Open Collections

UBC Theses and Dissertations

UBC Theses Logo

UBC Theses and Dissertations

Third party preferences among resolutions of inequity in the criminal-victim dyad Hunt, Valerye Agnes 1976

Your browser doesn't seem to have a PDF viewer, please download the PDF to view this item.

Notice for Google Chrome users:
If you are having trouble viewing or searching the PDF with Google Chrome, please download it here instead.

Item Metadata

Download

Media
831-UBC_1976_A1 H85.pdf [ 9.13MB ]
Metadata
JSON: 831-1.0093810.json
JSON-LD: 831-1.0093810-ld.json
RDF/XML (Pretty): 831-1.0093810-rdf.xml
RDF/JSON: 831-1.0093810-rdf.json
Turtle: 831-1.0093810-turtle.txt
N-Triples: 831-1.0093810-rdf-ntriples.txt
Original Record: 831-1.0093810-source.json
Full Text
831-1.0093810-fulltext.txt
Citation
831-1.0093810.ris

Full Text

THIRD PARTY PREFERENCES AMONG RESOLUTIONS OF INEQUITY IN THE CRIMINAL-VICTIM DYAD by VALERYE AGNES HUNT B.A., UNIVERSITY OF LETHBRIDGE, 1970 M.A., UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA, 1972 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQIJIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES Department of Psychology We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA January, 1976 (c) Valerye Agnes Hunt In p r e s e n t i n g t h i s t h e s i s in p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t o f the r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r an advanced degree at the U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a , I a g r e e that the L i b r a r y s h a l l make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r r e f e r e n c e and s t u d y . I f u r t h e r agree t h a t p e r m i s s i o n f o r e x t e n s i v e c o p y i n g o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r s c h o l a r l y p u r p o s e s may be g r a n t e d by the Head o f my Department o r by h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . It i s u n d e r s t o o d tha t c o p y i n g o r p u b l i c a t i o n o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r f i n a n c i a l g a i n s h a l l not be a l l o w e d w i t h o u t my w r i t t e n p e r m i s s i o n . Department o f Psychology The U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Co lumbia 2075 Wesbrook Place Vancouver, Canada V6T 1W5 Date Mai-ch ?. 197* ABSTRACT Adams' (1965) equity theory provided a theoretical background for the research which examined third party response to dyadic inequity caused by negative input from one member of a dyad. Consideration of differences between f i r s t and third parties and of the possibility of negative input suggested three principles important to third party equity behavior. These were: 1) a preference for actual f rather than psychological, equity 2) a preference for positive, rather than negative, input 3) a preference for positive input rather than actual equity i n case of conflict between preferences for actual equity and input positivity. Four hypotheses were derived from these principles. Hypothesis 1: When alternative solutions to inequitable situations are equal i n actual equity, third parties w i l l prefer alternatives that maximise input positivity. Hypothesis 2: When alternative solutions to inequitable situations are equal i n input positivity, third parties w i l l prefer alternatives that maximize actual equity. Hypothesis 3* When alternative solutions to inequitable situations are such that preferences for maximizing actual equity and input positivity conflict, third parties w i l l prefer to achieve maximum input positivity rather than maximum actual equity. Hypothesis 4: When resolution of inequity satisfies preferences for i i i i i actual equity and input positivity, t h i r d parties w i l l report greater satisfaction with the solution than when resolution of inequity satisfies only one preference or involves conflict between preferences. Additional hypotheses were: Hypothesis 5: Third parties w i l l restore psychological equity for an over-rewarded party by cognitively enhancing inputs so they are commensurate with outcomes. Hypothesis 6: Third parties w i l l restore psychological equity for an under-rewarded party by cognitively devaluing inputs so they are commensurate with outcomes. Two studies tested hypotheses. Study I examined preferences among, and satisfaction with, different reductions of dyadic inequity. Subjects read simulated criminal cases and selected one of two alternative sentences. The actual equity and input positivity of solutions within and between conditions were manipulated by varying kind of punishment for criminals and availability of compensation for victims. Choice of sentence and satisfaction with solutions provided data for testing the f i r s t four hypotheses. Ratings of victims' attractiveness and responsibility for the offence tested Hypothesis 6. In Study II , the case summary described the sentence imposed. The actual equity and input positivity of solutions represented by sentences varied among conditions. Reported satisfaction with sentences provided an additional test of Hypothesis 4 . Ratings of criminals' and victims' attractiveness and responsibility for the offence permitted tests of Hypotheses 5 and 6. Results supported Hypotheses 1, 2 and 4 . The importance of i v preference for a c t u a l e q u i t y a s a determinant o f t h i r d p a r t y equity b e h a v i o r w a s demonstrated by the finding that actual equity i s more i m p o r t a n t t h a n e i t h e r i n p u t o r o u t c o m e p o s i t i v i t y . D a t a a l s o i n d i c a t e t h a t a positivity principle i s invoked t o d e t e r m i n e c h o i c e between e q u a l l y e q u i t a b l e a l t e r n a t i v e s . T h e d i s c u s s i o n r e v i e w s p v i d e n e e i n d i c a t i n g t h a t p r e f e r e n c e f o r p o s i t i v e i n p u t d e t e r m i n e s c h o i c e i n t h e s e c a s e s . D a t a f r o m S t u d y II i n d i c a t e t h a t d i f f e r e n c e s i n s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h s o l u t i o n s a n d d i s t i n c t p r e f e r e n c e s a m o n g r e s o l u t i o n s o f i n e q u i t y a r e n o t p e c u l i a r t o d e c i s i o n - m a k e r s b u t a r e s h a r e d b y n o n - p a r t i c i p a n t o b s e r v e r s a s w e l l . D a t a f r o m b o t h s t u d i e s f a i l e d t o s u p p o r t p r e d i c t i o n s t h a t third p a r t i e s w h o w e r e p o w e r l e s s t o c h a n g e t h e r e a l i n p u t s o r o u t c o m e s o f m e m b e r s o f d y a d s w o u l d r e s t o r e psychological e q u i t y b y d e r o g a t i n g u n d e r — r e w a r d e d p a r t i e s or enhancing o v e r — r e w a r d e d o n e s . TABLE OF CONTENTS Page LIST OF TABLES . v Chapter I INTRODUCTION 1 II REVIEW OF PILOT STUDIES AMD PREVIEW OF PRESENT RESEARCH .. 23 III METHOD 36 IV RESULTS 61 V DISCUSSION 87 VI IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 113 BIBLIOGRAPHY 119 APPENDICES A. Stimulus Materials for Study I • 123 B. Report of Pilot Studies 132 C. U. B. C. Department of Psychology "Basic Rights and Privileges of Volunteer Subjects" 144 D. Sentencing Instructions for Study I 145 E. Sets of Sentencing Alternatives for Study I ............. 146 F. Satisfaction Scale for Study I 150 G. Materials for Rating Participants'' Attractiveness 151 H. Materials for Rating Responsibility and Blame ........... 155 I. Short Questionnaire for Study I 157 v v i TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont'd) Page APPENDICES (cont'd) J . Thurstone-Wang "Attitude toward Punishment of Criminals" Scale 15& K. Stimulus Materials for Study II 160 L. Sentences for Study II 169 M. Satisfaction Scale for Study II 170 N. Short Questionnaire for Study II 171 LIST OF TABLES Table Page I Mean Ratings of Five Sentences on Two Items ••••••••••••••• 31 II Summary of Analysis of Variance of Ratings of Choice Value, to the Criminal, of Five Sentences 32 III Summary of Analysis of Variance of Ratings of Perceived Comparative Desirability, to the Criminal, of Five Sentences 32 IV Frequency of Selection of Predicted and Non-Predicted Alternatives • 6l V Cell Means for Satisfaction with Solutions Expressed by Male and Female Subjects i n Each Condition •••••••••••••• 6 4 VI Summary of Analysis of Variance of Subjects' Expressed Satisfaction with Solution 6 4 VII Mean Ratings of P l a i n t i f f s ' Attractiveness as a Function of Conditions, Rating Order and Sex of Subject 67 VIII Summary of Analysis of Variance of Ratings of P l a i n t i f f s ' Attractiveness .......................................... 6 S IX Mean Ratings of Blame Attributed to P l a i n t i f f s as a Function of Conditions and Sex of Rater 69 X Summary of Analysis of Variance of Blame Attributed to P l a i n t i f f s 70 XI Mean Ratings of Defendants' Attractiveness as a Function of Conditions, Rating Order and Sex of Rater 71 XII Summary of Analysis of Variance of Ratings of Defendants' Attractiveness .............................. 71 XIII Mean Ratings of Wrongness of Defendants' Acts as a Function of Conditions and Sex of Rater 73 v i i v i i i LIST OF TABLES (cont'd) Table Page XIV Summary of Analysis of Variance of Ratings of Wrongness of Defendant's Act 73 XV Mean Ratings of Defendant's Responsibility as a Function of Conditions and Sex of Rater 75 XVI Summary of Analysis of Variance of Ratings of Defendant's Responsibility f o r the Offence 75 XVII Mean Ratings of Sa t i s f a c t i o n with Sentences as a Function of Conditions and Sex of Rater 77 XVIII Summary of Analysis of Variance of Subjects' Expressed Sa t i s f a c t i o n with Sentences 77 XIX Mean Ratings of Defendants' Attractiveness as a Function of Conditions, Rating Order and Sex of Rater 80 XX Summary of Analysis of Variance of Ratings of Defendant's Attractiveness 30 XXI Mean Ratings of Wrongness of Defendant's Acts as a Function of Conditions and Sex of Rater S i XXII Summary of Analysis of Variance of Ratings of Wrongness of Defendant's Act 82 XXIII Mean Ratings of Defendant's Responsibility as a Function of Conditions and Sex of Rater 82 XXIV Summary of Analysis of Variance of Ratings of Defendant's Responsibility f o r the Offence 83 XXV Mean Ratings of P l a i n t i f f s ' Attractiveness as a Function of Conditions, Rating Order and Sex of Subject 34 XXVT Summary of Analysis of Variance of Ratings of P l a i n t i f f s ' Attractiveness 34 XXVII Mean Ratings of Blame Attributed to P l a i n t i f f s as a Function of Conditions and Sex of Rater 85 i x LIST OF TABLES (cont'd) Table Page XXVIII Summary of Analysis of Variance of Blame Attributed to P l a i n t i f f s 86 XXTX Mean Ratings of Attractiveness of Criminal-Victim Pairs 133 XXX Split-Half Correlations, Corrections, and Zr Transformations of Ratings of Average University Student on Lerner's Scale 137 XXXI Split-Half Correlations, Corrections, and Zr Transformations of Ratings of "Criminals" on Lerner's Scale • • •• •• 138 XXXII Split-Half Correlations, Corrections, and Zr Transformations of Ratings of "Victims" on Lerner's Scale • • ••••••••• 139 XXXIII Dependent Measures, Mean Ratings, t Values and Associated Probabilities .• 141 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I welcome the opportunity to extend thanks to the people who made completion of this dissertation possible. I am indebted not only to the students who took part i n the studies but also to the members of the Committee for their advice and assistance i n the planning and preparation of the dissertation. Special thanks are due to Dr. Robert Knox, who gave generously of his time to supervise the research, and to Dr. Thomas Storm for their counsel and encouragement. x CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION Many theorists (e.g., Adams, 1965; Blau, 1964; Homans, 1961; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959) have analyzed dyadic interaction in terms of a reciprocal exchange of rewards and costs. A proposition that is common to these, theories is that individuals in an interaction try to ensure that the rewards or gains from a relationship exceed the costs of the exchange. For example, Homans (1961) and Thibaut & Kelley (1959) both assume that an interaction will cease i f i t is not mutually reinforcing for the parties involved. Homans, however, noted that the experience of mutual reward did not guarantee satisfaction with the exchange unless the distribution of reward was such that the reward received by the parties was in proportion to their contributions to the exchange. A fair exchange was, according to Homans, one which conformed to the rule of distributive justice. The rule of distributive justice stated that: "a man in an exchange relationship with another will expect ... that the net rewards, or profits, of each man be proportional to his investments — the greater the investments, the greater the profit (Homans, 1961, p. 75) Homans suggested that exchanges that violated the rule of distributive justice resulted in expressions of negative emotional affect on the part of both parties to the transaction, anger i f under—rewarded and guilt i f over-rewarded. Adams (1965) suggested that social psychologists in general and 1 2 exchange theorists in particular had failed to appreciate fully the importance of perceived justice or injustice in exchange, Adams noted that Homans' articulation of the rule of distributive justice represented a distinct contribution in this regard. He pointed out, however, that although Homans1 treatment discussed the causes of perceived justice and injustice in exchange, only scanty attention was given to the consequences of perceived injustice, Adams noted that the behavioral consequences of perceived injustice in exchange extend beyond the expressions of negative emotional affect mentioned by Homans and argued that specification of these consequences was essential for an adequate understanding of human exchange. Consideration of the theoretical and practical importance of perceived justice or injustice in dyadic exchange resulted in the Adams (1965) formulation of equity theory, Adams referred to equity rather than to justice in exchange both to avoid possible confusion resulting from use of the term "justice" and, more importantly, "to emphasize that the primary concern is with the causes and consequences of the absence of equity in human exchange relationships (1965, P« 2 7 6 ) , " Adams formulated his theory of equity with employer-employee exchanges in mind but pointed out that the theory was applicable to other social situations involving exchange since a l l are characterized by expectations of fairness. Two key terms in Adams* (1965) theory of fir s t party equity behavior are outcomes and inputs. Outcomes designate a person's returns from an exchange. These may be positive or negative. For example, outcomes from an employer-employee exchange may include, for the worker, such positively valued rewards as pay, seniority benefits and status as well 3 as negatively valued factors such as poor working conditions and monotony. Adams specified that the valuation of a given outcome factor depended on i t s being recognized as relevant to the exchange. Inputs, i n the Adams formulation, refer to perceived contributions to an exchange that may include: "education, intelligence, experience, training, s k i l l , seniority, age, sex, ethnic background, social status and, of course, effort ... on the job (1965, p. 277)•" Adams specified that for any of these factors to be regarded as an input required that i t be recognized as relevant to the exchange. Only positive inputs or contributions to an exchange were considered by Adams. Adams proposed that an individual would experience inequity whenever his Outcome/input ratio was not equal to the Outcome/input ratio of a comparison other. The comparison other could be the individual's partner i n an exchange relationship. Alternatively, the comparison other could be an individual engaged i n a similar exchange with another person. For example, a secretary might evaluate the "equitableness" of her arrangement with her employer by comparing her inputs and outcomes with those of another secretary. The importance for f i r s t party equity behavior of "normative expectations of f a i r exchange" was emphasized by Adams. Maintenance of equity i n exchange i s dependent on some degree of agreement between parties regarding the relevance and valuation of inputs and outcomes. Two factors mentioned by Adams as important to the development of equity norms are the socialization process and the process of social comparison. In the course of socialization, individuals learn how others w i l l evaluate various outcomes and the circumstances under which various outcomes may be offered to others in order to maintain equity. For example, an individual learns not only that both money and expressions of esteem are valued by others but, equally importantly, the circumstances under which one or the other of these reinforcers may be preferred as payment for services rendered. The importance of social comparison to first party equity behavior was also discussed by Adams, He pointed out that, in many situations, comparison of own outcomes and inputs with those of another individual in a similar exchange enables individuals to determine what constitutes a fair exchange. Thus, processes that facilitate agreement regarding the valuation of inputs and outcomes and the conditions under which particular inputs entitle the contributor to particular outcomes make possible maintenance of equity in dyadic exchange. However, as Adams pointed out, these processes do not result in perfect agreement regarding the relationship between inputs and outcomes. This i s one of the causes of inequity in exchange. The presentation by Adams of a theory of dyadic equity behavior has stimulated considerable research among social psychologists who have, in recent years, expressed increasing interest in problems related to the maintenance of justice and correction of injustice in society. In a recent review of equity research, Walster, Berscheid & Walster (1973) discuss the extension of the concept of equity to analysis of exploitative, helping and intimate relationships, A substantial body of research now demonstrates the importance of equity for both formal and informal exchanges. Researchers have, however, been concerned with fi r s t party equity behavior. Attention has focussed on the maintenance 5 and restoration of equity by parties involved in an exchange, A relatively unstudied area is that of third party equity behavior. Third party equity behavior may be defined as encompassing a l l instances in which an impartial observer responds to perceived inequity in exchange between others. The area of third party equity behavior that is of interest to the present discussion i s third party response to dyadic inequity brought about by the counter-normative or negative inputs of one of the parties to an exchange. Responses to such inequities are commonplace in daily l i f e . For example, parents and teachers intervene to resolve disputes between children. At the formal level, the legal system provides for intervention to re-establish equity in dyadic exchange. Despite the frequency and importance of third party equity behavior in maintaining or restoring equity in dyadic exchange, equity researchers have neglected this area. The relative neglect of the area of third party equity behavior is especially surprising in view of its acknowledged theoretical and practical importance. The propositions that groups commonly evolve systems specifying acceptable distributions of rewards and costs among individual members and enforce adherence to these systems by purrLshing those who behave inequitably are widely accepted (cf., Walster, Berscheid & Walster, 1 9 7 3 ) . Adams' (1965) outcome-input model may be applied to analysis of third party equity behavior. Adams' original formulation applied to f i r s t party equity behavior and did not consider the possibility of negative as well as positive input. Consideration of differences between fi r s t and third party equity behavior and of the possibility of 6 negative as well as positive input suggests that the theory requires revision to apply to the present area of interest. The present discussion will suggest three general principles important to third party responses to dyadic inequity resulting from the negative input of one of the parties to the exchange. These principles permit derivation of hypotheses concerning third party choice among methods of reduction of inequity in dyads where restoring equity involves punishment of a harm-doer. Only positive inputs or contributions to an exchange were considered in the, Adams (19&5) discussion of first party equity behavior. As Walster, Berscheid & Walster (1973) pointed out, a person's input may be negative as well as positive: such inputs as boorishness or cruelty entitle the possessor to costs rather than to rewards. Considerable attention (Zuckerman, 1975? Walster, 1975) has been devoted to the revision of the definitional formula of equity so that i t calculates the "equitableness" of exchanges involving negative as well as positive input. The category of negative input that is relevant to the present discussion of third party equity behavior is behavioral input that violates commonly accepted and understood rules governing the behavior of participants in exchanges. Both formal and informal transactions are governed by rules that specify the means by which parties may attempt to maximize their outcomes from an exchange. Inputs directed toward maximizing outcomes by means that violate moral or legal prohibitions of such inputs may be regarded as negative. Examples of such negative inputs are extorting desired resources from another by use of such 7 coercive tactics as threat of blackmail or physical violence or by persuasion that involves fraud or deceit. The criminal-victim dyad is an example of one in which dyadic inequity results from the exploitation of one party by another. In such situations, the inputs of the party responsible for the inequity, the harm-doer or criminal, are directed toward winning undeserved positive outcomes, the rewards or satisfactions resulting from the crime. Thus, the input of the harm-doer is negative and his outcomes are positive. The inputs of the victim are positive while his outcomes, the experience of victimization and suffering resulting from the loss of valued resources, are negative. Adams* original formulation of equity behavior discussed alternative means of inequity reduction and attempted to specify factors important in determining f i r s t person preference for various alternatives. Some of these methods of inequity reduction are available to third party observers of inequity. As Walster, Berscheid & Walster (1973) pointed out, the methods specified by Adams may be classified as restoring either actual or psychological equity. Actual equity refers to real changes in the inputs or outcomes of a party to the exchange. Psychological equity, for a third party, refers to reduction of perceived inequity by means of cognitive re-appraisal of inputs or outcomes. That i s , by altering his evaluations of the inputs or outcomes of the members of the dyad, a third party may convince himself that the exchange i s , after a l l , equitable. A third party may restore either actual or psychological equity for one or both members of a dyad in which inequity results from the counter-normative actions of one of 8 the parties to an exchange. A third party may possess two options for restoring actual equity for a harm-doer: altering his inputs or changing his outcomes. A judge may, for example, require that a criminal make amends for his offence, either directly to the victim or else to a stand-in for the victim. For example, an embezzler may be required to repay the stolen money or a vandal may be required to donate his services to the upkeep of a public park.- In these instances, actual equity i s restored by means of positive input from the harm-doer. Alternatively, a third party may restore equity for a harrrMioer by inflicting negative outcomes on the offender. A spanking for a child or a term of imprisonment for an adult offender are examples of punishments directed toward restoring equity by inflicting negative outcomes on a harm-<ioer. A third party appears to possess only one option for restoring actual equity for a victim. This is to restore the victim's positive outcomes. If a third party arranges for a harm-doer to make restitution to the victim or else provides compensation from some other source, actual equity i s restored for the victim. Actual equity could also be restored by means of negative input from the victim. That i s , the victim could make negative input, directed toward producing negative outcomes for the harm-doer. This would, however, require that the victim make counter-niorraative or illegal input. For a third party to require such input from an injured party would, itself, constitute a counter-normative act. Accordingly, at the formal level, a third party may achieve actual equity for a victim only by restoring positive outcomes. 9 A third party may also reduce inequity by changing his appraisal of the inputs or outcomes of the parties to an offence. For example, an observer may convince himself that the inequitable relationship between a con man and an elderly widow bilked out of her l i f e savings is an equitable one. He may dwell on the fact that the lady in question brought about her misfortune by her own greed and stupidity. He may, belatedly, note that the funds in question had been left by her late husband and conclude that the widow had, in the first place, been enjoying undeserved benefits. If the observer can further convince himself that the criminal was, in this case, actually an agent of poetic justice, the psychological reduction of inequity may be complete. The preceding paragraphs indicate that a third party may choose any one of a number of methods of reducing dyadic inequity. The ability of a third party to restore actual equity may be related to the presence or absence of constraints that limit his power to impose punishment on a harm-doer or award compensation to a victim. For example, the power of a judge or magistrate to restore actual equity for criminal and victim may be limited by restrictions on the type of sentence that may be imposed on an offender. Generally, these officials are empowered only to punish an offender: the present system does not allow compensation for losses of victims of most crimes. An individual who is empowered to punish a wrong-doer or to compensate a victim is not necessarily compelled to exercise his power. He may elect, instead, to restore psychological equity for one or both members of the dyad. The importance of specifying general determinants of f i r s t party preferences among methods of dyadic inequity reduction was recognized 10 by Adams. Equally important is consideration of general determinants of third party choice among methods of reduction of dyadic inequity. Firstly, this makes possible prediction of choice of method of actual inequity reduction by third parties who possess some kind of intervention power. Secondly, i t makes possible investigation of the effects on other aspects of equity behavior of constraints that limit third party choice of methods of reducing inequity. For example, constraints that limit third parties to less preferred reductions of inequity may also limit third party satisfaction with justice decisions. Differences in satisfaction with justice decisions that achieve more or less preferred reductions of inequity may be experienced by observers as well as by decision makers. Thus, consideration of third party preferences for methods of inequity reduction may, for example, have implications for the consequences of legal reforms that introduce or remove constraints bn the power of those responsible for justice decisions. There are several reasons for proposing, as a first principle of third party equity behavior, a preference for reduction of dyadic inequities by methods that restore actual, rather than psychological, equity for members of the dyad. Firstly, empirical evidence indicates that observers who possess power to restore actual equity for others will do so. Data from two studies (Lerner & Simmons, 1966; Simmons & Lerner, 1968) demonstrate that third parties will exercise power to restore the positive outcomes of victims of injustice. Lerner & Simmons (1966) presented naive observers with an "innocent victim" who was apparently receiving painful electric shock in a learning experiment. In two conditions in the Lerner & Simmons experiment, subjects were exposed to the suffering victim and were then given an opportunity to alter her fate. Subjects were told they could watch a second session in which the victim received negative reinforcement (shock), positive reinforcement (money), or no reinforcement. Subjects were told their votes would determine the victim^ fate in the second session. Of the total of twenty-eight subjects in these two conditions, a l l but two voted to place the victim in the positive reinforcement condition in which a sum of money would compensate her for her previous pains. Simmons & Lerner (1968) presented subjects with power to establish justice in a social situation. Subjects were given as a partner in a work situation an other who, as a result of the actions of her previous partner, had either been over-rewarded or under-rewarded. They supported the hypothesis that, in order to restore justice, subjects would work harder to increase the reward available for a previously under-rewarded partner. Data from these two studies thus demonstrate that, when i t is within their power to do so, observers will restore actual equity for others. Other studies (Baker, 1974; Lerner, 1974; Lincoln & Levinger, 1972) have demonstrated that third parties will attempt to maintain or restore equity in dyads. Baker used a two-choice, three—person matrix game to study third party justice behavior. The play of two participants was simulated by the experimenter. Subjects were placed in the position of third parties and given power over the allocation of rewards between the two simulated players. In some instances the 12 relationship between the two simulated players was an equitable one while, in other instances, one of the simulated players received more points than the other. Baker supported the hypotheses that third parties would act to maintain and re-establish equity between others, Lerner (1974) compared fi r s t and third party division of earnings between workers who were defined either as teammates or co-workers. The magnitude of reward available for distribution between the workers was determined by their task performance. In both teammate and co-worker conditions, the performance of one worker was clearly superior to that of the other. Lerner found that both fi r s t and third parties tended to divide the reward equally in teammate conditions and according to performance in co-worker conditions. Lerner (1974) concluded that, although the basis for allocation of reward differed as a function of situational cues, both fi r s t and third party division of reward was in accordance with the dictates of justice. Lincoln & Levinger (1972) investigated third party response to dyads in which the inequity was due to the counter-normative and negative input of a harm-doer. In the Lincoln & Levinger study, subjects* responses to harm-doers were separated from their responses to victims. There were two conditions in the study: Consequences and No Consequences. Subjects in both conditions were instructed to indicate their evaluations of harm-doers and victims. In the Consequences condition, subjects were told these evaluations would be sent to the parties involved in the incident while subjects in the No Consequences condition believed their ratings would remain private. It was predicted that ratings of the target persons would differ as a function of the consequentiality of the evaluation. That i s , subjects in the Consequences condition could, through their ratings, punish the harm-doer and compensate the victim. Subjects' responses to victims were as predicted: the data indicated that subjects attempted to restore actual equity for victims. Responses to harm-doers did not clearly indicate a preference for actual equity for harm-doers. Thus, the Lincoln & Levinger study does not provide empirical data to support the proposition that third parties prefer actual equity for harm-doers. There i s , however, justification for proposing that third parties will prefer to restore actual equity for harm-doers as well as for victims. The importance for the maintenance of equity norms of punishment for those who behave inequitably i s illustrated by Walster, Berscheid & Walster (1973)• Failure to restore actual equity for a harm-doer may be perceived as a threat to maintenance of equity norms for two reasons. Firstly, failure to punish the harm-doer implies that he may be tempted to repeat his offence and, secondly, allows him to serve as a model for others tempted to maximize outcomes through similar transgressions. These considerations suggest that the principle of preference for actual equity for others applies to third party exercise of punishment as well as compensation power. An assumption that is implicit in the adoption of a principle of third party preference for actual equity is that preference for positive outcomes does not apply to third party justice behavior. The importance of preference for positive outcomes as a determinant of first party equity behavior is generally acknowledged. Adams' (1965) discussion of f i r s t party equity behavior suggested that preference for positive outcomes not only accounted for deviations from preference for actual equity but also deterroined first party choices among methods of inequity reduction, Pritchard (1969) and Walster, Berscheid & Walster (1973) also emphasize the importance of preference for positive outcomes as a determinant of first party equity behavior. The present analysis suggests that the preference for outcome positivity i s not a determinant of third party equity behavior. The rationale offered by Adams and others to account for first party preference for outcome positivity i s the individual's motivation to maximize his own gains. The observer of inequity i s presumably not motivated to maximize the gains or positive outcomes of either of the parties to the inequity. To permit an over—rewarded party to maintain his positive outcomes without a corresponding increase in positive input does not achieve equity. In general, a person who enjoys undeserved positive outcomes from an exchange may be perceived as violating equity norms. Outcome positivity may be rejected in part because an over—rewarded comparison person may engender dissatisfaction among others and tempt them to violate equity norms in order to reap similar benefits. Accordingly, although a preference for outcome positivity may influence f i r s t party equity behavior, the present analysis suggests that this i s not an important consideration for third party equity behavior. The possibility of negative input was not considered in the Adams (1965) discussion of f i r s t party equity behavior. Consequently, he did not consider the relative importance of preferences for positive versus negative input. Consideration of this question appears important for analysis of third party equity behavior. Third parties appear to exhibit a definite preference for positive input from others. Some empirical evidence that third parties prefer positive to negative input may be derived from Baker 1s (1974) investigation of third party justice behavior. As has already been mentioned, Baker supported the hypotheses that third parties w i l l act to maintain or restore equity between others. Baker also investigated the effects of the cause of the inequity — the helpful or harmful behavior of the over-rewarded party — on third party allocation of reward. Cause was manipulated by altering the strategy of the two simulated players i n the two-choice, three-person matrix game so that i n one condition (harm), the over-rewarded party caused the under—rewarded one to receive fewer points than would have been obtained had the over-rewarded player followed a different strategy. In the other condition (help), the over-rewarded player helped the under-rewarded one i n that the under-rewarded player would have received even fewer points had the over-rewarded player chosen differently. The discrepancy between the points received by the simulated players was the same i n both conditions. Baker predicted that third parties would give more rewards to the over—rewarded party when he was helpful than when he was harmful. Some support for this prediction was obtained. Kaufman (1970) found that an i l l e g a l failure to save an other from harm was judged as morally wrong and deserving of punishment. He also found that a person who fa i l e d to intervene under such conditions was judged to be unpleasant. Evidence from this study and from the one by Baker indicates that third parties prefer that individuals behave positively rather than negatively toward others. Additional support for a general preference for positive rather than negative input may be derived from noting the existence of both formal and informal mechanisms designed to reward positive input and to punish negative input. These observations provide the rationale for stating, as a second principle, that third parties prefer positive input from others. The second question that is of importance to analysis of third party justice behavior is that of the relative importance, to third parties, of actual equity and input positivity. There seems to be some justification for predicting that a third party preference for positive input from others may be stronger than third party preference for actual equity for others. Third party preference for input positivity over actual equity may be most clearly demonstrated by the response to harm-doer-victim dyads in which equity can be restored only by means of retaliation from the victim. In many of these cases, third parties appear to prefer that the inequity remain uncorrected than that the victim make negative input to even the score. In case of minor offences, third parties appear to exhibit only ndrdmal tolerance for restoration of equity by means of retaliation from the victim. For example, Piaget (1932) investigated children's responses to victim retaliation against an aggressor in situations involving childish offences and found that retaliation was judged acceptable only i f i t was identical in quality and quantity to the original offence. Non-retaliation was preferred when retaliation involved arbitrary measures invented to settle the score. Kalven & Zeisel (1966) found a similar phenomenon among jurors who were reluctant to return a guilty verdict when retaliation matched in quality and quantity the original offence but did not hesitate to return a guilty verdict under other conditions. When victims threaten to retaliate considerable pressure, both formal and informal, i s often exerted to prevent them from doing so. For example, victims are frequently urged to "forget and forgive" while maxims such as "forgiveness is divine" point to the greater virtue and moral superiority of a peaceful solution. When harm results from a serious transgression, victims are further dissuaded from retaliation by threat of legal penalties. In some cases, as when: merchants or members of an ethnic minority become the target of juvenile delinquent instances of victimization may be repeated while law enforcement agencies appear powerless to prevent further offences. Even in these cases, threats to retaliate e l i c i t strong opposition. These considerations provide the rationale for stating as a third principle of third party equity behavior that, when preferences for positive input and actual equity conflict, third parties may prefer positive input from others to actual equity for others. These three principles permit derivation of the following hypotheses concerning third party preferences among various restorations of equity in dyads where inequity is caused by counter-*iormative behavior. Hypothesis 1: When alternative solutions to inequitable situations are equal in actual equity, third parties will prefer alternatives that maximize input positivity. This hypothesis may be derived from the combination of the principles of preference for actual equity and for input positivity. Adams (1965) specified that actual equity could be restored for an over-rewarded party by means of lowered outcomes or improved inputs. The principle of preference for input positivity predicts that the preferred restoration will be the one that provides positive input from the over—rewarded party. Hypothesis 2: When alternative solutions to inequitable situations are equal in input positivity, third parties will prefer alternatives that maximize actual equity. This hypothesis is also derived from the combination of the principles of preference for actual equity and for input positivity. Alternative reductions of inequity may be equal in input positivity but differ in actual equity. The principle of preference for actual equity predicts that, in this case, the preferred solution will be the one that is greater in actual equity. Hypothesis 3s When alternative solutions to inequitable situations are such that preferences for maximizing actual equity and input positivity conflict, third parties will prefer to achieve maximum input positivity rather than maximum actual equity. This hypothesis is derived from the third principle which specifi the relative importance to third parties of positive input and actual equity. The principle leads to the hypothesis that, when alternatives present a conflict between actual equity and positive input, the preferred alternative will be the one that is greatest in input positivity. Hypothesis 4s When resolution of an inequity permits third parties to satisfy preferences for actual equity and for input positivity, third parties will report greater satisfaction with the solution than when resolution of an inequity satisfies only one preference or involves satisfying one preference at the expense of the other. Third party satisfaction with the solution will be further decreased as the number and salience of remaining inequities requiring resolution through psychological means increases, Adams (1965) noted that the occurrence of inequity elicited expressions of negative emotional affect from the parties involved in the exchange. Baker (1974) demonstrated that the occurrence of inequity between others results in expressions of anger from third party observers of the injustice. The present analysis permits prediction of differences in the extent to which felt dissatisfaction is reduced when resolutions of the inequity vary in achievement of actual equity and input positivity. Principles 1 and 2 permit the prediction that dissatisfaction will be most completely reduced when resolution of inequity satisfies preferences for actual equity and for input positivity. It i s also possible to predict that, when reduction of inequity satisfies only one preference or involves conflict between preferences, dissatisfaction with the situation will persist. When actual equity is not restored for one or both members of a dyad, third parties may restore psychological equity by means of cognitive re-appraisal of inputs or outcomes. The following two hypotheses concerning modes of psychological reduction of inequity are not derived from the principles outlined above. These hypotheses follow from previous investigations that have examined third party restoration of equity by means of cognitive re-appraisal of inputs 20 and outcomes. Hypothesis 5s Third parties will restore psychological equity for an over-rewarded party by cognitively re-appraising inputs so they are commensurate with outcomes. That i s , a third party may enhance his evaluation of the inputs of the over-rewarded party in order to convince himself that the situation is equitable. This hypothesis i s based partly on the premise that restoration of psychological inequity by means of cognitive re-appraisals of inputs or outcomes will be in a direction of least resistance. When a harm-doer eludes justice and i s free to enjoy his ill-gotten gains, third parties may find i t easier to alter cognitions about his inputs than to deny the value of a definite gain, Lerner's (1965) findings are consistent with this hypothesis. Observers were presented with a situation in which chance determined which one of two workers would be paid for his efforts, Lerner found that the recipient of chance reward was perceived as making a greater contribution to the group task. When the inputs of the over—rewarded party are counter—normative and negative and guilt is clear, cognitive re-appraisals that serve to reduce perceived inequity may be more likely to involve enhanced perception of the actor's positive personality characteristics and/or attributions of responsibility for the actor's negative acts away from him than denial of the wrongness of the act. That third parties are not likely to deny the wrongness of the act is suggested by reports that even juvenile delinquents (Sykes & Matza, 1957) and con men (Maurer, 1963) do not deny the wrongness of their criminal activities, Sykes and 21 Matza, however, report that juvenile delinquents are quick to point out the situational and environmental factors responsible for their delinquent behaviors, Vidmar (1972) reports that subjects who permitted a harm-doer to escape too lightly subsequently evaluated the defendant as less bad and as more likeable than did subjects who did not let the defendant off too lightly. On this basis, i t may be expected that the over—rewarded harm-doer will be perceived asf more attractive and/or held less personally responsible for the event. Hypothesis 6: Third parties will restore psychological equity for an under—rewarded party by cognitively re—appraising inputs so they are commensurate with outcomes. In this case, the third party may devalue the inputs of the under—rewarded party in order to convince himself that the situation is equitable, A series of experiments by Lerner and his colleagues (e.g., Lerner & Matthews, 19&7; Lerner & Simmons, 1966; Lerner, 1971) has demonstrated that observers who cannot restore victims* positive outcomes restore psychological equity by devaluing victims' inputs. In general, psychological equity for a victim may be restored by derogating the victim's personal characteristics or by blaming the victim for his own misfortune (Lerner, 1970). Previous investigations have tested "just world" hypotheses in situations where the negative input of another party is the cause of the victim's misfortune• Lincoln & Levinger (1972) demonstrated that third party evaluation of a victim of assault would differ as a function of the consequences of the evaluation for the fate of the victim. Jones & Aronson (1973) investigated the effects of the respectability of the victim and the seriousness of the crime on attribution of fault to a rape victim and severity of punishment for the criminal* They found that, the more serious the crime and the more attractive the victim, the more severe was the sentence imposed on the offender. They also found, however, that more respectable victims were attributed more blame for the injury than less respectable victims. These findings thus indicate that punishment of a wrong-doer does not preclude derogation of a victim. Results of the study by Jones and Aronson indicate that devaluation of victims may occur among subjects who are in a position to punish a harm-doer but cannot compensate a victim. This suggests that, intervention that provides no real compensation for a victim's loss will e l i c i t derogation of the victim. In these cases, third parties may restore psychological equity by derogating the victim's personal characteristics and/or attributing responsibility for his misfortune to him. CHAPTER II REVIEW OF PILOT STUDIES AND PREVIEW OF PRESENT RESEARCH Hypothetical examples of criminal-victim dyads were used to test predictions concerning third party responses to dyadic inequity. This particular exchange was selected for several reasons. F i r s t l y , the criirrLnal-victim dyad provides an example of inequity resulting from the deliberate exploitation of one party by another. Such dyads are formed when one party uses means that violate moral and legal prohibitions to exploit another. In this dyad, the counter-normative and negative input of the criminal wins him an undeserved positive outcome: the rewards and pleasures gained from the trans-action. By contrast, the behavior of the victim does not violate moral or legal prohibitions- and he experiences suffering and deprivation. Thus, the inputs of the victim are positive and his outcomes are negative. This dyad thus met the requirements of the research for an exchange i n which the inputs of one party were negative, those of the other positive and the valence of the outcome of each party was opposite to that of the input. A second advantage of the criminal-victim exchange was that i t i s one i n which intervention i s commonplace and appropriate. Consequently, subjects were not l i k e l y to question the legitimacy of intervention or become suspicious of experimental interest i n 23 2k questions related to intervention. Additionally, since questions related to crime concern many people, the stimulus situation and experimental tasks seemed l i k e l y to possess i n t r i n s i c interest for subjects. Predictions concerning third party restoration of dyadic equity were tested by presenting subjects with different reductions of the inequity. The actual equity and input positivity of various resolutions of inequity were manipulated by the kind of sentence for the criminal and the availability of compensation for the victim. Different resolutions of the inequity included two possible outcomes for the victim. A positive outcome for the victim was represented by a resolution that made good his losses, either by means of restitution from the criminal or by compensation paid by a provincial fund. The victim's'outcome was represented as negative when the resolution of inequity did not make good his losses. The victim's inputs were assumed positive i n a l l cases. Different sentences represented, different inputs and outcomes for the criminal. The rationale for defining different sentences as representing different resolutions of the inequity for the criminal i s outlined below. Whether a sentence prescribing a punishment i s represented as positive or negative input from the offender depends on whether the sentence involves active restitution or reparation from the offender, or whether he becomes the passive object of actions carried out by others. Some punishments involve restitution from the offender. A person found guilty of vandalism may, for example, pay the victim for the damaged property or else repair i t . In other cases, restitution may be directed toward some party eligible to "stand in" for the victim. A driver found guilty of manslaughter might, for example, provide a sum of money to the victim's survivors. In other cases, society may "stand in" for the victim and accept restitution on his behalf. For example, a vandal might make amends by donating his services to the up-keep of a public park or a driver might contribute to a traffic safety program. These punishments require the co-operation of the offender in remedying the injustice; the offender "undoes" or compensates for the harm by making amends, either directly to the injured partyjor to a representative of the victim, for the offence. Other punishments do not involve a positive contribution from the offender. Penalties or deprivations are inflicted on the offender in order to make him suffer for his misdeeds. These penalties do not require active restitution from the offender but instead seem directed toward taking revenge on the offender. The terms revenge or retaliation are here used to designate punishments in which the offender is the object rather than the origin of the actions that restore equity. Such punishments are carried out by others and involve constraint. A spanking for an unruly child and a prison sentence for an adult offender are examples of retaliatory or revenge oriented punishments. In equity terms, punishments that restore equity through restitution appear oriented toward restoring equity by changing the inputs of the haimwioer from negative ones to positive ones. Punishments that restore equity through revenge or retaliation do not restore equity by means of changed input from the offender but instead operate on his outcomes. A pre-test was conducted to test the conceptual distinction between input- and outcome-related punishments. Subjects were given a brief outline to acquaint them with equity terms. Then they were asked to consider four offences and to make up possible punishments to restore equity. Subjects were directed to prescribe, for each of the four offences, two punishments: one to restore equity by changing the offender's inputs and the other to restore equity by changing the harm-doer's outcomes. The four offences presented to subjects were: a boy who stole his sister's saved allowance and spent the money on movies and treats, a g i r l who became angry with her sister and unravelled a sweater her sister had been knitting, a man who swindled an elderly widow out of her savings, and a dentist who charged patients exorbitant fees for unnecessary treatments. It was hypothesized that subjects would prescribe restitution for input-related punishments and revenge or retaliatory type penalties for outcome-related punishments. Twenty-six subjects in "the first pre—test completed the task. Each subject suggested a total of eight punishments: two for each of four offences. Each of the 208 punishments suggested by subjects was copied on a separate index card. Two independent raters were presented with the offences and the suggested punishments for each offence• The raters were instructed to assign each punishment one of five values. Raters were told to consider as restitution punishments that required the active participation of the offender in remedying the 27 injustice. They were told that such punishments require the offender to ••undo" the harm by making amends either directly to the injured party or, in some cases, to a "stand in" for the injured party. Raters were instructed to assign a " 1 " to punishments that were clearly restitution. Raters were told to consider as revenge or retaliation punishments that prescribed penalties or deprivations inflicted on the offender in order to make him suffer for his misdeeds. Raters were told that these punishments were carried out by others and did not require the co-operation of the offender in order to be carried out. Raters were told to assign a " 5 " to punishments that were clearly revenge or retaliation. Raters were instructed to assign a " 2 " to punishments that primarily involved restitution, a " 3 " to punishments that could not be classified as restitution or retaliation and a " 4 " to punishments that primarily involved revenge or retaliation. Raters thus assigned each punishment a rating from one to five to indicate their judgments of the activity or passivity of the role of the offender in the restoration of equity. In one hundred and forty-four cases, judges agreed in identifying punishments as clearly or primarily restitution or as clearly or primarily retaliation. Thus, approximately 69 percent of the items were identified by both judges as restitution or by both judges as retaliation. Judges disagreed on the restitutive or retaliatory nature of 36 (approximately 17 percent) of the punishments. That i s , when these items were rated as clearly or primarily restitution by one judge, they were rated as clearly or primarily retaliation by the other, judge. In twenty-eight cases, one or both judges indicated that they could not classify a punishment as 28 either restitution or retaliation. Fourteen of these punishments were rated as neither restitution nor retaliation by both judges while the other fourteen were rated as retaliation or restitution by one judge and as neither by the other judge. The hypothesis that subjects would prescribe restitution for input-related punishments and revenge or retaliatory type penalties for outcome-related punishments was tested as follows. Each subject suggested eight punishments: four of these were input-related punishments and four were outcome-related punishments. Each of these eight punishments was rated by two judges. Ratings of input-related punishments as restitution or of outcome-related punishments as retaliation were consistent with predictions. Ratings of input-related punishments as retaliation or of outcome-related punishments as restitution were not consistent with predictions. Ratings of punishments as neither restitution nor retaliation were not included in the analysis. On this basis, eighteen of the ratings of input-related punishments and twenty-four of the ratings of outcome-related punishments were discarded. For each subject's set of punishments, the number of ratings of input-related punishments as clearly or primarily restitution and of outcome-related punishments as clearly or primarily retaliation was compared to the number of ratings of input-related punishments as clearly or primarily retaliation and of outcome-related punishments as clearly or primarily restitution. In twenty-three out of twenty-six cases, the number of ratings that were as predicted exceeded the number of ratings that were contrary to predictions. The binomial test indicated that cases in which the number of predicted ratings exceeded the number of non-predicted ones were obtained significantly more often than would be expected by chance 002), These findings support the conceptual 29 d i s t i n c t i o n between input- and outcome-related punishments. Punishments that e l i c i t active r e s t i t u t i o n , to the vi c t i m or to society, may be regarded as restoring equity by means of positive input from the offender. Punishments that make the offender the passive object of penalties intended to i n f l i c t suffering and deprivation on him restore equity by operating on outcomes. The accounts of crimes used i n the present research a l l described offences against property. Four sentences were used to represent three dif f e r e n t resolutions of the inequity f o r the harm-doer. These sentences were: (1) making r e s t i t u t i o n to the vi c t i m , (2) paying a f i n e , (3) a term of imprisonment and, (4) a release, A party responsible f o r an in j u r y to another may make r e s t i t u t i o n i n any one of a number of ways depending on the nature of the offence and the circumstances. When the crime i s against property, an appropriate means of r e s t i t u t i o n i s to pay the v i c t i m or h i s representative a sum of money s u f f i c i e n t to compensate him f o r h i s losses. Accordingly, i n the present research, r e s t i t u t i o n involved paying a 'sum of money d i r e c t l y to the v i c t i m . Fine represented the case where r e s t i t u t i o n was not made d i r e c t l y to the vict i m but was, instead, received by society on his behalf. Restitution and fine both involve the active p a r t i c i p a t i o n of the harm-doer i n the restoration of equity. Both these sentences c a l l f o r the harm-doer to co-operate to restore equity by changing his inputs to positive ones. Consequently, both these alternatives are represented as involving positive input from the cr i m i n a l . Imprisonment i s c l a s s i f i e d as a revenge-oriented punishment that does not require the co-operation of the offender i n the restoration of equity and thus does not require that he change his input to restore equity. Release also does not require that the offender change his inputs. Both these sentences are represented as negative input to signify that the resolution does not require that the harm-doer alter the nature of his prior negative inputs. In Adams' (196-5) equity model, inputs and outcomes were conceptually distinct. A change in one did not affect the other. Thus, restoring equity by altering inputs did not change outcomes. As Pritchard (1969) pointed out, the psychological independence of inputs and outcomes is s t i l l an open question. It is possible to argue that an alteration in inputs also alters the psychological valuation of outcomes. This unresolved problem i s relevant to the present study. That i s , despite empirical evidence supporting the distinction between input-related punishments and outcome-related punishments, i t may be argued that a punishment that restores equity by means of positive input from an offender will be perceived as also operating on his outcomes. For this reason, an attempt was made to define the outcome positivity of sentences independently of the input positivity of sentences. Whether or not the outcome value associated with a particular sentence is represented as a positive'orvnagative one for the offender depends on the perceived favorability, for the offender, of this sentence compared to other sentences the offender could also receive. Twenty-six subjects in the fi r s t pilot study were given a brief general description of a property crime and five possible sentences for i t . The five possible sentences were: a term of imprisonment, paving a fine, making restitution to the victim, a term of probation, and a release. Subjects were asked to rate these sentences on two items intended to assess the perceived f a v o r a b i l i t y , f o r a criminal, of the various sentences. These items asked subjects to indicate, f o r each sentence, how desirable the offender would f i n d i t compared to other sentences and how much he would prefer i t to other sentences i f given his choice of the f i v e sentences. Subjects indicated t h e i r evaluation of each sentence on each item by c i r c l i n g a number from one to nine. A higher number indicated that a sentence was perceived as being less desired by an offender and as less l i k e l y to be chosen by an offender. The obtained data were subjected to analyses of variance f o r single factor experiments having repeated measures on the same elements (Winer, 1 9 6 2 ) . The mean ratings on the two items f o r each of the f i v e sentences are shown i n Table I and the analysis of variance summary tables are presented i n Tables I I and I I I . As Tables I I and I I I indicate, obtained differences i n ratings of the f i v e sentences on each of the two items were s i g n i f i c a n t . TABLE I MEAN RATINGS OF FIVE SENTENCES ON TWO ITEMS Sentences Item Imprisonment Fine R e s t i t u t i o n Probation Release Comparative • d e s i r a b i l i t y 8.15 5.27 5.88 2.92 1 .38 Choice value 8.19 5.08 5 .88 2.58 1.00 32 TABLE II SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF RATINGS OF CHOICE VALUE, TO THE CRIMINAL, OF FIVE SENTENCES SOURCE SS df MS F P Between subjects 77.00 25 Within subjects 1019.20 104 Sentences 827.33 4 206.83 107.72 -^.05 Residual 191.87 100 1.92 Total 1096.20 129 TABLE III SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF RATINGS OF PERCEIVED COMPARATIVE DESIRABILITY, TO THE CRIMINAL, OF FIVE SENTENCES SOURCE SS df MS F P Between subjects 140.83 25 Within subjects 977.20 104 Sentences 722.88 4 180.72 71.14 ^- .05 Residual 254.32 100 2.54 Total 1118.03 129 The Newman-Keuls method was used to compare obtained ratings for a l l possible pairs of means. These tests indicated that, for the two items assessing the perceived favorability, for the criminal, of the sentences, a l l comparisons were significant at the JD -^.01 l e v e l except f o r the f i n e - r e s t i t u t i o n comparison. The ratings of comparative d e s i r a b i l i t y , to the criirdnal, and of offender preference f o r various sentences provide empirical support f o r the proposition that these alternatives d i f f e r i n perceived f a v o r a b i l i t y or p o s i t i v i t y of outcome. That the differences between ratings of fine and r e s t i t u t i o n were not s i g n i f i c a n t either for d e s i r a b i l i t y or f o r choice value was i n keeping with experimental purposes since these alternatives were conceptualized as being approximate equivalents for the harm-doer but as having d i f f e r e n t consequences for the v i c t i m . . The obtained data thus provided the basis f o r representing the outcome associated with a p a r t i c u l a r sentence as a positive or negative one. Imprisonment was rated as the least favorable of a l l sentences while release was regarded as the most favorable Fine and r e s t i t u t i o n were not perceived as d i f f e r i n g s i g n i f i c a n t l y from one another i n f a v o r a b i l i t y f o r the offender but were regarded as s i g n i f i c a n t l y more favorable than imprisonment. To summarize, the four sentences represented three d i f f e r e n t resolutions of the inequity f o r the offender. These resolutions are as outlined below: 1. A term of imprisonment: This sentence i s represented as restoring actual equity for the harm-doer. This sentence restores equity with a negative outcome for the offender. I t does not require positive input from the offender. Accordingly, "^Since Release was rated as s i g n i f i c a n t l y more favorable than Probation, the Release alternative was retained as a sentence that did not restore equity by means of positive input or negative outcome for the offender. The Probation alternative was omitted. imprisonment represents actual equity with negative input and outcome for the harm-doer, 2. Restitution: This sentence is represented as restoring actual equity for the harm-doer. Since the sentence requires that the harm-doer participate in reduction of inequity by making restitution to the victim, his changed input is represented as positive. The outcome associated with this sentence is also represented as positive relative to imprisonment, 3. Fine: This sentence also represents actual equity for the harm-doer. This sentence also requires that the criminal participate in restoring equity. In this case, however, restitution is made to society rather than directly to the victim. Accordingly, this sentence represents actual equity with positive input and, relative to imprisonment, a positive outcome for the harm-doer. 4. Release: This sentence does not restore actual equity for the harm-doer. It does not require that he change his input. Thus, this represents inequity with a positive outcome and negative input for the offender. The hypotheses outlined in the Introduction were tested in two separate studies. The f i r s t study tested predictions, derived from Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3, concerning third party preferences among reductions of inequity. These predictions were tested by presenting subjects in each condition with an account of a simulated criminal case and a set of sentencing alternatives. The sentences represented 35 resolutions of inequity that varied in actual equity and input positivity. Subjects were asked to indicate the sentences that they would impose in the case. Data concerning subjects' choice of sentences provided a test of predictions derived from Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3» The fi r s t study also permitted a test of predictions, derived from Hypothesis 4, concerning satisfaction with different resolutions of inequity. In addition,, the study tested predictions regarding the effects of availability of compensation on subjects' evaluations of victims. The conditions included in the study and the predictions tested are described in detail in the next section. In the second study, subjects were not permitted to make a sentencing decision and thus had no power to determine the fates of the parties to the inequity. In this study, the summary of the simulated case described a sentence that had been imposed in the case. This study permitted a test of a prediction, derived from Hypothesis 4t concerning satisfaction with solutions among on-lookers rather than decision-makers. The study also tested predictions, derived from Hypotheses 5 and 6, concerning the influence of different resolutions of inequity on subsequent evaluations of plaintiffs and defendants. The conditions included in this study and the predictions tested are also detailed in the next section. CHAPTER III METHOD STUDY I OVERVIEW STIMULUS MATERIALS Subjects were presented with a summary of a simulated criminal case. The case accounts contained a brief outline of the offence. This was followed by summaries of testimony given by the plaintiff, defendant and various witnesses in the case. A l l accounts specified the amount of the victim's loss and, in addition, clearly indicated that the defendant had been found guilty of the offence. The offences described in the case accounts were crimes against property, that did not involve physical harm to any person. In a l l cases, the account made clear that the victim would not be compensated for his loss by a private source such as an insurance company. Confining the crimes to offences against property ensured that the loss suffered by the victim could be tangibly specified and could be made good by financial compensation i f funds were available. Included in the studies were accounts of three different crimes: a fraud, 2 a theft, and an act of vandalism. The type of crime was varied to 'See Appendix A for a copy of the Stimulus Materials for Study I. 36 strengthen the generalizability of the findings by ensuring that the observed responses were not specific to a single account or a particular crime. Each account was represented an equal number of times in each condition in the study. Pretests were conducted with pilot subjects to determine whether the case accounts were suitable for experimental purposes. Data were collected to: 1) compare the attractiveness, when they were presented independently of their subsequent criminal-victim roles, of stimulus persons to be identified in each account as plaintiff and defendant•* and, 2) ensure that the evidence to be supplied in each case account was sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt, A report of the pilot study is presented in Appendix B, This report also contains a brief account of pre-tests conducted to assess the suitability of dependent measures used in the present research, CONDITIONS AND PREDICTIONS The number and kind of resolutions of actual equity available to subjects was varied by presenting subjects in each condition with a different set of sentencing alternatives. The four conditions in the f i r s t study were as outlined below. Subjects in each condition were asked to indicate which of two alternatives they would prefer to impose in the case. 1. Fine vs Imprisonment Condition: Subjects in this condition were presented with alternatives of sentencing the criminal to pay a fine or serve a term of imprisonment. Both alternatives represented actual equity for the criminal: the first sentence required that equity be restored by means of positive input from the criminal while the second did not alter his input. Both alternatives limited subjects to restoring actual equity only for the criminal: neither alternative restored the victim's positive outcomes. This condition provided a test of Hypothesis 1 which stated that when alternative solutions to inequitable situations were equal in actual equity, third parties would prefer alternatives that maximized positive input. The prediction derived from this hypothesis was that subjects would choose the Fine alternative because i t was greater in input positivity than the Imprisonment one, 2, Restitution vs Fine Condition: Subjects in this condition were presented with alternatives of ordering the criminal to make restitution to the victim or else to pay a fine. Both of these sentences represented positive input from the criminal and assumed positive input from the victim but restitution restored actual equity for the victim and was, therefore, greater in actual equity than the Fine condition. This condition tested Hypothesis 2 which stated that when alternative solutions to inequitable situations were equal in input positivity, third parties would prefer alternatives that were greater in actual equity. The prediction derived from this hypothesis was that subjects would choose the Restitution alternative because i t was greater in actual equity, 3, Imprisonment vs Release Condition: This condition presented subjects with alternatives of releasing the criminal or of sentencing 39 him to serve a term of imprisonment. Neither alternative required the criminal to alter his input. Thus, both sentences left the criminal's negative input unchanged. The Imprisonment alternative restored actual equity for the harm-doer by changing his outcomes to negative ones while the Release alternative represented continued inequity with a positive outcome for the criminal. Neither option restored the victim's positive outcomes and, accordingly, subjects could not achieve actual equity for the victim. This condition permitted subjects to resolve the situation so as to achieve actual equity with a negative outcome for the criminal or to maintain the inequity with a positive outcome for the crlniinal. This condition provided a test of Hypothesis 2 . The prediction was that subjects would select the Imprisonment alternative because i t was greater in actual equity. 4 . Imprisonment with Compensation vs Fine Condition* Subjects in this condition were presented with alternatives of sentencing the criminal to a term of imprisonment and awarding the victim compensation to be paid by a Provincial Fund or of ordering the criminal to pay a fine without compensation to the victim. The first alternative did not involve positive input from the criminal but did restore actual equity for both parties to the offence. The second alternative involved positive input from the criminal and produced actual equity for him but did not restore actual equity for the victim. This condition thus permitted subjects to maximize actual equity by selecting the Imprisonment with Compensation alternative or to maximize input positivity by choosing the second option. . This condition provided a test of Hypothesis 3. This hypothesis was that when alternative solutions to inequitable situations were such that preferences for maximizing actual equity conflicted with preferences for maximizing input positivity, third parties would prefer to achieve maximum input positivity rather than maximum actual equity. The prediction was that subjects would select the Fine alternative which maximized input positivity. This study also permitted a test of Hypothesis 4« This hypothesis was that, when third parties were permitted to resolve inequity so as to satisfy preferences for actual equity and for input positivity, third parties would report more satisfaction with the solution than when resolution of inequity satisfied only one preference or involved satisfying one preference at the expense of the other. Two conditions, Fine vs Imprisonment and Restitution vs Fine, permitted subjects to select alternatives that represented input positivity and actual equity. The Imprisonment vs Release condition permitted subjects to restore actual equity but not to achieve input positivity. The Imprisonment with Compensation vs Fine condition presented subjects with a conflict between actual equity and input positivity. These considerations led to the prediction, derived from Hypothesis 4 , that subjects would express greater satisfaction in conditions where alternatives permitted selection of solutions that increased actual equity and input positivity (Fine vs Imprisonment and Restitution vs Fine conditions) than in conditions where alternatives satisfied only one preference or made salient conflict between preferences (imprisonment vs Release and Imprisonment with 41 Compensation vs Fine conditions). The study also permitted a test of Hypothesis 6 which stated that third parties would restore psychological equity for an under—rewarded party by devaluation of the inputs of the under-rewarded party. The prediction derived from this hypothesis was that victims who did not receive financial compensation for losses would be devalued in comparison to victims who did receive such compensation. Neither of the alternative sentences in the Fine vs Imprisonment and the Imprisonment vs Release conditions provided financial compensation for victims' losses. Accordingly, .these two conditions did not permit subjects to compensate victims. Although one of the alternative sentences in the Imprisonment with Compensation vs Fine condition did make available financial compensation for victims' losses, subjects were expected to choose the Fine alternative that did not compensate victims. In this condition, however, subjects' responses to victims might be affected by a feeling of personal responsibility for depriving victims of deserved compensation. For this reason, this condition was not included in the proposed test of Hypothesis 6. The Restitution vs Fine condition also made available an alternative that provided financial compensation for victims' losses. This condition could be compared to the two that did not provide for such compensation. The prediction was that subjects in the Fine vs Imprisonment and the Imprisonment vs Release conditions would rate the victim as less attractive and/or as more to blame for the offence than would subjects in the Restitution vs Fine condition. 42 SUBJECTS The subjects who participated in the study were volunteers from Psychology classes at the University of British Columbia. The design for the experiment called for a total of 120 subjects: 30 in each of four conditions with an equal proportion of male and female subjects in each condition. Subjects were tested in groups ranging in size from two to four persons. A l l subjects in any particular group were of the same sex. Different conditions were represented within groups and the experimenter was unaware of the conditions that were represented within a group, A total of 55 groups took part in the study: 11 contained four subjects, 23 contained three subjects and 19 contained two subjects. One group of three subjects did not complete the experiment due to a procedural error. The nature of the study was such that, for a subject's responses to be meaningful, i t was necessary that he appreciate fully several aspects of the stimulus situation, A subject who read the case account too hastily might, for example, confuse the identities and roles of the parties to the offence or f a i l to understand the nature of the offence, A subject who, for example, failed to appreciate the deception involved in the fraud might, incorrectly, conclude that the defendant had borrowed the money from the plaintiff and had subsequently been unable to repay the loan. Alternatively, a subject might f a i l to take note of the value of the property involved in the crime. Failure to perceive, with a reasonable degree of accuracy, the amount involved could lead to differential perceptions of the severity of the crime or of the victim's loss. Finally, the choice of sentences available to subjects in different conditions constituted the major manipulation of the study. Success of this manipulation was dependent on subjects' appreciation of the consequences, for plaintiffs and defendants, of the different reductions of inequity represented by these sentences. For these reasons, i t was decided, on an a priori basis, to include in the study a check on subjects1 recall of the facts of the case and to discard data from subjects who failed to answer these items correctly. Thus, for a subject's data to be included in the analysis, i t was necessary that he answer correctly items asking him to name the defendant and to specify the nature of the crime. Subjects were also asked to state the approximate value of the property involved in the offence, A subject's data were discarded i f he recalled the amount, which was $ 2 , 5 0 0 , , as less than $ 2 , 0 0 0 , or as greater than $ 3 , 0 0 0 , A fairly demanding multiple choice item tested subjects* understanding of the sentences available to them. This item presented subjects with a brief description of five possible sentences for the offence. Subjects were requested to indicate which two had been available for them to choose from when they sentenced the defendant. Unless a subject could identify the two sentences which had been available to him, his data were not included in the analysis, A total of 148 subjects completed the experimental tasks. Data from 25 subjects were discarded because these subjects failed to answer correctly one or more of the recall items. One subject failed to recall the name of the defendant and nine erred in their estimates of the value of the property involved in the offence. Seventeen subjects failed to indicate correctly the sentencing alternatives available to 44 them. One male and three females in the Imprisonment vs Release conditionj two males and six females in the Fine vs Imprisonment condition; one male and three females in the Imprisonment with Compensation vs Fine condition; and one female in the Restitution vs Fine condition failed to indicate correctly which two sentencing alternatives had been available to them. Data from these subjects were eliminated on the basis of their responses on the test items without examination of their other responses. In order to maintain 30 subjects in each of the four conditions, one subject's data were randomly eliminated from each of the Imprisonment vs Release, Fine vs Imprisonment and Restitution vs Fine conditions. PROCEDURE The experimental setting permitted up to four subjects at a time to participate in the study. The room used for the study is approximately nine feet- long and nine feet wide. It was furnished with a single table which was approximately six feet long and three feet wide. Five chairs were placed around the table: two at each side and one at an end. Subjects were not separated from one another or from the experimenter by screens or partitions. The space permitted subjects in a l l groups to work comfortably at the task without being cramped or crowded. The presence of the experimenter in the room precluded any discussion of the task among subjects. Once a l l subjects comprising a group had arrived, subjects were escorted to the experimental room and seated. The experimenter began each session by distributing copies of the UBC Department of Psychology "Basic Rights and Privileges of Human Subjects,""' This document was reviewed with each group. During the review of the rights and privilege of human subjects, subjects were instructed to make up code names for themselves and to place the code name on each booklet they completed. The experimenter explained that this would permit her to keep each subject's data together yet ensure anonymity. Once subjects had had an opportunity to ask any questions about their rights and privileges or the procedure for using the code name, the experimental tasks were begun. The experimental tasks were presented to the subjects in three parts. The fir s t part consisted of a booklet composed of a summary of a simulated case followed by materials to measure major dependent variables. The fir s t three pages of each booklet contained an account of one of the offences. The fourth page provided the rationale and instructions for choosing one of two possible sentences for the offence. Subjects were instructed to read the descriptions of two possible sentences and to indicate which one they would prefer to impose in the case presented to them. The next page outlined the two sentences which represented different resolutions of the inequity. Each subject 5 received one of four different sets of sentencing alternatives. The 3 See Appendix C for a copy of the UBC Department of Psychology "Basic Rights and Privileges of Human Subjects", "^See Appendix D for a copy of the Sentencing Instructions for Study I. See Appendix E for the four sets of sentencing alternatives in Study I, 46 different sets of sentences varied the input positivity and actual equity of solutions available to subjects. As a control measure, there were two orders of presentation of available sentences i n each condition. Half of the subjects i n each condition received the sentences i n one order; this order was reversed for the remaining subjects. Both sentences were presented on the same page. To ensure that subjects would indicate their preferred sentence before proceeding to subsequent sections of the booklet, the instruction "Please complete this page before you turn to the next one" was hand—printed at the bottom of the page. The sixth page instructed subjects to indicate how satisfactory they found the resolution of the situation represented by their chosen sentence.^1 Satisfaction was assessed by means of a 10-centimeter line labelled "completely satisfactory" at one end and "completely unsatisfactory" at the other end. Subjects were instructed to draw a vertical line through the scale at the point that best represented how satisfactory they found the resolution of the situation represented by the sentence they selected. The ten centimeter scale on which subjects were to indicate degree of satisfaction was presented on the same page as these instructions. Again, at the bottom of the page, was the hand-printed reminder: "Please complete this page before you turn to the next one." Pages 7, 8, 9 and 10 contained instructions and scales for rating V"" See Appendix F for a copy of the Satisfaction Scale for Study I. the attractiveness of defendants and p l a i n t i f f s . Page 7 presented instructions for using nine-point semantic dif f e r e n t i a l type scales. These instructions were adapted from Osgood, Suci.and Tannenbaum (1957)• Page 8 contained instructions specific to the present experiment. Subjects were requested to rate the stimulus persons i n the order i n which they were presented and to complete each set of ratings before going on to the next one. Subjects were also instructed to put the name of the individual being rated i n the spaces provided on the pages containing the rating scales. The f i n a l paragraph instructed subjects to work at f a i r l y high speed through the scales. These f i n a l instructions were also adapted from Osgood, Suci and Tannenbaum (1957), The next two pages each contained the 15 bi-polar adjective pairs comprising the scale developed by Lerner (1965), A stimulus person's score on each item could range from one (negative evaluation) to nine (positive evaluation). Ratings on these items were summed to yield an overall index of attractiveness. The range of possible scores was, therefore, from 15 to 135» A higher score indicates a more positive rating. In order to control for possible effects of rating order, half of the subjects i n each condition were directed to rate the p l a i n t i f f f i r s t and then the defendant: this order was reversed for the remaining subjects. The pages containing scales for rating stimulus persons contained spaces for subjects to indicate the name of the character (defendant or p l a i n t i f f ) being rated. 'See Appendix G for Instructions and" Scales ,fof .Rating participants' Attractivenes s• The purpose of asking subjects to supply the names of defendants and p l a i n t i f f s was to ensure that subjects would be clear as to the harm-doer or victim identity of the individual they were rating. Hand-printed instructions at the top of the pages reminded subjects to: "Please complete this page before you turn to the next one." The bottom of the page contained the hand-written reminder: "N. B. Be sure to put the name of the person you are rating i n the space provided at the top of the page." The l a s t two pages of each booklet presented instructions for responding to items intended to assess subjects' perceptions of the moral wrongness of the offence, the amount of blame attributable to the victim and the perceived responsibility of the criminal for 8 the offence. The f i r s t page explained how subjects were to use the scales: the second page presented items intended to measure variables of interest. Two items, adapted from Kaufman (1970), assessed subjects' perceptions of the moral wrongness of the offence. The f i r s t one asked subjects to complete the item: "As a question not of law but of morality, Dory's actions were:" by c i r c l i n g a number ranging from one for "as wrong as possible" to nine for "very right". The second item began: "Quite apart from legal aspects, Dory". Subjects responded to this item by c i r c l i n g a number ranging from one for "did not do anything wrong" to nine for "did very wrong". These items were scored and summed so that possible scores ranged from 'See Appendix H for a copy of Responsibility and Blame Scales. 49 two to eighteen. The lower the score, the greater the perceived wrongness of the act. The amount of blame attributed to the victim was assessed by-asking subjects to respond to the question: "How much do you think the p l a i n t i f f i s to blame for what happened?" Subjects responded to this item by c i r c l i n g a number ranging from one for "not at a l l " to nine for "completely". Two items assessed the perceived responsibility of the criminal for the offence. Subjects were asked to indicate whether they agreed or disagreed with the following two statements: (l) "Dory's acts were a result of the circumstances i n which he found himself" and (2) "Dory i s more a victim of circumstances than a criminal". Subjects indicated the extent of their agreement with these two items by c i r c l i n g a number on a scale ranging from one for "agree completely" to nine for "disagree completely". The experimenter introduced the f i r s t task by stating: "I am interested i n finding out some things about how people judge criminal offences and how they make sentencing decisions. This questionnaire (the experimenter displayed f i r s t booklet) consists of a case summary followed by questions about various aspects of the case. The case summary contains a brief outline of a criminal offence and the testimony given by witnesses i n the case. What I'd lik e you to do i s read over the case summary and then give your opinions about i t . "There are three main sets of questions asking your opinions about different aspects of the case. In front of each set of questions are instructions for using the scales. Please read over the instructions and, i f you find the instructions are clear, complete that part of the questionnaire and then turn to the next part. I f you find the instructions are not clear or i f you have any questions, l e t me know. 50 Please complete each part of the questionnaire before going on to the next one, "Are there any questions? (Pause), In that case, I ' l l distribute the questionnaire and l e t you begin. Remember —-when you f i n i s h the booklet — put your code name on i t and turn i t over — like this (experimenter demonstrated) — face down. After a l l subjects i n a group had completed the booklet comprising the f i r s t part of the experimental task, the second part was introduced. As the last subject completed and turned over his booklet, the experimenter glanced up from the book she had been reading and said: "Good, Now —- the next thing I'd like you to do i s —• without referring back to your f i r s t booklet — complete this short questionnaire," (The experimenter produced and displayed a copy of the questionnaire,) These four questions (pointing) ask you to r e c a l l some facts about the case. Look over this one (pointing to number seven on the questionnaire) carefully. It l i s t s five possible sentences for the offence and asks you to re c a l l the two you had to pick from when you sentenced the defendant. These questions (pointing) ask you what you would do i f you were imposing these sentences i n the case. This last question asks why you picked the sentence you chose. Answer i t very b r i e f l y — with just a sentence or two — and don't worry about spelling or grammar. Are there any questions? (Pause), Let me know i f you have any questions. Remember — when you f i n i s h — put your code name on top of the page and turn i t over — face down —- on top of your f i r s t booklet. The second part of the task consisted of a single page containing four items testing subjects' r e c a l l of the case and the sentencing alternatives available to them as well as four items asking for subjects' opinions regarding possible penalties and reasons for -See Appendix I for a copy of the Short Questionnaire for Study I, preferring one alternative to another. The three items included to test subjects' r e c a l l of the case asked them to state the name of the defendant, the nature of the offence and the amount of the victim's loss. The last item asked subjects to read over five possible sentences for the offence and indicate which two had been available for them to choose from when they sentenced the defendant. Subjects were asked to specify the magnitude of the penalties they would impose on the criminal by responding to the following three questions: l ) I f the defendant were to be sentenced to a term of imprisonment for the offence, how long a term should he serve for this offence?, 2) I f the defendant were to pay a fine rather than serve time i n prison, what amount of money should he pay as a fine?, and, 3) I f the defendant were to pay a sum of money to the rightful owner of the lost or damaged property rather than pay a fine or serve time i n prison, what amount of money should he pay to the p l a i n t i f f as restitution? Subjects were also asked to explain their choice of a sentence. This item was included as an open-ended measure that might provide insight into subjects' reasons for selecting or rejecting various alternatives. When a l l subjects i n a group had completed the short questionnaire, the experimenter produced copies of the Thurstone-Wang "Attitude toward Punishment of Criminals" Scale"1'0 with the comment: See Appendix J for a copy of the Thurstone-Wang "Attitude toward Punishment of Crindnals" Scale, 52 "This i s the last thing I have for you to do, (Pause), What I'd like you to do i s read over the statements i n this booklet. Put a check-mark i f you agree with a statement, a cross i f you disagree with i t and a question mark i f you cannot decide about i t . That's a check-mark i f you agree, a cross i f you disagree and a question mark i f you can't decide. During these instructions, the experimenter demonstrated for each subject by writing check-marks, crosses and question marks i n the appropriate places i n the instructions on the top of the f i r s t page of each copy of the attitude scale. After each subject had been given a copy of the scale, the experimenter said: "Again — when you're finished — remember to put your code name on your booklet and turn i t over face down," This scale was included i n order to obtain an indication of subjects' attitudes toward punishment of criminals. In view of the nature of the stimulus situation, this measure appeared to have some potential use as an aid to interpreting or explaining possible findings. As the last subject i n a group finished the Thurstone—Wang "Attitude toward Punishment of Criminals" Scale, the experimenter said: "And f i n a l l y , could you please take a minute or two and — on the back of that last booklet — the one you just turned over — write down your ideas about the purpose of the experiment. That i s , t e l l :me what you think the study i s trying to find^out. Remember not to worry about spelling or grammar. After completion of the last task, subjects were provided with Subjects were scheduled to participate i n the experiment when they had a free hour between classes. This time was sufficient for most groups to complete the experiment with a few minutes to spare. Some groups were later i n starting because subjects arrived l a t e . In order to avoid inconveniencing subjects i n such groups by, for example, making them late for their next class, this f i n a l request was omitted i n some instances. an explanation of the purpose of the experiment and were given an opportunity to ask questions. Subjects were requested to keep confidential information about the nature of the stimulus materials and the purposes and hypotheses of the experiment. The experimenter also mentioned that the accounts of crimes used i n the study were f i c t i t i o u s . At the conclusion of the discussion, the experimenter announced that a brief description of the findings would be available to participants i n the study and addresses were obtained from subjects who wished to receive one, STUDY II OVERVIEW STIMULUS MATERIALS Subjects were presented with slightly revised versions of the summaries of simulated criminal cases used i n Study I, The case accounts were revised so that the past, rather than the present, 12 tense was used where this was appropriate. Additionally, the case summaries for this study described a sentence that had been imposed i n the case, CONDITIONS AND PREDICTIONS This study was intended to test predictions concerning responses 'See Appendix K for a copy of the Stimulus Materials for Study I I , to resolutions of inequity that varied i n actual equity and input p o s i t i v i t y . Three different resolutions of the inequity were represented 13 by the sentences described. The three conditions included i n the experiment are outlined below, 1. Release Condition: Subjects i n this condition were told that the criminal had been released. This represented a continuation of the inequity with a positive outcome and negative input for the criminal. The input of the victim was assumed positive and, since the sentence did not provide compensation for his losses, his outcome was represented as negative, 2. Imprisonment with Compensation Condition: Subjects i n this condition were told that the criminal was sentenced to serve a term of imprisonment. Subjects were told to assume that the f u l l term would be served and that no parole would be considered. Subjects were also told that the victim received compensation for the loss and that the compensation was paid by a Provincial Fund. This represented actual equity for both parties to the offence. 3. Restitution Condition: Subjects were told that the criminal was sentenced to a term of imprisonment equal to that imposed i n the Imprisonment with Compensation condition but that the sentence was suspended i n view of the court order that the criminal make restitution to the victim. This condition also restored actual equity for both parties to the offence. This study permitted tests of Hypotheses 4» 5 and 6. See Appendix L for copies of Sentences for Study II 55 The three conditions i n this study represented reductions of dyadic inequity that varied i n actual equity and input p o s i t i v i t y . Restitution and Imprisonment with Compensation restored actual equity for both parties to the offence while Release restored actual equity for neither party. Restitution represented restoration with greater input positivity than did Imprisonment with Compensation, Therefore, the prediction derived from Hypothesis 4 was that subjects would express greatest satisfaction i n the Restitution condition, less satisfaction i n the Imprisonment with Compensation condition and least satisfaction i n the Release condition. Hypothesis 5 stated that a third party would restore psychological equity for an over-rewarded party by enhancing his evaluation of the inputs of the over-rewarded party i n order to convince himself that the situation was equitable. Two conditions, Imprisonment with Compensation and Restitution, restored actual equity for criminals. The Release condition did not restore actual equity for the criminal. Therefore, i t was predicted that subjects i n the Release condition would restore psychological equity for the criminal by enhancing his personal characteristics and/or holding him less responsible for the offence than would subjects i n the Imprisonment with Compensation condition. Hypothesis 6 was that third parties would restore psychological equity for an under-rewarded party by devaluation of the inputs of the under-rewarded party. Two conditions, Restitution and Imprisonment with Compensation, provided victims with financial compensation for losses. The Release condition deprived victims of both vindication and financial compensation. Therefore, i t was predicted that subjects i n the Release condition would rate victims as less attractive and/or as more responsible for the offence than (Would subjects i n the Restitution and Imprisonment with Compensation conditions. SUBJECTS The subjects who took part i n the study were volunteers from Psychology classes at the University of Bri t i s h Columbia. The design for this study called for a t o t a l of 48 subjects: 16 i n each of three conditions with an equal proportion of male and female subjects i n each of three conditions. Subjects were again brought into the experimental room i n groups ranging i n size from two to four persons. A l l subjects i n any particular group were of the same sex. Different conditions were represented within groups and the experimenter was unaware of the conditions that were represented within a group. A tot a l of 23 groups took'part i n the study: 14 groups contained two persons, eight groups contained three persons, and one group contained four persons. Thus, a t o t a l of 56 subjects took part i n the study. For reasons similar to those outlined i n connection with the f i r s t study, four items were used as guidelines to determine whether or not a subject's data would be included i n the analysis. Subjects were asked to r e c a l l the name of the defendant, the nature of the offence and the approximate value of the property involved i n the offence. The last item asked subjects to read over descriptions of three possible sentences for the offence and to indicate which one had been imposed on the defendant. A subject was required to r e c a l l the name of the defendant, the nature of the crime, the sentence imposed i n the case and to specify that the loss was greater than $2,000. or less 57 than $3,000, i n order for his data to be retained. As before, a subject's responses to these items were examined and a decision to accept or discard the data was made without reference to his responses to other items. Out of the tot a l of 56 subjects who took part i n the study, data from four were discarded because one of the re c a l l items was not completed correctly. One subject i n the Imprisonment with Compensation condition fa i l e d to r e c a l l the defendant's name and three subjects i n the Restitution condition indicated that the defendant had been released. To f a c i l i t a t e analysis, data from four remaining subjects were elijninated i n order to have equal numbers of subjects i n conditions, PROCEDURE The room used for the second study was the same one used for the f i r s t study. Again, copies of the "Basic Rights and Privileges of Human Subjects" were given to.subjects and the contents reviewed prior to presentation of the tasks. As i n the f i r s t study, subjects were requested to make up code names and to place these names on completed materials. The experimenter introduced the f i r s t task by stating: "I am interested i n finding out some things about how people judge criminal offences. This questionnaire (experimenter displayed f i r s t booklet) consists of a case summary followed by questions about various aspects of the case. The case summary contains a brief outline of the offence followed by the testimony given by witnesses i n the case. What I'd like you to do i s read over the case summary and then give your opinions about i t . "There are two main sets of questions asking your opinions about different aspects of the case. In front of each set of questions are instructions for using the scales. Please read over the instructions and, i f you find the instructions clear, complete that part of the questionnaire and then turn to the next part. I f you find the instructions are not clear or i f you have any questions, l e t me know. Please complete each part of the questionnaire before going on to the next one, "Are there any questions? (Pause), In that case, I ' l l distribute the questionnaire and l e t you begin. Remember — when you fi n i s h the booklet — put your code name on i t and turn i t over — like this (experimenter demonstrated) —• face down. When these instructions were completed, the booklet comprising the f i r s t part of the task was given to subjects. The booklet was composed of the summary of the simulated case and a description of a sentence imposed i n the case. Subjects i n each condition received a description of a sentence different from the one described i n other conditions. The different sentences represented resolutions of the original inequity that varied i n input positivity and actual equity. The booklet also included the dependent measures for the second study. These were, with two exceptions, the same as i n the f i r s t study. Materials for assessing subjects' choice of sentence were, of course, omitted. The instructions for indicating degree of satisfaction with the solution were also revised.^ 1' The remainder of the booklet contained the same materials i n the same form as i n Study I . After a l l subjects i n a group had completed the booklet I I . "^See Appendix M for a copy of the Satisfaction Scale for Study 59 comprising the f i r s t part of the task, the second part was introduced. As the last subject completed and turned over his booklet, the experimenter produced and displayed a copy of the questionnaire, containing items to test subjects' r e c a l l of the details of cases and to assess their opinions regarding various penalties. The experimenter said: "Good, Now the next thing I'd li k e you to do i s •— without referring back to your f i r s t booklet — complete this short questionnaire. Answer this (pointing) l a s t question f a i r l y b r i e f l y — with just a sentence or two — and don't worry about spelling or grammar. Let me know i f you have any questions. And remember — when you f i n i s h — put your name on the top of the page and turn i t over — face down — on top of your f i r s t booklet. The questionnaire was then given to subjects. The questionnaire asked for essentially the same information as i t did i n the f i r s t experiment. The f i n a l two items on the questionnaire were revised so as to be appropriate for the second study. The revised questionnaire i s shown i n Appendix N, When a l l subjects had completed the short questionnaire, the Thurstone-Wang "Attitude toward Punishment of Criminals" Scale was distributed. The comments and instructions accompanying distribution of the scale were the same as i n the f i r s t study. When the last task had been completed, the experimenter said: "Sometimes people form hypotheses about the purpose of an experiment — or suspect that deception i s involved. What I'd like you to do i s — i f you think the experiment has involved deception or i f you've formed some hypotheses about the purpose of the experiment — write out on the back of the last booklet what you think the deception involves or what the real purpose of the study i s . Once subjects had had time to write out their comments, they 6 0 were provided with an explanation of the purpose of the experiment and given an opportunity to ask questions about i t . Subjects were requested to keep confidential information about the nature of the stimulus materials and the purpose and hypotheses of the study. The experimenter also mentioned that the accounts of crimes used i n the study were f i c t i t i o u s . At the conclusion of the discussion, the experimenter collected addresses from subjects interested i n receiving b r i e f descriptions of the findings. CHAPTER IV RESULTS STUDY I Subjects in each condition were presented with two sentences that represented different resolutions of the inequity and asked to indicate which one they would impose in the case. Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3 predicted that, in each of the four conditions, one alternative would be selected significantly more frequently than the other. The binomial test was used to determine whether, within each condition, the predicted alternative was chosen significantly more frequently than the non-predicted alternative. Table IV shows the number of choices of predicted and non-predicted alternatives in each condition as well as the probability of the smaller of the obtained values. TABLE IV FREQUENCY OF SELECTION OF PREDICTED AND NON—PREDICTED ALTERNATIVES Condition Number of Choices of Predicted Alternative Number of Choices of Non-Predicted Alternative £ Imprisonment vs Release 24 6 <- .001 Fine vs Imprisonment 25 5 < .001 Restitution vs Fine 28 2 < . , 0 0 1 Imprisonment with Compensation vs Fine 7 23 61 62 As reference to Table IV indicates, the three predictions based on Hypotheses 1 and 2 were supported. Hypothesis 1 stated that when alternative solutions to inequitable situations were equal i n actual equity, third parties would prefer alternatives that maximized input po s i t i v i t y . The prediction derived from this hypothesis was that subjects i n the Fine vs Imprisonment condition would select the Fine alternative significantly more frequently than the Imprisonment one. The predicted alternative was chosen twenty-five times and the non-predicted alternative was selected five times. The binomial test indicated that the probability of obtaining this result by chance was -<: .001. Two predictions were derived from Hypothesis 2 which stated that when alternative solutions to inequitable situations were equal i n input positivity, third parties would prefer alternatives that maximized actual equity. The f i r s t prediction derived from this hypothesis was that subjects i n the Imprisonment vs Release condition would select the Imprisonment alternative more frequently than the Release alternative. Out of a t o t a l of thirt y subjects, six selected the Release alternative. As Table IV shows, the binomial test indicated that the probability of obtaining this result by chance was «c . 0 0 1 . The second prediction derived from Hypothesis 2 was that subjects i n the Restitution vs Fine condition would prefer the Restitution alternative. Reference to Table IV indicates that this prediction was also supported. The probability of obtaining by chance the observed number of choices of the non-predicted alternative i s <. . 0 0 1 . Hypothesis 3 stated that when alternative solutions to inequitable situations were such that preferences for maximizing equity and for maximizing input positivity conflicted, third parties would prefer to achieve maximum input positivity rather than maximum equity. The prediction derived from this hypothesis was that subjects i n the Imprisonment with Compensation vs Fine condition would select the Fine alternative. As Table IV shows,'-the data did not support this prediction. The predicted alternative was chosen less frequently than the non-predicted one. The implications of this finding w i l l be considered i n the Discussion section. The fourth hypothesis was that third parties would be more satisfied with solutions when alternatives permitted them to satisfy preferences for actual equity and for input positivity than when only one preference could be satisfied or when preferences conflicted. This hypothesis provided the basis for the prediction that expressed satisfaction with the solution would be greater i n the Fine vs Imprisonment and Restitution vs Fine conditions than i n the Imprisonment vs Release and Imprisonment with Compensation vs Fine conditions. Subjects indicated degree of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the solution by breaking a ten centimeter line labelled "completely satisfactory" at one end and "completely unsatisfactory" at the other. Scores, measured i n millimeters, could range from 0 to 100: a higher score indicated greater satisfaction with the solution. C e l l means for male and female subjects i n each condition are shown i n Table V. 64 TABLE V CELL MEANS FOR SATISFACTION WITH SOLUTION EXPRESSED BY MALE AND FEMALE SUBJECTS IN EACH CONDITION Sex of Subject Condition Male (N) Female (N) Condition Mean (N) Imprisonment vs Release 57.86 14 39.62 16 48.12 30 Fine vs Imprisonment 60.43 14 66.37 16 63.60 30 Restitution vs Fine 78.93 14 74.25 16 76.43 30 Imprisonment with Compensation vs Fine 36.13 14 51.50 . 16 44.33 30 The data were submitted to a four (conditions) by two (sex of subject) analysis of variance. Since each condition contained an equal proportion of male and female subjects, a modified conventional analysis (Kirk, 1969, p. 201) was carried out. Table VI shows the analysis of variance summary table. TABLE VI SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF SUBJECTS' EXPRESSED SATISFACTION WITH SOLUTION SOURCE SS df MS F A (Conditions) 19656.41 3 6552.14 14.26 f \ « 0 1 B (Sex of Subject) 4.81 1 4.81 -eCl.OO A x B 4665.60 3 1555.20 3.39 <. .05 Within C e l l 51442.29 112 459.31 TOTAL 75769.12 119 As Table VI shows, the obtained F values for both the main effect for conditions (F = 14.26, d.f. = 3t H2; £ -^ .01) and the conditions x sex interaction (F = 3«39» d.f. = 3, 112; £ *c.05) reached conventional levels of significance. The overall pattern of means shown in Table V indicates that satisfaction was greatest in conditions where alternatives permitted selection of solutions that increased actual equity and input positivity (the Fine vs Imprisonment and Restitution vs Fine Conditions) and least when alternatives permitted subjects to satisfy only one preference or made salient conflict between preferences (the Imprisonment vs Release and Imprisonment with Compensation vs Fine conditions). That satisfaction with the solution would be greater in the former two conditions than in the latter two had been predicted. The planned comparison indicated that the difference was significant (t = 6.08; d.f. • 112; £ -c.01). The significant sex x conditions interaction was not predicted. The interaction suggests that, although the expected main effect appeared and the overall planned comparison was as expected, both these results may require qualification. Inspection of the cell means shown in Table V suggests that the significant interaction is due to differences between male and female subjects in expressed satisfaction in the two conditions where least satisfaction with the solution had been predicted: the Imprisonment vs Release and the Imprisonment with Compensation vs Fine conditions. Both males 66 and females expressed most satisfaction i n the Restitution vs Fine condition and next most satisfaction i n the Fine vs Imprisonment condition. Males i n the Imprisonment with Compensation vs Fine condition, however, reported least satisfaction while females reported least satisfaction with the Imprisonment vs Release condition. This unexpected interaction w i l l be pursued i n the next Chapter, Subjects i n two conditions, the Imprisonment vs Release and Fine vs Imprisonment conditions, were limited to alternatives that permitted only partial reduction of inequity. These subjects could not provide victims with real compensation for losses. Hypothesis 5 stated that third parties who were powerless to restore actual equity for an other would restore psychological equity. This hypothesis led to the prediction that subjects i n these two conditions would either derogate p l a i n t i f f s or blame them for their misfortune. Subjects rated victims on the fifteen item bi-polar adjective scale developed by Lerner, The score for each item could range from one for a negative evaluation to nine for a positive evaluation. The t o t a l score was obtained by summing scores on the 15 adjective pairs, A higher score indicates greater positivity of evaluation. The obtained data were subjected to a four (conditions) by two (rating order) by two (sex of subject) analysis of variance. The c e l l means are shown i n Table VII and the results of the analysis of variance are summarized i n Table VIII, 67 TABLE VII MEAN RATINGS OF PLAINTIFFS * ATTRACTIVENESS AS A FUNCTION OF CONDITIONS, RATING ORDER AND SEX OF SUBJECT Plaintiff-Defendant Defendant-Plaintiff Rating Order Rating Order Condition Female (n) Male (n) Female (n) Male (n) Condition Mean (n) Imprisonment vs Release 97.12 8 83.71 7 78.37 8 8 8 . 0 0 7 86.87 30 1'Finer vs Imprisonment 93 .25 8 89.28 7 83.75 8 84.43 7 87.73 30 Restitution vs Fine 93.37 8 87.71 7 91 .00 8 81.29 7 8 8 . 6 0 30 rImprisonment with Compensation vs Fine 95.87 8 83.71 7 89.37 8 89.86 7 89 .90 30 Rating Order Y -A. Sex Mean 9 4 . 9 0 32 86.11 28 85.62 32 85.89 28 Overall Order Means 90.80 85.75 63 TABLE VIII SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF RATINGS OF FLAINTIFFS• ATTRACTIVENESS SOURCE SS df MS F A (Conditions) 150.69 3 50.23 - C l B (Rating Order) 765.07 1 765.07 4.86 ^ . 0 5 C (Sex of Rater) •543.43 1 543.43 3.45 <.10 A x B 257.49 3 85.83 < 1 A x C 199.32 3 66.44 <-l B x C 613.83 1 613.83 3.89 -^.10 A x B x C 745.99 3 248.66 1.58 Within C e l l I6364.O9 104 157.35 TOTAL 19639.92 119 As Table VIII shows, the data did not support the prediction that p l a i n t i f f s i n the Imprisonment vs Release and Fine vs Imprisonment conditions would be derogated i n comparison to p l a i n t i f f s i n conditions where compensation was available. The main effect f o r conditions was not s i g n i f i c a n t and the condition means do not d i f f e r greatly. The si g n i f i c a n t F value f o r the main eff e c t of order (F = 4.86; d.f• = 1, 104; £ <- .05) was not predicted. This main eff e c t r e f l e c t s higher ratings given t o p l a i n t i f f s who were rated f i r s t (X = 90.80) than t o p l a i n t i f f s who were rated second (X = 85.75). The main eff e c t for sex of rater approached significance: females tended to rate p l a i n t i f f s more favorably (X = 90.26) than did males (X = 86.00). Females were more sensitive to order effects than were males: when females rated the p l a i n t i f f f i r s t , the mean rating was 94.90; when the p l a i n t i f f was rated second, the mean ra t i n g was 85.62. Comparisons of the means f o r males i n r a t i n g order conditions suggests that, among males, evaluations 69 of the p l a i n t i f f do not diff e r as a function of rating order. Inspection of the data shown i n Table VII suggests that the significant main effect for order and the near significant main effect for order and the sex x order interaction effect are attributable to higher ratings given by-females to f i r s t rated p l a i n t i f f s . An explanation for this unexpected but interesting finding w i l l be pursued i n the next Chapter, Subjects indicated how much the p l a i n t i f f was to blame for the incident by c i r c l i n g a number from one for "not at a l l " to nine for "completely". These data were subjected to a four (conditions) by two (sex of rater) analysis of variance. C e l l means are shown i n Table IX and the results of the analysis of variance are presented i n Table X, TABLE IX MEAN RATINGS OF BLAME ATTRIBUTED TO PLAINTIFFS AS A FUNCTION OF CONDITIONS AND SEX OF RATER Sex of Rater Condition Female (N) Male (N) Condition Mean (N) Imprisonment vs Release 4.94 16 ,3.21 14 4.13 30 Fine vs Release 4,00 16 4.50 14 4.23 30 Restitution vs Fine 4.12 16 3.86 14 4.00 30 Imprisonment with Compensation vs Fine 3.31 16 3.36 14 3.33 30 Sex of Rater Mean 4.09 64 3.73 56 70 TABLE X SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF BLAME ATTRIBUTED TO PLAINTIFFS SOURCE SS df MS F A (Conditions) B (Sex of Rater) A x B Within C e l l 14.83 3.91 20.68 804.91 3 1 3 112 4.94 3.91 6.89 7.18 l ^ 1 1 TOTAL 844.33 119 The F values obtained for the main effects of conditions and sex and for the interaction effect were a l l less than unity. The data did not support the prediction that blame attributed to the p l a i n t i f f would vary as a function of ava i l a b i l i t y of financial compensation for the loss. Subjects i n each condition also rated the attractiveness of defendants on the 15-item bi-polar adjective scale developed by Lerner. As before, a higher rating on this scale indicated greater positivity of evaluation. These data were subjected to a four (conditions) by two (rating order) by two (sex of rater) analysis of variance. C e l l means are presented i n Table XI and the results of the analyis of variance are summarized i n Table XII. 71 TABLE XI MEAN RATINGS OF DEFENDANTS• ATTRACTIVENESS AS A FUNCTION OF CONDITIONS, RATING ORDER AND SEX OF RATER Plaintiff-Defendant Defendant-Plaintiff Rating Order Rating Order Condition Female (N) Male (N) Female (N) Male (N) Condition Mean (N] Imprisonment vs Release 67.75 8 65.OO 7 64.25 8 65.71 7 65.70 30 Fine vs Imprisonment 86.62 8 75.29 .7 72.87 8 75.00 7 77.60 30 Restitution vs Fine 62.12 8 74.14 7 80.00 8 74.14 7 72.50 30 Imprisonment with Compensation vs Fine 73.37 8 75.57 7 69.25 8 76.71 7 73.57 30 TABLE XII SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF RATINGS OF DEFENDANTS» ATTRACTIVENESS SOURCE SS df MS F A (Conditions) 2198.60 3 732.86 3.13 B (Rating Order) 2.40 1 2.40 1 C (Sex of Rater) 13.22 1 13.22 -^1 A x B 1135.86 3 378.62 1.62 A x C 393.44 3 131.14 < 1 B •» C 12.01 1 12.01 < 1 A x B x C 1007.75 3 335.91 1.43 Within Cell 24275.72 104 233.42 TOTAL 29039.00 119 72 The o n l y s i g n i f i c a n t F v a l u e o b t a i n e d was t h a t (F = 3.13; d . f . = 3, 104; JJ -<.05) f o r t h e m a i n e f f e c t o f c o n d i t i o n s . Newman-Keu ls p r o c e d u r e was u s e d t o compare a l l p a i r s o f means f o r t h i s f a c t o r . T h i s t e s t i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e o n l y d i f f e r e n c e t o r e a c h s i g n i f i c a n c e ( £ <.05) was t h e d i f f e r e n c e be tween t h e mean r a t i n g o f t h e d e f e n d a n t i n t h e I m p r i s o n m e n t v s R e l e a s e and t h e F i n e v s I m p r i s o n m e n t c o n d i t i o n s . Two i t e m s , a d a p t e d f r o m Kaufman (1970) were i n c l u d e d t o a s s e s s s u b j e c t s ' e v a l u a t i o n s o f t h e m o r a l w rongness o f t h e o f f e n c e . The f i r s t o f t h e s e i t e m s w a s : " A s a q u e s t i o n n o t o f l a w b u t o f m o r a l i t y , D o r y ' s a c t i o n s w e r e " . S u b j e c t s r e s p o n d e d t o t h i s i t e m b y c i r c l i n g a number on a s c a l e r a n g i n g f r o m one f o r " a s w rong as p o s s i b l e " t o n i n e f o r " v e r y r i g h t " . The s e c o n d i t e m b e g a n : " Q u i t e a p a r t f r o m l e g a l a s p e c t s , D o r y " . S u b j e c t s c o m p l e t e d t h i s i t e m b y c i r c l i n g a number r a n g i n g f r o m one f o r " d i d n o t do a n y t h i n g w r o n g " t o n i n e f o r " d i d v e r y w r o n g " . S u b j e c t s ' r e s p o n s e s on t h i s i t e m were r e v e r s e s c o r e d so t h a t , f o r b o t h i t e m s , a l o w e r s c o r e i n d i c a t e d g r e a t e r p e r c e i v e d w r o n g n e s s . S u b j e c t s ' r e s p o n s e s on t h e two i t e m s were summed t o y i e l d a f i n a l e v a l u a t i o n o f t h e m o r a l w rongness o f t h e a c t . T h u s , t h e p o s s i b l e r a n g e o f s c o r e s was f r o m two t o e i g h t e e n w i t h l o w e r s c o r e s i n d i c a t i n g g r e a t e r p e r c e i v e d w r o n g n e s s . The c e l l means f o r e v a l u a t i o n s o f t h e w r o n g n e s s o f t h e a c t a r e p r e s e n t e d i n T a b l e X I I I and t h e a n a l y s i s o f v a r i a n c e summary t a b l e i s shown i n T a b l e X I V . 73 TABLE XIII MEAN RATINGS OF WRONGNESS OF DEFENDANTS* ACTS AS A FUNCTION OF CONDITIONS AND SEX OF RATER Sex of Subject Condition Female (N) Male (N) Condition Mean (N) Imprisonment vs Release 4.00 16 4.36 14 4.17 30 Fine vs Imprisonment 4.75 16 3.93 14 4.37 30 Restitution vs Fine 3.75 16 4.07 14 3.90 30 Imprisonment with Compensation vs Fine 3.25 16 3.57 14 3.40 30 Sex of Rater Means 3.94 64 3.98 56 TABLE XIV SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF RATINGS OF WRONGNESS OF DEFENDANT'S ACT SOURCE SS df MS F R A (Conditions) B (Sex of Subject) A x B Within C e l l 15.76 0.06 7.46 589.51 3 1 3 112 5.25 0.06 2.49 5.25 1.00 <• 1 < 1 n.s. TOTAL 612.79 119 As Table XIV indicates, only one F value reached unity and that one f e l l far short of significance. Finding that the perceived wrongness of the offence did not vary across conditions i s i n accord with expectations. The mean evaluation of the wrongness of the defendant's act was 3 . 9 6 . This value i s very close to the most negative rating possible. These data thus support the claim that the defendant's input was regarded as negative. Two items were included to assess the extent to which the defendant was held responsible for the offence. These items asked subjects to indicate,, by c i r c l i n g a number ranging from one for "agree completely" to nine for "disagree completely" how much they concurred with two statements. The f i r s t statement was: "Dory's acts were a result of the circumstances i n which he found himself". The second item was: "Dory i s more a victim of circumstances than a criminal". For each subject, a t o t a l score was obtained by summing scores on the two items. Thus, possible scores ranged from two to eighteen. A higher score indicated that greater responsibility for the offence was attributed to the defendant. Table XV shows mean evaluations of defendant's responsibility and the results of the four (conditions) by two (sex of rater) analysis of variance are summarized i n Table XVI. 75 TABLE XV MEAN RATINGS OF DEFENDANT'S RESPONSIBILITY AS A FUNCTION OF CONDITIONS AND SEX OF RATER Sex of Rater Condition Female (N) Male •(H) Condition Mean (N) Imprisonment vs Release 12.62 16 14.07 14 13.30 30 Fine vs Imprisonment 11.50 16 13.00 14 12.20 30 Restitution vs Fine 9.94 16 11.50 14 10.67 30 Imprisonment with Compensation vs Fine 12,62 16 11.29 14 12.00 30 Sex of Rater Means 11.67 64 12.46 56 TABLE XVI SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF RATINGS OF DEFENDANT'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE OFFENCE SOURCE SS df . MS F £ A (Conditions) B (Sex of Rater) A x B Within C e l l 105.02 18.75 45.30 2389.72 3 1 3 112 35.00 18.75 15.10 21.34 I .64 n.s. 1 - c l TOTAL 2558.79 119 As Table XVI indicates, neither of the main effects nor the interaction effect was significant. STUDY II The summaries of simulated cases for this study described a sentence imposed i n the case. Subjects i n each condition received a description of a sentence different from the one described for other conditions. These sentences represented reductions of inequity that varied i n actual equity and input p o s i t i v i t y . Subjects indicated the extent of their satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the sentence by breaking a ten centimeter line labelled "completely unsatisfactory" at one end and "completely satisfactory" at the other. On this item scores, measured i n millimeters, could range from zero to one hundred. Higher scores indicated greater satisfaction. These data were obtained to test the prediction that subjects' satisfaction with the sentence would be greatest i n the Restitution condition, next greatest i n the Imprisonment with Compensation condition, and least i n the Release condition. The ratings of satisfaction with the sentence were subjected to a three (conditions) by two (sex of rater) analysis of variance. Mean satisfaction ratings are shown i n Table XVII and the results of the analysis of variance are summarized i n Table XVIII. 77 TABLE XVTI MEAN RATINGS OF SATISFACTION WITH SENTENCES AS A FUNCTION OF CONDITIONS AND SEX OF RATER Sex of Rater Condition Female (N) Male (N) Condition Mean (N) Release 39.00 10 36.66 6 38.12 16 Restitution 76.90 10 63.83 6 72.00 16 Imprisonment with Compensation 64.30 10 36.83 6 54.00 16 Sex of Rater Means 60.06 30 45.77 18 TABLE XVIII SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF SUBJECTS* EXPRESSED SATISFACTION WITH SENTENCES SOURCE SS df MS A (Conditions) B (Sex of Rater) A x B Within Cell 9192.17 2296.93 1192.81 35302.01 2 1 2 42 4596.08 2296.93 596.40 840.52 5.47 2.72 1 -.01 n.s. TOTAL 47983.92 47 As Table XVIII indicates, the obtained F value for the main effect of conditions was significant. Furthermore, the order of the condition means was exactly as predicted: greatest satisfaction was reported i n the Restitution condition and least satisfaction was reported i n the Release condition. As expected, subjects i n the Imprisonment with Compensation condition reported less satisfaction with the solution than did subjects i n the Restitution condition and more than did subjects i n the Release condition. A problem in.testing the significance of differences i n expressed satisfaction among conditions i s that none of the existing tests takes into account an a p r i o r i prediction of the order of a l l means. The rationale for the predicted order was that satisfaction with the solution would decrease with the input positivity and equity of the solution. The Release condition restored equity for neither party while the Imprisonment with Compensation and the Restitution conditions restored equity for both parties. Accordingly, the inequitable Release condition should be rated as less satisfactory than the other two conditions. Of the two conditions, Imprisonment with Compensation and Restitution, that restored equity for both parties to the offence, the latter was greater i n input p o s i t i v i t y . Therefore, this sentence should be rated as more satisfactory than Imprisonment with Compensation. In keeping with the rationale outlined above, two orthogonal comparisons, the maximum number possible, tested the significance of differences among conditions. The f i r s t compared expressed satisfaction i n the Release condition with expressed satisfaction i n the Restitution and the Imprisonment with Compensation conditions. The second compared expressed satisfaction i n the Restitution condition with that i n the Imprisonment with Compensation condition. Since the order had been predicted i n advance, the level of significance was evaluated by a one-tailed test. The f i r s t comparison indicated that subjects i n the Release condition expressed significantly less satisfaction with the solution than did subjects i n the Imprisonment with Compensation and the Restitution conditions (t = 2.80; d.f. = 42; £ < . 0 5 ) . The second comparison was also significant: subjects i n the Restitution condition were more satisfied with the resolution of the inequity than were subjects i n the Imprisonment with Compensation condition (t = 1.75; d.f. = 42; £ < . 0 5 ) . Third parties were expected to restore psychological equity for over-rewarded defendants by enhancing inputs to make them commensurate with outcomes. Ratings of the attractiveness and responsibility of the over-rewarded defendant i n the Release condition were compared with those of defendants i n the Imprisonment with Compensation and Restitution conditions. Subjects i n each condition rated defendants* attractiveness on Lerner's 15-item bi-polar adjective scale. Table XIX summarizes mean ratings of the defendant's attractiveness and Table XX presents the results of the three (conditions) by two (sex of rater) by two (rating order) analysis of variance of these data. 80 TABLE XIX MEAN RATINGS OF DEFENDANT'S ATTRACTIVENESS AS A FUNCTION OF CONDITIONS, RATING ORDER AND SEX OF RATER Plaintiff-Defendant Defendant-Plaintiff Rating Order Rating Order Condition Female (N) Male (N) Female (N) Male (N) Condition Mean ( N) Release 75.60 5 81.33 3 89.80 5 72.00 3 80.43 16 Restitution 60.60 5 59.00 3 75.80 5 70.00 3 66.81 16 Imprisonment with Compensation 78.80 5 76.00 3 71.00 5 75.00 3 75.12 16 Sex x Rating Order Mean 71.66 15 72.11 9 78.86 15 72.33 9 TABLE XX SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF RATINGS OF DEFENDANT'S ATTRACTIVENESS SOURCE SS df MS F £ A (Conditions) 1569.12 2 754.56 3.69 . <.05 B (Rating Order) 252.08 1 •252.08 1.23'. n.s. C (Sex of Rater) 104.27 1 104*27 ^ 1 A x B 716.30 2 358.15 1.75 n.s. A x C 84.93 2 42.46 ^1 B x C 136.94 1 136.94 ^•1 A x B x C 442.12 2 221.07 1.08 n.s. Within C e l l 7355.47 36 204.32 TOTAL 10601.25 47 81 As Table XX indicates, the main effect of conditions was significant (F m 3.69; d.f. = 2, 36; £ -<..05). The obtained t value (t = 1.05; d.f. = 36; £ <.15) for the planned comparison between the Release and Imprisonment with Compensation conditions did not reach conventional levels of significance. The difference was, however, i n the direction predicted. These findings w i l l be considered i n the next Chapter. Subjects also rated the moral wrongness of the defendant's act and the defendant's responsibility for the offence. Analyses of these data revealed no differences as a function of either conditions or sex of subject. Mean ratings of the moral wrongness of the act are presented i n Table XXI. As before, the range of possible ratings of the wrongness of the offence was from two to eighteen with lower ratings indicating greater perceived wrongness. Table XXII summarizes the results of the three (conditions) by two (sex of rater) analysis of variance of these data. TABLE XXI MEAN RATINGS OF WRONGNESS OF DEFENDANT'S ACTS AS A FUNCTION OF CONDITIONS AND SEX OF RATER Sex of Rater Condition Female (N) Male (N) Condition Mean (N) Release 2.70 10 3.83 6 3.12 16 Restitution 3.70 10 3.17 6 3.50 16 Imprisonment with 4.06 16 Compensation 3.50 10 5.00 6 Sex of Rater Means 3.30 30 4.00 18 82 TABLE XXII SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF RATINGS OF WRONGNESS OF DEFENDANT'S ACT SOURCE SS df MS F MM 2 A (Conditions) 7.12 2 3.56 1.02 n.s. B (Sex of Rater) 5.50 1 5.50 1.58 n.s. A x B 8.81 2 4.40 1.26 n.s. Within C e l l 146.37 42 3.48 TOTAL 167.80 47 Table XXIII presents mean ratings of defendant's responsibility for the offence. As i n Study I, ratings could range from two to eighteen. The higher the rating, the greater the responsibility for the offence attributed to the defendant. The results of the three (conditions) by two (sex of rater) analysis of variance of these data are shown i n Table XXIV. TABLE XXIII MEAN RATINGS OF DEFENDANT'S RESPONSIBILITY AS A FUNCTION OF CONDITIONS AND SEX OF RATER Sex of Rater Condition Female (N) Male (N) Condition Mean (N) Release 14.00 10 13.00 6 13.62 16 Restitution 11.20 10 13.50 6 12.06 16 Imprisonment with Compensation 12.30 10 12.17 6 12.25 16 Sex of Rater Mean 12.50 30 12.89 18 83 TABLE X f f l SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF RATINGS OF DEFENDANT'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE OFFENCE SOURCE SS df MS F R A (Conditions) 23.29 2 11.64 ^ 1 n.s. B (Sex of Rater) 1.70 1 1.70 < 1 n.s. A x B -2i:95 2 10.97 n.s. Within C e l l 936.03 42 22.28 TOTAL 982.97 47 Subjects rated the p l a i n t i f f ' s attractiveness on Lerner's 15-item bi-polar adjective scale. These data were collected to test the prediction that subjects i n the Release condition, i n which the p l a i n t i f f was not compensated for losses, would evaluate the p l a i n t i f f less favorably than would subjects i n the Restitution and the Imprisonment with Compensation conditions. Mean ratings of the p l a i n t i f f ' s attractiveness are shown i n Table XXV. "The;results of the three (conditions) by two (rating order) by two (sex of rater) analysis of variance of these data are summarized i n Table .XXVI. 84 TABLE XXV ' MEAN RATINGS OF PLAINTIFF'S ATTRACTIVENESS AS A FUNCTION OF CONDITIONS, RATING ORDER AND SEX OF SUBJECT Plaintiff-Defendant Rating Order De fendant-Plaintiff Rating Order Condition Female (N) Male (N) Female (N) Male (N) Condition Mean (N) Release 90.60 5 87.00 3 92.00 5 78.66 3 88.12 16 Restitution 85.40 5 78.00 3 84.20 5 82.33 3 83.06 16 Imprisonment with Compensation 85.60 5 86.66 3 83.20 5 76.33 3 83.31 16 Rating Order x Sex Mean 87.20 15 83.88 9 86.46 15 79.11 9 TABLE XXVT SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF RATINGS OF PLAINTIFF'S ATTRACTIVENESS SOURCE SS df MS F £ A (Conditions) 260.54 2 130.27 1.36 n.s. B (Rating Order) 60.75 1 60.75 1 C (Sex of Rater) 320.00 1 320.00 3.34 n.s. A x B 78.12 2 39.06 < 1 A x C 60.86 2 30.43 < 1 B x C 46.OO 1 46.OO ^-1 A x B x C 130.52 2 65.26 Within C e l l 3443.87 36 95.66 TOTAL 4400.67 47 85 As i s shown by Table XXVI, evaluations of the p l a i n t i f f ' s attractiveness did not diffe r as a function of conditions, rating order or sex of rater. Data were also collected to enable a test of the prediction that p l a i n t i f f s denied compensation for losses would be blamed for the misfortune more than ones receiving compensation. Subjects indicated how much the p l a i n t i f f was to blame on a nine point scale. Possible ratings ranged from one to nine with lower ratings indicating lesser blame. Analysis of the data revealed that the amount of blame attributed to p l a i n t i f f s did not vary significantly as a function of either conditions or sex of rater. Table XXVII presents mean ratings of blame attributed to p l a i n t i f f s and the summary of the results of a three (conditions) by two (sex of rater) analysis of variance of these data i s shown i n Table XXVIII, TABLE XXVII MEAN RATINGS OF BLAME ATTRIBUTED TO PLAINTIFFS AS A FUNCTION OF CONDITIONS AND SEX OF RATER Sex of Rater Condition Female (N) Male (N) Condition Mean (N) Release- . 4.20 10 4.83 6 4.44 16 Restitution 4.90 10 3.83 6 4.50 16 Imprisonment with Compensation 4.00 10 3.50 6 3.81 16 Sex of Rater Mean 4.36 , 30 4.06 . 18 TABLE XXVIII SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF BLAME ATTRIBUTED TO PLAINTIFFS SOURCE SS df MS F A (Conditions) 4.62 2 2.31 ' ~< 1 B (Sex of Rater) 1.09 1 1.09 -< 1 A x B 5.62 2 2.81 <:1 Within C e l l 357.67 42 8.52 TOTAL 369.00 47 CHAPTER V DISCUSSION Results of the research support previous investigations that have demonstrated that third parties w i l l attempt to maintain or to restore equity for others. The present studies, however, extend previous research by considering the consequences for third party equity behavior of variations i n the actual equity and input positivity of possible reductions of dyadic inequity. Third party choice among possible resolutions of inequity i s related to two general determinants of third party equity behavior: preference for actual equity and preference for positive input. Evidence from both studies indicates that these principles not only permit prediction of third party preferences among resolutions of inequity but also prediction of satisfaction with solutions. This evidence supports the hypothesized importance of principles of preference for actual equity and for input positivity as general determinants of third party equity behavior. These findings thus provide empirical support for the proposed extension of Adams' (1965) equity theory to apply to third party equity behavior. The theoretical and practical implications of these findings w i l l be discussed after a review of the evidence supporting the importance of preferences for actual equity and input positivity as determinants of third party response to reductions of inequity that entail real changes i n the inputs or outcomes of the parties to the inequity. 87 m The importance of actual equity i s demonstrated by the finding that, i n a l l three conditions which varied the equity of alternative solutions, subjects selected the one that was greatest i n actual equity. In two of these three conditions, actual equity was pitted against positivity. That i s , the nature of the alternatives available to subjects was such that solutions that increased actual equity decreased input or outcome positivity. One of these two conditions, the Imprisonment vs Release condition, provided a test of the relative importance of actual equity and outcome positivity. Subjects i n this condition could either imprison the harm-doer or release him. The f i r s t option represented, for the harm-doer, actual equity with a negative outcome while the second represented continued inequity with a positive outcome. Thus, i n this particular test, the Imprisonment alternative which represented greater actual equity also represented decreased outcome positivity. Results of this test supported the prediction that the alternative that was greater i n actual equity would be the preferred one. This demonstration that outcome positivity i s rejected i n favor of actual equity provides support for the argument, developed i n the Introduction, that preference for outcome positivity does not extend to third parties. Preference for positive outcomes i s generally acknowledged as a determinant of f i r s t party choice among methods of reducing inequity (cf., Adams, 1965; Pritchard, 1969; Walster, Berscheid, and Walster, 1973)* The theoretical grounds for stating that preference for outcome positivity does not extend to observers have been discussed. Results from the Imprisonment vs Release condition provide empirical 89 data to support t h i s contention. Previous investigations of t h i r d party-preferences f o r actual or psychological equity appear to have c l e a r l y demonstrated only that t h i r d parties prefer actual equity for under-rewarded parties: that i s , when achievement of equity increases p o s i t i v i t y . The finding that actual equity i s also preferred when i t involves a negative outcome for an over-rewarded party and thus decreases p o s i t i v i t y supports and extends previous research. Furthermore, the finding substantiates the claim that preference for actual equity, rather than p o s i t i v i t y , explains the award of compensation i n cases of under-reward. „ Additional support for the importance of actual equity comes from the finding that, contrary to predictions, actual equity i s more important than input p o s i t i v i t y as well as outcome p o s i t i v i t y . Data in d i c a t i n g the greater importance of actual equity come from the Imprisonment with Compensation vs Fine condition which tested Hypothesis 3. This hypothesis specified the r e l a t i v e importance of t h i r d party preferences f o r actual equity and for input p o s i t i v i t y . I t stated that, when achievement of actual equity conflicted with achievement of input p o s i t i v i t y , t h i r d parties would restore equity so that positive input would be maximized. The specif i c ' p r e d i c t i o n derived from t h i s hypothesis was that subjects i n the Imprisonment with Compensation vs Fine condition would select the Fine alternative that increased positive input rather than the more equitable Imprisonment with Compensation one. Results did not support the prediction. Out of a t o t a l of 30 subjects, 23 chose the non-predicted a l t e r n a t i v e . The predicted alternative was selected by only seven subjects. These data appear to 90 indicate that the non-predicted alternative was the preferred one. Had the hypothesis been a non-directional one, the binomial test would have shown the probability of obtaining by chance the observed number of choices of the less frequently selected alternative to be less than .006.- With the-benefit of hindsight and an ad hoc s t a t i s t i c a l test, the data suggest that actual equity i s preferred to input positivity. The results, as a whole, clearly demonstrate the importance of a preference for actual equity as a determinant of third party choice of method of reducing dyadic inequity. Discussion of the general implications of this finding for third party response to perceived inequity must await consideration of two questions raised by the unexpected finding that actual equity i s preferred to input positivity. The f i r s t question i s whether or not an adequate model of third party equity behavior requires incorporation of an additional' principle to specify preferences among resolutions of inequity that are equal i n actual equity but different i n input and outcome positivity. The second question concerns the relative importance ,to' third parties of positive input and positive outcome. The f i r s t question i s answered by the behavior of subjects i n the Fine vs Imprisonment condition. This condition provided a test of Hypothesis 2 which stated that, when available alternatives were equally equitable, third parties would prefer the alternative that was greater i n positive input. The prediction derived from this hypothesis was that subjects i n the Fine vs Imprisonment condition would prefer the Fine alternative, which was greatest i n positive input, to the equally equitable but less positive Imprisonment one. The existence of a 91 d i s t i n c t preference between these alternatives supports the argument that, when equity i s held constant, an additional pr i n c i p l e determines choice between alternatives. The Fine alternative represented, for the defendant, positive input and positive outcome compared to the Imprisonment alternative. Therefore, there are two possible explanations f o r subjects' preferences. A preference f o r either input p o s i t i v i t y or outcome p o s i t i v i t y could account f o r t h i s f i n d i n g . Support for the contention that t h i r d parties are more concerned with positive input from others than with positive outcomes for others may be derived from subjects' expressed s a t i s f a c t i o n with solutions. I t was hypothesized that subjects' s a t i s f a c t i o n with the solution would vary as a function of the extent to which chosen alternatives s a t i s f i e d preferences f o r actual equity and for input p o s i t i v i t y and as a function of the salience of c o n f l i c t s between preferences. Overall, data confirmed the prediction that subjects i n the Re s t i t u t i o n vs Fine and the Fine vs Imprisonment conditions would express greater s a t i s f a c t i o n with the sentence they selected than would subjects i n the Imprisonment with Compensation vs Fine and the Imprisonment vs Release conditions. The f i r s t two conditions permitted subjects to s a t i s f y simultaneously preferences for actual equity and for input p o s i t i v i t y . The l a s t two conditions permitted subjects to s a t i s f y only one preference and, i n addition, involved a c o n f l i c t between preferences for actual equity and p o s i t i v i t y . The Imprisonment with Compensation vs Fine condition involved a c o n f l i c t between actual equity and input p o s i t i v i t y while the Imprisonment vs Release condition presented a 92 conflict between actual equity and outcome pos i t i v i t y . The hypothesized comparative importance of preferences for positive input and positive outcome might have been tested by an additional comparison between satisfaction expressed i n the latter two conditions. Any direct test would, however, have been complicated by the significant sex by conditions interaction which indicated that interpretation of these data required consideration of the pattern of differences within sex. Accordingly, the Newman-Keuls procedure was employed to compare a l l pairs of means within each sex. This analysis suggested that, among males, reported satisfaction with resolutions of inequity i s related to two factors. F i r s t , the presence of a conflict between equity and input positivity appears to result i n comparative dissatisfaction with the solution. Males expressed significantly less satisfaction i n the Imprisonment with Compensation vs Fine condition, which presented a conflict between actual equity and input positivity, than they did i n a l l other conditions. In both conditions that represented a conflict between actual equity and positivity, the Imprisonment with Compensation vs Fine and the Imprisonment vs Release conditions, males chose the equitable alternative and thus rejected positivity i n favor of equity. When input positivity was rejected, however, males expressed significantly less satisfaction with the solution than when outcome positivity was rejected. This suggests that input positivity i s more important than i s outcome positivity. In the absence of conflict between actual equity and input positivity, males' satisfaction with the resolution of the situation appears related only to the greater or lesser equity of the chosen alternative. In both 93 the Imprisonment vs Release and the Fine vs Imprisonment conditions, the chosen alternative restored actual equity only for the defendant. The difference between expressed s a t i s f a c t i o n i n these two conditions was not s i g n i f i c a n t . The preferred alternative i n the Re s t i t u t i o n vs Fine condition restored actual equity for both defendant and p l a i n t i f f . Males expressed s i g n i f i c a n t l y greater s a t i s f a c t i o n i n t h i s condition than i n the other three conditions. Overall, then, males* reported s a t i s f a c t i o n with solutions supports the hypothesized importance of preferences f o r actual equity and for input p o s i t i v i t y . Examination of the pattern of differences among conditions i n females* reported s a t i s f a c t i o n with solutions suggests that, among females, expressed s a t i s f a c t i o n i s related to different factors than among males. Overall, females expressed s i g n i f i c a n t l y greater s a t i s f a c t i o n i n the R e s t i t u t i o n vs Fine and the Fine vs Imprisonment conditions than i n the Imprisonment with Compensation vs Fine and the Imprisonment vs 15 Release conditions. The preferred alternatives i n the f i r s t two conditions restored equity by means of positive input from the defendant. These conditions did not present subjects with a c o n f l i c t between equity and p o s i t i v i t y . The preferred alternatives i n the l a s t two conditions did not achieve positive input from the defendant. Add i t i o n a l l y , both of these conditions presented subjects with a c o n f l i c t between equity I t should be noted that one of these comparisons, the comparison between the Fine vs Imprisonment and the Imprisonment with Compensation vs Fine conditions, was not s i g n i f i c a n t at the . 0 5 l e v e l . The obtained difference between the means was 14»87 while the value required by the Newman-Keuls te s t f o r significance at the conventional l e v e l was 1 5 . 0 0 . 94 and po s i t i v i t y . There are two possible interpretations of these data. The f i r s t i s that expressed satisfaction among females i s related primarily to the input positivity of the preferred sentence. That i s , females may be relatively dissatisfied with resolutions of inequity that do not achieve positive input from the defendant. Males, on the other hand, may experience dissatisfaction due to lack of positive input from the defendant only when circumstances make this salient. The second possible interpretation of the data i s that, among females, expressed satisfaction reflects only the presence or absence of a conflict between equity and positivity per se. Thus, the greater satisfaction expressed i n the Restitution vs Fine and the Fine vs Imprisonment conditions than i n the Imprisonment with Compensation vs Fine and the Imprisonment vs Release conditions may be attributed to the absence of conflict between equity and positivity i n the former two conditions and the presence of conflict i n the latter two conditions. Some data appear to offer indirect support for the proposition that the f i r s t interpretation, that satisfaction among females i s related primarily to the input positivity of the preferred solution, i s the correct one. I f positivity per se were more important to females than to males, one would predict that females would be more inclined to leniency than males. One possible demonstration of a preference for positivity on the part of female subjects would be for females i n the Imprisonment vs Release condition to choose the Release option significantly more frequently than male subjects. Examination of data from this condition indicates that no such significant difference occurred: of 16 female subjects, four selected the Release option and, of 14 male subjects, two selected the Release option. A second demonstration of bias toward positivity on the part of 95 females could consist of restoration of equity with less severity than males. That i s , females might be expected to impose less severe terms * of imprisonment than males. The short questionnaire asked subjects to indicate the magnitude of sentences they would impose on defendants. These data were examined for sex differences i n severity of recommended sentence. The majority of subjects indicated the exact duration of the sentence they would impose. Three, however, gave responses that could not be included i n the analysis while other subjects indicated indefinite time spans of, for example, six to eight months. In the latt e r cases, the mean was used i n the analysis. The mean sentence recommended by females was 340.21 days i n j a i l while the mean sentence recommended by males was 204.19 days of imprisonment. The obtained t value for the significance of the difference between males' and females' recommended terms of imprisonment was 2 .24 (d.f. = 115; £ <^.05). The difference was, however, i n the direction opposite to that predictable on the basis of a bias toward positivity on the part of females. The mean amounts recommended as fines by males and females were $ 2 , 6 5 0 . 7 8 and $ 2 , 9 1 2 . 2 5 , respectively. The difference between these means was not significant (t = 0 . 6 0 4 ; d.f. = 114, n.s.). Examination of these data does not support the ad hoc proposition that outcome positivity i s more important to females than to males. That i s , females i n the Imprisonment vs Release condition rejected outcome positivity and selected the more equitable Imprisonment alternative equally as often as males. Additionally, females indicated that they would impose more, rather than less, severe terms of imprisonment on defendants. Taken together, these data refute rather than support the 96 suggestion that outcome positivity or positivity per se i s more important to females than to males. Accordingly, the greater satisfaction reported by females i n the Restitution vs Fine and the Fine vs Imprisonment conditions may be attributed to the greater input positivity of the preferred solutions i n these two conditions. Additional support for the argument that third parties are more concerned with positive input from others than with positive outcomes for others may be drawn from examination of subjects' comments regarding their choice of sentences. Had subjects i n the Fine vs Imprisonment condition selected the Fine alternative because of a preference for outcome positivity, their comments might be expected to indicate rejection of the negative outcomes associated with the unchosen alternative. Of the twenty-five subjects who chose the Fine alternative, only three j u s t i f i e d their choice by mentioning the negative outcomes (e.g., loss of a job) associated with the rejected alternative. Twelve subjects just i f i e d their choice by mentioning the implications of the sentence for the future input of the defendant. That i s , they referred to the positive consequences of the Fine alternative for the future input of the defendant and/or explained that a term of imprisonment would provide the defendant with an opportunity to become more proficient at crime. The remaining comments were ambiguous remarks that could not be interpreted as related to either input or outcome positivity. That input positivity i s of greater importance to third parties than outcome positivity may also be inferred, from the concern for the future input of defendants which was expressed by subjects i n the Imprisonment vs Release condition. Of the twenty-four subjects who 97 selected the Imprisonment alternative, fifteen justified their choice by reference to the defendant's future input. Subjects in this condition referred primarily to the efficacy of the punishment in inhibiting subsequent negative input from the defendant. An example of justification in these terms i s : "The other is really just a positive reinforcement to him, so its not a deterrent at a l l . Also i t wouldn't do anything to improve him (psychologically, etc.) so wouldn't improve the situation." Of the six subjects who selected the Release option, only two justified their decision in terms of rejection of the negative outcomes associated with the Imprisonment alternative. One subject explained choice of the Release option by referring to the danger of exposing the "defendant's vulnerable personality to more criminal elements". On the whole, examination of subjects' written comments appears to support the premise that preference for positive input influences third party efforts to resolve dyadic inequity. This interpretation is consistent with subjects' expressions of satisfaction with solutions which also appear to suggest that positive input is of more importance to third parties than is positive outcome. To summarize, obtained data illustrate the importance of preference for actual equity as a determinant of third party responses to dyadic inequities created by the negative input of a harm-doer. As has been discussed, in a l l three conditions which varied the equity of alternative solutions, subjects selected the alternative that was greatest in actual equity. Data from two of these conditions, the Imprisonment vs Release and the Imprisonment with Compensation vs Fine conditions, clearly demonstrate that actual equity is more important than either input or 98 outcome positivity. Data from the Fine vs Imprisonment condition indicate that a positivity principle is invoked to determine choice between equally equitable alternatives. Examination of subjects' expressed satisfaction with solutions and written comments explaining choice of sentence suggests that third parties are more concerned with input positivity than with outcome positivity. Thus, evidence from these sources provides some further support for Hypothesis 1 which stated that preference for positive input determines third party choice among alternatives that are equal in actual equity. These findings come from the first study which examined responses to inequity caused by negative input from one member of a dyad when subjects possessed some power to intervene in the situation. Subjects in the second study did not possess any power to intervene to effect real changes in the inputs or outcomes of the members of the dyad. Instead, they were presented with fait accompli decisions that varied the actual equity and input positivity of the resolutions of the inequity. Data from the second study indicate that differences in satisfaction with solutions and distinct preferences among resolutions of inequity are not peculiar to those responsible for intervention but are shared by non-participant on-lookers as well. The analysis of variance of expressed satisfaction with the solution in the second study indicated that the main effect of conditions was significant. Expressed satisfaction among conditions was ordered as predicted: greatest satisfaction was reported in the Restitution condition and least satisfaction was reported in the Release condition. As was expected, subjects in the Imprisonment with Compensation condition 99 reported less satisfaction with the solution than did subjects in the Restitution condition and more than did subjects in the Release condition. These data indicate that the differences in satisfaction with resolutions of inequity registered by observers of fait accompli decisions are similar to those reported by decision makers. This finding is important because i t indicates that variations in satisfaction are not confined to those who are, to some extent, responsible for the fates of the parties to the inequity. Additionally, the order of the means supports the a priori prediction that satisfaction among on-lookers is related to the actual equity and to the input positivity of the solution. Additional support for the importance of actual equity and input positivity in determining reactions to inequity may also be derived from the second study. The short questionnaire asked subjects to indicate which of three sentences: Release, Imprisonment with Compensation, and Restitution, they would have imposed in the case. Subjects in a l l three conditions indicated that the Restitution alternative would have been the preferred one. Fifteen subjects in the Release condition and twelve subjects in each of the Imprisonment with Compensation and the Restitution conditions indicated that they would have preferred to see the Restitution alternative imposed on the defendant. This finding strengthens the argument that, among on-lookers, satisfaction is related to the degree to which resolutions of inequity satisfy preferences for actual equity and input positivity. The demonstrated importance of actual equity has implications for the comparative importance, to third parties, of reduction of perceived 100 i n e q u i t y b y means o f p s y c h o l o g i c a l , r a t h e r t h a n r e a l , a l t e r a t i o n s o f i n p u t s and o u t c o m e s . I n h i s o r i g i n a l f o r m u l a t i o n o f e q u i t y t h e o r y , Adams (1965) p o i n t e d o u t t h a t an a l t e r n a t i v e t o r e s t o r i n g e q u i t y t h r o u g h r e a l c h a n g e s i n i n p u t s and ou tcomes was t o r e s t o r e p s y c h o l o g i c a l e q u i t y b y means o f c o g n i t i v e c h a n g e s i n e v a l u a t i o n s o f i n p u t s and o u t c o m e s . P r e v i o u s i n v e s t i g a t i o n s have shown t h a t o b s e r v e r s who a r e u n a b l e t o i n t e r v e n e t o remedy t h e s i t u a t i o n may r e s p o n d t o p e r c e i v e d i n e q u i t y b y i n d u l g i n g i n c o g n i t i v e o p e r a t i o n s t h a t t r a n s f o r m p e r c e i v e d i n j u s t i c e t o p e r c e i v e d j u s t i c e . P a r t i c u l a r a t t e n t i o n h a s b e e n p a i d t o t h e p o s s i b l e i m p l i c a t i o n s o f s u c h f i n d i n g s f o r r e a l w o r l d r e s p o n s e s t o v i c t i m s o f i n j u s t i c e . A s L i n c o l n & L e v i n g e r (1972) p o i n t o u t , one o f t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s o f t h o s e f i n d i n g s i s t h a t a p p e a l i n g f o r remedy o f i n j u s t i c e b y m a k i n g i t s e x i s t e n c e s a l i e n t may r e s u l t i n d e r o g a t i o n o f t h e v i c t i m r a t h e r t h a n r e s t o r a t i o n o f a c t u a l e q u i t y . D a t a s u p p o r t i n g t h e p r i n c i p l e o f p r e f e r e n c e f o r a c t u a l e q u i t y a r e c o n s i s t e n t w i t h r e p o r t e d r e s u l t s o f p r e v i o u s i n v e s t i g a t i o n s ( e . g . , L i n c o l n & L e v i n g e r , 1972) t h a t have s u g g e s t e d t h a t v i c t i m s may be d e r o g a t e d o n l y when t h i r d p a r t i e s a r e c o n s t r a i n e d f r o m r e s t o r i n g a c t u a l e q u i t y . D a t a f r o m t h e p r e s e n t r e s e a r c h , h o w e v e r , d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t p r e f e r e n c e f o r a c t u a l e q u i t y e x t e n d s t o h a r m - d o e r s as w e l l as t o v i c t i m s . T h e s e r e s u l t s t h u s s u g g e s t t h a t t h i r d p a r t i e s may r e d u c e p e r c e i v e d i n e q u i t y b y u s e o f s u c h t a c t i c s as d e r o g a t i o n o f u n d e r - r e w a r d e d p a r t i e s o r enhancement o f o v e r - r e w a r d e d ones o n l y when.means o f r e s t o r i n g a c t u a l e q u i t y a r e n o t a v a i l a b l e t o t h e m . The s u g g e s t i o n t h a t t h i r d p a r t i e s may r e s t o r e p s y c h o l o g i c a l e q u i t y o n l y when t h e y c a n n o t r e s t o r e a c t u a l e q u i t y does n o t i m p l y t h a t t h i r d p a r t y u s e o f s u c h t e c h n i q u e s i s u n i m p o r t a n t . I n r e a l l i f e , c o n s t r a i n t s 101 frequently l i m i t third party power to restore actual equity. The criminal justice system, for example, generally provides only for punishment of harm-doers: compensation for victims i s frequently not available. In these cases, punishment of harm-doers does not provide victims with real compensation for losses. In other cases, the legal justice system not only f a i l s to restore actual equity for victim or harm-doer but' creates an additional injustice as, for example, when a harm-doer i s released because of his association with influential and corrupt politicians. These are examples of cases where constraints that limit third party power to reduce inequity by means of real changes i n inputs or outcomes may leave observers with no alternative but to resort;.to psychological tactics i f perceived inequity i s to be reduced. The present research examined the effects of limitations on third party power to restore actual equity on subsequent evaluations of the parties involved. The f i r s t study tested the hypothesis that, when intervention power was limited to punishment of the harm-doer, subjects would restore psychological equity for victims by derogating them. Previous research (e.g., Lerner, 1970; Lincoln & Levinger, 1972; Jones & Aronson, 1973) indicates that third parties w i l l sometimes reduce inequity for uncompensated victims by devaluing inputs i n the direction of outcomes. Such devaluation may take the form of either derogating the victim's personal characteristics or else attributing to the victim part of the blame for the misfortune. In the f i r s t study two conditions, the Imprisonment vs Release and the Fine vs Imprisonment conditions, did not provide compensation for p l a i n t i f f s * losses. The 102 preferred alternative, Restitution, i n the Re s t i t u t i o n vs Fine condition did provide r e a l compensation for losses. The prediction was that subjects i n the Imprisonment vs Release and the Fine vs Imprisonment conditions would rate p l a i n t i f f s as less attractive and more to blame for the offence than would subjects i n the R e s t i t u t i o n vs Fine condition. Analysis of ratings of p l a i n t i f f s ' attractiveness and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the offence did not support the prediction. Subjects' attributions of blame to victims did not vary as a function of conditions. The only s i g n i f i c a n t F value associated with the analysis of variance of ratings of victims' attractiveness was for the main eff e c t of rating order: when subjects rated the p l a i n t i f f before they rated the defendant, they evaluated p l a i n t i f f s more favorably than when the p l a i n t i f f was rated after the defendant. Examination of the c e l l means shown i n Table VII suggests that the s i g n i f i c a n t main effect for order i s attributable to higher ratings given by females to f i r s t rated p l a i n t i f f s . Inspection of means for males i n different rating order conditions indicates that, among males, evaluations of p l a i n t i f f s do not d i f f e r as a function of ratin g order. Consideration of possible explanations f o r the order effect appearing among female subjects suggests that t h i s phenomenon may, i n part, be due to a b i l i t y of subjects to intervene i n the s i t u a t i o n . Subjects i n a l l conditions i n the f i r s t study were empowered to punish the harm-doer. Such intervention may inspire i n i t i a l feelings that j u s t i c e has triumphed: that i s , that the effect of intervention i s to punish the harm-doer and vindicate the vi c t i m . I n i t i a l p o s i t i v i t y toward p l a i n t i f f s may, therefore, r e f l e c t subjects' feelings that, 103 by intervening to punish the criminal, they helped the victim. These feelings may be strongest immediately after intervention and, therefore, result i n greater positivity toward f i r s t rated p l a i n t i f f s . Some support for the suggestion that the order effect may result from a feeling of having acted on the victim's behalf may be derived from noting that rating order did not affect evaluations of defendants. Also, ratings of p l a i n t i f f s i n the second study, where subjects did not intervene i n the situation, did not d i f f e r as a function of rating order. Attribution of the effect of rating order to subjects' feelings of having aided the victim i s , of course, a post hoc explanation and must, therefore, be regarded with caution. Caution i s especially advisable i n view of the fact that the interpretation offered above does not explain why the effect appeared only among female subjects. Why greater positivity toward f i r s t rated p l a i n t i f f s occurred only among female subjects i s a question that cannot be answered from the present data. Overall, then, data obtained i n the f i r s t study offer l i t t l e support for the importance to third parties of derogation as a means of restoring psychological equity for uncompensated victims. A possible explanation for the non-appearance of the predicted effect i s that, i n a l l conditions i n the f i r s t study, punishment of the harm-doer provided vindication for the victim. Evidence that, even i n the absence of vindication, derogation may be an elusive phenomenon comes from the second study which tested predictions concerning evaluations of p l a i n t i f f s and defendants when subjects were presented with f a i t  accompli resolutions of the inequity and were powerless to intervene. 104 Two of the conditions i n this study, the Imprisonment with Compensation condition and the Restitution condition, restored actual equity for both p l a i n t i f f and defendant. The third condition, Release, restored actual equity for neither p l a i n t i f f nor defendant and thus deprived victims of both vindication and financial compensation. The prediction was that subjects i n the Release condition would evaluate p l a i n t i f f s less favorably and/or hold them more to blame for the misfortune than would subjects i n the Imprisonment with Compensation and the Restitution conditions. These predictions were not supported. Instead, as inspection of means i n Table XXIII indicates, subjects tended to evaluate p l a i n t i f f s deprived of both vindication and financial compensation more positively than p l a i n t i f f s who received both. The second study also tested predictions that defendants who were released would be evaluated significantly more favorably and/or held less responsible for the offence"than defendants who were imprisoned. Although there were no significant differences among conditions i n attributions of responsibility for the offence, analysis of variance of ratings of attractiveness indicated that the main effect of conditions was significant. Overall, defendants who were released were rated more favorably than defendants who were imprisoned or ordered to make restitution. However, only the difference between evaluations of the defendant i n the Release and the Restitution conditions exceeded that required by the Newman-Keuls test for the comparison to be significant at the £ -<.05 l e v e l . Enhancement of the personal attributes of the released defendant may be regarded as evidence of psychological reduction of perceived inequity. Some skepticism regarding acceptance of this interpretation appears j u s t i f i e d . The greater positivity toward the defendant i n this condition may have reflected subjects 1 assumptions that the Court's lenient treatment of the defendant was due to his positive personality characteristics or personal worth. The latter interpretation would be consistent with present findings that failure to restore actual equity did not e l i c i t other evidence of reduction of inequity by means of cognitive re-evaluation of inputs. Present data do demonstrate that third parties respond to incomplete reductions of inequity with expressions of dissatisfaction. This finding i s consistent with Baker's (1973) report that the occurrence of inequity between others e l i c i t s expressions of anger from third party observers. The primary importance of this finding l i e s i n i t s implications for the subsequent behavior of the third party observer of inequity. As Adams (1965) pointed out: "Men do not simply become dissatisfied with conditions they perceive to be unjust. They usually do something about them (p. 2 7 6 ) . " Social psychologists appear to have assumed that what third parties do when adequate means of restoring actual equity are not available i s to restore psychological equity. Consideration of the possible origins of motivation for third parties to maintain equity between others suggests that perhaps this assumption should be questioned. Equity theorists account for the development and maintenance of systems of equity by pointing out that, i n order for a society to function, i t i s necessary to avoid continual conflict over distribution of desired resources. Additionally, they agree that 106 individual members of society learn the system of equity i n the process of socialization. In general the appearance, among both f i r s t and third parties, of behavior directed toward maintenance of actual equity i s regarded as conformity to internalized standards of fairness. Baker (1974)» for example, proposed not only that individuals internalize obligations to maintain justice between others but also that there may be considerable urdfomiity i n socialization of third party equity behavior. He suggested that such individual difference variables as sex and relative reward status may not result i n variation i n third party justice behavior because "society does not permit the socialization of systematic variation i n the enforcement of the norm (Baker, 1974, p. 3 1 5 ) . " Lerner ( l97l)»"too, notes that "most people have internalized the obligation to defend the innocent and punish the wicked (p. 1 2 7 ) . " Adams (1965) discussion of the use of cognitive distortions as alternatives to restoration of actual equity was based on the assumption that experience of inequity was akin to the experience of dissonance. This seems a valid assumption for f i r s t party equity behavior. In these cases the occurrence of inequity may cause distress for both parties to the exchange. The behavior of the parties conflicts with internalized standards of fairness. Walster, Berscheid & Walster (1973) note that an over-rewarded party may experience distress for two reasons: perpetuation of the inequity constitutes a threat to self-esteem and arouses fear of retaliation. A victim who cannot restore actual equity to a relationship may be, as Walster, Berscheid & Walster point out,-forced to justify the inequity i n order to 107 avoid the humiliation of acknowledging that he i s unable to enforce his demands for f a i r treatment. Among f i r s t parties, then, justification of a continuing inequity-may be necessary because the cognition that the relationship violates standards of fairness i s at odds with the cognition that nothing i s being done to remedy i t . In such cases, the perception that inequity exists conflicts with the behavior and self-concept of the perceiver. These are circumstances that should clearly give rise to the kind of cognitive conflict that necessitates reduction of dissonance by means of cognitive distortion. Some attention has been directed to specifying the circumstances under which individuals responsible for an inequity are not motivated to deny or justify i t . These investigations have considered the importance of volition and commitment as determinants of arousal of dissonance. Davis. & Jones ( i 9 6 0 ) examined the effects of choice and anticipation of future interaction on a harm-doer's response to his victim. Subjects were either forced or else allowed to choose to read an extremely negative evaluation to another person. Half of the subjects i n each of these conditions expected to meet the victim; the other half did not. Results demonstrated the importance of volition i n determining whether or not harm-doers would derogate victims: subjects who chose to read the negative evaluation derogated victims while those who were forced to read i t did not. In a subsequent experiment, Glass (1964) .convinced subjects that they were, administering electric shocks to another. Again, half of the subjects were permitted to choose to administer shocks; the other half were not. In addition, 108 Glass manipulated level of self-esteem by giving subjects either positive or negative feedback concerning their personality. Glass found that harm-doers who possessed high self-esteem and perceived themselves as choosing to deliver shock, derogated the victim. These studies thus indicate that existence of inequity does not result i n justification through derogation of the victim unless the circumstances are such that harm-doers perceive themselves as responsible for the state of aff a i r s . Walster, Berscheid & Walster point out that: "If the harm-doer can perceive that i t was not his behavior but rather the action of someone else (e.g., the experimenter or fate) that caused the victim's suffering, then his relationship with the victim becomes an equitable one (p. 157)." These considerations make obvious the existence of a problem i n explaining why a third party who perceives that an exchange between others i s inequitable should, i n the absence of personal responsibility for either the creation or continuation of the inequity deny or justify i t s existence. Lerner and his associates (e.g., Lerner & Simmons, 1966; Lerner & Matthews, 1967; Lerner, 1971) have proposed that justification occurs because undeserved suffering threatens the observer's belief i n a "just world" — a world i n which people deserve what they get. Lerner & Simmons (1966) argue that perceived injustice i s denied because "most people cannot afford, for the sake of their own sanity, to believe i n a world governed by a schedule of random reinforcements (p. 127)." Several recent investigations (e.g., Aderman, Brehm & Katz, 1973; Godfrey & Lowe, 1975; Stokols & Schopler, 1973) have suggested that derogation of victims i s due to factors other than conflict between perceived injustice and belief i n a just world. 109 Stokols & Schopler (1973) argued that denial of perceived injustice i s most l i k e l y to occur when the observer i s somehow implicated i n the creation or continuation of the inequity. These authors suggest that, i n the absence of such factors as third party commitment to the system creating the inequity, the response to the victim of undeserved misfortune i s apt to be sympathy rather than derogation. This position seems consistent with the suggestion put forth by dissonance researchers (e.g., Cooper & Goethals, 1974; Worchel.& Brand, 1972; Cooper, 1971) that some degree of personal responsibility i s a prerequisite for the arousal and reduction of cognitive dissonance. Third parties may not become motivated to justify inequity i n the absence of some conflict between the belief that inequity exists and their behavior i n the situation. Perhaps, then, another important difference between f i r s t and third party equity behavior i s that third parties who cannot restore actual equity are, unlike f i r s t parties, not particularly motivated to deny or to justify perceived inequity. Preference for actual equity may be a determinant of third party equity behavior even i n cases where third parties do not possess means of restoring equity by real changes i n the inputs or outcomes of the members of the dyad. Preference for actual equity may be expressed by protesting the injustice and, for exampledemanding that the situation be remedied. This suggests that perception of inequity between others may e l i c i t j u s t i fication of the inequity only when circumstances are such that the third party i s implicated i n creation of the inequity or committed to i t s continuation. Thus, justification may occur only when 110 the observer perceives himself as having some power to remedy the situation and i s , for one reason or another, unwilling to exercise his power. In many cases, for a third party to achieve justice between others requires that he incur costs. When the situation i s such that a third party's motivation to maximize his own positive outcomes conflicts with his internalized obligation to enforce the norms, unwillingness to incur the costs of intervention may make i t necessary for the individual to justify the inequity. Thus, specification of the conditions under which third party dissatisfaction with perceived injustice may lead to justification of the inequity may require consideration of the costs of equity for the perceiver. The difference between activists and opponents of social reform may be not i n their perceptions of power to affect the fates of others, as Lincoln & Levinger (1972) suggest, but i n their willingness to incur the costs of achieving equity between others. The present studies would imply that preference for actual equity and input positivity may determine third party equity behavior i n circumstances where the costs of achieving equity are not excessive. Dissatisfaction resulting from inadequate reductions of inequity may, under these circumstances, be expressed i n ways consistent with preference for actual equity. That i s , a third party may maintain veridical perceptions of the inputs and outcomes of the parties to the inequity and attribute responsibility for the maintenance of inequity to, for example, the inadequacies of the criminal justice system. Such a possibility may be tested by further research. A second, and important, question for future research i s I l l to specify the circumstances under which perceived inequity w i l l arouse i n the observer the kind of cognitive conflict that motivates denial or justification of the inequity. The present analysis suggests that this may occur when reduction of inequity threatens the observer's own positive outcomes. It may be noted, however, that even i n these circumstances, third parties may be able to reduce dissonance without denying or justifying the inequity. Possible techniques include, for example, denying power to intervene or attributing responsibility for intervention to someone else. A possible explanation for a backlash effect, where pointing to the existence of inequity e l i c i t s derogation from some quarters, i s that the publicity may cause bystanders to perceive that they possess some power to remedy the situation. Unwillingness to incur the costs of restoring equity, rather than perception of inequity, may explain the ensuing justification of inequity. Consideration of similarities and differences between f i r s t and third party equity behavior suggests that Adams' (1965) theory may be extended to apply to third party equity behavior. Data from the present research support the propositions that preferences for actual equity and input positivity determine third party choice among reductions of dyadic inequity and satisfaction with these reductions. That third parties exhibit differences i n satisfaction with solutions raises the potentially important question of the consequences of dissatisfaction for subsequent behavior. Consideration of the dissonance based origin of Adams' proposal that cognitive alterations i n evaluation of 112 inputs and outcomes could serve as an alternative to r e a l changes suggests that these may occur only when t h i r d parties are implicated i n the continuation of the inequity. Thus, an important question f o r future research i s to specify the conditions under which t h i r d party d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n w i l l be expressed i n ways consistent with preference f o r actual equity as opposed to denial or j u s t i f i c a t i o n of the inequity. This may require consideration of the cost, to t h i r d p a r t i e s , of achieving equity for others. CHAPTER VI IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH The research tested predictions concerning third party-preferences for resolutions of inequity by using hypothetical accounts of criminal offences. An important question for further research i s to test the generalizability of findings regarding the importance to third parties of preferences for actual equity and for input positivity. A category of variables relevant to questions concerning the generalizability of these findings may be identified as perceiver variables. These include such individual difference variables as authoritarianism (e.g., Mitchell & Byrne, 1973) and internal-external locus of control (e.g., Phares & Wilson, 1972) that may affect third party perception of the gravity of the offence or influence tendencies to attribute responsibility for 'i actions. Also included i n the category of perceiver variables may be class differences (Nemeth & Sosis, 1973) which may'partly determine responses to offenders. Other perceiver variables appear to include those which increase situational or personal relevance (Shaver, 1970) or lead to greater identification with one of the actors (Chaiken & Darley, 1973). Some studies (e.g., Mitchell & Byrne, 1973; Nemeth & Sosis, 1973) have indicated that, among jurors, such variables as 113 114 authoritarianism and class interact with factors that may influence the degree to which the juror perceives himself as similar to a defendant to determine the juror's response to the defendant. Mitchell & Byrne (1973) report that high authoritarians exhibit leniency toward defendants i n the presence of attitude similarity and severity i n the presence of attitude dissimilarity. Nemeth &!Sosis (1973) note that jurors who are from a white working class background not only appear to be more punitive i n general but also especially punitive toward a defendant from a similar background. A question of direct relevance to the present research i s whether or not these variables operate only to influence severity of punishment within a particular resolution of inequity or whether they also extend to determine preferences among alternative resolutions of inequity. The present research used students from psychology classes at the University of B r i t i s h Columbia. I f one assumes that such a sample i s apt to contain a disproportionate number of individuals who are from a middle or upper-middle class background and thus may be more l i b e r a l than the general population, i t i s possible to argue that different preferences among resolutions of inequity may be exhibited by other samples. The salience of this question i s indicated by the previously mentioned research by Nemeth & Sosis (1973). They investigated the effect of the background of the juror on responses to the defendant i n a negligent homicide case. Background of the juror was manipulated by using samples from the University of Chicago and from a junior college i n Chicago. According to Nemeth & Sosis (1973), the University of Chicago sample came from middle and upper-middle class backgrounds while the junior college sample was composed of individuals from a working class background, As has already been mentioned, jurors from working class backgrounds meted out more severe sentences than did middle and upper-middle class jurors. Of primary importance to the present discussion is the report by Nemeth & Sosis (1973) that: Part of the reason for less punitiveness by the university sample is that a good proportion of these individuals gave the defendant 'zero years' in prison for his crime but added comments such as 'prisons only harden criminals and some alternative form of punishment would be more, appropriate and more rehabilitative•' In other words, these subjects did not render the defendant guiltless for his crime; they simply preferred other modes of dealing with the transgression than sentencing the defendant to a number of years in prxson (p. 228). This would imply that, among samples with a liberal orientation, one might find rejection of punishments that restore equity for criminals by means of such measures as prison terms and acceptance of alternatives that reduce inequity by means of improved input from criminals. Findings from the present study, which used samples of students from the University of British Columbia, indicated that alternatives that involved lowered outcomes for criminals were rejected only when another equitable alternative permitted subjects to achieve both equity and input positivity. When the alternative to a prison term was an inequitable and positive outcome for the criminal (imprisonment vs Release) or when the alternative to a prison sentence required acceptance of a less equitable solution (imprisonment with Compensation vs Fine), subjects selected the alternative that involved sentencing the defendant to a term of imprisonment. The study carried out by Nemeth & Sosis (1973) and the present research differed i n several respects. F i r s t l y , the Nemeth & Sosis study involved a defendant who, while driving under the influence of alcohol, had h i t and k i l l e d a pedestrian. The present research used accounts of property crimes which constituted deliberate violations of the law but did not involve physical harm to anyone. Secondly, the Nemeth & Sosis study used American students while the present research was carried out with Canadian undergraduates. Thus, apparent differences i n willingness to restore equity by means that involve lowered outcomes for offenders may be attributed either to differences i n the stimulus situation or to differences i n the l i b e r a l i t y of subjects. I f one assumes that a sample of university students represents a f a i r l y l i b e r a l sample of the Canadian population, then the primary question i s whether or not other members of Canadian society would also prefer to restore equity by means that involve positive input from offenders. Some data indicating that preference for restoration of equity by means of positive input from offenders i s not exclusive to university students comes from the Final Report of the Surrey Task Force on Juvenile Delinquency. This group circulated a questionnaire i n local newspapers i n Surrey. Readers were asked to complete and return the questionnaire which solicited their opinions on juvenile delinquency i n Surrey. One of the questions asked respondents to indicate which form of punishment they would prefer to impose for such offences. Results were that restitution and fines were selected by approximately of the respondents. Although the data come from a f a i r l y small (N = 167) sample of self-selected subjects, they do provide some evidence that preferences for resolutions 117 of inequity by means of positive input from offenders may be found among other samples. Another question concerning the generalizability of findings does not deal with class differences but with differences that may be attributed to the personal history of third parties. Chaiken and Darley (1973) report that, when the perpetrator and victim of an accident are clearly separated, identification with one or the other of the parties to the incident affects attributions of responsibility and assignment of blame for the accident. This finding implies that experience of victimization or expectation of victimization may be a factor in determining preferences for resolutions of inequity by means of real changes in inputs or outcomes. Vidmar (1973) tested the hypothesis that fear of crime would be positively related to support for the death penalty and found only equivocal support for i t . Vidmar reported that respondents who perceived the crime rate as rising and who reported experience of victimization also supported the death penalty. However, a significant correlation between direct assessments of threat and expectation of personal victimization and support for the death penalty was not found. One possible explanation for Vidmar's equivocal findings may be that the majority of respondents may have feared the consequences of such common crimes as theft and vandalism rather than of crimes, such as murder, which may be punishable by death. Thus, a stronger correlation between .expectation of victimization and attitude toward punishments may have appeared i f the survey had dealt with penalties for common crimes. The rationale behind the expectation that individuals who have 1 1 8 experienced victimization may exhibit different preferences for resolution of inequity appears to be related to consideration of the victim's desire for vindication. As Schafer ( i960) points out, emphasis on rehabilitation may be perceived as depriving victims of even the compensation of vindication. Such compensation may reside primarily i n the knowledge that society has recognized the inequity and undertaken to right the wrong. For a victim to experience the satisfaction of vindication may not require that the offender be punished by means of lowered outcomes. Punishments that require positive input from the offender may also provide the victim with the satisfaction of vindication. Additionally, i f one considers that an individual who identifies strongly with the victim may be motivated by concerns common to f i r s t parties, then preference for positive outcomes should be a factor i n determining preferences among resolutions of inequity. That i s , a solution such as restitution that not only provides the victim with vindication but also provides real compensation for losses should be a preferred one. Further research investigating the effect of perceiver variables on third party responses to inequity between others may have both theoretical and practical implications. For example, i f subsequent research were to demonstrate that class of the third party influenced equity decisions, these findings could be relevant not only to practical concerns but might also provide insight into the effects of socialization on third party equity behavior. Such research could, therefore, contribute not only to analysis of the effect of third party behavior on the maintenance of equity i n society but also to further refinement and application of equity theory. REFERENCES Adams, J. S. Inequity i n social exchange. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances i n experimental social psychology. Vol. 2. New York: Academic Press, Aderman, D., Brehm, S. S., and Katz, L. B. Empathic observation of an innocent victim: The just world revisited. Journal  of Personality and Social Psychology, 1974, 2£ (3), 342 - 347. Baker, K. A. Experimental analysis of third party justice behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 1974» 20 (2), 307 - 316. Blau, P. M. Exchange and power i n social l i f e . New York: Wiley, 1964. Boutilier, R. A test of the just world hypothesis: Sympathy for victims, blame for victimizers. Unpublished M. A. Thesis. University of Br i t i s h Columbia, 1975. Chaiken, Alan L., and Darley, John M. Victim or perpetrator?: defensive attribution of responsibility and the need for order and justice. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 1973,, 2£ (2), 268 - 275. Cooper, J. Personal responsibility and dissonance: The role of foreseen consequences. Journal of Personality and Social  Psychology. 1971, 18 (3), 354 - 363. Cooper, J., and Goethals, G. R. Unforeseen events and the elimination of cognitive dissonance. Journal of Personality  and Social Psychology. 1974, 2°.; (4), 441 - 445. Davis, K. E., and Jones, E. E. Changes i n interpersonal perception as a means of reducing cognitive dissonance. Journal of  Abnormal and Social Psychology, i960, 6l, 402 - 410. Ferguson, G. A. S t a t i s t i c a l analysis i n psychology and education. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1966. Glass, D. C. Changes i n l i k i n g as a means of reducing cognitive discrepancies between self-esteem and aggression. Journal of Personality. 1964, ^2, 531 - 549. 119 120 Godfrey, B. W., and Lowe, C. A. Devaluation of innocent victims: An attribution analysis within the just world paradigm. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 1975, 2k (5)? 944 - 951. Homans, G. C. Social behavior: Its elementary forms. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1961. Jones, C , and Aronson, E. Attribution of fault to a rape victim as a function of respectability of the victim. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 1973, .26 ( 3 ) , 415 - 420. Kalven, H., Jr., and Zeisel, H. The American Jury. Boston: L i t t l e , Brown, 1966. Kaufman, H. Legality and harmfulness of a bystander's failure to intervene as determinants of moral judgment. In Macaulay, J., and Berkowitz, L., (Eds.), Altruism and helping behavior. New York: Academic Press, 1970. Kirk, R. Experimental design: Procedures for the behavioral s c i e n c e s ^ C a l i f o r n i a : Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, 1969. Lerner, M. J. Evaluation of performance as a function of performer's reward and attractiveness. Journal of Personality and Social  Psychology. 1965, 1 (4) , 355 - 360. Lerner, M. J . The desire for justice and reactions to victims. In, Macaulay, J., and Berkowitz, L., (Eds.), Altruism and  helping behavior. New York: Academic Press, 1970. Lerner, M. J. Observer's evaluation of a victim: justice, guilt and veridical perception. Journal of Personality and  Social Psychology, 1971, 20 (2) , 127 - 135. Lerner, M. J. The justice motive: "Equity" and "parity" among children. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 1974, 22 (4) , 539 - 550. Lerner, M. J., and Matthews, G. Reactions to the suffering of others under conditions of indirect responsibility. Journal  of Personality and Social Psychology. 1967, 319 - 325. Lerner, M. J., and Simmons, C. H. Observers reaction to the "Innocent victim": Compassion or rejection. Journal of Personality  and Social Psychology. 1966, 203 - 210. 121 Lincoln, A., and Levinger, G. Observers' evaluations of the victim and the attacker i n an aggressive incident. Journal of Personality  and Social Psychology. 1972, 22 ( 2 ) , 202 - 210. Maurer, J. C. The big con. 1963. Mitchell, Herman E., and Byrne, Donn. The defendant's dilemma: effects of jurors' attitudes and authoritarianism on judicial decisions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 1973, 25, ( 1 ) , 123 - 129. Nemeth, Charlan & Sosis, Ruth Hyland. A simulated jury study: characteristics of the defendant and the jurors. The Journal  of Social Psychology. 1973, 2 0 , 221 - 229. Phares, E., and Wilson, K. Responsibility attribution: role of outcome severity, situational ambiguity and internal-external control. Journal of Personality. 1972, 4j0 ( 3 ) , 392 - 406. Piaget, J. (1932) The moral .judgment of the child. Marjorie Gabain (Trans.). London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1968 edition. Pritchard, R. D. Equity theory: A review and critique. Organizational  behavior and human performance. 1969, 176 - 211. Schafer, S. Restitution to victims of crime. London: Stevens and Son, I 9 6 0 . Shaver, K. G. Defensive attribution: effects of severity and relevance on the responsibility assigned for an accident. Journal of  Personality and Social Psychology. 1970, 1Z., 101 - 113. Siegal, S. Nonparametric statistics for the behavioral sciences. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1956. Simmons, C. H., and Lerner, M. J. Altruism as a search for justice. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 1968, £ ( 3 ) , Stokols, D., and Schopler, J. Reactions to victims under conditions of situational detachment: The effects of responsibility, severity, and expected future interaction. Journal of Personality  and Social Psychology. 1973, 2£ ( 2 ) , 199 - 209. Surrey Task Force on Juvenile Delinquency Final Report. Submitted to the Mayor and Council of the Corporation of the D i s t r i c t of Surrey, October 6, 1975. 122 Sykes, G. M., and Matza, D. Techniques of neutralization: A theory of delinquency. American Sociological Review. 1957, 2 2 , 664 - 670. Thibaut, J., and Kelley, H. The social psychology of groups. New York: Wiley, 1959. Vidmar, N. Effects of decision alternatives on the verdicts and social perceptions of simulated jurors. Journal of Personality and  Social Psychology. 1972, 22 ( 2 ) , 211 - 218. Vidmar, N. Retributive and u t i l i t a r i a n motives and other correlates of Canadian attitudes toward the death penalty. Canadian Psychologist. 1974, 1 £ ( 4 ) , 337 - 356. Walster, E., Berscheid, E., and Walster, G. W. New directions i n equity research. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 1973, 2£ ( 2 ) , 151 - 176. Walster, G. W. The Walster et. a l . (1973) equity formula: A Correction. Representative research i n social psychology. 1975, 0 , 65 Winer, B. J. S t a t i s t i c a l principles i n experimental design. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1962. Worchel, S., and Brand, J. Role of responsibility and violated expectancy i n the arousal of dissonance. Journal of Personality  and Social Psychology. 1972, 22 ( l ) , 87 - 9 7 . Zuckerman, M. A comment on the equity formula by Walster, Berscheid and Walster ( 1973) . Representative research i n social psychology. 1975, 6 , 63 - 6 4 . APPENDIX A STIMULUS MATERIALS FOR STUDY I ACCOUNT OF FRAUD Summary of the Case; The defendant, James Dory, i s charged with obtaining funds by false pretences. The amount of money i n question i s $2,500, The prosecution claims that Dory posed as a Bank o f f i c i a l and persuaded Mrs, Dorothy Campbell to entrust him with funds which he then used for his own purposes. Testimony of the P l a i n t i f f , Mrs, Campbell: Mrs, Dorothy Campbell i s a 67-year-old widow. Since her husband's death i n 1969 she has resided alone i n a small apartment which she owns. Prior to the fraud, Mrs, Campbell had about $3,500, saved for emergencies. Now, apart from her home, her assets consist of approximately a thousand dollars remaining i n her savings account. For her day-to-day l i v i n g expenses, she relies on her old age pension. The lost money represents a significant portion of the money she had deposited for emergencies, Mrs, Campbell t e s t i f i e d that the defendant f i r s t contacted her on January 4, 1974 when he telephoned and claimed to be a Bank 123 1 2 4 investment counsellor. Mrs. Campbell stated that Dory told her the Bank was offering special investment opportunities to selected customers. Dory requested and obtained Mrs. Campbell's permission to v i s i t her to explain the investment program. Mrs. Campbell stated that the defendant followed up his telephone c a l l by appearing at her home and presenting her with an identification card showing he was a Bank employee. She further t e s t i f i e d that he persuaded her that her funds would be better invested i n the Bank plan than l e f t i n her savings account. Mrs. Campbell stated that she gave Dory a cheque for $ 2 , 5 0 0 . and received i n return a Bank Plan certificate and a receipt. (These documents were introduced as Exhibits A, B and c ) . Mrs. Campbell stated that, when she next visited the Bank, she discovered that she had been the victim of a fraud. Testimony of Police Officer t The detective who worked on the case t e s t i f i e d that, when the fraud was reported, a police portrait of Dory was drawn from the descriptions given by Mrs. Campbell and the bank t e l l e r who had cashed the cheque. He explained that a police officer who had seen the portrait later met Dory at a party and recognized him. The detective t e s t i f i e d that when he received this report, he investigated further. The detective t e s t i f i e d that Dory was placed i n a police line-up and positively identified by both the t e l l e r and by Mrs. Campbell. Also offered i n evidence was a business card (Exhibit D) which identifies the holder .as a Bank employee. The detective t e s t i f i e d that this card was found i n Dory's possession. It contains Dory's photograph and. a f i c t i t i o u s name. 125 Testimony of the Defendant. James Dory: The defendant, 49-year-old James Dory, has been employed for 14 years as a salesman by a local car dealer. At the time of the t r i a l , Dory i s s t i l l working i n this capacity. He i s married with no children l i v i n g at home. Dory pleaded guilty to the charge and agreed that Mrs. Campbell accurately described the technique he used to persuade her to entrust him with the funds. He stated, however, that he planned only to borrow the money for investment purposes and that he planned to repay Mrs. Campbell out of his profits. Dory t e s t i f i e d that an acquaintance had offered him a chance to invest i n a promising venture. Dory stated he was wondering how to raise the necessary funds when he heard the fraud described on an open line radio programme and decided to use i t to acquire funds. Dory further t e s t i f i e d that the money was lost when the business venture f a i l e d . Dory also t e s t i f i e d that he had never before committed, been charged with, or convicted of, a criminal offence. Testimony of Dory's Employer: The owner of the car dealership where Dory i s employed t e s t i f i e d that during the fourteen years the defendant has worked for him, he has been a good worker and that there have been no customer complaints about Dory. Verdict: The defendant i s found guilty of the charge. ACCOUNT OF THEFT 126 Summary of the Case; The defendant, James Dory, i s charged with theft. The prosecution charges that, on the evening of April 8, 1974, Dory entered an apartment occupied by Mr. and Mrs. Peter Roth and removed the following items: a portable color television set, a stereo set, a diamond engagement ring, a camera and four articles of clothing belonging to Mr. Roth. At the time of the t r i a l the television set, the stereo set and the diamond ring, together valued at about $ 2 , 5 0 0 . have not been recovered. The prosecution alleges that Dory, the former occupant of the suite now rented by the Roths, kept a spare set of keys to the suite and used them to gain entrance. Testimony of the P l a i n t i f f . Peter Roth: Twenty-six year old Peter Roth i s employed as a salesman by a local department store. Roth te s t i f i e d that he had lived i n the suite for less than a month before the theft occurred. He stated that he moved into the suite on April 1 s t and that on April 7 t h he and his wife l e f t for Calgary to spend a week v i s i t i n g relatives. Roth stated that when he returned from Calgary on April 14, he discovered that the apartment had been entered and .that the goods l i s t e d above had been stolen. Roth stated that the lost property had not been insured against theft. Four articles of clothing and a camera were produced i n court and identified by Mr. Roth as the ones he had reported stolen. 127 Testimony of Police Officer; The police officer assigned to investigate the theft t e s t i f i e d that he had questioned other tenants i n the building. He stated that one of the tenants contacted, Mrs. Campbell, reported that she had seen James Dory, the former occupant of the Roth apartment, leave the suite carrying a portable television set and some clothing. The officer t e s t i f i e d that Dory's new residence had been searched and that four items of clothing which matched the description of those reported stolen were found i n Dory's possession. The officer also t e s t i f i e d that the seri a l number of a camera also found i n Dory's possession was the same as the serial number of the one reported stolen. The officer further t e s t i f i e d that the articles produced i n court and identified by Roth were the ones he found i n Dory's possession. Testimony of Mrs. Campbell, witness; Mrs. Campbell t e s t i f i e d that she lives i n an apartment i n the same building as the one i n which the Roth apartment i s located. She t e s t i f i e d that, on April 8 , 1974, she observed the defendant, James Dory, leave the Roth apartment carrying a portable television set and some clothing. She explained that, at the time, she had not realized that the suite had changed hands and thus had not reported the incident. Testimony of the Defendant. James Dory: The defendant, James Dory, i s a 27-year-old construction worker. He has worked for the same firm for five years. At the time of the t r i a l , he i s s t i l l working i n this capacity. Dory pleaded guilty to the charge. He te s t i f i e d that he had moved from the apartment now occupied by the Roths less than a month before the theft occurred. Dory explained that he discovered he s t i l l had a spare set of keys to his former apartment and drove to the apartment building to return the keys to the manager. Dory stated that when he found the manager not at home, he decided to give the keys to the new occupant of the suite. The new occupant did not answer the door and Dory used the keys to l e t himself i n . Dory stated that, after he entered the suite, he realized that he had an opportunity to commit a perfect crime. Dory reported that he selected several items and proceeded to carry them to his car. He was carrying out the portable television set and some clothing when he encountered Mrs. Campbell. Dory t e s t i f i e d that he. became afraid that he had been recognized and decided to dispose of the goods as quickly as possible. Dory stated that he went to a bar and there sold the color television, the stereo set and the diamond ring. Dory t e s t i f i e d that the identities and whereabouts of the purchasers of these articles were unknown to him. Dory t e s t i f i e d that he had never before committed, been charged with, or convicted of, a criminal offence. Testimony of Dory's Employer: The owner of the firm where Dory i s employed t e s t i f i e d that, during the five years Dory has been employed by the firm, he has been a hard and conscientious worker. Verdict: The defendant i s found guilty of the charge. ACCOUNT OF VANDALISM 129 Summary of the Case; The defendant, James Dory, i s charged with vandalism. The prosecution charges that, on the afternoon of A p r i l 8 , 1974? Dory broke into a house owned by Thomas Finn and severely damaged the premises. Testimony of the P l a i n t i f f . Thomas Finn: The owner of the house, Thomas Finn, i s a 32-year-old mechanic. Finn t e s t i f i e d that he had purchased a pa r t i a l l y built house and, on evenings and weekends, worked to complete i t so that he could move his family into i t . Finn stated that the house had been almost completed when the damage occurred. Finn t e s t i f i e d that the damages to the house included smashed fixtures i n the bathroom, paint poured over carpeting and the plaster on several walls smashed with a hammer. Finn t e s t i f i e d that i t had been necessary to replace the bathroom fixtures and the carpeting and that the cost of these items plus materials to repair other damages had been $2,501.32. Finn added that these losses were not covered by insurance. Testimony of Mrs. Campbell, witness: Mrs. Campbell t e s t i f i e d that she resides i n the house across the street from the Finn property. She t e s t i f i e d that on the afternoon i n question she was i n her front yard when she observed a strange car p u l l up to the Finn house. Mrs. Campbell stated that she saw the defendant emerge from the car and walk to the rear of the Finn house. Mrs. Campbell t e s t i f i e d that she then heard what sounded like glass breaking, 130 became suspicious and noted the licence number, make and model of the defendant's car. Mrs. Campbell stated that she continued to watch for several minutes and then approached the Finn house with intentions of questioning the defendant about his presence on the premises. Mrs. Campbell t e s t i f i e d that as she approached the house, she was able to see the defendant clearly through the dining room window and observed that he was pouring the contents of a can of paint on the fl o o r . Mrs. Campbell said she returned to her home and telephoned police. Before they arrived, she saw the defendant emerge from the house, enter his car and drive away. Testimony of Police Officert The police officer who arrested Dory t e s t i f i e d that he was on his way to the Finn house when he observed the defendant's car a few blocks away from the property. The officer stated that he stopped the car to question the defendant and noticed that the defendant's slacks and shoes were spattered with wet paint. When he returned with the defendant to the Finn house, the officer-observed that the color of the paint was the same as that poured on the carpeting. The officer further t e s t i f i e d that he found the glass i n the rear door had been smashed. Testimony of the Defendant. James Dory: The defendant, 25—year-old James Dory, has been employed as a truck-driver for the past three years. He i s s t i l l working i n this capacity at the time of the t r i a l . Dory pleaded guilty to the charge and admitted that he did the damage described. He t e s t i f i e d that he had been on vacation when the 131 offence occurred. Dory stated that, on the day i n question, he had been suffering the after-effects of drinking heavily the previous evening. Dory stated that he was driving through the sub-division when he became extremely thirsty and stopped at the Finn house to ask for water. When he realized the house was vacant, he smashed the glass pane i n the rear door and l e t himself i n . Dory stated that he tr i e d to obtain water f i r s t from the kitchen and then from the bathroom. Dory said that he found the water was not turned on, became enraged, seized a hammer and smashed the bathroom fixtures. Dory stated that he then used the hammer to pound holes i n walls u n t i l he stumbled over the paint which he poured on the carpeting. Once he had emptied the paint cans, he l e f t the premises. Dory t e s t i f i e d that he had never before committed, been charged with, or convicted of, a criminal offence. Testimony of Dory's Employer; The owner of the firm where Dory i s employed as a truck driver t e s t i f i e d that, during the three years Doryhas been i n his employ, he has been a hard and conscientious worker. Verdict; The defendant i s found guilty of the charge. APPENDIX B REPORT OF PILOT STUDIES OVERVIEW Two pilot studies were conducted to examine various aspects of the stimulus materials and dependent measures proposed for use i n the research. Findings related to the adequacy of stimulus materials w i l l be covered f i r s t and then consideration w i l l be given to selection of dependent measures, STIMULUS MATERIALS Attractiveness of Criminals and Victims Within Each Account Brief descriptions of criminals and victims were abstracted from simulated case transcripts and presented to subjects i n the second pilot study. Subjects rated the stimulus person on the set of 15 bi-polar adjectives developed by Lerner ( 1 9 6 5 ) , These are presented i n semantic dif f e r e n t i a l form and a stimulus person's score on each item may range from one (negative evaluation) to nine (positive evaluation). Ratings on these items may be summed to yield an overall index of attractiveness. The range of possible scores i s , therefore, from 15 to 1 3 5 , A higher score indicates a more positive rating. These ratings were made prior to subjects' being told of the stimulus persons' involvements i n criminal offences. Each subject 132 133 rated only one of the criminal-victim pairs. Mine subjects rated each pair. The purpose of this procedure was to determine i f any of the criminal-victim pairs were perceived as differing greatly i n attractiveness. Mean attractiveness ratings are presented i n Table XXIX. TABLE XXIX MEAN RATINGS OF ATTRACTIVENESS OF CRIMINAL-VICTIM PAIRS Stimulus Persons Account Criminal Victim Fraud 9 2 . 8 8 99.22 Theft 9 4 . 4 4 105.11 Vandalism 92.66 95.77 Theft (revised) 0 8 4 . 8 8 86.22 The difference between rated attractiveness of the criminal and victim involved i n the theft was found to be significant (t = 4.18; d.f. = 8; 2 • < . 0 5 ) . This difference appeared due to the favorability with which subjects rated the victim: a bookkeeper who had visited his a i l i n g mother-in-law. The description of the victim was revised so that he became a department store salesman who had visited relatives. The revised descriptions of the criminal-victim pair were rated by nine additional subjects and obtained means are shown i n Table XXEX, above. 134 Perceived Guilt of the.Defendant; Subjects i n the second pilot study were presented with a simulated case transcript, asked to read i t over and then indicate whether or not the evidence proved the defendant's g u i l t . Subjects were also asked to indicate, on a scale ranging from zero to one hundred percent, how certain they were that their decisions were correct. The purpose of this task was to ensure that the material presented i n each case established the guilt of the defendant and to thereby avoid possible complications due to asking experimental subjects to sentence defendants not perceived as guilty. Nine subjects rated each of the accounts of fraud and vandalism and eighteen subjects rated the account of theft. A l l subjects found the defendant guilty. The mean ratings for certainty were as follows: "theft —- 86.13 percent, fraud — 89 .50 percent, and vandalism — 73 percent. The data appear to j u s t i f y the conclusion that the stimulus materials contain sufficient incrimination for experimental purposes. Clarity and Adequacy of Stimulus Materials: The thirty-six subjects i n the second pil o t study were given a description of six alternative sentences and asked to indicate the order i n which they would prefer to impose the sentences on the offender i n the case. The primary purpose of this task was to provide an opportunity to discover i f the descriptions of the sentences were adequate and i f the alternatives seemed sensible to subjects. Once subjects had read over the alternative sentences, they were asked to complete a post-experimental questionnaire. The questionnaire asked subjects to indicate the nature of the crime, the value of the property involved and to specify the length of the term of imprisonment they would impose on the defendant and the amount of money they would assess as fine or restitution for the offence. The questionnaire also included several items to assess the adequacy of the stimulus materials. On the whole, subjects appeared to have l i t t l e d i f f i c u l t y recalling the nature of the crime and the value of the property involved. Three subjects indicated that the sentences were not clear: one suggested that they be put i n point form and the other two expressed doubt as to whether or not the victim would be compensated when the sentence stated only probation or imprisonment. These data suggest that consideration should, perhaps, be given to specifying when compensation i s not available i n experimental conditions where doubt might arise. DEPENDENT MEASURES Subjects' preferences for various restorations of equity are to be assessed by asking them to choose one of a pair of sentencing alternatives. Subjects w i l l also be asked to specify the magnitude of the penalties they would impose and to indicate their satisfaction with their resolution of the situation. As has already been mentioned, pilot subjects were exposed to descriptions of the six alternative sentences. Pilot subjects were also asked to specify the length of the term of imprisonment they would impose on the defendant and to indicate the amounts they would assess as fine and restitution. Experience with pi l o t subjects indicates that these measures are suitable for 136 experimental purposes. The attractiveness of crirninals and victims w i l l be ^assessed by means of the scale developed by Lerner (1965). This scale consists of f i fteen bi-polar adjective pairs. These are presented i n semantic differential form and a stimulus person's score on each item may range from one for a negative evaluation to nine for a positive evaluation. Ratings on these items may be summed to yield an overall index of attractiveness. The range of possible scores i s , therefore, from 15 to 135» A higher score indicates a more positive rating. R e l i a b i l i t y of the scale has been estimated by means of the procedure outlined below. Samples of ratings of stimulus persons were obtained. Fifteen sets of fourteen item' l i s t s were prepared by eliminating each of the bi-ptilar adjective pairs once from the l i s t . A table of random numbers was used to assign each of the fourteen adjective pairs i n each of the fifteen l i s t s a number from one to fourteen. The l i s t s were then s p l i t by assigning the adjective pairs randomly assigned numbers from one to seven, inclusive, to the f i r s t half and the remaining pairs to the second half. The product-moment correlation between scores on the f i r s t and second halves of each l i s t was-computed and corrected by the Spearman-^Brown formula (Ferguson, 1966, p. 378). Values of Zr- corresponding to the resulting coefficients were then obtained from tables i n Ferguson (1966). Then the mean Zr and the r corresponding to i t were found. The above procedures were used to estimate the r e l i a b i l i t y of Lerner's scale with data from three samples. The f i r s t sample i s from an experimenter by Boutilier (1975). Subjects i n this study rated the average university student. It should be noted that the fifteen items were not presented to these subjects i n semantic differential form but that subjects made their ratings by c i r c l i n g a number from one to nine. The procedures outlined above yielded an overall r e l i a b i l i t y coefficiant of .800 for this sample. Table XXX shows the individual coefficients, corrected coefficients and transformations. TABLE XXX SPLIT-HALF CORRELATIONS, CORRECTIONS AND 2R TRANSFORMATIONS OF RATINGS OF AVERAGE UNIVERSITY STUDENTS ON LERNER'S SCALE Split-Half Corrected L i s t Correlation Correlation Zr 1 0.686 0.814 1.142 2 0.725 0.840 1.221 3 0.517 0.682 .829 4 0.657 0.793 1.071 5 0.740 O.85O I . 2 5 6 6 0.637 0.778 1.045 7 0 .603 0.752 .973 8 0.510 0.675 .820 9 0.743 O.852 1.256 10 0.594 0.745 .962 11 0.862 0.926 1.623 12 0.532 0.695 .858 13 0.718 O.836 1.204 14 0.690 0.816 1.142 15 0.626 O.769 1.020 138 The second and third samples are from the second pilot study for the present research. . Each of 36 pilot subjects rated the two stimulus persons comprising one of the criminal-victim pairs. Subjects* ratings of "criminals" were treated as one sample and ratings of "victims" were treated as another sample. Random numbers were assigned to the adjective pairs and the fifteen l i s t s of fourteen items were split into halves as previously outlined. The lists were split in identical fashion for these two samples. Tables..XXXI and XXXII show the individual coefficients, corrected coefficients and Zr transformations for the two samples. The obtained overall reliability coefficient for the sample of ratings of criminals was O.858 and the obtained coefficient for the sample of ratings of "victims" was 0.800. TABLE XXXI SPLIT-HALF CORRELATIONS, CORRECTIONS AND Zr TRANSFORMATIONS OF RATINGS OF "CRIMINALS" ON LERNER'S SCALE Split-Half Corrected List Correlation Correlation Zr 1 0.719 O.836 1.204 2 0.756 0.861 1.293 3 0.793 0.884 1.398 4 0.735 0.847 1.238 5 0.718 O.836 1.204 6 0.890 0.942 1.738 7 O.652 0.789 1.058 8 0.742 0.852 1.256 9 0.739 0.849 1.256 10 0.789 0.882 1.376 11 0.735 0.847 1.238 12 0.756 0.861 1.293 13 0.802 0.890 1.422 14 0.741 0.851 1.256 15 0.771 0.870 1.333 139 TABLE XXXII SPLIT-HALF CORRELATIONS, CORRECTIONS AND Zr TRANSFORMATIONS OF RATINGS OF "VICTIMS" ON LERNER»S SCALE L i s t Split-Half Correlation Corrected Correlation Zr 1 0.637 0.778 1.033 2 0.694 0.819 1.157 3 0.627 0.770 1.020 4 0.695 0.820 1.157 5 0.759 0.863 1.293 6 0.699 0.823 1.020 7 0.539 0.700 .867 8 0.584 0.737 .940 9 0.744 0.853 1.256 10 0.783 0.878 1.354 11 0.691 0.817 1.142 12 0.649 0.787 1 .058 13 0.687 0.814 1.142 14 0.627 0.770 1.020 15 O.613 0.760 .996 To determine i f assignment of numbers to the individual items i n the l i s t s was, indeed, random; Kendall's Coefficient of Concordance was used to test for relationship among ranks assigned to individual items. The obtained value of W (O.lll) for the f i r s t sample was transformed (Siegal, 1956) to a chi-square value. The obtained chi-square value ( 2 3 . 3 1 , d.f. = 14) was found to be only slightly less than that 140 required for significance at the £ --C.05 level (23.68). The obtained value of W for the second and third samples was found to be 0.058 which was transformed to a chi-square value of 12.18, d.f. = 14, jo -<.50. These data suggest that the r e l i a b i l i t y of Lerner's scale i s sufficient for present purposes. The f i r s t p i l o t study included a task devised to provide some evidence for the construct and concurrent validity of the proposed dependent measures of perceived gravity of the offence and responsibility of the victim and criminal for the offence. Two stories were prepared. In the Severe version the offence involved an armed robbery during which an unsuspecting victim was attacked and wounded. In the Mild version, the offender was unarmed and the victim was wounded as a result of his deliberate and unnecessary attack on the criminal. Each of the twenty-six subjects was randomly assigned either the Mild or Severe version and asked to rate various aspects of the situation on the items shown i n Table XXXIII. Items 1 and 2 were included to assess subjects' perceptions of the gravity of the offence. In order to determine i f obtained differences i n ratings of the "wrongness" of the offence i n the Mild and Severe conditions were significant, t_-tests were used. The obtained t values and associated probabilities are shown i n Table XXXIII. As reference to Table XXXIII shows, the means differed i n the direction predicted and the differences were significant (t = 3.21, d.f. = 24, £ ^ . 0 0 5 ; t = 3.93, d.f. = 24, £ -£.005). 141 TABLE XXXIII DEPENDENT MEASURES, MEAN RATINGS, t VALUES AND ASSOCIATED PROBABILITIES Mild Condition Severe Condition X X t mm* d.f. £ Item 1: As a question not of law but of morality, Dory's actions were: as wrong as possible (l) — very right (9) 3.46 1.69 3.21 24 ^.05 Item 2: Quite apart from legal aspects, Dory: did not do any-thing wrong (l) -— did very wrong (9) 6.30 8.54 3.93 24 <.05 Item 3: How much do you think the victim i s to blame for what happened? 4.30 3.15 1.24 24 ^.15 Item 4: How much do you agree or disagree with the statement that: "Dory's acts were a result of the circumstances i n which he found himself"? Agree completely (l) — disagree completely (9) 4.08 5.92 1.94 24 ^.05 Item 5: How much do you agree or disagree with the statement that; "Dory i s more a victim of c i r -cumstances than a criminal"? Agree completely (l) — disagree completely (9) 3.69 6.85 3.95 24 <.05 Item 6; How much do you agree or disagree with the statement that: "Even under different circum-stances, Dory would eventually have become a criminal"? Agree completely (l) — disagree completely (9) 6.61 6.08 0.62 24 <.30 142 Item 3 was included to assess the degree of responsibility assigned to the victim. Jones and Aronson (1973) used this item and obtained expected and significant differences i n responsibility attributed to the victim. In the present instance the victim i n the Severe condition was the unsuspecting target of an attack with a knife while the victim i n the Mild condition armed himself with a knife and forced a confrontation with an intruder. The mean rating for blame attributable to the aggressive victim was 4»30 and the mean rating for blame attributable to the unsuspecting victim was 3.15» As i s shown i n Table XXXIII, the difference between means i s not significant at the JD -<.05 l e v e l . Means did, however, diff e r i n the predicted direction. Important differences between the Jones and Aronson study and the present one may be that subjects i n the former study were rating blame attributable to attractive and unattractive victims for being the targets of an attack. The present study dealt with differences i n responsibility for being wounded i n the course of an unexpected or deliberate confrontation with an intruder. Subjects may have been reluctant to blame the victim for attempting to defend his property. Also, the Jones and Aronson manipulation of the attractiveness of the victim may have made i t more d i f f i c u l t to derogate the victim on this dimension. The present study presented no barriers to derogation of the victim as an alternative to attribution of blame. Since this item was used successfully i n the Jones and Aronson study and since obtained differences i n the present study were in the predicted direction, i t i s proposed to include i t . Items 4» 5 and 6 were included as measures of perceived 143 responsibility of the harm-doer for the offence. The obtained means and associated t values are shown i n Table XXXIII. As Table XXXIII indicates, ratings i n the Mild and Severe conditions on Items 4 and 5 differed significantly i n the predicted direction. As w i l l also be seen from Table XXXIII, Item 6 did not discriminate between the two conditions. Accordingly, i t i s proposed that only Items 4 and 5 be used i n the research. Once subjects had read and rated either the Mild or Severe version of the offence, they were presented with both versions of the story and asked to indicate, by c i r c l i n g a number from one to nine, the extent of their agreement with the statements that the offenders wounded the victims while acting i n self-defence and also to evaluate the comparative wrongness of the offences. Time limitations were such that only 21 subjects were presented with this task. A t-test for correlated observations was used to test the significance of the difference between mean ratings of self-defence for the Mild (X = 3 .90) and Severe (X =» 8 .09) offenders. The obtained t value (t = 8 . 3 8 , d.f. = 20) was significant at the £ ^ . 0 0 5 l e v e l . Of the 21 subjects evaluating the comparative wrongness of the offences, four rated the Severe offence as less wrong than the Mild one and three rated the Mild and Severe offences as equally wrong. Using the binomial test and considering ratings of less or equally wrong as misses, the probability of seven misses with N = 21 i s £ ^ . 0 9 5 ' (Siegal, 1 9 5 ° ) . Taken together, these results may be interpreted as indicating that subjects perceived the different versions of the stories as expected. APPENDIX C DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA Basic Rights and Privileges of Volunteer Subjects Any person who volunteers to participate i n experiments conducted by f u l l or part-time members of the faculty of the Department of Psychology at the University of Br i t i s h Columbia, by their employees, or by the graduate and undergraduate students working under the direction of faculty members of the above named Department, i s entitled to the following rights and privileges. 1. The subject may terminate and withdraw from the experiment at any time without being accountable for the reasons for such an action, 2 . The subject shall be informed, prior to the beginning of an experiment, of the maximum length of time the experiment might take and of the general nature of the experiments^--3 . The subject shall be informed, prior to the beginning of an experiment, of the nature and function of any mechanical and el e c t r i c a l equipment which i s to be used i n the experiment. In cases where the subject i s i n direct contact with such equipment, he shall be informed of the safety measures designed to protect him from physical injury, regardless of how slight the possibility of such injury i s , 4. The subject shall be informed, prior to the beginning of an experiment, of the aspects of his behavior that are to be observed and recorded and how this i s to be done. 5. Any behavioral record that i s obtained during the course of the experiment i s confidential. Any behavioral records that are made public through either journal papers or books, public addresses, research colldquia, or classroom presentations for teaching purposes, shall be anonymous, 6. The subject shall be offered, at the end of an experiment, a complete explanation of the purpose of the experiment, either orally by the experimenter or, at the option of the experimenter, i n writing. The subject shall also have the opportunity to ask questions pertaining to the experiment and shall be entitled to have these questions answered, 7. The subject has the right to inform.the Chairman of the Departmental Committee of Research with Human Subjects of any perceived violations of, or questions about, the aforementioned rights and privileges. 144 APPENDIX D SENTENCING INSTRUCTIONS FOR STUDY I Provisions of the Criminal Code of Canada permit the Courts considerable latitude i n dealing with cases such as the one you have just seen, I am interested i n finding out some things about how sentencing decisions are made. What I"d like you to do i s consider that the two sentences outlined on the next page are the ones available i n this case. Please read carefully the descriptions of these two possible sentences. Suppose that you are to sentence the defendant i n this case. Consider the two sentences l i s t e d on the next page and decide which sentence you would prefer to impose on the offender i n the case "bie.|ore'you. Indicate which sentence you would prefer to impose by placing an (X) i n the box beside that sentence. Take as'much time as you want i n thinking about the case before indicating your choice. Please remember that I am interested i n your personal decision and not i n how you think others might react or how you f e e l you should react. 145 o APPENDIX E SETS OF SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES IN STUDY I Fine vs Imprisonment Condition 1 . A term of probation on condition that the offender pay a fine, maintain good behavior and report to a probation o f f i c e r . Assume that no maximum or minimum amount payable as a fine i s specified. Assume that the offender may be fined any amount you f e e l i s appropriate and that terms of payment w i l l be worked out i n consultation with a probation of f i c e r , 2. A term of imprisonment. Assume that no maximum or rninimum term i s specified and that the offender may be sentenced to imprisonment for any length of: time you f e e l i s appropriate. PLEfiSE COMPLETE THIS P/9C-E BEFORE "/CU TllKN TO THE N^KT ON€ 146 147 Restitution vs Fine Condition " I 1. A term of probation on condition that the offender pay ' a sum of money to the rightful owner or owners of the lost or damaged property, maintain good behavior and report to a probation o f f i c e r . Assume that no maximum or minimum amount payable as restitution i s specified. The offender may be required to pay any amount you f e e l i s appropriate to the rightful owner of the lost or damaged property. Assume that terms of payment w i l l be worked out i n consultation with a probation o f f i c e r . "\ 2. A term of probation on condition that the offender pay a 1 fine, maintain good behavior and report to a probation of f i c e r . Assume that no maximum or minimum amount payable as a fine i s specified. Assume that the offender may be fined any amount you feel i s appropriate and that terms of payment w i l l be worked out i n consultation with a probation o f f i c e r . Assume that this alternative does not allow compensation to the rightful owner or owners of the lost or damaged property. £ COMPLETE JHI5 PfiGE BeraRE y o u TUKN TO THE AfEXT ONG-148 Imprisonment vs Release Condition j ~ | !• A release with a reprimand. 2. A term of imprisonment. Assume that no maximum or rninimum term i s specified and that the offender may be sentenced to imprisonment for any length of time you feel i s appropriate. Pt-efiS£ <LonPU=T£ THIS pfiC-CL BEFoflSL y0U/ TURN T O THE. NEAT ONtE. 149 Imprisonment with Compensation vs Fine Condition " I 1. A term of imprisonment for the offender and compensation, I paid by the Province, for the rightful owner or owners of the lost or damaged property. Assume that no maximum or minimum term of imprisonment is specified and that the offender may be sentenced to imprisonment for any length of time you feel i s appropriate. * Assume also that you may order, that the rightful owner or owners of the lost or damaged property receive compensation from the Province for losses. Assume that no maximum or minimum amount payable as compensation is specified and that you may award as compensation any amount you feel is appropriate. 1 2. A term of probation on condition that the offender pay a fine, maintain good behavior and report to a probation officer. Assume that no maximum or minimum amount payable as a fine is specified. Assume that the offender may be fined any amount you feel is appropriate and that terms of payment will be worked out in consultation with a probation officer. Assume that this alternative does not allow compensation to the rightful owner or owners of the lost or damaged property. PLEPlSE COMPLeTSZ THIS PfiC-E BEFORE YOU TURN TO THE NEXT Of/£. APPENDIX F SATISFACTION SCALE FOR STUDY I Consider the nature of the offence i n the case presented to you and the sentencing decision you made. Decide how satisfactory you find this resolution of the situation. Then indicate your feelings by drawing a vertical line through the scale at the point that best represents how satisfactory or unsatisfactory you find the resolution of the situation. completely completely unsatisfactory satisfactory 150 APPENDIX G MATERIALS FOR RATING PARTICIPANTS * ATTRACTIVENESS You are asked to rate the participants i n t h i s case on a set of descriptive scales. Here i s how you are to use these scales. I f you f e e l that the person i s very closely related to one end of the scale, you should mark as follows: f a i r X : : : : : : : : unfair or f a i r : : : : : : : : X unfair I f you f e e l that the person i s quite closely related to one or the other end of the scale (but not extremely), you should place your mark as follows: strong : X : : : : : : : weak or strong : : : : : : : X : weak I f you f e e l that the person i s moderately closely related to one or the other end of the scale, you should place your mark as follows: good : : X : : : : : : bad or good : : : : : : X : : bad I f you f e e l that the person i s only s l i g h t l y related to one side as opposed to the other side (but i s not r e a l l y neutral), then you should mark as follows: active : : : X : : : : : passive or active : : : : : X : : : passive The di r e c t i o n toward which you mark, of course, depends upon which of the two ends of the scale seems most chara c t e r i s t i c of the person you are judging. I f you consider the person to be neutral on the scale — both sides of the scale equally associated with the person —- you should place your mark i n the middle space. safe : : : : X : : : : dangerous IMPORTANT: 1 . Place your marks i n the middle of the spaces. 2. Be sure you check every scale —- do not omit any. 3. Never put more than one mark on a single space. 151 152 You are being asked to rate two individuals — the defendant and the p l a i n t i f f . Please do these ratings i n the order presented and complete your ratings of the f i r s t individual before going on to the next. Before you do the ratings please note, i n the spaces provided at the top of each page, the name of the individual you are rating. You may refer back to the summary of the case i f you wish. Form as strong an impression as you can of the person you are rating. Then mark the scales to show your impression of that individual. Work at f a i r l y high speed through the scales. Do not worry  or puzzle over individual items. It i s your f i r s t impressions, your immediate feelings about the person that we want. Please do not be careless because we want your true impressions. 153 PLEASE COMPLETE. THIS Pf)GE BEFORE YoU TURN To THE NEXT ONE The name of the p l a i n t i f f i s : ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ intelligent : , . . . . . . unintelligent likeable : ; : . . . . _ . u n l i a b l e bossy : : : ; « . . . easy-going immature : ; ; : • : ; • . mature imaginative : « ? : : : : • unimaginative irresponsible : : : : : . . . responsible nervous : » » « . . . . calm reasonable : ; » . . . unreasonable r i g i d : : : . . . . f l e x ± h l e courteous ; ; ; . . . rude selfish : : : ; . . . unselfish . w a r m • _ : : : : : : : C 0 l d sincere : ; ; . . . . . insincere co-operative ; » • . . unco-o f 154 PL Ef\SE COMPLETE THIS PftC-E aEToifE You ru*N ro r#e SVETxr OA/e. The name of the defendant i s : , The crime he committed i s : . intelligent likeable bossy-immature imaginative irresponsible nervous patient reasonable ri g i d courteous selfish warm sincere unintelligent unlikeable easy-going mature unimaginative responsible calm impatient unreasonable flexible rude unselfish cold insincere co-operative : ' ' i : : : : unco-operative APPENDIX H MATERIALS FOR RATING RESPONSIBILITY AND BLAME The next page contains items asking your opinions about the case. Please consider each item and then indicate your opinion by marking the scale below each item. The scales you are to use are like the one shown below. How pleasant did you find the last party you attended? extremely 1 6 extremely pleasant ^ ' unpleasant If you found the party extremely pleasant you would circle the 1 and i f you found i t extremely unpleasant you would circle the 9_. If you thought the party was average, you would circ l e the j5. I f you thought the party was somewhere between extreme and average, you would circle the number in-between (2, 2 » it o r 2 » HQ that best represented your estimate of the pleasantness of the party. Please turn to the next page, consider the questions and mark the scales to show your opinions. Please remember that I am interested i n your personal opinions and not i n how you think others might react or how you feel you should react. 155 156 As a question not of law but of morality, Dory's actions were: as wrong as-, O I L 6 7 8 Q 7 6 1 7 . possible ' 7 right Quite apart from legal aspects, Dory: did not do did very anything 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 wrong wrong How much do you think the p l a i n t i f f i s to blame for what happened? not at a l l 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 completely How much do you agree with the statement that: "Dory's acts were a result of the circumstances i n which he found himself"? agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ^ a g 1 " 6 6 completely completely How much do you agree or disagree with the statement that: "Dory i s 1 more a victim of circumstances than a criminal"? agree 1 2 3 ^ ^ 6 7 8 0 disagree completely ^ * 5 0 . ' H v completely APPENDIX I SHORT QUESTIONNAIRE FOR STUDY I 1, The name of the defendant i n the case i s : 2. The crime with which the defendant i s charged i s : _____________________ 3 . The value of the lost or damaged property involved i n the offence i s approximately . 4. I f the defendant were to be sentenced to a term of imprisonment for the offence, how long a term should he serve for this offence? 5 . I f the defendant were to pay a fine rather than serve time i n prison, what amount of money should he pay as a fine? _____________________________ 6. If the defendant were to pay a sum of money to the rightful owner of the lost or damaged property rather than pay a fine or serve time i n prison, what amount of money should he pay to the p l a i n t i f f as restitution? ________________________^  7. Five possible sentences are l i s t e d below. Two of these sentences were available for you to choose from when you sentenced the defendant. Please place a check-mark i n the box beside each of these two sentences. ______ A. A term of imprisonment for the offender. ______ B. A term of imprisonment for the offender and compensation, paid by the Province, for the rightful owner or owners of the lost or damaged goods. ______ C. A term of probation for the offender on condition that he pay a fine. ______ D. A term of probation for the offender on condition that he pay a sum of money to the rightful .owner or owners of the lost or damaged goods. ______ E. A release with a reprimand. 8. Which of the two alternatives did you choose? Why did you select this one? 157 APPENDIX J THURSTONE-WANG "ATTITUDE TOWARD PUNISHMENT OF CRIMINALS" SCALE On t h i s page and on t h e n e x t page y o u w i l l f i n d a number o f s t a t e m e n t s e x p r e s s i n g d i f f e r e n t a t t i t u d e s t o w a r d p u n i s h m e n t o f c r i m i n a l s . P u t a c h e c k mark i f y o u a g r e e w i t h t h e s t a t e m e n t . X P u t a c r o s s i f y o u d i s a g r e e w i t h t h e s t a t e m e n t . T r y t o i n d i c a t e e i t h e r agreement o r d i s a g r e e m e n t f o r e a c h . s t a t e m e n t . I f y o u s i m p l y c a n n o t d e c i d e abou t a s t a t e m e n t y o u may mark i t w i t h a q u e s t i o n m a r k . ? T h i s i s n o t an e x a m i n a t i o n . T h e r e a r e no r i g h t o r w rong a n s w e r s t o t h e s e s t a t e m e n t s . I am s i m p l y i n t e r e s t e d i n y o u r a t t i t u d e s t o w a r d p u n i s h m e n t o f c r i m i n a l s . P l e a s e i n d i c a t e y o u r c o n v i c t i o n s b y a c h e c k mark when y o u a g r e e and b y a c r o s s when y o u d i s a g r e e . _____ A p e r s o n s h o u l d be i m p r i s o n e d o n l y f o r s e r i o u s o f f e n c e s . ______ I t i s w rong f o r s o c i e t y t o make any o f i t s members s u f f e r . ______ H a r d p r i s o n l i f e w i l l k e e p men f r o m c o m m i t t i n g c r i m e . ______ Some c r i m i n a l s w i l l n o t b e n e f i t f r o m p u n i s h m e n t . ______ M o s t p r i s o n s a r e s c h o o l s o f c r i m e . ______ We s h o u l d n o t c o n s i d e r t h e c o m f o r t o f a p r i s o n e r . ______ A c r i m i n a l w i l l go s t r a i g h t o n l y when he f i n d s t h a t p r i s o n l i f e i s h a r d . 158 159 No punishment can reduce crime. Prison influence i s degenerating. Only habitual criminals should be punished. We should employ corporal punishment i n dealing with a l l criminals. I have no opinion about the treatment of crime. Punishment of criminals i s a disgrace to c i v i l i z e d society. Solitary confinement w i l l make the criminal penitent. It i s advantageous to society to spare certain criminals. Only humane treatment can cure criminals. Harsh imprisonment merely embitters a criminal. No leniency should be shown to convicts. Many petty offenders become dangerous criminals after a prison term Failure to punish the criminal encourages crime. Only by extreme brutal punishment can we cure the criminal. The more severely a man i s punished, the greater criminal he become A criminal should be punished f i r s t and then reformed. One way to deter men from crime i s to make them suffer. Punishment i s wasteful of human l i f e . A bread and water diet i n prison w i l l cure the criminal. Brutal treatment of a criminal makes him more dangerous. A j a i l sentence w i l l cure many criminals of further offences. Prison inmates should be put i n irons. We should consider the individual i n treating crime. Even the most vicious criminal should not be harmed. Humane treatment inspires the criminal to be good. Some punishment i s necessary i n dealing with the criminal. APPENDIX K STIMULUS MATERIALS FOR STUDY II ACCOUNT OF FRAUD Summary of the Case: The defendant, James Dory, was charged with obtaining funds by false pretences. The amount of money i n question was $2,500, The prosecution claimed that Dory posed as a Bank o f f i c i a l and persuaded Mrs, Dorothy Campbell to entrust him with funds which he then used for his own purposes. Testimony of the P l a i n t i f f . Mrs, Campbell: Mrs, Dorothy Campbell i s a 67-year-old widow. Since her husband's death i n 1969 she has resided alone i n a small apartment which she owns. Prior to the fraud, Mrs. Campbell had about $3,500. saved for emergencies. Afterwards, apart from her home, her assets consisted of approximately a thousand dollars remaining i n a savings account. For her day-to-day l i v i n g expenses, she relies on her old age pension. The lost money represented a significant portion of the money she had deposited for emergencies. Mrs. Campbell t e s t i f i e d that the defendant f i r s t contacted her on January 4, 1974 when he telephoned and claimed to be a Bank investment 160 1 6 1 counsellor, Mrs, Campbell stated that Dory t o l d her the Bank was off e r i n g special investment opportunities to selected customers. Dory requested and obtained Mrs, Campbell's permission to v i s i t her to explain the investment program, Mrs, Campbell stated that the defendant followed up his telephone c a l l by appearing at her home and presenting her with an i d e n t i f i c a t i o n card showing he was a Bank employee. She further t e s t i f i e d that he persuaded her that her funds would be better invested i n the Bank plan than l e f t i n her savings account, Mrs, Campbell stated that she gave Dory a cheque f o r $2,500, and received i n return a Bank Plan c e r t i f i c a t e and a receipt, (These documents were introduced as Exhibits A, B and C), Mrs, Campbell stated that, when she next v i s i t e d the Bank, she discovered that she had been the vict i m of a fraud. Testimony of Police O f f i c e r t The detective who worked on the case t e s t i f i e d that, when the fraud was reported, a police p o r t r a i t of Dory was drawn from the descriptions given by Mrs, Campbell and the bank t e l l e r who had cashed the cheque. He explained that a police o f f i c e r who had seen the p o r t r a i t l a t e r met Dory at a party and recognized him. The detective t e s t i f i e d that when he received t h i s report, he investigated further. The detective t e s t i f i e d that Dory was placed i n a police line-tip and p o s i t i v e l y i d e n t i f i e d by both the t e l l e r and by Mrs, Campbell, Also offered i n evidence was a business card (Exhibit D) which i d e n t i f i e s the holder as a Bank employee. The detective t e s t i f i e d that t h i s card was found i n Dory's possession. I t contained Dory's photograph and a f i c t i t i o u s name,, 162 Testimony of the Defendant. James Dory: The defendant, 49-year-old James Dory, had been employed for 14 years as a salesman by, a lo c a l car dealer. At the time of the t r i a l , Dory was s t i l l working i n this capacity. He i s married with no children l i v i n g at home. Dory pleaded guilty to the charge and agreed that Mrs. Campbell accurately described the technique he used to persuade her to entrust him with the funds. He stated, however, that he planned only to borrow the money for investment purposes and that he planned to repay Mrs. Campbell out of his prof i t s . Dory t e s t i f i e d that an acquaintance had offered him a chance to invest i n a promising venture. Dory stated he was wondering how to raise the necessary funds when he heard the fraud described on an open line radio programme and decided to use i t to acquire funds. Dory further t e s t i f i e d that the money was lost when the business venture f a i l e d . Dory also t e s t i f i e d that he had never before committed, been charged with, or convicted of, a criminal offence. Testimony of Dory's Employer: The owner of the car dealership where Dory was employed t e s t i f i e d that during the fourteen years the defendant worked for him, he was a good worker and that there were no customer complaints about Dory. Verdict: The defendant was found guilty of the charge. 163 Sentence: ACCOUNT OF THEFT Summary of the Case; ( The defendant, James Dory, was charged with theft. The prosecution charged that, on the evening of April 8, 1974, Dory entered an apartment occupied by Mr. and Mrs. Peter Roth and removed the following items; a portable color television set, a stereo set, a diamond engagement ring, a camera and four articles of clothing belonging to Mr. Roth. At the time of the t r i a l the television set, the stereo set and the diamond ring, together valued at about $2,500. had not been recovered. The prosecution alleged that Dory, the former occupant of the suite now rented by the Roths, kept a spare set of keys to the suite and used them to gain entrance. Testimony of the P l a i n t i f f . Peter Roth: Twenty-six year old Peter Roth i s employed as a saleman by a l o c a l department store. Roth t e s t i f i e d that he had lived i n the suite for less than a month before the theft occurred. He stated that he moved into the suite on A p r i l 1st and that on Ap r i l 7th he and his wife l e f t for Calgary to spend a week v i s i t i n g relatives. Roth stated that when he returned from Calgary on April 14, he discovered that the apartment had been entered and that the goods l i s t e d above had been stolen. Roth stated that the lost property had not been insured against theft, ''"^ Three different sentences represented three different resolutions of the inequity. Subjects i n each condition received a description of the sentence appropriate to that condition. See Appendix L for the three sentences used i n the study. 164 Four articles of clothing and a camera were produced in court and identified by Mr, Roth as the ones he. had reported stolen. Testimony of Police Officer; The police officer assigned to investigate the theft testified that he had questioned other tenants in the building. He stated that one of the tenants contacted, Mrs, Campbell, reported that she had seen James Dory, the former occupant of the Roth apartment, leave the suite carrying a portable television set and some clothing. The officer testified that Dory's new residence had been searched and that four items of clothing which matched the description of those reported stolen were found in Dory's possession. The officer also testified that the serial number of a camera also found in Dory's possession .was the same as the serial number of the one reported stolen. The officer further testified that the articles produced in court and identified by Roth were the ones he found in Dory's possession. Testimony of Mrs, Campbell, witness; Mrs, Campbell testified that she lives in an apartment in the same building as the one in which the Roth apartment is located. She testified that, on April 8, 1974, she observed the defendant, James Dory, leave the Roth apartment carrying a portable television set and some clothing. She explained that, at the time, she had not realized that the suite had changed hands and thus had not reported the incident. Testimony of the Defendant. James Dory; The defendant, James Dory, a 27-^year-old construction worker, had 165 worked for the same firm for five years. At the time of the t r i a l he was s t i l l working i n that capacity. Dory pleaded guilty to the charge. He t e s t i f i e d that he had moved from the apartment occupied by the Roths less than a month before the theft occurred. Dory explained that he discovered he s t i l l had a spare set of keys to his former apartment and drove to the apartment building to return the keys to the manager. Dory stated that when he found the manager was not at home, he decided to give the keys to the new occupant of the suite. The new occupant did not answer the door and Dory used the keys to l e t himself i n . Dory stated that, after he entered the suite, he realized that he had an opportunity to commit a perfect crime. Dory reported that he selected several items and proceeded to carry them to his car. He was carrying out the portable television set and some clothing when he encountered Mrs, Campbell, Dory t e s t i f i e d that he became afraid that he had been recognized and decided to dispose of the goods as quickly as possible. Dory stated that he went to a bar and there sold the color television, the stereo set and the diamond ring. Dory t e s t i f i e d that the identities and whereabouts of the purchasers of these articles were unknown to him. Dory t e s t i f i e d that he had never before committed, been charged with, or convicted of, a criminal offence. Testimony of Dory's Employer; The owner of the firm where Dory was employed t e s t i f i e d that, during the five years Dory had been employed by the firm, he had been a hard and conscientous worker. 166 Verdict; The defendant was found guilty of the charge. 17 Sentence; ACCOUNT OF VANDALISM Summary of the Case; The defendant, James Dory, was charged with vandalism. The prosecution charged that, on the afternoon of April 8 , 1974» Dory broke into a house owned by Thomas Finn and severely damaged the premises. Testimony of the Plaintiff. Thomas Finn; The owner)Of the house, Thomas Finn, is a 32-year-old mechanic. Finn testified that he had purchased a partially built house and, on evenings and weekends, worked to complete i t so that he could move his family into i t . Finn stated that the house had been almost completed when the damage occurred. Finn testified that the damages to the house included smashed fixtures in the bathroom, paint poured over carpeting and the plaster on several walls smashed with a hammer. Finn testified that i t had been necessary to replace the bathroom fixtures and the carpeting and that the cost of these items plus materials to repair other damages had been $2,501.32. Finn added that these losses were not covered by insurance. Testimony of Mrs. Campbell, witness; Mrs. Campbell testified that she resides in the house across the 17 The account concluded with a description of a sentence imposed in the case. 167 street from the Finn; property. She t e s t i f i e d that on the afternoon i n question she was i n her front yard when she observed a strange car pu l l up to the Finn house, Mrs, Campbell stated that she saw the defendant emerge froimthe car and walk to the rear of the Finn house, Mrs, Campbell t e s t i f i e d that she then heard what sounded like glass breaking, became suspicious and noted the licence number, make and model of the defendant's car, Mrs, Campbell stated that she continued to watch for several rninutes and then approached the Finn house with intentions of questioning the defendant about his presence on the premises, Mrs, Campbell t e s t i f i e d that as she approached the house, she was able to see the defendant clearly through the dLning room window and observed that he was pouring the contents of a can of paint on the floor, Mrs, Campbell said she returned to her home and telephoned police. Before they arrived, she saw the defendant emerge from the house, enter his car and drive away. Testimony of Police Officer: The police officer who arrested Dory t e s t i f i e d that he was on his way to the Finn house when he observed the defendant's car a few blocks away from the property. The officer stated that he stopped the car to question the defendant and noticed that the defendant's slacks and shoes were spattered with wet paint. When he returned with the defendant to the Finn house, the officer observed that the color of the paint was the same as that poured on the carpeting. The officer further t e s t i f i e d that he found the glass i n the rear door had been smashed. Testimony of the Defendant, James Dory; The defendant, 25-year-old James Dory, had been employed as a truck-driver for the past three years and was s t i l l working i n that capacity at the time of the t r i a l . Dory pleaded guilty to the charge and admitted that he did the damage described. He t e s t i f i e d that he had been on vacation when the offence occurred. Dory stated that, on the day i n question, he had been suffering the after-effects of drinking heavily the previous evening. Dory stated that he was driving through the sub-division when he became extremely thirsty and stopped at the Finn house to ask for water. When he realized the house was vacant, he smashed the glass pane i n the rear door and l e t himself i n . Dory stated that he tried to obtain water f i r s t from the kitchen and then from the bathroom. Dory said that he found the water was not turned on, became enraged, seized a hammer and smashed the bathroom fixtures. Dory stated that he then used the hammer to pound holes i n walls u n t i l he stumbled over the paint which he poured on the carpeting. Once he had emptied the paint cans, he l e f t the premises. Dory t e s t i f i e d that he had never before committed, been charged with, or convicted of, a criminal offence. Testimony of Dory's Employer: The owner of the firm where Dory was employed as a truck-driver t e s t i f i e d that, during the three years Dory had been i n his employ, he had been a hard and conscientious worker. Verdict: The defendant was found guilty of the charge. 18 Sentence: T"he account concluded with a description of a sentence imposed i n the case. APPENDIX L SENTENCES FOR STUDY II Release Condition The defendant was reprimanded for his conduct and released. Imprisonment with Compensation Condition The defendant was sentenced to serve a term of one year i n prison. (Assume that the sentence required the defendant to serve the f u l l term: do not consider paroled) The p l a i n t i f f was awarded $ 2 , 5 0 0 . compensation for losses resulting from the crime. This sum was paid from a Provincial Fund established to provide compensation for persons incurring losses due to crime. Restitution Condition The defendant was sentenced to serve a term of one year i n prison but was not required to serve any of this term. Instead, the sentence was suspended and the defendant released on probation on condition that he maintain good behavior, report to a probation officer and pay the p l a i n t i f f the sum of $ 2 , 5 0 0 . as compensation for losses resulting from the crime. Terms of payment were to be worked out i n consultation with a probation of f i c e r . 169 APPENDIX M SATISFACTION SCALE FOR STUDY II Consider the nature of the offence in the case presented to you and the sentencing decision made. Decide how satisfactory you find this resolution of the situation. Then indicate your feelings by drawing a vertical line through the scale at the point that best represents how satisfactory or unsatisfactory you find the resolution of the situation, completely completely unsatisfactory ' satisfactory 170 APPENDIX N SHORT QUESTIONNAIRE FOR STUDY II 1. The name of the defendant in the case i s : ___________________________^^ -2. The crime the defendant committed was: 3. The value of the lost or damaged property involved in the offence was approximately: m m ^ m m m m m m m ^ ^ m m m m m M m m m ^ m 4. If the defendant were to be sentenced to a term of imprisonment for the offence, how long a term do you think he should serve for this offence? 5. If the defendant were to be fined rather than serve time in prison, what amount of money do you think he should pay as a fine? 6. If the defendant were to pay a sum of money to the rightful owner of the lost or damaged property rather than pay a fine or serve time in prison, what amount of money do you think he should pay to the plaintiff as restitution? 7. Three possible sentences are listed below. The defendant in the case you read about received one of these sentences. Please place a check—mark in the box beside the sentence given to the defendant. _______ A. A term of imprisonment for the offender and compensation, paid by the Province, for the rightful owner or owners of the lost or damaged goods. ______ B. A term of probation for the defendant on condition that he pay a sum of money to the rightful owner or owners of the lost or damaged goods. ______ C, A release with a reprimand. 8. Which one of these alternatives would you have chosen? Why would you select this one i f you were to determine the sentence for the defendant? 171 

Cite

Citation Scheme:

        

Citations by CSL (citeproc-js)

Usage Statistics

Share

Embed

Customize your widget with the following options, then copy and paste the code below into the HTML of your page to embed this item in your website.
                        
                            <div id="ubcOpenCollectionsWidgetDisplay">
                            <script id="ubcOpenCollectionsWidget"
                            src="{[{embed.src}]}"
                            data-item="{[{embed.item}]}"
                            data-collection="{[{embed.collection}]}"
                            data-metadata="{[{embed.showMetadata}]}"
                            data-width="{[{embed.width}]}"
                            data-media="{[{embed.selectedMedia}]}"
                            async >
                            </script>
                            </div>
                        
                    
IIIF logo Our image viewer uses the IIIF 2.0 standard. To load this item in other compatible viewers, use this url:
https://iiif.library.ubc.ca/presentation/dsp.831.1-0093810/manifest

Comment

Related Items