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An analysis and critique of the political and educational philosophy of Joseph Tussman Freeman, Natalie Veiner 1974

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AN ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE OF THE POLITICAL AND EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOSEPH TUSSMAN BY NATALIE VEINER FREEMAN B.A., University of B r i t i s h Columbia,  196^.  A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE DEGREE OF MASTER.OF ARTS  .  In the Department of Philosophy We accept t h i s t h e s i s as conforming t o the required standard  THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA November, 197^ .;, '  In p r e s e n t i n g t h i s  thesis  an advanced degree at the L i b r a r y s h a l l I  f u r t h e r agree  in p a r t i a l  f u l f i l m e n t o f the requirements f o r  the U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h  make i t  freely available  that permission  for  Columbia,  I agree  r e f e r e n c e and  f o r e x t e n s i v e copying o f  this  that  study. thesis  f o r s c h o l a r l y purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by h i s of  this  representatives. thesis  It  is understood that copying or p u b l i c a t i o n  f o r f i n a n c i a l gain s h a l l  written permission.  Department of  fi  \^  The U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Vancouver 8. Canada  W f ^ l l ^ Columbia  not be allowed without my  i A B S T R A C T  The struggle from Plato onward, i n every p o l i t i c a l theory and i n every actual p o l i t i c a l system, has been the attempt to deal with the notion of public purpose, generally expressed as the public i n t e r e s t .  The struggle has been to make sense out of the  relationship between a concept of public interest on the one hand, and a concept of private interests on the other.  This same struggle  i s the central theme of Tussman's theory of obligation, and i n his attempt to come to terms w i t h the problem, I have been struck by how Platonic a stance he i s f i n a l l y forced to adopt even though he seems to be i n i t i a l l y w r i t i n g out of a d i f f e r e n t t r a d i t i o n : the democratic  tradition. I want, then, to trace a pervasive influence of Platonic  notions on Tussman's p o l i t i c a l theory; s p e c i f i c a l l y , I want to argue that i t i s the Platonic view of the ' s e l f and i t s relationship to a s p e c i a l theory of freedom which has d i r e c t bearing upon three areas of Tussman's argument i n Obligation and the B ody P o l i t i c . want to argue that these Platonic notions d i r e c t l y inform his view of the public i n t e r e s t , h i s theory of representation, and f i n a l l y , flowing out of these f i r s t t wo, Tussman's d i s t i n c t i v e theory of education.  I  ii  C O N T E N T S  page  Introduction Chapter I;  1 ANALYSIS OF TUSSMAN'S POLITICAL THEORY....  4  1.  D e f i n i t i o n of Body P o l i t i c  5  2.  Theory of Membership  6  3.  Relationship of the Notion of the Public Interest  4. Chapter I I :  to Platonic Notions  10  The Platonic Theory of the D i v i s i o n of the Soul..  18  A 'HUMANISTIC CRITIQUE  Chapter I I I ; THEORY OF REPRESENTATION 1.  Concept of P o l i t i c a l Freedom  2,  Consequences of the Dichotomy Between Private and  26 35 40  Public Interest  49  3.  An Alternative Model...  57  4,  Theory of Democracy  64  THEORY OF EDUCATION  70  Chapter IV; Conclusion  90  Bibliography  92  Post-Script  93  iii  ACKNOWLEDGEMENT  I would l i k e to thank Robert Rowan, Donald G. Brown and Elbridge Rand f o r the help they have given me not only i n the preparation of t h i s paper but throughout my educational experience i n the philosophy department at the University of B.C.  -1-  INTRODUCTION  Obligation and the Body P o l i t i c i s an attempt t o write p o l i t i c a l theory rather than t o merely analyze i t .  The book i s  written from "the perspective of action" rather than from "the perspective of d e s c r i p t i o n " * and the argument, so Tussman says, "turns" on t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n ; f o r he writes the book' from the perspective of being i n s i d e the mind of a man who i s a p a r t i c i p a n t i n the sovereign function i n a democracy, and Is f a c i n g the problem of deciding how to act i n that capacity.  Tussman, then, i s presenting a theory of  o b l i g a t i o n i n p o l i t i c a l l i f e which only becomes sensible i f i t i s appropriate t o ask the question "what should I do?" rather than "what am I doing?" or "what w i l l I do?" as a p o l i t i c a l agent. From t h i s perspective, he has some t e l l i n g cannons t o f i r e a t the door of the f o r t r e s s of the s o c i a l sciences.  High time  too, f o r the d e s c r i p t i v e - p r e d i c t i v e hangover of the s c i e n t i f i c model has badly scarred the study of p o l i t i c a l theory and Tussman i s r i g h t when he points out that "the a r t of t r a i n i n g of the decision maker i s not simply i d e n t i c a l with that of the s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t ; and a school of government cannot simply be a d i v i s i o n of s o c i a l science." Tussman claims, fundamentally,  that the 'is/ought* d i s -  t i n c t i o n , as we too commonly r e - i n t e r p r e t Hume, should be put to r e s t i n p o l i t i c a l matters - f o r a democracy cannot survive unless i t understands and takes s e r i o u s l y the obligations and duties i n volved i n the r o l e of being a p o l i t i c a l member and agent.  1 Joseph Tussman, Obligation and the Body P o l i t i c , New York, Oxford Press, 1961, p. 12. 2  I b i d . , p. 1^.  -2-  In order to write from t h i s perspective of there obligations i n p o l i t i c a l l i f e , Tussman must have two operating:  (1)  being  assumptions  f i r s t of a l l , he must assume that man  i s free, i n  the sense - not compelled - to make choices about important decisions in his l i f e  , and (2)  secondly, he must assume the p o s s i b i l i t y of  r a t i o n a l arguments about morality.  That i s , he must assume that  there are some moral c r i t e r i a against which a member or agent can examine h i s a l t e r n a t i v e s ; f o r to say a man —  'ought* to do something  or more important —: f o r me to make a judgment about what 'I  ought to do*, means I am engaged i n assessing a claim on my action which a r i s e s outside myself; a claim which I can e i t h e r accept or r e j e c t as binding upon my actions. So to t a l k about obligation at a l l , means, at the  very  l e a s t , that I am engaged i n the process of acknowledging r a t i o n a l moral claims upon my actions.  Tussman, then, i s writing from the  perspective of the moral agent i n a democracy; which i s to i n s i s t that democratic p o l i t i c a l man  always exists within a structure of  actual public purposes, and that these purposes can be known and f e l t t o be obligatory. The struggle from Plato onward, i n every p o l i t i c a l  theory  and i n every actual p o l i t i c a l system, has been the attempt to deal with the notion of public purpose, generally expressed as the public i n t e r e s t .  The struggle has been to make sense out of the  3 Tussman makes i t c l e a r that he doesn't want to take on the whole f r e e - w i l l problem, but that he assumes there are jobs that need to be done i n a democracy and that the members of a democracy can do them. Most important — one of these jobs i s to decide whether or not we're going to take up our 'governing' r o l e i n a self-governing community.  -3-  r e l a t i o n s h i p between a concept of public i n t e r e s t on the one hand, and a concept of private i n t e r e s t s on the other.  This same struggle  i s the central theme of Tussman's theory of o b l i g a t i o n , and i n h i s attempt to come t o terms with the problem, I have been struck by how Platonic a stance he i s f i n a l l y forced t o adopt even though he seems t o be i n i t i a l l y w r i t i n g out of a d i f f e r e n t t r a d i t i o n ? democratic  the  tradition. I want, then, to trace a pervasive influence of Platonic  notions on Tussman's p o l i t i c a l theory: s p e c i f i c a l l y , I want t o argue that i t i s the P l a t o n i c view of the ' s e l f and i t s r e l a t i o n s h i p t o a s p e c i a l theory of freedom which has d i r e c t bearing upon three areas of Tussman's argument i n Obligation and the Body P o l i t i c .  I  want t o argue that these P l a t o n i c notions d i r e c t l y inform h i s view of the public i n t e r e s t , h i s theory of representation, and f i n a l l y , flowing out of these f i r s t two, Tussman's d i s t i n c t i v e theory of education.  CHAPTER I  Tussman begins Obligation and the Body P o l i t i c by s t a t i n g that h i s concern i s with the nature of r e l a t i o n s h i p ; but he quickly moves t o narrow that focus to p o l i t i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p , and then, within a few sentences, even more s p e c i f i c a l l y to the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the members of a body p o l i t i c . Next he searches f o r the d e f i n i t i o n of t h i s concept of a 'body p o l i t i c ' , saying that he i s looking f o r the d i s t i n c t i v e features that hold that kind of grouping of people together.  It  soon becomes apparent, however, that h i s search f o r the d e f i n i t i o n of a body p o l i t i c i s r e a l l y a c i r c u l a r one; f o r Tussman already has h i s own c r i t e r i a that the d e f i n i t i o n must s a t i s f y . In f a c t , i t turns out that i t i s h i s knowledge of the workings of the democratic process - e s p e c i a l l y the American one that underlies the d e f i n i t i o n of b o d y . p o l i t i c i n the f i r s t  chapter,  even though the word democratic doesn't appear u n t i l P.22.  Tussman  wants to so define a body p o l i t i c that the concept becomes i d e n t i c a l to the concept of a democracy, so that he can produce a model of a body p o l i t i c which answers the d i s t i n c t i v e features of the r e l a t i o n ship i n a democracy of the r u l e r to the r u l e d and vice versa.  That  model turns out to be 'voluntary agreement.' So, f o r Tussman, the d i s t i n g u i s h i n g features of a body p o l i t i c i s that i t must be able t o accomodate three democratic notions: (l)  the notion of the 'common good': that i s , the commitment to  -5-  comraon i n t e r e s t s or purposes which constitutes the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of an authority structure, (2)  the notion of 'legitimacy*:  such as 'duty', 'obligation', and  which involves a sub-set of notions 'right*, making moral claims  extending beyond mere claims of 'prudence' or 'power', and (3) way  the notion of ' p o l i t i c a l freedom': of r e c o n c i l i n g 'being f r e e ' and  the idea that there i s a  'being under law'.  To these c r i t e r i a he'introduces  three s u i t o r s :  of power, habit and custom, and voluntary agreement.  the models  I t soon becomes  obvious that only the model of voluntary agreement i s going to f i t with a l i t t l e pinching and s t r a i n i n g at that.  So Tussman concludes  that the proper mode of a body p o l i t i c i s an association of people i n r e l a t i o n s h i p to authority, based upon t h e i r voluntary agreement. What I am arguing here i s that h i s attempt to define a body p o l i t i c i s not so much a legitimate d e f i n i t i o n as i t i s an attempt to e l i c i t the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s governing the r e l a t i o n s h i p of authori t y i n a democracy.  But there i s no reason to see a democratic body  p o l i t i c and a body p o l i t i c as i d e n t i c a l notions, f o r there i s nothing inherent i n the idea of a body p o l i t i c which demands that i t s a t i s f y Tussman's a r b i t r a r y c r i t e r i a .  On the contrary, i t doesn't seem r e -  dundant to speak of a democratic body p o l i t i c , whereas i t does seem uncomfortable to speak of a body p o l i t i c and assume everyone knows you mean a democratic one.  Even Tussman doesn't r i s k that; f o r there  are several places where he q u a l i f i e s h i s use of body p o l i t i c a f t e r  -6-  his  d e f i n i t i o n of i t . * *  S t i l l , i t turns out to be an i n t e r e s t i n g  exercise f o r i t makes c l e a r some of the d i f f e r e n t kinds of authority r e l a t i o n s h i p s that are possible, and what conditions they do or do not s a t i s f y . Almost immediately following on the heels of h i s d e f i n i t i o n o f a body p o l i t i c , he introduces the idea of a "member".  I  want t o argue that there are some fundamental implications of being seen as a "member" of a body p o l i t i c , where we would o r d i n a r i l y be accustomed t o use the word 'subject' or ' c i t i z e n ' , which only a democratic body p o l i t i c based upon a voluntary model'' can provide. It i s important t o point out that already, i n t h i s f i r s t chapter, Tussman's idea of a "member" i s a very s p e c i a l one stemming d i r e c t l y from h i s conception  of the body p o l i t i c :  s p e c i f i c a l l y , the  c r i t e r i o n he sets up of the common good or the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t . ^ Furthermore, I want t o argue that h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h i s c r i t e r i o n of the public i n t e r e s t stems d i r e c t l y , i n turn, from the Platonic theory of the soul. his  But before pursuing t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p between  c r i t e r i o n of public i n t e r e s t and Platonic notions, l e t me f i r s t  turn t o a consideration of his s p e c i a l idea of a "member"; f o r so much of the l a t e r arguments i n the book depend upon understanding i t .  4 ( l ) Tussman, Obligation and the Body P o l i t i c , p. 27. "A body p o l i t i c , based upon consent," (2) I b i d . , p, 21. "...a theory which meets the demands of a body p o l i t i c concerned with p o l i t i c a l freedom." 5 Following Tussman from t h i s point on, with attention to h i s d e f i n i t i o n , I'm using interchangeably the notions 'body p o l i t i c ' , 'democracy', and a 'group based upon voluntary agreement'. 6 Tussman f i r s t introduces the notion of the 'common good', but he l a t e r t a l k s about t h i s notion as the 'public i n t e r e s t ' and also 'public purpose. From t h i s point on I s h a l l speak of t h i s notion, p r i m a r i l y as 'the public i n t e r e s t ' ,  -7-  The usual or ordinary notion we have o f a member o f a government generally means a designated individual somehow arriving at a particular office with particular authority.  Thus when we speak  of a Member of Parliament, we generally refer to a man who has been elected by a certain constituent group to take his seat in a governing tribunal and share in that process.  Tussman extends this usual notion  of a member of a government to include a l l whom we are more accustomed to c a l l citizens or subjects of a government; and he i s able to do this and s t i l l make sense because of the way he has already talked about a body p o l i t i c . More explicitly, his enlarged notion of "member" flows from his establishing the model of voluntary agreement as the only one that satisfies his c r i t e r i a of what constitutes a body p o l i t i c ; for from a l l models of voluntary agreement i t i s perfectly natural to talk about members. What else could you talk of?  So, i n fact,  to slide from the definition of body p o l i t i c into talk of members i s necessitated b y the way he talks about the body p o l i t i c and i s already an unusual use of the word member. Let me now point out one of the important consequences of this point.  Because of Tussman's special sense of the word member,  following logically from his construction of a body p o l i t i c , he can claim that the ordinary role of a citizen or subject i s markedly changed from our usual conception o f i t .  And this he proceeds to do.  He wants to argue that there i s an extension of the range of duties and rights flowing from that special conception of being a 'member'  -8-  of a "body p o l i t i c , and i n p a r t i c u l a r , stemming from the c r i t e r i o n of the public i n t e r e s t .  I t i s important t o understand t h i s claim  for the r e s t of the book l o g i c a l l y depends upon i t . Tussman wants t o argue what F l a t o d i d as w e l l ; that there are two ranges of r i g h t s that may be accorded the r u l e d by the r u l e r : there are the r i g h t s of subjects, and there are the r i g h t s of agentcitizens.'  In any government that we would recognize as legitimate,  i t could be argued that there must be at l e a s t the f i r s t category of r i g h t s accorded.  In t h i s category we would place the r i g h t to 'equal  protection* and the r i g h t t o 'due process of law' or any s i m i l a r r i g h t s that e n t i t l e us as subjects to conditions of f a i r n e s s : a lawyer, t o a f a i r t r i a l , to non-discriminatory  the r i g h t to  treatment.  However, i t i s n ' t the case that any government that may be legitimate must extend the second category o f r i g h t s :  the r i g h t  of free speech, of equal p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the governing function, the r i g h t t o vote, the r i g h t t o a f r e e press etc., because i t i s possible for there t o be legitimate governments that aren't democratic.  (I  make t h i s naked point without stopping to pursue c r i t e r i a of l e g i t i macy here.)  This second category of r i g h t s , Tussman would argue,  i s a function o f our member r o l e i n a democracy; that i s , they are the r i g h t s that are accorded to us i n our c i v i c capacity when we are behaving as agents, not as merely subjects:  when we are acting i n  our capacity as voters, sovereigns, r u l e r s .  7  For Plato, i t would be the r i g h t s of the guardian-citizens.  -9So Tussman's argument goes, there are r i g h t s that must be accorded to us i n our capacity as subjects by any legitimate government whether or not i t i s a democratic one, but there are a d d i t i o n a l r i g h t s that we accord t o ourselves (so to speak) as members o f a democratic government i n order to f u l f i l l our r o l e as agents.  It is  to t h i s l a t t e r category of r i g h t s that Tussman means to r e f e r to when he t a l k s about the 'member' and i t i s the implications of those r i g h t s f o r a theory of duties or obligations which he wants to draw out i n the next two chapters.  He wants t o argue that we do not generally  understand t h i s r o l e that we have based upon the r i g h t s accorded t o us as members i n a democracy pursuing  our agent r o l e , and that i t  must be the task of p o l i t i c a l education  to f i l l t h i s vacuum.  A c t u a l l y , as I w i l l argue, what he r e a l l y does i s to convert the notion of member quite quickly i n t o the notion of agent and then, r e s t r i c t the notion o f agent again t o that o f the representative*.  The r e s u l t of t h i s conversion,  'elected  I w i l l argue, i s due  to Platonic influences, and i n the end, h i s 'elected representative' becomes barely distinguishable from a Platonic guardian. The point t o be made here i s simply that the r e s t of the  8 book —  and most importantly —  h i s theory of education  —  turns on  the specialness of h i s model of a body p o l i t i c and the unusual conception of member l o g i c a l l y flowing from i t .  8 Though Tussman t a l k s about the r e l a t i o n s h i p between p o l i t i c a l theory and education almost immediately, I leave the theme u n t i l the l a s t section of t h i s paper to pick up on: I do so because a thorough understanding of i t , requires an analysis of other parts of h i s argument f i r s t .  -10-  Let me now return t o pursuing the. r e l a t i o n s h i p of Tussman's c r i t e r i o n of the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t to Platonic notions.  In  Chapter I I , Tussman t a l k s about the nature of membership i n the body p o l i t i c - using the model o f voluntary agreement that he has already set up. He begins by analyzing the meaning and consequences o f s i n g l e i n d i v i d u a l s coming together t o form a group under a system of agreements which create a legitimate authority.  His claim  i s that the act of voluntary membership, or the status of being a voluntary member, e l i c i t s a new r e l a t i o n s h i p between the i n d i v i d u a l s so r e l a t e d , and that t h i s new r e l a t i o n s h i p expresses  i t s e l f i n two  fundamental acts of subordination or o b l i g a t i o n s : (1)  the o b l i g a t i o n to subordinate private t o p u b l i c decisions, and  (2)  the o b l i g a t i o n to subordinate private t o p u b l i c i n t e r e s t . Tussman i s arguing that t h i s two-fold subordination i s  a n a l y t i c to the concept of membership i n a voluntary group based upon agreement; that i s , he i s arguing that obligations ( l ) and (2) are what i s l o g i c a l l y e n t a i l e d i n agreeing t o be a member o f a voluntary a s s o c i a t i o n .  I would agree that ( l ) i s always a n a l y t i c  to the concept of voluntary membership, but (2)  i s only a n a l y t i c  i f the kind of voluntary association one agrees to be a member of i s a body p o l i t i c so defined, as Tussman does, to include the c r i t e r i o n of commitment t o the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t i n i t s very d e f i n i t i o n . This i s a small point, and I do not wish to pursue i t further here; I r a i s e i t merely t o show how much of h i s conception  -11-  of the nature of membership i n a voluntary association derives from h i s d e f i n i t i o n of a body p o l i t i c rather than the other way around5 e s p e c i a l l y from the s p e c i f i c notion of the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t . i s c e r t a i n l y possible t o t a l k about voluntary  For i t  groups based upon agree-  ment, where people stand i n some other kind of r e l a t i o n s h i p to each other than the subordination interest.  o f t h e i r private i n t e r e s t t o the public  His second o b l i g a t i o n of subordination  i s only l o g i c a l l y  required then, assuming that the public i n t e r e s t i s always involved i n the concept of a voluntary association based upon agreement. This brings me to the major problem with the book; the r e a l lack of any substantial theory about the nature of the public i n t e r e s t ; s p e c i f i c a l l y , the r e l a t i o n s h i p , i f any,  of private interest  to public i n t e r e s t , or private good to public good.  It i s a distinc-  t i o n , f i r s t met here, that i s fundamental t o everything that Tussman has to say about the o b l i g a t i o n of both the member and the agent, yet he never r e a l l y pursues i t deeply. The problem i s underlined  when a person asks himself why  he would want to be a member of a body p o l i t i c so constituted; that i s why i s i t sensible or reasonable t o subordinate h i s private i n t e r e s t to the' public interest?  Only i f he becomes c l e a r on what the public  i n t e r e s t involves i s he i n a p o s i t i o n to determine whether, indeed, he would want to be a voluntary member o f such an association. The  fundamental question i s then what i s the r e l a t i o n s h i p of  a person's private i n t e r e s t to the public i n t e r e s t ?  In t h i s regard  -12-  Tussman gives us some sketchy answers.  F i r s t of a l l we know that the  model of voluntary agreement means that at l e a s t , i n his view, the private must always subordinate i t s e l f to the public i n t e r e s t whereever there i s c o n f l i c t between the two. He also t e l l s us that t h i s subordination  i s l o g i c a l l y bound up with the guarantee of c e r t a i n  procedural r i g h t s stemming from the p r i n c i p l e of equality:  those of  'due process' and 'equal protection'; f o r who would f e e l obliged t o subordinate t h e i r private i n t e r e s t t o a p u b l i c i n t e r e s t that d i d not guarantee them a minimum of equal consideration and protection? I t i s d i f f i c u l t to see how one could claim the r i g h t s without having made the subordination o r how one can be held t o the subordination and denied the r i g h t s . Both are inseperable aspects of membership.g T h i r d l y , stemming from t h i s l a s t condition, we know that therefore, the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t i s somehow concerned with a "system of i n t e r e s t s  9 of which any i n d i v i d u a l ' s i s only a part." But more than t h i s , we do not know.  We do not know how  a member would determine what i s i n the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t ; what c r i t e r i a he would use.  We do not know what the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t i s made up o f :  i s i t made up of generalized private i n t e r e s t s ? share the same i n t e r e s t ?  of the majority who  Or i s i t something not even r e l a t e d to  private i n t e r e s t , but another kind of conception? At t h i s point i n the book, the only further hint we have of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the private and public i n t e r e s t i s Tussman's vague remarks that the public i n t e r e s t must be concerned with the t o t a l amount of i n t e r e s t s dealt with i n some equal way: 8  Tussman, Obligation p.31.  9  I b i d . , p. 28.  -13-  To be a member i s to acknowledge that one's own i n t e r e s t s are only a part of a broader system of i n t e r e s t s , that other members have t h e i r s as you have yours, and thus i t i s the function of government to promote and safeguard the entire system, of which yours i s a part but no more s i g n i f i c a n t part than any o t h e r s . ^ It looks as though he i s saying at t h i s point that a l l private i n t e r e s t s have the same s i g n i f i c a n c e and that the public i n t e r e s t i s d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d to these p r i v a t e i n t e r e s t s , but i t can't be made up of only your i n t e r e s t .  But l a t e r on he t a l k s  about public i n t e r e s t as the "recognition that one's own i n t e r e s t s  12 constitute only a subordinate part of a broader system of i n t e r e s t s , " Is a "broader system of i n t e r e s t s " the same thing as a system of private i n t e r e s t s of which the i n d i v i d u a l s ' i s only a part?  Or i s i t another whole conception which reduces the notion  of private i n t e r e s t to t r i v i a l i t y ?  Furthermore, even i f i t i s the  former case, we s t i l l don't know how  a member can e l i c i t the public  i n t e r e s t out of the welter of private i n t e r e s t s he i s confronted  with:  by what procedure, guide, p r i n c i p l e ? This problem, f i r s t encountered i n the chapter on membership, becomes even a more serious one when Tussman comes to discuss the r o l e of the agent i n a democracy.  The member as  "subject",  needs only acknowledge the claim of subordinating h i s private i n t e r e s t 11  Joseph Tussman, Obligation, p.  12  Ibid., p.  29.  28.  -14-  to the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t , but the agent must be involved, not only i n that same a c t of subordination,  but also i n the actual day t o day  determination or creation of the very public i n t e r e s t the member must subordinate himself to.  But there i s no a d d i t i o n a l help  offered out of the confusion here e i t h e r . Let me suggest that there are two d i r e c t i o n s i n which one  could move at t h i s point with regard to the problem of the  public i n t e r e s t .  One d i r e c t i o n i s to assume that each members*  private i n t e r e s t has a legitimate claim upon the c r i t e r i a of the public i n t e r e s t , and the problem l i e s i n t r y i n g to f i n d some r e l i able method of computing a l l of these legitimate private desires into a "system of i n t e r e s t s " which apportions an equal share to a l l or the greatest possible number.  The c l a s s i c attempts i n t h i s  d i r e c t i o n would be the U t i l i t a r i a n move t o compute "the greatest happiness of the greatest numbers" based on just such an assumption, or modern attempts i n welfare economics t o d i s t r i b u t e benefits i n some appropriate  way.  The second d i r e c t i o n i s to see that there i s a d i f f e r e n t sort of problem involved i n t r y i n g to determine what i s i n the public interest.  To move i n t h i s d i r e c t i o n i s t o f i n d something lacking  i n the ordinary conception of 'private i n t e r e s t ' , which brings the kind of claim of legitimacy between private and public i n t e r e s t mentioned above into question,  I want t o argue that i t i s t h i s  second d i r e c t i o n which Tussman takes at t h i s point, i f not  -15purposefully, then i m p l i c i t l y , because he has a view of the r e l a t i o n ship between private and public interest which i s e s s e n t i a l l y a 13 Platonic one  depending upon a . s p e c i a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of ' p r i v a t e  interest*. I want to argue that Tussman sees there are only two possible interpretations of the public i n t e r e s t :  one that he  continually argues f o r , based upon h i s commitment to Platonic notions, against what he sees as a more popular one now i n p r a c t i s e . t h i s more popular Interpretation,  It  is  sometimes characterized as the  theory of pluralism, which Tussman finds disastrous f o r the s u r v i v a l of a body p o l i t i c committed to the 'common good'.  Let me outline  these two interpretations b r i e f l y . (  The theory of pluralism i s the view that a democratic  system provides the framework f o r the legitimate pursuit of private individualism; where each i n d i v i d u a l regards h i s i n t e r e s t i n a narrow and private sphere.  Each man, according to t h i s conception  of the public i n t e r e s t , has the r i g h t to decide what h i s i n t e r e s t  is  and to express that judgement p o l i t i c a l l y . What Tussman sees as the inevitable outcome of t h i s view, i s that public interest then becomes the r e s u l t of the vying of a l l these personal, i n d i v i d u a l interests f o r the most support; each person t r y i n g to catch the vote of h i s neighbour, pursuading, pressuring, arguing, u n t i l a solution i s reached; u n t i l some interest 13 '//hen I r e f e r to Platonic notions, I am r e f e r r i n g to the views generally expressed i n the Socratic dialogues, but with p a r t i c u l a r emphasis to Republic.  -16-  succeeds in gaining the support of the majority or a bargain i s struck:  " f o r t h i s , you can have t h a t . " Tussman argues that, on t h i s view, public  interest  becomes defineable i n terms of a procedure of compromise among private i n t e r e s t ,  seen as the expression of peoples' wants.  In  t h i s process, he argues, a man's private i n t e r e s t i s thought to be considered because he has been given a chance to express h i s wishes through being given a vote.  I f he f a i l s , i f h i s i n t e r e s t does not  carry the day, he must accept the fact that he has had h i s equal chance; he has participated i n the system such as i t i s .  If he i s  not s a t i s f i e d , he must organize f o r another day, meanwhile facing the fact that the alternatives to t h i s kind of system are worse. What Tussman i s arguing throughout Obligation and the Body P o l i t i c i s that there i s at l e a s t one a l t e r n a t i v e which i s not worse, but much b e t t e r .  He argues an e s s e n t i a l l y Platonic  notion about the public i n t e r e s t :  that there i s some objective  c r i t e r i a by which'specially g i f t e d and trained i n d i v i d u a l s can make decisions as to what i s i n the community's p u b l i c Where that public interest accomodates p r i v a t e , interest,  that i s a happy chance occurrence,  interest.  individual  but more often,  it  i s the expression of something quite opposed to a person's private 14 interest;  i t i s more often the case of 'governing'  those private  interests  through the development of a w e l l - t r a i n e d , d i s c i p l i n e d  14 Plato, i n the Republic, labors hard to i d e n t i f y ' p r i v a t e ' and •public' i n t e r e s t v i a h i s theory of knowledge; but s t i l l needs to r e l y on a.notion of 'governing' private interests as an intermediary stage — and then, only intermediary for the'guardians, who have the capacity to ultimately 'know' or 'apprehend' the t r u t h . ' ' ;,.  -17mind which acts as our best s e l f .  In f a c t , on t h i s view, following  one's private interests within a democratic structure which has that very pursuit f o r everyone as i t s purpose, i s more l i k e a return to the Hobessian "state of nature" - a condition where power rather than authority, and manipulation rather than j u s t i c e ,  prevails.  Plato's view, and Tussman's as well, depends f o r understanding on the d i s t i n c t i o n between two p a i r s of concepts that are c l o s e l y connected to each other:  the d i s t i n c t i o n between the concept  of needs and the concept of wants, and the d i s t i n c t i o n between the concept of r e a l and the concept of apparent i n t e r e s t .  Let me t r y a  short analysis where a long one i s c a l l e d f o r . In the simplest sense ~  the d i s t i n c t i o n that both of these  .concepts r e f e r to i s the difference between what a person may want what he sees as the immediate object of h i s happiness —  and i n  r e a l i t y , what he may need or come to see as good f o r him i f he had the time f o r r e f l e c t i o n , or had the wisdom to see what i n the long run of h i s l i f e would r e a l l y make him happy. Much of the weight of t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n must be born by our experienced knowledge of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between ( f o r want of better terms I use the c l a s s i c categories) passion and reason.  That i s , the  d i s t i n c t i o n between a conception of ourselves when we behave i n the throes of passion; when we are concerned primarily with immediate and momentary g r a t i f i c a t i o n of our i n d i v i d u a l wants —  and ~  a conception  of ourselves as future-oriented, r a t i o n a l , responsible beings concerned with our long range needs.  -18-  The' p o i n t o f t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n i s t o connect what a p e r s o n needs with what' he would want i f he were f u l l y r a t i o n a l , considered  therefore  h i s l o n g - r a n g e i n t e r e s t ; t h e n , what a p e r s o n wants, b u t  d o e s n ' t need, i s seen as i n h i s apparent i n t e r e s t b u t n o t i n h i s real interest.  R e a l i n t e r e s t i s connected t o r e a s o n as apparent  i n t e r e s t i s t o passion. and  passion  The r o o t s o f t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n between r e a s o n  - and t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r a t h e o r y  found i n t h e P l a t o n i c t h e o r y  o f human b e h a v i o r a r e  o f the d i v i s i o n o f t h e s o u l .  One way t o view t h e P l a t o n i c t h e o r y t h e s o u l i s as an attempt t o p r o v i d e  of the d i v i s i o n of  an answer t o t h e problem o f t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p between freedom and t h e ' s e l f .  I t i s a d o c t r i n e which  i s d i r e c t l y d e r i v e d from a s p e c i a l view o f what c o n s t i t u t e s t h e n a t u r e o f a person, f o r i t proposes t h a t t o be f r e e a p e r s o n must have a k i n d o f I n t e r n a l freedom as w e l l as freedom from e x t e r n a l r e s t r a i n t s , and  t h a t t h i s k i n d o f i n t e r n a l freedom i s t h e e x p r e s s i o n  self  of a person.  In order t o support t h i s p r o p o s i t i o n , P l a t o i s  dependent upon a t h e o r y it  o f t h e 'true  of the s e l f :  how t h e s e l f emerges, and how  functions. F o r P l a t o , man i s l i k e a community w i t h a l l s o r t s o f r i v a l  i n t e r e s t s which do not e x i s t c o m p a t i b l y s i d e by s i d e . n e c e s s a r y t o r e s t r a i n some i n o r d e r t o f r e e o t h e r s .  I t becomes The f r e e man  f o r P l a t o i s one who p r a c t i s e s temperance and "temperance s u r e l y means a k i n d o f o r d e r l i n e s s , a c o n t r o l o f c e r t a i n p l e a s u r e s and a p p e t i t e s " " ^ so t h a t a p e r s o n can a c t i n accordance with h i s t r u e  15  1956,  F. M. C o r n f o r d , i v . 430.  The R e p u b l i c  o f P l a t o , Oxford, U n i v e r s i t y  Press,  -19-  nature  or  'best s e l f .  But the problem I s , which o f t h e m u l t i t u -  d i n o u s wants o f a g i v e n i n d i v i d u a l a r e e x p r e s s i v e o f h i s t r u e n a t u r e ; which must be c o n t r o l l e d and which encouraged; which a r e such t h a t t h e i r f u l f i l l m e n t  i s conducive  t o the e x p r e s s i o n o f  ' i n n e r ' o r ' t r u e ' o r 'best' s e l f and t h e r e f o r e enable  our  one t o be  P l a t o ' s answer t o t h i s problem i s t o put forward  free?  a view  about our i n t e r e s t s which c l a i m s t h a t a l l our wants are not o f t h e same n a t u r a l o r d e r o r worth; t h e y a r e a l l not i n our a c t u a l o r i n t e r e s t s i n t h e same way.  H i s c r i t e r i o n o f what makes an  o f d i v i d i n g up  and the  s o u r c e o f our v a r i o u s i n t e r e s t s i n t o c a t e g o r i e s o r p a r t s o f t h e (1)  the a p p e t i t i v e  (2)  t h e r a t i o n a l and  H i s f i r s t two  (3)  the  soul:  spirited,^  c a t e g o r i e s seem r e c o g n i z a b l e d i s t i n c t i o n s :  We may c a l l t h a t p a r t o f t h e s o u l whereby i t r e f l e c t s , r a t i o n a l ; and t h e o t h e r , w i t h which i t f e e l s hunger and t h i r s t and i s d i s t r a c t e d by s e x u a l p a s s i o n and a l l the o t h e r d e s i r e s , we w i l l c a l l i r r a t i o n a l a p p e t i t e , a s s o c i a t e d w i t h p l e a s u r e i n the r e p l e n i s h m e n t o f c e r t a i n wants,^ But t h e t h i r d c a t e g o r y —  the s p i r i t e d —  seems somewhat s t r a n g e .  P l a t o d e f i n e s t h i s t h i r d c a t e g o r y as " t h a t p a s s i o n a t e element which  18 makes us f e e l angry and t h a t i t doesn't  belong  indignant,"  but a t the same time,  insists  i n t h e c a t e g o r y o f a p p e t i t e s , but i s a  d i f f e r e n t k i n d o f p a s s i o n - sometimes i n c o n f l i c t with the a p p e t i t e s - though i t can be shown t o be d i s t i n c t 16  C o r n f o r d , The R e p u b l i c , i v .  17  Loc. c i t .  18  Loc. c i t .  439.  1  interest  ' r e a l ' i s r e l a t e d t o what w i l l g i v e us l a s t i n g s a t i s f a c t i o n , t h a t c r i t e r i o n i s r e l a t e d i n t u r n t o h i s way  'real  other  from r e a s o n .  It  -20-  appears that he i s t a l k i n g about a kind of neutral category of passionate anger which i s , so he says, n a t u r a l l y present i n children and animals —  a moral indignation which can be used i n the service  of reason i f i t i s properly t r a i n e d , I do not wish to argue here whether t h i s t h i r d category makes sense or not except to say i n passing that i t does seem strange to separate o f f one element of passion, namely, anger or indignation, and i n s i s t that i t i s separate.from a l l the other i n s t i n c t u a l emotions that we o r d i n a r i l y r e f e r to as passions.  I leave that p a r t i c u l a r  and well-worn problem alone however, f o r the connection of Tussman's conception of p u b l i c i n t e r e s t and h i s theory of representation to Plato's theory of the d i v i s i o n of the soul does not depend upon i t } that connection can be aptly demonstrated by acknowledging the importance of Plato's major conception:  the s p l i t t i n g o f f of the  r a t i o n a l elements i n our nature from others we can c o l l e c t under the general heading of the instinctual-emotional l i f e .  I would l i k e to  elaborate on that conception and show the implications following from i t both f o r Plato and f o r Tussman. Plato's conception of the nature of man depends upon the b e l i e f that within each person there i s a r a t i o n a l or moral element which i s l i k e a small seed tucked away among many other r i v a l elements, a l l competing f o r attention and expression.  This r a t i o n a l  element of a person i s considered to be h i s 'best s e l f :  the s e l f  which represents h i s true nature, f o r i t i s the s e l f which i s t r u l y  -21-  i n tune w i t h  what i s good f o r him  a more temperate, more j u s t and  —  with  therefore happier  However, as a l r e a d y p o i n t e d himself, having  what w i l l  out, man  contribute  and  better  i s divided  life.  against  w i t h i n h i s n a t u r e as w e l l , s u r g e s o f impulse  or  p a s s i o n which a r e o b s t a c l e s t o the f r e e e x e r c i s e o f h i s b e s t and  self  t h e r e f o r e t o the a t t a i n m e n t o f what he would r e a l l y want i f  o n l y he were f r e e from the s h a c k l e s h i s n a t u r e and So, one  to  of these i r r a t i o n a l parts  a b l e t o choose.on t h i s account, the n a t u r e o f man  hand t h e r e i s t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t ,  rational,  is split:  'real'  o r i e n t e d c o n t r o l l e r which i s the b e t t e r p a r t , w h i l e t h e r e i s the e m p i r i c a l bundle o f d e s i r e s and  r a t i o n a l s e l f and  on  the  intereston t h e  passions  'apparent' i n t e r e s t s which must be d i s c i p l i n e d by the  part.  of  —  other,  momentary  higher  brought t o h e e l because t h e y comprise the worse  F o r P l a t o , f o r a man  t o be  "master o f h i m s e l f " means:  . . . t h a t w i t h i n the. man h i m s e l f , i n h i s s o u l , t h e r e i s a b e t t e r p a r t and a worse; and t h a t he i s h i s own master when the p a r t which i s b e t t e r by n a t u r e has the worse under i t s c o n t r o l . , . . i t i s c o n s i d e r e d a d i s g r a c e , when, through bad b r e e d i n g or bad company, the b e t t e r p a r t i s overwhelmed by.the worse,,.,A man i n t h a t c o n d i t i o n i s c a l l e d a s l a v e t o h i m s e l f and i n t e m p e r a t e , .  I7  I am  arguing  t h a t the assumption t h a t t h i s view p u t s  forward i s t h a t i t i s our r a t i o n a l c a p a c i t y alone which r e v e a l s t r u e or h i g h e r n a t u r e :  the n a t u r e o f a human p e r f o r m i n g t h a t  f u n c t i o n f o r which he i s u n i q u e l y  19  Cornford,  The  our  Republic,  i v . 430  and  best suited.  - iv.  4-31.  Only when r e a s o n  -22-  i s i n control are we performing that function and therefore are performing f r e e l y as our best s e l f .  Accordingly, freedom becomes  i d e n t i f i e d with r a t i o n a l i t y f o r , on t h i s account, only r a t i o n a l ends can be true objects or wants of a free man's true nature. This i s not the end of the story however, f o r a problem a r i s e s when we see that there i s nothing inherent i n t h i s human nature so described which guarantees that our best s e l f , i f l e f t to i t s own devices, w i l l indeed triumph over our worse s e l f .  The  argument therefore continues, that part of us, the seed o f our best s e l f , requires nourishment i f i t i s t o grow properly or at all.  Part of that nourishment may be the purposeful development  of l a t e n t c a p a c i t i e s such as t r a i n i n g i n d e l i b e r a t i o n , reasoning and l o g i c ; part of that nourishment may be merely the creation o f the best possible environment f o r the natural unfolding o f these capacities;  20  •  but part of that nourishment must also be the  f o r c i b l e r e s t r a i n t of our i n s t i n c t u a l desires and passions  i n order  to give our better s e l f a chance to emerge. Interestingly enough, on t h i s view o f the nature o f man, i t i s man's lower nature —  his desires and passions —  which  appear t o be naturally stronger; which, i f not restrained p a r t i c u l a r l y early i n l i f e , may well run away with his personality or character.  I t i s t h i s i r r a t i o n a l part of man which seems to be  the most powerful element of the soul; yet the true s e l f i s not  20  This i s pretty much the view put forward by Socrates  i n Meno.  -23i d e n t i f i e d with what i s most powerful weakest:  the r a t i o n a l element.  i n us, but with what i s  I t i s t h i s s p e c i a l power r e l a t i o n -  ship which makes i t necessary to talk about r e s t r a i n t - e i t h e r external i n the form of authority, or i n t e r n a l i n the sense of self-mastery - as necessary  i n order t o s h i f t the power from man's  21 lower or worst s e l f to h i s higher or best s e l f . I t i s important  to see what kind of s h i f t takes place  here with our ordinary conception o f freedom; f o r t h i s  necessary  r e s t r a i n t or control (either external or self-mastery) i s seen, not as our usual notion o f r e s t r a i n t , but as the a r b i t e r of true freedom.  For freedom i s seen here not as doing what you 'want',  i f what you want i s connected t o passion or i n s t i n c t u a l desires, but doing what you r a t i o n a l l y see that you 'need' to do:  doing  what you 'ought' t o do i f you were acting as your best s e l f i n your ' r e a l ' i n t e r e s t . Freedom on t h i s account, i s not freedom to do what i s irrational.  For there i s the i m p l i c i t assumption that what i s  i r r a t i o n a l i s r e a l l y harmful t o oneself and therefore detrimental to one's r e a l or best i n t e r e s t s , and no man, i t i s argued, who i s t r u l y free would act against h i s own r e a l i n t e r e s t s , f o r that would be enslavement, not freedom. Let me make a note here that the foregoing account explains i n part the paradoxical assertion o f Rousseau that i t i s sometimes necessary  "to force men t o be f r e e " ; f o r , as I have already  argued, freedom on t h i s account i s s e l f - c o n t r o l and s e l f - d i r e c t i o n  21 Cornford, The Republic, see i v . 441, i v . 443, i v . 444 where the references are to words l i k e "control and subordination", "command" and " r u l i n g " to express the r e l a t i o n s h i p of the r a t i o n a l part o f the soul over the appetitive.  -24-  t r a n s l a t e d as t h e c o n t r o l o f t h e r a t i o n a l p a r t o f our n a t u r e over the  other parts,  C o n t r o l i s seen here as a k i n d o f power which  e x p r e s s e s freedom; f o r a man who s u b j e c t s h i s p a s s i o n s c o n t r o l o f r e a s o n has t h e power o v e r h i m s e l f  t o the  t o do what he knows  he ought t o do; what he would want t o do i f he were f r e e o f h i s i r r a t i o n a l passions  so-that  he c o u l d a c t i n h i s r e a l  Interests.  R e a l i n t e r e s t s , on t h i s account t h e n , a r e always i d e n t i f i e d  with  freedom o r t h e power t o be r a t i o n a l . Tussman i s c l e a r l y i n t h i s t r a d i t i o n , f o r he b e l i e v e s t h a t t o have t h a t k i n d o f i n t e r n a l power i s t o be f r e e .  Though he  o n l y h i n t s a t t h i s view o f freedom i n O b l i g a t i o n and t h e Body P o l i t i c , Freedom i s t h e f r u i t o f the s u c c e s s f u l o p e r a t i o n o f t h e t e a c h i n g power. Freedom i s power and i t , t o o , must be d e l i b e r a t e l y c u l t i v a t e d . ^ an attempt i s made t o c l e a r l y d e v e l o p t h e i d e a i n h i s next book Experiment a t B e r k e l e y  where he makes i t c l e a r t h a t "the freedom  t h a t we c u l t i v a t e i s t h e freedom o f mastery not i m p u l s e . " F o r t h e mind t o be f r e e i s f o r i t t o be a b l e , t o have t h e power, t o do what i t s h o u l d do. T h a t i s t h e freedom w i t h which e d u c a t i o n i s concerned. I r a i s e t h i s p o i n t here because I want t o argue t h a t Tussman's s p e c i a l view o f freedom, stemming from t h e i n f l u e n c e o f the P l a t o n i c theory  o f t h e s o u l , i s an i m p o r t a n t u n d e r c u r r e n t r u n -  n i n g throughout O b l i g a t i o n and t h e Body P o l i t i c ; informs h i s theory  o f t h e p u b l i c i n t e r e s t and t h e r e f o r e h i s t h e o r i e s  22  Tussman, O b l i g a t i o n , p.  23  Joseph Tussman, Experiment a t B e r k e l e y ,  New York, 1969, p.  f o r it' d i r e c t l y  3*.  6?. Oxford U n i v e r s i t y  Press,  -25of membership and agency.  Most s p e c i f i c a l l y , i t informs h i s theory  of the agent's r o l e as a representative and therefore, h i s theory of p o l i t i c a l education;  f o r the member and agent who f u l f i l l s h i s  p u b l i c obligations turns out to be that Platonic conception  - the  free man trained t o a c t as h i s best s e l f . I t i s my contention that i t i s a Platonic conception of character, o f the 'best s e l f  within us, that Tussman appeals to  i n the end as the a r b i t e r between public and private i n t e r e s t . Behind his conception  of the public i n t e r e s t i s the demand that i t  must have reference to the ' r e a l ' needs and ' r e a l ' i n t e r e s t s of the community; that turns out t o be those needs and i n t e r e s t s we d i s cover when we are acting i n the capacity of our best selves:  when  our r a t i o n a l capacity i s i n control of our i n s t i n c t u a l desires and wants.  Accordingly, f o r Tussman, private i n t e r e s t i s i d e n t i f i e d  with our worst s e l f , with our i r r a t i o n a l , s e l f i s h passions, while public i n t e r e s t i s i d e n t i f i e d with our best s e l f , with acting i n and through our r a t i o n a l capacity.  ourselves  This i s , i n the end,  the only c r i t e r i o n of public i n t e r e s t that he gives us; but i t i s a c r i t e r i o n which forces him into a dilemma which only an authori t a r i a n model o f representation and education  can resolve,  I want to argue that he i s pushed i n t o an unnecessary dilemma v i a t h i s private public d i s t i n c t i o n , because h i s Platonic view of human nature i s too reductive, leaving out of account a wealth of psychological understanding that i s available t o us now, which would under-cut such a narrow perspective on the nature of man.  Let me t r y to point i n another d i r e c t i o n .  -26-  CHAPTER I I *  First  o f a l l , one c o u l d  d i n g human n a t u r e up i n t o r i v a l instinctual-emotional  life,  o b j e c t t o t h e whole view o f d i v i -  camps o f t h e r a t i o n a l l i f e and t h e  and f u r t h e r c a t e g o r i z i n g them r e s p e c -  t i v e l y as h i g h e r n a t u r e - l o w e r n a t u r e , r e a l s e l f - a p p a r e n t  self,  b e t t e r o r worse p a r t , o r r e a l freedom as opposed t o apparent freedom. What i s t h e b a s i s f o r such a judgement except t h e p a r t i c u l a r ( e m o t i o n a l ? ) preference o f the jury? For instance,  i f t h e s e l f i s made up o f p a r t s ,  l o g i c a l l y absurd t h a t only  one p a r t i s t o be r e g a r d e d as t h e r e a l  s e l f o r t h e e x p r e s s o r o f o u r r e a l wants.  A r e we t o b e l i e v e t h a t a  p e r s o n ' s n a t u r e i s l i k e a p i c t u r e and a n e g a t i v e :  only  i s r e a l , o n l y o v e r one p a r t can ownership be c l a i m e d ? "self-mastery" and  looks  i t seems  one o f them On t h i s view  l i k e a d e n i a l of a t l e a s t part of the s e l f ,  t h u s a d e n i a l - n o t a n a s s e r t i o n - o f man's r e a l n a t u r e .  The  metaphor o f t h e d i v i s i o n o f t h e s o u l r e s u l t s i n a s c h i z o i d p i c t u r e o f a f r e e man - and a d e p r e s s i n g one, I r i s k t h e judgement t h a t t h e s e l f i s n o t a human n a t u r e f r a c t u r e d i n t o r e a l and a p p a r e n t , o r good and bad s e l v e s , n o r has p r i v a t e i n t e r e s t g o t t o do with o u r lower s e l f and p u b l i c i n t e r e s t w i t h some k i n d o f t r a n s f o r m e d h i g h e r s e l f .  That i s a view which i s  not a t a l l c l e a r , and moreover, damaging t o human p e r s o n a l i t y . The  damage i s t w o - f o l d :  i n the f i r s t  place  i t lies  i n the  c r e a t i o n o f a s p l i t w i t h i n a person while i g n o r i n g the psyc-  ^  I am d e e p l y i n d e b t e d t o E l l e n T a l l m a n , t h e c u r r e n t c o - d i r e c t o r o f The R e s i d e n t F e l l o w Program a t C o l d Mountain I n s t i t u t e f o r v a l u a b l e i n s i g h t s on t h i s whole s e c t i o n .  -27-  h o l o g i c a l implications of such a model of the s p l i t t i n g of the pers o n a l i t y , and secondly, i t l i e s i n the reinforcement always of the need f o r outer r e s t r i c t i o n s ; f o r outer forms of authority i n order to r u l e human nature. these two  natures:  and uncontrolled  I t does t h i s by somehow d i v i d i n g us i n t o  the p r i m i t i v e , passionate c h i l d who  on the one hand, and the wise man  i s immature  - the r a t i o n a l  adult on the other. One  of the unhappy r e s u l t s of such a view i s to give so  l i t t l e encouragement or i n t e r e s t to the whole creative ranges. i s to see only those who  It  are working f o r over-riding systems or In-  s t i t u t i o n s , or set-ups of control as r e a l l y acting as mature adults i n the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t .  This r e s u l t s i n the denial of the whole  a r t i s t i c , creative world, where often the r e a l antennae of the race i s happening, f o r we l e a r n as much from the i r r a t i o n a l , the unknown, the i l l o g i c a l , the uncharted, out of control places as we do from the r a t i o n a l :  the already known and structured  places.  Philosophers l i k e Nietzsche, and since Freud,  psychologists  24 l i k e Jung and Adler  have moved more and more i n the d i r e c t i o n of  seeing the s e l f , not as a human nature fractured into good and  bad  parts, seen r e s p e c t i v e l y as the r a t i o n a l and the non-rational,  but  as the integrating force of an entire range of human capacities which includes both. 24 The l i s t i s long, but I r e f e r e s p e c i a l l y to the group c a l l e d Humanistic Psychologists whose approach to human personality i s i n the ' h o l i s t i c ' t r a d i t i o n . People l i k e Abraham Maslow, F r i t z P e r l s , Wilhem Reich, E r i c Fromm, R.D. Laing.  -28-  I t i s impossible f o r me at t h i s point to t r y to put forward t h e i r views i n e i t h e r a h i s t o r i c a l or detailed, way, could be expressed i n t h i s way.  but a summary  Most of them talk about the harmony  of the soul i n much the same terms as Plato d i d , but they d i f f e r as to how  t h i s harmony i s to be achieved, and t h i s difference i s a  s i g n i f i c a n t one.  The  ' h o l i s t i c * view of man  t a l k s about achieving  harmony through the model of i n t e g r a t i n g the various parts of the personality rather than through the model of balancing them.  This  important d i s t i n c t i o n leaves open to them the creative elements of human personality which are closed to the more negative model of balance, and therefore, leaves more scope f o r a person's 'private', emotional l i f e .  Let me t r y to explain t h i s d i f f e r e n c e .  The notion of balancing the r a t i o n a l against the  emotional-  i n s t i n c t u a l elements i n our personality so as to achieve a harmony, assigns a necessarily negative r o l e to reason; f o r the act of b a l ancing means you are constantly engaged i n keeping elements from getting out of c o n t r o l . pacity:  Reason must be used i n a r e s t r i c t i v e ca-  always checking, weighing, judging, r e s t r i c t i n g the ex-  pansion of each d i f f e r e n t part so as to keep everything within some sort of equal (balanced) r e l a t i o n s h i p . By i t s very nature, the model of balancing involves the structure of p o l a r i t i e s that must be  juggled.  The notion o f - i n t e g r a t i o n , on the other hand, acknowledges the importance of harmony i n the soul, but does not see that harmony as possible through the r a t i o n a l part containing the other parts through balancing them.  ' H o l i s t i c ' psychologists argue that the  -29-  r e s u l t of t h a t conception  n e c e s s a r i l y c r e a t e s a s i t u a t i o n where  one  split  sees o n e s e l f as b e i n g  o b l i g e d t o check and l o o k i n g down on t h e rival.  But,  are involved  the  i n t o two  c o n t r o l the other,  'other'  h a t i n g and  is still  i n h a t i n g and  other,  s i d e s , one and  therefore,  always  f e a r i n g the.other  ourselves  and  fearing ourselves;  i s seen as merely t h e n e g a t i v e  as  a  t h a t means t h a t  a course which  o n l y l e a d t o s e v e r e c o n f l i c t w i t h i n our p s y c h e s . of balancing  s i d e always  Thus, the  can model  achievement o f k e e p i n g  peace between w a r r i n g elements; t h e maintenance o f t h e s t a t u s or o r d e r .  Though harmony i s a c h i e v e d  through t h i s ' p r o c e s s ,  c o n f l i c t remains c o n t i n u a l l y r a g i n g w i t h i n On  Accordingly,  the  c o n f l i c t works  t o s t u l t i f y a c t i o n r a t h e r t h a n t o f r e e us t o a c t ; f o r the  of the s e l f against  quo  us.  t h i s view, t h e r e s u l t o f t h a t c o n t i n u i n g  o f energy i n v o l v e d i n the  c o n t i n u a l judging, and  binding  c h e c k i n g o f one  another i s experienced inescapably  as  part  repression.'  t h e y argue t h i s r e p r e s s i o n , w h i l e o f t e n very u s e f u l ,  i n e v i t a b l y r e s u l t s i n a. b l i n d , c o n t r o l l i n g s e l f - r i g h t e o u s n e s s , the double edge o f t h a t : more t o deaden the  a d e s p a i r i n g g u i l t and  course there  process of balancing.  and  c o n f l i c t which works  s o u l r a t h e r t h a n f r e e i t . They a r e s p e l l i n g  the p s y c h o l o g i c a l u n d e r p i n n i n g s o f Of  we  out  'idealism'.  i s much t o be g a i n e d from t h i s  repressive  Peace i s a t t a i n e d , with a l l i t s v a l u a b l e  train  25 The s t r u g g l e , almost c l a s s i c a l l y P l a t o n i c , i s b e s t r e v e a l e d i n Freud's C i v i l i z a t i o n and I t s D i s c o n t e n t s . Here, r e p r e s s i o n i s c e n t r a l and i n e s c a p a b l e , with the g a i n and l o s s t o c i v i l i z a t i o n never r e a l l y settled.  -30of benefits:  security, predictability, a measure of control or  •power' over one's l i f e which i s certainly an important kind of freedom.  But there i s an important loss of freedom as well; there  is a continuing loss of newness, a drying up of joy and creativity which depend for their sources upon unbound energy and the risking of pushing into unknown regions. The 'holistic' psychological school then, sees harmony as the positive integration or interlocking of the self.  Freedom on  this account i s achieved, not though the caging of the instinctualpassionate l i f e via checking and suppressing parts of the self, but ?6  through the 'allowing' ' knowing, and i n that way, having use of the emotional ranges.  They argue for a kind of creative interplay between  a l l parts, for they claim that you cannot integrate yourself into a harmonious whole unless you are f i r s t willing to see who you are. That means that we must see the totality of our nature, for the hiding of undesireable parts doesn't make them disappear: instead, they continue underground, affecting our behavior in subconscious ways that we have no access to and therefore no affective use -of; binding us to our nature, not freeing us and requiring more and more external controls to keep our outside behavior appropriate. 2 6 In putting forward the idea that the Platonic view sees freedom achieved through balance via rational suppression, and the 'holistic' view sees freedom achieved through integration via emotional 'allowing*, I'm tempted to use the metaphor of the paternal and maternal archetypes or modes of acting in the world, I mention i t here as a footnote, mainly because I haven't worked i t out as a full-blown theory, yet suggest I t . might be illuminating for someone who i t strikes as intuitively appropriate here. By. this I mean that the Platonic view of the nature of man i s essentially a paternal one - with emphasis upon external restraint, order, duty and obligation, while the. 'holistic' approach to the nature of man is essentially a maternal one - with emphasis upon allowing, accepting, expressing inner development and growth. The distinction i s an important one with relationship to different kinds of authority systems.  -31-  S p e c i f i c a l l y t h e i r argument looks l i k e t h i s :  we can only  have r e a l control over ourselves when we understand ourselves.  Since  we can only understand ourselves once we see ourselves, and we can only see ourselves i f we allow ourselves, then we must permit the f u l l range o f our behavior that we can look at i t and accept i t i n order t o have control of i t .  Accordingly, the route to harmony l i e s  through the expression of the emotional l i f e , not through balancing i t against the r a t i o n a l . To regard human nature i n t h i s way i s not to say that there are no dangerous parts i n our animal natures, nor that reason does not have an important place i n i t .  I t would be madness t o uphold  a view of emotional expression that gives people permission t o go around k i l l i n g others or indulging i n s i m i l a r destructive patterns of behavior.  When i t i s argued that through too much emphasis on  the r a t i o n a l element i n our nature we have been stunting and r e pressing the source of our energy and c r e a t i v i t y i n our emotional l i f e , no one i s arguing f o r a return to violence i n human a f f a i r s , but f o r a d i f f e r e n t and more e f f e c t i v e method or way to handle those a n t i - s o c i a l drives i n our personality. Both the Platonic and the ' h o l i s t i c ' views of the nature of man want to control the a n t i - s o c i a l and destructive parts of our nature, but they go about control i n a d i f f e r e n t way and f o r a d i f f e r e n t purpose.  The P l a t o n i c view wants to control the i r r a t i o n a l  parts of our nature by the r a t i o n a l i n order t o achieve a kind of order or balance which allows the 'better s e l f  of man to emerge:  the t r u l y r a t i o n a l man who i s concerned with h i s ' r e a l ' i n t e r e s t s .  -32The  ' h o l i s t i c ' approach wants to bring about a kind of  control of our emotions as well, but through 'allowing' a f u l l range of expression of that emotional l i f e i n order t o b u i l d on i t , move from i t so as t o extend and challenge ranges i n a person's psyche that he can then move i n t o .  This kind of control i s more  often expressed as the control of our emotions i n order to achieve inner development or 'growth' so that a person can move into previously unknown ranges of experience which enrich h i s l i f e .  In  t h i s sense, the Platonic view i s reductive, the ' h o l i s t i c ' i s more expansive. But, just as the r a t i o n a l understanding, the a n a l y t i c mode, does very l i t t l e towards change i n a person's l i f e because i t doesn't touch the emotional l e v e l s of 'knowing' which permeate the whole being of a person, so too does just being able t o f e e l , know one's emotions, having catharsis etc., by i t s e l f do very l i t t l e .  So the  problem remains of how to bind or i n t e r - l o c k d i f f e r e n t modes of being in the world.  The ' h o l i s t i c ' approach maintains that the solution  i s not a matter of swinging back and f o r t h between passion and reason or good and bad parts of the s e l f f o r the ultimate r e s u l t o f that approach can only be suppresion and outward forms of control. Their view i s weakest at t h i s point; that i s , i t doesn't yet  have a r e a l l y s a t i s f a c t o r y theory of the creative interplay  between the emotions with reason that explains t h i s kind of integrative growth process.  That i s why i n the attempt to describe the process,  they often get thrown back into descriptions that look very much  -33-  l i k e the Platonic conception of balancing d i f f e r e n t parts of the soul, or else r e t r e a t i n t o subjective rambling that has more of a mystical tone than an a n a l y t i c one.  They use words to describe  the  process l i k e 'experienced knowledge* or 'experiential learning*, and what i s behind t h i s kind of language i s p r e c i s e l y that point: that the process cannot be  'gotten' through the i n t e l l e c t alone,  but i s more l i k e a c l i c k i n awareness, i n v o l v i n g a l l the layers and centers of knowledge. The kind of inner control brought about through the constant awareness of yourself i s dependent upon t h i s d i f f e r e n t kind of i n t e g r a t i v e knowledge of oneself, and i s c l e a r l y i n another  27 t r a d i t i o n from the Platonic sense of control balance.  brought about through  Furthermore, i t has important implications f o r a theory  of freedom i n r e l a t i o n to authority.  I have spent some time i n  t h i s paper attempting to uncover the difference because the r e s t of my argument depends upon seeing the d i s t i n c t i o n between a system of authority which i s based upon an integrative rather than a balancing model of human nature. S p e c i f i c a l l y , the Platonic view provides the  psychological  underpinnings f o r a theory of authoritarianism, while the  'holistic'  approach does the same job f o r a theory of individualism, c l o s e l y r e l a t e d to our ordinary understanding of the notion of freedom within a democracy; f o r unless one understands and takes responsib i l i t y for what one does i n the world, there i s no way 27  to change  Though I suspect i t i s very close to the Socratic view.  -34-  outside behavior without increasing external  control.  Accordingly, the implications of the  ' h o l i s t i c ' model of  integration has bearing on Tussman's theory of the r e l a t i o n s h i p o f private i n t e r e s t s , seen as one's emotional-instinctual public i n t e r e s t , seen as one's r a t i o n a l l i f e . of any psychological  life,  I t i s Tussman's lack  theory of i n d i v i d u a l i t y or human growth which  I f i n d most d i f f i c u l t i n his account of obligation and the interest i n a democracy.  public  Because of h i s Platonic bias, he seems  to have no room f o r the passions i n public l i f e for  and  (outside of l o y a l t y ) ,  he sees them as belonging almost s o l e l y to private l i f e .  That i s ,  he doesn't seem to have any r e l a t i o n s h i p f o r these emotional ranges of i n t e r e s t s to the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t , except one  of suppression.  In short, he i s lacking any p o s i t i v e theory of the r e l a t i o n s h i p of a theory of Individualism  to a theory of public purpose, which any  serious attempt to explain the r e l a t i o n s h i p of the ruled to the r u l e r i n a democracy must be involved i n . of representation  Consequently h i s theory  and the theory of education which flows from i t  suffer f r o m t h i s lack.  -35CHAPTER I I I  I have argued i n the l a s t section that Tussman's view of the public i n t e r e s t i s a l i m i t e d one because of i t s Platonic base, nevertheless  i t i s important to see the weight of the problem, f i r s t  encountered there, that drives h i s theory of representation.  In  t a l k i n g about the public i n t e r e s t , Tussman's appeal to the d i s t i n c t i o n between r e a l and apparent i n t e r e s t s i s c e r t a i n l y an appropriate one.  The idea that there can be r e a l needs as distinguished from  apparent wants, and that freedom i s the r e a l i z a t i o n of the former through the r e s t r a i n t of the l a t t e r , r e s t s on the assumption that one can harm oneself, or hurt oneself, defeat one's own deep-rooted and long range i n t e r e s t s unknowingly or even u n w i l l i n g l y .  Thus we  speak of being a "slave t o passion" or "enslaved" by ignorance. This i s not such a strange assumption i f we look around us at how democracy a c t u a l l y works much of the time.  We know very well  that there are objects or experiences that we want that turn out t o be destructive f o r us. of what we i n i t i a l l y  We know very well that our s e l f i s h pursuit  see as our i n t e r e s t , often turns out to be the  opposite of what we would have wanted i f we had only known better. Even more often, we see that the maximization of everyone pursuing t h e i r own i n d i v i d u a l Interest a l l the time can destroy the very f a b r i c of a democratic l i f e i f that means as a body p o l i t i c we value s e c u r i t y , peace, j u s t i c e and equality as much as we do our individualism.  We may want to drive bigger and f a s t e r cars, but i f we r e a l l y understand the consequences of doing so, we might see that i t i s the worst s o l u t i o n to our transportation problem.  We  may  want to develop industry i n order to produce more and more goods, thus s a t i s f y i n g our d e s i r e f o r a higher standard of l i v i n g ; yet, that may not be i n our r e a l i n t e r e s t i n view of the environmental p r i c e that we, or future generations w i l l have to pay.  I t may  be  that i t i s both a natural and i n s t i n c t u a l need f o r human beings to procreate t h e i r own kind, and yet i t may be the case that i t i s not i n our best i n t e r e s t to allow uncontrolled procreation i f we are to protect the earth from the problems of over-population. A l l of these very r e a l problems which face us as members of a democratic body p o l i t i c involved i n determining the public i n t e r e s t , force us to acknowledge that the d i s t i n c t i o n appealed to between r e a l and apparent i n t e r e s t , or between need and want, i s not an unimportant  one.  That i f the p u b l i c interest i s to have  any meaning at a l l with regards to t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n , i t must be concerned with r e a l i n t e r e s t s and r e a l needs. The problem then, i s not the recognition of the d i s t i n c t i o n and the p l a u s i b i l i t y of the assumption i t rests on, f o r they are v a l i d , but the question as to what implications are to be drawn from i t .  What i s going t o be done about t h i s fact of l i f e ?  How  i s a community going to handle t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n i n the process of a r r i v i n g at the public i n t e r e s t ?  Are we going to give the power  to someone to make these kind of public d i s t i n c t i o n s which we  -37-  w i l l accept as binding upon us, even against our own judgement; or are we going to allow the vast majority of people t o make t h e i r own decisions on these issues, whatever the outcome?  Tussman - following  Plato - has drawn his own implications from t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n f o r a theory of government, ' '  As I have argued, Plato saw that only the 'best s e l f  could  determine what was i n the r e a l or public i n t e r e s t of the i n d i v i d u a l , and because he despaired of the vast majority of human beings ever being able t o operate out of a conception  of t h e i r 'best s e l f , he  found i t necessary to develop a s p e c i a l class of 'best selves' who were t o be set over the r e s t of the population to r u l e them i n the  28 p u b l i c i n t e r e s t ; with t h e i r consent, but not with t h e i r voice, Tussman, because of h i s commitment to a democratic form of government, or a t l e a s t , because he i s w r i t i n g out o f the democratic context, must i n i t i a l l y appeal t o that 'best s e l f  which resides i n  every member of the body p o l i t i c ; but i n f a c t , we f i n d that he, l i k e Plato, acknowledges important differences between people that are important t o his concept of r u l i n g , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the capacity of r a t i o n a l judgement,  He cannot escape the observation that a l l are  not f i t to govern i n the public i n t e r e s t : To make a l l men good and wise seems beyond hope. ...Even i f i t i s assumed that a l l men have latent .. capacity i n t h i s d i r e c t i o n , there are some who seem to be 'naturals 1  28 Cornford, The Republic, i v , kjl. Here Plato establishes the consent of the governed as a condition of authority. This point i s often missed. 29  Tussman, Obligation, p. 100.  -38It i s to these 'naturals' that Tussman wants to r e l y on in the' end to safeguard the search f o r the public i n t e r e s t i n l i e u of any c l e a r c r i t e r i a . "we  This i s what he means when he says that  must grope our way back to the Republic and j o i n Plato i n the  search f o r the guardian type, f o r the agent who  by endowment and 30  the t r a i n i n g of mind and character can play the public r o l e , " So, i t i s not s u r p r i s i n g to f i n d as the book moves from a consideration of membership to agency that he, l i k e Plato, r e l i e s more and more on the development of a s p e c i a l class of people to r u l e i n the public i n t e r e s t :  the agent who  i s to man  the democratic  t r i b u n a l against the wishes, wants and desires of the majority the members i f need be.  The agent who  through education and  of  character  i s able to make those kind of tough public d i s t i n c t i o n s that are required echoes the Platonic notion of the 'best s e l f :  "the public 31 agent had better be us at our best, not at our most t y p i c a l , " What distinguishes Tussman from Plato i s only a t h i n thread at t h i s point; that thread i s Tussman hanging onto the e l e c t i v e 32  process.  I f the members of the body p o l i t i c can be induced to  vote f o r t h i s s p e c i a l class of people as t h e i r representatives,  and  i f they w i l l understand the notion of representation to mean that the agent i s to represent them "at t h e i r best", against t h e i r 33 ordinary selves,  J  then democracy and Plato can be reconciled at  30  Tussman, Obligation, p.  31  Ibid,, p.  99.  62.  32 That, and h i s lack of a theory of knowledge, i t s nature, how attained etc.  i t is  33 Tussman, Obligation, p. 62, the f u l l quote goes: "I r i s k the judgement that the conception of the representative body as a representative sample i s a f u t i l e and f a t a l one. The representative, the public agent, had better be us at our best, not at our most t y p i c a l . "  -39-  last.  Tussman can maintain an e s s e n t i a l l y Platonic conception of  government within a democratic framework and i n so doing, can make sense of both. There are obvious d i f f i c u l t i e s with the attempt, fascinat i n g and powerful as i t i s .  The most serious objection i s that h i s  attempt to r e c o n c i l e Plato and democratic theory involves some very unfamiliar notions about democracy; s p e c i f i c a l l y , a s p e c i a l notion of representation, freedom.  and with that, a strained view of p o l i t i c a l  I t can be argued that these s p e c i a l notions are very  d i f f e r e n t from our ordinary understanding of a theory of democracy, and, however sensible, f e e l strange i n t h i s context.  In f a c t , they  seem closer to an authoritarian system of government - a dilemma Tussman seems pushed into because he sees no a l t e r n a t i v e to an e s s e n t i a l l y Platonic view of the public i n t e r e s t . h i s theory of representation  Let us look at  more c l o s e l y .  I want to argue f i r s t , that Tussman's model of representat i o n involves a r e a l dichotomy between private and public i n t e r e s t seen respectively as the emotional and r a t i o n a l l i f e , and though i t i s by no means obvious that t h i s model does violence to the notion of freedom he started with, i t c e r t a i n l y bends i t around quite a b i t .  Secondly, I'd l i k e to point out the implications  of  such a dichotomy between private and public i n t e r e s t f o r a theory of authority.  T h i r d l y , I want to argue that the model of integra-  t i o n rather than that of balance, as outlined i n the l a s t section,  -40-  provides  a t l e a s t one p o s s i b l e a l t e r n a t i v e t o Tussman's t h e o r y o f  representation. education,  F i n a l l y , before  t u r n i n g t o t h e next s e c t i o n on  I want t o c o n s i d e r Tussman's t h e o r y  i n r e l a t i o n s h i p t o some o r d i n a r y  conceptions  of representation  o f democratic  theory,  I b e g i n t h e n w i t h a c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f Tussman's model o f • r e p r e s e n t a t i o n and t h e concept o f p o l i t i c a l b e g i n s t a l k i n g about a t h e o r y  freedom.  o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n by i n t r o d u c i n g two  d i f f e r e n t senses o f r e p r e s e n t a t i v e government:  on t h e one hand,  t h e r e i s t h e sense t h a t t h e agent i s t o r e p r e s e n t majority  Tussman  t h e views o f t h e  o f p e o p l e who have e l e c t e d him t o be t h e i r d e l e g a t e ;  the o t h e r ,  on  i s t h e famous Burkean model o f t h e a,gent who i s t o be  elected t o represent  h i s e l e c t o r a t e as an i n d i v i d u a l judge o f what  he t h i n k s i s t h e b e s t p o l i c y . Tussman goes on t o make t h e p o i n t t h a t t h e s e two d i f f e r e n t senses o f t h e r o l e o f a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e i n two p a r a l l e l c o n c e p t i o n s  i n a democracy a r e r e f l e c t e d  o f what a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e body i s sup-  posed t o be: On t h e one hand, i t s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e n e s s i s thought t o be t h a t o f a 'sample'; a l e g i s l a t u r e i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e when I t c o n t a i n s w i t h i n i t s e l f t h e same elements, i n t h e sa.me p r o p o r t i o n , a s a r e found i n t h e body p o l i t i c a t l a r g e . . . . O n t h e o t h e r hand t h e r e s t i l l l i n g e r s t h e c o n c e p t i o n o f r e p r e s e n t a t i v e government as a. form o f e l e c t i v e a r i s t o c r a c y . And on t h i s view we want t o be r e p r e s e n t e d by our b e s t , our w i s e s t and f a i r e s t . The r e p r e s e n t a t i v e body s h o u l d be a cream n o t a homogenized s a m p l e , ^ 35 I have a l r e a d y d i s c u s s e d what view he s u p p o r t s . committed t o a t h e o r y  He i s  o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n t h a t t u r n s o u t t o be an  34  Tussman, O b l i g a t i o n , p.  35  See p. 38 o f t h i s  61-62.  paper.  -41-  "elected a r i s t o c r a c y " because of the importance of p u b l i c i n t e r e s t as a d e f i n i n g c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of a body p o l i t i c , and because of h i s view of achieving that purpose only through the character or the 'best s e l f  o f the representative agent.  He cannot permit a theory  of representation wherein the agent merely takes orders from h i s electorate f o r that would be l i k e having the worst s e l f — the private i n t e r e s t s of the members —  r u l e the 'best s e l f — the  public i n t e r e s t a r r i v e d at through reason and d e l i b e r a t i o n .  The  agent, so Tussman argues, must be free to d e l i b e r a t e , to discover the public i n t e r e s t . One of the d i f f i c u l t i e s with t h i s view i s that we get i n c r e d i b l y twisted up i n a maze which does strange things t o the notion of p o l i t i c a l freedom.  Tussman has defined p o l i t i c a l freedom  i n h i s f i r s t chapter as "the freedom under law"  and says that  freedom i n t h i s sense "does not turn on the absence of law but on 3 7  whether the law i s "self-imposed."  That i s one of the reasons  that only the model of a voluntary group based upon agreement w i l l adequately politic.  f i t t h i s necessary  condition of freedom as d e f i n i n g a body  But i t turns out to be a t r i c k y business t r y i n g t o square  t h i s condition of p o l i t i c a l freedom, defined as "self-imposed law", with h i s theory of representation.  He can a c t u a l l y do i t , - b u t the  thread that holds i t a l l together i s very t h i n indeed, and one wonders how much of an ordinary sense of "self-imposed" gets l o s t or d i s t o r t e d along the way. 36  Tussman, Obligation, p. 8,  37  Ibjd., p. 9.  -42-  Before getting into a discussion of that, l e t me pause here to make a minor point with regard t o the r e l a t i o n s h i p between freedom and law.  Tussman says i n the f i r s t  chapter:  ...to the extent that law i s a system of agreements to which I am a party, "being under law' does not c o n f l i c t with 'being f r e e ' unless', indeed, I consider myself not free when I do what I have agreed or consented to do.^g I f i n d t h i s view just f a l s e ; f o r 'being under law' often does conf l i c t with 'being free'; at l e a s t , we often f e e l l e s s free when we obey law no matter how b e n e f i c i a l we agree i t s e f f e c t s are. i s pretty much echoing the Platonic-Rousseauian  Tussman  argument about  freedom that I have mentioned e a r l i e r ; where freedom i s seen as the power or the active capacity t o do something that you w i l l —  that  you know you 'ought' to do. The problem with t h i s t r a d i t i o n i n t h i s context of p o l i t i c a l freedom i s that i t ignores f o r the most part another t r a d i t i o n of freedom which i s generally expressed as the absence of r e s t r a i n t s upon our actions.  According t o t h i s t r a d i t i o n , freedom can only be  FROM r e s t r a i n t and i t i s therefore a contradiction t o t a l k about people being made free BY  MEANS  of r e s t r a i n t .  This l a t t e r t r a d i t i o n does, I think, convey a more s a t i s f y i n g d e s c r i p t i v e sense of the way we use the word freedom; one that f i t s i n t o our e x p e r i e n t i a l sense of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between freedom and law.  For when you have laws or rules which you have agreed to  as the basis of an authority structure, there are s t i l l c e r t a i n  38  Tussman, Obligation, p. 9.  freedoms l o s t as well as c e r t a i n freedoms gained.  The point i s that  i f we re-define the notion of freedom so that there i s no  conceptual  c o n f l i c t involved i n i t s r e l a t i o n s h i p to law, then we have to deny the r e a l i t y of our i n t e r n a l experience:  that there r e a l l y are  choices  one has to make with regard to areas of freedom, and that there i s a r e s u l t i n g f e e l i n g of l o s s or gain i n freedom which we experience due to those choices. That Tussman i s aware of t h i s c o n f l i c t becomes apparent l a t e r on when he i s discussing the r e l a t i o n s h i p of the  subordination  required by membership to p o l i t i c a l freedom, and remarks that "we  are  frequently reminded that the achievement, and preservation of order exacts i t s p r i c e i n freedom, that some freedom must be given up,  that  we must c a r e f u l l y and constantly balance the demands of these unfortunately competing goods.  But then he puts forward two arguments  which are an attempt to cancel out that "reminder". F i r s t he asks i f "we  ought to consider whether i t (law) does  not i n fact so increase the options and p o s s i b i l i t i e s open to us that on any reasonable assessment i t increases rather than diminishes  the  40 opportunity  or power 'to do as one l i k e s , ' "  I have no argument with  the idea that authority which regulates our a c t i v i t i e s i n many instances increases our freedom to do what we want.  In e f f e c t , what I c a l l  'regulative authority' makes possible the condition of equal freedom f o r i t protects i n d i v i d u a l s and groups by enforcing prohibitions against the free exercise of a r b i t r a r y desires, where those actions 39  Tussman, Obligation, p.  51.  40 Ibid., p. 6 l , brackets mine. It i s i n t e r e s t i n g that i n order to make t h i s point, Tussman adopts the other t r a d i t i o n of freedom that he tends to argue against f o r the most part: that i s , freedom seen as the power 'to do as one l i k e s ' , not as what 'one ought to do'.  would i n t e r f e r e with the s i m i l a r freedom of other members of the group. On t h i s view then, quite r i g h t l y , regulative authority increases rather than diminishes the freedom t o do as one consciously chooses; i t makes r e a l rather than formal freedom possible.  I f we  d i d not have t r a f f i c r u l e s and r e s t r i c t i o n s , no one would have the freedom to d r i v e i n any s i g n i f i c a n t sense; and i f we d i d not have the intervention and regulation of food inspectors and standards of health safety, no one would have the same freedom t o eat.  But i n each of  these examples, there are also actions that we are not free to do, and when we look at the r e l a t i o n s h i p of freedom to authority, we are always balancing j u s t t h i s gain of one kind of freedom against the loss of another. To acknowledge then that there can be a r e l a t i o n s h i p between freedom and authority which increases our freedom i s one thing; but to claim that there i s always t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p , or that there i s never a c o n f l i c t between freedom and self-imposed  law, i s , as I have  claimed - t o be b l i n d t o the binding nature o f authority as well as the freeing; i t i s to make an important point without seeing the r e l a t i o n s h i p of freedom t o authority i n i t s t o t a l i t y . To return now t o my major consideration, I take up Tussman's second argument concerning  p o l i t i c a l freedom and i t s r e l a t i o n s h i p to  law to examine what sense he makes of "self-imposed  law" —  the de-  f i n i n g c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of p o l i t i c a l freedom within a body p o l i t i c .  He says here:  " l e t us consider freedom as 'governing oneself'"^" " 1  and then s l i d e s Into the bald assertion almost immediately that 'governing o n e s e l f i s : ...not quite the same thing as 'doing as one l i k e s * ; i t r e s t s on a d i f f e r e n t conception of the s e l f and finds expression i n Rousseau's 'The mere Impulse of appetite i s slavery, while obedience to a law which we prescribe to ourselves i s l i b e r t y , ' ^ Or again, s h o r t l y on: On t h i s view....we are free when we are self-governing, making and following our own r u l e s . ^ I t looks as though he i s saying that p o l i t i c a l freedom consists simply i n obeying the laws that we make ourselves,  S t i l l , i n the  f i r s t quotation he t a l k s about a " d i f f e r e n t conception of the s e l f " and sees 'governing o n e s e l f as not "doing as one  likes,"  I t i s my contention that these P l a t o n i c notions are i m p l i c i t i n h i s conception of making laws; that they serve as c r i t e r i a f o r making laws i n the public i n t e r e s t , f o r the concept of a 'best  self  which makes laws i n the public i n t e r e s t i s necessary to the argument of t h i s whole section on representation.  I t i s necessary to Tussman's  argument because, even i f he succeeds i n showing that the complex notion of 'delegation' or representation can be interpreted as "making and following our own r u l e s " , he s t i l l needs the concept of a 'best s e l f  i n order to j u s t i f y stretching t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of "self-imposed  law" further to include the notion of a representa-  t i v e agent who  i s not to r e f l e c t h i s e l e c t o r s , but to r u l e i n t h e i r  place.  41  Tussman, Obligation, p.  42  Loc. c i t .  43  I b i d . , p.  53.  52.  -46-  One  could argue that t h i s attempt to r e c o n c i l e a theory of  p o l i t i c a l freedom as "making and following our own r u l e s " with a Platonic theory of representation stretches the sense of the former theory a b i t too f a r ; f o r how  free can a member r e a l l y be when, not  only i s he one step removed from making laws because he must delegate that power, but i n addition, the r o l e of h i s delegate i s to e s s e n t i a l l y govern f o r him - ignoring, i f need be, what he may interests,  see as h i s private  The "necessary r e l a t i o n s h i p between membership and  ' p a r t i c i p a t i o n ' which, since Rousseau at l e a s t , has made ' p o l i t i c a l  44 freedom' and  'democracy' v i r t u a l l y synonymous",  seems to fade almost into a haze.  on Tussman's account,  P a r t i c i p a t i o n gets reduced to the  45 r i g h t to "consent to being governed without our further consent", and without any apparent l i m i t s on the kind of laws the agent  may  f e e l are necessary. Tussman i s aware of t h i s dilemma f o r he says that Rousseau thought that a single delegation of the thread of p a r t i c i p a t i o n "snapped" the r e l a t i o n s h i p to freedom.  But not only does he defend  as inevitable the delegation of power to representatives and  their  inevitable delegation i n turn to committees and bureaucracies, also argues f o r t h i s one further step of delegation:  he  the delegation  of law-making to the elected representative agent alone.  In the  end,  his answer to t h i s very r e a l problem of making sense of p o l i t i c a l freedom within a representative democracy as he has defined i t i s only the curious statement that: 44  Tussman, Obligation, p.  45 Ibid., p. 53, artisans.  5^.  Reducing "members" very close to the r o l e of Plato's  -47-  But the free c i t i z e n w i l l refuse to abdicate, ...Only by d i n t of ceaseless devotion to the task of keeping the d e l i c a t e structure of consent, p a r t i c i p a t i o n and authority i n good r e p a i r can we save the claim of self-government from being a b i t t e r mockery. But i s n ' t h i s own demand that the representative agent be free to pursue the public i n t e r e s t as d i s t i n c t from the private interests or wishes of the members who  elected him,  a demand f o r abdication  by the members of t h e i r rule-making function?  Perhaps we  should  look more c l o s e l y at the r e l a t i o n s h i p he proposes between the member and h i s elected agent. The notion underlying most of the d i f f i c u l t y i n understanding the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the member and h i s elected representative i s , of course, that of the public i n t e r e s t . "(1)  For so long as Tussman  sees the public i n t e r e s t as the fundamental concern of a body  p o l i t i c , and  (2)  so long as he sees that public i n t e r e s t as separate  from private i n t e r e s t (or even i n opposition to i t ) , only r e a l i z a b l e through the development of our best, most r a t i o n a l , objective s e l f against our worst, most s e l f i s h , i n d i v i d u a l s e l f , and  (3)  so long  as he sees that the ordinary member i s incapable of performing h i s public function on t h i s l e v e l , but some responsible members - best suited by character and t r a i n i n g can; then i t i s an obvious conclusion that i f we wish to achieve the public i n t e r e s t we must set these s p e c i a l l y s k i l l e d guardians to r u l e over us.  46  Tussman, Obligation, p.  56.  -48-  I f we want to hold onto some other notion of representat i o n i n a democracy, then i t i s necessary to deal with t h i s s t i c k y question of the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t again, f o r i f Tussman's assumptions are a l l v a l i d , then we are pretty much stuck with h i s conclusion. Let me t r y to drive a wedge into h i s theory of representat i o n with the idea that the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t has, or should have a more d i r e c t r e l a t i o n s h i p to p r i v a t e i n t e r e s t than Tussman i s prepared to acknowledge.  He i n e v i t a b l y gets caught i n a representative  model which encourages a disastrous dichotomy between private and public i n t e r e s t p r e c i s e l y because he regards the agent as there t o , i n some sense, transcend  or control private i n t e r e s t s instead of  to unite or integrate them into the public i n t e r e s t . Tussman's representative model works i n t h i s way  very  simmilarly to the Platonic model of balance within the soul which encourages a dichotomy between reason and passion.  As I have a l -  ready argued, i n the balancing model of the s e l f , once you assign reason the r o l e of balancer, reason and passion are immediately set i n opposition to each other, thus generating a c o n f l i c t which i s s e l f - v e r i f y i n g ; f o r once you postulate that kind of dichotomy, the d i f f e r e n t parts are bound to develop i n independent ways that play o f f against each other and therefore always c o n f l i c t with each other.  The i n e v i t a b l e r e s u l t of such a s i t u a t i o n i s more and more  control being exerted by the r a t i o n a l element and a starving of the instinctual-emotional l i f e .  -49-  The same thing happens here i n Tussman's theory of representation, only on two l e v e l s .  I f you do set-up the guardian-agents  to define a public i n t e r e s t which i s seen as separate, not reducible to private i n t e r e s t , then not only i s there- set i n motion t h i s dichotomy between public and private i n t e r e s t , but because of Tussman's Platonic leanings, the private i s i d e n t i f i e d with the emotional l i f e and the public with the r a t i o n a l .  The r o l e of the agent then becomes  the r o l e of the balancer between reason and passion; between the public and private l i f e .  There are several consequences following  from such a view of representation  that I f i n d troubling.  F i r s t of a l l , because Tussman takes the hard l i n e that there i s on the one hand the public i n t e r e s t , and on the other there are a l l these s e l f i s h private i n t e r e s t s , and believes that one i s not reducible into the other, private and public i n t e r e s t w i l l i n e v i t a b l y develop along separate, c o n f l i c t i n g paths.  Therefore the public  agent r o l e v i s a v i s private i n t e r e s t can only be a c o n t r o l l i n g one. There i s no way around the agents assuming an authoritarian or oppressor r o l e whenever public and private i n t e r e s t c o n f l i c t , f o r they are not supposed to be i n charge of u n i t i n g private i n t e r e s t s , or working on integrating them; they are supposed t o be i n charge of transcending them.  I t i s t h e i r duty to oppose the private interests  of i n d i v i d u a l members and over-ride them i n the ' r e a l ' i n t e r e s t s of the community, as they see them.  -50-  Secondly, and consequently, there i s a s h i f t i n the sense of p o l i t i c a l freedom Tussman has been t a l k i n g about, f o r suddenly "making and obeying your, own laws" gets translated into choosing representatives who are i n charge of t e l l i n g members things that they are either not competent to decide, or do not see, or cannot get themselves to do without outside authority.  What Tussman i s  arguing f o r here i s the authorization of a c e r t a i n kind of c o n t r o l : the control of reason over the passions, or the subordination of p r i v a t e i n t e r e s t t o the public i n t e r e s t . I f we accept the r o l e of Tussman's agent as a balancer between our reason and our passions so as to emerge with public i n t e r e s t , then i t might very well make sense f o r an adult member to consent t o having someone l i k e that placed i n authority over him — j u s t as on Plato's account a man consents as an autonomous agent to assigning h i s reason a balancing r o l e i n h i s own psyche. But, I want t o argue that though there i s nothing i l l o g i c a l about an adult member assigning c e r t a i n powers t o an agent without l o s i n g h i s autonomy, the kind of power and the kind of control he assigns i s c r u c i a l t o that sense of autonomy.  S p e c i f i c a l l y , I would l i k e  to point out that Tussman's model exacts a very heavy p r i c e i n our ordinary conception  of autonomy or p o l i t i c a l freedom; a p r i c e , I  s h a l l argue l a t e r , that i s not necessary to the maintenance of a sensible notion of the public i n t e r e s t .  -51-  T h i r d l y , with Tussman's model of representation, there seems to be some confusion, i f not an outright paradox generated i n t r y i n g to understand the r o l e of the member seen i n t h i s new l i g h t .  It  appears at f i r s t glance that the member i s not r e a l l y to be concerned, or i s not able to be concerned with the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t i n the same way as the agent i s ; f o r i f he were able t o determine what i s i n the public i n t e r e s t , then why wouldn't the r o l e of the representative agent be t o r e f l e c t the judgement of the member or the majority of members - at l e a s t on c r u c i a l issues? Now there i s nothing absurd about' the contention that most members, most of the time are incapable of getting beyond t h e i r private i n t e r e s t s and therefore need a responsible agent to make important decisions f o r them, but i f t h i s i s the case, as Tussman suggests, we are s t i l l l e f t with the problem of how they are going to get beyond t h e i r private i n t e r e s t s i n e l e c t i n g a representative, Plato didn't even bother with t h i s problem; he made sure that the ordinary c i t i z e n had nothing to do with e l e c t i n g anybody to o f f i c e . M i l l , coming out of mixture of a r i s t o c r a t i c and democratic theory, solved a s i m i l a r d i f f i c u l t y by r e l y i n g on some vague reference to the power o f "respect"; the b e l i e f that the i n d i v i d u a l member could be trusted t o vote f o r his 'betters' out of a kind of 'reverence'. But the kind of democratic body p o l i t i c that Tussman i s writing about involves a complex system of constituencies, parties and platforms, and has no guaranteed theory of knowledge to validate the d i f f i c u l t decision  processes.  -52This means that at each election period, the i n d i v i d u a l member i s going to be d i r e c t l y confronted with the problem of the public i n t e r e s t i f , and when, he must choose between r i v a l candidates and r i v a l b e l i e f systems.  I t won't do at t h i s point to say "vote f o r  the best man", f o r that decision as to who i s the best man i s going to depend upon how you assess what each man stands f o r who i s running f o r o f f i c e ; how you assess what he believes i n , and how he sees the nature of the problems a f f e c t i n g the body p o l i t i c . So no matter how much we may despair of the majority of members having the capacity to act i n the public i n t e r e s t , even on t h i s seemingly minimal of r u l i n g tasks —  still,  the election of  the representative agent, they are necessarily confronted with the problem of deciding what i s i n the public i n t e r e s t . The next question i s then, "How does the member of a constituency go about deciding what the public i n t e r e s t i s ? " Do they know what i t i s beforehand and simply t r y to match .each candidate to some objective c r i t e r i a they, or some of them have?  Or does the  public i n t e r e s t emerge out of debate, consideration or arguments and deliberation? I cannot see how i t can be the former case, i f we are t o hold onto any meaningful sense of the public interest,  That i s , I  cannot see how the public interest can be known beforehand unless we are merely r e f e r r i n g to vague g e n e r a l i t i e s which no one would  -53-  disagrees with, l i k e :  the public i n t e r e s t i s always concerned with  the needs of the community, with health, transportation, s u r v i v a l , welfare etc.  But i f that i s a l l we mean by the public i n t e r e s t  then we just have to push the problem to another l e v e l ; we have to ask what the means are by which these agreed upon public i n t e r e s t s can be brought about.  We are s t i l l confronted with the problem of  t r y i n g to determine what methods are i n the public i n t e r e s t t o best accomplish what i s i n the 'objective' public i n t e r e s t - and these methods or means c e r t a i n l y can't be known beforehand. back to the second proposition:  So we are  the public i n t e r e s t or i t s means  can only be determined a f t e r discussion, d e l i b e r a t i o n and argument. I f t h i s i s the case, where does an i n d i v i d u a l member begin to consider the public interest? over.  What does he s t a r t with to argue  Surely i t must be a c o l l e c t i o n of private and i n d i v i d u a l  interests.  That i s , one can accept a c r i t e r i o n of public i n t e r e s t  which i s d i f f e r e n t from a simple c o l l e c t i o n o f private interests  —  and also oblige both member and agent to do so as well, but surely the public i n t e r e s t s t a r t s f i r s t from t h i s c o l l e c t i o n ; f o r i t cannot be unrelated to somebody's i n t e r e s t . Tussman i s not b l i n d t o t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p i n a democracy between a person's private i n t e r e s t s and the public i n t e r e s t .  He  acknowledges i t by putting forward a 'claiming' c r i t e r i o n which converts private interest into public i n t e r e s t .  He argues that  that process of transforming private i n t e r e s t s into public i n t e r e s t s  involves the understanding of c e r t a i n r a t i o n a l structures i n our system; structures, or standards which are d i f f i c u l t to s p e l l out and are not understood i n t u i t i v e l y by a l l those engaged i n the process.  These structures involve c r u c i a l concepts l i k e 'making  a claim', 'having a good argument', the r e l a t i o n s h i p of claims to evidence, the notions or reasoning which include t h e i r  own  logical criteria. Tussman argues that there must be a c e r t a i n class of claims which may begin as a p r i v a t e expression of a f e l t want, but i n order to be l e g i t i m a t e l y considered as a public expression of a r a t i o n a l need, must s a t i s f y r a t i o n a l structures of argument.  He  argues that what we are more often engaged i n when determining what the public i n t e r e s t i s , i s t r y i n g to assess whether a private i n t e r e s t can pass a l l of these t e s t s ; can f i t within these structures of a 'claim'. To the extent that Tussman i s engaged i n analyzing the d i s t i n c t i o n between want and claim and showing how  the former must  be converted into the l a t t e r as a necessary condition of the public i n t e r e s t , he deserves e x p l i c i t mention; h i s analysis i s c l e a r and enlightening on t h i s score.  But I want to argue that t h i s  necessary condition Is only a minimal one i n t r y i n g to get at the r e l a t i o n s h i p between private and public i n t e r e s t , and not r e a l l y the main or i n t e r e s t i n g problem we encounter with regard to determining the public i n t e r e s t .  He never r e a l l y t a l k s about how  we  can  -55-  go about d e t e r m i n i n g t h e p u b l i c i n t e r e s t out o f a w e l t e r o f legitimate claims;  f o r what a c t u a l l y seems t o be a t t h e c e n t r e  o f t h e problem o f t h e p u b l i c i n t e r e s t i s t h e q u e s t i o n  o f how you .  d i s c r i m i n a t e between l e g i t i m a t e p u b l i c i n t e r e s t s , how you a s s i g n priorities etc. The  dilemma most o f t h e time i s n o t r e a l l y between p r i -  vate i n t e r e s t narrowly conceived  as p a s s i o n  o r want, and a p u b l i c  i n t e r e s t i d e n t i f i e d with r e a s o n , b u t over l e g i t i m a t e d i f f e r e n t methods o r p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f a c h i e v i n g p u b l i c good,  'claims' o f  some agreed upon  I would suggest t h a t most p u b l i c p o l i c y , i f n o t  r e d u c i b l e t o t h e c o a l e s c i n g o f p r i v a t e and p u b l i c i n t e r e s t i n t h e end,  then i s a t l e a s t i n a middle r e a l m where p r i v a t e i n t e r e s t s  are n o t i r r e l e v a n t , f o r t h e y g i v e t h e shape t o p u b l i c i s s u e s . That i s , what people come t o see as t h e i r i n t e r e s t s i n terms o f l i v i n g s t y l e , h e a l t h , s e c u r i t y , and t h e v a l u e s are  i m p o r t a n t t o p u b l i c i s s u e s and t h e r e  by Tussman on t h e k i n d s  t h a t they uphold,  ought t o be some remarks  o f t h i n g s which would r e p r e s e n t  solutions f o r c o l l e c t i o n s of legitimate claims.  legitimate  He never seems t o  get t o t h i s l e v e l i n t h e d i s c u s s i o n however, because he i s working out o f h i s dilemma between t h e e m o t i o n a l and r a t i o n a l l i f e all  almost  t h e t i m e , b u t even on t h i s l e v e l he i s i n v o l v e d i n a s e r i o u s  problem. I f i t i s true that the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t requires a t r a i n i n g and  e x p e r i e n c e i n t h e r a t i o n a l a c t s o f ' c l a i m i n g ' o r argument,  -56-  and i f i t i s true that the i n d i v i d u a l member must be involved i n t h i s process i n order to s e l e c t a representative-agent  who w i l l  perform t h i s function f o r him, then e i t h e r the member i s capable of such an enterprise or he i s not.  I f he i s not, how are we  going to get the 'best' agents elected, and i f he i s capable, then how can Tussman j u s t i f y having a representative agent that doesn't represent him? Of course, there can be several j u s t i f i c a t i o n s f o r having a model of representation l i k e the one Tussman puts forward, but he owes us some more c l a r i f i c a t i o n on t h i s score.  I t won't do to  merely t a l k about the necessity of r a t i o n a l control of 'the best* over the i r r a t i o n a l 'rest' and see the agent as the balancing voice of reason.  The member, i t seems, must also be the voice of  reason on occasion, and that f a c t must have some bearing on the authority r e l a t i o n s h i p between agent and member, Let me suggest at t h i s point an a l t e r n a t i v e model of representation i n the same way as I have suggested an a l t e r n a t i v e model of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between parts of the soul. put forward a model of the representative-agent  I want to  that sees h i s  guardian r o l e as more of an integrator of private i n t e r e s t s rather than as a balancer between reason and passion.  According to  t h i s model there i s a legitimate sense of public i n t e r e s t which doesn't have to create an adversary r e l a t i o n s h i p between private and public i n t e r e s t because p u b l i c i n t e r e s t can be shown to emerge  -57-  from private i n t e r e s t ; therefore, private i n t e r e s t can at every stage be a legitimate reference point f o r voters and agents a l i k e . This a l t e r n a t i v e view of the agent's r o l e as a representa-  47 t i v e i s best expressed by Saul Alinsky i n R e v e i l l e f o r Radicals. . His basic s t a r t i n g point i s that the people's private i n t e r e s t s are f i n a l , though of course he doesn't s e t t l e f o r those i n t e r e s t s as they e x i s t , but t r i e s to change them. the way  The  important point i s  his agent goes about changing those private i n t e r e s t s .  The agent i s seen here as a f a c i l i t a t o r who  i s there to aid i n a  t r a n s i t i o n , not by transcending private i n t e r e s t s through t e l l i n g people what the public i n t e r e s t i s , but by changing those private i n t e r e s t s through a c t u a l l y putting people i n d i f f e r e n t s i t u a t i o n s where t h e i r private i n t e r e s t s have a chance to change, Alinsky's point- i s quite simple:  the agent takes the  private i n t e r e s t s of the community as they e x i s t and that i s his reference point from then on; he accepts the f a c t that the member's approval or disapproval t h e i r private i n t e r e s t s .  i s always going to be couched i n terms of The reason that he can s t i l l get away  with claiming to be advancing a sense of community or public i n t e r e s t i s because the changes that he brings about w i l l lead the members to change t h e i r private i n t e r e s t s b i t by b i t .  However,  i f those private i n t e r e s t s don't change, then what the agent i s attempting to do i s not a legitimate public i n t e r e s t .  According  to t h i s model then, the public i n t e r e s t i s d i r e c t l y connected to private i n t e r e s t , though not necessarily the private i n t e r e s t s that a c t u a l l y e x i s t at any given time and 4-7  place.  Saul Alinsky, R e v e i l l e f o r Radicals, Vintage Books, New  York, lQoQ.  The great value of t h i s model i s that i t eliminates the extrem dichotomy that Tussman gets i n t o .  In Tussman's model, the  representative, because of the negative r e l a t i o n s h i p of private interest to public i n t e r e s t i s forced into an oppressor or authori t a r i a n r o l e sometimes, p a r t i c u l a r l y when p r i v a t e and public i n t e r e s t c o n f l i c t and subordination i s required.  The Alinsky model makes the  agent a servant rather than a master (as i n the Tussman model), but not a servant of just present private i n t e r e s t s which allows him  an  escape from the equally b l i n d i n g ' p l u r a l i s t ' approach to public interest that Tussman i s so r i g h t l y concerned with. What i s happening i n the Alinsky model i s that the agent i s taking private i n t e r e s t s and transforming  them, not by opposing  them as i n the case of Tussman's guardian-agent, but by t i n g the change through the person's s e l f - i n t e r e s t .  facilita-  In other words,  one's p r i v a t e i n t e r e s t i s not only an i n e v i t a b l e reference but a desirable  point,  one.  Many exponents and supporters of People's Organizat i o n s b i t t e r l y denounce s e l f - i n t e r e s t as one of the main obstacles that must be crushed i f people ar-e to be organized into a co-operative fellowship. Both l i b e r a l s and organizers have a t t r i b u t e d the f a i l u r e of t h e i r attempts to the rampant s p i r i t of i n d i v i dualism and s e l f i s h n e s s . These organizers have never appreciated that many seeming obstacles can be u t i l i z e d to great advantage. The fact i s that s e l f - i n t e r e s t can be a most potent weapon i n the development of co-operation and i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of the group welfare as being of greater importance than personal w e l f a r e , ^  48  Saul Alinsky, R e v e i l l e for.Radicals, p.  94,  -59-  To see the agent's r o l e i n t h i s a l t e r n a t i v e context i s , as I have s a i d , to see his.task as more of a f a c i l i t a t o r or i n t e grator than a balancer or judge; he becomes an advocate-guardian more than a paternal-guardian.  By f o r c i n g the representative to  pay attention to p r i v a t e i n t e r e s t s , you force him into a l l kinds of non-authoritarian ways of changing those private i n t e r e s t s , either through educating the public, or putting them into s i t u a tions which make them d i r e c t l y experience  a transformation  of  t h e i r private i n t e r e s t s . Alinsky provides various examples of  49 the ways i n which t h i s has been, and can be done successfully, I could, of course, t r y to extend t h i s a l t e r n a t i v e model of representation to t r y to show that t h i s i s an i d e a l form of representation, or the only form of representation that makes sense within the structure of a democratic body p o l i t i c , but I don't wish to get into that kind of argument here. that there are a l t e r n a t i v e conceptions  A l l I mean to do i s to show of representation and  the  r e l a t i o n s h i p of private to public i n t e r e s t , and the Interesting thing about Tussman's argument i s that he doesn't see that there are and consequently, i s stuck i n his formulation of the dilemma. His dilemma i s to see that e i t h e r you have these private i n t e r e s t s which are quarrelsome, f a c t i o n a l and chaotic i n the l i f e of the body p o l i t i c , or you have order founded on a conception  of  the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t which only a few s p e c i a l l y ' g i f t e d and trained agents can appreciate and impose.  But we see with h i s theory of  representation (which i s where he f i r s t seems driven to  formulate  49 Saul Alinsky, R e v e i l l e f o r Radicals, pp. 95-100, pp. 110-116, Closer to home, a p o s i t i v e example would be medicare, a negative one the B.C. Auto-Plan Insurance scheme.  -60-  th i s dilemma and bring i t home to us, transforming  the concept of  freedom i n the process) that t h i s dilemma i s not r e a l l y necessary. At l e a s t he owes us much more argument against a l t e r n a t i v e models f o r there is. at l e a s t one a l t e r n a t i v e which, seems to be a l e g i t i mate contender f o r a theory of representation. Let me t r y to c l a r i f y my p o s i t i o n at t h i s point.  I am  arguing that Tussman i s n ' t wrong i n p r i n c i p l e ; that i s , he i s n ' t wrong i n wanting agents to defend or create something that goes beyond e x i s t i n g Individual private i n t e r e s t , but everything depends upon how,  and how  f a r the public i n t e r e s t goes beyond private  i n t e r e s t , just as i n the model of the theory of the soul, everyt h i n g depends upon how,  and how  f a r reason goes beyond the  passions  i n control. Accordingly, i t does make sense f o r autonomous adult members to appoint a guardian-agent of some kind, but you have to d i s t i n g u i s h the r i g h t kind of guardian from the wrong kind, f o r the consequences are markedly difference i n each case depending upon which view you have.  Tussman's guardian involves him i n a  paradox - not because he i s a guardian, but because he i s the kind of guardian he i s .  That i s , i t i s not true that an autonomous adult  member cannot take on the authority of a guardian-agent, but i t seems to be true that an adult cannot take on a guardian-agent of Tussman's kind p r e c i s e l y because Tussman i s f a i r l y extreme i n his  emphasis on the dichotomy between reason and passion which  would necessitate an authoritarian kind of guardian.  -61-  I t would c e r t a i n l y make more sense f o r an adult to accept some kind of guardian who' would work with him i n an integrative way than i t would be to accept a guardian who  would see h i s r o l e of  balancing private and public i n t e r e s t i n such a way the sum  that whatever  of the balancing process i s , i t i s going to stand i n op-  p o s i t i o n to private i n t e r e s t most of the time, necessitating an oppressive kind of authority. Furthermore Tussman i s committed to dealing with f u l l y autonomous adults v i a h i s theory of membership, p a r t i c u l a r l y h i s theory of consent.  In the chapter on membership Tussman goes to  great lengths to argue that the notion of consent which i s at the heart of the model of a voluntary association "must be  voluntary,  not unconscious or accidental. That i s the act can only be properly taken as 'consent' i f i t i s done 'knowingly', i f i t i s understood by the one performing the act that h i s action involves his acceptance of the obligat i o n of membership. This condition seems to me so c r u c i a l that, i n f a c t , i t may even override the force of an e x p l i c i t verbal expression of consent. That i s why we take the c h i l d ' s pledge l i g h t l y . He says the magic words, but he does not know quite what he i s saying. I t i s form without substance.^ This i s so because the necessary 'knowing' q u a l i t y of to membership —  consenting  the acceptance of the obligations and the r o l e s  implied plus the understanding of the r i g h t s received  —requires  a stage of mental development and a s o p h i s t i c a t i o n of awareness  50  Tussman, Obligation, p.  51  Loc. c i t .  36.  and commitment that only an autonomous 'adult' i n t e l l i g e n c e can p o s s i b l y achieve,  For to see yourself as a f u l l - f l e d g e d member  of the body p o l i t i c i n the same sense that Tussman speaks about i s more than just consent; i t i s an affirmation of oneself as a responsible, r a t i o n a l , p o l i t i c a l being.  And Tussman needs just  t h i s sense of consent i f he i s to hang onto any meaningful account of p o l i t i c a l freedom under law.  But, i f t h i s i s the case, Tussman's  member i s hardly going to e l e c t an agent of h i s kind, My suspicion i s that Tussman has a much narrower view of adulthood than I would want to put forward.' Tussman, and Hobbes as well, saw that the demands of accepting authority and  recog-  n i z i n g the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to e l e c t a good guardian-agent  was  s u f f i c i e n t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r one to be considered an autonomous adult member of the body p o l i t i c ; but that seems to constitute a member's only 'adult' t a l e n t ,  I would want to argue f o r a notion  of adulthood that i s more extensive and has a d i f f e r e n t r e s u l t , My conception  of adult autonomy, and therefore p o l i t i c a l  freedom, involves more than having the i n t e l l i g e n c e to submit to control which i s s t a t i c and external; i t i s a notion which requires rather the i n t e l l i g e n c e to submit to a control which i s dynamic and i n t e r n a l .  This l a t t e r condition would best express i t s e l f by  e l e c t i n g somebody to control your private i n t e r e s t , but someone who  i s to help you move your private i n t e r e s t i n new d i r e c t i o n s .  So long as r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r p u b l i c decisions i s kept with the member rather than given over to the agent i n one act of e l e c t i v e  f a i t h , than the r e s u l t i s quite a d i f f e r e n t conception of agency or a theory o f representation. I t i s not my purpose to d e t a i l t h i s other conception.  I  r a i s e i t here mainly t o point out that Tussman arrives i n a kind of a u t h o r i t a r i a n dilemma because he doesn't see the personality i n the terms of integration and growth, but only i n terms of the dichotomy between passion and reason; therefore, he doesn't see the p o s s i b i l i t y of any other kind of agent.  He sees the only  a l t e r n a t i v e to h i s model as stark and disastrous, f o r either the passions dominate, meaning i n the p o l i t i c a l area, private interest, or there i s control of these passions by reason, meaning i n the p o l i t i c a l area, public i n t e r e s t .  He doesn't see any middle ground  or other way between the horns o f that dilemma. There i s nothing inherently i l l o g i c a l about such a comb i n a t i o n or i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of representation and democracy; that i s a theory of democracy could e a s i l y incorporate such a view and s t i l l be i n t e l l i g i b l e .  S t i l l , i t i s important to see that Tussman  i s putting forward an e s s e n t i a l l y a r i s t o c r a t i c theory of government which i s not our usual concept of democracy, and one which seems t o c o n f l i c t i n places with other versions. In t h i s regard I think i t i s important to have a look at what a democratic theory of government a c t u a l l y involves concept u a l l y , but t h i s , Tussman doesn't provide.  He makes many r e f e r -  ences t o what a democrat believes, t o what democracy assumes, and to what purposes are fundamental, but I f i n d no d e f i n i t i v e analysis  -64-  o f i t as a p o l i t i c a l But  concept u n l e s s  t h e e n t i r e book i s t h a t a n a l y s i s .  i f t h i s i s t h e case, t h e n I s t i l l  seems m i s s i n g ;  want t o argue t h a t something  t h a t t h e p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n t h a t he imputes  t o a democrat i s a s t r a n g e one, Tussman makes assumptions t h a t I'm n o t c o n v i n c e d a r e generally true.  He says a t one p o i n t i n h i s d i s c u s s i o n o f democracy  that "the e s s e n t i a l features for  o f a d e m o c r a t i c p o l i t y i s i t s concern  t h e p a r t i c i p a t i o n o f t h e member i n t h e p r o c e s s by which t h e  community i s governed.,"  Indeed, t h a t does seem t o be t h e e s s e n t i a l  f e a t u r e , b u t r a t h e r t h a n go on from t h a t p o i n t t o draw t h e u s u a l implications with reference oped h i s own t h e o r y  t o " p a r t i c i p a t i o n " , Tussman has d e v e l -  o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n , which, as I have a l r e a d y  i n e f f e c t r e s u l t s i n t h e wrong k i n d  argued,  ( o r n o t enough) f o r t h e o r d i n a r y ,  autonomous member. He j u s t i f i e s that this  h i s own v e r s i o n o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n on t h e grounds  " c o n c e r n f o r t h e p a r t i c i p a t i o n o f t h e member" was a concern  o f a s p e c i a l k i n d stemming from a s p e c i f i c motive.  "The democrat",  so Tussman wants t o a r g u e : ...when democracy was a creed t h a t mattered... argued t h a t a l l ( o r most) men have d e l i b e r a t i v e and moral p o t e n t i a l i t y ar.d t h a t g i v e n t h e p r o p e r e d u c a t i o n and environment, each c o u l d take h i s p l a c e i n t h e d e l i b e r a t i v e forum and s h a r e t h e responsibility of sovereignty.^ He t h e n goes on t o argue t h a t men wanted t h i s k i n d o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n "the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o f sovereignty"...."not  52  Tussman, O b l i g a t i o n , p. 105,  53  Loc, c i t .  simply  t o g e t more,  -65-  but p r i m a r i l y i n order to develop h i s d e l i b e r a t i v e and moral character." I don't believe that assumption squares with the history of the extension of the franchise to a l l who are legitimate members of the body p o l i t i c - which i s the essential feature of ' p a r t i c i p a t i o n ' in a democracy, or "each man  I f i n d the phrase "no taxation without representation"  i s the best judge of h i s own i n t e r e s t s " are more adequate  places to s t a r t t h e o r i z i n g about the origins and purposes of democrat i c theory. When men demanded a part i n the sovereign power, i t i s more reasonable to assume that they wanted more power or control over t h e i r own l i v e s , not "primarily" ( i f at a l l ) "to develop t h e i r d e l i b erative and moral character."  In f a c t , the r i s i n g demand f o r a share  i n the governing process f o r every man and woman who was a member of the body p o l i t i c matched, rather, the r i s i n g consciousness of the concept of a 'person'; a concept of a human being seen as an i n d i v i dual e n t i t y who has the equal r i g h t to autonomy and respect f o r h i s i n d i v i d u a l i t y within a l e g a l framework that guarantees s i m i l a r r i g h t s f o r those s i m i l a r l y situated. What may be true i s that men have found i n the process of achieving these goals —  i n the process of 'governing themselves'  —  that the ideals they cherish which bind them together i n the pursuit of a common public i n t e r e s t - ideals such as equality, j u s t i c e , human d i g n i t y and welfare - these ideals demand the development of  54  Tussman, Obligation, p. 105,  emphasis mine.  -66-  a d e l i b e r a t i v e and moral character f o r t h e i r implementation political life.  But t h i s i s a discovery a f t e r the f a c t , not the  reason f o r which democracy — function —  in  p a r t i c i p a t i o n In the sovereign  was demanded, nor i s demanded today. It  i s t h i s very discovery which gives r i s e to the d i f f i c u l t  c o n f l i c t which confronts any body p o l i t i c faced with i d e a l s , on the one hand, and the r e a l i t y of human experience on the other.  I find  Tussman's arguments both powerful and convincing where he points out the need f o r our understanding the nature of t h i s c o n f l i c t which faces any body p o l i t i c i f i t i s to escape hypocracy public purposes.  i n r e l a t i o n to  He i s at h i s best s p e c i f i c a l l y where he talks  about the t r i b u n a l context i n i t s r o l e of determining and protecting the public i n t e r e s t , where he gives us a razor-sharp analysis of the i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p between procedure, purpose and law with the model of the American Constitutional democracy i n mind.  His  insights i n t o what turns out to be i n the end, the procedural r o l e of the judge, are compellingly clear and  insightful.  But where I have d i f f i c u l t y with h i s democratic theory i s where he refuses a place i n the public process f o r the private, individual l i f e , of  In that attempt, since he lacks any p o s i t i v e theory  individualism, he d i s t o r t s democratic conceptions to s u i t his  own Platonic view of man.  Despite what he says, he i s not just  arguing f o r a d i f f e r e n t view of democracy,  I believe h i s view  challenges the very conceptual foundation of our understanding of  -67-  democracy, and t h a t t o f o l l o w i t i n a p r a c t i c a l way would q u i c k l y change t h e form we c a l l d e m o c r a t i c r a d i c a l l y .  very  That may  t u r n out t o be a v e r y good t h i n g with r e s p e c t t o t h e achievement o f t h e p u b l i c i n t e r e s t i n one sense, b u t t h e n , t h a t I s a d i f f e r e n t argument.  My c l a i m here i s t h a t Tussman i s n o t p u t t i n g f o r t h j u s t  a h o r s e o f a d i f f e r e n t c o l o r , b u t a n o t h e r a n i m a l , r e s t i n g on a d i s t i n c t i v e a t t i t u d e toward human b e i n g s . I suspect  t h a t Tussman i s d r i v e n t o t h i s a t t i t u d e when he  l o o k s around a t t h e a c t u a l working o f t h e d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e s s and t r i e s t o make sense o f t h a t commitment•to a p u b l i c purpose, o r p u b l i c i n t e r e s t , o r common good, o r whatever t h e term we use t o a p p e a l t o t h o s e i d e a l s which extend beyond o u r own p r i v a t e , d u a l wants and i n t e r e s t s .  indivi-  That i s , he I s d r i v e n t o an a r i s t o c r a t i c  view o f human n a t u r e from t h e r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t t h e d e m o c r a t i c view doesn't seem t o work, t h a t men p u r s u i n g  t h e i r own p r i v a t e i n t e r e s t s  w i t h i n an a u t h o r i t a t i v e s t r u c t u r e which encourages t h a t p u r s u i t , can r a r e l y a c h i e v e a f o r m u l a t i o n  o f the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t .  The b e s t  t h a t can e v e r happen under t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s i s t h a t someone s e i z e s command, one s i d e o u t - b a r g a i n s o r out-manoeuvres a l l t h e o t h e r s ,  with  the r e s u l t b e i n g t h e l e g i t i m a c y o f s h e e r power as t h e c r i t e r i a o f p u b l i c purpose. perspective  H i s d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e s s from t h i s  i s a c h i l l i n g l y accurate  and. a l l t o o s o b e r i n g o n e . ^  Perhaps he i s s a y i n g t h a t we a r e no l o n g e r a c o n f l i c t , but a c r i s i s .  55  confronted  with  We l i v e i n such a dangerous time t h a t we  Tussman, O b l i g a t i o n , p . 104,  -68-  can no longer a f f o r d the luxury of experimenting with the giving of power to adolescents i n the hopes that the process of r u l i n g w i l l turn them into responsible adults.  Perhaps he i s saying that we  can no longer give people power over dangerous weapons that they regard as toys, or over the resources of the earth that they regard as private possessions.  Perhaps he i s saying that we l i v e i n  an emergency era, where even democracies must be w i l l i n g to put more power i n the hands of the few, well-chosen wise men who they elect as t h e i r r u l e r s . This i s n ' t such a strange idea, f o r democracies have b u i l t i n measures which e n t i t l e the agents to take over emergency powers i n times of c r i s i s .  During those times, we allow government to  r u l e us paternally with not only our consent, but with our gratitude. (The Platonic i d e a l ! )  The point i s t h i s , however:  i s Tussman  putting forward a viable theory of democratic government and representation f o r extraordinary times, or i s he claiming i t i s an approp r i a t e model of the r e l a t i o n s h i p of r u l e r to ruled a l l the time? I f i t i s the l a t t e r claim then I cannot see how  one can escape  seeing h i s theory of t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p of authority as fundamentally p a t e r n a l i s t i c and a r i s t o c r a t i c , not democratic.  Either i t i s one  or the other, f o r i t cannot be both as the same time and  still  permit these words t h e i r d i s t i n c t i v e , p o l i t i c a l signification,,  -69CHAPTER IV  With t h i s analysis of Tussman's theory of p o l i t i c a l obl i g a t i o n and i t s r e l a t i o n s h i p t o a theory of democracy behind us, we can f i n a l l y turn to the major concern of h i s p o l i t i c a l p h i l o sophy both i n t h i s book and i n Experiment of p o l i t i c a l education.  at Berkeley, h i s theory  I t w i l l not look so strange to confront  assertions l i k e : The theory of education i s e s s e n t i a l l y the theory o f the government of mind; i t Is hopeless when i t i s not at the same time a theory of the state — a theory of p o l i t i c a l o b l i g a t i o n . ^ f o r i t i s not s u r p r i s i n g t o see that the dilemma which spawned h i s d i s t i n c t i v e theory of representation i s what i s d r i v i n g h i s argument here as w e l l . I put forward the contention e a r l i e r that Tussman i s c l e a r l y i n the Platonic-Rousseau t r a d i t i o n of seeing freedom as a kind of i n t e r n a l power of the r a t i o n a l f a c u l t y over the emotional-instinctual l i f e , and that t h i s view of freedom i s an important undercurrent which informs h i s theory of public i n t e r e s t , h i s theory o f representation, and most e s p e c i a l l y , h i s theory of education. For Tussman then, "government of mind" i s another term f o r "freedom of the mind"; the very Platonic sense of freedom already discussed.  Tussman wants to argue that i t i s the primary function  of a l i b e r a l education t o nourish that kind of freedom. The crux i s freedom. L i b e r a l education aims at the free mind.,..If we could force men t o be free, we would, as i t i s we can only t r y to help them. Once we understand what freedom of the mind i s , the paradoxical q u a l i t y of that statement disappears. Minds are not made free by being l e f t alone. Nor are s t u d e n t s , ^  56  Tussman, Obligation, p. 103.  57  Tussman, Experiment  at Berkeley, p. 29  -70-  Th e reason that the c u l t i v a t i o n of t h i s "free mind" i s so important a task that i t must be, so Tussman argues, the primary goal of any concept of l i b e r a l education i n a democracy, i s because without i t we cannot approach the public/private d i s t i n c t i o n with any i n t e l l i gence and therefore, cannot f u l f i l l our r o l e s as active members i n the body p o l i t i c .  To have a free mind i n t h i s sense i s to have  trained our character ( i n the Platonic sense) t o f i t us f o r the roles of member and agent i n the democratic community,  I t i s i n t h i s sense  that Tussman sees education as having a p o s i t i v e , purposeful mission, a task and r o l e to play, and, he claims, i t i s the raison d'etre of a free, compulsory and universal educational system. Tussman's educational theory embroils him i n an age-old educational controversy as to the nature o f the development o f the r a t i o n a l capacity - the exercise of which he regards as "freedom of the mind,"  There are two c o n f l i c t i n g views concerning the develop-  ment of capacity, as o l d as Socrate's arguments i n Meno.  One view  regards man at b i r t h as l i t t l e more than an empty b o t t l e which needs f i l l i n g up.  I t therefore i s the duty and purpose of teaching to put  knowledge i n t o the person. On the other view man i s seen at b i r t h as simply a complex of i n h e r i t e d f a c u l t i e s which unfold spontaneously and automatically when confronted with p a r t i c u l a r s t i m u l i when i t i s appropriate f o r that organism to do so. Pushed to i t s extreme p o s i t i o n , t h i s l a t t e r view holds that a l l guidance by adults i s a form of imposition on the c h i l d who generates h i s own standards and controls wholly from  -71-  within himself. These two doctrines appear i n the area of human a f f a i r s mostly as c o n f l i c t i n g doctrines under the names respectively of the "authoritarian" and "permissive" schools i n educational theory.  Each  r i v a l s the other f o r the throne of truth, but, i n f a c t , they share the throne between them.  For i t seems to be the case that human  nature i s a set of complex, innate capacities - genetically determined — not.  some of which unfold spontaneously, and some of which do  That i s , there are some capacities which, given the appro-  p r i a t e environment, do just unfold spontaneously without any kind of purposeful, t r a i n i n g period.  We can see that i n the capacities  of eating, t a l k i n g , and walking, or even l o v i n g , hating, sympathizing,  You cannot r e a l l y speak o f teaching someone to t a l k or to  love i n the same way as you speak of teaching someont to play a game or do mathematical sums.  At l e a s t , i n an important sense,  i f you leave people alone, i t i s very l i k e l y that they w i l l be able to develop the a b i l i t y to walk and make sounds with t h e i r mouth, and eat what they must without any d i r e c t , purposeful t r a i n i n g period..or teaching. But there are also important 'potential' capacities which, while r e s i d u a l l y inherent i n the i n d i v i d u a l , may not develop auto matically or spontaneously.  These must be c a l l e d out through  purposeful i n t e r a c t i o n with other people, and i t i s usually the. case that these ' p o t e n t i a l i t i e s ' or 'capacities' are r a r e l y actual i z e d u n t i l a f t e r t h i s i n t e r a c t i o n has occured.  Some of our most  -72-  valuable a c t i v i t i e s belong to t h i s l a t t e r category, a c t i v i t i e s such as abstract reasoning, l o g i c a l d e l i b e r a t i o n , playing musical i n s t r u ments, or even performing a t h l e t i c games that depend on s k i l l and the development of certain parts of our musculature 'ordinary' range.  beyond an  There i s a d i f f e r e n c e between learning to walk  and learning to play the v i o l i n , or between learning the r e f l e x action of drinking and learning to do higher mathematics, though they are a l l inherent human capacities and though we use the same word 'learning' when t a l k i n g about them. Beginning with Plato many philosophers and educational t h e o r i s t s have recognized t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n between capacities as an important one f o r the purposes of education.  In p a r t i c u l a r ,  they have regarded the development of the r a t i o n a l capacities of the mind as belonging to the second category; that i s , they have regarded the a c t i v i t i e s of reasoning, d e l i b e r a t i n g , judging, and the exercise of c e r t a i n mental s k i l l s as inherent i n everyone i n greater or l e s s e r degrees, but not actualized automatically — most p a r t i c u l a r l y —  not actualized automatically i n accordance  with p a r t i c u l a r c u l t u r a l t r a d i t i o n s and moral values which are c r u c i a l to the on-going l i f e of a c i v i l i z e d community.  They  argue that even i f these capacities are innate, we s t i l l have the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of developing and engaging them, i n awakening t h e i r p o t e n t i a l , and i n guiding them along c e r t a i n paths, Tussman - l i k e Plato and Rousseau before him - goes even further to suggest that "freedom of mind" and therefore,  r e a l freedom, depends upon the development of these r a t i o n a l capacities as a 'power' against the strength of the spontaneous appetites.  He argues that i t i s the power that we have to actua-  l i z e our capacities f o r purposes that we have consciously  and  r a t i o n a l l y determined that makes us free-self-determining  indivi-  duals , I f , as on t h i s account, power i s freedom, then the degree of freedom that a man has i s d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d to the degree of power he can a c t u a l i z e .  Accordingly,  i f the a c t u a l i z a t i o n of those powers  i s dependent upon the development of innate capacities, then a must have access to the means of developing and thus his freedom, are not to be  man  them i f h i s powers,  diminished.  Tussman i s arguing that the meaning of self-government, both i n d i v i d u a l l y and p o l i t i c a l l y , i s not what we think i t i s . I t i s not merely the condition of making your own rules seen as 'doing what you l i k e ' .  The freedom that he speaks of as needed i n order  to be s e l f - d i r e c t i n g , self-governing members of society i s the Platonic freedom:  freedom of the mind.  He sees that freedom as  not an automatic, f i x e d part of human nature; but that i t can be established where i t does not occur spontaneously, and where i t does, through learning, experience and  increased  cultivation.  For Tussman, then, the free mind i s not the mind that has been l e f t alone to' express only i n i t i a l f i r s t desires, wants, and  passions:  Minds are not made free by being l e f t alone. Nor are students. For to do t h i s i s not to contribute to a person's r e a l freedom.  He  might make choices or give his consent without adequate r e f l e c t i o n or appreciation of the consequences, or i n pursuit of t r a n s i t o r y or unreal desires, or i n various predicaments when judgement i s l i k e l y to be clouded by lack of understanding. Tussman sees that education alone cannot cope with a l l of these f a c t o r s , nor perhaps even change them, but i t can diminish t h e i r effect and create conditions of awareness that contribute to greater possible freedom of choice.  Thus i t l i b e r a t e s us from the  bonds of "mere appetite" and allows us to take our place as d e l i b erative members i n the body p o l i t i c , Through a l l of t h i s , he i s making the claim that since democracy depends upon a t r u l y self-governing society, and f o r him the condition of self-government requires freedom seen as "government of the mind", then i t i s the f i r s t duty of the democratic body p o l i t i c to provide an educational system which i s engaged i n the p o s i t i v e c u l t i v a t i o n of that kind of free mind.  He wants to argue,  that not only does democratic government have the "license to meddle", with the minds of i t s members, but i t has the p o s i t i v e obligation to "meddle." L i b e r a l education  This i s what he means when he says that  must be "educa/tion  f o r the l i f e of action and  59 decision."-^  58  Tussman, Experiment at Berkeley,  59  Tussman, Obligation, p.  15.  p.  29.  -75-  T h i s argument i s a s t r o n g and t h a t i f democratic theory p a r t i c i p a t e i n the politic,  and  compelling  one.  I t i s true  i s concerned w i t h g i v i n g the r i g h t t o  sovereign  power t o every member o f the body  i f i t i s true that t h i s p a r t i c u l a r r o l e requires  the  l e a r n i n g o f s p e c i a l s k i l l s and  t r a i t s r e l a t e d t o the development  of a d i s t i n c t i v e  r a t i o n a l a b i l i t y , t h e n we  character  and  can  c o n c l u d e with Tussman t h a t i t i s sheer f o l l y t o i g n o r e the tant educational But  only  impor-  r o l e t h a t p o l i t i c a l l i f e demands.  there  i s an important s h i f t t h a t o c c u r s i n h i s  theory  that.Tussman doesn't acknowledge.  t o the  c l a i m t h a t what b e g i n s as a d e m o c r a t i c t h e o r y ,  educational  T h i s s h i f t adds more f u e l turns  out  in  60 the  end  t o be an a r i s t o c r a t i c  P l a t o n i c one,  one  —  o r more s p e c i f i c a l l y ,  f o r i t i s here t h a t h i s P l a t o n i s m  Tussman b e g i n s O b l i g a t i o n and "the  education  o f the  a  is clearest,  the Body P o l i t i c s a y i n g  that  c i t i z e n f o r the r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s o f a v a r i e t y  of p o l i t i c a l r o l e s i s a pressing task" "the r o l e o f the member, i s the  one  6l  and  one  role in particular,  f o r which everyone needs educa-  62 tion,"  But  very q u i c k l y i t becomes apparent t h a t he means i n  e f f e c t to convert  the n o t i o n o f member i n t o t h a t o f agent,  although h i s theory all  o f membership p r e s e r v e s  and  t h e n o t i o n t h a t we  are  agents i n some sense i n a democracy, once he b e g i n s t a l k i n g  60 I have begun t o use the word ' a r i s t o c r a t i c ' r a t h e r t h a n ' a u t h o r i t a r i a n ' . f o r t h a t word conveys the p a r t i c u l a r k i n d o f a u t h o r i t a r i a n system t h a t I . b e l i e v e Tussman, l i k e P l a t o , argues f o r . 61 62  . Tussman, O b l i g a t i o n , p. I b i d . , p.  11.  10,  -76-  about t h e agent, he b e g i n s t o r e s t r i c t the n o t i o n o f agency t o the c o n c e r n with o n l y t h e r o l e o f t h e  'elected representative'.  s e q u e n t l y , t h e e d u c a t i o n t h a t he i s so concerned be not the p o l i t i c a l  Con-  w i t h , t u r n s out t o  e d u c a t i o n o f t h e l a r g e mass o f members, but  s p e c i f i c e d u c a t i o n o f t h e e l e c t e d agent f o r h i s r o l e as T h i s f a c t , though not so obvious  the  ruler.  i n O b l i g a t i o n and  the  Body P o l i t i c , becomes v e r y c l e a r i n h i s next book, Experiment a t Berkeley.  Here he f a s t e n s on t h e c o l l e g e as d i s t i n c t from t h e  6? university  t o be the i n s t i t u t i o n t o f u l f i l l  c a t i o n a l task.  He doesn't  a university —  t h e expansion  disciplines — self-government  this  important  edu-  deny the importance o f t h e concept o f knowledge d i v i d e d i n t o  of  separate  b u t he wants t o argue t h a t the p o l i t i c a l r o l e  of  i n a democracy demands a two-year programme which  s h o u l d be t o t a l l y  c e n t e r e d around p o l i t i c a l , moral and s o c i a l themes  b e f o r e a l l o w i n g s t u d e n t s t o go on t o s p e c i a l i z e i n t h e d i s c i p l i n e s p r o v i d e d by a u n i v e r s i t y . i t s own  F o r him,  s p e c i a l task i n t h i s regard.  t h e l i b e r a l a r t s c o l l e g e has It i s :  ,,,a d i f f e r e n t e n t e r p r i s e . I t does not a s s a u l t o r extend the f r o n t i e r s o f knowledge. I t has a d i f f e r e n t mission. I t c u l t i v a t e s human unders t a n d i n g . The mind o f t h e person, not t h e body o f knowledge, i s i t s c e n t r a l c o n c e r n . ^ At t h i s p o i n t he seems t o have abandoned any i d e a o f e d u c a t i n g t h e m a j o r i t y o f members, a t l e a s t f o r m a l l y , f o r by time a member reaches  the  a c o l l e g e o r t h e lower d i v i s i o n o f a u n i v e r s i t y ,  63 Though i n f a c t , he argues the same case f o r t h e f i r s t two y e a r s o f u n i v e r s i t y ' l i f e — what he c a l l s t h e "lower d i v i s i o n " y e a r s . 64  Tussman, Experiment a t B e r k e l e y ,  I n t r o d u c t i o n , p. x i v .  -77-  t h e r e has a l r e a d y been a s y s t e m a t i c w i t h a group o f people, P l a t o ' s guardian  winnowing p r o c e s s .  I n modern d r e s s , b u t c l o s e l y  c l a s s In Republic,  s p e c i a l l y s e l e c t i v e process.  We a r e l e f t resembling  who underwent t h e i r own  Tussman's s e l e c t i v e p r o c e s s  i s the  v e r t i c a l m o b i l i t y through our e d u c a t i o n a l t e s t i n g system which i s supposed t o determine who a r e t h e most i n t e l l e c t u a l l y - o r i e n t e d members  o f our s o c i e t y . So  Out o f t h i s group w i l l  come our a g e n t s .  i t i s r e a l l y t h e s p e c i a l l y s e l e c t e d , agent, t h e e l e c t e d  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , which i s t h e c e n t e r o f Tussman's e d u c a t i o n a l j u s t as f o r P l a t o i t was t h e e d u c a t i o n sumed t h e major p a r t o f R e p u b l i c .  o f t h e guardians  energy,  which con-  But what o f t h e o r d i n a r y member?  What k i n d o f e d u c a t i o n w i l l he r e c e i v e ?  How i s he t o understand t h e  complex n o t i o n o f agreement t h a t Tussman f i n d s so c r u c i a l t o t h e n o t i o n o f a body p o l i t i c ?  How w i l l he u n d e r s t a n d t h e "knowing"  q u a l i t y of h i s obligations of subordination? his. r i g h t s ?  Indeed, t h e argument comes f u l l  How w i l l he c o n s t r u e circle —  how w i l l he  e v e r be a b l e t o u n d e r s t a n d who a r e h i s b e t t e r s t h a t he might them t o r u l e over him?  On t h e s e  matters,  elect  Tussman g i v e s us no f u r t h e r  information. D e s p i t e h i s d e m o c r a t i c n o t i o n o f member, Tussman t r e a t s t h e o r d i n a r y member i n v e r y much t h e same way t h a t Plato, t r e a t s t h e a r t i s a n s i n the Republic.  I t ' s n o t e x a c t l y f o r t h e same r e a s o n ,  though i t i s f o r a s i m i l a r one: o r d i n a r y , r u n - o f - t h e - m i l l member. M i l l ' s notion of "respect":  he doesn't h o l d much hope f o r t h e H i s o n l y hope i s somewhat  like  t h e hope t h a t t h e o r d i n a r y member w i l l  -78-  have enough sense to allow *a saving remnant' to save themj that they w i l l allow a well-trained and dedicated group of superior agents to r u l e over them, with t h e i r consent. that he conceives the purpose of l i b e r a l  I t i s to t h i s end  education.  L i b e r a l education i s - when i t i s what i t should be....training free c i t i z e n s to exercise judgement on behalf of a consciously self-governed community,g Another and most important d i f f i c u l t y with h i s theory of education l i e s less with i t s undemocratic ness of i t s conception.  nature, but i n the narrow-  Tussman seems to hold the view that the  great t r a d i t i o n of a l i b e r a l a r t s education should be conceived of as s t r i c t l y a " p o l i t i c a l education" and p o l i t i c a l i n just that s p e c i a l sense of h i s . He says at the beginning of Obligation and the Body P o l i t i c that "I s h a l l r e s i s t  the temptation to pursue the argument that the  ' l i b e r a l ' i s the ' p o l i t i c a l ' " but then immediately  says:  The l i b e r a l college w i l l continue to flounder from one morass into another u n t i l i t r e discovers i n the task of educating the r u l e r , the central theme of i t s l i f e . ^ By the end of the book, there are no more q u a l i f i c a t i o n s : The education of the r u l e r , of the p o l i t i c a l agent, i s s t i l l our greatest unmet educational challenge. I t is.,..the central theme, i f not the l o s t chord, of ' l i b e r a l ' education.g,-, And by the time he writes Experiment  at Berkeley, he i s committed  to the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of the ' l i b e r a l ' with the ' p o l i t i c a l ' from the very beginning.  He states that the l i b e r a l arts college has  65  Tussman, Obligation, p.  66  Loc. c i t .  67  Ibid., p.  103.  10.  -79" i t s own mission:  to f i t us f o r the l i f e of a c t i v e membership i n  the democratic community; to f i t us to serve, i n i t s broadest  sense  our common p o l i t i c a l v o c a t i o n , " ^ E i t h e r Tussman has expanded the notion of the p o l i t i c a l remarkably beyond what we o r d i n a r i l y see as part of that notion, or the notion of the p o l i t i c a l remains as i t usually i s , r e l a t i v e l y narrow, and a whole other range of important  values just drop out  of the conception of l i b e r a l arts educational purposes.  That i s ,  does Tussman mean to enlarge the notion of the ' p o l i t i c a l ' to i n clude the a c t i v i t i e s of our emotional, s p i r i t u a l , aesthetic, psycho l o g i c a l , a r t i s t i c and creative l i v e s ? I think not,  I think the best that can be said f o r h i s  enlargement of the range of the p o l i t i c a l i s to include 'moral',  69 and  ' s o c i a l * a c t i v i t i e s c l o s e l y r e l a t e d to p o l i t i c a l l i f e  and  that the charge of narrowness concerning the subject matter of a l i b e r a l a r t s education i s an appropriate There i s good evidence  one.  f o r t h i s view given i n the l a s t  chapter of Obligation and the Body P o l i t i c where he says: The s c h o o l i s , , , , e i t h e r the nurturer of the d e l i b e r a t i v e animal, or, f a i l i n g that, a bordello of the mind.^Q There i s a t o t a l lack Of any other values which could balance p a r a l l e l construction of that sentence,  the  A f t e r the words " f a i l i n g  that", there Is nothing but a reference to degeneracy!  What can  Tussman possibly mean by r e f e r r i n g to the e n t i r e range of a c t i v i t i e s  68  Tussman, Experiment at Berkeley, p,  4.  69 I b i d . , p. 38. Here he says that "Important f o r the l i b e r a l - a r t s lower d i v i s i o n i n America today means 'moral', ' s o c i a l ' , ' p o l i t i c a l ' . 70  Tussman, Obligation, p. 105.  Emphasis mine.  -80-  mentioned above, and not covered by the word " d e l i b e r a t i v e " , as a "bordello".  Is he using the word d e s c r i p t i v e l y or evaluatively? .  Is he contrasting a heaven and a h e l l ? My own sense i s that Tussman uses the word with tolerant contempt.  He sees any a c t i v i t y of the mind which i s not d e l i b e r a t i v e ,  r a t i o n a l , not oriented to t r a i n the agent to play his r o l e i n the democratic enterprise, as a seductive degeneracy of the mind, where passion may  be indulged i n f o r a p r i c e .  He can r e f e r to any kind  of i n t e r e s t other than the p o l i t i c a l as the "bordello of the mind" because he sees c u r i o s i t y which i s unharnessed from the l i f e of the p o l i s as no p a r t i c u l a r v i r t u e at a l l , and I t appears he f e e l s the same way  about c r e a t i v i t y .  My objection takes the form that i t seems both strange and i n c o r r e c t to relegate the powerful and c r u c i a l range of a c t i v i t i e s that a f f e c t our emotional and s p i r i t u a l l i f e to a bordello image.  Most of these a c t i v i t i e s are not d e l i b e r a t i v e i n the sense  that he means, and though they are instrumental  i n t r a i n i n g our  character f o r the l i f e of action and decision that he values much, they do not do so i n the way  so  that Tussman stresses.  Tussman's model of t r a i n i n g character i s a controlled one, whereas a l l the creative a c t i v i t i e s are part of an integrative t r a i n i n g model.  They are a c t i v i t i e s or modes of t r a i n i n g which  are means of growing i n the f u l l sense of t r a i n i n g yourself f o r seeing and understanding yourself more c l e a r l y through focussing energies along c e r t a i n channels of•expression.  To argue  -81-  t h i s vray i s not t o deny the importance  of character, but to claim that  i t i s best developed i n an integrated way rather than a c o n t r o l l i n g way.  I t i s t o argue that the creative ranges of education are a  d i f f e r e n t sort of a c t i v i t y , but, at l e a s t as important to the f u l l l i f e of any human animal, f o r they are what give l i f e much of i t s energy, v i t a l i t y and i n t e r e s t . I t i s true that Tussman sees the ' p o l i t i c a l ' as the center of the subject matter f o r only the f i r s t two years of the college or the lower d i v i s i o n of the u n i v e r s i t y , but the objection s t i l l stands, f o r i t i s these very years which play, such a c r u c i a l part in the development of a person's character.  Tussman's narrowness  of v i s i o n just as t h i s p a r t i c u l a r point i n a person's education i s a serious one, I suspect that part o f the problem here i s , again, the o l d one encountered e a r l i e r i n t r y i n g to understand the r e l a t i o n s h i p of private i n t e r e s t to public i n t e r e s t :  the o l d c o n f l i c t between the  rationa.1 and the emotional l i f e , the roots of which can be traced to h i s fundamentally Platonic conception of human nature, and to the d i v i s i o n of the soul,  Tussman applauds the r a t i o n a l capacity  while fearing the appetative-emotional.  He sees the only proper  purpose of education t o be the strengthening of our reasoning capacity so that we may perform as our 'best s e l f . Related to that c o n f l i c t , and another part of the problem here, i s h i s lack of a p o s i t i v e theory concerning i n d i v i d u a l i t y .  -82-  Tussman seems only to recognize p o l i t i c a l i n d i v i d u a l s — in that s p e c i a l sense of h i s .  and p o l i t i c a l  Because of that h i s theory of  lacks any psychological underpinnings r e l a t e d to how, learn the very things that he values. i n c l u s i v e view of human nature.  education  i n f a c t , people  I t lacks a broader, more  Because of t h i s , and because of  his emphasis on duty, reason and obligation, Tussman comes out looking more l i k e a. r i g i d a u t h o r i t a r i a n than a democratic advocate of freedom. This missing part of h i s theory i s a serious omission, for. i t tends to work l i k e a smoke screen, blocking out the very important contribution that a programme l i k e the one offered at Berkeley  and  others l i k e i t have to make i n terms of a viable and e x c i t i n g teaching method.  In t h i s regard, i t i s a p i t y that he didn't use the "bordello"  metaphor i n much the same way  as he uses h i s metaphor of the "market-  71 place"  regarding the forum.  For I think he has a fundamental point  to make, one that has given both h i s programme and others l i k e i t t h e i r s p e c i a l q u a l i t y and  life.  Where he sees educational i n s t i t u t i o n s as bordellos or marketplaces, where he sees them as seductive exploiters of our passing whims, cursory i n t e r e s t s , or panderers to our immediate pleasures, he i s making an important point.  He i s making a d i s t i n c t i o n between  two d i f f e r e n t ways to approach learning.  One  i s from the basis of  abstraction - from the d i s c i p l i n e of a ' f i e l d of study',.the other i s from the basis of the very problems which gave r i s e to the f i e l d of study In the f i r s t place.  He i s t a l k i n g fundamentally about two  d i f f e r e n t ways to hook up f a c t s and. knowledge, or learning and understanding, or science and vrisdom. 71  He i s claiming that education  Tussman, Experiment at Berkeley, p.  13.  should  not be either a marketplace  nor a bordello.  I t should not be a place  where knowledge i s hawked or seductively sold, but should be the purposeful confrontation of a series of issues growing out of actual problems i n l i f e . Tussman i s making a claim that i s much the same claim that Popper has made with regard to the a l l too seductive, but i n e v i t a b l y bankrupt method of beginning to teach from the basis of abstraction 72 alone.  Popper argues that what he c a l l s the "prima f a c i e method 73  of teaching philosophy"  y  i s l i a b l e to produce a philosophy that  turns out to be a l o t of nonsense: What I mean by 'the prima f a c i e method of teaching philosophy', and what would seem to be the only method, i s that of giving the beginner,,..the works of the great philosophers to read; the works, say, of Plato, A r i s t o t l e , Descartes and Leibniz, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Kant and M i l l , What i s the e f f e c t of such a course of reading? A new world of astonishingly subtle and vast abstractions opens i t s e l f before the reader; abstractions on an extremely high and d i f f i c u l t l e v e l . Thoughts and arguments are put before h i s mind which sometimes are not only hard to understand, but which seem to him i r r e l e v a n t because he cannot f i n d out what they may be relevant to. .. Yet the student knows that these are the great philosophers, that t h i s i s the way of philosophy, Thus he w i l l make an e f f o r t to adjust his mind to what he believes (mistakenly, as we s h a l l see) to be t h e i r way of thinking. He w i l l attempt to speak t h e i r queer language, to match the tortuous s p i r a l s of t h e i r argumentation and. perhaps even t i e hims e l f up i n t h e i r curious knots. Some may learn these t r i c k s i n a s u p e r f i c i a l way, others may begin to become genuinely fascinated addicts. Yet I f e e l that we ought to respect the man who having made h i s e f f o r t comes ultimately to what may be described as Wittgenstein's conclusion: 'I have learned the jargon as well as anybody, It i s very clever and captivating. In f a c t , i t i s dangerously captivating; f o r the simple truth about the matter i s that i t i s much ado about nothing — just a l o t of nonsense. x  nh  72 Popper i s t a l k i n g fundamentally about philosophy only, but I think can be generalized, 73 Karl R. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations; the-Growth of S c i e n t i f i c Knowledge, Harper Torchbook, New York, I 9 6 3 , p. 72. 7'+  Ibid. , p. 72-72.  The excellence of the argument j u s t i f i e s i t s  -84-  Popper t a l k s here about the 'prima f a c i e method' i n much the same way as Tussman uses the metaphor of the "bordello" to describe a p a r t i c u l a r kind of education —  or the only kind of  education most students get i n t h e i r u n i v e r s i t y l i f e .  Students  come to the college or u n i v e r s i t y knowing l i t t l e or nothing about the various d i s c i p l i n e s of learning.  During t h e i r  undergraduate  years, so the theory goes, they are to be exposed to as many d i s c i p l i n e s as possible i n order to be able to get an understanding of what they are about and thus to be able to choose what they are r e a l l y interested i n pursuing i n t h e i r l i v e s . Popper argues that what i n fact happens i s that the student does l e a r n how to 'do' science, or philosophy, or history, or whatever, that i s , he learns how t o copy the method of abstraction that i s being taught.  Furthermore,  there i s a kind of seduction i n the  very process, f o r once the student begins to r e l a t e to learning i n t h i s way, and becomes good at i t - thus being rewarded f o r the proper procedures - he becomes committed t o the process i t s e l f , often l o s i n g sight of the meaning. However, Popper points out quite r i g h t l y , that eventually the abstract process and the r e a l i t y of the problems that the process was designed to illuminate, get further and further apart F i n a l l y the student becomes dissociated from the emotional  energy  and excitement that made those i n t e l l e c t u a l pursuits concerns i n the f i r s t place.  Eventually he must s t a r t a l l over again i f he  r e a l l y wants to continue i n the f i e l d with some kind of meaningful  experience.  More o f t e n , he j u s t becomes d i s i l l u s i o n e d .  Popper t h i n k s t h e r e i s a n o t h e r way t o approach of i n t e l l e c t u a l  these kinds  concerns, a method which c u t s a c r o s s t h e d i v i s i o n  o f knowledge i n t o compartments with t h e i r own s t r u c t u r e s . i n s t e a d w i t h t h e problems  I t begins  themselves:  The d e g e n e r a t i o n o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l s c h o o l s i n i t s t u r n i s t h e consequence o f t h e mistaken b e l i e f t h a t one can p h i l o s o p h i z e w i t h o u t h a v i n g been compelled t o p h i l o s o p h i z e by problems which a r i s e o u t s i d e p h i l o s o p h y — i n mathematics, f o r example, o r i n cosmology, o r i n p o l i t i c s , o r i n r e l i g i o n , or i n s o c i a l l i f e . I n o t h e r words my f i r s t t h e s i s is this. Genuine p h i l o s o p h i c a l problems a r e always r o o t e d i n u r g e n t problems o u t s i d e p h i l o s o p h y , and they d i e i f these r o o t s d e c a y , ^ Tussman's e d u c a t i o n a l t h r u s t , both i n O b l i g a t i o n and t h e Body P o l i t i c and i n Experiment He argues  i n B e r k e l e y i s towards t h i s  approach.  f o r a method o f s t u d y i n g p o l i t i c a l problems based on  fundamental  and important i s s u e s :  "freedom and a u t h o r i t y , t h e i n -  7 d i v i d u a l and s o c i e t y , c o n s c i e n c e and law, acceptance and r e b e l l i o n " r a t h e r t h a n t h e a b s t r a c t study o f a p a r t i c u l a r body o f m a t e r i a l d i v i d e d up i n t o compartments o r c a t e g o r i e s . We do n o t t h i n k i n terms o f " h u m a n i t i e s " o r " s o c i a l s c i e n c e " ; we do not even t h i n k i n terms of " h i s t o r y " or " l i t e r a t u r e " or " p o l i t i c a l s c i e n c e " o r " p h i l o s o p h y " . I t i s n o t t h a t we want t o r e p l a c e t h e s e c a t e g o r i e s w i t h o t h e r s . We do not q u a r r e l with them; we s i m p l y do n o t u s e them, and, i f they p r e s c r i b e l i m i t s , we do not observe them. We r e a d Homer, Thucydides, a.nd P l a t o ; b u t we do n o t say o r t h i n k , "now we a r e on l i t e r a t u r e " , "Now we t u r n t o h i s t o r y " , "At l a s t we come t o philosophy". 7 7  75  Popper, C o n j e c t u r e s and R e f u t a t i o n s , p .  76  Tussman, Experiment  77  I b i d . , p. 47.  a t E e r k e l e y , p. 32.  72.  -86-  Tussman c a l l s t h i s difference "the s u b s t i t u t i o n of the program f o r the course" and what he has to say about the importance of t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n f o r educating students In the lower d i v i s i o n years i s one of the most l u c i d arguments on the subject and p a r a l l e l s much of what popper has to say about the teaching of philosophy and 78  science,'  They are both t a l k i n g about a method of inquiry and  teaching. My only complaint i s that he doesn't develop t h i s method as appropriate to subject area.s other than the s t r i c t l y  'political',  that he doesn't see a wider range of worthwhile a c t i v i t i e s that can be considered the proper purpose of a l i b e r a l a r t s education.  It  would be e x c i t i n g to see not only p o l i t i c s , but l i t e r a t u r e , art and science taught from the same perspective.  Because of Tussman's  narrow conception of l i b e r a l education as ' p o l i t i c a l ' education, he aborts the "bordello" metaphor from some of i t s more natural implications. To t h i s charge of narrowness must be added a p o s t - s c r i p t . What i s important i n what Tussman has to say i n t h i s regard i s the reminder of something we seem to have forgotten or never t r u l y understood.  He argues f o r the strengthening of one of the weakest  l i n k s i n our educational chain, and, as the l o g i c of h i s arguments . point out, a c r u c i a l one i n a democracy,  He demonstrates with  power and s k i l l the l o g i c a l steps which connect the ideals of our democratic p o l i t i c a l theory to the necessity of some kind of poli t i c a l education.  Whether or not one sees h i s description of " s e l f -  government", as the Platonic conception of a free mind, he forces 78  Tussman, Experiment at Berkeley, pp. 46-65.  -87-  us to recognize that even at the simplest l e v e l of a notion of " s e l f government", the business of the state requires the t r a i n i n g of minds i n the i n t e l l i g e n t exercise of the r i g h t t o vote.  I f right  have duties attached, we may well require the exercise of the duties first. As he points out, i t i s one of the great c u r i o s i t i e s of p o l i t i c a l l i f e - t h a t we require a s p e c i a l course of t r a i n i n g f o r 'naturalized' c i t i z e n s , but not f o r those who acquire t h e i r membership through the accident of b i r t h .  Though Tussman tends to lose  sight of the broader spectrum of the purposes of education  that  we value as.much as we do the ' p o l i t i c a l ' , he recognizes that the i n t e l l i g e n t l i f e of a member of the body p o l i t i c means that we must see the p o l i t i c a l as one o f the.highest purposes of a free, universal and compulsory educational system i n a democracy. Furthermore, the idea that decision-making requires at least some modicum of s k i l l may well mean that vre need to re-think a theory of agency which includes at least Tussman's suggestion  that  t r a i n i n g i s a necessary precondition f o r the a c q u i s i t i o n or actual i z a t i o n of those s k i l l s , though we may want to argue about the kind or method or t r a i n i n g which i s the most e f f e c t i v e .  I t may  very well make sense to set up some obligations on the part of a c i t i z e n before giving him the r i g h t to.make decisions a f f e c t i n g us a l l ; a course of study f o r a r e l a t i v e l y b r i e f time that i s neither punitive nor r e s t r i c t i v e , but a kind of acknowledgement that a process has been undergone.  The problem i s , o f c o u r s e , as i t always i s with any movement towards  'qualifications'  (especially  r i g h t t o vote or standing f o r o f f i c e ) , qualifying  f o r having the  who a d m i n i s t e r s t h e  s t a n d a r d s and how do we p r o t e c t t h e purpose o f t h o s e  k i n d o f p r o v i s i o n s from b e i n g used i n v i c i o u s and r e s t r i c t i v e ways?  \Je have seen how l o y a l t y oaths o r p r o p e r t y q u a l i f i c a t i o n s  or l i t e r a c y t e s t s  have been used t o m a i n t a i n an ' a r i s t o c r a t i c  b i a s ' t h a t i s unequal and u n j u s t .  What Tussman does i s t o remind  us t h a t i t may not be a l t o g e t h e r outrageous t o r e - t h i n k what t h e r i g h t t o v o t e r e q u i r e s o f us e d u c a t i o n a l l y .  - 8 9 -  CONCLUSION  I have been a r g u i n g throughout t h i s paper t h a t Tussman's relia.nce upon P l a t o n i c n o t i o n s i s the key ments i n O b l i g a t i o n argued t h a t  and  to understanding h i s argu-  the Body P o l i t i c .  S p e c i f i c a l l y , I have  i t i s the promotion o f t h i s n o t i o n  o f the  public  i n t e r e s t , seen In i t s P l a t o n i c form, which Tussman sees as fundamental purpose o f t h e  State.  I t i s the  notion  which spawns  h i s s p e c i a l view o f freedom, h i s t h e o r y o f p o l i t i c a l and  h i s t h e o r y o f education.'  the  implications  open t o the  o f the  notion  charge of P l a t o n i c  The  notion  that  e l i t i s m and  'the b e s t ' s h o u l d r u l e i s not  i n the hands o f some d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g n e c e s s a r i l y an  I n t h a t sense Tussman i s w r e s t l i n g  i m p o r t a n t problem.  What pushes him  c o n s i s t s o f ; i n p a r t i c u l a r , the dilemma he a dichotomy between r e a s o n and  authorwith a  over i n t o  a u t h o r i t a r i a n camp i s j u s t h i s P l a t o n i c view o f vrhat the  s e t t i n g up  him  i n d i v i d u a l s have d i f f e r e n t c a p a c i t i e s ,  body, a.nd t h a t  t r a d i t i o n a l and  develops  authoritarianism.  must be p l a c e d  o f view.  he  public i n t e r e s t leaves  that authority  itarian point  representation  I have argued t h a t the way of. the  the  the  best  g e t s i n t o through passion,  and  private  and  public interest respectively. The important one.  d i s t i n c t i o n between p r i v a t e and I t has  been made i n a l l k i n d s o f ways which a r e n ' t  r e a l l y v e r y s a t i s f a c t o r y , and i t with reason against  Tussman's P l a t o n i c attempt t o a l i g n  p a s s i o n i s n ' t much o f a s o l u t i o n  However, where the d i s t i n c t i o n p o i n t s lationships —  p u b l i c i n t e r e s t i s an  political  t o the n e c e s s i t y  o r o t h e r w i s e •—  either. i n peer r e -  o f a p r o c e s s which t r a n s f o r m s  a v a r i e t y o f i n d i v i d u a l p r i v a t e c l a i m s i n t o a "system o f i n t e r e s t s " which i s f a i r t o a l l i n t e r e s t s , i t i s on s o l i d ground.  Whenever a  -90-  group of people get together and t r y to l i v e together, there has to he some movement out of just t h e i r own i n d i v i d u a l concerns or interests into something larger, something that takes account of everyone who i s equally situated.  How that process a c t u a l l y takes place i s d i r e c t l y  r e l a t e d to the kind of authority structure that characterizes a body p o l i t i c . Tussman sees that process as e s s e n t i a l l y the suppression, of the emotional, i r r a t i o n a l l i f e t o the r a t i o n a l , or the transformat i o n of the private t o the public,, and t h i s view colors his theory of representation.  What he leaves us with i n the end i s the concept  of the agent i n the Platonic model of the guardian.  His attempt i n  Obligation and the 3ody P o l i t i c t o bring both Plato and democracy together i n t o some kind of synthesis which t r i e s t o save the wisdom i n each, turns out f i n a l l y to resemble a Platonic model of a body p o l i t i c rather than a democratic one.  B I B L I O G R A P H Y I.  BOOKS:  A l i n s k y , S a u l D. R e v e i l l e f o r R a d i c a l s . Books, 1969. Ashton-Warner,  1964.  Sylvia.  Teacher.  New York:  New Y o r k :  B e r l i n , I s a i a h , Four E s s a y s on L i b e r t y . U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1969.  Vintage  Bantam Book,  London:  Oxford  B u r k e , Edmund, The P h i l o s o p h y o f Edmund B u r k e . Ann A r b o r P a p e r b a c k s : The U n i v e r s i t y o f M i c h i g a n P r e s s , I967. C o r n f o r d , F.M. The R e p u b l i c o f P l a t o . U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1956.  Oxford:  Oxford  F r e u d , Sigmund. C i v i l i z a t i o n and. I t s D i s c o n t e n t s . New Y o r k : W.W. N o r t o n & Co., 1962. Hobbes, Thomas. L e v i a t h a n , P a r t s I and. I I . New Y o r k : L i b r a r y o f L i b e r a l A r t s , 1958. Hook, S i d n e y , The Paradoxes o f Freedom. B e r k e l e y : s i t y o f C a l i f o r n i a P r e s s , 1967, H o l t , John. How C h i l d r e n F a i l . Co., 1964.  New Y o r k :  . Escape From C h i l d h o o d . & Co., 1974.  The  Univer-  Dell Publishing  New Y o r k :  E.P. D u t t o n  Humboldt, Von W i l h e l m . The L i m i t s o f S t a t e A c t i o n . Ed. J.W. Burrow, Cambridge: Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1969. Jung, C a r l , G. Man and H i s Symbols. i n g Co., 1973.  New Y o r k :  . Memories, Dreams, R e f l e c t i o n s . V i n t a g e Books, 1963. . .The U n d i s c o v e r e d S e l f . American L i b r a r y , 1958,  Dell Publish-  New York:  New Y o r k :  The New  Maslow, A.H. The F a r t h e r Reaches o f Human N a t u r e . The Viking P r e s s , 1971. . Toward a P s y c h o l o g y o f B e i n g . Van N o s t r a n d , 1962.  New Y o r k :  P r i n c e t o n , N.J.:  M e i k l e j o h n , A l e x a n d e r , E d u c a t i o n Between Two Worlds. York: Atherton Press, i960.  New  -92-  Kill,  John S t u a r t . Autobiography. ' New York: U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1 9 2 4 ,  Columbia  . U t i l i t a r i a n i s m ; Liberty; Representative Government. London: Dent, 1 9 5 7 . [Everyman's L i b r a r y , No. 482.) N e i l l , A.S. Summerhill. I960.  New York:  H a r t P u b l i s h i n g Co.,  Nietzsche, F r i e d r i c h . The B i r t h o f Tragedy. V i n t a g e Books, 1 9 6 7 .  New York:  P e a r l s , F r e d e r i c k , H e f f e r l i n e , Ralph F., Goodman, P a u l . G e s t a l t Therapy. New York: D e l l P u b l i s h i n g Co., 1951. . I n And Oat o f t h e Garbage P a i l . Lafayette, California: R e a l People P r e s s , I 9 6 9 . P e t e r s , R i c h a r d , A u t h o r i t y , R e s p o n s i b i l i t y and E d u c a t i o n . London: George A l l e n & Unwin L t d , , 1 9 6 9 , . The Concept o f E d u c a t i o n . Kegan P a u l , 1 9 6 7 . , E t h i c s and E d u c a t i o n . and Company, 1 9 6 7 .  London: . Routledge &  Atlanta;  S c o t t , Foresman  Popper, K a r l R, C o n j e c t u r e s and R e f u t a t i o n s : The Growth o f S c i e n t i f i c Knowledge, New York; Harper Torchbook, 1963. Rousseau,  Jean Jacques. E m i l e . t r a n s . B a r b a r a F o x l e y , London: Everyman's L i b r a r y , 1 9 6 6 . .  The C o n f e s s i o n s . B a l t i m o r e :  Penguin  Books,  1967. .. The S o c i a l C o n t r a c t and D i s c o u r s e s . New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., 1 9 5 2 . (Everyman's L i b r a r y , No. 6 6 0 ) . Tussman, Joseph. • Experiment a t B e r k e l e y . U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1 9 6 9 .  New York:  . O b l i g a t i o n and, t h e Body P o l i t i c . Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1 9 o l , II.  Oxford  New York:  ARTICLES:  Tussman, Joseph. "The C o l l e g i a t e R i t e o f Passage." I n n o v a t i o n , V o l . I I , No. 1 , J u l y I 9 6 8 .  Experiment and  and tenBroek, Jacobus. "The E q u a l P r o t e c t i o n o f t h e Laws," C a l i f o r n i a Law Review, Sept. 1949.  -93POST-SCRIPT  My bibliography i s not t r a d i t i o n a l i n the sense that i t does not pretend to be an exhaustive l i s t of the books and a r t i c l e s a v a i l a b l e i n the area of p o l i t i c a l and educational philosophy.  This  i s not an oversight but a matter of p r i n c i p l e .  sense  In an important  a l l that I have ever read with interest i s part of t h i s thesis, f o r my commitment and focus f o r so many years o f graduate work has always been centered around my own experiences with educating myself and f i n d i n g answers to the problems - personal and t h e o r e t i c a l - that have been generated by that struggle.  Therefore i t would be p e r f e c t l y  appropriate to l i s t every book and a r t i c l e that I have been concerned eneough t o read.  However, that task seems to me a rather s t y l i s h  waste of time. Instead, I have presented a working bibliography f o r the purposes of t h i s paper, but i n keeping with the main thesis expressed i n these pages, I would l i k e to include four learning experiences that have been major influences on my t h i n k i n g : 1.  Board Member i n The New School, Vancouver, B.C.  2.  The Experimental College at Berkeley, C a l i f o r n i a .  3.  The Resident Fellow Program at Cold Mountain I n s t i t u t e , Cortes Island, B.C.  h.  My years of graduate work at U.B.C, both as a student and a teacher, youngest  I have been a student f o r so long that, my  c h i l d f i n a l l y asked me what I wanted to be  when I grew up.  

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