UBC Theses and Dissertations

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UBC Theses and Dissertations

Parties and participation in Vancouver, 1964-1976 Ioannou, Gregory Phillip 1977

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PARTIES AND PARTICIPATION IN VANCOUVER, 1964 - 1976 by GREGORY PHILLIP IOANNOU B.A., University of British Columbia, 1976 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (Department of P o l i t i c a l Science) We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA August, 1 9 7 7 @ Gregory P h i l l i p Ioannou, 1 9 7 7 In p r e s e n t i n g t h i s t h e s i s in p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t o f the requ i rement s f o r an advanced degree at the U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Co lumb ia , I a g ree that the L i b r a r y s h a l l make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r r e f e r e n c e and s tudy . I f u r t h e r agree t h a t p e r m i s s i o n f o r e x t e n s i v e c o p y i n g o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r s c h o l a r l y purposes may be g r a n t e d by the Head o f my Department o r by h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . It i s u n d e r s t o o d tha t c o p y i n g o r p u b l i c a t i o n o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r f i n a n c i a l g a i n s h a l l not be a l l o w e d w i thout my w r i t t e n p e r m i s s i o n . Department o f / ^ ^ / 7 7 ^ ^ S^dpce The U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Co lumbia 2075 Wesbrook Place Vancouver, Canada V6T 1W5 Date AU&Jjir JL*I, 1^11 _» i i Abstract. The formation of participationist parties was a strategy employed in the drive for reform of traditional mechanisms for public control of government decisions in the late 1960's. This paper evaluates the impact of such a party on levels of participation at the urban level by examining participation at Vancouver public hearings. A comparison between Vancouver and two "control" municipalities suggests that, while the formation of a party probably has no effect, the election of a new participationist party results in changes in part-icipation similar to those caused by the election of any new party. A closer examination of the Vancouver data reveals how the participationist beliefs of the council inter-acted with a number of other factors to increase participation. Although i t i s concluded that the data presented do not allow an adequate evaluation of this participationist strategy, i t i s noted that a participationist party i s not a necessary condition, and may not even be a sufficient condition, for increased participation. i i i Table o f Contents. Chapter One. I n t r o d u c t i o n 1 - S t r u c t u r e of the Study 5 - Footnotes 8 Chapter Two. Background Information 9 - B r i e f H i s t o r y of Vancouver C i v i c P o l i t i c s . 9 - P u b l i c Hearings and Rezoning 1 4 - A T y p i c a l Vancouver P u b l i c Hearing 1 8 - Footnotes 2 4 Chapter Three. Two P r i o r Questions 2 6 - F i r s t P r i o r Question: The V i c t o r i a Case . . 2 6 - Second P r i o r Question: The Surrey Case. . . 3 4 - Footnotes . . . . . - . 4 0 Chapter Four. I n t r o d u c t i o n o f Vancouver Data. . . 4 1 - T h i r d P r i o r Question: The Vancouver Case. . 4 1 -Comparing Vancouver and V i c t o r i a 4 6 - Comparing Vancouver and Surrey 4 6 - Footnotes 4 8 Chapter F i v e . Vancouver i n Depth . 4 9 - Methodology ».50 - A p p l i c a t i o n s and Meetings 5 4 - C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of P a r t i c i p a n t s 6 2 - The P a t t e r n : 1 9 7 2 - 1 9 7 6 7 0 - Footnotes .76 Chapter S i x . Conclusions . . 7 8 Appendix A. T y p i c a l Vancouver Hearing N o t i c e . . 8 1 Appendix B. T y p i c a l Burnaby Hearing N o t i c e . . . . 8 2 iv Table of Contents, Continued. Appendix C. Floorplan of Vancouver Council Chambers . 8 4 Appendix D. Graph of Annual Participation in Surrey, Victoria and Vancouver. . . . 8 5 V L i s t of Tables, 3 - 1 . Population Characteristics: Greater Vancouver Regional D i s t r i c t , Victoria and Nanaimo . . . 2 7 3 - 2 . Municipalities Ranked in Terms of Similarity to Vancouver 2 9 3 - 3 . Municipal Similarity Scores 3 0 3 - 4 . Participation in Victoria Public Hearings . . 3 2 3 - 5 « Participation in Surrey Public Hearings . . . 3 7 4 - 1 . Participation in Vancouver Public Hearings. . 4 4 4— 2 . S t a t i s t i c a l Characteristics of Vancouver Participation . 4-5 5 - 1 • Rezoning Applications 5 5 5 - 2 . Participation Per Meeting, Per Application and Per Annum 56 5 - 3 - Comparison of Per Annum, Per Meeting and Per Application Methods of Measuring Participation 5 8 5 - 4 - . Intervenors Addressing Private and Municipal Applications. . . . . 61 5 - 5 . Intervenors at Public Hearings 6 3 5 - 6 . Pro and Con Intervenors at Public Hearings. . 64-5 - 7 . Pro and Con Intervenors at Municipal and Private Applications. 6 5 5 - 8 . Percentage of Intervenors Pro and Con . . . . 67 5 - 9 . Percentage of Intervenors by Type 6 8 5 - 1 0 . Repeating Intervenors in 1 9 7 4 and 1 9 7 5 * . . . 6 9 1 Chapter One. Introduction. One of the consequences of the social upheaval of the 1960's has been the increased popularity of the idea of public participation. Traditional mechanisms for public control of government decisions were increasingly considered inadequate. Such concerns largely stem from the size and complexity of modern government structures, and their greatly expanded role i n society. In the United States, they were enhanced by a decision-making process which led to the American involvement i n Vietnam, seemingly against the wishes of a vast segment of the American population. But doubts about traditional mechanisms, and the advocacy of participation, were not confined to the United States. There were many proposals for reform, and these proposals took many forms. Citizens were urged to vote, citizens' committees were formed, workers' control of corporate decision-making was advocated, and partic-ipationist p o l i t i c a l parties were formed. These parties are the focus of this paper. They are participationist not in terms of their internal organisation (although most would probably have some system of internal demo-cracy as an ideal), but rather i n advocacy of citizen participation in government decision-making, or at the very least greater citizen input into the decision-making process. 2 Such an approach represents an. attempt to overcome problems with more traditional mechanisms for particip-i ation i n p o l i t i c s , such as p o l i t i c a l parties and inter-est groups. There i s a long tradition in p o l i t i c a l science, the best-known example being Michels* "Iron Law of Oligarchy" 1, which holds that internal democracy i n parties, movements and interest groups inevitably gives way to e l i t e dominance. Ostrogorskii and McKenzie are 2 two others who have helped develop this line of thought. In addition the structure of interest groups often leases large sections of the populace unorganised. The 1 9 6 0 ' s saw greater emphasis on a different approach. Those committed to greater participation urged a variety of experiments designed to increase the direct participation of individuals and small groups within the structure of government. In some cases changes were made in administrative systems to accomm-odate this form of citizen input. And participationist parties and politicians arose who advocated such reform. However i t i s s t i l l unclear,whether such strategies w i l l wofck. In the f i r s t place, can politicians and parties dedicated to increased participation actually succeed i n increasing participation? Secondly, i f they do, w i l l those who participate prove effective i n i n f l u -encing public decisions and making governments more reponsive to public wishes? These are large questions, the f u l l resolution of which i s /beyond the scope of any 3 single research project. But this paper provides at least a partial assessment of the effectiveness of this strategy. In particular, the paper examines the f i r s t of the above questions: do parties and politicians dedicated to participation actually increase participation? This issue w i l l be explored in the context of Vancouver urban p o l i t i c s . The 1960*8 i n Vancouver saw the advent of several participationist parties, one of which was elected to power in the early 1 970 's. Of course such a case study can never provide a definitive answer to such issues, but without such evidence, no resolution of issues can ever be possible. This paper, in the context of many others which have been written, are being written and w i l l be written on participation, w i l l help in our understanding of an intriguing new phenomenon. The exact question the; paper w i l l answer i s "what effect did the formation and election of a participat-i o n i s t urban party in Vancouver have on citizen partic-ipation at public hearings?" Public hearings were chosen ewer several possible forums for participation: city council meetings, courts of revision, voting and writing or petitioning council. The only one of these options which provides a data source as ricb, as the public hearings would be council meetings. However, council meetings have some disad-vantages. Not a l l participants at council meetings are recorded i n the minutes, and neither i s what i s said by the participant, In almost a l l cases partic-ipants at public hearings are l i s t e d , and some indication of the position they took in respect to the issue being discussed i s usually provided. The other forms of participation would be inapprop-riatefsffor this study. Voting i e at best a marginal form.of participation, and one that i s encouraged by virt u a l l y a l l p o l i t i c a l parties. The renewed emphasis on participation did not produce an increase i n voter turnout; i n fact voting i n Vancouver from the mid-1950*s to the mid-1970's showed a slight but steady decline.^ Writing or petitioning council i s a rather more active form of participation, but has been recorded, rather erratically. As with voting, there has been a drop (this time gather a dramatic drop) i n the number of letters and petitions received by council since the mid-1960*s. This may be more a reflection of the city clerk*s record-keeping than a change in letter-writing habits. Courts of revision are designed to enforce compliance with the by-laws, and as the name would suggest most of the "participants" in this forum are witnesses. Although some citizens appear before these couits voluntarily, this i s s t i l l not a very reliable data source for testing the currents of public particip-5 ation. In Vancouver, public hearings should, be a reliable indicator of party impact, for most of the contentious issues of the time were at one time or another fought through the public hearings. Yet this data source also has some weaknesses. No socioeconomic data on the participants, not even the address of the participant, i s regularly recorded. There are no indications of the participants' p o l i t i c a l beliefs, other than occasional glimpses when the hearing minutes record someone's presentation i n more detail than simply "pro" or "con". The paper w i l l inevitably reflect the strengths and weaknesses of this data source. Structure of the Study. The study opens i n chapter two with a more thorough background discussion of Vancouver p o l i t i c s and the mechanics of the public hearing process during the 1 9 6 0's and 1 9 7 0's. The following chapters then analyse the participation process in greater detail. Chapters three and four answer three questions which are logi c a l l y prior to a consideration of the effects of a participationist party on participation. Two of these are, i n effect, controls. 1/ Was the period in which the participat-ionist parties were formed and elected "normal" or was participation higher or lower than usual 6 for reasons other than the existence of the new parties? The 1960*s and 1970's have been characterised by a growing general interest in participation, and i t w i l l be important to tfctke this into account. Chapters three and four do so by introducing a "control" muni-cip a l i t y with which Vancouver w i l l be compared. 2/ Does the formation of a non-participationist party have any effect on participation at public hearings? The focus of this paper i s on the effects of the participationist beliefs of a p o l i t i c a l party. Clearly i t w i l l not be sufficient to demonstrate that partic-ipation increased after the formation and election of a participationist party. It must also be shown that this effect i s different from the effect of the advent of a non-participationist party. Again, chapters thapee and fbureuse a control municipality to answer this question. 3/ What was the "normal" rate of participation before the formation of the participationist parties, and was this rate relatively stable or did i t fluctuate? This third question i s intended to provide a context for the data on Vancouver which w i l l follow i t . How can one know i f a change has occurred jfcf one 7 does not know what went before? This question i s answered in the forth chapter. Chapter five i s devoted to answering the main question "in depth" by examining the relationship between the advehf of participationist parties and rates of participation in Vancouver, as well as the changing composition of this participation. At several points in this chapter, i t has been necessary $ 0 supf&ement the data with information obtained i n interviews with city h a l l staff:. A f i n a l chapter, chapter six, draws conclusions and attempts to put these conclusions into context. 8 Footnotes; Chapter One. 1 . Robert Michels, P o l i t i c a l Parties. C o l l i e r , NY, 1 9 6 2 . 2 . Moisei Ostrogorskii, Democracy and the Organisation  of B o l i t i c a l garties, MacMillan, London, 1 9 0 2 . R.T. McKenzie, Britis h P o l i t i c a l Parties, second edition, Mercury, London, 1 9 6 2 . 3. For data on voting i n Vancouver elections see Michele Lioy, Social Trends in Greater Vancouver, Gordon Soules Economic and Marketing Research, Vancouver, 1 9 7 5 . 9 Chapter Two. Background Information. Brief History of Vancouver Civic P o l i t i c s . 1 In the early 1 9 6 0's, Vancouver was on the verge of ending a long period of s t a b i l i t y in civic p o l i t i c s . The Non-Partisan Association had ruled continuously since the 1 9 3 0's, with no effective opposition. Their longevity was based on a favourable electoral system, economic growth, a broad conservative consensus among a large part of the electorate, and the a b i l i t y of the NPA, through allowing i t s aldermen great indep-endence, to represent v i r t u a l l y a l l viewpoints within that consensus. Before 1 9 3 6 , Vancouver had had a ward system, where each alderman was elected by the citizens of an area of the city, and represented the people of that area. Since 1 9 3 6 , the at-large system has been in use, where the ten aldermen with the most votes in a city-wide election are elected. This system has operated to the advantage of what Tennant terms the "west-side professional-manag-e r i a l group", and to the detriment of the lower income citizens, mo£t of whom l i v e on the east side of the city. The former group participate much more actively than the l a t t e r , so that the candidates favoured by the west side group tend to be elected over those favoured by the east side residents. 1 0 In the 1 9 6 0 ' s the conservative or traditional beliefs which had dominated civ i c p o l i t i c s since the 1 9 3 0's were challenged by reformers holding what Tennant c a l l s "progressive beliefs", based primarily on a desire for participation and an aversion to uncontrolled development. The opposing conservative beliefs emphasised that those with "knowledge and experience" should lead and participate, and that the city should concern i t s e l f with; providing essential services and leave planning to the private developers. The reform movement came together as a result of a major p o l i t i c a l battle over a proposed freeway through the centre of downtown Vancouver. Protest meetings were held, presentations were made to public hearings concerning specific parts of the development, and f i n a l l y a council meeting was "taken over" and the freeway c r i t i c s "treated the startled council to 2 loud denunciations of the freeway proposals." In 1 9 6 8 , a number of the people from this reform movement entered the p o l i t i c a l arena i n a more formal way. The Electors' Action Movement (TEAM) and the Committee of Progressive Electors (COPE), two new ci v i c parties, were formed. The provincial New Democratic Party (NDP) also entered the civic arena. A l l three parties espoused progressive values, with the NDP and COPE specifically trying to appeal to voters on the l e f t , while TEAM were more eclectic, occupying 11 a rather centrist position and trying to appeal to voters of a l l types. In the election of 1968, TEAM elected two alder-men, COPE elected one, and the NDP none. The NPA won the seven remaining seats. The period from 1968 to 1972 was one of frequent controversy, with six major issues dominating. These were the freeway proposal (and the related controversy concerning a third bridge to North Vancouver, known as the "third crossing"), Strathcona (an urban development scheme proposed by the federal and civi c governments which would have seen the demolition of a large portion of Chinatown), Project 200 (a large downtown waterfront development), Jericho (a proposal for a scenic drive through what i s now undeveloped land and parkland), Four Seasons (a hotel development planned for the entrance to Stanley Park), and Arbutus Village (a shopping centre proposed for an area i n the west side of the cit y ) * Each of these controversies saw the new parties fighting against most of the NPA, the civic bureaucracy and private developers. In each case the reformers were successful in stoppings the development because enough NPA aldermen voted with them on council. The election of 195?Oxproduced no major changes, and the controversies raged on unti l about September, 1972, when the Strathcona controversy was settled. In the election of 1972, TEAM elected eight aldermen (and the 1 2 mayor), and COPE and the NPA elected one each. In 1 9 7 4 , the NDP withdrew from civ i c p o l i t i c s . Since 1 9 7 2 , urban p o l i t i c s in Vancouver has returned to a state of near serenity, with few major controversies. The largest controversy concerned a proposal to return to the ward system. The NPA has slowly regained i t s electoral strength, so that at present the NPA and TEAM have roughly the same strength on council, with the balance of power held by two independents and a COPE alderman. TEAM has made a number of changes since i t was elected to office to implement their participationist philosophy. Immediately TEAM came to office, some council meetings were transferred to the evenings, and, with a few exceptions, public hearings were also held i n the evenings. For example, the twenty hearings in 1 9 7 5 consisted of fifteen evening hearings, four afternoon hearings, and one morning hearing. Hearings are now often held in school halls near the area affected by the applications being heard. This had been done under the NPA, but very infrequently. To make the labyrinthine city h a l l less intimidating, an information booth was opened in the lobby. A functioning committee system was established, with the intention of allowing more citizen access. A l l of these changes were intended to increase the opportunities for citizen participation.^ 13 One change which i s necessary but which has not been implemented has been some remodification of the notices which are published to announce the hearings. As can be seen from the example reproduced i n Appendix A, these announcements are surely unintelligible, to. the average citizen. Not only are the "location" descriptions worded in s t r i c t l y legal terms, but no mention i s made of what alterations are proposed (other than to give the existing and proposed zones), and who has proposed the alteration. Thus, i n Appendix A, the f i r s t application could concern a small local grocery store or a huge supermarket conplex. These notices probably have the effect of discouraging participation. It should be noted, however, that a notice, in plainer English, i s mailed to residents; in the area and to obviously affected interest groups. Appendix B shows a more satisfactory form of hearing announcement. Burnaby announcements give a clearer description of the proposed zoning change, with more precise zone labels, and more easily understood "locations". Also, a brief explanation of the applic-ation i s provided. Later i n this chapter, in a section where a typical Vancouver public hearing i s described, there i s a discussion of problems concerning the actual hearing which might inhibit participation. 1% Public Hearings and Rezoning. A l l of the controversies which dominated Vancouver p o l i t i c s in the late 1 9 6 0's and early 1 9 7 0 ' s were fought at least i n part through the city's public hearing system. A l l of the controversies were concerned with amendments to the city's zoning bylaws. Although most public hearings are concerned with rezoning, nine hearings have been included i n my data which were not zoning hearings.. These hearings, scattered throughout the thirteen year period from 1 9 6 4 to 1 9 7 6 , were called by council so that the public's views on certain controversies could be heard. Hearings have been held on such issues as the banning of highrises in certain areas, the abolition of billboards, and the extention of the runway at Vancouver International Airport. None of these hearings ever considered any of the six "major controversies". The only differences between these hearings and the regular hearings are that these hearings do not involve rezoning, and they are generally somewhat better attended. Other similar hearings, called "public information hearings", are d i f f -erent i n character, as they are designed to provide an opportunity for citizens to gain access to information by questioning council and municipal staff. These hearings are not included in the data, and cannot be beeause no minutes of them are kept. Vancouver enacts and enforces i t s bylaws i n accord-1 5 ance with the Vancouver Charter, an Act passed by the provincial government in i t s present form i n 1 9 5 3 . Other municipalities i n the province are covered by the more recent Municipal Act. The two pieces of legislation are quite similar i n the sections concerning public hearings and rezonlng. In this discussion, I w i l l quote the Municipal Act, as i t i s much more concise i n i t s discussion of hearings than the Charter.** As w i l l be seen, the Act also has provisions not i n the Charter. Councils in their zoning bylaws may divide their municipalities into zones as they wish, and regulate the use of water, land and buildings within those zones. Bylaws may regulate the size, shape and siting of a l l buildings, structures and improvements, may require owners or occupiers of any building to provide sufficient parking or loading space for that building, and may exempt any building from the requirements of 5 any bylaw. In making regulations, councils must have "due regard" for the promotion of health and convenience; prevention of overcrowding; adequate li g h t , a i r and access; the character of buildings already in existence; conservation of property values; betterment of the environment; the impact of development on present and future public costs; the provision of necessary public space, and the fulfillment of community goals. (The 16 Charter lacks a l l provisions after "conservation of property values",)** Presumably in this catalogue of goals councils can find justification for whatever they could possibly wish to do. Public hearings are required by two provisions of the Act: "the council shall not adopt a,zoning 7 bylaw unless i t has held a hearing thereon" and "no zoning bylaw shall be adopted, amended or repealed 8 except after a hearing". A notice giving the time and location of a hearing must be published in two or more consecutive issues of a local newspaper, and copies must be •mailed to a l l "occupiers" within or Q adjacent to the property being rezonedV^ At the hearing, a l l people "who deem their interest i n the property affected by the proposed bylaw shall be afforded an opportunity to be heard on matters contained in the bylaw". 1 0 A provision in the Act that i s not in the Charter i s that a member of the council not present at the hearing may vote on the bylaw only i f he has been given an oral or written report of the hearing. 1 1 Although tooth the Act and the Charter go into much technical detail about zoning bylaws, this i s a l l they say about hearings. Neither specifies that minutes of public hearings are to be kept, although in the case of the Act this appears to be an oversight. 1 7 Different councils have different approaches to scheduling hearings. New Westminster, Burnaby and Vancouver hold them at irregular intervals, when they judge that there are enough applications to justify a hearing. Victoria conducts hearings before i t s fort-nightly regular council meetings, i f there are any applications to consider. Surrey has experimented, with a notable lack of success, with regularly scheduled meetings. I did not notice any period of longer than a few months where the$ were able to keep to their current schedule. Over the past fifteen years, Surrey has scheduled meetings semi-annually, bimonthly, monthly and fortnightly. The month after they decided tb hold semi-annual meetings (April, 1 9 6 5 )» three meetings were held. Most councils hold their meetings in council chambers, although New Westminster has on occasion held them in committee rooms; Vancouver and Burnaby sometimes hold meetings in school halls near the area affected by the application, and Surrey rather eccentrically holds meetings in a basement cafeteria. Most councils hold their meetings in the evenings. New Westminster has afternoon meetings, as did Vancouver (usually) prior to 1 9 7 3 . Vancouver has also sometimes held morning hearings. 1 8 A Typical Vancouver Public Hearing, This section i s intended to give the reader a taste of what a hearing i s l i k e , although I would of course heartily recommend the reader attend one him/herself. Most people would be surprised how interesting even a mundane hearing can be. The "typical" hearing I w i l l describe i s slightly atypical. (The meeting being described i s the same one "announced" in appendix Ac) It was held on a Tuesday afternoon, prior to a regular council meeting. The timing of the meeting seemed to have been more determined by the councillors* holiday schedules than by any concern for the public's convenience. The hearing was held in the council chambers. (See appendix C.) The chambers have three rows of seats for the audience, as well as a gallery upstairs. The tatal capacity i s approximately one hundred and f i f t y people, and for this meeting the chambers were very close to being f u l l . It i s impossible to say how many people were in attendance for the hearing and how many for the council meeting, but after the hearing concluded approximately thirty or forty l e f t , so at least that many were primarily interested in the hearing. As people entered the chamber, they were asked to sign i n i f they wished to speak to any of the applic-ations. A detailed agenda was supplied, but on this 1 9 occasion the agenda contained only the f i r s t thrBe items, as there had not been enough of the forth item printed. Most people did not take an agenda, possibly because they did not notice the agenda s i t t i n g on the speakers' table. The proceedings could easily be followed without an agenda, so neither the incomplete agenda nor the ineff i c i e n t distribution of them was really a problem. The hearing was started by a clerk who rang a be l l hanging over the entrance to the chamber, causing some startled jumps and knowing smiles among the audience. Each application on the agenda goes through the following process: a/ a clerk reads the application as i t has appeared i n the published announcement, i n a monotone. b/ city planning staff explain the application and i t s significance, using a large board at the south end of the chamber to display plans, photographs and so on. They also explain the reasons for the planning department's recommendation ( i . e . either for approval or rejection). c/ councillors ask questions of the planners. d/ the applicant i s given an opportunity to speak in favour of the application, and to respond to any criticism the planners may have had. e/ councillors ask questions of the applicant. f/ the mayor asks those intervenors who had signed in before the hearing to speak. 2 0 g/ councillors ask questions of the intervenors. h/ the applicant i s given an opportunity to rebut the statements of the intervenors. i / the councillors debate the application. j / a motion i s moved and a vote taken. This outline makes the process sound more formal than i t actually i s , as the councillors are prone to speech-making and asking questions of anyone at any stage of the proceedings. I w i l l b r i e f l y outline the f i r s t application, as i t represents a pleasant median between the complexity of numbers 2 and 3 , and the simplicity of number 4 » This i s the f i r s t item i n the announcement in Appendix A. The application concerned a commercial complex consisting of a gas station, a restaurant and a grocery store, a l l occupying one building covering twollots at a relatively busy intersection. The building was built i n 1 9 2 8 , and the present owner, a widow i n her si x t i e s , wished to offer the property for sale so that she could r e t i r e on the proceeds; She currently operates the gas station. She had found a prospective purchaser who had refused to purchase the property at the last minute when he found that one of the two lots on which the property was built was zoned for residential use. A search by the planning department found that this zoning had been changed, evidently by mistake, i n 1 9 5 5 * Prior to that, the whole l o t had been zoned for commercial use. 21 The property owner had been charged municipal taxes on the l o t i a s i f i t had been zoned entirely as commer-c i a l . As the building was now quite dilapidated, any prospective purchaser would probably wish to redevelop the site. According to the zoning regulations, such a redevelopment would have to be i n the form of a resid-ential structure on one half of the site, and a comm-ercial structure on the other half of the si t e . Such a redevelopment was said to be "unprofitable". In effect, then, the council was being asked to change a twenty-year-old error which was now claimed to be causing hardship. The owner was represented by a real estate company, whose spokesman made the tact i c a l mistake of dwelling on the present d i f f i c u l t y of redevel-opment. The property owner did not appear at the hearing. A neighbour of the site appeared to oppose the application, expressing fears about what might be built i f the rezoning were allowed. The property owner's representative attempted to rebut the citizen by re i t e r -ating his argument about the impossibility of a sale unless the zoning were changed. Several of the councillors questioned him along the lines the citizen had set, and were clearly not satisfied by his answers. A vote was taken, and the application was narrowly rejected. (I fe l t at the time that i f the property owner had simply said that the application was to correct an error the council had made, and to make the zoning agree with the 22 present s t r u c t u r e s , she would have encountered no d i f f i c u l t y . ) 1 2 Obviously, the announcement of the meeting does not t e l l anyone reading i t anything about the i s s u e s i n v o l v e d , but, somewhat more s e r i o u s l y , n e i t h e r do the plans which are open to p u b l i c s c r u t i n y before the meeting. However, a phone c a l l to the planning department r e v e a l e d that they were w i l l i n g to go to great l e n g t h s to e x p l a i n an a p p l i c a t i o n and the i s s u e s i n v o l v e d . 1 ^ I f the c i t i z e n does not ask f o r i n f o r m a t i o n p r i o r to the meeting, he i s then handicapped durin g the meeting. As speakers are asked to s i g n i n before the h e a r i n g , the c i t i z e n must decide before he hears the a p p l i c a n t ' s p r e s e n t a t i o n whether he opposes i t or not. However, i n a case such as the one d e s c r i b e d , where the c i t i z e n c l e a r l y knew beforehand what i s s u e s were i n v o l v e d , he was able to mount an e f f e c t i v e a t t a c k on the a p p l i c a t i o n . H i s arguments were used e x t e n s i v e l y d u r i n g the d i s c u s s i o n among the aldermen, and seem to have been d e c i s i v e i n persuading some " f e n c e s i t t e r s " to oppose the a p p l i c a t i o n . As I have s a i d , the a p p l i c a t i o n described was the second l e a s t complex one heard at a mundane hearing. I t was not p a r t i c u l a r l y c o n t r o v e r s i a l , f a r l e s s so than the average a p p l i c a t i o n . I t i n v o l v e d only a s m a l l s i t e . Although the i s s u e s i n v o l v e d were l e s s complex than those i n v o l v e d i n most a p p l i c a t i o n s , they were 2 3 probably complex enough to discourage some c i t i z e n s from p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n the process. Although the process does not seem to be designed to encourage p a r t i c i p a t i o n , i t can provide an e f f e c t i v e forum for those i n t r e p i d enough to go to the trouble of obtaining information. The process r e f l e c t s TEAM'S emphasis on f a c i l i t a t i n g p a r t i c i p a t i o n (by providing information) rather than encouraging i t . I t should be stressed that the hearing described occurred i n 1 9 7 7 . A hearing during the controversies of the l a t e 1 9 6 0 ' s , or a hearing i n the early 1 9 6 0's before the controversies, may have presented an e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t p i c t u r e . 2 4 Footnotes: Chapter Two, 1 . This section i s largely drawn from Paul Tennant's Vancouver Po l i t i c s : the Changing Context of Citizen Participation. (Unpublished paper.) 2 . i b i d , p. 1 1 , 3 « i b i d , p. 2 1 . It should be noted that the intent off these TEAM reforms i s to make i t easier for people to participate in civi c p o l i t i c s , not to cajole them into action, or to "bring out" TEAM supporters. 4 . The Vancouver Charter. 1 9 5 3 , and the Br i t i s h Columbia  Municipal Act, i 9 6 0 . Citations to the Act refer to the consolidation of January 1 5 , 1 9 7 6 . The equivalent sections in the Charter to those I quote from the Act are sections 5 5 9 - 5 6 4 (on planning), 5 6 5 - 5 6 7 (on zoning) and 5 6 6 (on hearings). 5 . Municipal Act, section 7 0 2 , 1, a - d. 6 « i b i d , section 702, 2 , a - f, and section 702A, 1 , b - c. 7 . i b i d , section 7 0 3 , 1. 8 . i b i d , section 704, 1 . 9 » i b i d , section 703, 1 , 2 and 2A. 10. i b i d , section 703, 3 . 1 1 . i b i d , section 703, 5 . e.g. "What happened at the hearing Tuesday night, Jack?" "Nothing much, George." 2 5 Footnotes: Chapter Two. Continued. 1 2 . This decision i s in keeping with a tendency-pointed out by Tennant in "Bylaws and Setbacks: The Oil Industry and Local Government i n Briti s h Columbia", i n B.C. Studies. Number 9 (Spring, 1 9 7 1 ) , pp. 3 - 1 4 . He points to what i s i n effect almost a neighbourhood veto resulting from local councils siding with "irate neighbours". However, Tennant's paper focusses on opposition to new gas stations, and applications for rezoning by large o i l companies, so the parallel with the case beiKg discussed here i s not exact. 1 3 . I phoned rather than asking questions i n person to minimise the risk of being recognised and thus possibly being given "special treatment". I posed as a somewhat dim citizen interested i n an item being discussed at the hearing after the one described in this chapter. The planning staff were extremely patient and helpful, and went out of their way to answer even the most irrelevant of questions. (Such as "How many people l i v e there?") 26 Chapter Three. Two Prior Questions. F i r s t Prior Question: The Victoria Case. "Was the period i n which the participationist parties were formed and elected "normal", or was participation higher or lower than usual for reasons other than the existence of the new parties?" This question w i l l be answered by comparing a "control" municipality with Vancouver. Obviously, this control municipality should be as similar to Vancouver as possible, should be near Vancouver to avoid or minimise regional differences, and should have had no p o l i t i c a l parties form (and, preferably, should have had no major changes take place) in the period from 1 9 6 8 to 1 9 7 6 . Table 3 - 1 shows the fourteen municipalities considered. They are the fourteen closest to Van-couver, not counting predominantly rural areas and extremely small population units such as Bowen Island (population 3 5 0 ) . The most distant from Vancouver i s Victoria, roughly f i f t y - f i v e miles away. Twelve of the municipalities are within the Greater Vancouver Regional D i s t r i c t . Table 3 - 1 compares the municip-a l i t i e s on the bases of population and population growth, based on figures from the 1 9 6 1 and 1 9 7 1 censuses. 27 Table 3-1. Population Characteristics: Greater Vancouver Regional D i s t r i c t , Victoria and Nanaimo. Municipality Population, 1971 Population Census, in * 0 0 0 s . Growth, 1 9 6 1 - 1 9 (in %) Burnaby 126 2 5 Coquitlam 5 3 80 Delta 46 1 9 0 Nanaimo 1 5 5 New Westminster 4 3 2 0 North Vancouver City 3 2 3 0 North Vancouver Di s t r i c t 5 8 5 0 Port Coquitlam 2 0 14©: Port Moody 11 1 2 5 Richmond 62 4 5 Surrey 9 9 4 0 Vancouver (Including University Endowment Lands) 4 3 0 10 Victoria 6 2 1 5 West Vancouver 3 6 4 5 White Rock 10 6 0 Sources: Statistics for GVRD from Li6y, Social Trends  i n Greater Vancouver, pp 6 , 1 5 . Statistics for Victoria and Nanaimo from Canada Census reports, 1 9 6 1 (Volume 1 ) and 1 9 7 1 (Volume 1 ) . Note: I have rounded the population figures to the nearest thousand; Lioy has rounded the population growth figures to the nearest five percent. 2 8 The "ideal" control municipality would be the same size as Vancouver, and would exhibit the same rate of population growth. The reason for seeking a municipal-i t y of the same size seems obvious: a*metropolis would be expected to exhibit different cultural characteristics (e.g. "community s p i r i t " , feelings of efficacy) than a much smaller municipality. The simple fact that in the smaller municipalities citizens are more l i k e l y to know an alderman suggests that they may feel "closer" to their councils and therefore be more l i k e l y to participate at public hearings. The necess-i t y for the control municipality to have a similar growth rate i s less readily apparent. Because public hearings are basically concerned with rezoning applica-tions, we would expect a higher frequency of hearings i n higher population growth areas than i n low populat-ion growth areas, as the areas with high growth would experience more need for "development". Tables 3 - 2 and 3 - 3 show my method for deciding which municipalities are most similar to Vancouver. Table 3 - 2 shows a ranking of municipalities i n terms of population and population growth, while Table 3 - 3 combines the two parts of Table 3 - 2 to give each municipality a "similarity score". It i s interesting to note that this method does give municipalities which are in t u i t i v e l y very similar, such as West Vancouver, North Vancouver City and North Vancouver Di s t r i c t or 29 Table 5-2. Municipalites Ranked in Terms of Similarity To Vancouver. A. Population. Burnaby 1 Surrey 2 Richmond 3 * V i c t o r i a 3 * North Vancouver D i s t r i c t ... 5 Coquitlam 6 Delta ? New Westminster 8 West Vancouver 9 North Vancouver City 1 0 Port Coquitlam 11 Nanaimo 1 2 Port Moody 1 3 White Rock 14 B. Population Growth. Vict o r i a 1* Nanaimo 1 * New Westminster 3 Burnaby 4 North Vancouver City 5 Surrey 6 Richmond 7 * West Vancouver 7 * North Vancouver D i s t r i c t ... 9 White Rock 1 0 Coquitlam 11 Port Moody 12 Port Coquitlam 1 3 Delta 1 4 * denotes " t i e " . Source: Derived from Table 3 - 1 • Method: Municipalities were ranked in order of similarity of population and population .growth (to Vancouver), wiSbh numbers from 1 (most similar) to 1 4 (least similar) assigned to each municipality. 3 0 Table 3 - 3 * Municipal Similarity Scores. Municipality Score Vic t o r i a 4 Burnaby 5 Surrey 8 Richmond 1 0 New Westminster 11 Nanaimo 1 3 North Vancouver D i s t r i c t . . 1 4 North Vancouver City 1 5 West Vancouver 1 6 Coquitlam 1 7 Delta 21 White Rock 2 4 Port Coquitlam 2 4 Port Moody 2 5 The lower the number assigned to each municipality, the more similar i t i s to Vancouver in terms of population characteristics. Method: The numbers assigned to each municipality i n parts A and B of Table 3 - 2 were added together. The municipalities were then ranked from highest "similarity score" to lowest. Source: derived from Table 3 - 2 . 3 1 Surrey or Richmond, very similar scores. Table 3 - 3 shows Victoria, Burnaby and Surrey to be the three municipalities most similar to Vancouver. Victoria i s the most suitable for answering the f i r s t prior question. Victoria has a stable non-party system^1, whereas both Surrey and Burnaby have party systems which have undergone changes during the period under consideration. There were three other considerations relevant to the choice of Victoria over Burnaby and Surrey: - Burnaby and Surrey are huge dormitory areas in the suburbs of Vancouver. Victoria i s more lik e Van-couver i n that i t i s a more traditional c i t y . It has a distinct core surrounded by dormitory areas, and i s a transportation centre. - It would take me "several months" to obtain authorization to examine the Burnaby municipal council minutes. The recent minutes I was allowed to examine showed that the Burnaby municipal clerk's office uses a system of keeping minutes which i s very unsatisfactory for my purposes. Minutes of a l l meetings - committees, council, public hearings and courts of revision - are kept in one place, i n chronological order. Thus to find the relatively infrequent hearings minutes, i t would be necessary to s i f t through a l l the various minutes, which would be extremely time consuming. - Surrey's p o l i t i c a l system makes i t an ideal muniei-3 2 Table 3-if. Participation in Victoria Public Hearings. Year Estimated No. of No. of P a r t i c i - Annual Population Meetings Particip- pamts per Particip-(in » 0 0 0 s ) ants per 1 0 0 0 pop- ation, annum ulation bases100 1 9 6 4 56 8 2 7 . 4 8 2 1 0 0 1 9 6 5 5 7 11 1 3 . 2 2 8 4 7 1 9 6 6 5 7 11 4 1 . 7 1 9 1 4 9 1 9 6 7 5 8 1 3 3 0 . 5 1 7 1 0 7 1 9 6 8 5 9 1 2 3 2 . 5 4 2 1 1 2 1 9 6 9 6 0 1 5 5 7 . 9 5 0 1 9 7 1 9 7 0 61 1 3 5 4 .885 1 8 4 1 9 7 1 6 2 1 5 4 9 . 7 9 0 1 6 4 1 9 7 2 6 2 1 9 1 0 8 1 . 7 4 2 3 6 1 1 9 7 3 6 2 1 9 1 3 4 2 . 1 6 1 4 4 8 1 9 7 4 62 1 9 117 1 . 8 8 7 3 9 1 1 9 7 5 6 2 1 6 5 6 . 9 0 3 1 8 7 1 9 7 6 6 2 1 5 1 4 5 2 . 3 3 9 4 8 5 Population estimates are based on census figures for 1 9 6 1 , 1 9 6 6 , 1 9 7 1 and 1 9 7 6 . Data on participation and number of meetings drawn from Vict o r i a city council minutes. The cheerful assistance of the Vic t o r i a City Clerk's office staff was much appreciated. 33 pality to use in answering the next prior question. Accordingly, Victoria was selected as the control municipality for this prior question. Statistics describing Victorians public hearings are given i n Table 3~k* This table combines data from the minutes of Victoria's public hearings and the four censuses from 1 9 6 1 to 1 9 7 6 . The population estimate in the second column i s calculated by taking the data on Victoria's population from the four censuses and using these to estimate the city's population for the inter-vening years. Thus the 1966 census gives Victoria's population as 5 7 , 0 0 0 (rounded to the nearest thousand), and the 1 9 7 1 population was 6 2 , 0 0 0 . I have assumed that the increase was evenly distributed over the five years, so in the estimated population column I have increased the population by one-fifth of the increase ( i . e . one thousand) per annum. The next two columns are f a i r l y self-explanatory. "Number of participants" refers to the total number of participants during the year, not the average number per meeting. "Participant" in this context refers to any person speaking to oppose or support an application, but does not include the applicant or his agent. Through-out the paper the terms "participant" a3Bdl"lntervenor" have been used interchangably. The "participants per 1 0 0 0 population" column i s obtained by dividing the number of participants by the 3 4 estimated population. The annual participation column i s equivalent to the per 1 0 0 0 population column, except that the figure for 1 9 6 4 n a e been adjusted to a base of 1 0 0 , and the other figures have been L adjusted accordingly. 1 The participation per 1 0 0 0 population and annual participation columns serve sli g h t l y different pur-poses. The former i s useful in comparing the participation i n each municipality (e.g. seeing which municipality has a larger proportion of i t s population participating at public hearings). The la t t e r i s useful in examining changes in participation patterns between municipalities. That i s because this method, by equating the particip-ation figures for the base year, eliminates the factor of persistent differences between municipalities in participation per thousand. These figures for Victoria w i l l be compared with the equivalent figures for Vancouver i n the next chapter. The methodological considerations discussed i n connection with Table 3 - 4 also apply to the equivalent tables for the other municipalities discussed. Second Prior Question: The Surrey Case. "Does the formation of a nontparticipationist party have any effect on participation at public hearings?" 3 5 Again, a control municipality i s needed i n order to answer this question. In this case, we are controlling for the mere presence of any,new party, even one not dedicated to participation. Both of the second and third "most similar" municipalities, Burnaby and Surrey (see Table 3 - 3 ) » had non-participationist parties form during the period studied, but as mentioned earlier, i t was d i f f i c u l t to study the minutes of the Burnaby hearings. Even i f the Burnaby minutes had been available, I would have chosen the Surrey case. Its complexity i s most inters esting, and i t i s a closer parallel to the Vancouver case. Until 1 9 6 9 i there were no municipal parties active p i n Surrey p o l i t i c s . In 1 9 6 9 , the Surrey Voters' Association (SVA) was formed. The SVA i s a right-wing party, similar to Vancouver's NPA. SVA favours government by experienced managers operating under business principl.es, and i s not in favour of partic-ipation. In 1 9 7 3 the SVA gained control of the council. In 1 9 7 5 another party, the Surrey Municipal Electors (SME), was formed. SME i s similar to Vancouver's TEAM, being rather centrist, and consisting of people from a l l major ( i . e . federal and provincial) parties. SME i s i n favour of increased participation. Surrey has annual elections, with four of the 36 eight council positions up for election each year. The mayor faces re-election every two years. In the election of 1 9 7 5 , the f i r s t election the SME contested, the SVA took three of the four council positions, with the SME taking the other. Mayor VaniDer Zalm did not stand for re-election, as he wanted to run for a provin-c i a l seat, and Mayor McKitka was elected. He i s an independent who had been a member of the SVA un t i l 1 9 7 1 , when the SVA refused to endorse him. He l e f t the party. In the election of 1 9 7 6 , the SVA and the SME each won two seats, so that the SVA now has five seats and the SME three, with an independent mayor. Thus i n Surrey there i s a non-participationist party formed in 1 9 6 9 , and elected in 1 9 7 3 , and then a participationist party formed i n 1 9 7 5 - Surrey offers both a comparison with Vancouver, and two parties to compare with each other. The comparison with Vancouver w i l l be presented in the next chapter, but the within-Surrey comparison i s possible with the information presented in Table 3 - 5 . It should be noted that this discussion i s not part of the discussion of the prior question, but i s rather additional evidence in the consideration of the main question. Table 3 - 5 shows that participation rates in Surrey followed an erratic course from 1 9 6 4 to 1 9 7 6 . Partic-ipation per 1 0 0 0 population ranged from a low of about Table 3 - 5 . Participation in Surrey Public Hearings. Year Estimated No. of No. of P a r t i c i - Annual Population Meetings P a r t i c i - pants per Particip-(in ' 0 0 0 s ) ants per 1 0 0 0 pop- ation. annum ulation base= 1 9 6 4 7 7 5 6 3 . 8 1 8 100 1 9 6 5 7 9 10 1 2 7 1 . 6 0 8 199 1 9 6 6 8 2 6 7 3 . 8 9 0 1 0 9 1 9 6 7 85 7 7 5 • 882 1 0 8 1 9 6 8 8 9 8 1 9 . 2 1 3 2 6 1 9 6 9 9 2 7 5 5 . 5 9 8 7 3 1 9 7 0 9 5 6 8 6 . 9 0 5 1 1 1 \ 1 9 7 1 9 9 12 9 0 . 9 0 9 111 1 9 7 2 1 0 2 2 0 1 0 7 1 . 0 4 9 1 2 8 1 9 7 3 1 0 6 3 1 3 4 . 3 2 1 3 9 1 9 7 4 1 0 9 3 1 1 0 0 . 9 1 7 1 1 2 1 9 7 5 112 3 3 1 2 0 1 . 0 7 1 131 1 9 7 6 1 1 6 3 9 3 0 5 2 . 6 2 9 3 2 1 Population estimates based on figures in 1 9 6 1 , 1 9 6 6 , 1 9 7 1 and 1 9 7 6 censuses. Data on participation and number of meetings drawn from Surrey municipal council minutes. Assistance from the obliging staff at Surrey Municipal Clerk's office gratefully acknowledged. 3 8 0 . 2 to a high of 2 . 6 . 1 9 6 9 , the year of the formation of the nonparticipationist SVA, was a year of quite low participation. Participation rose slightly in 1 9 7 0 . The election of the SVA took place in 1 9 7 3 , a year of very low participation rates, with an average of only one intervener speaking at each hearing. SVA's f i r s t year in office, 1 9 7 4 , saw an increase i n participation, although participation rates were s t i l l by no means high. This increase appears to be more a return to normal levels after the unusual lack of participation in 1 9 7 3 * 1 9 7 5 , the year SME was formed, saw a slight increase i n participation, followed by a massive increase in 1 9 7 6 , when the f i r s t SME alderman took his seat. The participation rate for 1 9 7 6 was swelled by a huge hearing held during the summer, where 1 0 7 people spoke, mainly to oppose an application by the Daon Corporation. Even i f this meeting i s excluded from the figures as being exceptional, the annual participation rate (base 1 0 0 ) for the year i s 2 0 9 , s t i l l a substantial increase over 1 9 7 5 * 8 1 3 1 . Given the rather random appearance of the figures on Surrey's participation rate, i t would be foolish to draw any firm conclusions from them. The figures provide slight evidence for the idea that the formation of participationist parties encourages participation, and i t i s notable that the two years which have seen the advent of a participationist party have been years 3 9 of unusually high participation. 4 0 Footnotes: Chapter Three. 1. That i s , by dividing the participants per thousand population for each year by the participation per thousand for 1964, and multiplying by 100. This i s equivalent to ion (Participationtyear x) / (Est pop;year x)  1 U U X (Participation: 1 9 6 4 ) / (Est pop: 1 9 6 4 ) . The correction for population change i s , of course, intended to allow valid comparisons over time. 2. Occasional candidates ran representing small parties such as the Communist Party of Canada. I believe none of these was ever elected, and i t i s arguable whether or not these can be considered municipal parties i n any meaningful sense. Sincere thanks to Rita Johnson, a member of the Surrey Voters! Association, Alderman Don Ross of the Surrey Municipal Electors and several of the staff of the Surrey Municipal Clerk's Office for providing me with information on Surrey p o l i t i c s , and other assistance. 41 Chapter Four. Introduction of Vancouver Data. Third Prior Question: The Vancouver Case. "What was the "normal" rate of participation before the formation of the participationist parties, and was this rate relatively stable or did i t fluc-tuate?" I had hoped, in answering this question, to be able to draw from data from a long period prior to 1 9 6 8 , when the new parties were formed. Unfortunately, the minutes of a l l Vancouver hearings prior to November, 1 9 6 3 commence with the words "The chairman called on any persons who wish to speak to the proposed amendments of the Zoning and Development By-Law, and a number of representations were made by persons deeming themselves to be affected." This of course makes i t impossible to use these minutes for my purpose. Thus my examination of the Vancouver minutes commences in January, 1 9 6 4 . Data from the other municipalities was also collected from this date, in the interests of consistency. This problem makes i t d i f f i c u l t to give a definitive answer to this prior question. It ie perhaps appropriate at this point to mention other shortcomings of the Vancouver City Council minutes, for these minutes are kept far more erratically than i f2 those of either the Victoria or Surrey councils. A number of different people have taken the minutes in Vancouver over the past few years, and each of these people has used a different method to record participation by the public. Most of these people have recorded the participant's name, and occasionally his address, and also whether the person spoke for or against the application being considered. A l l minute-takers seem to have been diligent in recording any group or company representative as such, perhaps an indication that the interventions of these people were given more weight than those of "ordinary" citizens. However, one minute-taker . seems to have been particularly lazy, and the minutes of five hearings (one in 1 9 6 6 , two in 1 9 6 7 and one in each of 1 9 6 9 and 1 9 7 0 ) bear the frustrating note "a number of people spoke". I have tried to circumvent the problem posed by these five hearings by noting how long the hearing lasted, and seeing how many people participated at hearings of a similar length, where a similar number of applications were heard. From this I have guesstim-ated the number of people at these hearings. My guess-timates range from ten for a short 1 9 6 9 hearing to twenty-five for a longish hearing in 1 9 6 7 . It should be noted that this only affects about four percent of the Vancouver hearings, none of which were on any of the five major controversies discussed earlier. 4 3 A different minute-taker in the period 1 9 7 1 -1 9 7 3 (one meeting i n each of these years) neglected to mention whether speakers were for or against the application being considered, which w i l l have a slight effect on the data being considered i n the next chapter. Each of these participants has been recorded as "neutral". Only a total of twelve participants are affected. In contrast, the minutes in both Victoria and Surrey were compiled consistently, and informatively. I believe there are no irregularities of this type in the data from either of those councils, although i t i s impossible for me to be aware of any omissions which may have occurred. Table 4 - 1 shows that, with the exception of 1 9 7 5 and 1 9 7 6 , participation i n Vancouver tended to vary within f a i r l y narrow boundaries. 1 Annual particip-ation i n this period varied from a low of 1 0 0 to a high of 2 8 4 » with no pattern immediately apparent. Table 4 - 2 confirms this impression. The means and standard deviations of annual participation for the periods 1 9 6 4 - 1 9 6 7 and 1 9 6 8 - 1 9 7 2 (the f i r s t period corresponding to the period before the formation of the parties and the second the period between the formation and the election of TEAM) are very similar to each other. Both are rather lower than for the entire period ( 1 9 6 4 - 1 9 7 6 ) , but this seems to be the 4 4 Table 4 - 1 * Participation i n Vancouver Public Hearings. Year Estimated No. of No. of P a r t i c i - Annual Population Meetings P a r t i c i - pants per Particip-(i n 0 0 0 * s ) pants per 1 0 0 0 pop- ation. annum ulation base=t00 1 9 6 4 4 0 2 8 3 7 . 0 9 2 100 1 9 6 5 4 0 6 11 96 . 2 3 6 2 5 7 1 9 6 6 4 1 0 9 8 4 . 2 0 5 2 2 3 1 9 6 7 4 1 4 8 107 .261 2 8 4 1 9 6 8 4 1 8 7 7 2 .172 1 8 7 1 9 6 9 4 2 1 7 85 . 2 0 2 2 2 0 1 9 7 0 4 2 4 7 5 5 . 1 3 0 141 1 9 7 1 4 2 6 5 5 3 . 1 2 4 1 3 5 1 9 7 2 4 2 3 7 9 8 . 2 3 2 2 5 2 1 9 7 3 4 2 0 8 6 6 . 1 5 7 171 1 9 7 4 4 1 7 7 6 4 . 1 5 3 1 6 6 1 9 7 5 4 1 4 2 0 2 3 2 . 5 6 0 6 0 9 1 9 7 6 4 1 0 2 0 201 . 4 9 0 5 3 3 Population estimates based on figures from 1 9 6 1 , 1 9 6 6 , 1 9 7 1 and 1 9 7 6 censuses. Data on participation and number of meetings drawn from Vancouver City Council minutes. Thanks to the staff of the City Archives and City Clerk's office (especially Eldon Bowie) for their kind assistance. 4 5 Table 4 - 2 . S t a t i s t i c a l Characteristics of Vancouver Participation. Period Mean Annual Standard Participation Deviation 1 9 6 4 - 7 6 2 5 2 . 2 1 4 5 . 9 1 9 6 4 - 6 7 2 1 6 . 0 7 9 . 1 1 9 6 8 - 7 2 1 8 7 . 0 7 9 . 1 1 9 7 3 - 7 6 3 6 9 . 8 2 3 4 . 7 Figures calculated using data in "annual participation" column in Table 4 - 1 . result of the two "outlier" observations i n 1975 and 1976. In terms of the prior question, which i s designed to provide a comparison between the pre- and post-formation periods within the Vancouver case, the normal rate of participation prior to the formation of the parties ( i . e . the mean rate) was 2 16 , and this rate was relatively constant, with a standard deviation of 7 9 . 1 . These figures only become meaningful in comparison with the post-formation figures, which are surprisingly similar: the mean i s 187 while the standard deviation i s an identical 7 9 . 1 . Only the figures for the period after the election of TEAM show any marked difference, with the mean participation rising to about 370 while the standard deviation rises to 2 3 4 * 7 . Thus we have a context for the study of the Vancouver 1*6 data, and u t i l i s i n g this context we can see that the only real change i n participation which has occurred i n Vancouver has been the large increase observed in 1 9 7 5 and 1 9 7 6 . This increase w i l l be explored further i n the next chapter. Comparing Vancouver and Victoria. If the formation of the new parties and the election of TEAM had had no effect on participation, we would expect that participation patterns in Victoria and Vancouver would be similar. The data from the annual participation columns of Tables 3-k, 3 - 5 and if-1 have been brought together for the reader's convenience in the graph i n Appendix D. This graph makes i t easy to see that the data for Victoria and Vancouver display fundamentally different patterns. As would be expected, a correlation of the two sets of data shows l i t t l e relationship. The correlation 2 coefficient i s +0.12. This dissimilarity between the Vancouver and Victoria data does not prove that the formation and election of new parties affect p o l i t i c a l participation. But neither does i t lend support to the hypothesis that these parties had no effect on participation. Comparing Vancouver and Surrey. The Surrey data are quite different from the Victoria 4 7 data. For the most part, the Surrey line i n the graph in Appendix D rises when the Vancouver line rises, and f a l l s when the Vancouver line f a l l s . It i s no surprise that the two sets of data correlate quite highly. The correlation coefficient i s +0.51» which i s significant at the 0 . 0 5 l e v e l . ^ In both municipalities, the year after parties were formed saw a rise in participation. In each municipality, the election of a new party was followed by a drop in participation. The similarity between the Vancouver and Surrey cases seems to indicate that the participatory beliefs of parties make no difference to participation. 4 8 Footnotes: Chapter Four, 1• It i s interesting to note that the participation rate per thousand people in Vancouver prior to 1 9 7 5 i s roughly the same as the lowest participation level recorded i n either Surrey or Victoria. The highest figure recorded in Vancouver, .56 in 1 9 7 5 , would be an average-to-low reading in either of the other two municipalities. 2. A l l correlations i n this paper were calculated using Spearman's rank correlation coefficient. 3. The two lines would look even more similar in Appendix D had not Vancouver's base year seen an unusually low level of participation. k9 Chapter Five. Vancouver in Depth. The comparisons with the control municipalities have raised doubts about the impact of an avowed participationist party on participation levels. However, overall participation i s only one measure of possible impact. More subtle relationships may exist. For example, the advent of TEAM may have led to changes in the type of participant. TEAM may have had an impact on the rate and nature of applications coming before the public hearings. A better understanding may be gained by looking at the data on public hearings in greater detail. The weakness of the data source becomes glaringly obvious at this point. The public hearing minutes t e l l us l i t t l e about the backgrounds of those who speak. They do t e l l us, however, whether the par t i c i -pants act as individuals or groups, and whether they are "pro" or "con" the application. The indications may be used to extend the analysis but, as we shall see, any conclusions are tentative indeed. The general pattern of participation in Vancouver was outlined in the last chapter. Although participation was slightly higher i n 1 9 6 9 than 1 9 6 8 , i t would be foolish to attribute this rise to the formation of the new parties. TEAM'S f i r s t year i n office saw quite a large drop i n participation, but in the third year of TEAM government, 1 9 7 5 , the participation rate jumped 5 0 spectacularly, A number of explanations come to mind. The fluctuations may be explained completely by non-party factors. Or the party system may have been relevant. TEAM'S participationist emphasis and the reforms i t introduced may have had an impact -albeit a slightly delayed one. The drop i n part-icipation in 1 9 7 3 may have been caused by the new council taking some time to get organised, while private developers held back on their applications u n t i l they knew the new council better. Similarly, the rise i n participation i n 1 9 7 5 may have been caused by TEAM development policies inciting people to attend hearings. Perhaps the increase i n participation in 1 9 7 5 simply reflects a greater number of applications as TEAM became more active and private developers came to trust them. These explanations are by no means mutually exclusive, and i t i s possible, even l i k e l y , that they combined to produce the effects we have seen. Methodology. This chapter employs several different methods for 5 1 more closely examining the data. In this section, I w i l l explain the concepts and methods involved. I have cla s s i f i e d interveners into four categories: interest groups, individuals, companies and "miscell-aneous". I had originally Intended to have two classes 1 of interest groups, institutional and issue-oriented. When gathering the data, I found only three institutional groups had participated i n the hearings during the t h i r -teen years studied. Almost a l l interest groups participating were small residents* groups (the largest probably being the Downtown Eastside Residents 1 Assoc-iation (DERA)), although there were a few merchants* and businessmen's groups such as the Illuminated Sign Manufacturers' Association of Brit i s h Columbia. There w i l l be some overlap between the individual and company interveners, as occasionally a company representative w i l l appear (or w i l l be recorded in the minutes) as an individual. However, in those meetings where intervenors' addresses were recorded, the addresses indicate that most participants lived within a block or two of the affected si t e . This suggests that these participants were local residents rather than company representatives. The miscellaneous category consists of a few intervenors (never more than ten in one year) repre-senting organisations other than private companies: government departments, charitable organisations and 5 2 so on. This category i s of no importance and i s included merely for the sake of completeness. The largest "subcategory" of this miscellaneous group i s prob-ably private music schools, ten of which attended a meeting i n 1971, thereby constituting the whole of the miscellaneous category for that year. I have also c l a s s i f i e d each intervener as being in favour ("pro"), opposed ("con") or neutral, as regards the application being considered. Neutral here means neither pro nor con, rather than s t r i c t l y neutral. In some cases intervenors have been classed as neutral because the clerk taking the minutes neglected to indicate the position the intervenor took. (See p. 430 In most cases intervenors c l a s s i f i e d as neutral either came to obtain information from the applicant, or had things to say which were both in favour of the applic-ation and opposed to i t . An example would be a person who was in favour of the building of a new supermarket, but was opposed to the site of i t s proposed parking l o t . Applications have been divided into two categories, municipal and private. Roughly forty percent of zoning applications are by the municipal planning department. These applications involve a municipal o f f i c i a l attending the hearing to explain the application, and to defend i t . Private applications include a l l applications p made by individuals and companies. Individual and company applications have been grouped together because 5 3 many businesses have an individual, usually a lawyer or architect, make the application on their behalf. In these cases the name of the individual i s a l l that appears i n the minutes. Similarly, many companies are creations used by individuals for tax avoidance and other similar purposes, and i t i s virtually impossible to distinguish these from more legitimate enterprises. Included as municipal applications are ten meetings called to discuss specific issues, such as the extension to the runway at Vancouver International Airport. These are not s t r i c t l y speaking rezoning applications, but they are treated similarly by council, and there are not really enough of them to justify making a sep-arate category. Inclusion of these hearings with the municipal hearings has the effect of very slightly increasing the participation rate for the municipal hearings. This increase i s so slight that the exclusion of these hearings would make no difference to the general interpretation of the data. The purpose of this chapter i s to s i f t through possible interpretations of the patterns of participation already observed. To do so, I w i l l look more carefully at: a/ The rate of applications and their sponsors, as well as the number of meetings. b/ The characteristics of intervenors, in particular 5 4 whether they acted as individuals or groups and whether they were "pro" or "con". Having examined these, I w i l l again look at the pattern of participation under the TEAM council. Applications and Meetings. Before drawing any conclusions from the data on participation per annum, i t i s necessary to discuss two other variables which could confound any interpret-ation. These are the number of meetings, and the number of zoning applications. Obviously, i f there are more meetings in one year than another, and the same number of people attend each meeting, then the participation rates for the two years w i l l d i f f e r . Yet this i s irrelevent to the particip-ationist beliefs of any party, unless the increased number of meetings were the result of those beliefs. The same argument applies to the number of applications. Table 5 - 1 shows the data on the number of rezoning applications per annum. The table appears somewhat similar to the st a t i s t i c s on participation, especially during the last four years. The election of TEAM was followed by a drop in applications, followed by a rise i n 1 9 7 5 . To see i f this i s what i s accounting -for the rise i n participation, I have constructed a measure which shows participation per application, corrected for 5 5 Table 5 - 1 . Rezoningf'Applications. Year Municipal Private Total Applications Applications Appli' 1 9 6 4 2 6 2 3 4 9 1 9 6 5 2 9 2 6 5 5 1 9 6 6 1 2 2 2 3 4 1 9 6 7 8 19 2 7 1 9 6 8 8 1 3 21 1 9 6 9 8 2 0 28 1 9 7 0 1 6 2 0 3 6 1 9 7 1 8 14 2 2 1 9 7 2 7 1 9 26 1 9 7 3 1 0 V 10) 2 0 1 9 7 4 2 8 1 9 7 5 18; 1 3 ) 3 1 1 9 7 6 2 8 8 3 6 5 6 Table 5 - 2 . Participation per Meeting, per Application and per Annum. Year Per Meeting Per Application Per Annum* 1 9 6 4 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 9 6 5 1 8 7 2 2 9 2 5 7 1 9 6 6 1 9 8 3 2 1 2 2 3 1 9 6 7 2 8 4 5 1 5 2 8 4 1 9 6 8 2 1 4 4 3 6 1 8 7 1 9 6 9 2 5 1 3 8 4 2 2 0 1 9 7 0 1 6 2 1 9 2 1 4 1 1 9 7 1 2 1 6 3 0 0 1 3 5 1 9 7 2 2 8 8 4 7 5 2 5 2 1 9 7 3 1 7 1 4 1 8 1 7 1 1 9 7 4 1 9 0 2 9 1 1 6 6 1 9 7 5 2 4 4 9 6 2 6 0 9 1 9 7 6 2 1 3 7 2 5 5 3 3 * This column i s reproduced from Table 4 - 1 for the convenience of the reader. Participation per meeting and per application were calculated by dividing the participation, per thousand for each year (from Table 4 - 1 ) by the number of meetings or applications for that year. These figures were then recalculated so that the base year, 1 9 6 4 , equalled 1 0 0 . 5 7 population growth. This data appears i n TSble 5 - 2 , which also includes data on participation per meeting corrected for population growth. There are problems with both the per application and per meeting methods of calculation. Many applic-ations are treated together during the hearings, and should really be considered as one application, but i t i s impossible to t e l l this from the council minutes. As an example, i n the meeting announced in Appendix A, items 2 , 3 a and 3 b were treated together as they a l l concerned property owned by Ocean Concrete Ltd. Thus two private applications ( 2 and 3 a ) and one municipal application ( . 3 b ) were i n effect treated as a single application. This combination of municipal and private applications i s rare, but for applications to be con-sidered together i s common practice. This means that participation per application would tend to under-estimate participation. This i s not a serious problem when changes in participation rates are being studied, but i t does allow the possibility of an analysis being confounded by some change i n the practice regarding the grouping of applications. The problem with the "per meeting" method i s that these figures are l i k e l y to reflect changing methods of calling meetings as much as changing participation. Thus the per meeting figures for Surrey are meaningless because of the number of times Surrey council has changed 58 Table 5 - 3» Comparison of Per Annum, Per Meeting and Per Application Methods of Measuring Participation. Variables Correlation Significance Per Annum and Per Application + 0 . 7 7 . 0 0 1 Per Annum and Per Meeting + 0 . 5 4 . 0 2 7 Per Application and Per Meeting + 0 . 7 1 . 0 0 3 the frequency of their public hearings. As the frequ-ency of hearings rose from five a year to thirty-nine a year, the number of participants per meeting dropped markedly.^ Table 5 - 3 shows the correlations between the three ways of measuring participation. The three methods are highly intercorrelated, with measurement per meeting and per annum the two least similar. The high intercorrelation allows us to consider any of the three measures as a valid measure of changing trends in participation. Looking at this another way, when I controlled for changes in numbers of meetings and applications, the relationship previously evident was s t i l l present, so that i t i s safe to assert that the changes i n participation per annum were not the result of changes in the numbers of meetings or applications. As I consider the "participation per annum" method to be the most convenient withvwhich to work, I w i l l 5 9 use i t for the remainder of the chapter. However, I would l i k e to make two observations about the other two measures, to illuminate trends not readily apparent from the per annum data. The f i r s t i s that, in Table 5 - 2 , the number of participants per meeting does not show the same increase i n 1 9 7 5 and 1 9 7 6 as i s evident i n the other two measures. This indicates that the increased number of meetings in those years was related to the increase in particip-ation. This gives rise to a chicken-and-egg problem: did the number of meetings rise because of increased participation, or did participation increase because of the increased number of meetings? Information obtained at an interview**- suggests that the f i r s t explanation i s the correct one. Planners intentionally began scheduling hearings so that there was only one possible contentious application at each hearing because "who wants to get home at k a.m.?" Issues are judged to be potentially contentious i f there are a number of requests for information about the application, or i f interest groups are known to be interested in i t . This almost certainly has the effect of increasing particip-ation, i f only because citizens are also discouraged by the prospect of k a.m. adjournments. Of course, increasing the number of meetings also increases the opportunities for participation, and the smaller number of applications considered at each meeting probably 6 0 causes the meetings to seem less rushed. It i s important to emphasise, however, that this increase was not the direct result of any participationist beliefs on the part of TEAM, although of course a non-participationist administration might have responded differently to the problem of over-long hearings. Secondly, Table 5-1 indicates that i n 1 9 7 5 and 1 9 7 6 there were a small number of private applications and a large number of municipal applications. This suggests that the increased participation i n these years was the result of municipal applications rather than private ones. Table 5-1+ i s designed to explore this possibility. This table shows that, except for 1 9 7 5 , most intervenors were concerned with municipal applications. The large number of intervenors against private applications i n 1 9 7 5 i s easily explicable. In late 1 9 7 4 » the council removed a freeze they had imposed in 1 9 7 3 on applications affecting the downtown area. This caused a small rush of contentious private downtown applications i n 1 9 7 5 . The large number of municipal interveners were attracted by a number of applications concerning^zoming changes for lasge parts of the city, which were part of the new council's broad development "plan". More wi l l be said about this in the next section. 6 1 Table 5 - 4 . Intervenors Addressing Private and Municipal Applications. Year Municipal Private 1 9 6 4 1 3 2 4 1 9 6 5 2 5 7 0 1 9 6 6 3 8 4 6 1 9 6 7 4 2 6 5 1 9 6 8 1 3 5 9 1 9 6 9 1 8 6 7 1 9 7 0 2 2 3 4 1 9 7 1 2 3 3 0 1 9 7 2 61 3 7 1 9 7 3 5 7 9 1 9 7 4 51 1 3 1 9 7 5 1 2 0 1 1 2 1 9 7 6 1 6 3 3 8 6 2 Characteristics of Participants. Another way of approaching the situation i s by examining changes in the composition of participation. Tables 5 - 5 and 5 - 6 show the data collected on intervenors at public hearings. The data in Table 5 - 5 concerning letters and petitions received by council i n regard to public hearings are not s t r i c t l y relevant. However they are included in the hope that they may be of use to some readers. Several things are immediately apparent about these tables. The increase in participation in 1 9 7 5 does not appear to be the result of a large increase i n only one or two types of participant, although pro interest groups, pro and con individuals and con companies a l l reach unprecedented (within the period being studied) levels. Con interest groups, although high, are not outstandingly so. A more suggestive pattern emerges, however, when the pro/con figures are broken down according to whether the intervenor i s addressing a municipal or a private application. This i s done i n Table 5 - 7 » There i s a noticeable increase i n the number of intervenors supporting municipal applications while there i s no similarly consistent increase in the supporters of private applications. The most plausible interpretation would seem to 6 3 Table 5-5. Intervenors at Public Hearings. Year Interest Individuals Companies Total* Letters Petitions  Groups and Misc-ellaneous 1 9 6 4 5 3 1 1 3 7 7 4 4 1 9 6 5 16 6 8 1 2 9 6 3 5 5 1 9 6 6 19 3 2 1 3 64 2 8 0 1 9 6 7 3 5 2 3 1 4 7 2 2 5 2 1 9 6 8 2 3 3 7 1 2 7 2 8 3 1 9 6 9 3 0 3 3 1 2 7 5 9 4 1 9 7 0 1 0 3 1 4 4 5 6 3 1 9 7 1 1 0 3 0 1 3 5 3 0 3 T 9 7 2 4 2 4 1 1 5 9 8 6 0 1 9 7 3 2 2 3 6 8 6 6 0 2 1 9 7 4 1 9 3 7 8 64 0 0 1 9 7 5 4 4 1 6 8 2 0 2 3 2 0 1 1 9 7 6 r . 4 0 1 4 7 1 4 2 0 1 0 1 * This column i s the total off interest groups,, individuals, companies and miscellaneous. It does not include letters or petitions. Note: The figures i n this table represent number of participants. They are not percentages. 6 4 Table 5 - 6 . Pro and Con Intervenors at Public Hearings. Year Interest Indiv- Compan- Miscell- Total  Groups iduals ies aneous P e N p c N p a N P C N p C N 1 9 6 4 T 4 0 1 3 0 0 0 -0 0 0 0 1 2 3 4 1 1 9 6 5 4 1 0 2 1 0 5 6 2 3 5 1 0 1 2 1 7 7 2 7 1 9 6 6 * 7 11 1 9 2 2 1 l 3 0 0 1 8 1 7 3 7 1 0 1 9 6 7 * 0 2 8 7 4 1 8 1 4 1 0 0 0 9 8 4 7 1 7 1 9 6 8 6 1 7 0 1 4 2 1 2 0 3 3 0 0 6 2 0 4 1 11 1 9 6 9 * 1 2 8 1 8 2 5 0 2 4 1 1 0 4 1 2 5 7 6 1 9 7 0 * 5 4 ,T. 5 21 5 0 0 1 0 0 3 1 0 2 6 TO 1 9 7 1 0 1 0 0 1 2 6 3 1 2 0 1 0 0 0 1 2 38 3 1 9 7 2 2 4 0 0 4 3 6 1 0 0 5 7 2 1 1 3 78 7 1 9 7 3 2 2 0 0 5 2 7 4 2 2 2 0 1 1 9 5 0 7 1 9 7 4 6 1 2 1 1 5 1 7 5 2 5 0 0 T 0 2 3 3 5 6 1 9 7 5 1 2 3 2 0 5 3 1 1 4 1 1 1 4 2 1 2 0 67 1 6 2 3 1 9 7 6 1 2 2 7 1 3 0 1 1 2 5 3 4 0 1 2 4 4 6 1 4 5 1 0 * Figures in these years w i l l not agree with the figures in Table 4 - 1 because these figures do not include my estimates of participation at meetings where the minutes of the meeting are imprecise. (See page 4 2 . ) P stands for Pro, C stands for Con and N stands for neutral. The figures in the table represent number of participants, they are not percentages. 6 5 Table 5 - 7 i Pro and Con Intervenors at Municipal and Private Applications. Municipal Private Year Pro Con Pro Con 1 9 6 4 0 1 3 2 2 2 1 9 6 5 9 1 7 8 6 2 1 9 6 6 7 2 3 1 0 2 4 1 9 6 7 0 4 2 8 2 2 1 9 6 8 3 1 0 1 7 4 2 1 9 6 9 9 9 3 5 4 1 9 7 0 . 5 1 7 5 1 9 1 9 7 1 5 1 8 7 2 3 1 9 7 2 1 6 0 1 2 2 5 1 9 7 3 ^ 8 4 9 1 8 1.974 2 1 3 0 2 11 1 9 7 5 4 6 7 4 2 1 * 9 1 1 9 7 6 4 1 1:22 5 3 3 * This unusually high figure i s the result of an application to provide low-cost housing, which attracted sixteen favourable interventions. Figures are not i n percentsges. This table does not include my estimates of participation at meetings where the minutes are imprecise, so totals w i l l not agr;ee with Table 4 - 1 . 6 6 be that at least some of the con intervenors i n the past were opposed to development generally. Under the new council, these people would s t i l l oppose private applications, but would support some of the municipal applications. The municipal applications they would support would be those which involve what planners term "downzoning". Downzoning means limiting the development in an area. An example was the rezoning of some areas of the west end from highrise to lowrise construction. When these downzoning applications began to come forward i n 1 9 7 4 * an increase in pro interventions became apparent. (See Table 5 - 8 . ) Table 5 -9 shows the participants categorised according to type. This categorisation does not seem to t e l l us much about the impact of participationist parties, but i t does show the relative prominence of interest groups during the years of peak controversy ( 1 9 6 7 - 1 9 6 9 ) , and i n 1 9 7 2 - 3 . It also shows an increase i n the proportion of individuals making up the recent upsurge in participation, as was suggested by the relative continuity of the absolute number of these groups shown i n Table 5 - 5 . A further explanation of the increase in part-icipation i n 1 9 7 5 was suggested by Paul Tennant and City Manager F r i t z Bowers. They thought that the increase may have been the result of a number of "habitual" participants who have started to attend 6 7 Table 5-8. Percentages of Intervenors Pro and Con. Tear Pro, % Con % Neutral % 1 9 6 4 5 . 4 9 1 , 9 2 . 7 1 9 6 5 1 7 . 7 7 5 . 0 7 . 3 1 9 6 6 2 6 . 6 5 7 . 8 1 5 . 6 1 9 6 7 11.1 6 5 . 3 2 3 . 6 1 9 6 8 2 7 . 7 5 6 . 9 1 5 . 3 1 9 6 9 16 .0 7 6 . 0 8 . 0 1 9 7 0 2 1 . 7 5 6 . 5 2 1 . 7 1 9 7 1 2 2 . 6 7 1 . 7 5 . 6 1 9 7 2 1 3 . 2 7 9 . 6 7 . 1 T 9 7 3 1 3 . 6 7 5 . 8 TO-6 1 9 7 4 3 5 . 9 5 4 . 7 9 . 4 . 1 9 7 5 28 .9 6 9 . 8 1 . 3 1 9 7 6 2 2 . 9 7 2 . 1 5 . 0 Figures may not add up to 1 0 0 % for any year due to rounding error. This table i s based on Table 5 - 6 . 6 8 Table 5 - 9 . Percentages of Intervenors By Type. Year;! Interest Groups % Individuals °/o Others % 1 9 6 4 1 3 . 5 8 3 . 8 2 . 8 1 9 6 5 1 6 . 6 7 0 . 8 1 2 . 5 1 9 6 6 2 9 . 7 5 0 . 0 2 0 . 3 1 9 6 7 4 8 . 6 3 1 . 9 1 9 . 4 1 9 6 8 3 1 . 9 5 1 . 4 1 6 . 6 1 9 6 9 4 0 . 0 4 4 . 0 1 6 . 0 1 9 7 0 2 2 . 2 6 8 . 8 8 . 8 1 9 7 1 1 8 . 8 5 6 . 6 2 4 . 5 1 9 7 2 4 2 . 8 4 1 . 8 1 5 . 3 T 9 7 3 3 3 . 3 5 4 . 5 1 2 . 1 1 9 7 4 2 9 . 7 5 7 . 8 1 2 . 5 - 1 9 7 5 1 8 . 8 7 1 . 8 8 . 5 1 9 7 6 1 9 . 9 7 3 . 1 7 . 0 Figures f o r any year may not total 1 0 0 % due to rounding This table i s based on Table 5 - 6 . 69 Table 5-10. Repeating Intervenors i n 1974 and 1975. 1974 1221 °£of Mo. °A Ho. °k i n c r e a s e . I n t e r e s t Groups 4 21 ' 18 41 56 I n d i v i d u a l s 0 0 26 15 20 Companies 0 0 6 35 60 T o t a l 4 6 50 22 30 No. r e f e r s to the number of i n t e r v e n t i o n s by i n t e r v e n o r s who appeared more than once. Thus two i n t e r v e n o r s each appearing twice would count as 4. % r e f e r s to the number of i n t e r v e n t i o n s by i n t e r v e n o r s who appeared more than once as a percentage of the t o t a l number of that type of i n t e r v e n t i o n i n that year. % of i n c r e a s e i n d i c a t e s the percentage of the i n c r e a s e i n p a r t i c i p a t i o n from 1974 to 1975 accounted f o r by the i n c r e a s e i n the number of repe a t i n g i n t e r -venors over the same pe r i o d . This i s a measure of the impact these i n t e r v e n o r s have had on p a r t i c -i p a t i o n r a t e s . hearings. The r e l e v a n t data appears i n Table 5-10. In 1974 there were only two r e p e a t e r s , accounting f o r four i n t e r v e n t i o n s , and they accounted f o r s i x percent of that year's p a r t i c i p a t i o n . In 1975 there were twenty-two r e p e a t e r s , accounting f o r 50 i n t e r v e n t i o n s , and these accounted f o r twenty-two percent of the p a r t i c i p a t i o n , and t h i r t y percent of the i n c r e a s e from 1974 to 1975. 70 Some of these frequent intervenors may have had " p o l i t i c a l " motives, and certainly Bruce Erikson, Libby Davies and Jean Swanson have been able to generate much publicity through their participation. However, the repeated appearances of the United Church, Imperial O i l and a doctor and his wife are rather less easily explained. Mr. Bowers suggested that they feel they have been effective the f i r s t time they appear, and thus are motivated to return. The Pattern; 1972-1976. We are now i n a position to evaluate the possible explanations presented earlier i n this chapter. To do so, I w i l l apply the data I have presented, as 5 well as information gleaned from interviews. 1 / "The drop in participation in 1 9 7 3 may have been caused by the new council taking some time to get organised ..." There i s no evidence to support this. There were more municipal applications for rezoning i n 1 9 7 3 than there had been in 1 9 7 2 or 1 9 7 1 . If the new council were not yet organised, they were s t i l l at least as organised as the old council had been. 2 / "... while private developers held back on their applications until they knew the new council better." This may be so, but i t i s probably not a major factor. 1 9 7 3 saw less private applications than 1 9 7 2 , 71 but the number i s not spectacularly lower. It may be that private applications i n that year were particularly uncontentious. Only nine interventions were lodged against private applications i n 1 9 7 3 . A better explanation of the lower number of private applications would be the new council's freeze on downtown rezoning. In any case, I have presented strong evidence that the application rate was not a.major factor affecting the participation rate. 3 / "...the increase i n participation in 1 9 7 5 may have been caused by TEAM development policies i n c i t i n g people to attend hearings". This i s obviously a major factor i n the increase in participation. Most of the intervenors in 1 9 7 5 and 1 9 7 6 were concerned with municipal rather than private applications. This i s especially noticeable in 1 9 7 6 , as 1 9 7 5 saw a surge of private rezoning applications concerning the downtown area, many of which were contentious. The municipal applications, especially those concerning "downzoning", attracted many pro intervenors, and some con interventions from the companies affected. The increased participation seems more linked to TEAM'S zoning plans than i t s participationist beliefs. 4 / "... the increase in participation in 1 9 7 5 simply reflects a greater number of applications as TEAM became more active and private developers came to trust them." 72 The data showed the application rate not to be a decisive factor in the change in the participation rate, so the assumption behind this explanation i s not valid. 6/ "The fluctuations may be explained completely by non-party factors." Even i f "the increased participation seems more linked to TEAM'S rezoning plans than i t s participationist beliefs", this i s s t i l l enough for us to say that party factors are relevant to participation fluctuations. The comparison between Surrey and Vancouver lends weight to this conclusion, as does the finding that the number of applications was not a major factor in the changes in the participation rate. This i s because most of the other non-party factors which affect zoning, such as economic factors, more log i c a l l y affect the application rate than the participation rate. 7 / "TEAM'S participationist emphasis and the reforms i t introduced may have had an impact - albeit a slightly delayed one." The evaluation of this explanation w i l l be complex. When TEAM were elected in late 1 9 7 2 , they had two ideas that were potentially relevant to the public hearing process. One of these was that participation by citizens was desirable', and should be facilitated... Note, facilitated, rather than encouraged. TEAM did not 7 3 intend to cajole people into participating, but instead wished to provide them with the information they would need i f they wished to participate. The other idea was that TEAM wished to change the zoning of some parts of the city. These changes were intended to encourage some types of development, and discourage others. TEAM "froze" development applications for the downtown area while they prepared the necessary applications for their rezoning plans. Plans for other areas of the city were also prepared. Nothing much happened at public hearings for about two years. Possibly private interests intentionally held back on contentious applications while they came to know the new council. Late in 1 9 7 4 , the f i r s t of the new TEAM zoning plans was unveiled, and the necessary applications started to go through the hearing process. Also, a number of contentious private applications were "unfrozen". These applications, both municipal and private, attracted increased participation at public hearings. Armed with the information TEAM had made freely available, interest groups and individuals came to do battle. Many of them f e l t their participation was successful, or rewarding, and began to participate regularly. Some people associated with DERA have attained prominence, in part through this activity. The increased participation resulted i n some 7k hearings that ran on into the wee hours of the morning. Because of this, planners, when scheduling meetings, tried to have no more than one contentious issue at any hearing. The result was a jump in the number of hearings, possibly adding to the participation rate by increasing the opportunities to participate. To "defuse" some issues, planning staff began to hold "information hearings" much more frequently. This backfired, as people attending these hearings took more entrenched positions on the issues being discussed. Their rage overflowed into the public hearings. The net result has been a spectacular jump i n the participation rate at public hearings. So, are the participationist beliefs of TEAM the cause of the increased participation? The answer must be a resounding "well, yes and no". Yes, because the participationist beliefs have led TEAM to f a c i l i t a t e participation by increasing access to information, and by making i t easier for the public to attend the hearings, by holding them in the evenings, and in the areas affected. Also, the reaction of a non-particip-ationist administration to the inconveniences caused by increased participation may have been different. Instead of trying to "streamline" hearings, TEAM responded to increased participation by increasing the number of hearings, and thus the opportunities for participation. No, because as has been seen, there were many other factors involved. Participationist beliefs alone would not have been enough to increase participation. Footnotes: Chapter Five. 1 . Based on Pross's categories i n Pressure Group  Behaviour in Canadian P o l i t i c s , McGraw-Hill Ryerson, Toronto, 1 9 7 5 . Pross uses four categories; issue-oriented, fledgling, mature and in s t i t u t i o n a l . These differ i n such factors as structure and objectives. I originally chose to use the two extreme categories as I f e l t I would not have sufficient information to categorise the groups so finely. As i t turned out I need not have worried, as almost a l l interest groups participating were issue-oriented by Pross's definition. 2 . An exception i s made for applications involving alterations at one residential address. For part of 1 9 6 4 , hearings were held to consider such applications, but i n that year a decision was made to refer a l l such applications to the Board of Administration. A l l of these applications have been removed from my data. 3 . The data on Surrey and Victoria were recalculated on a per meeting basis, with the intention of adding this to chapter three, but as the Surrey figures were meaningless and the Victoria figures were very simlar to the Victoria participation per annum figures, I have omitted these tables. Data on the number of applications per annum was 7 7 Footnotes, Chapter Five. Continued. not collected in Victoria or Surrey. 4 . With City Manager F r i t z Bowers. 5. Interviewed were City Manager F r i t z Bowers (who i s also a former TEAM alderman), City Clerk L i t t l e and Mr, Grey of the planning department. 78 Chapter Six. Conclusions. Life has once more proven i t s e l f to be far more complex than the questions we choose to ask about i t . Personally, I find that rather reassuring. L i f e may be complex, but this should ensure that i t w i l l not be dul l . Yet when we come to ask questions of l i f e , we often find that the answers make the questions we have asked seem childlike. As many writers have pointed out (Robert Sheckley being by far my favourite of these), to e l i c i t an appropriate answer, one must ask the right question. The question I asked was "what effect does the formation and election of a participationist party have on public participation at public hearings?" At the outset, the question seemed not inappropriate. Much p o l i t i c a l rhetoric has been invested i n encouraging participation, and i t seemed lik e a straightforward project to investigate the effects of that rhetoric. Would a strategy of f a c i l i t i a t i n g participation be effective? By comparing Vancouver, my chosen subject, with two other municipalities, I tentatively decided that, i f nothing more, a party system, or more accurately, changes i n a party system, were relevant to particip-ation at public hearings. Some evidence was present i n the Surrey case that the formation of a participat-ionist party had an effect on participation rates, but 7 9 no such evidence was found in Vancouver. In retro-spect, this makes sense, because a strategy of f a c i l -i t a t i n g participation presupposes that the party i s in power, so no change would be expected until the party has been elected. On closer examination of the Vancouver case, i t was seen that the participationist beliefs of the TEAM council were a factor in the increased partic-ipation observed after this council was elected. Yet this increased participation occurred two f u l l years after the beginning of the TEAM reign. Obviously, the election of a participationist party was not an instant spell to increase participation. Only when combined with the other necessary ingredients, most of which I probably have not identified, did the participationist beliefs have the expected effect. So, in answer to the second part of my question: yes, the election of a participationist party can have the effect of increasing participation, but only in the presence of other factors. To turn the question on i t s ear, i t was been found that participationist beliefs are not a necessary condition for increased participationj and the question i s s t i l l open as to whether they are even a sufficient condition. This tentative conclusion i s obviously too treacherous a base to even think of beginning an evaluation of the effectiveness of advocating increased participation 8 0 as a strategy for improved decision-making. As always, much work remains to be done. Hopefully, a small step has been taken towards an understanding of the p o l i t i c s of Vancouver, the p o l i t i c s of participation, and of p o l i t i c s . 81 Appendix A. Typical Vancouver Public Hearing Notice. (Amendments to Zon ing and Deve lopment By-Law No.3575) N O T I C E IS H E R E B Y G I V E N T H A T , p u r s u a n t to the p r o v i s i o n s of the V a n c o u v e r Char ter , a meet ing of the C o u n c i l of the C i t y of V a n c o u v e r w i l l be h e l d in C O U N C I L C H A M B E R , T H I R D F L O O R , CITY H A L L , 453 West 12th Avenue, on T U E S D A Y , J U L Y 26, 1977, c o m -m e n c i n g at 2:00 P . M . , to c o n s i d e r the f o l l o w i n g p r o p o s e d a m e n d m e n t s to the Z o n i n g a n d Deve lopment B y - L a w N o . 3575: 1. Eas ter ly 48 feet of Lot 1, B l o c k 48, D . L . 2027, L O C A T I O N : l o c a t e d o n the s o u t h e a s t c o r n e r of W e s t 33rd A v e n u e a n d M a c K e n z i e Street . T h e wester ly 33.6 feet of Lot 1, B l o c k 48, D . L . 2027 is present ly z o n e d (C-1) C o m m e r c i a l D i s t r i c t . P r e s e n t Z o n e : (RS-1) O n e - F a m i l y D w e l l i n g Dis t r i c t R e q u e s t e d Z o n e : (C-1) C o m m e r c i a l D i s t r i c t 2. Area West of the Q u e b e c / C o l u m b i a C o n -t O C A T I O N : nec tor at T e r m i n a l A v e n u e . A p o r t i o n of L o t A , D . L . ' s 2037 & 2064, P l a n 5568; a p o r t i o n of Lot B , D . L . 2037, A m e n d e d P l a n 5568 a n d a p o r t i o n of P a r c e l C (Explanatory P l a n 3340) e x c e p t that part i n c l u d e d in P l a n 15452 of Lot 2, D . L . 2037, P l a n 5568. Present Z o n e : (RS-1) O n e - F a m i l y D w e l l i n g Dis t r i c t R e q u e s t e d Z o n e : (M-1) Industr ia l Dis t r ic t 3. (a) N o r t h w e s t C o r n e r of M a i n Street a n d 1 O C A T I O N : T e r m i n a l A v e n u e , be ing a p o r t i o n of Lot 3, D . L . 2037, P l a n 15505. A n area of ap-p r o x i m a t e l y 12,000 s q u a r e feet, b e i n g a l m o s t t r i angular in s h a p e a n d having a f rontage a l o n g M a i n Street f r o m T e r m i n a l A v e n u e northerly of a p p r o x i m a t e l y 216 feet a n d a f rontage a l o n g T e r m i n a l A v e n u e wes ter ly of a p p r o x i m a t e l y 78 feet . Present Z o n e : (RS-1) O n e - F a m i l y D w e l l i n g D i s t r i c t R e q u e s t e d Z o n e : (M-1) Industr ia l Dis t r i c t (b) Text A m e n d m e n t to S c h e d u l e C - " S t r e e t s R e q u i r i n g L a n d s c a p e d S e t b a c k s " — E s t a b l i s h m e n t of a l a n d s c a p e d s e t b a c k at the l o c a t i o n a n d c o v e r i n g the area noted in (a) above . 4. Eas t Thir ty-F irs t A v e n u e (One lot on the L O C A T I O N : nor th s i d e of E a s t 31st A v e n u e l o c a t e d a p p r o x i m a t e l y 135 feet east of F r a s e r Street) , b e i n g L o t 44, B l o c k 9, D . L . ' s 391 & 392. 1 Present Z o n e : (RS-1) O n e - F a m i l y D w e l l i n g Dis t r i c t R e q u e s t e d Z o n e : (RT-2) T w o - F a m i l y D w e l l i n g Dis t r i c t »-A L L P E R S O N S w h o d e e m t h e m s e l v e s a f fec ted by the p r o p o s e d a m e n d m e n t s s h a l l be a f f o r d e d a n o p p o r t u n i t y to be heard before C o u n c i l on matters c o n t a i n e d tnere in . A c o p y of the p r o p o s e d B y - L a w s may be s e e d in the C i t y C l e r k ' s O f f i c e , T h i r d F loor , C i t y H a l l a n d in the P l a n n i n g Depar tment , Th i rd F loor , East W i n g , C i t y H a l l , 453 W e s t 12th A v e n u e , M o n d a y to Fr iday f r o m 9:00 A . M . to 5:00 P . M . , on regular w o r k i n g days . O.H. IITTIE CITY C L E R K . * fi) <Q <D « . o o CO Appendix B. Burnaby Public Hearing Notice. 8 2 The Council of The Corporation of the Dis-trict of Burnaby hereby gives notice that it will hold a Public Hearing on T U E S D A Y , AUGUST 16, 1977 AT 7:30 P.M. in the Municipal Hall, 4949 Canada Way, Burnaby, B.C. V5G 1M2 to receive repre-sentations in connection with the following proposed amendments to "Burnaby Zoning By-Law 1965": 1. F R O M C O M P R E H E N S I V E D E V E L O P -M E N T DISTRICT (CD) TO A M E N D E D C O M P R E H E N S I V E D E V E L O P M E N T DISTRICT ( A M E N D E D CD) Reference Rezoning No. 34/75A' "BURNABY ZONING BY-LAW 1965, AMENDMENT B Y-LA W NO. 43,1977'' — BY-LAW NO. 7083 Lot 35, D.L. 79, Plan 42703 2920 Norland Avenue — located on the •east side of Norland Avenue south of Sprott Street. The applicant proposes to amend the ap-proved CD plan from a single two storey office building with surface parking to s redesigned two and a half storey office building with underground parking. . F R O M RESIDENTIAL DISTRICT (Rl) TO P A R K & PUBLIC U S E DISTRICT (PS) Reference Rezoning No. 31/77 "BURNABY ZONING BY-LAW 1965, AMENDMENT BY-LAW NO. 44,1977" — BY-LAW NO. 7084 Lot 5 Except Ref. Plan 31543, D.L . 85, Plan 11109 (Westerly portion only) 5017 Dale Avenue — located at the south-west corner of Dale Avenue and Canada Way. The municipality has requested rezoning in'order to utilize the subject site for a public picnic area in association with Heritage Village. I. F R O M NEIGHBOURHOOD COMMER-CIAL DISTRICT (Cl) TO RESIDENTIAL DISTRICT (R3) Reference Rezoning No. 33/77 "BURNABY ZONING BY-LAW 1965, •AMENDMENT BY-LAW NO. 45,1977" — ,. B Y-LA W NO. 7085 Appendix continues on next page. A p p e n d i x B , c o n t i n u e d . H Lots 1, 2, 3, & 4 of Lot L, S.D. 20, Blk. 2, \ D.L. 74, Plan 4313 . ; 3314-3388 Royal Oak Avenue — located on the east side of Royal Oak Avenue be-•\ tween Schou Street and Laurel Street. ] The applicant has requested rezoning in •j order to bring the subject properties into j. conformity with the zoning designation of :] the adjacent area. M 4. F R O M G E N E R A L C O M M E R C I A L DIS--! TRICT (C3) TO GASOLINE S E R V I C E 5 STATION S E L F - S E R V E (C6A) Reference Rezoning No. 36/77 "BURNABY ZONING BY-LAW 1965, AMENDMENT BY-LAW NO. 46, 1977" — BY-LAW NO. 7086 Lot 115, D.L. 124, Plan 27154 4515 Lougheed Highway — located at the northeast corner of the Lougheed High-way-Willingdon Avenue intersection. The applicant has requested rezoning in order to convert the existing full-service gas station to a self-serve facility. 5. IN-LAW S U I T E S IN R E S I D E N T I A L ZONES T E X T A M E N D M E N T Sections 3 and 7.7 "BURNABY ZONING BY-LAW 1965, AMENDMENT BY-LAW NO. 47, 1977" — BY-LAW NO. 7087 Residential Districts — R l , R2, R3, R4 and R5 The Municipality has requested text amendments in order to better control the establishment and use of In-law suites. The amendments-include pro-posed definition changes for "In-law Suites" (To include sons or daughters), "Accessory Use" and "Dwelling Unit" as well as other related matters. All persons who deem their interest in property affected by the proposed By-Laws and wish to register an opinion may appear in person, by attorney or by peti-tion at the said Hearing. A copy of the proposed By-Laws may be inspected at the office of the undersigned any time between the hours of 'eight-thir-ty o'clock in the forenoon and four-thirty o'clock in the afternoon, Monday to Fri- ' day inclusive (excepting Public Holidays) up to four-thirty o'clock in the afternoon on Tuesday, August 16, 1977 James Hudson MUNICIPAL C L E R K MUNICIPAL H A L L , 4949 Canada Way, BURNABY, B.C. V5G 1M2 8 4 Appendix C. Floorplan of Vancouver Council Chambers. 


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