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Oda Nobunaga and the Buddhist institutions McMullin, Neil Francis 1977

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ODA NOBUNAGA AND THE BUDDHIST INSTITUTIONS by Neil Francis McMullin B.A., Saint Francis Xavier University, 1960 S.T.B., University of Toronto, 1975 Th.M., Harvard University, 1971: A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Faculty of Graduate Studies ^(Department of Asian Studies) We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard The University of British Columbia September, 1977 Neil Francis McMullin In presenting th i s thes is in pa r t i a l fu l f i lment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the Un ivers i ty of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree that the L ibrary sha l l make it f ree ly ava i l ab le for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scho lar ly purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by his representat ives. It is understood that copying or pub l i ca t ion of th is thesis fo r f i nanc ia l gain sha l l not be allowed without my writ ten pe rm i ss i on . Department of The Un ivers i ty of B r i t i s h Columbia 2075 Wesbrook Place Vancouver, Canada V6T 1W5 Date ODA NOBUNAGA AND THE BUDDHIST INSTITUTIONS Abstract In the latter half of the sixteenth century, Japan, which for almost one hundred years had been fractured into a great number of small do-mains ruled by daimyo, was in the process of being unified. Three im-portant figures, of whom the f i r s t was Oda Nobunaga (1534-1582), brought about that unification. Gda Nobunaga's role as a unifier of the Japanese state has been extensively studied by Japanese historians, but in those studies historians have usually misconstrued the nature and pur-pose of Oda's policies towards Buddhist institutions by portraying them as merely destructive, and have overlooked the most important effect of those policies. Oda Nobunaga's policies towards Buddhist institutions were not as sweepingly negative as has been generally asserted, and their effect was not the destruction of those institutions but a profound re-definition of the place of Buddhism in Japanese society. The greatest obstacle that Oda Nobunaga encountered in his efforts to unify the country was the Buddhist institutions which by the sixteenth century had come to possess great power. That power was of three types: many Buddhist institutions maintained armies of "cleric-soldiers" (so-hei) or "lay followers" (monto) that interfered in secular affairs and engaged in military campaigns; many owned vast stretches of land spread throughout the country; and many enjoyed a high degree of autonomy, in-dependence, and extraterritoriality. By far the most powerful opposition to the realization of Oda's goal of a unified country was that put for-ward by the Ishiyama Honganji, the chief temple of the Honganji branch of True Pure Land Buddhism (Jodo Shinshu). The Ishiyama Honganji was the apex of a huge organization of monto. and i t was also the hub of the anti-Nobunaga league that was made up of a number of Buddhist in-stitutions, daimyo, and eventually the shogun Ashikaga Toshiaki. In order to unify the country Oda Nobunaga had to reduce the power of the Buddhist institutions, and to that end he pursued three policies, each one directed against one of the types of power enjoyed by those in-stitutions: he eradicated the Buddhist armies of sphel and monto in a series of campaigns over the years from 1569 to 1582; he reduced the size of the Buddhist institutions' land holdings by confiscating many of their estates and by instituting a new land-ownership policy; and he denied their right to independence from the central administration. The result of Oda Nobunaga's policies was twofold: the power, land-hold-ings, and independence of Buddhist institutions was severely and perma-nently reduced; and more importantly, there was a redefinition of the place that Buddhism was to occupy in Japanese society in the centuries following the sixteenth. The classical definition of the role that Bud-dhism played i n Japanese society was no longer accepted; Buddhism lost i t s influence on affairs of state as society underwent a process of secularization. Oda Nobunaga's policies were instrumental i n ushering in a secular world. Oda Nobunaga's policies towards Buddhist institutions were investigated through an examination of a collection of 1461 documents, the vast ma-jor i t y of which are considered to have been issued by Oda between the years 1549 and 1582. Because the majority of the documents that were i s -i i sued by Oda deal with Buddhist i n s t i t u t i o n s , i t i s possible to gain an understanding of h i s p o l i c i e s towards those i n s t i t u t i o n s by a study of these documents. Much information on Oda's r e l a t i o n s with Buddhist i n -s t i t u t i o n s i s a l s o contained i n a biography of Oda, the Shincho K5ki. that was w r i t t e n by Ota Izumi no Kami Gyuichi i n 1610, twenty-eight years a f t e r Oda's death. i i i Contents iv Introduction 1 Part I Introduction 9 Chapter 1: The Buddhist Institutions, the Emperor, and the Shogun II Section 1: An Outline History of the Place of Buddhism 12, in Japanese Society Section 2: The Buddhist Institutions in the Sengoku Period 25 Section 3: Shogun and Emperor in the Sixteenth Century 5g Chapter 2; Oda Nobunaga g4 Section 1: Oda Nobunaga's Character: His Attitude Towards gg Religion Section 2: Oda Nobunaga's Rise to Power and His A l l i e s QJ Section 3: Oda Nobunaga's Relations with the Shogun and the 95 Emperor Part II Introduction IQ9 Chapter 3: Oda Nobunaga's First Policy Towards Buddhist H5 Institutions Introduction Section 1: Oda Nobunaga and the Honganji I19 Section 2: Oda Nobunaga and Mount Hiei ^g 5 Section 3: The Azuchi Shuron 2.72 Section 4: Other Applications of Oda's First Policy Towards 179 Buddhist Institutions Section 5: Oda Nobunaga's Buddhist A l l i e s lg3 Chapter 4: Oda Nobunaga's Second Policy Towards Buddhist 1 9 1 Institutions v Chapter 5: Oda Nobunaga's Third Policy Towards Buddhist 208 Institutions Conclusion 225 Part III Chapter 6: An Evaluation of Oda Nobunaga's Policies Towards 229 Buddhist Institutions and Their Effects Introduction 230 Section 1: Oda Nobunaga's Relations with the Various 232 Buddhist Schools . Section 2: The Immediate Results of Oda's Policies 254 Towards Buddhist Institutions Section 3: An Evaluation of Oda's Policies Towards 264 Buddhist Institutions Chapter 7: The Secularization of Japanese Society 276 Introduction 277 Section 1: The Place of Buddhism in Japanese Society 279 During the Time of Toyotomi Hideyoshi and the Tokugawa bakufu Section 2: The Rise of "Human-centrism" 289 Section 3: The Secularization of Japanese Society in the 296 Late Medieval and Early Modern Periods Section 4: Oda Nobunaga's Role in the Secularization of 311 Japanese Society Section 5: Conclusion 321 Footnotes 333 Bibliography: Notes on Primary Sources 389 List of References 403 Glossary 412 v i Introduction 2 In the latter half of the sixteenth century Oda Nobunaga1 (1534-1582) redefined the relationship between Church (Buddhist) and State in Japan. It was Nobunaga's goal to reunify the Japanese state which, for almost a century, had been fractured into hundreds of autonomous domains that were under the control of daimyo who had l i t t l e or no loyalty to the central administration. Powerful Buddhist institutions, particularily the Ishi-yama Honganji , the center of the Honganji branch of True Pure Land Bud-dhism (Jodo-shinshu), represented the greatest obstacle to Nobunaga's realization of his goal, and therefore i t was necessary for him to re-duce the power of the Buddhist institutions and bring them under the control of the central administration. Policies .pursued by Oda Nobunaga i n his efforts to reunify Japan resulted not simply in the reduction of the power of the Buddhist institutions but in a redefinition of the role that Buddhism was to play i n Japanese society over the centuries following the sixteenth. Nobunaga removed Bud-dhism from the center stage position that i t had occupied in Japanese society for one thousand years, and relegated i t to a position in the wings. As a result of Nobunaga's policies, which were continued by Toyo-toml Hideyoshi and Tokugawa Ieyasu, Japanese society was reunited and re-built on a new ideological base and there was established a strong and stable central administration that lasted for over two hundred and f i f t y years. The sixteenth century was a time of exceptional upset in Japanese society. It was the age of gekokujo "when, according to the traditional view, m i l i -tary upstarts displaced their legitimate superiors by treachery and trick-3 ery." It was an upside down world, a world in which the most lowly mem-3 bers of society strove, often successfully, to displace and replace their masters, and when the sudden transfer of allegiance from one master to another could cause the balance of power in any given area to shift over-night. It was a time in which broad economic, p o l i t i c a l , and social changes swept over the country. In the Studies in the Institutional History of Early Modern Japan, John Whitney: Hall notes that "The possibility that the military confusion of the Sengoku period masked many fundamental and even revolutionary social and p o l i t i c a l changes has not been ignored completely by historians."^ And yet, i t appears that the most fundamental and important change that resulted fasom the Sengoku period is by and large overlooked by histo-rians, namely, the profound change that took place in the religious dimen-sion of Japanese society.^ The social revolutions of the sixteenth cen-tury were accompanied by a radical change in the role that Buddhism play-ed i n Japanese society. Indeed, the social turmoil of the Sengoku period may be seen as a manifestation of the important "religious" change that was taking place. Christopher Dawson's maxim that "Social revolution is an index of spiritual change."^ may well be applied to the Sengoku period. The sp i r i t u a l change that Japanese society was undergoing in the six-teenth century has a parallel i n the profound transformation that Euro-pean societies were experiencing at about that same time. Both European and Japanese society were involved i n the process commonly indicated by . the term "secularization." There were only two other periods in history when Japanese society under-went changes as profound as those experienced in the late sixteenth cen-4 tury. These were the sixth and seventh centuries, when the Japanese state was formed out of an alliance of loosely knit clans ( u j i ) , and the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries when Japanese society experi-enced another major transformation as a result of i t s meeting with the West. The p o l i t i c a l , social, and economic changes that occurred during those other two periods were somewhat more sweeping in their scope than were those that f i n a l l y resulted i n the establishment of the Tokugawa Shogunate in the early seventeenth century. From a number of perspectives, therefore, those other two periods are more important than the sixteenth century, but i n terms of Japanese religious history the latter period is certainly as important as the other two. The importance of Oda Nobunaga's period may be appreciated when one un-derstands the significance of the sweeping changes that were then taking place in terms of religious history. The purpose of this dissertation is to indicate the nature and scale of the change that was undergone by the religious dimension of Japanese society in the sixteenth century, and to examine Oda Nobunaga's role i n hastening the secularization of that soci-ety. Our interest is not primarily in Nobunaga but i n the change that he imposed on the Buddhist institutions and in the overall result of his policies towards them. This w i l l be undertaken by means of an examination of the relationship between Nobunaga and the Buddhist institutions, par-t i c u l a r l y his relationship with the Ishiyama Honganji. It would require several lifetimes to incorporate into one's research a l l the sixteenth century materials that make mention of Nobunaga and his a c t i v i t i e s . There are hundreds, and possibly thousands, of letters, dia-5 ries, chronicles, biographies, and assorted literary materials that con-tain references to him. In the preparation of this work two primary sources were used: 1. A two volume work entitled Oda Nobunaga Monjo no Kenkyu.^ This is a collection by Okuno Takahiro, an acknowledged scholar of Japanese histo-ry, of some 1461 documents that were issued in the latter half of the sixteenth century, the great majority of which (975 documents) are con-sidered to have been issued by Oda Nobunaga between the years 1549, when he was fifteen years old, and 1582 when he died at the age of forty-eight. 2. The Shincho Koki. This is a biography of Nobunaga that was written early in the seventeenth century--probably in 1610--by Ota Izumi no Kami Gyuichi, a former retainer of Oda's who at the age of eighty-four pro-duced a biography of his master in sixteen folios from notes that he had Q made while in Nobunaga's service. While i t cannot be stated that these works contain a l l the relevant, ex-tant information on Nobunaga's relationship with Buddhist institutions, they do provide more than sufficient information for one to come to under-stand the nature of that relationship. Just over three hundred of the 1461 documents in Okuno's collection are addressed directly to Buddhist i n s t i -tutions, and many other documents, approximately another four hundred, deal indirectly with Buddhist institutions in that they contain orders and directions by Nobunaga to his generals in their campaigns against such institutions, reports to other daimyo about those campaigns, reports by Buddhist institutions to their a l l i e s about Nobunaga's actions, and so on. Thus approximately one half of the collected documents contain mate-r i a l relating to Buddhist i n s t i t u t i o n s — t h i s in i t s e l f demonstrates the 6 importance that Oda attached to the Buddhist institutions and their mem-bers. Throughout this paper the Japanese word "otera" w i l l be l e f t i n the Jap-anese rather than translated as "temple" or "monastery" as is usually the case. This i s because neither of those English terms correctly trans-lates the Japanese. 1 0 A "tera" is a building that houses a statue of the Buddha and a community of bonzes or nuns who practise the Buddhist way and explain i t s teachings. 1 1 An otera is certainly not a temple for the latter is an "edifice or place regarded primarily as the dwelling place or 'house' of a deity or deities; hence, an edifice devoted to divine 12 worship." The word temple, therefore, would be more appropriately ap-plied to a Shinto shrine; a Zen otera certainly cannot be called a tem-ple. A monastery is a "place of residence of a community of persons l i v -13 ing secluded from the world under religious vows." While this term may more aptly be used to translate "otera", i t too is less than accurate. A Buddhist otera, certainly i n the sixteenth century, was not necessarily inhabited by a group—many small rural otera, branches of larger, more centrally located institutions, had no resident clergy, and many others were looked after by but one bonze.who was not necessarily retired from the world (many were married) and who was not under any vows equivalent to the Christian monastic vows. While there are many similarities between 14 an otera and a monastery, the two institutions are far from identical. In OUT examination of the relationship between Oda Nobunaga and the Bud-dhist institutions, and the results of Nobunaga's policies towards them, we shall discuss the following topics: 7 Part I The place of Buddhism in Japanese society down to the sixteenth century, and the power of the Buddhist institutions in the sixteenth century. (Chapter 1) Oda Nobunaga's attitude towards religion and towards Buddhism, and his rise to power in the latter half of the sixteenth century. (Chapter 2) Part II Nobunaga's policies towards the three types of power possessed by the Buddhist institutions. (Chapters 3 , 4 , and 5 ) Part III An evaluation of Nobunaga's three policies. (Chapter 6) The result of Nobunaga's policies. (Chapter 7) 8 Part I r Part I 10 Before we can examine the relationship between Oda Nobunaga and the Bud-dhist institutions i t is necessary to appreciate the "character" of both of these major contestants in the power struggle of the latter part of the sixteenth century. In Chapter 1, therefore, we shall outline first the history of the "place" of Buddhism in Japanese society prior to the sixteenth century, and the nature of the power possessed by Buddhist institutions in the sixteenth century. Because there were other powerful figures in society besides Oda Nobunaga and the Buddhist institutions, namely, the dalmyo, the shogun, and the court, we shall briefly note the type of power they possessed, for their power and position seriously in-fluenced the relationship between Oda and the Buddhist institutions. Our interest in the daimyo, shogun, and court is confined to theiln-fluence they had on that relationship, and they shall be discussed only in so far as an understanding of their condition is necessary for an ap-preciation of the power structure in Japan in Oda's time. In Chapter 2 we shall first examine Nobunaga's attitude towards religion in general, and towards Buddhism in particular, in order that we may appreciate the personal factors in the Nobunaga-Buddhism relationship. This examination is confined to those factors relevant to that relation-ship and is not meant to be a general character analysis of Nobunaga. Chapter 2 will conclude with a brief description of Nobunaga's power, his allies, his relationship with the shogun, and finally his relations with the court. Having thereby completed an examination of the setting, we can proceed to discuss the details of Nobunaga's relationship with the Buddhist i n s t i l tutions in Part II. Part I Chapter 1 The Buddhist Institutions, the Emperor, and the Shog 12 Part I Chapter 1 Section 1 An Outline History of the Place of Buddhism i n Japanese Society 13 By the late sixteenth century Buddhism had already existed in Japan for over one thousand years. The character of the Buddhist institutions in the sixteenth century resulted from myriad and complex factors. 1 Buddhism was o f f i c i a l l y received ln Japan in the middle of the sixth cen-tury when i t was used by the leaders of the newly developing Japanese state to bring about a degree of social unity theretofore unknown in Jap-an. Buddhist institutions were built to further the spiritual and mate-r i a l welfare of the state and i t s o f f i c i a l s , and to reinforce p o l i t i c a l authority i n a manner parallel to that of the traditional Shinto but be-yond the particularism of the clans (uji) which had formed the basis of the old society. Buddhism was sponsored as the protector of the state and was seen as a means to justify and uphold the ruling regime. It was the agency to bind together the nation. In reward for this service Buddhist institutions were given grants of land, and the Buddhist clergy were ap-pointed as government o f f i c i a l s with state salaries. From the time of the Prince Regent Shotoku (572-621), or at any rate those 2 in authority i n the early seventh century, through the time of the Taika Reform (645-701), there developed an understanding of the relationship be-tween Buddhism and the state according to which those two phenomena mutu-a l l y reinforced each other. The Imperial, or secular, law (obo) and the Buddhist, or religious, law (buppo) were wedded in such a way that acts of Buddhist piety were believed to benefit the state, and the proper con-duct of the state was thought to bring Buddhist spiritual reward. This was, therefore, and in other words, a Church-State philosophy according to which service to the state was rewarded with religious merit, and the 14 proper performance of r e l i g i o u s p rac t i se s assured the p ro spe r i t y and un i t y of the s t a t e . This phi losophy i s i nd i ca ted throughout th i s paper by the express ion "abo-huppo formula" ,, i . e . , Imperial law-Buddhist law f o r -- - - 3 mula, or "6bo-buppo equat ion" . Thus the e a r l y r u l i n g c l a s s designed a concept that would help preserve t h e i r p o s i t i o n and guarantee the we l l -be ing of the new order . In apply ing t h i s formula the leaders of the new Japanese s tate replaced clan-sponsored Buddhist i n s t i t u t i o n s w i th state-sponsored ones i n the i n t e r e s t o f , and on the bas i s of a b e l i e f i n , a p a c i f i e d and cont inuing Japanese people. In many respects t h i s arrangement was most b e n e f i c i a l to the Buddhist com-munity, but mainly i n economic and p o l i t i c a l terms. The great defect of t h i s arrangement was that i t d i d hot a l low the Buddhist community to de -velop i t s own i n t e g r i t y and coherence. In both China and Japan, un l ike i n Ind ia , there was no room i n soc ie ty fo r a group that fol lowed an " e x t r a -o r d i n a r y " s o c i e t a l norm. In a word, r e l i g i o u s d i d not stand outs ide the pa le of the secu lar au thor i t y . The c l o s e r the Buddhist i n s t i t u t i o n s came to be i d e n t i f i e d w i th the cause of the court and the n o b i l i t y (kuge), the more they tended to lose t h e i r v i t a l i t y — a v i t a l i t y not to be restored u n t i l Buddhism fused wi th shaman-i s t i c popular r e l i g i o n centur ies l a t e r . While the Buddhist orthodoxy main-ta ined i t s i n s t i t u t i o n a l s t ruc ture by emphasizing the charism o f o f f i c e , i . e . , the t r a n s f e r of au thor i t y w i th in the Buddhist community by appoint -ment to o f f i c e , the shamanistic Buddhists were charac ter i zed by personal charism. By t h e i r very nature, the re fo re , the shamanistic Buddhists were outs ide the def ined norms of the i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d Church-State r e l a t i o n -15 sh ip and they were ever under pressure from the c e n t r a l admin i s t ra t ion to be brought i n t o conformity wi th the "Rules fo r the Conduct o f Bonzes and Nuns" ( i on i ryo ) that were wr i t t en in to the Taiho Gode of the e a r l y e ighth 4 century. The i d e a l of a mutual ly support ive Church-State partnersh ip was not to be r e a l i z e d . The Nara per iod (710-784) witnessed the " e c c l e s i a s t i f i c a t i o n " o f Japanese c u l t u r e and s oc i e t y , and the Buddhist i n s t i t u t i o n s which began by support ing the s tate became formidable counter-balances to i t and c r e -ated out o f the i d e a l o f Church-State un i t y a de facto Church-State t en -s i on . The Taiho Code s p e c i f i e d that c e r t a i n l a n d s — s h r i n e lands, otera lands, and those bestowed on i nd i v i dua l s for h i gh l y mer i tor ious se rv i ce to the s ta te—were outs ide the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the o f f i c i a l s entrusted with gov-ern ing the provinces (kokushi). These lands enjoyed "Non-entry of the kokush i " (kokushi-funyu) s tatus fo r the kokushi were not allowed to enter (funyu) them or c o l l e c t taxes on them. As a r e s u l t , and desp i te the attempted c o n t r o l s , from the e a r l y Nara per iod otera and powerful nobles came to own Imperially-exempt estates (shoen) on which the c e n t r a l admin-i s t r a t i o n d i d not c o l l e c t taxes or enforce the law. So much land came to be c o n t r o l l e d by the Buddhist I n s t i t u t i o n s that i n 741, for example, the Emperor Kanmu had to withdraw government support o f Buddhism because the na t i ona l t reasury was dep le ted. In the l a t t e r par t o f the e i ghth century the Hosso bonze Dokyo t r i e d to e s t a b l i s h d i r e c t e c c l e s i a s t i c a l c on t ro l over the s t a t e , but h i s scheme f a i l e d . In order to f l e e the power and in f luence o f the Buddhist i n s t i t u -16 t ions the court l e f t Nara In 784 and moved to Helan (Kyoto), but to l i t -t l e a v a i l . The Heian per iod (794-1185), which began i n protes t against the e c c l e s i a s t i f i c a t i o n of cu l tu re and s o c i e t y , soon developed i t s own burdensome c l e r i c a l i s m . Those i n au thor i t y i n both the secu lar and r e l i -g ious spheres of soc ie ty throughout the Heian per iod came from the same smal l group of noble f a m i l i e s , and the r e l i g i o u s i n s t i t u t i o n s continued t o h o l d , and even expand, t h e i r numerous e s ta te s . For example, i n the e a r l y Heian per iod the T o d a i j i , c h i e f o tera of the Kegon s c h o o l 5 o f Bud-dhism and one of the most powerful o f the Nara o te r a , held some n i n e t y -two shSen spread throughout twenty-three prov inces . In the n in th century the Tendai and Shingon schools arose and dec lared the support o f the throne and government to be t h e i r primary duty, but i n fact they competed wi th the n o b i l i t y for e x t r a - l e g a l bene f i t s and secular power and they i n te r f e red time and again i n temporal a f f a i r s . Because the Buddhist i n s t i t u t i o n s owned vas t holdings they began to maintain large 6 forces of what were c a l l e d " bonze - so l d i e r s " ( sohei ) . The sohei were, at f i r s t , not r e a l l y bonzes. Rather, they were pet ty warr iors conscr ipted by - 7 the l a rger o t e r a , p a r t i c u l a r i t y by the Ko fuku j i , En ryaku j i , and O n j o j i , which developed the largest bands of s ohe i , to protect the otera and t h e i r e s ta te s . The c e n t r a l admin i s t ra t ion was unable to provide such a se rv i ce . Before long , however, the otera began to use t h e i r sohei to at tack other otera and thereby expand t h e i r ho ld ings , and eventua l l y the sohei were used against the forces of the s t a te . This led to the development of what was, i n e f f e c t , a s tate w i t h i n a s t a t e . The great Buddhist i n s t i t u t i o n s had a l l but t o t a l l y escaped government c o n t r o l : they heav i l y f o r t i f i e d t h e i r o te r a , maintained p r i v a t e armies of 17 s ohe i , c o l l e c t e d rents and taxes from t h e i r estates and forwarded none to Kyoto, and they cou ld , as a r e s u l t , impose t h e i r w i l l on the o f f i c e r s o f s t a t e . In 1006, fo r example, sohei from the Kofukuj i marched on Kyoto and pressured Minamoto Yor i ch ika i n to making t h e i r otera lo rd o f Yamato prov-ince?. The Emperor Shirakawa, whose re i gn i n the e leventh century was con -s t a n t l y piagued wi th ba t t l e s against the sohei o f the Enryaku j i , once l a -mented that there were three things over which he had no c o n t r o l : the waters of the Kamo r i v e r , the r o l l o f the d i c e , and the mountain bonzes. The mountain, of course, was Mt. H i e i . From the tenth through the twe l f th centur ies a warr ior (bushi) c l a s s de* veloped and, w i th the establ ishment o f the shogunate, came to c o n t r o l the c e n t r a l admin i s t ra t ion . A swing away from the large r e l i g i o u s i n s t i t u t i o n s began i n the e leventh century wi th the appearance of popular Amidist p i e -t i sm, but the great i n s t i t u t i o n s maintained t h e i r power and remained e n -meshed i n secular d i sputes . They s ided wi th the T a i r a and the Minamoto, the most powerful bushi f a m i l i e s , who rewarded or punished them accord -i n g l y - - the Minamoto c o n t i n u a l l y c a l l e d on the many Buddhist i n s t i t u t i o n s wi th a n t i - T a i r a sentiments to support them, and the Ta i r a se ized the lands of o tera that conspired against them. In 1180, fo r example, T a i r a Shige-h i r a burned the T o d a i j i and the Ko fuku j i , among the most powerful otera of that t ime, for taking s ides against him. In the end, the Minamoto v i c -t o ry over the T a i r a was due l a r g e l y to the fact that the bonzes were hos-t i l e to them. S p i r i t u a l i t y burned low i n the twe l f th century. The Enryakuj i and the M i -l de r a f requent ly used t h e i r sohei against one another, and as f a r away as 18 Kyushu r e l i g i o u s i n s t i t u t i o n s r e g u l a r l l y ra ided one another ' s e s ta tes . As i f to witness to the r e l a t i v e meaninglessness o f po s i t i on s i n r e l i g i o u s l eader sh ip , a non-Shingon bonze was appointed abbot o f the Kongobuji, the 8 c h i e f o tera of the Kogi Branch of Shingon Buddhism on Mt. Koya. Over the centur ies from the Nara through the Heian per iods the shoen s t r a -tum o f soc ie ty cons i s ted of the t r a d i t i o n a l noble f ami l i e s of Kyoto and the Buddhist and Shinto r e l i g i o u s i n s t i t u t i o n s . The proper t ie s that the great o tera he ld i n the l a t e Heian per iod were immense: for example, o f the 357 shoen i n Yamato province the Kofukuj i owned 267, the T o d a i j i 73, and the T o j i (Shingon) 4. By con t ra s t , the Emperor owned 17 shoen and the kuge 15. Ninety percent of a l l estates i n Yamato were owned by o te ra . Of the 79 shoen i n Yamashiro province the Emperor held 20, the kuge 26, and otera 22: the Kofukuj i had 13, the T o d a i j i 5, and the T o j i 4. Otera held over t h i r t y - f i v e percent of the t o t a l . Of the 29 shoen i n Owari p rov ince , mm *» the T o d a i j i he ld 7 and the T o j i 1, between them twenty- f ive percent of the t o t a l . In Omi province a l s o the shoen owned by the T o d a i j i , Ko fuku j i , and T o j i amounted to over twenty- f ive percent of the t o t a l number of shoen o i n that p rov ince . The bushi c l a s s took over c e n t r a l admin i s t ra t i ve con t ro l i n the twe l f th century wi th the establishment o f the Kamakura " tent government" (bakufu) pres ided over by the shogun. In the e a r l y years o f the Kamakura per iod (1192-1333) the bakufu dec lared a l l estates and p r i v a t e lands to be sub-j e c t to the genera l t axa t ion . They appointed m i l i t a r y governors (shugo) over the provinces t o exerc i se p r o v i n c i a l m i l i t a r y and p o l i c e a f f a i r s , and land stewards ( j i t o ) over a l l p u b l i c lands and shoen i n order to a s -19 sure regular tax c o l l e c t i o n . Consequently, many of the kuge and high o f -f i c e r s of the Heian per iod l o s t t h e i r ho ld ings . A l so i n e a r l y Kamakura times the bakufu f requent ly despo i led otera ho ld ings , but many of the great otera continued to maintain t h e i r holdings and, not i n f requen t l y , they won fur ther exemptions. The T o d a i j i kept i t s e f f e c t i v e con t ro l of vast holdings i n the province of B izen, the Kofukuj i c o n t r o l l e d a l l of Yamato p rov ince , the holdings o f the Negoroj i were valued at severa l hun-10 dred thousand koku, and many otera came to be heav i l y patronized by the bakufu. In the Kamakura per iod many otera came to possess what was c a l l e d "Non-entry of the m i l i t a r y governor" (shugo-funyu) s t a t u s — o r , "Non-entry of the m i l i t a r y governor ' s agents" (shugoshi-funyu) status—whereby they were exempt from in ter ference by the m i l i t a r y governor i n a f f a i r s on t h e i r e s t a te s . Otera that enjoyed shugo-funyu status had the exc lus i ve r i g h t to c o l l e c t taxes and a r re s t c r im ina l s on t h e i r shugo-funyu lands (shugo-funyuchi. or shugosh i - funyuchi ) , and no bushi were allowed to enter those lands bear ing arms. It was o r d i n a r i l y understood that otera that enjoyed t h i s exemption would a r re s t c r im ina l s and hand them over to the a u t h o r i t i e s , but the shugo o f ten d i d not have the power to oversee or en -force t h i s procedure so that l i t t l e or nothing might be done about i t should an o tera refuse to comply. Thus i n the Kamakura per iod the land system was p a r t i a l l y restored to the way i t had been centur ies e a r l i e r when kokushi - funyu status was enjoyed by many r e l i g i o u s i n s t i t u t i o n s . As a r e s u l t o f the possess ion o f shugo-funyu status many otera enjoyed, i n e f f e c t , a great degree of e x t r a t e r r i t o r i a l i t y . Over the centur ies the Kongobuji, for example, could grant sanctuary, asylum,' to any and a l l who 20 sought she l te r there . People who committed crimes i n some other par t of the country could evade the punishments due them should they have been ab le to make i t to the sa fety of the Kongobuji i n to whose t e r r i t o r i e s m pursuing p a r t i e s would not fo l low. Thus the possess ion of shugo-funyu status and the degree o f e x t r a t e r r i t o r i a l i t y connected wi th i t p laced the r e l i g i o u s i n s t i t u t i o n s outs ide the pa le of c e n t r a l admin i s t ra t i ve c o n t r o l . Many o tera were i n complete c o n t r o l o f t h e i r l ands—no outs ide party had any r i gh t to a p o r t i o n to the y i e l d o f those lands and, as we have noted, some o f the great otera even had j u r i d i c a l au thor i t y on t h e i r ho ld ings . From medieval times the major i ty o f Buddhist i n s t i t u t i o n s occupied impor-tant po s i t i on s on s c e n i c , and u sua l l y s t r a t e g i c , mountains, or i n conven-ien t f l a t areas l i k e r i v e r de l ta s and fo rds , and major crossroads. Many otera were, i n f a c t , f o r t r e s s e s . f o r they were o f ten surrounded by an earthen rampart, sometimes wi th a moat behind or before i t , and they were u sua l l y on a p i ece o f e levated ground that made them e s p e c i a l l y d i f f i c u l t to bes iege. From the middle ages towns c a l l e d "towns before the gates " (monzenmachi) 12 grew up around many o te ra . This was a na tura l development because the dwel l ings o f the many bonzes who belonged to the l a rger otera were u s u a l -l y spread out around the entrances to the otera p r e c i n c t s . These ready-made communities a t t r ac ted many l a i t y who would take up residence there and engage i n se rv i ce i ndus t r i e s i n the newly developing towns. Large markets grew up i n many monzenmachi, l a r g e l y to the bene f i t o f the otera for they u sua l l y owned the lands i n the surrounding area. I f an otera pos -sessed shugo-funyu status so too d id i t s monzenmachi, and th i s was an a d -21 ded a t t r a c t i o n to those who came to l i v e there. i J The Kamakura per iod i s important fo r the appearance of the great r e l i -g ious reformers Honen, Shinran, Dogen, E i s a i , and N i c h i r e n , who respond-ed to the r e l i g i o u s appet i tes o f the medieval populace. With them the pomp and circumstance, and to a great extent the ceremony and mystery, o f the o lder schools was passed over i n favor of simple p i e t y and s p i r i t u a l ex-14 e r c i s e s . Doctr ine gave way to personal exper ience, and i t was d i s cov -ered that f a i t h could provide a bas i s fo r group cohes ion. On th i s f a i t h there developed the new, independent, r e l i g i o u s organizat ions that char -a c t e r i z e d Japanese Buddhism from that time on. The Tendal s choo l , the matr ix o f those new movements, dec l ined to where i t became an academic as * opposed to a r e l i g i o u s cen te r , and Buddhism changed from the r e l i g i o n of the cu l tured e l i t e to the refuge o f the lower c l a s se s . S t i l l the -o ld i d e a l of obo-buppo un i t y was never l o s t . The new schools d id not develop any concept according to which l o y a l t y to the Emperor was separated from l o y a l t y to the Buddha, and none maintained that " the s ta te ought t o be r u l e d by those who had seen the v i s i o n o f t r u t h and know the w i l l o f h igher powers . " 1 ^ The reformers took pains to show how t h e i r teachings would bene f i t the s t a te . For example, Peter A. Pardue says that E i s a i " f e l t ob l i ged to j u s t i f y Zen as conducive to the na t i ona l w e l -f a r e " , 1 ^ t o which end he wrote h i s Propagation o f Zen for the P r o t e c t -i on of the Country (Kozen-gokoku-ron). Pardue goes on to exp l a in that the "Zen teaching i n genera l provided a remarkably c r e a t i v e base fo r c o o r d i -na t ion with the secu la r needs and c u l t u r a l goals of the s t a t e . T o Shinran there was no doubt that the buppo transcended the law of t h i s wor ld , the obo. but he was not p r i m a r i l y in teres ted i n t h i s wor ld. It was 22 Nich i ren who was t r u l y a r a d i c a l for he considered "every th ing , even the 18 emperor, as subordinate to the Buddha of the Lotus S u t r a . " And y e t , N i ch i ren assumed that the Emperor was an adherent of the cor rec t buppo--he reaf f i rmed the type of dbo-buppo un i ty that was espoused i n the seventh century, and he looked forward to the age i n which the 6bo and buppo would p e r f e c t l y fuse and introduce a golden age. Sa l va t ion was s t i l l not d i sa s soc ia ted from p o l i t i c s desp i te the new s t y l e of Buddhism. L ike t h e i r Nara and Heian predecessors , who continued to rece ive mater ia l rewards f o r s p i r i t u a l se rv i ces and whose p o s i t i o n continued r e l a t i v e l y unchanged i n to the fourteenth century, the new schools a l so developed vast holdings and cons iderable power independent of the secu lar author-i t i e s . Throughout the Heian, Kamakura, and Muromachi (1338-1573) per iods the many f a r - f l u n g r e l i g i o u s i n s t i t u t i o n s , o f both the o ld and new schools , o f ten served as outposts of the c e n t r a l au thor i t y and provided many se rv -i ce s fo r the s t a t e : they brought cu l tu re to the prov inces , helped main-t a i n the peace, reported to the c e n t r a l admin i s t ra t ion about a c t i v i t i e s i n the p rov inces , and so on. In 1331 the Emperor Godaigo, wi th the ass i s tance of Buddhist i n s t i t u t i o n s , attacked the Kamakura bakufu i n an e f f o r t to res tore Imperial power, but the Ashikaga fami ly succeeded i n ga in ing c o n t r o l and they es tab l i shed the Muromachi bakufu. The Ashikaga were wary of r e l i g i o u s i n s t i t u t i o n s and some e f f o r t s were made, e s p e c i a l l y by Ashikaga Yoshimitsu (1358-1408), to c o n t r o l the great otera but no o v e r a l l p o l i c y resu l ted because t h e i r e f -19 f o r t s were d i r e c t e d mainly against the powerful Zen Gozan o te ra . This was because the three hundred otera of the Gozan system were among the 23 p r i n c i p a l landholders of medieval Japan. Most of those o tera owned some-where i n the v i c i n i t y of from ten to twenty shoen. so that i n a l l severa l thousand estates were under t h e i r c o n t r o l . For example, i n the f i f t e e n t h century the Nanzenji o f Kyoto possessed lands w i th a y i e l d of 4000 koku of r i c e and i t s branch otera had lands that could y i e l d another 10,000 koku. Tenryu j i estates y ie lded 2400 koku and those o f i t s branch otera another 6000. By comparison, the court's income during the Kamakura and Muromachi per iods was, on the average, i n the v i c i n i t y o f 4000 koku year-l y . It was not only Zen otera that held vast estates i n the Muromachi pe r i od . The Ko fuku j i , for example, had an average year l y income o f 19,000 koku. and i t s branches brought i n an a d d i t i o n a l 2000. John W. H a l l provides an example of the propor t ion of Buddhist holdings i n the province of Bizen i n e a r l y Ashikaga t imes: o f the one hundred and f i f t y shoen that made up B izen at that t ime, twenty-s ix were owned by c e n t r a l l y located otera and shr ines . According to these s t a t i s t i c s r e l i g i o u s i n s t i t u t i o n s he ld about seventeen percent o f the estates i n the p rov ince , and t h i s does not i n -20 elude the lands that were owned by smal l r u r a l otera i n B izen. The per iod from the Haaboku (1336-1392) through the Muromachi per iods was charac te r i zed by increas ing d i f f i c u l t i e s for the Buddhist i n s t i t u t i o n s . Many o tera began t o lose c o n t r o l o f t h e i r estates and monzenmachi. and v i o l e n t campaigns were sometimes d i r ec ted against the most powerful o te ra . For example, i n 1434 Ashikaga Yosh inor i attacked and suppressed the sShei of the Enryaku j i . Nevertheless , the great o tera l i k e Mt. Koya, the Ko-f u k u j i , and a l s o Mt. H i e i , continued to prosper and shugo -funyu status was granted to more and more i n s t i t u t i o n s . Even as l a t e as 1563 the I s h l -24 yama Honganji was g iven shugo-funyu status for i t s r a p i d l y expanding mon-zenmachi i n Osaka by the shogun Ashikaga Yosh i teru. From the l a t e Muromachi per iod many monzenmachi became the centers of a new and important development, i . e . , the r i s e of commerce and the mer-chant c l a s s . As the burgeoning merchant economy expanded i n the monzen- machi the o tera around which they grew became more wealthy and gained more power i n p r o v i n c i a l p o l i t i c s . With the Onin War of 1467-1477 Japan entered what has become known as the 21 Sengoku p e r i o d , which continued u n t i l 1573 when Oda Nobunaga deposed the l a s t Ashikaga shogun. The per iod from 1573 u n t i l 1600 i s commonly c a l l e d the Azuchi-Momoyama p e r i o d , a f t e r the names of those p laces where Nobunaga and Toyotomi Hideyoshi b u i l t t h e i r magnif icent pa l ace - fo r t re s se s 22 i n 1576 and 1593 r e s p e c t i v e l y . It i s a l so c a l l e d the Shokuho per iod 23 a f t e r the family names of Oda and Toyotomi. With Tokugawa Ieyasu's v i c t o r y i n the b a t t l e o f Sekigahara i n 1600, and h i s attainment of the p o s i t i o n of shogun i n 1603, Japan entered the Tokugawa, or Edo, per iod which continued for two hundred and s i x t y - f i v e years to 1867. Part I Chapter 1 Sect ion 2 The Buddhist I n s t i tu t i ons i n the Sengoku Period 26 The Onin-Bunmei per iod (1467-1486) brought an end to the shoen system of admin i s t ra t ion ; shogunal au thor i t y no longer p r e v a i l e d , and power passed from the shugo daimyo to the Sengoku daimyo who held au toc ra t i c adminis-t r a t i v e powers w i t h i n t h e i r domains which were known as bunkoku .^ Ac -cording to John W. H a l l , "By 1560 over two hundred daimyo had made t h e i r appearance, and the major p l a i n s o f Japan had been reduced to s tab le blocks of con t ro l by the more powerful o f these feudal l o rd s . The Sen-goku Jinmei J i t e n contains the names, and short b iographic sketches, of upwards of two thousand daimyo and important bush i , a great many of whom 2fi were d i r e c t l y Involved i n the campaigns for or against Oda Nobunaga, and the names o f hundreds of bush i . ranging from lower ranked and unknown o f f i c e r s through great and famous daimyo, appear i n Nobunaga*s documents. It i s not necessary to our top ic fo r us to i d e n t i f y those hundreds of bush i . nor i s i t re levant to us to examine the r i s e of the Sengoku and Shokuho daimyo and the way i n which they he ld power i n t h e i r bunkoku. In the mid-s ixteenth century the s i t u a t i o n among the daimyo was one char-ac te r i zed p r i m a r i l y by d i s u n i t y . Each daimyo held au toc ra t i c power i n h i s bunkoku and maintained cont ro l by means of a h i e r a r c h i c a l system o f a l -leg iances i n which m i l i t a r y serv i ces were rewarded with grants o f f i e f . The daimyo held a cons iderable p o r t i o n — u s u a l l y around twenty- f ive pe r -cent - -o f the lands w i th in h i s bunkoku as h i s p r i va te domain (chokkatsu-c h i ) , and the rest was entrusted to h i s vassa l s who he ld con t ro l over sect ions o f the bunkoku from for t res ses interspersed through i t . Wi th in the bunkoku the holdings of absentee l and lords , notably the kuge and o t e r a , were u sua l l y conf i scated by the daimyo, and there was l i t t l e or no contact between the provinces and Kyoto. 27 The forming, break ing, and reforming o f a l l i a n c e s with neighbouring d a i -myo went on inces sant l y as daimyo attempted to secure, and pos s ib l y ex -pand, t h e i r ho ld ings . A l l daimyo ex i s ted i n a balance of power s i t u a t i o n i n which t h e i r standing armies were ever at the ready to defend the bun-koku against the attacks of other daimyo who wished to expand t h e i r h o l d -ings , or to march against neighbouring daimyo for the same purpose. For example, Uesugi Kenshin of Echigo and Takeda Shlngen o f Kai p rov ince, two of the most powerful daimyo i n the mid-s ixteenth century, spent most o f t h e i r adu l t l i v e s f i gh t i n g against each other every year, u sua l l y at the same batt leground. Besides these inter-bunkoku tens ions , there were a l s o complex tensions w i t h i n any g iven bunkoku fo r a daimyo could never be c e r t a i n , i n that notor ious age o f gekoku.jo, that h i s vassa l s would remain l o y a l to him. A daimyo always had to be ready to defend h imse l f against h i s own sub-ord ina tes . With in the bunkoku. daimyo-Buddhist r e l a t i o n s v a r i ed according to a number o f cond i t ions and circumstances: the l o c a l e , the moment, the daimyo's personal a t t i t u d e towards Buddhism, the tendencies and s t ructures of the i n d i v i d u a l Buddhist groups w i t h i n the bunkoku, the number and i n t e n s i t y o f d i sputes between Buddhist groups at a p a r t i c u l a r t ime. The most bas ic f ac t about s ix teenth century Buddhism i s that the otera could not avoid coming i n t o contac t , and sometimes c o n f l i c t , with the daimyo. An otera located i n an area con t ro l l ed by, fo r example, the Rokkaku fami ly had to choose between alignment with the Rokkaku and def iance o f them by s i d i ng wi th an enemy daimyo l i k e Nobunaga. To s ide wi th Nobunaga was to Inv i te immediate punishment from the Rokkaku, but to s ide wi th them was to i n v i t e 28 Oda's wrath should h i s forces overcome the Rokkaku at some future po in t . There was no safe cho ice . An otera w i th wise leaders would attempt to maintain a low p r o f i l e and make no e x p l i c i t commitment to e i t h e r s ide — a weak o tera that held l i t t l e i n terms of secu lar power and land might succeed i n such a p l an and s imply be passed over by both p a r t i e s o f the c o n f l i c t ; but i f the otera were of cons iderable s i ze e i t he r i n terms of personnel or land ho ld ings , or both as was more l i k e l y the case, i t could not but a t t r a c t the a t t en t i on of the warring p a r t i e s , both of whom would want i t s a l l e g i ance because of the men and suppl ies that i t could prov ide. As a r u l e , t h e r e f o r e , otera both great and smal l could not avoid taking s ides i n the s trugg les o f the Sengoku p e r i o d . In order to su rv i ve , most smal ler otera entered in to a l l i a n c e s wi th daimyo, and abbots o f some of the l a rges t otera themselves tended to act l i k e daimyo. As we have seen, most otera were able to support themselves throughout Japanese h i s t o r y on the bas i s o f estates that they he ld i n t h e i r own names. Su rv i va l and p ro spe r i t y demanded the possess ion of vast estates that enjoyed shugo-funyu s ta tus . In the Sengoku p e r i o d , however, the d a i -myo t r i e d to reduce the holdings o f the l a rger o t e r a , depr ive them of t h e i r c o n t r o l o f the monzenmachi and, i n genera l , enforce a p o l i c y o f 27 c o n t r o l over the o tera w i th in t h e i r bunkoku. Very many p r o v i n c i a l c i t -i e s of Sengoku times were r e a l l y otera c i t i e s . For example, three of the ten c i t i e s i n the province o f Owari, Oda's home prov ince, had grown up around o te ra ; s i m i l a r i l y , four of the f i f t e e n c i t i e s i n Mino prov ince , four of e ight i n Yamato, four of twelve i n Yamashiro, four of fourteen i n Se t t su , and s i x o f twenty-three i n Omi p rov ince , had developed as monzen- machi. On the average one t h i r d o f a l l p r o v i n c i a l c i t i e s were monzenmachi. 29. Daimyo could not con t ro l the economy of t h e i r bunkoku unless they gained f i r m c o n t r o l over those c i t i e s which, i n the developing merchant economy, were sources o f much wealth. Sengoku daimyo a l s o made e f f o r t s to move the l o c a l headquarters of Bud-dh i s t schools i n to t h e i r c a s t l e towns (Jokamachi) where c lose s c ru t iny of the r e l i g i o u s groups could be maintained. Daimyo decided where otera could be b u i l t and thus the c a s t l e towns became the r e l i g i o u s centers of the bunkoku as w e l l as the admin i s t ra t i ve centers . However, wi th the Sengoku daimyo there was no u n i f i e d p o l i c y towards Buddhist i n s t i t u t i o n s through-out the whole country, and there was great v a r i e t y i n i n d i v i d u a l daimyo's successes i n c o n t r o l l i n g the o te ra . Some of the great o t e r a , notably Mt. H i e i , Mt. Koya, and Negoro, were so powerful that they could chal lenge i n d i v i d u a l daimyo, and could be con t ro l l ed only by consor t i a o f daimyo. Ye t , i t was not the large ancient otera that presented the greatest threat to the da imyo- - i t was., rather;, the power possessed by the Honganji Branch of True Pure Land Buddhism (Jodo-shinshu, or simply Shinshu). With the c e n t r a l admin i s t ra t ion i n u t t e r d i s a r r a y , the supporters o f the buppo. the o t e r a , e i t h e r had to l i n k up wi th Ind iv idua l daimyo who were the de fac to obo i n any g iven bunkoku, or attempt to formulate a new d e f i n i t i o n of the obo-buppo formula. It was Shinshu that had the p o t e n t i a l to br ing about the l a t t e r , and i t was, t he re fo re , o f s p e c i a l concern to the daimyo and p a r t i c u l a r i l y to Nobunaga. During the upset o f the Onin-Bunmei per iod the Shin school developed a powerful o rgan iza t ion that spread throughout a number of provinces i n c e n t r a l Japan, notab ly the provinces o f Kaga, Noto, Etchu, Ech izen, K i i , 30 Mikawa, Ise, Yamato, Yamashiro, Kawachi, Izumi, and Set t su. This phenom-enon reminds one o f a s i m i l a r development centur ies e a r l i e r when the smal l landholders i n the provinces gathered around the n o b i l i t y , e s p e c i a l l y the Minamoto, took up mar t i a l s k i l l s , and formed the bushi c l a s s . In the Sen-goku per iod newly a r i s en smal l landholders (myoshu) gathered around the o lder myoshu—these were the people who cons t i tu ted the p r o v i n c i a l l and -owning c l a s s , i . e . , the l o c a l gentry (dogo or koku1 in)—and, together wi th smal l l o c a l warr io r s ( l i samura i ) and peasant farmers (nomin). were organ-i zed by the daimyo i n to v i l l a g e - l i k e autonomous groupings c a l l e d so. A s -cending daimyo would s t ruc ture these so i n to groups that centered around the daimyo's c h i e f vassa l s and thereby create a strong o rgan iza t i ona l cha in of command that extended from the daimyo, through h i s v a s s a l s , down to the v i l l a g e l e v e l and the farming c l a s s . With the spread o f Shinshu from the time of Shinran i n the t h i r t e e n t h century, many v i l l a g e l e v e l gentry , small landholders , l o c a l war r i o r s , and farmers were converted. Converted gentry customar i ly b u i l t smal l Shinshu otera ( c a l l ed j i i n ) or " p r a c t i s e h a l l s " (dojo) on t h e i r lands i n and a -round the so, and many inhabi tants of the so became members of the Sh in -shu r e l i g i o u s groups, or " p a r i s h e s " (kyodan^that were beginning to form - 29 -around the newly constructed Shinshu o t e r a . The Shinshu f a i t h f u l , c a l -30 led monto. were thus organized i n to s t rong ly un i ted l o c a l groups under the leadersh ip of the l o c a l dogo. These l o c a l un i t s were un i ted i n t e r n a l l y , 31 and wi th one another, by r e l i g i o u s t i e s . In an area where there were many monto the Shin school had much power and cons iderable autonomy. Even l o c a l gentry who d id not j o i n the monto were forced to a l l y w i th them i n the event o f a d isturbance i n that area be -31 cause such gentry were s imply not strong enough to maintain t h e i r i nde -pendence. Towns of cons iderable s i z e grew up i n areas where there were concentra-t i ons of Shinshu monto and these new monzenmachi enjoyed shugo-funyu s ta tus . It was o f t en the case that farmers who jo ined the monto would leave the land and move to a monto town where they would become engaged i n merchant, money-lending, and commercial e n t e r p r i s e s , w i th the r e s u l t that many o f those towns began to develop in to p r o v i n c i a l commercial cen -t e r s . Provinces i n which the Shin school had bands o f monto were dotted with .11 i n and dojo that served as the ske leton o f a powerful body. In the province o f K i t , for example, there were almose three hundred Shinshu otera and branch o t e r a , most o f which were d i s t r i b u t e d along the coast but approximately seventy of them were c l o s e l y located i n the Saiga area 32 o f the prov ince. This was a most powerful monto group because i t held the d e l t a o f the K i i r i v e r , the on ly f e r t i l e p l a i n i n the prov ince. In the province of Owari, Shinshu otera were f a i r l y numerous—there were 33 probably about f o r t y i n a l l — b u t not on the sca le o f the monto bands i n provinces l i k e K i i , Kaga, and Ech izen. Thus, un l i ke the o lder Buddhist schools w i th t h e i r r e l a t i v e l y i n s u l a r , con f ined , and by and large c l e r i c a l s t r u c t u r e , the Shin school developed widespread bases of power among the peasantry and l o c a l gentry who were organized on a l o c a l s c a l e . The b e l i e f that f a i t h alone saves provided the monto w i th a r a t i o n a l e fo r denying both p o l i t i c a l and t r a d i t i o n a l r e l i g i o u s a u t h o r i t y , and the con f idence—on the bas i s o f t h e i r f a i t h i n 32 Amida—that they were i n v i n c i b l e , made them e s p e c i a l l y dangerous. The sheer numbers of monto gave to Shinshu the p o t e n t i a l to br ing about a new type of s oc ie ty bound together by r e l i g i o u s bonds. The moving f i gure and source of energy behind the transformation of a personal r e l i g i o u s f a i t h preached by Shinran in to a powerful r e l i g i o u s organ izat ion was Rennyo Kenju (1415-1499), the eighth ch ie f abbot of the 34 Honganji branch of Shinshu, and blood descendant of the great Shinran. U n t i l Rennyo appeared the groups of monto were not organized i n to any h i e r a r c h i c a l s t ruc ture with the Honganji at i t s apex, and Indeed the Hon-gan j i was cons iderably less powerful than the S e n j u j i , the c h i e f otera of the Takada branch of Shinshu, which had managed to impose i t s author-i t y on many p r o v i n c i a l monto groups. Through Rennyo's e f f o r t s the major-i t y of l oose ly connected bands of monto came to focus on the Honganji as t h e i r r e l i g i o u s center and were absorbed i n t o the f o ld of monto who took 35 orders from the abbot of the Honganji. In t h i s way the c h i e f abbot of the Honganji became, i n e f f e c t , a daimyo, and indeed h i s power r i v a l e d that of the greatest Sengoku daimyo. The power of the Honganji "Pope" from the time of Rennyo was a t tes ted to by the fact that he received the patronage of the leading m i l i t a r y f i gures of the per i od . In provinces where there was a high concentrat ion of monto an "Abbot 's Representat ive" (daibozu), who i s a l s o re fe r red to by h i s t o r i a n s as a "Bonze Daimyo" (bozu daimyo). was appointed over a l l monto throughout the 36 prov ince. These f igures were, in e f f e c t , vas sa l daimyo of the Hongan-j i * 8 daimyo-abbot, and they were, i n t h e i r own r i g h t , powerful daimyo. The Honganji was unique both i n terms of the type of o rgan iza t iona l s t r u c -33 ture that I t developed among the monto. and i n that the type of power i t wielded was not p r i m a r i l y over the land i t s e l f - - a s was the case with the Nara and Heian Buddhist i n s t i t u t i o n s — b u t over the workers o f the land and the v i l l a g e r s throughout the provinces o f c e n t r a l Honshu. Thus whi le the land i n Kaga, for example, may have a c t u a l l y been owned by o ther s , i t was the Honganji abbot who could con t ro l the province through the monto. Mt. H i e i could be crushed, or at any rate severe ly reduced, by the con-f i s c a t i o n of i t s e s t a te s , but t h i s was not the case wi th the Honganji. The economic power of the Honganji was not founded on vast estates but on the monto. and t h i s power was g rea t l y expanded by Rennyo by h i s e s t a b l i s h -ment o f a cont r ibut ions system whereby each l o c a l monto group r e g u l a r i l y sent donations to the Honganji. Those donations were pa id d i r e c t l y to the Honganji , ra ther than to the l o c a l o t e r a , and i n th i s way Rennyo both enhanced the p o s i t i o n o f the Honganji and prevented the bozu-daimyo i n the provinces from becoming too independent. Moreover, because the Hon-g a n j i monto were mainly concentrated i n c e n t r a l Honshu, the most econ-omica l l y advanced area of the country, a huge amount o f money flowed s t e a d i l y i n to the Honganji c o f f e r s . The great assembly o f monto who made up the Honganji branch o f Shinshu came to be c a l l e d the Ikko monto. and the school was p o p u l a r i l y c a l l e d the Ikkoshu. The term " i k k o " means " s ing le -minded" or "one- focused" , and i t came to be app l ied to the Honganji monto at t h i s time because of t h e i r ex -3 7 e l u s i v e r e l i a n c e on f a i t h i n Amida Buddha as the agent o f s a l v a t i o n . In h i s l a t e r years (1496-1497) Rennyo b u i l t the Yamashina (Kyoto) Hon-g a n j i as the new center fo r the masses of monto, and t h i s o tera came to 34 be the headquarters of what was, i n e f f e c t , a reserve army. Over the years down from Rennyo's time there were many upr i s ings by the monto throughout most o f the provinces l y i n g between the present Osaka and Tokyo. Those upr i s ings ( i k k i ) were c a l l e d "Ikko u p r i s i n g s " ( Ikko-38 i k k i ) . The causes of I kko- ikk i were many and va r i ed and they inc luded: demands f o r " v i r tuous admin i s t ra t ion o rder s " ( t o k u s e i r e i ) . i . e . , orders from the p r o v i n c i a l a u t h o r i t i e s whereby peop le ' s debts were cance led; s t rugg les w i th secular enemies or wi th the members of other Buddhist schoo l s , e s p e c i a l l y wi th the Hokkeshu monto: attempts to expand the area under monto c o n t r o l by d r i v i n g o f f the l o c a l daimyo's va s sa l s . It i s not to be thought that the I kko - ikk i were simply sporadic outbursts i nvo lv ing but a handful o f people fo r In Nobunaga's time thousands o f monto were mob i l i zed , many of them armed wi th guns. As Tamamuro T a i j o notes, many of the monto kyodan had become "combat groups" (sento-shudan) capable of 39 waging l a r ge - s ca l e and prot rac ted warfare. The f i r s t ind i sputab le e v i -dence of monto power was i n 1488 when the monto groups i n Kaga province un i ted to oust the shugo Togashi Masachika and e s t a b l i s h a " land run by 40 farmers" (hyakusho mochi no kun i ) . The shugo and representat ives o f the Ashikaga shogunate were d r i ven out o f Kaga which remained i n monto hands f o r almost one hundred years . There i s much debate among h i s t o r i a n s over the nature of the Ikko- ikk i and the degree to which they were a c t u a l l y " r e l i g i o u s " u p r i s i n g s , as w e l l 41 as over the r o l e played by the Honganji i n those up r i s i n g s . While hot denying that there were p o l i t i c a l and economic reasons fo r j o i n i n g the Ikko monto and f o r the Ikko u p r i s i n g s , nevertheless that which cemented together the peasants, l o c a l gentry , and l o c a l warr io r s i n the provinces 35 was t h e i r r e l i g i o u s t i e w i th the Honganji and wi th t h e i r fe l low monto. There i s a l s o no doubt that the Honganji could c a l l f o r and d i r e c t up-r i s i n g s . The fac t that there were upr i s ing s i n the provinces both before and a f t e r the per iod o f Honganji involvement i n them does not negate the r o l e that the Honganji d id i n fact p l a y . There i s a l s o cons iderable debate and disagreement about jus t when the Honganji abbots became respons ib le fo r i n i t i a t i n g I kko - i kk i . As a general r u l e the Honganji abbots abided by Sh lnran ' s d i r e c t i v e s and urged the monto to make compromises w i th the secu lar a u t h o r i t i e s , and i n the Sen-goku per iod they d i d t h e i r best to avoid involvements wi th the daimyo, aware as they were o f the sh i f t ing - sands nature of the t imes. Although i t i s genera l l y acknowledged that Rennyo was not respons ib le for urg ing the Kaga monto to oust the shugo. h i s f a i l u r e to d i s c i p l i n e them by excom-municating them, as he could have, seems to i nd i ca te that at least he 42 . condoned t h e i r behavior. S t i l l , i t was Rennyo*s general p o l i c y to t r y t o reduce tensions between the monto and the secu lar a u t h o r i t i e s by threatening t o excommunicate those who became embroiled i n s trugg les and who refused to obey the secu la r a u t h o r i t i e s . However, the s i t u a t i o n was such i n the Sengoku per iod that the monto were u l t i m a t e l y forced to choose between f i gh t i n g i n t h e i r own defense or being crushed. Shor t ly a f t e r Rennyo es tab l i shed a new Shinshu center i n Yo sh i -z a k i i n Ech izen p r o v i n c e — t o which he moved i n 1471 fo l lowing the de s t ruc -t i o n , i n 1465, o f the Otani Honganji, the s i t e o f Sh inran 's tomb i n Kyoto, by the Enryakuj i s ohe i—tens i on s began to mount between the monto and l o c a l bu sh i . and i n 1473 some bushi bands made an at tack on the monto. 36 Rather than passively endure those attacks Rennyo elected to defend his monto and he inspired them to this defense by reminding them that they had nothing to fear, including death, because their salvation was assured. Having successfully defended themselves, however, the Kaga monto groups refused to respect secular authority, a situation that led, in the end, to the conflict between them and Togashi Masachika from which the monto emerged triumphant. Rennyo's decision to take up arms in defense of the Honganji established a dangerous precedent for i t justified the use of force in defense of religion. Perhaps Rennyo would have reserved the application of this principle in only the most desperate circumstances, but other monto could invoke the principle to take up arms against any group that they cared to identify as their enemy. When Rennyo died in 1499 he was succeeded by Jitsunyo Koken, the fifth of his thirteen sons, who became the ninth chief abbot of the Honganji. During Jitsunyo's time the extent to which the monto openly opposed sec-ular authority expanded. In Article 3 of his last will and testament Jitsu-nyo told the monto: "You must defend the Obo, and preserve the buppo as i t was in the time of Shinrah." The problem was, however, that the obo was in disarray—the Sengoku daimyo were on the rise and clashes between them and the more powerful monto groups were a l l but inevitable. While most daimyo did their best to suppress, or at least control, the monto in their bunkoku. i t was not unusual for daimyo to attempt to use the powerful monto to their own ends. Such daimyo would promise to grant favors to the monto on condition that they render certain services. For 37 example, from 1506 to 1566 the house laws of the Hojo fami ly banned Sh in -shu from t h e i r domains, but i n 1566 t h i s ban was l i f t e d by Ho jo U j i t o r a who promised to res tore a l l Shinshu o tera i n the Kanto area on cond i t i on that the monto agree to take part i n a Hojo advance against the Uesugi 44 o f Bchigo. There are many cases of t h i s type of dea l i n g . Furthermore, the monto tended to be drawn i n t o c o n f l i c t s i n support of c e r t a i n bushi who were e s p e c i a l l y f r i e n d l y , or generous, to them. One such person was Hosokawa Masamoto, Governor General (kanrei ) from 1486 45 to 1507, who was a c lo se f r i e n d of Rennyo and a patron o f the Honganji. When Masamoto requested the ass i s tance of Settsu and Kawachi monto i n h i s campaigns against the Hatakeyama i n 1506, J i t sunyo r e p l i e d that the Hon-g a n j i made a po in t o f never becoming involved i n daimyo d i sputes , but Masamoto i n s i s t e d that he deserved monto help by v i r t u e o f h i s past gener-o s i t y to the Honganji* The monto agreed with J i t sunyo ' s r e f u s a l , saying that they had no weapons and that ever s ince the time of Shinran they had stayed out o f such involvements. Despite those re fu sa l s Masamoto i n s i s t e d and J i t sunyo c a u s t i c a l l y asked him: "Would you make me do something never 46 done s ince the time of our founder?" In the end, Masamoto rece ived the ass i s tance of one thousand monto from Kaga prov ince. The c lo se t i e s between the Honganji and i t s daimyo f r iends on the one hand, and the threat posed to the monto by i t s daimyo enemies on the o the r , u l t i m a t e l y brought the Honganji i n t o the c o n f l i c t s o f the Sengoku p e r i o d . Fol lowing J i t sunyo*s death i n 1525, h i s son Shonyo Kokyo succeeded him as the tenth c h i e f abbot of the Honganji. When the Yamashina Honganji was 38 burned down i n r e l i g i o u s wars i n 1532, Shonyo moved to the area of modern Osaka and b u i l t the immense Ishiyama Honganji which was to be the center o f the Ikkoshu u n t i l 1580. The con f ronta t ion between Oda Nobunaga and the Ishiyama Honganji was i n -e v i t a b l e because those areas i n which the monto were most powerful were p r e c i s e l y the areas that Nobunaga had t o br ing under h i s con t ro l i n order t o u n i f y the center o f the country. Honganji monto power extended i n an arch over Oda's home province o f Owari: to the east o f Owari the monto i n Mikawa formed one cornerstone o f that a r c h , and t o the west i n Osaka was the Honganji i t s e l f and i t s monto i n the provinces of K i i , Izumi, and Set -t s u , who formed the other cornerstone. Across the curve o f the arch from east to west were the Ikko forces i n the provinces of Mino, H ida, Kaga, Noto, Ech izen, Omi, and Ise. The keystone o f t h i s arch was made up of the excep t i ona l l y powerful monto of Kaga and Echizen who were po i sed, to the no r th , d i r e c t l y over Owari. Besides t h i s arch of power, the monto were d i s t r i b u t e d i n such a way as t o form a strong bar r ie r ? - runn ing i n a l i n e north-south across Honshu from the P a c i f i c Ocean to the Japan Sea through the provinces of Ise, Omi, Mino, and Echizen—between Owari and the c a p i t o l . In order to br ing Hon-shu under h i s c o n t r o l i t was necessary f o r Oda to p i e r c e the north-south b a r r i e r , topple the Ikko a r ch , and destroy i t s cornerstone i n Osaka. Nobunaga undertook t h i s e f f o r t dur ing the ascendancy of Kennyo Kosa, e l e v -47 enth c h i e f abbot o f the Honganji. The c o n f l i c t between Oda and Kennyo spanned the years between 1570 and 1580, and i s known as the Ishiyama Honganji War (Ishiyama Honganji i k k i . or kassen). This was the major con -39 f l i c t o f the e n t i r e Sengoku p e r i o d . The power of the Ikkoshu represented the greatest obstac le to Oda Nobunaga i n h i s e f f o r t s to un i f y the country f o r the fo l lowing reasons: 1. The Honganji was, as we have exp la ined, the hub o f a broad based and h i gh l y organized s t ruc ture which, l i k e an octopus, spread i t s tentac les throughout most o f the provinces between the Kansai and Kanto p l a i n s . In t h i s regard i t was unique fo r no other i n s t i t u t i o n , e i t h e r secu lar or r e l i -g i ous , commanded such a wide-spread base o f power. The daimyo and the great o tera l i k e Negoro and Koya he ld a type o f power b u i l t on a r e l a t i v e -l y conf ined geographical b a s e — t h e i r bunkoku i n the case o f the daimyo, and t h e i r shoen i n the case of the o te ra—which served as both the source o f supply fo r t h e i r troops as w e l l as the l a s t bas t ion to which they could be pushed back and which, i f destroyed, meant t h e i r e l i m i n a t i o n as powers to be reckoned w i th . Prom a next to impregnable f o r t re s s i n Ssaka, the Honganji could d i r e c t movements o f the monto throughout the prov inces . Rather than having to d i spatch an army i n to the f i e l d from Osaka, and thereby expose the Honganji to a t tack , Kennyo could command the mob i l -i z a t i o n o f large l o c a l f o rces . Should those forces s u f f e r a defeat i n one p rov ince , ne i ther the Honganji nor the monto groups i n other p rov inces , were e s p e c i a l l y endangered. The loss o f one ten tac le d i d not grave ly threaten the l i f e o f the monto octopus as a whole. Thus, without ever ex -posing h i s base Kennyo could keep Oda occupied on a number of f ronts at the same time by c a l l i n g on the p r o v i n c i a l monto groups to r i s e up i n arms. Kennyo was, i n e f f e c t , a daimyo at the head of a c o a l i t i o n of v a s -s a l da imyo—his bonze-daimyo—who headed the major branches of the Ikko-shu i n the provinces and who, i n t u r n , had l e s se r bonze -o f f l eer s under them. 4 a 2. The Honganji did not have to maintain a standing army in the field. No supply lines were stretched from the Honganji to the fighting forces afield. Local monto forces provided their own supplies—they were es-sentially guerilla fighters who could rise up at the Honganji's ca l l , and who could as easily disperse upon receipt of orders to stand down. They fed, clothed, and housed,themselves, and required no funds from a central treasury as did the sohei and the daimyo's troops. Indeed, i f a flow of goods went in any direction i t was not from the Honganji but rather to i t from the provincial monto groups that kept the Honganji sup-plied with men and material. Here again i f one monto group, one arm of the octopus, were-severed, the others could continue to provision the Honganji. 3. A further advantage enjoyed by the Honganji was its position on Osaka Bay. Even should a l l tentacles throughout the Kinai be severed, the Hon-ganji could s t i l l be supplied by sea, as indeed i t was by the Mori of Aki province from 1576. The Honganji could face north-east for supplies by land and south-west for supplies by sea, a l l the while enjoying an im-pregnable position atop a mountain with a steep bluff that prevented its being surrounded and stormed. 4. The religious nature of the bond between the Honganji and its monto made the easy shifting of allegiances next to impossible. Thus Nobunaga could not make use of the standard daimyo practise of enticing segments of the opposing forces into one's camp and thereby split the enemy's forces. A general might betray his lord, switch sides, and lead his troops over to the enemy's side, but monto leaders were loathe to betray their bond with the Honganji. There is no evidence that Oda ever succeeded in luring 41 Honganji monto i n t o h i s camp. This i s not to imply that the monto were imbued wi th an except i ona l l y ardent and l o y a l type o f f a i t h . Membership i n the monto kyodan was e s p e c i a l l y a t t r a c t i v e to the small landholders and the peasant c las ses i n the Sengoku per iod because i t enabled them to enjoy a degree o f autonomy, power, and s e c u r i t y that was not e a s i l y come by i n the upset o f the t imes, and p r o v i n c i a l townsmen were able to enjoy a cons iderab le degree o f economic p ro spe r i t y i n the commercial centers that developed around Ikko o t e r a . The r e l i g i o u s t i e was a strong ad -d i t i o n a l l i n k between the Honganji and i t s monto. 5. Most important ly , the Honganji served as the r a l l y i n g p o i n t , together w i th the shogun Ashikaga Yosh iak i who was a c t i v e l y and openly opposed to Nobunaga from 1573, around which those p a r t i e s opposed to Nobunaga might gather. Thus, the Honganji was not on ly the hub of an a l l i a n c e o f monto. f o r between the years 1570 and 1580 i t was the center of a league o f d a i -myo who attempted to b lock Nobunaga. As e a r l y as 1568 a number of daimyo— notably the Asakura of Ech izen, the A s a i o f Omi, the Rokkaku of 5mi and Yamashiro, and the Miyoshi o f Awa—joined with the Honganji to form the "anti-Nobunaga league". As Nobunaga overcame each o f these daimyo t h e i r p laces were taken by o ther s , l i k e the Uesugi o f Echigo, the Takeda of K a i , the Mori o f A k i , and the Bessho of Harima. Although the league membership f requent ly changed, the Honganji ever f i gured l a r g e l y as i t s un i f y ing cen -t e r . To that end Kennyo took advantage of the fact that the Honganji ab-bots were allowed to marry to cement r e l a t i o n s wi th the daimyo. For ex-ample, i n 1571 Kennyo*s e ldes t son Kyonyo Koju married a daughter o f A sa -kura Yoshikage, l o rd o f Echizen p rov ince , and thereby strengthened the Honganj i -Echizen l i n k , and because Yoshikage's mother was a member o f the 42 famous Takeda family the Honganji thereby a l so forged a l i n k with the l o rd of Ka i prov ince. The s p e c i a l danger presented by the anti-Nobunaga league was the fact that i t s members were located i n such a way as to lend added strength to the arch of monto poised over Gwari prov ince. The westernmost cornerstone o f the Ikko arch i n Osaka was supported by the Mlyoshi o f Awa and the Mor i of A k i , and the easternmost cornerstone was strengthened by the Takeda i n Kai prov ince. Between those po ints were a number o f daimyo a l -l i e s o f the Honganji who lent t h e i r support to the a rch , e s p e c i a l l y Asa-kura Yoshikage o f Echizen province whose bunkoku was located near the keystone o f the arch. Th i s was the power s t ructure that Nobunaga confronted. It was because of the foregoing fac tor s that the Honganji presented a s p e c i a l problem to Nobunaga, and because o f them that h i s campaign against i t spread over ten years. The Honganji was the only r e l i g i o u s i n s t i t u t i o n s t h a t was power-f u l enough to o f f e r an opt ion to the u n i f i c a t i o n of Japan under a c o a l i -t i o n of bushJL--it was the most u n i f i e d of a l l o f Nobunaga's enemies, and the greater the degree o f un i t y w i th in a group the greater the d i f f i c u l t y i n br ing ing i t under c o n t r o l . Most h i s t o r i a n s agree that there was no p o s s i b i l i t y o f the development of a "country run by farmers" with the Honganji at the apex of power--the m i l i t a r y c l a s s would never have permitted such an unprecedented turn of events because bush i . u l t i m a t e l y , would not be subservient to a r e l i g i o u s over lo rd . Be t h i s as i t may from the vantage point of l a t e r h i s t o r i a n s , i t was not so c l e a r to Oda that such a p o s s i b i l i t y was not v i a b l e . The Hon-43 g a n j i represented the most powerful b loc a f t e r Oda's and, t h e o r e t i c a l l y at any r a t e , i t could have forged a new type of regime. The fact that there was no precedent i n Japanese h i s t o r y for such an arrangement brought, one may be sure, l i t t l e comfort to Nobunaga. Besides these factors that contr ibuted to the advantage of the Honganji i n i t s s trugg le wi th Nobunaga, there were other fac tors that m i l i t a t e d against i t s success: 1. There was a c e r t a i n psycho log ica l f ac to r that i n h i b i t e d Kennyo: he does not appear to have had the stomach for a massive conf ronta t ion with Oda. While Oda had a v i s i o n of a u n i f i e d Japan, Kennyo had no equiva lent v i s i o n . Kennyo wanted to maintain the status quo and he appears to have been w i l l i n g to s e t t l e for a precar ious balance of power s i t u a t i o n be -tween the anti-Nobunaga league and Nobunaga's c o a l i t i o n . He appears to have been more in teres ted i n ga in ing a peace, even under les s than f avor -ab le c ircumstances, than i n ga in ing a d e c i s i v e v i c t o r y over Nobunaga. Ken-nyo lacked the d r i ve and ambit ion needed to be t te r Nobunaga. 2. Unl ike Nobunaga, Kennyo was more l i k e l y to obey Imperial or shogunal decrees even when they threatened h i s p o s i t i o n . Nobunaga ob l iged only when he considered It to h i s advantage. This gave Nobunaga an advantage over Kennyo because, i n the event that the s i t u a t i o n took a turn for the worse for Oda, he could p e t i t i o n the court to decree a t ruce between him-s e l f and Kennyo conf ident that Kennyo would accept the decree. Kennyo could enjoy no such conf idence. For example, i n 1578, when Oda's general A rak i Murashige betrayed Oda and a l l i e d with the anti-Nobunaga league, Oda f e l t compelled to make peace with the Honganji i n order to ga in the time required to e l iminate A r a k i . While peace negot iat ions were being 44 held, a certain Nakagawa Kiyohide, one of Araki*s leading generals, be-trayed his lord Araki and came over to Oda's side. Oda immediately called off the peace negotiations, even though they were being conducted under Imperial decree and through the intercession of Imperial envoys. 3. It is incorrect to assume that Kennyo had absolute control over the monto. Local monto groups had considerable autonomy and uprisings could, and did, occur with neither the instigation nor the approval of the Hon-ganji. Local conditions could spark an Ikko-ikki, and even though Kennyo could call for a mobilization of the monto there was a possibility that his orders might go unheeded should local conditions require a particular monto group to act in its own best interests. Kennyo*s reasons for urging an uprising invariably involved matters of a national, or at least trans-provincial nature, but local monto frequently had less grand although none the less pressing reasons for revolt. Monto local interests militated against their embracing a trans-provincial focus, and they were inclined to obey Honganji commands only when those commands coincided with their own best interests. 4. The Honganji had no powerful field marshal who could direct monto movements on a number of fronts simultaneously—Kennyo himself never per-sonally conducted troops in the field. Among the Honganji's most able generals were several members of the Shimozuma family, a family whose members had been leaders of the Shinshu monto since the time of Shinran. In Nobunaga's time Shimozuma Raisho (Yoriteru) was the head of the monto in Echizen, and others like Shimozuma Raijun (Yorlzumi), Rairen (Yoriyasu), and Rairyu (Yoritatsu), commanded provincial monto groups, but the lack of an overall, united, command proved cr i t i c a l . Never once did monto 45 forces move against Nobunaga on a l l f ronts s imultaneoulsy. While Echizen monto might have been mob i l i zed , those i n K i i might w e l l have been do r -mant. While there were strong v e r t i c a l l i n k s between the Honganji and the monto groups, there were no strong h o r i z o n t a l connections between the monto i n Ech izen, f o r example, and those i n K i i , and no f i e l d marshal ap-peared to forge those l i n k s . Occas iona l ly the monto of one area would c o -operate wi th and a s s i s t those of another a rea , but t h i s was by way of ex-cept ion rather than es tab l i shed p r a c t i s e . Because of the shortage of competent f i e l d o f f i c e r s , on at l eas t one o c -cas ion Kennyo was forced to p lace the monto forces under the d i r e c t com-mand of non-monto daimyo. In 1572 Kennyo ordered the monto to mix i n with A s a i Nagamasa's troops and f i gh t under Nagamasa's command. This was not a s a t i s f a c t o r y arrangement, however, because bushi and monto had d i f f e r -ent l o y a l t i e s and d i f f e r e n t i n t e r e s t s . I r o n i c a l l y , the lack of a c l e a r l y d i scernab le o f f i c e r corps was, i n one respec t , an advantage to the Honganji: monto o f f i c e r s were more d i spen -sable than the key generals i n the case of a daimyo. Had there been a c l e a r l y d i scernab le leadership corps i t s e l im ina t i on might have brought monto forces i n the f i e l d to a h a l t much more qu i ck l y than was a c t u a l l y the case. 5. With in the monto ranks there was some d i s sens ion and d i s u n i t y . In 1577, f o r example, a c o n f l i c t broke out between Nanazato Y o r i c h i k a , Kennyo's ap-pointed admin i s t rator o f Kaga prov ince , and Kaburaki Yorinobu, c a s t e l l a n of Matsutae f o r t re s s i n that prov ince. Interna l d isputes weakened the monto and d i s s i pa ted t h e i r power by causing s e l f - d e s t r u c t i v e i k k i . 46 The Honganji, then, was i n command of a r e l a t i v e l y d i sorganized force under something less than i t s complete c o n t r o l . Without a r a d i c a l strengthening o f t h e i r i n t e r n a l o r gan i za t i on , the non-bushi forces o f the Honganji could not but l o se , i n the end, to Nobunaga's t i gh t and proven armies. Furthermore, the anti-Nobunaga league had a c r i t i c a l f law: namely, i t had no p o s i t i v e , u n i f y i n g , cause that a l l members of the league shared. Each member of the league was in teres ted i n prevent ing Oda Nobunaga from u n i f y -ing the country and thereby br ing ing a l l the daimyo in to submission. While the Honganji acted as the un i f y i ng center o f the league wi th strong t i e s to each member i n i t , there were no strong l a t e r a l t i e s among the league members. Although the Asakura, fo r example, were members o f the league i n the e a r l y 1570*8, they had l i t t l e sympathy fo r the cause of the Kaga and Echizen monto. Asakura Yoshikage's father Norikage spent most o f h i s l i f e f i g h t i n g t o keep the Kaga and Echizen monto from taking con t ro l o f h i s bunkoku i n Ech izen, and Yoshikage a l s o warred wi th the monto u n t i l 1562 when a peace was concluded and monto con t ro l was l im i ted to the one province of Kaga. The problem, the re fo re , was that there was no f o ca l po in t of l o y a l t y w i t h i n the anti-Nobunaga league: a l l that the Honganji, Mor i , and the shogun had i n common was a de s i re to prevent Nobunaga from acqu i r ing a h igh degree of cen t r a l au thor i t y . It was a case of the enemy of my enemy being my f r i e n d , and i t i s thus appropr ia te ly termed the " a n t i -Nobunaga l eague . " Although the Honganji managed to br ing a cons iderable degree o f u n i t y to the anti-Nobunaga league, the league never developed a s i ng le command s t ruc ture that embraced both monto and bushi under a s ing le au thor i t y . 47 Each daimyo member of the league held supreme author i t y over h i s v a s s a l s , and t h i s made i t most d i f f i c u l t to coordinate a uni ted assau l t on Oda. Bes ides, r e l a t i o n s between daimyo members o f the anti-Nobunaga league were f r a g i l e . Peace pledges among daimyo were almost i n v a r i a b l y o f no l a s t i n g v a l u e , and one simply could not depend on t h e i r being honored. One of the p a r t i c i p a n t s o f the peace might, alone or i n league with o ther s , a t tack the other p a r t i c i p a n t without warning or provocat ion. A peace agreement was o f ten nothing more than a breathing s p e l l between campaigns. Such agreements u sua l l y meant nothing more than that the con-tes tant s were both in te res ted i n h a l t i n g h o s t i l i t i e s fo r an undetermined length o f t ime, and both would know that the agreement was no longer In e f f e c t when one or the other reopened h o s t i l i t i e s . In h i s peace pledges Oda Nobunaga was accustomed to c a l l upon Bonten, Taishaku, Hachiman Da i -bosatsu, Hakuzan, Atago, and a l l the other (unnamed) Kami and Buddhas, e s p e c i a l l y h i s own " f ami l y gods" (u j l gaml ) . to punish him with the most dreadfu l d iseases i n t h i s l i f e and wi th e te rna l damnation i n the next 48 should he betray h i s p ledge. Despite the h igh-f lown rhe to r i c o f such p ledges, they had no r e a l b ind ing fo rce . In the end, the a l l i a n c e be-tween monto and bushi was by nature r a r e l y a comfortable o n e - - i t was usu -a l l y a marriage o f convenience. I r o n i c a l l y , i t was the Ikko monto that cont r ibu ted , more than any other s i n g l e f a c t o r , to Nobunaga's eventual success i n a t t a i n i n g great power. Th i s was because the monto forces f requent ly kept at bay those daimyo who might w e l l have otherwise presented the most ser ious threat to Oda when he was s o l i d i f y i n g h i s con t ro l over Owari between 1553 and 1558. The monto were not e s p e c i a l l y powerful i n Owari, nor i n Mino province which Oda 48 wrested from the Sa i to fami ly between 1558 and 1564. However, other daimyo who were f a r more powerful than Oda was at that time were plagued wi th Ikko upr i s ings i n t h e i r home prov inces . Both the Asakura of Echizen and the Uesugi o f Echigo were so preoccupied wi th c o n t r o l l i n g monto forces that threatened to overrun t h e i r bunkoku that they had l i t t l e time to con -cern themselves wi th Oda's operat ions . Had Nobunaga been plagued by Ikko upr i s ing s i n h i s e a r l i e r years he could never have gained power so q u i c k l y . Although the Ikko monto were les s than p e r f e c t l y organized, the degree of o rgan iza t ion that they d id achieve made them the most formidable force i n a world charac ter i zed by the f r ac tu r i ng o f soc ie ty i n to many sma l l , autonomous u n i t s . Thus i t was the Honganji that presented the greatest obstac le to Oda Nobunaga. The Honganji was not the only r e l i g i o u s i n s t i t u t i o n that possessed much power i n the mid-s ix teenth century. P a r a l l e l i n g the r i s e o f the Ikko monto i n the provinces was the spread o f the Hokkeshu, or N ich i renshu, among the newly developed "town groups" (machishu). These were groups of "townsmen" (chonin)--merchants, a r t i s a n s , money-lenders, and warehousemen— that appeared i n the l a t e Muromachi per iod and that formed the new " b u s i -ness " c l a s s . While many of the new commercial centers i n the provinces were made up l a r g e l y of Ikko monto. townsmen i n and around the c a p i t o l , 49 and i n major t rad ing centers l i k e Saka i , became N ich i ren monto. In Oda's time the N i ch i ren monto a c t u a l l y c o n t r o l l e d Kyoto and Sakai—Kyoto had become such an important business center that t h i s aspect overshadowed i t s t r a d i t i o n a l i d e n t i t y as government center and i t came to be c a l l e d Kyoto C i t y (Kyoto-machi) rather than Miyako. 49 In the e a r l y decades of the s ix teenth century, p a r t i c u l a r ! l y i n the e a r l y 1530*8, there were many "Hokke u p r i s i n g s " (Hokke-ikki) i n protes t against var ious taxes that the townsmen-monto were expected to pay, and others caused by tensions between the Hokke monto and the sohei of Mt. H i e i . In the summer of 1536 the Hokke monto su f fered a severe blow at the hands of the Enryakuj i i n the s o - c a l l e d Tenbun Hokke Disturbance (Tenbun Hokke no Ran) when s i x t y thousand H i e i sohei descended on Kyoto, burned down some twenty-one Hokke o t e r a , and drove the monto out o f the c i t y . This d i s -turbance was sparked when Hokke monto c r i t i c i z e d and rebuked some Tendai bonzes who were preaching i n Kyoto. Although the Hokke monto were severe ly weakened by the Enryakuj i a c t i o n , they were s t i l l powerful i n Kyoto i n Nobunaga*8 time."*^ The Hokke monto had a p a r t i c u l a r a b i l i t y to a t t r a c t the i r e of many d a i -myo f o r , as Tamamuro T a i j o exp la in s , many of them were exces s i ve ly boast -f u l about t h e i r t r a d i t i o n and they had a narrow minded and e x c l u s i v i s t i c view o f r e l i g i o n . 5 * The Hokke monto were e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y convinced o f the pureness o f the Hokke teaching—and therefore of the imper fect ion of a l l other teachings—which they attempted to spread by a technique c a l l e d "ahakubuku". This term re fe r red to the uncommonly aggressive p r a c t i s e of "stamping out e v i l " , i . e . , other Buddhist schoo l s , and fo rc ing convers ions. One o f the main ways i n which the shakubuku p r a c t i s e was implemented was by engaging i n pub l i c r e l i g i o u s debates (shuron) i n which the e r ro r s of the opposing school were to be exposed and t h e i r adherents punished. Not s u r p r i s i n g l y such debates f requent ly resu l ted i n v i o l e n t outbursts be -tween the members of the two schools involved i n the debate, sosmuch; so that we f i nd many instances of daimyo banning a l l r e l i g i o u s debates i n 5Q t h e i r domains. For example, one of the a r t i c l e s o f the house laws of the Takeda fami ly s t a t e d : "There must be no r e l i g i o u s d i sputes between the Pure Land and N ich i ren schools i n these domains. Anyone who i n s t i g a te s 52 them w i l l be punished together wi th the bonzes. " Chosokabe house laws commanded the bonzes o f a l l schools to concern themselves e x c l u s i v e l y wi th r e l i g i o u s learn ing and p r a c t i s e and to r e f r a i n from debates. There 53 are many examples of laws of t h i s k i n d . Although the Hokke school had a large fo l lowing o f l ay members, for sev-e r a l reasons i t d i d not present a threat to Nobunaga on the same sca le as that presented by the Honganji monto: 1. The Hokkeshu lacked the c r i t i c a l ingredient that would po s s i b l y have p rope l l ed i t i n to the front ranks of Oda's enemies i n that i t had no equiva lent o f the Honganji "Pope" (Kennyo). I t lacked the degree of cen -t r a l i z e d focus and s ing le l i n e o f au thor i t y that could have t i e d together a l l monto i n a s i ng le h ie rarchy . The school never had a Rennyo. Hokkeshu otera were more autonomous than Shinshu o te ra - - they had a l o c a l focus , l o c a l i n t e r e s t s , and l o c a l c o n t r o l . Even though many merchants were Hokke monto. the focus of Kyoto merchants was on Kyoto, Sakai merchants on Saka i , and so on. Loya l ty among the Hokke monto appears t o have been more to the i n d i v i d u a l who converted them than i t was to the l o c a l o tera or to the school i t s e l f ; the i n d i v i d u a l on whom t h e i r p i e t y was founded was the main f o c a l po i n t . Therefore the Hokke monto d i d not have the s t ructured l i n e s of c o n t r o l and the c e n t r a l i z a t i o n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of Shinshu. 2. In general i t was i n the daimyo's best i n te re s t s to be on good terms w i th the Hokke monto because t h e i r business s k i l l s were needed for the development o f commerce i n the bunkoku. and to that end the daimyo o f ten 51 granted exemptions from taxes and gave various incentives to merchant families, many of whom were Hokke monto. Besides, because the Hokkeshu townsmen were prospering in the business world, they were not as inclined to take part in uprisings and revolts as were those less prosperous. 3. The Hokke monto appear to have had an attitude whereby they tended to identify as their mortal enemy less the daimyo and the secular author-ities than the other Buddhist schools which they delighted In besting. Their wild and thoughtless plunge into the Azuchi Religious Debate (Azuchi Shuron), as shall be seen in Chapter 3, points up this fact. The monto were willing to risk defying Nobunaga's orders to disband and refrain from coming to Azuchi in the interest of routing representatives of the Pure Land school in a religious debate. The Zen school too had a broad following but i t presented no threat to Nobunaga for the following reasons: 1. The Zenshu members were not organized into structured kyodan under the central leadership of a Zen "Pope". 2. While the Ikko monto were mainly provincial peasants and local gentry who could easily identify the bushi as their enemy, and while the Hokke monto were mainly townsmen, Zenshu membership was largely from among the bushi class. Thus the Zen bonzes were less likely to see themselves as apart from, or in opposition to, that class. Tamamuro Taijo explains, in 54 his Nihon Bukkyo-shi. how many Sengoku daimyo--including the Imagawa, Takeda, Hojo, Saito, Asakura, and Mori—were on intimate terms with Zen bonzes, and how they were interested in inculcating a certain Zen atmos-phere or spirit in their domains. He suggests that the daimyo sought in 52 Zen a peace of mind that was d i f f i c u l t to come by i n the turmoi l o f the Sengoku p e r i o d . Another dimension o f the Zenshu-bushi r e l a t i on sh ip i s brought out i n the r e l a t i o n s h i p between Imagawa Yoshimoto and the R i n -z a l Zen bonze Taigen Sufu, fo r not only was Yoshimoto on good " r e l i g i o u s " terms wi th Taigen but the l a t t e r was a l s o an adv i ser to the Imagawa In the area of m i l i t a r y s t rategy. A reason commonly suggested fo r the good r e l a t i o n s between the daimyo and Zenshu i s that the daimyo may have seen i n the Zen i n s t i t u t i o n s a model o f d i s c i p l i n e that they hoped to have t h e i r r e t a ine r s emulate. 3. Although Zen otera enjoyed shogunal patronage and g rea t l y prospered dur ing the Ashikaga p e r i o d , they were ever kept on a short leash . The i r very prox imity to the bushi kept them from acqu i r ing much independence, and by the l a t e f i f t e e n t h century the Zen Gozan i n s t i t u t i o n s were Im-poverished and incapable o f acqu i r ing power. While the type of power possessed by the Shin and Hokke schools rested on the support o f t h e i r monto. the schools of the Nara and Heian periods depended on vast t r a c t s o f land that could support large armies of sohe i . Of those ancient o tera the most powerful ones i n the s i x teenth century were the Enryakuj i (Mt. H i e i ) , the Kongobuji (Mt. Koya), and the Negoroj i . Each of these was the c h i e f o tera (hon11, or hpnzan) of a system of branch otera (matsujJL), most of which were c l o s e l y grouped around the c h i e f otera although some branches were very far removed from i t . The Negoroj i had as many as 2700 branches dur ing the Ashikaga p e r i o d , and at i t s peak the Enryakuj i was the center of a huge network o f branch otera scat tered through the v a l l e y s of Mt. H i e i for a d i s tance of about e ight mi les and i nc lud ing upwards of 3800 bu i l d i n g s . Even i n i t s reduced cond i t i on i n the 53 s i x teenth century the Enryakuj i had over four hundred branch otera on Mt. H i e i . Each of those three great otera commanded an army of sohei numbering at l ea s t f i v e thousand men i n Nobunaga's t ime. The Jesu i t miss ionary Padre V i l e l a estimated that Negoro kept an army of upwards o f twenty thousand sohei i n the s ix teenth c e n t u r y , 5 5 and i t i s u sua l l y estimated that Mt. Koya had approximately seven thousand bonzes and at l eas t that many sohe i . Negoro sohei were equipped with the most up to date weapons of the day because the Negoroj i was one of the f i r s t producers o f f irearms which had been introduced by the Portuguese i n 1543. A group of Negoro sohei formed a famous " r i f l e corps " ( teppota i ) . and there i s a p o s s i b i l i t y that they a l so made use of rudimentary canons. The Negoro sohei were so powerful that they could even dare to defy Impe-r i a l commands to cease f i g h t i n g , as indeed they d id i n the e a r l y 1560's when they h i r e d themselves out as mercenaries to Hatakeyama Takamasa, l o rd of Kawachi p rov ince , and took par t i n h i s campaigns against the Miyoshi of Awa. The c h i e f abbots o f those three otera were daimyo i n t h e i r own r i g h t , and they cou ld , and d i d , negot iate w i th and enter i n to a l l i a n c e s w i th the daimyo. The Enryakuj i enjoyed e s p e c i a l l y good r e l a t i o n s w i th the daimyo i n neighbouring areas because i t was customary fo r daimyo l i k e the A s a i , Goto, Kuroda, and Rokkaku, to send t h e i r c h i l d r e n to be educated on Mt. H i e i . Because of t h e i r power those great o tera were able to sus ta in the en joy -ment o f shugo-funyu status and keep most o f t h e i r estates even i n the upset o f the Sengoku pe r i od . The i r r h e t o r i c defended t h e i r p r i v i l e g e d con -d i t i o n wi th reference to ancient precedent, but i n fact t h e i r defense 54 res ted on t h e i r a b i l i t y to r e s i s t externa l threats to t h e i r s e c u r i t y . Despite t h e i r power those otera shared a grave weakness i n that they were r e l a t i v e l y i s o l a t e d power b locs with no large foi lowings from among the masses, no monto to lend them support during a c r i s i s . Mt. Koya had as part o f i t s membership—in add i t i on to Its " scho lar bonzes" (gakuryo)^^ and "laymgn" ( g y o n i n ) , ^ many of whom were s o h e i — a group c a l l e d h i j i r i . ^ These were p i l g r i m bonzes who wandered alone or i n small groups throughout the countrys ide preaching Buddhist s a l v a t i o n , but they d id not develop kyodan i n those areas through which they t r a v e l l e d . Although many l a i t y throughout the provinces looked upon h i j i r i as t h e i r r e l i g i o u s masters, they were more l i k e personal d i s c i p l e s o f the rather char ismat ic h i j i r i than members of a s t ructured organ iza t ion with Mt. Koya at the apex. Be-s i de s , i t i s suspected that many o f the h i j i r i were less r e l i g i o u s f i gures than wandering merchants and a r t i s ans who spread not Buddhist s a l v a t i on but merchant s k i l l s i n the provinces through which they wandered. Given t h i s type of s t r u c t u r e , i t was, t h e o r e t i c a l l y , a r e l a t i v e l y simple th ing for a daimyo to erad icate any o f those great otera i n a s ing le campaign-- i t was s imply a matter o f surrounding the base of the mountain on which the otera stood and order ing h i s troops to advance up the mountain. This was not the case wi th the Honganji monto. F i n a l l y , the ancient Nara otera had very l i t t l e power i n the mid-s ixteenth century. Several of them, notably the Kofukuj i and the T O d a i j i , had bands of sohei but they had been severe ly reduced e a r l i e r i n the century as a r e s u l t o f c o n f l i c t s wi th daimyo and other r e l i g i o u s i n s t i t u t i o n s . For ex-ample, the Kofukuj i was badly burned dur ing an I kko- ikk i i n 1533, and the T o d a i j i was set a f i r e , and the h a l l that she l tered the famous daibutsu was 55 completely destroyed, during a b a t t l e between Matsunaga Hisahide, l o rd of Kawachi and Yamato prov inces , and h i s former masters the Miyoshi o f Awa, i n 1567. A l s o , the Nara otera l o s t many of t h e i r estates because they could not prevent t h e i r c o n f i s c a t i o n by the daimyo. Thus, r e l a t i v e l y weak and wi th no organ izat ions of l ay members, the Nara otera d i d not f i gure l a r g e l y i n Nobunaga's campaigns against the Buddhist i n s t i t u t i o n s . That which prevented the Buddhist i n s t i t u t i o n s from o f f e r i n g a po s s i b l y indomitable re s i s tance to any and a l l who might have attempted to sup-press t h e i r power or con f i s ca te t h e i r lands was t h e i r t o t a l lack of un i t y . This was true not only i n the case of r e l a t i o n s between d i f f e r e n t schools but even w i t h i n each schoo l . Most otera were in te res ted i n maintaining t h e i r own holdings and r i g h t s , o f ten i n oppos i t ion to other otera that claimed some po r t i on of them. The Buddhist i n s t i t u t i o n s had so l i t t l e sense o f common cause that on occas ion otera would a l l y wi th daimyo to campaign against other o t e r a , even against otera of t h e i r own schoo l . R e l i -gious bonds between otera were most o f ten simply non-ex i s tent . Re l i g ion was a house d i v ided against i t s e l f , wi th no p o s s i b i l i t y o f un i t y and s t i l l l e s s , the re fo re , o f u l t imate v i c t o r y . Evidence of t h i s lack of un i t y i s p l e n t i f u l : The o lder Buddhist schools u sua l l y t r i e d to prevent the spread o f newer ones, e s p e c i a l l y Shinshu, among the inhabi tants o f t h e i r e s ta tes . For ex -ample, i n 1575 the adminis trators of Kofukuj i estates i n Yamato fought against the monto to prevent t h e i r spread i n that area for i t was u sua l l y the case that Honganji monto refused to pay the required takes to the es ta te owner—landowners v i r t u a l l y l o s t t h e i r estates when the monto moved i n t o them. 56 The spread of the Honganji monto was opposed not only by non-Shinshu Bud-d h i s t schoo l s , but by o tera that belonged to other branches of Shinshu as w e l l . For example, monto o f the Takada and Sanmonto branches of Shinshu i n the province of Echizen were opposed to the Honganji monto and were even w i l l i n g to cooperate wi th Nobunaga i n h i s campaigns against them. Negoro and Koya had a h i s t o r y o f mutual h o s t i l i t y going back to the twe l f th century. In the s ix teenth century they fought against one another i n t o the mid-1570's for con t ro l of Uchi county i n Yamato province which l ay immediately to the east of them. Negoro and Koya were ever t r y i n g to expand t h e i r ho ld ings , and i t was na tura l for them to look to the east f o r expansion because to the west was the Saiga area of K i i province where there was an e s p e c i a l l y strong Ikko monto organ iza t ion that was best l e f t a lone. In order to dea l a blow to t h e i r Shinshu enemies, Negoro and Koya leaders were w i l l i n g to a l l y wi th one another, or wi th daimyo who were campaigning against the Saiga monto. The w i l l i ngnes s o f those otera to a l l y w i th daimyo against t h e i r c o - r e l i g i o n i s t s witnesses to the f ractured nature of Buddhism. R i va l r y between the two main branches of Tendai i s legendary. From as e a r l y as the e leventh century the Enryakuj i and the Mi idera (Onjoj i ) were b i t t e r and v i o l e n t r i v a l s : i n 1081 Enryakuj i sohei attacked and burned down the M i i de ra , and repeated t h i s act i n 1121, 1162, 1214, 1264, and 1317. In the mid-s ixteenth century the Enryakuj i had an ongoing d ispute with the T o j i (Shingon): from 1555 to 1576 they quarre led over who was allowed to wear a s p e c i a l type of Buddhist robe. The Shingon bonzes had taken i t upon 57 themselves to wear a vestment that had been for the exc lus ive use of En-r y a k u j i bonzes s ince the tenth century when i t was bestowed on them by the Emperor Murakami. The dispute was not, a c t u a l l y , over r e l i g i o u s garb but over which school would acquire supremacy i n the Kanto area. F i n a l l y , i n Nara there were disputes among the var ious otera and among the branches of each. For example, between 1574 and 1579 there was i n t e r -na l b i cker ing between the Eastern and Western branches of the Horyu j i . Because of the u t t e r lack of un i ty among the Buddhist schools , the Bud-dh i s t i n s t i t u t i o n s as a whole never presented a united front against any-one who was determined to c u r t a i l t h e i r power. Had there appeared a r e l i -gious equivalent of Oda Nobunaga, had a new type of Rennyo appeared, J a -pan might have become ru led by a Buddhist "Pope." But t h i s i s just i d l e specu la t ion because the fact i s that there was no u n i f i e r of the Buddhist wor ld , and indeed l i t t l e p o s s i b i l i t y of h i s r e a l i z i n g success should he have appeared. Nobunaga could br ing the other daimyo i n to l i n e with the sword, but r e l i g i o u s un i ty could not be brought about i n that way. Thus, when Nobunaga appeared on the na t iona l scene i n the l a te 1560's he had to contend with the powerful but d i sun i ted Buddhist i n s t i t u t i o n s . Part I Chapter 1 Section 3 Shogun and Emperor in the Sixteenth Century 59 It i s necessary to b r i e f l y note the power of the shogun and the court i n the s ix teenth century because they played a part i n the r e l a t i o n s h i p be -tween Nobunaga and the Buddhist i n s t i t u t i o n s . In the mid-s ix teenth century the ac tua l power s t i l l i n the hands of the shogun was minimal. Although there was a cont inua l success ion of Ashikaga who held the t i t l e Shogun. they were at the mercy of the Sengoku daimyo. Ye t , the Ashikaga had a s p e c i a l type o f power: they could dangle before the eyes o f the daimyo the p o s s i b i l i t y o f being chosen as patron o f the Ashikaga cause, and a daimyo so chosen would thereby become the power be-hind the shogunate. This was a most a t t r a c t i v e l u r e - - i t could i n s p i r e d a i -myo to take to the f i e l d on beha l f of an Ashikaga with a strong c l a im to the shogunate. In 1545, at the age o f t e n , Yoshiteru. became the t h i r t e e n t h Ashikaga sho-gun. Yosh i teru was supported by the powerful Sasaki (Rokkaku) fami ly , but the Sasaki had s t i l l more powerful enemies i n the persons of the Miyoshi and t h e i r va s sa l Matsunaga Hisahide. In 1550 the Miyoshi entered Kyoto and p laced i t under the au thor i t y o f Matsunaga who became master of the provinces of Kawachi and Yamato. Hisahide was a no tor ious l y ambitious man: when h i s master Miyoshi Chokei d ied i n 1564, Hisahide k i l l e d Chokei ' s son and declared h i s independence. The next year he appealed to Yosh i teru to appoint him Governor General ( kanre i ) , a post formerly he ld by Chokei, and when the shogun refused Hisahide attacked h i s pa lace. Yosh i teru c a l -led upon Uesugi Kenshin and Mori Motonari to come to h i s a id and when they dec l ined he k i l l e d h imse l f . H i sah ide, newly a l l i e d with Miyoshi Yoshitsugu, the nephew and adopted son 60 of Chokei, chose the three year old Yoshihide, grandson of the tenth sho-gun Yoshitane, to succeed Yoshiteru. Although investiture was refused bes cause of his young age, Yoshihide is nevertheless counted as the four-teenth shogun. On the death of Yoshiteru in 1565, the bonze Gakkei of the Ichijo-in, a branch of the Kofukuji, had designs on becoming shogun?-he was a younger brother of Yoshiteru and son of the twelfth shogun Yoshiharu. Gakkei lef t the Ichijo-in and, fleeing a plot against his l i f e by Hisahide, took re-fuge i n Omi province with the Sasaki, and there he took the name Yoshiaki. Yoshiaki was powerless so he appealed to Sasaki Yoshikata to sponsor his claim to the shogunate. When Yoshikata declined that d i f f i c u l t task, Yoshiaki appealed to the Takeda and then to the Asakura but they too re-fused. Finally, i n 1567, Yoshiaki sought, and received, the assistance of Oda Nobunaga who took up Yoshiaki's cause. One year later, on November 6, 1568, Nobunaga succeeded in entering Kyoto with Yoshiaki who thus became 59 the fifteenth Ashikaga shogun and last of the line. The court was in an especially impoverished condition during the six-teenth century. Indeed, i t was so impoverished that the enthronement of the 106th Emperor Ogimachi (1558-1586) had to be delayed three years be-cause of lack of funds. Although many land holdings were s t i l l i n i t s name, the court no longer received taxes from those lands because they had been confiscated by the daimyo who controlled the provinces i n which they lay. The Emperor possessed, however, a type of power by virtue of his e l i t e status: he could invite a daimyo to "restore the terika". i.e., unify the country,**® and thereby give to that daimyo a degree of status and j u s t i -61 fication for his actions that was otherwise unattainable. It is difficult to assess the real power of those invitations; they were quite meaningless were a daimyo not actually powerful enough to bring about reunification, but i t is generally acknowledged that an Imperial invitation did give one an added advantage. In Nobunaga'8 time the Emperor had a role in most peace negotiations be-tween powerful warring parties. The Emperor served as an irreproachable third party in whose name the warring parties could address peace over-tures to one another, and Imperial envoys, usually kuge, acted as medi-ators between them. The Emperor contributed to such negotiations not the ability to force warring parties to make peace or to abide by the articles of the peace pledge, but rather an air of respectability and confidence that the negotiations would not have otherwise had. Besides, the Emperor's involvement made the acceptance of a peace proposal an honorable act. Be-tween Nobunaga and Kennyo, for example, i t would have been one thing for Kennyo to flatly acknowledge his submission to Nobunaga, but another thing to submit to the wishes of the Emperor. The latter course was far less embarrassing, and i t allowed the parties to feel somewhat more secure ln the pact even though both were aware that they were in reality dealing directly with each other. It was customary to open a peace pledge with a notice to the effect that the person making the pledge was doing so in accordance with the wishes of the Emperor. Also, to fa i l to abide by the agreed upon stipulations was to f a i l to heed the Imperial dictum, and the degree of culpability borne by an offender would be greater than had the pact been but a simple arrangement between two contestants. This does not mean that either party was firmly bound to abide by the pact, but i t meant 62 that one would probably give extra consideration to thoughts of breaking i t . Besides, when one party requested peace through the Emperor, the other party was under more pressure to grant the request than i f i t had come directly from his opponent. The Emperor's presence raised the degree of gravity of peace negotiations and pledges, but he was not in a position to dictate the articles of peace or punish any who disregarded Imperial injunctions. The Emperor could send down orders that a certain policy be followed, but the extent to which those orders were followed depended more on the willingness of the recipient than on the elite status of the sender. 63 Having seen the array of forces that confronted any daimyo who might a t -tempt to un i f y the country, we s h a l l now turn our a t t en t i on to the d a i -myo who made, and l a r g e l y succeeded i n , that attempt: Oda Nobunaga. Part 65 In this chapter we will examine those factors that are important for an understanding of how and why Oda Nobunaga related to Buddhist institutions in the way he did: Section 1. Nobunaga's attitude towards religion, in so far as this can be determined, and towards tradition in general. Section 2. Nobunaga'8 rise to power, and his allies. Section 3. Nobunaga*s relationship with the shogun and the court.* 66 Part I Chapter 2 Section 1 Oda Nobunaga's Character: His Attitude Towards Religion 67 Speculative probing into Nobunaga's character is often interesting and challenging, and a great deal has been done by Japanese historians*—even 2 Nobunaga's sexual mores have been probed. While i t is not our purpose to 3 provide a broad, detailed, character sketch of Nobunaga, an examination of his attitudes towards religion and religious institutions is necessary in order to dispel a general notion that his actions against the Buddhist institutions reflected a demented mind. Unless Nobunaga's attitudes to-wards religion and religious institutions aire understood, the significance of the changes that were taking place i n the religious sphere of Japanese society in the sixteenth century, and Nobunaga's role in helping to bring about those changes, w i l l be overlooked or misunderstood. Oda Nobunaga has not fared well at the hands of historians, both Japanese and foreign. He is painted i n broad strokes as savage and heartless, with not the slightest trace of humanity. In Oda Nobunaga. Harada Tomohiko says 4 that Nobunaga had no j i n (human-ness, benevolence, charity). George San-som does not grant Nobunaga a single redeeming quality—he portrays him as savage and barbaric: a "crude and callous brute" who "never showed a sign of compassion..."5 Sansom supported this opinion of Nobunaga's char-acter by asserting that "a modern historian, the learned and kind-hearted Tsuji Zennosuke, has tried with but l i t t l e success to find favourable aspects of Nobunaga."** Even James Murdoch, who ordinarily looked upon Oda, Toyotomi, and Tokugawa, as great heroes, asserted in his early twentieth century history of Japan that while Hideyoshi was a genius, Nobunaga was "at bottom and essentially merely a magnificent savage."^ Such evaluations of Nobunaga*s character may be found in scores of works that deal with the Sengoku and Shokuho periods and, like most sweeping 68 g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s , they are s i m p l i s t i c and inaccurate. It i s s imply f a l s e to assert that Nobunaga was thoroughly inhumane or that he never showed a s i gn o f compassion. It i s a l s o untrue that T s u j i Zennosuke held as low an op in ion o f Nobunaga as Sansom imp l i e s , for as T s u j i h imsel f s a i d : " . . . h a v -ing reduced the power of the great r e l i g i o u s i n s t i t u t i o n s , and having opened the way fo r the r e s t o r a t i o n of order i n s o c i e t y , we cannot but g s ta te that Nobunaga too was g r e a t . " It i s a l l the more remarkable that T s u j i made t h i s statement i n h i s grand work on the h i s t o r y of Japanese Buddhism, h i s Nihon Bukkyo-shi. a context i n which i t i s not l i k e l y that he would have been sympathetic to the person of Nobunaga. It i s a phenomenon of Japanese h i s t o r y that most o f the great f i gures of the Sengoku per iod are remembered i n somewhat s i m p l i s t i c extremes. Takeda Shingen, for example, i s u sua l l y portrayed as a great man and a f ine f i g -ure of a daimyo, yet t h i s same Shingen gained power i n the f i r s t instance by oust ing h i s own f a ther , Nobutora, who l i v e d out h i s years under v i r t u a l house a r r e s t . The stereotype o f Nobunaga as savage, Hideyoshi as genius, and Ieyasu as w i se , has rooted i t s e l f deeply i n the minds o f Japanese h i s -t o r i a n s . A l l Japanese school c h i l d r e n know the d i t t y that says Nobunaga ground the wheat, Hideyoshi baked the cake, and Ieyasu ate i t . Another popular express ion of t h i s type t e l l s us that Nobunaga was the k ind of person who on f i nd ing a cuckoo that would not s ing would k i l l i t , H ide-yosh i would make i t s i n g , and Ieyasu would wait fo r i t to s ing . Expres-s ions l i k e these are dangerous because they b l u r the true r o l e o f Nobu-naga i n Japanese h i s t o r y — h e Is portrayed as without purpose other than to destroy a l l that prevented h i s r e u n i f i c a t i o n o f the country. Most h i s t o r i a n s are so overwhelmed by Nobunaga's savage a t tacks on the 6.9. Buddhist institutions, particularity by his destruction of Mt. Hiei, that he is ever thought of i n a most negative way and his negative character-i s t i c s are greatly exaggerated. To portray Nobunaga's character in such broad, negative strokes is to f a i l to take into consideration the complex-i t y of the man and the nature of his times. But far more c r i t i c a l l y , i t causes us to f a i l to appreciate the nature of the policies that Nobunaga pursued. To dismiss him as a brute is to assume that his strikes against the Buddhist institutions were but the wild f l a i l i n g s of a madman. It is our contention that Oda had very clearly defined policies towards the Buddhist institutions, policies that cannot be dismissed outright as 9 f l a t l y negative. A calm historical evaluation of Nobunaga's role vis-a-vis the Buddhist institutions is made d i f f i c u l t by the fact that he was such a cruel and callous person. On occasion, as shall be seen, he was capable of perform-ing acts of kindness, but his dominant pattern was a harsh one. The char-acteristic of Nobunaga most frequently noted by historians is his cruel-ty. There is no doubt that Nobunaga committed many cruel acts, the most familiar ones being his slaughter of men, women, and children, on Mt. Hiei i n 1571, and his execution of the h i j i r i of Mt. Koya ten years later. A number of other actions witness to Nobunaga's cruelty, for example: Oda's behavior on the occasion of the defeat of Asai Nagamasa and Asakura Yoshlkage in 1573 is a classic of depravity: he commanded that their de-capitated heads be cleaned of flesh and the skulls lacquered in silver and gold and placed on a serving tray so that he could use them as sake 10 cups. The Jesuit missionary Luis Frois recounts the story of how when Oda was 70 i n spec t ing the cons t ruc t ion of Yosh iak i ' s N i jo palace i n 1569 he espied a s o l d i e r who had for a moment taken a break from h i s duty and was p l a y -f u l l y attempting to l i f t the v e i l from a young woman's face i n order to enjoy a bet ter look at her. Oda strode over to the man and, without saying a word, drew h i s sword and cut o f f the man's head wi th one s t roke . * * In h i s Nihon Bunka-shi. Supplement III, T s u j i Zennosuke l i s t s a number of Oda'8 r e l a t i v e s who were put to death by Oda during h i s e f f o r t s to br ing 12 the province of Owari under h i s c o n t r o l . Such act ions have moved many to consider Oda insane. Okada Akio says that 13 i t i s recorded that Nobunaga seemed, on occas ion, to have gone mad. Per -haps, suggests Okada, there i s a greater or le s ser degree of madness i n any despot, but i n Nobunaga's case there appears to have been something abnormal i n h i s character . Sansom went so f a r as to suggest that " there 14 must have been an e v i l s treak i n the Oda f a m i l y . . . " , and Sugiyama J i r o suggests that a type of madness possessed Nobunaga.* 5 It i s o f ten sug-gested that the many years o f unceasing warfare caused Oda to go insane. Oda spent most o f h i s l i f e i n the saddle moving from one bloody campaign to the next, and throughout h i s l i f e t i m e he never enjoyed more than a few months re sp i t e from b a t t l e . It i s a l so suggested that Oda's character was warped as a r e s u l t of h i s having been betrayed on a number of occasions by some of h i s most t rusted va s sa l s . For such reasons Oda i s sa id to have become v i c i o u s , c r u e l , and excess ive to the point o f i n san i t y i n h i s campaigns. To conclude from Oda's acts of c r u e l t y that he was insane i s to make a judgment that cannot be supported by f a c t . It begs proof , and none i s a v a i l a b l e — i t i s e s s e n t i a l l y a prejudiced conc lus ion. Oda c e r t a i n l y does 71 not appear insane i n h i s l e t t e r s . To the end of h i s l i f e Oda demonstrated the a b i l i t y to make keen and l o g i c a l dec i s ions c l e a r l y i n keeping with h i s o v e r a l l ambit ion. He made ho e r r a t i c or f ana t i c dec i s ions that could lead us to judge him to have been insane. When we acknowledge, as we must, that Oda was c r u e l , we must r e a l i z e that the term c r u e l t y i s r e l a t i v e , and that war i s always c r u e l . The Sengoku per iod was po s s i b l y the c rue le s t i n Japanese h i s t o r y — i t was a time when the tak ing of scores of heads on the b a t t l e f i e l d was a standard p r a c t i s e , and when women, and even c h i l d r e n , were accustomed to apply makeup to the f r e s h l y severed heads of the f a l l e n without a qualm. F i r e and s t a rva t i on were the two main weapons of Sengoku per iod b a t t l e s . In the f i e l d both arrows and b u l l e t s were used, but i n the end, more o f ten than not, the outcome was determined by the s i ze of the s tockp i l e o f suppl ies on which the besieged were s i t t i n g . One can imagine the wretchedness o f the s i t u -a t i o n when the suppl ies ran out fo r the beseiged and they were reduced to eat ing the leather of t h e i r horses ' saddles and, i n the end, one another. This horror i s brought out i n Document 464 i n which Oda informed h i s gen-e r a l Akechi Mitsuhide of h i s progress against the Ikko monto i n Ise prov-ince i n 1574: Oda to ld Akechi that because monto suppl ies had run low i n two of the fo r t res ses under seige i t would be but a matter of days be-fore the fo r t s co l lapsed, and a l ready reports ind icated that large numbers of peop le , both men and women, had starved to death i n the beseiged f o r t s . From a present day perspect ive there i s not one Sengoku daimyo who could be spared the accusat ion o f c r u e l t y — e v e n i f i t could be es tab l i shed that Nobunaga's treatment of h i s enemies was more c rue l than that o f h i s con -temporaries, we have no reason to th ink him e s s e n t i a l l y un l i ke other d a i -72 myo. In terms of savagery and cruelty there was l i t t l e difference be-tween Nobunaga and Hideyoshi, Nobunaga and Takeda Shingen, Nobunaga and the other daimyo—the others were not markedly more humane than Nobunaga, so i f any can be called savage they a l l can. Even i f Nobunaga was more cruel than other daimyo the difference was quantitative, and not by much, rather than qualitative. Indeed, although the Jesuit missionaries con-demned Nobunaga's behavior, i t was they who, when the Dutch (Protestant) ship Liefde was towed, crippled, into a Bungo (Kyushu) port in 1600, urged that i t s crew be put to death at once. While i t is easy to find evidence of Nobunaga's cruelty, there is also material that provides us with a glimpse of a better side of his char-acter. This material is usually overlooked. Although we are often told that Nobunaga k i l l e d his younger brother Nobuyuki in 1557, i t is rarely mentioned that but one year earlier Nobunaga forgave him for having risen against him. When Nobuyuki took up arms against Nobunaga the second time, he was k i l l e d . In 1556 Nobunaga*s half brother Tsuda Nobuhiro plotted with Saito Yoshitatsu, lord of Mino province, and attacked Oda. When Oda de-feated them he did not execute Nobuhiro but treated him warmly, and from that year Nobuhiro became a loyal subordinate of Oda. In Document 14 we 17 have more evidence of Nobunaga's a b i l i t y to show compassion. In that document Nobunaga forgave the Yamaguchi family which had been punished by his father and brought to ruin--he instructed that their holdings be re-stored and that the family's re-establishment be carried out according to 18 the wishes of Yamaguchi's widow. In Document 311 Nobunaga ordered the "foreign religion's doctors" (gaikyS kusushi). that i s , Jesuit Padres who knew medicine, to come at once to Azuchi from the Kannonji in Omi where 73 they were s tay ing , to t rea t Matsui Yukan, Oda's par t - t ime secretary and " Imper ia l Household M i n i s t e r " (kunaikyo Ko in ) , who was s i c k with a tumor. The Jesu i t s had a bet ter knowledge of medicine than the t r a d i t i o n a l Japan-ese doctor s , so Nobunaga appealed to them when Matsui became i l l . This was i n 1572, one of Nobunaga's most d i f f i c u l t years , and h i s personal i n te rven t i on on beha l f o f Matsui a t such a c r i t i c a l time witnesses s t rong-l y to h i s concern for h i s l o y a l r e t a i n e r s . T s u j i Zennosuke t e l l s us about Oda's kindness to one of h i s foot s o l d i e r s who had fought i n a b a t t l e i n 1573. A f t e r the b a t t l e , when Oda not iced that the s o l d i e r was marching along i n bare feet that were covered with b lood , he took from h i s waist a p a i r o f sandals that he was accustomed from h i s youth to ca r ry i n to b a t t l e with him as a good luck charm, and 19 gave them to the s o l d i e r . By f a r the most i n t e r e s t i n g evidence that we have of Nobunaga's human s ide i s found i n a l e t t e r that he wrote to H ideyosh i ' s wi fe whom he ad -- 20 dressed as "Mrs. T o k i c h i r o " (Tok ich i ro Onnadomo). This l e t t e r i s not dated but i t was probably w r i t t e n i n 1576 or 1577 because i t r e f e r s to a meeting between Oda and Hideyosh i ' s wi fe that apparent ly took p lace when Oda was on an in spec t ion tour of h i s new c a s t l e at Azuchi that was then under cons t ruc t i on . During t h e i r meeting H ideyosh i ' s wi fe gave Nobunaga some g i f t s and, i n the course o f t h e i r conversat ion, she complained about her s i t u a t i o n wi th Hideyoshi . In the l e t t e r that Oda subsequently sent to her he thanked her fo r the g i f t s and s a i d : You looked even be t te r than you d id the l a s t time I saw you. I compliment you on your beauty and grace. It i s a most d i s g r ace fu l s ta te of a f f a i r s that Tok ich i rS should sometimes complain about a wi fe such as you. No matter how he might search, that bald rat 74 could never again find a wife the equal of you. Therefore, be of good cheer from now on. Like a proper wife always behave in a dignified manner and do not, even for a moment, give in to feelings of jealousy. Such is the duty of a wife: refrain from speaking too much, and be sure to take good care of Tokichiro. I want you to show this letter to Hashiba. This letter i s , as Kuwata Tadachika notes, the greatest of a l l of Nobu-naga' 8 letters for in i t we find a display of much kindness by the leg-endary "demon-like warrior whose very name i n s t i l l e d fear" (naku-ko mo 99 damaru kishin no gotoki busho). * In this letter Nobunaga expressed sym-pathy for Hideyoshi's (Tokichiro's) wife, tried to cheer her up by com-plimenting her beauty and grace and by assuring her that she was most deserving of Hideyoshi's attention, and he admonished Hideyoshi (Hashiba) by instructing his wife to show the letter to him. Nobunaga*s continual involvement i n military s t r i f e did not allow this side of his character to show through very often, but i t i s evident from this letter that there was a human side to him. The main reason why there are but a few displays of kindness in Nobunaga's letters i s that we do not have a collection of his personal letters. A l -though a few personal letters, like the one to Hideyoshi's wife and an-other one in which Nobunaga thanked a certain "Fumoshi" for her letter 23 and the g i f t of two light summer kimono (katabira), are extant, Okuno's collection consists mainly of o f f i c i a l documents in which i t is rather too much to expect displays of personal affection. A great number of Hide-yoshi's letters to his wife, concubines, and friends are extant, and from them one can come to know Hideyoshi's h e a r t . ^ Nobunaga's letters allow us to see his mind and w i l l . To adopt the extreme position that Nobunaga lacked humanity i s to overlook the few opposing pieces of evidence we have. 75 Nobunaga'8 attitude towards religion in general appears to have been a-theistic. In the description of Oda that he sent to his Jesuit superiors, Luis Frois said of him: "He scorns the kami and Buddhas and their images, and he believes nothing of paganism or of such things as divination. A l -though he is nominally a member of the Hokke school, he states unequiv-ocally that there is no Creator, no immortality of the soul, and that 25 nothing exists after death." It is evident from his actions that Oda cared nothing about those places that were traditionally venerated in Japan. For example, in Harada Toshihara's Sohei to Bushi we find a clear contrast between Oda's opinion of Mt. Hiei and that of Takeda Shingen: on hearing of Nobunaga's destruction of Mt. Hiei, Shingen said of him, 26 "He has destroyed the buppo-obo. He is the ghost of the d e v i l ! " Oda, on the other hand, said of the famous mountain: "In Japan i t considers 27 i t s e l f to be a living kami or Buddha. Rocks and trees are not kami." Hirata also t e l l s us that Oda made a characteristically irreverent re-sponse to Shingen's lament by signing a letter with the signature "Nobu-- 28 naga, Anti-Buddhist Demon" (Dairokuten no Mao Nobunaga) Aida Yuji, i n Oda Nobunaga, says f l a t l y that Nobunaga hated religion, but elsewhere in the same work Sugiyama Jiro says that i t was not simply a 29 case of hating Buddhism because Oda had some bonze friends. Oda appears to have enjoyed offending the sensibilities of the bonzes. Frois paints a picture of Nobunaga's sacriligeous acts against a number 30 of otera in Kyoto in 1569 when he was constructing the Nijo palace. Materials for that palace were gathered from the Kyoto otera by f o r c e — Oda simply confiscated their most valuable works of art and precious treasures, and used the sacred stone statues of the Buddha for building 76 b lock s . F ro i s re l a ted how some statues were placed on car t s i n order to be transported to the s i t e of the N i jo pa l ace , and how others , when ca r t s were i n short supply or the statues too l a r ge , were dragged along through the s t ree t s of Kyoto by ropes t i e d around t h e i r necks. F ro i s added, need-l e s s l y , that the bonzes and a l l the res idents of Kyoto were t e r r i f i e d of Nobunaga. - - 31 The Shlncho Koki t e l l s how Oda used bu i l d i n g stones and other mater ia l s that were taken from a number of o tera i n the cons t ruc t ion of h i s p a l -a ce - f o r t re s s i n Azuchi i n 1576. S i m i l a r i l y , i n that same year Oda simply commandeered from the Nara otera the suppl ies and personnel needed for the cons t ruc t i on o f severa l fo r t res ses i n the v i c i n i t y o f the Honganji. In 1580 Oda's general Tsut su i Junke i , h imsel f a former bonze, conf i scated b e l l s from severa l o f the Nara otera so they could be melted down and turned i n t o cannons. Oda's contempt for the monto appears i n severa l documents: i n Document 283 ^32 he re fe r red to the Ikko monto as the "gang of r e b e l s " ( i k k i no yakara), 33 i n Document 461 he re fe r red to them as " r e b e l s " ( ikki -domo). and i n Document 831 he c a l l e d the Hokke monto "nu i sances " , or " pe s t s " ( i t a z u r a -34 mono). Oda's contemptuous a t t i t u d e appears to have gotten the be t te r of h i s judgment on at leas t one occasion:' i n Document 512, issued i n 1575, Oda boasted to h i s general Nagaoka Fuj i taka tha t , having overcome the monto i n the provinces of K a i , Shinano, Suruga, and Mikawa, he had but one "smal l h i l l " (Osaka) to conquer. 3-* Oda made a pun on the name Osaka, the Honganji c i t a d e l , by subs t i tu t i ng for the f i r s t character o f the Osaka name compound, which i s pronounced " o " (long vowel) and means " g rea t " or " l a r g e " , a character that i s pronounced " o " (short vowel) and means " s m a l l " 77 or " t r i v i a l " . Thus Osaka, which translates as "Great H i l l " and contained the nuance of Honganji greatness, was changed to "osaka", meaning "small h i l l " . It required another five years after this boast for Oda to gain victory over the Honganji. In this context, i t also appears that Oda was loath to admit defeat at the hands of the monto. In Document 278, a response to a letter of con-dolence that Oda received from several bakufu o f f i c i a l s when he suffered a defeat by the monto of Ise province in 1571, Oda did not acknowledge defeat even though his reply was written on the very day on which he 3 6 cut his losses and withdrew from Ise. On the contrary, he explained that just at the point when he was about to rout the monto they begged his for-37 giveness and he (magnanimously) acquiesced. Similarily, i n Document 414 Oda lied to Kobayakawa Takakage, son of Mori Motonari of Aki province, about how he punished the Echizen monto rebels in the f a l l of 1573 when 38 in fact he had just suffered a setback on their account. There is much speculation and disagreement about what Buddhist school Oda may have belonged to, even though Oda himself scorned religion. Luis 3 9 Frois, as quoted above, said that Oda was nominally of the Hokke school. Frois may have thought this because Oda had a close relationship with the 40 Hokke bonze Hichijo Chozan, and because Oda was accustomed to stay at Hokke otera during his v i s i t s to Kyoto. During those v i s i t s Oda usually stayed at the Honnoji, a Hokke otera and the site of his death in 1582, and i n the f i r s t a r t i c l e of Document 267 he declared that the Honnoji was 41 his reserved lodging and that no others were to stay there. Tamamuro Taijo says that although Nobunaga hated Buddhism, the active and 78 aggress ive character o f the Hokke school was very compatible w i th h i s own charac te r , and that he seems to have had a s p e c i a l f e e l i n g fo r i t at 42 f i r s t . It w i l l be seen that Oda had no major c o n f l i c t s with the Hokke monto u n t i l 1579. Contrary to the foregoing opinions about Nobunaga*s r e l i g i o u s a f f i l i a t i o n , 43 Ik i J u i c h i says that Oda was a member of the Zen schoo l . According to I k i , t h i s was because Oda's Buddhist " convers ion " was received by Takugen Shuon, a R lnza i Zen bonze of the Myoshinj i i n Kyoto, wi th whom Oda was on 44 int imate terms. Okuno Takahiro, however, says that Oda's convers ion was rece ived by the T o d a i j i (Kegonshu) bonze Shogoku who was abbot of the 45 Amidaj i i n Yamashirp prov ince. Nobunaga a l s o had a s p e c i a l connection wi th the Kudaradera, a Tendai otera i n Omi p rov ince , and wi th the Komatsuji , a Shingon otera i n Owari, i n that he recognized them as h i s "patron o t e r a " 46 ( k i g a n l i . or k igansho). Besides those as soc ia t ions wi th Buddhist schools and o t e r a , Oda had other connections w i th Buddhist bonzes: he o f ten used bonzes—such as the Ten-47 _ d a i abbot Shoren ' in and the aforementioned N i c h i j o Chozan—as messengers and mediators i n h i s deal ings wi th other daimyo, the cour t , and r e l i g i o u s i n s t i t u t i o n s ; some o f Oda's' h igh-ranking o f f i c e r s were ex-bonzes--such as Cho Tsuratatsu and Tsut su i Junke i^ 8 —and severa l members of Oda's fami ly , such as h i s younger brother Nagamasu and h i s two sons Sh ink i ch i and Nobu-49 h ide , were a l s o bonzes. One cannot conclude from the foregoing informat ion that Nobunaga had any kind of personal f a i t h or devot ion. While i t i s impossible to be c e r t a i n o f Nobunaga'8. phi losophy of l i f e , that phi losophy i s po s s i b l y best summed 79 up i n the short verse Oda i s said to have sung on the eve of the B a t t l e of Okehazama when his small force of some 1800 men was about to face the 25,000 man army of Imagawa Yoshimoto i n 1560. The Shincho Koki says that while Oda performed a dance c a l l e d the atsumori he sang: "When we con-s i d e r man's f i f t y years i n t h i s world, they are l i k e a passing dream. 50 We have l i f e but once...how perishable we are." To Oda, t h i s l i f e i s a l l that there i s . It i s sometimes suggested, however, that Oda claimed d i v i n i t y for himself. Kashiwahara Yusen, for example, t e l l s us that when Oda b u i l t Azuchi c a s t l e he i n s t a l l e d i n i t an image of a kami on which was engraved Oda's own name, and to which a l l had to o f f e r worship.^* In t h i s same v e i n , Luis F r o i s ' l e t t e r of 1583 stated that Oda "fancied that there was no greater l o r d than he, not merely i n the world but i n Heaven 52 i t s e l f . . . " However he may have r a t i o n a l i z e d or philosophized i t , i t ap-pears that Oda himself was the highest being i n h i s own pantheon, and no authority, on earth or i n heaven, was higher than his own. Towards r e l i g i o n , r e l i g i o u s i n s t i t u t i o n s , and the Japanese t r a d i t i o n i n general, Oda appears to have been an i c o n o c l a s t . He had l i t t l e or no r e -spect for r e l i g i o n and, as F r o i s reported, he talked down to the Japanese 53 n o b i l i t y for whom he had nothing but contempt. Sugiyama J i r o suggests that a type of madness drove Nobunaga to tear out a l l the ancient taboos."^ This was, says Sugiyama, a type of madness that manifested i t s e l f i n r a -t i o n a l a c t i o n s — O d a c o l d l y and l o g i c a l l y implemented h i s mad schemes. One can accept Sugiyama's suggestion that Nobunaga was against the ancient taboos without having to agree that that was a sign of i n s a n i t y . Perhaps, indeed, i t was a sign of genius. The problem with t h i s type of g e n e r a l i z a -t i o n about Oda's a n t i - t r a d i t i o n a l a t t i t u d e i s that i t gives the impression 80 that Oda s t ruck i n d i s c r i m i n a t e l y at any and a l l taboos, but that was not the case. Had Nobunaga dea l t harsh ly wi th the Emperor and the cour t , Sug i -yama would have a strong argument—but Oda re s to red , at l eas t f i n a n c i a l l y , the Imperial house, so he must have had a s e l e c t i v e , d i s c r i m i n a t i n g , form o f madness i f indeed he was mad at a l l . Oda was i c o n o c l a s t i c , not mad. In order to understand Nobunaga's i c o n o c l a s t i c a t t i t u d e i t i s necessary to cons ider one c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the newly a r i sen daimyo of the Sengoku p e r i o d . That i s , t h e i r intense i n te re s t i n c lo se r e l a t i o n s wi th the court and the a r i s t o c r a c y . Many new daimyo had a f e e l i n g of i n f e r i o r i t y towards the center of cu l tu re and the way of l i f e of the upper c l a s s i n Kyoto; they were i n awe of t r a d i t i o n and, suggests Suzuki Ryo i ch i , they a t -tempted to stand as c lose as pos s ib le to the font of t r a d i t i o n a l author-i t y . 5 5 They wanted to bask i n the borrowed g lo ry of the ancient court and to insure t h e i r own sa fe ty . Suzuki fur ther expla ins that the term gekoku-j o . which descr ibes a s i t u a t i o n i n which vassa l s attempt to overthrow and rep lace t h e i r masters, and which i s u sua l l y used to descr ibe the s i t u a t i o n i n Nobunaga's t ime, does not r e f l e c t a negat ion of " j o " ( super ior , upper, or i n t h i s context , upper c l a s s ) , but ra ther i t means that the bush i , cap-t i va ted by the c o u r t , t r i e d to become " j o " . 5 * * They wanted o f f i c i a l ranks and t i t l e s , a court -granted name, and the r i gh t to use a s p e c i a l sea l or r i d e i n a lacquered palanquin; they a l s o wanted economic and commercial r e l a t i o n s wi th the K ina i d i s t r i c t . In t h i s c l imate i t was pos s ib le fo r the Emperor and shogun, devoid of ac tua l m i l i t a r y might, to wie ld cons ider -ab le power. Oda Nobuhide, Nobunaga's f a the r , had gained somewhat o f a name for h imsel f at the court by donations o f money to i t on two occas ions: i n 1540 he con-81 tributed to the construction of a temporary outer shrine building at the Great Shrine in Ise, and in 1543 he donated a large sum of money toward the repair of the Imperial palace. In return for the former, Nobuhide was granted the tit l e "Lord of Bingo" (Bingo no Kami)—by which t i t l e he is referred to in the Shincho Koki 5 7—and for the latter he was sent a letter from the Emperor Gonara and a copy of the first part of the Kokin Wakashu. Shortly afterwards Nobuhide fought with Saito Dosan of Mino and barely escaped with his l i f e ; he attributed his fortunate escape to the court and requested i t to make another request that he donate money to i t in the event of a battle at some future date. Like many of his contemporaries, Nobuhide perceived the court in almost magical terms. Nobunaga, however, harboured no such affection for Kyoto. On the contrary, i t appears that he reacted against what he considered to be the excessive attachment of his father and his peers to the court. From a very early age Oda demonstrated such a strong degree of independence, iconoclasm, and eccentricity, that he was given the nicknames "Big Fool" and "Idiot" (o-utsuke and tawakemono). Many stories describe Oda's strange behavior which his dress and appearance reflected: "He wore a short-sleeved shirt and a bag of flints hung from his waist. His hair was done in the chasen style, tied up with red and green cords, and a long sword in a red lacquered sheath hung from his belt. He strode around town laden with chestnuts, 58 persimmons, and melons, and with his mouth stuffed with rice cakes." It is commonly suggested that Nobunaga deliberately chose to play the fool as a ploy for survival in the time of upset following his father's death. Nobuhide died in 1551 when Nobunaga was but sixteen years old, and the only way he could survive was to appear a fool who offered no threat to 82 the older and more powerful members of the Oda family who were competing for power ln Owari. While there may be some truth to this suggestion, i t does not completely explain Oda's behavior. The fact i s that from very early after Nobuhide's death Nobunaga was involved i n any number of skirmishes with his relatives who tried to take control of Nobuhide's bunkoku. Besides, Nobunaga's behavior was somewhat unorthodox even be-fore his father's death, and i t continued to be so well after i t . For example, Padre Frois supplied the following description of Nobunaga's dress when he met him in 1569 at the Nijo palace: "When he went to s i t down, Nobunaga wrapped a tiger skin around his hips. He wore extremely rough clothing and i n imitation of him a l l present put on animal skins. No one dared appear before him wearing the robes of the c o u r t . F r o i s also stated that Nobunaga hated the circumlocutions that characterized the speech of the nobility.** 1 Although i t is impossible to judge motivation, i t seems that Nobunaga's eccentric behavior reflected a conscious policy on his part—he was acting, from an early age, against what he considered to be an excessive affection for the court, and was deliberately rejecting the standards and mores of the court and of tradition i n general. Oda appears to have harbored high ambitions from a young age. According to Tsuji Zennosuke, as early as 1549 when Oda was but fourteen or fifteen 62 years old, he used the name Taira i n his signature. In fact, two of Oda's g o documents i n Okuno's collection are signed "Taira Nobunaga". Tsuji sug-gests that because the Ashikaga shogunal line was descended from the Mina-moto family, the Seiwa Genlji, Nobunaga's use of the name Taira was a way to serve notice on the Ashikaga that i t was time for them to transfer their 83 power to a descendant of the Ta i r a fami ly according to the p r ac t i s e of t u rn about between the Ta i r a and Minamoto f ami l i e s which had been estab-64 l i s h e d centur ies e a r l i e r . By c la iming to be descended from the T a i r a , Oda declared h i s leg i t imacy as successor to the Ashikaga. Since Oda was on ly f i f t e e n years o ld when he f i r s t used the T a i r a name, i t would seem that he had very h igh ambitions from that e a r l y age. Besides the name T a i r a , he a l s o used the ancient and noble name Fuj iwara, 65 as evidenced i n Document 1 i n which he signed h imsel f Fujiwara Nobunaga. The reason why Oda used th i s s ignature i s not c l e a r , and Kuwata Tadachika urges caut ion i n drawing any conclus ions on the bas i s o f i t s usage i n 66 Document 1 because i t appears i n no other documents. . Document 1 was sent to the famous Shinto Atsuta Dai j ingu i n Owari p rov ince, and i t i s pos s ib le that Oda may have t r i e d to g ive h imsel f some s p e c i a l status i n correspond-ing wi th that shr ine by a s ser t ing a t r a d i t i o n a l c l a im of h i s fami ly that i t had descended from a fourteenth century kuge named Fujiwara Nobumasa. Besides these except iona l uses of the Ta i r a and Fujiwara names, Oda some-times signed documents with h i s o f f i c i a l t i t l e s . In a number of documents issued i n 1568, fo r example, Oda used the s ignature Danjo no j o ^ , and i n 68 other documents he signed himsel f Oda Owari no Kami, i . e . , Lord o f Owari. From 1568 Oda almost i nva r i ab l y used simply h i s s ignature or h i s sea l on which was i n sc r ibed h i s name or h i s motto. In some of h i s l e t t e r s — f o r ex-ample, the famous one to H ideyosh i ' s w i fe—Oda used the very informal s i g -nature "Nobu". This p r a c t i s e of not us ing t i t l e s was cons i s tent wi th h i s lack of respect fo r t r a d i t i o n a l va lues . Although throughout the Shincho Koki there i s a s ca t te r ing of informat ion 84 on the var ious court ranks that Oda rece ived over the years , i n May of 1577 he resigned a l l Imperial o f f i c e s and d ivested h imsel f o f court ranks and t i t l e s . In Document 707, which was issued l a t e i n A p r i l , o f 1577, Oda t o l d the kuge Hino Terusuke that i t would not be time for him to hold court ranks u n t i l a l l the provinces were p a c i f i e d and the " four seas" ( sh ika i ) were under c o n t r o l . 7 ® Nobunaga's re s i gna t ion o f court t i t l e s witnesses to h i s i c o n o c l a s t i c a t t i t u d e . He wanted to demonstrate h i s i n -depencence from the ancient symbols o f au thor i t y which he held i n l i t t l e esteem. Breeding and proper blood l i ne s meant nothing to Nobunaga. Together wi th such p a t r i c i a n s as Niwa Nagahide and Hosokawa F u j i t a k a , he added to h i s inner c i r c l e such low born people as Toyotomi Hideyoshi and Akechi M i t su -h ide . Oda promoted people on the bas i s of t h e i r a b i l i t y , and demoted those--no matter what t h e i r breeding—who f a i l e d to meet h i s expectat ions. A good example o f the l a t t e r was Nobunaga's punishment of Sakuma Nobumori, a person of noble family and one of Oda's tOp ranking genera l s , fo r h i s poor performance dur ing the seige of the Honganji c i t a d e l from 1575 to 1 5 8 0 . 7 1 Persons, whether they were bonzes, kuge. or peasants, who showed l o y a l t y to Oda were rewarded, and those who opposed him were destroyed. Even Nobunaga's hobbies r e f l e c t e d h i s iconoclasm: he enjoyed the common sports o f sumo and hawking. Nobunaga*s character i s probably best summed up i n the motto that the Zen bonze Takugen Shuon recommended to him i n 1567, and which he used c o n t i n -u a l l y from December of that year. Oda's motto read "tenka fubu" and i t meant, l i t e r a l l y , " t o overspread wi th power" (fubu) " a l l under heaven" 85. (tenka), i.e., the nation.'* Thus the motto may be translated "Rule the nation by force". 7 3 From 1568 until his death in 1582 Oda frequently made appeals to other daimyo to join his cause "for the good of the tenka" (tenka no tame) or for Oda's own good (Oda no tame), and to Oda's mind the good of the tenka and Oda'8 own good were one and the same. In Document 233 Oda appealed for the loyalty of the Endo family of Mino province, telling them that a forthcoming battle was of critical importance "to the tenka. to Nobu-74 naga" (tenka no tame, Nobunaga tame). In Document 378 Oda explained to Mori Terumoto of Aki province that he took steps against the shogun Yoshi-aki because he had "discarded the tenka" (tenka o suteokaruru).75 This meant that Yoshiaki had failed to act in keeping with Nobunaga's plans for the tenka. Oda identified what was good for him as good for the state, and he felt, like Louis XIV of France and Napoleon Bonaparte, "L'etat c'est moi." Nobunaga has been called many things: insane, a "lucky adventurer" (fuun-ko)7*>, «f£ r s t among the lawless" (muho daiichi no shu) 7 7, a "mad ration-- 78 al i s t " (kySki gorishugisha) , an atheist, and a magnificent savage. He was neither irrational nor insane. Rather, says Okada Akio, he was a quick-tempered and autocratic person with a violent nature, someone who knew his purpose and paid no heed to the opinions of others in pursuing 79 i t . Nobunaga had a vision of a unified Japan, with himself at the apex of power and with a l l other segments of society f i l l i n g roles assigned by him, and he struck violently at any and a l l who stood in the way of the realization of that vision. Oda would brook no opposition--neither the kami, nor Buddhas, nor respected traditions deterred him. Whatever else 8 6 Oda Nobunaga was, he was f i r s t and foremost a Sengoku daimyo and one espec i a l l y equipped to deal with the Buddhist i n s t i t u t i o n s . Part I Chapter 2 Section 2 Oda Nobunaga'8 Rise to Power and his Allies 88 Oda Nobunaga's goal was to un i fy the tenka. This goal was g iven o f f i c i a l sanct ion by both the Emperor Ogimachi and the shogun Ashikaga Yosh iak i . By 1564 Nobunaga had brought the province of Owari under h i s con t ro l and 8C entered the ranks of those daimyo who held sway over fan' e n t i r e prov ince. The court recognized Nobunaga*s power i n October of that year when i t sent the kuge T a c h i i r i Munetsugu to Owari wi th a secret message that i s thought to have been an i n v i t a t i o n to Nobunaga to restore the Imperial holdings to t h e i r proper owner. It i s p o s s i b l e , however, that t h i s was simply a request for Oda to contr ibute to the r e p a i r and upkeep of the Imperial palace as h i s father had done twenty-one years e a r l i e r . In 1567 Ashikaga Yosh iak i , having had h i s requests for ass i s tance denied by the Sasak i , Takeda, and Asakura, turned to Nobunaga to support h i s c l a im to the shogunate, and Nobunaga consented. Oda therefore pressed h i s e f f o r t s to expand the area under h i s c o n t r o l p r i o r to attempting an ad -vance on Kyoto. In 1567 he took c o n t r o l o f Mino province from Sa i to Tatsuoki and absorbed the northern counties o f Ise province in to h i s bun-koku. With two provinces f i rm ly under h i s c o n t r o l , Nobunaga had become one of the most powerful Sengoku daimyo. On December 9 of that year the Emperor Ogimachi sent Nobunaga a second Imperial order i n which he pra i sed Oda's successes i n " p a c i f y i n g " two prov inces , and c a l l e d h i s accomplishment one of unpara l l e led m i l i t a r y 81 -prowess. Ogimachi commanded Oda to p a c i f y a l l the prov inces , i . e . , to un i f y the tenka, and to res tore the Imperial holdings to t h e i r r i g h t f u l owners. Thus armed with Imperial and shogunal i n v i t a t i o n s , and wi th a p ro -f e s s i ona l army, Oda was ready to begin h i s work of reun i fy ing the country. 89 Nobunaga was not the first daimyo to make this attempt. From the 1530's there began to appear efforts on the part of the more powerful daimyo to establish hegemony over a l l the provinces. Early in 1560, not long be-fore Oda began his attempt, Imagawa Yoshimoto assembled an army of some 25,000 warriors from Suruga, Totomi, and Mikawa provinces and began a march on Kyoto. On the morning of June 12, 1560, Oda's force of 1800 men, against incredible odds, routed the Imagawa force at the Battle of Oke-hazama when they entered Owari province. It is remarkable that Oda Nobunaga, who was not a powerful daimyo until well into the 1560's, rose above such daimyo as the Rokkaku, Miyoshi, Takeda, and Uesugi, whose power was great and long established. Oda's position just east of Kyoto gave him a certain advantage over the Takeda and Uesugi, whose bunkoku were far removed from the Kinai, but not over those other daimyo whose bunkoku bordered on Kyoto. It seems that the primary advantage that Oda enjoyed was not economic, military, or geo-graphic, but rather one of vision. Oda dared when the others balked. The Takeda, Asakura, and Rokkaku, were every bit as capable of taking up Yoshiaki's cause as was Oda, but they refused. They appear to have lacked the daring vision of Nobunaga; perhaps Imagawa had i t , but Oda stopped him. Takeda Shingen and Uesugi Kenshin also realized that i t might be pos-sible for them to seize central control, but too late. They came to that realization only after i t had become apparent from Oda's success that i t was indeed possible. While i t is not our purpose to examine the many factors that contributed to the successful rise of Nobunaga, i t is necessary to be acquainted with some of the more important figures who contributed to Oda's successes and 90 whose names appear time and again in Nobunaga's documents.oz Nobunaga was fortunate to have among his vassals a number of great generals—many of whom were themselves daimyo when they joined Oda, and many others who be-came daimyo during their years of service with him—who performed out-standing service for him. The most important of these were: Toyotomi Hideyoshi: Hideyoshi was lowly born—he was the son of a farmer named Taemon who had become a foot sOldler (ashlgaru) i n the service of Oda's father—and he entered Oda's service in 1554 at the age of seven-teen as Nobunaga's "sandal bearer" (zori-tori). Hideyoshi rose to be one of Nobunaga's leading and most gifted generals who led many of Nobunaga's campaigns, especially the one i n the south against the Mori from 1577 until Oda's death. Shibata Katsuie: member of an Owari daimyo family that was vassal to the Oda, Katsuie joined Nobunaga in 1557 and, together with Hideyoshi, led the greatest number of Nobunaga's campaigns. In 1576 he was made lord of Echizen province where he was to protect Nobunaga*s northern flank by keeping the monto under control and by preventing the Uesugi and Takeda from flooding down on Kyoto from the north. Tokugawa Ieyasu: although he i s not mentioned in Oda's documents as fre« > quently as Hideyoshi and Katsuie, Ieyasu was one of Nobunaga's most impor-tant vassal daimyo. Ieyasu a l l i e d with Nobunaga in 1562 at the age of nineteen and Oda entrusted him with the province of Mikawa where, for almost two decades, he provided the invaluable service of acting as a bulwark against the Takeda of Kai and the Hojo of Sagami province, and thus secured Nobunaga's eastern flank. This allowed Nobunaga to concen-- 83 trate bhsKyoto, the Kinai, and the Honganji. Hosokawa (Nagaoka) Fujitaka: member of a daimyo family descended from the 91 ancient Hosokawa family, Fujitaka allied with Ashikaga Yoshiaki as early as 1565 and was instrumental in having Nobunaga take up Yoshiaki's cause. In 1573 Fujitaka switched his allegiance to Nobunaga and thereafter led many of his campaigns. Akechi Mitsuhide: son of an ancient daimyo family from Mino province, Akechi first served the Saito, the Asakura, and the Hosokawa before join-ing Oda in 1566. From 1575 he was charged with leading the campaigns in Tamba and the provinces to the southwest along the Japan Sea coast. Sakuma Nobumori: a member of an ancient daimyo family from Owari, Nobu-mori served Nobunaga from the early 1560's. He was one of the generals in charge of the campaign against the Honganji from 1575 to 1580, and be-cause of his incompetence during that campaign Oda exiled him to Mt. Koya in 1580. Niwa Nagahide: son of a daimyo family descended from the Fujiwara, Naga-hide also served Oda from the early 1560's. One of Nagahide's major tasks was supervising the construction of Azuchi castle, for which he was re-warded with a large bunkoku in Wakasa province. In addition to these were many other vassals of greater and lesser rank?-ihcluding Oda's brothers Nobuharu and Nohuhiro, and his older three sons Nobutada, Nobuo, and Nobutaka—who took part in Nobunaga's campaigns. Some of Oda's vassals—like Ujiie Naomoto and Oda's brothers Nobuharu and Nobuhiro—were killed in battle, others—like Matsunaga Hisahide—were killed by Nobunaga for betraying him, and s t i l l others—like Hideyoshi, Katsuie, and Ieyasu--outlived him. Thus in the same way that the members of the anti-Nobunaga league changed over the years from 1570 to 1580, so too did the members of the alliance under Oda's command. With a few ex-92 ceptions, most of Oda's early allies were of relatively low status and l i t t l e power when they joined him. As Oda's successes mounted, their power and prestige expanded proportionally and they enjoyed higher rank than those daimyo who cast in their lot with Oda in his later years. Hideyoshi is the most outstanding case of a rise from the lowest ranks to the highest. Although Nobunaga's coalition of forces was not as troubled by the lack of internal unity as was the anti-Nobunaga league, there were several factors that caused tension and difficulty within that coalition: 1. Relations among Oda's leading generals iwere far from smooth. There were bitter rivalries and jealousies among his generals, especially among Hide-yoshi, Katsuie, and Akechi Mitsuhide, as they vied with each other to gain first place at Oda's table. Sometimes this rivalry interfered with campaign operations: for example, when Oda sent Katsuie and Hideyoshi into Kaga province in 1576 to ward off an impending march on Kyoto by Uesugi Kenshin, they were not together in Kaga for long before they quarreled and Hideyoshi rashly withdrew from Kaga without first receiving marching orders from Nobunaga. Another instance of this type of difficulty occurred in 1574: early in that year Maeba Nagatoshi, the person Oda placed over Echizen province in the fa l l of 1573 following his victory over the Ikko monto and the Asakura, was attacked by Tomita Nagashige, Oda's appointee as castellan of Fuchu in Echizen, because of Maeba's arrogant refusal to pass over to Tomita the administrative records that were properly his. Tomita's attack sparked another Ikko ikki with the result that Oda lost control of Echizen. 2. Like a l l daimyo, Oda had to be ever wary of betrayal. The coalition of 93 forces under him could rupture and the whole s i t u a t i o n could change i n -s t a n t l y i f a powerful vassa l switched a l l eg i ance and suddenly became an enemy. Nobunaga experienced such treachery by three of h i s vas sa l daimyo: Matsunaga Hisahide betrayed him i n 1572 and again l n 1577, A rak i Mura-shige i n 1578, and Akechi Mitsuhide i n 1582. Because o f the ever present danger o f b e t r a y a l , Oda was ever caut ious of those with whom he was a l -l i e d and was r a r e l y without an escort of severa l thousand warr io r s . Nobu-naga's d i s t r u s t , even o f h i s c lo ses t va s sa l s , may be seen i n severa l o f h i s documents. For example, when Nobunaga awarded the province of Echizen to Shibata Katsuie i n 1575, he reminded Shibata that i t was h i s primary duty t o ho ld Nobunaga i n the highest esteem, and cautioned him against harbouring any fee l ings o f enmity towards him. Nobunaga warned Shibata "not even to turn your steps i n my [[Nobunaga' s^ j d i r e c t i o n " (wareware aru  kata e wa. a sh i o mo sasazaru yd n i . . . ) , that i s , Shibata was to have no thoughts o f treachery against h i m . ^ When Hideyoshi , who performed more mer i tor ious m i l i t a r y se rv i ce for Oda than anyone e l s e , was once asked why he bothered to send Nobunaga a d a i l y report o f the progress o f h i s cam-paigns, he r e p l i e d : " I f I do not do so Nobunaga i s l i a b l e to explode i n anger at me, and at an unexpected moment I may become the object o f h i s wrath. He may even k i l l m e . " ^ 3. Th i s type o f i n s e c u r i t y and tens ion was heightened by the fact that a campaigning daimyo had no choice but to put great f a i t h i n h i s vas sa l lords and generals . Given the slow speed o f communications i n Nobunaga's t ime, a daimyo could not be up to date on condi t ions i n the f i e l d , and i n h i s responses to h i s f ront l i n e o f f i c e r s a daimyo was u sua l l y address-ing cond i t ions that most o f ten no longer he ld . Thus, most o f Nobunaga's l e t t e r s to h i s generals cons i s t of congratu latory expressions about mis -94 sions accomplished, general directives about such things as how he would like the campaigns to go next, warnings to be wary and cautious, and prom-ises of aid. Field decisions had to be left to the discretion of officers in the field. For example, in Document 464, Oda's reply to Akechi Mitsu-hide's report of his campaign, Oda told Akechi several times that i t was 86 up to him to decide what course of action to take. 4. Because of these conditions, a daimyo could not totally trust battle reports—they were often as much efforts at propaganda as they were at-tempts to keep the recipient up to date on the situation being reported. The writer of the report could always hope that his reported condition would indeed be realized by the time he heard back from his addressee. Okuno Takahiro tells us, for instance, that Hideyoshi was most aware that his forces were making l i t t l e headway against the Mori Of Aki in 1577, so "day and night he ran around Harima taking hostages," and he even sent his 87 armies into Tajima province to attack a castle there. Following his desertion of Kaga, Hideyoshi was at pains to make sure that he would re-main in Oda'8 good graces, and he was careful not to be put in the situ-ation where he could be accused by Nobunaga of incompetence and lack of effort. This fate befell others but not Hideyoshi for he always had a success story for Nobunaga, no matter how meaningless the victory might have been. Besides the foregoing problems within Nobunaga's camp, he also had less than perfect control over his bunkoku. For example, there was an Ikko uprising in 1572, even though that province was part of Nobunaga's bun- koku since 1567, and other Ikko ikki took place as late as 1574 in Oda's home province of Owari which he had brought under control ten years ear-i 95 l i e r . F i n a l l y , the person of Nobunaga was so powerful and so c e n t r a l to h i s c o a l i t i o n of forces tha t , i n the end, t h i s contr ibuted to the f a i l u r e of h i s " reg ime." Each of Oda's c h i e f vassa l s was l inked to Oda by strong personal t i e s , but Oda f a i l e d to construct under h imsel f a s o l i d pyramid of power that could have held together a f t e r h i s death. When Oda was k i l l e d i n 1582 there was no s o l i d s t ruc ture among h i s vassa l s that could have handled the jea lous ies and personal r i v a l r i e s that immediately came to the f o r e , and thus the c o a l i t i o n f r ac tu red . H ideyoshi , however, qu i ck l y p u l l e d i t back together, but he too f a i l e d to create a s t ruc ture that would ou t l a s t him. It was l e f t to Tokugawa Ieyasu to create a l a s t -ing dynasty. Part I Chapter 2 Section 3 Oda Nobunaga's Relations with the Shogun and the Erape 97 Ashikaga Yoshiaki served an indispensable role in enabling Nobunaga to officially begin his work of reunifying Japan. It was by making use of Yoshiaki that Nobunaga was able to take possession of the capital and, as James Murdoch noted, "In Japan the possession of the capital, and more 88 especially the person of the Emperor, counted for more than much." A short discussion of Nobunaga's relationship with Yoshiaki is necessary because of the latter's importance first to Oda as an ally, and then as a central figure, together with the Honganji, in the anti-Nobunaga league. The relationship between Nobunaga and Yoshiaki was one in which each need-ed the other for a short period of time, after which each became a l i a -b i l i t y to the other. Yoshiaki needed Nobunaga's power in order to become shogun, but once he did so, on November 26, 1568, he no longer needed Oda's services. Oda's continued presence made Yoshiaki uneasy so he began to make an effort to get rid of him, or at least to relegate him to a minor role. As a reward for his assistance Yoshiaki offered Oda a choice of any of five central provinces except Omi and Yamashiro, but Oda re-fused, saying that i t was really not through his efforts but through the authority of the shogunal family that the Kinai had been pacified, and that there was, therefore, no cause for him to be so honored. Yoshiaki then offered Nobunaga the t i t l e of "Assistant Shogun" (fulsushogun) or "Governor General" (kanrei), but these too were refused. Kuwata Tada-chika explains Oda's refusal by saying that should he have accepted those offerings from Yoshiaki, for the rest of his li f e never again would he 89 have been able to raise his head before the man. Had Nobunaga submitted to Yoshiaki at that juncture, he would never have been able to pursue his grand scheme. He would have been type cast and short circuited. However, 93 Nobunaga did accept from Yoshiaki the port c i t i e s of Sakai in Izumi, and Otsu and Kusatsu in Omi, which thus became part of Oda's directly con-trolled holdings (chokkatsuchi). Those c i t i e s were rich centers of mari-time trade and important areas in the development of a merchant economy, and by gaining control of them Oda acquired a great source of funding for his future campaigns. Thus, Oda chose to stay out from under Yoshiaki's wing and to pursue his own plans. Almost immediately after becoming shogun Yoshiaki took several steps to r i d himself of Nobunaga. Okada Akio says that one of Yoshiaki'8 f i r s t acts as shogun was to send guarantees to many of the more powerful otera, in order to make them his a l l i e s , and orders to a number of great daimyo whom 90 he commanded to cease making war against each other. Yoshiaki made a special effort to bring peace between Mori Terumoto of Aki and Otomo Yoshishige (Sorin), lord of six provinces in Kyushu, and among Takeda Shingen of Kai, Uesugi Kenshin of Echigo, and Ho jo Ujimasa of Sagami, who were perpetually i n conflict. Should Yoshiaki have been able to work out a peace among the latter three, Shingen would have been released from cares in his home territory and free to come to Yoshiaki*s assistance. Nobunaga, meanwhile, was benefiting from his relationship with Yoshiaki. Having entered Kyoto as Yoshiaki's supporter, Oda was able to establish his control over the d i s t r i c t s around Kyoto and throughout the Kinai with considerable ease, and by making use of the shogun*s name he could issue commands to other daimyo, and thus take the i n i t i a l steps i n bringing them under his control. To this end, shortly after establishing himself in Kyoto Oda sent a summons to the daimyo of central Japan to come to the 91 capital to pay their respects to the new shogun. On the one hand this 99 was a normal procedure, but on the other no daimyo would have failed to realize that the summons was really a command, and that its sender was really Nobunaga and not Yoshiaki. Therefore, for a daimyo to accept the summons was to acknowledge his submissive status not only to Yoshiaki but, more importantly, to Nobunaga; to refuse was to put oneself in the unenviable position of being disobedient to the shogun—it would have been treasonous. This dilemma was particularily nasty for Asakura Yoshikage, the lord of Echizen province, who but a few years earlier had declined Yoshiaki's request to take up the Ashikaga cause. Ironically, the main reason why Yoshikage had to decline was that he was having difficulties with the Ikko monto of Kaga province who were trying to expand their power into Echizen. With Nobunaga's summons, Asakura was being asked to bow to the man who had achieved the prize that he had once been offered. He refused. Aida Yuji suggests that Yoshiaki might have urged the Asakura to refuse the sum-go mons for relations between him and Nobunaga were already badly strained. Yoshikage's refusal gave Nobunaga an excuse to march against the Asakura, which he finally did in the spring of 1570. In the first month of 1569 Nobunaga sent the first of three important documents to Yoshiaki,in which he began to limit the shogun*s power. Evi-93 dently their relationship soured very early because in Document 142 , i s -sued but two months after Yoshiaki became shogun, we see the first set of constraints that Nobunaga imposed on him. While this document is most im-portant for a detailed study of the Nobunaga-Yoshiaki conflict, i t is not of special significance to our topic because only a few of the sixteen ar-ticles in i t concerned religious institutions. In article 9 Oda forbade IQO Yoshiaki to have representatives of Mt. Hiei's sohei freely visit the shogunal palace. It appears that Yoshiaki might have been encouraging an alliance between the Enryakuji and himself as part of his effort to get new allies. In article 10 Oda strictly prohibited the confiscation of lands that belonged to otera and shrines. Yoshiaki was possibly trying to amass an area of land under his personal control, and Nobunaga did not want him to gain that kind of independence. Given that Nobunaga had no right whatsoever to act in such a manner towards the shogun, this document is extraordinarily audacious. Even though relations between Nobunaga and Yoshiaki were quite poor by early 1569, Nobunaga s t i l l needed him until he was firmly in control of the Kinai, so when Yoshiaki was attacked by the Miyoshi of Awa in January of that year Nobunaga hurried from his headquarters in Gifu to save him. One year later, on February 27, 1570, Nobunaga sent a second letter to 94 Yoshiaki with the same purpose as the first. None of the five articles in that letter concerned religious institutions but two of them shed important light on Nobunaga's way of thinking. In article 3 he told Yoshi-aki that should he wish to reward people who were loyal to him with grants of land, Oda would be willing to permit Yoshiaki to reward those people with portions of Oda's bunkoku in the event that the shogun did not have any land to give. The implication of this article is clear: lands brought under control by Oda belonged to him and not to the shogun. By becoming shogun Yoshiaki did not automatically acquire any lands. Furthermore, in article 4 Oda stated most clearly that the tenka had been entrusted to him, and that he could therefore act as he wished without first having to consult with the shogun. 101 Finally, in October of 1572 Oda sent a most famous 17 article document to Yoshiaki in which he criticized him for a number of failings and stripped him of his remaining power. Article 1 of this document is especially in-teresting because in i t Oda told Yoshiaki that just as the former shogun, Yoshiteru, lost the protection of the kami and Buddhas because of his 95 failure to perform his duties towards the court, so too with Yoshiaki. No articles in that document concerned religious institutions. With the issuance of that document relations between Nobunaga and Yoshi-aki were completely and openly ruptured. Yoshiaki desperately tried to have some other daimyo rescue him, but to no avail. Late in April of 1573 Nobunaga marched on Kyoto from Gifu, surrounded Yoshiaki's Nijo palace, and set fire to a large section of the city. Fearing for his l i f e , Yoshiaki appealed to the Emperor for peace and on May 8 he surrendered unconditionally to Nobunaga. Three months later, however, Yoshiaki at-tempted to make a stand against Oda at Makishima fortress in Yamashiro where he had managed to assemble almost 4000 warriors. Late in August Nobunaga attacked Yoshiaki's stronghold, took i t , and accepted Yoshiaki*s two year old son as a hostage. Oda then sent Yoshiaki to Wakae fortress in Kawachi where he was to be a prisoner of Miyoshi Yoshitsugu, a daimyo ally of Oda since 1568. Thus ended the Ashikaga shogunate which had begun two hundred and thirty-five years earlier in 1338. From Wakae fortress Yoshiaki continued his attempts to gain the assistance of the Takeda, Asakura, and Miyoshi, and in 1576 he fled to Bingo province where he found shelter with the Mori. Following his deposition Yoshiaki joined the anti-Nobunaga league to which he contributed his ability--by virtue of his status—to entice daimyo to join the campaign against Oda. 102 Although Yosh iak i con t inua l l y conspired to br ing together a c o a l i t i o n o f forces that would enable him to rega in the shogunate, he f a i l e d . In the long run Yosh iak i was more an asset than a l i a b i l i t y to Nobunaga because through him Nobunaga could br ing to bear on the daimyo a type of p re s -sure otherwise unava i lab le to him i n h i s e a r l i e r years i n Kyoto. Oda was determined to un i f y the tenka and nothing, i nc lud ing the shogun, was allowed to stand i n h i s way. How Oda h imse l f i n te rpre ted the turn o f events that led to the end of the Ashikaga l i n e of shoguns i s impossible to determine, but i n severa l documents Oda made e x p l i c i t statements about i t : i n a l e t t e r to Mori Terumoto, Oda stated that Yosh i ak i , by h i s ac -t i o n s , had "d iscarded the tenka" (tenka o suteokaruru) and therefore Oda - 96 proceeded to Kyoto and restored peace. In a l e t t e r to Date Terumune of Dewa prov ince , Oda sa id that a i l was w e l l between h imse l f and Yoshiaki during the f i r s t few years fo l lowing t h e i r entry i n to Kyoto but that the Takeda, Asakura, and other " smooth- ta lkers " (neJLjin) ent iced the shogun i n to j o i n i n g t h e i r treasonous p l o t s . "What a great p i t y t h i s was!" (mu-nen sukunakarazu soro) sa id Nobunaga who, as a r e s u l t , had no recourse 9 7 but to take the steps he d i d . Mor i Terumoto and Date Terumune were powerful daimyo with whom Oda wanted to stay on good terms i n the e a r l y 1570*8, and therefore he attempted to j u s t i f y h i s behavior by blaming, i n the former case, Yosh i ak i , whom Oda accused of b r ing ing about h i s own downfal l by h i s f a i l u r e to perform acts conducive to the u n i f i c a t i o n o f the tenka. and i n the l a t t e r case the Takeda and other treacherous daimyo who duped the shogun. Y o s h i a k i 18 c r i t i c a l f a i l u r e , as f a r as Nobunaga was concerned, was that 103 he did not act in accordance with the plans Nobunaga had for the tenka. A l l actions that militated against the successful implementation of Oda's plan to unify the country were seen by him to be acts against the tenka. and a l l who performed such acts were to be condemned as traitors. Yoshiaki's pursuit of "selfish" ends impeded the realization of Oda's vision, so he was removed. One cannot assume, of course, that Nobunaga acted out of any but selfish motives himself for i t was he who would gain most by the new order he envisaged. The relationship between Nobunaga and Yoshiaki was doomed to failure from the first. Both men wanted to be supreme, but there was room for only one. Yoshiaki was, apparently, a man over whose misfortune few would grieve. According to Kuwata Tadachika, Yoshiaki was a mean and cowardly person with a broad streak of cruelty and whose cunning surpassed many times over even 98 that of Nobunaga. Kuwata described Yoshiaki's character with the Japan-ese expression "nite mo yaite mo kuenai shiromono" which means, literally, something that cannot be eaten whether broiled or boiled or, figuratively, a most crafty person. Elsewhere Kuwata observed that Nobunaga was a man towards whom it would be only natural for the ordinary person to have a 99 feeling of repugnance. Two such selfish and crafty people as Nobunaga and Yoshiaki were not destined to enjoy a long and favourable relationship. Nobunaga had l i t t l e enough trust in his own generals, let alone in the likes of Yoshiaki. Nobunaga was by far the stronger of the two, both in terms of character and in terms of the number of troops under his command, and therefore i t was Yoshiaki who was defeated. 104 In the Sengoku period the Emperor and the kuge were in dire financial straights. Local power holders, both bushi and monto, had confiscated their holdings with the result that they were no longer receiving taxes from lands s t i l l in their names. There is no doubt that the Emperor and the kuge benefited by Nobunaga's arrival in Kyoto for, in general, he sought to improve and stabilize their condition. According to Kuwata Tadachika, although the court felt a sense of uneasiness at Oda's arrival in Kyoto in 1568, i t nevertheless looked upon him as a saviour—Kuwata actually used the Japanese word for saviour 100 (kyuseishu) to describe Oda's role vis-a-vis the court. The main ways in which Nobunaga assisted the court were: 1. He commanded the return of kuge properties to their rightful owners. Some examples of this policy are: in Document 166 four of Oda's generals commanded Utsu Yorishige, a bushi of Tamba province, to release Yamakuni estate, an Imperial estate that he had confiscated. 1 0 1 In 1572 Nobunaga commanded that a l l lands that had been transferred to religious institu-tions by the kuge either by sale, pawn, or free grant, be returned to the 102 kuge. In article 4 of Document 549 Oda commanded Shibata Katsuie, his newly appointed lord of Echizen province, to return to the kuge those estates that they had in fact controlled prior to the Ikko uprisings in that area. Oda reserved to himself the right to veto any of those re-turns. 1 0 3 It is to be noted that Nobunaga's care of the nobility was limited to the Kyoto nobility of the highest order. Lesser nobility, especially provin-cial gentry, were not so well treated. Okuno Takahiro relates the some-what pathetic story of a certain Mozume Tadashige, a descendant of an 105 ancient Yamashiro family who refused to allow his lands to be taken by Nobunaga. Nobunaga called Mozume a traitor, and told his general Nagaoka 104 Fujitaka that i t was right for him to k i l l Mozume. People like Mozume stood no chance against Nobunaga, and indeed he looked upon them as traitors for daring to defy him. Of course, to defy Nobunaga was to be a traitor. 2. Oda made donations to the repair of the Imperial palace. According to the Shincho Koki Oda undertook those repairs in 1569 and 1571*°^, and 106 Tsuji Zennosuke says that further repairs were made in 1577. 3. Oda contributed to the upkeep of the Emperor and the kuge, and he charged Nichijo Chozan and Murai Sadakatsu, whom he appointed Governor of Kyoto (Kyoto shoshidai) in 1573, with the task of assuring that the Im-. perlal family's condition was improved..In 1572 and again in 1575, Oda levied a tax on the city of Ky5to that was to be paid to the court— thus i t appears that Nobunaga*s generosity to the court was not neces-sarily at his personal expense. In his commentary on Document 599 Okuno Takahiro tells us that Oda made a grant of 1000 koku to the Emperor in late 1575.107 It appears, then, that Nobunaga was intent on improving the living con-ditions of the Emperor and kuge. and that he took his obligation towards the Emperor seriously. As we have seen, article 1 of Oda's famous letter to Yoshiaki in 1572 condemned him for failing to perform his duties to-wards the Emperor. On the basis of the foregoing evidence some have gone so far as to conclude that Nobunaga had a deep reverence for the court. This is an exaggeration. 106 Although the court benefited by Oda's rise to power, he was not an atten-tive and obedient subject for he appears to have abided by Imperial in-junctions only to the degree that i t suited his purpose. In Document 614, for example, Oda complied with the wishes of the Emperor by commanding - — 108 that the Sennyuji, a Shingon otera in Kyoto, be repaired, but in Doc-ument 264 Supplement 1 there is an Imperial command that Oda disregarded.** In that document the Emperor Ogimachi commanded Nobunaga to return to Mt. Hiei the holdings that he had confiscated from i t in 1568 and 1569, but in 1571 Nobunaga destroyed Mt. Hiei and gave its lands to his generals. Oda's advantage, rather than the person and status of the Emperor, was the main factor that determined his obedience or disobedience. Even the Emperor took second place to the implementation of Nobunaga's vision. Moreover, i t appears that Imperial estates were not exempt from Nobunaga's interference should he have deemed i t necessary to the advancement of his purpose. For example, during the struggle for control of Settsu province in 1574 several of Oda's vassals commanded the village of Yamashina, part of an ancient Imperial estate in Yamashiro province, to supply them with lumber and other such materials necessary for the campaign.**® Finally, as we shall see in detail in the next chapter, when the situation looked bad for Nobunaga he was quick to appeal to the Imperial powers of mediation, but once things took a turn for the better he was equally quick to pay no more heed to the Imperial injunctions. To Oda, the Emper-or and kuge were to be preserved in a comfortable but powerless position. The Emperor's word was to be received with grave respect, but not neces-sarily heeded. 107 Having seen the cast of characters who played a role in the main drama of the sixteenth century, we can now examine the details of the struggle between Oda Nobunaga and the Buddhist institutions. A Japanese adage says that the nail that sticks out most prominently will be the one that gets hit. When Nobunaga wielded the hammer i t was the Bud-dhist institutions that stuck out most glaringly above the surface of Japanese society as Nobunaga imagined that surface should be. 108 Part II Part I I 110 In the same way that Oda Nobunaga*s character is commonly described in broad negative strokes, so too is his policy towards the Buddhist insti-tutions. There are several ways in which Japanese historians have tended to view that policy: Some, the vast majority, see Oda Nobunaga as purely and simply a destroyer of Buddhism. Tsuji Zennosuke speaks for many Japanese historians when he says that Nobunaga's Buddhist policy, with the exception of the Zen school, could be summed up by the word "oppression" (appaku).^ A similar sentiment is expressed by Ishida Ichiro in his Nihon Bunka-shi Gairon when he says that "Nobunaga realized instinctively that it was his personal historical mission to destroy things medieval." Historians who view Nobunaga's Bud-dhist policy as destructive, and its effects most negative, tend to ex-plain, or justify, this view in one of two ways: 1. They say that Nobunaga was a brute, insane, a monster. People from Takeda Shingen through Sugiyama Jiro and George Sansom have made this as-sertion. To them, the strokes that Nobunaga dealt the Buddhist institu-tions were the frantic and fanatic acts of a madman for no sane person would have wrought such destruction on, for example, the grand cultural storehouse that was Mt. Hiei. 2. In the other extreme, some historians say that the Buddhist institu-tions richly deserved the destructive blows rained on them by Nobunaga. These historians attempt to portray Nobunaga in a pleasing light, and thereby to justify his destruction of the Buddhist institutions, by de-scribing in the darkest tones the situation in the Buddhist institutions in his time. The corruption, decadence, and avariciousness of the Bud-dhist clergy is played up so that, by contrast, Nobunaga appears as the arm of God to punish Buddhism. Tanaka Yoshinari, for example, says that I l l by the time of Nobunaga the bonzes had abandoned learning and the cul-3 tivation of the Buddhist Way, and wantonly engaged in e v i l practises. It was in this context that Arthur Lloyd said that "Before the advent of Christianity, Buddhism bid fair to destroy i t s e l f . " 4 Many historians combine these two lines of approach in such a way as to show that while the Buddhist institutions indeed deserved to be oppressed, Oda's excesses in dealing with them stemmed from the fact that he was quite mad, or at least a callous brute. Other historians, Tsuji Zennosuke among them, have a viewpoint quite d i f -ferent from the foregoing. They attempt to see the Azuchi-Momoyama period as a purgative purifying one, such that the result of i t was the restor-ation of Japanese society, including the restoration of Buddhism once i t s corruption and abuses were excised by Nobunaga. These historians attempt to show that a good result came from an essentially e v i l undertaking. The implications of this assertion are great, and they shall be dealt with in the concluding chapter. The serious error shared by those who offer the foregoing interpretations of Nobunaga's policy towards Buddhist institutions is that they a l l simply assume that Nobunaga intended to destroy Buddhism and i t s institutions. They assume that his policy was primarily, i f not exclusively, geared to the destruction of the Buddhist institutions. Proponents of those theses appear to be so captivated by the scale and brutality of some of Oda's actions agaihsttoteraathat they lose sight of the coherent nature of his p o l i c y — i t is lost in the glare of the flames that consumed the Enryakuji. To appreciate the nature of the change that took place in the religious 112 sector of Japanese society in the sixteenth century, i t is necessary to understand that Nobunaga's policy towards Buddhist institutions was not as simple or as negative as historians would often have us believe. Oda did not simply lash out at Buddhist institutions. Rather, he constantly pursued a coherent policy of reducing the power of the Buddhist i n s t i t u -tions in the interest of bringing them under the control of the central administration. In the sixteenth century Buddhist otera enjoyed three types of power: 1. They maintained large forces, either sShei or monto, that could make war, cause social upset, and interfere i n secular a f f a i r s . 2. They controlled vast land holdings and many monzenmachi' whereby they could wield considerable economic power, support troops, and amass great wealth. 3. Otera enjoyed a high degree of autonomy and independence from the central administration. This autonomy and independence expressed i t s e l f i n otera's possession of shugo-funyu status, ext r a t e r r i t o r i a l i t y , and the right to grant sanctuary. As a general rule, otera that enjoyed one of these types of power enjoyed a l l three, and there was a direct ratioubetween the degree to which one of these powers was possessed and the degree to which a l l three were pos-sessed. Land was wealth, wealth was power, and power was the necessary ingredient for the maintenance of autonomy. The outstanding exception to this general rule was the Honganji for although, through the monto, i t could control broad expanses of territory, i t owned very few estates of the classical type. 113 Given the foregoing types of power on the part of the Buddhist institu-tions, Nobunaga's general policy of reducing their power had a three pronged character, or three branch policies: 1. He attempted to eradicate the military power of the Buddhist institu-tions, and their power to cause upsets in society. This policy was car-ried out by means of military campaigns against ptera that possessed that type of power. The most outstanding cases of Nobunaga's violent application of this policy were his campaigns against Mt. Hiei and the Ishiyama Hon-ganji. Nobunaga also conducted devastating campaigns against other otera, as we shall see, but his reason for doing so was not precisely because of their active and militant posture, but because of their failure to com-ply with one or the other of his second and third policies. 2. Nobunaga attempted to reduce the size and number of otera land holdings. The vast majority of otera were affected by this policy and, as a general rule, the larger the holdings of an otera the more i t was affected by this policy. 3. Nobunaga rejected otera's claims to a high degree of autonomy. No otera were permitted to stand outside the pale of central administrative author-ity. Otera most affected by the cviolent application of this policy were the Kongobuji and the Senrinji, a Zen otera in Kai province. In the following three chapters we shall examine the ways in which Nobu-naga attempted to implement his three policies and'thereby reduce the power of the Buddhist institutions. Most otera could be adequately controlled by the enforcement of the second and third policies, and there was no need, in most cases, to mount military campaigns against otera in order to a-chieve his goal. Finally, i t must be born in mind that the eradication of u 114 the excessive power of the Buddhist institutions was an ideal towards which Nobunaga strove but which he was unable to completely realize. The cumulative power of Buddhist institutions was so great that Nobunaga was sometimes forced to make compromises with them. 115 Part II Chapter 3 Oda Nobunaga's First Policy Towards Buddhist Institutions 116. Part II Chapter 3 Introduction 117 Oda Nobunaga's f i r s t policy towards Buddhist institutions was to eradicate their a b i l i t y to engage in military campaigns, cause social upset, and interfere in secular affa i r s . Nobunaga made his position regarding the involvement of otera i n secular disputes perfectly clear in 1570 when he told ten representatives of the Enryakuji that they could follow one of three courses of action towards him:Mthey could a l l y with him, in which case he would give them a "sword oath" (kincho) that he would return to them a l l Sanmon lands that hisumen had confiscated; they could act most in keeping with the way of the Bud-dha and maintain a position of complete neutrality, in which case they would not be harmed; or, should they f a i l to opt for either of those two courses, he would put their entire mountain to the torch.* Nobunaga's warning could not have been clearer: the Enryakuji--and, one might also assume, any other otera--was to a l l y with Nobunaga and be rewarded, re-main neutral and go unharmed, or be destroyed. Although the Enryakuji was given a choice as to what course to follow, in fact it--and a l l other otera—had no real choice at a l l . We saw in Chapter 1 that i t was a l l but impossible for powerful otera to maintain neutral-i t y in the Sengoku period. They could not avoid forming alliances with the daimyo. Smaller otera might have been able to escape entanglements but only for a short length of time for eventually they too would have to acknowledge their submission to one daimyo or another. Therefore, the option of neutrality did not really exist. Moreover, should an otera have chosen to a l l y with Nobunaga, there was no guarantee that i t s condition was to be enhanced or even to continue as i t had been over the centuries. Otera that a l l i e d with Nobunaga would receive certain guarantees and grants 118 of land, but even friendly otera were not exempt from his second and third policies. No religious institutions were to survive the sixteenth century with their traditional rights, privileges, and land holdings intact. The primary application of Nobunaga's f i r s t policy was against those otera that, as members of the anti-Nobunaga league, attemped to prevent Nobunaga from unifying the country. The two most powerful otera in that league were the Honganji and Mt. Hiei, and therefore we shall examine Nobunaga's campaigns against the Honganji in Section 1 of this chapter, and his destruction of Mt. Hiei in Section 2. In Section 3 we w i l l dis-cuss the blow that Nobunaga dealt to the Hokke monto on the occasion of the "Azuchi Religious Debate" (Azuchi shuron), and in Section 4 his sup-pression of several other otera in the application of his f i r s t policy. Finally, in Section 5 we w i l l consider the exceptional circumstances in which Nobunaga accepted certain religious institutions as active a l l i e s i n his campaigns. Part II Chapter 3 Section 1 Oda Nobunaga and the Honganji 120 The Honganji was, as we have seen, the center of a league of forces that attempted to block Nobunaga's attempts to unify Japan, and as such i t was his greatest enemy. With its bands of monto welded together by ties of religious loyalty, the Honganji was, in effect, a competing world order. More of Nobunaga's documents deal with the Honganji than with any other institution, religious or otherwise. Nobunaga's letters to the Honganji, or to others in which he talks about i t , outnumber his collected let-ters to a l l other Buddhist institutions combined. The majority of Nobu-naga's letters to the Honganji--approximately fifty in number—contain orders and instructions directed against i t , but in another twenty-five documents Nobunaga commended its behavior. Not surprisingly, the vast majority of the favourable documents were issued after Nobunaga's victory over the Honganji in 1580. Over and above the documents that were sent directly to the Honganji are the hundreds of letters that Oda sent to his vassals in regard to their campaigns against the Honganji forces. Before Oda could begin to concentrate on the central citadel of monto power he had to sever, one by one, each local cell, each tentacle of the Honganji octopus. Those local campaigns were usually indecisive--time and again Nobunaga's forces would suppress the monto in a certain area only to find them rising up against him once more at a later date. The majority of Nobunaga's campaigns against religious institutions lasted but a few days but i t took five years just to prepare a base for a direct siege of the Honganji citadel. Nobunaga's conflict with the Ikkoshu was the longest and most difficult of 121 a l l his struggles. It spread over the years from 1570 to 1580, and was one of the few conflicts in which, in the end, Nobunaga did not eradicate his enemy in a fight to the f i n i s h — i t concluded with a peace pact in 1580. Because Nobunaga's campaign against the Honganji did not culminate in a great battle, i t is generally less well known than his explosive strike against Mfc. Hiei in 1571, but the Ishiyama Honganji War was the major event of Oda's lif e and, indeed, of the whole Sengoku period. The Honganji caused Nobunaga great difficulties because over the years from 1570 to 1580 it continually called upon the groups of monto in the provinces to rise in ikki against him, and this kept Nobunaga's forces occupied on a number of fronts. The Honganji citadel was a heavily armed fortress from 1570 until 1580, and the monto of Kaga province were con-tinually in arms from 1573 through 1581. During the 1570's there were in-numerable minor uprisings by the monto, and the following major ones: by the monto of the Nagashima area of Ise province in 1570, 1573, and 1574; by the Omi monto in 1570; by the Kawachi and Echizen monto in 1574 and 1575; by the Izumi monto in 1575; and by the monto of Kii province in 1577. Even when those groups of monto were not actually fighting, their power was such that Nobunaga could not consider a province in which they were located to be under his control until that power was curtailed. Adding to Nobunaga's difficulties was the fact that it was usually the case that when the monto were in arms they were accompanied by the forces of various daimyo members of the anti-Nobunaga league who contributed their strength to the campaigns against him. The first contact between Nobunaga and the Honganji appears to have been 122 in 1567. When Oda gained control of Mino and the northern section of Ise province, Kennyo Kosa sent him a letter of congratulations and a gift of a sword. This was a typical diplomatic gesture on the part of one powerful party in recognition of another, and i t expressed the desire of the sender 2 to have peaceful relations with that other. Although Kennyo made this friendly gesture towards Nobunaga i t is possible, and even probable, that as early as 1567 the Honganji began to cement its relations with daimyo who were not likely to be sympathetic to Nobunaga because by that date Oda had gained considerable power and had been invited by Ashikaga Yoshi-aki to sponsor him. Following Nobunaga's successful entry into Kyoto in October of 1568, one of his first acts was to impose taxes on a number of institutions, includ-ing the Honganji from which he demanded a large sum of money. According to Kasahara Kazuo, Kennyo paid the tax but, fearing that i t would not be Oda's last levy on the Honganji, he was in the position of having to choose 3 between confrontation with Nobunaga or submission to him. Kennyo chose the former. Therefore he immediately began to strengthen the Honganji's relations with the Rokkaku family with whom he had formed a marital rela-tion in 1557, ordered ten branch otera of the Honganji in Omi province to prepare for an uprising, and cooperated with the Miyoshi and Matsunaga Hisahide in provisioning two of their fortresses. Tamamuro Taijo has a slightly different explanation of the Honganji's position at that time.4 He says that even though the Honganji paid Oda's levy without protest, Kennyo came to consider the levy an unfair and un-reasonable one and therefore he began to cement his relations with the daimyo. However, in order to avoid an open clash with Nobunaga he pre-123 tended to have had nothing to do with those daimyo—even though he was cooperating with the Miyoshi, he wrote to Akechi Mitsuhide stating that he had no connection with them.5 During 1569 Nobunaga was occupied with efforts to s o l i d i f y his control over the Kinai, and in a campaign against the Kitabatake of Ise for con-t r o l of that province. The Honganji, meanwhile, was busily strengthening i t s ties with the Asai of Omi, Asakura of Echizen, Takeda of Kai, Miyoshi of Awa, Mori of Aki, and the Rokkaku of Omi, in preparation for the im-pending confrontation with Nobunaga. In other words, Kennyo was forming the anti-Nobunaga league. Early in 1570 Oda marched against the Asakura for their refusal to come to Kyoto in response to his summons of 1568. To Oda's great shock, while he was confronting the Asakura forces in Echizen, Asai Nagamasa, Oda's brother i n law, rose up i n his rear and trapped Oda between the Asai-Asa-kura combined forces? Those forces were assisted by the Rokkaku and, i t appears, by the Honganji because Kennyo called for an Ikko ikki in May of that year while Nobunaga's forces were trapped. And yet, Kennyo s t i l l tried to avoid open host i t i t i e s with Oda by pretending to have nothing to do with the act i v i t i e s of the monto who participated against him. Oda's situation was desperate. Lest he be hopelessly trapped "like a bean in a bag tied top and bottom without even a speck of dust being able to leak i n or out," 7 he beat a hasty retreat from Echizen in the company of only a few warriors, and reached Kyoto safely on June 2. On his way back to Kyoto Oda was almost assasinated by a famous rifleman named Sugitani g Zenjubo, who fired two shots at him but managed to h i t only Oda's sieve. 124 The Shincho Koki says that Zenjubo was hired by the Rokkaku as a sniper to k i l l Oda.9 In June of 1570 Nobunaga attacked, and defeated, :the Rokkaku in a matter of a few weeks, following which Nobunaga's troops, assisted by Ieyasu's men, dealt the Asai-Asakura forces a decisive blow in Omi province. Here and there the monto took part in sporadic outbursts that hampered Oda's campaign against the Asai and Asakura. In their plight the Asai appealed to the Miyoshi for assistance, and the Miyoshi answered the call by cross-ing, from Shikoku to Settsu province where they established a base near the Honganji in August. Taking advantage of the Miyoshi presence, Kennyo sent out an order for the monto to take up arms, but he continued his attempt to keep his involvement with the anti-Nobunaga forces a secret from Nobunaga. With the Miyoshi and the monto now involved, the remnant of the routed Asai and Asakura regrouped and marched to Sakamoto in southern Omi where they established a base close by Mt. Hiei. Nobunaga's younger brother Nobuharu, who was stationed in Sakamoto, was killed dur-ing the Asai-Asakura advance into that area. In October Nobunaga marched to Sakamoto and routed the Asai-Asakura for-ces, who then took refuge on Mt. Hiei. In pursuit of those forces, Nobu-naga had his men surround the base of the mountain, and he issued his warning to the Enryakuji bonzes.10 At that point, according to Kasahara Kazuo, the Honganji completely aban-doned its general policy of discouraging Ikko ikki that it had been fol-lowing down from Rennyo's time. Kennyo ceased pretending to be uninvolved in the campaigns against Nobunaga, and in October of 1570 he sent out a 125 general appeal to a l l the monto to make war on Nobunaga.** In this ap-12 peal Kennyo referred to Nobunaga as the "enemy of the Law" (hoteki). According to KaSahara, Kennyo arrived at that decision when he saw Nobu-• naga's troops advance to the very doorstep of the Enryakuji. With the Asai and Asakura out of the way, at least for the moment, there was no strong buffer between Nobunaga's troops and Osaka, and therefore the Hon-ganji could be directly threatened. According to Kasahara this was a per-ilous moment for Kennyo for he greatly feared that the Buddhist tradition 13 passed down from the time of Shinran was about to be trampled on. Ken-nyo f e l t , from that point, that he had no choice but to oppose Nobunaga with a l l the forces he could muster. In response to Kennyo's c a l l to arms, the monto of Omi province attacked, and defeated, Nobunaga's troops in Tenmanmori in Omi, and one month later, in early December of 1570, the monto of the Nagashima area of Ise at-tacked Nobunaga's forces i n Ogie fortress in Owari province where they k i l l e d Oda's younger brother Nobuoki. *^ The anti-Nobunaga league, with Kennyo active at i t s center, was far too powerful for Nobunaga to contend with at that time so he was forced to seek peace through the intercession of Yoshiaki and the Emperor. Con-sequently, on January 9, 1571, a peace pact was drawn up and Oda with-15 drew his forces from Omi and retired to Gifu. This was the f i r s t of two occasions on which the anti-Nobunaga league bet-tered Oda. As a result of the f i r s t defeat Oda realized that his only hope for victory lay in severing from the Honganji both i t s secular a l l i e s and i t s tentacles throughout the provinces. This undertaking was to occupy Oda 12.6 for ten years. By the end of 1570 there was established a coalition of parties who re-cognized Nobunaga as their common enemy: these were the Asai, Asakura, Miyoshi, Takeda, Mt. Hiei, and the Honganji. It was also around that time that Ashikaga Yoshiaki began to lend his support to the anti-Nobunaga league because his relationship with Nobunaga had reached the breaking point. On the day after New Year of the year Genki 1 (January 27, 1571), Oda began his campaign against the Ikko, monto by ordering Toyotomi Hideyoshi, then installed in Yokoyama fortress in Omi province, to cut a l l t r a f f i c be-tween Echizen and Osaka by setting up blockades between Anegawa and Asa-zuma, two points on the main road through Omi.^ This tactic of Oda's ser-ved several purposes: i t impeded the flow of supplies and information be-tween the Honganji and i t s monto in the provinces of Kaga and Echizen, i t s p l i t the Asai (Omi) and Asakura (Echizen) forces, and i t prevented any further link between the Honganji and the Asai and Asakura. It appears from this undertaking that Nobunaga's immediate goal was to divide the anti-Nobunaga league into two isolated segments by taking control of a stretch of land, mainly the province of Omi, that stood between Osaka and the provinces of Echizen and Kaga. Anyone who attempted to cross the closed territory, and that included merchants and bonzes, was liable to be executed as a spy. With the anti-Nobunaga league s p l i t into two parts, Oda could then begin to attack and eradicate each part individually. In February of 1571 Oda sent Shibata Katsuie and Ujiie Naomoto,a vassal of Nobunaga since 1564, into Ise province to attack the Nagashima monto 127 who had dealt Oda's forces a severe blow in the previous December. Once again, however, Oda's troops were unable to defeat the monto, and in June Oda was forced to order a retreat. During the retreat Ujiie was ambushed and k i l l e d , and Shibata was severely wounded. In anger and frustration Nobunaga commanded his vassal Inoko Takanari 1 7 to put to death a l l Ikko 18 monto whom he could round up, no matter whose vassals they were. In September of 1571 Nobunaga led his forces into Omi against the Asai where they attacked and set f i r e to the main Asai fortress at Odani. Then, quite unexpectedly, Nobunaga turned his 30,000 troops northwest towards Kyoto and ordered them to bivouac at the Miidera. On the morning of Sept-ember 30, 1571,. Nobunaga began his notorious attack on Mt; Hiei, and the year 1571 concluded--as far as his relations with otera were concerned--19 with his destruction of that famous institution. 1572 Throughout 1572 the anti-Nobunaga league members continued to have Nobu-naga surrounded because they s t i l l maintained an unbroken chain of forces that extended from the Takeda in the east to the Honganji i n the west. Yoshiaki made every effort to have one of the daimyo, preferably Takeda Shingen whom he ceaselessly implored, advance on Kyoto and oust Nobunaga. In the opening months of 1572 combined Ikko and Rokkaku forces attacked Oda's positions i n Omi province, and in order to prevent the participation of more monto in that struggle Oda warned the monto of southern Omi not to oppose him. In Document 310 Sakuma Nobumori told the monto of an estate in southern Omi that they were not to take part in any Ikko-ikki, and that they were to have no contact whatsoever with those monto who were up in 128 arms even though they might have been relatives of theirs. Sakuma also ordered the monto to send pledges to Nobunaga that they would obey his 20 order. Three supplementary documents accompanying Document 310 contain 21 the monto pledges—evidently they heeded the warning. This incident sheds light on another tactic Nobunaga used against the monto: in ad-dition to his efforts to break the anti-Nobunaga league into two parts, he tried to break down the unity and cohesiveness of each provincial monto group. In this case he tried to divide the Omi monto and apparently was successful. Meanwhile, Yoshiaki was attempting to bring peace: he was especially i n -terested in bringing peace, on the one hand, between Oda and the Honganji, and on the other hand he urged the Takeda, Uesugi, and Hojo to stop war-ring. In order to bring this about Yoshiaki planned to have the Takeda mediate between Oda and the Honganji, while Oda and Asakura Yoshikage mediated the peace among the Takeda, Uesugi, and Hojo. The negotiations failed before they really got started because Uesugi Kenshin categorically refused to accept his neighbouring daimyo and hated enemy Asakura Yoshikage as mediator. We see here an ongoing effort by Yoshiaki to bring peace, especially in the Kanto area, so that one or several of the warring dai-myos might be able to come to his rescue. The fact that Oda was willing to engage in the peace negotiations witnesses to the a b i l i t y of the sho-gun, because of his status and despite his weakness, to move the daimyo. However, Oda most lik e l y agreed to the peace negotiations at that time because i t was certainly to his benefit to have the monto actions in Omi cease. Kennyo too was willing to cooperate with Yoshiaki although he certainly had no trust in Nobunaga and was not inclined to make peace with 129 him. Okuno Takahiro quotes Kennyo as having said that he would abide by the shogun's wishes even though he bore "feelings of bitter malice towards 22 Nobunaga" (Nobunaga ni taishi ikon shincho da ga...). It is li k e l y that Kennyo was moved to accept peace negotiations at that time because he feared that Asakura Yoshikage was diffident about the ongoing struggle 23 with Nobunaga, and because he appears ever to have been hoping to avoid a to-the-death fight with Nobunaga. As part of the formalities that ac-companied peace negotiations, Kennyo sent Oda presents of a painted s c r o l l and tea utensils. After the peace negotiations failed, Kennyo took the offensive. He order-ed the Echizen monto to gather supplies for a large uprising, and he urged the Asai and Asakura forces to proceed once again to Sakamoto. Should the latter not be possible, he asked them at least to take care to cut the road between Mino and Owari provinces in order to impede Nobunaga's supply trains. Oda, i n turn, once again forbade any t r a f f i c to Osaka be-cause he did not want a flow of supplies and personnel to reinforce the Honganji--monto forces from K i i province were marching to Osaka at that time to bolster the garrison there. Early in June a bonze envoy between Asakura Yoshikage and Miyoshi Yoshi-tsugu was captured while attempting to cross the stretch of land that Oda had closed to a l l travellers a year earlier; Oda summarily sentenced him to be burned to death in Kyoto. Okuno states that Nobunaga's action caused great shock for never before was such a drastic punishment visited upon Buddhist bonze envoys.^ Oda was determined to enforce his decrees, and no exceptions were to be made for offenders, c l e r i c a l or otherwise. 130 Once again, in August of 1572, Nobunaga renewed his efforts to stop a l l t r a f f i c between the Honganji and i t s provincial monto. In Document 331, for example, he told the monto of the Senpukuji and i t s branches in Mino province that the coming and going of monto between that province and Osaka was forbidden. He also ordered them to get a new "Abbot's Repre-sentative" (daibozu)--evidently he was displeased with the former one— and he gave them u n t i l the twenty-third of the month for a l l monto who 25 had assembled at those otera to disperse. Nobunaga's document was i s -sued on the twenty-first of the month, so they were given but two days in which to comply with his orders. The stern nature of this document is evident in both the opening phrase, in which he accused the Honganji of unprecedented scheming (Honganji no zoi o kuwadatsuru shidai zendai mi-mon...), and in the closing admonition in which Nobunaga threatened with dire punishment anyone who might disobey his orders. On November 3, 1572, Nobunaga sent Yoshiaki the famous seventeen ar t i c l e document in which he stripped the shogun of his powers. In reaction to that document Yoshiaki implored Takeda Shingen to hurry to his aid, and Nobunaga, in turn, made an alliance with Uesugi Kenshin of Echigo prov-ince. This was a typical daimyo strategy whereby a daimyo would a l l y with an enemy of his opponent in order to cause that opponent to fight on two fronts. This alliance placed the Takeda in a dangerous position between Nobunaga's forces to their west and the Uesugi to the north and northeast. Kenshin was too hard pressed by Ikko uprisings in Kaga and Etchu to be of much help to Nobunaga, but Nobunaga won an alliance with him by arguing that a combined effort by Oda and Uesugi forces could rout the Takeda, after which the Uesugi could attack the Kaga and Etchu monto without having to worry about the Takeda. 131 The Takeda became especially important to the anti-Nobunaga league at that time because Asakura Yoshikage had suddenly broken off his participation in the campaign against Nobunaga and retired to his home province of Echizen i n October. Why Yoshikage withdrew is not clear—Okuno suggests 26 that he simply did not have the stomach for war. With Yoshikage*s de-sertion, Kennyo was moved to put monto forces under the command of Asai Nagamasa in order to hold their position until the Takeda, hopefully, could join them. In November Takeda Shingen took to the f i e l d in response to Yoshiaki's c a l l for help. He advanced, at the head of 30,000 troops, into Totomi province where he defeated Ieyasu'8 forces at the battle of Mikatagahara (Mikatagahara no tatakai), after which he turned his troops 27 into Mikawa province in order to pursue his advance on Kyoto. Nobunaga saw out the year 1572 making preparations to parry the Takeda thrust. 1573 Throughout the early months of 1573 Yoshiaki continued his efforts to forge a combination of forces to topple Nobunaga, and he even managed to 28 get the Miidera to join in an uprising against him. ° But fate deserted Yoshiaki and smiled on Nobunaga on May 13, 1573, when Takeda Shingen, the single most dangerous threat to Nobunaga at that time, suddenly died of a bullet wound that he had received four months earlier during the bat-tle of Mikatagahara. Shingen's unexpected death immediately brought a halt to the Takeda and relieved the pressure from Nobunaga's eastern flank. Just five days before Shingen's death, Yoshiaki surrendered to Nobunaga whose troops had him surrounded in the Nijo palace. 132 In September Nobunaga once again attacked, and this time eradicated, the Asai and Asakura. With Takeda Shingen, Asai Nagamasa, and Asakura Yoshi-kage dead, the Honganji lost i t s major daimyo a l l i e s i n the Kinai and central Honshu areas, so Kennyo was forced to look to the west, to the Mori of Aki, for support. Thus the main theatre of combat began to shift from the Kinai and provinces to i t s east to Osaka and the provinces to it s west. The monto in the Kinai and the Hokuriku (Wakasa, Echizen, Etchu, Echigo, Kaga, Noto, and Sado provinces) were s t i l l far from under Nobunaga's con-t r o l . In October Nobunaga's army marched against the Kaga and Echizen mon-to who had once again taken to the f i e l d . This time Oda's troops bettered the monto, and Oda took control of the three provinces of Echizen, Kaga, and Noto. This was to be, as we shall see, a very short-lived victory. Meanwhile, the powerful Nagashima monto of Ise province were in arms—Oda also sent his forces against them but once again they proved to be too strong and Nobunaga's men were forced to withdraw from Ise. That was Oda's last campaign of 1573. 1574 This year opened with a large Ikko ik k i in Echizen. When Oda brought Echi-zen under his control in October of the preceding year he appointed Maeba Nagatoshi to administer the province. This appointment proved premature be-cause, as events proved, the monto were not yet completely subdued. In mid February Maeba was attacked by Tomita Nagashige, castellan of Fuchu, for his failure to give over to Tomita the administrative records properly due him. This conflict between two of Nobunaga's appointees sparked a violent Ikko uprising, and Oda lost his control of Echizen. Oda attempted to re-133 gain control by s o l l i c i t i n g support from some powerful local bushi fami-l i e s — f o r example, in Document 437 he thanked a certain Senpuku Shikibu 29 Ofu for capturing the headmen of a town controlled by the monto --but the monto were in arms throughout the province and Nobunaga's attempts failed. To add to Nobunaga's d i f f i c u l t i e s , late in April Kennyo sent out a c a l l for a massive uprising by the monto who were to be supported by the Rok-kaku and the Miyoshi. Yoshiaki, meanwhile, continued to push his schemes for peace, this time among Takeda Katsuyori—Shingen's third son and successor as head of the Takeda family—Uesugi Kenshin, and Hojo Ujimasa. While Nobunaga was making preparations to launch an attack on the Hon-ganji citadel he received a summons from Tokugawa Ieyasu to send rein-forcements to Mikawa to help Ieyasu's troops repel an attack by the Take-da who were once again on the march. In June Nobunaga's reinforcements reached Ieyasu and the Takeda attack was blunted. From July through September of 1574 Oda's armies, under the leadership of Araki Murashige and Takayama Hida no Kami—father of the famous "Christian Daimyo" Takayama Ukon (Dom Justo)--who was a vassal of Araki, fought and won a decisive battle with the Ikko monto of the Nakanoshima area of Set-tsu province. Following this victory Nobunaga sent his men into Ise prov-ince against the most troublesome Nagashima monto who had been in arms since June. This time Oda had the grim intention of surrounding those monto and slaughtering them: in Document 461 he told his general Kawajiri Hidetaka that the monto had made several entreaties to him but that he would not overlook their "offenses" (toga)—he intended to tear them out 30 31 from the roots (nekirubeki). This time Oda succeeded. The Ise campaign 1.34 lasted just over two months and concluded with the eradication of monto 32 power. With that victory Nobunaga's position i n the Kinai and the prov-inces of central Honshu was quite secure. Nevertheless, small uprisings continued to break out here and there, caus-ing Nobunaga to hurriedly dispatch troops to the trouble spots in order to snuff out the uprisings before they developed into large scale dis-turbances. Nobunaga's determination to crush the monto is brought out in Document 466 in which he commanded Nagaoka Fujitaka to search out and 33 k i l l a l l rebels i n the two provinces of Owari and Ise. Evidently there were s t i l l rebellious monto in Oda's home province as late as 1574. Because Oda's troops were occupied in Mikawa, Settsu, and Ise during the summer months of 1574 he could not send an army into Echizen in order to retake that province from the monto. Therefore, Oda formed a strange a l -liance: he took as his a l l i e s the remnant of the Asakura forces and groups of monto who belonged to branches of Jodo Shinshu other than the Honganji branch. It w i l l be recalled that the Asakura had been embroiled in con-f l i c t with the monto in Echizen for decades prior to the early 1560's, and thus Oda probably had l i t t l e d i f f i c u l t y in convincing them to fight with him against the monto. Early in November Itami Chikaoki, a minor bushi of Yamato province, took up arms against Oda. To prevent the spread of this uprising, and the possible involvement of the monto, Nobunaga sent Araki and Kawajiri to suppress i t . In Document 480 Nobunaga told Kawajiri that even though the people who were blockaded in Itami castle beseeched Ms forgiveness a number of times he would not forgive them, and he commanded that not one 135 of them be spared. The heads of a l l i n the fortress were to be taken. Oda made an example of the rebellious Itami in order to warn others against 34 such behavior. From November Nobunaga's troops campaigned in Kawachi province against militant monto groups, and in Echizen province—by means of his new Asa-kura and Shinshu a l l i e s — t o regain control there. Early in December Nobunaga commanded that a l l roads and bridges through-35 out his bunkoku be repaired and widened. The purpose of this was to make for faster and smoother movement of his troops, and i t was part of Oda's preparations for a siege of the Honganji citadel. 1575 Nobunaga's preparations for an attack on the Honganji occupied the f i r s t half of 1575. Early in May he commanded Nagaoka Fujitaka to assemble personnel and supplies on an exceptionally large scale because, as he said, he intended to make war on Osaka in the f a l l . Oda's siege of the Honganji actually began in late May when he dispatched 10,000 troops to Osaka. Those troops swept up the remnant of the Miyoshi and Asakura for-ces on the way.3*' In June Oda's forces, with the aid of Ieyasu's troops, scored a major 37 victory over the Takeda at Nagashino in Mikawa. This battle broke the back of the Takeda; thenceforth they caused no d i f f i c u l t i e s for Nobunaga. Early in June Oda boasted to Nagaoka Fujitaka that he had but one enemy 38 l e f t , i.e., the Honganji, but i t was a formidable enemy. There were s t i l l powerful monto groups in Kawachi and Izumi, provinces to the east and south of Osaka, and i n Echizen which was s t i l l in monto hands. 136 In order to get some assistance against the Echizen monto Nobunaga ap-pealed to the Nichirenshu monto in that province, and to the monto of three Shinshu otera that belonged to branches of Shinshu other than the 39 Honganji branch. Through September Nobunaga led the campaign against the Ikko monto i n Echizen and he enjoyed much success. In Document 533, a report of his progress in Echizen to Murai Sadakatsu, his Governor (shoshidai) of Kyoto since 1573, Nobunaga said that in the seige of the ci t y of Fuchu approximately 1500 heads were taken, and 2000 more were 40 taken in i t s neighbouring areas. The scale of the carnage in this cam-paign i s also brought out in Document 571 in which Nobunaga told Date Terumune of Dewa province that he had "cut down several tens of thousands of rebels" (kyotora suman nin o nadegiri...) in the provinces of Kaga and 41 - -Echizen i n the month of September. The Shincho Koki says that the num-42 ber of monto k i l l e d totalled some thirty to forty thousand people. In October Shimozuma Raisho, the monto leader in the Kaga-Echizen area, was captured through the efforts of other monto who belonged to the Sho-myoji, an otera of the Takada Branch of Shinshu in Echizen. Evidently Oda's request earlier in the year for their help was answered. In reward for this service the Shomyoji was placed i n charge of a l l "returnees" (kisannin), i.e., a l l the monto who were returning home after their i n -43 volvement in the Ikko uprisings. Here we see another facet of Oda's pol-icy of eradicating monto power: by placing those monto who belonged to the Honganji branch of Shinshu under the authority of otera that belonged to other branches of the same school, Nobunaga hoped to splinter the Honganji organization and keep the monto under control. By the end of October Echizen province was "pacified", and in that month 137 Nobunaga made Shibata Katsuie master of Echizen and gave him detailed 44 instructions as to how he was to carry out his appointment. It w i l l be recalled that Nobunaga's f i r s t efforts at governing Echizen failed, so this time he was not about to take any risks. Shibata's primary tasks were to keep the monto under control and to act as a barrier against any forces, especially the Uesugi, that might attempt to descend on Kyoto from the northeast. As a result of the foregoing developments, the Honganji was in grave trou-ble: the monto of Kaga and Echizen provinces were suppressed and could no longer be of any assistance; Shimozuma Raisho had been captured and k i l l e d ; and a l l the Honganji's daimyo a l l i e s in central Japan were defeated. There-fore Kennyo appealed, through Miyoshi Yasunaga--a vassal of Nobunaga since May of that year--and Matsui Yukan, for peace. Nobunaga consented, and on 45 December 5 he sent Kennyo a pledge of his good faith. The terms of the Nobunaga-Honganji peace pact are contained in Document 561 Supplement 1 which was signed by Miyoshi and Matsui and delivered to 46 five representatives of the Honganji. The document began with a state-ment to the effect that the pledge was made to the kami and Buddhas and 47 before them, and i t contained three arti c l e s : In a r t i c l e 1 Nobunaga acquiesced in the desire of the Honganji for peace, assured them that there would be no discrepancy between his words and ac-tions--!, e., that there would be no duplicity whereby he might say one thing and intend another--and that no new and unreasonable demands would be made on the Honganji. In ar t i c l e 2 Nobunaga pledged that throughout those provinces under his control " a l l would be as in the past" (sakizaki no gotoku tarubeshi), 138 i.e., that the Honganji could keep i t s branch otera in those provinces, and that the monto kyodan and their customary religious activities could continue. Oda also pledged not to impose regulations on the flow of traf-f i c between the Honganji and i t s branches, and not to harass monto who were returning to resettle the lands that they had deserted during the Ikko uprisings. Arti c l e 3 stated that there would be no deviation from the promises con-tained in the pledge. Thus Nobunaga repeated his assurances to the Hon-ganji that he was acting in good faith. In the remainder of the document, which makes up approximately one half of its length, Oda called down upon himself the most severe of divine 48 punishments should he break his pledge. True to form, in Document 561 Nobunaga instructed Matsui Yukan to get a good look around at conditions i n the Honganji when he went to deliver the peace pledge--Oda wanted to get a f i r s t hand appraisal of his enemy. Matsui delivered the pledge on November 23, from which date Nobunaga and the Hon-49 ganji were o f f i c i a l l y at peace. On f i r s t consideration i t may seem surprising that Nobunaga was willing to accept Kennyo's peace overtures at this time, but the fact is that 1575 was an exhausting year for Nobunaga. During that year Nobunaga fought the Takeda in Mikawa and the Ikko monto in Echizen, and he initiated his seige of the Honganji citadel. The peace with Kennyo gave Nobunaga time to rest his troops, procure more supplies, develop a plan of action against the Honganji, and look after chores that demanded his attention. Document 562 provides an example of how Nobunaga used this respite for in i t he i n -structed his administrators of Owari province to repair and rebuild the 139. bridges and roads throughout the province."*0 A further reason for Oda's willingness to make peace at that time was that i t afforded him the chance to establish relationships with daimyo into whose areas his influence was beginning to spread. For example, in Docu-ment 573 there is evidence of Nobunaga's communication with the Chosokabe, daimyo of Tosa province, who wanted Nobunaga to approve their efforts to take control of the entire island of Shikoku."'1 Furthermore, the peace pact allowed Nobunaga to shuffle his troops around with considerable impunity as he initiated campaigns in areas not yet under his control. For example, in Document 563 Oda told Nagaoka Fujitaka of his planned campaigns in Tamba and Tango provinces, over which Akechi Mitsuhide was placed in command, and in Harima province under the command 52 of Araki Murashige. The peace with the Honganji enabled Nobunaga to send his troops southwest beyond the Osaka area without fighting. Tactically this was a great advantage to Nobunaga because when the h o s t i l i t i e s began anew in May of 1576 Nobunaga's forces had the Honganji fenced i n : to the north was Akechi Mitsuhide and his army, to the west was Murashige, and to the east was Nobunaga. The Honganji could look only south for assistance, and to the south was the Inland Sea (Seto Naikai). Finally, as shall be discussed i n detail i n the following chapter, the Nobunaga-Honganji peace gave Nobunaga time to implement his new land policy. 1576 During the early months of 1576 Nobunaga and the Honganji were s t i l l at peace. Ashikaga Yoshiaki, as always, was s t i l l searching for someone to 140 fight for his cause. Since there was no hope of finding such a person in central Honshu, Yoshiaki moved to Bingo province where he could be close to Mori Terumoto of Aki whose assistance he requested. Over the preceding years, from 1568, Nobunaga enjoyed cautious but peaceful relations with the Mori even though they had close ties with the Honganji and were, at least nominally, part of the anti-Nobunaga league. This was because the Mori were too far removed from the Kinai to have had any involvement in the struggles in that area in the late 1560's and early 1570*s. In 1576, however, Mori Terumoto became an active member of the anti-Nobunaga league. He did so in response to Yoshiaki's urgings and, more importantly, be-cause by that time Nobunaga's troops had advanced west beyond Osaka and were moving in the direction of Aki province. The fact that Nobunaga's armies under Murashige were positioned west of the Honganji, between Osaka and Aki province, made communication between the Mori and the Honganji most awkward. Any assistance that the Mori were to send to Osaka would have to go by sea because the land routes were tightly sealed. By the end of April the fragile peace between Oda and the Honganji was broken: Nobunaga's armies were on the march in the west, Mori Terumoto had committed himself to assist the Honganji and sponsor Yoshiaki*s cause, and Kennyo sent out a call to the monto to rise up against Nobunaga once again. Kennyo's call was answered by the monto of Settsu and Echizen, who took up arms late in April, and thus there began the third and final round of the Ishiyama Honganji War. In reopening hostilities Nobunaga ordered his generals to cut down a l l 141 grains that were growing i n the general v i c i n i t y of the H o n g a n j i — t h i s was a standard p r a c t i s e designed to deprive the besieged forces of food supplies--and to post notices near the entrance to the Honganji promising that the l i v e s of those who quit the otera would be spared. J Nobunaga s t i p u l a t e d , however, that t h i s "absolution did not extend to bonzes and other such people who looked as i f they might r i s e against me." (bozu ika yo n l mo tachlsoro mono o ba, shamen subekarazu soro). How t h i s was to be determined i s not explained. In e f f e c t , Nobunaga would probably have put to death a l l able bodied men and spared only women, c h i l d r e n , and e l d e r l y men. In preparation f o r a massive siege of the Honganji, Nobunaga ordered h i s generals to construct f o r t s i n i t s v i c i n i t y to serve as r a l l y i n g points for h i s troops as w e l l as shelters from Honganji gunfire. In Document 638 Nobunaga instructed h i s o f f i c e r s to be on guard day and night against mon-to movements, and to be prepared to attack any Honganji forces that l e f t 54 the c i t a d e l by whatever e x i t . He a l s o warned h i s o f f i c e r s against reck-les s and p o i n t l e s s skirmishes i n which valuable warriors were l i a b l e to be injured or k i l l e d by Honganji gunfire. Nobunaga made a s p e c i a l e f f o r t to assure that the Honganji would not receive any outside support. For example, i n Document 636 he warned the Hirano estater-an important com-mercial port adjacent to the Honganji, and one of Nobunaga's personally owned holdings (chokkatsuchi)—against sending a i d to the Honganji, and he threatened severe penalties against any fami l i e s that dared disobey h i s o r d e r s . ^ It i s doubtful that Hirano would have a c t u a l l y supplied the Hon-g a n j i with i t s own goods, but i t might have been w i l l i n g to serve as the port of debarkation for troops and supplies a r r i v i n g by sea from the Mori. 142 Early in June Nobunaga's general Harada Naomasa led 10,000 troops, sev-eral thousand of them armed with firearms, i n an assault on the Honganji, 56 but they were repulsed and Harada was k i l l e d . In retaliation Nobunaga personally led a vicious attack to the very gates of the Honganji in which some three thousand monto heads were taken. In Settsu province, mean-while, Ikko forces were on the move—they attacked and burned the Tendai otera Shitennoji and several other positions held by Nobunaga's men--and Oda dispatched Akechi Mitsuhide to Settsu to suppress them. Also i n June, unfortunately for Nobunaga, Uesugi Kenshin made peace with Kennyo through the efforts of the indefatigable Yoshiaki who also succeed-ed in bringing about a peace among Uesugi Kenshin, Takeda Katsuyori, and Hojo Ujima8a. This new development was threatening to Nobunaga because his forces were in danger of being squeezed between those of the Uesugi to the northeast and the Mori to the west, who began to pursue a pincer move-ment against him. In order to relieve the pressure being applied to him from the northeast Nobunaga immediately sought an alliance with the Date of Dewa province, which was situated to the northeast of Uesugi's home province of Echigo, and requested them to make war on the Uesugi from the rear while Shibata tried to hold the line i n Echizen. To add to Nobunaga's d i f f i c u l t i e s , i t was at that time that the Mori began to provision the Honganji by sending troops and supplies by ship up the am Inland Sea from Aki to Osaka. In order to prevent the successful delivery of those men and supplies Nobunaga appealed to Adaka Nobuyasu of Awaji for assistance, and told him that i t would be an outstanding service to Oda should he be able to drive off Mori Terumoto*s fleet of shi p s . 5 7 In July approximately one hundred ships, the vanguard of Mori's navy, arrived off 143 Awaji, and early i n August there was a decisive naval battle near the mouth of the Kizu River—a branch of the Yodo River that empties into Osaka Bay at a point just north of where the Honganji stood—between the roughly three hundred ships assembled by Nobunaga's a l l i e s , especially by Adaka _ 58 Nobuyasu, and the seven to eight hundred ships of Mori's navy. It was really no contest: the Mori ships outnumbered Nobunaga's by better than two to one, fcheirhships were larger, and the crews were seasoned mariners. Nobunaga's fleet was destroyed by f i r e and Mori's men and supplies got through to Kennyo. With this development, Nobunaga's seige of the Hon-ganji was temporarily s t i f l e d . Immediately after the defeat of his hastily assembled navy Nobunaga com-missioned the c i t y of Ominato i n Ise province to construct a new navy for him under the direction of Takigawa Kazumasu and Nobunaga's "Admiral"' Kuki 59 Yoshitaka. The year 1576 ended with Nobunaga making preparations to renew the assault on the Honganji. 1577 In 1577 the most important members of the anti-Nobunaga league were the Honganji, Ashikaga Yoshiaki, Mori Terumoto, and Uesugi Kenshin. In March Hatakeyama Sadamasa of Kawachi was encouraged by Kennyo to i n i -tiate a large uprising i n his home area with the cooperation of the monto from the Saiga area of K i i . Hatakeyama consented and attempted to e l i c i t the support of the Negoro sohei who had fought on the side of the Hatake-yama family in the past. This time, however, the Negoro leaders decided to offer their support to Nobunaga and they sent envoys to him in Kyoto 144 with that offer. Nobunaga accepted their support and commanded them to send their sohei into Kawachi province. Oda then dispatched Akechi Mitsu-hide and Takigawa Kazumasu to crush the Saiga monto. By this date Nobunaga's power was so great i n central Honshu that local pockets of resistance stood l i t t l e chance against him. By early April the Saiga uprising was suppressed, and on April 3 Oda sent a letter to the seven leaders of the Saiga monto i n which he acknowledged a pledge of loyalty that they had apparently sent to him, and he promised to forgive them. 6 0 It is remarkable that Oda was willing to spare the leaders of an Ikko uprising, and indeed Okuno Takahiro says that that was not exactly the case because there were other monto leaders who had gone into hiding 61 and whom Nobunaga ordered to be sought out and k i l l e d . It i s possible that Nobunaga was willing at that point to allow the Saiga monto to re-tain some degree of power i n order that they might act as a deterrent against their neighbours to the east, the sohei of Koya and Negoro. Meanwhile, Uesugi Kenshin was working at top speed to descend on Kyoto. Thanks to his new-found friendship with Kennyo, Uesugi was on good terms with the monto of Kaga, Echizen, and Noto provinces, and thus his forces were able to advance on Kyoto through those provinces without any danger of being attacked by them. In an effort to block the Uesugi advance Oda appealed to some families of local gentry in Kaga to fight on his behalf. In Document 711, for example, he told Shibayama Chojiro, the head of a powerful Kaga family, that in reward for loyalty Oda would guarantee his present land holdings, and that rewards would be showered upon him in 62 gratitude for meritorious military service. This was the standard offer that Oda made when he sought the assistance of non-aligned parties. 145 In late July Oda commanded Shibata Katsuie, assisted by Toyotomi Hide-yoshi, to advance into Kaga to stop the Uesugi drive towards Kyoto, and he continued his efforts to have Date Terumune assist him by attacking 63 the Uesugi from behind. A l l was not well with Oda's forces in Kaga, however. The mutual h o s t i l i t y between Katsuie and Hideyoshi caused quar-rels and dissension with the result that Hideyoshi suddenly, and rashly, 64 l e f t his assignment in Kaga without f i r s t receiving orders from Nobunaga. Nobunaga had l i t t l e time to concern himself with Hideyoshi's desertion of his post, however, because new troubles appeared i n September. F i r s t , the Saiga monto rose in arms once again and Oda was forced to march against them. In Document 732 he told Tsutsui Junkei to consult with Sakuma Nobu-mori about the Saiga campaign, and commanded him to proceed with caution 65 against the monto. Second, on September 28 Matsunaga Hisahide and his son Hisamichi suddenly broke off their campaign against the Honganji, with-drew to Yamato province over which Hisahide had been appointed by Nobunaga in 1568, and revolted against him. Nobunaga was shocked and angered by the Matsunagas' treachery: in Document 736 he called their behavior out-rageous (gengo-dodan), a term Oda reserved for only the most infuriating events, and he commanded a certain Okasuho no Kami, a vassal of Hisahide, 66 to confiscate his master's holdings. Oda added the warning that anyone who aided the Matsunaga would be considered equally guilty with them, and he even threatened to punish any farmers who paid taxes to them. Oda sent Akechi Mitsuhide, Nagaoka Fujitaka, Tsutsui Junkei, and Toyotomi Hideyoshi against the Matsunaga who were completely routed ln a ten day battle. Hisa-hide' 8 two young sons were captured and executed at Kyoto's Rokujogawara on November 14. 6 7 146 In addition to these difficulties, the situation was not going well for Nobunaga in the northeast. In October the Uesugi forces pushed into Kaga where they defeated Oda's troops under the command of Shibata Katsuie, and Kenshin pressed his advance on Kyoto. In the west, however, Oda's armies were doing well. Akechi Mitsuhide was fighting successfully in Tamba province, and Toyotomi Hideyoshi, who left for Harima province in November as Oda's field marshal in charge of the campaign in the Chugoku area, succeeded in gaining control of a large section of Harima. Thus the year ended with the situation well in hand in the west, but quite out of hand in the northeast. 1578 In the early months of 1578 Nobunaga's forces continued their campaigns in the west and attempted to stop the Uesugi advance from the northeast. Fortune smiled on Nobunaga on April 19 when Uesugi Kenshin suddenly be-came sick and died at the age of forty-eight. Oda was spared the neces-sity of having to do battle with the formidable Uesugi because succession disputes following Kenshin's death halted their drive towards Kyoto. In the meantime, however, the situation took a turn for the worse in Hideyoshi's campaign against the Mori and their allies the Ukita of Bitchu province. The Bessho of Harima, who had been allied with Hideyoshi, be-trayed him and allied with the Mori, thereby tipping the scales in favor of the Mori forces. Oda immediately sent a large army under the command 68 of Araki Murashige to Hideyoshi's aid in July. It will be recalled that following the defeat of his navy by the Mori in August of 1576, Oda commissioned the construction of a new one at Ominato 147 i n Ise province. The new navy was completed by July of 1578 , and i t was new not only in that i t was freshly constructed but in that a new type of war-ship was produced. According to Okuno Takahiro, Nobunaga's new navy con-sisted of seven metal s h i p s — s i x of them were of the same size (21.6 me-ters long by 12.6 meters wide) and there was a slightly larger one that 69 was to serve as flagshipr-that were fitted out with heavy cannon. It is not to be imagined that those ships were constructed entirely of metal — rather, they were wooden ships overlaid with metal plates in the manner of the famous "Ironclad" design of the American C i v i l War. The combination of metal defensive plates and heavy cannons made Oda1 s ships a l l but i n -destructible in the sixteenth century. The construction of the new navy is a tribute both to Nobunaga's determination—it required a f u l l two years and untold expense to build the ships—and his inventiveness, and the very decision to construct metal men-of-war reflects NobunagaJs genius. In July Nobunaga'8 new navy sailed from Ise to the Saiga coast, an area on the coast of K i i province just south of 5saka, where i t was met by a large fleet of ships that belonged to the monto of Saiga and Awaji. The monto's smaller wooden ships attempted to surround Nobunaga's fleet in the nar-row channel between Awaji and the K i i mainland, but one barrage from the large cannons on Oda's ships could destroy scores of enemy craft at once. Nobunaga'8 navy devastated the monto fleet, and on August 19 i t sailed into Osaka Bay where i t set up a blockade against any further t r a f f i c be-tween the Mori and the Honganji. In November, the Uesugi—under Uesugi Kagekatsu, Kenshin's nephew and suc-cessor as head of the Uesugi family—incited disturbances i n Etchu prov-ince, so Nobunaga sent his vassal Saito Shingoro to suppress them. In Doc-148 ument 780 Nobunaga congratulated Salto for his unparalleled service in k i l l i n g over 3000 of the enemy.70 Once again, however, one of Nobunaga's powerful vassals betrayed him. On November 16 Araki Murashige, lord of Settsu province, deserted Oda and joined the anti-Nobunaga league. This was indeed an unfortunate incident. It i s not known exactly why Araki l e f t Nobunaga, but i t appears that Nobu-naga's spies reported to him that there was some kind of impropriety going on in the fortresses manned by Araki's troops i n the v i c i n i t y of the Hon-ganji. Some of the vassals of Nakagawa Kiyohide, a vassal general of Araki and the person in command of his front line troops in the seige of the Honganji, were accused of secretly selling rice under cover of night to the people blockaded in the Honganji citadel. Nobunaga commissioned several people to verify the accusations, and in the meantime, according to one version of that incident, he ordered Araki to hand over his mother 71 as a hostage, Araki refused to do so. According to another version, when Nobunaga received his spies' report he ordered Araki to come to Azuchi to answer charges of conspiring with the enemy, but some of Araki's vassals dissuaded him from making that trip.by arguing that Nobunaga would k i l l anyone whom he suspected of treachery no matter how long and fa i t h f u l l y that person might have served him. Therefore Araki threw i n his lot with the anti-Nobunaga league by sending hostages to the Mori and pledges of loyalty to Mori Terumoto and the Honganji. He then barricaded himself i n Arioka fortress in Settsu and prepared for Nobunaga's attack. In order to gain the time in which to r i d himself of that new threat, Oda appealed to the kuge Tach i i r i Munetsugu to intervene on his behalf and request the Emperor to i n i t i a t e a peace pact between himself and Kennyo. 149 Ogimachi complied with Nobunaga's request and peace negotiations between Oda and Rennyo began early i n December. Kennyo was w i l l i n g to negotiate a m peace with Oda under one condition: namely, Oda had to include Mori Teru-moto i n the peace and enter into negotiations with him also. I t appears that Kennyo f e l t