THIRD PARTY PREFERENCES AMONG RESOLUTIONS OF INEQUITY IN THE CRIMINAL-VICTIM DYAD by VALERYE AGNES HUNT B.A., UNIVERSITY OF LETHBRIDGE, 1970 M.A., UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA, 1972 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQIJIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES Department of Psychology We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA January, 1976 (c) Valerye Agnes Hunt In presenting this an a d v a n c e d d e g r e e the I Library further for agree scholarly by h i s of shall this written thesis in at University make the it for It financial for The U n i v e r s i t y of British 2075 Wesbrook Place Vancouver, Canada V6T 1W5 Mai-ch ? . 197* of of Columbia, British gain Columbia for extensive by the is understood permission. Psychology fulfilment available p u r p o s e s may be g r a n t e d Department o f Date freely that permission representatives. thesis partial shall requirements reference copying of Head o f that not the I agree and this be a l l o w e d that study. thesis my D e p a r t m e n t copying or for or publication w i t h o u t my ABSTRACT Adams' (1965) equity theory provided a t h e o r e t i c a l background f o r the research which examined t h i r d party response to dyadic inequity caused by negative input from one member of a dyad. Consideration of differences between f i r s t and t h i r d p a r t i e s and of the p o s s i b i l i t y of negative input suggested three p r i n c i p l e s important t o t h i r d equity behavior. party These were: 1) a preference f o r a c t u a l 2) a preference f o r p o s i t i v e , rather than negative, 3) a preference f o r positive input rather than actual equity i n case f rather than psychological, equity input of c o n f l i c t between preferences f o r actual equity and input positivity. Four hypotheses were derived from these p r i n c i p l e s . Hypothesis 1: When alternative solutions to inequitable situations are equal i n actual equity, t h i r d parties w i l l prefer alternatives that maximise input Hypothesis 2: positivity. When alternative solutions t o inequitable situations are equal i n input p o s i t i v i t y , t h i r d parties w i l l prefer alternatives that maximize actual equity. Hypothesis 3* When alternative solutions t o inequitable situations are such that preferences f o r maximizing actual equity and input p o s i t i v i t y c o n f l i c t , t h i r d parties w i l l prefer to achieve maximum input p o s i t i v i t y rather than maximum actual equity. Hypothesis 4: When resolution of inequity s a t i s f i e s preferences f o r ii iii actual equity and input p o s i t i v i t y , t h i r d parties w i l l report greater s a t i s f a c t i o n with the solution than when resolution of inequity s a t i s f i e s only one preference or involves c o n f l i c t between preferences. Additional hypotheses were: Hypothesis 5: Third parties w i l l restore psychological equity f o r an over-rewarded party by c o g n i t i v e l y enhancing inputs so they are commensurate with outcomes. Hypothesis 6: Third parties w i l l restore psychological equity f o r an under-rewarded party by c o g n i t i v e l y devaluing inputs so they are commensurate with outcomes. Two studies tested hypotheses. Study I examined preferences among, and s a t i s f a c t i o n with, d i f f e r e n t reductions of dyadic inequity. read simulated sentences. Subjects criminal cases and selected one of two alternative The actual equity and input p o s i t i v i t y of solutions within and between conditions were manipulated by varying kind of punishment for criminals and a v a i l a b i l i t y of compensation f o r v i c t i m s . Choice of sentence and s a t i s f a c t i o n with solutions provided data f o r t e s t i n g the f i r s t four hypotheses. Ratings of victims' attractiveness and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for the offence tested Hypothesis 6. In Study I I , the case summary described the sentence imposed. The actual equity and input p o s i t i v i t y of solutions represented by sentences varied among conditions. Reported s a t i s f a c t i o n with sentences an additional t e s t of Hypothesis 4 . provided Ratings of criminals' and victims' attractiveness and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the offence permitted tests of Hypotheses 5 and 6. Results supported Hypotheses 1, 2 and 4 . The importance of iv preference f o r behavior that than determinant a of t h i r d outcome p o s i t i v i t y . Data a positivity principle i s invoked to choice e i t h e r equitable that cases. s a t i s f a c t i o n i n e q u i t y Data w i t h are from p a r t i e s who members of a l t e r n a t i v e s . preference s o l u t i o n s both dyads p a r t i e s to as studies would II determine d i s c u s s i o n p o s i t i v e and p e c u l i a r powerless The for Study observers were under—rewarded from not n o n - p a r t i c i p a n t Data equity party or i n d i c a t i n g of as input e q u a l l y these e q u i t y demonstrated by the finding that actual equity i s more was important a c t u a l i n p u t i n d i c a t e d i s t i n c t reviews also choice differences preferences decision-makers but among are between pvidenee determines that i n d i c a t e i n i n r e s o l u t i o n s shared by w e l l . f a i l e d to restore to change support the r e a l psychological or enhancing p r e d i c t i o n s i n p u t s e q u i t y over—rewarded or by ones. t h a t third outcomes derogating of TABLE OF CONTENTS Page LIST OF TABLES . v Chapter I II III IV V VI INTRODUCTION 1 REVIEW OF PILOT STUDIES AMD PREVIEW OF PRESENT RESEARCH .. 23 METHOD 36 RESULTS 61 DISCUSSION 87 IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 113 BIBLIOGRAPHY 119 APPENDICES A. Stimulus Materials f o r Study I • B. Report of P i l o t Studies C. U. B. C. Department of Psychology "Basic Rights and 123 132 P r i v i l e g e s of Volunteer Subjects" 144 D. Sentencing Instructions f o r Study I 145 E. Sets of Sentencing A l t e r n a t i v e s f o r Study I ............. 146 F. S a t i s f a c t i o n Scale f o r Study I 150 G. Materials f o r Rating Participants'' Attractiveness 151 H. Materials f o r Rating R e s p o n s i b i l i t y and Blame ........... 155 I. Short Questionnaire f o r Study I 157 v vi TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont'd) Page APPENDICES (cont'd) J. Thurstone-Wang "Attitude toward Punishment of Criminals" Scale 15& K. Stimulus Materials f o r Study I I 160 L. Sentences f o r Study I I 169 M. S a t i s f a c t i o n Scale f o r Study I I 170 N. Short Questionnaire f o r Study I I 171 LIST OF TABLES Table I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI XII XIII Page Mean Ratings of Five Sentences on Two Items ••••••••••••••• 31 Summary of Analysis of Variance of Ratings of Choice Value, t o the Criminal, of Five Sentences 32 Summary of Analysis of Variance of Ratings of Perceived Comparative D e s i r a b i l i t y , to the Criminal, of Five Sentences 32 Frequency of Selection of Predicted and Non-Predicted Alternatives • 6l C e l l Means f o r S a t i s f a c t i o n with Solutions Expressed by Male and Female Subjects i n Each Condition •••••••••••••• 64 Summary of Analysis of Variance of Subjects' Expressed S a t i s f a c t i o n with Solution 64 Mean Ratings of P l a i n t i f f s ' Attractiveness as a Function of Conditions, Rating Order and Sex of Subject Summary of Analysis of Variance of Ratings of P l a i n t i f f s ' Attractiveness .......................................... 67 6S Mean Ratings of Blame Attributed t o P l a i n t i f f s as a Function of Conditions and Sex of Rater 69 Summary of Analysis of Variance of Blame Attributed to P l a i n t i f f s 70 Mean Ratings of Defendants' Attractiveness as a Function of Conditions, Rating Order and Sex of Rater 71 Summary of Analysis of Variance of Ratings of Defendants' Attractiveness .............................. 71 Mean Ratings of Wrongness of Defendants' Acts as a Function of Conditions and Sex of Rater 73 vii viii LIST OF TABLES (cont'd) Table XIV XV XVI XVII XVIII XIX XX XXI XXII XXIII XXIV XXV XXVT XXVII Page Summary of A n a l y s i s of Variance o f Ratings of Wrongness of Defendant's Act 73 Mean Ratings of Defendant's R e s p o n s i b i l i t y as a Function of Conditions and Sex of Rater 75 Summary of A n a l y s i s of Variance of Ratings of Defendant's R e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the Offence 75 Mean Ratings of S a t i s f a c t i o n with Sentences as a Function of Conditions and Sex of Rater 77 Summary of A n a l y s i s of Variance of Subjects' Expressed S a t i s f a c t i o n with Sentences 77 Mean Ratings of Defendants' A t t r a c t i v e n e s s as a Function of Conditions, Rating Order and Sex of Rater 80 Summary of A n a l y s i s of Variance of Ratings of Defendant's A t t r a c t i v e n e s s 30 Mean Ratings of Wrongness of Defendant's Acts as a Function of Conditions and Sex of Rater Si Summary of A n a l y s i s of Variance of Ratings of Wrongness of Defendant's Act 82 Mean Ratings of Defendant's R e s p o n s i b i l i t y as a Function of Conditions and Sex of Rater 82 Summary of A n a l y s i s of Variance of Ratings of Defendant's R e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the Offence 83 Mean Ratings of P l a i n t i f f s ' A t t r a c t i v e n e s s as a Function of Conditions, Rating Order and Sex of Subject 34 Summary o f A n a l y s i s o f Variance o f Ratings o f P l a i n t i f f s ' Attractiveness 34 Mean Ratings o f Blame A t t r i b u t e d t o P l a i n t i f f s as a Function of Conditions and Sex of Rater 85 ix LIST OF TABLES (cont'd) Table XXVIII XXTX XXX XXXI XXXII XXXIII Page Summary of Analysis of Variance of Blame Attributed to P l a i n t i f f s 86 Mean Ratings of Attractiveness of Criminal-Victim Pairs 133 S p l i t - H a l f Correlations, Corrections, and Zr Transformations of Ratings of Average University Student on Lerner's Scale 137 S p l i t - H a l f Correlations, Corrections, and Zr Transformations of Ratings of "Criminals" on Lerner's Scale • • •• •• 138 S p l i t - H a l f Correlations, Corrections, and Zr Transformations of Ratings of "Victims" on Lerner's Scale • • ••••••••• 139 Dependent Measures, Mean Ratings, t Values and Associated P r o b a b i l i t i e s .• 141 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I welcome the opportunity to extend thanks to the who made completion of t h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n possible. indebted not only to the students who people I am took part i n the studies but also to the members of the Committee f o r t h e i r advice and assistance i n the planning and preparation of the d i s s e r t a t i o n . Special thanks are due to Dr. Robert Knox, who gave generously of h i s time to supervise the research, and to Dr. Thomas Storm f o r t h e i r counsel and encouragement. x CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION Many theorists (e.g., Adams, 1965; Blau, 1964; Homans, 1961; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959) have analyzed dyadic interaction i n terms of a reciprocal exchange of rewards and costs. A proposition that i s common to these, theories i s that individuals i n an interaction try to ensure that the rewards or gains from a relationship exceed the costs of the exchange. For example, Homans (1961) and Thibaut & Kelley (1959) both assume that an interaction w i l l cease i f i t i s not mutually reinforcing for the parties involved. Homans, however, noted that the experience of mutual reward did not guarantee satisfaction with the exchange unless the distribution of reward was such that the reward received by the parties was i n proportion to their contributions to the exchange. A f a i r exchange was, according to Homans, one which conformed to the rule of distributive justice. The rule of distributive justice stated that: "a man i n an exchange relationship with another w i l l expect ... that the net rewards, or profits, of each man be proportional to his investments — the greater the investments, the greater the profit (Homans, 1961, p. 75) Homans suggested that exchanges that violated the rule of distributive justice resulted i n expressions of negative emotional affect on the part of both parties to the transaction, anger i f under—rewarded and guilt i f over-rewarded. Adams (1965) suggested that social psychologists i n general and 1 2 exchange theorists i n particular had failed to appreciate f u l l y the importance of perceived justice or injustice i n exchange, Adams noted that Homans' articulation of the rule of distributive justice represented a distinct contribution i n this regard. He pointed out, however, that although Homans treatment discussed the causes of perceived justice and 1 injustice i n exchange, only scanty attention was given to the consequences of perceived injustice, Adams noted that the behavioral consequences of perceived injustice i n exchange extend beyond the expressions of negative emotional affect mentioned by Homans and argued that specification of these consequences was essential for an adequate understanding of human exchange. Consideration of the theoretical and practical importance of perceived justice or injustice i n dyadic exchange resulted i n the Adams (1965) formulation of equity theory, Adams referred to equity rather than to justice i n exchange both to avoid possible confusion resulting from use of the term "justice" and, more importantly, "to emphasize that the primary concern i s with the causes and consequences of the absence of equity i n human exchange relationships (1965, P« 2 7 6 ) , " Adams formulated his theory of equity with employer-employee exchanges i n mind but pointed out that the theory was applicable to other social situations involving exchange since a l l are characterized by expectations of fairness. Two key terms i n Adams* (1965) theory of f i r s t party equity behavior are outcomes and inputs. Outcomes designate a person's returns from an exchange. These may be positive or negative. For example, outcomes from an employer-employee exchange may include, for the worker, such positively valued rewards as pay, seniority benefits and status as well 3 as negatively valued factors such as poor working conditions and monotony. Adams s p e c i f i e d that the valuation of a given outcome factor depended on i t s being recognized as relevant t o the exchange. Inputs, i n the Adams formulation, r e f e r to perceived contributions to an exchange that may include: "education, i n t e l l i g e n c e , experience, t r a i n i n g , s k i l l , s e n i o r i t y , age, sex, ethnic background, s o c i a l status and, of course, e f f o r t ... on the job (1965, p. 277)•" Adams s p e c i f i e d that f o r any of these factors to be regarded as an input required that i t be recognized as relevant to the exchange. Only p o s i t i v e inputs or contributions t o an exchange were considered by Adams. Adams proposed that an i n d i v i d u a l would experience inequity whenever h i s Outcome/input r a t i o was not equal t o the Outcome/input r a t i o of a comparison other. The comparison other could be the i n d i v i d u a l ' s partner i n an exchange r e l a t i o n s h i p . A l t e r n a t i v e l y , the comparison other could be an i n d i v i d u a l engaged i n a s i m i l a r exchange with another person. For example, a secretary might evaluate the "equitableness" of her arrangement with her employer by comparing her inputs and outcomes with those of another secretary. The importance f o r f i r s t party equity behavior of "normative expectations of f a i r exchange" was emphasized by Adams. Maintenance of equity i n exchange i s dependent on some degree of agreement between p a r t i e s regarding the relevance and valuation of inputs and outcomes. Two f a c t o r s mentioned by Adams as important to the development of equity norms are the s o c i a l i z a t i o n process and the process of s o c i a l comparison. In the course of s o c i a l i z a t i o n , i n d i v i d u a l s l e a r n how others w i l l evaluate various outcomes and the circumstances under which various outcomes may be offered to others i n order to maintain equity. For example, an individual learns not only that both money and expressions of esteem are valued by others but, equally importantly, the circumstances under which one or the other of these reinforcers may be preferred as payment for services rendered. The importance of social comparison to f i r s t party equity behavior was also discussed by Adams, He pointed out that, i n many situations, comparison of own outcomes and inputs with those of another individual i n a similar exchange enables individuals to determine what constitutes a f a i r exchange. Thus, processes that facilitate agreement regarding the valuation of inputs and outcomes and the conditions under which particular inputs entitle the contributor to particular outcomes make possible maintenance of equity i n dyadic exchange. However, as Adams pointed out, these processes do not result i n perfect agreement regarding the relationship between inputs and outcomes. This i s one of the causes of inequity i n exchange. The presentation by Adams of a theory of dyadic equity behavior has stimulated considerable research among social psychologists who have, i n recent years, expressed increasing interest i n problems related to the maintenance of justice and correction of injustice i n society. In a recent review of equity research, Walster, Berscheid & Walster (1973) discuss the extension of the concept of equity to analysis of exploitative, helping and intimate relationships, A substantial body of research now demonstrates the importance of equity for both formal and informal exchanges. Researchers have, however, been concerned with f i r s t party equity behavior. Attention has focussed on the maintenance 5 and restoration of equity by parties involved i n an exchange, A relatively unstudied area i s that of third party equity behavior. Third party equity behavior may be defined as encompassing a l l instances i n which an impartial observer responds to perceived inequity i n exchange between others. The area of third party equity behavior that i s of interest to the present discussion i s third party response to dyadic inequity brought about by the counter-normative or negative inputs of one of the parties to an exchange. Responses to such inequities are commonplace i n daily l i f e . For example, parents and teachers intervene to resolve disputes between children. At the formal level, the legal system provides for intervention to re-establish equity i n dyadic exchange. Despite the frequency and importance of third party equity behavior i n maintaining or restoring equity i n dyadic exchange, equity researchers have neglected this area. The relative neglect of the area of third party equity behavior i s especially surprising i n view of i t s acknowledged theoretical and practical importance. The propositions that groups commonly evolve systems specifying acceptable distributions of rewards and costs among individual members and enforce adherence to these systems by purrLshing those who behave inequitably are widely accepted (cf., Walster, Berscheid & Walster, 1 9 7 3 ) . Adams' (1965) outcome-input model may be applied to analysis of third party equity behavior. Adams' original formulation applied to f i r s t party equity behavior and did not consider the possibility of negative as well as positive input. Consideration of differences between f i r s t and third party equity behavior and of the possibility of 6 negative as well as positive input suggests that the theory requires revision to apply to the present area of interest. The present discussion w i l l suggest three general principles important to third party responses to dyadic inequity resulting from the negative input of one of the parties to the exchange. These principles permit derivation of hypotheses concerning third party choice among methods of reduction of inequity i n dyads where restoring equity involves punishment of a harm-doer. Only positive inputs or contributions to an exchange were considered i n the, Adams (19&5) discussion of f i r s t party equity behavior. As Walster, Berscheid & Walster (1973) pointed out, a person's input may be negative as well as positive: such inputs as boorishness or cruelty entitle the possessor to costs rather than to rewards. Considerable attention (Zuckerman, 1975? Walster, 1975) has been devoted to the revision of the definitional formula of equity so that i t calculates the "equitableness" of exchanges involving negative as well as positive input. The category of negative input that i s relevant to the present discussion of third party equity behavior i s behavioral input that violates commonly accepted and understood rules governing the behavior of participants i n exchanges. Both formal and informal transactions are governed by rules that specify the means by which parties may attempt to maximize their outcomes from an exchange. Inputs directed toward maximizing outcomes by means that violate moral or legal prohibitions of such inputs may be regarded as negative. Examples of such negative inputs are extorting desired resources from another by use of such 7 coercive tactics as threat of blackmail or physical violence or by persuasion that involves fraud or deceit. The criminal-victim dyad i s an example of one i n which dyadic inequity results from the exploitation of one party by another. In such situations, the inputs of the party responsible for the inequity, the harm-doer or criminal, are directed toward winning undeserved positive outcomes, the rewards or satisfactions resulting from the crime. Thus, the input of the harm-doer i s negative and his outcomes are positive. The inputs of the victim are positive while his outcomes, the experience of victimization and suffering resulting from the loss of valued resources, are negative. Adams* original formulation of equity behavior discussed alternative means of inequity reduction and attempted to specify factors important i n determining f i r s t person preference for various alternatives. Some of these methods of inequity reduction are available to third party observers of inequity. As Walster, Berscheid & Walster (1973) pointed out, the methods specified by Adams may be classified as restoring either actual or psychological equity. Actual equity refers to real changes i n the inputs or outcomes of a party to the exchange. Psychological equity, for a third party, refers to reduction of perceived inequity by means of cognitive re-appraisal of inputs or outcomes. That i s , by altering his evaluations of the inputs or outcomes of the members of the dyad, a third party may convince himself that the exchange i s , after a l l , equitable. A third party may restore either actual or psychological equity for one or both members of a dyad i n which inequity results from the counter-normative actions of one of 8 the parties to an exchange. A third party may possess two options for restoring actual equity for a harm-doer: altering his inputs or changing his outcomes. A judge may, for example, require that a criminal make amends for his offence, either directly to the victim or else to a stand-in for the victim. For example, an embezzler may be required to repay the stolen money or a vandal may be required to donate his services to the upkeep of a public park.- In these instances, actual equity i s restored by means of positive input from the harm-doer. Alternatively, a third party may restore equity for a harrrMioer by i n f l i c t i n g negative outcomes on the offender. A spanking for a child or a term of imprisonment for an adult offender are examples of punishments directed toward restoring equity by i n f l i c t i n g negative outcomes on a harm-<ioer. A third party appears to possess only one option for restoring actual equity for a victim. This i s to restore the victim's positive outcomes. I f a third party arranges for a harm-doer to make restitution to the victim or else provides compensation from some other source, actual equity i s restored for the victim. Actual equity could also be restored by means of negative input from the victim. That i s , the victim could make negative input, directed toward producing negative outcomes for the harm-doer. This would, however, require that the victim make counter-niorraative or i l l e g a l input. For a third party to require such input from an injured party would, i t s e l f , constitute a counter-normative act. Accordingly, at the formal level, a third party may achieve actual equity for a victim only by restoring positive outcomes. 9 A third party may also reduce inequity by changing his appraisal of the inputs or outcomes of the parties to an offence. For example, an observer may convince himself that the inequitable relationship between a con man and an elderly widow bilked out of her l i f e savings i s an equitable one. He may dwell on the fact that the lady i n question brought about her misfortune by her own greed and stupidity. He may, belatedly, note that the funds i n question had been l e f t by her late husband and conclude that the widow had, i n the f i r s t place, been enjoying undeserved benefits. I f the observer can further convince himself that the criminal was, i n this case, actually an agent of poetic justice, the psychological reduction of inequity may be complete. The preceding paragraphs indicate that a third party may choose any one of a number of methods of reducing dyadic inequity. The ability of a third party to restore actual equity may be related to the presence or absence of constraints that limit his power to impose punishment on a harm-doer or award compensation to a victim. For example, the power of a judge or magistrate to restore actual equity for criminal and victim may be limited by restrictions on the type of sentence that may be imposed on an offender. Generally, these o f f i c i a l s are empowered only to punish an offender: the present system does not allow compensation for losses of victims of most crimes. An individual who i s empowered to punish a wrong-doer or to compensate a victim i s not necessarily compelled to exercise his power. He may elect, instead, to restore psychological equity for one or both members of the dyad. The importance of specifying general determinants of f i r s t party preferences among methods of dyadic inequity reduction was recognized 10 by Adams. Equally important i s consideration of general determinants of third party choice among methods of reduction of dyadic inequity. F i r s t l y , this makes possible prediction of choice of method of actual inequity reduction by third parties who possess some kind of intervention power. Secondly, i t makes possible investigation of the effects on other aspects of equity behavior of constraints that limit third party choice of methods of reducing inequity. For example, constraints that limit third parties to less preferred reductions of inequity may also limit third party satisfaction with justice decisions. Differences i n satisfaction with justice decisions that achieve more or less preferred reductions of inequity may be experienced by observers as well as by decision makers. Thus, consideration of third party preferences for methods of inequity reduction may, for example, have implications for the consequences of legal reforms that introduce or remove constraints bn the power of those responsible for justice decisions. There are several reasons for proposing, as a f i r s t principle of third party equity behavior, a preference for reduction of dyadic inequities by methods that restore actual, rather than psychological, equity for members of the dyad. F i r s t l y , empirical evidence indicates that observers who possess power to restore actual equity for others w i l l do so. Data from two studies (Lerner & Simmons, 1966; Simmons & Lerner, 1968) demonstrate that third parties w i l l exercise power to restore the positive outcomes of victims of injustice. Lerner & Simmons (1966) presented naive observers with an "innocent victim" who was apparently receiving painful electric shock i n a learning experiment. In two conditions i n the Lerner & Simmons experiment, subjects were exposed to the suffering victim and were then given an opportunity to alter her fate. Subjects were told they could watch a second session i n which the victim received negative reinforcement (shock), positive reinforcement (money), or no reinforcement. Subjects were told their votes would determine the v i c t i m ^ fate i n the second session. Of the total of twenty-eight subjects i n these two conditions, a l l but two voted to place the victim i n the positive reinforcement condition i n which a sum of money would compensate her for her previous pains. Simmons & Lerner (1968) presented subjects with power to establish justice i n a social situation. Subjects were given as a partner i n a work situation an other who, as a result of the actions of her previous partner, had either been over-rewarded or under-rewarded. They supported the hypothesis that, i n order to restore justice, subjects would work harder to increase the reward available for a previously under-rewarded partner. Data from these two studies thus demonstrate that, when i t i s within their power to do so, observers w i l l restore actual equity for others. Other studies (Baker, 1974; Lerner, 1974; Lincoln & Levinger, 1972) have demonstrated that third parties w i l l attempt to maintain or restore equity i n dyads. Baker used a two-choice, three—person matrix game to study third party justice behavior. The play of two participants was simulated by the experimenter. Subjects were placed i n the position of third parties and given power over the allocation of rewards between the two simulated players. In some instances the 12 relationship between the two simulated players was an equitable one while, i n other instances, one of the simulated players received more points than the other. Baker supported the hypotheses that third parties would act to maintain and re-establish equity between others, Lerner (1974) compared f i r s t and third party division of earnings between workers who were defined either as teammates or co-workers. The magnitude of reward available for distribution between the workers was determined by their task performance. In both teammate and co-worker conditions, the performance of one worker was clearly superior to that of the other. Lerner found that both f i r s t and third parties tended to divide the reward equally i n teammate conditions and according to performance i n co-worker conditions. Lerner (1974) concluded that, although the basis for allocation of reward differed as a function of situational cues, both f i r s t and third party division of reward was i n accordance with the dictates of justice. Lincoln & Levinger (1972) investigated third party response to dyads i n which the inequity was due to the counter-normative and negative input of a harm-doer. In the Lincoln & Levinger study, subjects* responses to harm-doers were separated from their responses to victims. There were two conditions i n the study: Consequences and No Consequences. Subjects i n both conditions were instructed to indicate their evaluations of harm-doers and victims. In the Consequences condition, subjects were told these evaluations would be sent to the parties involved i n the incident while subjects i n the No Consequences condition believed their ratings would remain private. It was predicted that ratings of the target persons would differ as a function of the consequentiality of the evaluation. That i s , subjects i n the Consequences condition could, through their ratings, punish the harm-doer and compensate the victim. victims were as predicted: Subjects' responses to the data indicated that subjects attempted to restore actual equity for victims. Responses to harm-doers did not clearly indicate a preference for actual equity for harm-doers. Thus, the Lincoln & Levinger study does not provide empirical data to support the proposition that third parties prefer actual equity for harm-doers. There i s , however, justification for proposing that third parties w i l l prefer to restore actual equity for harm-doers as well as for victims. The importance for the maintenance of equity norms of punishment for those who behave inequitably i s illustrated by Walster, Berscheid & Walster (1973)• Failure to restore actual equity for a harm-doer may be perceived as a threat to maintenance of equity norms for two reasons. F i r s t l y , failure to punish the harm-doer implies that he may be tempted to repeat his offence and, secondly, allows him to serve as a model for others tempted to maximize outcomes through similar transgressions. These considerations suggest that the principle of preference for actual equity for others applies to third party exercise of punishment as well as compensation power. An assumption that i s implicit i n the adoption of a principle of third party preference for actual equity i s that preference for positive outcomes does not apply to third party justice behavior. The importance of preference for positive outcomes as a determinant of f i r s t party equity behavior i s generally acknowledged. Adams' (1965) discussion of f i r s t party equity behavior suggested that preference for positive outcomes not only accounted for deviations from preference for actual equity but also deterroined f i r s t party choices among methods of inequity reduction, Pritchard (1969) and Walster, Berscheid & Walster (1973) also emphasize the importance of preference for positive outcomes as a determinant of f i r s t party equity behavior. The present analysis suggests that the preference for outcome positivity i s not a determinant of third party equity behavior. The rationale offered by Adams and others to account for f i r s t party preference for outcome positivity i s the individual's motivation to maximize his own gains. The observer of inequity i s presumably not motivated to maximize the gains or positive outcomes of either of the parties to the inequity. To permit an over—rewarded party to maintain his positive outcomes without a corresponding increase i n positive input does not achieve equity. In general, a person who enjoys undeserved positive outcomes from an exchange may be perceived as violating equity norms. Outcome positivity may be rejected i n part because an over—rewarded comparison person may engender dissatisfaction among others and tempt them to violate equity norms i n order to reap similar benefits. Accordingly, although a preference for outcome positivity may influence f i r s t party equity behavior, the present analysis suggests that this i s not an important consideration for third party equity behavior. The possibility of negative input was not considered i n the Adams (1965) discussion of f i r s t party equity behavior. Consequently, he did not consider the relative importance of preferences for positive versus negative input. Consideration of t h i s question appears important f o r analysis of t h i r d party equity behavior. T h i r d parties appear to exhibit a d e f i n i t e preference f o r p o s i t i v e input from others. Some empirical evidence that t h i r d parties prefer p o s i t i v e to negative input may be derived from Baker s (1974) i n v e s t i g a t i o n of t h i r d party j u s t i c e 1 behavior. As has already been mentioned, Baker supported the hypotheses that t h i r d p a r t i e s w i l l act to maintain or restore equity between others. Baker also investigated the e f f e c t s of the cause of the inequity the h e l p f u l or harmful behavior of the over-rewarded party — party a l l o c a t i o n of reward. — on t h i r d Cause was manipulated by a l t e r i n g the strategy of the two simulated players i n the two-choice, three-person matrix game so that i n one condition (harm), the over-rewarded party caused the under—rewarded one to receive fewer points than would have been obtained had the over-rewarded player followed a d i f f e r e n t strategy. In the other condition (help), the over-rewarded player helped the under-rewarded one i n that the under-rewarded player would have received even fewer points had the over-rewarded player chosen d i f f e r e n t l y . The discrepancy between the points received by the simulated players was the same i n both conditions. Baker predicted that t h i r d parties would give more rewards to the over—rewarded party when he was h e l p f u l than when he was harmful. Some support f o r t h i s p r e d i c t i o n was obtained. Kaufman (1970) found that an i l l e g a l f a i l u r e to save an other from harm was judged as morally wrong and deserving of punishment. He also found that a person who was judged to be unpleasant. f a i l e d to intervene under such conditions Evidence from t h i s study and from the one by Baker indicates that third parties prefer that individuals behave positively rather than negatively toward others. Additional support for a general preference for positive rather than negative input may be derived from noting the existence of both formal and informal mechanisms designed to reward positive input and to punish negative input. These observations provide the rationale for stating, as a second principle, that third parties prefer positive input from others. The second question that i s of importance to analysis of third party justice behavior i s that of the relative importance, to third parties, of actual equity and input positivity. There seems to be some justification for predicting that a third party preference for positive input from others may be stronger than third party preference for actual equity for others. Third party preference for input positivity over actual equity may be most clearly demonstrated by the response to harm-doer-victim dyads i n which equity can be restored only by means of retaliation from the victim. In many of these cases, third parties appear to prefer that the inequity remain uncorrected than that the victim make negative input to even the score. In case of minor offences, third parties appear to exhibit only ndrdmal tolerance for restoration of equity by means of retaliation from the victim. For example, Piaget (1932) investigated children's responses to victim retaliation against an aggressor i n situations involving childish offences and found that retaliation was judged acceptable only i f i t was identical i n quality and quantity to the original offence. Non-retaliation was preferred when retaliation involved arbitrary measures invented to settle the score. Kalven & Zeisel (1966) found a similar phenomenon among jurors who were reluctant to return a guilty verdict when retaliation matched i n quality and quantity the original offence but did not hesitate to return a guilty verdict under other conditions. When victims threaten to retaliate considerable pressure, both formal and informal, i s often exerted to prevent them from doing so. For example, victims are frequently urged to "forget and forgive" while maxims such as "forgiveness i s divine" point to the greater virtue and moral superiority of a peaceful solution. When harm results from a serious transgression, victims are further dissuaded from retaliation by threat of legal penalties. In some cases, as when: merchants or members of an ethnic minority become the target of juvenile delinquent instances of victimization may be repeated while law enforcement agencies appear powerless to prevent further offences. threats to retaliate e l i c i t strong opposition. Even i n these cases, These considerations provide the rationale for stating as a third principle of third party equity behavior that, when preferences for positive input and actual equity conflict, third parties may prefer positive input from others to actual equity for others. These three principles permit derivation of the following hypotheses concerning third party preferences among various restorations of equity i n dyads where inequity i s caused by counter-*iormative behavior. Hypothesis 1: When alternative solutions to inequitable situations are equal i n actual equity, third parties w i l l prefer alternatives that maximize input positivity. This hypothesis may be derived from the combination of the principles of preference for actual equity and for input positivity. Adams (1965) specified that actual equity could be restored for an over-rewarded party by means of lowered outcomes or improved inputs. The principle of preference for input positivity predicts that the preferred restoration w i l l be the one that provides positive input from the over—rewarded party. Hypothesis 2: When alternative solutions to inequitable situations are equal i n input positivity, third parties w i l l prefer alternatives that maximize actual equity. This hypothesis i s also derived from the combination of the principles of preference for actual equity and for input positivity. Alternative reductions of inequity may be equal i n input positivity but differ i n actual equity. The principle of preference for actual equity predicts that, i n this case, the preferred solution w i l l be the one that i s greater i n actual equity. Hypothesis 3s When alternative solutions to inequitable situations are such that preferences for maximizing actual equity and input positivity conflict, third parties w i l l prefer to achieve maximum input positivity rather than maximum actual equity. This hypothesis i s derived from the third principle which specifi the relative importance to third parties of positive input and actual equity. The principle leads to the hypothesis that, when alternatives present a conflict between actual equity and positive input, the preferred alternative w i l l be the one that i s greatest i n input positivity. Hypothesis 4s When resolution of an inequity permits third parties to satisfy preferences for actual equity and for input positivity, third parties w i l l report greater satisfaction with the solution than when resolution of an inequity satisfies only one preference or involves satisfying one preference at the expense of the other. Third party satisfaction with the solution w i l l be further decreased as the number and salience of remaining inequities requiring resolution through psychological means increases, Adams (1965) noted that the occurrence of inequity elicited expressions of negative emotional affect from the parties involved i n the exchange. Baker (1974) demonstrated that the occurrence of inequity between others results i n expressions of anger from third party observers of the injustice. The present analysis permits prediction of differences i n the extent to which f e l t dissatisfaction i s reduced when resolutions of the inequity vary i n achievement of actual equity and input positivity. Principles 1 and 2 permit the prediction that dissatisfaction w i l l be most completely reduced when resolution of inequity satisfies preferences for actual equity and for input positivity. I t i s also possible to predict that, when reduction of inequity satisfies only one preference or involves conflict between preferences, dissatisfaction with the situation w i l l persist. When actual equity i s not restored for one or both members of a dyad, third parties may restore psychological equity by means of cognitive re-appraisal of inputs or outcomes. The following two hypotheses concerning modes of psychological reduction of inequity are not derived from the principles outlined above. These hypotheses follow from previous investigations that have examined third party restoration of equity by means of cognitive re-appraisal of inputs 20 and outcomes. Hypothesis 5s Third parties w i l l restore psychological equity for an over-rewarded party by cognitively re-appraising inputs so they are commensurate with outcomes. That i s , a third party may enhance his evaluation of the inputs of the over-rewarded party i n order to convince himself that the situation i s equitable. This hypothesis i s based partly on the premise that restoration of psychological inequity by means of cognitive re-appraisals of inputs or outcomes w i l l be i n a direction of least resistance. When a harm-doer eludes justice and i s free to enjoy his ill-gotten gains, third parties may find i t easier to alter cognitions about his inputs than to deny the value of a definite gain, Lerner's (1965) findings are consistent with this hypothesis. Observers were presented with a situation i n which chance determined which one of two workers would be paid for his efforts, Lerner found that the recipient of chance reward was perceived as making a greater contribution to the group task. When the inputs of the over—rewarded party are counter—normative and negative and guilt i s clear, cognitive re-appraisals that serve to reduce perceived inequity may be more l i k e l y to involve enhanced perception of the actor's positive personality characteristics and/or attributions of responsibility for the actor's negative acts away from him than denial of the wrongness of the act. That third parties are not l i k e l y to deny the wrongness of the act i s suggested by reports that even juvenile delinquents (Sykes & Matza, 1957) and con men (Maurer, 1963) do not deny the wrongness of their criminal activities, Sykes and 21 Matza, however, report that juvenile delinquents are quick to point out the situational and environmental factors responsible for their delinquent behaviors, Vidmar (1972) reports that subjects who permitted a harm-doer to escape too lightly subsequently evaluated the defendant as less bad and as more likeable than did subjects who did not l e t the defendant off too l i g h t l y . On this basis, i t may be expected that the over—rewarded harm-doer w i l l be perceived asf more attractive and/or held less personally responsible for the event. Hypothesis 6: Third parties w i l l restore psychological equity for an under—rewarded party by cognitively re—appraising inputs so they are commensurate with outcomes. In this case, the third party may devalue the inputs of the under—rewarded party i n order to convince himself that the situation i s equitable, A series of experiments by Lerner and his colleagues (e.g., Lerner & Matthews, 19&7; Lerner & Simmons, 1966; Lerner, 1971) has demonstrated that observers who cannot restore victims* positive outcomes restore psychological equity by devaluing victims' inputs. In general, psychological equity for a victim may be restored by derogating the victim's personal characteristics or by blaming the victim for his own misfortune (Lerner, 1970). Previous investigations have tested "just world" hypotheses i n situations where the negative input of another party i s the cause of the victim's misfortune• Lincoln & Levinger (1972) demonstrated that third party evaluation of a victim of assault would differ as a function of the consequences of the evaluation for the fate of the victim. Jones & Aronson (1973) investigated the effects of the respectability of the victim and the seriousness of the crime on attribution of fault to a rape victim and severity of punishment for the criminal* They found that, the more serious the crime and the more attractive the victim, the more severe was the sentence imposed on the offender. They also found, however, that more respectable victims were attributed more blame for the injury than less respectable victims. These findings thus indicate that punishment of a wrong-doer does not preclude derogation of a victim. Results of the study by Jones and Aronson indicate that devaluation of victims may occur among subjects who are i n a position to punish a harm-doer but cannot compensate a victim. This suggests that, intervention that provides no real compensation for a victim's loss w i l l e l i c i t derogation of the victim. In these cases, third parties may restore psychological equity by derogating the victim's personal characteristics and/or attributing responsibility for his misfortune to him. CHAPTER I I REVIEW OF PILOT STUDIES AND PREVIEW OF PRESENT RESEARCH Hypothetical examples of criminal-victim dyads were used to t e s t predictions concerning t h i r d party responses to dyadic inequity. This p a r t i c u l a r exchange was selected f o r several reasons. Firstly, the criirrLnal-victim dyad provides an example of inequity r e s u l t i n g from the deliberate e x p l o i t a t i o n of one party by another. Such dyads are formed when one party uses means that v i o l a t e moral and l e g a l prohibitions to exploit another. I n t h i s dyad, the counter- normative and negative input of the criminal wins him an undeserved p o s i t i v e outcome: action. the rewards and pleasures gained from the trans- By contrast, the behavior of the v i c t i m does not v i o l a t e moral or l e g a l prohibitions- and he experiences s u f f e r i n g and deprivation. Thus, the inputs of the victim are positive and his outcomes are negative. research This dyad thus met the requirements of the f o r an exchange i n which the inputs of one party were negative, those of the other positive and the valence of the outcome of each party was opposite to that of the input. A second advantage of the criminal-victim exchange was that i t i s one i n which intervention i s commonplace and appropriate. Consequently, subjects were not l i k e l y to question the legitimacy of intervention or become suspicious of experimental i n t e r e s t i n 23 2k questions related to intervention. A d d i t i o n a l l y , since questions related to crime concern many people, the stimulus s i t u a t i o n and experimental tasks seemed l i k e l y to possess i n t r i n s i c i n t e r e s t for Predictions subjects. concerning t h i r d party restoration of dyadic equity were tested by presenting subjects with d i f f e r e n t reductions of the inequity. The actual equity and input p o s i t i v i t y of various resolutions of inequity were manipulated by the kind of sentence f o r the criminal and the a v a i l a b i l i t y of compensation f o r the v i c t i m . Different resolutions of the inequity included two possible outcomes f o r the v i c t i m . A positive outcome f o r the v i c t i m was represented by a resolution that made good his losses, either by means of r e s t i t u t i o n from the criminal or by compensation paid by a p r o v i n c i a l fund. The victim's'outcome was represented as negative when the resolution of inequity did not make good his l o s s e s . The victim's inputs were assumed positive i n a l l cases. D i f f e r e n t sentences represented, d i f f e r e n t inputs and outcomes f o r the c r i m i n a l . as representing The rationale f o r defining d i f f e r e n t sentences d i f f e r e n t resolutions of the inequity f o r the criminal i s outlined below. Whether a sentence prescribing a punishment i s represented as positive or negative input from the offender depends on whether the sentence involves active r e s t i t u t i o n or reparation from the offender, or whether he becomes the passive object of actions carried out by others. Some punishments involve r e s t i t u t i o n from the offender. person found g u i l t y of vandalism may, f o r example, pay the v i c t i m A for the damaged property or else repair i t . In other cases, restitution may be directed toward some party eligible to "stand i n " for the victim. A driver found guilty of manslaughter might, for example, provide a sum of money to the victim's survivors. In other cases, society may "stand i n " for the victim and accept restitution on his behalf. For example, a vandal might make amends by donating his services to the up-keep of a public park or a driver might contribute to a t r a f f i c safety program. These punishments require the co-operation of the offender i n remedying the injustice; the offender "undoes" or compensates for the harm by making amends, either directly to the injured partyjor to a representative of the victim, for the offence. Other punishments do not involve a positive contribution from the offender. Penalties or deprivations are inflicted on the offender i n order to make him suffer for his misdeeds. These penalties do not require active restitution from the offender but instead seem directed toward taking revenge on the offender. The terms revenge or retaliation are here used to designate punishments i n which the offender i s the object rather than the origin of the actions that restore equity. Such punishments are carried out by others and involve constraint. A spanking for an unruly child and a prison sentence for an adult offender are examples of retaliatory or revenge oriented punishments. In equity terms, punishments that restore equity through restitution appear oriented toward restoring equity by changing the inputs of the haimwioer from negative ones to positive ones. Punishments that restore equity through revenge or retaliation do not restore equity by means of changed input from the offender but instead operate on his outcomes. A pre-test was conducted to test the conceptual distinction between input- and outcome-related punishments. Subjects were given a brief outline to acquaint them with equity terms. Then they were asked to consider four offences and to make up possible punishments to restore equity. Subjects were directed to prescribe, for each of the four offences, two punishments: one to restore equity by changing the offender's inputs and the other to restore equity by changing the harm-doer's outcomes. The four offences presented to subjects were: a boy who stole his sister's saved allowance and spent the money on movies and treats, a g i r l who became angry with her sister and unravelled a sweater her sister had been knitting, a man who swindled an elderly widow out of her savings, and a dentist who charged patients exorbitant fees for unnecessary treatments. It was hypothesized that subjects would prescribe restitution for input-related punishments and revenge or retaliatory type penalties for outcome-related punishments. Twenty-six subjects i n "the f i r s t pre—test completed the task. Each subject suggested a total of eight punishments: two for each of four offences. Each of the 208 punishments suggested by subjects was copied on a separate index card. Two independent raters were presented with the offences and the suggested punishments for each offence• The raters were instructed to assign each punishment one of five values. Raters were told to consider as restitution punishments that required the active participation of the offender i n remedying the 27 injustice. They were told that such punishments require the offender to ••undo" the harm by making amends either directly to the injured party or, i n some cases, to a "stand i n " for the injured party. Raters were instructed to assign a " 1 " to punishments that were clearly restitution. Raters were told to consider as revenge or retaliation punishments that prescribed penalties or deprivations inflicted on the offender i n order to make him suffer for his misdeeds. Raters were told that these punishments were carried out by others and did not require the co-operation of the offender i n order to be carried out. Raters were told to assign a " 5 " to punishments that were clearly revenge or retaliation. Raters were instructed to assign a " 2 " to punishments that primarily involved restitution, a " 3 " to punishments that could not be classified as restitution or retaliation and a " 4 " to punishments that primarily involved revenge or retaliation. Raters thus assigned each punishment a rating from one to five to indicate their judgments of the activity or passivity of the role of the offender i n the restoration of equity. In one hundred and forty-four cases, judges agreed i n identifying punishments as clearly or primarily restitution or as clearly or primarily retaliation. Thus, approximately 69 percent of the items were identified by both judges as restitution or by both judges as retaliation. Judges disagreed on the restitutive or retaliatory nature of 36 (approximately 17 percent) of the punishments. That i s , when these items were rated as clearly or primarily restitution by one judge, they were rated as clearly or primarily retaliation by the other, judge. In twenty-eight cases, one or both judges indicated that they could not classify a punishment as 28 either restitution or retaliation. Fourteen of these punishments were rated as neither restitution nor retaliation by both judges while the other fourteen were rated as retaliation or restitution by one judge and as neither by the other judge. The hypothesis that subjects would prescribe restitution for inputrelated punishments and revenge or retaliatory type penalties for outcomerelated punishments was tested as follows. punishments: Each subject suggested eight four of these were input-related punishments and four were outcome-related punishments. Each of these eight punishments was rated by two judges. Ratings of input-related punishments as restitution or of outcome-related punishments as retaliation were consistent with predictions. Ratings of input-related punishments as retaliation or of outcome-related punishments as restitution were not consistent with predictions. Ratings of punishments as neither restitution nor retaliation were not included i n the analysis. On this basis, eighteen of the ratings of input-related punishments and twenty-four of the ratings of outcome-related punishments were discarded. For each subject's set of punishments, the number of ratings of input-related punishments as clearly or primarily restitution and of outcome-related punishments as clearly or primarily retaliation was compared to the number of ratings of input-related punishments as clearly or primarily retaliation and of outcome-related punishments as clearly or primarily restitution. In twenty-three out of twenty-six cases, the number of ratings that were as predicted exceeded the number of ratings that were contrary to predictions. The binomial test indicated that cases i n which the number of predicted ratings exceeded the number of non-predicted ones were obtained significantly more often than would be expected by chance 002), These findings support the conceptual 29 d i s t i n c t i o n between i n p u t - and outcome-related punishments. Punishments t h a t e l i c i t a c t i v e r e s t i t u t i o n , t o the v i c t i m or t o s o c i e t y , may be regarded as r e s t o r i n g equity by means o f p o s i t i v e input from the offender. Punishments t h a t make the offender the passive object o f p e n a l t i e s intended to i n f l i c t s u f f e r i n g and d e p r i v a t i o n on him restore e q u i t y by operating on outcomes. The accounts of crimes used i n the present research a l l described offences against property. Four sentences were used t o represent three d i f f e r e n t r e s o l u t i o n s o f the i n e q u i t y f o r the harm-doer. These were: sentences (1) making r e s t i t u t i o n t o the v i c t i m , (2) paying a f i n e , (3) a term o f imprisonment and, (4) a r e l e a s e , A party responsible f o r an i n j u r y t o another may make r e s t i t u t i o n i n any one o f a number of ways depending on the nature of the offence and the circumstances. When the crime i s against property, an appropriate means of r e s t i t u t i o n i s t o pay the v i c t i m or h i s representative a sum of money s u f f i c i e n t t o compensate him f o r h i s l o s s e s . Accordingly, i n the present research, r e s t i t u t i o n i n v o l v e d paying a 'sum of money d i r e c t l y t o the v i c t i m . Fine represented the case where r e s t i t u t i o n was not made d i r e c t l y t o the v i c t i m but was, i n s t e a d , received by s o c i e t y on h i s b e h a l f . R e s t i t u t i o n and f i n e both involve the a c t i v e p a r t i c i p a t i o n of the harm-doer i n the r e s t o r a t i o n of e q u i t y . Both these sentences c a l l f o r the harm-doer t o co-operate to restore e q u i t y by changing h i s inputs t o p o s i t i v e ones. Consequently, both these a l t e r n a t i v e s are represented as i n v o l v i n g p o s i t i v e input from the c r i m i n a l . Imprisonment i s c l a s s i f i e d as a revenge-oriented punishment that does not require the co-operation of the offender i n the r e s t o r a t i o n of equity and thus does not require t h a t he change h i s input to restore equity. Release also does not require that the offender change his inputs. Both these sentences are represented as negative input to signify that the resolution does not require that the harm-doer alter the nature of his prior negative inputs. In Adams' (196-5) equity model, inputs and outcomes were conceptually distinct. A change i n one did not affect the other. Thus, restoring equity by altering inputs did not change outcomes. As Pritchard (1969) pointed out, the psychological independence of inputs and outcomes i s s t i l l an open question. I t i s possible to argue that an alteration i n inputs also alters the psychological valuation of outcomes. This unresolved problem i s relevant to the present study. That i s , despite empirical evidence supporting the distinction between input-related punishments and outcome-related punishments, i t may be argued that a punishment that restores equity by means of positive input from an offender w i l l be perceived as also operating on his outcomes. For this reason, an attempt was made to define the outcome positivity of sentences independently of the input positivity of sentences. Whether or not the outcome value associated with a particular sentence i s represented as a positive'orvnagative one for the offender depends on the perceived favorability, for the offender, of this sentence compared to other sentences the offender could also receive. Twenty-six subjects i n the f i r s t pilot study were given a brief general description of a property crime and five possible sentences for i t . The five possible sentences were: a term of imprisonment, paving a fine, making restitution to the victim, a term of probation, and a release. Subjects were asked to rate these sentences on two items intended t o assess the perceived f a v o r a b i l i t y , f o r a c r i m i n a l , of the various sentences. These items asked subjects t o i n d i c a t e , f o r each sentence, how d e s i r a b l e the offender would f i n d i t compared t o other sentences and how much he would prefer i t t o other sentences i f given h i s choice of the f i v e sentences. Subjects i n d i c a t e d t h e i r evaluation of each sentence on each item by c i r c l i n g a number from one t o n i n e . A higher number i n d i c a t e d t h a t a sentence was perceived as being l e s s d e s i r e d by an offender and as l e s s l i k e l y t o be chosen by an offender. The obtained data were subjected t o analyses o f variance f o r s i n g l e f a c t o r experiments having repeated measures on the same elements (Winer, 1 9 6 2 ) . The mean r a t i n g s on the two items f o r each of the f i v e sentences are shown i n Table I and the a n a l y s i s of variance summary t a b l e s are presented i n Tables I I and I I I . As Tables I I and I I I i n d i c a t e , obtained d i f f e r e n c e s i n r a t i n g s of the f i v e sentences on each o f the two items were s i g n i f i c a n t . TABLE I MEAN RATINGS OF FIVE SENTENCES ON TWO ITEMS Sentences Item Comparative • desirability Choice value Imprisonment Fine Restitution Probation Release 8.15 5.27 5.88 2.92 1.38 8.19 5.08 5.88 2.58 1.00 32 TABLE I I SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF RATINGS OF CHOICE VALUE, TO THE CRIMINAL, OF FIVE SENTENCES SOURCE df SS Between subjects 77.00 25 Within subjects 1019.20 104 MS Sentences 827.33 4 206.83 Residual 191.87 100 1.92 Total 1096.20 F P 107.72 -^.05 129 TABLE I I I SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF RATINGS OF PERCEIVED COMPARATIVE DESIRABILITY, TO THE CRIMINAL, OF FIVE SENTENCES SOURCE df SS Between subjects 140.83 25 Within subjects 977.20 104 Sentences 722.88 Residual 254.32 Total 1118.03 MS 4 100 180.72 F P 71.14 ^- .05 2.54 129 The Newman-Keuls method was used t o compare obtained ratings f o r a l l possible p a i r s of means. These t e s t s indicated that, f o r the two items assessing the perceived f a v o r a b i l i t y , f o r the c r i m i n a l , of the sentences, a l l comparisons were s i g n i f i c a n t at the JD -^.01 l e v e l except f o r the f i n e - r e s t i t u t i o n comparison. The r a t i n g s of comparative d e s i r a b i l i t y , t o the c r i i r d n a l , and of offender preference f o r various sentences provide e m p i r i c a l support f o r the p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t these a l t e r n a t i v e s d i f f e r i n perceived f a v o r a b i l i t y or p o s i t i v i t y of outcome. That the d i f f e r e n c e s between r a t i n g s of f i n e and r e s t i t u t i o n were not s i g n i f i c a n t e i t h e r f o r d e s i r a b i l i t y or f o r choice value was i n keeping with experimental purposes since these a l t e r n a t i v e s were conceptualized as being approximate equivalents f o r the harm-doer but as having d i f f e r e n t consequences f o r the v i c t i m . . The obtained data thus provided the basis f o r representing the outcome associated w i t h a p a r t i c u l a r sentence as a p o s i t i v e or negative one. Imprisonment was rated as the l e a s t favorable of a l l sentences while release was regarded as the most favorable Fine and r e s t i t u t i o n were not perceived as d i f f e r i n g s i g n i f i c a n t l y from one another i n f a v o r a b i l i t y f o r the offender but were regarded as s i g n i f i c a n t l y more favorable than imprisonment. To summarize, the four sentences represented three d i f f e r e n t r e s o l u t i o n s of the i n e q u i t y f o r the offender. These r e s o l u t i o n s are as o u t l i n e d below: 1. A term of imprisonment: This sentence i s represented as r e s t o r i n g a c t u a l equity f o r the harm-doer. This sentence r e s t o r e s equity w i t h a negative outcome f o r the offender. not require p o s i t i v e input from the offender. I t does Accordingly, "^Since Release was rated as s i g n i f i c a n t l y more favorable than Probation, the Release a l t e r n a t i v e was r e t a i n e d as a sentence t h a t d i d not restore e q u i t y by means of p o s i t i v e input or negative outcome f o r the offender. The Probation a l t e r n a t i v e was omitted. imprisonment represents actual equity with negative input and outcome for the harm-doer, 2. Restitution: This sentence i s represented as restoring actual equity for the harm-doer. Since the sentence requires that the harm-doer participate i n reduction of inequity by making restitution to the victim, his changed input i s represented as positive. The outcome associated with this sentence i s also represented as positive relative to imprisonment, 3. Fine: This sentence also represents actual equity for the harmdoer. This sentence also requires that the criminal participate i n restoring equity. In this case, however, restitution i s made to society rather than directly to the victim. Accordingly, this sentence represents actual equity with positive input and, relative to imprisonment, a positive outcome for the harm-doer. 4. Release: This sentence does not restore actual equity for the harm-doer. It does not require that he change his input. Thus, this represents inequity with a positive outcome and negative input for the offender. The hypotheses outlined i n the Introduction were tested i n two separate studies. The f i r s t study tested predictions, derived from Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3, concerning third party preferences among reductions of inequity. These predictions were tested by presenting subjects i n each condition with an account of a simulated criminal case and a set of sentencing alternatives. The sentences represented 35 resolutions of inequity that varied i n actual equity and input positivity. Subjects were asked to indicate the sentences that they would impose i n the case. Data concerning subjects' choice of sentences provided a test of predictions derived from Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3» The f i r s t study also permitted a test of predictions, derived from Hypothesis 4 , concerning satisfaction with different resolutions of inequity. In addition,, the study tested predictions regarding the effects of availability of compensation on subjects' evaluations of victims. The conditions included i n the study and the predictions tested are described i n detail i n the next section. In the second study, subjects were not permitted to make a sentencing decision and thus had no power to determine the fates of the parties to the inequity. In this study, the summary of the simulated case described a sentence that had been imposed i n the case. This study permitted a test of a prediction, derived from Hypothesis 4t concerning satisfaction with solutions among on-lookers rather than decision-makers. The study also tested predictions, derived from Hypotheses 5 and 6, concerning the influence of different resolutions of inequity on subsequent evaluations of plaintiffs and defendants. The conditions included i n this study and the predictions tested are also detailed i n the next section. CHAPTER III METHOD STUDY I OVERVIEW STIMULUS MATERIALS Subjects were presented with a summary of a simulated criminal case. The case accounts contained a brief outline of the offence. This was followed by summaries of testimony given by the p l a i n t i f f , defendant and various witnesses i n the case. A l l accounts specified the amount of the victim's loss and, i n addition, clearly indicated that the defendant had been found guilty of the offence. The offences described i n the case accounts were crimes against property, that did not involve physical harm to any person. In a l l cases, the account made clear that the victim would not be compensated for his loss by a private source such as an insurance company. Confining the crimes to offences against property ensured that the loss suffered by the victim could be tangibly specified and could be made good by financial compensation i f funds were available. Included i n the studies were accounts of three different crimes: a fraud, 2 a theft, and an act of vandalism. The type of crime was varied to 'See Appendix A for a copy of the Stimulus Materials for Study I . 36 strengthen the generalizability of the findings by ensuring that the observed responses were not specific to a single account or a particular crime. Each account was represented an equal number of times i n each condition i n the study. Pretests were conducted with pilot subjects to determine whether the case accounts were suitable for experimental purposes. Data were collected to: 1) compare the attractiveness, when they were presented independently of their subsequent criminal-victim roles, of stimulus persons to be identified i n each account as plaintiff and defendant•* and, 2) ensure that the evidence to be supplied i n each case account was sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt, A report of the pilot study i s presented i n Appendix B, This report also contains a brief account of pre-tests conducted to assess the suitability of dependent measures used i n the present research, CONDITIONS AND PREDICTIONS The number and kind of resolutions of actual equity available to subjects was varied by presenting subjects i n each condition with a different set of sentencing alternatives. The four conditions i n the f i r s t study were as outlined below. Subjects i n each condition were asked to indicate which of two alternatives they would prefer to impose i n the case. 1. Fine vs Imprisonment Condition: Subjects i n this condition were presented with alternatives of sentencing the criminal to pay a fine or serve a term of imprisonment. Both alternatives represented actual equity for the criminal: the f i r s t sentence required that equity be restored by means of positive input from the criminal while the second did not alter his input. Both alternatives limited subjects to restoring actual equity only for the criminal: neither alternative restored the victim's positive outcomes. This condition provided a test of Hypothesis 1 which stated that when alternative solutions to inequitable situations were equal i n actual equity, third parties would prefer alternatives that maximized positive input. The prediction derived from this hypothesis was that subjects would choose the Fine alternative because i t was greater i n input positivity than the Imprisonment one, 2, Restitution vs Fine Condition: Subjects i n this condition were presented with alternatives of ordering the criminal to make restitution to the victim or else to pay a fine. Both of these sentences represented positive input from the criminal and assumed positive input from the victim but restitution restored actual equity for the victim and was, therefore, greater i n actual equity than the Fine condition. This condition tested Hypothesis 2 which stated that when alternative solutions to inequitable situations were equal i n input positivity, third parties would prefer alternatives that were greater i n actual equity. The prediction derived from this hypothesis was that subjects would choose the Restitution alternative because i t was greater i n actual equity, 3, Imprisonment vs Release Condition: This condition presented subjects with alternatives of releasing the criminal or of sentencing 39 him to serve a term of imprisonment. Neither alternative required the criminal to alter his input. Thus, both sentences l e f t the criminal's negative input unchanged. The Imprisonment alternative restored actual equity for the harm-doer by changing his outcomes to negative ones while the Release alternative represented continued inequity with a positive outcome for the criminal. Neither option restored the victim's positive outcomes and, accordingly, subjects could not achieve actual equity for the victim. This condition permitted subjects to resolve the situation so as to achieve actual equity with a negative outcome for the criminal or to maintain the inequity with a positive outcome for the crlniinal. This condition provided a test of Hypothesis 2 . The prediction was that subjects would select the Imprisonment alternative because i t was greater i n actual equity. 4. Imprisonment with Compensation vs Fine Condition* Subjects i n this condition were presented with alternatives of sentencing the criminal to a term of imprisonment and awarding the victim compensation to be paid by a Provincial Fund or of ordering the criminal to pay a fine without compensation to the victim. The f i r s t alternative did not involve positive input from the criminal but did restore actual equity for both parties to the offence. The second alternative involved positive input from the criminal and produced actual equity for him but did not restore actual equity for the victim. This condition thus permitted subjects to maximize actual equity by selecting the Imprisonment with Compensation alternative or to maximize input positivity by choosing the second option. . This condition provided a test of Hypothesis 3. This hypothesis was that when alternative solutions to inequitable situations were such that preferences for maximizing actual equity conflicted with preferences for maximizing input positivity, third parties would prefer to achieve maximum input positivity rather than maximum actual equity. The prediction was that subjects would select the Fine alternative which maximized input positivity. This study also permitted a test of Hypothesis 4« This hypothesis was that, when third parties were permitted to resolve inequity so as to satisfy preferences for actual equity and for input positivity, third parties would report more satisfaction with the solution than when resolution of inequity satisfied only one preference or involved satisfying one preference at the expense of the other. Two conditions, Fine vs Imprisonment and Restitution vs Fine, permitted subjects to select alternatives that represented input positivity and actual equity. The Imprisonment vs Release condition permitted subjects to restore actual equity but not to achieve input positivity. The Imprisonment with Compensation vs Fine condition presented subjects with a conflict between actual equity and input positivity. These considerations led to the prediction, derived from Hypothesis 4 , that subjects would express greater satisfaction i n conditions where alternatives permitted selection of solutions that increased actual equity and input positivity (Fine vs Imprisonment and Restitution vs Fine conditions) than i n conditions where alternatives satisfied only one preference or made salient conflict between preferences (imprisonment vs Release and Imprisonment with 41 Compensation vs Fine conditions). The study also permitted a test of Hypothesis 6 which stated that third parties would restore psychological equity for an under—rewarded party by devaluation of the inputs of the under-rewarded party. The prediction derived from this hypothesis was that victims who did not receive financial compensation for losses would be devalued i n comparison to victims who did receive such compensation. Neither of the alternative sentences i n the Fine vs Imprisonment and the Imprisonment vs Release conditions provided financial compensation for victims' losses. Accordingly, .these two conditions did not permit subjects to compensate victims. Although one of the alternative sentences i n the Imprisonment with Compensation vs Fine condition did make available financial compensation for victims' losses, subjects were expected to choose the Fine alternative that did not compensate victims. In this condition, however, subjects' responses to victims might be affected by a feeling of personal responsibility for depriving victims of deserved compensation. For this reason, this condition was not included i n the proposed test of Hypothesis 6 . The Restitution vs Fine condition also made available an alternative that provided financial compensation for victims' losses. This condition could be compared to the two that did not provide for such compensation. The prediction was that subjects i n the Fine vs Imprisonment and the Imprisonment vs Release conditions would rate the victim as less attractive and/or as more to blame for the offence than would subjects i n the Restitution vs Fine condition. 42 SUBJECTS The subjects who participated i n the study were volunteers from Psychology classes at the University of British Columbia. The design for the experiment called for a total of 120 subjects: 30 i n each of four conditions with an equal proportion of male and female subjects in each condition. Subjects were tested i n groups ranging i n size from two to four persons. A l l subjects i n any particular group were of the same sex. Different conditions were represented within groups and the experimenter was unaware of the conditions that were represented within a group, A total of 55 groups took part i n the study: 11 contained four subjects, 23 contained three subjects and 19 contained two subjects. One group of three subjects did not complete the experiment due to a procedural error. The nature of the study was such that, for a subject's responses to be meaningful, i t was necessary that he appreciate f u l l y several aspects of the stimulus situation, A subject who read the case account too hastily might, for example, confuse the identities and roles of the parties to the offence or f a i l to understand the nature of the offence, A subject who, for example, failed to appreciate the deception involved i n the fraud might, incorrectly, conclude that the defendant had borrowed the money from the plaintiff and had subsequently been unable to repay the loan. Alternatively, a subject might f a i l to take note of the value of the property involved i n the crime. Failure to perceive, with a reasonable degree of accuracy, the amount involved could lead to differential perceptions of the severity of the crime or of the victim's loss. Finally, the choice of sentences available to subjects i n different conditions constituted the major manipulation of the study. Success of this manipulation was dependent on subjects' appreciation of the consequences, for plaintiffs and defendants, of the different reductions of inequity represented by these sentences. For these reasons, i t was decided, on an a priori basis, to include i n the study a check on subjects recall of the facts of the 1 case and to discard data from subjects who failed to answer these items correctly. Thus, for a subject's data to be included i n the analysis, i t was necessary that he answer correctly items asking him to name the defendant and to specify the nature of the crime. Subjects were also asked to state the approximate value of the property involved i n the offence, A subject's data were discarded i f he recalled the amount, which was $ 2 , 5 0 0 , , as less than $ 2 , 0 0 0 , or as greater than $3,000, A f a i r l y demanding multiple choice item tested subjects* understanding of the sentences available to them. This item presented subjects with a brief description of five possible sentences for the offence. Subjects were requested to indicate which two had been available for them to choose from when they sentenced the defendant. Unless a subject could identify the two sentences which had been available to him, his data were not included i n the analysis, A total of 148 subjects completed the experimental tasks. Data from 25 subjects were discarded because these subjects failed to answer correctly one or more of the recall items. One subject failed to recall the name of the defendant and nine erred i n their estimates of the value of the property involved i n the offence. Seventeen subjects failed to indicate correctly the sentencing alternatives available to 44 them. One male and three females i n the Imprisonment vs Release conditionj two males and six females i n the Fine vs Imprisonment condition; one male and three females i n the Imprisonment with Compensation vs Fine condition; and one female i n the Restitution vs Fine condition failed to indicate correctly which two sentencing alternatives had been available to them. Data from these subjects were eliminated on the basis of their responses on the test items without examination of their other responses. In order to maintain 30 subjects i n each of the four conditions, one subject's data were randomly eliminated from each of the Imprisonment vs Release, Fine vs Imprisonment and Restitution vs Fine conditions. PROCEDURE The experimental setting permitted up to four subjects at a time to participate i n the study. The room used for the study i s approximately nine feet- long and nine feet wide. I t was furnished with a single table which was approximately six feet long and three feet wide. Five chairs were placed around the table: two at each side and one at an end. Subjects were not separated from one another or from the experimenter by screens or partitions. The space permitted subjects i n a l l groups to work comfortably at the task without being cramped or crowded. The presence of the experimenter i n the room precluded any discussion of the task among subjects. Once a l l subjects comprising a group had arrived, subjects were escorted to the experimental room and seated. The experimenter began each session by distributing copies of the UBC Department of Psychology "Basic Rights and Privileges of Human Subjects,""' This document was reviewed with each group. During the review of the rights and privilege of human subjects, subjects were instructed to make up code names for themselves and to place the code name on each booklet they completed. The experimenter explained that this would permit her to keep each subject's data together yet ensure anonymity. Once subjects had had an opportunity to ask any questions about their rights and privileges or the procedure for using the code name, the experimental tasks were begun. The experimental tasks were presented to the subjects i n three parts. The f i r s t part consisted of a booklet composed of a summary of a simulated case followed by materials to measure major dependent variables. The f i r s t three pages of each booklet contained an account of one of the offences. The fourth page provided the rationale and instructions for choosing one of two possible sentences for the offence. Subjects were instructed to read the descriptions of two possible sentences and to indicate which one they would prefer to impose i n the case presented to them. The next page outlined the two sentences which represented different resolutions of the inequity. Each subject received one of four different sets of sentencing alternatives. 5 The 3 See Appendix C for a copy of the UBC Department of Psychology "Basic Rights and Privileges of Human Subjects", ^"See Appendix D for a copy of the Sentencing Instructions for Study I . See Appendix E for the four sets of sentencing alternatives i n Study I , 46 d i f f e r e n t sets of sentences varied the input p o s i t i v i t y and actual equity of solutions available t o subjects. As a control measure, there were two orders of presentation of available sentences i n each condition. Half of the subjects i n each condition received the sentences i n one order; t h i s order was reversed f o r the remaining subjects. Both sentences were presented on the same page. To ensure that subjects would indicate t h e i r preferred sentence before proceeding to subsequent sections of the booklet, the i n s t r u c t i o n "Please complete t h i s page before you turn t o the next one" was hand—printed at the bottom of the page. The s i x t h page instructed subjects to indicate how s a t i s f a c t o r y they found the resolution of the s i t u a t i o n represented by t h e i r chosen sentence.^ 1 S a t i s f a c t i o n was assessed by means of a 10-centimeter l i n e l a b e l l e d "completely s a t i s f a c t o r y " at one end and "completely unsatisfactory" at the other end. Subjects were instructed t o draw a v e r t i c a l l i n e through the scale at the point that best represented how s a t i s f a c t o r y they found the resolution of the s i t u a t i o n represented by the sentence they selected. The t e n centimeter scale on which subjects were t o indicate degree of s a t i s f a c t i o n was presented on the same page as these i n s t r u c t i o n s . was the hand-printed reminder: Again, at the bottom of the page, "Please complete t h i s page before you turn to the next one." Pages 7, 8, 9 and 10 contained instructions and scales f o r r a t i n g V"" See Appendix F f o r a copy of the S a t i s f a c t i o n Scale f o r Study I . the attractiveness of defendants and p l a i n t i f f s . Page 7 presented i n s t r u c t i o n s f o r using nine-point semantic d i f f e r e n t i a l type scales. These i n s t r u c t i o n s were adapted from Osgood, Suci.and Tannenbaum (1957)• Page 8 contained instructions s p e c i f i c t o the present experiment. Subjects were requested t o rate the stimulus persons i n the order i n which they were presented and t o complete each set of ratings before going on to the next one. Subjects were also instructed to put the name of the i n d i v i d u a l being rated i n the spaces provided on the pages containing the r a t i n g s c a l e s . The f i n a l paragraph instructed subjects to work at f a i r l y high speed through the scales. These f i n a l i n s t r u c t i o n s were also adapted from Osgood, Suci and Tannenbaum (1957), The next two pages each contained the 15 bi-polar adjective pairs comprising the scale developed by Lerner (1965), A stimulus person's score on each item could range from one (negative evaluation) t o nine (positive evaluation). Ratings on these items were summed t o yield an o v e r a l l index of attractiveness. The range of possible scores was, therefore, from 15 t o 135» A higher score i n d i c a t e s a more positive r a t i n g . I n order t o control f o r possible e f f e c t s of r a t i n g order, half o f the subjects i n each condition were directed t o rate the p l a i n t i f f f i r s t and then the defendant: t h i s order was reversed f o r the remaining subjects. The pages containing scales f o r r a t i n g stimulus persons contained spaces f o r subjects t o indicate the name of the character (defendant or p l a i n t i f f ) being rated. 'See Appendix G f o r Instructions and" Scales ,fof .Rating p a r t i c i p a n t s ' Attractivenes s• The purpose of asking subjects to supply the names of defendants and p l a i n t i f f s was to ensure that subjects would be clear as to the harm-doer or v i c t i m i d e n t i t y of the i n d i v i d u a l they were r a t i n g . Hand-printed instructions at the top of the pages reminded subjects to: "Please complete t h i s page before you turn to the next The bottom of the page contained the hand-written "N. B. one." reminder: Be sure to put the name of the person you are r a t i n g i n the space provided at the top of the page." The l a s t two pages of each booklet presented i n s t r u c t i o n s f o r responding to items intended to assess subjects' perceptions of the moral wrongness of the offence, the amount of blame attributable to the v i c t i m and the perceived r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the criminal f o r 8 the offence. scales: The f i r s t page explained how subjects were to use the the second page presented items intended to measure variables of i n t e r e s t . Two items, adapted from Kaufman (1970), assessed subjects' perceptions of the moral wrongness of the offence. asked subjects to complete the item: The f i r s t one "As a question not of law but of morality, Dory's actions were:" by c i r c l i n g a number ranging from one f o r "as wrong as possible" to nine f o r "very r i g h t " . item began: "Quite apart from l e g a l aspects, Dory". The second Subjects responded to t h i s item by c i r c l i n g a number ranging from one f o r "did not do anything wrong" to nine f o r "did very wrong". These items were scored and summed so that possible scores ranged from 'See Appendix H f o r a copy of Responsibility and Blame Scales. 49 two to eighteen. The lower the score, the greater the perceived wrongness of the act. The amount of blame attributed t o the victim was assessed byasking subjects to respond to the question: "How the p l a i n t i f f i s to blame f o r what happened?" much do you think Subjects responded to t h i s item by c i r c l i n g a number ranging from one f o r "not at a l l " to nine f o r "completely". Two items assessed the perceived r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the criminal for the offence. Subjects were asked to indicate whether they agreed or disagreed with the following two statements: ( l ) "Dory's acts were a r e s u l t of the circumstances i n which he found himself" and (2) "Dory i s more a v i c t i m of circumstances than a c r i m i n a l " . Subjects indicated the extent of t h e i r agreement with these two items by c i r c l i n g a number on a scale ranging from one f o r "agree completely" to nine f o r "disagree completely". The experimenter introduced the f i r s t task by s t a t i n g : "I am interested i n f i n d i n g out some things about how people judge criminal offences and how they make sentencing decisions. This questionnaire (the experimenter displayed f i r s t booklet) consists of a case summary followed by questions about various aspects of the case. The case summary contains a b r i e f outline of a criminal offence and the testimony given by witnesses i n the case. What I'd l i k e you to do i s read over the case summary and then give your opinions about i t . "There are three main sets of questions asking your opinions about d i f f e r e n t aspects of the case. In front of each set of questions are i n s t r u c t i o n s f o r using the s c a l e s . Please read over the i n s t r u c t i o n s and, i f you f i n d the i n s t r u c t i o n s are c l e a r , complete that part of the questionnaire and then turn t o the next p a r t . I f you f i n d the i n s t r u c t i o n s are not clear or i f you have any questions, l e t me know. 50 Please complete each part of the questionnaire before going on t o the next one, "Are there any questions? (Pause), In that case, I ' l l d i s t r i b u t e the questionnaire and l e t you begin. Remember —when you f i n i s h the booklet — put your code name on i t and turn i t over — l i k e t h i s (experimenter demonstrated) — face down. After a l l subjects i n a group had completed the booklet comprising the f i r s t part o f the experimental task, the second part was introduced. As the l a s t subject completed and turned over h i s booklet, the experimenter glanced up from the book she had been reading and said: "Good, Now —- the next thing I'd l i k e you t o do i s — • without r e f e r r i n g back t o your f i r s t booklet — complete t h i s short questionnaire," (The experimenter produced and displayed a copy o f the questionnaire,) These four questions (pointing) ask you t o r e c a l l some f a c t s about the case. Look over t h i s one (pointing to number seven on the questionnaire) c a r e f u l l y . I t l i s t s f i v e possible sentences f o r the offence and asks you t o r e c a l l the two you had t o pick from when you sentenced the defendant. These questions (pointing) ask you what you would do i f you were imposing these sentences i n the case. This l a s t question asks why you picked the sentence you chose. Answer i t very b r i e f l y — with just a sentence or two — and don't worry about s p e l l i n g or grammar. Are there any questions? (Pause), L e t me know i f you have any questions. Remember — when you f i n i s h — put your code name on top of the page and turn i t over — face down — - on top of your f i r s t booklet. The second part of the task consisted of a single page containing four items t e s t i n g subjects' r e c a l l of the case and the sentencing a l t e r n a t i v e s available t o them as well as four items asking for subjects' opinions regarding possible penalties and reasons f o r -See Appendix I f o r a copy of the Short Questionnaire f o r Study I , p r e f e r r i n g one alternative to another. The three items included t o t e s t subjects' r e c a l l of the case asked them t o state the name of the defendant, the nature of the offence and the amount of the victim's loss. The l a s t item asked subjects t o read over f i v e possible sentences f o r the offence and indicate which two had been available f o r them t o choose from when they sentenced the defendant. Subjects were asked to specify the magnitude of the penalties they would impose on the criminal by responding to the following three questions: l ) I f the defendant were to be sentenced to a term of imprisonment f o r the offence, how long a term should he serve f o r t h i s offence?, 2) I f the defendant were to pay a f i n e rather than serve time i n prison, what amount of money should he pay as a f i n e ? , and, 3) I f the defendant were to pay a sum of money to the r i g h t f u l owner of the l o s t or damaged property rather than pay a fine or serve time i n prison, what amount of money should he pay to the p l a i n t i f f as r e s t i t u t i o n ? t h e i r choice of a sentence. Subjects were also asked to explain This item was included as an open-ended measure that might provide i n s i g h t i n t o subjects' reasons f o r selecting or r e j e c t i n g various a l t e r n a t i v e s . When a l l subjects i n a group had completed the short questionnaire, the experimenter produced copies of the Thurstone-Wang "Attitude toward Punishment of Criminals" Scale" ' with the comment: 1 0 See Appendix J f o r a copy of the Thurstone-Wang "Attitude toward Punishment of Crindnals" Scale, 52 "This i s the l a s t thing I have f o r you to do, (Pause), What I'd l i k e you to do i s read over the statements i n t h i s booklet. Put a check-mark i f you agree with a statement, a cross i f you disagree with i t and a question mark i f you cannot decide about i t . That's a check-mark i f you agree, a cross i f you disagree and a question mark i f you can't decide. During these i n s t r u c t i o n s , the experimenter demonstrated f o r each subject by w r i t i n g check-marks, crosses and question marks i n the appropriate places i n the i n s t r u c t i o n s on the top of the first page of each copy of the attitude s c a l e . After each subject had been given a copy of the scale, the experimenter said: when you're f i n i s h e d — "Again — remember to put your code name on your booklet and turn i t over face down," This scale was included i n order to obtain an i n d i c a t i o n of subjects' attitudes toward punishment of c r i m i n a l s . In view of the nature of the stimulus s i t u a t i o n , t h i s measure appeared to have some p o t e n t i a l use as an aid to i n t e r p r e t i n g or explaining possible f i n d i n g s . As the l a s t subject i n a group f i n i s h e d the Thurstone—Wang "Attitude toward Punishment of Criminals" Scale, the experimenter said: "And f i n a l l y , could you please take a minute or two and — on the back of that l a s t booklet — the one you just turned over — write down your ideas about the purpose of the experiment. That i s , t e l l :me what you think the study i s t r y i n g to find^out. Remember not to worry about s p e l l i n g or grammar. After completion of the l a s t task, subjects were provided with Subjects were scheduled to p a r t i c i p a t e i n the experiment when they had a free hour between c l a s s e s . This time was s u f f i c i e n t f o r most groups to complete the experiment with a few minutes to spare. Some groups were l a t e r i n s t a r t i n g because subjects arrived l a t e . In order to avoid inconveniencing subjects i n such groups by, f o r example, making them l a t e f o r t h e i r next c l a s s , t h i s f i n a l request was omitted i n some instances. an explanation of the purpose of the experiment and were given an opportunity to ask questions. Subjects were requested t o keep c o n f i d e n t i a l information about the nature of the stimulus materials and the purposes and hypotheses of the experiment. The experimenter also mentioned that the accounts of crimes used i n the study were fictitious. At the conclusion of the discussion, the experimenter announced that a b r i e f description of the findings would be available to participants i n the study and addresses were obtained from subjects who wished t o receive one, STUDY I I OVERVIEW STIMULUS MATERIALS Subjects were presented with s l i g h t l y revised versions of the summaries of simulated criminal cases used i n Study I , The case accounts were revised so that the past, rather than the present, 12 tense was used where t h i s was appropriate. A d d i t i o n a l l y , the case summaries f o r t h i s study described a sentence that had been imposed i n the case, CONDITIONS AND PREDICTIONS This study was intended to t e s t predictions concerning responses 'See Appendix K f o r a copy of the Stimulus Materials f o r Study I I , t o resolutions of inequity that varied i n actual equity and input positivity. Three d i f f e r e n t resolutions of the inequity were represented 13 by the sentences described. The three conditions included i n the experiment are outlined below, 1. Release Condition: Subjects i n t h i s condition were t o l d that the criminal had been released. This represented a continuation of the inequity with a p o s i t i v e outcome and negative input f o r the criminal. The input of the v i c t i m was assumed positive and, since the sentence d i d not provide compensation f o r h i s l o s s e s , h i s outcome was represented as negative, 2. Imprisonment with Compensation Condition: Subjects i n t h i s condition were t o l d that the criminal was sentenced t o serve a term of imprisonment. Subjects were t o l d t o assume that the f u l l term would be served and that no parole would be considered. Subjects were also t o l d that the v i c t i m received compensation f o r the l o s s and that the compensation was paid by a P r o v i n c i a l Fund. This represented actual equity f o r both p a r t i e s t o the offence. 3. R e s t i t u t i o n Condition: Subjects were t o l d that the criminal was sentenced t o a term of imprisonment equal t o that imposed i n the Imprisonment with Compensation condition but that the sentence was suspended i n view of the court order that the criminal make r e s t i t u t i o n to the v i c t i m . This condition also restored actual equity f o r both p a r t i e s to the offence. This study permitted t e s t s of Hypotheses 4» 5 and 6. See Appendix L f o r copies of Sentences f o r Study I I 55 The three conditions i n t h i s study represented reductions of dyadic inequity that varied i n actual equity and input p o s i t i v i t y . R e s t i t u t i o n and Imprisonment with Compensation restored actual equity f o r both parties t o the offence while Release restored actual equity f o r neither party. R e s t i t u t i o n represented r e s t o r a t i o n with greater input p o s i t i v i t y than d i d Imprisonment with Compensation, Therefore, the prediction derived from Hypothesis 4 was that subjects would express greatest s a t i s f a c t i o n i n the R e s t i t u t i o n condition, l e s s s a t i s f a c t i o n i n the Imprisonment with Compensation condition and l e a s t s a t i s f a c t i o n i n the Release condition. Hypothesis 5 stated that a t h i r d party would restore psychological equity f o r an over-rewarded party by enhancing h i s evaluation of the inputs of the over-rewarded party i n order t o convince himself that the s i t u a t i o n was equitable. Two conditions, Imprisonment with Compensation and R e s t i t u t i o n , restored actual equity f o r c r i m i n a l s . The Release condition did not restore actual equity f o r the c r i m i n a l . Therefore, i t was predicted that subjects i n the Release condition would restore psychological equity f o r the criminal by enhancing h i s personal c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s and/or holding him l e s s responsible f o r the offence than would subjects i n the Imprisonment with Compensation condition. Hypothesis 6 was that t h i r d parties would restore psychological equity f o r an under-rewarded party by devaluation of the inputs of the underrewarded party. Two conditions, R e s t i t u t i o n and Imprisonment with Compensation, provided victims with f i n a n c i a l compensation f o r l o s s e s . The Release condition deprived victims of both v i n d i c a t i o n and f i n a n c i a l compensation. Therefore, i t was predicted that subjects i n the Release condition would rate victims as l e s s a t t r a c t i v e and/or as more responsible f o r the offence than (Would subjects i n the R e s t i t u t i o n and Imprisonment with Compensation conditions. SUBJECTS The subjects who took part i n the study were volunteers from Psychology classes at the U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia. f o r t h i s study c a l l e d f o r a t o t a l of 48 subjects: The design 16 i n each of three conditions with an equal proportion of male and female subjects i n each of three conditions. Subjects were again brought i n t o the experimental room i n groups ranging i n size from two t o four persons. A l l subjects i n any p a r t i c u l a r group were of the same sex. Different conditions were represented within groups and the experimenter was unaware of the conditions that were represented within a group. t o t a l of 23 groups took'part i n the study: A 14 groups contained two persons, eight groups contained three persons, and one group contained four persons. Thus, a t o t a l of 56 subjects took part i n the study. For reasons similar to those outlined i n connection with the f i r s t study, four items were used as guidelines to determine whether or not a subject's data would be included i n the analysis. Subjects were asked to r e c a l l the name of the defendant, the nature of the offence and the approximate value of the property involved i n the offence. The l a s t item asked subjects t o read over descriptions of three possible sentences f o r the offence and t o indicate which one had been imposed on the defendant. A subject was required t o r e c a l l the name of the defendant, the nature of the crime, the sentence imposed i n the case and to specify that the l o s s was greater than $2,000. or less 57 than $3,000, i n order f o r h i s data t o be retained. As before, a subject's responses t o these items were examined and a decision t o accept or discard the data was made without reference t o h i s responses to other items. Out of the t o t a l of 56 subjects who took part i n the study, data from four were discarded because one of the r e c a l l items was not completed c o r r e c t l y . One subject i n the Imprisonment with Compensation condition f a i l e d t o r e c a l l the defendant's name and three subjects i n the R e s t i t u t i o n condition indicated that the defendant had been released. To f a c i l i t a t e analysis, data from four remaining subjects were elijninated i n order t o have equal numbers of subjects i n conditions, PROCEDURE The room used f o r the second study was the same one used f o r the f i r s t study. Again, copies of the "Basic Rights and P r i v i l e g e s of Human Subjects" were given to.subjects and the contents reviewed p r i o r to presentation of the tasks. As i n the f i r s t study, subjects were requested t o make up code names and t o place these names on completed materials. The experimenter introduced the f i r s t task by stating: "I am interested i n f i n d i n g out some things about how people judge criminal offences. This questionnaire (experimenter displayed f i r s t booklet) consists of a case summary followed by questions about various aspects of the case. The case summary contains a b r i e f outline of the offence followed by the testimony given by witnesses i n the case. What I'd l i k e you t o do i s read over the case summary and then give your opinions about i t . "There are two main sets of questions asking your opinions about d i f f e r e n t aspects of the case. In front of each s e t of questions are instructions f o r using the s c a l e s . Please read over the instructions and, i f you f i n d the i n s t r u c t i o n s c l e a r , complete that part of the questionnaire and then turn t o the next p a r t . I f you f i n d the i n s t r u c t i o n s are not clear or i f you have any questions, l e t me know. Please complete each part of the questionnaire before going on to the next one, "Are there any questions? (Pause), In that case, I ' l l d i s t r i b u t e the questionnaire and l e t you begin. Remember — when you f i n i s h the booklet — put your code name on i t and turn i t over — l i k e t h i s (experimenter demonstrated) — • face down. When these i n s t r u c t i o n s were completed, the booklet comprising the f i r s t part of the task was given t o subjects. The booklet was composed of the summary of the simulated case and a description of a sentence imposed i n the case. Subjects i n each condition received a description of a sentence d i f f e r e n t from the one described i n other conditions. The d i f f e r e n t sentences represented resolutions of the o r i g i n a l inequity that varied i n input p o s i t i v i t y and actual equity. The booklet also included the dependent measures f o r the second study. These were, with two exceptions, the same as i n the f i r s t study. Materials f o r assessing subjects' choice of sentence were, of course, omitted. The i n s t r u c t i o n s f o r i n d i c a t i n g degree of s a t i s f a c t i o n with the solution were also revised.^ ' The remainder of 1 the booklet contained the same materials i n the same form as i n Study I . A f t e r a l l subjects i n a group had completed the booklet "^See Appendix M f o r a copy of the S a t i s f a c t i o n Scale f o r Study II. 59 comprising the f i r s t part of the task, the second part was introduced. As the l a s t subject completed and turned over h i s booklet, the experimenter produced and displayed a copy of the questionnaire, containing items to t e s t subjects' r e c a l l of the d e t a i l s of cases and to assess t h e i r opinions regarding various p e n a l t i e s . The experimenter said: "Good, Now the next thing I'd l i k e you to do i s •— without r e f e r r i n g back t o your f i r s t booklet — complete t h i s short questionnaire. Answer t h i s (pointing) l a s t question f a i r l y b r i e f l y — with just a sentence or two — and don't worry about s p e l l i n g or grammar. Let me know i f you have any questions. And remember — when you f i n i s h put your name on the top of the page and turn i t over — face down — on top of your f i r s t booklet. The questionnaire was then given to subjects. The — questionnaire asked f o r e s s e n t i a l l y the same information as i t d i d i n the f i r s t experiment. The f i n a l two items on the questionnaire were revised so as to be appropriate f o r the second study. The revised questionnaire i s shown i n Appendix N, When a l l subjects had completed the short questionnaire, the Thurstone-Wang "Attitude toward Punishment of Criminals" Scale distributed. The comments and instructions of the scale were the same as i n the f i r s t was accompanying d i s t r i b u t i o n study. When the l a s t task had been completed, the experimenter said: "Sometimes people form hypotheses about the purpose of an experiment — or suspect that deception i s involved. What I'd l i k e you to do i s — i f you think the experiment has involved deception or i f you've formed some hypotheses about the purpose of the experiment — write out on the back of the l a s t booklet what you think the deception involves or what the r e a l purpose of the study i s . Once subjects had had time to write out t h e i r comments, they 60 were provided with an explanation of the purpose of the experiment and given an opportunity t o ask questions about i t . Subjects were requested to keep c o n f i d e n t i a l information about the nature o f the stimulus m a t e r i a l s and the purpose and hypotheses of the study. The experimenter also mentioned t h a t the accounts o f crimes used i n the study were fictitious. At the conclusion of the d i s c u s s i o n , the experimenter c o l l e c t e d addresses from subjects i n t e r e s t e d i n r e c e i v i n g b r i e f d e s c r i p t i o n s of the f i n d i n g s . CHAPTER IV RESULTS STUDY I Subjects i n each condition were presented with two sentences that represented different resolutions of the inequity and asked to indicate which one they would impose i n the case. Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3 predicted that, i n each of the four conditions, one alternative would be selected significantly more frequently than the other. The binomial test was used to determine whether, within each condition, the predicted alternative was chosen significantly more frequently than the non-predicted alternative. Table IV shows the number of choices of predicted and non-predicted alternatives i n each condition as well as the probability of the smaller of the obtained values. TABLE IV FREQUENCY OF SELECTION OF PREDICTED AND NON—PREDICTED ALTERNATIVES Condition Number of Choices of Predicted Alternative Number of Choices of Non-Predicted Alternative £ Imprisonment vs Release 24 6 <- . 0 0 1 Fine vs Imprisonment 25 5 < .001 Restitution vs Fine 28 2 <.,001 7 23 Imprisonment with Compensation vs Fine 61 62 As reference t o Table IV i n d i c a t e s , the three predictions based on Hypotheses 1 and 2 were supported. Hypothesis 1 stated that when alternative solutions t o inequitable situations were equal i n actual equity, t h i r d parties would prefer alternatives that maximized input positivity. The prediction derived from t h i s hypothesis was that subjects i n the Fine vs Imprisonment condition would select the Fine alternative s i g n i f i c a n t l y more frequently than the Imprisonment one. The predicted alternative was chosen twenty-five was selected f i v e times. times and the non-predicted alternative The binomial t e s t indicated that the p r o b a b i l i t y of obtaining t h i s r e s u l t by chance was -<:.001. Two predictions were derived from Hypothesis 2 which stated that when alternative solutions t o inequitable situations were equal i n input p o s i t i v i t y , t h i r d parties would prefer alternatives that maximized actual equity. The f i r s t p r e d i c t i o n derived from t h i s hypothesis was that subjects i n the Imprisonment vs Release condition would s e l e c t the Imprisonment alternative more frequently than the Release a l t e r n a t i v e . Out of a t o t a l of t h i r t y subjects, s i x selected the Release a l t e r n a t i v e . As Table IV shows, the binomial t e s t indicated that the p r o b a b i l i t y of obtaining t h i s r e s u l t by chance was «c . 0 0 1 . The second prediction derived from Hypothesis 2 was that subjects i n the R e s t i t u t i o n vs Fine condition would prefer the R e s t i t u t i o n a l t e r n a t i v e . Reference to Table IV indicates that t h i s prediction was also supported. The p r o b a b i l i t y of obtaining by chance the observed number of choices of the non-predicted alternative i s <. . 0 0 1 . Hypothesis 3 stated that when alternative solutions t o inequitable situations were such that preferences f o r maximizing equity and f o r maximizing input p o s i t i v i t y c o n f l i c t e d , t h i r d parties would prefer t o achieve maximum input p o s i t i v i t y rather than maximum equity. The prediction derived from t h i s hypothesis was that subjects i n the Imprisonment with Compensation vs Fine condition would select the Fine a l t e r n a t i v e . not support t h i s p r e d i c t i o n . As Table IV shows,'-the data d i d The predicted alternative was chosen l e s s frequently than the non-predicted one. The implications of t h i s f i n d i n g w i l l be considered i n the Discussion section. The fourth hypothesis was that t h i r d parties would be more s a t i s f i e d with solutions when alternatives permitted them to s a t i s f y preferences f o r actual equity and f o r input p o s i t i v i t y than when only one preference could be s a t i s f i e d or when preferences c o n f l i c t e d . This hypothesis provided the basis f o r the prediction that expressed s a t i s f a c t i o n with the solution would be greater i n the Fine vs Imprisonment and R e s t i t u t i o n vs Fine conditions than i n the Imprisonment vs Release and Imprisonment with Compensation vs Fine conditions. Subjects indicated degree of s a t i s f a c t i o n or d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n with the solution by breaking a ten centimeter l i n e l a b e l l e d "completely s a t i s f a c t o r y " at one end and "completely unsatisfactory" at the other. Scores, measured i n millimeters, could range from 0 t o 100: score indicated greater s a t i s f a c t i o n with the s o l u t i o n . a higher C e l l means f o r male and female subjects i n each condition are shown i n Table V. 64 TABLE V CELL MEANS FOR SATISFACTION WITH SOLUTION EXPRESSED BY MALE AND FEMALE SUBJECTS IN EACH CONDITION Sex of Subject Condition Male (N) Female (N) Imprisonment vs Release 57.86 14 39.62 16 48.12 30 Fine vs Imprisonment 60.43 14 66.37 16 63.60 30 R e s t i t u t i o n vs Fine 78.93 14 74.25 16 76.43 30 Imprisonment with Compensation vs Fine 36.13 14 51.50 . 16 44.33 30 Condition Mean (N) The data were submitted t o a four (conditions) by two (sex of subject) analysis of variance. Since each condition contained an equal proportion of male and female subjects, a modified conventional analysis (Kirk, 1969, p. 201) was carried out. Table VI shows the analysis of variance summary table. TABLE VI SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF SUBJECTS' EXPRESSED SATISFACTION WITH SOLUTION SOURCE SS df MS 6552.14 4.81 1555.20 459.31 A (Conditions) B (Sex of Subject) A xB Within C e l l 19656.41 4.81 4665.60 51442.29 3 1 3 112 TOTAL 75769.12 119 F 14.26 -eCl.OO 3.39 f\« 0 1 <. .05 As Table VI shows, the obtained F values for both the main effect for conditions (F = 14.26, d.f. = 3t H2; £ -^.01) and the conditions x sex interaction (F = 3«39» d.f. = 3, 112; £ *c.05) reached conventional levels of significance. The overall pattern of means shown i n Table V indicates that satisfaction was greatest i n conditions where alternatives permitted selection of solutions that increased actual equity and input positivity (the Fine vs Imprisonment and Restitution vs Fine Conditions) and least when alternatives permitted subjects to satisfy only one preference or made salient conflict between preferences (the Imprisonment vs Release and Imprisonment with Compensation vs Fine conditions). That satisfaction with the solution would be greater i n the former two conditions than i n the latter two had been predicted. The planned comparison indicated that the difference was significant (t = 6.08; d.f. • 112; £ -c.01). The significant sex x conditions interaction was not predicted. The interaction suggests that, although the expected main effect appeared and the overall planned comparison was as expected, both these results may require qualification. Inspection of the c e l l means shown i n Table V suggests that the significant interaction i s due to differences between male and female subjects i n expressed satisfaction i n the two conditions where least satisfaction with the solution had been predicted: the Imprisonment vs Release and the Imprisonment with Compensation vs Fine conditions. Both males 66 and females expressed most s a t i s f a c t i o n i n the R e s t i t u t i o n vs Fine condition and next most s a t i s f a c t i o n i n the Fine vs Imprisonment condition. Males i n the Imprisonment with Compensation vs Fine condition, however, reported l e a s t s a t i s f a c t i o n while females reported l e a s t s a t i s f a c t i o n with the Imprisonment vs Release condition. This unexpected i n t e r a c t i o n w i l l be pursued i n the next Chapter, Subjects i n two conditions, the Imprisonment vs Release and Fine vs Imprisonment conditions, were l i m i t e d to a l t e r n a t i v e s that permitted only p a r t i a l reduction of i n e q u i t y . These subjects could not provide victims with r e a l compensation f o r l o s s e s . Hypothesis 5 stated that t h i r d parties who were powerless to restore actual equity f o r an other would restore psychological equity. This hypothesis l e d to the p r e d i c t i o n that subjects i n these two conditions would e i t h e r derogate p l a i n t i f f s or blame them f o r t h e i r misfortune. Subjects rated victims on the f i f t e e n item bi-polar adjective scale developed by Lerner, The score f o r each item could range from one f o r a negative evaluation to nine f o r a positive evaluation. The t o t a l score was obtained by summing scores on the 15 adjective pairs, A higher score indicates greater p o s i t i v i t y of evaluation. The obtained data were subjected to a four (conditions) by two (rating order) by two (sex of subject) analysis of variance. The c e l l means are shown i n Table VII and the r e s u l t s of the analysis of variance are summarized i n Table V I I I , 67 TABLE VII MEAN RATINGS OF PLAINTIFFS * ATTRACTIVENESS AS A FUNCTION OF CONDITIONS, RATING ORDER AND SEX OF SUBJECT Plaintiff-Defendant Rating Order Condition Imprisonment vs Release Female (n) Defendant-Plaintiff Rating Order Male (n) Female (n) Male (n) Condition Mean (n) 97.12 8 83.71 7 78.37 8 88.00 7 86.87 30 1'Finer vs Imprisonment 9 3 . 2 5 8 89.28 7 83.75 8 84.43 7 87.73 30 93.37 8 87.71 7 91.00 8 81.29 7 88.60 30 Imprisonment with Compensation vs Fine 95.87 8 83.71 7 89.37 8 89.86 7 89.90 30 32 86.11 28 85.62 32 85.89 28 Restitution vs Fine r Rating Order Y -A. Sex Mean O v e r a l l Order Means 94.90 90.80 85.75 63 TABLE V I I I SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF RATINGS OF FLAINTIFFS• ATTRACTIVENESS SOURCE SS df A (Conditions) B (Rating Order) C (Sex o f Rater) A xB A x C B x C A xB xC Within C e l l 150.69 765.07 •543.43 257.49 199.32 613.83 745.99 I6364.O9 3 1 1 3 3 1 3 104 TOTAL 19639.92 119 MS 50.23 765.07 543.43 85.83 66.44 613.83 248.66 157.35 F -Cl 4.86 3.45 < 1 <-l 3.89 1.58 ^.05 <.10 -^.10 As Table V I I I shows, the data d i d not support the p r e d i c t i o n t h a t p l a i n t i f f s i n the Imprisonment vs Release and Fine vs Imprisonment conditions would be derogated i n comparison t o p l a i n t i f f s i n conditions where compensation was a v a i l a b l e . The main e f f e c t f o r conditions was not s i g n i f i c a n t and the c o n d i t i o n means do not d i f f e r g r e a t l y . The s i g n i f i c a n t F value f o r the main e f f e c t o f order (F = 4.86; d.f• = 1, 104; £ <- .05) was not p r e d i c t e d . T h i s main e f f e c t r e f l e c t s higher r a t i n g s given t o p l a i n t i f f s who were r a t e d f i r s t (X = 90.80) than t o p l a i n t i f f s who were rated second (X = 85.75). The main e f f e c t f o r sex of r a t e r approached s i g n i f i c a n c e : females tended t o r a t e p l a i n t i f f s more f a v o r a b l y (X = 90.26) than d i d males (X = 86.00). more s e n s i t i v e t o order e f f e c t s than were males: the Females were when females rated p l a i n t i f f f i r s t , the mean r a t i n g was 94.90; when the p l a i n t i f f was r a t e d second, the mean r a t i n g was 85.62. Comparisons o f the means f o r males i n r a t i n g order conditions suggests t h a t , among males, evaluations 69 of the p l a i n t i f f do not d i f f e r as a function of r a t i n g order. Inspection of the data shown i n Table VII suggests that the s i g n i f i c a n t main e f f e c t f o r order and the near s i g n i f i c a n t main e f f e c t f o r order and the sex x order i n t e r a c t i o n e f f e c t are attributable t o higher ratings given byfemales to f i r s t rated p l a i n t i f f s . An explanation f o r t h i s but i n t e r e s t i n g f i n d i n g w i l l be pursued i n the next unexpected Chapter, Subjects indicated how much the p l a i n t i f f was to blame f o r the incident by c i r c l i n g a number from one f o r "not at a l l " to nine f o r "completely". These data were subjected to a four (conditions) by two (sex of r a t e r ) analysis of variance. C e l l means are shown i n Table IX and the r e s u l t s of the analysis of variance are presented i n Table X, TABLE IX MEAN RATINGS OF BLAME ATTRIBUTED TO PLAINTIFFS AS A FUNCTION OF CONDITIONS AND SEX OF RATER Sex of Rater (N) Condition Mean (N) ,3.21 14 4.13 30 16 4.50 14 4.23 30 4.12 16 3.86 14 4.00 30 Imprisonment with Compensation vs Fine 3.31 16 3.36 14 3.33 30 Sex of Rater Mean 4.09 64 3.73 56 Female (N) Imprisonment vs Release 4.94 16 Fine vs Release 4,00 R e s t i t u t i o n vs Fine Condition Male 70 TABLE X SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF BLAME ATTRIBUTED TO PLAINTIFFS SOURCE SS df MS 14.83 3.91 4.94 A (Conditions) B (Sex of Rater) A x B Within C e l l 804.91 3 1 3 112 TOTAL 844.33 119 20.68 3.91 6.89 7.18 F l ^ 1 1 The F values obtained f o r the main e f f e c t s of conditions and and f o r the i n t e r a c t i o n e f f e c t were a l l l e s s than u n i t y . not support the p r e d i c t i o n that blame attributed to the sex The data d i d plaintiff would vary as a function of a v a i l a b i l i t y of f i n a n c i a l compensation f o r the l o s s . Subjects i n each condition also rated the attractiveness of defendants on the 15-item bi-polar adjective scale developed by Lerner. As before, a higher r a t i n g on t h i s scale indicated greater p o s i t i v i t y of evaluation. two These data were subjected to a four (conditions) (rating order) by two (sex of rater) analysis of variance. by Cell means are presented i n Table XI and the r e s u l t s of the analyis of variance are summarized i n Table XII. 71 TABLE XI MEAN RATINGS OF DEFENDANTS• ATTRACTIVENESS AS A FUNCTION OF CONDITIONS, RATING ORDER AND SEX OF RATER Plaintiff-Defendant Rating Order Condition Female (N) Male Defendant-Plaintiff Rating Order (N) Female (N) Male (N) Condition Mean (N] Imprisonment vs Release 67.75 8 65.OO 7 64.25 8 65.71 7 65.70 30 Fine vs Imprisonment 86.62 8 75.29 .7 72.87 8 75.00 7 77.60 30 Restitution vs Fine 62.12 8 74.14 7 80.00 8 74.14 7 72.50 30 Imprisonment with Compensation vs Fine 73.37 8 75.57 7 69.25 8 76.71 7 73.57 30 TABLE XII SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF RATINGS OF DEFENDANTS» ATTRACTIVENESS SOURCE SS df A (Conditions) B (Rating Order) C (Sex o f Rater) A xB A xC B •» C A x B xC Within C e l l 2198.60 2.40 13.22 1135.86 393.44 12.01 1007.75 24275.72 3 1 1 3 3 1 3 104 TOTAL 29039.00 119 MS 732.86 2.40 13.22 378.62 131.14 12.01 335.91 233.42 F 3.13 1 -^1 1.62 < 1 <1 1.43 72 The o n l y s i g n i f i c a n t d.f. 3, 104; = -<.05) JJ F v a l u e o b t a i n e d was t h a t f o r the main e f f e c t N e w m a n - K e u l s p r o c e d u r e was u s e d t o this factor. This test reach s i g n i f i c a n c e rating of the vs Imprisonment Two i t e m s , subjects' first "very right". "As a question not "did very wrong". wrongness. Subjects completed t h i s both items, assess The morality, circling apart i t e m by c i r c l i n g i t e m were S u b j e c t s ' r e s p o n s e s o n t h e t w o i t e m s w e r e summed t o p o s s i b l e range of s c o r e s was f r o m t w o t o greater perceived wrongness. of the wrongness o f the act o f v a r i a n c e summary t a b l e i s Thus, eighteen with lower T h e c e l l means f o r XIV. for perceived yield the scores evaluations are p r e s e n t e d i n T a b l e X I I I and the shown i n T a b l e a reverse a lower score i n d i c a t e d greater act. to from do a n y t h i n g w r o n g " t o n i n e S u b j e c t s ' r e s p o n s e s on t h i s for of item by "Quite e v a l u a t i o n of the moral wrongness o f the indicating Fine " a s w r o n g as p o s s i b l e " The s e c o n d i t e m b e g a n : " d i d not offence. of law but Subjects responded to t h i s n u m b e r r a n g i n g f r o m one f o r s c o r e d so t h a t , mean and t h e included to e v a l u a t i o n s of the m o r a l wrongness o f the aspects, Dory". a final vs Release for to between the (1970) w e r e a number o n a s c a l e r a n g i n g f r o m one f o r legal only difference difference Imprisonment adapted from Kaufman actions were". nine for conditions. conditions. of these items was: Dory's was t h e defendant i n the 3.13; compare a l l p a i r s o f means i n d i c a t e d that the ( £ <.05) of (F = analysis 73 TABLE XIII MEAN RATINGS OF WRONGNESS OF DEFENDANTS* ACTS AS A FUNCTION OF CONDITIONS AND SEX OF RATER Sex of Subject Condition Female (N) Male (N) Condition Mean (N) Imprisonment vs Release 4.00 16 4.36 14 4.17 30 Fine vs Imprisonment 4.75 16 3.93 14 4.37 30 Restitution vs Fine 3.75 16 4.07 14 3.90 30 Imprisonment with Compensation vs Fine 3.25 16 3.57 14 3.40 30 Sex o f Rater Means 3.94 64 3.98 56 TABLE XIV SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF RATINGS OF WRONGNESS OF DEFENDANT'S ACT SS df MS A (Conditions) B (Sex of Subject) A xB Within C e l l 15.76 0.06 7.46 589.51 3 1 3 112 5.25 0.06 2.49 5.25 TOTAL 612.79 119 SOURCE F 1.00 <• 1 < 1 R n.s. As Table XIV i n d i c a t e s , only one F value reached u n i t y and that one f e l l f a r short of s i g n i f i c a n c e . Finding that the perceived wrongness of the offence d i d not vary across conditions i s i n accord with expectations. The mean evaluation of the wrongness of the defendant's act was 3 . 9 6 . This value i s very close to the most negative r a t i n g p o s s i b l e . These data thus support the claim that the defendant's input was regarded as negative. Two items were included to assess the extent to which the defendant was held responsible f o r the offence. These items asked subjects to indicate,, by c i r c l i n g a number ranging from one f o r "agree completely" to nine f o r "disagree completely" how much they concurred with two statements. was: The f i r s t statement "Dory's acts were a r e s u l t of the circumstances i n which he found himself". The second item was: circumstances than a c r i m i n a l " . "Dory i s more a v i c t i m of For each subject, a t o t a l score was obtained by summing scores on the two items. scores ranged from two to eighteen. Thus, possible A higher score indicated that greater r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the offence was attributed to the defendant. Table XV shows mean evaluations of defendant's r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and the r e s u l t s of the four (conditions) by two (sex of r a t e r ) analysis of variance are summarized i n Table XVI. 75 TABLE XV MEAN RATINGS OF DEFENDANT'S RESPONSIBILITY AS A FUNCTION OF CONDITIONS AND SEX OF RATER Sex of Rater Condition Female (N) Male Imprisonment vs Release 12.62 16 14.07 14 13.30 30 Fine vs Imprisonment 11.50 16 13.00 14 12.20 30 R e s t i t u t i o n vs Fine 9.94 16 11.50 14 10.67 30 Imprisonment with Compensation vs Fine 12,62 16 11.29 14 12.00 30 Sex of Rater Means 11.67 64 12.46 56 •(H) Condition Mean (N) TABLE XVI SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF RATINGS OF DEFENDANT'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE OFFENCE SS df . MS F £ A (Conditions) B (Sex of Rater) A x B Within C e l l 105.02 18.75 45.30 2389.72 3 1 3 112 35.00 18.75 15.10 21.34 I.64 1 -cl n.s. TOTAL 2558.79 119 SOURCE As Table XVI indicates, neither of the main e f f e c t s nor the i n t e r a c t i o n e f f e c t was s i g n i f i c a n t . STUDY I I The summaries of simulated cases f o r t h i s study described a sentence imposed i n the case. Subjects i n each condition received a description of a sentence d i f f e r e n t from the one described f o r other conditions. These sentences represented reductions of inequity that varied i n actual equity and input positivity. Subjects indicated the extent of t h e i r s a t i s f a c t i o n or d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n with the sentence by breaking a ten centimeter l i n e l a b e l l e d "completely unsatisfactory" at one end and "completely s a t i s f a c t o r y " at the other. On t h i s item scores, measured i n millimeters, could range from zero to one hundred. indicated greater s a t i s f a c t i o n . Higher scores These data were obtained to t e s t the prediction that subjects' s a t i s f a c t i o n with the sentence would be greatest i n the R e s t i t u t i o n condition, next greatest i n the Imprisonment with Compensation condition, and l e a s t i n the Release condition. The ratings of s a t i s f a c t i o n with the sentence were subjected to a three (conditions) by two (sex of r a t e r ) analysis of variance. Mean s a t i s f a c t i o n ratings are shown i n Table XVII and the r e s u l t s of the analysis of variance are summarized i n Table XVIII. 77 TABLE XVTI MEAN RATINGS OF SATISFACTION WITH SENTENCES AS A FUNCTION OF CONDITIONS AND SEX OF RATER Sex of Rater Condition Female (N) Release 39.00 10 36.66 6 38.12 16 Restitution 76.90 10 63.83 6 72.00 16 Imprisonment with Compensation 64.30 10 36.83 6 54.00 16 Sex of Rater Means 60.06 30 45.77 18 Male (N) Condition Mean (N) TABLE XVIII SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF SUBJECTS* EXPRESSED SATISFACTION WITH SENTENCES SS df A (Conditions) B (Sex of Rater) A xB Within C e l l 9192.17 2296.93 1192.81 35302.01 2 1 2 42 TOTAL 47983.92 47 SOURCE MS 4596.08 2296.93 596.40 840.52 5.47 2.72 1 -.01 n.s. As Table XVIII i n d i c a t e s , the obtained F value f o r the main e f f e c t of conditions was s i g n i f i c a n t . Furthermore, the order of the condition means was exactly as predicted: greatest s a t i s f a c t i o n was reported i n the R e s t i t u t i o n condition and l e a s t s a t i s f a c t i o n was reported i n the Release condition. As expected, subjects i n the Imprisonment with Compensation condition reported l e s s s a t i s f a c t i o n with the solution than d i d subjects i n the R e s t i t u t i o n condition and more than d i d subjects i n the Release condition. A problem i n . t e s t i n g the significance of differences i n expressed s a t i s f a c t i o n among conditions i s that none of the e x i s t i n g tests takes i n t o account an a p r i o r i prediction o f the order of a l l means. The rationale f o r the predicted order was that s a t i s f a c t i o n with the solution would decrease with the input p o s i t i v i t y and equity of the solution. The Release condition restored equity f o r neither party while the Imprisonment with Compensation and the R e s t i t u t i o n conditions restored equity f o r both p a r t i e s . Accordingly, the inequitable Release condition should be rated as l e s s s a t i s f a c t o r y than the other two conditions. Of the two conditions, Imprisonment with Compensation and R e s t i t u t i o n , that restored equity f o r both p a r t i e s t o the offence, the l a t t e r was greater i n input p o s i t i v i t y . Therefore, t h i s sentence should be rated as more s a t i s f a c t o r y than Imprisonment with Compensation. In keeping with the rationale outlined above, two orthogonal comparisons, the maximum number possible, tested the significance of differences among conditions. The f i r s t compared expressed s a t i s f a c t i o n i n the Release condition with expressed s a t i s f a c t i o n i n the R e s t i t u t i o n and the Imprisonment with Compensation conditions. The second compared expressed s a t i s f a c t i o n i n the R e s t i t u t i o n condition with that i n the Imprisonment with Compensation condition. Since the order had been predicted i n advance, the l e v e l o f significance was evaluated by a one-tailed t e s t . The f i r s t comparison indicated that subjects i n the Release condition expressed s i g n i f i c a n t l y l e s s s a t i s f a c t i o n with the s o l u t i o n than did subjects i n the Imprisonment with Compensation and the R e s t i t u t i o n conditions ( t = 2.80; 42; £ < . 0 5 ) . d.f. = The second comparison was also s i g n i f i c a n t : subjects i n the R e s t i t u t i o n condition were more s a t i s f i e d with the r e s o l u t i o n of the inequity than were subjects i n the Imprisonment with Compensation condition ( t = 1.75; d.f. = 42; £ < . 0 5 ) . T h i r d parties were expected to restore psychological equity f o r over-rewarded defendants by enhancing inputs t o make them commensurate with outcomes. Ratings of the attractiveness and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the over-rewarded defendant i n the Release condition were compared with those of defendants i n the Imprisonment with Compensation and R e s t i t u t i o n conditions. Subjects i n each condition rated defendants* attractiveness on Lerner's 15-item bi-polar adjective scale. Table XIX summarizes mean ratings of the defendant's attractiveness and Table XX presents the r e s u l t s of the three (conditions) by two (sex of rater) by two ( r a t i n g order) analysis of variance of these data. 80 TABLE XIX MEAN RATINGS OF DEFENDANT'S ATTRACTIVENESS AS A FUNCTION OF CONDITIONS, RATING ORDER AND SEX OF RATER Plaintiff-Defendant Rating Order Defendant-Plaintiff Rating Order Female (N) Male Female (N) Male Release 75.60 5 81.33 3 89.80 5 72.00 3 80.43 16 Restitution 60.60 5 59.00 3 75.80 5 70.00 3 66.81 16 Imprisonment with Compensation 78.80 5 76.00 3 71.00 5 75.00 3 75.12 16 Sex x Rating Order Mean 71.66 15 72.11 9 78.86 15 72.33 9 Condition (N) (N) Condition ( ) Mean N TABLE XX SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF RATINGS OF DEFENDANT'S ATTRACTIVENESS SOURCE A (Conditions) B (Rating Order) C (Sex of Rater) A x B A x C B x C A x B x C Within C e l l TOTAL SS df 1569.12 252.08 104.27 716.30 84.93 136.94 442.12 7355.47 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 36 10601.25 47 MS 754.56 •252.08 104*27 358.15 42.46 136.94 221.07 204.32 F 3.69 . 1.23'. ^1 1.75 ^1 ^•1 1.08 £ <.05 n.s. n.s. n.s. 81 As Table XX i n d i c a t e s , the main e f f e c t of conditions was s i g n i f i c a n t (F m 3.69; d.f. = 2, 36; £ -<..05). d.f. = 36; £ <.15) The obtained t value ( t = 1.05; f o r the planned comparison between the Release and Imprisonment with Compensation conditions did not reach conventional l e v e l s of s i g n i f i c a n c e . predicted. The difference was, however, i n the d i r e c t i o n These findings w i l l be considered i n the next Chapter. Subjects also rated the moral wrongness of the defendant's act and the defendant's r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the offence. Analyses of these data revealed no differences as a function of e i t h e r conditions or sex of subject. Mean ratings of the moral wrongness of the act are presented i n Table XXI. As before, the range of possible ratings of the wrongness of the offence was from two to eighteen with lower ratings i n d i c a t i n g greater perceived wrongness. Table XXII summarizes the r e s u l t s of the three (conditions) by two (sex of rater) analysis of variance of these data. TABLE XXI MEAN RATINGS OF WRONGNESS OF DEFENDANT'S ACTS AS A FUNCTION OF CONDITIONS AND SEX OF RATER Sex of Rater Condition Female (N) Male (N) Condition Mean (N) Release 2.70 10 3.83 6 3.12 16 Restitution 3.70 10 3.17 6 3.50 16 Imprisonment with Compensation 3.50 10 5.00 6 4.06 16 Sex of Rater Means 3.30 30 4.00 18 82 TABLE XXII SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF RATINGS OF WRONGNESS OF DEFENDANT'S ACT SOURCE SS df MS F 2 MM A (Conditions) B (Sex of Rater) A xB Within C e l l 7.12 5.50 8.81 146.37 2 1 2 42 TOTAL 167.80 47 1.02 1.58 1.26 3.56 5.50 4.40 3.48 n.s. n.s. n.s. Table XXIII presents mean ratings of defendant's r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the offence. As i n Study I , ratings could range from two t o eighteen. The higher the r a t i n g , the greater the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the offence attributed t o the defendant. The r e s u l t s of the three (conditions) by two (sex o f rater) analysis of variance of these data are shown i n Table XXIV. TABLE XXIII MEAN RATINGS OF DEFENDANT'S RESPONSIBILITY AS A FUNCTION OF CONDITIONS AND SEX OF RATER Sex o f Rater Condition Female (N) Male (N) Release 14.00 10 13.00 6 13.62 16 Restitution 11.20 10 13.50 6 12.06 16 Imprisonment with Compensation 12.30 10 12.17 6 12.25 16 Sex of Rater Mean 12.50 30 12.89 18 Condition Mean (N) 83 TABLE X f f l SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF RATINGS OF DEFENDANT'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE OFFENCE SOURCE SS df MS F R A (Conditions) B (Sex of Rater) A x B Within C e l l 23.29 1.70 -2i:95 936.03 2 1 2 42 11.64 1.70 10.97 22.28 ^1 <1 n.s. n.s. n.s. TOTAL 982.97 47 Subjects rated the p l a i n t i f f ' s attractiveness on Lerner's 15-item bi-polar adjective scale. These data were c o l l e c t e d t o t e s t the prediction that subjects i n the Release condition, i n which the p l a i n t i f f was not compensated f o r losses, would evaluate the p l a i n t i f f l e s s favorably than would subjects i n the R e s t i t u t i o n and the Imprisonment with Compensation conditions. the p l a i n t i f f ' s Mean ratings of attractiveness are shown i n Table XXV. "The;results of the three (conditions) by two ( r a t i n g order) by two (sex of rater) analysis of variance of these data are summarized i n Table .XXVI. 84 TABLE XXV ' MEAN RATINGS OF PLAINTIFF'S ATTRACTIVENESS AS A FUNCTION OF CONDITIONS, RATING ORDER AND SEX OF SUBJECT Plaintiff-Defendant Rating Order De f e n d a n t - P l a i n t i f f Rating Order Female (N) Male Release 90.60 5 87.00 3 92.00 5 78.66 3 88.12 16 Restitution 85.40 5 78.00 3 84.20 5 82.33 3 83.06 16 Imprisonment with Compensation 85.60 5 86.66 3 83.20 5 76.33 3 83.31 16 Rating Order x Sex Mean 87.20 15 83.88 9 86.46 15 79.11 9 (N) Female (N) Male (N) Condition Mean (N) Condition TABLE XXVT SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF RATINGS OF PLAINTIFF'S ATTRACTIVENESS SOURCE SS df A (Conditions) B (Rating Order) C (Sex of Rater) A xB A xC B xC A x B xC Within C e l l 260.54 60.75 320.00 78.12 60.86 46.OO 130.52 3443.87 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 36 TOTAL 4400.67 47 MS 130.27 60.75 320.00 39.06 30.43 46.OO 65.26 95.66 F £ 1.36 1 3.34 < 1 <1 ^-1 n.s. n.s. 85 As i s shown by Table XXVI, evaluations of the p l a i n t i f f ' s attractiveness did not d i f f e r as a function of conditions, rating order or sex of rater. Data were also collected t o enable a t e s t of the prediction that p l a i n t i f f s denied compensation f o r losses would be blamed f o r the misfortune more than ones receiving compensation. Subjects indicated how much the p l a i n t i f f was to blame on a nine point s c a l e . Possible ratings ranged from one to nine with lower ratings i n d i c a t i n g l e s s e r blame. Analysis of the data revealed that the amount of blame attributed to p l a i n t i f f s d i d not vary s i g n i f i c a n t l y as a function of either conditions or sex of r a t e r . Table XXVII presents mean ratings of blame attributed t o p l a i n t i f f s and the summary of the r e s u l t s of a three (conditions) by two (sex of rater) analysis of variance of these data i s shown i n Table XXVIII, TABLE XXVII MEAN RATINGS OF BLAME ATTRIBUTED TO PLAINTIFFS AS A FUNCTION OF CONDITIONS AND SEX OF RATER Sex of Rater Condition Female (N) Male (N) Condition Mean (N) Release- . 4.20 10 4.83 6 4.44 16 Restitution 4.90 10 3.83 6 4.50 16 4.00 10 3.50 6 3.81 16 4.36 , 30 4.06 . 18 Imprisonment with Compensation Sex of Rater Mean TABLE XXVIII SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF BLAME ATTRIBUTED TO PLAINTIFFS SS df MS A (Conditions) B (Sex of Rater) A x B Within C e l l 4.62 1.09 5.62 357.67 2 1 2 42 2.31 1.09 2.81 8.52 TOTAL 369.00 47 SOURCE F ' ~< 1 -< 1 <:1 CHAPTER V DISCUSSION Results of the research support previous investigations that have demonstrated that t h i r d parties w i l l attempt to maintain or to restore equity f o r others. The present studies, however, extend previous research by considering the consequences f o r t h i r d party equity behavior of v a r i a t i o n s i n the actual equity and input p o s i t i v i t y of possible reductions of dyadic i n e q u i t y . Third party choice among possible resolutions of inequity i s related to two general determinants of t h i r d party equity behavior: preference f o r p o s i t i v e input. preference f o r actual equity and Evidence from both studies indicates that these p r i n c i p l e s not only permit p r e d i c t i o n of t h i r d party preferences among resolutions of inequity but also prediction of s a t i s f a c t i o n with s o l u t i o n s . This evidence supports the hypothesized importance of p r i n c i p l e s of preference f o r actual equity and f o r input p o s i t i v i t y as general determinants of t h i r d party equity behavior. These findings thus provide empirical support f o r the proposed extension of Adams' (1965) equity theory to apply t o t h i r d party equity behavior. The t h e o r e t i c a l and p r a c t i c a l implications of these findings w i l l be discussed a f t e r a review of the evidence supporting the importance of preferences f o r actual equity and input p o s i t i v i t y as determinants of t h i r d party response to reductions of inequity that e n t a i l r e a l changes i n the inputs or outcomes of the parties t o the inequity. 87 m The importance of actual equity i s demonstrated by the f i n d i n g that, i n a l l three conditions which varied the equity of alternative solutions, subjects selected the one that was greatest i n actual equity. In two of these three conditions, actual equity was p i t t e d against p o s i t i v i t y . That i s , the nature of the alternatives available to subjects was such that solutions that increased actual equity decreased input or outcome positivity. One of these two conditions, the Imprisonment vs Release condition, provided a t e s t of the r e l a t i v e importance of actual equity and outcome positivity. Subjects i n t h i s condition could e i t h e r imprison the harm-doer or release him. The f i r s t option represented, f o r the harm-doer, actual equity with a negative outcome while the second represented continued inequity with a p o s i t i v e outcome. Thus, i n t h i s p a r t i c u l a r t e s t , the Imprisonment alternative which represented actual equity also represented decreased outcome p o s i t i v i t y . greater Results of t h i s t e s t supported the prediction that the alternative that was greater i n actual equity would be the preferred one. This demonstration that outcome p o s i t i v i t y i s rejected i n favor of actual equity provides support f o r the argument, developed i n the Introduction, that preference f o r outcome p o s i t i v i t y does not extend to t h i r d p a r t i e s . Preference f o r positive outcomes i s generally acknowledged as a determinant of f i r s t party choice among methods of reducing inequity ( c f . , Adams, 1965; Pritchard, 1969; Walster, Berscheid, and Walster, 1973)* for The t h e o r e t i c a l grounds f o r s t a t i n g that preference outcome p o s i t i v i t y does not extend to observers have been discussed. Results from the Imprisonment vs Release condition provide empirical 89 data t o support t h i s contention. Previous i n v e s t i g a t i o n s of t h i r d party- preferences f o r a c t u a l o r psychological equity appear t o have c l e a r l y demonstrated only that t h i r d p a r t i e s prefer a c t u a l equity f o r underrewarded p a r t i e s : that i s , when achievement of equity increases positivity. The f i n d i n g that a c t u a l equity i s also preferred when i t i n v o l v e s a negative outcome f o r an over-rewarded party and thus decreases p o s i t i v i t y supports and extends previous research. Furthermore, the f i n d i n g substantiates the claim t h a t preference f o r a c t u a l e q u i t y , rather than p o s i t i v i t y , explains the award of compensation i n cases of under-reward. „ A d d i t i o n a l support f o r the importance of a c t u a l equity comes from the f i n d i n g t h a t , contrary t o p r e d i c t i o n s , a c t u a l equity i s more important than input p o s i t i v i t y as w e l l as outcome p o s i t i v i t y . Data i n d i c a t i n g the greater importance of a c t u a l equity come from the Imprisonment with Compensation vs Fine c o n d i t i o n which t e s t e d Hypothesis 3. This hypothesis s p e c i f i e d the r e l a t i v e importance of t h i r d party preferences f o r a c t u a l equity and f o r input p o s i t i v i t y . I t stated t h a t , when achievement of a c t u a l equity c o n f l i c t e d with achievement of input p o s i t i v i t y , t h i r d p a r t i e s would restore equity so t h a t p o s i t i v e input would be maximized. The s p e c i f i c ' p r e d i c t i o n derived from t h i s hypothesis was that subjects i n the Imprisonment with Compensation vs Fine c o n d i t i o n would s e l e c t the Fine a l t e r n a t i v e that increased p o s i t i v e input rather than the more equitable Imprisonment with Compensation one. R e s u l t s d i d not support the p r e d i c t i o n . Out of a t o t a l of 30 s u b j e c t s , 23 chose the non-predicted alternative. a l t e r n a t i v e was selected by only seven subjects. The predicted These data appear t o 90 indicate that the non-predicted alternative was the preferred one. Had the hypothesis been a non-directional one, the binomial t e s t would have shown the p r o b a b i l i t y of obtaining by chance the observed number of choices of the l e s s frequently selected alternative to be l e s s than .006.- With thebenefit of hindsight and an ad hoc s t a t i s t i c a l t e s t , the data suggest that actual equity i s preferred to input p o s i t i v i t y . The r e s u l t s , as a whole, c l e a r l y demonstrate the importance of a preference f o r actual equity as a determinant of t h i r d party choice of method of reducing dyadic inequity. Discussion of the general implications of t h i s f i n d i n g f o r t h i r d party response to perceived inequity must await consideration of two questions raised by the unexpected f i n d i n g that actual equity i s preferred to input p o s i t i v i t y . The f i r s t question i s whether or not an adequate model of t h i r d party equity behavior requires incorporation of an additional' p r i n c i p l e to specify preferences among resolutions of inequity that are equal i n actual equity but d i f f e r e n t i n input and outcome p o s i t i v i t y . The second question concerns the r e l a t i v e importance ,to' t h i r d parties of p o s i t i v e input and p o s i t i v e outcome. The f i r s t question i s answered by the behavior of subjects i n the Fine vs Imprisonment condition. This condition provided a t e s t of Hypothesis 2 which stated that, when available alternatives were equally equitable, t h i r d parties would prefer the alternative that was i n p o s i t i v e input. greater The prediction derived from t h i s hypothesis was subjects i n the Fine vs Imprisonment condition would prefer the Fine alternative, which was greatest i n p o s i t i v e input, to the equally equitable but l e s s p o s i t i v e Imprisonment one. The existence of a that 91 d i s t i n c t preference between these a l t e r n a t i v e s supports the argument t h a t , when equity i s h e l d constant, an a d d i t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e determines choice between a l t e r n a t i v e s . The Fine a l t e r n a t i v e represented, f o r the defendant, p o s i t i v e input and p o s i t i v e outcome compared t o the Imprisonment a l t e r n a t i v e . there are two possible explanations f o r subjects' preferences. Therefore, A preference f o r e i t h e r input p o s i t i v i t y or outcome p o s i t i v i t y could account for this finding. Support f o r the contention that t h i r d p a r t i e s are more concerned with p o s i t i v e input from others than with p o s i t i v e outcomes f o r others may be derived from subjects' expressed s a t i s f a c t i o n with s o l u t i o n s . I t was hypothesized that s u b j e c t s ' s a t i s f a c t i o n with the s o l u t i o n would vary as a f u n c t i o n of the extent t o which chosen a l t e r n a t i v e s s a t i s f i e d preferences f o r a c t u a l equity and f o r input p o s i t i v i t y and as a f u n c t i o n of the salience of c o n f l i c t s between preferences. O v e r a l l , data confirmed the p r e d i c t i o n that subjects i n the R e s t i t u t i o n vs Fine and the Fine vs Imprisonment conditions would express greater s a t i s f a c t i o n with the sentence they selected than would subjects i n the Imprisonment with Compensation vs Fine and the Imprisonment vs Release c o n d i t i o n s . The f i r s t two conditions permitted subjects t o s a t i s f y simultaneously preferences f o r a c t u a l equity and f o r input positivity. The l a s t two conditions permitted subjects t o s a t i s f y only one preference and, i n a d d i t i o n , involved a c o n f l i c t between preferences f o r a c t u a l e q u i t y and p o s i t i v i t y . The Imprisonment w i t h Compensation vs Fine c o n d i t i o n i n v o l v e d a c o n f l i c t between a c t u a l e q u i t y and input p o s i t i v i t y while the Imprisonment vs Release c o n d i t i o n presented a 92 c o n f l i c t between actual equity and outcome p o s i t i v i t y . The hypothesized comparative importance of preferences f o r positive input and positive outcome might have been tested by an additional comparison between s a t i s f a c t i o n expressed i n the l a t t e r two conditions. Any d i r e c t t e s t would, however, have been complicated by the s i g n i f i c a n t sex by conditions i n t e r a c t i o n which indicated that i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of these data required consideration of the pattern of differences within sex. Accordingly, the Newman-Keuls procedure was employed to compare a l l pairs of means within each sex. This analysis suggested that, among males, reported s a t i s f a c t i o n with resolutions of inequity i s r e l a t e d t o two f a c t o r s . F i r s t , the presence of a c o n f l i c t between equity and input p o s i t i v i t y appears to r e s u l t i n comparative d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n with the s o l u t i o n . Males expressed s i g n i f i c a n t l y l e s s s a t i s f a c t i o n i n the Imprisonment with Compensation vs Fine condition, which presented a c o n f l i c t between actual equity and input p o s i t i v i t y , than they did i n a l l other conditions. conditions that represented In both a c o n f l i c t between actual equity and p o s i t i v i t y , the Imprisonment with Compensation vs Fine and the Imprisonment vs Release conditions, males chose the equitable alternative and thus rejected p o s i t i v i t y i n favor of equity. When input p o s i t i v i t y was rejected, however, males expressed s i g n i f i c a n t l y l e s s s a t i s f a c t i o n with the solution than when outcome p o s i t i v i t y was rejected. This suggests that input p o s i t i v i t y i s more important than i s outcome p o s i t i v i t y . In the absence of c o n f l i c t between actual equity and input p o s i t i v i t y , males' s a t i s f a c t i o n with the r e s o l u t i o n of the s i t u a t i o n appears r e l a t e d only to the greater or l e s s e r equity of the chosen a l t e r n a t i v e . In both 93 the Imprisonment vs Release and the Fine vs Imprisonment c o n d i t i o n s , the chosen a l t e r n a t i v e restored a c t u a l equity only f o r the defendant. The d i f f e r e n c e between expressed s a t i s f a c t i o n i n these two conditions was not s i g n i f i c a n t . The preferred a l t e r n a t i v e i n the R e s t i t u t i o n vs Fine c o n d i t i o n restored a c t u a l equity f o r both defendant and p l a i n t i f f . Males expressed s i g n i f i c a n t l y greater s a t i s f a c t i o n i n t h i s c o n d i t i o n than i n the other three c o n d i t i o n s . O v e r a l l , then, males* reported s a t i s f a c t i o n with s o l u t i o n s supports the hypothesized importance of preferences f o r a c t u a l equity and f o r input p o s i t i v i t y . Examination of the pattern of d i f f e r e n c e s among conditions i n females* reported s a t i s f a c t i o n with s o l u t i o n s suggests t h a t , among females, expressed s a t i s f a c t i o n i s r e l a t e d t o d i f f e r e n t f a c t o r s than among males. O v e r a l l , females expressed s i g n i f i c a n t l y greater s a t i s f a c t i o n i n the R e s t i t u t i o n vs Fine and the Fine vs Imprisonment conditions than i n the Imprisonment with Compensation vs Fine and the Imprisonment vs 15 Release c o n d i t i o n s . The preferred a l t e r n a t i v e s i n the f i r s t two conditions restored equity by means of p o s i t i v e input from the defendant. These conditions d i d not present subjects with a c o n f l i c t between equity and p o s i t i v i t y . The preferred a l t e r n a t i v e s i n the l a s t two conditions d i d not achieve p o s i t i v e input from the defendant. of these conditions presented A d d i t i o n a l l y , both subjects with a c o n f l i c t between equity I t should be noted t h a t one of these comparisons, the comparison between the Fine vs Imprisonment and the Imprisonment with Compensation vs Fine c o n d i t i o n s , was not s i g n i f i c a n t at the . 0 5 l e v e l . The obtained d i f f e r e n c e between the means was 1 4 » 8 7 while the value required by the Newman-Keuls t e s t f o r s i g n i f i c a n c e a t the conventional l e v e l was 1 5 . 0 0 . 94 and p o s i t i v i t y . There are two possible interpretations of these data. The f i r s t i s that expressed s a t i s f a c t i o n among females i s related primarily t o the input p o s i t i v i t y of the preferred sentence. That i s , females may be r e l a t i v e l y d i s s a t i s f i e d with resolutions of inequity that do not achieve positive input from the defendant. Males, on the other hand, may experience d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n due to lack of p o s i t i v e input from the defendant only when circumstances make t h i s s a l i e n t . The second possible i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the data i s that, among females, expressed s a t i s f a c t i o n r e f l e c t s only the presence or absence of a c o n f l i c t between equity and p o s i t i v i t y per se. Thus, the greater s a t i s f a c t i o n expressed i n the R e s t i t u t i o n vs Fine and the Fine vs Imprisonment conditions than i n the Imprisonment with Compensation vs Fine and the Imprisonment vs Release conditions may be attributed to the absence of c o n f l i c t between equity and p o s i t i v i t y i n the former two conditions and the presence of c o n f l i c t i n the l a t t e r two conditions. Some data appear t o o f f e r i n d i r e c t support f o r the proposition that the f i r s t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , that s a t i s f a c t i o n among females i s related primarily t o the input p o s i t i v i t y of the preferred solution, i s the correct one. I f p o s i t i v i t y per se were more important to females than t o males, one would predict that females would be more i n c l i n e d to leniency than males. One possible demonstration of a preference f o r p o s i t i v i t y on the part of female subjects would be f o r females i n the Imprisonment vs Release condition to choose the Release option s i g n i f i c a n t l y more frequently than male subjects. Examination of data from t h i s condition indicates that no such s i g n i f i c a n t difference occurred: of 16 female subjects, four selected the Release option and, of 14 male subjects, two selected the Release option. A second demonstration of bias toward p o s i t i v i t y on the part of 95 females could consist of restoration of equity with l e s s severity than males. * That i s , females might be expected to impose l e s s severe terms of imprisonment than males. The short questionnaire asked subjects t o indicate the magnitude of sentences they would impose on defendants. These data were examined f o r sex differences i n severity of recommended sentence. The majority of subjects indicated the exact duration of the sentence they would impose. Three, however, gave responses that could not be included i n the analysis while other subjects indicated i n d e f i n i t e time spans of, f o r example, s i x to eight months. the mean was used i n the analysis. In the l a t t e r cases, The mean sentence recommended by females was 340.21 days i n j a i l while the mean sentence recommended by males was 204.19 days of imprisonment. The obtained t value f o r the significance of the difference between males' and females' recommended terms of imprisonment was 2 . 2 4 ( d . f . = 115; £ <^.05). The difference was, however, i n the d i r e c t i o n opposite to that predictable on the basis of a bias toward p o s i t i v i t y on the part of females. The mean amounts recommended as f i n e s by males and females were $ 2 , 6 5 0 . 7 8 and $2,912.25, respectively. The difference between these means was not s i g n i f i c a n t ( t = 0 . 6 0 4 ; d.f. = 114, n.s.). Examination of these data does not support the ad hoc proposition that outcome p o s i t i v i t y i s more important to females than to males. That i s , females i n the Imprisonment vs Release condition rejected outcome p o s i t i v i t y and selected the more equitable Imprisonment alternative equally as often as males. A d d i t i o n a l l y , females indicated that they would impose more, rather than l e s s , severe terms of imprisonment defendants. on Taken together, these data refute rather than support the 96 suggestion that outcome p o s i t i v i t y or p o s i t i v i t y per se i s more important to females than to males. Accordingly, the greater s a t i s f a c t i o n reported by females i n the R e s t i t u t i o n vs Fine and the Fine vs Imprisonment conditions may be attributed to the greater input p o s i t i v i t y of the preferred solutions i n these two conditions. Additional support f o r the argument that t h i r d p a r t i e s are more concerned with p o s i t i v e input from others than with positive outcomes f o r others may be drawn from examination of subjects' comments regarding t h e i r choice of sentences. Had subjects i n the Fine vs Imprisonment condition selected the Fine alternative because of a preference f o r outcome p o s i t i v i t y , t h e i r comments might be expected to indicate r e j e c t i o n of the negative outcomes associated with the unchosen alternative. Of the twenty-five subjects who chose the Fine a l t e r n a t i v e , only three j u s t i f i e d t h e i r choice by mentioning the negative outcomes (e.g., l o s s of a job) associated with the rejected a l t e r n a t i v e . Twelve subjects j u s t i f i e d t h e i r choice by mentioning the implications of the sentence f o r the future input of the defendant. That i s , they referred to the positive consequences of the Fine alternative f o r the future input of the defendant and/or explained that a term of imprisonment would provide the defendant with an opportunity to become more p r o f i c i e n t at crime. The remaining comments were ambiguous remarks that could not be interpreted as r e l a t e d to e i t h e r input or outcome p o s i t i v i t y . That input p o s i t i v i t y i s of greater importance to t h i r d parties than outcome p o s i t i v i t y may also be inferred, from the concern f o r the future input of defendants which was expressed by subjects i n the Imprisonment vs Release condition. Of the twenty-four subjects who 97 selected the Imprisonment alternative, fifteen justified their choice by reference to the defendant's future input. Subjects i n this condition referred primarily to the efficacy of the punishment i n inhibiting subsequent negative input from the defendant. An example of justification i n these terms i s : "The other i s really just a positive reinforcement to him, so i t s not a deterrent at a l l . Also i t wouldn't do anything to improve him (psychologically, etc.) so wouldn't improve the situation." Of the six subjects who selected the Release option, only two justified their decision i n terms of rejection of the negative outcomes associated with the Imprisonment alternative. One subject explained choice of the Release option by referring to the danger of exposing the "defendant's vulnerable personality to more criminal elements". On the whole, examination of subjects' written comments appears to support the premise that preference for positive input influences third party efforts to resolve dyadic inequity. This interpretation i s consistent with subjects' expressions of satisfaction with solutions which also appear to suggest that positive input i s of more importance to third parties than i s positive outcome. To summarize, obtained data illustrate the importance of preference for actual equity as a determinant of third party responses to dyadic inequities created by the negative input of a harm-doer. As has been discussed, i n a l l three conditions which varied the equity of alternative solutions, subjects selected the alternative that was greatest i n actual equity. Data from two of these conditions, the Imprisonment vs Release and the Imprisonment with Compensation vs Fine conditions, clearly demonstrate that actual equity i s more important than either input or 98 outcome positivity. Data from the Fine vs Imprisonment condition indicate that a positivity principle i s invoked to determine choice between equally equitable alternatives. Examination of subjects' expressed satisfaction with solutions and written comments explaining choice of sentence suggests that third parties are more concerned with input positivity than with outcome positivity. Thus, evidence from these sources provides some further support for Hypothesis 1 which stated that preference for positive input determines third party choice among alternatives that are equal i n actual equity. These findings come from the f i r s t study which examined responses to inequity caused by negative input from one member of a dyad when subjects possessed some power to intervene i n the situation. Subjects i n the second study did not possess any power to intervene to effect real changes i n the inputs or outcomes of the members of the dyad. Instead, they were presented with f a i t accompli decisions that varied the actual equity and input positivity of the resolutions of the inequity. Data from the second study indicate that differences i n satisfaction with solutions and distinct preferences among resolutions of inequity are not peculiar to those responsible for intervention but are shared by non-participant on-lookers as well. The analysis of variance of expressed satisfaction with the solution i n the second study indicated that the main effect of conditions was significant. predicted: Expressed satisfaction among conditions was ordered as greatest satisfaction was reported i n the Restitution condition and least satisfaction was reported i n the Release condition. As was expected, subjects i n the Imprisonment with Compensation condition 99 reported less satisfaction with the solution than did subjects i n the Restitution condition and more than did subjects i n the Release condition. These data indicate that the differences i n satisfaction with resolutions of inequity registered by observers of fait accompli decisions are similar to those reported by decision makers. This finding i s important because i t indicates that variations i n satisfaction are not confined to those who are, to some extent, responsible for the fates of the parties to the inequity. Additionally, the order of the means supports the a priori prediction that satisfaction among on-lookers i s related to the actual equity and to the input positivity of the solution. Additional support for the importance of actual equity and input positivity i n determining reactions to inequity may also be derived from the second study. The short questionnaire indicate which of three sentences: asked subjects to Release, Imprisonment with Compensation, and Restitution, they would have imposed i n the case. Subjects i n a l l three conditions indicated that the Restitution alternative would have been the preferred one. Fifteen subjects i n the Release condition and twelve subjects i n each of the Imprisonment with Compensation and the Restitution conditions indicated that they would have preferred to see the Restitution alternative imposed on the defendant. This finding strengthens the argument that, among on-lookers, satisfaction i s related to the degree to which resolutions of inequity satisfy preferences for actual equity and input positivity. The demonstrated importance of actual equity has implications for the comparative importance, to third parties, of reduction of perceived 100 inequity inputs b y means o f p s y c h o l o g i c a l , r a t h e r and o u t c o m e s . In h i s o r i g i n a l formulation (1965) p o i n t e d o u t t h a t changes i n i n p u t s means o f cognitive than r e a l , an a l t e r n a t i v e a n d o u t c o m e s was t o to alterations of equity theory, restore intervene s i t u a t i o n may r e s p o n d t o perceived justice. implications injustice. of by making i t s rather Particular attention such f i n d i n g s for of those findings perceived inequity has been p a i d t o the than restoration of of preference for of previous investigations out, one o f i s that appealing for actual equity. actual equity c o n s t r a i n e d from r e s t o r i n g remedy o f are c o n s i s t e n t w i t h r e p o r t e d victim principle results ( e . g . , L i n c o l n & L e v i n g e r , 1972) t h a t however, demonstrate t h a t preference f o r as t o victims. a c t u a l equity extends by use of actual equity are not T h e s u g g e s t i o n t h a t t h i r d p a r t i e s may r e s t o r e o n l y when t h e y c a n n o t r e s t o r e are In third as o v e r - r e w a r d e d ones available to psychological a c t u a l e q u i t y does not i m p l y t h a t such t e c h n i q u e s i s u n i m p o r t a n t . to suggest t h a t such t a c t i c s d e r o g a t i o n o f u n d e r - r e w a r d e d p a r t i e s o r enhancement o f o n l y when.means o f r e s t o r i n g have D a t a from the present r e s e a r c h , These r e s u l t s thus p a r t i e s may r e d u c e p e r c e i v e d i n e q u i t y of injustice i n derogation of the Data s u p p o r t i n g the actual equity. to the s u g g e s t e d t h a t v i c t i m s may be d e r o g a t e d o n l y when t h i r d p a r t i e s p a r t y use of by possible r e a l world responses to victims e x i s t e n c e s a l i e n t may r e s u l t harm-doers as w e l l to operations that transform perceived i n j u s t i c e A s L i n c o l n & L e v i n g e r (1972) p o i n t implications by and o u t c o m e s . h a v e shown t h a t o b s e r v e r s who a r e u n a b l e indulging i n cognitive real psychological equity changes i n e v a l u a t i o n s of i n p u t s remedy t h e Adams r e s t o r i n g equity through Previous investigations to of real life, them. equity third constraints 101 frequently l i m i t t h i r d party power t o restore actual equity. The criminal justice system, f o r example, generally provides only f o r punishment of harm-doers: available. compensation f o r victims i s frequently not In these cases, punishment of harm-doers does not provide victims with r e a l compensation f o r l o s s e s . In other cases, the l e g a l j u s t i c e system not only f a i l s to restore actual equity f o r v i c t i m or harm-doer but' creates an additional i n j u s t i c e as, f o r example, when a harm-doer i s released because of h i s association with i n f l u e n t i a l and corrupt p o l i t i c i a n s . These are examples of cases where constraints that l i m i t t h i r d party power t o reduce inequity by means of r e a l changes i n inputs or outcomes may leave observers with no alternative but to resort;.to psychological t a c t i c s i f perceived inequity i s t o be reduced. The present research examined the e f f e c t s of l i m i t a t i o n s on t h i r d party power t o restore actual equity on subsequent evaluations of the parties involved. The f i r s t study tested the hypothesis that, when intervention power was l i m i t e d to punishment of the harm-doer, subjects would restore psychological equity f o r victims by derogating them. Previous research (e.g., Lerner, 1970; L i n c o l n & Levinger, 1972; Jones & Aronson, 1973) indicates that t h i r d parties w i l l sometimes reduce inequity f o r uncompensated victims by devaluing inputs i n the d i r e c t i o n of outcomes. Such devaluation may take the form of e i t h e r derogating the victim's personal c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s or else a t t r i b u t i n g to the v i c t i m part of the blame f o r the misfortune. In the f i r s t study two conditions, the Imprisonment vs Release and the Fine vs Imprisonment conditions, d i d not provide compensation f o r p l a i n t i f f s * l o s s e s . The 102 preferred a l t e r n a t i v e , R e s t i t u t i o n , i n the R e s t i t u t i o n vs Fine c o n d i t i o n d i d provide r e a l compensation f o r l o s s e s . The p r e d i c t i o n was t h a t subjects i n the Imprisonment vs Release and the Fine vs Imprisonment conditions would rate p l a i n t i f f s as l e s s a t t r a c t i v e and more t o blame for the offence than would subjects i n the R e s t i t u t i o n vs Fine c o n d i t i o n . A n a l y s i s of r a t i n g s of p l a i n t i f f s ' a t t r a c t i v e n e s s and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the offence d i d not support the p r e d i c t i o n . Subjects' a t t r i b u t i o n s of blame t o v i c t i m s d i d not vary as a f u n c t i o n of c o n d i t i o n s . The only s i g n i f i c a n t F value associated with the a n a l y s i s of variance of r a t i n g s of v i c t i m s ' a t t r a c t i v e n e s s was f o r the main e f f e c t o f r a t i n g order: when subjects rated the p l a i n t i f f before they rated the defendant, they evaluated p l a i n t i f f s more favorably than when the p l a i n t i f f was rated a f t e r the defendant. Examination of the c e l l means shown i n Table V I I suggests that the s i g n i f i c a n t main e f f e c t f o r order i s a t t r i b u t a b l e t o higher r a t i n g s given by females t o f i r s t rated p l a i n t i f f s . Inspection of means f o r males i n d i f f e r e n t r a t i n g order conditions i n d i c a t e s t h a t , among males, evaluations of p l a i n t i f f s do not d i f f e r as a f u n c t i o n of r a t i n g order. Consideration of possible explanations f o r the order e f f e c t appearing among female subjects suggests that t h i s phenomenon may, i n p a r t , be due t o a b i l i t y of subjects t o intervene i n the s i t u a t i o n . Subjects i n a l l conditions i n the f i r s t study were empowered t o punish the harm-doer. Such i n t e r v e n t i o n may i n s p i r e i n i t i a l f e e l i n g s that j u s t i c e has triumphed: that i s , t h a t the e f f e c t of i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t o punish the harm-doer and v i n d i c a t e the v i c t i m . I n i t i a l positivity toward p l a i n t i f f s may, t h e r e f o r e , r e f l e c t subjects' f e e l i n g s t h a t , 103 by intervening to punish the criminal, they helped the v i c t i m . These feelings may be strongest immediately a f t e r intervention and, therefore, r e s u l t i n greater p o s i t i v i t y toward f i r s t rated p l a i n t i f f s . Some support f o r the suggestion that the order e f f e c t may r e s u l t from a f e e l i n g of having acted on the victim's behalf may be derived from noting that r a t i n g order d i d not affect evaluations of defendants. Also, ratings of p l a i n t i f f s i n the second study, where subjects d i d not intervene i n the s i t u a t i o n , did not d i f f e r as a function of r a t i n g order. A t t r i b u t i o n of the e f f e c t of rating order to subjects' f e e l i n g s of having aided the v i c t i m i s , of course, a post hoc explanation and must, therefore, be regarded with caution. Caution i s e s p e c i a l l y advisable i n view of the fact that the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n offered above does not explain why the e f f e c t appeared only among female subjects. Why greater p o s i t i v i t y toward f i r s t rated p l a i n t i f f s occurred only among female subjects i s a question that cannot be answered from the present data. O v e r a l l , then, data obtained i n the f i r s t study o f f e r l i t t l e support f o r the importance to t h i r d parties of derogation as a means of restoring psychological equity f o r uncompensated v i c t i m s . A possible explanation f o r the non-appearance of the predicted e f f e c t i s that, i n a l l conditions i n the f i r s t study, punishment of the harm-doer provided v i n d i c a t i o n f o r the v i c t i m . Evidence that, even i n the absence of v i n d i c a t i o n , derogation may be an elusive phenomenon comes from the second study which tested predictions concerning evaluations of p l a i n t i f f s and defendants when subjects were presented with f a i t accompli resolutions of the inequity and were powerless to intervene. 104 Two of the conditions i n t h i s study, the Imprisonment with Compensation condition and the R e s t i t u t i o n condition, restored actual equity f o r both p l a i n t i f f and defendant. The t h i r d condition, Release, restored actual equity f o r neither p l a i n t i f f nor defendant and thus deprived victims of both v i n d i c a t i o n and f i n a n c i a l compensation. The prediction was that subjects i n the Release condition would evaluate p l a i n t i f f s l e s s favorably and/or hold them more to blame f o r the misfortune than would subjects i n the Imprisonment with Compensation and the R e s t i t u t i o n conditions. Instead, These predictions were not supported. as inspection of means i n Table XXIII indicates, subjects tended to evaluate p l a i n t i f f s deprived of both v i n d i c a t i o n and f i n a n c i a l compensation more p o s i t i v e l y than p l a i n t i f f s who The received both. second study also tested predictions that defendants were released would be evaluated who s i g n i f i c a n t l y more favorably and/or held l e s s responsible f o r the offence"than defendants who were imprisoned. Although there were no s i g n i f i c a n t differences among conditions i n attributions of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the offence, analysis of variance of ratings of attractiveness indicated that the main e f f e c t of conditions was significant. O v e r a l l , defendants who favorably than defendants who restitution. were released were rated more were imprisoned or ordered to make However, only the difference between evaluations of the defendant i n the Release and the R e s t i t u t i o n conditions exceeded that required by the Newman-Keuls t e s t f o r the comparison to be at the £ -<.05 significant level. Enhancement of the personal attributes of the released defendant may be regarded as evidence of psychological reduction of perceived inequity. Some skepticism regarding acceptance of t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n appears j u s t i f i e d . The greater p o s i t i v i t y toward the defendant i n t h i s condition may have r e f l e c t e d subjects 1 assumptions that the Court's lenient treatment of the defendant was due to his positive personality c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s or personal worth. The l a t t e r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n would be consistent with present findings that f a i l u r e to restore actual equity did not e l i c i t other evidence of reduction of inequity by means of cognitive re-evaluation of inputs. Present data do demonstrate that t h i r d parties respond to incomplete reductions of inequity with expressions of d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n . This f i n d i n g i s consistent with Baker's (1973) report that the occurrence of inequity between others e l i c i t s expressions from t h i r d party observers. of anger The primary importance of t h i s f i n d i n g l i e s i n i t s implications f o r the subsequent behavior of the t h i r d party observer of inequity. As Adams (1965) pointed out: "Men do not simply become d i s s a t i s f i e d with conditions they perceive to be unjust. They usually do something about them (p. 2 7 6 ) . " Social psychologists appear t o have assumed that what t h i r d p a r t i e s do when adequate means of r e s t o r i n g actual equity are not available i s to restore psychological equity. Consideration of the possible o r i g i n s of motivation f o r t h i r d parties to maintain equity between others suggests that perhaps t h i s assumption should be questioned. Equity t h e o r i s t s account f o r the development and maintenance of systems of equity by pointing out that, i n order f o r a society t o function, i t i s necessary t o avoid continual c o n f l i c t over d i s t r i b u t i o n of desired resources. A d d i t i o n a l l y , they agree that 106 i n d i v i d u a l members of society l e a r n the system of equity i n the process of socialization. In general the appearance, among both f i r s t and t h i r d p a r t i e s , of behavior directed toward maintenance of actual equity i s regarded as conformity to i n t e r n a l i z e d standards of fairness. Baker (1974)» f o r example, proposed not only that i n d i v i d u a l s i n t e r n a l i z e obligations t o maintain j u s t i c e between others but also that there may be considerable urdfomiity i n s o c i a l i z a t i o n of t h i r d party equity behavior. He suggested that such i n d i v i d u a l difference variables as sex and r e l a t i v e reward status may not r e s u l t i n v a r i a t i o n i n t h i r d party j u s t i c e behavior because "society does not permit the s o c i a l i z a t i o n of systematic v a r i a t i o n i n the enforcement norm (Baker, 1974, p. 3 1 5 ) . " of the Lerner (l97l)»"too, notes that "most people have i n t e r n a l i z e d the o b l i g a t i o n t o defend the innocent and punish the wicked (p. 1 2 7 ) . " Adams (1965) discussion of the use of cognitive d i s t o r t i o n s as alternatives to restoration of actual equity was based on the assumption that experience of inequity was akin to the experience of dissonance. behavior. This seems a v a l i d assumption f o r f i r s t party equity In these cases the occurrence of inequity may cause d i s t r e s s for both p a r t i e s t o the exchange. The behavior of the parties c o n f l i c t s with i n t e r n a l i z e d standards of f a i r n e s s . (1973) note that an over-rewarded two reasons: Walster, Berscheid & Walster party may experience d i s t r e s s f o r perpetuation of the inequity constitutes a threat to self-esteem and arouses fear of r e t a l i a t i o n . A v i c t i m who cannot restore actual equity to a r e l a t i o n s h i p may be, as Walster, Berscheid & Walster point out,-forced to j u s t i f y the inequity i n order to 107 avoid the humiliation of acknowledging that he i s unable to enforce h i s demands f o r f a i r treatment. Among f i r s t parties, then, j u s t i f i c a t i o n of a continuing inequitymay be necessary because the cognition that the r e l a t i o n s h i p v i o l a t e s standards of fairness i s at odds with the cognition that nothing i s being done to remedy i t . In such cases, the perception that inequity exists c o n f l i c t s with the behavior and self-concept of the perceiver. These are circumstances that should c l e a r l y give r i s e to the kind of cognitive c o n f l i c t that necessitates reduction of dissonance by means of cognitive d i s t o r t i o n . Some attention has been directed to specifying the circumstances under which i n d i v i d u a l s responsible f o r an inequity are not motivated to deny or j u s t i f y i t . These investigations have considered the importance of v o l i t i o n and commitment as determinants of arousal of dissonance. Davis. & Jones ( i 9 6 0 ) examined the e f f e c t s of choice and a n t i c i p a t i o n of future i n t e r a c t i o n on a harm-doer's response to h i s victim. Subjects were either forced or else allowed to choose t o read an extremely negative evaluation to another person. Half of the subjects i n each of these conditions expected to meet the victim; the other h a l f d i d not. Results demonstrated the importance of v o l i t i o n i n determining whether or not harm-doers would derogate victims: subjects who chose to read the negative evaluation derogated victims while those who were forced to read i t did not. In a subsequent experiment, Glass (1964) .convinced subjects that they were, administering e l e c t r i c shocks to another. Again, half of the subjects were permitted to choose to administer shocks; the other h a l f were not. In addition, 108 Glass manipulated l e v e l of self-esteem by giving subjects e i t h e r p o s i t i v e or negative feedback concerning t h e i r personality. Glass found that harm-doers who possessed high self-esteem and perceived themselves as choosing to deliver shock, derogated the v i c t i m . These studies thus indicate that existence of inequity does not r e s u l t i n j u s t i f i c a t i o n through derogation of the v i c t i m unless the circumstances are such that harm-doers perceive themselves as responsible f o r the state of a f f a i r s . Walster, Berscheid & Walster point out that: " I f the harm-doer can perceive that i t was not h i s behavior but rather the action of someone else (e.g., the experimenter or fate) that caused the victim's suffering, then h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p with the v i c t i m becomes an equitable one (p. 157)." These considerations make obvious the existence of a problem i n explaining why a t h i r d party who perceives that an exchange between others i s inequitable should, i n the absence of personal r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r e i t h e r the creation or continuation of the inequity deny or j u s t i f y i t s existence. Lerner and his associates (e.g., Lerner & Simmons, 1966; Lerner & Matthews, 1967; Lerner, 1971) have proposed that j u s t i f i c a t i o n occurs because undeserved s u f f e r i n g threatens the observer's b e l i e f i n a "just world" — a world i n which people deserve what they get. Lerner & Simmons (1966) argue that perceived i n j u s t i c e i s denied because "most people cannot a f f o r d , f o r the sake of t h e i r own sanity, to believe i n a world governed by a schedule of random reinforcements Several recent investigations (e.g., Aderman, Brehm & Katz, Godfrey & Lowe, 1975; Stokols & Schopler, 1973) (p. 127)." 1973; have suggested that derogation of victims i s due to factors other than c o n f l i c t between perceived i n j u s t i c e and b e l i e f i n a just world. 109 Stokols & Schopler (1973) argued that denial of perceived injustice i s most l i k e l y to occur when the observer i s somehow implicated i n the creation or continuation of the inequity. These authors suggest that, i n the absence of such factors as t h i r d party commitment to the system creating the inequity, the response to the victim of undeserved misfortune i s apt to be sympathy rather than derogation. This p o s i t i o n seems consistent with the suggestion put f o r t h by dissonance researchers (e.g., Cooper & Goethals, 1974; Worchel.& Brand, 1972; Cooper, 1971) that some degree of personal r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i s a prerequisite f o r the arousal and reduction of cognitive dissonance. Third parties may not become motivated to j u s t i f y inequity i n the absence of some c o n f l i c t between the b e l i e f that inequity e x i s t s and t h e i r behavior i n the situation. Perhaps, then, another important difference between f i r s t and t h i r d party equity behavior i s that t h i r d parties who cannot restore actual equity are, unlike f i r s t p a r t i e s , not p a r t i c u l a r l y motivated to deny or to j u s t i f y perceived inequity. Preference f o r actual equity may be a determinant of t h i r d party equity behavior even i n cases where t h i r d parties do not possess means of restoring equity by r e a l changes i n the inputs or outcomes of the members of the dyad. Preference f o r actual equity may be expressed by protesting the i n j u s t i c e and, f o r exampledemanding that the s i t u a t i o n be remedied. This suggests that perception of inequity between others may e l i c i t j u s t i f i c a t i o n of the inequity only when circumstances are such that the t h i r d party i s implicated i n creation of the inequity or committed to i t s continuation. Thus, j u s t i f i c a t i o n may occur only when 110 the observer perceives himself as having some power to remedy the s i t u a t i o n and i s , f o r one reason or another, unwilling to exercise h i s power. In many cases, f o r a t h i r d party to achieve justice between others requires that he incur costs. When the s i t u a t i o n i s such that a t h i r d party's motivation to maximize h i s own p o s i t i v e outcomes c o n f l i c t s with h i s i n t e r n a l i z e d o b l i g a t i o n to enforce the norms, unwillingness to incur the costs of intervention may make i t necessary f o r the i n d i v i d u a l to j u s t i f y the i n e q u i t y . Thus, s p e c i f i c a t i o n of the conditions under which t h i r d party d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n with perceived i n j u s t i c e may lead to j u s t i f i c a t i o n of the inequity may perceiver. require consideration of the costs of equity f o r the The difference between a c t i v i s t s and opponents of s o c i a l reform may be not i n t h e i r perceptions of power to a f f e c t the fates of others, as L i n c o l n & Levinger (1972) suggest, but i n t h e i r willingness to incur the costs of achieving equity between others. The present studies would imply that preference f o r actual equity and input p o s i t i v i t y may circumstances determine t h i r d party equity behavior i n where the costs of achieving equity are not excessive. D i s s a t i s f a c t i o n r e s u l t i n g from inadequate reductions of inequity may, under these circumstances, be expressed i n ways consistent with preference f o r actual equity. That i s , a t h i r d party may maintain v e r i d i c a l perceptions of the inputs and outcomes of the parties to the inequity and attribute r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the maintenance of inequity to, f o r example, the inadequacies of the criminal j u s t i c e system. Such a p o s s i b i l i t y may be tested by further research. A second, and important, question f o r future research i s Ill to specify the circumstances under which perceived inequity w i l l arouse i n the observer the kind of cognitive c o n f l i c t that denial or j u s t i f i c a t i o n of the inequity. motivates The present analysis suggests that t h i s may occur when reduction of inequity threatens the observer's own positive outcomes. I t may be noted, however, that even i n these circumstances, t h i r d parties may be able to reduce dissonance denying or j u s t i f y i n g the i n e q u i t y . without Possible techniques include, f o r example, denying power to intervene or a t t r i b u t i n g r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r intervention t o someone e l s e . A possible explanation f o r a backlash e f f e c t , where pointing t o the existence of inequity e l i c i t s derogation from some quarters, i s that the p u b l i c i t y may cause bystanders to perceive that they possess some power t o remedy the s i t u a t i o n . Unwillingness to incur the costs of restoring equity, rather than perception of inequity, may explain the ensuing j u s t i f i c a t i o n of inequity. Consideration of s i m i l a r i t i e s and differences between f i r s t and t h i r d party equity behavior suggests that Adams' (1965) theory may be extended to apply to t h i r d party equity behavior. Data from the present research support the propositions that preferences f o r actual equity and input p o s i t i v i t y determine t h i r d party choice among reductions of dyadic inequity and s a t i s f a c t i o n with these reductions. That t h i r d parties e x h i b i t differences i n s a t i s f a c t i o n with solutions r a i s e s the p o t e n t i a l l y important question of the consequences of d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n for subsequent behavior. Consideration of the dissonance based o r i g i n of Adams' proposal that cognitive a l t e r a t i o n s i n evaluation of 112 inputs and outcomes could serve as an a l t e r n a t i v e t o r e a l changes suggests t h a t these may occur only when t h i r d p a r t i e s are i m p l i c a t e d i n the continuation of the i n e q u i t y . Thus, an important question f o r future research i s t o s p e c i f y the conditions under which t h i r d party d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n w i l l be expressed i n ways consistent with preference f o r a c t u a l equity as opposed t o d e n i a l or j u s t i f i c a t i o n of the i n e q u i t y . This may r e q u i r e consideration of the c o s t , t o t h i r d p a r t i e s , of achieving equity f o r others. CHAPTER VI IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH The research tested predictions concerning t h i r d partypreferences f o r resolutions of inequity by using accounts of criminal offences. hypothetical An important question f o r further research i s to t e s t the g e n e r a l i z a b i l i t y of findings regarding the importance t o t h i r d p a r t i e s of preferences f o r actual equity and for input p o s i t i v i t y . A category of variables relevant t o questions concerning the g e n e r a l i z a b i l i t y of these findings may be i d e n t i f i e d as perceiver v a r i a b l e s . These include such i n d i v i d u a l difference variables as authoritarianism (e.g., M i t c h e l l & Byrne, 1973) and internal-external locus of control (e.g., Phares & Wilson, 1972) that may a f f e c t t h i r d party perception of the gravity of the offence or influence tendencies t o attribute r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r 'i actions. Also included i n the category of perceiver variables may be class differences (Nemeth & Sosis, 1973) which may'partly determine responses to offenders. Other perceiver variables appear to include those which increase s i t u a t i o n a l or personal relevance (Shaver, 1970) or lead t o greater i d e n t i f i c a t i o n with one of the actors (Chaiken & Darley, 1973). Some studies (e.g., M i t c h e l l & Byrne, 1973; Nemeth & Sosis, 1973) have indicated that, among jurors, such variables as 113 114 authoritarianism and class i n t e r a c t with factors that may influence the degree to which the juror perceives himself as s i m i l a r t o a defendant t o determine the juror's response to the defendant. Mitchell & Byrne (1973) report that high authoritarians exhibit leniency toward defendants i n the presence of attitude s i m i l a r i t y and severity i n the presence of attitude d i s s i m i l a r i t y . Nemeth &!Sosis (1973) note that jurors who are from a white working class background not only appear to be more punitive i n general but also e s p e c i a l l y punitive toward a defendant from a s i m i l a r background. A question of d i r e c t relevance to the present research i s whether or not these variables operate only to influence severity of punishment within a p a r t i c u l a r resolution of inequity or whether they also extend to determine preferences among alternative resolutions of inequity. The present research used students from psychology classes at the University of B r i t i s h Columbia. I f one assumes that such a sample i s apt t o contain a disproportionate number of i n d i v i d u a l s who are from a middle or upper-middle class background and thus may be more l i b e r a l than the general population, i t i s possible t o argue that d i f f e r e n t preferences among resolutions of inequity may be exhibited by other samples. The salience of t h i s question i s indicated by the previously mentioned research by Nemeth & Sosis (1973). They investigated the e f f e c t of the background of the juror on responses t o the defendant i n a negligent homicide case. Background of the juror was manipulated by using samples from the University of Chicago and from a junior college i n Chicago. According t o Nemeth & Sosis (1973), the University of Chicago sample came from middle and upper-middle class backgrounds while the junior college sample was composed of individuals from a working class background, As has already been mentioned, jurors from working class backgrounds meted out more severe sentences than did middle and upper-middle class jurors. Of primary importance to the present discussion i s the report by Nemeth & Sosis (1973) that: Part of the reason for less punitiveness by the university sample i s that a good proportion of these individuals gave the defendant 'zero years' in prison for his crime but added comments such as 'prisons only harden criminals and some alternative form of punishment would be more, appropriate and more rehabilitative•' In other words, these subjects did not render the defendant guiltless for his crime; they simply preferred other modes of dealing with the transgression than sentencing the defendant to a number of years i n prxson (p. 228). This would imply that, among samples with a l i b e r a l orientation, one might find rejection of punishments that restore equity for criminals by means of such measures as prison terms and acceptance of alternatives that reduce inequity by means of improved input from criminals. Findings from the present study, which used samples of students from the University of British Columbia, indicated that alternatives that involved lowered outcomes for criminals were rejected only when another equitable alternative permitted subjects to achieve both equity and input positivity. When the alternative to a prison term was an inequitable and positive outcome for the criminal (imprisonment vs Release) or when the alternative to a prison sentence required acceptance of a less equitable solution (imprisonment with Compensation vs Fine), subjects selected the alternative that involved sentencing the defendant to a term of imprisonment. The study carried out by Nemeth & Sosis (1973) and the present research d i f f e r e d i n several respects. study involved a defendant who, F i r s t l y , the Nemeth & Sosis while d r i v i n g under the influence of alcohol, had h i t and k i l l e d a pedestrian. The present research used accounts of property crimes which constituted deliberate v i o l a t i o n s of the law but did not involve physical harm to anyone. Secondly, the Nemeth & Sosis study used American students while the research was c a r r i e d out with Canadian undergraduates. present Thus, apparent differences i n willingness to restore equity by means that involve lowered outcomes f o r offenders may be attributed e i t h e r to differences i n the stimulus s i t u a t i o n or to differences i n the l i b e r a l i t y of subjects. I f one assumes that a sample of u n i v e r s i t y students represents a f a i r l y l i b e r a l sample of the Canadian population, then the primary question i s whether or not other members of Canadian society would also prefer to restore equity by means that involve positive input from offenders. Some data i n d i c a t i n g that preference for restoration of equity by means of p o s i t i v e input from offenders i s not exclusive to u n i v e r s i t y students comes from the F i n a l Report of the Surrey Task Force on Juvenile Delinquency. This group c i r c u l a t e d a questionnaire i n l o c a l newspapers i n Surrey. Readers were asked to complete and return the questionnaire which s o l i c i t e d t h e i r on juvenile delinquency i n Surrey. One of the questions opinions asked respondents to indicate which form of punishment they would prefer to impose f o r such offences. Results were that r e s t i t u t i o n and f i n e s were selected by approximately of the respondents. data come from a f a i r l y small (N = 167) subjects, they do provide Although the sample of s e l f - s e l e c t e d some evidence that preferences f o r resolutions 117 of inequity by means of positive input from offenders may be found among other samples. Another question concerning the generalizability of findings does not deal with class differences but with differences that may be attributed to the personal history of third parties. Chaiken and Darley (1973) report that, when the perpetrator and victim of an accident are clearly separated, identification with one or the other of the parties to the incident affects attributions of responsibility and assignment of blame for the accident. This finding implies that experience of victimization or expectation of victimization may be a factor i n determining preferences for resolutions of inequity by means of real changes i n inputs or outcomes. Vidmar (1973) tested the hypothesis that fear of crime would be positively related to support for the death penalty and found only equivocal support for it. Vidmar reported that respondents who perceived the crime rate as rising and who reported experience of victimization also supported the death penalty. However, a significant correlation between direct assessments of threat and expectation of personal victimization and support for the death penalty was not found. One possible explanation for Vidmar's equivocal findings may be that the majority of respondents may have feared the consequences of such common crimes as theft and vandalism rather than of crimes, such as murder, which may be punishable by death. Thus, a stronger correlation between .expectation of victimization and attitude toward punishments may have appeared i f the survey had dealt with penalties for common crimes. The rationale behind the expectation that individuals who have 118 experienced v i c t i m i z a t i o n may exhibit d i f f e r e n t preferences f o r resolution of inequity appears to be related to consideration of the victim's desire f o r v i n d i c a t i o n . As Schafer ( i 9 6 0 ) points out, emphasis on r e h a b i l i t a t i o n may be perceived as depriving victims of even the compensation of v i n d i c a t i o n . Such compensation may reside primarily i n the knowledge that society has recognized and undertaken t o r i g h t the wrong. the inequity For a v i c t i m t o experience the s a t i s f a c t i o n of v i n d i c a t i o n may not require that the offender be punished by means of lowered outcomes. Punishments that require positive input from the offender may also provide the victim with the s a t i s f a c t i o n of v i n d i c a t i o n . A d d i t i o n a l l y , i f one considers that an i n d i v i d u a l who i d e n t i f i e s strongly with the victim may be motivated by concerns common to f i r s t p a r t i e s , then preference f o r positive outcomes should be a factor i n determining preferences among resolutions of inequity. That i s , a solution such as r e s t i t u t i o n that not only provides the victim with v i n d i c a t i o n but also provides r e a l compensation f o r losses should be a preferred one. Further research i n v e s t i g a t i n g the e f f e c t of perceiver variables on t h i r d party responses to inequity between others may have both t h e o r e t i c a l and p r a c t i c a l implications. For example, i f subsequent research were to demonstrate that class of the t h i r d party influenced equity decisions, these findings could be relevant not only to p r a c t i c a l concerns but might also provide i n s i g h t i n t o the e f f e c t s of s o c i a l i z a t i o n on t h i r d party equity behavior. Such research could, therefore, contribute not only t o analysis of the e f f e c t of t h i r d party behavior on the maintenance of equity i n society but also to further refinement and application of equity theory. REFERENCES Adams, J . S. Inequity i n s o c i a l exchange. 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Retributive and u t i l i t a r i a n motives and other correlates of Canadian attitudes toward the death penalty. Canadian Psychologist. 1974, 1 £ ( 4 ) , 337 - 3 5 6 . Walster, E., Berscheid, E., and Walster, G. W. New directions i n equity research. Journal of Personality and S o c i a l Psychology. 1973, 2£ ( 2 ) , 151 - 176. Walster, G. W. The Walster e t . a l . (1973) equity formula: A Correction. Representative research i n s o c i a l psychology. 1975, 0 , 65 Winer, B. J . S t a t i s t i c a l p r i n c i p l e s i n experimental design. McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1962. New York: Worchel, S., and Brand, J . Role of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and violated expectancy i n the arousal of dissonance. Journal of Personality and S o c i a l Psychology. 1972, 22 ( l ) , 87 - 9 7 . Zuckerman, M. A comment on the equity formula by Walster, Berscheid and Walster ( 1 9 7 3 ) . Representative research i n s o c i a l psychology. 1975, 6 , 63 - 6 4 . APPENDIX A STIMULUS MATERIALS FOR STUDY I ACCOUNT OF FRAUD Summary of the Case; The defendant, James Dory, i s charged with obtaining funds by f a l s e pretences. The amount of money i n question i s $2,500, The prosecution claims that Dory posed as a Bank o f f i c i a l and persuaded Mrs, Dorothy Campbell t o entrust him with funds which he then used f o r h i s own purposes. Testimony of the P l a i n t i f f , Mrs, Campbell: Mrs, Dorothy Campbell i s a 67-year-old widow. Since her husband's death i n 1969 she has resided alone i n a small apartment which she owns. P r i o r t o the fraud, Mrs, Campbell had about $3,500, saved f o r emergencies. Now, apart from her home, her assets consist of approximately a thousand d o l l a r s remaining i n her savings account. For her day-to-day l i v i n g expenses, she r e l i e s on her o l d age pension. The l o s t money represents a s i g n i f i c a n t portion of the money she had deposited f o r emergencies, Mrs, Campbell t e s t i f i e d that the defendant f i r s t contacted her on January 4, 1974 when he telephoned and claimed t o be a Bank 123 124 investment counsellor. Mrs. Campbell stated that Dory t o l d her the Bank was o f f e r i n g s p e c i a l investment opportunities to selected customers. Dory requested and obtained Mrs. Campbell's permission to v i s i t her to explain the investment program. Mrs. Campbell stated that the defendant followed up h i s telephone c a l l by appearing at her home and presenting her with an i d e n t i f i c a t i o n card showing he was a Bank employee. She further t e s t i f i e d that he persuaded her that her funds would be better invested i n the Bank plan than l e f t i n her savings account. Mrs. Campbell stated that she gave Dory a cheque for $ 2 , 5 0 0 . and received i n return a Bank Plan c e r t i f i c a t e and a r e c e i p t . (These documents were introduced as E x h i b i t s A, B and c). Mrs. Campbell stated that, when she next v i s i t e d the Bank, she discovered that she had been the v i c t i m of a fraud. Testimony of Police O f f i c e r t The detective who worked on the case t e s t i f i e d that, when the fraud was reported, a police p o r t r a i t of Dory was drawn from the descriptions given by Mrs. Campbell and the bank t e l l e r who had cashed the cheque. He explained that a p o l i c e o f f i c e r who had seen the p o r t r a i t l a t e r met Dory at a party and recognized him. The detective t e s t i f i e d that when he received t h i s report, he investigated f u r t h e r . The detective t e s t i f i e d that Dory was placed i n a police line-up and p o s i t i v e l y i d e n t i f i e d by both the t e l l e r and by Mrs. Campbell. Also offered i n evidence was a business card (Exhibit D) which i d e n t i f i e s the holder .as a Bank employee. The detective t e s t i f i e d that t h i s card was found i n Dory's possession. I t contains Dory's photograph and. a f i c t i t i o u s name. 125 Testimony of the Defendant. James Dory: The defendant, 49-year-old James Dory, has been employed f o r 14 years as a salesman by a l o c a l car dealer. Dory i s s t i l l working i n t h i s capacity. At the time of the t r i a l , He i s married with no children l i v i n g at home. Dory pleaded g u i l t y to the charge and agreed that Mrs. Campbell accurately described the technique he used t o persuade her t o entrust him with the funds. He stated, however, that he planned only to borrow the money f o r investment purposes and that he planned to repay Mrs. Campbell out of h i s p r o f i t s . Dory t e s t i f i e d that an acquaintance had offered him a chance to invest i n a promising venture. Dory stated he was wondering how to raise the necessary funds when he heard the fraud described on an open l i n e radio programme and decided to use i t to acquire funds. Dory further t e s t i f i e d that the money was l o s t when the business venture f a i l e d . Dory also t e s t i f i e d that he had never before committed, been charged with, or convicted of, a criminal offence. Testimony of Dory's Employer: The owner of the car dealership where Dory i s employed t e s t i f i e d that during the fourteen years the defendant has worked f o r him, he has been a good worker and that there have been no customer complaints about Dory. V e r d i c t: The defendant i s found g u i l t y of the charge. 126 ACCOUNT OF THEFT Summary of the Case; The defendant, James Dory, i s charged with t h e f t . The prosecution charges that, on the evening of A p r i l 8, 1974, Dory entered an apartment occupied by Mr. and Mrs. Peter Roth and removed the following items: a portable color t e l e v i s i o n set, a stereo set, a diamond engagement r i n g , a camera and four a r t i c l e s of clothing belonging to Mr. Roth. At the time of the t r i a l the t e l e v i s i o n set, the stereo set and the diamond r i n g , together valued at about $ 2 , 5 0 0 . have not been recovered. The prosecution alleges that Dory, the former occupant of the suite now rented by the Roths, kept a spare set of keys to the suite and used them to gain entrance. Testimony of the P l a i n t i f f . Peter Roth: Twenty-six year old Peter Roth i s employed as a salesman by a l o c a l department store. Roth t e s t i f i e d that he had l i v e d i n the suite f o r less than a month before the t h e f t occurred. He stated that he moved i n t o the suite on A p r i l 1 s t and that on A p r i l 7 t h he and h i s wife l e f t f o r Calgary to spend a week v i s i t i n g r e l a t i v e s . Roth stated that when he returned from Calgary on A p r i l 1 4 , he discovered that the apartment had been entered and .that the goods l i s t e d above had been stolen. Roth stated that the l o s t property had not been insured against theft. Four a r t i c l e s of clothing and a camera were produced i n court and i d e n t i f i e d by Mr. Roth as the ones he had reported stolen. 127 Testimony of Police O f f i c e r ; The police o f f i c e r assigned to investigate the theft t e s t i f i e d that he had questioned other tenants i n the b u i l d i n g . He stated that one of the tenants contacted, Mrs. Campbell, reported that she had seen James Dory, the former occupant of the Roth apartment, leave the suite carrying a portable t e l e v i s i o n set and some c l o t h i n g . The o f f i c e r t e s t i f i e d that Dory's new residence had been searched and that four items of clothing which matched the description of those reported stolen were found i n Dory's possession. The o f f i c e r also t e s t i f i e d that the s e r i a l number of a camera also found i n Dory's possession was the same as the s e r i a l number of the one reported stolen. The o f f i c e r further t e s t i f i e d that the a r t i c l e s produced i n court and i d e n t i f i e d by Roth were the ones he found i n Dory's possession. Testimony of Mrs. Campbell, witness; Mrs. Campbell t e s t i f i e d that she l i v e s i n an apartment i n the same b u i l d i n g as the one i n which the Roth apartment i s located. t e s t i f i e d that, on A p r i l 8 , 1974, She she observed the defendant, James Dory, leave the Roth apartment carrying a portable t e l e v i s i o n set and some clothing. She explained that, at the time, she had not r e a l i z e d that the suite had changed hands and thus had not reported the i n c i d e n t . Testimony of the Defendant. James Dory: The defendant, James Dory, i s a 27-year-old construction worker. He has worked f o r the same firm f o r f i v e years. At the time of the t r i a l , he i s s t i l l working i n t h i s capacity. Dory pleaded g u i l t y to the charge. He t e s t i f i e d that he had moved from the apartment now occupied by the Roths l e s s than a month before the t h e f t occurred. Dory explained that he discovered he s t i l l had a spare set of keys to h i s former apartment and drove to the apartment b u i l d i n g to return the keys to the manager. Dory stated that when he found the manager not at home, he decided to give the keys to the new occupant of the s u i t e . The new occupant d i d not answer the door and Dory used the keys to l e t himself i n . Dory stated that, a f t e r he entered the suite, he r e a l i z e d that he had an opportunity to commit a perfect crime. Dory reported that he selected several items and proceeded to carry them to h i s c a r . He was carrying out the portable t e l e v i s i o n set and some clothing when he encountered Mrs. Campbell. Dory t e s t i f i e d that he. became a f r a i d that he had been recognized and decided t o dispose of the goods as quickly as possible. Dory stated that he went to a bar and there sold the color t e l e v i s i o n , the stereo set and the diamond r i n g . Dory t e s t i f i e d that the i d e n t i t i e s and whereabouts of the purchasers of these a r t i c l e s were unknown to him. Dory t e s t i f i e d that he had never before committed, been charged with, or convicted of, a criminal offence. Testimony of Dory's Employer: The owner of the firm where Dory i s employed t e s t i f i e d that, during the f i v e years Dory has been employed by the firm, he has been a hard and conscientious worker. Verdict: The defendant i s found g u i l t y of the charge. 129 ACCOUNT OF VANDALISM Summary of the Case; The defendant, James Dory, i s charged with vandalism. The prosecution charges that, on the afternoon of A p r i l 8 , 1974? Dory broke i n t o a house owned by Thomas Finn and severely damaged the premises. Testimony of the P l a i n t i f f . Thomas Finn: The owner of the house, Thomas Finn, i s a 32-year-old mechanic. Finn t e s t i f i e d that he had purchased a p a r t i a l l y b u i l t house and, on evenings and weekends, worked to complete i t so that he could move h i s family i n t o i t . Finn stated that the house had been almost completed when the damage occurred. Finn t e s t i f i e d that the damages to the house included smashed f i x t u r e s i n the bathroom, paint poured over carpeting and the p l a s t e r on several walls smashed with a hammer. Finn t e s t i f i e d that i t had been necessary to replace the bathroom f i x t u r e s and the carpeting and that the cost of these items plus materials to repair other damages had been $2,501.32. Finn added that these losses were not covered by insurance. Testimony of Mrs. Campbell, witness: Mrs. Campbell t e s t i f i e d that she resides i n the house across the street from the Finn property. question she was She t e s t i f i e d that on the afternoon i n i n her front yard when she observed a strange car p u l l up to the Finn house. Mrs. Campbell stated that she saw the defendant emerge from the car and walk to the rear of the Finn house. Mrs. Campbell t e s t i f i e d that she then heard what sounded l i k e glass breaking, 130 became suspicious and noted the l i c e n c e number, make and model of the defendant's c a r . Mrs. Campbell stated that she continued to watch f o r several minutes and then approached the Finn house with intentions of questioning the defendant about h i s presence on the premises. Mrs. Campbell t e s t i f i e d that as she approached the house, she was able to see the defendant c l e a r l y through the dining room window and observed that he was pouring the contents of a can of paint on the f l o o r . Campbell said she returned to her home and telephoned p o l i c e . Mrs. Before they a r r i v e d , she saw the defendant emerge from the house, enter h i s car and drive away. Testimony of Police O f f i c e r t The police o f f i c e r who arrested Dory t e s t i f i e d that he was on h i s way to the Finn house when he observed the defendant's car a few blocks away from the property. The o f f i c e r stated that he stopped the car to question the defendant and noticed that the defendant's slacks and shoes were spattered with wet p a i n t . When he returned with the defendant to the Finn house, the officer-observed that the c o l o r of the paint was the same as that poured on the carpeting. The o f f i c e r further t e s t i f i e d that he found the glass i n the rear door had been smashed. Testimony of the Defendant. James Dory: The defendant, 25—year-old James Dory, has been employed as a truck-driver f o r the past three years. He i s s t i l l working i n t h i s capacity at the time of the t r i a l . Dory pleaded g u i l t y to the charge and admitted that he d i d the damage described. He t e s t i f i e d that he had been on vacation when the 131 offence occurred. Dory stated that, on the day i n question, he had been s u f f e r i n g the a f t e r - e f f e c t s of drinking heavily the evening. previous Dory stated that he was d r i v i n g through the sub-division when he became extremely t h i r s t y and stopped at the Finn house t o ask f o r water. When he r e a l i z e d the house was vacant, he smashed the glass pane i n the rear door and l e t himself i n . Dory stated that he t r i e d to obtain water f i r s t from the kitchen and then from the bathroom. Dory said that he found the water was not turned on, became enraged, seized a hammer and smashed the bathroom f i x t u r e s . Dory stated that he then used the hammer t o pound holes i n walls u n t i l he stumbled over the paint which he poured on the carpeting. Once he had emptied the paint cans, he l e f t the premises. Dory t e s t i f i e d that he had never before committed, been charged with, or convicted of, a criminal offence. Testimony of Dory's Employer; The owner of the f i r m where Dory i s employed as a truck d r i v e r t e s t i f i e d that, during the three years Doryhas been i n his employ, he has been a hard and conscientious worker. Verdict; The defendant i s found g u i l t y of the charge. APPENDIX B REPORT OF PILOT STUDIES OVERVIEW Two p i l o t studies were conducted t o examine various aspects of the stimulus materials and dependent measures proposed f o r use i n the research. Findings related t o the adequacy of stimulus materials w i l l be covered f i r s t and then consideration w i l l be given to s e l e c t i o n of dependent measures, STIMULUS MATERIALS Attractiveness of Criminals and Victims Within Each Account B r i e f descriptions of criminals and victims were abstracted from simulated case t r a n s c r i p t s and presented t o subjects i n the second p i l o t study. Subjects rated the stimulus person on the set of 15 bi-polar adjectives developed by Lerner ( 1 9 6 5 ) , These are presented i n semantic d i f f e r e n t i a l form and a stimulus person's score on each item may range from one (negative evaluation) t o nine (positive evaluation). Ratings on these items may be summed t o y i e l d an o v e r a l l index of a t t r a c t i v e n e s s . The range of possible scores i s , therefore, from 15 t o 1 3 5 , A higher score i n d i c a t e s a more positive rating. These ratings were made p r i o r t o subjects' being t o l d of the stimulus persons' involvements i n criminal offences. 132 Each subject 133 rated only one of the criminal-victim p a i r s . pair. Mine subjects rated each The purpose of t h i s procedure was to determine i f any of the criminal-victim pairs were perceived attractiveness. as d i f f e r i n g greatly i n Mean attractiveness ratings are presented i n Table XXIX. TABLE XXIX MEAN RATINGS OF ATTRACTIVENESS OF CRIMINAL-VICTIM PAIRS Stimulus Persons Account Criminal Victim Fraud 92.88 99.22 Theft 94.44 105.11 Vandalism 92.66 95.77 84.88 86.22 Theft (revised) 0 The difference between rated attractiveness of the criminal and v i c t i m involved i n the theft was found to be s i g n i f i c a n t ( t = 4.18; d.f. = 8; 2 • . 0 5 ) . < This difference appeared due to the f a v o r a b i l i t y with which subjects rated the v i c t i m : h i s a i l i n g mother-in-law. a bookkeeper who had v i s i t e d The description of the v i c t i m was revised so that he became a department store salesman who had v i s i t e d r e l a t i v e s . The revised descriptions of the criminal-victim p a i r were rated by nine additional subjects and obtained means are shown i n Table XXEX, above. 134 Perceived G u i l t of the.Defendant; Subjects i n the second p i l o t study were presented with a simulated case t r a n s c r i p t , asked t o read i t over and then indicate whether or not the evidence proved the defendant's g u i l t . Subjects were also asked t o i n d i c a t e , on a scale ranging from zero t o one hundred percent, how c e r t a i n they were that t h e i r decisions were c o r r e c t . The purpose of t h i s task was t o ensure that the material presented i n each case established the g u i l t of the defendant and t o thereby avoid possible complications due t o asking experimental subjects to sentence defendants not perceived as g u i l t y . Nine subjects rated each of the accounts of fraud and vandalism and eighteen subjects rated the account of t h e f t . A l l subjects found the defendant g u i l t y . The mean ratings f o r certainty were as follows: "theft — - 8 6 . 1 3 percent, fraud — 8 9 . 5 0 percent, and vandalism — 73 percent. The data appear to j u s t i f y the conclusion that the stimulus materials contain s u f f i c i e n t incrimination f o r experimental purposes. C l a r i t y and Adequacy of Stimulus Materials: The t h i r t y - s i x subjects i n the second p i l o t study were given a d e s c r i p t i o n of s i x alternative sentences and asked t o indicate the order i n which they would prefer to impose the sentences on the offender i n the case. The primary purpose of t h i s task was to provide an opportunity t o discover i f the descriptions of the sentences were adequate and i f the alternatives seemed sensible t o subjects. Once subjects had read over the alternative sentences, they were asked t o complete a post-experimental questionnaire. The questionnaire asked subjects to indicate the nature of the crime, the value of the property involved and t o specify the length of the term of imprisonment they would impose on the defendant and the amount of money they would assess as fine or r e s t i t u t i o n f o r the offence. The questionnaire also included several items to assess the adequacy of the stimulus materials. On the whole, subjects appeared to have l i t t l e d i f f i c u l t y r e c a l l i n g the nature of the crime and the value o f the property involved. Three subjects indicated that the sentences were not c l e a r : one suggested that they be put i n point form and the other two expressed doubt as to whether or not the v i c t i m would be compensated when the sentence stated only probation or imprisonment. These data suggest that consideration should, perhaps, be given t o specifying when compensation i s not available i n experimental conditions where doubt might a r i s e . DEPENDENT MEASURES Subjects' preferences f o r various restorations of equity are t o be assessed by asking them t o choose one of a pair of sentencing alternatives. Subjects w i l l also be asked t o specify the magnitude of the penalties they would impose and t o indicate t h e i r s a t i s f a c t i o n with t h e i r r e s o l u t i o n of the s i t u a t i o n . As has already been mentioned, p i l o t subjects were exposed t o descriptions of the s i x alternative sentences. P i l o t subjects were also asked t o specify the length of the term of imprisonment they would impose on the defendant and to indicate the amounts they would assess as fine and r e s t i t u t i o n . Experience with p i l o t subjects indicates that these measures are suitable f o r 136 experimental purposes. The attractiveness of crirninals and victims w i l l be ^assessed by means of the scale developed by Lerner (1965). of f i f t e e n b i - p o l a r adjective p a i r s . This scale consists These are presented i n semantic d i f f e r e n t i a l form and a stimulus person's score on each item may range from one f o r a negative evaluation to nine f o r a positive evaluation. Ratings on these items may be summed to y i e l d an o v e r a l l index of attractiveness. 15 t o 135» The range of possible scores i s , therefore, from A higher score indicates a more positive r a t i n g . R e l i a b i l i t y of the scale has been estimated by means of the procedure outlined below. obtained. Samples of ratings of stimulus persons were F i f t e e n sets of fourteen item' l i s t s were prepared by eliminating each of the bi-ptilar adjective pairs once from the l i s t . A table of random numbers was used to assign each of the fourteen adjective pairs i n each of the f i f t e e n l i s t s a number from one to fourteen. The l i s t s were then s p l i t by assigning the adjective pairs randomly assigned numbers from one t o seven, i n c l u s i v e , to the f i r s t h a l f and the remaining pairs to the second h a l f . The product-moment c o r r e l a t i o n between scores on the f i r s t and second halves of each l i s t was-computed and corrected by the Spearman-^Brown formula (Ferguson, 1966, p. 378). Values of Zr- corresponding to the r e s u l t i n g c o e f f i c i e n t s were then obtained from t a b l e s i n Ferguson (1966). Then the mean Zr and the r corresponding to i t were found. The above procedures were used to estimate the r e l i a b i l i t y of Lerner's scale with data from three samples. from an experimenter by B o u t i l i e r (1975). The f i r s t sample i s Subjects i n t h i s study rated the average u n i v e r s i t y student. I t should be noted that the f i f t e e n items were not presented to these subjects i n semantic d i f f e r e n t i a l form but that subjects made t h e i r ratings by c i r c l i n g a number from one to nine. The procedures outlined above yielded an o v e r a l l r e l i a b i l i t y c o e f f i c i a n t of .800 f o r t h i s sample. Table XXX shows the i n d i v i d u a l c o e f f i c i e n t s , corrected c o e f f i c i e n t s and transformations. TABLE XXX SPLIT-HALF CORRELATIONS, CORRECTIONS AND 2R TRANSFORMATIONS OF RATINGS OF AVERAGE UNIVERSITY STUDENTS ON LERNER'S SCALE Split-Half Correlation Corrected Correlation 1 0.686 0.814 1.142 2 0.725 0.840 1.221 3 0.517 0.682 4 0.657 0.793 1.071 5 0.740 O.85O I.256 6 0.637 0.778 1.045 7 0.603 0.752 .973 8 0.510 0.675 .820 9 0.743 O.852 1.256 10 0.594 0.745 .962 11 0.862 0.926 1.623 12 0.532 0.695 .858 13 0.718 O.836 1.204 14 0.690 0.816 1.142 15 0.626 O.769 1.020 List Zr .829 138 The second and third samples are from the second pilot study for the present research. . Each of 36 pilot subjects rated the two stimulus persons comprising one of the criminal-victim pairs. Subjects* ratings of "criminals" were treated as one sample and ratings of "victims" were treated as another sample. Random numbers were assigned to the adjective pairs and the fifteen l i s t s of fourteen items were split into halves as previously outlined. The l i s t s were split i n identical fashion for these two samples. Tables..XXXI and XXXII show the individual coefficients, corrected coefficients and Zr transformations for the two samples. The obtained overall r e l i a b i l i t y coefficient for the sample of ratings of criminals was O.858 and the obtained coefficient for the sample of ratings of "victims" was 0.800. TABLE XXXI SPLIT-HALF CORRELATIONS, CORRECTIONS AND Zr TRANSFORMATIONS OF RATINGS OF "CRIMINALS" ON LERNER'S SCALE List Split-Half Correlation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 0.719 0.756 0.793 0.735 0.718 0.890 O.652 0.742 0.739 0.789 0.735 0.756 0.802 0.741 0.771 Corrected Correlation O.836 0.861 0.884 0.847 O.836 0.942 0.789 0.852 0.849 0.882 0.847 0.861 0.890 0.851 0.870 Zr 1.204 1.293 1.398 1.238 1.204 1.738 1.058 1.256 1.256 1.376 1.238 1.293 1.422 1.256 1.333 139 TABLE XXXII SPLIT-HALF CORRELATIONS, CORRECTIONS AND Zr TRANSFORMATIONS OF RATINGS OF "VICTIMS" ON LERNER»S SCALE List Split-Half Correlation Corrected Correlation Zr 1 0.637 0.778 1.033 2 0.694 0.819 1.157 3 0.627 0.770 1.020 4 0.695 0.820 1.157 5 0.759 0.863 1.293 6 0.699 0.823 1.020 7 0.539 0.700 .867 8 0.584 0.737 .940 9 0.744 0.853 1.256 10 0.783 0.878 1.354 11 0.691 0.817 1.142 12 0.649 0.787 1.058 13 0.687 0.814 1.142 14 0.627 0.770 1.020 15 O.613 0.760 .996 To determine i f assignment of numbers to the i n d i v i d u a l items i n the l i s t s was, indeed, random; Kendall's C o e f f i c i e n t of Concordance was used to t e s t f o r r e l a t i o n s h i p among ranks assigned to i n d i v i d u a l items. The obtained value of W ( O . l l l ) f o r the f i r s t sample was transformed (Siegal, 1956) t o a chi-square value. (23.31, The obtained chi-square value d.f. = 14) was found to be only s l i g h t l y less than that 140 required f o r s i g n i f i c a n c e at the £ --C.05 l e v e l (23.68). The obtained value of W f o r the second and t h i r d samples was found t o be 0.058 which was transformed to a chi-square value of 12.18, d . f . = 14, jo -<.50. These data suggest that the r e l i a b i l i t y of Lerner's scale i s s u f f i c i e n t f o r present purposes. The f i r s t p i l o t study included a task devised t o provide some evidence f o r the construct and concurrent v a l i d i t y of the proposed dependent measures of perceived gravity of the offence and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the v i c t i m and criminal f o r the offence. Two s t o r i e s were prepared. In the Severe version the offence involved an armed robbery during which an unsuspecting v i c t i m was attacked and wounded. In the M i l d version, the offender was unarmed and the v i c t i m was wounded as a r e s u l t of h i s deliberate and unnecessary attack on the c r i m i n a l . Each of the twenty-six subjects was randomly assigned e i t h e r the Mild or Severe version and asked to rate various aspects of the s i t u a t i o n on the items shown i n Table XXXIII. Items 1 and 2 were included t o assess subjects' perceptions of the gravity of the offence. In order to determine i f obtained differences i n ratings of the "wrongness" of the offence i n the Mild and Severe conditions were s i g n i f i c a n t , t_-tests were used. The obtained t values and associated p r o b a b i l i t i e s are shown i n Table XXXIII. As reference to Table XXXIII shows, the means d i f f e r e d i n the d i r e c t i o n predicted and the differences were s i g n i f i c a n t ( t = 3.21, d.f. = 24, £ ^ . 0 0 5 ; t = 3.93, d.f. = 24, £ -£.005). 141 TABLE XXXIII DEPENDENT MEASURES, MEAN RATINGS, t VALUES AND ASSOCIATED PROBABILITIES Mild Condition Severe Condition X X t d.f. £ mm* Item 1: As a question not of law but of morality, Dory's actions were: as wrong as possible ( l ) — very r i g h t (9) 3.46 1.69 3.21 24 ^.05 Item 2: Quite apart from l e g a l aspects, Dory: d i d not do anything wrong ( l ) -— d i d very wrong (9) 6.30 8.54 3.93 24 <.05 Item 3: How much do you think the v i c t i m i s to blame f o r what happened? 4.30 3.15 1.24 24 ^.15 Item 4: How much do you agree or disagree with the statement that: "Dory's acts were a r e s u l t of the circumstances i n which he found himself"? Agree completely ( l ) — disagree completely (9) 4.08 5.92 1.94 24 ^.05 Item 5: How much do you agree or disagree with the statement that; "Dory i s more a v i c t i m of c i r cumstances than a criminal"? Agree completely ( l ) — disagree completely (9) 3.69 6.85 3.95 24 <.05 Item 6; How much do you agree or disagree with the statement that: "Even under d i f f e r e n t circumstances, Dory would eventually have become a criminal"? Agree completely ( l ) — disagree completely (9) 6.61 6.08 0.62 24 <.30 142 Item 3 was included to assess the degree of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y Jones and Aronson (1973) used t h i s item assigned to the v i c t i m . and obtained expected and s i g n i f i c a n t differences i n r e s p o n s i b i l i t y attributed to the v i c t i m . In the present instance the victim i n the Severe condition was the unsuspecting target of an attack with a knife while the v i c t i m i n the Mild condition armed himself with a knife and forced a confrontation with an intruder. The mean r a t i n g f o r blame attributable to the aggressive 4»30 and the mean r a t i n g victim was f o r blame attributable to the unsuspecting v i c t i m was 3.15» As i s shown i n Table XXXIII, the difference between means i s not s i g n i f i c a n t at the JD -<.05 level. Means did, however, d i f f e r i n the predicted d i r e c t i o n . Important differences between the Jones and Aronson study and the present one may be that subjects i n the former study were r a t i n g blame attributable to a t t r a c t i v e and unattractive victims f o r being the targets of an attack. The present study dealt with differences i n r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r being wounded i n the course of an unexpected or deliberate confrontation with an intruder. may Subjects have been reluctant to blame the v i c t i m f o r attempting to defend his property. Also, the Jones and Aronson manipulation of the attractiveness of the v i c t i m may have made i t more d i f f i c u l t to derogate the v i c t i m on t h i s dimension. The present study presented no b a r r i e r s to derogation of the victim as an alternative to a t t r i b u t i o n of blame. Since t h i s item was used successfully i n the Jones and Aronson study and since obtained differences i n the present study were i n the predicted d i r e c t i o n , i t i s proposed to include i t . Items 4» 5 and 6 were included as measures of perceived 143 r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the harm-doer f o r the offence. The obtained means and associated t values are shown i n Table XXXIII. As Table XXXIII i n d i c a t e s , ratings i n the Mild and Severe conditions on Items 4 and 5 d i f f e r e d s i g n i f i c a n t l y i n the predicted d i r e c t i o n . As w i l l also be seen from Table XXXIII, Item 6 d i d not discriminate between the two conditions. Accordingly, i t i s proposed that only Items 4 and 5 be used i n the research. Once subjects had read and rated e i t h e r the M i l d or Severe version of the offence, they were presented with both versions of the story and asked to i n d i c a t e , by c i r c l i n g a number from one to nine, the extent of t h e i r agreement with the statements that the offenders wounded the victims while acting i n self-defence and also to evaluate the comparative wrongness of the offences. Time l i m i t a t i o n s were such that only 21 subjects were presented with t h i s task. A t - t e s t f o r correlated observations was used to t e s t the significance of the difference between mean ratings of self-defence f o r the Mild (X = 3 . 9 0 ) and Severe (X =» 8 . 0 9 ) offenders. The obtained t value ( t = 8 . 3 8 , d.f. = 20) was s i g n i f i c a n t at the £ ^ . 0 0 5 l e v e l . Of the 21 subjects evaluating the comparative wrongness of the offences, four rated the Severe offence as less wrong than the Mild one and three rated the Mild and Severe offences as equally wrong. Using the binomial t e s t and considering ratings of l e s s or equally wrong as misses, the p r o b a b i l i t y of seven misses with N = 21 i s £ (Siegal, 1 9 5 ° ) . ^.095' Taken together, these r e s u l t s may be interpreted as i n d i c a t i n g that subjects perceived the d i f f e r e n t versions of the s t o r i e s as expected. APPENDIX C DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA Basic Rights and P r i v i l e g e s of Volunteer Subjects Any person who volunteers to participate i n experiments conducted by f u l l or part-time members of the f a c u l t y of the Department of Psychology at the University of B r i t i s h Columbia, by t h e i r employees, or by the graduate and undergraduate students working under the d i r e c t i o n of f a c u l t y members of the above named Department, i s e n t i t l e d t o the following r i g h t s and p r i v i l e g e s . 1. The subject may terminate and withdraw from the experiment at any time without being accountable f o r the reasons f o r such an action, 2. The subject s h a l l be informed, p r i o r t o the beginning of an experiment, of the maximum length of time the experiment might take and of the general nature of the experiments^-- 3. The subject s h a l l be informed, p r i o r t o the beginning of an experiment, of the nature and function of any mechanical and e l e c t r i c a l equipment which i s t o be used i n the experiment. In cases where the subject i s i n d i r e c t contact with such equipment, he s h a l l be informed of the safety measures designed t o protect him from physical i n j u r y , regardless of how s l i g h t the p o s s i b i l i t y of such i n j u r y i s , 4. The subject s h a l l be informed, p r i o r to the beginning of an experiment, of the aspects of h i s behavior that are to be observed and recorded and how t h i s i s t o be done. 5. Any behavioral record that i s obtained during the course of the experiment i s c o n f i d e n t i a l . Any behavioral records that are made public through either journal papers or books, public addresses, research colldquia, or classroom presentations f o r teaching purposes, s h a l l be anonymous, 6. The subject s h a l l be offered, at the end of an experiment, a complete explanation of the purpose of the experiment, e i t h e r o r a l l y by the experimenter or, at the option of the experimenter, i n w r i t i n g . The subject s h a l l also have the opportunity to ask questions pertaining t o the experiment and s h a l l be e n t i t l e d t o have these questions answered, 7. The subject has the r i g h t t o inform.the Chairman of the Departmental Committee of Research with Human Subjects of any perceived v i o l a t i o n s of, or questions about, the aforementioned r i g h t s and p r i v i l e g e s . 144 APPENDIX D SENTENCING INSTRUCTIONS FOR STUDY I Provisions of the Criminal Code of Canada permit the Courts considerable l a t i t u d e i n dealing with cases such as the one you have just seen, I am interested i n f i n d i n g out some things about how sentencing decisions are made. What I"d l i k e you to do i s consider that the two sentences outlined on the next page are the ones available i n t h i s case. Please read c a r e f u l l y the descriptions of these two possible sentences. Suppose that you are to sentence the defendant i n t h i s case. Consider the two sentences l i s t e d on the next page and decide which sentence you would prefer to impose on the offender i n the case "bie.|ore'you. Indicate which sentence you would prefer t o impose by placing an (X) i n the box beside that sentence. Take as'much time as you want i n thinking about the case before i n d i c a t i n g your choice. Please remember that I am interested i n your personal decision and not i n how you think others might react or how you f e e l you should r e a c t . 145 o APPENDIX E SETS OF SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES IN STUDY I Fine vs Imprisonment Condition 1. A term of probation on condition that the offender pay a f i n e , maintain good behavior and report t o a probation o f f i c e r . Assume that no maximum or minimum amount payable as a f i n e i s s p e c i f i e d . Assume that the offender may be fined any amount you f e e l i s appropriate and that terms of payment w i l l be worked out i n consultation with a probation o f f i c e r , 2. A term of imprisonment. Assume that no maximum or rninimum term i s s p e c i f i e d and that the offender may be sentenced t o imprisonment f o r any length of: time you f e e l i s appropriate. PLEfiSE COMPLETE THIS P/9C-E BEFORE 146 "/CU TllKN TO THE N^KT ON€ 147 R e s t i t u t i o n vs Fine Condition " I 1. ' A term of probation on condition that the offender pay a sum of money t o the r i g h t f u l owner or owners of the l o s t or damaged property, maintain good behavior and report to a probation o f f i c e r . Assume that no maximum or minimum amount payable as r e s t i t u t i o n i s specified. The offender may be required to pay any amount you f e e l i s appropriate t o the r i g h t f u l owner of the l o s t or damaged property. Assume that terms of payment w i l l be worked out i n consultation with a probation o f f i c e r . "\ 2. 1 A term of probation on condition that the offender pay a f i n e , maintain good behavior and report to a probation o f f i c e r . Assume that no maximum or minimum amount payable as a fine i s s p e c i f i e d . Assume that the offender may be f i n e d any amount you f e e l i s appropriate and that terms of payment w i l l be worked out i n consultation with a probation o f f i c e r . Assume that t h i s alternative does not allow compensation to the r i g h t f u l owner or owners of the l o s t or damaged property. £ COMPLETE JHI5 PfiGE BeraRE y o u T UKN TO THE AfEXT ONG- 148 Imprisonment vs Release Condition j ~ | !• A release with a reprimand. 2. A term of imprisonment. Assume that no maximum or rninimum term i s specified and that the offender may be sentenced to imprisonment f o r any length of time you f e e l i s appropriate. Pt-efiS£ <LonPU=T£ THIS pfiC-CL BEFoflSL y 0U/ TURN TO THE. NEAT ONtE. 149 Imprisonment with Compensation vs Fine Condition " I 1. A term of imprisonment for the offender and compensation, I paid by the Province, for the rightful owner or owners of the lost or damaged property. Assume that no maximum or minimum term of imprisonment i s specified and that the offender may be sentenced to imprisonment for any length of time you feel i s appropriate. * Assume also that you may order, that the rightful owner or owners of the lost or damaged property receive compensation from the Province for losses. Assume that no maximum or minimum amount payable as compensation i s specified and that you may award as compensation any amount you feel i s appropriate. 1 2. A term of probation on condition that the offender pay a fine, maintain good behavior and report to a probation officer. Assume that no maximum or minimum amount payable as a fine i s specified. Assume that the offender may be fined any amount you feel i s appropriate and that terms of payment w i l l be worked out i n consultation with a probation officer. Assume that this alternative does not allow compensation to the rightful owner or owners of the lost or damaged property. PLEPlSE COMPLeTSZ THIS PfiC-E BEFORE YOU TURN TO THE NEXT Of/£. APPENDIX F SATISFACTION SCALE FOR STUDY I Consider the nature of the offence i n the case presented to you and the sentencing decision you made. you f i n d t h i s resolution of the s i t u a t i o n . Decide how s a t i s f a c t o r y Then indicate your feelings by drawing a v e r t i c a l l i n e through the scale at the point that best represents how s a t i s f a c t o r y or unsatisfactory you f i n d the resolution of the s i t u a t i o n . completely completely unsatisfactory satisfactory 150 APPENDIX G MATERIALS FOR RATING PARTICIPANTS * ATTRACTIVENESS You are asked t o rate the p a r t i c i p a n t s i n t h i s case on a s e t of descriptive scales. Here i s how you are t o use these s c a l e s . I f you f e e l that the person i s very c l o s e l y r e l a t e d t o one end of the s c a l e , you should mark as f o l l o w s : X: fair : : : : : : : unfair or fair : : : : : : : X : unfair I f you f e e l that the person i s quite c l o s e l y r e l a t e d t o one or the other end o f the scale (but not extremely), you should place your mark as f o l l o w s : strong : X : strong : : : : : : : : : : : : : X : weak or weak I f you f e e l that the person i s moderately c l o s e l y r e l a t e d t o one or the other end of the s c a l e , you should place your mark as f o l l o w s : : good : X : : : : : : bad or : good : : : : : X : : bad I f you f e e l that the person i s only s l i g h t l y r e l a t e d t o one side as opposed t o the other side (but i s not r e a l l y n e u t r a l ) , then you should mark as f o l l o w s : : active : : X : : : : : passive or : active : : : : X : : : passive The d i r e c t i o n toward which you mark, o f course, depends upon which of the two ends of the scale seems most c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the person you are judging. I f you consider the person t o be n e u t r a l on the scale — both sides of the scale equally associated with the person —- you should place your mark i n the middle space. : safe : : : X : : : : dangerous IMPORTANT: 1 . Place your marks i n the middle of the spaces. 2. Be sure you check every scale —- do not omit any. 3. Never put more than one mark on a s i n g l e space. 151 152 You are being asked to rate two i n d i v i d u a l s — and the p l a i n t i f f . the defendant Please do these ratings i n the order presented and complete your ratings of the f i r s t i n d i v i d u a l before going on t o the next. Before you do the ratings please note, i n the spaces provided at the top of each page, the name of the i n d i v i d u a l you are r a t i n g . You may r e f e r back to the summary of the case i f you wish. Form as strong an impression as you can of the person you are r a t i n g . Then mark the scales to show your impression of that i n d i v i d u a l . Work at f a i r l y high speed through the scales. or puzzle over i n d i v i d u a l items. Do not worry I t i s your f i r s t impressions, your immediate feelings about the person that we want. not be careless because we want your true impressions. Please do 153 PLEASE COMPLETE. THIS Pf)GE BEFORE The name of the p l a i n t i f f i s : TURN To THE NEXT ONE ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ intelligent : , likeable : ; bossy : : : ; « immature : ; ; : •: imaginative : « ? irresponsible : : : : : . . . responsible nervous : » » « . . . . calm reasonable : ; » . . . rigid : : ; ; selfish : : w a r m . • _ : sincere : ; co-operative ; » . . : : . ; . . : . . ; unliable . easy-going • : . unimaginative unreasonable . . f . . . . : : : : : : . . . . . . . l e x ± h l e rude ; • mature • : ; unintelligent . _ . . . . . . : . : courteous . . YoU unselfish C 0 ld insincere unco-o f 154 PL Ef\SE COMPLETE THIS PftC-E aEToifE You ru*N r#e ro SVETxr OA/e. The name of the defendant i s : , The crime he committed i s : . intelligent unintelligent likeable unlikeable bossy- easy-going immature mature imaginative unimaginative irresponsible responsible nervous calm patient impatient reasonable unreasonable rigid flexible courteous rude selfish unselfish warm cold sincere co-operative insincere : ' ' i : : : : unco-operative APPENDIX H MATERIALS FOR RATING RESPONSIBILITY AND BLAME The next page contains items asking your opinions about the case. Please consider each item and then indicate your opinion by marking the scale below each item. The scales you are to use are l i k e the one shown below. How pleasant d i d you f i n d the l a s t party you attended? extremely pleasant 1 6 ^ ' extremely unpleasant I f you found the party extremely pleasant you would c i r c l e the 1 and i f you found i t extremely unpleasant you would c i r c l e the 9_. I f you thought the party was average, you would c i r c l e the j5. I f you thought the party was somewhere between extreme and average, you would c i r c l e the number in-between (2, 2 » it o r 2 » HQ that best represented your estimate of the pleasantness of the party. Please turn to the next page, consider the questions and mark the scales to show your opinions. Please remember that I am interested i n your personal opinions and not i n how you think others might react or how you f e e l you should react. 155 156 As a question not of law but of morality, Dory's actions were: as wrong a s - , . possible O I L 6 7 ' 8 Q 7 7 6 1 7 right Quite apart from l e g a l aspects, Dory: did not do anything wrong d i d very 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 wrong How much do you think the p l a i n t i f f i s t o blame f o r what happened? not at a l l 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 completely How much do you agree with the statement that: "Dory's acts were a r e s u l t of the circumstances i n which he found himself"? agree completely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ^ag " completely 1 6 6 How much do you agree or disagree with the statement that: "Dory i s more a v i c t i m of circumstances than a criminal"? 1 agree completely 1 2 3 ^ ^ * ^ 5 6 0 . 7 ' 8 H 0 v disagree completely APPENDIX I SHORT QUESTIONNAIRE FOR STUDY I 1, The name of the defendant i n the case i s : 2. The crime with which the defendant i s charged i s : 3. The value of the l o s t or damaged property involved i n the offence i s approximately 4. _____________________ . I f the defendant were to be sentenced to a term of imprisonment f o r the offence, how long a term should he serve f o r t h i s offence? 5. I f the defendant were to pay a fine rather than serve time i n prison, what amount of money should he pay as a fine? 6. _____________________________ I f the defendant were to pay a sum of money t o the r i g h t f u l owner of the l o s t or damaged property rather than pay a fine or serve time i n prison, what amount of money should he pay to the p l a i n t i f f as restitution? 7. ________________________^ Five possible sentences are l i s t e d below. Two of these sentences were available f o r you t o choose from when you sentenced the defendant. Please place a check-mark i n the box beside each of these two sentences. 8. ______ A. A term of imprisonment f o r the offender. ______ B. A term of imprisonment f o r the offender and compensation, paid by the Province, f o r the r i g h t f u l owner or owners of the l o s t or damaged goods. ______ C. A term of probation f o r the offender on condition that he pay a f i n e . ______ D. A term of probation f o r the offender on condition that he pay a sum of money to the r i g h t f u l .owner or owners of the l o s t or damaged goods. ______ E. A release with a reprimand. Which of the two alternatives d i d you choose? t h i s one? 157 Why d i d you select APPENDIX J THURSTONE-WANG " A T T I T U D E TOWARD PUNISHMENT OF C R I M I N A L S " SCALE On t h i s page and on t h e n e x t statements expressing d i f f e r e n t page y o u w i l l attitudes find a number toward punishment of of criminals. P u t a c h e c k mark i f X Put a cross i f Try to indicate either you agree w i t h the you disagree w i t h the statement. agreement o r d i s a g r e e m e n t f o r statement. If may m a r k i t w i t h a question mark. you s i m p l y cannot decide about a statement This i s not an e x a m i n a t i o n . answers t o these s t a t e m e n t s . toward punishment of I statement. each . you ? T h e r e a r e no r i g h t or wrong am s i m p l y i n t e r e s t e d i n y o u r criminals. attitudes Please i n d i c a t e your c o n v i c t i o n s by a c h e c k m a r k when y o u a g r e e a n d b y a c r o s s when y o u d i s a g r e e . _____ A p e r s o n s h o u l d be i m p r i s o n e d o n l y f o r ______ It ______ Hard p r i s o n l i f e ______ Some c r i m i n a l s w i l l ______ Most p r i s o n s are s c h o o l s o f ______ We s h o u l d n o t ______ A criminal w i l l i s wrong f o r serious offences. s o c i e t y t o make a n y o f i t s will members k e e p men f r o m c o m m i t t i n g not b e n e f i t consider the go s t r a i g h t from suffer. crime. punishment. crime. comfort of a prisoner. o n l y when he f i n d s t h a t p r i s o n l i f e 158 is hard. 159 No punishment can reduce crime. Prison influence i s degenerating. Only habitual criminals should be punished. We should employ corporal punishment i n dealing with a l l criminals. I have no opinion about the treatment of crime. Punishment of criminals i s a disgrace to c i v i l i z e d S o l i t a r y confinement w i l l make the criminal society. penitent. I t i s advantageous to society to spare c e r t a i n criminals. Only humane treatment can cure criminals. Harsh imprisonment merely embitters a c r i m i n a l . No leniency should be shown to convicts. Many petty offenders become dangerous criminals after a prison term Failure to punish the criminal encourages crime. Only by extreme b r u t a l punishment can we cure the c r i m i n a l . The more severely a man i s punished, the greater criminal he become A criminal should be punished f i r s t and then reformed. One way to deter men from crime i s to make them s u f f e r . Punishment i s wasteful of human l i f e . A bread and water d i e t i n prison w i l l cure the c r i m i n a l . B r u t a l treatment of a criminal makes him more dangerous. A j a i l sentence w i l l cure many criminals of further offences. Prison inmates should be put i n i r o n s . We should consider the i n d i v i d u a l i n t r e a t i n g crime. Even the most vicious criminal should not be harmed. Humane treatment i n s p i r e s the criminal to be good. Some punishment i s necessary i n dealing with the c r i m i n a l . APPENDIX K STIMULUS MATERIALS FOR STUDY I I ACCOUNT OF FRAUD Summary of the Case: The defendant, James Dory, was charged with obtaining funds by f a l s e pretences. The amount of money i n question was $2,500, The prosecution claimed that Dory posed as a Bank o f f i c i a l and persuaded Mrs, Dorothy Campbell t o entrust him with funds which he then used f o r h i s own purposes. Testimony of the P l a i n t i f f . Mrs, Campbell: Mrs, Dorothy Campbell i s a 67-year-old widow. Since her husband's death i n 1969 she has resided alone i n a small apartment which she owns. P r i o r t o the fraud, Mrs. Campbell had about $3,500. saved f o r emergencies. Afterwards, apart from her home, her assets consisted of approximately a thousand d o l l a r s remaining i n a savings account. For her day-to-day l i v i n g expenses, she r e l i e s on her o l d age pension. The l o s t money represented a s i g n i f i c a n t portion of the money she had deposited f o r emergencies. Mrs. Campbell t e s t i f i e d that the defendant f i r s t contacted her on January 4 , 1974 when he telephoned and claimed t o be a Bank investment 160 161 counsellor, Mrs, Campbell stated t h a t Dory t o l d her the Bank was o f f e r i n g s p e c i a l investment opportunities t o selected customers. Dory requested and obtained Mrs, Campbell's permission t o v i s i t her t o e x p l a i n the investment program, Mrs, Campbell stated that the defendant followed up h i s telephone c a l l by appearing at her home and presenting her with an i d e n t i f i c a t i o n card showing he was a Bank employee. She f u r t h e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t he persuaded her t h a t her funds would be b e t t e r invested i n the Bank plan than l e f t i n her savings account, Mrs, Campbell stated t h a t she gave Dory a cheque f o r $2,500, and received i n r e t u r n a Bank Plan c e r t i f i c a t e and a r e c e i p t , (These documents were introduced as E x h i b i t s A, B and C ) , Mrs, Campbell stated t h a t , when she next v i s i t e d the Bank, she discovered t h a t she had been the v i c t i m of a f r a u d . Testimony of P o l i c e O f f i c e r t The detective who worked on the case t e s t i f i e d t h a t , when the fraud was reported, a p o l i c e p o r t r a i t of Dory was drawn from the d e s c r i p t i o n s given by Mrs, Campbell and the bank t e l l e r who had cashed the cheque. He explained t h a t a p o l i c e o f f i c e r who had seen the p o r t r a i t l a t e r met Dory at a party and recognized him. The detective t e s t i f i e d t h a t when he received t h i s r e p o r t , he i n v e s t i g a t e d f u r t h e r . The detective t e s t i f i e d t h a t Dory was placed i n a p o l i c e l i n e - t i p and p o s i t i v e l y i d e n t i f i e d by both the t e l l e r and by Mrs, Campbell, Also o f f e r e d i n evidence was a business card ( E x h i b i t D) which i d e n t i f i e s the holder as a Bank employee. The detective t e s t i f i e d that t h i s card was found i n Dory's possession. name,, I t contained Dory's photograph and a f i c t i t i o u s 162 Testimony of the Defendant. James Dory: The defendant, 49-year-old James Dory, had been employed f o r 14 years as a salesman by, a l o c a l car dealer. Dory was s t i l l working i n t h i s capacity. At the time of the t r i a l , He i s married with no children l i v i n g at home. Dory pleaded g u i l t y t o the charge and agreed that Mrs. Campbell accurately described the technique he used t o persuade her t o entrust him with the funds. the He stated, however, that he planned only t o borrow money f o r investment purposes and that he planned t o repay Mrs. Campbell out of his p r o f i t s . Dory t e s t i f i e d that an acquaintance had offered him a chance t o invest i n a promising venture. Dory stated he was wondering how to r a i s e the necessary funds when he heard the fraud described on an open l i n e radio programme and decided t o use i t to acquire funds. Dory further t e s t i f i e d that the money was l o s t when the business venture f a i l e d . Dory also t e s t i f i e d that he had never before committed, been charged with, or convicted of, a criminal offence. Testimony of Dory's Employer: The owner of the car dealership where Dory was employed t e s t i f i e d that during the fourteen years the defendant worked f o r him, he was a good worker and that there were no customer complaints about Dory. Verdict: The defendant was found g u i l t y of the charge. 163 Sentence: ACCOUNT OF THEFT Summary of the Case; ( The defendant, James Dory, was charged with t h e f t . charged that, on the evening of A p r i l 8, 1974, The prosecution Dory entered an apartment occupied by Mr. and Mrs. Peter Roth and removed the following items; a portable color t e l e v i s i o n set, a stereo set, a diamond engagement r i n g , a camera and four a r t i c l e s of clothing belonging to Mr. Roth. At the time of the t r i a l the t e l e v i s i o n set, the stereo set and the diamond r i n g , together valued at about $2,500. had not been recovered. The prosecution alleged that Dory, the former occupant of the suite now rented by the Roths, kept a spare set of keys to the suite and used them t o gain entrance. Testimony of the P l a i n t i f f . Peter Roth: Twenty-six year o l d Peter Roth i s employed as a saleman by a l o c a l department store. Roth t e s t i f i e d that he had l i v e d i n the suite f o r l e s s than a month before the t h e f t occurred. suite on A p r i l 1st He stated that he moved i n t o the and that on A p r i l 7th he and h i s wife l e f t f o r Calgary to spend a week v i s i t i n g r e l a t i v e s . from Calgary on A p r i l 14, Roth stated that when he returned he discovered that the apartment had been entered and that the goods l i s t e d above had been stolen. Roth stated that the l o s t property had not been insured against t h e f t , ''"^Three d i f f e r e n t sentences represented three d i f f e r e n t resolutions of the i n e q u i t y . Subjects i n each condition received a description of the sentence appropriate to that condition. See Appendix L f o r the three sentences used i n the study. 164 Four articles of clothing and a camera were produced i n court and identified by Mr, Roth as the ones he. had reported stolen. Testimony of Police Officer; The police officer assigned to investigate the theft testified that he had questioned other tenants i n the building. He stated that one of the tenants contacted, Mrs, Campbell, reported that she had seen James Dory, the former occupant of the Roth apartment, leave the suite carrying a portable television set and some clothing. The officer testified that Dory's new residence had been searched and that four items of clothing which matched the description of those reported stolen were found i n Dory's possession. The officer also testified that the serial number of a camera also found i n Dory's possession .was the same as the serial number of the one reported stolen. The officer further testified that the articles produced i n court and identified by Roth were the ones he found i n Dory's possession. Testimony of Mrs, Campbell, witness; Mrs, Campbell testified that she lives i n an apartment i n the same building as the one i n which the Roth apartment i s located. She testified that, on April 8, 1974, she observed the defendant, James Dory, leave the Roth apartment carrying a portable television set and some clothing. She explained that, at the time, she had not realized that the suite had changed hands and thus had not reported the incident. Testimony of the Defendant. James Dory; The defendant, James Dory, a 27-^year-old construction worker, had 165 worked f o r the same firm f o r f i v e years. At the time of the t r i a l he was s t i l l working i n that capacity. Dory pleaded g u i l t y to the charge. He t e s t i f i e d that he had moved from the apartment occupied by the Roths l e s s than a month before the t h e f t occurred. set to Dory explained that he discovered he s t i l l had a spare of keys to h i s former apartment and drove to the apartment b u i l d i n g return the keys to the manager. Dory stated that when he found the manager was not at home, he decided to give the keys to the new occupant of the s u i t e . The new occupant d i d not answer the door and Dory used the keys t o l e t himself i n . Dory stated that, a f t e r he entered the s u i t e , he r e a l i z e d that he had an opportunity to commit a perfect crime. Dory reported that he selected several items and proceeded to carry them t o his car. He was carrying out the portable t e l e v i s i o n set and some clothing when he encountered Mrs, Campbell, Dory t e s t i f i e d that he became a f r a i d that he had been recognized and decided to dispose of the goods as quickly as possible. Dory stated that he went to a bar and there sold the color t e l e v i s i o n , the stereo set and the diamond r i n g . Dory t e s t i f i e d that the i d e n t i t i e s and whereabouts of the purchasers of these a r t i c l e s were unknown t o him. Dory t e s t i f i e d that he had never before committed, been charged with, or convicted of, a criminal offence. Testimony of Dory's Employer; The owner of the firm where Dory was employed t e s t i f i e d that, during the f i v e years Dory had been employed by the firm, he had been a hard and conscientous worker. 166 Verdict; The defendant was found guilty of the charge. 17 Sentence; ACCOUNT OF VANDALISM Summary of the Case; The defendant, James Dory, was charged with vandalism. The prosecution charged that, on the afternoon of April 8 , 1974» Dory broke into a house owned by Thomas Finn and severely damaged the premises. Testimony of the P l a i n t i f f . Thomas Finn; The owner)Of the house, Thomas Finn, i s a 32-year-old mechanic. Finn testified that he had purchased a partially built house and, on evenings and weekends, worked to complete i t so that he could move his family into i t . Finn stated that the house had been almost completed when the damage occurred. Finn testified that the damages to the house included smashed fixtures i n the bathroom, paint poured over carpeting and the plaster on several walls smashed with a hammer. Finn testified that i t had been necessary to replace the bathroom fixtures and the carpeting and that the cost of these items plus materials to repair other damages had been $2,501.32. Finn added that these losses were not covered by insurance. Testimony of Mrs. Campbell, witness; Mrs. Campbell testified that she resides i n the house across the 17 The account concluded with a description of a sentence imposed i n the case. 167 street from the Finn; property. She t e s t i f i e d that on the afternoon i n question she was i n her front yard when she observed a strange car p u l l up to the Finn house, Mrs, Campbell stated that she saw the defendant emerge froimthe car and walk to the rear of the Finn house, Mrs, Campbell t e s t i f i e d that she then heard what sounded l i k e glass breaking, became suspicious and noted the licence number, make and model of the defendant's car, Mrs, Campbell stated that she continued to watch f o r several rninutes and then approached the Finn house with intentions of questioning the defendant about h i s presence on the premises, Mrs, Campbell t e s t i f i e d that as she approached the house, she was able t o see the defendant c l e a r l y through the dLning room window and observed that he was pouring the contents of a can of paint on the f l o o r , returned to her home and telephoned p o l i c e . Mrs, Campbell said she Before they arrived, she saw the defendant emerge from the house, enter h i s car and drive away. Testimony of Police O f f i c e r : The police o f f i c e r who arrested Dory t e s t i f i e d that he was on h i s way to the Finn house when he observed the defendant's car a few blocks away from the property. The o f f i c e r stated that he stopped the car to question the defendant and noticed that the defendant's slacks and shoes were spattered with wet paint. When he returned with the defendant to the Finn house, the o f f i c e r observed that the color of the paint was the same as that poured on the carpeting. The o f f i c e r further t e s t i f i e d that he found the glass i n the rear door had been smashed. Testimony of the Defendant, James Dory; The defendant, 25-year-old James Dory, had been employed as a truck-driver f o r the past three years and was capacity at the time of the s t i l l working i n that trial. Dory pleaded g u i l t y to the charge and admitted that he did the damage described. He t e s t i f i e d that he had been on vacation when the offence occurred. Dory stated that, on the day i n question, he had been suffering the a f t e r - e f f e c t s of drinking heavily the previous evening. Dory stated that he was d r i v i n g through the sub-division when he became extremely t h i r s t y and stopped at the Finn house to ask f o r water. When he r e a l i z e d the house was vacant, he smashed the glass pane i n the rear door and l e t himself i n . Dory stated that he t r i e d to obtain water f i r s t from the kitchen and then from the bathroom. Dory said that he found the water was not turned on, became enraged, seized a hammer and smashed the bathroom f i x t u r e s . Dory stated that he then used the hammer to pound holes i n walls u n t i l he stumbled over the paint which he poured on the carpeting. Once he had emptied the paint cans, he l e f t the premises. Dory t e s t i f i e d that he had never before committed, been charged with, or convicted of, a criminal offence. Testimony of Dory's Employer: The owner of the f i r m where Dory was employed as a truck-driver t e s t i f i e d that, during the three years Dory had been i n h i s employ, he had been a hard and conscientious worker. Verdict: The defendant was found g u i l t y of the charge. 18 Sentence: T"he account concluded with a d e s c r i p t i o n of a sentence imposed i n the case. APPENDIX L SENTENCES FOR STUDY I I Release Condition The defendant was reprimanded f o r h i s conduct and released. Imprisonment with Compensation Condition The defendant was sentenced t o serve a term of one year i n prison. (Assume that the sentence required the defendant t o serve the f u l l term: do not consider paroled) The p l a i n t i f f was awarded $ 2 , 5 0 0 . compensation f o r losses r e s u l t i n g from the crime. This sum was paid from a P r o v i n c i a l Fund established t o provide compensation f o r persons i n c u r r i n g losses due to crime. R e s t i t u t i o n Condition The defendant was sentenced t o serve a term of one year i n prison but was not required to serve any of t h i s term. Instead, the sentence was suspended and the defendant released on probation on condition that he maintain good behavior, report t o a probation o f f i c e r and pay the p l a i n t i f f the sum of $ 2 , 5 0 0 . as compensation f o r losses r e s u l t i n g from the crime. Terms of payment were t o be worked out i n consultation with a probation o f f i c e r . 169 APPENDIX M SATISFACTION SCALE FOR STUDY II Consider the nature of the offence i n the case presented to you and the sentencing decision made. Decide how satisfactory you find this resolution of the situation. Then indicate your feelings by drawing a vertical line through the scale at the point that best represents how satisfactory or unsatisfactory you find the resolution of the situation, completely unsatisfactory completely ' satisfactory 170 APPENDIX N SHORT QUESTIONNAIRE FOR STUDY II 1. The name of the defendant i n the case i s : 2. The crime the defendant committed 3. The value of the lost or damaged property involved i n the offence was approximately: m m ^ m m m m m m m ^^ ___________________________^^ - was: m m m m m M m m m ^ m 4. I f the defendant were to be sentenced to a term of imprisonment for the offence, how long a term do you think he should serve for this offence? 5. I f the defendant were to be fined rather than serve time i n prison, what amount of money do you think he should pay as a fine? 6. If the defendant were to pay a sum of money to the rightful owner of the lost or damaged property rather than pay a fine or serve time i n prison, what amount of money do you think he should pay to the plaintiff as restitution? 7. Three possible sentences are listed below. The defendant i n the case you read about received one of these sentences. Please place a check—mark i n the box beside the sentence given to the defendant. 8. _______ A. A term of imprisonment for the offender and compensation, paid by the Province, for the rightful owner or owners of the lost or damaged goods. ______ B. A term of probation for the defendant on condition that he pay a sum of money to the rightful owner or owners of the lost or damaged goods. ______ C, A release with a reprimand. Which one of these alternatives would you have chosen? Why would you select this one i f you were to determine the sentence for the defendant? 171
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UBC Theses and Dissertations
Third party preferences among resolutions of inequity in the criminal-victim dyad Hunt, Valerye Agnes 1976
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