ODA NOBUNAGA AND THE BUDDHIST INSTITUTIONS

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In the latter half of the sixteenth century, Japan, which for almost one hundred years had been fractured into a great number of small domains ruled by daimyo, was in the process of being unified. Three important figures, of whom the first was Oda Nobunaga (1534-1582), brought about that unification. Oda Nobunaga's role as a unifier of the Japanese state has been extensively studied by Japanese historians, but in those studies historians have usually misconstrued the nature and purpose of Oda's policies towards Buddhist institutions by portraying them as merely destructive, and have overlooked the most important effect of those policies. Oda Nobunaga's policies towards Buddhist institutions were not as sweepingly negative as has been generally asserted, and their effect was not the destruction of those institutions but a profound redefinition of the place of Buddhism in Japanese society.

The greatest obstacle that Oda Nobunaga encountered in his efforts to unify the country was the Buddhist institutions which by the sixteenth century had come to possess great power. That power was of three types: many Buddhist institutions maintained armies of "cleric-soldiers" (sō-hei) or "lay followers" (monto) that interfered in secular affairs and engaged in military campaigns; many owned vast stretches of land spread throughout the country; and many enjoyed a high degree of autonomy, independence, and extraterritoriality. By far the most powerful opposition to the realization of Oda's goal of a unified country was that put forward by the Ishiyama Honganji, the chief temple of the Honganji branch.
of True Pure Land Buddhism (Jōdo Shinshū). The Ishiyama Honganji was the apex of a huge organization of *monto*, and it was also the hub of the anti-Nobunaga league that was made up of a number of Buddhist institutions, daimyo, and eventually the shogun Ashikaga Yoshiaki.

In order to unify the country Oda Nobunaga had to reduce the power of the Buddhist institutions, and to that end he pursued three policies, each one directed against one of the types of power enjoyed by those institutions: he eradicated the Buddhist armies of *sōhei* and *monto* in a series of campaigns over the years from 1569 to 1582; he reduced the size of the Buddhist institutions' land holdings by confiscating many of their estates and by instituting a new land-ownership policy; and he denied their right to independence from the central administration.

The result of Oda Nobunaga's policies was twofold: the power, land-holdings, and independence of Buddhist institutions was severely and permanently reduced; and more importantly, there was a redefinition of the place that Buddhism was to occupy in Japanese society in the centuries following the sixteenth. The classical definition of the role that Buddhism played in Japanese society was no longer accepted; Buddhism lost its influence on affairs of state as society underwent a process of secularization. Oda Nobunaga's policies were instrumental in ushering in a secular world.

Oda Nobunaga's policies towards Buddhist institutions were investigated through an examination of a collection of 1461 documents, the vast majority of which are considered to have been issued by Oda between the years 1549 and 1582. Because the majority of the documents that were is-
sued by Oda deal with Buddhist institutions, it is possible to gain an understanding of his policies towards those institutions by a study of these documents. Much information on Oda's relations with Buddhist institutions is also contained in a biography of Oda, the Shinchō Kōki, that was written by Ōta Izumi no Kami Gyūichi in 1610, twenty-eight years after Oda's death.
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Glossary
Introduction
In the latter half of the sixteenth century Oda Nobunaga\(^1\) (1534-1582) redefined the relationship between Church (Buddhist) and State in Japan. It was Nobunaga's goal to reunify the Japanese state which, for almost a century, had been fractured into hundreds of autonomous domains that were under the control of daimyo who had little or no loyalty to the central administration. Powerful Buddhist institutions, particularly the Ishiyama Honganji\(^2\), the center of the Honganji branch of True Pure Land Buddhism (Jōdo-shinshū), represented the greatest obstacle to Nobunaga's realization of his goal, and therefore it was necessary for him to reduce the power of the Buddhist institutions and bring them under the control of the central administration.

Policies pursued by Oda Nobunaga in his efforts to reunify Japan resulted not simply in the reduction of the power of the Buddhist institutions but in a redefinition of the role that Buddhism was to play in Japanese society over the centuries following the sixteenth. Nobunaga removed Buddhism from the center stage position that it had occupied in Japanese society for one thousand years, and relegated it to a position in the wings. As a result of Nobunaga's policies, which were continued by Toyotomi Hideyoshi and Tokugawa Ieyasu, Japanese society was reunited and rebuilt on a new ideological base and there was established a strong and stable central administration that lasted for over two hundred and fifty years.

The sixteenth century was a time of exceptional upset in Japanese society. It was the age of gekokujo "when, according to the traditional view, military upstarts displaced their legitimate superiors by treachery and trickery."\(^3\) It was an upside down world, a world in which the most lowly mem-
bers of society strove, often successfully, to displace and replace their masters, and when the sudden transfer of allegiance from one master to another could cause the balance of power in any given area to shift overnight. It was a time in which broad economic, political, and social changes swept over the country.

In the *Studies in the Institutional History of Early Modern Japan*, John Whitney Hall notes that "The possibility that the military confusion of the Sengoku period masked many fundamental and even revolutionary social and political changes has not been ignored completely by historians." And yet, it appears that the most fundamental and important change that resulted from the Sengoku period is by and large overlooked by historians, namely, the profound change that took place in the religious dimension of Japanese society. The social revolutions of the sixteenth century were accompanied by a radical change in the role that Buddhism played in Japanese society. Indeed, the social turmoil of the Sengoku period may be seen as a manifestation of the important "religious" change that was taking place. Christopher Dawson's maxim that "Social revolution is an index of spiritual change." may well be applied to the Sengoku period.

The spiritual change that Japanese society was undergoing in the sixteenth century has a parallel in the profound transformation that European societies were experiencing at about that same time. Both European and Japanese society were involved in the process commonly indicated by the term "secularization."

There were only two other periods in history when Japanese society underwent changes as profound as those experienced in the late sixteenth cen-
tury. These were the sixth and seventh centuries, when the Japanese state was formed out of an alliance of loosely knit clans (uji), and the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries when Japanese society experienced another major transformation as a result of its meeting with the West. The political, social, and economic changes that occurred during those other two periods were somewhat more sweeping in their scope than were those that finally resulted in the establishment of the Tokugawa Shogunate in the early seventeenth century. From a number of perspectives, therefore, those other two periods are more important than the sixteenth century, but in terms of Japanese religious history the latter period is certainly as important as the other two.

The importance of Oda Nobunaga's period may be appreciated when one understands the significance of the sweeping changes that were then taking place in terms of religious history. The purpose of this dissertation is to indicate the nature and scale of the change that was undergone by the religious dimension of Japanese society in the sixteenth century, and to examine Oda Nobunaga's role in hastening the secularization of that society. Our interest is not primarily in Nobunaga but in the change that he imposed on the Buddhist institutions and in the overall result of his policies towards them. This will be undertaken by means of an examination of the relationship between Nobunaga and the Buddhist institutions, particularly his relationship with the Ishiyama Honganji.

It would require several lifetimes to incorporate into one's research all the sixteenth century materials that make mention of Nobunaga and his activities. There are hundreds, and possibly thousands, of letters, dia-
ries, chronicles, biographies, and assorted literary materials that contain references to him. In the preparation of this work two primary sources were used:

1. A two volume work entitled *Oda Nobunaga Monjo no Kenkyū*. This is a collection by Okuno Takahiro, an acknowledged scholar of Japanese history, of some 1461 documents that were issued in the latter half of the sixteenth century, the great majority of which (975 documents) are considered to have been issued by Oda Nobunaga between the years 1549, when he was fifteen years old, and 1582 when he died at the age of forty-eight.

2. The *Shincho Kōki*. This is a biography of Nobunaga that was written early in the seventeenth century—probably in 1610—by Ōta Izumi no Kami Gyūichi, a former retainer of Oda's who at the age of eighty-four produced a biography of his master in sixteen folios from notes that he had made while in Nobunaga's service.

While it cannot be stated that these works contain all the relevant, extant information on Nobunaga's relationship with Buddhist institutions, they do provide more than sufficient information for one to come to understand the nature of that relationship. Just over three hundred of the 1461 documents in Okuno's collection are addressed directly to Buddhist institutions, and many other documents, approximately another four hundred, deal indirectly with Buddhist institutions in that they contain orders and directions by Nobunaga to his generals in their campaigns against such institutions, reports to other daimyo about those campaigns, reports by Buddhist institutions to their allies about Nobunaga's actions, and so on. Thus approximately one half of the collected documents contain material relating to Buddhist institutions—this in itself demonstrates the
importance that Oda attached to the Buddhist institutions and their members.

Throughout this paper the Japanese word "otera" will be left in the Japanese rather than translated as "temple" or "monastery" as is usually the case. This is because neither of those English terms correctly translates the Japanese. 10 A "tera" is a building that houses a statue of the Buddha and a community of bonzes or nuns who practise the Buddhist way and explain its teachings. 11 An otera is certainly not a temple for the latter is an "edifice or place regarded primarily as the dwelling place or 'house' of a deity or deities; hence, an edifice devoted to divine worship." 12 The word temple, therefore, would be more appropriately applied to a Shintō shrine; a Zen otera certainly cannot be called a temple. A monastery is a "place of residence of a community of persons living secluded from the world under religious vows." 13 While this term may more aptly be used to translate "otera", it too is less than accurate. A Buddhist otera, certainly in the sixteenth century, was not necessarily inhabited by a group--many small rural otera, branches of larger, more centrally located institutions, had no resident clergy, and many others were looked after by but one bonze. who was not necessarily retired from the world (many were married) and who was not under any vows equivalent to the Christian monastic vows. While there are many similarities between an otera and a monastery, the two institutions are far from identical. 14

In our examination of the relationship between Oda Nobunaga and the Buddhist institutions, and the results of Nobunaga's policies towards them, we shall discuss the following topics:
Part I

The place of Buddhism in Japanese society down to the sixteenth century, and the power of the Buddhist institutions in the sixteenth century.
(Chapter 1)

Oda Nobunaga's attitude towards religion and towards Buddhism, and his rise to power in the latter half of the sixteenth century.
(Chapter 2)

Part II

Nobunaga's policies towards the three types of power possessed by the Buddhist institutions.
(Chapters 3, 4, and 5)

Part III

An evaluation of Nobunaga's three policies.
(Chapter 6)

The result of Nobunaga's policies.
(Chapter 7)
Part I
Part I

Introduction
Before we can examine the relationship between Oda Nobunaga and the Buddhist institutions it is necessary to appreciate the "character" of both of these major contestants in the power struggle of the latter part of the sixteenth century. In Chapter 1, therefore, we shall outline first the history of the "place" of Buddhism in Japanese society prior to the sixteenth century, and the nature of the power possessed by Buddhist institutions in the sixteenth century. Because there were other powerful figures in society besides Oda Nobunaga and the Buddhist institutions, namely, the daimyo, the shogun, and the court, we shall briefly note the type of power they possessed, for their power and position seriously influenced the relationship between Oda and the Buddhist institutions. Our interest in the daimyo, shogun, and court is confined to their influence they had on that relationship, and they shall be discussed only in so far as an understanding of their condition is necessary for an appreciation of the power structure in Japan in Oda's time.

In Chapter 2 we shall first examine Nobunaga's attitude towards religion in general, and towards Buddhism in particular, in order that we may appreciate the personal factors in the Nobunaga-Buddhism relationship. This examination is confined to those factors relevant to that relationship and is not meant to be a general character analysis of Nobunaga. Chapter 2 will conclude with a brief description of Nobunaga's power, his allies, his relationship with the shogun, and finally his relations with the court.

Having thereby completed an examination of the setting, we can proceed to discuss the details of Nobunaga's relationship with the Buddhist institutions in Part II.
Part I

Chapter 1

The Buddhist Institutions, the Emperor, and the Shogun
Part I

Chapter 1

Section 1

An Outline History of the Place of Buddhism in Japanese Society
By the late sixteenth century Buddhism had already existed in Japan for over one thousand years. The character of the Buddhist institutions in the sixteenth century resulted from myriad and complex factors. ¹

Buddhism was officially received in Japan in the middle of the sixth century when it was used by the leaders of the newly developing Japanese state to bring about a degree of social unity theretofore unknown in Japan. Buddhist institutions were built to further the spiritual and material welfare of the state and its officials, and to reinforce political authority in a manner parallel to that of the traditional Shinto but beyond the particularism of the clans (uji) which had formed the basis of the old society. Buddhism was sponsored as the protector of the state and was seen as a means to justify and uphold the ruling regime. It was the agency to bind together the nation. In reward for this service Buddhist institutions were given grants of land, and the Buddhist clergy were appointed as government officials with state salaries.

From the time of the Prince Regent Shōtoku (572-621), or at any rate those in authority in the early seventh century,² through the time of the Taika Reform (645-701), there developed an understanding of the relationship between Buddhism and the state according to which those two phenomena mutually reinforced each other. The Imperial, or secular, law (ōbo) and the Buddhist, or religious, law (buppo) were wedded in such a way that acts of Buddhist piety were believed to benefit the state, and the proper conduct of the state was thought to bring Buddhist spiritual reward. This was, therefore, and in other words, a Church-State philosophy according to which service to the state was rewarded with religious merit, and the
proper performance of religious practices assured the prosperity and unity of the state. This philosophy is indicated throughout this paper by the expression "öbo-huppō formula", i.e., Imperial law-Buddhist law formula, or "öbo-huppō equation".  

Thus the early ruling class designed a concept that would help preserve their position and guarantee the well-being of the new order. In applying this formula the leaders of the new Japanese state replaced clan-sponsored Buddhist institutions with state-sponsored ones in the interest of, and on the basis of a belief in, a pacified and continuing Japanese people.

In many respects this arrangement was most beneficial to the Buddhist community, but mainly in economic and political terms. The great defect of this arrangement was that it did not allow the Buddhist community to develop its own integrity and coherence. In both China and Japan, unlike in India, there was no room in society for a group that followed an "extraordinary" societal norm. In a word, religious did not stand outside the pale of the secular authority.

The closer the Buddhist institutions came to be identified with the cause of the court and the nobility (kuge), the more they tended to lose their vitality—a vitality not to be restored until Buddhism fused with shamanistic popular religion centuries later. While the Buddhist orthodoxy maintained its institutional structure by emphasizing the charism of office, i.e., the transfer of authority within the Buddhist community by appointment to office, the shamanistic Buddhists were characterized by personal charism. By their very nature, therefore, the shamanistic Buddhists were outside the defined norms of the institutionalized Church-State relation-
ship and they were ever under pressure from the central administration to be brought into conformity with the "Rules for the Conduct of Bonzes and Nuns" (soniryo) that were written into the Taihō Code of the early eighth century.

The ideal of a mutually supportive Church-State partnership was not to be realized. The Nara period (710-784) witnessed the "ecclesiastification" of Japanese culture and society, and the Buddhist institutions which began by supporting the state became formidable counter-balances to it and created out of the ideal of Church-State unity a de facto Church-State tension.

The Taihō Code specified that certain lands—shrine lands, otera lands, and those bestowed on individuals for highly meritorious service to the state—were outside the jurisdiction of the officials entrusted with governing the provinces (kokushi). These lands enjoyed "Non-entry of the kokushi" (kokushi-funyu) status for the kokushi were not allowed to enter (funyu) them or collect taxes on them. As a result, and despite the attempted controls, from the early Nara period otera and powerful nobles came to own Imperially-exempt estates (shōen) on which the central administration did not collect taxes or enforce the law. So much land came to be controlled by the Buddhist institutions that in 741, for example, the Emperor Kanmu had to withdraw government support of Buddhism because the national treasury was depleted.

In the latter part of the eighth century the Hossō bonze Dōkyō tried to establish direct ecclesiastical control over the state, but his scheme failed. In order to flee the power and influence of the Buddhist institu-
tions the court left Nara in 784 and moved to Heian (Kyoto), but to lit-
ttle avail. The Heian period (794-1185), which began in protest against
the ecclesiastification of culture and society, soon developed its own
burdensome clericalism. Those in authority in both the secular and reli-
gious spheres of society throughout the Heian period came from the same
small group of noble families, and the religious institutions continued
to hold, and even expand, their numerous estates. For example, in the
early Heian period the Todaiji, chief otera of the Kegon school\(^5\) of Bud-
dhism and one of the most powerful of the Nara otera, held some ninety-
two shōen spread throughout twenty-three provinces.

In the ninth century the Tendai and Shingon schools arose and declared
the support of the throne and government to be their primary duty, but in
fact they competed with the nobility for extra-legal benefits and secular
power and they interfered time and again in temporal affairs. Because the
Buddhist institutions owned vast holdings they began to maintain large
forces of what were called "bonze-soldiers" (sōhei).\(^6\) The sōhei were, at
first, not really bonzes. Rather, they were petty warriors conscripted by
the larger otera, particularly by the Kōfukuji, Enryakuji, and Onjōji,
which developed the largest bands of sōhei, to protect the otera and their
estates. The central administration was unable to provide such a service.
Before long, however, the otera began to use their sōhei to attack other
oteras and thereby expand their holdings, and eventually the sōhei were
used against the forces of the state. This led to the development of what
was, in effect, a state within a state.

The great Buddhist institutions had all but totally escaped government
control: they heavily fortified their otera, maintained private armies of
sohei, collected rents and taxes from their estates and forwarded none to Kyōto, and they could, as a result, impose their will on the officers of state. In 1006, for example, sohei from the Kōfukuji marched on Kyōto and pressured Minamoto Yorichika into making their otera lord of Yamato province. The Emperor Shirakawa, whose reign in the eleventh century was constantly plagued with battles against the sohei of the Enryakuji, once lamented that there were three things over which he had no control: the waters of the Kamo river, the roll of the dice, and the mountain bonzes. The mountain, of course, was Mt. Hiei.

From the tenth through the twelfth centuries a warrior (bushi) class developed and, with the establishment of the shogunate, came to control the central administration. A swing away from the large religious institutions began in the eleventh century with the appearance of popular Amidist pietism, but the great institutions maintained their power and remained entangled in secular disputes. They sided with the Taira and the Minamoto, the most powerful bushi families, who rewarded or punished them accordingly—the Minamoto continually called on the many Buddhist institutions with anti-Taira sentiments to support them, and the Taira seized the lands of otera that conspired against them. In 1180, for example, Taira Shige-hira burned the Todaiji and the Kofukuji, among the most powerful otera of that time, for taking sides against him. In the end, the Minamoto victory over the Taira was due largely to the fact that the bonzes were hostile to them.

Spirituality burned low in the twelfth century. The Enryakuji and the Midera frequently used their sohei against one another, and as far away as
Kyūshū religious institutions regularly raided one another's estates. As if to witness to the relative meaninglessness of positions in religious leadership, a non-Shingon bonze was appointed abbot of the Kongōbuji, the chief otera of the Kogi Branch of Shingon Buddhism on Mt. Kōya.  

Over the centuries from the Nara through the Heian periods the shōen stratum of society consisted of the traditional noble families of Kyōto and the Buddhist and Shintō religious institutions. The properties that the great otera held in the late Heian period were immense: for example, of the 357 shōen in Yamato province the Kōfukuji owned 267, the Tōdaiji 73, and the Tōji (Shingon) 4. By contrast, the Emperor owned 17 shōen and the kuge 15. Ninety percent of all estates in Yamato were owned by otera. Of the 79 shōen in Yamashiro province the Emperor held 20, the kuge 26, and otera 22: the Kōfukuji had 13, the Tōdaiji 5, and the Tōji 4. Otera held over thirty-five percent of the total. Of the 29 shōen in Owari province, the Tōdaiji held 7 and the Tōji 1, between them twenty-five percent of the total. In Ōmi province also the shōen owned by the Tōdaiji, Kōfukuji, and Tōji amounted to over twenty-five percent of the total number of shōen in that province.  

The bushi class took over central administrative control in the twelfth century with the establishment of the Kamakura "tent government" (bakufu) presided over by the shogun. In the early years of the Kamakura period (1192-1333) the bakufu declared all estates and private lands to be subject to the general taxation. They appointed military governors (shugo) over the provinces to exercise provincial military and police affairs, and land stewards (jūtō) over all public lands and shōen in order to as-
sure regular tax collection. Consequently, many of the kuge and high officials of the Heian period lost their holdings. Also in early Kamakura times the bakufu frequently despoiled otera holdings, but many of the great otera continued to maintain their holdings and, not infrequently, they won further exemptions. The Todaiji kept its effective control of vast holdings in the province of Bizen, the Kofukuji controlled all of Yamato province, the holdings of the Negoroji were valued at several hundred thousand koku, and many otera came to be heavily patronized by the bakufu.

In the Kamakura period many otera came to possess what was called "Non-entry of the military governor" (shugo-funyu) status—or, "Non-entry of the military governor's agents" (shugoshi-funyu) status—whereby they were exempt from interference by the military governor in affairs on their estates. Otera that enjoyed shugo-funyu status had the exclusive right to collect taxes and arrest criminals on their shugo-funyu lands (shugo-funyuchi, or shugoshi-funyuchi), and no bushi were allowed to enter those lands bearing arms. It was ordinarily understood that otera that enjoyed this exemption would arrest criminals and hand them over to the authorities, but the shugo often did not have the power to oversee or enforce this procedure so that little or nothing might be done about it should an otera refuse to comply. Thus in the Kamakura period the land system was partially restored to the way it had been centuries earlier when kokushi-funyu status was enjoyed by many religious institutions.

As a result of the possession of shugo-funyu status many otera enjoyed, in effect, a great degree of extraterritoriality. Over the centuries the Kongobuji, for example, could grant sanctuary, asylum, to any and all who
sought shelter there. People who committed crimes in some other part of the country could evade the punishments due them should they have been able to make it to the safety of the Kongōbuji into whose territories pursuing parties would not follow. Thus the possession of shugo-funyū status and the degree of extraterritoriality connected with it placed the religious institutions outside the pale of central administrative control. Many otera were in complete control of their lands—no outside party had any right to a portion to the yield of those lands and, as we have noted, some of the great otera even had juridical authority on their holdings.

From medieval times the majority of Buddhist institutions occupied important positions on scenic, and usually strategic, mountains, or in convenient flat areas like river deltas and fords, and major crossroads. Many otera were, in fact, fortresses for they were often surrounded by an earthen rampart, sometimes with a moat behind or before it, and they were usually on a piece of elevated ground that made them especially difficult to besiege.

From the middle ages towns called "towns before the gates" (monzenmachi) grew up around many otera. This was a natural development because the dwellings of the many bonzes who belonged to the larger otera were usually spread out around the entrances to the otera precincts. These ready-made communities attracted many laity who would take up residence there and engage in service industries in the newly developing towns. Large markets grew up in many monzenmachi, largely to the benefit of the otera for they usually owned the lands in the surrounding area. If an otera possessed shugo-funyū status so too did its monzenmachi, and this was an ad-
ded attraction to those who came to live there.  

The Kamakura period is important for the appearance of the great religious reformers Hōnen, Shinran, Dōgen, Eisai, and Nichiren, who responded to the religious appetites of the medieval populace. With them the pomp and circumstance, and to a great extent the ceremony and mystery, of the older schools was passed over in favor of simple piety and spiritual exercises. Doctrine gave way to personal experience, and it was discovered that faith could provide a basis for group cohesion. On this faith there developed the new, independent, religious organizations that characterized Japanese Buddhism from that time on. The Tendai school, the matrix of those new movements, declined to where it became an academic as opposed to a religious center, and Buddhism changed from the religion of the cultured elite to the refuge of the lower classes.

Still the old ideal of ôbô-buppo unity was never lost. The new schools did not develop any concept according to which loyalty to the Emperor was separated from loyalty to the Buddha, and none maintained that "the state ought to be ruled by those who had seen the vision of truth and know the will of higher powers." The reformers took pains to show how their teachings would benefit the state. For example, Peter A. Pardue says that Eisai "felt obliged to justify Zen as conducive to the national welfare", to which end he wrote his Propagation of Zen for the Protection of the Country (Kōzen-gokoku-ron). Pardue goes on to explain that the "Zen teaching in general provided a remarkably creative base for coordination with the secular needs and cultural goals of the state." To Shinran there was no doubt that the buppo transcended the law of this world, the ôbô, but he was not primarily interested in this world. It was
Nichiren who was truly a radical for he considered "everything, even the emperor, as subordinate to the Buddha of the Lotus Sutra." And yet, Nichiren assumed that the Emperor was an adherent of the correct buppo—he reaffirmed the type of ōbo-buppo unity that was espoused in the seventh century, and he looked forward to the age in which the ōbo and buppo would perfectly fuse and introduce a golden age. Salvation was still not disassociated from politics despite the new style of Buddhism.

Like their Nara and Heian predecessors, who continued to receive material rewards for spiritual services and whose position continued relatively unchanged into the fourteenth century, the new schools also developed vast holdings and considerable power independent of the secular authorities. Throughout the Heian, Kamakura, and Muromachi (1338-1573) periods the many far-flung religious institutions, of both the old and new schools, often served as outposts of the central authority and provided many services for the state: they brought culture to the provinces, helped maintain the peace, reported to the central administration about activities in the provinces, and so on.

In 1331 the Emperor Godaigo, with the assistance of Buddhist institutions, attacked the Kamakura bakufu in an effort to restore Imperial power, but the Ashikaga family succeeded in gaining control and they established the Muromachi bakufu. The Ashikaga were wary of religious institutions and some efforts were made, especially by Ashikaga Yoshimitsu (1358-1408), to control the great otera but no overall policy resulted because their efforts were directed mainly against the powerful Zen Gozan otera. This was because the three hundred otera of the Gozan system were among the
principal landholders of medieval Japan. Most of those otera owned somewhere in the vicinity of from ten to twenty shōen, so that in all several thousand estates were under their control. For example, in the fifteenth century the Nanzenji of Kyoto possessed lands with a yield of 4000 koku of rice and its branch otera had lands that could yield another 10,000 koku. Tenryuji estates yielded 2400 koku and those of its branch otera another 6000. By comparison, the court's income during the Kamakura and Muromachi periods was, on the average, in the vicinity of 4000 koku yearly.

It was not only Zen otera that held vast estates in the Muromachi period. The Kofukuji, for example, had an average yearly income of 19,000 koku, and its branches brought in an additional 2000. John W. Hall provides an example of the proportion of Buddhist holdings in the province of Bizen in early Ashikaga times: of the one hundred and fifty shōen that made up Bizen at that time, twenty-six were owned by centrally located otera and shrines. According to these statistics religious institutions held about seventeen percent of the estates in the province, and this does not include the lands that were owned by small rural otera in Bizen. 20

The period from the Nanboku (1336-1392) through the Muromachi periods was characterized by increasing difficulties for the Buddhist institutions. Many otera began to lose control of their estates and monzenmachi, and violent campaigns were sometimes directed against the most powerful otera. For example, in 1434 Ashikaga Yoshinori attacked and suppressed the söhei of the Enryakuji. Nevertheless, the great otera like Mt. Kōya, the Kōfukuji, and also Mt. Hiei, continued to prosper and shugo-funyū status was granted to more and more institutions. Even as late as 1563 the Ishi-
yama Honganji was given shugo-funyū status for its rapidly expanding monzenmachi in Osaka by the shogun Ashikaga Yoshiteru.

From the late Muromachi period many monzenmachi became the centers of a new and important development, i.e., the rise of commerce and the merchant class. As the burgeoning merchant economy expanded in the monzenmachi the otera around which they grew became more wealthy and gained more power in provincial politics.

With the Ōnin War of 1467-1477 Japan entered what has become known as the Sengoku period, which continued until 1573 when Oda Nobunaga deposed the last Ashikaga shogun. The period from 1573 until 1600 is commonly called the Azuchi-Momoyama period, after the names of those places where Nobunaga and Toyotomi Hideyoshi built their magnificent palace-fortresses in 1576 and 1593 respectively. It is also called the Shokuho period after the family names of Oda and Toyotomi. With Tokugawa Ieyasu's victory in the battle of Sekigahara in 1600, and his attainment of the position of shogun in 1603, Japan entered the Tokugawa, or Edo, period which continued for two hundred and sixty-five years to 1867.
Part I

Chapter 1

Section 2

The Buddhist Institutions in the Sengoku Period
The Ōnin-Bunmei period (1467-1486) brought an end to the shōen system of administration; shogunal authority no longer prevailed, and power passed from the shugo daimyō to the Sengoku daimyō who held autocratic administrative powers within their domains which were known as bunkoku. According to John W. Hall, "By 1560 over two hundred daimyo had made their appearance, and the major plains of Japan had been reduced to stable blocks of control by the more powerful of these feudal lords." The Sengoku Jinmei Jiten contains the names, and short biographic sketches, of upwards of two thousand daimyo and important bushi, a great many of whom were directly involved in the campaigns for or against Oda Nobunaga, and the names of hundreds of bushi, ranging from lower ranked and unknown officers through great and famous daimyo, appear in Nobunaga's documents. It is not necessary to our topic for us to identify those hundreds of bushi, nor is it relevant to us to examine the rise of the Sengoku and Shokuhō daimyō and the way in which they held power in their bunkoku.

In the mid-sixteenth century the situation among the daimyo was one characterized primarily by disunity. Each daimyo held autocratic power in his bunkoku and maintained control by means of a hierarchical system of allegiances in which military services were rewarded with grants of fief. The daimyo held a considerable portion—usually around twenty-five percent—of the lands within his bunkoku as his private domain (chokkatsu-chi), and the rest was entrusted to his vassals who held control over sections of the bunkoku from fortresses interspersed through it. Within the bunkoku the holdings of absentee landlords, notably the kuge and otera, were usually confiscated by the daimyo, and there was little or no contact between the provinces and Kyōto.
The forming, breaking, and reforming of alliances with neighbouring daimyo went on incessantly as daimyo attempted to secure, and possibly expand, their holdings. All daimyo existed in a balance of power situation in which their standing armies were ever at the ready to defend the bunkoku against the attacks of other daimyo who wished to expand their holdings, or to march against neighbouring daimyo for the same purpose. For example, Uesugi Kenshin of Echigo and Takeda Shingen of Kai province, two of the most powerful daimyo in the mid-sixteenth century, spent most of their adult lives fighting against each other every year, usually at the same battleground.

Besides these inter-bunkoku tensions, there were also complex tensions within any given bunkoku for a daimyo could never be certain, in that notorious age of gekujo, that his vassals would remain loyal to him. A daimyo always had to be ready to defend himself against his own subordinates.

Within the bunkoku, daimyo-Buddhist relations varied according to a number of conditions and circumstances: the locale, the moment, the daimyo's personal attitude towards Buddhism, the tendencies and structures of the individual Buddhist groups within the bunkoku, the number and intensity of disputes between Buddhist groups at a particular time. The most basic fact about sixteenth century Buddhism is that the otera could not avoid coming into contact, and sometimes conflict, with the daimyo. An otera located in an area controlled by, for example, the Rokkaku family had to choose between alignment with the Rokkaku and defiance of them by siding with an enemy daimyo like Nobunaga. To side with Nobunaga was to invite immediate punishment from the Rokkaku, but to side with them was to invite
Oda's wrath should his forces overcome the Rokkaku at some future point. There was no safe choice. An otera with wise leaders would attempt to maintain a low profile and make no explicit commitment to either side—a weak otera that held little in terms of secular power and land might succeed in such a plan and simply be passed over by both parties of the conflict; but if the otera were of considerable size either in terms of personnel or land holdings, or both as was more likely the case, it could not but attract the attention of the warring parties, both of whom would want its allegiance because of the men and supplies that it could provide.

As a rule, therefore, otera both great and small could not avoid taking sides in the struggles of the Sengoku period. In order to survive, most smaller otera entered into alliances with daimyo, and abbots of some of the largest otera themselves tended to act like daimyo.

As we have seen, most otera were able to support themselves throughout Japanese history on the basis of estates that they held in their own names. Survival and prosperity demanded the possession of vast estates that enjoyed shugo-funyu status. In the Sengoku period, however, the daimyo tried to reduce the holdings of the larger otera, deprive them of their control of the monzenmachi and, in general, enforce a policy of control over the otera within their bunkoku. Very many provincial cities of Sengoku times were really otera cities. For example, three of the ten cities in the province of Owari, Oda's home province, had grown up around otera; similarly, four of the fifteen cities in Mino province, four of eight in Yamato, four of twelve in Yamashiro, four of fourteen in Settsu, and six of twenty-three in Omi province, had developed as monzenmachi. On the average one third of all provincial cities were monzenmachi.
Daimyo could not control the economy of their bunkoku unless they gained firm control over those cities which, in the developing merchant economy, were sources of much wealth.

Sengoku daimyo also made efforts to move the local headquarters of Buddhist schools into their castle towns (jōkamachi) where close scrutiny of the religious groups could be maintained. Daimyo decided where otera could be built and thus the castle towns became the religious centers of the bunkoku as well as the administrative centers. However, with the Sengoku daimyo there was no unified policy towards Buddhist institutions throughout the whole country, and there was great variety in individual daimyo's successes in controlling the otera. Some of the great otera, notably Mt. Hie, Mt. Kōya, and Negoro, were so powerful that they could challenge individual daimyo, and could be controlled only by consortia of daimyo.

Yet, it was not the large ancient otera that presented the greatest threat to the daimyo—it was, rather, the power possessed by the Honganji Branch of True Pure Land Buddhism (Jōdo-shinshū, or simply Shinshū). With the central administration in utter disarray, the supporters of the buppo, the otera, either had to link up with individual daimyo who were the de facto ōbo in any given bunkoku, or attempt to formulate a new definition of the ōbo-buppo formula. It was Shinshū that had the potential to bring about the latter, and it was, therefore, of special concern to the daimyo and particularly to Nobunaga.

During the upset of the Ōnin-Bunmei period the Shin school developed a powerful organization that spread throughout a number of provinces in central Japan, notably the provinces of Kaga, Noto, Etchū, Echizen, Kii,
Mikawa, Ise, Yamato, Yamashiro, Kawachi, Izumi, and Settsu. This phenomenon reminds one of a similar development centuries earlier when the small landholders in the provinces gathered around the nobility, especially the Minamoto, took up martial skills, and formed the bushi class. In the Sen-goku period newly arisen small landholders (myōshū) gathered around the older myōshū—these were the people who constituted the provincial land-owning class, i.e., the local gentry (dogō or kokujin)—and, together with small local warriors (jisamurai) and peasant farmers (nōmin), were organized by the daimyo into village-like autonomous groupings called sō. Ascending daimyo would structure these sō into groups that centered around the daimyo's chief vassals and thereby create a strong organizational chain of command that extended from the daimyo, through his vassals, down to the village level and the farming class.

With the spread of Shinshū from the time of Shinran in the thirteenth century, many village level gentry, small landholders, local warriors, and farmers were converted. Converted gentry customarily built small Shinshū otera (called jiin) or "practise halls" (dōjō) on their lands in and around the sō, and many inhabitants of the sō became members of the Shinshū religious groups, or "parishes" (kyōdan) that were beginning to form around the newly constructed Shinshū otera.29 The Shinshū faithful, called monto,30 were thus organized into strongly united local groups under the leadership of the local dogō. These local units were united internally, and with one another, by religious ties.31

In an area where there were many monto the Shin school had much power and considerable autonomy. Even local gentry who did not join the monto were forced to ally with them in the event of a disturbance in that area be-
cause such gentry were simply not strong enough to maintain their independence.

Towns of considerable size grew up in areas where there were concentrations of Shinshū monto and these new monzenmachi enjoyed shugo-funyu status. It was often the case that farmers who joined the monto would leave the land and move to a monto town where they would become engaged in merchant, money-lending, and commercial enterprises, with the result that many of those towns began to develop into provincial commercial centers.

Provinces in which the Shin school had bands of monto were dotted with jin and dojō that served as the skeleton of a powerful body. In the province of Kii, for example, there were almost three hundred Shinshū otera and branch otera, most of which were distributed along the coast but approximately seventy of them were closely located in the Saiga area of the province.32 This was a most powerful monto group because it held the delta of the Kii river, the only fertile plain in the province. In the province of Owari, Shinshū otera were fairly numerous—there were probably about forty in all33—but not on the scale of the monto bands in provinces like Kii, Kaga, and Echizen.

Thus, unlike the older Buddhist schools with their relatively insular, confined, and by and large clerical structure, the Shin school developed widespread bases of power among the peasantry and local gentry who were organized on a local scale. The belief that faith alone saves provided the monto with a rationale for denying both political and traditional religious authority, and the confidence—on the basis of their faith in
Amida—that they were invincible, made them especially dangerous. The sheer numbers of monto gave to Shinshū the potential to bring about a new type of society bound together by religious bonds.

The moving figure and source of energy behind the transformation of a personal religious faith preached by Shinran into a powerful religious organization was Rennyo Kenju (1415-1499), the eighth chief abbot of the Honganji branch of Shinshū, and blood descendant of the great Shinran. Until Rennyo appeared the groups of monto were not organized into any hierarchical structure with the Honganji at its apex, and indeed the Honganji was considerably less powerful than the Senjuji, the chief otera of the Takada branch of Shinshū, which had managed to impose its authority on many provincial monto groups. Through Rennyo's efforts the majority of loosely connected bands of monto came to focus on the Honganji as their religious center and were absorbed into the fold of monto who took orders from the abbot of the Honganji. In this way the chief abbot of the Honganji became, in effect, a daimyo, and indeed his power rivaled that of the greatest Sengoku daimyo. The power of the Honganji "Pope" from the time of Rennyo was attested to by the fact that he received the patronage of the leading military figures of the period.

In provinces where there was a high concentration of monto an "Abbot's Representative" (daibōzu), who is also referred to by historians as a "Bonze Daimyo" (bōzu daimyō), was appointed over all monto throughout the province. These figures were, in effect, vassal daimyo of the Honganji's daimyo-abbot, and they were, in their own right, powerful daimyo.

The Honganji was unique both in terms of the type of organizational struc-
ture that it developed among the *monto*, and in that the type of power it wielded was not primarily over the land itself—as was the case with the Nara and Heian Buddhist institutions—but over the workers of the land and the villagers throughout the provinces of central Honshū. Thus while the land in Kaga, for example, may have actually been owned by others, it was the Honganji abbot who could control the province through the *monto*. Mt. Hiei could be crushed, or at any rate severely reduced, by the confiscation of its estates, but this was not the case with the Honganji.

The economic power of the Honganji was not founded on vast estates but on the *monto*, and this power was greatly expanded by Rennyo by his establishment of a contributions system whereby each local *monto* group regularly sent donations to the Honganji. Those donations were paid directly to the Honganji, rather than to the local otera, and in this way Rennyo both enhanced the position of the Honganji and prevented the *bōzu-daimyō* in the provinces from becoming too independent. Moreover, because the Honganji *monto* were mainly concentrated in central Honshū, the most economically advanced area of the country, a huge amount of money flowed steadily into the Honganji coffers.

The great assembly of *monto* who made up the Honganji branch of Shinshū came to be called the *Ikko monto*, and the school was popularly called the *Ikkōshū*. The term "*ikkō*" means "single-minded" or "one-focused", and it came to be applied to the Honganji *monto* at this time because of their exclusive reliance on faith in Amida Buddha as the agent of salvation.37

In his later years (1496-1497) Rennyo built the Yamashina (Kyōto) Honganji as the new center for the masses of *monto*, and this otera came to
be the headquarters of what was, in effect, a reserve army.

Over the years down from Rennyo's time there were many uprisings by the monto throughout most of the provinces lying between the present Osaka and Tōkyō. Those uprisings (ikki) were called "Ikko uprisings" (Ikko-ikki). The causes of Ikko-ikki were many and varied and they included: demands for "virtuous administration orders" (tokuseirei), i.e., orders from the provincial authorities whereby people's debts were canceled; struggles with secular enemies or with the members of other Buddhist schools, especially with the Hokkeshū monto; attempts to expand the area under monto control by driving off the local daimyo's vassals. It is not to be thought that the Ikko-ikki were simply sporadic outbursts involving but a handful of people for in Nobunaga's time thousands of monto were mobilized, many of them armed with guns. As Tamamuro Taijō notes, many of the monto kyōdan had become "combat groups" (sento-shudan) capable of waging large-scale and protracted warfare. The first indisputable evidence of monto power was in 1488 when the monto groups in Kaga province united to oust the shugo Togashi Masachika and establish a "land run by farmers" (hyakushō mochi no kuni). The shugo and representatives of the Ashikaga shogunate were driven out of Kaga which remained in monto hands for almost one hundred years.

There is much debate among historians over the nature of the Ikko-ikki and the degree to which they were actually "religious" uprisings, as well as over the role played by the Honganji in those uprisings. While not denying that there were political and economic reasons for joining the Ikko monto and for the Ikko uprisings, nevertheless that which cemented together the peasants, local gentry, and local warriors in the provinces
was their religious tie with the Honganji and with their fellow monto. There is also no doubt that the Honganji could call for and direct uprisings. The fact that there were uprisings in the provinces both before and after the period of Honganji involvement in them does not negate the role that the Honganji did in fact play.

There is also considerable debate and disagreement about just when the Honganji abbots became responsible for initiating Ikkō-ikki. As a general rule the Honganji abbots abided by Shinran's directives and urged the monto to make compromises with the secular authorities, and in the Sengoku period they did their best to avoid involvements with the daimyo, aware as they were of the shifting-sands nature of the times. Although it is generally acknowledged that Rennyo was not responsible for urging the Kaga monto to oust the shugo, his failure to discipline them by excommunicating them, as he could have, seems to indicate that at least he condoned their behavior. 42 Still, it was Rennyo's general policy to try to reduce tensions between the monto and the secular authorities by threatening to excommunicate those who became embroiled in struggles and who refused to obey the secular authorities.

However, the situation was such in the Sengoku period that the monto were ultimately forced to choose between fighting in their own defense or being crushed. Shortly after Rennyo established a new Shinshū center in Yoshizaki in Echizen province—to which he moved in 1471 following the destruction, in 1465, of the Otani Honganji, the site of Shinran's tomb in Kyōto, by the Enryakuji sōhei—tensions began to mount between the monto and local bushi, and in 1473 some bushi bands made an attack on the monto.
Rather than passively endure those attacks Rennyo elected to defend his monto and he inspired them to this defense by reminding them that they had nothing to fear, including death, because their salvation was assured. Having successfully defended themselves, however, the Kaga monto groups refused to respect secular authority, a situation that led, in the end, to the conflict between them and Togashi Masachika from which the monto emerged triumphant.

Rennyo's decision to take up arms in defense of the Honganji established a dangerous precedent for it justified the use of force in defense of religion. Perhaps Rennyo would have reserved the application of this principle in only the most desperate circumstances, but other monto could invoke the principle to take up arms against any group that they cared to identify as their enemy.

When Rennyo died in 1499 he was succeeded by Jitsunyo Kōken, the fifth of his thirteen sons, who became the ninth chief abbot of the Honganji. During Jitsunyo's time the extent to which the monto openly opposed secular authority expanded. In Article 3 of his last will and testament Jitsunyo told the monto: "You must defend the ōbō, and preserve the buppo as it was in the time of Shinrahan." The problem was, however, that the ōbō was in disarray—the Sengoku daimyo were on the rise and clashes between them and the more powerful monto groups were all but inevitable.

While most daimyo did their best to suppress, or at least control, the monto in their bunkoku, it was not unusual for daimyo to attempt to use the powerful monto to their own ends. Such daimyo would promise to grant favors to the monto on condition that they render certain services. For
example, from 1506 to 1566 the house laws of the Hōjō family banned Shinshū from their domains, but in 1566 this ban was lifted by Hōjō Ujitora who promised to restore all Shinshū otera in the Kantō area on condition that the montō agree to take part in a Hōjō advance against the Uesugi of Echigo. There are many cases of this type of dealing.\textsuperscript{44}

Furthermore, the montō tended to be drawn into conflicts in support of certain bushi who were especially friendly, or generous, to them. One such person was Hosokawa Masamoto, Governor General (kanrei) from 1486 to 1507, who was a close friend of Rennyo and a patron of the Honganji.\textsuperscript{45}

When Masamoto requested the assistance of Settsu and Kawachi montō in his campaigns against the Hatakeyama in 1506, Jitsunyo replied that the Honganji made a point of never becoming involved in daimyo disputes, but Masamoto insisted that he deserved montō help by virtue of his past generosity to the Honganji. The montō agreed with Jitsunyo's refusal, saying that they had no weapons and that ever since the time of Shinran they had stayed out of such involvements. Despite those refusals Masamoto insisted and Jitsunyo caustically asked him: "Would you make me do something never done since the time of our founder?"\textsuperscript{46} In the end, Masamoto received the assistance of one thousand montō from Kaga province.

The close ties between the Honganji and its daimyo friends on the one hand, and the threat posed to the montō by its daimyo enemies on the other, ultimately brought the Honganji into the conflicts of the Sengoku period.

Following Jitsunyo's death in 1525, his son Shōnyo Kōkyō succeeded him as the tenth chief abbot of the Honganji. When the Yamashina Honganji was
burned down in religious wars in 1532, Shōnyo moved to the area of modern Osaka and built the immense Ishiyama Honganji which was to be the center of the Ikkōshū until 1580.

The confrontation between Oda Nobunaga and the Ishiyama Honganji was inevitable because those areas in which the monto were most powerful were precisely the areas that Nobunaga had to bring under his control in order to unify the center of the country. Honganji monto power extended in an arch over Oda's home province of Owari: to the east of Owari the monto in Mikawa formed one cornerstone of that arch, and to the west in Osaka was the Honganji itself and its monto in the provinces of Kii, Izumi, and Settsu, who formed the other cornerstone. Across the curve of the arch from east to west were the Ikkō forces in the provinces of Mino, Hida, Kaga, Noto, Echizen, Ōmi, and Ise. The keystone of this arch was made up of the exceptionally powerful monto of Kaga and Echizen who were poised, to the north, directly over Owari.

Besides this arch of power, the monto were distributed in such a way as to form a strong barrier—running in a line north-south across Honshū from the Pacific Ocean to the Japan Sea through the provinces of Ise, Ōmi, Mino, and Echizen—between Owari and the capitol. In order to bring Honshū under his control it was necessary for Oda to pierce the north-south barrier, topple the Ikkō arch, and destroy its cornerstone in Osaka.

Nobunaga undertook this effort during the ascendancy of Kennyo Kōsa, eleventh chief abbot of the Honganji. The conflict between Oda and Kennyo spanned the years between 1570 and 1580, and is known as the Ishiyama Honganji War (Ishiyama Honganji ikki, or kassen). This was the major con-
flict of the entire Sengoku period.

The power of the Ikkōshū represented the greatest obstacle to Oda Nobunaga in his efforts to unify the country for the following reasons:

1. The Honganji was, as we have explained, the hub of a broad based and highly organized structure which, like an octopus, spread its tentacles throughout most of the provinces between the Kansai and Kantō plains. In this regard it was unique for no other institution, either secular or religious, commanded such a wide-spread base of power. The daimyo and the great otera like Negoro and Kōya held a type of power built on a relatively confined geographical base—their bunkoku in the case of the daimyo, and their shōen in the case of the otera—which served as both the source of supply for their troops as well as the last bastion to which they could be pushed back and which, if destroyed, meant their elimination as powers to be reckoned with. From a next to impregnable fortress in Ōsaka, the Honganji could direct movements of the monto throughout the provinces. Rather than having to dispatch an army into the field from Ōsaka, and thereby expose the Honganji to attack, Kennyo could command the mobilization of large local forces. Should those forces suffer a defeat in one province, neither the Honganji nor the monto groups in other provinces, were especially endangered. The loss of one tentacle did not gravely threaten the life of the monto octopus as a whole. Thus, without ever exposing his base Kennyo could keep Oda occupied on a number of fronts at the same time by calling on the provincial monto groups to rise up in arms. Kennyo was, in effect, a daimyo at the head of a coalition of vassal daimyo—his bonze-daimyo—who headed the major branches of the Ikkōshū in the provinces and who, in turn, had lesser bonze-officers under them.
2. The Honganji did not have to maintain a standing army in the field. No supply lines were stretched from the Honganji to the fighting forces afield. Local monto forces provided their own supplies—they were essentially guerilla fighters who could rise up at the Honganji's call, and who could as easily disperse upon receipt of orders to stand down. They fed, clothed, and housed themselves, and required no funds from a central treasury as did the sōhei and the daimyo's troops. Indeed, if a flow of goods went in any direction it was not from the Honganji but rather to it from the provincial monto groups that kept the Honganji supplied with men and material. Here again if one monto group, one arm of the octopus, were severed, the others could continue to provision the Honganji.

3. A further advantage enjoyed by the Honganji was its position on Osaka Bay. Even should all tentacles throughout the Kinai be severed, the Honganji could still be supplied by sea, as indeed it was by the Mōri of Aki province from 1576. The Honganji could face north-east for supplies by land and south-west for supplies by sea, all the while enjoying an impregnable position atop a mountain with a steep bluff that prevented its being surrounded and stormed.

4. The religious nature of the bond between the Honganji and its monto made the easy shifting of allegiances next to impossible. Thus Nobunaga could not make use of the standard daimyo practise of enticing segments of the opposing forces into one's camp and thereby split the enemy's forces. A general might betray his lord, switch sides, and lead his troops over to the enemy's side, but monto leaders were loath to betray their bond with the Honganji. There is no evidence that Oda ever succeeded in luring
Honganji monto into his camp. This is not to imply that the monto were imbued with an exceptionally ardent and loyal type of faith. Membership in the monto kyōdan was especially attractive to the small landholders and the peasant classes in the Sengoku period because it enabled them to enjoy a degree of autonomy, power, and security that was not easily come by in the upset of the times, and provincial townspeople were able to enjoy a considerable degree of economic prosperity in the commercial centers that developed around Ikko otera. The religious tie was a strong additional link between the Honganji and its monto.

5. Most importantly, the Honganji served as the rallying point, together with the shogun Ashikaga Yoshiaki who was actively and openly opposed to Nobunaga from 1573, around which those parties opposed to Nobunaga might gather. Thus, the Honganji was not only the hub of an alliance of monto, for between the years 1570 and 1580 it was the center of a league of daimyo who attempted to block Nobunaga. As early as 1568 a number of daimyo—notably the Asakura of Echizen, the Asai of Ōmi, the Rokkaku of Ōmi and Yamashiro, and the Miyoshi of Awa—joined with the Honganji to form the "anti-Nobunaga league". As Nobunaga overcame each of these daimyo their places were taken by others, like the Uesugi of Echigo, the Takeda of Kai, the Mori of Aki, and the Bessho of Harima. Although the league membership frequently changed, the Honganji ever figured largely as its unifying center. To that end Kennyo took advantage of the fact that the Honganji abbots were allowed to marry to cement relations with the daimyo. For example, in 1571 Kennyo's eldest son Kyōnyo Kōju married a daughter of Asakura Yoshikage, lord of Echizen province, and thereby strengthened the Honganji-Echizen link, and because Yoshikage's mother was a member of the
famous Takeda family the Honganji thereby also forged a link with the lord of Kai province.

The special danger presented by the anti-Nobunaga league was the fact that its members were located in such a way as to lend added strength to the arch of monto poised over Owari province. The westernmost cornerstone of the Ikko arch in Ōsaka was supported by the Miyoshi of Awa and the Mōri of Aki, and the easternmost cornerstone was strengthened by the Takeda in Kai province. Between those points were a number of daimyo allies of the Honganji who lent their support to the arch, especially Asakura Yoshikage of Echizen province whose bunkoku was located near the keystone of the arch.

This was the power structure that Nobunaga confronted. It was because of the foregoing factors that the Honganji presented a special problem to Nobunaga, and because of them that his campaign against it spread over ten years. The Honganji was the only religious institution that was powerful enough to offer an option to the unification of Japan under a coalition of bushi—it was the most unified of all of Nobunaga's enemies, and the greater the degree of unity within a group the greater the difficulty in bringing it under control.

Most historians agree that there was no possibility of the development of a "country run by farmers" with the Honganji at the apex of power—the military class would never have permitted such an unprecedented turn of events because bushi, ultimately, would not be subservient to a religious overlord. Be this as it may from the vantage point of later historians, it was not so clear to Oda that such a possibility was not viable. The Hon-
ganji represented the most powerful bloc after Oda's and, theoretically at any rate, it could have forged a new type of regime. The fact that there was no precedent in Japanese history for such an arrangement brought, one may be sure, little comfort to Nobunaga.

Besides these factors that contributed to the advantage of the Honganji in its struggle with Nobunaga, there were other factors that militated against its success:

1. There was a certain psychological factor that inhibited Kennyo: he does not appear to have had the stomach for a massive confrontation with Oda. While Oda had a vision of a unified Japan, Kennyo had no equivalent vision. Kennyo wanted to maintain the status quo and he appears to have been willing to settle for a precarious balance of power situation between the anti-Nobunaga league and Nobunaga's coalition. He appears to have been more interested in gaining a peace, even under less than favorable circumstances, than in gaining a decisive victory over Nobunaga. Kennyo lacked the drive and ambition needed to better Nobunaga.

2. Unlike Nobunaga, Kennyo was more likely to obey Imperial or shogunal decrees even when they threatened his position. Nobunaga obliged only when he considered it to his advantage. This gave Nobunaga an advantage over Kennyo because, in the event that the situation took a turn for the worse for Oda, he could petition the court to decree a truce between himself and Kennyo confident that Kennyo would accept the decree. Kennyo could enjoy no such confidence. For example, in 1578, when Oda's general Araki Murashige betrayed Oda and allied with the anti-Nobunaga league, Oda felt compelled to make peace with the Honganji in order to gain the time required to eliminate Araki. While peace negotiations were being
held, a certain Nakagawa Kiyohide, one of Araki's leading generals, betrayed his lord Araki and came over to Oda's side. Oda immediately called off the peace negotiations, even though they were being conducted under Imperial decree and through the intercession of Imperial envoys.

3. It is incorrect to assume that Kennyo had absolute control over the monto. Local monto groups had considerable autonomy and uprisings could, and did, occur with neither the instigation nor the approval of the Honganji. Local conditions could spark an Ikkō-ikki, and even though Kennyo could call for a mobilization of the monto there was a possibility that his orders might go unheeded should local conditions require a particular monto group to act in its own best interests. Kennyo's reasons for urging an uprising invariably involved matters of a national, or at least trans-provincial nature, but local monto frequently had less grand although none the less pressing reasons for revolt. Monto local interests militated against their embracing a trans-provincial focus, and they were inclined to obey Honganji commands only when those commands coincided with their own best interests.

4. The Honganji had no powerful field marshal who could direct monto movements on a number of fronts simultaneously--Kennyo himself never personally conducted troops in the field. Among the Honganji's most able generals were several members of the Shimozuma family, a family whose members had been leaders of the Shinshū monto since the time of Shinran. In Nobunaga's time Shimozuma Raishō (Yoriteru) was the head of the monto in Echizen, and others like Shimozuma Raijun (Yorizumi), Rairen (Yoriyasu), and Raityū (Yoritatsu), commanded provincial monto groups, but the lack of an overall, united, command proved critical. Never once did monto
forces move against Nobunaga on all fronts simultaneously. While Echizen
monto might have been mobilized, those in Kii might well have been dor­
mant. While there were strong vertical links between the Honganji and the
monto groups, there were no strong horizontal connections between the
monto in Echizen, for example, and those in Kii, and no field marshal ap­
peared to forge those links. Occasionally the monto of one area would co­
operate with and assist those of another area, but this was by way of ex­
ception rather than established practise.

Because of the shortage of competent field officers, on at least one oc­
casion Kennyo was forced to place the monto forces under the direct com­
mand of non-monto daimyo. In 1572 Kennyo ordered the monto to mix in with
Asai Nagamasa's troops and fight under Nagamasa's command. This was not
a satisfactory arrangement, however, because bushi and monto had differ­
ent loyalties and different interests.

Ironically, the lack of a clearly discernable officer corps was, in one
respect, an advantage to the Honganji: monto officers were more dispen­
sable than the key generals in the case of a daimyo. Had there been a
clearly discernable leadership corps its elimination might have brought
monto forces in the field to a halt much more quickly than was actually
the case.

5. Within the monto ranks there was some dissension and disunity. In 1577,
for example, a conflict broke out between Nanazato Yorichika, Kennyo's ap­
pointed administrator of Kaga province, and Kaburaki Yorinobu, castellan
of Matsutae fortress in that province. Internal disputes weakened the
monto and dissipated their power by causing self-destructive ikki.
The Honganji, then, was in command of a relatively disorganized force under something less than its complete control. Without a radical strengthening of their internal organization, the non-bushi forces of the Honganji could not but lose, in the end, to Nobunaga's tight and proven armies.

Furthermore, the anti-Nobunaga league had a critical flaw: namely, it had no positive, unifying, cause that all members of the league shared. Each member of the league was interested in preventing Oda Nobunaga from unifying the country and thereby bringing all the daimyo into submission. While the Honganji acted as the unifying center of the league with strong ties to each member in it, there were no strong lateral ties among the league members. Although the Asakura, for example, were members of the league in the early 1570's, they had little sympathy for the cause of the Kaga and Echizen monto. Asakura Yoshikage's father Norikage spent most of his life fighting to keep the Kaga and Echizen monto from taking control of his bunkoku in Echizen, and Yoshikage also warred with the monto until 1562 when a peace was concluded and monto control was limited to the one province of Kaga. The problem, therefore, was that there was no focal point of loyalty within the anti-Nobunaga league: all that the Honganji, Mōri, and the shogun had in common was a desire to prevent Nobunaga from acquiring a high degree of central authority. It was a case of the enemy of my enemy being my friend, and it is thus appropriately termed the "anti-Nobunaga league."

Although the Honganji managed to bring a considerable degree of unity to the anti-Nobunaga league, the league never developed a single command structure that embraced both monto and bushi under a single authority.
Each daimyo member of the league held supreme authority over his vassals, and this made it most difficult to coordinate a united assault on Oda. Besides, relations between daimyo members of the anti-Nobunaga league were fragile. Peace pledges among daimyo were almost invariably of no lasting value, and one simply could not depend on their being honored. One of the participants of the peace might, alone or in league with others, attack the other participant without warning or provocation. A peace agreement was often nothing more than a breathing spell between campaigns. Such agreements usually meant nothing more than that the contestants were both interested in halting hostilities for an undetermined length of time, and both would know that the agreement was no longer in effect when one or the other reopened hostilities. In his peace pledges Oda Nobunaga was accustomed to call upon Bonten, Taishaku, Hachiman Dai-bosatsu, Hakuzan, Atago, and all the other (unnamed) Kami and Buddhas, especially his own "family gods" (ujigami), to punish him with the most dreadful diseases in this life and with eternal damnation in the next should he betray his pledge. Despite the high-flown rhetoric of such pledges, they had no real binding force. In the end, the alliance between monoto and bushi was by nature rarely a comfortable one—it was usually a marriage of convenience.

Ironically, it was the Ikko monoto that contributed, more than any other single factor, to Nobunaga's eventual success in attaining great power. This was because the monoto forces frequently kept at bay those daimyo who might well have otherwise presented the most serious threat to Oda when he was solidifying his control over Owari between 1553 and 1558. The monoto were not especially powerful in Owari, nor in Mino province which Oda
wrested from the Saitō family between 1558 and 1564. However, other daimyo who were far more powerful than Oda was at that time were plagued with Ikko uprisings in their home provinces. Both the Asakura of Echizen and the Uesugi of Echigo were so preoccupied with controlling montō forces that threatened to overrun their bunkoku that they had little time to concern themselves with Oda’s operations. Had Nobunaga been plagued by Ikko uprisings in his earlier years he could never have gained power so quickly.

Although the Ikko montō were less than perfectly organized, the degree of organization that they did achieve made them the most formidable force in a world characterized by the fracturing of society into many small, autonomous units. Thus it was the Honganji that presented the greatest obstacle to Oda Nobunaga.

The Honganji was not the only religious institution that possessed much power in the mid-sixteenth century. Paralleling the rise of the Ikko montō in the provinces was the spread of the Hokkeshū, or Nichirenshū, among the newly developed "town groups" (machishū). These were groups of "townsmen" (chōnin)--merchants, artisans, money-lenders, and warehousemen--that appeared in the late Muromachi period and that formed the new "business" class. While many of the new commercial centers in the provinces were made up largely of Ikko montō, townsmen in and around the capitol, and in major trading centers like Sakai, became Nichiren montō. In Oda’s time the Nichiren montō actually controlled Kyōto and Sakai--Kyōto had become such an important business center that this aspect overshadowed its traditional identity as government center and it came to be called Kyōto City (Kyōto-machi) rather than Miyako.
In the early decades of the sixteenth century, particularly in the early 1530's, there were many "Hokke uprisings" (Hokke-ikki) in protest against various taxes that the townsmen-monto were expected to pay, and others caused by tensions between the Hokke monto and the sohei of Mt. Hiei. In the summer of 1536 the Hokke monto suffered a severe blow at the hands of the Enryakuji in the so-called Tenbun Hokke Disturbance (Tenbun Hokke no Ran) when sixty thousand Hiei sohei descended on Kyōto, burned down some twenty-one Hokke otera, and drove the monto out of the city. This disturbance was sparked when Hokke monto criticized and rebuked some Tendai bonzes who were preaching in Kyōto. Although the Hokke monto were severely weakened by the Enryakuji action, they were still powerful in Kyōto in Nobunaga's time.  

The Hokke monto had a particular ability to attract the ire of many daimyō for, as Tamamuro Taijō explains, many of them were excessively boastful about their tradition and they had a narrow minded and exclusivistic view of religion. The Hokke monto were extraordinarily convinced of the pureness of the Hokke teaching—and therefore of the imperfection of all other teachings—which they attempted to spread by a technique called "shakubuku". This term referred to the uncommonly aggressive practice of "stamping out evil", i.e., other Buddhist schools, and forcing conversions. One of the main ways in which the shakubuku practise was implemented was by engaging in public religious debates (shuron) in which the errors of the opposing school were to be exposed and their adherents punished. Not surprisingly such debates frequently resulted in violent outbursts between the members of the two schools involved in the debate, so much so that we find many instances of daimyō banning all religious debates in
their domains. For example, one of the articles of the house laws of
the Takeda family stated: "There must be no religious disputes between
the Pure Land and Nichiren schools in these domains. Anyone who instigates
them will be punished together with the bonzes."

Chōsokabe house laws commanded the bonzes of all schools to concern themselves exclusively
with religious learning and practice and to refrain from debates. There
are many examples of laws of this kind.

Although the Hokke school had a large following of lay members, for sev­
eral reasons it did not present a threat to Nobunaga on the same scale as
that presented by the Honganji _monto_: 1. The Hokkeshū lacked the critical ingredient that would possibly have
propelled it into the front ranks of Oda's enemies in that it had no
equivalent of the Honganji "Pope" (Kennyō). It lacked the degree of cen­
tralized focus and single line of authority that could have tied together
all _monto_ in a single hierarchy. The school never had a Rennyo. Hokkeshū
otera were more autonomous than Shinshū otera--they had a local focus,
local interests, and local control. Even though many merchants were Hokke
_monto_, the focus of Kyōto merchants was on Kyōto, Sakai merchants on
Sakai, and so on. Loyalty among the Hokke _monto_ appears to have been more
to the individual who converted them than it was to the local otera or to
the school itself; the individual on whom their piety was founded was the
main focal point. Therefore the Hokke _monto_ did not have the structured
lines of control and the centralization characteristic of Shinshū.

2. In general it was in the daïmyo's best interests to be on good terms
with the Hokke _monto_ because their business skills were needed for the
development of commerce in the _bunkoku_, and to that end the daïmyo often
granted exemptions from taxes and gave various incentives to merchant families, many of whom were Hokke monto. Besides, because the Hokkeshū townsman were prospering in the business world, they were not as inclined to take part in uprisings and revolts as were those less prosperous.

3. The Hokke monto appear to have had an attitude whereby they tended to identify as their mortal enemy less the daimyo and the secular authorities than the other Buddhist schools which they delighted in besting. Their wild and thoughtless plunge into the Azuchi Religious Debate (Azuchi Shūron), as shall be seen in Chapter 3, points up this fact. The monto were willing to risk defying Nobunaga's orders to disband and refrain from coming to Azuchi in the interest of routing representatives of the Pure Land school in a religious debate.

The Zen school too had a broad following but it presented no threat to Nobunaga for the following reasons:

1. The Zenshū members were not organized into structured kyōdan under the central leadership of a Zen "Pope".

2. While the Ikkō monto were mainly provincial peasants and local gentry who could easily identify the bushi as their enemy, and while the Hokke monto were mainly townsman, Zenshū membership was largely from among the bushi class. Thus the Zen bonzes were less likely to see themselves as apart from, or in opposition to, that class. Tamamuro Taijō explains, in his Nihon Bukkyo-shi, how many Sengoku daimyo—including the Imagawa, Takeda, Hōjō, Saitō, Asakura, and Mōri—were on intimate terms with Zen bonzes, and how they were interested in inculcating a certain Zen atmosphere or spirit in their domains. He suggests that the daimyo sought in
Zen a peace of mind that was difficult to come by in the turmoil of the Sengoku period. Another dimension of the Zenshū-bushi relationship is brought out in the relationship between Imagawa Yoshimoto and the Rinzaï Zen bonze Taigen Sūfu, for not only was Yoshimoto on good "religious" terms with Taigen but the latter was also an adviser to the Imagawa in the area of military strategy. A reason commonly suggested for the good relations between the daimyo and Zenshū is that the daimyo may have seen in the Zen institutions a model of discipline that they hoped to have their retainers emulate.

3. Although Zen otera enjoyed shogunal patronage and greatly prospered during the Ashikaga period, they were ever kept on a short leash. Their very proximity to the bushi kept them from acquiring much independence, and by the late fifteenth century the Zen Gozan institutions were impoverished and incapable of acquiring power.

While the type of power possessed by the Shin and Hokke schools rested on the support of their monto, the schools of the Nara and Heian periods depended on vast tracts of land that could support large armies of sohei. Of those ancient otera the most powerful ones in the sixteenth century were the Enryakuji (Mt. Hiei), the Kongōbuji (Mt. Kōya), and the Negoroji. Each of these was the chief otera (honji, or honzan) of a system of branch otera (matsuji), most of which were closely grouped around the chief otera although some branches were very far removed from it. The Negoroji had as many as 2700 branches during the Ashikaga period, and at its peak the Enryakuji was the center of a huge network of branch otera scattered through the valleys of Mt. Hiei for a distance of about eight miles and including upwards of 3800 buildings. Even in its reduced condition in the
sixteenth century the Enryakuji had over four hundred branch otera on Mt. Hiei.

Each of those three great otera commanded an army of sohei numbering at least five thousand men in Nobunaga's time. The Jesuit missionary Padre Vilela estimated that Negoro kept an army of upwards of twenty thousand sohei in the sixteenth century, and it is usually estimated that Mt. Koya had approximately seven thousand bonzes and at least that many sohei. Negoro sohei were equipped with the most up to date weapons of the day because the Negoroji was one of the first producers of firearms which had been introduced by the Portuguese in 1543. A group of Negoro sohei formed a famous "rifle corps" (teppōtsai), and there is a possibility that they also made use of rudimentary canons.

The Negoro sohei were so powerful that they could even dare to defy Imperial commands to cease fighting, as indeed they did in the early 1560's when they hired themselves out as mercenaries to Hatakeyama Takamasa, lord of Kawachi province, and took part in his campaigns against the Miyoshi of Awa. The chief abbots of those three otera were daimyo in their own right, and they could, and did, negotiate with and enter into alliances with the daimyo. The Enryakuji enjoyed especially good relations with the daimyo in neighbouring areas because it was customary for daimyo like the Asai, Gotō, Kuroda, and Rokkaku, to send their children to be educated on Mt. Hiei.

Because of their power those great otera were able to sustain the enjoyment of shugo-funyū status and keep most of their estates even in the upset of the Sengoku period. Their rhetoric defended their privileged condition with reference to ancient precedent, but in fact their defense
rested on their ability to resist external threats to their security.

Despite their power those otera shared a grave weakness in that they were relatively isolated power blocs with no large followings from among the masses, no monto to lend them support during a crisis. Mt. Kōya had as part of its membership—in addition to its "scholar bonzes" (gakuryō) and "laymen" (gyōnin), many of whom were sohei—a group called hijiri. These were pilgrim bonzes who wandered alone or in small groups throughout the countryside preaching Buddhist salvation, but they did not develop kyōdan in those areas through which they travelled. Although many laity throughout the provinces looked upon hijiri as their religious masters, they were more like personal disciples of the rather charismatic hijiri than members of a structured organization with Mt. Kōya at the apex. Besides, it is suspected that many of the hijiri were less religious figures than wandering merchants and artisans who spread not Buddhist salvation but merchant skills in the provinces through which they wandered. Given this type of structure, it was, theoretically, a relatively simple thing for a daimyo to eradicate any of those great otera in a single campaign—it was simply a matter of surrounding the base of the mountain on which the otera stood and ordering his troops to advance up the mountain. This was not the case with the Honganji monto.

Finally, the ancient Nara otera had very little power in the mid-sixteenth century. Several of them, notably the Kōfukuji and the Tōdaiji, had bands of sohei but they had been severely reduced earlier in the century as a result of conflicts with daimyo and other religious institutions. For example, the Kōfukuji was badly burned during an Ikki in 1533, and the Tōdaiji was set afire, and the hall that sheltered the famous daibutsu was
completely destroyed, during a battle between Matsunaga Hisahide, lord of Kawachi and Yamato provinces, and his former masters the Miyoshi of Awa, in 1567. Also, the Nara otera lost many of their estates because they could not prevent their confiscation by the daimyo. Thus, relatively weak and with no organizations of lay members, the Nara otera did not figure largely in Nobunaga's campaigns against the Buddhist institutions.

That which prevented the Buddhist institutions from offering a possibly indomitable resistance to any and all who might have attempted to suppress their power or confiscate their lands was their total lack of unity. This was true not only in the case of relations between different schools but even within each school. Most otera were interested in maintaining their own holdings and rights, often in opposition to other otera that claimed some portion of them. The Buddhist institutions had so little sense of common cause that on occasion otera would ally with daimyo to campaign against other otera, even against otera of their own school. Religious bonds between otera were most often simply non-existent. Religion was a house divided against itself, with no possibility of unity and still less, therefore, of ultimate victory.

Evidence of this lack of unity is plentiful:

The older Buddhist schools usually tried to prevent the spread of newer ones, especially Shinshū, among the inhabitants of their estates. For example, in 1575 the administrators of Kōfukuji estates in Yamato fought against the montō to prevent their spread in that area for it was usually the case that Honganji montō refused to pay the required takes to the estate owner—landowners virtually lost their estates when the montō moved into them.
The spread of the Honganji monto was opposed not only by non-Shinshū Buddhist schools, but by otera that belonged to other branches of Shinshū as well. For example, monto of the Takada and Sanmonto branches of Shinshū in the province of Echizen were opposed to the Honganji monto and were even willing to cooperate with Nobunaga in his campaigns against them.

Negoro and Kōya had a history of mutual hostility going back to the twelfth century. In the sixteenth century they fought against one another into the mid-1570's for control of Uchi county in Yamato province which lay immediately to the east of them. Negoro and Kōya were ever trying to expand their holdings, and it was natural for them to look to the east for expansion because to the west was the Saiga area of Kii province where there was an especially strong Ikko monto organization that was best left alone. In order to deal a blow to their Shinshū enemies, Negoro and Kōya leaders were willing to ally with one another, or with daimyo who were campaigning against the Saiga monto. The willingness of those otera to ally with daimyo against their co-religionists witnesses to the fractured nature of Buddhism.

Rivalry between the two main branches of Tendai is legendary. From as early as the eleventh century the Enryakuji and the Miidera (Onjōji) were bitter and violent rivals: in 1081 Enryakuji sōhei attacked and burned down the Miidera, and repeated this act in 1121, 1162, 1214, 1264, and 1317.

In the mid-sixteenth century the Enryakuji had an ongoing dispute with the Tōji (Shingon): from 1555 to 1576 they quarreled over who was allowed to wear a special type of Buddhist robe. The Shingon bonzes had taken it upon
themselves to wear a vestment that had been for the exclusive use of En­
ryakuji bonzes since the tenth century when it was bestowed on them by
the Emperor Murakami. The dispute was not, actually, over religious garb
but over which school would acquire supremacy in the Kantō area.

Finally, in Nara there were disputes among the various otera and among
the branches of each. For example, between 1574 and 1579 there was inter­
nal bickering between the Eastern and Western branches of the Hōryūji.

Because of the utter lack of unity among the Buddhist schools, the Bud­
dhist institutions as a whole never presented a united front against any­
one who was determined to curtail their power. Had there appeared a reli­
gious equivalent of Oda Nobunaga, had a new type of Rennyo appeared, Ja­
pan might have become ruled by a Buddhist "Pope." But this is just idle
speculation because the fact is that there was no unifier of the Buddhist
world, and indeed little possibility of his realizing success should he
have appeared. Nobunaga could bring the other daimyo into line with the
sword, but religious unity could not be brought about in that way. Thus,
when Nobunaga appeared on the national scene in the late 1560's he had
to contend with the powerful but disunited Buddhist institutions.
Part I

Chapter 1

Section 3

Shogun and Emperor in the Sixteenth Century
It is necessary to briefly note the power of the shogun and the court in the sixteenth century because they played a part in the relationship between Nobunaga and the Buddhist institutions.

In the mid-sixteenth century the actual power still in the hands of the shogun was minimal. Although there was a continual succession of Ashikaga who held the title Shogun, they were at the mercy of the Sengoku daimyo. Yet, the Ashikaga had a special type of power: they could dangle before the eyes of the daimyo the possibility of being chosen as patron of the Ashikaga cause, and a daimyo so chosen would thereby become the power behind the shogunate. This was a most attractive lure— it could inspire daimyo to take to the field on behalf of an Ashikaga with a strong claim to the shogunate.

In 1545, at the age of ten, Yoshiteru became the thirteenth Ashikaga shogun. Yoshiteru was supported by the powerful Sasaki (Rokkaku) family, but the Sasaki had still more powerful enemies in the persons of the Miyoshi and their vassal Matsunaga Hisahide. In 1550 the Miyoshi entered Kyōto and placed it under the authority of Matsunaga who became master of the provinces of Kawachi and Yamato. Hisahide was a notoriously ambitious man: when his master Miyoshi Chōkei died in 1564, Hisahide killed Chōkei's son and declared his independence. The next year he appealed to Yoshiteru to appoint him Governor General (kanrei), a post formerly held by Chōkei, and when the shogun refused Hisahide attacked his palace. Yoshiteru called upon Uesugi Kenshin and Mōri Motonari to come to his aid and when they declined he killed himself.

Hisahide, newly allied with Miyoshi Yoshitsugu, the nephew and adopted son
of Chōkei, chose the three year old Yoshihide, grandson of the tenth shogun Yoshitane, to succeed Yoshiteru. Although investiture was refused because of his young age, Yoshihide is nevertheless counted as the fourteenth shogun.

On the death of Yoshiteru in 1565, the bonze Gakkei of the Ichijō-in, a branch of the Kōfukuji, had designs on becoming shogun—he was a younger brother of Yoshiteru and son of the twelfth shogun Yoshiharu. Gakkei left the Ichijō-in and, fleeing a plot against his life by Hisahide, took refuge in Ōmi province with the Sasaki, and there he took the name Yoshiaki. Yoshiaki was powerless so he appealed to Sasaki Yoshikata to sponsor his claim to the shogunate. When Yoshikata declined that difficult task, Yoshiaki appealed to the Takeda and then to the Asakura but they too refused. Finally, in 1567, Yoshiaki sought, and received, the assistance of Oda Nobunaga who took up Yoshiaki’s cause. One year later, on November 6, 1568, Nobunaga succeeded in entering Kyōto with Yoshiaki who thus became the fifteenth Ashikaga shogun and last of the line.

The court was in an especially impoverished condition during the sixteenth century. Indeed, it was so impoverished that the enthronement of the 106th Emperor Ōgimachi (1558-1586) had to be delayed three years because of lack of funds. Although many land holdings were still in its name, the court no longer received taxes from those lands because they had been confiscated by the daimyo who controlled the provinces in which they lay.

The Emperor possessed, however, a type of power by virtue of his elite status: he could invite a daimyo to "restore the tenka", i.e., unify the country, and thereby give to that daimyo a degree of status and justi-
fication for his actions that was otherwise unattainable. It is difficult
to assess the real power of those invitations; they were quite meaningless
were a daimyo not actually powerful enough to bring about reunification,
but it is generally acknowledged that an Imperial invitation did give one
an added advantage.

In Nobunaga's time the Emperor had a role in most peace negotiations be­
tween powerful warring parties. The Emperor served as an irreproachable
third party in whose name the warring parties could address peace over­
tures to one another, and Imperial envoys, usually kuge, acted as medi­
ators between them. The Emperor contributed to such negotiations not the
ability to force warring parties to make peace or to abide by the articles
of the peace pledge, but rather an air of respectability and confidence
that the negotiations would not have otherwise had. Besides, the Emperor's
involvement made the acceptance of a peace proposal an honorable act. Be­
tween Nobunaga and Kennyo, for example, it would have been one thing for
Kennyo to flatly acknowledge his submission to Nobunaga, but another
thing to submit to the wishes of the Emperor. The latter course was far
less embarrassing, and it allowed the parties to feel somewhat more secure
in the pact even though both were aware that they were in reality dealing
directly with each other. It was customary to open a peace pledge with a
notice to the effect that the person making the pledge was doing so in
accordance with the wishes of the Emperor. Also, to fail to abide by the
agreed upon stipulations was to fail to heed the Imperial dictum, and the
degree of culpability borne by an offender would be greater than had the
pact been but a simple arrangement between two contestants. This does not
mean that either party was firmly bound to abide by the pact, but it meant
that one would probably give extra consideration to thoughts of breaking it. Besides, when one party requested peace through the Emperor, the other party was under more pressure to grant the request than if it had come directly from his opponent. The Emperor's presence raised the degree of gravity of peace negotiations and pledges, but he was not in a position to dictate the articles of peace or punish any who disregarded Imperial injunctions. The Emperor could send down orders that a certain policy be followed, but the extent to which those orders were followed depended more on the willingness of the recipient than on the elite status of the sender.
Having seen the array of forces that confronted any daimyo who might attempt to unify the country, we shall now turn our attention to the daimyo who made, and largely succeeded in, that attempt: Oda Nobunaga.
Part I

Chapter 2
In this chapter we will examine those factors that are important for an understanding of how and why Oda Nobunaga related to Buddhist institutions in the way he did:

Section 1. Nobunaga's attitude towards religion, in so far as this can be determined, and towards tradition in general.

Section 2. Nobunaga's rise to power, and his allies.

Section 3. Nobunaga's relationship with the shogun and the court.
Part I

Chapter 2

Section 1

*Oda Nobunaga's Character: His Attitude Towards Religion*
Speculative probing into Nobunaga's character is often interesting and challenging, and a great deal has been done by Japanese historians\(^1\)--even Nobunaga's sexual mores have been probed.\(^2\) While it is not our purpose to provide a broad, detailed, character sketch of Nobunaga,\(^3\) an examination of his attitudes towards religion and religious institutions is necessary in order to dispel a general notion that his actions against the Buddhist institutions reflected a demented mind. Unless Nobunaga's attitudes towards religion and religious institutions are understood, the significance of the changes that were taking place in the religious sphere of Japanese society in the sixteenth century, and Nobunaga's role in helping to bring about those changes, will be overlooked or misunderstood.

Oda Nobunaga has not fared well at the hands of historians, both Japanese and foreign. He is painted in broad strokes as savage and heartless, with not the slightest trace of humanity. In *Oda Nobunaga*, Harada Tomohiko says that Nobunaga had no *jin* (human-ness, benevolence, charity).\(^4\) George Sansom does not grant Nobunaga a single redeeming quality--he portrays him as savage and barbaric: a "crude and callous brute" who "never showed a sign of compassion..."\(^5\) Sansom supported this opinion of Nobunaga's character by asserting that "a modern historian, the learned and kind-hearted Tsuji Zennosuke, has tried with but little success to find favourable aspects of Nobunaga."\(^6\) Even James Murdoch, who ordinarily looked upon Oda, Toyotomi, and Tokugawa, as great heroes, asserted in his early twentieth century history of Japan that while Hideyoshi was a genius, Nobunaga was "at bottom and essentially merely a magnificent savage."\(^7\)

Such evaluations of Nobunaga's character may be found in scores of works that deal with the Sengoku and Shōkōhō periods and, like most sweeping
generalizations, they are simplistic and inaccurate. It is simply false to assert that Nobunaga was thoroughly inhumane or that he never showed a sign of compassion. It is also untrue that Tsuji Zennosuke held as low an opinion of Nobunaga as Sansom implies, for as Tsuji himself said: "...having reduced the power of the great religious institutions, and having opened the way for the restoration of order in society, we cannot but state that Nobunaga too was great." It is all the more remarkable that Tsuji made this statement in his grand work on the history of Japanese Buddhism, his *Nihon Bukkyō-shi*, a context in which it is not likely that he would have been sympathetic to the person of Nobunaga.

It is a phenomenon of Japanese history that most of the great figures of the Sengoku period are remembered in somewhat simplistic extremes. Takeda Shingen, for example, is usually portrayed as a great man and a fine figure of a daimyo, yet this same Shingen gained power in the first instance by ousting his own father, Nobutora, who lived out his years under virtual house arrest. The stereotype of Nobunaga as savage, Hideyoshi as genius, and Ieyasu as wise, has rooted itself deeply in the minds of Japanese historians. All Japanese school children know the ditty that says Nobunaga ground the wheat, Hideyoshi baked the cake, and Ieyasu ate it. Another popular expression of this type tells us that Nobunaga was the kind of person who on finding a cuckoo that would not sing would kill it, Hideyoshi would make it sing, and Ieyasu would wait for it to sing. Expressions like these are dangerous because they blur the true role of Nobunaga in Japanese history—he is portrayed as without purpose other than to destroy all that prevented his reunification of the country.

Most historians are so overwhelmed by Nobunaga's savage attacks on the
Buddhist institutions, particularly by his destruction of Mt. Hiei, that he is ever thought of in a most negative way and his negative characteristics are greatly exaggerated. To portray Nobunaga's character in such broad negative strokes is to fail to take into consideration the complexity of the man and the nature of his times. But far more critically, it causes us to fail to appreciate the nature of the policies that Nobunaga pursued. To dismiss him as a brute is to assume that his strikes against the Buddhist institutions were but the wild flailings of a madman. It is our contention that Oda had very clearly defined policies towards the Buddhist institutions, policies that cannot be dismissed outright as flatly negative.  

A calm historical evaluation of Nobunaga's role vis-a-vis the Buddhist institutions is made difficult by the fact that he was such a cruel and callous person. On occasion, as shall be seen, he was capable of performing acts of kindness, but his dominant pattern was a harsh one. The characteristic of Nobunaga most frequently noted by historians is his cruelty. There is no doubt that Nobunaga committed many cruel acts, the most familiar ones being his slaughter of men, women, and children, on Mt. Hiei in 1571, and his execution of the hijiri of Mt. Kōya ten years later. A number of other actions witness to Nobunaga's cruelty, for example: Oda's behavior on the occasion of the defeat of Asai Nagamasa and Asakura Yoshikage in 1573 is a classic of depravity: he commanded that their decapitated heads be cleaned of flesh and the skulls lacquered in silver and gold and placed on a serving tray so that he could use them as sake cups.  

The Jesuit missionary Luis Frois recounts the story of how when Oda was
inspecting the construction of Yoshiaki's Nijō palace in 1569 he espied a soldier who had for a moment taken a break from his duty and was playfully attempting to lift the veil from a young woman's face in order to enjoy a better look at her. Oda strode over to the man and, without saying a word, drew his sword and cut off the man's head with one stroke. In his *Nihon Bunka-shi*, Supplement III, Tsuji Zennosuke lists a number of Oda's relatives who were put to death by Oda during his efforts to bring the province of Owari under his control.

Such actions have moved many to consider Oda insane. Okada Akio says that it is recorded that Nobunaga seemed, on occasion, to have gone mad. Perhaps, suggests Okada, there is a greater or lesser degree of madness in any despot, but in Nobunaga's case there appears to have been something abnormal in his character. Sansom went so far as to suggest that "there must have been an evil streak in the Oda family...", and Sugiyama Jirō suggests that a type of madness possessed Nobunaga. It is often suggested that the many years of unceasing warfare caused Oda to go insane. Oda spent most of his life in the saddle moving from one bloody campaign to the next, and throughout his lifetime he never enjoyed more than a few months respite from battle. It is also suggested that Oda's character was warped as a result of his having been betrayed on a number of occasions by some of his most trusted vassals. For such reasons Oda is said to have become vicious, cruel, and excessive to the point of insanity in his campaigns.

To conclude from Oda's acts of cruelty that he was insane is to make a judgment that cannot be supported by fact. It begs proof, and none is available—it is essentially a prejudiced conclusion. Oda certainly does
not appear insane in his letters. To the end of his life Oda demonstrated
the ability to make keen and logical decisions clearly in keeping with his
overall ambition. He made no erratic or fanatic decisions that could lead
us to judge him to have been insane.

When we acknowledge, as we must, that Oda was cruel, we must realize that
the term cruelty is relative, and that war is always cruel. The Sengoku
period was possibly the cruelest in Japanese history—it was a time when
the taking of scores of heads on the battlefield was a standard practise,
and when women, and even children, were accustomed to apply makeup to the
freshly severed heads of the fallen without a qualm. Fire and starvation
were the two main weapons of Sengoku period battles. In the field both
arrows and bullets were used, but in the end, more often than not, the
outcome was determined by the size of the stockpile of supplies on which
the besieged were sitting. One can imagine the wretchedness of the situ-
ation when the supplies ran out for the besieged and they were reduced to
eating the leather of their horses' saddles and, in the end, one another.
This horror is brought out in Document 464 in which Oda informed his gen-
eral Akechi Mitsuhide of his progress against the Ikkō monto in Ise prov-
ince in 1574: Oda told Akechi that because monto supplies had run low in
two of the fortresses under siege it would be but a matter of days be-
fore the forts collapsed, and already reports indicated that large numbers
of people, both men and women, had starved to death in the besieged forts.16

From a present day perspective there is not one Sengoku daimyo who could
be spared the accusation of cruelty—even if it could be established that
Nobunaga's treatment of his enemies was more cruel than that of his con-
temporaries, we have no reason to think him essentially unlike other dai-
myo. In terms of savagery and cruelty there was little difference between Nobunaga and Hideyoshi, Nobunaga and Takeda Shingen, Nobunaga and the other daimyo—the others were not markedly more humane than Nobunaga, so if any can be called savage they all can. Even if Nobunaga was more cruel than other daimyo the difference was quantitative, and not by much, rather than qualitative. Indeed, although the Jesuit missionaries condemned Nobunaga's behavior, it was they who, when the Dutch (Protestant) ship *Liefde* was towed, crippled, into a Bungo (Kyushū) port in 1600, urged that its crew be put to death at once.

While it is easy to find evidence of Nobunaga's cruelty, there is also material that provides us with a glimpse of a better side of his character. This material is usually overlooked. Although we are often told that Nobunaga killed his younger brother Nobuyuki in 1557, it is rarely mentioned that but one year earlier Nobunaga forgave him for having risen against him. When Nobuyuki took up arms against Nobunaga the second time, he was killed. In 1556 Nobunaga's half brother Tsuda Nobuhiro plotted with Saitō Yoshitatsu, lord of Mino province, and attacked Oda. When Oda defeated them he did not execute Nobuhiro but treated him warmly, and from that year Nobuhiro became a loyal subordinate of Oda. In Document 14 we have more evidence of Nobunaga's ability to show compassion. In that document Nobunaga forgave the Yamaguchi family which had been punished by his father and brought to ruin—he instructed that their holdings be restored and that the family's re-establishment be carried out according to the wishes of Yamaguchi's widow. In Document 31 Nobunaga ordered the "foreign religion's doctors" (*gaikan kusushi*), that is, Jesuit Padres who knew medicine, to come at once to Azuchi from the Kannonji in Ōmi where
they were staying, to treat Matsui Yukan, Oda's part-time secretary and "Imperial Household Minister" (kunaikyō hōin), who was sick with a tumor. The Jesuits had a better knowledge of medicine than the traditional Japanese doctors, so Nobunaga appealed to them when Matsui became ill. This was in 1572, one of Nobunaga's most difficult years, and his personal intervention on behalf of Matsui at such a critical time witnesses strongly to his concern for his loyal retainers.

Tsuji Zennosuke tells us about Oda's kindness to one of his foot soldiers who had fought in a battle in 1573. After the battle, when Oda noticed that the soldier was marching along in bare feet that were covered with blood, he took from his waist a pair of sandals that he was accustomed from his youth to carry into battle with him as a good luck charm, and gave them to the soldier.

By far the most interesting evidence that we have of Nobunaga's human side is found in a letter that he wrote to Hideyoshi's wife whom he addressed as "Mrs. Tōkichirō" (Tōkichirō Onnadomo). This letter is not dated but it was probably written in 1576 or 1577 because it refers to a meeting between Oda and Hideyoshi's wife that apparently took place when Oda was on an inspection tour of his new castle at Azuchi that was then under construction. During their meeting Hideyoshi's wife gave Nobunaga some gifts and, in the course of their conversation, she complained about her situation with Hideyoshi. In the letter that Oda subsequently sent to her he thanked her for the gifts and said:

You looked even better than you did the last time I saw you. I compliment you on your beauty and grace. It is a most disgraceful state of affairs that Tōkichirō should sometimes complain about a wife such as you. No matter how he might search, that bald rat
could never again find a wife the equal of you. Therefore, be of good cheer from now on. Like a proper wife always behave in a dignified manner and do not, even for a moment, give in to feelings of jealousy. Such is the duty of a wife: refrain from speaking too much, and be sure to take good care of Tōkichirō. I want you to show this letter to Hashiba.

This letter is, as Kuwata Tadachika notes, the greatest of all of Nobunaga's letters for in it we find a display of much kindness by the legendary "demon-like warrior whose very name instilled fear" (naku-ko no damaru kishin no gotoki bushō). In this letter Nobunaga expressed sympathy for Hideyoshi's (Tōkichirō's) wife, tried to cheer her up by complimenting her beauty and grace and by assuring her that she was most deserving of Hideyoshi's attention, and he admonished Hideyoshi (Hashiba) by instructing his wife to show the letter to him. Nobunaga's continual involvement in military strife did not allow this side of his character to show through very often, but it is evident from this letter that there was a human side to him.

The main reason why there are but a few displays of kindness in Nobunaga's letters is that we do not have a collection of his personal letters. Although a few personal letters, like the one to Hideyoshi's wife and another one in which Nobunaga thanked a certain "Fumoshi" for her letter and the gift of two light summer kimono (katabira), are extant, Okuno's collection consists mainly of official documents in which it is rather too much to expect displays of personal affection. A great number of Hideyoshi's letters to his wife, concubines, and friends are extant, and from them one can come to know Hideyoshi's heart. Nobunaga's letters allow us to see his mind and will. To adopt the extreme position that Nobunaga lacked humanity is to overlook the few opposing pieces of evidence we have.
Nobunaga's attitude towards religion in general appears to have been atheistic. In the description of Oda that he sent to his Jesuit superiors, Luis Frois said of him: "He scorns the kami and Buddhas and their images, and he believes nothing of paganism or of such things as divination. Although he is nominally a member of the Hokke school, he states unequivocally that there is no Creator, no immortality of the soul, and that nothing exists after death." It is evident from his actions that Oda cared nothing about those places that were traditionally venerated in Japan. For example, in Harada Toshihara's Sōhei to Bushi we find a clear contrast between Oda's opinion of Mt. Hiei and that of Takeda Shingen: on hearing of Nobunaga's destruction of Mt. Hiei, Shingen said of him, "He has destroyed the huppō-ōbō. He is the ghost of the devil!" Oda, on the other hand, said of the famous mountain: "In Japan it considers itself to be a living kami or Buddha. Rocks and trees are not kami." Hirata also tells us that Oda made a characteristically irreverent response to Shingen's lament by signing a letter with the signature "Nobunaga, Anti-Buddhist Demon" (Dairokuten no Maō Nobunaga).

Aida Yūji, in Oda Nobunaga, says flatly that Nobunaga hated religion, but elsewhere in the same work Sugiyama Jirō says that it was not simply a case of hating Buddhism because Oda had some bonze friends.

Oda appears to have enjoyed offending the sensibilities of the bonzes. Frois paints a picture of Nobunaga's sacriligious acts against a number of otera in Kyōto in 1569 when he was constructing the Nijō palace. Materials for that palace were gathered from the Kyōto otera by force—Oda simply confiscated their most valuable works of art and precious treasures, and used the sacred stone statues of the Buddha for building
blocks. Frois related how some statues were placed on carts in order to be transported to the site of the Nijō palace, and how others, when carts were in short supply or the statues too large, were dragged along through the streets of Kyōto by ropes tied around their necks. Frois added, needlessly, that the bonzes and all the residents of Kyōto were terrified of Nobunaga.

The Shinchō Kōki tells how Oda used building stones and other materials that were taken from a number of otera in the construction of his palace-fortress in Azuchi in 1576. Similarly, in that same year Oda simply commandeered from the Nara otera the supplies and personnel needed for the construction of several fortresses in the vicinity of the Honganji. In 1580 Oda's general Tsutsui Junkei, himself a former bonze, confiscated bells from several of the Nara otera so they could be melted down and turned into cannons.

Oda's contempt for the monto appears in several documents: in Document 283 he referred to the Ikō monto as the "gang of rebels" (ikki no yakara), in Document 461 he referred to them as "rebels" (ikki-domo), and in Document 831 he called the Hokke monto "nuisances", or "pests" (itazura-mono). Oda's contemptuous attitude appears to have gotten the better of his judgment on at least one occasion: in Document 512, issued in 1575, Oda boasted to his general Nagaoka Fujitaka that, having overcome the monto in the provinces of Kai, Shinano, Suruga, and Mikawa, he had but one "small hill" (osaka) to conquer. Oda made a pun on the name Ōsaka, the Honganji citadel, by substituting for the first character of the Ōsaka name compound, which is pronounced "ō" (long vowel) and means "great" or "large", a character that is pronounced "o" (short vowel) and means "small"
or "trivial". Thus Osaka, which translates as "Great Hill" and contained the nuance of Honganji greatness, was changed to "osaka", meaning "small hill". It required another five years after this boast for Oda to gain victory over the Honganji.

In this context, it also appears that Oda was loath to admit defeat at the hands of the monto. In Document 278, a response to a letter of condolence that Oda received from several bakufu officials when he suffered a defeat by the monto of Ise province in 1571, Oda did not acknowledge defeat even though his reply was written on the very day on which he cut his losses and withdrew from Ise. On the contrary, he explained that just at the point when he was about to rout the monto they begged his forgiveness and he (magnanimously) acquiesced. Similarly, in Document 414 Oda lied to Kobayakawa Takakage, son of Mōri Motonari of Aki province, about how he punished the Echizen monto rebels in the fall of 1573 when in fact he had just suffered a setback on their account.

There is much speculation and disagreement about what Buddhist school Oda may have belonged to, even though Oda himself scorned religion. Luis Frois, as quoted above, said that Oda was nominally of the Hokke school. Frois may have thought this because Oda had a close relationship with the Hokke bonze Nichijō Chōzan, and because Oda was accustomed to stay at Hokke otera during his visits to Kyōto. During those visits Oda usually stayed at the Honnōji, a Hokke otera and the site of his death in 1582, and in the first article of Document 267 he declared that the Honnōji was his reserved lodging and that no others were to stay there.

Tamamuro Taijō says that although Nobunaga hated Buddhism, the active and
aggressive character of the Hokke school was very compatible with his own character, and that he seems to have had a special feeling for it at first. It will be seen that Oda had no major conflicts with the Hokke monto until 1579.

Contrary to the foregoing opinions about Nobunaga's religious affiliation, Iki Juichi says that Oda was a member of the Zen school. According to Iki, this was because Oda's Buddhist "conversion" was received by Takugen Shuon, a Rinzai Zen bonze of the Myōshinji in Kyōto, with whom Oda was on intimate terms. Okuno Takahiro, however, says that Oda's conversion was received by the Tōdaiji (Kegonshū) bonze Shōgoku who was abbot of the Amidaji in Yamashiro province. Nobunaga also had a special connection with the Kudaradera, a Tendai otera in Ōmi province, and with the Komatsuji, a Shingon otera in Owari, in that he recognized them as his "patron otera" (kiganji, or kigansho).

Besides those associations with Buddhist schools and otera, Oda had other connections with Buddhist bonzes: he often used bonzes--such as the Tendai abbot Shōren'in and the aforementioned Nichijō Chōzan--as messengers and mediators in his dealings with other daimyo, the court, and religious institutions; some of Oda's high-ranking officers were ex-bonzes--such as Chō Tsuratatsu and Tsutsui Junkei--and several members of Oda's family, such as his younger brother Nagamasu and his two sons Shinkichi and Nobushide, were also bonzes.

One cannot conclude from the foregoing information that Nobunaga had any kind of personal faith or devotion. While it is impossible to be certain of Nobunaga's philosophy of life, that philosophy is possibly best summed
up in the short verse Oda is said to have sung on the eve of the Battle of Okehazama when his small force of some 1800 men was about to face the 25,000 man army of Imagawa Yoshimoto in 1560. The Shincho Kōki says that while Oda performed a dance called the atsumori he sang: "When we consider man's fifty years in this world, they are like a passing dream. We have life but once...how perishable we are." To Oda, this life is all that there is. It is sometimes suggested, however, that Oda claimed divinity for himself. Kashiwahara Yusen, for example, tells us that when Oda built Azuchi castle he installed in it an image of a kami on which was engraved Oda's own name, and to which all had to offer worship. In this same vein, Luis Frois' letter of 1583 stated that Oda "fancied that there was no greater lord than he, not merely in the world but in Heaven itself..." However he may have rationalized or philosophized it, it appears that Oda himself was the highest being in his own pantheon, and no authority, on earth or in heaven, was higher than his own.

Towards religion, religious institutions, and the Japanese tradition in general, Oda appears to have been an iconoclast. He had little or no respect for religion and, as Frois reported, he talked down to the Japanese nobility for whom he had nothing but contempt. Sugiyama Jirō suggests that a type of madness drove Nobunaga to tear out all the ancient taboos. This was, says Sugiyama, a type of madness that manifested itself in rational actions--Oda coldly and logically implemented his mad schemes.

One can accept Sugiyama's suggestion that Nobunaga was against the ancient taboos without having to agree that that was a sign of insanity. Perhaps, indeed, it was a sign of genius. The problem with this type of generalization about Oda's anti-traditional attitude is that it gives the impression
that Oda struck indiscriminately at any and all taboos, but that was not the case. Had Nobunaga dealt harshly with the Emperor and the court, Sugi-yama would have a strong argument—but Oda restored, at least financially, the Imperial house, so he must have had a selective, discriminating, form of madness if indeed he was mad at all. Oda was iconoclastic, not mad.

In order to understand Nobunaga's iconoclastic attitude it is necessary to consider one characteristic of the newly arisen daimyo of the Sengoku period. That is, their intense interest in close relations with the court and the aristocracy. Many new daimyo had a feeling of inferiority towards the center of culture and the way of life of the upper class in Kyōto; they were in awe of tradition and, suggests Suzuki Ryōichi, they attempted to stand as close as possible to the font of traditional authority. They wanted to bask in the borrowed glory of the ancient court and to insure their own safety. Suzuki further explains that the term gekokujo, which describes a situation in which vassals attempt to overthrow and replace their masters, and which is usually used to describe the situation in Nobunaga's time, does not reflect a negation of "jō" (superior, upper, or in this context, upper class), but rather it means that the bushi, captivated by the court, tried to become "jō". They wanted official ranks and titles, a court-granted name, and the right to use a special seal or ride in a lacquered palanquin; they also wanted economic and commercial relations with the Kinai district. In this climate it was possible for the Emperor and shogun, devoid of actual military might, to wield considerable power.

Oda Nobuhide, Nobunaga's father, had gained somewhat of a name for himself at the court by donations of money to it on two occasions: in 1540 he con-
tributed to the construction of a temporary outer shrine building at the Great Shrine in Ise, and in 1543 he donated a large sum of money toward the repair of the Imperial palace. In return for the former, Nobuhide was granted the title "Lord of Bingo" (Bingo no Kami)--by which title he is referred to in the Shinchō Kōki— and for the latter he was sent a letter from the Emperor Gonara and a copy of the first part of the Kokin Wakashū. Shortly afterwards Nobuhide fought with Saitō Dōsan of Mino and barely escaped with his life; he attributed his fortunate escape to the court and requested it to make another request that he donate money to it in the event of a battle at some future date. Like many of his contemporaries, Nobuhide perceived the court in almost magical terms.

Nobunaga, however, harboured no such affection for Kyōto. On the contrary, it appears that he reacted against what he considered to be the excessive attachment of his father and his peers to the court. From a very early age Oda demonstrated such a strong degree of independence, iconoclasm, and eccentricity, that he was given the nicknames "Big Fool" and "Idiot" (ō-utsuke and tawakemono). Many stories describe Oda's strange behavior which his dress and appearance reflected: "He wore a short-sleeved shirt and a bag of flints hung from his waist. His hair was done in the chasen style, tied up with red and green cords, and a long sword in a red lacquered sheath hung from his belt. He strode around town laden with chestnuts, persimmons, and melons, and with his mouth stuffed with rice cakes."

It is commonly suggested that Nobunaga deliberately chose to play the fool as a ploy for survival in the time of upset following his father's death. Nobuhide died in 1551 when Nobunaga was but sixteen years old, and the only way he could survive was to appear a fool who offered no threat to
the older and more powerful members of the Oda family who were competing for power in Owari. While there may be some truth to this suggestion, it does not completely explain Oda's behavior. The fact is that from very early after Nobuhide's death Nobunaga was involved in any number of skirmishes with his relatives who tried to take control of Nobuhide's bunkoku. Besides, Nobunaga's behavior was somewhat unorthodox even before his father's death, and it continued to be so well after it. For example, Padre Frois supplied the following description of Nobunaga's dress when he met him in 1569 at the Nijo palace: "When he went to sit down, Nobunaga wrapped a tiger skin around his hips. He wore extremely rough clothing and in imitation of him all present put on animal skins. No one dared appear before him wearing the robes of the court." Frois also stated that Nobunaga hated the circumlocutions that characterized the speech of the nobility.

Although it is impossible to judge motivation, it seems that Nobunaga's eccentric behavior reflected a conscious policy on his part—he was acting, from an early age, against what he considered to be an excessive affection for the court, and was deliberately rejecting the standards and mores of the court and of tradition in general.

Oda appears to have harbored high ambitions from a young age. According to Tsuji Zennosuke, as early as 1549 when Oda was but fourteen or fifteen years old, he used the name Taira in his signature. In fact, two of Oda's documents in Okuno's collection are signed "Taira Nobunaga". Tsuji suggests that because the Ashikaga shogunal line was descended from the Minamoto family, the Seiwa Genji, Nobunaga's use of the name Taira was a way to serve notice on the Ashikaga that it was time for them to transfer their
power to a descendant of the Taira family according to the practice of
turn about between the Taira and Minamoto families which had been estab-
lished centuries earlier. By claiming to be descended from the Taira, Oda declared his legitimacy as successor to the Ashikaga. Since Oda was only fifteen years old when he first used the Taira name, it would seem that he had very high ambitions from that early age.

Besides the name Taira, he also used the ancient and noble name Fujiwara, as evidenced in Document 1 in which he signed himself Fujiwara Nobunaga. The reason why Oda used this signature is not clear, and Kuwata Tadachika urges caution in drawing any conclusions on the basis of its usage in Document 1 because it appears in no other documents. Document 1 was sent to the famous Shintō Atsuta Daijingū in Owari province, and it is possible that Oda may have tried to give himself some special status in correspond­ing with that shrine by asserting a traditional claim of his family that it had descended from a fourteenth century kuge named Fujiwara Nobumasa.

Besides these exceptional uses of the Taira and Fujiwara names, Oda some­times signed documents with his official titles. In a number of documents issued in 1568, for example, Oda used the signature Danjō no jō, and in other documents he signed himself Oda Owari no Kami, i.e., Lord of Owari. From 1568 Oda almost invariably used simply his signature or his seal on which was inscribed his name or his motto. In some of his letters—for example, the famous one to Hideyoshi's wife—Oda used the very informal sig­nature "Nobu". This practise of not using titles was consistent with his lack of respect for traditional values.

Although throughout the Shincho Koki there is a scattering of information
on the various court ranks that Oda received over the years, in May of 1577 he resigned all Imperial offices and divested himself of court ranks and titles. In Document 707, which was issued late in April of 1577, Oda told the kuge Hino Terusuke that it would not be time for him to hold court ranks until all the provinces were pacified and the "four seas" (shikai) were under control. Nobunaga's resignation of court titles witnesses to his iconoclastic attitude. He wanted to demonstrate his independence from the ancient symbols of authority which he held in little esteem.

Breeding and proper blood lines meant nothing to Nobunaga. Together with such patricians as Niwa Nagahide and Hosokawa Fujitaka, he added to his inner circle such low born people as Toyotomi Hideyoshi and Akechi Mitsuhide. Oda promoted people on the basis of their ability, and demoted those--no matter what their breeding--who failed to meet his expectations. A good example of the latter was Nobunaga's punishment of Sakuma Nobumori, a person of noble family and one of Oda's top ranking generals, for his poor performance during the seige of the Honganji citadel from 1575 to 1580. Persons, whether they were bonzes, kuge, or peasants, who showed loyalty to Oda were rewarded, and those who opposed him were destroyed.

Even Nobunaga's hobbies reflected his iconoclasm: he enjoyed the common sports of sumô and hawking.

Nobunaga's character is probably best summed up in the motto that the Zen bonze Takugen Shûon recommended to him in 1567, and which he used continually from December of that year. Oda's motto read "tenka fubu" and it meant, literally, "to overspread with power" (fubu) "all under heaven"
(tenka), i.e., the nation. Thus the motto may be translated "Rule the nation by force."

From 1568 until his death in 1582 Oda frequently made appeals to other daimyo to join his cause "for the good of the tenka" (tenka no tame) or for Oda's own good (Oda no tame), and to Oda's mind the good of the tenka and Oda's own good were one and the same. In Document 233 Oda appealed for the loyalty of the Endō family of Mino province, telling them that a forthcoming battle was of critical importance "to the tenka, to Nobunaga" (tenka no tame, Nobunaga tame). In Document 378 Oda explained to Mori Terumoto of Aki province that he took steps against the shogun Yoshiaki because he had "discarded the tenka" (tenka o suteokaruru). This meant that Yoshiaki had failed to act in keeping with Nobunaga's plans for the tenka. Oda identified what was good for him as good for the state, and he felt, like Louis XIV of France and Napoleon Bonaparte, "L'etat c'est moi."

Nobunaga has been called many things: insane, a "lucky adventurer" (fūunko), "first among the lawless" (muhō daiichi no shū), a "mad rationalist" (kyōki gōrishugisha), an atheist, and a magnificent savage. He was neither irrational nor insane. Rather, says Okada Akio, he was a quick-tempered and autocratic person with a violent nature, someone who knew his purpose and paid no heed to the opinions of others in pursuing it. Nobunaga had a vision of a unified Japan, with himself at the apex of power and with all other segments of society filling roles assigned by him, and he struck violently at any and all who stood in the way of the realization of that vision. Oda would brook no opposition—neither the kami, nor Buddhas, nor respected traditions deterred him. Whatever else
Oda Nobunaga was, he was first and foremost a Sengoku daimyo and one especially equipped to deal with the Buddhist institutions.
Part I

Chapter 2

Section 2

Oda Nobunaga's Rise to Power and his Allies
Oda Nobunaga’s goal was to unify the *tenka*. This goal was given official sanction by both the Emperor Ōgimachi and the shogun Ashikaga Yoshiaki.

By 1564 Nobunaga had brought the province of Owari under his control and entered the ranks of those daimyo who held sway over an entire province. By 1564 Nobunaga had brought the province of Owari under his control and entered the ranks of those daimyo who held sway over an entire province. The court recognized Nobunaga’s power in October of that year when it sent the *kuge* Tachiiri Munetsugu to Owari with a secret message that is thought to have been an invitation to Nobunaga to restore the Imperial holdings to their proper owner. It is possible, however, that this was simply a request for Oda to contribute to the repair and upkeep of the Imperial palace as his father had done twenty-one years earlier.

In 1567 Ashikaga Yoshiaki, having had his requests for assistance denied by the Sasaki, Takeda, and Asakura, turned to Nobunaga to support his claim to the shogunate, and Nobunaga consented. Oda therefore pressed his efforts to expand the area under his control prior to attempting an advance on Kyōto. In 1567 he took control of Mino province from Saitō Tatsuoki and absorbed the northern counties of Ise province into his *bun-koku*. With two provinces firmly under his control, Nobunaga had become one of the most powerful Sengoku daimyo.

On December 9 of that year the Emperor Ōgimachi sent Nobunaga a second Imperial order in which he praised Oda’s successes in “pacifying” two provinces, and called his accomplishment one of unparalleled military prowess. Ōgimachi commanded Oda to pacify all the provinces, i.e., to unify the *tenka*, and to restore the Imperial holdings to their rightful owners. Thus armed with Imperial and shogunal invitations, and with a professional army, Oda was ready to begin his work of reunifying the country.
Nobunaga was not the first daimyo to make this attempt. From the 1530's there began to appear efforts on the part of the more powerful daimyo to establish hegemony over all the provinces. Early in 1560, not long before Oda began his attempt, Imagawa Yoshimoto assembled an army of some 25,000 warriors from Suruga, Totomi, and Mikawa provinces and began a march on Kyōto. On the morning of June 12, 1560, Oda's force of 1800 men, against incredible odds, routed the Imagawa force at the Battle of Okazama when they entered Owari province.

It is remarkable that Oda Nobunaga, who was not a powerful daimyo until well into the 1560's, rose above such daimyo as the Rokkaku, Miyoshi, Takeda, and Uesugi, whose power was great and long established. Oda's position just east of Kyōto gave him a certain advantage over the Takeda and Uesugi, whose bunkoku were far removed from the Kinai, but not over those other daimyo whose bunkoku bordered on Kyōto. It seems that the primary advantage that Oda enjoyed was not economic, military, or geographic, but rather one of vision. Oda dared when the others balked. The Takeda, Asakura, and Rokkaku, were every bit as capable of taking up Yoshiaki's cause as was Oda, but they refused. They appear to have lacked the daring vision of Nobunaga; perhaps Imagawa had it, but Oda stopped him. Takeda Shingen and Uesugi Kenshin also realized that it might be possible for them to seize central control, but too late. They came to that realization only after it had become apparent from Oda's success that it was indeed possible.

While it is not our purpose to examine the many factors that contributed to the successful rise of Nobunaga, it is necessary to be acquainted with some of the more important figures who contributed to Oda's successes and
whose names appear time and again in Nobunaga's documents. Nobunaga was fortunate to have among his vassals a number of great generals—many of whom were themselves daimyo when they joined Oda, and many others who became daimyo during their years of service with him—who performed outstanding service for him. The most important of these were:

Toyotomi Hideyoshi: Hideyoshi was lowly born—he was the son of a farmer named Yaemon who had become a foot soldier (ashigaru) in the service of Oda's father—and he entered Oda's service in 1554 at the age of seventeen as Nobunaga's "sandal bearer" (zori-tori). Hideyoshi rose to be one of Nobunaga's leading and most gifted generals who led many of Nobunaga's campaigns, especially the one in the south against the Mori from 1577 until Oda's death.

Shibata Katsuie: member of an Owari daimyo family that was vassal to the Oda, Katsuie joined Nobunaga in 1557 and, together with Hideyoshi, led the greatest number of Nobunaga's campaigns. In 1576 he was made lord of Echizen province where he was to protect Nobunaga's northern flank by keeping the montō under control and by preventing the Uesugi and Takeda from flooding down on Kyōto from the north.

Tokugawa Ieyasu: although he is not mentioned in Oda's documents as frequently as Hideyoshi and Katsuie, Ieyasu was one of Nobunaga's most important vassal daimyo. Ieyasu allied with Nobunaga in 1562 at the age of nineteen and Oda entrusted him with the province of Mikawa where, for almost two decades, he provided the invaluable service of acting as a bulwark against the Takeda of Kai and the Hōjō of Sagamihara province, and thus secured Nobunaga's eastern flank. This allowed Nobunaga to concentrate on Kyōto, the Kinai, and the Hongan-ji.

Hosokawa (Nagaoka) Fujitaka: member of a daimyo family descended from the
ancient Hosokawa family, Fujitaka allied with Ashikaga Yoshiaki as early as 1565 and was instrumental in having Nobunaga take up Yoshiaki's cause. In 1573 Fujitaka switched his allegiance to Nobunaga and thereafter led many of his campaigns.

Akechi Mitsuhide: son of an ancient daimyo family from Mino province, Akechi first served the Saitō, the Asakura, and the Hosokawa before joining Oda in 1566. From 1575 he was charged with leading the campaigns in Tamba and the provinces to the southwest along the Japan Sea coast.

Sakuma Nobumori: a member of an ancient daimyo family from Owari, Nobumori served Nobunaga from the early 1560's. He was one of the generals in charge of the campaign against the Honganji from 1575 to 1580, and because of his incompetence during that campaign Oda exiled him to Mt. Kōya in 1580.

Niwa Nagahide: son of a daimyo family descended from the Fujiwara, Nagahide also served Oda from the early 1560's. One of Nagahide's major tasks was supervising the construction of Azuchi castle, for which he was rewarded with a large bunkoku in Wakasa province.

In addition to these were many other vassals of greater and lesser rank—including Oda's brothers Nobuharu and Nobuhiro, and his older three sons Nobutada, Nobuo, and Nobutaka—who took part in Nobunaga's campaigns.

Some of Oda's vassals—like Ujiie Naomoto and Oda's brothers Nobuharu and Nobuhiro—were killed in battle, others—like Matsunaga Hisahide—were killed by Nobunaga for betraying him, and still others—like Hideyoshi, Katsuie, and Ieyasu—outlived him. Thus in the same way that the members of the anti-Nobunaga league changed over the years from 1570 to 1580, so too did the members of the alliance under Oda's command. With a few ex-
ceptions, most of Oda's early allies were of relatively low status and little power when they joined him. As Oda's successes mounted, their power and prestige expanded proportionally and they enjoyed higher rank than those daimyo who cast in their lot with Oda in his later years. Hideyoshi is the most outstanding case of a rise from the lowest ranks to the highest.

Although Nobunaga's coalition of forces was not as troubled by the lack of internal unity as was the anti-Nobunaga league, there were several factors that caused tension and difficulty within that coalition:

1. Relations among Oda's leading generals were far from smooth. There were bitter rivalries and jealousies among his generals, especially among Hideyoshi, Katsuie, and Akechi Mitsuhide, as they vied with each other to gain first place at Oda's table. Sometimes this rivalry interfered with campaign operations: for example, when Oda sent Katsuie and Hideyoshi into Kaga province in 1576 to ward off an impending march on Kyoto by Uesugi Kenshin, they were not together in Kaga for long before they quarreled and Hideyoshi rashly withdrew from Kaga without first receiving marching orders from Nobunaga. Another instance of this type of difficulty occurred in 1574: early in that year Maeba Nagatoshi, the person Oda placed over Echizen province in the fall of 1573 following his victory over the Ikkō monto and the Asakura, was attacked by Tomita Nagashige, Oda's appointee as castellan of Fuchū in Echizen, because of Maeba's arrogant refusal to pass over to Tomita the administrative records that were properly his. Tomita's attack sparked another Ikkō ikki with the result that Oda lost control of Echizen.

2. Like all daimyo, Oda had to be ever wary of betrayal. The coalition of
forces under him could rupture and the whole situation could change instantly if a powerful vassal switched allegiance and suddenly became an enemy. Nobunaga experienced such treachery by three of his vassal daimyo: Matsunaga Hisahide betrayed him in 1572 and again in 1577, Araki Mura-shige in 1578, and Akechi Mitsuhide in 1582. Because of the ever present danger of betrayal, Oda was ever cautious of those with whom he was allied and was rarely without an escort of several thousand warriors. Nobunaga's distrust, even of his closest vassals, may be seen in several of his documents. For example, when Nobunaga awarded the province of Echizen to Shibata Katsuie in 1575, he reminded Shibata that it was his primary duty to hold Nobunaga in the highest esteem, and cautioned him against harbouring any feelings of enmity towards him. Nobunaga warned Shibata "not even to turn your steps in my [Nobunaga's] direction" (wareware aru kata e wa, ashi o mo sasazaru yō ni...), that is, Shibata was to have no thoughts of treachery against him.84 When Hideyoshi, who performed more meritorious military service for Oda than anyone else, was once asked why he bothered to send Nobunaga a daily report of the progress of his campaigns, he replied: "If I do not do so Nobunaga is liable to explode in anger at me, and at an unexpected moment I may become the object of his wrath. He may even kill me."85

3. This type of insecurity and tension was heightened by the fact that a campaigning daimyo had no choice but to put great faith in his vassal lords and generals. Given the slow speed of communications in Nobunaga's time, a daimyo could not be up to date on conditions in the field, and in his responses to his front line officers a daimyo was usually addressing conditions that most often no longer held. Thus, most of Nobunaga's letters to his generals consist of congratulatory expressions about mis-
sessions accomplished, general directives about such things as how he would like the campaigns to go next, warnings to be wary and cautious, and promises of aid. Field decisions had to be left to the discretion of officers in the field. For example, in Document 464, Oda's reply to Akechi Mitsuhide's report of his campaign, Oda told Akechi several times that it was up to him to decide what course of action to take.

4. Because of these conditions, a daimyo could not totally trust battle reports--they were often as much efforts at propaganda as they were attempts to keep the recipient up to date on the situation being reported. The writer of the report could always hope that his reported condition would indeed be realized by the time he heard back from his addressee. Okuno Takahiro tells us, for instance, that Hideyoshi was most aware that his forces were making little headway against the Mōri of Aki in 1577, so "day and night he ran around Harima taking hostages," and he even sent his armies into Tajima province to attack a castle there. Following his desertion of Kaga, Hideyoshi was at pains to make sure that he would remain in Oda's good graces, and he was careful not to be put in the situation where he could be accused by Nobunaga of incompetence and lack of effort. This fate befell others but not Hideyoshi for he always had a success story for Nobunaga, no matter how meaningless the victory might have been.

Besides the foregoing problems within Nobunaga's camp, he also had less than perfect control over his bunkoku. For example, there was an Ikkō uprising in 1572, even though that province was part of Nobunaga's bunkoku since 1567, and other Ikkō ikki took place as late as 1574 in Oda's home province of Owari which he had brought under control ten years ear-
Finally, the person of Nobunaga was so powerful and so central to his coalition of forces that, in the end, this contributed to the failure of his "regime." Each of Oda's chief vassals was linked to Oda by strong personal ties, but Oda failed to construct under himself a solid pyramid of power that could have held together after his death. When Oda was killed in 1582 there was no solid structure among his vassals that could have handled the jealousies and personal rivalries that immediately came to the fore, and thus the coalition fractured. Hideyoshi, however, quickly pulled it back together, but he too failed to create a structure that would outlast him. It was left to Tokugawa Ieyasu to create a lasting dynasty.
Part I

Chapter 2

Section 3

Oda Nobunaga's Relations with the Shogun and the Emperor
Ashikaga Yoshiaki served an indispensable role in enabling Nobunaga to officially begin his work of reunifying Japan. It was by making use of Yoshiaki that Nobunaga was able to take possession of the capital and, as James Murdoch noted, "In Japan the possession of the capital, and more especially the person of the Emperor, counted for more than much." A short discussion of Nobunaga's relationship with Yoshiaki is necessary because of the latter's importance first to Oda as an ally, and then as a central figure, together with the Honganji, in the anti-Nobunaga league.

The relationship between Nobunaga and Yoshiaki was one in which each needed the other for a short period of time, after which each became a liability to the other. Yoshiaki needed Nobunaga's power in order to become shogun, but once he did so, on November 26, 1568, he no longer needed Oda's services. Oda's continued presence made Yoshiaki uneasy so he began to make an effort to get rid of him, or at least to relegate him to a minor role. As a reward for his assistance Yoshiaki offered Oda a choice of any of five central provinces except Ômi and Yamashiro, but Oda refused, saying that it was really not through his efforts but through the authority of the shogunal family that the Kinai had been pacified, and that there was, therefore, no cause for him to be so honored. Yoshiaki then offered Nobunaga the title of "Assistant Shogun" (Fukushōgun) or "Governor General" (kanrei), but these too were refused. Kuwata Tadachika explains Oda's refusal by saying that should he have accepted those offerings from Yoshiaki, for the rest of his life never again would he have been able to raise his head before the man. Had Nobunaga submitted to Yoshiaki at that juncture, he would never have been able to pursue his grand scheme. He would have been type cast and short circuited. However,
Nobunaga did accept from Yoshiaki the port cities of Sakai in Izumi, and Ōtsu and Kusatsu in Ōmi, which thus became part of Oda's directly controlled holdings (chokkatsuchi). Those cities were rich centers of maritime trade and important areas in the development of a merchant economy, and by gaining control of them Oda acquired a great source of funding for his future campaigns. Thus, Oda chose to stay out from under Yoshiaki's wing and to pursue his own plans.

Almost immediately after becoming shogun Yoshiaki took several steps to rid himself of Nobunaga. Okada Akio says that one of Yoshiaki's first acts as shogun was to send guarantees to many of the more powerful otera, in order to make them his allies, and orders to a number of great daimyo whom he commanded to cease making war against each other.90 Yoshiaki made a special effort to bring peace between Mōri Terumoto of Aki and Ōtomo Yoshishige (Sōrin), lord of six provinces in Kyūshū, and among Takeda Shingen of Kai, Uesugi Kenshin of Echigo, and Hōjō Ujimasa of Sagami, who were perpetually in conflict. Should Yoshiaki have been able to work out a peace among the latter three, Shingen would have been released from cares in his home territory and free to come to Yoshiaki's assistance.

Nobunaga, meanwhile, was benefiting from his relationship with Yoshiaki. Having entered Kyoto as Yoshiaki's supporter, Oda was able to establish his control over the districts around Kyoto and throughout the Kinai with considerable ease, and by making use of the shogun's name he could issue commands to other daimyo, and thus take the initial steps in bringing them under his control. To this end, shortly after establishing himself in Kyoto Oda sent a summons to the daimyo of central Japan to come to the capital to pay their respects to the new shogun.91 On the one hand this
was a normal procedure, but on the other no daimyo would have failed to realize that the summons was really a command, and that its sender was really Nobunaga and not Yoshiaki. Therefore, for a daimyo to accept the summons was to acknowledge his submissive status not only to Yoshiaki but, more importantly, to Nobunaga; to refuse was to put oneself in the unenviable position of being disobedient to the shogun—it would have been treasonous.

This dilemma was particularly nasty for Asakura Yoshikage, the lord of Echizen province, who but a few years earlier had declined Yoshiaki's request to take up the Ashikaga cause. Ironically, the main reason why Yoshikage had to decline was that he was having difficulties with the Ikko-ombo of Kaga province who were trying to expand their power into Echizen. With Nobunaga's summons, Asakura was being asked to bow to the man who had achieved the prize that he had once been offered. He refused. Aida Yūji suggests that Yoshiaki might have urged the Asakura to refuse the summons for relations between him and Nobunaga were already badly strained.92 Yoshikage's refusal gave Nobunaga an excuse to march against the Asakura, which he finally did in the spring of 1570.

In the first month of 1569 Nobunaga sent the first of three important documents to Yoshiaki, in which he began to limit the shogun's power. Evidently their relationship soured very early because in Document 14293, issued but two months after Yoshiaki became shogun, we see the first set of constraints that Nobunaga imposed on him. While this document is most important for a detailed study of the Nobunaga-Yoshiaki conflict, it is not of special significance to our topic because only a few of the sixteen articles in it concerned religious institutions. In article 9 Oda forbade
Yoshiaki to have representatives of Mt. Hiei's sohei freely visit the shogunal palace. It appears that Yoshiaki might have been encouraging an alliance between the Enryakuji and himself as part of his effort to get new allies. In article 10 Oda strictly prohibited the confiscation of lands that belonged to otera and shrines. Yoshiaki was possibly trying to amass an area of land under his personal control, and Nobunaga did not want him to gain that kind of independence. Given that Nobunaga had no right whatsoever to act in such a manner towards the shogun, this document is extraordinarily audacious.

Even though relations between Nobunaga and Yoshiaki were quite poor by early 1569, Nobunaga still needed him until he was firmly in control of the Kinai, so when Yoshiaki was attacked by the Miyoshi of Awa in January of that year Nobunaga hurried from his headquarters in Gifu to save him.

One year later, on February 27, 1570, Nobunaga sent a second letter to Yoshiaki with the same purpose as the first. None of the five articles in that letter concerned religious institutions but two of them shed important light on Nobunaga's way of thinking. In article 3 he told Yoshiaki that should he wish to reward people who were loyal to him with grants of land, Oda would be willing to permit Yoshiaki to reward those people with portions of Oda's bunkoku in the event that the shogun did not have any land to give. The implication of this article is clear: lands brought under control by Oda belonged to him and not to the shogun. By becoming shogun Yoshiaki did not automatically acquire any lands. Furthermore, in article 4 Oda stated most clearly that the renka had been entrusted to him, and that he could therefore act as he wished without first having to consult with the shogun.
Finally, in October of 1572 Oda sent a most famous article document to Yoshiaki in which he criticized him for a number of failings and stripped him of his remaining power. Article 1 of this document is especially interesting because in it Oda told Yoshiaki that just as the former shogun, Yoshiteru, lost the protection of the kami and Buddhas because of his failure to perform his duties towards the court, so too with Yoshiaki. No articles in that document concerned religious institutions.

With the issuance of that document relations between Nobunaga and Yoshiaki were completely and openly ruptured. Yoshiaki desperately tried to have some other daimyo rescue him, but to no avail. Late in April of 1573 Nobunaga marched on Kyōto from Gifu, surrounded Yoshiaki's Nijō palace, and set fire to a large section of the city. Fearing for his life, Yoshiaki appealed to the Emperor for peace and on May 8 he surrendered unconditionally to Nobunaga. Three months later, however, Yoshiaki attempted to make a stand against Oda at Makishima fortress in Yamashiro where he had managed to assemble almost 4000 warriors. Late in August Nobunaga attacked Yoshiaki's stronghold, took it, and accepted Yoshiaki's two year old son as a hostage. Oda then sent Yoshiaki to Wakae fortress in Kawachi where he was to be a prisoner of Miyoshi Yoshitsugu, a daimyo ally of Oda since 1568. Thus ended the Ashikaga shogunate which had begun two hundred and thirty-five years earlier in 1338.

From Wakae fortress Yoshiaki continued his attempts to gain the assistance of the Takeda, Asakura, and Miyoshi, and in 1576 he fled to Bingo province where he found shelter with the Mōri. Following his deposition Yoshiaki joined the anti-Nobunaga league to which he contributed his ability--by virtue of his status--to entice daimyo to join the campaign against Oda.
Although Yoshiaki continually conspired to bring together a coalition of forces that would enable him to regain the shogunate, he failed. In the long run Yoshiaki was more an asset than a liability to Nobunaga because through him Nobunaga could bring to bear on the daimyo a type of pressure otherwise unavailable to him in his earlier years in Kyōto.

Oda was determined to unify the *tenka* and nothing, including the shogun, was allowed to stand in his way. How Oda himself interpreted the turn of events that led to the end of the Ashikaga line of shoguns is impossible to determine, but in several documents Oda made explicit statements about it: in a letter to Mōri Terumoto, Oda stated that Yoshiaki, by his actions, had "discarded the *tenka*" (*tenka o suteokaruru*) and therefore Oda proceeded to Kyōto and restored peace. In a letter to Date Terumune of Dewa province, Oda said that all was well between himself and Yoshiaki during the first few years following their entry into Kyōto but that the Takeda, Asakura, and other "smooth-talkers" (*neijin*) enticed the shogun into joining their treasonous plots. "What a great pity this was!" (*mu-nen sukunakarazu sōro*) said Nobunaga who, as a result, had no recourse but to take the steps he did.

Mōri Terumoto and Date Terumune were powerful daimyo with whom Oda wanted to stay on good terms in the early 1570's, and therefore he attempted to justify his behavior by blaming, in the former case, Yoshiaki, whom Oda accused of bringing about his own downfall by his failure to perform acts conducive to the unification of the *tenka*, and in the latter case the Takeda and other treacherous daimyo who duped the shogun.

Yoshiaki's critical failure, as far as Nobunaga was concerned, was that
he did not act in accordance with the plans Nobunaga had for the tenka. All actions that militated against the successful implementation of Oda's plan to unify the country were seen by him to be acts against the tenka, and all who performed such acts were to be condemned as traitors. Yoshiaki's pursuit of "selfish" ends impeded the realization of Oda's vision, so he was removed. One cannot assume, of course, that Nobunaga acted out of any but selfish motives himself for it was he who would gain most by the new order he envisaged.

The relationship between Nobunaga and Yoshiaki was doomed to failure from the first. Both men wanted to be supreme, but there was room for only one. Yoshiaki was, apparently, a man over whose misfortune few would grieve. According to Kuwata Tadachika, Yoshiaki was a mean and cowardly person with a broad streak of cruelty and whose cunning surpassed many times over even that of Nobunaga. Kuwata described Yoshiaki's character with the Japanese expression "nite mo yaite mo kuenai shiromono" which means, literally, something that cannot be eaten whether broiled or boiled or, figuratively, a most crafty person. Elsewhere Kuwata observed that Nobunaga was a man towards whom it would be only natural for the ordinary person to have a feeling of repugnance. Two such selfish and crafty people as Nobunaga and Yoshiaki were not destined to enjoy a long and favourable relationship. Nobunaga had little enough trust in his own generals, let alone in the likes of Yoshiaki. Nobunaga was by far the stronger of the two, both in terms of character and in terms of the number of troops under his command, and therefore it was Yoshiaki who was defeated.
In the Sengoku period the Emperor and the kuge were in dire financial straights. Local power holders, both bushi and monto, had confiscated their holdings with the result that they were no longer receiving taxes from lands still in their names.

There is no doubt that the Emperor and the kuge benefited by Nobunaga's arrival in Kyōto for, in general, he sought to improve and stabilize their condition. According to Kuwata Tadachika, although the court felt a sense of uneasiness at Oda's arrival in Kyōto in 1568, it nevertheless looked upon him as a saviour—Kuwata actually used the Japanese word for saviour (kyuseishu) to describe Oda's role vis-a-vis the court. The main ways in which Nobunaga assisted the court were:

1. He commanded the return of kuge properties to their rightful owners. Some examples of this policy are: in Document 166 four of Oda's generals commanded Utsu Yorishige, a bushi of Tamba province, to release Yamakuni estate, an Imperial estate that he had confiscated.

2. In 1572 Nobunaga commanded that all lands that had been transferred to religious institutions by the kuge either by sale, pawn, or free grant, be returned to the kuge. In article 4 of Document 549 Oda commanded Shibata Katsuie, his newly appointed lord of Echizen province, to return to the kuge those estates that they had in fact controlled prior to the Ikō uprisings in that area. Oda reserved to himself the right to veto any of those returns.

It is to be noted that Nobunaga's care of the nobility was limited to the Kyoto nobility of the highest order. Lesser nobility, especially provincial gentry, were not so well treated. Okuno Takahiro relates the somewhat pathetic story of a certain Mozume Tadashige, a descendant of an
ancient Yamashiro family who refused to allow his lands to be taken by Nobunaga. Nobunaga called Mozume a traitor, and told his general Nagaoka Fujitaka that it was right for him to kill Mozume. People like Mozume stood no chance against Nobunaga, and indeed he looked upon them as traitors for daring to defy him. Of course, to defy Nobunaga was to be a traitor.

2. Oda made donations to the repair of the Imperial palace. According to the Shinchō Kōki Oda undertook those repairs in 1569 and 1571, and Tsuji Zennosuke says that further repairs were made in 1577.

3. Oda contributed to the upkeep of the Emperor and the kuge, and he charged Nichijō Chōzan and Murai Sadakatsu, whom he appointed Governor of Kyoto (Kyoto shoshidai) in 1573, with the task of assuring that the imperial family's condition was improved. In 1572 and again in 1575, Oda levied a tax on the city of Kyoto that was to be paid to the court—thus it appears that Nobunaga's generosity to the court was not necessarily at his personal expense. In his commentary on Document 599 Okuno Takahiro tells us that Oda made a grant of 1000 koku to the Emperor in late 1575.

It appears, then, that Nobunaga was intent on improving the living conditions of the Emperor and kuge, and that he took his obligation towards the Emperor seriously. As we have seen, article 1 of Oda's famous letter to Yoshiaki in 1572 condemned him for failing to perform his duties towards the Emperor.

On the basis of the foregoing evidence some have gone so far as to conclude that Nobunaga had a deep reverence for the court. This is an exaggeration.
Although the court benefited by Oda's rise to power, he was not an attentive and obedient subject for he appears to have abided by Imperial injunctions only to the degree that it suited his purpose. In Document 614, for example, Oda complied with the wishes of the Emperor by commanding that the Sennyūji, a Shingon otera inKyoto, be repaired, but in Document 264 Supplement 1 there is an Imperial command that Oda disregarded.

In that document the Emperor Ōgimachi commanded Nobunaga to return to Mt. Hiei the holdings that he had confiscated from it in 1568 and 1569, but in 1571 Nobunaga destroyed Mt. Hiei and gave its lands to his generals. Oda's advantage, rather than the person and status of the Emperor, was the main factor that determined his obedience or disobedience. Even the Emperor took second place to the implementation of Nobunaga's vision.

Moreover, it appears that Imperial estates were not exempt from Nobunaga's interference should he have deemed it necessary to the advancement of his purpose. For example, during the struggle for control of Settsu province in 1574 several of Oda's vassals commanded the village of Yamashina, part of an ancient Imperial estate in Yamashiro province, to supply them with lumber and other such materials necessary for the campaign.

Finally, as we shall see in detail in the next chapter, when the situation looked bad for Nobunaga he was quick to appeal to the Imperial powers of mediation, but once things took a turn for the better he was equally quick to pay no more heed to the Imperial injunctions. To Oda, the Emperor and kuge were to be preserved in a comfortable but powerless position. The Emperor's word was to be received with grave respect, but not necessarily heeded.
Having seen the cast of characters who played a role in the main drama of the sixteenth century, we can now examine the details of the struggle between Oda Nobunaga and the Buddhist institutions.

A Japanese adage says that the nail that sticks out most prominently will be the one that gets hit. When Nobunaga wielded the hammer it was the Buddhist institutions that stuck out most glaringly above the surface of Japanese society as Nobunaga imagined that surface should be.
Part II
Part II

Introduction
In the same way that Oda Nobunaga's character is commonly described in broad negative strokes, so too is his policy towards the Buddhist institutions. There are several ways in which Japanese historians have tended to view that policy:

Some, the vast majority, see Oda Nobunaga as purely and simply a destroyer of Buddhism. Tsuji Zennosuke speaks for many Japanese historians when he says that Nobunaga's Buddhist policy, with the exception of the Zen school, could be summed up by the word "oppression" (appaku). A similar sentiment is expressed by Ishida Ichirō in his Nihon Bunka-shi Gairon when he says that "Nobunaga realized instinctively that it was his personal historical mission to destroy things medieval." Historians who view Nobunaga's Buddhist policy as destructive, and its effects most negative, tend to explain, or justify, this view in one of two ways:

1. They say that Nobunaga was a brute, insane, a monster. People from Takeda Shingen through Sugiyama Jirō and George Sansom have made this assertion. To them, the strokes that Nobunaga dealt the Buddhist institutions were the frantic and fanatic acts of a madman for no sane person would have wrought such destruction on, for example, the grand cultural storehouse that was Mt. Hiei.

2. In the other extreme, some historians say that the Buddhist institutions richly deserved the destructive blows rained on them by Nobunaga. These historians attempt to portray Nobunaga in a pleasing light, and thereby to justify his destruction of the Buddhist institutions, by describing in the darkest tones the situation in the Buddhist institutions in his time. The corruption, decadence, and avariciousness of the Buddhist clergy is played up so that, by contrast, Nobunaga appears as the arm of God to punish Buddhism. Tanaka Yoshinari, for example, says that
by the time of Nobunaga the bonzes had abandoned learning and the cul-
tivation of the Buddhist Way, and wantonly engaged in evil practises.³
It was in this context that Arthur Lloyd said that "Before the advent of
Christianity, Buddhism bid fair to destroy itself."⁴
Many historians combine these two lines of approach in such a way as to
show that while the Buddhist institutions indeed deserved to be oppressed,
Oda's excesses in dealing with them stemmed from the fact that he was
quite mad, or at least a callous brute.

Other historians, Tsuji Zennosuke among them, have a viewpoint quite dif-
ferent from the foregoing. They attempt to see the Azuchi-Momoyama period
as a purgative purifying one, such that the result of it was the restor-
ation of Japanese society, including the restoration of Buddhism once its
corruption and abuses were excised by Nobunaga. These historians attempt
to show that a good result came from an essentially evil undertaking. The
implications of this assertion are great, and they shall be dealt with in
the concluding chapter.

The serious error shared by those who offer the foregoing interpretations
of Nobunaga's policy towards Buddhist institutions is that they all simply
assume that Nobunaga intended to destroy Buddhism and its institutions.
They assume that his policy was primarily, if not exclusively, geared to
the destruction of the Buddhist institutions. Proponents of those theses
appear to be so captivated by the scale and brutality of some of Oda's
actions against tera that they lose sight of the coherent nature of his
policy—it is lost in the glare of the flames that consumed the Enryakuji.

To appreciate the nature of the change that took place in the religious
sector of Japanese society in the sixteenth century, it is necessary to understand that Nobunaga's policy towards Buddhist institutions was not as simple or as negative as historians would often have us believe. Oda did not simply lash out at Buddhist institutions. Rather, he constantly pursued a coherent policy of reducing the power of the Buddhist institutions in the interest of bringing them under the control of the central administration.

In the sixteenth century Buddhist otera enjoyed three types of power:

1. They maintained large forces, either sōhei or monto, that could make war, cause social upset, and interfere in secular affairs.

2. They controlled vast land holdings and many monzenmachi whereby they could wield considerable economic power, support troops, and amass great wealth.

3. Otera enjoyed a high degree of autonomy and independence from the central administration. This autonomy and independence expressed itself in otera's possession of shugo-funyū status, extraterritoriality, and the right to grant sanctuary.

As a general rule, otera that enjoyed one of these types of power enjoyed all three, and there was a direct ratio between the degree to which one of these powers was possessed and the degree to which all three were possessed. Land was wealth, wealth was power, and power was the necessary ingredient for the maintenance of autonomy. The outstanding exception to this general rule was the Honganji for although, through the monto, it could control broad expanses of territory, it owned very few estates of the classical type.
Given the foregoing types of power on the part of the Buddhist institutions, Nobunaga's general policy of reducing their power had a three pronged character, or three branch policies:

1. He attempted to eradicate the military power of the Buddhist institutions, and their power to cause upsets in society. This policy was carried out by means of military campaigns against otera that possessed that type of power. The most outstanding cases of Nobunaga's violent application of this policy were his campaigns against Mt. Hiei and the Ishiyama Honganji. Nobunaga also conducted devastating campaigns against other otera, as we shall see, but his reason for doing so was not precisely because of their active and militant posture, but because of their failure to comply with one or the other of his second and third policies.

2. Nobunaga attempted to reduce the size and number of otera land holdings. The vast majority of otera were affected by this policy and, as a general rule, the larger the holdings of an otera the more it was affected by this policy.

3. Nobunaga rejected otera's claims to a high degree of autonomy. No otera were permitted to stand outside the pale of central administrative authority. Otera most affected by the violent application of this policy were the Kongōbuji and the Senrinji, a Zen otera in Kai province.

In the following three chapters we shall examine the ways in which Nobunaga attempted to implement his three policies and thereby reduce the power of the Buddhist institutions. Most otera could be adequately controlled by the enforcement of the second and third policies, and there was no need, in most cases, to mount military campaigns against otera in order to achieve his goal. Finally, it must be born in mind that the eradication of
the excessive power of the Buddhist institutions was an ideal towards which Nobunaga strove but which he was unable to completely realize. The cumulative power of Buddhist institutions was so great that Nobunaga was sometimes forced to make compromises with them.
Part II

Chapter 3

Oda Nobunaga's First Policy Towards Buddhist Institutions
Part II

Chapter 3

Introduction
Oda Nobunaga's first policy towards Buddhist institutions was to eradicate their ability to engage in military campaigns, cause social upset, and interfere in secular affairs.

Nobunaga made his position regarding the involvement of otera in secular disputes perfectly clear in 1570 when he told ten representatives of the Enryakuji that they could follow one of three courses of action towards him: they could ally with him, in which case he would give them a "sword oath" (kinchō) that he would return to them all Sanmon lands that his men had confiscated; they could act most in keeping with the way of the Buddha and maintain a position of complete neutrality, in which case they would not be harmed; or, should they fail to opt for either of those two courses, he would put their entire mountain to the torch. Nobunaga's warning could not have been clearer: the Enryakuji—and, one might also assume, any other otera—was to ally with Nobunaga and be rewarded, remain neutral and go unharmed, or be destroyed.

Although the Enryakuji was given a choice as to what course to follow, in fact it—and all other otera—had no real choice at all. We saw in Chapter 1 that it was all but impossible for powerful otera to maintain neutrality in the Sengoku period. They could not avoid forming alliances with the daimyo. Smaller otera might have been able to escape entanglements but only for a short length of time for eventually they too would have to acknowledge their submission to one daimyo or another. Therefore, the option of neutrality did not really exist. Moreover, should an otera have chosen to ally with Nobunaga, there was no guarantee that its condition was to be enhanced or even to continue as it had been over the centuries. Otera that allied with Nobunaga would receive certain guarantees and grants
of land, but even friendly otera were not exempt from his second and third policies. No religious institutions were to survive the sixteenth century with their traditional rights, privileges, and land holdings intact.

The primary application of Nobunaga's first policy was against those otera that, as members of the anti-Nobunaga league, attempted to prevent Nobunaga from unifying the country. The two most powerful otera in that league were the Honganji and Mt. Hiei, and therefore we shall examine Nobunaga's campaigns against the Honganji in Section 1 of this chapter, and his destruction of Mt. Hiei in Section 2. In Section 3 we will discuss the blow that Nobunaga dealt to the Hokke monto on the occasion of the "Azuchi Religious Debate" (Azuchi shūron), and in Section 4 his suppression of several other otera in the application of his first policy. Finally, in Section 5 we will consider the exceptional circumstances in which Nobunaga accepted certain religious institutions as active allies in his campaigns.
Part II

Chapter 3

Section 1

Oda Nobunaga and the Honganji
The Honganji was, as we have seen, the center of a league of forces that attempted to block Nobunaga's attempts to unify Japan, and as such it was his greatest enemy. With its bands of monto welded together by ties of religious loyalty, the Honganji was, in effect, a competing world order.

More of Nobunaga's documents deal with the Honganji than with any other institution, religious or otherwise. Nobunaga's letters to the Honganji, or to others in which he talks about it, outnumber his collected letters to all other Buddhist institutions combined. The majority of Nobunaga's letters to the Honganji--approximately fifty in number--contain orders and instructions directed against it, but in another twenty-five documents Nobunaga commended its behavior. Not surprisingly, the vast majority of the favourable documents were issued after Nobunaga's victory over the Honganji in 1580. Over and above the documents that were sent directly to the Honganji are the hundreds of letters that Oda sent to his vassals in regard to their campaigns against the Honganji forces.

Before Oda could begin to concentrate on the central citadel of monto power he had to sever, one by one, each local cell, each tentacle of the Honganji octopus. Those local campaigns were usually indecisive--time and again Nobunaga's forces would suppress the monto in a certain area only to find them rising up against him once more at a later date. The majority of Nobunaga's campaigns against religious institutions lasted but a few days but it took five years just to prepare a base for a direct siege of the Honganji citadel.

Nobunaga's conflict with the Ikkōshū was the longest and most difficult of
all his struggles. It spread over the years from 1570 to 1580, and was one of the few conflicts in which, in the end, Nobunaga did not eradicate his enemy in a fight to the finish—it concluded with a peace pact in 1580. Because Nobunaga's campaign against the Honganji did not culminate in a great battle, it is generally less well known than his explosive strike against Mt. Hiei in 1571, but the Ishiyama Honganji War was the major event of Oda's life and, indeed, of the whole Sengoku period.

The Honganji caused Nobunaga great difficulties because over the years from 1570 to 1580 it continually called upon the groups of *monto* in the provinces to rise in *ikki* against him, and this kept Nobunaga's forces occupied on a number of fronts. The Honganji citadel was a heavily armed fortress from 1570 until 1580, and the *monto* of Kaga province were continually in arms from 1573 through 1581. During the 1570's there were innumerable minor uprisings by the *monto*, and the following major ones: by the *monto* of the Nagashima area of Ise province in 1570, 1573, and 1574; by the Omi *monto* in 1570; by the Kawachi and Echizen *monto* in 1574 and 1575; by the Izumi *monto* in 1575; and by the *monto* of Kii province in 1577. Even when those groups of *monto* were not actually fighting, their power was such that Nobunaga could not consider a province in which they were located to be under his control until that power was curtailed.

Adding to Nobunaga's difficulties was the fact that it was usually the case that when the *monto* were in arms they were accompanied by the forces of various daimyo members of the anti-Nobunaga league who contributed their strength to the campaigns against him.

The first contact between Nobunaga and the Honganji appears to have been
in 1567. When Oda gained control of Mino and the northern section of Ise province, Kennyo Kōsa sent him a letter of congratulations and a gift of a sword. This was a typical diplomatic gesture on the part of one powerful party in recognition of another, and it expressed the desire of the sender to have peaceful relations with that other. Although Kennyo made this friendly gesture towards Nobunaga it is possible, and even probable, that as early as 1567 the Honganji began to cement its relations with daimyo who were not likely to be sympathetic to Nobunaga because by that date Oda had gained considerable power and had been invited by Ashikaga Yoshiaki to sponsor him.

Following Nobunaga's successful entry into Kyōto in October of 1568, one of his first acts was to impose taxes on a number of institutions, including the Honganji from which he demanded a large sum of money. According to Kasahara Kazuo, Kennyo paid the tax but, fearing that it would not be Oda's last levy on the Honganji, he was in the position of having to choose between confrontation with Nobunaga or submission to him. Kennyo chose the former. Therefore he immediately began to strengthen the Honganji's relations with the Rokkaku family with whom he had formed a marital relation in 1557, ordered ten branch otera of the Honganji in Ōmi province to prepare for an uprising, and cooperated with the Miyoshi and Matsunaga Hisahide in provisioning two of their fortresses.

Tamamuro Taijō has a slightly different explanation of the Honganji's position at that time. He says that even though the Honganji paid Oda's levy without protest, Kennyo came to consider the levy an unfair and unreasonable one and therefore he began to cement his relations with the daimyo. However, in order to avoid an open clash with Nobunaga he pre-
tended to have had nothing to do with those daimyo—even though he was cooperating with the Miyoshi, he wrote to Akechi Mitsuhide stating that he had no connection with them.5

During 1569 Nobunaga was occupied with efforts to solidify his control over the Kinai, and in a campaign against the Kitabatake of Ise for control of that province. The Honganji, meanwhile, was busily strengthening its ties with the Asai of Ōmi, Asakura of Echizen, Takeda of Kai, Miyoshi of Awa, Mōri of Aki, and the Rokkaku of Ōmi, in preparation for the impending confrontation with Nobunaga. In other words, Kennyo was forming the anti-Nobunaga league.

Early in 1570 Oda marched against the Asakura for their refusal to come to Kyoto in response to his summons of 1568. To Oda's great shock, while he was confronting the Asakura forces in Echizen, Asai Nagamasa, Oda's brother-in-law, rose up in his rear and trapped Oda between the Asai-Asakura combined forces.6 Those forces were assisted by the Rokkaku and, it appears, by the Honganji because Kennyo called for an Ikkō ikki in May of that year while Nobunaga's forces were trapped. And yet, Kennyo still tried to avoid open hostilities with Oda by pretending to have nothing to do with the activities of the montō who participated against him.

Oda's situation was desperate. Lest he be hopelessly trapped "like a bean in a bag tied top and bottom without even a speck of dust being able to leak in or out,"7 he beat a hasty retreat from Echizen in the company of only a few warriors, and reached Kyoto safely on June 2. On his way back to Kyoto Oda was almost assassinated by a famous rifleman named Sugitani Zenjūbō, who fired two shots at him but managed to hit only Oda's sleeve.8
The *Shincho Kōki* says that Zenjūbō was hired by the Rokkaku as a sniper to kill Oda.9

In June of 1570 Nobunaga attacked, and defeated, the Rokkaku in a matter of a few weeks, following which Nobunaga's troops, assisted by Ieyasu's men, dealt the Asai-Asakura forces a decisive blow in Ōmi province. Here and there the *monto* took part in sporadic outbursts that hampered Oda's campaign against the Asai and Asakura. In their plight the Asai appealed to the Miyoshi for assistance, and the Miyoshi answered the call by crossing from Shikoku to Settsu province where they established a base near the Honganji in August. Taking advantage of the Miyoshi presence, Kennyo sent out an order for the *monto* to take up arms, but he continued his attempt to keep his involvement with the anti-Nobunaga forces a secret from Nobunaga. With the Miyoshi and the *monto* now involved, the remnant of the routed Asai and Asakura regrouped and marched to Sakamoto in southern Ōmi where they established a base close by Mt. Hiei. Nobunaga's younger brother Nobuharu, who was stationed in Sakamoto, was killed during the Asai-Asakura advance into that area.

In October Nobunaga marched to Sakamoto and routed the Asai-Asakura forces, who then took refuge on Mt. Hiei. In pursuit of those forces, Nobunaga had his men surround the base of the mountain, and he issued his warning to the Enryakuji bonzes.10

At that point, according to Kasahara Kazuo, the Honganji completely abandoned its general policy of discouraging *Ikko ikki* that it had been following down from Rennyo's time. Kennyo ceased pretending to be uninvolved in the campaigns against Nobunaga, and in October of 1570 he sent out a
general appeal to all the monto to make war on Nobunaga. In this appeal Kennyo referred to Nobunaga as the "enemy of the Law" (hōteki). According to Kasahara, Kennyo arrived at that decision when he saw Nobunaga's troops advance to the very doorstep of the Enryakuji. With the Asai and Asakura out of the way, at least for the moment, there was no strong buffer between Nobunaga's troops and Osaka, and therefore the Honkanji could be directly threatened. According to Kasahara this was a perilous moment for Kennyo for he greatly feared that the Buddhist tradition passed down from the time of Shinran was about to be trampled on. Kennyo felt, from that point, that he had no choice but to oppose Nobunaga with all the forces he could muster.

In response to Kennyo's call to arms, the monto of Ōmi province attacked, and defeated, Nobunaga's troops in Tenmanmori in Ōmi, and one month later, in early December of 1570, the monto of the Nagashima area of Ise attacked Nobunaga's forces in Ogie fortress in Owari province where they killed Oda's younger brother Nobuoki.

The anti-Nobunaga league, with Kennyo active at its center, was far too powerful for Nobunaga to contend with at that time so he was forced to seek peace through the intercession of Yoshiaki and the Emperor. Consequently, on January 9, 1571, a peace pact was drawn up and Oda withdrew his forces from Ōmi and retired to Gifu.

This was the first of two occasions on which the anti-Nobunaga league bettered Oda. As a result of the first defeat Oda realized that his only hope for victory lay in severing from the Honganji both its secular allies and its tentacles throughout the provinces. This undertaking was to occupy Oda
for ten years.

By the end of 1570 there was established a coalition of parties who recognized Nobunaga as their common enemy: these were the Asai, Asakura, Miyoshi, Takeda, Mt. Hiei, and the Honganji. It was also around that time that Ashikaga Yoshiaki began to lend his support to the anti-Nobunaga league because his relationship with Nobunaga had reached the breaking point.

On the day after New Year of the year Genki 1 (January 27, 1571), Oda began his campaign against the Ikko monto by ordering Toyotomi Hideyoshi, then installed in Yokoyama fortress in Ōmi province, to cut all traffic between Echizen and Osaka by setting up blockades between Anegawa and Asazuma, two points on the main road through Ōmi. This tactic of Oda's served several purposes: it impeded the flow of supplies and information between the Honganji and its monto in the provinces of Kaga and Echizen, it split the Asai (Ōmi) and Asakura (Echizen) forces, and it prevented any further link between the Honganji and the Asai and Asakura. It appears from this undertaking that Nobunaga's immediate goal was to divide the anti-Nobunaga league into two isolated segments by taking control of a stretch of land, mainly the province of Ōmi, that stood between Osaka and the provinces of Echizen and Kaga. Anyone who attempted to cross the closed territory, and that included merchants and bonzes, was liable to be executed as a spy. With the anti-Nobunaga league split into two parts, Oda could then begin to attack and eradicate each part individually.

In February of 1571 Oda sent Shibata Katsuie and Ujiie Naomoto, a vassal of Nobunaga since 1564, into Ise province to attack the Nagashima monto
who had dealt Oda's forces a severe blow in the previous December. Once again, however, Oda's troops were unable to defeat the monto, and in June Oda was forced to order a retreat. During the retreat Ujiie was ambushed and killed, and Shibata was severely wounded. In anger and frustration Nobunaga commanded his vassal Inoko Takanari to put to death all Ikko monto whom he could round up, no matter whose vassals they were.

In September of 1571 Nobunaga led his forces into Ōmi against the Asai where they attacked and set fire to the main Asai fortress at Odani. Then, quite unexpectedly, Nobunaga turned his 30,000 troops northwest towards Kyoto and ordered them to bivouac at the Miidera. On the morning of September 30, 1571, Nobunaga began his notorious attack on Mt. Hiei, and the year 1571 concluded—as far as his relations with otera were concerned—with his destruction of that famous institution.

1572

Throughout 1572 the anti-Nobunaga league members continued to have Nobunaga surrounded because they still maintained an unbroken chain of forces that extended from the Takeda in the east to the Honganji in the west. Yoshiaki made every effort to have one of the daimyo, preferably Takeda Shingen whom he ceaselessly implored, advance on Kyoto and oust Nobunaga.

In the opening months of 1572 combined Ikko and Rokkaku forces attacked Oda's positions in Ōmi province, and in order to prevent the participation of more monto in that struggle Oda warned the monto of southern Ōmi not to oppose him. In Document 310 Sakuma Nobumori told the monto of an estate in southern Ōmi that they were not to take part in any Ikko-ikki, and that they were to have no contact whatsoever with those monto who were up in
arms even though they might have been relatives of theirs. Sakuma also ordered the monto to send pledges to Nobunaga that they would obey his order. Three supplementary documents accompanying Document 310 contain the monto pledges—evidently they heeded the warning. This incident sheds light on another tactic Nobunaga used against the monto: in addition to his efforts to break the anti-Nobunaga league into two parts, he tried to break down the unity and cohesiveness of each provincial monto group. In this case he tried to divide the Ōmi monto and apparently was successful.

Meanwhile, Yoshiaki was attempting to bring peace: he was especially interested in bringing peace, on the one hand, between Oda and the Honganji, and on the other hand he urged the Takeda, Uesugi, and Hōjō to stop warring. In order to bring this about Yoshiaki planned to have the Takeda mediate between Oda and the Honganji, while Oda and Asakura Yoshikage mediated the peace among the Takeda, Uesugi, and Hōjō. The negotiations failed before they really got started because Uesugi Kenshin categorically refused to accept his neighbouring daimyo and hated enemy Asakura Yoshikage as mediator. We see here an ongoing effort by Yoshiaki to bring peace, especially in the Kantō area, so that one or several of the warring daimyos might be able to come to his rescue. The fact that Oda was willing to engage in the peace negotiations witnesses to the ability of the shogun, because of his status and despite his weakness, to move the daimyo. However, Oda most likely agreed to the peace negotiations at that time because it was certainly to his benefit to have the monto actions in Ōmi cease. Kennyo too was willing to cooperate with Yoshiaki although he certainly had no trust in Nobunaga and was not inclined to make peace with
him. Okuno Takahiro quotes Kennyo as having said that he would abide by the shogun's wishes even though he bore "feelings of bitter malice towards Nobunaga" (Nobunaga ni taishi ikon shincho da ga...). It is likely that Kennyo was moved to accept peace negotiations at that time because he feared that Asakura Yoshikage was diffident about the ongoing struggle with Nobunaga, and because he appears ever to have been hoping to avoid a to-the-death fight with Nobunaga. As part of the formalities that accompanied peace negotiations, Kennyo sent Oda presents of a painted scroll and tea utensils.

After the peace negotiations failed, Kennyo took the offensive. He ordered the Echizen monto to gather supplies for a large uprising, and he urged the Asai and Asakura forces to proceed once again to Sakamoto. Should the latter not be possible, he asked them at least to take care to cut the road between Mino and Owari provinces in order to impede Nobunaga's supply trains. Oda, in turn, once again forbade any traffic to Osaka because he did not want a flow of supplies and personnel to reinforce the Honganji-monto forces from Kii province were marching to Osaka at that time to bolster the garrison there.

Early in June a bonze envoy between Asakura Yoshikage and Miyoshi Yoshitsugu was captured while attempting to cross the stretch of land that Oda had closed to all travellers a year earlier; Oda summarily sentenced him to be burned to death in Kyōto. Okuno states that Nobunaga's action caused great shock for never before was such a drastic punishment visited upon Buddhist bonze envoys. Oda was determined to enforce his decrees, and no exceptions were to be made for offenders, clerical or otherwise.
Once again, in August of 1572, Nobunaga renewed his efforts to stop all traffic between the Honganji and its provincial monto. In Document 331, for example, he told the monto of the Senpukuji and its branches in Mino province that the coming and going of monto between that province and Osaka was forbidden. He also ordered them to get a new "Abbot's Representative" (daibōzu) -- evidently he was displeased with the former one -- and he gave them until the twenty-third of the month for all monto who had assembled at those otera to disperse. \(^{25}\) Nobunaga's document was issued on the twenty-first of the month, so they were given but two days in which to comply with his orders. The stern nature of this document is evident in both the opening phrase, in which he accused the Honganji of unprecedented scheming (Honganji no zōi o kuwadatsuru shidai sendai mémon...), and in the closing admonition in which Nobunaga threatened with dire punishment anyone who might disobey his orders.

On November 3, 1572, Nobunaga sent Yoshiaki the famous seventeen article document in which he stripped the shogun of his powers. In reaction to that document Yoshiaki implored Takeda Shingen to hurry to his aid, and Nobunaga, in turn, made an alliance with Uesugi Kenshin of Echigo province. This was a typical daimyo strategy whereby a daimyo would ally with an enemy of his opponent in order to cause that opponent to fight on two fronts. This alliance placed the Takeda in a dangerous position between Nobunaga's forces to their west and the Uesugi to the north and northeast. Kenshin was too hard pressed by Ikki uprisings in Kaga and Etchu to be of much help to Nobunaga, but Nobunaga won an alliance with him by arguing that a combined effort by Oda and Uesugi forces could rout the Takeda, after which the Uesugi could attack the Kaga and Etchu monto without having to worry about the Takeda.
The Takeda became especially important to the anti-Nobunaga league at that time because Asakura Yoshikage had suddenly broken off his participation in the campaign against Nobunaga and retired to his home province of Echizen in October. Why Yoshikage withdrew is not clear—Okuno suggests that he simply did not have the stomach for war. With Yoshikage's desertion, Kennyo was moved to put \textit{monto} forces under the command of Asai Nagamasa in order to hold their position until the Takeda, hopefully, could join them. In November Takeda Shingen took to the field in response to Yoshiaki's call for help. He advanced, at the head of 30,000 troops, into Totomi province where he defeated Ieyasu's forces at the battle of Mikatagahara (Mikatagahara \textit{no tatakai}), after which he turned his troops into Mikawa province in order to pursue his advance on Kyōto.

Nobunaga saw out the year 1572 making preparations to parry the Takeda thrust.

1573

Throughout the early months of 1573 Yoshiaki continued his efforts to forge a combination of forces to topple Nobunaga, and he even managed to get the Miidera to join in an uprising against him. But fate deserted Yoshiaki and smiled on Nobunaga on May 13, 1573, when Takeda Shingen, the single most dangerous threat to Nobunaga at that time, suddenly died of a bullet wound that he had received four months earlier during the battle of Mikatagahara. Shingen's unexpected death immediately brought a halt to the Takeda and relieved the pressure from Nobunaga's eastern flank. Just five days before Shingen's death, Yoshiaki surrendered to Nobunaga whose troops had him surrounded in the Nijō palace.
In September Nobunaga once again attacked, and this time eradicated, the Asai and Asakura. With Takeda Shingen, Asai Nagamasa, and Asakura Yoshikage dead, the Honganji lost its major daimyo allies in the Kinai and central Honshū areas, so Kennyo was forced to look to the west, to the Mori of Aki, for support. Thus the main theatre of combat began to shift from the Kinai and provinces to its east to Osaka and the provinces to its west.

Themonto in the Kinai and the Hokuriku (Wakasa, Echizen, Etchū, Echigo, Kaga, Noto, and Sado provinces) were still far from under Nobunaga's control. In October Nobunaga's army marched against the Kaga and Echizenmonto who had once again taken to the field. This time Oda's troops bettered themonto, and Oda took control of the three provinces of Echizen, Kaga, and Noto. This was to be, as we shall see, a very short-lived victory.

Meanwhile, the powerful Nagashimamonto of Ise province were in arms—Oda also sent his forces against them but once again they proved to be too strong and Nobunaga's men were forced to withdraw from Ise. That was Oda's last campaign of 1573.

1574

This year opened with a large Ikkōikki in Echizen. When Oda brought Echizen under his control in October of the preceding year he appointed Maeba Nagatoshi to administer the province. This appointment proved premature because, as events proved, themonto were not yet completely subdued. In mid February Maeba was attacked by Tomita Nagashige, castellan of Fuchū, for his failure to give over to Tomita the administrative records properly due him. This conflict between two of Nobunaga's appointees sparked a violent Ikkō uprising, and Oda lost his control of Echizen. Oda attempted to re-
gain control by soliciting support from some powerful local bushi families—for example, in Document 437 he thanked a certain Senpaku Shikibu Ōfu for capturing the headmen of a town controlled by the monto—29—but the monto were in arms throughout the province and Nobunaga's attempts failed.

To add to Nobunaga's difficulties, late in April Kennyo sent out a call for a massive uprising by the monto who were to be supported by the Rokkaku and the Miyoshi. Yoshiaki, meanwhile, continued to push his schemes for peace, this time among Takeda Katsuyori—Shingen's third son and successor as head of the Takeda family—Uesugi Kenshin, and Hōjō Ujimasa. While Nobunaga was making preparations to launch an attack on the Hōnganji citadel he received a summons from Tokugawa Ieyasu to send reinforcements to Mikawa to help Ieyasu's troops repel an attack by the Takeda who were once again on the march. In June Nobunaga's reinforcements reached Ieyasu and the Takeda attack was blunted.

From July through September of 1574 Oda's armies, under the leadership of Araki Murashige and Takayama Hida no Kami—father of the famous "Christian Daimyo" Takayama Ukon (Dom Justo)—who was a vassal of Araki, fought and won a decisive battle with the Ikko monto of the Nakanoshima area of Settsu province. Following this victory Nobunaga sent his men into Ise province against the most troublesome Nagashima monto who had been in arms since June. This time Oda had the grim intention of surrounding those monto and slaughtering them: in Document 461 he told his general Kawajiri Hidetaka that the monto had made several entreaties to him but that he would not overlook their "offenses" (toga)—he intended to tear them out from the roots (nekirubeki). 30 This time Oda succeeded. 31 The Ise campaign
lasted just over two months and concluded with the eradication of monto power. With that victory Nobunaga's position in the Kinai and the provinces of central Honshū was quite secure.

Nevertheless, small uprisings continued to break out here and there, causing Nobunaga to hurriedly dispatch troops to the trouble spots in order to snuff out the uprisings before they developed into large scale disturbances. Nobunaga's determination to crush the monto is brought out in Document 466 in which he commanded Nagaoka Fujitaka to search out and kill all rebels in the two provinces of Owari and Ise. Evidently there were still rebellious monto in Oda's home province as late as 1574.

Because Oda's troops were occupied in Mikawa, Settsu, and Ise during the summer months of 1574 he could not send an army into Echizen in order to retake that province from the monto. Therefore, Oda formed a strange alliance: he took as his allies the remnant of the Asakura forces and groups of monto who belonged to branches of Jōdo Shinshū other than the Honganji branch. It will be recalled that the Asakura had been embroiled in conflict with the monto in Echizen for decades prior to the early 1560's, and thus Oda probably had little difficulty in convincing them to fight with him against the monto.

Early in November Itami Chikaoki, a minor bushi of Yamato province, took up arms against Oda. To prevent the spread of this uprising, and the possible involvement of the monto, Nobunaga sent Araki and Kawajiri to suppress it. In Document 480 Nobunaga told Kawajiri that even though the people who were blockaded in Itami castle beseeched his forgiveness a number of times he would not forgive them, and he commanded that not one
of them be spared. The heads of all in the fortress were to be taken. Oda made an example of the rebellious Itami in order to warn others against such behavior.  

From November Nobunaga's troops campaigned in Kawachi province against militant montō groups, and in Echizen province--by means of his new Asakura and Shinshū allies--to regain control there.

Early in December Nobunaga commanded that all roads and bridges throughout his bunkoku be repaired and widened. The purpose of this was to make for faster and smoother movement of his troops, and it was part of Oda's preparations for a siege of the Honganji citadel.

1575

Nobunaga's preparations for an attack on the Honganji occupied the first half of 1575. Early in May he commanded Nagaoka Fujitaka to assemble personnel and supplies on an exceptionally large scale because, as he said, he intended to make war on Osaka in the fall. Oda's siege of the Honganji actually began in late May when he dispatched 10,000 troops to Osaka. Those troops swept up the remnant of the Miyoshi and Asakura forces on the way.

In June Oda's forces, with the aid of Ieyasu's troops, scored a major victory over the Takeda at Nagashino in Mikawa. This battle broke the back of the Takeda; thenceforth they caused no difficulties for Nobunaga. Early in June Oda boasted to Nagaoka Fujitaka that he had but one enemy left, i.e., the Honganji, but it was a formidable enemy. There were still powerful montō groups in Kawachi and Izumi, provinces to the east and south of Osaka, and in Echizen which was still in montō hands.
In order to get some assistance against the Echizen monto Nobunaga appealed to the Nichirenshū monto in that province, and to the monto of three Shinshū otera that belonged to branches of Shinshū other than the Honganji branch. 39 Through September Nobunaga led the campaign against the Ikko monto in Echizen and he enjoyed much success. In Document 533, a report of his progress in Echizen to Murai Sadakatsu, his Governor (shoshidai) of Kyōto since 1573, Nobunaga said that in the siege of the city of Fuchū approximately 1500 heads were taken, and 2000 more were taken in its neighbouring areas. 40 The scale of the carnage in this campaign is also brought out in Document 571 in which Nobunaga told Date Terumune of Dewa province that he had "cut down several tens of thousands of rebels" (kyōtora sūman nin o nade giri...) in the provinces of Kaga and Echizen in the month of September. 41 The Shincho Kōki says that the number of monto killed totalled some thirty to forty thousand people. 42

In October Shimozuma Raishō, the monto leader in the Kaga-Echizen area, was captured through the efforts of other monto who belonged to the Shōmyōji, an otera of the Takada branch of Shinshū in Echizen. Evidently Oda's request earlier in the year for their help was answered. In reward for this service the Shōmyōji was placed in charge of all 'returnees' (kisannin), i.e., all the monto who were returning home after their involvement in the Ikko uprisings. 43 Here we see another facet of Oda's policy of eradicating monto power: by placing those monto who belonged to the Honganji branch of Shinshū under the authority of otera that belonged to other branches of the same school, Nobunaga hoped to splinter the Honganji organization and keep the monto under control.

By the end of October Echizen province was "pacified", and in that month
Nobunaga made Shibata Katsuie master of Echizen and gave him detailed instructions as to how he was to carry out his appointment. \(^{44}\) It will be recalled that Nobunaga's first efforts at governing Echizen failed, so this time he was not about to take any risks. Shibata's primary tasks were to keep the monto under control and to act as a barrier against any forces, especially the Uesugi, that might attempt to descend on Kyōto from the northeast.

As a result of the foregoing developments, the Honganji was in grave trouble: the monto of Kaga and Echizen provinces were suppressed and could no longer be of any assistance; Shimozuma Raishō had been captured and killed; and all the Honganji's daimyo allies in central Japan were defeated. Therefore Kennyo appealed, through Miyoshi Yasunaga—a vassal of Nobunaga since May of that year—and Matsui Yukan, for peace. Nobunaga consented, and on December 5 he sent Kennyo a pledge of his good faith. \(^{45}\)

The terms of the Nobunaga-Honganji peace pact are contained in Document 561 Supplement 1 which was signed by Miyoshi and Matsui and delivered to five representatives of the Honganji. \(^{46}\) The document began with a statement to the effect that the pledge was made to the kami and Buddhas and before them, \(^{47}\) and it contained three articles:

In article 1 Nobunaga acquiesced in the desire of the Honganji for peace, assured them that there would be no discrepancy between his words and actions—i.e., that there would be no duplicity whereby he might say one thing and intend another—and that no new and unreasonable demands would be made on the Honganji.

In article 2 Nobunaga pledged that throughout those provinces under his control "all would be as in the past" (sakizaki no gotoku tarubeshi),
i.e., that the Honganji could keep its branch otera in those provinces, and that the *monto kyōdan* and their customary religious activities could continue. Oda also pledged not to impose regulations on the flow of traffic between the Honganji and its branches, and not to harass *monto* who were returning to resettle the lands that they had deserted during the Ikkō uprisings.

Article 3 stated that there would be no deviation from the promises contained in the pledge. Thus Nobunaga repeated his assurances to the Honganji that he was acting in good faith.

In the remainder of the document, which makes up approximately one half of its length, Oda called down upon himself the most severe of divine punishments should he break his pledge.

True to form, in Document 561 Nobunaga instructed Matsui Yūkan to get a good look around at conditions in the Honganji when he went to deliver the peace pledge--Oda wanted to get a first hand appraisal of his enemy. Matsui delivered the pledge on November 23, from which date Nobunaga and the Honganji were officially at peace.

On first consideration it may seem surprising that Nobunaga was willing to accept Kennyo's peace overtures at this time, but the fact is that 1575 was an exhausting year for Nobunaga. During that year Nobunaga fought the Takeda in Mikawa and the Ikkō *monto* in Echizen, and he initiated his seige of the Honganji citadel. The peace with Kennyo gave Nobunaga time to rest his troops, procure more supplies, develop a plan of action against the Honganji, and look after chores that demanded his attention. Document 562 provides an example of how Nobunaga used this respite for in it he instructed his administrators of Owari province to repair and rebuild the
bridges and roads throughout the province. 50

A further reason for Oda's willingness to make peace at that time was that it afforded him the chance to establish relationships with daimyo into whose areas his influence was beginning to spread. For example, in Document 573 there is evidence of Nobunaga's communication with the Chōsokabe, daimyo of Tosa province, who wanted Nobunaga to approve their efforts to take control of the entire island of Shikoku. 51

Furthermore, the peace pact allowed Nobunaga to shuffle his troops around with considerable impunity as he initiated campaigns in areas not yet under his control. For example, in Document 563 Oda told Nagaoka Fujitaka of his planned campaigns in Tamba and Tango provinces, over which Akechi Mitsuhide was placed in command, and in Harima province under the command of Araki Murashige. 52 The peace with the Honganji enabled Nobunaga to send his troops southwest beyond the Osaka area without fighting. Tactically this was a great advantage to Nobunaga because when the hostilities began anew in May of 1576 Nobunaga's forces had the Honganji fenced in: to the north was Akechi Mitsuhide and his army, to the west was Murashige, and to the east was Nobunaga. The Honganji could look only south for assistance, and to the south was the Inland Sea (Seto Naikai).

Finally, as shall be discussed in detail in the following chapter, the Nobunaga-Honganji peace gave Nobunaga time to implement his new land policy.

1576

During the early months of 1576 Nobunaga and the Honganji were still at peace. Ashikaga Yoshiaki, as always, was still searching for someone to
fight for his cause. Since there was no hope of finding such a person in central Honshū, Yoshiaki moved to Bingo province where he could be close to Mōri Terumoto of Aki whose assistance he requested. Over the preceding years, from 1568, Nobunaga enjoyed cautious but peaceful relations with the Mōri even though they had close ties with the Honganji and were, at least nominally, part of the anti-Nobunaga league. This was because the Mōri were too far removed from the Kinai to have had any involvement in the struggles in that area in the late 1560's and early 1570's. In 1576, however, Mōri Terumoto became an active member of the anti-Nobunaga league. He did so in response to Yoshiaki's urgings and, more importantly, because by that time Nobunaga's troops had advanced west beyond Ōsaka and were moving in the direction of Aki province.

The fact that Nobunaga's armies under Murashige were positioned west of the Honganji, between Ōsaka and Aki province, made communication between the Mōri and the Honganji most awkward. Any assistance that the Mōri were to send to Ōsaka would have to go by sea because the land routes were tightly sealed.

By the end of April the fragile peace between Oda and the Honganji was broken; Nobunaga's armies were on the march in the west, Mōri Terumoto had committed himself to assist the Honganji and sponsor Yoshiaki's cause, and Kennyo sent out a call to the monto to rise up against Nobunaga once again. Kennyo's call was answered by the monto of Settsu and Echizen, who took up arms late in April, and thus there began the third and final round of the Ishiyama Honganji War.

In reopening hostilities Nobunaga ordered his generals to cut down all
grains that were growing in the general vicinity of the Honganji--this was a standard practise designed to deprive the besieged forces of food supplies--and to post notices near the entrance to the Honganji promising that the lives of those who quit the otera would be spared.53 Nobunaga stipulated, however, that this "absolution did not extend to bonzes and other such people who looked as if they might rise against me." (bōzu ike yō ni mo tachisōrō mono o ba, shamen subekarazu sōrō). How this was to be determined is not explained. In effect, Nobunaga would probably have put to death all able bodied men and spared only women, children, and elderly men.

In preparation for a massive siege of the Honganji, Nobunaga ordered his generals to construct forts in its vicinity to serve as rallying points for his troops as well as shelters from Honganji gunfire. In Document 638 Nobunaga instructed his officers to be on guard day and night against mon-to movements, and to be prepared to attack any Honganji forces that left the citadel by whatever exit.54 He also warned his officers against reckless and pointless skirmishes in which valuable warriors were liable to be injured or killed by Honganji gunfire. Nobunaga made a special effort to assure that the Honganji would not receive any outside support. For example, in Document 636 he warned the Hirano estate--an important commercial port adjacent to the Honganji, and one of Nobunaga's personally owned holdings (chokkatsuchi)--against sending aid to the Honganji, and he threatened severe penalties against any families that dared disobey his orders.55 It is doubtful that Hirano would have actually supplied the Honganji with its own goods, but it might have been willing to serve as the port of debarkation for troops and supplies arriving by sea from the Mōri.
Early in June Nobunaga's general Harada Naomasa led 10,000 troops, several thousand of them armed with firearms, in an assault on the Honganji, but they were repulsed and Harada was killed. In retaliation Nobunaga personally led a vicious attack to the very gates of the Honganji in which some three thousand monto heads were taken. In Settsu province, meanwhile, Ikko forces were on the move—they attacked and burned the Tendai otera Shitennoji and several other positions held by Nobunaga's men—and Oda dispatched Akechi Mitsuhide to Settsu to suppress them.

Also in June, unfortunately for Nobunaga, Uesugi Kenshin made peace with Kennyo through the efforts of the indefatigable Yoshiaki who also succeeded in bringing about a peace among Uesugi Kenshin, Takeda Katsuyori, and Hojo Ujimasa. This new development was threatening to Nobunaga because his forces were in danger of being squeezed between those of the Uesugi to the northeast and the Mori to the west, who began to pursue a pincer movement against him. In order to relieve the pressure being applied to him from the northeast Nobunaga immediately sought an alliance with the Date of Dewa province, which was situated to the northeast of Uesugi's home province of Echigo, and requested them to make war on the Uesugi from the rear while Shibata tried to hold the line in Echizen.

To add to Nobunaga's difficulties, it was at that time that the Mori began to provision the Honganji by sending troops and supplies by ship up the Inland Sea from Aki to Osaka. In order to prevent the successful delivery of those men and supplies Nobunaga appealed to Adaka Nobuyasu of Awaji for assistance, and told him that it would be an outstanding service to Oda should he be able to drive off Mori Terumoto's fleet of ships. In July approximately one hundred ships, the vanguard of Mori's navy, arrived off
Awaji, and early in August there was a decisive naval battle near the mouth of the Kizu River—a branch of the Yodo River that empties into Osaka Bay at a point just north of where the Honganji stood—between the roughly three hundred ships assembled by Nobunaga's allies, especially by Adaka Nobuyasu, and the seven to eight hundred ships of Mōri's navy. It was really no contest: the Mōri ships outnumbered Nobunaga's by better than two to one, their ships were larger, and the crews were seasoned mariners. Nobunaga's fleet was destroyed by fire and Mōri's men and supplies got through to Kennyo. With this development, Nobunaga's siege of the Honganji was temporarily stifled.

Immediately after the defeat of his hastily assembled navy Nobunaga commissioned the city of Ōminato in Ise province to construct a new navy for him under the direction of Takigawa Kazumasu and Nobunaga's "Admiral" Kuki Yoshitaka.

The year 1576 ended with Nobunaga making preparations to renew the assault on the Honganji.

1577

In 1577 the most important members of the anti-Nobunaga league were the Honganji, Ashikaga Yoshiaki, Mōri Terumoto, and Uesugi Kenshin.

In March Hatakeyama Sadamasu of Kōwachō was encouraged by Kennyo to initiate a large uprising in his home area with the cooperation of the montō from the Saiga area of Kii. Hatakeyama consented and attempted to elicit the support of the Negoro sōhei who had fought on the side of the Hatakeyama family in the past. This time, however, the Negoro leaders decided to offer their support to Nobunaga and they sent envoys to him in Kyōto.
with that offer. Nobunaga accepted their support and commanded them to send their sohei into Kawachi province. Oda then dispatched Akechi Mitsuhide and Takigawa Kazumasu to crush the Saiga monto.

By this date Nobunaga's power was so great in central Honshū that local pockets of resistance stood little chance against him. By early April the Saiga uprising was suppressed, and on April 3 Oda sent a letter to the seven leaders of the Saiga monto in which he acknowledged a pledge of loyalty that they had apparently sent to him, and he promised to forgive them. It is remarkable that Oda was willing to spare the leaders of an Ikko uprising, and indeed Okuno Takahiro says that that was not exactly the case because there were other montō leaders who had gone into hiding and whom Nobunaga ordered to be sought out and killed. It is possible that Nobunaga was willing at that point to allow the Saiga montō to retain some degree of power in order that they might act as a deterrent against their neighbours to the east, the sohei of Kōya and Negoro.

Meanwhile, Uesugi Kenshin was working at top speed to descend on Kyōto. Thanks to his new-found friendship with Kennyo, Uesugi was on good terms with the montō of Kaga, Echizen, and Noto provinces, and thus his forces were able to advance on Kyōto through those provinces without any danger of being attacked by them. In an effort to block the Uesugi advance Oda appealed to some families of local gentry in Kaga to fight on his behalf. In Document 711, for example, he told Shibayama Chōjirō, the head of a powerful Kaga family, that in reward for loyalty Oda would guarantee his present land holdings, and that rewards would be showered upon him in gratitude for meritorious military service. This was the standard offer that Oda made when he sought the assistance of non-aligned parties.
In late July Oda commanded Shibata Katsuie, assisted by Toyotomi Hideyoshi, to advance into Kaga to stop the Uesugi drive towards Kyōto, and he continued his efforts to have Date Terumune assist him by attacking the Uesugi from behind. All was not well with Oda's forces in Kaga, however. The mutual hostility between Katsuie and Hideyoshi caused quarrels and dissension with the result that Hideyoshi suddenly, and rashly, left his assignment in Kaga without first receiving orders from Nobunaga.

Nobunaga had little time to concern himself with Hideyoshi's desertion of his post, however, because new troubles appeared in September. First, the Saiga monto rose in arms once again and Oda was forced to march against them. In Document 732 he told Tsutsui Junkei to consult with Sakuma Nobumori about the Saiga campaign, and commanded him to proceed with caution against the monto. Second, on September 28 Matsunaga Hisahide and his son Hisamichi suddenly broke off their campaign against the Honganji, withdrew to Yamato province over which Hisahide had been appointed by Nobunaga in 1568, and revolted against him. Nobunaga was shocked and angered by the Matsunagas' treachery: in Document 736 he called their behavior outrageous (gengo-dōdan), a term Oda reserved for only the most infuriating events, and he commanded a certain Okasuho no Kami, a vassal of Hisahide, to confiscate his master's holdings. Oda added the warning that anyone who aided the Matsunaga would be considered equally guilty with them, and he even threatened to punish any farmers who paid taxes to them. Oda sent Akechi Mitsuhide, Nagaoka Fujitaka, Tsutsui Junkei, and Toyotomi Hideyoshi against the Matsunaga who were completely routed in a ten day battle. Hisahide's two young sons were captured and executed at Kyōto's Rokujōgawara on November 14.
In addition to these difficulties, the situation was not going well for Nobunaga in the northeast. In October the Uesugi forces pushed into Kaga where they defeated Oda's troops under the command of Shibata Katsuie, and Kenshin pressed his advance on Kyōto. In the west, however, Oda's armies were doing well. Akechi Mitsuhide was fighting successfully in Tamba province, and Toyotomi Hideyoshi, who left for Harima province in November as Oda's field marshal in charge of the campaign in the Chūgoku area, succeeded in gaining control of a large section of Harima. Thus the year ended with the situation well in hand in the west, but quite out of hand in the northeast.

1578

In the early months of 1578 Nobunaga's forces continued their campaigns in the west and attempted to stop the Uesugi advance from the northeast. Fortune smiled on Nobunaga on April 19 when Uesugi Kenshin suddenly became sick and died at the age of forty-eight. Oda was spared the necessity of having to do battle with the formidable Uesugi because succession disputes following Kenshin's death halted their drive towards Kyōto.

In the meantime, however, the situation took a turn for the worse in Hideyoshi's campaign against the Mōri and their allies the Ukita of Bitchū province. The Bessho of Harima, who had been allied with Hideyoshi, betrayed him and allied with the Mōri, thereby tipping the scales in favor of the Mōri forces. Oda immediately sent a large army under the command of Araki Murashige to Hideyoshi's aid in July.

It will be recalled that following the defeat of his navy by the Mōri in August of 1576, Oda commissioned the construction of a new one at Ōminato.
in Ise province. The new navy was completed by July of 1578, and it was new not only in that it was freshly constructed but in that a new type of warship was produced. According to Okuno Takahiro, Nobunaga’s new navy consisted of seven metal ships—six of them were of the same size (21.6 meters long by 12.6 meters wide) and there was a slightly larger one that was to serve as flagship—that were fitted out with heavy cannon. It is not to be imagined that those ships were constructed entirely of metal—rather, they were wooden ships overlaid with metal plates in the manner of the famous “Ironclad” design of the American Civil War. The combination of metal defensive plates and heavy cannons made Oda’s ships all but indestructible in the sixteenth century. The construction of the new navy is a tribute both to Nobunaga’s determination—it required a full two years and untold expense to build the ships—and his inventiveness, and the very decision to construct metal men-of-war reflects Nobunaga’s genius.

In July Nobunaga’s new navy sailed from Ise to the Saiga coast, an area on the coast of Kii province just south of Osaka, where it was met by a large fleet of ships that belonged to the montō of Saiga and Awaji. The montō’s smaller wooden ships attempted to surround Nobunaga’s fleet in the narrow channel between Awaji and the Kii mainland, but one barrage from the large cannons on Oda’s ships could destroy scores of enemy craft at once. Nobunaga’s navy devastated the montō fleet, and on August 19 it sailed into Osaka Bay where it set up a blockade against any further traffic between the Mori and the Honganji.

In November, the Uesugi—under Uesugi Kagekatsu, Kenshin’s nephew and successor as head of the Uesugi family—incited disturbances in Etchu province, so Nobunaga sent his vassal Saitō Shingorō to suppress them. In Doc-
Nobunaga congratulated Saitō for his unparalleled service in killing over 3000 of the enemy.

Once again, however, one of Nobunaga's powerful vassals betrayed him. On November 16 Araki Murashige, lord of Settsu province, deserted Oda and joined the anti-Nobunaga league. This was indeed an unfortunate incident. It is not known exactly why Araki left Nobunaga, but it appears that Nobunaga's spies reported to him that there was some kind of impropriety going on in the fortresses manned by Araki's troops in the vicinity of the Honkanji. Some of the vassals of Nakagawa Kiyohide, a vassal general of Araki and the person in command of his front line troops in the seige of the Honkanji, were accused of secretly selling rice under cover of night to the people blockaded in the Honkanji citadel. Nobunaga commissioned several people to verify the accusations, and in the meantime, according to one version of that incident, he ordered Araki to hand over his mother as a hostage. Araki refused to do so. According to another version, when Nobunaga received his spies' report he ordered Araki to come to Azuchi to answer charges of conspiring with the enemy, but some of Araki's vassals dissuaded him from making that trip by arguing that Nobunaga would kill anyone whom he suspected of treachery no matter how long and faithfully that person might have served him. Therefore Araki threw in his lot with the anti-Nobunaga league by sending hostages to the Mōri and pledges of loyalty to Mōri Terumoto and the Honkanji. He then barricaded himself in Arioka fortress in Settsu and prepared for Nobunaga's attack.

In order to gain the time in which to rid himself of that new threat, Oda appealed to the kuge Tachiiri Munetsugu to intervene on his behalf and request the Emperor to initiate a peace pact between himself and Kennyo.
Ogimachi complied with Nobunaga's request and peace negotiations between Oda and Kennyo began early in December. Kennyo was willing to negotiate a peace with Oda under one condition: namely, Oda had to include Mōri Terumoto in the peace and enter into negotiations with him also. It appears that Kennyo felt that the Honganji would not be secure unless he could arrange a type of stalemate between Oda in the Kinai and Mōri in the Chūgoku with the Honganji sitting as a buffer between them. Oda accepted Kennyo's condition and arranged for Imperial envoys to depart for Aki on December 24 with notice of the peace.

Once again, however, fate smiled in Nobunaga's direction. On December 22, two days before the Imperial envoys were scheduled to depart for Aki, Araki's trusted general and master of Ibaraki castle in Settsu, Nakagawa Kiyohide, deserted Araki and came over to Nobunaga's camp. With the situation changed in his favor, Nobunaga immediately cancelled the departure of the Imperial envoys and the peace negotiations thereby ceased. Nobunaga then sent Nagaoka Fujitaka and Akechi Mitsuhide against the Araki, and he commanded the slaughter of some twenty people—Araki's daughters and other relatives—whom he was holding as hostages. With the Araki threat muted, Oda renewed his campaign against the Honganji citadel and committed 60,000 troops to that siege.

On December 4 Nobunaga scored a most important victory. On that day a huge fleet of over six hundred ships that had sailed from Aki to break through Nobunaga's naval blockade of the Honganji reached Ōsaka Bay. In the ensuing battle Nobunaga's "Ironclads" wreaked havoc on the Mōri fleet and utterly destroyed it. The defeat of Mōri's navy insured the final and unbreakable isolation of the Honganji. It was completely cut off from all
possible sources of supply, and the troops that the Mōri had stationed in
the vicinity of the Honganji were stranded far from their home province.
The Honganji's fate was in Nobunaga's hands.

1579
The anti-Nobunaga league members in the opening months of 1579 were the
Honganji, Ashikaga Yoshiaki, Mōri Terumoto, the Bessho of Harima, and the
newly joined Araki Murashige.

By this date Nobunaga had suppressed all but a few pockets of resistance
in the Kinai and central Honshū. Although Kennyo called for Ikki ikki in
late 1578 and early 1579, and was answered by the monto of the Saiga area
of Kii and the Yoshino area of Yamato, those outbursts were not of such a
scale as to cause Oda great concern.

Through September Akechi Mitsuhide led the seige of Arioka castle in which
the Araki forces were blockaded. Akechi made overtures to Araki, promising
to spare his life if he would surrender, but Araki wisely paid no heed to
those offers, and when his fortress collapsed in late September he managed
to escape. Eventually Araki made his way safely to Aki where he spent the
rest of his life in retirement as a guest of the Mōri. Robbed of his re-
venge against Araki, Nobunaga commanded that the retinue of over five hun-
dred servants, courtesans, and minor retainers whom Araki left behind in
Arioka be burned to death.

Throughout 1579 Nobunaga's armies in the west enjoyed success. By October
Akechi Mitsuhide's troops had taken control of Tamba and Tango provinces,
and Toyotomi Hideyoshi was winning in Harima against the Mōri. In the
northeast Shibata Katsuie maintained control of the provinces of Kaga and
Echizen, and put down a new outburst by the Kaga monto late in the year. Oda's forces continued the siege of the Honganji, and his navy assured that no supplies could get through to it by sea. The Ishiyama Honganji War was almost over.

1580

In early February the Bessho of Harima were defeated and Hideyoshi's army pushed on towards Aki. The Honganji was bereft of all its allies but Ashikaga Yoshiaki, who at that point could contribute nothing to the anti-Nobunaga league, and Mōri Terumoto, and the latter was fighting for his life.

Suddenly, in March, Nobunaga requested the court to reopen the peace negotiations that had been abruptly terminated in late December of 1578 when Nakagawa Kiyohide deserted Araki Murashige and joined Oda. The court, as ever, accepted Nobunaga's request, and sent three Imperial envoys to Kenkyo with Ōgimachi's injunction that he enter into peace negotiations with Nobunaga. Matsui Yukan and Sakuma Nobumori accompanied the Imperial envoys as Nobunaga's "observers" (metsuke).

It would have been most unwise for Kenkyo to turn his back on the offer of peace because his position was quite hopeless. Nevertheless, Kenkyo attempted to negotiate with Nobunaga in an effort to gain permission to remain in the Honganji following the establishment of peace, but it was one of the conditions of Nobunaga's peace offer that Kenkyo and the monto quit Osaka. Nobunaga would not concede that point so Kenkyo acquiesced and signed the peace pact on April 1, 1580. To formalize the agreement, Nobunaga and Kenkyo each sent to the other a pledge in which both promises and demands were made. Document 852 is Nobunaga's pledge to Kenkyo—it is dated
April 1, 1580, and contains seven articles which state as follows:

I pardon all the montō in the Honganji citadel.
Retainers of Lord Sakihisa (one of the Imperial envoys) will immediately replace my troops at the Tennōji's Kitajō (this was an auxiliary fortress constructed by Nobunaga's men close to the Honganji as a siege base), and at the time of Kennyo's withdrawal from Ōsaka I shall also retreat from Ōshizuka (another attack base near the Honganji) and the Imperial envoys' party will go there to replace my troops.

I shall send hostages as a token of my good faith.
Traffic to and from Ōsaka will be permitted as in the past.
Following your withdrawal from Ōsaka, if all goes as agreed upon, I shall return to you two counties (Enuma and Nōbi counties) in Kaga province.
The withdrawal from Ōsaka is to be carried out by the Bon of July.
Hanakuma and Amazaki (two fortresses near the Honganji that were manned by Mori Terumoto's forces) are to be ceded at the time of your withdrawal from Ōsaka.

This document had no addressee, no opening statement other than the single word "notice" (oboe), and no closing statement. The signature "Nobunaga" was written in Nobunaga's blood.

In Document 853, issued on the same day as his pledge to Kennyo, Nobunaga pledged to the Imperial envoys Niwata Shigeyasu and Kanjuji Harutoyo that he pardoned the Honganji in accordance with the wishes of the Emperor (sic), and that he would abide by the articles of peace if the Honganji did likewise. This document closed with a recitation of the names of those kami and Buddhas who were invoked as witnesses to Nobunaga's good will.

Document 853 Supplement 2 is the Honganji's declaration of the articles of
The document was sent not to Nobunaga but to the envoys Niwata and Kanjuji, and was signed, in blood, not by Kennyo personally but by three members of the Shimozuma family. It contains the following five articles:

In accordance with the pardon recently granted in keeping with the Imperial decree, I hereby submit these articles of peace and assert that I intend no duplicity or underhanded actions in this regard whatsoever. I promise to keep the stipulated hostages (i.e., from Nobunaga) in Ōsaka and not to send them to the Chūgoku (i.e., to the Mōri), to Saiga, or anywhere else. When I quit Ōsaka, and after I arrive in a safe place, I shall return the hostages.

I pledge that the Saiga monto will abide by the commands of the Abbot (i.e., Kennyo). Hostages sent to Nobunaga by the Honganji and the Saiga monto are not to be sent to the Chūgoku or any other place.

I shall withdraw from the Honganji by the agreed upon date, the Bon of July.

At the time of my withdrawal from Ōsaka, the fortresses of Hanakuma and Amazaki, and all others, will also be handed over.

This document contained a short opening notice: "Pledge notice: Dear Sirs:" (kishōmon oboegaki: keihaku:) that addressed the Imperial envoys, and a short closing statement in which Kennyo promised to honor the five articles of his pledge.

It is evident from the articles of those two pledges that the peace conditions weighed heavily in Oda's favor. Oda would give up the fortresses at the Tennōji and Ōshizuka, and return two counties in Kaga province to Honganji control, but Kennyo would lose the Honganji citadel and its ad-
jacent fortresses. Kennyo had no real choice but to accept Nobunaga's peace proposal even though it demanded his abandonment of the Honganji for over the years from 1570 the Honganji's monto and secular supporters had been pared away from it one by one, and it was isolated and surrounded when Nobunaga intervened with his peace proposal. Undoubtedly Kennyo could have held out at Osaka for a considerable length of time, possibly for a few years, but there was no possibility of his ultimate victory over Oda. Even should Nobunaga's forces never have successfully breached the Honganji citadel, eventually supplies would have run out and there was no hope of replenishment. Over the months the situation in the Honganji would have become unbearable—starvation and thirst would have caused untold suffering, and collapse would have been inevitable. Therefore Kennyo settled for the peace pact rather than endure the misery that he most likely foresaw.

Nobunaga exercised extreme caution in his dealings with the Honganji at this point. In Document 854 he told his observer Matsui Yukan that if Kennyo failed to abide by even one of the clauses of the peace pact, then the whole arrangement was voided. Oda also made an effort through the envoy Sakihisa to put Kennyo's mind at ease. In Document 855 he thanked Sakihisa for the major part he played in the peace negotiations, and said that he realized that it was natural for Kennyo to be anxious about the peace pact and its implementation. Oda insisted that he personally had no treachery in mind, all the more so because of the mediating role played by Sakihisa and the Emperor, and he requested Sakihisa to pass those assurances on to the Honganji in order to dispel Kennyo's fears. Oda further encouraged Kennyo by sending him a document in which he reiterated
his promise to return Kaga to the monto. 82

In Documents 862 and 863 Nobunaga informed Toyotomi Hideyoshi and Shibata Katsuie of the peace and commanded them to observe the ceasefire in Harima and Kaga respectively. Shibata was ordered to continue to garrison fortresses in Kaga, i.e., he was not to return to Echizen. 83

In Document 864 Nobunaga once again assured Kennyo that he would honor his promise to return Kaga. 84 Oda was evidently making a concerted effort to convince the Honganji that he would keep his pledge to return the two counties in Kaga province.

However, Kennyo had unforeseen troubles on his hands in the Honganji. Many of the Saiga monto were small landholders from Kii province who had been able, over the years, to enjoy considerable power and independence by standing under the Honganji umbrella, and the fall of the Honganji meant the end of their valued autonomy. Therefore they had come to the Honganji to join in a last ditch stand against Nobunaga. Kennyo's accession to Nobunaga's peace proposal was a blow to those monto, and they were not willing to quietly abide by his decision. Nobunaga appears to have had a premonition that the Saiga monto might be troublesome for in the third article of Kennyo's peace pledge, as we have seen, it stated that the Saiga monto would heed the commands of the Honganji abbot. It seems that Oda had Kennyo accept the responsibility of seeing to it that those monto would accept the peace. In Document 864 Supplement 1 Kennyo told the Imperial envoys that discord at the Honganji might necessitate an extension of the time allotted to quit Osaka, but he assured them that he had not changed his mind about the peace pact and he asked them to convey that message to
Nobunaga through Sakihisa. 85 Kennyo also told the envoys that preparations for leaving Osaka were gradually being carried out, but this was less than the truth because the situation was, in fact, rapidly getting out of hand. Kennyo could no longer control the tension between the pro- and anti-withdrawal factions in the Honganji.

While on the surface the peace pact maintained a veneer of credibility and certainty, below the surface there were dangerous tensions. While Kennyo struggled to control internal dissent among the monto groups gathered in the Honganji, Oda made an effort to impose a firm control over Kaga province. Shibata Katsuie maintained garrisons there and his troops continued to engage in some campaigns against the monto groups there who, like the Saiga monto, had minds of their own and did not need Honganji promptings to take up arms. In Document 865 Nobunaga expressed his happiness over the outstanding aid given to Shibata by Chō Tsuratatsu, a Noto bushi and vassal of Nobunaga since 1579, in pacifying Kaga and destroying monto fortifications. Evidently the ceasefire that Nobunaga instructed Shibata to observe in Kaga was not kept. 86

Meanwhile Nobunaga continued his soothing approach to Kennyo. In Document 866 he reiterated his guarantee of free traffic to and from Osaka, and threatened anyone who failed to abide by this ruling with punishment. 87 However, those repetitions of Nobunaga's good intentions were no longer meant so much for Kennyo but for his eldest son Kyōno Koju 88 for Kyōno had become the leader of the anti-peace faction in the Honganji, and the Saiga, Awaji, and other monto groups assembled there no longer took their direction from Kennyo. Kyōno decided to throw out his father's peace pact with Nobunaga and make a stand at Osaka. It was probably this turn of
events that inspired the Kaga monto to the renewed uprisings that required Shibata's attention.

In keeping with his pledge Kennyo left Osaka on May 22, almost two months ahead of the deadline, and went to Saginomori in Kii province where he built a small dojo called the Saginomori Betsu-in and where he came to be called the "Saginomori Bonze" (Saginomori gobō). At the same time, the Mōri forces that were defending the fortresses of Hanakumo and Amasaki in Settsu province vacated their positions and left for Aki. Thus Kennyo kept his part of the bargain as well as he could. He could not, however, control Kyōnyo or the Saiga monto as demanded in the articles of peace.

By mid May Kyōnyo Kōju, then twenty-two years of age, came to be looked upon as the new chief abbot of the Honganji by those monto who refused to leave Osaka with Kennyo. In Document 867 Supplement 1, written by Kennyo to the monto of Noto province on May 28, Kennyo referred to his son as the "New Abbot" (shin monshu), and therefore Kyōnyo must have claimed that title by that date. In that document Kennyo explained his withdrawal from the Honganji and the reasons for it, and he condemned the steps taken by his son and the "troublemakers" (itazuramono) who agreed with Kyōnyo's decision to reject the peace. Kennyo told the Noto monto that Kyōnyo had lied: although it was true that he, Kennyo, had quit Osaka, it was not true that he no longer cared about the buppō, and it was also not true that Oda could not be trusted. Kennyo therefore condemned Kyōnyo's actions as unpardonable and insisted that it was he Kennyo who was still chief abbot for "it is I who protect the statue of our founder." (kaizen eizō o mamori-mosu...). Kennyo beseeched the monto to be calm, to have no doubts but to trust him, and to recite the nembutsu.
The father and son, Kennyo and Kyōnyo, split was a most tragic one. Kennyo had to convince the monto that his decision to leave Osaka was the wisest one and that it was not a sign that he had abandoned Shinshū and no longer cared about the buppo. He tried to convince the monto that it was not a mark of insanity to trust Nobunaga, and he had to repudiate Kyōnyo and call him a liar so the monto would keep their confidence in him, Kennyo, and thus avoid the disaster that he felt would surely be visited upon them should Kyōnyo and his supporters have their way. Kyōnyo, on the other hand, was not simply being stubborn. He felt that Nobunaga was thoroughly untrustworthy, and in Document 867 Supplement 2 he said so explicitly to the monto of Kai province when he referred to Nobunaga as being "out and out two faced" (hyōri ganzen). In that same document Kyōnyo appealed to "all those who call themselves disciples of the saint" (seijin no montei to gō suru haisha), i.e., disciples of Shinran, to exert themselves to bring about a revival of the buppo and thereby pay their debt of gratitude to Shinran. Like Kennyo, Kyōnyo too urged the monto to diligence in reciting the nembutsu. Kyōnyo's letter to the Kai monto was accompanied by ōhē written by Shimozuma Rairyū, a member of the leading Shinshū family which had come to look upon Kyōnyo as the new chief abbot. Shimozuma repeated Kyōnyo's urgings and lamented that Kennyo had decided to turn over the "seat of our founder" (kaizansama no gozasho) to the "enemy of the Law" (hoteki), i.e., Nobunaga. Besides fearing that Nobunaga would not be good to his word, Kyōnyo probably thought that it would be a serious mistake to enter into a peace pact with Nobunaga without having some allies, like the Mōri, as party to the pact. Otherwise Nobunaga could make a separate arrangement with the Mōri
and the Honganji would have no strong ally with whom to oppose Nobunaga should he decide to betray his promises. It will be recalled that in 1578 Kennyo insisted that Nobunaga include the Mōri in any peace negotiations, and it appears that in 1580 Kyōnyo would have consented to a peace arrangement along the lines of the 1578 model. Such a model was essentially repugnant to Nobunaga, however, and in 1580 he did not have to settle for the type of conditions that were part of the 1578 peace pact because in 1580 the Honganji was in a much weaker bargaining position than it had been in two years earlier when Nobunaga was anxious to make peace in order to have time to deal with Araki Murashige.

In order to make a stand against Nobunaga, Kyōnyo appealed to the monto of Saiga, Awaji, and Etchū province to stand solidly behind him, and Nobunaga took steps to short circuit this new danger. In Document 870 Oda told the Saiga monto to exhibit loyalty to him, and not to send even one man to Osaka. Furthermore, they were ordered to recall from Osaka any monto who might have already gone there, and thenceforth the Saiga-Osaka highway was closed. This action ran counter to Oda's promise to Kennyo to allow free traffic to and from Ōsaka, but because Kyōnyo and his supporters did not recognize the peace pact, Oda was not bound to honor it. Nevertheless, Oda assured the Saiga monto—and this is significant—that he would treat them in the same way that he treated the members of all other Buddhist schools.

Kyōnyo was under pressure from two sides: his father, Kennyo, was urging him to accept the peace pact with Nobunaga, and the indefatigable Ashikaga Yoshiaki was encouraging him to take a stand against Nobunaga, and was attempting to get Mōri Terumoto to actively support Kyōnyo's cause. Kennyo finally washed his hands of his son and officially designated Junnyo Kō-
shō, Kyōnyo's younger brother, to be Kennyo's successor as twelfth chief abbot of the Honganji.

Nobunaga, meanwhile, was becoming impatient with those developments. In Document 873 he told Sakuma Nobumori and Matsui Yūkan that he was pleased with the commendable behavior of Kennyo but that he had serious misgivings about the situation with Kyōnyo. Oda closed this letter with the assertion that he would allow the Honganji to continue no longer and that there was, therefore, but one option left: namely, it was time for either Nobunaga or for Kyōnyo to die.95

In Kaga province Shibata Katsuie continued his campaigns against the monto, and to make sure that the Honganji would receive no support from that quarter Oda commanded Niwa Nagahide to close all Kaga ports lest the monto attempt to send supplies to Ōsaka by sea.96 In order to force Kyōnyo to concede, Oda asserted pressure on him by amassing troops around the Honganji and taking a few more fortresses in its vicinity that were still held by the monto.

Finally, on August 23, Kyōnyo abandoned his position and bowed to Nobunaga. Four days later Nobunaga sent Kyōnyo a five article document in which he made the following demands and promises:97

You are to send hostages as a precautionary measure.
Traffic between the Honganji and its branch otera is to be permitted as in the past.
Following your departure from Ōsaka, Kaga will be returned to you if all goes as agreed.
Townsmen are to be recognized (i.e., people who lived in and around the
Honganji would not have their properties confiscated.)
You will depart Osaka by September 18.
This document has no opening or closing statement.

In Document 878, issued on the same day and addressed to the "New Abbot" (shin monshū), Oda assured Kyōnyo that he would abide by all the articles of the foregoing document, and he invited down upon himself the wrath of various invoked kami and Buddhas should he fail to do so. 98

At that juncture Nobunaga was willing to take even fewer chances than usual. In Document 879 he ordered Tsutsui Junkei to assemble his troops around the Honganji in order to put pressure on Kyōnyo, 99 and in Document 880 he urged the Imperial envoy Sakihisa to implement Kyōnyo's withdrawal as quickly as possible lest Nobunaga's troops become dispirited during a long delay. 100 Oda also assured Sakihisa by all the kami and Buddhas that he intended to abide by his pledge. In Document 881 Supplement 1 Sakihisa assured Kyōnyo that he would be treated by Nobunaga in the same way that he treated the "True Pure Land School in Saiga" (Saiga no Jōdoshū), i.e., Kennyo and those who accompanied him to Saiga three months earlier, and Sakihisa gave Kyōnyo his personal word on that. 101 Sakihisa evidently took Nobunaga at his word. 102

In Document 881 Supplement 2, issued on September 3, Sakihisa relayed the following guarantee from Nobunaga to Kennyo: 103

I acknowledge you as chief abbot.
I shall return to you the holdings of your otera and branch otera, and shall guarantee them.
I guarantee your various holdings, and I will permit free traffic.
Conspicuous by its absence from this document is Nobunaga's promise to return Kaga province to the monto, a promise that was contained in Oda's letter of August 27 which was written but one week earlier than this one. It appears that in the intervening week Nobunaga changed his mind about returning Kaga to monto control.

On the morning of September 10, almost four months after Kennyo left Osaka, Kyōnyo opened the gates of the Honganji to a party of Imperial envoys and Nobunaga's representatives, and boarded one of several hundred ships that had come from Saiga and Awaji to escort him to Kii province. At the same time, the monto groups that had been manning the auxiliary fortresses around the Honganji abandoned their positions and left. Nobunaga immediately made preparations for a sightseeing tour of his new trophy but that triumphant visit was foiled because while Kyōnyo was leaving the Honganji some of his followers ran around the otera precincts with pine torches and set all the buildings afire. A huge cloud of black smoke hung over the mountain as the conflagration raged for three days and nights, reducing the Honganji citadel to ashes. Kyōnyo made sure that Nobunaga, enemy of the Law, would never set foot inside the Shinshū holy of holies.

On the very day on which Kyōnyo left Osaka, Nobunaga sent a thank you letter to Kennyo for the congratulatory message and gifts that Kennyo had sent to him. What an ironic turn of events! The man who had opposed Oda for over ten years, the chief abbot of the Honganji, sent gifts and congratulations to him as the Honganji collapsed. Whatever Kennyo's feelings at that moment might have been, there were good reasons for feelings of relief. Kennyo's son and his followers were spared and safely on their way to Kii province. The peace pact which had been broken was mended, and no
one had to pay for the break with his life. Shinshū was quite safe—there was no reason to suspect that Oda would initiate some kind of purge of the monto following the withdrawal from Ōsaka. Should a battle have broken out between Nobunaga and Kyōnyo, however, there was reason to fear that Nobunaga would not have been mindful of the distinction between Kyōnyo and his followers on the one hand and Kennyo and those loyal to him on the other. As far as the Honganji itself was concerned, Kennyo may have been inwardly rejoicing over its having been spared a devastating siège. Perhaps too he felt a certain sense of satisfaction in seeing Kyōnyo, who opposed his father and rashly took over first place in the Honganji branch of Shinshū, humbled.

Over the months following Kyōnyo's departure from Ōsaka, Nobunaga and Kennyo continued to reassure each other: on August 12, September 24, and November 30, Oda sent thank-you letters to Kennyo for his various gifts, and on the last occasion he told Kennyo that there was no reason to fear because he did not intend any treachery against him. Oda also told Kennyo to pass those assurances on to the Saiga monto. In Document 901 Supplement 1 Matsui Yūkan reaffirmed the three article pledge that Sakihisa sent to the Honganji three months earlier. Finally, in Document 908 Oda acknowledged yet another gift from Kennyo. This was Oda's last document of that year.

Nobunaga's ten year campaign against the Honganji was over. The result of that long struggle was the eradication of the power of the Honganji branch of True Pure Land Buddhism. Although there were still minor outbursts by the monto—for example, in April of 1581 an Ikki broke out in the provinces of Kaga and Etchū while Shibata Katsuie was paying a visit to
Nobunaga in Kyōto—they presented no grave threat to the peace of the country. Nobunaga continued to be wary of the monto, as evidenced in Document 917 in which he warned them against causing disturbances in the Saginomori district of Saiga during their pilgrimages there, but his victory over them was complete. Nobunaga was not to enjoy his victory for long, however, because he died less than two years later.
Part II

Chapter 3

Section 2

Oda Nobunaga and Mount Hiei
Oda Nobunaga's most notorious single act was the vicious snuffing out of the "Indestructible Light of the Law" (fumetsu no hōtō) as Mt. Hiei had considered itself to be since the time of Saichō in the ninth century. Although the Enryakuji with its branch otera on Mt. Hiei was far less powerful than the Honganji with its montō kyōdan, and did not present a great obstacle to the realization of Nobunaga's vision of a unified country, it did take part in the military conflicts of the latter half of the sixteenth century with the result that it too suffered a severe application of Nobunaga's first policy towards religious institutions.

Trouble between Nobunaga and the Enryakuji began in 1569 when Nobunaga seized some estates that belonged to the Enryakuji in Ōmi and Mino during his land surveys of those provinces. Nobunaga's action greatly contributed to the Enryakuji's decision to ally with the members of the newly forming anti-Nobunaga league.

In October of 1570, following Nobunaga's defeat of the Asai and Asakura forces that were encamped in the town of Sakamoto at the base of Mt. Hiei, the Asai and Asakura survivors sought and were granted refuge on Mt. Hiei. It was on that occasion that Nobunaga issued his warning to the Enryakuji bonzes that they could ally with him and be rewarded, remain neutral and go unharmed, or oppose him and be destroyed. No action was taken against Mt. Hiei at that time.

One year later, in September of 1571, after dealing the Asai another defeat in Ōmi province, Nobunaga commanded his 30,000 troops to march northwest and throw a cordon around the base of Mt. Hiei, while Oda himself set up headquarters at the Miidera.
When the Mt. Hiei bonzes realized the gravity of their situation they sent messengers to Nobunaga with three hundred pieces of gold in order to buy their way out of danger. Nobunaga refused their offering, denying that he had come with the purpose of amassing wealth, and announced that he had come to punish the Enryakuji for its grave offenses. The bonzes, terrified at the thought of what might follow and in an effort to seek shelter, abandoned the outer otera scattered about the sides of the mountain, and assembled in the great hall at the top. Many lay people from Sakamoto and Katata, towns adjacent to and closely associated with Mt. Hiei, also sought safety by climbing the mountain and joining the bonzes at the top.

On the morning of September 30 Nobunaga commanded his ring of troops to advance up the mountain and destroy everything in their path with the sword or the torch. Nobunaga is said to have begun this attack with the following words: "If I do not take them away now, this great trouble will be everlasting. Moreover, these priests violate their vows; they eat fish and stinking vegetables, keep concubines, and never unroll the sacred books. How can they be vigilant against evil, or maintain the right? Surround their dens and burn them, and suffer none within them to live!"  

Thus there began one of the most notorious events in Japanese history.

A description of Nobunaga's destruction of Mt. Hiei may be found in the diary of Yamashina Tokitsugu, a sixteenth century kuge:  

"On the twelfth day of the ninth month Oda Danjō no jō destroyed by fire everything from the mountain top to Sakamoto. Then, sparing neither the Hiyoshi Shrine, the Eastern and Western Pagodas, nor the branch otera, he spread fire everywhere, and thus it was that he killed everyone on the mountain.... The number of bonzes and laity killed, including both men and women, to-
talled three to four thousand. He also burned Katata. This destruction of the bunpo, how inexplicable, how inexplicable! Can there be any more such a thing as the obo?"

On October 1, the second day of the attack, Nobunaga ordered out archers with guns to hunt out and kill all who might have hidden in the groves and deep forests of the mountain, and he commanded that all the buildings that were still standing were to be pillaged and burned down. The slaughter and destruction continued for a week and then on October 8 Nobunaga pulled back his men and returned to Gifu.

For a long time thereafter, said Tsuji Zennosuke, Mt. Hiei was nothing more than a haunt of foxes and badgers. All its buildings were destroyed and its land holdings were confiscated and divided up among Akechi Mitsuhide, Sakuma Nobumori, and Shibata Katsuie. Thus in the space of but a few days the ancient and powerful Enryakuji was reduced to ashes.

The Enryakuji long enjoyed an aura of invulnerability because over the centuries it had usually been able to fight, buy, or pray its way out of difficulties. Unlike the Honganji, however, it stood not a chance against Nobunaga. The fact that Mt. Hiei was a most ancient and venerable center of Buddhist piety meant nothing to him. Once Nobunaga's troops surrounded the base of the mountain the bonzes were trapped—they could not flee from fortress to fortress like daimyo armies, and they could not expect help from groups like the Honganji monto because they had no organized body of lay followers. Mt. Hiei was an easy target, and Nobunaga dealt it a death blow.

Nobunaga's action against Mt. Hiei has evoked reactions ranging from mourn-
ful shock over the loss of such an ancient and venerable center of Bud­
dhism in Japan, to a somewhat smug "they asked for it" attitude, and mod­
ern scholars still confess that they do not completely understand why
Nobunaga chose to wreck such havoc on it. Why, we may ask, if Nobunaga
was willing to accept the peaceful submission of the Honganji in 1580
was he so destructive of Mt. Hiei?

It is commonly suggested that Nobunaga's attack on Mt. Hiei was motivated
by a bloodthirsty desire for revenge against the bonzes for their having
dared to disregard his warning of the preceding year by allowing his en­
emies to take refuge there. It is also possible, as it is sometimes sug­
gested, that Nobunaga struck the Enryakuji as violently as he did in order
to show off his power. The months preceding that attack were difficult and
relatively fruitless ones for Nobunaga—even after four months of campaign­
ing Shibata Katsuie and Ujiie Naomoto were unable to defeat the Nagashima
monto of Ise province—so he decided to seize whatever victory he could,
and because the Enryakuji was an immediately accessible target it was the
automatic choice.

The foregoing reasons for Oda's attack on Mt. Hiei appear to be based on
the assumption of a vengeful and cruel streak in his character, and do not
adequately take into consideration the exigencies of Nobunaga's situation
in 1571. At that time Nobunaga was surrounded by a league of forces far
more powerful than he. The Enryakuji, on the very doorstep of Kyōto, was
one link in the chain of forces that opposed Oda, and because it was the
weakest link it was the most logical place to strike. Besides, the Enryaku­
ji was located in that strip of land between the Honganji to the west and
the provinces of Echizen and Kaga to the east that Nobunaga was trying to
bring under his control in order to separate the Honganji from its montō groups in the Kaga-Echizen area. It was imperative that all parties opposed to Nobunaga be eliminated from that central stretch of territory. Moreover, Oda could afford to make peace with the Honganji in 1580 because he had the rest of central Honshū firmly under his control, but in 1571 he was in no position to allow a potentially dangerous opponent like Mt. Hiei to stand poised above Kyoto. Nobunaga had to eliminate the possibility that Enryakuji sōhei might at any moment descend on the capitol and deprive Nobunaga of his newly acquired position in the Kinai. Besides, it is highly likely that Ashikaga Yoshiaki was involved in some kind of scheme with Mt. Hiei because, as we have seen, in article 9 of Document 142, the first of three documents in which Nobunaga limited Yoshiaki’s powers, Nobunaga forbade Yoshiaki to have representatives of Mt. Hiei’s sōhei freely visit the shogunal palace.

Finally, one might surmise that Nobunaga wanted to make an example of Mt. Hiei. By his violent destruction of the most sacred of all Buddhist institutions Oda served notice on both allies and enemies, on bushi and bonzes alike, of the extent to which he was prepared to go in order to bring about his goal of unifying the tenka. Nothing was sacred, none would be spared who failed to cooperate with him.

While the loss of the great cultural treasure that was Mt. Hiei is most lamentable, there should be no surprise at Nobunaga’s action against it. Mt. Hiei was a prime example of what Nobunaga was against in terms of the power of religious institutions, for it sinned against all three of his policies: it maintained armed sōhei who had a long history of interference in secular affairs, it owned vast tracts of land in a number of provinces,
and it enjoyed a great deal of autonomy. It was a natural target for Nobunaga's attack.

Just over a century after the destruction of Mt. Hiei, Arai Hakuseki, the great Tokugawa scholar and man of letters, summed up the significance of Nobunaga's action as follows: "While it was a brutal thing to do, it cancelled out the atrocities committed by the Hiei bonzes over the years. Indeed, for the tenka it was a meritorious act."¹¹⁷

Perhaps the final irony in the Nobunaga-Mt. Hiei chapter is that from the ashes of Mt. Hiei arose the man who was to destroy Nobunaga. Following the destruction of Mt. Hiei Nobunaga awarded Akechi Mitsuhide the town of Sakamoto, where he was to have his central fortress, and a 100,000 koku domain that included the Hiei mountain.
Part II

Chapter 3

Section 3

The Azuchi shūron
One of the most interesting incidents in the context of Oda Nobunaga's relations with Buddhist institutions is the so-called "Azuchi Religious Debate" (Azuchi shūron) of 1579, on the occasion of which Nobunaga dealt a blow to the Hokkeshū monto.

Over the years until 1579 Nobunaga had no serious conflicts with the monto of the Nichiren school. When Nobunaga entered Kyōto in 1568, and asserted his authority over the commercial center of Sakai in the following year, the Nichirenshū monto of the Kinai area were under his control. Although Nobunaga had no major clashes with them until 1579, when they caused a potentially dangerous disturbance in the spring of that year he sternly suppressed them. The occasion of the Nobunaga-Hokkeshū clash was a religious debate between representatives of the Pure Land (Jōdo) and Lotus (Hokke) schools of Buddhism.

The Azuchi shūron was precipitated by the arrival in Azuchi—the newly built castle-fortress into which Nobunaga moved in March, 1576—in early June, 1579, of the Jōdo bonze Gyokunen Reiyo who came from Kōzuke province to preach Jōdo salvation. On one occasion when Reiyo was preaching in the streets of Azuchi, two Hokkeshū laymen named Takebe Shōchi and Ōwaki Den-suke delighted in heckling him. Reiyo turned to them and scornfully rebuffed them by saying that they were but novices with no understanding of religious matters. He told them that if they wanted to have a religious discussion they should bring forth the bonze who converted them, i.e., their Hokkeshū master, and he would speak with him. Accordingly, Takebe and Ōwaki quickly sent word to Kyōto where the Hokkeshū bonzes were delighted to accept Reiyo's challenge, and a large contingent of bonzes and monto set out from Kyōto and Sakai to engage Reiyo in a debate.
There is disagreement among Japanese historians as to Nobunaga's reaction on first hearing about the impending debate. Imai Rintarō says that Oda was afraid of the debate because of the possibility that it might induce a large scale uprising, and therefore he forbade it and appointed a number of his retainers as "overseers" (keigo) to see to it that the people who had gathered for the debate be dispersed and sent home. The Hokke monto were blind, however, to all but the thought of routing the Jōdo bonzes in a debate, so they disregarded Nobunaga's orders. At that point, says Imai, Nobunaga consented to the debate and plotted to have its outcome be according to his wishes. Suzuki Ryōichi, on the other hand, says that Nobunaga planned to take advantage of the debate as soon as he heard about it, and it was for that very reason that he appointed his vassals as "overseers" because to Nobunaga's mind the word keigo (watch, guard), which is used in the Shinchō Kōki to designate the role that Nobunaga's appointees were to play, actually meant "crush" or "suppress" (danatsu).

Since most daimyo simply prohibited religious debates, it is probable that Nobunaga's first reaction was to prohibit it, but once it became apparent to him that here was a perfect opportunity to deal a blow to the Hokke monto, he chose not to enforce his prohibition and took steps to assure that the debate would serve his purpose. Nobunaga did this by making sure that the debate would be judged in favor of the Jōdo side, and therefore he appointed judges who would do his bidding. Before the debate even got under way Nobunaga instructed the judges to decide against the Hokke side, and thus the Azuchi Religious Debate was not a debate at all. It was, says Suzuki Ryōichi, nothing but a "monkey play" (saru shibai), a farce.

On the morning of June 21 four representatives of each of the two schools
took their places opposite each other in the main hall of the Jōgon'in, a Jōdo otera built by Nobunaga in Azuchi. The bonze Nikkō of the Chōmyōji in Kyōto was to speak for the Hokke side, and the bonze Seiyo Jōan of the Saikōji, another Jōdo otera recently built by Nobunaga in Azuchi, for the Jōdo side. A great throng of onlookers, mostly Hokke monto from Kyōto and Sakai, packed the corridors and verandas adjacent to the main hall and, although it is nowhere stated, we may be sure that a large number of Nobunaga's men were at hand.

There are many accounts of the exchange that took place between Jōan and Nikkō, and the accounts vary greatly. What appears certain is that the debate broke down very quickly. After but a few exchanges between Jōan and Nikkō the judges declared Jōan the winner and presented him with the victor's fan. Immediately a commotion broke out among the spectators, and some of them grabbed the sutras from Nikkō's hands and tore them to shreds. The Hokke monto, fearing a massacre, quickly fled in all directions, and Takebe Shōchi managed to make an escape to Sakai.

When Nobunaga was informed that the decision had been rendered, he came down from his Azuchi palace to the Jōgon'in and meted out two forms of punishment to the Hokkeshū:

1. Thirteen bonzes were obliged to sign a three article pledge that read as follows:

   In the religious debate held recently at the Jōgon'in in Omi province between the Hokke and Jōdo schools, we acknowledge that the Hokke party was defeated. Accordingly, the Kyōto bonze Fuden and the salt merchant Densuke are to be punished. Hereafter we shall never again persecute other schools. We acknowledge that the honor of the Hokke school must be re-established, and that Hokke bonzes are to be arrested and jailed for a time.
This statement was signed by the Hokke bonzes on June 21, the day of the debate.

2. Three Hokke monto were sentenced to be executed. Nobunaga’s choice of the three victims is important for an understanding of his motives in allowing the debate in the first place. Takebe Shōchi and Ōwaki Densuke were executed, following the former’s capture in Sakai, for their role in causing the debate in the first place: they heckled Reiyo when he was preaching in Azuchi, and it was they who stirred up the Hokke monto in Kyōto. Thus they were executed not for "religious" reasons but because they were public nuisances, disturbers of the peace. The third person who was condemned to death was, surprisingly, not Nikkō or one of the other leading Hokke bonzes from Kyōto, but a certain Fuden from Sakai who was not even an official spokesman for the Hokke side in the debate.

The Shinchō Kōki describes Fuden as a bonze who had a reputation for knowing the contents of any and all of the Hokke sutras, who had just the previous fall come up from Kyūshū, and who until very recently had not been a bonze at all. When Nobunaga came down to the Jōgon'in following the debate, he turned to Fuden and made what appears to have been a strange accusation: he condemned Fuden for his preaching techniques by saying that Fuden would sometimes wear expensive silk garments with lovely red-blossomed plum-flower prints, and at other times cheap garments with faded prints, and he would tell the masses that he was, in fact, an Imperial Guard (konoe) who in accepting Buddhism deliberately chose to wear the ragged clothing. Fuden would then give a religious talk and lead people in song and prayer to the Buddha. By such deceitful means, said Nobunaga, Fuden enticed people to listen to him, renew their faith, and become de-
voted to him.

It appears, then, that Fuden was an itinerant preacher who wandered throughout the Kinai and as far west as Kyūshū preaching a return to Buddhist piety. He was probably neither a bonze nor a member of any specific Buddhist school until shortly before 1579, but he was a very effective proselytizer (who used, according to Nobunaga, devious techniques) who established, wherever he went, bodies of believers united in kyōdan-like groups. Through his personal charism, Fuden had assembled a large body of devotees and, for reasons unknown—Suzuki Ryōichi suggests that the Hokke bonzes paid him—he became a member of the Hokke school and brought his groups of followers into the fold of the Hokkemonto.

The power of a person like Fuden represented a threat to Nobunaga. Fuden could have been a dangerous rabble rouser; he had already proven his ability to move and organize the peasantry, and to the degree that the peasantry could be organized along kyōdan-like lines the greater was the danger of an explosive uprising on their part. Nobunaga eliminated such potentially dangerous groups whenever he could, and therefore because of the degree of success that Fuden enjoyed as a popular preacher Nobunaga condemned him. Takebe and Owaki were put to death for the public disturbance they had helped cause, and Fuden was put to death for the threat that he represented as a likely leader of some future uprising. As Nakao Takashi notes in his "Azuchi Shūron no Shiteki Igi" (The Historical Significance of the Azuchi Religious Debate), Fuden was the Hokke preacher with the most widespread reputation in society, and as such it was automatic that he would be the one chosen to suffer most following the Azuchi shūron.
On the day after the debate Nobunaga told Murai Sadakatsu, his Governor of Kyōto, to announce in and around the capital that the Hokke bonzes had signed the aforementioned pledge. Murai's announcement caused a large disturbance in the capital as people other than Hokke monto rejoiced in their embarrassment and took advantage of it to deal some blows to the ordinarily arrogant monto. The diary of Yamashina Tokitsugu describes how some one thousand Hokke monto were chased into the Kyūonji, and how the city was in a state of upset for several days. According to Tsuji Zen-nosuke, many of the Hokke monto who attended the debate were not allowed to return to their homes in Kyōto and were banned from the capital for a long time thereafter.

Although Nobunaga had had a close friendship with Nichijo Chōzan, although he might have been, as Frois thought, a member of the Hokkeshū, and even though, as Tamamuro Taijō suggested, the active and aggressive character of the Hokkeshū matched Nobunaga's own character, he was not at all loathe to suppress it when the opportunity presented itself. Indeed, it appears that Nobunaga had no great liking for the Hokke monto because in Document 831, issued shortly after the debate, he told his son Nobutada that "the nuisances lost" (kare itazura-mono makesōro). The Hokke monto were guilty of causing a disturbance that could have sparked large uprisings that would have shattered the peace of the tenka. Therefore, in keeping with his first policy, Nobunaga harshly punished them.
Part II

Chapter 3

Section 4

Other Applications of Oda's First Policy Towards Religious Institutions
Besides the Ikkō monto, Mt. Hiei, and the Hokke monto, a number of other religious institutions suffered as a result of the application of Nobunaga's first policy.

In January of 1569, when the Miyoshi of Awa province attacked the new shogun Ashikaga Yoshiaki in his temporary residence in the Honkokuji in Kyoto, the sohei of the Kongōbuji of Mt. Kōya and other sohei from the Kongōji, a Shingon otera in Kawachi province and a branch of the ancient Nin-naji of Kyoto, assisted the Miyoshi, and the Kongōbuji sohei also took advantage of the upset to march into Uchi county in Yamato province where they constructed two fortresses. After Nobunaga succeeded in putting down the Miyoshi revolt he sent the following reprimand to the Kongōbuji: "Your groups of sohei have allied with the enemy. Time and again you have taken part in military campaigns, and you even constructed fortresses. You also confiscated Uchi county. Your behavior is outrageous. You are to vacate your position as quickly as possible, and to return what you seized. Otherwise, you will be punished forthwith." Also, in Appended Document 44, eight of Nobunaga's vassals condemned the Kongoji for its involvement with the Miyoshi—they called its behavior outrageous and levied a fine of one thousand koku of rice on it as a penalty. No further action was taken against those otera at that time.

In May of 1573 the Kudaradera, a Tendai otera in Ōmi province, answered a call for assistance by Ashikaga Yoshiaki and participated with the Rokkaku in an uprising in Ōmi. Nobunaga punished the Hakusaiji for its involvement in the campaign against him by burning it to the ground on May 12. Almost five years earlier, in October of 1568, the Hakusaiji received special favors from Nobunaga: in Document 99 he guaranteed its land holdings,
exempted it from various taxes, and acknowledged it to be his personal "patron otera" (kigansho). It is not clear why the Hakusaiji took up arms against Nobunaga, but it is likely that it had no choice but to do so. The Hakusaiji was located in a section of Ōmi province where, at that time, the Rokkaku family still had considerable power, so had it refused to cooperate with the Rokkaku in their campaigns against Nobunaga, it would most likely have been destroyed by them. It appears, then, that this was a case in which an otera had no choice but to become involved in the conflicts of the day, and was doomed to disaster for doing so.

Following Nobunaga's victory over the Honganji in 1580, the abbot of the ancient Kiyomizudera, chief otera of the Hossō school of Buddhism in Nara, was punished by Nobunaga. In Document 884 Murai Sadakatsu accused the Kiyomizudera abbot of sending letters of sympathy and encouragement to the Honganji while it was still under seige by Nobunaga's forces. In punishment for having sent such letters the abbot was deprived of his residence, his other buildings, and his "cash box" (zenibako), all of which were turned over to the otera. Nobunaga punished those who even so much as showed sympathy for the Honganji cause. It is noteworthy that he did not punish the whole institution, but only the imprudent abbot.

In addition to the individual cases described above, many other otera were destroyed when Nobunaga brought an area under his control because it was his practise to destroy all small fortresses in that area. We have seen in Chapter 1 that many otera were surrounded by a rampart, usually earthen, and sometimes by a moat. There is one case in which Oda specifically guaranteed the ramparts of an otera: in Document 625 he told the Hokkeji, a Hokkeshū otera in Owari province, that its buildings, the walls of the
otera precincts, and its ramparts (doi), were to continue as in the past. This was, however, an exception to his general practice of reducing the number of strongholds in an area to but a few in which he would post his loyal vassals.

Finally, as a general rule Oda attempted to deprive the religious institutions of their arms. Okuno Takahiro states in Nobunaga to Hideyoshi that Nobunaga collected arms from the bonzes, but he supplies no evidence to support that claim.
Part II

Chapter 3

Section 5

Oda Nobunaga's Religious Allies
Although it was Oda Nobunaga's general policy to eradicate the power of the Buddhist religious institutions and keep them out of secular conflicts, he sometimes took advantage of their power by accepting them as allies in his campaigns. Religious institutions with whom Nobunaga is known to have allied belonged to the Shingon, Hokke, and Shin schools.

The religious institution with which Nobunaga allied more frequently than with any other was the Negoroji, the Shingon otera in Kii province that had, as we saw in Chapter 1, an exceptionally powerful army of sohei. While direct evidence is lacking, it is possible that Nobunaga made use of the Negoro sohei as early as 1569. When the Kongōbuji of Mt. Kōya took advantage of the Miyoshi attack on Ashikaga Yoshiaki in January of that year and sent its sohei into Uchi county in Yamato province, Negoro sohei also marched into Uchi county where they fought against the Kōya sohei. According to Okuno Takahiro it is not clear exactly why Negoro took action against the Kongōbuji forces at that time, but it is not unlikely that Nobunaga encouraged them to do so.

Five years later, in December of 1574, the situation appears to have been reversed. In Document 492 Nobunaga thanked the Kongōbuji for gifts that it had sent him and urged it to demonstrate loyalty to him by campaigning against enemy forces in Uchi county in Yamato province. It is not clear what enemy Nobunaga was referring to in that document, but it is very possible that it was the Negoro sohei. As noted in Chapter 1, Negoro and Kōya competed for control of Uchi county because it was in the direction in which those otera could expand their holdings—the powerful Saiga monto were located immediately west of Negoro and Kōya, and therefore they looked to the east, to Yamato province, for expansion. It would seem, then,
that Nobunaga encouraged the Negoro sōheī to fight against the Kōya sōheī in 1569, and in 1574 he encouraged Mt. Kōya to fight against Negoro.

It also appears that the Negoro sōheī took part in Nobunaga's siege of the Honganji in May of 1576 because the Shinchō Kōki mentions them as having been part of Oda's front line assault troops during the attack on the Honganji in which Harada Naomasa was killed. 144

Early in 1577 Kennyo encouraged Hatakeyama Sadamasa, lord of Kawachi province, to lead a large uprising against Nobunaga with the cooperation of the Saiga montō. Sadamasa attempted to gain the assistance of the Negoro sōheī who had fought for his family on different occasions in the past, but they refused. Instead, they offered their assistance to Nobunaga, and a leader of the sōheī named Sugi no Bō went to Kyoto to meet with him. 145 Nobunaga accepted Sugi no Bō's offer, and ordered him to send the Negoro sōheī into Kawachi province. According to Okuno Takahiro, the Negoro sōheī also served as guides to lead Nobunaga's troops along the mountain paths of Kii province against the Saiga montō during Nobunaga's campaigns in that area in the early months of 1577. 147 Undoubtedly the Negoro sōheī would have known the rough terrain of Kii province much better that Oda's men. Although none of Nobunaga's documents are addressed to Sugi no Bō, in Document 683, issued on February 27, 1577, Nobunaga told Nagaoka Fuji-taka that Sugi no Bō had allied with him, 148 and in Document 713, issued on June 2 of the same year, Oda told the residents of three villages in Kii that Negoro sōheī had rendered him incomparable service against the Saiga montō. 149

For all his praise of the assistance he received from the Negoro sōheī, ap-
parently Oda did not trust them to any great extent. In Document 685, for example, he told one of his vassals to keep a sharp eye on the activities of the sohei and to report them to him. The Negoro leaders appear to have been pleased with their alliance with Nobunaga on that occasion. In an especially interesting document, Document 683 Supplement 1, the Negoro leaders informed the sohei command of the Kongōbuji that they had allied with Nobunaga in order to defeat the Saiga monto, and they attempted to convince the Kōya leaders of the advantages to be gained by taking part in that campaign by arguing that it would be in the best interests of the Kongōbuji to deal the monto a blow. Although Kōya and Negoro were old enemies, it appears that their hostility towards the Ikkō monto was greater than their hostility towards one another. It is important to note that the Negoro sohei took advantage of the fact that Nobunaga was at war with the Saiga monto in 1577 and joined him in dealing them a blow. They joined Oda on that specific occasion to fight against a common enemy, and they were not thereby submitting themselves to Nobunaga's authority. The Negoroji acted like Nobunaga's partner, like an allied daimyo, in that campaign. Nobunaga was willing to accept Negoro assistance at that time because he was in difficult straits: his navy had been defeated by that of the Mōri in August of the preceding year, the Uesugi were pushing towards Kyōto, and the Saiga monto were up in arms. Any assistance was welcomed.

In December, 1578, Nobunaga sent Document 790 to the Kongōbuji in which he thanked it for fifty pieces of silver which it had sent him, promised to suppress the Ikkō monto in the area around Mt. Kōya, and said that he would campaign against the monto in Kawachi province in the following
spring. This document may well have been an indirect request for the assistance of the Kōya sōhei in those campaigns. One month later, on January 9, 1579, Nobunaga told the Negoroji that he intended to give it a grant of land but that he was simply too busy at that time for such an undertaking. And yet, in Document 897, issued on October 29, 1580, Oda granted Uchi county in Yamato province to the Kongōbuji. Why Nobunaga declined to give a grant to the Negoroji, and yet gave this exceptional grant to the Kongōbuji one year later, is not clear, but the Kongōbuji grant might have been made in reward for services rendered to Oda by the Kōya sōhei in response to his request of December, 1578. In Document 897 Nobunaga told the Kongōbuji sōhei that it was of primary importance that they demonstrate loyalty to him, and he warned them that he would take back his grant if any improper activities took place there.

By that grant the Kongōbuji received from Nobunaga the parcel of land that it had tried to take by force in 1569, and over which it had been fighting with the Negoroji for many years.

One receives the impression from Nobunaga's dealings with Negoro and Kōya that while he attempted to maintain good relations with both otera, he did not want either one to gain a great advantage over the other and thereby become too powerful. Oda appears to have attempted to keep a balance of power between Negoro and Kōya so that each might serve as a brake on the other, while at the same time he allowed them to maintain a considerable amount of power so together they might serve as a brake on their, and his, enemy, the Saiga monto.

Finally, when Oda initiated his attack on Mt. Kōya in 1581, as shall be seen in Chapter 5, he sought and received the cooperation of Negoro sōhei.
against their coreligionists in the Kongōbuji. In Document 948 Nobunaga thanked them for their marvelous services against Mt. Kōya.\textsuperscript{157}

In addition to his alliances with the sohei of Negoro and Kōya, Nobunaga also sought assistance from the Hokke monto and from several Shinshū otera in Echizen province. In Document 513, issued in July of 1575,\textsuperscript{158} Oda told the Nichiren monto and the "Sanmonto"—those were people who belonged to otera that were affiliated with three branches of Shinshū other than the Honganji branch—who lived on the Ikeda estate in Ōno county in Echizen that he would pardon their past crimes of involvement in uprisings if they would be loyal to him.\textsuperscript{159} He also promised to guarantee their present holdings and to reward meritorious service with new grants of land. This document was an invitation to those religious groups to ally with Nobunaga.\textsuperscript{160} There is no indication in Nobunaga's documents that the Hokke monto gave him any assistance, but in Document 519, issued just eight days after the foregoing invitation, Oda thanked the three Shinshū otera as follows:\textsuperscript{161} "Regarding you three groups: I acknowledge your independence from Osaka. Moreover, your display of loyalty on this recent occasion is most commendable. I permit you to construct bonzes' quarters and such buildings as in the past. Most importantly, maintain your loyalty." Evidently the Sanmonto complied with Nobunaga's request for assistance.\textsuperscript{162}

Furthermore, in Document 555 Supplement 3\textsuperscript{163} Shibata Katsušada, a vassal of Katsuie, thanked the Shōmyō-ji, an otera of the Takada branch of Shinshū in Echizen, for its unparalleled service in capturing Shimozuma Raishō who was the leader of the Ikkō monto in Echizen province.\textsuperscript{164}

Finally, Nobunaga also seems to have received the assistance of the Shō-
nenji, an otera of the Ji school of Buddhism in Echizen, in 1575. Okuno Takahiro says that in return for its assistance Shibata Katsuie granted the Shōnenji a number of exemptions. 165

Nobunaga appears to have been willing to accept any and all assistance in his campaigns against the religious institutions, particularly against the Ikkō montō. In Document 600 Nobunaga even forgave a certain Imai, an administrator of Kōfukuji estates in Yamato province, for taking up arms against the Ikkō montō who were spreading into that area. Although Nobunaga was certainly not wont to forgive people who took up arms and caused disturbances in his domains, Imai's enemy was the Ikkō montō, and therefore Nobunaga was sympathetic and forgiving. 166

It is apparent from the foregoing that Nobunaga was not loathe to set aside his general policy of eliminating the military power of the religious institutions when it was to his advantage to use them as his allies. It is noteworthy, however, that Nobunaga usually sent his religious allies against other religious institutions: he used his Shinshū, Jishū, and possibly his Nichirenshū allies in Echizen to fight against the Ikkō montō in that area, and he used the Negoro and Kōya sohei against the Saiga montō and against each other. It was especially advantageous to Nobunaga to have the religious institutions fight against each other and thereby reduce the power of them all. It also seems that Nobunaga's alliances with religious institutions were temporary arrangements rather than long-standing alliances as were his contracts with other daimyo.

Although there were a few exceptions, in general Oda Nobunaga pursued a rigorous policy of eradicating the power of the religious institutions and
destroying their ability to take an active part in secular affairs.
Part II

Chapter 4

Oda Nobunaga's Second Policy Towards Buddhist Institutions
Oda Nobunaga's second policy towards the Buddhist institutions was that of reducing the size of their land holdings.

In order to achieve his goal of a unified country with all segments of society squarely under the control of the central administration, Nobunaga reduced the size of the power base of the Buddhist institutions. No longer were otera to be permitted to hold vast expanses of land capable of supporting armies of followers who could interfere in secular affairs and defend the autonomy of their otera. Without underestimating the effects of Nobunaga's military campaigns against the Buddhist institutions, as seen in the preceding chapter, his relentless confiscation of otera land holdings probably contributed most of all to the final establishment of permanent control over those institutions. Even after a devastating blow an otera could possibly rebuild and reacquire power as long as it continued to own large tracts of land, but without those holdings it did not have the wherewithal to rebuild and support a large organization.

In general, Nobunaga's second policy was applied to all Buddhist institutions although its impact was felt most by those otera that possessed large holdings. The Honganji branch of Shinshū was not greatly affected by Nobunaga's second policy because, as we have seen, the nature of its power was not primarily that of landholder. Rather, it was the Tendai, Shingon, and Nara otera that were most affected by that policy.

Even though the practise was sanctioned by centuries of precedent, there was no justification, as far as Nobunaga was concerned, for any religious institution to control thousands of koku of land. It was necessary for the average otera to own just a few dozen koku of land with which to support
a small community of bonzes, but not enough to enable it to support thousands of sohei or amass great wealth. Therefore Nobunaga's second policy denied to the otera a right that they had enjoyed for almost ten centuries.

Over the centuries so many different types of rights over land had arisen that by the sixteenth century the whole question of land ownership was extremely complex. Any number of different parties could make claims on a particular piece of land: some held rights to a portion of the yield of that land, others the right to levy certain types of taxes on it, still others the right to fell timber on all or a portion of that land, and so on. In the Sengoku period many parties had their claims to a given piece of land usurped by local daimyo, so that while those parties held legal claims they could not benefit from them. Rather than try to sort out the various claims to the portions of land that made up his bunkoku, it was much simpler for a daimyo to endorse the existing conditions even though those conditions might have been ones in which the rights of some of the claimants had been usurped by others. Oda Nobunaga was not concerned with sorting out and re-establishing the rights of all claimants over portions of land in his bunkoku, and it is evident in his earlier documents that he was inclined to acknowledge the rights of otera to continue to own their existing holdings no matter how those otera might have acquired those lands in the first place. Although a religious institution may have been in possession of lands to which it had no clear right, Oda chose to avoid the whole problem of sorting out which parties might have superior claims to the land in question. Nobunaga did not endorse the claims of various parties to a piece of land on the basis of rights granted to them at some
time in the past; rather, those parties would be disenfranchised and the otera that had the major claim to the land--by actual possession if not by clear title--would be charged with administering it completely. The general trend, therefore, was towards a simplification of the problem of land ownership. A number of documents witness to Nobunaga's early policy in this regard:

In Document 26 Nobunaga prohibited any disturbances by the descendants of people who had in the past sold or donated lands to the Unkōji, a Sōtō Zen otera in Owari province. Those descendants, no matter what claims they may have had to lands presently owned by the Unkōji, were to cause no upset in attempting to assert their claims.

In Document 44 Nobunaga guaranteed the paddies and dry fields of the Empukuji, a Jishū otera in Owari province, even though they might have been confiscated from another party no matter who that party was.

In Document 429 Nobunaga told the Ninnaji, a Shingon otera in Yamashiro province, that he did not recognize any other claims to its lands no matter who held those claims. Nobunaga granted the Ninnaji "complete rights" (isshiki) over its lands regardless of whose domain it was in which the lands were located.

In Appended Document 5 Nobunaga guaranteed the land holdings of the Hōsaiji, a Sōtō Zen otera in Owari province, even though the Hōsaiji might have confiscated those lands from some other party in the first place.

In addition to the problems caused by the fact that any number of parties made claims against individual plots of land, it was frequently the case that an otera claimed ownership of parcels of land far removed from the otera and its central holdings (honryō). In some cases those "separated
holdings" (betsuryō), or "scattered holdings" (sanzairyō), were located in the same province as the otera itself, but in other cases they were spread throughout many provinces. Many of the ancient Nara and Kyōto otera owned lands in provinces far removed from the Kinai. Otera could not control their scattered holdings without setting up complex systems of administrators, assistant administrators, and various appointees who made sure that the administrators were in fact delivering to the owner otera the "land tax" (nengu)--the tax, in kind, paid yearly to the principal owner of the land--and other taxes due them.

To Nobunaga, as to all Sengoku daimyo, this arrangement was repugnant. Ideally, to Nobunaga, one party would hold complete title to a given piece of land over which it was to maintain direct, orderly, control, and which it was to administer on all levels. No other parties were allowed to make any kind of claim on that land. In general, and ideally, an otera was to own only those lands on which the otera stood and the lands immediately adjacent to them. That is, an otera would be allowed to own its honryō, but the scattered holdings would be confiscated and granted to others who would own and administer them directly.

Each daimyo considered conquered lands to be entirely his. He could confirm and allow the continuation of the standing arrangements, or he could make new ones. When Nobunaga was in the process of bringing an area under his control, all those otera that defied him were treated like any other enemy and destroyed, or had their land holdings confiscated along with those of the conquered daimyo. The confiscated lands (bosshūchi) of both otera and daimyo were usually divided among Nobunaga's major vassals who were to administer their allotted portions according to norms laid down by
him. Nobunaga himself was the ultimate authority throughout his bunkoku: he could take what land he wished, and impose any levies whatsoever, regardless of the various exemptions enjoyed by different parties in that area to that time. This does not mean that Nobunaga automatically took for himself the land holdings of all who defied him during his campaigns to take control of an area. For example, in Document 232 Oda granted to a certain Nagata Kagehiro the lands in Ōmi province that had formerly belonged to his brother Kunori Saburozaemon. Because Kunori had sided with the Asai and Asakura against Nobunaga, all his land holdings were transferred to his younger brother Nagata with orders for him to be loyal to Oda. It is to be noted that Nobunaga was not especially interested in bringing all the land possible into his private holding (chokkatsuchi). He was a generous rewarder of his generals, and was willing to entrust captured lands to his vassals and to other parties as long as they were able to maintain the peace on those holdings. Oda was more interested in having private control of great merchant cities like Sakai, Ōtsu, and Kusatsu which he accepted from Yoshiaki in 1568 as a reward for supporting the latter’s claim to the shogunate. Finances were more readily available from that type of holding than from great stretches of cultivated land.

When a daimyo brought an area firmly under his control it was customary to conduct a land survey (kenchi). It was only by means of detailed surveys that a daimyo could discover the exact financial and economic resources of his domain, and until they were completed he had but a vague estimate of his resources. In conducting a province wide land survey a daimyo would command all property owners in the province to submit their "land registers", or "cadastral records", (sashidashi) to his appointee
over that province. The *sashidashi* contained detailed information on such things as who owned what portions of land, the number of acres under cultivation, the kinds of crops and the average yearly yield per crop, the amount of trees and bamboo on each holding, the number of peasant cultivators, and the number of buildings.

Between the years 1568 and 1581 Nobunaga conducted a number of provincial land surveys: of Ōmi and Mino provinces in 1568; of Ise in 1570-1571; of Yamashiro in 1574; of Yamato in 1575; of Echizen in 1577-1578; of Ōmi again in 1578; of Yamashiro, Yamato, Tamba, Harima, and Ōmi once again, in 1580; of Tamba, Tango, Noto, and Izumi in 1581; and of Kaga, Noto, and Shinano in 1582. The *kenchi* were very detailed and laborious undertakings, often requiring a number of years to complete. The Yamato *kenchi*, for example, required upwards of five years. Sometimes a *kenchi* would be interrupted before its completion and resumed at a later date. The Ōmi *kenchi* of 1568, for example, was stopped before completion and resumed in 1578.

When a land survey was being carried out in a province no institutions were exempt from the necessity of handing over their *sashidashi* to Oda's representatives, and this caused much concern on the part of the otera. Okuno Takahiro quotes the Tamon-in Diary (*Tamon-in Nikki*) as having said that during Nobunaga's survey of Yamato province in 1580 people both great and small were most anxious: "It was like the suffering of hell!" Landholders feared what might follow the *kenchi*—they were liable to have their holdings severely reduced.

Shortly after Nobunaga was firmly established in Kyōto in 1568 he began to conduct a *kenchi* of Ōmi and Mino provinces by calling for *sashidashi*. For example, on December 13, 1568, (Document 131) two of Nobunaga's vassals
commanded the Chōmyō-ji, a Tendai otera in Ōmi province, to hand over its sashidashi. It was during that kenchi that Mori Sanzaemon, one of Oda's vassals, set up his headquarters at Sakamoto and began to confiscate the scattered estates of the Enryakuji throughout Ōmi and Mino. In order to have Nobunaga's vassals cease that activity and return to the Enryakuji the lands that were taken from it, some 1500 bonzes met to implore the Emperor to intercede on behalf of the Enryakuji and Ōgimachi complied by sending Nobunaga an Imperial rescript in which he commanded that Sanmon land holdings were to be changed in no way from how they were in the past. In that rescript Ōgimachi asserted that the "Buddhist Law-Imperial Law" (buppo-hoso) combination was the very basis of peace. The Enryakuji bonzes also offered money to Nobunaga to stop confiscating their holdings but there is no evidence to suggest that he paid any heed either to their request or the Imperial command.

Tamamuro Taijō suggests that some of the lands that Nobunaga confiscated from the Enryakuji had been recently granted to it by the Asakura and that Oda refused to recognize the Enryakuji's newly acquired rights. As a result of Nobunaga's confiscation of those lands and his refusal to return them, the Enryakuji decided--not surprisingly--to side with the newly forming anti-Nobunaga league and contribute to the war of encirclement against Nobunaga. It will also be recalled that in October of 1570 Oda promised to return Enryakuji holdings if the bonzes would ally with him, but by that time the Enryakuji had come to realize that Nobunaga presented them with a dire threat given the type of policies he was pursuing, and it committed itself firmly to the anti-Nobunaga league.

Thus, although Nobunaga's destruction of the Enryakuji and its branch o-
tera on Mt. Hiei came about because of their involvement in the war against Nobunaga—that is, because they sinned against Nobunaga's first policy—it was Oda's land policy that was largely responsible for causing the Enryakuji to take a position hostile to him. Therefore we can say that indirectly the Enryakuji was destroyed because of its refusal to cooperate peacefully with Nobunaga's second policy. 14

The most famous case of an otera that suffered Nobunaga's wrath for refusing to cooperate with his land surveys was that of the Makinōji, or Makinō-dera, a branch otera of the Kongōbuji in Izumi province. 15 During Nobunaga's kenchi of Izumi province in 1581, the Makinōji flatly refused to cooperate. Instead of handing over the otera's sashidashi as ordered, the bonzes took up arms and mobilized the residents of the villages at the foot of the small mountain on which the Makinōji was situated. Then, anticipating Nobunaga's attack, the bonzes made preparations to flee the otera. On June 11, 1581, Hori Hidemasa, Oda Nobuzumi, and several other of Nobunaga's generals attacked the Makinōji and burned it to the ground. Nothing, including even the copies of the sutras, was spared. 16

Up until 1575 it was Nobunaga's custom, following a kenchi in a given area, to confiscate otera's separated estates and guarantee their continued possession of their central holdings. However, in a number of documents issued between 1568 and 1573 Oda allowed otera to continue to possess their scattered holdings. For example, in Document 124 Nobunaga told the Ninna-ji that its properties, including its scattered holdings, were to continue as in the past, 17 and in Document 151 Nobunaga sent a similar guarantee to a Rinzai Zen otera in Yamashiro province in which he specifically mentioned its "scattered paddies and dry fields" (sanzai no tabatake). 18
There are several reasons why Nobunaga issued the foregoing types of guarantees and made no sweeping land policy changes until 1575:

1. During his first five or six years in Kyōtō Nobunaga was intent on solidifying his control over the Kinai area, and it would have been unwise to alienate the hundreds of otera throughout that area by seizing their lands. Therefore, he simply endorsed the status quo.

2. Many of the documents that Nobunaga sent to religious institutions during his first few years in Kyōtō simply reiterated guarantees that were granted to them by the new shogun. That is, Nobunaga simply underwrote Yoshiaki's guarantees of various otera. For example, in Document 149, issued on March 3, 1569, Oda guaranteed all the holdings of the Ninchōji, a Shingon otera in Settsu province. The Ninchōji was a “patron otera” (kiganji) of Yoshiaki who sent it a guarantee of its holdings on March 2, but one day before Nobunaga sent his. Nobunaga obviously underwrote Yoshiaki's guarantee. When that was the case, Nobunaga's documents usually contained an expression that indicated that the otera to which it was sent was to continue to enjoy its condition “in accordance with shogunal commands” (gonaiho--or, gogechi--no mune ni makasete...), and the “shogunal commands” referred to were those sent by Yoshiaki.

3. Between 1569 and 1575 Nobunaga was occupied with campaigns against the members of the anti-Nobunaga league in central Honshū, and therefore he had no time to conduct thorough land surveys or to formulate new land ownership policies. Thus in most cases up until 1575 we do not find in Nobunaga's documents that endorse otera land holdings any indication of what portions of land were being endorsed. Those documents usually used very general expressions such as “there must be no change” (soi aru bekarazaru), all is to continue “as in the past” (sakizaki no gotoku), or “ac-
cording to past precedent" (senki no gotoku). 21

In 1572, however, Nobunaga did issue a decree that caused many otera to lose some of their land holdings. This was the "Decree Revoking Otera Holdings" (jiryō kiha-rei) according to which all lands, the ownership of which had been transferred by the kuge to religious institutions either by sale, pawn, or free grant, were to be returned to their original owners. All documents that transferred land titles from the kuge to religious institutions were to be considered void. 22 The immediate purpose of that decree was not to reduce the size of otera land holdings but rather to improve and stabilize the condition of the kuge, and this was to be accomplished at the expense of the religious institutions. It is not known to what extent otera suffered as a result of that decree because there is no record of how much land changed ownership following its issuance, nor is it known how widely Nobunaga applied it.

The high point, and a critical turning point, in Nobunaga's formulation of land ownership policies was in 1575 when he instituted his "New Land Tenure Policy" (shinchigyōsei). This major adjustment in land control marked the transition from the "Estates System" (shōensei) to the "Red Seal System" (shuinsei) of land ownership. The new land ownership system was called the "Red Seal System" because new lands (shinchi) were granted to Buddhist otera, Shintō shrines, and the kuge, by means of a "Red Seal Document" (shuinjō), i.e., a document officially stamped with a red seal. 23 From 1575 Nobunaga began, on a large scale, to grant to the otera, shrines, and kuge, new portions of land in exchange for their traditional holdings. In those documents in which new lands were granted one does not find any
expressions like "all is to be as in the past", or "in accordance with shogunal decrees". Past precedent no longer had any weight. The rights of kuge and religious institutions over certain lands by virtue of tradition or precedent were no longer recognized, for such criteria were simply dismissed by Nobunaga. Thenceforth a party was to hold land by virtue of a grant from the present central administration, that is, by Nobunaga himself. Land within the provinces under Nobunaga's control were his to assign or withhold—it mattered not who the former owner might have been. Even land that had been held by a religious institution for centuries was considered to be newly granted when Nobunaga sent that institution a document in which he confirmed its ownership of that land, and the institution was to consider itself fortunate that Nobunaga deigned to make it a grant of land at all. Thenceforth the religious institutions were to own, and completely administer, the "new lands" that Nobunaga granted to them in a given province following a land survey of that province.

As a general rule Nobunaga's "Red Seal Documents" made no reference to the former holdings of the otera to which they were issued, and although they did not explicitly state that those holdings were confiscated, such was usually the case. The otera's former holdings, especially the "scattered estates", were confiscated, and thenceforth the otera were to own only those lands granted to them in the "Red Seal Documents". In many cases the newly granted lands were far removed geographically from the otera's former holdings, and they were invariably smaller in size than them because they were small enough to be completely and directly administered by the otera without the necessity of a complex administrative system. Indeed, most shinchi totaled less than one hundred koku: for example, in Docu-
ment 576 Nobunaga granted thirty koku of new lands to the Sanji-Chionji, a Jōdošū otera in Yamashiro province;\(^{24}\) in Document 577 he gave thirty koku to the Donge’in, a Rinzai Zen convent in Yamashiro;\(^{25}\) in Document 578 the Hōkyō-ji, a Rinzai Zen otera in Yamashiro was given twenty koku,\(^ {26}\) and in Document 579 it received another thirty;\(^ {27}\) in Document 580 the Ninnaji of Yamashiro province was granted one hundred koku.\(^ {28}\) There are many examples of this type of document.\(^ {29}\)

The "Red Seal Documents" in which Nobunaga granted shinchi usually did not designate exactly what piece of land the recipient was to own. This task was carried out by four of his vassals whom Nobunaga charged with working out the details of the new grants.\(^ {30}\) In Documents 575, 576, 577, 578, and 581, for example, Nobunaga granted to a number of parties portions of land that were formerly part of the Sai’in estate in Yamashiro province.\(^ {31}\) Each of those documents opened with the phrase: “Regarding the thirty koku in the Sai’in estate in Yamashiro province,” (Yamashiro no kuni Sai’in no uchi sanju koku no koto,)—obviously this phrase does not designate what part of the land of the former Sai’in estate the documents’ recipients were to own. Therefore, those who administered and implemented Nobunaga’s new land policy would have had to delineate the boundaries of each parcel of land.

Documents in which Nobunaga granted shinchi almost invariably had a set format. After designating the location of the new land, and the number of koku, Nobunaga would conclude: “I hereby grant them to you as new lands. You are to completely and directly administer them as authorized hereby.” (…shinchi no tame mairase iwanu, mattaku gochokumu arubeki no jōken no gotoshi).\(^ {32}\) Thus each otera recipient was to administer the new lands com-
pletely and directly; no otera was to own more land than it could control quite simply, and no other parties could make claims of any kind to a portion of that land. Nobunaga wanted each social unit to possess no more than it could effectively control.

The complexity of the old shōen system was such, however, that it could not be easily uprooted. Moreover, it must be borne in mind that Nobunaga's new land policy was not a hard and fast one that could be strictly applied to all religious institutions regardless of their size and power. Many religious institutions were granted exemptions from it, and there were even cases in which Nobunaga guaranteed otera's scattered estates after 1575. For example, in 1576 he guaranteed the Tōdaiji's holdings in Yamato and Yamashiro provinces, and in Document 753, issued in 1577, he acknowledged that the Tōji-in of Yamashiro was the lawful owner of a number of estates in Settsu province. As late as 1580 Nobunaga made exceptions in the application of his new land policy, notably in the case of the great Nara otera. In 1580 Takigawa Kazumasu and Akechi Mitsuhide conducted a survey of Yamato province in the course of which they commanded all otera to deliver their sashidashi to them. For example, in Document 898 Akechi informed the Tōhoku-in, a branch of the Kōfukuji, that he was collecting sashidashi from all shrines and otera throughout the province, and that Nobunaga would grant the otera "Red Seal Documents" on the basis of those records. Therefore he commanded the Tōhoku-in to immediately send forth the chief bonzes and all others engaged in administering the otera's land holdings. Mitsuhide closed that document with the warning that they were not to be negligent in that matter. However, having gathered sashidashi from all the Yamato otera, Nobunaga elected not to confiscate their tradi-
tional holdings and grant shinchi in their place. Instead, on December 11, 1580, he guaranteed their traditional holdings. Okuno Takahiro suggests that the reason Nobunaga did so was because he feared that any severe blow to the Nara otera would cause them to react like "the cornered rat that attacks the cat" (kyūso neko o kamu)—in desperation they were liable to rise up against Nobunaga and rekindle uprisings throughout the Kinai. While this was a possibility, Nobunaga was not really concerned at that point with losing his control over the Kinai—central Honshū was completely under his control since four months earlier when Kyōnyo surrendered—but he did not want to have to commit troops to campaigns in the Kinai when there was far more to be gained by defeating the Mōri of Aki and the Chōsokabe of Tosa province. Therefore, in order to maintain peace in the Kinai Nobunaga confirmed the traditional holdings of the Nara otera, and appointed Tsutsui Junkei over Yamato province to maintain a strict control.

Besides that special treatment of the Nara otera, Oda also made a special concession to the Kongōbuji in 1580. In Document 897 Oda told the Kongōbuji that he guaranteed its control of Uchi county in Yamato province. Although that document was signed with a red seal, it does not read like any of the other documents in which Nobunaga granted shinchi to otera, and it is unlikely that Nobunaga gave complete and exclusive ownership of Uchi county to the Kongōbuji. In any case, that was an exceptional grant. As we saw in the preceding chapter, it appeared for a while in 1580 that Oda might make a similar grant to the Honganji, but as it turned out the Honganji was never given the two counties in Kaga province that Nobunaga offered to return to its control.
It must also be noted that when Nobunaga granted an otera shinchi in a given province following a kenchi of that province, the otera was not automatically deprived of its land holdings in other provinces. Evidence of this may be found in the case of Nobunaga's grants to the Ninnaji. It will be recalled that in 1575 Nobunaga granted one hundred koku of shinchi in Yamashiro to the Ninnaji which was located in that province. In 1580, during a survey of Yamato province, the Ninnaji presented Akechi Mitsuhide with a sashidashi in which were listed the number of koku that it held in that province. Therefore, the Ninnaji was not deprived of its holdings in Yamato province when Nobunaga granted it the one hundred koku of shinchi in Yamashiro province five years earlier. Until Nobunaga completed his survey of Yamato province, he would not necessarily have known that the Ninnaji held lands there. Thus, Nobunaga's shinchi grant in 1575 designated what lands the Ninnaji was to own in Yamashiro province, and it neither confirmed nor confiscated Ninnaji holdings in other provinces. Such was most likely the case with all of Nobunaga's shinchi grants.

As in the case of Nobunaga's "Decree Revoking Otera Holdings" (jiryō kiha-rei) of 1572, it is difficult to assess exactly what degree of change the "New Land Tenure Policy" wrought on the condition of the otera. It is not known exactly how much land was actually owned by the otera in the 1570's, nor have we any exact record of how many shinchi grants Nobunaga made. Besides, the situation was such in Nobunaga's time that he had to make compromises and limit the application of his new land policy—to have applied the policy too quickly and too broadly would have caused further clashes with the larger religious institutions. In any case, it was necessary first of all for Nobunaga to complete the prior task of unifying the country and
conducting surveys of all the provinces. Until such surveys were completed, Nobunaga could not get an accurate estimate of just how much land each otera—especially the ancient, large otera that traditionally held estates scattered throughout a number of provinces—actually owned. The direction in which Nobunaga was moving, however, is quite clear, and it is not rash to speculate that he would have applied his new land policy on a national scale had he lived long enough. But Nobunaga died before he was able to complete land surveys of any more than a few provinces. Thus it was left to Toyotomi Hideyoshi to carry on this work by means of the famous "taikō kenchō", which was begun in Yamashiro in 1582 and completed between 1588 and 1591.

By reducing the size of the land holdings of the Buddhist institutions, Nobunaga shrunk their economic base—he deprived them of their source of wealth and independence, and thus curtailed their ability to support sōhei who could take an active part in secular affairs. In terms of its long-range effect, Nobunaga's second policy towards the Buddhist institutions was the most important of the three.
Part II

Chapter 5

Oda Nobunaga's Third Policy Towards Buddhist Institutions
By his third policy Oda Nobunaga rejected the claims of the Buddhist institutions to a high degree of autonomy and independence. No longer were otera to be permitted to enjoy shugo-funyu status or its equivalent, extraterritoriality, or the right to grant asylum; no longer were religious institutions to enjoy such a degree of autonomy and independence that they could form, in effect, independent states within the body of the nation state. Nobunaga attempted to bring all otera under the control of the central administrative authority.

Otera manifested their autonomy and independence in three major ways:

1. Many of the larger otera tended to act like daiyō; they entered into alliances with the daiyō, and involved themselves in military campaigns. Such activities offended against Nobunaga's first policy which was examined in Chapter 3.

2. Many otera owned vast estates over which they often held complete authority. Nobunaga's second policy was directed against that condition, as we saw in the preceding chapter.

3. Some otera granted sanctuary to enemies of the tenka, and attempted to maintain their independence from the strong central authority that was being developed by Nobunaga. In this chapter we shall examine Nobunaga's policy in this regard.

It was simply unacceptable to Nobunaga that religious institutions could stand outside the pale of central administrative authority and pursue policies not in the best interests of that authority. That central authority was, of course, Nobunaga himself. Kashiwahara Yusen says that Nobunaga denied the existence of any authority but his own, and claimed the priority of his own personal authority over all other, including religious.
Nobunaga made no argument as to whether or not a particular otera legitimately claimed *shugo-funyu* status for as far as he was concerned such status was to exist no longer. Indeed, otera that attempted to hold on to that status thereby declared their own treachery. No otera could claim *shugo-funyu* status vis-a-vis Nobunaga's appointee over the area in which the otera was located. No otera, including those that did not oppose Nobunaga and even those that actively cooperated with him, were permitted to be independent of the secular authority. Not surprisingly, otera that were long accustomed to the possession of considerable autonomy were loathe to accept a lessened and subjected position, and therefore Nobunaga's third policy tended to drive otera, especially the more powerful and thus the more independent ones, into the anti-Nobunaga league. Membership in that league was gained not at the price of an otera's autonomy, but ultimately an alliance with Oda was.

Shortly after he became established in Kyōto in 1568, Nobunaga took several steps that were designed to curtail the independence of the otera, and those steps fueled the fires of hostility against Oda on the part of the otera. One of Nobunaga's first acts was to command that all "border posts" (*sekishō*) throughout his *bunkoku* be abolished. Oda took that step in order to encourage the development of trade by allowing an easier flow of goods throughout his domain, but the step severely hurt many otera. Many otera had toll barriers posted at those points where roads crossed their lands and a fee was collected from all persons who wanted to travel across the otera's lands. When Nobunaga outlawed the practise of charging transit fees many otera were deprived of a steady source of income.

On October 22, 1568, Nobunaga imposed a number of levies on the provinces
of Settsu and Yamato, on the cities of Nara and Sakai, and on a number of religious institutions including the Hōryūji of Nara, the Chōmyōji of Ōmi province, and the Ishiyama Honganji. Those levies had a twofold purpose:

1. They served notice on the powerful centers like Nara, Sakai, and Ōsaka that Nobunaga had taken command of the Kinai, and they were to acknowledge his supremacy by paying the imposed levies.

2. They placed the obligation of providing for the upkeep of the bakufu on the shoulders of those wealthy centers. This meant, of course, that they were to contribute to the upkeep of Nobunaga's forces which were functioning as bulwark to the shogunate and which must have incurred great expenses in pacifying the Kinai and in establishing Yoshiaki as shogun.

Apparently those institutions were given very little time in which to debate whether or not they would pay the levies—in Document 123, for example, four of Nobunaga's vassals told the Hōryūji that it was to pay within the day the 150 pieces of silver demanded from it. The city of Sakai was the only party that refused to pay. Historians are not certain of the exact nature of Nobunaga's levies, and there is a strong possibility that he demanded more than a designated amount of money. There is, in fact, a strong possibility that Oda had begun to confiscate land holdings in connection with his land survey of Ōmi and Mino provinces. In Document 131, for example, in addition to his levy of a tax on the Chōmyōji, Oda also commanded it to deliver its sashidashi to him.

Undoubtedly the foregoing activities made the religious institutions wary of Nobunaga, and it most likely encouraged them to form alliances against him. It was in that milieu that the anti-Nobunaga league was born.
An especially compelling reason why Nobunaga was determined to destroy the autonomy of the religious institutions was an economic one. As we saw in Chapter 1, "towns before the gates" (monzenmachi) had grown up around many otera, and those towns customarily enjoyed shugo-funyu status along with the otera around which they developed. In areas where there were strong concentrations of Ikko monto many provincial towns of considerable size formed around branch otera of the Honganji, and although they usually did not enjoy the classical shugo-funyu status they had, nevertheless, a great degree of autonomy. Those otera towns were of special interest to the Sengoku daimyo because they were frequently the centers of the newly developing merchant and commercial economy, and the daimyo wanted to bring them under their authority in order that they might enjoy the benefits of the new commerce. Thus, if Nobunaga was to structure a solid economic base for his new administration, it was necessary for him to bring the independent commercial centers throughout his bunkoku under his control.

When Nobunaga succeeded in subjugating an area, he customarily assigned one of his vassals over that area. That vassal was to set up his headquarters at one of the larger and more prosperous towns in that area, and, as we have seen, many of those towns were monzenmachi. Therefore, Nobunaga's appointees over sections of his bunkoku became masters of the monzenmachi, which ceased to be monzenmachi and became "castle towns" (joka-machi). For example, after Nobunaga destroyed Mt. Hiei in 1572 he appointed Akechi Mitsuhide over a section of Ōmi province that was formerly owned by the Enryakuji, and Akechi was commanded to establish his military and administrative center in the town of Sakamoto, formerly a large monzenmachi of the Enryakuji. Thus the thriving town of Sakamoto became Akechi's cas-
tle town. By turning the monzenmachi into jōkamachi Nobunaga eliminated the religious institutions from competition with him in the sphere of business and commerce. There is evidence that in some instances Nobunaga contributed generously to otera around which commercial towns had developed. For example, in Document 314, issued in April, 1572, Oda exempted the Chōenji, a Hokke otera in Settsu province, from military encampments, lumbering, tokusei orders, people bearing arms, and an assortment of taxes. The Chōenji was in a large market town on Osaka Bay, and Oda made an effort to protect and nurture that valuable source of wealth.

While in general it is true that Nobunaga's third policy denied the right of otera to the continued enjoyment of shugo-funyū, there were some exceptions made:

In Document 149 Nobunaga told the Ninchōji, a Shingon otera in Settsu province, that he acknowledged its possession of shugo-funyū status according to past precedent.

In Document 215 he told the Donge'in, a Rinzai Zen convent in Yamashiro province, that it was to administer its holdings directly and without any outside interference because it had shugo-funyū status.

In Documents 321 and 380 Oda told the Chōfukuji, a Tendai otera in Yamashiro province, that because its lands were shugoshi-funyū it was to completely administer them and be hindered by no one. Document 321 specified those possessions of the Chōfukuji that had shugo-funyū status: its central holdings, lands belonging to its branch otera, paddies and dry fields, mountain groves, rents it received from lands that it owned in Kyōto, and so on.

In Document 429 Nobunaga acknowledged that the precincts of the Ninnaji
Finally, in Document 477 Oda told the Hōkyōji, a Rinzai Zen otera in Yamashiro province, that it was treasonous for anyone to conscript corvee or to take lumber from its holdings because they had long enjoyed shugo-funyū status.

Besides the foregoing endorsements of shugo-funyū status, there is also a document in which Nobunaga appears to have recognized an otera's right to grant sanctuary. In Document 26, issued in January or February of 1559 to the Unkōji, a Sōtō Zen otera in Owari province, Nobunaga stated in the second article that "killing is prohibited within the otera precincts" (kinsei...keidai ni oite, sesshō...). According to Okuno Takahiro's commentary on that document, that expression in the second article acknowledged the otera's right to grant asylum. Given that Nobunaga was but twenty-four years old when he sent that document to the Unkōji, one cannot take it as representative of Nobunaga's policy on that issue.

It is to be noted that the documents in which Nobunaga recognized shugo-funyū status were all issued prior to 1575—the last one, Document 477, was issued on November 4, 1574. It will be recalled that prior to 1575 Nobunaga often simply guaranteed an otera's long-standing condition for he had yet to complete many land surveys, and besides, many of his earlier documents to otera underwrote guarantees that had been sent to them by Ashikaga Yoshiaki. Thus although there were some exceptions, in general Nobunaga pursued a policy of reducing otera autonomy: he deprived them of their control of monzenmachi, forbade them to collect transit tariffs at boundary posts, and denied their shugo-funyū status. There are no documents in which Oda stated specifically that otera were not to maintain
shugo-funyu status--he did not expressly deny that status, but he acted towards the otera as though they never had it in the first place. Oda simply paid no attention to any such claims. Even when he did endorse an otera's right to shugo-funyu status it did not mean that the otera was permitted to stand outside the jurisdiction of Nobunaga's appointee over the province in which it was located.

Three otera in particular--the Enryakuji, the Senrinji, and the Kongobu-ji--defied Nobunaga by acting in a manner that ran counter to his third policy:

Mt. Hiei, as we have already seen, defied Nobunaga by allowing the Asai and Asakura remnants to take refuge there in 1570. For that reason, as well as for its offenses against Nobunaga's first and second policies, he destroyed it.

In April of 1582 Nobunaga attacked and burned the Senrinji for having allowed Rokkaku Yoshisuke, an ally of the Takeda, to take refuge there. Tsuji Zennosuke recounts how Oda's troops chased some one hundred and eighty bonzes into the Senrinji and then, surrounding the base of the small mountain on which it sat, they set fire to all the buildings as they advanced up the sides of the mountain. The otera was destroyed and all the bonzes killed.

By far the most famous conflict between Nobunaga and a religious institution on the issue of autonomy was that between him and Mt. Kōya in 1581. Two incidents led up to that conflict:

1. Following Araki Murashige's revolt against Nobunaga in November of 1578 and Nobunaga's year long campaign against him in Arioka fortress, Araki
and some of his vassals managed to escape from Nobunaga. Araki himself made it to safety in Aki province, and some of his vassals fled to Mt. Kōya where they were given sanctuary.  

2. A few days after Kyōnyo and the monto left the Honganji on September 10, 1580, Nobunaga sent a letter overflowing with venom and vengeance to Sakuma Nobumori and his son Jinkurō. In that letter Nobunaga condemned the Sakuma for their failure to perform properly during the siege of the Honganji in which they took part over the years from 1575 to 1580. Oda accused them of comfortably sitting out the siege in the fortresses that were built as attack bases, and of making no effort to perform meritorious military services against the Honganji. In article 2 of that letter he asked the Sakuma: “What were you thinking? That the enemy, because they are bonzes, would scatter at the very thought of my might?” Nobunaga then added that such thinking was not at all compatible with the “way of the warrior” (bushadō), and he compared the Sakuma unfavorably with Akechi Mitsuhide, Toyotomi Hideyoshi, and Shibata Katsuie. Nobunaga even boasted how he himself had yet to lose a battle! In article 11 Nobunaga accused the Sakuma of what was most likely their most serious offense, namely, their failure to obey his commands. Finally, in the last article, Nobunaga stated coldly and tersely that the Sakuma, father and son, were to “shave their heads” (kashira o kosoge)—that is, take the Buddhist tonsure or, in other words, become bonzes—and betake themselves to Mt. Kōya. Their offenses, said Oda, would never be forgiven. Accordingly, Nobumori and his son went into exile on Mt. Kōya.

One year later, following Sakuma Nobumori’s death in August of 1581, Nobunaga sent envoys to Mt. Kōya with a certain demand, or demands. There is
considerable discrepancy as to the nature of Nobunaga's demand(s): the _Shincho Kōki_ mentions only the demand that the Kongōbuji hand over to Nobunaga's envoys the Araki vassals who had taken refuge there, but the _Tamon-in Nikki_ says that Nobunaga's confrontation with Mt. Kōya began when his envoys demanded that the Kongōbuji deliver over to them whatever possessions Nobumori left behind when he died. In any case, the Kongōbuji bonzes refused Nobunaga's demand(s) and, surprisingly, they killed his envoys. By that act the Kongōbuji was not simply being perverse; rather, it was asserting its right to the continued enjoyment of its autonomy, of its right to grant sanctuary, in the face of what it perceived to be an infringement on that right.

In retaliation, Nobunaga struck at Mt. Kōya in two ways:

1. Early in September he sent a huge army of over 137,000 men under the command of Hori Hidemasa into Kii province to surround Mt. Kōya and begin a siege of it. Mt. Kōya was vastly outnumbered—it could muster only 36,000 troops by pulling together its own bonzes and _sohei_, local warriors from its land holdings in the vicinity of the _oterā_, and villagers from the adjacent areas of Kii province. In utter desperation Mt. Kōya even appealed to the Saiga _monto_ for assistance. In order to prevent the destruction of the _oterā_, the Kongōbuji appealed to the Ninnaji, the chief abbot of which was of _kuge_ ancestry, to intercede on its behalf with the Emperor. In October Ōgimachi answered the Kongōbuji's appeal by sending Nobunaga an _Imperial injunction_ to break off his campaign against it. It appears that Nobunaga partially obeyed Ōgimachi's command because he ordered his troops to cease all engagements with the Mt. Kōya forces. However, he did not order his army to withdraw from Kii province; instead,
it maintained its cordon around the base of Mt. Kōya and the situation settled into a holding pattern.

2. Besides the attack on Mt. Kōya, which was somewhat defused by Emperor Ogimachi's order, Nobunaga punished it in another way. On September 14, 1581, he commanded that all Kōya hijiri—the pilgrim bonzes who wandered throughout the provinces—be arrested wherever they might be found and put to death. Estimates as to the number of hijiri Nobunaga killed vary widely: the Shincho Kōki says several hundred, but Okuno Takahiro suggests just over 1000 and Kuwata Tadachika estimates that there were upwards of 1300. Whatever the actual number might have been, this was certainly one of Nobunaga's most reprehensible acts.

Mt. Kōya was spared destruction by Nobunaga's troops because the somewhat stagnated campaign against it simply ceased when he was killed in June of the following year. Therefore one cannot but estimate what would have been the outcome of the Nobunaga-Mt. Kōya conflict had Nobunaga lived longer. Okuno Takahiro suggests that Oda probably never intended to destroy Mt. Kōya—he intended only to punish it for killing his envoys. This is a totally improbable suggestion, and Okuno provides no evidence to support it. One cannot conclude from the fact that Oda made peace with the Honkanji that he would have spared Mt. Kōya. It was to Nobunaga's great advantage to be spared the necessity of a long campaign against the Honkanji citadel. He did not want to become bogged down in Osaka when there were rich provinces in Shikoku and southern Honshū ready for his taking. Besides, Kennyo and Kyōnyo were forced to surrender the Honkanji to Oda. Mt. Kōya, on the other hand, was not in a strategically important area, and Nobunaga's troops, who outnumbered those of the otera by almost four
to one, could have destroyed it in a matter of a few days. Watanabe Yosuke estimated that Nobunaga would have wrought great destruction on Mt. Kōya had he not been killed ten months after the attack on it began. Watanabe is most likely correct. Despite the Imperial injunction, Mt. Kōya was doomed to disaster. Given the violent punishment that was visited on the Senrinji in 1582 and the Makinōji in 1581 for their defiance of him, it is likely that Mt. Kōya would have received the same. Indeed, it is probable that a clash between Nobunaga and the Negoroji would not have been long in coming because it still had much power in 1581.

The foregoing are the most outstanding cases of otera that attempted to assert their independence and autonomy in opposition to Nobunaga's third policy. There were other instances in which otera attempted to do so, but in which Nobunaga's threat of severe punishment was sufficient to cause them to alter their behavior. For example, when Oda granted a "benign administration order" (tokuseirei), i.e., a cancellation of people's debts, to the province of Kawachi in 1576, the Kongoji refused to abide by the order, claiming that it was exempt and that if it obeyed the order its ability to have confidence in its debtors would be destroyed. Two of Nobunaga's vassals ordered the Kongoji to produce whatever documents of proof the otera might have whereby it could be established that it was traditionally exempt from tokusei orders. On the basis of those documents a judgment would be made. Should it turn out, however, that the Kongoji's reasons for disobeying the tokusei order be considered invalid or unacceptable, then the bonzes of the Kongoji and of all its branch otera throughout Kawachi province would be arrested and put to death. What happened next is not known, but because there is no record of an attack on
the Kongoji by Nobunaga around that time, we might conclude that it succumbed to his threat.

In Nobunaga's time some of the more powerful religious institutions attempted to behave like politically autonomous units that could, and did, enter into alliances with daimyo. Mt. Kōya and Negoro, for example, were willing to negotiate with Nobunaga, to send him gifts in recognition of his superior strength and to keep on good terms with him, but that was all done in a *primus inter pares* context. They attempted to act like partners in Nobunaga's campaigns. For example, we have seen that Negoro took advantage of the fact that Nobunaga was campaigning against the Saiga monto in 1577 by joining him to fight against them. Negoro did not really submit to Nobunaga's authority when it cooperated with him on that occasion. When in 1581 Nobunaga challenged Mt. Kōya to acknowledge his authority by delivering to his envoys the Araki remnant and the Sakuma estate, it refused to do so and killed his envoys. It was Mt. Kōya and Negoro that were able to retain their independence longer than any of the other great otera.

Besides his attacks on otera that attempted to assert their independence, Nobunaga took other steps to bring them firmly under his control. We have already noted that Nobunaga allowed otera to own relatively small parcels of land over which they could maintain direct and complete control. One of Nobunaga's purposes in making those grants was to have the otera contribute to the smooth and peaceful running of the state by maintaining order on their holdings. But not only were the otera to serve as agents for the pacification of the state, they were also to be tied together in such a way that they could police themselves. It was for that purpose that
Nobunaga ordered the construction of the Jōdo otera Jionji Jōgon'in in Azuchi in 1576. When the Jōgon'in was completed in 1578 Nobunaga designated it the head otera of all 808 Jōdo otera in the provinces of Ōmi and Iga. As founding abbot of the Jōgon'in Oda invited the Jōdo bonze Ōyo of the Konzeji in Ōmi, and in Document 663 he commanded his vassal Hasegawa Hidekazu as follows: "Regarding the otera holdings of the Konze bonze: they are to be passed over to him as I instructed you yesterday. Other bonzes are also to move to this area; if they do not come as instructed all their properties will be confiscated. It is imperative that you instruct them to comply with my wishes." Nobunaga's "invitation" to various bonzes to establish their otera in Azuchi was actually a heavy-handed threat—either they would relocate in Azuchi or have their holdings confiscated.

It would be naive to imagine that Nobunaga built the Jōgon'in and the other otera in Azuchi for devotional purposes. It was done with the purpose of having the religious institutions bound together in a hierarchical structure so that they might be the more easily kept in line, and that they might be used as a tool for the pacification of the tenka. Nobunaga was neither the first nor the only daimyo to implement a system whereby otera were organized in a hierarchical structure in such a way that otera ranked high in the structure were held responsible for making sure that otera under them obeyed all directives issued by the central administration. Many daimyo, including Nobunaga, wanted the religious institutions to be tied together in such a way that they would not have to deal with each otera individually. Instead, a daimyo would be able to issue a command to, for example, the head otera of the Jōdo school and leave it to
that otera to make sure that the command was passed down the structure to
the other Jōdo otera in his domain. Thus the Jōgon'in, as chief otera of
all Jōdo otera in the provinces of Ōmi and Iga, would be responsible for
implementing Nobunaga's commands and he would not have to have anything
to do with the hundreds of branch otera for they would all answer to the
head otera which, in turn, would answer to Nobunaga.

That type of control structure is commonly referred to as the furegashira
system, and the head otera were also referred to by the term furegashira.31
There were two main types of furegashira: in some cases an otera would be
placed over the other otera that belonged to the same Buddhist school in
a given area. The Jōgon'in was of that type.32 In other cases an otera
would be made the chief otera, the furegashira, of all religious institu-
tions, regardless of what Buddhist school they belonged to, throughout a
designated area.33 It does not appear that Nobunaga appointed any of the
latter type.

Besides instituting a system whereby religious institutions were charged
with policing themselves, Nobunaga also appointed several of his vassals
to take charge of all central administrative business related to Buddhist
oteras. In Document 594 Nobunaga appointed four of his vassals—Takei Seki-
an, Matsui Yūkan, Murai Sadakatsu, and Harada Naomasa—to administer his
new land policy in the case of the kuge and the religious institutions.34
It is commonly suggested that the "Office of Otera and Shrine Administra-
tors" (jisha bugyō)35 was re-established by the Tokugawa regime, but even
though Nobunaga's appointees cannot strictly be called jisha bugyō, it ap-
ppears that Nobunaga had the equivalent of that office in operation from
1575 because the functions performed by Nobunaga's appointees vis-a-vis
the Buddhist institutions were most like those of the jisha bugyō of the
Tokugawa period. Thus, Nobunaga's vassal appointees were to oversee the
Buddhist institutions from without, and the furegashira were to implement
his policies from within the religious structure.

Nobunaga's plan to bind otera together in a strong hierarchical frame-
work was rather paradoxical: on the one hand Nobunaga made every effort
to fracture the tight kyōdan structure that characterized, and gave
strength to, the Honganji monto groups throughout the provinces, while on
the other hand he attempted to develop a form of centralized structure
that would embrace many otera with the appointment of furegashira.

There is yet another paradox in Nobunaga's relations with otera: while on
the one hand he made great efforts to bring the otera under the umbrella
of the central authority by eradicating their special shugo-funyū status
and their independence, on the other hand it was actually a modified form
of shugo-funyū status that Nobunaga wanted all otera to have. Otera that
received new grants of land from Nobunaga had a degree of control over
those lands approaching that enjoyed by otera with shugo-funyū status in
earlier centuries over their holdings. Of course, an otera with a shinchi
grant from Nobunaga had no right to exclude representatives of the central
administration from those lands, as had the otera with shugo-funyū status
in earlier centuries, and under Nobunaga no otera--or any other social
unit for that matter--was to enjoy autonomous juridical power. The right
to grant asylum was no longer to exist, and no otera was permitted to take
a stance in opposition to the policies of the central administration.
Nevertheless, Nobunaga did want each otera to administer its holdings and
conduct its own affairs unmolested by any other parties, and thus he
brought to the otera a degree of self-direction reminiscent of that once enjoyed by otera with *shugo-funyū* status. In the end, therefore, Nobunaga allowed the religious institutions to retain a considerable degree of autonomy, but within the limits determined by the central administration.
Part II

Conclusion
In the foregoing three chapters we have seen how Oda Nobunaga pursued policies designed to deprive the Buddhist institutions of their power. We have distinguished three policies that Nobunaga pursued in order to eradicate the three major types of power possessed by the Buddhist institutions. There is no evidence that Nobunaga himself ever thought in terms of three policies, and it is most unlikely that he did so. He simply brought pressure to bear on those otera that he felt were acting against, or not cooperating with, his program for unifying the *tenka*.

In certain cases it is quite clear that specific otera suffered at Oda's hands because they offended against one or other of what we have identified as his three policies: the Honganji abbot acted like a daimyo and directed the *monto* forces into battle against him, and thus the Honganji offended against Oda's first policy; the Makinoji refused to cooperate with his land surveys, and thus it offended against the second policy; the Kongobuji attempted to maintain an excessive degree of independence, and therefore it offended against his third policy. To some degree most of the larger otera offended against all three of Nobunaga's policies, and nowhere was this more true than in the case of the Enryakuji: it had an army of *sōhei* that posed a threat to him, it strove to hold on to its lands in Ōmi and Mino provinces, and it gave sanctuary to Oda's enemies.

Having seen the nature of Nobunaga's policies towards the Buddhist institutions and the ways in which they were implemented, in Part III we shall attempt to appreciate the balanced nature of Nobunaga's policies and understand their implications and effects.
Part III
In Part III we shall attempt to evaluate Oda Nobunaga's policies towards the Buddhist institutions and their effects on those institutions. In Chapter 6 we shall examine the immediate effects of Nobunaga's policies, and in Chapter 7 we shall consider the long term effects of those policies and the significance of Nobunaga's time in the context of Japanese religious history.
Part III

Chapter 6

An Evaluation of Oda Nobunaga's Policies Towards Buddhist Institutions and Their Effects
Part III

Chapter 6

Introduction
Policies pursued by Oda Nobunaga contributed to a redefinition of the size and shape of the Buddhist institutions and of the role that Buddhism itself was to play in Japanese society in the centuries following the Sengoku period. In order to appreciate the condition of the Buddhist institutions following Nobunaga's time, it is necessary to appreciate the balanced nature of his policies towards them. In this chapter, therefore, we shall consider the following:

In Section 1 we shall examine Nobunaga's relations with the various Buddhist schools.

In Section 2 we shall outline the immediate results of Nobunaga's policies towards the Buddhist institutions.

In Section 3 we shall evaluate those policies.
Part III

Chapter 6

Section 1

Oda Nobunaga's Relations with the Various Buddhist Schools
Oda Nobunaga and the Shin school of Buddhism.

The Honganji branch of Shinshū presented the greatest obstacle to the realization of Nobunaga's goal of unifying the tenka. This was for two reasons:

1. Because of the organizational structure of the Ikkōshū, the Honganji was at the apex of a pyramid of monto who were scattered throughout many provinces and on whom the Honganji abbot could call to rise up in arms against Nobunaga. The Honganji commanded more troops than any of the dai-myo, and thus by sheer force of numbers it was most powerful. In 1587 Hideyoshi acknowledged that Kennyo caused Nobunaga more difficulties than all his other enemies combined.¹

2. The Honganji served as the center not only of the Ikkō monto but of the league of forces that opposed Nobunaga. It was the hub of the anti-Nobunaga league.

Although Nobunaga carried on a ten year struggle with the Honganji monto, and even though, on several occasions, he expressed his intention to tear the monto out by the roots, it does not appear that he ever intended to completely eradicate the monto. He wanted to deny them the ability to participate in uprisings against him, and to have them acknowledge their submission to him. Although on occasion Nobunaga indulged in feelings of rage and vengeance towards the monto, throughout his life he was quite consistent with his policy of bringing them under control, and he rarely let that primary aim slip his mind. If this is not understood, then Nobunaga's willingness to make peace with the Honganji makes little sense. Nobunaga was willing to accept, and indeed encourage, peace negotiations with the Honganji in 1580, and despite the lengthy and bitter struggle he had with it he calmly and rationally constructed a peace with Kennyo and then with
At first glance it is quite surprising that Oda suddenly reopened peace negotiations with Kennyo in March of 1580. By 1580 Oda's position was very strong: he had completely isolated the Honganji, his troops were campaigning successfully in the Chūgoku, and no one threatened his control of the Kinai and central Honshū. By 1580 Nobunaga was confident of victory over the Honganji; while he had exhibited overconfidence in the past, his degree of confidence in 1580 was not unwarranted. Therefore it is totally unlikely that Oda chose to resume peace negotiations with the Honganji out of fear of the monto. It is also unlikely that he did so in order to gain some time as was the case in 1578 when he requested the court to negotiate a peace between himself and the Honganji following Araki Murashige's betrayal. In fact, while Nobunaga was in a position in which it was necessary for him to accept less than the complete surrender of the Honganji, any peace pact into which he entered with it was understood by him to be no more than a respite from hostilities. The peace pact of 1580 was not just a respite; it was to be a lasting peace, and one that greatly favored Nobunaga. In other words, the peace pact of 1580 was not a bilateral treaty at all. Rather, it was an acknowledgement of defeat on the part of the Honganji.

In order for Nobunaga to win the peace it was necessary for him to make certain concessions to the Honganji, but those concessions were of a very minor nature. He promised to quit the Tennōji's Kitajō and Ōshizuka, two assault bases near the Honganji citadel, but with the monto gone from the Honganji there was no need for him to maintain his forces at those bases. It would have been a major concession had Oda agreed to withdraw his men
from those bases while allowing Kennyo and the *monto* to remain in the Honganji, but that was not the case. The only real concession Nobunaga made was his promise to return two Kaga counties to Honganji control, but that too was a rather hollow concession. There was no essential difference between Oda's concession to Kennyo on this point and his practice of awarding religious institutions with new lands by way of his "Red Seal Documents" (*shuinjō*). In effect Oda was simply promising to give certain designated lands to the Honganji, and this did not contradict his basic policies towards Buddhist institutions. The Honganji would have been able to collect taxes from the lands in those two counties, but it would not have held any political position or title because those were held by Shibata Katsuie who was in firm control of the Kaga-Echizen area.

Document 865, issued on May 13, 1580, sheds some light on what Nobunaga's intentions towards the Honganji were at that time. In that document Nobunaga congratulated Chō Tsuratatsu and Shibata Katsuie for their successes in Kaga province, and told them that it was imperative that they have the province under control. It appears that Nobunaga wanted to have Kaga firmly in his grip so that there would be no mistaking the fact that his grant of part of that province to the Honganji was an act freely done and not one necessitated by the fact that Kaga was actually under *monto* control. It was always implicit in Nobunaga's land grants that lands given by him might as easily be taken back by him. Thus Nobunaga's concession to allow the Honganji to control two Kaga counties was not an exceptional act. It was, essentially, a grant of lands controlled by Nobunaga to the Honganji, a type of grant made many times to various otera.

It is possible that Nobunaga made the offer to return the two Kaga coun-
ties in bad faith, and that he never intended to keep his promise. Once the Honganji was evacuated and Kenryo's forces were out in the open, Oda would renege on his promise with the hope of thereby infuriating the monto and causing them to rise up against him, and then he would wipe them out once and for all. Some historians suggest this possibility, but it is a weak one. Had Nobunaga wanted to eradicate the monto once they were away from Osaka, he would have had no trouble finding or inventing some excuse to attack them: he could say that they had broken the terms of the peace pact by harming one of his hostages, by leaving some armed monto in one the the Honganji's branch fortresses, or some such concoction. Besides, by 1580 Nobunaga was in a position in which he did not have to worry about justifying his actions because there was no powerful party to take exception to his actions no matter how unjustified they may have been.

A factor that most likely influenced Nobunaga's decision to make peace with Kenryo and Kyonyo was that he realized the overwhelming difficulties involved in breaching the Honganji citadel. It is likely that Oda did not want to commit tens of thousands of troops for a number of months, and possibly years, to that venture when he had ambitions about the Chūgoku and Kyūshū. Indeed, according to Padre Frois, Nobunaga had plans to mount an invasion of China once he overcame the Mōri of Aki. Therefore, in the interest of extending his sway over a still greater expanse of territory Oda chose not to become bogged down in Osaka. Although the peace pact deprived Oda of the satisfaction of putting the Honganji to the torch, it did bring the monto under his control and this satisfied his first policy towards religious institutions.

A number of documents bear witness to the fact that Nobunaga never adopted
a blanket policy of suppressing all Shinshū otera, or all otera of the Honganji branch of Shinshū. In Document 250 Oda guaranteed the condition of the Kenshōji, and Ikkōshū otera in Ōmi province, and assured it that all was to continue as in the past.\(^5\) This was a reward to the monto of the Kenshōji for their refusal to respond to a call to arms by Kennyo in 1570. In Document 257 Nobunaga commended the Shōtokuji, an Ikkōshū otera in Owari province, for its refusal to participate in an Ikkō ikki.\(^6\) Oda told the Shōtokuji that he intended to punish the Honganji monto, both men and women, wherever he found them, but that he would guarantee the continuity of that otera because of its good behaviour. In Document 419 Oda sent a "letter of prohibition" (kinseijo) to the Senjuji of Ise province, the chief otera of the Takada branch of Shinshū.\(^7\) This document was issued in November of 1573 when Oda was campaigning against the Ikkō monto in Ise province, and it was a reward to the Senjuji for not participating in the uprising against him. In Document 470 Oda permitted the Fukushōji, an Ikkōshū otera in Ōmi province, to continue to enjoy its long standing exemption from certain levies.\(^8\) This document was issued in 1574, a year in which Nobunaga was having much difficulty with the Nagashima monto of Ise province. In Document 701, issued in 1577, Nobunaga forgave seven leaders of the Saiga monto who pledged to abide by his directives following their defeat.\(^9\) Finally, and most significantly, in Document 870 Nobunaga assured the Saiga monto that he would treat them in the same way that he treated the members of all other Buddhist schools.\(^10\)

Therefore, despite the long and bitter war between Nobunaga and the Ikkō monto, it appears that he had no special designs against the Ikkōshū. It was not Nobunaga's character or a special policy towards the Ikkōshū that
caused him to campaign so long and viciously against it. Rather, the Ikkōshū was the most powerful Buddhist group, requiring the most massive campaigns to bring it under control. And yet, all in all, Nobunaga's first policy towards the Buddhist institutions was applied in the case of the Ikkōshū with considerable balance and reasonableness.

Nobunaga and the Shingon school of Buddhism.

Although the Shingon otera of Mt. Kōya and Negoro were fit targets for Nobunaga's policy of eradicating the power of the Buddhist institutions, he had no major conflicts with those otera between 1569 when, as we have seen, he ordered the Kongōbuji to cease its military activities in Yamato province, and 1581 when he attacked it.\textsuperscript{11} There are several reasons for Nobunaga's good relations with Kōya and Negoro:

1. The most important reason is that Nobunaga made use of the Kōya and Negoro sōhei as his allies on several occasions. As long as Nobunaga could use their power to his ends he made no effort to suppress them.

2. Kōya and Negoro were not involved in the anti-Nobunaga league. This is not to say that those otera were not inordinately involved in the conflicts of the day, for indeed they were. But Nobunaga had enough enemies in the late 1560's and through the 1570's without entering into conflict with Kōya and Negoro. It would have been foolish for him to court the enmity of such powerful otera.

3. There are some indications that Shingon otera might have served in some capacity as Nobunaga armorers. In Document 248, as we have seen, Nobunaga thanked the Makinōji of Izumi province, a branch otera of the Kongōbuji, for sending him ten gun barrels.\textsuperscript{12} Whether this was an exceptional gift or part of a contract that Nobunaga had with that otera is not known.
4. Both Kōya and Negoro were located in Kii province, considerably south of where most of Nobunaga's campaigns took place. Nobunaga was involved mainly in an east-west power struggle, and thus Kōya and Negoro were not in his path of expansion. Mt. Hiei and the Honganji were crushed because, among other reasons, they lay athwart Nobunaga's route of expansion. Moreover, Kōya and Negoro were situated in a type of terrain into which a daimyō would have been loathe to send a large investment of men and supplies. It was mountainous, impassable in many places, and not good for agriculture. The flat delta region of Kii, the most prosperous section of the province, was inhabited by the Saiga monto and it was to that area that Nobunaga directed his attention.

The main reason why Nobunaga allowed Kōya and Negoro to maintain their armies of sōhei was not because he recognized their possession of a special right to do so but because, as we have noted, he made use of them as his allies. However, with his victory over the Honganji, Nobunaga no longer needed those sōhei allies and it was time for them to be suppressed. Thus it would seem that Nobunaga's demand that Mt. Kōya deliver over to him the Araki remnant and/or the possessions of Sakuma Nobumori was in fact a challenge to Mt. Kōya to submit to him. In 1581 Mt. Kōya and Negoro were the only powerful institutions in central Honshū that were not under Nobunaga's control.

The most innocent victims of Nobunaga's strikes against Buddhist groups were the hijiri of Mt. Kōya. Nobunaga gained no tactical advantage by their slaughter; they were the unfortunate victims of his anger at Mt. Kōya for its refusal to obey him. The hijiri were the most accessible of all Mt. Kōya bonzes, and they suffered simply because of their affiliation
with that otera. And yet, many of the hijiri were less bonzes than travelling merchants and artisans, and others were most likely spies. This is noted not to justify Nobunaga's action but to show that even in that case there were mitigating factors.

Although Nobunaga's slaughter of the hijiri was vicious and cruel, it was not an act of blind rage directed against any and all pilgrims regardless of what religious group they belonged to. In Document 939 Nobunaga assured the Taga Shrine, a Shinto shrine in Omi province, that he would not mistake its wandering pilgrims for Kōya hijiri and put them to death with the latter. Nobunaga's action was directed specifically against the bonzes of the Kongōbuji.

Some Shingon otera survived the upset of Nobunaga's time by taking care to remain in his good graces, usually by sending him gifts. In Document 235 Nobunaga thanked the Komatsuji, a Shingon otera in Owari province, for some gifts that it had sent him; in Document 406 he warmly thanked the Daikakuji, the ancient Shingon otera in Yamashiro province, for its gift of two "prayer scrolls" (kanzu)—the Daikakuji was especially astute at maintaining good relations with Nobunaga by frequently sending him gifts—and in Documents 921 through 923 Oda thanked the Kongōji of Kawachi province for various gifts. It is clear that Nobunaga distinguished between otera that cooperated with him and those that did not.

Nobunaga and the Tendai school.

With the destruction of Mt. Hiei in 1571 the most powerful Tendai institution was eliminated from the ranks of Nobunaga's enemies. With the exception of his attack on the Hakusaiji, a Tendai otera in Omi province, in
May of 1573, Nobunaga had no major conflicts with Tendai otera.

Hayashiya Tatsusaburō suggests that Nobunaga's destruction of Mt. Hiei was a short-sighted act.¹⁷ He suggests that had Nobunaga concentrated on overcoming the Asakura in 1571, instead of attacking the Enryakuji, he could have then manipulated the Enryakuji bonzes to his advantage against the Honganji because there was little likelihood that the Enryakuji and the Honganji would have been willing to set aside their mutual animosity and work out some kind of pact to stand together against Nobunaga. Thus, says Hayashiya, Mt. Hiei could have become a major ally of Nobunaga in his war against the Honganji. While there would have been some merit to that strategy, several factors made it an unlikely and even dangerous choice:

1. The location of the Enryakuji made it especially dangerous to Nobunaga. In 1570, just one year before his attack on it, Oda had the unpleasant experience of a surprise attack on his rear by Asai Nagamasa during his campaign against the Asakura in Echizen. It would have been most risky for Oda to ally with the Enryakuji and then carry on a campaign against the Honganji with the sohei of Mt. Hiei behind his back overlooking Kyōto. A repeat of the Asai Nagamasa experience would not have been unlikely.

2. It is doubtful that Nobunaga could have attracted the Enryakuji away from its alliance with the Asakura and the other members of the anti-Nobunaga league. A Mt. Hiei-Asakura alliance made no special demands on Mt. Hiei, but even if it agreed to ally with Nobunaga it is not likely that he would have restored its many holdings in Ōmi and Mino provinces which he had confiscated.

3. While there is no evidence to show that Mt. Hiei and the Honganji had entered into a direct alliance, both otera were allied with the Asakura,
Asai, and Rokkaku, and therefore they were united at least indirectly against Nobunaga. Mt. Hiei was one link in the chain of forces lined up against Nobunaga in 1571. Oda's strategy, as we have seen, was to break that chain by taking control of a stretch of territory between Osaka and Echizen province. Unless Nobunaga destroyed Mt. Hiei he would not have had complete control over that important strip of land because Mt. Hiei was located squarely in it.

4. Although Oda was willing on occasion to accept religious institutions as allies, one receives the impression from his documents that he did not feel comfortable with them; he simply did not trust them to any great degree.

In any case, even if Nobunaga had made use of Mt. Hiei for a time, in the end he would have had to eradicate its power.

Nobunaga and the Hokke school.

When Nobunaga took control of Kyōto and the Kinai in 1568 and Sakai in the following year, the two major centers of Hokke monto power were under his authority. From those years until 1579, when there was the Azuchi shūron, Nobunaga was on good terms with the Hokke monto and he was accustomed to stay at Hokke otera when away from Azuchi. Because many of the Hokke monto were merchants whose enterprises Nobunaga was interested in encouraging, relations between them were peaceful.

Nobunaga and the Nara otera.

When Nobunaga was making preparations to enter Kyōto with Ashikaga Yoshi-aki in 1568, he contacted the great Nara otera and requested them not to oppose him. For example, in Document 82, issued on December 31, 1567, Oda
told the Kōfukuji, chief otera of the Hossō school of Buddhism, that he intended to enter Kyōto in the near future at which time he wanted it to display loyalty to Yoshiaki. The Nara otera complied with Nobunaga's request and made no effort to oppose him.

From 1568 until 1577 the province of Yamato, in which Nara is located, was under the firm control of Matsunaga Hisahide, and thereafter under Tsutsui Junkei. Both those daimyo kept a tight rein on the great Nara otera. Occasionally there were minor difficulties in Nara that required Nobunaga's attention—for example, between 1574 and 1579 there was bickering between the Eastern and Western branches of the Hōryūji—but those problems were handled without any show of force.

The Nara otera did not take part in any campaigns against Nobunaga, and they cooperated with his land surveys. During Nobunaga's survey of Yamato province in 1580 the Nara otera delivered over their sashidashi without great protest and, as we have seen, Nobunaga guaranteed their land holdings in Yamato following the kenchi, and thus he wisely avoided any rash acts that might have moved the Nara otera to revolt against him. Nobunaga could have easily crushed any revolts in the Kinai area in 1580, but he would have had to slow down his campaign in the Chūgoku in order to do so and that was repugnant to Nobunaga.

Nobunaga and the Zen school.

Oda Nobunaga's policies towards Buddhist institutions were applied as much to Zen otera as to those of any other school. Many Japanese historians assert that Nobunaga was especially lenient towards Zen otera. Tsuji Zennosuke, for example, says that "While Nobunaga's attitude towards Buddhism
might be summed up by the single word "oppression" (appaku), in the case of the Zen school he had two or three close friends." Thus Tsuji implies that Nobunaga had a special relationship with the Zen school. Nobunaga's documents do not bear this out.

In the first place, Nobunaga was probably more friendly with the Hokke bonze Nichijō Chōzan than with the Zen bonze Takugen Shōon, and yet he did not hesitate to punish the Hokke monto when they caused upset. It is true that Nobunaga granted an exceptional number of benevolent documents to Zen otera. For example, over one third of the seventy-two "letters of prohibition" (kinseiō) that were granted to religious institutions went to otera of the Zen school: Rinzai Zen otera received fifteen of them, and Sōtō Zen otera eleven. Moreover, of all otera Nobunaga appears to have had especially friendly relations with the Daitokuji, chief otera of the Daitokuji branch of the Rinzai Zen school, to which he sent ten documents all of which were friendly. In Document 319, as we have seen, he even exempted the Daitokuji from his jiryō kiha-rei of 1572. It must be noted, however, that the Daitokuji made a concerted effort to maintain friendly relations with Oda. In most of his letters to that otera Oda thanked it for gifts that it had sent him. For example, in Document 451 he thanked the Daitokuji for a gift of some money. Other Zen otera, like the Tenryūji of Yamashiro province, also sent gifts to Nobunaga. In Document 407, for example, Oda thanked the Tenryūji for its gift of aloes. In general, the Zen otera appear to have taken special pains to avoid conflict with Oda, and their gifts to him were often very well timed. In Document 373, for example, Oda thanked the Daitokuji for a bolt of cloth that it had sent him in June of 1573. Around that time Oda was building a fleet of small
ships on which to transport his troops across Lake Biwa in order to at­
tack and depose Ashikaga Yoshiaki. The Daitokuji anticipated Oda's move
and made sure that he would think kindly of it when he marched on Kyōto.
The Daitokuji was especially astute at keeping in tune with Nobunaga's
movements.

It appears that the letters that accompanied gifts to Nobunaga from Zen
oteras often requested information about his itinerary. Evidence for this
is found in Nobunaga's letters of thanks to those oteras for those letters
frequently contained a short note on his campaigns or a promise that he
would report his ventures to the otera in detail when he next visited them.
Such a promise is contained in Document 407, a letter of thanks to the
Tenryū-ji. ²⁵

Despite those friendly exchanges, Nobunaga's policy towards Zen oteras was
no different than that towards oteras of other Buddhist schools. For ex­
ample, letters of prohibition granted to Zen oteras were no more generous
than those granted to oteras of other schools: Document 111, a kinzeiō
sent to the Daitokuji is not at all exceptional; ²⁶ the detailed endorse­
ment granted to the Rinzai Zen otera Hōkyō-ji in Document 477 ²⁷ is not as
generous as the endorsement sent to the Chōenji, a Hokkeshū otera, in Doc­
ument 314; ²⁸ this kind of comparison could be extended to great length.
Most Zen oteras were spared attacks by Nobunaga, but the reason for this
is simple: most Zen oteras did not defy him. Most Zen oteras were neither
antagonistic to Nobunaga nor dangerous—they did not have powerful bands
of sōhei or monto.

However, if a Zen otera defied Nobunaga it was dealt with as harshly as
any other enemy. We have seen, for example, that Nobunaga destroyed the Senrinji in 1581 for allowing the Rokkaku troops to take refuge there. Finally, there is no evidence to suggest that Zen otera were excused from having to hand over their sashidashi to Nobunaga's men who conducted the provincial land surveys, nor were they excused from the various levies that Nobunaga imposed on otera. In Document 562, for example, Nobunaga told several of his vassals who were charged with repairing roads and bridges that the lumber for such repairs was to be commandeered from the Jōkōji, a Rinzai Zen otera, if supplies were insufficient elsewhere.29

It is simply false to assert that Nobunaga pursued a special policy towards Zen otera.

Nobunaga and otera of the Jōdo school.

There is no record of any conflict between Nobunaga and an otera of the Jōdo school. Even the Jōdo bonzes who took part in the Azuchi shūron were not punished by Nobunaga—indeed, they received the victor's prize of fifty pieces of silver. In Document 830 Nobunaga sent his congratulations to the Jōdo bonze Jōan for his "truly incomparable feat" (makoto ni tegarā hirui nashi) in defeating the Hokke bonzes in the religious debate.30

When Nobunaga's new palace-fortress at Azuchi was being built between 1576 and 1579, he ordered that a number of otera, especially otera of the Jōdo school, be established in that vicinity. Imai Rintarō explains that the reason Oda chose to build Jōdo otera was that a great many members of the upper strata of society belonged to that school and such people did not have a hostile attitude towards political authority.31 Watanabe Yosuke concludes his discussion of the Azuchi shūron in his "Azuchi-Momoyama Ji-
dai-shi" by stating that the reason Oda favoured the Jōdo school was that it was weak.³² This seems to have been the case for Jōdo otera were singularly uninvolved in the power struggles of the sixteenth century. Like the otera of other schools that managed to avoid conflict with Nobunaga, Jōdo otera either cooperated actively with him or maintained a very low profile. Otera that did not oppose Nobunaga had no reason to be unduly concerned for their safety. In Document 205 three bakufu officials assured the Amidaji, a Jōdo otera in Yamashiro province, that it had no reason to fear because Nobunaga intended it no evil.³³ Such was Nobunaga's attitude towards Jōdo otera in general.

Nobunaga and Christianity.

It is helpful for an understanding of Nobunaga's policy towards religious institutions to consider his relationship with Christianity.³⁴

It is commonly suggested that the main reason why Nobunaga permitted the Jesuit missionaries to proselytize in his domains was that, given the mutual animosity between many of the Buddhist bonzes and the Jesuit Padres, it was a blow against the Buddhists. It was, in other words, but one other aspect of Nobunaga's "anti-Buddhist" campaign. Also, it is often suggested that Christianity had a special appeal to the daimyo because its clergy were the bearers of exotic news and gifts. It seems, however, that the main reason why Nobunaga endorsed Christianity was no different than the reason why he endorsed other religious groups: Christianity was one religious group among many and it received no more, and no less, than the others. The missionaries were given lands and permission to preach, but they were not exempt from Nobunaga's policies towards religious institu-
tions. Indeed, the Jesuits made a serious mistake in this regard.

The Jesuits were delighted to find in Nobunaga a powerful person who shared their enmity towards the bonzes. Luis Frois quotes Nobunaga as having said of the bonzes: "Not like you are those deceivers... who delude the populace, false and lying and swollen with pride and with arrogance." One can practically feel in Frois' letters to his superiors in Europe the Jesuits' delight over Oda's destruction of Buddhist buildings and religious objects. The Jesuits condemned the bonzes for their idolatry and paganism and for their degenerate life style. It was at their feet that the missionaries laid the blame for the many immoral practises that were rife in sixteenth century Japan: adultery, fornication, polygamy, infanticide, suicide, and regicide. But the reasons for Nobunaga's condemnation of the Buddhist bonzes were not the same as those that inspired Jesuit contempt. When Nobunaga condemned the bonzes for their pride and arrogance and for deluding the populace he did not have in mind the same kind of ethical considerations as the Jesuit padres. It is totally improbable that it was on classical moral grounds that Nobunaga objected to the behaviour of the bonzes. After all, Nobunaga himself was hardly a paragon of morality no matter what criteria one might elect to judge him by: he committed infanticide in 1573 when he put to death Asai Nagamasa's two young sons while sparing his wife and three daughters--and they were spared only because Asai's wife was Nobunaga's sister Oichi. The ousting of the shogun was a sin of the genus of regicide; ritual suicide (seppuku) was the only recourse left for many of Nobunaga's enemies; and one may venture that Nobunaga's sexual mores would hardly have evoked Jesuit admiration.
In the Shinchō Kōki Ōta Gyūichi condemns the Honganji monto for the following reasons:

They no longer stressed the moral practises of the nembutsu path.
They paid no heed to learning.
They were boastful about their greatness.
They spent day and night in boisterous revelry.
They were concerned only with worldly affairs.
They constructed fortified outposts in many places.
They treated provincial officials with contempt.
They disobeyed even the ordinances of their own school.
They even went so far as to seize lands that belonged to others.

The foregoing reasons are most likely the ones for which Nobunaga condemned the monto, and it is to be noted that those reasons concern mainly a type of behaviour that causes upset and turmoil in society.

The Christian missionaries misunderstood the reasons for Nobunaga's objections to the life styles of the Buddhist clergy. Frois and the other padres thought that Nobunaga shared their attitude towards the bonzes, but whereas the Jesuits were contemptuous of the bonzes from the standpoint of Christian ethics and Catholic clerical norms, Nobunaga was contemptuous of a clerical lifestyle that allowed active and militant involvement in secular affairs. Mt. Hiei was evil to the Jesuits because the bonzes were not celibate, because they condoned the aforementioned sins, and because they obstructed the spread of the "good news;" it was evil to Nobunaga because it committed the grave sin of involving itself in conflicts of a secular nature. Such secular involvements would not have been considered evil by the padres because sixteenth century Roman Catholic thinking al-
lowed a high degree of church involvement in affairs of state.\(^{38}\)

Nobunaga himself realized that it was possible to make use of the padres because, like the bonzes, they were not unwilling to bring to bear their spiritual leverage in the secular arena. In fact, Nobunaga made use of the Jesuit padre Organtino Gnechi-Soldo to draw Takayama Ukon, a Christian daimyo, away from his lord Araki Murashige and into Nobunaga's camp when Araki revolted against Nobunaga in 1578.\(^{39}\) Nobunaga promised Organtino that should he be successful in bringing Takayama over to Nobunaga's side, he, Oda, "would favor the Law of God in whatsoever the Padre demanded of him."\(^{40}\) Organtino, accordingly, acted as an agent of Nobunaga in convincing Takayama to betray Araki, and in return for that service Nobunaga gave the missionaries permission to preach and build churches in Azuchi.\(^{41}\)

On that occasion it was advantageous to Nobunaga to use Christianity to his advantage, but we may be sure that he was not so blind as to miss the implications of the Jesuits' behavior. Both Nobunaga and Hideyoshi were all too aware that the padres were willing to use their spiritual powers to material ends. Indeed, the willingness of the Jesuits to actively take part in secular affairs was the rock on which Christianity in Japan perished. Any religious group that was willing to ally with a certain party in a given instance in return for favors promised to it by that party was equally apt to ally with the enemy camp at some future time for promises by that enemy to contribute to the advancement of the private interests of the religious group. To become involved was to automatically become suspect. Nobunaga was surely aware that Organtino was not motivated by a sense of loyalty to Nobunaga or to his cause but by his primary commit-
tment to the Church. Organtino and the Jesuits could not do otherwise, and in the end they could not but be rejected by the unifiers of the Japanese state. The Japanese state allowed but one object of loyalty, not two. As Robert Bellah explains, Christianity was fatal to the concepts of loyalty and filial piety as traditionally understood by the Japanese, and thus it "threatened the core of the traditional value system with its religious base." Ultimately Christianity had to be suppressed more than any other religious group because it supplied for its members a theological/doctrinal basis for treason. No Christian, daimyo or otherwise, could be obliged to obey an immoral command of his superior, but to refuse any command, even the command to commit suicide, was disallowed by the code of the bushi. The Buddhist institutions did not justify their refusal to bow to Nobunaga on the basis of some doctrinal principle but on the basis of precedent. They insisted that privileges granted to them by past daimyo, shoguns, and Emperors were to be enjoyed forever. Thus the Buddhist justification for involvement in secular affairs was, from this viewpoint, essentially weaker than that of Christianity, and therefore the latter had to be rejected. In Nobunaga's time that eventuality never came to pass because he had far more powerful enemies in the Buddhist institutions.

Nobunaga's relationship with the Jesuits was not unlike that with Negoro: he was willing to use them to his advantage when he could and he did not suppress either one, but the suppression of both was inevitable had he lived long enough.

Nobunaga's application of his three policies was consistent: all religious institutions were to cease their interference and involvement in secular affairs, all were to cooperate with his land surveys, and all were to ac-
knowledge their submission to the central administrative authority. Although, as we have seen, some exceptions were allowed, as a general rule all otera were affected by at least one of those policies. The larger and more powerful otera were most often affected by the first policy, but even small otera were touched by the latter two.

Nobunaga was not determined to reduce any particular Buddhist group to a lesser condition than that enjoyed by the others. All otera were to be peaceful and obedient, and those that were survived the storms of Oda's period intact.

It is safe to venture that Nobunaga was on good terms with more religious institutions at any given time than those with which he was in conflict. It is simply incorrect to portray Nobunaga as anti-religious or anti-Buddhist. The religious institutions that Nobunaga attacked almost invariably deserved it for they did stand in the way of the unification of the tenka, at least as Nobunaga envisaged that process. Nobunaga was often the aggressor but rarely the unjust aggressor. He was wont to act in a fair manner towards those otera that did not stand in his way, and those otera were often given guarantees of their condition, various exemptions, and letters of prohibition.

While it is not our primary purpose to demonstrate, for the sake of Oda's historical image, that his policy towards the Buddhist institutions was balanced, unless the balanced nature of that policy is appreciated one is forced to fall back into that type of thinking according to which the Buddhist institutions were dealt with violently and capriciously by a madman. Were that the case, it was simply bad fortune that befell those institutions; it was unfortunate for them that the unifier of the state in the
sixteenth century was an anti-Buddhist despot. But the fate that befell the Buddhist institutions was not generated by such unmeasurable determinants as bad luck. Nobunaga's policy was balanced and consistent in that acts forbidden one Buddhist institution were forbidden all, and behavior allowed one otera was allowed all. The few exceptions that were allowed do not disprove the norm. Nobunaga had no intention to destroy Buddhism, and no desire to give special privileges to any particular school. If he was especially generous to an otera it was not because that otera belonged to a favoured school but because it cooperated with his policies. A Shinshū otera was as apt to receive a document that guaranteed its holdings as was a Zen otera, and Jōdoshū otera were no more exempt from having to hand over their sashidashi than Tendai otera. While Nobunaga's policies were consistent, the means necessary for their implementation differed from school to school and from otera to otera within each school. For this reason Nobunaga's relations with various otera differed greatly.

Having seen the nature of Nobunaga's three policies and the ways in which they were applied to the Buddhist institutions, we shall consider next the immediate results of those policies.
Part III

Chapter 6

Section 2

The Immediate Results of Oda's Policies Towards Buddhist Institutions
The result of Nobunaga's first policy was the eradication of the power of most Buddhist institutions to cause disturbances and upsets in society. Otera that commanded armies of sohei or monto were suppressed and their armies defeated. Although a few otera, notably Mt. Kōya and Negoro, continued to maintain armies of sohei after Nobunaga's death, they were brought under the control of the central administration by Toyotomi Hideyoshi in 1585. Thus the phenomenon of the sohei, which had been a powerful factor in Japanese society for almost one thousand years, went out of existence. Never again were there to be arms-bearing bonzes.

Although there were hundreds of ikki on the part of the peasantry during the Tokugawa period, there were no more Ikkō-ikki. Never again was a religious institution able to act as the hub of a coalition of forces so powerful that it could defy the central administration. The great Honganji, center of Shinshū piety and monto loyalty, was reduced to ashes, and the monto were deprived of their bonze leaders. Thenceforth religious institutions could no longer enjoy the type of militant power they had long possessed. Thenceforth all otera were to maintain an inactive role in secular affairs.

By the time Nobunaga died in 1582 his control extended from the province of Musashi in the northeast through Harima and Tajima provinces in the southwest. Nobunaga's bunkoku embraced twenty-nine of the sixty-six provinces, and it would not have been long before he sent his armies across Awaji and into Shikoku. The Jesuit padre Coelho said of Nobunaga in the annual Jesuit letter of 1582, "if it had not been for the bonzes he would now be lord of the whole of Japan." To become lord of the whole of Japan Nobunaga had to eradicate the power of the bonzes, and that is just
what he did.

As a result of Nobunaga's second policy the wealth of the Buddhist institutions was severely reduced. As a general rule the otera lost their separated estates and their central holdings were reduced to but a fraction of their former size by the application of Nobunaga's new land grant policy. Thenceforth the otera were able to support only a small number of bonzes—sohei could no longer be afforded. The less land, and thus the less power, that the otera controlled, the less capable they were of defying the central authority. As a result of the second policy, in the Tokugawa period the otera were completely dependent on the bakufu for support; they had to depend on the good will of the central administration.

While it is generally agreed that Nobunaga's land policy was responsible for severely reducing the size of otera holdings, accurate statistics as to the degree to which those holdings were cut back are not available. Tamamuro Taijō says that according to the best estimates religious institutions controlled somewhere in the vicinity of twenty to thirty percent of all lands in Japan at the beginning of the medieval period. We do know that in the early Tokugawa period the total grain yield for the entire country was slightly over thirty million koku, and that the total allotment for religious institutions, both Buddhist and Shintō, was roughly 610,000 koku, or approximately two percent of the whole. Therefore, in general, otera holdings were reduced from twenty to thirty percent of the total to slightly less than two percent, and thus the average otera was left with one koku for every ten to fifteen formerly owned.

In a few cases we have fairly accurate statistics on the scale of reduc-
tion of otera holdings: at its peak in the tenth century the Tōdaiji of
Nara held shōen in twenty-three provinces, with a total area of about
14,000 acres, but in the Edo period its holdings were valued at a mere
2173 koku. Thus the Tōdaiji was left with but fifteen percent of its
peak total. Hideyoshi reduced the holdings of Mt. Kōya from 53,000 to
3000 koku, a reduction by a factor of almost eighteen, and he deprived the
Shihonryūji in Nikkō of all but six hundred of its 180,000 koku in 1590.
It was left with but a fraction of one percent of its former holdings.

One must be very careful in drawing any firm conclusions from such statis-
tics. It is impossible to estimate the degree to which an otera actually
suffered by the loss of, for example, its separated estates in the six-
teenth century. The fact is that many otera were receiving no income from
lands still in their names because the local administrators of those es-
tates had ceased delivering the taxes to the owners, or because local dai-
myo had confiscated the estates outright. While many otera had holdings on
paper, they did not profit from them and did not suffer when Nobunaga took
away their rights to those estates.

From another perspective it is true that many otera actually benefited by
Nobunaga’s new land policy. When an otera received a grant of land from
Nobunaga, that otera was assured that the land was indeed under its con-
trol and it did not have to worry about not receiving the taxes from it.
Nobunaga would punish those who failed to recognize the otera’s right over
the land granted or guaranteed by him. Several documents bear witness to
this protective dimension of Nobunaga’s second policy: in Document 198
Oda’s vassal Niwa Nagahide commanded that lands confiscated from the Ten-
nōji, a Tendai otera in Settsu province, were to be returned to it. In
his commentary on that document Okuno Takahiro explains that some Tennōji lands had been seized by Ikeda Katsumasa, master of Ikeda castle in Settsu province and a vassal of Nobunaga, in the preceding year. Thus, even Nobunaga's vassals were not to arbitrarily seize otera lands. In Document 618 Oda commanded that lands that had been confiscated from the Tōnomine, a Tendai otera in Yamato province, by bushi in recent years were to be returned to it. Oda also included in this document a generous guarantee of Tōnomine holdings in Izumi province. In Document 682 there is evidence that Nobunaga was instrumental in bringing about the return of the Shinsen'en, a famous garden, to its rightful owner the Tōji, a Shingon otera in Kyōto. For a time that garden had been dug up and cultivated like a regular rice paddy from which the Emperor received the major portion of the yield, but Nobunaga wanted to restore the garden so he appealed to the Emperor to return it; the Emperor complied. In 1575, one year after the Dōmyōji, a Shingon otera in Kawachi province, was burned down during a battle between Oda's forces and the Ikkō montō and their allies, the Miyoshi, Oda sent it a document in which he sympathized that its destruction was indeed lamentable and he ordered the bonzes to return to the otera with the assurance that the Dōmyōji's holdings were to continue as in the past. In Appendix Document 37 the Emperor Ōgimachi expressed his joy over the fact that Akechi Mitsuhide and Murai Sadakatsu had sent letters of guarantee to two otera in Kyōto's Ōhara district. It is a telling counterpoint to the standard interpretation of Nobunaga's role vis-a-vis the Buddhist institutions to have a document from the Emperor praising Nobunaga for his kindness towards otera.

It will be recalled from our examination of the relationship between Oda
and Ashikaga Yoshiaki that Oda commanded the shogun to leave otera and shrine lands alone. There are many possible reasons for that command: Oda wanted to gain the loyalty of the Buddhist otera and their allies in his struggle with Yoshiaki; it was a pretext to justify the steps Oda took against the legitimate shogun; he wanted to prevent Yoshiaki from seizing otera lands and amassing a great number of estates which he could use as the basis for the development of power independent of Nobunaga. While not denying the likelihood of those motives on Oda's part, his overall treatment of otera causes us to feel that he opposed anyone, including the shogun, who acted in a high-handed fashion towards the religious institutions. This was not because Oda had a special attitude of patronage towards the otera, but because he strongly disapproved of any kind of upsets and disturbances in his domains; each party in his bunkoku was to be safe from aggression by any other party. Otera holdings were to be respected as much as the holdings of bushi. Oda himself, of course, could confiscate what lands he willed in the interest of furthering his ends, but no others could act in that way.

Nobunaga's protective attitude is also seen in the reasons given for his condemnation of Matsunaga Hisahide who revolted against him in 1577. Hayashiya Tatsusaburō says that Nobunaga had three main reasons for attacking the Matsunaga: they took part in the murder of the thirteenth shogun Ashikaga Yoshiteru; they revolted against their masters the Miyoshi (and Oda); and they burned down the Todajī's Daibutsu Hall, the building that sheltered the Great Buddha, in 1567. The third reason may well have been simply a pretext for his slaughter of the Matsunaga family, but once again we find that Oda did in fact condemn actions against Bud-
dhist institutions. Indeed, just a few years earlier, in 1572, Nobunaga commanded all the people in his domains to contribute a small fee monthly for the restoration of the Daibutsu. 57

Nobunaga did not want the religious institutions to be wealthy, and therefore powerful and dangerous, but neither did he want them to be stripped of all their holdings and reduced to a state of poverty. He guaranteed, or granted, to the otera portions of land that were commensurate with their needs. Thus while the otera were greatly weakened, they were not impoverished and in many respects they were guaranteed a degree of security theretofore unknown.

According to Nobunaga's third policy religious institutions were not to enjoy such a degree of autonomy and independence that they could stand without the all enveloping mantle of the central administrative authority. No longer could otera grant sanctuary to enemies of the tenka or bar agents of the central administration from otera holdings. The result of Nobunaga's third policy was that all otera were brought under the control of the central administration.

This does not mean that otera were completely denied any semblance of autonomy. Nobunaga permitted the otera to keep a considerable degree of self-direction; each otera was responsible for conducting affairs on its holdings and even the military governors whom Nobunaga appointed over the provinces were not allowed to treat the otera in a cavalier or high-handed fashion. Each otera was to conduct its own affairs in such a way as to contribute to the smooth running of the province in which it was located. By maintaining peace and order among the inhabitants of its holdings, each
otera could contribute to, and serve as an agency for, the pacification of the populace. To this end Nobunaga frequently endorsed otera autonomy and in a number of documents he specifically endorsed "otera laws" (ji-hō), the ordinances whereby otera administered their holdings and which applied to all who lived on otera properties. For example: in Document 99 Oda guaranteed the Hakusaiji, a Tendai otera in Ōmi province, that its jiho were to continue as in the past; in Document 168 he told the Sai- renji, a Jōdo otera in Settsu province, that he recognized its jiho and those appointed by the otera to conduct its affairs; in Document 477 Oda warned the residents of lands that belonged to the Hōkyōji, a Zen otera in Yamashiro province, that they would be punished if they disobeyed the otera authorities; in Document 836 he gave permission to the Komatsuji and Henshōji, Shingon oteras in Owari province, to punish, at their discretion, farmers who disobeyed the "bonzes' ordinances" (jike no hat-to); in Document 970 Nobunaga told the Myoshinji, a Zen otera in Yamashiro province, that: "Regarding the otera laws of the Myoshinji: the articles drawn up by the group of elders are most acceptable. If anyone offends against them he is to be dealt with by the consensus of the elders in accordance with the norms of the otera laws." Finally, in Appended Document 9 Oda acknowledged that the laws of the Enkyōji, a Shingon otera in Mino province, were to continue as in the past. In Document 176, although there is no mention of the jiho, Oda acknowledged the right of the Myōkenji, a Hokke otera in Yamashiro province, to expel from its lands any people who were there illegally. It is to be noted that the documents in which Nobunaga endorsed otera laws were not confined to the years prior to 1575, as were those documents in which he acknowledged the right of oteras to shugo-funyū status, for one such document was issued as late as 1582.
Thus we can see that Nobunaga permitted otera to conduct affairs on their holdings. In two cases noted above—Documents 836 and 970—he went so far as to allow otera to handle offenders of the otera laws.

Furthermore, in several cases we find that Nobunaga strictly warned bushi not to interfere with the otera: in Document 171 Oda expressed his regrets to the Donge'in, a Rinzai Zen convent in Yamashiro province, over its inability to collect taxes from its Ōsumi estate in that province because of the upset caused by the military campaigns that were conducted in that area in recent years, and he gave it complete authority over that estate and told it to administer it directly. Oda also endorsed the Donge'in's appointed administrator and warned all and sundry not to interfere with its holdings. In Document 493 Oda told the administrators of otera and shrine holdings both within and without Kyōto that their behavior in usurping control of those holdings was treasonous. He warned the administrators that even though they had been properly appointed to their posts by the otera their cases were going to be reviewed.

Nobunaga wanted the otera to contribute to the peace of the country by having all who lived on their holdings abide by the otera laws, and no outsiders were to interfere with the smooth running of those holdings. In order to make sure that the otera would not be able to pursue private goals that were not in the best interest of the central administration Oda appointed the equivalent of jisha bugyō to oversee the otera from without, and furegashira to oversee them from within. As a result of those measures, by the time of Oda's death in 1582 all otera except Mt. Kōya, which was then under siege, and Negoro had been brought under the authority of the central administration.
When Hideyoshi brought about the submission of Mt. Kōya in 1585 he forced representatives of that otera to sign a document of submission, the fourth article of which read as follows: "It is not fitting that enemies of the tenka, rebellious and wicked people, find shelter in the otera." The attitude that Nobunaga had towards otera and that was manifested in his third policy is well captured in this sentence. It was simply not fitting that religious institutions stand without the pale of central administrative authority, and never again would religious institutions be permitted to enjoy such a degree of autonomy and independence that they could do so.
Part III

Chapter 6

Section 3

An Evaluation of Oda's Policies Towards Buddhist Institutions
The great movement that was taking place in the latter part of the sixteenth century in Japan was the reunification of the country. The primary driving force behind that movement was Oda Nobunaga. The momentum that was built up by Nobunaga was carried along after him by Toyotomi Hideyoshi and Tokugawa Ieyasu, and it resulted in the establishment of the Tokugawa bakufu.

The main obstacle to Nobunaga's goal of unifying the country was the Buddhist institutions. While Nobunaga was fighting to establish centralized control over the entire country, and while other great daimyo were ultimately interested in accomplishing this same goal— but on their own terms and not on Oda's—the religious institutions were, at base, conservative. The Buddhist institutions attempted to hold a position against the powerful currents of the times; they tried to maintain a condition that flew in the face of the all-enveloping movement of the sixteenth century. Although it cannot be asserted that Buddhist institutions were opposed to, on principle, the reunification of the country, they did oppose a reunification that entailed the loss of their power and privilege. The otera were not opposed to the type of centralized control that characterized the Ashikaga period, one that allowed the great institutions to enjoy a high degree of autonomy and self-direction, but they did oppose the establishment of a new, strong, central administration that would deprive them of that autonomy and self-direction.

In the sixteenth century a new order was in the process of being born, and the religious institutions had to fit in. Otera that failed to grasp the nature of the times and that attempted to hold on to their status quo on the basis of precedent and past privilege were doomed to failure. To Oda
and those who succeeded him, religious institutions were to be subservient to the tenka and were to enjoy whatever condition the tenka deigned to allow them. Institutions that had long enjoyed considerable power and autonomy were, of course, loathe to accept a lessened condition and therefore, not surprisingly, many otera preferred the old order. Essentially, each otera was forced to choose between the new regime and the old, between the future and the past. To choose the past was to oppose the new, it was to make oneself out of joint with the times, and no acceptable justification for doing so could be argued. Ultimately, then, it was largely the attitude of an otera towards Nobunaga, rather than his attitude towards the otera in general, that determined the nature of his relationship with it.

It is sometimes inferred that it was wrong for religious institutions to attempt to keep their acquired rights and privileges and to oppose the establishment of a united country. According to Okuno Takahiro, for example, "Even though religion ought to obey the polity, Mt. Hiei and the Honganji were unwilling to be deprived of their already acquired rights." While this statement might be correct from the standpoint of present Church-State philosophy according to which religious institutions are not to set themselves at odds with the state, it is not applicable to Nobunaga's time. A most basic problem for many otera was that they simply did not know what kind of a position to adopt vis-a-vis Nobunaga. On the one hand Nobunaga insisted that religious institutions act in the best interests of the tenka, but on the other hand there was serious question as to who bore the right to speak for the tenka, and this was especially true from 1573 when Nobunaga ousted the legitimate shogun. Moreover, the posi-
tion enjoyed by the religious institutions was one that had been built up over the centuries with the approval, at least tacit, of many generations of Emperors and shoguns who had been spokesmen for the tenka in their own times. Ultimately the position enjoyed by the Buddhist institutions was founded on the ōbō-buppo equation, but the actual shape that the Buddhist establishment had come to acquire over the centuries was one gained through an abuse of the power placed in its hands by the formulators of that equation. The degree of power, privilege, and autonomy that the otera enjoyed through the medieval period could never have been foreseen in the seventh and eighth centuries. Part of the tragedy of the history of Japanese Buddhism was that the Buddhist establishment so freely exchanged its spiritual prerogatives for worldly benefits; the otera used their position for selfish and secular ends.

Perhaps it was fitting that the otera be punished for having abused their position. Undoubtedly, many otera long deserved disciplinary action. However, it should not be surprising that they felt no obligation to accept penance from Oda Nobunaga. After all, who was Nobunaga to define the role that the religious institutions were to play in society? It is one thing to argue that the otera should not fly in the face of national polity, but another to assert that Nobunaga's action against, for example, Mt. Hiei, was an act of the nation against that otera. The Enryakuji, Honganji, Mt. Kōya, and the other great otera were not the only ones that refused to identify Oda's will with what was best for the tenka. As a matter of fact, Oda and his followers were the only ones who did. Even the shogun disagreed with Oda, and one would think that it was more his prerogative to determine what was good for the tenka than it was Oda's. To the otera Nobunaga was but one of many daimyo and although it was true that he had been
invited to unify the *tenka*, and thereby had a certain degree of authority, he could not claim to speak for the nation. Nobunaga was not the shogun, and indeed it was he who deposed the incumbent shogun. To disobey Nobunaga was not, automatically, to disobey national polity; rather, to fail to obey Yoshiaki was treasonous.

Therefore Okuno's assertion is incorrect. Even if it could be said that Nobunaga was the spokesman for the *tenka*, the fact is that the Buddhist institutions enjoyed a condition approved by former spokesmen for the *tenka* and justified, correctly or incorrectly, on the ancient and revered principle of the 5b5-bupp5 formula.

The fact is, however, that Nobunaga was, certainly from 1572 at the latest, the person who spoke for the *tenka*, and to Nobunaga it was treasonous for any religious institution to consider that it had some justification for the possession of power, land, and autonomy on the basis of some principle aside from the simple fact that the existing administration, that is, Oda himself, granted it to that otera. Such an otera was adhering to some criterion outside the one recognized by Nobunaga as the basis for determining the condition of religious institutions.

Nobunaga envisaged a form of Buddhism devoted to strictly religious ends and uninvolved in secular considerations. If Buddhism as an institution had been willing to remove itself from a position of secular power, from a center stage position in Japanese history to one in the wings, Oda would have had no quarrel with it. Religion was not to be an actor in the play of state; Oda did not want to have to address it, have intercourse with it, or keep it in mind. He did not want religious institutions in the bu-
shi arena; they had no business to involve themselves in secular affairs. It was not their prerogative. Nobunaga did not make war on all otera but only on those that sought to maintain a privileged condition in defiance of the central administration. He wanted to disarm the Buddhist institutions and reduce them in size in order to preclude any possibility of their rearming. He wanted the otera to enjoy a stable and peaceful existence but he did not conceive of that as possible unless they were without secular power. Therefore Nobunaga attempted to remove from the older Buddhist schools--Tendai, Shingon, and the Nara institutions--a type of economic and political power that they had accumulated over the centuries since the Nara period and to which they claimed a right on the basis of precedent, a precedent founded on the obo-buppō formula. In his conflict with the newer schools, especially the Shin and Hokke schools, Nobunaga attempted to prevent them from establishing a new type of "ecclesiastification" of Japanese society. Buddhist institutions were to observe the peace (Document 901); they were to conduct their own affairs properly and without fear (Document 205); they were to be loyal and obedient (Document 897); they were to cause no disturbances and to make sure that their followers and the people who lived on their lands did likewise. Ideally otera were to be concerned exclusively with things religious: in Document 818 Nobunaga told the Hōryūji that its primary concern should be to educate its bonzes, and in Document 519 Supplement 1 Shibata Katsuie told the Jōshōji and its branch otera in Echizen province to work for the prosperity of the buppō.

Oda Nobunaga had a neat and orderly vision of the way in which a state should be structured. According to that vision, religious institutions were
to have a minor and subservient role in the operation of the state, not a major and aggressive one. They were not to have an active and forceful part in national polity. The overall impression one receives from a reading of Nobunaga's documents is that what he had in mind for the religious institutions was, first and foremost, the aim of forcing them into a weakened and tranquil condition. This peaceful condition was, however, peace on Nobunaga's terms; pacified meant, in fact, obedient to Nobunaga. If a religious institution tended to its own affairs, kept out of conflict with other religious institutions and with the *bushi*, and acknowledged its subservience to the central authority, it could survive the turmoil of Nobunaga's time and enjoy a secure, albeit lessened, condition. Religious institutions that were willing to relinquish secular power were treated quite well by Nobunaga; those that took for themselves a politically active role were seen to be acting out of character and performing acts detrimental to the general good of the *tenka*. Otera were to serve the state, and not their own ends.

While on the one hand it is clear that Nobunaga was willing to accept religious allies, it appears that he was primarily interested in having the religious institutions stay out of secular affairs altogether. As a matter of expedience Nobunaga made use of several otera as allies but such otera were always suspect for an otera that might assist one today might well be against one tomorrow. The religious institutions were not committed to Nobunaga's goal of national unification; if anything they were the opposite, and therefore not trustworthy. In a number of instances, as we have seen, Nobunaga thanked religious institutions for not taking part in Ikko uprisings: in Document 250 and its accompanying Supplement Nobunaga and Hideyoshi guaranteed the Kenshōji, a Shinshū otera in Ōmi province, be-
cause it "was not reckless" (soryaku naki), that is, it did not rise up against him with the other rebellious otera, and in Document 257 Nobunaga congratulated the Shōtokuji, a Shinshū otera in Owari province, for not joining an Ikkō-ikki. Not to take part was, from Nobunaga's perspective, praiseworthy. It was not necessary for otera to campaign actively for Nobunaga; to do nothing was praiseworthy because that was exactly what he wanted religious institutions to do. Otera often received exemptions, endorsements, and letters of prohibition for simply being peaceful and uninvolved.

In the final analysis it must be acknowledged that the Buddhist otera brought destruction upon themselves. The Buddhist establishment in Japan had involved itself to such a degree in things "not of the spirit" that it condemned itself to being worthy of no more preferential treatment than that meted out to secular institutions.

We must conclude from the foregoing that it is incorrect to speak of Nobunaga's relationship with Buddhist institutions in the broad, negative, terms commonly used. It is very neat, but most inaccurate, to speak of Nobunaga as destroyer, Hideyoshi as rebuilder, and Ieyasu as solidifier. Not only does that portrayal do an injustice to Nobunaga—and unduly compliment Hideyoshi—but it fails to recognize the reasonableness of Nobunaga's Church-State philosophy. Admittedly Nobunaga's strikes against some Buddhist institutions were cruelly excessive, but they were not the wild rampages of a madman. Throughout his life Nobunaga rationally and logically pursued his three pronged policy towards the Buddhist institutions. Neither Nobunaga's vision nor the way he pursued that vision give us any reason to think that he was mad. He was not dedicated to the destruction
of Buddhist institutions; his policy of reshaping religious institutions, of depriving them of secular power and privilege and of removing them from the arena of "politics" was not essentially destructive. Buddhist otera were an integral part of the physical and psychological scenery of Japan, and Nobunaga had no intention of ridding the country of them or of reducing them to a state of poverty. To have attempted to do so would not have been in Nobunaga's best interests because it would have nurtured seeds of discontent. The Buddhist institutions were as much a part of the life of the tenka as any other segment of society, but as a segment of the whole otera interests were not to conflict with or defy the whole. To Nobunaga all aspects of the state, and religion was one aspect, were to be subsumed by the state.

One can only speculate as to what would have happened had the Honganji-Mōri combination succeeded in overcoming Nobunaga and in reinstating Yoshiaki as shogun with the Mōri acting as the right arm of the shogunate. Most likely it would not have been long before Mōri Terumoto would have begun to follow Nobunaga's course by ousting Yoshiaki and depriving the Honganji and its monjo of much of their power. In the end Terumoto would have had to best the Honganji because there was no real likelihood that a Honganji-Mōri coalition would have lasted for long. As opposed to speculation, the fact is that there was no possibility of Nobunaga's centralized authority and highly autonomous religious institutions existing comfortably in the same state. In the end the powerful otera that refused to submit to the authority of the newly forming central administration were simply forced to submit. Nobunaga lived by his motto "tenka fubu"--the nation was to be ruled by the sword.
There is a Japanese adage that states that he who does not understand the arts of peace cannot succeed in the arts of war. Oda Nobunaga failed in that he was killed in the famous Honnōji Incident (Honnōji no ran) before his grand vision of a unified Japan was realized. On the night of June 20, 1582, Akechi Mitsuhide, one of Nobunaga's most trusted and high ranking generals, led the 13,000 troops under his command against his lord who was staying at the Honnōji, the Hokke otera in Kyōto where Nobunaga was accustomed to lodge during his visits to Kyōto. Nobunaga, accompanied by an entourage of fewer than two hundred troops, was vastly outnumbered and he died in the conflagration that engulfed the Honnōji and its adjacent buildings. Nobunaga had just turned forty-eight years of age.

One can imagine that the Ikko monto greatly rejoiced on hearing of Nobunaga's death. According to the bonzes his death "was the Buddha's punishment for his having burned down Mt. Hiei." Kose Hoan, author of the Shinchōki, offered a religious, albeit not a Buddhist, explanation for Nobunaga's early death. According to Kose, Nobunaga had lost the protection of the kami because he worshipped demons and because he failed to pay proper reverence to the Emperor. His early death was an act of "Divine Providence" (tento).

Following Nobunaga's death many identified certain signs and omens in his life that predicted an early death. For example, Nobunaga's motto tenka fubu was interpreted to be a bad omen because it contained four Japanese characters rather than the customary three or five, and the Japanese word for four (shi/yon) has the same pronunciation as the word for death (shi). Even the poem that Nobunaga is reported to have recited on the eve of the battle of Okehazama in 1560 was thought to contain a bad omen in its open-
ing phrase, "Man lives but fifty years..." (ningen gojū nen...). On Oda's death in his forty-ninth year, according to the Japanese way of reckoning age, this was interpreted to have been a prophecy of things to come. The most famous prophecy of Nobunaga's downfall is attributed to the Rinzai Zen bonze Ekei of the Ankokuji, an otera in Aki province, ten years before Nobunaga's death. Ekei is said to have predicted that "Oda's era will last five years. He will be in control for three years, and one of these years he will even become a kuge, but after that he will fall, from on high, on his back."

Perhaps the final irony in the Nobunaga-Buddhist institutions relationship is that several places that were closely associated with Nobunaga are now owned by Buddhist otera: the site of Furuwatari castle, where Oda spent his boyhood, now belongs to a Shinshū otera. Furuwatari castle is gone and all that marks the spot where it stood is a memorial stone within the precincts of the Honganji Betsuin of the Ōtani branch of Shinshū. On the site once occupied by Oda's Azuchi palace-fortress, once the most magnificent in Japan and the symbol of his new order, stands the Sōkenji, a branch of the Daitokuji, which was built as a bodaiji for Oda. And finally, the Shūfukuji, a Shinshū otera in Gifu, is Oda's mausoleum.
Thus far we have examined the ways in which the Buddhist institutions were brought under the umbrella of central administrative authority, and the result of that undertaking in terms of the size and shape of the Buddhist institutions. On a more profound level one finds that there resulted from Nobunaga's policies towards those institutions not simply the suppression of their power but rather a radical change in the role that Buddhism traditionally played in Japanese society. In the following chapter we shall attempt to appreciate the impact of Nobunaga's policies in terms of the way in which they determined the place that Buddhism was to have in Japanese society over the centuries following the sixteenth.
Part III

Chapter 7

The Secularization of Japanese Society
Part III

Chapter 7

Introduction
In this chapter we shall examine the change that was taking place in the religious dimension of Japanese society in the sixteenth century in five sections:

Section 1: The place of Buddhism in Japanese society during the time of Toyotomi Hideyoshi and the Tokugawa bakufu.

Section 2: The rise of "human-centrism."

Section 3: The secularization of Japanese society in the late medieval and early modern periods.

Section 4: Oda Nobunaga's role in the secularization of Japanese society.

Section 5: Conclusion.
Part III

Chapter 7

Section 1

The Place of Buddhism in Japanese Society During the Time of Toyotomi Hideyoshi and the Tokugawa bakufu
In the latter part of the sixteenth century the Japanese Buddhist institutions underwent a great change. This change is most commonly interpreted as having been a change for the worst. The policies followed by Oda Nobunaga are commonly seen to have been essentially negative, in that they were directed towards the destruction of the Buddhist institutions, and the overall result of those policies was, accordingly, negative. That is, the power, land holdings, and autonomy of the Buddhist institutions were destroyed or at least severely curtailed. Nobunaga's destructive policy is usually attributed to the fact that he was anti-Buddhist, or that he was mad, or it is explained away by showing that the Buddhist institutions deserved the punishments visited upon them. Thus Nobunaga's policies and their results are described in dark, negative, tones.

Some historians, by contrast, have attempted to see the changes that the Buddhist institutions underwent in the Azuchi-Momoyama period in a somewhat more positive light. This view is expressed by Tsuji Zennosuke as follows: "The Azuchi-Momoyama period was one of restoration. In order to bring about this restoration, first of all the relics of the past were destroyed—they had to be swept aside. It was Nobunaga's mission to destroy and sweep them aside. His destruction was one that preceded construction. Rather than having been a negative destruction, it was a positive destruction. Nobunaga attempted to eradicate all that impeded his unification policy. His policy towards otera and shrines was no exception to this rule." Later in that same work Tsuji said: "Regarding the restoration of the various schools: although Nobunaga's work was largely destructive, we have explained above that it was the preliminary step towards restoration. Following this, the person responsible for construction,
for restoration, was Hideyoshi.\textsuperscript{2}

In the foregoing quotations Nobunaga's policies and activities are portrayed in dark tones, but their overall result is described as positive. Nobunaga is still identified as a destroyer, as the one who swept away the residue of the past, but that activity is interpreted as one of ground clearing. Thus his role is said to have been not purely negative--his destruction is termed "constructive" or "positive" destruction, a strange turn of phrase. Nobunaga's actions vis-à-vis the Buddhist institutions are termed "constructive" not from an examination of the actions themselves, but from an examination of the contribution that those actions made to the period following the Sengoku period. Nobunaga's actions are seen as but one phase in a larger, ultimately restorative, movement. His actions, still characterized essentially as negative, are seen as having been necessary for the purification of Buddhism, and are described as having made a constructive, purifying, reformative, contribution to the establishment of the society that was to follow. Thus an attempt is made to make sense out of Nobunaga's negative and destructive activity; a good result is seen to have come from a bad cause. Nobunaga is identified as the demolisher of the old Buddhist edifice, and Hideyoshi as the architect who reconstructed the Buddhist establishment along cleaner lines. In the long view, therefore, Nobunaga's policies are seen as part of a grand process of renewal and restoration.\textsuperscript{3}

In order to lend support to this interpretation, historians look to the periods immediately following that of Nobunaga and point out how Buddhism enjoyed a revival in those periods. Tsuji Zennosuke, for example, tells us that Hideyoshi, unlike Nobunaga, dealt with the Buddhist institutions with
moderation and tact, and he asserts that in Hideyoshi's time the movement towards unification, peace, and restoration—also in the religious sector of society—left nothing to be desired. Evidence to support this assertion is found in the favourable actions of Toyotomi Hideyoshi and Tokugawa Ieyasu towards Buddhist institutions.

Hideyoshi, it is true, contributed to the repair and restoration of a number of otera, notably the Honganji and Mt. Hiei which was partially restored. While Nobunaga carried on a vicious war with Kennyo and finally exiled him to Kii province following the capitulation of the Honganji, Hideyoshi forgave Kennyo, allowed the restoration of the Honganji, and even donated land in Kyōto as a site for its reconstruction. Moreover, Hideyoshi appointed the Mt. Kōya bonze Mokujiki to oversee the restoration of otera, and it is estimated that Mokujiki was instrumental in having over ninety otera repaired and rebuilt. The symbol of Hideyoshi's Buddhist restoration policy was the colossal daibutsu in Kyōto, the construction of which was begun in 1586 and completed in 1595 when a dedication ceremony involving over one thousand bonzes honored Hideyoshi's deceased mother.

The construction of that daibutsu, which towered just over nineteen meters high—three meters higher than the Tōdaiji daibutsu in Nara—involved the labor of upwards of one million people.

One can also find evidence that Buddhist institutions prospered in the early Tokugawa period. For example, between the years 1600 and 1613 some forty-six otera were restored through the efforts of Toyotomi Hideyori, and at least ten others were restored by the Tokugawa authorities. In addition, some seventy other otera received favourable treatment in the form of large donations of money, guarantees of their holdings, and letters of
prohibition.

To conclude from the foregoing type of evidence that the general movement within the religious sector of Japanese society in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries was a restorative one is simply incorrect. While it is incorrect to assume that Nobunaga's policy towards the Buddhist institutions was simply destructive, it is equally incorrect to assert that the policies of Hideyoshi and the early Tokugawa shoguns were directed towards the restoration of Buddhism.\(^6\) The simple fact is that Buddhism was never restored, in any sense, to the position it enjoyed in Japanese society down to Nobunaga's time.

Hideyoshi was no restorer of the Buddhist establishment, and statistics used to bolster the thesis that he was give a false impression.\(^7\) One could easily use statistics to make a case that Nobunaga was capable of using the Buddhist institutions with more tact and moderation than Hideyoshi. For example, over the years from 1569 to 1581 Nobunaga used the Negoro sohei to his advantage and never once dealt them a destructive blow, but Hideyoshi attacked and destroyed Negoro in 1585. Hideyoshi's policy towards otera did not differ from Nobunaga's. In the spring of 1585 Hideyoshi burned down the Negoro otera and killed over 2000 of its inhabitants because they had assisted Tokugawa Ieyasu in a campaign against him in the preceding year, and at the same time he sent messengers to demand the submission of Mt. Kōya. When Kōya wisely submitted Hideyoshi issued orders that it was to return all lands that it had confiscated, the bonzes were to confine their activities to learning, the otera was to harbor criminals no longer—that is, it was denied the right to grant sanctuary—and it was to act "as in the past," that is, according to otera ideals. Thus, in a
situation similar to many in which Nobunaga found himself Hideyoshi made demands identical to those made by his predecessor. Furthermore, Hideyoshi destroyed many small otera, particularly in the Saiga area of Kii province.

In order to reduce otera land holdings Hideyoshi conducted his famous nation-wide land survey, the taikō kenchi, which was really a continuation of the kenchi made over the years from 1568 by Nobunaga. In the course of that kenchi many otera had their separated estates confiscated. For example, the Shihonryūji in Nikkō had its holdings reduced from 180,000 koku to a mere six hundred. Even Hideyoshi's famous "sword hunt" (katanagari), whereby he stripped the farming class and the religious institutions of all arms in 1588, was but a nation-wide application of a policy followed to some degree by Nobunaga. Between 1576 and 1578, for example, Nobunaga's powerful vassal Shibata Katsuie conducted a sword hunt in the provinces of Kaga and Echizen. Also, in article 3 of Document 555 Supplement 2, issued in December, 1575, Shibata commanded that farmers who lived on lands that belonged to the Shōnenji, a Jishū otera in Echizen province, were not to desert their lands and "take new masters" (shingi no shūdori kore aru bekarazaru), that is, the farmers were not allowed to leave the land and change their social status by becoming bushi. The practise of not allowing farmers to become bushi, a practise followed by Shibata, was strictly enforced by Hideyoshi and later by the Tokugawa.

Hideyoshi also took steps to keep the bonzes under strict control. He separated the elder bonzes from the younger ones by forbidding them to co-habit, and he ordered the elder bonzes to caution their juniors, and the younger bonzes to keep a sharp eye on the activities of their elders. In
1594 Hideyoshi warned all bonzes that they were to strictly observe the laws (jihō) of their otera and devote themselves to the pursuit of learning. Nobunaga, as we have seen, issued identical instructions to the bonzes several decades earlier. Hideyoshi also commanded that each month all bonzes were to make oaths of loyalty, in which they asserted that they were living according to the injunctions of the founders of their schools, to the head otera of their branch of Buddhism, and once a year all bonzes were to present oaths of loyalty to the central administration. Otera were ordered to expel all troublemakers and, should an otera pardon such people, all residents of the otera were to be held responsible and punished accordingly.

Furthermore, Hideyoshi's construction of the Hōkōji daibutsu should not be construed as a sign of the restoration of Buddhism. His daibutsu was a monument not to the Buddha but to the glory of the Toyotomi family and the personal authority of Hideyoshi. Its construction was not an act of devotion; it was a sacrilegious act. Hideyoshi made his daibutsu larger than the Nara daibutsu to reflect a glory greater than that of the Buddha. The construction of the daibutsu also served as a means of weakening both the other daimyo and the peasantry. The daimyo were obliged to contribute the finances, building materials, and the labourers for its construction, and the peasants were ordered to give over their swords and spears in order that they could be melted down and converted into nails for the construction of the great hall that was to house the daibutsu. Thus Hideyoshi used that project as an excuse to consume daimyo wealth and to implement his katenagari. Finally, Hideyoshi's construction of the daibutsu and reconstruction of the Honganji, Enryakuji, and other otera witness not to
his personal piety or esteem for Buddhism but to his efforts to win the
loyalty of the Buddhist clergy and the faithful masses. Hideyoshi used
the Buddhist institutions as tools to pacify and unify the tenka.

Some historians, such as Ōno Tatsunosuke, attempt to distinguish between
Nobunaga's and Hideyoshi's policies towards Buddhist institutions by sug­
gesting that whereas Nobunaga strove to destroy the military power of
the otera, Hideyoshi took steps to weaken their economic base.¹² This is
not correct because, as we have seen, Nobunaga's second policy towards
the Buddhist institutions was designed to reduce their economic power.

It is, therefore, a gross misrepresentation to characterize Nobunaga as
destroyer and Hideyoshi as restorer of the Buddhist establishment. If
Hideyoshi may be called a genius, as indeed he was by James Murdoch, then
so too must Nobunaga because many of the policies followed by Hideyoshi
were implemented earlier by Nobunaga and against much greater odds.¹³ In
any case, Hideyoshi could not have been as lenient towards the Buddhist
institutions as he was had it not been for the prior accomplishments of
Nobunaga.

Turning to the early Tokugawa period, there is no doubt that many otera
were renovated and rebuilt in that period but the "restoration" of Bud­
dhism went hardly any farther than that, than buildings. Besides, much
of the early Tokugawa restoration work was carried out by Toyotomi Hide­
yori, Hideyoshi's son, with the urgings of Tokugawa Ieyasu who saw in that
undertaking a way to use up the wealth of the Toyotomi family. While it
is true that Ieyasu sent guarantees, donations, and letters of prohibition
to some seventy otera, Nobunaga issued several times that many favourable
documents to otera—he issued over seventy letters of prohibition alone.
One must be careful not to conclude from the generous acts of the early Tokugawa bakufu that Buddhism was being restored at that time, that it was regaining an important role in Japanese society in the early Tokugawa period.\textsuperscript{14} Nakamura Hajime says that while the number of otera increased during the Tokugawa period, the social influence of Buddhism decreased.\textsuperscript{15} In \textit{Twelve Doors to Japan} Richard K. Beardsley says that in the Tokugawa period "Buddhism was...strengthened in numbers, but it was in no danger of escaping from government control."\textsuperscript{16} The Tokugawa used the "Office of Administration of Shrines and Otera" (jisha bugyō), made up of vassals of the shogun, to oversee the religious institutions from without, and the furegashira structure, presided over by bonzes, to carry out bakufu commands within the otera hierarchy. As Max Weber is said to have observed, in the Tokugawa period the state functioned not as the patron but as the religious police of Buddhism.

Speaking of Buddhism in the Tokugawa period, Joseph Kitagawa observed that "On the whole, the material security of Buddhism was had at a price. The role of Buddhism was defined not by Buddhism but by the shogunate. Doctrinal deviation was tolerated but the will of the temporal authority might not be disobeyed."\textsuperscript{17} Buddhist institutions never regained the power, the land holdings, or the independence that they had once enjoyed, and thus one can hardly speak of the restoration of Buddhism in the Tokugawa period.

Neither can one speak of the restoration of the Emperor and the kuge. To acknowledge that Nobunaga did not eradicate the kuge and to recognize that he made their condition more secure than it had been at any time over the preceding several centuries is not to agree that he restored them. To acknowledge that Nobunaga bolstered and stabilized the condition of the
Imperial family is not to agree that he restored it. If one asserts that Nobunaga restored the Emperor, the obvious question is, to what? Both the kuge and the Emperor were relegated to the closet of history. They did have a role to play but a symbolic one, one devoid of power. Joseph Kitagawa says that the Tokugawa regime recognized the Imperial and courtier families as special categories within society, and that while it paid nominal respect to the court it did not permit any interference on the part of the court—and, we might add, on the part of the religious institutions—with practical politics. The Emperor and kuge could recommend, suggest, and advise but never command. Of course documents issued by the Emperor were always commands—it would have been infra dignitatem for him to merely recommend—but they were not read as commands by the bakufu. It is quite meaningless to assert that Nobunaga restored the Imperial institution unless one restricts the meaning of the word "restored" to the economic sphere.

It is false, therefore, to describe the Azuchi-Momoyama period as one of restoration unless one is referring only to the fact that the country was reunited under a single, central, authority. It is obvious that the major result of Nobunaga's efforts was the reestablishment of a united country, and in this sense his actions were indeed constructive. But Nobunaga's efforts did not result in a renewed and revivified Buddhism, and thus they cannot be termed "constructive destructive" as Tsuji Zennosuke suggested.
Part III

Chapter 7

Section 2

The Rise of "Human-centrism"
In the Azuchi-Momoyama period Japanese society underwent a most profound change. Writing in the year 1620, Joao Rodriguez Tcuzzu, a Jesuit missionary to Japan, observed that "Japan has been completely renovated and is almost a different nation from of old, even as regards ceremonies and customs,..." 20

It is generally acknowledged that a new sense, a new atmosphere, began to pervade Japanese society from around the time of the Ōnin War in the latter part of the fifteenth century. Japanese historians use a variety of terms to describe the new spirit that was in evidence in the Sengoku period, terms such as "present-world-ism" or "secularism" (gensei shugi), "momentalism" or "carpe diem-ism" (genjitsu shugi), "epicureanism" or "hedonism" (kyōraku shugi), "sensualism" (kanno shugi), "humanism" (ningen chūshin shugi), and even "rationalism" (gori shugi). 21

It is commonly asserted that the atmosphere in the late Azuchi-Momoyama and early Tokugawa periods was exhilarating. The world was in the spring of an entirely new age; a new world of which all men should sing great praise was being born. The sunlight of peace pervaded a world that had suffered a century of war and social upheaval. It was a period of thankfulness and auspiciousness. The world was no longer the world of the Buddhist, it was not a place of which one was to become weary, from which one was to long to depart. It was no longer the world of the "final days" (mappō), but the new age of Maitreya (Miroku), the Buddha who would appear after centuries of the decline of the buppō. The image and promise of the Pure Land tended to fade and this present existence was positively affirmed. Human nature came to be looked upon more as something to be enjoyed.
Nobunaga believed that there is no next world and that nothing exists but what one can experience. In a similar vein a sixteenth century Sakai merchant once said: "In order to attain Heaven one must, by all means, cast aside one's credits and worldly reputation. I do not want to go to any such Heaven!" Shimai Soshitsu, a wealthy Hakata merchant, once professed that "up to the age of fifty prayers for the afterlife are a waste of time. What is most important is that one not lose one's worldly reputation in this life. Things of the next life are of no concern to ordinary people." These quotations witness to a strong sense of carpe diem. Human life, like a dream, is brief. Rather than think on the life hereafter, one was to enjoy what he could here and now and without reserve. The conclusions reached in response to the realization of the transience of life were not those of the Buddhist bonzes who also knew that fact; indeed, they drew the opposite conclusions.

The currents of epicureanism and secularism that swelled up in the Azuchi-Momoyama period frequently expressed themselves, in the seventeenth century, in songs and poems with a theme of the "floating world" (ukiyo), and sensual pursuits gained in popularity among the members of all strata of society. The folding screens (byōbu) and sliding partitions (fusuma) of the Azuchi-Momoyama age were filled with images of flashily dressed people, lords and peasants, men and women, young and old, amusing themselves at drinking bouts, dances, flower viewing, and such activities. There were rich portrayals of scenes in and around Kyōto, of flowers and birds, war scenes, exotic animals and still more exotic Europeans, daily life, play, and love. The risque side of life was a popular theme, and bars, actors, baths, and brothels all enjoyed popularity. Edo's Yoshiwara and Osaka's
Shinmachi, along with Kyōto's Misujimachi and Shumokumachi, rapidly developed and enjoyed much patronage. The three treasures were no longer those of the Buddhists but were, instead, good fortune, happiness, and longevity. And the *sine qua non*, the most prized treasure of all, was financial blessings.

The Azuchi-Momoyama period was an ostentatious and rather garrish one that greatly prized silver and gold. Men bowed down before those precious metals; great otera were visited that their famous treasures might be viewed, and Amida was praised for his golden halo rather than for his Eighteenth Vow. It is said that Hideyoshi, on occasion, covered the floor of his main reception hall with a carpet of gold and awarded sections of it to his loyal vassals.

In Japan, as in Europe, the merchant had been stigmatized traditionally as socially inferior and ethically questionable, but no longer. The centuries following the sixteenth were to belong to the merchants, and even such a refined person as the tea master Sen no Rikyū traded in tea utensils and so turned a small fortune. In the Genroku period (1688-1703) especially merchant tastes dominated Japanese culture. Kabuki originated in the Keicho era (1596-1615) and presented a sense of vitality and life affirmation. The garb was novel and bold, the women lovely, and the themes worldly. Its replacement of the No drama is a significant sign of the spirit of the times.

Throughout the ancient and medieval periods of Japanese history artisans traditionally concentrated their genius on the construction and decoration of shrines and otera for the celebration of the *kami* and Buddhas. In the
Azuchi-Momoyama period there were still some undertakings of that type but artistry had its highest moments not in religious edifices but in the palace-castles of Nobunaga, Hideyoshi, and the great lords. Probably the most striking feature of the Azuchi-Momoyama period was the castles. Nobunaga's castle at Azuchi, where he took up residence in March of 1576, was the largest of its time and it realized in stone, for all men to see, the fact of *tenka fubu*. The grandness of Buddhist otera witnessed to the glory of the Buddha and the wonder of the "other shore," but the scale and grandeur of the Azuchi donjon witnessed to the sufficiency of this shore. The magnificent palace-castles witnessed to the power and glory of the daimyo, not of the *kami* and Buddhas.

Sculpture no longer served to create Buddhist statues but intricate filigree and ornamentation for the palace-castles. Goldsmiths and lacquerers who over the preceding centuries directed their genius to shaping Buddhist altars and ceremonial robes and utensils now made decorations for daimyo palaces and for the mansions of wealthy merchants. The arts were secularized no more so than in the area of painting. Thenceforth no great Buddhist scrolls or objects of worship were to be produced. Artists of schools like that of the Kanō, who did much of the work at Azuchi, produced purely secular art. Grave and solemn portraits of Oda and Toyotomi replaced those of the Buddhas, and those paintings of the Buddhas that adorned some of the rooms of Azuchi castle had little if any devotional significance.

Oda, Toyotomi, and Tokugawa restored otera not to gain the protection of the Buddhas but to display their own riches and power. Besides, the restoration was carried out frequently not in traditional style but with the gilt and rich colors of the Azuchi-Momoyama taste, and more often than not
the restoration of the central object of worship in the otera was completely neglected. The arts served not the Buddhas but the great lords.

Even the Tea Ceremony, which had developed in Zen otera as a simple ritual in which the dust of the ukiyo world was brushed off, was transformed. The tea hut was no longer the retreat of one who left the transient world, for wealth and prestige came to be displayed in the quality of the tea house itself, the tea utensils, the objects placed in the alcove, and in the fine clothing worn during the ceremony. It is said that Hideyoshi even built a golden tea hut. The simple, internalizing, experience was turned into the ostentatious "daimyo tea" (daimyō-cha).

Thus we find evidence in the period following Oda Nobunaga that Japanese society had undergone a profound and most important change, a change that was manifested in all sectors of society. Even though the cosmopolitan and intellectual flavors that were reflected in the Namban arts were to all but disappear under the shadow of the Tokugawa bakufu's "closed country" (sakoku) policy, and even though the loud and garish flavor of the Momoyama period was short lived, nevertheless Japanese society of the centuries following Nobunaga remained basically different from the way it had been before his time.

The most striking fact is that while throughout the middle ages, in both Japan and Europe, religion held sway over men's minds, the focus shifted from the next world to this one at approximately the same time in both those civilizations. In both Europe and Japan traditional religion, Christianity and Buddhism, ceased to provide the central pivot around which man's world revolved. From the fifteenth century the Renaissance, espe-
cially the Italian Renaissance, glorified the natural and emphasized the human, and in the seventeenth century the Deist movement signified the excision of supernatural revelation and institutional religion from the center of human life. The shift in atmosphere and emphasis in Japan of the Sengoku period is sometimes spoken of as the result of the rise of "human-centrism" (ningen chūshin shugi). Indeed, according to Ishida Ichi-rō, "The loss of religious authority and, on the other hand, the rise of human-centrism, was the most remarkable development of this whole period." According to Ishida, dusk had fallen on the middle ages with its world of kami and Buddhas, and dawn had broken on the modern world of human-centrism.
Part III

Chapter 7

Section 3

The Secularization of Japanese Society in the Late Medieval and Early Modern Periods
The profound change that took place in Japanese society in the sixteenth century was paralleled in the European West where the process is traditionally indicated by the word secularization. In the sixteenth century Japanese society was undergoing a process of secularization and it is in this context that Oda Nobunaga's role in Japanese history must be considered. Before doing this, however, it is necessary first of all to turn our attention to the term secularization.

Secularization is a most difficult term to define; there are as many definitions of it as there are of religion itself. Secularization is usually defined in extremely broad terms as a social and cultural process whereby non-religious beliefs, practices, and institutions replace religious ones in certain spheres of life. It is an aspect of a general trend towards structural differentiation in society, in the process of which the loss of the secular functions of the religious order parallels the loss of the religious functions of secular institutions. Thus it inevitably involves the problem of defining the respective competencies of the religious and secular orders and the establishment of the temporal and spiritual authorities. The tensions generated in this process are intensified in the relationship between Church and State. Ultimately the change that was taking place in Japanese society in Nobunaga's time was one that involved the relationship between Church and State, between religion and politics.

This is a most profound problem. It is quite impossible to give a clear answer to the question of the relationship between religion and politics, Church and State, at any given time in Japanese history. One can offer answers to this question in terms of the institutions through which power was exercised in society and the emotional loyalties that those institu-
tions demanded. Thus one can speak of loyalty to the Emperor, to the sho-
gun, to individual daimyo, to Buddhism as a whole, to an individual Bud-
dhist school, and of the suspicions and hostilities which each of those
in different ways aroused. But beyond these considerations are myriad
others, for beyond the institutions and symbols are the interests and
needs from which they spring. Thus one must also consider such complex
factors as family connections, regional loyalties, geographic and psychic
distance from Kyōto, the type and quality of local Buddhist clergy, com-
mercial and economic interests, and so forth. The complexity of this ques-
tion is expanded further by the very nature of religion itself. Religion
is never a mere doctrine concerning the nature of the world and the des-
tiny of the individual human being. It is also the ideal expression of a
particular social and political organization; and yet, religion is more
than a political program idealized. It is a complex amalgam in which many
human instincts are sublimated and harmonized. Church and State, in both
Europe and Japan, were but different aspects of the same society; non-
conformity with established religion invited expulsion from the civil
state. Heretics (or, reformers) were customarily exiled or executed. In
Europe a citizen was synonymous with a Christian. The history of the re-
lation between Church and State reflects society's attempt to define the
balance between the roles played by those two aspects of that society. In
the movement known as secularization answers to the question of this bal-
ance are offered in such a way that religion, the traditional framework
which contained and ordered every aspect of life—the political, economic,
social, and personal—is deprived of some of its traditional roles.

The cause of secularization is next to impossible to assess; one simply
cannot account for the myriad factors involved in and responsible for its
development. Its origins are attributed, in general, to broad economic,
political, social, and religious changes, common to each of which is a
greater separation of the temporal order from religious influences by
the transfer of various functions from religious to secular authority.
The breadth, complexity, and profundity of the web of causes responsible
for the rise of secularization is such that it is impossible to account
for them all in the case of either European or Japanese society.

European scholars point to a number of factors within both the secular
and religious dimensions of society to explain the secularization of
European society. For example: some point to the victory of Nominalism in
fourteenth century Europe as the most critical element in that process;
others emphasize the secularizing effect of the contact between peoples
of one culture and those of another—the Crusades and the explora-
tions of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries are said to have contrib-
uted significantly to the secularization of European society. For this
reason people like Thomas Aquinas were opposed to the development of trade
for fear that it would accelerate the secularizing pace. Perhaps, say
others, newly developed civil states had begun to answer many of people's
needs that had heretofore been answered by religious institutions, with
the result that those institutions had outlived a basic reason for their
existence. Still others speak of the development of cities, the rise of
commerce and trade, the revival of Hellenism, and other broad factors as
largely responsible for the secularization of European society.

The foregoing suggested reasons for secularization are ones that lie out-
side the religious dimension of society. Other, perhaps more important,
causes may be found within the religious dimension. In our consideration of the secularization of Japanese society, we shall confine ourselves to those factors that lie within the religious dimension of society and shall leave aside the overwhelming number of other factors.

Within the religious sector of European society, the loss of Christian unity in the sixteenth century is the factor most commonly singled out by historians as the chief cause of the secularization of society. In other words, it was a development within the religious dimension that was primarily responsible for secularization. In this context the great historian Arnold Toynbee lists a number of shocks that were experienced by the Western Christian peoples, all of which pushed society along the road to secularization. Those shocks included the thirteenth century realization that the Church was intently involved in a struggle for power, the fact that the Church used its power to gain mundane military and political goals, and the divisiveness of the Protestant Reformation and the ensuing wars between Catholics and Protestants.

Basically there were two major sets of factors within the religious dimension of society that were responsible for the rise of secularization, factors that we might identify by the terms "institutional" and "doctrinal." In terms of the institutional factors, in both European and Japanese society the secular-political involvement of religious institutions was a major cause of secularization. In both Europe and Japan the involvement of religious institutions in things secular caused them, eventually, to be treated no differently than the secular authorities whose behavior they emulated and with whom they competed.
In Japanese society, as we have seen, the shape that Buddhism had in the sixteenth century was the result of a long and complex process. In Japan's formative years Prince Shotoku used Buddhism—like Asoka used it in India, and like Constantine used Christianity in Europe—to provide a religious basis for the newly forming state. In traditional Japanese society the relationship between Church and State was defined by the ōbō-buppō formula according to which the secular law and the Buddhist law were seen to support each other. But, as we have seen, from as early as the Nara period the religious institutions took for themselves considerable independence and threatened the nobility. They had become, to use a Japanese expression frequently employed to describe the Buddhist institutions from Heian times on, "fleas on the body of the lion" (shishi shinchū no mushi). The great Heian schools, and later the new schools of the Kamakura period, gained and held considerable power and independence, and although in theory Church and State were mutually supportive, through much of Japanese history they were competitors.

Much of the responsibility for the failure of the Church-State partnership must be borne by the Japanese state itself and not just by the religious institutions. Religious institutions took up arms in the Heian period in order to defend themselves against aggressors because there was no powerful central authority on whom they could depend for protection. Mt. Hiei first employed sohei to defend the otera from attack, and the Honganji first called on its monto to rise in arms in order to prevent their extinction in the Kaga-Echizen area.

By the sixteenth century many Buddhist abbots had ceased to distinguish between their particular religious institutions and the buppō, and this is
brought out in several documents: in Document 506 Supplement 1, a letter from Kennyo to the monto of the Hokuriku district, Kennyo lamented Oda's plan to destroy the school and spoke of protecting and restoring the Buppō. In Document 867 Supplement 2 Kennyo asked the monto of Kai province to send him more troops to defend the Honganji against Nobunaga's attack and he called upon them to strive for the restoration of the buppō. It appears that Kennyo identified the form and structure of Shin Buddhism with the buppō; he identified the form with the essence, the institution in its contemporary shape with the teaching of the founder—a way of thinking not at all unknown in the history of religion. For both Kennyo and Kyōnyo any violation of the rights and prerogatives of the Ikkōshū contravened the buppō. They made no distinction between the buppō and the Honganji institution, and they did not speak of the buppō in the context of its relationship with the ōbo. For Kennyo, as it had been for the succession of Honganji abbots from the time of Rennyo, the defense of the Honganji institution and the defense of the teachings of Shinran were one and the same thing. The well-being of the Honganji institution was synonymous with the well-being of the Shinshū faith. There was little or no distinction in the minds of people like Kennyo and Kyōnyo between the buppō and the Buddhist institutions; the way of the Buddha was not simply an abstracted way of life for it also included the institutional aspects of Buddhism to such a degree that the destruction of an otera, a building, could be called the destruction of the buppō. Thus the enemy of the Honganji institution, the visible manifestation of the Shinshū faith, was the enemy of the faith. He was an enemy of Buddhism (hōteki).

This way of thinking was not confined to members of the Shin school. In
Document 830 Supplement 1 the Hokke bonze Nittei explained to the Hokkeji of Mino province what a great embarrassment it was to lose the Azuchi shûron, and he expressed his hope that through the intercession of the Hokkeji, which was on especially good terms with Nobunaga, the buppō would be restored. By the word buppō Nittei obviously meant his own branch of Nichiren Buddhism. It appears that the Buddhist bonzes of Nobunaga's time were, on the whole, excessively devoted to the prosperous continuity of their institutions. This is not to naively suggest that there is somewhere a pure form of religion that has no institutional manifestation of its existence. Throughout history it never took religions long to develop from communities of people professing the same beliefs to bricks and mortar institutions. Religion needs concrete form and institution, but the religion that comes to pay more heed to the accidents of its tradition than to the substance has lost its mandate and can be destroyed by blows from without. Kennyo was not Shinran—it is doubtful that the long war between Nobunaga and the Honganji would have occurred had a man like Shinran been the Honganji abbot in the sixteenth century.

This question deals, in the end, with man's ultimate loyalties. Christianity ever attempted to subject the political demand of loyalty to the religious—and thus the famous case of a person like Thomas More and, perhaps, Takayama Ukon. In sixteenth century Japan there was a fracturing of loyalties that Nobunaga repaired: Mt. Hiei bonzes were loyal primarily to the chief abbot of the Enryakuji and not to the shogun, and the Ikkô monto were obedient to Kennyo rather than to the local daimyo and shogunal representatives.

It is frequently pointed out that Nobunaga was not against Buddhism itself.
Okada Akio, for example, says that Nobunaga did not suppress the bonzes' "salvific works" (kyūsai katsudō). In one sense this observation is correct, but it is very misleading. It is true that Nobunaga had no doctrinal argument with Buddhism; he simply did not care about that aspect of Buddhism and it mattered not at all to him what the Buddhists believed or practised in liturgical-ceremonial terms. However, it is rarely if ever possible to separate a religion's beliefs and practises from the societal-institutional form that that religion has acquired. In effect, to oppose the societal-institutional form of a religion is to oppose the basic principles that are at the heart of the tradition. In other words, for Nobunaga to have questioned the shape and structure of the Tendai institutions on Mt. Hiei was for him to have questioned the "truth" of Tendai. To attempt to redefine the institutional shape and size of Buddhism, to attempt to redefine the place that Buddhism was to occupy in Japanese society, was to question more than just the external forms of Buddhism. To be against the forms was to be against the essence. Thus Nobunaga's efforts to reduce the power, size, and autonomy of the Buddhist institutions called into question the basic definition of the role of Buddhism in Japanese society. Therefore Nobunaga's efforts to change the size and shape of the Buddhist institutions were directed automatically against the buppo because the two were intimately connected.

Institutionally Buddhism had developed in Japan in such a way as to form a powerful counter force to the central political authority in a way reminiscent of the Christian Church in medieval Europe. Institutionally Buddhism secularized itself; it became more and more secular in terms of its structure and interests. From this institutional perspective we might echo the words of Kose Hoan who, in his Hoan Taikōki, most succinctly explained
the reason for the destruction of Mt. Hiei as follows: "The destroyer of the Sanmon was the Sanmon itself." Finally we might say about the Japanese Buddhist institutions what J. Milton Yinger, the famous sociologist of religion, said about the Catholic Church: "The history of the papacy itself was a story of increasing secularization."

In addition to the institutional factors, a second set of factors that we have called "doctrinal factors" are responsible for the secularization of Japanese society. That is, both Western Christianity and Japanese Buddhism secularized themselves doctrinally—the secularization process did not have its origins simply in the institutional changes in the Christian and Buddhist Churches, and not only in the social, economic, and political changes in European and Japanese society. In Japan, as in Europe, the secularization process had its roots in a complex set of developments within the doctrinal sphere of religion.

In Europe, by its hostility to monasticism, the Protestant Reformation destroyed the contemplative ideal and substituted the standard of practical moral duty. Also, the Renaissance culture of southern Europe represented a secularization from the cloister to the world, from the monastic ideal of religious contemplation to the active life of the world. Life was no longer regarded as a pilgrimage towards eternity but as a fine art in which every opportunity for knowledge and enjoyment was to be cultivated. Ishida Ichirō's declaration that the rise of human-centrism is the most remarkable development of the Azuchi-Momoyama period is echoed by Christopher Dawson's observation that many regard the new attitude towards secular life as the greatest and most characteristic achievement of the Protestant Reformation.
One of the most important commodities that the Protestant Reformation brought to European man was "time." When a person could place his personal faith in Jesus Christ and be assured of salvation he had no more need for the mediating ceremony and celebration of traditional Christianity; he had more time to think of this world, of his life in this world, of man himself. Protestantism, especially Calvinism, is largely a religion of one's doing one's duty in this world; it is, at base, essentially a religion of action. Christopher Dawson quotes Martin Luther as having said that "The right and practical divinity is this: Believe in Christ, and do thy duty in that state of life to which God has called thee."38

In the process of the secularization of Japanese society the single most important causative factor was the very nature of Japanese Buddhism itself. Ultimately, "doctrinally," Japanese Buddhism was its own worst enemy. In a word, Japanese Buddhism secularized itself doctrinally. In Japanese Buddhism, unlike in Christianity, with the exception of one flavor of the Protestant Reformers, there was a logically evolutionary doctrinal trend that led to the inevitable self destruction of the tradition. An examination of the two main branches of Buddhism in medieval Japan—that is, Zen Buddhism with its tradition of "self-power" (jiriki) Buddhism, and Pure Land Buddhism with its tradition of "other power" (tariki) Buddhism—leads one to the realization that the logical development of the basic doctrines of both those traditions ultimately voided the traditions themselves. Both Zen and Pure Land Buddhism developed in such a way as to blur the distinction between this world and the next, between the noumenon and the phenomenon, although they did so in very different ways.

Zen Buddhism so identified the transcendent with the immanent, the "other
world" with this one, that it no longer served to give man the impetus to raise his vision above the level of this empirical world. This is not to say that Zen does not have a most profound and beautiful vision, but that its vision, salvation, lies in the here and now, in us, in a blade of grass or a slap in the face. One does not have to look without, to raise his eyes to a heaven or a God, to find meaning; it is here.

Shinran, as the greatest exponent of other-power Buddhism, so stressed the certainty of salvation, on the basis of Amida's Eighteenth Vow, that it became almost an act of disbelief and a manifestation of one's lack of faith in Amida for one to concern oneself unduly and inordinately with the question of salvation. Even the act of belief in Amida is a gift of Amida. Amida saves. Shinran spoke relatively little of the other world, of the Pure Land; he spoke mainly of this world. The sense of mappō had waned; the mappō world was discovered to be not so bad after all. Amida forgives and saves, so there is no cause for fear and gloom. Indeed, the fruits of salvation which even the peasantry were assured of receiving were to be enjoyed by the believers even in this world. Henceforth it was rebirth in this world that was to be treasured, not rebirth in some other world.

The Zen tradition repudiated and denied the other; the Pure Land tradition absolutely guaranteed one's access to it. In neither case was a person compelled to concern himself with it. In both cases the door was opened to secularization. This development was paralleled in Europe with the emergence of science and rationalism, on the one hand, and the Protestant Reformation on the other. Zen, at least in terms of its influence, was similar to the former, and the Pure Land tradition, both in terms of its influence and, to a distinct degree, "doctrinally," was similar to the
Ienaga Saburō notes the great irony that it was out of the Zen school, with its dominating influence on Japanese culture of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, that there emanated the turn from a religious culture to a secular (seizoku) one. Thirty Takeyama Michio says that in the sixteenth century Japanese intellectuals were rationalistic, Zen was atheistic and practical. The this-worldly attitude of Zen is apparent in the following remark of Suzuki Shōsan, a late seventeenth century Zen scholar: "To pray for a happy future does not mean to pray for a world after death. It means to be delivered from afflictions really and now and thus to attain a great comfort." Perhaps, in this context, we can identify another factor that was responsible for the secularization of Japanese society: Peter Pardue notes that Zen's "mystical affirmation of the world tended to support an uncritical acceptance of social and political institutions." Perhaps the fact that Zen and the other Buddhist schools did, or were able to do, nothing to alleviate the miseries and strife of Sengoku times caused Buddhism to become irrelevant. Once society was restored to peace and unity there was no need to restore Buddhism with it.

Nakamura Hajime brings out the this-worldly flavor of Pure Land Buddhism as follows: "Pure Land Buddhism was originally full of justification for realistic and practical activities which were particularly accentuated in Japan. During the Tokugawa period, the merchants of Ōmi province, who peddled their wares assiduously all around the country, were mostly devoted followers of the Jōdo-shin sect and travelled around in a spirit of service to others." Thus the Zen and Pure Land schools were largely concerned with man's pres-
ent condition, and to the degree that this was true the strictly religious, that is, the transcendent, other-worldly, character of those schools tended to wane. As Frederick Nietzsche is said to have stated, one who is loyal to the earth is the sworn enemy of the transcendent God.

According to Ienaga Saburō, after the fifteenth century there was no development of "Buddhist thought" (bukkyō shisō), and from that time Buddhism lost its place as leader in Japan's "world of thought" (shisōkai). The classical religious spirit was lost. In the Sengoku period, according to Takeyama Michio, "Buddhism lost its powers of spiritual leadership and was increasingly relegated to a shut-off corner of life, where it survived in a moribund state, its inner vitality replaced by empty ceremony. The Japanese lost their sense of the divine. Their temples became historical relics for the casual sightseer, the word 'bonze' became almost a term of contempt, while the traditional 'man of religion' was only to be found in the form of Zen hermits or certain devotees of the Shin sect in the poverty-stricken areas. In Europe, similarly, the Christian heritage had fallen into moral and intellectual discredit, and even the word virtue lost its moral connotation and came to be applied to artists and statesmen (the "virtues" and "merits" of their works). Buddhism in Japan fell into such disrepute that many Buddhist sacred terms came to denote lustful and lascivious acts, and some Buddhist sacred objects were turned into caricatures. For example, the daruma, which initially commemorated the legendary Zen patriarch Bodhidharma, became a legless doll weighted in the bottom in such a way that it would return to the upright position if pushed over.

Institutionally Buddhism was finally and completely brought under the um-
brella of secular authority by Nobunaga and Hideyoshi, but by that time Buddhism had already voided itself doctrinally. Institutionally Buddhism had developed in Japan in such a way as to have become highly secularized, and doctrinally the focus was on this world rather than the other.
Part III

Chapter 7

Section 4

Oda Nobunaga's Role in the Secularization of Japanese Society
Given the complexity of the movement known as secularization, it would be unreasonable to point to Oda Nobunaga as the cause of that movement in Japanese society. Japanese society would have been secularized had Nobunaga ever lived or not. Even though Nobunaga cannot be identified as the primary cause of the secularization process, the policies followed by him were instrumental in speeding that process. Nobunaga was in power at that critical juncture when the change was coming about, and thus he may be looked upon as an important efficient cause of it.

Nobunaga followed, as we have seen, three policies that resulted in the reduction of the power, size, and independence of the Buddhist otera. Quantitatively, therefore, Nobunaga reduced the size of the Buddhist institutions, but the major result of his policies was not simply a quantitative change in those institutions. Rather, there was also a qualitative change, that is, a change in the role that the Buddhist institutions were to play in Japanese society in the centuries following Oda's time. As long as historians continue to focus on the quantitative change that Oda wrought on the Buddhist institutions there is considerable validity to a negative description of his policies and their results. But far more important is the qualitative change for which his policies were partially responsible, and thus our focus must shift from one that dwells on the size of the Buddhist institutions following his time to one that considers the role change that those institutions experienced as a result of his policies. While Japanese historians are most cognizant of the great cultural and societal changes that took place in Japanese society around Nobunaga's time, they tend to overlook the implications of those changes in the religious dimension of Japanese society.
The essential struggle between Nobunaga and the Buddhist institutions was not a quantitative one; that is, it was not basically about the size of the Buddhist institutions. Rather, the struggle was of a qualitative nature; that is, it was a struggle over the interpretation of the relationship between Church and State. The change that Nobunaga was instrumental in bringing about was a redefinition of the relationship between Church and State in Japanese society. What Nobunaga did, in other words, was reject the classic obo-buppo formula. By means of his three policies Oda removed from the otera the layers of power that they had built up over the centuries on the basis of, and through and abuse of, the obo-buppo formula, and he removed those powers to such a degree that in the end he pared away even the obo-buppo formula itself. The layers of power were stripped back one by one until even the basic definitional layer, the obo-buppo formula, was torn away. As a result of Nobunaga's three policies the religious institutions lost whatever justification they had handed down to them from the past for the position they enjoyed in society. Nobunaga supplied a new justification for their social position and curtailed their degree of involvement in national polity. The ideal relationship between Church and State that was defined by Shōtoku Taishi and accepted, at least in theory, for almost a thousand years, a relationship of mutual support, was no longer acceptable.

To Shōtoku Taishi Buddhism was the soul of the state, but to Nobunaga it was one part of the whole, one with no prerogatives or special conditions, and with no justification for being thought of as an advisor or guide to the central administration. Nobunaga's goal was to unify the country, and he identified the religious institutions as a formidable obstacle to the
realization of that goal. The religious institutions had failed to rec-
ognize the prerogatives of the rulers of society to determine policy, and
thus he removed them from competition with the secular order and subjected
them to the authority of the secular state. Nobunaga treated the religious
establishment as a single entity that was obliged to submit itself to a
higher set of values not defined by a consortium of bonzes and nobles.
Nobunaga's higher values were defined in strictly secular terms, that is,
in terms of the unification and smooth running of the state divorced from
spiritual guarantees or goals.

Institutionally, or functionally, Nobunaga united Church and State in that
he related them, in a way unparalleled since Shōtoku's time, in a new hi-
erarchy in which the latter enjoyed higher status than the former, and
doctrinally he separated Church and State in that thenceforth spiritual
exercises were to beget only spiritual rewards and political acts polit-
ical rewards. According to the traditional Church-State formula, secular
works beneficial to the state gained spiritual rewards, but with Nobunaga
Buddhist works were not considered to benefit the state, and secular works
were not considered to beget spiritual rewards. Nobunaga's central admin-
istration had no religious function, and the Buddhist institutions had no
active secular function other than to contribute to the peaceful running
of the country. This arrangement is characteristic of a secularized state
which, as we have noted, is one in which the loss of the secular functions
of the religious order parallels the loss of the religious functions of
secular institutions. It cannot be said that Nobunaga separated Church and
State in Japan; any concept of the separation of Church and State in Japan
is a post-Tokugawa phenomenon.
From Nobunaga's time religion was to be a buttress, not a pillar, of national polity— the latter supports a structure from within, the former from without. Nobunaga had no intention to eradicate Buddhism. He had no anti-doctrinal stance for he simply did not care about that aspect of Buddhism. Institutionally Buddhism was to be preserved on a relatively small scale and it was to contribute to the pacification and smooth running of the state; ideologically it was not to form the foundation of Japanese society. Nobunaga moved Buddhism from its center stage place in Japanese society to one in the wings. Religious institutions were not to have a part in the play of state. To Nobunaga, religious institutions had no business to involve themselves in matters relating to national polity.

With Nobunaga the Church-State partnership that had begun a thousand years earlier was dissolved. As Okuno Takahiro observed, somewhat excessively, the age in which religion controlled men was past. This was the end of the middle ages and the beginning of the early modern period in Japanese history.

In the late sixteenth century Japanese society was reunited, of this there is no doubt, but it was reunited on an entirely new base, with a new ideology, a new spirit. Probably the single most important ingredient of the old order was missing for although there was a restoration of the political and social order, there was no restoration of the religious order. There was, rather, a renovation, a recreation, of the Japanese state. The social upheaval of the Sengoku period was great, and great upheaval is an index, as Christopher Dawson observed, of spiritual change.

The final result of Nobunaga's policies was not the destruction of Buddhism but a redefinition of its place in Japanese society. According to
Hirata Toshiharu, Nobunaga separated society from the magical powers of Buddhism that were thought to pacify and preserve the nation, and opened the way to a new period that had Confucianism as its "spiritual foundation" (seishinteki genri).  

Japanese society shifted its ideological base; Buddhism was to be no longer the ideological underpinning of Japanese society, and Confucianism was inserted in its place. Confucianism was called upon by the early Tokugawa leaders to provide a new basis for society, one directed to the establishment of order in the present world and the formalization of human relationships in a way commensurate with the new order. No longer was Buddhism to be the navigator of the ship of state; it had lost its place in Japanese society. The Buddhist "faith" of those who were involved in the direction of the state was relegated to a place in their private lives. Even when Nobunaga, Hideyoshi, and the early Tokugawa shoguns contributed to the upkeep of Buddhist institutions their acts did not witness to a personal belief; they were not religious acts. On the contrary, they were acts of self-aggrandizement, essentially sacrilegious. The power of the kami and Buddhas had waned; for Japan it was the twilight of the gods. Once again it must be noted, however, that Nobunaga was the efficient and not the primary cause of the demise of Buddhism; the common assertion that Tokugawa Buddhism lacked vitality because of the blows struck against Buddhism by Nobunaga and Hideyoshi is false. Buddhism had already destroyed, as we have seen, its own rationale. Nobunaga really only transferred a powerful but relatively empty shell.

Thus Nobunaga's period marked the end of the attempt to base society on a Buddhist religious foundation, and the beginning of the progressive secularization of the Japanese state. The tendency towards the secularization
of a state, writes Christopher Dawson, is but one aspect of a wider movement which makes for the secularization of culture. Earlier in this chapter we noted the ways in which Japanese culture was being secularized in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. A secular world is not a religionless world, at least not of necessity. There is a place for religion in secular society, and Nobunaga guaranteed for Buddhism a place in Japanese society. Despite the secularization process, religion was far from finished in Japan, and it is incorrect to suggest that Japanese society of the sixteenth century was in the process of rejecting all religion. After Nobunaga's time many otera were rebuilt, repaired, and cared for, and there was still much faith among the people in the saving power of Amida Buddha. The so-called "New Religions" that arose from the late Tokugawa period witness to the continuation of a religious appetite in Japanese society.

In 1569 there was an incident that neatly symbolizes what Nobunaga did to Buddhism. In January of that year Nobunaga granted a piece of land in Kyōto to the Shinnyōdō, a Tendai otera. Nobunaga wanted the land on which that otera stood as a site for the Nijō palace which he was building for Ashikaga Yoshiaki, so he gave it another piece of land and commanded it to relocate and rebuild there. This was not a punishment because Nobunaga guaranteed the Shinnyōdō's land holdings, even its separated estates, and awarded it several favourable prohibitions. In this act of the relocation of a Buddhist institution in the interest of a secular goal we can see symbolized Nobunaga's philosophy: he did not destroy the otera, and he did not confiscate its holdings; he simply moved it. In his relationships with the Buddhist institutions Nobunaga was not simply punishing certain otera for acts deemed reprehensible; he was picking up the
What made Nobunaga unique was not that he stripped the Buddhist otera of much of their power because there were many in Japanese history who did likewise. But those others never brought into question the ōbō-buppō formula itself. In *Sōhei to Bushi* Hirata Toshiharu says that although there were many in Japanese history—like Taira Kiyomori, Minamoto Yoritomo, Hōjō Yasutoki, and Ashikaga Yoshinori—who persecuted Buddhist institutions, they all had a deep faith in the kami and Buddhas and were unable to separate themselves from that faith. Thus, says Hirata, "while they did persecute evil bonzes, they could not but respect the authority of the kami and Buddhas." The aforementioned people never called into question the validity of the ōbō-buppō formula; they punished otera that abused the formula, but they never rejected it, they never doubted, in other words, the right of Buddhism to the role that it traditionally played in Japanese society. Hirata goes on to say that Nobunaga, on the other hand, conquered any fear of the kami and Buddhas and of the buppō. While it certainly cannot be asserted that Nobunaga was unique in his atheism, his lack of respect for and fear of those things held sacred by most others gave him a certain advantage over the other daimyo of his period in terms of his ability to coldly and impartially deal with the Buddhist establishment.

Other daimyo, like Takeda Shingen and Uesugi Kenshin, for example, were Buddhists; the names Shingen and Kenshin are Buddhist names. Like Nobunaga, those daimyo also fought against Buddhist institutions—Kenshin, for example, spent most of his life embroiled in conflicts with the Ikkō monto in the Hokuriku area—but it was one thing to engage in hostilities...
with religious groups that threatened one's control over one's own bun-koku, and another thing to see the entire religious establishment as a single entity that had to be dealt with universally and uniformly so as to redefine its role in society. Uesugi and the other daimyo did not make that shift, but Nobunaga did. In the Sengoku period it was customary for a daimyo to proceed to Kyōto to meet with the Emperor and shogun and declare himself to be a guardian of the legitimate authority. Uesugi Kenshin, for example, made such a visit twice—once in 1553 and again six years later in 1559. On both visits he met with the Emperor and with the shogun Ashikaga Yoshiteru, and then, evidently satisfied, he returned to Echigo. Uesugi saw himself as the protector, the guardian, of the ōbō-bupperō, and like most Sengoku daimyo he considered this to be the supreme honor.

It is possible that at first, following his alliance with Yoshiaki, Nobunaga too felt much the same in this regard as Uesugi. He, Oda, had been invited to restore and unify the tenka, and he was allied with a rightful claimant to the shogunate. But for some reason it appears that Nobunaga soon came to see that his role was not to protect the ōbō-bupperō balance but to remove it. Indeed, some of Nobunaga's contemporaries appear to have realized the implications of his actions against the Buddhist institutions for, as we have seen, the kuge Yamashina Tokitsugu lamented Nobunaga's destruction of Mt. Hiei with the words: "He has destroyed the bupperō....How can there be any more such a thing as the ōbō?" How or why Nobunaga came to think in those terms is not possible to assess. I suggest that there developed early in his life an attitude of repulsion towards what appeared to him to have been a sycophantic attachment to Kyōto on the part of his father and other daimyo, and that this attitude solidified into an iconoclastic view of the traditional structure
of Japanese society. This iconoclasm manifested itself in his casual attitude towards the court and the traditional aristocracy on the one hand, and in an atheistic attitude towards religion in general coupled with a contemptuous attitude towards religious institutions in particular on the other. It is likely that Nobunaga earned the nicknames "Great Fool" (ō-utsuke) and "Idiot" (tawakemono) because of his irreverent, unconformist, and iconoclastic attitude. Perhaps it was necessary that the person who was responsible for redefining the place of Buddhism in Japanese society be one who had no particular attachment to it.

Nobunaga's individual actions against Buddhist institutions were not unique, but in terms of the degree to which he carried the policy of reducing the power of those institutions, he was exceptional. He was thoroughly unscrupulous about destroying what was held sacred by everyone else for traditional claims and precedent meant nothing to him. Moreover, late in his life he was the only person who could implement those policies on a broad, trans-provincial scale. Nobunaga was, as George Sansom observed, "fortune's child in the time and place of his activity."58 History itself had overtaken the traditional role of Buddhism in Japanese society; Nobunaga was simply the tool of fate, as it were, albeit a not unwilling one for the containment of the Buddhist institutions profited him much.
Part III

Chapter 7

Section 5

Conclusion
Again we may return to the question of how destructive Nobunaga was of the Buddhist institutions. This question must be answered from two different perspectives: from a quantitative perspective Nobunaga was much less destructive of Buddhist institutions than is commonly suggested. Historians have greatly exaggerated Nobunaga's destructive intent, and have mistakenly cast him as a fanatic enemy of those institutions. Of course in the light of the condition enjoyed by many Buddhist otera over the centuries it is certainly true that Nobunaga was a destroyer, or at least a reducer, of that condition. From a qualitative perspective, from the perspective of the effect that Nobunaga's policies had on Buddhism as a whole, he was much more destructive of Buddhism than is ordinarily imagined. But can we call Nobunaga's redefinition of the place that Buddhism was to hold in Japanese society destructive?

From the point of view of the history of Buddhism in Japan, indeed it was most destructive. Let us for a moment, however, consider several famous Europeans who had a role in the secularization of their societies. Giuseppe Garibaldi, one of the leaders of the movement to unify Italy in the latter part of the nineteenth century, brought the Papal States--large tracts of land in what is now central and northern Italy that were owned by the Catholic Church until the 1870's--under the hegemony of the central government and out from under the authority of the Pope. Through the 1860's the newly unified Italian state repressed religious houses, seized and sold ecclesiastical properties, and seized Rome itself in 1870. Looked at from one perspective it may be said that Garibaldi was an enemy of religion in that he reduced the secular power of the Catholic Church. Admittedly Garibaldi's methods of attaining his end were much less violent than those employed by Nobunaga, but that is a peripheral consider-
The fact is that the effect was similar. Consider also Thomas Cromwell, advisor to Henry VIII and one of the most powerful figures in England in the 1530s, who was responsible for bringing about the surrender of the great religious houses to such a degree that by 1540 all monastic institutions had ceased to exist and their properties had been vested in the crown. Cromwell secured the total submission of the clergy to the king in matters of legislation. Both Garibaldi and Cromwell effected changes with respect to the religious institutions in their countries similar to those effected by Nobunaga in Japan, and it is in the company of such men that Nobunaga must be ranked and judged. It might be noted that Nobunaga left the religious institutions in Japan with far more possessions than did Cromwell in England.

Perhaps, therefore, Nobunaga's relationship with Buddhist institutions might best be termed "modern" or "progressive" rather than destructive. After all, no modern state would allow religious institutions to bear arms and unduly influence the decision making processes in society. The modern world separates Church and State, or at least it claims to. In fact, no religious group is allowed to perform acts deemed illegal by the secular administration. Members of a church may object to war, but they may not burn draft cards; they may feel that the reception of a blood transfusion is immoral, but they cannot prevent the giving of a transfusion to one of their children who requires it. Religious groups are free to believe as they will, but they are not free to act according to those beliefs when they conflict with the defined policy of the secular state. Institutionally, in effect, the church is subservient to the state. It may speak out against state policy and strive to have the populace refrain
from supporting that policy, but it cannot physically force a policy change. In Nobunaga's case, religious institutions that failed to acknowledge the prerogative of the rulers of society to determine policy were suppressed. There ought to be no reason why this policy should appear strange or destructive to us.

The great irony in this is that Buddhism, which served in the early centuries of the Japanese state as the vehicle to bring about a degree of unity theretofore unknown, had to take a lesser position in the sixteenth century to allow a still higher degree of unification. In its formative period the founders of the Japanese state used Buddhism to bring to the country a degree of unity greater than that which the native Shinto tradition, with its investment in the clan (uji) structure, could possibly provide. In the early centuries the clans had to lose some autonomy in order to become parts of a more complex and unified whole; in Nobunaga's time the Buddhist schools had to lose much of their power and autonomy in order to be able to fit into the newly developing state with its higher degree of unity. To bring a yet further degree of unity to Japanese society Oda Nobunaga "transcended" Buddhism and ushered in a new secular order. In a sense, Nobunaga's task was not to unify the state, it was to create a state; he did not restore, he renovated. The principles that had tied together the Japanese Church-State unit for a millennium had become inoperative. Precedent continued to exist, the ōbō-buppō formula was still in existence, but they failed to inspire unity; worse, they justified splintering. Peter Pardue tells us that in the sixteenth century "Buddhism was increasingly regarded as a political menace precisely because it gravitated toward clan particularism, and, with the exception
of Zen, seemed to add little to political or economic reason." In a word, Buddhism in the sixteenth century stood in the same position as did Shintō in the sixth, and just as Shintō was on the wane for centuries following the rise of Buddhism, so now it became Buddhism's turn to be on the wane in the new philosophical milieu of the secularized state.

In the seventeenth century "Society could no longer be organized as an ecclesiastical polity: the time had come to reshape the Church and to reformulate its place in society." In the preceding sentence, found in W. A. Barker's Religion and Politics 1559-1642, the author was referring to seventeenth century England, but he accurately describes what was happening at roughly the same time in Japan. Again, according to Barker, with the Protestant Reformation "the godly prince in place of the Pope simply became the focus of the community where Church and State were but two aspects of one organic society." In Japan the newly unified state, with the powerful figure of Nobunaga, followed by Hideyoshi and Ieyasu, at the apex of power, became this focal point.

According to Takeyama Michio, Japan "seems to have been the first country in the world to abandon its religion." Takeyama goes on to observe that the secularization experienced by both Japan and Europe did not take place in the rest of Asia or in the Arab world, and he goes so far as to suggest that "the fact that such a change took place was one of the fundamental factors making possible the swift modernization of Japan, just as the absence of such a change in the other countries of Southeast Asia is one of the chief reasons why they have been so slow to modernize." The secularization process that was under way in Japanese society in the sixteenth century continued throughout the Tokugawa period.
Thenceforth the secular state, with its autonomous authority, was to be the guarantor of social order. It is interesting to note that the "house laws" (buke shohatto) that were issued by Tokugawa Ieyasu in 1615 include no transcendent justification for his demands of certain behavior on the part of the daimyo and bushi. It is not stated, as it is in the Jōei Code (Jōei shikimoku) of 1232 or the Kenmu Code (Kenmu shikimoku) of 1336, that by acting according to the directions of the code one would please the kami and Buddhas. The older codes were religious statements, but Ieyasu's code was an ethical injunction that reflects the secularized values of the Tokugawa era.

According to W. A. Barker, the English Reformation resulted in the monarchy's assumption of supremacy over the Church which became the ecclesiastical department of state. Such was also the case in Tokugawa Japan: the establishment of the "Office of the Administration of Otera and Shrines" (jisha bugyō); the institution of the "Office of the Inquisition" (shūmon aratame yaku), that is, the office charged with assuring that everyone in the country was a registered member of an officially recognized otera; the appointment of furegashira; and the rigid structuring of all otera along "Home otera" (honzan or honji)-"Branch otera" (matsuji) lines, all witness to the Tokugawa regime's "departmentalization" of religion. As we have seen, many of Nobunaga's programs were antecedents of those Tokugawa institutions: Murai Sadakatsu was, in effect, head of the jisha bugyō; Nobunaga's effort, through Shibata Katsuie, to place Honganji monto under the authority of the Shōmyōji of the Takada branch of Shinshū reminds one of the type of activity carried on by the shūmon aratame yaku; and his appointment of the Jogon'in over all other Jōdo otera in the Azuchi area was an act similar in design to the Tokugawa regime's rigid
structuring of otera.

To fill the void left by Buddhism the Japanese intelligentsia turned to Confucianism. Yazaki Takeo notes that "while Buddhism had dominated the moral consciousness of the Japanese up through the medieval period, it was replaced now by Confucian precepts, promoted by the ruling class in support of the new system of stratification." It is the general contention of Ienaga Saburō that the negative, transcendent, and religious message of Buddhism ultimately failed to take precedence over the positive, this-worldly, and ethical teachings of Confucianism. J. Milton Yinger tells us that "A religious movement which was not committed to the support of the old social order held a great advantage in winning the allegiance of the new. That does not mean that secular changes create new religious developments, but it does mean that the success or failure of a doctrine, whatever its source, is closely related to secular conditions." Thus it was to Confucianism, specifically to the Neo-Confucianism (shushigaku) of the Sung dynasty, that the Japanese turned.

Neo-Confucianism had been in Japan from Kamakura times when the Zen Gozan otera imported it and incorporated it as an intrinsic part of Zen learning. From mid-Muromachi times Neo-Confucianism came to be studied for its own sake, apart from Zen learning, but its study was still undertaken mainly by Zen bonzes. Even Fujiwara Seika (1561-1619), who is principally responsible for developing the study of Neo-Confucianism apart from the Zen tradition by the establishment of his school of Confucianism called Teshu-gaku, began his career as a Zen bonze. Seika became laicized with the famous declaration: "Buddhism is divorced from human affairs and it also destroys man's sense of duty; thus it must be declared an erroneous teach-
Seika thence became a layman, a Confucian scholar, and a famous teacher whose greatest student was Hayashi Razan on whom Tokugawa Ieyasu bestowed the title "Doctor" (hakase) and the position of First Secretary to the bakufu in 1606. With Fujiwara Seika and his followers there came about the secularization of learning and thought.

In Europe, especially in France, as early as the sixteenth century there was an increasing tendency among intellectuals to abandon religious issues and devote their attention to the idea of a rational religion common to all sensible men. In place of the Christian faith there developed a belief in the moral perfectibility and the potential for progress of human society. Men's views, says Christopher Dawson, were "transformed into a rational enthusiasm for moral and material progress." The French religious wars of the sixteenth century gave rise to the party of Politiques who placed national unity before all religious considerations--Nobunaga, Hideyoshi, and Ieyasu would have well understood their position. Beginning in the seventeenth century European intellectuals searched for a rational approach to faith in the study of nature itself, and a "religion of nature" substituted for Christianity. As Dawson points out, "The French Enlightenment was, in fact, the last of the great European heresies, and its appeal to Reason was in itself an act of faith which admitted of no criticism."

Interestingly, Hayashi Razan may be quoted as having said: "The Way of Gods is nothing but Reason (li). Nothing exists outside of Reason. Reason is the truth of nature." "Reason" meant, of course, something different to Hayashi than it did to the European thinkers: to the latter it meant universal reason that applied to all men everywhere; a discerning, dis-
criminating, rational faculty that was focused primarily on nature, on the empiric world of the senses. To Hayashi Razan and the Japanese Confucians reason signified one pole of the primal chi-li equation, chi being the atmosphere, the material principle that originated all physical phenomena, and li being the metaphysical basis of it. Although Hayashi did not talk about a universal law of man, his focus was on things, on the universe and the principles underlying it, rather than on any kind of transcendent noumenon. Hayashi and the Japanese intellectuals turned less to reason in the European Enlightenment sense, that is, to the mind and the world of nature and science, than to China and their own past history where, as they had done before, they sought new norms for society. The grand intellectual developments of Renaissance and Enlightenment Europe never appeared in Japan, but the changes that took place in the religious dimensions of those societies were strikingly similar.

In both Europe and Japan the dominant form of religion had run its thousand year course. The religious-intellectual torch was passed to a different kind of person: an Aquinas passed the torch of ideological leadership to a Descartes, a Shinran to a Razan. Europe had its Luther and Calvin, Japan its Hōnen, Shinran, and Nichiren; Europe had its Descartes and Newton, Japan its Neo-Confucians, "Dutch scholars" (rangakusha), and classicists (kokugakusha). In Japan, Buddhism was a normative and powerfully directive and definitional force for the one thousand years between Shōtoku Taishi and Oda Nobunaga; in Europe, Christianity was a most potent, formative, force for just over one thousand years from the time of Constantine. In both cases those great religions were instrumental in contributing to their host countries a higher degree of societal unity than
they had theretofore known, and in the case of both there was a collapse, a thousand years later, in the face of the secularization of Japanese and European society. In both cases the religious traditions were doomed to fall before states that were on the point of becoming highly unified internally.

Ironically, the historical, institutional forms that were adopted by Buddhism in Japan and Christianity in Europe could be maintained only so long as the political worlds in which they existed remained fragmented to the extent that the religions could maintain a degree of autonomy that no "modern" state could accept. In a word, and all Buddhist and Christian theory to the contrary notwithstanding, both Japanese Buddhism and European Christianity endorsed, in practise, an ideal of a bi-polar society. Church and State were in a sense one, but the former was not to be subject to the latter. There was little chance that the State would ever become subject to the Church in either Europe or Japan in a theocratic society, and thus the thousand years of Church-State history were characterized by tension between the two.

In Europe the transformation of man's world view required a somewhat more drastic act on the part of the intelligentsia than did the equivalent transformation in Japan. The reason for that is that the Christian tradition had much more of an exclusive hold over the mind of European man than did the Buddhist tradition in Japan. Together with the Buddhist world view, the Japanese had always preserved their native Shinto tradition, and from the sixth century Chinese Confucianism was an integral part of the Japanese intellectual mix. Thus for the Japanese intelligentsia to move away from Buddhism did not require a radical repudiation of their entire reli-
gious tradition up to that point. They could find within the boundaries of the Japanese religious-intellectual tradition other ways of looking at the world; the Confucian tradition, especially the Sung brand of Neo-Confucianism, was part and parcel of Japanese culture from long before the Azuchi-Momoyama period. Thus the Japanese only had to shift their focus from one stream of the Japanese tradition, albeit the main stream for a thousand years, to an already long present other stream. This was not the case in the West. Over the centuries Christianity dominated the European world view because it had succeeded either in eliminating optional world views by declaring them heretical, or in absorbing them into its corpus of myth, legend, and folk level religion, with the result that there was no discernible other stream to which to turn. In the end, European thinkers looked to Christianity with a critical eye and abstracted many elements from it; they "de-supernaturalized" it. Christian moral laws were divested of all ascetic and other-worldly elements and made to stand on their own, apart from their matrix. And, of course, European man turned away from revelation and faith to the human mind and natural science. Because of this difference between the European and Japanese religious traditions, the Western experience of secularization was perhaps more painful than the Japanese, with the result that the experience itself had been dwelt on and examined most often by historians. The Japanese experience, having been less radical in the term discussed, has been largely overlooked by historians.

References have been made to Europe in this chapter not, primarily, to draw comparisons between Western, European, history and Japanese history. The variables that one encounters in such a task are so great as to render
it most difficult, if not impossible, to draw any meaningful conclusions.

Our focus has been on religion; while it is impossible to draw religion completely out of its historical context, it is possible to observe that two religious traditions, belonging to two radically different cultures, had extraordinarily similar types of development. By making use of Western studies on the rise, development, and demise of its dominant religious system, one might understand better what may have been causing the major religious system in another culture to follow the same steps. European historians have studied very carefully the secularization of European culture and society, while Japanese historians have neglected to examine, by and large, developments in Japanese religious history from that perspective. One can understand better the transition of Japanese society in the sixteenth century when one places that transition in the context of the secularization of Japanese culture. And one will understand the significance of Oda Nobunaga's role in Japanese history only by viewing it in that context.
Footnotes
Introduction

Throughout this paper individuals will be referred to by those names whereby they are remembered to history, regardless of when they acquired those names, rather than by other names that they used during different periods of their lives. Thus, Oda Nobunaga will be called by that name rather than Oda Kikutōshi, the name he had in his youth, and Toyotomi Hideyoshi will not be referred to by his earlier names Kinoshita Tōkichi and Hashiba Hiyoshi, even though he did not take the name Toyotomi until 1586, well after Nobunaga's death.


Oda Nobunaga was born in June, 1534, and died on the evening of June 20, or the morning of June 21, 1582. For conversion of dates from the Japanese calendar to the Western calendar, see Paul Y. Tsuchihashi, Japanese Chronological Tables, Monumenta Nipponica Monographs, No. 11 (Tōkyō, 1952).

The Ishiyama Honganji will be discussed in detail in Chapter 1, and Oda Nobunaga's relationship with it will be examined in Chapter 3.


John W. Hall, op.cit., p. 67. Hall notes, for example, that George Sansom stressed the shift from clan to family as the basis of social organization.

John W. Hall, op. cit., p. 67. Hall goes on from the preceding quotation to note that what has been lacking in the study of the Sengoku period "has been a recognition of the full magnitude and variety of the institutional changes which accompanied the emergence of the modern daimyo and the capacity to describe these changes comprehensively." Professor Hall's focus is on institutional history rather than religious.


Okuno Takahiro, Oda Nobunaga Monjo no Kenkyū, 2 vols. (Tōkyō: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1971). This two volume work was completed in 1971, although the first volume was published in 1969. Subsequently a second edition of the first volume was published in 1971, and of the second volume in 1973. A third edition is also planned. I have used the first edition of volume two, and both the first and second editions of volume one; the second edition of volume two had not been published when my research was being done. The second edition contains but minor differences from the first. For the
sake of consistency all references to Oda Nobunaga Monjo no Kenkyū in this paper are to the first editions of both volumes. Throughout this paper Oda Nobunaga Monjo no Kenkyū will be indicated by the abbreviation ONM.

Besides this work by Okuno Takahiro, several other works that contain analyses of Oda Nobunaga's documents have been used extensively: Kuwata Tadachika, Nobunaga no Tegami (Tōkyō, 1960); Kuwata Tadachika, Oda Nobunaga no Tegami (Tōkyō, 1966); and Kuwata Tadachika, Sengoku Bushō no Tegami (Tōkyō, 1967). The first two of these three works deal exclusively with Oda Nobunaga's letters, and the third examines letters written by ten Sengoku period military figures, including Ashikaga Yoshiaki, Toyotomi Hideyoshi, Tokugawa Ieyasu, and others in addition to Nobunaga.

8 For a detailed description of the number and types of document contained in Okuno's collection, see "Notes on Primary Sources" in the bibliography.


Throughout this paper all references to the Shinchō Kōki are to Kuwata Tadachika's edition, which will be referred to simply by the abbreviation SK. See "Notes on Primary Sources" in the bibliography for a short description of this work.

It is generally agreed that the proper reading of the title of Ota Gyūichi's biography of Nobunaga is Shinchō Kōki, and I shall therefore abide by that consensus. However, a reading of the Shinchō Kōki causes one to feel that the title would be more appropriately read Nobunaga-Kō Ki. Throughout the work Ota Gyūichi most frequently refers to Oda Nobunaga as "Nobunaga-Kō", that is, Lord Nobunaga, and therefore it would be fitting to have that reading in the title of the biography.

A second biography of Nobunaga entitled the Shinchōki, was written by a Confucian scholar named Kose Hoan in 1622, twelve years after Ota Gyūichi wrote his, Kose based his biography of Nobunaga on Ota's work, and he twisted Ota's material in such a way as to cast Nobunaga as a Confucian. To that end he inserted into Nobunaga's mouth a number of expressions that are purely Confucian and highly untypical of Nobunaga. For example, Kose frequently has Nobunaga stress the importance of learning. Moreover, he attributed Nobunaga's death to, among other things, his failure to pay due homage to the Emperor. For these reasons the Shinchōki was not used as primary source material for this paper. For a good evaluation of Kose's description of Nobunaga see Kobayashi Kenzō, "Edo Shoki ni okeru Shiron no Ikkeishiki ni tsuite," Shigaku Zasshi, XXXVIII, No. 8 (August 1927), 55-69. Hoan's family name may also be read Koze, Ose, and Oze.

10 "Ji" is the Chinese reading (on-yomi) and "tera" the Japanese reading (kun-yomi) of that character. It is proper to attach the honorific "o" to the kun-yomi, thus rendering our pronunciation "otera". Because the term otera shall be used throughout this paper as an English word it will not be underlined.

11 This is the definition of an otera according to Shinmura Izuru, Kō-
The word otera will be used throughout this paper in a somewhat personalized sense. That is, it will refer not specifically to a Buddhist building and its precincts, but to the buildings and their resident clergy and/or lay affiliates. Thus, for example, we can speak of Nobunaga's relations with the Mt. Hiei otera and of actions taken by that otera. Similarly, the name of a given otera will be used in this same sense. Thus we can say, for example, that the Enryakuji plotted against Nobunaga. This usage will eliminate constant repetition of expressions like "the leaders of..." or "the followers of..." the Enryakuji. Finally, the word "monk" will not be used, as is customary, to translate the Japanese "bozu" or its equivalent. Instead, we shall use the word bonze, or clergy, because these words have less Christian overtones than the word monk.
Chapter 1

Secondary materials that have been used in writing this chapter are:

General histories of late medieval-early modern Japan:

General Histories of Buddhism:

In addition to the foregoing Japanese works, a number of other works, in both Japanese and English, were used to a lesser extent. See the bibliography for references.

1 For an interesting discussion of Shotoku Taishi and his role in early Japanese history see Jacques H. Kamstra, *Encounter or Syncretism: The Initial Growth of Japanese Buddhism* (Leiden, 1967). Kamstra contends that Shotoku's role in the sixth and seventh centuries was greatly exaggerated by early Japanese scholars in order to downplay the power of the Empress Suiko and the Soga family in that period. Suiko was downplayed because she was a woman, and the Chinese historical models that the Japanese were attempting to use did not assign a high place to women in directing affairs of state. The Soga, according to Kamstra, were downplayed because they were of Korean ancestry.

2 The expressions "ōbō-buppo formula" and "ōbō-buppo equation" are not used by Japanese historians to designate the early Japanese Church-State philosophy. Indeed the term ōbō appears to have been coined by the bonze Rennyo, chief abbot of the Hōganji branch of True Pure Land Buddhism (Shinshū), in 1474 to designate the secular authority. Nevertheless, throughout this paper we shall use that expression to indicate the close relationship between Church and State in the early centuries. In the sixteenth century an expression similar to that one was in use: in Document 264 Supplement 1 (*ONM*, I, 436-437) the Emperor Ōgimachi referred to the "buppo-hōso" as the "foundation of peace" (buppo-hōso heian no moto). The term Hōso means Imperial throne, or Imperial reign, and thus buppo-hōso has essentially the same meaning as buppo-ōbō. There is no change in meaning whether the expression is read buppo-ōbō or ōbō-buppo, but for the sake of consistency we shall use the latter rendering.
Some Japanese scholars, like Kashiwahara Yusen for example, use the expression **obo-buppo** when they deal with the problem of the relationship between Church and State in the early Meiji period. Kashiwahara used the expression to indicate the so-called "two wings thesis" (sōyokuron), that is, the thesis according to which Buddhist Law and Imperial Law were the two wings of the Japanese bird of state, and he also used it to indicate the so-called "mutual identity thesis" (sōsokuron) which has the same basic meaning as the former. See Kashiwahara Yusen, *Nihon Kinsei Kindai Bukkyō-shi no Kenkyū* (Kyoto, 1969), pp. 347 and 359.

Although, as we have noted, the expression **obo-buppo** did not exist until the late medieval period, the phenomenon that it indicated dominated Japanese society from the earliest centuries.

4 The Taihō Code, promulgated in 701, defined the theoretical basis of government in Japan and it was accepted, at least in theory, down to the mid-nineteenth century. The Taihō Code is not extant but a revision of it that was made in 718, the Yōrō Code, is. According to that code, "The central government consisted of two main divisions—the Department of Religion and the Department of Administration, with the former taking precedence over the latter." See David Lu, *Sources of Japanese History* (New York, 1974), I, 27.

5 The Japanese word "shū" that is here rendered into English as "school" is commonly translated as "sect." "Sect" is a mistranslation of "shū" according to Leon N. Hurvitz: "The only English word that will do it justice—and rough justice at that—is 'school';" Hurvitz, op. cit., 664. Throughout this paper the word "school" will be used whenever the Japanese "shū" is translated. Therefore, Shinshū will be translated as the Shin school, or it will be simply left in the Japanese.

6 "Bonze-soldiers", usually translated into English as "monk-soldiers", came to be called **sōhei** in the Edo period, prior to which time they were called "wicked bonzes" (akuso). It is the latter term that is found in Nobunaga's documents. See, for example, Document 657, ONM, II, 222-224.

7 Chief otera of the Hossō school of Buddhism, the Kōfukuji was built in Nara in 669 by the wife of the famous Fujiwara no Kamatari. Throughout Japanese history it was one of the most powerful otera. The Enryakuji, first called the Hieizanji until the name was changed in 823, was founded by the Tendai bonze Saichō (Dengyō Daishi) in 783. The Enryakuji is situated on Mt. Hiei, an 848 meter high mountain roughly nine miles to the northeast of the center of Kyōto. The name of that mountain was commonly used as the name of the Tendai school of Buddhism, thus the Hiei school. Rivalry between the Tendai bonzes Ennin and Enshin led, in 933, to a split within the school: Enshin's followers left the mountain and established the Jimon branch of Tendai with the Onjōji—more commonly known as the Miidera—as its chief otera, and the Enryakuji was thenceforth recognized as the chief otera of the Sanmon branch of Tendai. The Enryakuji was always looked upon as the center of Buddhism in Japan.

8 The Kongobuji was the first Shingon otera and was founded by the bonze Kūkai (Kôbō Daishi) in 816. It is commonly called Kōya-san, or simply Kōya, after the name of the mountain in Kii province on which it is situated. In 1130 the Shingon bonze Kakuban built another otera, the Daidembō-in, on
Mt. Kōya. In 1288 the bonzes of this otera opposed the Imperial promotion of the abbot of the Kongobuji, broke away from it, and moved their headquarters to Negoro, a short distance to the west of Mt. Kōya, where they built the Negoroji, or Negoro-dera, and formed the Shingi branch of Shingon Buddhism. The Kongobuji was the chief otera of the Kogi branch.

9 These statistics may be found in Nihon-shi Jiten, ed. Takayanagi Mitsunaga and Takeuchi Rizō (Tōkyō: Kadokawa Shoten, 1966), p. 977.

10 It is extremely difficult, and not of great importance to our topic, to obtain accurate estimates of the size and value of otera holdings throughout the early and medieval periods of Japanese history. Although the koku was a somewhat standardized measure of volume, it fluctuated from age to age and from place to place. As a very general norm we will accept the measurement that one koku equals one hundred and eighty liters, or approximately five bushels, of rice. Thus one koku of land would be that acreage necessary to produce, in the average yield, five bushels of rice. As a general rule one koku of rice was the amount required to support a person for a year; most of the rice was eaten and the remainder was used to trade for farm implements, cloth, and such necessities. An otera with a yearly income of 100,000 koku could support, theoretically, the same number of bonzes, but realistically somewhere in the vicinity of two-thirds of that income would go to the upkeep of the properties and buildings, and therefore the otera could in fact support around 30,000 bonzes.

11 Tamamuro Taijō uses the French word "asile" (asylum, sanctuary) to describe that aspect of shugo-funyu status. See Tamamuro Taijō, Nihon Bukkyo-shi, III (Kyōto: Hōzōkan, 1968), 37. This is a valid choice of terms because the right of sanctuary in Christendom in the medieval period was most similar to the right enjoyed by Mt. Kōya.

12 Some large and famous cities began as monzenmachi: Nara began as a "town before the gates" of the Kofukuji, and Sakamoto was a monzenmachi of Mt. Hiei. The modern day outstanding instance of this phenomenon is Tenri City in Nara prefecture which began to develop around the headquarters of Tenrikyō.


14 Much material is available on the development of medieval Japanese Buddhism. An especially good work on the great medieval reformers is Ienaga Saburō, Chūsei Bukkyō Shisō-shi Kenkyū (Kyōto, 1963).


17 Peter A. Pardue, op. cit., p. 134.


19 For a detailed account of the relation between Church and State in medieval Japan see Kuroda Toshio, Nihon Chūsei no Kokka to Shūkyō (Tōkyō, 1975).

20 John W. Hall, op. cit., p. 68.

21 There is considerable dispute over the exact dates of the Sengoku period. Many consider it to fall between the end of the Ōnin War and 1600, others consider it to extend only to 1568 when Oda Nobunaga entered Kyōto, and some others say it ended in 1573 when Nobunaga deposed the last Ashikaga shogun.

22 There is also considerable disagreement over the exact dating of the Azuchi-Momoyama period. Some consider it to have begun in 1568, others in 1573; some consider it to have ended in 1598 with Hideyoshi's death, others in 1600 with the Battle of Sekigahara, others in 1603 with Tokugawa Ieyasu's attainment of the title of shogun, and still others in 1615 with the final suppression of the Toyotomi family. For a discussion of this issue see Suzuki Ryōichi, "Oda-Toyotomi Jidai no Jidai-Kubetsu ni Tsute,," Rekishi Kyoiku, XI, No. 10 (1963), 18-23.

23 It is to be noted that the term "Azuchi-Momoyama" is a misnomer in that the place where Hideyoshi's castle was built was not called "Momoyama" until after Hideyoshi's death, before which time it was called Fushimi. Fushimi was a town in Yamashiro province on the southern outskirts of Kyoto, and Azuchi was on the northeastern shore of Lake Biwa in Ōmi province. Nobunaga moved into Azuchi castle in March, 1576.


27 For a good description of the relationship between Sengoku daimyo and the religious institutions in their domains see Okuno Takahiro, Sengoku

These statistics are found in Nihon-shi Jiten, ed. Takayanagi Mitsu-naga and Takeuchi Rizo (Tōkyō, 1966), p. 1031.

Many Shinshū buildings were too small to merit the designation of otera, and many of them housed no clergy. Jiin were small branch buildings of an otera, and dōjō were somewhat akin to "parish centers." Where-as a jiin served more as a devotional center, a dōjō served as a local community center. To avoid confusion we shall refer to all Shinshū otera, jiin, and dōjō by the term otera.

Shinshū is sometimes called Montoshū after the termmonto that means adherent, follower, or disciple. The termmonto refers to both the individual Shinshū follower and the groups of them organized into kyōdan.

The whole question of the structure of the Shinshū organization is a complex one with many aspects of it yet to be understood. In dealing with the Shinshū mon to I have relied mainly on several works: Kasahara Kazuo, Ikkō-Ikki no Kenkyū (Tōkyō, 1962); Kasahara Kazuo, Chūsei ni Okeru Shinshū Kyōdan no Keisei (Tōkyō, 1971); and Inoue Toshio, Ikkō-Ikki no Kenkyū (Tōkyō, 1969). For an especially good description of the mon to structure see Inoue Toshio, Ikkō-Ikki no Kenkyū (Tōkyō, 1969), pp. 257-295.

For details on the mon to organization in Kii province see Kasahara Kazuo, Ikkō-Ikki no Kenkyū (Tōkyō, 1962), pp. 706-725.

No lengthy treatments of the mon to organization in Nobunaga's home province of Owari are available. For a short note on it see Kasahara Kazuo, op. cit., pp. 797-800.

For an excellent work on Rennyo see Kasahara Kazuo and Inoue Toshio, Rennyo: Ikkō-Ikki (Tōkyō, 1972). For a good English language work on Rennyo's role in the development of the Shinshū organization see the unpublished dissertation (Harvard University, 1972) by Minor L. Rogers, "Rennyo Shōnin 1415-1499: A Transformation in Shin Buddhist Piety."

The Honganji branch of Shinshū was one of nine branches that were in existence in the sixteenth century. The Honganji is the principal branch of Shinshū and it took its name from the otera that was built by Shinran's daughter and grandson in 1272. There was a number of successive Shin otera with that name: in 1457 the Kyōto Honganji was burned down by the sōhei of the Enryakuji so a new one was built at Yoshizaki in Echizen province; that one was burned down by rival mon to of the Takada branch of Shinshū, so a new one was built in Yamashina, near Kyōtō, in 1480. When the Yamashina Honganji was destroyed by the Governor General (kanrei) Hosokawa Harumoto in 1532, the headquarters of the Honganji branch was moved to the site of modern Ōsaka where the immense Ishiyama Honganji was built. It was this Honganji that was the center of Ikkōshū power during Nobunaga's time, and against which he campaigned. For an excellent history of the Hon-

36. *Monto* provincial administrators were usually called "Bonze Representatives" (*daibōzu*), that is, they represented the Honganji abbot in the provinces. Sometimes they were called simply "bonze officials" (*bōkan*), and modern historians often refer to them as "bonze daimyō" (*bōzu daimyō*). See, for example, Kasahara Kazuo, *Ikkō-Ikki no Kenkyū* (Tōkyō, 1962), p. 671.

37. The designation *Ikkōshū* was not applied originally to the Honganji Branch of Shinshū at all. Rather, from late Kamakura times it referred to the followers of the bonze Ippen, founder of the Ji school of Buddhism in 1275. Indeed, Rennyo did not like that designation and he lamented the fact that the term was applied indiscriminately to his school as well as others: "It is completely wrong for the term Ikkō to be applied to us and to others as well." Quoted in *Nihon-shi Jiten*, ed. Takayanagi Mitsu-naga and Takeuchi Rizō (Tōkyō, 1966), p. 63. Despite Rennyo's objections, the term *Ikkō* became the popular name of the Honganji branch of Shinshū. Rennyo himself used the name "Nembutsu-shū" for the school, and "Nembutsu-sha" for the *monto*.

38. The word *ikki* has several distinct meanings: it can mean a member of an organization or fraternity, or an uprising, a disturbance. Thus *Ikkō-ikki* means either an uprising by the Ikkō *monto*, or the body of *monto* themselves. Nobunaga used the term most frequently in the former sense, although in a few documents he used it in the latter: for example, in Document 461 (*ONM*, I, 766-767) he referred to the "*Ikki-domo*:" that is, the Shinshū Honganji *monto*. Used in that way the term meant "rebels" or "rioters." For a good short description of religious uprisings see Inoue Toshio, "Shukyo Ikki," Iwanami Köza Nihon Rekishi, ed. Suzuki Ryōichi, et. al., VIII (Tōkyō, 1963), 157-188.


40. Kasahara Kazuo, op. cit., p. 439. This expression is commonly used to refer to Kaga province when it was under *monto* control.

41. It is not our province to delve into the complex question of the underlying causes of *Ikkō-ikki* and the Honganji's role in them. There are many opinions as to the nature of *Ikkō-ikki*: Kasahara Kazuo, the foremost authority on the *Ikkō-ikki* and the author of a number of books and scores of articles on that topic, tends to interpret the uprisings as a class struggle between peasants who were united by a religious bond, and *bushi*. Inoue Toshio, a leading economic historian, argues that Honganji leadership was made up of both peasants and local warriors, and that their motivation was more political than ideological, more to maintain and expand personal power and prestige than to fight a religious war. David L. Davis, an American scholar presently working on the Kaga *Ikkō-ikki* says that those *ikki* were not in any sense primarily religious movements, but were political movements by the so-called *kokujin* class of *bushi*, and that their association with the Honganji did not result from religious motives but from the fact that in the areas where they operated the local Honganji leadership and village leadership were indistinguishable. (David L. Davis,


43 Quoted in Kasahara Kazuo, op. cit., p. 628.

44 Tamamuro gives several samples of this type of dealing between daimyo and the Honganji in Tamamuro Taijō, *Nihon Bukkyo-shi*, III (Kyōto, 1968), 20-21.

45 For a description of the relationship between the Hosokawa and Rennyo and his son Jitsunyo Kōken, see Michael Solomon, "Hosokawa Masamoto (1446-1507) and the Emergence of Honganji as a Military Power," a paper read at the Annual Meeting of the Association for Asian Studies, Toronto (March 1976).


47 Kennyo Kōsa was the son of Shōnyo Kōkyō, and nine years Nobunaga's junior. He died in 1592 at the age of 49.

48 Nobunaga's invocation of the *kami* and Buddhas appears to have been according to a set formula because in Documents 853 and 878 (*ONM*, II, 472-474 and 509-510) identical wording is followed. The *kami* and Buddhas invoked were:


Hachiman Daibosatsu: the Shintō *kami* of war.

Hakuzan: bordering on the provinces of Ishikawa and Gifu, Hakuzan is one of the three most famous mountains in Japan and it was long an object of veneration. See Shinmura Izuru, *Kōjien*, p. 1774.

Atago: a Shintō *kami* who was believed to prevent destruction by fire, and who was venerated at a shrine atop a mountain in Kyōto. See *ONM*, II, 109.

Ujigami: one's ancestral guardian *kami*. The Tsurugi Shrine in Echizen province was the home of the *ujigami* of the Oda family.

The formula whereby those *kami* and Buddhas were invoked was used not only by Nobunaga but by his vassals as well. For example, in Document 561, Supplement 1 (*ONM*, II, 107-109) it was used by Nobunaga's vassals Matsui Yūkan and Miyoshi Yasunaga.

Even the diseases that one called down upon himself should he break his pledge were standardized: Nobunaga usually "requested" *byakurai*, a type of leprosy in which the skin turns white, and *kokurai*, in which it turns black.

49 It is commonly asserted that membership in Buddhist schools in the Sengoku and Shokuhō periods was along the lines of Shinshū among the peasants, Nichirenshū among the townspeople, and Zenshū among the bushi class. No statistics are available to support this claim but, with reservation, it shall be accepted as valid as far as such generalizations go. It would be more accurate to speak of Shinshū as having been popular among people
who lived in the provinces somewhat removed from the Kinai rather than among the peasantry strictly speaking.


51 Tamamuro Taijō, op. cit., 31. The Nichiren school always possessed the unenviable talent of attracting bushi ire. Nichiren himself was twice exiled and once condemned to death by the Hōjō lords whose right to rule he dared to question.

52 Tamamuro Taijō, op. cit., 20.

53 Some other examples are supplied by Tamamuro Taijō, op. cit., 20-21.

54 Tamamuro Taijō, op. cit., 21-22.


56 The bonzes called "gakuryo" in the Shingon school were called "gaku-shō" in Tendai. The meaning is essentially the same.

57 The "gyōnin" of the Shingon school were called "dōshu" in Tendai. Again, the meaning is essentially the same.

58 The term "hijiri" originally meant any especially virtuous Buddhist bonze, but from the tenth century it came to refer specifically to those bonzes who left the otera and wandered throughout the countryside praying, preaching, and collecting alms for the home otera. The hijiri were largely responsible for the dissemination of Buddhism among the masses during the medieval period. Mt. Kōya was particularly famous as the mother otera of many hijiri who were especially anxious to have people decide to have their ashes interred on Mt. Kōya because it was considered to be conducive to quick salvation to be buried near the grave of Kūkai. In the sixteenth century a certain decay had set in and many of the hijiri were little different than travelling merchants and, because they traditionally enjoyed the right to cross borders with impunity, many were suspected of acting as spies for one group or another.

59 The relationship between Nobunaga and Ashikaga Yoshiaki will be examined in some detail in Chapter 2.

60 This expression will be discussed in the following chapter.
Chapter 2

1 In addition to the general histories that were noted in footnote 1 Chapter 1, the following secondary works on Oda Nobunaga have been used extensively in preparing this chapter:

2 Aida Yūji, for example, suggests that Nobunaga may have had sexual relations with his sister Oichi, wife of Asai Nagamasa. Later in the same work he says that Oda never lost his head over a woman, "the poor fellow!" (komatta otoko da naa). See Aida Yūji, et. al., Oda Nobunaga (Tōkyō, 1972), pp. 183 and 272.

3 A detailed examination of Nobunaga's character might be found in a proposed forthcoming biography of Nobunaga by George Elison.

4 Jin is the first and greatest of the Confucian virtues. In Aida Yūji, op. cit., 265-277, the authors demonstrate that Nobunaga had neither Confucian virtues nor a Confucian attitude.


6 Ibid., 310.

7 James Murdoch, A History of Japan (Kobe, 1903), II, 143.


9 Those policies will be examined in detail in Chapters 3, 4, and 5.

10 This story is recounted in many works. I have used the version in Aida Yūji, et. al., op. cit., p. 182.

11 This story, recounted originally by Padre Frois, many be found in a number of Japanese works. See, for example, Kuwata Tadachika, Oda Nobunaga no Tegami (Tōkyō, 1966), pp. 84-85.


13 Okada Akio, "Nobunaga to Hideyoshi," Nihon no Rekishi (Tōkyō: Yomiuri Shinbun-sha, 1965), VII, 53. It is not stated where evidence that Nobunaga went crazy may be found.

14 Sir George Sansom, op. cit., 313.
15 Aida Yūji, et. al., op. cit., 186.
16 ONM, I, 769-771.
17 ONM, I, 36-37.
18 ONM, I, 513-514. See also Okuno Takahiro's comments on Document 311 in ONM, I, 515.
19 Tsuji Zennosuke, Nihon Bunka-shi (Tōkyō, 1970), Supplement III, 20. Tsuji does not cite his source for this story, and I have not found it in any other works on Nobunaga.
20 That letter is Document 628, ONM, II, 189-191. "Tōkichirō Onnadomo" is Hideyoshi's first wife Sugihara Yasuko, who is better known to history by her title Kita no Mandokoro.
21 All or parts of this letter are quoted in a number of works, and the versions vary somewhat. This quotation is a composite translation of the versions found in ONM, II, 189-190, and in Kuwata Tadachika, Nobunaga no Tegami (Tōkyō: Bungei Shunjū Shinsha, 1960), pp. 184-185. Note that in that letter Nobunaga referred to Hideyoshi by two of his names, Tōkichirō and Hashiba, and by the nickname "bald rat" (hage nezumi), a nickname by which Nobunaga commonly referred to Hideyoshi. Actually Hideyoshi's common nickname was "monkey" (sarū), and a number of reasons are suggested for its origin: Hideyoshi was born in the year of the monkey; his mother's maiden name was "small monkey" (Kosarū); his face resembled that of a monkey. Amusingly, one can even find debates over whether Hideyoshi's face resembled more closely that of a rat rather than a monkey! In any case, it appears that Hideyoshi was far from handsome.
22 Kuwata Tadachika, op. cit., pp. 184-185.
23 This letter, Document 1117, ONM, II, 826, is also found in Tsuji Zennosuke, op. cit., 88. The identity of the person "Fumoshi" is unknown.
24 Interesting and valuable insights into Hideyoshi's character may be found in a work based on a number of his private letters. See 101 Letters of Hideyoshi: The Private Correspondence of Toyotomi Hideyoshi, ed. and trans. Adriana Boscaro, Monumenta Nipponica Monograph, No. 54 (Tōkyō, 1975). The main reason why Nobunaga's private letters are not extant is that most of the people with whom he had close contact were eradicated, or faded from an important place in history, following his death. With them perished Oda's personal letters. Interestingly, most of Nobunaga's extant documents were preserved by Buddhist institutions over the centuries since his death.
26 Shingen's words are quoted in Hirata Toshiharu, Sōhei to Bushi (Tōkyō, 1965), p. 259.
Ibid., p. 259.

Dairokuten Maō was a demon who tried to prevent Gautama from attaining his goal while he was on the way to Buddhahood. See Oda Tokuno, Bukkyō Daijiten, p. 1169. By extension that term refers to anyone who obstructs the Buddhist path, any enemy of Buddhism. Oda confessed, indeed boasted, that he was such a one.

Aida Yūji, et. al., op. cit., pp. 197 and 186.

For a Japanese translation of Frois' detailed description of this event see Kuwata Tadachika, Oda Nobunaga no Tegami (Tōkyō, 1966), pp. 85-87.

SK, p. 191.

ONM, I, 462-463.

ONM, I, 766-767.

ONM, II, 447.

ONM, II, 30 31.

ONM, I, 457-458. Document 278 was written on June 8, 1571.

In Document 280, ONM, I, 459-460, Nobunaga told his vassal Inoko Hyōsuke to transmit his command to his forces to put to death all "rebels" (ikki) no matter whose vassals they might be. This document was issued on July 5, 1571, less than a month after Document 278, so it appears that Nobunaga's forgiveness of the monto was short lived, if indeed he ever forgave them in the first place.

ONM, I, 696-697.

See text page 75, and footnote 25 above.

Although this bonze is commonly called Asayama Nichijō, the Nihon-shi Jiten, ed. Takayanaga Mitsunaga and Takeuchi Rizō (Tōkyō, 1966), p. 14, says that this is an incorrect reading, the correct one being Nichijō Chōzan. Nichijō was a most interesting figure: he was a member of the Asayama family, vassals of the Amako family of Izumo, but he deserted the Amako, joined the Mōri of Aki province, and acted as a messenger for them during their campaigns against the Miyoshi and Matsunaga in the 1560's. Nichijō was eventually captured by the Miyoshi and imprisoned in Nishinomiya where, it is said, he had a dream in which he was told to work for the restoration of the Imperial palace. Nichijō heeded the injunction of his dream and became an intimate of the court. The Emperor Gonara gave him his name in appreciation of his services: "Chōzan" may be read "ashita no yama" (tomorrow's mountain), and "Nichijō" can mean "the sun's vehicle", thus Nichijō's name symbolized that the sun (the Emperor) would ascend the mountain (the heights; that is, the Emperor's condition would be improved) tomorrow (that is, in the near future). Because of his relationship with
the court, Nichijō was chosen by Nobunaga to oversee the reconstruction and repair of the Imperial palace. He also served as Oda's envoy to the shogun and, given his past connections with the Mori, he was a natural choice as Nobunaga's ambassador to them.

In 1577 Nichijō engaged in a religious debate with Padre Luis Frois and, having lost, spread slanderous falsehoods against Wada Koremasa, a Christian daimyo and an ally of Nobunaga. For that indiscretion Nobunaga got rid of Nichijō, and he disappeared from history. The Nichiren school lost a good protector with Nichijō's fall from grace. Unfortunately, none of the documents that Nobunaga sent to Nichijō shed light on Nobunaga's attitude towards the Hokke school, and most of them are of little importance. For example, in Document 272, ONM, I, 449-450, Nobunaga sent Nichijō a short note telling him that the swan that he had sent to Nichijō was a gift for a kuge, and that Nichijō was to deliver it.

41 ONM, I, 442-443. Other favorable documents to the Honnōji are Document 119, ONM, I, 204-205, and Document 155, ONM, I, 263-264. In the latter document Nobunaga stated that the Honnōji was his reserved "hotel" (ryoshuku).

42 Tamamuro Taijō, Nihon Bukkyo-shi, III (Kyōto, 1968), 32.


44 Takugen Shūon's name may also be read Sōn and Sōin. Joseph Kitagawa, Religion in Japanese History, (New York, 1966), p. 132, uses the reading Shuon. Takugen was on close terms with the Oda family and with Nobunaga personally. In 1553 Nobunaga invited Takugen to be founding abbot of the Seishūji, the otera that Nobunaga built in Owari as a memorial to his guardian Hirate Masahide who, according to Ōta Gyūichi, SK, p. 28, committed suicide as a way of remonstrating with Nobunaga for the idle and pointless lifestyle he was following after the death of his father. It was Takugen who suggested the name Nobunaga for Oda Nobuhide's son Kitsu-bōshi on his thirteenth birthday in 1546—Nobunaga's twelfth birthday according to the Western way of reckoning age—as well as the name Gifu for Inabayama in Mino province to which Nobunaga moved his headquarters in 1567, and Nobunaga's motto "tenka fubu" in that same year. For a note on the relationship between Nobunaga and Takugen see Tsuji Zennosuke, Nihon Bunka-shi (Tokyō, 1970), Supplement III, 9-10.

45 ONM, I, 545. Okuno supplies no evidence for this claim. There is some confusion here: Okuno states that Shōgoku was a bonze of the Tōdaiji, the chief otera of the Kegon school, but the Amidaji in Yamashiro province belonged to the Jōdo school, as Okuno himself notes in ONM, I, 335. Therefore it is not clear which school Shōgoku belonged to.

46 The term kiganji, or kigansho, refers to a Buddhist otera that dedicated itself to offering up prayers or sutra reading for a particular individual, and thus it was that individual's patron otera. A kiganji is analogous to a bodaiji, or bodaisho, an otera associated with a particular family or individual. Thus the Kudaradera and the Komatsuji would have offered up prayers for Nobunaga's success. In Document 99, ONM, I, 182-184,
Nobunaga granted the Hakusaiji a number of guarantees and exemptions, and in the first article of Document 836, ONN, II, 453, he explicitly told the Komatsuji that because it was his kigansho he gave it special treatment.

47 Shōren'in, whose full name and title was Shōren'in Monseki Sonchō Hōshinnō and who was also called Sada'atsu Shin'o, was a Tendai abbot and a nephew of the Emperor Ōgimachi. Nobunaga used him as a mediator between himself and the Honganji on several occasions.

48 Chō Tsuratatsu of Noto province was a bonze of the Kōonji before he joined Oda in 1579. Tsutsui Junkei was a bonze at the Ichijō-in (Kōfukuji) before he joined Oda who made him lord of Yamato province following the death of Matsunaga Hisahide in 1577.

49 It would be naive to imagine that such people were actually ardent devotees of the Buddhist Way. In the Sengoku period many bushi became bonzes when the chances for fame and fortune looked bleak, and as quickly quit religion--as did the bonze Gakkei/Ashikaga Yoshiaki--when they saw a chance to advantageously re-enter the struggle for power.

50 This poem in quoted in many works and in various versions. I have used the one in SK, p. 54.


52 Frois is quoted in James Murdoch, A History of Japan (Kobe, 1903), II, 182. Thus Frois accused Nobunaga of the ultimate hubris, the cardinal sin against the first commandment.

53 Frois is quoted in Kuwata Tadachika, Nobunaga no Tegami (Tōkyō, 1960), p. 96. Frois says that Nobunaga was thoroughly contemptuous of the Japanese "princes" and that he spoke to them "from over his shoulder," that is, he spoke down to them in the same way that he spoke to his underlings.

54 Aida Yūji, et. al., op. cit., p. 186.


56 Ibid., p. 15.

57 SK, p. 28, for example.

58 This description of Nobunaga may be found in Suzuki Ryōichi, op. cit., p. 14, and in Imai Rintarō, Oda Nobunaga (Tōkyō, 1966), pp. 17-18.

59 It is generally agreed that Oda Nobuhide died in April of 1551, two months before Nobunaga's seventeenth birthday, but some say that he died in April of 1549, two months before Nobunaga's fifteenth birthday. Ōta Gyūichi suggests the latter date. See SK, p. 28.

60 Frois is quoted in Suzuki Ryōichi, op. cit., p. 15.
Frois is quoted in Kuwata Tadachika, Nobunaga no Tegami (Tōkyō, 1960), p. 96.

Tsuji Zennosuke, Nihon Bunka to Bukkyō (Tōkyō, 1951), p. 225. Tsuji provides no evidence for that claim.

These are Document 287, ONM, I, 467-468, and Appended Document 8, ONM, II, 839-841. In the former document, issued in 1571, Nobunaga's name appears in the dedication engraved on a gong that he presented to a Shinto shrine in Echizen province as "Taira Nobunaga," and in the latter document, issued in 1564, that same name is found on a dedication engraved on a bell that Nobunaga donated to a Shinshū otera in Mino province. It is significant that Oda signed himself Taira Nobunaga as early as 1564, three years before he received Ashikaga Yoshiaki's request for his assistance.

That practise was called "Minamoto-Taira Alternation" (Gempei kōtai). See Hayashiya Tatsusaburō, "Tenka Ittō," Nihon no Rekishi, XII (Tōkyō: Chūō Kōron-sha, 1971), 60, for a short description of that practise.

This document was issued in December, 1549, when Nobunaga was only fifteen years old. ONM, I, 14-17.


See, for example, Documents 96, 97, 99, 101, 103, 104, and 107. ONM, I, 178-193.

See, for example, Documents 89 and 90. ONM, I, 159-160, and 166-168.

"The four seas" (shikai) can mean the whole country of Japan or the whole world. Nobunaga's use of this term may indicate that by 1577 he had some ambitions of power beyond Japan's shores, but the evidence is meager.

This incident will be noted in some detail in Chapter 5.

The word "tenka" is one with many nuances. It can refer to an expanse as small as the Kinai, to the Japanese nation, or to the entire world. It appears that Nobunaga usually meant the nation. For a good description of the term see Hayashiya Tatsusaburō, op. cit., 2-15.

Nobunaga first used this motto as his seal in Document 77, issued in December, 1577. ONM, I, 139-140. For a detailed explanation of this motto see Iki Juichi, "Oda Nobunaga no Jihitsu Monjo oyobi Tenka Fubu no In ni Tsuite," Rekishi Kōron, V, No. 6 (1936), 22-29; Hayashiya Tatsusaburō, op. cit., 105; and Tsuji Zennosuke, Nihon Bunka-shi (Tōkyō, 1970), Supplement III, 15.

Some suggest that Nobunaga's motto should be read tenka hobu—for example, Hirata Toshiharu, Sohei to Bushi (Tōkyō, 1965), p. 256—but tenka fubu is the more commonly accepted reading.

The Oda family had a liking for violent mottos: Oda Nobuo, Nobunaga's second son, used the motto "Intimidate the Nation" (ika kaidai), and Oda
Nobutaka, Nobunaga's third son, used "Pacify the Nation with One Sword" (ikken hei tenka). The "one sword" was, of course, the Oda sword.

74 ONM, I, 388-390.

75 ONM, I, 649-650.

76 Kuwata calls Nobunaga this in Kuwata Tadachika, Oda Nobunaga no Tegami (Tōkyō, 1966), p. 39.

77 According to Okada Akio, Nobunaga was sometimes referred to by his contemporaries by that expression. Okada Akio, "Nobunaga to Hideyoshi," Jinbutsu: Nihon no Rekishi (Tōkyō, 1966), VII, 33.

78 Sugiyama Jirō thus refers to Nobunaga in Aida Yūji, et. al., op. cit., p. 197.

79 Okada Akio, op. cit., 35.

80 Information on the development of Nobunaga's power may be found in a number of works. The following are especially good: Domon Fuyuji, Dōsan to Nobunaga (Tōkyō, 1973); Imai Rintarō, "Nobunaga no Shutsugen to Chūsei no Kenji no Hiten," Iwanami Kōza Nihon Rekishi (Tōkyō, 1963), IX, 47-83; Toyoda Takeshi, "Shokuhō Seiken no Seifitsu," Shisō, No. 310 (April, 1950), 237-247; and Wakita Osamu, Oda Seiken no Kiso Kōzō (Tōkyō, 1975).

81 The Imperial rescript was signed not by Ōgimachi himself but by the kuge Uchūben Kanjuji Harutoyo. ONM, I, 126.

82 A great many works deal with daimyo contemporaries of Nobunaga and his relationships with them. See, for example:

Andō Hideo, Rokunin no Bushō: Sengoku Ranzai no Tetsugaku (Tokyo, 1971). The six people whom Andō deals with are Hōjō Sōun, Hōjō Ujiyasu, Mōri Motonari, Takeda Shingen, Uesugi Kenshin, and Nobunaga.

Iida Tadahiro and Sugiyama Hiroshi, Dainihon Yashi Oda Daimyō-shū: Nobunaga to Sono Bushō (Tōkyō, 1971). This work discusses some twenty-five important Sengoku bushi.

Kuwata Tadachika, "Sengoku Gun-yū Hen," Nihon Bushō Retsuden, III (Tōkyō, 1972). Kuwata discusses twenty bushi at length, and thirty others receive a short treatment. All were contemporaries of Nobunaga.

Kuwata Tadachika, "Tenka Tōitsu Hen," Nihon Bushō Retsuden, IV (Tōkyō, 1972). All of the fifty military figures whom Kuwata discusses were contemporaries of Hideyoshi, although many were also contemporaries of Oda. Kuwata Tadachika, Nobunaga o Meguru Shichinin no Bushō (Tōkyō, 1973). The seven people discussed are Saitō Dōsan, Tokugawa Ieyasu, Matsuura Hisahide, Takeda Shingen, Uesugi Kenshin, Toyotomi Hideyoshi, and Akechi Mitsuhide.

Okuno Takahiro, Sengoku Daimyō (Tōkyō, 1963). This is a general description of the daimyo.

83 The relationship between Ieyasu and Nobunaga is an especially interesting one. In 1547 Nobunaga's father Nobuhide attacked Ieyasu's father Matsudaira Hirotada in his fortress in Mikawa province, and Hirotada ap-
pealed to the Imagawa family for help. One of Hirotada’s vassals who was charged with delivering the then four year old Ieyasu to the Imagawa as a hostage, betrayed his lord and delivered Ieyasu to the Oda. where he was held captive for two years. In 1549 Ieyasu was exchanged for Oda Nobuhiro, Nobunaga’s elder brother, who had been captured by the Imagawa, and thus he became a hostage of the Imagawa in Suruga province. In 1560 Nobunaga defeated the Imagawa in the Battle of Okehazama, and with their defeat Ieyasu’s fourteen year exile was over and he was allowed to return to his home province of Mikawa. Eventually Ieyasu gained control of Mikawa and put down the powerful monto groups in that area, and in 1561 he formed an alliance with Nobunaga.

This warning is found in Document 549, ONM, II, 87-92. It was issued in October, 1575, and addressed to “Echizen Province” (Echizen no kuni), but there is no doubt that Shibata was the recipient. In the nine articles of that document Nobunaga gave detailed instructions as to how he wanted Shibata to govern Echizen. Nobunaga’s demand of exclusive loyalty may be found in scores of letters to his vassals.

Hideyoshi’s words are quoted in Okada Akio, “Nobunaga to Hideyoshi,” Jinbutsu: Nihon no Rekishi (Tokyo, 1966), VII, 35.

ONM, I, 769-771.

James Murdoch, op. cit., 140.

Kuwata Tadachika, Oda Nobunaga no Tegami (Tokyo, 1966), p. 75.


Document 210, ONM, I, 346-348, lists the names of some thirty-five daimyo and kuge who were invited to come to Kyōto to pay their respects to Yoshiaki, and to contribute to the repair of the Imperial palace and the upkeep of the shogun. That document is not dated but Okuno estimates that it was issued in 1570. It was most likely an invitation similar to that one that Nobunaga sent to the Asakura, but the Asakura are not among those named in Document 210.

Aida Yūji, et. al., op. cit., p. 179. Aida also notes that rivalry between the Oda and Asakura families had been great since the middle of the fifteenth century. Both the Oda and the Asakura had once been vassals of the Shiba whose holdings they divided up, the Oda taking Owari province, and the Asakura Echizen. It is possible that Yoshiaki made use of that traditional rivalry to his ends.

ONM, I, 239-243. This document was issued in two sections: the first nine articles were issued on January 30, 1569, the remaining seven on February 1. The document opened with the simple declaration: “Shogunal Palace Regulations:” (denchu go-okite), and it had no closing remarks or greetings. Okuno Takahiro, ONM, I, 236, says that it was after Yoshiaki
received that document that he began his efforts to bring peace among
the warring daimyo.

94 This was Document 209, ONM, I, 343-345.

95 Document 341, ONM, I, 565-576. Nobunaga's letter to Yoshiaki may
also be found in SK, 131-136. The tone of that letter was quite rude:
it opened with none of the customary polite greetings, and it closed with
the simple statement "The foregoing" or "As stated above" (ijo). Ac­
cording to Okuno, ONM, I, 576, when Takeda Shingen was informed of that
letter he remarked that Nobunaga was "no ordinary person" (Nobunaga o
bonjin de nai)--this expression has the nuance of the colloquial English
"Who does he think he is?"

It was issued on August 10, 1573, four months after Oda burned Kyōto.

97 Nobunaga's letter to Date Terumune is Document 431, ONM, I, 724-726.
It is dated January 20, 1574, a few months after the end of the Ashikaga
shogunate.

98 Kuwata Tadachika, Oda Nobunaga no Tegami (Tokyo, 1966), p. 150.
99 Ibid., p. 61.
100 Ibid., p. 54.
101 ONM, I, 280-282.

102 There is some confusion about the year in which Nobunaga took that
action. It shall be discussed in some detail in Chapter 4.

103 Document 549, ONM, II, 87-92, was issued in October, 1575. See foot­
note 84 above.

104 This was in Document 558, ONM, II, 103-105.
105 SK, pp. 95 and 122.
107 ONM, II, 149-150.
108 This was in December of 1575. ONM, II, 167-168.
110 This was in Document 482, ONM, I, 790-791.
Part II: Introduction

1 Tsuji Zennosuke, Nihon Bunka to Bukkyō (Tōkyō, 1951), p. 234.

2 Ishida Ichirō, Nihon Bunka-shi Gairon (Tōkyō, 1968), p. 341. This statement by Ishida corroborates our estimate that Nobunaga was an iconoclast.


Chapter 3

1 Nobunaga's warning to the Enryakuji bonzes may be found in SK, p. 113, and ONM, I, 444.

2 Okuno notes that Nobunaga-Ken'yo contact in ONM, I, 127, but his collection of documents does not contain a copy of Ken'yo's letter to Oda. Kasahara Kazuo also discusses the early contacts between Nobunaga and the Honganji in Kasahara Kazuo, Ikko-Ikki no Kenkyū (Tokyo, 1962), p. 673.


4 Tamamuro Taijō, Nihon Bukkyo-shi, III (Kyōto, 1968), 33.

5 Tamamuro Taijō, op. cit., 33. Tamamuro suggests that Nobunaga "drooled over" (suizen) the thought of gaining control of the lush lands of the Chūgoku, Shikoku, and Kyūshū, and that he identified the Honganji as the main obstacle to a triumphant march westward. It is unlikely, however, that Oda was primarily concerned with those far removed areas at such an early date, for he had much to occupy him in the Kinai and its adjacent areas.

6 The story of Asai Nagamasa is a pathetic one. He was but twenty-five years old in 1570 when he was forced to choose between loyalty to Nobunaga, his brother-in-law since 1568 when he married Oda's sister Oichi, and the Asakura, of whom the Asai were traditional vassals. It is commonly suggested that Nagamasa's father Hisamasa strongly influenced his son's decision to ally with the Asakura.

7 This is Hayashiya Tatsusaburō's description of Nobunaga's peril at that time. Hayashiya Tatsusaburō, op. cit., 136.

8 This incident is related in Hayashiya Tatsusaburō, op., cit., 137.

9 SK, p. 104. No other information on Sugitani Zen'jūō is available. Given his name, it is possible that he was a bonze.

10 See footnote 1 above.


12 Kasahara, in Kasahara Kazuo, Ikko-Ikki: Sono Kōdō to Shisō (Tokyo, 1970), pp. 141-142, quotes a letter that Ken'yo sent to the monto of Ōmi province in October, 1570, and in which he encouraged them to be willing to give up their lives to prevent Nobunaga from destroying the school of
our founder," that is, Shinran's followers, the *monto*. Kennyo closed his letter with the warning that *monto* who failed to respond to his call would no longer be considered *monto*, that is, they would be excommunicated. The Honganji abbots commonly referred to Nobunaga, and to anyone else who troubled the *monto*, as an "enemy of the Law" (hōteki).

13 Ibid., 139.

14 Some details of this event may be found in ONM, I, 343 and 440. Actually Nobuoki committed suicide during the *monto* attack.

15 According to Tamamuro, Oda appealed to Yoshiaki to have Takeda Shingen persuade the Honganji to make peace. Tamamuro Taijo, op. cit., 34. Such complex steps were standard procedure as one attempted to gain a peace by working through the various alliances that were in existence at that moment.

16 Nobunaga's command to Hideyoshi is contained in Document 268, ONM, I, 444-446.

17 Those commands are found in Documents 281 and 282, ONM, I, 460-462, which were issued on July 4 and July 10, 1571.

18 In Document 283, ONM, I, 462-463, Oda thanked Inoko for his fine service in killing "brigands" (yakara) during the hot summer months, and for three enemy heads that Inoko had forwarded to him.

19 Nobunaga's campaign against the Enryakuji will be dealt with in some detail in Section 2 of this chapter.

20 ONM, I, 505-507.

21 See Document 310 Supplements 1, 2, and 3, ONM, I, 507-513. The *monto* pledged that they would take no part in campaigns against Nobunaga's forces, that they would have no secret communications with those who did, and that they would report and punish their "six blood relations" (rokushin)—that is, father, mother, elder brothers, younger brothers, wife, and children—who opposed Nobunaga.

22 ONM, I, 551.

23 Okuno, ONM, I, 517, says that Kennyo realized that Asakura was depressed, but he does not indicate the cause of his depression.

24 ONM, I, 548-549.


26 It is not clearly understood why Yoshikage made that inopportune decision. Okuno, ONM, I, 504, suggests that there was something lacking from his character that was necessary for a Sengoku daimyo. While this may have been so, I suspect that Yoshikage was not pleased by the fact that he was
allied with the Honganji and its monto. He had been at war with the Kaga and Echizen monto up until 1562 when peace was made and sealed by the marriage of Yoshiaki’s daughter and Kennyo’s son Kyōnyo. Despite that link, the Kaga and Echizen monto continued to pose a powerful threat to Ashikaga control of Echizen. Yoshikage was forced into the Honganji camp when he refused to heed Nobunaga’s summons to Kyōto in 1569, but it appears that his alliance with Osaka was not a comfortable one for him. It will be seen that Nobunaga easily gained the support of the Asakura remnant against the Ikkō monto in 1574.

There is some dispute as to whether Shingen was actually involved in a massive effort to march on Kyōto and replace Nobunaga as the de facto central authority, or whether he was simply embroiled in a local campaign against daimyo whose territories neighboured on his home province of Kai. The likelihood is that it was the former because Shingen’s troops were advancing from the east towards Kyōto, and Shingen himself was in close contact with Yoshiaki.

One might expect that the Miidera would have been wise enough to refrain from such activity, given the terrible lesson taught the Enryakuji by Nobunaga but one year earlier.

In Document 471, ONM, I, 778-779, Oda told Nagaoka Fujitaka that Kennyo’s involvement in the Nagashima Ikkō ikki caused him a great deal of “trouble” (meiwaku). Nobunaga appears to have been referring to the fact that Kennyo was responsible for having the Nagashima monto rise up against him.

That was an expensive victory for Nobunaga for two of his brothers, his younger brother Oda Hidenari and his older step-brother Tsuda Nobuhiko, were killed during the campaign. The scale of carnage was great in that campaign: according to Okuno, ONM, I, 776, over 1000 people, including men, women, and children, were killed during a siege of a monto fortress in Ise, and according to Tamamuro Taijō, op. cit., 34, approximately 20,000 Nagashima monto were killed.

A short note on the Itami uprising may be found in ONM, I, 729. Document 480 is contained in ONM, I, 788-789.

Okuno has a short note on that undertaking in ONM, I, 796-797.

Nobunaga’s command to Nagaoka is in Document 501, ONM, II, 14. It was issued on May 2, 1575.

In that battle Nobunaga employed over 3000 riflemen, and it is thought that large bore cannons were also used by Nobunaga’s forces. Nobunaga’s in-
novative military tactics, notably his massive use of firearms, contributed greatly to his victory.

38. Nobunaga's boast to Nagaoka is in Document 512, ONM, II, 30-31. It is also in that document that Nobunaga referred contemptuously to Osaka (Great Hill) as "osaka" (small hill).

39. The details of Nobunaga's alliances with those religious groups will be discussed in Section 5 of this chapter.

40. ONM, II, 61-64.

41. ONM, II, 124-125.

42. SK, p. 180.

43. This reward was granted to the Shōmyōji in Document 555 Supplement 3, ONM, II, 100-101. It was issued on November 20, 1575, by Shibata Katsu-sada, a vassal of Katsuie.

44. Nobunaga's instructions to Shibata are in Document 549, ONM, II, 87-92. See footnote 84, Chapter 2, for a short note on that document. At the same time that Nobunaga appointed Shibata over Echizen province he made Akechi Mitsuhide master of Tamba province.

45. Nobunaga's pledge of good faith is Document 559, ONM, II, 105.

46. ONM, II, 107-109. That document was issued in January, 1576. Its exact date of issuance is not designated.

47. Pledges, as we noted in Chapter 1, were not made to the party with whom one was entering into an agreement but to the kami and Buddhas who witnessed to and underwrote the good faith of the party that was making the pledge.

48. The closing portion of Document 561 Supplement 1 is identical to that described in footnote 48, Chapter 1.


50. ONM, II, 109-111.

51. ONM, II, 127-128. In Document 573 Nobunaga awarded Chōsokabe Yosaburō with one of the two characters of his personal name, the character read "nobu." Thenceforth Yosaburō was known as Nobuchika. The awarding of name characters was a common practise when daimyo wished to form close ties with less powerful daimyo to whom they would award name characters.

52. ONM, II, 112-113.


54. ONM, II, 201-203. This document was sent to Shiogawa Kunimaro
and Andō Heiemon, two of Nobunaga's generals who were leading the campaign against the Honganji. Document 638 was issued on May 26, 1576, just over three weeks after Document 634 (May 1, 1576) in which Nobunaga promised to spare those who quit the Honganji. Evidently Nobunaga changed his mind about that offer over the intervening few weeks. In any case, the offer probably went unheeded.

55 ONM, II, 200-201.

56 Details on this attack may be found in SK, p. 193.

57 Nobunaga's appeal to the Adaka is found in Document 642, ONM, II, 206. Awaji is an island situated between Honshū and Shikoku at the extreme eastern end of the Inland Sea. All sea traffic bound for Osaka must pass through either the narrow Akashi Straits between Harima province on Honshū and Awaji, or the equally narrow Yura Straits between Awaji and the Kii peninsula, in order to enter Osaka Bay. Nobunaga wanted the Adaka to prevent the Mōri from passing through the Akashi Straits on their way from Aki province.

58 A description of this battle may be found in SK, pp. 196-197.

59 Takigawa Kazumasu was involved in the construction of Nobunaga's navy because he was master of most of Ise province since 1574 when the Nagashima monto were crushed. Kuki Yoshitaka was a member of an old "navy family" from Kii province. The Kumano area of Kii had been long famous for its pirate ships—as far back as the time of the Gempei War in the twelfth century the Kumano pirates were a power to be reckoned with. Kuki was a logical choice to head Oda's new navy.

60 Nobunaga's letter to the Saiga monto is Document 701, ONM, II, 273-274. The first of the seven people to whom that document was addressed was a certain Suzuki Magoichi, the leader of the coalition of villagers who made up the Saiga monto.

61 ONM, II, 274. Okuno does not cite the source of that information.

62 ONM, II, 284. It appears that Nobunaga's efforts were successful. In Document 711 Supplement 1, ONM, II, 285-286, Shibata Katsuie thanked Shibayama Chōjirō for having brought the Yamanaka family over to Nobunaga's side, and he repeated Nobunaga's offer of reward.

63 For example, in Document 729, ONM, II, 311-312, Nobunaga urged the Date to join him against the Uesugi.

64 Okuno says that Nobunaga punished Hideyoshi's desertion by "disowning" or "disinheriting" (kando) him. ONM, II, 255. It is not clear what this actually entailed.

65 ONM, II, 315-316.

66 ONM, II, 319-320. That was the second time that the Matsunaga revolted against Nobunaga, even though they had surrendered to him in 1568
at which time Hisahide was appointed lord of Yamato province. In 1572 Hisahide betrayed Nobunaga and allied with the Miyoshi against him. On that occasion, however, Hisahide quickly deserted his new allies and assisted Nobunaga in defeating them, so Nobunaga forgave his treachery. Hayashiya Tatsu Saburō suggests that the Matsunaga had never really submitted to Nobunaga—they were always awaiting the chance to overthrow him, as they had their former lord Miyoshi Chōkei. Hayashiya Tatsu Saburō, "Tenka Ittō," *Nihon no Rekishi*, XII (Tokyo, 1971), 214.

Nobunaga appears to have been personally hurt by the Matsunagas' treason. In Document 736, *ONM*, II, 319-320, he asked Matsui Yūkan to find out the reason for it. It seems that Hisamichi might have been responsible for urging his father to revolt against Oda because in Document 736 Oda referred specifically to the treachery of Matsunaga Uemonnosuke (Hisamichi).

Oda's orders to Araki are found in Document 767, *ONM*, II, 362-365. In that document Nobunaga gave an exceptionally detailed description to Araki of the situation on a number of fronts.

A description of Nobunaga's men-of-war may be found in *ONM*, II, 371-372.

In Document 780 Supplement 1, *ONM*, II, 380-381, Nobunaga's eldest son Nobutada also congratulated Shingorō for having taken "over three thousand heads" (*kubi san-zen amari uchitoru*). Both Okuno Takahiro and Kuwata Tadachika, *ONM*, II, 387, and Kuwata Tadachika, *Oda Nobunaga no Tegami* (Tokyo, 1966), p. 205, say that Akechi Mitsuhide was one of the people Nobunaga sent to verify the reports about Araki. According to Kuwata, Akechi inflamed Nobunaga's anger towards Araki by telling slanderous stories about him. Kuwata does not cite his source for this information, but it is not at all improbable that Akechi would have done such a thing given the intense rivalry and competition among Oda's chief vassals.

Okuno Takahiro, *ONM*, II, 387-388, cites the various explanations offered for Araki's treason. See also SK, pp. 233-238 for a detailed description of that incident.

Takayama Ukon, the famous "Christian Daimyo," was also a vassal of Araki and lord of Takatsuki castle in Settsu province. With his lord Araki's treason Takayama was placed in a most painful dilemma: Nobunaga told the Jesuit Padre Organtino that he would be most generous to the Christian missionaries should Organtino succeed in convincing Takayama to desert his lord Araki and join Nobunaga. Accordingly Organtino presented Takayama with the need to choose between the definition of loyalty described by the *bushi* code, in which case he would remain loyal to Araki and oppose Nobunaga, and the definition of loyalty taught by the Catholic Church, in which case he would betray Araki and join Nobunaga in order to contribute to the advancement of the Church. Takayama had to choose between the dictates of the *bushi* code and the imperatives of Catholic theology, between Church and State, in a land where such a choice was neither respected nor permitted. For a detailed description of Takayama Ukon's

74 The Imperial envoys were Kanjuji Harutoyo, Niwata Shigeyasu—the brother of Kennyo's mother—and Maeseki Sakihisa. The arrangement was that the former two would stay with the Honganji leaders to assure that they abided by the articles of peace, and Sakihisa would stay with Oda. Kanjuji and Niwata were *kuge* of the same rank, Maeseki was an "Imperial Guard" (*konoe*).

75 *ONM*, II, 471-472. I have chosen to give a free rendering of the contents of that document rather than a strict translation because it was written in such a cryptic style, with so many necessary explanatory details missing, that a strict translation would be quite unintelligible.

76 The Bon is the festival of the dead. Also called the Lantern Festival, it is celebrated yearly between the thirteenth and the sixteenth of July. Thus Kennyo was given roughly four months in which to complete the evacuation of the Honganji.

77 *ONM*, II, 472-474.

78 *ONM*, II, 475-477. This document is dated April 18, 1570, seventeen days after Nobunaga's pledge was signed.

79 For reasons stated in footnote 75 above, this document is not given a strict translation. Although the Honganji pledge was signed by three members of the Shimozuma family, I shall use the first person singular in rendering the contents of it because it was, in fact, Kennyo's pledge.

80 *ONM*, II, 477-478. Nobunaga sent that letter to Matsui Yukan on April 1, the same day on which he sent the pledge to Kennyo.

81 *ONM*, II, 478. This document was also issued on April 1, 1580.

82 Document 858, *ONM*, II, 482-483. It was issued on April 15.

83 *ONM*, II, 486-487. Those documents were issued April 24, 1580.

84 *ONM*, II, 487. The wording of this document is almost identical to that of Document 858, footnote 82 above, and it was issued on April 24, only nine days after it. Nobunaga's reiteration of his promise to return Kaga province causes us to think that this was the most important clause in the agreement in that it was the only real concession that Oda made to Kennyo. The difficulty was, however, that Nobunaga would return Kaga only after Kennyo quit Osaka, and thus Kennyo had to keep his part of the bargain first. Kennyo had to trust Oda, certainly a risky venture from Kennyo's perspective. Therefore Oda continued to reassure Kennyo that he would keep his word.

85 *ONM*, II, 487-488. This document was issued May 10, 1580.
86 Document 865 is in ONM, II, 488-489.
87 ONM, II, 490-491.
88 Kyonyo was born in 1559, so he was but twenty-one years old at this time.
89 ONM, II, 493-495. Kennyo sent that document to the Noto monto from his new residence in Saginomori to which he had moved just six days earlier on May 22.
90 It is noteworthy that Kennyo used the word buppo when he actually meant the Honganji school, and probably the Honganji citadel. Kennyo was in the awkward position at that time of having to convince the monto that they could trust Nobunaga to honor his pledge, while at the same time Kennyo himself most likely had serious misgivings as to the wisdom of placing much trust in Nobunaga.
91 The nembutsu is the invocation of the Buddha Amida "Namu Amida Butsu" (Hail to, or Praise to, the Buddha Amida).
92 ONM, II, 495-496. This letter was sent on June 3, 1580.
93 Shimozuma's letter is Document 867 Supplement 3, ONM, II, 496-497. It was written on June 4, one day after Kyonyo's letter which it accompanied.
94 ONM, II, 500-501. This document was issued on July 4, 1580.
95 ONM, II, 503-505. Document 873 was issued on August 3, 1580.
96 ONM, II, 505-506. Nobunaga's command to Niwa is in Document 874, issued on August 4.
97 This is Document 877, ONM, II, 508-509. This is a most cryptic document that contained nothing by five terse articles preceded by the word "Articles:" (jōjo). It is freely translated in the text.
98 ONM, II, 509-510. The kami and Buddhas Nobunaga invoked are noted in footnote 48, Chapter 1.
99 ONM, II, 510-511. Document 879 was issued on August 28, 1580.
100 ONM, II, 511-513. This document was issued on August 30.
101 ONM, II, 513-514. Document 881 Supplement 1 was issued on September 3, 1580.
102 A glimpse into Sakihisa's noble character is provided by Okuno, ONM, II, 512-513, when he tells us that Sakihisa returned to Kennyo some precious scroll paintings that the latter sent to him as a gift for his services as mediator in the peace negotiations.
This document too is paraphrased rather than strictly translated. ONM, II, 514-516.

Kyōnyo's departure from Ōsaka is described in SK, 304-305.

This is Document 883, ONM, II, 517-518.

Nobunaga's reassurances to Kennyo are found in Documents 875, 888, and 901, ONM, II, 507-508, 523-524, and 558-559.

ONM, II, 559-560. This document was issued on November 30. See footnote 101 above for reference to Sakihisa's document.

ONM, II, 568-569. This document was Nobunaga's last of the year Tenshō 8 as it was issued on Tenshō 8/12/29, but according to the Western calendar it was issued on January 2, 1581.

ONM, II, 587-588. This document was issued some time in April, 1581.

We have already seen that when Kyōnyo took over from Kennyo and became the twelfth chief abbot of the Honganji, Kennyo washed his hands of Kyōnyo and declared Jūnnyo Kōshō, his youngest son, to be the legitimate successor to that office. Following Nobunaga's defeat of the Honganji, the center of Shinshū piety moved from place to place: to Izumi province in 1583, back to Ōsaka in 1585, and finally, in 1591, Toyotomi Hideyoshi deposed Kyōnyo and contributed land in Kyōto to the followers of Junnyo who there established the Nishi Honganji (Western Honganji) as the chief otera of the Honpa Honganji branch of Shinshū. In 1602 Tokugawa Ieyasu officially recognized Kyōnyo as twelfth chief abbot, and granted him land in Kyōto where he established the Higashi (Eastern) Honganji, center of the Ōtani Honganji branch of Shinshū. The rift that opened within the Honganji branch of Shinshū during its confrontation with Nobunaga never healed, and the final seal on that division was stamped by Ieyasu.

A good description of Nobunaga's confrontation with, and destruction of, Mt. Hiei may be found in Tsuji Zennosuke, Nihon Bukkyō-shi (Tōkyō, 1970), VII, 21-39.

One can imagine that no matter how evil Oda's intentions towards Mt. Hiei might have been the bonzes of the Miidera would not have opposed him, given the long history of enmity between those two Tendai otera.

Nobunaga's words are quoted in James Murdoch, A History of Japan (Kobe, 1903), II, 164. Murdoch does not cite his source for that quotation.

The Diary of Yamashina Tokitsugu (Tokitsugu Kyōki) is quoted by Hirata Toshiharu in Sōhei to Bushi (Tōkyō, 1965), p. 256. Yamashina Tokitsugu was a kuge who lived from 1507 to 1579, and who wrote a diary that covered the years 1527 to 1576. A detailed account of Nobunaga's action against Mt. Hiei was written by the Jesuit Padre Luis Frois, a central portion of which account may be found, in Japanese, in Tamamuro Taijō, Nihon Bukkyō-shi, III (Kyōto, 1968), 31, and in English in Michael Cooper,
ed., They Came to Japan: An Anthology of European Reports on Japan, 1543-1640 (Berkeley, 1965), pp. 401-402. See also SK, pp. 120-121.


116 For example, in Document 308, ONM, I, 499-502, Nobunaga made a grant of lands that once belonged to Mt. Hiei to Sakuma Nobumori.

117 Arai Hakuseki is quoted in Tamamuro Taijō, op. cit., 31.

118 Religious debates, particularly ones between members of the Hokke and Jōdo schools, were a common event in the late Sengoku period. The amount of social upset caused by such debates was not insignificant because they were not simply peaceful exchanges of doctrinal opinion, rather, they had a somewhat circus atmosphere. When one of the two debating teams was declared the loser, it frequently followed that the members of the winning school would burn down their otera and put some of them to death. Because of the turmoil that frequently resulted from religious debates, many daimyo outlawed them and included clauses to that effect in their "House Laws" (jike no hatto). For details about the Azuchi Shuron see: Tsuji Zennosuke, Nihon Bukkyō-shi, (Tōkyō, 1970), VII, 39-85; Nakao Takashi, "Azuchi Shūron no Shiteki Igi," Nihon Rekishi, CXII (October, 1957), 48-54; and SK, pp. 250-255.

119 The Shinchō Kōki does not identify Takebe's occupation, but it says that Ōwaki was a "salt merchant" (shio-uri). SK, p. 253.

120 The identities of the Hokke representatives is not important to us. Their names, and the otera they represented, are noted in SK, p. 250.


122 Suzuki Ryōichi, Oda Nobunaga (Tōkyō, 1967), pp. 162-163. Suzuki too acknowledges that Nobunaga feared an outbreak of violence should the debate take place, but he points out that there would have been no reason for him to appoint overseers immediately upon hearing of the intended debate had he not intended to turn it to his advantage.

123 Imai Rintarō, op. cit., p. 134, says that four judges were appointed, but Ōta Gyūichi, SK, p. 251, names only two: a Gozan bonze named Hidenaga, and a lay Buddhist named Inga. No other information on Inga is known, but Hayashiya Tatsusaburō, "Tenka Ito," Nihon no Rekishi (Tōkyō, 1971), XII, 199, identifies the Gozan bonze Hidenaga as a certain Keishū Tessō of the Nanzenji.

124 Suzuki Ryōichi, op. cit., p. 162.

125 Tsuji Zennosuke, Nihon Bukkyō-shi (Tōkyō, 1970), VII, 44-45, recounts the most commonly cited version of the exchange. According to that version the Jōdo bonzes bested those of the Hokke school after but six exchanges. However, Watanabe Yosuke, "Azuchi-Momoyama Jidai-shi," Nihon Jidai-shi (Tōkyō, 1926), VIII, 225-226, recounts a version in which the Jōdo bonzes were argued into silence three times in the course of eight
exchanges. It is to be noted that there are many records of the exchange that took place in Azuchi: four by Jōdo people, eight by Hokke people, and five by neutral parties. See Tsuji Zennosuke, op. cit., 40-43. It is not important to us just who won the debate in terms of argument.

126 The pledge may be found in SK, p. 254.

127 It is to be noted that no mention is made of Takebe Shōchi, but it will be recalled that, at least for the moment, he had made good an escape to Sakai.

128 SK, p. 253. For a detailed estimation of the nature of the bonze Fuden, see Nakao Takashi, op. cit., 49-51. Nakao, pp. 50-51, quotes Luis Frois as having said that "Funden" (Fuden) was a famous preacher.

129 Suzuki Ryōichi, op. cit., p. 164.

130 Nakao Takashi, op. cit., 51.

131 Yamashina Tokitsugu is cited in Nakao Takashi, op. cit., 52, and in Suzuki Ryōichi, op. cit., p. 163.


133 Document 831, ONM, II, 447. Although that document contains no date, Okuno estimates that it was written shortly after the debate.

134 The Kongōbuji action in Yamato province was not really in support of the Miyoshi; rather the Kongōbuji took advantage of the Miyoshi campaign to expand its power in that province. As we have seen, Mt. Kōya and Negoro were constantly involved in a struggle for control of Uchi county.

135 This reprimand is found in Document 161, ONM, I, 272-273, issued on April 23, 1569.

136 ONM, II, 877-878.

137 This incident is recounted in SK, p. 138. In ONM, I, 184, Okuno mistakenly dates the destruction of the Kudaradera in 1570, but in ONM, I, 628, he correctly dates it in 1573.

138 Those favors were granted to the Kudaradera in Document 99, ONM, I, 182-184.

139 ONM, II, 518-519. This document was issued on September 15, 1580, five days after Kyōnyo withdrew from Osaka.

140 ONM, II, 183-184. There is some confusion as to the identity of the otera to which that document was issued. The Japanese characters that Okuno used to write the name Hokkeji differ from those actually on Oda's document. The likelihood is that Okuno's rendition of the name is correct and that Nobunaga's secretary probably used the incorrect characters.
The Hatakeyama family had sought, and gained, Negoro sohei support in past conflicts. In 1563, for example, Sadamasa's brother Takamasa was aided by the Negoro sohei during his conflict with the Miyoshi and Matsunaga. The Hatakeyama were traditional masters of Kawachi province and therefore neighbours to the north of Negoro.

Very little is known about this person Sugi no Bō. He was a leader of the so-called "sōbun satasho" (or, sōbun rōjakusho) as the Negoro sohei command was called.

We have seen that the Ikki monto of the Saiga area of Kii province were immediate neighbours to the west of Kōya and Negoro, and thus a powerful, nearby enemy.

Document 801, ONM, II, 405-406, contains Nobunaga's pledge of land to Negoro.

As we shall see in Chapter 5, Mt. Kōya was not to possess that land for long.

The "Sanmonto" refers to three branches of Shinshū in Echizen province: the Sangen, or Yamamoto, branch with the Shōjōji as its chief otera; the Jōshōji branch, with an otera of that name as its chief otera; and the branch known specifically as the Sanmonto branch, with the Senjuji as its chief otera. Those branches of Shinshū had long opposed the expansion of Honganji power in Echizen.
Nobunaga appears to have courted the assistance of those Shinshū otera against the Ikkō monto in Echizen from the middle of the preceding year. In Document 459, ONM, I, 762-763, issued on August 6, 1574, Oda's friendly relations with the Senjuji are evident in his note of gratitude for gifts it sent to him, and in Document 459 Supplement 1, ONM, I, 763-764, a document by Hideyoshi that accompanied Nobunaga's document, Hideyoshi told the Senjuji, some Asakura vassals, and a number of other groups, that their loyalty to Nobunaga would be awarded with new grants of land in accord with their wishes.

161 ONM, II, 39-40. Document 519 was issued on July 21, 1575.

162 This document was addressed to the Jōshōji of the Jōshōji branch of Shinshū, the "Yamamoto-ji" (the Shōjōji), and the "Nakano-ji" (Senjuji).

163 ONM, II, 100-101. Document 555 Supplement 3 was issued on November 20, 1575.

164 It was in Document 555 Supplement 3 that the Shōmyōji was placed in charge of the Ikkō monto who were returning to their lands following their involvement in Ikkō ikki.

165 ONM, II, 100. Those exemptions are found in Document 555 Supplement 2, ONM, II, 99-100.

166 Document 600, issued on December 11, 1575, is in ONM, II, 150-152.
Chapter 4

1 ONM, I, 52-54.

2 ONM, I, 80-81.

3 ONM, I, 721-723.

4 ONM, II, 836-837.

5 ONM, I, 387-388.

6 It is to be noted that Oda's survey of Harima province was carried out by Toyotomi Hideyoshi. Hideyoshi thus had some experience in conducting kenchi long before he undertook the famous taikō kenchi beginning in 1582 in Yamashiro province.

7 Quoted in ONM, II, 550. The Tamon-in Nikki is a diary that was kept by the Tamon-in, a branch of the Kōfukuji of Nara, between the years 1478 and 1617. ONM, II, 550-554, contains copies of three sashidashi, one each by the Kōfukuji, Hōryūji, and Ninnaji, that were delivered to Nobunaga's retainers during the Yamato kenchi. The Kōfukuji's sashidashi listed that otera's holdings in Yamato province as totaling over 18,000 koku, the Hōryūji's Yamato holdings totaled 1124 koku, and those of the Ninnaji amounted to just 135 koku.

8 ONM, I, 224-225. Document 131, issued by Niwa Nagahide and Murai Sada­katsu, contains the word shomu ("holdings affairs") to indicate the sashidashi.

9 In Document 201, ONM, I, 327-329, for example, on December 13, 1569, Nobunaga granted some specific pieces of land that once belonged to Mt. Hiei to one of his retainers.

10 The Imperial rescript is Document 264 Supplement 1, ONM, I, 436-437. It was issued on December 15, 1569.

11 The meaning of the term buppo-hoso is essentially the same as bup­pō-obō. By this statement the Emperor Ogimachi reasserted the classical formulation of the foundation of the Japanese state, and warned that the destruction of the buppo side of the equation would be detrimental to the whole equation, and therefore an act against the state.

12 Tamamuro Taijō, Nihon Bukkyō-shi, III (Kyōto, 1968), 30. The type of thinking whereby Nobunaga refused to recognize the Enryakuji's newly acquired rights was displayed on at least one other occasion. In Document 933, ONM, II, 606-607, Oda's retainer Sugaya Nagayori granted to Chō Tsurata-tsutsu lands that had been donated recently to the Isurugi Shrine by Uesugi Kenshin. It is clearly stated in this document that Nobunaga did not recognize the Uesugi grant to that shrine.

13 According to Okuno Takahiro, ONM, I, 437, this was the main reason
for the Enryakuji's decision to side against Nobunaga, although one must also bear in mind that other factors, such as the Enryakuji's friendly relations with the Rokkaku, Asai, and Asakura families, also influenced its decision.

14 It will be recalled that following the destruction of the Enryakuji Nobunaga divided most of its former holdings among Akechi Mitsuhide, Sakuma Nobumori, and Shibata Katsuie.

15 Eleven years earlier, in 1570, this otera sent Nobunaga a gift of ten gun barrels, as evidenced by Document 248, ONM, I, 416-417, Oda's letter of thanks to it.

16 Nobunaga's destruction of the Makinōji is described in SK, pp. 323-325.

ONM, I, 211-212.

ONM, I, 255-256.

ONM, I, 251-252.

17 OnM, I, 251-252.

18 OnM, I, 251-252.

19 OnM, I, 251-252.

20 Yoshiaki's guarantee is found in Document 149 Supplement 1, OnM, I, 252. It was issued on March 2, 1569, and Nobunaga's guarantee of the Ninchōji was issued on March 3, 1569.

21 These types of expressions and ones similar to them may be found in scores of Nobunaga's documents. See, for example, Documents 72, 133, and 149, OnM, I, 132-133, 228-229, and 251-252.

22 Both Tamamuro Taijō, Nihon Bukkyō-shi, III (Kyōto, 1968), 30, and Tsuji Zennosuke, Nihon Bunka-shi (Tokyō, 1970), Supplement III, 23, state that Nobunaga's jiryō kiha-rei was issued in 1572, although the Shinchō Köki, SK, p. 165, says that it was issued in 1575. Document 319, OnM, I, 526-527, lends support to the claim that the year of issuance was 1572. In that document, issued on June 5, 1572, Nobunaga told the Daitokuji, a Rinzai Zen otera in Yamashiro province, that its condition would not be altered even though he issued a kiha order. Oda did state, however, that lands taken from the Daitokuji in recent years—presumably by Nobunaga, and most likely separated estates—were not included in that exemption. In Document 326, OnM, I, 538-539, Matsui Yukan reiterated Oda's exemption and assured the Daitokuji that Oda would not confuse Daitokuji holdings with those of other otera.

Nobunaga's jiryō kiha-rei was not unique for the Muromachi bakufu issued similar orders that were designed to better the condition of the kuge by invalidating their debts, and the Tokugawa bakufu also issued similar orders called kien or gien.

23 See the Notes on Primary Sources in the Bibliography for a short description of the types of documents found in the Oda Nobunaga Monjo no Kenkyū. "Red Seal Documents" in which Nobunaga granted lands to a particular party were in themselves title and deed to the lands granted therein.
There are also documents in which Nobunaga made new land grants to kuge. In Document 593, ONM, II, 144, for example, Nobunaga granted ten koku to a member of the noble Takatsukasa family.

Oda's four retainers who implemented and administered his new land ownership policy in the Kinai area are named in Document 594, ONM, II, 144-145. They were Takei Sekian, Matsui Yūkan, Murai Sadakatsu, and Harada Naomasa.

This formula, or ones very similar to it, may be found in a number of documents such as those noted in footnotes 24 through 28 above.

This guarantee is contained in Document 678, ONM, II, 249-250. In his commentary on this document Okuno Takahiro says that Oda probably confiscated Todaiji holdings in other provinces while he guaranteed its holdings in Yamato and Yamashiro.

Document 898 is found in ONM, II, 546-547. Okuno Takahiro, in his commentary on this document, says that Akechi Mitsuhide's command to the Tōhoku-in was phrased roughly and disrespectfully. The three sashidashi noted in footnote 7 above accompany this document in Okuno's collection.

Okuno also suggests that the Nara otera appealed to the Emperor to command Nobunaga to stop taking otera lands. It is unlikely that Imperial rescripts would have been sufficiently powerful to move Oda to cease that activity for it will be recalled that they were of little avail in the case of Mt. Hiei.

It will be recalled that in Document 161, ONM, I, 272-273, issued some ten years earlier, Oda commanded the Kongōbuji forces that had invaded Yamashiro province to withdraw at once.

This was in Document 580, ONM, II, 133.

Document 898 Supplement 4, ONM, II, 554. See footnote 7 above.
Chapter 5


2. ONM, I, 207-208. Document 123 Supplements 1, 2, and 3, detail the Hōryūji's efforts to procure the demanded cash by exchanging rice for silver at Sakai, and their payment of the silver to Nobunaga's agents. In Document 128, ONM, I, 221-222, Nobunaga sent a favorable letter to the Hōryū-ji, most likely in return for its payment of his levy. Document 123 was issued on November 6, 1568, and Document 128 was issued some time in that month, most likely some time after the sixth. Okuno Takahiro, ONM, I, 211, says that the Hōryūji called a special meeting of the bonzes to pray for the safety of the otera in that time of emergency.

3. The story of Nobunaga's subjugation of the important merchant city of Sakai is a most interesting one, but not of immediate relevance to our topic. For a description of that event see Hayashiya Tatsusaburo, "Tenka Ittō," Nihon no Rekishi, XII (Tokyo, 1971), 109-112. As noted in footnote 3 of Chapter 3, Yazaki Takeo suggests that the Honzanji also refused to pay Nobunaga's levy. See Yazaki Takeo, Social Change and the City in Japan: From Earliest Times Through the Industrial Revolution, trans. David L. Swain (Tokyo, 1968), p. 237.

4. ONM, I, 224-225. Document 131 was issued in mid-December of 1568. It will be recalled that it was around that time that Nobunaga began a survey of the provinces of Omihara and Mino. It appears that, at least in some cases, Nobunaga's demand that otera deliver their sashidashi to him was accompanied by levies on those otera.

5. ONM, I, 519-521.

6. ONM, I, 251-252. The Ninchōji was a "patron otera" (kiganjī) of Ashikaga Yoshiaki.

7. ONM, I, 356-357.

8. ONM, I, 529-531, and 652-653.

9. ONM, I, 721-723.

10. ONM, I, 785-786.

11. ONM, I, 52-54.

12. ONM, I, 54. Okuno used the French term asile (ajiru), rather than a Japanese term, to indicate the right of sanctuary or asylum.

13. Tsuji Zennosuke, Nihon Bunka-shi (Tokyo, 1970), Supplement III, 18-19. It was in this conflagration that the Zen bonze Kaisen Shōki, abbot of the Senrinji, spoke his famous last words as he sat in meditation amid the flames that consumed his otera: "The tranquility of Zen is not neces-
sarily like a mountain brook; for those who have extinguished their minds, even fire itself is cool." Quoted in Tsuji Zennosuke, op. cit., 19.

14 There is some disagreement over the number of Araki vassals in question: Suzuki Ryōichi, Oda Nobunaga (Tōkyō, 1967), p. 160, states that five Araki vassals took refuge on Mt. Kōya; Watanabe Yosuke, "Azuchi-Momoyama Jidai-shi," Nihon Jidai-shi (Tōkyō, 1926), VIII, 227, suggests only two or three. In any case, there were not many.

15 The Sakuma letter is Document 894, ONM, II, 531-539. The exact date of issuance is not indicated on the copy of this document in Okuno Taka-hiro's collection, but the Shincho Kōki, SK, p. 305, dates it September 20, 1580, just ten days after Kyōnyo and his followers left Osaka. This letter is contained in its entirety in SK, pp. 305-309. With nineteen articles, it is one of the longest documents Nobunaga wrote. On reading it one cannot but feel sorry for Sakuma Nobumori for whom the letter was undoubtedly a shock. Indeed, but two months earlier—in Document 873, ONM, II, 503-505—Oda told Nobumori about the problems he was having on account of Kyōnyo. Document 894 corroborates the point made in Chapter 2 to the effect that Nobunaga was a person who rewarded people, no matter how lowly their station, for their meritorious services, and punished others, no matter how high their rank, for their failure to render such services.

16 In addition to accusing the Sakuma of failing to perform according to the "way of the warrior" (bushadō), in article 13 of Document 894 Nobunaga accused them of lacking the discipline demanded by the "way of the martial arts" (buhendo). The Sakuma lacked the degree of courage and aggressiveness that Nobunaga demanded in his warriors.

17 SK, p. 331.


19 There is considerable discrepancy as to the number of envoys killed by the Kongōbuji bonzes: The Shincho Kōki, SK, p. 331, says approximately ten; Suzuki Ryōichi, Oda Nobunaga (Tōkyō, 1967), p. 160, says thirty-two; and there are many other estimates, most falling somewhere between ten and thirty-two.

20 There is evidence, as we saw in Chapter 3, that Negoro sōhei fought for Nobunaga against their Shingon brothers in the Kongōbuji at that time. In Document 948, ONM, II, 628-630, issued on October 8, 1581, Nobunaga thanked the Negoro sōhei for their marvelous service.

21 Document 948 Supplements 1-4, ONM, II, 630-634, contain appeals made by Mt. Kōya to several powerful families of Kii province to send supplies to them.

22 SK, p. 331.
Various other estimates of the number of hijiri killed by Nobunaga may be found. For example, Tamamura Taijō, Nihon Bukkyō-shi, III (Kyōto, 1968), 37, suggests the very exact number 1383.

This order is found in Document 629, ONM, II, 191-192.

Besides the Jōgon'in at least ten other otera, including the Saikōji, were built by Nobunaga in Azuchi. Most of those otera were of the Jōdo school. The reason why Oda chose to build Jōdo otera was that, as we noted earlier, that school was quite weak, and its membership was largely from among the docile upper classes.

The figure 808 is supplied by Tamamuro Taijō in his Nihon Bukkyō-shi, III, (Kyōto, 1968), 28. According to Imai Rintarō, Oda Nobunaga (Tokyo, 1966), p. 133, Nobunaga ordered that the Jōgon-in be constructed on a site once occupied by an otera that was a kiganji of the Rokkaku family in order to eradicate the memory of the Rokkaku from the minds of the inhabitants of that area.

Document 663 is found in ONM, II, 233-234, and it is dated October 31, 1576. The "Konze bonze" is Ōyo of the Konzeji, who was thenceforth commonly known by the title "the Jōgon bonze" (Jōgon no Bō).

The term furegashira means, literally, touch/contact (fure) head/leader (gashira). It was devised in the Muromachi period when the thirteen "town groups" (machigumi) that comprised Upper Kyōto were designated "parent towns" (oyamachi), and all other towns that were part of greater Kyōto were designated "branch towns" (edamachi). The former, the oyamachi, were also called furegashira and they were responsible for the behavior of the residents of the edamachi. This was part of a system for governing Kyōto. When the term furegashira was taken over into the religious world it was used to designate a system whereby "upper otera" (furegashira in a specific sense) were made responsible for the behavior of "lower otera." A number of other terms were also used to designate the furegashira otera: for example, sōroku (literally, "bonze record"), rokusho (literally, "record office"), and sōrokusho (literally, "all record office"). These terms could refer to either the bonze or to the otera that was appointed over all others.

Many daimyo appointed furegashira of that type: for example, in 1559 Takeda Shingen appointed a Hokke bonze over all otera of that school in Kai province, and in 1572 he did the same with the Sōtō Zen school in Shinano province. The Inada in Awa, Maeda in Noto, and Date in Mutsu, also implemented that practise.
Some daimyo also appointed furegashira of that type: for example, in 1553 Uesugi Kenshin granted the title sōrokusho to the Honseiji of the Shin school and appointed it over all Buddhist otera in the three provinces of Echigo, Sado, and Dewa. In 1635 the furegashira system was implemented on a national scale with the appointment of furegashira in every Tokugawa han.

The term jisha bugyō first appeared in the Kamakura period when it was given as a title to a person placed in charge of all matters relating to otera and shrines. Hōjō Tokitsura, in 1293, was the first incumbent to that office.
Chapter 6

1 Hideyoshi is cited in James Murdoch, A History of Japan (Kobe, 1903), II, 166. Murdoch does not designate the source of this citation.

2 ONM, II, 488-489. Document 865 was issued just less than one month after Kennyo sent his peace pledge to the Imperial envoys on April 18, 1580.

3 In ONM, II, 516, Okuno Takahiro suggests this as a possible reason why the offer to return Kaga was not included in Nobunaga's pledge to Kennyo in Document 881 Supplement 2, ONM, II, 514-516, which was issued on September 4, 1580, even though such a pledge was included in Document 877, ONM, II, 508-509, which Nobunaga sent to Kennyo but one week earlier on August 27.

Kuwata Tadachika suggests that it was the participation of Imperial envoys in the peace negotiations that restrained Nobunaga from following his usual practise of severely punishing his enemies. Kuwata Tadachika, Oda Nobunaga no Tegami (Tokyo, 1966), p. 212. This too is doubtful.

4 Frois' reference to Nobunaga's plans is found in James Murdoch, A History of Japan (Kobe, 1903), II, 176-177.

5 ONM, I, 418. On November 17, 1570, one month after Nobunaga sent Document 250 to the Kenshōji, Hideyoshi also sent it a document in which he repeated Nobunaga's guarantees and assurances. Document 250 Supplement 1, ONM, I, 418-419.

6 ONM, I, 427-428.

7 ONM, I, 709-710. Kinseiō—pronounced kinzeiō in Nobunaga's time—were documents, usually requested and paid for by the recipient, in which various types of activity were prohibited on lands owned by the recipient. Kinseiō usually prohibited violent and destructive activity, and were designed to protect the recipient from being harmed during campaigns in the vicinity of his holdings. Military encampments on the recipient's lands, the conscription of lumber, military provisions, and corvee labor, the imposition of various levies, and the destruction of crops, were the most commonly prohibited acts.

8 ONM, I, 777-778.

9 ONM, II, 273-274.

10 ONM, II, 500-501.

11 Although there were no major conflicts with Shingon otera over those years, there were minor incidents involving Shingon otera in which Nobunaga became involved. For example, in Document 657, ONM, II, 222-224, which was issued on September 24, 1576, Nobunaga reprimanded the Daigoji, a Shingon otera in Yamashiro province, for carrying on a dispute with Mt. Hiei. He called the Daigoji's behavior outrageous and threatened to punish all "wicked bonzes" (akusō), that is, sōhei.
12 ONM, I, 416-417. Since Portuguese firearms were introduced into Japan in the 1540's the Negoroji became one of their major producers. Evidently some branch otera of Mt. Kôya also made firearms.

13 ONM, II, 620. Document 939 was most likely requested by the priests of Taga Shrine who probably feared that Nobunaga might arrest and execute pilgrims indiscriminately. The document was issued on September 19, 1581, five days after Nobunaga ordered the arrest of all Kôya hijiri.

14 ONM, I, 391.

15 ONM, I, 688-689. "Prayer scrolls" (kanzu) were lists of the number of prayers offered or sutras read for a particular individual. Such a list was sent to Nobunaga by the Daikakuji as evidence that the bonzes of that otera had prayed for him. Thus kanzu are similar to the Christian "spiritual bouquets."

16 ONM, II, 592-593. Those documents were issued on July 22, August 28, and October 21, 1581. In September of 1571 Nobunaga began his siege of Mt. Kôya, so it appears that the Kongôji, a branch otera of the Ninnaji, was being most careful around that time to remain in Nobunaga's good graces. It did not want to suffer the same fate as its brother Shingon otera the Kongôbuji.


18 ONM, I, 145-146. Document 82 was addressed to the Kôfukuji's "battle ready groups" (gozaijinshu), that is, the sôhei. The Kôfukuji sôhei were in arms during the latter months of 1567 because there was fighting in the Nara area at that time between Matsunaga Hisahide and the Miyoshi.


20 Many otera of schools other than Zen also received kinseijô. For example:
Nichirenshu otera: Documents 119, 120, 121, 122, 267, and 314. ONM, I, 204-207, 442-443, and 519-521.
Shingonshu otera: Documents 116, 118, 990, 1022, 1027, and 1035. ONM, I, 201-203, ONM, II, 707, 738, 742, and 748-749.
Shinshu otera: Documents 73, 419, and 1031. ONM, I, 133-134, 709-710, and ONM, II, 745.

21 ONM, I, 526-527.

22 ONM, I, 749-750.

23 ONM, I, 689-690.
One suspects that Nobunaga was being somewhat facetious in his excessive praise of Jōan. After all, the Jōdo shū victory over the Hokke bonzes was a result of Nobunaga's scheming rather than Jōan's debating skills. It is possible that the Jōdo bonzes never did learn that the debate was a farce.


ONM, I, 334-335.

We are not concerned with the details of Nobunaga's relations with the Christian missionaries for several reasons: there is very little primary material relating to the missionaries in Nobunaga's letters, or in the *Shincho Kōki*; the whole question of Christianity in sixteenth-century Japan is dealt with at length by George Elison in his *Deus Destroyed*; and most importantly, Christianity was not nearly as powerful or important a force in Japanese society as Buddhism.


See, for example, Frois' report of Nobunaga's sacrilegious behavior in 1569 when he dismantled a number of Buddhist otera in order to get materials for the construction of Ashikaga Yoshiaki's Nijō palace, cited in Kuwata Tadachika, *Oda Nobunaga no Tegami* (Tōkyō, 1966), p. 85.

Indeed the fact that it was Portuguese nationals, and not some others, who first reached Japan was decided largely by the Vatican. In the Treaty of Tordesillas of June, 1494, which was arbitrated by Pope Alexander VI, it was decided that Portugal would extend its lines of trade and colonization eastward around the Cape of Good Hope and across the Indian Ocean, and Spain would push westward across the Americas to the Pacific Ocean and on to the Philippines.

Details on Araki's treason and Oda's campaigns against him are found
in SK, pp. 235-238. Ota Gyuichi notes, SK, p. 235, the role played in the Araki affair by the "Padre cleric" (bateren monke); presumably he means Organtino, but he does not mention him by name. For an account of Organtino's role in that affair see George Elison, Deus Destroyed, pp. 49-51.

40 Frois is quoted in Elison, op. cit., p. 50.

41 Organtino placed Takayama Ukon in a cruel dilemma: Ukon was forced to choose between his loyalty to Araki which was demanded by the Japanese bushi code, and an alliance with Nobunaga which would contribute to the advancement of the cause of the Catholic Church in Japan. Organtino convinced Takayama that his deeper loyalties lay in the latter direction, and therefore he joined Nobunaga. It would be naive to think that Takayama's sense of his duty as a Christian was the sole determinant of his choice; it is most likely that Takayama realized that his future prospects were much brighter with Nobunaga than with Araki, whose fate was all but sealed the moment he revolted against Nobunaga. Takayama has been roundly cursed by the Japanese as a traitor to the bushi code of honor because of his betrayal of Araki, and his name has been a synonym for turncoat for centuries. To such Christian historians as Ebisawa Arimichi, Johannes Laures, and Hubert Cieslik, however, Ukon is an exemplar of Christian morality. He was the "Christian samurai" par excellence.


43 An entire chapter could be devoted to an examination of the types of guarantees, exemptions, and prohibitions that Nobunaga granted to otera, but this is not immediately relevant to our topic. Such an examination would provide details about the ways Nobunaga rewarded otera, but it would not contribute to our assessment of his three policies and their effects on the Buddhist institutions.

44 Indeed hardly a year went by in the Tokugawa period without some kind of uprising. "Peasant uprisings" (tsuchi-ikki), "benevolent government uprisings" (tokusei-ikki)--that is, uprisings on the part of a group that wanted to have its debts cancelled--and "farmers uprisings" (hyakushō-ikki) plagued the Tokugawa period.

45 There is evidence that Nobunaga was making preparations early in 1582 for a campaign against the Chōsokabe of Tosa province in Shikoku. In Document 1052, ONM, II, 764-765, issued on May 28, 1582, Nobunaga gave the island province of Awaji to Miyoshi Yasunaga, and promised to give the province of Sanuki in Shikoku to his own third son Nobutaka. He also mentioned that he personally would award the two Shikoku provinces of Iyo and Tosa when he reached Awaji.

46 Coelho is quoted in James Murdoch, A History of Japan (Kobe, 1903), II, 167.

47 Tamamuro Taijō, Nihon Bukkyō-shi, III (Kyōto, 1968), 30. Tamamuro uses the ambiguous figure "several tens of percent" (sūjū pāsentō) to indicate the amount of land owned by religious institutions.
These statistics are found in John W. Hall, Japan: From Prehistory to Modern Times (New York, 1970), p. 70. From this meager evidence it is not possible to determine the degree of curtailment of Tōdaiji land ownership. Because the quality of paddy land varied greatly from place to place and year to year, one cannot estimate with any accuracy the number of koku of rice that 14,000 acres of land could yield. Besides, it is totally unlikely that the entire 14,000 acres would have been rice paddies.

That a famous garden was turned into a rice paddy from which the Imperial family received revenue witnesses to the poor straits into which the Imperial family had descended. With Nobunaga's improvement of the living conditions of the Emperor and the kuge, such supplementary income was no longer needed.

In article 10 of Document 142, ONM, I, 239-243, which was issued on January 30 and February 1, 1569, Nobunaga commanded Yoshiaki as follows: "You are to cease completely from confiscating, without good reason, the central holdings and other lands of shrines and otera." (Jisha honshoryō-tōchigyō no chi, iware naku ōryō no gi, kataku chōji no koto).

Hayashiya Tatsu Saburō, "Tenka Ittō," Nihon no Rekishi, XII (Tokyo, 1971), 214. According to Hayashiya, those are the reasons that Nobunaga gave to Tokugawa Ieyasu for his destruction of the Matsunaga, but he does not cite the source of this information.

That command is contained in Document 328, ONM, I, 544-545.
The document of submission that was signed by the Mt. Kōya bonzes is cited in Tamamuro Taijō, *Nihon Bukkyō-shi*, III (Kyōto, 1968), 37.

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The number 493, which is assigned to this document, the first one in Volume II of Okuno's collection, is also assigned to the last document in Volume I. Therefore I have called the first document with the number 493, Document 493A, and the second one 493B.

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There is much speculation by Japanese historians about the reasons for Akechi Mitsuhide's betrayal; and about the exact manner in which Nobunaga died. It is suggested that Akechi attacked Nobunaga out a desire for revenge for his having allowed Akechi's mother to die as an enemy hostage; or because he was jealous of the way Toyotomi Hideyoshi, a bitter rival of Akechi's in the pursuit of Nobunaga's favor, was becoming ever more powerful and influential while he was not; or because he wanted to pay Nobunaga back for the embarrassment of a rebuke by him when Akechi failed to provide a satisfactory banquet on one occasion when Ieyasu was visiting Azuchi; or because he simply felt that he should seize the chance offered to him to take control of the tenka while Hideyoshi was engaged in campaigns far to the south. These and other suggested reasons for Akechi's treachery are discussed in any of the standard sets of Japanese histories. See, for example, Hayashiya Tatsusaburō, "Tenka Iptō," *Nihon no Rekishi*, XII (Tokyō, 1971), 289-292. See also *SK*, pp. 380-384 for a detailed account of the Honnōji Incident.

It is not known exactly how Nobunaga died. Some suggest that he burned to death, others that he died of wounds inflicted by Akechi's men, and still others that he committed suicide (seppuku) amidst the flames. The last suggestion seems to be the most popular, possibly because of its sense of drama. Nobunaga's body was never recovered. It is surprising
that Nobunaga was accompanied by so few warriors at the Honnōji; it seems that he had become overly confident of his security in a world still characterized by *gekokujō*.


80 Kose Hoan is quoted in Kobayashi Kenzō, "Edo Shoki ni Okeru Shiron no Ikkeishiki ni Tsuite," *Shigaku Zasshi*, XXXVIII, No. 8 (1927), 57.

81 See Iki Juichi, "Oda Nobunaga no Jihitsu Monjo Oyobi Tenka Fubu no In ni Tsuite," *Rekishi Kōron*, V, No. 6 (1936), 29. According to the Japanese manner of counting a person's age, that is, one in which a person is said to be one year old during the first year of his life, Nobunaga died at the age of forty-nine. According to the Western way of counting age, that is, one in which a person has his first birthday one year after he was born, Oda died at the age of forty-eight, just a few weeks after his forty-eighth birthday.

Chapter 7

1 Tsuji Zennosuke, Nihon Bunka to Bukkyō (Tōkyō, 1951), p. 232.

2 Ibid., p. 236.

3 Okuno Takahiro says that Nobunaga's policy towards the kuge is sometimes described as a "restoration policy" (fukko seiji). ONM, II, 3. As Okuno points out, however, that is an incorrect evaluation of Nobunaga's policy.


5 It is interesting to note, in this connection, that the Hokkeshū bonzes debated whether or not they should attend the dedication ceremony. Some argued that they should not attend because Hideyoshi did not believe in, but rather reviled, Buddhism, while others contended that an exception had to be made in Hideyoshi's case because he was the leader of the nation. The latter side won the debate.

6 For a good description of the ways in which the Tokugawa bakufu controlled religion see Tamamuro Fumio, Edo Bakufu no Shūkyō Tosei (Tōkyō, 1971).

7 For a good, concise, one volume history of Toyotomi Hideyoshi, in which there is much detail on his relations with Buddhist institutions, see Suzuki Ryōichi, Toyotomi Hideyoshi (Tōkyō, 1954).

8 We have noted in Chapter 4 footnote 6 above that Hideyoshi conducted his first kenchi in Harima province in 1580 while he was serving under Nobunaga.

9 In Document 555 Supplement 3, ONM, II, 100-101, issued on November 20, 1575, Shibata Katsusada, a vassal of Katsuie, gave permission to the inhabitants of four villages situated on lands that belonged to the Shōmyōji, an Echizen otera of the Takada branch of Shinshū, to bear the koshigatana, a short sword that is worn at the waist, and other arms. This permission was granted in reward for the capture of Shimozuma Raishō, themonto leader in Echizen, by the members of the Shōmyōji. That such a concession was granted suggests that as a general rule the peasants were not allowed to bear arms.

10 ONM, II, 99-100.

11 Hideyoshi's daibutsu, which was housed in the Hōkōji, a Tendai otera in Kyōto, was ill fated. In the summer of 1596 an earthquake that shook the Kinai area destroyed the daibutsu, while leaving the hall that housed it unscathed. In 1599 Hideyoshi's son Hideyori undertook its reconstruction but in 1602, almost immediately following its rededication, a fire totally destroyed it. Once again, from 1609 through 1612, Hideyori had it rebuilt. Ieyasu, then shogun, gladly gave Hideyori permission to restore the daibutsu because the great expenses incurred therein drained off much
of the Toyotomi wealth. It is interesting, and ironic, that the Hokōji daibutsu eventually became the excuse for conflict between Ieyasu and Hideyori: Ieyasu took exception to the wording of the dedication plaque that Hideyori affixed to the daibutsu in 1614 and used it as a pretext to open hostilities with, and eventually suppress, the Toyotomi. In 1662 the daibutsu was destroyed once again by an earthquake, and again rebuilt in 1667. The daibutsu lasted until 1789 when it was destroyed by a fire caused by lightning; it was never rebuilt.


13 Murdoch calls Hideyoshi a genius in James Murdoch, *A History of Japan* (Kobe, 1903), II, 143.

14 As with Hideyoshi, many of the policies of the Tokugawa regime were ones followed earlier by Nobunaga. Even the Tokugawa practise of moving daimyo from one bunkoku to another was in operation in a rudimentary way in Nobunaga's time. In many cases Nobunaga moved his powerful vassal daimyo from place to place. Yazaki Takeo tells us, for example, that in 1574 Nobunaga moved Hideyoshi from Kotani (the correct reading is Odani) to Nagahama in Omi province, in 1575 he moved Shibata Katsuie from Ichinori-tani (the correct reading is Ichijōdan or Ichijōgatani) to Kitanoshō in Echizen, and in 1576 he moved Hideyoshi from Miki to Himeji in Harima province. There were many other such moves during Nobunaga's time. See Yazaki Takeo, *Social Change and the City in Japan: From Early Times Through the Industrial Revolution*, trans. David L. Swain (Tokyo, 1968), pp. 129-130.


19 According to Ishida Ichirō, from the time of Nobunaga the Emperor and the kuge concerned themselves with "classical culture" (koten bunka); they delved into the classics as an "outlet for their excessive leisure and passion" (ariamaru kanka to jōnetsu no hakeguchi). Ishida Ichirō, *Nihon Bunka-shi Gairon* (Tokyo, 1968), pp. 347-348.


21 Works consulted for information on this change in Japanese society were:

Hayashiya Tatsusaburō, et. al., "Onin-Genroku," Köza Nihon Bunka-shi (Tokyo, 1971), IV.
Ienaga Saburō, Nihon Bunka-shi (Tokyo, 1960).
Ishida Ichirō, Nihon Bunka-shi Gairon (Tokyo, 1968).
_____, Nihon Bunka to Bukkyō (Tokyo, 1951).

22The Sakai merchant, whose name is not mentioned, is quoted in Ishida Ichirō, Nihon Bunka-shi Gairon (Tokyo, 1968), p. 345.

23Ibid., p. 345.

24Ibid., p. 342.

25 Various definitions of the term secularization and its major characteristics are found in a great many works. I have used primarily the following:
_____, Tokugawa Religion (Boston, 1970).

26Arnold Toynbee lists the following seven factors as having been of primary influence in bringing on the secularization of European society:
1. The thirteenth century conflict between the Papacy and Emperor Frederick II, a conflict that revealed the Papacy to Western eyes "in the new and distressing light of a self-centered institution fighting nakedly for supremacy in a struggle for power..." 2. The Church's development of an unedifying mercenary-minded financial organization. 3. The "Great Schism" of the fourteenth century Avignon Papacy. 4. The fifteenth century attempt by the Papacy to turn the Western Christian "Commonwealth" into an ecclesiastical autocracy. 5. The Protestant Reformation's fracturing of the Christian Church. 6. Religious Wars between Catholics and Protestants, and between one Protestant sect and another. This was the final great shock to Western Christendom. It was a lamentable spectacle, says Toynbee, "to see Religion being used as tool for the furtherance of mundane military and political purposes, and to recognize that this was a consequence of Religion's own unprincipled attempt to use War and Politics as weapons in ecclesiastical struggles for supremacy." 7. The revival of Hellenism.

27The "competition" between Church and State in Japan in the middle ages had many parallels in Europe. For example, as far back as Charles Martel in the eighth century, leaders in need of estates to support their warriors found the properties of the Church essential to their tasks and pursued policies that resulted in whole or partial confiscation of Church
property. Thus a policy of secularization of Church property in the interest of military reorganization frequently took place. The Carolingians heavily taxed Church, especially monastic, properties, and although immunities were frequently granted to churches and monasteries they usually involved no true exemption from fiscal burden, but only the privilege of themselves arranging for tax collection and military recruitment. From the twelfth century through the late middle ages, however, the Church—like the great Buddhist institutions in Japan—was strong enough to protect its endowments against major losses, but now and then nobles were permitted to reclaim properties given by their ancestors to the Church.

28. The basic definition of the relationship between Church and State in Japan differs from that of Europe, and those cultures cannot at all be seen as identical in this regard. In Europe as early as the final decade of the fourth century a number of developments had resulted in the understanding that no one, including secular leaders, was above the moral law, which was enforced by the Church. W. H. C. Frend tells us that this understanding "assured the primacy of spiritual over secular authority in the West." W. H. C. Frend, "Frustrated Father," Review of J. N. D. Kelly, Jerome: His Life, Writings, and Controversies (New York, 1976), The New York Review of Books, XXXIII, No. 7 (April 29, 1976), 3. Such was not the case in Japan.

29. As in Japan, the Church in medieval Europe owned vast tracts of land. One third of Charlemange's world was owned by the Church, and according to S. Harrison Thomson "The Church was the greatest single landholder in Europe in the thirteenth century, and many cities grew up on Church land... The ecclesiastical overlords were more tenacious of their ancient rights than the lay suzerains." S. Harrison Thomson, Europe in Renaissance and Reformation (New York, 1963), p. 219.

30. ONM, II, 21-22.

31. ONM, II, 495-496.

32. It appears that Kennyo's way of thinking in this regard underwent a change as a result of his defeat by Nobunaga. When Kennyo recognized the hopelessness of the Honganji position and agreed to withdraw to Kii province, he defended his decision by arguing that he certainly had not given up on the buppō and he asserted that he intended to take the statue of Shinran with him. Document 867 Supplement 1, ONM, II, 493-495. Thus Kennyo seems to have distinguished between the buppō and the Honganji institution, a distinction that Kyōnyo failed to recognize. Kennyo recognized that retirement from the Honganji was not to be construed as the finish of Shin Buddhism; he could, and would, take the statue of Shinran with him and wherever it was there too was the "true" Honganji.

33. ONM, II, 446-447. Document 830 Supplement 1 was written on August 24, 1579, just over two months after the Azuchi shūron which was held on June 21.

35 This quotation from the Hoan Taikōki may be found in Hayashiya Tatsu-saburō, "Tenka Ittō," Nihon no Rekishi, XII (Tōkyō, 1971), 146.


38 Martin Luther is quoted in Christopher Dawson, op. cit., p. 146.


43 Nakamura Hajime, op. cit., p. 420.

44 Indeed even the Christianity that was preached by the Jesuit missionaries might be said, in one sense, to have had a this-worldly flavor. Following the first few unsuccessful attempts to communicate Christian doctrinal concepts in Japanese, the missionaries abandoned a doctrinal emphasis in their preaching and directed their attention to what they identified as grave moral abuses in Japanese society. Thus the missionaries were concerned specifically with moral behavior, with human acts, and the fact that they had that focus probably contributed greatly to their success in Japan.


46 Takeyama Michio, op. cit., 18-19.

47 This irreligious sense did not appear for the first time in Japan in the Azuchi-Momoyama period. In the thirteenth century the great Shinran lamented the disrespect that was then shown to Buddhism and its clergy as follows: "Tokens are these, that Buddhism they despise:
Nuns and Monks are made their slaves,
The names of priests are given to knaves."
Quoted in Nakamura Hajime, op. cit., p. 456.

48 BNM, I, 444.

49 Christopher Dawson, Progress and Religion (New York, 1960), p. 156. Dawson's observation is also noted on page 3 of the Introduction to this paper.

This is not to imply, as does Tanaka Yoshinari, for example, in his *Oda Jidai-shi* (Tōkyō, 1925), p. 223, that Oda Nobunaga adopted Confucianism as the ideological foundation for his newly reunited state. Nobunaga himself embraced no particular religious or ethical ideology. Nobunaga's biographer Kose Hoan attempted to attribute a certain Confucian attitude to Nobunaga, but he fails to convince the reader. For a discussion of Kose's biases in this regard see Kobayashi Kenzō, "Edo Shoki ni Okeru Shiron no Ikkeishiki ni Tsuite," *Shigaku Zasshi*, XXXVIII, No. 8 (August 1927), 55-69.


Nobunaga's grant to the Shinnyodō is contained in Document 147, *ONM*, I, 248-249.


Just as the Kamakura bakufu did not question the basic ōbō-buppō formula, so too in European history, until the middle ages, there was no opposition to Church power and wealth offered on moral or doctrinal grounds; no one questioned the basic right of the Church to possess vast estates. In the fourteenth century in England, however, men like William of Ockham and John Wycliffe did question that right, and its denial became most explicit in the early Reformation period when Protestant princes confiscated religious holdings and imposed lay supervision on the remaining endowments of the Church. During the age of the Enlightened Despots in France (1648-1789) there was ceded to the king ultimate dominion over all Church properties.

Hirata Toshiharu, op. cit., p. 259.

Yamashina Tokitsugu's diary is quoted in Harada Toshiharu, op. cit., p. 256.


Ibid., p. 3.

Takeyama Michio, "The Secularization of Feudal Japan," *Japan Quarterly*, VI, No. 1 (January-March, 1959), 13. This article by Takeyama is one of the very few that clearly addresses the phenomenon of secularization in Japan but it is, unfortunately, disappointingly short and superficial.

Takeyama Michio, op. cit., 15. This is a very sweeping statement that demands explication, but the author fails to provide any. He does acknowledge, however, that the secularization process was one of critical importance in early modern Japan, and one that demands further study.
W. A. Barker, op. cit., p. 3.

Yazaki Takeo, Social Change and the City in Japan: From Early Times Through the Industrial Revolution, trans. David L. Swain (Tokyo, 1968), p. 127. One must not conclude from this quotation that Confucianism became the ideology of the entire Tokugawa period. Ultimately the scholars of the Tokugawa period went so far as to reject entirely both Buddhism and Confucianism. This development represents another stage in Japanese religious history, one not relevant to the present considerations. Robert Bellah deals with this topic in his Tokugawa Religion (Boston, 1970). It is interesting to note that despite the fact that Buddhism gave way to Confucianism with its expressly this-worldly focus, there was still a great residue of Buddhist influence that permeated Japanese society. For example, in the early seventeenth century the Confucian scholars, even those far removed from Buddhism, continued to wear Buddhist robes and take the tonsure.

This contention runs throughout Ienaga's Nihon Bunka-shi (Tōkyō, 1960).

J. Milton Yinger, Religion in the Struggle for Power (North Carolina, 1946), p. 61. In this context it is interesting to note that Confucianism twice supplanted Buddhism: once in China, following roughly one thousand years of Buddhist ascendancy, and again in Japan after approximately the same length of time.


Ibid., p. 154.

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Notes on Primary Sources
Okuno Takahiro's two volume, 1693 page, collection of documents issued by Oda Nobunaga is divided into three major parts:

**Part I: "Owari Zaikoku Jidai"** (The Period of Residence in Owari Province), *ONM*, I, 13-122. Part I includes documents issued by Nobunaga between the ages of fifteen and thirty-three, between the years 1549 and 1567. Nobunaga's first document was issued in November or December of 1549.

**Part II: "Mino Zaikoku Jidai"** (The Period of Residence in Mino Province), *ONM*, I, 123-803, and *ONM*, II, 1-174. Part II includes documents issued by Nobunaga between the ages of thirty-four and forty-two, between the years 1567 and 1576. Nobunaga moved his headquarters from Komaki, or Komakisan, in Owari province to Inabayama, which he renamed Gifu, in Mino province in September, 1567.

**Part III: "Ōmi Zaikoku Jidai"** (The Period of Residence in Ōmi province), *ONM*, II, 175-772. Part III includes documents issued by Nobunaga between the ages of forty-two and forty-eight, between 1576 and his death in 1582. Nobunaga moved his headquarters from Gifu in Mino province to his new palace-castle at Azuchi in Ōmi province in March, 1576.

*Oda Nobunaga Monjo no Kenkyū* is structured chronologically, with Nobunaga's documents listed according to the year, month, and day of issuance as far as that can be determined. All the documents are presented as they were written originally, although in print and not hand lettering. Most, but not all, documents are accompanied by a modern Japanese rendition of the text, and many are accompanied by a short note in which Okuno comments on the date of issuance of the document, its meaning if it is especially vague, the identity of persons and places named in it, and its significance.
The documents in *Oda Nobunaga Monjo no Kenkyū* are grouped as follows:

Part I contains seventy-eight documents. Sixty-seven of them are numbered chronologically from one through sixty-seven--*ONM*, I, 13-122--according to their dates of issuance. Ten other documents included in Part I do not have numbers assigned to them; instead, they are prefixed by the word "supplement" (*sanko*) and are interspersed throughout the numbered documents. None of the *sanko* in Okuno's collection were issued by Nobunaga, but they are included because their content bears directly on the numbered documents that they accompany and thus they assist the reader's understanding of those documents. Some *sanko*, for example, were issued by Nobunaga's vassals and they repeat instructions contained in Nobunaga's documents that they accompany, and others are documents that were sent by various parties to Nobunaga. Two documents in Part I are prefixed by both a number and the word "added" or "addended" (*furoku*). Most *furoku* documents are ones of which Okuno was unsure of the date of issuance but which he inserted at those points in his chronology where he estimated they belong. Finally, there is one document that is contained in Okuno's introductory remarks on documents that were issued during the year 1566, and which is prefixed by neither a number, the word *sanko*, nor the word *furoku*. *ONM*, I, 116.

Part II contains 717 documents. 553 of them--Documents 68 through 493 in Volume I, *ONM*, I, 123-802, and 493 through 619 in Volume II, *ONM*, II, 1-174--are numbered chronologically according to their date of issuance. It is to be noted that Okuno assigned the number 493 to two consecutive documents: the last document in Volume I, *ONM*, I, 802-803, and the first document in Volume II, *ONM*, II, 4-5. In addition to the 553 numbered doc-
umens, Part II contains 156 sankō, two unnumbered furoku—actually there are sixteen furoku but fourteen of them are numbered—and six uncategorized documents of which five are included in Okuno's introductory remarks on documents that were issued in 1568, ONM, I, 150-154, and one in his remarks on documents issued in 1575, ONM, II, 2.

Part III contains 548 documents. 436 of them—Documents 620 through 1055, ONM, II, 175-772—are numbered chronologically according to their date of issuance. There are also 107 sankō, thirty-three furoku—all of which are numbered—and five uncategorized documents in Okuno's introductory remarks on documents issued in 1582. ONM, II, 657-664.

Part III is followed by a section titled "Nendai Misuitei" (Undetermined Dates). It includes sixty-seven numbered documents—Documents 1056 through 1122, ONM, II, 773-831—and three sankō. As its title indicates, this section includes documents that contain no clear designation of their date of issuance, and of which the contents do not provide sufficient evidence for Okuno to estimate where they might fit in his chronology.

Finally there is a section of documents titled "Hōi" (Appendix). It contains forty-eight documents that are numbered, chronologically, from one through forty-eight according to their date of issuance. ONM, II, 832-881. Of these forty-eight, six are sankō and two are furoku. The Appended Documents were added after Okuno had completed the compilation of his work.

Volume II concludes with a five page note, ONM, II, 882-886, on Nobunaga's signatures (kaō) and seals (finshō, or just in), and a four page note, ONM, II, 887-890, in which the author discusses which of the documents in the collection were written by Nobunaga's own hand.

There follows two breakdowns of the material outlined above:
Breakdown 1.

<table>
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<th>Numbered documents</th>
<th>Unnumbered documents:</th>
<th>Total</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>sankō (10)</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>uncategorized documents</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>553</td>
<td>sankō (156)</td>
<td>717</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>III</td>
<td>436</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Numbered documents</td>
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<td>70</td>
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<tr>
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</tbody>
</table>

Total number of documents in the collection: 1461

Breakdown 2

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<th>Part II</th>
<th>Part III</th>
<th>Undetermined Date Documents</th>
<th>Appended Documents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>553</td>
<td>436</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unnumbered documents: sankō:</td>
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<td>Part II</td>
<td>Part III</td>
<td>Undetermined Date Documents</td>
<td>Appended Documents (6 are numbered)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>156</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>furoku:</td>
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<td>Part II (14 are numbered)</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total number of documents: 1461
Of the 1461 documents in *Oda Nobunaga Monjo no Kenkyū*, Nobunaga is thought to have issued 975, or almost seventy percent, of them:

**Numbered documents:** he issued all but 168 of the 1123 documents numbered consecutively from 1 through 1122. (Note the discrepancy here; it is caused by the fact that the number 493 was used twice). Thus Nobunaga issued: 955

He issued all but 28 of the 48 Appended Documents numbered from 1 through 48. 20

**Unnumbered documents:** sankō: none were issued by Nobunaga. 0

fu roku: he issued all but 19 of the 54 fu roku, but all the ones he issued are numbered. 0

Uncategorized documents: none by Nobunaga. 0

Total number of documents issued by Nobunaga: 975

There is a great variety in the types of documents contained in the *Oda Nobunaga Monjo no Kenkyū* and great variation in the number of each type that appears. There are several hundred samples of certain types of documents, but only one sample of a large number of other types. Excluding the five documents with no designated classification, the documents may be classified according to the frequency with which they appear:

shuinjō: red seal document. (382 shuinjō are contained in the collection).

In Nobunaga's time daimyo affixed a red seal to a document to indicate that it was an official order or authorization, and thus such documents were sent only to one's vassals and inferiors. The red seal documents were the most official type used by Nobunaga, and it was by means of them that he ruled his domains. The use of a red seal was common in the Muromachi, Sengoku, and Tokugawa periods, but in Tokugawa times its use came to be restricted to the shogun. According to Okuno, there are 497 shuinjō in his collection, but my count yields only 382. *ONM*, II, 887.

kokujinjō: black seal document. (223) A black seal was also used to indi-
cate that the document so sealed was an official order or authorization.

According to Nobunaga's usage, there was no strict distinction between a shuinjō and a kokuinjō, although the former was affixed to documents of a more official or more weighty nature, and it was used only by persons of daimyo rank.

shojo: This term simply means "letter" or "document." (270) Many documents in Okuno's collection, such as thank you notes, requests, and queries, are of no special type and are therefore simply called shojo.

kinseijō (or kinseija): a letter of prohibition. (137)

hanmotsu: A document containing a judgment or a confirmation, and signed with either a signature or a seal. (118) Many documents that Nobunaga issued early in his life, before he attained enough status and power to use shuinjō or kokuinjō, were hanmotsu. The hanmotsu was a lesser bushi's equivalent of the red and black seal documents.

renshojo: joint signature documents. (70) It was frequently the case that Nobunaga's vassals would pass down his orders to their vassals by means of a document signed by several or a number of them.

fukujo: accompanying documents. (56) This was a document that accompanied, or followed shortly afterwards, one issued by Nobunaga. The fukujo usually repeated the message in Nobunaga's document that it accompanied, and thus served as a stage in the transmission of orders. Nobunaga himself issued a number of these to accompany, and endorse, documents sent out by Ashikaga Yoshiaki during the early years of their alliance.

hōjō or hōsho: (40) These were letters issued by shogunal administrators or stewards in transmitting shogunal commands.

origami: affidavit or testimonial. (40).

imbanjō or impanjō: seal document. (29) That is, documents that were
signed with a seal rather than a signature. This general term is used to describe those documents about which it is impossible to discern what kind of seal was used.

kishōmon: personal contracts or pledges. (10)
gonaisho: a private document, usually a decree, issued by the shogun. (8)
jōsho: a document that lists certain provisions or conditions. (8)
oboegaki: notes or memos. (8)
okitesho: a document that lists specific regulations or commands. (8)
seisatsu: a public notice, usually a prohibition against certain actions specified in the notice, that was displayed at the entrance to the institution to which it was granted. (6)
sōsoku: a personal letter. (5)
jōki: same as jōsho above. (4)
kinsekibun: an inscription, usually a dedication, on a monument, a bell, a statue, or some such object. (4)
andojō: a permit, pardon, or letter of reassurance. (3)
rinshi (or rinji): an Imperial edict. (3)
sashidashi mokuroku: a cadastral record; a detailed record of the size and yield of a given area of land. (3)
uketorijō: receipts or acknowledgements. (3)
ategaujō: a document detailing apportionments or allotments, usually of land. (2)
jōjō: same as jōsho above. (2)
chigyō-ojō: a note that detailed what persons owned what sections of a given tract of land. (1)
chigyōwari-ojō: same as chigyō-ojō above. (1)
gohan-gokyōshō: a private letter of the shogun signed with his signature. (1)
ikensho: a document that contained objections or protests.  (1)
kakitate: a document that listed the holdings of an estate.  (1)
keizu: a genealogy.  (1)
menkyojo: a license or permit.  (1)
sashidashi: same as sashidashi mokuroku above,  (1)
seishi: a written pledge.  (1)
seisho: same a seishi above.  (1)
shommon: a letter of proof or testimony.  (1)
tegata: a promissory note.  (1)
ukebumi: same as uketorijo above.  (1)
ukejo: same as uketorijo above.  (1)

Some documents fall into more than one category. For example, a document could be both a renshojo, a joint signature document, and a fukujo, an accompanying document; it could be signed by three of Nobunaga's vassals and accompany a document issued by Nobunaga.

Undoubtedly, all the documents and letters ever issued by Oda Nobunaga can never be accounted for. Okuno is confident, however, that the vast majority of Nobunaga's official documents are assembled in his collection. Those documents have been culled from over six hundred different sources, from such an array of places that an Index of Sources is included at the end of Volume II. It is possible, and even probable, that other documents of Nobunaga will come to light in the future as historians continue to search through otera records, diaries, chronicles, and other materials handed down from the sixteenth century. Nevertheless, it is safe to assume that whatever new materials may be found, they will not critically alter the picture of Nobunaga provided by the materials at hand, nor will
any newly discovered materials cause a radical change in our understanding of Oda's basic policies. The materials at hand are adequate to an understanding of Nobunaga.

All documents that were issued by Nobunaga have either his signature or his seal, both of which changed many times during his life. Nobunaga altered the style of his signature over a dozen times, and changed the shape of his red seal three times, and that of his black seal twice. Since Nobunaga used each particular style of signature and shape of seal during a specific period of his life, it is possible to date his documents quite accurately by examining the style of the affixed signature or seal. In some cases either the writer—Nobunaga or one of his secretaries—or the recipient of a document noted the date of issuance or reception on the document itself, in which case it is easy to date such documents. Should the signature, or seal, or the date be illegible, one can sometimes estimate the date of a given document on the basis of internal evidence.

There are many bits of information within most documents that enable them to be dated: for example, Nobunaga may refer to an individual by a certain title that we know was used by that individual between, for example, 1576 and 1578; Nobunaga may have addressed the document to a person who died in 1571 and thereby an outside limit for its date of issuance is established; the document may mention that a certain battle took place just the preceding week, and we know with certainty the actual date of that battle; or the document may open with a New Year's greeting for a certain year. By making use of such information one can accurately date most of Nobunaga's documents; this is indeed a great service that Okuno Takahiro has provided for us.
Shinchō Koki

The Shinchō Koki, also known as the Nobunaga Koki and the Azuchi-ki, is a biography of Oda Nobunaga that was written by Ōta Izumi no Kami Gyūichi.

Ōta Gyūichi (1527-1611?), also known as Ōta Goichi, Ōta Matasuke, and Ōta Sukefusa, was a high-ranking bushi of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries who held the title "Lord of Izumi Province" (Izumi no Kami). He was something of a literatus who spent most of his life as a secretary and bureaucratic administrator. Gyūichi was a native of Owari, Oda Nobunaga's home province, and he served as one of Nobunaga's secretaries until the age of fifty-five when, in 1582, Nobunaga died. Gyūichi then entered the service of Toyotomi Hideyoshi under whom he served as the administrator (daikan) of the provinces of Ōmi and Yamashiro, and in 1589 he had an active role in the implementation of Hideyoshi's "National Land Survey (taikō kenchi). Following Hideyoshi's death in 1598, Gyūichi served his son Toyotomi Hideyori until the year 1610 or shortly thereafter when he died.

Ōta Gyūichi authored four works:

Taikō Gunki (The Military Chronicle of Toyotomi Hideyoshi).
Sekigahara Gokassen Sōshi (Notes on the Battle of Sekigahara).
Ōta Gyūichi Zakki (Miscellany of Ota Gyūichi).
Shinchō Koki (Chronicle of Lord Nobunaga).

The Shinchō Koki is a biography of Oda Nobunaga in sixteen folios—rendered into modern Japanese type it totals 368 pages in the 1965 edition by Kuwata Tadachika—that was written at the end of the first decade of the seventeenth century, probably just before Ōta Gyūichi's death in
1610 or shortly thereafter. Thus it was written some twenty-eight years after Nobunaga's death. In writing the biography Gyūichi relied on a series of notes that he had compiled during his years of service under Nobunaga.

The first folio of the Shinchō Kōki, called simply "Introductory Chapter" (kanshu), is introduced with the notice: "The following are notes on Nobunaga prior to his entry into Kyōto" (kore wa, Nobunaga gojurakū naki izen no sōshi nari). This folio traces the major events in Nobunaga's life from his birth in 1534 until the year 1568 when Nobunaga took up the cause of Ashikaga Yoshiaki and ushered him into Kyōto. The second folio, called simply "Chapter One" (maki-ichi), deals with events of the year 1568, and each year thereafter, from 1569 to 1582, is treated in a separate folio: the third folio, "Chapter Two" (maki-ni), deals with events of the year 1569, the fourth folio with 1570, and so on through the sixteenth folio, "Chapter Fifteen" (maki-jūgo), which concludes with the events of the month of June, 1582, when Nobunaga died.

There are some doubts about the reliability of the Shinchō Kōki because Ōta Gyūichi was inclined to paint a flattering picture of Nobunaga. Gyūichi recalled Nobunaga as a great master and a heroic bushi, and the biography tends to idealize its subject and paint him larger than life. Nevertheless, Gyūichi was not unwilling to include in his work some of the less flattering events in Nobunaga's life: for example, his destruction of the Kudaradera in 1573, the Enryakuji in 1572, and the Senrinji in 1582; the slaughter of Araki Murashige's hostages in 1578, and the massacre of the Mt. Kōya hijiri in 1581; and Nobunaga's barbaric treatment of the heads of his decapitated enemies Asai Nagamasa and Asakura Yoshi-
kage in 1574, (Shincho Kōki, pp. 138, 120-122, 367-368, 234, 331, and 153), and therefore the Shincho Kōki provides us with a friendly but accurate picture of Nobunaga.

Several seventeenth century copies of the Shincho Kōki have come down to us, and Gyūichi's original handwritten version was preserved as one section of a larger work entitled simply "Chronicle of the Year 1568" (Ei-roku Juichi-nen Ki). This ancient document had been handed down as a possession of the Maeda family, an ancient daimyo family of Owari province that claimed descent from the famous Sugawara Michizane. Several modern editions of the original Shincho Kōki are available in Japanese:


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Glossary
Adaka 安宅
Adaka Nobuyasu 安宅信康
Ajiru アジール
Akashi Straits (Kaikyō) 明石海峡
Akechi 明智
Akechi Mitsuhide 明智光秀
Aki Province (no Kuni) 安芸国
Akusō 悪僧
Amako 尼子
Amazaki 尼崎
Amida 阿弥陀
Amida Buddha (Butsu) 阿弥陀佛(仏)
Amidaji 阿弥陀寺
Andō Heiemon 安東平右衛門
Andōjō 安堵状
Ane-gawa 姊川
Ankokuji (Ekei) 安国寺惠瓊
Appaku 壓(圧)迫
Arai Hakuseki 新井白石
Araki 荒木
Araki Murashige 荒木村重
Ariamaru kanka to jōnetsu no hakeguchi ありあまる闘戦と情熱のはげし
Arioka fortress (jō) 有岡城
Asai 浅井
Asai Nagamasa 浅井長政
Asakura 朝倉
Asakura Norikage 朝倉教景
Asakura Yoshikage 朝倉義景
Asayama 朝山
Asayama Nichijō 朝山日乗
Asazuma 朝拝
Ashigaru 足軽
Ashikaga 足利
Ashikaga Bakufu 足利幕府
Ashikaga period (jidai) 足利時代
Ashikaga Yoshisaki 足利義秋 (昭)
Ashikaga Yoshiharu 足利義晴
Ashikaga Yoshihide 足利義栄
Ashikaga Yoshimitsu 足利義満
Ashikaga Yoshinori 足利義教
Ashikage Yoshitane 足利義楨
Ashikaga Yoshiteru 足利義輝
Ashita no Ōama 朝の山
Atago 爱宕
Ategaujo 宛行状
Atsumori 敦盛
Atsuta Shrine (Daijingū) 熱田大神宮
Awa Province (no Kuni) 阿波国
Awaji Province (no Kuni) 濃路国
Azuchi 安土
Azuchi-Momoyama period (jidai) 安土桃山時代
Azuchi Shūron 安土宗論
Bakufu
Bateren Monke
Bessho
Betsuryō
Bingo Province (no Kuni)
Bingo no Kami
Bitchū Province (no Kuni)
Biwa, Lake (ko)
Bizen Province (no Kuni)
Bodaiji
Bodaisho
Bodhidharma (Bodaidaruma)
Bōkan
Bon
Bonten
Bosshūchi
Bōzu
Bōzu Daimyō
Bōzu ika yō ni mo tachisōrō mono o ba, shamen subekarazu sōrō
Buddha (Buttsu/Hotoke)
Buddha Amida (Amida Butsu)
Buhendō
Buze Shohatto
Bukkyō
Bukkyō Shisō
Bungo Province (no Kuni)
Bunkoku 分国
Bunmei 文明
Buppō 仏法
Buppō-Hōso 仏法・宝祚
Buppō-Hōso heian no moto 仏法・宝祚平安之基
Buppō-Obō 仏法・王法
Bushadō 武者道
Bushi 武士
Butsudō 仏道
Byakurai 白爛
Byōbu 屏風
Chasen 茶人
Chi 気
Chigyō-oobe 知行覚
Chigyōwari-oobe 知行割覚
Chi-Li 気・理
Chōenji 長遠寺
Chōfukuji 長福寺
Chokkatsuchi 直轄地
Chōmyōji 長命(頂妙)寺
Chōnin 町人
Chōsokabe 長宗我部
Chōsokabe Yosaburō 長宗我部弥三郎
Chō Tsuratatsu 長連竜
Chōzan (or Chōsan) 朝山
Christian daimyo (Kirishitan daimyō) 切支丹大名
Christian samurai (Kirishitan samurai) 切支丹侍
Chūgoku 中国
Confucianism (Jukyō or Jugaku) 儒教・儒学
Daibōzu 代坊主
Daibutsu 大仏
Daidembō-in 大伝法院
Daikakuji 大覚寺
Daikan 代官
Daimyō 大名
Daimyō-cha 大名茶
Dairokuten (no) Maō 第六天の魔王
Dairokuten no Maō Nobunaga ドイロクテンノ・マウノ・ノブナカ
Daitokuji 大徳寺
Danatsu 弾圧
Danjō no jō 弾正忠
Daruma 達磨
Date 伊達
Date Terumune 伊達輝宗
Denchū Go-okite 殿中御浣
Densuke 伝介
Dewa Province (no Kuni) 出羽(国)
Dōgen 道元
Dogō 土豪
Doi 土圏
Dōjō 道場
Dōkyō 道鏡
Dōmyōji 道明寺
Donge'in 曇華院
Dōshu 堂衆
Ebisawa Arimichi 海老沢有道
Echigo Province (no Kuni) 越後国
Echizen Province (no Kuni) 越前国
Edamachi 枝町
Edo 江戸
Edo Period (Jidai) 江戸時代
Eiroku Jūichi-nen Ki 永禄十一年記
Eisai 栄西
Ekei 恵瓊
Empukuji 亀福寺
Enchin 圓(円)珍
Endō 遠藤
Enkyōji 亀鏡寺
Ennin 圓仁
Enryakuji 延暦寺
Enuma 江沼
Etchū Province (no Kuni) 越中国
Gaikyō kusushi 外教くすし
Gakkei 覚慶
Gakuryo 学侶
Gakushō 学匠
Gashira 頭
Gekokujō 下剋上
Gempei War (no Ran) 源平(の乱)
Gempei Kōtai 源平交替
Gengo Dōdan 言語道断
Genjitsu Shugi 現実主義
Genki 元亀
Genroku 元禄
Gensei Shugi 現世主義
Gien (or, kien) 棄損
Gifu (Prefecture: Ken) 岐阜(県)
Godaigo, Emperor (Tennō) 後醍醐 (天皇)
Gohan-gokyōshō 御判御教書
Gonaishō 御内書
Gonaishō, gogechi no mune ni makasete 御内書・御下知之旨
Gonara, Emperor (Tennō) 後奈良 (天皇)
Gōrishugi 合理主義
Gotō 後藤
Gozaijinshū 御在陣衆
Gozan 五山
Gyokunen Reiyo 玉灌霊誉
Gyōnin 行人
Gyūichi 牛一
Hachiman Daibosatsu
Hage Nezumi
Hakase
Hakata
Hakuzan
Han
Hanakuma
Hanmotsu
Harada
Harada Naomasa
Harima Province (no Kuni)
Hasegawa Hidekazu
Hashiba
Hashiba Hiyoshi
Hatakeyama
Hatakeyama Sadamasa
Hatakeyama Takamasa
Hayashi
Hayashi Razan
Heian Period (Jidai)
Henshōji
Hida Province (no Kuni)
Hidenaga
Hideyori
Hideyoshi
Hiei
Hiei Sohei
Hieizan (ji) 北教山(寺)
Higashi Honganji 東本願寺
Hijiri 聖
Himeji 姫路
Hino Terusuke 日野輝資
Hirano Estate (shō) 平野(荘)
Hirate Masahide 平手政秀
Hirotada 廣忠
Hisahide 永秀
Hisamasa 永政
Hisamichi 永通
Hiyoshi Shrine (jinja) 日吉(神社)
Hō/toyo 豊
Hoan Taikōki 甫廼太閣記
Hōi 補遺
Hōjō, or Hōsho 奉状・奉書
Hōjō 北條
Hōjō Sōun 北條早雲
Hōjō Tokitsura 北條時連
Hōjō Ujimasa 北條氏政
Hōjō Ujitora 北條氏虎
Hōjō Ujiyasu 北條氏康
Hōjō Yasutoki 北條泰時
Hokke 法華
Hokke-Ikki 法華一揆
Hokkeji 法華寺 or 法花寺
Hokke Monto 法華門徒
Hokkeshū 法華宗
Hōkōji 方広寺
Hōkōji Daibutsu 方広寺大仏
Hokuriku/Hokuroku 北陸
Hōkyō-ji 宝鏡寺
Hōnen 法然
Honganji 本願寺
Honganji Betsuin 本願寺別院
Honganji no zōi o kuwadatsuru shidai sendai mimon 本願寺企遠意次第時代末聞
Honji 本寺
Honkokuji 本園寺
Honnōji 本能寺
Honnōji Incident (no Ran) 本能寺の乱
Honpa Honganji 本派本願寺
Honryō 本領
Honzeiji/Honzuji 本誓寺
Honshū 本州
Honzan 本山
Hori Hidemasa 堀秀政
Hōryūji 法隆寺
Hōsaiji 広濟寺
Hōso 宝祚
Hosokawa 細川
Hosokawa (Nagaoka) Fujitaka 細川(長岡)藤高
Hosokawa Harumoto 細川晴元
Hosokawa Masamoto 細川政元
Hosso School (shū) 法相（宗）
Hōteki 法敵
Hyakushō-ikki 百姓一揆
Hyakushō mochi no kuni 百姓持ちの国
Hyōri Ganzen 表裏眼前
Ibaraki 茨木
Ichijō-in 一乘院
Ichinoritani (Ichijōgatani or Ichijōdani) 一乘谷
Ieyasu 家康
Iga Province (no Kuni) 伊賀(国)
Ijō 以上
Ika Kaidai 威加海内
Ikeda (Castle, jō) 池田(城)
Ikeda Katsumasa 池田勝正
Ikensho 異見書
Ikken Hei Tenka 弁勅平天下
Ikki 一揆
Ikki-domo 一揆共
Ikki no Yakara 一揆之族
Ikkō 一向
Ikkō-ikki 一向一揆
Ikkō Monto 一向門徒
Ikkōshū 一向宗
Imagawa 今川
Imagawa Yoshimoto 今川義元
Imai 今井
Imbanjō (or, Impanjō) 印判状
In 印
Inabayama 稲葉山
Inada 稻田
Inga 因果
Inoko 猪子
Inoko Hyōsuke (Takanari)  猪子兵介（高就）
Inshō 印章
Ippen 一遍
Ise Province (no Kuni) 伊勢（国）
Ise Daijingū 伊勢大神宮
Ishikawa Prefecture (ken) 石川（県）
Ishiyama Honganji 石山本願寺
Ishiyama Honganji Ikki (or, Kassen) 石山本願寺一揆（合戦）
Isshiki 一職
Isurugi Shrine (Jinja) 伊須流支（神社）
Itami 伊丹
Itami Chikaoki 伊丹親興
Itazura-mono いたつらもの
Iyo Province (no Kuni) 伊予（国）
Izumi Province (no Kuni) 和泉（国）
Izumi no Kami 和泉守
Izumo Province (no Kuni) 出雲（国）
寺
時
寺法
寺院
寺家法度
寺家を相応すべき事専一に候
寺門
仁
甚九郎
慈恩寺 清願院
自力
寺領棄破令
地侍
寺社奉行
寺社本所領・当知行之地、無謂押領之儀、堅停止事。
実如光兼
上
貞安
浄士
浄土真宗
貞定式目
浄願院
浄願(の)坊
Jōjō 条条
Jōkamachi 城下町
Jōki 条規
Jōkōji 定光寺
Jōsho 条書
Jōshōji 誠照寺
Jōshōji Branch (Ha) 誠照寺 (派)
Junnyo 准如
Junnyo Kōshō 准如光照
Kabuki 舞楽
Kaburaki Yorinobu 藤原信信
Kaga Province (no Kuni) 加賀 (国)
Kai Province (no Kuni) 甲斐 (国)
Kaisen 矢見
Kaitakate 書立
Kakuban 覚鑑
Kamakura Period (Jidai) 鎌倉 (時代)
Kami 神
Kamo River (Gawa) 加茂 (川)
Kandô 橘
Kanjuji 勧修寺
Kanjuji Harutoyo 勧修寺晴豊
Kannmu, Emperor (Tennō) 桓武 (天皇)
Kanno 官能
Kannonji 観音寺
Kanō School (Ryu) 狩野 (流)
Kanrei 管領
Kansai 関西
Kanshu 卷首
Kantō 関東
Kanzu (or Kanju) 弓拝 (参数)
Ko 花押
Kare itazura-mono makesorō 彼れときはものまけ候
Kashira o Kosoge かしらをこそけ
Katabira かたびら (帷子)
Katanagari 刀狩
Katata 堅田
Katsuie 賢家
Kawachi Province (no Kuni) 河内(国)
Kawajiri 川尻
Kawajiri Hidetaka 川尻秀隆
Kegon School (Shū) 華厳(宗)
Keichō 慶長
Keigo 警固
Keishū Tessō 景秀鉄叟
Keizu 系図
Kenchi 檜地
Kenmu Shikimoku 建武式目
Kennyo 映如
Kennyo Kōsa 映如光佐
Kenshin 謙信
Kenshōji 頭証寺
Kichihōshi 吉法師
Kien (Gien) 葉損
Kiganji 祈願寺
Kigansho 祈願所
Kiha 棄破
Kii Province (no Kuni) 紀伊(国)
Kimono 着物
Kinai 程内
Kinchō 金打
Kinoshita Tōkichirō 木下藤吉郎
禁制
禁制状
禁制...於境内殺生
金石文
帰参人
起請文
起請文覚書: 敬白
北畠
北政所
北庄(北莊)
吉法師
清水寺
木津川
木津川口
小早川隆景
興福寺
古義(派)
古今和歌集
石 (或 解)
国学者
黒印状
国人
黒癒
国司
国司不入
小牧(山)
小松寺
Komatata otoko da naa 困た男だなあ
KougoBuji 金剛武寺
Kougoji 金剛寺
Konoe 近衛
Konze こんじ（金勝）
Konze Bonze (no Bōzu) こんじの坊主
Konzeji こんじ寺
Koonji 厚恩寺
Korea (Kankoku) 韓国
Kore wa, Nobunaga gojuraku naki izen no sōshi nari
是れは、信長御入洛無き以前の双紙なり
Kosaru (or, Kozaru) 小猿
Kose (or, Koze, Ose, Oze) 小瀬
Kose Hoan 小瀬甫庵
Koshigatana 腰刀
Kotani (or Kodani, Otani, Odani) 小谷
Koten Bunka 古典文化
Koya, Mount (San) 高野（山）
Kozen Gokoku-Ron 興禅護國論
Kozuke Province (no Kuni) 上野（国）
Kubi sanzen amari uchitoru 首三千余打捕
Kudaradera 百濟寺
Kuge 公家
Kukai (Kobo Daishi) 空海（弘法大師）
Kuki 久鬼
Kuki Yoshitaka 久鬼喜隆
Kumano 熊野
Kunaikyō Hōin 宮内卿法印
Kunori 九里
Kunori Saburozaemon 九里三郎左衛門
Kun-yomi 訓読
Kuroda 黒田
Kusatsu 草津
Kyōdan 教団
Kyōki Gorishugishā 狂気合理主義者
Kyōnyo 教如
Kyōnyo Kōju 教如光寿
Kyōraku Shugi 享樂主義
Kyōto 京都
Kyōto Honganji 京都本願寺
Kyōto-machi 京都町
Kyōtora sūman-nin o nadegiri 凶徒等数万人撫切
Kyōto Shoshidai 京都所司代
Kyūonji 久遠寺
Kyūsai Katsudō 救濟活動
Kyūseishu 救世主
Kyūshū 九州
Kyūso neko o kamu 窮鼠猫を喰む
Li (Ri) 理
Machigumi 町組
Machishū 町衆
Maeba 前波
Maeba Nagatoshi 前波長俊
Maeda 前田
Maeseki 前関
Maeseki Sakihisa 前関前久
Maki-ichi 卷一
Maki-jūgo 卷十五
Maki-ni 卷二
Makinōdera (Makinōji) 槇尾寺
Makishima 槇島
Makoto ni tegara hirui nashi 誠手柄無比類
Mappō 末法
Matsudaira Hirotada 松平廣忠
Matsui 松井
Matsui Yūkan 松井友閑
Matsuji 末寺
Matsunaga 松永
Matsunaga Hisahide 松永久秀
Matsunaga Hisamichi 松永久通
Matsunaga Uemonnosuke 松永右衛門佐
Matsutae Fortress (jō) 松任(城)
Meiwaku 迷惑
Menkyōjō 免許状
Metsuke 目付け
Miidera 三井寺
Mikatagahara no Tatakai  三方ヶ原の戦
Mikawa Province (no Kuni)  三河 (国)
Miki  三木
Minamoto 源
Minamoto-Taira 源平
Minamoto Yorichika 源頼親
Minamoto Yoritomo 源頼朝
Mino Province (no Kuni) 美濃 (国)
Mino Zaikoku Jidai 美濃在国時代
Miroku (Maitreya) 彌勒
Misujimachi 三筋町
Mitsuhide 光秀
Miyako 都
Miyoshi 三好
Miyoshi Chōkei 三好長慶
Miyoshi Yasunaga 三好康長
Miyoshi Yoshitsugu 三好義継
Mokujiki 木食
Momoyama 桃山
Monto 門徒
Monto Kyōdan 門徒教団
Montoshū 門徒宗
Monzenmachi 門前町
Mori Sanzaemon 森三左衛門
Mōri 毛利
Mōri Motonari 毛利元就
Mozume 物集女
Mozume Tadashige
Muhō Daiichi no Shū
Munen sukunakarazu sōrō
Murai Sadakatsu
Murakami, Emperor (Tennō)
Murashige
Muromachi Bakufu
Muromachi Period (Jidai)
Musashi Province (no Kuni)
Mutsu Province (no Kuni)
Myōkenji
Myōshinji
Myōshu
Nagahama 長浜
Nagahide 長秀
Nagamasu 長益
Nagaoka 長岡
Nagaoka Fujitaka 長岡藤高
Nagashima 長嶋
Nagashino 長篠
Nagata 永田
Nagata Kagehiro 永田景弘
Nakagawa Kiyohide 中川清秀
Nakano-ji 中野寺
Nakanoshima 中埜
Naku ko mo damaru kishin no gotoki bushō 泣く兒もだらる鬼神のごとき武将
Namban 南蛮
Namu Amida Butsu 南無阿弥陀仏
Nanazato Yorichika 万里頼周
Nanboku Period (chō) 南北(朝)
Nanzenji 南禅寺
Nara Period (Jidai) 奈良(時代)
Nara Prefecture (ken) 奈良県
Negorodera (or, Negoroji) 根来寺
Negoro Sohei 根来僧兵
Nējin 倭人
Nekirubeki 可根切
Nembutsu 念佛
Nembutsu-sha 念佛者
Nembutsu 念仏宗
Nengu 年貢
Neo-Confucianism (Shushigaku) 朱子学
Nichijō 日乗
Nichijō Chōzan (or, Chōsan) 日乗朝山
Nichiren 日蓮
Nichiren Monto 日蓮門徒
Nichirenshū 日蓮宗
Nihon (or, Nippon) Koku 日本国
Nihon Kai (Japan Sea) 日本国海
Nijō Palace (jō) 二条(城)
Nikkō 日琉
Ninchōji 忍頂寺
Ningen Chūshin-shugi 人間中心主義
Ningen gojū nen 人間五十年
Ninnaji 仁和寺
Nishi Honganji 西本願寺
Nishinomiya 西(り)宮
Nitte mo yaite mo kuenai shiromono 煮ても焼いても食えない代物
Nittei 日禎
Niwa 丹羽
Niwa Nagahide 丹羽長秀
Niwata 庭田
Niwata Shigeyasu 庭田重保
Nō 能
Nōbi 能美
Nobu 信
Nobuchika 信親
Nobuharu 信治
Nobuhide 信秀
Nobuhiro 信広
Nobumori 信盛
Nobunaga 信長
Nobunaga Kōki 信長公記
Nobunaga ni taishi ikon shincho da ga...
信長に対し遺恨深重だが
Nobunaga o bonjin de nai 信長を同人でない
Nobuo 信雄
Nobuoki 信興
Nobutada 信忠
Nobutaka 信高
Nobuyuki 信行
Nobuzumi 信澄
Nōmin 農民
Norikage 教景
Noto Province (no Kuni) 能登
Ogimachi, Emperor (Tennō) 正親町(天皇)
Ōhara 大原
Oichū お市
Okasuhō no Kami 岡周防守
Okehazama, Battle of (no Tatakai) 桶狭間の戦
Okitehao 掖書
Ōmi Province (no Kuni) 近江(国)
Ōminato 大湊
Ōmi Zaikoku Jidai 近江在国時代
Onjōji 園城寺
Ōnin 鷹(応)仁
Ōnin-Bunmei Period (Jidai) 応仁・文明
Ōnin War (no Ran) 応仁の乱
On-yomi 音詣
Origami 折紙
Osaka 小坂
Ōsaka 大坂
Ōsaka Bay (Wan) 大坂(湾)
Ōshizuka 太子塚
Ōsumi Estate (no Shō) 大住(の庄)
Ōta 太田
Ōta Gyūichi (or, Goichi) 太田牛一
Ōta Gyūichi Zakki 太田牛一雑記
Ōta Izumi no Kami Gyūichi 太田和泉守牛一
Ōta Matasuke 太田又助
Ōtani Branch (Ha) 大谷(派)
Ōtani Honganji 大谷本願寺
太田資房  Ota Sukefusa
お寺  Otera
大友義鎮（宗麟）  Otomo Yorishige (Sōrin)
大津  Ōtsu
大うつけ  Ōtsuke
大膳  Ōwaki
大膳伝介  Ōwaki Densuke
尾張（国）  Owari Province (no Kuni)
尾張在国時代  Owari Zaikoku Jidai
親町  Oyamachi
応誉  Ōyo
Raigei'in  来迎院
Rangakusha  蘭学者
Reiyo  靈薫
Rennyo  蓮如
Rennyo Kenju  蓮如兼寿
Renshojō  連署状
Rinshi (or, Rinji)  繍旨
Rinzai Zen  臨済禅
Rokkaku  六角
Rokkaku Yoshisuke  六角義弼
Rokujōgawara  六条河原
Rokushin  六親
Rokusho  録所
Ryoshuku  旅宿
Sada'atsu Shin'ō 貞敦親王
Sadamasa 貞政
Sado Province (no Kuni) 佐渡（国）
Sagami Province (no Kuni) 相模（国）
Saginomori 鷺森
Saginomori Betsuin 鷺森別院
Saginomori Gobō 鷺森御坊
Saichō (Dengyō Daishi) 最澄（伝教大師）
Saiga 雑賀
Saiga Monto 雑賀門徒
Saiga no Jōdoshū 雑賀之浄土宗
Sai'in 西院
Saikōji 西光寺
Sairenji 西蓮寺
Saito 斎藤
Saitō Dōsan 斎藤道三
Saitō Shingorō 斎藤新五郎
Saitō Tatsuoki 斎藤竜興
Saitō Yoshitatsu 斎藤義宣
Sakai 坂
Sakamoto 坂本
Sake 酒
Sakihisa 前久
Sakizaki no gotoku 如前々
Sakizaki no gotoku tarubeshi 可為如前々
Sakoku 鎖国
Sakuma 佐久間
Sakuma Jinkurō 佐久間甚九郎
Sakuma Nobumori 佐久間信盛
Samurai 侍
Sangen Branch (Ha) 山元 (派)
Sanji-Chionji 三時・知恩寺
Sankō 参考
Sanmon 三門
Sanmonte Branch (Ha) 三門徒 (派)
Sanuki Province (no Kuni) 諫岐 (国)
Sanzai no tabatake 散在 (の) 田畑
Sanzairyō 散在領
Sanzen'in 三千院
Saru 猿
Sarushibai 猿使い
Sasaki 佐々木
Sasaki Yoshikata 佐々木義賢
Sashidashi 指出
Sashidashi Mokuroku 指出目録
Seijin no montei to gō suru haisha 聖人之号門弟輩者
Seika 惣窓
Seisatsu 制札
Seishi 誓紙 - 誓詞
Seishinteki Genri 精神的原理
Seisho 誓書
Seishūji 政秀寺
Seiwa Genji 清和源氏
Seiyo Jōan 聖譽貞安
Seizoku Sekigahara, Battle of (no Tatakai)

Sekisho

Sengoku

Sengoku Daimyo

Sengoku Period (jidai)

Senjuji

Sen no Rikyu

Sennyoji

Senpukuji

Seto Naikai (Inland Sea)

Settsu Province (no Kuni)

Shakubuku

Shi

Shiba

Shibayama Chojiro

Shihonryoji

Shibata

Shibata Katsuie

Shibata Katsusada

Shibata

Shima

Shibata

Shiba

Shihonryoji
Shikai 四海
Shikoku 四国
Shimai Sōshitsu 鳥井宗室
Shimozuma 下間
Shimozuma Raijun (Yorizumi) 下間赖経
Shimozuma Rairen (Yoriyasu) 下間赖廉
Shimozuma Rairyū (Yoritatsu) 下間赖童
Shimozuma Raishō (Yoriteru) 下間赖照
Shin 真
Shinano Province (no Kuni) 信濃 (国)
Shinchi 新地
Shinchigyōsei 新知行制
Shinchì no tame mairase iwanu, mattaku (go)chokumu arubeki no jōken no
gotoshi 為新地進之詣、全可有(御)直務之狀如件
Shinchōki 信長記
Shinchō Kōki 信長公記
Shingen 信玄
Shingi 新義
Shingi no shūdori kore aru bekazaru 新儀之主執不可在
Shingon 真言
Shingonshū 真言宗
Shingorō 新五郎
Shinkichi 新吉
Shinmachi 新町
Shin Monshu 新門主
Shinnyodō 真知堂
Shinran 新鸞
Shinsen'en 神せんえん (神泉苑)
Shinshū 真宗
Shintō 神道
Shiogawa Kunimaro 坂川国満
Shio-uri 塩矢
Shirakawa, Emperor (Tennō) 白河(天皇)
Shishi shinchū no mushi 獅子身中の虫
Shisōkai 思想界
Shitennoji 四天王寺
Shōen 荘園
Shōensei 荘園制
Shōgoku 清玉
Shōgun 将軍
Shōjō 書状
Shōjōji 証城(〜証誠)寺
Shokuhō 織豊
Shokuhō Daimyō 織豊大名
Shokuhō Jidai 織豊時代
Shōmon 証文
Shōmu 所務
Shōmyōji 称名寺
Shōnenji 称念寺
Shōnyo Kōkyō 証(〜証)如光教
Shōren'in 青蓮院
Shōren'in Monseki Sonchō Hōshinnō 青蓮院門跡尊朝法親王
Shoshidai 所司代
Shōtoku, Prince Regent (Taishi) 聖徳太子
Shōtokuji 聖徳寺
Shū 宗
Shūfukuji 崇福寺
Shugo 守護
Shugo Daimyō 守護大名
Shugo-funyū 守護不入
Shugo-funūchi 守護不入地
Shugoshi 守護使
Shugoshi-funyū 守護使不入
Shugoshi-funūchi 守護使不入地
Shuinjō 朱印状
Shuinsei 朱印制
Shumokumachi 撞木町
Shūmon Aratame-yaku 宗門改役
Shūron 宗論
Shushigaku 朱子学
Sō 萩
Sōbun Rōjakusho 萩分老若所
Sōbun Satasho 萩分沙汰所
Soga 蘇我
Sōhei 僧兵
Sōi aru bekarazaru 不可有相違
Sōin (or, Sōon) 宗恩
Sōkenji 撃見寺
Sōniryō 僧尼円
Sōroku 僧録
Sōrokusho 僧録所
Soryaku naki 末略あり
Sōsoku 消息
Sōsokuron 相即論
Sōtō Zen 曹洞禅
Sōyokuron 双翼論
ssu/ji/tera 寺
Sugawara (no) Michizane 菅原道真
Sugaya Nagayori 菅屋 (菅谷) 長頼
Sugihara Yasuko 杉原寧子
Sugi no Bō 杉坊
Sugitani Zenjūbō 杉谷善住坊
Suiko, Empress (Tennō) 推古 (天皇)
Suizen 垂涎
Sūjū pasento 数十パーセント
Sumō 相撲
Sung Dynasty (Japanese: Sōchō) 宋朝
Suruga Province (no Kuni) 駿河 (国)
Suzuki Magoichi 鈴木孫一
Suzuki Shōsan 鈴木正三
Tachiiri Munetsugu 立入宗矩
Taga Shrine (Taisha) 多賀（大社）
Taigen Sūfu 太原崇孚
Taihō Code (Ritsuryō) 大宝（律令）
Taika Reform (no Kaishin) 大化（改新）
Taikō Gunki 太閣軍記
Taikō Kenchi 太閤椛地
Taira 平
Taira Kiyomori 平清盛
Taira Nobunaga 平信長
Taira Shigehira 平重衡
Taishaku 帝赦
Tajima Province (no Kuni) 但馬（国）
Takada Branch (Ha) 高田（派）
Takamasa 高政
Takatsukasa 鷹司
Takatsuki 高槻
Takayama 高山
Takayama Hida no Kami 高山飛騨守
Takayama Ukon 高山右近
Takebe 連部
Takebe Shōchi 連部紹智
Takeda 武田
Takeda Katsuyori 武田勝頼
Takeda Nobutora 武田信虎
Takeda Shingen 武田信玄
Takei Sekian 武井夕庵
Takigawa Kazumasu 滝川一益
Takugen 沢彦
Takugen Shūon (or, Sōin, Sōon) 沢彦宗恩
Tamba Province (no Kuni) 丹波(国)
Tamon-in 多聞院
Tamon-in Nikki 多聞院日記
Tango Province (no Kuni) 丹後(国)
Tariki 他力
Tawake-mono たわけ物
Tegata 手形
Teishugaku 程朱学
Tenbun Hokke no Ran 天文法華の乱
Tendai 天台
Tendaishū 天台宗
Tenka 天下
Tenka Fubu (or, Hobu) 天下布武
Tenka no tame 天下之為
Tenka no tame, Nobunaga tame 天下之為, 信長為
Tenka o suteokaruru 天下被弃
Tenmanmori 天满森
Tennōji Kitajō 天王寺北城
Tenri City (Shi) 天理市
Tenrikyō 天理教
Tenryūji 天龍寺
Tenshō 天正
Tentō 天道
Teppōtai 鉄炮隊
Tera 寺
Terumoto 照元
Tōdaiji 東大寺
Tōdaiji Daibutsu 東大寺大仏
Toga 告
Togashi Masachika 富樫政親
Tōhoku-in 東北院
Tōji 東寺
Tōji-in 等持院
Tōkichirō 藤きちろう（藤吉郎）
Tōkichirō Onnadomo 藤きちろうたんなんとも
Tokitsugu Kyōki 言継卿記
Tokugawa 徳川
Tokugawa Bakufu 徳川幕府
Tokugawa Ieyasu 徳川家康
Tokugawa Period (Jidai) 徳川（時代）
Tokusei 徳政
Tokusei-ikki 徳政一揆
Tokuseirei 徳政令
Tōkyō 東京
Tomita 富田
Tomita Nagashige 富田長繁
Tōnomine 多武峯
Tosa Province (no Kuni) 土佐（国）
Tōtōmi Province (no Kuni) 遠江（国）
Toyotomi 豊臣
Toyotomi Hideyori 豊臣秀頼
Toyotomi Hideyoshi 豊臣秀吉
Tsuchi-ikki 土一揆
Tsuda Nobuhiro 津田信広
Tsurugi Shrine (Jinja) 剣 (神社)
Tsutsui Junkei 筒井順慶
Uchi 宇(有)智
Uchūben Kanjuji Harutoyo 右中井勘修寺晴豊
Uesugi 上杉
Uesugi Kagekatsu 上杉景勝
Uesugi Kenshin 上杉謙信
Uji 氏
Ujigami 氏神
Ujiie Naomoto 氏家道元
Ukebumi 請文
Ukejō 請状
Uketorijō 請取状
Ukita 宇喜多
Ukiyo 浮世
Ukon 右近
Unkōji 雲興寺
Utsu Yorishige 宇津顕重
Wada Koremasa 和田惟政
Wakae 若江
Wakasa Province (no Kuni) 若狭（国）
Wareware aru kata e wa, ashi o mo sasazaru yō ni...
我へかたへ八、足をもさささるやうに
Yaemon 弥右衛門
Yakara 族
Yamaguchi 山口
Yamakuni Estate (shō) 山国(莊)
Yamamoto Branch (Ha) 山元(派)
Yamamoto-ji 山本寺
Yamanaka 山中
Yamashina 山科
Yamashina Honganji 山科本願寺
Yamashina Tokitsu 山科住継
Yamashiro Province (no Kuni) 山城(国)
Yamashiro no kuni Sai'in no uchi sanjū koku no koto 山城国西院内参拾石事
Yamato Province (no Kuni) 大和(国)
Yodo River (gawa) 津(川)
Yokoyama Fortress (jō) 橫山(城)
Yon 四
Yōrō Code (Ritsuryō) 養老律令
Yosaburō 弥三郎
Yoshiaki 義秋(義昭)
Yoshiharu 義晴
Yoshihide 義景
Yoshikage 義昌
Yoshino 義野
Yoshitane 義輝
Yoshiteru 義原
Yoshiwara
Yoshizaki 吉崎
Yura Straits (Kaikyō) 由良 (海峡)
Zen 禅
Zen Gozan 禅五山
Zenibako 錢箱
Zenjūbō 善住坊
Zenshū 禅宗
Zōri-tori 草履取り