

FARMERS' POLITICAL BELIEF SYSTEMS

by

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Chapter 1

Introduction

The political mobilization of prairie farmers in the first half of this century is in stark contrast to their relative political inactivity since. In Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba, farmers united together over the period 1900 - 1950 to obtain a more equitable marketing system and generally a greater say in the important decisions affecting them. Their collective strength enabled them to elect and defeat governments: the United Farmers of Alberta and Social Credit administrations in Alberta and the CCF government in Saskatchewan were all farmer-based. This period was thus one when farmer political activity enabled farmers to obtain specific policy successes.

In contrast, although the structure of the agricultural economy has undergone massive changes in the second half of this century, the post-1950 period has been one of relative political quiescence on the part of prairie farmers. Intensive capitalization of agriculture has meant larger farms, fewer farmers, and less interaction among them. Growing economic disparities separate farmers who have not engaged in capital intensive agriculture from those who have. At the same time, the penetration of agribusiness into the agricultural sector has severely limited the economic control of the farmer over the prices of both agricultural supplies and commodities. The continuing shift of the population from rural to urban centers, already underway by 1950, has meant a concomitant decline of farmers as a proportion of the population. These far-reaching changes in agriculture have been unaccompanied by any

major political mobilization of farmers. Collective farmer demonstrations and protestations have been the exception rather than the rule. Since 1969, however, when a national farmers union committed to procuring a larger voice for farmers in the political and economic decisions affecting them was formed, the possibility has existed that this period of inactivity might be ending. The National Farmers Union has engaged in a number of activities reminiscent of the populism of farmers in the early years of this century. However, membership in the National Farmers Union remains today limited to a small minority of farmers. Hence, while the presence of the NFU ensures the availability of a vehicle for collective political action by farmers, its limited membership base suggests the reluctance of most farmers to utilize this channel. The dual phenomena of the existence of the organization and its restricted membership base provide the specific impetus for the research reported in this thesis. Both inevitably stimulate curiosity as to why some farmers should, in the historical tradition of Canadian agrarian politics, be collectively engaging in political action while others are not. In seeking to satisfy that curiosity, the research here focuses upon farmers' political belief systems.

More precisely, the thesis is an empirical study of the political belief systems of two groups of Alberta farmers: the one, members of the National Farmers Union; the other, non-members of that organization. Two objectives guide the research. The first goal is an essentially descriptive one. It is to inquire into the content, structure, and context of Alberta farmers' political belief systems. At this stage, the research seeks answers to questions like the following. Firstly, how do the two groups of farmers perceive and appraise the political and economic systems

in which they function? Secondly, how (if at all) are those perceptions and evaluations inter-related? Are the different measures of perceptions and evaluations sufficiently inter-related that they can be said to be measuring political attitudes? And thirdly, what are the bases of the political attitudes of the two groups of farmers? The second research objective is to examine the role of farmers' political belief systems in the specific political activity of belonging to the National Farmers Union. At this level, the intent is to specify at least some of the conditions under which farmers' political beliefs are congruent with their political activity. A sampling design that deliberately includes members of the National Farmers Union makes this task possible.

In this introductory chapter, the theoretical underpinnings of the research and their application to sections of the dissertation are indicated. More specifically, a concept of attitude and attitudinal formation is outlined; a theory of behavior which places an important focus on situational factors is stressed; and the reader is generally prepared for what follows in the dissertation.

Theoretical Underpinnings

The study of political belief systems rests upon a particular theory of attitudes, attitudinal formation, attitudinal constraint, and the role of attitudes in behavior. Prior to examining each of these aspects, it should be noted that "political belief system" and "political attitude system" are interchangeable terms in the dissertation as are "political beliefs" and "political attitudes". Political

belief systems are constellations of political beliefs (attitudes).

1. What are beliefs/attitudes?

A belief or attitude is defined here as the probability of certain responses recurring with respect to certain objects. (DeFleur and Westie, 1963; Campbell, 1963; Bem, 1968) An attitude is thus a consistent predisposition to respond in a certain way toward a specific object or situation. Although the primary interest is in the attitudes or beliefs which constitute farmers' ideologies, the evidence from which we infer these attitudes consists entirely of statements in an interview situation. The inferences from such statements to attitudes must meet certain scholarly criteria of reliability and validity. These matters will be dealt with at appropriate points throughout the thesis. In this chapter, however, phrases such as "verbal behavior", "verbal responses", and "questionnaire responses" should be understood as referring to the underlying beliefs. Since political behavior may, of course, be verbal, one kind of verbal behavior is used to predict another kind of verbal behavior. It is hoped, however, that the type of verbal behavior will be clear from the context.

Given a probabilistic conceptualization of attitude, the researcher interested in political attitudes looks for response consistency across behaviors over time. "Response consistency across behaviors over time" entails that the term "attitude" be restricted to statements which reveal enduring assessments with respect to a certain object. This definition focuses the search for attitudes

outside the individual to his environment. A reified 'inner mechanism' motivating the individual to respond in a given way to a specific stimulus need not be postulated.¹

2. How are beliefs/attitudes formed?

There are two questions here. One, what is the source of an individual's beliefs (attitudes)? Two, how does the individual make those beliefs known to the researcher?

Firstly, the source of an individual's attitudes lies in his past experiences; his attitudes and the verbal statements from which we infer them reflect his environmental history.² The probabilistic definition of attitude embraces a generally recognized principle of human behavior: an individual's current pattern of behavior toward a certain object is shaped by his past behavior toward that object. Accordingly, responses which have been positively reinforced in the past will tend to recur in the future; those which have been negatively reinforced will not. Consistent reinforcements should also result in a positive correlation between questionnaire behavior and behavior in other settings.

The suggestion that "residues of experience" (Campbell, 1963) with respect to an object guide future behavior towards that object entails the conclusion that the more frequent and more consistent an individual's contact with a given object, the more probable his behavior towards that object will exhibit a recurring pattern. An individual is, therefore, more likely to have attitudes toward objects in his environment with which he has had frequent interaction. This

proposition leads the researcher of political attitudes to focus on the political objects with which the individual has interacted in the past.

Secondly, an individual makes his attitudes known to others as well as to himself by reflecting upon and evaluating his past behavior.³ Typically, the researcher acquires knowledge of an individual's attitudes by asking the individual what they are. In replying to the researcher, the respondent relates his "self-evaluations of his own behavior" - "observations of his own overt behavior and the stimulus conditions under which it occurs". (Bem, 1968: 204) In short, the individual "knows" his attitudes towards a given object by looking at his past behavior toward that object.⁴ The ability of the individual to make his beliefs and attitudes known to the researcher is thus contingent upon at least three factors: one, his awareness of his own behavior and thoughts; two, his capacity to relate his thoughts to another person; and three, the extent to which he is allowed to clarify and elaborate upon his thoughts.

3. How are constellations of beliefs/attitudes structured?

The concern in political belief system research extends beyond isolating discrete political attitudes to uncovering the structuring among constellations of political attitudes. While an attitude by definition implies a degree of structuring among assessments with respect to a certain object, the structural character of a belief system is an empirical question not a defining characteristic.

While initial research into political belief systems tended

to search for one single dimension that constrained an individual's political beliefs, it is now assumed that political belief sets are not so simply structured. It is accepted that most belief clusters are complex and multi-dimensional. What are some of the dimensions upon which mass political beliefs are structured? Under what conditions are such dimensions likely to occur?

Firstly, empirical research has revealed the rarity of logical constraints among most individual's political beliefs. Early in the study of political belief systems, Philip Converse (1964) suggested that logically consistent sets of beliefs were characteristic of only the better educated and politically aware.

Secondly, the assumption of attitudes as "residues of experience" means that consistency of constellations of attitudes is in part a function of the consistency of individuals' environmental histories. When consistent messages from several aspects of an individual's environment reinforce one another, his attitudes toward different objects are more likely to be integrated than when his experiences have left conflicting messages.

Thirdly, liberal and conservative (left and right) attitudes may co-occur within a given belief system. To the extent that this happens, the left-right dimension is not a significant organizing principle. In a cluster analysis of responses of Americans to sixteen policy statements, Robert Axelrod (1967: 57-59) discerned three distinct clusters, one of which he labelled "Populism". He described the cluster in these terms: "Agreement with the first three items reflects a liberal attitude on the welfare scale, while agreement with

the second three reflects what is currently regarded as a conservative position. Thus the scale measures something very different from the left-right dimension that is so frequently used in commentary on the structure of American public opinion." (1973: 57) Furthermore, according to Axelrod, the left-right dimension is the sole organizing principle for neither the uneducated and uninformed nor the informed and educated.

In addition, interviews with over one hundred American blue collar workers led Litwak et al. (1973) to conclude that the predominant ideology of the group, which they described as "Middle American", was a "noncorrelated multi-causal ideology".⁵ This ideology, suggest the authors, does not fit along the liberal-conservative continuum insofar as the Middle American ideology is opposed to both the very rich and the very poor. They argue that a noncorrelated multi-causal belief system is not intrinsically irrational because it may be a rational response to conflicting elements in the political system.

And finally, a recent smallest space analysis by Gerald Hikel of the "ideological" and "stylistic" aspects of belief systems led to the conclusion that "... the data do not appear to support the assumption of a liberalism-conservatism dimension for ideologues any more than for nonideologues" given that "... social welfare and civil rights attitudes are psychologically differentiated for both groups". (1973: 80)

Empirical evidence thus suggests the nature of the multi-dimensional structuring of mass belief systems. In light of these findings, the assumption throughout this research is that farmers'

political belief systems will be structured in a relatively complex fashion.

4. What kinds of beliefs are relevant to action?

Empirical and theoretical research suggests important lessons for the researcher intent on eliciting statements which adequately reveal stable orientations toward particular objects. Such verbal responses have a high probability of recurring when the search is for specific attitudes towards specific objects in issue areas defined by the respondent as salient and in crisis situations when those responses are being challenged. Attitudes and attitudinal constraint are more noticeable when there is a heightened salience of politics in the system as a whole. Each of these conditions will be dealt with in turn.

DeFleur and Westie (1968: 30) emphasize that attitudes must be defined as "specific forms of response to specific social objects, or specific classes of social objects". In a similar vein, Ehrlich prescribes that if we are ever to isolate verbal responses that are consistent across behaviors, the search must be for verbal and behavioral responses jointly towards specific objects: "... either we measure an attitude toward a specific person and then predict a subject's behavior toward that person, or we measure attitudes towards a class of people and predict a subject's behavior to some (perhaps phenomenologically) representative sample of that class". (1972: 497) The merit of the first strategy Ehrlich suggests is seen in Crespi's ability to improve predictions of behavior from "specific dimensions

of attitudes with respect to a specific point in time among persons with a high likelihood of having to make a behavioral decision"

(1971: 333)

Searching for specific questionnaire or interview responses towards particular objects in areas important to the individual further maximizes the chances of isolating attitudes. McKennell argues that the salience of an area must be determined by the respondent since what is relevant for the investigator may not be for the respondent: "the definition of relevance rests at least in part with informants". (1974: 207) When opinions are solicited on matters of public affairs salient to them, it has been shown that members of the public have belief systems characterized by substantial informational support and organization. (Litwak et al., 1973) Moreover, their ability to articulate ideas about salient issues is also high. Luttbeg (1968), in a factor analysis of ten specific issues of concern in a two to three year period prior to his study, found that the belief systems of the mass public were only slightly less constrained than those of their leaders. Through the use of open-ended questions, which allowed the voter "to define his own issue space by naming the issues that were most salient to him" (1971: 391), RePass disclosed that salient issues were almost as significant a factor as party identification in predicting voting choice.

Heightened political activity in the system itself appears to foster attitudinal constraint. Field and Anderson (1969) found that more people made ideological evaluations of the parties and presidential candidates in the 1964 campaign which Senator Goldwater contested as

a Presidential candidate than they did in 1960. They conclude that the data support "the relevance of the environment" (1969: 396) to ideological thinking on the part of the public. Nie and Andersen (1974), examining increases in levels of attitude consistency over a sixteen year period, reached a similar conclusion: "inherent characteristics of the mass public are less important as determinants of mass ideology than are variations in the nature and salience of political stimuli". (1974: 544)

And lastly, there is some evidence that verbal and behavioral responses will be more consistent with each other in a situation which threatens the belief. (Holsti et al., 1964) The importance of a crisis situation for motivating individuals to act on their beliefs is well known to students of mass movements. (Smelser, 1962). The latter two optimal measurement conditions - a crisis situation and/or heightened political activity in the system - are generally outside the researcher's control but constitute circumstances to be exploited if possible.

5. What are the links between political beliefs and political behavior?

While a proper answer to the above question entails a theory of human behavior and a determination of the role of political beliefs in that theory, it is possible here to suggest some factors that need to be considered in postulating links between political beliefs and political activity.

As a general consideration, an individual's behavior is a function of his situational context. Behavior always occurs within a

particular situational context characterized by social norms and constraints. Jeanne Knutson hypothesizes that "under usual conditions" as much as half the variance in behavior is accounted for by the actual field situation. (1973: 38) Hunt, suggesting that the figure would vary depending upon the individual and the situation,⁶ reduces the proportion to about one third. (1965: 83)

From the perspective of drawing links between political beliefs and political behavior, two aspects of the political or social setting are important. The first of these is the opportunity the setting affords for attitudes to be expressed behaviorally. Whether an attitude has behavioral consequences will depend in part upon opportunities to act on that attitude. The second important characteristic of the political or social setting is the opportunity it allows for action congruent with attitudes. For example, a situation where habits or norms govern what is appropriate behavior inhibits the translation of non-modal attitudes into political behavior. Hence, there may be good reasons not to expect a strong link between beliefs and behavior. However, if the research can be conducted in a manner and at a time when the situation does provide an opportunity for action, these links are more likely. Specifically, if farmers' political attitudes can be tapped at a time when those attitudes can be acted upon, then it may be possible to arrive at some understanding of the links - if any - between farmers' political beliefs and their political activity.

The Specific Study of Farmers' Political Belief Systems

The foregoing considerations guide the empirical inquiry

into the content, structure, and source of farmers' political attitudes, and the implications of these attitudes for membership in the National Farmers Union. More specifically, they have directed this research into farmers' beliefs in three ways: firstly, in terms of what kinds of responses are tapped; secondly, regarding the strategy used to tap them; and thirdly, by determining what additional factors are considered in efforts to link beliefs with behavior. Both the data-gathering and data analyses stages have been affected by these directives. The general effects will be outlined, followed by a more detailed discussion.

With regard to the kinds of responses tapped, at the data gathering level the concern has been to isolate fairly specific responses towards specific objects or issues salient to the respondent, rather than general responses to less specific and less relevant objects or issues. A major thrust of the data analyses is directed to ensuring the enduring nature of these responses.

The search for salient enduring responses has entailed a research strategy designed to elicit salient responses and to procure information necessary to uncover the meaning of these responses. At the level of data gathering, the respondent is given great latitude to define the relevant political attitude domain. Aspects of his environmental history that have resulted in those attitudes are elicited. The data analyses include a three step process which focuses in turn upon perceptions, evaluations, and the cognitive bases of evaluative judgments to uncover the "meaning" of political beliefs.

A major focus of the thesis is on describing the past and present situational context of the farmer. The questionnaire elicits

information regarding these aspects; the analyses direct paramount attention to contextual aspects in drawing links between political beliefs and political activity.

A more detailed discussion of the data gathering and data analyses procedures clarifies the theoretical underpinnings of the dissertation.

1. Data Gathering

Both the timing and method of data gathering were designed to exploit and maximize optimal conditions for tapping salient political beliefs and for uncovering their underlying structure. The timing of the study coincides with a crisis in the western Canadian farming community and hence with a period wherein politics should be salient to farmers. The research method affords respondents ample scope to define the relevant political attitude domain by relying extensively upon open-ended questions.

Data were collected at a time when a number of Alberta farmers were facing a cost-price squeeze. It was also a time when farmers were facing the prospect of the decline of the family farm as the major unit of agricultural production in Canada.

The significance of the cost-price squeeze is best illustrated statistically. Over the period 1962 to 1969, the total cash receipts of prairie farmers increased by 32% while their operating and depreciation costs climbed by 76%. (Bronson: 124) In more stark terms, this cost-price squeeze meant that in 1969 approximately one-third of Canadian farmers were estimated to be below the poverty line -- that is, earning

less than \$3,000 annually. (Canadian Agriculture in the Seventies: 7) Translated into terms of a weekly income, in 1970 the Canadian farmer netted an average income of \$66.00 per week. This contrasted with an average composite industrial wage and salary of \$126.77 per week. (Bronson: 124) Over the period 1966 - 1971, the average net income of an Alberta farmer declined from \$5,600 to \$5,000. (The Family Farm, 1974: 18) In 1974, at the time the data were gathered, the situation of farmers in Alberta who were producing anything other than grain had not improved and may well have deteriorated from the 1971 situation.

Declining net farm incomes for many farmers have paralleled and in part, contributed to a growing trend whereby the family farm is gradually being replaced by agribusiness and large commercial farms. Between 1962 and 1972, farmers in Canada were leaving the land at the rate of 1,000 per month. This process of rural depopulation has been underway since at least 1940. In 1939, the farm population constituted 31.7% of the total population; in 1966, it comprised 9.8%. (Canadian Agriculture in the Seventies: 6) The Federal Task Force on Agriculture has estimated that by 1990 the figure will be 3 or 4%. (Canadian Agriculture in the Seventies: 9) The province of Alberta has not escaped the national pattern of rural depopulation. In 1951, the Alberta farm population numbered 345,222; in 1971, it totalled 237,924. (The Family Farm, 1974: 18)

There appears to be no move on the government's part to stop this trend. The Federal Task Force on Agriculture approved of the current decline of the farm population and the existence of fewer family farms, and welcomed the development of farm mergers and consoli-

dations. It projected that single operator farms (family farms) would be phased out "as a high and rising proportion" of present farm operators would become "employees working for salaries and wages". (p. 9) If the projections of the Task Force are correct, the farmer as an independent entrepreneur, farming his land with little external help save the voluntary labour of members of his family, will be a rare phenomenon by 1990.

The present economic situation which Canadian farmers as a whole face is one with which Alberta farmers in particular are also grappling. Like farmers throughout the country, the goals and life style of a number of Alberta farmers are threatened. Given that beliefs are most salient when being challenged, it appears to be an opportune time to investigate the farmer's attitudinal and behavioral response to this "crisis".

If the timing of the study is more fortuitous than contrived, the method of research has been deliberately designed to locate salient political attitudes and to uncover their links with one form of political activity. This applies with respect to both the sampling design and questionnaire format.

A stratified sampling design was chosen to allow the inclusion of two groups of farmers: one, members of the National Farmers Union; the other, non-members of this national farm protest organization. Both study groups include farmers recruited from the same geographical area in order that the field situation of the farmers might be "equalized" to some extent. The existence of the farm organization means that the field situation does offer the opportunity for political attitudes conducive

to the goals and objectives of the National Farmers Union to be expressed in political behavior. The organizational channel of the National Farmers Union was available for over half the farmers in the two study groups. The stratified sampling design allows a delineation of the conditions under which farmers' attitudes and their organization membership are congruent.

The data gathering technique utilized here represents a compromise between McKennell's plea for "intensive qualitative exploration" (1974: 206) and the general practice of using closed-ended scales in standardized interview schedules. Aubrey McKennell suggests that ideally

Informants must be given maximum opportunity for revealing the 'reasons' underlying their evaluations, for saying what, in their view, is related to what in the attitude domain.

... the work should be both thorough yet conducted in a way that the elements that informants introduce stem naturally from their own attitudes. Standardised schedules presenting questions with fixed choice alternatives minimise the opportunity for such contributions by informants, and are therefore totally unsuited for this initial phase of exploration. Nondirected approaches which do not rely on a fixed schedule of questions is (sic) what is required.

(1974: 222)

Financial constraints necessitated a retreat from this ideal of mapping an attitude domain by relying upon the respondent's definition of salient cognitions and evaluations in that domain. The compromise which has been struck here is an extensive reliance upon open-ended items in tapping cognitive and evaluative orientations in specific issue areas that touch the respondent's everyday life.⁷ Thus, while the respondent is not

completely free to define what is relevant cognitively for him, the open-ended item does allow a certain flexibility for presenting a view-point unanticipated by the researcher. The hope is that, in being free to reflect upon his behavior with respect to a certain object, the individual himself can describe his probable response toward that object.

2. Data Analyses

The data analyses are guided by attitudinal theory presented earlier in three ways: firstly, in the emphasis placed upon isolating stable responses; secondly, in tracing those responses to the respondent's environmental history; and thirdly, in the focus on the situational factor in accounting for political behavior. A broad overview of the form of the dissertation followed by a more detailed examination of the chapter contents indicates this more clearly.

The thesis is in three parts. The first part, Chapters 2 and 3, lays the groundwork for the analyses that follow. Chapter 2, "Agricultural Policy as an Object of Farmers' Political Belief Systems", provides the basis for interpretation of subsequent thesis findings. It reviews Canadian agricultural policy for the purpose of summarizing some aspects of the history of interaction of farmers with federal and provincial authorities. The chapter indicates that governments have undertaken a liberal policy with respect to agriculture. Provincial and federal governments have restricted their involvement in agriculture to finding markets, leaving the pricing and production sectors generally unregulated except for periodic efforts to shore up farmers' incomes in emergency situations. Given the underlying premise that farmers'

political attitudes are "residues" of their experiences, this chapter provides a benchmark by which farmers' perceptions of the governmental record with respect to agriculture can be checked.

Chapter 3, "The Study Groups", describes the aggregate characteristics of the two study groups and assesses the extent to which they are representative of farmers in the province as a whole. The chapter indicates that the group of NFU members operates slightly less profitable farms than the non-NFU farmers. However, being less Eastern-European born and more orthodox in their religious affiliation, they may be more socially in the mainstream.

The second part of the thesis is essentially descriptive. It documents the content and structure of the political beliefs of the two groups of farmers. It is guided by two concerns: one, to isolate consistent perceptions and evaluations; two, to determine the association between the two and thereby the cognitive bases of farmers' evaluative judgements. The relevant dissertation chapters are 4, 5, and 6.

Chapter 4, "Cognitive Beliefs: How the System Works", describes how farmers perceive the operation of aspects of the political and economic systems. Chapter 5, "Evaluative Beliefs: How the System Ought to Work", traces the manner in which farmers evaluate the operation of aspects of those systems. In both chapters, the importance of establishing the stability of farmers' responses entails examining the covariation among different measures of a given belief. In Chapter 6, "The Structure of Farmers' Belief Systems and a Typology of Activity and Belief", the inter-item association of cognitive and evaluative

elements is examined in order to determine the view of reality on which attitudes are held. These analyses buttress respondent volunteered suggestions (in open ended questions) as to the formative character of the political system in shaping the political evaluations.

Chapter 4, "Cognitive Beliefs: How the System Works", establishes the stability of two perceptions of the political and economic systems. Farmers in both groups view the external world as relevant to their lives and assess their position in the pricing and political systems as lacking any appreciable degree of control over either sector. Both groups view power concentrated in a few top governmental officials and in an economic sector which includes large corporations and middlemen. Farmers' unions and elected representatives are excluded from this circle. Differences between the two groups of farmers are apparent. NFU farmers are more enthusiastic about the possibility of collective farmer action to achieve their goals, and their appraisal of the political and economic sectors is more integrated along radical lines.

Chapter 5, "Evaluative Beliefs: How the System Ought to Work", reveals that both NFU and non-NFU farmers are opposed to more governmental involvement in production, but willing to have controls over the pricing sector. NFU members are more in favor of regulating the marketing system and the size and ownership of farms. Farmers in both groups value a combination of personal and altruistic goals. Again structural differences emerge: NFU members are more consistent in recommending regulation of both the pricing and marketing sectors.

Chapter 6, "The Structure of Farmers' Belief Systems and a

Typology of Activity and Belief", shows that the evaluations of both NFU and non-NFU farmers for regulating the pricing, marketing, and production sectors are associated with perceptions of control in one or more of the pricing, marketing, and political decision-making sectors as externalized from farmers. The consensual beliefs of the two groups of farmers include a mixture of radical and conservative belief elements with the bias toward radicalism. The majority of NFU members subscribe to a more particularistic set of beliefs which is properly labelled "populist". Four types of farmers are analytically defined in terms of the two criteria of belief and activity. Farmers whose political behavior is consistent with their interview responses comprise two of the farmer types, and farmers whose beliefs and behavior (membership or non-membership in the National Farmers Union) differ comprise the other two types.

The third section of the thesis is more explanatory. Chapters 7 and 8 assess the role of farmers' political beliefs in fostering or thwarting membership in the National Farmers Union and other political activities. The search for the source of both farmers' political beliefs and political activity focuses upon the farmers' past and immediate situational context.

Chapter 7, entitled "The Correlates of Belief and Activity", establishes the importance of the immediate situation and of alienation rooted in more distant situational factors for recruitment to the National Farmers Union. The data indicate that a longer experience with a disadvantageous farming situation promotes protest politics and a left-wing ideology; satisfaction with farming and governmental

performance is associated with non-protest conservative politics.

In Chapter 8, "The Paths to Ideology and Action", multivariate analyses reinforce the findings of Chapter 7. Frustration with one's current financial return and occupation, combined with a belief in the viability of joint farmer action are shown to foster membership in a protest organization in the absence of conducive beliefs. The importance of the immediate situation to political activity is thus established. At the same time, the independent effect of beliefs on activity is reiterated. The close association of the NFU Belief Cluster, political alienation, and general economic discontent confirm that most farmers' understanding of their place in the political and economic system is grounded in their experiences as farmers functioning in that system.

The concluding chapter, Chapter 9, reiterates the necessity to examine situational and environmental factors in seeking to understand both political beliefs and activity.

Notes to Chapter 1

- 1 DeFleur and Westie (1963) review the literature which describes an attitude as a 'latent process' and outline the distinctions between this conceptualization of attitude and the probabilistic notion.
- 2 B.F. Skinner is the foremost proponent of the idea that an individual's environmental history (and genetic history) control his current behavior: "A scientific analysis of behavior must, I believe, assume that a person's behavior is controlled by his genetic and environmental histories rather than by the person himself as an imitating, creative agent," (1974: 189) Skinner argues that expressions referring to "the intellectual side of the life of the mind - ... one's intentions, purposes, ideas" all refer to "aspects of human behavior attributable to contingencies of reinforcement - or, ... to the subtle and complex relations among three things: the situation in which behavior occurs, the behavior itself, and its consequences". (1974: 148)
- 3 The idea that an individual knows what he thinks by reflecting upon his behavior is found in the work of the attribution theorists. See Jones and Davis (1965), Bem (1965, 1968, 1970), and Sutherland (1975); the first two for the theory itself; the latter, for an adaptation of attribution theory to attitudinal measurement.
- 4 Skinner (1953, 1957) discusses the role of stimulus generalization and metaphor in enabling the individual to develop response patterns towards objects with which he has had no previous encounter. An individual reacting to a stimulus on the basis of his past encounters with "similar" stimuli will "waste" responses until one is reinforced. Behavior shaped by "descriptions" of contingencies rather than the contingencies themselves is rule governed behavior and is less under control than contingency shaped behavior. (1969: 144-146)
- 5 A "noncorrelated multicausal ideology" appears to be any multicausal explanation. See page 324 especially of Litwak et al.
- 6 Hunt's statistic is based upon clinical experiments which examined behavior as a function of personality traits, the situation, and (physiological) modes-of-response. His conclusion is that "... it is neither the individual differences among subjects, per se, nor the variations among situations, per se, that produce the variations in behavior. It is, rather, the interactions among these which are important." (1965: 83) He recommends that students of behavior develop and use instruments that classify people according to their responses in various categories of situations..

- 7 McKennell recommends a more "extensive initial exploratory phase" that would entail "a series of free-ranging, unstructured individual interviews including perhaps other non-directive techniques, the material from which is content-analysed to provide a source of hypotheses and questionnaire items phrased in 'natural population language'. (1974: 206) This recommendation entails a prior step to the actual collection of the data for analyses.

Agricultural Policy as an Object of Farmers' Political
Belief Systems

In order to map an attitude as an evaluative-belief structure....we are not interested in sampling from anything and everything that might be said about the attitude object, but only from those aspects that are salient in determining the evaluation placed upon it; we are interested in sampling....not any cognitions but only the "hot cognitions".

(McKennell, 1974:221)

The theoretical and empirical framework postulated here with-
in which farmers' belief sets will be examined is exploratory in every sense. Two factors necessitate this. Firstly, in the absence of any previous empirical research into the political attitudes of farmers - and indeed of any systematic documentation of the ideological dispositions of Canadian citizens as a whole¹ - there are no available attitudinal scales capable of being adapted to this study group. Secondly, while reliable measures have been developed by social scientists studying American public attitudes, the researcher's skepticism of the utility of adopting wholesale American attitudinal and psychological measures to the Canadian context precludes their use. This reluctance is grounded in the belief that there are important cultural differences between Canada and the United States; accordingly, measures predicated on assumptions regarding American cultural patterns would not be reliable in a context where those assumptions may be weakly adhered to or not at all.²

There are therefore few tangible guidelines as to how and where to begin to map empirically farmers' salient political cognitions and evaluations. It thus becomes necessary to extrapolate from theoretical

guidelines laid down by political belief system research generally to the particular empirical study of farmers' belief sets. As outlined in the introductory chapter, the possibility of successfully mapping an individual's conceptual arena is maximized when the search is for stable opinions in issue relevant areas. In the case of farmers, matters related to agriculture and farming must surely demarcate relevant issues. A primary focus upon farmers' appraisals and reactions to problems and issues in areas in which agriculture and politics impinge upon one another should enhance the chances of tapping salient opinions that either directly or indirectly describe the way in which the farmer orients himself ideologically to the political and economic systems. It is therefore important to peruse the historical and contemporary stance of Canadian federal governments with regard to the agricultural sector. Once the areas of interface of farmers and the political system have been delineated, it will then be possible to posit an ideological framework within which to examine the appropriate organization of the farming and agricultural sectors.

I. The Federal Government and Agricultural Policy³

A. Agricultural Policy in the Pre-1970 Period

The discussion of federal agricultural policy will be facilitated by examining separately its role in the marketing of agricultural produce and in the production of foodstuffs. However, the following generalization recurs so frequently in the literature and appears to apply equally to the two sectors as to provide the theme for the discussion:

Canadian farm policy since 1930...has been largely one of providing expedient measures to meet crises of depression, drought, war inflation and surpluses There is little evidence that Canada has had any overall national policy based on clear thinking and economic and sociological research facts.
(Hurd, 1960)

1. The Marketing Sector

Federal agricultural policy until 1970 can be characterized as one consonant with a liberal economic philosophy. (Crown and Heady, 1972:82; Fowke and Fowke, 1968:289) Rather than attempting to regulate domestic marketing, the federal government's record in the marketing of foodstuffs included a concern with transportation costs; a response to farmers' demands in the early 1900's to operate terminal elevator facilities; the establishment of the Canadian Wheat Board; market promotion; and grading and inspection duties including controlling handling, storage, and processing of export grains and foodstuffs.

The one exception to a general policy of non-interference with the "free market of supply and demand" has, of course, been the Canadian Wheat Board, the exclusive marketing agency for wheat, and until recently for barley and oats. The Canadian Wheat Board, established as a monopoly in the marketing of Canadian Wheat in 1943, is a clear anomaly in an otherwise consistent policy of non-interference with the free market and the grain exchange system of pricing in which prices float daily (hourly, indeed by the minute) in response to "demand". It is an intervention in at least two senses: one, it is a compulsory board - the sole agency to which wheat growers may sell; and two, it establishes delivery quotas which equalize the amount of and opportunities for sales.

Vernon Fowke contends, as do virtually all other analysts, that the Federal Government permitted the Canadian Wheat Board to continue after 1939 only "under direct and indirect political pressure rather than out of government conviction." And, in 1943, when the Canadian Wheat Board became the monopoly agency for the sale of wheat, it was in order to ensure a continuous supply of wheat at non-inflationary prices. (Fowke, 1957: 294-5) Hence, it was not out of volition but of political necessity that the Canadian Wheat Board was born.

In short, with the exception of the Canadian Wheat Board, federal governments have abstained from regulation of the marketing of foodstuffs.

2. The Production Sector

If financial assistance were taken as an indicator of degree of government involvement in the production of foodstuffs, then the Canadian governments' involvement would be extensive. When an examination is undertaken, however, of the nature of the financial assistance, then, once again, it must be concluded that federal governments have been extremely loath to depart from the assumptions of economic liberalism. The major thrust of financial support in the production sphere has been to enable the farmer to increase his productivity and efficiency, "the assumption being, apparently, that if agricultural output could but be doubled the farmer would be twice as well off as before." (Fowke, 1957: 292)

A study commissioned by the Federal Task Force on Agriculture to appraise government involvement in agriculture proposed the following tripartite classification of government assistance programs: a) those

intended to facilitate the production and marketing of farm products;
 b) those whose goal was to support farm prices and maintain farm income;
 and c) research, education, and extension programs. (Garland and Hudson, 1968: 336) Table 2.1 lists various government programs under each of the three broad headings: production assistance; price and income maintenance; and research, education and extension.

Table 2.1 Government Assistance Programs

A. Production Assistance

1. Livestock improvement - quality improvement
2. Crop improvement - disease and pest control; research into new varieties; informational efforts to increase productivity by encouraging new practices and techniques
3. Grants to agricultural organizations, fairs and exhibitions
4. Resource development - programs to increase number of acres of farm land and rehabilitate unproductive farms e.g. PFRA (1935) ARDA (1966) FRED (1966) Prairie Grain Advance Payments (1957-62)
5. Farm Credit - Farm Credit Corporation (1959) Farm Improvement Loans (1944)
6. Agricultural manpower

B. Price and Income Maintenance

1. Producer marketing operations - cooperatives; producer marketing boards, statutory marketing boards (Canadian Wheat Board)
2. Price support programs - Agricultural Prices Support Board (1944-1958) Agricultural Products Board (1947-1951) Agricultural Stabilization Board (1958) Canadian Dairy Commission (1966-)
3. Supplementary income assistance - crop insurance; freight and storage subsidies; disaster aids; acreage payments (1957-62)

C. Research, Education and Extension

It is the area of price and income maintenance that has received the bulk of government money. In 1966-67 more money was channelled into this sector than into programs directed toward an expansion of agricultural output. (Garland and Hudson, 1968: Table 82, 318) It is important to examine more closely these programs to see just how much they meant an effort to control production.

Programs which represent the greatest opportunity for governmental control include those related to resource development (A4), producer marketing boards (B1), and price support programs (B2). The Prairie Farm Assistance Administration (PFAA) and the Prairie Farm Rehabilitation Administration (PFRA) were programs established in the 1930's, the former an income maintenance scheme which protected farmers against losses from total crop disasters through minimum acreage payments; the latter, a conservation and rehabilitation of land project. In 1960-1, the federal and provincial governments agreed to cooperate in ARDA (Agricultural and Rural Development Act), a scheme to attack rural poverty on a regional basis and thereby secure a more equitable distribution of income within the farm sector. A second program, FRED (Fund for Regional Economic Development), was specifically concerned with the farm poor. There has been much controversy concerning the efficacy of both programs. (Buckley and Tihanyi, 1967)

Price support programs were begun in the early war years by the federal government to stimulate war production. These programs established ceiling as well as floor prices on food products. The Agricultural Prices Support Board, set up in 1944, was empowered with supporting base prices on eleven farm commodities, either by directly buying farm products (where there was a surplus) or by underwriting the market with written guarantees to support the prices. Because of farmer demand, the price supports continued in the post war era. In 1958, pursuant to campaign promises by the Progressive Conservative Party and John Diefenbaker, the Agricultural Stabilization Board replaced the Agricultural Prices Support Board. The new board made price support

mandatory for nine key commodities; the prices of these commodities would be supported at 80% of the average price received during the preceding ten year period. In the period from 1958-59 to 1967-68, it was the dairy industry which was the primary beneficiary of price support programs. Receiving about 80% of federal expenditures on price and income maintenance schemes, it became one of the most closely regulated sectors of the domestic agricultural economy.

The decision of the government to guarantee floor prices is a decision to interfere with the price system. When the decision was initially made in 1941, the objective was increased productivity for the promotion of the war effort (hence floor prices) and the forestalling of domestic inflation (hence ceiling prices). The ceiling prices were set low enough to cause farm organizations to complain that their prices were being frozen at a level lower than that of non-foodstuffs. (Drummond et al., 1966: 51) It has been argued that "the level of support was set with the objective of protecting producers against serious loss in the short run but not to support prices above the normal, supply-demand relationship". (Drummond et al.:56. My emphasis.) The validity of this theme, that price supports are consumer subsidies, not producer subsidies, has been established econometrically. (Crown and Heady: Chapter 2)

In addition to cash advances and subsidy schemes, the other major thrust of governmental efforts to shore up farm incomes has been in the extension of available credit, usually at fairly low interest rates. The Farm Improvement Loans Act (1944) made available short and intermediate term loans to farmers; the Veterans Land Act enabled returning soldiers to purchase farms; and the Farm Credit Corporation makes

credit available on a long term, with special considerations to beginning farmers. Clearly these credit schemes are more properly labelled "developmental" (aimed at expanding production) rather than income maintenance schemes. (Crown and Heady: 5-6)

This overview supports the conclusion that the price and income maintenance schemes denote an effort to buoy up farmers' finances by either direct monetary payments (subsidies and grants) or by furthering credit, rather than by interfering with the price system.⁴

B. Agricultural Policy in the 1970's

Federal agricultural policy in the 1970's represents somewhat of a deviation from pre-1970 initiatives. The guidelines for these new directions have been the recommendations of the Task Force Report on Agriculture. Called "the blueprint of government policy" and "the most politically significant statement in the history of Canadian agriculture", (Mitchell:149) the Task Force Report is a clear enunciation of several themes: (1) the need for a reduction of direct government involvement in agriculture; (2) an affirmation of the inevitability and correctness of competition among farmers; (3) the necessity of accommodating Canadian agriculture to the continental economy; (4) a rejection of the 'public utility' or socialized concept of agriculture; and (5) the advocacy of the concept of supply management.

Early in their report, in attempting to define the goals of the Task Force, the commissioners make explicit their liberal philosophy:

The Task Force accepts the rational realization of each individual's potential as the ultimate goal.....in the ultimate analysis, it is individuals that count, rather than organizations..... governments exist to serve people, not the opposite.

(Canadian Agriculture in the Seventies:28)

They reiterate this sentiment later when they are sketching a model of the ideal political-economic-social system: "...a democratic political system ensuring the highest practical degree of individual freedom is of primary importance and ...government and economic planning must be conditioned by this supreme principle". (Canadian Agriculture in the Seventies: 279)

The oft-reiterated assumption of the Task Force members that the freedom of the farmer is a priority value occurs alongside the belief that freedom is best safeguarded by ensuring the continuation of the competitive economic system. (Canadian Agriculture...:290-291) Free enterprise is equated with the competitive system. To ensure the greatest freedom for the individual farmer, the Task Force recommended an elimination of direct subsidies (Canadian Agriculture...:9) and a reduction of governmentdirect involvement in agriculture: "...the general role of government should be to produce a favorable economic climate for farmers and agribusiness but not to attempt to 'manage' or direct agriculture". (Canadian Agriculture...:282) A North American free trade area in which tariff barriers would be removed would also ensure that freedom. (Canadian Agriculture...:59) Canadian foodstuffs would compete with American foodstuffs for the same market.

The foregoing recommendations did not call for any radical reorientation of the federal government's approach to agriculture. The potentially most radical proposals were those advocating an extension of the marketing board concept as a means of supply management.⁵ Legislation to enable producers to establish marketing boards represents, theoretically, an even greater possibility for meddling with the concept of the free market establishment of prices (through the normal supply and demand process) than do price support schemes. To be clear about what

marketing boards are, they are normally defined in terms similar to the following: "a producer-controlled, compulsory, horizontal organization sanctioned by governmental authority to perform specific marketing operations in the interests of the producers of the commodity concerned."⁶ (Metcalf, 1969:107) The function and goal of marketing boards is to stabilize and increase members' incomes and to establish an equal price for an equal product offered. They accomplish this by the pooling of members' products and selling them through a single agency. The collective selling of the entire output of a given commodity constitutes a movement towards orderly marketing and away from "free" marketing. Because of the compulsory membership and the frequent establishment of quotas on what each individual producer can sell (in order to restrict the supply which flows to market), it represents, as well, a type of supply management, and accordingly some restrictions on price competition.

Eugene Whelan, Federal Minister of Agriculture since 1972, extended the enabling legislation to permit the establishment of national marketing boards under the National Farm Products Marketing Act in 1972.⁷ Whelan's concerns are both producer and consumer oriented: to stabilize both farm income and consumer prices, as well as to guarantee future food supplies. The opportunity to organize marketing on a national level clearly provides the means for a much greater degree of supply management than theretofore existed with only provincial boards.

Because of the proliferation of marketing boards,⁸ it is important to examine the extent to which they are an effective tool in the goal of supply management, and consequently, increased and stable incomes.

Marketing boards in Canada vary widely in terms of their power and effectiveness. Hiscocks and Bennett (1974) have analysed the extent to which the provincial marketing boards in Canada can control prices in terms of their pricing powers in fourteen different areas.

Some of the most important of these areas include the ability to regulate the following: to set consumer or wholesale prices, to establish a maximum or minimum producer price, to establish marketing and/or production quotas for every producer, to license producers, to regulate interprovincial and export trade, to control imports, and to purchase and/or sell the regulated product. In terms of these criteria, the powers of marketing boards are severely restricted. All but four (the Canadian Egg Marketing Agency, Canadian Dairy Commission, Canadian Wheat Board, and the Canadian Turkey Marketing Agency) are provincial in scope. Constitutionally, they must be created and empowered by provincial governments. This is a serious limitation to their ability to control the supply of products coming to market.⁹ As well, marketing boards are organized on the principle of a separate board for every commodity. Each commodity group in each province has a separate marketing board (save for the four national boards). A more serious drawback to effectiveness in controlling supply is their complete inability to control imports.¹⁰

More specifically, in terms of the criteria Hiscocks and Bennett set forth, the most powerful boards are the fluid milk boards or commissions which do directly determine prices and establish marketing quotas. Poultry marketing boards rank second most powerful in their ability to influence price levels. They can set marketing quotas and

minimum sales prices. A third group of boards may negotiate prices with major buyers but generally the buyers rather than the board determine the selling price. Consequently, Hiscocks and Bennett conclude that "it is difficult to determine the extent to which these boards influence the producer price beyond the basic supply and demand situation or expectations of the situation at the time of the negotiations". (1974:22) Finally, a large number of boards have no pricing powers or influence beyond what an improved organization of the market secures, or what stepped up promotional activities yield.

Accordingly, by extending marketing board legislation, the federal government has in the present decade created the conditions for greater producer protection from the vicissitudes of the free market. However, it would clearly be an exaggeration to suggest that this is tantamount to producer or (even more remotely) governmental control of production. If anything is needed to dispel the impression of the abandonment of the free market concept on the part of the Federal Liberal Party, the introduction in 1973, by Otto Lang, Minister in charge of the Canadian Wheat Board, of the Feed Grains Policy would suffice. The Feed Grains Policy removed the Wheat Board monopoly over inter-provincial trade in feed grains and permitted the creation of an "off Board" selling mechanism to make room for feed grain handling by private grain companies. Farmers are now "free" to choose to whom they will market their feed grains.

As an overview of federal agricultural policy, there may be no more fitting assessment than that of the Task Force on Agriculture. On a one hundred degree continuum where one hundred degrees represents

the greatest extent and scale of government planning and control, the Commissioners placed Canada between twenty-five and thirty degrees.¹¹ This metric location approximates the ideological position of a liberal policy of periodic departure from non-involvement in the marketing and pricing sectors when emergency situations arise.

II. Provincial Agricultural Policy

Even less scholarly attention has been directed to the role of provincial governments in the agricultural sector than to that of the federal government. But because Alberta farmers interact not only with a federal Department of Agriculture, but a provincial one as well, it may be helpful to provide an overview of the agricultural policies of the Social Credit and Progressive Conservative administrations in Alberta.

Although agriculture is a jurisdiction which the provincial and federal governments share concurrently, the federal constitutional authority over inter-provincial and export trade reduces the marketing powers of the provincial governments to those related to intra-provincial concerns. Hence, save for powers to establish marketing boards and to advertise and search for domestic and international markets, the role of the provincial government in agriculture is confined mainly to the production and pricing sectors. It is primarily in these terms that the agricultural policies of the Alberta Social Credit and Progressive Conservative Administrations will be contrasted.

It is probably fair to say that the election of the Progressive Conservative Party in Alberta in 1971 marked a turning point in provincial

assistance to agriculture. Prior to 1971, the Social Credit administration's involvement in agriculture had been confined, for the most part, to supplementary income assistance in the event of natural disasters (B3 in Table 2.1), to dispensing research information through the local District Agriculturalist's office (A1, A2), and to financing agricultural exhibitions and fairs (A3). None of these types of schemes meant substantial financial assistance to the farmer or interference with production or pricing.

The New Minister of Agriculture in the Progressive Conservative Government in 1971, Dr. Hugh Horner, himself a hobby farmer, was very much committed to resource development programs. (A4 in Table 2.1) Working with an expanded budget, Dr. Horner implemented new schemes like the Agricultural Development Corporation and the Beef Incentive Programs designed to loan farmers the capital necessary to expand their operations. Loans to purchase farm land and construct new buildings were forthcoming. The Progressive Conservative government has been active in two further areas since 1971: one, bolstering international sales of provincially produced foodstuffs; and two, supplementing incomes of farmers who have been the victims of natural disasters. The latter does, however, need to be qualified. While disaster assistance was made available (after pressure initially from the National Farmers Union and subsequently another farm organization) to farmers whose crops were snowed under in the Fall of 1973, this same administration has not taken action during the period 1974-6 to provide emergency support to cow-calf operators suffering extremely depressed prices.

In broader terms, provincial agricultural policy, like federal policy, has not entailed any substantial encroachment into the production and pricing sectors. The Alberta farmer has been left relatively free of either federal or provincial regulation of his enterprise. However, because there are slight differences of orientation with respect to production and pricing, it seems advisable to make an analytical distinction between the two sectors for the purpose of tapping farmers responses towards each. This holds as well with respect to the marketing sector, the area in which there has been somewhat more regulation.

III. A Framework for Mapping Farmers' Political Attitudes

Having surveyed the policies and programs within which the sampled farmers practise farming, the parameters of the domain of farming and politics have been broadly mapped. Farmers' reactions to governmental activity or more accurately, passivity, in the production, pricing, and marketing sectors should constitute stable and salient responses in their belief systems. Because the interest in belief system research is not only with the particular content of discrete attitudes but as well with the broad nature of collections of attitudes, it becomes imperative to establish some means by which the researcher can get a theoretical "handle" on respondents' attitudes. Traditionally, in political belief system research, the framework used to do this is the left-right ideological continuum: the description of an individual's set of attitudes is in terms of the attitudes as being "on the left" or "on the right"; or more frequently, as conservative, liberal or radical/socialist. To facilitate the pursuit of this practice in the present study and to thereby provide a framework within which farmers' specific attitudes towards selected

objects in the political system can be identified in ideological terms, Chart 2.1 is included. Chart 2.1 defines left, centre and right positions with respect to the extent and scale of government involvement advocated in the pricing, production, and marketing sectors of agriculture. To varying degrees the left position approximates a radical/socialist stance; the centre, a liberal position; and the right, a conservative perspective. Liberalism and conservatism in the Canadian context vary slightly, as is indicated below. While the criteria in the chart are selective and not inclusive of all - maybe not even the most significant - aspects of a left or right orientation, they nevertheless constitute a set of elements readily recognizable as cognitive and evaluative components of conservative, liberal, and socialist perspectives.

As part of its view of the appropriate economic system, the conservative perspective includes the following elements.¹² Firstly, the free market and a strict policy of laissez-faire on the part of the government is the appropriate economic structure and the source of political freedom. This entails free trade, no monopolies, no tariffs, no subsidies. The government should have no, or at best a minimal, role in the production and management of the economy. Secondly, the protection and ownership of private property must be assured. Only to the end of protecting private property should the government intervene in the economy.

The conservative position, in terms of Chart 2.1 is one of non-interference in regulating input costs and producer prices and quantity and type of foodstuffs produced. It encourages private ownership of land and equipment with no limits as to who can farm. The principle of the free market, with prices established by the law of supply and demand, is affirmed.

Chart 2.1 Left, Right, and Centre Positions on Scale and Extent of Government Planning and Control

	Left	Centre	Right
<u>Pricing Control</u>			
a) regulation of prices and income	Production costs and some profit guaranteed - either by producers bargaining with buyers or gov't. established maximum and minimum prices; stabilized prices.	Emergency or continuous supports	open market (supply and demand)
b) regulation of nature and cost of inputs	controlled by government	emergency controls	no controls
<u>Production Control</u>			
a) criteria as to who can farm	restricted to licensed farmers	no limits	no limits
b) structure of farm ownership	public ownership; land leased to individuals or collective ownership; regulation of size and integration	both public and private ownership	private ownership of land and equipment
c) quantity and production regulations	production quotas on quantity and product	gov't. advice and direction with subsidies and grants	no controls

Chart 2.1 Continued *

	Left	Centre	Right
<u>Marketing Control</u>			
a) mechanism whereby farm prices are established	national marketing boards for all commodities (orderly marketing)	marketing boards optional	open market (supply and demand)
b) regulation of imports and/or interprovincial trade	tariffs regulate imports	selective international tariffs	no regulation, no tariffs
c) transportation policy	publicly owned and operated	both public and private systems	privately operated, privately owned

*The genesis of this chart is Table 4, "Major Characteristics of Farming Systems in the Five Stages of Government Involvement", in Canadian Agriculture in the Seventies (1969:281).

In the Canadian context, conservatism may include selective tariffs and a publicly-owned transportation system coexisting alongside private schemes. The major thrust of a conservative agricultural policy would be directed towards finding export markets. In summary, the conservative position in Canada entails a stance on the right of Chart 2.1 with respect to pricing and production and veers toward the centre on marketing.

Liberalism, like conservatism, supports free enterprise and the capitalistic system as the appropriate economic arrangement.¹³ However, it advocates a greater governmental role in managing the economy (to create conditions in which private enterprise may flourish). Both private and public enterprise are tolerated. In the Canadian context, liberalism has tended to be equated with a greater advocacy of welfare schemes than has conservatism. In liberal terms, welfare schemes are necessary to allow everyone to compete equally in the free and competitive market. And finally, liberalism lends a supportive role to big business but does not entail the same preoccupation with private property as does conservatism. It generally does not advocate the ownership of major industries, but rather recognizes the occasional necessity for regulation of them.

The liberal position, in terms of Chart 2.1, includes both "centre" and "right" aspects. Like conservatism in the Canadian context it puts no limits on who can farm, no controls on input costs, and recommends the private ownership of land (including the right of non-individuals such as corporations to enter into farming). Liberalism is inclined towards emergency support programs and sporadic interference

with the free market by imposing short-lived tariffs. The liberal position may be either an advocacy of the free market alone or of a choice between free and regulated marketing (hence, the optionality of marketing boards, the provision of both publicly-owned and privately-operated transportation systems). Broadly, then, the liberal perspective in Canada oscillates between the right and centre positions with respect to the pricing and production areas and settles in the centre concerning marketing.

Included in the socialist perspective is a set of economic beliefs which firstly, advocate government intervention in the economy and the use of state power and planning to secure public ownership of the means of production of the major national industries, and the distribution, transportation, and communication sectors.¹⁴ Secondly socialists recommend the abolition of private property and its replacement with communal ownership. Socialism, as a third criterion, includes a critique of capitalism as necessarily leading to economic inequality and ultimately to political inequality. In recommending the abolition of private property, it counsels as well an equitable distribution of power among classes. In terms of practical politics, this takes the form of a sympathetic posture towards the working class and trade unions. And fourthly, socialism may advise the utility of interim redistribution of wealth measures like the social welfare schemes liberals implement to maximize equal opportunity for all. A socialist, however, would define equality in terms of equal social conditions.

The position on the left side of Chart 2.1 corresponds to some aspects of a radical/socialist approach to agriculture. Such an approach presupposes the joint occurrence of planning and controls and the regulation of production, pricing, and marketing. The structure of land ownership advocated by a socialist differs, as well, from that recommended by a liberal or conservative, being, of course, one of public rather than private land ownership.

There is a fourth set of beliefs which also must be defined in terms of Chart 2.1. This is the official ideology of the National Farmers Union, the organization to which one of the two study groups of farmers belongs. The NFU ideology, as it is outlined here, is the set of beliefs gleaned from a careful scrutiny of policy statements passed at Conventions of the National Farmers Union; from articles published in their monthly periodical, The Union Farmer, which all members receive; from their more frequent directives to NFU executive members in the Newsletter; and from articles concerning the NFU in an influential farm newspaper, The Western Producer. This set of beliefs is now outlined.

In terms of Chart 2.1, the NFU position on the scale and extent of government planning and control advocated, is as follows:

Pricing Controls

a) regulation of prices and income: It is the policy of the NFU that farm prices and income should be continuously regulated by the process of collective bargaining wherein the certified bargaining agent for producers (the NFU/authorized farm organization) would bargain with a government-appointed marketing commission "to determine the price that

producers would receive for their products". Once this process of bargaining had taken place, "The marketing commission then would have the power to fix or determine selling prices, to regulate distribution of the product, to fix and collect fees and to seize, remove, and dispose of any of the regulated products kept or marketed in violation of any orders or rules of the commission".¹⁵

The collective bargaining process is designed to ensure a price to the producer equal to "the cost of production plus a reasonable profit on his investment, management and labor." (Union Farmer, Jan., 1975:5) In the interim, while awaiting governmental authorization as the collective bargaining agent for farmers, the NFU has demanded stabilization programs but rejected those of the "emergency type" which lend short term assistance without stabilizing prices at cost of production plus levels. (Union Farmer, April, 1975:4)

b) control on nature and cost of inputs: The NFU position is that input costs be subject to conjoint governmental and farmer control.¹⁶

Production Controls

a) criteria as to who can farm: Although they have yet to arrive at a definition of "a farmer" and to specify who should be able to farm, the NFU Conventions have unanimously endorsed the principle that there should be definite restrictions on who can farm and are of accord in stipulating some of those who should not be able to.

Agribusiness (chain food stores, packing plants, feed companies, commercial corporate enterprises, and "producers engaged in farm production for 'hobby', research, or tax advantage") should be restricted from

farming. Furthermore, criteria as to who can farm should not be guided by an "economic determinism" principle, but by a wider conception of the sort of society and community it is desirable to create in Canada.¹⁸

b) structure of farm ownership: Until the 1974 National Convention, when a Land Ownership Policy was put forward for discussion that suggested it was time to re-evaluate "the principle of private land compared to public ownership with tenure secured by leasing arrangements" (Union Farmer, Jan., 1975:8), the NFU had always endorsed "the principles of farm production based on the individual management, ownership and control of production resources by farm people". The latter was one of the Statements of Purpose endorsed by the 1973 and 1974 Conventions. The 1974 Land Ownership Policy sparked sufficient controversy to result in the resignation of one president of an Ontario local. To date, the endorsement of public ownership seems to be confined to the leadership level, with the President of the Union, Roy Atkinson, having argued its merits on different occasions. (Union Farmer, August, 1974:12)

Less controversial have been the recognition of the need for maximum farm size limits and the prohibition of vertical integration and contract farming.¹⁹

c) quantity and product regulations: The NFU has endorsed production controls as to quantity but not as to product. An upper limit to egg production quotas has been specified and the principle of "supply management" for livestock and livestock products endorsed.²⁰ However, " 'supply management' should not be interpreted as....recommending overly restrictive production controls but should be defined as geared to regulated expansion". (Union Farmer, Jan., 1975:7) Rather than the

government alone stipulating upper production limits on livestock and other foodstuffs, the NFU asks that farmers' organizations have a say in the establishment of those controls. A producer-controlled national meat authority, for example, should be created and empowered to manage supplies and allocate import and export quotas on the basis of negotiated agreements with domestic and foreign buyers. (Union Farmer, January, 1976)

Marketing Control

a) mechanism whereby farm prices are established: Probably no other area has so preoccupied the attention of the NFU as that concerning the appropriate marketing mechanism. In the defence of orderly marketing and the Canadian Wheat Board as the vehicle to ensure orderly grain marketing, the NFU has launched attack after attack upon the Federal Task Force Report on Agriculture and the Federal Feed Grains Policy of Otto Lang.²¹ The consistent NFU position is that the Canadian Wheat Board should be assigned jurisdiction over marketing all grains and oilseeds interprovincially and intraprovincially in Canada and all export sales, as well as over the operation and management of all grain-handling facilities. (Union Farmer, Jan., 1975)

In an article entitled "Our Policy Must Stand", the NFU President, Roy Atkinson, rejected the alternative to orderly marketing, that is, selling on the free market. He argued, "No longer can we depend on the free market to dispense equity and justice....because the basic drive in the market economy and those interests operating in the market economy is self-interest based on maximized profits for their own use or abuse". (Union Farmer, Dec., 1974:2) This judgment of the injustice of the free market system has led to the call for producer-controlled

national marketing agencies concerned with livestock and other farm products able to "negotiate long-term agreements with buyers, domestic and into export...." (Union Farmer, Jan., 1975:7) To be able to regulate the market in this manner, it is necessary that the producer boards be nationally organized, not provincially. (Newsletter, June 19, 1973)

b) regulation of imports and/or interprovincial trade: In contrast to the vacillating posture of the Canadian Federation of Agriculture and the Canadian Cattlemens' Association, the National Farmers Union has consistently recommended restrictions on the importation of fruits and vegetables,²² beef (Western Producer, May 22, 1975), and dairy products.²³

c) transportation policy: As part of its transportation policy, the NFU recommends the nationalization of all forms of transportation, including the expropriation of Canadian Pacific Limited and its merger with Canadian National. (Union Farmer, Jan., 1975:6,8)

In terms of the foregoing policy positions, the NFU ideology may be summarized as occupying the left position in Chart 2.1 on regulation of the pricing and marketing sectors and containing aspects of the right, centre, and left positions with respect to production.

Specific cognitive and evaluative predispositions towards the three sectors of pricing, production, and marketing - potential areas for the overlap of politics and farming - constitute one fundamental dimension of farmers' political belief systems in this study. In addition to these specific attitudes, other more general beliefs, typically regarded as important components of ideologies, are tapped as well.

These include one, beliefs about "how the present social, economic and political order operates"; two, the values and goals that define how the social and economic order ought to be structured; and three, the tactical prescription for action to realize those values and goals.²⁴ Elaboration of the theoretical and empirical conceptualization of these dimensions occurs as each enters the analyses. Inclusion of more general orientations ensures the opportunity to uncover higher order factors in the farmers' belief sets should they exist.

In conclusion, a framework for mapping those areas of the domain of farmers' belief systems of interest in this research has been broadly outlined. As the empirical inquiry proceeds, components of that framework will be more precisely formulated. Initially, however, a description of the study groups and the procedure by which the data was obtained must be provided. That is the task of the next chapter.

Notes to Chapter 2

- 1 Gad Horowitz's (1970:47-74) application of the Hartzian framework to account for the relative incidence of conservatism, liberalism, and socialism in Canada has been the most ambitious effort to delineate the beliefs and assumptions that characterize Canadian ideologies. This work aside, we are left to infer the ideological dispositions of Canadians from their patterns of partisan support.
- 2 The five item political efficacy measure developed by researchers at the Michigan Survey Research Centre is an excellent example of an American measure widely used by Canadian researchers. (Campbell et al., 1954:187-189) This measure stresses the efficacy of individual orientations in the political arena. And yet one of the points about which there is a marked consensus concerning the Canadian political culture is that of the relatively stronger collectivist ethic in this country as compared with the United States. The point then is how reliable is a measure predicated on individualist assumptions in a country where those assumptions are much more weakly adhered to? Support for the contention that the SRC political efficacy scale (and minimally adopted variations thereof) is predicated on individualistic assumptions is found in the discovery of Simeon and Elkins (1974:406) that efficacy feelings are highest of all among residents of British Columbia, a province of which one subgroup of the citizenry has been described in individualistic terms. (Robin, 1972) In addition, the authors report that the proportion of Saskatchewan residents with high feelings of efficacy is relatively low, a finding most surprising in light of the collectivist and cooperative tradition of that province, but one that can be at least partially accounted for if the efficacy items do indeed have an individualist bias. There is, as well, some evidence that the SRC efficacy scale does not "work" on a Dutch sample. (Mokken, 1969) The solution would seem to be to buttress the SRC measure with items that tap a collectivist orientation, and/or develop a new measure from volunteered statements of Canadian samples.

David Elkins (1976:000) suggests that the SRC efficacy measure is probably inadequate to tapping efficacy orientations in the United States as well since Almond and Verba (1963) found that among the U.S. respondents, a number of individuals voiced a preference for group political action over individual activity.

- 3 It is symptomatic of the sporadic attention to the agricultural sector that so few political economists and historians have deemed it worth their while to inquire into governmental programs and policies regarding Canadian agriculture. Vernon Fowke's work (1946, 1957: Fowke and Fowke, 1968) on the wheat economy was for many years the sole contribution in this area. In 1967, the federal government commissioned a Task Force on Agriculture for the purpose of projecting agricultural directions in the 1970's and proposing policy initiatives in line with those projections. As part of this Task Force, several research papers

appeared which examined historically the role of governments in the agricultural economy. (Garland and Hudson, 1968; Their, 1968; Canadian Agriculture in the Seventies: 462-4) More recently, Don Mitchell (1975) has analysed the food industry in Canada and in the process examined the federal role as regards agriculture. There is accordingly, not much literature upon which to draw. Hence, the summary in the text relies, of necessity, upon the work of this handful of scholars.

- 4 Garland and Hudson state that programs that involve direct payments to or on behalf of farmers account for 50% of all governmental expenditures on agriculture and 60% of federal governmental expenditures. p. 343.
- 5 Supply management "refers to centralized control over the quantity and/or price of one or more commodities of specified quality coming from a specified group of producers to a particular market or markets, in a given period." Canadian Agriculture in the Seventies: 312.
- 6 Another definition of marketing boards is that of the Canadian Agricultural Economics Society which in 1961 suggested that the marketing board "may be defined as a producer body organized under statute to exercise compulsory control over some or all of the stages in the marketing of a specified commodity or commodities". See Bob Philips, "Marketing Boards Are Meant for Farmers", The Western Producer, Winnipeg, Thursday, October 10, 1974, p. 41.
- 7 The first marketing board legislation that enabled the establishment of federal marketing boards in Canada was enacted in 1934 under the Natural Products Marketing Act. The 17 marketing schemes which were established under this legislation were scuttled in 1936 when the Supreme Court of Canada and later the JCPC declared the Natural Products Marketing Act ultra-vires federal jurisdiction. (This was part of the "New Deal" package R.B. Bennett had introduced and which the Liberal government of MacKenzie King asked the courts to declare on.) In 1949, the Federal Government successfully enacted the Agricultural Products Marketing (Canada) Act "which provided enabling legislation permitting the provincial marketing boards to exercise outside of the province in which they were established the same powers which provincial legislation allowed them to exercise within the provinces". See Philips (1974: 41)
- 8 G. A. Hiscocks and T.A. Bennett (1974: 15) report 80 marketing boards in 1974. Omitted from this figure are pulpwood and oyster boards and the Quebec manufacturing milk boards.
- 9 The chicken and egg wars were one manifestation of interprovincial competition of provincial marketing boards. When one provincial marketing board found itself with a surplus of eggs - that is, with more eggs

than the consumers in its own province would purchase - it would try to unload those surplus eggs in a neighbouring province at a price below the selling price of eggs in that second province.

- 10 It will be recalled that the Task Force recommended this be ruled out. The Federal Liberal Party has for the most part concurred: beef import restrictions have been levied and lifted sporadically.
- 11 See Table 3, "Five Stages of Government Involvement in Farming: Degree of Government Planning and Control", Canadian Agriculture in the Seventies: 280. To put the rating of Canada in perspective, it is instructive to know that China is placed between 80° and 90° and Russia between 75° and 80° on this same continuum. At this extreme end, agriculture is under complete government control and planning and the farmer is a wage-earning employee of the government. Closer to the Canadian rating are France and Britain, both occupying positions somewhere between 30° and 45°.
- 12 This definition of conservatism is drawn from the following sources: C. Rossiter, "Conservatism", International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences ed. E. Sills (New York: Macmillan, 1968); J. C. Rees, "Conservatism", A Dictionary of the Social Sciences, eds. J. Gould and W. Kolb (New York: Free Press, 1964), 129-130; Dolbeare and Dolbeare, American Ideologies, Chapters 5 and 10; Herbert McClosky, "Conservatism and Personality", APSR, 52 (March, 1958), 27-45; G. Horowitz, "Conservatism, Liberalism and Socialism" (1970:42-74); and Viscount Hailsham, The Conservative Case, (Penquin, Harmondsworth, 1959).
- 13 This definition of liberalism draws upon the following sources: Dolbeare and Dolbeare, American Ideologies (1973: Chapters 2,3,4, and 10); G. Horowitz, "Conservatism, Liberalism and Socialism" (1970:64); Robinson, Rusk, and Head, Measures of Political Attitudes (1968: Chapter 3); J. W. Pickersgill, The Liberal Party (1962:69); James P. Young, The Politics of Affluence (1968); Leo Strauss, Liberalism Ancient and Modern (1968)
- 14 The definition of socialism relies on a number of sources of which the principal ones are Dolbeare and Dolbeare, American Ideologies (1973: Chapters 9 and 10); Horowitz, "Conservatism, Liberalism and Socialism" (1970); Leo Huberman and Paul M. Sweezy, Introduction to Socialism (1968).
- 15 NFU Convention Board of Directors Report (Winnipeg: Dec., 1973); Agricultural Producers Collective Bargaining and Marketing Act Draft Copy (Winnipeg: Dec., 1973). Here, as for all references to the source of NFU policy positions, the reference is selective in the

sense that all NFU beliefs and positions outlined recur several times in one or all of the Union Farmer, the NFU Newsletter, The Western Producer, or other NFU Publications.

- 16 Proposed Collective Bargaining Resolution (Saskatoon: NFU, June, 1970), p. 2.
- 17 National Convention Policy Statements (Winnipeg: Dec., 1973 and and Dec., 1974); Union Farmer (Saskatoon: NFU, Jan., 1975), p. 7.
- 18 A Critique of the Agricultural Adjustment or Development Policy for Canadian Agriculture (Saskatoon: NFU, June 16, 1971), p. 4.
- 19 Newsletter (Saskatoon: NFU, April 28, 1972); "Land Ownership Policy", Union Farmer (Saskatoon: NFU, Jan., 1975), p. 8.
- 20 "Egg Policy", Union Farmer (Saskatoon: NFU, Jan., 1975), p. 7.
- 21 For the former see Background Information for the Farmers' Task Force Grains Policy Hearings (Saskatoon: NFU, n.d.). For the latter see issues of the Union Farmer and Newsletter from July 9 to October 22, 1973.
- 22 Submission to Alberta Agricultural Marketing Council (Saskatoon: NFU, n.d.), p. 15-16.
- 23 Proposed Collective Bargaining Resolution (Saskatoon: NFU, June, 1970); "NFU Policy", Union Farmer (Saskatoon: NFU, Jan., 1975).
- 24 These components of an ideology are outlined by Dolbeare and Dolbeare (1973: 3-7). The delineation conforms to several other notions of ideology which include both cognitive beliefs (generally about the desirability or undesirability of government intervention in the economy) and stylistic orientations (posture toward change). See McClosky (1958); Hikel (1973:5); and Christian and Campbell (1974: 15-18).

Chapter 3

The Study Groups

In the study of prairie politics there exists no more exciting chronicle than that recounting the mobilization to protest politics of prairie farmers in the early decades of this century. Even today, students dispute the meaning of farmer support for the United Farmers of Alberta, the Social Credit Party in Alberta, the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation in Saskatchewan, and the Progressive Party on the prairies as a whole. Were such movements manifestations of agrarian radicalism and farmer socialist perspectives? (Lipset, 1950) Or, were farmers only deviating from their inherent conservatism in order to allay severe economic grievances? (Macpherson, 1953) Were farmers not acting ideologically at all, not seeking to implement socialist goals, but only utilizing available channels to redress economic hardships? (Bennett and Krueger, 1968; Eager, 1968; Naylor, 1972) While the controversy of necessity remains unresolved, it is possible to inquire into the "meaning" for some farmers of contemporary recruitment to a farm organization radical in its objectives. More precisely, given the existence of a current protest farm union, by sampling both members of that organization and non-members, it is possible to trace the links, if any, between farmers' membership in a radical farm organization and their belief sets. The radical farm organization available is the National Farmers Union.

In 1969, the National Farmers Union was formed out of the amalgamation of the existing provincial Farmers Unions. Shortly thereafter, local organizations were established in most provinces, including

Alberta. Since then the National Farmers Union has engaged in both quiet diplomacy and more vociferous confrontation tactics in the pursuit of clearly defined goals and objectives. (Some of these were outlined in Chapter 2, pages 45 - 49). The NFU leadership has presented briefs and policy proposals to the provincial and federal governments on virtually every governmental action (or inaction) of consequence to Canadian farmers. Members of the organization have taken part in rallies and pickets of agribusiness conglomerates (Bordens, Weston, Kraft), waged a national boycott of Kraft products for several years, and demonstrated on the grounds of Provincial Legislative Assemblies in Alberta, Saskatchewan, British Columbia, and other provinces. It was members of this union whose tractors and vehicles blocked all access routes into Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island in August, 1971, and whose President, Roy Atkinson, was jailed as a consequence. Such activities have earned it the reputation of "the most militant and most radical" of present farm organizations. (Brown, 1972:40) It is from this organization, whose membership has been estimated to encompass about 10% of all Canadian farmers, that one of the two study groups has been drawn.

The sampling design by which farmers in the NFU and the counterpart "control" group of non-members were drawn is detailed in this chapter. In addition, the chapter contrasts the two groups of farmers on an aggregate level and considers the extent to which the two groups represent farmers in the province as a whole.

Selection of the Study Groups

Two study groups comprise the data base for this study: 48 farmers who were members of the National Farmers Union in 1974, and

85 farmers who were not members of that organization at that time.

Both groups have been chosen by a design which entailed personal interviews with respondents in one geographical area of the province and the completion of mail questionnaires by farmers randomly selected in the province as a whole. Hence, both the member (NFU) and non-member (non-NFU) study groups are composed of farmers who were personally interviewed or farmers who returned mail questionnaires which they had completed on their own.

1. The Interviewed Groups

The farmers in the two study groups who were personally interviewed by the researcher were all residents of a geographical area which lies, for the most part, within Census Division 13. Diagram 3.1 shows the location of this division in the province of Alberta. The choice of this farming area as one in which to sample intensively was made for two reasons. First, both specialized and mixed farmers produce a diversity of crops in the area on land that ranges from being marginal to highly productive farmland. It includes 9.5% of the total farms in Alberta; only three census divisions contain more. It appears to be as representative as any farming area of the province as a whole. Table 3.1 indicates that, in comparison with the province as a whole, Census Division 13 has smaller farms on the average, both in terms of the number of acres owned and operated¹ as well as with respect to the estimated market value. There are fewer wheat farms since this area is outside the wheat growing belt. With respect to the socio-demographic characteristics of the farmers in the area, while the religious affiliation and age composition are similar to those of farmers throughout the province,

there are more Eastern-European born farmers in Census Division 13. With a few caveats, sampling in this area affords the opportunity to establish the generalizability of previous studies of the political behavior of prairie wheat farmers early in the twentieth century.

Second, the area was selected because the National Farmers Union had organized in the area and sustained a level of activity roughly equal to that of most other districts in the province.² The largest part of NFU District 3 overlaps with Census Division 13.³ NFU District 3 in Alberta encompasses all farming areas north of the North Saskatchewan River, excepting the Peace River Block, with the eastern boundary lying 12 miles east of Highway 2 North. The area included in the district is roughly demarcated in Diagram 3.1 where it can be observed that the overlap of the NFU district with the census division is not perfect. (The census division includes two counties - Thorhild and Athabasca - the largest parts of which lie outside the NFU district in question.) Five established locals existed in NFU District 3 at the time of the research; members of the NFU study group have been drawn from all locals except the one which had been established in April of that year and which was outside the confines of Census Division 13.

While the proportion of NFU members to farmers as a whole is probably not as great in this district as it is in some other NFU districts in the province, District 3 had two characteristics which made it desirable as an area in which to conduct the personal interviews. First, a large number of farmers in the area had experienced and were continuing to feel a reduction in their income, owing to both a loss of




Diagram 3.1



NFU District 3



Census Division 13

Table 3.1 A Comparison of Census Division 13 and the Province as a Whole

	Province	Census Division 13
<u>Birthplace ^a</u>		
Canada	82.7%	82.2%
U.S.A.	2.9	3.2
Northern Europe	5.2	3.9
Western Europe	3.3	3.0
Southern Europe	1.2	.2
Eastern Europe	3.3	6.9
Asia, Africa, Other	1.4	.6
	<hr/> 100.0	<hr/> 100.0
<u>Religious Affiliation ^b</u>		
Anglo-Protestant ^c	42.0	38.0
Catholic	26.5	30.6
European Protestant	15.0	18.3
Evangelical Protestant	5.2	4.7
Not affiliated	6.7	5.1
Other religion	4.2	3.3
Jewish	.4	-
	<hr/> 100.0	<hr/> 100.0
<u>Age ^d</u>		
Under 25 years	2.5	2.0
25 - 34 years	14.2	13.8
35-44 years	24.1	26.1
45 - 54 years	28.6	28.0
55 - 59 years	11.5	11.3
60 - 64 years	9.1	9.3
65 - 69 years	5.8	5.9
70 years plus	4.2	3.6
	<hr/> 100.0	<hr/> 100.0
<u>Size of Farm</u>		
Average # acres operated ^e	790	487
Average # acres owned ^e	506	392
Average capital value farm ^f	\$83,603	\$54,625
<u>Primary Product Raised ^g</u>		
Cattle, hogs, sheep ^h	55.5	65.2
Small grains	19.6	16.6
Mixed	7.7	8.2
Wheat	8.4	1.7
Dairy	5.4	6.8
Field Crops	1.7	.3
Other ⁱ	1.7	1.2
	<hr/> 100.0	<hr/> 100.0

Table 3.1 Continued

Codes

^aSource of Province Data: Table 35, "Population by Birthplace and Sex for Canada and Provinces, Rural Nonfarm and Rural Farm, 1971", Catalogue 92 - 727, 1971 Census.

Source of C.D. 13 Data: Table 36, "Population by Birthplace and Sex for Census Divisions, 1971", Population, Catalogue 92 - 727, 1971 Census.

^bSource of Province Data: "Population by Religious Denomination and Sex for Canada and Provinces, Rural Non-Farm and Rural Farm, 1971", Population, 1971 Census.

Source of C.D. 13 Data: "Population by Religious Denomination and Sex, for Census Divisions, 1971", Population, 1971 Census.

^cThe religious affiliation groups include the following specific denominations:

Anglo-Protestant: Anglican, Presbyterian, United Church, Baptist

Catholic: Roman Catholic, Greek Catholic

European Protestant: Lutheran, Greek Orthodox, Christian Reformed

Evangelical Protestant: Adventist, Christian Alliance, Church of Christ, Jehovah's Witness, Mormon, Pentecostal

Other religion: Salvation Army, Hutterite, Mennonite, Buddhist, Other

^dSource of Province and C.D. 13 Data: Table 31, "Population, Tenure, Age and Residence of Operator, Type of Organization for Census-farms, 1971", Agriculture Alberta, 1971 Census.

^eSource of Province and C.D. 13 Data: Table 31, "Population, Tenure, Age and Residence of Operator, Type of Organization for Census Farms, 1971", Agriculture Alberta, 1971 Census.

^fTable 50, Agriculture Alberta, 1971 Census.

^gSource of Province and C.D. 13 Data: Table 14, "Census Farms with Sales of \$2500 or more Classified by Product Type", Agriculture Alberta, 1971 Census.

^hSmall grains: Barley, oats, etc.

ⁱOther: Forestry, fruits and vegetables, poultry, 'miscellaneous specialty'

their crops the previous fall to a premature snowfall and a slump in the cattle market. Secondly, in seeking compensation for this loss of income, a number of farmers in the region had personally petitioned the provincial government. These two features, combined with the fact that another more conservative farm organization, Unifarm, had long been present in the area, meant that the region afforded a good opportunity to tap farmers of different ideological persuasions.

In June, 1974, a questionnaire was pretested on ten farmers in the region. The pretest group included leaders of the two farm organizations in the province (the National Farmers Union and Unifarm), members of these organizations, and farmers who belonged to neither. It was felt that such a range of farmers with both varying degree of articulateness and ideological perspective would highlight problems of item difficulty, bias, and ambiguity. The exercise was successful on all three accounts; a number of items were deleted from the questionnaire, other items were added, and the wording of some changed. (These questionnaires, because they were not completed by randomly drawn respondents, have not been included in the analyses discussed in this report.)

An original target of 50 personal interviews with members of the National Farmers Union and 50 interviews with non-members was set. The sample of NFU members was randomly drawn from a list of current members made available to the researcher by provincial officials of the NFU. The lists from which the non-NFU members were randomly selected were compiled lists of farmers obtained from the District Agriculturalists in the counties of Barrhead, Lac Ste Anne, and Westlock. The D.A. files were accurate in the sense that it was extremely unlikely that practising

farmers were absent from them; they were unreliable in the sense of including not only people farming, but as well, people interested in farming. Where possible, the list of farmers was validated by farmers knowledgeable of the area who could eliminate non-farmers. This was, unfortunately, possible in only one county.⁴

Farmers in both study groups were initially contacted by a letter informing them of the researcher's interest in interviewing them and of the nature of the questionnaire they would be asked to respond to. Interview dates were set by telephone and the interviews were conducted in the respondents' homes in the months of September and October, 1974. The normal length of the interview ranged between two and two and one half hours. That so few farmers failed to co-operate and that almost all availed the researcher of so much of their time is, I believe, testimony of the extent to which they found the experience an interesting one.

Of the original target, three refusals,⁵ the elimination of five farmers who could not be contacted after three attempts, the removal of two farmers who had been interviewed but who were semi-retired, and the deletion of a further two who had been working off the farm for the past year, brought the figures to 43 NFU members and 43 non-NFU farmers.

2. The Mail Questionnaire

In order to augment the size of both study groups and to increase the generalizability of the research findings, the research questionnaire was mailed to a randomly drawn sample of 300 farmers in the province as a whole. This aspect of the sampling design was beset by a problem which had not been as acute in the gathering of the personal interviews. The difficulty involved the census definition of a 'farmer'.

The 1961, 1966, and 1971 census of Canada define a census farm as an agricultural holding of one acre or more with sales of agricultural produce during the preceding twelve months of \$50 or more. The definition is unduly generous, defining as a farmer anyone who produces foodstuffs grossing at least \$50 annually. It includes as farmers large numbers of people who do not depend upon farming for their livelihood; people, for example, who farm as a hobby or tax dodge; and semi-retired and retired farmers who may continue to produce small quantities of foodstuffs but who are not dependent upon farming (but rather upon pensions) for the major source of their income. The definition admits, as well, corporate enterprises engaged in farming. The imprecise definition of "farmer" posed problems for the selection of the farmers to whom questionnaires would be mailed because this sample was drawn from a list of 848 farmers who had been randomly drawn from the Statistics Canada census list of all farmers in the province of Alberta.⁶ Three hundred Farmers were randomly drawn from this list by the method of the table of random numbers and questionnaires were mailed to them. Of these, 47 questionnaires were returned by full-time farmers, sufficiently completed to enable their inclusion in the analysis. A further twelve which were returned were deleted for one of two reasons: the potential respondent was no longer farming or he was receiving the bulk of his income from off-farm employment. In many of the latter instances, the individual had been working off the farm for a number of years. A more precise census definition of 'farmer' would have eliminated such people from the universe of farmers, avoided an unnecessary expense of money and time on the researcher's part, and indirectly could have resulted in a higher response rate. And, of

course, there is no way of knowing how many questionnaires were not returned because the potential respondent no longer saw himself as fitting into the category of "farmer".

The mail questionnaires returned bolster the NFU study group by five members to a total N of 48 and the non-NFU group by a further 42 farmers to a total N of 85 farmers; these are the groups contrasted in the following analyses unless it is specified otherwise.

Comparability of Study Groups

To what extent does amalgamation of the mail questionnaires with the interview schedules alter the composition of the two study groups? Since the mail group of NFU farmers is comprised of only 5 farmers, for the purposes of this discussion the NFU and Non-NFU interview schedules are jointly contrasted with the combined NFU and Non-NFU mail questionnaires. The comparison of firstly the two different samples in Tables 3.2 and 3.3, followed by a contrast of these tables with Table 3.1 indicates that the effect of adding the mail and interview schedules is to make the NFU and non-NFU study groups more like the province as a whole than would otherwise have been the case. (This is particularly true with respect to the Non-NFU group.)

Since it is the criterion of NFU versus non-NFU (and not interview versus mail) which defines the two data sets in the thesis analysis, the question of the generalizability of research findings revolves around the comparability of the NFU and non-NFU groups (Tables 3.3 and 3.4) and the province as a whole (Table 3.1).

Table 3.2 A Comparison of the Interview and Mail Groups

	Interview (N=86) (NFU & Non-NFU)	Mail (N=47) (NFU & Non-NFU)
<u>Birthplace</u>		
Canada	62.8	80.4
United States	2.3	4.3
Northern Europe	5.9	2.2
Western Europe	8.2	4.4
Southern Europe	-	-
Eastern Europe	20.9	8.7
	<u>100.1</u>	<u>100.0</u>
<u>Religious Affiliation</u>		
European Protestant	30.2	13.6
Anglo-Protestant	23.3	38.6
Catholic	18.6	27.3
Evangelical Protestant	12.8	6.8
Not affiliated	15.1	13.6
	<u>100.0</u>	<u>99.9</u>
<u>Primary Product Raised</u>		
Mixed	66.3	29.8
Cattle, hogs	18.6	34.0
Wheat	-	12.8
*Feed Grains	14.0	6.4
Dairy	1.2	4.3
Field Crops	-	2.1
Other	-	6.4
Missing	-	4.3
	<u>100.1</u>	<u>100.1</u>

*Feed Grains, as a category used by farmers themselves, approximates the "Small Grains" census category in Table 3.1

Table 3.3 Mean Market Value, Income, Farm Size, Years of School, and Age of NFU, Non-NFU, Interview and Mail Questionnaire Groups.

	NFU	Non-NFU	Interview	Mail
Market Value	\$128,800	\$150,300	\$117,100	\$191,600
Net Income	\$ 5,170	\$ 6,870	\$ 5,490	\$ 9,080
# acres owned	493	588	491	717
# acres operated	915	787	722	1039
# years school	8.6	9.3	8.3	10.5
Age	46.6	48.9	47.6	48.9

1. The NFU and non-NFU Groups and the Province as a Whole

Differences of religious affiliation, type of farming, and estimated market value of farm prevail. First, both the NFU and non-NFU groups differ from the province as a whole in being more Eastern-European born, less Anglo-Protestant, and more unaffiliated religiously. The NFU contains more European Protestants than the province as a whole; the non-NFU group, more Evangelical Protestants. It is suggested that these differences reflect the fact that the period of settlement of Northern Alberta (from where the bulk of the NFU group and one half the non-NFU group are drawn) was later than that of Southern Alberta and consequently involved more people from Eastern Europe and fewer British and American immigrants. (Hiller:112-115) The differences also reflect the greater tendency of Eastern Europeans to cluster in one geographical area. (Hiller:123,477-8) The inflated figure for Evangelical Protestants in the non-NFU group is the consequence of a large Dutch settlement in Census Division 13, the Dutch also being an ethnic group with a tendency to cluster. (Hiller:477)

Secondly, the two study groups have more farmers engaged in mixed farming. Since the proportion of "mixed" farmers among the NFU and non-NFU groups is comparable to that characteristic of a sample of farmers included in a random survey of the province in 1971,⁷ the differences would appear to be an artifact of the census coding scheme not allowing "mixed" as an admissible category on the criterion of primary product raised.

Thirdly, both the NFU and non-NFU farmers report a higher estimated market value for their farms than the 1971 Census farm capital value average. There are two possible explanations here. One, the

Table 3.4 Comparison of NFU and Non-NFU Study Groups

	NFU (N=48)	Non-NFU (N=85)
<u>Birthplace</u>		
Canada	72.3%	67.1%
U.S.A.	4.3	2.4
Northern Europe	2.1	5.9
Western Europe	6.4	7.0
Eastern Europe	14.9	17.7
	<hr/> 100.0	<hr/> 100.1
<u>Religious Affiliation</u>		
European Protestant	31.9	20.5
Anglo-Protestant	25.5	30.1
Catholic	23.4	20.5
Evangelical Protestant	6.4	13.3
Not affiliated	12.8	15.7
	<hr/> 100.0	<hr/> 100.1
<u>Primary Product Raised</u>		
Mixed	55.3	52.3
Cattle, hogs	27.7	22.1
Wheat	4.3	4.7
*Feed grains	12.8	10.5
Dairy	-	3.5
Field Crops	-	1.2
Other	-	5.8
	<hr/> 100.1	<hr/> 100.1

*This category is similar to the "Small Grains" category in Table 3.1

differences could be the spurious effect of the census data having been gathered in 1971 and the study group data in 1974. The trend over this period has been towards larger and more capital intensive farms. A second possible explanation is that farmers, fearful of census information falling into the hands of income tax officials, under-value their farm value for census-taking purposes.

Whether the unrepresentativeness of the study groups on these characteristics will limit the generalizability of the research findings will, of course, be contingent upon the extent to which these factors are important determinants of farmers' belief systems.

2. NFU versus Non-NFU Groups

And finally, since the focus of the thesis is upon these groups, it may be useful to note briefly the similarities and differences of the NFU and non-NFU farmers.

In terms of Tables 3.3 and 3.4, any differences of education, age, and type of farming engaged in are slight. The non-NFU farmers assess the market value of their farms as greater and declare slightly higher net incomes. They own slightly larger farms, although they do not operate more acres. The non-NFU group is slightly less Canadian and slightly more Eastern European born. It has, compared to the NFU group, more farmers with Evangelical Protestant affiliations and less with European Protestant ties. In general, then, the non-NFU group seems to be slightly better off, and is less Canadian-born and less orthodox in its religious affiliation.

With the sampling method defined and the nature of the two study groups described, it is now possible to move to the empirical inquiry into the content of farmers' political belief systems.

Notes on Chapter 3

- 1 The number of acres owned may differ from the number of acres operated since farmers may farm land that they rent or lease.
- 2 There are NFU districts, such as the district encompassing the Peace River Block, where membership is higher. There are also parts of the province - south of the city of Red Deer - that have not yet been organized by the NFU.
- 3 The United Farmers of Alberta district organizations, established in the early part of the twentieth century, served as guidelines in the setting of NFU district boundaries.
- 4 The alternative to using these lists of District Agriculturalists was to compile a list of farmers from the County and Municipal maps. This approach was rejected because the D.A.'s lists had been drawn from such maps and because for two of the three counties no current map could be obtained. Those available were described as being hopelessly outdated as a result of the high turnover of land in some areas.
- 5 In the case of the refusals, one farmer was in the midst of harvesting; another was angry with "snoopy governmental officials" and could not be persuaded that the interviewer was not one; and the third had reluctantly agreed to an interview time but was absent from his home when the researcher arrived.
- 6 This list of 848 farmers was compiled by officials in the Federal Department of Agriculture for the Alberta Department of Agriculture. It was generously made available to me by Mr. Hugh Bryce of the Marketing Division of the Alberta Department of Agriculture.
- 7 62.5% farmers (N=144) described themselves as mixed farmers in the Alberta 1971 post-electoral survey. The principal researcher of this Canada Council sponsored project was Professor Richard Baird, Department of Political Science, University of Alberta.

Chapter 4

Cognitive Beliefs: How the System Works

This chapter and the subsequent one document the content of selected aspects of farmers' cognitions and evaluations of the marketing and political systems in which they function. Both chapters examine in detail the attitudes by which the two groups of farmers can be distinguished. In order to facilitate a general appraisal of the perspectives of the two groups, conservative, liberal, and radical responses are defined on each of the dimensions. It thereby becomes possible to examine the "ideological" consensus within each of the two study groups (NFU and non-NFU members) as well as the "ideological" contrasts between the two groups. This analysis, pinpointing as it does a few important inter-group differences in the midst of several similarities of perspective, suggests the slightly greater extent to which the attitudes of the NFU members predispose them to collective and political action.

Findings are reported in two steps. First, a profile of the two study groups is outlined: the views of the NFU members and NFU non-members are reported and contrasted. And secondly, by way of establishing the status of these evaluations and cognitions as enduring responses, the inter-item association of the individual measures within each of the two groups is detailed. The strength of association is generally such as to affirm the attitudinal status of these responses.

I. The Perceived Locus of Control

As part of its world view, an ideology includes assumptions about causation - "the frame of reference with which the ideology understands events and processes".¹ Dolbeare and Dolbeare argue that conservatism and liberalism may be distinguished from more radical ideologies in their tendency to search for the causes of events in individual actions. (1973: 261) The strength of individualism as a component of a liberal perspective means that individuals are held responsible for their own actions and lot in life. This assumption of individual causation occurs as well in some strains of conservatism (individualist conservatism) but not in others (organic conservatism). For socialists, on the other hand, a causal analysis is usually a structural analysis and one which focuses on phenomena external to individuals. Since political power resides with economic forces, the explanation of political events will include a focus upon the economic system. (Dolbeare and Dolbeare: 262)

It is suggested that ideologies, or more specifically, conservatism and radicalism/socialism can be distinguished in terms of their assumptions regarding the perceived locus of control. Psychological journals have in the past two decades abounded with articles treating just such a variable as a personality attribute.² It is, however, becoming increasingly clear that the variable taps ideological beliefs as well. Repeated factor analyses on different samples of the internality-externality measure developed by Rotter et al. to tap a belief in internal-external control have yielded several analytically distinct components. Mirels found two factors which he labelled Feelings of Personal Mastery and Feelings of Political Control: the former measures "a belief concerning

felt mastery over the course of one's life"; the second, "a belief concerning the extent to which the individual citizen is deemed capable of exerting an impact on political institutions". (1970: 226-228) The latter, I suggest, is what scholars typically refer to as a feeling of political efficacy.

The research of Gurin and associates showed the Rotter measure to be multi-dimensional in the sense of tapping not only the two dimensions which Mirels isolated but, in addition, an Individual versus Systemic Blame factor and an Individualistic versus Collectivist Orientation factor.³ The Individual versus Systemic Blame factor is interpreted as an assessment of whether individual qualities of the person or social system factors are perceived as key determinants of his fate. The Individualistic versus Collectivist Orientation factor is viewed as distinguishing between individuals who advocate individual effort and mobility rather than group action as the best way to realize goals.

It is posited here that three of the four dimensions of locus of control isolated by Gurin and associates are important in distinguishing the conservative or liberal from the radical/socialist: Control Ideology, Individual versus Systemic Blame, and Individualist versus Collectivist Orientation.⁴ The Personal Control factor, which seems to measure whether the individual feels he has control over his own life appears to be both a reality-testing measure as well as a personality variable and not necessarily an ideological one. The more general Control Ideology dimension allows for the possibility that while the individual may feel he has personal control over his own "life space", people in general do not. The Individual versus Systemic Blame dimension is perceived by the researcher

to be a more specific measure than Control Ideology but one of the same essential type: whether the individual blames himself or external others for what happens to him will reflect and be dependent upon the role he accords to internal and external forces in determining events as a whole. Conservatives and liberals will be internally oriented on the whole and attribute a larger determinant role to internal (individual) factors than to external forces. The socialist/radical would do the opposite. With respect to the third dimension, the collectivist versus individualist orientation, conservatives and liberals would again be individually oriented; radical/socialists, collectively oriented. The NFU official view is of control externalized from individual farmers. Because of this situation, one unified national organization of farmers is a pre-requisite to governments' inviting farmers into their chambers to allow farmers a say in the important decisions that affect their lives. The locus of control will continue to lie outside the individual farmer, but will be shared by governments, farmers through their farm organizations, and other appropriate organizations.⁵

In this research three aspects of internality-externality of locus of control are examined: individual versus systemic blame, the proclivity towards individualist or collectivist action, and the sense of personal control. This analysis is viewed as a means by which to establish the parameters of farmers' belief systems; more specifically, the salience of the external world to their lives.

A. Individual versus Systemic Blame

Three items are used to tap this locus of control dimension. Farmers were queried as to where they view control as residing in two current problem areas: the cost-price squeeze and the decline of the family

farm. A third item assesses responsibility for a more ongoing difficulty - farmers lack of success at obtaining "a good deal" from governments. In all instances, questions were open-ended; internality-externality is thus assessed on the basis of volunteered responses.

1. Attribution of Blame for the Cost-Price Squeeze

Most Canadian farmers have in the past few years been experiencing what has come to be known as a cost-price squeeze. Very simply this term refers to the costs of production rising at a more rapid rate than the prices farmers receive for their produce so that profits are minimal or non-existent. Because this phenomenon is one of which virtually all farmers are aware (87% of the total study group) as well as one which four-fifths were experiencing, it was felt that information concerning both whom they blamed for the squeeze and who they felt could do something about it would provide a measure of the internality-externality of control.

Two questions were posed to the farmer. "Who or what in your opinion is to blame for the cost-price squeeze?" "Is there anything anybody can do about the cost-price squeeze?" Responses to the two queries are reported in Table 4.1.

The two groups of farmers externalize both the blame for the cost-price squeeze and the locus of control to do something to halt it: the former principally to extra-governmental forces, the latter mainly to the government. The extra-governmental forces blamed for the squeeze in order of the frequency with which they are mentioned, include big businesses and/or corporations, speculators, labour and strikes, and a host of less tangible forces - inflation, society as a whole, the energy crisis, the

Table 4.1 Individual versus Systemic Blame Regarding the
Cost-Price Squeeze: NFU and Non-NFU Groups.

	NFU (N=48)	Non-NFU (N=85)
a. <u>Who is to blame?</u>		
Extra-Governmental forces	44.7% (21)	43.9% (36)
Government with others	25.5 (12)	25.6 (21)
Government alone	19.1 (9)	20.7 (17)
Farmers: alone/with others	10.6 (5)	9.8 (8)
missing data	(1)	(3)
	99.9%	100.0%
b. <u>Can anybody act re squeeze?</u>		
Government	55.6% (25)	52.1% (38)
Nobody	20.0 (9)	24.7 (18)
Farmers	17.8 (8)	9.6 (7)
Gov't. & Farmers	4.4 (2)	4.1 (3)
*Extra-Governmental Forces	2.2 (1)	6.9 (5)
Gov't. & Extra-Gov'tal Forces	-	2.7 (2)
Missing data	(3)	(12)
	100.0%	100.1%

*Includes "Society as a whole" and the specification of middlemen.

monetary system, international forces, human nature, supply and demand, and consumers. NFU members are slightly more inclined to single out big business; non-NFU farmers to blame labour and strikes. When the government is blamed (either the Federal or Provincial Government, sometimes both), it is more frequently for doing nothing to alleviate the squeeze than for creating or exacerbating it by interfering actions.

While one-fifth NFU farmers and one-quarter non-members feel there is nothing anybody can do about the cost-price squeeze, over one-half the farmers in both study groups point to either the Federal or Provincial government as capable of acting on the squeeze. The implication is that farmers in both groups do not see the problem - or the world, for that matter - as being so complex that they cannot identify who has the power or responsibility to deal with the problem afflicting them.

2. Attribution of Blame for the Disappearance of the Family Farm

Whereas the cost-price squeeze is an immediate problem which confronts farmers daily, the decline of the family farm as Canadians have known it may be a more remote but no less real concern. In the last decade, the migration from farm to urban centre has accelerated. It is estimated that currently 10,000 farmers leave the land every year. (Mitchell: 6) Why? In most farmers' minds, it is the cost-price squeeze and income problems generally that are to blame. Table 4.2 gives the relevant figures for the two farmer groups. As blame for that squeeze is most frequently externalized, it may be concluded that the source of this problem is seen to lie outside farmers themselves.

Table 4.2 Attribution of Blame for the Disappearance of the Family Farm: NFU and Non-NFU Groups

	NFU (N-48)	Non-NFU (N-85)
Cost-price squeeze	60.4% (29)	57.8% (48)
Squeeze & unattractiveness	16.6 (8)	24.2 (20)
Unattractiveness of farming	10.4 (5)	6.0 (5)
Squeeze & farmers' fault	4.2 (2)	2.4 (2)
Gov'tal. Policy	2.1 (1)	2.4 (2)
Farmers' fault	2.1 (1)	3.6 (3)
Gov't. & Farmers' fault	2.1 (1)	-
Gov't. & unattractiveness	-	2.4 (2)
Farmers' fault & unattract.	2.1 (1)	1.2 (1)
missing data		(2)
	100.0%	100.0%

3. Attribution of Blame for Farmers' Lack of Success with Governments

Following a series of questions assessing the respondent's evaluations of the ability of farmers to "get a good deal" from the Provincial and Federal Governments, those farmers who assessed that record as "generally unsuccessful" were asked why they thought farmers and farm

organizations had been unsuccessful. Reasons volunteered have been collapsed into categories which affix the blame to farmers and/or farm organizations, to government(s), to both farmers and government, or to the minority position of farmers in the total population. The latter is a "non-blame" response - the gist of this response being that because the urban areas and consumers have the majority of the votes, and farmers are a political minority, the government is necessarily preoccupied with urban, and consumer problems and demands.

Table 4.3 Attribution of Blame for Farmers' Relative Lack of Success with Governments: NFU and Non-NFU Groups

	NFU (N=48)	Non-NFU (N=85)
Farmers' fault	58.3% (28)	32.9% (27)
Gov't.'s fault	14.6 (7)	13.4 (11)
Minority Position	8.3 (4)	28.0 (23)
Gov't. & Farmers' fault	6.3 (3)	2.4 (2)
missing data		(3)
Inapplicable - farmers been successful	12.5 (6)	23.2 (19)
	100.0%	99.9%

Table 4.3 indicates that while non-members of the NFU divide between blaming farmers themselves and not blaming anyone for farmers' relative lack of success, NFU members are much more inclined to affix the blame to farmers themselves - to farmers for being too individualistic and self-centred to organize themselves into unions, and less frequently for having no understanding of their situation and/or for asking for too much. The fault is also seen to lie with weak farm organizations - weak because of their limited membership and conflicting public utterances.

Limited and equal proportions of farmers in both study groups externalize the blame for farmers' lack of success to the government(s). These farmers blame the government for being apathetic, for being deliberately anti-farmer ("having a cheap food policy"), giving "handouts to pacify farmers when things are rough just to keep farmers on the farm", and for having a Liberal and Eastern-Canadian bias.

In short, farmers in both study groups, even though they may feel that it is not their fault personally, but that of all the other farmers who are not cooperative, appear to blame themselves more than they blame the government for their perceived lack of success in getting a good deal from government.

NFU farmers extend the locus of control more widely than do non-NFU members, no doubt partially because they affirm the possibility of collective action by NFU members to achieve desired goals.

B. The Individualist versus Collectivist Orientation

Two open-ended items, one slightly more directed than the other, ascertain the individualist-collectivist orientation of farmers in the two study groups.

1. Ability of farmers to act regarding the Cost-Price Squeeze

A presupposition to both a collectivist and an individualist orientation to solving problems in the political arena is the belief that one can be effective at all.⁶ There are important differences in the study groups concerning this belief. Firstly, when asked whether there was "anything you can do about the cost-price squeeze", whereas one-third of the NFU members felt there was not, the figure climbed to 46% for the non-NFU farmers. (See Table 4.4) Clearly, more so for non-NFU members than

for members, the locus of control to deal with a current problem lies outside themselves.⁷ These differences are not entirely the artifact of the comparison of members of an organization (and presumably individuals who believe in the efficacy of their action) with non-members since just under two-fifths of the latter do indeed belong to another farm organization.⁸ Secondly, as anticipated, NFU members are much more collectively directed than non-members, suggesting that they could do something about the squeeze by organizing and supporting a farmers' union or by striking or engaging in a withholding action. The kinds of activities mentioned more frequently by non-members were actions they could undertake on their own - such as controlling their own spending and trying to keep their costs down, cutting back production, working harder, and even, as a last resort, quitting farming.

Table 4.4 Individualist versus Collectivist Action on the Cost-Price Squeeze: NFU and Non-NFU Groups.

	NFU (N=48)	Non-NFU (N=85)
Social/political activity	45.7% (21)	20.2% (17)
No action possible	32.6 (15)	46.4 (39)
Personal/nonpol. activity	19.6 (9)	29.8 (25)
Social & personal activity	2.2 (1)	3.6 (3)
missing data	(2)	(1)
	100.1%	100.0%

2. Ability of farmers to organize as a political group

As a second estimate of collective versus individual orientations, farmers were questioned as to the possibility of their organizing politically. The import of the question was organization in the form of a political group rather than an interest group: the question was "What do you think about the

idea of farmers organizing together to form a political group today, nominating candidates and trying to get them elected in order to form the government here in Alberta? Do you think it's a realistic idea - that is, is it likely that farmers could get together and form a political group?"⁹

While one-quarter of non-members affirm the possibility of this, 36% of NFU members feel farmers could organize into a political group. (These figures are given in Table 4.5) Those who replied in the negative were probed as to their skepticism of a farmers' political organization. Contrary to the earlier inclination for NFU members to be more inclined to blame farmers and farm organizations for farmers not getting a better bargain from government, it is now non-members who pose limitations of farmers as the greatest obstacle to their collective political mobilization. NFU farmers are slightly more likely to refer to the minority situation of farmers in the population (and hence politically) than to attributes of farmers and their organizations in denying the feasibility of forming a political group of farmers.

Table 4.5 Ability of Farmers to Organize as a Political Group: NFU and Non-NFU Groups

	NFU (N=48)		Non-NFU (N=85)	
Could organize	36.0%	(15)	25.7%	(18)
Unable to organize				
Farmers' fault	31.0	(13)	45.7	(32)
Minority situation	33.0	(14)	22.9	(16)
Both farmers' & minority	-		5.7	(4)
Missing data		(6)		(15)
	100.0%		100.0%	

The implication, then, is that if control is to reside with farmers, for NFU members it is by means of a collective action on the part of farmers through an interest group rather than a political organization. Non-members of the NFU, on the other hand, maybe because of the lower visibility of the interest group as a vehicle of action, possibly as well because they deny its viability, are more likely to feel that any effective action will be an individual one. Thus, while there are no differences in the two groups in the externalizing of fault for two current economic problems, there are discrepancies in the mode of action that farmer initiatives ought to take to secure political goods.

The foregoing cognitions are parameter beliefs - their occurrence affirms a perception of the relevance of the external world to the farmer's life and outlook. Before leaving these items, their inter-association pattern is examined to substantiate their character as enduring cognitions; their association with like items confirms their status as attitudes rather than as opinions.

Because of the multiplicity of tables engendered by the inter-item tabulations of the locus of control measures, only the general trends of these tables are reported in the text. The tables themselves, and a more detailed summary of their results are reported in Appendix A.

The cross-tabulation of individual locus of control items within the NFU group¹⁰ reveals three consistent patterns. First, NFU members are consistent in their belief in the ability of farmers to organize or engage in joint action. Secondly, farmers who affix blame externally for one current problem tend to view the locus of responsibility to correct that problem as external to the farmer. Conversely, those who

blame farmers themselves for one problem are inclined to blame farmers for other problems. Thirdly, NFU members who hold farmers themselves responsible for their lack of success with governments and who affirm the viability of farmer action on a current problem view power externalized to governments rather than to extra-governmental forces. Conversely, NFU farmers who judge the locus of control in one problem area to reside with extra-governmental forces deny the possibility of farmer action to correct the problem.

Among non-NFU farmers, inter-item cross-tabulations indicate the following trends. Firstly, non-members are fairly consistent in affixing blame to a given problem. Secondly, there is congruence in suggesting the limited possibility of a collective action on the cost-price squeeze and feeling farmers could organize politically. Thirdly, there is a limited indication that individuals who attribute the cost-price squeeze and/or farmers' lack of success with governments to characteristics of farmers themselves are more collectivistically oriented.

In short, there appears to be sufficient inter-item consistency within both groups to assure that these are fairly stable perspectives regarding the internality-externality of the locus of control in these problem areas.

C. Sense of Personal Control

While a conservative economic position as regards agriculture can sometimes be distinguished from a liberal or radical one in terms of its perception of the way in which the economic system works,

there is as well an important element of reality-testing involved. However, how the individual orients himself and where he affixes blame and credit in light of this reality-testing probably does distinguish ideologies. That is, it is not the cognitions themselves but the evaluations pursuant upon those cognitions that are ideological. In the following section which describes how farmers perceive the system in which they market their produce and buy their supplies, the items are probably most correctly viewed as realistic assessments of the degree of personal control.

By way of a preface to subsequent findings, it may be significant to note that analysts of the agricultural marketing and price system are virtually unanimous in the observation that farmers have no ability to control the price of their product or the cost of their supplies. This sentiment, argued initially by V.C. and D.V. Fowke (1968:210) has been more recently seconded by H. Bronson who describes farmers as operating in "a controlled and manipulated market". (1972:123) Don Mitchell expands upon Bronson's conclusion:

Only agricultural resources and products, like land, wheat and livestock, have their price fate determined so completely by shifts in supply and demand and by the speculative activity of grain brokers and petty investors. Other goods and services under capitalist production and markets are priced by the companies involved, primarily according to costs of production and profit objectives. (1975:56)

1. Perceptions of the Pricing System: How it Works

Clearly, farmers perceive themselves as functioning in a system in which they have no control over either the prices they receive for the produce they sell or the price they pay for the goods and supplies they buy. When questioned, "How much control does the farmer have over the prices he receives for his produce?", 94 % of NFU members and 79% of

non-members said "none". NFU members are significantly more likely to feel they have no control at all over prices: only 6 per cent of this group in contrast to 17.5 per cent of the non-member group feel farmers have "a little" control over farm prices. Only slightly more farmers in both groups feel they have as little control over the cost of their supplies. Again, 94% of NFU farmers responded with "none" when queried as to the amount of control the farmer has over the costs of supplies like building materials, fuel, fertilizers, and machinery. The non-NFU farmers are not far behind; 85% of them state they have no control over input costs. The remainder of both groups assessed that control as no greater than "only a little".

In short, the farmers' perceptions of the pricing system closely approximate those of political economists, and supposedly of reality. But although the farmer himself may have none or little control, he could still perceive the system to be one in which he has as much control as anyone else if he were to see it as a non-manipulated system wherein the forces of supply and demand determine prices, or as one in which producers and consumers alike were subject to governmental control. Tables 4.6 and 4.7 give the range of responses to the questions of who controls the prices of farm produce and farm supplies, respectively.¹¹

There are differences between the two groups of farmers; none, however, are statistically significant. NFU members attribute more control over farm prices to corporations/middlemen alone or corporations/middlemen and government together. Neither group adhere very strongly to the perception of a free market system: only 6.5% and 17.3% of NFU and non-NFU members respectively believe that supply and demand alone control

farm produce prices. However, non-NFU members are more strongly inclined to suggest that supply and demand has something to do with the fixing of farm produce prices.¹² There is, as well, greater unanimity among members as to where control resides; non-members divide their responses more evenly among the seven categories.

Table 4.6 Perceived Locus of Control over Farm Prices:
NFU and Non-NFU Groups

	NFU (N=48)	Non-NFU (N=85)
1 Corporations, middleman ^a	39.1% (18)	21.3% (16)
2 Corporations & Gov't.	21.7 (10)	14.7 (11)
3 Corps. & Supply and demand	13.1 (6)	12.0 (9)
4 Corps., Gov't., & supply demand	8.7 (4)	6.7 (5)
5 Supply & demand	6.5 (3)	17.3 (13)
6 Gov't. & supply & demand	6.5 (3)	13.3 (10)
7 Government ^c	4.3 (2)	14.7 (11)
missing data	(2)	(10)
	99.9%	100.0%

^aCorporations: includes "Big Business"; "Industry"; "Middlemen" such as food processors, chain food stores, the retailer, the wholesaler, packing plants; "The Winnipeg Grain Exchange"; "The Commodities Market"; "Speculators"; and "Unions".

^bSupply and demand: refers to "The Consumers" (pressuring government, boycotting); "The International Market"; "The U.S. Market"; and "Supply and demand".

^cThe Government: includes "The Canadian Wheat Board"; Marketing Boards; "The Government" (level unspecified) or the Federal and Provincial Government as specified.

The perspective of corporate control of farm prices as revealed here by members of the National Farmers Union parallels that of articles in the NFU newspaper which refer to "the existence of a managed market system and an administered price structure by the corporate industrial complex" and the "oligopoly power of retail food chains making excess profits".¹³

It is difficult to draw conclusions from Table 4.6. The impression is that NFU members are somewhat more inclined than non-members to believe that farm prices are manipulated. NFU farmers appear to believe corporations and/or middlemen monopolize price setting.¹⁴ On the other hand, the non-NFU group seem to subscribe to a view of there being sufficient "fingers in the pie" - a pluralistic distribution of control - to ensure that the farmer is not the victim of anyone's manipulation.¹⁵

While there is no clear perception of monopolistic control over foodstuff prices, there certainly is with regard to machinery, fuel, and other farm input costs. Table 4.7 shows the majority of farmers credit the manufacturer on his own or the manufacturer and the middleman together as determining the price the farmer pays here. The government is perceived to have little say, either alone or with other agencies. The differences in the perceptions of NFU and non-NFU members are small. NFU members are more unanimous in viewing control as uni-dimensional and in the hands of the manufacturer, and secondarily, the middleman.

Table 4.7 Locus of Control over Input Supplies Costs

	NFU (N=48)	Non-NFU (N=85)
^a The manufacturer alone	69.6% (32)	61.0% (47)
^b Others	30.4 (14)	39.0 (30)
missing data	(2)	(3)
	100.0%	100.0%

^aThe manufacturer alone: responses include "The Manufacturer"; certain specified manufacturers such as machine and fuel companies; "Big Business"; "Industry"; "Corporations".

^bOthers: includes "The Manufacturer and Middlemen"; "The Government"; specified middlemen such as "Retail outlets"; "Labour"; "Unions"; "Everyone along the line"; "Supply and demand"; and combinations of these

2. Perceptions of the Marketing System

An important aspect of the market system with which the farmers interact is its provision for both "orderly" and "open" marketing of grain (wheat being exempted). Orderly marketing refers to marketing through the Canadian Wheat Board. Canadian Wheat Board marketing is orderly in at least two senses: firstly, every farmer has an equal opportunity to market as ensured by the "orderly" provision of elevator cars throughout the Canadian Wheat Board region; and secondly, every farmer selling to the Canadian Wheat Board is assured of the same price per bushel of grain, regardless of when he sells. Open marketing is off-Board marketing - the price the farmer receives is the price of grain on the day he sells, as established by bidding on the Winnipeg Grain Exchange. There is no quota system of delivery but rather grain sellers are received on a first-come first-served basis. Accordingly, there is a greater amount of speculation involved in off-Board marketing. The merit of the open market system would appear to be higher initial prices for the farmer who brings his grain to market early in the harvesting season.

It is difficult to over-estimate the historical significance of the Canadian Wheat Board. When it was established in the 1930's as a temporary agency and in 1943 as a permanent fixture, the Canadian Wheat Board represented the victorious culmination of a lengthy struggle for a compulsory pooling agency. Since the early 1900's, prairie farmers had been organizing themselves into Grain Growers movements in an effort to wrest monopoly control over the marketing and selling of grain from private dealers operating through the Winnipeg Grain Exchange. The significance

of the marketing issue manifested itself in the sweep of the Progressive Party in 1921. In 1922, when the Farmers Union of Canada was founded, and later in the mid 1920's, with the establishment of the three prairie Wheat Pools, the organization of farmers for the drive for the Wheat Board became more intense. Part of that endeavour to persuade governments of farmer support for a monopoly Pool to which all farmers would sell their grain was a massive campaign to sign up a majority of all farmers. Accordingly, the eventual establishment of the Canadian Wheat Board and its continuation to the present day signalled then and continues to do so today a tangible symbol of the force of collective farmer mobilization.

Farmers were asked whom they felt to be the beneficiaries of open marketing.¹⁶ The question, admittedly, does not necessarily elicit an ideological position. The respondent who believes the farmer is not the beneficiary of open marketing may be a proponent of regulated marketing and hence may be a non-conservative economically. He could, on the other hand, feel the farmer is not the beneficiary because the free market is not acting properly (that is, as it should) because individuals or the government are meddling with it, and were there to be no meddling, all would be well with the free market and the farmer.

As Table 4.8 shows, while slightly more than one-half the non-NFU members believe farmers to be the beneficiaries of the open marketing system, the figure for NFU members is much lower and in fact, here, the majority of respondents feel it is not the farmer, but speculators and grain companies, who benefit chiefly from open marketing. While not statistically significant, these differences are substantively important

(Gamma: .28) Subsequent analyses show that it is clearly those farmers who prefer to sell their grain off the Board who feel that the farmer benefits from the system. Concomitantly, farmers who prefer to market through the Canadian Wheat Board perceive speculators to be the main beneficiaries of open marketing. (Gamma = .83; chi square significant at the .0001 level; Pearson $r = .64$; significant at the .001 level.)

Table 4.8 Perceived Beneficiary of the Open Marketing System: NFU and Non-NFU Groups

	NFU (N=48)	Non-NFU (N=85)
^a Speculators, grain cos.	58.1% (25)	42.2% (27)
^b The farmer	37.2 (16)	51.6 (33)
^c Both speculators & Farmers	4.7 (2)	6.3 (4)
^d missing data	_____ (5)	_____ (21)
	100.0%	100.1%

^aSpeculators: refers to "Private Grain Companies"; "Brokers"; "The Winnipeg Grain Exchange"; and less frequently, "The Money Man", "Manipulators"; and "Middlemen".

^bThe farmer: usually includes a qualification as to the type of farmer: "The Bigger Farmer"; "Farmers who can hold off and sell when the price is high"; "Farmers who run feedlots"; "Farmers who buy feed"; and so on.

^cBoth speculators and farmers: A few farmers thought both the producer and the speculators benefitted.

^dDon't know: The fairly high proportion of "missing" responses on this item includes replies from farmers for whom the question was not meaningful because they were not presently, or had never marketed grain. Most farmers not presently raising grain for sale had done so in the past and so had a preference. Twenty-six farmers felt unqualified to make a choice.

The thrust of the discussion to this point has been to establish in a general way how the groups of farmers perceive the functioning of the market system. This brief inquiry has demonstrated both uniformity and diversity in the cognitions of the market system. Farmers in the two groups

are virtually one in their belief that they function in a market system in which they have no say - or, at best, only a little say - in the price system as regards both foodstuffs and materials. They concur, as well, in the judgment of almost monopolistic control by manufacturers to fix fuel, machinery, and other supply costs. This degree of concurrence between the farmers' assessments and those of political economists is gratifying and may be taken as one testimony that farmers realistically assess their position in the market system - at least as regards their minimal control over the price system.

Where there is greater diversity of opinion is just where we would anticipate it - on speculation as to the way in which the market system works. There is a division of farmers as to whether the market system is free, regulated, or manipulated. (See Table 4.8) Some farmers would appear to endorse the assumptions of the free market; others would seem not to. In short, there seems to be a range of perceptions, some of which have ideological implications, in the study group.

II. Distribution of Influence in the Political System

The preceding section has documented both that few farmers in either group saw themselves as having control over prices and costs of foodstuffs and supplies, and, as well, that only a limited number of farmers attributed much control to governmental agencies in the area of price fixing. To what extent is the perception of limited personal and governmental control in this specific area of price fixing symptomatic of the perceived distribution of political control generally? And are there any differences between the two groups in this regard?

The recognized relative strength of political and economic control in the political system as a whole is an important aspect of an individual's belief system. The socialist ideology posits an unequal distribution of power whereby those who control the means of production are the most powerful politically in the sense of being able to get their way. Large corporations and middlemen, in the socialist perspective, by controlling the distribution of wealth in the economic system, have much to say about the distribution of political goods and services. A liberal perspective, on the other hand, tends to view political power as more broadly based; political power is pluralistically and individually distributed. The political power of corporations is counterbalanced by that of the legitimized governing bodies and multiple interest groups which represent the varied interests in society. In addition, individuals have access to the important decision-makers by virtue of the one man, one vote principle. Like the socialist outlook, the conservative perspective is one of political power as economically based. Contrary to the socialist, the conservative evaluates the economic base of political power favorably.

The NFU official view of the distribution and source of political power reflects the socialist perspective: the corporate elite is judged to make the major decisions in the country. If the political authorities appear to act as though uninfluenced by big business, it is because their interests are synonymous.¹⁷

In this study, farmers' images of the distribution of power are ascertained by presenting them with the following task. They were handed a card with a diagram of concentric circles and asked to "think of the centre, A, as the place where the important decisions affecting farmers

are made. Think of the outer circle, E, as being the place where those people are who do not have any influence in agricultural matters - no say in the important decisions affecting farmers. Think of the other circles, B, C, and D as the places where those people are located who have lesser amounts of influence than the people at A and greater amounts of influence than the people at E".

Once presented with this set of instructions, farmers were then requested to assess the position in the set of circles of various persons and groups, including themselves, the Federal and Provincial Ministers of Agriculture, multinational corporations, and so on.¹⁸

As an initial overview of how farmers in the two study groups visualize the distribution of influence in important decision-making, the mean rankings for the two groups for each of the "actors" is given in Table 4.9. Possible ratings of influence range from 1 ("A") to 5 ("E"); a high mean represents less influence in decision-making than a low mean since "1" represents the greatest influence in decision-making and "5" the least.

Table 4.9 Mean Influence Ratings of Selected Political Actors:
NFU and Non-NFU Groups

Political Actor	NFU (N=48)		Non-NFU (N=85)	
	Mean	S.D.*	Mean	S.D.
Multinational corps.	1.4 ^a	.77	1.9	1.16
Fed. Minister Agric.	1.7	.76	1.6	.85
Packing plants	1.7	.81	1.9	.91
Chain food stores	1.8	.94	1.9	1.09
Min. Can. Wheat Board	1.9	.83	1.8	.84
The banks	1.9 ^a	1.06	2.3	1.38
Winnipeg Grain Exchange	2.0	1.00	2.1	1.03
Prov. Minister Agric.	2.3	1.02	2.1	.98
Can. Pacific Railway	2.3	1.19	2.5	1.26
U.S. Government	2.3	1.20	1.9	1.02

Table 4.9 cont'd.

Political Actor	NFU(N=48)		Non-NFU (N=85)	
	Mean	S.D.*	Mean	S.D.
Nat'l. marketing bds.	2.8	1.24	2.6	1.15
Prov. marketing bds.	2.9	1.26	2.8	1.17
Average Member Parl.	3.3	1.13	3.5	1.27
Average M.L.A.	3.5	1.17	3.5	1.15
Nat'l. Farmers Union	3.5	1.04	3.5	1.02
Unifarm	3.9	1.11	3.6	1.01
Respondent	4.5	.91	4.6	.68

^a NFU and non-NFU differences on a 2-tail probability T-test are significant at the .01 level.

*Standard deviation from the mean.

It can be readily observed that there are no significant differences in the mean ratings of the two study groups, with two exceptions. The average rating of "multinational corporations" by the two study groups is significantly different. While NFU and non-NFU mean rankings of "The banks" are statistically significant, the standard deviation is sufficiently large to indicate a lack of stability of the mean and hence suggests one should not place too much confidence in it as a summary statistic.

For both groups a mixture of political and economic bodies appear in the top six most influential groups (those which have a mean less than 2.0): multinational corporations, the Federal Minister of Agriculture, packing plants, chain food stores, the Minister in charge of the Canadian Wheat Board, and the banks (for the NFU group) and the United States Government (for the non-NFU group). If there is a vision of a pluralistic distribution of power, it is of a division of power between top governmental officials and large corporations and middlemen, and not one which includes farmer interest groups. The study groups are similar in their judgements of the least influential groups. Placed

at the outer circles are the respondent himself, Unifarm (a provincial farm organization), the National Farmers Union, and the average M.L.A. and M.P. - in short, the farmer, his farm organizations, and his most accessible representatives. The farmer apparently feels that his lack of control over prices in the market system is only one aspect of a general incapacity to influence the important decisions in his life. The ability of manufacturers, large corporations, and middlemen (packing plants, chain food stores) to set the prices of input supplies and to a lesser extent, of foodstuffs, is one manifestation of their capability of getting their way on most things. The farmers under scrutiny here do not seem to subscribe to a pluralist image of the diffusion of power among conflicting interest groups which represent all the interests in society. Instead, the general perception is of a concentration of power in an economic sector and a few top governmental officials.

Perhaps a more reliable indicator than their ranking of where they are in the set of concentric circles is the farmers' rating of where they could be. On the latter criterion, the NFU subgroup mean is 3.0 (standard deviation of 1.2); the non-NFU group mean is 3.3 (standard deviation of 1.3). The NFU rating is thus somewhat closer to the centre of the circle - where the important decision-making takes place. This may reflect the sentiment some members voiced that by working through this national organization, they would be able to get that much closer to the centre of decision-making. The absence of such an organizational vehicle for the non-member group may account for their lower perceived possible influence.

The second piece of information needed to establish the "ideological" direction of the appraisal of influence and power in the political system is the judgement of the appropriateness of that distribution of power - whether it is as it should be. After farmers had rated the series of actors as to where they were in the set of concentric circles of decision-making, they were asked to assess whether each had "the right amount" of influence in decision-making, "too much", or "too little". Respondents' evaluations of the appropriateness of decision-making influence of each of the specified actors are given in Table 4.10.

Farmers in both groups evaluate middlemen (packing plants, chain food stores), multinational corporations, and the United States' Government as unduly influential; political authorities and farmers' political and organizational representatives, as under-influential. The one exception to the latter is the Minister in charge of the Canadian Wheat Board. Farmers appeared to be assessing the current incumbent of that portfolio rather than the portfolio itself.

The distasteful nature of Mr. Otto Lang's Federal Feed Grains Policy to the majority of farmers surveyed here, may be one factor that accounts for the relatively lower percentage of farmers who view Lang's political influence as "too little" in comparison to the proportion who assess other political authorities as have too little decision-making say.

There are slight differences of perspective between NFU and non-NFU farmers. First, NFU members are more inclined than their counterparts to judge provincial and national marketing boards and the average Member of Parliament and Member of the Legislative Assembly as having too

Table 4.10 Assessments of Appropriateness of Distribution of
Political Influence: NFU and Non-NFU Groups (%'s)

	NFU (N=48)			Non-NFU (N=85)		
	Too much	Right amount	Too Little	Too much	Right amount	Too little
Chain food stores	89	11	--	87	9	4
Multinational corps.	87	11	2	80	14	7
Packing plants	85	11	4	81	16	3
U.S. Government	74	26	--	68	27	5
Can. Pacific Railway	56	38	7	59	32	9
Winnipeg Grain Exch.	54	41	5	48	31	21
Banks	44	50	6	45	43	12
Min. Can. Wheat Bd.	24	48	28	37	39	24
Fed. Minister Agric.	8	43	49	15	48	37
Prov. Minister Agric.	4	41	54	4	50	46
Nat'l. marketing bds.	24	26	50	32	29	39
Prov. marketing bds.	27	20	54	23	32	45
Average M.L.A.	--	22	78	6	25	68
Average M.P.	--	17	83	9	19	72
Unifarm	11	24	64	1	19	80
Nat'l. Farmers Union	2	9	89	5	17	77

little influence. Non-NFU farmers in greater proportions evaluate national marketing boards as having too much say in decision-making. Secondly, in keeping with earlier intimations of a greater open marketing bias, non-NFU members are much more inclined to assess the Winnipeg Grain Exchange as having too little influence and the Minister in charge of the Canadian Wheat Board as having too much say in important decision-making. Thirdly and not surprisingly, the two groups of farmers exhibit their farm organizational bias: NFU members assessing in greater proportions the NFU as under-influential; non-members judging the more conservative provincial organization, Unifarm, as having less say than they would like.

Four summary measures have been devised to assess the appropriateness of the perceived distribution of decision-making power. These indices are:

- (a) Perceived Under-Influence of Political Authorities
- (b) Perceived Over-Influence of Economic Forces
- (c) Dissatisfaction with Perceived Current Personal Influence
- (d) Dissatisfaction with Perceived Possible Influence

The four measures have a specific empirical and theoretical meaning.

- (a) Perceived Under-Influence of Political Authorities

The respondents' influence ratings of 16 potential political actors and of the respondent's current, desired, and possible decision-making influence were factor analysed to discern the manner in which farmers grouped the various actors. The loadings of actors on the first factor of the unrotated factor matrix of the NFU and non-NFU groups are presented in Table 4.11.

Table 4.11 The First Factor of the Unrotated Matrix
of Potential Political Actors: NFU and
Non-NFU Groups (Factor Loadings)

	NFU (N=48)	Non-NFU (N=85)
Federal Minister of Agriculture	.647	.451
Average Member of Parliament	.535	.616
Average Member of the Legislative Assembly	.547	.804
Minister for the Canadian Wheat Board	.447	.498
Provincial Minister of Agriculture	.756	.695
Provincial marketing boards	.748	.666
National marketing boards	.690	.660
National Farmers Union	.637	.479
Unifarm	.648	.546
Winnipeg Grain Exchange	.022	.112
The banks	-.063	.296
Multinational corporations	-.324	-.083
Canadian Pacific Railway	-.147	.273
Chain food stores	-.257	.171
Large packing plants	-.331	.292
The U.S. Government	-.126	.137
Respondent in	.382	.225
Respondent like to be	.246	.003
Respondent could be	.130	.112

The first factor which emerges for both farmer groups is a "political" factor. Elected officials - the Provincial Minister of Agriculture, the average Member of Parliament and Member of the Legislative Assembly -, government authorized boards - provincial and national marketing boards -, and one farmers' organization - Unifarm - emerge on the first factor of the unrotated matrix for both groups. The Federal Minister of Agriculture and the National Farmers Union have a slightly higher loading on the first factor in the NFU group. "Economic forces" load significantly for neither group.

The measure of Perceived Under-Influence of Political Authorities is a Likert index constructed by the summation of "too little influence" scores on the eight political authorities which load at .450 or greater on

this initial factor: the Federal and Provincial Ministers of Agriculture, provincial and national marketing boards, the average M.P. and M.L.A., the National Farmers Union, and Unifarm.

(b) Perceived Over-Influence of Economic Forces

This is a Likert measure as well, the summation of "too much influence" scores on five actors: the Winnipeg Grain Exchange, chain food stores, multinational corporations, the Canadian Pacific Railway, and packing plants. These are the economic actors which load in common on a separate factor in a Varimax solution of the factor analysis of the ratings of influence of the actors.

(c) Dissatisfaction with Perceived Current Personal Influence

This is a continuous level variable representing the distance between the individual's rating of where he is in the decision-making circle and where he would like to be.

(d) Dissatisfaction with Perceived Possible Influence

Also a continuous level measure, it represents the distance between where the individual feels he is and where he could be. It is thus a measure of the respondent's perception of the openness of the decision-making process.

The two groups are contrasted on these four variables in Table 4.13. Any differences between them are small. Both are displeased with their present influence and with the distribution of power between political and economic actors. Non-NFU members are slightly more optimistic than their counterparts that the decision-making process is open enough that they could have the say in decision making that they desire (if they presumably tried harder).¹⁹

Table 4.13 Summary Indices of Appropriateness of Political Influence Distribution: NFU and Non-NFU Groups.

	NFU (N=48)		Non-NFU (N=85)	
	Mean	S.D.*	Mean	S.D.
^a Under-Infl. Pol. Auth.	4.9	2.2	4.4	2.0
^b Over-Infl. Econ. Forces	3.5	1.3	3.4	1.5
^c Dissat. Current Influence	2.4	1.3	2.1	1.4
^d Dissat. Possible Influence	6.0	1.5	5.9	1.5

*Standard deviation

^aPossible range of scores is 0 - 8.

^bPossible range of scores is 0 - 5.

^cPossible range of scores is 0 - 4.

^dPossible range of scores is 1 - 9 since some people felt more influence was possible than they desired.

In summary, cognitions and evaluations of the distribution of decision-making influence do not vary much across the two study groups. There is a slight indication that NFU members are more distressed at being shut out of decision-making circles and particularly, at seeing their political and organizational representatives as having been excluded. The ideological perspective of both groups tends more toward a socialistic perspective than a liberal or conservative one for both farmer groups. Both members and non-members perceive an improper imbalance of decision-making power on the side of the economic sector.

III. Class Structure of Society

A more general assessment of respondents' view of the organization of the social/political world is their perception of whether society is structured along class lines and their approval or disapproval of stratification on that basis. It is suggested, in accordance with common

assumptions, that a view of society structured along class lines and an approval of that stratification characterizes a conservative perspective. The socialist, like the conservative, affirms the class nature of society but, unlike the conservative, would reject its appropriateness. The liberal unlike either the conservative or socialist, tends to deny that classes exist and that they should exist.

In order to tap this dimension, two questions were posed to respondents. First, "In your opinion, is Canada divided into different social classes like the working class, the middle class, and the upper class?" And secondly, "Should society be divided into different classes?" Responses of the NFU and non-NFU groups to the two questions indicate an acceptance of the reality of social class divisions in Canada and a rejection of its appropriateness. Table 4.14 indicates that the NFU group is slightly more likely than the non-member group to affirm the division of Canadian society along class lines; the differences are not, however, statistically significant. Both groups are equally adamant in rejecting the need for a class division of society, with only slightly more than one quarter of each group feeling that there should be classes. Farmers here are an egalitarian lot.

In keeping with the definitions stipulated in the introduction to this section, conservative, liberal, and socialist class perspectives were distinguished. Table 4.15 contrasts the two farmer groups on this criterion. It can be seen that the two groups are slightly different. There is a greater inclination to subscribe to a socialist class perspective in the NFU farmer group. While the socialist perspective is the

most prevalent among the non-NFU group, there are more farmers in this set who adhere to a liberal viewpoint regarding the class structure of society.

Table 4.14 Perception and Appropriateness of Class Nature of Canadian Society: NFU and Non-NFU Groups.

a. Perception of classes	NFU (N=48)	Non-NFU (N=85)
Are classes	83.0% (39)	75.9% (63)
Are not classes	17.0 (8)	24.1 (20)
Missing data	(1)	(2)
	100.0%	100.0%
b. Appropriateness of classes		
Should be classes	26.1% (12)	27.8% (22)
Should not be classes	73.9 (34)	72.2 (57)
Missing data	(2)	(6)
	100.0%	100.0%

Table 4.15 Ideological Perspective on Class Nature of Canadian Society: NFU and Non-NFU Groups

	NFU (N=48)	Non-NFU (N=85)
Conservative	26.1% (12)	27.3% (21)
Liberal	13.0 (6)	24.7 (19)
Socialist	60.9 (28)	48.1 (37)
Missing Data	(2)	(8)
	100.0%	100.1%

This chapter has demarcated cognitions of two groups of Alberta farmers on a number of aspects of the locus of control in current problem areas, the pricing and marketing systems, and political decision-making, and indirectly, in the organization of society along class lines. These cognitive beliefs have included both general and specific objects of appraisal. Throughout the discussion, the concern has been mainly to describe the differing perspectives of the two groups of farmers with the objective of highlighting suggestions of divergent ideological perspectives.

Because these measures are mostly single item indices (and have not been extracted from a pool of attitudinal items sorted into unidimensional scales by a multivariate procedure such as factor analysis) it becomes important to examine their pattern of inter-relationship to elaborate upon their meaning. The inter-item association of these measures enables an understanding of their specificity - generality, and in so doing, provides information concerning the extent to which they are enduring responses.

IV. The Structure of Cognitive Beliefs

This section examines inter-item associations for the two farmer groups (separately) on the following set of measures:

1. Control in the pricing and marketing system:
 - corporation control over prices of farm produce
 - manufacturer control over costs of supplies
 - speculators as beneficiaries of open marketing
2. Control in political decision-making:
 - perceived over-influence of economic forces
 - perceived under-influence of political authorities
 - dissatisfaction with current personal influence
 - dissatisfaction with perceived possible influence
3. Class structure of society:
 - conservative/liberal/socialist perspective

For the purposes of these analyses, eleven members of the NFU who hold membership in another farmers' organization, Unifarm, are removed from the NFU group. The official statements of Unifarm reveal quite dissimilar points of view on a number of issues to those held by official NFU spokesmen. It is believed that the remaining 37 farmers are more ideologically representative of the National Farmers Union than the original 48, and it is these 37 who comprise the NFU group in the following discussion.

Inter-item associations for the NFU and non-NFU groups are given in Tables 4.16 and 4.17, respectively.

(1) Pricing and Marketing Systems: Cognitive Structure

(a) The NFU Group

While NFU farmers agree that forces other than themselves control the marketing system, there is a limited accord as to just where control resides. There is no association between believing that corporations fix farm prices and that manufacturers control input costs or that speculators benefit from open marketing. There is a weak positive association between believing manufacturers control costs and that it is the nonfarmer who benefits from open marketing. This limited structuring among beliefs is in part the consequence of limited variance on a number of these items: of this reduced group, 72% suggest that corporations control farm prices, 61% that speculators benefit from open marketing, and 69% that the manufacturer controls the cost of farm input supplies.

(b) The Non-NFU Group

While individuals who hold that corporations alone establish farm prices tend also to believe that manufacturers independently control input costs, they do not also believe that speculators are the chief

beneficiaries of the free marketing system. This latter "non-association" is in keeping with the preference of non-members to market their grain off the Board.

(2) Political Decision-Making: Cognitive Structure

(a) The NFU Group

There is a strong tendency for NFU farmers to judge political authorities as under-influential if they also regard the economic sector as unduly powerful. Assessing the economic sector as over-influential is associated with both wanting more influence than the respondent feels he has and that he feels he could have. There is, however, no similar association between the latter two items and with evaluating political authorities as less powerful than they ought to be. This finding, in light of the strong positive relationship between perceiving the economic sector as unduly dominant and the politically authorized bodies as relatively less forceful suggests that the sort of redistribution of power NFU members are looking for is one that places more say in their own and not their political authorities' hands.

An independent statistical technique confirms that NFU farmers operate on the assumption that more power for the economic sector necessarily means less for political authorities and the respondent himself. An oblique rotation of the factor analysis of the potential political actors from which the measures of Perceived Under-Influence of Political Authorities and Over-Influence of Economic Forces have been constructed resulted in the emergence of six factors for the NFU group, one of which is an economic factor on which the economic actors (the Winnipeg Grain Exchange,

Table 4.16 Inter-Item Association (Pearson r^*) of
Locus of Control Measures: NFU Group

	Corps. control prices	Speculs. benefit open mk.	Manufs. control costs	Political auth. Under-Infl.	Economic forces Over-Infl.	Dissat. Present Infl.	Dissat. Possible Infl.
Specul. benefit	-						
Manufs. control	-	.16					
Pol auth. Under	-.25	.20	.14				
Econ. forces Over	-	.46	.13	.60			
Dissat. Present	.12	-	.18	-	.12		
Dissat. Possible	.24	.13	.14	-	.22	.48	
Radical class view	-	-	.18	.15	.13	.14	-

*Only Pearson r 's equal to or greater than .12 are reported since r 's less than .12 are insignificant.

The level of measurement of the variables is as follows:

Coded as dummy variables are: Corporations control prices/corporations do not control prices.

Speculators benefit from open marketing/speculators do not benefit.

Manufacturers control supplies' costs/manufacturers do not control.

The remaining variables are continuous level variables:

Political Authorities Under-Influential

Economic Forces Over-Influential

Dissatisfaction Present Influence

Dissatisfaction Possible Influence

Table 4.17 Inter-Item Association (Pearson r^*) of
Locus of Control Measures: Non-NFU Group

	Corps. control prices	Speculs. benefit open mk.	Manufs. control costs	Political Auth. Under-Infl.	Economic Forces Over-Infl.	Dissat. Present Infl.	Dissat. Possible Infl.
Specul. benefit	-						
Manufs. control	.20	-					
Pol. Auth. Under	.22	-.16	-				
Econ. Forces Over	.12	.45	-	-			
Dissat. Present	-.12	.23	-	.16	.13		
Dissat. Possible	-	.15	.25	.18	.29	.61	
Radical class view	.14	-	.12	.21	-.17	.15	-

*Only r 's equal to or greater than .12 are reported since r 's less than .12 are generally insignificant.

The level of measurement of the variables is the same as in Table 4.16.

the banks, multinational corporations, chain food stores, packing plants) load together.²⁰ The implication is that NFU members view economic forces as one entity. (On the first factor of the unrotated matrix given in Table 4.11, it will be noted that economic actors have negative loadings on this first political factor.) The factor pattern matrix²¹ suggests the meaning underlying the negative association between Over-Influence of Economic Forces and Dissatisfaction with Current and also Possible Influence. Correlations between factors in the oblique solution indicate the NFU members link their power as individuals and as members of farm organizations to that of quasi-governmental bodies (the Canadian Wheat Board, provincial and national marketing boards). The interpretation is that the farmer's ability to influence decision-making is contingent upon the effectiveness of quasi-governmental bodies like the Canadian Wheat Board that are intended to work on their behalf, but not on political representatives (the M.P. or M.L.A.) or governmental spokesmen for agriculture (the Federal and Provincial Ministers of Agriculture). Thus, since it is the latter four actors that mainly comprise the measure of Perceived under-Influence of Political Authorities, there is no association between wanting more personal influence and viewing political authorities as under-influential.

(b) Non-NFU Group

Unlike members of the National Farmers Union, non-members do not associate the disproportionate influence of economic agents in decision-making with an unduly uninfluential position of political authorities. . . Desiring more influence for oneself than what one believes one has presently or what is possible is associated weakly with wanting more say for authorized political actors and less for certain elements in the economic sector.

(3) Pricing/Marketing and Political Decision-Making: Cognitive Structure

(a) NFU Group

Are perceptions of the locus of control in the marketing system related to assessments of the appropriate distribution of decision-making power? Dissatisfaction with Present and Possible Influence are both weakly and positively related to believing that corporations control prices and that the non-farmer benefits from open marketing. (Again, limited variance on most of these items - 91% NFU members are displeased with their current influence and 62% with their assessed possible influence - undoubtedly prohibits stronger correlations among items.) Evaluating economic authorities as overly influential is weakly associated with believing that manufacturers alone control the cost of input supplies and strongly with feeling that it is speculators rather than farmers who benefit from open marketing. These two beliefs also tend to occur alongside assessments of political authorities as under-influential. Thus, there is some overlap of views regarding the pricing/marketing system and political decision-making on the dimension of externalization of control to economic forces.

(b) Non-NFU Group

More say for political authorities and less for economic forces are much less interrelated with the other beliefs of non-NFU members than is the case with the NFU group. Among the non-members the greater the inclination to regard political authorities as under-influential, the more likely is there a belief in corporations on their own being responsible for setting farm prices. The greater the desire for the economic sector

to have less say in decision-making, the greater the proclivity towards viewing the open marketing system as detrimental to farmers.

As with NFU farmers, desiring more influence for oneself than what one believes one has presently or could conceivably have is related to evaluating speculators as the beneficiaries of open marketing. Individuals displeased with their estimated possible influence are also more inclined to believe that manufacturers control costs.

(4) Pricing/Marketing, Political System, and Class System:
Cognitive Structure

(a) NFU Group

The view of the class structure among NFU farmers is not related to their judgments as to who controls farm produce prices or who benefits from open marketing. But it is related to perceptions of manufacturers' dominant influence on input costs. 76% of NFU farmers with a socialist class perspective as contrasted to 56% with a conservative outlook agree that manufacturers control input costs.

A radical view of the class structure is related weakly to perceptions of an unfavorable imbalance of decision-making power: that is, that political authorities and the respondent have too little say and the economic sector too much. The perceived maldistribution of power and authority in the political system may thus be a specific manifestation of disapproval of the more nebulous imbalance of status in society.

(b) Non-NFU Group

Among non-NFU farmers, a radical class perspective is associated (weakly) with a belief that corporations and manufacturers set farm produce prices and input supplies' costs, respectively. It is not related to who is judged to be the beneficiary of the open marketing system.

As with the NFU group, a radical class outlook tends to occur alongside the judgment that political authorities have less influence than they should have. Contrary to the NFU group, a radical class perspective is negatively related to the view of the economic sector as overly influential, indicating that it is individuals who are conservative or liberal in their appraisal of the class structure of society who are most likely to disapprove of the power of the economic sector. And, not surprisingly, a radical perspective is related to disapproving of estimated possible and present influence.

Although most interrelationships are weak, there is sufficient inter-item consistency in both farmer groups to conclude that more than isolated opinions are being tapped. In addition there is evidence of some important distinctions among farmers in the two study groups. /

Summary

Farmers recruited to the National Farmers Union are similar in some respects but different in others, from farmers who have not been recruited to this protest organization. In terms of their similar viewpoints, both groups externalize the blame for their current economic difficulties. Neither group feels it has any control over either the marketing system or any influence in the important political decisions that affect its life. There is a uniform perception of decision-making powers concentrated in the hands of an economic elite and a few top political officials. For both groups, more power for the economic sector means less for the farmer.

Differences between members and non-members of the National Farmers Union are mainly structural but include at least one content aspect. First, notwithstanding their lack of control over economic problems, NFU members are much more inclined to affirm the possibility of a united farmers' action, and it is this belief in the viability of a collective mobilization that ostensibly leads them to fault themselves for their past failures to obtain desired policy outcomes from governments. Non-members, in contrast, cite individual endeavors more frequently.

Secondly, members of the National Farmers Union are more inclined to view the economic sector as a powerful collectivity. NFU farmers appear to be operating on a "limited pie" view of influence in decision-making; political authorities have too little say in decision-making because the economic sector has too much. For non-members, too little say for top political representatives is not equated with too much influence for economic agents. The implication is thus that for this second group of farmers the relative distribution of influence in decision-making is not so clear-cut.

Thirdly, whereas NFU farmers are generally consistent in viewing control externalized across the pricing, marketing, and political decision-making sectors, and combine this perception with a radical perspective of the class structure of society, non-NFU farmers exclude the marketing sector as an area out of the control of farmers. Hence, for non-NFU farmers, the integrated consensual outlook includes a vision of monopoly control of the prices of farm produce and input supplies, of political authorities as under-influential, of the respondent as excluded from political decision-making circles, and of a negatively evaluated class structured society.

Those non-NFU farmers who judge the open marketing system to be detrimental to farmers are, like NFU members, disapproving of the undue power of the economic sector.

To conclude this chapter, the view of "how the system works" held by members of the protest farm organization is more integrated along radical/socialist lines. The extent to which these cognitions give rise to equally radical solutions to rectify the maldistribution (from the farmer's viewpoint) of influence in the marketing and pricing system is the subject of the next chapter.

Notes to Chapter 4

- 1 Dolbeare and Dolbeare, American Ideologies, p. 261.
Robert Lane, Political Ideology, makes the same point:
"all ideologies, like all other beliefs, imply an empirical theory of cause and effect in the world", p. 15.
- 2 J. B. Rotter, "Generalized Expectancies for Internal versus External Control of Reinforcement", Psychological Monographs, No. 1, 80(1966), 1 - 28 developed the original I-E Scale.
A bibliography by Warren E. Throop and A.P. Macdonald, Jr. listed 339 articles which discussed the concept. See "Internal-External Locus of Control A Bibliography", Psychological Reports, 28(1971), 175-190.
- 3 P. Gurin et al., "A Multi-Dimensional E Scale", Journal of Social Issues, 25(1969), 29 - 53. They equate the Personal Control factor with Rotter's internal-external measure. The Control Ideology factor "seems to measure the R's ideology or general beliefs about the role of internal and external forces in determining success and failure in the culture at large".
- 4 Louise Selvirn and Charles Nakamura, "Powerlessness, Social-Political Action, Social-Political Views: Their Interrelation among College Students", Journal of Social Issues, 27 (No. 4, 1971), 137-157.
Left-wing activity is high on "externality", evidence that the measure is correlated with ideology; and L.E. Thomas, "The I-E Scale, Ideological Bias, and Political Participation", Journal of Personality, 38(1970), 273-286, found that internality-externality has a conservative bias.
- 5 An article in the Dec. 22, 1971 NFU Newsletter argued "The problem of farmers' income is not on the farm - it's off the farmer (sic). The problem is the market system of our economy which is designed to exploit farmers and to deny them a fair price for their product." The Regional Co-ordinator for Alberta, in an article called "Inflation Major Problem", suggested "...with no control over the price setting mechanism and with no control over the costs of inputs that go into that production, farmers are at the mercy of the real power within our country - the multi-national corporations". See Union Farmer, Aug., 1974, p. 12.
- 6 The question will immediately arise as to whether I am not simply measuring political efficacy. That may be the case, but in light of the earlier discussion in Chapter 2, the interesting aspect of the concept for ideological beliefs is whether efficacious feelings are collectivist or individualistic in their orientation.

- 7 Among NFU members, but not among non-NFU members, those who feel they themselves could do nothing about the squeeze are more inclined to believe nobody could do anything.

The question ascertaining whether "you can do anything about the cost-price squeeze" immediately followed the general question, "Is there anything that anybody can do about the cost-price squeeze?" Hence farmers were given the opportunity to evaluate their capability to act independently of that of the body most able to effect a solution to the cost-price squeeze.

- 8 Membership in organizations is not related to the type of activity the respondent volunteers in answer to the query as to whether he can do anything about the squeeze. Among NFU members, those who feel they can do nothing belong to 1.3 farm organizations; those who mention a non-political activity to 1.7 organizations; and those who suggest a political/collective action to 1.3 farm organizations. Among non-NFU members, individuals feeling they could not act on the squeeze belong to .6 farm organizations; those who suggest a non-political activity to .7 farm organizations, and those mentioning the possibility of collective farm action as an answer to the squeeze, to .6 farm organizations.
- 9 The farmer was directed to respond to the second (underlined) question. The question was phrased in terms of a political "group" rather than political "party" because historically Alberta farmers (or at any rate the leadership of the United Farmers of Alberta) had rejected "party politics" for "group politics".
- 10 The NFU N is 37. NFU members who belong to another farm organization, eleven in number, have been deleted from the NFU group.
- 11 Because both questions were open-ended, multiple responses were possible. About one-half the sample gave multi-agency responses, naming more than one body as controlling prices. The remainder mentioned a single agency. The question regarding cost controls elicited far more single-agency replies. 76% of those answering the question (N=124) mentioned a single agency.
- In Table 4.6, multiple responses have been collapsed to form a single response. Hence, if the farmer mentioned both "corporations" and the "government" as fixing farm prices, his response is coded as "Corporations & Gov't." in Table 4.6. Likewise, if he mentioned all of "corporations", "the government", and "supply and demand", his response is coded in category "Corporations, Gov't., & Supply and demand" in Table 4.6.
- 12 If the responses which mention "supply and demand" are summed (codes 3 through 6), then 49.3% of the Non-NFU group and 34.8% of the NFU group believe that "supply and demand" has something to do with the way in which farm produce prices are established.

- 13 Union Farmer, Jan., 1975, p. 5 for the first quote. For the reference to chain store oligopolic power, see "Prairie Province Cost Study Commission", Submission to Alberta Agricultural Marketing Council, n.d., p. 10-12.
- 14 There are a number of ways of interpreting Table 4.6. It is possible to conclude that the NFU study group is disinclined to believe that either supply and demand alone or government regulation alone control prices, or that the two together do so. (The sum of responses 5, 6, and 7 is 17.3%) On the other hand, 92.5% (the sum of responses 1, 2, 3, and 4) of NFU farmers believe that corporations and/or middlemen alone or in conjunction with other forces fix the price of farm foodstuffs.
- 15 Again, there are a number of interpretations of Table 4.6. Less than one-half of the non-members believe that the government and/or supply and demand regulate farm prices. (This figure, 45.3%, is the sum of responses 5, 6, and 7.) With respect to the "pluralist" interpretation, the following three figures seem relevant. 49.3% (the sum of responses 3, 5, and 7) of non-members could feel the producer's say as regards prices is afforded at least partially by the laws of supply and demand. Concomitantly, those who view governmental regulation as a partial surrogate for farmer control could account for 49.3% (the sum of responses 2, 4, and 7) of the group. And, 54.7% (the sum of responses 1, 2, 3, and 4) of non-NFU farmers regard corporations as having a say in the fixing of prices in one way or another.
- 16 It is recalled (Table 3.2, Chapter 3) that 14% of the NFU members and 19.2% of the non-members reported raising grains (feed grains, wheat) as their primary product. However, most farmers in the area had either raised grain in the past or were currently doing so, and hence were familiar with the two marketing systems. Only 5 NFU members and 21 non-members felt unqualified to choose between the two mechanisms of marketing grain.
- 17 Speech by Walter Miller, Vice-President of the NFU, NFU Newsletter; Jan. 26, 1973. An article entitled "NFU Meets Farmers Inquiry" in the Union Farmer, March, 1975, p. 3, included the following quote from a submission of the NFU to the New Brunswick Farmers Inquiry: "Economic power and political power are still closely aligned in the present day.one final difference between eighteenth century capitalism and the present form of capitalism practised large corporations was the absence of price competition. Instead prices being determined for goods produced by corporations on a supply-demand basis, corporations followed a practise of price setting in such a way as to reduce competition".

18 The actual wording of the question was: "Where in the circle - that is, how close to the centre - would you say each of these groups or persons is most of the time when it comes to making decisions on agricultural matters?"

19 The following two tables which contrast the two groups on the simpler criterion of satisfaction/dissatisfaction with present and possible influence highlight these inter-group differences.

Satisfaction with Present Influence:	NFU		Non-NFU	
^a Satisfied	12.5%*(6)	14.0%**	18.8%*(16)	21.6%**
Want more influence	77.1 (37)	86.0%	68.2 (58)	78.4
Missing date	<u>10.4 (5)</u>		<u>12.9 (11)</u>	
	100.0%	100.0%	99.9%	100.0%
Satisfaction with Possible Influence:	NFU		Non-NFU	
^b Satisfied	27.1%*(13)	31.0%**	31.8%*(27)	37.0%**
^c Dissatisfied	52.1 (25)	59.5	44.7 (38)	52.1
^d Over-satisfied	8.3 (4)	9.5	9.4 (8)	11.0
Missing data	<u>12.5 (6)</u>		<u>14.1 (12)</u>	
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.1%

^aare where would like to be
^bcould be where would like to be
^cwant more influence than feel they could have
^dcould have more influence than they want

*as % of entire group responding

**as % of group responding substantively

20 The oblique matrix, presented below, presents patterns in the data - clusterings of variables. Differences between factors are thus emphasized.

NFU Group

Prov. marketing bds.	960*	012	-152	-142	074	014
Nat'l. marketing bds.	816*	051	081	-083	135	-123
Unifarm	639*	021	210	360	-010	183
Winnipeg Grain Exch.	115	719*	016	-014	037	-214
The banks	115	593*	177	127	-104	150
Multinat'l. corps.	-038	507*	-221	-220	484	223
Canadian Pacific Rail	-170	511*	-234	193	055	176
Chain food stores	-164	836*	108	018	158	-169
Packing plants	031	953*	085	-196	-103	-020

cont'd.

U. S. Gov't.	048	205	670*	-035	-082	-156
NFU	255	-176	472	689*	149	-058
Prov. Minister Agric.	408	-181	-531*	186	159	-231
CWB Minister	-152	094	-179	852*	-042	052
M.L.A.	168	189	-412	264	-330	-383
M.P.	398	282	-420	135	-248	-153
Federal Min. Agric.	150	-238	-250	397	070	-294
R could be	014	-010	-037	029	464	-158
R like to be	-028	077	119	-052	134	-761*
R is	289	102	049	253	334	027

21 The matrix of factor pattern correlations stresses the inter-relatedness of factors.

Factor Pattern Correlations for Pattern
Matrix: NFU Group

Factor	1	2	3	4	5	6
1	1.00					
2	-.01	1.00				
3	-.02	-.01	1.00			
4	.37	.01	-.13	1.00		
5	.03	.05	.03	.03	1.00	
6	-.30	.05	.07	-.09	-.06	1.00

Chapter 5

Evaluative Beliefs: How the System Ought to Work

Continuing the inquiry into the substance of farmers' political attitudes, this chapter focuses upon farmers' evaluations of aspects of production, pricing and marketing, and upon more general evaluative beliefs concerning appropriate life goals. Assessments of the appropriateness of governmental involvement in the production, pricing, and marketing of foodstuffs may properly be construed as the evaluative counterparts of cognitive beliefs tapped in the preceding chapter.

The format of the discussion is identical to that in the preceding chapter since the objective of the analysis remains the same. That goal is to contrast the perspectives of the two groups of farmers (NFU and non-NFU members) for the purpose of determining whether the belief systems of farmers recruited to a protest organization differ from those of farmers not similarly mobilized. Once again, in order to provide some benchmark by which to describe farmers' attitudes in general terms, responses are characterized in terms of their location on the left-right continuum. (See Chart 2.1, Chapter 2.)

I. Evaluative Beliefs Regarding Regulation of Agricultural Production, Pricing, and Marketing

The Alberta farmer's free enterprise bias and his abhorrence of governmental regulation are tenets which almost every student of Alberta politics takes on faith. We accept unthinkingly the declaration that Alberta farmers constituted for thirty-five years the backbone of the conservative Social Credit government. In doing so, we subscribe to the the consensus of the handful of scholars who have studied prairie agrarian political movements and activity.

Macpherson's (1953) characterization of Alberta farmers as conservatively accepting the free enterprise marketing and pricing system save in economically depressed times when they may be converted to affirming the necessity of bringing that system more under farmer control is generally accepted by other scholars. James McCrorie has described Saskatchewan farmers as "small, independent capitalistic entrepreneurs who believe, for the most part, in the private ownership of land and the means of production". (1971: 36) Elsewhere, the politics of this same group have been summarized as "conservatism based on pragmatism". (Eager, 1968: 1)

If commentators are in agreement that farmers have been reluctant for governments to involve themselves in the production sector, they concur as well that farmers have historically opted for governmental regulation of the pricing and marketing sector in an effort to curb the "excesses" of monopoly power over agricultural prices and marketing conditions. The fight for the Canadian Wheat Board (described in Chapter 4) was part of a general drive against the monopoly power of large manufacturers and railways over the pricing of farm produce and farm input supplies. (Lipset, 1968; Morton, 1950; Sharp, 1948) The contemporary salience of traditional farmer support for a regulated pricing and marketing system is questionable in light of more recent denunciations of governmental involvement in either the production or marketing sectors of agriculture by such commodity groups as the Palliser Wheat Growers Association and the Canadian Cattlemen's Association.¹ There appears then to be a split among farmers between those traditionally inclined toward governmental regulation

of selected aspects of the pricing and marketing systems and those who deny the validity of any interference with the free enterprise system.

Farmers' judgments of the appropriate organization of the production, pricing, and marketing sectors of farming are examined in turn.

A. Governmental Involvement in the Production Sector

Three aspects of governmental involvement in production appear here: one, the respondent's recommended role for the Provincial and Federal Governments in the production of food; two, a more specific examination of the types of governmental programs liked and disliked; and three, approval or disapproval of the regulation of land and farm ownership.

1. Recommendations regarding the governments' roles in production

"What about the production of agricultural foodstuffs? What should be the role of the Federal (Provincial) Government there?"

The question is a difficult one for a group of farmers whose educational level averages just over nine years of school, and of whom 84% did not finish high school. Accordingly, there is a great range in both the quality and quantity of information elicited. While the interviewer probed as deeply as possible to understand fully the response being volunteered, she was reluctant to structure the responses. The open-ended question format had been deliberately chosen to avoid the problem of "instant attitude" formation by the respondent. (Converse (1970) calls these "non-attitudes".) In retrospect, perhaps more probing - at least in the direction of soliciting the specific areas in which government

involvement was not desirable - would have been profitable. In its absence, however, the responses are perhaps more accurate measures of recommended governmental roles than they might otherwise have been because they are almost completely voluntary.

Table 5.1 contrasts the varying proportions of farmers in the two study groups who recommend conservative, liberal, and radical federal production roles. The two groups distribute themselves more or less uniformly among the three recommended roles. With respect to the federal role, while there are fairly equal proportions of conservatives among the NFU and non-NFU study groups, there are slightly more radicals among NFU members and slightly more liberals among non-members. The differences are not, however, significant. In terms of their recommended type of provincial involvement in the producing of foodstuffs, the differences between NFU and non-NFU farmers in recommended roles are smaller.

Table 5.1 Recommendations Regarding Governmental
Production Roles: NFU and Non-NFU Groups

a. Federal role	NFU (N=48)	Non-NFU (N=85)		
Conservative	35.4% ^a (17)	36.0% ^a (27)	31.8% ^b	
Liberal	29.1 (14)	34.7 (26)	30.6	
Radical	35.5 (17)	29.3 (22)	25.8	
Missing data		(10)	11.8	
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	
b. Provincial role				
Conservative	34.1% ^a (15)	31.3% ^b	30.6% ^a (22)	25.9% ^b
Liberal	40.9 (18)	37.5	43.0 (31)	36.4
Radical	25.0 (11)	23.0	26.4 (19)	22.4
Missing data	(4)	8.3	(13)	15.3
	100.0%	100.1%	100.0%	100.0%

^a of % answering substantively

^b of total group

The recommendations for conservative, liberal, and radical roles with respect to the production of foodstuffs are qualitatively different proposals. That is, a radical role differs from a liberal or conservative role in being not simply an advocacy of more continuous governmental involvement and more of it, but rather, in entailing a prescription for a different kind of involvement (based on a different conception of the role of the farmer and foodstuffs in the social and economic system).² Elaboration upon the types of responses coded as "conservative", "liberal", and "radical" clarifies the meaning of this statement.

(a) The conservative position on governmental involvement

This is a recommendation that the government have no role in the production of foodstuffs. Individuals who subscribed to this position generally suggested that the government "stay out all together", "stay out of advising the farmer what and how much to produce", or warned that there should be no interference with production. Many responses coded as "conservative" were as terse and to the point as the foregoing. Indeed, because of the necessity to probe to obtain a response of any sort from farmers who were eventually coded in this category, and because of the low informational content to most of these replies, there was some concern that "non-attitudes" were being coded as conservative attitudes. While it must be acknowledged that this may have occurred in a few instances in the case of the personal interviews, it is also recognized that it takes fewer words to be against something than to be for it. That is, to recommend a socialist position as regards agriculture when the traditional government policy has been non-socialist, of necessity means spelling out what that position would entail. But when the modal governmental policy

is conservative or liberal, and one supports that policy, then one "knows" what one is for and does not need to elaborate since presumably everyone else is for it too; one only needs to say what one is against.

The problem of brevity was not uniform among conservative answers. Some farmers expanded upon why they disliked government involvement; in doing so, they "construct validated" their responses. A frequent rationale for proposing no governmental interference in production was "as soon as the government tells the farmer what to do, the farmer loses incentive". A dairy farmer, calculating that he had lost \$3,000 the previous year by producing more milk than his allotted quota, was against quotas on the principle that a person should be able to produce what he wants (that is, quotas restrict freedom). Another man advocated free enterprise: "Let the chips fall where they may! Everything would be better." Other farmers, in rejecting incentive grants and subsidies, referred to the inherent knowledge of the farmer to know what to produce: "People would naturally produce what was needed and hold back when prices were low".

Perhaps the most precise articulation of the principles behind the advocacy of no government involvement in production was that of the farmer who began by voicing his dislike of the compulsory selling of eggs through the Egg Marketing Board because "it destroys free enterprise and leads to a socialist state". Referring to the American Government's policy of paying farmers not to produce, he rejected this policy on the grounds that such disincentive grants only helped the lazy farmers, "the dumb-bells". In laying the responsibility on the individual for his fate, this farmer accepted personal accountability for dealing with the

"gambling aspect" of farming: he called it "the management factor".

Seldom was there such an explicit linking of the respondent's assumptions of man with his recommended governmental position.

(b) The liberal position

Two types of responses were coded as liberal: those which suggested either an informational and advisory role for the government and/or a role of financial assistance in the form of incentives and subsidies to produce and loans for capital expansion or initial purchase of farmland and machinery. Types of advice recommended are confined to what the government presently makes available: information pertaining to research regarding market situations and production levels, and regarding the development of new crop varieties. Also coded as liberal responses are suggestions that the government supervise the quality of foodstuffs. Examples of liberal replies include:

"They need to do something about getting some more farmers - more young people - on the land. Grass incentive programs were a good idea, but now we're short of grain. I appreciate the Canadian Wheat Board reports on what they need and what farmers should produce regarding new strains of grain."

and

"They should guarantee credit to farmers at a reasonable cost, especially to beginning farmers even if a 'reasonable cost' means no interest payments."

It will be noted that the liberal role corresponds closely to the historical policy of the Canadian federal government.

(c) The radical/socialist position

The farmer whose reply is coded within this category is more easily recognized than either his liberal or conservative counterpart, partly because he tended to elaborate upon his recommendation more frequently.

Responses coded here are generally of three types: firstly, those advocating a government guaranteed (floor) price or "fair return"; secondly, those suggesting the government control profits of corporations, markups on food after it leaves the farm, and/or material and machinery costs; and thirdly, a proposal that production be regulated in some way - either by putting limits on the quantity of foodstuffs sold, or by controlling land usage and ownership. Answers coded as radical/socialist were frequently the most articulate and well-informed. Many began with the premise that current (and past) governmental policy was clearly inadequate (pointing to the cost-price squeeze or the failure of grass incentive and grain disincentive schemes in the recent past) and attempted to suggest ways to overcome these perceived problems. Concluding that "someone has to take over as a whole - at the present time the Federal Government is the only one capable of doing so", one farmer concluded that the Government should take steps to establish a World Food Bank "to stabilize prices". Other responses were specific to the type of farming the respondent was engaged in. A hog farmer suggested the Federal Government should guarantee a certain price for a set amount of hogs and a lower price for anything over the quota in order to protect the small farmer.

The implementation of quota systems to regulate production and a fair or profitable floor price were the most typical replies in the radical category. Less typical was the following carefully formulated position:

"Farms should be limited in size to family farms. The Government should have a Land Use Policy which keeps arable land for agriculture and the family farm. The government's role would be supply management so that farmers do not over-supply the market and hurt themselves and the taxpayers. The latter occurs when

the government buys up agricultural surpluses and gives them away. Supply management would mean the elimination of the highs and lows of the costs of products. This yo-yo effect allows middlemen to keep prices high at all times, even when the market goes down. Food should be geared to the income of consumers and the maximum number of people should be engaged in the production of food and have an income equivalent to that of the Canadian labourer."

It is perhaps no accident that this farmer was currently a Director of the National Farmers Union.

It was apparent that farmers recommending all three production roles for the Federal and Provincial governments were frequently responding to past and present governmental policies. The most significant cues in the way of governmental policies were LIFT (Lower Inventories for Tomorrow) and the federal and provincial beef production incentive schemes, which had followed in the wake of LIFT. Both programs had, in a very real sense, backfired and were responsible, in a number of people's eyes, for the current depressed beef prices and grain shortages. Many farmers appeared to react to these policies in one of two ways: either by blaming the current depressed beef prices on too much governmental interference and concluding that the only solution was for governments to stay out completely from involvement in agriculture, or by blaming the current economic malaise not on government involvement per se, but on its short-lived, ad hoc nature, and recommending more long-range and better formulated governmental planning. The former tend to be conservatives; the latter, radical/socialists.

To conclude, there are only slight differences between NFU members and non-members concerning their ideological perspective regarding foodstuff production. Fewer than one-third of the farmers in either group

suggest that the federal government involve itself in the production of food to any greater extent than providing the money for the farmer to manage on his own. Even fewer farmers in both groups recommend that much involvement on the part of the provincial government.

There is some reason to believe that the strength of economic conservatism and liberalism witnessed here is not unique to farmers in this study group. A 1971 province-wide random survey of Alberta residents revealed that fully 71% of the farmers interviewed disagreed with the statement "If a farmer can't sell things he raises at a profit, the government should buy them and limit the amount the farmer can produce."³

2. Perceived harmful and beneficial programs

It has been noted that farmers tended to react to previous governmental programs when recommending a federal or provincial role in agricultural production. Farmers were given a direct opportunity to respond to these programs when they were asked to voice their approval or disapproval of particular schemes. They were requested to recall "any government policies - provincial or federal - that have benefitted farmers and yourself in the past, or any policies that are currently helping farmers"; and secondly, any policies that were "currently hurting the farmer", or had hurt farmers in the past. Multiple responses were forthcoming; four possible replies were coded. In Table 5.2, programs mentioned have been coded in four discrete categories (monetary assistance schemes; incentives and subsidies; orderly marketing; and miscellaneous) plus categories representing combinations of these. (The list of programs placed under each category may be found in Table 5.2a in Appendix B.)

Table 5.2 Types of Beneficial Programs Mentioned:
NFU and non-NFU Groups.

	NFU (N=48)	Non-NFU (N=85)
Monetary assistance	33.3% (16)	31.8% (27)
Monetary assistance & Subsidies	16.7 (8)	10.6 (9)
Incentives & subsidies	12.5 (6)	10.6 (9)
Combination of programs	10.4 (5)	10.6 (9)
Miscellaneous	10.4 (5)	3.5 (3)
Orderly marketing	4.2 (2)	1.2 (1)
None mentioned*	12.5 (6)	31.8 (27)

*including missing data

For farmers in both groups, government programs singularly mentioned as being the most beneficial are grants and loans with no strings attached - programs which make money available to the farmer to do with as he wishes. Monetary programs which interfere with the farmer's freedom of decision-making, by giving him an incentive to raise hay, instead of grain, or cattle instead of hogs, are not so welcome. In fact, the latter are viewed as being the most distasteful by both NFU and non-NFU farmers. The figure for incentive programs in the Harmful Programs table (Table 5.3) is inflated by the LIFT program of the federal Liberal government in the early 1970's and the very recent moves by the Alberta government to encourage the production of beef. At the time of the interviews, the bottom had fallen out of the beef market. LIFT was a program that paid farmers \$6.00 per acre to leave normally productive wheat land in fallow. It has been labelled the first attempt of the government to control production, but it should be noted that it had its critics everywhere, not just among free enterprisers.

Table 5.3 Types of Harmful Programs Mentioned:
NFU and non-NFU Groups.

	NFU = (N=48)		Non-NFU (N=85)	
Incentives	20.8%	(10)	27.1%	(23)
Combination of schemes	18.8	(9)	15.3	(13)
Miscellaneous	8.3	(4)	8.2	(7)
Against free marketing	8.3	(4)	11.8	(10)
Monetary assistance	4.2	(2)	3.5	(3)
Against orderly marketing	4.2	(2)	2.4	(2)
Subsidies & incentives	2.1	(1)	2.4	(2)
Monetary assist. & subsidies	2.1	(1)	5.9	(5)
Subsidies	-		2.4	(2)
None*	<u>31.3</u>	(15)	<u>21.2</u>	(18)
	100.1%		100.2%	

*including missing data

Why are incentive schemes disliked so much, and these two (LIFT and beef programs) in particular?⁴ There would seem to be three possible reasons. Firstly, they might be disliked because any incentive scheme means government interference and a consequent lessening of the farmer's freedom to produce what he wants. Secondly, they could be distrusted because of the ad hoc nature of most of these plans, their short-sightedness and ill-planned nature. And thirdly, they could be frowned upon because, given the food shortage in many parts of the world, farmers should be paid to produce food, not to refrain from doing so.

Incentive schemes were disliked more frequently by farmers in both study groups for their ad hoc and ill-planned character than for their invasion of the farmer's freedom. In a very few instances they were viewed as harmful because of their attempt to thwart food production.

Farmers describe in their own words how many government schemes - particularly LIFT and the beef incentive projects - backfired.

"The grass incentive program conflicted with other programs. It meant the government had to have a beef loan incentive. This led to over-production and didn't benefit the farmer in the long run. In the short outlook, the snowed-under crop payment [scheme of the Alberta government in the fall and spring of 1973-74] is a help, but in the long term, the government needs to set guidelines to ensure a margin of profit. Then we wouldn't need incentive programs."

"The incentive grants for hay production (along with the beef loan) ruined the cattle market and bolstered grain production."

"So many policies help one (the grain farmer) and hurt the other (the guy who runs a feedlot)."

"The LIFT program asked us to put land in forage four years ago. Now there's a wheat shortage. They seem to do the wrong thing. They don't look that far ahead." And, as for incentive programs, "They don't accomplish that much; a lot of people benefit from them who aren't really farmers."

A less frequent rationale for disliking incentive schemes was

"As soon as the government tells the farmer what to do, the farmer loses initiative." There were a few other examples of this distrust of incentive schemes because they "take away the naturalness of agriculture" and "destroy the farmer's initiative". One farmer, after commenting that the market situation on which LIFT was predicated "turned out to be the opposite" and the grass incentive program "went sour", concluded "I'm not against incentive or disincentive programs, but these programs put it so much out of balance that two years later you feel the after-effects. They upset the natural supply and demand situation."

It is, in short, impossible to discern whether dislike for incentive grants denotes an economically conservative outlook without knowing something about the history of government assistance to agriculture

in this country. That history can best be described as one of ad hoc programs which have frequently benefitted one sector of the farming community at the expense of another. The question which immediately arises, of course, is whether such improvised and short-term reactions have been a response to farmers' demands and are, in fact, what farmers have asked for and what they have wanted - periodic governmental involvement in crisis situations and abstention in normal times. Judging from the responses of both groups of farmers here, that would seem not to be the case. It is precisely the episodic governmental intervention which they dislike. And most of them disapprove of it not because it interferes with the "natural law of supply and demand" but because it has frequently produced unanticipated consequences detrimental to the farmer. And, this being the case, as one farmer put it, "with this kind of record, how can they successfully administer controls?"

Thus, NFU farmers and their non-member counterparts jointly chastise incentive schemes and welcome unconditional monetary assistance plans more than other governmental programs.

3. Regulation of land and farm ownership policies

The private ownership of farm land has long been regarded as the sacred cow of farming in Canada. To examine the veracity of this claim, farmers were queried as to their unwillingness for regulations on the size of farms and the entry of corporations into farming. If the sine qua non is indeed private land ownership, then farmers may well approve the regulation of corporate entry into farming since the latter could conceivably interfere with the unlimited right of individuals to acquire and operate farm land.

As Table 5.4 indicates, there are indeed important substantive and statistical differences between the two farmer groups. While 72% of NFU members agree that there should be a legislated maximum farm size, only 44% of non-NFU members go along with the idea. The margin between the proportion of the two groups of farmers who feel corporate farming should be eliminated is much smaller. 81% of the NFU group and 77% of the non-NFU farmers agree that corporate farming should be outlawed. The implication is thus that when non-members think of legislating the size of farms, it is not their own or their neighbour's, or any individual's farm that should be limited in size, but rather the aggrandizement of farm land by corporations and other conglomerates. Indeed, the two attitudes are more strongly correlated for the non-NFU group (Pearson $r = .47$) than for the NFU group (Pearson $r = .38$), indicating that non-NFU members would tend to agree with both statements more than would NFU members.⁵ Private land ownership, then, appears to be an indispensable goal for non-members who exhibit an anti-monopoly streak reminiscent of a populist outlook - private ownership, yes; corporate control, no. This seems to be less true of the NFU group.

B. Regulation of the Pricing System

Two closed-ended questions specifically probed the need for controls in the area of producer prices and suppliers' costs. The questions solicit directly the respondent's adherence to the principle of the "law of supply and demand" as the appropriate determinant of prices and costs. In addition, they provide an opportunity to test the historic proposition that when farmers advocate controls, they mean controls for everyone but themselves. Table 5.5 gives the marginals for the two study groups on the need for controls on farm produce prices and farm input costs.

Table 5.4 Regulation of Farm Size and Ownership:
NFU and non-NFU Groups

	NFU (N=48)	Non-NFU (N=85)
<u>a. There should be a legislated maximum farm size.</u>		
Strongly agree	51.1% (24)	33.0% (27)
Agree somewhat	21.3 (10)	11.0 (9)
Neither agree or disagree	2.1 (1)	14.6 (12)
Disagree somewhat	12.8 (6)	17.1 (14)
Strongly disagree	12.8 (6)	24.4 (20)
Missing data	(1)	(3)
	100.1%	100.1%
<u>b. Corporate farming should be outlawed.</u>		
Strongly agree	55.3% (26)	60.2% (50)
Agree somewhat	25.5 (12)	16.9 (14)
Neither agree nor disagree	6.4 (3)	9.6 (8)
Disagree somewhat	8.5 (4)	6.0 (5)
Strongly disagree	4.3 (2)	7.3 (6)
Missing data	(1)	(2)
	100.0%	100.0%

In both the NFU and non-NFU groups, over three-quarters of the farmers favor controls on both farm products' prices and input supplies' costs. There are, however, important differences between the two groups. Interestingly, while more people in the non-NFU study group favor controls on the cost of machinery and other input supplies than favor controls on farm produce prices, no such differences appear among members of the National Farmers Union. The historical pattern of Western Canadian farmers' fight against industrial monopolies and demand for their regulation, while at the same time wishing to avoid any regulation of their own enterprise, seems not quite so characteristic of these farmers. It is less true of the NFU group than the non-member group; NFU farmers are statistically more in

favor of producer prices being controlled. (The Gamma measure of association is .55 for which the chi square statistic is significant at the .05 level.) Nevertheless, a surprisingly large number of farmers in both groups opt for controls on both foodstuffs and supplies: 79% of the NFU farmers and 76% of the non-NFU farmers. (The latter is the percentage of those who responded to both questions: N=74.)

Table 5.5 Pricing Controls on Farm Produce and Input Supplies: NFU and non-NFU Groups.

	NFU (N=48)	Non-NFU (N=85)
a. <u>Controls on Farm Produce Prices</u>		
Agree	87.5% (42)	68.2% ^a (58)
Disagree	12.5 (6)	21.2 (18)
Missing data	_____	10.6 (9)
	100.0%	100.0%
b. <u>Controls on Input Supplies Costs</u>		
Agree	87.5% (42)	82.4% ^a (70)
Disagree	12.5 (6)	12.9 (11)
Missing data	_____	4.7 (4)
	100.0%	100.0%

^a% of total group including missing data

^b% of substantive answers (excluding missing data)

A partial explanation for the somewhat greater propensity of the NFU members for regulation of farm produce prices is found when respondents are queried as to who should set controls on foodstuff prices and supplies' costs - if there are indeed to be such controls. As Table 5.6 indicates, the explanation lies in the differing proportions of farmers in

the two groups who demand a voice for farmers in the setting of input supplies' costs. While almost equal proportions of NFU and non-NFU members advocate either one or both governments or governmental agencies to set produce prices as demand that the farmer have some say (in conjunction with other bodies like the government, the processors, the labourer, or marketing boards), in the case of regulating input costs, NFU members are statistically more in favor of farmers having some say in their control than are their non-member counterparts. (The Gamma measure

Table 5.6 Body Recommended to Set Price Controls:
NFU and Non-NFU Groups

	NFU (N=48)		Non-NFU (N=85)	
a. Who should set <u>farm produce prices?</u>				
Nobody/no controls	12.5% ^a	(6)	28.2% ^a	(24)
Government	35.4	(17) 40.5 ^b	28.2	(24) 39.3% ^b
Farmer with others	35.4	(17) 40.5	26.0	(22) 36.1
Farmer/his organiz.	<u>16.7</u>	(8) <u>19.1</u>	<u>17.6</u>	(15) <u>24.6</u>
	100.0%	100.1%	100.0%	100.0%
b. Who should set <u>input supplies' costs?</u>				
Nobody/no controls	11.5%	(5)	18.1%	(13)
Gov't./Gov't. agency	41.9	(18) 47.4	61.1	(44) 74.6%
Farmers with others	41.9	(18) 47.4	19.4	(14) 23.7
Farmer	4.7	(2) 5.3	1.4	(1) 1.7
Missing data	<u> </u>	(5) <u> </u>	<u> </u>	(13) <u> </u>
	100.1%	100.1%	100.0%	100.0%

^aincludes missing data

^bexcluding "Nobody/no controls".

of association is .40 for which the chi square statistic is significant at the .04 level.) Non-members frequently opt for governmental regulation - either by each government alone or both together - basing their reasoning on the premise that the government is really the only body with the authority to set controls on farm inputs. NFU farmers' lesser skepticism of controls of any sort - including those on producer prices - appears grounded in an assumption that farmers should (and hopefully, would) have some say in their operation.

C. Orderly Versus Open Marketing

In Chapter 4, in contrasting farmers in the two study groups regarding whom they perceived to be the beneficiaries of open (off-Board) marketing, it was noted that NFU farmers were much more suspicious than non-members that farmers could benefit from open marketing. It is thus not surprising to find in Table 5.7 that they prefer Canadian Wheat Board marketing in much larger proportions than do non-NFU members. The latter divide themselves more or less equally between choosing Canadian Wheat Board and off-Board marketing. The differences are statistically significant at the .04 level.⁶

Table 5.7 Preferred Type of Marketing:
NFU and Non-NFU Groups

	NFU (N=48)		Non-NFU (N=85)	
Canadian Wheat Board	72.3%	(34)	70.8%	52.8% (38) 44.7%
Off-Board/Both	27.7	(13)	27.1	47.2 (34) 40.0
Missing data		(1)	2.1	(13) 15.3
	100.0%		100.0%	100.0%

This section has contrasted selected evaluative beliefs of the NFU and non-NFU study groups concerning regulation of the production, pricing, and marketing sectors of farming. In general, members of the protest organization are slightly more radical as regards regulation of the production sector, somewhat more radical regarding the marketing sector, and more consistent in recommending controls on both farm inputs and farm produce. With respect to the latter, while there is unanimity for governmental determination of controls on input supplies within the non-NFU group, NFU members divide equally between governmental fixing and farmer say in cost control determination.

The final part of this section examines the inter-item association of the production, pricing, and marketing measures within the two study groups for the dual purpose of establishing the stability and generality of these opinions.

D. The Structure of Evaluative Beliefs

Tables 5.8 and 5.9 report the pattern of inter-item association of evaluative beliefs for the NFU and non-NFU groups, respectively.

The NFU Group

Members of the National Farmers Union tend to advocate controls consistently across the pricing and marketing sectors. As Table 5.8 indicates, agreeing to controls on farm produce prices, on input costs, and preferring Canadian Wheat Board marketing are positively intercorrelated.

While farmers who recommend regulation of one aspect of the production process (farm size, for example) also tend to recommend

regulation of other aspects (corporate entry, the federal production role), there is an uneven association between measures regarding regulation of the production sector and items ascertaining regulation of the pricing and marketing aspects of farming.

With respect to the suggested federal role in production, mentioning a conservative role for the federal government is negatively related to preferring Canadian Wheat Board marketing. NFU farmers who deny the need for controls on input supplies' costs are more likely to suggest either a conservative or a radical federal production role than they are a liberal production role.⁷

While a willingness for the establishment of farm size limits is consistently related to approval of controls over prices and orderly marketing, agreeing that corporate entry into farming should be regulated is not part of this same belief set. The latter does occur alongside approval of orderly marketing but is negatively related to the need for cost controls and not associated with price controls.

In brief, NFU members as a whole exhibit a fair amount of consistency in affirming the need for controls and regulations across farming areas.

Non-NFU

Like NFU members, this group tends to be consistent in approving of regulations across the pricing and marketing sectors. (See Table 5.9) As with NFU farmers, approving controls in the pricing and marketing aspects of farming does not necessarily mean wanting the production sector regulated, or vice versa.

Table 5.8 Inter-Item Association of Evaluative Beliefs:
NFU Group (N=37)

1. Gamma Measure of Association

	Input Cost Controls	Farm Price Controls	CWB Mk.	Farm Size Limits	Restrict Corporate Entry	Conserv. Prod. Role	Liberal Prod. Role	Radical Prod. Role
Farm Price Controls	.41							
Wheat Board Mkting.	.58	.73						
Farm Size Limits	.45	.23	.63					
Restrict Corpor.	-.23	.07	.44					

2. Pearson Corr.

Conserv. Prod. Role	-.11	-.04	-.24	-.48	.07			
Liberal Prod. Role	.24	-.06	.12	-.06	-.17	-.51		
Radical Prod. Role	-.13	.11	.12	.42	.24	-.51	-.48	

Level of measurement of variables: All variables are dichotomous (dummy) variables except "Farm Size Limits" and "Restrict Corporate Entry".

Within the production sector, non-members who agree to the need for legislation on farm size and corporate farming are like NFU members in tending to suggest radical federal production roles. Non-NFU liberals (on the federal production role) are most unfavorable towards regulation of farm size and corporate entry, while conservatives are weakly pre-disposed toward such regulations. There is thus one contrast between this group and the NFU group. In the latter, conservatives (on the federal production role) rejected legislating farm size limits.

With respect to congruence between the pricing and production sectors, wanting farm produce prices and input costs controlled is associated positively with a radical federal production role.⁸ Advocating controls on both input and output farm products occurs alongside recommending legislation to establish a maximum farm size and limit corporate entry into farming. (The strongest relationship here is between wanting input costs controlled and restricting corporate farming.)

The pattern of association between the production items and the single marketing item (the preference for orderly versus open marketing) differs in two respects from that within the NFU group. Firstly, a preference for open marketing is virtually unrelated to the federal production role recommended by non-NFU farmers.⁹ This is in contrast to NFU liberals and radicals (on the federal production role) equally favouring open marketing. Secondly, among non-NFU farmers, preferring orderly marketing is related to only one of the farm ownership items - that suggesting that farms be limited in terms of their maximum size. Wanting limits to corporate entry into farming is not related to a preference for Canadian Wheat Board marketing.

Table 5.9 Inter-Item Association of Evaluative Beliefs:
Non-NFU Group (N=96)

	Input Cost Controls	Farm Price Controls	CWB Mk.	Farm Size Limits	Restrict Corporate Entry	Conser. Prod. Role	Liberal Prod. Role	Radical Prod. Role
<u>1. Gamma Measure</u>								
Farm Price Controls	.95							
Wheat Board Mktng.	.53	.81						
Farm Size Limits	.39	.23	.33					
Restrict Corpor.	.63	.38	.01					
<u>2. Pearson Corr.</u>								
Conserv. Prod. Role	-.06	-.13	-.06	.12	.12			
Liberal Prod. Role	-.15	-.09	-.00	-.26	-.26	-.44		
Radical Prod. Role	.21	.15	-.04	.22	.22	-.43	-.40	

Level of measurement of variables: All variables are dichotomous (dummy) variables except "Farm Size Limits" and "Restrict Corporate Entry".

For non-NFU farmers, it is regulation of the marketing sector which proves to be the stumbling block to congruity of regulation across farming sectors. Non-NFU farmers' reluctance to abandon the open market system wherein ostensibly the law of supply and demand determines just prices over the long run does not generally restrain them from approving some regulation and governmental involvement in the pricing and production sectors.

Summary

By way of an overview of this first section, it is useful to reiterate the points of similarity and divergence regarding the judgments of the two groups of farmers as to how the pricing, marketing, and production aspects of farming might best function. While there are slight discrepancies between NFU and non-NFU farmers in the numbers favoring regulation of farm produce prices, relatively equal proportions suggest regulation of input supplies' costs, the three governmental production roles, the same governmental programs as being beneficial and harmful, and restrictions on corporate farming. There are striking differences in the form of a greater NFU preference for orderly marketing and a maximum farm size. The latter two findings, when coupled with information regarding the inter-item association of measures across the pricing, marketing, and production sectors, leads to the conclusion that NFU farmers are more consistent along radical lines across the three aspects of farming.

II. Values and Goals

The preceding section has tapped specific evaluations of the economic system in which farmers function. In this section, more generalized evaluative beliefs concerning life goals are documented. As in the foregoing section, myth and traditional thought alert us to what those values and life goals are likely to be.

Individualism and independence - these are held to be the pre-eminent values of the prairie farmer. The argument establishing their superiority in the farmer's value system is one of inference "backwards" to their source and "forwards" to their behavioral manifestations. A sense of independence and a spirit of individualism are described as the inevitable outcome of the frontier tradition which demanded self-sufficiency (Bennett and Krueger, 1968: 351) and the homesteading experience when the availability of free land made the farmer seem free of external controls (Macpherson, 1953: 228); the immigration to Alberta and Saskatchewan of Americans imbued with the Lockean liberalism emphasis upon freedom and individualism (Sharp, 1948: 1-22; Hansen, 1970); the heterogeneous and doctrinaire character of religious sects in Alberta (Palmer, 1972; Hiller, 1968; Flanagan, 1972; Mann, 1955); and the organization of farming itself as a capitalist operation independent of hired labour (Macpherson, 1953: 220-222; Mitchell: 15).

Behaviorally, it is argued that individualistic values have manifested themselves in support for the UFA and later, the Social Credit movement in Alberta, both of which emphasized the rights of the individual against state control. (Irving, 1959: 229) In Saskatchewan, Krueger and

Bennett point to the farmer's insistence upon "security of individual land tenure, stability of individual enterprise and income, and in general, the support of private property" as evidence of the individualism of Saskatchewan farmers. (1968: 356) This same individualism has led to the failure to establish co-operative farms in Saskatchewan and to farmers' opposition to "governmental, or any other form of organized compulsion" (Krueger and Bennett: 352)

Insofar as individualism and independence are generally described as conservative values, the consensus is that the instrumental and terminal goals of Alberta farmers are traditional ones. This section describes the value systems of the two groups in ideological terms. Accordingly, the discussion will be facilitated by a definition of socialist, liberal, and conservative value systems. In accordance with common usage, conservatism, liberalism, and socialism are frequently distinguished in terms of both how they define and what priority each assigns to values like freedom, equality, and authority. Conservatives are defined as valuing freedom above equality; socialists, equality before freedom. While liberals value both freedom and equality highly, when freedom is equated with property rights, it is freedom that receives top priority. (Dolbeare and Dolbeare: 64-72) Liberals are said to construe equality differently from socialists: for liberals, equality means equality of opportunity while for socialists any meaningful equality must be equality of social and economic conditions. And for conservatives, the freedom valued is one equated with an absence of constraints - that is, independence.

The subsequent discussion has two parts: first, a description of the over-all set of life goals of the two study groups, secondly, a specific focus upon the commitment to private property of farmers in the two groups. NFU and non-NFU members are contrasted by highlighting any differences of life goals that could predispose individuals to join a protest farm organization. In the absence of previous suppositions, the hypothesis is that protest members' values should be more egalitarian and less individualistic.

A. Terminal Values of Farmers

1. The Rokeach Survey

The principal instrument utilized to tap the value systems of farmers is the Rokeach value survey. (Rokeach, 1971) The logic of the Rokeach survey is that individuals have stable beliefs regarding preferred "end-states of existence" and "modes of conduct". (Rokeach, 1973: 5) Rokeach argues that knowledge of an individual's preferred "end-states" - his values - enables a description of his political ideology. More specifically, the ideological positions of communist, socialist, capitalist, and fascist ideologies can be differentiated in terms of the priority they attach to freedom or equality. (1973: Chapter 6). It is thus possible to distinguish political ideologies on the basis of the relative priority assigned to freedom and equality. Socialists, says Rokeach, value both equality and freedom highly; capitalists value freedom highly and equality lowly; for fascists, both equality and freedom are assigned a low value; and communists place a high priority on equality and a low value on freedom. Elsewhere (1968-69: 556), Rokeach has distinguished American political liberals

from American conservatives and "middle-of-the-roaders" in the former's higher valuation of equality. The three political types do not differ in the value they assign to freedom.

Rokeach's set of 18 terminal values is used here to tap the value hierarchies of Alberta farmers. The choice of this instrument, which assesses the respondent's relative preference for different end-states of existence, was predicated on four considerations. Firstly, there is recent evidence to indicate the utility of the Rokeach model in distinguishing among supporters of political parties in the Canadian context. Sutherland and Tanenbaum's (1975) research on a Canadian student sample shows that supporters of parties on the right side of the spectrum can be distinguished from those on the left with respect to their orderings of both instrumental and terminal values. Adherents to the right-wing parties (Social Credit and Progressive Conservative parties) emphasize A COMFORTABLE LIFE, FAMILY SECURITY, HAPPINESS, and NATIONAL SECURITY. In contrast, individuals supporting the New Democratic Party emphasize FREEDOM, EQUALITY, A WORLD AT PEACE, A WORLD OF BEAUTY and AN EXCITING LIFE. With specific reference to the two values central to Rokeach's "theory" of political ideology, whereas EQUALITY is the third highest ranked value in importance for NDP supporters, it is the tenth, eleventh, and twelfth ranked by Progressive Conservative, Liberal, and Social Credit supporters, respectively. FREEDOM is ranked as second-most important by NDP partisans, and eighth by adherents of right-wing parties. This inconsistency with Rokeach's theory raises three considerations: one, the cultural specificity of Rokeach's model;

two, a differing interpretation of the meaning of "FREEDOM" in the Canadian sample; and three, political parties in the Canadian context are not ideologically disparate. The over-all robustness of the instrument itself across cultures is not, however, hampered by the specificity of the model.

Secondly, the demands on the respondent's time were already so onerous that the simpler and less time-consuming the means of soliciting value preferences, the estimated higher completion rate and consequent reliability. The Rokeach instrument, when consisting of both sets of terminal and instrumental values, can normally be completed in about twenty minutes. Since the test-retest reliabilities are higher for the 18 terminal values than for the 18 instrumental values, it was decided to rely solely upon the 18 terminal values. The use of only one of the two sets would minimize the time required even more.

Thirdly, the Rokeach instrument is easily comprehended: an important consideration given the relatively low formal educational level of the study groups. And fourthly, covariation of the instrument with criterion attitude scales had demonstrated to the researcher's satisfaction the validity of the tool. (Sutherland and Tanenbaum, 1975)

Respondents were presented with the set of 18 terminal values, arranged alphabetically on gummed labels and asked to order them in the order of importance for them, placing the most important goal at the top of the ladder, in Box 1; the second most important goal beneath it, in Box 2, and so on. They were requested to place the least important goal at the bottom of the ladder, in Box 18. The median rankings, semi-interquartile range, and importance, and consensus ranks for the

NFU and non-NFU study groups are given in Table 5.10. The consensus ranks, derived from the semi-interquartile range scores, indicate the degree of consensus in the study group as to the importance of a given value.

For both groups, FAMILY SECURITY is clearly a primary goal: it is ranked first in both importance and consensus. FREEDOM is also a uniformly highly-prized value, being the second highest ranked in importance for the non-NFU group and the fourth highest ranked for the NFU. Its consensus ranking is second highest among NFU farmers and sixth highest among non-members. For the latter, HAPPINESS is valued highly and consensually. Because of the proximate nature of many value medians, the actual numerical ranking of each value is not as important as the relative ranking - whether the value appears in the top five or so, or in the bottom five or so. In terms of these criteria, FAMILY SECURITY is judged to be a uniformly highly valued goal; only slightly less important are A COMFORTABLE LIFE, FREEDOM, HAPPINESS, A WORLD AT PEACE, and A SENSE OF ACCOMPLISHMENT. However, the consensus in both groups concerning the importance of A COMFORTABLE LIFE, A WORLD AT PEACE, and A SENSE OF ACCOMPLISHMENT make it difficult to place any confidence in the uniform importance of these values in the group as a whole.

The six values ranked as least important for the NFU group are SALVATION, A WORLD OF BEAUTY, SOCIAL RECOGNITION, PLEASURE, NATIONAL SECURITY, and INNER HARMONY. Consensus is least, however, as to the unimportance of SALVATION and very low concerning PLEASURE and NATIONAL SECURITY. The six least important goals for the non-NFU group differ

Table 5.10 Median Value, Importance and Consensus Rankings of the 18 Terminal Values: NFU and Non-NFU Differences

	NFU (N=48)				Non-NFU (N=85)			
	Median	Impt. Rank	S.I. Range*	Consensus Rank	Median	Impt. Rank	S.I. Range	Consensus Rank
COMFORTABLE LIFE	3.29	2	3.84	11	6.25	3	4.64	11
EXCITING LIFE	11.50	12	2.94	4	12.55	14	3.65	12
SENSE ACCOMPLISHMENT	5.83	5	4.42	15	6.42	6	3.67	13
WORLD AT PEACE	5.50	3	3.90	12	6.40	5	4.38	17
WORLD OF BEAUTY	13.17	17	3.31	7	11.69	13	2.92	4
EQUALITY	9.17	8	4.35	14	7.80	7	3.75	14
FAMILY SECURITY	2.61	1	1.69	1	2.47	1	2.48	1
FREEDOM	5.50	4	2.21	2	5.92	2	3.21	6
HAPPINESS	6.00	6	3.17	6	6.29	4	2.84	2
INNER HARMONY	11.50	13	2.97	5	10.31	11	3.28	7
MATURE LOVE	9.50	10	3.39	9	11.42	12	3.94	16
NAT'L SECURITY	12.00	14	4.59	17	12.94	15	3.54	9
PLEASURE	12.83	15	4.44	16	14.44	16	3.40	8
SALVATION	15.50	18	5.14	18	14.69	17	4.98	18
SELF-RESPECT	10.17	11	3.35	8	9.14	10	3.89	15
SOCIAL RECOGNITION	13.10	16	3.93	13	14.85	18	2.87	3
TRUE FRIENDSHIP	7.63	7	2.88	3	8.57	9	3.02	5
WISDOM	9.50	9	3.67	10	8.19	8	3.60	10

*Semi-interquartile Range

slightly. Again, in order of least importance, they are SOCIAL RECOGNITION, SALVATION, PLEASURE, NATIONAL SECURITY, AN EXCITING LIFE, and A WORLD AT PEACE. As with the NFU group, consensus is least surrounding the ranking of SALVATION. But there is fairly high agreement that SOCIAL RECOGNITION, PLEASURE, NATIONAL SECURITY, and A WORLD OF BEAUTY are less important than other values. In short, while the value profiles of the two study groups are very similar, there is greater consensus among non-NFU members as to what is relatively unimportant.

Highly prized values for both groups of farmers are individualistic (self) values, with the possible exceptions of A WORLD AT PEACE and FREEDOM. (It is unclear whether FREEDOM - elaborated upon as independence, free choice - is perceived as freedom for the individual farmer or freedom for society as a whole.) How can those value systems best be described ideologically? Recall that Rokeach found evidence that known groups of conservatives rank FREEDOM high and EQUALITY low. Farmers here do indeed rank FREEDOM high - higher than EQUALITY. But EQUALITY is ranked eighth. While four other values are ranked before it (after FREEDOM), the median values of the two are close enough for it to appear unwise to describe one rating as "high" and the other as "low". Accordingly, on the basis of Rokeach's criterion, there is at best only meagre support in the value hierarchy for describing the study groups as conservative. In terms of the findings of Sutherland and Tanenbaum, farmers in both groups here value a mixture of both right wing and left wing values. The right wing values include A COMFORTABLE LIFE, FAMILY SECURITY, and HAPPINESS; the left wing values, A WORLD AT PEACE and

FREEDOM. Of these, consensual rankings are high for FAMILY SECURITY, FREEDOM, and HAPPINESS. If it can be established what sort of freedom farmers value, then it will be easier to affirm the correctness of observers of agrarian politics in arguing that farmers do indeed value just what the experience of farming seems best able to afford: freedom and a sense of accomplishment.

Before proceeding to other modes of inquiry into farmers' goals and values, it is of interest to note that a sample of residents in the capital city of Alberta who were surveyed in 1971 ranked FAMILY SECURITY, A WORLD AT PEACE, and FREEDOM among the top four most highly valued goals.¹⁰ The similarity of the value profiles of the two samples is striking. The Edmonton sample differs from the farmer groups in attaching a relatively lower priority to the other two values ranked highly here: A COMFORTABLE LIFE and A SENSE OF ACCOMPLISHMENT. (See Table 5.10B, Appendix B.) While further research is needed to determine the occupational specificity of a high ranking of A SENSE OF ACCOMPLISHMENT, it is possible to probe its meaning for Alberta farmers. The next set of items allowed the study groups the opportunity to do just that.

2. Desirable Aspects of Farming

While the Rokeach value survey is useful in describing general life goals individuals deem worth pursuing, it is less capable of delineating the specific meaning of those valued "end-states". More pointedly, it has been previously noted that it is unclear whether farmers value freedom for themselves or for society as a whole. In order to establish the more precise life goals of farmers in the two study groups, respondents were asked to elaborate upon the desirable aspects of farming. The question

posed of farmers was "What do you like most about farming?" The premise is that knowledge of what farmers value most about their occupation is informative of what they value in life generally.

Table 5.11 summarizes the aspects of farming which respondents in the two groups like most. (Since two responses were possible, Table 5.11 represents the combined measure of the two replies.) This table substantiates the high priority that farmers in both groups attach to freedom. Two-fifths of NFU members and one-third of non-members like farming simply for the independence it affords. 71% of NFU farmers and 60% of non-members mentioned "independence" in conjunction with some other aspect of farming as the most desirable aspect of farming. A closer scrutiny of farmers' responses confirms the appropriateness of regarding the freedom farmers value as personal freedom.

Table 5.11 Desirable Aspects of Farming:
NFU and Non-NFU Groups.

	NFU (N=48)	Non-NFU (N=85)
Independence	39.6% (19)	33.3% (28)
Independence and work	31.3 (15)	26.2 (22)
^a Type of work	22.9 (11)	38.1 (32)
Nothing	6.3 (3)	2.4 (2)
Missing data		(1)
	100.1%	100.0%

^aType of work includes references to specific jobs on the farm, the quiet and natural life, the sense of accomplishment, the diversity of work (involving the use of both physical and mental skills).

By far the single most liked aspect of farming is the chance it affords to "be my own boss". Just what sort of independence does that expression summarize? The most frequently mentioned type is independence of decision-making -- "being able to make my own decisions", "you can do what you want when you want", "you can set your own hours" to the point of "taking a day off when you want to" or doing tomorrow what you did not do today, and, most simply, "no one tells you what to do". Less frequently described is the opportunity for independence of individual development. As one farmer outlined his preferred aspect of farming, it entailed "I like the independence. Thinking for myself. I felt restricted when I was holding down a job (in town). Here there is more opportunity to expand myself and contribute."

Since the second type of independence valued is very much a minority response, it thus becomes possible to conclude that the independence that farmers value - the personal freedom from constraints on individual initiatives - is precisely the sort of freedom conservatives value.¹¹

As an interesting aside, it was common practice for farmers, in defining the independence of farming as its most desirable aspect, to compare their occupation with non-self-employed occupations. Workers in the latter jobs were perceived as being subject to undue pressure from other people and as having very little personal freedom. And yet, of the two groups of farmers, 42% had never worked off the farm and a further 38% had not done off-farm work for any longer than five years. Thus, surprising indeed are the occupational contrasts. Whether farmers are basing their views of off-farm occupations on experience of friends and

relatives, or whether a process of rationalization is at work here whereby farming becomes a worthwhile occupation for its satisfaction of less tangible goals than the visible one of providing an adequate income¹² is impossible to determine.

Thus in terms of their value rankings on the Rokeach instrument and their proffered reasons for liking farming, farmers in both groups are committed to goals of independence. NFU members are no less inclined than non-members to value the personal freedom they see farming as affording. How near do farmers feel they are to realizing these goals of independence? Most farmers believe they are reasonably close. The evidence is the overwhelming subscription of both groups to the idea that the farmer is more independent than the wage-earner: 8 out of 10 NFU members and 9 out of 10 non-members affirm this statement.¹³ Not only do farmers in both groups value independence for themselves, but they believe, as well, that other farmers are equally committed to the goal of independence. It is their fellow workers' independence and/or competitiveness which is a serious obstacle to farmers' organizing politically to realize goals in the political system. Of the group of farmers who fault farmers themselves for their inability to organize politically, 46% of the NFU farmers cited farmers' independence and competitiveness as reasons why farmers could not get together. The figure for non-NFU members is an astonishing 73% (again, of those blaming farmers).¹⁴ (The lower figure for the NFU members may result from an official NFU policy to dispell the idea of the necessity of farmer-farmer competition.)¹⁵

There are a variety of interesting speculations by farmers themselves as to why farmers are independent and competitive. In describing each other as competitive, farmers do so in terms like the following: "Each farmer is scared his neighbours will get ahead of him". "Every farmer feels he is smarter than all the other farmers." Competition is seen to occur between big and small farmers;¹⁶ between farmers in different types of agriculture - for example, beef farmers compete with grain growers in the sense that beef producers want cheap feed grain while grain growers want expensive grain to sell; between farmers with different political outlooks; between farmers of different ethnic and national origins; and between farmers with just different personalities.

When respondents refer to the independence of (other) farmers, they generally mean one of two things: either a preoccupation with one's own "kingdom" and a concomitant lack of concern with the problems of neighbouring farmers, or a disinclination from taking orders from anyone else (as they might have to do within an organization).¹⁷ The parochialism of the farmer preoccupied with his own product and with making his own livelihood is felt, by some farmers, to be a byproduct of the type of life farmers live and have chosen. As one farmer said, "They don't have to get together." (My emphasis.) In addition to the solitary, individualistic nature of the enterprise of farming, the idea that "Farmers have to compete with each other" contributes to the independence of farmers.

Accordingly, the evidence favors the twenty-year old argument of Macpherson that the practice of farming itself promotes independence. (1953: 220-222) That is at least in part how farmers view the source of

farmers' competition and individualism, and by their own admission it is a situation they find desirable.

B. The Commitment to Private Property

Theoretically, the right of the individual to own private property (and to dispose of it as he sees fit) is one of the basic tenets of free enterprise and conservatism. In fact, the conservative is frequently defined as one who equates freedom with this right.

(Hailsham, 1959: 7-102; Kirk: 18) Historically, one of the major reasons for labelling the prairie farmer a capitalist and conservative has been his commitment to the private ownership of farm land. Krueger and Bennett (1968: 350, 354) cite as evidence of the importance of individual land tenure to farmers the "necessity" for the CCF to eliminate the plank of "collective ownership of land" from its platform before it could amass support to form the government in Saskatchewan in 1944.

If it is true that individuals adhere more strongly to values when those values are threatened, then now is indeed a ripe time to measure the strength of the Alberta farmers' commitment to the private ownership of land. For the past two decades, farms in Canada have been growing larger in size, fewer in number, and more costly to acquire. Today, the aggrandizement of land in the hands of fewer and fewer operators means that the existence of the family farm which typically ranged in size from a half to a section and a half is jeopardized. The principle of the freedom of individual land tenure is seriously threatened by the entry of corporations (which enjoy an advantage in capital) into farming.

There are two questions of concern here. One, are farmers in the two study groups committed to individual ownership of land and the family farm? And two, to what extent does that commitment reflect conservative values in either or both groups?

Fully 79% of the farmers in both study groups feel the trend toward a reduction in the number of family farms is a bad one. Only one farmer felt it was unqualifiedly good; the remaining 20% viewed it as both good and bad. The perspective of the latter group was that as the non-profitable farms disappear, the people formerly on them will be better off.

Why do the huge majority of farmers in both groups feel the disappearance of the family farm is a bad trend? It is not simply because they feel they will be worse off personally. 56% of them felt they would be; 42% felt they would be unaffected, and the remaining 2% did not know. While the largest proportion of the farmers in both groups couch their response in terms of the effect fewer farms will have on them personally, substantial numbers refer to the social consequences of the trend, and over one-fifth of both groups cite both personal and social reasons for disapproving of the trend.

Reasons why farmers in the two study groups dislike the trend away from the family farm are presented in Table 5.12. The first part gives the frequency with which each of the ten different types of reasons were mentioned. The total percentages exceed 100%, owing to the possibility of multiple responses. The ten responses in the first part of the table have been collapsed into broader categories in the second part of the table. For example, an individual who mentions "Social Problems" in the second part of the table would have suggested one or more of

"Lead to Urban Problems", "Less Food Produced", "Higher Food Costs" or "Overproduction of Food" in the first part of the table. Similarly, the category "Loss of a Way of Life" in part two subsumes "Destroy Rural Community" and "Loss of community Country/Way of Life". Accordingly, the much higher percentage of NFU members bemoaning the "Loss of a Way of Life" in part two of Table 5.12 is accounted for by their greater reference to the loss of the rural community in part one. Likewise, the relatively larger non-NFU figure for citing increased social problems with the disappearance of the family farm in part two is accounted for by greater reference to problems stemming from under-production of food in part one.

There are some interesting contrasts between the two groups. First, members of the National Farmers Union regret more than non-members the passing of a way of life that was beneficial to both the rural community and the entire country. While farmers in both study groups fervently believe in the superiority of the rural life,¹⁸ NFU members are much more likely to spell out the consequences of its decline. Farmers directly referred to what the better way of life meant for the individual, the rural community, and the country as a whole.

"The farm is a healthier atmosphere in which to raise a family."

"If you leave farming to bigger farms, the towns and country stores will automatically disappear."

"When the farm population declines, the prosperity of the country goes since the farmer is the backbone. Corporate farms don't do as much for the country as the family farm."

"Agriculture is the backbone of the country and it should stay that way."

Secondly, the resulting social problems that fewer farms will create are most frequently mentioned as deleterious consequences by non-NFU members. These include the shortage of food and the probability of higher food prices, increasing unemployment and welfare, and housing problems experienced by urban centres as former farmers and former would-be farmers migrate to urban centres.

Thirdly, although numbers here are small, non-NFU farmers are somewhat more inclined to regret the decline of the family farm because they see it being replaced by "big operators". Some of these farmers denounce larger/corporate farms in general terms the implication being that replacing the family farm with "large syndicates", "corporate farms", or "too many big guys getting in and controlling things" were sufficiently obvious denunciations in themselves that there was no need to elaborate further. Other farmers decried large units specifically because they represent a lessening of the farmer's freedom. With larger units, farmers "will have to work for wages", "will have to do what they're told since they'll just be working for a company", and "they won't be their own boss anymore". This category of reasons for disliking the disappearance of the family farm - this "Against Bigness" category - unaccompanied by any other type of reasoning is more than any other response conservative in its outlook. It seems to reflect an assumption that "small is good and big is bad".¹⁹ Big represents domination of the individual and a consequent loss of personal freedom. However, the number of farmers subscribing to this position exclusively is few. Most farmers in both study groups are more thoughtful and altruistic in their regrets for the decline of the family farm.

To conclude, farmers in both study groups adhere to relatively conservative values. Life goals are personal, close-to-home ones. Satisfactions derived from farming relate to independence and autonomy. The subjective impression, garnered by perusing respondents' comments, is that independence and parochialism coexist. This impression is supported by statistical evidence which comes in the form of associations between selected values on the Rokeach survey and reported reasons for liking farming. Mean value rankings of respondents who mentioned each of the possible desirable aspects of farming (independence, type of work, independence and type of work) are calculated for five values - EQUALITY, A WORLD AT PEACE, A COMFORTABLE LIFE, FREEDOM and A SENSE OF ACCOMPLISHMENT. (These values have been chosen because of their importance in distinguishing ideologies and there being sufficient variance within both groups on their rankings.) While differences of means on the rankings of the values are low for the most part in both groups (the reflection of the general accord as to what are important goals), in the NFU and the non-NFU group, the most inward looking farmers are those who like farming because of the independence they feel it affords, and the most outward looking, those who like the type of work associated with farming. That is, in the NFU group, individuals who like the independence farming affords give a lower priority to A WORLD AT PEACE and EQUALITY. Those who find the type of work most desirable place a greater emphasis on A WORLD AT PEACE and EQUALITY, and a lesser one on A COMFORTABLE LIFE and A SENSE OF ACCOMPLISHMENT. Farmers most satisfied with farming, who mention liking both the independence and type of work, value A COMFORTABLE LIFE and EQUALITY moreso than others.

In the non-NFU group, individuals who like the independence of farming emphasize FAMILY SECURITY and FREEDOM more so than others, and A SENSE OF ACCOMPLISHMENT less so. Those who like the type of work associated with their occupation place a higher than average priority on A WORLD AT PEACE and a lower than average value on A COMFORTABLE LIFE and FREEDOM. Non-NFU farmers most pleased with farming, who like both the independence and the work, stress EQUALITY more than others and A WORLD AT PEACE less than others.

Hence, while NFU members who value the independence farming affords undervalue altruistic goals, and non-NFU farmers who like the independence of farming over-value egocentric goals, the import is the same: an inward-looking stance and preferring the autonomy of farming co-occur. This meshing of the two methods of tapping farmers' values and life goals thereby indicates that the task of this second section - to tap the values and goals of the two farmer groups - has been successful.

Notes on Chapter 5

- 1 This reading is based on public statements of the Canadian Cattlemens' Association and the Palliser Wheat Growers' Association as reported in The Western Producer, a farm weekly serving the three prairie provinces. See, for example, "Income Assurance Plans Not Answer to Producers' Problems Say Cattlemen", Western Producer, Thursday, October 16, 1975, p. 10.
- 2 The intent originally was to construct a scale of degree of recommended federal (provincial) involvement in production. Such a scale would have end points representing, at the one end, a recommendation of no governmental involvement at all in production, and, at the other, high governmental involvement. High governmental involvement would take the form of production controls. In between these extremities, running from the non-involvement to the high involvement end, would be placed recommendations for a governmental advisory role, for a monetary and financial assistance role, for intervention in the establishment of cost and profit controls, for ensuring a fair price, and for controlling production in various ways. The scale would then be as follows:

1	2	3	4	5	6
No role	Advisory role	Financial Assistance	Cost & Profit Controls	Ensure fair return	Production controls

In accordance with this plan, all respondents' replies to the production questions were content analysed and coded along this continuum. As the coding task progressed, it became increasingly clear to the researcher that such a continuum would be a most unreliable indicator of the farmers' responses if it were indeed treated as a scale of recommended involvement. This was because while the logic of the scale meant that a recommendation that the government ensure a fair price (a score of "5") would also constitute a recommendation that the government provide financial assistance in the form of incentive grants, for example, (a score of "3"), some farmers would endorse a position at "4" or "5" or "6" without endorsing a position at "2" or "3". Indeed, farmers frequently suggested that the government's role should be to ensure a fair price because "If they paid us a fair price, we wouldn't need all these incentive grants and subsidies." In short, a proposal that the government ensure a fair price to farmers is a qualitatively different response than that of proposing a role of monetary assistance. Repeated scrutinies of the responses to the production questions thereby lent support to the earlier assumption that it may not be sensible to posit conservatism, liberalism, and socialism as different points on a continuum. Conservatism and socialism are to some extent opposite, but so are liberalism and

socialism. This being the case, it was decided that the responses would be coded as "conservative", as "liberal", or as "radical" (socialist?) In line with the continuum set forth earlier, responses recommending "no role" were coded as "conservative"; those suggesting an advisory and monetary assistance role as "liberal"; and speculations that the government involve itself in the regulation of the profits of corporations, the ensuring of a fair price to the farmer, or the establishment of production quotas and controls as "radical".

3. The data set was collected by researchers at the University of Alberta, of which Professor Richard Baird was the Principal Researcher, in August, 1971. The N for the farmers' responses reported here is 144. Disagreement with this statement does not necessarily mean disagreement with limits on what the farmer can produce. A farmer could disagree with the statement because in a world of starving people, he feels there should be no limits to food production.
4. LIFT was mentioned 6/10 times under the "Incentive Scheme" heading; as a percentage of all harmful programs, it was mentioned 25% of the time.
5. Further evidence that when non-NFU farmers think of farm size limits it is limits on corporate farms, not individual enterprises, comes from the results of a factor analysis of these two attitudinal items with other items. While both items load on the same factor on an oblique pattern matrix for the non-NFU group, they do not for the NFU farmers.
6. The Gamma measure of association for Preferred Type of Marketing by NFU Membership is .40 when missing data are excluded (chi square statistic significant at .05 level); and .52 with missing data included (chi square statistic significant at .01 level).

7 NFU (N=37)

Input Supplies' <u>Cost Controls</u>	Federal Production Role			N
	<u>Conservative</u>	<u>Liberal</u>	<u>Radical</u>	
Agree	33%	36%	30%	99%(33)
Disagree	50	-	50	100%(4)

8. Non-NFU (N=96)

<u>Input Cost Controls</u>	Federal Production Role			N
	<u>Conservative</u>	<u>Liberal</u>	<u>Radical</u>	
Agree	34%	30%	36%	100%(70)
Disagree	39	46	15	100%(13)
Missing Data				(13)

Farm Price Controls	Federal Production Role			
	Conservative	Liberal	Radical	N
Agree	35.5%	29%	35.5%	100% (62)
Disagree	47	37	16	100% (19)
Missing data				(15)

9	Non-NFU (N=96)	Federal Production Role			
		Conservative	Liberal	Radical	N
	<u>Marketing</u>				
	Canadian Wheat Board	36%	33%	31%	100% (42)
	Open marketing	33	36	30	(33)
	Missing data				(21)

- 10 The researcher thanks Mr. Eric Tanenbaum, SSRC Archive Director at the University of Essex for making these data available.
- 11 It may well be that it is only this type of conservatism (freedom) that the questions could elicit. The possibility that farmers are concerned with more global questions of freedom should not therefore be ruled out.
- 12 The evidence that farmers regard farming as a less than adequate occupation on the visible criterion of providing a suitable income comes in the form of responses to what farmers dislike most about farming. 29.2% of NFU farmers and 20% of non-NFU farmers mentioned "Income/Financial Problems" as the single feature they disliked most. A further 20.8% NFU farmers and 15.3% non-NFU farmers cited "Income/Financial Problems" in conjunction with some other aspect.
- 13 The statement read "The farmer is more independent than people who work for wages"; of NFU farmers, 13% disagreed somewhat and 7% disagreed strongly with the statement. Of non-NFU farmers, 6% disagreed somewhat and 1% strongly with the statement. The Gamma statistic is -.40 and the chi square statistic is significant at the .06 level.
- 14 31% of NFU members and 46% of non-members faulted farmers or their organizations for their inability to organize politically. Thus, the 46% and 73% figures quoted in the text are 46% of 31% to represent the percentage of total NFU members who cited individualism and competitiveness as detriments to mobilization, and 73% of 46% to represent the corresponding non-NFU figure.

- 15 The NFU Submission to the Alberta Agricultural Marketing Council presented at Taber, Alberta, Jan. 24, 1973, included the following idea: "The recognized effect of competition is to destroy profits and in a profit-oriented system, individual competition among farmers has certainly resulted in widespread reduction in the number of farm families now living in our rural areas.", pp. 1 - 2.
- 16 One member of the National Farmers Union recalled attending an NFU meeting where the biggest farmers, he felt, always had the most to say and the little farmer felt left out.
- 17 This definition of individualism offered by farmers closely approximates the notion of individualism that a capitalist values: "This individualism stresses the moral responsibility and opportunity of each person to serve his own needs as he sees fit. It is his responsibility to act purposefully in his own behalf; he should not be concerned for others, nor should he expect others to serve his needs for him." Dolbeare and Dolbeare, p. 32.
- 18 54% of the NFU group agreed strongly and 33% agreed somewhat with the following statement: "The rural life produces a better kind of person than the town or city life." Comparable figures for the non-NFU group are 61% agreeing strongly and 25% agreeing somewhat.
- 19 Assuming that the philosophy "small is good and big is bad" denotes an ideological perspective - and a conservative one - may be erroneous insofar as this same perspective has been adopted of late by the new left and by a group of economists. See E.F. Schumacher, Small is Beautiful (London: Abacus, 1974).

Chapter 6
The Structure of Farmers' Belief Systems
and
A Typology of Activity and Belief

Selected but limited differences of content distinguish the belief sets of farmers recruited to the protest farm organization from those of the unrecruited. In terms of both how they view the world operating and how they suggest it ought to function, NFU members have been shown to be more radical than their non-member counterparts. Because belief system research is inevitably concerned with understanding the linkages between belief components, documenting the content of the belief set is not sufficient. The second and equally important task involves uncovering the pattern whereby the belief components are related to one another. Discerning the links between evaluative and cognitive belief components is of paramount importance in uncovering the reasons for evaluation. A farmer's support for governmental regulation of prices will be more understandable if it is shown that this same farmer perceives monopolistic control over price-fixing and assesses such control as detrimental to the farmer. In short, uncovering the "view of reality" on which judgments are based is important in describing an evaluative-belief set.

Thus, this chapter examines, first, the structure of farmers' political belief sets. More precisely, the degree of inter-relationship of evaluative and cognitive components will be examined for the purpose of uncovering the cognitive bases of judgments for regulation of the pricing, marketing, and production sectors. There are two further

purposes of this chapter. The second objective is to describe the set of consensual beliefs among farmers as a whole and the constellation of particularistic beliefs to which members of the National Farmers Union adhere. The third goal is the construction of a typology based on the criteria of belief content and NFU membership which will facilitate the understanding of the conditions under which beliefs and activity are congruent.

I. Structure of Belief Systems

The inquiry focuses upon structure among the following cognitive and evaluative belief elements.¹

Cognitive belief elements

- (1) Control in the Pricing Sector
 - corporations establish farm prices/corporations do not establish farm prices
 - manufacturers fix input supplies' costs/manufacturers do not fix input costs
- (2) Control in the Marketing Sector
 - speculators benefit from open marketing/speculators do not benefit
- (3) Control in Political Decision-Making
 - *-political authorities under influential
 - *-economic forces over influential
- (4) Class nature of society
 - radical view of class structure/non-radical view

Evaluative belief elements

- (1) Appropriate Pricing System
 - agree with controls on farm prices/disagree with controls
 - agree with controls on input costs/disagree with controls
- (2) Appropriate Marketing System
 - prefer orderly (Canadian Wheat Board) marketing/
 - prefer open marketing
- (3) Appropriate Organization of the Production Sector
 - conservative federal production role/non-conservative role
 - liberal federal production role/non-liberal role
 - radical federal production role/non-radical role

- *- agree with legislating a maximum farm size
- *- agree with restricting corporate entry into farming

*These are continuous level variables. All non-starred variables are dichotomous (dummy) variables wherein the response on the left side of the / is scored as "1"; that on the right side as "0".

For the purposes of the discussion here, a "radical" position on each of these belief elements is the position on the left side of the / in the event of dichotomous variables and the affirmation of the item in the continuous level measures.

As in the preceding two chapters, the concern is to determine intergroup differences for the ultimate objective of relating farmers' belief systems to one type of political activity - joining a protest organization. Hence, the analysis is divided into two parts: first, the structure among cognitive and evaluative beliefs in the NFU group is detailed; and secondly, the same analyses are undertaken for the non-NFU group.

A. The NFU Group

Since the NFU study group is comprised of only NFU members who do not hold conjoint membership in a counter organization with an officially "free enterprise" ideology (and hence the N is 37), there is a "disappearing cell" problem. There is little or no variance among NFU members on cognitions and evaluations of the pricing system: 72% concur that it is corporations that control farm prices and 69% that manufacturers set farm supplies' costs; 86% and 89% favor controls on farm produce prices and input supplies' costs, respectively. With respect to cognitions of the marketing system, over three-fifths of the

NFU farmers agree that the beneficiary of the open marketing system is not the farmer but the speculator. This high degree of accord of perspective, combined with the small sample size, limits the extent to which statistical correlations are meaningful indicators of the structural inter-relatedness of belief items. Nevertheless, correlations and measures of association do provide some insight into the links between cognitions and evaluations and, in the absence of multidimensional techniques of structural analyses, form the bases of the following discussion.

Tables 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3 are reference tables for this section wherein the task is to answer the question of whether, in the NFU group, recommendations for regulation of the three agricultural sectors - pricing, production, and marketing - are rooted in views of externalized control of that sector and society generally. Table 6.1 reports the association between cognitive belief elements regarding the pricing and marketing sectors and evaluations of the pricing, marketing and production sectors. Table 6.2 contrasts the evaluative beliefs on pricing, marketing, and production of individuals with a conservative and radical class structure perspective. (The number of individuals ascribing to the liberal perspective is very small; hence this group has been dropped from the comparison here.) Table 6.3 reports Pearson correlations of distribution of influence in decision-making items and a radical class perspective, on the one hand, with recommendations for regulation of the pricing, marketing, and production sectors on the other.

Table 6.1 Gamma Measure of Association Between Cognitive Beliefs Regarding the Pricing and Marketing Sectors and Evaluations Regarding the Pricing, Marketing and Production Sectors: NFU (N=37)

Cognitions	Evaluations					
	Farm Price Controls	Input Cost Controls	CWB Mk.	Federal* Prod. Role	Farm Size Limits	Restrict Corporate Entry
Corps. control prices	.29	-1.00	-.22	-.40	-.11	-.11
Manufs. set costs	.22	- .18	-.30	-.26	-.61	.23
Specul. benefit open	.79	-.14	1.00	.08	.26	.27

Level of measurement: all variables are dichotomous (dummy variables) except "Federal Prod. Role", "Farm Size Limits", "Restrict Corporate Entry" which are ordinal level measures.

*In Table 6.1, "Federal Prod. Role" is treated as an ordinal variable wherein a high score signifies a radical role; a moderate score, a liberal role; and a low score, a conservative role. When the three recommended roles are treated as separate (dummy) variables, the Pearson r's are as follows.

	Conserv. Prod. Role	Liberal Prod. Role	Radical Prod. Role
Corps. control prices	.19	.02	-.21
Manufs. set costs	.10	.06	-.16
Specul. benefit open	-.09	.09	-.01

Table 6.2 Class Structure View and Evaluations Regarding the Pricing, Marketing, and Production Sectors: NFU %'s* (N=37)

<u>Class Structure</u> <u>View</u>	Evaluations							
	Farm Price Controls	Input Cost Controls	CWB Mk.	Conserv. Prod. Role	Liberal Prod. Role	Radical Prod. Role	Farm Size Lim.	Restrict Corporate Entry
Conservative	100%	89	67	44	11	44	78	67
Radical	87	87	83	30	39	30	74	87

*Cell entries are percentages of individuals with a Conservative(Radical) Class Structure View who evaluate the need for Farm Price Controls, Input Cost Controls, and so on.

Table 6.3 Pearson Correlations of Distribution of Decision-Making Influence and Radical Class View with Evaluations Regarding Pricing, Marketing, and Production Sectors: NFU. Evaluations

	Wheat Board Marketing	Conserv. Prod. Role	Liberal Prod. Role	Radical Prod. Role	Farm Size Limits	Restrict Corporate Entry
Pol. Auth. Under Infl.	.34	-.01	-.32	.33	.13	.51
Econ. Forces Over Infl.	.33	-.02	-.21	.23	.20	.17
Radical Class Perspective	.17	-.13	.22	-.10	-.02	.33

Level of measurement: all variables are dichotomous (dummy) variables except "Farm Size Limits", "Restrict Corporate Entry", "Political Authorities Under Influence" and "Economic Forces Over Influential".

(N=37)

What then are the cognitive components of recommendations for regulation of various agricultural sectors? First, with respect to the pricing sector, the call for its regulation tends to be grounded for the most part in cognitions of the functioning of the pricing system itself - specifically the monopolistic control by corporations and manufacturers over the sector (Table 6.1). The advocacy of regulation of farm produce prices is (unlike the recommendation of input cost controls) related to views of control in two other sectors - the marketing sector (Speculators controlling the open market system of grain selling) and a conservative view of the class structure of Canadian society (Tables 6.1 and 6.2, respectively).

Secondly, the preference for a regulated, orderly marketing scheme is linked to more cognitive components than are other evaluative belief elements. It is associated not only with a view of the functioning of the marketing system itself but also with a more general perception of the distribution of influence and control in the political system and society as a whole. Individuals who recommend Canadian Wheat Board marketing have a view of speculators as benefitting from open marketing (Table 6.1), of political control as maldistributed in favor of the economic sector (Table 6.3), and (weakly) of the inappropriateness of the class nature of Canadian society (Table 6.2).

Thirdly, recommendations for regulation of the production sector occur alongside views of political decision-making as out of the hands of the legitimate political authorities and in that of the economic sector (the middlemen and the multinationals). This holds true of

recommendations for a radical federal production role, limits on farm size, and restrictions on corporate entry into farming (Table 6.3). Views of control within the marketing and pricing sectors are also related to selected judgments of the need for regulation of the production sector - especially with respect to establishing limits on corporate farming (Table 6.1).

The desire to have restrictions upon corporations entering into production appears to be rooted in views of the input aspect of pricing (Table 6.1), of marketing (Table 6.1), and of political decision-making as out of the hands of farmers and political authorities (Table 6.3). It is, as well, congruent with a negative judgement of the organization of society along class lines (Table 6.2). The willingness for regulation of corporate entry into the production sector is thus apparently rooted in a vision of manufacturers, speculators, and the economically powerful as encroaching upon other aspects of farming. To a lesser extent, those links recur with respect to the inclination to see maximum limits on farm sizes (Tables 6.1 and 6.3).

With respect to the three possible roles recommended for the federal government in production, the cognitive bases of each are slightly - and informatively - different. Whereas the radical production role is congruent with perceptions of the economic sector dominating political decision-making, the liberal production role is negatively related to such views and the conservative role is not associated at all with views of the appropriateness of the distribution of decision-making influence (Table 6.3). Hence, it appears that radicals are recommending greater governmental involvement at least partly because they feel that governmental

regulation of production is a preferable alternative to the undue influence of middlemen and large corporations in farming.

Another correlate of the federal production role recommended is the perspective regarding the class nature of Canadian society (Table 6.2). Individuals who are conservative in their production control outlook are also conservative in their view of Canada's class nature; liberals on the criterion of production regulation are radical in their class perspective. The finding is interesting, giving rise to the speculation that the conservatives (on the production question) know their place and are happy to be left alone in it; the liberals (on production) want no barriers to their (successful) pursuit of their goals - either class or regulatory.²

B. The Non-NFU Group

This discussion draws upon Tables 6.4 through 6.6 to trace the cognitive correlates of non-NFU members' assessments of the appropriateness of regulation of the pricing, marketing, and production sectors. On the whole, the exercise yields similar results to those established for the NFU group.

First, among non-NFU members, advocating regulation of the pricing sector is based on perceptions of monopolistic control with respect to farm produce price fixing (Table 6.4), speculator manipulation of the open marketing of grain (Table 6.4), and weakly with a radical class perspective (Table 6.5). In addition, the affirmation of the need for farm produce price controls is related to a view of decision-making influence as wielded to a lesser extent than is suitable by legitimate political authorities (Table 6.6). Thus, judgments by non-members of

the need to control the pricing sector are more extensively linked to cognitive elements than those of NFU members.

Secondly, espousing the necessity of orderly, regulated Marketing occurs alongside cognitions of external monopolistic control of both the marketing and pricing sectors (Table 6.4). It is rooted, as well, in a view of economic forces as exercising predominant control over decision-making (Table 6.5), and weakly with a radical class perspective (Table 6.5). Thus, the cognitive correlates of regulation of the marketing system are similar for both study groups - extending beyond a perception of the functioning of the marketing system to an appraisal of the locus of control in decision-making and society as a whole.

Thirdly, while the pattern differs somewhat for each of the three aspects of production (recommended federal role, limiting corporate farming, establishing farm size limits), advocating regulation of the production sector occurs alongside a view of the inappropriateness of the distribution of political control. That is, non-NFU individuals who recommend a radical production role view political authorities as under-influential; farmers who espouse limiting the size of farms suggest the economic sector is overly powerful; and farmers who want corporate farming restricted view political authorities as under-persuasive and economic forces as predominant (Table 6.6).

Other cognitive correlates of non-NFU recommendations for regulation of the production sector tend to be more or less congruent with those established for the NFU group. Thus, advocating restrictions on farm ownership and size are (contrary to the NFU group) founded on views of external control of the pricing and marketing sectors (Table 6.4),

Table 6.4 Gamma Measure of Association Between Cognitive Beliefs Regarding the Pricing and Marketing Sectors and Evaluations Regarding the Pricing, Marketing, and Production Sectors: Non-NFU (N=96)

<u>Cognitions</u>	<u>Evaluations</u> *					
	Farm Price Controls	Input Cost Controls	CWB Mk.	Federal Prod. Role	Farm Size Limit	Restrict Corporate Entry
Corps. control prices	.57	.54	.49	.15	.09	.30
Manufs. set costs	.19	.08	.38	.11	.17	.42
Specul. benefit open	.33	.74	.90	-.02	.32	.14

Level of measurement: all variables are dichotomous (dummy) variables except "Federal Prod. Role", "Farm Size Limits" and "Restrict Corporate Entry" which are continuous level measures.

*In Table 6.4, "Federal Prod. Role" is treated as an ordinal variable, whereby low, medium, and high scores represent conservative, liberal, and radical roles, respectively. When the three recommended roles are treated as separate (dummy) variables, the Pearson r's are as follows.

	Conser. Prod. Role	Liberal Prod. Role	Radical Prod. Role
Corps. control prices	.00	-.05	.16
Manufs. set costs	.06	-.13	.17
Specul. benefit open	-.03	.25	-.07

Table 6.5 Class Structure View and Evaluations Regarding the Pricing, Marketing, and Production Sectors: Non-NFU %'s* (N=96)

Class Structure View	Evaluations							
	Farm Price Controls	Input Cost Controls	CWB Mk.	Conserv. Prod. Role	Liberal Prod. Role	Radical Prod. Role	Farm Size Limits	Restrict Corporate Entry
Conservative	75%	83	50	42	25	33	56	84
Liberal	63	82	47	40	40	20	41	73
Radical	90	91	60	30	32	38	45	77

*Cell entries are percentages of individuals with a Conservative(Radical) Class Structure View who evaluate the need for farm Price Controls, Input Controls, and so on.

Table 6.6 Pearson Correlations of Distribution of Decision-Making Influence and Radical Class View with Evaluations Regarding Pricing, Marketing, and Production Sectors: Non-NFU (N=96)

	Evaluations							
	Farm Price Controls	Input Cost Controls	CWB Mk.	Conserv. Prod. Role	Liberal Prod. Role	Radical Prod. Role	Farm Size Limits	Restrict Corporate Entry
Pol. Auth. Under Infl.	.26	.07	-.01	-.03	-.13	.19	.06	.23
Econ. Forces Over Infl.	.07	.14	.19	.03	.06	.10	.28	.23
Radical Class Perspective	.18	.10	.10	-.13	.02	.02	-.03	-.06

Level of measurement: all variables are dichotomous (dummy) variables except "Farm Size Limits", "Restrict Corporate Entry", "Political Authorities under Influential", and "Economic Forces over Influential".

of a conservative class perspective (Table 6.5); and, as mentioned, on a cognition of decision-making influence as improperly distributed (Table 6.6).

Like the NFU group, non-NFU farmers conservative in their outlook regarding federal intervention in the production sector adhere to a conservative view of the class nature of Canadian society; unlike the NFU group, non-NFU producers with a liberal production outlook are weakly inclined to be liberals with respect to their viewpoint regarding the Canadian class structure (Table 6.5). Thus, for both study groups, efforts to trace the cognitive bases of recommended federal production roles do not yield particularly fruitful results. For the NFU group, the clearest correlate of a radical production perspective is a radical vision of the distribution of political influence - as out of the grasp of political authorities and in that of the economic sector (Table 6.3). For the non-NFU group, the radical production perspective is rooted in only one aspect of the assessment of the distribution of political influence - that is, that political authorities are less dominant than they should be (Table 6.6). For both study groups, liberal and conservative production perspectives appear to be related to broad observations of the class structure of Canadian society (Tables 6.2 and 6.5).

In short, the structural character of the belief sets of the two study groups does not differ greatly. For both groups, recommendations for regulation and/or governmental involvement in the pricing, marketing, and production sectors of farming are based on perceptions of control externalized from the farmer in one or more of the pricing, marketing and

political decision-making sectors. Possibly the best example of inter-group similarity is the wide cognitive base of a recommendation for order and regulation within the marketing sector (that is, a preference for Canadian Wheat Board marketing). It is grounded in locus of control cognitions extending to the distribution of political influence and (less strongly) to the class nature of Canadian society. There are slight variations between the two farmer groups in the extent to which "radical" evaluative beliefs regarding the pricing sector, for example, are linked to cognitions specific to that agricultural sector or more general perceptions of the locus of control in other sectors. However, most inter-group differences of structuring are minor.

While the structural nature of cognitive-evaluative belief elements does not differ greatly for the two study groups, Table 6.7 demonstrates that the incidence of association of certain cognitive and evaluative belief elements is greater within the NFU group than the non-member group. Percentages in Table 6.7 indicate the proportion of the NFU and non-NFU group as a whole which is congruent on the two items. Thus they give some indication of the degree of consensus within the two study groups concerning the association of the two belief elements. Accordingly, with respect to cognitive links to espousing the regulation of farm produce prices, for 63% of the NFU group and 46% of the non-member group, favoring the regulation of produce prices occurs alongside a view of corporations controlling farm prices. Similarly, in the NFU group as a whole, the preference for orderly marketing is linked for 51% with a view of corporations controlling farm prices, for 49% with a perception that manufacturers set input costs, and for 61% with a view

that speculators benefit from open marketing. The comparative non-NFU group percentages are 36%, 39%, and 40% respectively. Further inter-group contrasts in this same vein can be noted with respect to the cognitive bases of advocating farm size limits, corporate entry into farming, and regulation of input costs. Hence, the incidence of cognitive-evaluative belief association within the protest organization is higher than among the more disparate non-member group. This is to be expected. But the pattern (the direction of the correlation) whereby evaluative recommendations for organization of the pricing, marketing, and production sectors are linked to views of the way each of these sectors operates is not substantially different.

In order to arrive at some over all appraisal of the manner in which belief sets of NFU members differ from those of farmers not similarly recruited to this organization, a review of the highlights of Chapters 4 and 5 is now undertaken. The objective is to develop a profile of consensual beliefs which farmers in both study groups adhere to, and a set of the more particularistic beliefs which NFU members hold to a greater extent than do non-members. These two profiles will emphasize the substantive and structural distinctions between the belief systems of the members of the protest farm organization and non-members.

II. Consensual and Particularistic Belief Sets in the Two Study Groups

A. Consensual Beliefs

Cognitions regarding the locus of control with respect to current farm problems, the pricing, marketing, and political arena have been detailed in Chapter 4. Evaluations of regulation of the pricing, marketing, and production sectors, as well as of more general values and

Table 6.7 Incidence of Joint Occurrence of Cognitive and Evaluative Belief Elements
Regarding the Pricing, Marketing, and Production Sectors: %'s*

<u>NFU Group</u> <u>Cognitions</u>	Farm Price Controls	Input Cost Controls	CWB Mk.	Evaluations			Farm Size Limits	Restrict Corporate Entry
				Conserv. Prod. Role	Liberal Prod. Role	Radical Prod. Role		
Corps. control prices	63%	60	51	29	23	20	56	62
Manufs. set costs	60	60	49	26	23	20	53	56
Specul. Benefit open	58	55	61	18	24	18	47	53
 <u>Non-NFU Group</u> <u>Cognitions</u>								
Corps. control prices	46	48	36	19	16	20	27	44
Manufs. set costs	51	55	39	24	18	23	33	53
Specul. Benefit open	38	43	40	16	20	13	24	36

*% of group congruent on the two items

Level of measurement: all variables are dichotomous (dummy) variables except "Farm Size Limits" and "Restrict Corporate Entry", which are continuous level measures.

life goals have been tapped in Chapter 5. The consensus of farmers in both study groups, in the sense of representing the belief elements to which over one half of the farmers in both groups adhere, includes a subscription to the following beliefs. (The proportion of NFU and non- NFU farmers agreeing with each belief is given in Table 6.8)

Consensual Beliefs

General Locus of Control

1. Control (in the sense of ability to act) with respect to the cost-price squeeze lies with the government and extra governmental forces and not with the farmer.

Pricing Control

2. Control is completely externalized from the farmer in the matter of farm produce prices and input supplies' costs. Farmers have no say in either matter.
3. Determination of farm input supplies' prices is monopolized by the manufacturer of each commodity.

Decision-Making

4. Multinational corporations, the Canadian Pacific Railway, chain food stores, packing plants, and the United States' government all have too much influence in the important decisions that affect farmers.
5. Farmers' elected representatives - the Member of Parliament and the Member of the Legislative Assembly - as well as their farm organizations have too little say in important decision-making.
6. The decision-making system is closed to the individual farmer who is unable to have the say he feels entitled to.

Class Structure of Society

7. Society is structured along class lines and ought not to be.

Pricing Regulation

8. The prices of farm produce and input supplies should be controlled.

Production Regulation

9. Corporate farming should be outlawed.

General Values and Life Goals

10. The disappearance of the family farm is a bad trend.
11. The farmer is more independent than the wage-earner.
12. Family Security and Freedom are important values in life. Pleasure, National Security, and a World of Beauty are relatively unimportant life goals.

How can this set of consensual beliefs be described in ideological terms? That task may be facilitated by recalling both beliefs which at least 50% of each of the two groups did not adhere to, and the pattern of intercorrelation among these elements. In terms of the first consideration, perhaps the most significant aspect of farmers surveyed here, at least in terms of their evaluative beliefs, is their failure simultaneously to endorse Canadian Wheat Board marketing and to recommend extensive governmental involvement in production. While it is easy to make too much of the latter, especially considering the degree to which recommending a radical production position is confounded with articulation skills,³ it does nevertheless constitute a point beyond which farmers will not go. Indeed, they will not go very far in the matter of regulation; orderly marketing is rejected by 50% of both groups. With respect to the second consideration, intercorrelation among belief components, it must be noted that while more than 50% of both groups of farmers subscribe to these twelve beliefs, this is not to suggest that all items of this set tend to co-occur in the evaluative-belief set of more than half the farmers. Hence, given that ideological descriptions of individual belief systems as radical or conservative usually assume some constraint among belief elements, it may be the case that, in seeking to attach an ideological label to this collection, we are violating that particular assumption. A review of the pattern of intercorrelation of these belief elements suggests that there is constraint among most of these elements, probably a sufficient amount to justify describing them as a cluster of consensual beliefs.⁴

Table 6.8 Consensual Beliefs of NFU & Non-NFU Farmers

	% NFU Agree	% Non-NFU Agree
1 Control re cost-price squeeze externalized	58	62
2 No farmer say over either farm produce prices or input costs	90	72
3 Monopoly manufacturer control over input supplies' costs	70	61
4 Decision-Making: bodies with too much influence		
Multinational corporations	87	80
Canadian Pacific Railway	56	59
chain food stores	89	87
packing plants	85	81
the United States' government	74	68
5 Decision-Making: bodies with too little influence		
Member of Parliament	83	72
Member of Legislative Assembly	78	68
Unifarm	64	80
National Farmers Union	89	77
6 Decision-Making: individual unable to have entitled influence	60	52
7 Radical view of class structure		
are classes	83	76
should not be classes	74	72
8 Should be controls on farm prices	88	68
Should be controls on input costs	88	82
Should be controls on both of above	79	76
9 Corporate farming should be outlawed	78	77
10 Disappearance of family farm bad trend	79	79
11 Farmer is more independent than wage earner	80	90
12 Values: Importance Rank High		
FAMILY SECURITY	1*	1*
FREEDOM	4*	2*
Values: Importance Rank Low		
PLEASURE	15*	16*
NATIONAL SECURITY	14*	15*
A WORLD OF BEAUTY	17*	13*

*Rank of value in range of 1 - 18 as determined from median value.

In seeking to put an ideological label on this belief set, it is important to recall that conservative, liberal, and radical ideologies are distinguished in terms of their view of reality and their appraisal of that view as good or bad. In terms of this criterion, while the majority of farmers in the two groups perceive reality correctly, their proposals to reform that "reality" fall short of being radical. An item-by-item examination of the consensual belief elements substantiates this conclusion.

Looking down the set of items, while it may be argued that the first three beliefs are reality-testing measures, it does seem correct to regard the first belief as a rejection of individual responsibility for one malaise afflicting farmers. The co-occurrence of beliefs 4, 5, 6, and 7 can be inferred to denote adherence to a radical view of the distribution of political and societal power. Belief 8, a recommendation for controls in price fixing, represents a departure from conservative principles and an adherence to either a liberal or radical viewpoint. While items 11 and 12 serve to describe a relatively conservative set of values, it is not so easy to label elements 9 and 10 the same way. Wanting corporate farming controlled was shown earlier to be related to a radical perspective of the distribution of influence and power in society and reasons for regretting the disappearance of the family farm were as much altruistic as egocentric. Traditional values and goals appear then to occur alongside a realistic appraisal of the present pricing system and a willingness to keep a regulated version of that pricing system. The consensual beliefs do not include a complete rejection of the laissez faire pricing system, but rather a degree of control over it.

Accordingly, this set of beliefs is not a radical belief set, particularly if belief element constraint is a consideration. But neither is it a conservative one. It is a mixture of both, with the bias towards non-conservatism.

B. Particularistic (NFU) Beliefs

The more particularistic set of beliefs are those to which over half the NFU members adhere but which over half the non-NFU reject. The items and the percentage of NFU and non-NFU members who subscribe to each are reported below.

Particularistic Beliefs

General Locus of Control

- 1 Farmers themselves are at fault for their lack of success with governments in the past. (58% NFU; 33% Non-NFU)

Marketing Control

- 2 Speculators (like the Winnipeg Grain Exchange) are the prime beneficiaries of the open marketing system. (58% NFU; 42% Non-NFU)

Decision-Making Control

- 3 The Winnipeg Grain Exchange is viewed as unduly influential in the important decisions that affect farmers' lives. (54% NFU; 48% Non-NFU)
- 4 Less influential in decision-making than is appropriate are provincial marketing boards (54% NFU; 45% non-NFU), national marketing boards (50% NFU; 39% Non-NFU), and the Provincial Minister of Agriculture (54% NFU; 46% non-NFU).

Marketing Regulation

- 5 Orderly (Canadian Wheat Board) marketing is preferred over open marketing. (71% NFU; 45% Non-NFU)

Production Regulation

- 6 There should be a legislated maximum farm size (72% NFU; 44% Non-NFU).

On items 2, 5, and 6 particularly, there are substantial differences between the NFU and non-NFU groups. Adherence to beliefs 2, 3, 4, and 5 denotes a greater approval for control over and regulation

of the marketing system. Item 6 suggests a desire for more regulation of the food production process. The non-NFU group has been both consistently less inclined to view the open market system as manipulated by speculators, and consequently, to want to abandon it. Throughout the analyses, the NFU farmers' cognitions and evaluations of the marketing sector have been somewhat more radically integrated with their views of other sectors. The NFU belief constellation therefore, differs from the consensual belief cluster in being slightly more structured along radical lines. The term "radical" applies particularly with respect to evaluations concerning the marketing sector, and less so with regard to the production process.⁵

Students of agrarian politics will recognize the similarity of the NFU Particularistic Beliefs to the Populist ideology which was imported into Western Canada at the turn of the century and found expression in such agrarian organizations as the Non-Partisan League, the Grain Growers' Association, and later the United Farmers provincial organizations and the Progressive Party. The ideology contained the following elements. First, it was anti-monopoly. It attacked and resisted the monopoly power of banks, railways, large manufacturers, elevator companies, and the Grain Exchange over farm prices and marketing conditions. (Lipset, 1968: 22 - 23; Mitchell: 13; McCrorie, 1966: 36) Secondly, and concomitantly, its antipathy to corporate wealth led to a demand for the elimination of the middleman, who in placing himself between the producer and the consumer exploited the producer. (Lipset, 1968: 23) Thirdly, to curb monopoly power, it advocated governmental involvement in and regulation of the

grain marketing and elevator system. This became a demand for a public marketing board for grain - a demand that was eventually satisfied with the establishment of the Canadian Wheat Board. The non-Partisan League supported the nationalization of vital public utilities such as the transport and communication systems, grain elevators, flour mills, and processing plants. (Young, 1969: 23) Fourthly, it affirmed the principles of private property and the right of the individual to own land. (Lipset, 1968: 358; Mitchell: 13) This had led one historian to conclude that Populist solutions were based "upon an essentially individualistic philosophy and were designed merely to ensure for every man his right to 'get ahead' in the world." (Hicks: 422) Fifthly, it advocated collective action on the part of farmers to realize their goals and a broad series of political reforms to redemocratize the political system. (Morton, 1950: 301, 303)

In summary, populism was a reformist, not a radical ideology; the change it advocated was change in the established system, not change of the system itself. Thus,

The majority of them....accepted industrialization
but condemned monopoly, accepted banking and finance
but condemned usury and financial sleight of hand,
welcomed accumulation but condemned economic feudal-
ism, welcomed enterprise but condemned speculation.
(Nugent: 97)

The NFU belief cluster parallels the populist ideology in its anti-monopoly stance on the Grain Exchange, in espousing regulation of the grain marketing system and elimination of middlemen, in affirming the necessity of collective action to ensure a role for farmers in the democratic establishment of input costs and farm produce prices, and

in including an affirmation of the appropriateness of private property.

On a number of aspects the consensual belief cluster is similar to the populist ideology. Where it departs from the populist perspective, and where the NFU cluster does not, is in its less enthusiastic endorsement of regulation of the grain marketing system and of the detrimental effects of middlemen like the Winnipeg Grain Exchange in the grain marketing process.

The analogy, if appropriate, confirms the NFU protest organization as the latest and most recent farm movement in the tradition of agrarian rebellion against monopoly and espousal of regulation of the pricing and marketing aspects of farming to eliminate that monopoly situation.

III. A Typology of the Congruence of Belief and Activity

Throughout the two preceding chapters, as well as in the current one, it has been established that there is by no means unanimity of outlook within the NFU group nor complete dissimilarity of perspective between the members of the protest organization and non-members. On the question of federal governmental involvement in food production, for example, there are conservatives, liberals, and radicals among NFU members. NFU members and non-members have shared outlooks on several matters. More precisely, both adhere to the consensual belief cluster. It has been apparent that there are farmers in the non-NFU group who were not members of the NFU at the time the study data were collected who subscribed then to the same beliefs as did the plurality of NFU members. Detailing the structural links among belief elements has indicated that for some non-members, as for some NFU members, evaluations

of the need for regulation and government involvement in production and marketing, for example, are grounded in similar cognitions of the manner in which those and other sectors' function. Hence, it is clear that it is not entirely beliefs alone, nor the way those beliefs are organized, that distinguishes NFU members from non-members. What then is it? Or, more interestingly, when are beliefs and the organization activity congruent? And when are they not?

The questions move the research project to its second objective: the delineation of the links between political belief systems and the political activity of joining a farm protest organization. To pursue this objective an index of NFU Particularistic Beliefs is constructed that facilitated the division of farmers on the criteria of belief and organizational membership.

Table 6.9 reports both the individual belief elements espoused by greater than 50% of the NFU members and their item-test correlations. Item-test correlations meet Guilford's criteria that they range between .30 and .80 (Guilford, 1956: 481). It is therefore proper to describe the set as an "index". Insofar as the index correlates with a leftish vote in the previous federal election⁶ it may be more precisely described as a relatively left-wing index.

The empirical establishment of the imperfect congruence of NFU membership and adherence to the NFU Particularistic Belief Index in Table 6.10 clarifies that there are both NFU members who do not subscribe to the majority of items in the NFU Belief Index and non-members who do.

Table 6.9 Item-Test Correlations of NFU
Belief Index Components

	Correlation (r)
<u>General Locus of Control</u>	
The ability to act on the cost-price squeeze is external to the farmer.	.31
Farmers at fault for lack of governmental success	.38
<u>Marketing Control</u>	
Speculators beneficiaries of open marketing	.61
<u>Pricing Control</u>	
Manufacturers control the cost of input supplies	.36
<u>Decision-Making Control</u>	
Four or more of these actors have more say in decision-making than they should: the Winnipeg Grain Exchange, multinational corporations, the Canadian Pacific Railway, chain food stores, large packing plants	.51
Five or more of these actors have too little say in decision-making: the Provincial and Federal Ministers of Agriculture, the average M.P. and M.L.A., provincial and national marketing boards, the National Farmers Union, Unifarm	.44
The decision-making system is closed to the farmer.	.36
<u>Class Nature of Canadian Society</u>	
A radical view of the class structure	.39
<u>Pricing Regulation</u>	
Farm produce prices and input costs should be controlled	.36
<u>Marketing Regulation</u>	
Prefer Canadian Wheat Board marketing to open marketing	.66
<u>Production Regulation</u>	
Affirm strongly the need for a legislated maximum farm size	.41

Table 6.10 gives both the distribution of NFU and non-NFU members on the Index, and the probability of NFU membership over the range of Index scores.⁷

Table 6.10 NFU Belief Index and Probability of NFU Membership

A. Distribution of NFU and Non-NFU Groups on Index

NFU Index Score	%	%
	<u>NFU Members</u>	<u>Non-NFU Members</u>
0	0	3.5
1	2.1	5.9
2	2.1	10.6
3	2.1	7.1
4	14.6	8.2
5	14.6	18.8
6	10.4	11.8
7	10.4	15.3
8	18.8	4.7
9	18.8	11.8
10	6.3	2.4
	<u>100.2</u>	<u>100.1</u>

B. Probability of NFU Membership given in Index Score

Given a score of	% who are	% who are non-	<u>Total</u>
	<u>NFU Members</u>	<u>NFU Members</u>	
0	0.0	100.0%	100%
1	16.7	83.3	100
2	10.0	90.0	100
3	14.3	85.7	100
4	50.0	50.0	100
5	30.4	69.6	100
6	33.3	66.7	100
7	27.8	72.2	100
8	69.2	30.8	100
9	47.4	52.6	100
10	60.0	40.0	100

Table 6.10 indicates the possibility of isolating four types of farmers in the combined study groups: one, farmers who belong to a protest organization whose members' modal beliefs they subscribe to; two, farmers who belong to a protest organization whose members' modal beliefs they do not adhere to; three, farmers who do not belong to the given protest organization but who do subscribe to the modal beliefs of the members of that organization; and four, farmers who neither belong to this organization nor subscribe to the viewpoint of the majority of members of that organization. That is, it is possible to distinguish two types of farmers for whom beliefs and the one political activity are congruent and two types for whom beliefs and protest organizational membership are not. This being the case, clarification of the criteria on which the four types differ will enable a specification of the conditions under which first, congruent beliefs facilitate organizational membership; secondly, corresponding beliefs do not result in recruitment; and thirdly, incongruent beliefs do nevertheless occur alongside membership in the protest organization.

It will thereafter be possible to explicate the role of farmers' political beliefs in their recruitment (or non-recruitment) to the NFU protest organization. More pointedly, the context in which belief sets matter for mobilization to a protest organization and that in which they do not, can be delineated.

The four-fold belief-activity typology has been constructed in the following manner:

(1) NFU believers and joiners: NFU consistents

These are members of the NFU who subscribe to 7 or more of the NFU beliefs. N=26. They constitute about 20% of the combined farmer group. They are individuals whose evaluative-belief set and organizational activity are consistently "radical".

(2) NFU non-believers and joiners: NFU inconsistencies

This group is composed of NFU members who subscribe to 6 or fewer of the NFU beliefs. N=22. They constitute about 17% of the combined group. These are farmers who belong to a farm organization whose members' modal beliefs they do not subscribe to.

(3) NFU believers and non-joiners: NFU clients

These are non-members who subscribe to 7 or more of the NFU beliefs. N=29. NFU clients, representing 22% of the combined group, are organizational clients in the sense that by adhering to beliefs of members of the protest organization, they are potential NFU members.

(4) Non-NFU believers and Non-NFU joiners: Non-NFU consistents

Individuals who do not belong to the NFU and who adhere to 6 or fewer of the items on the NFU index comprise this group. N=56. They comprise about 42% of the combined group. These are individuals whose evaluative-belief set and organizational activity are well fitted in a conservative direction.

Types 1 and 4 are conceived as ideological opposites; Types 2 and 3 as lying somewhere in between these two extremes. The appositeness of this thinking is partially confirmed by subjective assessments made by the researcher at the end of the interview schedule of the respondent's stance towards free enterprise, communism, and labour. A minority of farmers elaborated upon one or more of these three topics during the interview. The four farmer types are contrasted on these three subjective measures of ideological perspective in Table 6.11. The percentage of farmers in each type is small since most farmers did not voluntarily outline their position with respect to free enterprise, communism, and labor. Table 6.11 indicates that the least fearful of communism and the least anti-labour and the most anti-free enterprise

are Type 1 farmers - NFU consistents. Type 4, non-NFU consistents, are the least anti-free enterprise and the most anti-labour.

Table 6.11 Farmer Types and Subjective Measures of Ideological Perspective: %'s *

	Type 1 NFU Consis.	Type 2 NFU Clients	Type 3 NFU Incons.	Type 4 Non-NFU Consis.
Argues free enterprise	-	10	-	7
Argues opposite	23	21	14	5
Fears communism	11.5	10	9	7
Argues opposite	15	3	9	-
Anti-labour	23	31	36	46
Argues opposite	4	3	9	-

*Cell entries are column percentages

The subsequent chapters of the thesis undertake to specify the conditions under which believers are joiners, and, as importantly, non-believers are joiners. The situational and personality attributes of the four types are described, and in that process, the role of beliefs in organizational membership in a farm protest organization is clarified.

Notes to Chapter 6

- 1 Some general belief elements have been deleted from the set of possible evaluative elements because the focus is upon fairly specific cognitions and evaluations. This applies particularly with respect to the measures of values and life goals - the Rokeach instrument and mentioned likes about farming, for example.
- 2 There is some evidence that the conservatives on the production question are, while relatively young (Pearson r with years of education is $-.28$), fairly successful in terms of their reported net income ($r=.21$). In contrast, liberals on the production criterion appear to be operators of more established farms (r with Farm Market Value is $.27$) that yield lower gross incomes ($r= -.14$). Hence the conservative farmers may have less reason to acknowledge and denounce a class based society than do the liberal farmers.
- 3 Espousing a radical position on the federal role in production is correlated with informational content and specificity: $r = .50$.
- 4 The following figures indicate what proportion of farmers in the two study groups subscribe to what proportion of the Particularistic Cluster.

Percentage subscribing to:	<u>NFU</u>	<u>Non-NFU</u>
less than or equal to one-third items	0%	13%
greater than one-third and less than two-thirds items	40%	34%
over two-thirds items	60%	53%
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

- 5 But it is cautioned that the former has been more systematically tapped and that it is indeed easier to tap, thereby giving rise to the possibility that not finding greater willingness for governmental involvement in the food production aspect of farming may be in part at least an artifact of the research questionnaire.
- 6 The position on the voting index, from right to left, was Social Credit, Progressive Conservative, Liberal, New Democratic Party, and Communist. The Pearson r of voting index position with NFU belief index is $.29$.
- 7 Length of membership in the NFU is correlated with the NFU Belief Index: Pearson $r = .26$.

Chapter 7

Correlates of Belief and Activity

Inferring the meaning to an individual of his attitudes and actions involves uncovering the context of those beliefs and activities. In current social science practice this entails relating the attitudes and activities to other measures. Accordingly, the purpose of this chapter is to describe the correlates of ideology and action - more precisely, NFU belief and NFU membership - by describing the situational, personality, and behavioral attributes of the four farmer types.

Political behavior literature, especially that focusing upon Western Canadian agrarian behavior, provides conjectures and hypotheses as to which personality and situational characteristics are likely to be important in accounting for both behavior and belief systems. Few, however, provide much insight into the conditions under which behavior and beliefs are congruent. Accordingly, the set of explanatory variables focused upon in this chapter includes both exploratory and more traditional ones. In order of their examination, these variables are:

- (1) Situational variables: subjective measures
economic satisfaction/dissatisfaction,
self-assigned class
- (2) Situational variables: objective measures
social integration, media consumption,
occupational history, size of farm,
income, market value of farming enterprise
- (3) Personality and Social Background attributes:
self-esteem, social trust, age, religion,
ethnic background, frequency of church
attendance.

- (4) Values and Goals: 18 terminal values
- (5) Political Alienation: These variables are dealt with separately from the preceding four groups because of the reluctance to specify them as either antecedents or consequences of political (ideological) beliefs. While it may be possible to specify their temporal relationship to ideological beliefs later in the thesis, at this point it seems best to make no assumptions of this nature.
- (6) Partisan and Political Activity: Like the immediately preceding set, these variables are not antecedent predictors but concomitant attributes.

I. Antecedent Attributes

The theoretical and empirical conceptualization of variables in the first four sets is outlined prior to examining the pattern of their association with the four farmer types.

1. Situational Variables: Subjective Measures

a) Economic Satisfaction/Dissatisfaction

The social movement and mass society literature lead us to believe that individuals discontented with their economic situation are more likely targets for mobilization into protest movements than are their more economically satisfied counterparts.¹ (Pinard, 1971: 106-109, passim; Morrison and Steeves, 1967; Kornhauser, 1959). The literature on Western Canadian politics has suggested that farmers are no exception. The immediate economic situation in which the farmer finds himself has been held to be a prime determinant of his political beliefs and crucial for his mobilization into radical protest politics. (Macpherson, 1953: 221-230; Lipset, 1968: Chapter 2; Irving: Chapters 8 and 11). When the farmer is not facing severe economic strains, his preoccupation with the immediate concerns of living results in a conservatism based on pragmatism. (Eager, 1968: 1)

The importance of this variable in traditional accounts of agrarian political behavior must be stressed. Traditionally, "economic deprivation" has been pitted against "ideology" as the motivating force for the rise of farmer protest movements. Yet students of Western Canadian agrarian politics have obliquely intimated that it may not be one factor versus the other; rather the farmer's ideology may be a prevailing assessment of the relatively deprived position of farmers in the economy, the consequence of the persistence of economic grievances over a long period of time. Maurice Pinard, discovering that both Quebec farmers who had experienced a net increase in their income or whose income had declined in the past two years supported the Social Credit Party in greater proportions than did those farmers whose income had not changed, concluded that the persistence of long range grievances combined with short-term ones leads farmers to an extreme and high degree of political protest. (Pinard, 1971: 115-116)

Three measures tap respondents' assessments of their present financial situation. The first is a three item index tapping satisfaction/dissatisfaction with present and future financial prospects. It includes the following items:

- (i) "As far as you and your family are concerned, how satisfied are you with your present financial situation?"

Respondent receives a score of 1 if very satisfied; 2 if fairly satisfied; 3 if a little dissatisfied; and 4 if quite dissatisfied.

- (ii) "Would you say that you and your family are better off, or worse off financially than you were 5 years ago?"

Respondent receives a score of 1 if better off; 2 if about the same; and 3 if worse off.

- (iif) "With respect to your future prospects financially, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, a little dissatisfied, or quite dissatisfied with the way things look for the future?"

Scoring as for (i)

The measure is thus one of economic dissatisfaction: a high score represents dissatisfaction; a low score, satisfaction.

The second measure is a single item index of the individual's present financial well-being - whether he is presently getting a fair return. The actual wording of the question is: "Do you feel the farmer is getting a fair return on his produce today?" The respondent receives a score of 1 for "yes", 2 for "on some", and 3 for "no". Hence, a high score signifies dissatisfaction with present financial return.

The third measure is a single item indicator of the respondent's perception of the likelihood of farmers receiving a fair return in the future. The question read: "How likely is it that the farmer will get a fair return in the future?" Responses range from "very likely in the short run", "fairly likely in the short run", "very likely in the long run", "fairly likely in the long run" to "not likely at all". The latter is scored high so that this measure, like the other two, is a dissatisfaction indicator.

b) Self-assessed Class

C.B. Macpherson (1953: 226) has argued that as a member of the petit-bourgeoisie, the farmer has a false consciousness of his place in the economic order which prohibits him from "identifying" himself, from making "permanent common cause, with either of the other two classes".

Farmers, he says (1953: 222-223), lack a class consciousness, a common awareness of the anomaly of their position as entrepreneurs denied a say in the pricing system and unable to dispose of labour in an economy wherein economic power is based on that ability.

Earlier evidence has indicated that farmers do not uniformly describe their class position. To some extent, then, Macpherson has already been shown to be at least partially correct in his characterization of farmers "veer(ing) at different rates of speed and ... in different directions at different times" (1953: 226) - that is, in making alliances with other classes. Farmers do not have a class consciousness in the sense of viewing their position in the economic structure from one common perspective.

Nevertheless, the possibility remains that individual farmers' class identities will have important links with their political behavior. The inclusion of a measure of social class here is thus rooted not in the literature concerning agrarian behavior but in more general political behavior literature. Jeanne Knutson has suggested that "...at best, social class membership is a compact label for a variety of basic, formative life experiences which predispose an individual to certain behaviors and attitudes - that is, which become internalized at various levels in his personality system." (1972: 12) This quotation, with its promised explanatory import of social class, is the stimulus for including a social class measure as a potential explanatory variable.

The respondent's self-assigned class - as upper, middle, working or lowest - is the measure of social class used here.

2. Situational Variables: Objective Measures

Objective indicators of the way in which the farmer describes the immediate empirical situation in which he finds himself and the more distal situation which summarizes his life experiences are included to reinforce the measures of the perceived situation. Firstly, the measures describing the immediate situation are outlined.

a) Social integration

Empirical research has established the importance of organizational involvement for facilitating socialization to system-supportive beliefs and for mobilizing middle class persons to alleged political activity. (Verba and Nie, 1972: Chapter 11; Nie, Powell and Prewitt, 1969a; Almond and Verba, 1963: Chapter 10) There is some evidence, however, that organizational involvement may foster alienation from the political system among workers and farmers. (Pinard, 1971: 237, 242) In the preface to the revised edition of Agrarian Socialism, Lipset reiterated the importance of both an organizational network and rural leadership as mediating links between the individual farmer and a political movement. (1968: xx-xxi) Both had been crucial in the mobilization of Saskatchewan farmers into the CCF in the 1930's and 1940's. Differences among farmers in their contacts with urban areas, links to other institutions such as churches, organizational involvement with other farmers, and the extent of involvement of their community in national or local rural politics all predispose farmers towards different "types of politics - left, right or centre; authoritarian or democratic". (Lipset, 1968: xxiii) More specifically, ties with urban areas may mobilize farmers to protest politics and non-supportive behaviors in periods of

economic stress, by increasing their expectations and making them aware of their deprivation relative to urban people. (Morrison and Steeves, 1967: 424)

Two aspects of social integration are tapped here: integration within the farming community and integration within the urban shopping centre. The following measures tap both.

- (i) Number of organization memberships, number of farm memberships, number of service club memberships.
- (ii) extent of interaction with farmers in the process of formulating opinions about farming and politics.
- (iii) distance from and frequency of contact with the nearest urban centre and people living there.
- (iv) length of residence in the area: all one's life, over half one's life, less than half one's life.

The second category of measures entails two ordinal level scales of the importance to the respondent of other farmers and farm leaders as sources of information in forming his opinions about firstly, farming, and secondly, politics.² The third set of measures includes separate items tapping firstly, the distance the respondent lives from the urban centre where he does most of his shopping; secondly the frequency with which he goes there (daily, 2-3 times a week, and so on); and thirdly, his familiarity with people living there (knows "a great many", "some", "only a few", "almost none").

b) Media Consumption

Information, media consumption, and political activity go hand in hand. The curious, inquisitive individual seeking to make sense

of his political world approximates the democratic man. While there is some speculation that he may be the democratic man who is on the left of the political spectrum, the evidence is not conclusive.

Here, the farmer's receipt of news and farm magazines and his attention to farm radio broadcasts are measures of his media consumption.

A number of measures have been included that attempt to summarize the individual's past experiences as a farmer. They include the following: Work History, Work Alienation and View of Farming.

c) Work History

Has the respondent farmed all his life? Or, has he worked off the farm for part of that time? Were his parents farmers? The supposition is that the farmer who has spent the greater part of his life farming will have a greater tolerance than the beginning farmer for the detrimental (income) aspects of farming - he will be more complacent about the inadequacies of farming as a money making enterprise (assuming he does see such inadequacies). It is further supposed that this complacency will make him less prone to involvement in protest farm organizations.

The three items that summarize the respondent's work history are:

- (i) having farmed all his life/not having farmed all his life (a dummy variable)
- (ii) Having had parents who were farmers/not having had parents who were farmers (a dummy variable)
- (iii) number of years of off-farm work (an interval level variable)

d) Work Alienation

The political meaning of alienation from work remains unexplored. Alienation from farm work is the converse of agricultural fundamentalism, the ideology which in past decades predicated, among other things, the independence of the farmer and agriculture as the fundamental employment of man upon which all other economic activities were dependent. (Whyte, 1966: 98) In slightly different terms, alienation from work represents the opposite constellation of sentiments ascribed to farmers by Macpherson. Macpherson has posited that the key to understanding farmers' political behavior is recognizing the farmer's belief in his independence - the source of which is the farmer's perception that he produces commodities which are basic necessities of life without being dependent upon either an employer or hired labour. (1953: 220-222) Owning his land and the means of production allow the farmer to feel independent.

That belief, it is suggested, is the opposite of contemporary conceptualizations of alienation from work. Although the construct is as old as Marx,³ it has recently been defined and measured by social scientists who have delineated the criteria under which powerlessness and meaninglessness in the work situation are most likely to be felt. (Blauner, 1972: 110-137) These conditions are, on the whole, ones from which the occupation of farming is immune.⁴ If that is the case, and if Macpherson is correct, the opportunity is thereby provided to examine the links he postulated between work attitudes and political behavior.

The measures of work alienation devised here attempt to meet two stipulated requirements: one, they try to distinguish between alienation from work and job dissatisfaction;⁵ and two, they attempt to tap perceptions of a lost relationship.⁶ The first measure is a dummy variable wherein negative attitudes towards work are scored as 1 and the absence of negative attitudes as 0. To earn a score of 1, it is necessary that the farmer have acquired his negative attitudes towards farming since he began to farm; if his attitudes have either not changed or changed in a positive direction over the years he has been farming, then he is coded as 0, non-alienated from work.⁷

The second item taps considerations of quitting farming. Like the former measure, it is also a dummy variable. For the individual to score as alienated (that is, as 1) he must have considered quitting farming for factors other than ill health, retirement, or family pressures, or the economic unfeasability of the present farming set-up (infertile land, small size).⁸

There is a third gauge of farmers' attitudes towards their work which is not an alienation measure but an indicator of a factor illuminating alienation from work (should it exist). This is the process whereby the respondent undertook to farm - whether he deliberately chose farming as an occupation or "fell into it". The alienated response is the second one - having involuntarily decided to farm. It entails having started farming because of being born and raised on a farm, inheriting a farm from aging parents, or having no other options (owing to a poor education, lack of money, or any other alternatives at the time). The

non-alienated response is the condition of having chosen to farm because of liking farming as a way of life, of being tired of "working out", or feeling farming offered a good standard of living or a comparable opportunity to that of other occupations and jobs. The inclusion of this measure is premised on the consideration that work alienation could vary depending upon whether the individual had deliberately chosen to farm or not. While it is not clear what the relationship will be, it is speculated that disenchantment with a chosen occupation is less likely to lead to protest behavior than is displeasure with an occupation that the individual did not seek in the first place.

e) View of farming: as a business or way of life?

Traditionally, farming has been regarded by farmers as a way of life rather than as a business enterprise. The difference in perspective entails differing criteria of success. When farming is viewed principally as a business, the income yielded by the enterprise would be a prime criterion of success. On the other hand, when farming is regarded as a way of life, the net income of the enterprise would be one of the criteria of success; considerations related to the quality of life farming affords - family unity, natural/clean living, freedom from urban pressures - would all be included in an assessment of the ability of farming to afford a good living.

The farmer's view of farming will be related to his satisfaction with farming as an occupation. More specifically, those who value farming as a way of life will presumably have a greater tolerance for economic insecurity than those who value farming as a way of earning a

living. It will thus take greater economic deprivation for the former to attempt to allay such grievances through political action (assuming the same level of political salience for both groups).

The measure used here is a single item questioning farmers whether they viewed farming as "a business", "a way of life", or "both".

f) Financial Well-being:

The farmers' present financial situation is assessed by indicators of his reported gross and net income, farm market value, and size of farm owned and operated.

3. Personality and Social Background Attributes

Personality attributes are less adequately tapped here than are situational aspects of the individual. This may be at least partially justified by the general failure of personality scales to account for greater "than one third of the variance in most overt behavior."

(Knutson, 1973 b: 38) Only two personality attributes are tapped here: self-esteem and social trust.

a) Self-esteem

Beliefs about self-evaluations are part of an individual's "core" set of beliefs, fundamental to his outlook on the world. (Lane, 1973: 110; Knutson, 1973b: 40; Renshon, 1974: 69; Rokeach, 1960: 39-45) It has been postulated that they shape political beliefs both directly and indirectly. In the direct link, there is evidence that certain ideologies appear to be adopted and adhered to for their ability to assuage feelings of low self-esteem.⁹ (Knutson, 1974: 36) Indirectly, low self-esteem may impair one's ability to learn particular political

beliefs by affecting both exposure to and comprehension of information.¹⁰
(Di Palma and McClosky, 1970: 1059-1060; Sniderman and Citrin, 1971;
402-403)

The uneven correlation of low self-esteem with conservatism measures (for example, it correlates with independence of government and elitism indices but not with business ideology and economic conservatism scales) leads Sniderman and Citrin to conclude that "low self-esteem can promote the acceptance of both extreme left-wing and extreme right-wing values simultaneously" if both will serve to assuage unsatisfied self-esteem needs. (1971: 412) The association between low self-esteem and conservatism has been more recently corroborated by Knutson (1974b: 35)

Low self-esteem appears to inhibit individual political activity and interest in public affairs (Barber, 1965: 217; Milbrath and Klein, 1962; Rosenberg, 1962, 1965) as well as hinder collective participatory acts. This is because while the individual may be drawn toward extremist politics in order to assuage low self-esteem needs, those very feelings of personal inadequacy act as a brake on his mobilization. (Sniderman, 1975: 307)

The self-esteem measure used here is a three-item Likert index comprised of the following:

- (i) I feel that I am a person of worth.
- (ii) I am able to do things as well as most other people.
- (iii) I feel that I have a number of good qualities.

A high score represents high esteem feelings.

b) Social Trust

Like self-esteem, social trust is usually treated as a core belief or basic personality characteristic. (Lane, 1973: 110; Knutson, 1973b: 40; Renshon, 1974: 69; Rokeach, 1960: 39-45) While Morris Rosenberg first speculated on the implications of an individual's attitudes towards human nature for understanding his political ideology, a number of political psychologists since then have reiterated the centrality of "beliefs about the other people who inhabit the life space of the individual ... whether people are good and can be trusted". (Rosenberg, 1956: 690) Again, like self-esteem, social trust has been shown to have both direct and indirect links with political beliefs: indirectly shaping political attitudes by affecting primary and secondary interpersonal relationships which in turn structure political beliefs and opinions (Rosenberg, 1956: 690, 694) and directly affecting the ideology adhered to. (Scott, 1968: Chapter 4) Jeanne Knutson, in a study of the political ideologies of party activists, found activists in parties on the Right to be significantly more misanthropic than activists in parties on the Left and Centre. (1974b: 29) She concludes "... the political Right is an ideological stance which gains support from those who are punitive and hostile in their views toward others" (1974b: 35)

Misanthropy and political apathy have been shown to go hand in hand. (Rosenberg, 1954) The link between misanthropy and feelings of powerlessness is well documented (Finifter, 1970; Skogstad, 1975: 198; Thompson and Horton, 1962) and gives rise to the suggestion that powerlessness may intervene to account, at least partially, for the association

between misanthropy and apathy. While cautioning that alienation from specific institutions is not necessarily rooted in misanthropic feelings, Finifter notes that the behavioral consequences of specific alienation feelings - apathy or activity - "are likely to depend at least partially on the basic view of human nature or individual potential with which they are coupled." (1972: 59)

Throughout the subsequent analyses, the measure of social trust is a two-item index, adapted from the Rosenberg faith-in-people scale and is comprised of the following items:

- (i) You can't be too careful in dealing with people.
- (ii) Most people would try to take advantage of you if they got a chance.

A high score represents high trust in others.

c) Socio-demographic Attributes

A number of background attributes, some of which have proved elsewhere to be important explanatory variables of political beliefs and behavior, are included here: age, religion, frequency of church attendance, level of education and ethnic origin.

4. Values

These are tapped by the set of 18 terminal values in the Rokeach instrument.

The Four Farmer Types and Situational, Personality, Social-Background, and Preferred Value Attributes

In keeping with the discussion in the preceding chapter and in light of the trends which emerge in the subsequent discussion, the four farmer types are labelled as follows: Individuals who both adhere to NFU

members' beliefs and who belong to that farm organization will be referred to as "NFU Consistents". Their belief set and organizational membership are consistent. NFU believers but non-joiners will be described as "NFU Clients". They are clients in the sense of being potential recruits owing to the similarity of their evaluative-belief set with NFU Consistents. NFU joiners and non-believers are called "NFU Inconsistent". They are inconsistent in belonging to an organization to whose official ideology they do not subscribe. And farmers who neither belong to the NFU nor adhere to its modal beliefs will be referred to as "Non-NFU Consistents". Their beliefs and membership are consistent in a manner opposite to that of NFU Consistents.

The tables upon which this discussion relies are Tables 7.1 through 7.4. Tables 7.1 and 7.3 contrast the four farmer types on their situational characteristics, and background and personality attributes, respectively.

1. a) Subjective Situation: Economic discontent

Table 7.2 demonstrates that general and current economic discontent are greater among NFU members than non-members. While the group of NFU Consistents have a slight edge on all other farmers on the general economic discontent measure, the NFU Inconsistent are as frustrated with their present economic situation. The NFU Inconsistent's overall level of economic dissatisfaction is second to that of the NFU Consistents, and they are, with Non-NFU Consistents, most likely to expect a fair return in the future. The Client group is like both groups with whom it shares characteristics; like the non-NFU Consistents, in being generally relatively

less economically dissatisfied; like NFU Consistents in being displeased with their present financial return.

It is the Non-NFU Consistent group which is the most economically satisfied with their present financial return. They are, as well, relatively less generally discontented and relatively more optimistic regarding the future. Their higher than average tendency to describe themselves as "middle class" undoubtedly reflects their optimism and complacency (Table 7.1).

b) Objective Situation: Financial discontent

Where differences emerge in Table 7.2, they add up to the conclusion that the NFU members - whether consistent or inconsistent - are relatively disadvantaged as regards their objective economic situation in comparison to non-NFU members. Table 7.2 indicates that NFU members report a lower market value for their farm, a lower gross and net income the previous year and fewer acres owned.

Table 7.1 Situational Characteristics
of the Four Farmer Types: %'s

	NFU Consistents (N=26)	Clients (N=29)	NFU Inconsis. (N=22)	Non-NFU Cons. (N=56)	Total Group (N=133)
<u>Self-Assigned Class</u>					
lowest/working	60	66	70	51	59
Middle	40	34	30	49	41
<u>Social Integration</u>					
Length of Residence					
all life	50	35	36	51	45
over half life	31	48	32	33	36
less than half life	19	17	32	16	20
<u>Work History</u>					
farmed all life	42	38	36	46	42
parents farmers	100	86	91	84	89
off-farm work	23	31	23	24	25
Farming way of life	42	28	23	38	34
business	19	17	32	15	19
both	39	55	45	47	47
<u>Work Attitudes</u>					
negative attitude	42	45	64	51	50
wanting to quit	42	35	27	28	32
nonchosen occupation	52	52	62	38	48

Table 7.2 Standard Scores of Four Farmer Types
on Situational Characteristics

	NFU Consistents (N=26)	Clients (N=29)	NFU Inconsis. (N=22)	Non-NFU Consis. (N=56)	Total Group Mean
<u>Economic grievances</u>					
General discontent	.15	-.05	.06	-.07	7.55
Present return unfair	.21	.11	.23	-.26	2.41
ill future prospects	.19	.03	.09	-.07	4.13
<u>Economic situation</u>					
market value	-.23	-.10	.01	.17	\$142,322
acres owned	-.14	.12	-.05	.03	570 acres
acres operated	.08	.07	.11	-.12	832 acres
net income	-.25	.41	-.05	-.03	\$7,080
*gross income	-.14	.23	-.16	.04	\$16,820
<u>Social integration</u>					
^a No. organiz. memshps	.41	.08	.24	-.34	3.24
^b No. farm orgs	.24	-.30	.60	-.20	.92
<u>Communication intake</u>					
^c No. magazines received	.47	-.03	.16	-.30	4.04
^d No. farm magazines	.66	-.07	.50	-.47	2.42
No. radio news/week	.11	.11	-.12	.07	3.82
<u>Communication Pattern</u>					
^e contact for pol. opin.	.42	-.07	.26	.08	.78
contact for farming "	.33	-.09	-.17	-.05	1.14
<u>Work History</u>					
No. years off-farm work	.06	.08	-.16	-.01	5.12
**length residence area	-.08	.10	.26	-.13	1.75

**A negative standard score means above average length of residence.

Groups are diminished in size: NFU Consis=23; Clients=18;
NFU Inconsis=13; Non-NFU Consis=34.

*Groups are diminished in size: NFU Consis=23; Clients=18;
NFU Inconsis=13; Non-NFU Consis=28.

Table 7.2 cont'd.

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- ^aA two-tailed probability T-test indicates the following differences in the mean number of organizational memberships. NFU Consistents belong to significantly more organizations (at the .001 level) than do Non-NFU Consistents. NFU Inconsistentents belong to significantly more organizations (at the .05 level) than do non-NFU Consistents.
- ^bA two-tailed probability T-test indicates differences in farmer types of the following nature. NFU Consistents belong to significantly more farm organizations (at the .005 level) than do Clients; Clients belong to significantly fewer farm organizations (at the .001 level than do NFU Inconsistentents; and NFU Inconsistentents belong to significantly more farm organizations (at the .005 level) than do non-NFU Consistents.
- ^cNFU Consistents receive significantly more magazines than non-NFU Consistents. (The T value on a two-tailed probability test is significant at the .001 level)
- ^dT-test values reveal the following statistically significant differences. NFU Consistents receive significantly more farm magazines than Clients (at the .001 level) and non-NFU Consistents (at the .001 level). Clients receive significantly fewer farm magazines than NFU Inconsistentents (at the .05 level) and significantly more farm magazines than non-NFU Consistents (at the .05 level). And finally, NFU Inconsistentents receive significantly more farm magazines than do non-NFU Consistents (at the .001 level).
- ^eNFU Consistents have more contact with other people in forming political opinions than do both Clients and non-NFU Consistents. (T-test differences on a two-tailed probability test are significant in both instances at the .05 level.)

2. Social integration and Media consumption

While the pattern of social interaction of the farmer with his nearest urban centre is unrelated to his "typing", the NFU Consistents seem to be, in other ways, the most socially integrated into the farming community.¹¹ Table 7.2 indicates that they are at the same time the most active seekers of information: reporting that they receive more magazines, listen to farm radio reports more frequently (with the exception of the Client group), and belong to more organizations. As well, they engage in more social interaction with other farmers and farm leaders in formulating their opinions about politics and farming. Most unlike them in these respects are the non-NFU Consistents - that is, farmers who neither belong to the NFU nor subscribe to its set of beliefs. Non-NFU Consistents belong to the fewest organizations and report receiving the the least number of magazines. Interestingly, it is these two groups of whom the greatest proportion has spent the best part of their life in the area where they presently live.

3. Work History

Tables 7.1 and 7.2 show the NFU Consistent group to have had the most traditional work experience and work attitudes. They are the most likely to have had parents who were farmers and to regard farming as a way of life. While they describe themselves as having a relatively less negative attitude toward their work, proportionately more of them have thought of quitting farming.

Closest to them on the latter two criteria is the Client group: second least likely to have undergone a negative attitudinal change towards farming but second most prone to have contemplated getting out of farming. They have the highest tendency to regard farming as both a business and way of life; perhaps this helps to account for their relatively greater engagement in off-farm work at the present time.

Impressionistically, the group of NFU Inconsistents seem most dissatisfied with their occupation - possibly because they did not choose it, maybe because they think of it as a business at a time when farming is not a well-paying occupation. Their displeasure with farming appears to have led them to seek off-farm employment rather than quit farming altogether. It will be recalled that this group reported being most disenchanted with their present return. Their off-farm employment is undoubtedly an effort to shore up faltering finances.

Not surprisingly, Non-NFU Consistents seem to be the most allegiant farmers. While they, too, are not completely happy with farming as an occupation, they are among those with the lowest probability of having thought of leaving farming. The latter, and their tendency to have farmed all their life, may be the consequence of their being the most likely to have chosen to farm. Possibly their satisfaction is relatively high because their expectations are not so large; they are the second most likely to regard farming as a way of life.

4. Personality and Social Background

As anticipated, because these variables are furthest from their behavioral act (Crespi, 1971: 333), they are less consistently and

less strongly useful differentiators among the four types of farmers. Although relatively poorly educated and economically disadvantaged (their lower reported market value for their farm, lower gross and net income the previous year, fewer acres owned have been previously noted), the NFU Consistent group are, amazingly, slightly more self-efficacious than any other farmer type (Table 7.4). Self-esteem feelings are not, however, related to membership; NFU Inconsistents have the lowest feelings of self-esteem -- the consequence possibly of their relative youth and poorer education.

5. Values and Goals

Furthest from the behavioral act are the values and goals individual farmers are striving to realize in their lives. Their generality and distance from the behavioral act militate against the possibility of their being important differentiators among the four types of farmers. Value profiles of the four farmer types, reported in Appendix D, confirm this initial speculation with the two important exceptions. Firstly, value rankings of EQUALITY by the NFU Consistents and the Client group are significantly higher than those for the other two farmer types.¹² Secondly, the NFU Inconsistent group rank AN EXCITING LIFE significantly higher than do other farmers.¹³ A third contrast, although not statistically significant, is the relatively higher rating of A COMFORTABLE LIFE by the NFU members (both consistent and inconsistent). Thus, even though there is a great deal of consensus among all farmers as to what life goals are important - FAMILY SECURITY, FREEDOM, A WORLD AT PEACE - the more left-wing belief groups value EQUALITY

Table 7.3 Personality and Background Characteristics
of the Four Farmer Types: %'s

	NFU Consistents (N=26)	Clients (N=29)	NFU Inconsis. (N=22)	Non-NFU Cons. (N=56)	Total Group (N=133)
<u>Personality</u>					
Self-esteem: high	31	43	24	35	34
medium	50	29	43	30	36
low	19	29	33	35	30
Social Trust: high	50	46	52	51	50
low	50	54	48	49	50
<u>Religion</u>					
Catholic	15	25	36	17	22
Anglo-Protestant	31	21	18	35	29
European Protestant	31	29	32	17	25
Evangelical Protestant	8	11	5	15	11
Not affiliated	15	14	9	17	15
<u>Ethnic Origin</u>					
Canadian	73	66	73	67	70
British-American	4	3	5	9	6
European	8	14	14	15	13
Slavic	15	17	9	9	12

Table 7.4 Standard Scores of Four Farmer Types on
Personality and Background Characteristics

	NFU Consistents (N=26)	Clients (N=29)	NFU Inconsis. (N=22)	Non-NFU Consis. (N=56)	Total Group Mean
<u>Personality</u>					
Self-esteem	.17	.12	-.13	-.09	2.17
Social Trust	.13	-.09	-.01	.00	3.53
<u>Background</u>					
Age	.03	.10	-.23	.03	48.04
Education	-.23	-.06	-.15	.20	9.07
Infrequency church attendance	-.17	.26	.09	-.15	

slightly more. Furthermore, the association of membership with a higher evaluation of A COMFORTABLE LIFE gives at least one clue as to the motivation to join a farmer's organization.

II. Political Alienation and the Four Farmer Types

Empirical research in the past decade has done much to confirm the centrality of alienation and/or efficacy beliefs in studies of political behavior. But it is not all clear what the direction of the relationship between ideological behavior and alienation is. More pointedly, is alienation a predisposing factor towards the adoption of a right or left political ideology, or does espousing a left-wing set of beliefs, for example, lead to feelings of powerlessness and political normlessness, or are both the result of a third factor? The causal direction of the relation - if any - is not yet clear. Accordingly, a symmetrical association is assumed here until further evidence indicates otherwise.

While the multi-dimensionality of the concept is now clearly established, only two dimensions are examined here: political powerlessness and systemic inefficacy. Both dimensions are felt to be particularly relevant to the study of agrarian politics.

1. Perceived Systemic Inefficacy

While there exists as yet no empirical research into the political alienation of farmers as a select group, there is reason to suspect that the objective situation of farmers may well be one conducive to the growth of perceptions of systemic inefficacy.¹⁴ A number of students of agrarian politics have suggested that as a group, the agricultural sector may have fared less well than other interests

in terms of realizing governmental outputs consonant with their demands and needs. Professor Vernon Fowke argues that the farmer's ability to realize certain policy objectives and goals has depended upon the extent to which those goals benefitted not farmers but other sectors of the economy, notably the commercial interests. Canadian farmers, he suggests, "... have generally been powerless to secure assistance which would benefit them at the expense of other substantial groups within the community." (1946: 272) Policy successes of farmers up to 1930 "were directly related to the importance of agriculture to the Canadian economy", and after 1930, "farmers ... were reduced to asking for relief instead of reform" (Fowke, 1946: 250) If a measure of the success of wheat farmers' efforts at political persuasion were to be their "persistent ability to secure state support for policies which favour it in obvious disregard for the broader public interest", (Fowke and Fowke, 1968: 211) then, given what the wheat grower has wanted of the Dominion Government in the way of policy outputs, and what he has obtained, "It can be stated categorically ... that the Canadian wheat grower has never occupied a political position of such strength". (Fowke and Fowke, 1968: 211) Fowkes' analysis, while restricted to the wheat grower, isolates an historical situation that may have produced alienation feelings among agricultural producers generally.

Perceived systemic inefficacy has been found to have important implications for political behavior, at times inducing withdrawal, in other social contexts predisposing individuals to the use of violence.. (Nachmias, 1974: Renshon, 1974: 224, passim; Schwartz, 1973: Chapter 12)

System responsiveness is measured here in terms of the following items.

a) Perceived Past Success with Provincial and Federal Governments

The question read: "Have farmers and farm organizations generally been able to get a good deal from the government in Alberta, or have they generally been unsuccessful in their efforts?"

The question was repeated with reference to "the government in Ottawa - the Federal government". Assessments of the comparative success vis-à-vis the two levels of government are also tapped by asking respondents "Have farmers been able to get a better deal relatively speaking, from the Alberta government or from the federal government, or is there any difference?"

Federal System Unresponsiveness and Provincial System Unresponsiveness are ordinal level measures scored as follows: 1 if the past record is viewed as "successful"; 2 if the past record is perceived as "somewhat successful"; and 3 if the past record is judged as "unsuccessful."

b) Evaluation of Fair and Serious Treatment by Provincial Officials

To assess farmers expectations of future governmental responsiveness, they were presented with the following scenario which was based on an incident which had occurred the preceding autumn.

"Last fall, some farmers in this area didn't get their crops off in the Fall and needed governmental assistance to get through the winter. If they made a presentation to the provincial government, outlining their need for assistance, would the farmers be treated as well as anyone else approaching a governmental

official? Would the farmers be given equal treatment, or would they be treated as inferior? How seriously do you think the provincial government would consider their presentation? Would the provincial government give their presentation serious consideration, only a little attention, or would it ignore what the farmers had to say?"

(The two questions underlined were repeated in two separate questions.)

Because of the high correlation between expecting fair treatment and anticipating serious consideration ($\text{Gamma} = .84$), the two items are combined to form a single measure where a high score represents an expectation of unfair and non-serious consideration. (Conversely, a low score means an expectation of fair and serious treatment and a medium score of one of either fair or serious treatment.)

2. Political Powerlessness

The concept of political "powerlessness", or some variant of it ... appears in practically all discussions of political alienation.

(Finifter, 1972: 182)

When "the expectancy or probability held by the individual that his own behavior cannot determine the occurrence of the outcomes or reinforcements he seeks" (Seeman, 1959: 783) is accompanied by resentment with that state of affairs, then the individual is described as being powerless.¹⁵ It is both impossible and unnecessary to summarize the plethora of studies concerned with political powerlessness.¹⁶ In terms of the present data set and analyses, findings of particular interest are those documenting the connection between powerlessness and the frequency of and ideological direction of participatory acts. Results here are at best non-cumulative. Accordingly, while powerlessness may

encourage political apathy (Finifter, 1970; Erbe, 1964; Olsen, 1965), under other circumstances it facilitates protest voting (Horton and Thompson, 1962) and is equated with political extremism (Boderman, 1964: 307) and violence (Ransford, 1968).

While efforts to link political powerlessness directly with ideological beliefs are few, there is evidence that powerlessness is positively associated with radical right wing activities (Abcarian and Stanage, 1965). Elsewhere, activists in centrist parties (Republican and Democratic) have been shown to be much less alienated and more efficacious than respondents on the right and left of the political spectrum. (Knutson, 1974b: 28)

The hypothesis that political powerlessness is an important concept in understanding farmers' political beliefs and behavior grows out of the conjectures regarding the consequences of system(governmental) nonresponsiveness. It has been noted that there is reason to believe farmers have a record of unsuccessful pressure for policy outputs. What might the behavioral/attitudinal consequences of that past record be? Lipsky posits that

If among the groups least capable of organizing for political activity there is a history of organizing for protest, and if that activity, once engaged in, is rewarded primarily by the dispensation of symbolic gestures without perceptible changes in material conditions, then rational behavior might lead to expressions of apathy and lack of interest in politics or a rejection of conventional political channels as a meaningful arena of activity.

(Lipsky, 1968: 1158)

Similarly, Lane suggests that apathy may be systemically induced. Because people's self-images are shaped by "their social situations, from the reflections of themselves they see in such cues as forms of address, minor courtesies, and postures of attention accorded to them by others" (Lane, 1959: 339), constant indifference to farmers' demands may be a sufficient cue to induce withdrawal from politics. This is the theme of Murray Edelman as well. Individuals, he says, are socialized by society "and especially the government itself" into expecting and wanting certain things and no more, into believing they deserve only so much, and into accepting their deprivation as "natural" or as their responsibility. (1973: 2)

The measure of political powerlessness used here is composed of the following four items.

- a) I don't think the government cares much about what people like me think.
- b) People like me don't have any say about what the government does.
- c) Farmers have generally been powerless to secure governmental assistance which would benefit them.
- d) The market system of our economy is designed to exploit farmers.

Responses are scored so that a high score represents powerlessness.

3. Availability of Legitimate Vehicles of Action

Participation and support for a political system seem to be contingent upon the perception of available channels by which to participate - should one want to. Even should one not desire to act politically, it appears important that one believe there are channels by which one

could participate should one change one's mind. Insofar as one of the norms in a democratic system is that there are political avenues and vehicles by which one can make oneself heard and counted, a denial of the availability of such channels may presage political normlessness.

The vehicles focused upon here are the provincial and federal party systems. Two queries are presented to farmers. One, does either political party system contain alternatives that would make a difference to the personal welfare of the farmer depending upon which party was in power provincially or federally? Two, does any party at either system level represent farmers? The two questions are quite distinct: first, the political party systems could pose alternatives without representing farmers; and secondly, without offering differences, the two party systems could represent farmers if all parties advanced farmers' interests.

Different scholars have both defined agrarian political radicalism in terms of the rejection of the alternate party system, and pointed to the latter as a determinant of agrarian political radicalism. (Brown, 1972; Morton, 1950; Sharp, 1948; Smith, 1967) Farmers' historical propensity to vote for parties other than the two traditional centre-of-the-road parties would seem to indicate that farmers are either displeased with the alternate party system or see no need for it. Do they reject the system itself or only certain parties in it?

The two variables of relevance here are:

- a) a dichotomous variable with 1 representing the perception that the party system (or any one party) represents farmers; 0 represents the denial that any or all parties represent farmers.

- b) a continuous level measure with responses ranging from "great deal of difference" (score of 4) to "no difference at all" (score of 1) in reply to the query, "In terms of their policies, how much difference do you think it makes to you as a farmer which party won the election on July 8th?" The question assesses perceived salience of the federal party system. A similarly phrased question taps perceived provincial party salience.

4. Possibility of Farmers Organizing Politically

As another test of the availability of farmer action within the political system, farmers were queried as to the possibility of collective political action.

"What do you think about the idea of farmers organizing together to form a political group today, nominating candidates and trying to get them elected in order to form the government here in Alberta? Do you think it's a realistic idea - that is, is it likely that farmers could get together and form a political group?"

(The question underlined was repeated and is the one to which the farmer was asked to respond.)

Responses are coded dichotomously: a score of 1 represents affirmation of the possibility of collective farm action; 0, denial of the possibility.

5. Governmental Salience

Not itself a measure of political alienation, perceived governmental salience has come increasingly to be recognized as a variable whose interaction with feelings of alienation may well mean the difference between apathy and withdrawal or protest behavior and violence.

It has been argued that only if the political arena and politics are perceived to be salient to the resolution of goals and demands will

individuals seek to realize those goals by participating politically.

(Czudnowski, 1968; Renshon, 1974: 2) And that perception may be dependent upon the political culture of the political system. Any given individual's propensity to utilize the political system to attain highly valued goals is a function of the extent to which individuals in the system as a whole orient themselves towards the political system to resolve non-political conflicts and to achieve social-type goals. (Czudnowski, 1968: 884)

The variable would appear to be differently related to varying political ideologies. Stanley Renshon has suggested that the political system may be viewed as salient for three reasons: for the rewards it affords, for the punishment it metes out, and for perceptions relating to the role of a good citizen. (1974: 76-79) If it can be established which of these three types of salience farmers accord the provincial and federal governments, then it may be possible to come to some understanding of why some individuals are more predisposed towards governmental intervention into farming than are others.

Federal and provincial governmental salience are continuous measures, where a low score represents a belief that the federal and provincial government have "no effect at all" in answer to the question "How much would you say the actions of the Federal (Provincial) Government affect the daily lives of you and your family?" Conversely, a belief in governmental salience, a high score, entails an answer of "a great deal" or "a fair amount" of effect.

Findings: Political Alienation and the Four Types

How do the four groups compare? Tables 7.5 and 7.6 provide rich grounds for speculation. The most politically alienated are NFU Consistents; the least, Non-NFU Consistents. In general terms, alienation with respect to the federal government is stronger the more NFU beliefs are adhered to, and estrangement from the provincial government is greater among NFU members than non-members.

NFU Consistents are politically alienated with respect to their own powerlessness and their perceptions of past and future federal and provincial system responsiveness. Clients feel politically powerless and estranged from the federal government but not from the provincial government or provincial party system. These two groups are thus very similar, differing mainly in terms of the Client group's greater satisfaction with the responsiveness of the provincial government. The NFU Inconsistents are "inconsistent" in their alienation feelings. While they, like the NFU Consistents, are displeased with the provincial government, they seem to subscribe more to the norms of the political system - holding to the belief that they will be treated fairly and equally with other groups in society. Of all farmers, they accord the least impact to the actions of the two governments and the relevance of the federal party system. But, significantly, they affirm the possibility of farmers organizing politically. This suggests that they are members because they believe in the efficacy of farm organizations. Although the individual is powerless, the collectivity of farmers can be strong.

Table 7.5 Political Alienation and the
Four Farmer Types: %'s*

	NFU Consistents (N=26)	Clients (N=29)	NFU Inconsis. (N=22)	Non-NFU Consis. (N=56)	Total Group (N=133)
<u>Powerlessness</u>					
High	46	45	33	17	32
Medium	35	31	24	28	29
Low	19	24	43	55	39
<u>Past Success Alta. Government</u>					
No	62	48	50	33	45
Somewhat	15	28	18	18	20
Yes	23	24	32	49	36
<u>Past Success Federal Government</u>					
No	85	79	57	70	72
Somewhat	15	11	33	16	18
Yes	—	11	10	14	10
<u>Relative Governmental Success</u>					
Better from Alta.	35	52	38	58	48
**Better Alta./lately	42	55	38	62	52
Same from both	54	41	57	33	43
<u>Expectation of unequal and Unfair Treatment</u>					
Yes	44	31	20	16	25
Somewhat	32	27	30	26	28
No	24	42	50	58	47
<u>Salience Fed. Gov't.</u>					
Great deal	42	38	9	30	31
Great deal/fair amount	77	76	68	74	74
<u>Salience Prov. Gov't.</u>					
Great deal	27	21	10	22	21
Great deal/fair amount	77	76	76	72	75
<u>Salience Federal Party System</u>					
Great deal/some	56	59	33	60	55
<u>Salience Provincial Party System</u>					
Great deal/some	61	69	67	57	62

Table 7.5 cont'd.

	NFU Consistents	Clients	NFU Inconsis.	Non-NFU Consis.	Total Sample
<u>Any Provincial</u>					
<u>Party Represent</u>					
<u>Farmers?</u>					
Yes	58	59	60	62	60
<u>Any Federal</u>					
<u>Party Represent</u>					
<u>Farmers?</u>					
Yes	42	52	48	48	48
<u>Possibility of</u>					
<u>Collective Farmer</u>					
<u>Action</u>					
Yes	27	24	52	25	30

**This response represents the combined percentage feeling that they had received better success with the Alberta government and the percentage who qualified their response with "lately" or "since 1971". The proportions who mentioned farmers had been relatively more successful with the Federal Government have been omitted from this item since they are small.

*Percentages do not sum to 100 in some cases because of the elimination of some categories.

Table 7.6 Political Alienation
Farmer Types: Standard Scores

	NFU Consistents (N=26)	Clients (N=29)	NFU Inconsis. (N=22)	Non-NFU Consis. (N=56)
^a Powerlessness	.36	.43	-.08	-.38
^b Past Unsuccess Alta. Gov't.	.33	.17	.10	-.28
Past Unsuccess Federal Gov't.	.33	.08	-.23	-.12
^c Expectation of Unequal/Unfair Treatment	.49	.11	-.11	-.25
Salience Prov. Government	.17	-.01	-.13	-.03
Salience Fed. Government	.22	.07	-.29	-.04

^aMean Powerlessness scores of NFU Consistents and Non-NFU Consistents are significantly different at the .001 level. Mean Powerlessness scores of Clients and Non-NFU Consistents are significantly different at the .001 level. Mean Powerlessness scores of Clients and NFU Inconsistents are significantly different at the .05 level.

^bMean scores of NFU Consistents and Non-NFU Consistents on "Past Unsuccess Alta. Gov't." are significantly different at the .01 level; differences in scores of Clients and Non-NFU Consistents are significant at the .05 level.

^cMean scores of NFU Consistents and Non-NFU Consistents on "Expectation of Unequal/Unfair Treatment" are significantly different at the .003 level; those of NFU Consistents and NFU Inconsistents at the .05 level.

It is the non-NFU Consistent group - the farmers who neither adhere to NFU beliefs nor belong to that farm organization - who are happiest with the political system. They have the highest probability of not feeling politically powerless and of judging federal and particularly provincial governments to have been responsive in the past and to expect them to be in the future.

The four farmer types do not vary on a number of dimensions. Three-fourths of all farmers (with one exception) agree that federal and provincial governments have a great deal or moderate impact on their lives. Thus, the powerless and the less powerless, the radical and the less radical all accord salience to governmental actions. It is thus not clear whether governments are viewed as salient for their punishment, reward, or normative relevance. This may be just a reality measure; the well being and livelihood of all farmers is probably more intimately tied up with governmental policies than is that of most citizens.

The timing of the study presented a unique opportunity to tap whether assessments of the probability of success in influence attempts actually reflect individual experiences in the political system. Extensive crop losses in this area the previous fall had motivated both members and non-members of the National Farmers Union to pressure the provincial government for financial assistance to help recoup crop losses. While reference was made to this incident, the question posed of the farmers which was designed to assess their personal experience at influencing governmental officials was more generally phrased.¹⁷ Of the four farmer types, 62.5% of the NFU Consistents, 25% of Clients, 60% of

NFU Inconsistents, and 40% of the Non-NFU Consistent group report having had "personal experience" at trying to influence governmental officials. Has reality testing heightened or eased political alienation?

The relevant type comparisons, given in Table 7.7, may be summarized as follows. For NFU Inconsistents, reality testing exacerbates or produces alienation feelings. Just the opposite occurs among the NFU Client and non-NFU Consistent groups. For these two groups, individuals who have tested the benevolence of governmental officials score lower on powerlessness, expect more equal and fair treatment, and are more positive about the performance of the Federal government than are those people in these two types who have not tested the governments. The NFU Consistent group falls between these extremes. Among NFU Consistents, reality testing tends only slightly to be associated with greater powerlessness and an expectation of unequal and unfair treatment. It is associated with a more positive evaluation of past success of farmers with both provincial and federal governments.

The differences are interesting and probably reflect both the differing expectations and different experiences of the four types of farmers. The NFU Inconsistents experienced the most financial distress; accordingly, satisfaction of their demands by government probably necessitated greater governmental assistance than would alleviation of grievances of farmers better off financially. If they feel powerless after approaching governmental officials, it may well be because governments have not gone far enough to meet their demands. On the other hand, satisfaction of the demands of farmers who are better off as well as more

Table 7.7 Reality-Testing and Political Alienation
Among the Four Farmer Types: %'s*

Alienation Measure	Personal Experience in Influencing Governmental Officials							
	NFU		Clients		NFU		Non-NFU	
	Consistents				Inconsis.		Consistents	
	Yes (N=15)	No (N=9)	Yes (N=7)	No (N=21)	Yes (N=12)	No (N=8)	Yes (N=23)	No (N=32)
<u>Powerlessness</u>								
**High	47	44	29	52	42	12.5	9.5	78
Low	13	22	14	24	33	62.5	57.0	55
<u>Expectation of Unfair or Unequal Treatment</u>								
* *High	47	44	--	38	25	12.5	17	16
Low	20	33	80	33	33	75.0	70	50
<u>Past Lack of Success with Alta. Gov't.</u>								
Yes	53	78	57	48	69	12.5	35	32
No	26	11	29	24	15	62.5	56	42
<u>Past Lack of Success with Federal Gov't.</u>								
Yes	80	89	57	85	67	29	61	75
No	20	11	29	5	8	14	13	16

*Column percentages; N's slightly smaller owing to missing data.

**"Middle" categories have been omitted.

conservative ideologically would seem to require less governmental involvement and assistance. Accordingly, such farmers have probably been much more successful in obtaining from government what they have sought from it. Their more favorable prospect of having their demands effectively met by the provincial governments may result because they are closer to these governments ideologically and accordingly have demanded less of them.

Why should the NFU Inconsistent be somewhat more alienated after approaching governmental officials than the NFU Consistent? Anticipating data to be presented later in the chapter, it is speculated that the NFU Consistent, as upholders of the NFU Belief Index and more probable adherents to the efficacy of the NFU approach to political persuasion, will be more inclined to judge that political bargaining by their organization yields more successful outcomes than would be forthcoming in the absence of such pressure tactics. That is, the bases of comparison of "success" of the two groups, as well as the commitment to the efficacy of the NFU stance, may differ for the two types of NFU members. Thelma Oliver, discovering a similar finding whereby "fairly active" members of agricultural associations were more alienated than "very active" members, raises another explanation. She argues that high activity and control in an organization "may have the effect of moderating alienation, since the position of control itself induces -- or assumes -- accomodating behaviour toward other groups and presentation of an acceptable image to the 'inactive', who are the majority in the organization." (1975: 12)

Summary Characteristics of Four Farmer Types

A number of situational and personality characteristics did not differentiate directly among the four types of farmers. These included social trust,¹⁸ perceptions of the salience and ability of the provincial and federal party systems to represent farmers' interests, attitudes towards farming, almost all the social background characteristics, frequency of interaction with the nearest urban centre, and aspects of the individual's farming experience. We must await further analyses to determine if they make an indirect impact. But a number of hypothesized predictor variables did directly distinguish the four types of farmers. These included measures of economic discontent, political powerlessness, perceived federal and provincial responsiveness, integration into the farming community, and media consumption. The reported size of farm owned, estimated market value of the farming operation, and self-esteem appear to be less significant differentiators.

The most divergent groups in terms of the explanatory criteria examined here are NFU Consistents and non-NFU Consistents; that is, individuals who adhere to NFU beliefs and who belong to that organization in contrast to farmers who neither belong to the NFU nor ascribe to its modal beliefs. In general terms, the former are alienated and economically dissatisfied; the latter are not. But the differences exceed these two.

NFU believers and joiners are the most economically discontented generally, the second most displeased with their current economic intake, and the most pessimistic regarding future returns from farming. Their

political alienation is pervasive. They have feelings of both political powerlessness and system unresponsiveness, are most inclined to judge farmers' past attempts to secure favourable policy outputs from both provincial and federal governments to have been unsuccessful, and are least optimistic in expecting fair and serious consideration in approaching provincial governmental officials. Whether because of their negative evaluations of government or not, they tend to attribute a greater impact to the actions of the provincial and federal governments on their daily lives. Their political alienation and economic discontent appear grounded in objective conditions: they report netting lower incomes on their less financially profitable farms. This constellation of characteristics is one that is quite properly congruent with adherence to the NFU ideology. At the same time, this group of farmers is characterized by traits conducive to participation generally; they are high in feelings of self-esteem, are socially integrated into the farming community, and consume media with greater frequency. They thus possess the set of political attitudes and personal attributes that previous empirical research has led us to believe are consistent with "radical" beliefs and political activity.

In contrast are the Non-NFU Consistents - farmers whose belief system and farm membership are consistently non-radical and probably conservative. These farmers are among the most satisfied with their overall economic situation, most pleased with their present return, and are among the least pessimistic about the future economic returns farmers will realize. Political alienation is lowest among this group. They

report the lowest powerlessness and are most likely to assess the past interactions of farmers with both the federal and provincial governments - but particularly with the Alberta government - as having yielded beneficial results. They are furthermore most prone to expect equal and serious treatment in approaching provincial officials.

And like the NFU Consistents whose political and economic discontent is rooted at least partially in objective conditions, the life situation of the Non-NFU Consistents appears consonant with their political and economic contentment. Non-NFU Consistents report the highest market value for their farming operations. The happiest with their chosen occupation, they are among the least likely to have contemplated quitting farming. They thus have no need to adhere to NFU beliefs.

There are two hints that it is this group which most closely approximates the mythical individualistic, independent farmer. The first clue is that while 30% of them judge the federal government to have a great deal of impact on their daily lives, there is only one group that attributes less salience to the actions of the federal government (and that is NFU Inconsistent). This group of Non-NFU Consistents may thus be slightly more inclined to feel free from the impact of governmental actions in their daily lives. A second indication of their individualism is the seemingly greater solitude of these farmers in their daily lives: they belong to fewer organizations and receive fewer magazines, both indications that they tune in to the farming and outside communities less than do other farmers.

These two farmer types represent the two extremes among farmers. The remaining two types lie in between, characterized by attributes and attitudes that are like those of NFU Consistents in some respects and those of Non-NFU Consistents in others. Both the NFU Client and the NFU Inconsistent groups exhibit traits that jointly constrain and promote their recruitment to a radical protest organization. In terms of their political powerlessness, alienation from the Federal and Provincial governments, and discontent with the present return on farm products, the Client group is similar to NFU Consistents. However, their favorable appraisal of the provincial government's treatment of farmers as contrasted with the federal record, their feelings that the provincial party system represents farmers, and their objective criteria of owning larger and more profitable farms are characteristics which they share more with Non-NFU Consistents than with NFU Consistents. They are not as socially integrated as NFU members nor as socially isolated as Non-NFU Consistents - save for the fact they belong to the fewest farm organizations. The Clients' interaction with farmers and their receipt of farm magazines are both less intense than those of NFU Consistents.

NFU Inconsistents are perhaps best characterized as farmers whose dreams have turned sour. Younger than average, with fewer years of school, they are substantially more disenchanted with farming than are the other farmers. These are the farmers with the lowest self-esteem, the men who place themselves at the bottom rung of society's ladder. As one farmer put it:

"I figured at one time I could really get somewhere. Now I figure that farming will always be a hand-me-down affair. Society doesn't care about farmers."

The NFU Inconsistents' disillusionment may be all the more complete because of their greater inclination to regard farming as a business enterprise rather than as a way of life as do most farmers.

NFU Inconsistents share their displeasure with the present economic situation with NFU Consistents. But in terms of their degree of political alienation, they are more like Non-NFU Consistents. That is, they are second lowest in feelings of powerlessness (behind Non-NFU Consistents), most inclined to judge farmers as having been successful in the past with the Federal Government and second most likely to expect equal and serious treatment from the provincial government. They are the most inclined to accord low salience to the federal and provincial governments' actions. By relying on nonpersonal sources of information to arrive at their opinions about politics and farming, they interact less with other farmers. The latter may be at least partially the consequence of their relative youth and shorter residence in the area. The picture which emerges of them is of a group of individuals, frustrated with their economic straits and occupation, trying to find some meaning for their lot. On the one hand, their inclination to accord lower than average salience to the federal government particularly, their low self-esteem, their lack of social communication with other farmers, and their poorer education would predispose them to fault themselves. On the other hand, their perusal of magazines and their farm organizational membership

would work in the direction of bringing them outside themselves to fault those bodies that hinder their economic viability and prevent their political effectiveness.

III. Behavioral Implications

A number of behavioral measures which tap the activity of the farmer in the wider political arena further enhance the description of each of the four farmer types. These indicators point to the conclusion that the NFU Consistent group - one of the two groups of farmers whose membership and belief characteristics are congruent - are the most politically curious and active citizens.

Table 7.8 contrasts the four farmer types on indices of voting turnout, direction, consistency, and rationale; past organizational activities; and role in political discussions. Standard scores of the four types on two indices of NFU Activity and Political Interest and Discussion are given in Table 7.9. While most of the items in Table 7.8 are straightforward, a few require some elaboration. All items were closed-ended except for "Why Voted" and "Basis of Vote Decision". In the former, the farmer freely explained why he voted in the preceding federal election, and in the latter what were the most important considerations in his vote choice. In Table 7.9, the NFU Activity index is a Likert index, constructed by summing the incidence of participation in the following NFU-sponsored activities: handing out pamphlets in an informational picket, partaking in a demonstration to protest a government (non-) action, being a delegate to the NFU National Convention, writing letters to governmental officials, and signing a telegram to governmental officials.

Table 7.8 Behavioral Attributes
of the Four Farmer Types: %'s *

	NFU Consistents (N=26)	Clients (N=29)	NFU Inconsis. (N=22)	Non-NFU Consis. (N=56)	Total Group (N=133)
Voted past federal election	96	86	86	91	90
<u>Why Voted</u>					
duty/right	38	48	64	53	51
pol./partisan	58	38	23	38	39
didn't vote	4	14	14	9	10
<u>Vote Choice</u>					
PC Vote Federally	35	52	46	66	53
NDP Vote Federally	35	17	18	5	16
PC Vote Prov. 1971	67	57	77	60	63
Socred Vote Prov.	14	17	6	21	17
NDP Vote Prov. 1971	19	22	12	4	12
<u>Basis Vote Decision</u>					
Issues	28	32	16	15	21.5
**Man	25	20	53	35	32
Party	28	16	21	23	22
Issues & Party	8	16	5	8	9
<u>Vote Constancy</u>					
a)Provincially: yes	42	48	30	48	44
no	58	45	55	48	50
switched last time	--	7	15	4	6
b)Federally: yes	61.5	65.5	50	63.5	61
no	38.5	34.5	50	36.5	39
c)Federally & Prov'lly					
yes	38.5	48	35	49	44
no	61.5	52	65	51	56
<u>Pol. Discussion Role</u>					
Convince others	19	7	14	11	12
Take equal share	50	48	45.5	37	43.5
<u>Past Farm Org. Membshp.</u>					
Yes	61.5	11	18	6	20
Yes/Belong Now	73	50	50	41.5	51

*Where percentages do not total to 100%, it is because only certain responses to each item have been presented in order to make type contrasts clearer.

**Voted on the basis of the local candidate, or provincial or national party leader.

Table 7.9 Behavioral Attributes of the
Four Farmer Types: Standard Scores

	NFU Consistents	Clients	NFU Inconsis.	Non-NFU Consis.
Political Interest	.29	-.10	-.04	-.07
NFU Activity	1.04	-.33	.15	-.38

The Political Interest index, also a Likert measure, is comprised of three items ascertaining the individual's interest in politics, frequency of discussion of political matters, and his role in political discussions. (The construction of this measure, as that of all measures introduced in this chapter, is discussed in more detail in Appendix C.)

While reported voting turnout in the previous federal election is exceptionally high for all farmers, the group of NFU Consistents has a slight edge here. A further profile development of this group shows them to be the most left-wing in their partisan support and the most calculating in their vote choice. When asked why they vote, they are, of all farmers, by far the most likely to report it is political or partisan considerations, rather than a sense of habit or duty or a normative belief in the right of all citizens to vote that motivates them to go to the polls. Wanting to change the government, to return a minority government, to improve a given party's or candidate's chances of winning - these are the sort of calculations that induce the NFU Consistent farmer moreso than other farmers to go to the polls. Furthermore, they are among the most prone to report basing their voting decision on consideration of the campaign issues, rather than the candidates or leaders. The implication is thus that voting is a purposive activity for NFU Consistents, and less the ritualistic/expressive function it is for other farmer types. (Wilker and Milbrath, 1972: 55)

While NFU Consistents are, of course, presently members of at least one farm organization, there is evidence that they are perennial organizational members. Table 7.8 shows that they are the most likely to have belonged to farm organizations in the past. And, in contrast to NFU Inconsistent, they are activists in NFU-sponsored activities; writing letters, signing telegrams, partaking in demonstrations and rallies. Lastly, they report being more politically interested and active in political discussions, taking an equal share in conversations or trying to convince others of their point of view.

Given this evidence of high activity, therefore, it is concluded that the political estrangement and alienation of the NFU Consistent farmers does not impede their political involvement and activity. These farmers have not withdrawn from the political system, even in the face of perceived lack of success in the past with authorities in that system. Where rejection has occurred, it would appear to have taken the form of a removal of support from the traditional centrist parties to the most left wing party in the system, the New Democratic Party. But that support is not extensive. This mixture of powerlessness and perceived system inefficacy alongside political involvement and activity is intriguing and suggests the need for a more intensive examination of the pattern of interaction of NFU belief adherence and political alienation.

The NFU Consistents' organizational associates, the NFU Inconsistent group, reflect further tendencies of the uneven socialization experience which they displayed earlier. They have the highest tendency to subscribe to political norms in accounting for why they vote. Since

they are most inclined to report voting for the man (the party leader or local candidate) rather than the party, it is not surprising that they are also the least likely to vote consistently for the same party in provincial and federal elections.. The relative youth of this group undoubtedly partially accounts for these "searching" behavioral patterns: they are farmers still seeking a party allegiance.

Non-believers and non-joiners, Non-NFU Consistents are, in keeping with their political opinions, the most conservative in their vote choice. While their voting turnout is as high or higher than that of other farmers, they are not joiners of farm organizations - either now or in the past. Furthermore, Non-NFU Consistents are least interested in discussing politics, following political events, or trying to convince other individuals of their points of view. Their social isolation from other farmers constrains their opportunities to engage in political discussions; their perceived lesser relevance of governmental actions may mean they see no need to discuss politics anyway.

The ideological radicalness of the NFU Client group is not matched by a left wing partisanship. They are Conservative party supporters provincially and federally, but also farmers who vote on the basis of campaign issues more than party considerations.

In summary, the behavioral attributes of the four farmer types confirm preceding analyses. NFU Consistents and Non-NFU Consistents are least alike: the former being relatively left-wing; the latter, comparatively right-wing. Involvement of NFU Consistents in a protest organization is just one manifestation of their higher than average activity and interest.

In contrast, the Non-NFU Consistents, non-members of this organization, are generally politically and socially isolated. And between these extremes, revealing attributes of both types and ones unique to themselves, are the NFU Inconsistent and Clients.

Summary

The contrasting features of the four farmer types permit speculation as to parallels and discontinuities of the findings of this research with trends established on non-farmer adult samples. The set of hypotheses which were outlined earlier in this chapter are now stipulated and it is indicated whether they appear to be supported within this group of Alberta farmers.

On the basis of previous findings on adult samples, the following patterns were hypothesized to prevail between situational and personality characteristics and traditional and protest forms of political activity.

- (1) Economic discontent is related to mobilization into protest politics. Confirmed.
- (2) Social integration fosters mobilization into protest politics. Confirmed.
Media consumption is associated with left-wing political support and stance. Confirmed.
Contacts with urban centres and urban ties foster recruitment to protest politics. Not confirmed.
- (3) Low self-esteem is associated with political conservatism. Weakly supported.
Low self-esteem is associated with withdrawal from politics and low political interest. Partially supported: NFU Consistents, highest in self-esteem are more politically interested and active; NFU Clients, second highest in esteem, are not overly politically active or interested.
- (4) Social trust is associated with support for parties on the Right. Not Confirmed.

- (5) A high evaluation of EQUALITY occurs alongside a left-wing ideology. Confirmed.
- (6) Powerlessness induces withdrawal from politics. Not confirmed.
Powerlessness promotes deviant politics. Partially confirmed.
Powerlessness facilitates right wing activities. Not confirmed.
- (7) Perceived governmental salience is related to political participation. Partially confirmed: NFU Consistents, but not NFU Inconsistent view governmental activities as salient.

In general hypotheses positing links between social-structural or situational factors and protest politics tend to be supported here. Conversely, the study tends to disconfirm hypotheses that implicitly assume a disjunction between protest and traditional behavior patterns - that is, that the individual who engages in "legitimate" political activities does not take part in "protest" politics. The four-fold division of farmers has demonstrated that it is the group of NFU consistent - who act upon their belief set by joining a farmers' organization espousing that viewpoint - who are the most politically active and politically curious. There are two implications to be drawn from this. The first is that the act of joining a farmers' protest organization represents a demand to participate - a demand to have a say in the important decisions that effect one's life. This statement certainly describes the public exhortations and activities of the National Farmers Union organization itself; it is thus most probable that proselytizing efforts of the organization have played upon farmers' similar desires. The second implication is that participation is a learned ability. (Sutherland, 1975: 19-20) The current activity of NFU Consistents has

its roots in a background of membership in farm organizations. These men are habitual actors.

In the interest of pursuing the primary objective of examining the correlates of ideology and action - more precisely, the correlates of their admixture - a number of equally interesting trends in the data which are tangential to this primary purpose are obscured. In this summary section, it is possible to comment briefly upon some of these.

First, contrary to Macpherson's supposition that farmers identify with the entrepreneurial (bourgeois) class, a surprisingly large number here describe themselves as members of the working or lowest classes. The self-assigned label appears to reflect a judgment of how the farmer perceives others as viewing him. Thus, the farmer frequently justified his inclusion in the working/lowest class on the grounds that "That's where society seems to put us since they won't pay us a decent living". To what degree the epithet is a function of bad times is not clear but there is some evidence that it is the person who describes himself as middle class who is pessimistic about the economic future of farming.

Secondly, over three-fifths of the farmers here judge the federal government to have been unresponsive to their requests and demands in the past. This high degree of discontent with the federal government confirms previous research findings. Oliver, in an analysis of data gathered in a province-wide post electoral survey of Alberta residents in 1971, showed that feelings of discontent paralleled agricultural association membership and an early rural socialization environment.

(Oliver, 1975: 10-12) A government Information Study similarly disclosed that Alberta farmers were less optimistic of rapid and equal treatment from federal officials than were Alberta residents as a whole, themselves among the most disenchanting citizens in the country. (To Know and Be Known, Vol. 2: 67, 72) There is, furthermore, some evidence that estrangement from the federal government occurs as early as adolescence and does not drop much thereafter. (Skogstad: 197)

Thirdly, there is uniformity among farmers in the perceived impact of federal authorities on their daily lives. This finding, which has been previously noted, raises the supposition that it is this perception of governmental salience that prompts the fifth behavioral pattern noted - the amazingly high turnout of farmers at the polls (or at least their reports of such). It may appear to matter more to farmers which party forms the government at Ottawa. The remaining pattern observed - the alleged consistency of federal vote choice - seems to substantiate this interpretation. A relatively stable vote choice indicates a fixed opinion as to which party would most suitably form the government at Ottawa.

The contrasts between the four types allow speculations as to the conditions facilitating recruitment of individuals to protest organizations. In the absence of a generalized feeling of political alienation, it appears that farmers may be recruited to organizations on the basis of their economic grievances. To that extent, Macpherson was correct about the circumstances conducive to mobilization to radical politics. But there are slightly more than one-half the NFU members for

whom membership in a protest organization represents more than an attempt to hook into whatever "ideology" seems most likely at the moment to provide a vehicle by which to seek the redress of economic grievances. The correlation of political alienation and economic discontent with the set of NFU modal beliefs for not only NFU members but non-members as well indicates that adherence to the NFU belief cluster represents an integrated appraisal of the individual's place in the political and economic system. The subsequent chapter devotes itself to examining more explicitly this possibility.

Notes on Chapter 7

- 1 It has been argued that it is not deprivation per se, but relative deprivation that promotes protest or revolutionary politics. For a general discussion of the concept "relative deprivation" see W. G. Runciman, Relative Deprivation and Social Justice (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966). The argument that revolutionary behavior follows in the wake of frustration of rising expectations is put by essays by Alexis de Tocqueville, "Equality and Rising Expectations", 93-98; James C. Davies, "The Revolutionary State of Mind", 134-149 in When Men Revolt and Why ed. J. C. Davies (New York: Free Press, 1971).
- 2 The question read: "Which of these sources is most important in influencing your opinions on farming matters? Second most important? Which of these sources is most important in influencing your opinions on political matters? Second most important?"
A personal pattern of farming opinion formation denotes "conversations with other farmers" and/or "conversations with farm leaders" rather than reliance on magazines, TV, radio or newspapers as sources.
A personal pattern of political opinion formation denotes "conversations with other farmers" and/or "conversations with farm leaders" and/or "conversations with family members" rather than reliance on magazines, TV, radio or newspapers as sources.
For information as to the scoring of these responses, see Appendix C.
- 3 As formulated by Marx, work becomes alienating in the capitalist system because "... the work is external to the worker, ... it is not part of his nature ... consequently, he does not fulfill himself in his work but denies himself ... His work ... is not the satisfaction of a need, but only a means of satisfying other needs ... it is not his work but work for someone else ... in work he does not belong to himself but to another person".
Karl Marx: Early Writings Trans. T.B. Bottomore (London: C.A. Watts and Co., 1963), 124-125. Originally published in 1844.
- 4 Robert Blauner (1972) has theorized that alienation from the work situation experienced as powerlessness will be greater the more the individual feels a) separated from ownership of the means of production and the finished products; b) unable to influence general managerial policies; c) lacking control over the conditions of employment; and d) over the immediate work process. (p. 111) Alienation from work in the form of meaninglessness will be experienced to a greater degree when the individual is unable to fit his labour into the overall scheme of things. (p. 120)
In terms of these criteria, the occupation of farming would appear to offer ample opportunities to escape alienating labour. The farmer experiences freedom on all four criteria outlined by Blauner. As manager-operator of his enterprise, he typically owns the means of

production (although he may be highly indebted for it). He is thereby able - with certain obvious parameters - to set his own work pace (including his hours of work), is free of the pressure and orders of others, free to move about physically at his work. Moreover, he chooses how to do his own job, including what and how much he will produce. This freedom in and control over the immediate work situation is accompanied as well by the opportunity to engage in meaningful labour. The farmer's daily labour can be perceived to be part of an entire process, the end-product of which is clearly visible and the result of his own efforts.

- 5 C. Wright Mills argues that alienation must be distinguished from work dissatisfaction since alienation could exist and deepen even if material standards of living were improved. See C. Wright Mills, The Marxists (New York: Dell Publ. Co., 1962), 86.
- 6 Most students of alienation concur that it is the despair over a lost relationship that is described as alienation. See Yinger (1973: 178), Finifter (1970: 390-391) and Clarke (1959).
- 7 The following types of responses constitute alienated attitudes towards farming: a) a disillusionment over the years with the financially insecure nature of farming or the meagre income it affords; b) a disenchantment with the increasingly business-like trend in farming; the growing specialization, mechanization, and expansion; and c) a negative growing perception of the farmer at the bottom of society. Examples of each of these types of responses may be found in Appendix C.
- 8 The most frequently volunteered reasons for having considered (or presently contemplating) getting out of farming were economic considerations related to the cost-price squeeze, the low profit margin, and the ability to make more money off the farm with less investment and less risk. Farmers who had considered quitting farming because of the unfavourable comparison of the work hours and difficulty are also coded as alienated.
- 9 Jeanne Knutson has empirically demonstrated that activists in political parties on the ideological Right appear to be motivated by esteem needs. It is her argument that such individuals, feeling insecure and threatened, project their inner insecurity outward by adopting a political philosophy that espouses the importance of law and order and political controls. See J. Knutson, Psychological Variables in Political Recruitment: An Analysis of Party Activists. Mimeograph. (Berkeley: The Wright Institute, 1974), 36.
- 10 The reasoning of Sniderman and Citrin is that if low self-esteem leads to social withdrawal and a consequent removal from the mainstream of channels of communication, exposure to different beliefs and attitudes is thereby reduced. So is comprehension affected:

the individual preoccupied with himself is less capable of understanding the world around him. In short, both the opportunity to learn new beliefs and to test these beliefs against reality is lessened.

- 11 Since membership in the NFU guarantees that farmers receive at least one periodical (Union Farmer), both organizational memberships and number of magazines received may be partially confounded with NFU membership.
- 12 Differences of means of four types: Analysis of Variance $F=2.66$ $df=129$ significant at .05 level.
- 13 Differences of means of four types: Analysis of Variance $F=3.08$ $df=129$ significant at .03 level. An Exciting Life is in the second half of the value hierarchy for all groups but is significantly higher for NFU Inconsistents.
- 14 Schwartz (1973: 13) argues that perceived systemic inefficacy is the crucial condition for withdrawal of identification from the political systems: "If the individual perceives that the system and not just his person is inefficacious to attain his values, then his value conflict is truly irreconcilable and alienation seems likely to result".
- 15 The original definition of powerlessness (in quotes) was stipulated by Melvin Seeman in "On the Meaning of Alienation" American Sociological Review, 24, 6(Dec., 1959), 783. A number of theorists have argued that unless powerlessness is accompanied by displeasure or dissatisfaction with that state of affairs, it is not alienation. See John P. Clarke, "Measuring Alienation Within a Social System", American Sociological Review, 24 (1959), 849-852.
- 16 For the most part studies of alienation have been concerned with establishing a) the meaning of powerlessness by establishing the pattern of intercorrelation of this dimension of alienation with other dimensions such as meaninglessness, normlessness, social isolation; b) the referents or objects of powerlessness feelings; c) the social-structural and psychological conditions that facilitate the growth of powerlessness feelings; and d) the varying behavioral consequences (and circumstances promoting them) of powerlessness.
A good summary of these studies may be found in J. Milton Yinger, "Anomie, Alienation and Political Behavior", 176-202 in Handbook of Political Psychology ed. J. Knutson (San Francisco: Jossey Bass, 1973)
- 17 The question was phrased "If they made a presentation to the provincial government" It was made clear to respondents that they could draw upon other experiences with the government.

- 18 At least a partial explanation for the failure of Social Trust to emerge as a useful explanatory factor is found in the inclination of farmers, when posed with the item in the personal interview situation, to distinguish between being able to trust "insiders" - other farmers, people in the area - and "outsiders" - people not personally known to them.

Chapter 8

The Paths to Ideology and Action

The four farmer types have been distinguished in terms of selected personality, situational and behavioral characteristics. In one sense, then, the conjunction of circumstances and individual attributes that facilitate the acting upon one set of beliefs has already been demarcated. However, neither the relative importance nor pattern of interaction of those predictor variables has been established. This chapter attempts to model the two-fold process of belief adherence and organizational recruitment.

There are two principal questions of concern. What is the set of circumstances that facilitates adherence to the NFU belief cluster? And what conditions and attributes are conducive to recruitment to the NFU, a protest farm organization? Subsidiary questions revolve around the connection between economic discontent and political powerlessness. Are the two sets of variables to some extent interchangeable? And what about the third set of variables that has proven to be useful in predicting NFU Beliefs* and in differentiating the four types of farmers - that is, the set of social integration measures? How do other variables - social background, work history, self-esteem - not directly linked to membership or NFU Beliefs, affect those variables that are?

The plan of this chapter is as follows. First, multiple regression analyses determine the best set of predictors to NFU Belief


*See Table 6.9, Chapter 6.

Adherence and to two further variables important to NFU Beliefs - Powerlessness and Perceived Unfair Return. Secondly, the conditions facilitating NFU membership in both the presence and absence of NFU belief adherence are determined. Thirdly, the chapter concludes by summarizing the findings of the multivariate analyses and their implications for describing the rationality of farmers' belief systems.

I. The Links with Belief Adherence

At the outset, to aid the comprehension of the discussion which follows, it may be helpful to diagram postulated connections among the independent and dependent variables. This is done in Diagram 8.1.

Diagram 8.1 The Hypothesized Links Between
Independent and Dependent Variables



The physical proximity of concepts to Political Alienation and the NFU Belief Index in Diagram 8.1 represents their theoretical closeness and ability to predict those concepts. That is, Economic Discontent, closest to Alienation and NFU Beliefs in the diagram, is believed to be the best predictor; Social Integration, the second best, and so on. The links of Social Background and Work History may be mediated through other variables closer to Alienation and NFU Beliefs such as Economic Discontent and Social Integration. While there may be no better reason to suspect

that feelings of powerlessness lead to NFU Beliefs than that NFU Beliefs induce powerlessness, multiple regression analysis necessitates an explicit assumption as to the direction of the path between alienation and the NFU Belief Index. For both theoretical and practical reasons the link will be assumed to run from alienation to NFU Beliefs. Practically, the major research focus here is on NFU Beliefs. Theoretically, it is suggested that feelings of alienation lead to an attempt to understand the world; part of that understanding includes an adherence to a belief set which is here described as the NFU Belief Index. Powerlessness is the general disposition; the NFU Belief Index the more particularized belief set¹, induced in large part by situational opportunities. Adherence to NFU Beliefs is likely a situationally specific expression of alienation.

1. The Route to NFU Beliefs

In the interests of parsimony, stepwise regression was used throughout and only statistically significant coefficients are reported in the tables. While the possibility exists that important variables have thus been omitted from the final equation resulting in "specification error", the stepwise procedure is more "efficient" (Draper and Smith, 1967: 81-85) and therefore better able to isolate the major correlates of NFU Beliefs.

Moreover, by carefully monitoring various stages in the stepwise procedure, in particular changes in coefficients and standard errors of variables already in the equation when new variables are entered, the researcher is in a better position to detect possible multicollinearity. (Correlation matrices of the predictor variables, reported in Appendix F, suggest variable constellations where multicollin-

earity may be a problem.)

The regression of the NFU Belief Index on the set of hypothesized independent variables reported in Table 8.1 utilized the following procedure. First, the NFU Index has been regressed in a stepwise procedure on each of the five separate sets of predictor variables: Alienation, Economic Discontent, Social Integration, Work History, and Social Background (including self-esteem). Once the reduced set of best predictors has been obtained, those variables are then combined in one final regression procedure. Table 8.1 gives the results of this final regression equation.²

Table 8.1 indicates first, that the regression of the NFU Belief Index on the smaller set of predictor variables yielded significant regression coefficients for seven variables: Powerlessness, Number of Organizational Memberships, Perceived Salience of the Federal Government, Perceived Unfairness of Present Economic Return, and a Social Contact Pattern of Forming Political Opinions.

Secondly, Table 8.1 indicates the crucial importance of Powerlessness in predicting NFU Beliefs. Nearly half the explained variance is associated with this variable.

Moreover, since this is a stepwise regression procedure, the regression coefficients reflect the total influence (direct and indirect) of each variable. The first variable entered into the equation, however, is tested without adjustment for the effects of other variables that will subsequently enter into the equation. Its effect may be moderated as other variables enter. This happens with Powerlessness in the regression equation reported here; the coefficient of Powerlessness drops with the entry of subsequent variables since effects of those variables which Powerlessness was mediating are now being represented by another variable. The importance to the equation of Powerlessness, Number of Organizations Belonged to, and Past

Table 8.1 Regression of NFU Belief Index on Independent Variables

Independent Variable	Simple r	B Coeff.	S.E. B*	Signif.	Cumulative R Square.
Powerlessness	.46	.19	.06	.004	.21
# Orgs. Belonged	.26	.45	.12	.000	.27
Farm Market Value	-.31	-.32	.16	.05	.32
Unsuccess Prov. Gov't.	.31	.63	.23	.007	.35
Salience Federal Gov't.	.19	.57	.24	.02	.38
Present Return Unfair	.24	.69	.32	.03	.41
Social Contact in Forming Pol. Opinions	.26	.39	.19	.04	.44
Constant		.43	1.30	.74	

$F(7,95) = 10.48$ Significant at .0001 level. $N = 103$

*Standard Error of B Coefficient

Unsuccess with the Provincial Government should thus be interpreted in light of this information.

Thirdly, the cumulative R^2 , .44, indicates that this collection of variables accounts for 44% of the variance in the NFU Belief Index. Fourthly, the equation is statistically significant beyond the .0001 level.

The variables with significant regression coefficients in Table 8.1 represent three distinct concepts: alienation, social integration, and economic discontent. The first set, alienation, includes Political Powerlessness, Past Unsuccess with the Provincial Government, and Perceived Federal Governmental Salience. The second set, social integration, includes organization memberships and interacting with other farmers in formulating political opinions (as opposed to relying on non-personal sources of information). Since Market Value of Farm is most probably an indicator of perceived economic well-being, the third set is comprised of two indicators of current financial discontent - Market Value of Farm and Present Return Unfair (a judgement that the present financial return to the farmer is unfair and inadequate). The three variable sets account for about 44% of the variance in the NFU Beliefs measure. None of the indicators of Work History and Social Background directly predict to NFU Beliefs.

Powerlessness, like other variables in the regression equation in Table 8.1 is best regarded as representative of other variables like it but has at the same time unique variance. The emergence of Past Unsuccess with the Provincial Government can be accounted for in terms of the fact that this belief is representative of other alienation measures (Past Unsuccess Federal Government) at the same time it is not so highly correlated with Powerlessness as to get submerged by it.³ Present Unfair Return emerges for these same reasons:⁴ it has both unique

and overlapping variance with other indicators in the set of economic dissatisfaction measures. Because NFU members have a slight edge on other farmers in terms of the number of farm organizations they belong to, the significance of Organizational Memberships as an important predictor of the NFU Belief Index attests in some measure to the importance of belonging to the NFU organization for the instilling of NFU beliefs. Number of Organizational Memberships is a measure of the impact of the experience of belonging to the NFU.

Both the general phenomenon of variables in the regression equation masking the effect of other variables external to the equation with which they are intercorrelated, and the particular instance of this happening with Powerlessness have been noted. A closer scrutiny of the step-by-step regression of NFU Beliefs on the predictor variables indicates which variables never enter the equation because their effect is drowned out by Powerlessness particularly, but also by other variables. The entry of Powerlessness as the variable which explains the greatest amount of variance in the NFU Belief Index results in a severe reduction in the size of the partial correlation coefficients of the NFU Index with other alienation measures (especially Expectation of Unequal/Unfair Treatment) as well as with Perceived Ill Future Economic Prospects and Self-Esteem. The failure of these variables to emerge as significant predictors of the NFU Belief Index is thus attributable partially to their relationship to a better predictor of NFU Beliefs, that is Political Powerlessness. Another indicator of this general phenomenon is that the close association between belonging to organizations and reading magazines (Pearson $r=.36$) means that once Number of Organizational Memberships enters

the equation (Step 2), Number of Magazines Received never does.

The second piece of information garnered from a close reading of the step by step regression is that as subsequent variables enter the equation, the coefficient of Powerlessness drops, from an initial weight of .35 to .19. Powerlessness is thus a key variable, linked to measures both in and outside the equation.

While the ideal procedure at this point would be to model analytically the paths to NFU Beliefs, a number of considerations make that impracticable in this study.⁵ Nevertheless, it may be possible to unravel the links to at least two of the predictors to the NFU Belief Index. Because of the central relationships of both Present Unfair Return (that is, current economic discontent) and Powerlessness with NFU Beliefs, both these variables will now be treated as dependent variables in two subsequent multiple regression analyses.

2. Powerlessness: Its Links

The procedure used to arrive at the equations reported in Tables 8.2 and 8.3 was similar to that utilized to derive the NFU Beliefs regression equation. That is, the number of relevant predictor variables was reduced by regressing Powerlessness in a stepwise fashion in five separate procedures on each of the five sets of predictor variables: Alienation, Economic Discontent, Work History, Social Integration, and Social Background. In a final analysis, Powerlessness is regressed on the smaller set composed of those variables with significant regression coefficients and/or reasonably sized simple Pearson r correlations with Powerlessness.

Table 8.2 Regression of Powerlessness on Predictor Variables
Including Other Alienation Measures

Independent Variable	Simple r	B Coeff.	S.E. B*	Signif.	Cumulative R Square
Unequal/Unfair Treatment	.53	1.21	.33	.000	.279
Education	-.33	-.30	.12	.01	.388
Ill Future Economic Prospects	.36	.31	.14	.03	.448
Past Unsuccess Prov. Gov't.	.37	.74	.29	.01	.489
General Econ. Discontent	.45	.20	.13	.12	.514
Self-Esteem	.33	.23	.11	.05	.537
Non-Choice Farming	.21	1.03	.48	.04	.553
# News Magazines Received	.00	.52	.27	.06	.564
Infrequent Visits to Shops	.25	.63	.29	.03	.576
Social Contact in Forming Political Opinions	.26	1.11	.52	.04	.597
Constant		4.35	2.02	.03	

$F(10,86) = 12.75$ Significant at .0001 level. $N=97$

Level of Measurement of Variables: All variables are continuous level measures except the following which are dichotomous (dummy) measures: Non-Choice Farming as an Occupation

*Standard Error of B Coefficient

Table 8.3 Regression of Powerlessness on Predictor Variables
Minus Alienation Measures

Independent Variable	Simple r	B Coeff.	S.E. B*	Signif.	Cumulative R Square
General Econ. Discontent	.45	.46	.12	.000	.198
Self-Esteem	.33	.39	.12	.002	.275
Education	-.33	-.31	.11	.004	.336
Ill Future Economic Prospects	.36	.40	.14	.006	.386
Non-Choice Farming	.21	1.05	.52	.044	.409
Constant		5.46	1.87	.004	

$F(5,105) = 14.53$ Significant at .0001 level. $N=111$

Level of measurement of variables is as for Table 8.4

*Standard Error of B Coefficient

Table 8.2 reports the results of the regression of Powerlessness on variables from all five independent variable sets including alienation measures; Table 8.3, the equation which results when alienation indices are excluded as possible predictor variables. The drop in the proportion of variance explained, from about 60% in Table 8.2 to 41% in Table 8.3 indicates the strong connections between Powerlessness and other alienation dimensions.

Whereas Work History and Social Background variables were not directly linked to the NFU Belief Index, they are related to Powerlessness if alienation measures are included as potential predictors of Powerlessness. (Table 8.2) Indeed, in Table 8.2, all five types of predictor variables are related to Powerlessness. When alienation measures are dropped from the analysis, the set of Social Integration indices do not enter significantly into the equation. This is at least partially because they are related to General Economic Discontent which is a better predictor of Powerlessness.

There are two further technical notes to make. One, the regression coefficients of all variables in Table 8.3 are relatively higher than those reported in Table 8.2. The withdrawal of the two alienation indicators, and particularly Expectation of Unequal/Unfair Treatment, accounts for this rise; Education, Ill Future Economic Prospects, and General Economic Discontent are all related to that alienation measure. Two, the General Economic Discontent coefficient in Table 8.2 is non-significant. It is recalled that the coefficients reported in Table 8.2 and 8.3 are those for the final equation: that is, their coefficients at the time the last independent variable with a significant

coefficient was added. Thus, while General Economic Discontent had a significant coefficient at the time it entered the equation, its coefficient drops with the addition of subsequent variables whose effects Discontent was mediating to the equation.

What are the conditions facilitating Powerlessness? They are economic frustration, a poor education, not voluntarily having chosen to farm, high self-esteem, reading magazines, talking to other farmers in the process of formulating political opinions, and infrequent contact with the nearest urban centre. Some of these conditions are consistent with previous findings and are theoretically common-sensical. It is not surprising that individuals who are economically frustrated, physically remote from the nearest urban centre, and who have a poor education should feel powerless. They are individuals least able to master their environment and/or life chances insofar as they have little power over events in either the more remote political or the more immediate everyday life arenas. The link between not having chosen to farm (having "fallen into" farming) and Powerlessness is part of this same dimension. Individuals unable even to make a choice as to what they want to make a living at can scarcely feel in command of their life chances.

The most intriguing findings of Table 8.2 are that the powerless individuals are also the self-esteemed, the people who read magazines and the people who talk to other farmers in the process of formulating their political opinions. Information from other farmers or the media seems to bolster powerlessness feelings. While most research has hypothesized a negative association between communication intake and powerlessness,

there is at least one other study which confirms the finding here. Schwartz(1973: 191-195) has shown that alienation is associated with a search for and consumption of radical/revolutionary literature. That self-esteem is related to Powerlessness is indicative of the earlier trend of farmers to externalize the blame for their problems. Individuals who feel powerless are not down and out and beaten; they are instead persons who feel that they, as individuals who are as good as the next fellow, are not getting a fair shake in the political system and it is not their fault. And one possible reason why they externalize the blame is because their neighbours and their magazines relay this message.

How different are the conditions promoting NFU Beliefs and Powerlessness? An initial comparison of the regression equations summarized in Tables 8.1 and 8.2 suggest they are quite dissimilar. The only variables which load significantly in both equations are Past Unsuccess with the Provincial Government and a pattern of Social Contact in Forming Political Opinions. Whereas current economic frustrations predict to NFU Beliefs, more generalized measures of pessimism regarding future farming returns are important in predicting feelings of Powerlessness. And none of the Work History or Social Background characteristics facilitate adherence to NFU Beliefs, whereas some promote Powerlessness.

But these differences are more apparent than real. It was noted earlier that the paramount effect of Powerlessness on the NFU Belief Index masked the effect of other variables - such as Self-Esteem, Ill Future Economic Prospects, and Expectation of Unequal/Unfair Treatment. As Table 8.4 shows, these latter variables are all related to the NFU Belief Index as well, but they are associated even more strongly with

Powerlessness. In terms of their antecedents, then, differences in the NFU Belief Index and Powerlessness boil down to: firstly, Governmental Salience has an impact on NFU Beliefs but not on Powerlessness; secondly, more general indicators of Economic Discontent are associated with Powerlessness and more specific immediate grievances with the NFU Beliefs Cluster; and thirdly, Powerlessness but not NFU Beliefs is promoted by meagre schooling and disenchantment with farming as an occupation. In terms of similar facilitating circumstances, both attitudinal dimensions are advanced by social integration, interaction with other farmers, media consumption, self-esteem, and perceived systemic inefficacy.

3. Present Unfair Return: Its Links

The belief in the inadequacy of the present return to the farmer has a direct bearing on adherence to the NFU belief cluster. Unravelling its links with background and situational characteristics will further the understanding specifically of the conditions giving rise to this judgment and more generally, of the manner in which economic discontent is related to adherence to NFU Beliefs.

Neither the regression equation which includes other subjective Economic Discontent measures as possible predictors of Present Unfair Return (Table 8.5) nor the one which excludes these indicators (Table 8.6) is able to account for much of the variance in Present Unfair Return. In the first Table, three variables - General Economic Discontent, not belonging to service clubs, and being under 45 years old - account for about 21% of the variance in the dependent variable. The deletion of General Economic Discontent and the addition of Number of Acres Operated

Table 8.4 Pearson r's of Predictor Variables with
Powerlessness and the NFU Belief Index

	Powerlessness	NFU Belief Index
<u>Political Alienation</u>		
Past Unsuccess with Fed. Gov't.	.31	.22
Past Unsuccess with Prov. Gov't.	.37	.31
Expectation Unequal/Unfair Trtmt.	.53	.34
Salience Federal Government	.04	.19
Salience Provincial Government	.01	.17
<u>Economic Discontent</u>		
General Economic Discontent	.45	.15
Present Unfair Return	.11	.24
Ill Future Economic Prospects	.36	.18
Lowest Class	.24	.20
<u>Social Integration</u>		
Total Organizations Belonged	.08	.26
# Service Clubs	-.22	-.08
Infrequency Visits to Urban Shops	.25	-.06
<u>Communication Patterns</u>		
Social Contact in Forming Farming Opinions	.26	.24
Social Contact in Forming Political Opinions	.25	.26
<u>Communication Intake</u>		
# Magazines Received	.18	.19
# Farm Magazines Received	.16	.30
Frequency Listening Radio	.04	.15
<u>Work Experience</u>		
Parents' Farmers	.14	.19
Farming Both a Business & Way of Life	-.06	-.03
Non-Choice Farming	.21	-.02
<u>Social Background</u>		
Self-esteem	.33	.18
Education	-.33	-.11
Farm Market Value	-.24	-.31

All r's greater than .15 generally significant at .01 level.

and Viewing Farming as a Business reduced that explained variance to about 15%. Had the large amount of missing data on reported income indicators not necessitated their exclusion from these equations, it would most likely have been possible to arrive at a more inclusive set of predictive characteristics.⁶

Tables 8.5 and 8.6 together indicate the rooting of Present Unfair Return in both subjective and objective situational conditions.⁷ The farmers displeased with their current return are younger individuals trying to run farming as a business even while they operate smaller than average farms. This is straightforward enough: these are indeed circumstances likely to make farmers economically frustrated. But these men are also inclined to be farmers who do not join service clubs. Bearing in mind that service clubs are located in urban-town centres, and manned predominantly by townspeople (Willmott:53), the negative association of Present Unfair Return and service club membership becomes interpretable. The social gap between town and country, first alluded to in the late 1950's by Jean Burnet (1957: 78, 89, 95) still tends to prevail in the prairie social structure (Robertson, 1973: 41, 310) and is widest between town middle class and rural working class. Income is still the dividing line: the better-off farmer frequently mingles with townsmen and joins their clubs; the poorer farmer, possibly for want of the necessary funds to join and maintain that social interaction, does not. The negative link between service club membership and current economic grievances raises the possibility that social isolation of the relatively deprived farmer from residents of his nearest shopping centre, and the consequent lessening of his chances to be assimilated to the points of view of townspeople

Table 8.5 Regression of Present Unfair Return on Predictor Variables
With Economic Discontent Variables

Independent Variable	Simple r	B. Coeff.	S.E. B*	Signif.	Cumulative R Square
General Econ. Discontent	.40	.10	.02	.000	.162
# Service Clubs Belonged	-.24	-.09	.05	.06	.189
Over 45 Years Old	-.20	-.19	.10	.06	.211
Constant		1.81	.20	.000	

*Standard Error of B Coefficient

$F(3,126) = 11.25$ Significant at .0001 level. $N=130$

Table 8.6 Regression of Present Unfair Return on Predictor Variables
Minus Economic Discontent Variables

Independent Variable	Simple r	B Coeff.	S.E. B*	Signif.	Cumulative R Square
# Service Clubs Belonged	-.24	-.11	.05	.03	.060
Farming as a Business	.21	.25	.13	.05	.094
Over 45 Years Old	-.20	-.23	.10	.03	.120
# Acres Operated	-.19	-.13	.06	.03	.153
Constant		2.66	.11	.000	

* Standard Error of B Coefficient

$F(4,125) = 9.33$ Significant at .0001 level. $N=130$

All measures are continuous except "over 45" and "Farming as a Business" which are dichotomous.

makes him ripe for recruitment to an organization waging an ongoing struggle to secure a better way of life for such farmers.

In concluding this discussion of the links to NFU Beliefs Adherence, it is informative that canonical correlations provide independent support for the preceding regression analyses. The canonical correlation reported in Tables E.1 and E.2 in Appendix E, summarize the inter-relationships among the independent and dependent variable sets in terms analogous to those reported here in the text. The results of both multivariate techniques enable the following summary of the paths to adherence to NFU Beliefs. First, there are close links between Economic Discontent, Political Powerlessness and NFU Beliefs adherence. Secondly, the NFU Belief Index appears to be the more particularistic set of beliefs; Powerlessness, the more general cluster. And thirdly, while the patterns of interaction differ in the two instances, there are clear links of economic grievances with both Powerlessness and NFU Beliefs. Whether this factor is equally conducive to recruitment to protest politics is a consideration now explored.

II. The Links to NFU Membership

The dichotomous nature of the NFU membership measure (the respondent is either an NFU member or not) means the violation of certain assumptions when multiple regression analyses, treating NFU membership as the dependent variable, are used to determine the best set of predictors to NFU membership.⁸ However, given that there exists an independent check on these regression results - that check being the information garnered from the profiles of the four farmer types as outlined in Chapter 7 - the procedure is utilized as a summary analysis of the links to NFU membership.

The profile of the four farmer types in Chapter 7 distinguished non-believing members and non-believing non-members. These two groups are the types described as "NFU Inconsistents" and "Non-NFU Consistents". Examination of the aspects on which they differ alerts us to possible variables which are important in facilitating membership in the absence of belief adherence. Similarly, distinguishing characteristics of the "NFU Consistents" and the "Client" groups uncovers factors likely to induce membership given similar political attitudes. Thus, the plan of this discussion is as follows. First, type differences are outlined. Secondly, NFU membership among believers and subsequently among non-believers is regressed on the set of predictor variables. The results of that analysis are examined for their fit with knowledge previously garnered from farmer type comparisons. And thirdly, and lastly, with knowledge of the conditions facilitating adherence to NFU Beliefs as established previously in the chapter, it will be possible to infer the circumstances under which membership and belief are or are not intertwined.

1. Membership in the Presence of a Conducive Belief Set

A comparison of the "NFU Consistents" and "NFU Client" groups suggests that the following variables (which characterize the NFU Consistent farmers to a greater extent than they do the Client farmers) might be important factors facilitating membership given similar ideological perspectives:

- having had parents who were farmers
- viewing farming as a way of life
- formulating farming and political opinions through social interaction
- belonging to more organizations
- reading more magazines

- having fewer years of education
- reporting a lower net and gross income
- owning fewer acres of land
- infrequent church attendance
- judging the past record with the Federal Government as unsuccessful
- expecting unfair and unequal treatment from government officials
- attributing greater salience to provincial and Federal governments

On none of the Economic Discontent variables are there large differences between the two groups. While the foregoing list implies considerable contrasts between believers and joiners and believers and non-joiners, a number of considerations limit the capability to determine the predictive importance of certain of these factors. All of Number of Organizations Belonged to, Number of Farm Organizations Belonged to, Number of Magazines Received, Net Income, Gross Income, Number of Acres Owned are omitted from the regression analyses reported in Table 8.7. The first three variables are possibly confounded with NFU membership;⁹ the last three have too many missing data. Having to delete indicators of objective financial well-being is lamentable and undoubtedly limits the generalizability of the analyses.

The stepwise regression results reported in Table 8.7 represent the final step of an analysis involving both standard and stepwise regression procedures. Stepwise regression of the dependent variable on each of the five sets of independent variables yielded the best predictors in each of the sets: "best Predictors" being established not only on the basis of the regression weight but also considering the Pearson correlation of the independent variable with the dependent variable. The dependent variable, NFU membership, was then regressed on this smaller set of indep-

endent variables among the set of farmers who adhere to the NFU Belief Cluster. Reported in Table 8.7 are the best predictors of NFU membership given a conducive belief set, as determined by a stepwise regression procedure.

The effort to determine what distinguishes NFU believers who are members from NFU believers who are non-members yields disappointing results. In the equation reported in Table 8.7, three variables, of which only one is statistically significant, account for 17% of the variance in NFU membership. That variable which is statistically important is having had parents who were farmers. Further information indicates that the people most likely to have inherited the occupation of farming from their parents are men who did not deliberately choose to farm ($r=.18$) and who have fewer years of education ($r = -.24$). They are likely to have farmed all their lives. ($r = .20$) The possibility arises that they are joiners of farm organizations mainly because they are committed farmers with a legacy of family farming.¹⁰

While not statistically significant, the coefficients of Social Contact in Forming Farming Opinions and Expectation of Unequal/Unfair Treatment are substantial and the former, particularly, makes an important contribution to the total variance explained. Contact with other farmers and farm leaders - some of who may be members of the National Farmers Union - increases one's likelihood of recruitment to an organization whose members' beliefs are similar to one's own. This finding is independently substantiated by conversations of the researcher with NFU Directors. The importance of inter-personal contact of NFU organizers with the individual farmers as the most effective recruitment tactic was continually reiterated.

Table 8.7 Regression of NFU Membership Among Believers
on Predictor Variables

Independent Variable	Simple r	B Coeff.	S.E. b*	Signif.	Cumulative R Square
Parents' Farmers	.30	.61	.25	.02	.09
Contact in Forming Farming Opinions	.20	.08	.06	.21	.15
Expectation Unequal/ Unfair Treatment	.20	.09	.09	.30	.17
Constant		-.25	.27	.35	

*Standard Error of B Coefficient

F(3,45)=3.07 Significant at .04 level. N=49

While it may be possible to over-emphasize the importance of this finding (considering its nonsignificant coefficient), it raises serious questions concerning the capability of grass roots organizations like the NFU to expand their membership base. As noted elsewhere in the thesis, the rural communities have been declining. The capital and land expansion of farms has meant less free time and less physical opportunity for social interaction among farmers. During the interviews, when the data were being gathered, it was commonplace for farmers to lament the passing of the rural community and the unfilled social gap that was left. Hence, the problems for organizing farmers may be more formidable today than they were in the 1930's, the last period of extensive political mobilization of farmers, when there were both more farmers and more interaction among them.

2. Membership in the Absence of a Conducive Belief Set

A contrast of "NFU Inconsistents" and "Non-NFU Consistents" indicates that the following characteristics (more symptomatic of NFU Inconsistents) could be important in distinguishing non-believers who have joined the NFU from those who have not:

- viewing farming as a business
- having negative attitudes towards farming
- not having chosen farming as an occupation
- having a poorer education
- being younger
- operating fewer acres
- having a lower gross income
- being Catholic or European-Protestant
- attending church more frequently
- placing oneself in the lowest class
- presently receiving an unfair return
- viewing farmers as unsuccessful in the past
with the Alberta Gov't and Federal Gov't.
- attributing salience to Federal Governmental actions
- affirming the possibility of collective farmer action

As in the previous analysis, Number of Organizations Belonged to and a Number of Magazines Received are also important differentiators but the possibility of their being confounded with membership results in their deletion. Income indicators are likewise omitted from the analysis.

Table 8.8 reports that attempts to pinpoint the characteristics and circumstances conducive to membership in the absence of adherence to members' beliefs are no more satisfactory than efforts to predict membership in the presence of belief adherence. Belief in the Possibility of Collective Farmer Action is excluded from the first equation. The rationale for the two separate equations is that the variable, Belief in the Possibility of Collective Farmer Action, measures a belief with ideological ramifications; hence, it is very likely to obscure the effects of other more distant Social Background and Work History indices. (As the analyses reveal, the assumption is well founded.)

Affirmation of the possibility of collective farmer action, not having deliberately chosen farming as an occupation, and dissatisfaction with the present return farming nets are all factors statistically important in inducing membership to a union among farmers whose own belief set is not consonant with that of the members of the union. Alienated farmers who adhere to the efficacy of collective action are thus the recruits among the non-believers.

A closer scrutiny of the stepwise regression results allows elaboration of this profile. Farmers who affirm the possibility of joint farmer action are the poorly educated ($r = -.22$), who did not choose to farm ($r = .15$), and who are displeased with their present return ($r = .16$). Catholic farmers are least likely to have deliberately chosen to farm ($r = -.38$) and those of European Protestant affiliation most likely.

Table 8.8 Regression of NFU Membership Among Non-Believers
on Predictor Variables

Independent Variable	Simple r	B Coeff.	S.E. B*	Signif.	Cumulative R Square
<u>1. Minus Belief in Collective Action</u>					
Nonchoice Farming	.28	.25	.10	.02	.08
Present Unfair Return	.26	.20	.08	.02	.13
Unsuccess Fed. Gov't.	-.10	-.13	.08	.08	.17
Constant		.06	.24	.81	
F(3,66)=4.49 Significant at .006 level. N=70					
<u>2. With Belief in Collective Action</u>					
Belief in Collective Action	.36	.32	.11	.006	.13
Nonchoice Farming	.28	.21	.10	.05	.18
Constant		.10	.07	.18	
F(2,64)=6.99 Significant at .002 level. N=67					
*Standard Error of B Coefficient					

($r = .19$) Recalling the results of Tables 8.5 and 8.6, farmers displeased with current farming returns are more likely to be younger men who view farming as a business enterprise, who operate smaller farms, and who are non-members of service clubs. Hence, a reinforcing social context facilitates recruitment among non-believers. Statistically, this is reflected by a rise in the percentage of variance explained by equation 2 in Table 8.8 to 30% when European Protestant, Present Unfair Return, Catholic Religion, Education, and Viewing Farming as a Business are included in the equation.

As a generalization, given two sets of farmers both of whom subscribe to the same belief cluster, having had parents who were farmers is an "advantage" for recruitment to a protest farm organization. Given two farmers, neither of whom identifies with the ideology of the farm union's members, with all other things equal, farmers currently economically frustrated with their financial return, farmers who did not choose their occupation, and farmers who believe in the viability of joint farmer action are more suitable targets as potential members.

Conclusion

There are two conclusions to be drawn from the analyses reported in this chapter. The first concerns the meaning and possible rationality of farmers' belief systems; the second, the circumstances facilitating organizational activity.

The belief set of interest in this research - the NFU Beliefs cluster - views economic and political decision-making as externalized from the farmer and political authorities, perceives a manipulated market system, and prescribes price and cost regulations to rectify that situation.

The analyses reported in this chapter have shown the close links of this belief cluster with both political alienation dimensions and economic discontent measures. The implication of this pattern of interaction is that the understanding farmers have of their position and chances in the political and economic system is grounded in their experiences as farmers functioning in a given marketing and political system. In short, the findings are supportive of Robert Lane's supposition that

The concepts that help a person organize his political ideas and that determine what ideas go properly together are not drawn primarily from some major judgemental dimension, such as liberalism-conservatism, but from more intimate sources, closer to the individual and the world he knows.

(Lane, 1973: 105)

But this is not to say that political attitudes are completely disorganized, that farmers' belief systems are without more generalized beliefs and values. The evidence suggests that some political attitudes have more generalized life-goal components, taking the form of inter-correlations between selected Rokeach values and attitudinal dimensions related directly and indirectly to NFU Beliefs. These are reported in Table 8.9. (A positive correlation signifies that a highly valued goal is associated with a high attitudinal score; a negative correlation means a lowly valued goal is related to a high attitudinal score. A positive correlation thus denotes "consistency".)

The more readily tapped political and economic attitudes are specific formulations of more generalized life goals and values. Individuals who feel powerless tend to be the same people who want Comfort and Pleasure from life; those displeased with their general economic situation

Table 8.9 Pearson Correlations of Selected Rokeach Values
and Political Alienation and Economic Discontent*

	Powerless- ness	Expectation Unequal/Unfair Treatment	Economic Discontent	Ill Future Prospects	Present Return Unfair	Class
A COMFORTABLE LIFE	.18				.17	
EQUALITY		.20	.19			.26
FAMILY SECURITY				.16		
FREEDOM			.13	.16		
PLEASURE	.26	.18				
SALVATION	-.15	-.16	-.20		-.14	

*Only Pearson r's greater than or equal to .13 are reported.

are seeking Equality and Freedom. Farmers alarmed about future economic prospects are concerned with goals of Family Security and Freedom; those experiencing current poor returns with a Comfortable Life. And individuals who place themselves in the lowest class, like those who expect inferior treatment from governmental officials are concerned with Equality and (for the latter) Pleasure. The low ratings of the goal of Salvation by individuals who are powerless, feel systemically inefficacious, and economically discontented put in perspective the meaning of the high rankings on more immediate goals.

The correlations are admittedly weak. But the study group is small and it would be unwise to dismiss these findings simply because the interrelationships are not stronger. Weak as they are, they do nevertheless help to shed some light on the evidence accumulated earlier about the tendency of farmers to value conservative and radical life goals. The pattern of interrelationship of antecedent conditions has led to the establishment of the close association of economic discontent and alienation sentiments. The economically discontented are frequently the powerless. In Table 8.9, the economically displeased are the individuals pursuing EQUALITY and (to a lesser degree) FREEDOM. The powerless are the farmers concerned with A COMFORTABLE LIFE. Because the powerless tend to be the economically dissatisfied the same individual is thus concerned with "leftish" goals like EQUALITY and with "rightish" values like A COMFORTABLE LIFE. Hence it appears that the objective and subjective conditions of living may foster concern for both right-wing and left-wing goals.

The second conclusion concerns the circumstances conducive to recruitment to a protest farm organization given either congruence or dissimilarity of personal and organizational evaluative-belief sets. Multivariate analyses have sketched only the boldest strokes here.

Given two individuals with conducive belief sets, there is little to warrant a guess as to which one will most likely be recruited. The best bet is on the person whose parents were farmers. In the absence of a conducive belief set, the farmer currently more economically frustrated and/or who did not choose to farm is the more suitable target for the NFU director. This individual - who has joined a farm union whose members' beliefs he does not generally concur with - appears to be relatively deprived with respect to his own aspirations. Farming is not fulfilling his expectations - possibly because the current marketing situation is bad, possibly because his expectations are high. (He tends to be younger and more inclined to regard farming as a business enterprise rather than as a way of life.) His expectations of making money at farming are not being met. At any rate, he is disillusioned, there being perhaps no better indication of this than his above average tendency to describe himself as being in the lowest class.¹¹ However, this is also the farmer most inclined to affirm the efficacy of collective action by farmers. It therefore appears that the conjunction of economic and relative deprivation, and affirmation of the effectiveness of a joint farmers' endeavor to realize goals facilitates recruitment to the National Farmers Union.

Notes to Chapter 8

- 1 It is readily recognized that the links may well run in the opposite direction or, even more probably, that NFU Beliefs and Powerlessness simultaneously act upon one another.
- 2 The "B coefficients" reported here and in following tables are partial regression coefficients. A given coefficient indicates the change in the dependent variable (NFU Belief Index) associated with a unit change in the independent variables, when all other variables are held constant.
- 3 Pearson Correlations Among Political Alienation Measures

	Powerless- ness	Unequal/ Unfair Trtmnt.	Unsuccess Alberta	Unsuccess Federal Government
Unequal/Unfair	.51			
Unsuccess Alberta	.37	.36		
Unsuccess Federal Government	.31	.27	.44	

- 4 Pearson Correlations Among Economic Discontent Measures

	Present Return Unfair	Ill Future Prospects	General Economic Discontent
Ill Future	.14		
General Discontent	.39	.20	
Lowest Class	.17	-.03	.23

- 5 Two factors militate against the use of path analysis here. First, path analysis becomes difficult to interpret when the number of independent variables in the model exceeds three and definitely when it reaches five. Since seven paths to NFU Beliefs have already been established, it seems ill-advised to attempt any modelling formally of how and where each of the seven predictors fits into a model of routes to NFU Belief Adherence. Secondly, while it may not be completely satisfactory to regard alienation as an independent variable in an equation predicting NFU Beliefs, it seems most unsatisfactory to explicate this same assumption of causal antecedence into a model, particularly in light of the increasing tendency to regard the two attitudinal sets as part of the same syndrome. If the direction of the causal link between NFU Belief Adherence and Powerlessness cannot be established, then it is of course impossible to test any model of postulated paths to NFU Beliefs.

- 6 Present Unfair Return is not related to gross income but it is related to Farm Market Value (negatively) for NFU Inconsistents and NFU Clients: $r = -.27$ and $r = -.28$, respectively.
- 7 Viewing Farming as a Business is related to General Economic Discontent: $r = -.17$. This helps to account for their failure to emerge as significant predictors in the equation in Table 8.7.
- 8 The homoscedasticity assumption is most in danger of being violated: a normal distribution of Y about the X's and of the random distribution of the error variance through the range of Y values is jeopardized when there are only 2 Y values.
- 9 By virtue of belonging to the NFU, members receive the NFU periodical, The Union Farmer. Thus, their membership automatically gives them a chance for higher scores on both Number of Organizations Belonged to and Number of Magazines Received. Introducing Number of Magazines Received as a possible predictor of Membership raises the R^2 of the equation in Table 8.9 to .22.
- 10 However, they are less likely to know about the United Farmers of Alberta having formed the government in Alberta. $r = -.14$ of Familiarity with the UFA and Having Parents Who Were Farmers.
- 11 Farmers in the lowest class report lower Farm Market Values: $r = -.12$ and lower gross incomes: $r = -.15$. These farmers are also likely to be in debt for their farms.

Chapter 9

Conclusion

Farmers' political attitudes are the product of their past experiences with the political and economic systems. These political attitudes in conjunction with their current situational context shape their behavior within the political system. This concluding chapter reviews the evidence presented in the thesis which supports these claims, and draws out the implications of these findings for the study of political belief systems generally.

Farmers' Political Belief Systems

Two political attitudes above all summarize farmers' political perspectives. Both include a large element of reality-testing. And both are informative of the structuring of farmers' political beliefs.

The first political attitude of importance concerns farmers' assessments of their position in the political and economic systems. Farmers judge themselves to be politically and economically powerless. The ability to deal with two problems they currently face is external to them - lying with the government or less accountable extra-governmental forces. Farmers have no say in either the prices they receive for farm produce or the costs they pay for their agricultural supplies. The result is that "The farmer is the last person to receive any benefit (from foodstuff price hikes) and the first to realize a drop in the prices of his products". Their elected representatives and interest groups are excluded from the decision-making circles where a few top governmental officials, large corporations, and middlemen determine their

fate. In short, farmers have no say in the important decisions that affect their lives.

Equally significantly, many farmers see no means of rectifying that position of powerlessness. Both the stark reality of the minority position of farmers in the population and farmers' assessments of each other's "nature" make all but a minority of farmers pessimistic about the possibility of collective farmer action. In Alberta, farmers comprise less than one-third of the total population; nationally, they constitute less than ten percent of the voting population. Aware that they are outnumbered by consumers and urban dwellers, farmers conclude that the government will necessarily place the interests of consumers ahead of those of producers since, as one farmer metaphorically put it, "the wheel that squeaks the most gets the most grease". Though small in numbers, farmers could be collectively powerful since they produce an essential commodity. However, virtually all (all but 7%) rule out the possibility of a strike or withholding action. Bank payments to be met and the perishable nature of their products are both mitigating factors. Neither, however, is as formidable a barrier to collective political action as the farmer's view of other farmers.

Farmers are cynical about each other. They feel their neighbours can be bought off cheaply - "by an offer of two cents more per pound" - and that they are apathetic and likely to "sit back and take what comes to them". Their individualism, independence, and selfishness make them "the hardest people in the world to organize". Given this outlook, farmers conclude that their position of powerlessness

is not likely to be easily or quickly removed. Bitterness and self-deprecation inevitably result. One farmer, affirming the statement "I don't have much to be proud of ", added "because I'm a farmer". Another farmer succinctly described his frustration with society's misunderstanding of his life as a farmer by volunteering "As I grow older, I see more injustice from people who think farming is wearing cowboy boots". Inevitably, farmers adopt the image of themselves they see society has of them. This assessment of their relative powerlessness is one important ingredient of most farmers' political perspectives.

The second central political attitude concerns farmers' evaluations of the governments' past record with respect to farming. Farmers appraise past federal governmental policies and overall governmental performance as having been neither responsive nor responsible. Many governmental programs have, in farmers' eyes, had a substantial and adverse impact on their daily lives. In making these evaluations, farmers draw upon their own experiences concerning what past governmental involvement (or non-involvement) in agriculture has meant for them and other farmers. Nowhere is this more apparent than in their reflections upon the appropriate role for provincial and federal governments in the production and marketing aspects of farming. Farmers are generally reluctant to extend governmental regulation of farming beyond price controls on produce and supplies to include the regulation of food production. Their hesitation frequently stems from negative judgements of previous governmental involvement in food production. Citing "past attempts, for example, the LIFT program and grassland incentives" as unsuccessful, one farmer argued that he was not against

a role for the government in agriculture - "Government needs to play a role". - but he wanted "more farsighted planning". Another farmer noted that he had "always thought that government should be advising", but "after the deal with wheat (LIFT), I'm not so sure". Some farmers are not willing to excuse the detrimental effects of programs as the consequence of inadequate or shortsighted planning. A minority impute malevolent motives to the federal government, perceiving the decline of the family farm, for instance, to be a "purposeful and systematic" policy of the federal government. Another farmer refused to dismiss as "coincidental" the periodic slump in the price of one commodity while another yields high returns. This phenomenon, he felt, signifies that "The government will do everything in its power to keep farmers from getting together".

Whether the result of design or carelessness, a history of unfavorable governmental policies has led many farmers to be strongly suspicious of governments and the federal government in particular. That suspicion is frequently based on the notion that "Politicians are so much under the influence of financial interests that they can't actually run the country to the benefit of most people even if they wanted to". The suggestion is that political authorities cannot be responsive because "Their hands are tied by corporations", in the sense that "Corporations put governments in power and take them out". Accordingly, in the specific instance of the cost-price squeeze, while the government could end it "by setting controls on the cost of supplies and machinery", its ability to do so is thwarted because "the board of the corporate elite is too powerful." Another farmer said it more

strongly - "Every millionaire is a government man".

These two political attitudes, central to the farmer's political belief system, are quite simply "summary statements of his experiences" (Sutherland, 1975: 36) in the political system. They are his reflections about what he has learned from past governmental policies and performance. There is further evidence to indicate the importance of the political system itself in socializing farmers to attitudes of powerlessness and political suspicion. The youngest farmer type, the NFU Inconsistent farmers, most zealously subscribes to political norms of equal and fair dispensation of political goods and services to all societal groups. When these norms have been tested, it is this group which suffers the greatest shock, as indicated by the wide disparities between farmers of this type who have tested the norms against reality and those who have not. The implication is clear: the more experiences an individual has with the political system, and thus the greater the opportunity to test norms against reality, the more norms are likely to be overturned.

The importance of these two political attitudes - perceived economic and political powerlessness, and displeasure with and distrust of federal authorities - lies in their apparent impact upon other political attitudes and modes of political activity. With respect to other political attitudes, both help to account for farmers' ideological predispositions and the emergence of the NFU Belief Cluster.

Farmers' view of their relative powerlessness in the economic and political systems is related to their ideological judgements. At the level of the individual, farmers who view themselves without control

in any or all of the pricing, marketing, and political decision-making circles are most willing for regulation of various aspects of farming. At the level of the group of farmers as a whole, the propensity to recommend regulation of various aspects of farming is related to farmers' uniformity of perspective concerning their control in those sectors. First, where control is seen by virtually all farmers to be entirely outside the farmer's hands - in the matter of price determination of farm produce and agricultural supplies - there is almost complete accord that that sector of farming needs to be regulated. Secondly, where farmers are divided as to whether they are manipulated by non-producers - in the marketing sector - there is a concomitant split regarding the need for regulated and orderly marketing by marketing boards. Those farmers (NFU members) most skeptical of the benefits to the producer of the free marketing system are the producers most likely to recommend a regulated marketing system. And thirdly, in those sectors where they feel they have a measure of independence and control - in the production of foodstuffs¹ - farmers are generally reluctant for the government to involve itself unless it is to restrict anything that would jeopardize farmers' independence - corporations entering into farming, for instance.

Just as farmers' vision of their lack of political and economic clout helps to account for their ideological perspectives, so do their past experiences with governmental programs. Farmers are generally more disposed toward regulation of those sectors of farming where governments have either not interfered in the past or have intervened at the farmers' request. Most farmers are willing to give regulation

of the pricing sector a try, and a majority favor the continuation of orderly grain marketing. The former is an area which governments have assiduously refrained from controlling; the latter, a sector farmers long campaigned to have regulated. Most farmers do not recommend any extensive governmental involvement in the production aspects of farming. This is an area that governments have entered, both continuously to provide credit for capital expansion and periodically to shore up finances in "emergency" situations. Farmers thus have the opportunity to assess governments' past records here - and to reject them as detrimental. Thus, where intervention in the past has meant undesirable consequences, farmers are loathe to call for involvement in the future -- involvement which could conceivably yield more of the same deleterious results.

The combination of assessments of lack of economic and political clout and of federal authorities' relatively inefficacious record is significant in another way which is indirectly linked to farmers' political activity. For a segment of the farmer population, the conjunction of the two attitudes is associated with adherence to a set of beliefs known in the thesis as the NFU Belief Cluster. This cluster encompasses belief elements referring to farmers' lack of control over important decisions affecting their lives. It is also conceptually close to a measure of political powerlessness and other indices of political alienation. Hence, although embracing as well a set of particular goals for re-ordering the political and economic sectors, the NFU Belief Cluster includes elements of the first political attitude (lack of control) and is associated with measures of the second (federal inefficacy). This belief cluster, which is espoused by both members

and non-members of the National Farmers Union, appears to be a situationally-specific expression of the two central political attitudes. The belief set is, in short, a predisposition which, under certain circumstances, promotes membership in the NFU. Hence, while past experiences and learning as summarized in an individual's political attitudes are conducive to a particular type of political activity, it is the immediate situation which is the missing link needed to account for farmers' political behavior.

Farmers' Political Activity

The immediate situation in which the farmer finds himself is crucial to his political activity. It is vital in two senses. One, individuals who do not wholeheartedly endorse the ideology of a protest union can be recruited to it given a particular context. Two, the recruitment to this union of individuals whose beliefs are conducive appears contingent upon a particular current situation.

Individuals who find themselves frustrated by their current financial return and farming situation are most likely to partake in protest politics through a farm organization. Members of the National Farmers Union are the most economically discontented farmers: for some, the displeasure is with recent financial returns; for others, the discontent is more persistent and pervasive, rooted in a history of inadequate incomes. Conversely, farmers who do not belong to the NFU are generally satisfied with their financial situation and prospects.

The first indication of the importance of the immediate situation to political activity is that for a group of farmers (labelled "NFU Inconsistents" in the thesis) economic frustration appears to be a

sufficient inducement to membership in a protest farm union. These farmers have been recruited to the NFU even while their political perspectives differ from both the official ideology of the National Farmers Union and those of the majority of its members. However, they possess other political attitudes which are conducive to political activity. NFU Inconsistents are less likely than other farmers to endorse the two political attitudes singled out earlier as symptomatic of most Alberta farmers' perspectives. First, they are less likely to be politically alienated. Given the conceptual similarity of the NFU Cluster and political powerlessness, this is not surprising. Secondly, and more significantly, they also deviate from most other farmers in affirming the viability of a collective action by farmers. In denying the hopelessness of farmers getting together politically, they depart to some extent from farmers' prevailing assumption of their powerlessness.

NFU Inconsistents thus find themselves in a situation which is thwarting their economic aspirations at the same time their experiences to date have not dampened their enthusiasm for the possibility of farmers having a voice through their collective mobilization and their faith in the federal government to legislate in their favour. The relative youth of this group, coupled with evidence that the reality testing that comes with age frequently promotes disenchantment with other farmers and federal authorities, suggests that the combination may be a rare one. That aside, it is evident that the immediate situation is a key factor in the recruitment of the NFU Inconsistents. At the same time, however, these farmers have political outlooks which are independently conducive

to mobilization to a farmers' organization. In this sense, it is the combination of the immediate situation and political perspectives that induces membership.

The second manifestation of the vital nature of the farmer's immediate context to his protest political activity is that it is immediate situational differences which distinguish individuals who support the protest union's philosophy and have been recruited to it from farmers who agree with the union's ideology but have not been recruited to it.

The political perspectives of NFU Consistents (believers and joiners) and NFU Clients (believers and non-joiners) are similar in most respects. For both groups, appraisal of the political and economic system includes a judgement of themselves as economically and politically powerless, and of federal authorities as non-responsive. However, in contrast to that of the Client group, the immediate situation of NFU Consistents is one of economic deprivation. NFU Consistents find themselves in an unfavorable financial situation, netting lower incomes and operating less profitable farms than the Client group, and indeed, most farmers. They are thereby more frustrated not only with their current returns but as well with their prospects for the future.

The consequent implication is that the crucial factor for mobilization to protest politics is not a particular constellation of political attitudes, but rather an ongoing situation of economic frustration. However, two caveats must be entered. The first is that joining the NFU is not an act entirely within the farmer's control.

Membership is contingent upon not only the farmer's behavior but upon that of the NFU recruitment director as well. That is, the situational context of the NFU Consistents and Clients may differ in a second respect: in the opportunity each provides to join the farm protest organization. All NFU Consistents have been requested to join the farm union; all Clients may not have been.² The possibility does not deny the importance of the immediate situation to farmers' political activity. It does suggest, however, that other factors besides the current financial context may be fundamental to recruitment to protest politics.

The second caveat is that there are attitudinal and behavioral differences between the NFU Consistent and Client groups. First, the Client group is less alienated from the provincial political system. While NFU Consistents feel they have been unjustly dealt with by both provincial and federal governments, Clients appraise the provincial government's treatment of farmers relatively favorably. An effective farmer's organization committed to farmer participation in the decisions that affect them may thus not be so apparent a need for the Client group. Secondly, the Client group is less interested in politics, less likely to vote, and less inclined to join farm organizations. The implication is that these farmers are less accustomed to acting upon their political attitudes than are the Consistent farmers. Both inter-group differences necessitate a conclusion similar to that drawn earlier for the NFU Inconsistent farmers: protest behavior is best viewed as a function of both political attitudes and immediate situational circumstances.

In summary, farmers' political perspectives are ones they have arrived at through their experiences as farmers functioning in a given marketing and political system. Views of economic and political powerlessness and unresponsive federal authorities are important ingredients in that outlook. Such attitudes mean that in periods of both financial well-being and distress most farmers tend to be conservative in their ideological bias - opting for less rather than more government involvement in agriculture. A minority of farmers are more "radical", wanting more regulation of farming and more farmer say in that regulation. Farmers' propensity for protest activity does however vary with the state of their financial well-being. In periods of favorable financial circumstances, their relative financial satisfaction combined with their judgements of the unviability of farmers uniting together politically restrain most of them from mobilizing to radical farm organizations. Situations of prolonged and severe financial distress will dispose those who are particularly discontented to more radical farmers' unions.

Research Implications

In the process of describing farmers' political attitudes and their links to political behavior, the research has raised a number of considerations for the study of political belief systems generally. First, how we conceptualize attitudes and attitude formation will significantly affect our ability to determine the underlying structure of constellations of attitudes. Secondly, successful tapping of attitudes is contingent upon a research methodology which allows respondents the maximum latitude to elucidate upon their opinions and ideas. And thirdly,

an individual's political attitudes are more likely to be linked to his political behavior when his situational context allows him the opportunity to act on his attitudes.

The conceptualization of "attitude" which is most capable of uncovering the structure (and meaning) of an individual's political belief set is a probabilistic one - one that defines an attitude as a probability of the recurrence of a certain response with respect to a given object. Since similar responses to a given object are more likely to recur with more interactions with that object, this definition directs the attention of the attitudinal researcher to the need to tap an individual's responses towards objects with which the individual has a history of interaction. More specifically, recognizing that an individual asked about his attitudes towards federal involvement in the production of foodstuffs, reflects upon and appraises his past experiences with federal involvement, allows the researcher to direct his attention to issues relevant to the respondent. In this way, the researcher can maximize his chances of isolating verbal responses that are both stable and salient.

The second implication of this research is to stress the need for an appropriate method of inquiry when studying attitudes and belief systems. A data gathering method which makes extensive use of open-ended questions to grant respondents ample opportunity to describe what they think is more likely to ascertain also why respondents think the way they do. The open-ended strategy is more likely to encourage respondents to volunteer the cognitive bases of their evaluative beliefs. "Inconsistent" responses become understandable when it becomes known that "inconsistent" experiences have shaped them.

The third and final consideration concerns the importance of including the situational factor in searches for links between political attitudes and political activity. Verbal and behavioral responses are more likely to be consistent when the situation gives the respondent the chance to be consistent - that is, to act upon his pronouncements. Since one is more likely to behave in accordance with one's verbal attitudes the easier it is to do so, it is vital that the researcher interested in assessing verbal attitudinal-behavioral attitudinal links appraise the opportunity the situation allows one to be consistent.

In conclusion, the thesis has performed three tasks. First, it has described the political belief sets of a group of Alberta farmers. Secondly, it has traced links between farmers' belief sets and their political activity, emphasizing the importance of the farmer's situational context in making such links. And thirdly, in fulfilling those two specific tasks, the research has raised a number of considerations applicable to the study of belief systems generally.

Notes to Chapter 9

- 1 The conclusion that the farmer feels he has a measure of independence in the production sector is based on two pieces of information. First, 80% of NFU members and 90% of non-members agreed that "The farmer is more independent than people who work for wages". Secondly, 71% of NFU members and 60% of non-members referred to "the independence" as the aspect of farming they liked most.
- 2 Of the group of Clients for whom it was possible to procure information (19 of the original 29), 11 had been asked to join the NFU and refused. Another 6 had not been asked but said they would not join if asked. Two Clients had not been asked but said they would join if they were.

APPENDIX A

INTER-ITEM ASSOCIATION OF LOCUS OF CONTROL MEASURES

The tables included in this Appendix lend support to the conclusion drawn in the text of the thesis that farmers' responses are consistent across locus of control measures. Where several tables indicate the same pattern, only one or two are reported here. Where there are variations in a pattern across measures, the deviating tables are reported.

The NFU Group (N=37)

Table A4.1 demonstrates the first pattern noted among the NFU group - the affirmation across measures of the possibility of joint farmer action. In Table A4.1, NFU members who feel farmers collectively could act on the cost-price squeeze are much more inclined to believe in the possibility of farmers' organizing politically than those who feel farmers could not do anything about the squeeze or who mention an individual activity.

Table A4.1 Individualist-Collectivist Orientation
by Obstacles to Farmers Organizing
Politically (NFU)

<u>Orientation</u>	<u>Obstacles</u>			<u>Total</u>	<u>N</u>
	<u>None</u>	<u>Farmers</u>	<u>Minority</u>		
None	20%	40%	40%	100%	(10)
Individualistic	17	50	33	100%	(6)
Collectivist	40	40	20	100%	(15)

Table A4.2 illustrates the second pattern among the NFU group, the tendency to be consistent in externalizing (or internalizing) blame. NFU farmers who internalize the blame for farmers' relative inefficacy at securing favourable outputs from government to farmers themselves also tend to believe farmers are the major limitation to their mobilizing collectively. A second table, Table A4.3, indicates that farmers who feel they can individually or collectively undertake action regarding the cost-price squeeze are more prone to blame farmers' lack of success

on farmers and farm organizations, rather than on the government or the fact of farmers being a political minority.

Table A4.2 Reasons for Farmers Lack of Success by Obstacles to Farmers Organizing Politically: %'s (NFU)

Reason	Obstacle			Total	N
	None	Farmers	Minority		
Been Successful	100	0	0	100%	(2)
Government's Fault	17	33	50	100%	(6)
Farmers Fault	25	50	25	100%	(20)
Minority Position	50	0	50	100%	(2)
Both Minority/and Farmers' Fault	0	50	50	100%	(2)

Table A4.3 Individualist-Collectivist Orientation by Reasons for Farmers Lack of Success: %'s (NFU)

Orientation	Reason				All	Total
	Been Successful	Gov't. Fault	Farmers' Fault	Minority Position		
None	9	36	46	0	9	100%(11)
Individualistic	0	14	72	0	14	100%(7)
Collectivist	12	6	71	12	0	100%(17)

The third pattern noted among NFU farmers is that where extra-governmental forces are judged responsible for the cost-price squeeze (rather than the farmers, or the government in conjunction with others) there is an inclination to believe that it is farmers' fault that they have had difficulty in obtaining what they have wanted from the government (Table A4.4) and that any action undertaken by farmers must be of a collective political nature. (Table A4.5)

Table A4.4 Agent Blamed for Cost-Price Squeeze
by Reasons for Farmers Lack of
Success: %'s (NFU)

Agent Blamed	Been Successful	Gov't. Fault	Reason Farmers' Fault	Minority Position	All	Total
Government	33	17	33	0	17	100%(6)
Farmers*	50	0	50	0	0	100%(2)
Extra-Governmental	0	12.5	75	12.5	0	100%(16)
Gov't. plus others	8	25	58	0	8	100%(12)

*Farmers alone or with others

Table A4.5 Individualist-Collectivist Orientation
by Agent Blamed for Squeeze: %'s. (NFU)

Orientation	Agent Blamed			
	Gov't.	Farmers	Extra-Governmental	Gov't. plus others
None	33	--	27	42
Individualist	33	--	13	25
Collectivist	33	100	60	33
Total	99%	100%	100%	100%

On the other hand, Table A4.6 indicates that if the government is blamed along with other forces for the squeeze, there is a tendency to feel that it is farmers and their organizations' own limitations that account for their inability to organize, rather than the fact of their being a political minority.

Table A4.6 Agent Blamed for Squeeze by Obstacles to
Farmers Organizing Politically: %'s (NFU)

Agent Blamed	Obstacle			Total
	None	Farmers	Minority	
Gov't. alone	67	17	17	101% (6)
Farmers	--	--	100	100% (1)
Extra-Governmental	39	31	31	101% (13)
Gov't. plus others	--	64	36	100% (11)

The Non-NFU Group (N=96)

Concerning the first pattern noted in the text, the consistent location of responsibility in external forces, non-NFU farmers who blame farmers for the squeeze tend to view the sources of farmers' ineffectiveness with governments in characteristics of farmers, farm organizations, and their minority position in the population. Table A4.7 is the relevant table.

Table A4.7 Agent Blamed for Squeeze by Reasons for Farmers Lack of Success: %'s (Non-NFU)

Agent Blamed	Reason				All	Total
	Been Successful	Gov't. Fault	Farmers' Fault	Minority Position		
Gov't. alone	35	15	30	20	—	100%(20)
Farmers	18	9	36	37	—	100%(11)
Extra-Governmental	25	15	27.5	27.5	5	100%(40)
Gov't. plus others	5	11	53	26	5	100%(19)

Table A4.8 further substantiates this pattern, showing that non-NFU farmers who censure farmers for their incapacity to mobilize are also most likely to be the ones who blame farmers for the cost-price squeeze.

Table A4.8 Agent Blames for Squeeze by Obstacles to Farmers Organizing Politically (Non-NFU)

Agent Blamed	Obstacle			
	None	Farmers	Minority	Both
Gov't. alone	44	13	25	—
Farmers	9	19	10	—
Extra-Governmental	39	44	45	75
Gov't. plus others	9	25	20	25
Total	101%	101%	100%	100%
N	23	32	20	4

The second pattern in the non-NFU group is the consistency of feeling farmers could act collectively. Table A4.9 indicates the coincidence of affirming the possibility of collective action on the cost-price squeeze and a stronger belief that there are no obstacles to forming a farmers' political group.

Table A4.9 Individualist-Collectivist Orientation by Obstacles to Farmers Organizing Politically (Non-NFU)

Orientation	Obstacle				Total
	None	Farmers	Minority	Both	
None	35	32	27	5	99% (37)
Individual	9	73	18	-	100% (22)
Collective	47	24	18	12	101% (17)
Both	25	-	75	-	100% (4)

And lastly, the third pattern observed among non-NFU farmers is the link between blaming farmers for the squeeze and suggesting a collectivist farmer action regarding that problem. The relevant table here is Table A4.10.

Table A4.10 Individualist-Collectivist Orientation by Agent Blamed for Squeeze (Non-NFU)

Orientation	Agent Blamed			
	Gov't.	Farmers	Extra-Gov'tal.	Gov't.+
None	50	46	44	38
Individual	20	9	39	29
Collective	25	36	17	24
Both	5	9	-	9
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	20	11	41	21

Tables A4.11 and A4.12, as well as Table A4.8 presented earlier, throw further light on this third pattern. While those in Table A4.11 who posit a united farmer action on the squeeze are slightly more inclined to blame farmers for their ineffectiveness with governments than those suggesting a nonpolitical move, those most likely to censure farmers are the individuals who feel nothing can be done regarding the squeeze. Table A4.8 shows that non-NFU farmers who cite farmers' characteristics or their minority situation as the major obstacle to farmers' organizing collectively point to extra-governmental forces as responsible for the squeeze. Those who feel there are no obstacles to farmers organizing tend to fault the government for the squeeze. And finally, with regard to the third overall pattern, non-NFU farmers who affix the blame for farmers' inefficacy with governments to farmers and farm organizations are more likely to believe in the possibility of a farmers' political group. The supporting table here is A4.12.

Table A4.11 Reasons for Farmers Unsuccessfulness by
Individualist-Collectivist Orientation
(Non-NFU)

Reason	Orientation			
	None	Individual	Collective	Both
Successful	19	27	20	25
Governmental	5	23	20	-
Farmers	45	19	35	25
Minority	29	27	25	25
Both	2	4	-	25
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	42	26	20	4

Table A4.12 Obstacles to Farmers Organizing Politically
by Reasons for Farmers Unsuccessfulness
(Non-NFU)

Obstacle	Reason				
	Succ.	Govtal.	Farmers	Minority	Both
None	24	20	48	14	67
Farmers	47	50	33	41	-
Minority	29	30	15	36	-
Both	-	-	4	9	33
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	17	10	27	22	3

APPENDIX B

Table 5.2a Programs of Benefit

-
- a) Marketing Assistance Programs - no strings attached
 disaster aids (flood, wildlife)
 low interest loans and grants
 Alberta payment for snowed-under crop
 Provincial government's building, water wells grants
 Agricultural Development Corporation
 Farm Credit Corporation
 Farm Improvement Loan
 Alberta Farm Purchase Board
 non-taxed farm fuel
 winter works program
 Summer Student Work program
 Provincial school tax grant
 Provincial grazing reserves
- b) Subsidies and incentives
 subsidies generally
 dairy subsidy and quotas
 hog subsidy
 beef subsidy last spring
 ewe-lamb retention program
 PFAA/PFRA/acreage payments
 incentive programs
 Grass incentive grant
 LIFT
 Provincial livestock loan
- c) Orderly marketing
 orderly marketing
 Canadian Wheat Board
 two-price wheat system
 ban on DES cattle
 marketing boards
 Crows Nest Pass Agreement
 building more railway cars
- d) Non-ideological
 Federal export markets
 Provincial export markets
 Research stations
 Health care
 Crop insurance

Table 5.3a Harmful Programs

-
- a) No strings attached financial assistance
 easy credit/loans
 high interest rates on loans
 snowed under crop payment
 loans to build feedlots/barns
- b) Subsidies
 subsidy programs and cash advances
 Federal subsidy on beef last spring
 cream subsidy
 deficiency payment for pork and eggs
- c) Incentive Schemes
 LIFT
 Federal grass incentive scheme
 Provincial beef incentive scheme
 all policies concerning beef
- d) Moves against free marketing and production
 interference in production
 quota system
 predictions regarding futures
 trade and tariff policies
 marketing boards
 embargo on American beef
 Canadian Egg Marketing Agency
 Canadian Wheat Board
- e) Moves against orderly marketing (insufficient Gov't. control)
 do nothing policy regarding corporations profits/high costs
 of machinery
 allowing corporations into production
 freight rates/railway cars
 allowing American beef in
 open marketing
 programs to encourage mass production and eliminate
 small farms
- f) Miscellaneous
 marketing policies
 not finding markets
 not moving grain to meet export
 commitments
 low prices for produce
 taxes
- discriminating against women
 fuel, oil, gas in Alberta
 fuel policies generally
 favoring exotic cattle

Table 5.10B Median and Importance Rankings of
Edmonton Sample (N=931)

Value	Median	Importance Rank
A COMFORTABLE LIFE	7.76	6
AN EXCITING LIFE	14.16	16
A SENSE OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	8.84	9
A WORLD AT PEACE	4.46	2
A WORLD OF BEAUTY	13.34	14
EQUALITY	8.24	8
FAMILY SECURITY	3.56	1
FREEDOM	6.51	4
HAPPINESS	6.31	3
INNER HARMONY	9.79	12
MATURE LOVE	9.71	11
NATIONAL SECURITY	11.56	13
PLEASURE	13.89	15
SALVATION	15.11	18
SELF-RESPECT	7.79	7
SOCIAL RECOGNITION	14.76	17
TRUE FRIENDSHIP	8.96	10
WISDOM	7.75	5

APPENDIX C
CONSTRUCTION OF MEASURES

Economic Satisfaction/Dissatisfaction

The three items which load significantly on the first factor of the unrotated matrix of a factor analysis of possible Dissatisfaction measures comprise the index. They are outlined below with their factor loadings on the left of the item.

- .661 As far as you and your family are concerned, how satisfied are you with your present financial satisfaction?
- .531 Would you say that you and your family are better off, or worse off financially than you were 5 years ago?
- .735 With respect to your future prospects financially, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, a little dissatisfied, or quite dissatisfied with the way things look for the future?

Of interest are the items which did not load on this first factor.

(Rotation was not performed as it made no sense.) The items with non-significant loadings include a comparison of the respondent's financial situation with that of the preceding year and with that of "most other farmers in this area" and with "the average person living in a town or city". The loading of these items on the unrotated matrix was .301, .274, and .395 respectively. The implication is that neither neighbouring farmers nor the town or city wageearner is a comparative reference group for farmers in this study group. Relative satisfaction or dissatisfaction with one's financial situation appears to be made on considerations of what that situation was previously or what it will be in the future.

Communication Pattern

a) Contact in Forming Farming Opinions: Possible scores range from 0 to 3. Scoring is as follows:

- 0 - neither "farm leaders" nor "other farmers" are mentioned as the most important or second most important source of information in forming opinions about farming.
- 1 - either "farm leaders" or "other farmers" are cited as the second most important source of information regarding farming opinions
- 2 - either "farm leaders" or "other farmers" are cited as the most important source of information for farming opinions.
- 3 - both "farm leaders" and "other farmers" are mentioned as the most important and second most important information sources for farming opinions.

b) Contact in Forming Political Opinions

Scores also range from 0 to 3 and involve choices of "other farmers", "family members", and "farm leaders" as most important or second most important information sources for forming political opinions.

- 0 - neither "other farmers", "farm leaders", nor "family members" mentioned as most important or second most important source
- 1 - one of these three mentioned as second most important
- 2 - one of these three cited as most important information source in forming political opinions.
- 3 - two of "other farmers", "farm leaders", and "family members" mentioned as most important and second most important sources of information in forming opinions about politics.

Social Integration

The actual wording of the items designed to assess the farmers contact with the nearest urban centre is as follows:

- a) Where do you do most of your shopping? How far away is that?
The response is coded as number of miles; this constitutes the measure of distance from nearest urban centre.
- b) How frequently do you go there?
 - daily
 - 2/3 times a week
 - once a week
 - every 2 weeks
 - once a month
 - less than once a month

The item is used to measure frequency of contact with nearest urban centre.

- c) How many people do you know living there?
- | | |
|----------------|---------------|
| - a great many | - only a few |
| - some | - almost none |

This item is the measure of familiarity with people in nearest urban centre.

Work Alienation

a) Negative Attitudes Towards Work: Examples of each of the types of responses coded as "alienated" are given below.

"I am less eager and more apathetic today. The stress and challenge is much greater in recent times due to the low margin of profit and risks from unstable prices and weather."
(disillusionment with income)

"I like it less now than when I started. You seem to be more pressured now; things are changing from year to year. Prices are changing yearly and much more quickly than formerly."
(disenchantment with business-like trend)

"We are the peasants of society, meaning farmers are the last to get an increase in income and the first to get a decrease. Farmers have no say regarding the price of their commodity. There is no way to get ahead."
(view of farmer at bottom of society)

b) Wanting to Quit Farming: Since the plurality of responses here referred to the cost-price squeeze and inadequate returns, the following quotation is as good an example of this type of response as any.

"I am losing interest in farming because I work for nothing."

Self-Esteem

Respondents were asked to agree or disagree with four items from the Rosenberg personal self-esteem measure. The frequency distribution of the two farmer groups (N=133) to the items is as follows:

- .678 I feel that I am a person of worth.
56% agree strong; 37% agree somewhat
- .676 I am able to do things as well as most other people.
55% agree strongly; 36% agree somewhat
- .009 I feel I do not have much to be proud of.
66% disagree strongly; 16% disagree somewhat
- .576 I feel that I have a number of good qualities.
53% agree strongly; 43% agree somewhat.

The factor loadings of the four items on a single factor in an oblique rotation are to the left of the statements. The Pearson Correlation matrix confirmed the factor analysis' result of the need to eliminate the third item. (that is, "I feel I do not have much to be proud of.")

The distribution of responses on the individual items should alert us to the particular nature of this self-esteem measure. Over one half of the entire sample agreed strongly with each of these three items and a further 36-43% agreed somewhat with the individual items. While it is possible that an acquiescent response bias is operating, it seems unlikely given that the self-esteem item which did not load significantly on the same factor as these three and which was worded negatively, was almost as strongly denied as these three were affirmed. It appears then that farmers as a group have strong self-esteem feelings and what constitutes a low self-esteem rating in this study group may well be a high self-esteem rating among another research group.

Social Trust

Farmers responded to three items of the Rosenberg "Faith in People" scale. Frequency distributions are as follows:

- .522 You can't be too careful in dealing with people.
53% agree strongly; 30% agree somewhat
- .209 Most of the time people try to be helpful.
44% agree strongly; 47% agree somewhat

- .829 Most people would try to take advantage of you if they got a chance.
23% agree strongly; 27% agree somewhat

The factor loadings in an oblique rotation, on the left of the items, together with the Pearson Correlation Matrix, led to the decision to combine the first and third items in a Likert measure. (The Pearson r of the first and third items is .46; the other item-item correlations are much smaller.)

Political Powerlessness

The final four item measure was the end result of factor analysis of four political efficacy items and five powerlessness statements which had appeared in NFU periodicals and Newsletters. The frequency distributions and loadings of four items which loaded significantly on one factor in an oblique rotation are as follows:

- .834 I don't think the government cares much about what people like me think.
48.9% agree strongly; 24.4% agree somewhat
- .661 Farmers have generally been powerless to secure governmental assistance which would benefit them.
46.6% agree strongly; 35.9 agree somewhat
- .774 People like me don't have any say about what the government does.
38.5% agree strongly; 29.2% agree somewhat
- .515 The market system of our economy is designed to exploit farmers.
46.5% agree strongly; 26.4% agree somewhat

What sort of powerlessness measure is this? A sense of powerlessness does not appear to be predicated on individual inadequacy feelings. The item suggesting that it is difficult for the individual to understand the complicated nature of politics and government does not load significantly on the unrotated factor nor the oblique rotation factor.

The source of powerlessness is external to the individual - in the market system, tariff, railways, banks - as much as in authorized political officials.

Political Interest

The measure is a Likert index comprised of the following items:

- a) How interested are you in politics generally?
 - very interested (score of 3)
 - fairly interested (score of 2)
 - interested only a little (score of 1)
 - not interested at all (score of 0)

- b) When an election campaign is not on, how frequently do you discuss political matters with members of your family, and friends?
 - 2/3 times a week (score of 4)
 - once a week (score of 3)
 - couple times a month (score of 2)
 - almost never (score of 1)
 - never (score of 0)

- c) When you and your friends discuss political matters, what part do you usually take?
 - just listen (score of 1)
 - express an opinion once in a while (score of 2)
 - take an equal share in the conversation (score of 3)
 - try to convince others (score of 4)
 - never discuss (score of 0)

Table D.1 Rokeach Value Profiles of Four Farmer Types

	NFU Consistents		Clients		NFU Inconsis.		Non-NFU Consis.	
	Median	Impt. Rank	Median	Impt. Rank	Median	Impt. Rank	Median	Impt. Rank
A COMFORTABLE LIFE	3.50	2	7.00	7	3.40	2	6.17	5*
AN EXCITING LIFE	13.50	15	13.00	14	9.88	8	11.75	13
A SENSE OF ACCOMPLSH	6.50	4	6.00	3	6.00	6	6.50	6
A WORLD AT PEACE	6.50	5*	6.67	6	5.00	3	6.00	3
A WORLD OF BEAUTY	14.67	18	11.88	13	12.00	13	11.90	14
EQUALITY	7.50	6	5.75	2	10.00	9	9.67	10
FAMILY SECURITY	2.67	1	2.19	1	2.83	1	3.00	1
FREEDOM	6.17	3	6.33	5	5.33	4	5.83	2
HAPPINESS	7.50	7*	6.20	4	5.67	5	6.17	4
INNER HARMONY	11.50	12	10.63	11	12.25	15	10.00	11
MATURE LOVE	12.50	13	11.75	12	10.00	10*	11.17	12
NATIONAL SECURITY	10.50	11	13.00	15*	13.75	16	12.83	15
PLEASURE	14.00	16	14.13	16	12.00	14*	14.83	18
SALVATION	14.50	17	15.75	18	15.83	18	13.83	16
SELF-RESPECT	9.50	10	9.00	8	12.00	12	9.00	9
SOCIAL RECOGNITION	13.17	14	15.00	17	15.00	17	14.80	17
TRUE FRIENDSHIP	7.83	8	9.63	10	7.70	7	7.00	7
WISDOM	8.50	9	9.60	9	10.50	11	7.83	8

*Tied with next highest value (has same median value)

APPENDIX E
CANONICAL CORRELATION ANALYSES

Canonical correlation examines the nature of the relationship between two sets of variables with the objective of finding the linear combination of variables in each set which will maximize the resulting correlation between the two sets. (Cooley and Lohnes, 1962: Chapter 3; SPSS Manual, 1975: Chapter 25) Statistics returned include a canonical correlation which is the correlation between the two sets of variables and is equivalent to the Pearson's correlation. As well, a canonical coefficient for each variable in the two sets is given; this coefficient represents the relative weight or contribution of that variable to the set. If there is no significant linear association between the sets of variables, no set of canonical variates will be returned. (The variate is the re-ordered set of variables.) If there is more than one linear relationship between the two sets of variables, further sets of canonical variates will be returned. Each set is orthogonal to each other set.

The primary advantage of canonical correlation over multiple regression is that it allows the simultaneous examination of the inter-relationship of several independent and dependent variables. (Multiple regression permits only one dependent variable to be examined at a time.)

Two tables present condensed results of canonical correlations between each of the sets of independent variables and NFU Beliefs (Table E.1) and between the sets of independent variables (Table E.2). Where more than one significant linear combination of the two sets of variables is returned, it is reported. In the interest of parsimony,

Table E.1 gives the canonical coefficients of only the independent variables; canonical coefficients of each of the eleven components of the NFU Belief cluster are not given. Only the canonical coefficients of the variables with the highest loadings on each of the canonical variates are reported.

The results of the canonical correlation analyses, as reported in Tables E.1 and E.2, assist in uncovering the meaning of each of the sets of variables by demonstrating the amount of overlapping variance among the sets. Thus, the reordered NFU Belief variate shares 39% of its variance with the Political Alienation set when that set is reordered to represent a Powerlessness dimension and 28% when the Alienation set is reordered as a Normlessness set. The rearranged NFU Index variate shares 21% and 17% with general Economic Discontent measures and more specific Economic Dissatisfaction indicators, respectively. Media consumption and a pattern of interacting with other farmers and with one's family in the process of formulating opinions about politics are likewise important predictors of NFU Beliefs; overlapping variance here being about 38%. Neither Work History nor Social Background variates share a statistically significant amount of variance with the reordered NFU Index components.

In more specific terms, the emergence of two canonical correlations between NFU Beliefs and both Political Alienation and Economic Discontent (although only one of the latter is statistically significant) suggests that there are two links between each set of independent variables and NFU Belief Adherence. Adherence to the NFU Belief Cluster appears to be related to both short-term economic grievances and more

generalized philosophical assessments of one's class position. Likewise, different alienation dimensions are linked to different NFU Belief items. The expectation of unfair and unequal treatment when approaching governmental officials, as well as generalized powerlessness feelings are associated with the NFU Belief cluster. Different components of the NFU Belief Index load at the top of the reordered NFU Belief Index in each instance.

The second table, Table E.2, establishes the pattern of relationships among the independent variable sets. (Only sets with significant canonical correlations are reported. Omitted from the table are canonical variates not significantly inter-related.) Perhaps the clearest aspect of Table E.2 is its demonstration of the appropriateness of regarding Powerlessness and disaffection from government indicators as alienation measures. Powerlessness is reordered to the top of the political alienation set; Expectations of Future Ill Economic Prospects to the top of the economic discontent set. It thus is concluded that political alienation - experienced as powerlessness and disaffection with the federal government - is not the simple artifact of a current economic malaise but a more enduring and pervasive attitudinal dimension. The canonical correlation between the Political Alienation and Economic Discontent indices is .606, indicating that about 37% of the variance in Powerlessness and (federal) alienation is contributed by negative judgements of future financial prospects and economic dissatisfaction generally.

While Social Background characteristics are related to both Economic Discontent and Political Alienation with the exception of

Table E.1 Canonical Correlation Between NFU Beliefs
and Independent Variable Sets

Variable Set	Canon. Coeff.	Canon. Correl.	% Expl. Variance	Significance
<u>Political Alienation (N=108)</u>				
First canon. correlation		.625	39.06	.0001
Powerlessness	.878			
Unsuccess Prov. Gov't.	.534			
Unsuccess Fed. Gov't.	-.509			
Second canon. correlation		.534	28.52	.001
Unfair/Unequal Treatment	-.814*			
Unsuccess Fed. Gov't.	-.475			
Powerlessness	.466			
<u>Economic Discontent (N=108)</u>				
First canon. correlation		.463	21.44	.05
Lowest Class	.714			
General Discontent	.411			
Second canon. correlation		.415	17.22	Not Sig.
Future Ill Prospects	.764			
Present Unfair Return	.605			
<u>Social Integration (N=123)</u>				
First canon. correlation		.613	37.58	.01
# Farm Magazines Received	-.744*			
Contact in Pol. Opinion Formation	-.564			
<u>Work History (N=123)</u>				
First canon. correlation		.448	20.07	Not Sig.
Parents' farmers	.793			
Viewing Farming as Both Business and Lifestyle	-.470			
<u>Social Background (N=123)</u>				
First canon. correlation		.482	23.23	Not Sig.
Catholic	.672			
Over 45 years old	.432			

*The items which load at the top of the NFU Set canonical variate are also negatively weighted.

All variables are continuous measures except the following which are dichotomous (dummy) variables: Parents' Farmers, Viewing Farming as Both Business and Lifestyle, Catholic, and Over 45 Years Old.

Table E.2 Canonical Correlation Between Independent
Variable Sets

329.

Set 1	Canon. Coeff.	Set 2	Canon. Coeff.
<u>Economic Discontent</u>		<u>Political Alienation</u>	
First canon. correlation			
Future Ill Prospects	.700	Powerlessness	.684
General Discontent	.475	Past Unsuccess Feds.	.444
Lowest Class	.283	Past Unsuccess Prov.	-.299
Present Return Unfair	-.045	Unequal/Unfair Trtmt.	.295
Canonical Correlation = .606 % variance explained = 36.72 chi square = 59.22 df=16 Significance=.0001 N=108			
<u>Social Background</u>		<u>Economic Discontent</u>	
First canon. correlation			
Slavic Origin	.736	Lowest Class	.882
Catholic	.439	Present Return Unfair	.517
Estimated Farm Market Value	-.353	General Discontent	-.455
Canonical Correlation = .432 % variance explained = 18.66 chi square = 58.32 df=36 Significance=.01 N=110			
Second canon. correlation			
Over 45 Years Old	.597	Present Return Unfair	-.834
# Acres Operated	.556	Lowest Class	.475
European Born	.446	General Discontent	-.308
Canonical Correlation = .392 % variance explained = 15.37 chi square = 37.09 df=24 Significance = .04 N=110			
<u>Social Background</u>		<u>Political Alienation</u>	
First canon. correlation			
Self-Esteem	-.671	Powerlessness	-.954
Education	.557	Unsuccess Prov.	.502
Slavic Origin	.362		
Canonical Correlation = .494 % variance explained = 24.40 chi square = 53.16 df=36 Significance = .03 N=114			
<u>Social Integration</u>		<u>Political Alienation</u>	
First canon. correlation			
# Farm Orgs. Belonged	.717	Powerlessness	-.577
# Farm Mags. Received	-.538	Unequal/Unfair Trtmt.	-.565
Social Contact in Forming Political Opinions	-.461	Unsuccess Prov. Gov't.	.415
Social Contact in Forming Farming Opinions	-.460	Unsuccess Fed. Gov't.	-.301
Canonical Correlation = .491 % variance explained = 24.11 chi square = 40.51 df=28 Significance = .06 N=97			

Table E.2 Continued

All variables are continuous measures except the following which are dichotomous (dummy) variables: Slavic Origin, Catholic, Over 45 Years Old, European Born.

being of Slavic origin, the same characteristics are not related to both sets, making it difficult to note any trends and posit any links from social background through alienation and economic discontent to NFU Beliefs. In summarizing general trends, a minority/disadvantaged social background (being Slavic, Catholic, and with a low market-valued farm) is related to economic discontent. Surprisingly, and in defiance of almost all findings on non-farmer samples, esteem and powerlessness are positively related. The other social background variables related to powerlessness are a lower education and not being of Slavic origin.

The remaining sets of canonical variates are those linking Social Integration indicators and Political Alienation. Both powerlessness and perceived systemic inefficacy are related to media consumption, and social interaction patterns in forming political and farming opinions. However, membership in farm organizations is negatively ordered in this Social Integration cluster. The implication is that indicators of social cohesion are not uniformly conducive to political alienation.

In summarizing the major trends in Tables E.1 and E.2 the most important finding is the close link among Economic Discontent, Political Powerlessness, and the NFU Belief Cluster. While they share variance, each of these sets of variables is conceptually distinct. That is, feelings of economic discontent and political alienation have an enduring aspect; political alienation is estrangement from the political system (especially the federal system) and not merely displeasure with incumbent

officials in bad times. A second important finding is the pattern of interaction among independent variables: Social Background, Social Integration, Economic Dissatisfaction and Powerlessness are all inter-related. The inconsistency of the inter-relationships suggests a complicated path to NFU Beliefs.

APPENDIX F - Table F.1 Correlation Matrix of Situational Variables I

[illegible]

APPENDIX F - Table F.2 Correlation Matrix of Situational Variables II

	Contact for Farming Opinions	Contact for Political Opinions	Contact with Urban Area	Distance from Urban Area	Unfamiliarity with Urban People	Number Organizational Memberships	No. Farm Organizational Memberships	Number Service Club Memberships	Length Residence in Area	Number News Magazines Received	Number Farm Magazines Received	Number Radio Newscasts per Week
Contact for Farming Opinions	39											
Contact for Political Opinions	-15	-14										
Contact with Urban Area	-16	-10	66									
Distance from Urban Area	-18	-02	33	29								
Unfamiliarity with Urban People	03	-09	-11	01	-18							
Number Organizational Memberships	01	-09	07	13	01	55						
No. Farm Organizational Memberships	02	-12	-10	-03	-06	37	56					
Number Service Club Memberships	15	-00	12	-00	25	-02	03	-04				
Length Residence in Area	-06	-14	-19	-15	03	21	11	06	-03			
Number News Magazines Received	-08	-12	-05	02	-02	22	29	-03	09	27		
Number Farm Magazines Received	06	-09	03	00	01	12	07	-00	09	04	16	
Number Radio Newscasts per Week												

APPENDIX F - Table F.3 Personality and Social Background Correlation Matrix

	Self-Esteem	Social Trust	Age	Infrequency Church Attendance	Education	Slavic Origin	European Origin	Canadian Origin	Catholic Religion	Anglo-Protestant	Evangelical Protestant	European Protestant
Self-Esteem												
Social Trust												
Age												
Infrequency Church Attendance												
Education												
Slavic Origin												
European Origin												
Canadian Origin												
Catholic Religion												
Anglo-Protestant												
Evangelical Protestant												
European Protestant												

APPENDIX F - Table F.4 Political Alienation Correlation Matrix

	Powerlessness	Past Unsuccess Federal Government	Past Unsuccess Alberta Government	Expectation of Unequal/Unfair Treatment	Provincial Party System Representative	Federal Party System Representative	Possible Farmers Could Organize	Salience Federal Government	Salience Provincial Government	Salience Federal Party System	Salience Provincial Party System
Powerlessness											
Past Unsuccess Federal Government	31										
Past Unsuccess Alberta Government	34	44									
Expectation of Unequal/Unfair Treatment	50	32	39								
Provincial Party System Representative	02	-04	-19	-11							
Federal Party System Representative	-12	-01	-08	02	44						
Possible Farmers Could Organize	-05	10	-07	-02	-08	-12					
Salience Federal Government	-04	-16	04	-07	06	-03	-01				
Salience Provincial Government	-01	-16	-01	-04	00	-05	01	68			
Salience Federal Party System	02	-08	06	05	-03	-14	01	19	07		
Salience Provincial Party System	03	-02	14	18	-10	02	03	36	34	29	

APPENDIX F - Table F.5 Correlation Matrix of Situational Variables I
and Personality and Social Background Variables

	Self-Esteem	Social Trust	Age	Infrequency Church Attendance	Education	Slavic Origin	European Origin	Canadian Origin	Catholic Religion	Anglo-Protestant	Evangelical Protestant	European Protestant
Economic Dissatisfaction	05	-07	-21	22	-12	-02	-09	17	-02	-00	-09	02
Present Return Unfair	01	-04	-19	13	-06	09	-18	10	02	09	-07	-03
Class	03	-02	-02	18	-23	28	-03	-14	12	-20	05	08
Ill Future Return	28	-05	-06	-07	01	-04	04	-05	-08	05	-01	-03
Farmed All One's Life	01	09	23	-12	-16	-08	13	-13	-07	-02	10	-02
Parents Were Farmers	00	-07	-07	-10	-24	05	-00	02	-05	-04	05	09
No. Years Off-farm Work	-05	-11	-10	22	17	08	-09	07	-04	05	-17	11
Negative Attitude re Work	13	00	-13	01	17	-14	-02	22	00	05	00	-04
Wanting to Quit Farming	01	-01	-12	14	02	-11	-01	14	-04	05	-08	-00
Not Having Chosen Farming	-09	-19	27	-01	-20	16	-12	-00	06	-04	-11	-12
Farming as a Business	05	04	-12	-07	-19	17	-07	-05	03	-04	09	04
Farming Both Business and Way of Life	01	03	-10	-05	19	-07	00	-00	04	-08	07	-03
Farm Market Value	-03	03	-11	-09	35	01	-06	12	12	-04	-03	-12
Number Acres Owned	04	08	-06	-06	20	00	-05	10	-03	13	06	-15
Number Acres Operated	02	-01	-17	03	15	-04	-07	15	-09	-08	-04	-13

APPENDIX F - Table F.6 Correlation Matrix of Situational Variables II
and Personality and Social Background Variables

	Self-Esteem	Social Trust	Age	Infrequency Church Attendance	Education	Slavic Origin	European Origin	Canadian Origin	Catholic Religion	Anglo-Protestant	Evangelical Protestant	European Protestant
Contact for Farming Opinions	36	-01	-01	02	-07	-05	02	00	10	02	-14	11
Contact for Political Opinions	20	-13	05	08	-26	-00	-12	13	-06	11	02	-01
Contact with Urban Area	11	-07	-05	15	-17	-06	10	-12	-07	07	-06	-04
Distance from Urban Area	-01	03	-15	14	03	-05	12	-02	-10	02	-01	-03
Unfamiliarity with Urban People	05	-01	-23	15	-12	-02	23	-08	-11	-07	-08	15
Number Organizational Memberships	-06	21	06	-03	03	03	-03	-05	-04	-02	-04	-02
No. Farm Organizational Memberships	-15	05	-05	-08	03	-03	19	-09	09	-04	-13	07
Number Service Club Memberships	-22	-09	10	-13	18	-11	15	-03	05	03	-05	-01
Length Residence in Area	18	-01	11	-03	-07	21	33	-46	-07	01	-02	21
Number News Magazines Received	-00	20	05	09	18	08	01	-06	09	-06	-13	-08
Number Farm Magazines Received	-01	24	02	03	-14	07	09	-15	09	-07	00	-01
Number Radio Newscasts per Week	-02	09	-00	00	04	-03	04	-01	-04	07	-10	-03

APPENDIX F - Table F.7 Correlation Matrix of Situational
Variables I and Political Alienation Variables

	Powerlessness	Past Unsuccess Federal Government	Past Unsuccess Alberta Government	Expectation of Unequal/Unfair Treatment	Provincial Party System Representative	Federal Party System Representative	Possible Farmers Could Organize	Salience Federal Government	Salience Provincial Government	Salience Federal Party System	Salience Provincial Party System
Economic Dissatisfaction	39	21	24	34	07	14	-13	-12	-09	00	-07
Present Return Unfair	11	24	13	15	03	06	-25	-09	-20	-01	-11
Class	23	04	04	16	10	-04	-11	07	05	18	05
Ill Future Return	36	36	03	28	03	-05	06	-14	-11	00	-03
Farmed All One's Life	06	03	-10	-08	11	10	23	12	12	00	01
Parents Were Farmers	14	02	04	09	10	00	-13	-03	-05	-03	-05
No. Years Off-farm Work	00	07	10	15	-13	-16	-16	-10	-04	07	04
Negative Attitude re Work	05	-05	-03	02	-12	-07	06	-07	-14	-14	-08
Wanting to Quit Farming	13	08	02	-00	08	-07	-11	-00	08	-03	-03
Not Having Chosen Farming	20	02	09	01	-01	02	-10	13	-01	10	-14
Farming as a Business	11	03	06	10	12	12	-08	03	05	01	16
Farming Both Business and Way of Life	-06	-03	07	-11	-08	-06	-05	-08	-21	-09	-21
Farm Market Value	-21	-01	-00	-21	-06	-04	04	08	14	-02	06
Number Acres Owned	-28	-12	-05	-13	11	20	-00	-12	-12	-13	-00
Number Acres Operated	-10	-01	02	-05	06	09	14	-13	-03	-05	-05

APPENDIX F - Table F.8 Correlation Matrix of Situational
Variables II and Political Alienation Variables

	Powerlessness	Past Unsuccess Federal Government	Past Unsuccess Alberta Government	Expectation of Unequal/ Unfair Treatment	Provincial Party System Representative	Federal Party System Representative	Possible Farmers Could Organize	Salience Federal Government	Salience Provincial Government	Salience Federal Party System	Salience Provincial Party System
Contact for Farming Opinions	27	15	11	27	-01	-12	-10	-11	-11	00	-08
Contact for Political Opinions	25	08	05	23	13	06	-18	01	01	-17	03
Contact with Urban Area	22	17	04	11	10	13	-09	-10	01	-08	-03
Distance from Urban Area	00	16	04	04	03	07	-11	-13	-08	-17	-14
Unfamiliarity with Urban People	02	03	04	-01	06	06	06	09	12	08	-05
Number Organizational Memberships	06	06	04	-05	01	-13	28	-03	-14	01	03
No. Farm Organizational Memberships	-07	-13	-01	-17	-01	-09	07	-07	08	06	-09
Number Service Club Memberships	-17	-24	-10	-16	-19	-13	05	00	11	04	05
Length Residence in Area	08	-05	-11	08	-05	01	-06	11	12	22	15
Number News Magazines Received	-05	05	02	-12	-13	-22	24	-09	-06	02	-07
Number Farm Magazines Received	07	20	15	06	-08	-18	10	-08	-01	03	-07
Number Radio Newscasts per Week	04	05	-03	-15	08	05	13	-03	-01	-14	-02

APPENDIX F - Table F.9 Correlation Matrix of Personality and Social Background Variables and Political Alienation Variables

	Powerlessness	Past Unsuccess Federal Government	Past Unsuccess Alberta Government	Expectation of Unequal/Unfair Treatment	Provincial Party System Representative	Federal Party System Representative	Possible Farmers Could Organize	Salience Federal Government	Salience Provincial Government	Salience Federal Party System	Salience Provincial Party System
Self-Esteem	32	01	-00	19	04	-05	03	-13	-14	08	-05
Social Trust	-16	08	01	-10	07	-06	23	01	-05	-11	-04
Age	-05	-20	-29	-20	13	03	11	13	10	-02	09
Infrequency Church Attendance	11	23	28	19	-14	-12	08	05	12	-00	02
Education	-30	-06	-05	-05	-29	-10	15	-17	-17	-03	01
Slavic Origin	-01	-00	12	-10	-08	-08	01	00	05	16	11
European Origin	-06	-11	-06	-03	13	18	09	22	25	11	08
Canadian Origin	05	07	06	13	-04	-04	-10	-19	-16	-22	-18
Catholic Religion	03	03	05	08	-22	-07	-08	00	01	07	10
Anglo-Protestant	-12	-03	-14	-10	05	-01	-20	-04	-08	-18	-01
Evangelical Protestant	-12	-07	-09	-06	03	07	-12	00	02	-08	01
European Protestant	07	-09	08	-01	07	-06	19	05	12	15	-08

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WEEKLIES AND MONTHLIES

National Farmers Union Newsletter 1970 - 1975

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