

PARTIES AND PARTICIPATION IN VANCOUVER, 1964 - 1976

by

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Abstract.

The formation of participationist parties was a strategy employed in the drive for reform of traditional mechanisms for public control of government decisions in the late 1960's. This paper evaluates the impact of such a party on levels of participation at the urban level by examining participation at Vancouver public hearings.

A comparison between Vancouver and two "control" municipalities suggests that, while the formation of a party probably has no effect, the election of a new participationist party results in changes in participation similar to those caused by the election of any new party.

A closer examination of the Vancouver data reveals how the participationist beliefs of the council interacted with a number of other factors to increase participation. Although it is concluded that the data presented do not allow an adequate evaluation of this participationist strategy, it is noted that a participationist party is not a necessary condition, and may not even be a sufficient condition, for increased participation.

Table of Contents.

Chapter One. Introduction . . . . .	1
- Structure of the Study. . . . .	5
- Footnotes . . . . .	8
Chapter Two. Background Information . . . . .	9
- Brief History of Vancouver Civic Politics .	9
- Public Hearings and Rezoning. . . . .	14
- A Typical Vancouver Public Hearing. . . . .	18
- Footnotes . . . . .	24
Chapter Three. Two Prior Questions. . . . .	26
- First Prior Question: The Victoria Case .	26
- Second Prior Question: The Surrey Case. .	34
- Footnotes . . . . .	40
Chapter Four. Introduction of Vancouver Data. .	41
- Third Prior Question: The Vancouver Case. .	41
- Comparing Vancouver and Victoria . . . . .	46
- Comparing Vancouver and Surrey. . . . .	46
- Footnotes . . . . .	48
Chapter Five. Vancouver in Depth. . . . .	49
- Methodology . . . . .	50
- Applications and Meetings . . . . .	54
- Characteristics of Participants . . . . .	62
- The Pattern: 1972-1976. . . . .	70
- Footnotes . . . . .	76
Chapter Six. Conclusions. . . . .	78
Appendix A. Typical Vancouver Hearing Notice ...	81
Appendix B. Typical Burnaby Hearing Notice . . .	82

Table of Contents, Continued.

Appendix C. Floorplan of Vancouver Council Chambers .	84
Appendix D. Graph of Annual Participation in Surrey, Victoria and Vancouver. . . .	85

## List of Tables.

3-1.	Population Characteristics: Greater Vancouver Regional District, Victoria and Nanaimo . . .	27
3-2.	Municipalities Ranked in Terms of Similarity to Vancouver. . . . .	29
3-3.	Municipal Similarity Scores . . . . .	30
3-4.	Participation in Victoria Public Hearings . .	32
3-5.	Participation in Surrey Public Hearings . . .	37
4-1.	Participation in Vancouver Public Hearings. .	44
4-2.	Statistical Characteristics of Vancouver Participation . . . . .	45
5-1.	Rezoning Applications . . . . .	55
5-2.	Participation Per Meeting, Per Application and Per Annum . . . . .	56
5-3.	Comparison of Per Annum, Per Meeting and Per Application Methods of Measuring Participation	58
5-4.	Intervenors Addressing Private and Municipal Applications. . . . .	61
5-5.	Intervenors at Public Hearings. . . . .	63
5-6.	Pro and Con Intervenors at Public Hearings. .	64
5-7.	Pro and Con Intervenors at Municipal and Private Applications. . . . .	65
5-8.	Percentage of Intervenors Pro and Con . . . .	67
5-9.	Percentage of Intervenors by Type . . . . .	68
5-10.	Repeating Intervenors in 1974 and 1975. . . .	69

## Chapter One. Introduction.

One of the consequences of the social upheaval of the 1960's has been the increased popularity of the idea of public participation. Traditional mechanisms for public control of government decisions were increasingly considered inadequate. Such concerns largely stem from the size and complexity of modern government structures, and their greatly expanded role in society. In the United States, they were enhanced by a decision-making process which led to the American involvement in Vietnam, seemingly against the wishes of a vast segment of the American population. But doubts about traditional mechanisms, and the advocacy of participation, were not confined to the United States.

There were many proposals for reform, and these proposals took many forms. Citizens were urged to vote, citizens' committees were formed, workers' control of corporate decision-making was advocated, and participationist political parties were formed. These parties are the focus of this paper. They are participationist not in terms of their internal organisation (although most would probably have some system of internal democracy as an ideal), but rather in advocacy of citizen participation in government decision-making, or at the very least greater citizen input into the decision-making process.

Such an approach represents an attempt to overcome problems with more traditional mechanisms for participation in politics, such as political parties and interest groups. There is a long tradition in political science, the best-known example being Michels' "Iron Law of Oligarchy"<sup>1</sup>, which holds that internal democracy in parties, movements and interest groups inevitably gives way to elite dominance. Ostrogorskii and McKenzie are two others who have helped develop this line of thought.<sup>2</sup> In addition the structure of interest groups often leaves large sections of the populace unorganised.

The 1960's saw greater emphasis on a different approach. Those committed to greater participation urged a variety of experiments designed to increase the direct participation of individuals and small groups within the structure of government. In some cases changes were made in administrative systems to accommodate this form of citizen input. And participationist parties and politicians arose who advocated such reform.

However it is still unclear whether such strategies will work. In the first place, can politicians and parties dedicated to increased participation actually succeed in increasing participation? Secondly, if they do, will those who participate prove effective in influencing public decisions and making governments more responsive to public wishes? These are large questions, the full resolution of which is beyond the scope of any



single research project. But this paper provides at least a partial assessment of the effectiveness of this strategy.

In particular, the paper examines the first of the above questions: do parties and politicians dedicated to participation actually increase participation? This issue will be explored in the context of Vancouver urban politics. The 1960's in Vancouver saw the advent of several participationist parties, one of which was elected to power in the early 1970's.

Of course such a case study can never provide a definitive answer to such issues, but without such evidence, no resolution of issues can ever be possible. This paper, in the context of many others which have been written, are being written and will be written on participation, will help in our understanding of an intriguing new phenomenon.

The exact question the paper will answer is "what effect did the formation and election of a participationist urban party in Vancouver have on citizen participation at public hearings?"

Public hearings were chosen over several possible forums for participation: city council meetings, courts of revision, voting and writing or petitioning council. The only one of these options which provides a data source as rich as the public hearings would be council

meetings. However, council meetings have some disadvantages. Not all participants at council meetings are recorded in the minutes, and neither is what is said by the participant. In almost all cases participants at public hearings are listed, and some indication of the position they took in respect to the issue being discussed is usually provided.

The other forms of participation would be inappropriate for this study. Voting is at best a marginal form of participation, and one that is encouraged by virtually all political parties. The renewed emphasis on participation did not produce an increase in voter turnout; in fact voting in Vancouver from the mid-1950's to the mid-1970's showed a slight but steady decline.<sup>3</sup> Writing or petitioning council is a rather more active form of participation, but has been recorded rather erratically. As with voting, there has been a drop (this time rather a dramatic drop) in the number of letters and petitions received by council since the mid-1960's. This may be more a reflection of the city clerk's record-keeping than a change in letter-writing habits. Courts of revision are designed to enforce compliance with the by-laws, and as the name would suggest most of the "participants" in this forum are witnesses. Although some citizens appear before these courts voluntarily, this is still not a very reliable data source for testing the currents of public particip-

ation.

In Vancouver, public hearings should be a reliable indicator of party impact, for most of the contentious issues of the time were at one time or another fought through the public hearings. Yet this data source also has some weaknesses. No socioeconomic data on the participants, not even the address of the participant, is regularly recorded. There are no indications of the participants' political beliefs, other than occasional glimpses when the hearing minutes record someone's presentation in more detail than simply "pro" or "con". The paper will inevitably reflect the strengths and weaknesses of this data source.

#### Structure of the Study.

The study opens in chapter two with a more thorough background discussion of Vancouver politics and the mechanics of the public hearing process during the 1960's and 1970's. The following chapters then analyse the participation process in greater detail.

Chapters three and four answer three questions which are logically prior to a consideration of the effects of a participationist party on participation. Two of these are, in effect, controls.

- 1/ Was the period in which the participationist parties were formed and elected "normal" or was participation higher or lower than usual

for reasons other than the existence of the new parties?

The 1960's and 1970's have been characterised by a growing general interest in participation, and it will be important to take this into account. Chapters three and four do so by introducing a "control" municipality with which Vancouver will be compared.

2/ Does the formation of a non-participationist party have any effect on participation at public hearings?

The focus of this paper is on the effects of the participationist beliefs of a political party. Clearly it will not be sufficient to demonstrate that participation increased after the formation and election of a participationist party. It must also be shown that this effect is different from the effect of the advent of a non-participationist party. Again, chapters three and four use a control municipality to answer this question.

3/ What was the "normal" rate of participation before the formation of the participationist parties, and was this rate relatively stable or did it fluctuate?

This third question is intended to provide a context for the data on Vancouver which will follow it. How can one know if a change has occurred if one

does not know what went before? This question is answered in the forth chapter.

Chapter five is devoted to answering the main question "in depth" by examining the relationship between the advent of participationist parties and rates of participation in Vancouver, as well as the changing composition of this participation. At several points in this chapter, it has been necessary to supplement the data with information obtained in interviews with city hall staff.

A final chapter, chapter six, draws conclusions and attempts to put these conclusions into context.

Footnotes: Chapter One.

1. Robert Michels, Political Parties, Collier, NY, 1962.
2. Moisei Ostrogorski, Democracy and the Organisation of Political Parties, MacMillan, London, 1902.  
R.T. McKenzie, British Political Parties, second edition, Mercury, London, 1962.
3. For data on voting in Vancouver elections see Michele Liroy, Social Trends in Greater Vancouver, Gordon Soules Economic and Marketing Research, Vancouver, 1975.

## Chapter Two. Background Information.

### Brief History of Vancouver Civic Politics.<sup>1</sup>

In the early 1960's, Vancouver was on the verge of ending a long period of stability in civic politics. The Non-Partisan Association had ruled continuously since the 1930's, with no effective opposition. Their longevity was based on a favourable electoral system, economic growth, a broad conservative consensus among a large part of the electorate, and the ability of the NPA, through allowing its aldermen great independence, to represent virtually all viewpoints within that consensus.

Before 1936, Vancouver had had a ward system, where each alderman was elected by the citizens of an area of the city, and represented the people of that area. Since 1936, the at-large system has been in use, where the ten aldermen with the most votes in a city-wide election are elected. This system has operated to the advantage of what Tennant terms the "west-side professional-managerial group", and to the detriment of the lower income citizens, most of whom live on the east side of the city. The former group participate much more actively than the latter, so that the candidates favoured by the west side group tend to be elected over those favoured by the east side residents.

In the 1960's the conservative or traditional beliefs which had dominated civic politics since the 1930's were challenged by reformers holding what Tennant calls "progressive beliefs", based primarily on a desire for participation and an aversion to uncontrolled development. The opposing conservative beliefs emphasised that those with "knowledge and experience" should lead and participate, and that the city should concern itself with providing essential services and leave planning to the private developers.

The reform movement came together as a result of a major political battle over a proposed freeway through the centre of downtown Vancouver. Protest meetings were held, presentations were made to public hearings concerning specific parts of the development, and finally a council meeting was "taken over" and the freeway critics "treated the startled council to loud denunciations of the freeway proposals."<sup>2</sup>

In 1968, a number of the people from this reform movement entered the political arena in a more formal way. The Electors' Action Movement (TEAM) and the Committee of Progressive Electors (COPE), two new civic parties, were formed. The provincial New Democratic Party (NDP) also entered the civic arena. All three parties espoused progressive values, with the NDP and COPE specifically trying to appeal to voters on the left, while TEAM were more eclectic, occupying



a rather centrist position and trying to appeal to voters of all types.

In the election of 1968, TEAM elected two aldermen, COPE elected one, and the NDP none. The NPA won the seven remaining seats. The period from 1968 to 1972 was one of frequent controversy, with six major issues dominating. These were the freeway proposal (and the related controversy concerning a third bridge to North Vancouver, known as the "third crossing"), Strathcona (an urban development scheme proposed by the federal and civic governments which would have seen the demolition of a large portion of Chinatown), Project 200 (a large downtown waterfront development), Jericho (a proposal for a scenic drive through what is now undeveloped land and parkland), Four Seasons (a hotel development planned for the entrance to Stanley Park), and Arbutus Village (a shopping centre proposed for an area in the west side of the city).

Each of these controversies saw the new parties fighting against most of the NPA, the civic bureaucracy and private developers. In each case the reformers were successful in stopping the development because enough NPA aldermen voted with them on council. The election of 1970 produced no major changes, and the controversies raged on until about September, 1972, when the Strathcona controversy was settled. In the election of 1972, TEAM elected eight aldermen (and the

mayor), and COPE and the NPA elected one each. In 1974, the NDP withdrew from civic politics. Since 1972, urban politics in Vancouver has returned to a state of near serenity, with few major controversies. The largest controversy concerned a proposal to return to the ward system. The NPA has slowly regained its electoral strength, so that at present the NPA and TEAM have roughly the same strength on council, with the balance of power held by two independents and a COPE alderman.

TEAM has made a number of changes since it was elected to office to implement their participationist philosophy. Immediately TEAM came to office, some council meetings were transferred to the evenings, and, with a few exceptions, public hearings were also held in the evenings. For example, the twenty hearings in 1975 consisted of fifteen evening hearings, four afternoon hearings, and one morning hearing.

Hearings are now often held in school halls near the area affected by the applications being heard. This had been done under the NPA, but very infrequently. To make the labyrinthine city hall less intimidating, an information booth was opened in the lobby. A functioning committee system was established, with the intention of allowing more citizen access. All of these changes were intended to increase the opportunities for citizen participation.<sup>3</sup>

One change which is necessary but which has not been implemented has been some remodification of the notices which are published to announce the hearings. As can be seen from the example reproduced in Appendix A, these announcements are surely unintelligible to the average citizen. Not only are the "location" descriptions worded in strictly legal terms, but no mention is made of what alterations are proposed (other than to give the existing and proposed zones), and who has proposed the alteration. Thus, in Appendix A, the first application could concern a small local grocery store or a huge supermarket complex. These notices probably have the effect of discouraging participation. It should be noted, however, that a notice, in plainer English, is mailed to residents in the area and to obviously affected interest groups.

Appendix B shows a more satisfactory form of hearing announcement. Burnaby announcements give a clearer description of the proposed zoning change, with more precise zone labels, and more easily understood "locations". Also, a brief explanation of the application is provided.

Later in this chapter, in a section where a typical Vancouver public hearing is described, there is a discussion of problems concerning the actual hearing which might inhibit participation.

Public Hearings and Rezoning.

All of the controversies which dominated Vancouver politics in the late 1960's and early 1970's were fought at least in part through the city's public hearing system. All of the controversies were concerned with amendments to the city's zoning bylaws.

Although most public hearings are concerned with rezoning, nine hearings have been included in my data which were not zoning hearings. These hearings, scattered throughout the thirteen year period from 1964 to 1976, were called by council so that the public's views on certain controversies could be heard. Hearings have been held on such issues as the banning of highrises in certain areas, the abolition of billboards, and the extension of the runway at Vancouver International Airport. None of these hearings ever considered any of the six "major controversies". The only differences between these hearings and the regular hearings are that these hearings do not involve rezoning, and they are generally somewhat better attended. Other similar hearings, called "public information hearings", are different in character, as they are designed to provide an opportunity for citizens to gain access to information by questioning council and municipal staff. These hearings are not included in the data, and cannot be because no minutes of them are kept.

Vancouver enacts and enforces its bylaws in accord-

ance with the Vancouver Charter, an Act passed by the provincial government in its present form in 1953. Other municipalities in the province are covered by the more recent Municipal Act. The two pieces of legislation are quite similar in the sections concerning public hearings and rezoning. In this discussion, I will quote the Municipal Act, as it is much more concise in its discussion of hearings than the Charter.<sup>4</sup> As will be seen, the Act also has provisions not in the Charter.

Councils in their zoning bylaws may divide their municipalities into zones as they wish, and regulate the use of water, land and buildings within those zones. Bylaws may regulate the size, shape and siting of all buildings, structures and improvements, may require owners or occupiers of any building to provide sufficient parking or loading space for that building, and may exempt any building from the requirements of any bylaw.<sup>5</sup>

In making regulations, councils must have "due regard" for the promotion of health and convenience; prevention of overcrowding; adequate light, air and access; the character of buildings already in existence; conservation of property values; betterment of the environment; the impact of development on present and future public costs; the provision of necessary public space, and the fulfillment of community goals. (The

Charter lacks all provisions after "conservation of property values").<sup>6</sup> Presumably in this catalogue of goals councils can find justification for whatever they could possibly wish to do.

Public hearings are required by two provisions of the Act: "the council shall not adopt a zoning bylaw unless it has held a hearing thereon"<sup>7</sup> and "no zoning bylaw shall be adopted, amended or repealed except after a hearing".<sup>8</sup> A notice giving the time and location of a hearing must be published in two or more consecutive issues of a local newspaper, and copies must be mailed to all "occupiers" within or adjacent to the property being rezoned.<sup>9</sup> At the hearing, all people "who deem their interest in the property affected by the proposed bylaw shall be afforded an opportunity to be heard on matters contained in the bylaw".<sup>10</sup> A provision in the Act that is not in the Charter is that a member of the council not present at the hearing may vote on the bylaw only if he has been given an oral or written report of the hearing.<sup>11</sup>

Although both the Act and the Charter go into much technical detail about zoning bylaws, this is all they say about hearings. Neither specifies that minutes of public hearings are to be kept, although in the case of the Act this appears to be an oversight.

Different councils have different approaches to scheduling hearings. New Westminster, Burnaby and Vancouver hold them at irregular intervals, when they judge that there are enough applications to justify a hearing. Victoria conducts hearings before its fortnightly regular council meetings, if there are any applications to consider. Surrey has experimented, with a notable lack of success, with regularly scheduled meetings. I did not notice any period of longer than a few months where they were able to keep to their current schedule. Over the past fifteen years, Surrey has scheduled meetings semi-annually, bimonthly, monthly and fortnightly. The month after they decided to hold semi-annual meetings (April, 1965), three meetings were held.

Most councils hold their meetings in council chambers, although New Westminster has on occasion held them in committee rooms; Vancouver and Burnaby sometimes hold meetings in school halls near the area affected by the application, and Surrey rather eccentrically holds meetings in a basement cafeteria.

Most councils hold their meetings in the evenings. New Westminster has afternoon meetings, as did Vancouver (usually) prior to 1973. Vancouver has also sometimes held morning hearings.

### A Typical Vancouver Public Hearing.

This section is intended to give the reader a taste of what a hearing is like, although I would of course heartily recommend the reader attend one him/herself. Most people would be surprised how interesting even a mundane hearing can be.

The "typical" hearing I will describe is slightly atypical. (The meeting being described is the same one "announced" in appendix A) It was held on a Tuesday afternoon, prior to a regular council meeting. The timing of the meeting seemed to have been more determined by the councillors' holiday schedules than by any concern for the public's convenience.

The hearing was held in the council chambers. (See appendix C.) The chambers have three rows of seats for the audience, as well as a gallery upstairs. The total capacity is approximately one hundred and fifty people, and for this meeting the chambers were very close to being full. It is impossible to say how many people were in attendance for the hearing and how many for the council meeting, but after the hearing concluded approximately thirty or forty left, so at least that many were primarily interested in the hearing.

As people entered the chamber, they were asked to sign in if they wished to speak to any of the applications. A detailed agenda was supplied, but on this



occasion the agenda contained only the first three items, as there had not been enough of the forth item printed. Most people did not take an agenda, possibly because they did not notice the agenda sitting on the speakers' table. The proceedings could easily be followed without an agenda, so neither the incomplete agenda nor the inefficient distribution of them was really a problem. The hearing was started by a clerk who rang a bell hanging over the entrance to the chamber, causing some startled jumps and knowing smiles among the audience.

Each application on the agenda goes through the following process:

- a/ a clerk reads the application as it has appeared in the published announcement, in a monotone.
- b/ city planning staff explain the application and its significance, using a large board at the south end of the chamber to display plans, photographs and so on. They also explain the reasons for the planning department's recommendation (i.e. either for approval or rejection).
- c/ councillors ask questions of the planners.
- d/ the applicant is given an opportunity to speak in favour of the application, and to respond to any criticism the planners may have had.
- e/ councillors ask questions of the applicant.
- f/ the mayor asks those intervenors who had signed in before the hearing to speak.

- g/ councillors ask questions of the intervenors.
- h/ the applicant is given an opportunity to rebut the statements of the intervenors.
- i/ the councillors debate the application.
- j/ a motion is moved and a vote taken.

This outline makes the process sound more formal than it actually is, as the councillors are prone to speech-making and asking questions of anyone at any stage of the proceedings.

I will briefly outline the first application, as it represents a pleasant median between the complexity of numbers 2 and 3, and the simplicity of number 4. This is the first item in the announcement in Appendix A.

The application concerned a commercial complex consisting of a gas station, a restaurant and a grocery store, all occupying one building covering two lots at a relatively busy intersection. The building was built in 1928, and the present owner, a widow in her sixties, wished to offer the property for sale so that she could retire on the proceeds. She currently operates the gas station. She had found a prospective purchaser who had refused to purchase the property at the last minute when he found that one of the two lots on which the property was built was zoned for residential use. A search by the planning department found that this zoning had been changed, evidently by mistake, in 1955. Prior to that, the whole lot had been zoned for commercial use.

The property owner had been charged municipal taxes on the lot as if it had been zoned entirely as commercial. As the building was now quite dilapidated, any prospective purchaser would probably wish to redevelop the site. According to the zoning regulations, such a redevelopment would have to be in the form of a residential structure on one half of the site, and a commercial structure on the other half of the site. Such a redevelopment was said to be "unprofitable".

In effect, then, the council was being asked to change a twenty-year-old error which was now claimed to be causing hardship. The owner was represented by a real estate company, whose spokesman made the tactical mistake of dwelling on the present difficulty of redevelopment. The property owner did not appear at the hearing.

A neighbour of the site appeared to oppose the application, expressing fears about what might be built if the rezoning were allowed. The property owner's representative attempted to rebut the citizen by reiterating his argument about the impossibility of a sale unless the zoning were changed. Several of the councillors questioned him along the lines the citizen had set, and were clearly not satisfied by his answers. A vote was taken, and the application was narrowly rejected. (I felt at the time that if the property owner had simply said that the application was to correct an error the council had made, and to make the zoning agree with the

present structures, she would have encountered no difficulty.)<sup>12</sup>

Obviously, the announcement of the meeting does not tell anyone reading it anything about the issues involved, but, somewhat more seriously, neither do the plans which are open to public scrutiny before the meeting. However, a phone call to the planning department revealed that they were willing to go to great lengths to explain an application and the issues involved.<sup>13</sup> If the citizen does not ask for information prior to the meeting, he is then handicapped during the meeting. As speakers are asked to sign in before the hearing, the citizen must decide before he hears the applicant's presentation whether he opposes it or not.

However, in a case such as the one described, where the citizen clearly knew beforehand what issues were involved, he was able to mount an effective attack on the application. His arguments were used extensively during the discussion among the aldermen, and seem to have been decisive in persuading some "fencesitters" to oppose the application.

As I have said, the application described was the second least complex one heard at a mundane hearing. It was not particularly controversial, far less so than the average application. It involved only a small site. Although the issues involved were less complex than those involved in most applications, they were

probably complex enough to discourage some citizens from participating in the process. Although the process does not seem to be designed to encourage participation, it can provide an effective forum for those intrepid enough to go to the trouble of obtaining information. The process reflects TEAM's emphasis on facilitating participation (by providing information) rather than encouraging it.

It should be stressed that the hearing described occurred in 1977. A hearing during the controversies of the late 1960's, or a hearing in the early 1960's before the controversies, may have presented an entirely different picture.

Footnotes: Chapter Two.

1. This section is largely drawn from Paul Tennant's Vancouver Politics: the Changing Context of Citizen Participation. (Unpublished paper.)
2. ibid, p. 11.
3. ibid, p. 21. It should be noted that the intent of these TEAM reforms is to make it easier for people to participate in civic politics, not to cajole them into action, or to "bring out" TEAM supporters.
4. The Vancouver Charter, 1953, and the British Columbia Municipal Act, 1960. Citations to the Act refer to the consolidation of January 15, 1976. The equivalent sections in the Charter to those I quote from the Act are sections 559-564 (on planning), 565-567 (on zoning) and 566 (on hearings).
5. Municipal Act, section 702, 1, a - d.
6. ibid, section 702, 2, a - f, and section 702A, 1, b - c.
7. ibid, section 703, 1.
8. ibid, section 704, 1.
9. ibid, section 703, 1, 2 and 2A.
10. ibid, section 703, 3.
11. ibid, section 703, 5. e.g. "What happened at the hearing Tuesday night, Jack?"  
"Nothing much, George."

Footnotes: Chapter Two. Continued.

12. This decision is in keeping with a tendency pointed out by Tennant in "Bylaws and Setbacks: The Oil Industry and Local Government in British Columbia", in B.C. Studies, Number 9 (Spring, 1971), pp. 3 - 14. He points to what is in effect almost a neighbourhood veto resulting from local councils siding with "irate neighbours". However, Tennant's paper focusses on opposition to new gas stations, and applications for rezoning by large oil companies, so the parallel with the case being discussed here is not exact.
13. I phoned rather than asking questions in person to minimise the risk of being recognised and thus possibly being given "special treatment". I posed as a somewhat dim citizen interested in an item being discussed at the hearing after the one described in this chapter. The planning staff were extremely patient and helpful, and went out of their way to answer even the most irrelevant of questions. (Such as "How many people live there?")

### Chapter Three. Two Prior Questions.

#### First Prior Question: The Victoria Case.

"Was the period in which the participationist parties were formed and elected "normal", or was participation higher or lower than usual for reasons other than the existence of the new parties?"

This question will be answered by comparing a "control" municipality with Vancouver. Obviously, this control municipality should be as similar to Vancouver as possible, should be near Vancouver to avoid or minimise regional differences, and should have had no political parties form (and, preferably, should have had no major changes take place) in the period from 1968 to 1976.

Table 3-1 shows the fourteen municipalities considered. They are the fourteen closest to Vancouver, not counting predominantly rural areas and extremely small population units such as Bowen Island (population 350). The most distant from Vancouver is Victoria, roughly fifty-five miles away. Twelve of the municipalities are within the Greater Vancouver Regional District. Table 3-1 compares the municipalities on the bases of population and population growth, based on figures from the 1961 and 1971 censuses.



**Table 3-1. Population Characteristics: Greater  
Vancouver Regional District, Victoria  
and Nanaimo.**

Municipality	Population, 1971 Census, in '000s.	Population Growth, 1961-1971. (in %)
Burnaby	126	25
Coquitlam	53	80
Delta	46	190
Nanaimo	15	5
New Westminster	43	20
North Vancouver City	32	30
North Vancouver District	58	50
Port Coquitlam	20	140
Port Moody	11	125
Richmond	62	45
Surrey	99	40
Vancouver (Including University Endowment Lands)	430	10
Victoria	62	15
West Vancouver	36	45
White Rock	10	60

Sources: Statistics for GVRD from Liöy, Social Trends in Greater Vancouver, pp 6, 15. Statistics for Victoria and Nanaimo from Canada Census reports, 1961 (Volume 1) and 1971 (Volume 1).

Note: I have rounded the population figures to the nearest thousand; Liöy has rounded the population growth figures to the nearest five percent.

The "ideal" control municipality would be the same size as Vancouver, and would exhibit the same rate of population growth. The reason for seeking a municipality of the same size seems obvious: a metropolis would be expected to exhibit different cultural characteristics (e.g. "community spirit", feelings of efficacy) than a much smaller municipality. The simple fact that in the smaller municipalities citizens are more likely to know an alderman suggests that they may feel "closer" to their councils and therefore be more likely to participate at public hearings. The necessity for the control municipality to have a similar growth rate is less readily apparent. Because public hearings are basically concerned with rezoning applications, we would expect a higher frequency of hearings in higher population growth areas than in low population growth areas, as the areas with high growth would experience more need for "development".

Tables 3-2 and 3-3 show my method for deciding which municipalities are most similar to Vancouver. Table 3-2 shows a ranking of municipalities in terms of population and population growth, while Table 3-3 combines the two parts of Table 3-2 to give each municipality a "similarity score". It is interesting to note that this method does give municipalities which are intuitively very similar, such as West Vancouver, North Vancouver City and North Vancouver District or

Table 3-2. Municipalities Ranked in Terms of Similarity  
To Vancouver.

A. Population.

Burnaby .....	1
Surrey .....	2
Richmond .....	3*
Victoria .....	3*
North Vancouver District ...	5
Coquitlam .....	6
Delta .....	7
New Westminster .....	8
West Vancouver .....	9
North Vancouver City .....	10
Port Coquitlam .....	11
Nanaimo .....	12
Port Moody .....	13
White Rock .....	14

B. Population Growth.

Victoria .....	1*
Nanaimo .....	1*
New Westminster .....	3
Burnaby .....	4
North Vancouver City .....	5
Surrey .....	6
Richmond .....	7*
West Vancouver .....	7*
North Vancouver District ...	9
White Rock .....	10
Coquitlam .....	11
Port Moody .....	12
Port Coquitlam .....	13
Delta .....	14

\* denotes "tie".

Source: Derived from Table 3-1.

Method: Municipalities were ranked in order of similarity of population and population growth (to Vancouver), with numbers from 1 (most similar) to 14 (least similar) assigned to each municipality.

Table 3-3. Municipal Similarity Scores.

<u>Municipality</u>	<u>Score</u>
Victoria .....	4
Burnaby .....	5
Surrey .....	8
Richmond .....	10
New Westminster .....	11
Nanaimo .....	13
North Vancouver District ..	14
North Vancouver City .....	15
West Vancouver .....	16
Coquitlam .....	17
Delta .....	21
White Rock .....	24
Port Coquitlam .....	24
Port Moody .....	25

The lower the number assigned to each municipality,  
the more similar it is to Vancouver in terms of  
population characteristics.

Method: The numbers assigned to each municipality in  
parts A and B of Table 3-2 were added together. The  
municipalities were then ranked from highest "similarity  
score" to lowest.

Source: derived from Table 3-2.

Surrey or Richmond, very similar scores.

Table 3-3 shows Victoria, Burnaby and Surrey to be the three municipalities most similar to Vancouver.

Victoria is the most suitable for answering the first prior question. Victoria has a stable non-party system, whereas both Surrey and Burnaby have party systems which have undergone changes during the period under consideration.

There were three other considerations relevant to the choice of Victoria over Burnaby and Surrey:

- Burnaby and Surrey are huge dormitory areas in the suburbs of Vancouver. Victoria is more like Vancouver in that it is a more traditional city. It has a distinct core surrounded by dormitory areas, and is a transportation centre.

- It would take me "several months" to obtain authorization to examine the Burnaby municipal council minutes. The recent minutes I was allowed to examine showed that the Burnaby municipal clerk's office uses a system of keeping minutes which is very unsatisfactory for my purposes. Minutes of all meetings - committees, council, public hearings and courts of revision - are kept in one place, in chronological order. Thus to find the relatively infrequent hearings minutes, it would be necessary to sift through all the various minutes, which would be extremely time consuming.

- Surrey's political system makes it an ideal municipi-

Table 3-4. Participation in Victoria Public Hearings.

<u>Year</u>	<u>Estimated Population (in '000s)</u>	<u>No. of Meetings</u>	<u>No. of Particip- ants per annum</u>	<u>Partici- pamts per 1000 pop- ulation</u>	<u>Annual Particip- ation, base=100</u>
1964	56	8	27	.482	100
1965	57	11	13	.228	47
1966	57	11	41	.719	149
1967	58	13	30	.517	107
1968	59	12	32	.542	112
1969	60	15	57	.950	197
1970	61	13	54	.885	184
1971	62	15	49	.790	164
1972	62	19	108	1.742	361
1973	62	19	134	2.161	448
1974	62	19	117	1.887	391
1975	62	16	56	.903	187
1976	62	15	145	2.339	485

Population estimates are based on census figures for 1961, 1966, 1971 and 1976.

Data on participation and number of meetings drawn from Victoria city council minutes. The cheerful assistance of the Victoria City Clerk's office staff was much appreciated.

pality to use in answering the next prior question.

Accordingly, Victoria was selected as the control municipality for this prior question. Statistics describing Victoria's public hearings are given in Table 3-4. This table combines data from the minutes of Victoria's public hearings and the four censuses from 1961 to 1976. The population estimate in the second column is calculated by taking the data on Victoria's population from the four censuses and using these to estimate the city's population for the intervening years. Thus the 1966 census gives Victoria's population as 57,000 (rounded to the nearest thousand), and the 1971 population was 62,000. I have assumed that the increase was evenly distributed over the five years, so in the estimated population column I have increased the population by one-fifth of the increase (i.e. one thousand) per annum.

The next two columns are fairly self-explanatory. "Number of participants" refers to the total number of participants during the year, not the average number per meeting. "Participant" in this context refers to any person speaking to oppose or support an application, but does not include the applicant or his agent. Throughout the paper the terms "participant" and "intervenor" have been used interchangeably.

The "participants per 1000 population" column is obtained by dividing the number of participants by the

estimated population. The annual participation column is equivalent to the per 1000 population column, except that the figure for 1964 has been adjusted to a base of 100, and the other figures have been adjusted accordingly.<sup>1</sup>

The participation per 1000 population and annual participation columns serve slightly different purposes. The former is useful in comparing the participation in each municipality (e.g. seeing which municipality has a larger proportion of its population participating at public hearings). The latter is useful in examining changes in participation patterns between municipalities. That is because this method, by equating the participation figures for the base year, eliminates the factor of persistent differences between municipalities in participation per thousand.

These figures for Victoria will be compared with the equivalent figures for Vancouver in the next chapter. The methodological considerations discussed in connection with Table 3-4 also apply to the equivalent tables for the other municipalities discussed.

#### Second Prior Question: The Surrey Case.

"Does the formation of a non-participationist party have any effect on participation at public hearings?"



Again, a control municipality is needed in order to answer this question. In this case, we are controlling for the mere presence of any new party, even one not dedicated to participation.

Both of the second and third "most similar" municipalities, Burnaby and Surrey (see Table 3-3), had non-participationist parties form during the period studied, but as mentioned earlier, it was difficult to study the minutes of the Burnaby hearings. Even if the Burnaby minutes had been available, I would have chosen the Surrey case. Its complexity is most interesting, and it is a closer parallel to the Vancouver case.

Until 1969, there were no municipal parties active in Surrey politics.<sup>2</sup> In 1969, the Surrey Voters' Association (SVA) was formed. The SVA is a right-wing party, similar to Vancouver's NPA. SVA favours government by experienced managers operating under business principles, and is not in favour of participation. In 1973 the SVA gained control of the council.

In 1975 another party, the Surrey Municipal Electors (SME), was formed. SME is similar to Vancouver's TEAM, being rather centrist, and consisting of people from all major (i.e. federal and provincial) parties. SME is in favour of increased participation.

Surrey has annual elections, with four of the

eight council positions up for election each year. The mayor faces re-election every two years. In the election of 1975, the first election the SME contested, the SVA took three of the four council positions, with the SME taking the other. Mayor Van Der Zalm did not stand for re-election as he wanted to run for a provincial seat, and Mayor McKitka was elected. He is an independent who had been a member of the SVA until 1971, when the SVA refused to endorse him. He left the party. In the election of 1976, the SVA and the SME each won two seats, so that the SVA now has five seats and the SME three, with an independent mayor.

Thus in Surrey there is a non-participationist party formed in 1969, and elected in 1973, and then a participationist party formed in 1975. Surrey offers both a comparison with Vancouver, and two parties to compare with each other.

The comparison with Vancouver will be presented in the next chapter, but the within-Surrey comparison is possible with the information presented in Table 3-5. It should be noted that this discussion is not part of the discussion of the prior question, but is rather additional evidence in the consideration of the main question.

Table 3-5 shows that participation rates in Surrey followed an erratic course from 1964 to 1976. Participation per 1000 population ranged from a low of about

Table 3-5. Participation in Surrey Public Hearings.

<u>Year</u>	<u>Estimated Population (in '000s)</u>	<u>No. of Meetings</u>	<u>No. of Partici- ants per annum</u>	<u>Partici- pants per 1000 pop- ulation</u>	<u>Annual Particip- ation, base=100</u>
1964	77	5	63	.818	100
1965	79	10	127	1.608	199
1966	82	6	73	.890	109
1967	85	7	75	.882	108
1968	89	8	19	.213	26
1969	92	7	55	.598	73
1970	95	6	86	.905	111
1971	99	12	90	.909	111
1972	102	20	107	1.049	128
1973	106	31	34	.321	39
1974	109	31	100	.917	112
1975	112	33	120	1.071	131
1976	116	39	305	2.629	321

Population estimates based on figures in 1961, 1966, 1971 and 1976 censuses. Data on participation and number of meetings drawn from Surrey municipal council minutes. Assistance from the obliging staff at Surrey Municipal Clerk's office gratefully acknowledged.

0.2 to a high of 2.6. 1969, the year of the formation of the nonparticipationist SVA, was a year of quite low participation. Participation rose slightly in 1970. The election of the SVA took place in 1973, a year of very low participation rates, with an average of only one intervenor speaking at each hearing. SVA's first year in office, 1974, saw an increase in participation, although participation rates were still by no means high. This increase appears to be more a return to normal levels after the unusual lack of participation in 1973.

1975, the year SME was formed, saw a slight increase in participation, followed by a massive increase in 1976, when the first SME alderman took his seat. The participation rate for 1976 was swelled by a huge hearing held during the summer, where 107 people spoke, mainly to oppose an application by the Daon Corporation. Even if this meeting is excluded from the figures as being exceptional, the annual participation rate (base 100) for the year is 209, still a substantial increase over 1975's 131.

Given the rather random appearance of the figures on Surrey's participation rate, it would be foolish to draw any firm conclusions from them. The figures provide slight evidence for the idea that the formation of participationist parties encourages participation, and it is notable that the two years which have seen the advent of a participationist party have been years

of unusually high participation.

Footnotes: Chapter Three.

1. That is, by dividing the participants per thousand population for each year by the participation per thousand for 1964, and multiplying by 100. This is equivalent to

$$100 \times \frac{(\text{Participation:year } x) / (\text{Est pop:year } x)}{(\text{Participation:1964}) / (\text{Est pop: 1964})}.$$

The correction for population change is, of course, intended to allow valid comparisons over time.

2. Occasional candidates ran representing small parties such as the Communist Party of Canada. I believe none of these was ever elected, and it is arguable whether or not these can be considered municipal parties in any meaningful sense. Sincere thanks to Rita Johnson, a member of the Surrey Voters' Association, Alderman Don Ross of the Surrey Municipal Electors and several of the staff of the Surrey Municipal Clerk's Office for providing me with information on Surrey politics, and other assistance.

#### Chapter Four. Introduction of Vancouver Data.

##### Third Prior Question: The Vancouver Case.

"What was the "normal" rate of participation before the formation of the participationist parties, and was this rate relatively stable or did it fluctuate?"

I had hoped, in answering this question, to be able to draw from data from a long period prior to 1968, when the new parties were formed. Unfortunately, the minutes of all Vancouver hearings prior to November, 1963 commence with the words

"The chairman called on any persons who wish to speak to the proposed amendments of the Zoning and Development By-Law, and a number of representations were made by persons deeming themselves to be affected."

This of course makes it impossible to use these minutes for my purpose. Thus my examination of the Vancouver minutes commences in January, 1964. Data from the other municipalities was also collected from this date, in the interests of consistency. This problem makes it difficult to give a definitive answer to this prior question.

It is perhaps appropriate at this point to mention other shortcomings of the Vancouver City Council minutes, for these minutes are kept far more erratically than

those of either the Victoria or Surrey councils.

A number of different people have taken the minutes in Vancouver over the past few years, and each of these people has used a different method to record participation by the public. Most of these people have recorded the participant's name, and occasionally his address, and also whether the person spoke for or against the application being considered. All minute-takers seem to have been diligent in recording any group or company representative as such, perhaps an indication that the interventions of these people were given more weight than those of "ordinary" citizens.

However, one minute-taker seems to have been particularly lazy, and the minutes of five hearings (one in 1966, two in 1967 and one in each of 1969 and 1970) bear the frustrating note "a number of people spoke". I have tried to circumvent the problem posed by these five hearings by noting how long the hearing lasted, and seeing how many people participated at hearings of a similar length, where a similar number of applications were heard. From this I have guesstimated the number of people at these hearings. My guesstimates range from ten for a short 1969 hearing to twenty-five for a longish hearing in 1967. It should be noted that this only affects about four percent of the Vancouver hearings, none of which were on any of the five major controversies discussed earlier.



A different minute-taker in the period 1971-1973 (one meeting in each of these years) neglected to mention whether speakers were for or against the application being considered, which will have a slight effect on the data being considered in the next chapter. Each of these participants has been recorded as "neutral". Only a total of twelve participants are affected.

In contrast, the minutes in both Victoria and Surrey were compiled consistently, and informatively. I believe there are no irregularities of this type in the data from either of those councils, although it is impossible for me to be aware of any omissions which may have occurred.

Table 4-1 shows that, with the exception of 1975 and 1976, participation in Vancouver tended to vary within fairly narrow boundaries.<sup>1</sup> Annual participation in this period varied from a low of 100 to a high of 284, with no pattern immediately apparent.

Table 4-2 confirms this impression. The means and standard deviations of annual participation for the periods 1964-1967 and 1968-1972 (the first period corresponding to the period before the formation of the parties and the second the period between the formation and the election of TEAM) are very similar to each other. Both are rather lower than for the entire period (1964-1976), but this seems to be the

Table 4-1. Participation in Vancouver Public Hearings.

<u>Year</u>	<u>Estimated Population (in 000's)</u>	<u>No. of Meetings</u>	<u>No. of Partici- pants per annum</u>	<u>Partici- pants per 1000 pop- ulation</u>	<u>Annual Particip- ation, base=100</u>
1964	402	8	37	.092	100
1965	406	11	96	.236	257
1966	410	9	84	.205	223
1967	414	8	107	.261	284
1968	418	7	72	.172	187
1969	421	7	85	.202	220
1970	424	7	55	.130	141
1971	426	5	53	.124	135
1972	423	7	98	.232	252
1973	420	8	66	.157	171
1974	417	7	64	.153	166
1975	414	20	232	.560	609
1976	410	20	201	.490	533

Population estimates based on figures from 1961, 1966, 1971 and 1976 censuses. Data on participation and number of meetings drawn from Vancouver City Council minutes. Thanks to the staff of the City Archives and City Clerk's office (especially Eldon Bowie) for their kind assistance.

Table 4-2. Statistical Characteristics of Vancouver Participation.

<u>Period</u>	<u>Mean Annual Participation</u>	<u>Standard Deviation</u>
1964-76	252.2	145.9
1964-67	216.0	79.1
1968-72	187.0	79.1
1973-76	369.8	234.7

Figures calculated using data in "annual participation" column in Table 4-1.

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result of the two "outlier" observations in 1975 and 1976.

In terms of the prior question, which is designed to provide a comparison between the pre- and post-formation periods within the Vancouver case, the normal rate of participation prior to the formation of the parties (i.e. the mean rate) was 216, and this rate was relatively constant, with a standard deviation of 79.1.

These figures only become meaningful in comparison with the post-formation figures, which are surprisingly similar: the mean is 187 while the standard deviation is an identical 79.1. Only the figures for the period after the election of TEAM show any marked difference, with the mean participation rising to about 370 while the standard deviation rises to 234.7.

Thus we have a context for the study of the Vancouver

data, and utilising this context we can see that the only real change in participation which has occurred in Vancouver has been the large increase observed in 1975 and 1976. This increase will be explored further in the next chapter.

#### Comparing Vancouver and Victoria.

If the formation of the new parties and the election of TEAM had had no effect on participation, we would expect that participation patterns in Victoria and Vancouver would be similar.

The data from the annual participation columns of Tables 3-4, 3-5 and 4-1 have been brought together for the reader's convenience in the graph in Appendix D. This graph makes it easy to see that the data for Victoria and Vancouver display fundamentally different patterns. As would be expected, a correlation of the two sets of data shows little relationship. The correlation coefficient<sup>2</sup> is +0.12.

This dissimilarity between the Vancouver and Victoria data does not prove that the formation and election of new parties affect political participation. But neither does it lend support to the hypothesis that these parties had no effect on participation.

#### Comparing Vancouver and Surrey.

The Surrey data are quite different from the Victoria

data. For the most part, the Surrey line in the graph in Appendix D rises when the Vancouver line rises, and falls when the Vancouver line falls. It is no surprise that the two sets of data correlate quite highly. The correlation coefficient is  $+0.51$ , which is significant at the 0.05 level.<sup>3</sup>

In both municipalities, the year after parties were formed saw a rise in participation. In each municipality, the election of a new party was followed by a drop in participation.

The similarity between the Vancouver and Surrey cases seems to indicate that the participatory beliefs of parties make no difference to participation.

Footnotes: Chapter Four.

1. It is interesting to note that the participation rate per thousand people in Vancouver prior to 1975 is roughly the same as the lowest participation level recorded in either Surrey or Victoria. The highest figure recorded in Vancouver, .56 in 1975, would be an average-to-low reading in either of the other two municipalities.
2. All correlations in this paper were calculated using Spearman's rank correlation coefficient.
3. The two lines would look even more similar in Appendix D had not Vancouver's base year seen an unusually low level of participation.

## Chapter Five. Vancouver in Depth.

The comparisons with the control municipalities have raised doubts about the impact of an avowed participationist party on participation levels. However, overall participation is only one measure of possible impact. More subtle relationships may exist. For example, the advent of TEAM may have led to changes in the type of participant. TEAM may have had an impact on the rate and nature of applications coming before the public hearings. A better understanding may be gained by looking at the data on public hearings in greater detail.

The weakness of the data source becomes glaringly obvious at this point. The public hearing minutes tell us little about the backgrounds of those who speak. They do tell us, however, whether the participants act as individuals or groups, and whether they are "pro" or "con" the application. The indications may be used to extend the analysis but, as we shall see, any conclusions are tentative indeed.

The general pattern of participation in Vancouver was outlined in the last chapter. Although participation was slightly higher in 1969 than 1968, it would be foolish to attribute this rise to the formation of the new parties. TEAM's first year in office saw quite a large drop in participation, but in the third year of TEAM government, 1975, the participation rate jumped

spectacularly,

A number of explanations come to mind. The fluctuations may be explained completely by non-party factors. Or the party system may have been relevant. TEAM's participationist emphasis and the reforms it introduced may have had an impact - albeit a slightly delayed one. The drop in participation in 1973 may have been caused by the new council taking some time to get organised, while private developers held back on their applications until they knew the new council better. Similarly, the rise in participation in 1975 may have been caused by TEAM development policies inciting people to attend hearings. Perhaps the increase in participation in 1975 simply reflects a greater number of applications as TEAM became more active and private developers came to trust them.

These explanations are by no means mutually exclusive, and it is possible, even likely, that they combined to produce the effects we have seen.

### Methodology.

This chapter employs several different methods for



more closely examining the data. In this section, I will explain the concepts and methods involved.

I have classified intervenors into four categories: interest groups, individuals, companies and "miscellaneous". I had originally intended to have two classes of interest groups, institutional and issue-oriented.<sup>1</sup> When gathering the data, I found only three institutional groups had participated in the hearings during the thirteen years studied. Almost all interest groups participating were small residents' groups (the largest probably being the Downtown Eastside Residents' Association (DERA)), although there were a few merchants' and businessmen's groups such as the Illuminated Sign Manufacturers' Association of British Columbia.

There will be some overlap between the individual and company intervenors, as occasionally a company representative will appear (or will be recorded in the minutes) as an individual. However, in those meetings where intervenors' addresses were recorded, the addresses indicate that most participants lived within a block or two of the affected site. This suggests that these participants were local residents rather than company representatives.

The miscellaneous category consists of a few intervenors (never more than ten in one year) representing organisations other than private companies: government departments, charitable organisations and

so on. This category is of no importance and is included merely for the sake of completeness. The largest "subcategory" of this miscellaneous group is probably private music schools, ten of which attended a meeting in 1971, thereby constituting the whole of the miscellaneous category for that year.

I have also classified each intervenor as being in favour ("pro"), opposed ("con") or neutral, as regards the application being considered. Neutral here means neither pro nor con, rather than strictly neutral. In some cases intervenors have been classed as neutral because the clerk taking the minutes neglected to indicate the position the intervenor took. (See p. 43.) In most cases intervenors classified as neutral either came to obtain information from the applicant, or had things to say which were both in favour of the application and opposed to it. An example would be a person who was in favour of the building of a new supermarket, but was opposed to the site of its proposed parking lot.

Applications have been divided into two categories, municipal and private. Roughly forty percent of zoning applications are by the municipal planning department. These applications involve a municipal official attending the hearing to explain the application, and to defend it. Private applications include all applications made by individuals and companies.<sup>2</sup> Individual and company applications have been grouped together because

many businesses have an individual, usually a lawyer or architect, make the application on their behalf. In these cases the name of the individual is all that appears in the minutes. Similarly, many companies are creations used by individuals for tax avoidance and other similar purposes, and it is virtually impossible to distinguish these from more legitimate enterprises.

Included as municipal applications are ten meetings called to discuss specific issues, such as the extension to the runway at Vancouver International Airport. These are not strictly speaking rezoning applications, but they are treated similarly by council, and there are not really enough of them to justify making a separate category. Inclusion of these hearings with the municipal hearings has the effect of very slightly increasing the participation rate for the municipal hearings. This increase is so slight that the exclusion of these hearings would make no difference to the general interpretation of the data.

The purpose of this chapter is to sift through possible interpretations of the patterns of participation already observed. To do so, I will look more carefully at:

- a/ The rate of applications and their sponsors, as well as the number of meetings.
- b/ The characteristics of intervenors, in particular

whether they acted as individuals or groups and whether they were "pro" or "con".

Having examined these, I will again look at the pattern of participation under the TEAM council.

#### Applications and Meetings.

Before drawing any conclusions from the data on participation per annum, it is necessary to discuss two other variables which could confound any interpretation. These are the number of meetings, and the number of zoning applications.

Obviously, if there are more meetings in one year than another, and the same number of people attend each meeting, then the participation rates for the two years will differ. Yet this is irrelevant to the participationist beliefs of any party, unless the increased number of meetings were the result of those beliefs. The same argument applies to the number of applications.

Table 5-1 shows the data on the number of rezoning applications per annum. The table appears somewhat similar to the statistics on participation, especially during the last four years. The election of TEAM was followed by a drop in applications, followed by a rise in 1975.

To see if this is what is accounting for the rise in participation, I have constructed a measure which shows participation per application, corrected for

Table 5-1. Rezoning Applications.

<u>Year</u>	<u>Municipal</u> <u>Applications</u>	<u>Private</u> <u>Applications</u>	<u>Total</u> <u>Applications</u>
1964	26	23	49
1965	29	26	55
1966	12	22	34
1967	8	19	27
1968	8	13	21
1969	8	20	28
1970	16	20	36
1971	8	14	22
1972	7	19	26
1973	10	10	20
1974	9	19	28
1975	18	13	31
1976	28	8	36

Table 5-2.    Participation per Meeting, per Application  
and per Annum.

Year	Per Meeting	Per Application	Per Annum*
1964	100	100	100
1965	187	229	257
1966	198	321	223
1967	284	515	284
1968	214	436	187
1969	251	384	220
1970	162	192	141
1971	216	300	135
1972	288	475	252
1973	171	418	171
1974	190	291	166
1975	244	962	609
1976	213	725	533

\* This column is reproduced from Table 4-1 for the convenience of the reader.

Participation per meeting and per application were calculated by dividing the participation per thousand for each year (from Table 4-1) by the number of meetings or applications for that year. These figures were then recalculated so that the base year, 1964, equalled 100.

population growth. This data appears in Table 5-2, which also includes data on participation per meeting corrected for population growth.

There are problems with both the per application and per meeting methods of calculation. Many applications are treated together during the hearings, and should really be considered as one application, but it is impossible to tell this from the council minutes. As an example, in the meeting announced in Appendix A, items 2, 3a and 3b were treated together as they all concerned property owned by Ocean Concrete Ltd. Thus two private applications (2 and 3a) and one municipal application (3b) were in effect treated as a single application. This combination of municipal and private applications is rare, but for applications to be considered together is common practice. This means that participation per application would tend to underestimate participation. This is not a serious problem when changes in participation rates are being studied, but it does allow the possibility of an analysis being confounded by some change in the practice regarding the grouping of applications.

The problem with the "per meeting" method is that these figures are likely to reflect changing methods of calling meetings as much as changing participation. Thus the per meeting figures for Surrey are meaningless because of the number of times Surrey council has changed

Table 5-3. Comparison of Per Annum, Per Meeting and Per Application Methods of Measuring Participation.

<u>Variables</u>	<u>Correlation</u>	<u>Significance</u>
Per Annum and Per Application	+0.77	.001
Per Annum and Per Meeting	+0.54	.027
Per Application and Per Meeting	+0.71	.003

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the frequency of their public hearings. As the frequency of hearings rose from five a year to thirty-nine a year, the number of participants per meeting dropped markedly.<sup>3</sup>

Table 5-3 shows the correlations between the three ways of measuring participation. The three methods are highly intercorrelated, with measurement per meeting and per annum the two least similar.

The high intercorrelation allows us to consider any of the three measures as a valid measure of changing trends in participation. Looking at this another way, when I controlled for changes in numbers of meetings and applications, the relationship previously evident was still present, so that it is safe to assert that the changes in participation per annum were not the result of changes in the numbers of meetings or applications.

As I consider the "participation per annum" method to be the most convenient with which to work, I will



use it for the remainder of the chapter. However, I would like to make two observations about the other two measures, to illuminate trends not readily apparent from the per annum data.

The first is that, in Table 5-2, the number of participants per meeting does not show the same increase in 1975 and 1976 as is evident in the other two measures. This indicates that the increased number of meetings in those years was related to the increase in participation. This gives rise to a chicken-and-egg problem: did the number of meetings rise because of increased participation, or did participation increase because of the increased number of meetings? Information obtained at an interview<sup>4</sup> suggests that the first explanation is the correct one. Planners intentionally began scheduling hearings so that there was only one possible contentious application at each hearing because "who wants to get home at 4 a.m.?" Issues are judged to be potentially contentious if there are a number of requests for information about the application, or if interest groups are known to be interested in it. This almost certainly has the effect of increasing participation, if only because citizens are also discouraged by the prospect of 4 a.m. adjournments. Of course, increasing the number of meetings also increases the opportunities for participation, and the smaller number of applications considered at each meeting probably

causes the meetings to seem less rushed. It is important to emphasise, however, that this increase was not the direct result of any participationist beliefs on the part of TEAM, although of course a non-participationist administration might have responded differently to the problem of over-long hearings.

Secondly, Table 5-1 indicates that in 1975 and 1976 there were a small number of private applications and a large number of municipal applications. This suggests that the increased participation in these years was the result of municipal applications rather than private ones. Table 5-4 is designed to explore this possibility. This table shows that, except for 1975, most intervenors were concerned with municipal applications. The large number of intervenors against private applications in 1975 is easily explicable. In late 1974, the council removed a freeze they had imposed in 1973 on applications affecting the downtown area. This caused a small rush of contentious private downtown applications in 1975. The large number of municipal intervenors were attracted by a number of applications concerning zoning changes for large parts of the city, which were part of the new council's broad development "plan". More will be said about this in the next section.

Table 5-4. Intervenor Addressing Private and Municipal Applications.

<u>Year</u>	<u>Municipal</u>	<u>Private</u>
1964	13	24
1965	25	70
1966	38	46
1967	42	65
1968	13	59
1969	18	67
1970	22	34
1971	23	30
1972	61	37
1973	57	9
1974	51	13
1975	120	112
1976	163	38

### Characteristics of Participants.

Another way of approaching the situation is by examining changes in the composition of participation.

Tables 5-5 and 5-6 show the data collected on intervenors at public hearings. The data in Table 5-5 concerning letters and petitions received by council in regard to public hearings are not strictly relevant. However they are included in the hope that they may be of use to some readers.

Several things are immediately apparent about these tables. The increase in participation in 1975 does not appear to be the result of a large increase in only one or two types of participant, although pro interest groups, pro and con individuals and con companies all reach unprecedented (within the period being studied) levels. Con interest groups, although high, are not outstandingly so.

A more suggestive pattern emerges, however, when the pro/con figures are broken down according to whether the intervenor is addressing a municipal or a private application. This is done in Table 5-7. There is a noticeable increase in the number of intervenors supporting municipal applications while there is no similarly consistent increase in the supporters of private applications.

The most plausible interpretation would seem to

Table 5-5. Intervenors at Public Hearings.

<u>Year</u>	<u>Interest</u>	<u>Individuals</u>	<u>Companies</u>	<u>Total*</u>	<u>Letters</u>	<u>Petitions</u>
	<u>Groups</u>		<u>and Misc-</u>			
			<u>ellaneous</u>			
1964	5	31	1	37	74	4
1965	16	68	12	96	35	5
1966	19	32	13	64	28	0
1967	35	23	14	72	25	2
1968	23	37	12	72	8	3
1969	30	33	12	75	9	4
1970	10	31	4	45	6	3
1971	10	30	13	53	0	3
1972	42	41	15	98	6	0
1973	22	36	8	66	0	2
1974	19	37	8	64	0	0
1975	44	168	20	232	0	1
1976	40	147	14	201	0	1

\* This column is the total of interest groups, individuals, companies and miscellaneous. It does not include letters or petitions.

Note: The figures in this table represent number of participants. They are not percentages.

Table 5-6. Pro and Con Intervenors at Public Hearings.

<u>Year</u>	<u>Interest</u>			<u>Indiv-</u>			<u>Compan-</u>			<u>Miscell-</u>			<u>Total</u>		
	<u>Groups</u>			<u>iduals</u>			<u>ies</u>			<u>aneous</u>					
	<u>P</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>P</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>P</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>P</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>P</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>N</u>
1964	1	4	0	1	30	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	34	1
1965	4	10	2	10	56	2	3	5	1	0	1	2	17	72	7
1966*	7	11	1	9	22	1	1	3	0	0	1	8	17	37	10
1967*	0	28	7	4	18	1	4	1	0	0	0	9	8	47	17
1968	6	17	0	14	21	2	0	3	3	0	0	6	20	41	11
1969*	1	28	1	8	25	0	2	4	1	1	0	4	12	57	6
1970*	5	4	1	5	21	5	0	0	1	0	0	3	10	26	10
1971	0	10	0	1	26	3	1	2	0	10	0	0	12	38	3
1972	2	40	0	4	36	1	0	0	5	7	2	1	13	78	7
1973	2	20	0	5	27	4	2	2	2	0	1	1	9	50	7
1974	6	12	1	15	17	5	2	5	0	0	1	0	23	35	6
1975	12	32	0	53	114	1	1	14	2	1	2	0	67	162	3
1976	12	27	1	30	112	5	3	4	0	1	2	4	46	145	10

\* Figures in these years will not agree with the figures in Table 4-1 because these figures do not include my estimates of participation at meetings where the minutes of the meeting are imprecise.

(See page 42.)

P stands for Pro, C stands for Con and N stands for neutral.

The figures in the table represent number of participants, they are not percentages.

Table 5-7: Pro and Con Intervenors at Municipal and Private Applications.

<u>Year</u>	<u>Municipal</u>		<u>Private</u>	
	<u>Pro</u>	<u>Con</u>	<u>Pro</u>	<u>Con</u>
1964	0	13	2	22
1965	9	17	8	62
1966	7	23	10	24
1967	0	42	8	22
1968	3	10	17	42
1969	9	9	3	54
1970	5	17	5	19
1971	5	18	7	23
1972	1	60	12	25
1973	8	49	1	8
1974	21	30	2	11
1975	46	74	21*	91
1976	41	122	5	33

\* This unusually high figure is the result of an application to provide low-cost housing, which attracted sixteen favourable interventions.

Figures are not in percentages. This table does not include my estimates of participation at meetings where the minutes are imprecise, so totals will not agree with Table 4-1.

be that at least some of the con intervenors in the past were opposed to development generally. Under the new council, these people would still oppose private applications, but would support some of the municipal applications. The municipal applications they would support would be those which involve what planners term "downzoning". Downzoning means limiting the development in an area. An example was the rezoning of some areas of the west end from highrise to lowrise construction. When these downzoning applications began to come forward in 1974, an increase in pro interventions became apparent. (See Table 5-8.)

Table 5-9 shows the participants categorised according to type. This categorisation does not seem to tell us much about the impact of participationist parties, but it does show the relative prominence of interest groups during the years of peak controversy (1967-1969), and in 1972-3. It also shows an increase in the proportion of individuals making up the recent upsurge in participation, as was suggested by the relative continuity of the absolute number of these groups shown in Table 5-5.

A further explanation of the increase in participation in 1975 was suggested by Paul Tennant and City Manager Fritz Bowers. They thought that the increase may have been the result of a number of "habitual" participants who have started to attend



Table 5-8. Percentages of Intervenors Pro and Con.

<u>Year</u>	<u>Pro %</u>	<u>Con %</u>	<u>Neutral %</u>
1964	5.4	91.9	2.7
1965	17.7	75.0	7.3
1966	26.6	57.8	15.6
1967	11.1	65.3	23.6
1968	27.7	56.9	15.3
1969	16.0	76.0	8.0
1970	21.7	56.5	21.7
1971	22.6	71.7	5.6
1972	13.2	79.6	7.1
1973	13.6	75.8	10.6
1974	35.9	54.7	9.4
1975	28.9	69.8	1.3
1976	22.9	72.1	5.0

Figures may not add up to 100% for any year due to rounding error. This table is based on Table 5-6.

Table 5-9. Percentages of Intervenors By Type.

<u>Year:</u>	<u>Interest Groups %</u>	<u>Individuals %</u>	<u>Others %</u>
1964	13.5	83.8	2.8
1965	16.6	70.8	12.5
1966	29.7	50.0	20.3
1967	48.6	31.9	19.4
1968	31.9	51.4	16.6
1969	40.0	44.0	16.0
1970	22.2	68.8	8.8
1971	18.8	56.6	24.5
1972	42.8	41.8	15.3
1973	33.3	54.5	12.1
1974	29.7	57.8	12.5
1975	18.8	71.8	8.5
1976	19.9	73.1	7.0

Figures for any year may not total 100% due to rounding.

This table is based on Table 5-6.

Table 5-10. Repeating Intervenor in 1974 and 1975.

	<u>1974</u>		<u>1975</u>		<u>% of increase.</u>
	<u>No.</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>%</u>	
Interest Groups	4	21	18	41	56
Individuals	0	0	26	15	20
Companies	0	0	6	35	60
Total	4	6	50	22	30

No. refers to the number of interventions by intervenors who appeared more than once. Thus two intervenors each appearing twice would count as 4.

% refers to the number of interventions by intervenors who appeared more than once as a percentage of the total number of that type of intervention in that year.

% of increase indicates the percentage of the increase in participation from 1974 to 1975 accounted for by the increase in the number of repeating intervenors over the same period. This is a measure of the impact these intervenors have had on participation rates.

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hearings. The relevant data appears in Table 5-10. In 1974 there were only two repeaters, accounting for four interventions, and they accounted for six percent of that year's participation. In 1975 there were twenty-two repeaters, accounting for 50 interventions, and these accounted for twenty-two percent of the participation, and thirty percent of the increase from 1974 to 1975.

Some of these frequent intervenors may have had "political" motives, and certainly Bruce Erikson, Libby Davies and Jean Swanson have been able to generate much publicity through their participation. However, the repeated appearances of the United Church, Imperial Oil and a doctor and his wife are rather less easily explained. Mr. Bowers suggested that they feel they have been effective the first time they appear, and thus are motivated to return.

The Pattern: 1972-1976.

We are now in a position to evaluate the possible explanations presented earlier in this chapter. To do so, I will apply the data I have presented, as well as information gleaned from interviews.<sup>5</sup>

1/ "The drop in participation in 1973 may have been caused by the new council taking some time to get organised ..."

There is no evidence to support this. There were more municipal applications for rezoning in 1973 than there had been in 1972 or 1971. If the new council were not yet organised, they were still at least as organised as the old council had been.

2/ "... while private developers held back on their applications until they knew the new council better."

This may be so, but it is probably not a major factor. 1973 saw less private applications than 1972,

but the number is not spectacularly lower. It may be that private applications in that year were particularly uncontentious. Only nine interventions were lodged against private applications in 1973. A better explanation of the lower number of private applications would be the new council's freeze on downtown rezoning.

In any case, I have presented strong evidence that the application rate was not a major factor affecting the participation rate.

3/ "...the increase in participation in 1975 may have been caused by TEAM development policies inciting people to attend hearings".

This is obviously a major factor in the increase in participation. Most of the intervenors in 1975 and 1976 were concerned with municipal rather than private applications. This is especially noticeable in 1976, as 1975 saw a surge of private rezoning applications concerning the downtown area, many of which were contentious. The municipal applications, especially those concerning "downzoning", attracted many pro intervenors, and some con interventions from the companies affected. The increased participation seems more linked to TEAM's zoning plans than its participationist beliefs.

4/ "... the increase in participation in 1975 simply reflects a greater number of applications as TEAM became more active and private developers came to trust them."

The data showed the application rate not to be a decisive factor in the change in the participation rate, so the assumption behind this explanation is not valid.

6/ "The fluctuations may be explained completely by non-party factors."

Even if "the increased participation seems more linked to TEAM's rezoning plans than its participationist beliefs", this is still enough for us to say that party factors are relevant to participation fluctuations. The comparison between Surrey and Vancouver lends weight to this conclusion, as does the finding that the number of applications was not a major factor in the changes in the participation rate. This is because most of the other non-party factors which affect zoning, such as economic factors, more logically affect the application rate than the participation rate.

7/ "TEAM's participationist emphasis and the reforms it introduced may have had an impact - albeit a slightly delayed one."

The evaluation of this explanation will be complex. When TEAM were elected in late 1972, they had two ideas that were potentially relevant to the public hearing process. One of these was that participation by citizens was desirable, and should be facilitated. Note, facilitated, rather than encouraged. TEAM did not

intend to cajole people into participating, but instead wished to provide them with the information they would need if they wished to participate. The other idea was that TEAM wished to change the zoning of some parts of the city. These changes were intended to encourage some types of development, and discourage others. TEAM "froze" development applications for the downtown area while they prepared the necessary applications for their rezoning plans. Plans for other areas of the city were also prepared.

Nothing much happened at public hearings for about two years. Possibly private interests intentionally held back on contentious applications while they came to know the new council.

Late in 1974, the first of the new TEAM zoning plans was unveiled, and the necessary applications started to go through the hearing process. Also, a number of contentious private applications were "unfrozen". These applications, both municipal and private, attracted increased participation at public hearings. Armed with the information TEAM had made freely available, interest groups and individuals came to do battle. Many of them felt their participation was successful, or rewarding, and began to participate regularly. Some people associated with DERA have attained prominence, in part through this activity.

The increased participation resulted in some

hearings that ran on into the wee hours of the morning. Because of this, planners, when scheduling meetings, tried to have no more than one contentious issue at any hearing. The result was a jump in the number of hearings, possibly adding to the participation rate by increasing the opportunities to participate.

To "defuse" some issues, planning staff began to hold "information hearings" much more frequently. This backfired, as people attending these hearings took more entrenched positions on the issues being discussed. Their rage overflowed into the public hearings.

The net result has been a spectacular jump in the participation rate at public hearings.

So, are the participationist beliefs of TEAM the cause of the increased participation? The answer must be a resounding "well, yes and no". Yes, because the participationist beliefs have led TEAM to facilitate participation by increasing access to information, and by making it easier for the public to attend the hearings, by holding them in the evenings, and in the areas affected. Also, the reaction of a non-participationist administration to the inconveniences caused by increased participation may have been different. Instead of trying to "streamline" hearings, TEAM responded to increased participation by increasing the number of hearings, and thus the opportunities for participation.



No, because as has been seen, there were many other factors involved. Participationist beliefs alone would not have been enough to increase participation.

Footnotes: Chapter Five.

1. Based on Pross's categories in Pressure Group Behaviour in Canadian Politics, McGraw-Hill Ryerson, Toronto, 1975. Pross uses four categories; issue-oriented, fledgling, mature and institutional. These differ in such factors as structure and objectives. I originally chose to use the two extreme categories as I felt I would not have sufficient information to categorise the groups so finely. As it turned out I need not have worried, as almost all interest groups participating were issue-oriented by Pross's definition.
2. An exception is made for applications involving alterations at one residential address. For part of 1964, hearings were held to consider such applications, but in that year a decision was made to refer all such applications to the Board of Administration. All of these applications have been removed from my data.
3. The data on Surrey and Victoria were recalculated on a per meeting basis, with the intention of adding this to chapter three, but as the Surrey figures were meaningless and the Victoria figures were very similar to the Victoria participation per annum figures, I have omitted these tables. Data on the number of applications per annum was

Footnotes, Chapter Five, Continued.

not collected in Victoria or Surrey.

4. With City Manager Fritz Bowers.
5. Interviewed were City Manager Fritz Bowers (who is also a former TEAM alderman), City Clerk Little and Mr. Grey of the planning department.

## Chapter Six. Conclusions.

Life has once more proven itself to be far more complex than the questions we choose to ask about it. Personally, I find that rather reassuring. Life may be complex, but this should ensure that it will not be dull. Yet when we come to ask questions of life, we often find that the answers make the questions we have asked seem childlike. As many writers have pointed out (Robert Sheckley being by far my favourite of these), to elicit an appropriate answer, one must ask the right question.

The question I asked was "what effect does the formation and election of a participationist party have on public participation at public hearings?" At the outset, the question seemed not inappropriate. Much political rhetoric has been invested in encouraging participation, and it seemed like a straightforward project to investigate the effects of that rhetoric. Would a strategy of facilitating participation be effective?

By comparing Vancouver, my chosen subject, with two other municipalities, I tentatively decided that, if nothing more, a party system, or more accurately, changes in a party system, were relevant to participation at public hearings. Some evidence was present in the Surrey case that the formation of a participationist party had an effect on participation rates, but

no such evidence was found in Vancouver. In retrospect, this makes sense, because a strategy of facilitating participation presupposes that the party is in power, so no change would be expected until the party has been elected.

On closer examination of the Vancouver case, it was seen that the participationist beliefs of the TEAM council were a factor in the increased participation observed after this council was elected. Yet this increased participation occurred two full years after the beginning of the TEAM reign. Obviously, the election of a participationist party was not an instant spell to increase participation. Only when combined with the other necessary ingredients, most of which I probably have not identified, did the participationist beliefs have the expected effect.

So, in answer to the second part of my question: yes, the election of a participationist party can have the effect of increasing participation, but only in the presence of other factors. To turn the question on its ear, it was been found that participationist beliefs are not a necessary condition for increased participation, and the question is still open as to whether they are even a sufficient condition.

This tentative conclusion is obviously too treacherous a base to even think of beginning an evaluation of the effectiveness of advocating increased participation

as a strategy for improved decision-making. As always, much work remains to be done.

Hopefully, a small step has been taken towards an understanding of the politics of Vancouver, the politics of participation, and of politics.



# CITY OF VANCOUVER

## NOTICE OF PUBLIC HEARING

(Amendments to Zoning  
and Development By-Law No.3575)

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT, pursuant to the provisions of the Vancouver Charter, a meeting of the Council of the City of Vancouver will be held in **COUNCIL CHAMBER, THIRD FLOOR, CITY HALL, 453 West 12th Avenue**, on **TUESDAY, JULY 26, 1977**, commencing at 2:00 P.M., to consider the following proposed amendments to the Zoning and Development By-Law No. 3575:


1. **LOCATION:** Easterly 48 feet of Lot 1, Block 48, D.L. 2027, located on the southeast corner of West 33rd Avenue and MacKenzie Street. The westerly 33.6 feet of Lot 1, Block 48, D.L. 2027 is presently zoned (C-1) Commercial District.  
Present Zone: (RS-1) One-Family Dwelling District  
Requested Zone: (C-1) Commercial District
2. **LOCATION:** Area West of the Quebec/Columbia Connector at Terminal Avenue. A portion of Lot A, D.L.'s 2037 & 2064, Plan 5568; a portion of Lot B, D.L. 2037, Amended Plan 5568 and a portion of Parcel C (Explanatory Plan 3340) except that part included in Plan 15452 of Lot 2, D.L. 2037, Plan 5568.  
Present Zone: (RS-1) One-Family Dwelling District  
Requested Zone: (M-1) Industrial District
3. (a) **LOCATION:** Northwest Corner of Main Street and Terminal Avenue, being a portion of Lot 3, D.L. 2037, Plan 15505. An area of approximately 12,000 square feet, being almost triangular in shape and having a frontage along Main Street from Terminal Avenue northerly of approximately 216 feet and a frontage along Terminal Avenue westerly of approximately 78 feet.  
Present Zone: (RS-1) One-Family Dwelling District  
Requested Zone: (M-1) Industrial District
- (b) Text Amendment to Schedule C - "Streets Requiring Landscaped Setbacks" — Establishment of a landscaped setback at the location and covering the area noted in (a) above.
4. **LOCATION:** East Thirty-First Avenue (One lot on the north side of East 31st Avenue located approximately 135 feet east of Fraser Street), being Lot 44, Block 9, D.L.'s 391 & 392.  
Present Zone: (RS-1) One-Family Dwelling District  
Requested Zone: (RT-2) Two-Family Dwelling District

ALL PERSONS who deem themselves affected by the proposed amendments shall be afforded an opportunity to be heard before Council on matters contained therein. A copy of the proposed By-Laws may be seen in the City Clerk's Office, Third Floor, City Hall and in the Planning Department, Third Floor, East Wing, City Hall, 453 West 12th Avenue, Monday to Friday from 9:00 A.M. to 5:00 P.M., on regular working days.

D.H. LITTLE  
CITY CLERK.

Page 4

the courier, July 21, 1977

**ZONING BY-LAW AMENDMENTS****PUBLIC HEARING**

The Council of The Corporation of the District of Burnaby hereby gives notice that it will hold a Public Hearing on  
**TUESDAY, AUGUST 16, 1977 AT 7:30 P.M.**

in the Municipal Hall, 4949 Canada Way, Burnaby, B.C. V5G 1M2 to receive representations in connection with the following proposed amendments to "Burnaby Zoning By-Law 1965":

**1. FROM COMPREHENSIVE DEVELOPMENT DISTRICT (CD) TO AMENDED COMPREHENSIVE DEVELOPMENT DISTRICT (AMENDED CD)**

Reference Rezoning No. 34/75A

"BURNABY ZONING BY-LAW 1965, AMENDMENT BY-LAW NO. 43, 1977" — BY-LAW NO. 7083

Lot 35, D.L. 79, Plan 42703

3920 Norland Avenue — located on the east side of Norland Avenue south of Sprott Street.

*The applicant proposes to amend the approved CD plan from a single two storey office building with surface parking to a redesigned two and a half storey office building with underground parking.*

**2. FROM RESIDENTIAL DISTRICT (R1) TO PARK & PUBLIC USE DISTRICT (P3)**

Reference Rezoning No. 31/77

"BURNABY ZONING BY-LAW 1965, AMENDMENT BY-LAW NO. 44, 1977" — BY-LAW NO. 7084

Lot 5 Except Ref. Plan 31543, D.L. 85, Plan 11109 (Westerly portion only)

5017 Dale Avenue — located at the southwest corner of Dale Avenue and Canada Way.

*The municipality has requested rezoning in order to utilize the subject site for a public picnic area in association with Heritage Village.*

**3. FROM NEIGHBOURHOOD COMMERCIAL DISTRICT (C1) TO RESIDENTIAL DISTRICT (R3)**

Reference Rezoning No. 33/77

"BURNABY ZONING BY-LAW 1965, AMENDMENT BY-LAW NO. 45, 1977" — BY-LAW NO. 7085

30\*\*\* THE VANCOUVER SUN: TUES. AUGUST 9, 1977

Appendix continues

on next page.



## Appendix B, continued.

Lots 1, 2, 3, & 4 of Lot L, S.D. 20, Blk. 2,  
D.L. 74, Plan 4313

3314-3388 Royal Oak Avenue — located on  
the east side of Royal Oak Avenue be-  
tween Schou Street and Laurel Street.

*The applicant has requested rezoning in  
order to bring the subject properties into  
conformity with the zoning designation of  
the adjacent area.*

4. FROM GENERAL COMMERCIAL DIS-  
TRICT (C3) TO GASOLINE SERVICE  
STATION SELF-SERVE (C6A)

Reference Rezoning No. 36/77

"BURNABY ZONING BY-LAW 1965,  
AMENDMENT BY-LAW NO. 46, 1977" —  
BY-LAW NO. 7086

Lot 115, D.L. 124, Plan 27154

4515 Lougheed Highway — located at the  
northeast corner of the Lougheed High-  
way-Willingdon Avenue intersection.

*The applicant has requested rezoning in  
order to convert the existing full-service  
gas station to a self-serve facility.*

5. IN-LAW SUITES IN RESIDENTIAL  
ZONES TEXT AMENDMENT

Sections 3 and 7.7

"BURNABY ZONING BY-LAW 1965,  
AMENDMENT BY-LAW NO. 47, 1977" —  
BY-LAW NO. 7087

Residential Districts — R1, R2, R3, R4  
and R5

*The Municipality has requested text  
amendments in order to better control  
the establishment and use of In-law  
suites. The amendments include pro-  
posed definition changes for "In-law  
Suites" (To include sons or daughters),  
"Accessory Use" and "Dwelling Unit" as  
well as other related matters.*

All persons who deem their interest in  
property affected by the proposed By-  
Laws and wish to register an opinion may  
appear in person, by attorney or by peti-  
tion at the said Hearing.


A copy of the proposed By-Laws may be  
inspected at the office of the undersigned  
any time between the hours of eight-thir-  
ty o'clock in the forenoon and four-thirty  
o'clock in the afternoon, Monday to Fri-  
day inclusive (excepting Public Holidays)  
up to four-thirty o'clock in the afternoon  
on Tuesday, August 16, 1977

James Hudson  
MUNICIPAL CLERK

MUNICIPAL HALL,  
4949 Canada Way,  
BURNABY, B.C.  
V5G 1M2

July 20, 1977

Appendix C. Floorplan of Vancouver Council Chambers.



Appendix D. Graph of Annual Participation in Surrey,  
Victoria and Vancouver.

