THIRD PARTY PREFERENCES AMONG RESOLUTIONS OF
INEQUITY IN THE CRIMINAL-VICTIM DYAD

by

VALERYE AGNES HUNT

B.A., UNIVERSITY OF LETHBRIDGE, 1970
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA, 1972

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Department of Psychology

The University of British Columbia
2075 Wesbrook Place
Vancouver, Canada
V6T 1W5

Date March 2, 1976
ABSTRACT

Adams' (1965) equity theory provided a theoretical background for the research which examined third party response to dyadic inequity caused by negative input from one member of a dyad. Consideration of differences between first and third parties and of the possibility of negative input suggested three principles important to third party equity behavior. These were:

1) a preference for actual, rather than psychological, equity
2) a preference for positive, rather than negative, input
3) a preference for positive input rather than actual equity in case of conflict between preferences for actual equity and input positivity.

Four hypotheses were derived from these principles.

Hypothesis 1: When alternative solutions to inequitable situations are equal in actual equity, third parties will prefer alternatives that maximize input positivity.

Hypothesis 2: When alternative solutions to inequitable situations are equal in input positivity, third parties will prefer alternatives that maximize actual equity.

Hypothesis 3: When alternative solutions to inequitable situations are such that preferences for maximizing actual equity and input positivity conflict, third parties will prefer to achieve maximum input positivity rather than maximum actual equity.

Hypothesis 4: When resolution of inequity satisfies preferences for
actual equity and input positivity, third parties will report greater satisfaction with the solution than when resolution of inequity satisfies only one preference or involves conflict between preferences.

Additional hypotheses were:

Hypothesis 5: Third parties will restore psychological equity for an over-rewarded party by cognitively enhancing inputs so they are commensurate with outcomes.

Hypothesis 6: Third parties will restore psychological equity for an under-rewarded party by cognitively devaluing inputs so they are commensurate with outcomes.

Two studies tested hypotheses. Study I examined preferences among, and satisfaction with, different reductions of dyadic inequity. Subjects read simulated criminal cases and selected one of two alternative sentences. The actual equity and input positivity of solutions within and between conditions were manipulated by varying kind of punishment for criminals and availability of compensation for victims. Choice of sentence and satisfaction with solutions provided data for testing the first four hypotheses. Ratings of victims' attractiveness and responsibility for the offence tested Hypothesis 6.

In Study II, the case summary described the sentence imposed. The actual equity and input positivity of solutions represented by sentences varied among conditions. Reported satisfaction with sentences provided an additional test of Hypothesis 4. Ratings of criminals' and victims' attractiveness and responsibility for the offence permitted tests of Hypotheses 5 and 6.

Results supported Hypotheses 1, 2 and 4. The importance of
preference for actual equity as a determinant of third party equity behavior was demonstrated by the finding that actual equity is more important than either input or outcome positivity. Data also indicate that a positivity principle is invoked to determine choice between equally equitable alternatives. The discussion reviews evidence indicating that preference for positive input determines choice in these cases. Data from Study II indicate that differences in satisfaction with solutions and distinct preferences among resolutions of inequity are not peculiar to decision-makers but are shared by non-participant observers as well.

Data from both studies failed to support predictions that third parties who were powerless to change the real inputs or outcomes of members of dyads would restore psychological equity by derogating under-rewarded parties or enhancing over-rewarded ones.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Many theorists (e.g., Adams, 1965; Blau, 1964; Homans, 1961; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959) have analyzed dyadic interaction in terms of a reciprocal exchange of rewards and costs. A proposition that is common to these theories is that individuals in an interaction try to ensure that the rewards or gains from a relationship exceed the costs of the exchange. For example, Homans (1961) and Thibaut & Kelley (1959) both assume that an interaction will cease if it is not mutually reinforcing for the parties involved.

Homans, however, noted that the experience of mutual reward did not guarantee satisfaction with the exchange unless the distribution of reward was such that the reward received by the parties was in proportion to their contributions to the exchange. A fair exchange was, according to Homans, one which conformed to the rule of distributive justice. The rule of distributive justice stated that: "a man in an exchange relationship with another will expect ... that the net rewards, or profits, of each man be proportional to his investments — the greater the investments, the greater the profit (Homans, 1961, p. 75)." Homans suggested that exchanges that violated the rule of distributive justice resulted in expressions of negative emotional affect on the part of both parties to the transaction, anger if under-rewarded and guilt if over-rewarded.

Adams (1965) suggested that social psychologists in general and
exchange theorists in particular had failed to appreciate fully the importance of perceived justice or injustice in exchange. Adams noted that Homans' articulation of the rule of distributive justice represented a distinct contribution in this regard. He pointed out, however, that although Homans' treatment discussed the causes of perceived justice and injustice in exchange, only scanty attention was given to the consequences of perceived injustice. Adams noted that the behavioral consequences of perceived injustice in exchange extend beyond the expressions of negative emotional affect mentioned by Homans and argued that specification of these consequences was essential for an adequate understanding of human exchange. Consideration of the theoretical and practical importance of perceived justice or injustice in dyadic exchange resulted in the Adams (1965) formulation of equity theory.

Adams referred to equity rather than to justice in exchange both to avoid possible confusion resulting from use of the term "justice" and, more importantly, "to emphasize that the primary concern is with the causes and consequences of the absence of equity in human exchange relationships (1965, p. 276)." Adams formulated his theory of equity with employer-employee exchanges in mind but pointed out that the theory was applicable to other social situations involving exchange since all are characterized by expectations of fairness.

Two key terms in Adams' (1965) theory of first party equity behavior are outcomes and inputs. Outcomes designate a person's returns from an exchange. These may be positive or negative. For example, outcomes from an employer-employee exchange may include, for the worker, such positively valued rewards as pay, seniority benefits and status as well
as negatively valued factors such as poor working conditions and monotony. Adams specified that the valuation of a given outcome factor depended on its being recognized as relevant to the exchange.

Inputs, in the Adams formulation, refer to perceived contributions to an exchange that may include: "education, intelligence, experience, training, skill, seniority, age, sex, ethnic background, social status and, of course, effort ... on the job (1965, p. 277)." Adams specified that for any of these factors to be regarded as an input required that it be recognized as relevant to the exchange. Only positive inputs or contributions to an exchange were considered by Adams.

Adams proposed that an individual would experience inequity whenever his Outcome/Input ratio was not equal to the Outcome/Input ratio of a comparison other. The comparison other could be the individual's partner in an exchange relationship. Alternatively, the comparison other could be an individual engaged in a similar exchange with another person. For example, a secretary might evaluate the "equitableness" of her arrangement with her employer by comparing her inputs and outcomes with those of another secretary.

The importance for first party equity behavior of "normative expectations of fair exchange" was emphasized by Adams. Maintenance of equity in exchange is dependent on some degree of agreement between parties regarding the relevance and valuation of inputs and outcomes. Two factors mentioned by Adams as important to the development of equity norms are the socialization process and the process of social comparison. In the course of socialization, individuals learn how others will evaluate various outcomes and the circumstances under which various
outcomes may be offered to others in order to maintain equity. For example, an individual learns not only that both money and expressions of esteem are valued by others but, equally importantly, the circumstances under which one or the other of these reinforcers may be preferred as payment for services rendered. The importance of social comparison to first party equity behavior was also discussed by Adams. He pointed out that, in many situations, comparison of own outcomes and inputs with those of another individual in a similar exchange enables individuals to determine what constitutes a fair exchange. Thus, processes that facilitate agreement regarding the valuation of inputs and outcomes and the conditions under which particular inputs entitle the contributor to particular outcomes make possible maintenance of equity in dyadic exchange. However, as Adams pointed out, these processes do not result in perfect agreement regarding the relationship between inputs and outcomes. This is one of the causes of inequity in exchange.

The presentation by Adams of a theory of dyadic equity behavior has stimulated considerable research among social psychologists who have, in recent years, expressed increasing interest in problems related to the maintenance of justice and correction of injustice in society. In a recent review of equity research, Walster, Berscheid & Walster (1973) discuss the extension of the concept of equity to analysis of exploitative, helping and intimate relationships. A substantial body of research now demonstrates the importance of equity for both formal and informal exchanges. Researchers have, however, been concerned with first party equity behavior. Attention has focussed on the maintenance
and restoration of equity by parties involved in an exchange.

A relatively unstudied area is that of third party equity behavior. Third party equity behavior may be defined as encompassing all instances in which an impartial observer responds to perceived inequity in exchange between others. The area of third party equity behavior that is of interest to the present discussion is third party response to dyadic inequity brought about by the counter-normative or negative inputs of one of the parties to an exchange. Responses to such inequities are commonplace in daily life. For example, parents and teachers intervene to resolve disputes between children. At the formal level, the legal system provides for intervention to re-establish equity in dyadic exchange. Despite the frequency and importance of third party equity behavior in maintaining or restoring equity in dyadic exchange, equity researchers have neglected this area.

The relative neglect of the area of third party equity behavior is especially surprising in view of its acknowledged theoretical and practical importance. The propositions that groups commonly evolve systems specifying acceptable distributions of rewards and costs among individual members and enforce adherence to these systems by punishing those who behave inequitably are widely accepted (cf., Walster, Berscheid & Walster, 1973).

Adams' (1965) outcome-input model may be applied to analysis of third party equity behavior. Adams' original formulation applied to first party equity behavior and did not consider the possibility of negative as well as positive input. Consideration of differences between first and third party equity behavior and of the possibility of
negative as well as positive input suggests that the theory requires revision to apply to the present area of interest. The present discussion will suggest three general principles important to third party responses to dyadic inequity resulting from the negative input of one of the parties to the exchange. These principles permit derivation of hypotheses concerning third party choice among methods of reduction of inequity in dyads where restoring equity involves punishment of a harm-doer.

Only positive inputs or contributions to an exchange were considered in the Adams (1965) discussion of first party equity behavior. As Walster, Berscheid & Walster (1973) pointed out, a person's input may be negative as well as positive: such inputs as boorishness or cruelty entitle the possessor to costs rather than to rewards. Considerable attention (Zuckerman, 1975; Walster, 1975) has been devoted to the revision of the definitional formula of equity so that it calculates the "equitableness" of exchanges involving negative as well as positive input.

The category of negative input that is relevant to the present discussion of third party equity behavior is behavioral input that violates commonly accepted and understood rules governing the behavior of participants in exchanges. Both formal and informal transactions are governed by rules that specify the means by which parties may attempt to maximize their outcomes from an exchange. Inputs directed toward maximizing outcomes by means that violate moral or legal prohibitions of such inputs may be regarded as negative. Examples of such negative inputs are extorting desired resources from another by use of such
coercive tactics as threat of blackmail or physical violence or by persuasion that involves fraud or deceit.

The criminal-victim dyad is an example of one in which dyadic inequity results from the exploitation of one party by another. In such situations, the inputs of the party responsible for the inequity, the harm-doer or criminal, are directed toward winning undeserved positive outcomes, the rewards or satisfactions resulting from the crime. Thus, the input of the harm-doer is negative and his outcomes are positive. The inputs of the victim are positive while his outcomes, the experience of victimization and suffering resulting from the loss of valued resources, are negative.

Adams' original formulation of equity behavior discussed alternative means of inequity reduction and attempted to specify factors important in determining first person preference for various alternatives. Some of these methods of inequity reduction are available to third party observers of inequity. As Walster, Berscheid & Walster (1973) pointed out, the methods specified by Adams may be classified as restoring either actual or psychological equity. Actual equity refers to real changes in the inputs or outcomes of a party to the exchange. Psychological equity, for a third party, refers to reduction of perceived inequity by means of cognitive re-appraisal of inputs or outcomes. That is, by altering his evaluations of the inputs or outcomes of the members of the dyad, a third party may convince himself that the exchange is, after all, equitable. A third party may restore either actual or psychological equity for one or both members of a dyad in which inequity results from the counter-normative actions of one of
the parties to an exchange.

A third party may possess two options for restoring actual equity for a harm-doer: altering his inputs or changing his outcomes. A judge may, for example, require that a criminal make amends for his offence, either directly to the victim or else to a stand-in for the victim. For example, an embezzler may be required to repay the stolen money or a vandal may be required to donate his services to the upkeep of a public park. In these instances, actual equity is restored by means of positive input from the harm-doer. Alternatively, a third party may restore equity for a harm-doer by inflicting negative outcomes on the offender. A spanking for a child or a term of imprisonment for an adult offender are examples of punishments directed toward restoring equity by inflicting negative outcomes on a harm-doer.

A third party appears to possess only one option for restoring actual equity for a victim. This is to restore the victim's positive outcomes. If a third party arranges for a harm-doer to make restitution to the victim or else provides compensation from some other source, actual equity is restored for the victim. Actual equity could also be restored by means of negative input from the victim. That is, the victim could make negative input, directed toward producing negative outcomes for the harm-doer. This would, however, require that the victim make counter-normative or illegal input. For a third party to require such input from an injured party would, itself, constitute a counter-normative act. Accordingly, at the formal level, a third party may achieve actual equity for a victim only by restoring positive outcomes.
A third party may also reduce inequity by changing his appraisal of the inputs or outcomes of the parties to an offence. For example, an observer may convince himself that the inequitable relationship between a con man and an elderly widow bilked out of her life savings is an equitable one. He may dwell on the fact that the lady in question brought about her misfortune by her own greed and stupidity. He may, belatedly, note that the funds in question had been left by her late husband and conclude that the widow had, in the first place, been enjoying undeserved benefits. If the observer can further convince himself that the criminal was, in this case, actually an agent of poetic justice, the psychological reduction of inequity may be complete.

The preceding paragraphs indicate that a third party may choose any one of a number of methods of reducing dyadic inequity. The ability of a third party to restore actual equity may be related to the presence or absence of constraints that limit his power to impose punishment on a harm-doer or award compensation to a victim. For example, the power of a judge or magistrate to restore actual equity for criminal and victim may be limited by restrictions on the type of sentence that may be imposed on an offender. Generally, these officials are empowered only to punish an offender: the present system does not allow compensation for losses of victims of most crimes. An individual who is empowered to punish a wrong-doer or to compensate a victim is not necessarily compelled to exercise his power. He may elect, instead, to restore psychological equity for one or both members of the dyad.

The importance of specifying general determinants of first party preferences among methods of dyadic inequity reduction was recognized
by Adams. Equally important is consideration of general determinants of third party choice among methods of reduction of dyadic inequity. Firstly, this makes possible prediction of choice of method of actual inequity reduction by third parties who possess some kind of intervention power. Secondly, it makes possible investigation of the effects on other aspects of equity behavior of constraints that limit third party choice of methods of reducing inequity. For example, constraints that limit third parties to less preferred reductions of inequity may also limit third party satisfaction with justice decisions. Differences in satisfaction with justice decisions that achieve more or less preferred reductions of inequity may be experienced by observers as well as by decision makers. Thus, consideration of third party preferences for methods of inequity reduction may, for example, have implications for the consequences of legal reforms that introduce or remove constraints on the power of those responsible for justice decisions.

There are several reasons for proposing, as a first principle of third party equity behavior, a preference for reduction of dyadic inequities by methods that restore actual, rather than psychological, equity for members of the dyad. Firstly, empirical evidence indicates that observers who possess power to restore actual equity for others will do so.

Data from two studies (Lerner & Simmons, 1966; Simmons & Lerner, 1968) demonstrate that third parties will exercise power to restore the positive outcomes of victims of injustice. Lerner & Simmons (1966) presented naive observers with an "innocent victim" who was
apparently receiving painful electric shock in a learning experiment. In two conditions in the Lerner & Simmons experiment, subjects were exposed to the suffering victim and were then given an opportunity to alter her fate. Subjects were told they could watch a second session in which the victim received negative reinforcement (shock), positive reinforcement (money), or no reinforcement. Subjects were told their votes would determine the victim's fate in the second session. Of the total of twenty-eight subjects in these two conditions, all but two voted to place the victim in the positive reinforcement condition in which a sum of money would compensate her for her previous pains. Simmons & Lerner (1968) presented subjects with power to establish justice in a social situation. Subjects were given as a partner in a work situation an other who, as a result of the actions of her previous partner, had either been over-rewarded or under-rewarded. They supported the hypothesis that, in order to restore justice, subjects would work harder to increase the reward available for a previously under-rewarded partner. Data from these two studies thus demonstrate that, when it is within their power to do so, observers will restore actual equity for others.

Other studies (Baker, 1974; Lerner, 1974; Lincoln & Levinger, 1972) have demonstrated that third parties will attempt to maintain or restore equity in dyads. Baker used a two-choice, three-person matrix game to study third party justice behavior. The play of two participants was simulated by the experimenter. Subjects were placed in the position of third parties and given power over the allocation of rewards between the two simulated players. In some instances the
relationship between the two simulated players was an equitable one while, in other instances, one of the simulated players received more points than the other. Baker supported the hypotheses that third parties would act to maintain and re-establish equity between others.

Lerner (1974) compared first and third party division of earnings between workers who were defined either as teammates or co-workers. The magnitude of reward available for distribution between the workers was determined by their task performance. In both teammate and co-worker conditions, the performance of one worker was clearly superior to that of the other. Lerner found that both first and third parties tended to divide the reward equally in teammate conditions and according to performance in co-worker conditions. Lerner (1974) concluded that, although the basis for allocation of reward differed as a function of situational cues, both first and third party division of reward was in accordance with the dictates of justice.

Lincoln & Levinger (1972) investigated third party response to dyads in which the inequity was due to the counter-normative and negative input of a harm-doer. In the Lincoln & Levinger study, subjects' responses to harm-doers were separated from their responses to victims. There were two conditions in the study: Consequences and No Consequences. Subjects in both conditions were instructed to indicate their evaluations of harm-doers and victims. In the Consequences condition, subjects were told these evaluations would be sent to the parties involved in the incident while subjects in the No Consequences condition believed their ratings would remain private.
It was predicted that ratings of the target persons would differ as a function of the consequentiality of the evaluation. That is, subjects in the Consequences condition could, through their ratings, punish the harm-doer and compensate the victim. Subjects' responses to victims were as predicted: the data indicated that subjects attempted to restore actual equity for victims. Responses to harm-doers did not clearly indicate a preference for actual equity for harm-doers. Thus, the Lincoln & Levinger study does not provide empirical data to support the proposition that third parties prefer actual equity for harm-doers.

There is, however, justification for proposing that third parties will prefer to restore actual equity for harm-doers as well as for victims. The importance for the maintenance of equity norms of punishment for those who behave inequitably is illustrated by Walster, Berscheid & Walster (1973). Failure to restore actual equity for a harm-doer may be perceived as a threat to maintenance of equity norms for two reasons. Firstly, failure to punish the harm-doer implies that he may be tempted to repeat his offence and, secondly, allows him to serve as a model for others tempted to maximize outcomes through similar transgressions. These considerations suggest that the principle of preference for actual equity for others applies to third party exercise of punishment as well as compensation power.

An assumption that is implicit in the adoption of a principle of third party preference for actual equity is that preference for positive outcomes does not apply to third party justice behavior. The importance of preference for positive outcomes as a determinant of first party equity behavior is generally acknowledged. Adams' (1965) discussion of
first party equity behavior suggested that preference for positive outcomes not only accounted for deviations from preference for actual equity but also determined first party choices among methods of inequity reduction. Pritchard (1969) and Walster, Berscheid & Walster (1973) also emphasize the importance of preference for positive outcomes as a determinant of first party equity behavior.

The present analysis suggests that the preference for outcome positivity is not a determinant of third party equity behavior. The rationale offered by Adams and others to account for first party preference for outcome positivity is the individual's motivation to maximize his own gains. The observer of inequity is presumably not motivated to maximize the gains or positive outcomes of either of the parties to the inequity. To permit an over-rewarded party to maintain his positive outcomes without a corresponding increase in positive input does not achieve equity. In general, a person who enjoys undeserved positive outcomes from an exchange may be perceived as violating equity norms. Outcome positivity may be rejected in part because an over-rewarded comparison person may engender dissatisfaction among others and tempt them to violate equity norms in order to reap similar benefits. Accordingly, although a preference for outcome positivity may influence first party equity behavior, the present analysis suggests that this is not an important consideration for third party equity behavior.

The possibility of negative input was not considered in the Adams (1965) discussion of first party equity behavior. Consequently, he did not consider the relative importance of preferences for positive
versus negative input. Consideration of this question appears important for analysis of third party equity behavior. Third parties appear to exhibit a definite preference for positive input from others. Some empirical evidence that third parties prefer positive to negative input may be derived from Baker's (1974) investigation of third party justice behavior. As has already been mentioned, Baker supported the hypotheses that third parties will act to maintain or restore equity between others. Baker also investigated the effects of the cause of the inequity — the helpful or harmful behavior of the over-rewarded party — on third party allocation of reward. Cause was manipulated by altering the strategy of the two simulated players in the two-choice, three-person matrix game so that in one condition (harm), the over-rewarded party caused the under-rewarded one to receive fewer points than would have been obtained had the over-rewarded player followed a different strategy. In the other condition (help), the over-rewarded player helped the under-rewarded one in that the under-rewarded player would have received even fewer points had the over-rewarded player chosen differently. The discrepancy between the points received by the simulated players was the same in both conditions. Baker predicted that third parties would give more rewards to the over-rewarded party when he was helpful than when he was harmful. Some support for this prediction was obtained.

Kaufman (1970) found that an illegal failure to save an other from harm was judged as morally wrong and deserving of punishment. He also found that a person who failed to intervene under such conditions was judged to be unpleasant. Evidence from this study and from the one
by Baker indicates that third parties prefer that individuals behave positively rather than negatively toward others. Additional support for a general preference for positive rather than negative input may be derived from noting the existence of both formal and informal mechanisms designed to reward positive input and to punish negative input. These observations provide the rationale for stating, as a second principle, that third parties prefer positive input from others.

The second question that is of importance to analysis of third party justice behavior is that of the relative importance, to third parties, of actual equity and input positivity. There seems to be some justification for predicting that a third party preference for positive input from others may be stronger than third party preference for actual equity for others. Third party preference for input positivity over actual equity may be most clearly demonstrated by the response to harm-doer-victim dyads in which equity can be restored only by means of retaliation from the victim. In many of these cases, third parties appear to prefer that the inequity remain uncorrected than that the victim make negative input to even the score. In case of minor offences, third parties appear to exhibit only minimal tolerance for restoration of equity by means of retaliation from the victim. For example, Piaget (1932) investigated children's responses to victim retaliation against an aggressor in situations involving childish offences and found that retaliation was judged acceptable only if it was identical in quality and quantity to the original offence. Non-retaliation was preferred when retaliation involved arbitrary measures invented to settle the score. Kalven & Zeisel (1966) found a similar phenomenon among jurors who were reluctant to return a
guilty verdict when retaliation matched in quality and quantity the original offence but did not hesitate to return a guilty verdict under other conditions.

When victims threaten to retaliate considerable pressure, both formal and informal, is often exerted to prevent them from doing so. For example, victims are frequently urged to "forget and forgive" while maxims such as "forgiveness is divine" point to the greater virtue and moral superiority of a peaceful solution. When harm results from a serious transgression, victims are further dissuaded from retaliation by threat of legal penalties. In some cases, as when merchants or members of an ethnic minority become the target of juvenile delinquents, instances of victimization may be repeated while law enforcement agencies appear powerless to prevent further offences. Even in these cases, threats to retaliate elicit strong opposition. These considerations provide the rationale for stating as a third principle of third party equity behavior that, when preferences for positive input and actual equity conflict, third parties may prefer positive input from others to actual equity for others.

These three principles permit derivation of the following hypotheses concerning third party preferences among various restorations of equity in dyads where inequity is caused by counter-normative behavior.

Hypothesis 1: When alternative solutions to inequitable situations are equal in actual equity, third parties will prefer alternatives that maximize input positivity.

This hypothesis may be derived from the combination of the
principles of preference for actual equity and for input positivity. Adams (1965) specified that actual equity could be restored for an over-rewarded party by means of lowered outcomes or improved inputs. The principle of preference for input positivity predicts that the preferred restoration will be the one that provides positive input from the over-rewarded party.

Hypothesis 2: When alternative solutions to inequitable situations are equal in input positivity, third parties will prefer alternatives that maximize actual equity.

This hypothesis is also derived from the combination of the principles of preference for actual equity and for input positivity. Alternative reductions of inequity may be equal in input positivity but differ in actual equity. The principle of preference for actual equity predicts that, in this case, the preferred solution will be the one that is greater in actual equity.

Hypothesis 3: When alternative solutions to inequitable situations are such that preferences for maximizing actual equity and input positivity conflict, third parties will prefer to achieve maximum input positivity rather than maximum actual equity.

This hypothesis is derived from the third principle which specifies the relative importance to third parties of positive input and actual equity. The principle leads to the hypothesis that, when alternatives present a conflict between actual equity and positive input, the preferred alternative will be the one that is greatest in input positivity.

Hypothesis 4: When resolution of an inequity permits third parties to satisfy preferences for actual equity and for input
positivity, third parties will report greater satisfaction with the solution than when resolution of an inequity satisfies only one preference or involves satisfying one preference at the expense of the other. Third party satisfaction with the solution will be further decreased as the number and salience of remaining inequities requiring resolution through psychological means increases.

Adams (1965) noted that the occurrence of inequity elicited expressions of negative emotional affect from the parties involved in the exchange. Baker (1974) demonstrated that the occurrence of inequity between others results in expressions of anger from third party observers of the injustice. The present analysis permits prediction of differences in the extent to which felt dissatisfaction is reduced when resolutions of the inequity vary in achievement of actual equity and input positivity. Principles 1 and 2 permit the prediction that dissatisfaction will be most completely reduced when resolution of inequity satisfies preferences for actual equity and for input positivity. It is also possible to predict that, when reduction of inequity satisfies only one preference or involves conflict between preferences, dissatisfaction with the situation will persist.

When actual equity is not restored for one or both members of a dyad, third parties may restore psychological equity by means of cognitive re-appraisal of inputs or outcomes. The following two hypotheses concerning modes of psychological reduction of inequity are not derived from the principles outlined above. These hypotheses follow from previous investigations that have examined third party restoration of equity by means of cognitive re-appraisal of inputs
and outcomes.

Hypothesis 5: Third parties will restore psychological equity for an over-rewarded party by cognitively re-appraising inputs so they are commensurate with outcomes. That is, a third party may enhance his evaluation of the inputs of the over-rewarded party in order to convince himself that the situation is equitable.

This hypothesis is based partly on the premise that restoration of psychological inequity by means of cognitive re-appraisals of inputs or outcomes will be in a direction of least resistance. When a harm-doer eludes justice and is free to enjoy his ill-gotten gains, third parties may find it easier to alter cognitions about his inputs than to deny the value of a definite gain.

Lerner's (1965) findings are consistent with this hypothesis. Observers were presented with a situation in which chance determined which one of two workers would be paid for his efforts. Lerner found that the recipient of chance reward was perceived as making a greater contribution to the group task.

When the inputs of the over-rewarded party are counter-normative and negative and guilt is clear, cognitive re-appraisals that serve to reduce perceived inequity may be more likely to involve enhanced perception of the actor's positive personality characteristics and/or attributions of responsibility for the actor's negative acts away from him than denial of the wrongness of the act. That third parties are not likely to deny the wrongness of the act is suggested by reports that even juvenile delinquents (Sykes & Matza, 1957) and con men (Maurer, 1963) do not deny the wrongness of their criminal activities. Sykes and
Matza, however, report that juvenile delinquents are quick to point out the situational and environmental factors responsible for their delinquent behaviors. Vidmar (1972) reports that subjects who permitted a harm-doer to escape too lightly subsequently evaluated the defendant as less bad and as more likeable than did subjects who did not let the defendant off too lightly. On this basis, it may be expected that the over-rewarded harm-doer will be perceived as more attractive and/or held less personally responsible for the event.

Hypothesis 6: Third parties will restore psychological equity for an under-rewarded party by cognitively re-appraising inputs so they are commensurate with outcomes. In this case, the third party may devalue the inputs of the under-rewarded party in order to convince himself that the situation is equitable.

A series of experiments by Lerner and his colleagues (e.g., Lerner & Matthews, 1967; Lerner & Simmons, 1966; Lerner, 1971) has demonstrated that observers who cannot restore victims' positive outcomes restore psychological equity by devaluing victims' inputs. In general, psychological equity for a victim may be restored by derogating the victim's personal characteristics or by blaming the victim for his own misfortune (Lerner, 1970).

Previous investigations have tested "just world" hypotheses in situations where the negative input of another party is the cause of the victim's misfortune. Lincoln & Levinger (1972) demonstrated that third party evaluation of a victim of assault would differ as a function of the consequences of the evaluation for the fate of the victim. Jones & Aronson (1973) investigated the effects of the
respectability of the victim and the seriousness of the crime on attribution of fault to a rape victim and severity of punishment for the criminal. They found that, the more serious the crime and the more attractive the victim, the more severe was the sentence imposed on the offender. They also found, however, that more respectable victims were attributed more blame for the injury than less respectable victims.

These findings thus indicate that punishment of a wrong-doer does not preclude derogation of a victim. Results of the study by Jones and Aronson indicate that devaluation of victims may occur among subjects who are in a position to punish a harm-doer but cannot compensate a victim. This suggests that intervention that provides no real compensation for a victim's loss will elicit derogation of the victim. In these cases, third parties may restore psychological equity by derogating the victim's personal characteristics and/or attributing responsibility for his misfortune to him.
CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF PILOT STUDIES AND PREVIEW OF PRESENT RESEARCH

Hypothetical examples of criminal-victim dyads were used to test predictions concerning third party responses to dyadic inequity. This particular exchange was selected for several reasons. Firstly, the criminal-victim dyad provides an example of inequity resulting from the deliberate exploitation of one party by another. Such dyads are formed when one party uses means that violate moral and legal prohibitions to exploit another. In this dyad, the counter-normative and negative input of the criminal wins him an undeserved positive outcome: the rewards and pleasures gained from the transaction. By contrast, the behavior of the victim does not violate moral or legal prohibitions and he experiences suffering and deprivation. Thus, the inputs of the victim are positive and his outcomes are negative. This dyad thus met the requirements of the research for an exchange in which the inputs of one party were negative, those of the other positive and the valence of the outcome of each party was opposite to that of the input.

A second advantage of the criminal-victim exchange was that it is one in which intervention is commonplace and appropriate. Consequently, subjects were not likely to question the legitimacy of intervention or become suspicious of experimental interest in
questions related to intervention. Additionally, since questions related to crime concern many people, the stimulus situation and experimental tasks seemed likely to possess intrinsic interest for subjects.

Predictions concerning third party restoration of dyadic equity were tested by presenting subjects with different reductions of the inequity. The actual equity and input positivity of various resolutions of inequity were manipulated by the kind of sentence for the criminal and the availability of compensation for the victim.

Different resolutions of the inequity included two possible outcomes for the victim. A positive outcome for the victim was represented by a resolution that made good his losses, either by means of restitution from the criminal or by compensation paid by a provincial fund. The victim's outcome was represented as negative when the resolution of inequity did not make good his losses. The victim's inputs were assumed positive in all cases.

Different sentences represented different inputs and outcomes for the criminal. The rationale for defining different sentences as representing different resolutions of the inequity for the criminal is outlined below.

Whether a sentence prescribing a punishment is represented as positive or negative input from the offender depends on whether the sentence involves active restitution or reparation from the offender, or whether he becomes the passive object of actions carried out by others. Some punishments involve restitution from the offender. A person found guilty of vandalism may, for example, pay the victim
for the damaged property or else repair it. In other cases, restitution may be directed toward some party eligible to "stand in" for the victim. A driver found guilty of manslaughter might, for example, provide a sum of money to the victim's survivors. In other cases, society may "stand in" for the victim and accept restitution on his behalf. For example, a vandal might make amends by donating his services to the up-keep of a public park or a driver might contribute to a traffic safety program. These punishments require the co-operation of the offender in remedying the injustice: the offender "undoes" or compensates for the harm by making amends, either directly to the injured party, or to a representative of the victim, for the offence.

Other punishments do not involve a positive contribution from the offender. Penalties or deprivations are inflicted on the offender in order to make him suffer for his misdeeds. These penalties do not require active restitution from the offender but instead seem directed toward taking revenge on the offender. The terms revenge or retaliation are here used to designate punishments in which the offender is the object rather than the origin of the actions that restore equity. Such punishments are carried out by others and involve constraint. A spanking for an unruly child and a prison sentence for an adult offender are examples of retaliatory or revenge oriented punishments.

In equity terms, punishments that restore equity through restitution appear oriented toward restoring equity by changing the inputs of the harm-doer from negative ones to positive ones. Punishments that restore equity through revenge or retaliation do not restore equity by means of changed input from the offender but instead operate on
A pre-test was conducted to test the conceptual distinction between input- and outcome-related punishments. Subjects were given a brief outline to acquaint them with equity terms. Then they were asked to consider four offences and to make up possible punishments to restore equity. Subjects were directed to prescribe, for each of the four offences, two punishments: one to restore equity by changing the offender's inputs and the other to restore equity by changing the harm-doer's outcomes. The four offences presented to subjects were: a boy who stole his sister's saved allowance and spent the money on movies and treats, a girl who became angry with her sister and unravelled a sweater her sister had been knitting, a man who swindled an elderly widow out of her savings, and a dentist who charged patients exorbitant fees for unnecessary treatments. It was hypothesized that subjects would prescribe restitution for input-related punishments and revenge or retaliatory type penalties for outcome-related punishments.

Twenty-six subjects in the first pre-test completed the task. Each subject suggested a total of eight punishments: two for each of four offences. Each of the 208 punishments suggested by subjects was copied on a separate index card. Two independent raters were presented with the offences and the suggested punishments for each offence.

The raters were instructed to assign each punishment one of five values. Raters were told to consider as restitution punishments that required the active participation of the offender in remedying the
injustice. They were told that such punishments require the offender to "undo" the harm by making amends either directly to the injured party or, in some cases, to a "stand in" for the injured party. Raters were instructed to assign a "1" to punishments that were clearly restitution. Raters were told to consider as revenge or retaliation punishments that prescribed penalties or deprivations inflicted on the offender in order to make him suffer for his misdeeds. Raters were told that these punishments were carried out by others and did not require the co-operation of the offender in order to be carried out. Raters were told to assign a "5" to punishments that were clearly revenge or retaliation. Raters were instructed to assign a "2" to punishments that primarily involved restitution, a "3" to punishments that could not be classified as restitution or retaliation and a "4" to punishments that primarily involved revenge or retaliation. Raters thus assigned each punishment a rating from one to five to indicate their judgments of the activity or passivity of the role of the offender in the restoration of equity.

In one hundred and forty-four cases, judges agreed in identifying punishments as clearly or primarily restitution or as clearly or primarily retaliation. Thus, approximately 69 percent of the items were identified by both judges as restitution or by both judges as retaliation. Judges disagreed on the restitutive or retaliatory nature of 36 (approximately 17 percent) of the punishments. That is, when these items were rated as clearly or primarily restitution by one judge, they were rated as clearly or primarily retaliation by the other judge. In twenty-eight cases, one or both judges indicated that they could not classify a punishment as
either restitution or retaliation. Fourteen of these punishments were rated as neither restitution nor retaliation by both judges while the other fourteen were rated as retaliation or restitution by one judge and as neither by the other judge.

The hypothesis that subjects would prescribe restitution for input-related punishments and revenge or retaliatory type penalties for outcome-related punishments was tested as follows. Each subject suggested eight punishments: four of these were input-related punishments and four were outcome-related punishments. Each of these eight punishments was rated by two judges. Ratings of input-related punishments as restitution or of outcome-related punishments as retaliation were consistent with predictions. Ratings of input-related punishments as retaliation or of outcome-related punishments as restitution were not consistent with predictions. Ratings of punishments as neither restitution nor retaliation were not included in the analysis. On this basis, eighteen of the ratings of input-related punishments and twenty-four of the ratings of outcome-related punishments were discarded. For each subject's set of punishments, the number of ratings of input-related punishments as clearly or primarily restitution and of outcome-related punishments as clearly or primarily retaliation was compared to the number of ratings of input-related punishments as clearly or primarily retaliation and of outcome-related punishments as clearly or primarily restitution. In twenty-three out of twenty-six cases, the number of ratings that were as predicted exceeded the number of ratings that were contrary to predictions. The binomial test indicated that cases in which the number of predicted ratings exceeded the number of non-predicted ones were obtained significantly more often than would be expected by chance \((p < .002)\). These findings support the conceptual
distinction between input- and outcome-related punishments. Punishments that elicit active restitution, to the victim or to society, may be regarded as restoring equity by means of positive input from the offender. Punishments that make the offender the passive object of penalties intended to inflict suffering and deprivation on him restore equity by operating on outcomes.

The accounts of crimes used in the present research all described offences against property. Four sentences were used to represent three different resolutions of the inequity for the harm-doer. These sentences were: (1) making restitution to the victim, (2) paying a fine, (3) a term of imprisonment and, (4) a release. A party responsible for an injury to another may make restitution in any one of a number of ways depending on the nature of the offence and the circumstances. When the crime is against property, an appropriate means of restitution is to pay the victim or his representative a sum of money sufficient to compensate him for his losses. Accordingly, in the present research, restitution involved paying a sum of money directly to the victim. Fine represented the case where restitution was not made directly to the victim but was, instead, received by society on his behalf. Restitution and fine both involve the active participation of the harm-doer in the restoration of equity. Both these sentences call for the harm-doer to co-operate to restore equity by changing his inputs to positive ones. Consequently, both these alternatives are represented as involving positive input from the criminal. Imprisonment is classified as a revenge-oriented punishment that does not require the co-operation of the offender in the restoration of equity and thus does not require that he change his
input to restore equity. Release also does not require that the offender change his inputs. Both these sentences are represented as negative input to signify that the resolution does not require that the harm-doer alter the nature of his prior negative inputs.

In Adams' (1965) equity model, inputs and outcomes were conceptually distinct. A change in one did not affect the other. Thus, restoring equity by altering inputs did not change outcomes. As Pritchard (1969) pointed out, the psychological independence of inputs and outcomes is still an open question. It is possible to argue that an alteration in inputs also alters the psychological valuation of outcomes. This unresolved problem is relevant to the present study. That is, despite empirical evidence supporting the distinction between input-related punishments and outcome-related punishments, it may be argued that a punishment that restores equity by means of positive input from an offender will be perceived as also operating on his outcomes.

For this reason, an attempt was made to define the outcome positivity of sentences independently of the input positivity of sentences. Whether or not the outcome value associated with a particular sentence is represented as a positive or negative one for the offender depends on the perceived favorability, for the offender, of this sentence compared to other sentences the offender could also receive.

Twenty-six subjects in the first pilot study were given a brief general description of a property crime and five possible sentences for it. The five possible sentences were: a term of imprisonment, paying a fine, making restitution to the victim, a term of probation, and a release. Subjects were asked to rate these sentences on two
items intended to assess the perceived favorability, for a criminal, of the various sentences. These items asked subjects to indicate, for each sentence, how desirable the offender would find it compared to other sentences and how much he would prefer it to other sentences if given his choice of the five sentences. Subjects indicated their evaluation of each sentence on each item by circling a number from one to nine. A higher number indicated that a sentence was perceived as being less desired by an offender and as less likely to be chosen by an offender.

The obtained data were subjected to analyses of variance for single factor experiments having repeated measures on the same elements (Winer, 1962). The mean ratings on the two items for each of the five sentences are shown in Table I and the analysis of variance summary tables are presented in Tables II and III. As Tables II and III indicate, obtained differences in ratings of the five sentences on each of the two items were significant.

**TABLE I**

**MEAN RATINGS OF FIVE SENTENCES ON TWO ITEMS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Imprisonment</th>
<th>Fine</th>
<th>Restitution</th>
<th>Probation</th>
<th>Release</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Comparative desirability</td>
<td>8.15</td>
<td>5.27</td>
<td>5.88</td>
<td>2.92</td>
<td>1.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Choice value</td>
<td>8.19</td>
<td>5.08</td>
<td>5.88</td>
<td>2.58</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE II
SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF RATINGS OF CHOICE VALUE, TO THE CRIMINAL, OF FIVE SENTENCES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOURCE</th>
<th>SS</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>MS</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>P</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Between subjects</td>
<td>77.00</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within subjects</td>
<td>1019.20</td>
<td>104</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sentences</td>
<td>827.33</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>206.83</td>
<td>107.72</td>
<td>&lt;.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residual</td>
<td>191.87</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1.92</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1096.20</td>
<td>129</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE III
SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF RATINGS OF PERCEIVED COMPARATIVE DESIRABILITY, TO THE CRIMINAL, OF FIVE SENTENCES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOURCE</th>
<th>SS</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>MS</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>P</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Between subjects</td>
<td>140.83</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within subjects</td>
<td>977.20</td>
<td>104</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sentences</td>
<td>722.88</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>180.72</td>
<td>71.14</td>
<td>&lt;.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residual</td>
<td>254.32</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>2.54</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1118.03</td>
<td>129</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Newman-Keuls method was used to compare obtained ratings for all possible pairs of means. These tests indicated that, for the two items assessing the perceived favorability, for the criminal, of the sentences, all comparisons were significant at the p < .01 level.
except for the fine-restitution comparison.

The ratings of comparative desirability, to the criminal, and of offender preference for various sentences provide empirical support for the proposition that these alternatives differ in perceived favorability or positivity of outcome. That the differences between ratings of fine and restitution were not significant either for desirability or for choice value was in keeping with experimental purposes since these alternatives were conceptualized as being approximate equivalents for the harm-doer but as having different consequences for the victim.

The obtained data thus provided the basis for representing the outcome associated with a particular sentence as a positive or negative one. Imprisonment was rated as the least favorable of all sentences while release was regarded as the most favorable.\(^1\) Fine and restitution were not perceived as differing significantly from one another in favorability for the offender but were regarded as significantly more favorable than imprisonment.

To summarize, the four sentences represented three different resolutions of the inequity for the offender. These resolutions are as outlined below:

1. A term of imprisonment: This sentence is represented as restoring actual equity for the harm-doer. This sentence restores equity with a negative outcome for the offender. It does not require positive input from the offender. Accordingly,

\(^1\)Since Release was rated as significantly more favorable than Probation, the Release alternative was retained as a sentence that did not restore equity by means of positive input or negative outcome for the offender. The Probation alternative was omitted.
imprisonment represents actual equity with negative input and outcome for the harm-doer.

2. Restitution: This sentence is represented as restoring actual equity for the harm-doer. Since the sentence requires that the harm-doer participate in reduction of inequity by making restitution to the victim, his changed input is represented as positive. The outcome associated with this sentence is also represented as positive relative to imprisonment.

3. Fine: This sentence also represents actual equity for the harm-doer. This sentence also requires that the criminal participate in restoring equity. In this case, however, restitution is made to society rather than directly to the victim. Accordingly, this sentence represents actual equity with positive input and, relative to imprisonment, a positive outcome for the harm-doer.

4. Release: This sentence does not restore actual equity for the harm-doer. It does not require that he change his input. Thus, this represents inequity with a positive outcome and negative input for the offender.

The hypotheses outlined in the Introduction were tested in two separate studies. The first study tested predictions, derived from Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3, concerning third party preferences among reductions of inequity. These predictions were tested by presenting subjects in each condition with an account of a simulated criminal case and a set of sentencing alternatives. The sentences represented
resolutions of inequity that varied in actual equity and input positivity. Subjects were asked to indicate the sentences that they would impose in the case. Data concerning subjects' choice of sentences provided a test of predictions derived from Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3. The first study also permitted a test of predictions, derived from Hypothesis 4, concerning satisfaction with different resolutions of inequity. In addition, the study tested predictions regarding the effects of availability of compensation on subjects' evaluations of victims. The conditions included in the study and the predictions tested are described in detail in the next section.

In the second study, subjects were not permitted to make a sentencing decision and thus had no power to determine the fates of the parties to the inequity. In this study, the summary of the simulated case described a sentence that had been imposed in the case. This study permitted a test of a prediction, derived from Hypothesis 4, concerning satisfaction with solutions among on-lookers rather than decision-makers. The study also tested predictions, derived from Hypotheses 5 and 6, concerning the influence of different resolutions of inequity on subsequent evaluations of plaintiffs and defendants. The conditions included in this study and the predictions tested are also detailed in the next section.
CHAPTER III

METHOD

STUDY I

OVERVIEW

STIMULUS MATERIALS

Subjects were presented with a summary of a simulated criminal case. The case accounts contained a brief outline of the offence. This was followed by summaries of testimony given by the plaintiff, defendant and various witnesses in the case. All accounts specified the amount of the victim's loss and, in addition, clearly indicated that the defendant had been found guilty of the offence.

The offences described in the case accounts were crimes against property that did not involve physical harm to any person. In all cases, the account made clear that the victim would not be compensated for his loss by a private source such as an insurance company. Confining the crimes to offences against property ensured that the loss suffered by the victim could be tangibly specified and could be made good by financial compensation if funds were available. Included in the studies were accounts of three different crimes: a fraud, a theft, and an act of vandalism. The type of crime was varied to

\[2\text{See Appendix A for a copy of the Stimulus Materials for Study I.}\]
strengthen the generalizability of the findings by ensuring that the observed responses were not specific to a single account or a particular crime. Each account was represented an equal number of times in each condition in the study.

Pre-tests were conducted with pilot subjects to determine whether the case accounts were suitable for experimental purposes. Data were collected to: 1) compare the attractiveness, when they were presented independently of their subsequent criminal-victim roles, of stimulus persons to be identified in each account as plaintiff and defendant and, 2) ensure that the evidence to be supplied in each case account was sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt. A report of the pilot study is presented in Appendix B. This report also contains a brief account of pre-tests conducted to assess the suitability of dependent measures used in the present research.

CONDITIONS AND PREDICTIONS

The number and kind of resolutions of actual equity available to subjects was varied by presenting subjects in each condition with a different set of sentencing alternatives. The four conditions in the first study were as outlined below. Subjects in each condition were asked to indicate which of two alternatives they would prefer to impose in the case.

1. Fine vs Imprisonment Condition: Subjects in this condition were presented with alternatives of sentencing the criminal to pay a fine or serve a term of imprisonment. Both alternatives represented
actual equity for the criminal: the first sentence required that equity be restored by means of positive input from the criminal while the second did not alter his input. Both alternatives limited subjects to restoring actual equity only for the criminal: neither alternative restored the victim's positive outcomes.

This condition provided a test of Hypothesis 1 which stated that when alternative solutions to inequitable situations were equal in actual equity, third parties would prefer alternatives that maximized positive input. The prediction derived from this hypothesis was that subjects would choose the Fine alternative because it was greater in input positivity than the Imprisonment one.

2. Restitution vs Fine Condition: Subjects in this condition were presented with alternatives of ordering the criminal to make restitution to the victim or else to pay a fine. Both of these sentences represented positive input from the criminal and assumed positive input from the victim but restitution restored actual equity for the victim and was, therefore, greater in actual equity than the Fine condition.

This condition tested Hypothesis 2 which stated that when alternative solutions to inequitable situations were equal in input positivity, third parties would prefer alternatives that were greater in actual equity. The prediction derived from this hypothesis was that subjects would choose the Restitution alternative because it was greater in actual equity.

3. Imprisonment vs Release Condition: This condition presented subjects with alternatives of releasing the criminal or of sentencing
him to serve a term of imprisonment. Neither alternative required the criminal to alter his input. Thus, both sentences left the criminal's negative input unchanged. The Imprisonment alternative restored actual equity for the harm-doer by changing his outcomes to negative ones while the Release alternative represented continued inequity with a positive outcome for the criminal. Neither option restored the victim's positive outcomes and, accordingly, subjects could not achieve actual equity for the victim. This condition permitted subjects to resolve the situation so as to achieve actual equity with a negative outcome for the criminal or to maintain the inequity with a positive outcome for the criminal.

This condition provided a test of Hypothesis 2. The prediction was that subjects would select the Imprisonment alternative because it was greater in actual equity.

4. Imprisonment with Compensation vs Fine Condition: Subjects in this condition were presented with alternatives of sentencing the criminal to a term of imprisonment and awarding the victim compensation to be paid by a Provincial Fund or of ordering the criminal to pay a fine without compensation to the victim. The first alternative did not involve positive input from the criminal but did restore actual equity for both parties to the offence. The second alternative involved positive input from the criminal and produced actual equity for him but did not restore actual equity for the victim. This condition thus permitted subjects to maximize actual equity by selecting the Imprisonment with Compensation alternative or to maximize input positivity by choosing the second option.
This condition provided a test of Hypothesis 3. This hypothesis was that when alternative solutions to inequitable situations were such that preferences for maximizing actual equity conflicted with preferences for maximizing input positivity, third parties would prefer to achieve maximum input positivity rather than maximum actual equity. The prediction was that subjects would select the Fine alternative which maximized input positivity.

This study also permitted a test of Hypothesis 4. This hypothesis was that, when third parties were permitted to resolve inequity so as to satisfy preferences for actual equity and for input positivity, third parties would report more satisfaction with the solution than when resolution of inequity satisfied only one preference or involved satisfying one preference at the expense of the other.

Two conditions, Fine vs Imprisonment and Restitution vs Fine, permitted subjects to select alternatives that represented input positivity and actual equity. The Imprisonment vs Release condition permitted subjects to restore actual equity but not to achieve input positivity. The Imprisonment with Compensation vs Fine condition presented subjects with a conflict between actual equity and input positivity. These considerations led to the prediction, derived from Hypothesis 4, that subjects would express greater satisfaction in conditions where alternatives permitted selection of solutions that increased actual equity and input positivity (Fine vs Imprisonment and Restitution vs Fine conditions) than in conditions where alternatives satisfied only one preference or made salient conflict between preferences (Imprisonment vs Release and Imprisonment with
Compensation vs Fine conditions).

The study also permitted a test of Hypothesis 6 which stated that third parties would restore psychological equity for an under-rewarded party by devaluation of the inputs of the under-rewarded party. The prediction derived from this hypothesis was that victims who did not receive financial compensation for losses would be devalued in comparison to victims who did receive such compensation. Neither of the alternative sentences in the Fine vs Imprisonment and the Imprisonment vs Release conditions provided financial compensation for victims' losses. Accordingly, these two conditions did not permit subjects to compensate victims. Although one of the alternative sentences in the Imprisonment with Compensation vs Fine condition did make available financial compensation for victims' losses, subjects were expected to choose the Fine alternative that did not compensate victims. In this condition, however, subjects' responses to victims might be affected by a feeling of personal responsibility for depriving victims of deserved compensation. For this reason, this condition was not included in the proposed test of Hypothesis 6.

The Restitution vs Fine condition also made available an alternative that provided financial compensation for victims' losses. This condition could be compared to the two that did not provide for such compensation. The prediction was that subjects in the Fine vs Imprisonment and the Imprisonment vs Release conditions would rate the victim as less attractive and/or as more to blame for the offence than would subjects in the Restitution vs Fine condition.
SUBJECTS

The subjects who participated in the study were volunteers from Psychology classes at the University of British Columbia. The design for the experiment called for a total of 120 subjects: 30 in each of four conditions with an equal proportion of male and female subjects in each condition. Subjects were tested in groups ranging in size from two to four persons. All subjects in any particular group were of the same sex. Different conditions were represented within groups and the experimenter was unaware of the conditions that were represented within a group. A total of 55 groups took part in the study: 11 contained four subjects, 23 contained three subjects and 19 contained two subjects. One group of three subjects did not complete the experiment due to a procedural error.

The nature of the study was such that, for a subject's responses to be meaningful, it was necessary that he appreciate fully several aspects of the stimulus situation. A subject who read the case account too hastily might, for example, confuse the identities and roles of the parties to the offence or fail to understand the nature of the offence. A subject who, for example, failed to appreciate the deception involved in the fraud might, incorrectly, conclude that the defendant had borrowed the money from the plaintiff and had subsequently been unable to repay the loan. Alternatively, a subject might fail to take note of the value of the property involved in the crime. Failure to perceive, with a reasonable degree of accuracy, the amount involved could lead to differential perceptions of the severity of the crime or of the victim's loss. Finally, the choice of sentences available to
subjects in different conditions constituted the major manipulation of the study. Success of this manipulation was dependent on subjects’ appreciation of the consequences, for plaintiffs and defendants, of the different reductions of inequity represented by these sentences.

For these reasons, it was decided, on an a priori basis, to include in the study a check on subjects’ recall of the facts of the case and to discard data from subjects who failed to answer these items correctly. Thus, for a subject’s data to be included in the analysis, it was necessary that he answer correctly items asking him to name the defendant and to specify the nature of the crime. Subjects were also asked to state the approximate value of the property involved in the offence. A subject’s data were discarded if he recalled the amount, which was $2,500, as less than $2,000, or as greater than $3,000. A fairly demanding multiple choice item tested subjects’ understanding of the sentences available to them. This item presented subjects with a brief description of five possible sentences for the offence. Subjects were requested to indicate which two had been available for them to choose from when they sentenced the defendant. Unless a subject could identify the two sentences which had been available to him, his data were not included in the analysis.

A total of 148 subjects completed the experimental tasks. Data from 25 subjects were discarded because these subjects failed to answer correctly one or more of the recall items. One subject failed to recall the name of the defendant and nine erred in their estimates of the value of the property involved in the offence. Seventeen subjects failed to indicate correctly the sentencing alternatives available to
them. One male and three females in the Imprisonment vs Release condition; two males and six females in the Fine vs Imprisonment condition; one male and three females in the Imprisonment with Compensation vs Fine condition; and one female in the Restitution vs Fine condition failed to indicate correctly which two sentencing alternatives had been available to them. Data from these subjects were eliminated on the basis of their responses on the test items without examination of their other responses. In order to maintain 30 subjects in each of the four conditions, one subject's data were randomly eliminated from each of the Imprisonment vs Release, Fine vs Imprisonment and Restitution vs Fine conditions.

PROCEDURE

The experimental setting permitted up to four subjects at a time to participate in the study. The room used for the study is approximately nine feet long and nine feet wide. It was furnished with a single table which was approximately six feet long and three feet wide. Five chairs were placed around the table: two at each side and one at an end. Subjects were not separated from one another or from the experimenter by screens or partitions. The space permitted subjects in all groups to work comfortably at the task without being cramped or crowded. The presence of the experimenter in the room precluded any discussion of the task among subjects.

Once all subjects comprising a group had arrived, subjects were escorted to the experimental room and seated. The experimenter began each session by distributing copies of the UBC Department of Psychology
"Basic Rights and Privileges of Human Subjects." This document was reviewed with each group. During the review of the rights and privileges of human subjects, subjects were instructed to make up code names for themselves and to place the code name on each booklet they completed. The experimenter explained that this would permit her to keep each subject's data together yet ensure anonymity. Once subjects had had an opportunity to ask any questions about their rights and privileges or the procedure for using the code name, the experimental tasks were begun.

The experimental tasks were presented to the subjects in three parts. The first part consisted of a booklet composed of a summary of a simulated case followed by materials to measure major dependent variables. The first three pages of each booklet contained an account of one of the offences. The fourth page provided the rationale and instructions for choosing one of two possible sentences for the offence. Subjects were instructed to read the descriptions of two possible sentences and to indicate which one they would prefer to impose in the case presented to them. The next page outlined the two sentences which represented different resolutions of the inequity. Each subject received one of four different sets of sentencing alternatives. The

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3 See Appendix C for a copy of the UBC Department of Psychology "Basic Rights and Privileges of Human Subjects".

4 See Appendix D for a copy of the Sentencing Instructions for Study I.

5 See Appendix E for the four sets of sentencing alternatives in Study I.
different sets of sentences varied the input positivity and actual equity of solutions available to subjects. As a control measure, there were two orders of presentation of available sentences in each condition. Half of the subjects in each condition received the sentences in one order; this order was reversed for the remaining subjects. Both sentences were presented on the same page. To ensure that subjects would indicate their preferred sentence before proceeding to subsequent sections of the booklet, the instruction "Please complete this page before you turn to the next one" was hand-printed at the bottom of the page.

The sixth page instructed subjects to indicate how satisfactory they found the resolution of the situation represented by their chosen sentence. Satisfaction was assessed by means of a 10-centimeter line labelled "completely satisfactory" at one end and "completely unsatisfactory" at the other end. Subjects were instructed to draw a vertical line through the scale at the point that best represented how satisfactory they found the resolution of the situation represented by the sentence they selected. The ten centimeter scale on which subjects were to indicate degree of satisfaction was presented on the same page as these instructions. Again, at the bottom of the page, was the hand-printed reminder: "Please complete this page before you turn to the next one."

Pages 7, 8, 9 and 10 contained instructions and scales for rating

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6See Appendix F for a copy of the Satisfaction Scale for Study I.
the attractiveness of defendants and plaintiffs. Page 7 presented instructions for using nine-point semantic differential type scales. These instructions were adapted from Osgood, Suci, and Tannenbaum (1957). Page 8 contained instructions specific to the present experiment. Subjects were requested to rate the stimulus persons in the order in which they were presented and to complete each set of ratings before going on to the next one. Subjects were also instructed to put the name of the individual being rated in the spaces provided on the pages containing the rating scales. The final paragraph instructed subjects to work at fairly high speed through the scales. These final instructions were also adapted from Osgood, Suci and Tannenbaum (1957).

The next two pages each contained the 15 bi-polar adjective pairs comprising the scale developed by Lerner (1965). A stimulus person's score on each item could range from one (negative evaluation) to nine (positive evaluation). Ratings on these items were summed to yield an overall index of attractiveness. The range of possible scores was, therefore, from 15 to 135. A higher score indicates a more positive rating. In order to control for possible effects of rating order, half of the subjects in each condition were directed to rate the plaintiff first and then the defendant; this order was reversed for the remaining subjects. The pages containing scales for rating stimulus persons contained spaces for subjects to indicate the name of the character (defendant or plaintiff) being rated.

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7See Appendix G for Instructions and Scales for Rating Participants' Attractiveness.
The purpose of asking subjects to supply the names of defendants and plaintiffs was to ensure that subjects would be clear as to the harm-doer or victim identity of the individual they were rating. Hand-printed instructions at the top of the pages reminded subjects to: "Please complete this page before you turn to the next one." The bottom of the page contained the hand-written reminder: "N. B. Be sure to put the name of the person you are rating in the space provided at the top of the page."

The last two pages of each booklet presented instructions for responding to items intended to assess subjects' perceptions of the moral wrongness of the offence, the amount of blame attributable to the victim and the perceived responsibility of the criminal for the offence. The first page explained how subjects were to use the scales: the second page presented items intended to measure variables of interest.

Two items, adapted from Kaufman (1970), assessed subjects' perceptions of the moral wrongness of the offence. The first one asked subjects to complete the item: "As a question not of law but of morality, Dory's actions were:" by circling a number ranging from one for "as wrong as possible" to nine for "very right". The second item began: "Quite apart from legal aspects, Dory". Subjects responded to this item by circling a number ranging from one for "did not do anything wrong" to nine for "did very wrong". These items were scored and summed so that possible scores ranged from

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8 See Appendix H for a copy of Responsibility and Blame Scales.
two to eighteen. The lower the score, the greater the perceived wrongness of the act.

The amount of blame attributed to the victim was assessed by asking subjects to respond to the question: "How much do you think the plaintiff is to blame for what happened?" Subjects responded to this item by circling a number ranging from one for "not at all" to nine for "completely".

Two items assessed the perceived responsibility of the criminal for the offence. Subjects were asked to indicate whether they agreed or disagreed with the following two statements: (1) "Dory's acts were a result of the circumstances in which he found himself" and (2) "Dory is more a victim of circumstances than a criminal". Subjects indicated the extent of their agreement with these two items by circling a number on a scale ranging from one for "agree completely" to nine for "disagree completely".

The experimenter introduced the first task by stating:

"I am interested in finding out some things about how people judge criminal offences and how they make sentencing decisions. This questionnaire (the experimenter displayed first booklet) consists of a case summary followed by questions about various aspects of the case. The case summary contains a brief outline of a criminal offence and the testimony given by witnesses in the case. What I'd like you to do is read over the case summary and then give your opinions about it.

"There are three main sets of questions asking your opinions about different aspects of the case. In front of each set of questions are instructions for using the scales. Please read over the instructions and, if you find the instructions are clear, complete that part of the questionnaire and then turn to the next part. If you find the instructions are not clear or if you have any questions, let me know."
Please complete each part of the questionnaire before going on to the next one.

"Are there any questions? (Pause). In that case, I'll distribute the questionnaire and let you begin. Remember — when you finish the booklet — put your code name on it and turn it over — like this (experimenter demonstrated) — face down.

After all subjects in a group had completed the booklet comprising the first part of the experimental task, the second part was introduced. As the last subject completed and turned over his booklet, the experimenter glanced up from the book she had been reading and said:

"Good. Now — the next thing I'd like you to do is — without referring back to your first booklet — complete this short questionnaire.\(^9\) (The experimenter produced and displayed a copy of the questionnaire.) These four questions (pointing) ask you to recall some facts about the case. Look over this one (pointing to number seven on the questionnaire) carefully. It lists five possible sentences for the offence and asks you to recall the two you had to pick from when you sentenced the defendant. These questions (pointing) ask you what you would do if you were imposing these sentences in the case. This last question asks why you picked the sentence you chose. Answer it very briefly — with just a sentence or two — and don't worry about spelling or grammar. Are there any questions? (Pause). Let me know if you have any questions. Remember — when you finish — put your code name on top of the page and turn it over — face down — on top of your first booklet.

The second part of the task consisted of a single page containing four items testing subjects' recall of the case and the sentencing alternatives available to them as well as four items asking for subjects' opinions regarding possible penalties and reasons for

\(^9\)See Appendix I for a copy of the Short Questionnaire for Study I.
preferring one alternative to another. The three items included to test subjects' recall of the case asked them to state the name of the defendant, the nature of the offence and the amount of the victim's loss. The last item asked subjects to read over five possible sentences for the offence and indicate which two had been available for them to choose from when they sentenced the defendant.

Subjects were asked to specify the magnitude of the penalties they would impose on the criminal by responding to the following three questions: 1) If the defendant were to be sentenced to a term of imprisonment for the offence, how long a term should he serve for this offence?, 2) If the defendant were to pay a fine rather than serve time in prison, what amount of money should he pay as a fine?, and, 3) If the defendant were to pay a sum of money to the rightful owner of the lost or damaged property rather than pay a fine or serve time in prison, what amount of money should he pay to the plaintiff as restitution? Subjects were also asked to explain their choice of a sentence. This item was included as an open-ended measure that might provide insight into subjects' reasons for selecting or rejecting various alternatives.

When all subjects in a group had completed the short questionnaire, the experimenter produced copies of the Thurstone-Wang "Attitude toward Punishment of Criminals" Scale with the comment:

10 See Appendix J for a copy of the Thurstone-Wang "Attitude toward Punishment of Criminals" Scale.
"This is the last thing I have for you to do. (Pause). What I'd like you to do is read over the statements in this booklet. Put a check-mark if you agree with a statement, a cross if you disagree with it and a question mark if you cannot decide about it. That's a check-mark if you agree, a cross if you disagree and a question mark if you can't decide.

During these instructions, the experimenter demonstrated for each subject by writing check-marks, crosses and question marks in the appropriate places in the instructions on the top of the first page of each copy of the attitude scale. After each subject had been given a copy of the scale, the experimenter said: "Again — when you're finished — remember to put your code name on your booklet and turn it over face down." This scale was included in order to obtain an indication of subjects' attitudes toward punishment of criminals. In view of the nature of the stimulus situation, this measure appeared to have some potential use as an aid to interpreting or explaining possible findings.

As the last subject in a group finished the Thurstone-Wang "Attitude toward Punishment of Criminals" Scale, the experimenter said:

"And finally, could you please take a minute or two and — on the back of that last booklet — the one you just turned over — write down your ideas about the purpose of the experiment. That is, tell me what you think the study is trying to find out. Remember not to worry about spelling or grammar."

After completion of the last task, subjects were provided with

11 Subjects were scheduled to participate in the experiment when they had a free hour between classes. This time was sufficient for most groups to complete the experiment with a few minutes to spare. Some groups were later in starting because subjects arrived late. In order to avoid inconveniencing subjects in such groups by, for example, making them late for their next class, this final request was omitted in some instances.
an explanation of the purpose of the experiment and were given an opportunity to ask questions. Subjects were requested to keep confidential information about the nature of the stimulus materials and the purposes and hypotheses of the experiment. The experimenter also mentioned that the accounts of crimes used in the study were fictitious. At the conclusion of the discussion, the experimenter announced that a brief description of the findings would be available to participants in the study and addresses were obtained from subjects who wished to receive one.

STUDY II

OVERVIEW

STIMULUS MATERIALS

Subjects were presented with slightly revised versions of the summaries of simulated criminal cases used in Study I. The case accounts were revised so that the past, rather than the present, tense was used where this was appropriate. Additionally, the case summaries for this study described a sentence that had been imposed in the case.

CONDITIONS AND PREDICTIONS

This study was intended to test predictions concerning responses

12 See Appendix K for a copy of the Stimulus Materials for Study II.
to resolutions of inequity that varied in actual equity and input positivity. Three different resolutions of the inequity were represented by the sentences described.\textsuperscript{13} The three conditions included in the experiment are outlined below.

1. Release Condition: Subjects in this condition were told that the criminal had been released. This represented a continuation of the inequity with a positive outcome and negative input for the criminal. The input of the victim was assumed positive and, since the sentence did not provide compensation for his losses, his outcome was represented as negative.

2. Imprisonment with Compensation Condition: Subjects in this condition were told that the criminal was sentenced to serve a term of imprisonment. Subjects were told to assume that the full term would be served and that no parole would be considered. Subjects were also told that the victim received compensation for the loss and that the compensation was paid by a Provincial Fund. This represented actual equity for both parties to the offence.

3. Restitution Condition: Subjects were told that the criminal was sentenced to a term of imprisonment equal to that imposed in the Imprisonment with Compensation condition but that the sentence was suspended in view of the court order that the criminal make restitution to the victim. This condition also restored actual equity for both parties to the offence.

This study permitted tests of Hypotheses 4, 5 and 6.

\textsuperscript{13}See Appendix I for copies of Sentences for Study II.
The three conditions in this study represented reductions of dyadic inequity that varied in actual equity and input positivity. Restitution and Imprisonment with Compensation restored actual equity for both parties to the offence while Release restored actual equity for neither party. Restitution represented restoration with greater input positivity than did Imprisonment with Compensation. Therefore, the prediction derived from Hypothesis 4 was that subjects would express greatest satisfaction in the Restitution condition, less satisfaction in the Imprisonment with Compensation condition and least satisfaction in the Release condition.

Hypothesis 5 stated that a third party would restore psychological equity for an over-rewarded party by enhancing his evaluation of the inputs of the over-rewarded party in order to convince himself that the situation was equitable. Two conditions, Imprisonment with Compensation and Restitution, restored actual equity for criminals. The Release condition did not restore actual equity for the criminal. Therefore, it was predicted that subjects in the Release condition would restore psychological equity for the criminal by enhancing his personal characteristics and/or holding him less responsible for the offence than would subjects in the Imprisonment with Compensation condition.

Hypothesis 6 was that third parties would restore psychological equity for an under-rewarded party by devaluation of the inputs of the under-rewarded party. Two conditions, Restitution and Imprisonment with Compensation, provided victims with financial compensation for losses. The Release condition deprived victims of both vindication and financial compensation. Therefore, it was predicted that subjects in the Release condition would rate victims as less attractive and/or as
more responsible for the offence than would subjects in the Restitution and Imprisonment with Compensation conditions.

SUBJECTS

The subjects who took part in the study were volunteers from Psychology classes at the University of British Columbia. The design for this study called for a total of 48 subjects: 16 in each of three conditions with an equal proportion of male and female subjects in each of three conditions. Subjects were again brought into the experimental room in groups ranging in size from two to four persons. All subjects in any particular group were of the same sex. Different conditions were represented within groups and the experimenter was unaware of the conditions that were represented within a group. A total of 23 groups took part in the study: 14 groups contained two persons, eight groups contained three persons, and one group contained four persons. Thus, a total of 56 subjects took part in the study.

For reasons similar to those outlined in connection with the first study, four items were used as guidelines to determine whether or not a subject's data would be included in the analysis. Subjects were asked to recall the name of the defendant, the nature of the offence and the approximate value of the property involved in the offence. The last item asked subjects to read over descriptions of three possible sentences for the offence and to indicate which one had been imposed on the defendant. A subject was required to recall the name of the defendant, the nature of the crime, the sentence imposed in the case and to specify that the loss was greater than $2,000 or less.
than $3,000, in order for his data to be retained. As before, a subject's responses to these items were examined and a decision to accept or discard the data was made without reference to his responses to other items.

Out of the total of 56 subjects who took part in the study, data from four were discarded because one of the recall items was not completed correctly. One subject in the Imprisonment with Compensation condition failed to recall the defendant's name and three subjects in the Restitution condition indicated that the defendant had been released. To facilitate analysis, data from four remaining subjects were eliminated in order to have equal numbers of subjects in conditions.

PROCEDURE

The room used for the second study was the same one used for the first study. Again, copies of the "Basic Rights and Privileges of Human Subjects" were given to subjects and the contents reviewed prior to presentation of the tasks. As in the first study, subjects were requested to make up code names and to place these names on completed materials.

The experimenter introduced the first task by stating:

"I am interested in finding out some things about how people judge criminal offences. This questionnaire (experimenter displayed first booklet) consists of a case summary followed by questions about various aspects of the case. The case summary contains a brief outline of the offence followed by the testimony given by witnesses in the case. What I'd like you to do is read over the case summary and then give your opinions about it."
There are two main sets of questions asking your opinions about different aspects of the case. In front of each set of questions are instructions for using the scales. Please read over the instructions and, if you find the instructions clear, complete that part of the questionnaire and then turn to the next part. If you find the instructions are not clear or if you have any questions, let me know. Please complete each part of the questionnaire before going on to the next one.

"Are there any questions? (Pause). In that case, I'll distribute the questionnaire and let you begin. Remember — when you finish the booklet — put your code name on it and turn it over — like this (experimenter demonstrated) — face down.

When these instructions were completed, the booklet comprising the first part of the task was given to subjects. The booklet was composed of the summary of the simulated case and a description of a sentence imposed in the case. Subjects in each condition received a description of a sentence different from the one described in other conditions. The different sentences represented resolutions of the original inequity that varied in input positivity and actual equity.

The booklet also included the dependent measures for the second study. These were, with two exceptions, the same as in the first study. Materials for assessing subjects' choice of sentence were, of course, omitted. The instructions for indicating degree of satisfaction with the solution were also revised. \(^{14}\) The remainder of the booklet contained the same materials in the same form as in Study I.

After all subjects in a group had completed the booklet

\(^{14}\)See Appendix M for a copy of the Satisfaction Scale for Study II.
comprising the first part of the task, the second part was introduced. As the last subject completed and turned over his booklet, the experimenter produced and displayed a copy of the questionnaire containing items to test subjects' recall of the details of cases and to assess their opinions regarding various penalties. The experimenter said:

"Good. Now the next thing I'd like you to do is — without referring back to your first booklet — complete this short questionnaire. Answer this (pointing) last question fairly briefly — with just a sentence or two — and don't worry about spelling or grammar. Let me know if you have any questions. And remember — when you finish — put your name on the top of the page and turn it over — face down — on top of your first booklet.

The questionnaire was then given to subjects. The questionnaire asked for essentially the same information as it did in the first experiment. The final two items on the questionnaire were revised so as to be appropriate for the second study. The revised questionnaire is shown in Appendix N.

When all subjects had completed the short questionnaire, the Thurstone-Wang "Attitude toward Punishment of Criminals" Scale was distributed. The comments and instructions accompanying distribution of the scale were the same as in the first study.

When the last task had been completed, the experimenter said:

"Sometimes people form hypotheses about the purpose of an experiment — or suspect that deception is involved. What I'd like you to do is — if you think the experiment has involved deception or if you've formed some hypotheses about the purpose of the experiment — write out on the back of the last booklet what you think the deception involves or what the real purpose of the study is.

Once subjects had had time to write out their comments, they
were provided with an explanation of the purpose of the experiment and
given an opportunity to ask questions about it. Subjects were requested
to keep confidential information about the nature of the stimulus
materials and the purpose and hypotheses of the study. The experimenter
also mentioned that the accounts of crimes used in the study were
fictitious. At the conclusion of the discussion, the experimenter
collected addresses from subjects interested in receiving brief
descriptions of the findings.
CHAPTER IV

RESULTS

STUDY I

Subjects in each condition were presented with two sentences that represented different resolutions of the inequity and asked to indicate which one they would impose in the case. Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3 predicted that, in each of the four conditions, one alternative would be selected significantly more frequently than the other. The binomial test was used to determine whether, within each condition, the predicted alternative was chosen significantly more frequently than the non-predicted alternative. Table IV shows the number of choices of predicted and non-predicted alternatives in each condition as well as the probability of the smaller of the obtained values.

TABLE IV

FREQUENCY OF SELECTION OF PREDICTED AND NON-PREDICTED ALTERNATIVES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>Number of Choices of Predicted Alternative</th>
<th>Number of Choices of Non-Predicted Alternative</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Imprisonment vs Release</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>&lt; .001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fine vs Imprisonment</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>&lt; .001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restitution vs Fine</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>&lt; .001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imprisonment with</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compensation vs Fine</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As reference to Table IV indicates, the three predictions based on Hypotheses 1 and 2 were supported. Hypothesis 1 stated that when alternative solutions to inequitable situations were equal in actual equity, third parties would prefer alternatives that maximized input positivity. The prediction derived from this hypothesis was that subjects in the Fine vs Imprisonment condition would select the Fine alternative significantly more frequently than the Imprisonment one. The predicted alternative was chosen twenty-five times and the non-predicted alternative was selected five times. The binomial test indicated that the probability of obtaining this result by chance was \(<.001\).

Two predictions were derived from Hypothesis 2 which stated that when alternative solutions to inequitable situations were equal in input positivity, third parties would prefer alternatives that maximized actual equity. The first prediction derived from this hypothesis was that subjects in the Imprisonment vs Release condition would select the Imprisonment alternative more frequently than the Release alternative. Out of a total of thirty subjects, six selected the Release alternative. As Table IV shows, the binomial test indicated that the probability of obtaining this result by chance was \(<.001\). The second prediction derived from Hypothesis 2 was that subjects in the Restitution vs Fine condition would prefer the Restitution alternative. Reference to Table IV indicates that this prediction was also supported. The probability of obtaining by chance the observed number of choices of the non-predicted alternative is \(<.001\).

Hypothesis 3 stated that when alternative solutions to inequitable situations were such that preferences for maximizing equity and
for maximizing input positivity conflicted, third parties would prefer to achieve maximum input positivity rather than maximum equity. The prediction derived from this hypothesis was that subjects in the Imprisonment with Compensation vs Fine condition would select the Fine alternative. As Table IV shows, the data did not support this prediction. The predicted alternative was chosen less frequently than the non-predicted one. The implications of this finding will be considered in the Discussion section.

The fourth hypothesis was that third parties would be more satisfied with solutions when alternatives permitted them to satisfy preferences for actual equity and for input positivity than when only one preference could be satisfied or when preferences conflicted. This hypothesis provided the basis for the prediction that expressed satisfaction with the solution would be greater in the Fine vs Imprisonment and Restitution vs Fine conditions than in the Imprisonment vs Release and Imprisonment with Compensation vs Fine conditions.

Subjects indicated degree of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the solution by breaking a ten centimeter line labelled "completely satisfactory" at one end and "completely unsatisfactory" at the other. Scores, measured in millimeters, could range from 0 to 100: a higher score indicated greater satisfaction with the solution. Cell means for male and female subjects in each condition are shown in Table V.
TABLE V
CELL MEANS FOR SATISFACTION WITH SOLUTION EXPRESSED BY MALE AND FEMALE SUBJECTS IN EACH CONDITION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>Male (N)</th>
<th>Female (N)</th>
<th>Condition Mean (N)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Imprisonment vs Release</td>
<td>57.86</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>39.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fine vs Imprisonment</td>
<td>60.43</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>66.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restitution vs Fine</td>
<td>78.93</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>74.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imprisonment with Compensation vs Fine</td>
<td>36.13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>51.50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The data were submitted to a four (conditions) by two (sex of subject) analysis of variance. Since each condition contained an equal proportion of male and female subjects, a modified conventional analysis (Kirk, 1969, p. 201) was carried out. Table VI shows the analysis of variance summary table.

TABLE VI
SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF SUBJECTS' EXPRESSED SATISFACTION WITH SOLUTION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOURCE</th>
<th>SS</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>MS</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>P</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A (Conditions)</td>
<td>19656.41</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6552.14</td>
<td>14.26</td>
<td>&lt;.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B (Sex of Subject)</td>
<td>4.81</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.81</td>
<td>&lt;1.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A x B</td>
<td>4665.60</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1555.20</td>
<td>3.39</td>
<td>&lt;.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within Cell</td>
<td>51442.29</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>459.31</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>75769.12</td>
<td>119</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As Table VI shows, the obtained F values for both the main effect for conditions (F = 14.26, d.f. = 3, 112; p < .01) and the conditions x sex interaction (F = 3.39; d.f. = 3, 112; p < .05) reached conventional levels of significance. The overall pattern of means shown in Table V indicates that satisfaction was greatest in conditions where alternatives permitted selection of solutions that increased actual equity and input positivity (the Fine vs Imprisonment and Restitution vs Fine Conditions) and least when alternatives permitted subjects to satisfy only one preference or made salient conflict between preferences (the Imprisonment vs Release and Imprisonment with Compensation vs Fine conditions). That satisfaction with the solution would be greater in the former two conditions than in the latter two had been predicted. The planned comparison indicated that the difference was significant (t = 6.08; d.f. = 112; p < .01).

The significant sex x conditions interaction was not predicted. The interaction suggests that, although the expected main effect appeared and the overall planned comparison was as expected, both these results may require qualification. Inspection of the cell means shown in Table V suggests that the significant interaction is due to differences between male and female subjects in expressed satisfaction in the two conditions where least satisfaction with the solution had been predicted: the Imprisonment vs Release and the Imprisonment with Compensation vs Fine conditions. Both males
and females expressed most satisfaction in the Restitution vs Fine condition and next most satisfaction in the Fine vs Imprisonment condition. Males in the Imprisonment with Compensation vs Fine condition, however, reported least satisfaction while females reported least satisfaction with the Imprisonment vs Release condition. This unexpected interaction will be pursued in the next Chapter.

Subjects in two conditions, the Imprisonment vs Release and Fine vs Imprisonment conditions, were limited to alternatives that permitted only partial reduction of inequity. These subjects could not provide victims with real compensation for losses. Hypothesis 5 stated that third parties who were powerless to restore actual equity for another would restore psychological equity. This hypothesis led to the prediction that subjects in these two conditions would either derogate plaintiffs or blame them for their misfortune. Subjects rated victims on the fifteen item bi-polar adjective scale developed by Lerner. The score for each item could range from one for a negative evaluation to nine for a positive evaluation. The total score was obtained by summing scores on the 15 adjective pairs. A higher score indicates greater positivity of evaluation.

The obtained data were subjected to a four (conditions) by two (rating order) by two (sex of subject) analysis of variance. The cell means are shown in Table VII and the results of the analysis of variance are summarized in Table VIII.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>Plaintiff-Defendant Rating Order</th>
<th>Defendant-Plaintiff Rating Order</th>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>Mean (n)</th>
<th>(n)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Imprisonment vs Release</td>
<td>97.12 8</td>
<td>83.71 7</td>
<td></td>
<td>86.87</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fine vs Imprisonment</td>
<td>93.25 8</td>
<td>89.28 7</td>
<td>87.73</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restitution vs Fine</td>
<td>93.37 8</td>
<td>87.71 7</td>
<td>88.60</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imprisonment with Compensation vs Fine</td>
<td>95.87 8</td>
<td>83.71 7</td>
<td>89.90</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rating Order X X</td>
<td>94.90 32</td>
<td>86.11 28</td>
<td>85.62</td>
<td>28</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Order Means</td>
<td>90.80</td>
<td>85.75</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As Table VIII shows, the data did not support the prediction that plaintiffs in the Imprisonment vs Release and Fine vs Imprisonment conditions would be derogated in comparison to plaintiffs in conditions where compensation was available. The main effect for conditions was not significant and the condition means do not differ greatly. The significant F value for the main effect of order (F = 4.86; d.f. = 1, 104; p < .05) was not predicted. This main effect reflects higher ratings given to plaintiffs who were rated first (X = 90.80) than to plaintiffs who were rated second (X = 85.75). The main effect for sex of rater approached significance: females tended to rate plaintiffs more favorably (X = 90.26) than did males (X = 86.00). Females were more sensitive to order effects than were males: when females rated the plaintiff first, the mean rating was 94.90; when the plaintiff was rated second, the mean rating was 85.62. Comparisons of the means for males in rating order conditions suggests that, among males, evaluations
of the plaintiff do not differ as a function of rating order. Inspection of the data shown in Table VII suggests that the significant main effect for order and the near significant main effect for order and the sex x order interaction effect are attributable to higher ratings given by females to first rated plaintiffs. An explanation for this unexpected but interesting finding will be pursued in the next chapter.

Subjects indicated how much the plaintiff was to blame for the incident by circling a number from one for "not at all" to nine for "completely". These data were subjected to a four (conditions) by two (sex of rater) analysis of variance. Cell means are shown in Table IX and the results of the analysis of variance are presented in Table X.

**TABLE IX**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>Female (N)</th>
<th>Male (N)</th>
<th>Condition Mean (N)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Imprisonment vs Release</td>
<td>4.94</td>
<td>3.21</td>
<td>4.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fine vs Release</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>4.50</td>
<td>4.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restitution vs Fine</td>
<td>4.12</td>
<td>3.86</td>
<td>4.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imprisonment with Compensation vs Fine</td>
<td>3.31</td>
<td>3.36</td>
<td>3.33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sex of Rater Mean 4.09 64 3.73 56
The F values obtained for the main effects of conditions and sex and for the interaction effect were all less than unity. The data did not support the prediction that blame attributed to the plaintiff would vary as a function of availability of financial compensation for the loss.

Subjects in each condition also rated the attractiveness of defendants on the 15-item bi-polar adjective scale developed by Lerner. As before, a higher rating on this scale indicated greater positivity of evaluation. These data were subjected to a four (conditions) by two (rating order) by two (sex of rater) analysis of variance. Cell means are presented in Table XI and the results of the analysis of variance are summarized in Table XII.
### TABLE XI

**MEAN RATINGS OF DEFENDANTS' ATTRACTIVENESS AS A FUNCTION OF CONDITIONS, RATING ORDER AND SEX OF RATER**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>Plaintiff-Defendant Rating Order</th>
<th>Defendant-Plaintiff Rating Order</th>
<th>Condition Mean (N)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female (N)</td>
<td>Male (N)</td>
<td>Female (N)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Imprisonment vs Release</strong></td>
<td>67.75</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>65.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fine vs Imprisonment</strong></td>
<td>86.62</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>75.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Restitution vs Fine</strong></td>
<td>62.12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>74.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Imprisonment with Compensation vs Fine</strong></td>
<td>73.37</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>75.57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE XII

**SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF RATINGS OF DEFENDANTS' ATTRACTIVENESS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>SS</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>MS</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A (Conditions)</td>
<td>2198.60</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>732.86</td>
<td>3.13</td>
<td>&lt;.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B (Rating Order)</td>
<td>2.40</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.40</td>
<td>&lt;1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C (Sex of Rater)</td>
<td>13.22</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13.22</td>
<td>&lt;1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A x B</td>
<td>1135.86</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>378.62</td>
<td>1.62</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A x C</td>
<td>393.44</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>131.44</td>
<td>&lt;1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B x C</td>
<td>12.01</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12.01</td>
<td>&lt;1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A x B x C</td>
<td>1007.75</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>335.91</td>
<td>1.43</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within Cell</td>
<td>24275.72</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>233.42</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>29039.00</td>
<td>119</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The only significant F value obtained was that (F = 3.13; d.f. = 3, 104; p < .05) for the main effect of conditions. Newman-Keuls procedure was used to compare all pairs of means for this factor. This test indicated that the only difference to reach significance (p < .05) was the difference between the mean rating of the defendant in the Imprisonment vs Release and the Fine vs Imprisonment conditions.

Two items, adapted from Kaufman (1970) were included to assess subjects' evaluations of the moral wrongness of the offence. The first of these items was: "As a question not of law but of morality, Dory's actions were". Subjects responded to this item by circling a number on a scale ranging from one for "as wrong as possible" to nine for "very right". The second item began: "Quite apart from legal aspects, Dory". Subjects completed this item by circling a number ranging from one for "did not do anything wrong" to nine for "did very wrong". Subjects' responses on this item were reverse scored so that, for both items, a lower score indicated greater perceived wrongness. Subjects' responses on the two items were summed to yield a final evaluation of the moral wrongness of the act. Thus, the possible range of scores was from two to eighteen with lower scores indicating greater perceived wrongness. The cell means for evaluations of the wrongness of the act are presented in Table XIII and the analysis of variance summary table is shown in Table XIV.
### TABLE XIII

**MEAN RATINGS OF WRONGNESS OF DEFENDANTS' ACTS AS A FUNCTION OF CONDITIONS AND SEX OF RATER**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>Sex of Subject</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female (N)</td>
<td>Male (N)</td>
<td>Condition Mean (N)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imprisonment vs Release</td>
<td>4.00 16</td>
<td>4.36 14</td>
<td>4.17 30</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fine vs Imprisonment</td>
<td>4.75 16</td>
<td>3.93 14</td>
<td>4.37 30</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restitution vs Fine</td>
<td>3.75 16</td>
<td>4.07 14</td>
<td>3.90 30</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imprisonment with Compensation vs Fine</td>
<td>3.25 16</td>
<td>3.57 14</td>
<td>3.40 30</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sex of Rater Means</strong></td>
<td>3.94 64</td>
<td>3.98 56</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE XIV

**SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF RATINGS OF WRONGNESS OF DEFENDANT'S ACT**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOURCE</th>
<th>SS</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>MS</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>P</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A (Conditions)</td>
<td>15.76</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5.25</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B (Sex of Subject)</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>&lt; 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A x B</td>
<td>7.46</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.49</td>
<td>&lt; 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within Cell</td>
<td>589.51</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>5.25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>612.79</td>
<td>119</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As Table XIV indicates, only one F value reached unity and that one fell far short of significance. Finding that the perceived wrongness of the offence did not vary across conditions is in accord with expectations. The mean evaluation of the wrongness of the defendant's act was 3.96. This value is very close to the most negative rating possible. These data thus support the claim that the defendant's input was regarded as negative.

Two items were included to assess the extent to which the defendant was held responsible for the offence. These items asked subjects to indicate, by circling a number ranging from one for "agree completely" to nine for "disagree completely" how much they concurred with two statements. The first statement was: "Dory's acts were a result of the circumstances in which he found himself". The second item was: "Dory is more a victim of circumstances than a criminal". For each subject, a total score was obtained by summing scores on the two items. Thus, possible scores ranged from two to eighteen. A higher score indicated that greater responsibility for the offence was attributed to the defendant. Table XV shows mean evaluations of defendant's responsibility and the results of the four (conditions) by two (sex of rater) analysis of variance are summarized in Table XVI.
### TABLE XV

**MEAN RATINGS OF DEFENDANT'S RESPONSIBILITY AS A FUNCTION OF CONDITIONS AND SEX OF RATER**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>Female Mean</th>
<th>(N)</th>
<th>Male Mean</th>
<th>(N)</th>
<th>Condition Mean</th>
<th>(N)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Imprisonment vs Release</td>
<td>12.62</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14.07</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13.30</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fine vs Imprisonment</td>
<td>11.50</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13.00</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12.20</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restitution vs Fine</td>
<td>9.94</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11.50</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10.67</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imprisonment with Compensation vs Fine</td>
<td>12.62</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11.29</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12.00</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sex of Rater Means**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Female Mean</th>
<th>(N)</th>
<th>Male Mean</th>
<th>(N)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11.67</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>12.46</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE XVI

**SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF RATINGS OF DEFENDANT'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE OFFENCE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOURCE</th>
<th>SS</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>MS</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A (Conditions)</td>
<td>105.02</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>35.00</td>
<td>1.64</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B (Sex of Rater)</td>
<td>18.75</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18.75</td>
<td>&lt; 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A x B</td>
<td>45.30</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15.10</td>
<td>&lt; 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within Cell</td>
<td>2389.72</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>21.34</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>2558.79</td>
<td>119</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As Table XVI indicates, neither of the main effects nor the interaction effect was significant.
STUDY II

The summaries of simulated cases for this study described a sentence imposed in the case. Subjects in each condition received a description of a sentence different from the one described for other conditions. These sentences represented reductions of inequity that varied in actual equity and input positivity.

Subjects indicated the extent of their satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the sentence by breaking a ten centimeter line labelled "completely unsatisfactory" at one end and "completely satisfactory" at the other. On this item scores, measured in millimeters, could range from zero to one hundred. Higher scores indicated greater satisfaction. These data were obtained to test the prediction that subjects' satisfaction with the sentence would be greatest in the Restitution condition, next greatest in the Imprisonment with Compensation condition, and least in the Release condition.

The ratings of satisfaction with the sentence were subjected to a three (conditions) by two (sex of rater) analysis of variance. Mean satisfaction ratings are shown in Table XVII and the results of the analysis of variance are summarized in Table XVIII.
### TABLE XVII
MEAN RATINGS OF SATISFACTION WITH SENTENCES AS A FUNCTION OF CONDITIONS AND SEX OF RATER

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>Female (N)</th>
<th>Male (N)</th>
<th>Condition Mean (N)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Release</td>
<td>39.00</td>
<td>36.66</td>
<td>38.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restitution</td>
<td>76.90</td>
<td>63.83</td>
<td>72.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imprisonment with Compensation</td>
<td>64.30</td>
<td>36.83</td>
<td>54.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Sex of Rater Means              | 60.06      | 45.77    |

### TABLE XVIII
SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF SUBJECTS' EXPRESSED SATISFACTION WITH SENTENCES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOURCE</th>
<th>SS</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>MS</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A (Conditions)</td>
<td>9192.17</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4596.08</td>
<td>5.47</td>
<td>&lt; .01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B (Sex of Rater)</td>
<td>2296.93</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2296.93</td>
<td>2.72</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A x B</td>
<td>1192.81</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>596.40</td>
<td>&lt; 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within Cell</td>
<td>35302.01</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>840.52</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>47983.92</td>
<td>47</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As Table XVIII indicates, the obtained F value for the main effect of conditions was significant. Furthermore, the order of the condition means was exactly as predicted: greatest satisfaction was reported in the Restitution condition and least satisfaction was reported in the Release condition. As expected, subjects in the Imprisonment with Compensation condition reported less satisfaction with the solution than did subjects in the Restitution condition and more than did subjects in the Release condition.

A problem in testing the significance of differences in expressed satisfaction among conditions is that none of the existing tests takes into account an a priori prediction of the order of all means. The rationale for the predicted order was that satisfaction with the solution would decrease with the input positivity and equity of the solution. The Release condition restored equity for neither party while the Imprisonment with Compensation and the Restitution conditions restored equity for both parties. Accordingly, the inequitable Release condition should be rated as less satisfactory than the other two conditions. Of the two conditions, Imprisonment with Compensation and Restitution, that restored equity for both parties to the offence, the latter was greater in input positivity. Therefore, this sentence should be rated as more satisfactory than Imprisonment with Compensation.

In keeping with the rationale outlined above, two orthogonal comparisons, the maximum number possible, tested the significance of differences among conditions. The first compared expressed
satisfaction in the Release condition with expressed satisfaction in the Restitution and the Imprisonment with Compensation conditions. The second compared expressed satisfaction in the Restitution condition with that in the Imprisonment with Compensation condition. Since the order had been predicted in advance, the level of significance was evaluated by a one-tailed test. The first comparison indicated that subjects in the Release condition expressed significantly less satisfaction with the solution than did subjects in the Imprisonment with Compensation and the Restitution conditions \( (t = 2.80; d.f. = 42; p < .05) \). The second comparison was also significant: subjects in the Restitution condition were more satisfied with the resolution of the inequity than were subjects in the Imprisonment with Compensation condition \( (t = 1.75; d.f. = 42; p < .05) \).

Third parties were expected to restore psychological equity for over-rewarded defendants by enhancing inputs to make them commensurate with outcomes. Ratings of the attractiveness and responsibility of the over-rewarded defendant in the Release condition were compared with those of defendants in the Imprisonment with Compensation and Restitution conditions. Subjects in each condition rated defendants' attractiveness on Lerner's 15-item bi-polar adjective scale. Table XIX summarizes mean ratings of the defendant's attractiveness and Table XX presents the results of the three (conditions) by two (sex of rater) by two (rating order) analysis of variance of these data.
**TABLE XIX**
MEAN RATINGS OF DEFENDANT'S ATTRACTIVENESS AS A FUNCTION OF CONDITIONS, RATING ORDER AND SEX OF RATER

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>Plaintiff-Defendant Rating Order</th>
<th>Defendant-Plaintiff Rating Order</th>
<th>Condition Mean (N)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female (N) Male (N)</td>
<td>Female (N) Male (N)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Release</td>
<td>75.60 5 81.33 3</td>
<td>89.80 5 72.00 3</td>
<td>80.43 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restitution</td>
<td>60.60 5 59.00 3</td>
<td>75.80 5 70.00 3</td>
<td>66.81 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imprisonment with Compensation</td>
<td>78.80 5 76.00 3</td>
<td>71.00 5 75.00 3</td>
<td>75.12 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex x Rating Order Mean</td>
<td>71.66 15 72.11 9</td>
<td>78.86 15 72.33 9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE XX**
SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF RATINGS OF DEFENDANT'S ATTRACTIVENESS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOURCE</th>
<th>SS</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>MS</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>P</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A (Conditions)</td>
<td>1509.12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>754.56</td>
<td>3.69</td>
<td>&lt;.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B (Rating Order)</td>
<td>252.08</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>252.08</td>
<td>1.23</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C (Sex of Rater)</td>
<td>104.27</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>104.27</td>
<td>&lt;=1</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A x B</td>
<td>716.30</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>358.15</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A x C</td>
<td>84.93</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>42.46</td>
<td>&lt;=1</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B x C</td>
<td>136.94</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>136.94</td>
<td>&lt;=1</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A x B x C</td>
<td>442.12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>221.07</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within Cell</td>
<td>7355.47</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>204.32</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>10601.25</td>
<td>47</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As Table XX indicates, the main effect of conditions was significant ($F = 3.69; \text{d.f.} = 2, 36; p < .05$). The obtained $t$ value ($t = 1.05; \text{d.f.} = 36; p < .15$) for the planned comparison between the Release and Imprisonment with Compensation conditions did not reach conventional levels of significance. The difference was, however, in the direction predicted. These findings will be considered in the next Chapter.

Subjects also rated the moral wrongness of the defendant's act and the defendant's responsibility for the offence. Analyses of these data revealed no differences as a function of either conditions or sex of subject. Mean ratings of the moral wrongness of the act are presented in Table XXI. As before, the range of possible ratings of the wrongness of the offence was from two to eighteen with lower ratings indicating greater perceived wrongness. Table XXII summarizes the results of the three (conditions) by two (sex of rater) analysis of variance of these data.

**TABLE XXI**

MEAN RATINGS OF WRONGNESS OF DEFENDANT'S ACTS AS A FUNCTION OF CONDITIONS AND SEX OF RATER

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>Female (N)</th>
<th>Male (N)</th>
<th>Condition Mean (N)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Release</td>
<td>2.70 10</td>
<td>3.83 6</td>
<td>3.12 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restitution</td>
<td>3.70 10</td>
<td>3.17 6</td>
<td>3.50 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imprisonment with Compensation</td>
<td>3.50 10</td>
<td>5.00 6</td>
<td>4.06 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex of Rater Means</td>
<td>3.30 30</td>
<td>4.00 18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table XXII

**Summary of Analysis of Variance of Ratings of Wrongness of Defendant's Act**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>SS</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>MS</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>P</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A (Conditions)</td>
<td>7.12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.56</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B (Sex of Rater)</td>
<td>5.50</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5.50</td>
<td>1.58</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A x B</td>
<td>8.81</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4.40</td>
<td>1.26</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within Cell</td>
<td>146.37</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>3.48</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>167.30</td>
<td>47</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table XXIII presents mean ratings of defendant's responsibility for the offence. As in Study I, ratings could range from two to eighteen. The higher the rating, the greater the responsibility for the offence attributed to the defendant. The results of the three (conditions) by two (sex of rater) analysis of variance of these data are shown in Table XXIV.

### Table XXIII

**Mean Ratings of Defendant's Responsibility as a Function of Conditions and Sex of Rater**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sex of Rater</th>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>Female (N)</th>
<th>Male (N)</th>
<th>Condition Mean (N)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Release</td>
<td>14.00</td>
<td>13.00</td>
<td>13.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Restitution</td>
<td>11.20</td>
<td>13.50</td>
<td>12.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Imprisonment with Compensation</td>
<td>12.30</td>
<td>12.17</td>
<td>12.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Sex of Rater Mean</strong></td>
<td><strong>12.50</strong></td>
<td><strong>12.89</strong></td>
<td><strong>18</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE XXIV
SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF RATINGS OF DEFENDANT'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE OFFENCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOURCE</th>
<th>SS</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>MS</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>P</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A (Conditions)</td>
<td>23.29</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11.64</td>
<td>&lt;1</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B (Sex of Rater)</td>
<td>1.70</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.70</td>
<td>&lt;1</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A x B</td>
<td>.2195</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10.97</td>
<td>&lt;1</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within Cell</td>
<td>936.03</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>22.28</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>982.97</td>
<td>47</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Subjects rated the plaintiff's attractiveness on Lerner's 15-item bi-polar adjective scale. These data were collected to test the prediction that subjects in the Release condition, in which the plaintiff was not compensated for losses, would evaluate the plaintiff less favorably than would subjects in the Restitution and the Imprisonment with Compensation conditions. Mean ratings of the plaintiff's attractiveness are shown in Table XXV. The results of the three (conditions) by two (rating order) by two (sex of rater) analysis of variance of these data are summarized in Table XXVI.
### TABLE XXV

MEAN RATINGS OF PLAINTIFF'S ATTRACTIVENESS AS A FUNCTION OF CONDITIONS, RATING ORDER AND SEX OF SUBJECT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>Plaintiff-Defendant Rating Order</th>
<th>Defendant-Plaintiff Rating Order</th>
<th>Condition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female (N)</td>
<td>Male (N)</td>
<td>Female (N)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Release</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>90.60</td>
<td>87.00</td>
<td>92.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restitution</td>
<td>85.40</td>
<td>78.00</td>
<td>84.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imprisonment</td>
<td>85.60</td>
<td>86.66</td>
<td>83.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rating Order x Sex Mean</td>
<td>87.20</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>83.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE XXVI

SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF RATINGS OF PLAINTIFF'S ATTRACTIVENESS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOURCE</th>
<th>SS</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>MS</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A (Conditions)</td>
<td>260.54</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>130.27</td>
<td>1.36</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B (Rating Order)</td>
<td>60.75</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>60.75</td>
<td>&lt;1</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C (Sex of Rater)</td>
<td>320.00</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>320.00</td>
<td>3.34</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A x B</td>
<td>78.12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>39.06</td>
<td>&lt;1</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A x C</td>
<td>60.86</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>30.43</td>
<td>&lt;1</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B x C</td>
<td>46.00</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>46.00</td>
<td>&lt;1</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A x B x C</td>
<td>130.52</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>65.26</td>
<td>&lt;1</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within Cell</td>
<td>3443.87</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>95.66</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>4400.67</td>
<td>47</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As is shown by Table XXVI, evaluations of the plaintiff's attractiveness did not differ as a function of conditions, rating order or sex of rater.

Data were also collected to enable a test of the prediction that plaintiffs denied compensation for losses would be blamed for the misfortune more than ones receiving compensation. Subjects indicated how much the plaintiff was to blame on a nine point scale. Possible ratings ranged from one to nine with lower ratings indicating lesser blame. Analysis of the data revealed that the amount of blame attributed to plaintiffs did not vary significantly as a function of either conditions or sex of rater. Table XXVII presents mean ratings of blame attributed to plaintiffs and the summary of the results of a three (conditions) by two (sex of rater) analysis of variance of these data is shown in Table XXVIII.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>Female (N)</th>
<th>Male (N)</th>
<th>Condition Mean (N)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Release</td>
<td>4.20</td>
<td>4.83</td>
<td>4.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restitution</td>
<td>4.90</td>
<td>3.83</td>
<td>4.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imprisonment with</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>3.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compensation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex of Rater Mean</td>
<td>4.36</td>
<td>4.06</td>
<td>3.81</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE XXVII
MEAN RATINGS OF BLAME ATTRIBUTED TO PLAINTIFFS AS A FUNCTION OF CONDITIONS AND SEX OF RATER
### TABLE XXVIII

**Summary of Analysis of Variance of Blame Attributed to Plaintiffs**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOURCE</th>
<th>SS</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>MS</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A (Conditions)</td>
<td>4.62</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.31</td>
<td>&lt; 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B (Sex of Rater)</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>&lt; 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A x B</td>
<td>5.62</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.81</td>
<td>&lt; 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within Cell</td>
<td>357.67</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>8.52</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>369.00</td>
<td>47</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER V

DISCUSSION

Results of the research support previous investigations that have demonstrated that third parties will attempt to maintain or to restore equity for others. The present studies, however, extend previous research by considering the consequences for third party equity behavior of variations in the actual equity and input positivity of possible reductions of dyadic inequity. Third party choice among possible resolutions of inequity is related to two general determinants of third party equity behavior: preference for actual equity and preference for positive input. Evidence from both studies indicates that these principles not only permit prediction of third party preferences among resolutions of inequity but also prediction of satisfaction with solutions. This evidence supports the hypothesized importance of principles of preference for actual equity and for input positivity as general determinants of third party equity behavior. These findings thus provide empirical support for the proposed extension of Adams' (1965) equity theory to apply to third party equity behavior. The theoretical and practical implications of these findings will be discussed after a review of the evidence supporting the importance of preferences for actual equity and input positivity as determinants of third party response to reductions of inequity that entail real changes in the inputs or outcomes of the parties to the inequity.
The importance of actual equity is demonstrated by the finding that, in all three conditions which varied the equity of alternative solutions, subjects selected the one that was greatest in actual equity. In two of these three conditions, actual equity was pitted against positivity. That is, the nature of the alternatives available to subjects was such that solutions that increased actual equity decreased input or outcome positivity.

One of these two conditions, the Imprisonment vs Release condition, provided a test of the relative importance of actual equity and outcome positivity. Subjects in this condition could either imprison the harm-doer or release him. The first option represented, for the harm-doer, actual equity with a negative outcome while the second represented continued inequity with a positive outcome. Thus, in this particular test, the Imprisonment alternative which represented greater actual equity also represented decreased outcome positivity. Results of this test supported the prediction that the alternative that was greater in actual equity would be the preferred one.

This demonstration that outcome positivity is rejected in favor of actual equity provides support for the argument, developed in the Introduction, that preference for outcome positivity does not extend to third parties. Preference for positive outcomes is generally acknowledged as a determinant of first party choice among methods of reducing inequity (cf., Adams, 1965; Pritchard, 1969; Walster, Berscheid, and Walster, 1973). The theoretical grounds for stating that preference for outcome positivity does not extend to observers have been discussed. Results from the Imprisonment vs Release condition provide empirical
data to support this contention. Previous investigations of third party preferences for actual or psychological equity appear to have clearly demonstrated only that third parties prefer actual equity for under-rewarded parties: that is, when achievement of equity increases positivity. The finding that actual equity is also preferred when it involves a negative outcome for an over-rewarded party and thus decreases positivity supports and extends previous research. Furthermore, the finding substantiates the claim that preference for actual equity, rather than positivity, explains the award of compensation in cases of under-reward.

Additional support for the importance of actual equity comes from the finding that, contrary to predictions, actual equity is more important than input positivity as well as outcome positivity. Data indicating the greater importance of actual equity come from the Imprisonment with Compensation vs Fine condition which tested Hypothesis 3. This hypothesis specified the relative importance of third party preferences for actual equity and for input positivity. It stated that, when achievement of actual equity conflicted with achievement of input positivity, third parties would restore equity so that positive input would be maximized. The specific prediction derived from this hypothesis was that subjects in the Imprisonment with Compensation vs Fine condition would select the Fine alternative that increased positive input rather than the more equitable Imprisonment with Compensation one.

Results did not support the prediction. Out of a total of 30 subjects, 23 chose the non-predicted alternative. The predicted alternative was selected by only seven subjects. These data appear to
indicate that the non-predicted alternative was the preferred one. Had the hypothesis been a non-directional one, the binomial test would have shown the probability of obtaining by chance the observed number of choices of the less frequently selected alternative to be less than .006. With the benefit of hindsight and an ad hoc statistical test, the data suggest that actual equity is preferred to input positivity.

The results, as a whole, clearly demonstrate the importance of a preference for actual equity as a determinant of third party choice of method of reducing dyadic inequity. Discussion of the general implications of this finding for third party response to perceived inequity must await consideration of two questions raised by the unexpected finding that actual equity is preferred to input positivity. The first question is whether or not an adequate model of third party equity behavior requires incorporation of an additional principle to specify preferences among resolutions of inequity that are equal in actual equity but different in input and outcome positivity. The second question concerns the relative importance to third parties of positive input and positive outcome.

The first question is answered by the behavior of subjects in the Fine vs Imprisonment condition. This condition provided a test of Hypothesis 2 which stated that, when available alternatives were equally equitable, third parties would prefer the alternative that was greater in positive input. The prediction derived from this hypothesis was that subjects in the Fine vs Imprisonment condition would prefer the Fine alternative, which was greatest in positive input, to the equally equitable but less positive Imprisonment one. The existence of a
distinct preference between these alternatives supports the argument that, when equity is held constant, an additional principle determines choice between alternatives.

The Fine alternative represented, for the defendant, positive input and positive outcome compared to the Imprisonment alternative. Therefore, there are two possible explanations for subjects' preferences. A preference for either input positivity or outcome positivity could account for this finding.

Support for the contention that third parties are more concerned with positive input from others than with positive outcomes for others may be derived from subjects' expressed satisfaction with solutions. It was hypothesized that subjects' satisfaction with the solution would vary as a function of the extent to which chosen alternatives satisfied preferences for actual equity and for input positivity and as a function of the salience of conflicts between preferences.

Overall, data confirmed the prediction that subjects in the Restitution vs Fine and the Fine vs Imprisonment conditions would express greater satisfaction with the sentence they selected than would subjects in the Imprisonment with Compensation vs Fine and the Imprisonment vs Release conditions. The first two conditions permitted subjects to satisfy simultaneously preferences for actual equity and for input positivity. The last two conditions permitted subjects to satisfy only one preference and, in addition, involved a conflict between preferences for actual equity and positivity. The Imprisonment with Compensation vs Fine condition involved a conflict between actual equity and input positivity while the Imprisonment vs Release condition presented a
conflict between actual equity and outcome positivity. The hypothesized comparative importance of preferences for positive input and positive outcome might have been tested by an additional comparison between satisfaction expressed in the latter two conditions. Any direct test would, however, have been complicated by the significant sex by conditions interaction which indicated that interpretation of these data required consideration of the pattern of differences within sex. Accordingly, the Newman-Keuls procedure was employed to compare all pairs of means within each sex.

This analysis suggested that, among males, reported satisfaction with resolutions of inequity is related to two factors. First, the presence of a conflict between equity and input positivity appears to result in comparative dissatisfaction with the solution. Males expressed significantly less satisfaction in the Imprisonment with Compensation vs Fine condition, which presented a conflict between actual equity and input positivity, than they did in all other conditions. In both conditions that represented a conflict between actual equity and positivity, the Imprisonment with Compensation vs Fine and the Imprisonment vs Release conditions, males chose the equitable alternative and thus rejected positivity in favor of equity. When input positivity was rejected, however, males expressed significantly less satisfaction with the solution than when outcome positivity was rejected. This suggests that input positivity is more important than is outcome positivity.

In the absence of conflict between actual equity and input positivity, males' satisfaction with the resolution of the situation appears related only to the greater or lesser equity of the chosen alternative. In both
the Imprisonment vs Release and the Fine vs Imprisonment conditions, the chosen alternative restored actual equity only for the defendant. The difference between expressed satisfaction in these two conditions was not significant. The preferred alternative in the Restitution vs Fine condition restored actual equity for both defendant and plaintiff. Males expressed significantly greater satisfaction in this condition than in the other three conditions. Overall, then, males' reported satisfaction with solutions supports the hypothesized importance of preferences for actual equity and for input positivity.

Examination of the pattern of differences among conditions in females' reported satisfaction with solutions suggests that, among females, expressed satisfaction is related to different factors than among males. Overall, females expressed significantly greater satisfaction in the Restitution vs Fine and the Fine vs Imprisonment conditions than in the Imprisonment with Compensation vs Fine and the Imprisonment vs Release conditions. The preferred alternatives in the first two conditions restored equity by means of positive input from the defendant. These conditions did not present subjects with a conflict between equity and positivity. The preferred alternatives in the last two conditions did not achieve positive input from the defendant. Additionally, both of these conditions presented subjects with a conflict between equity

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15 It should be noted that one of these comparisons, the comparison between the Fine vs Imprisonment and the Imprisonment with Compensation vs Fine conditions, was not significant at the .05 level. The obtained difference between the means was 14.87 while the value required by the Newman-Keuls test for significance at the conventional level was 15.00.
and positivity. There are two possible interpretations of these data.

The first is that expressed satisfaction among females is related primarily to the input positivity of the preferred sentence. That is, females may be relatively dissatisfied with resolutions of inequity that do not achieve positive input from the defendant. Males, on the other hand, may experience dissatisfaction due to lack of positive input from the defendant only when circumstances make this salient.

The second possible interpretation of the data is that, among females, expressed satisfaction reflects only the presence or absence of a conflict between equity and positivity *per se*. Thus, the greater satisfaction expressed in the Restitution vs Fine and the Fine vs Imprisonment conditions than in the Imprisonment with Compensation vs Fine and the Imprisonment vs Release conditions may be attributed to the absence of conflict between equity and positivity in the former two conditions and the presence of conflict in the latter two conditions.

Some data appear to offer indirect support for the proposition that the first interpretation, that satisfaction among females is related primarily to the input positivity of the preferred solution, is the correct one. If positivity *per se* were more important to females than to males, one would predict that females would be more inclined to leniency than males. One possible demonstration of a preference for positivity on the part of female subjects would be for females in the Imprisonment vs Release condition to choose the Release option significantly more frequently than male subjects. Examination of data from this condition indicates that no such significant difference occurred: of 16 female subjects, four selected the Release option and, of 14 male subjects, two selected the Release option.

A second demonstration of bias toward positivity on the part of
females could consist of restoration of equity with less severity than males. That is, females might be expected to impose less severe terms of imprisonment than males. The short questionnaire asked subjects to indicate the magnitude of sentences they would impose on defendants. These data were examined for sex differences in severity of recommended sentence. The majority of subjects indicated the exact duration of the sentence they would impose. Three, however, gave responses that could not be included in the analysis while other subjects indicated indefinite time spans of, for example, six to eight months. In the latter cases, the mean was used in the analysis. The mean sentence recommended by females was 340.21 days in jail while the mean sentence recommended by males was 204.19 days of imprisonment. The obtained t value for the significance of the difference between males' and females' recommended terms of imprisonment was 2.24 (d.f. = 115; p < .05). The difference was, however, in the direction opposite to that predictable on the basis of a bias toward positivity on the part of females. The mean amounts recommended as fines by males and females were $2,650.78 and $2,912.25, respectively. The difference between these means was not significant (t = 0.604; d.f. = 114, n.s.).

Examination of these data does not support the ad hoc proposition that outcome positivity is more important to females than to males. That is, females in the Imprisonment vs Release condition rejected outcome positivity and selected the more equitable Imprisonment alternative equally as often as males. Additionally, females indicated that they would impose more, rather than less, severe terms of imprisonment on defendants. Taken together, these data refute rather than support the
suggestion that outcome positivity or positivity *per se* is more important to females than to males. Accordingly, the greater satisfaction reported by females in the Restitution vs Fine and the Fine vs Imprisonment conditions may be attributed to the greater input positivity of the preferred solutions in these two conditions.

Additional support for the argument that third parties are more concerned with positive input from others than with positive outcomes for others may be drawn from examination of subjects' comments regarding their choice of sentences. Had subjects in the Fine vs Imprisonment condition selected the Fine alternative because of a preference for outcome positivity, their comments might be expected to indicate rejection of the negative outcomes associated with the unchosen alternative. Of the twenty-five subjects who chose the Fine alternative, only three justified their choice by mentioning the negative outcomes (e.g., loss of a job) associated with the rejected alternative. Twelve subjects justified their choice by mentioning the implications of the sentence for the future input of the defendant. That is, they referred to the positive consequences of the Fine alternative for the future input of the defendant and/or explained that a term of imprisonment would provide the defendant with an opportunity to become more proficient at crime. The remaining comments were ambiguous remarks that could not be interpreted as related to either input or outcome positivity.

That input positivity is of greater importance to third parties than outcome positivity may also be inferred from the concern for the future input of defendants which was expressed by subjects in the Imprisonment vs Release condition. Of the twenty-four subjects who
selected the Imprisonment alternative, fifteen justified their choice by reference to the defendant's future input. Subjects in this condition referred primarily to the efficacy of the punishment in inhibiting subsequent negative input from the defendant. An example of justification in these terms is: "The other is really just a positive reinforcement to him, so it's not a deterrent at all. Also it wouldn't do anything to improve him (psychologically, etc.) so wouldn't improve the situation."

Of the six subjects who selected the Release option, only two justified their decision in terms of rejection of the negative outcomes associated with the Imprisonment alternative. One subject explained choice of the Release option by referring to the danger of exposing the "defendant's vulnerable personality to more criminal elements".

On the whole, examination of subjects' written comments appears to support the premise that preference for positive input influences third party efforts to resolve dyadic inequity. This interpretation is consistent with subjects' expressions of satisfaction with solutions which also appear to suggest that positive input is of more importance to third parties than is positive outcome.

To summarize, obtained data illustrate the importance of preference for actual equity as a determinant of third party responses to dyadic inequities created by the negative input of a harm-doer. As has been discussed, in all three conditions which varied the equity of alternative solutions, subjects selected the alternative that was greatest in actual equity. Data from two of these conditions, the Imprisonment vs Release and the Imprisonment with Compensation vs Fine conditions, clearly demonstrate that actual equity is more important than either input or
outcome positivity. Data from the Fine vs Imprisonment condition indicate that a positivity principle is invoked to determine choice between equally equitable alternatives. Examination of subjects' expressed satisfaction with solutions and written comments explaining choice of sentence suggests that third parties are more concerned with input positivity than with outcome positivity. Thus, evidence from these sources provides some further support for Hypothesis 1 which stated that preference for positive input determines third party choice among alternatives that are equal in actual equity.

These findings come from the first study which examined responses to inequity caused by negative input from one member of a dyad when subjects possessed some power to intervene in the situation. Subjects in the second study did not possess any power to intervene to effect real changes in the inputs or outcomes of the members of the dyad. Instead, they were presented with fait accompli decisions that varied the actual equity and input positivity of the resolutions of the inequity. Data from the second study indicate that differences in satisfaction with solutions and distinct preferences among resolutions of inequity are not peculiar to those responsible for intervention but are shared by non-participant on-lookers as well.

The analysis of variance of expressed satisfaction with the solution in the second study indicated that the main effect of conditions was significant. Expressed satisfaction among conditions was ordered as predicted: greatest satisfaction was reported in the Restitution condition and least satisfaction was reported in the Release condition. As was expected, subjects in the Imprisonment with Compensation condition
reported less satisfaction with the solution than did subjects in the Restitution condition and more than did subjects in the Release condition. These data indicate that the differences in satisfaction with resolutions of inequity registered by observers of *fait accompli* decisions are similar to those reported by decision makers. This finding is important because it indicates that variations in satisfaction are not confined to those who are, to some extent, responsible for the fates of the parties to the inequity. Additionally, the order of the means supports the *a priori* prediction that satisfaction among on-lookers is related to the actual equity and to the input positivity of the solution.

Additional support for the importance of actual equity and input positivity in determining reactions to inequity may also be derived from the second study. The short questionnaire asked subjects to indicate which of three sentences: Release, Imprisonment with Compensation, and Restitution, they would have imposed in the case. Subjects in all three conditions indicated that the Restitution alternative would have been the preferred one. Fifteen subjects in the Release condition and twelve subjects in each of the Imprisonment with Compensation and the Restitution conditions indicated that they would have preferred to see the Restitution alternative imposed on the defendant. This finding strengthens the argument that, among on-lookers, satisfaction is related to the degree to which resolutions of inequity satisfy preferences for actual equity and input positivity.

The demonstrated importance of actual equity has implications for the comparative importance, to third parties, of reduction of perceived
inequity by means of psychological, rather than real, alterations of inputs and outcomes. In his original formulation of equity theory, Adams (1965) pointed out that an alternative to restoring equity through real changes in inputs and outcomes was to restore psychological equity by means of cognitive changes in evaluations of inputs and outcomes. Previous investigations have shown that observers who are unable to intervene to remedy the situation may respond to perceived inequity by indulging in cognitive operations that transform perceived injustice to perceived justice. Particular attention has been paid to the possible implications of such findings for real world responses to victims of injustice. As Lincoln & Levinger (1972) point out, one of the implications of those findings is that appealing for remedy of injustice by making its existence salient may result in derogation of the victim rather than restoration of actual equity. Data supporting the principle of preference for actual equity are consistent with reported results of previous investigations (e.g., Lincoln & Levinger, 1972) that have suggested that victims may be derogated only when third parties are constrained from restoring actual equity. Data from the present research, however, demonstrate that preference for actual equity extends to harm-doers as well as to victims. These results thus suggest that third parties may reduce perceived inequity by use of such tactics as derogation of under-rewarded parties or enhancement of over-rewarded ones only when means of restoring actual equity are not available to them.

The suggestion that third parties may restore psychological equity only when they cannot restore actual equity does not imply that third party use of such techniques is unimportant. In real life, constraints
frequently limit third party power to restore actual equity. The
criminal justice system, for example, generally provides only for
punishment of harm-doers: compensation for victims is frequently not
available. In these cases, punishment of harm-doers does not provide
victims with real compensation for losses. In other cases, the legal
justice system not only fails to restore actual equity for victim or
harm-doer but creates an additional injustice as, for example, when
a harm-doer is released because of his association with influential
and corrupt politicians. These are examples of cases where constraints
that limit third party power to reduce inequity by means of real changes
in inputs or outcomes may leave observers with no alternative but to
resort to psychological tactics if perceived inequity is to be
reduced.

The present research examined the effects of limitations on third
party power to restore actual equity on subsequent evaluations of the
parties involved. The first study tested the hypothesis that, when
intervention power was limited to punishment of the harm-doer, subjects
would restore psychological equity for victims by derogating them.
Previous research (e.g., Lerner, 1970; Lincoln & Levinger, 1972;
Jones & Aronson, 1973) indicates that third parties will sometimes
reduce inequity for uncompensated victims by devaluing inputs in the
direction of outcomes. Such devaluation may take the form of either
derogating the victim's personal characteristics or else attributing to
the victim part of the blame for the misfortune. In the first study
two conditions, the Imprisonment vs Release and the Fine vs Imprisonment
conditions, did not provide compensation for plaintiffs' losses. The
preferred alternative, Restitution, in the Restitution vs Fine condition did provide real compensation for losses. The prediction was that subjects in the Imprisonment vs Release and the Fine vs Imprisonment conditions would rate plaintiffs as less attractive and more to blame for the offence than would subjects in the Restitution vs Fine condition.

Analysis of ratings of plaintiffs' attractiveness and responsibility for the offence did not support the prediction. Subjects' attributions of blame to victims did not vary as a function of conditions. The only significant \( F \) value associated with the analysis of variance of ratings of victims' attractiveness was for the main effect of rating order: when subjects rated the plaintiff before they rated the defendant, they evaluated plaintiffs more favorably than when the plaintiff was rated after the defendant. Examination of the cell means shown in Table VII suggests that the significant main effect for order is attributable to higher ratings given by females to first rated plaintiffs. Inspection of means for males in different rating order conditions indicates that, among males, evaluations of plaintiffs do not differ as a function of rating order.

Consideration of possible explanations for the order effect appearing among female subjects suggests that this phenomenon may, in part, be due to ability of subjects to intervene in the situation. Subjects in all conditions in the first study were empowered to punish the harm-doer. Such intervention may inspire initial feelings that justice has triumphed: that is, that the effect of intervention is to punish the harm-doer and vindicate the victim. Initial positivity toward plaintiffs may, therefore, reflect subjects' feelings that,
by intervening to punish the criminal, they helped the victim. These feelings may be strongest immediately after intervention and, therefore, result in greater positivity toward first rated plaintiffs. Some support for the suggestion that the order effect may result from a feeling of having acted on the victim's behalf may be derived from noting that rating order did not affect evaluations of defendants. Also, ratings of plaintiffs in the second study, where subjects did not intervene in the situation, did not differ as a function of rating order. Attribution of the effect of rating order to subjects' feelings of having aided the victim is, of course, a post hoc explanation and must, therefore, be regarded with caution.

Caution is especially advisable in view of the fact that the interpretation offered above does not explain why the effect appeared only among female subjects. Why greater positivity toward first rated plaintiffs occurred only among female subjects is a question that cannot be answered from the present data.

Overall, then, data obtained in the first study offer little support for the importance to third parties of derogation as a means of restoring psychological equity for uncompensated victims. A possible explanation for the non-appearance of the predicted effect is that, in all conditions in the first study, punishment of the harm-doer provided vindication for the victim. Evidence that, even in the absence of vindication, derogation may be an elusive phenomenon comes from the second study which tested predictions concerning evaluations of plaintiffs and defendants when subjects were presented with fait accompli resolutions of the inequity and were powerless to intervene.
Two of the conditions in this study, the Imprisonment with Compensation condition and the Restitution condition, restored actual equity for both plaintiff and defendant. The third condition, Release, restored actual equity for neither plaintiff nor defendant and thus deprived victims of both vindication and financial compensation.

The prediction was that subjects in the Release condition would evaluate plaintiffs less favorably and/or hold them more to blame for the misfortune than would subjects in the Imprisonment with Compensation and the Restitution conditions. These predictions were not supported. Instead, as inspection of means in Table XXIII indicates, subjects tended to evaluate plaintiffs deprived of both vindication and financial compensation more positively than plaintiffs who received both.

The second study also tested predictions that defendants who were released would be evaluated significantly more favorably and/or held less responsible for the offence than defendants who were imprisoned. Although there were no significant differences among conditions in attributions of responsibility for the offence, analysis of variance of ratings of attractiveness indicated that the main effect of conditions was significant. Overall, defendants who were released were rated more favorably than defendants who were imprisoned or ordered to make restitution. However, only the difference between evaluations of the defendant in the Release and the Restitution conditions exceeded that required by the Newman-Keuls test for the comparison to be significant at the $p < .05$ level.

Enhancement of the personal attributes of the released defendant may be regarded as evidence of psychological reduction of perceived
inequity. Some skepticism regarding acceptance of this interpretation appears justified. The greater positivity toward the defendant in this condition may have reflected subjects' assumptions that the Court's lenient treatment of the defendant was due to his positive personality characteristics or personal worth. The latter interpretation would be consistent with present findings that failure to restore actual equity did not elicit other evidence of reduction of inequity by means of cognitive re-evaluation of inputs.

Present data do demonstrate that third parties respond to incomplete reductions of inequity with expressions of dissatisfaction. This finding is consistent with Baker's (1973) report that the occurrence of inequity between others elicits expressions of anger from third party observers. The primary importance of this finding lies in its implications for the subsequent behavior of the third party observer of inequity. As Adams (1965) pointed out: "Men do not simply become dissatisfied with conditions they perceive to be unjust. They usually do something about them (p. 276)." Social psychologists appear to have assumed that what third parties do when adequate means of restoring actual equity are not available is to restore psychological equity. Consideration of the possible origins of motivation for third parties to maintain equity between others suggests that perhaps this assumption should be questioned.

Equity theorists account for the development and maintenance of systems of equity by pointing out that, in order for a society to function, it is necessary to avoid continual conflict over distribution of desired resources. Additionally, they agree that
individual members of society learn the system of equity in the process of socialization. In general the appearance, among both first and third parties, of behavior directed toward maintenance of actual equity is regarded as conformity to internalized standards of fairness. Baker (1974), for example, proposed not only that individuals internalize obligations to maintain justice between others but also that there may be considerable uniformity in socialization of third party equity behavior. He suggested that such individual difference variables as sex and relative reward status may not result in variation in third party justice behavior because "society does not permit the socialization of systematic variation in the enforcement of the norm (Baker, 1974, p. 315)." Lerner (1971), too, notes that "most people have internalized the obligation to defend the innocent and punish the wicked (p. 127)."

Adams (1965) discussion of the use of cognitive distortions as alternatives to restoration of actual equity was based on the assumption that experience of inequity was akin to the experience of dissonance. This seems a valid assumption for first party equity behavior. In these cases the occurrence of inequity may cause distress for both parties to the exchange. The behavior of the parties conflicts with internalized standards of fairness. Walster, Berscheid & Walster (1973) note that an over-rewarded party may experience distress for two reasons: perpetuation of the inequity constitutes a threat to self-esteem and arouses fear of retaliation. A victim who cannot restore actual equity to a relationship may be, as Walster, Berscheid & Walster point out, forced to justify the inequity in order to
avoid the humiliation of acknowledging that he is unable to enforce his demands for fair treatment.

Among first parties, then, justification of a continuing inequity may be necessary because the cognition that the relationship violates standards of fairness is at odds with the cognition that nothing is being done to remedy it. In such cases, the perception that inequity exists conflicts with the behavior and self-concept of the perceiver. These are circumstances that should clearly give rise to the kind of cognitive conflict that necessitates reduction of dissonance by means of cognitive distortion.

Some attention has been directed to specifying the circumstances under which individuals responsible for an inequity are not motivated to deny or justify it. These investigations have considered the importance of volition and commitment as determinants of arousal of dissonance. Davis & Jones (1960) examined the effects of choice and anticipation of future interaction on a harm-doer's response to his victim. Subjects were either forced or else allowed to choose to read an extremely negative evaluation to another person. Half of the subjects in each of these conditions expected to meet the victim; the other half did not. Results demonstrated the importance of volition in determining whether or not harm-doers would derogate victims: subjects who chose to read the negative evaluation derogated victims while those who were forced to read it did not. In a subsequent experiment, Glass (1964) convinced subjects that they were administering electric shocks to another. Again, half of the subjects were permitted to choose to administer shocks; the other half were not. In addition,
Glass manipulated level of self-esteem by giving subjects either positive or negative feedback concerning their personality. Glass found that harm-doers who possessed high self-esteem and perceived themselves as choosing to deliver shock, derogated the victim. These studies thus indicate that existence of inequity does not result in justification through derogation of the victim unless the circumstances are such that harm-doers perceive themselves as responsible for the state of affairs.

Walster, Berscheid & Walster point out that: "If the harm-doer can perceive that it was not his behavior but rather the action of someone else (e.g., the experimenter or fate) that caused the victim's suffering, then his relationship with the victim becomes an equitable one (p. 157)."

These considerations make obvious the existence of a problem in explaining why a third party who perceives that an exchange between others is inequitable should, in the absence of personal responsibility for either the creation or continuation of the inequity deny or justify its existence. Lerner and his associates (e.g., Lerner & Simmons, 1966; Lerner & Matthews, 1967; Lerner, 1971) have proposed that justification occurs because undeserved suffering threatens the observer's belief in a "just world" — a world in which people deserve what they get. Lerner & Simmons (1966) argue that perceived injustice is denied because "most people cannot afford, for the sake of their own sanity, to believe in a world governed by a schedule of random reinforcements (p. 127)."

Several recent investigations (e.g., Aderman, Brehm & Katz, 1973; Godfrey & Lowe, 1975; Stokols & Schopler, 1973) have suggested that derogation of victims is due to factors other than conflict between perceived injustice and belief in a just world.
Stokols & Schopler (1973) argued that denial of perceived injustice is most likely to occur when the observer is somehow implicated in the creation or continuation of the inequity. These authors suggest that, in the absence of such factors as third party commitment to the system creating the inequity, the response to the victim of undeserved misfortune is apt to be sympathy rather than derogation. This position seems consistent with the suggestion put forth by dissonance researchers (e.g., Cooper & Goethals, 1974; Worchel & Brand, 1972; Cooper, 1971) that some degree of personal responsibility is a prerequisite for the arousal and reduction of cognitive dissonance. Third parties may not become motivated to justify inequity in the absence of some conflict between the belief that inequity exists and their behavior in the situation.

Perhaps, then, another important difference between first and third party equity behavior is that third parties who cannot restore actual equity are, unlike first parties, not particularly motivated to deny or to justify perceived inequity. Preference for actual equity may be a determinant of third party equity behavior even in cases where third parties do not possess means of restoring equity by real changes in the inputs or outcomes of the members of the dyad. Preference for actual equity may be expressed by protesting the injustice and, for example, demanding that the situation be remedied.

This suggests that perception of inequity between others may elicit justification of the inequity only when circumstances are such that the third party is implicated in creation of the inequity or committed to its continuation. Thus, justification may occur only when
the observer perceives himself as having some power to remedy the situation and is, for one reason or another, unwilling to exercise his power. In many cases, for a third party to achieve justice between others requires that he incur costs. When the situation is such that a third party's motivation to maximize his own positive outcomes conflicts with his internalized obligation to enforce the norms, unwillingness to incur the costs of intervention may make it necessary for the individual to justify the inequity.

Thus, specification of the conditions under which third party dissatisfaction with perceived injustice may lead to justification of the inequity may require consideration of the costs of equity for the perceiver. The difference between activists and opponents of social reform may be not in their perceptions of power to affect the fates of others, as Lincoln & Levinger (1972) suggest, but in their willingness to incur the costs of achieving equity between others.

The present studies would imply that preference for actual equity and input positivity may determine third party equity behavior in circumstances where the costs of achieving equity are not excessive. Dissatisfaction resulting from inadequate reductions of inequity may, under these circumstances, be expressed in ways consistent with preference for actual equity. That is, a third party may maintain veridical perceptions of the inputs and outcomes of the parties to the inequity and attribute responsibility for the maintenance of inequity to, for example, the inadequacies of the criminal justice system. Such a possibility may be tested by further research.

A second, and important, question for future research is
to specify the circumstances under which perceived inequity will arouse in the observer the kind of cognitive conflict that motivates denial or justification of the inequity. The present analysis suggests that this may occur when reduction of inequity threatens the observer's own positive outcomes. It may be noted, however, that even in these circumstances, third parties may be able to reduce dissonance without denying or justifying the inequity. Possible techniques include, for example, denying power to intervene or attributing responsibility for intervention to someone else. A possible explanation for a backlash effect, where pointing to the existence of inequity elicits derogation from some quarters, is that the publicity may cause bystanders to perceive that they possess some power to remedy the situation. Unwillingness to incur the costs of restoring equity, rather than perception of inequity, may explain the ensuing justification of inequity.

Consideration of similarities and differences between first and third party equity behavior suggests that Adams' (1965) theory may be extended to apply to third party equity behavior. Data from the present research support the propositions that preferences for actual equity and input positivity determine third party choice among reductions of dyadic inequity and satisfaction with these reductions. That third parties exhibit differences in satisfaction with solutions raises the potentially important question of the consequences of dissatisfaction for subsequent behavior. Consideration of the dissonance based origin of Adams' proposal that cognitive alterations in evaluation of
inputs and outcomes could serve as an alternative to real changes suggests that these may occur only when third parties are implicated in the continuation of the inequity. Thus, an important question for future research is to specify the conditions under which third party dissatisfaction will be expressed in ways consistent with preference for actual equity as opposed to denial or justification of the inequity. This may require consideration of the cost, to third parties, of achieving equity for others.
CHAPTER VI

IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

The research tested predictions concerning third party preferences for resolutions of inequity by using hypothetical accounts of criminal offences. An important question for further research is to test the generalizability of findings regarding the importance to third parties of preferences for actual equity and for input positivity.

A category of variables relevant to questions concerning the generalizability of these findings may be identified as perceiver variables. These include such individual difference variables as authoritarianism (e.g., Mitchell & Byrne, 1973) and internal-external locus of control (e.g., Phares & Wilson, 1972) that may affect third party perception of the gravity of the offence or influence tendencies to attribute responsibility for actions. Also included in the category of perceiver variables may be class differences (Nemeth & Sosis, 1973) which may partly determine responses to offenders. Other perceiver variables appear to include those which increase situational or personal relevance (Shaver, 1970) or lead to greater identification with one of the actors (Chaiken & Darley, 1973).

Some studies (e.g., Mitchell & Byrne, 1973; Nemeth & Sosis, 1973) have indicated that, among jurors, such variables as
authoritarianism and class interact with factors that may influence
the degree to which the juror perceives himself as similar to a
defendant to determine the juror's response to the defendant. Mitchell
& Byrne (1973) report that high authoritarians exhibit leniency toward
defendants in the presence of attitude similarity and severity in the
presence of attitude dissimilarity. Nemeth & Sosis (1973) note that
jurors who are from a white working class background not only appear
to be more punitive in general but also especially punitive toward a
defendant from a similar background. A question of direct relevance
to the present research is whether or not these variables operate only
to influence severity of punishment within a particular resolution of
inequity or whether they also extend to determine preferences among
alternative resolutions of inequity.

The present research used students from psychology classes at
the University of British Columbia. If one assumes that such a sample
is apt to contain a disproportionate number of individuals who are from
a middle or upper-middle class background and thus may be more liberal
than the general population, it is possible to argue that different
preferences among resolutions of inequity may be exhibited by other
samples. The salience of this question is indicated by the previously
mentioned research by Nemeth & Sosis (1973). They investigated the
effect of the background of the juror on responses to the defendant
in a negligent homicide case. Background of the juror was manipulated
by using samples from the University of Chicago and from a junior
college in Chicago. According to Nemeth & Sosis (1973), the University
of Chicago sample came from middle and upper-middle class backgrounds
while the junior college sample was composed of individuals from a working class background, As has already been mentioned, jurors from working class backgrounds meted out more severe sentences than did middle and upper-middle class jurors. Of primary importance to the present discussion is the report by Nemeth & Sosis (1973) that:

Part of the reason for less punitiveness by the university sample is that a good proportion of these individuals gave the defendant 'zero years' in prison for his crime but added comments such as 'prisons only harden criminals and some alternative form of punishment would be more appropriate and more rehabilitative.' In other words, these subjects did not render the defendant guiltless for his crime; they simply preferred other modes of dealing with the transgression than sentencing the defendant to a number of years in prison (p. 228).

This would imply that, among samples with a liberal orientation, one might find rejection of punishments that restore equity for criminals by means of such measures as prison terms and acceptance of alternatives that reduce inequity by means of improved input from criminals.

Findings from the present study, which used samples of students from the University of British Columbia, indicated that alternatives that involved lowered outcomes for criminals were rejected only when another equitable alternative permitted subjects to achieve both equity and input positivity. When the alternative to a prison term was an inequitable and positive outcome for the criminal (Imprisonment vs Release) or when the alternative to a prison sentence required acceptance of a less equitable solution (Imprisonment with Compensation vs Fine), subjects selected the alternative that involved sentencing the defendant to a term of imprisonment.

The study carried out by Nemeth & Sosis (1973) and the present
research differed in several respects. Firstly, the Nemeth & Sosis study involved a defendant who, while driving under the influence of alcohol, had hit and killed a pedestrian. The present research used accounts of property crimes which constituted deliberate violations of the law but did not involve physical harm to anyone. Secondly, the Nemeth & Sosis study used American students while the present research was carried out with Canadian undergraduates. Thus, apparent differences in willingness to restore equity by means that involve lowered outcomes for offenders may be attributed either to differences in the stimulus situation or to differences in the liberality of subjects.

If one assumes that a sample of university students represents a fairly liberal sample of the Canadian population, then the primary question is whether or not other members of Canadian society would also prefer to restore equity by means that involve positive input from offenders. Some data indicating that preference for restoration of equity by means of positive input from offenders is not exclusive to university students comes from the Final Report of the Surrey Task Force on Juvenile Delinquency. This group circulated a questionnaire in local newspapers in Surrey. Readers were asked to complete and return the questionnaire which solicited their opinions on juvenile delinquency in Surrey. One of the questions asked respondents to indicate which form of punishment they would prefer to impose for such offences. Results were that restitution and fines were selected by approximately 58% of the respondents. Although the data come from a fairly small (N = 167) sample of self-selected subjects, they do provide some evidence that preferences for resolutions
of inequity by means of positive input from offenders may be found among other samples.

Another question concerning the generalizability of findings does not deal with class differences but with differences that may be attributed to the personal history of third parties. Chaiken and Darley (1973) report that, when the perpetrator and victim of an accident are clearly separated, identification with one or the other of the parties to the incident affects attributions of responsibility and assignment of blame for the accident. This finding implies that experience of victimization or expectation of victimization may be a factor in determining preferences for resolutions of inequity by means of real changes in inputs or outcomes. Vidmar (1973) tested the hypothesis that fear of crime would be positively related to support for the death penalty and found only equivocal support for it. Vidmar reported that respondents who perceived the crime rate as rising and who reported experience of victimization also supported the death penalty. However, a significant correlation between direct assessments of threat and expectation of personal victimization and support for the death penalty was not found. One possible explanation for Vidmar's equivocal findings may be that the majority of respondents may have feared the consequences of such common crimes as theft and vandalism rather than of crimes, such as murder, which may be punishable by death. Thus, a stronger correlation between expectation of victimization and attitude toward punishments may have appeared if the survey had dealt with penalties for common crimes.

The rationale behind the expectation that individuals who have
experienced victimization may exhibit different preferences for resolution of inequity appears to be related to consideration of the victim's desire for vindication. As Schafer (1960) points out, emphasis on rehabilitation may be perceived as depriving victims of even the compensation of vindication. Such compensation may reside primarily in the knowledge that society has recognized the inequity and undertaken to right the wrong. For a victim to experience the satisfaction of vindication may not require that the offender be punished by means of lowered outcomes. Punishments that require positive input from the offender may also provide the victim with the satisfaction of vindication. Additionally, if one considers that an individual who identifies strongly with the victim may be motivated by concerns common to first parties, then preference for positive outcomes should be a factor in determining preferences among resolutions of inequity. That is, a solution such as restitution that not only provides the victim with vindication but also provides real compensation for losses should be a preferred one.

Further research investigating the effect of perceiver variables on third party responses to inequity between others may have both theoretical and practical implications. For example, if subsequent research were to demonstrate that class of the third party influenced equity decisions, these findings could be relevant not only to practical concerns but might also provide insight into the effects of socialization on third party equity behavior. Such research could, therefore, contribute not only to analysis of the effect of third party behavior on the maintenance of equity in society but also to further refinement and application of equity theory.
REFERENCES


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Summary of the Case:

The defendant, James Dory, is charged with obtaining funds by false pretences. The amount of money in question is $2,500. The prosecution claims that Dory posed as a Bank official and persuaded Mrs. Dorothy Campbell to entrust him with funds which he then used for his own purposes.

Testimony of the Plaintiff, Mrs. Campbell:

Mrs. Dorothy Campbell is a 67-year-old widow. Since her husband's death in 1969 she has resided alone in a small apartment which she owns. Prior to the fraud, Mrs. Campbell had about $3,500 saved for emergencies. Now, apart from her home, her assets consist of approximately a thousand dollars remaining in her savings account. For her day-to-day living expenses, she relies on her old age pension. The lost money represents a significant portion of the money she had deposited for emergencies.

Mrs. Campbell testified that the defendant first contacted her on January 4, 1974 when he telephoned and claimed to be a Bank
investment counsellor. Mrs. Campbell stated that Dory told her the Bank was offering special investment opportunities to selected customers. Dory requested and obtained Mrs. Campbell’s permission to visit her to explain the investment program.

Mrs. Campbell stated that the defendant followed up his telephone call by appearing at her home and presenting her with an identification card showing he was a Bank employee. She further testified that he persuaded her that her funds would be better invested in the Bank plan than left in her savings account. Mrs. Campbell stated that she gave Dory a cheque for $2,500. and received in return a Bank Plan certificate and a receipt. (These documents were introduced as Exhibits A, B and C).

Mrs. Campbell stated that, when she next visited the Bank, she discovered that she had been the victim of a fraud.

Testimony of Police Officer:

The detective who worked on the case testified that, when the fraud was reported, a police portrait of Dory was drawn from the descriptions given by Mrs. Campbell and the bank teller who had cashed the cheque. He explained that a police officer who had seen the portrait later met Dory at a party and recognized him. The detective testified that when he received this report, he investigated further. The detective testified that Dory was placed in a police line-up and positively identified by both the teller and by Mrs. Campbell. Also offered in evidence was a business card (Exhibit D) which identifies the holder as a Bank employee. The detective testified that this card was found in Dory’s possession. It contains Dory’s photograph and a fictitious name.
Testimony of the Defendant, James Dory:

The defendant, 49-year-old James Dory, has been employed for 14 years as a salesman by a local car dealer. At the time of the trial, Dory is still working in this capacity. He is married with no children living at home.

Dory pleaded guilty to the charge and agreed that Mrs. Campbell accurately described the technique he used to persuade her to entrust him with the funds. He stated, however, that he planned only to borrow the money for investment purposes and that he planned to repay Mrs. Campbell out of his profits. Dory testified that an acquaintance had offered him a chance to invest in a promising venture. Dory stated he was wondering how to raise the necessary funds when he heard the fraud described on an open line radio programme and decided to use it to acquire funds. Dory further testified that the money was lost when the business venture failed.

Dory also testified that he had never before committed, been charged with, or convicted of, a criminal offence.

Testimony of Dory's Employer:

The owner of the car dealership where Dory is employed testified that during the fourteen years the defendant has worked for him, he has been a good worker and that there have been no customer complaints about Dory.

Verdict:

The defendant is found guilty of the charge.
ACCOUNT OF THEFT

Summary of the Case:

The defendant, James Dory, is charged with theft. The prosecution charges that, on the evening of April 8, 1974, Dory entered an apartment occupied by Mr. and Mrs. Peter Roth and removed the following items: a portable color television set, a stereo set, a diamond engagement ring, a camera and four articles of clothing belonging to Mr. Roth. At the time of the trial the television set, the stereo set and the diamond ring, together valued at about $2,500, have not been recovered. The prosecution alleges that Dory, the former occupant of the suite now rented by the Roths, kept a spare set of keys to the suite and used them to gain entrance.

Testimony of the Plaintiff, Peter Roth:

Twenty-six year old Peter Roth is employed as a salesman by a local department store. Roth testified that he had lived in the suite for less than a month before the theft occurred. He stated that he moved into the suite on April 1st and that on April 7th he and his wife left for Calgary to spend a week visiting relatives. Roth stated that when he returned from Calgary on April 14, he discovered that the apartment had been entered and that the goods listed above had been stolen. Roth stated that the lost property had not been insured against theft.

Four articles of clothing and a camera were produced in court and identified by Mr. Roth as the ones he had reported stolen.
Testimony of Police Officer:

The police officer assigned to investigate the theft testified that he had questioned other tenants in the building. He stated that one of the tenants contacted, Mrs. Campbell, reported that she had seen James Dory, the former occupant of the Roth apartment, leave the suite carrying a portable television set and some clothing.

The officer testified that Dory's new residence had been searched and that four items of clothing which matched the description of those reported stolen were found in Dory's possession. The officer also testified that the serial number of a camera also found in Dory's possession was the same as the serial number of the one reported stolen. The officer further testified that the articles produced in court and identified by Roth were the ones he found in Dory's possession.

Testimony of Mrs. Campbell, witness:

Mrs. Campbell testified that she lives in an apartment in the same building as the one in which the Roth apartment is located. She testified that, on April 8, 1974, she observed the defendant, James Dory, leave the Roth apartment carrying a portable television set and some clothing. She explained that, at the time, she had not realized that the suite had changed hands and thus had not reported the incident.

Testimony of the Defendant, James Dory:

The defendant, James Dory, is a 27-year-old construction worker. He has worked for the same firm for five years. At the time of the trial, he is still working in this capacity.

Dory pleaded guilty to the charge. He testified that he had moved
from the apartment now occupied by the Roths less than a month before the theft occurred. Dory explained that he discovered he still had a spare set of keys to his former apartment and drove to the apartment building to return the keys to the manager. Dory stated that when he found the manager not at home, he decided to give the keys to the new occupant of the suite. The new occupant did not answer the door and Dory used the keys to let himself in. Dory stated that, after he entered the suite, he realized that he had an opportunity to commit a perfect crime. Dory reported that he selected several items and proceeded to carry them to his car. He was carrying out the portable television set and some clothing when he encountered Mrs. Campbell. Dory testified that he became afraid that he had been recognized and decided to dispose of the goods as quickly as possible. Dory stated that he went to a bar and there sold the color television, the stereo set and the diamond ring. Dory testified that the identities and whereabouts of the purchasers of these articles were unknown to him.

Dory testified that he had never before committed, been charged with, or convicted of, a criminal offence.

**Testimony of Dory's Employer:**

The owner of the firm where Dory is employed testified that, during the five years Dory has been employed by the firm, he has been a hard and conscientious worker.

**Verdict:**

The defendant is found guilty of the charge.
ACCOUNT OF VANDALISM

Summary of the Case:

The defendant, James Dory, is charged with vandalism. The prosecution charges that, on the afternoon of April 8, 1974, Dory broke into a house owned by Thomas Finn and severely damaged the premises.

Testimony of the Plaintiff, Thomas Finn:

The owner of the house, Thomas Finn, is a 32-year-old mechanic. Finn testified that he had purchased a partially built house and, on evenings and weekends, worked to complete it so that he could move his family into it. Finn stated that the house had been almost completed when the damage occurred.

Finn testified that the damages to the house included smashed fixtures in the bathroom, paint poured over carpeting and the plaster on several walls smashed with a hammer. Finn testified that it had been necessary to replace the bathroom fixtures and the carpeting and that the cost of these items plus materials to repair other damages had been $2,501.32. Finn added that these losses were not covered by insurance.

Testimony of Mrs. Campbell, witness:

Mrs. Campbell testified that she resides in the house across the street from the Finn property. She testified that on the afternoon in question she was in her front yard when she observed a strange car pull up to the Finn house. Mrs. Campbell stated that she saw the defendant emerge from the car and walk to the rear of the Finn house. Mrs. Campbell testified that she then heard what sounded like glass breaking,
became suspicious and noted the licence number, make and model of the defendant's car. Mrs. Campbell stated that she continued to watch for several minutes and then approached the Finn house with intentions of questioning the defendant about his presence on the premises. Mrs. Campbell testified that as she approached the house, she was able to see the defendant clearly through the dining room window and observed that he was pouring the contents of a can of paint on the floor. Mrs. Campbell said she returned to her home and telephoned police. Before they arrived, she saw the defendant emerge from the house, enter his car and drive away.

Testimony of Police Officer:

The police officer who arrested Dory testified that he was on his way to the Finn house when he observed the defendant's car a few blocks away from the property. The officer stated that he stopped the car to question the defendant and noticed that the defendant's slacks and shoes were spattered with wet paint. When he returned with the defendant to the Finn house, the officer observed that the color of the paint was the same as that poured on the carpeting. The officer further testified that he found the glass in the rear door had been smashed.

Testimony of the Defendant, James Dory:

The defendant, 25-year-old James Dory, has been employed as a truck-driver for the past three years. He is still working in this capacity at the time of the trial.

Dory pleaded guilty to the charge and admitted that he did the damage described. He testified that he had been on vacation when the
offence occurred. Dory stated that, on the day in question, he had been suffering the after-effects of drinking heavily the previous evening. Dory stated that he was driving through the sub-division when he became extremely thirsty and stopped at the Finn house to ask for water. When he realized the house was vacant, he smashed the glass pane in the rear door and let himself in. Dory stated that he tried to obtain water first from the kitchen and then from the bathroom. Dory said that he found the water was not turned on, became enraged, seized a hammer and smashed the bathroom fixtures. Dory stated that he then used the hammer to pound holes in walls until he stumbled over the paint which he poured on the carpeting. Once he had emptied the paint cans, he left the premises.

Dory testified that he had never before committed, been charged with, or convicted of, a criminal offence.

Testimony of Dory's Employer:

The owner of the firm where Dory is employed as a truck driver testified that, during the three years Dory has been in his employ, he has been a hard and conscientious worker.

Verdict:

The defendant is found guilty of the charge.
APPENDIX B

REPORT OF PILOT STUDIES

OVERVIEW

Two pilot studies were conducted to examine various aspects of the stimulus materials and dependent measures proposed for use in the research. Findings related to the adequacy of stimulus materials will be covered first and then consideration will be given to selection of dependent measures.

STIMULUS MATERIALS

Attractiveness of Criminals and Victims Within Each Account

Brief descriptions of criminals and victims were abstracted from simulated case transcripts and presented to subjects in the second pilot study. Subjects rated the stimulus person on the set of 15 bi-polar adjectives developed by Lerner (1965). These are presented in semantic differential form and a stimulus person's score on each item may range from one (negative evaluation) to nine (positive evaluation). Ratings on these items may be summed to yield an overall index of attractiveness. The range of possible scores is, therefore, from 15 to 135. A higher score indicates a more positive rating.

These ratings were made prior to subjects' being told of the stimulus persons' involvements in criminal offences. Each subject
rated only one of the criminal-victim pairs. Nine subjects rated each pair. The purpose of this procedure was to determine if any of the criminal-victim pairs were perceived as differing greatly in attractiveness. Mean attractiveness ratings are presented in Table XXIX.

**TABLE XXIX**

**MEAN RATINGS OF ATTRACTIVENESS OF CRIMINAL-VICTIM PAIRS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stimulus Persons</th>
<th>Criminal</th>
<th>Victim</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fraud</td>
<td>92.88</td>
<td>99.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theft</td>
<td>94.44</td>
<td>105.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vandalism</td>
<td>92.66</td>
<td>95.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theft (revised)</td>
<td>84.88</td>
<td>86.22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The difference between rated attractiveness of the criminal and victim involved in the theft was found to be significant ($t = 4.18; d.f. = 8; p < .05$). This difference appeared due to the favorability with which subjects rated the victim: a bookkeeper who had visited his ailing mother-in-law. The description of the victim was revised so that he became a department store salesman who had visited relatives. The revised descriptions of the criminal-victim pair were rated by nine additional subjects and obtained means are shown in Table XXIX, above.
Perceived Guilt of the Defendant:

Subjects in the second pilot study were presented with a simulated case transcript, asked to read it over and then indicate whether or not the evidence proved the defendant's guilt. Subjects were also asked to indicate, on a scale ranging from zero to one hundred percent, how certain they were that their decisions were correct. The purpose of this task was to ensure that the material presented in each case established the guilt of the defendant and to thereby avoid possible complications due to asking experimental subjects to sentence defendants not perceived as guilty. Nine subjects rated each of the accounts of fraud and vandalism and eighteen subjects rated the account of theft. All subjects found the defendant guilty. The mean ratings for certainty were as follows: theft — 86.13 percent, fraud — 89.50 percent, and vandalism — 73 percent. The data appear to justify the conclusion that the stimulus materials contain sufficient incrimination for experimental purposes.

Clarity and Adequacy of Stimulus Materials:

The thirty-six subjects in the second pilot study were given a description of six alternative sentences and asked to indicate the order in which they would prefer to impose the sentences on the offender in the case. The primary purpose of this task was to provide an opportunity to discover if the descriptions of the sentences were adequate and if the alternatives seemed sensible to subjects.

Once subjects had read over the alternative sentences, they
were asked to complete a post-experimental questionnaire. The questionnaire asked subjects to indicate the nature of the crime, the value of the property involved and to specify the length of the term of imprisonment they would impose on the defendant and the amount of money they would assess as fine or restitution for the offence. The questionnaire also included several items to assess the adequacy of the stimulus materials.

On the whole, subjects appeared to have little difficulty recalling the nature of the crime and the value of the property involved. Three subjects indicated that the sentences were not clear: one suggested that they be put in point form and the other two expressed doubt as to whether or not the victim would be compensated when the sentence stated only probation or imprisonment. These data suggest that consideration should, perhaps, be given to specifying when compensation is not available in experimental conditions where doubt might arise.

**DEPENDENT MEASURES**

Subjects' preferences for various restorations of equity are to be assessed by asking them to choose one of a pair of sentencing alternatives. Subjects will also be asked to specify the magnitude of the penalties they would impose and to indicate their satisfaction with their resolution of the situation. As has already been mentioned, pilot subjects were exposed to descriptions of the six alternative sentences. Pilot subjects were also asked to specify the length of the term of imprisonment they would impose on the defendant and to indicate the amounts they would assess as fine and restitution. Experience with pilot subjects indicates that these measures are suitable for
experimental purposes.

The attractiveness of criminals and victims will be assessed by means of the scale developed by Lerner (1965). This scale consists of fifteen bi-polar adjective pairs. These are presented in semantic differential form and a stimulus person's score on each item may range from one for a negative evaluation to nine for a positive evaluation. Ratings on these items may be summed to yield an overall index of attractiveness. The range of possible scores is, therefore, from 15 to 135. A higher score indicates a more positive rating.

Reliability of the scale has been estimated by means of the procedure outlined below. Samples of ratings of stimulus persons were obtained. Fifteen sets of fourteen item lists were prepared by eliminating each of the bi-polar adjective pairs once from the list. A table of random numbers was used to assign each of the fourteen adjective pairs in each of the fifteen lists a number from one to fourteen. The lists were then split by assigning the adjective pairs randomly assigned numbers from one to seven, inclusive, to the first half and the remaining pairs to the second half. The product-moment correlation between scores on the first and second halves of each list was computed and corrected by the Spearman-Brown formula (Ferguson, 1966, p. 378). Values of $Z_r$ corresponding to the resulting coefficients were then obtained from tables in Ferguson (1966). Then the mean $Z_r$ and the $r$ corresponding to it were found.

The above procedures were used to estimate the reliability of Lerner's scale with data from three samples. The first sample is from an experimenter by Boutilier (1975). Subjects in this study rated
the average university student. It should be noted that the fifteen items were not presented to these subjects in semantic differential form but that subjects made their ratings by circling a number from one to nine. The procedures outlined above yielded an overall reliability coefficient of .800 for this sample. Table XXX shows the individual coefficients, corrected coefficients and transformations.

TABLE XXX

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>List</th>
<th>Split-Half Correlation</th>
<th>Corrected Correlation</th>
<th>Zr</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.686</td>
<td>0.814</td>
<td>1.142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.725</td>
<td>0.840</td>
<td>1.221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.517</td>
<td>0.682</td>
<td>0.829</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.657</td>
<td>0.793</td>
<td>1.071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.740</td>
<td>0.850</td>
<td>1.256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.637</td>
<td>0.778</td>
<td>1.045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.603</td>
<td>0.752</td>
<td>0.973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.510</td>
<td>0.675</td>
<td>0.820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.743</td>
<td>0.852</td>
<td>1.256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.594</td>
<td>0.745</td>
<td>0.962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>0.862</td>
<td>0.926</td>
<td>1.623</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>0.532</td>
<td>0.695</td>
<td>0.858</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>0.718</td>
<td>0.836</td>
<td>1.204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>0.690</td>
<td>0.816</td>
<td>1.142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>0.626</td>
<td>0.769</td>
<td>1.020</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The second and third samples are from the second pilot study for the present research. Each of 36 pilot subjects rated the two stimulus persons comprising one of the criminal-victim pairs. Subjects' ratings of "criminals" were treated as one sample and ratings of "victims" were treated as another sample. Random numbers were assigned to the adjective pairs and the fifteen lists of fourteen items were split into halves as previously outlined. The lists were split in identical fashion for these two samples.

Tables XXXI and XXXII show the individual coefficients, corrected coefficients and Zr transformations for the two samples. The obtained overall reliability coefficient for the sample of ratings of criminals was 0.858 and the obtained coefficient for the sample of ratings of "victims" was 0.800.

| TABLE XXXI |
| SPLIT-HALF CORRELATIONS, CORRECTIONS AND Zr TRANSFORMATIONS OF RATINGS OF "CRIMINALS" ON LERNER'S SCALE |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>List</th>
<th>Split-Half Correlation</th>
<th>Corrected Correlation</th>
<th>Zr</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.719</td>
<td>0.836</td>
<td>1.204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.756</td>
<td>0.861</td>
<td>1.293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.793</td>
<td>0.884</td>
<td>1.398</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.735</td>
<td>0.847</td>
<td>1.238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.718</td>
<td>0.836</td>
<td>1.204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.890</td>
<td>0.942</td>
<td>1.738</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.652</td>
<td>0.789</td>
<td>1.058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.742</td>
<td>0.852</td>
<td>1.256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.739</td>
<td>0.849</td>
<td>1.256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.789</td>
<td>0.882</td>
<td>1.376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>0.735</td>
<td>0.847</td>
<td>1.238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>0.756</td>
<td>0.861</td>
<td>1.293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>0.802</td>
<td>0.890</td>
<td>1.422</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>0.741</td>
<td>0.851</td>
<td>1.256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>0.771</td>
<td>0.870</td>
<td>1.333</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE XXXII

SPLIT-HALF CORRELATIONS, CORRECTIONS AND $Z_r$ TRANSFORMATIONS OF RATINGS OF "VICTIMS" ON LERNER'S SCALE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>List</th>
<th>Split-Half Correlation</th>
<th>Corrected Correlation</th>
<th>$Z_r$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.637</td>
<td>0.778</td>
<td>1.033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.694</td>
<td>0.819</td>
<td>1.157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.627</td>
<td>0.770</td>
<td>1.020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.695</td>
<td>0.820</td>
<td>1.157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.759</td>
<td>0.863</td>
<td>1.293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.699</td>
<td>0.823</td>
<td>1.020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.539</td>
<td>0.700</td>
<td>0.867</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.584</td>
<td>0.737</td>
<td>0.940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.744</td>
<td>0.853</td>
<td>1.256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.783</td>
<td>0.878</td>
<td>1.354</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>0.691</td>
<td>0.817</td>
<td>1.142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>0.649</td>
<td>0.787</td>
<td>1.058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>0.687</td>
<td>0.814</td>
<td>1.142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>0.627</td>
<td>0.770</td>
<td>1.020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>0.613</td>
<td>0.760</td>
<td>0.996</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To determine if assignment of numbers to the individual items in the lists was, indeed, random; Kendall's Coefficient of Concordance was used to test for relationship among ranks assigned to individual items. The obtained value of $W (0.111)$ for the first sample was transformed (Siegal, 1956) to a chi-square value. The obtained chi-square value (23.31, d.f. = 14) was found to be only slightly less than that.
required for significance at the $p < .05$ level (23.68). The obtained value of $W$ for the second and third samples was found to be 0.058 which was transformed to a chi-square value of 12.18, d.f. = 14, $p < .50$.

These data suggest that the reliability of Lerner's scale is sufficient for present purposes.

The first pilot study included a task devised to provide some evidence for the construct and concurrent validity of the proposed dependent measures of perceived gravity of the offence and responsibility of the victim and criminal for the offence.

Two stories were prepared. In the Severe version the offence involved an armed robbery during which an unsuspecting victim was attacked and wounded. In the Mild version, the offender was unarmed and the victim was wounded as a result of his deliberate and unnecessary attack on the criminal.

Each of the twenty-six subjects was randomly assigned either the Mild or Severe version and asked to rate various aspects of the situation on the items shown in Table XXXIII.

Items 1 and 2 were included to assess subjects' perceptions of the gravity of the offence. In order to determine if obtained differences in ratings of the "wrongness" of the offence in the Mild and Severe conditions were significant, $t$-tests were used. The obtained $t$ values and associated probabilities are shown in Table XXXIII. As reference to Table XXXIII shows, the means differed in the direction predicted and the differences were significant ($t = 3.21$, d.f. = 24, $p < .005$; $t = 3.93$, d.f. = 24, $p < .005$).
TABLE XXXIII
DEPENDENT MEASURES, MEAN RATINGS, t VALUES
AND ASSOCIATED PROBABILITIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Dependent Measures</th>
<th>Mean Ratings</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>d.f.</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Item 1: As a question not of law but of morality, Dory's actions were: as wrong as possible (1) — very right (9)</td>
<td>3.46</td>
<td>1.69</td>
<td>3.21</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>&lt;.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item 2: Quite apart from legal aspects, Dory: did not do anything wrong (1) — did very wrong (9)</td>
<td>6.30</td>
<td>8.54</td>
<td>3.93</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>&lt;.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item 3: How much do you think the victim is to blame for what happened?</td>
<td>4.30</td>
<td>3.15</td>
<td>1.24</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>&lt;.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item 4: How much do you agree or disagree with the statement that: &quot;Dory's acts were a result of the circumstances in which he found himself&quot;? Agree completely (1) — disagree completely (9)</td>
<td>4.08</td>
<td>5.92</td>
<td>1.94</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>&lt;.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item 5: How much do you agree or disagree with the statement that: &quot;Dory is more a victim of circumstances than a criminal&quot;? Agree completely (1) — disagree completely (9)</td>
<td>3.69</td>
<td>6.85</td>
<td>3.95</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>&lt;.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item 6: How much do you agree or disagree with the statement that: &quot;Even under different circumstances, Dory would eventually have become a criminal&quot;? Agree completely (1) — disagree completely (9)</td>
<td>6.61</td>
<td>6.08</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>&lt;.30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Item 3 was included to assess the degree of responsibility assigned to the victim. Jones and Aronson (1973) used this item and obtained expected and significant differences in responsibility attributed to the victim. In the present instance the victim in the Severe condition was the unsuspecting target of an attack with a knife while the victim in the Mild condition armed himself with a knife and forced a confrontation with an intruder. The mean rating for blame attributable to the aggressive victim was 4.30 and the mean rating for blame attributable to the unsuspecting victim was 3.15. As is shown in Table XXXIII, the difference between means is not significant at the \( p < .05 \) level. Means did, however, differ in the predicted direction. Important differences between the Jones and Aronson study and the present one may be that subjects in the former study were rating blame attributable to attractive and unattractive victims for being the targets of an attack. The present study dealt with differences in responsibility for being wounded in the course of an unexpected or deliberate confrontation with an intruder. Subjects may have been reluctant to blame the victim for attempting to defend his property. Also, the Jones and Aronson manipulation of the attractiveness of the victim may have made it more difficult to derogate the victim on this dimension. The present study presented no barriers to derogation of the victim as an alternative to attribution of blame. Since this item was used successfully in the Jones and Aronson study and since obtained differences in the present study were in the predicted direction, it is proposed to include it.

Items 4, 5 and 6 were included as measures of perceived
responsibility of the harm-doer for the offence. The obtained means and associated t values are shown in Table XXXIII. As Table XXXIII indicates, ratings in the Mild and Severe conditions on Items 4 and 5 differed significantly in the predicted direction. As will also be seen from Table XXXIII, Item 6 did not discriminate between the two conditions. Accordingly, it is proposed that only Items 4 and 5 be used in the research.

Once subjects had read and rated either the Mild or Severe version of the offence, they were presented with both versions of the story and asked to indicate, by circling a number from one to nine, the extent of their agreement with the statements that the offenders wounded the victims while acting in self-defence and also to evaluate the comparative wrongness of the offences. Time limitations were such that only 21 subjects were presented with this task.

A t-test for correlated observations was used to test the significance of the difference between mean ratings of self-defence for the Mild ($\bar{X} = 3.90$) and Severe ($\bar{X} = 8.09$) offenders. The obtained t value ($t = 8.38$, d.f. = 20) was significant at the $p < .005$ level. Of the 21 subjects evaluating the comparative wrongness of the offences, four rated the Severe offence as less wrong than the Mild one and three rated the Mild and Severe offences as equally wrong. Using the binomial test and considering ratings of less or equally wrong as misses, the probability of seven misses with $N = 21$ is $p < .095$ (Siegal, 1956). Taken together, these results may be interpreted as indicating that subjects perceived the different versions of the stories as expected.
APPENDIX C

DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY

THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

Basic Rights and Privileges of Volunteer Subjects

Any person who volunteers to participate in experiments conducted by full or part-time members of the faculty of the Department of Psychology at the University of British Columbia, by their employees, or by the graduate and undergraduate students working under the direction of faculty members of the above named Department, is entitled to the following rights and privileges.

1. The subject may terminate and withdraw from the experiment at any time without being accountable for the reasons for such an action.

2. The subject shall be informed, prior to the beginning of an experiment, of the maximum length of time the experiment might take and of the general nature of the experiment.

3. The subject shall be informed, prior to the beginning of an experiment, of the nature and function of any mechanical and electrical equipment which is to be used in the experiment. In cases where the subject is in direct contact with such equipment, he shall be informed of the safety measures designed to protect him from physical injury, regardless of how slight the possibility of such injury is.

4. The subject shall be informed, prior to the beginning of an experiment, of the aspects of his behavior that are to be observed and recorded and how this is to be done.

5. Any behavioral record that is obtained during the course of the experiment is confidential. Any behavioral records that are made public through either journal papers or books, public addresses, research colloquia, or classroom presentations for teaching purposes, shall be anonymous.

6. The subject shall be offered, at the end of an experiment, a complete explanation of the purpose of the experiment, either orally by the experimenter or, at the option of the experimenter, in writing. The subject shall also have the opportunity to ask questions pertaining to the experiment and shall be entitled to have these questions answered.

7. The subject has the right to inform the Chairman of the Departmental Committee of Research with Human Subjects of any perceived violations of, or questions about, the aforementioned rights and privileges.
Provisions of the Criminal Code of Canada permit the Courts considerable latitude in dealing with cases such as the one you have just seen. I am interested in finding out some things about how sentencing decisions are made. What I'd like you to do is consider that the two sentences outlined on the next page are the ones available in this case. Please read carefully the descriptions of these two possible sentences.

Suppose that you are to sentence the defendant in this case. Consider the two sentences listed on the next page and decide which sentence you would prefer to impose on the offender in the case before you. Indicate which sentence you would prefer to impose by placing an (X) in the box beside that sentence.

Take as much time as you want in thinking about the case before indicating your choice. Please remember that I am interested in your personal decision and not in how you think others might react or how you feel you should react.
Fine vs Imprisonment Condition

1. A term of probation on condition that the offender pay a fine, maintain good behavior and report to a probation officer. Assume that no maximum or minimum amount payable as a fine is specified. Assume that the offender may be fined any amount you feel is appropriate and that terms of payment will be worked out in consultation with a probation officer.

2. A term of imprisonment. Assume that no maximum or minimum term is specified and that the offender may be sentenced to imprisonment for any length of time you feel is appropriate.
Restitution vs Fine Condition

1. A term of probation on condition that the offender pay a sum of money to the rightful owner or owners of the lost or damaged property, maintain good behavior and report to a probation officer. Assume that no maximum or minimum amount payable as restitution is specified. The offender may be required to pay any amount you feel is appropriate to the rightful owner of the lost or damaged property. Assume that terms of payment will be worked out in consultation with a probation officer.

2. A term of probation on condition that the offender pay a fine, maintain good behavior and report to a probation officer. Assume that no maximum or minimum amount payable as a fine is specified. Assume that the offender may be fined any amount you feel is appropriate and that terms of payment will be worked out in consultation with a probation officer. Assume that this alternative does not allow compensation to the rightful owner or owners of the lost or damaged property.

PLEASE COMPLETE THIS PAGE BEFORE YOU TURN TO THE NEXT ONE.
**Imprisonment vs Release Condition**

1. A release with a reprimand.

2. A term of imprisonment. Assume that no maximum or minimum term is specified and that the offender may be sentenced to imprisonment for any length of time you feel is appropriate.
Imprisonment with Compensation vs Fine Condition

1. A term of imprisonment for the offender and compensation, paid by the Province, for the rightful owner or owners of the lost or damaged property. Assume that no maximum or minimum term of imprisonment is specified and that the offender may be sentenced to imprisonment for any length of time you feel is appropriate. Assume also that you may order that the rightful owner or owners of the lost or damaged property receive compensation from the Province for losses. Assume that no maximum or minimum amount payable as compensation is specified and that you may award as compensation any amount you feel is appropriate.

2. A term of probation on condition that the offender pay a fine, maintain good behavior and report to a probation officer. Assume that no maximum or minimum amount payable as a fine is specified. Assume that the offender may be fined any amount you feel is appropriate and that terms of payment will be worked out in consultation with a probation officer. Assume that this alternative does not allow compensation to the rightful owner or owners of the lost or damaged property.

PLEASE COMPLETE THIS PAGE BEFORE YOU TURN TO THE NEXT ONE.
APPENDIX F

SATISFACTION SCALE FOR STUDY I

Consider the nature of the offence in the case presented to you and the sentencing decision you made. Decide how satisfactory you find this resolution of the situation. Then indicate your feelings by drawing a vertical line through the scale at the point that best represents how satisfactory or unsatisfactory you find the resolution of the situation.

unsatisfactory

satisfactory

completely

completely
APPENDIX G
MATERIALS FOR RATING PARTICIPANTS' ATTRACTIONNESS

You are asked to rate the participants in this case on a set of descriptive scales. Here is how you are to use these scales.

If you feel that the person is very closely related to one end of the scale, you should mark as follows:

fair $\text{fair} \quad \begin{array}{c} \text{fair} \\ \vdots \end{array}$ unfair
or
fair $\begin{array}{c} \vdots \\ \vdots \end{array} \text{unfair}$

If you feel that the person is quite closely related to one or the other end of the scale (but not extremely), you should place your mark as follows:

strong $\begin{array}{c} \text{strong} \\ \vdots \end{array}$ weak
or
strong $\vdots \text{weak}$

If you feel that the person is moderately closely related to one or the other end of the scale, you should place your mark as follows:

good $\begin{array}{c} \text{good} \\ \vdots \end{array}$ bad
or
good $\vdots \text{bad}$

If you feel that the person is only slightly related to one side as opposed to the other side (but is not really neutral), then you should mark as follows:

active $\begin{array}{c} \text{active} \\ \vdots \end{array}$ passive
or
active $\vdots \text{passive}$

The direction toward which you mark, of course, depends upon which of the two ends of the scale seems most characteristic of the person you are judging.

If you consider the person to be neutral on the scale — both sides of the scale equally associated with the person — you should place your mark in the middle space.

safe $\begin{array}{c} \text{safe} \\ \vdots \end{array}$ dangerous

IMPORTANT: 1. Place your marks in the middle of the spaces.

$\begin{array}{c} \vdots \\ \vdots \end{array}$

2. Be sure you check every scale — do not omit any.

3. Never put more than one mark on a single space.
You are being asked to rate two individuals — the defendant and the plaintiff. Please do these ratings in the order presented and complete your ratings of the first individual before going on to the next.

Before you do the ratings please note, in the spaces provided at the top of each page, the name of the individual you are rating. You may refer back to the summary of the case if you wish. Form as strong an impression as you can of the person you are rating. Then mark the scales to show your impression of that individual.

Work at fairly high speed through the scales. Do not worry or puzzle over individual items. It is your first impressions, your immediate feelings about the person that we want. Please do not be careless because we want your true impressions.
The name of the plaintiff is: ________________________

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trait</th>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>intelligent</td>
<td></td>
<td>unintelligent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>likeable</td>
<td></td>
<td>unlikeable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bossy</td>
<td></td>
<td>easy-going</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>immature</td>
<td></td>
<td>mature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>imaginative</td>
<td></td>
<td>unimaginative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>irresponsible</td>
<td></td>
<td>responsible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nervous</td>
<td></td>
<td>calm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>patient</td>
<td></td>
<td>impatient</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reasonable</td>
<td></td>
<td>unreasonable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rigid</td>
<td></td>
<td>flexible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>courteous</td>
<td></td>
<td>rude</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>selfish</td>
<td></td>
<td>unselfish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>warm</td>
<td></td>
<td>cold</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sincere</td>
<td></td>
<td>insincere</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>co-operative</td>
<td></td>
<td>unco-operative</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N.B. Be sure to put the name of the person you are rating in the space provided at the top of the page.
PLEASE COMPLETE THIS PAGE BEFORE YOU TURN TO THE NEXT ONE.

The name of the defendant is: ________________.

The crime he committed is: ________________.

intelligent ____________ unintelligent
likeable ____________ unlikeable
bossy ____________ easy-going
immature ____________ mature
imaginative ____________ unimaginative
irresponsible ____________ responsible
nervous ____________ calm
patient ____________ impatient
reasonable ____________ unreasonable
rigid ____________ flexible
courteous ____________ rude
selfish ____________ unselfish
warm ____________ cold
sincere ____________ insincere
co-operative ____________ unco-operative

N.B. Be sure to put the name of the person you are rating in the space provided at the top of the page.
APPENDIX H

MATERIALS FOR RATING RESPONSIBILITY AND BLAME

The next page contains items asking your opinions about the case. Please consider each item and then indicate your opinion by marking the scale below each item. The scales you are to use are like the one shown below.

How pleasant did you find the last party you attended?

extremely pleasant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 extremely unpleasant

If you found the party extremely pleasant you would circle the 1 and if you found it extremely unpleasant you would circle the 9.

If you thought the party was average, you would circle the 5. If you thought the party was somewhere between extreme and average, you would circle the number in-between (2, 3, 4 or 6, 7, 8) that best represented your estimate of the pleasantness of the party.

Please turn to the next page, consider the questions and mark the scales to show your opinions. Please remember that I am interested in your personal opinions and not in how you think others might react or how you feel you should react.
As a question not of law but of morality, Dory's actions were:

as wrong as possible 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 very right

Quite apart from legal aspects, Dory:

did not do anything wrong 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 did very wrong

How much do you think the plaintiff is to blame for what happened?

not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 completely

How much do you agree with the statement that:

"Dory's acts were a result of the circumstances in which he found himself"?

agree completely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 disagree completely

How much do you agree or disagree with the statement that:

"Dory is more a victim of circumstances than a criminal"?

agree completely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 disagree completely
APPENDIX I

SHORT QUESTIONNAIRE FOR STUDY I

1. The name of the defendant in the case is: ____________________________

2. The crime with which the defendant is charged is: ____________________

3. The value of the lost or damaged property involved in the offence is
   approximately ____________________.

4. If the defendant were to be sentenced to a term of imprisonment for
   the offence, how long a term should he serve for this offence?
   ________________________________

5. If the defendant were to pay a fine rather than serve time in prison,
   what amount of money should he pay as a fine? _______________________

6. If the defendant were to pay a sum of money to the rightful owner of
   the lost or damaged property rather than pay a fine or serve time in
   prison, what amount of money should he pay to the plaintiff as
   restitution? _______________________

7. Five possible sentences are listed below. Two of these sentences were
   available for you to choose from when you sentenced the defendant.
   Please place a check-mark in the box beside each of these two sentences.

   ___ A. A term of imprisonment for the offender.
   ___ B. A term of imprisonment for the offender and compensation,
         paid by the Province, for the rightful owner or owners of
         the lost or damaged goods.
   ___ C. A term of probation for the offender on condition that he
         pay a fine.
   ___ D. A term of probation for the offender on condition that he
         pay a sum of money to the rightful owner or owners of the
         lost or damaged goods.
   ___ E. A release with a reprimand.

8. Which of the two alternatives did you choose? Why did you select
   this one?
APPENDIX J

THURSTONE-WANG "ATTITUDE TOWARD PUNISHMENT OF CRIMINALS" SCALE

On this page and on the next page you will find a number of statements expressing different attitudes toward punishment of criminals.

✓ Put a check mark if you agree with the statement.

✗ Put a cross if you disagree with the statement.

Try to indicate either agreement or disagreement for each statement. If you simply cannot decide about a statement you may mark it with a question mark. ?

This is not an examination. There are no right or wrong answers to these statements. I am simply interested in your attitudes toward punishment of criminals. Please indicate your convictions by a check mark when you agree and by a cross when you disagree.

A person should be imprisoned only for serious offences.

It is wrong for society to make any of its members suffer.

Hard prison life will keep men from committing crime.

Some criminals will not benefit from punishment.

Most prisons are schools of crime.

We should not consider the comfort of a prisoner.

A criminal will go straight only when he finds that prison life is hard.
No punishment can reduce crime.
Prison influence is degenerating.
Only habitual criminals should be punished.
We should employ corporal punishment in dealing with all criminals.
I have no opinion about the treatment of crime.
Punishment of criminals is a disgrace to civilized society.
Solitary confinement will make the criminal penitent.
It is advantageous to society to spare certain criminals.
Only humane treatment can cure criminals.
Harsh imprisonment merely embitters a criminal.
No leniency should be shown to convicts.
Many petty offenders become dangerous criminals after a prison term.
Failure to punish the criminal encourages crime.
Only by extreme brutal punishment can we cure the criminal.
The more severely a man is punished, the greater criminal he becomes.
A criminal should be punished first and then reformed.
One way to deter men from crime is to make them suffer.
Punishment is wasteful of human life.
A bread and water diet in prison will cure the criminal.
Brutal treatment of a criminal makes him more dangerous.
A jail sentence will cure many criminals of further offences.
Prison inmates should be put in irons.
We should consider the individual in treating crime.
Even the most vicious criminal should not be harmed.
Humane treatment inspires the criminal to be good.
Some punishment is necessary in dealing with the criminal.
Summary of the Case:

The defendant, James Dory, was charged with obtaining funds by false pretences. The amount of money in question was $2,500. The prosecution claimed that Dory posed as a Bank official and persuaded Mrs. Dorothy Campbell to entrust him with funds which he then used for his own purposes.

Testimony of the Plaintiff, Mrs. Campbell:

Mrs. Dorothy Campbell is a 67-year-old widow. Since her husband's death in 1969 she has resided alone in a small apartment which she owns. Prior to the fraud, Mrs. Campbell had about $3,500 saved for emergencies. Afterwards, apart from her home, her assets consisted of approximately a thousand dollars remaining in a savings account. For her day-to-day living expenses, she relies on her old age pension. The lost money represented a significant portion of the money she had deposited for emergencies.

Mrs. Campbell testified that the defendant first contacted her on January 4, 1974 when he telephoned and claimed to be a Bank investment
Mrs. Campbell stated that Dory told her the Bank was offering special investment opportunities to selected customers. Dory requested and obtained Mrs. Campbell's permission to visit her to explain the investment program.

Mrs. Campbell stated that the defendant followed up his telephone call by appearing at her home and presenting her with an identification card showing he was a Bank employee. She further testified that he persuaded her that her funds would be better invested in the Bank plan than left in her savings account. Mrs. Campbell stated that she gave Dory a cheque for $2,500 and received in return a Bank Plan certificate and a receipt. (These documents were introduced as Exhibits A, B and C).

Mrs. Campbell stated that, when she next visited the Bank, she discovered that she had been the victim of a fraud.

Testimony of Police Officer:

The detective who worked on the case testified that, when the fraud was reported, a police portrait of Dory was drawn from the descriptions given by Mrs. Campbell and the bank teller who had cashed the cheque. He explained that a police officer who had seen the portrait later met Dory at a party and recognized him. The detective testified that when he received this report, he investigated further. The detective testified that Dory was placed in a police line-up and positively identified by both the teller and by Mrs. Campbell. Also offered in evidence was a business card (Exhibit D) which identifies the holder as a Bank employee. The detective testified that this card was found in Dory's possession. It contained Dory's photograph and a fictitious name.
Testimony of the Defendant, James Dory:

The defendant, 49-year-old James Dory, had been employed for 14 years as a salesman by a local car dealer. At the time of the trial, Dory was still working in this capacity. He is married with no children living at home.

Dory pleaded guilty to the charge and agreed that Mrs. Campbell accurately described the technique he used to persuade her to entrust him with the funds. He stated, however, that he planned only to borrow the money for investment purposes and that he planned to repay Mrs. Campbell out of his profits. Dory testified that an acquaintance had offered him a chance to invest in a promising venture. Dory stated he was wondering how to raise the necessary funds when he heard the fraud described on an open line radio programme and decided to use it to acquire funds. Dory further testified that the money was lost when the business venture failed.

Dory also testified that he had never before committed, been charged with, or convicted of, a criminal offence.

Testimony of Dory's Employer:

The owner of the car dealership where Dory was employed testified that during the fourteen years the defendant worked for him, he was a good worker and that there were no customer complaints about Dory.

Verdict:

The defendant was found guilty of the charge.
ACCOUNT OF THEFT

Summary of the Case:

The defendant, James Dory, was charged with theft. The prosecution charged that, on the evening of April 8, 1974, Dory entered an apartment occupied by Mr. and Mrs. Peter Roth and removed the following items: a portable color television set, a stereo set, a diamond engagement ring, a camera and four articles of clothing belonging to Mr. Roth. At the time of the trial the television set, the stereo set and the diamond ring, together valued at about $2,500, had not been recovered. The prosecution alleged that Dory, the former occupant of the suite now rented by the Roths, kept a spare set of keys to the suite and used them to gain entrance.

Testimony of the Plaintiff, Peter Roth:

Twenty-six year old Peter Roth is employed as a salesman by a local department store. Roth testified that he had lived in the suite for less than a month before the theft occurred. He stated that he moved into the suite on April 1st and that on April 7th he and his wife left for Calgary to spend a week visiting relatives. Roth stated that when he returned from Calgary on April 14, he discovered that the apartment had been entered and that the goods listed above had been stolen. Roth stated that the lost property had not been insured against theft.

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16 Three different sentences represented three different resolutions of the inequity. Subjects in each condition received a description of the sentence appropriate to that condition. See Appendix L for the three sentences used in the study.
Four articles of clothing and a camera were produced in court and identified by Mr. Roth as the ones he had reported stolen.

**Testimony of Police Officer:**

The police officer assigned to investigate the theft testified that he had questioned other tenants in the building. He stated that one of the tenants contacted, Mrs. Campbell, reported that she had seen James Dory, the former occupant of the Roth apartment, leave the suite carrying a portable television set and some clothing.

The officer testified that Dory's new residence had been searched and that four items of clothing which matched the description of those reported stolen were found in Dory's possession. The officer also testified that the serial number of a camera also found in Dory's possession was the same as the serial number of the one reported stolen. The officer further testified that the articles produced in court and identified by Roth were the ones he found in Dory's possession.

**Testimony of Mrs. Campbell, witness:**

Mrs. Campbell testified that she lives in an apartment in the same building as the one in which the Roth apartment is located. She testified that, on April 8, 1974, she observed the defendant, James Dory, leave the Roth apartment carrying a portable television set and some clothing. She explained that, at the time, she had not realized that the suite had changed hands and thus had not reported the incident.

**Testimony of the Defendant, James Dory:**

The defendant, James Dory, a 27-year-old construction worker, had
worked for the same firm for five years. At the time of the trial he was still working in that capacity.

Dory pleaded guilty to the charge. He testified that he had moved from the apartment occupied by the Roths less than a month before the theft occurred. Dory explained that he discovered he still had a spare set of keys to his former apartment and drove to the apartment building to return the keys to the manager. Dory stated that when he found the manager was not at home, he decided to give the keys to the new occupant of the suite. The new occupant did not answer the door and Dory used the keys to let himself in. Dory stated that, after he entered the suite, he realized that he had an opportunity to commit a perfect crime. Dory reported that he selected several items and proceeded to carry them to his car. He was carrying out the portable television set and some clothing when he encountered Mrs. Campbell. Dory testified that he became afraid that he had been recognized and decided to dispose of the goods as quickly as possible. Dory stated that he went to a bar and there sold the color television, the stereo set and the diamond ring. Dory testified that the identities and whereabouts of the purchasers of these articles were unknown to him.

Dory testified that he had never before committed, been charged with, or convicted of, a criminal offence.

**Testimony of Dory's Employer:**

The owner of the firm where Dory was employed testified that, during the five years Dory had been employed by the firm, he had been a hard and conscientious worker.
Verdict:
The defendant was found guilty of the charge.

Sentence: 17

ACCOUNT OF VANDALISM

Summary of the Case:
The defendant, James Dory, was charged with vandalism. The prosecution charged that, on the afternoon of April 8, 1974, Dory broke into a house owned by Thomas Finn and severely damaged the premises.

Testimony of the Plaintiff, Thomas Finn:
The owner of the house, Thomas Finn, is a 32-year-old mechanic. Finn testified that he had purchased a partially built house and, on evenings and weekends, worked to complete it so that he could move his family into it. Finn stated that the house had been almost completed when the damage occurred.

Finn testified that the damages to the house included smashed fixtures in the bathroom, paint poured over carpeting and the plaster on several walls smashed with a hammer. Finn testified that it had been necessary to replace the bathroom fixtures and the carpeting and that the cost of these items plus materials to repair other damages had been $2,501.32. Finn added that these losses were not covered by insurance.

Testimony of Mrs. Campbell, witness:
Mrs. Campbell testified that she resides in the house across the 17 The account concluded with a description of a sentence imposed in the case.
street from the Finn property. She testified that on the afternoon in question she was in her front yard when she observed a strange car pull up to the Finn house. Mrs. Campbell stated that she saw the defendant emerge from the car and walk to the rear of the Finn house. Mrs. Campbell testified that she then heard what sounded like glass breaking, became suspicious and noted the licence number, make and model of the defendant's car. Mrs. Campbell stated that she continued to watch for several minutes and then approached the Finn house with intentions of questioning the defendant about his presence on the premises. Mrs. Campbell testified that as she approached the house, she was able to see the defendant clearly through the dining room window and observed that he was pouring the contents of a can of paint on the floor. Mrs. Campbell said she returned to her home and telephoned police. Before they arrived, she saw the defendant emerge from the house, enter his car and drive away.

**Testimony of Police Officer:**

The police officer who arrested Dory testified that he was on his way to the Finn house when he observed the defendant's car a few blocks away from the property. The officer stated that he stopped the car to question the defendant and noticed that the defendant's slacks and shoes were spattered with wet paint. When he returned with the defendant to the Finn house, the officer observed that the color of the paint was the same as that poured on the carpeting. The officer further testified that he found the glass in the rear door had been smashed.

**Testimony of the Defendant, James Dory:**

The defendant, 25-year-old James Dory, had been employed as a
truck-driver for the past three years and was still working in that capacity at the time of the trial.

Dory pleaded guilty to the charge and admitted that he did the damage described. He testified that he had been on vacation when the offence occurred. Dory stated that, on the day in question, he had been suffering the after-effects of drinking heavily the previous evening. Dory stated that he was driving through the sub-division when he became extremely thirsty and stopped at the Finn house to ask for water. When he realized the house was vacant, he smashed the glass pane in the rear door and let himself in. Dory stated that he tried to obtain water first from the kitchen and then from the bathroom. Dory said that he found the water was not turned on, became enraged, seized a hammer and smashed the bathroom fixtures. Dory stated that he then used the hammer to pound holes in walls until he stumbled over the paint which he poured on the carpeting. Once he had emptied the paint cans, he left the premises.

Dory testified that he had never before committed, been charged with, or convicted of, a criminal offence.

Testimony of Dory's Employer:

The owner of the firm where Dory was employed as a truck-driver testified that, during the three years Dory had been in his employ, he had been a hard and conscientious worker.

Verdict:

The defendant was found guilty of the charge.

Sentence:

18 The account concluded with a description of a sentence imposed in the case.
APPENDIX L

SENTENCES FOR STUDY II

Release Condition

The defendant was reprimanded for his conduct and released.

Imprisonment with Compensation Condition

The defendant was sentenced to serve a term of one year in prison. (Assume that the sentence required the defendant to serve the full term: do not consider parole.) The plaintiff was awarded $2,500 compensation for losses resulting from the crime. This sum was paid from a Provincial Fund established to provide compensation for persons incurring losses due to crime.

Restitution Condition

The defendant was sentenced to serve a term of one year in prison but was not required to serve any of this term. Instead, the sentence was suspended and the defendant released on probation on condition that he maintain good behavior, report to a probation officer and pay the plaintiff the sum of $2,500 as compensation for losses resulting from the crime. Terms of payment were to be worked out in consultation with a probation officer.
APPENDIX M

SATISFACTION SCALE FOR STUDY II

Consider the nature of the offence in the case presented to you and the sentencing decision made. Decide how satisfactory you find this resolution of the situation. Then indicate your feelings by drawing a vertical line through the scale at the point that best represents how satisfactory or unsatisfactory you find the resolution of the situation.

completely unsatisfactory completely satisfactory
APPENDIX N

SHORT QUESTIONNAIRE FOR STUDY II

1. The name of the defendant in the case is: ___________________________

2. The crime the defendant committed was: ___________________________

3. The value of the lost or damaged property involved in the offence was approximately: ___________________________

4. If the defendant were to be sentenced to a term of imprisonment for the offence, how long a term do you think he should serve for this offence? ___________________________

5. If the defendant were to be fined rather than serve time in prison, what amount of money do you think he should pay as a fine? ___________________________

6. If the defendant were to pay a sum of money to the rightful owner of the lost or damaged property rather than pay a fine or serve time in prison, what amount of money do you think he should pay to the plaintiff as restitution? ___________________________

7. Three possible sentences are listed below. The defendant in the case you read about received one of these sentences. Please place a check-mark in the box beside the sentence given to the defendant.

   A. A term of imprisonment for the offender and compensation, paid by the Province, for the rightful owner or owners of the lost or damaged goods.

   B. A term of probation for the defendant on condition that he pay a sum of money to the rightful owner or owners of the lost or damaged goods.

   C. A release with a reprimand.

8. Which one of these alternatives would you have chosen? Why would you select this one if you were to determine the sentence for the defendant?

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