nine key commodities; the p r i c e s of these commodities would be supported at 8c$ of the average p r i c e received during the preceding ten year period. In the period from 1958-59 to 1967-68, i t was the d a i r y industry which was the primary b e n e f i c i a r y of p r i c e support programs. Receiving about &0% of f e d e r a l expenditures on p r i c e and income maintenance schemes, i t became one of the most c l o s e l y regulated sectors of the domestic a g r i c u l t u r a l economy. The d e c i s i o n of the government to guarantee f l o o r p r i c e s i s a d e c i s i o n to i n t e r f e r e with the p r i c e system. When the d e c i s i o n was i n i t i a l l y made i n 19^ 1, the objective was increased p r o d u c t i v i t y f o r the promotion of the war e f f o r t (hence f l o o r p r i c e s ) and the f o r e s t a l l i n g of domestic i n f l a t i o n (hence c e i l i n g p r i c e s ) . The c e i l i n g p r i c e s were set low enough to cause farm organizations to complain that t h e i r p r i c e s were being frozen at a l e v e l lower than that of non-foodstuffs. (Drummond et a l . , 1966: 51) I t has been argued that "the l e v e l of support was set with the objective of pr o t e c t i n g producers against serious l o s s i n the short run but not to support p r i c e s above the normal, supply-demand  r e l a t i o n s h i p " . (Drummond et al.:56. My emphasis.) The v a l i d i t y of t h i s theme, that p r i c e supports are consumer subsidies, not producer subsidies, has been e s t a b l i s h e d econometrically. (Crown and Heady: Chapter 2) In a d d i t i o n to cash advances and subsidy schemes, the other major t h r u s t of governmental e f f o r t s to shore up farm incomes has been i n the extension of a v a i l a b l e c r e d i t , u s u a l l y at f a i r l y low i n t e r e s t rates. The Farm Improvement Loans Act (19^ 4) made a v a i l a b l e short and intermediate term loans to farmers; the Veterans Land Act enabled r e t u r n -ing s o l d i e r s to purchase farms; and the Farm C r e d i t Corporation makes 32. c r e d i t a v a i l a b l e on a long term, with s p e c i a l considerations to beginning farmers. C l e a r l y these c r e d i t schemes are more properly l a b e l l e d "developmental" (aimed at expanding production) rather than income main-tenance schemes. (Crown and Heady: 5-6) This overview supports the conclusion that the p r i c e and income maintenance schemes denote an e f f o r t to buoy up farmers' finances by e i t h e r d i r e c t monetary payments (subsidies and grants) or b y • f u r t h e r i n g c r e d i t , rather than by i n t e r f e r i n g with the p r i c e system. B. A g r i c u l t u r a l P o l i c y i n the 1970'3 Federal a g r i c u l t u r a l p o l i c y i n the 1970's represents somewhat of a d e v i a t i o n from pre-1970 i n i t i a t i v e s . The guidelines f o r these new d i r e c t i o n s have been the recommendations of the Task Force Report on A g r i c u l t u r e . C a l l e d "the b l u e p r i n t of government p o l i c y " and "the most p o l i t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t statement i n the h i s t o r y of Canadian .agriculture", (Mitchell:l49) the Task Force Report i s a c l e a r enunciation of s e v e r a l themes: ( l ) the need f o r a reduction of d i r e c t government involvement i n a g r i c u l t u r e ; (2) an a f f i r m a t i o n of the i n e v i t a b i l i t y and correctness of competition among farmers; (3) the necessity of accommodating Canadian a g r i c u l t u r e to the continental economy; (4) a r e j e c t i o n of the 'public u t i l i t y ' or s o c i a l i z e d concept of a g r i c u l t u r e ; and (5) the advocation of the concept of supply management. E a r l y i n t h e i r report, i n attempting to define the goals of the Task Force, the commissioners make e x p l i c i t t h e i r l i b e r a l philosophy: The Task Force accepts the r a t i o n a l r e a l i z a t i o n of each i n d i v i d u a l ' s p o t e n t i a l as the ultimate g o a l . . . . . i n the ultimate a n a l y s i s , i t i s i n d i v i d -uals that count, rather than organizations governments e x i s t to serve people, not the opposite. (Canadian A g r i c u l t u r e i n the Seventies:28) 33. They r e i t e r a t e t h i s sentiment l a t e r when they are sketching a model of the i d e a l p o l i t i c a l - e c o n o m i c - s o c i a l system: "...a democratic p o l i t i c a l system ensuring the highest p r a c t i c a l degree of i n d i v i d u a l freedom i s of primary importance and ...government and economic planning must be con-d i t i o n e d by t h i s supreme p r i n c i p l e " . (Canadian A g r i c u l t u r e i n the Seventies: 279) The o f t - r e i t e r a t e d assumption of the Task Force members that the freedom of the farmer i s a p r i o r i t y value occurs alongside the b e l i e f that freedom i s best safeguarded by ensuring the continuation of the competitive economic system. (Canadian Agriculture...:290-291) Free enterprise i s equated with the competitive system. To ensure the great-est freedom f o r the i n d i v i d u a l farmer, the Task Force recommended an e l i m i n a t i o n of d i r e c t subsidies (Canadian Agriculture...:9) and. a reduc-t i o n of government d i r e c t involvement i n a g r i c u l t u r e : "...the general r o l e of government should be to produce a favorable economic climate f o r farmers and agribusiness but not to attempt to 'manage' or d i r e c t a g r i c u l t u r e " . (Canadian A g r i c u l t u r e . . . : 282) A North American free trade area i n which t a r i f f b a r r i e r s would be removed would also ensure that freedom. (Canadian Agriculture...:59) Canadian foodstuffs would compete with American food-s t u f f s f o r the same market. The foregoing recommendations d i d not c a l l f o r any r a d i c a l r e o r i e n t a t i o n of the f e d e r a l government's approach to a g r i c u l t u r e . The p o t e n t i a l l y most r a d i c a l proposals were those advocating an extension of 5 the marketing board concept as a means of supply management. L e g i s l a t i o n to enable, producers to e s t a b l i s h marketing boards represents, t h e o r e t i c -a l l y , an even greater p o s s i b i l i t y f o r meddling with the concept of the free market establishment of p r i c e s (through the normal supply and demand process) than do p r i c e support schemes. To be c l e a r about what 34. marketing boards are, they.are normally defined i n terms s i m i l a r to the foll o w i n g : "a producer-controlled, compulsory, h o r i z o n t a l organ-i z a t i o n sanctioned by governmental authority to perform s p e c i f i c marketing operations i n the i n t e r e s t s of the producers of the commodity concerned." (Metcalf, 1969:107) The fun c t i o n and goal of marketing boards i s to s t a b i l i z e and increase members' incomes and to e s t a b l i s h an equal p r i c e f o r an equal product offered. They accomplish t h i s by the pooling of members' products and s e l l i n g them through a s i n g l e agency. The c o l l e c t -ive s e l l i n g of the e n t i r e output of a given commodity const i t u t e s a movement towards orderly marketing and away from " f r e e " marketing. Because of the compulsory membership and the frequent establishment of quotas on what each i n d i v i d u a l producer can s e l l ( i n order to r e s t r i c t the supply which flows t o market), i t represents, as w e l l , a type of supply management, and accordingly some r e s t r i c t i o n s on p r i c e competition. Eugene Whelan, Federal M i n i s t e r of A g r i c u l t u r e since 1972, extended the enabling l e g i s l a t i o n to permit the establishment of n a t i o n a l 7 marketing boards under the National Farm Products Marketing Act i n 1972. Whelan's concerns are both producer and consumer oriented: to s t a b i l i z e both farm income and consumer p r i c e s , as w e l l as to guarantee future food supplies. The opportunity to organize marketing on a n a t i o n a l l e v e l c l e a r l y provides the means f o r a much greater degree of supply management than theretofore e x i s t e d with only p r o v i n c i a l boards. Q Because of the p r o l i f e r a t i o n of marketing boards, i t i s important to examine the extent to which they are an e f f e c t i v e t o o l i n the goal of supply management, and consequently, increased and stable incomes. 35. Marketing boards i n Canada vary widely i n terms of t h e i r power and eff e c t i v e n e s s . Hiscocks and Bennett (197*0 have analysed the extent to which the p r o v i n c i a l marketing boards i n Canada can c o n t r o l p r i c e s i n terms of t h e i r p r i c i n g powers i n fourteen d i f f e r e n t areas. Some of the most important of these areas include the a b i l i t y to regulate the follow i n g : to set consumer or wholesale p r i c e s , to e s t a b l i s h a maximum or minimum producer p r i c e , to e s t a b l i s h marketing and/or production quotas for' every producer, to l i c e n s e producers, to regulate i n t e r p r o v i n c i a l and export trade, to c o n t r o l imports, and to purchase and/or s e l l the regulated product. I n terms of these c r i t e r i a , the powers of marketing boards are severely r e s t r i c t e d . A l l but four (the Canadian Egg Marketing Agency, Canadian Dairy Commission, Canadian Wheat Board, and the Canadian Turkey Marketing Agency) are p r o v i n c i a l i n scope. C o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y , they must be created and em-powered by p r o v i n c i a l governments. This i s a serious l i m i t a t i o n to t h e i r 9 a b i l i t y t o co n t r o l the supply of products coming to market. As w e l l , marketing boards are organized on the p r i n c i p l e of a separate board f o r every commodity. Each commodity group i n each province has a separate marketing board (save f o r the four n a t i o n a l boards). A more serious drawback to effe c t i v e n e s s i n c o n t r o l l i n g supply i s t h e i r complete i n -a b i l i t y to co n t r o l imports. More s p e c i f i c a l l y , i n terms of the c r i t e r i a Hiscocks and Bennett set f o r t h , the most powerful boards are the f l u i d milk boards or commissions which do d i r e c t l y determine p r i c e s and e s t a b l i s h marketing quotas. Poultry marketing boards rank second most powerful i n t h e i r a b i l i t y t o influence p r i c e l e v e l s . They can set marketing quotas and 36. minimum sales p r i c e s . A t h i r d group of boards may negotiate p r i c e s with major buyers but generally the buyers rather than the board determine the s e l l i n g p r i c e . Consequently, Hiscocks and Bennett conclude that " i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o determine the extent to which these boards influence the producer p r i c e beyond the basic supply and demand s i t u a t i o n or expect-ations of the s i t u a t i o n at the time of the negotiations". (1974:22) F i n a l l y , a large number of boards have no p r i c i n g powers or influence beyond what an improved organization of the market secures, or what stepped up promotional a c t i v i t i e s y i e l d . Accordingly, by extending marketing board l e g i s l a t i o n , the fe d e r a l government has i n the present decade created the conditions f o r greater producer p r o t e c t i o n from the v i c i s s i t u d e s of the free market. However, i t would c l e a r l y be an exaggeration to suggest that t h i s i s tantamount to producer or (even more remotely) governmental c o n t r o l of production. I f anything i s needed to d i s p e l the impression of the aband-onment of the free market concept on the part of the Federal L i b e r a l Party, the i n t r o d u c t i o n i n 1973> by Otto Lang, M i n i s t e r i n charge of the Canadian Wheat Board, of the Feed Grains - P o l i c y would s u f f i c e . The Feed Grains P o l i c y removed the Wheat Board monopoly over i n t e r - p r o v i n c i a l trade i n feed grains and permitted the c r e a t i o n of an " o f f Board" s e l l i n g mechanism to make room f o r feed g r a i n handling by priv a t e g r a i n companies. Farmers are now " f r e e " to choose to whom they w i l l market t h e i r feed grains. As an overview of f e d e r a l a g r i c u l t u r a l p o l i c y , there may be no more f i t t i n g assessment than that of the Task Force on A g r i c u l t u r e . On a one hundred degree continuum where one hundred degrees represents 37. the greatest extent and scale of government planning and c o n t r o l , the Commissioners placed Canada between twenty-five and t h i r t y d e g r e e s . ^ This metric l o c a t i o n approximates the i d e o l o g i c a l p o s i t i o n of a l i b e r a l p o l i c y of p e r i o d i c departure from non-involvement i n the marketing and p r i c i n g sectors when emergency s i t u a t i o n s a r i s e . I I . P r o v i n c i a l A g r i c u l t u r a l P o l i c y Even l e s s s c h o l a r l y a t t e n t i o n has been d i r e c t e d to the r o l e of p r o v i n c i a l governments i n the a g r i c u l t u r a l sector than to that of the f e d e r a l government. But because A l b e r t a farmers i n t e r a c t not only with a f e d e r a l Department of A g r i c u l t u r e , but a p r o v i n c i a l one as w e l l , i t may be h e l p f u l to provide an overview of the a g r i c u l t u r a l p o l i c i e s of the S o c i a l C r e d i t and Progressive Conservative administrations i n A l b e r t a . Although a g r i c u l t u r e i s a j u r i s d i c t i o n which the p r o v i n c i a l and f e d e r a l governments share concurrently, the f e d e r a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l authority over i n t e r - p r o v i n c i a l and export trade reduces the marketing powers of the p r o v i n c i a l governments to those r e l a t e d to i n t r a - p r o v i n c i a l concerns. Hence, save f o r powers to e s t a b l i s h marketing boards and to advertise and search f o r domestic and i n t e r n a t i o n a l markets, the r o l e of the p r o v i n c i a l government i n a g r i c u l t u r e i s confined mainly to the production and p r i c i n g sectors. I t i s . p r i m a r i l y i n these terms that the a g r i c u l t u r a l p o l i c i e s of the A l b e r t a S o c i a l C r e d i t and Progressive Conservative Administrations w i l l be contrasted. I t i s probably f a i r to say that the e l e c t i o n of the Progressive Conservative Party i n A l b e r t a i n 1971 marked a turning point i n p r o v i n c i a l 38. assistance to a g r i c u l t u r e . P r i o r to 1971, the S o c i a l C r e d i t adminis-t r a t i o n ' s involvement i n a g r i c u l t u r e had been confined, f o r the most part, to supplementary income assistance i n the event of n a t u r a l disasters' (B3 i n Table 2.1), to dispensing research information through the l o c a l D i s t r i c t A g r i c u l t u r a l i s t ' s o f f i c e ( A l , A2), and to f i n a n c i n g a g r i c u l t u r a l e x h i b i t i o n s and f a i r s (A3). None.of these types of schemes meant substant-i a l f i n a n c i a l assistance to the farmer or interference with production or p r i c i n g . The New M i n i s t e r of A g r i c u l t u r e i n the Progressive .Conservative Government i n 1971, Vr. Hugh Horner, himself a hobby farmer, was very much committed to resource development programs. (A4 i n Table 2.1) Work-ing with an expanded budget, Dr. Horner implemented new schemes l i k e the A g r i c u l t u r a l Development Corporation and the Beef Incentive Programs designed to loan farmers the c a p i t a l necessary to expand t h e i r operations. Loans to purchase farm land and construct new b u i l d i n g s were forthcoming. The Progressive Conservative government has been active i n two f u r t h e r areas since 1971s one, b o l s t e r i n g i n t e r n a t i o n a l sales of p r o v i n c i a l l y produced f o o d s t u f f s ; and two, supplementing incomes of farmers who have been the victims of n a t u r a l d i s a s t e r s . The l a t t e r does, however, need to be q u a l i f i e d . While d i s a s t e r assistance was made a v a i l a b l e ( a f t e r pressure i n i t i a l l y from the National Farmers Union and subsequently another farm organization) to farmers whose crops were snowed under i n the F a l l of 1973, t h i s same administration has not taken a c t i o n during the period 1974-6 to provide emergency support to cow-calf operators s u f f e r i n g extremely depressed p r i c e s . 39. In broader terms, p r o v i n c i a l a g r i c u l t u r a l p o l i c y , l i k e f e d e r a l p o l i c y , has not e n t a i l e d any s u b s t a n t i a l encroachment i n t o the production and p r i c i n g sectors. The A l b e r t a farmer has been l e f t r e l a t i v e l y f r ee of e i t h e r f e d e r a l or p r o v i n c i a l r e g u l a t i o n of h i s enterp r i s e . However, because there are s l i g h t d i f f e r e n c e s of o r i e n t a t i o n -with respect to production and p r i c i n g , i t seems advisable to make an a n a l y t i c a l d i s t i n c t -i o n between the two sectors f o r the purpose of tapping farmers responses towards each. This holds as w e l l with respect to the marketing sector, the area i n which there has been somewhat more r e g u l a t i o n . I I I . A Framework f o r Mapping Farmers' P o l i t i c a l A t t i t u d e s Having surveyed the p o l i c i e s and programs w i t h i n which the sampled farmers p r a c t i s e farming, the parameters of the domain of farming and p o l i t i c s have been broadly mapped. Farmers' reactions to governmental a c t i v i t y or more accurately, p a s s i v i t y , i n the production, p r i c i n g , and marketing sectors should constitute stable and s a l i e n t responses i n t h e i r b e l i e f systems. Because the i n t e r e s t i n b e l i e f system research i s not only with the p a r t i c u l a r content of d i s c r e t e a t t i t u d e s but as w e l l with the broad nature of c o l l e c t i o n s of a t t i t u d e s , i t becomes imperative to e s t a b l i s h some means by which the researcher can get a t h e o r e t i c a l "handle" on respondents' a t t i t u d e s . T r a d i t i o n a l l y , i n p o l i t i c a l b e l i e f system research, the framework used to do t h i s i s the l e f t - r i g h t i d e o l o g i c a l continuum: the d e s c r i p t i o n of an i n d i v i d u a l ' s set of at t i t u d e s i s i n terms of the at t i t u d e s as being "on the l e f t " or "on the r i g h t " ; or more frequently, as conservative, l i b e r a l or r a d i c a l / s o c i a l i s t . To f a c i l i t a t e the p u r s u i t of t h i s p r a c t i c e i n the present study and to thereby provide a framework w i t h i n which farmers* s p e c i f i c a t t i t u d e s towards se l e c t e d 4o. objects i n the p o l i t i c a l system can be identified i n ideological terms, Chart 2.1 is included. Chart 2.1 defines l e f t , centre and right positions with respect to the extent and scale of government involvement advocated i n the pricing, production, and marketing sectors of agriculture. To varying degrees the l e f t position approximates a radical/socialist stance; the centre, a l i b e r a l position; and the right, a conservative perspective. Liberalism and conservatism i n the Canadian context vary slightly, as i s indicated below. While the c r i t e r i a i n the chart are selective and not inclusive of a l l - maybe not even the most significant - aspects of a l e f t or right orientation, they nevertheless constitute a set of elements readily recognizable as cognitive and evaluative components of conservat-ive, liberal,' and s o c i a l i s t perspectives. As part of i t s view of the appropriate economic system, the 12 conservative perspective includes the following elements. F i r s t l y , the free market and a s t r i c t policy of laissez-faire on the part of the govern-ment is the appropriate economic structure and the source of p o l i t i c a l freedom. This entails free trade, no monopolies, no t a r i f f s , no subsidies. The government should have no, or at best a minimal, role i n the production and management of the economy. Secondly, the protection and ownership of private property must be assured. Only to the end of protecting private property should the government intervene i n the economy. The conservative position, i n terms of Chart 2.1 i s one of non-interference i n regulating input costs and producer prices and quantity and type of foodstuffs produced. It encourages private ownership of land and equipment with no limits as to who can farm. The principle of the free market, with prices established by the law of'supply and demand, i s affirmed. Chart 2.1 Left, Right, and Centre Positions on Scale and Extent of Government Planning and Control  Pricing Control a) regulation of prices and income Left Production costs and some profit guaranteed - either by producers bargaining with buyers or gov't, established maximum and minimum prices; stabilized prices. Centre Emergency or continuous supports Right open market (supply and demand) b) regulation of nature and cost of inputs controlled by government emergency controls no controls Production Control a) c r i t e r i a as to who can farm restricted to licensed farmers no limits no limits b) structure of farm ownership public ownership; land leased to individuals or collective ownership; regulation of size and integration both public and private ownership private ownership of land and equipment c) quantity and production regulations production quotas on quantity and product gov't, advice and direction with subsidies and grants no controls Chart 2.1 Continued * L e f t Centre Right Marketing Control ~k~) mechanism whereby farm pr i c e s are established b) r e g u l a t i o n of imports and/or i n t e r p r o v i n c i a l trade n a t i o n a l marketing boards f o r a l l commodities (orderly marketing) t a r i f f s regulate imports marketing boards optional s e l e c t i v e i n t e r -n a t i o n a l t a r i f f s open market (supply and demand) no regulation, no t a r i f f s c) tran s p o r t a t i o n p o l i c y p u b l i c l y owned and operated both p u b l i c and p r i v a t e systems p r i v a t e l y operated, p r i v a t e l y owned *The genesis of t h i s chart- i s Table 4, "Major C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of Farming Systems i n the Five Stages of Government Involvement", i n Canadian A g r i c u l t u r e i n the Seventies (1969:281). 43-In the Canadian context, conservatism may include s e l e c t i v e t a r i f f s and a publicly-owned t r a n s p o r t a t i o n system c o e x i s t i n g alongside p r i v a t e schemes. The major thrust of a conservative a g r i c u l t u r a l p o l i c y would be d i r e c t e d towards f i n d i n g export markets. In summary, the conservative p o s i t i o n i n Canada e n t a i l s a stance on the r i g h t of Chart 2.1 with respect to p r i c i n g and production and veers toward the centre on marketing. Liberalism, l i k e conservatism, supports free enterprise and 13 the c a p i t a l i s t i c system as the appropriate economic arrangement. However, i t advocates a greater governmental r o l e i n managing the economy (to create conditions i n which p r i v a t e enterprise may f l o u r i s h ) . Both p r i v a t e and p u b l i c enterprise are t o l e r a t e d . In the Canadian context, l i b e r a l i s m has tended to be equated with a greater advocation of welfare schemes than has conservatism. In l i b e r a l terms, welfare schemes are necessary to allow everyone to compete equally i n the free and competit-t i v e market. And f i n a l l y , l i b e r a l i s m lends a supportive r o l e to b i g business but does not e n t a i l the same preoccupation with p r i v a t e property as does conservatism. I t generally does not advocate the ownership of major i n d u s t r i e s , but rather recognizes the occasional n e c e s s i t y f o r r e g u l a t i o n of them. The l i b e r a l p o s i t i o n , i n terms of Chart 2.1, includes both "centre" and " r i g h t " aspects. Like conservatism i n the Canadian context i t puts no l i m i t s on who can farm, no controls on input costs, and recommends the p r i v a t e ownership of land ( i n c l u d i n g the r i g h t of non-i n d i v i d u a l s such as corporations to enter i n t o farming). L i b e r a l i s m i s i n c l i n e d towards emergency support programs and sporadic interference 44. with the free market by imposing s h o r t - l i v e d t a r i f f s . The l i b e r a l p o s i t i o n may be e i t h e r an advocacy of the free market alone or of a choice between free and regulated marketing (hence, the o p t i o n a l i t y of marketing boards, the p r o v i s i o n of both publicly-owned and p r i v a t e l y -operated t r a n s p o r t a t i o n systems). Broadly, then, the l i b e r a l perspec-t i v e i n Canada o s c i l l a t e s between the r i g h t and centre p o s i t i o n s with respect to the p r i c i n g and production areas and s e t t l e s i n the' centre concerning marketing. Included i n the s o c i a l i s t perspective i s a set of economic b e l i e f s which f i r s t l y , advocate government i n t e r v e n t i o n i n the economy and the use of state power and planning to secure p u b l i c ownership of the means of production of the major n a t i o n a l i n d u s t r i e s , and the 14 d i s t r i b u t i o n , t r a n s p o r t a t i o n , and communication sectors. Secondly s o c i a l i s t s recommend the a b o l i t i o n of p r i v a t e property and i t s replace-ment with communal ownership. Socialism, as a t h i r d c r i t e r i o n , includes a c r i t i q u e of c a p i t a l i s m as n e c e s s a r i l y leading to economic i n e q u a l i t y and u l t i m a t e l y to p o l i t i c a l i n e q u a l i t y . In recommending the a b o l i t i o n of p r i v a t e property, i t counsels as w e l l an equitable d i s t r i b u t i o n of power among clas s e s . In terms of p r a c t i c a l p o l i t i c s , t h i s takes the form of a,sympathetic posture towards the working cl a s s and trade unions. And f o u r t h l y , s o c i a l i s m may advise the u t i l i t y of i n t e r i m r e d i s t r i b u t i o n of wealth measures l i k e the s o c i a l welfare schemes l i b e r a l s implement to maximize equal opportunity f o r a l l . A s o c i a l i s t , however, would define e q u a l i t y i n terms of equal s o c i a l conditions. 45. The position on the l e f t side of Chart 2.1 corresponds to some aspects of a radical/socialist approach to agriculture. Such an approach presupposes the joint occurrence of planning and controls and the regulation of production, pricing, and marketing. The structure of land ownership advocated by a s o c i a l i s t differs, as well, from that recommended by a l i b e r a l or conservative, being, of course, one of public rather than private land ownership. There i s a fourth set of beliefs which also must be defined i n terms of Chart 2.1. This i s the o f f i c i a l ideology of the National Farmers Union, the organization to which one of the two study groups of farmers belongs. The NFU ideology, as i t i s outlined here, i s the set of beliefs gleaned from a careful scrutiny of policy statements passed at Conventions of the National Farmers Union; from articles published i n their monthly periodical, The Union Farmer, which a l l members receive; from their more frequent directives to NFU executive members i n the Newsletter; and from articles concerning the NFU i n an influ e n t i a l farm newspaper, The Western Producer. This set of beliefs i s now outlined. In terms of Chart 2.1, the NFU position on the scale and extent of government planning and control advocated, i s as follows: Pricing Controls a ) r e g u l a t i o n of prices and income: I t i s the policy of the NFU that farm prices and income should be continuously regulated by the process of collective bargaining wherein the ce r t i f i e d bargaining agent for producers (the NFU/authorized farm organization) would bargain with a government-appointed marketing commission "to determine the price that 46. producers would receive f o r t h e i r products". Once t h i s process of bargaining had taken place, "The marketing commission then would have the power to f i x or determine s e l l i n g p r i c e s , to regulate d i s t r i b u t i o n of the product, to f i x and c o l l e c t fees and to se i z e , remove, and dispose of any of the regulated products kept or marketed i n v i o l a t i o n of any 15 orders or ru l e s of the commission". The c o l l e c t i v e bargaining process i s designed to ensure a pr i c e to the producer equal to "the cost of production plus a reasonable p r o f i t on h i s investment, management and labor." (Union Farmer, Jan., 1975:5) In the interim, while awaiting governmental a u t h o r i z a t i o n as the c o l l e c t i v e bargaining agent f o r farmers, the NFU has demanded stab-i l i z a t i o n programs but r e j e c t e d those of the "emergency type" which lend short term assistance without s t a b i l i z i n g p r i c e s at cost of product-i o n plus l e v e l s . (Union Farmer, A p r i l , 1975:4) b) c o n t r o l on nature and cost of inputs: The NFU p o s i t i o n i s 16 that input costs be subject to conjoint governmental and farmer c o n t r o l . Production Controls ' a) c r i t e r i a as to who can farm: Although they have yet to a r r i v e at a d e f i n i t i o n of "a farmer" and to s p e c i f y who should be able to farm, the NFU Conventions have unanimously endorsed the p r i n c i p l e that there should be d e f i n i t e r e s t r i c t i o n s on who can farm and are of accord i n s t i p u l a t i n g some of those who should not be able t o . Agribusiness (chain food stores, packing plants, feed companies, commercial corporate enterprises, and "producers engaged i n farm product-i o n f o r 'hobby*, research, or tax advantage") should be r e s t r i c t e d from 47. farming. Furthermore, c r i t e r i a as to who can farm should not be guided by an "economic determinism" p r i n c i p l e , but by a wider conception of the l8 sort of so c i e t y and community i t i s desi r a b l e to create i n Canada. b) structure of farm ownership: U n t i l the 1974 National Convention, when a Land Ownership P o l i c y was put forward f o r di s c u s s i o n that sug-gested i t was time to re-evaluate "the p r i n c i p l e of p r i v a t e land compared to p u b l i c ownership with tenure secured by l e a s i n g arrangements" (Union  Farmer, Jan., 1975*8), the NFU had always endorsed "the p r i n c i p l e s of farm production based on the i n d i v i d u a l management, ownership and c o n t r o l of production resources by farm people". The l a t t e r was one of the Statements of Purpose endorsed by the 1973 and 1974 Conventions. The 1974 Land Ownership P o l i c y sparked s u f f i c i e n t controversy to r e s u l t i n the r e s i g n a t i o n of one president of an Ontario l o c a l . To date, the endorsement of pu b l i c ownership seems to be confined to the leadership l e v e l , with the President of the Union, Roy Atkinson, having argued i t s merits on d i f f e r e n t occasions. (Union Farmer, August, 1974:12) Less c o n t r o v e r s i a l have been the rec o g n i t i o n -of the need f o r maximum farm s i z e l i m i t s and the p r o h i b i t i o n of v e r t i c a l i n t e g r a t i o n and 19 contract farming. c) quantity and product re g u l a t i o n s : The NFU has endorsed prod-u c t i o n controls as to quantity but not as to product. An upper l i m i t to egg production quotas has been s p e c i f i e d and the p r i n c i p l e of "supply 20 management" f o r l i v e s t o c k and l i v e s t o c k products endorsed. However, " 'supply management' should not be i n t e r p r e t e d as....recommending overly r e s t r i c t i v e production controls but should be defined as geared to regulated expansion". (Union Farmer, Jan., 1975*7) Rather than the 48. government alone s t i p u l a t i n g upper production l i m i t s on l i v e s t o c k and other f o o d s t u f f s , the NFU asks that farmers' organizations have a say i n the establishment of those c o n t r o l s . A producer-controlled n a t i o n a l meat authority, f o r example, should be created.and empowered to manage supplies and a l l o c a t e import and export quotas on the basis of negotiated agree-ments with domestic and f o r e i g n buyers. (Union Farmer, January, 1976) Marketing Control a) mechanism whereby farm p r i c e s are established: Probably no other area has so preoccupied the a t t e n t i o n of the NFU as that concerning the appropriate marketing, mechanism. In the defence of orderly marketing and the Canadian Wheat Board as the v e h i c l e to ensure ord e r l y g r a i n marketing, the NFU has launched attack a f t e r attack upon the Federal Task Force Report on A g r i c u l t u r e and the Federal Feed Grains P o l i c y of Otto 21 Lang. The consistent NFU p o s i t i o n i s that the Canadian Wheat Board should be assigned j u r i s d i c t i o n over marketing a l l grains and oilseeds i n t e r p r o v i n c i a l l y and i n t r a p r o v i n e i a l l y i n Canada and a l l export s a l e s , as w e l l as over the operation and management of a l l grain-handling f a c i l i t i e s . (Union Farmer, Jan., 1975) In an a r t i c l e e n t i t l e d "Our P o l i c y Must Stand", the NFU President, Roy Atkinson, r e j e c t e d the a l t e r n a t i v e to o r d e r l y marketing, that i s , s e l l i n g on the free market. He argued, "No longer can we depend on the free market to dispense equity and justice....because the b a s i c drive i n the market economy and those i n t e r e s t s operating i n the market economy i s s e l f - i n t e r e s t based on maximized p r o f i t s f o r t h e i r own use or abuse". (Union Farmer, D e c , 1974:2) This judgment of the i n j u s t i c e of the free market system has l e d to the c a l l f o r producer-controlled 49. n a t i o n a l marketing agencies concerned with l i v e s t o c k and other farm products able to "negotiate long-term agreements with buyers, domestic and i n t o export...." (Union Parmer, Jan., 1975:7) .To be able to regulate the market i n t h i s manner, i t i s necessary that the producer boards be n a t i o n a l l y organized, not p r o v i n c i a l l y . (Newsletter, June 19, 1973) b) re g u l a t i o n of imports and/or i n t e r p r o v i n c i a l trade: In contrast to the v a c i l l a t i n g posture of the Canadian Federation of A g r i c u l t u r e and the Canadian Cattlemens' A s s o c i a t i o n , the National Farmers Union has c o n s i s t e n t l y recommended r e s t r i c t i o n s on the importation'of f r u i t s 22 and vegetables, beef (Western Producer, May 22, 1975)> and d a i r y p roducts. 2^ c) t r a n s p o r t a t i o n p o l i c y : As part of i t s t r a n s p o r t a t i o n p o l i c y , the NFU recommends the n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of a l l forms of tran s p o r t a t i o n , i n c l u d i n g the expropriation of Canadian P a c i f i c Limited and i t s merger with'Canadian National. . (Union Farmer, Jan., 1975:6,8) In terms of the foregoing p o l i c y p o s i t i o n s , the NFU ideology may be summarized as occupying the l e f t p o s i t i o n i n Chart 2.1 on regu-l a t i o n of the p r i c i n g and marketing sectors and containing aspects of the r i g h t , centre, and l e f t p o s i t i o n s with respect to production. S p e c i f i c cognitive and evaluative p r e d i s p o s i t i o n s towards the .three sectors of p r i c i n g , production, and marketing - p o t e n t i a l areas f o r the overlap of p o l i t i c s and farming - constitute one fundamental dimension of farmers' p o l i t i c a l b e l i e f systems i n t h i s study. In a d d i t i o n to these s p e c i f i c a t t i t u d e s , other more general b e l i e f s , t y p i c a l l y regarded as important components of ideo l o g i e s , are tapped as w e l l . 50. These include one, b e l i e f s about "how the present s o c i a l , economic and p o l i t i c a l order operates"; two, the values and goals that define how the s o c i a l and economic order ought to be structured; and three, 2 the t a c t i c a l p r e s c r i p t i o n f o r a c t i o n t o r e a l i z e those values and goals. El a b o r a t i o n of the t h e o r e t i c a l and e m p i r i c a l conceptualization of these dimensions occurs as each enters the analyses. I n c l u s i o n of more general o r i e n t a t i o n s ensures the opportunity to uncover higher order f a c t o r s i n the farmers' b e l i e f sets should they e x i s t . In conclusion, a framework f o r mapping those areas of the domain of farmers' b e l i e f systems of i n t e r e s t i n t h i s research has been broadly o u t l i n e d . - As the e m p i r i c a l i n q u i r y proceeds, components of t h a t framework w i l l be more p r e c i s e l y formulated. I n i t i a l l y , however, a d e s c r i p t i o n of the study groups and the procedure by which the data was obtained must be provided. That i s the task of the next chapter. 51. Notes to Chapter 2 1 Gad Horowitz's (1970:47-74) a p p l i c a t i o n of the Hartzian framework to account f o r the r e l a t i v e incidence of conservatism, l i b e r a l i s m , and s o c i a l i s m i n Canada has been the most ambitious e f f o r t to delineate the b e l i e f s and assumptions that characterize Canadian i d e o l o g i e s . This work aside, we are l e f t to i n f e r the i d e o l o g i c a l d i s p o s i t i o n s of Canadians from t h e i r patterns of p a r t i s a n support. 2 The f i v e item p o l i t i c a l e f f i c a c y measure developed by researchers at the Michigan Survey Research Centre i s an e x c e l l e n t example of an American measure widely used by Canadian researchers. (Campbell et a l . . 1954:l87-l89) This measure stresses the e f f i c a c y of i n d i v i d u a l o r i e n t a t i o n s i n the p o l i t i c a l arena. And yet one of the points about which there i s a marked consensus concerning the Canadian p o l i t i c a l c u lture i s that of the r e l a t i v e l y stronger c o l l e c t i v i s t e t h i c i n t h i s country as compared with the United States. The point then i s how r e l i a b l e i s a measure predicated on i n d i v i d u a l i s t assumptions i n a country where those assumptions are much more weakly adhered to? Support f o r the contention that the SRC p o l i t i c a l e f f i c a c y scale (and minimally adopted v a r i a t i o n s thereof) i s predicated on i n d i v i d -u a l i s t i c assumptions i s found i n the discovery of Simeon and E l k i n s (1974:406) that e f f i c a c y f e e l i n g s are highest of a l l among residents of B r i t i s h Columbia, a province of which one subgroup of the c i t i z e n -ry has been described i n i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c terms.(Robin, 1972) In addition,, the authors report that the proportion of Saskatchewan residents with high f e e l i n g s of e f f i c a c y i s r e l a t i v e l y low, a f i n d -i n g most s u r p r i s i n g i n l i g h t of the c o l l e c t i v i s t and cooperative t r a d i t i o n of that province, but one that can be at l e a s t p a r t i a l l y accounted f o r i f the e f f i c a c y items do indeed have an i n d i v i d u a l i s t b i a s . There i s , as w e l l , some evidence that the SRC e f f i c a c y scale does not "work" on a Dutch sample. (Mokken, 1969) The s o l u t i o n would seem to be to buttress the SRC measure with items that tap a c o l l e c t -i v i s t o r i e n t a t i o n , and/or develop a new measure from volunteered statements of Canadian samples. David E l k i n s (1976:000) suggests tha t the SRC e f f i c a c y measure i s probably inadequate to tapping e f f i c a c y o r i e n t a t i o n s i n the United States as w e l l since Almond and Verba (1963) found that among the U.S. respondents, a number of i n d i v i d u a l s voiced a preference f o r group p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n over i n d i v i d u a l a c t i v i t y . 3 I t i s symptomatic of the sporadic a t t e n t i o n to the a g r i c u l t u r a l sector that so few p o l i t i c a l economists and h i s t o r i a n s have deemed i t worth t h e i r while to inquire i n t o governmental programs and p o l i c i e s regard-i n g Canadian a g r i c u l t u r e . Vernon Fowke's work (1946, 1957: Fowke and Fowke, 1968) on the wheat economy was f o r many years the sole contribu-t i o n i n t h i s area. In 1967» the f e d e r a l government commissioned a Task Force on A g r i c u l t u r e f o r the purpose of p r o j e c t i n g a g r i c u l t u r a l d i r e c t i o n s i n the 1970's and proposing p o l i c y i n i t i a t i v e s i n l i n e with those p r o j e c t i o n s . As part of t h i s Task Force, several research papers 52. appeared which examined h i s t o r i c a l l y the r o l e of governments i n the a g r i c u l t u r a l economy. (Garland and Hudson, 1968; Their , 1968; Canadian A g r i c u l t u r e i n the Seventies: 462-4) More recently, Don M i t c h e l l (1975) has analysed the food industry i n Canada and i n the process examined the f e d e r a l r o l e as regards a g r i c u l t u r e . There i s accordingly, not much l i t e r a t u r e upon which to draw. Hence, the summary i n the t e x t r e l i e s , of necessity, upon the work of t h i s hand-f u l of scholars. 4 Garland and Hudson state that programs that involve d i r e c t payments to or on behalf of farmers account f o r 50% of a l l governmental expend-i t u r e s on a g r i c u l t u r e and 60% of f e d e r a l governmental expenditures. P. 343. 5 Supply management " r e f e r s to c e n t r a l i z e d c o n t r o l over the quantity and/or p r i c e of one or more commodities of spe c i f i e d ' q u a l i t y coming from a s p e c i f i e d group of producers to a p a r t i c u l a r market or markets, i n a given period." Canadian A g r i c u l t u r e i n the Seventies: 312. 6 Another d e f i n i t i o n of marketing boards i s that of the Canadian A g r i c u l t u r a l Economics Society which i n 1961 suggested that the marketing board"may be defined as a producer body organized under statute to exercise compulsory c o n t r o l over some or a l l of the stages i n the marketing of a s p e c i f i e d commodity or commodities". See Bob P h i l i p s , "Marketing Boards Are Meant f o r Farmers", The Western Producer, Winnipeg, Thursday, October 10, 1974, p. 4l. 7 The f i r s t marketing board l e g i s l a t i o n that enabled the establishment of f e d e r a l marketing boards i n Canada was enacted i n 1934 under the Natural Products Marketing Act. The 17 marketing schemes which were esta b l i s h e d under t h i s l e g i s l a t i o n were s c u t t l e d i n 1936 when the Supreme Court of Canada and l a t e r the JCPC declared the Natural Products Marketing Act u l t r a - v i r e s f e d e r a l j u r i s d i c t i o n . (This was part of the "New Deal" package R.B. Bennett had introduced and which the L i b e r a l government of MacKenzie King asked the courts t o declare on.) In 1949, the Federal Government s u c c e s s f u l l y enacted the A g r i c u l t u r a l Products Marketing (Canada) Act "which provided enabling l e g i s l a t i o n permitting the p r o v i n c i a l marketing boards to exercise outside of the province i n which they were established the same powers which p r o v i n c i a l l e g i s l a t i o n allowed them to exercise w i t h i n the provinces". See P h i l i p s (1974: 4l) 8 G. A. Hiscocks and T.A. Bennett (1974: 15) report 80 marketing boards i n 1974. Omitted from t h i s f i g u r e are pulpwood and oyster boards and the Quebec manufacturing milk boards. 9 The chicken and egg wars were one manifestation of i n t e r p r o v i n c i a l competition of p r o v i n c i a l marketing boards. When one p r o v i n c i a l market-ing board found i t s e l f with a surplus of eggs - that i s , with more eggs 53. than the consumers i n i t s own province would purchase - i t would t r y to unload those surplus eggs i n a neighbouring province at a p r i c e below the s e l l i n g p r i c e of eggs i n that second province. 10 I t w i l l be r e c a l l e d that the Task Force recommended t h i s be r u l e d out. The Federal L i b e r a l Party has f o r the most part concurred: beef import r e s t r i c t i o n s have been l e v i e d and l i f t e d s p o r a d i c a l l y . 11 See Table 3> "Five Stages of Government Involvement i n Farming: Degree of Government Planning and Control", Canadian A g r i c u l t u r e i n  the Seventies: 280. To put the r a t i n g of Canada i n perspective, i t i s i n s t r u c t i v e to know that China i s placed between 80° and 90° and Russia between 75° and 80° on t h i s same continuum. At t h i s extreme end, a g r i c u l t u r e i s under complete government c o n t r o l and planning and the farmer i s a wage-earning employee of the government. Closer to the Canadian r a t i n g are France and B r i t a i n , both occupying p o s i t i o n s somewhere between 30° and 4-5°. 12. This d e f i n i t i o n of conservatism i s drawn from the f o l l o w i n g sources: C. Ros s i t e r , "Conservatism", I n t e r n a t i o n a l Encyclopedia of the S o c i a l  Sciences ed. E. S i l l s (New York: Macmillan, 1968); J . C. Rees, "Conservatism", A D i c t i o n a r y of the S o c i a l Sciences, eds. J . Gould and W. Kolb (New York: Free Press, 1964), 129-130; Dolbeare and Dolbeare, American Ideologies, Chapters 5 and 10; Herbert McClosky, "Conservatism and Personality", APSR, 52 (March, 1958), 27-45; G. Horowitz, "Conservatism, L i b e r a l i s m and Socialism" (1970:42-74); and Viscount Hailsham, The Conservative Case, (Penquin, Harmondsworth, 1959). 13 This d e f i n i t i o n of l i b e r a l i s m draws upon the f o l l o w i n g sources: Dolbeare and Dolbeare, American Ideologies (1973: Chapters 2,3,4, and 10); G. Horowitz, "Conservatism, L i b e r a l i s m and So c i a l i s m " (1970:64); Robinson, Rusk, and Head, Measures of P o l i t i c a l A t t i t u d e s (1968: Chapter 3); J . W. P i c k e r s g i l l , The L i b e r a l Party (1962:69); James P. Young, The P o l i t i c s of Affluence (1968); Leo Strauss, L i b e r a l i s m Ancient and Modern (1968) 14 The d e f i n i t i o n of s o c i a l i s m r e l i e s on a number of sources of which the p r i n c i p a l ones are Dolbeare and Dolbeare, American Ideologies (1973: Chapters 9 and 10); Horowitz, "Conservatism, L i b e r a l i s m and Socialism" (1970); Leo Huberman and Paul M. Sweezy, Introduction to S o c i a l i s m (1968). 15 NFU Convention Board of D i r e c t o r s Report (Winnipeg: D e c , 1973); A g r i c u l t u r a l Producers C o l l e c t i v e Bargaining and Marketing Act D r a f t  Copy (Winnipeg: D e c , 1973). Here, as f o r a l l references to the source of NFU p o l i c y p o s i t i o n s , the reference i s s e l e c t i v e i n the 54. sense that a l l NFU beliefs and positions outlined recur several times i n one or a l l of the Union Farmer, the NFU Newsletter, The Western  Producer, or other NFU Publications. 16 Proposed Collective Bargaining: Resolution (Saskatoon: NFU, June, 1970), p. 2. 17 National Convention Policy Statements (Winnipeg: Dec, 1973 and and Dec, 1974); Union Farmer (Saskatoon: NFU, Jan., 1975), p. 7. 18 A Critique of the Agricultural Adjustment or Development Policy for Canadian Agriculture (Saskatoon: NFU, June 16, 1971), p. 4. 19 Newsletter (Saskatoon: NFU, A p r i l 28, 1972); "Land Ownership Policy", Union Farmer (Saskatoon: NFU, Jan., 1975), P« 8. 20 "Egg Policy", Union Farmer (Saksatoon: NFU, Jan., 1975), P- 7. 21 For the former see Background Information for the Farmers' Task Force  Grains Policy Hearings (Saskatoon: NFU, n.d.). For the latter see issues of the Union Farmer and Newsletter from July 9 to October 22, 1973. 22 Submission to Alberta Agricultural Marketing Council (Saskatoon: NFU, n.d.), p. 15-16. 23 Proposed Collective Bargaining Resolution (Saskatoon: NFU, June, 1970); "NFU Policy", Union Farmer (Saskatoon: NFU, Jan., 1975). 24 These components of an ideology are outlined by Dolbeare and Dolbeare (1973: 3-7). The delineation conforms to several other notions of ideology which include both cognitive beliefs (generally about the desirability or undesirability of government intervention i n the economy) and s t y l i s t i c orientations (posture toward change). See McClosky (1958); Hikel (1973:5); and Christian and Campbell (1974: 15-18). 55. Chapter 3 The Study Groups In the study of p r a i r i e p o l i t i e s there e x i s t s no more e x c i t i n g chronicle than that recounting the m o b i l i z a t i o n to protest p o l i t i c s of p r a i r i e farmers i n the e a r l y decades of t h i s century. Even today, students dispute the meaning of farmer support f o r the United Farmers of A l b e r t a , the S o c i a l C r e d i t Party i n A l b e r t a , the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation i n Saskatchewan, and the Progressive Party on the p r a i r i e s as a whole. Were such movements manifestations of agrarian r a d i c a l i s m and farmer s o c i a l i s t perspectives? (Lip s e t , 1950) Or, were farmers only de v i a t i n g from t h e i r inherent conservatism i n order to a l l a y severe economic grievances? (Macpherson, 1953) Were farmers not a c t i n g ideo-l o g i c a l l y at a l l , not seeking to implement s o c i a l i s t goals, but only u t i l i z i n g a v a i l a b l e channels to redress economic hardships? (Bennett and Krueger, 1968; Eager, 1968; Naylor, 1972) While the controversy of n e c e s s i t y remains unresolved, i t i s p o s s i b l e to inquire i n t o the "meaning" f o r some farmers of contemporary recruitment to a farm organization r a d i c a l i n i t s objectives. More p r e c i s e l y , given the existence of a current protest farm union, by sampling both members of that organization and non-members, i t i s p o s s i b l e t o trace the l i n k s , i f any, between farmers' membership i n a r a d i c a l farm organization and t h e i r b e l i e f sets. The r a d i c a l farm organization a v a i l a b l e i s the National Farmers Union. In 1969, the National Farmers Union was formed out of the amalgamation of the e x i s t i n g p r o v i n c i a l Farmers Unions. S h o r t l y there-a f t e r , l o c a l organizations were est a b l i s h e d i n most provinces, i n c l u d i n g 56. Alberta. Since then the National Farmers Union has engaged i n both quiet diplomacy and more vociferous confrontation tactics i n the pursuit of clearly defined goals and objectives. (Some of these were outlined i n Chapter 2, pages 45 -49). The NFU leadership has presented briefs and policy proposals to the provincial and federal governments on v i r t u -a l l y every governmental action (or inaction) of consequence to Canadian farmers. Members of the organization have taken part i n r a l l i e s and pickets of agribusiness conglomerates (Bordens, Weston, Kraft), waged a national boycott of Kraft products for several years, and demonstrated on the grounds of Provincial Legislative Assemblies i n Alberta, Saskatchewan, B r i t i s h Columbia, and other provinces. I t was members of this union whose tractors and vehicles blocked a l l access routes into Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island i n August, 1971, and whose President, Roy Atkinson, was ja i l e d as a consequence. Such ac t i v i t i e s have earned i t the reputation of "the most militant and most radical" of present farm organizations. (Brown, 1972:4o) I t i s from this organization, whose membership has been estimated to encompass about 10% of a l l Canadian farmers, that one of the two study groups has been drawn. The sampling design by which farmers i n the NFU and the counterpart "control" group of non-members were drawn i s detailed i n this chapter. In addition, the chapter contrasts the two groups of farmers on an aggregate level and considers the extent to which the two groups represent farmers i n the province as a whole. Selection of the Study Groups Two study groups comprise the data base for this study: 48 farmers who were members of the National Farmers Union i n 1974, and 57. 85 farmers who were not members of that organization at that time. Both groups have been chosen by a design which e n t a i l e d personal i n t e r -views with respondents i n one geographical area of the province and the completion of mail questionnaires by farmers randomly selected i n the province as a whole. Hence, both the member (NFU) and non-member (non-NFTJ) study groups are composed of farmers who were personally interviewed or farmers who returned mail questionnaires which they had completed on t h e i r own. 1. The Interviewed Groups The farmers i n the two study groups who were personally interviewed by the researcher were a l l residents of a geographical area which l i e s , f o r the most part, w i t h i n Census D i v i s i o n 13. Diagram 3.1 shows the l o c a t i o n of t h i s d i v i s i o n i n the province of A l b e r t a . The choice of t h i s farming area as one i n which to sample i n t e n s i v e l y was made f o r two reasons. F i r s t , both s p e c i a l i z e d and mixed farmers produce a d i v e r s i t y of crops i n the area on land that ranges from being marginal to h i g h l y productive farmland. I t includes 9.5$ of the t o t a l farms i n A l b e r t a ; only three census d i v i s i o n s contain more. I t appears to be as representative as any farming area of the province as a whole. Table 3.1 i n d i c a t e s that, i n comparison with the province as a whole, Census D i v i s i o n 13 has smaller farms on the average, both i n terms of the number of acres owned and operated'1' as w e l l as with respect to the estimated market value. There are fewer wheat farms since t h i s area i s outside the wheat growing b e l t . With respect to the socio-demographic character-i s t i c s of the farmers i n the area, while the r e l i g i o u s a f f i l i a t i o n and age composition are s i m i l a r to those of farmers throughout the p r o v i n c e j 58. there are more Eastern-European born farmers i n Census D i v i s i o n 13. With a few caveats, sampling i n t h i s area affords the opportunity to e s t a b l i s h the g e n e r a l i z a b i l i t y of previous studies of the p o l i t i c a l behavior of p r a i r i e wheat farmers e a r l y i n the twentieth century. Second, the area was selected because the National Farmers Union had organized i n the area and sustained a l e v e l of a c t i v i t y 2 roughly equal to that of most other d i s t r i c t s i n the province. The 3 l a r g e s t part of NFU D i s t r i c t 3 overlaps with Census D i v i s i o n 13. NFU D i s t r i c t 3 i n A l b e r t a encompasses a l l farming areas north of the North Saskatchewan River, excepting the Peace River Block, with the eastern boundary l y i n g 12 miles east of Highway 2 North. The area included i n the d i s t r i c t i s roughly demarcated i n Diagram 3«1 where i t can be observed that the overlap of the NFU d i s t r i c t with the census d i v i s i o n i s not p e r f e c t . (The census d i v i s i o n includes two counties - T h o r h i l d and Athabasca - the l a r g e s t parts of which l i e outside the NFU d i s t r i c t i n question.) Five e s t a b l i s h e d l o c a l s e x i s t e d i n NFU D i s t r i c t 3 at the time of the research; members of the NFU study group have been drawn from a l l l o c a l s except the one which had been established i n A p r i l of that year and which was outside the confines of Census D i v i s i o n 13. While the proportion of NFU members to farmers as a whole i s probably not as great i n t h i s d i s t r i c t as i t i s i n some other NFU d i s t r i c t s i n the province, D i s t r i c t 3 had two c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s which made i t d esirable as an area i n which to conduct the personal interviews. F i r s t , a large number of farmers i n the area had experienced and were continuing to f e e l a reduction i n t h e i r income, owing to both a los s of. Diagram 3.1 NFU D i s t r i c t 3 Census D i v i s i o n 13 Table 3.1 A Comparison of Census Division 13 and the Province as a Whole 60. Province Census Division 13 . . . u n 1 . 1 1 — i . n . .II, • .11 . 1 1 . . 1 . 1 . 1 1 .I.I. 1 . M Birthplace Canada 82.7% 82.25 U.S.A. 2.9 3.2 Northern Europe 5.2 3.9 Western Europe 3.3 3.0 Southern Europe 1.2 .2 Eastern Europe 3.3 6.9 Asia, Africa, Other 1.4 .6 100.0 100.0 Religious A f f i l i a t i o n b Anglo-Protestant 0 42.0 38.0 Catholic 26.5 30.6 European Protestant 15.0 18.3 Evangelical Protestant 5.2 4.7 Not a f f i l i a t e d 6.7 5.1 Other religion 4.2 3.3 Jewish .4 -100.0 100.0 d Age Under 25 years 2.5 2.0 25 - 34 years 14.2 13.8 35-44 years 24.1 26.1 45 - 54 years 28.6 28.0 55 - 59 years 11.5 11.3 60 - 64 years 9.1 9.3 65 - 69 years 5.8 5.9 70 years plus 4.2 3.6 100.0 100.0 Size of Farm Average # acres operated 790 487 Average # acres owned 6 506 392 f Average capital value farm $83,603 $54,625 g Primary Product Raised Cattle, hogs^sheep 55.5 65.2 Small grains 19.6 16.6 Mixed 7.7 8.2 Wheat 8.4 1.7 Dairy 5.4 6.8 F i e l d Crops 1.7 .3 Other i 1.7 1.2 100.. 0 100.0 61. Table 3.1 Continued  Codes Si Source of Province Data: Table 35, "Population by B i r t h p l a c e and Sex f o r Canada and Provinces, Rural Nonfarm and Rural Farm, 1971"» Catalogue 92 - 727, 1971 Census. Source of C D . 13 Data: Table 36, "Population by B i r t h p l a c e and Sex f o r Census D i v i s i o n s , 1971", Population, Catalogue 92 - 727, 1971 Census. ^Source of Province Data: "Population by R e l i g i o u s Denomination and Sex f o r Canada and Provinces, Rural Non-Farm and Rural Farm, 1971"» Population, 1971 Census. Source of C D . 13 Data: "Population by R e l i g i o u s Denomination and Sex, f o r Census D i v i s i o n s , 1971", Population, 1971 Census. CThe r e l i g i o u s a f f i l i a t i o n groups include the f o l l o w i n g s p e c i f i c d e n o n ^ r i | i o - P r 6 t e s t a n t : Anglican, Presbyterian, United Church, B a p t i s t C a t h o l i c : Roman C a t h o l i c , Greek C a t h o l i c European Protestant: Lutheran, Greek Orthodox, C h r i s t i a n Reformed E v a n g e l i c a l Protestant: Adventist, C h r i s t i a n A l l i a n c e , Church of C h r i s t , Jehovah's Witness, Mormon, Pentecostal Other r e l i g i o n : S a l v a t i o n Army, H u t t e r i t e , Mennonite, Buddhist, Other dSource of Province and C D . 13 Data: Table 31, "Population, Tenure, Age and Residence of Operator, Type of Organization f o r Census-farms, 1971", A g r i c u l t u r e A l b e r t a , 1971 Census. eSource of Province and C D . 13 Data: Table 31, "Population, Tenure, Age and Residence of Operator, Type of Organization f o r Census Farms, 1971", A g r i c u l t u r e A l b e r t a , 1971 Census. f Table 50, A g r i c u l t u r e A l b e r t a , 1971 Census. sSource of Province and C D . 13 Data: Table 14, "Census Farms with Sales of $2500 or more C l a s s i f i e d by Product Type", A g r i c u l t u r e A l b e r t a , 1971 Census. Small grains: Barley, oats, etc. """Other: Forestry, f r u i t s and vegetables, poultry, 'miscellaneous s p e c i a l t y ' 62. t h e i r crops the previous f a l l to a premature snowfall and a slump i n the c a t t l e market. Secondly, i n seeking compensation f o r t h i s l o s s of income, a number of farmers i n the region had personally p e t i t i o n e d the p r o v i n c i a l government. These two features, combined with the f a c t that another more conservative farm organization, Unifarm, had long been present i n the area, meant that the region afforded a good opportunity to tap farmers of d i f f e r e n t i d e o l o g i c a l persuasions. In June, 197^, a questionnaire was pretested on ten farmers i n the region. The p r e t e s t group included leaders of the two farm organizations i n the province (the National Farmers Union and Unifarm), members of these organizations, and farmers who belonged to n e i t h e r . I t was f e l t that such a range of farmers with both varying degree of a r t i c -ulateness and i d e o l o g i c a l perspective would h i g h l i g h t problems of item d i f f i c u l t y , b i a s , and ambiguity. The exercise was s u c c e s s f u l on a l l three accounts; a number of items were deleted from the questionnaire, other items were added, and the wording of some changed. (These question-naires, because they were not completed by randomly drawn respondents, have not been included i n the analyses discussed i n t h i s report.) An o r i g i n a l target of 50 personal interviews with members of the National Farmers Union and 50 interviews with non-members was set. The sample of NFU members was randomly drawn from a l i s t of current members made a v a i l a b l e to the researcher by p r o v i n c i a l o f f i c i a l s of the NFU. The l i s t s from which the non-NFU members were randomly s e l e c t e d were compiled l i s t s of farmers obtained from the D i s t r i c t A g r i c u l t u r a l i s t s i n the counties of Barrhead, Lac Ste Anne, and Westlock. The D.A. f i l e s were accurate i n the sense that i t was extremely u n l i k e l y that p r a c t i s i n g 63-farmers were absent from them; they were u n r e l i a b l e i n the sense of i n c l u d i n g not only people farming, but as w e l l , people i n t e r e s t e d i n farming. Where possib l e , the l i s t of farmers was v a l i d a t e d by farmers knowledgeable of the area who could eliminate non-farmers. This was, unfortunately, possible i n only one county. Farmers i n both study groups were i n i t i a l l y contacted by a l e t t e r informing them of the researcher's i n t e r e s t i n interviewing them and of the nature of the questionnaire they would be asked to respond t o . Interview dates were set by telephone and the interviews were conducted i n the respondents' homes i n the months of September and October, 1974. The normal length of the interview ranged between two and two and one h a l f hours. That so few farmers f a i l e d t o co-operate and that almost a l l a v a i l e d the researcher of so much of t h e i r time i s , I b e l i e v e , testimony of the extent to which they found the experience an i n t e r e s t i n g one. 5 Of the o r i g i n a l target, three r e f u s a l s , the e l i m i n a t i o n of f i v e farmers who could not be contacted a f t e r three attempts, the removal of two farmers who had been interviewed but who were semi-retired, and the d e l e t i o n of a f u r t h e r two who had been working o f f the farm f o r the past year, brought the f i g u r e s to 4-3 NFU members and kj> non-NFU farmers. 2. The M a i l Questionnaire In order t o augment the s i z e of both study groups and to increase the g e n e r a l i z a b i l i t y of the research f i n d i n g s , the research questionnaire was mailed to a randomly drawn sample of 300 farmers i n the province as a whole. This aspect of the sampling design was beset by a problem which had not been as acute i n the gathering of the personal interviews. The d i f f i c u l t y involved the census d e f i n i t i o n of a 'farmer'. 6 4 . The 196l, 1966, and 1971 census of Canada define a census farm as an agricultural holding of one acre or more with sales of agricultural produce during the preceding twelve months of $50 or more. The de f i n i t -ion i s unduly generous, defining as a farmer anyone who produces foodstuffs grossing at least $50 annually. I t includes as farmers large numbers of people who do not depend upon farming for their livelihood; people, for example, who farm as a hobby or tax dodge; and semi-retired and retired farmers who may continue to produce small quantities of food-stuffs but who are not dependent upon farming (but rather upon pensions) for the major source of their income. The definition admits, as well, corporate enterprises engaged i n farming. The imprecise definition of "farmer" posed problems for the selection of the farmers to whom question-naires would be mailed because this sample was drawn from a l i s t of 848 farmers who had been randomly drawn from the Statistics Canada census l i s t of a l l farmers i n the province of Alberta.^ Three hundred Farmers were randomly drawn from this l i s t by the method of the table of random numbers and questionnaires were mailed to them. Of these, 47 questionnaires were returned by full-time farmers, sufficiently completed to enable their inclusion i n the analysis. A further twelve which were returned were deleted for one of two reasons: the potential respondent was no longer farming or he was receiving the bulk of his income from off-farm employ-ment. In many of the latter instances, the individual had been working off the farm for a number of years. A more precise census definition of 'farmer' would have eliminated such people from the universe of farmers, avoided an unnecessary expense of money and time on the researcher's part, and indirectly could have resulted i n a higher response rate. And, of . 65. . course, there i s no way of knowing how many questionnaires were not returned because the p o t e n t i a l respondent no longer saw himself as f i t t i n g i n t o the category of "farmer". The mail questionnaires returned b o l s t e r the NFU study group by f i v e members to a t o t a l N of 48 and the non-NFU group by a f u r t h e r 42 farmers to a t o t a l N of 85 farmers; these are the groups contrasted i n the fo l l o w i n g analyses unless i t i s s p e c i f i e d otherwise. Comparability of Study Groups To what extent does amalgamation of the mail questionnaires with the interview schedules a l t e r the composition of the two study groups? Since the mail group of NFU farmers i s comprised of only 5 farmers, f o r the purposes of t h i s d i s c u s s i o n the NFU and Non-NFU interview schedules are j o i n t l y contrasted with the combined NFU and Non-NFU mail questionnaires. The comparison of f i r s t l y the two d i f f e r e n t samples i n Tables 3.2 and 3*3, followed by a contrast of.these tables with Table 3-1 i n d i c a t e s that the e f f e c t of adding the mail and interview schedules i s to make the NFU and non-NFU study groups more l i k e the province as a whole than would otherwise have been the case. (This i s p a r t i c u l a r l y true with respect to the Non-NFU group.) Since i t i s the c r i t e r i o n of NFU versus non-NFU (and not interview versus mail) which defines the two data sets i n the t h e s i s a n a l y s i s , the question of the g e n e r a l i z a b i l i t y of research f i n d i n g s revolves around the comparability of the NFU and non-NFU groups (Tables 3.3 and 3.4) and the province as a whole (Table 3-l). 66. Table 3.2 A Comparison of the Interview and Mail Groups Interview (N=86) Mail (N=47) (NFU & Non-NFU) (NFU & Non-NFU) Birthplace Canada United States Northern Europe Western Europe Southern Europe Eastern Europe Religious A f f i l i a t i o n European Protestant Anglo-Protestant Catholic Evangelical Protestant Not a f f i l i a t e d Primary Product Raised Mixed Cattle, hogs Wheat *Feed Grains Dairy Fiel d Crops Other Missing 62.8 80.4 2.3 4.3 5.9 2.2 8.2 . •4.4 20.9 8^ 7 100.1 100.0 30.2 13.6 23-3 38.6 18.6 27.3 12.8 6.8 15.1 13.6 100.0 99.9 66.3 29.8 18.6 34.0 12.8 14.0 6.4 1.2 4.3 _ 2.1 _ 6.4 - 4.3 100.1 100.1 *Feed Grains, as a category used by farmers themselves, approximates the "Small Grains" census category i n Table 3.1 Table 3-3 Mean Market Value, Income, Farm Size, Years of School, and Age of NFU, Non-NFU, Interview and Mail Questionnaire Groups. NFU Non-NFU Interview Mail Market Value $128,800 $150,300 $117,100 $191,600 Net Income $ 5,170 $ 6,870 $ 5,490 $ 9,080 # acres owned 493 588 491 717 # acres operated 915 787 722 1039 # years school 8.6 9-3 8.3 10.5 Age 46.6 48.9 47.6 48.9 67. 1. The NFU and non-NFU Groups and the Province as a Whole . Differences of religious a f f i l i a t i o n , type of farming, and estimated market value of farm prevail.- F i r s t , both the NFU and non-NFU groups d i f f e r from the province as a whole i n being more Eastern-European born, less Anglo-Protestant, and more unaffiliated religiously. The NFU contains more European Protestants than the province as a whole; the non-NFU group, more Evangelical Protestants. I t i s suggested that these differences r e f l e c t the fact that the period of settlement of Northern Alberta (from where the bulk of the NFU group and one half the non-NFU group are drawn) was later than that of Southern Alberta and con-sequently involved more people from Eastern Europe and fewer B r i t i s h and American immigrants. (Hiller:112-115) The differences also ref l e c t the greater tendency of Eastern Europeans to cluster i n one geographical area. (Hiller:123,477-8) The inflated figure for Evangelical Protestants i n the non-NFU group i s the consequence of a large Dutch settlement i n Census Division 13, the Dutch also being an ethnic group with a tendency to cluster. (Hiller:477) Secondly, the two study groups have more farmers engaged i n mixed farming. Since the proportion of "mixed" farmers among the NFU and non-NFU groups i s comparable to that characteristic of a sample of 7 farmers included i n a random survey of the province i n 1971» "the d i f -ferences would appear to be an art i f a c t of the census coding scheme not allowing "mixed" as an admissable category on the criterion of primary product raised. Thirdly, both the NFU and non-NFU farmers report a higher estimated market value for their farms than the 1971 Census farm capital value average. There are two possible explanations here. One, the 68. Table 3.4 Comparison of NFU and Non-NFU Study Groups NFU (N=48) Non-NFU (14=85) Birthplace Canada 12.~5% 61.1% U.S.A. 4.3 2.4 Northern Europe 2.1 5-9 Western Europe 6.4 7.0 Eastern Europe 14.9 17.7 100.0 100.1 Religious A f f i l i a t i o n European Protestant . 31'9 20.5 .Anglo-Protestant 25.5 30.1 ' Catholic 23.4 20.5 Evangelical Protestant 6.4 13.3 Not a f f i l i a t e d 12.8 15-7 100.0 100.1 Primary Product Raised Mixed 55-3 52.3 Cattle, hogs 27.7 22.1 Wheat 4.3 4.7 *Feed grains 12.8 10.5 Dairy - 3-5 Field Crops - 1-2 Other - 5.8 100.1 100.1 *This category i s similar to the "Small Grains" category i n Table 3-1 differences could be the spurious effect of the census data having been gathered i n 1971 and the study group data i n 197^. The trend over this period has been towards larger and more capital intensive farms. A second possible explanation i s that farmers, fearful of census inform-ation f a l l i n g into the hands of income tax o f f i c i a l s , under-value their farm value for census-taking purposes. 69. Whether the unrepresentativeness of the study groups on these characteristics w i l l limit the generalizability of the research findings w i l l , of course, be contingent upon the extent to which these factors are important determinants of farmers' belief systems. 2. NFU versus Non-NFU Groups And f i n a l l y , since the focus of the thesis i s upon these groups, i t may be useful to note b r i e f l y the similarities and.differences of the NFU and non-NFU farmers. In terms of Tables 3-3 and J>.k, any differences of education, age, and type of farming engaged i n are slight. The non-NFU farmers assess the market value of their farms as greater and declare sli g h t l y higher net incomes. They own slig h t l y larger farms, although they do not operate more acres. The non-NFU group i s slig h t l y less Canadian and s l i g h t l y more Eastern European born. I t has, compared to the NFU group, more farmers with Evangelical Protestant a f f i l i a t i o n s and less with European Protestant t i e s . In general, then, the non-NFU group seems to be slightly better off, and i s less Canadian-born and less orthodox i n i t s religious a f f i l i a t i o n . With the sampling method defined and the nature of the two study groups described, i t i s now possible to move to the empirical inquiry into the content of farmers' p o l i t i c a l belief systems. 70. Notes on Chapter 3 1 The number of acres owned may differ from the number of acres operated since farmers may farm land that they rent or lease. 2 There are NFU districts, such as the district encompassing the Peace River Block, where membership is higher. There are also parts of the province - south of the city of Red Deer - that have not yet been organized by the NFU. 3 The United Farmers of Alberta district organizations, established in the early part of the twentieth century, served as guidelines in the setting of NFU district boundaries. 4 The alternative to using these lists of District Agriculturalists was to compile a l i s t of farmers from the County and Municipal maps. This approach was rejected because the D.A.'s lists had been drawn from such maps and because for two of the three counties no current map could be obtained. Those available were described as being hopelessly outdated as a result of the high turnover of land in some areas. 5 In the case of the refusals, one farmer was in the midst of harvesting; another was angry with "snoopy governmental officials" and could not be persuaded that the interviewer was not one; and the third had reluctantly agreed to an interview time but was absent from his home when the researcher arrived. 6 This l i s t of 848 farmers was compiled by officials in the Federal Department of Agriculture for the Alberta Department of Agriculture. It was generously made available to me by Mr. Hugh Bryce of the Marketing Division of the Alberta Department of Agriculture. 7 62.5$ farmers (N=l44) described themselves as mixed farmers in the Alberta 1971 post-electoral survey. The principal researcher of this Canada Council sponsored project was Professor Richard Baird, Department of Political Science, University of Alberta. 71 Chapter k Cognitive Beliefs: How the System Works This chapter and the subsequent one document the content of selected aspects of farmers' cognitions, and evaluations of the marketing and p o l i t i c a l systems in which they function. Both chapters examine i n detail the attitudes by which the two groups of farmers can be distinguished. In order to f a c i l i t a t e a general appraisal of the perspectives of the two groups, conservative, l i b e r a l , and radical responses are defined on each of the dimensions. I t thereby becomes possible to examine the "ideological" consensus within each of the two study groups (NFU and non-NFU members) as well as the "ideological" contrasts betweeen the two groups. This analysis, pinpointing as i t does a few important inter-group differences i n the midst of several similarities of perspective, suggests the sl i g h t l y greater extent to which the attitudes of the NFU members predispose them to collective and p o l i t i c a l action. Findings are reported i n two steps. F i r s t , a profile of the two study groups is outlined: the views of the NFU members and NFU non-members are reported and contrasted. And secondly, by way of establishing the status of these evaluations and cognitions as enduring responses, the inter-item association of the individual measures within each of the two groups is detailed. The strength of association is generally such as to affirm the attitudinal status of these responses. 72. I. The Perceived Locus of Control As part of i t s world view, an ideology includes assumptions about causation - "the frame of reference with which the ideology under-stands events and processes"."1" Dolbeare and Dolbeare argue that conservat-ism and liberalism may be distinguished from more radical ideologies i n their tendency to search for the causes of events i n individual actions. (1973: 26l) The strength of individualism as a component of a l i b e r a l perspective means that individuals are held responsible for their own actions and lot i n l i f e . This assumption of individual causation occurs as well i n some strains of conservatism (individualist conservatism) but not i n others (organic conservatism). For socialists, on the other hand, a causal analysis i s usually a structural analysis and one which focuses on phenomena external to individuals. Since p o l i t i c a l power resides with economic forces, the explanation of p o l i t i c a l events w i l l include a focus upon the economic system. (Dolbeare and Dolbeare: 262) I t i s suggested that ideologies, or more specifically, conserv-atism and radicalism/socialism can be distinguished i n terms of their assumptions regarding the perceived locus of control. Psychological journals have in the past two decades abounded x^th articles treating 2 just such a variable as a personality attribute. I t i s , however, be-coming increasingly clear that the variable taps ideological beliefs as well. Repeated factor analyses on different samples of the internality-externality measure developed by Rotter et a l . to tap a belief i n internal-external control have yielded several analytically distinct components. Mirels found two factors which he labelled Feelings of Personal Mastery and Feelings of P o l i t i c a l Control: the former measures "a belief concerning 73. f e l t mastery over the course of one's l i f e " ; the second, "a belief concern-ing the extent to which the individual citizen i s deemed capable of exerting an impact on p o l i t i c a l institutions". (1970: 226-228) The latter, I suggest, i s what scholars typically refer to as a feeling of p o l i t i c a l efficacy. The research of Gurin and associates showed the Rotter measure to be multi-dimensional i n the sense of tapping not only the two dimensions which Mirels isolated but, i n addition, an Individual versus Systemic Blame factor and an Individualistic versus C o l l e c t i v i s t Orientation factor."^ The Individual versus Systemic Blame factor i s interpreted as an assessment of whether individual qualities of the person or social system factors are perceived as key determinants of his fate. The Individualistic versus Co l l e c t i v i s t Orientation factor i s viewed as distinguishing between individu-als who advocate individual effort and mobility rather than group action as the best way to realize goals. It i s posited here that three of the four dimensions of locus of control isolated by Gurin and associates are important i n distinguishing the conservative or l i b e r a l from the radical/socialist: Control Ideology, Individual versus Systemic Blame, and Individualist versus C o l l e c t i v i s t Orientation. The Personal Control factor, which seems to measure whether the individual feels he has control over his own l i f e appears to be both a reality-testing measure as well as a personality variable and not necess- a r i l y an ideological one. The more general Control Ideology dimension allows for the poss i b i l i t y that while the individual may feel he has personal control over his own " l i f e space", people i n general do not. The Individual versus Systemic Blame dimension is -perceived by the researcher 74. to be a more specific measure than Control Ideology but one of the same essential type: whether the individual blames himself or external others for what happens to him w i l l reflect and be dependent upon the role he accords to internal and external forces i n determining events as a whole. Conservatives and liberals w i l l be internally oriented on the whole and attribute a larger determinant role to internal (individual) factors than to external forces. The socialist/radical would do the opposite. With respect to the third dimension, the c o l l e c t i v i s t versus individualist orientation, conservatives and liberals would again be individually orient-ed; radical/socialists, collectively oriented. The NFU o f f i c i a l view i s of control externalized from individual farmers. Because of this situation, one unified national organization of farmers i s a pre-requisite to governments' inviting farmers into their chambers to allow farmers a say i n the important decisions that affect their li v e s . The locus of control w i l l continue to l i e outside the individual farmer, but w i l l be shared by governments, farmers through their farm organizations, and other appropriate 5 organizations. In this research three aspects of internality-externality of locus of control are examined: individual versus systemic blame, the proclivity towards individualist or c o l l e c t i v i s t action, and the sense of personal control. This analysis i s viewed as a means by which to establish the parameters of farmers' belief systems; more specifically, the salience of the external world to their l i v e s . A. Individual versus Systemic Blame Three items are used to tap this locus of control dimension. Farmers were queried as to where they view control as residing i n two current-problem areas: the cost-price squeeze and the decline of the family 75. farm. A third item assesses responsibility for a more ongoing d i f f i c u l t y - farmers lack of success at obtaining "a good deal" from governments. In a l l instances, questions were open-ended; internality-externality i s thus assessed on the basis of volunteered responses. 1. Attribution of Blame for the Cost-Price Squeeze Most Canadian farmers have i n the past few years been experien-cing what has come to be known as a cost-price squeeze. Very simply this term refers to the costs of production ri s i n g at a more rapid rate than the prices farmers receive for their produce so that profits are minimal or non-existent. Because this phenomenon i s one of which v i r t u a l l y a l l farmers are aware (87% of the to t a l study group) as well as one which four-fifths were experiencing, i t was f e l t that information concerning both whom they blamed for the squeeze and who they f e l t could do some-thing about i t would provide a measure of the internality-externality of control. Two questions were posed to the farmer. "Who or what i n your opinion i s to blame for the cost-price squeeze?" "Is there anything any-body can do about the cost-price squeeze?" Responses to the two queries are reported i n Table 4.1. The two groups of farmers externalize both the blame for the cost-price squeeze and the locus of control to do something to halt i t : the former principally to extra-governmental forces, the latter mainly to the government. The extra-governmental forces blamed for the squeeze i n order of the frequency with which they are mentioned, include big businesses and/or corporations, speculators, labour and strikes, and a host of less tangible forces - inflation, society as a whole, the energy c r i s i s , the 76. Table 4.1 Individual versus Systemic Blame Regarding the Cost-Price Squeeze: NFU and Non-NFU Groups. NFU (N=48) Non-NFU (N=85) a. Who is to blame? Extra-Governmental forces 44.7% (21) 43.9% (36) Government with others 25.5 (12) 25.6 (21) Government alone 19.1- ( 9) 20.7 (17) Farmers: alone/with others 10.6 ( 5) 9.8 ( 8) missing data ( 1) ( 3) 99-9% 100.0% b. Can anybody act re squeeze? Government 55.6% (25) • 52.1$ (38) Nobody 20.0 ( 9) 24.7 (18) Farmers . 17.8 ( 8) 9.6 ( 7) Gov't. & Farmers 4.4 ( 2) 4.1 ( 3) *Extra-Governmental Forces 2.2 ( 1)' 6.9 ( 5) Gov't. & Extra-Gov'tal Forces — 2.7 ( 2) Missing data ( 3) (12) 100.0% 100.1% ^Includes "Society as a whole" and the specification of middlemen. monetary system, international forces, human nature, supply and demand, and consumers. NFU members are slig h t l y more inclined to single out big business; non-NFU farmers to blame labour and strikes. When the government i s blamed (either the Federal or Provincial Government, sometimes both), i t i s more frequently for doing nothing to alleviate the squeeze than for creating or exacerbating i t by interfering actions. While one-fifth NFU farmers and one-quarter non-members f e e l there i s nothing anybody can do about the cost-price squeeze, over one-half the farmers i n both study groups point to either the Federal or Provincial government as capable of acting on the squeeze. The implication i s that farmers i n both groups do not see the problem - or the world, for that matter - as being so complex that they cannot identify who has the power or responsibility to deal with the problem a f f l i c t i r i g them. 77-2. Attribution of Blame for the Disappearance of the  Family Farm Whereas the cost-price squeeze i s an immediate problem which confronts farmers daily, the decline of the family farm as Canadians have knoxm i t may be a more remote but no less real concern. In the last decade, the migration from farm to urban centre has accelerated. I t i s estimated that currently 10,000 farmers leave the land every year. (Mitchell: 6) Why? In most farmers' minds, i t i s the cost-price squeeze and income problems generally that are to blame. Table 4.2 gives the relevant figures for the two farmer groups. As blame for that squeeze i s most frequently externaliz-ed, i t may be concluded that the source of this problem i s seen to l i e outside farmers themselves. Table 4.2 Attribution of Blame for the Disappearance of the Family Farm: NFU and Non-NFU Groups NFU (N-48) Non-NFU (N-85) Cost-price squeeze Squeeze & unattractiveness Unattractiveness of farming Squeeze & farmers' fault Gov'tal. Policy Farmers' fault Gov't. & Farmers' fault Gov't. & unattractiveness Farmers' fault & unattract. missing data 60.4$ (29) 57.8# (48) 16.6 ( 8) 24.2 (20) 10.4 ( 5) 6.0 ( 5) 4.2 ( 2) 2.4 ( 2) 2.1 (1) 2.4 ( 2) 2.1 (1) 3.6 ( 3) 2.1 (1) — -_ 2.4 ( 2) 2.1 (1) 1.2 (1) ( 2) 100.0^ 100.0^ 3. Attribution of Blame for Farmers' Lack of Success  with Governments Following a series of questions assessing the respondent's evaluations of the a b i l i t y of farmers to "get a good deal" from the Provincial and Federal Governments, those farmers who assessed that record as "generally unsuccessful" were asked why they thought farmers and farm ' 78. organizations had been unsuccessful. Reasons volunteered have been collapsed into categories which a f f i x the blame to farmers and/or farm organizations, to government(s), to both farmers and government, or to the minority position of farmers i n the total population. The latter i s a "non-blame" response - the gist of this response being that because the urban areas and consumers have the majority of the votes, and farmers are a p o l i t i c a l minority, the government i s necessarily preoccupied with urban, and consumer problems and demands. Table 4.3 Attribution of Blame for Farmers' Relative Lack of Success -with Governments: NFU and Non-NFU-Groups NFU (N=48) Non-NFU (N=85) Farmers' fault 58.3^ (28) 32.9^ (27) Gov't.'s fault 14.6 ( 7) 13.4 (11) Minority Position 8.3 ( 4) 28.0 (23) Gov't. & Farmers' fault 6.3 ( 3) 2.4 ( 2) missing data ( 3) Inapplicable - farmers 12.5 ( 6) 23.2 (19) been successful 100.0% 99.9^ Table 4.3 indicates that while non-members of the NFU divide between blaming farmers themselves and not blaming anyone for farmers' relative lack of success, NFU members are much more inclined to a f f i x the blame to farmers themselves - to farmers for being too individualistic and self-centred to organize themselves into unions, and less frequently for having no understanding of their situation and/or for asking for too much. The fault i s also seen to l i e with weak farm organizations - weak because of their limited membership and conflicting public utterances. 7 9 . Limited and equal proportions of farmers i n both study groups externalize the blame for farmers' lack of success to the government(s). These farmers blame the government for being apathetic, for being deliberately anti-farmer ("having a cheap food policy"), giving "handouts to pacify farmers when things are rough just to keep farmers on the farm", and for having a Liberal and Eastern-Canadian bias. In short, farmers i n both study groups, even though they may feel that i t i s not their fault personally, but that of a l l the other farmers who are not cooperative, appear to blame themselves more than they blame the government for their perceived lack of success i n getting a good deal from government. NFU farmers extend the locus of control more widely than do non-NFU members, no doubt p a r t i a l l y because they affirm the pos s i b i l i t y of collective action by NFU members to achieve desired goals. B. The Individualist versus C o l l e c t i v i s t Orientation Two open-ended items, one slig h t l y more directed than the other, ascertain the in d i v i d u a l i s t - c o l l e c t i v i s t orientation of farmers i n the two study groups. 1. A b i l i t y of farmers to act regarding the Cost-Price Squeeze A presupposition to both a c o l l e c t i v i s t and an individualist orientation to solving problems i n the p o l i t i c a l arena i s the belief that one can be effective at a l l . There are important differences i n the study groups concerning this belief. F i r s t l y , when asked whether there was "anything you can do about the cost-price squeeze", whereas one-third of the NFU members f e l t there was not, the figure climbed to k6% for the non-NFU farmers. (See Table k.k) Clearly, more so for non-NFU members than 80. for members, the locus of control to deal with a current problem l i e s 7 outside themselves. These differences are not entirely the art i f a c t of the comparison of members of an organization (and presumably individuals who believe i n the efficacy of their action) with non-members since just under two-fifths of the latter do indeed belong to another farm organization. Secondly, as anticipated, NFU members are much more collectively directed than non-members, suggesting that they could do something about the squeeze by organizing and supporting a farmers' union or by striking or engaging i n a withholding action. The kinds of acti v i t i e s mentioned more frequently by non-members were actions they could undertake on their own - such as controlling their own spending and trying to keep their costs down, cutting back production, working harder, and even, as a last resort, quitting farming. Table k.k Individualist versus C o l l e c t i v i s t Action on the Cost-Price Squeeze: NFU and Non-NFU Groups. NFU (N=48) Non-NFU (N=85) S o c i a l / p o l i t i c a l activity No action possible Personal/nonpol. activity Social & personal activity missing data 45-75 32.6 19.6 2.2 I (21) (15) ( 9) ( l ) ( 2) 20.2$ h6A 29.8 3.6 (17) (39) , (25) ( 3) ( l ) 100.1$ t 100.0$ 2. A b i l i t y of farmers to organize as a p o l i t i c a l group As a second estimate of collective versus individual orientations, farmers were questioned as to the po s s i b i l i t y of their organizing p o l i t i c a l l y . The import of the question was organization i n the form of a p o l i t i c a l group rather than an interest group: the question was "What do you think about the 81. idea of farmers organizing together to form a p o l i t i c a l group today, nominating candidates and t r y i n g to get them elect e d i n order to form the government here i n Alberta? Do you think i t ' s a r e a l i s t i c idea - that i s , Q i s i t l i k e l y that farmers could get together and form a p o l i t i c a l group?" While one-quarter of non-members a f f i r m the p o s s i b i l i t y of t h i s , J>6% of NFU members f e e l farmers could organize i n t o a p o l i t i c a l group. (These fi g u r e s are given i n Table 4.5) Those who r e p l i e d i n the negative were probed as to t h e i r skepticism of a farmers' p o l i t i c a l organization. Contrary to the e a r l i e r i n c l i n a t i o n f o r NFU members to be more i n c l i n e d to blame farmers and farm organizations f o r farmers not g e t t i n g a b e t t e r bargain from government, i t i s now non-members who pose l i m i t a t i o n s of farmers as the greatest obstacle to t h e i r c o l l e c t i v e p o l i t i c a l m o b i l i z a t i o n . NFU farmers are s l i g h t l y more l i k e l y to r e f e r to the minority s i t u a t i o n of farmers i n the population (and hence p o l i t i c a l l y ) than to a t t r i b u t e s of farmers and t h e i r organizations i n denying the f e a s i b i l i t y of forming a p o l i t i c a l group of farmers. Table 4.5 A b i l i t y of Farmers to Organize as a P o l i t i c a l Group: NFU and Non-NFU Groups Could organize Unable to organize . Farmers' f a u l t M i n o r i t y s i t u a t i o n Both farmers' & minority Missing data NFU (N=48) Non-NFU (N=85) 36.0% (15) 31.0 33-0 (13) (14) ( 6) 25.7% (18) 45-7 22.9 5.7 (32) (16) ( 4) (15) 100.0% 100.0% 82. The implication, then, i s that i f control i s to reside i-ri-th farmers, for NFU members i t i s by means of a collective action on the part of farmers through an interest group rather than a p o l i t i c a l organization. Non-members of the NFU, on the other hand, maybe because of the lower v i s i b i l i t y of the interest group as a vehicle of action, possibly as well because they deny i t s v i a b i l i t y , are more l i k e l y to feel that any effective action w i l l be an individual one. Thus, while there are no differences i n the two groups i n the externalizing of fault for two current economic problems, there are discrepancies i n the mode of action that farmer i n i t i a t i v e s ought to take to secure p o l i t i c a l goods. The foregoing cognitions are parameter beliefs - their occur-ence affirms a perception of the relevance of the external world to the farmer's l i f e and outlook. Before leaving these items, their inter-associ-ation pattern i s examined to substantiate their character as enduring cognitions; their association with lik e items confirms their status as attitudes rather than as opinions. Because of the multiplicity of tables engendered by the inter-item tabulations of the locus of control measures, only the general trends of these tables are reported i n the text. The tables themselves, and a more detailed summary of their results are reported i n Appendix A. The cross-tabulation of individual locus of control items within the NFU group"^ reveals three consistent patterns. F i r s t , NFU members are consistent i n their belief i n the a b i l i t y of farmers to organize or engage i n joint action. Secondly, farmers who aff i x blame externally for one current problem tend to view the locus of responsibility to correct that problem as external to the farmer. Conversely, those who 83. blame farmers themselves for one problem are inclined to blame farmers for other problems. Thirdly, NFU members who hold farmers themselves responsible for their lack of success with governments and who affirm the v i a b i l i t y of farmer action on a current problem view power external-ized to governments rather than to extra-governmental forces. Conversely, NFU farmers who judge the locus of.control i n one problem area to reside with extra-governmental forces deny the poss i b i l i t y of farmer action to correct the problem. Among non-NFU farmers, inter-item cross-tabulations indicate the following trends. F i r s t l y , non-members are f a i r l y consistent i n affixing blame to a given problem. Secondly, there i s congruence i n suggesting the limited p o s s i b i l i t y of a collective action on the cost-price squeeze and feeling farmers could organize p o l i t i c a l l y . Thirdly, there i s a limited indication that individuals who attribute the cost-price squeeze and/or farmers? lack of success with governments to characteristics of farmers themselves are more c o l l e c t i v i s t i c a l l y oriented. In short, there appears to be sufficient inter-item consistency within both groups to assure that these are f a i r l y stable perspectives regarding the internality-externality of the locus of control i n these problem areas. C. Sense of Personal Control While a conservative economic position as regards agriculture i can sometimes be distinguished from a l i b e r a l or radical one i n terms of i t s perception of the way in which the economic system works, 84. there is as well an important element of reality-testing involved. However, how the individual orients himself and where he affixes blame and credit in light of this reality-testing probably does distinguish ideologies. That is, i t is not the cognitions themselves but the evaluat-ions pursuant upon those cognitions that are ideological. In the following section which describes how farmers perceive the system in which they market their produce and buy their supplies, the items are probably most correctly viewed as realistic assessments of the degree of personal control. By way of a preface to subsequent findings, i t may be signific-ant to note that analysts of the agricultural marketing and price system are virtually unanimous in the observation that farmers have no ability to control the price of their product or the cost of their supplies. This sentiment, argued in i t i a l l y by V.C. and D.V. Fowke (1968:210) has been more recently seconded by H. Bronson who describes farmers as operating in "a controlled and manipulated market". (1972:123) Don Mitchell expands upon Bronson's conclusion: Only agricultural resources and products, like land, wheat and livestock, have their price fate determined so completely by shifts in supply and demand and by the speculative activity of grain brokers and petty investors. Other goods and services under capitalist production and markets are priced by the companies involved, primarily according to costs of production and profit objectives. (1975:56) 1. Perceptions of the Pricing System: How i t Works Clearly, farmers perceive themselves as functioning in a system in which they have no control over either the prices they receive for the produce they sell or the price they pay for the goods and supplies they buy. When questioned, "How much control does the farmer have over the prices he receives for his produce?", 94 % of NFU members and 79% of 85. non-members said "none". NFU members are significantly more l i k e l y to fee l they have no control at a l l over prices: only 6 per cent of this group i n contrast to 17.5 per cent of the non-member group f e e l farmers have "a l i t t l e " control over farm prices. Only sli g h t l y more farmers i n both groups fe e l they have as l i t t l e control over the cost of their supplies. Again, 94% of NFU farmers responded with "none" when queried as to the amount of control the farmer has over the costs of supplies like building materials, fuel, f e r t i l i z e r s , and machinery. The non-NFU farmers are not far behind; 85% of them state they have no control over input costs. The remainder of both groups assessed that control as no greater than "only a l i t t l e " . In short, the farmers' perceptions of the pricing system closely approximate those of p o l i t i c a l economists, and supposedly of real i t y . But although the farmer himself may have none or l i t t l e control, he could s t i l l perceive the system to be one i n which he has as much control as anyone else i f he were to see i t as a non-manipulated system wherein the forces of supply and demand determine prices, or as one i n which producers and consumers alike were subject to governmental control. Tables 4.6 and 4.7 give the range of responses to the questions of who controls the prices of farm produce and farm supplies, respectively.^ There are differences between the two groups of farmers; none, however, are s t a t i s t i c a l l y significant. NFU members attribute more control over farm prices to corporations/middlemen alone or corporations/middle-men and government together. Neither group adhere very strongly to the perception of a free market system: only 6.5% and 17.3% of NFU and non-NFU members respectively believe that supply and demand alone control 86. farm produce prices. However, rion-NFU members are more strongly inclined to suggest that supply and demand has something to do with the fixing of 12 farm produce prices. There i s , as well, greater unanimity among members as to where control resides; non-members divide their responses more evenly among the seven categories. Table 4.6 Perceived Locus of Control over Farm Prices: NFU and Non-NFU Groups NFU (N=48) Non-NFU (N=85) £1 1 Corporations, middleman 2 Corporations & Gov't. 3 Corps. & Supply and demand 4 Corps., Gov't.,^& supply demand 5 Supply & demand 6 Gov't. & supply & demand 7 Government missing data 39.1$ 18 21.3$ (16) 21.7 (10) 14.7 (11) 13.1 ( 6) 12.0 ( 9) 8.7 ( 4) 6.7 ( 5) 6.5 ( 3) 17.3 (13) 6.5 ( 3) 13.3 (10) 4.3 ( 2) 14.7 ( l l ) ( 2) (10) 99.9$ 100.0$ Si Corporations: includes "Big Business"; "Industry"; "Middlemen" such as food processors, chain food stores, the retai l e r , the wholesaler, packing plants; "The Winnipeg Grain Exchange"; "The Commodities Market"; "Speculators"; and "Unions". Supply and demand: refers to "The Consumers" (pressuring government, boycotting); "The International Market"; "The U.S. Market"; and "Supply and demand". The Government: includes "The Canadian Wheat Board"; Marketing Boards; "The Government" (level unspecified) or the Federal and Provincial Government as specified. The perspective of corporate control of farm prices as revealed here by members of the National Farmers Union parallels that of articles in the NFU newspaper which refer to "the existence of a managed market system and an administered price structure by the corporate industrial complex" and the"oligopoly power of r e t a i l food chains making excess profits" 87. I t i s d i f f i c u l t to draw conclusions from Table 4 . 6 . The impression i s that NPU members are somewhat more inclined thannon-members to believe that farm prices are manipulated. NPU farmers appear to believe corporations / 14 and/or middlemen monopolize price setting. On the other hand, the non-NFU group seem to subscribe to a view of there being sufficient "fingers i n the pie" - a p l u r a l i s t i c distribution of control - to ensure that the 15 farmer i s not the victim of anyone's manipulation. While there is no clear perception of monopolistic control over foodstuff prices, there certainly i s with regard to machinery, fuel, and other farm input costs. Table 4 . 7 shows the majority of farmers credit the manufacturer on his own or the manufacturer and the middleman together as determining the price the farmer pays bare. The government i s perceived to have l i t t l e say, either alone or with other agencies. The differences i n the perceptions of NFU and non-NFU members are small. NFU members are more unanimous in viewing control as uni-dimensional and i n the hands of the manufacturer, and secondarily, the middleman. Table 4 . 7 Locus of Control over Input Supplies Costs NFU (N=48) Non-NFU (N-85) aThe manufacturer alone 69.6% (32) 6 l . 0 % ( 47 ) b 0 t h e r s 30 .4 ( l 4 ) 39.0 (50) missing data ( 2) ( 3) 100.0% 100.0% cl The manufacturer alone: responses include "The Manufacturer"; certain specified manufacturers such as machine and fuel companies; "Big Business"; "Industry"; "Corporations". Others: includes "The Manufacturer and Middlemen"; "The Government"; specified middlemen such as "Retail outlets"; "Labour"; "Unions"; "Everyone along the l i n e " ; "Supply and demand"; and combinations of these 88 2. Perceptions of the Marketing System An important aspect of the market system with which the farmers interact i s i t s provision for both "orderly" and "open" marketing of grain (wheat being exempted). Orderly marketing refers to marketing through the Canadian Wheat Board. Canadian Wheat Board marketing i s orderly i n at least two senses: f i r s t l y , every farmer has an equal opportunity to market as ensured by the "orderly" provision of elevator cars throughout the Canadian Wheat Board region; and secondly, every farmer selling to the Canadian Wheat Board i s assured of the same price per bushel of grain, regardless of when he s e l l s . Open marketing i s off-Board marketing - the price the farmer receives i s the price of grain on the day he s e l l s , as established by bidding on the Winnipeg Grain Exchange. There i s no quota system of delivery but rather grain sellers are received on a first-come first-served basis. Accordingly, there i s a greater amount of speculation involved i n off-Board marketing. The merit of the open market system would appear to be higher i n i t i a l prices for the farmer who brings his grain to market early i n the harvesting season. It i s d i f f i c u l t to over-estimate the h i s t o r i c a l significance of the Canadian Wheat Board. When i t was established i n the 1930's as a temporary agency and i n 19^3 as a permanent fixture, the Canadian Wheat Board represented the victorious culmination of a lengthy struggle for a compulsory pooling agency. Since the early 1900's, prairie farmers had been organizing themselves into Grain Growers movements i n an effort to wrest monopoly control over the marketing and sel l i n g of grain from private dealers operating through the Winnipeg Grain Exchange. The significance 89. of the marketing issue manifested i t s e l f i n the sweep of the Progressive Party i n 1921. In 1922, when the Farmers Union of Canada was founded, and later i n the mid 1920's, with the establishment of the three prairie Wheat Pools, the organization of farmers for the drive for the Wheat Board became more intense. Part of that endeavour to persuade governments of farmer support for a monopoly Pool to which a l l farmers would s e l l their grain was a massive campaign to sign up a majority of a l l farmers. Accord-ingly, the eventual establishment of the Canadian Wheat Board and i t s continuation to the present day signalled then and continues to do so today a tangible symbol of the force of collective farmer mobilization. Farmers were asked whom they f e l t to be the beneficiaries of open marketing. The question, admittedly, does not necessarily e l i c i t an ideological position. The respondent who believes the farmer is not the beneficiary of open marketing may be a proponent of regulated marketing and hence may be a non-conservative economically. He could, on the other hand, feel the farmer i s not the beneficiary because the free market is not acting properly (that i s , as i t should) because individuals or the government are meddling with i t , and were there to be no meddling, a l l would be well with the free market and the farmer. As Table 4.8 shows, while sli g h t l y more than one-half the non-NFU members believe farmers to be the beneficiaries of the open marketing system, the figure for NFU members i s much lower and i n fact, here, the majority of respondents feel i t i s not the farmer, but speculators and grain companies, who benefit chiefly from open marketing. While not s t a t i s t i c a l l y significant, these differences are substantively important 90. (Gamma: .28) Subsequent analyses show that i t i s clearly those farmers who prefer to s e l l their grain off the Board who fee l that the farmer benefits from the system. Concomitantly, farmers who prefer to market through the Canadian Wheat Board perceive speculators to be the main beneficiaries of open marketing. (Gamma = .83; chi square significant at the .0001 level; Pearson r = .64; significant at the .001 level.) Table 4.8 Perceived Beneficiary of the Open Marketing System: NFU and Non-NFU Groups NFU (N=48) Non-NFU (N=85) Speculators, grain cos. 58.1$ t (25) 42.2$ (27) ^The farmer 37.2 (16) 51.6 (33) Both speculators & Farmers 4.7 ( 2) 6.3 ( 4) ^missing data ( 5) (21) 100.0$ % 100.1$ Speculators: refers to "Private Grain Companies"; "Brokers"; "The Winnipeg Grain Exchange"; and.less frequently, "The Money Man", "Manipulators"; and "Middlemen". ^The farmer: usually includes a qualification as to the type of farmer: "The Bigger Farmer"; "Farmers who can hold off and s e l l when the price i s high"; "Farmers who run feedlots"; "Farmers who buy feed"; and so on. Both speculators and farmers: A few farmers thought both the producer and the speculators benefitted. ^Don't know: The f a i r l y high proportion of "missing" responses on this , item includes replies from farmers for whom the question was not meaningful because they were not presently, or had never marketed grain. Most farmers not presently raising grain for sale had done so in the past and so had a preference. Twenty-six farmers f e l t unqualified to make a choice. The thrust of the discussion to this point has been to establish in a general way how the groups of farmers perceive the functioning of the market system. This brief inquiry has demonstrated both uniformity and diversity i n the cognitions of the market system. Farmers i n the two groups 91. are v i r t u a l l y one i n t h e i r b e l i e f that they f u n c t i o n i n a market system i n which they have no say - or, at best, only a l i t t l e say - i n the p r i c e system as regards both foodstuffs and materials. They concur, as w e l l , i n the judgment of almost monopolistic c o n t r o l by manufacturers to f i x f u e l , machinery, and other supply costs. This degree of concurrence between the farmers' assessments and those of p o l i t i c a l economists i s g r a t i f y i n g and may be taken as one testimony that farmers r e a l i s t i c a l l y assess t h e i r p o s i t i o n i n the market system - at l e a s t as regards t h e i r minimal c o n t r o l over the p r i c e system. Where there i s greater d i v e r s i t y of opinion i s j u s t where we would a n t i c i p a t e i t - on speculation as to the way i n which the market system works. There i s a d i v i s i o n of farmers as to whether the market system i s f r e e , regulated, or manipulated. (See Table 4.8) Some farmers would appear to endorse the assumptions of the free market; others would seem not to. In short, there seems to be a range of perceptions, some of which have i d e o l o g i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s , i n the study group. I I . D i s t r i b u t i o n of Influence i n the P o l i t i c a l System The preceding s e c t i o n has documented both that few farmers i n e i t h e r group saw themselves as having c o n t r o l over p r i c e s and costs of foodstuffs and supplies, and, as w e l l , that only a l i m i t e d number of farmers a t t r i b u t e d much co n t r o l to governmental agencies i n the area of p r i c e f i x i n g . To what extent i s the perception of l i m i t e d personal and governmental c o n t r o l i n t h i s s p e c i f i c area of p r i c e f i x i n g symptomatic of the perceived d i s t r i b u t i o n of p o l i t i c a l c o n t r o l generally? And are there any dif f e r e n c e s between the two groups i n t h i s regard? 9 2 . The recognized relative strength of p o l i t i c a l and economic control i n the p o l i t i c a l system as a whole is an important aspect of an individual's belief system. The s o c i a l i s t ideology•posits an unequal distribution of power whereby those who control the means of production are the most powerful p o l i t i c a l l y i n the sense of being able to get their way. Large corporations and middlemen, i n the s o c i a l i s t perspective, by controlling the distribution of wealth i n the economic system, have much to say about the distribution of p o l i t i c a l goods and services. A l i b e r a l perspective, on the other hand, tends to view p o l i t i c a l power as more broadly based; p o l i t i c a l power i s p l u r a l i s t i c a l l y and individually dis-tributed. The p o l i t i c a l power of corporations i s counterbalanced by that of the legitimized governing bodies and multiple interest groups which represent the varied interests i n society. In addition, individuals have access to the important decision-makers by virtue of the one man, one vote principle. Like the s o c i a l i s t outlook, the conservative perspective is one of p o l i t i c a l power as economically based. Contrary to the s o c i a l i s t , the conservative evaluates the economic base of p o l i t i c a l power favorably. The NPU" o f f i c i a l view of the distribution and source of p o l i t i -cal power reflects the s o c i a l i s t perspective: the corporate e l i t e i s judged to make the major decisions i n the country. If the p o l i t i c a l authorities appear to act as though uninfluenced by big business, i t i s 17 because their interests are synonymous. In this study, farmers' images of the distribution of power are ascertained by presenting them with the following task. They were handed a card with a diagram of concentric circles and asked to "think of the centre, A, as the place where the important decisions affecting farmers 93. are made. Think of the outer circle, E, as being the place where those people are who do not have any influence in agricultural matters - no say in the important decisions affecting farmers. Think of the other circles, B, C, and D as the places where those people are located who have lesser amounts of influence than the people at A and greater amounts of influence than the people at E". Once presented with this set of instructions, farmers were then requested to assess the position in the set of circles of various persons and groups, including themselves, the Federal and Provincial Ministers of l8 Agriculture, multinational.corporations, and so on. As an i n i t i a l overview of how farmers in the two study groups visualize the distribution of influence in important decision-making, the mean rankings for the two groups for each of the"actors" is given in Table 4.9. Possible ratings of influence range from 1 ("A') to 5 ("E"); a high mean represents less influence in decision-making than a low mean since "1" represents the greatest influence in decision-making and "5" the least. Table 4.9 Mean Influence Ratings of Selected Political Actors: NFU and Non-NFU Groups NFU (N=48) Non-NFU (N=85) Political Actor Mean S.D.* Mean S.D. Multinational corps. i . 4 a .77 1.9 1.16 Fed. Minister Agric. 1.7 .76 1.6 .85 Packing plants 1.7 .81 1.9 • 91 Chain food stores 1.8 .94 1.9 1.09 Min. Can. Wheat Board 1'9» .83 1.8 .84 The banks 1.9 1.06 2.3 1.38 Winnipeg Grain Exchange 2.0 1.00 2.1 1.03 Prov. Minister Agric. 2.3 1.02 2.1 .98 Can. Pacific Railway 2.3 1.19 2.5 1.26 U.S. Gove rnment 2.3 1.20 1.9 1.02 94. Table 4.9 cont'd. NFU(N=48) Non-NFU (N=85) P o l i t i c a l Actor Mean S.D.* Mean S.D. Nat'1. marketing bds. 2.8 1.24 2.6 1.15 Prov. marketing bds. 2.9 1.26 2.8 1.17 Average Member P a r i . 3-3 .1.13 3.5 1.27 Average M.L.A. 3-5 1.17 3.5 1.15 N a t ' l , Farmers Union 3.5 1.04 3-5 1.02 Unifarm 3.9 1.11 3.6 1.01 Respondent 4.5 .91 4.6 .68 ^IFU and non-NFU diff e r e n c e s on a 2 - t a i l p r o b a b i l i t y T - t e s t are s i g n i f i c a n t at the .01 l e v e l . ^Standard d e v i a t i o n from the mean. I t can be r e a d i l y observed that there are no s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e s i n the mean rat i n g s of the two study groups, with two exceptions. The average r a t i n g of "multinational corporations" by the two study groups i s s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t . While NFU and non-NFU mean rankings of "The banks" are s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t , the standard d e v i a t i o n i s s u f f i c i e n t l y large to i n d i c a t e a l a c k of s t a b i l i t y of the mean and hence suggests one should not place too much confidence i n i t as a summary s t a t i s t i c . For both groups a mixture of p o l i t i c a l and economic bodies appear i n the top s i x most i n f l u e n t i a l groups (those which have a mean le s s than 2.0): m u l t i n a t i o n a l corporations, the Federal M i n i s t e r of A g r i c u l t u r e , packing plants, chain food stores, the M i n i s t e r i n charge of the Canadian Wheat Board, and the banks ( f o r the NFU group)and the United States Government ( f o r the non-NFU group). I f there i s a v i s i o n of a p l u r a l i s t i c d i s t r i b u t i o n of power, i t i s of a d i v i s i o n of power between top governmental o f f i c i a l s and large corporations and middlemen, and not one which includes farmer i n t e r e s t groups. The study groups are s i m i l a r i n t h e i r judgements of the l e a s t i n f l u e n t i a l groups. Placed 95. at the outer circles are the respondent himself, Unifarm ( a provincial farm organization), the National Farmers Union, and the average M.L.A. and M.P. - i n short, the farmer, his farm organizations, and his most accessible representatives. The farmer apparently feels that his lack of control over prices i n the' market system i s only one aspect of a general incapacity to influence the important decisions i n his l i f e . The a b i l i t y of manufacturers, large corporations, and middlemen (packing plants, chain food stores) to set the prices of input supplies and to a lesser extent, of foodstuffs, is one manifestation of their capability of getting their way on most things. The farmers under scrutiny here do not seem to subscribe to a pl u r a l i s t image of the diffusion of power among conflicting interest groups which represent a l l the interests i n society. Instead, the general perception i s of a concentration of power i n an economic sector and a few top governmental o f f i c i a l s . Perhaps a more reliable indicator than their ranking of where they are i n the set of concentric circles i s the farmers' rating of where they could be. On the latter criterion, the NFU subgroup mean i s 3-0 (standard deviation of 1.2); the non-NFU group mean is 3-3 (standard deviation of 1.3). The NFU rating i s thus somewhat closer to the centre of the circ l e - where the important decision-making takes place. This may reflect the sentiment some members voiced that by working through this national organization, they would be able to get that much closer to the centre of decision-making. The absence of such an organizational vehicle for the non-member group may account for their lower perceived possible influence. 96. The second piece of information needed to e s t a b l i s h the " i d e o l o g i c a l " d i r e c t i o n of the a p p r a i s a l of influence and power i n the p o l i t i c a l system i s the judgement of the appropriateness of that d i s t r i -bution of power - whether i t i s as i t should be. A f t e r farmers had rate d the s e r i e s of actors as to where they were i n the set of concentric c i r c l e s of decision-making, they were asked to assess whether each had "the r i g h t amount" of influence i n decision-making, "too much", or "too l i t t l e " . Respondents 1 evaluations of the appropriateness of decision-making influence of each of the s p e c i f i e d actors are given i n Table 4«10. Farmers i n both groups evaluate middlemen (packing p l a n t s , chain food s t o r e s ) , m u l t i n a t i o n a l corporations, and the United States' Govern-ment as unduly i n f l u e n t i a l ; p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t i e s and farmers' p o l i t i c a l and o r g a n i z a t i o n a l representatives, as u n d e r - i n f l u e n t i a l . The one exception to the l a t t e r i s the M i n i s t e r i n charge of the Canadian Wheat Board. Farmers appeared to be assessing the current incumbent of that p o r t f o l i o rather than the p o r t f o l i o i t s e l f . The d i s t a s t e f u l nature of Mr. Otto Lang's Federal Feed Grains P o l i c y to the majority of farmers surveyed here, may he one f a c t o r that accounts f o r the r e l a t i v e l y lower percentage of farmers who view Lang's p o l i t i c a l i n f l u e n c e as "too l i t t l e " i n comparison to the proportion who assess other p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t i e s as have too l i t t l e decision-making say. There are s l i g h t d i f f e r e n c e s of perspective between NFU and non-NFU farmers. F i r s t , NFU members are more i n c l i n e d than t h e i r counter-parts to judge p r o v i n c i a l and n a t i o n a l marketing boards and the average Member of Parliament and Member of the L e g i s l a t i v e Assembly as having too Table 4.10 Assessments of Appropriateness of D i s t r i b u t i o n of P o l i t i c a l I n f l u e n c e : NFU and Non-NFU Groups ($'s) NFU (N=48) Non-NFU (N=85) Too Right Too Too Right Too much amount L i t t l e much amount l i t t l e Chain food stores 89 11 87 9 4 M u l t i n a t i o n a l corps. 87 11 2 80 14 7 Packing p l a n t s 85 11 4 81 16 3 U.S. Government 74 26 — 68 27 5 Can. P a c i f i c Railway- 56 38 7 59 32 9 Winnipeg Gr a i n Exch. 54 41 5 48 31 21 Banks 44 50 6 45 43 12 Min. Can. Wheat Bd. 24 48 28 37 39 24 Fed. M i n i s t e r A g r i c . 8 43 49 15 48 37 Prov. M i n i s t e r A g r i c . 4 4l 54 4 50 46 N a t ' l . marketing bds. 24 26 50 32 29 39 Prov. marketing bds. 27 20 54 23 32 45 Average M.L.A. — 22 78 6 25 68 Average M.P. — 17 83 9 19 72 Unifarm l l 24 64 1 19 80 N a t ' l . Farmers Union 2 9 89 5 17 77 98. l i t t l e influence. Non-NFU farmers i n greater proportions evaluate national marketing boards as having too much say i n decision-making. Secondly, i n keeping with earlier intimations of a greater open marketing bias, non-NFU members are much more inclined to assess the Winnipeg Grain Exchange as having too l i t t l e influence and the Minister i n charge of the Canadian Wheat Board as having too much say i n important decision-making. Thirdly and not surprisingly, the two groups of farmers exhibit their farm organiz-ational bias: NFU members assessing i n greater proportions the NFU as under-influential; non-members judging the more conservative provincial organization, Unifarm, as having less say than they would l i k e . Four summary measures have been devised to assess the appropriate-ness of the perceived distribution of decision-making power. These indices are: (a) Perceived Under-Influence of P o l i t i c a l Authorities (b) Perceived Over-Influence of Economic Forces (c) Dissatisfaction with Perceived Current Personal Influence (d) Dissatisfaction with Perceived Possible Influence The four measures have a specific empirical and theoretical meaning, (a) Perceived Under-Influence of P o l i t i c a l Authorities The respondents' influence ratings of 16 potential p o l i t i c a l actors and of the respondent's current, desired, and possible decision-making influence were factor analysed to discern the manner in which farmers grouped the various actors. The loadings of actors on the f i r s t factor of the unrotated factor matrix of the NFU and non-NFU groups are presented i n Table 4.11. 99. Table 4.11 The F i r s t Factor of the Unrotated Matrix of Potential P o l i t i c a l Actors: NFU and Non-NFU Groups (Factor Loadings) NFU (N=48) Non-NFU (N=85) Federal Minister of Agriculture .647 .451 Average Member of Parliament -535 .616 Average Member of the Legislative Assembly .547 .804 Minister for the Canadian Wheat Board «447 .498 Provincial Minister of Agriculture .756 .695 Provincial marketing boards -748 .666 National marketing boards .690 .660 National Farmers Union .637 «479 Unifarm .648 .546 Winnipeg Grain Exchange .022 .112 The hanks -.063 .296 Multinational corporations -.324 -.083 Canadian Pacific Railway -.147 .273 Chain food stores -.257 .171 Large packing plants -.331 .292 The U.S. Government -.126 .137 Respondent in .382 .225 Respondent like to be .246 .003 Respondent could be .130 .112 The f i r s t factor which emerges for both farmer groups i s a " p o l i t i c a l " factor. Elected o f f i c i a l s - the Provincial Minister of Agriculture, the average Member of Parliament and Member of the Legislative Assembly -, government authorized boards - provincial and national market-ing boards -, and one farmers' organization - Unifarm - emerge on the f i r s t factor of the unrotated matrix for both groups. The Federal Minister of Agriculture and the National Farmers Union have a sl i g h t l y higher loading on the f i r s t factor i n the NFU group. "Economic forces" load, significantly for neither group. The measure of Perceived Under-Influence of P o l i t i c a l Authorities i s a Likert index constructed by the summation of "too l i t t l e influence" scores on the eight p o l i t i c a l authorities which load at .450 or greater on 100. this i n i t i a l factor: the Federal and Provincial Ministers of Agriculture, provincial and national marketing boards, the average M.P. and M.L.A., the National Farmers Union, and Unifarm. (b) Perceived Over-Influence of Economic Forces This i s a Likert measure as well, the summation of "too much influence" scores on five actors: the Winnipeg Grain Exchange, chain food stores, multinational corporations, the Canadian Pacific Railway, and packing plants. These are the economic actors which load i n common on a separate factor i n a Varimax solution of the factor analysis of the ratings of influence of the actors. (c) Dissatisfaction with Perceived Current Personal Influence This i s a continuous level variable representing the distance between the individual's rating of where he i s i n the decision-making circl e and where he would like to" be. (d) Dissatisfaction with Perceived Possible Influence Also a continuous level measure, i t represents the distance between where the individual feels he i s and where he could be. I t i s thus a measure of the respondent's perception of the openness of the decision-making process. The two groups are contrasted on these four variables i n Table 4.1J. Any differences between them are small. Both are displeased with their present influence and with the distribution of power between p o l i t i c a l and economic actors. Non-NFU members are slightly more optimistic than their counterparts that the decision-making process is open enough that they could have the say i n decision making that they desire ( i f they presumably t r i e d harder)."^ 101. Table 4.13 Summary Indices of Appropriateness of P o l i t i c a l Influence Distribution: . NFU and Non-NFU Groups. NFU Mean (N=48) S.D.* Non-NFU Mean (It 85) S.D. ^Tnder-Infl. Pol. Auth. 4.9 2.2 4 . 4 2.0 b 0 v e r - l n f l . Econ. Forces 3.5 1.3 3 . 4 1.5 Dissat. Current Influence 2 . 4 ' 1.3 2.1 1.4 ^ i s s a t . Possible Influence 6.0 1.5 5.9 1.5 ^Standard deviation "Possible range of scores i s 0 - 8 . ^Possible range of scores i s 0 - 5. Possible range of scores i s 0 - 4. ^Possible range of scores i s 1 - 9 since some people f e l t more influence was possible than they desired. In summary, cognitions and evaluations of the distribution of decision-making influence do not vary much across the two study groups. There i s a slight indication that NFU members are more distressed at being shut out of decision-making circles and particularly, at seeing their p o l i t i c a l and organizational representatives as having been excluded. The ideological perspective of both groups tends more toward a s o c i a l i s t i c perspective than a l i b e r a l or conservative one for both farmer groups. Both members and non-members perceive an improper imbalance of decision-making power on the side of the economic sector. III. Class Structure of Society A more general assessment of respondents' view of the organization of the s o c i a l / p o l i t i c a l world i s their perception of whether society i s structured along class lines and their approval or disapproval of s t r a t i -fication on that basis. I t i s suggested, i n accordance with common 102. assumptions, that a view of society structured along class lines and an approval of that s t r a t i f i c a t i o n characterizes a conservative perspective. The so c i a l i s t , like the conservative, affirms the class nature of society but, unlike the conservative, would reject i t s appropriateness. The l i b e r a l unlike either the conservative or so c i a l i s t , tends to deny that classes exist and that they should exist. In order to tap this dimension, two questions were posed to respondents. F i r s t , "In your opinion, is Canada divided into different social classes like the working class, the middle class, and the upper class?" And secondly, "Should society be divided into different classes?" Responses of the NFU and non-NFU groups to the two questions indicate an acceptance of the r e a l i t y of social class divisions i n Canada and a rejection of i t s appropriateness. Table 4.14 indicates that the NFU group i s sl i g h t l y more l i k e l y than the non-member group to affirm the division of Canadian society along class lines; the differences are not, however, s t a t i s t i c a l l y significant. Both groups are equally adamant i n rejecting the need for a class division of society, with only slightly more than one quarter of each group feeling that there should be classes. Farmers here are an egalitarian l o t . In keeping with the definitions stipulated i n the introduction to this section, conservative, l i b e r a l , and s o c i a l i s t class perspectives were distinguished. Table 4.15 contrasts the two farmer groups on this criterion. I t can be seen that the two groups are slightly different. There i s a greater inclination to subscribe to a s o c i a l i s t class perspec-tive i n the NFU farmer group. While the s o c i a l i s t perspective is the 103. most prevalent among the non-NFU group, there are more farmers i n this set who adhere to a l i b e r a l viewpoint regarding the class structure of society. Table 4.14 Perception and Appropriateness of Class Nature of Canadian Society: NFU and Non-NFU Groups. Perception of classes NFU (N-48) Non-NFU (N=85) Are classes Are not classes Missing data 83.0% 17.0 100.0% (39) ( 8) ( 1) 75-9% 24.1 100.0% (63) (20) ( 2) Appropriateness of classes Should be classes Should not be classes Missing data 26.1% (12) 73.9 (34) ( 2) 100.0% 27.8% 72.2 100.0% (22) (57) ( 6) Table 4.15 Ideological Perspective on Class Nature of Canadian Society: NFU and Non-NFU Groups Conservative Liberal Socialist Missing Data NFU (N=48) 26.1% 13.0 60.9 100.0% (12) ( 6) (28) ( 2) Non-NFU (N=85) 27-32 24.7 48.1 100.1% (21) (19) (37) ( 8) 104. This chapter has demarcated cognitions of two groups of Alberta farmers on a number of aspects of the locus of control i n current problem areas, the pricing and marketing systems, and p o l i t i c a l decision-making, and indirectly, i n the organization of society along class lines. These cognitive beliefs have included both general and specific objects of appraisal. Throughout the discussion, the concern has been mainly to describe the differing perspectives of the two groups of farmers with the objective of highlighting suggestions of divergent ideological perspectives. Because these measures are mostly single item indices (and have not been extracted from a pool of attitudinal items sorted into unidimen-sional scales by a multivariate procedure such as factor analysis) i t becomes important to examine their pattern of inter-relationship' to elaborate upon their meaning. The inter-item association of these measures enables an understanding of their spe c i f i c i t y - generality, and i n so doing, provides information concerning the extent to which they are enduring responses. IV. The Structure of Cognitive Beliefs This section examines inter-item associations for the two farmer groups (separately) on the following set of measures: 1. Control i n the pricing and marketing system: - corporation control over prices of farm produce - manufacturer control over costs of supplies - speculators as beneficiaries of open marketing 2. Control i n p o l i t i c a l decision-making: -perceived over-influence of economic forces -perceived under-influence of p o l i t i c a l authorities' -dissatisfaction with current personal influence -dissatisfaction with perceived possible influence 3. Class structure of society: -conservative/liberal/socialist perspective 105. For the purposes of these analyses, eleven members of the NFU who hold membership i n another farmers' organization, Unifarm,are removed from the NFU group. The o f f i c i a l statements of Unifarm reveal quite dissimilar points of view on a number of issues to those held by o f f i c i a l NFU spokes-men. I t i s believed that the remaining 37 farmers are more ideologically representative of the National Farmers Union than the original 48, and i t is these 37 who comprise the NFU group i n the following discussion. Inter-item associations for the NFU and non-NFU groups are given i n Tables 4.16 and 4.17, respectively, (l) Pricing and Marketing Systems: Cognitive Structure (a) The NFU Group While NFU farmers agree that forces other than themselves control the marketing system, there i s a limited accord as to just where control resides. There i s no association between believing that corporat-ions f i x farm prices and that manufacturers control input costs or that speculators benefit from open marketing. There i s a weak positive association between believing manufacturers control costs and that i t is the nonfarmer who benefits from open marketing. This limited structuring among beliefs i s i n part the consequence of limited variance on a number of these items: of this reduced group, 72% suggest that corporations control farm prices, 6l% that speculators benefit from open marketing, and 69% that the manufacturer controls the cost of farm input supplies. (b) The Non-NFU Group While individuals who hold that corporations alone establish farm prices tend also to believe that manufacturers independently control input costs, they do not also believe that speculators are the. chief 106. beneficiaries of the free marketing system. This latter "non-association" i s i n keeping with the preference of non-members to market their grain off the Board. ( 2 ) P o l i t i c a l Decision-Making: Cognitive Structure (a) The NFU Group There i s a strong tendency for NFU farmers to judge p o l i t i c a l authorities as under-influential i f they also regard the economic sector as unduly powerful. Assessing the economic sector as over-influential i s associated with both wanting more influence than the respondent feels he has and that he feels he could have. There i s , however, no similar association between the latt e r two items and with evaluating p o l i t i c a l authorities as less powerful than they ought to be. This finding, i n light of the strong positive relationship between perceiving the economic sector as unduly dominant and the p o l i t i c a l l y authorized bodies as relatively less forceful suggests that the sort of redistribution of power NFU members are looking for i s one that places more say i n their own and not their p o l i t i c a l authorities' hands. An independent s t a t i s t i c a l technique confirms that NFU farmers operate on the assumption that more power for the economic sector necess-a r i l y means less for p o l i t i c a l authorities and the respondent himself. An oblique rotation of the factor analysis of the potential p o l i t i c a l actors from which the measures of Perceived Under-Influence of P o l i t i c a l Author-i t i e s and Over-Influence of Economic Forces have been constructed resulted in the emergence of six factors for the NFU group, one of which is an economic factor on which the economic actors (the Winnipeg Grain Exchange, Table .4.16 Inter-Item Association (Pearson r*) of Locus of Control Measures: NFU Group Corps. control prices Speculs. benefit open mk. Manufs. control costs P o l i t i c a l auth. Under-Infl. Economic forces Over-Infl. Dissat. Present I n f l . Dissat. Possible I n f l . Specul. benefit _ Manufs. control - .16 Pol auth. Under -.25 .20 .14 Econ. forces Over - .46 .13 .60 Dissat. Present .12 - .18 — .12 Dissat. Possible .24 .13 .14 — .22 .48 Radical class view — — .18 .15 .13 .14 -*Only Pearson r's insignificant. equal to or greater than .12 are reported since r's less than .12 are The level of measurement of the variables is as follows; Coded'as dummy variables are: Corporations control prices/corporations do not control prices. Speculators benefit from open marketing/speculators do not benefit. Manufacturers control supplies' costs/manufacturers do not control. The remaining variables are continuous level variables: P o l i t i c a l Authorities Under-Influential Economic Forces Over-Influential Dissatisfaction Present Influence Dissatisfaction Possible Influence Table 4.17 Inter-Item Association (Pearson r*) of Locus of Control Measures: Non-NFU Group Corps. Speculs. Manufs. P o l i t i c a l Economic Dissat. Dissat. control benefit control Auth. Forces Present Possible prices open mk. costs Under-Inf1. Over-Infl. I n f l . I n f l . Special, benefit Manuf s. c ontro1 .20 -Pol. Auth. Under .22 -.16 -Econ. Forces Over .12 .45 - -Dissat. Present -.12 .23 - .16 .13 Dissat. Possible - .15 .25 .18 .29 Radical class view .14 — .12 .21 -.17 *0nly r's equal to or greater than .12 are reported since r's less than .12 are generally insignificant. The level of measurement of the variables i s the same as i n Table 4.16. 109. the banks, multinational corporations, chain food stores, packing plants) 20 load together. The implication is that NFU members view economic forces as one entity. (On the f i r s t factor of the unrotated matrix given i n Table 4.11, i t w i l l be noted that economic actors have negative loadings 21 on this f i r s t p o l i t i c a l factor.) The factor pattern matrix suggests the" meaning underlying the negative association between Over-Influence of Economic Forces and Dissatisfaction with Current and also Possible Influence. Correlations between factors i n the oblique solution indicate the NFU y members link their power as individuals and as members of farm organizat-ions to that of quasi-governmental bodies (the Canadian Wheat Board, provincial and national marketing boards). The interpretation i s that the farmer's a b i l i t y to influence decision-making is contingent upon the effectiveness of quasi-governmental bodies like the Canadian Wheat Board that are intended to work on their behalf, but not on p o l i t i c a l represent-atives (the M.P. or M.L.A.) or governmental spokesmen for agriculture (the Federal and Provincial Ministers of Agriculture). Thus, since i t is the latter four actors that mainly comprise the measure of Perceived under-Influence of P o l i t i c a l Authorities, there i s no association between wanting more personal influence and viewing p o l i t i c a l authorities as under-inf l u e n t i a l . (b) Non-NFU Group Unlike members of the National Farmers Union, non-members do not associate the disproportionate influence of economic agents in decision-making with an unduly uninfluential position of p o l i t i c a l authorities. Desiring more influence for oneself than what one believes one has presently or what i s possible i s associated weakly with wanting more say for author-ized p o l i t i c a l actors and less for certain elements in the economic sector. 110. (3) Pricing/Marketing and P o l i t i c a l Decision-Making; Cognitive  Structure (a) NFU Group Are perceptions of the locus of control i n the marketing system related to assessments of the appropriate distribution of decision-making power? Dissatisfaction with Present and Possible Influence are both weakly and positively related to believing that corporations control prices and that the non-farmer benefits from open marketing. (Again, limited variance on most of these items - 91% W J members are displeased with their current influence and 62% with their assessed possible influence - undoubt-edly prohibits stronger correlations among items.) Evaluating economic authorities as overly influential i s weakly associated with believing that manufacturers alone control the cost of input supplies and strongly with feeling that i t i s speculators rather than farmers who benefit from open marketing. These two beliefs also tend to occur alongside assessments of p o l i t i c a l authorities as under-influential. Thus, there i s some overlap of views regarding the pricing/marketing system and p o l i t i c a l decision-making on the dimension of externalization of control to economic forces. (b) Non-NFU Group More say for p o l i t i c a l authorities and less for economic forces are much.less interrelated with the other beliefs of non-NFU members than i s the case with the NFU group. Among the non-members the greater the inclination to regard p o l i t i c a l authorities as under-influential, the more li k e l y i s there a belief i n corporations on their own being responsible for setting farm prices. The greater the desire for the economic sector 1 1 1 . to have less say i n decision-making, the greater the pro c l i v i t y towards viewing the open marketing system as detrimental to farmers. As with NPU farmers, desiring more influence for oneself than what one believes one has presently or could conceivably have is related to evaluating speculators as the beneficiaries of open marketing. Individuals displeased with their estimated possible influence are also more inclined to believe that manufacturers control costs. (4) Pricing/Marketing, P o l i t i c a l System, and Class System: Cognitive Structure (a) NPU Group The view of the class structure among NPU farmers i s not related to their judgments as to who controls farm produce prices or who benefits from open marketing. But i t is related to perceptions of manufacturers' dominant influence on input costs. of NPU farmers with a s o c i a l i s t class perspective as contrasted to 56% with a conservative outlook agree that manufacturers control input costs. A radical view of the class structure i s related weakly to perceptions of an unfavorable imbalance of decision-making power: that i s , that p o l i t i c a l authorities and the respondent have too l i t t l e say and the economic sector too much. The perceived maldistribution of power and authority i n the p o l i t i c a l system ma.y thus be a specific manifestation of disapproval of the more nebulous imbalance of status i n society. (b) Non-NFU Group Among non-NFU farmers, a radical class perspective is associated (weakly) with a belief that corporations and manufacturers set farm produce prices and input supplies' costs, respectively. It is not related to who is judged to be the beneficiary of the open marketing system. 112. As with the NFU group, a radical class outlook tends to occur alongside the judgment that p o l i t i c a l authorities have less influence than they should have. Contrary to the NFU group, a radical class perspective i s negatively related to the view of the economic sector as overly i n f l u -ential, indicating that i t i s individuals who are conservative or l i b e r a l i n their appraisal of the class structure of society who are most l i k e l y to disapprove of the power of the economic sector. And, not surprisingly, a radical perspective i s related to disapproving of estimated possible and present influence. Although most interrelationships are weak, there i s sufficient inter-item consistency i n both farmer groups to conclude that more than isolated opinions are being tapped. In addition there i s evidence of some important distinctions among farmers i n the two study groups. / Summary Farmers recruited to the National Farmers Union are similar i n some respects but different i n others, from farmers who have not been recruited to this protest organization. In terms of their similar view-points, both groups externalize the blame for their current economic d i f f i c u l t i e s . Neither group feels i t has any control over either the market-ing system or any influence i n the important p o l i t i c a l decisions that affect i t s l i f e . There i s a uniform perception of decision-making powers concen-trated i n the hands of an economic e l i t e and a few top p o l i t i c a l o f f i c i a l s . For both groups, more power for the economic sector means less for the farmer. 113. Differences between members and non-members of the National Farmers Union are mainly structural but include at least one content aspect. F i r s t , notwithstanding their lack of control over economic problems, NFU members are much more inclined to affirm the po s s i b i l i t y of a united farmers' action, and i t i s this belief i n the v i a b i l i t y of a collective mobilization that ostensibly leads them to fault themselves for their past failures to obtain desired policy outcomes from' govern-ments. Non-members, i n contrast, cite individual endeavors more frequently. Secondly, members of the National Farmers Union are more inclined to view the economic sector as a powerful c o l l e c t i v i t y . NFU farmers appear to be operating on a "limited pie" view of influence i n decision-making; p o l i t i c a l authorities have too l i t t l e say in' decision-making because the economic sector has too much. For non-members, too l i t t l e say for top p o l i t i c a l representatives i s not equated with too much influence for economic agents. The implication i s thus that for this second group of farmers the relative distribution of influence i n decision-making i s not so clear-cut. Thirdly, whereas NFU farmers are generally consistent i n viewing control externalized across the pricing, marketing, and p o l i t i c a l decision-making sectors, and combine this perception with a radical perspective of the class structure of society, non-NFU farmers exclude the marketing sector as an area out of the control of farmers. Hence, for non-NFU farmers, the integrated consensual outlook includes a vision of monopoly control of the prices of farm produce and input supplies, of p o l i t i c a l authorities as under-influential, of the respondent as excluded from p o l i t i c a l decision-making circles, and of. a negatively evaluated class structured society. . 114. Those non-NFU farmers who judge the open marketing system to be detrimental to farmers are, lik e NFU members, disapproving of the undue power of the economic sector. To conclude this chapter, the view of "how the system works" held by members of the protest farm organization i s more integrated along radical/socialist lines. The extent to which these cognitions give rise to equally radical solutions to rectify the maldistribution (from the farmer's viewpoint) of influence i n the marketing and pricing system i s the subject of the next chapter. 115. Notes to Chapter 4 1 Dolbeare and Dolbeare, American Ideologies, p. 26l. Robert Lane, P o l i t i c a l Ideology, makes the same point: " a l l ideologies, like a l l other beliefs, imply an.empirical theory of cause and effect i n the world . . . .", p. 15. 2 J. B. Rotter, "Generalized Expectancies for Internal versus External Control of Reinforcement", Psychological Monographs, No. 1, 80(1966), 1-28 developed the original I-E Scale. A bibliography by Warren E. Throop and A.P. Macdonald, Jr. l i s t e d 339 articles which discussed the concept. See "Internal-External Locus of Control A Bibliography", Psychological Reports, 28(l97l), 175-190. 3 P. Gurin et a l . , "A Multi-Dimensional E Scale", Journal of Social Issues, 25(1969), 29 - 53. They equate the Personal Control factor with Rotter's internal-external measure. The Control Ideology factor "seems to measure the R's ideology or general beliefs about the role of internal and external forces i n determining success and failure i n the culture at large". . 4 Louise Selvirn and Charles Nakamura, "Powerlessness, S o c i a l - P o l i t i c a l Action, S o c i a l - P o l i t i c a l Views: Their Interrelation among College Students", Journal of Social Issues, 27 (No. 4, 1971), 137-157. Left-wing activity i s high on "externality", evidence that the measure. is correlated with ideology; and L.E. Thomas, "The I-E Scale, Ideological Bias, and P o l i t i c a l Participation", Journal of Personality, 38(1970), 273-286, found that internality-externality has a conservative bias. 5 An a r t i c l e i n the Dec. 22, 1971 NFU Newsletter argued "The problem of farmers' income i s not on the farm - i t ' s off the farmer ( s i c ) . The problem is the market system of our economy which is designed to exploit farmers and to deny them a f a i r price for their product." The Regional Co-ordinator for Alberta, i n an a r t i c l e called "Inflation Major Problem", suggested "...with no control over the price setting mechanism and with no control over the costs of inputs that go into that production, farmers are at the mercy of the real power within our country - the multi-national corporations"; See Union Farmer, Aug., 1974, p. 12. 6 The question w i l l immediately arise as to whether I am not simply measuring p o l i t i c a l efficacy. That may be the case, but i n light of the earlier discussion i n Chapter 2, the interesting aspect of the concept for ideological beliefs i s whether efficacious feelings are c o l l e c t i v i s t or individualistic i n their orientation. 116. 7 Among NPU members, but not among non-NFU members, those who fe e l they themselves could do nothing about the squeeze are more inclined to believe nobody could do anything. The question ascertaining whether "you can do anything about the cost-price squeeze" immediately followed the general question, "Is there anything that anybody can do about the cost-price squeeze?" Hence farmers were given the opportunity to evaluate their capability to act independently of that of the body most able to effect a solution to the cost-price squeeze. 8 Membership in organizations i s not related to the type of activity the respondent volunteers i n answer to the query as to whether he can do anything about the squeeze. Among NFU members, those who feel they can do nothing belong to 1.3 farm organizations; those who mention a non-political activity to 1.7 organizations; and those who suggest a p o l i t i c a l / c o l l e c t i v e action to 1.3 farm organizations. Among non-NFU members, individuals feeling they could not act on the squeeze belong to .6 farm organizations; those who suggest a non-political activity to .7 farm organizations, and those mentioning the p o s s i b i l i t y of collective farm action as an answer to the squeeze, to .6 farm organizations. 9 The farmer was directed to respond to the second (underlined) question. The question was phrased i n terms of a p o l i t i c a l "group" rather than p o l i t i c a l ."party" because h i s t o r i c a l l y Alberta farmers (or at any rate the leadership of the United Farmers of Alberta) had rejected "party p o l i t i c s " for "group p o l i t i c s " . 10 The NFU N i s 37. NFU members who belong to another farm organization, eleven i n number, have been deleted from the NFU group. 11 Because both questions were open-ended, multiple responses were possible. About one-half the sample gave multi-agency responses, naming more than one body as controlling prices. The remainder mentioned a single agency. The question regarding cost controls e l i c i t e d far more single-agency replies. • 76% of those answering the question (N=124) mentioned a single agency. In Table 4.6, multiple responses have been collapsed to form a single response. Hence, i f the farmer mentioned both "corporations" and the . "government" as fixing farm prices, his response is coded as "Corporat-ions & Gov't." i n Table 4.6. Likewise, i f he mentioned a l l of "corporations", "the government", and "supply and demand", his response i s coded i n category "Corporations, Gov't., & Supply and demand" in Table 4.6. 12 If the responses which mention "supply and demand" are summed (codes 3 through 6), then 49.3% of the Non-NFU group and 3^.8% of the NFU group believe that "supply and demand" has' something to do with the way i n which farm produce prices are established. 117. 13 Union Farmer, Jan., 1975, p. 5 for the f i r s t quote. For the reference to chain store oligopolic power, see "Prairie Province Cost Study Commission", Submission to Alberta Agricultural Marketing Council, n.d., p. 10-12. 14 There are a number of ways of interpreting Table 4.6. It i s possible to conclude that the NFU study group i s disinclined to believe that either supply and demand alone or government regulation alone control prices, or that the two together do so. (The sum of responses 5,6, and 7 is 17-3$) On the other hand, 92.5$ (the sum of responses 1, 2, 3, and 4) of NFU farmers believe that corporations and/or middlemen alone or i n conjunction with other forces f i x the price of farm foodstuffs. 15 Again, there are a number of interpretations of Table 4.6. Less than one-half of the non-members believe that the government and/or supply and demand regulate farm prices. (This figure, 45.3$, is the sum of responses 5, 6, and 7.) With respect to the "plur a l i s t " interpretation, the following three figures seem relevant. 49.3$ (the sum of responses 3, 5, and 7) of non-members could f e e l the producer's say as regards prices i s afforded at least p a r t i a l l y by the laws of supply and demand. Concomitantly, those who view governmental regulation as a par t i a l surrogate for farmer control could account for 49-3$ (the sum of responses 2, 4, and 7) of "the group. And, 54.7$ (the sum of responses 1, 2, 3, and 4) of non-NFU farmers regard corporations as having a say i n the fixing of prices i n one way or another. 16 I t i s recalled (Table 3.2, Chapter 3) that 14$ of the NFU members and 19.2$ of the non-members reported raising grains (feed grains, wheat) as their primary product. However, most farmers i n the area had either raised grain i n the past or were currently doing so, and hence were familiar with the two marketing systems. Only 5 NFU members and 21 non-members f e l t unqualified to choose between the two mechanisms of marketing grain. 17 Speech by Walter Miller, Vice-President of the NFU, NFU Newsletter; Jan. 26, 1973. An art i c l e entitled "NFU Meets Farmers Inquiry" i n the Union Farmer, March, 1975, P . 3, included the following quote from a submission of the NFU to the New Brunswick Farmers Inquiry: "Economic pox-rer and p o l i t i c a l power are s t i l l closely aligned i n the present day one f i n a l difference between eighteenth century capitalism and the present form of capitalism practised large corporations was the absence of price competition. Instea. prices being determined for goods produced by corporations on a • pply-demand basis, corporations followed a practise of price setting in such a way as to reduce competition". 118. 18 The actual wording of the question was: "Where i n the ci r c l e - that i s , how close to the centre - would you say each of these groups or persons i s most of the time when i t comes to making decisions on agricultural matters?" 19 The following two tables which contrast the two groups on the simpler criterion of satisfaction/dissatisfaction with present and possible influence highlight these inter-group differences. Satisfaction with NFU Non-NFU  Present Influence: S a t i s f i e d 12.5%*( 6) 14.0%** l8.8<t(l6) 21.6%** Want more influence 77.1 (37) 86.0% 68.2 (58) 78.4 Missing date 10.4 ( 5) 12.9 ( l l ) 100.0% 100.0% 99.9% 100.0% Satisfaction with Possible Influence: Satisfied 27.1%*(l3) 31.0%** 31.8%* (27) 37-0%** ^Dissatisfied 52.1 (25) 59.5 44.7 (38) 52.1 Over-satisfied 8.3 ( 4) 9-5 9.4 ( 8) 11.0 Missing data 12.5 ( 6) 14.1 (12) 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.1% 'are where would like to be -could be where would like to be jwant more influence than f e e l they could have could have more.influence than they want *as % of entire group responding **as % of group responding substantively 20 The oblique matrix, presented belox^, presents patterns i n the data - clusterings of variables. Differences between factors are thus emphasized. NFU Group Prov. markting bds. 960* 012 -152 -142 074 014 Nat'l. marketing bds. 816* 051 081 -083 135 -123 Unifarm 639* 021 210 360 -010 183 Winnipeg Grain Exch. 115 719* 016 -014 037 -214 The banks 115 593* 177 127 -104 150 Multinat'1. c orps. -038 507* -221 -220 484 223 Canadian Pacifc Rail -170 511* -234 193 055 176 Chain food stores -164 836* 108 018 158 -169 Packing plants 031 953* 085 -196 -103 -020 119. cont'd. U. S. Gov't. 048 205 670* -035 -082 -156 NFU 255 -176 472 689* 149 -058 Prov. Minister Agric. 4o8 -181 -531* 186 159 -231 CWB Minister -152 094 -179 852* -042 052 M.L.A. 168 189 -412 264 -330 -383 M.P. 398 282 -420 135 -248 -153 Federal Min. Agric. 150. -238 -250 397 070 -294 R could be 014 -010 -037 029 464 -158 R like to be -028 077 119 -052 134 -761* R i s 289 102 049 253 334 027 21 The matrix of factor pattern correlations stresses the inter-relatedness of factors. Factor Pattern Correlations for Pattern Matrix: NFU Group Factor 1 2 3 4 5 6" 1 1.00 2 -.01 1.00 3 -.02 -.01 1.00 4 .37 .01 -.13 1.00 5 .03 .05 .03 .03 1.00 6 -.30 .05 .07 -.09 -.06 1.00 120. C h a p t e r 5 E v a l u a t i v e B e l i e f s : How t h e S y s t e m Ought t o W o r k C o n t i n u i n g t h e i n q u i r y i n t o t h e s u b s t a n c e o f f a r m e r s ' p o l i t i c a l a t t i t u d e s , t h i s . c h a p t e r f o c u s e s u p o n f a r m e r ' s ' e v a l u a t i o n s o f a s p e c t s o f p r o d u c t i o n , p r i c i n g a n d m a r k e t i n g , a n d u p o n more g e n e r a l e v a l u a t i v e b e l i e f s c o n c e r n i n g a p p r o p r i a t e l i f e g o a l s . A s s e s s m e n t s o f t h e a p p r o p r i a t e -n e s s o f g o v e r n m e n t a l i n v o l v e m e n t i n t h e p r o d u c t i o n , p r i c i n g , a n d m a r k e t i n g o f f o o d s t u f f s may p r o p e r l y b e c o n s t r u e d as t h e e v a l u a t i v e c o u n t e r p a r t s o f c o g n i t i v e b e l i e f s t a p p e d i n t h e p r e c e d i n g c h a p t e r . The f o r m a t o f t h e d i s c u s s i o n i s i d e n t i c a l t o t h a t i n t h e p r e c e d -i n g c h a p t e r s i n c e t h e o b j e c t i v e o f t h e a n a l y s i s r e m a i n s t h e same. T h a t g o a l i s t o . c o n t r a s t t h e p e r s p e c t i v e s o f t h e t w o g r o u p s o f f a r m e r s (NPU a n d n o n - N F U members) f o r t h e p u r p o s e o f d e t e r m i n i n g w h e t h e r t h e b e l i e f s y s t e m s o f f a r m e r s r e c r u i t e d t o a p r o t e s t o r g a n i z a t i o n d i f f e r f r o m t h o s e o f f a r m e r s n o t s i m i l a r i l y m o b i l i z e d . Once a g a i n , i n o r d e r t o p r o v i d e some b e n c h m a r k b y w h i c h t o d e s c r i b e f a r m e r s ' a t t i t u d e s i n g e n e r a l t e r m s , r e s p o n s e s a r e c h a r a c t e r i z e d i n t e r m s o f t h e i r l o c a t i o n o n t h e l e f t - r i g h t c o n t i n u u m . (See C h a r t 2.1, C h a p t e r 2.) I . E v a l u a t i v e B e l i e f s R e g a r d i n g R e g u l a t i o n o f A g r i c u l t u r a l  P r o d u c t i o n , P r i c i n g , a n d M a r k e t i n g The A l b e r t a f a r m e r ' s f r e e e n t e r p r i s e b i a s a n d h i s a b h o r r e n c e o f g o v e r n m e n t a l r e g u l a t i o n a r e t e n e t s w h i c h a l m o s t e v e r y s t u d e n t o f A l b e r t a p o l i t i c s t a k e s on f a i t h . We a c c e p t u n t h i n k i n g l y t h e d e c l a r a t i o n t h a t A l b e r t a f a r m e r s c o n s t i t u t e d f o r t h i r t y - f i v e y e a r s t h e b a c k b o n e o f t h e c o n s e r v a t i v e S o c i a l C r e d i t g o v e r n m e n t . I n d o i n g s o , we s u b s c r i b e t o t h e t h e c o n s e n s u s o f t h e h a n d f u l o f s c h o l a r s who h a v e s t u d i e d p r a i r i e a g r a r i a n p o l i t i c a l movements a n d a c t i v i t y . 121. Macpherson's (1953) characterization of Alberta farmers as conservatively accepting the free enterprise marketing and pricing system save i n economically depressed times when they may be converted to affirm-ing the necessity of bringing that system more under farmer control i s generally accepted by other scholars. James McCrorie has described Saskatchewan farmers as "small, independent c a p i t a l i s t i c entrepreneurs who believe, for the most part, i n the private ownership of land and the means of production". (1971: 36) Elsewhere, the p o l i t i c s of this same group have been summarized as "conservatism based on pragmatism". (Eager, 1968: 1) I f ;Commentators are i n agreement that farmers have been reluct-ant for governments to involve themselves i n the production sector, they concur as well that farmers have h i s t o r i c a l l y opted for governmental regulation of the pricing and marketing sector i n an effort to curb the "excesses" of monopoly power over agricultural prices and marketing conditions. The fight for the Canadian Wheat Board (described i n Chapter 4) was part of a general drive against the monopoly power of large manufactur-ers and railways over the pricing of farm produce and farm input supplies. (Lipset, 1968; Morton, 1950; Sharp, 1948) The contemporary salience of traditional farmer support for a regulated pricing and marketing system i s questionable i n light of more recent denouncements of governmental involvement i n either the production or marketing sectors of agriculture by such commodity groups as the P a l l i s e r Wheat Growers Association and the Canadian Cattlemen's Association. 1 There appears then to be a s p l i t among farmers between those traditionally inclined toward governmental regulation 122. of selected aspects of the pricing and marketing systems and those who deny the v a l i d i t y of any interference with the free enterprise system. Farmers1 judgments of the appropriate organization of the production, pricing, and marketing sectors of farming are examined i n turn. A. Governmental Involvement in the Production Sector Three aspects of governmental involvement i n production appear here: one, the respondent's recommended role for the Provincial and Federal Governments i n the production of food; two, a more•specific examination of the types of governmental programs liked and disliked; and three, approval or disapproval of the regulation of land and farm ownership. 1. Recommendations regarding the governments' roles i n  production "What about the production of agricultural foodstuffs? What should be the role of the Federal (Provincial) Government there?" The question i s a d i f f i c u l t one for a group of farmers whose educational level averages just over nine years of school, and of whom 8k% did not f i n i s h high school. Accordingly, there i s a great range i n both the quality and quantity of information e l i c i t e d . While the inter-viewer probed as deeply as possible to understand f u l l y the response being volunteered, she was reluctant to structure the responses. The open-ended question format had been deliberately chosen to avoid the problem of "instant attitude" formation by the respondent. (Converse (1970) calls these "non-attitudes".) In retrospect, perhaps more probing - at least i n the. direction of s o l i c i t i n g the specific areas i n which government 123. involvement was not desirable - would have been p r o f i t a b l e . In i t s absence, however, the responses are perhaps more accurate measures of recommended governmental r o l e s than they might otherwise have been because they are almost completely voluntary. Table 5-1 contrasts the varying proportions of farmers i n the two study groups who recommend conservative, l i b e r a l , and r a d i c a l f e d e r a l production r o l e s . The two groups d i s t r i b u t e themselves more or l e s s uniformly among the three recommended r o l e s . With respect to the f e d e r a l r o l e , while there are f a i r l y equal proportions of conservatives among the NPU and non-NFU study groups, there are s l i g h t l y more r a d i c a l s among NPU members and s l i g h t l y more l i b e r a l s among non-members. The d i f f e r e n c e s are not, however, s i g n i f i c a n t . In terms of t h e i r recommended type of p r o v i n c i a l involvement i n the producing of f o o d s t u f f s , the d i f f e r e n c e s between NFU and non-NFU farmers i n recommended r o l e s are smaller. Table 5-1 Recommendations Regarding Governmental Production Roles: NFU and Non-NFU Groups  a. Federal r o l e NFU (N=48) Non-NFU (N=85) Conservative 35.4% a (17) 36.0% a (27) 31.8% c L i b e r a l 29.1 (l4) 34.7 (26) 30.6 Radical 35.5 (17) 29.3 (22) 25.8 Missing data (lO) 11.8 100.0%. 100.0% 100.0% b. P r o v i n c i a l r o l e Conservative 34.1% & (15) 31-3% 30.6% (22) 25.' L i b e r a l 40.9 (18) 37.5 43.0 (31) 36.4 Radical 25.0 (11) 23.0 26.4 (19) 22.4 Missing data ( 4) 8.3 (13) 15.3 100.0% 100.1% 100.0% 100.0? of % answering substantively b o f t o t a l group 124. The recommendations for conservative, l i b e r a l , and radical roles with respect to the production of foodstuffs are qualitatively different proposals. That i s , a radical role differs from a l i b e r a l or conservative role i n being not simply an advocation of more continuous governmental involvement and more of i t , but rather, i n entailing a prescription for a different kind of involvement (based on a different conception of the role of the farmer and foodstuffs i n the social and economic system). Elaboration upon the types of responses coded as "conservative", " l i b e r a l " , and"radical" c l a r i f i e s the meaning of this statement. (a) The conservative position on governmental involvement This i s a recommendation that the government have no role i n the production of foodstuffs. Individuals who subscribed to this position generally suggested that the government "stay out a l l together", "stay out of advising the farmer what and how much to produce", or warned that there should be no interference with production. Many responses coded as "conservative" were as terse and to the point as the foregoing. Indeed, because of the necessity to probe to obtain a response of any sort from farmers who were eventually coded i n this category, and because of the low informational content to most of these replies, there was some concern that "non-attitudes" were being coded as conservative attitudes. While i t must be acknowledged that this may have occurred i n a few instances i n the case of the personal interviews, i t i s also recognized that i t takes fewer words to be against something than to be for i t . That i s , to recommend a so c i a l i s t position as regards agriculture when the traditional government policy has been non-socialist, of necessity means spelling out what that position would entail. But when the modal governmental policy 125. i s conservative or l i b e r a l , and one supports that policy, then one "knows" what one is for and does not need to elaborate since presumably everyone else i s for i t too; one only needs to say what one is against. The problem of brevity was not uniform among conservative answers. Some farmers expanded upon why they disliked government involve-ment; i n doing so, they "construct validated" their responses. A frequent rationale for proposing no governmental interference i n production was "as soon as the government t e l l s the farmer what to do, the farmer loses incentive". A dairy farmer, calculating that he had lost $13,000 the previous year by producing more milk than his allotted quota, was against quotas on the.principle that a person should be able to produce what he wants (that i s , quotas r e s t r i c t freedom). Another man advocated free enterprise: "Let the chips f a l l where they may! Everything would be better." Other farmers, i n rejecting incentive grants and subsidies, referred to the inherent knowledge of the farmer to know what to produce: "People would naturally produce what was needed and hold back when prices were low". Perhaps the most precise articulation of the principles behind the advocacy of no government involvement i n production was that of the farmer who began by voicing his dislike of the compulsory selling-of eggs through the Egg Marketing Board because " i t destroys free enterprise and leads to a so c i a l i s t state". Referring to the American Government's policy of paying farmers not to produce, he rejected this policy on the grounds that such disincentive grants only helped the lazy farmers, "the dumb-bells". In laying the responsibility on the individual for his fate, this farmer accepted personal accountability for dealing with the 126. "gambling aspect" of farming: he called i t "the management factor". Seldom was there such an ex p l i c i t linking of the respondent's assumptions of man with his recommended governmental position. (b) The l i b e r a l position Two types of responses were coded as l i b e r a l : those which suggested either an informational and advisory role for the government and/or a role of financial assistance i n the form of incentives and subsidies to produce and loans for capital expansion or i n i t i a l purchase of farmland and machinery. Types- of advice recommended are confined to what the government presently makes available: information pertaining to research regarding market situations and production levels, and regarding the development of new crop varieties. Also coded as l i b e r a l responses are suggestions that the government supervise the quality of foodstuffs. Examples of l i b e r a l replies include: "They need to do something about getting some more farmers - more young people - on the land. Grass incentive programs were a good idea, but now we're short of grain. I appreciate the Canadian Wheat Board reports on what they need and what farmers should produce regarding new strains of grain." and "They should guarantee credit to farmers at a reasonable cost, especially to beginning farmers even i f a 'reasonable cost' means no interest payments." It w i l l be noted that the l i b e r a l role corresponds closely to the h i s t o r i c a l policy of the Canadian federal government. (c) The radical/socialist position The farmer whose reply i s coded within this category i s more easily recognized than either his l i b e r a l or conservative counterpart, partly because he tended to elaborate upon his recommendation more frequently • 127. Responses coded here are generally of three types: f i r s t l y , those advocat-ing a government guaranteed (floor) price or " f a i r return"; secondly, those suggesting the government control profits of corporations, markups on food after i t leaves the farm, and/or material and machinery costs; and thirdly, a proposal that production be regulated i n some way - either by putting limits on the quantity of foodstuffs sold, or by controlling land usage and ownership. Answers coded as radical/socialist were frequently the most articulate and well-informed. Many began with the premise that current (and past) governmental policy-was clearly inadequate (pointing to the cost-price squeeze or the failure of grass incentive and grain disincentive schemes in the recent past) and attempted to suggest ways to overcome these perceived problems. Concluding that "someone has to take over as a whole - at the present time the Federal Government i s the only one capable of doing so", one farmer concluded that the Govern-ment should take steps to establish a World Food Bank "to stabilize prices". Other responses were specific to the type of farming the respondent was engaged i n . A hog farmer suggested-the Federal Government should guarantee a certain price for a set amount of hogs and a lower price for anything over the quota i n order to protect the small farmer. The implementation of quota systems to regulate production and a f a i r or profitable floor' price were the most typical replies i n the radical category. . Less typical was the following carefully formulated position: "Farms should be limited i n size to family farms. The Government should have a Land Use Policy which keeps arable land for agriculture and the family farm. The government's role would be supply management so that farmers do not over-supply the market and hurt themselves and the taxpayers. The latter occurs when 128. the government buys up agricultural surpluses and • gives them away. Supply management would mean the elimination of the highs and lows of the costs of products. This yo-yo effect allows middlemen to keep prices high at a l l times, even when the market goes down. Pood should be geared to the income of consumers and the maximum number of people should be engaged in the production of food and have an income equivalent to that of the Canadian labourer." It i s perhaps no accident that this farmer was currently a Director of the National Farmers- Union. It was apparent that farmers recommending a l l three production roles for the Federal and Provincial governments were frequently respond-ing to past and present governmental policies. The most significant cues in.the way of governmental, policies were LIFT (Lower Inventories for Tomorrow) and the federal and provincial beef production incentive schemes, which had followed i n the wake of LIFT. Both programs had, i n a very real sense, backfired and were responsible, i n a number of people's eyes, for the current depressed beef prices and grain shortages. Many farmers appeared to react to these policies i n one of two ways: either by blaming the current depressed beef prices on too much governmental interference and concluding that the only solution was for governments to stay out completely from involvement i n agriculture, or by blaming the current economic malaise not on government involvement per se, but on i t s short-lived, ad hoc nature, and recommending more long-range and better formul-ated governmental planning. The former tend to be conservatives; the latter, radical/socialists. To conclude, there are only slight differences between NFU members and non-members concerning their ideological perspective regarding foodstuff production. Fewer than one-third of the farmers i n either group 129. suggest that the federal government involve i t s e l f i n the production of food to any greater extent than providing the money for the farmer to manage on his own. Even fewer farmers i n both groups recommend that much involvement on the part of the provincial government. There i s some reason to believe that the strength of economic conservatism and liberalism witnessed here i s not unique to farmers i n this study group. A' 1971 province-wide random survey of Alberta residents revealed that f u l l y 71% of the farmers interviewed disagreed with the statement "If a farmer can't s e l l things he raises at a profit, the 3 government should buy them and limit the amount the farmer can produce." 2. Perceived harmful and beneficial programs It has been noted that farmers tended to react to previous governmental programs when recommending a federal or provincial role i n agricultural production. Farmers were given a direct opportunity to respond to these programs- when they were asked to voice their approval or disapproval of particular schemes. They were requested to r e c a l l "any government policies - provincial or federal - that have benefitted farmers and yourself i n the past, or any policies that are currently helping farmers"; and secondly, any policies that were "currently hurting the,farmer", or had hurt farmers i n the past. Multiple responses were forthcoming; four possible replies were coded. In Table 5.2, programs mentioned have been coded i n four discrete categories (monetary assistance schemes; incentives and subsidies; orderly marketing; and miscellaneous) plus categories representing combinations of these. (The l i s t of programs placed under each category may be found i n Table 5.2a i n Appendix B.) 130. Table 5.2 Types of Beneficial Programs Mentioned: NPU and non-NFU Groups. NFU (N=48) Non-NFU (N=85) Monetary assistance 33.35 I (16) 31.8% (27) Monetary assistance & Subsidies 16.7 ( 8) 10.6 ( 9) Incentives & subsidies 12.5 ( 6) 10.6 ( 9) Combination of programs 10.4 ( 5) 10.6 ( 9) Miscellaneous 10.4 ( 5) 3.5 ( 3) Orderly marketing 4.2 ( 2) 1.2 ( 1) None mentioned* 12.5 ( 6) 31.8 (27) ^including missing data For farmers i n both groups, government programs singularly mentioned as being the most beneficial are grants and loans with no strings attached - programs which make money available to the farmer to do with as he wishes. Monetary programs which interfere with the farmer's freedom of decision-making, by giving him an incentive to raise hay, instead of grain, or cattle instead of hogs, are not so welcome. In fact, the latter are viewed as being the most distasteful by both NFU and non-NFU farmers. The figure for incentive programs i n the Harmful Programs table (Table 5.3) i s inflated by the LIFT program of the federal Liberal government i n the early 1970's and the very recent moves by the Alberta government to encourage the production of beef. At the time of the.interviews, the bottom had fall e n out of the beef market. LIFT was a program that paid farmers $6.00 per acre to leave normally productive wheat land i n fallow. I t has been labelled the f i r s t attempt of the government to control production, but i t should be noted that i t had i t s c r i t i c s everywhere, not just among free enterprisers. 131. Table 5.3 Types of Harmful Programs Mentioned: NFU and non-NFU Groups. NFU = (N=48) Non-NFU (N=85) Incentives 20.8$ (10) 2?.1$ (23) Combination of schemes 18.8 ( 9) 15.3 (13) Miscellaneous 8.3 ( 4) 8.2 ( 7) Against free marketing 8.3 ( 4) 11.8 (10) Monetary assistance 4.2 ( 2) 3.5 ( 3) Against orderly marketing 4.2 ( 2) 2.4 ( 2) Subsidies & incentives 2.1 ( 1) 2.4 ( 2) Monetary assist; & subsidies 2.1 ( 1) 5.9 ( 5) Subsidies — 2.4 ( 2) None* 31-3 (15) 21.2 (18) 100.1$ 100.2$ *including missing data Why are incentive schemes disliked so much, and these two (LIFT and beef programs) i n particular?^ There would seem to be three possible reasons. F i r s t l y , they might be disliked because any incentive scheme means government interference and a consequent lessening of the farmer's freedom to produce what he wants. Secondly, they could be distrusted because of the ad hoc nature of most of these plans, their short-sightedness and ill-planned nature. And thirdly, they could be frowned upon because, given the food shortage i n many parts of the world, farmers should be paid to produce food, hot to refrain from doing so. Incentive schemes were disliked more frequently by farmers i n both study groups for their ad hoc and ill-planned character than for their invasion of the farmer's freedom. In a very few instances they were viewed as harmful because of their attempt to thwart food production. Farmers describe i n their own words how many government schemes - particularly LIFT and the beef incentive projects - backfired. 132. "The grass incentive program conflicted with other programs. I t meant the government had to have a beef loan incentive. This led to over-production and didn't benefit the farmer i n the long run. In the short outlook, the snowed-under crop payment {scheme of the Alberta government in the f a l l and spring of 1973-7L0is a help, but i n the long term, the government needs to set guidelines to ensure a margin of profit. Then we wouldn't need incentive programs." "The incentive grants for hay production (along with the beef loan) ruined the cattle market and bolstered grain production." "So many policies help one (the grain farmer) and hurt the other (the guy who runs a feedlot)." "The LIFT program asked us to put land i n forage four years ago. Now there's a wheat shortage. They seem to do the wrong thing. They don't look that far ahead." And, as for incentive programs, "They don't accomplish that much; a l o t of people benefit from them who aren't really farmers." A less frequent rationale for d i s l i k i n g incentive schemes was "As soon as the government t e l l s the farmer what to do, the farmer loses i n i t i a t i v e . " There were a few other examples of this distrust of incentive schemes because they "take away the naturalness of agriculture" and "destroy the farmer's i n i t i a t i v e " . One farmer, after commenting that the market situation on which LIFT was predicated "turned out to be the opposite" and the grass incentive program "went sour", concluded "I'm not against incentive or disincentive programs, but these programs put i t so much out of balance that two years later you f e e l the after-effects. They upset the natural supply and demand situation." It i s , i n short, impossible to discern whether dislike for incentive grants denotes an economically conservative outlook without knowing something about the history of government assistance to agriculture 133. i n this country. That history can best be described as one of ad hoc programs which have frequently benefitted one sector of the farming community at the expense of another. The question which, immediately arises, of course, i s whether such improvised and short-term reactions have been a response to farmers' demands and are, i n fact, what farmers have asked for and what they have wanted - periodic governmental involvement i n c r i s i s situations and abstention i n normal times. Judging from the responses of both groups of farmers here, that would seem not to be the case. I t is precisely the episodic governmental intervention which they dis l i k e . And most of them disapprove of i t not because i t interferes with the "natural law of supply and demand" but because i t has frequently produced unanticipated consequences detrimental to the farmer. And, this being the case, as one farmer put i t , "with this kind of record, how can they successfully administer controls?" Thus, NFU farmers and their non-member counterparts jointly chastise incentive schemes and welcome unconditional monetary assistance plans more than other governmental programs. 3. Regulation of land and farm ownership policies The private ownership of farm land has long been regarded as the sacred cow of farming i n Canada. To examine the veracity of this claim, farmers were queried as to their unwillingness for regulations on the size of farms and the entry of corporations into farming. I f the sine qua  non i s indeed private land ownership, then farmers may well approve the regulation of corporate entry into farming since the latter could conceiv-ably interfere with the unlimited right of individuals to acquire and operate farm land. 134. As Table 5.4 indicates, there are indeed important substantive and s t a t i s t i c a l differences between the two farmer groups. While 72% of NPU members agree that there should be a legislated maximum farm size, only 44% of non-NFU members go along with the idea. The margin between the proportion of the two groups of farmers who fee l corporate farming should be eliminated i s much smaller. 8 l % of the NPU group and 77% of the non-NFU farmers agree that corporate farming should be outlawed. The implication i s thus that when non-members think, of legislating the size of farms, i t i s not their own or their neighbour's, or any individ-ual's farm that should be limited i n size, but rather the aggrandizement of farm land by corporations and other conglomerates. Indeed, the two attitudes are more strongly correlated for the non-NFU group (Pearson r = .47) than for the NFU group (Pearson r = .38), indicating that non-NFU members would tend to agree with both statements more than would NFU 5 members. Private land ownership, then, appears to be an indispens ble goal for non-members who exhibit an anti-monopoly streak reminiscent of a populist outlook - private ownership, yes; corporate control, no. This seems to be less true of the NFU group. B. Regulation of the Pricing System Two closed-ended questions spe c i f i c a l l y probed the need for controls i n the area of producer prices and suppliers' costs. The questions s o l i c i t directly the respondent's adherence to the principle of the "law of supply and demand" as the appropriate determinant of prices and costs. In addition, they provide an opportunity to test the historic proposition that when farmers advocate controls, they mean controls for everyone but themselves. Table 5»5 gives the marginals for the two study groups on the need for controls on farm produce prices and farm input costs. 135. Table 5.4 Regulation of Farm Size and Ownership: NFU and non-NFU Groups a. There should be a legislated  maximum farm size. Strongly agree Agree somewhat Neither agree or disagree Disagree somewhat Strongly disagree Missing data b. Corporate farming should be  outlawed. Strongly agree Agree somewhat Neither agree nor disagree Disagree somewhat Strongly disagree Missing data NFU (N=48) Non-NFU (N=85) 51.1$ (24) 33.0$ (27) 21.3 (10) 11.0 ( 9) 2.1 ( 1 ) 14.6 (12) 12.8 ( 6) 17.1 (14) 12.8 ( 6) 24.4 (20) ( 1) ( 3) 100.1$ 100.1$ 55.3$ (26) 60.2$ (50) 25.5 (12) 16.9 (14) 6.4 ( 3) 9.6 ( 8) 8.5 ( 4) 6.0 ( 5) 4.3 ( 2) 7.3 ( 6) ( 1) ( 2) 100.0$ 100.0$ In both the NFU and non-NFU groups, over three-quarters of the farmers favor controls on both farm products' prices and input supplies' costs. There are, however, important differences between the two groups. Interestingly, while more people i n the non-NFU study group favor controls on the cost of machinery and other input supplies than favor controls on farm produce prices, no such differences appear among members of the National Farmers Union. The hi s t o r i c a l pattern of Western Canadian farmers' fight against industrial monopolies and demand for their regulation, while at the same time wishing to avoid any regulation of their own enterprise, seems not quite so characteristic of these farmers. It i s less, true of the NFU group than the non-member group; NFU farmers are s t a t i s t i c a l l y more i n 136. favor of producer prices being controlled. (The Gamma measure of association i s .55 for which the chi square s t a t i s t i c i s significant at the .05 level.) Nevertheless, a surprisingly large number of farmers i n both groups opt for controls on both foodstuffs and supplies: 79% of the NFU farmers and 76% of the non-NFU farmers. (The la t t e r i s the percentage of those who responded to both questions: Ns74.) Table 5.5 Pricing Controls on Farm Produce and Input Supplies: NFU and non-NFU Groups. a. Controls on Farm Produce Prices Agree Disagree Missing data NFU (N=48) 87.5% (42) 12.5 ( 6) 100.0% Non-NFU (N=85) 68.2%a (58) • 76.3%b 21.2 10.6 100.0% (18) ( 9) 23.7 100.0% b. Controls on Input Supplies Costs Agree Disagree Missing data 87.5% 12.5 100.0% 82.4%a (70) 12.9 ( l l ) 4.7 ( 4) 100.0% 86.4%c 13.6 100.0% % of total group including missing data 3% of substantive answers (excluding missing data) A p a r t i a l explanation for the somewhat greater propensity of the NFU members for regulation of farm produce prices i s found when respon-dents are queried as to who should set controls on foodstuff prices and supplies' costs - i f there are indeed to be such controls. As Table 5«6 indicates, the explanation lies i n the differing proportions of farmers i n 137. the two groups who demand a voice for farmers i n the setting of input  supplies' costs. While almost equal proportions of NFU and non-NFU members advocate either one or both governments or governmental agencies to set produce prices as demand that the farmer have some say (in con-junction with other bodies l i k e the government, the processors, the labourer, or marketing boards), i n the case of regulating input costs, NFU members are s t a t i s t i c a l l y more i n favor of farmers having some say in their control than are their non-member counterparts. (The Gamma measure Table 5.6 Body Recommended to Set Price Controls: NFU and Non-NFU Groups Who should set farm produce prices? Nobody/no controls Government Farmer with others Farmer/his organiz. b. Who should set input supplies' costs? Nobody/no controls Gov't./Gov't, agency Farmers with others Farmer Missing data NFU (N=48) Non-NFU (N=85) 12.5$* ( 6) 35.4 (17) 40.5 35.4 (17) 40.5 •16.7 ( 8) 19.1 28.2$ a (24) v 28.2 (24) 39.3$ 26.0 (22) 36.1 100.0% 17.6 (15) 24.6 100.1$ 100.0$ 100.0$ 11.5$ ( 5) 41.9 (18) 47.4 41.9 (18) 47.4 4-7 100.1$ 2) 5.3 5) 18.1$ (13) 61.1 (44) 74-6$ 19-4 (14) 23-7 1.4 i 1.7 (13) 100.0$ 100.0$ a. includes missing data •"excluding "Nobody/no controls". 138. of assocation i s .40 for which the chi square s t a t i s t i c i s significant at the .04 level.) Non-members frequently opt for governmental regulation - either by each government alone or both together - basing their reasoning on the premise that the government i s really the only body with the author-i t y to set controls on farm inputs. NFU farmers' lesser skepticism of controls of any sort - including those on producer prices - appears grounded i n an assumption that farmers should (and hopefully, would) have some say i n their operation. C. Orderly Versus Open Marketing In Chapter 4, i n contrasting farmers i n the two study groups regarding whom they perceived to be the beneficiaries of open (off-Board) marketing, i t was noted that NFU farmers were much more suspicious than non-members that farmers could benefit from open marketing. I t i s thus not surprising to find i n Table 5.7 that they prefer Canadian Wheat Board marketing i n much larger proportions than do non-NFU members. The latte r divide themselves more or less equally between choosing Canadian Wheat Board and off-Board marketing. The differences are s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i -cant at the .04 level. Table 5.7 Preferred Type of Marketing: NFU and Non-NFU Groups NFU (N=48) Non-NFU (N=85) Canadian Wheat Board 72.3% (34) 70.8% 52.8% (38) 44.7% Off-Board/Both 27.7 (13) 27.1 47.2 (34) 40.0 Missing data ( l ) 2.1 (13) 15.3 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 139. This section has contrasted selec-fced evaluative beliefs of the NFU and non-NFU study groups concerning regulation of the production, pricing, and marketing sectors of farming. In general, members of the protest organization are slig h t l y more radical as regards regulation of the production sector, somewhat more radical regarding the marketing sector, and more consistent i n recommending controls on both farm inputs and farm produce. With respect to the latter, while there i s unanimity for govern-mental determination of controls on input supplies within the non-NFU group, NFU members divide equally between governmental fixing and farmer say i n cost control determination. The f i n a l part of this section examines the inter-item association of the production, pricing, and marketing measures within the two study groups for the dual purpose of establishing the s t a b i l i t y and generality of these opinions. D. The Structure of Evaluative Beliefs Tables 5.8 and 5.9 report the pattern of inter-item association of evaluative beliefs for the NFU and non-NFU groups, respectively. The NFU Group Members of the National Farmers Union tend to advocate controls consistently across the pricing and marketing sectors. As Table 5.8 indicates, agreeing to controls on farm produce prices, on input costs, and preferring Canadian Wheat Board marketing are positively intercorrel-ated. While farmers who recommend regulation of one aspect of the production process (farm size, for example) also tend to recommend 1 4 0 . regulation of other aspects (corporate entry, the federal production role), there i s an uneven association between measures regarding regulation of the production sector and items ascertaining regulation of the pricing and marketing aspects of farming. With respect to the suggested federal role i n production, mentioning a conservative role for the federal government i s negatively related to preferring Canadian Wheat Board marketing. NFU farmers who deny the need for controls on input supplies' costs are more l i k e l y to suggest either a conservative or a radical federal production role than 7 they are a l i b e r a l production role. While a willingness for the establishment of farm size limits i s consistently related to approval of controls over prices and orderly marketing, agreeing that corporate entry into farming should be regulated is not part of this same belief set. The latte r does occur alongside approval of orderly marketing but i s negatively related to the need for cost controls and not associated with price controls. In brief, NFU members as a x^hole exhibit a f a i r amount of con-sistency i n affirming the need for controls and regulations across farm-ing areas. Non-NFU Like NFU members, this group tends to be consistent i n approving of regulations across the pricing and marketing sectors. (See Table 5.9) As with NFU farmers, approving controls i n the pricing and marketing aspects of farming does not necessarily mean wanting the production sector regulated, or vice versa. Table 5.8 Inter-Item A s s o c i a t i o n of Evaluative B e l i e f s : NFU Group (n=37) 1. Gamma Measure of As s o c i a t i o n Input Farm CWB Farm R e s t r i c t Conserv. L i b e r a l Radical Cost Price Mk. Size Corporate Prod. Prod. Prod. Controls Controls Limits Entry Role Role Role Farm P r i c e Controls .41 wheat Board Mkting. .58 .73 Farm Size Limits .45 .23 .63 R e s t r i c t Corpor. -.23 .07 .44 2. Pearson Corr. Conserv. Prod. Role -.11 -.04 -.24 -.48 .07 L i b e r a l Prod. Role .2k -.06 .12 -.06 -.17 Radical Prod. Role -.13 .11 .12 .42 .24 Level of measurement of v a r i a b l e s : A l l v a r i a b l e s are dichotomous (dummy) v a r i a b l e s except "Farm Size L i m i t s " and " R e s t r i c t Corporate Entry". 142. Within the production sector, non-members who agree to the need f o r l e g i s l a t i o n on farm s i z e and corporate farming are l i k e NFU members i n tending to suggest r a d i c a l f e d e r a l production r o l e s . Non-NFU l i b e r a l s (on the f e d e r a l production r o l e ) are most unfavorable towards r e g u l a t i o n of farm s i z e and corporate entry, while conservatives are weakly pre-disposed toward such r e g u l a t i o n s . There i s thus one contrast between t h i s group and the NFU group. In the l a t t e r , conservatives (on the f e d e r a l production r o l e ) r e j e c t e d l e g i s l a t i n g farm s i z e l i m i t s . With respect to congruence between the p r i c i n g and production sectors, wanting farm produce p r i c e s and input costs c o n t r o l l e d i s a s s o c i -Q ated p o s i t i v e l y with a r a d i c a l f e d e r a l production r o l e . Advocating controls on both input and output farm products occurs alongside recom-mending l e g i s l a t i o n to e s t a b l i s h a maximum farm s i z e and l i m i t corporate entry i n t o farming. (The strongest r e l a t i o n s h i p here i s between wanting input costs c o n t r o l l e d and r e s t r i c t i n g corporate farming.) The pattern of a s s o c i a t i o n between the production items and the si n g l e marketing item (the preference f o r o r d e r l y versus open marketing) d i f f e r s i n two respects from that within the NFU group. F i r s t l y , a preference f o r open marketing i s v i r t u a l l y unrelated to the 9 f e d e r a l production r o l e recommended by non-NFU farmers. This i s i n contrast to NFU l i b e r a l s and r a d i c a l s (on the f e d e r a l production r o l e ) equally favouring open marketing. Secondly, among non-NFU farmers, pre-f e r r i n g o r d e r l y marketing i s r e l a t e d to only one of the farm ownership items - that suggesting that farms be l i m i t e d i n terms of t h e i r maximum s i z e . Wanting limn ts to corporate entry i n t o farming i s not r e l a t e d to a preference f o r Canadian Wheat Board marketing. Table 5-9 Inter-Item Association of Evaluative B e l i e f s : Non-NFU Group (N=96) Input Farm CWB Farm R e s t r i c t Conser. L i b e r a l Radical Cost Price Mk. Size Corporate Prod. Prod. Prod. Controls Controls Limits Entry Role Role Role 1. Gamma Measure Farm Price Controls .95 Wheat Board Mktng. • 55 .81 Farm Size Limits • 39 .23 • 33 R e s t r i c t Corpor. • 63 • 38 .01 2. Pearson Corr. Conserv. Prod. Role -.06 -.13 -.06 .12 .12 L i b e r a l Prod. Role -.15 -.09 -.00 -.26 -.26 -.44 Radical Prod. Role .21 .15 -.04 .22 .22 -.43 Level of measurement of variables: A l l variables are dichotomous (dummy) variables except "Farm Size Limits" and "Restrict Corporate Entry". 144-For non-NFU farmers, i t i s regulation of the marketing sector which proves to be the stumbling block to congruity of regulation across farming sectors. Non-NFU farmers' reluctance to abandon the open market system wherein ostensibly the law of supply and demand determines just prices over the long run does not generally restrain them from approving some regulation and governmental involvement i n the pricing and production sectors. Summary By way of an overview of this f i r s t section, i t i s useful to reiterate the points of similarity and divergence regarding the judg-ments of the two groups of farmers as to how the pricing, marketing, and production aspects of farming might best function. While there are slight discrepancies between NFU and non-NFU farmers i n the numbers favoring regulation of farm produce prices, relatively equal proportions suggest regulation of input supplies' costs, the three governmental production roles, the same governmental programs as being beneficial and harmful, and restrictions on corporate farming. There are striking differences i n the form of a greater NFU preference for orderly marketing and a maximum farm size. The lat t e r two findings, when coupled with information regarding the inter-item association of measures across the pricing, marketing, and production sectors, leads to the conclusion that NFU farmers are more consistent along radical lines across the three aspects of farming. 145. II. Values and Goals The preceding section has tapped specific evaluations of the economic system i n which farmers function. In this section, more gener-alized evaluative beliefs concerning l i f e goals are documented. As i n the foregoing section, myth and traditional thought alert us to what those values and l i f e goals are l i k e l y to he. Individualism and independence - these are held to be the pre-eminent values of the prairie farmer. The argument establishing their superiority i n the farmer's value system i s one of inference "backwards" to their source and "forwards" to their behavioral manifest-ations. A sense of independence and a s p i r i t of individualism are des-cribed as the inevitable outcome of the frontier tradition which demanded self-sufficiency (Bennett and Krueger, 1968: 351) and the homesteading experience when the a v a i l a b i l i t y of free land made the farmer seem free of external controls (Macpherson, 1953* 228); the immigration to Alberta and Saskatchewan of Americans imbued with the Lockean liberalism emphasis upon freedom and individualism (Sharp, 1948: 1-22; Hansen, 1970); the heterogenous and doctrinaire character of religbus sects i n Alberta (Palmer, 1972; H i l l e r , 1968; Flanagan, 1972; Mann, 1955); and the organ-ization of farming i t s e l f as a cap i t a l i s t operation independent of hired labour (Macpherson, 1953: 220-222; Mitchell: 15). Behaviorally, i t i s argued that individualistic values have manifested themselves i n support for the UFA and later, the Social Credit movement in Alberta, both of which emphasized the rights of the individual against state control. (Irving, 1959: 229) In Saskatchewan, Krueger and 146. Bennett point to the farmer's insistence upon "security of individual land tenure, s t a b i l i t y of individual enterprise and income, and i n general, the support of private property" as evidence of the individu-alism of Saskatchewan farmers. (1968: 356) This same individualism has led to the failure to establish co-operative farms i n Saskatchewan and to farmers' opposition to "governmental, or any other form of organized compulsion ...." (Krueger and Bennett: 352) Insofar as individualism and independence are generally described as conservative values, the consensus i s that the instrumental and terminal goals of Alberta farmers are traditional ones. This section describes the value systems of the two groups i n ideological terms. Accordingly, the discussion w i l l be f a c i l i t a t e d by a definition of socia l i s t , l i b e r a l , and conservative value systems. In accordance with common usage, conservatism, liberalism, and socialism are frequently, distinguished i n terms of both how they define and what p r i o r i t y each assigns to values like freedom, equality, and authority. Conservatives are defined as valuing freedom above equality; s o c i a l i s t s , equality before freedom. While liberals value both freedom and equality highly, when freedom i s equated with property rights, i t i s freedom that receives top prio r i t y . (Dolbeare and Dolbeare: 64-72) Liberals are said to construe equality differently from soci a l i s t s : for l i b e r a l s , equality means equality of opportunity while for socialists any meaningful equality must be equality of social and economic conditions. And for conservatives, the freedom valued i s one equated with an absence of constraints - that i s , independence. 147. The subsequent discussion has two parts: f i r s t , a description of the over-all set of l i f e goals of the two study groups, secondly, a specific focus upon the commitmentto private property of farmers i n the two groups. NFU and non-NFU members are contrasted by highlighting any differences of l i f e goals that could predispose individuals to join a protest farm organization. In the absence of previous suppositions, the hypothesis i s that protest members' values should be more egalitarian and less individualistic. A. Terminal Values of Farmers 1. The Rokeach Survey The principal instrument u t i l i z e d to tap the value systems of farmers i s the Rokeach value survey. (Rokeach, 1971) The logic of the Rokeach survey i s that individuals have stable beliefs regarding preferred "end-states of existence" and "modes of conduct". (Rokeach, 1973: 5) Rokeach argues that knowledge of an individual's preferred "end-states" - his values - enables a description of his p o l i t i c a l ideology. More specifically, the ideological positions of communist, soc i a l i s t , capitalist, and fascist ideologies can be differentiated in terms of the p r i o r i t y they attach to freedom or equality. (1973: Chapter 6). It i s thus possible to distinguish p o l i t i c a l ideologies on the basis of the relative p r i o r i t y assigned to freedom and equality. Socialists, says Rokeach, value both equality and freedom highly; capitalists value freedom highly and equality lowly; for fascists, both equality and freedom are assigned a low value; and communists place a' high p r i o r i t y on equality and a low value on freedom. Elsewhere (1968-69: 556), Rokeach has distinguished American p o l i t i c a l l iberals 148. from American conservatives and "middle-of-the-roaders" i n the former's higher valuation of equality. The three p o l i t i c a l types do not differ i n the value they assign to freedom. Rokeach's set of 18 terminal values i s used here to tap the value hierarchies of Alberta farmers. The choice of this instrument, which assesses the respondent's relative preference for different end-states of existence, was predicated on four considerations. F i r s t l y , there i s recent evidence to indicate the u t i l i t y of the Rokeach model in distinguishing among supporters of p o l i t i c a l parties i n the Canadian context. Sutherland and Tanenbaum's (1975) research on a Canadian stud-ent sample shows that supporters of parties on the right side of the spectrum can be distinguished from those on the l e f t with respect to their orderings of both instrumental and terminal values. Adherents to the right-wing parties (Social Credit and Progressive Conservative, parties) emphasize A COMFORTABLE LIFE, FAMILY SECURITY, HAPPINESS, and NATIONAL SECURITY. In contrast, individuals supporting the New Democratic Party emphasize FREEDOM, EQUALITY, A WORLD AT PEACE, A WORLD OF BEAUTY and AN EXCITING LIFE. With specific reference to the two values central to Rokeach's "theory" of p o l i t i c a l ideology, whereas EQUALITY i s the third highest ranked value i n importance for NDP supporters, i t i s the tenth, eleventh, and twelfth ranked by Progressive Conservative, Liberal, and Social Credit supporters, respectively. FREEDOM i s ranked as second-most important by NDP partisans, and eighth by adherents of right-wing parties. This inconsistency with Rokeach's theory raises three considerations: one, the cultural s p e c i f i c i t y of Rokeach's model; 149. two, a differing interpretation of the meaning of "FTffiEDOM" i n the Canadian sample; and three, p o l i t i c a l parties in the Canadian context are not ideologically disparate. The over-all robustness of the instrument i t s e l f across cultures i s not, however, hampered by the s p e c i f i c i t y of the model. Secondly, the demands on the respondent's time were already so onerous that the simpler and less time-consuming the means of s o l i c i t -ing value preferences, the estimated higher completion rate and consequent r e l i a b i l i t y . The Rokeach instrument, when consisting of both sets of terminal and instrumental values, can normally be completed i n about twenty minutes. Since the test-retest r e l i a b i l i t i e s are higher for the 18 terminal values than for the 18 instrumental values, i t was decided to rely solely upon the 18 terminal values. The use of only one of the two sets would minimize the time required even more. Thirdly, the Rokeach instrument i s easily comprehended: an important consideration given the rel a t i v e l y low formal educational level of the study groups. And fourthly, covariation of the instrument with criterion attitude scales had demonstrated to the researcher's satisfaction the v a l i d i t y of the tool. (Sutherland and Tanenbaum, 1975) Respondents were presented with the set of 18 terminal values, arranged alphabetically on gummed labels and asked to order them i n the order of importance for them, placing the most important goal at the top of the ladder, i n Box 1; the second most important goal beneath i t , in Box 2, and so on. They were requested to place the least important goal at the bottom of the ladder, i n Box 18. The median rankings, semi-interquartile range, and importance, and consensus ranks for the 150. NFU and non-NFU study groups are given i n Table 5'10. The consensus ranks, derived from the semi-interquartile range scores, indicate the degree of consensus i n the study group as to the importance of a given value. For both groups, FAMILY SECURITY i s clearly a primary goal: i t i s ranked f i r s t in both importance and consensus. FREEDOM i s also a uniformly highly-prized value, being the second highest ranked i n importance for the non-NFU group and the fourth highest ranked for the NFU. Its consensus ranking i s second highest among NFU farmers and sixth highest among non-members. For the latter, HAPPINESS i s valued highly and consensually. Because of the proximate nature of many value medians, the actual numerical ranking of each value i s not as important as the relative ranking - whether the value appears i n the top five or so, or i n the bottom five or so. In terms of these c r i t e r i a , FAMILY SECURITY i s judged to be a uniformly highly valued goal; only s l i g h t l y less import-ant are A COMFORTABLE LIFE, FREEDOM, HAPPINESS, A WORLD AT PEACE, and A SENSE OF ACCOMPLISHMENT. However, the consensus i n both groups concern-ing the importance of A COMFORTABLE LIFE, A WORLD AT PEACE, and A SENSE OF ACCOMPLISHMENT make i t d i f f i c u l t to place any confidence in the uniform importance of these values i n the group as a whole. The six values ranked as least important for the NFU group are SALVATION, A WORLD OF BEAUTY, SOCIAL RECOGNITION, PLEASURE, NATIONAL SECURITY, and INNER HARMONY. Consensus-is least, however, as to the un-importance of SALVATION and very low concerning PLEASURE and NATIONAL SECURITY. The six least important goals for the non-NFU group d i f f e r Table 5.10 Median Value, Importance and Consensus Rankings of the 18 Terminal Values: NFU and Non-NFU Differences NFU (N=48) Non-NFU (N=85) Impt. S.I. Consensus Impt. S.I. Consensus Median Rank Range* • Rank Median Rank Range Rank COMFORTABLE LIFE 3-29 2 3.84 EXCITING LIFE 11.50 12 2.94 SENSE ACCOMPLISHMENT 5-83 5 4.42 WORLD AT PEACE 5.50 3 3-90 WORLD OF BEAUTY 13.17 17 3.31 EQUALITY 9.17 8 4.35 FAMILY SECURITY 2.61 1 1.69 FREEDOM 5.50 4 2.21 HAPPINESS 6.00 6 3.17 INNER HARMONY 11.50 13 2.97 MATURE LOVE 9.50 10 3-39 NAT'L SECURITY 12.00 14 4.59 PLEASURE 12.83 15 4-44 SALVATION 15.50 18 5.14 SELF-RESPECT 10.17 11 3.35 SOCIAL RECOGNITION 13.10 16 3,93 TRUE FRIENDSHIP 7.63 7 2.88 WISDOM 9.50 9 3.67 11 6.25 3 4.64 11 4 12.55 14 3.65 12 15 6.42 6 3.67 13 12 6.40 5 4-38 17 7 11.69 13 2.92 4 14 7.80 7 3.75 14 l 2.47 l 2.48 l 2 5-92 2 3.21 6 6 6.29 4 2.84 2 5 10.51 11 3.28 7 9 11.42 12 3.94 16 17 12.94 15 3.54 9 16 14.44 16 3.40 8 18 14.69 17 4.98 18 8 9.14 10 3-89 15 13 14.85 18 2.87 3 3 8.57 9 3.02 5 10 8.19 8 3.60 10 *Semi-interquartile Range 152. slightly. Again, i n order of least importance, they are SOCIAL RECOGNITION, SALVATION, PLEASURE, NATIONAL SECURITY, AN EXCITING LIFE, and A WORLD AT PEACE. As with the NFU group, consensus i s least surrounding the ranking of SALVATION. But there i s f a i r l y high agreement that SOCIAL RECOGNITION, PLEASURE, NATIONAL SECURITY, and A WORLD OF BEAUTY are less important than other values. In short, while the value profiles of the two study groups are very similar, there i s greater consensus among non-NFU members as to what i s relatively unimportant. Highly prized values for both groups of farmers are individu-a l i s t i c (self) values, with the possible exceptions of A WORLD AT PEACE and FREEDOM, ( i t i s unclear whether FREEDOM - elaborated upon as independence, free choice - i s perceived as freedom for the individual farmer or freedom for society as a whole.) How can those value systems best be described ideologically? Recall that Rokeach found evidence that known groups of conservatives rank FREEDOM high and EQUALITY low. Farmers here do indeed rank FREEDOM high - higher than EQUALITY. But EQUALITY i s ranked eighth. While four other values are ranked before i t (after FREEDOM), the median values of the two are close enough for i t to appear unwise to describe one rating as "high" and the other as "low". Accordingly, on the basis of Rokeach's criterion, there i s at best only meagre support i n the value hierarchy for describing the study groups as conservative. In terms of the findings of Sutherland and Tanenbaum, farmers i n both groups here value a mixture of both right wing and l e f t wing values. The right wing values include A COMFORTABLE LIFE, FAMILY' SECURITY, and HAPPINESS; the l e f t wing values, A WORLD AT PEACE and 153. FREEDOM. Of these, consensual rankings are high for FAMILY SECURITY, FREEDOM, and HAPPINESS. If i t can he established what sort of freedom farmers value, then i t w i l l he easier to affirm the correctness of observers of agrarian p o l i t i c s i n arguing that farmers do indeed value just what the experience of farming seems best able to afford: freedom and a sense of accomplishment. Before proceeding to other modes of inquiry into farmers' goals and values, i t i s of interest to note that a sample of residents in the capital c i t y of Alberta who were surveyed i n 1971 ranked FAMILY SECURITY, A WORLD AT PEACE, and FREEDOM among the top four most highly valued g o a l s . T h e similarity of the value profiles of the two samples i s striking. The Edmonton sample differs from the farmer groups in attaching a relatively lower p r i o r i t y to the other two values ranked highly here: A COMFORTABLE LIFE and A SENSE OF ACCOMPLISHMENT. (See Table 5.10B, Appendix B.) While further research i s needed to determine the occupational sp e c i f i c i t y of a high ranking of A SENSE OF ACCOMPLISH-MENT, i t i s possible to probe i t s meaning for Alberta farmers. The next set of items allowed the study groups the opportunity to do just that. 2. Desirable Aspects of Farming While the Rokeach value survey i s useful i n describing general l i f e goals individuals deem worth pursuing, i t i s less capable of deline-ating the specific meaning of those valued "end-states". More pointedly, i t has been previously noted that i t i s unclear whether farmers value freedom for themselves or for society as a whole. In order to establish the more precise l i f e goals of farmers in the two study groups, respondents were asked to elaborate upon the desirable aspects of farming. The question 154. posed of farmers was "What do you like most about farming?" The premise is that knowledge of what farmers value most about the,ir occupation i s informative of what they value i n l i f e generally. Table 5 » H summarizes the aspects of farming which respondents in the two groups like most. (Since two responses were possible, Table 5.11 represents the combined measure of the two replies.) This table substantiates the high p r i o r i t y that farmers i n both groups attach to freedom. Two-fifths of NFU members and one-third of non-members like farming simply for the independence i t affords. 71$ of NFU farmers and 60$ of non-members mentioned "independence" i n conjunction with some other aspect of farming as the most desirable aspect of farming. A closer scrutiny of farmers' responses confirms the appropriateness of regarding the freedom farmers value as personal freedom. Table 5 « H Desirable Aspects of Farming: NFU and Non-NFU Groups. NFU (N=48) Non-NFU (N=85) Independence 39.6$ (19) 33-3$ (28) Independence and work 31.3 (15) 26.2 (22) aType of work 22.9 ( l l ) 38.1 (32) Nothing 6.3 ( 3) 2.4 ( 2) Missing data ( l ) 100.1$ 100.0$ £1 Type of work includes references to specific jobs on the farm, the quiet and natural l i f e , the sense of accomplishment, the diversity of work (involving the use of both physical and mental s k i l l s ) . 155-By far the single most liked aspect of farming i s the chance i t affords to "he my own boss". Just what sort of independence does that expression summarize? The most frequently mentioned type i s independence of decision-making —"being able to make my own decisions", "you can do what you want \tfhen you want", "you can set your own hours" to the point of "taking a day off when you want to" or doing tomorrow what you did not do today, and, most simply, "no one t e l l s you what to do". Less frequently described i s the opportunity for independence of individual development. As one farmer outlined his preferred aspect of farming, i t entailed "I like the independence. Thinking for myself. I f e l t restricted when I was holding down a job (in town). Here there i s more opportunity to expand myself and contribute." Since the second type of independence valued i s very much a minority response, it.thus becomes possible to conclude that the indep-endence that farmers value - the personal freedom from constraints on individual i n i t i a t i v e s - i s precisely the sort of freedom conservatives value."'""'* As an interesting aside, i t was common practice for farmers, i n defining the independence of farming as i t s most desirable aspect, to compare their occupation with non-self-employed occupations. Workers i n the latter jobs were perceived as being subject to undue pressure from other people and as having very l i t t l e personal freedom. And yet, of the two groups of farmers, 42$ had never worked off the farm and a further J>&fo had not done off-farm work for any longer than five years. Thus, surprising indeed are the occupational contrasts. Whether farmers are basing their views of off-farm occupations on experience of friends and 156. relatives, or whether a process of rationalization i s at work here whereby farming becomes a worthwhile occupation for i t s satisfaction of less tangible goals than the vi s i b l e one of providing an adequate 12 income i s impossible to determine; Thus i n terms of their value rankings on the Rokeach instrument and their proffered reasons for l i k i n g farming, farmers i n both groups are committed to goals of independence. NFU members are no less inclined than non-members to value the personal freedom they see farming as affording. How near do farmers feel they are to realizing these goals of independence? Most farmers believe they are reasonably close. The evidence i s the overwhelming subscription of both groups to the idea that the farmer i s more independent than the wage-earner: 8 out of 10 NFU 13 members and 9 out of 10 non-members affirm this statement. Not only do farmers i n both groups value independence for themselves, but they believe, as well, that other farmers are equally committed to the goal of independence. It i s their fellow workers' independence and/or competitiveness which i s a serious obstacle to farmers' organizing p o l i t i c a l l y to realize goals i n the p o l i t i c a l system. Of the group of farmers who fault farmers themselves for their i n a b i l i t y to organize p o l i t i c a l l y , 46$ of the NFU farmers cited farmers' independence and competitiveness as reasons why farmers could not get together. The figure for non-NFU members i s an astonishing Ijfo (again, of those blaming farmers). "^ (The lower figure for the NFU members may result from an o f f i c i a l NFU policy to dispell the idea of the necessity of farmer-farmer competition.)"^ 157. There are a variety of interesting speculations by farmers themselves as to why farmers are independent and competitive. In describ-ing each other as competitive, farmers do so i n terms like the following: "Each farmer i s scared his neighbours w i l l get ahead of him". "Every farmer feels he i s smarter than a l l the other farmers." Competition i s seen to occur between big and small farmers;"*"^ between farmers i n different types of agriculture - for example, beef farmers compete with grain growers i n the sense that beef producers want cheap feed grain while grain growers want expensive grain to s e l l ; between farmers with different p o l i t i c a l outlooks; between farmers of different ethnic and national origins; and between farmers with just different personalities. When respondents refer to the independence of (other) farmers, they generally mean one of two things: either a preoccupation with one's own "kingdom" and a concomitant lack of concern with the problems of neighbouring farmers, or a disinclination from taking orders from anyone 17 else (as they might have to do within an organization). The parochial-ism of the farmer preoccupied with his own product and with making his own livelihood i s f e l t , by some farmers, to be a byproduct of the type of l i f e farmers li v e and have chosen. As one farmer said, "They don't have to get together." (My emphasis.) In addition to the solitary, individualistic nature of the enterprise of farming, the idea that "Farmers have to compete with each other" contributes to the independence of farmers. Accordingly, the evidence favors the twenty-year old argument of Macpherson that the practice of farming i t s e l f promotes independence. (1953s 220-222) That i s at least i n part how farmers view the source of 158. farmers' competition and individualism, and by their own admission i t i s a situation they find desirable. IB. The Commitment to Private Property Theoretically, the right of the individual to own private property (and to dispose of i t as he sees f i t ) i s one of the basic tenets of free enterprise and conservatism. In fact, the conservative i s frequently defined as one who equates freedom with this right. (Hailsham, 1959: 7-102; Kirk: 18) Historically, one of the major reasons for labelling the prairie farmer a c a p i t a l i s t and conservative has been his commitment to the private ownership of farm land. Krueger and Bennett (1968: 550, 354) cite as evidence of the importance of individual land tenure to farmers the "necessity" for the CCF to eliminate the plank of "collective ownership of land" from i t s platform before i t could amass support to form the government in Saskatchewan in 1944• If i t i s true that individuals adhere more strongly to values when those values are threatened, then now i s indeed a ripe time to measure the strength of the Alberta farmers' commitment to the private ownership of land. For the past two decades, farms in Canada have been growing larger i n size, fewer in number, and more costly to acquire. Today, the aggrandizement of land i n the hands of fewer and fewer operators means that the existence of the family farm which typically ranged in size from a half to a section and a half i s jeopardized. The principle of the free-dom of individual land tenure i s seriously threatened by the entry of corporations (which enjoy an advantage in capital) into farming. 159. There are two questions of concern here. One, are farmers i n the two study groups committed to individual ownership of land and the family farm? And two, to what extent does that commitment refle c t con-servative values i n either or both groups? Fully 79$ of the farmers i n both study groups feel the trend toward a reduction i n the number of family farms i s a bad one. Only one farmer f e l t i t was unqualifiedly good; the remaining 20$ viewed i t as both good and bad. The perspective of the latter group was that as the non-profitable farms disappear, the people formerly on them w i l l be better off. Why do the huge majority of farmers i n both groups feel the disappearance of the family farm i s a bad trend? It i s not simply because they feel they w i l l be worse off personally. 56$ of them f e l t they would be; 42$ f e l t they would be unaffected, and the remaining 2$ did not know. While the largest proportion of the farmers i n both groups couch their response i n terms of the effect fewer farms w i l l have on them personally, substantial numbers refer to the social consequences of the trend, and over one-fifth of both groups cite both personal and social reasons for disapproving of the trend. Reasons why farmers i n the two study groups dislike the trend away from the family farm are presented i n Table 5.12. The f i r s t part gives the frequency with which each of the ten different types of reasons were mentioned. The total percentages exceed 100$, owing to the possib-i l i t y of multiple responses. The ten responses i n the f i r s t part of the table have been collapsed into broader categories i n the second, part of the table. For example, an individual who mentions "Social Problems" in the second part of the table would have suggested one or more of 160. "Lead to Urban Problems", "Less Pood Produced", Higher Food Costs" or "Overproduction of Food" i n the f i r s t part of the table. Similarly, the category "Loss of a Way of L i f e " i n part two subsumes "Destroy Rural Community" and "Loss of community Country/Way of L i f e " . Accord-ingly, the much higher percentage of NFU members bemoaning the "Loss of a Way of L i f e " i n part two of Table 5.12 i s accounted for by their greater reference to the loss of the rural community in part one. Likewise, the relatively larger non-NFU figure for c i t i n g increased social problems with the disappearance of the family farm i n part two i s accounted for by greater reference to problems stemming from under-prod-uction of food i n part one. There are some interesting contrasts between the two groups. F i r s t , members of the National Farmers Union regret more than non-members the passing of a way of l i f e that was beneficial to both the rural community and the entire country. While farmers i n both study groups 18 fervently believe i n the superiority of the rural l i f e , NFU members are much more l i k e l y to spell out the consequences of i t s decline. Farm-ers directly referred to what the better way of l i f e meant for the individual, the rural community, and the country as a whole. "The farm i s a healthier atmosphere in which to raise a family." "If you leave farming to bigger farms, the towns and country stores w i l l automatically disappear." "When the farm population declines, the prosperity of the country goes since the farmer i s the backbone. Corporate farms don't do as much for the country as the family farm." "Agriculture i s the backbone of the country and i t should stay that way." Table 5-12 Reasons f o r D i s l i k i n g the Disappearance of the Family Farm: NFU and Non-NFU Groups. Part 1; M u l t i p l e responses* Destroy r u r a l community 46.8$ (22) 19.0$ Small farms are good 27.7 (13) 16.7 Lead to urban problems 23.4 (11) 16.7 Large u n i t s are bad 19.1 ( 9) 21.4 Less food produced 17.0 ( 8) 26.2 Higher food costs 10.6 ( 5) 15.5 Loss r u r a l power 8.5 ( 4) 3.6 Loss community/country way of l i f e 6.4 ( 3) 13.1 Over-production of food 4.3 ( 2) . 1.2 Loss i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c way of l i f e 2.1 ( 1) 7-1 NFU (N=48) Non-NFU (N=85) (14) (14) (18) (22) (13) ( 3) (11) ( 1) ( 6) Part 2: Single collapsed response** Loss of a way of l i f e 33'3$ Loss of way of l i f e & s o c i a l 28.9 problems S o c i a l problems 15-6 Loss way of l i f e & against 13•3 bigness Against bigness 4-4 Against bigness & s o c i a l problems 2.2 A l l three - bigness, s o c i a l 2.2 problems, & l o s s of way of l i f e M i ssing data 15 13 ( 7) ( 6) ( 2) ( 1 ( 1 ( 3) 18.2$ (14) 19.5 (15) 31.2 9.1 11-7 9.1 1.3 100.0% (24) ( 7) ( 8) *$'s exceed 100$ ~ " **$'s t o t a l to 100$ ^ F U and Non-NFU d i f f e r e n c e s are s i g n i f i c a n t at .001 l e v e l . 162. Secondly, the resulting social problems that fewer farms w i l l create are most frequently mentioned as deleterious consequences by non-NFU members. These include the shortage of food and the probability of higher food prices, increasing unemployment and welfare, and housing problems experienced by urban centres as former farmers and former would-be farmers migrate to urban centres. Thirdly, although numbers here are small, non-NFU farmers are somewhat more inclined to regret the decline of the family farm because they see i t being replaced by "big operators". Some of these farmers denounce larger/corporate farms i n general terms the implication being that replacing the family farm with "large syndicates","corporate farms", or "too many big guys getting i n and controlling things" were sufficiently obvious denunciations i n themselves that there was no need to elaborate further. Other farmers decried large units specifically because they represent a lessening of the farmer's freedom. With larger units, farmers " w i l l have to work for wages", " w i l l have to do what they're told since they'll just be working for a company", and "they won't be their own boss anymore". This category of reasons for d i s l i k i n g the disappearance of the family farm - this "Against Bigness" category -unaccompanied by any other type of reasoning i s more than any other response conservative i n i t s outlook. It seems to reflect an assumption 19 that "small i s good and big i s bad". Big represents domination of the individual and a consequent loss of personal freedom. However, the number of farmers subscribing to this position exclusively i s few. Most farmers i n both study groups are more thoughtful and a l t r u i s t i c i n their regrets for the decline of the family farm. 163. To conclude, farmers i n both study groups adhere to relat i v e l y conservative values. Life goals are personal, close-to-home ones. Satisfactions derived from farming relate to independence and autonomy. The subjective impression, garnered by perusing respondents' comments, i s that independence and parochialism coexist. This impression i s supported by s t a t i s t i c a l evidence which comes i n the form of associations between selected values on the Rokeach survey and reported reasons for l i k i n g farming. Mean value rankings of respondents who mentioned each of the possible desirable aspects of farming (independence, type of work, independence and type of work) are calculated for five values - EQUALITY, A WORLD AT PEACE, A COMFORTABLE LIFE, FREEDOM and A SENSE OF ACCOMPLISH-MENT. (These values have been chosen because of their importance i n distinguishing ideologies and there being sufficient variance within both groups on their rankings.) While differences of means on the rank-ings of the values are low for the most part i n both groups (the r e f l e c t -ion of the general accord as to what are important goals), i n the NFU and the non-NFU group, the most inward looking farmers are those who lik e farming because of the independence they fe e l i t affords, and the most outward looking, those who like the type of work associated with farming. That i s , i n the NFU group, individuals who like the independence farming affords give a lower p r i o r i t y to A WORLD AT PEACE and EQUALITY. Those who find the type of work most desirable place a greater emphasis on A WORLD AT PEACE and EQUALITY, and a lesser one on A COMFORTABLE LIFE and A SENSE OF ACCOMPLISHMENT. Farmers most satisfied with farming, who mention l i k i n g both the independence and type of work, value A COMFORTABLE LIFE and EQUALITY moreso than others. 164. I n the non-NFU group, i n d i v i d u a l s who l i k e the independence of farming emphasize FAMILY SECURITY and FREEDOM moreso than o t h e r s , and A SENSE OF ACCOMPLISHMENT l e s s so. Those who l i k e the type o f work a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e i r occupation p l a c e a h i g h e r than average p r i o r i t y on A WORLD AT PEACE and a lower than average value on A COMFORTABLE LIFE and FREEDOM. Non-NFU farmers most pleased w i t h farming, who l i k e both the independence and the work, s t r e s s EQUALITY more than others and A WORLD AT PEACE l e s s than o t h e r s . Hence, w h i l e NFU members who value the independence farming a f f o r d s undervalue a l t r u i s t i c g o a l s , and non-NFU farmers who l i k e the independence of farming over-value e g o c e n t r i c g o a l s , the import i s the same: an inward-looking stance and p r e f e r r i n g the autonomy of farming co-occur. T h i s meshing of the two methods o f tapping farmers' v a l u e s and l i f e g o als thereby i n d i c a t e s t h a t the task of t h i s second s e c t i o n - to tap the values and goals of the two farmer groups - has been s u c c e s s f u l . 165. Notes on Chapter 5 This reading i s "based on public statements of the Canadian Cattlemens Association and the P a l l i s e r Wheat Growers' Association as reported i n The Western Producer, a farm weekly serving the three prairie provinces. See, for example, "Income Assurance Plans Not Answer to Producers' Problems Say Cattlemen", Western Producer, Thursday, October 16, 1975, p. 10. The intent originally was to construct a scale of degree of recom-mended federal (provincial) involvement in production. Such a scale would have end points representing, at the one end, a recommendation of no governmental involvement at a l l i n production, and, at the other, high governmental involvement. High governmental involvement would take the form of production controls. In between these ex-tremities, running from the non-involvement to the high involvement end, would be placed recommendations for a governmental advisory role for a monetary and financial assistance role, for intervention i n the establishment of cost and profit controls, for ensuring a f a i r price, and for controlling production i n various ways. The scale would then be as follows: No role Advisory Financial Cost & Ensure Production role Assistance Profit f a i r controls Controls return In accordance with this plan, a l l respondents' replies to the product ion questions were content analysed and coded along this continuum. As the coding task progressed, i t became increasingly clear to the researcher that such a continuum would be a most unreliable indicator of the farmers' responses i f i t were indeed treated as a scale of recommended involvement. This was because while the logic of the scale meant that a recommendation that the government ensure a f a i r price (a score of "5") would also constitute a recommendation that the government provide financial assistance i n the form of incentive grants, for example, (a score of "3"), some farmers would endorse a position at "4" or "5" or "6" without endorsing a position at "2" or "3". Indeed, farmers frequently suggested that the government's role should be to ensure a f a i r price because "If they paid us a f a i r price, we wouldn't need a l l these incentive grants and subsidies." In short, a proposal that the government ensure a f a i r price to farmers i s a qualitatively different response than that of proposing a role of monetary assistance. Repeated scrutinies of the responses to the production questions thereby lent support to the earlier assump tion that i t may not be sensible to posit conservatism, liberalism, and socialism as different points on a continuum. Conservatism and socialism are to some extent opposite, but so are liberalism and 166. socialism. This being the case, i t was decided that the responses would be coded as "conservative", as " l i b e r a l " , or as "radical" (socialist?) In line with the continuum set forth earlier, responses recommending "no role" were coded as "conservative"; those suggesting an advisory and monetary assistance role, as " l i b e r a l " ; and speculations that the government involve i t s e l f i n the regulation of the profits of corporations, the ensuring of a f a i r price to the farmer, or the establishment of production quotas and- controls as "radical". 3. The data set was collected by researchers at the University of Alberta, of which Professor Richard Baird was the Principal Researcher, i n August, 1971« The N for the farmers' responses reported here i s 144. Disagreement with this statement does not necessarily mean disagreement with limits on what the farmer can produce. A farmer could disagree with the statement because i n a world of starving people, he feels there should be no limits to food production. 4. LIFT was mentioned 6/l0 times under the "Incentive Scheme" heading; as a percentage of a l l harmful programs, i t was mentioned 25$ of the 5. Further evidence that when non-NFU farmers think of farm size limits i t i s limits on corporate farms, not individual enterprises, comes from the results of a factor analysis of these two attitudinal items with other items. While both items load on the same factor on an oblique pattern matrix for the non-NFU group, they do not for the NFU farmers. 6. The Gamma measure of association for Preferred Type of Marketing by NFU Membership i s .40 when missing data are excluded (chi square s t a t i s t i c significant at .05 level); and .52 with missing data included (chi square s t a t i s t i c significant at .01 level). 7 NFU (N=37) time. Input Supplies Cost Controls Federal Production Role Conservative Liberal Radical N Agree Disagree 33$ 50 36$ 30$ 99$(33) 50 100$( 4) 8. Non-NFU (N=96) Input Cost Controls Conservative Federal Production Role' Liberal Radical N Agree Disagree Missing Data 34$ . 30$ 36$ 100$. 70 39 46" 15 100$(13 (13 167. Federal Production Role Farm Price Conservative Liberal Radical N  Controls Agree 35-5$ 29$ 35-5$ 100$ (62) Disagree 47 37 16 100$ (19) Missing data (15) 9 Non-NFU (N=96) Federal Production Role Conservative Liberal Radical N Marketing Canadian Wheat Board 36$ 33$ 31$ 100$ (42) Open marketing 33 36 30 (33) Missing data (21) 10 The researcher thanks Mr. Eric Tanenbaum, SSRC Archive Director at the University of Essex for making these data available. 11 It may well be that i t i s only this type of conservatism (freedom) that the questions could e l i c i t . The p o s s i b i l i t y that farmers are concerned with more global questions of freedom should not therefore be ruled out. 12 The evidence that farmers regard farming as a less than adequate occupation on the vis i b l e criterion of providing a suitable income comes i n the form of responses to what farmers dislike most about farming. 29.2$ of NFU farmers and 20$ of non-NFU farmers mentioned "Income/Financial Problems" as the single feature they disliked most. A further 20.8$ NFU farmers and 15.3$non-NFU farmers cited "Income/ Financial Problems" i n conjunction with some other aspect. 13 The statement read "The farmer i s more independent than people who work for wages"; of NFU farmers, 13$ disagreed somewhat and 7$ disagreed strongly with the statement. Of non-NFU farmers, 6$ disagreed somewhat and 1$ strongly with the statement. The Gamma st a t i s t i c i s - . 4 0 and the chi square s t a t i s t i c i s significant at the .06 level. 14 31$ of NFU members and 46$ of non-members faulted farmers or their organizations for their i n a b i l i t y to organize p o l i t i c a l l y . Thus, the 46$ and 73$ figures quoted i n the text are 46$ of 31$ to represent1he percentage of total NFU members who cited individualism and competitiveness as detriments to mobilization, and 73$ of 46$ to represent the corresponding non-NFU figure. 168. 15 The NFU Submission to the Alberta Agricultural Marketing Council presented at Taber, Alberta, Jan. 24, 1973> included the following idea: "The recognized effect of competition i s to destroy profits and i n a profit-oriented system, individual competition among farmers has certainly resulted i n widespread reduction i n the number of farm families now l i v i n g i n our rural areas.", pp. 1 - 2. 16 One member of the National Farmers Union recalled attending an NFU meeting where the biggest farmers, he f e l t , always had the most to say and the l i t t l e farmer f e l t l e f t out. 17 This definition of individualism offered by farmers closely approx-imates the notion of individualism that a c a p i t a l i s t values: "This individualism stresses the moral responsibility and opportunity of each person to serve his own needs as he sees f i t . It i s his responsibility to act purposefully i n his own behalf; he should not be concerned for others, nor should he expect others to serve his needs for him." Dolbeare and Dolbeare, p. 32. 18. 54$ of the NFU group agreed strongly and 33$ agreed somewhat with the following statement: "The rural l i f e produces a better kind of person than the town or c i t y l i f e . " Comparable figures for the non-NFU group are 61$ agreeing strongly and 25$ agreeing somewhat. 19 Assuming that the philosophy "small i s good and big i s bad" denotes an ideological perspective - and a conservative one - may be erron-eous insofar as this same perspective has been adopted of late by the new l e f t and by a group of economists. See E.F. Schumacher, Small i s Beautiful (London: Abacus, 1974)• 169. Chapter 6 The Structure of Farmers' Belief Systems and A Typology of Activity and Belief Selected hut linn*ted differences of content distinguish the belief sets of farmers recruited to the protest farm organization from those of the unrecruited. In terms of both how they view the world operating and how they suggest i t ought to function, NFU members have been shown to be more radical than their non-member counterparts. Because belief system research i s inevitably concerned with understanding the linkages between belief components, documenting the content of the belief set i s not sufficient. The second and equally important task involves uncovering the pattern whereby the belief components are related to one another. Discerning the links between evaluative and cognitive belief components i s of paramount importance i n uncovering the reasons for evaluation. A farmer's support for governmental regulation of prices w i l l be more understandable i f i t i s shown that this same farmer perceives monopolistic control over price-fixing and assesses such control as detrimental to the farmer. In short, uncovering the"view of r e a l i t y " on which judgments are based i s important i n describing an evaluative-belief set. Thus, this chapter examines, f i r s t , the structure of farmers' p o l i t i c a l belief sets. More precisely, the degree of inter-relationship of evaluative and cognitive components w i l l be examined for the purpose of uncovering the cognitive bases of judgments for regulation of the pricing, marketing, and production sectors. There are two further 170. purposes of this chapter. The second objective i s to describe the set of consensual beliefs among farmers as a whole and the constellation of partic u l a r i s t i c beliefs to which members of the National Farmers Union adhere. The third goal i s the construction of a typology based on the c r i t e r i a of belief content and NFU membership which w i l l f a c i l i t a t e the understanding of the conditions under which beliefs and ac t i v i t y are congruent. I. Structure of Belief Systems The inquiry focuses upon structure among the following cognit-ive and evaluative belief elements."*" Cognitive belief elements (1) Control i n the Pricing Sector - corporations establish farm prices/corporations do not establish farm prices ' - manufacturers f i x input supplies' costs/manufacturers . do not f i x input costs (2) Control i n the Marketing Sector - speculators benefit from open marketing/speculators do not benefit (3) Control in P o l i t i c a l Decision-Making ^ - p o l i t i c a l authorities under influential ^-economic forces over inf l u e n t i a l ( 4 ) Class nature of society - radical view of class structure/non-radical view Evaluative belief elements (1) Appropriate Pricing System - agree with controls on farm prices/disagree with controls - agree with controls on input costs/disagree with controls (2) Appropriate Marketing System - prefer orderly (Canadian Wheat Board) marketing/ prefer open marketing (3) Appropriate Organization of the Production Sector - conservative federal production role/non-conservative role - l i b e r a l federal production role/non-liberal role - radical federal production role/non-radical role 171. *- agree with legislating a maximum farm size *- agree with rest r i c t i n g corporate entry into farming *These are continuous level variables. A l l non-starred variables are dichotomous (dummy) variables wherein the response on the l e f t side of the / i s scored as "1"; that on the right side as "0". For the purposes of the discussion here, a "radical" position on each of these belief elements i s the position on the l e f t side of the / i n the event of dichotomous variables and the affirmation of the item i n the continuous level measures. As i n the preceding two chapters, the concern i s to determine intergroup differences for the ultimate objective of relating farmers' belief systems to one type of p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y - joining a protest organization. Hence, the analysis i s divided into two parts: f i r s t , the structure among cognitive and evaluative beliefs i n the NFU group i s detailed; and secondly, the same analyses are undertaken for the non-NFU group. A. The NFU Group Since the NFU study group i s comprised of only NFU members who do not hold conjoint membership i n a counter organization with an o f f i c i a l l y "free enterprise" ideology (and hence the N i s 37), there •is a "disappearing c e l l " problem. There i s l i t t l e or no variance among NFU members on cognitions and evaluations of the pricing system: 72$ concur that i t i s corporations that control farm prices and 69$ that manufacturers set farm supplies' costs; 86$ and 89$ favor controls on farm produce prices and input supplies' costs, respectively. With respect to cognitions of the marketing system, over three-fifths of the 172. NFU farmers agree that the beneficiary of the open marketing system i s not the farmer but the speculator. This high degree of accord of per-spective, combined with the small sample size, limits the extent to which s t a t i s t i c a l correlations are meaningful indicators of the struct-ural inter-relatedness of belief items. Nevertheless, correlations and measures of association do provide some insight into the links between cognitions and evaluations and, i n the absence of multidimensional techniques of structural analyses, form the bases of the following discussion. Tables 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3 are reference tables for this section wherein the task i s to answer the question of whether, i n the NFU group, recommendations for regulation of the three agricultural sectors - pricing, production, and marketing - are rooted i n views of externalized control of that sector and society generally. Table 6.1 reports the association between cognitive belief elements regarding the pricing and marketing sectors and evaluations of the pricing, marketing and production sectors. Table 6.2 contrasts the evaluative beliefs on pricing, marketing, and production of individuals with a conservative and radical class structure perspective. (The number of individuals ascribing to the l i b e r a l per-spective i s very small; hence this group has been dropped from the comparison here.) Table 6.3 reports Pearson correlations of distribution of influence i n decision-making items and a radical class perspective, on the one hand, with recommendations for regulation of the pricing, marketing, and production sectors on the other. Table 6.1 Gamma Measure,of Association Between Cognitive Beliefs Regarding the Pricing and Marketing Sectors and Evaluations Regarding the Pricing, Marketing and Production Sectors: NFU (N=37) Evaluations Cognitions Farm Input CWB * Federal Farm Restrict Price Cost Prod. Size Corporate Controls Controls Mk. Role Limits Entry Corps, control prices .29 -1.00 -.22 -.40 -.11 -.11 Manufs. set costs ,22 - .18 -.30 -.26 -.61 .23 Specul. benefit open • 79 -.14 1.00 .08 .26 .27 Level of measurement: a l l variables are dichotomous (dummy variables) except "Federal Prod. Role",-"Farm Size Limits", "Restrict Corporate Entry" which are ordinal level measures. *In Table 6.1, "Federal Prod. Role" i s treated as an ordinal variable wherein a high scnre signifies a radical role; a moderate score, a lib e r a l role; and a low score, a conservative role. When the three recommended roles are treated as separate (dummy)variables, the Pearson r's are as follows. Conserv. Liberal Radical Prod. Prod. Prod. Role Role Role Corps, control prices .19 .02 -.21 Manufs. set costs .10 .06 -.16 Specul. benefit open -.09 .09 -.01 Table 6.2 Class Structure View and Evaluations Regarding the Pricing, Marketing, and Production Sectors: NFU $"s* (N=37) Evaluations Farm Input CWB Conserv. Liberal Radical Farm Restrict Price Cost Prod. Prod. Prod. Size Corporate Controls Controls Mk. Role Role Role Lim. Entry Conservative 100$ 89 67 44 11 44 78 67 Radical 87 87 83 50 39 30 74 87 *Cell entries are percentages of individuals with a Conservative(Radical) Class Structure View who evaluate the need for Farm Price Controls, Input Cost Controls, and so on. Class Structure View Table 6.3 Pearson Correlations of Distribution of Decision-Making Influence and Radical Class View with Evaluations Regarding Pricing, Marketing, and Production Sectors: NFU. Evaluations  Wheat Conserv. Liberal Radical Farm Restrict Board Prod. Prod. Prod. Size Corporate Marketing Role Role Role Limits Entry Pol. Auth. Under I n f l . .34 -.01 -.32 .33 .13 .51 Econ. Forces Over I n f l . .33 -.02 -.21 .23 .20 .17 Radical Class Perspective .17 -.13 .22 -.10 -.02 .33 Level of measurement: a l l variables are dichotomous (dummy) variables except "Farm Size Limits", "Restrict Corporate Entry", " P o l i t i c a l Authorities Under Influence" and "Economic Forces Over Influential". (N=37) 175. What then are the cognitive components of recommendations for regulation of various agricultural sectors? F i r s t , with respect to the pricing sector, the c a l l for i t s regulation tends to he grounded for the most part i n cognitions of the functioning of the pricing system i t s e l f - specifically the monopolistic control by corporations and manufacturers over the sector (Table 6.1). The advocacy of regulation of farm produce prices i s (unlike the recommendation of input cost controls) related to views of control i n two other sectors - the marketing sector (Speculat-ors controlling the open market system of grain selling) and a conservat-ive view of the class structure of Canadian society (Tables 6.1 and 6.2, respectively). Secondly, the preference for a regulated, orderly marketing scheme i s linked to more cognitive components than are other evaluative belief elements. It i s associated not only with a view of the function-ing of the marketing system i t s e l f but also with a more general perception of the distribution of influence and control i n the p o l i t i c a l system and society as a whole. Individuals who recommend Canadian Wheat Board marketing have a view of speculators as benefitting from open marketing (Table 6.1), of p o l i t i c a l control as maldistributed i n favor of the economic sector (Table 6.3), and (weakly) of the inappropriateness of the class nature of Canadian society (Table 6.2). Thirdly, recommendations for regulation of the production sector occur alongside views of p o l i t i c a l decision-making as out of the hands of the legitimate p o l i t i c a l authorities and i n that of the economic sector (the middlemen and the multinationals). This holds true of 176. recommendations for a radical federal production role, limits on farm size, and restrictions on corporate entry into farming (Table 6.3). Views of control within the marketing and pricing sectors are also related to selected judgments of the need for regulation of the product-ion sector - especially with respect to establishing limits on corporate farming (Table 6.1). The desire to have restrictions upon corporations entering into production appears to be rooted i n views of the input aspect of pricing (Table 6.1), of marketing (Table 6.1), and of p o l i t i c a l decision-making as out of the hands of farmers and p o l i t i c a l authorities (Table 6.3). It i s , as well, congruent with a negative judgement of the organization of society along class lines (Table 6.2). The willingness for regulation of corporate entry into the production sector i s thus apparently rooted in a vision of manufacturers, speculators, and the economically powerful as encroaching upon other aspects of farming. To a lesser extent, those links recur with respect to the inclination to see maximum limits on farm sizes (Tables 6.1 and 6.3). Vith respect to the three possible roles recommended for the federal government in production, the cognitive bases of each are s l i g h t l y - and informatively - different. Whereas the radical production role i s congruent with perceptions of the economic sector dominating p o l i t i c a l decision-making, the l i b e r a l production role i s negatively related to such views and the conservative role i s not associated at a l l with views of the appropriateness of the distribution of decision-making influence (Table 6.3). Hence, i t appears that radicals are recommending greater governmental involvement at least partly because they feel that governmental 177. regulation of production i s a preferable alternative to the undue influence of middlemen and large corporations i n farming. Another correlate of the federal production role recommended is the perspective regarding the class nature of Canadian society (Table 6.2). Individuals who are conservative i n their production control out-look are also conservative i n their view of Canada's class nature; liberals on the criterion of production regulation are radical i n their 9 class perspective. The finding i s interesting, giving rise to the speculation that the conservatives (on the production question) know their place and are happy to be l e f t alone i n i t ; the liberals (on production) want no barriers to their (successful) pursuit of their goals 2 - either class or regulatory. B. The Non-NFU Group This discussion draws upon Tables 6.4 through 6.6 to trace the cognitive correlates of non-NFU members' assessments of the approp-riateness of regulation of the pricing, marketing, and production sectors. On the whole, the exercise yields similar results to those established for the NFU group. F i r s t , among non-NFU members, advocating regulation of the pricing sector i s based on perceptions of monopolistic control with respect to farm produce price f i x i n g (Table 6.4), speculator manipulation of the open marketing of grain (Table 6.4) > and weakly with a radical class perspective (Table 6.5). In addition, the affirmation of the need for farm produce price controls i s related to a view of decision-making influence as wielded to a lesser extent than i s suitable by legitimate p o l i t i c a l authorities (Table 6.6). Thus, judgments by non-members of 178. t h e n e e d t o c o n t r o l t h e p r i c i n g s e c t o r a r e more e x t e n s i v e l y l i n k e d t o c o g n i t i v e e l e m e n t s t h a n t h o s e o f N F U m e m b e r s . S e c o n d l y , e s p o u s i n g t h e n e c e s s i t y o f o r d e r l y , r e g u l a t e d M a r k e t i n g o c c u r s a l o n g s i d e c o g n i t i o n s o f e x t e r n a l m o n o p o l i s t i c c o n t r o l o f b o t h t h e m a r k e t i n g a n d p r i c i n g s e c t o r s ( T a b l e 6.4). I t i s r o o t e d , a s w e l l , i n a v i e w o f e c o n o m i c f o r c e s a s e x e r c i s i n g p r e d o m i n a n t c o n t r o l o v e r d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g ( T a b l e 6.5), a n d w e a k l y w i t h a r a d i c a l c l a s s p e r s p e c -t i v e ( T a b l e 6.5). T h u s , t h e c o g n i t i v e c o r r e l a t e s o f r e g u l a t i o n o f t h e m a r k e t i n g s y s t e m a r e s i m i l a r f o r b o t h s t u d y g r o u p s - e x t e n d i n g b e y o n d a p e r c e p t i o n o f t h e f u n c t i o n i n g o f t h e m a r k e t i n g s y s t e m t o a n a p p r a i s a l o f t h e l o c u s o f c o n t r o l i n d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g a n d s o c i e t y a s a w h o l e . x T h i r d l y , w h i l e t h e p a t t e r n d i f f e r s somewhat f o r e a c h o f t h e t h r e e a s p e c t s o f p r o d u c t i o n (recommended f e d e r a l r o l e , l i m i t i n g c o r p o r a t e f a r m i n g , e s t a b l i s h i n g f a r m s i z e l i m i t s ) , a d v o c a t i n g r e g u l a t i o n o f t h e p r o d u c t i o n s e c t o r o c c u r s a l o n g s i d e a v i e w o f t h e i n a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s o f t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f p o l i t i c a l c o n t r o l . T h a t i s , n o n - N F U i n d i v i d u a l s who recommend a r a d i c a l p r o d u c t i o n r o l e v i e w p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t i e s a s u n d e r -i n f l u e n t i a l ; f a r m e r s who e s p o u s e l i m i t i n g t h e s i z e o f f a r m s s u g g e s t t h e e c o n o m i c s e c t o r i s o v e r l y p o w e r f u l ; a n d f a r m e r s who w a n t c o r p o r a t e f a r m -i n g r e s t r i c t e d v i e w p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t i e s a s u n d e r - p e r s u a s i v e a n d e c o n o m i c f o r c e s a s p r e d o m i n a n t ( T a b l e 6.6). O t h e r c o g n i t i v e c o r r e l a t e s o f n o n - N F U r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s f o r r e g u l a t i o n o f t h e p r o d u c t i o n s e c t o r t e n d t o be more o r l e s s c o n g r u e n t w i t h t h o s e e s t a b l i s h e d f o r t h e NFU g r o u p . T h u s , a d v o c a t i n g r e s t r i c t i o n s o n f a r m o w n e r s h i p a n d s i z e a r e ( c o n t r a r y t o t h e N F U g r o u p ) f o u n d e d o n v i e w s o f e x t e r n a l c o n t r o l o f t h e p r i c i n g a n d m a r k e t i n g s e c t o r s ( T a b l e 6.4)» Table 6.4 Gamma Measure of Association Between Cognitive Beliefs Regarding the Pricing and Marketing Sectors and Evaluations Regarding the Pricing, Marketing, and Production Sectors: Non-KFO" (N=96) Evaluations . Cognitions Farm Input CWB Federal Farm Restrict Price Cost Prod. Size Corporate Controls Controls Mk. Role Limit Entry Corps, control prices • 57 • 54 .49 .15 .09 • 30 Manufs. set costs .19 .08 • 38 .11 .17 .42 Specul. benefit open • 33 .74 • 90 -.02 • 32 • 14 Level of measurement: a l l variables are dichotomous (dummy) variables except "Federal Prod. Role", "Farm Size Limits" and "Restrict Corporate Entry" which are continuous level measures. *In Table 6.4, "Federal Prod. Role" i s treated as an ordinal variable, whereby low, medium, and high scores represent conservative, l i b e r a l , and radical roles, respectively. When the three recommended roles are treated as separate (dummy) variables, the Pearson r's are as follows. Conser. Liberal Radical Prod. Prod. Prod. Role Role Role Corps, control prices .00 -.05 .16 Manufs. set costs .06 -.13 .17 Specul. benefit open -.03 .25 -.07 Table 6.5 Class Structure View and Evaluations Regarding the Pricing, Marketing, and Production Sectors: Non-NFU $'s* (N=96) Evaluations Farm Input CWB Conserv. Liberal Radical Farm Restrict Price Cost ^ Prod. Prod. Prod. Size Corporate Controls Controls Role Role Role Limits Entry ' Conservative 75$ 83 50 42 25 33 56 84 Liberal 63 82 47 40 40 20 41 73 Radical 90 91 60 30 32 38 45 77 *Cell entries are percentages of individuals with a Conservative(Radical) Class Structure View who evaluate the need for farm Price Controls, Input Controls, and so on. Class Structure View Table 6.6 Pearson Correlations of Distribution of Decision-Making Influence and Radical Class View with Evaluations Regarding Pricing, Marketing, and Production Sectors: Non-NFU (N=96) Evaluations Farm Input CWB Conserv. Liberal Radical Farm Restrict Price Cost • Prod. Prod. Prod. Size Corporate Controls Controls Mk. Role Role Role Limits Entry Pol. Auth. Under I n f l . .26 .07 -.01 -.03 -.13 .19 .06 • 23 Econ. Forces Over I n f l . .07 .14 .19 • 03 .06 .10 .28 .23 Radical Class Perspective .18 .10 .10 -.13 .02 .02 -.03 -.06 Level of measurement:all variables are dichotomous (dummy) variables except "Farm Size Limits", "Restrict Corporate Entry", " P o l i t i c a l Authorities under Influential", and "Economic Forces over Influential". 181. of a conservative class perspective (Table 6 . 5 ) ; and, as mentioned, on a cognition of decision-making influence as improperly distributed (Table 6 . 6 ) . Like the NFU group, non-NFU farmers conservative i n their outlook regarding federal intervention i n the production sector adhere to a conservative view of the class nature of Canadian society; unlike the NFU group, non-NFU producers with a l i b e r a l production outlook are weakly inclined to be liberals with respect to their viewpoint regard-ing the Canadian class structure (Table 6 . 5 ) . Thus, for both study groups, efforts to trace the cognitive bases of recommended federal production roles do not yie l d particularly f r u i t f u l results. For the NFU group, the clearest correlate of a radical production perspective i s a radical vision of the distribution of p o l i t i c a l influence - as out of the grasp of p o l i t i c a l authorities and i n that of the economic sector (Table 6 . 3 ) . For the non-NFU group, the radical production perspective i s rooted i n only one aspect of the assessment of the dis-tribution of p o l i t i c a l influence - that i s , that p o l i t i c a l authorities are less dominant than they should be (Table 6 . 6 ) . For both study groups, l i b e r a l and conservative production perspectives appear to be related to broad observations of the class structure of Canadian society (Tables 6 . 2 and 6 . 5 ) . In short, the structural character of the belief sets of the two study groups does not d i f f e r greatly. For both groups, recommendations for regulation and/or governmental involvement i n the pricing, marketing, and production sectors of farming are based on perceptions of control externalized from the farmer i n one or more of the pricing, marketing and 182. p o l i t i c a l decision-making sectors. Possibly the best example of inter-group similarity i s the wide cognitive base of a recommendation for order and regulation within the marketing sector (that i s , a preference for Canadian wheat Board marketing). It i s grounded in locus of control cognitions extending to the distribution of p o l i t i c a l influence and (less strongly) to the class nature of Canadian society. There are slight variations between the two farmer groups in the extent to which "radical" evaluative beliefs regarding the pricing sector, for example, are linked to cognitions specific to that agricultural sector or more general perceptions of the locus of control i n other sectors. However, most inter-group differences of structuring are minor. While the structural nature of cognitive-evaluative belief elements does not d i f f e r greatly for the two study groups, Table 6.7 ' demonstrates that the incidence of association of certain cognitive and evaluative belief elements i s greater within the NFU group than the non-member group. Percentages in Table 6.7 indicate the proportion of the NFU and non-NFU group as a whole which i s congruent on the two items. Thus they give some indication of the degree of consensus within the two study groups concerning the association of the two belief elements. Accordingly, with respect to cognitive links to espousing the regulation of farm produce prices, for 63$ of the NFU group and 46$ of the non-member group, favoring the regulation of produce prices occurs alongside a view of corporations controlling farm prices. Similarly, i n the NFU group as a whole, the preference for orderly marketing i s linked for 51$ with a view of corporations controlling farm prices, for 49$ with a perception that manufacturers set input costs, and for 6l$ with a view 183. that speculators benefit from open marketing. The comparative non-NFU group percentages are 36$, 39$, and 40$ respectively. Further inter-group contrasts i n this same vein can be noted with respect to the cognitive bases of advocating farm size limits, corporate entry into farming, and regulation of input costs. Hence, the incidence of cognitive-evaluative belief association within the protest organization i s higher than among the more disparate non-member group. This i s to be expected. But the pattern (the direction of the correlation) whereby evaluative recommendations for organization of the pricing, marketing, and production sectors are linked to views of the way each of these sectors operates i s not substantially different. In order to arrive at some over a l l appraisal of the manner in which belief sets of NFU members d i f f e r from those of farmers not similarly recruited to this organization, a review of the highlights of Chapters 4 and 5 i s now undertaken. The objective i s to develop a profile of consensual beliefs which farmers i n both study groups adhere to, and a set of the more parti c u l a r i s t i c beliefs which NFU members hold to a greater extent than do non-members. These two profiles w i l l em-phasize the substantive and structural distinctions between the belief systems of the members of the protest farm organization and non-members. II. Consensual and Particularistic Belief Sets in the Two Study Groups A. Consensual Beliefs Cognitions regarding the locus of control with respect to current farm problems, the pricing, marketing, and p o l i t i c a l arena have been detailed i n Chapter 4« Evaluations of regulation of the pricing, marketing, and production sectors, as well as of more general values and Table 6.7 Incidence of Joint Occurrence of Cognitive and Evaluative Belief Elements Regarding the Pricing, Marketing, and Production Sectors: $'s* Evaluations Farm Input CWB Conserv. Liberal Radical Farm Restrict NFU Group Price Cost ^ Prod. Prod. Prod. Size Corporate Cognitions Controls Controls Role Role Role Limits Entry Corps, control prices 63$ 60 51 29 23 20 56 62 Manufs. set costs 60 60 49 26 23 20 53 56 Specul. Benefit open 58 55 61 18 24 18 47 53 Non-NFU Group  Cognitions Corps, control prices 46 48 36 19 16 20 27 44 Manufs. set costs 51 55 39 24 18 23 33 53 Specul. Benefit open 38 43 40 16 20 13 24 36 *°/o of group congruent on the' two items Level of measurement: a l l variables are dichotomous (dummy) variables except "Farm Size Limits" and "Restrict Corporate Entry", which are continuous level measures. 185. l i f e goals have been tapped i n Chapter 5. The consensus of farmers in both study groups, i n the sense of representing the belief elements to which over one half of the farmers i n both groups adhere, includes a subscription to the following beliefs. (The proportion of NFU and non- NFU farmers agreeing with each b e l i e f i s given i n Table 6.8) Consensual Beliefs General Locus of Control 1. Control (in the sense of a b i l i t y to act) with respect to the cost-price squeeze l i e s with the government and extra governmental forces and not with the farmer. Pricing Control 2. Control i s completely externalized from the farmer i n the matter of farm produce prices and input supplies* costs. Farmers have no say in either matter. 5. Determination of farm input supplies' prices i s monopolized by the manufacturer of each commodity. Decision-Making 4. Multinational corporations, the Canadian Pacific Railway, chain food stores, packing plants, and the United States' government a l l have too much influence i n the important decisions that affect farmers. 5. Farmers' elected representatives - the Member of Parliament and the Member of the Legislative Assembly - as well as their farm organiz-ations have too l i t t l e say i n important decision-making. 6 . The decision-making system i s closed to the individual farmer who i s unable to have the say he feels entitled to. Class Structure of Society 7. Society i s structured along class lines and ought not to be. Pricing Regulation 8. The prices of farm produce and input supplies should be controlled. Production Regulation J . Corporate farming should be outlawed. General Values and Life Goals 10. The disappearance of the family farm i s a bad trend. 11. The farmer i s more independent than the wage-earner. 12. Family Security and Freedom are important values in l i f e . Pleasure, National Security, and a World of Beauty are rela t i v e l y unimportant l i f e goals. 186. How can this set of consensual beliefs be described i n ideo-logical terms? That task may be f a c i l i t a t e d by recalling both beliefs which at least 50$ of each of the two groups did not adhere to, and the pattern of intercorrelation among these elements. In terms of the f i r s t consideration, perhaps the most significant aspect of farmers surveyed here, at least i n terms of their evaluative beliefs, i s their failure simultaneously to endorse Canadian Wheat Board marketing and to recommend extensive governmental involvement i n production. While i t i s easy to make too much of the latter, especially considering the degree to which recommending a radical production position i s confounded with articulation s k i l l s , i t does nevertheless constitute a point beyond which farmers w i l l not go. Indeed, they w i l l not go very far i n the matter of regulation; orderly marketing i s rejected by 50$ of both groups. With respect to the second consideration, intercorrelation among belief components, i t must be noted that while more than 50$ of both groups of farmers subscribe to these twelve beliefs, this i s not to suggest that a l l items of this set tend to co-occur i n the evaluative-belief set of more than half the farmers. Hence, given that ideological descriptions of individual belief systems as radical or conservative usually assume some constraint among belief elements, i t may be the case that, i n seeking to attach an ideological label to this collection, we are violating that particular assumption. A review of the pattern of inter-correlation of these belief elements suggests that there i s constraint among most of these elements, probably a sufficient amount to ju s t i f y describing them as a cluster of consensual b e l i e f s . ^ Table 6.8 Consensual Beliefs of NFU & Non-NFU Farmers i<> NFU io Non-NFU Agree Agree 1 Control re cost-price squeeze 58 62 externalized 2 No farmer say over either farm 90 72 produce prices or input costs 3 Monopoly manufacturer control over 70 6l input supplies' costs 4 Decision-Making: bodies with too much influence Multinational corporations 87 80 Canadian Pacific Railway 56 59 chain food stores 89 87 packing plants 85 81 the United States' government 74 68 5 Decision-Making: bodies with too l i t t l e influence Member of Parliament 83 72 Member of Legislative Assembly 78 68 Unifarm 64 80 National Farmers Union 89 77 6 Decision-Making: individual unable to 60 52 have entitled influence 7 Radical view of class structure are classes 83 76 should not be classes 74 72 8 Should be controls on farm prices 88 68 Should be controls on input costs 88 82 Should be controls on both of above 79 76 9 Corporate farming should be outlawed 78 77 10 Disappearance of family farm bad trend 79 79 11 Farmer i s more independent than wage earner 80 90 12 Values: Importance Rank High FAMILY SECURITY 1* 1* FREEDOM 4* 2* Values: Importance Rank Low PLEASURE 15* 16* NATIONAL SECURITY 14* 15* A WORLD OF BEAUTY 17* 13* *Rank of value i n range of 1 - 18 as determined from median value. 188. In seeking to put an ideological label on this belief set, i t i s important to r e c a l l that conservative, l i b e r a l , and radical ideologies are distinguished in terms of their view of r e a l i t y and their appraisal of that view as good or bad. In terms of this criterion, while the majority of farmers i n the two groups perceive r e a l i t y correctly, their proposals to reform that "reality" f a l l short of being radical. An item-by-item examination of the consensual belief elements substantiates this conclusion. Looking down the set of items, while i t may be argued that the f i r s t three beliefs are reality-testing measures, i t does seem correct to regard the f i r s t belief as a rejection of individual responsibility for one malaise a f f l i c t i n g farmers. The co-occurence of beliefs 4> 5» 6, and 7 can be inferred to denote adherence to a radical view of the dis-tribution of p o l i t i c a l and societal power. Belief 8, a recommendation for controls in price fixing, represents a departure from conservative principles and an adherence to either a l i b e r a l or radical viewpoint. While items 11 and 12 serve to describe a relatively conservative set of values, i t i s not so easy to label elements 9 and 10 the same way. Wanting corporate farming controlled was shown earlier to be related to a radical perspective of the distribution of influence and power i n society and reasons for regretting the disappearance of the family farm were as much a l t r u i s t i c as egocentric. Traditional values and goals appear then to occur alongside a r e a l i s t i c appraisal of the present pricing system and a willingness to keep a regulated version of that pricing system. The consensual beliefs do not include a complete rejection of the laissez faire pricing system, but rather a degree of control over i t . 189. Accordingly, this set of beliefs i s not a radical belief set, partic-ularly i f belief element constraint i s a consideration. But neither i s i t a conservative one. It i s a mixture of both, with the bias towards non-conservatism. B. Particularistic (NFU) Beliefs The more par t i c u l a r i s t i c set of beliefs are those to which over half the NPU members adhere but which over half the non-NFU reject. The items and the percentage of NFU and non-NFU members who subscribe to each are reported below. Par t i c u l a r i s t i c Beliefs General Locus of Control 1 Farmers themselves are at fault for their lack of success with governments i n the .past. (58$ NFU; 33$ Non-NFU) Marketing Control 2 Speculators (like the Winnipeg Grain Exchange) are the prime bene-f i c i a r i e s of the open marketing system. (58$ NFU; 42$ Non-NFU) "Decision-Making Control 3 The Winnipeg Grain Exchange i s viewed as unduly influential i n the important decisions that affect farmers 8 l i v e s . (54$ NFU; 48$ Non-NFU) 4 Less influential in decision-making than i s appropriate are provincial marketing boards ( 54$ NFU; 45$ non-NFU), national marketing hoards 50$ NFU; 39$ Non-NFU ), and the Provincial Minister of Agriculture 54$ NFU; 46$ non-NFU Marketing Regulation 5 Orderly (Canadian Wheat Board) marketing i s preferred over open marketing. ( 71$ NFU; 45$ Non-NFU ) Production Regulation 6 There should be a legislated maximum farm size ( 72$ NFU; 44$ Non-NFU ). On items 2, 5, and 6 particularly, there are substantial differences between the NFU and non-NFU groups. Adherence to beliefs 2, 3 i 4> and 5 denotes a greater approval for control over and regulation 190. of the marketing system. Item 6 suggests a desire for more regulation of the food production process. The non-NFU group has been both consist-ently less inclined to view the open market system as manipulated by speculators, and consequently, to want to abandon i t . Throughout the analyses, the NFU farmers' cognitions and evaluations of the marketing sector have been somewhat more radically integrated with their views of other sectors. The NFU belief constellation therefore, differs from the consensual belief cluster i n being s l i g h t l y more structured along radical lines. The term "radical" applies particularly with respect to evalu-ations concerning the marketing sector, and less so with regard to the 5 production process. Students of agrarian p o l i t i c s w i l l recognize the similarity of the NFU Particularistic Beliefs to the Populist ideology which was imported into Western Canada at the turn of the century and found expres-sion i n such agrarian organizations as the Non-Partisan League, the Grain Growers' Association, and later the United Farmers provincial organizations and the Progressive Party. The ideology contained the following elements. F i r s t , i t was anti-monopoly. It attacked and resisted the monopoly power of banks, railways, large manufacturers, elevator companies, and the Grain Exchange over farm prices and marketing conditions. (Lipset, 1968: 22 - 23; Mitchell: 13; McCrorie, 1966: 36) Secondly, and concomitantly, i t s antipathy to corporate wealth led to a demand for the elimination of the middleman, who i n placing himself between the producer and the consumer exploited the producer. (Lipset, 1968: 23) Thirdly, to curb monopoly power, i t advocated governmental involvement i n and regulation of the 191. grain marketing and elevator system. This became a demand for a public marketing board for grain - a demand that was eventually satisfied with the establishment of the Canadian Wheat Board. The non-Partisan League supported the nationalization of v i t a l public u t i l i t i e s such as the transport and communication systems, grain elevators, flour mills, and processing plants. (Young, 1969: 23) Fourthly, i t affirmed the principles of private property and the right of the individual to own land. (Lipset, 1968: 358; Mitchell: 13) This had led one historian to conclude that Populist solutions were based "upon an essentially individualistic philosophy and were designed merely to ensure for every man his right to 'get ahead' i n the world.." (Hicks: 422) F i f t h l y , i t advocated collective action on the part of farmers to realize their goals and a broad series of p o l i t i c a l reforms to redemocratize the p o l i t i c a l system. (Morton, 1950s 301, 303) In summary, populism was a reformist, not a radical ideology; the change i t advocated was change in the established system, not change of the system i t s e l f . Thus, The majority of them....accepted industrialization but condemned monopoly, accepted banking and finance but condemned usury and financial sleight of hand, welcomed accumulation but condemned economic feudal-ism, welcomed enterprise but condemned speculation. (Nugent: 97) The NFU belief cluster parallels the populist ideology i n i t s anti-monopoly stance on the Grain Exchange, in espousing regulation of the grain marketing system and elimination of middlemen, in affirming the necessity of collective action to ensure a role for farmers i n the democratic establishment of input costs and farm produce prices, and 192. i n including an affirmation of the appropriateness of private property. On a number of aspects the consensual belief cluster i s similar to the populist ideology. Where i t departs from the populist perspective, and where the NFU cluster does not, i s in i t s less enthusiastic endorse-ment of regulation of the grain marketing system and of the detrimental effects of middlemen like the Winnipeg Grain Exchange i n the grain marketing process. The analogy, i f appropriate, confirms the NFU protest organ-ization as the latest and most recent farm movement i n the tradition of agrarian rebellion against monopoly andespousal of regulation of the pricing and marketing aspects of farming to eliminate that monopoly situation. III. A Typology of the Congruence of Belief and Activity Throughout the two preceding chapters, as well as i n the current one, i t has been established that there i s by no means unanimity of outlook within the NFU group nor complete dissimilarity of perspective between the members of the protest organization and non-members. On the question of federal governmental involvement i n food production, for example, there are conservatives, liberals, and radicals among NFU members. NFU members and non-members have shared outlooks on several matters. More precisely, both adhere to the consensual belief cluster. It has been apparent that there are farmers i n the non-NFU group who were not members of the NFU at the time the study data were collected who subscribed then to the same beliefs as did the pl u r a l i t y of NFU, members. Detailing the structural links among belief elements has indicated that for some non-members, as for some NFU members, evaluations 193. of the need for regulation and government involvement i n production and marketing, for example, are grounded in similar cognitions of the manner in which those and other sectors' function. Hence, i t i s clear that i t i s not entirely beliefs alone, nor the way those beliefs are organized, that distinguishes NFU members from non-members. What then i s i t ? Or, more interestingly, when are beliefs and the organization a c t i v i t y congruent? And when are they not? v The questions move the research project to i t s second object-ive: the delineation of the links between p o l i t i c a l belief systems and the p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y of joining a farm protest organization. To pursue this objective an index of NFU Par t i c u l a r i s t i c Beliefs i s construc-ted that f a c i l i t a t e d the division of farmers on the c r i t e r i a of belief and organizational membership. Table 6.9 reports both the individual belief elements espoused by greater than 50$ of the NFU members and their item-test correlations. Item-test correlations meet Guilford's c r i t e r i a that they range between •30 and .80 (Guilford, 1956: 481). It i s therefore proper to describe the set as an "index". Insofar as the index correlates with a l e f t i s h vote i n the previous federal election i t may be more precisely described as a'relatively left-wing index. The empirical establishment of the imperfect congruence of NFU membership and adherence to the NFU Particularistic Belief Index i n Table 6.10 c l a r i f i e s that there are both NFU members who do not subscribe to the majority of items i n the NFU Belief Index and non-members who do. 194-Table 6.9 Item-Test Correlations of NFU Belief Index Components Correlation (r) General Locus of Control ' The a b i l i t y to act on the cost-price squeeze i s external .31 to the farmer. Farmers at fault for lack of governmental success .38 Marketing Control Speculators beneficiaries of open marketing .61 Pricing Control Manufacturers control the cost of input supplies .36 Decision-Making Control Four or more of these actors have more say i n decision- .51 making than they should: the Winnipeg Grain Exchange, multinational corporations, the Canadian Pacific Railway, chain food stores, large packing plants Five or more of these actors have too l i t t l e say i n .44 decision-making: the Provincial and Federal Ministers of Agriculture, the average M.P. and M.L.A., provincial and national marketing boards, the National Farmers Union, Unifarm The decision-making system i s closed to the farmer. .36 Class Nature of Canadian Society A radical view of the class structure .39 Pricing Regulation Farm produce prices and input costs should be controlled .36 Marketing Regulation Prefer Canadian Wheat Board marketing to open marketing .66 Production Regulation Affirm strongly the need for a legislated maximum .41 farm size 195. Table 6.10 gives both the distribution of NFU and non-NFU members on the Index, and the probability of NFU membership over the range of Index 7 scores. Table 6.10 NFU Eelief Index and Probability of NFU Membership A. Distribution of NFU and Non-NFU Groups on Index -r , $ $ NFU Index Score ' , „ , NFU Members Non-NFU Members 0 0 3.5 1 2.1 5-9 2 2.1 10.6 3 2.1 7.1 4 . 14.6 8.2 5 14.6 18.8 6 10.4 11.8 7 10.4 15.3 8 18.8 4-7 9 18.8 11.8 10 6.3 2.4 100.2 100.1 B. Probability of NFU Membership given i n Index Score $ who are $ who are non-Given a score of NFU Members NFU Members Total 0 0.0 100.0$ 100$ 1 16.7 83-3 100 2 10.0 90.0 100 3 14.3 85-7 100 4 50.0 50.0 100 5 30.4 69.6 100 6 33.3 66.7 100 7 27.8 72.2 100 8 69.2 30.8 100 9 47.4 52.6 100 10 60.0 40.0 100 196. Table 6.10 indicates the p o s s i b i l i t y of isolating four types of farmers i n the combined study groups: one, farmers who belong to a protest organization whose members' modal beliefs they subscribe to; two, farmers who belong to a protest organization whose members' modal beliefs they do not adhere to; three, farmers who do not belong to the given protest organization but who do subscribe to the modal beliefs of the members of that organization; and four, farmers who neither belong to this organization nor subscribe to the viewpoint of the majority of members of that organization. That i s , i t i s possible to distinguish two types of farmers for whom beliefs and the one p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y are congruent and two types for whom beliefs and protest organizational membership are not. This being the case, c l a r i f i c a t i o n of the c r i t e r i a on which the four types d i f f e r w i l l enable a specification of the condit-ions under which f i r s t , congruent beliefs f a c i l i t a t e organizational membership; secondly, corresponding beliefs do not result i n recruitment; and thirdly, incongruent beliefs do nevertheless occur alongside member-ship i n the protest organization. It will.thereafter be possible to explicate the role of farmers' p o l i t i c a l beliefs i n their recruitment (or non-recruitment) to the WU protest organization. More pointedly, the context i n which belief sets matter for mobilization to a protest organization and that i n which they do not, can be delineated. The four-fold b e l i e f - a c t i v i t y typology has been constructed i n the following manner: 197. (1) NFU believers and .joiners; NFU consistents These are members of the NFU who subscribe to 7 or more of the NFU beliefs. N=26. They constitute about 20$ of the combined farmer group. They are individuals whose evaluative-belief set and organizational activity are consistently "radical". (2) NFU non-believers and joiners; . NFU inconsistents This group i s composed of NFU members who subscribe to 6 or fewer of the NFU beliefs. N=22. They constitute about 17$ of the combined group. These are farmers who belong to a farm organizat-ion whose members' modal beliefs they do not subscribe to. (3) NFU b e l i evers and non-joiners; NFU clients These are non-members who subscribe to 7 or more of the NFU beliefs. N=29. NFU clients, representing 22$ of the combined group, are organizational clients, in the sense that by adhering to beliefs of members of the protest organization, they are potential NFU members. (4) Non-NFU believers and Non-NFU joiners; Non-NFU consistents Individuals who do not belong to the NFU and who adhere to 6 or fewer of the items on the NFU index comprise this group. N=56. They comprise about 42$ of the combined group. These are individuals whose evaluative-belief set and organizational ac t i v i t y are well f i t t e d i n a conservative direction. Types 1 and 4 are conceived as ideological opposites; Types 2 and 3 as lying somewhere in between these two extremes. The apposite-ness of this thinking i s p a r t i a l l y confirmed by subjective assessments made by the researcher at the end of the interview schedule of the respondent's stance towards free enterprise, communism, and labour. A minority of farmers elaborated upon one or more of these three topics during the interview. The four farmer types are contrasted on these three subjective measures of ideological perspective i n Table 6.11. The percentage of farmers i n each type i s small since most farmers did not voluntarily outline their position with respect to free enterprise, communism, and labor. Table 6.11 indicates that the least fearful of communism and the least anti-labour and the most anti-free enterprise 198. are Type 1 fanners - NFU consistents. Type 4> non-NFU conslstents, are the least anti-free enterprise and the most anti-labour. Table 6.11 Farmer Types and Subjective Measures of Ideological Perspective: $'s * Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4 NFU NFU NFU Non-NFU Consis. Clients Incons. Consis. Argues free enterprise - 10 - 7 Argues opposite 23 21 14 5 Fears communism 11.5 10 9 7 Argues opposite 15 3 9 -Anti-labour 23 31 36 46 Argues opposite 4 3 9 -* C e l l entries are column percentages The subsequent chapters of the thesis undertake to specify the conditions under which believers are joiners, and, as importantly, non-believers are joiners. The situational and personality attributes of the four types are described, and i n that process, the role of beliefs i n organizational membership i n a farm protest organization i s c l a r i f i e d . 199. Notes to Chapter 6 1 Some general belief elements have been deleted from the set of possible evaluative elements because the focus i s upon f a i r l y specific cognitions and evaluations. This applies particularly with respect to the measures of values and l i f e goals - the Rokeach instrument and mentioned-likes about farming, for example. 2 There i s some evidence that the conservatives on the production question are, while relatively young (Pearson r with years of education i s -.28), f a i r l y successful i n terms of their reported net income (r=.2l). In contrast, liberals on the production criteri o n appear to be operators of more established farms ( r with Farm Market Value i s .27 ) that yield lower gross incomes ( r= -.14 )• Hence the conservative farmers may have less reason to acknowledge and denounce a class based society than do the l i b e r a l farmers. 3 Espousing a radical position on the federal role in production i s correlated with informational content and spec i f i c i t y : r = .50. A The following figures indicate what proportion of farmers i n the two study groups subscribe to what proportion of the Pa r t i c u l a r i s t i c Cluster. Percentage subscribing to: NFU Non-NFU less than or equal to one-third items 0$ 13$ greater than one-third and less than two-thirds items 40$ 34$ over two-thirds items 60$ 53$ 100$ 100$ 5 But i t i s cautioned that the former has been more systematically tapped and that i t i s indeed easier to tap, thereby giving rise to the p o s s i b i l i t y that not finding greater willingness for govern-mental involvement i n the food production aspect of farming may he in part at-least an a r t i f a c t of the research questionnaire. 6 The position on the voting index, from right to l e f t , was Social Credit, Progressive Conservative, Liberal, New Democratic Party, and Communist. The Pearson r of voting index position with NFU belief index i s .29. 7 Length of membership i n the NFU i s correlated with the NFU Belief Index: Pearson r = .26. 200. Chapter 1 Correlates of Belief and Activity-Inferring the meaning to an individual of his attitudes and actions involves uncovering the context of those beliefs and a c t i v i t i e s . In current social science practice this entails relating the attitudes and a c t i v i t i e s to other measures. Accordingly, the purpose of this chapter i s to describe the correlates of ideology and action - more precisely, NFU belief and NFU membership - by describing the situationa