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Origins of social exchange Lucas, Robert Gillmor 1978

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ORIGINS OF SOCIAL EXCHANGE by ROBERT GILLMOR LUCAS B.Comm., U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1968 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE IN BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION i n THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES FACULTY OF COMMERCE AND BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION We accept t h i s t h e s i s as conforming to the r e q u i r e d standard THE UNIVERSITY.OF BRITISH COLUMBIA August, 1977 © Robert G i l l m o r Lucas, 1977 In presenting th i s thes is in p a r t i a l fu l f i lment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the Un ivers i ty of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree that the L ibrary sha l l make it f ree l y ava i lab le for reference and study. I fur ther agree that permission for extensive copying of th i s thes is for scho la r l y purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by h is representat ives . It is understood that copying or pub l i ca t ion of th is thes is for f i n a n c i a l gain sha l l not be allowed without my wri t ten permission. Depa rtment The Univers i ty of B r i t i s h Columbia 2075 Wesbrook Place Vancouver, Canada V6T 1W5 Date /3*>^;/ J. /9 7g ABSTRACT The objective of this thesis was to i d e n t i f y and c r i t i c a l l y analyze the existing t h e o r e t i c a l origins of s o c i a l exchange. The i d e n t i f i c a t i o n and analysis of t h e o r e t i c a l l y pro-posed origins of exchange was based on a thorough review of the works of the better known s o c i a l exchange theorists. In the course of the review and analysis, i t was dis-covered that s o c i a l exchange theory consists of two d i s t i n -guishable bodies of l i t e r a t u r e . Further, each of the two bodies of l i t e r a t u r e proceeds from i t s own assumptions con-cerning the nature and extent of s o c i a l exchange a c t i v i t y , including the origins of such a c t i v i t y . C r i t i c a l analysis revealed the p o s s i b i l i t y of the con-struction of a un i f i e d , more parsimonious conception of the origins of s o c i a l exchange. The concept of s o c i a l s o l i d a r i t y and i t s role as both causal agent and s o c i a l r e s u l t of exchan, processes provided the basis for a new explanation of the origins "of s o c i a l exchange. The general conclusions of the thesis are four. F i r s t , two models of s o c i a l exchange exist i n the l i t e r a t u r e . They are the generalized model and r e s t r i c t e d model. Second, the origins of exchange assumed by each model d i f f e r . The generalized model posits the functional requirements of the group for integration and survival as ori g i n s . The r e s t r i c t e d model posits psychological needs and/or r a t i o n a l economic motives as origins. Third, the generalized exchange model i s capable of subsuming the r e s t r i c t e d exchange model, at least insofar as origins of exchange are concerned. Fourth, i t i s concluded that both the r e s t r i c t e d and generalized exchange models are linked i n one c r u c i a l way. Both models i m p l i c i t l y deal with the creation of s o c i a l s o l i d a r i t y , and the way i n which the models are rel a t e d through the concept of s o c i a l s o l i d a r i t y i s explained. i v TABLE OF CONTENTS Page CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 1 CHAPTER I I : ORIGINS OF EXCHANGE IN INDIVIDUALIST THEORY 12 CHAPTER I I I : ORIGINS OF EXCHANGE IN COLLECTIVIST THEORY 46 CHAPTER IV: CONCLUSIONS 82 BIBLIOGRAPHY 101 V ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS In my f i n a l year at the University of B r i t i s h Columbia, I had the good fortune of meeting and studying with Dr. Walter Nord. To say that the i n t e l l e c t u a l stimulation and warm encouragement he provided inspired this thesis and proved a turning point i n my l i f e i s somewhat of an understatement. Only an appreciation of Walter Nord's modesty as an academic and as a f r i e n d keeps me from more fulsome praise. I am also indebted to Dr. Vance M i t c h e l l and Dr. Craig Pinder for their patience and support during the long process of completing this thesis. Several friends have provided both the i n s i g h t f u l c r i t i -cism and tolerant companionship so h e l p f u l over the past months. I would e s p e c i a l l y l i k e to thank Mr. T. P. Haridas, Dr. Richard Hardin, Dr. Stephen M i t c h e l l , Dr. Howard Schwartz, and Ms. Janice D i l l o n . To my patient t y p i s t , Ms. Pat Kauppinen, who knows this thesis perhaps better than anyone, many thanks f o r the many well made drafts. Chapter I INTRODUCTION This thesis i d e n t i f i e s and analyzes the various theo-r e t i c a l s t a r t i n g mechanisms, both i m p l i c i t and e x p l i c i t , which underpin the s o c i a l exchange process. The analysis of the origins of s o c i a l exchange w i l l focus on: (a) r e s t r i c t e d exchange: origins framed i n terms of psychological needs and r a t i o n a l economic motive and (b) generalized exchange: origins framed i n terms of the relationship between the in d i v i d u a l and the laws of the organized whole. Further, a new explanation of the origins of s o c i a l exchange, based upon the two major classes of st a r t i n g mechanisms posited by exi s t i n g theory, w i l l be proposed. The conceptual framework which w i l l be used can be sum-marized i n the following statements. (1) Social exchange theory i s d i f f e r e n t i a t e d into two main divisio n s : (a) i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c and (b) c o l -l e c t i v i s t i c . (2) I n d i v i d u a l i s t i c s o c i a l exchange i s characterized by r e s t r i c t e d (dyadic) int e r a c t i o n and mutual 1 2 r e c i p r o c i t y . C o l l e c t i v i s t i c s o c i a l exchange i s c h a r a c t e r i z e d by g e n e r a l i z e d i n t e r a c t i o n and u n i v o c a l r e c i p r o c i t y . (3) R e s t r i c t e d exchange and mutual r e c i p r o c i t y focus on the nature of i n d i v i d u a l i n t e r a c t i o n and ex-change, and do not t h e o r e t i c a l l y r e q u i r e the assumption of a s o c i a l r e a l i t y independent of the i n d i v i d u a l . G e n e r a l i z e d exchange and u n i v o c a l r e c i p r o c i t y focus on exchange o c c u r r i n g i n a m a t r i x of s o c i a l t r u s t which e x i s t s p r i o r to s p e c i f i c a c t s of s o c i a l exchange. T h i s m a t r i x of t r u s t i s one aspect of a s o c i a l l y c o n s t r u c t e d r e a l i t y which i s independent of any gi v e n i n d i v i d u a l and which i s seen to be or g a n i z e d a c c o r d i n g to laws of i t s own. In other words, the assumption i s made of a s o c i a l f a c t which i s t h e o r e t i c a l l y t r e a t e d as a t h i n g (e.g., Durkheim, 1938, p. 14). S o c i a l exchange theory i n g e n e r a l encompasses two types of exchange: r e s t r i c t e d exchange and g e n e r a l i z e d exchange. R e s t r i c t e d exchange may be d e f i n e d as that which " i n c l u d e s any system which e f f e c t i v e l y or f u n c t i o n a l l y d i v i d e s the group i n t o p a i r s o f exchange u n i t s so that f o r any one p a i r X-Y there i s a r e c i p r o c a l ' ' " r e l a t i o n s h i p " ( L e v i - S t r a u s s , 1969, p. 146). Before proceeding, the use of the term r e c i p r o c i t y should be 3 E k e h ( 1 9 7 4 , p . 51) n o t e s t h a t t h e r e i s a d i s t i n c t i o n t o b e made b e t w e e n w h a t h e c a l l s e x c l u s i v e r e s t r i c t e d e x c h a n g e a n d i n c l u s i v e r e s t r i c t e d e x c h a n g e . I n e x c l u s i v e r e s t r i c t e d e x c h a n g e t h e a c t o r s h a v e n o o t h e r s o c i a l p a r t n e r s , i . e . , t h e y a r e i s o l a t e d d y a d i c s o c i a l e x c h a n g e r e l a t i o n s h i p s . U n d e r i n c l u s i v e r e s t r i c t e d e x c h a n g e " t h e r e s t r i c t e d e x c h a n g e p a r t -n e r s a r e i m p l i c a t e d i n a l a r g e r w h o l e a n d h e n c e t h e r e e x i s t s t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f c h a n g e o f p a r t n e r s " ( E k e h , 1 9 7 4 , p . 5 1 ) . I n r e s t r i c t e d e x c h a n g e t h e t w o p a r t i e s t o t h e s o c i a l e x c h a n g e t r a n s a c t i o n b e n e f i t e a c h o t h e r d i r e c t l y a n d do n o t g i v e t o a n y o t h e r p a r t y . G i v e n f o u r p e r s o n s t h e n , r e s t r i c t e d e x c h a n g e w o u l d o p e r a t e i n p a i r s : A - B , C - D , A - C , B - D , A - D , B - C . G e n e r a l i z e d e x c h a n g e , t o q u o t e E k e h ( 1 9 7 4 , p . 52 ) " o p e r -a t e s o n t h e p r i n c i p l e o f w h a t L e v i - S t r a u s s c a l l s u n i v o c a l F o o t n o t e c o n t i n u e d f r o m p r e v i o u s p a g e : c l a r i f i e d . P a r a l l e l t o t h e d u a l i t y o f r e s t r i c t e d a n d g e n e r -a l i z e d e x c h a n g e t h e r e e x i s t d u a l m e a n i n g s f o r r e c i p r o c i t y a s w e l l . A s u s e d b y G o u l d n e r ( 1 9 5 9 , 1 9 6 0 ) , Homans ( 1 9 6 1 , 1 9 7 4 ) a n d B l a u ( 1 9 6 4 ) , r e c i p r o c i t y r e f e r s t o t h e m u t u a l r e i n f o r c e -m e n t b y two p a r t i e s o f e a c h o t h e r ' s a c t i o n s . G o u l d n e r ( 1 9 6 0 ) h a s p o s i t e d a n o r m o f r e c i p r o c i t y w h i c h g o v e r n s s u c h r e i n f o r c e -m e n t i n t h e r e s t r i c t e d e x c h a n g e s i t u a t i o n . I n L e v i - S t r a u s s 1 ( 1 9 6 9 ) t h e o r y t h e p r i n c i p l e o f r e c i p r o c i t y t a k e s o n a b r o a d e r m e a n i n g i n t h a t t h e r e i s a p o s i t e d o b l i g a t i o n t o r e c i p r o c a t e a g i v e n a c t i o n , n o t n e c e s s a r i l y b y d i r e c t l y r e w a r d i n g t h e e x -c h a n g e p a r t n e r f r o m whom a b e n e f i t c ame , b u t b y r e w a r d i n g a n o t h e r s o c i a l a c t o r i m p l i c a t e d i n t h e g e n e r a l s o c i a l m a t r i x o f w h i c h t h e g i v e r a n d r e c e i v e r a r e a p a r t . T h e t e r m m u t u a l  r e c i p r o c i t y s h a l l b e u s e d i n s p e a k i n g o f e x c h a n g e s i t u a t i o n s i n v o l v i n g two i n d i v i d u a l s o n l y ( o r d y a d s ) , w h i l e t h e t e r m u n i - v o c a l r e c i p r o c i t y s h a l l b e u s e d i n s p e a k i n g o f e x c h a n g e s i t u a -t i o n s i n v o l v i n g a m i n i m u m o f t h r e e a c t o r s a n d w h e r e t h e s e a c t o r s r e w a r d o n e a n o t h e r i n d i r e c t l y . 4 re c i p r o c i t y . It occupies a unitary system of relationships i n that i t links a l l parties to the exchange together i n an integrated transaction i n which reciprocations are i n d i r e c t , not mutual". The unitary system referred to implies the oppo-s i t e of the pairing which characterizes r e s t r i c t e d exchange: any and a l l members of a s o c i a l system are implicated i n any given exchange i n this conception. As i n r e s t r i c t e d exchange, there are two basic types. The f i r s t , Ekeh (1974, p. 53) c a l l s chain generalized exchange, i n which individuals are so positioned that they operate a chain of univocal (one-way) reciprocations to each other, as i n the following: A-B-C-D-A. The second Ekeh c a l l s net generalized exchange, of which there are two sub-types. These are (1) Individual-focused where the group as a whole benefits each i n d i v i d u a l consecutively as follows: ABC-D; ABD-C; ACD-B; BCD-A, and (2) Group-focused where individuals successively give to the group as a unit and then gain back as part of the group from each of the unit mem-bers as follows: A-BCD; B-ACD; D-ABC (Ekeh, 1974, p. 54). Ekeh (1974, p. 54) notes generalized exchange places the generally accepted notion of r e c i p r o c i t y (Gouldner, 1960) under some s t r a i n . Gouldner (1960, p. 169) states " i t would seem that there can be stable patterns of r e c i p r o c i t y i n exchange only i n so far as each party has both rights and duties". Dis-covering such rights and duties i n generalized exchange becomes more d i f f i c u l t i n that the focus of these rights and duties must also rest on the group sui generis. Therefore, an old 5 q u e s t i o n a r i s e s : i s the group r e a l ? The i n d i v i d u a l i s t s take the p o s i t i o n t h a t as f a r as s o c i a l exchange goes, the group, i n an e x t e r n a l sense, i s not r e a l . However, i f net g e n e r a l i z e d exchange e x i s t s e m p i r i c a l l y , as has been documented by L e v i - S t r a u s s (1969), Malinowski (1926) and Mauss (1925), then the r e a l i t y of the group would be i m p l i e d a p r i o r i . In net g e n e r a l i z e d exchange, f o r example, i n d i v i d u a l A who bene-f i t s BCD together cannot press claims a g a i n s t B, C, D, f o r separate r e t u r n s , but o n l y (BCD) together (Ekeh, 1974, p. 54). In the case of c h a i n g e n e r a l i z e d exchange, the s i t u a t i o n i s more s u b t l e and without l o g i c a l s o l u t i o n . As the o p e r a t i o n of exchange w i t h i n the A-B-C-D s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n i s much l e s s o b v i o u s l y u n i t a r y to each i n d i v i d u a l , why does t h i s type of exchange f u n c t i o n ? L e v i - S t r a u s s (1969, p. 265) proposes that both types, c h a i n and net, operate under what he c a l l s a law of extended c r e d i t , or more s u c c i n c t l y u n i v o c a l r e c i p r o c i t y , which i s d i s t i n g u i s h e d from mutual r e c i p r o c i t y . In a gener-a l i z e d exchange s i t u a t i o n "the r e c e i p t of a b e n e f i t by any one p a r t y i s regarded as a c r e d i t to t h a t p a r t y by a l l other p a r t i e s and t h e r e f o r e h i s r e c i p r o c a t i o n i s regarded as a c r e d i t to a l l of them" (Ekeh, 1974, p. 55). A major i m p l i c a t i o n of t h i s type of reasoning i s that g e n e r a l i z e d exchange systems r e q u i r e and are based on the concepts of t r u s t and s o l i d a r i t y . As p r e v i o u s l y s t a t e d , the o r i g i n s of s o c i a l exchange are framed i n terms of p s y c h o l o g i c a l needs and economic r a t i o n a l i t y i n i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c theory, and i n terms of the s t r u c t u r a l -6 f u n c t i o n a l requirements of s o c i a l r e a l i t y s u i ge n e r i s by the c o l l e c t i v i s t t h e o r i s t s . The dimensions of t h i s d u a l i t y , which a r i s e from a comprehensive review of the l i t e r a t u r e , determine the o r g a n i z a t i o n o f the t h e s i s . Thus Chapter Two i s devoted to a d i s c u s s i o n o f the i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c a l l y o r i e n t e d o r i g i n s proposed by Homans, Blau, Thibaut and K e l l e y , Coleman, Emerson and Foa, or at l e a s t i m p l i c i t i n t h e i r f o r m u l a t i o n s . Chapter Three w i l l examine the c o l l e c t i v i s t i c o r i g i n s p o s i t e d by L e v i -S t r a u s s , Malinowski,and Mauss. Chapter Four summarizes the two d i s t i n c t t h e o r e t i c a l c l a s s e s o f o r i g i n a t i n g mechanisms. More im p o r t a n t l y , Chapter Four proposes and d i s c u s s e s two new hypotheses which suggest a r e s o l u t i o n of the d u a l i t y between c l a s s e s of o r i g i n s now e x i s t i n g i n the l i t e r a t u r e of s o c i a l exchange theory. The o r i g i n s of s o c i a l exchange are, at t h i s p o i n t i n the development of s o c i a l exchange theory, framed to an overwhelm-i n g degree i n terms of the i n d i v i d u a l i s t o r i e n t a t i o n . The review of the s o c i a l exchange l i t e r a t u r e w i l l show th a t the best known, most o f t e n quoted t h e o r i s t s are g e n e r a l l y from North America and proceed, almost e x c l u s i v e l y , from an i n d i v i d u a l -a l i s t i c view p o i n t . The o r i g i n s o f s o c i a l exchange then, would appear to a n y o n e approaching the f i e l d to be c o n t a i n e d i n one or two concepts, or p o s s i b l y some combination of both. These two concepts are (1) p s y c h o l o g i c a l needs, and (2) r a t i o n a l economic motives. The task of t h i s t h e s i s i s to i s o l a t e the assumptions r e g a r d i n g o r i g i n s of s o c i a l exchange which have been used by 7 s o c i a l exchange t h e o r i s t s i n g e n e r a l , then to analyze and c a t e g o r i z e these assumptions r e g a r d i n g s t a r t i n g mechanisms, and f i n a l l y , to a s s e r t whether the extant c a t e g o r i e s of assumptions are i r r e c o n c i l a b l e or whether there i s an under-l y i n g u n i t y between them. The u n i f y i n g concept which w i l l be used i s s o c i a l s o l i d a r i t y . I t w i l l be argued t h a t the c r e a t i o n of s o c i a l s o l i d a r i t y may be accounted f o r by combin-i n g both c l a s s e s of t h e o r e t i c a l o r i g i n s . I t w i l l be demon-s t r a t e d t h at the use of e i t h e r c l a s s alone i s inadequate, and that each c l a s s of o r i g i n s complements the o t h e r i n a c c o u n t i n g f o r the c r e a t i o n of s o c i a l s o l i d a r i t y . T h i s d i s c u s s i o n i s con-t a i n e d i n the c o n c l u d i n g chapter. I t w i l l be shown here that the i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c view i s s u f f i c i e n t unto i t s e l f , and indeed i s supported by a g r e a t d e a l of d i r e c t l y and i n d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d r e s e a r c h . However, i t s g r e a t s t r e n g t h , which i s a s o p h i s t i c a t e d understanding of s o c i a l exchange i n dyadic form, i . e . , r e s t r i c t e d exchange, i s a l s o i t s g r e a t weakness. For the i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c o r i e n t a t i o n i s unable to deal w i t h o r i g i n s of s o c i a l exchange beyond the p u r e l y a d d i -t i v e complexity of groups of dyads i n s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n . The proponents of the c o l l e c t i v i s t view, on the other hand, take the p o s i t i o n that s o c i a l exchange cannot be f u l l y under-stood u s i n g the dyadic f o r m u l a t i o n of r e s t r i c t e d exchange alone. When the dyadic f o r m u l a t i o n i s extended to the understanding of groups or s o c i e t i e s , i t leads to the c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n of s o c i e t i e s as aggregates. Aggregates of m u l t i p l e dyadic p a i r s 8 form the elements of the composite which i s then c a l l e d the group. A c o l l e c t i v i s t i c view regards the group as a whole, which has a s o c i a l structure independent of the p a r t i c u l a r elements which compose i t . As Piaget (1968, pp. 6-7) has pointed out, i t i s important to understand ... the.fundamental contrast between struc-tures and aggregates, the former being wholes, the l a t t e r composites formed of elements that are independent of the complexes into which they enter. To i n s i s t on t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n i s not to deny that structures have elements, but the elements of a structure are subordi-nated to laws, and i t i s i n terms of these laws that the structure qua whole or system i s defined. Moreover, the laws governing a structure's composition are not reducible to cumulative one by one association of i t s ele-ments (as i n the case of aggregates): they confer on the whole as such o v e r - a l l proper-ti e s d i s t i n c t from properties of i t s elements. This contrast i s a f a m i l i a r one i n systems theory, which makes a d i s t i n c t i o n between studying the elements of a whole or system, and studying the system i t s e l f . Bertalanffy, one of the founders of modern systems theory, has stated (1969, pp. 58-60) the c l a s s i c a l mechanistic view of science is now inadequate i n the psychological and s o c i a l sciences because the problems that they now face are no longer ones of 'pro-cess laws' such as Newton's laws or the laws of electrodynamics but rather they are faced with 'problems of organized complexity.' The c o l l e c t i v i s t i c approach to origins of s o c i a l exchange requires that origins, i n part, be a r t i c u l a t e d i n terms of a s o c i a l structure which i s independent of the individuals (ele-ments) of which i t i s composed. This i s not an i r r e s o l v a b l e 9 paradox, f o r the a r t i c u l a t i o n r e f e r r e d to i s , a t l e a s t par-t i a l l y , framed i n m a c r o - s o c i a l terms. To r e f e r once again to Durkheim (1938, p. 14} the c o l l e c t i v i s t i c approach does indeed t r e a t s o c i a l f a c t s , a ggregative p a t t e r n s , and con-s t r u c t e d s o c i a l r e a l i t i e s as t h i n g s . They are c o g n i t i v e ( r e f e r r i n g to the i n d i v i d u a l ) and s t r u c t u r a l ( r e f e r r i n g to the observer) o b j e c t s which have a f a c t i c i t y i n s o f a r as they r e p r e s e n t r e g u l a r i t i e s not observable i n i n d i v i d u a l s o c i a l a c t o r s , and which may be d e f i n e d as ...every way of a c t i n g , f i x e d or not, capable of e x e r c i s i n g on the i n d i v i d u a l an e x t e r n a l c o n s t r a i n t ; or again, every way o f a c t i n g which i s g e n e r a l through-out a given s o c i e t y , w h i l e at the same time e x i s t i n g i n i t s own r i g h t indepen-dent o f i t s i n d i v i d u a l m a n i f e s t a t i o n s (Durkheim, 1938, p. 13). While one may q u a r r e l w i t h the p a r t i c u l a r form of h i s d e f i n i t i o n , or w i t h aspects of i t , the g e n e r a l conception seems c l e a r enough. As d e f i n e d here, the s o c i a l f a c t , e x t e r n a l and independent from i n d i v i d u a l s o c i a l a c t o r s , i s a c o g n i t i v e s t r u c t u r e . As such i t has an o n t o l o g i c a l r e a l i t y of i t s own, even though i t i s both h e l d by and manifested through i n d i -v i d u a l s o c i a l a c t o r s . The t h e o r e t i c a l theme which, i t i s hoped, w i l l become ev i d e n t as the c r i t i c a l review c o n t a i n e d i n t h i s t h e s i s proceeds, i s that a p a r t i c u l a r s o c i a l f a c t , i . e . , s o c i a l s o l i d a r i t y , i s both a c a u s a l f a c t o r and a m a n i f e s t a t i o n of both the types of s o c i a l exchange which have been r e f e r r e d to e a r l i e r , i . e . , r e s t r i c t e d and g e n e r a l i z e d . A n a l y s i s cannot b e g i n w i t h the i n d i v i d u a l i n the context of g e n e r a l i z e d exchange because 10 an i n d i v i d u a l i s onl y one element i n the s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e . H i s a c t i o n w i t h i n i t i s bound by the s p a t i a l and temporal r e s t r i c t i o n s i m p l i c i t i n h i s c o g n i t i v e s t r u c t u r e of the s o c i a l f a c t . But n e i t h e r can the i n d i v i d u a l be ignored, f o r i f he i s then the elemental u n i t s , the ac t s and c o g n i t i o n s which com-pose the s t r u c t u r e , w i l l have been assumed away. The c o l l e c -t i v i s t s propose to d e a l w i t h the o r i g i n s of s o c i a l exchange on two l e v e l s . The f i r s t are the "laws of or g a n i z e d complexity" which govern the a c t i o n o f a whole or system, of which we have g i v e n an example, i . e . , the norm of r e c i p r o c i t y ; second, the f u n c t i o n of the i n d i v i d u a l as the composite element of the system, whose p s y c h o l o g i c a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s p r o v i d e the m a t r i x out of which, c o n s c i o u s l y or u n c o n s c i o u s l y , the d i v e r s e e m p i r i c a l s o c i a l r e a l i t i e s are made manifest. The i n d i v i d u a l i s t s , w h i l e f o c u s i n g t h e i r a t t e n t i o n on the process of r e s t r i c t e d exchange, a l s o are a d d r e s s i n g the i s s u e o f s o c i a l p a t t e r n s which, at l e a s t i n the sense i m p l i e d here, c o n s t r a i n and inform the p a r t i e s to any exchange.. I t w i l l be argued i n the f o l l o w i n g chapters t h a t although the twin conceptions of r e s t r i c t e d and g e n e r a l i z e d s o c i a l exchange appear to d i f f e r i n a c a t e g o r i c a l sense, they are i n f a c t aspects of a d i a -l e c t i c a l r e l a t i o n which both causes and manifests a s i n g l e s o c i a l f a c t : the f a c t o f the s o l i d a r i t y of s o c i a l groups. Fromm (1944, p. 380) o f f e r s a s u c c i n c t statement which charac-t e r i z e s the sense i n which the o r i g i n s o f s o c i a l exchange w i l l be developed i n the argument to f o l l o w . To paraphrase, 11 origins of s o c i a l exchange have to derive from an individual's desire (based on psychological cha r a c t e r i s t i c s ) for what i s objectively necessary (based on the s t r u c t u r a l laws which characterize the s o c i a l system as a whole) for them to do. This thesis s h a l l develop the p o s i t i o n that s o c i a l exchange, in both of i t s meanings, describes a d i a l e c t i c a l r e l a t i o n , one synthesis of which i s the s o c i a l fact of s o l i d a r i t y . Further, the c a u s a l f a c t o r s o f the " d e s i r e " o f the i n d i v i d u a l and the functional requirements of the c o l l e c t i v i t y may be accounted for i n a conception of s o c i a l exchange which treats r e s t r i c t e d and generalized s o c i a l exchange as being i n a d i a l e c t i c a l r e l a -tion, the dynamics of this d i a l e c t i c producing varying degrees and q u a l i t i e s of s o l i d a r i t y . Chapter I I ORIGINS OF EXCHANGE IN INDIVIDUALIST THEORY As s t a t e d i n the i n t r o d u c t i o n , t h i s chapter undertakes two t a s k s . F i r s t , i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c a l l y o r i e n t e d s o c i a l ex-change theory i s reviewed and i t s e x c l u s i v e emphasis on r e s t r i c t e d exchange i s documented. Second, i t i s shown that dyadic form as the i n t e r a c t i o n paradigm, which charac-t e r i z e s i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c s o c i a l exchange theory, has meant th a t i t s e x p l a n a t i o n s of o r i g i n s of i n t e r a c t i o n are framed i n terms which r e l a t e to i n d i v i d u a l a c t o r s alone. A review o f the s o c i a l exchange l i t e r a t u r e i n d i c a t e s that i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c s o c i a l exchange t h e o r i s t s r e l y e x c l u s i v e l y on i n d i v i d u a l p s y c h o l o g i c a l needs and r a t i o n a l economic motives to account f o r o r i g i n s o f exchange. In a rec e n t review, a l e a d i n g i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c exchange t h e o r i s t (Emerson, 1976, p. 337) notes t h a t the fundamental a n a l y t i c concepts o f s o c i a l exchange are s t i l l , i n h i s view, concepts o f reward, r e i n f o r c e -ment, u t i l i t y , c o s t , p r o f i t , p a y o f f , t r a n s a c t i o n , etc."'" T h i s i s not to say that o t h e r o r i g i n s are i n f a c t i n c a p a b l e of being conceived o f i n i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c a l l y o r i e n t e d a n a l y s i s . A l t r u i s m i s a good example of an attempt a t framing an a l t e r -n a t i v e o r i g i n which has r e c e i v e d some a t t e n t i o n from i n d i -v i d u a l i s t s i n s o c i a l exchange theory. However, although Berkowitz (1972, pp. 64-65) s t a t e s that a l t r u i s m i s not the r a r e s p e c i e s i m p l i e d by i n d i v i d u a l i s t t h e o r i s t s , i t does seem accurate to say that o r i g i n s other than p s y c h o l o g i c a l need 12 1 3 The l i t e r a t u r e reviewed for this study included the major works of the better known i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c s o c i a l ex-change theorists--Homans ( 1 9 5 5 , 1 9 5 8 , 1 9 6 1 , 1 9 7 4 ) , Blau ( 1 9 6 4 , 1 9 6 8 ) , Thibaut and Kelley ( 1 9 6 1 ) , Coleman ( 1 9 6 6 ) , Emerson ( 1 9 7 2 ) and Foa ( 1 9 7 1 ) . The two tasks outlined at the beginning of this chapter s h a l l be accomplished i n the following way. F i r s t , evidence that i n d i v i d u a l i s t theorists base their analysis on the dyadic model of s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n w i l l be presented. Second, i t w i l l be demonstrated, using relevant material from the works of each author, that, concomitant with the adoption of the dyadic model of s o c i a l interaction, i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c s o c i a l exchange theory posits that interaction originates from either psychological need, economic motive or some combination of the two. Before proceeding, i t should be pointed out that while the terms " i n d i v i d u a l i s t " and " c o l l e c t i v i s t " are used here to categorize both exchange theorists and their theories, this terminology i s not current within the l i t e r a t u r e of s o c i a l exchange. Rather, the terminology has been adapted from Ekeh ( 1 9 7 4 ) with the hope that i t s use as a c l a s s i f i c a t i o n device would enable one of the main arguments of this thesis to go forward. S p e c i f i c a l l y , this argument proceeds from the hypo-thesis that s o c i a l exchange theory i s divided into two main classes, each of which deals with d i f f e r i n g s o c i a l phenomena,-Footnote continued from previous page: and r a t i o n a l economic motive are not generally accepted i n i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c s o c i a l exchange theory. 14 wh i l e u s i n g s i m i l a r a n a l y t i c concepts. Hence t h i s chapter and Chapter Three are devoted to d e s c r i b i n g and t e s t i n g the "h y p o t h e s i s " t h a t each s o c i a l exchange theory so c l a s s i f i e d indeed should be, a c c o r d i n g to the c r i t e r i a which have been o u t l i n e d i n Chapter One. To b r i e f l y review these c r i t e r i a , i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c s o c i a l exchange theory i s c h a r a c t e r i z e d by (1) dyadic s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n (2) mutual r e c i p r o c i t y (3) absence of r e f e r e n c e to any s u p r a - i n d i v i d u a l s o c i a l e n t i t y , w h i l e c o l l e c t i v i s t i c s o c i a l exchange theory i s c h a r a c t e r i z e d by (1) g e n e r a l i z e d s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n : i . e . , not l e s s than three s o c i a l a c t o r s (2) u n i v o c a l r e c i p r o c i t y (3) the assumption of a s u p r a - i n d i v i d u a l s o c i a l e n t i t y , however p a r t i c u l a r l y d e f i n e d . I t w i l l not be assumed that any p a r t i c u l a r t h e o r i s t or theory must t o t a l l y meet these c r i t e r i a , but that the s u b s t a n t i v e body of any theory w i l l tend to meet one set of c r i t e r i a much more than the other. Hence, any giv e n theory may w e l l i n c l u d e some aspect of i n d i v i d u a l i s t (as d e f i n e d above) theory but be overwhelmingly framed a c c o r d i n g to the c r i t e r i a of c o l l e c t i -v i s t i c theory or v i c e v e r s a . (A) C l a s s i f i c a t i o n of I n d i v i d u a l i s t i c S o c i a l Exchange Th e o r i e s The use of the dyad as the model of i n t e r a c t i o n i n i n d i -15 v i d u a l i s t s o c i a l e x c h a n g e t h e o r y i s a t t h e r o o t o f t h e w o r k o f t h e b e s t k n o w n e x c h a n g e t h e o r i s t , G e o r g e C . H o m a n s . " S o c i a l B e h a v i o r : I t s E l e m e n t a r y F o r m s " ( 1 9 6 1 , r e v i s e d 1 9 7 4 ) , g e n e r a l l y c o n s i d e r e d t o b e H o m a n s ' p r i m e c o n t r i b u t i o n t o s o c i a l e x c h a n g e t h e o r y , w a s , h o w e v e r , p r e c e d e d b y two o t h e r w o r k s w h i c h d e a l t w i t h s o c i a l e x c h a n g e . T h e s e a r e " S o c i a l B e h a v i o r as E x c h a n g e " , p u b l i s h e d i n t h e A m e r i c a n J o u r n a l o f  S o c i o l o g y , 1 9 5 8 , a n d " M a r r i a g e , A u t h o r i t y , a n d F i n a l C a u s e s ; A S t u d y o f U n i l a t e r a l C r o s s C o u s i n M a r r i a g e " ( 1 9 5 5 ) . I t i s i n t h e l a t t e r , r a r e l y q u o t e d , s h o r t b o o k t h a t Homans m a k e s h i s f i r s t a n d s e m i n a l c o n t r i b u t i o n t o s o c i a l e x c h a n g e t h e o r y , i n h i s c r i t i q u e o f L e v i - S t r a u s s ' ( 1 9 4 9 ) e x c h a n g e t h e o r y . T h e c e n t r a l a s s u m p t i o n t h a t Homans a t t a c k e d was L e v i - S t r a u s s ' a r g u m e n t t h a t e x p l a n a t i o n s b a s e d o n g e n e r a l i z e d e x c h a n g e a r e s u p e r i o r t o t h o s e b a s e d o n r e s t r i c t e d ( d y a d i c ) e x c h a n g e . Homans w a s h i g h l y c r i t i c a l o f t h e c o n c e p t o f g e n e r a l i z e d e x -c h a n g e , a s i s i l l u s t r a t e d b y t h e f o l l o w i n g q u o t e : I t m i g h t b e a r g u e d t h a t i n e x t e n d i n g t h e i d e a o f e x c h a n g e t h i s w a y [ t o g e n e r a l i z e d e x c h a n g e ] , L e v i - S t r a u s s h a s t h i n n e d t h e m e a n i n g o u t o f i t . ( H o m a n s , 1 9 5 5 , p . 7) I n t h i s b o o k , Homans w e n t o n t o e x p l i c a t e , i n p o l e m i c a l c o n t r a d i s t i n c t i o n t o L e v i - S t r a u s s ' e x c h a n g e t h e o r y , a n i n d i -v i d u a l s e l f - i n t e r e s t t h e o r y . He a r g u e d t h a t a n " e f f i c i e n t c a u s e " ( H o m a n s , 1 9 5 5 , p . 17) t h e o r y , a s o p p o s e d t o a f i n a l c a u s e o r f u n c t i o n a l , t h e o r y p r o v i d e d a m o r e g e n e r a l a n d p a r -s i m o n i o u s e x p l a n a t i o n . H o m a n s ' v i e w o f a n i n d i v i d u a l s e l f -i n t e r e s t t h e o r y i s a s f o l l o w s : 16 An i n s t i t u t i o n i s what i t i s because i t r e s u l t s from the d r i v e s , or meets the immediate needs of i n d i v i d u a l s , or sub-groups, w i t h i n a s o c i e t y . I t s f u n c t i o n i s to meet these needs. We may c a l l t h i s an i n d i v i d u a l s e l f - i n t e r e s t theory, i f we remember that i n t e r e s t s may be other than economic. (Homans, 1955, p. 15) Homans' " e f f i c i e n t cause" i n the p a r t i c u l a r anthropolo-g i c a l q u e s t i o n d e a l t w i t h i n the (1955) book i s i n terms of an e g o - a l t e r (dyadic) r e l a t i o n s h i p i n v o l v i n g one i n d i v i d u a l c o n s t r a i n e d by the " a u t h o r i t y " (Homans, 1955, p. 21) of another i n d i v i d u a l . T h i s a u t h o r i t y i s b u i l t up from e g o - a l t e r i n t e r a c t i o n i n which the i n d i v i d u a l i n a u t h o r i t y has been granted the r e s p e c t w i t h which he then e x t r a c t s compliance i n the form o f adherence to the a u t h o r i t y f i g u r e ' s wishes. In proposing the " e f f i c i e n t cause" as the t h e o r e t i c a l l y s u p e r i o r one, Homans argued that L e v i - S t r a u s s ' f u n c t i o n a l , or " f i n a l cause" theory i s e s s e n t i a l l y redundant. T h i s p o s i t i o n i s per-haps bes t i l l u s t r a t e d by Homans (1955) where he s t a t e s "we do not argue that L e v i - S t r a u s s 1 theory i s wrong, onl y t h a t i t i s [given the i n d i v i d u a l s e l f - i n t e r e s t theory] now unnecessary" (Homans, 1955, p. 59). From the above i t i s i n f e r r e d that Homans was i n i t i a l l y p roposing a s o c i a l exchange theory that i n c l u d e s i n d i v i d u a l s o n l y i n i t s f o r m u l a t i o n , and s p e c i f i c a l l y excludes any h i g h e r order a b s t r a c t i o n , i . e . , s o c i e t y , as explanatory. In " S o c i a l Behavior: I t s Elementary Forms" (1961, 1974) Homans more f u l l y e l a b o r a t e s h i s s o c i a l exchange theory. The premises o f t h i s exchange theory may be summed up by two 17 c r u c i a l assumptions: f i r s t , s o c i a l behavior i n v o l v i n g two ac t o r s (animals or humans) i s t o t a l l y -r e d u c i b l e to the behavior of i n d i v i d u a l a c t o r s ; and second, animal behavior i s g e n e r a l i z a b l e to human behavior. (Ekeh, 1974, p. 101) Homans says i t thus: We are l e s s i n t e r e s t e d i n i n d i v i d u a l behavior than i n s o c i a l behavior, or true exchange, where the a c t i v i t y of each of two animals r e i n f o r c e s (or punishes) the behavior of the other. Yet we h o l d that we need no new p r o p o s i t i o n s to d e s c r i b e and e x p l a i n the s o c i a l . With s o c i a l b ehavior n o t h i n g unique emerges to be analyzed i n i t s own terms. Rather, from the laws of i n d i v i d u a l behavior f o l -low the laws of s o c i a l behavior. (Homans, 1961, pp. 30-31) In "Marriage, A u t h o r i t y and F i n a l Causes" (1955) Homans charged that the c o l l e c t i v i s t i c o r i e n t a t i o n to s o c i a l theory had " t h i n n e d the meaning" out of exchange. In response, h i s more f u l l y developed theory e m p h a t i c a l l y s t a t e s that elemen-t a r y s o c i a l behaviour i s the key to s o c i a l exchange. His exchange theory i s l i m i t e d to r e s t r i c t e d exchange between two i n d i v i d u a l s i n both time and space: " S o c i a l b e h a v i o r i s e l e -mentary i n the sense that the two men are i n f a c e - t o - f a c e con-t a c t , and each i s rewarding the other d i r e c t l y and immediately" (Homans, 1961, p. 4). The f i v e e xplanatory p r o p o s i t i o n s which form the l o g i c a l f o u n d a t i o n of h i s theory o f s o c i a l exchange are a l l l i m i t e d to two-person i n t e r a c t i o n . The f i r s t f o u r p r o p o s i t i o n s r e f e r to an i n d i v i d u a l ' s (person's) responses on the b a s i s o f h i s past experiences' to another i n d i v i d u a l ' s 18 (other's) s t i m u l i . The response o f Person i s e n t i r e l y d e t e r -mined by c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f what Person gets from the t r a n s a c -t i o n . The p r o p o s i t i o n s are: From Romans, 1961, pp. 53-55: (1) I f i n the pas t the occur-rence of a p a r t i c u l a r s timulus s i t u a t i o n has been the o c c a s i o n on which a man's a c t i v i t y has been rewarded, then the more s i m i l a r the prese n t stimulus s i t u a t i o n i s to the past one, the more l i k e l y he i s to emit the a c t i v i t y now. From Homans, 1974, pp. 16-39: (2) I f i n the pas t the occur-rence of a p a r t i c u l a r s t i m u l u s , or set of s t i m u l i has been the o c c a s i o n on which a person's a c t i o n has been rewarded, then the more s i m i l a r the p r e s e n t s t i m u l i are to the past ones, the more l i k e l y the person i s to perform the a c t i o n , or some s i m i l a r a c t i o n , now. (2) The more o f t e n w i t h i n a given p e r i o d of time a man's a c t i v i t y rewards the a c t i v i t y o f another, the more o f t e n the other w i l l emit the a c t i v i t y . (1) For a l l a c t i o n s taken by a l l persons, the more o f t e n a p a r t i c u l a r a c t i o n of a person i s rewarded, the more l i k e l y the person i s to perform that a c t i o n . (3) The more v a l u a b l e to a man a u n i t of a c t i v i t y another gives him, the more o f t e n he w i l l emit a c t i v i t y rewarded by the a c t i v i t y o f the other. (3) The more v a l u a b l e to a per-son i s the r e s u l t o f h i s a c t i o n , the more l i k e l y he i s to perform the a c t i o n . (4) The more o f t e n a man has i n the r e c e n t p a s t r e c e i v e d a rewarding a c t i v i t y from another, the l e s s v a l u a b l e any f u r t h e r u n i t of t h a t a c t i v i t y becomes to him. (4) The more o f t e n i n the re c e n t past a person has r e c e i v e d a p a r t i c u l a r reward, the l e s s v a l u a b l e any f u r t h e r u n i t of that reward becomes f o r him. (5) The more to a man's d i s -advantage the r u l e of d i s t r i -b u t i v e j u s t i c e f a i l s of r e a -l i z a t i o n , the more l i k e l y he i s to d i s p l a y the emotional behaviour we c a l l anger. (5a) When a person's a c t i o n does not r e c e i v e the reward he expected, or r e c e i v e s punish-ment he d i d not expect, he w i l l be angry; he becomes more l i k e l y to perform a g g r e s s i v e behavior, and the r e s u l t s o f such behavior become more v a l u a b l e to him. 19 From Homans, 1974, pp. 16-39: (5b) When a person's a c t i o n r e c e i v e s the r e w a r d he e x p e c t e d , e s p e c i a l l y a greater reward than he expected, or does not r e c e i v e punishment he expected, he w i l l be pleased; he becomes more l i k e l y to per-form approving behavior, and the r e s u l t s of such behavior become more val u a b l e to him. Over the course of the t h i r t e e n years separating the o r i g i n a l and r e v i s e d formulations, Homans has made changes i n the b a s i c p r o p o s i t i o n a l base underlying h i s s o c i a l exchange theory. While the (1961) p r o p o s i t i o n s one, two, three and four remain e s s e n t i a l l y the same i n substance, p r o p o s i t i o n f i v e has changed considerably. F i r s t , the status of the r u l e of d i s t r i b u t i v e j u s t i c e as a p r o p o s i t i o n has been a l t e r e d from axiomatic to more problematic. Homans includes i n the 1974 r e v i s i o n an extended d i s c u s s i o n (pp. 248-268) on the r u l e of d i s t r i b u t i v e j u s t i c e , the conclusion of which i s summarized i n the f o l l o w i n g statement: R e l a t i v e d e p r i v a t i o n or d i s t r i b u t i v e i n j u s -t i c e occurs when a person does not get the amount of reward he expected to get i n com-par i s o n w i t h the reward some other person gets. (Homans, 1974, p. 268) But the r u l e i s no longer considered as a p r o p o s i t i o n . Second, p r o p o s i t i o n s (5a) and (5b), as r e v i s e d , more d i r e c t l y i n c l u d e expectations and o p e r a t i o n a l d e f i n i t i o n s of the outcomes of 20 the c o n f i r m a t i o n or d i s c o n f i r m a t i o n of such e x p e c t a t i o n s , i . e . , approving and a g g r e s s i v e behavior. A c l o s e examination of a l l the o r i g i n a l and r e v i s e d p r o p o s i t i o n s may a l l o w a d i f -f e r ence i n emphasis i n that i n s e v e r a l cases (e.g., p r o p o s i -t i o n s three and f o u r ) , a s p e c i f i c other person i s no longer mentioned. I t i s argued here that the changes i n language and content made i n the p r o p o s i t i o n s have not, however, a l t e r e d the s u b s t a n t i v e s t r u c t u r e i m p l i e d by Homans: social-exchange s t i l l occurs, f o r him, d i r e c t l y between two i n d i v i d u a l s , con-tiguous i n both space and time. I t i s important to note that the evidence Homans o f f e r s to v a l i d a t e the theory i s s t a t e d i n dyadic terms. I n t e r e s t -i n g l y , t h i s evidence was taken from r e s e a r c h conducted i n con-n e c t i o n w i t h m u l t i - p e r s o n i n t e r a c t i o n s , i . e . , Bales and B o r g a t t a (1955). In reviewing Homans1 i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the above experimental r e s u l t s . Ekeh (1974, pp. 132-138) s t a t e s t h a t Homans co n s i d e r e d the m u l t i - p e r s o n i n t e r a c t i o n s i n the group as i f they were i n i s o l a t e d dyadic r e l a t i o n s h i p . Ekeh s t a t e s that "[Homans] i s wrong because, t r u e to h i s s o c i a l exchange theory, he i s redu c i n g m u l t i - p e r s o n i n t e r a c t i o n s to m u l t i p l e dyadic r e l a t i o n s h i p s under the assumption t h a t a l l s o c i a l ex-change processes must be d i r e c t , not i n d i r e c t " (Ekeh, 1974, pp. 134-145). Ekeh may w e l l be c o r r e c t i n h i s assessment, but the more important p o i n t i s to note what Homans assumes when i n t e r p r e t i n g the Bales and Borgatta (1955) data. These assump-t i o n s are most c l e a r l y expressed i n both h i s opening and c l o s i n g 21 statements i n Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms (1961, pp. 2, 378): s o c i a l exchange must be considered to be d i r e c t interaction, rather than i n d i r e c t , and i t must be face-to-face in t e r a c t i o n i n which each actor rewards (or punishes) immediately and i s always conducted between two individuals or i n multiples of two. The s o c i a l exchange theory of Peter Blau (1964, 1968) i s also i n d i v i d u a l i s t and r e l i e s heavily on dyadic in t e r a c t i o n . Following the e a r l i e r d e f i n i t i o n s of various types of ex-change, i . e . , r e s t r i c t e d vs. generalized, i t i s suggested that Blau views s o c i a l exchange as i n c l u s i v e r e s t r i c t e d exchange. However, unlike Homans, Blau notes that dyadic i n t e r a c t i o n does not take place i n i s o l a t i o n because individuals do have a l t e r -native partners with whom they may interact. Even the analysis of s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n i n dyads, therefore, must not treat these pairs as i f they existed i n i s o l a t i o n from other s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s . The mutual attrac-tion of two persons and the exchange be-tween them, for example, are affected by the alternative opportunities of each, with the r e s u l t that competitive processes arise that include wider c i r c l e s and that comple-ment and modify the processes of exchange and a t t r a c t i o n i n this pair and other pairs. (Blau, 1964, pp. 31-32) A close reading of Blau would indicate that he views s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n as the a c t i v i t y of pairs, each element of which i s , by degrees, free to partake of exchange with alternative partners. The basic concepts which Blau develops i n Exchange and Power i n Social L i f e (1964) r e f l e c t the assumption that s o c i a l exchange occurs between individuals i n a dyadic r e l a t i o n . 22 Thus Chapter One (1964, pp. 12-32) s t a t e s that b a s i c s o c i a l exchange processes are conceived of as a c t i v i t i e s o c c u r r i n g between two i n d i v i d u a l s , or " a s s o c i a t e s " . S o c i a l a t t r a c t i o n i s d i s c u s s e d i n terms of two i n d i v i d u a l s e s t a b l i s h i n g s o c i a l a s s o c i a t i o n on the b a s i s of the rewards each can p r o v i d e the other (Blau, 1964, p. 20) B l a u goes on to l a y out a s e r i e s of b a s i c concepts to be used i n h i s subsequently f u l l y d e v e l -oped d i s c u s s i o n of s o c i a l exchange processes, and i t i s empha-s i z e d that a l l of these b a s i c concepts are grounded i n the assumption of dyadic, d i r e c t i n t e r a c t i o n . For example, B l a u p o s i t s two d i f f e r e n t types of rewarding r e l a t i o n s h i p s , i n t r i n -s i c and e x t r i n s i c , which can occur. These types are a l s o p r esented i n terms of two i n d i v i d u a l s and the a l t e r n a t i v e p o s s i b i l i t i e s a v a i l a b l e through other i n d i v i d u a l s (Blau, 1964, p. 21). The d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n of power, a b a s i c process w i t h which Blau i s i n t i m a t e l y concerned, i s i n t u r n developed out of the s o c i a l exchange between two i n d i v i d u a l s , dependent upon the d i f f e r i n g number and q u a l i t y of a l t e r n a t i v e s each exchange p a r t n e r has (Blau, 1964, pp. 32-33). Blau i n c l u d e s i n h i s e x p o s i t i o n of b a s i c processes an acknowledgement of i n d i r e c t exchange, and t h i s process i s framed i n dyadic, r e s t r i c t e d exchange terms as w e l l . In the 1964 book, Chapter Ten (pp. 253-232) e n t i t l e d "Mediating Values i n Complex S t r u c t u r e s " i s almost e n t i r e l y devoted to e x p l i c a t -i n g Blau's view of i n d i r e c t exchange between i n d i v i d u a l s i n l a r g e r groups. However, Blau's concept of i n d i r e c t exchange 23 i s q u i t e d i f f e r e n t from t h a t p o s t u l a t e d by the c o l l e c t i v i s t i c t h e o r i s t s . Blau views exchange a t t h i s l a r g e group ( i n d i r e c t ) l e v e l as a hi g h e r form of exchange. By c o n t r a s t , L e v i - S t r a u s s and the c o l l e c t i v i s t s c h o o l see i n d i r e c t exchange as an e l e -mentary u n i t i n t h e i r understanding of s o c i a l p r o c e s s . I n d i r e c t exchange, i n the view of Blau, a l s o d i f f e r s from that of the c o l l e c t i v i s t s i n t h a t i t does not i n v o l v e i n d i v i d u a l s i n g e n e r a l i z e d , u n i v o c a l l y r e c i p r o c a t e d , exchange. Rather, s o c i a l l y mediated and i n t e r n a l i z e d norms stand i n , as i t were, f o r i n d i v i d u a l s i n Blau's i n d i r e c t exchange. S o c i a l norms s u b s t i t u t e i n d i r e c t exchange f o r d i r e c t exchange between i n d i v i d u a l s . The members of the group r e c e i v e group approval i n exchange f o r conformity and the c o n t r i b u t i o n to the group t h e i r con-f o r m i t y to s o c i a l e x p e c t a t i o n makes.. Conformity to normative standards o f t e n r e q u i r e s that group members r e f r a i n from engaging i n c e r t a i n d i r e c t exchange t r a n s -a c t i o n s w i t h o u t s i d e r s or among themselves . . . . Conformity f r e q u e n t l y e n t a i l s s a c r i f i c i n g rewards t h a t c o u l d be a t t a i n e d through d i r e c t exchange, but i t b r i n g s other rewards i n d i r e c t l y . (Blau, 1964, p. 259) Blau l i m i t s the p a r t p l a y e d by i n d i v i d u a l s i n t h i s c o n c e p t i o n of i n d i r e c t exchange. In h i s view, i t seems that as the com-p l e x i t y of the web of s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n s i n c r e a s e s , r e l a t i o n s are apt to become more impersonal. T h i s p o s s i b i l i t y a r i s e s because B l a u p o s i t s the "replacement" of an i n d i v i d u a l ( i n the more complex s i t u a t i o n ) exchange p a r t n e r w i t h the media-t i o n of impers o n a l i z e d , a u t h o r i t a t i v e r u l e s . Thus the i n d i -v i d u a l i s s t i l l seen to be i n a dyadic r e l a t i o n , but i n t h i s 24 case i t i s a r e l a t i o n between an i n d i v i d u a l and a set of imposed r u l e s or norms. I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note such a r e l a t i o n would probably be expected to change somewhat i n i t s c o g n i t i v e and a f f e c t i v e processes, as e n t e r i n g an exchange w i t h a r u l e or s e t of r u l e s must, at the very l e a s t , d i f f e r i n some re g a r d from i n t e r a c t i o n w i t h another human being. However, s i n c e Blau (1964) d i d not attempt to de a l w i t h the i m p l i c a t i o n s of h i s n o t i o n of i n d i r e c t exchange v i s - a - v i s c o g n i t i v e and a f f e c t i v e processes, i t appears t h a t he i s most i n t e r e s t e d i n the s t r u c t u r a l or r e l a t i o n a l aspects of h i s concept. Blau (1964, p. 259) d i d , however, acknowledge something a k i n to what has been c a l l e d g e n e r a l i z e d exchange. He wrote: Exchange t r a n s a c t i o n s between the c o l l e c -t i v i t y and i t s i n d i v i d u a l members r e p l a c e some of the t r a n s a c t i o n s between i n d i -v i d u a l s as the r e s u l t o f conformity to normative o b l i g a t i o n s . There i s no d i r e c t  exchange of f a v o r s , but group norms assure t h a t each f r i e n d r e c e i v e s a s s i s t a n c e when he needs i t . (Blau, 1964, p. 259) Se v e r a l w r i t e r s have i n v e s t i g a t e d the q u e s t i o n of s o c i a l norms, the best known of whom i s Gouldner on r e c i p r o c i t y (1959, 1960). Others who have i n v e s t i g a t e d norms other than that of r e c i p r o c i t y are Krebs (1970), Berkowitz (1972), Aronson (1967), Zimbardo (1967), and Leeds (1969) some of whom have w r i t t e n reviews and others who have undertaken o r i g i n a l r e s e a r c h . The co n c l u s i o n s of these s c h o l a r s , when taken together, seem to i n d i c a t e t h a t l i t t l e unambiguously s u p p o r t i v e evidence i s a v a i l a b l e i n d i c a t i n g the e x i s t e n c e and f u n c t i o n a l i t y of s o c i a l norms other than t h a t r e g a r d i n g r e c i p r o c i t y . These same w r i t e r s 25 of course do acknowledge the development of g r o u p - s p e c i f i c norms i n given s i t u a t i o n s , and i t i s these kinds of norms which i t i s b e l i e v e d B l a u i s r e f e r r i n g t o . U t i l i z i n g t h i s n o t i o n of norms, Blau's conception of g e n e r a l i z e d exchange i s expanded (1964, pp. 260-263) by a s e r i e s of examples i n which i n d i v i d u a l s exchange w i t h an o r g a n i z e d c o l l e c t i v i t y i n r e t u r n f o r rewards s u p p l i e d by t h a t c o l l e c t i v i t y . There i s an obvious i n c o n s i s t e n c y between Blau's n o t i o n of g e n e r a l i z e d exchange, as i l l u s t r a t e d i n the above q u o t a t i o n and h i s o v e r a l l theory of s o c i a l exchange. A c c o r d i n g to Blau's own f o r m u l a t i o n of s o c i a l exchange per se, exchange must i n v o l v e at l e a s t two i n d i v i d u a l s i n d i r e c t i n t e r a c t i o n w i t h one another; i n t e r a c t i o n ceases when one i n d i v i d u a l d e s i s t s from rewarding the other ( p r o f i t a b l y ) (1964, p. 6). But, as i s evidenced by the second quote from page 259, Blau a l s o p o s i t s a form of exchange which does not conform to h i s own p r o p o s i -t i o n s , and f a i l s to p r o v i d e any t h e o r e t i c a l b r i d g e between those p r o p o s i t i o n s and h i s ad hoc n o t i o n of g e n e r a l i z e d ex-change. T h i s quote (p. 259), which r e f e r s to " t r a n s a c t i o n s between the c o l l e c t i v i t y and i t s i n d i v i d u a l members" a l s o r e f e r s to the l a c k of d i r e c t exchange which i s a d i r e c t l y im-p l i e d c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of c o l l e c t i v i t y / i n d i v i d u a l exchanges. Thus, i n c o n t r a s t i n g Blau's b a s i c f o r m u l a t i o n of s o c i a l exchange (1964, p. 6) which p o s i t s the n e c e s s i t y of the d i r e c t i n t e r -a c t i o n of two i n d i v i d u a l s , w i t h h i s d i s c u s s i o n of g e n e r a l i z e d exchange, i t appears u n c l e a r whether Blau i s c o n t i n u i n g to 26 adhere to a dyadic model, or has i n fact adopted a d i f f e r e n t mo de1. To b r i e f l y summarize the points made i n the discussion of Blau's adherence to the dyadic model of interaction: (1) Blau's s o c i a l exchange model admits to only one kind of interaction: immediate, face-to-face interaction. (2) Individuals do have alternative partners with whom they may elect to interact. (3) Indirect exchange, i n Blau's view, consists of the i n t e r a c t i o n of a given i n d i v i d u a l with a " s o c i a l norm", which i s not sub s t a n t i a l l y d i f -ferent from the interaction described i n (1). It can be inferred then, that despite Blau's reputation as somewhat of a compromiser between the i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c and c o l l e c t i v i s t i c orientations i n s o c i a l exchange theory (Ekeh, 1974, p. 167), Blau's theory of s o c i a l exchange i s decidedly i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c . Thibaut and Kelley (1959), in a manner similar to that of Homans and Blau, discuss s o c i a l exchange i n terms of the outcomes a r i s i n g from i t . These outcomes are the rewards received and costs incurred by each participant i n an i n t e r -action (Deutsch and Krauss, 1965, p. 116). In deciding whether or not a given exchange i s l i k e l y to be a t t r a c t i v e , Thibaut and Kelley posit that an in d i v i d u a l w i l l make two kinds of 27 comparisons. F i r s t , the i n d i v i d u a l evaluates the rewards and/ or costs of a given exchange a g a i n s t a g e n e r a l i z e d a d a p t a t i o n l e v e l of d e s i r e d stimulus or reward. Secondly, he e v a l u a t e s the rewards (and/or co s t s ) expected from a g i v e n exchange p a r t -ner a g a i n s t those a v a i l a b l e from a l t e r n a t i v e o p p o r t u n i t i e s . These comparison l e v e l s are, r e s p e c t i v e l y the CL and C L a l t (Thibaut and K e l l e y , 1959, pp. 80-100). The CL concept r e f e r s to e v a l u a t i o n of the reward/cost r a t i o w i t h r e g a r d to a pros-p e c t i v e exchange p a r t n e r , i . e . , i n an i s o l a t e d dyad. The C L a l t concept widens the exchange context to i n c l u d e , q u i t e r i g h t l y , a l t e r n a t i v e sources o f i n t e r a c t i o n but s t i l l i n dyadic form. In the l a t t e r case, Thibaut and K e l l e y seem to envisage a c h a i n of p o s s i b l y dyadic i n t e r a c t i o n s l i m i t e d only by the i n d i v i d u a l ' s a b s o l u t e number of a l t e r n a t i v e s . In c h a r a c t e r i z i n g s o c i a l exchange, Thibaut and K e l l e y use a m a t r i x which d e s c r i b e s the outcomes (net reward/cost b e n e f i t s ) of s a t i s f a c t i o n or d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n to each p a r t i c i p a n t i n the exchange i n q u a n t i t a t i v e terms. C l e a r l y , Thibaut and K e l l e y ' s view of s o c i a l exchange i s i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c and focused on i n c l u -s i v e r e s t r i c t e d exchange. They are e x p l i c i t about both a s p e c t s . Thibaut and K e l l e y (1959, pp. 5-6) s t a t e : Because the e x i s t e n c e of the group i s based s o l e l y on the p a r t i c i p a t i o n and s a t i s f a c t i o n of the i n d i v i d u a l s comprising i t , the group f u n c t i o n a l i s r n becomes an i n d i v i d u a l f u n c t i o n -a l i s m . Our b i a s on t h i s p o i n t i s apparent: we assume th a t i f we can achieve a c l e a r understanding of the dyad we can subsequently extend our 28 understanding to encompass the problems of l a r g e r and more complex s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s . Taking i n t o account the dyadic, i n d i v i d u a l focus of the comparison processes used by Thibaut and K e l l e y and t h e i r e x p l i c i t statement of t h e o r e t i c a l " b i a s " as g i v e n immediately above, i t seems f a i r to say that t h e i r theory of s o c i a l ex-change should be c l a s s i f i e d as i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c . Another c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n of s o c i a l exchange which appears to best be c a t e g o r i z e d as i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c i s that of Coleman (1964, 1966). Coleman's "theory of c o l l e c t i v e d e c i s i o n s " i s an attempt at r e c o n c i l i n g the p r i n c i p l e o f p u r p o s i v e a c t i o n (as r e p r e s e n t e d by maximization of i n d i v i d u a l u t i l i t y ) w i t h the r e a l i t i e s of implementing such a p r i n c i p l e i n a l a r g e c o l l e c -t i v e s i t u a t i o n developed out of the exchange paradigm. As Coleman (1964, p. 616) e x p l a i n s , exchange i n v o l v i n g o n l y two a c t o r s , A and B, w i l l occur when such an exchange i s b e n e f i c i a l to both. But i n the case where there i s a l a r g e number of a c t o r s A, B, C, D, . . . the c o n d i t i o n s f o r j o i n t exchange remain unique, i . e . , a l l agree that the proposed a c t i o n (ex-change) i s b e n e f i c i a l . Only under the most extreme c o n d i t i o n of consensus does a c t i o n s p r i n g spontaneously from the a c t o r s ' i n d i v i d u a l g o a l s . Under any other c o n d i t i o n , there i s no spontaneous a c t i o n , f o r at l e a s t one a c t o r p r e f e r s a d i f f e r e n t course of a c t i o n . (Coleman, 1966, p. 616) Thus, one may i n t e r p r e t Coleman's p o s i t i o n to mean that i n the case of i n d i v i d u a l a c t o r s , each w i l l spontaneously c a r r y out the a c t i o n w i t h the h i g h e s t u t i l i t y . Where the outcome of 29 an a c t i s , however, determined by two or more a c t o r s , then' although there may be some a c t i o n s where i t i s p o s s i b l e that a l l may agree, the l a r g e m a j o r i t y of a c t i o n s w i l l not be pre-f e r r e d by a l l , and the i n d i v i d u a l theory breaks down. Coleman (1966, p. 618) sees the problem as one of " l i n k i n g together i n d i v i d u a l p r e f e r e n c e s and c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n i n s o c i a l o r g a n i -z a t i o n . " Coleman views exchange as dyadic i n nature, but i n c l u s i v e , as h i s prime concern i s w i t h i n d i v i d u a l s , not i n i s o l a t i o n , but i n r e l a t i o n with, ( s e v e r a l ) o t h e r s . Out of t h i s dyadic r e l a t i o n a r i s e s the concept of power d i f f e r e n t i a l s (p. 621) between the v a r i o u s i n d i v i d u a l s . Power i s here d e f i n e d as "the a b i l i t y to o b t a i n the outcomes . . . i n a system of c o l l e c t i v e d e c i s i o n s . . . that w i l l g i v e him the h i g h e s t u t i l i t y " (p. 621). In the c o l l e c t i v e d e c i s i o n s i t u a t i o n an i n d i v i d u a l becomes powerful v i s - a - v i s the c o l l e c t i v i t y when he c o n t r o l s a c t i o n s and/or res o u r c e s which are v a l u a b l e ( i . e . , o f i n t e r e s t ) to others as w e l l as h i m s e l f . Coleman (1964, p. 622) p o s t u l a t e s that c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n ( i t s content and d i r e c t i o n ) w i l l be determined by a "simultaneous c a l i b r a t i o n of the v a l u e of d i f f e r e n t a c t i o n s and the power of d i f f e r e n t a c t o r s ' . I t i s argued here that the "simultaneous c a l i b r a -t i o n " r e f e r r e d to i s c h a r a c t e r i z e d by i n d i v i d u a l comparison of s o c i a l a c t o r s a g a i n s t one another i n a dyadic f a s h i o n , the a c t u a l r e l a t i o n s h i p between the i n d i v i d u a l s being one of ex-change. Hence, Coleman's concept of s o c i a l exchange may be c o n s i d e r e d as i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c . 30 Emerson's (1972) theory of s o c i a l exchange i s much more s i m i l a r to Homans' than any of the other above mentioned t h e o r i e s i n that Emerson's v e r s i o n of s o c i a l exchange theory i s based on the dyadic i n t e r a c t i o n paradigm as r e g u l a t e d by the p r i n c i p l e s of operant psychology. Indeed, as Ekeh (1974, p. 166) p o i n t s out, "Emerson seems to out-Homans Homans i n h i s f a i t h i n the a b i l i t y of operant psychology to perform the func-t i o n of the fountainhead of a l l b e h a v i o r a l s c i e n c e s . " In h i s (1972) work, Emerson goes d i r e c t l y to Skinner's operant be-h a v i o u r a l psychology f o r h i s concepts i n the d e r i v a t i o n of an ungrounded, l o g i c o - d e d u c t i v e s e r i e s of p r o p o s i t i o n s a l a Homans which d e s c r i b e s o c i a l exchange and leaves the r a t i o n a l economic aspect of Homans' theory completely untouched. The i n t e r e s t i n Emerson here r e s u l t s from h i s w e l l a r t i c u l a t e d approach to s o c i a l exchange developed from what he h i m s e l f c a l l s " t h i s skimpy b a s i s " (Emerson, 1972, p. 45). I t i s suggested that h i s base i s indeed skimpy, although the r e s u l t i n g f o r m u l a t i o n i s f a r from simple, i n that Emerson does "not presume to know the needs and motives of men" (1972, p. 45). He argues that knowledge of such needs adds noth i n g to h i s theory of exchange, e x c e p t i n g that t h e i r s a t i s f a c t i o n a c t s e x i s t e n t i a l l y as a r e i n f o r c e r upon i n d i v i d u a l s . Thus Emerson has chosen operant psychology be-cause "operant behavior is_ behavior w i t h i n a form of exchange process, otherwise c a l l e d feedback or r e i n f o r c e m e n t " (1972, p. 42). He f u r t h e r excludes the c o g n i t i v e concept of expec-t a t i o n from h i s f o r m u l a t i o n : hence, one may r u l e out any n o t i o n 31 of r a t i o n a l , i . e . , economic, motive as a p o s s i b l e o r i g i n of exchange i n t h i s theory. In Emerson's D e f i n i t i o n 1, an exchange r e l a t i o n i s d e f i n e d as " c o n s i s t i n g of a s e r i e s of t e m p o r a r i l y i n t e r s p e r s e d o p p o r t u n i t i e s , i n i t i a t i o n s , and t r a n s a c t i o n s " , i n which the f i r s t "evokes" or i s accompanied by the second, which, i n t u r n , "evokes" the t h i r d . An oppor-t u n i t y i s a stimulus s i t u a t i o n which co n t a i n s a p p r o p r i a t e d i s -c r i m i n a t i v e s t i m u l i f o r evoking an i n i t i a t i o n . An i n i t i a t i o n i s an operant response and a t r a n s a c t i o n i s a p o s i t i v e l y r e i n -f o r c e d i n i t i a t i o n (Emerson,.1972, p. 45). Emerson concludes h i s (1972) e x p o s i t i o n by n o t i n g t h a t operant p r i n c i p l e s are "nothing more than the study of c o n t i n g e n c i e s r e l a t i n g an organism, to i t s environment" (p. 87). One aspect of the "environment" c o n s i s t s i n the presence of another i n d i v i d u a l i n a dyadic r e l a t i o n . The f i n a l example of a concept of s o c i a l exchange which may be d e s c r i b e d as i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c t h a t of Foa (1971). H i s ".theory" of s o c i a l exchange does not f i t e a s i l y i n t o the c l a s s i f i c a t i o n o f i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c vs. c o l l e c t i v i s t i c because Foa's f o r m u l a t i o n i s concerned w i t h the nature of rewards, or " r e s o u r c e s " . Foa appears to conceive of s o c i a l exchange as b e i n g a mutually rewarding process (p. 346). However, he p o s i t s that there are s e v e r a l forms of exchange due to d i f f e r e n c e s i n the type of reward or " r e s o u r c e " b e i n g exchanged. Foa (1971, p. 347) i d e n t i f i e s s i x types: love, s t a t u s , i n f o r m a t i o n , money, goods, and s e r v i c e s . An i l l u s t r a t i o n of Foa's p o s i t i o n i s 32 found i n the following (Foa, 1971, p. 346): It matters a great deal from whom we receive love since i t s r e i n f o r c i n g effectiveness i s close l y t i e d to the stimulus person. Money, on the other hand, i s the least p a r t i c u l a r -i s t i c resource, since, of a l l resources, i t i s most l i k e l y to r e t a i n the same value re-gardless of the r e l a t i o n between, or charac-t e r i s t i c s of, the rei n f o r c i n g agent and recipient. Services and status are less p a r t i c u l a r i s t i c than goods or information. Foa, i t i s suggested, f a l l s into the i n d i v i d u a l i s t school as his exposition nowhere implies i n t e r a c t i o n outside of that provided by the dyad of stimulus (person A) - response (person B). To summarize b r i e f l y the discussion thus far, i t has been the object of the argument to c l a s s i f y certain theories of s o c i a l exchange as i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c , as opposed to c o l l e c t i -v i s t i c , using stated c r i t e r i a . Hence, for the purposes of this thesis, a s o c i a l exchange theory would be classed as i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c i f i t was characterized by (1) dyadic s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n (2) mutual r e c i p r o c i t y (3) the absence of reference to any supra-in d i v i d u a l s o c i a l entity. In the case of each of the theories examined thus far, i t has been argued that these c r i t e r i a indeed characterize them, and thus they may be l a b e l l e d i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c s o c i a l exchange theories. 33 (B) Theoretical Origins of Social Exchange i n I n d i v i d u a l i s t i c  Theory The second task of this chapter i s to demonstrate that, given the dyadic nature of i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c a l l y conceived s o c i a l exchange, the origins of such exchange must and do l i e i n : (a) i n d i v i d u a l psychological needs (b) r a t i o n a l economic motives. Homans stands out among other s o c i a l exchange theorists in attempting to combine both behavioural psychology and ele-mentary economics i n formulating a theory of s o c i a l exchange. In t h i s , then, he concomitantly employs both u t i l i t a r i a n and hedonistic motives as the originators of s o c i a l exchange i t -s e l f . The psychological meaning of hedonism, i n general, i s the seeking of pleasure and the avoidance of pain. I t i s , then, e n t i r e l y physical i n nature, without e x p l i c i t considera-tion of space and time constraints. U t i l i t a r i a n i s m , i n eco-nomics, refers to an i n d i v i d u a l r a t i o n a l l y c a l c u l a t i n g his course of action i n terms of gains and loss, with the aim of maximizing the difference between the two. Thus, hedonism represents the process of enjoying oneself here and now, while u t i l i t a r i a n i s m represents the p r o f i t i n g from s o c i a l interaction, perhaps immediately, but also over time. Homans' usage of these two concepts as explanatory i s i l l u s t r a t e d i n the following: B r i e f l y , behavioral psychology and elemen-tary economics envisage human behavior as a function of i t s payoff: i n amount and kind i t depends on the amount and kind of 34 reward and punishment i t f e t c h e s . . . . Thus the g e n e r a l set of p r o p o s i t i o n s I s h a l l use envisages s o c i a l b ehavior as an exchange of a c t i v i t y , t a n g i b l e or i n t a n g i b l e , and more or l e s s rewarding or c o s t l y between two persons. (Homans, 1961, p. 13) Homans (1961, pp. 12-13) s t a t e s t h a t the p r o p o s i t i o n s of b e h a v i o r a l psychology and elementary economics can be " s t r e t c h e d " and i n so doing mesh together to "form a s i n g l e s e t " . U n f o r t u n a t e l y , he does not e x p l i c i t l y concern h i m s e l f w i t h p r o v i n g that t h i s i s so, and l e s s a m b i t i o u s l y proposes to "suggest what the s i n g l e set might be". (1961, p. 13) Homans1 attempt to " s t r e t c h " over the a d m i t t e d l y (by Homans, 1961, p. 12) l a r g e gap between hedonism and u t i l i -t a r i a n i s m as o r i g i n a t o r s of s o c i a l exchange i s n e c e s s i t a t e d by the f a c t t h at n e i t h e r b e h a v i o u r a l p s y c h o l o g i c a l p r o p o s i -t i o n s nor those of elementary economics alone are s u f f i c i e n t to e x p l a i n s o c i a l exchange i n human beings. The p r o p o s i t i o n s of b e h a v i o u r a l psychology are based on the study of behaviour i n animals i n very c o n s t r a i n e d environments, whereas economics s t u d i e s symbolic behaviour i n man. As Ekeh (1974) p o i n t e d out, meshing these two s e t s of p r o p o s i t i o n s i s not a simple matter. Ekeh (1974, p. 107) suggests t h a t what i s i n n a t e l y human i s "non-natural" and that t h i s subset of human a c t i v i t y i s i n the realm of symbolic behaviour. A c l o s e r e a d i n g of Homans i n d i c a t e s that one should agree w i t h Ekeh's (1974, p. 113) statement t h a t Homans, i n combining the two s e t s of p r o p o s i t i o n s , i s arguing that i t i s p o s s i b l e to upgrade the 35 nonsymbolic to the symbolic, to g e n e r a l i z e from c o n d i t i o n e d behaviour i n animals to symbolic behaviour i n humans. F o l l o w i n g Homans' view o f s o c i a l exchange then "as an exchange of a c t i v i t y . . . more or l e s s rewarding or c o s t l y " (1961, p. 13), i t i s suggested that he employs a combination of two independent sets of m o t i v e s f (1) Sensual or somatic s t i m u l i which are immediately g r a t i f y i n g or pu n i s h i n g , and (2) symbolic behaviour i n which present c o n d i t i o n s may be con-s i d e r e d r a t i o n a l l y a g a i n s t p r e v i o u s or a n t i c i p a t e d c o n d i t i o n s . Homans, as has been noted, does not c o n s i d e r t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n to be damaging to h i s theory. Rather, he proposes t h a t the two sets o f p r o p o s i t i o n s , i n t e r a c t i n g w i t h one another i n a " s i n g l e meshed s e t , " are i n f a c t compatible, and by t h e i r com-b i n a t i o n , do e x p l a i n s o c i a l exchange behaviour. I f i t i s granted that c o n d i t i o n e d behaviour, as i t i s observed i n animals, i s d e s c r i p t i v e of a great deal of human a c t i v i t y and at the same time symbolic (e.g., economic) beha-v i o u r i s assumed to be u n i q u e l y human (and not g e n e r a l i z a b l e from animal b e h a v i o u r ) , then Homans' attempt at meshing the two sets o f p r o p o s i t i o n s i s q u i t e understandable. In order to cover the range of human a c t i v i t y , Homans, to h i s gre a t c r e d i t has r e c o g n i z e d that both p s y c h o l o g i c a l needs and economic motives must be p o s i t e d , r a t h e r than e i t h e r alone. Whether, i n f a c t , the combination o f the two sets of p r o p o s i t i o n s i n t o one i s compatible seems s t i l l an open q u e s t i o n . Both Deutsch and Krauss (1965) and Ekeh (1974) b e l i e v e that the c o m p a t i b i l i 36 Homans assumes has not been demonstrated. The p o i n t at i s s u e here i s not whether Homans has adequately demonstrated a p l a u s i b l e l i n k a g e between c o n d i t i o n a l and s y m b o l i c a l l y charac-t e r i z e d behaviour, but i s th a t Homans p o s i t s both h e d o n i s t i c -a l l y d e f i n e d p s y c h o l o g i c a l need and s y m b o l i c a l l y r e p r e s e n t e d economic motive as o r i g i n a t o r s of s o c i a l exchange a c t i v i t y . I t was noted e a r l i e r t h a t B l a u has enjoyed the r e p u t a t i o n of being a compromiser between the i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c and c o l l e c -t i v i s t i c o r i e n t a t i o n s i n s o c i a l exchange theory. I f t h i s i s indeed so, then does he r e l y on p s y c h o l o g i c a l needs and the p o s t u l a t e s of elementary economics to pro v i d e the t h e o r e t i c a l o r i g i n s of s o c i a l exchange? The answer to t h i s i s not c l e a r cut because a t f i r s t glance Blau seems to employ p s y c h o l o g i c a l r o o t s of behaviour i n h i s assumptions of the o r i g i n s o f exchange. The b a s i c s o c i a l processes t h a t govern a s s o c i a t i o n s among men have t h e i r r o o t s i n p r i m i t i v e p s y c h o l o g i c a l processes, such as those u n d e r l y i n g the f e e l i n g s o f a t t r a c t i o n between i n d i v i d u a l s and t h e i r d e s i r e s f o r v a r i o u s k i n d s o f rewards. These psycholo-g i c a l tendencies are p r i m i t i v e o n l y i n r e s p e c t to our s u b j e c t matter, t h a t i s , they are taken as giv e n without f u r t h e r e n q u i r y i n t o the m o t i v a t i n g f o r c e s t h a t pro-duce them, f o r our concern i s w i t h the s o c i a l f o r c e s that emanate from them. (Blau, 1964, p. 19) An i n d i v i d u a l i s a t t r a c t e d to another i f he expects a s s o c i a t i n g w i t h him to be i n some way rewarding f o r h i m s e l f , and h i s i n t e r e s t i n the expected reward draws him to the other. The p s y c h o l o g i c a l needs and d i s p o s i -t i o n s of i n d i v i d u a l s determine which r e -wards are p a r t i c u l a r l y s a l i e n t f o r them and thus to whom they w i l l be a t t r a c t e d . (Blau, 1964, p. 20) 37 Mutual a t t r a c t i o n prompts people to estab-l i s h an a s s o c i a t i o n , and the rewards they p r o v i d e each other i n the course of t h e i r s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n , u n l e s s t h e i r expecta-t i o n s are d i s a p p o i n t e d , m a i n t a i n t h e i r mutual a t t r a c t i o n and the c o n t i n u i n g assoc-i a t i o n . Processes of s o c i a l a t t r a c t i o n , t h e r e f o r e , l e a d to processes of s o c i a l exchange. (Blau, 1964, p. 21) These s e c t i o n s are c r u c i a l to understanding Blau's p o s i -t i o n on the o r i g i n s of exchange f o r s e v e r a l reasons. He does indeed seem to b e . r e f e r r i n g to p s y c h o l o g i c a l needs as o r i g i -n a t i n g f a c t o r s . However, two t h i n g s happen to them i n Blau's treatment. F i r s t , needs are l a b e l l e d as p s y c h o l o g i c a l i n terms of t h e i r d e r i v a t i o n . However, i n d i s c u s s i n g these p s y c h o l o g i c a l needs Blau tends to t r e a t them l e s s as c a u s a l f a c t o r s i n o r i g i n a t i n g exchange, than as the ground i n which r a t i o n a l economic motive i s based. T h i s i s apparent from the c o n c e n t r a t i o n on the n o t i o n of e x p e c t a t i o n which Blau e x h i b i t s . Put s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t l y , the impetus f o r i n t e r a c t i o n seems to be i n the c a l c u l a t e d g a i n any s o c i a l a c t o r expects to o b t a i n from a g i v e n s o c i a l exchange a c t r a t h e r than the s t r i v i n g f o r the s a t i s f a c t i o n of a g i v e n p s y c h o l o g i c a l need. Second, i n the passage from page 20, B l a u p o s i t s t h at needs are s a l i e n t o n l y i n the d e t e r m i n a t i o n of r e l e v a n t reward, w h i l e emphasizing the processes o f c a l c u l a t i o n and e x p e c t a t i o n as the r e a l causes of exchange behaviour. A more a c c u r a t e d e s c r i p t i o n of Blau's c o n c e p t i o n would be to say that p s y c h o l o g i c a l needs and d i s p o s i t i o n s p r o v i d e the context of " r e s o u r c e s " from which i n d i v i d u a l s s e l e c t i v e l y c a l c u l a t e the v a r i o u s expected reward/ 38 cost benefits of engaging i n s o c i a l i nteraction. Social a t t r a c t i o n i s the force that induces human beings to establish s o c i a l associa-tions on the i r own i n i t i a t i v e and to expand the scope of their associations once they have been formed . . . . An i n d i v i d u a l i s attracted to another i f he expects associ-ating with him to be i n some way rewarding for himself, and his inter e s t i n the expect-ed s o c i a l rewards draws him to the other. (Blau, 1964, p. 20) It must be noted that there has been a transformation here, i n which s o c i a l a t t r a c t i o n , which was e a r l i e r treated as a primitive psychological tendency, i s spoken of now i n terms of rewards, and expected ones at that. I t i s the expected nature of the rewards which d i f f e r e n t i a t e s Blau's approach from those u t i l i z i n g h e d o n i s t i c a l l y defined rewards. For i f we say that expected, rather than immediate and sensual, rewards are c r u c i a l to the o r i g i n of s o c i a l exchange then we are at once speaking of a the o r e t i c a l scheme where rewards are treated as the subject of the r a t i o n a l c a l c u l a t i o n of gain. From this p o s i t i o n one has then begun to describe very closely what i s generally referred to as economic motive. It i s not being argued that "primary" rewards are not subject to such calcula-tion: rather, i n Blau's view, rewards of any description merely provide the basis for cal c u l a t i o n and expectation, with that expectation of reward actually providing the causal impetus for s o c i a l exchange behaviour. Psychological needs enter into the formulation because they determine the nature and value of that which i s rewarding for the individuals themselves. F i n a l l y , i t i s noted that Blau considers r a t i o n a l economic 39 o r i g i n s important enough to exclude any other from c o n s i d e r a -t i o n i n the context of h i s theory of s o c i a l exchange. S o c i a l exchange as here conceived i s l i m i t e d to a c t i o n s that are con t i n g e n t on rewarding r e a c t i o n s from others and t h a t cease when these expected r e a c t i o n s are not forthcoming. (Blau, 1964, p. 6) The b a s i c p r i n c i p l e u n d e r l y i n g marginal a n a l y s i s , and exchange g e n e r a l l y , i s that of e v e n t u a l l y d i m i n i s h i n g marginal u t i l i t y . (Blau, 1964, p. 169) Two c o n d i t i o n s must be met f o r b e h a v i o r . t o l e a d to s o c i a l exchange. I t must be o r i e n t e d towards ends that can only be achieved through i n t e r a c t i o n w i t h other persons, and i t must seek to adapt means to f u r t h e r the achievement of these ends . . . the r e c i p r o c a l exchange of e x t r i n s i c b e n e f i t s . (Blau, 1964, pp. 4-5) . . . many aspects o f s o c i a l l i f e do r e f l e c t an i n t e r e s t i n p r o f i t i n g from s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n , and these are the focus of the theory of s o c i a l exchange. (Blau, 1968, p. 452) On the b a s i s of these r e f e r e n c e s , i t i s argued here that i n Blau's theory o f s o c i a l exchange the c a l c u l a t e d e x p e c t a t i o n of g a i n , i . e . , r a t i o n a l economic motive, may be c o n s i d e r e d as the t h e o r e t i c a l o r i g i n of s o c i a l exchange. Turning to Thibaut and K e l l e y (1959), i t was demonstrated e a r l i e r t h a t they view s o c i a l exchange as t a k i n g p l a c e i n a r e s t r i c t e d , dyadic format. A c c o r d i n g to pre v i o u s r e a s o n i n g i t may be asked whether the o r i g i n s of s o c i a l exchange i n t h e i r theory l i e i n p s y c h o l o g i c a l needs or i n economic motives. I t i s suggested that Thibaut and K e l l e y ' s theory r e l i e s on eco-nomic motive alone f o r i t s o r i g i n s . T h i s i s so because " a t t r a c -t i o n " between two i n d i v i d u a l s , which Thibaut and K e l l e y s t a t e 40 i s r e q u i r e d both to i n i t i a t e and s u s t a i n an exchange, i s determined by two types of i n t e r p e r s o n a l comparison: the CL comparison and the C L a l t comparison. That the v a r i o u s com-pa r i s o n s are made i n terms of rewards which are t r e a t e d as symbolic and not somatic can be i n f e r r e d from the m a t r i x mechanism which c h a r a c t e r i z e s Thibaut and K e l l e y ' s s o c i a l exchange: The c e l l s of the m a t r i x r e p r e s e n t a l l p o s s i b l e events t h a t may occur i n the i n t e r -a c t i o n between A and B. (p. 13) The reward/cost v a l u e s i n the m a t r i x r e p r e -sent the outcomes each person would exper-ience f o r each of the m a n i f o l d i n t e r a c t i o n p o s s i b i l i t i e s . . . . The a c t u a l course of the i n t e r a c t i o n cannot be p r e d i c t e d s o l e l y from a knowledge of t h i s matrix. (p. 19) To summarize the main p o i n t s . . . the formation of a r e l a t i o n s h i p depends l a r g e l y on the (1) the m a t r i x of the p o s s i b l e out-comes of i n t e r a c t i o n (2) the process of e x p l o r i n g or sampl-in g the p o s s i b i l i t i e s ; and u l t i m a t e l y (3) whether or not the j o i n t l y exper-i e n c e d outcomes are above each member's C L a l t . (pp. 22-23) (from Thibaut and K e l l e y , 1959) These passages would seem to l e n d support to the n o t i o n that expected g a i n i s the motive behind s o c i a l exchange a c t i v i t y . The focus i s on events which may occur i n the f u t u r e , out of which event p o p u l a t i o n an exchange p a r t i c i p a n t chooses the one which i s both more v a l u a b l e to him and more 41 l i k e l y to occur g i v e n h i s s u b j e c t i v e p r o b a b i l i t y estimate. I t would appear that i t i s these f a c t o r s which cause an i n d i -v i d u a l to explore the m a t r i x of outcomes, r a t h e r than any c a u s a t i v e p r o p e r t y of the m a t r i x i t s e l f . Put s l i g h t l y d i f -f e r e n t l y , an i n d i v i d u a l decides whether or not to undertake a g i v e n a c t of s o c i a l exchange based on h i s c a l c u l a t i o n of expected b e n e f i t , both i n terms of v a l u e and l i k e l i h o o d , which i s a very adequate d e f i n i t i o n of economic motive. Coleman (1966) proceeded to d e f i n e a theory of c o l l e c t i v e d e c i s i o n s based on the exchange paradigm, and i n so doing u t i l i z e d a demonstrably dyadic framework i n which that exchange occurred. His concern was much more w i t h the r e s u l t s o f i n t e r -a c t i o n of ( l a r g e ) numbers of i n d i v i d u a l s i n v o l v i n g themselves i n a d e c i s i o n process, r a t h e r than on the o r i g i n s of the i n v o l v e -ment or i n t e r a c t i o n i t s e l f . I t i s suggested that Coleman assumes that i s i s a p o s i t e d "purposive a c t i o n p r i n c i p l e " (Coleman, 1966, p. 615) which o r i g i n a t e s exchange i n t e r a c t i o n , i . e . , the r a t i o n a l c a l c u l a t i o n of u t i l i t y , w i t h a c t i o n s being chosen which maximize s a i d u t i l i t y . Hence, i t i s f u r t h e r sug-gested t h a t Coleman's theory i s eminently i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c and r e l i e s on u t i l i t a r i a n economic m o t i v a t i o n to e x p l a i n the o r i g i n of s o c i a l exchange. Emerson (1972) o u t l i n e d an exchange theory based on the dyadic i n t e r a c t i o n paradigm as r e g u l a t e d by the p r i n c i p l e s of operant psychology. I t was p o i n t e d out e a r l i e r t h a t Emerson r e l i e d t o t a l l y on the p r i n c i p l e s of operant psychology i n 42 c o n s t r u c t i n g h i s s o c i a l exchange theory i n that he d i d not "presume to know the needs and motives of men" (Emerson, 1972, p. 45). One then can argue, as i s argued here, that Emerson may have d i s t a n c e d h i m s e l f i n the formal p r e s e n t a t i o n o f h i s theory from any concern w i t h p s y c h o l o g i c a l needs. However, i t i s f u r t h e r argued that, due to h i s u n a l l o y e d adoption of operant p r i n c i p l e s , i t seems c l e a r t hat the same o r i g i n s t hat have been noted i n Homans' theory may a l s o be p o s i t e d to be o p e r a t i v e i n Emerson's, l e a v i n g a s i d e Homans' n o t i o n s of eco-nomic r a t i o n a l i t y . I t i s not h e l d here that operant c o n d i t i o n i n g theory focuses on needs f o r that would be a t t r i b u t i n g to i t a charac-t e r i s t i c which i s e x p l i c i t l y denied by most operant t h e o r i s t s . However, i f s p e c i f i c need i s something which need not be ex-p l i c i t l y d e f i n e d i n operant c o n d i t i o n i n g theory, the u n d e r l y i n g assumption of a need-behaviour l i n k a g e i s s t i l l r e q u i r e d ; otherwise behaviour a v a i l a b l e f o r operant c o n d i t i o n i n g would not occur. Many needs may be imputed to any giv e n a c t , and operant c o n d i t i o n i n g i n e f f e c t d e f i n e s a f o c a l need by the nature of the p r o v i d e d reward. I t i s p r e c i s e l y because operant behaviour i s behaviour i n an exchange form, that Emerson can, as he sees i t , d i s r e g a r d the assumptions of content i n exchange behaviour, those assumptions being the u n d e r l y i n g complex of p s y c h o l o g i c a l needs p o s i t e d by b e h a v i o u r a l psychology. Hence, the p o s i t i o n of t h i s paper i s that Emerson's (1972) s o c i a l 43 exchange theory p o s i t s p s y c h o l o g i c a l needs and rewards as o r i g i n a t i n g f a c t o r s . The previous d i s c u s s i o n o f Foa's (1971) s o c i a l exchange framework p o i n t e d up the f a c t t h a t Foa regarded s o c i a l i n t e r -a c t i o n as a mutu a l l y rewarding process. F u r t h e r , Foa h e l d that the type o f reward was most s a l i e n t f o r understanding the nature and dynamic process of exchange r e l a t i o n s . His taxonomy o f s i x types o f rewards (Foa, 1971, p. 347) i . e . , love, s t a t u s , i n f o r m a t i o n , money, goods, and s e r v i c e s , are f o r the most p a r t s o c i a l l y mediated rewards: i t i s the a t t r a c t i o n response o f any given i n d i v i d u a l to any one of these rewards when presented by a second person which Foa p o s i t s as the o r i g i n of exchange r e l a t i o n s . I t i s not c l e a r that Foa d i s -t i n g u i s h e s i n any meaningful way between s o m a t i c a l l y r e l a t e d and symbolic reward, and indeed i t i s argued here t h a t Foa regards such a d i s t i n c t i o n as i n c o n s e q u e n t i a l . Foa b e l i e v e s that the source of the reward and the r e s u l t a n t i n t e r a c t i o n of the source and the reward i t s e l f are the c r i t i c a l f a c t o r s i n the i n s t i g a t i o n and maintenance of exchange. But, i t i s s t r o n g l y suggested here that Foa u l t i m a t e l y r e s t s h i s n o t i o n of the o r i g i n of exchange on the a t t r a c t i v e power of reward per se, i r r e s p e c t i v e of i t s type or source. Summary Thi s chapter has made two g e n e r a l arguments, u s i n g as data the p r o p o s i t i o n s , statements and arguments of i n d i v i d u a l i s t 44 s o c i a l e x c h a n g e t h e o r i s t s . ( 1 ) I n d i v i d u a l i s t s o c i a l e x c h a n g e t h e o r y u t i l i z e s t h e r e s t r i c t e d e x c h a n g e p a r a d i g m a l o n e , u s i n g i n t e r a c t i o n i n d y a d s a s t h e m o d e l o f e x c h a n g e r e l a t i o n s . ( 2 ) G i v e n t h e d y a d i c m o d e l o f i n t e r a c t i o n , o r i g i n s o f i n t e r a c t i o n i n i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c s o c i a l e x c h a n g e t h e o r y m u s t b e , a n d i n f a c t a r e , f r a m e d i n t e r m s o f ( a ) i n d i v i d u a l p s y c h o l o g i c a l n e e d s (b ) r a t i o n a l e c o n o m i c m o t i v e s . I n c o n c l u d i n g t h e s e two a r g u m e n t s , i t i s a r g u e d t h a t , g i v e n t h e e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h e w o r k s o f H o m a n s , B l a u , T h i b a u t a n d K e l l e y , C o l e m a n , E m e r s o n , a n d F o a , t h e i r t h e o r i e s do i n d e e d u t i l i z e t h e d y a d i c m o d e l o f i n t e r a c t i o n a n d may b e c l a s s e d as i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c . A s r e g a r d s t h e t h e o r e t i c a l o r i g i n s o f s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n w i t h i n t h e d y a d i c m o d e l o f e x c h a n g e , t h e r e i s a d i c h o t o m y o f o r i g i n s u t i l i z e d , a s r e p r e s e n t e d b y t h e f o l l o w i n g c h a r t . P s y c h o l o g i c a l N e e d / R e w a r d R a t i o n a l E c o n o m i c M o t i v e Homans ( 1 9 6 1 , 1974 ) B l a u ( 1 9 6 4 ) E m e r s o n ( 1 9 7 2 ) T h i b a u t a n d K e l l e y ( 1 9 5 9 ) F o a ( 1 9 7 1 ) C o l e m a n ( 1 9 6 6 ) T h e a b o v e d i c h o t o m y o f o r i g i n a t i n g m e c h a n i s m s i s c l e a r l y s u p p o r t e d b y d a t a f r o m t h e w o r k s o f t h e t h e o r i s t s t h e m s e l v e s , a n d i t i s b e l i e v e d t h a t t h e r e s u l t s o f t h e l i t e r a t u r e r e v i e w 45 show that, fortunately, no theory examined presented an i n -surmountable c l a s s i f i c a t i o n problem. Chapter III ORIGINS OF EXCHANGE IN COLLECTIVIST THEORY In Chapter II, the origins of s o c i a l exchange as con-ceived by the i n d i v i d u a l i s t theorists were examined. The conclusions following this examination were: (1) the i n d i v i d u a l i s t s employ the dyadic format of interpersonal interaction. (2) Out of this concentration on dyadic i n t e r a c t i o n , the necessity of origins of s o c i a l exchange developed s o l e l y from a consideration of the indi v i d u a l , i . e . , his psychological needs and/or his hope of gain, was demonstrated. In this chapter i t w i l l be shown that the c o l l e c t i v i s t i c theorists have put forward a concept of generalized exchange and r e c i p r o c i t y which i s capable of subsuming, without a l t e r -ing the formulations of, i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c , r e s t r i c t e d exchange. This capacity i s important i n that i t permits the p o s s i b i l i t y of combining otherwise disparate elements into a s i m p l i f i e d paradigm explaining the origins of s o c i a l exchange. In addition, i t follows that c o l l e c t i v i s t i c origins of s o c i a l exchange may l i e outside those postulated by indivi d u -alism. That i s , origins under a generalized exchange paradigm 46 47 may be s t a t e d i n terms of something other than what may be d i s c o v e r e d w i t h i n the r e l a t i o n s between two i n d i v i d u a l s at a p o i n t i n time. Relevant to t h i s d i s c o v e r y i s the work of L e v i - S t r a u s s (1969), Mauss (1954), and M a l i n o w s k i (1922, 1926) concerning s o c i a l exchange and e s p e c i a l l y the o r i g i n s o f s o c i a l exchange. A l s o examined i s the important work of Gouldner (1959, 1960) on the norm of r e c i p r o c i t y . L e v i - S t r a u s s (1969), i n the p o l e m i c a l t r a d i t i o n which has h i s t o r i c a l l y c h a r a c t e r i z e d the development of s o c i a l exchange theory, has s t a t e d that i t was h i s unhappiness w i t h dyadic, r e s t r i c t e d f o r m u l a t i o n s of s o c i a l exchange which l e d to h i s development of g e n e r a l i z e d exchange. A formal study o f the n o t i o n of exchange, such as s o c i o l o g i s t s have so f a r employed, has shown us t h a t i t d i d not succeed i n embracing the f a c t s i n t h e i r i n t e g r i t y . Rather than d e c i d i n g to l e n d a s t e r i l e d i s c o n t i n u i t y to phenomena which are, a f t e r a l l , of the same type, we have p r e f e r r e d to seek a wider and m o d i f i e d conception of exchange i n an attempt to a r r i v e a t a sys-tematic typology and an exhaustive explana-t i o n . [A r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of a n t h r o p o l o g i -c a l data] taken from the c l a s s i c r e g i o n of r e s t r i c t e d exchange . . . imposed upon us, as i t were, the n o t i o n of g e n e r a l i z e d ex-change. ( L e v i - S t r a u s s , 1969, p. 220) Malinowski, w r i t i n g e a r l i e r (1922), a l s o developed a n o t i o n o f c i r c u l a r or g e n e r a l i z e d exchange. His work i s remarkable es-p e c i a l l y i n that he developed from grounded data an e x p l a n a t i o n of exchange behaviour i n which g e n e r a l i z e d and r e s t r i c t e d ex-change operated s i m u l t a n e o u s l y . 48 [ I n M a l i n o w s k i 1 s f o r m u l a t i o n ] w h i l e r e s t r i c t e d e x c h a n g e e m p h a s i z e s t h e p s y c h o l o g i c a l n e e d s o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l e x c h a n g e a c t o r s , g e n e r a l i z e d e x c h a n g e s t r e n g t h e n s t h e b o n d s o f s o l i d a r i t y i n s o c i e t y . T h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n e n a b l e s M a l i n o w s k i t o w o r k o u t a n i s o m o r p h i s m b e t w e e n i n d i v i d u a l p s y c h o l o g i c a l n e e d s a n d t h e s o c i a l n e e d s o f t h e w i d e r s o c i e t y . ( E k e h , 1 9 7 4 , p . 209 ) T h e t e r m s o f t h e " s o m e t h i n g o t h e r " i n w h i c h c o l l e c t i -v i s t i c o r i g i n s o f e x c h a n g e m u s t b e a r t i c u l a t e d a r e f a r l e s s a m e n a b l e t o e x p l i c a t i o n t h a n t h e r e l a t i v e l y c l e a r , s t r a i g h t -f o r w a r d o r i g i n s p o s t u l a t e d f o r r e s t r i c t e d e x c h a n g e . I t i s b e l i e v e d t h a t a g r e a t d e a l o f t h e c a u s e o f t h i s u n f o r t u n a t e s i t u a t i o n l i e s i n t h e d i f f e r e n c e s i n t h e w a y b o t h o r i e n t a t i o n s f o r m t h e i r s t r a t e g y o f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . On t h e o n e h a n d , u t i l i t a r i a n i s m , t h e b o d y o f t h e o r e t i c a l k n o w l e d g e t h a t p l a c e s i n d i v i d u a l d e s i r e s a n d n e e d s a t t h e c e n t e r o f i t s a n a l y s i s , a n d w h i c h h a s l o n g b e e n t h e d o m i n a n t p a r a d i g m i n A n g l o - S a x o n c o u n t r i e s , h a s t e n d e d t o f o r m t h e s o c i a l s c i e n c e s i n t h e i m a g e o f t h e p h y s i c a l s c i e n c e s , i . e . , r a t i o n a l , m e c h a n i c a l a n d a n a l y t i c a l . T h u s , i t i s b e l i e v e d t h a t a l l s o c i a l p h e n o m e n a a r e r e d u c i b l e t o l a w s , a n d a l l t h e l a w s o f t h e s o c i a l w o r l d a r e i n t h e i r t u r n e x p l i c a b l e b y t h e ' l a w s o f human n a t u r e . 1 B u t t h e l a w s o f human n a t u r e a r e t h e m s e l v e s o f two k i n d s : p h y s i c a l l a w s , t h e d e f i n i t i o n o f w h i c h t h e e c o n o m i s t a n d t h e j u r i s t b o r r o w f r o m t h e p h y s i c i a n , t h e g e o -l o g i s t , a n d t h e b i o l o g i s t ; a n d p s y c h o l o g i c a l l a w s . ( H a l e v y , 1 9 2 8 , p . 4 3 3 ) T h e l o g i c o - d e d u c t i v e s t r a t e g y o f t h e o r y c o n s t r u c t i o n h a s i t s r o o t s i n t h e u t i l i a r i a n t r a d i t i o n a n d h a s b e e n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c -a l l y a d o p t e d b y t h e i n d i v i d u a l i s t s o c i a l e x c h a n g e t h e o r i s t s a s 49 t h e i r own s t r a t e g y . T h e l o g i c o - d e d u c t i v e s t r a t e g y p r e s c r i b e s t h a t s o c i a l t h e o r i e s may b e c o n s t r u c t e d i n t h e a b s t r a c t f r o m w h i c h human b e h a v i o u r may t h e n b e d e d u c e d . I t i s t h i s l o g i c a l d e d u c i b i l i t y t h a t l e a d s t o t h e n o t i o n o f r e d u c t i o n i s m , w h i c h p r e s c r i b e s t h a t t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e l a r g e r s o c i a l w h o l e m a y , i n p r i n c i p l e , b e d e r i v e d f r o m t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f i t s c o n s t i t u e n t p a r t s . S p e c i f i c a l l y , t h e r e d u c t i o n i s t s t r a t e g y a r g u e s t h a t t h e d i f f e r e n c e s b e t w e e n p s y c h o l o g i c a l a n a l y s i s a n d s o c i o l o g i c a l a n a l y s i s a r e q u a n t i t a t i v e , n o t q u a l i t a t i v e ; t h e y a r e l i n k e d b y a c h a i n o f d e d u c t i v e r e a s o n i n g ( E k e h , 1 9 7 4 , p . 1 5 ) . On t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e c o l l e c t i v i s t o r i e n t a t i o n d o e s n o t a c c e p t t h e p r i m a c y o f i n d i v i d u a l s e l f - i n t e r e s t a s t h e c e n t r a l i s s u e i n s o c i a l t h e o r y . R a t h e r , i t i s h e l d b y t h e c o l l e c t i v i s t s t h a t s o c i a l p r o c e s s e s ( s u c h a s s o c i a l e x c h a n g e ) g a i n r e l e v a n c e a c c o r d i n g t o t h e d e g r e e t o w h i c h t h o s e p r o c e s s e s c o n t r i b u t e t o t h e e x i s t e n c e o f s o c i e t y o r s p e c i f i c g r o u p s a s w h o l e s . T h e c o l l e c t i v i s t i c s t r a t e g y o f t h e o r y c o n s t r u c t i o n i s b a s e d o n t h e n o t i o n o f " t h e a u t o n o m y o f s o c i e t y a n d t h e i r r e d u c i b i l i t y o f s o c i a l p r o c e s s e s t o p s y c h o l o g i c a l o n e s " ( E k e h , 1 9 7 4 , p . 1 5 ) . G l a s e r a n d S t r a u s s ( 1 9 6 6 , p p . 1 -11 ) p o i n t o u t t h a t t h i s s o c i o -l o g i c a l t r a d i t i o n p r o c e e d s t o d e v e l o p t h e o r i e s g r o u n d e d i n t h e d a t a o f some s o c i o l o g i c a l p r o b l e m . I n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f s u c h d a t a t h e n y i e l d s a n i n d u c t i v e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o r o r d e r i n g o f t h e s i t u a t i o n w h i c h may ( o r may n o t ) y i e l d d e d u c t i v e l y d e r i v e d h y p o t h e s e s . G l a s e r a n d S t r a u s s p o i n t t o t h e t h e o r i e s o f D u r k h e i m a n d W e b e r a s p r i m e e x a m p l e s o f s u c h g r o u n d e d t h e o r i e s : 50 Blau's theory of s o c i a l exchange i s c i t e d as a major example of an ungrounded logico-deductive theory. In the c o l l e c t i v i s t i c view, s o c i o l o g i c a l concepts (such as s o c i a l exchange) are those which either define or contribute to the d e f i n i t i o n of society as an ent i t y sui generis, i . e . , without and apart from the individuals who constitute i t s population. Society i s then i n the nature of a the o r e t i c a l construct. There i s some dispute between the c o l l e c t i v i s t theorists as to whether this construct i s consciously apprehended by individuals or remains a manifestation of the unconscious. In any case we may be clear on one thing: the theorist who describes such s o c i o l o g i -c a l constructs i s ce r t a i n l y aware of them and i t i s i n the reasons, l o g i c a l and empirical, that he posits for the i r o r i g i -nation and operation that the origins of s o c i a l exchange, c o l -l e c t i v i s t i c a l l y viewed, must be found. The p o s i t i o n taken here i s that, unlike those of the i n d i -v i d u a l i s t i c s o c i a l exchange theories, c o l l e c t i v i s t i c s o c i a l exchanges occur i n a process informed by norms and rules which are external ( i . e . , r e i f i e d ) to the individuals involved. The rules (or norms) of behaviour governing s o c i a l exchange a c t i v i t y are the f a b r i c of what was recently referred to here as society sui generis, i . e . , s o c i a l r e a l i t y as a fac t or thing external to the i n d i v i d u a l . I t i s of course paradoxical to ref e r to something which i s a mental construct as being "external". And at this l e v e l , the paradox rests unresolved. Only when the notion of symbolic behaviour, that which i s uniquely human and 51 c u l t u r a l , r a t h e r than n a t u r a l or b i o l o g i c a l l y determined i s in t r o d u c e d , may the seeming paradox c l a r i f y i t s e l f . Symbolic behaviour i s behaviour which i s conscious of i t s e l f , i s capable of having (and has) meaning att a c h e d to i t , w h i l e at the same time being r o o t e d b i o l o g i c a l l y . E x t e r n a l i t y i n the sense r e f e r r e d to here, and throughout t h i s t h e s i s , d e r i v e s from the c a p a c i t y f o r the conscious apprehension of s o c i a l a c t i o n ( i . e . , the attachment of meaning to i t ) on the p a r t of the s o c i a l a c t o r s themsel ves. That i s , the s o c i a l a c t takes on a l i f e of i t s own, i s seen as being capable of a c t i n g back upon i t s o r i g i n a t o r s . In short, p a t t e r n s o f a c t i o n have the c a p a c i t y to become r e i f i e d . An understanding of the d i a l e c t i c between man as a b i o -l o g i c a l organism and man as a c r e a t i o n of and by s o c i a l i n t e r -a c t i o n i s c r u c i a l . Organismic e x i s t e n c e i s b i o l o g i c a l l y d e t e r -mined, s u b j e c t to n a t u r a l laws and may be understood i n i t s terms. Human "be-ing" i s produced by men together i n i n t e r -a c t i o n , and t h i s "be-ing" i s not e n t i r e l y determined by n a t u r a l law: r a t h e r t h i s s t a t e o f human "be-ing" i s determined s o c i o - c u l t u r a l l y , w i t h n a t u r a l laws c o n s t i t u t i n g the outer boundaries of human a c t i v i t y (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, pp. 50-53). I t i s " be-ing" r e s u l t i n g from the s o c i a l a c t i o n of men together which i s a t once " i n t e r n a l " to the i n d i v i d u a l ( i . e . , a c o g n i -t i v e c o n s t r u c t ) and " e x t e r n a l " to him ( i . e . , the c o g n i t i v e c o n s t r u c t has meaning a s c r i b e d to i t by the i n d i v i d u a l which de f i n e s i t s o n t o l o g i c a l s t a t u s as separate and apart from the i n d i v i d u a l ) . 52 I t has been s t a t e d that the context i n which o r i g i n s of s o c i a l exchange are c o l l e c t i v i s t i c a l l y i n t e r p r e t e d has two b a s i c parameters. F i r s t , the context must t h e o r e t i c a l l y i n c l u d e "something ot h e r " than that i m p l i e d i n a dyadic, p u r e l y i n d i v i d u a l i s t context. I t has been f u r t h e r suggested t h a t s o c i a l r e a l i t y , s u i g e n e r i s , a f a c t which may be c o n s i d e r e d " e x t e r n a l " to the i n d i v i d u a l s i n v o l v e d i n a s o c i a l exchange, i s one such parameter. Second, t h i s s o c i a l r e a l i t y , w h i c h takes the form of r u l e s which inform a l l s o c i a l exchanges, d e r i v e s from that which i s u n i q u e l y human, i . e . , a c a p a c i t y to symbolize and e x t e r n a l i z e behaviour. I t may then be p o s i t e d t h a t the laws governing s o c i a l exchanges as d e f i n e d by the c o l -l e c t i v i s t s , are i n the nature o f t h e o r e t i c a l c o n s t r u c t s , which as has al r e a d y been noted, may or may not be c o n s c i o u s l y appre-hended by the i n d i v i d u a l exchange a c t o r s . I t remains now to demonstrate two t h i n g s : f i r s t , the nature of t h i s s o c i a l r e a l i t y and second, the way i n which o r i g i n s of s o c i a l exchange may be understood u s i n g t h i s p o s t u l a t e d s o c i a l r e a l i t y . Berger and Luckmann (1966) i n t h e i r d i s c u s s i o n of the emergence of s o c i a l order s t a t e that "one must undertake an a n a l y s i s , that eventuates in, a theory of i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a -t i o n . " We w i l l not d i s c u s s t h e i r whole theory here, but wish to draw from i t some p o i n t s r e l e v a n t to an understanding of an e x t e r n a l s o c i a l r e a l i t y . Berger and Luckmann (1966, pp. 53-58) make the p o i n t that the f a c t t h a t human a c t i v i t y i s s u b j e c t to h a b i t u a l i z a t i o n has at l e a s t two consequences. F i r s t , choices 53 which once covered the entire range of a c t i v i t y become nar-rowed, and hence free the i n d i v i d u a l to some extent both from time constraints and the psychological tension of decision making. Second, individuals obtain the important advantage that each i n d i v i d u a l w i l l be able to predict the other's a c t i v i t y to a greater or lesser degree. Therefore, the i n t e r - action between individuals becomes more predictable. Berger and Luckmann (1966, p. 54) further state that . . . h a b i t u a l i z a t i o n of human a c t i v i t y i s coextensive with the l a t t e r ' s i n s t i t u t i o n -a l i z a t i o n . . . . I n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n occurs when ever there i s a r e c i p r o c a l t y p i f i c a t i o n of habitualized actions by types of actors. Put d i f f e r e n t l y , any such t y p i f a c t i o n i s an i n s t i t u t i o n . The t y p i f i c a t i o n s of habitualized actions that constitute i n s t i t u t i o n s are always shared ones. They are available to a l l the mem-bers of the p a r t i c u l a r s o c i a l group i n question, and the i n s t i t u t i o n i t s e l f t y p i -f i e s i n d i v i d u a l actors as well as i n d i v i d u a l actions. The i n s t i t u t i o n posits that actions of Type X w i l l be performed by actors of Type X. This view of i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n represents the basis for p o s i t i n g the externalization, or analogously, the symbolic objectivation (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, p. 20) of human a c t i v i t y . In the view of Berger and Luckmann (1966, p. 55), i n actual experience i n s t i t u t i o n s are manifest i n groups of con-siderable size. However, they also recognize that i t " i s t h e o r e t i c a l l y important . . . to emphasize that the i n s t i t u -t i o n a l i z i n g process of r e c i p r o c a l typification''" would occur T y p i f i c a t i o n refers to the process of recognizing h a b i t u a l l y 54 even i f only two individuals began to i n t e r a c t . " Thus any two prototypical individuals begin to structure t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l and j o i n t l i v e s i n terms of a growing number of habitualized routines. This h a b i t u a l i z a t i o n allows for, among other things, d i v i s i o n of labour between them, and the emergence of innova-tion. Phenomena previously novel and demanding of time and resources i n their understanding, become routinized, and cap-able therefore of h a b i t u a l i z a t i o n and t y p i f i c a t i o n . The re-s u l t i n g reduction i n demand for both time and undifferentiated resource i n turn allows for d i v i s i o n of labour and innovation. Further, Berger and Luckmann (1966, p. 5 7) state "each action of one i s no longer a source of astonishment and p o t e n t i a l danger to the other." This point i s of significance to L e v i -Strauss' formulation of the origins of exchange i n which he views i n i t i a l interactions as threat-producing and s o c i a l order (or p r e d i c t a b i l i t y ) as threat-reducing (Levi-Strauss, 1969, p. 59). The d i s t i n c t i o n between i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n (and i n t e r -action) between two individuals and that i n groups of more than two has c r u c i a l implications, however. The r e c i p r o c a l t y p i f i -cation (which constitutes i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n ) cannot occur except i n a continuing s o c i a l s i t u a t i o n i n which the habitu-a l i z e d actions of two or more individuals interlock. Where the Footnote continued from previous page: performed acts as represented by "types of actors". The recog-n i t i o n by actors i n i n t e r a c t i o n with one another i s referred to as r e c i p r o c a l . 55 i n s t i t u t i o n s are c r e a t e d by on l y two i n d i v i d u a l s (dyadic i n t e r -2 a c t i o n ) , t h e i r o b j e c t i v a t i o n o f r e a l i t y remains somewhat tenuous, e a s i l y changeable. T h i s i s because the r o u t i n e s of the two i n d i v i d u a l s ' a c t i v i t i e s are a c c e s s i b l e to d e l i b e r a t e i n t e r v e n t i o n by those i n d i v i d u a l s . They are f u l l y aware of the nature o f the r o u t i n e s which they themselves have, so to speak, c o n s t r u c t e d by hand. I t may be noted here that t h i s n o t i o n of a c c e s s i b i l i t y has some support from s m a l l group r e s e a r c h con-c e r n i n g the nature of dyadic i n t e r a c t i o n (e.g., Bales and Borgatta, 1965, pp. 501-502). However, where the i n s t i t u t i o n s are passed to o t h e r ( s ) , as i n the case o f one g e n e r a t i o n to another, a t h i r d person (or more) i s added to the i n t e r a c t i o n p r o c e s s . T h i s a d d i t i o n then i m p l i e s two t h i n g s : the i n s t i t u -t i o n s become h i s t o r i c a l i n nature, and the q u a l i t y o f t h e i r obj e c t i v i t y or e x t e r n a l i t y becomes more e v i d e n t . Moreover, t h i s l a t t e r p o i n t i s e m p i r i c a l i n the sense t h a t as more i n d i -v i d u a l s partake of the i n s t i t u t i o n s , these i n s t i t u t i o n s become more o b j e c t i v e i n the minds o f the i n d i v i d u a l s . The r o u t i n i z e d and i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d world becomes " t h i c k e n e d " or "hardened" i n i n d i v i d u a l consciousness as i t becomes e v i d e n t t h a t the i n s t i t u t i o n s cannot be so r e a d i l y changed (Berger and Luckmann, O b j e c t i v a t i o n of r e a l i t y r e f e r s to the e x t e r n a l i z a t i o n and r e i f i c a t i o n o f modes of human a c t i v i t y : these modes express-i n g to both t h e i r producer, and any other, s u b j e c t i v e i n t e n t . The term i s d e r i v e d from the Hegelian/Marxian " V e r s a c h l i c h u n g " (Berger and Luckman, 1966, p. 197). 56 1966, p. 59). I t i s at t h i s p o i n t only that one may r e a l l y b e gin to speak of an " e x t e r n a l " s o c i a l r e a l i t y or o b j e c t i v a t e d w o r l d at a l l . F or the i n d i v i d u a l experiences t h i s i n s t i t u -t i o n a l w o r l d as one which has a h i s t o r y a n t e d a t i n g h i s own e x i s t e n c e , and i s not o b v i o u s l y a c c e s s i b l e to h i s own i n t e r -v e n t i o n . Thus i n s t i t u t i o n s are there, e x t e r n a l to him, p e r s i s t e n t i n t h e i r r e a l i t y , whether he l i k e s i t or not . . . they r e s i s t h i s attempts to evade or change them . . . they have c o e r c i v e power over him by the sheer f o r c e of t h e i r f a c t i c i t y , and through the c o n t r o l mechanisms u s u a l l y a t t a c h e d to them. The o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y of i n s t i t u t i o n s i s not dim i n i s h e d i f the i n d i v i d u a l does not under-stand them . . . s i n c e they e x i s t as e x t e r n a l r e a l i t y , the i n d i v i d u a l cannot understand them by i n t r o s p e c t i o n . He must go out and l e a r n about them. (Berger and Luckman, 1966, p. 60) I t i s important to keep i n mind that the ob-j e c t i v i t y of the i n s t i t u t i o n a l w o r l d i s a humanly produced, c o n s t r u c t e d o b j e c t i v i t y . The o b j e c t i v e w o r l d then does not a c q u i r e an o n t o l o g i c a l s t a t u s apart from the human a c t i v i t y t h a t produced i t . . . . Man and h i s s o c i a l w o r l d i n t e r a c t w i t h each other: the producer and h i s product a c t upon one another i n a d i a l e c t i c a l way. (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, p. 61) The d i a l e c t i c i s thus made up of the f o l l o w i n g : s o c i e t y i s a human product; s o c i e t y i s an o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y ; s o c i e t y pro-duces s o c i a l man. Le t us q u i c k l y summarize the d i s c u s s i o n thus f a r . The need f o r "something o t h e r " than that c o n t a i n e d i n p u r e l y dyadic exchange i n which to a r t i c u l a t e the o r i g i n s of g e n e r a l i z e d s o c i a l exchange was proposed. I t was s t a t e d that the parameters 57 of this "something other" must be two-fold: one, i n the nature of rules which guide a l l exchanges and two, that these rules are human and c u l t u r a l i n derivation. What has been i l l u s t r a t e d over the l a s t few pages i s the nature of this "other" which has been c a l l e d s o c i a l r e a l i t y sui generis, borrowing from the sociology of knowledge of Berger and Luckmann (1966). If the v a l i d i t y of the form of s o c i a l r e a l i t y as i l l u s -trated above i s granted, one may proceed within this frame-work to describe the origins of s o c i a l exchange i n c o l l e c t i v e terms. For Levi-Strauss, Mauss, and Malinowski a l l express the necessity of granting the existence of such an external s o c i a l r e a l i t y and, i n fact, develop their views of s o c i a l exchange and r e c i p r o c i t y with this concept as a cornerstone. Origins of s o c i a l exchange as conceived by the c o l l e c -t i v i s t s are the functional consequences of s o c i a l exchange interactions. Functional consequences are the re s u l t s , either intended or unintended, of s o c i a l a c t i v i t y relevant to•the (non)survival and (non)adaptation of the s o c i a l unit as a whole. . . . [functional] consequences of any s o c i a l a c t i v i t y [are those] which make for the adaptation and adjustment of a given structure or i t s component parts. (Coser and Rosenberg, 1969, p. 609) . . . functions are those observed conse-quences which make for the adaptation and adjustment of a given system; and dys-functions, those observed consequences which lessen the adaptation or adjustment of the system. (Merton, 1949, p. 50) 58 The f u n c t i o n a l consequences r e f e r r e d to by the c o l l e c t i v i s t t h e o r i s t s are those summed up i n the phenomenon of s o c i a l s o l i d a r i t y . S o c i a l exchange processes i n t h i s view are seen as i n t e r v e n i n g between the d i v i s i o n of labour (and by i m p l i -c a t i o n , d i s c r e t e i n d i v i d u a l s ) and the s o c i a l s o l i d a r i t y of the group or c o l l e c t i v i t y , to paraphrase Ekeh (1974, p. 75). Put s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t l y , the c o l l e c t i v i s t i c view p o s i t s t h a t s o c i a l exchange processes o r i g i n a t e i n order to i n t e g r a t e the d i f f e r e n t i a t e d a c t i v i t i e s of the c o l l e c t i v i t y . I t would seem that at t h i s p o i n t one must be very c l e a r as to j u s t which l e v e l of e x p l a n a t i o n one i s o p e r a t i n g i n now. For there are two d i s t i n c t l e v e l s of e x p l a n a t i o n on which to a t t a c k the i n t e l l e c t u a l problem, i . e . , c o l l e c t i v i s t i c o r i g i n s o f s o c i a l exchange. The attempt may be made to form a model based on the i n d i v i d u a l ' s need f o r s o c i a l s o l i d a r i t y , and/or the requirement f o r s a i d s o l i d a r i t y by the c o l l e c t i v e s o c i a l r e a l i t y i t s e l f . Durkheim makes the o b s e r v a t i o n t h a t , to h i s mind, f u n c t i o n without i n t e n t i s not f u l l y e x p l a n a t o r y of the o r i g i n and e x i s t e n c e of s o c i a l phenomena. . . . we must seek s e p a r a t e l y the e f f i c i e n t cause which produces [the s o c i a l phenomenon] and the f u n c t i o n i t f u l f i l l s . (Durkheim, 1938, p. 95) But Durkheim goes on to note that questions o f s u b j e c t i v e i n t e n t are not amenable to s c i e n t i f i c o b s e r v a t i o n and d i s c o u r s e . We must determine whether there i s a c o r r e s -pondence between the f a c t under c o n s i d e r a -t i o n and the g e n e r a l needs of the s o c i a l organism, and i n what t h i s correspondence 5 9 c o n s i s t s , without occupying o u r s e l v e s w i t h whether i t has been i n t e n t i o n a l or not. (Durkheim, 1938, p. 95) The e x p l i c a t i o n of o r i g i n s i n t h i s chapter f o l l o w s the l a t t e r c o nception out of n e c e s s i t y as the c o l l e c t i v i s t the-o r i s t s themselves c o n s i d e r the unique e x i s t e n c e of a p a r t i c u -l a r i n d i v i d u a l as unimportant or even i r r e l e v a n t to t h e i r t h e o r i e s of s o c i a l exchange. T h i s i s not to say t h a t i n d i -v i d u a l requirements f o r s o l i d a r i t y can be thus assumed away. The work of Malinowski (1922) indeed o f f e r s a c o n c e p t i o n of s o c i a l exchange, and s o c i a l needs are s a t i s f i e d i n g e n e r a l i z e d exchange. But the main approach taken here to the problem o f c o l l e c t i v e o r i g i n s of exchange i s w i t h i n the context of the c o l l e c t i v i t y i t s e l f . Thus, the "cause" or o r i g i n of s o c i a l exchange i s i n t e r p r e t e d i n the l i g h t of i t s f u n c t i o n a l s i g n i -f i c a n c e f o r the s o c i e t y as a whole, both i t s s t r u c t u r a l c o n f i -g u r a t i o n and i t s dynamic process. To be more s p e c i f i c , s o c i a l exchange processes perform an i n t e g r a t i v e f u n c t i o n simultane-o u s l y w i t h the d i v i s i o n of labour which performs a d i f f e r e n t i -a t i n g f u n c t i o n . The c o l l e c t i v i s t i c s o c i a l exchange p e r s p e c t i v e sees exchange processes as promoting s o c i a l s o l i d a r i t y or s o c i a l cohesion. Thus, one f u n c t i o n a l d i f f e r e n c e between the types of s o c i a l exchange, r e s t r i c t e d and g e n e r a l i z e d , i s the degree to which e i t h e r achieves i n t e g r a t i o n and s o l i d a r i t y i n the c o l l e c t i v i t y . I f the e x i s t e n c e of s o c i a l r e a l i t y s u i g e n e r i s can be taken as given, then f o l l o w i n g Berger and Luckmann (1966, 6 0 pp. 55-58), t h i s s o c i a l r e a l i t y i s s u b j e c t to two dynamic f o r c e s , o p e r a t i n g i n d i a l e c t i c a l f a s h i o n : d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n (as r e p r e s e n t e d by the d i v i s i o n of labour) and i n t e g r a t i o n (as r e p r e s e n t e d by the s i m u l t a n e i t y of i n d i v i d u a l s o c i a l r e a l i t i e s ) . These processes have been noted by other s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s as w e l l , most n o t a b l y Durkheim. Durkheim (1933, p. 41) s t a t e s : . . . the d i v i s i o n of l a b o r , at the same time t h a t i t i s a law, of nature, i s a l s o a moral r u l e of human conduct . . . i t i s not necessary to show the g r a v i t y of t h i s p r a c t i c a l problem, f o r whatever o p i n i o n one has about the d i v i s i o n of l a b o r , every one knows that i t e x i s t s , and i s more and more becoming one of the f u n c t i o n a l bases of s o c i a l order. And to i l l u s t r a t e the complementary i n t e g r a t i o n process Durkheim (1933, p. 56) s t a t e s : We are thus l e d to c o n s i d e r the d i v i s i o n of labour i n a new l i g h t . In t h i s i n s t a n c e . . . the moral e f f e c t t h a t i t produces, and i t s t r u e f u n c t i o n i s to c r e a t e i n two or more persons a f e e l i n g of s o l i d a r i t y . In whatever manner the r e s u l t i s obtained, i t s aim i s to cause coherence among f r i e n d s . The nature of the s o c i a l r e a l i t y i n which a l l but s o l i -t a r y , i s o l a t e d i n d i v i d u a l s are a p a r t has been d e s c r i b e d . In t h i s view, s o c i a l s o l i d a r i t y i s simply the degree to which i n d i v i d u a l s ' s o c i a l r e a l i t i e s c o i n c i d e w i t h one another. I f , at one extreme, none of the i n d i v i d u a l s ' s o c i a l r e a l i t i e s i n any way o v e r l a p , there e x i s t s no " s o c i e t y " i n the l o g i c a l sense at a l l . T h i s non-overlap may be seen as analagous to Durkheimian anomie. I f on the other hand the i n d i v i d u a l s o c i a l 61 r e a l i t i e s are i d e n t i c a l , then a t o t a l l y m o n o l i t h i c s o c i e t y would be the r e s u l t . The m o n o l i t h i c nature o f such a s o c i e t y i s perhaps b e s t d e s c r i b e d by Durkheim's n o t i o n o f the "common conscience" i n which . . . the c o l l e c t i v e conscience [ s o c i e t y l i v i n g w i t h i n us] completely envelops our whole conscience and c o i n c i d e s i n a l l p o i n t s w i t h i t . (Durkheim, 1933, p. 130) N e i t h e r of these extremes are extant i n r e a l i t y , to our know-ledge. But the extremes p r o v i d e a continuum along w h i c h e m p i r i c a l l y measured s o l i d a r i t i e s o f v a r i o u s c o l l e c t i v i t i e s may be plac e d . To add to the complexity, however, i t must be noted that s o c i o l o g i c a l theory has i d e n t i f i e d two types of s o c i a l s o l i d a r i t y : mechanical and o r g a n i c . Durkheim (1933, p. 130) says t h a t mechanical s o l i d a r i t y d e r i v e s from a common conscience i n s o c i e t y and i s a t i t s maximum when the c o l l e c t i v e conscience completely envelops our whole conscience and c o i n c i d e s at a l l p o i n t s w i t h i t . O rganic s o l i d a r i t y , on the other hand, d e r i v e s from the d i v i -s i o n o f labour i n the c o l l e c t i v i t y , f l o w i n g from the comple-mentary r e l a t i o n s between the d i f f e r e n t f u n c t i o n s composing the e n t i t y t h a t i s s o c i e t y . A r e v i s e d view of the two types of s o c i a l s o l i d a r i t y which a i d s i n the e x p l a n a t i o n i s pro-v i d e d by Turner (1967, pp. 62-63). Organic s o l i d a r i t y r e q u i r e s . . . an e f f e c -t i v e substratum of mechanical s o l i d a r i t y . And the d i v i s i o n o f l a b o r f a i l s without a working mechanical s o l i d a r i t y [as] each p a r t i c i p a n t i n a d i v i s i o n of l a b o r must n e g l e c t some e s s e n t i a l tasks i n order to 62 accomplish h i s own. He can only do so when he has confidence that the n e g l e c t e d tasks w i l l be performed by o t h e r s . The most b a s i c source of each confidence i s the assurance that people share common sentiments. Second, the u s e f u l n e s s of s p e c i a l i z e d tasks i s not obvious . . . the i n d i v i d u a l must depend on group consensus to v a l i d a t e h i s c l a i m to be doing something u s e f u l . T h i r d , the i n d i v i d u a l i s unable to c o n t r o l the o v e r a l l d i r e c t i o n of group e f f o r t under d i v i d e d labour. I f the d i v i -s i o n o f l a b o r i s to produce o r g a n i c s o l i -d a r i t y , there must f i r s t be confidence t h a t the g e n e r a l d i r e c t i o n i n which the group product i s moving i s a d e s i r a b l e one. I t i s important to p o i n t out that s o l i d a r i t y as a molar con-cept i s being developed here which may then be broken down i n a molecular f a s h i o n i n t o o r g a n i c and mechanical s o l i d a r i t y . I t i s h e l d by the c o l l e c t i v i s t s t h a t s o c i a l exchange processes, as a whole, r e l a t e s o c i a l s o l i d a r i t y , as a whole, to p a r t i c u l a r types of s o c i a l exchange processes r e s u l t i n g i n d i f f e r e n t types and degrees of s o c i a l s o l i d a r i t y . Now, the nature of the e x t e r n a l s o c i a l r e a l i t y which, the c o l l e c t i v i s t s p o s i t as the arena i n which s o c i a l exchange occurs has been d e s c r i b e d i n some d e t a i l . F i r s t , the need f o r "some-t h i n g o t h e r " i n a d d i t i o n to that c o n t a i n e d i n p u r e l y dyadic exchange i n which to a r t i c u l a t e the o r i g i n s o f c o l l e c t i v i s t i c s o c i a l exchange was p o s i t e d . Second, the d e f i n i t i o n o f t h i s "something other" was tw o - f o l d (a) i n the nature o f r u l e s which inf o r m a l l exchanges, (b) that these r u l e s are u n i q u e l y human and c u l t u r a l i n d e r i v a t i o n . A l s o d e s c r i b e d was the nature of s o c i a l s o l i d a r i t y (which, i s a primary parameter of e x t e r n a l s o c i a l r e a l i t y ) and the 63 d i a l e c t i c a l l y opposed processes, d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n and i n t e g r a -t i o n , of which s o c i a l s o l i d a r i t y or cohesion i s a s y n t h e s i s . F i n a l l y , i t was. s t a t e d that the c o l l e c t i v i s t s o c i a l exchange t h e o r i s t s f i n d the o r i g i n s o f such exchange i n the f u n c t i o n a l s i g n i f i c a n c e of exchange processes i n c r e a t i n g s o c i a l s o l i -d a r i t y . T h i s l a s t p o i n t has not yet been adequately supported here and the f i n a l task i n t h i s chapter w i l l be to i l l u s t r a t e how the c o l l e c t i v i s t t h e o r i s t s formulate the l i n k between ex-change and s o l i d a r i t y . The key to t h i s l i n k a g e l i e s i n the form of r e c i p r o c i t y u t i l i z e d i n the c o l l e c t i v i s t view of g e n e r l i z e d exchange. I t i s u n i v o c a l , one-way r e c i p r o c i t y which underpins g e n e r a l i z e d exchange. T h i s i s of course opposed to the more c u r r e n t s o c i o -l o g i c a l usage of r e c i p r o c i t y , which, f o l l o w i n g Gouldner (1959, 1960) i s a d i f f e r e n t type, i . e . , mutual or two-way r e c i p r o c i t y . I t i s not b e i n g argued here that one or the other type of r e c i p r o c i t y i s wholly r e s p o n s i b l e , through i t s concomitant exchange processes, f o r s o l i d a r i t y . What i s being argued i s th a t mutual r e c i p r o c i t y (through i t s concomitant: r e s t r i c t e d , dyadic exchange) leads to one of two p o s s i b l e kinds of s o c i a l s o l i d a r i t y . Conversely, u n i v o c a l r e c i p r o c i t y leads, through g e n e r a l i z e d , m u l t i - a c t o r exchange, to quite a d i f f e r e n t k i n d of s o c i a l s o l i d a r i t y . Gouldner's (1959, 1960) concept of mutual r e c i p r o c i t y deals w i t h r e l a t i o n s between Ego and A l t e r . S p e c i f i c a l l y , I suggest t h a t a norm of r e c i p r o c i t y , i n i t s u n i v e r s a l form, makes 64 two i n t e r r e l a t e d , minimal demands: (1) people should help those who have helped them, and (2) people should not i n j u r e those who have helped them. (Gouldner, 1960, p. 171) T h i s conception of r e c i p r o c i t y emphasizes the mutual, i n d i -v i d u a l nature of i n t e r a c t i o n and, i n f a c t , i s d e f i n e d on t h i s b a s i s . R e c i p r o c i t y connotes that each p a r t y has r i g h t s and d u t i e s . . . there can be s t a b l e p a t t e r n s of r e c i p r o c i t y qua ex-change on l y i n so f a r as each p a r t y has both r i g h t s and d u t i e s . . . mutual r e c i -p r o c i t y may mean that a r i g h t (x) of A l t e r a g a i n s t Ego i m p l i e s a duty (-y) of A l t e r to Ego or i t may mean that a duty (-x) of Ego to A l t e r i m p l i e s a r i g h t (y) of Ego a g a i n s t A l t e r . (Gouldner, 1960, p. 169) The norm of mutual r e c i p r o c i t y thus operates i n f a c e - t o - f a c e i n t e r a c t i o n and i t r e q u i r e s r e c i p r o c a t i o n only f o r what has a c t u a l l y been gi v e n or r e c e i v e d . One i m p l i c a t i o n of t h i s con-cept of r e c i p r o c i t y i s th a t s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s are based on the e x i s t e n t i a l c o n t a c t of i n d i v i d u a l s , and t h e i r e v a l u a t i o n of the rewards e n t a i l e d i n the context of the p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a -t i o n . The sureness of continued rewarding i n t e r a c t i o n i s b u i l t up from ongoing i n t e r a c t i o n between the same two i n d i -v i d u a l s . That i s , t r u s t between the a c t o r s emerges as a r e s u l t of the i n t e r a c t i o n , r a t h e r than p r e c e d i n g the i n t e r a c t i o n and forming i t s b a s i s . B l a u (1964, p. 94) i n h i s d i s c u s s i o n of t r u s t i n the s o c i a l exchange process, w e l l i l l u s t r a t e s the source of such t r u s t i n mutual r e c i p r o c a l i n t e r a c t i o n : 65 T y p i c a l l y , however, exchange r e l a t i o n s evolve i n a slow process, s t a r t i n g w i t h minor t r a n s a c t i o n s i n which l i t t l e t r u s t i s r e q u i r e d because l i t t l e r i s k i s i n v o l v e d . . . . By d i s c h a r g i n g t h e i r o b l i g a t i o n s f o r s e r v i c e s rendered, i f o n l y to p r o v i d e inducements f o r the supply of more a s s i s -tance, i n d i v i d u a l s demonstrate t h e i r t r u s t -worthiness, and the g r a d u a l expansion o f mutual s e r v i c e i s accompanied by the p a r a l -l e l growth of mutual t r u s t . An i n t r i g u i n g footnote to t h i s d i s c u s s i o n i s Blau's observa-t i o n t h a t : Only s o c i a l exchange tends to engender f e e l -ings of p e r s o n a l o b l i g a t i o n , g r a t i t u d e , and t r u s t ; p u r e l y economic exchange as such does not. (Blau, 1964, p. 94) P a r e n t h e t i c a l l y , i t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note that Blau seems to d i f f e r e n t i a t e between s o c i a l exchange and economics, or p u r e l y e x t r i n s i c reward, exchange here w h i l e i n h i s d e f i n i -t i o n of s o c i a l exchange (1964, p. 6) he d e f i n e s s o c i a l exchange as being contingent on the t r a n s f e r of such rewards. A l s o , by t h i s q u o t a t i o n , Blau i s very n e a r l y agreeing w i t h the c o l l e c t i -v i s t s who s t a t e that s o c i a l exchange processes may i n c l u d e , but are at the same time, a d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e c l a s s of processes d e f i n e d i n terms ot h e r than economic. To r e t u r n to the d i s c u s s i o n of t r u s t , then, as opposed to L e v i - S t r a u s s and the c o l l e c t i v i s t s c h o o l , who view s o c i a l ex-change t r a n s a c t i o n s t a k i n g p l a c e w i t h i n a m a t r i x of s o c i a l t r u s t which e x i s t s b e f o r e i n d i v i d u a l exchange a c t s , B l a u i n s i s t s t h a t each a c t o r must be c a u t i o u s , as t r u s t i s an a t t r i -bute of each i n d i v i d u a l engaged i n exchange. B l a u p o s i t s , u s i n g the n o t i o n of mutual r e c i p r o c i t y , a t r i a l and e r r o r 66 exchange process which i m p l i e s t h a t s o c i a l exchange has to be d i r e c t , takes time enough to develop each s p e c i f i c context of exchange, and a c t o r s t r y each other out, s t a r t i n g from the b e g i n n i n g each time an i n t e r a c t i o n s i t u a t i o n presents i t s e l f . B l a u s p e c i f i c a l l y excludes the n o t i o n of norms or g e n e r a l i z e d values p r o v i d i n g a context i n which exchange takes p l a c e . He s t a t e s "group norms to r e g u l a t e and l i m i t the exchange t r a n s -a c t i o n s emerge, i n c l u d i n g the fundamental and u b i q u i t o u s norm of r e c i p r o c i t y " (Blau, 1964, p. 92.) In Blau's theory the norm emerges out of exchange t r a n s a c t i o n s between members of dyads. I t may be s a i d , then, that dyadic exchange and i t s companion o p e r a t i n g p r i n c i p l e of mutual r e c i p r o c i t y leads to s o l i d a r i t y or cohesion, of a type which p a r a l l e l s Durkheim's (1933) mechanical s o l i d a r i t y - - t h a t i s , a s o l i d a r i t y based on s i m i l a r i t y between i n d i v i d u a l s and f u n c t i o n s . Examined at the l e v e l of the i n d i v i d u a l , such s o l i d a r i t y must be maintained by continued contact between the g i v e n a c t o r s , or i n l i e u o f t h a t , i n t e r a c t i o n w i t h an emergent norm which has developed from the exchange process i t s e l f . T h i s type of s o l i d a r i t y , notes Durkheim (1933, p. 124) i s based on a d i v i s i o n of labour, where a common task i s d i v i d e d i n t o tasks which are q u a l i t a -t i v e l y s i m i l a r , but mutually i n d i s p e n s -able, which i s a simple d i v i s i o n of l a b o r of the f i r s t degree. But simple d i v i s i o n of l a b o r i s o n l y one of two p o s s i b l e types, and which leads to " s t r u c t u r a l d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n " and "mechanical s o l i d a r i t y " (Durkheim, 1933, p. 130). F o l l o w i n g 67 Berger and Luckmann's (1966) a n a l y s i s , t h i s type of s o l i -d a r i t y i s s u b j e c t to i n t e r v e n t i o n by the a c t o r s themselves and l a c k s o b j e c t i v i t y or a sense of e x t e r n a l s o c i a l r e a l i t y to any g r e a t extent. C l e a r l y , i n the absence of an o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y e x t e r n a l to the a c t o r s to r e f e r t o, comparisons r e s u l t i n g from any exchange w i l l be i n t e r p e r s o n a l . Often, these comparisons w i l l be v i s i b l e , and the i n d i v i d u a l who gains l e s s from an exchange w i l l f o l l o w h i s s e l f - i n t e r e s t and seek a new exchange p a r t n e r . T h e r e f o r e , i n s t a b i l i t y or low s o l i d a r i t y i s much more l i k e l y under mutual r e c i p r o c i t y . General exchange and i t s comparison p r i n c i p l e of u n i v o c a l r e c i p r o c i t y , on the other hand, o r i g i n a t e s i n the n e c e s s i t y to i n t e g r a t e f u n c t i o n a l l y d i f r e r e n t i a t e d c o l l e c t i v i t i e s . Func-t i o n a l d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n of s o c i a l a c t i o n occurs, a c c o r d i n g to Durkheim where a common task i s d i v i d e d i n t o tasks which . . . are of a d i f f e r e n t c h a r a c t e r [ r a t h e r than q u a l i t a t i v e l y s i m i l a r , which r e s u l t s i n ] a compound d i v i s i o n of l a b o r , s p e c i a l i -z a t i o n p r o p e r l y c a l l e d . (1933, p. 124) Durkheim i s here a d d r e s s i n g the s p e c i a l i z a t i o n o f f u n c t i o n s , r a t h e r than the d i s t r i b u t i o n of l i k e tasks among members of a c o l l e c t i v i t y . His i n t e g r a t i v e mechanism of a "conscience c o l -l e c t i v e " (1933, p. 130) i s adequate f o r d e s c r i b i n g mechanical s o l i d a r i t y a r i s i n g from s t r u c t u r a l d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n , i . e . , simple d i v i s i o n o f labour. T h i s i s because the s i m i l a r i t y o f tasks promotes ease of c o m p a r a b i l i t y between i n d i v i d u a l s engaged i n those tasks, r e s u l t i n g i n an e x i s t e n t i a l l a c k of 68 c o n f l i c t , a s o l i d a r i t y of s o r t s , but one i n which the s l i g h t e s t change i n i n t e r p e r s o n a l e q u a l i t y ( c o m p a r a b i l i t y between tasks) may upset the cohesion. Where f u n c t i o n a l d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n , or t r u e s p e c i a l i z a t i o n , has o c c u r r e d there i s no c o m p a r a b i l i t y between f u n c t i o n s , because the tasks are q u a l i t a t i v e l y d i f -f e r e n t . For s o c i a l s o l i d a r i t y to e x i s t i n such a context, cohesion i s achieved not by the o b j e c t i v e s i m i l a r i t y between f u n c t i o n s (which are not s i m i l a r i n any case) but by the commit-ment of each a c t o r to a common s o c i a l r e a l i t y . The means of t h i s commitment are the s o c i a l exchange processes themselves. T h i s i s p r e c i s e l y L e v i - S t r a u s s ' p o s i t i o n when he s t a t e s (1969, p. 139) The exchange r e l a t i o n s h i p comes b e f o r e the things exchanged and i s independent of them. I f the goods c o n s i d e r e d i n i s o -l a t i o n are i d e n t i c a l , they cease to be so when as s i g n e d t h e i r proper p l a c e i n the s t r u c t u r e o f r e c i p r o c i t y . . . . I t i s the exchange which counts and not the things exchanged. F o l l o w i n g Berger and Luckmann (1966) once more, i t would seem th a t the process of o b j e c t i v a t i n g i n d i v i d u a l a c t i v i t y i n t o p r e d i c t a b l e , e x t e r n a l i z e d r o u t i n e s i s the o b j e c t of the s o c i a l exchanges. For an i n d i v i d u a l to a c t on h i s own i s h i s own a f f a i r , but to act i n c o n c e r t w i t h another (or others) i n v o l v e s the r e c o g n i t i o n of d i f f e r e n c e and the e f f o r t of i n t e g r a t i o n . R o u t i n i z e d a c t i o n i s the o b j e c t of commitment ( e x t e r n a l s o c i a l s o l i d a r i t y ) w h i l e commitment e f f o r t s ( s o c i a l exchange pro-cesses) are the i n t e g r a t i v e f o r c e s u p p o r t i n g the o b j e c t . In g e n e r a l i z e d exchange u n i v o c a l r e c i p r o c i t y i s the p r i n c i p l e upon 6 9 which a c t i o n by i n d i v i d u a l s i s d i r e c t e d . But f o r a c t i v i t y to be i n i t i a t e d i n such an exchange, there must be t r u s t , f o r the i n i t i a t i n g a c t o r w i l l not n e c e s s a r i l y r e c e i v e back what he has g i v e n to the other i n d i v i d u a l from t h a t i n d i v i d u a l . I t i s e s s e n t i a l to note t h a t under the r u l e s of g e n e r a l i z e d exchange, t h i s t r u s t , i . e . , the f a i t h t h a t the exchange w i l l u l t i m a t e l y be r e c i p r o c a t e d , i s p r i o r to the exchange i t s e l f . In Berger and Luckmann's terms, the r e l e v a n t s o c i a l r e a l i t i e s o f the i n d i v i d u a l s i n v o l v e d are i n s u b s t a n t i a l agreement. But t h i s t r u s t , which i s r e a l l y a m o r a l i t y s u i g e n e r i s to the exchange t r a n s a c t i o n s , i s i t s e l f b u i l t up by the exchanges. G e n e r a l i z e d exchange e s t a b l i s h e s a system of o p e r a t i o n s conducted on c r e d i t . A g i v e s [something] to B, who surrenders [something] to C, who i n t u r n w i l l surrender [something] to A . . . there must be confidence that the c y c l e w i l l c l o s e again . . . . The b e l i e f i s the b a s i s of t r u s t , and confidence opens up c r e d i t . . . the whole system e x i s t s only because the group adopting i t i s prepared, i n the broadest meaning of the term, to  s p e c u l a t e . ( L e v i - S t r a u s s , 1969, p. 265) So there i s a c i r c u l a r system of c a u s a l i t y at work i n which the o r i g i n s of g e n e r a l i z e d exchange are the t r u s t , confidence and p r e d i c t a b i l i t y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h a s o l i d a r y e x t e r n a l s o c i a l r e a l i t y , w h i l e at the same time the exchange processes them-se l v e s are the very a c t i v i t i e s by which the e x t e r n a l s o c i a l r e a l i t y (which pro v i d e s such a s t a b l e context f o r exchange) comes to e x i s t . To quote Berger and Luckmann (1966, p. 149) the e x t e r n a l s o c i a l r e a l i t y m aintains i t s e l f by being embodied i n r o u t i n e s , which i s the essence of i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n . . . however, 70 the e x t e r n a l s o c i a l r e a l i t y i s ongoingly r e a f f i r m e d i n the i n d i v i d u a l ' s i n t e r -a c t i o n s w i t h o t h e r s . J u s t as r e a l i t y i s o r i g i n a l l y i n t e r n a l i z e d by s o c i a l process, so i t i s maintained i n consciousness by s o c i a l p r o c e s s e s . Thus, i n a q u i t e d i f f e r e n t context, the s o c i o l o g y o f knowledge, Berger and Luckmann converge on the same concept pursued by L e v i - S t r a u s s and the c o l l e c t i v i s t s . That i s that s o c i a l ex-change (processes) are both cause and e f f e c t i n the f u n c t i o n a l understanding o f s o c i a l s o l i d a r i t y . I t i s b e l i e v e d t h a t they p r o v i d e f u r t h e r support f o r the a s s e r t i o n t h a t o r i g i n s of s o c i a l exchange, c o l l e c t i v i s t i c a l l y viewed, are to be found i n the s i g n i f i c a n c e of those exchanges i n c r e a t i n g s o c i a l s o l i -d a r i t y . But there may be a p o i n t at which to break i n t o t h i s c i r c u l a r c h a i n of c a u s a l i t y . Both L e v i - S t r a u s s (1969) and Berger and Luckmann (1966) make r e f e r e n c e to t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y . F i r s t , Berger and Luckmann (1966, pp. 52-57) s t a t e The i n h e r e n t i n s t a b i l i t y of the human organism makes i t im p e r a t i v e that man him-s e l f p r o v i d e a s t a b l e environment f o r h i s conduct . . . human be i n g must ongoingly e x t e r n a l i z e i t s e l f i n a c t i v i t y . . . these b i o l o g i c a l f a c t s serve as a necessary pre-s u p p o s i t i o n f o r the p r o d u c t i o n o f s o c i a l order. To which L e v i - S t r a u s s would add t h a t b i o l o g y p r o v i d e s o n l y one type of u n c e r t a i n t y i n human conduct. The prime r o l e of c u l t u r e i s to ensure the group's e x i s t e n c e as a group, and, conse-quently to r e p l a c e chance by o r g a n i z a t i o n ... . t h i s problem of [ s o c i a l ] i n t e r v e n -t i o n i s r a i s e d , and r e s o l v e d i n the a f f i r m -a t i v e , every time the group i s f a c e d w i t h the i n s u f f i c i e n c y or the u n c e r t a i n d i s t r i -b u t i o n o f a v a l u a b l e o f fundamental impor-tance. ( L e v i - S t r a u s s , 1969, p. 32) 71 T h i s i s to say that i n s t a b i l i t y and u n c e r t a i n t y may be s o c i a l l y as w e l l as b i o l o g i c a l l y d e r i v e d . I t i s the concept of u n c e r t a i n t y and i t s r e s o l u t i o n that one may use to d r i v e a wedge i n t o the c i r c l e of f u n c t i o n a l c a u s a l i t y . In an anec-d o t a l d e s c r i p t i o n of two s t r a n g e r s engaged i n a simple dinner, L e v i - S t r a u s s i l l u s t r a t e s the formation o f a group f o r which, because of i t s temporary nature, no obvious formula f o r i n t e -g r a t i o n e x i s t s . For two i n d i v i d u a l s f o r c e d by circumstances to share a t a b l e f o r the purpose of d i n i n g , a s o c i a l context i s c r e a t e d , but n e i t h e r i n d i v i d u a l has a c l e a r procedure to f o l l o w v i s - a - v i s the other. An almost i m p e r c e p t i b l e a n x i e t y i s l i k e l y to a r i s e i n the minds of these t a b l e com-panions . . . t h i s i s the f l e e t i n g , but d i f f i c u l t s i t u a t i o n r e s o l v e d by the ex-changing of wine. I t i s an a s s e r t i o n o f good grace t h a t does away w i t h mutual u n c e r t a i n t y . I t s u b s t i t u t e s s o c i a l r e l a -t i o n s h i p f o r s p a t i a l j u x t a p o s i t i o n . But . . . wine o f f e r e d c a l l s f o r wine r e t u r n e d . . . the r e l a t i o n s h i p of i n d i f f e r e n c e s can never be r e s t o r e d [ i n t h i s s i t u a t i o n ] . . . f u r t h e r , acceptance of t h i s o f f e r s a n c t i o n s another, f o r c o n v e r s a t i o n , In t h i s way a whole range of s o c i a l t i e s are e s t a b l i s h e d . . . always beyond what had been gi v e n or accepted. ( L e v i - S t r a u s s , 1969, p. 59) T h i s r e d u c t i o n of u n c e r t a i n t y then has i t s obverse, the c r e a -t i o n of p r e d i c t a b i l i t y o f one's own a c t i o n s i n a g i v e n s i t u a -t i o n , and the p r e d i c t a b i l i t y of the course o f the i n t e r a c t i o n of i n d i v i d u a l s . But as was s t a t e d e a r l i e r , the c o l l e c t i v i s t e x p l a n a t i o n of o r i g i n s i s not couched i n these m i c r o - s o c i a l terms. The above anecdote i n L e v i - S t r a u s s (1969) was not 7 2, intended by him to p r o v i d e such an e x p l a n a t i o n . Rather, i t i s b e l i e v e d t h a t i t g i v e s h i s very sketchy view of the b e g i n -3 n i n g of the " t o t a l s o c i a l f a c t " of a s o c i a l system. Marcel Mauss was the f i r s t s o c i o l o g i s t to emphasize t h a t s o c i a l exchange qua s o c i a l exchange o c c u r r e d w i t h i n , and indeed was a c o n s t i t u e n t p a r t of "the t o t a l f a c t . " No one t r a n s a c t i o n , i n h i s view, c o u l d take p l a c e i n i s o l a t i o n from the r e s t of s o c i e t y (Mauss, 1954, p. 71). I t i s Mauss' view t h a t s o c i a l exchange processes c r e a t e a m o r a l i t y or g e n e r a l i z e d b a s i s f o r r e g u l a t i n g behaviour o f the c o l l e c t i v i t y . Each s o c i a l exchange t r a n s a c t i o n c r e a t e s bonds which t i e i n d i v i d u a l s to one another i n a c o l l e c t i v i t y . Mauss f u r t h e r a s s e r t s that the g e n e r a l i z e d r u l e s which emerge from the p a t t e r n i n g of these bonds become e x t e r n a l i z e d i n t o a s o c i a l r e a l i t y which then a c t s back on i t s c r e a t o r s to i n f o r m and guide a l l s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s . In a l l . . . i n s t a n c e s [of s o c i a l exchange] there i s a s e r i e s of r i g h t s and d u t i e s about consuming and r e p a y i n g e x i s t i n g s i d e by s i d e w i t h r i g h t s and d u t i e s about g i v i n g and r e c e i v i n g . The p a t t e r n of symmetrical and r e c i p r o c a l r i g h t s i s not d i f f i c u l t to understand i f we r e a l i z e t h at i t i s f i r s t and foremost a p a t t e r n of s p i r i t u a l bonds between things which are to some extent p a r t s of persons, and persons and groups that behave i n some measure as i f they were t h i n g s . (Mauss, 1954, p. 11) The " t o t a l s o c i a l f a c t " i s , to Mauss, the e n t i r e s o c i a l system. I t i s h i g h l y analogous to the "system" i n open sys-tems theory, e s p e c i a l l y i n r e g a r d to Mauss' view that no s o c i a l a c t may be c o r r e c t l y i n t e r p r e t e d i n i s o l a t i o n from the system of s o c i a l a c t s . 73 So, i n Mauss' theory, s o c i a l exchange acts take p l a c e w i t h i n a m a t r i x o f s o c i a l r u l e s which e x i s t b e f o r e i n d i v i d u a l a c t s and each a c t o r t h e r e f o r e assumes as given. In the w e l t e r of p o i n t s d i s c u s s e d i n the pre c e d i n g few pages, there have been s e v e r a l major concepts running through the argument. F i r s t , c o l l e c t i v i s t i c o r i g i n s of exchange are the f u n c t i o n a l consequences of s o c i a l exchange, which are summed up under the heading o f s o c i a l s o l i d a r i t y . Second, dyadic ex-change and g e n e r a l i z e d exchange l e a d to q u i t e d i f f e r e n t types of s o c i a l s o l i d a r i t y . T h i r d , the l i n k between exchange and s o c i a l s o l i d a r i t y i s to be made by examining the two types of r e c i p r o c i t y assumed to be o p e r a t i n g i n dyadic and g e n e r a l i z e d exchange, r e s p e c t i v e l y . Fourth, mutual r e c i p r o c i t y allows f o r no s o c i a l m o r a l i t y of t r u s t p r e e x i s t i n g s o c i a l exchanges, w h i l e u n i v o c a l r e c i p r o c i t y i s completely dependent upon such a sup-p o r t i n g m a t r i x o f t r u s t or p r e d i c t a b l e r e l a t i o n s . F i f t h , mutual r e c i p r o c i t y and dyadic exchange l e a d to a tenuous and f r a g i l e s o c i a l s o l i d a r i t y based on i n t e r p e r s o n a 1 comparison, w h i l e u n i v o c a l r e c i p r o c i t y and g e n e r a l i z e d exchange l e a d to a more supple and s t r o n g e r s o c i a l s o l i d a r i t y based on i n t r a -p e r s o n a l comparison w i t h and commitment to a shared e x t e r n a l s o c i a l r e a l i t y . S i x t h , the c o l l e c t i v i s t s propose t h a t s o c i a l exchange acts are, at one and the same time (a) b u i l d i n g the ma t r i x of s o c i a l t r u s t ( r o u t i n i z e d and p r e d i c t a b l e s o c i a l r e -l a t i o n s ) r e p r e s e n t e d by s o c i a l s o l i d a r i t y , and (b) "caused" by the f u n c t i o n a l requirement o f any s o c i a l system f o r s o l i d a r i t y . 74 It i s the " t o t a l s o c i a l f a c t " of a functioning s o c i a l . system which i n a sense explains the s o c i a l exchange processes. P r e d i c t a b i l i t y and trust being absolutely required for a s o c i a l system to continue, i n a very r e a l way i t i s they that are the s o c i a l system. It follows then that trust of i n d i -viduals i n given exchange transactions does not derive from the individuals themselves. Rather trust of individuals i s promoted by the existence of a s o c i a l r e a l i t y , i n which the individuals are implicated, by v i r t u e of the predictable posi-tion each in d i v i d u a l holds i n i t . And how else do these pre-dictable positions come about except by the inte r a c t i o n of individuals i n which their i n d i v i d u a l and mutual a c t i v i t i e s become habitualized and routinized? The interactions are the s o c i a l exchange processes themselves. It has been argued that these interactions occur i n two general classes: r e t r i c t e d (dyadic) exchange and generalized (multi-actor) exchange. Each of these very d i f f e r e n t exchange processes results i n d i f f e r i n g s o c i a l s o l i d a r i t i e s , and there-fore, d i f f e r i n g societies themselves. Restricted exchange, based as i t i s on dyadic interaction, tends to form a series of closed dyadic systems.* The s o l i d a r i t y l i n k i n g these closed systems, based as i t has to be on s i m i l a r i t y calculated through interpersonal comparisons, i s purely " s t r u c t u r a l " . I t has no means of maintaining the group as a group, and i t would not take long to fragment the s o c i a l group into a multitude of [dyads] which no pre-established harmony could prevent from p r o l i f e r a t i n g or coming into c o n f l i c t . (Levi-Strauss, 1969, p. 479) 75 R e s t r i c t e d exchange i s l i t e r a l l y t h a t what i t says i t i s : the r e s t r i c t e d i n t e r a c t i o n of i n d i v i d u a l s i n a s o c i a l group, where p r e d i c t a b i l i t y i s sought through the p e r c e p t i o n and e v a l u a t i o n of s i m i l a r c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of e i t h e r the other i n d i v i d u a l h i m s e l f or of those things which the other i n d i -v i d u a l presents f o r n e g o t i a t i o n . The i n t e r p e r s o n a l compari-sons made i n any g i v e n dyadic i n t e r a c t i o n are not e a s i l y t r a n s f e r a b l e to other i n t e r a c t i o n s , and so, q u i t e a s i d e from the f r a g i l i t y of the i n t e r p e r s o n a l comparisons themselves, there i s no easy way to understand and compare one t r a n s a c t i o n w i t h any other. Deutsch and Krauss (1965, pp. 114-115) recog-n i z e d t h i s problem o f g e n e r a l i z e d c o m p a r a b i l i t y i n t h e i r d i s -c u s s i o n of Homans' s o c i a l exchange theory. [ r e s t r i c t e d exchange] i m p l i e s that there i s a common currency or a s i n g l e dimension to which the v a l u e o f d i f f e r e n t experiences can be c o o r d i n a t e d so t h a t the va l u e of a 'u n i t ' o f one such a c t i v i t y r e c e i v e d can be compared w i t h the v a l u e o f another u n i t . I f there i s such a common currency of 'value', i t has not yet been i d e n t i f i e d nor have methods of u n i t i z i n g a c i t i v i t y been worked out. T h i s l i m i t a t i o n o f the g e n e r a l i z a b i l i t y of r e s t r i c t e d exchange has consequences f o r both the i n d i v i d u a l and the s o c i a l system. F i r s t , as has been noted e a r l i e r , the i n d i v i d u a l s themselves s t r u g g l e to m a i n t a i n e q u a l i t y w i t h i n the exchange t r a n s a c t i o n s , and the r e s u l t a n t emotional l o a d i n g makes the r e l a t i o n s h i p sub-j e c t to u n p r e d i c t a b l e d i s s o l u t i o n . Second, on the systemic s i d e , L e v i - S t r a u s s (1969, pp. 441-442) notes 76 There i s thus a b a s i c d i f f e r e n c e between [ r e s t r i c t e d and g e n e r a l i z e d ] exchange i n that the former i s extremely p r o d u c t i v e as regards the number of systems which can be based upon i t , but f u n c t i o n a l l y i s r e l a t i v e l y s t e r i l e . . . . The r e p e t i t i o n of the i n i t i a l process of dichotomy, end-i n g w i t h dual o r g a n i z a t i o n , w i l l be f r u i t -l e s s i n d e f i n i t e l y . No f u r t h e r i n t e g r a t i o n w i l l occur, and the process [of dichotomy], i f s e t i n motion, w i l l mark time i n d e f i -n i t e l y . . . without changing the s o c i a l u n i t s i n v o l v e d or the type o f connexion between them. The c o l l e c t i v i s t s s t a t e that r u l e s of exchange precede any g i v e n exchange, and the i n d i v i d u a l i s t s argue t h a t exchange occurs without b e n e f i t of g e n e r a l r u l e s , y e t g e n e r a l i z e d exchange a r i s e s out of r e s t r i c t e d exchange. Put another way, s o c i a l a c t o r s sometimes s p e c u l a t e (or i n c r e a s e u n c e r t a i n t y ) i n order to reduce u n c e r t a i n t y . L e v i - S t r a u s s (1949, p. 440) i s not sure whether the a c t u a l act of s p e c u l a t i o n r e q u i r e d to i n i t i a t e g e n e r a l i z e d exchange s p r i n g s from l u c k or f a t e , or i s the cumulative r e s u l t of the i n t e r a c t i o n between "deep" i n t e r n a l s t r u c t u r e s of the mind and the environment. Nonetheless, g e n e r a l i z e d exchange and u n i v o c a l r e c i p r o c i t y r e f l e c t s the p o s i t i o n t h a t n a t u r a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of a s s e t s should not be the b a s i s of s o c i a l p r a c t i c e . In any f i e l d v i t a l to the group's s u r v i v a l , g e n e r a l i z e d r u l e s ( i . e . , the m o r a l i t y i n which g e n e r a l i z e d exchange occurs) a f f i r m "the pre-eminence of the s o c i a l over the n a t u r a l , the c o l l e c t i v e over the i n d i -v i d u a l , o r g a n i z a t i o n over the a r b i t r a r y " ( L e v i - S t r a u s s , 1969, p. 45). The b a s i s of the r u l e s i s the c r e a t i o n and p r e s e r v a -t i o n of the group i t s e l f , which i s an a s s e r t i o n of the c u l t u r a l 77 over the n a t u r a l , o r d e r l i n e s s over chaos. The b e l i e f i n the group i s s p e c u l a t i o n i n the true sense, an act of w i l l i n the face o f b i o l o g i c a l f a c t . L e v i - S t r a u s s emphasizes (1969, pp. 450-452) the r i s k i n e s s of t h i s venture, which to the i n d i v i d u a l i s a long-term s p e c u l a t i o n c o n t i n u a l l y v e r g i n g on bankruptcy i f the unanimity of c o l l a b o r a t i o n s and the c o l l e c -t i v e observance of r u l e s should ever come i n t o d e f a u l t . In [ g e n e r a l i z e d exchange], the o v e r a l l c y c l e o f [ u n i v o c a l ] r e c i p r o c i t y i s coex-t e n s i v e w i t h the group i t s e l f both i n time and space, s u b s i s t i n g and develop-i n g w i t h i t . In [ r e s t r i c t e d exchange] the m u l t i p l e [mutually r e c i p r o c a l ] c y c l e s which are c o n t i n u a l l y c r e a t e d f r a c t u r e and d i s t o r t the u n i t y o f the group . . . groups which have not h e s i t a t e d to plunge i n t o t h a t great s o c i o l o g i c a l venture, the system of g e n e r a l i z e d exchange, which i s so r i c h l y promising o f r e s u l t s but a l s o so f u l l of hazards, have remained obsessed by the [ r e s t r i c t e d exchange] formula, which o f f e r s none of the advantages but does not e n t a i l the same dangers. I f the group i t s e l f i s an a s s e r t i o n o f c o l l e c t i v e w i l l over the chaos of n a t u r a l occurrence, then so again i s the g e n e r a l i z e d exchange a c t , based on u n i v o c a l r e c i p r o c i t y . I f the advantages of c o l l e c t i v e u n i t y are man i f e s t i n the c o l l e c t i v i t y , then so are i t s r i s k s , d i s s o l u t i o n and a r e t u r n to u n c e r t a i n t y . Here l i e s the m u l t i p l e s i g n i f i c a n c e s of both the g e n e r a l i z e d ex-change and the p r i n c i p l e o f u n i v o c a l r e c i p r o c i t y upon which i t operates. The exchange i t s e l f , r a t h e r than that which i s exchange, i s of value i n t h a t i t c r e a t e s bonds between i n d i -v i d u a l s w i t h i n the group. To quote L e v i - S t r a u s s (1969, p. 480): 78 Exchange . . . has i n i t s e l f a s o c i a l v a l u e . I t p r o v i d e s the means of b i n d i n g men t o -gether, and of superimposing upon the n a t u r a l l i n k s of k i n s h i p the h e n c e f o r t h a r t i f i c i a l l i n k s o f a l l i a n c e governed by r u l e . F u r t h e r , the p r i n c i p l e of u n i v o c a l r e c i p r o c i t y , o p e r a t i n g i n the context o f a t r u s t m o r a l i t y s u i g e n e r i s , p r e s c r i b e s t h a t i n d i v i d u a l A s h a l l surrender something to another i n d i v i d u a l B, not e x p e c t i n g immediate r e t u r n from that i n d i v i d u a l , but from the group i t s e l f , as w i l l be re p r e s e n t e d by i n d i v i d u a l Z. . . . i t r e q u i r e s the deferment of exchange, so that the settlement i s not to the same people as bore the burden of the s a c r i f i c e ; i n s h ort, so t h a t the exchange mechanism s h a l l f u n c t i o n i n r e l a t i o n to the whole group and not j u s t the i n d i v i d u a l s immedi-a t e l y i n t e r e s t e d . ( L e v i - S t r a u s s , 1969, p. 448) So, i n s o f a r as exchange i t s e l f i s s i g n i f i c a n t i n a s s e r t i n g the r e a l i t y o f the group, under g e n e r a l i z e d exchange each t r a n s -a c t i o n i n v o l v e s , r a t h e r than an i s o l a t e d p a i r , a l l the members of the group. T h i s i s the r e s u l t o f the b e l i e f of the i n d i -v i d u a l A, who has surrendered, f o r no immediate r e t u r n , some-t h i n g to i n d i v i d u a l B, that he can expect a r e t u r n or succor-ance of h i s s p e c i f i c need by a ( p o s s i b l y y e t unknown) i n d i v i d u a l T h i s concept of g e n e r a l i z e d r i g h t s and d u t i e s based on u n i v o c a l r e c i p r o c i t y leads d i r e c t l y to such h i g h e r order con-ce p t i o n s as c i t i z e n s h i p , i n which r i g h t s and d u t i e s are r e a -l i z e d i n an i n d i r e c t r e l a t i o n s h i p between one person and another (Ekeh, 1974, p. 206). These g e n e r a l i z e d r i g h t s and 79-d u t i e s are the r u l e s which make up the o b j e c t i v e s o c i a l r e a l i t y t h a t s o c i a l exchange c r e a t e s and maintains. I t i s the very process of exchange, g i v i n g here and now e x p r e s s i o n to the r u l e s , which makes r e a l t h at which i s d e s i r e d by the members of the c o l l e c t i v i t y . What i s r e a l i z e d i s the o b j e c t i -v a t e d s o c i a l r e a l i t y of the s o c i a l system i t s e l f , c h a r a c t e r i z e d by s o c i a l s o l i d a r i t y d e r i v e d from p r e d i c t a b i l i t y of r e l a t i o n s and the consciousness of being i m p l i c a t e d i n a s o c i a l whole of which one i s a p a r t . G e n e r a l i z e d exchange, w h i l e r e l a t i v e l y unpro-d u c t i v e i n the matter of system ( s i n c e i t can engender o n l y one s i n g l e pure system) i s ver y f r u i t f u l as a r e g u l a t i n g p r i n c i p l e : The group remaining unchanged i n extent and composition, g e n e r a l i z e d exchange allows the r e a l i z a t i o n o f a more supple and e f f e c t i v e s o l i d a r i t y w i t h i n t h i s m e c h a n i c a l l y s t a b l e group. ( L e v i - S t r a u s s , 1969, p. 441) Summary S e v e r a l arguments have been made i n t h i s chapter: one, th a t o r i g i n s of exchange, c o l l e c t i v e l y i n t e r p r e t e d , must a r i s e out o f "something other" than that i n h e r e n t i n the i n t e r a c t i o n between two i n d i v i d u a l s alone; second, that c o l l e c t i v i s t i c o r i g i n s are not mutually e x c l u s i v e of i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c o r i g i n s ; t h i r d , c o l l e c t i v i s t i c o r i g i n s o f exchange are the f u n c t i o n a l consequences of exchange, i . e . , s o c i a l s o l i d a r i t y ; f o u r t h , that the r e s t r i c t e d exchange and mutual r e c i p r o c i t y model leads to a f r a g i l e , r e l a t i v e l y u n i n t e g r a t e d s o l i d a r i t y , whereas the g e n e r a l i z e d exchange and u n i v o c a l r e c i p r o c i t y model (a) e x p l a i n s 8'0 a wider var i e t y of s o c i a l phenomena, e.g., the integration of functionally d i f f e r e n t i a t e d groups, and (b) leads to a more supple, stronger s o c i a l s o l i d a r i t y from which can be developed higher order concepts (such as citizenship) based on i n d i r e c t rather than purely face-to-face r e l a t i o n s . It has been argued here that functional, c o l l e c t i v i s t i c , origins of s o c i a l exchange may be viewed as "external" to the in d i v i d u a l himself, and that there i s strong t h e o r e t i c a l e v i -dence supporting this position. Thus, one i s not trying to overwhelm the pos i t i o n of those theorists described i n Chapter II, i n whose s o c i a l exchange theories the origins of exchange derived s o l e l y from the individuals involved i n interaction. Rather i t i s asserted i n th i s chapter that an or i g i n a t i n g causal linkage between s o c i a l s o l i d a r i t y and s o c i a l exchange may be in f e r r e d from c o l l e c t i v i s t s o c i a l theory. The conclud-ing chapter w i l l complete the argument of this thesis by pro-posing that the c o l l e c t i v i s t and i n d i v i d u a l i s t models of s o c i a l exchange are not mutually exclusive, but describe t h e o r e t i c a l elements which are i n a d i a l e c t i c a l r e l a t i o n with one another. Chapter IV CONCLUSIONS Chapters II and III reviewed the th e o r e t i c a l origins of contemporary models of s o c i a l exchange. Out of the analysis presented i n those chapters have come four broadly stated conclusions: (1) Two models of s o c i a l exchange exist i n the theo r e t i c a l l i t e r a t u r e . They are: (a) the dyadic, r e s t r i c t e d exchange model based on mutual r e c i p r o c i t y , and (b) the multi-actor, generalized exchange model based on univocal r e c i p r o c i t y . (2) Origins of s o c i a l exchange are dual i n nature. The two classes of origins are: (a) individual motivators: psychological needs and economic motives, and (b) functional requirements of the group for integration and continued existence. (3) The c o l l e c t i v i s t i c s o c i a l exchange theorists have formed a model of s o c i a l exchange which i s capable of subsuming the i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c conception. This 81 8 2 conclusion turns on the fact that c o l l e c -t i v i s t theory includes both the r e s t r i c t e d exchange of the i n d i v i d u a l i s t s and generalized exchange. The reverse i s not the case; indeed, the i n d i v i d u a l i s t s do not deal with the n o t i o n of generalized exchange, and, therefore, origins of s o c i a l exchange a r i s i n g from the functional requirements of the c o l l e c t i v i t y . (4) I t may be hypothesized out of the analysis that both the i n d i v i d u a l i s t and c o l l e c t i v i s t s o c i a l exchange models are linked i n one c r u c i a l way: i n both approaches, one important consequence, and hence, functional o r i g i n , of exchange i s the creation of s o c i a l s o l i d a r i t y , which helps provide for the continued existence of both the s o c i a l unit and the individuals which compose i t . Conclusions (1) and (2) have been f u l l y developed i n Chapters II and I I I . These conclusions are summaries of reviews d e t a i l i n g the origins of s o c i a l exchange assumed by the various t h e o r e t i c a l models. I t was discovered that s o c i a l exchange theory consists of two quite d i f f e r e n t conceptualiza-tions. These were labelled, following Ekeh (1974), the " i n d i -v i d u a l i s t " and " c o l l e c t i v i s t " concepts. The essence of the difference between the two, as developed i n the two previous chapters, turns on the d i s t i n c t i o n between (a) r e s t r i c t e d ex-change operating on the p r i n c i p l e of mutual r e c i p r o c i t y , and 83 (b) generalized exchange operating on the p r i n c i p l e of univocal r e c i p r o c i t y . The positions of the various theorists were out-l i n e d i n d e t a i l so as to be able to i d e n t i f y which concept of exchange they u t i l i z e d i n t h e i r respective theories. Further, the review of the theories of s o c i a l exchange themselves reveals a duality i n the t h e o r e t i c a l origins of s o c i a l exchange. Hence, conclusion (2) states that there are two d i s t i n c t classes of t h e o r e t i c a l o r i g i n s : i n d i v i d u a l motivators (psychological needs and/or economic motives), and functional requirements of the s o c i a l unit for i t s s u r v i v a l . There are of course no l o g i c a l or empirical reasons to assert that origins of s o c i a l exchange must be either unitary or not. I t seems that i n the case of both the i n d i v i d u a l i s t s and the c o l l e c t i v i s t s , the use of either psychological needs and s e l f - i n t e r e s t economic motive or functional s o c i a l require-ments as origins of s o c i a l exchange i s largely a matter of choice on the part of the theorists involved. I t must be emphasized that currently, both i n d i v i d u a l i s t and c o l l e c t i v i s t approaches are s t i l l only models of complex human behaviour. As t h e o r e t i c a l models, they function only as well as t h e i r assumptions allow them to i n explaining s o c i a l exchange behav-iour. The purposes of t h i s thesis were to i s o l a t e the assump-tions regarding origins of s o c i a l exchange used by s o c i a l exchange theorists i n general, then to analyse and categorize these assumptions, and f i n a l l y to c r i t i c a l l y analyze the sets of assumptions to discern whether they are i r r e c o n c i l a b l e or 84 i f an underlying unity exists between them. This c r i t i c a l analysis has led to two further conclusions which are not of a summary, review nature. Conclusion (3) i s t r a n s i t i o n a l i n that i t s elements, the c o l l e c t i v i s t and i n d i v i d u a l i s t models, are available i n the l i t e r a t u r e , but the v a l i d i t y of the linkage between them i s proposed here. Conclusion (4) d e t a i l s a pattern of unity, formulated for the f i r s t time i n this thesis, between the t h e o r e t i c a l origins of the two major models of s o c i a l exchange: r e s t r i c t e d and generalized. In conclusion (3) i t i s asserted that the c o l l e c t i v i s t s o c i a l exchange theorists have conceived the s o c i a l exchange process i n such a way that the i n d i v i d u a l i s t model may be sub-sumed, y i e l d i n g a more parsimonious o v e r a l l formulation. The c o l l e c t i v i s t s do not address themselves s p e c i f i c a l l y to this notion of i n c l u s i o n . The inference of this l i n k has arisen from the present examination of both theories. S p e c i f i c a l l y , the i n d i v i d u a l i s t s base th e i r model of s o c i a l exchange on dyadic r e s t r i c t e d exchange operating through mutual r e c i p r o c i t y . It was noted i n Chapter II that Homans and Blau, especially, view s o c i a l exchange between individuals as the location of elementary processes. The i n d i v i d u a l i s t s as a body s p e c i f i c -a l l y r e j e c t any notion of s o c i o l o g i c a l processes as being q u a l i t a t i v e l y d i f f e r e n t from psychological ones. In t h e i r view, s o c i o l o g i c a l processes may simply be aggregated from more basic psychological processes. 8 5 The c o l l e c t i v i s t s , on the other hand, include both r e s t r i c t e d , dyadic exchange and generalized, multi-actor ex-change i n t h e i r model of s o c i a l exchange. The c o l l e c t i v i s t s recognize the existence of exchanges between individuals based on economic and/or psychological premises, and exchanges involving the i n d i v i d u a l within and among s o c i a l constructed "external" r e a l i t i e s (e.g., s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s , rules, and norms). The c o l l e c t i v i s t s do not admit, however, as pointed out i n Chapter III, that the former type of exchange i s s o c i a l exchange, reserving that l a b e l for the l a t t e r . It i s argued here that the point at which c o l l e c t i v i s t s o c i a l exchange theory subsumes i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c exchange theory i s i n the origins of exchange. In a sense, to say that one theory subsumes the other with regard to origins i s misleading. While c o l l e c t i v i s t theory does recognize the v a l i d i t y of both r e s t r i c t e d and generalized exchange, i t i s exclusive i n that i t sees no r e l a t i o n between the two and i n fact derogates economically and psychologically motivated exchange to an " i n f e r i o r " status. It regards this " i n f e r i o r " class as not being t r u l y " s o c i a l " exchange. However, i t i s held here that i t i s much closer to the truth to assert that the two types of exchange, th e i r o r i g ins, and t h e i r consequences, are i n d i a l e c t i c a l r e l a t i o n with one another. This p o s i t i o n avoids the continuing, and somewhat s t e r i l e dispute over which expla-nation has p r i o r i t y . Simply stated, i t i s asserted here that neither has such p r i o r i t y , but neither can one exist without the other, either i n a f u l l y developed theory of s o c i a l ex-change, or i n s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n as i t actually goes on. For (a) given the existence of s o c i a l r e a l i t i e s sui generis, then .(b) s o c i a l exchange processes originate i n order to integrate those s o c i a l r e a l i t i e s , i . e . , create s o c i a l s o l i d a r i t y . By s o c i a l exchange processes i s meant either r e s t r i c t e d or generalized exchange processes, each of which produce a d i f -ferent "set" of s o c i a l r e a l i t i e s for the i n d i v i d u a l , and, i n turn, a d i f f e r e n t type and degree of s o c i a l s o l i d a r i t y . While this assertion may seem to assume that which the i n d i v i d u a l i s t s take as problematic or ignore, i . e . , external s o c i a l r e a l i t y , i t i s emphasized that s o l i d a r i t y may r e f e r to the s o l i d a r i t y between two individuals as well as the s o l i d a r i t y characteriz-ing relations i n larger groups. It i s this l i n k between ex-change processes and s o l i d a r i t y which leads to the conclusion that the c o l l e c t i v i s t model i s i n d i a l e c t i c a l r e l a t i o n with that of the i n d i v i d u a l i s t s . In conclusion (4 ) i t i s hypothesized that the i n d i v i d u a l -i s t i c model of r e s t r i c t e d exchange and the c o l l e c t i v i s t i c model of generalized exchange are not i r r e c o n c i l a b l e , at least i n one major respect. As both are models of complex human behaviour i t i s f e l t that i t i s possible that, while th e i r obvious parameters (e.g., interpersonal i n t e r a c t i o n vs. i n s t i -t u t i o n a l interaction) d i f f e r greatly, a unifying concept may exist to integrate them. 87 As has been made abundantly clear i n the discussions of the t h e o r e t i c a l origins of i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c and c o l l e c t i v i s t i c s o c i a l exchange, each of the schools tends to negate the origins posited by the other. In Chapter III i t was pointed out that, to a great extent, t h i s s i t u a t i o n i s due to the d i f f e r i n g ways i n which both schools form th e i r t h e o r e t i c a l strategies, i . e . , psychological (interpersonal, dyadic) vs. s o c i o l o g i c a l (macro-social unit, generalized). In the sense that the th e o r e t i c a l strategies d i f f e r q u a l i t a t i v e l y , then the two schools are speaking past one another with regard to o r i g i n s . Without proposing to provide an all-encompassing solution to this impasse, i t i s pointed out here that i t may be possible to provide a t h e o r e t i c a l l i n k between the two exchange models. This l i n k i s the s o c i a l construct of s o l i d a r i t y i t s e l f : more s p e c i f i c a l l y , the roles which both r e s t r i c t e d and generalized exchange play i n the emergence and maintenance of s o c i a l s o l i -darity. I t i s at this point, for the purposes of this argument that s o c i a l s o l i d a r i t y must be defined. Social s o l i d a r i t y i s defined here as the r e s u l t of the r o u t i n i z i n g , regularizing, reduction of uncertainty as may exist between s o c i a l actors i n their cognitive and behavioural l i f e . S o l i d a r i t y may be seen as the constructed (by s o c i a l actors) s o c i a l r e a l i t y which both informs and reassures the participants i n a s o c i a l system. The key notion on which this d e f i n i t i o n rests i s the assumption that s o c i a l s o l i d a r i t y i s a cognitive construct which i s simil a r to that providing the basis of the structure of d e f i -n i t i o n s of, for example, personality. To elaborate on this d e f i n i t i o n , then, one may say that s o c i a l s o l i d a r i t y qua  construct i s the s o c i a l equivalent of the individual's own ordering of the world: as such i t has, for that i n d i v i d u a l , the seemingly separate ontological status of the individual's own personality. That i s , i t appears to exist outside of the being of the individual's now-existing s e l f . In a word, i t i s r e i f i e d , at least to some degree. Using the above d e f i n i t i o n , i t i s argued here that while the c o l l e c t i v i s t s s p e c i f i c a l l y deal with the s o l i d a r i t y i m p l i c i t i n macro-social structures, the i n d i v i d u a l i s t s , without using the term s o l i d a r i t y , also deal with the same concept, but i n the context of dyads alone. The c r i t i c a l l i n k i n the posited th e o r e t i c a l connection i s that both types of exchange are s o c i a l exchange i n the true sense i n that both integrate members of a s o c i a l group and thus r e s u l t i n the s o l i d a r i t y of that group. But the attendant caveat imposed by the nature of the argu-ments made i n Chapters II and III must be recognized: r e s t r i c t e d exchange and generalized exchange integrate s o c i a l actions i n di f f e r e n t ways and thus lead to di f f e r e n t types and degrees of s o c i a l s o l i d a r i t y . How then do both contribute to s o c i a l s o l i d a r i t y per se? 89 Weber (1947, p. 101) wrote: . . . c o l l e c t i v i t i e s must be t r e a t e d as s o l e l y the r e s u l t a n t s and modes of o r g a n i -z a t i o n of p a r t i c u l a r a c t s of i n d i v i d u a l persons. Since these alone can be t r e a t e d as agents i n a course of s u b j e c t i v e l y understandable a c t i o n . . . the o b j e c t of c o g n i t i o n i s the s u b j e c t i v e meaning-complex of a c t i o n . Weick (1976c, pp. 10-31) s t a t e s : . . . a c t o r s immersed i n e x p e r i e n t i a l streams organize and punctuate those streams by p o s i t i n g o r g a n i z a t i o n s and environments and Gods and t r a i t s . . . what a person does i s what he e v e n t u a l l y w i l l know . . . o r g a n i z i n g a c t s are acts of i n v e n t i o n r a t h e r than acts of d i s c o v e r y , they i n v o l v e a superimposed order r a t h e r than u n d e r l y i n g order. . . . communication occurs when some raw data input has been m e a n i n g f u l l y r e l a t e d to some p o r t i o n of the t o t a l p s y c h o l o g i c a l system . . . the meaning of any experience i s c o n s t i t u t e d by the very process of i t s accommodation i n t o the dynamic p s y c h o l o g i c a l system. These quotations i n d i c a t e the g e n e r a l t h r u s t of an answer to t h i s q u e s t i o n . Both w r i t e r s focus on the s u b j e c t i v e nature of meaning atta c h e d to s o c i a l a c t s . F u r t h e r , the meaning of the a c t inheres i n i n d i v i d u a l s , the a c t t a k i n g on meaning as the experience i s accommodated i n t o the i n d i v i d u a l ' s t o t a l p s y c h o l o g i c a l system, or, as Weber s t a t e s i t , h i s s u b j e c t i v e meaning-complex of a c t i o n . Berger and Luckmann (1966) p r o v i d e a c l e a r c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n of the process i n v o l v e d i n the ob-j e c t i v a t i o n of the s u b j e c t i v e meaning-complex, as has been noted i n Chapters I I and I I I . They p o i n t out that a c t s become 90 r o u t i n i z e d , and these r o u t i n e s are s u b j e c t to t y p i f i c a t i o n : which i s to say, s u b j e c t to the a s c r i p t i o n of meaning to p r e v i o u s l y c o g n i t i v e l y unordered a c t i v i t y . I t i s i n the a s c r i p t i o n of meaning which becomes unequivocal between s o c i a l a c t o r s during the processes of s o c i a l exchange which c o n s t i t u t e s i n t e g r a t i o n and r e s u l t s i n s o c i a l s o l i d a r i t y . F u r t h e r , s o c i a l exchange processes o r i g i n a t e , i n a f u n c t i o n a l sense, to manifest i n a c t i o n such s u b j e c t i v e meanings between s o c i a l a c t o r s . Put s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t l y , at the s i m p l e s t l e v e l o f a n a l y s i s , i n d i v i d u a l s b egin to make sense of or enact (Weick, 1976b, p. 17) t h e i r s u b j e c t i v e s o c i a l r e a l i t y by and through s o c i a l exchange a c t s they engage i n . I t should be noted that s o c i a l exchange i s not regarded here as some separate c l a s s of a c t i v i t y . I t s d e f i n i t i o n f o r t h i s paper i s that s o c i a l exchange c o n s t i t u t e s a l l i n t e r a c t i o n between mem-bers of a s o c i a l u n i t . From t h i s p o s i t i o n , r e s t r i c t e d and g e n e r a l i z e d exchange may be seen as primary, a l b e i t q u i t e crude, d i s t i n c t i o n s made out of a (perhaps e x c e s s i v e l y broad) g e n e r a l case. S o l i d a r i t y o f some degree and type then w i l l c h a r a c t e r i z e the two cases c r e a t e d by the i n i t i a l d i s t i n c t i o n . The two types of exchange are q u a l i t a t i v e l y d i f f e r e n t and thus produce d i f f e r e n t types of i n t e g r a t i o n and s o c i a l s o l i d a r i t y among s o c i a l a c t o r s . I t i s argued that s o c i a l s o l i d a r i t y r e s u l t s from the o p e r a t i o n of two d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e c l a s s e s of i n t e g r a t i v e pro-cesses, the processes themselves being acts o f s o c i a l exchange. A d e s c r i p t i o n of the two c l a s s e s of i n t e g r a t i v e p r o cesses, d i s c r e t e and u n i t a r y , i s presented i n Table I. 91 Table I (1) Discrete: r e f e r r i n g to actions i - which are already routinized and habitual i i - to which subjective meaning has been attached and substantially agreed upon by s o c i a l actors i i i - which are t y p i f i e d both by content and the type of s o c i a l actor expected to perform them i y - i n which the primary motivation of actors i s the seeking of i n d i v i d u a l reward: such reward deriving value from mutually agreed upon subjective meanings of the reward v - i n which comparison i s interpersonal between known e n t i t i e s , either individuals, or objects of exchange v i - which are engaged i n by actors who are, for the pur-pose of these p a r t i c u l a r actions, unconscious of the r e l a t i o n of those acts to any larger s o c i a l e n t i t y v i i - which reaffirm the s o l i d a r i t y represented by routinized patterns of s o c i a l action v i i i - which are manifested i n dyadic, r e s t r i c t e d exchange (2) Unitary: r e f e r r i n g to actions i - which are sense making for the i n d i v i d u a l i i - which enact r e a l i t y and represent the formation of subjective meaning complexes i i i - i n which comparison i s intrapersonal as between the subjective meaning of an act and the subjective meaning complex representing the individual's s o c i a l world i v - which are i n the process of becoming t y p i f i e d through the removal of equivocality between the subjective meanings held by individuals with regard to the acts v - i n which the primary motivation of actors.is the order-ing and mapping of the flow of events v i - i n which consciousness of the r e l a t i o n between the act and a larger s o c i a l whole i s presupposed v i i - which construct s o l i d a r i t y by r o u t i n i z i n g event flows and attaching meaning to those enacted routines v i i i - which are manifested i n generalized exchange. 9 2 The two types of s o l i d a r i t y r e s u l t i n g from d i s c r e t e and u n i t a r y i n t e g r a t i o n processes do not e x i s t independently of one another. I t i s proposed that t h e i r r e l a t i o n to one another i s a d i a l e c t i c a l one, each i n f l u e n c i n g and b e i ng i n f l u e n c e d by the other. The d i f f e r i n g types of s o l i d a r i t y r e f l e c t the d i a l e c t i c a l t e n s i o n between s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e and p rocess. A c t i o n s which occur i n g e n e r a l i z e d exchange ( u n i t a r y i n t e g r a t i o n ) p r o v i d e the meaning-complex of a c t i o n which r e p r e -sents s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e . A c t i o n s which occur i n r e s t r i c t e d exchange d e r i v e t h e i r meaning from t h e i r accommodation w i t h i n e s t a b l i s h e d p a t t e r n s of behaviour ( i . e . , h i g h l y t y p i f i e d , agreed upon meaning-complexes), these e s t a b l i s h e d p a t t e r n s b e i ng the s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e . In essence, the g e n e r a l i z e d exchange a c t sets out to e s t a b l i s h a p a t t e r n of behaviour and the a c t o r i s prob-a b l y conscious of t h a t a c t ' s s i g n i f i c a n c e as p a r t of a p a t t e r n . The r e s t r i c t e d exchange a c t i s not a r e f l e c t i o n of such an o r d e r i n g i n t e n t , but r a t h e r i s an a c t i n accordance w i t h a g i v e n s t r u c t u r a l p a t t e r n . I t should be remembered that a c t i o n s , not people, c o n s t i -t u t e groups (Weick, 1969, Chap. 1), and that i n t e r a c t i n g mean-i n g - a c t i o n complexes are the f a b r i c of s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e : hence i t i s proposed that g e n e r a l i z e d s o c i a l exchange a c t s (which t y p i f y the sense-making of s o c i a l l i f e ) p r o v i d e s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e \ \ 9.3 and allow for the overreaching (unitary) s o c i a l s o l i d a r i t y i n which r e s t r i c t e d exchange may continue to take place. Restricted exchange i n i t s turn makes use of (indeed could not exist without) the bounded, routinized world implied i n unitary s o c i a l s o l i d a r i t y which i s created by generalized s o c i a l exchange. The dyadic (discrete) s o c i a l s o l i d a r i t y r e s u l t i n g from the r e s t r i c t e d exchange re l a t i o n s between any pai r of s o c i a l actors contains both an affirmation of and tension within the general (unitary) s o l i d a r i t y i n which i t exists. This tension does necessarily lead to a continual modification of both the meaning-action complex ( i . e . , s o c i a l structure) and the generalized s o c i a l exchange acts which ty p i f y i t . Thus, the inherently d i a l e c t i c a l r e l a t i o n between process and structure i s manifested i n the tension within and continuing modification of the meaning-action complex and the actual acts of r e s t r i c t e d and generalized exchange which pro-vide their phenomenal base. The s o c i a l actor makes no dis-t i n c t i o n between acts of s o c i a l exchange: they are part and parcel of a coherent s o c i a l construction of r e a l i t y . Hence, i t i s misleading to conceive of acts of exchange as mutually exclusive representations of either generalized or r e s t r i c t e d exchange. A more accurate description i s to say that any given s o c i a l exchange act represents somewhat more of a s t r u c t u r a l (generalized:unitary) quality or somewhat more of a process (restricted:discrete) quality. It i s , of course, the conse-quences of any exchange act which provide the evidence charac-94 t e r i z i n g the quality of that act. It has been argued here that one of the more important consequences of s o c i a l exchange is s o c i a l s o l i d a r i t y . Further, that s o c i a l s o l i d a r i t y , as a r e i f i e d cognitive construct, has the capacity to influence further action, i . e . , future s o c i a l exchange acts. This i s one aspect of the d i a l e c t i c at work in s o c i a l exchange. But there i s another aspect of the d i a l e c t i c which derives from the i n i t i a l d i s t i n c t i o n c l a s s i f y i n g s o c i a l exchange.into two major types, r e s t r i c t e d and generalized. This d i s t i n c t i o n turns on the notion of the difference between interpersonal and intrapersonal comparison, which i s the underlying d i f -ference between the two types of r e c i p r o c i t y , mutual and univocal. The statement that the discrete l e v e l of s o l i d a r i t y , characterized by r e s t r i c t e d dyadic exchange r e l a t i o n s , implies both affirmation of and tension within a given ordering of the world ( i . e . , a unitary s o c i a l s o l i d a r i t y ) i s based on Levi-Strauss' observation that dyadic relations are based on Inter-personal comparison. As such these comparisons do e x i s t phenomenally and thus represent integration of meaning-action complexes of individuals. But as 'inf er sub j ective comparison cannot, by d e f i n i t i o n be perfect between individuals then mis-interpretation (intentional or otherwise), tension, and con-f l i c t u a l d i s s o l u t i o n must ensue, at least to some degree. Out of this d i s s o l u t i o n of discrete s o l i d a r i t y , pressure for even-tual change i n unitary s o l i d a r i t y w i l l arise, based on the 95 demonstrated incapacity for a p a r t i c u l a r world-ordering ( i . e . , meaning-action complex) to accommodate a p a r t i c u l a r set of discrete r e l a t i o n s . This i s the essence of the second aspect of the d i a l e c t i c a l r e l a t i o n between r e s t r i c t e d and generalized exchange, and of course their functional consequences, discrete and unitary s o c i a l s o l i d a r i t y . I f the vessel containing the a c t i v i t y i s " r e a l " at any point i n time, i t i s also changed by that a c t i v i t y over time. Hence, the s o c i a l structure (here characterized as unitary s o l i d a r i t y which i s i n turn phenome-n a l l y represented i n generalized exchange) i s continually modi-f i e d by the s o c i a l processes (here characterized as discrete s o l i d a r i t y which i s i n turn phenomenally represented i n r e s t r i c t e d exchange) that operate within i t . I t must be noted however, that to say these processes operate within the struc-ture i s misleading, an unfortunate aspect of the language available to describe what i s the case. For the processes are the structure, and that i s why the d i a l e c t i c a l description i s the proper way of conceiving the s i t u a t i o n , both at one point i n time and over time. To b r i e f l y summarize the above discussion, i t i s argued that: (1) two types of s o c i a l s o l i d a r i t y exist, l a b e l l e d discrete and unitary, which are characterized by r e s t r i c t e d and generalized exchange, respectively. (2) unitary s o l i d a r i t y , a s t r u c t u r a l construct, repre-sents the degree of consensus upon meaning-action complexes or world-orderings: discrete s o l i d a r i t y , a process construct, represents the dyadic r e l a -tions of s o c i a l actors. 9 6 (3) dyadic, r e s t r i c t e d s o c i a l exchange r e l a t i o n s take p l a c e w i t h i n the bounds of a world-order (a u n i t a r y s o c i a l s o l i d a r i t y ) or s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e which i s t y p i f i e d by g e n e r a l i z e d s o c i a l exchange r e l a t i o n s . Now, the n o t i o n of g e n e r a l i z e d exchange, based as i t i s upon u n i d i r e c t i o n a l r e c i p r o c i t y , p r o v i d i n g the s o l i d a r i t y i n which r e s t r i c t e d , mutually r e c i p r o c a l exchange takes p l a c e i s s t a t e d as a p r o p o s a l - - a rudimentary hypothesis which remains to be r e f i n e d and p o s s i b l y t e s t e d . There i s some r e s e a r c h evidence a v a i l a b l e which bears on the sense making aspect of the p r o p o s a l , however, and which giv e s some hope f o r the f r u i t -f u l development of f u t u r e hypotheses. De c i (1975, pp. 51-59) has p r o v i d e d a review of the l i t e r a t u r e d e a l i n g w i t h the i n d i v i d u a l ' s r e d u c t i o n of uncer-t a i n t y and the concepts of competence and s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n . Deci d i s t i n g u i s h e s between u n c e r t a i n t y which i s d e r i v e d from i n c o n g r u i t y and t h a t d e r i v i n g from the ignorance of f u t u r e events. The l a t t e r n o t i o n i s of i n t e r e s t here and hence the c o g n i t i v e dissonance or balance theory d e f i n i t i o n s of uncer-t a i n t y are not d i s c u s s e d . To quote D e c i (1975, p. 53) People want to be able to p r e d i c t the f u t u r e , so they engage i n some beha v i o r s , not to reduce i n c o n g r u i t y , but to gather i n f o r m a t i o n which w i l l a l l o w them to p r e d i c t the f u t u r e more a c c u r a t e l y . Kagan (1972) proposed that u n c e r t a i n t y i n the p r e d i c t i o n of f u t u r e events leads to an i n t r i n s i c need to r e s o l v e such un-c e r t a i n t y . He notes (1972, p. 57) that . . . s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s are c o n v e n i e n t l y organized ways to p r o v i d e r o u t i n e s to deal w i t h u n c e r t a i n t y . . . . These r i t u a l i z e d s o l u t i o n s may f a i l when a s i g n i f i c a n t p o r t i o n of the p o p u l a t i o n questions t h e i r e f f e c t i v e n e s s . . . . T h i s i n -co n s i s t e n c y , which produces u n c e r t a i n t y , can be t o x i c to the e f f e c t i v e n e s s of the procedure. Kagan i s d e a l i n g w i t h both the need to c r e a t e p r e d i c t a b i l i t y , and, h e l p f u l to the pr o p o s a l made here, the process i n which such p r e d i c t a b i l i t y a r i s e s . He seems to see p r e d i c t a b i l i t y as o r i g i n a t i n g i n c o n s i s t e n t b e l i e f p a t t e r n s among i n d i v i d u a l s . I t i s h e l d here that s o c i a l exchange processes f o s t e r t h i s type o f c o n s i s t e n c y . L a n z e t t a (1963, 1971) pr o v i d e s some sup-p o r t as w e l l , as he shows that i n f o r m a t i o n g a t h e r i n g behaviour i s motivated by response u n c e r t a i n t y , and " t h a t t h i s search behaviour w i l l be a mo n o t o n i c a l l y i n c r e a s i n g f u n c t i o n of the amount of u n c e r t a i n t y . " Some r e s e a r c h conducted from the p e r s p e c t i v e of o r g a n i z a -t i o n a l r e d u c t i o n of u n c e r t a i n t y a l s o lends credence to the v a l i d i t y of the pr o p o s a l presented here. Van deVen and Delbecq (1974) used n o t i o n s of r e d u c t i o n of u n c e r t a i n t y ( o p e r a t i o n a l i z e d as task v a r i a b i l i t y and d i f f i c u l t y ) developed by s e v e r a l w r i t e r s (e.g., Perrow, 1967; March and Simon, 1958). The l a t t e r w r i t e r s propose t h a t task v a r i a b i l i t y ( i . e . , u n c e r t a i n t y ) " d i r e c t l y a f f e c t s the mode of o p e r a t i n g w i t h i n a u n i t of s t r u c t u r e work a c t i v i t i e s . " Van deVen and Delbecq t e s t e d the hypothesis t h a t the s t r u c t u r i n g of a c t i v i t y i s contingent on the u n c e r t a i n t y r e d u c t i o n r e q u i r e d of a work u n i t . T h e i r data i n d i c a t e t h a t , indeed, work u n i t s r e q u i r e d to d e a l w i t h low u n c e r t a i n t y , s t r u c -ture t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s to a hig h degree, w h i l e those u n i t s f a c e d 98 with high uncertainty do not use pre-specified means to deal with that uncertainty. Rather these high uncertainty work units develop strategies to f i t the p a r t i c u l a r nature of the uncertainty so as to accomplish the general ends of the work unit. It i s argued here that the Van deVen and Delbecq research may be interpreted as o f f e r i n g support for the proposal pre-sented above i n two ways: (1) work units which are dealing with high un-certainty, are i n fact engaged i n an order-ing of the world which is analogous to the generalized exchange functions: whereas work units which are faced with low uncertainty engage i n highly structured a c t i v i t y , which is analogous to the r e s c t r i c t e d exchange function. (2) i t i s further i n t u i t i v e l y obvious that t h e i r data indicate that the high uncertainty work units provide the structure upon which the low uncertainty work units base their a c t i -v i t i e s : this i s p r e c i s e l y why such units i n fact face.low uncertainty. The uncertainty has been reduced by a separate functional unit; i n this case a work unit whose task i s to do just that. Reduction of uncertainty by the construction of a model of the world which has the quality of being " r e a l " i s evidence both i n the psychological l i t e r a t u r e and that of some organi-zational theorists. In the former l i t e r a t u r e the unit of analysis i s the i n d i v i d u a l and his cognitive processes, while in the l a t t e r , the unit of analysis i s the organization and group processes within i t . But each describe the duality of process involved i n the l i f e of both the individual and the 99 organization: the construction of an ordered world and the subsequent l i v i n g within that world, the r e l a t i o n between the thing and the act being a d i a l e c t i c a l one. In conclusion, then, i t i s proposed that s o c i a l exchange processes may operate two ways (a) i n r e s t r i c t e d exchange the straightforward interpersonal comparison of c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s and assets makes use of, and reaffirms existing meaning-com-plexes and (b) i n generalized exchange, patterns of behaviour such as rules or norms ( i . e . , meaning-complexes) are created i n the form of a s o c i a l r e a l i t y , which then act back on their creator(s) and provide the information needed to reduce uncer-tainty (or obversely, create p r e d i c t a b i l i t y ) i n the i n t e r a c t i o n process. 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