AN ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE OF THE POLITICAL AND EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOSEPH TUSSMAN

BY

NATALIE VEINER FREEMAN


A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE DEGREE OF

MASTER OF ARTS

In the Department of Philosophy

We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard

THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA
November, 1974
In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by his representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission.

Department of Philosophy

The University of British Columbia
Vancouver 8, Canada

Date Jan. 27, 1975
**ABSTRACT**

The struggle from Plato onward, in every political theory and in every actual political system, has been the attempt to deal with the notion of public purpose, generally expressed as the public interest. The struggle has been to make sense out of the relationship between a concept of public interest on the one hand, and a concept of private interests on the other. This same struggle is the central theme of Tussman's theory of obligation, and in his attempt to come to terms with the problem, I have been struck by how Platonic a stance he is finally forced to adopt even though he seems to be initially writing out of a different tradition: the democratic tradition.

I want, then, to trace a pervasive influence of Platonic notions on Tussman's political theory; specifically, I want to argue that it is the Platonic view of the 'self' and its relationship to a special theory of freedom which has direct bearing upon three areas of Tussman's argument in *Obligation and the Body Politic*. I want to argue that these Platonic notions directly inform his view of the public interest, his theory of representation, and finally, flowing out of these first two, Tussman's distinctive theory of education.
CONTENTS

Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 1

Chapter I: ANALYSIS OF TUSSMAN'S POLITICAL THEORY ................................................. 4
  1. Definition of Body Politic ........................................................................................................... 5
  2. Theory of Membership ............................................................................................................. 6
  3. Relationship of the Notion of the Public Interest to Platonic Notions .............................. 10
  4. The Platonic Theory of the Division of the Soul .................................................................... 18

Chapter II: A 'HUMANISTIC' CRITIQUE ................................................................................. 26

Chapter III: THEORY OF REPRESENTATION ........................................................................... 35
  1. Concept of Political Freedom .................................................................................................. 40
  2. Consequences of the Dichotomy Between Private and Public Interest .......................... 49
  3. An Alternative Model ............................................................................................................. 57
  4. Theory of Democracy ............................................................................................................ 64

Chapter IV: THEORY OF EDUCATION ..................................................................................... 70

Conclusion .................................................................................................................................. 90

Bibliography ............................................................................................................................... 92

Post-Script ................................................................................................................................. 93
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I would like to thank Robert Rowan, Donald G. Brown and Elbridge Rand for the help they have given me not only in the preparation of this paper but throughout my educational experience in the philosophy department at the University of B.C.
Obligation and the Body Politic is an attempt to write political theory rather than to merely analyze it. The book is written from "the perspective of action" rather than from "the perspective of description"1 and the argument, so Tussman says, "turns" on this distinction; for he writes the book from the perspective of being inside the mind of a man who is a participant in the sovereign function in a democracy, and is facing the problem of deciding how to act in that capacity. Tussman, then, is presenting a theory of obligation in political life which only becomes sensible if it is appropriate to ask the question "what should I do?" rather than "what am I doing?" or "what will I do?" as a political agent.

From this perspective, he has some telling cannons to fire at the door of the fortress of the social sciences. High time too, for the descriptive-predictive hangover of the scientific model has badly scarred the study of political theory and Tussman is right when he points out that "the art of training of the decision maker is not simply identical with that of the social scientist; and a school of government cannot simply be a division of social science."2

Tussman claims, fundamentally, that the 'is/ought' distinction, as we too commonly re-interpret Hume, should be put to rest in political matters - for a democracy cannot survive unless it understands and takes seriously the obligations and duties involved in the role of being a political member and agent.

---


In order to write from this perspective of there being obligations in political life, Tussman must have two assumptions operating: (1) first of all, he must assume that man is free, in the sense - not compelled - to make choices about important decisions in his life, and (2) secondly, he must assume the possibility of rational arguments about morality. That is, he must assume that there are some moral criteria against which a member or agent can examine his alternatives; for to say a man 'ought' to do something -- or more important -- for me to make a judgment about what 'I ought to do', means I am engaged in assessing a claim on my action which arises outside myself; a claim which I can either accept or reject as binding upon my actions.

So to talk about obligation at all, means, at the very least, that I am engaged in the process of acknowledging rational moral claims upon my actions. Tussman, then, is writing from the perspective of the moral agent in a democracy; which is to insist that democratic political man always exists within a structure of actual public purposes, and that these purposes can be known and felt to be obligatory.

The struggle from Plato onward, in every political theory and in every actual political system, has been the attempt to deal with the notion of public purpose, generally expressed as the public interest. The struggle has been to make sense out of the

---

3 Tussman makes it clear that he doesn't want to take on the whole free-will problem, but that he assumes there are jobs that need to be done in a democracy and that the members of a democracy can do them. Most important -- one of these jobs is to decide whether or not we're going to take up our 'governing' role in a self-governing community.
relationship between a concept of public interest on the one hand, and a concept of private interests on the other. This same struggle is the central theme of Tussman's theory of obligation, and in his attempt to come to terms with the problem, I have been struck by how Platonic a stance he is finally forced to adopt even though he seems to be initially writing out of a different tradition: the democratic tradition.

I want, then, to trace a pervasive influence of Platonic notions on Tussman's political theory; specifically, I want to argue that it is the Platonic view of the 'self' and its relationship to a special theory of freedom which has direct bearing upon three areas of Tussman's argument in Obligation and the Body Politic. I want to argue that these Platonic notions directly inform his view of the public interest, his theory of representation, and finally, flowing out of these first two, Tussman's distinctive theory of education.
Tussman begins *Obligation and the Body Politic* by stating that his concern is with the nature of relationship; but he quickly moves to narrow that focus to political relationship, and then, within a few sentences, even more specifically to the relationship between the members of a body politic.

Next he searches for the definition of this concept of a 'body politic', saying that he is looking for the distinctive features that hold that kind of grouping of people together. It soon becomes apparent, however, that his search for the definition of a body politic is really a circular one; for Tussman already has his own criteria that the definition must satisfy.

In fact, it turns out that it is his knowledge of the workings of the democratic process - especially the American one - that underlies the definition of body politic in the first chapter, even though the word democratic doesn't appear until P.22. Tussman wants to so define a body politic that the concept becomes identical to the concept of a democracy, so that he can produce a model of a body politic which answers the distinctive features of the relationship in a democracy of the ruler to the ruled and vice versa. That model turns out to be 'voluntary agreement.'

So, for Tussman, the distinguishing features of a body politic is that it must be able to accommodate three democratic notions: (1) the notion of the 'common good': that is, the commitment to
common interests or purposes which constitutes the justification of an authority structure,

(2) the notion of 'legitimacy': which involves a sub-set of notions such as 'duty', 'obligation', and 'right', making moral claims extending beyond mere claims of 'prudence' or 'power', and

(3) the notion of 'political freedom': the idea that there is a way of reconciling 'being free' and 'being under law'.

To these criteria he introduces three suitors: the models of power, habit and custom, and voluntary agreement. It soon becomes obvious that only the model of voluntary agreement is going to fit - with a little pinching and straining at that. So Tussman concludes that the proper mode of a body politic is an association of people in relationship to authority, based upon their voluntary agreement.

What I am arguing here is that his attempt to define a body politic is not so much a legitimate definition as it is an attempt to elicit the characteristics governing the relationship of authority in a democracy. But there is no reason to see a democratic body politic and a body politic as identical notions, for there is nothing inherent in the idea of a body politic which demands that it satisfy Tussman's arbitrary criteria. On the contrary, it doesn't seem redundant to speak of a democratic body politic, whereas it does seem uncomfortable to speak of a body politic and assume everyone knows you mean a democratic one. Even Tussman doesn't risk that; for there are several places where he qualifies his use of body politic after
his definition of it. Still, it turns out to be an interesting exercise for it makes clear some of the different kinds of authority relationships that are possible, and what conditions they do or do not satisfy.

Almost immediately following on the heels of his definition of a body politic, he introduces the idea of a "member". I want to argue that there are some fundamental implications of being seen as a "member" of a body politic, where we would ordinarily be accustomed to use the word 'subject' or 'citizen', which only a democratic body politic based upon a voluntary model can provide.

It is important to point out that already, in this first chapter, Tussman's idea of a "member" is a very special one stemming directly from his conception of the body politic: specifically, the criterion he sets up of the common good or the public interest. Furthermore, I want to argue that his interpretation of this criterion of the public interest stems directly, in turn, from the Platonic theory of the soul. But before pursuing this relationship between his criterion of public interest and Platonic notions, let me first turn to a consideration of his special idea of a "member"; for so much of the later arguments in the book depend upon understanding it.

---

4 (1) Tussman, Obligation and the Body Politic, p. 27. "A body politic, based upon consent."
(2) Ibid., p. 21. "...a theory which meets the demands of a body politic concerned with political freedom."

5 Following Tussman from this point on, with attention to his definition, I'm using interchangeably the notions 'body politic', 'democracy', and a 'group based upon voluntary agreement'.

6 Tussman first introduces the notion of the 'common good', but he later talks about this notion as the 'public interest' and also 'public purpose. From this point on I shall speak of this notion, primarily as 'the public interest'.

The usual or ordinary notion we have of a member of a government generally means a designated individual somehow arriving at a particular office with particular authority. Thus when we speak of a Member of Parliament, we generally refer to a man who has been elected by a certain constituent group to take his seat in a governing tribunal and share in that process. Tussman extends this usual notion of a member of a government to include all whom we are more accustomed to call citizens or subjects of a government; and he is able to do this and still make sense because of the way he has already talked about a body politic.

More explicitly, his enlarged notion of "member" flows from his establishing the model of voluntary agreement as the only one that satisfies his criteria of what constitutes a body politic; for from all models of voluntary agreement it is perfectly natural to talk about members. What else could you talk of? So, in fact, to slide from the definition of body politic into talk of members is necessitated by the way he talks about the body politic and is already an unusual use of the word member.

Let me now point out one of the important consequences of this point. Because of Tussman's special sense of the word member, following logically from his construction of a body politic, he can claim that the ordinary role of a citizen or subject is markedly changed from our usual conception of it. And this he proceeds to do. He wants to argue that there is an extension of the range of duties and rights flowing from that special conception of being a 'member'
of a body politic, and in particular, stemming from the criterion of the public interest. It is important to understand this claim for the rest of the book logically depends upon it.

Tussman wants to argue what Flato did as well; that there are two ranges of rights that may be accorded the ruled by the ruler: there are the rights of subjects, and there are the rights of agent-citizens. In any government that we would recognize as legitimate, it could be argued that there must be at least the first category of rights accorded. In this category we would place the right to 'equal protection' and the right to 'due process of law' or any similar rights that entitle us as subjects to conditions of fairness: the right to a lawyer, to a fair trial, to non-discriminatory treatment.

However, it isn't the case that any government that may be legitimate must extend the second category of rights: the right of free speech, of equal participation in the governing function, the right to vote, the right to a free press etc., because it is possible for there to be legitimate governments that aren't democratic. (I make this naked point without stopping to pursue criteria of legitimacy here.) This second category of rights, Tussman would argue, is a function of our member role in a democracy; that is, they are the rights that are accorded to us in our civic capacity when we are behaving as agents, not as merely subjects: when we are acting in our capacity as voters, sovereigns, rulers.

7 For Plato, it would be the rights of the guardian-citizens.
So Tussman's argument goes, there are rights that must be accorded to us in our capacity as subjects by any legitimate government whether or not it is a democratic one, but there are additional rights that we accord to ourselves (so to speak) as members of a democratic government in order to fulfill our role as agents. It is to this latter category of rights that Tussman means to refer to when he talks about the 'member' and it is the implications of those rights for a theory of duties or obligations which he wants to draw out in the next two chapters. He wants to argue that we do not generally understand this role that we have based upon the rights accorded to us as members in a democracy pursuing our agent role, and that it must be the task of political education to fill this vacuum.

Actually, as I will argue, what he really does is to convert the notion of member quite quickly into the notion of agent and then, restrict the notion of agent again to that of the 'elected representative'. The result of this conversion, I will argue, is due to Platonic influences, and in the end, his 'elected representative' becomes barely distinguishable from a Platonic guardian.

The point to be made here is simply that the rest of the book -- and most importantly -- his theory of education -- turns on the specialness of his model of a body politic and the unusual conception of member logically flowing from it.

8 Though Tussman talks about the relationship between political theory and education almost immediately, I leave the theme until the last section of this paper to pick up on; I do so because a thorough understanding of it, requires an analysis of other parts of his argument first.
Let me now return to pursuing the relationship of Tussman's criterion of the public interest to Platonic notions. In Chapter II, Tussman talks about the nature of membership in the body politic - using the model of voluntary agreement that he has already set up. He begins by analyzing the meaning and consequences of single individuals coming together to form a group under a system of agreements which create a legitimate authority. His claim is that the act of voluntary membership, or the status of being a voluntary member, elicits a new relationship between the individuals so related, and that this new relationship expresses itself in two fundamental acts of subordination or obligations:

(1) the obligation to subordinate private to public decisions, and
(2) the obligation to subordinate private to public interest.

Tussman is arguing that this two-fold subordination is analytic to the concept of membership in a voluntary group based upon agreement; that is, he is arguing that obligations (1) and (2) are what is logically entailed in agreeing to be a member of a voluntary association. I would agree that (1) is always analytic to the concept of voluntary membership, but (2) is only analytic if the kind of voluntary association one agrees to be a member of is a body politic so defined, as Tussman does, to include the criterion of commitment to the public interest in its very definition.

This is a small point, and I do not wish to pursue it further here; I raise it merely to show how much of his conception
of the nature of membership in a voluntary association derives from his definition of a body politic rather than the other way around; especially from the specific notion of the public interest. For it is certainly possible to talk about voluntary groups based upon agreement, where people stand in some other kind of relationship to each other than the subordination of their private interest to the public interest. His second obligation of subordination is only logically required then, assuming that the public interest is always involved in the concept of a voluntary association based upon agreement.

This brings me to the major problem with the book; the real lack of any substantial theory about the nature of the public interest; specifically, the relationship, if any, of private interest to public interest, or private good to public good. It is a distinction, first met here, that is fundamental to everything that Tussman has to say about the obligation of both the member and the agent, yet he never really pursues it deeply.

The problem is underlined when a person asks himself why he would want to be a member of a body politic so constituted; that is why is it sensible or reasonable to subordinate his private interest to the public interest? Only if he becomes clear on what the public interest involves is he in a position to determine whether, indeed, he would want to be a voluntary member of such an association.

The fundamental question is then what is the relationship of a person's private interest to the public interest? In this regard
Tussman gives us some sketchy answers. First of all we know that the model of voluntary agreement means that at least, in his view, the private must always subordinate itself to the public interest wherever there is conflict between the two. He also tells us that this subordination is logically bound up with the guarantee of certain procedural rights stemming from the principle of equality: those of 'due process' and 'equal protection'; for who would feel obliged to subordinate their private interest to a public interest that did not guarantee them a minimum of equal consideration and protection?

It is difficult to see how one could claim the rights without having made the subordination or how one can be held to the subordination and denied the rights. Both are inseparable aspects of membership.8

Thirdly, stemming from this last condition, we know that therefore, the public interest is somehow concerned with a "system of interests of which any individual's is only a part."9

But more than this, we do not know. We do not know how a member would determine what is in the public interest; what criteria he would use. We do not know what the public interest is made up of: is it made up of generalized private interests? of the majority who share the same interest? Or is it something not even related to private interest, but another kind of conception?

At this point in the book, the only further hint we have of the relationship between the private and public interest is Tussman's vague remarks that the public interest must be concerned with the total amount of interests dealt with in some equal way:

8 Tussman, Obligation p.31.
9 Ibid., p. 28.
To be a member is to acknowledge that one's own interests are only a part of a broader system of interests, that other members have theirs as you have yours, and thus it is the function of government to promote and safeguard the entire system, of which yours is a part but no more significant part than any others.  

It looks as though he is saying at this point that all private interests have the same significance and that the public interest is directly related to these private interests, but it can't be made up of only your interest. But later on he talks about public interest as the "recognition that one's own interests constitute only a subordinate part of a broader system of interests."  

Is a "broader system of interests" the same thing as a system of private interests of which the individuals' is only a part? Or is it another whole conception which reduces the notion of private interest to triviality? Furthermore, even if it is the former case, we still don't know how a member can elicit the public interest out of the welter of private interests he is confronted with: by what procedure, guide, principle?  

This problem, first encountered in the chapter on membership, becomes even a more serious one when Tussman comes to discuss the role of the agent in a democracy. The member as "subject", needs only acknowledge the claim of subordinating his private interest

11 Joseph Tussman, Obligation, p. 28.
12 Ibid., p. 29.
to the public interest, but the agent must be involved, not only in that same act of subordination, but also in the actual day to day determination or creation of the very public interest the member must subordinate himself to. But there is no additional help offered out of the confusion here either.

Let me suggest that there are two directions in which one could move at this point with regard to the problem of the public interest. One direction is to assume that each members' private interest has a legitimate claim upon the criteria of the public interest, and the problem lies in trying to find some reliable method of computing all of these legitimate private desires into a "system of interests" which apportions an equal share to all or the greatest possible number. The classic attempts in this direction would be the Utilitarian move to compute "the greatest happiness of the greatest numbers" based on just such an assumption, or modern attempts in welfare economics to distribute benefits in some appropriate way.

The second direction is to see that there is a different sort of problem involved in trying to determine what is in the public interest. To move in this direction is to find something lacking in the ordinary conception of 'private interest', which brings the kind of claim of legitimacy between private and public interest mentioned above into question. I want to argue that it is this second direction which Tussman takes at this point, if not
purposefully, then implicitly, because he has a view of the relationship between private and public interest which is essentially a Platonic one depending upon a special interpretation of 'private interest'.

I want to argue that Tussman sees there are only two possible interpretations of the public interest: one that he continually argues for, based upon his commitment to Platonic notions, against what he sees as a more popular one now in practice. It is this more popular interpretation, sometimes characterized as the theory of pluralism, which Tussman finds disastrous for the survival of a body politic committed to the 'common good'. Let me outline these two interpretations briefly.

The theory of pluralism is the view that a democratic system provides the framework for the legitimate pursuit of private individualism; where each individual regards his interest in a narrow and private sphere. Each man, according to this conception of the public interest, has the right to decide what his interest is and to express that judgement politically.

What Tussman sees as the inevitable outcome of this view, is that public interest then becomes the result of the vying of all these personal, individual interests for the most support; each person trying to catch the vote of his neighbour, persuading, pressuring, arguing, until a solution is reached; until some interest

---

13 When I refer to Platonic notions, I am referring to the views generally expressed in the Socratic dialogues, but with particular emphasis to Republic.
succeeds in gaining the support of the majority or a bargain is struck: "for this, you can have that."

Tussman argues that, on this view, public interest becomes defineable in terms of a procedure of compromise among private interest, seen as the expression of peoples' wants. In this process, he argues, a man's private interest is thought to be considered because he has been given a chance to express his wishes through being given a vote. If he fails, if his interest does not carry the day, he must accept the fact that he has had his equal chance; he has participated in the system such as it is. If he is not satisfied, he must organize for another day, meanwhile facing the fact that the alternatives to this kind of system are worse.

What Tussman is arguing throughout Obligation and the Body Politic is that there is at least one alternative which is not worse, but much better. He argues an essentially Platonic notion about the public interest: that there is some objective criteria by which specially gifted and trained individuals can make decisions as to what is in the community's public interest. Where that public interest accomodates private, individual interest, that is a happy chance occurrence, but more often, it is the expression of something quite opposed to a person's private interest; it is more often the case of 'governing' those private interests through the development of a well-trained, disciplined

---

14 Plato, in the Republic, labors hard to identify 'private' and 'public' interest via his theory of knowledge; but still needs to rely on a notion of 'governing' private interests as an intermediary stage -- and then, only intermediary for the guardians, who have the capacity to ultimately 'know' or 'apprehend' the truth.
mind which acts as our best self. In fact, on this view, following one's private interests within a democratic structure which has that very pursuit for everyone as its purpose, is more like a return to the Hobessian "state of nature" - a condition where power rather than authority, and manipulation rather than justice, prevails.

Plato's view, and Tussman's as well, depends for understanding on the distinction between two pairs of concepts that are closely connected to each other: the distinction between the concept of needs and the concept of wants, and the distinction between the concept of real and the concept of apparent interest. Let me try a short analysis where a long one is called for.

In the simplest sense -- the distinction that both of these concepts refer to is the difference between what a person may want - what he sees as the immediate object of his happiness -- and in reality, what he may need or come to see as good for him if he had the time for reflection, or had the wisdom to see what in the long run of his life would really make him happy.

Much of the weight of this distinction must be born by our experienced knowledge of the relationship between (for want of better terms I use the classic categories) passion and reason. That is, the distinction between a conception of ourselves when we behave in the throes of passion; when we are concerned primarily with immediate and momentary gratification of our individual wants -- and -- a conception of ourselves as future-oriented, rational, responsible beings concerned with our long range needs.
The point of this distinction is to connect what a person needs with what he would want if he were fully rational, therefore considered his long-range interest; then, what a person wants, but doesn't need, is seen as in his apparent interest but not in his real interest. Real interest is connected to reason as apparent interest is to passion. The roots of this distinction between reason and passion - and the implications for a theory of human behavior are found in the Platonic theory of the division of the soul.

One way to view the Platonic theory of the division of the soul is as an attempt to provide an answer to the problem of the relationship between freedom and the 'self'. It is a doctrine which is directly derived from a special view of what constitutes the nature of a person, for it proposes that to be free a person must have a kind of internal freedom as well as freedom from external restraints, and that this kind of internal freedom is the expression of the 'true self' of a person. In order to support this proposition, Plato is dependent upon a theory of the self: how the self emerges, and how it functions.

For Plato, man is like a community with all sorts of rival interests which do not exist compatibly side by side. It becomes necessary to restrain some in order to free others. The free man for Plato is one who practises temperance and "temperance surely means a kind of orderliness, a control of certain pleasures and appetites"¹⁵ so that a person can act in accordance with his true

nature or 'best self'. But the problem is, which of the multitudinous wants of a given individual are expressive of his true nature; which must be controlled and which encouraged; which are such that their fulfillment is conducive to the expression of our 'inner' or 'true' or 'best' self and therefore enable one to be free?

Plato's answer to this problem is to put forward a view about our interests which claims that all our wants are not of the same natural order or worth; they are all not in our actual or 'real' interests in the same way. His criterion of what makes an interest 'real' is related to what will give us lasting satisfaction, and that criterion is related in turn to his way of dividing up the source of our various interests into categories or parts of the soul: (1) the appetitive (2) the rational and (3) the spirited.  

His first two categories seem recognizable distinctions:

We may call that part of the soul whereby it reflects, rational; and the other, with which it feels hunger and thirst and is distracted by sexual passion and all the other desires, we will call irrational appetite, associated with pleasure in the replenishment of certain wants.  

But the third category -- the spirited -- seems somewhat strange. Plato defines this third category as "that passionate element which makes us feel angry and indignant," but at the same time, insists that it doesn't belong in the category of appetites, but is a different kind of passion - sometimes in conflict with the other appetites - though it can be shown to be distinct from reason. It

17 Loc. cit.
18 Loc. cit.
appears that he is talking about a kind of neutral category of passionate anger which is, so he says, naturally present in children and animals — a moral indignation which can be used in the service of reason if it is properly trained.

I do not wish to argue here whether this third category makes sense or not except to say in passing that it does seem strange to separate off one element of passion, namely, anger or indignation, and insist that it is separate from all the other instinctual emotions that we ordinarily refer to as passions. I leave that particular and well-worn problem alone however, for the connection of Tussman's conception of public interest and his theory of representation to Plato's theory of the division of the soul does not depend upon it; that connection can be aptly demonstrated by acknowledging the importance of Plato's major conception: the splitting off of the rational elements in our nature from others we can collect under the general heading of the instinctual-emotional life. I would like to elaborate on that conception and show the implications following from it both for Plato and for Tussman.

Plato's conception of the nature of man depends upon the belief that within each person there is a rational or moral element which is like a small seed tucked away among many other rival elements, all competing for attention and expression. This rational element of a person is considered to be his 'best self': the self which represents his true nature, for it is the self which is truly
in tune with what is good for him — with what will contribute to a more temperate, more just and therefore happier and better life.

However, as already pointed out, man is divided against himself, having within his nature as well, surges of impulse or passion which are obstacles to the free exercise of his best self and therefore to the attainment of what he would really want if only he were free from the shackles of these irrational parts of his nature and able to choose.

So, on this account, the nature of man is split: on the one hand there is the transcendent, rational, 'real' interest-oriented controller which is the better part, while on the other, there is the empirical bundle of desires and passions -- momentary 'apparent' interests which must be disciplined by the higher rational self and brought to heel because they comprise the worse part. For Plato, for a man to be "master of himself" means:

...that within the man himself, in his soul, there is a better part and a worse; and that he is his own master when the part which is better by nature has the worse under its control. ...it is considered a disgrace, when, through bad breeding or bad company, the better part is overwhelmed by the worse....A man in that condition is called a slave to himself and intemperate. 19

I am arguing that the assumption that this view puts forward is that it is our rational capacity alone which reveals our true or higher nature: the nature of a human performing that function for which he is uniquely and best suited. Only when reason

is in control are we performing that function and therefore are performing freely as our best self. Accordingly, freedom becomes identified with rationality for, on this account, only rational ends can be true objects or wants of a free man's true nature.

This is not the end of the story however, for a problem arises when we see that there is nothing inherent in this human nature so described which guarantees that our best self, if left to its own devices, will indeed triumph over our worse self. The argument therefore continues, that part of us, the seed of our best self, requires nourishment if it is to grow properly or at all. Part of that nourishment may be the purposeful development of latent capacities such as training in deliberation, reasoning and logic; part of that nourishment may be merely the creation of the best possible environment for the natural unfolding of these capacities; but part of that nourishment must also be the forcible restraint of our instinctual desires and passions in order to give our better self a chance to emerge.

Interestingly enough, on this view of the nature of man, it is man's lower nature -- his desires and passions -- which appear to be naturally stronger; which, if not restrained particularly early in life, may well run away with his personality or character. It is this irrational part of man which seems to be the most powerful element of the soul; yet the true self is not

---

20 This is pretty much the view put forward by Socrates in *Meno.*
identified with what is most powerful in us, but with what is weakest: the rational element. It is this special power relationship which makes it necessary to talk about restraint - either external in the form of authority, or internal in the sense of self-mastery - as necessary in order to shift the power from man's lower or worst self to his higher or best self.21

It is important to see what kind of shift takes place here with our ordinary conception of freedom; for this necessary restraint or control (either external or self-mastery) is seen, not as our usual notion of restraint, but as the arbiter of true freedom. For freedom is seen here not as doing what you 'want', if what you want is connected to passion or instinctual desires, but doing what you rationally see that you 'need' to do: doing what you 'ought' to do if you were acting as your best self in your 'real' interest.

Freedom on this account, is not freedom to do what is irrational. For there is the implicit assumption that what is irrational is really harmful to oneself and therefore detrimental to one's real or best interests, and no man, it is argued, who is truly free would act against his own real interests, for that would be enslavement, not freedom.

Let me make a note here that the foregoing account explains in part the paradoxical assertion of Rousseau that it is sometimes necessary "to force men to be free"; for, as I have already argued, freedom on this account is self-control and self-direction.

21 Cornford, The Republic, see iv. 441, iv. 443, iv. 444 where the references are to words like "control and subordination", "command" and "ruling" to express the relationship of the rational part of the soul over the appetitive.
translated as the control of the rational part of our nature over the other parts. Control is seen here as a kind of power which expresses freedom; for a man who subjects his passions to the control of reason has the power over himself to do what he knows he ought to do; what he would want to do if he were free of his irrational passions so that he could act in his real interests. Real interests, on this account then, are always identified with freedom or the power to be rational.

Tussman is clearly in this tradition, for he believes that to have that kind of internal power is to be free. Though he only hints at this view of freedom in *Obligation and the Body Politic*,

Freedom is the fruit of the successful operation of the teaching power. Freedom is power and it, too, must be deliberately cultivated.  

an attempt is made to clearly develop the idea in his next book - *Experiment at Berkeley* where he makes it clear that "the freedom that we cultivate is the freedom of mastery not impulse."

For the mind to be free is for it to be able, to have the power, to do what it should do. That is the freedom with which education is concerned. 23

I raise this point here because I want to argue that Tussman's special view of freedom, stemming from the influence of the Platonic theory of the soul, is an important undercurrent running throughout *Obligation and the Body Politic*; for it directly informs his theory of the public interest and therefore his theories


of membership and agency. Most specifically, it informs his theory of the agent's role as a representative and therefore, his theory of political education; for the member and agent who fulfills his public obligations turns out to be that Platonic conception - the free man trained to act as his best self.

It is my contention that it is a Platonic conception of character, of the 'best self' within us, that Tussman appeals to in the end as the arbiter between public and private interest. Behind his conception of the public interest is the demand that it must have reference to the 'real' needs and 'real' interests of the community; that turns out to be those needs and interests we discover when we are acting in the capacity of our best selves: when our rational capacity is in control of our instinctual desires and wants. Accordingly, for Tussman, private interest is identified with our worst self, with our irrational, selfish passions, while public interest is identified with our best self, with ourselves acting in and through our rational capacity. This is, in the end, the only criterion of public interest that he gives us; but it is a criterion which forces him into a dilemma which only an authoritarian model of representation and education can resolve.

I want to argue that he is pushed into an unnecessary dilemma via this private public distinction, because his Platonic view of human nature is too reductive, leaving out of account a wealth of psychological understanding that is available to us now, which would under-cut such a narrow perspective on the nature of man. Let me try to point in another direction.
First of all, one could object to the whole view of dividing human nature up into rival camps of the rational life and the instinctual-emotional life, and further categorizing them respectively as higher nature-lower nature, real self-apparent self, better or worse part, or real freedom as opposed to apparent freedom. What is the basis for such a judgement except the particular (emotional?) preference of the jury?

For instance, if the self is made up of parts, it seems logically absurd that only one part is to be regarded as the real self or the expressor of our real wants. Are we to believe that a person's nature is like a picture and a negative: only one of them is real, only over one part can ownership be claimed? On this view "self-mastery" looks like a denial of at least part of the self, and thus a denial - not an assertion - of man's real nature. The metaphor of the division of the soul results in a schizoid picture of a free man - and a depressing one.

I risk the judgement that the self is not a human nature fractured into real and apparent, or good and bad selves, nor has private interest got to do with our lower self and public interest with some kind of transformed higher self. That is a view which is not at all clear, and moreover, damaging to human personality. The damage is two-fold: in the first place it lies in the creation of a split within a person while ignoring the psyc-
hological implications of such a model of the splitting of the personality, and secondly, it lies in the reinforcement always of the need for outer restrictions; for outer forms of authority in order to rule human nature. It does this by somehow dividing us into these two natures: the primitive, passionate child who is immature and uncontrolled on the one hand, and the wise man - the rational adult on the other.

One of the unhappy results of such a view is to give so little encouragement or interest to the whole creative ranges. It is to see only those who are working for over-riding systems or institutions, or set-ups of control as really acting as mature adults in the public interest. This results in the denial of the whole artistic, creative world, where often the real antennae of the race is happening, for we learn as much from the irrational, the unknown, the illogical, the uncharted, out of control places as we do from the rational: the already known and structured places.

Philosophers like Nietzsche, and since Freud, psychologists like Jung and Adler\(^2^4\) have moved more and more in the direction of seeing the self, not as a human nature fractured into good and bad parts, seen respectively as the rational and the non-rational, but as the integrating force of an entire range of human capacities which includes both.

---

\(^{24}\) The list is long, but I refer especially to the group called Humanistic Psychologists whose approach to human personality is in the 'holistic' tradition. People like Abraham Maslow, Fritz Perls, Wilhem Reich, Eric Fromm, R.D. Laing.
It is impossible for me at this point to try to put forward their views in either a historical or detailed way, but a summary could be expressed in this way. Most of them talk about the harmony of the soul in much the same terms as Plato did, but they differ as to how this harmony is to be achieved, and this difference is a significant one. The 'holistic' view of man talks about achieving harmony through the model of integrating the various parts of the personality rather than through the model of balancing them. This important distinction leaves open to them the creative elements of human personality which are closed to the more negative model of balance, and therefore, leaves more scope for a person's 'private', emotional life. Let me try to explain this difference.

The notion of balancing the rational against the emotional-instinctual elements in our personality so as to achieve a harmony, assigns a necessarily negative role to reason; for the act of balancing means you are constantly engaged in keeping elements from getting out of control. Reason must be used in a restrictive capacity: always checking, weighing, judging, restricting the expansion of each different part so as to keep everything within some sort of equal (balanced) relationship. By its very nature, the model of balancing involves the structure of polarities that must be juggled.

The notion of integration, on the other hand, acknowledges the importance of harmony in the soul, but does not see that harmony as possible through the rational part containing the other parts through balancing them. 'Holistic' psychologists argue that the
result of that conception necessarily creates a situation where one sees oneself as being split into two sides, one side always obliged to check and control the other, and therefore, always looking down on the other, hating and fearing the other as a rival. But, the 'other' is still ourselves and that means that we are involved in hating and fearing ourselves; a course which can only lead to severe conflict within our psyches. Thus, the model of balancing is seen as merely the negative achievement of keeping peace between warring elements; the maintenance of the status quo or order. Though harmony is achieved through this process, the conflict remains continually raging within us.

On this view, the result of that continuing conflict works to stultify action rather than to free us to act; for the binding of energy involved in the continual judging and checking of one part of the self against another is experienced inescapably as repression. Accordingly, they argue this repression, while often very useful, inevitably results in a blind, controlling self-righteousness, and the double edge of that: a despairing guilt and conflict which works more to deaden the soul rather than free it. They are spelling out the psychological underpinnings of 'idealism'.

Of course there is much to be gained from this repressive process of balancing. Peace is attained, with all its valuable train

25 The struggle, almost classically Platonic, is best revealed in Freud's Civilization and Its Discontents. Here, repression is central and inescapable, with the gain and loss to civilization never really settled.
of benefits: security, predictability, a measure of control or 'power' over one's life which is certainly an important kind of freedom. But there is an important loss of freedom as well; there is a continuing loss of newness, a drying up of joy and creativity which depend for their sources upon unbound energy and the risking of pushing into unknown regions.

The 'holistic' psychological school then, sees harmony as the positive integration or interlocking of the self. Freedom on this account is achieved, not though the caging of the instinctual-passionate life via checking and suppressing parts of the self, but through the 'allowing' knowing, and in that way, having use of the emotional ranges. They argue for a kind of creative interplay between all parts, for they claim that you cannot integrate yourself into a harmonious whole unless you are first willing to see who you are.

That means that we must see the totality of our nature, for the hiding of undesirable parts doesn't make them disappear; instead, they continue underground, affecting our behavior in subconscious ways that we have no access to and therefore no affective use of, binding us to our nature, not freeing us and requiring more and more external controls to keep our outside behavior appropriate.

26 In putting forward the idea that the Platonic view sees freedom achieved through balance via rational suppression, and the 'holistic' view sees freedom achieved through integration via emotional 'allowing', I'm tempted to use the metaphor of the paternal and maternal archetypes or modes of acting in the world. I mention it here as a footnote, mainly because I haven't worked it out as a full-blown theory, yet suggest it might be illuminating for someone who it strikes as intuitively appropriate here. By this I mean that the Platonic view of the nature of man is essentially a paternal one - with emphasis upon external restraint, order, duty and obligation, while the 'holistic' approach to the nature of man is essentially a maternal one - with emphasis upon allowing, accepting, expressing inner development and growth. The distinction is an important one with relationship to different kinds of authority systems.
Specifically their argument looks like this: we can only have real control over ourselves when we understand ourselves. Since we can only understand ourselves once we see ourselves, and we can only see ourselves if we allow ourselves, then we must permit the full range of our behavior that we can look at it and accept it in order to have control of it. Accordingly, the route to harmony lies through the expression of the emotional life, not through balancing it against the rational.

To regard human nature in this way is not to say that there are no dangerous parts in our animal natures, nor that reason does not have an important place in it. It would be madness to uphold a view of emotional expression that gives people permission to go around killing others or indulging in similar destructive patterns of behavior. When it is argued that through too much emphasis on the rational element in our nature we have been stunting and repressing the source of our energy and creativity in our emotional life, no one is arguing for a return to violence in human affairs, but for a different and more effective method or way to handle those anti-social drives in our personality.

Both the Platonic and the 'holistic' views of the nature of man want to control the anti-social and destructive parts of our nature, but they go about control in a different way and for a different purpose. The Platonic view wants to control the irrational parts of our nature by the rational in order to achieve a kind of order or balance which allows the 'better self' of man to emerge: the truly rational man who is concerned with his 'real' interests.
The 'holistic' approach wants to bring about a kind of control of our emotions as well, but through 'allowing' a full range of expression of that emotional life in order to build on it, move from it so as to extend and challenge ranges in a person's psyche that he can then move into. This kind of control is more often expressed as the control of our emotions in order to achieve inner development or 'growth' so that a person can move into previously unknown ranges of experience which enrich his life. In this sense, the Platonic view is reductive, the 'holistic' is more expansive.

But, just as the rational understanding, the analytic mode, does very little towards change in a person's life because it doesn't touch the emotional levels of 'knowing' which permeate the whole being of a person, so too does just being able to feel, know one's emotions, having catharsis etc., by itself do very little. So the problem remains of how to bind or inter-lock different modes of being in the world. The 'holistic' approach maintains that the solution is not a matter of swinging back and forth between passion and reason or good and bad parts of the self for the ultimate result of that approach can only be suppression and outward forms of control.

Their view is weakest at this point; that is, it doesn't yet have a really satisfactory theory of the creative interplay between the emotions with reason that explains this kind of integrative growth process. That is why in the attempt to describe the process, they often get thrown back into descriptions that look very much
like the Platonic conception of balancing different parts of the soul, or else retreat into subjective rambling that has more of a mystical tone than an analytic one. They use words to describe the process like 'experienced knowledge' or 'experiential learning', and what is behind this kind of language is precisely that point: that the process cannot be 'gotten' through the intellect alone, but is more like a click in awareness, involving all the layers and centers of knowledge.

The kind of inner control brought about through the constant awareness of yourself is dependent upon this different kind of integrative knowledge of oneself, and is clearly in another tradition from the Platonic sense of control brought about through balance. Furthermore, it has important implications for a theory of freedom in relation to authority. I have spent some time in this paper attempting to uncover the difference because the rest of my argument depends upon seeing the distinction between a system of authority which is based upon an integrative rather than a balancing model of human nature.

Specifically, the Platonic view provides the psychological underpinnings for a theory of authoritarianism, while the 'holistic' approach does the same job for a theory of individualism, closely related to our ordinary understanding of the notion of freedom within a democracy; for unless one understands and takes responsibility for what one does in the world, there is no way to change

27 Though I suspect it is very close to the Socratic view.
outside behavior without increasing external control.

Accordingly, the implications of the 'holistic' model of integration has bearing on Tussman's theory of the relationship of private interests, seen as one's emotional-instinctual life, and public interest, seen as one's rational life. It is Tussman's lack of any psychological theory of individuality or human growth which I find most difficult in his account of obligation and the public interest in a democracy. Because of his Platonic bias, he seems to have no room for the passions in public life (outside of loyalty), for he sees them as belonging almost solely to private life. That is, he doesn't seem to have any relationship for these emotional ranges of interests to the public interest, except one of suppression. In short, he is lacking any positive theory of the relationship of a theory of individualism to a theory of public purpose, which any serious attempt to explain the relationship of the ruled to the ruler in a democracy must be involved in. Consequently his theory of representation and the theory of education which flows from it suffer from this lack.
I have argued in the last section that Tussman's view of the public interest is a limited one because of its Platonic base, nevertheless it is important to see the weight of the problem, first encountered there, that drives his theory of representation. In talking about the public interest, Tussman's appeal to the distinction between real and apparent interests is certainly an appropriate one. The idea that there can be real needs as distinguished from apparent wants, and that freedom is the realization of the former through the restraint of the latter, rests on the assumption that one can harm oneself, or hurt oneself, defeat one's own deep-rooted and long range interests unknowingly or even unwillingly. Thus we speak of being a "slave to passion" or "enslaved" by ignorance.

This is not such a strange assumption if we look around us at how democracy actually works much of the time. We know very well that there are objects or experiences that we want that turn out to be destructive for us. We know very well that our selfish pursuit of what we initially see as our interest, often turns out to be the opposite of what we would have wanted if we had only known better. Even more often, we see that the maximization of everyone pursuing their own individual interest all the time can destroy the very fabric of a democratic life if that means as a body politic we value security, peace, justice and equality as much as we do our individualism.
We may want to drive bigger and faster cars, but if we really understand the consequences of doing so, we might see that it is the worst solution to our transportation problem. We may want to develop industry in order to produce more and more goods, thus satisfying our desire for a higher standard of living; yet, that may not be in our real interest in view of the environmental price that we, or future generations will have to pay. It may be that it is both a natural and instinctual need for human beings to procreate their own kind, and yet it may be the case that it is not in our best interest to allow uncontrolled procreation if we are to protect the earth from the problems of over-population.

All of these very real problems which face us as members of a democratic body politic involved in determining the public interest, force us to acknowledge that the distinction appealed to between real and apparent interest, or between need and want, is not an unimportant one. That if the public interest is to have any meaning at all with regards to this distinction, it must be concerned with real interests and real needs.

The problem then, is not the recognition of the distinction and the plausibility of the assumption it rests on, for they are valid, but the question as to what implications are to be drawn from it. What is going to be done about this fact of life? How is a community going to handle this distinction in the process of arriving at the public interest? Are we going to give the power to someone to make these kind of public distinctions which we
will accept as binding upon us, even against our own judgement; or are we going to allow the vast majority of people to make their own decisions on these issues, whatever the outcome? Tussman - following Plato - has drawn his own implications from this distinction for a theory of government.

As I have argued, Plato saw that only the 'best self' could determine what was in the real or public interest of the individual, and because he despaired of the vast majority of human beings ever being able to operate out of a conception of their 'best self', he found it necessary to develop a special class of 'best selves' who were to be set over the rest of the population to rule them in the public interest; with their consent, but not with their voice.  

Tussman, because of his commitment to a democratic form of government, or at least, because he is writing out of the democratic context, must initially appeal to that 'best self' which resides in every member of the body politic; but in fact, we find that he, like Plato, acknowledges important differences between people that are important to his concept of ruling, particularly in the capacity of rational judgement. He cannot escape the observation that all are not fit to govern in the public interest:

To make all men good and wise seems beyond hope. 
...Even if it is assumed that all men have latent capacity in this direction, there are some who seem to be 'naturals'.

28 Cornford, The Republic, iv, 431. Here Plato establishes the consent of the governed as a condition of authority. This point is often missed.

29 Tussman, Obligation, p. 100.
It is to these 'naturals' that Tussman wants to rely on in the end to safeguard the search for the public interest in lieu of any clear criteria. This is what he means when he says that "we must grope our way back to the Republic and join Plato in the search for the guardian type, for the agent who by endowment and the training of mind and character can play the public role." 30

So, it is not surprising to find as the book moves from a consideration of membership to agency that he, like Plato, relies more and more on the development of a special class of people to rule in the public interest: the agent who is to man the democratic tribunal against the wishes, wants and desires of the majority of the members if need be. The agent who through education and character is able to make those kind of tough public distinctions that are required echoes the Platonic notion of the 'best self': "the public agent had better be us at our best, not at our most typical." 31

What distinguishes Tussman from Plato is only a thin thread at this point; that thread is Tussman hanging onto the elective process. 32 If the members of the body politic can be induced to vote for this special class of people as their representatives, and if they will understand the notion of representation to mean that the agent is to represent them "at their best", against their ordinary selves, 33 then democracy and Plato can be reconciled at

30 Tussman, Obligation, p. 99.
31 Ibid., p. 62.
32 That, and his lack of a theory of knowledge, its nature, how it is attained etc.
33 Tussman, Obligation, p. 62, the full quote goes: "I risk the judgement that the conception of the representative body as a representative sample is a futile and fatal one. The representative, the public agent, had better be us at our best, not at our most typical."
last. Tussman can maintain an essentially Platonic conception of government within a democratic framework and in so doing, can make sense of both.

There are obvious difficulties with the attempt, fascinating and powerful as it is. The most serious objection is that his attempt to reconcile Plato and democratic theory involves some very unfamiliar notions about democracy; specifically, a special notion of representation, and with that, a strained view of political freedom. It can be argued that these special notions are very different from our ordinary understanding of a theory of democracy, and, however sensible, feel strange in this context. In fact, they seem closer to an authoritarian system of government — a dilemma Tussman seems pushed into because he sees no alternative to an essentially Platonic view of the public interest. Let us look at his theory of representation more closely.

I want to argue first, that Tussman's model of representation involves a real dichotomy between private and public interest seen respectively as the emotional and rational life, and though it is by no means obvious that this model does violence to the notion of freedom he started with, it certainly bends it around quite a bit. Secondly, I'd like to point out the implications of such a dichotomy between private and public interest for a theory of authority. Thirdly, I want to argue that the model of integration rather than that of balance, as outlined in the last section,
provides at least one possible alternative to Tussman's theory of representation. Finally, before turning to the next section on education, I want to consider Tussman's theory of representation in relationship to some ordinary conceptions of democratic theory.

I begin then with a consideration of Tussman's model of representation and the concept of political freedom. Tussman begins talking about a theory of representation by introducing two different senses of representative government: on the one hand, there is the sense that the agent is to represent the views of the majority of people who have elected him to be their delegate; on the other, is the famous Burkean model of the agent who is to be elected to represent his electorate as an individual judge of what he thinks is the best policy.

Tussman goes on to make the point that these two different senses of the role of a representative in a democracy are reflected in two parallel conceptions of what a representative body is supposed to be:

On the one hand its representativeness is thought to be that of a 'sample'; a legislature is representative when it contains within itself the same elements, in the same proportion, as are found in the body politic at large....On the other hand there still lingers the conception of representative government as a form of elective aristocracy. And on this view we want to be represented by our best, our wisest and fairest. The representative body should be a cream not a homogenized sample. 34

I have already discussed what view he supports.35 He is committed to a theory of representation that turns out to be an

34 Tussman, Obligation, p. 61-62.
35 See p. 38 of this paper.
"elected aristocracy" because of the importance of public interest as a defining characteristic of a body politic, and because of his view of achieving that purpose only through the character or the 'best self' of the representative agent. He cannot permit a theory of representation wherein the agent merely takes orders from his electorate for that would be like having the worst self -- the private interests of the members -- rule the 'best self' -- the public interest arrived at through reason and deliberation. The agent, so Tussman argues, must be free to deliberate, to discover the public interest.

One of the difficulties with this view is that we get incredibly twisted up in a maze which does strange things to the notion of political freedom. Tussman has defined political freedom in his first chapter as "the freedom under law" and says that freedom in this sense "does not turn on the absence of law but on whether the law is "self-imposed."

That is one of the reasons that only the model of a voluntary group based upon agreement will adequately fit this necessary condition of freedom as defining a body politic. But it turns out to be a tricky business trying to square this condition of political freedom, defined as "self-imposed law", with his theory of representation. He can actually do it, but the thread that holds it all together is very thin indeed, and one wonders how much of an ordinary sense of "self-imposed" gets lost or distorted along the way.

36 Tussman, Obligation, p. 8.
37 Ibid., p. 9.
Before getting into a discussion of that, let me pause here to make a minor point with regard to the relationship between freedom and law. Tussman says in the first chapter:

"...to the extent that law is a system of agreements to which I am a party, 'being under law' does not conflict with 'being free' unless, indeed, I consider myself not free when I do what I have agreed or consented to do."  

I find this view just false; for 'being under law' often does conflict with 'being free'; at least, we often feel less free when we obey law no matter how beneficial we agree its effects are. Tussman is pretty much echoing the Platonic-Rousseauian argument about freedom that I have mentioned earlier; where freedom is seen as the power or the active capacity to do something that you will -- that you know you 'ought' to do.

The problem with this tradition in this context of political freedom is that it ignores for the most part another tradition of freedom which is generally expressed as the absence of restraints upon our actions. According to this tradition, freedom can only be FROM restraint and it is therefore a contradiction to talk about people being made free BY MEANS of restraint.

This latter tradition does, I think, convey a more satisfying descriptive sense of the way we use the word freedom; one that fits into our experiential sense of the relationship between freedom and law. For when you have laws or rules which you have agreed to as the basis of an authority structure, there are still certain

38 Tussman, Obligation, p. 9.
freedoms lost as well as certain freedoms gained. The point is that if we re-define the notion of freedom so that there is no conceptual conflict involved in its relationship to law, then we have to deny the reality of our internal experience: that there really are choices one has to make with regard to areas of freedom, and that there is a resulting feeling of loss or gain in freedom which we experience due to those choices.

That Tussman is aware of this conflict becomes apparent later on when he is discussing the relationship of the subordination required by membership to political freedom, and remarks that "we are frequently reminded that the achievement, and preservation of order exacts its price in freedom, that some freedom must be given up, that we must carefully and constantly balance the demands of these unfortunately competing goods." But then he puts forward two arguments which are an attempt to cancel out that "reminder".

First he asks if "we ought to consider whether it (law) does not in fact so increase the options and possibilities open to us that on any reasonable assessment it increases rather than diminishes the opportunity or power 'to do as one likes.'" I have no argument with the idea that authority which regulates our activities in many instances increases our freedom to do what we want. In effect, what I call 'regulative authority' makes possible the condition of equal freedom for it protects individuals and groups by enforcing prohibitions against the free exercise of arbitrary desires, where those actions

39 Tussman, Obligation, p. 51.

40 Ibid., p. 61, brackets mine. It is interesting that in order to make this point, Tussman adopts the other tradition of freedom that he tends to argue against for the most part: that is, freedom seen as the power 'to do as one likes', not as what 'one ought to do'.
would interfere with the similar freedom of other members of the group.

On this view then, quite rightly, regulative authority increases rather than diminishes the freedom to do as one consciously chooses; it makes real rather than formal freedom possible. If we did not have traffic rules and restrictions, no one would have the freedom to drive in any significant sense; and if we did not have the intervention and regulation of food inspectors and standards of health safety, no one would have the same freedom to eat. But in each of these examples, there are also actions that we are not free to do, and when we look at the relationship of freedom to authority, we are always balancing just this gain of one kind of freedom against the loss of another.

To acknowledge then that there can be a relationship between freedom and authority which increases our freedom is one thing; but to claim that there is always this relationship, or that there is never a conflict between freedom and self-imposed law, is, as I have claimed - to be blind to the binding nature of authority as well as the freeing; it is to make an important point without seeing the relationship of freedom to authority in its totality.

To return now to my major consideration, I take up Tussman's second argument concerning political freedom and its relationship to law to examine what sense he makes of "self-imposed law" -- the defining characteristic of political freedom within a body politic.
He says here: "let us consider freedom as 'governing oneself'" and then slides into the bald assertion almost immediately that 'governing oneself' is:

...not quite the same thing as 'doing as one likes'; it rests on a different conception of the self and finds expression in Rousseau's 'The mere impulse of appetite is slavery, while obedience to a law which we prescribe to ourselves is liberty.'

Or again, shortly on:

On this view...we are free when we are self-governing, making and following our own rules.

It looks as though he is saying that political freedom consists simply in obeying the laws that we make ourselves. Still, in the first quotation he talks about a "different conception of the self" and sees 'governing oneself' as not "doing as one likes."

It is my contention that these Platonic notions are implicit in his conception of making laws; that they serve as criteria for making laws in the public interest, for the concept of a 'best self' which makes laws in the public interest is necessary to the argument of this whole section on representation. It is necessary to Tussman's argument because, even if he succeeds in showing that the complex notion of 'delegation' or representation can be interpreted as "making and following our own rules", he still needs the concept of a 'best self' in order to justify stretching this interpretation of "self-imposed law" further to include the notion of a representative agent who is not to reflect his electors, but to rule in their place.

41 Tussman, Obligation, p. 52.
42 Loc. cit.
43 Ibid., p. 53.
One could argue that this attempt to reconcile a theory of political freedom as "making and following our own rules" with a Platonic theory of representation stretches the sense of the former theory a bit too far; for how free can a member really be when, not only is he one step removed from making laws because he must delegate that power, but in addition, the role of his delegate is to essentially govern for him - ignoring, if need be, what he may see as his private interests. The "necessary relationship between membership and 'participation' which, since Rousseau at least, has made 'political freedom' and 'democracy' virtually synonymous", on Tussman's account, seems to fade almost into a haze. Participation gets reduced to the right to "consent to being governed without our further consent", and without any apparent limits on the kind of laws the agent may feel are necessary.

Tussman is aware of this dilemma for he says that Rousseau thought that a single delegation of the thread of participation "snapped" the relationship to freedom. But not only does he defend as inevitable the delegation of power to representatives and their inevitable delegation in turn to committees and bureaucracies, he also argues for this one further step of delegation: the delegation of law-making to the elected representative agent alone. In the end, his answer to this very real problem of making sense of political freedom within a representative democracy as he has defined it is only the curious statement that:

44 Tussman, Obligation, p. 54.

45 Ibid., p. 53. Reducing "members" very close to the role of Plato's artisans.
But the free citizen will refuse to abdicate. Only by dint of ceaseless devotion to the task of keeping the delicate structure of consent, participation and authority in good repair can we save the claim of self-government from being a bitter mockery.46

But isn't his own demand that the representative agent be free to pursue the public interest as distinct from the private interests or wishes of the members who elected him, a demand for abdication by the members of their rule-making function? Perhaps we should look more closely at the relationship he proposes between the member and his elected agent.

The notion underlying most of the difficulty in understanding the relationship between the member and his elected representative is, of course, that of the public interest. For so long as Tussman (1) sees the public interest as the fundamental concern of a body politic, and (2) so long as he sees that public interest as separate from private interest (or even in opposition to it), only realizable through the development of our best, most rational, objective self against our worst, most selfish, individual self, and (3) so long as he sees that the ordinary member is incapable of performing his public function on this level, but some responsible members - best suited by character and training can; then it is an obvious conclusion that if we wish to achieve the public interest we must set these specially skilled guardians to rule over us.

46 Tussman, Obligation, p. 56.
If we want to hold onto some other notion of representation in a democracy, then it is necessary to deal with this sticky question of the public interest again, for if Tussman's assumptions are all valid, then we are pretty much stuck with his conclusion.

Let me try to drive a wedge into his theory of representation with the idea that the public interest has, or should have a more direct relationship to private interest than Tussman is prepared to acknowledge. He inevitably gets caught in a representative model which encourages a disastrous dichotomy between private and public interest precisely because he regards the agent as there to, in some sense, transcend or control private interests instead of to unite or integrate them into the public interest.

Tussman's representative model works in this way very similarly to the Platonic model of balance within the soul which encourages a dichotomy between reason and passion. As I have already argued, in the balancing model of the self, once you assign reason the role of balancer, reason and passion are immediately set in opposition to each other, thus generating a conflict which is self-verifying; for once you postulate that kind of dichotomy, the different parts are bound to develop in independent ways that play off against each other and therefore always conflict with each other. The inevitable result of such a situation is more and more control being exerted by the rational element and a starving of the instinctual-emotional life.
The same thing happens here in Tussman's theory of representation, only on two levels. If you do set-up the guardian-agents to define a public interest which is seen as separate, not reducible to private interest, then not only is there set in motion this dichotomy between public and private interest, but because of Tussman's Platonic leanings, the private is identified with the emotional life and the public with the rational. The role of the agent then becomes the role of the balancer between reason and passion; between the public and private life. There are several consequences following from such a view of representation that I find troubling.

First of all, because Tussman takes the hard line that there is on the one hand the public interest, and on the other there are all these selfish private interests, and believes that one is not reducible into the other, private and public interest will inevitably develop along separate, conflicting paths. Therefore the public agent role vis a vis private interest can only be a controlling one. There is no way around the agents assuming an authoritarian or oppressor role whenever public and private interest conflict, for they are not supposed to be in charge of uniting private interests, or working on integrating them; they are supposed to be in charge of transcending them. It is their duty to oppose the private interests of individual members and over-ride them in the 'real' interests of the community, as they see them.
Secondly, and consequently, there is a shift in the sense of political freedom Tussman has been talking about, for suddenly "making and obeying your own laws" gets translated into choosing representatives who are in charge of telling members things that they are either not competent to decide, or do not see, or cannot get themselves to do without outside authority. What Tussman is arguing for here is the authorization of a certain kind of control: the control of reason over the passions, or the subordination of private interest to the public interest.

If we accept the role of Tussman's agent as a balancer between our reason and our passions so as to emerge with public interest, then it might very well make sense for an adult member to consent to having someone like that placed in authority over him -- just as on Plato's account a man consents as an autonomous agent to assigning his reason a balancing role in his own psyche. But, I want to argue that though there is nothing illogical about an adult member assigning certain powers to an agent without losing his autonomy, the kind of power and the kind of control he assigns is crucial to that sense of autonomy. Specifically, I would like to point out that Tussman's model exacts a very heavy price in our ordinary conception of autonomy or political freedom; a price, I shall argue later, that is not necessary to the maintenance of a sensible notion of the public interest.
Thirdly, with Tussman's model of representation, there seems to be some confusion, if not an outright paradox generated in trying to understand the role of the member seen in this new light. It appears at first glance that the member is not really to be concerned, or is not able to be concerned with the public interest in the same way as the agent is; for if he were able to determine what is in the public interest, then why wouldn't the role of the representative agent be to reflect the judgement of the member or the majority of members - at least on crucial issues?

Now there is nothing absurd about the contention that most members, most of the time are incapable of getting beyond their private interests and therefore need a responsible agent to make important decisions for them, but if this is the case, as Tussman suggests, we are still left with the problem of how they are going to get beyond their private interests in electing a representative.

Plato didn't even bother with this problem; he made sure that the ordinary citizen had nothing to do with electing anybody to office. Mill, coming out of mixture of aristocratic and democratic theory, solved a similar difficulty by relying on some vague reference to the power of "respect"; the belief that the individual member could be trusted to vote for his 'betters' out of a kind of 'reverence'. But the kind of democratic body politic that Tussman is writing about involves a complex system of constituencies, parties and platforms, and has no guaranteed theory of knowledge to validate the difficult decision processes.
This means that at each election period, the individual member is going to be directly confronted with the problem of the public interest if, and when, he must choose between rival candidates and rival belief systems. It won't do at this point to say "vote for the best man", for that decision as to who is the best man is going to depend upon how you assess what each man stands for who is running for office; how you assess what he believes in, and how he sees the nature of the problems affecting the body politic.

So no matter how much we may despair of the majority of members having the capacity to act in the public interest, still, even on this seemingly minimal of ruling tasks -- the election of the representative agent, they are necessarily confronted with the problem of deciding what is in the public interest.

The next question is then, "How does the member of a constituency go about deciding what the public interest is?" Do they know what it is beforehand and simply try to match each candidate to some objective criteria they, or some of them have? Or does the public interest emerge out of debate, consideration or arguments and deliberation?

I cannot see how it can be the former case, if we are to hold onto any meaningful sense of the public interest. That is, I cannot see how the public interest can be known beforehand unless we are merely referring to vague generalities which no one would
disagrees with, like: the public interest is always concerned with the needs of the community, with health, transportation, survival, welfare etc. But if that is all we mean by the public interest then we just have to push the problem to another level; we have to ask what the means are by which these agreed upon public interests can be brought about. We are still confronted with the problem of trying to determine what methods are in the public interest to best accomplish what is in the 'objective' public interest - and these methods or means certainly can't be known beforehand. So we are back to the second proposition: the public interest or its means can only be determined after discussion, deliberation and argument.

If this is the case, where does an individual member begin to consider the public interest? What does he start with to argue over? Surely it must be a collection of private and individual interests. That is, one can accept a criterion of public interest which is different from a simple collection of private interests -- and also oblige both member and agent to do so as well, but surely the public interest starts first from this collection; for it cannot be unrelated to somebody's interest.

Tussman is not blind to this relationship in a democracy between a person's private interests and the public interest. He acknowledges it by putting forward a 'claiming' criterion which converts private interest into public interest. He argues that that process of transforming private interests into public interests
involves the understanding of certain rational structures in our system; structures, or standards which are difficult to spell out and are not understood intuitively by all those engaged in the process. These structures involve crucial concepts like 'making a claim', 'having a good argument', the relationship of claims to evidence, the notions or reasoning which include their own logical criteria.

Tussman argues that there must be a certain class of claims which may begin as a private expression of a felt want, but in order to be legitimately considered as a public expression of a rational need, must satisfy rational structures of argument. He argues that what we are more often engaged in when determining what the public interest is, is trying to assess whether a private interest can pass all of these tests; can fit within these structures of a 'claim'.

To the extent that Tussman is engaged in analyzing the distinction between want and claim and showing how the former must be converted into the latter as a necessary condition of the public interest, he deserves explicit mention; his analysis is clear and enlightening on this score. But I want to argue that this necessary condition is only a minimal one in trying to get at the relationship between private and public interest, and not really the main or interesting problem we encounter with regard to determining the public interest. He never really talks about how we can
go about determining the public interest out of a welter of legitimate claims; for what actually seems to be at the centre of the problem of the public interest is the question of how you discriminate between legitimate public interests, how you assign priorities etc.

The dilemma most of the time is not really between private interest narrowly conceived as passion or want, and a public interest identified with reason, but over legitimate 'claims' of different methods or possibilities of achieving some agreed upon public good. I would suggest that most public policy, if not reducible to the coalescing of private and public interest in the end, then is at least in a middle realm where private interests are not irrelevant, for they give the shape to public issues. That is, what people come to see as their interests in terms of living style, health, security, and the values that they uphold, are important to public issues and there ought to be some remarks by Tussman on the kinds of things which would represent legitimate solutions for collections of legitimate claims. He never seems to get to this level in the discussion however, because he is working out of his dilemma between the emotional and rational life almost all the time, but even on this level he is involved in a serious problem.

If it is true that the public interest requires a training and experience in the rational acts of 'claiming' or argument,
and if it is true that the individual member must be involved in this process in order to select a representative-agent who will perform this function for him, then either the member is capable of such an enterprise or he is not. If he is not, how are we going to get the 'best' agents elected, and if he is capable, then how can Tussman justify having a representative agent that doesn't represent him?

Of course, there can be several justifications for having a model of representation like the one Tussman puts forward, but he owes us some more clarification on this score. It won't do to merely talk about the necessity of rational control of 'the best' over the irrational 'rest' and see the agent as the balancing voice of reason. The member, it seems, must also be the voice of reason on occasion, and that fact must have some bearing on the authority relationship between agent and member.

Let me suggest at this point an alternative model of representation in the same way as I have suggested an alternative model of the relationship between parts of the soul. I want to put forward a model of the representative-agent that sees his guardian role as more of an integrator of private interests rather than as a balancer between reason and passion. According to this model there is a legitimate sense of public interest which doesn't have to create an adversary relationship between private and public interest because public interest can be shown to emerge
from private interest; therefore, private interest can at every stage be a legitimate reference point for voters and agents alike.

This alternative view of the agent's role as a representative is best expressed by Saul Alinsky in *Reveille for Radicals*. His basic starting point is that the people's private interests are final, though of course he doesn't settle for those interests as they exist, but tries to change them. The important point is the way his agent goes about changing those private interests. The agent is seen here as a facilitator who is there to aid in a transition, not by transcending private interests through telling people what the public interest is, but by changing those private interests through actually putting people in different situations where their private interests have a chance to change.

Alinsky's point is quite simple: the agent takes the private interests of the community as they exist and that is his reference point from then on; he accepts the fact that the member's approval or disapproval is always going to be couched in terms of their private interests. The reason that he can still get away with claiming to be advancing a sense of community or public interest is because the changes that he brings about will lead the members to change their private interests bit by bit. However, if those private interests don't change, then what the agent is attempting to do is not a legitimate public interest. According to this model then, the public interest is directly connected to private interest, though not necessarily the private interests that actually exist at any given time and place.

---

The great value of this model is that it eliminates the extrem dichotomy that Tussman gets into. In Tussman's model, the representative, because of the negative relationship of private interest to public interest is forced into an oppressor or authoritarian role sometimes, particularly when private and public interest conflict and subordination is required. The Alinsky model makes the agent a servant rather than a master (as in the Tussman model), but not a servant of just present private interests which allows him an escape from the equally blinding 'pluralist' approach to public interest that Tussman is so rightly concerned with.

What is happening in the Alinsky model is that the agent is taking private interests and transforming them, not by opposing them as in the case of Tussman's guardian-agent, but by facilitating the change through the person's self-interest. In other words, one's private interest is not only an inevitable reference point, but a desirable one.

Many exponents and supporters of People's Organizations bitterly denounce self-interest as one of the main obstacles that must be crushed if people are to be organized into a co-operative fellowship. Both liberals and organizers have attributed the failure of their attempts to the rampant spirit of individualism and selfishness. These organizers have never appreciated that many seeming obstacles can be utilized to great advantage. The fact is that self-interest can be a most potent weapon in the development of co-operation and identification of the group welfare as being of greater importance than personal welfare.  

48 Saul Alinsky, Reveille for Radicals, p. 94.
To see the agent's role in this alternative context is, as I have said, to see his task as more of a facilitator or integrator than a balancer or judge; he becomes an advocate-guardian more than a paternal-guardian. By forcing the representative to pay attention to private interests, you force him into all kinds of non-authoritarian ways of changing those private interests, either through educating the public, or putting them into situations which make them directly experience a transformation of their private interests. Alinsky provides various examples of the ways in which this has been, and can be done successfully.49

I could, of course, try to extend this alternative model of representation to try to show that this is an ideal form of representation, or the only form of representation that makes sense within the structure of a democratic body politic, but I don't wish to get into that kind of argument here. All I mean to do is to show that there are alternative conceptions of representation and the relationship of private to public interest, and the interesting thing about Tussman's argument is that he doesn't see that there are and consequently, is stuck in his formulation of the dilemma.

His dilemma is to see that either you have these private interests which are quarrelsome, factional and chaotic in the life of the body politic, or you have order founded on a conception of the public interest which only a few specially-gifted and trained agents can appreciate and impose. But we see with his theory of representation (which is where he first seems driven to formulate

49 Saul Alinsky, Reveille for Radicals, pp. 95-100, pp. 110-116. Closer to home, a positive example would be medicare, a negative one the B.C. Auto-Plan Insurance scheme.
this dilemma and bring it home to us, transforming the concept of
freedom in the process) that this dilemma is not really necessary.
At least he owes us much more argument against alternative models
for there is at least one alternative which seems to be a legiti-
mate contender for a theory of representation.

Let me try to clarify my position at this point. I am
arguing that Tussman isn't wrong in principle; that is, he isn't
wrong in wanting agents to defend or create something that goes
beyond existing individual private interest, but everything depends
upon how, and how far the public interest goes beyond private
interest, just as in the model of the theory of the soul, every-
thing depends upon how, and how far reason goes beyond the passions
in control.

Accordingly, it does make sense for autonomous adult
members to appoint a guardian-agent of some kind, but you have to
distinguish the right kind of guardian from the wrong kind, for
the consequences are markedly difference in each case depending
upon which view you have. Tussman's guardian involves him in a
paradox - not because he is a guardian, but because he is the kind
of guardian he is. That is, it is not true that an autonomous adult
member cannot take on the authority of a guardian-agent, but it
seems to be true that an adult cannot take on a guardian-agent
of Tussman's kind precisely because Tussman is fairly extreme in
his emphasis on the dichotomy between reason and passion which
would necessitate an authoritarian kind of guardian.
It would certainly make more sense for an adult to accept some kind of guardian who would work with him in an integrative way than it would be to accept a guardian who would see his role of balancing private and public interest in such a way that whatever the sum of the balancing process is, it is going to stand in opposition to private interest most of the time, necessitating an oppressive kind of authority.

Furthermore Tussman is committed to dealing with fully autonomous adults via his theory of membership, particularly his theory of consent. In the chapter on membership Tussman goes to great lengths to argue that the notion of consent which is at the heart of the model of a voluntary association "must be voluntary, not unconscious or accidental."50

That is the act can only be properly taken as 'consent' if it is done 'knowingly', if it is understood by the one performing the act that his action involves his acceptance of the obligation of membership. This condition seems to me so crucial that, in fact, it may even override the force of an explicit verbal expression of consent. That is why we take the child's pledge lightly. He says the magic words, but he does not know quite what he is saying. It is form without substance.51

This is so because the necessary 'knowing' quality of consenting to membership -- the acceptance of the obligations and the roles implied plus the understanding of the rights received -- requires a stage of mental development and a sophistication of awareness

50 Tussman, Obligation, p. 36.

51 Loc. cit.
and commitment that only an autonomous 'adult' intelligence can possibly achieve. For to see yourself as a full-fledged member of the body politic in the same sense that Tussman speaks about is more than just consent; it is an affirmation of oneself as a responsible, rational, political being. And Tussman needs just this sense of consent if he is to hang onto any meaningful account of political freedom under law. But, if this is the case, Tussman's member is hardly going to elect an agent of his kind.

My suspicion is that Tussman has a much narrower view of adulthood than I would want to put forward. Tussman, and Hobbes as well, saw that the demands of accepting authority and recognizing the responsibility to elect a good guardian-agent was sufficient responsibility for one to be considered an autonomous adult member of the body politic; but that seems to constitute a member's only 'adult' talent. I would want to argue for a notion of adulthood that is more extensive and has a different result.

My conception of adult autonomy, and therefore political freedom, involves more than having the intelligence to submit to control which is static and external; it is a notion which requires rather the intelligence to submit to a control which is dynamic and internal. This latter condition would best express itself by electing somebody to control your private interest, but someone who is to help you move your private interest in new directions. So long as responsibility for public decisions is kept with the member rather than given over to the agent in one act of elective
faith, than the result is quite a different conception of agency or a theory of representation.

It is not my purpose to detail this other conception. I raise it here mainly to point out that Tussman arrives in a kind of authoritarian dilemma because he doesn't see the personality in the terms of integration and growth, but only in terms of the dichotomy between passion and reason; therefore, he doesn't see the possibility of any other kind of agent. He sees the only alternative to his model as stark and disastrous, for either the passions dominate, meaning in the political area, private interest, or there is control of these passions by reason, meaning in the political area, public interest. He doesn't see any middle ground or other way between the horns of that dilemma.

There is nothing inherently illogical about such a combination or interpretation of representation and democracy; that is a theory of democracy could easily incorporate such a view and still be intelligible. Still, it is important to see that Tussman is putting forward an essentially aristocratic theory of government which is not our usual concept of democracy, and one which seems to conflict in places with other versions.

In this regard I think it is important to have a look at what a democratic theory of government actually involves conceptually, but this, Tussman doesn't provide. He makes many references to what a democrat believes, to what democracy assumes, and to what purposes are fundamental, but I find no definitive analysis
of it as a political concept unless the entire book is that analysis. But if this is the case, then I still want to argue that something seems missing; that the particular interpretation that he imputes to a democrat is a strange one.

Tussman makes assumptions that I'm not convinced are generally true. He says at one point in his discussion of democracy that "the essential features of a democratic polity is its concern for the participation of the member in the process by which the community is governed." Indeed, that does seem to be the essential feature, but rather than go on from that point to draw the usual implications with reference to "participation", Tussman has developed his own theory of participation, which, as I have already argued, in effect results in the wrong kind (or not enough) for the ordinary, autonomous member.

He justifies his own version of participation on the grounds that this "concern for the participation of the member" was a concern of a special kind stemming from a specific motive. "The democrat", so Tussman wants to argue:

...when democracy was a creed that mattered... argued that all (or most) men have deliberative and moral potentiality and that given the proper education and environment, each could take his place in the deliberative forum and share the responsibility of sovereignty.

He then goes on to argue that men wanted this kind of participation in "the responsibility of sovereignty"..."not simply to get more,

52 Tussman, Obligation, p. 105.

53 Loc. cit.
but primarily in order to develop his deliberative and moral character."

I don’t believe that assumption squares with the history of the extension of the franchise to all who are legitimate members of the body politic - which is the essential feature of 'participation' in a democracy. I find the phrase "no taxation without representation" or "each man is the best judge of his own interests" are more adequate places to start theorizing about the origins and purposes of democratic theory.

When men demanded a part in the sovereign power, it is more reasonable to assume that they wanted more power or control over their own lives, not "primarily" (if at all) "to develop their deliberative and moral character." In fact, the rising demand for a share in the governing process for every man and woman who was a member of the body politic matched, rather, the rising consciousness of the concept of a 'person'; a concept of a human being seen as an individual entity who has the equal right to autonomy and respect for his individuality within a legal framework that guarantees similar rights for those similarly situated.

What may be true is that men have found in the process of achieving these goals -- in the process of 'governing themselves' -- that the ideals they cherish which bind them together in the pursuit of a common public interest - ideals such as equality, justice, human dignity and welfare - these ideals demand the development of

54 Tussman, Obligation, p. 105, emphasis mine.
a deliberative and moral character for their implementation in political life. But this is a discovery after the fact, not the reason for which democracy -- participation in the sovereign function -- was demanded, nor is demanded today.

It is this very discovery which gives rise to the difficult conflict which confronts any body politic faced with ideals, on the one hand, and the reality of human experience on the other. I find Tussman's arguments both powerful and convincing where he points out the need for our understanding the nature of this conflict which faces any body politic if it is to escape hypocrisy in relation to public purposes. He is at his best specifically where he talks about the tribunal context in its role of determining and protecting the public interest, where he gives us a razor-sharp analysis of the internal relationship between procedure, purpose and law with the model of the American Constitutional democracy in mind. His insights into what turns out to be in the end, the procedural role of the judge, are compellingly clear and insightful.

But where I have difficulty with his democratic theory is where he refuses a place in the public process for the private, individual life. In that attempt, since he lacks any positive theory of individualism, he distorts democratic conceptions to suit his own Platonic view of man. Despite what he says, he is not just arguing for a different view of democracy. I believe his view challenges the very conceptual foundation of our understanding of
democracy, and that to follow it in a practical way would very quickly change the form we call democratic radically. That may turn out to be a very good thing with respect to the achievement of the public interest in one sense, but then, that is a different argument. My claim here is that Tussman is not putting forth just a horse of a different color, but another animal, resting on a distinctive attitude toward human beings.

I suspect that Tussman is driven to this attitude when he looks around at the actual working of the democratic process and tries to make sense of that commitment to a public purpose, or public interest, or common good, or whatever the term we use to appeal to those ideals which extend beyond our own private, individual wants and interests. That is, he is driven to an aristocratic view of human nature from the recognition that the democratic view doesn't seem to work, that men pursuing their own private interests within an authoritative structure which encourages that pursuit, can rarely achieve a formulation of the public interest. The best that can ever happen under these circumstances is that someone seizes command, one side out-bargains or out-maneouvres all the others, with the result being the legitimacy of sheer power as the criteria of public purpose. His description of the democratic process from this perspective is a chillingly accurate and all too sobering one.55

Perhaps he is saying that we are no longer confronted with a conflict, but a crisis. We live in such a dangerous time that we

55 Tussman, Obligation, p. 104.
can no longer afford the luxury of experimenting with the giving of power to adolescents in the hopes that the process of ruling will turn them into responsible adults. Perhaps he is saying that we can no longer give people power over dangerous weapons that they regard as toys, or over the resources of the earth that they regard as private possessions. Perhaps he is saying that we live in an emergency era, where even democracies must be willing to put more power in the hands of the few, well-chosen wise men who they elect as their rulers.

This isn't such a strange idea, for democracies have built-in measures which entitle the agents to take over emergency powers in times of crisis. During those times, we allow government to rule us paternally with not only our consent, but with our gratitude. (The Platonic ideal!) The point is this, however: is Tussman putting forward a viable theory of democratic government and representation for extraordinary times, or is he claiming it is an appropriate model of the relationship of ruler to ruled all the time? If it is the latter claim then I cannot see how one can escape seeing his theory of this relationship of authority as fundamentally paternalistic and aristocratic, not democratic. Either it is one or the other, for it cannot be both as the same time and still permit these words their distinctive, political signification.
CHAPTER IV

With this analysis of Tussman's theory of political obligation and its relationship to a theory of democracy behind us, we can finally turn to the major concern of his political philosophy both in this book and in Experiment at Berkeley, his theory of political education. It will not look so strange to confront assertions like:

The theory of education is essentially the theory of the government of mind; it is hopeless when it is not at the same time a theory of the state -- a theory of political obligation.  

for it is not surprising to see that the dilemma which spawned his distinctive theory of representation is what is driving his argument here as well.

I put forward the contention earlier that Tussman is clearly in the Platonic-Rousseau tradition of seeing freedom as a kind of internal power of the rational faculty over the emotional-instinctual life, and that this view of freedom is an important undercurrent which informs his theory of public interest, his theory of representation, and most especially, his theory of education.

For Tussman then, "government of mind" is another term for "freedom of the mind"; the very Platonic sense of freedom already discussed. Tussman wants to argue that it is the primary function of a liberal education to nourish that kind of freedom.

The crux is freedom. Liberal education aims at the free mind....If we could force men to be free, we would, as it is we can only try to help them. Once we understand what freedom of the mind is, the paradoxical quality of that statement disappears. Minds are not made free by being left alone. Nor are students.

56 Tussman, Obligation, p. 103.
57 Tussman, Experiment at Berkeley, p. 29
The reason that the cultivation of this "free mind" is so important a task that it must be, so Tussman argues, the primary goal of any concept of liberal education in a democracy, is because without it we cannot approach the public/private distinction with any intelligence and therefore, cannot fulfill our roles as active members in the body politic. To have a free mind in this sense is to have trained our character (in the Platonic sense) to fit us for the roles of member and agent in the democratic community. It is in this sense that Tussman sees education as having a positive, purposeful mission, a task and role to play, and, he claims, it is the raison d'etre of a free, compulsory and universal educational system.

Tussman's educational theory embroils him in an age-old educational controversy as to the nature of the development of the rational capacity - the exercise of which he regards as "freedom of the mind." There are two conflicting views concerning the development of capacity, as old as Socrate's arguments in *Meno*. One view regards man at birth as little more than an empty bottle which needs filling up. It therefore is the duty and purpose of teaching to put knowledge into the person.

On the other view man is seen at birth as simply a complex of inherited faculties which unfold spontaneously and automatically when confronted with particular stimuli when it is appropriate for that organism to do so. Pushed to its extreme position, this latter view holds that all guidance by adults is a form of imposition on the child who generates his own standards and controls wholly from
within himself.

These two doctrines appear in the area of human affairs mostly as conflicting doctrines under the names respectively of the "authoritarian" and "permissive" schools in educational theory. Each rivals the other for the throne of truth, but, in fact, they share the throne between them. For it seems to be the case that human nature is a set of complex, innate capacities — genetically determined — some of which unfold spontaneously, and some of which do not. That is, there are some capacities which, given the appropriate environment, do just unfold spontaneously without any kind of purposeful, training period. We can see that in the capacities of eating, talking, and walking, or even loving, hating, sympathizing. You cannot really speak of teaching someone to talk or to love in the same way as you speak of teaching someone to play a game or do mathematical sums. At least, in an important sense, if you leave people alone, it is very likely that they will be able to develop the ability to walk and make sounds with their mouth, and eat what they must without any direct, purposeful training period...or teaching.

But there are also important 'potential' capacities which, while residually inherent in the individual, may not develop automatically or spontaneously. These must be called out through purposeful interaction with other people, and it is usually the case that these 'potentialities' or 'capacities' are rarely actualized until after this interaction has occurred. Some of our most
valuable activities belong to this latter category, activities such as abstract reasoning, logical deliberation, playing musical instruments, or even performing athletic games that depend on skill and the development of certain parts of our musculature beyond an 'ordinary' range. There is a difference between learning to walk and learning to play the violin, or between learning the reflex action of drinking and learning to do higher mathematics, though they are all inherent human capacities and though we use the same word - 'learning' when talking about them.

Beginning with Plato many philosophers and educational theorists have recognized this distinction between capacities as an important one for the purposes of education. In particular, they have regarded the development of the rational capacities of the mind as belonging to the second category; that is, they have regarded the activities of reasoning, deliberating, judging, and the exercise of certain mental skills as inherent in everyone in greater or lesser degrees, but not actualized automatically -- most particularly -- not actualized automatically in accordance with particular cultural traditions and moral values which are crucial to the on-going life of a civilized community. They argue that even if these capacities are innate, we still have the responsibility of developing and engaging them, in awakening their potential, and in guiding them along certain paths.

Tussman - like Plato and Rousseau before him - goes even further to suggest that "freedom of mind" and therefore,
real freedom, depends upon the development of these rational capacities as a 'power' against the strength of the spontaneous appetites. He argues that it is the power that we have to actualize our capacities for purposes that we have consciously and rationally determined that makes us free-self-determining individuals.

If, as on this account, power is freedom, then the degree of freedom that a man has is directly related to the degree of power he can actualize. Accordingly, if the actualization of those powers is dependent upon the development of innate capacities, then a man must have access to the means of developing them if his powers, and thus his freedom, are not to be diminished.

Tussman is arguing that the meaning of self-government, both individually and politically, is not what we think it is. It is not merely the condition of making your own rules seen as 'doing what you like'. The freedom that he speaks of as needed in order to be self-directing, self-governing members of society is the Platonic freedom: freedom of the mind. He sees that freedom as not an automatic, fixed part of human nature; but that it can be established where it does not occur spontaneously, and increased where it does, through learning, experience and cultivation.

For Tussman, then, the free mind is not the mind that has been left alone to express only initial first desires, wants, and passions:
Minds are not made free by being left alone. Nor are students.\textsuperscript{58}

For to do this is not to contribute to a person's real freedom. He might make choices or give his consent without adequate reflection or appreciation of the consequences, or in pursuit of transitory or unreal desires, or in various predicaments when judgement is likely to be clouded by lack of understanding.

Tussman sees that education alone cannot cope with all of these factors, nor perhaps even change them, but it can diminish their effect and create conditions of awareness that contribute to greater possible freedom of choice. Thus it liberates us from the bonds of "mere appetite" and allows us to take our place as deliberative members in the body politic.

Through all of this, he is making the claim that since democracy depends upon a truly self-governing society, and for him the condition of self-government requires freedom seen as "government of the mind", then it is the first duty of the democratic body politic to provide an educational system which is engaged in the positive cultivation of that kind of free mind. He wants to argue, that not only does democratic government have the "license to meddle", with the minds of its members, but it has the positive obligation to "meddle." This is what he means when he says that Liberal education must be "education for the life of action and decision."\textsuperscript{59}

\textsuperscript{58} Tussman, \textit{Experiment at Berkeley}, p. 29.

\textsuperscript{59} Tussman, \textit{Obligation}, p. 15.
This argument is a strong and compelling one. It is true that if democratic theory is concerned with giving the right to participate in the sovereign power to every member of the body politic, and if it is true that this particular role requires the learning of special skills and traits related to the development of a distinctive character and rational ability, then we can only conclude with Tussman that it is sheer folly to ignore the important educational role that political life demands.

But there is an important shift that occurs in his educational theory that Tussman doesn't acknowledge. This shift adds more fuel to the claim that what begins as a democratic theory, turns out in the end to be an aristocratic one -- or more specifically, a Platonic one, for it is here that his Platonism is clearest.

Tussman begins *Obligation and the Body Politic* saying that "the education of the citizen for the responsibilities of a variety of political roles is a pressing task" and one role in particular, "the role of the member, is the one for which everyone needs education." But very quickly it becomes apparent that he means in effect to convert the notion of member into that of agent, and although his theory of membership preserves the notion that we are all agents in some sense in a democracy, once he begins talking

---

60 I have begun to use the word 'aristocratic' rather than 'authoritarian' for that word conveys the particular kind of authoritarian system that I believe Tussman, like Plato, argues for.


62 Ibid., p. 11.
about the agent, he begins to restrict the notion of agency to the concern with only the role of the 'elected representative'. Consequently, the education that he is so concerned with, turns out to be not the political education of the large mass of members, but the specific education of the elected agent for his role as ruler.

This fact, though not so obvious in *Obligation and the Body Politic*, becomes very clear in his next book, *Experiment at Berkeley*. Here he fastens on the college as distinct from the university\(^63\) to be the institution to fulfill this important educational task. He doesn't deny the importance of the concept of a university -- the expansion of knowledge divided into separate disciplines -- but he wants to argue that the political role of self-government in a democracy demands a two-year programme which should be totally centered around political, moral and social themes before allowing students to go on to specialize in the disciplines provided by a university. For him, the liberal arts college has its own special task in this regard. It is:

...a different enterprise. It does not assault or extend the frontiers of knowledge. It has a different mission. It cultivates human understanding. The mind of the person, not the body of knowledge, is its central concern.\(^64\)

At this point he seems to have abandoned any idea of educating the majority of members, at least formally, for by the time a member reaches a college or the lower division of a university,

\(^63\) Though in fact, he argues the same case for the first two years of university life -- what he calls the "lower division" years.

there has already been a systematic winnowing process. We are left
with a group of people, in modern dress, but closely resembling
Plato's guardian class in *Republic*, who underwent their own
specially selective process. Tussman's selective process is the
vertical mobility through our educational testing system which is
supposed to determine who are the most intellectually-oriented mem-
bers of our society. Out of this group will come our agents.

So it is really the specially selected agent, the elected
representative, which is the center of Tussman's educational energy,
just as for Plato it was the education of the guardians which con-
sumed the major part of *Republic*. But what of the ordinary member?
What kind of education will he receive? How is he to understand the
complex notion of agreement that Tussman finds so crucial to the
notion of a body politic? How will he understand the "knowing"
quality of his obligations of subordination? How will he construe
his rights? Indeed, the argument comes full circle — how will he
ever be able to understand who are his betters that he might elect
them to rule over him? On these matters, Tussman gives us no further
information.

Despite his democratic notion of member, Tussman treats
the ordinary member in very much the same way that Plato treats the
artisans in the *Republic*. It's not exactly for the same reason,
though it is for a similar one: he doesn't hold much hope for the
ordinary, run-of-the-mill member. His only hope is somewhat like
Mill's notion of "respect": the hope that the ordinary member will
have enough sense to allow 'a saving remnant' to save them; that
they will allow a well-trained and dedicated group of superior
agents to rule over them, with their consent. It is to this end
that he conceives the purpose of liberal education.

Liberal education is - when it is what it should
be....training free citizens to exercise judgement
on behalf of a consciously self-governed community.65

Another and most important difficulty with his theory of
education lies less with its undemocratic nature, but in the narrow­
ness of its conception. Tussman seems to hold the view that the
great tradition of a liberal arts education should be conceived of
as strictly a "political education" and political in just that
special sense of his.

He says at the beginning of Obligation and the Body Politic
that "I shall resist the temptation to pursue the argument that the
"liberal" is the "political"" but then immediately says:

The liberal college will continue to flounder
from one morass into another until it re­
discovers in the task of educating the ruler,
the central theme of its life.66

By the end of the book, there are no more qualifications:

The education of the ruler, of the political
agent, is still our greatest unmet educational
challenge. It is,...the central theme, if not
the lost chord, of 'liberal' education.67

And by the time he writes Experiment at Berkeley, he is committed
to the identification of the 'liberal' with the 'political' from
the very beginning. He states that the liberal arts college has

65 Tussman, Obligation, p. 10.
66 Loc. cit.
67 Ibid., p. 103.
"its own mission: to fit us for the life of active membership in the democratic community; to fit us to serve, in its broadest sense our common political vocation."  

Either Tussman has expanded the notion of the political remarkably beyond what we ordinarily see as part of that notion, or the notion of the political remains as it usually is, relatively narrow, and a whole other range of important values just drop out of the conception of liberal arts educational purposes. That is, does Tussman mean to enlarge the notion of the 'political' to include the activities of our emotional, spiritual, aesthetic, psychological, artistic and creative lives?

I think not. I think the best that can be said for his enlargement of the range of the political is to include 'moral', and 'social' activities closely related to political life and that the charge of narrowness concerning the subject matter of a liberal arts education is an appropriate one.

There is good evidence for this view given in the last chapter of Obligation and the Body Politic where he says:

The school...is...either the nurturer of the deliberative animal, or, failing that, a bordello of the mind.

There is a total lack of any other values which could balance the parallel construction of that sentence. After the words "failing that", there is nothing but a reference to degeneracy! What can Tussman possibly mean by referring to the entire range of activities

68 Tussman, Experiment at Berkeley, p. 4.

69 Ibid., p. 38. Here he says that "Important for the liberal-arts lower division in America today means 'moral', 'social', 'political'.

70 Tussman, Obligation, p. 105. Emphasis mine.
mentioned above, and not covered by the word "deliberative", as a "bordello". Is he using the word descriptively or evaluatively? Is he contrasting a heaven and a hell?

My own sense is that Tussman uses the word with tolerant contempt. He sees any activity of the mind which is not deliberative, rational, not oriented to train the agent to play his role in the democratic enterprise, as a seductive degeneracy of the mind, where passion may be indulged in for a price. He can refer to any kind of interest other than the political as the "bordello of the mind" because he sees curiosity which is unharnessed from the life of the polis as no particular virtue at all, and it appears he feels the same way about creativity.

My objection takes the form that it seems both strange and incorrect to relegate the powerful and crucial range of activities that affect our emotional and spiritual life to a bordello image. Most of these activities are not deliberative in the sense that he means, and though they are instrumental in training our character for the life of action and decision that he values so much, they do not do so in the way that Tussman stresses.

Tussman's model of training character is a controlled one, whereas all the creative activities are part of an integrative training model. They are activities or modes of training which are means of growing in the full sense of training yourself for seeing and understanding yourself more clearly through focussing energies along certain channels of expression. To argue
this way is not to deny the importance of character, but to claim that it is best developed in an integrated way rather than a controlling way. It is to argue that the creative ranges of education are a different sort of activity, but, at least as important to the full life of any human animal, for they are what give life much of its energy, vitality and interest.

It is true that Tussman sees the 'political' as the center of the subject matter for only the first two years of the college or the lower division of the university, but the objection still stands, for it is these very years which play such a crucial part in the development of a person's character. Tussman's narrowness of vision just as this particular point in a person's education is a serious one.

I suspect that part of the problem here is, again, the old one encountered earlier in trying to understand the relationship of private interest to public interest: the old conflict between the rational and the emotional life, the roots of which can be traced to his fundamentally Platonic conception of human nature, and to the division of the soul. Tussman applauds the rational capacity while fearing the appetative-emotional. He sees the only proper purpose of education to be the strengthening of our reasoning capacity so that we may perform as our 'best self'.

Related to that conflict, and another part of the problem here, is his lack of a positive theory concerning individuality.
Tussman seems only to recognize political individuals — and political in that special sense of his. Because of that his theory of education lacks any psychological underpinnings related to how, in fact, people learn the very things that he values. It lacks a broader, more inclusive view of human nature. Because of this, and because of his emphasis on duty, reason and obligation, Tussman comes out looking more like a rigid authoritarian than a democratic advocate of freedom.

This missing part of his theory is a serious omission, for it tends to work like a smoke screen, blocking out the very important contribution that a programme like the one offered at Berkeley and others like it have to make in terms of a viable and exciting teaching method. In this regard, it is a pity that he didn't use the "bordello" metaphor in much the same way as he uses his metaphor of the "marketplace" regarding the forum. For I think he has a fundamental point to make, one that has given both his programme and others like it their special quality and life.

Where he sees educational institutions as bordellos or market-places, where he sees them as seductive exploiters of our passing whims, cursory interests, or panderers to our immediate pleasures, he is making an important point. He is making a distinction between two different ways to approach learning. One is from the basis of abstraction - from the discipline of a 'field of study', the other is from the basis of the very problems which gave rise to the field of study in the first place. He is talking fundamentally about two different ways to hook up facts and knowledge, or learning and understanding, or science and wisdom. He is claiming that education should

71 Tussman, Experiment at Berkeley, p. 13.
not be either a marketplace nor a bordello. It should not be a place where knowledge is hawked or seductively sold, but should be the purposeful confrontation of a series of issues growing out of actual problems in life.

Tussman is making a claim that is much the same claim that Popper has made with regard to the all too seductive, but inevitably bankrupt method of beginning to teach from the basis of abstraction alone.72 Popper argues that what he calls the "prima facie method of teaching philosophy"73 is liable to produce a philosophy that turns out to be a lot of nonsense:

What I mean by 'the prima facie method of teaching philosophy', and what would seem to be the only method, is that of giving the beginner...the works of the great philosophers to read; the works, say, of Plato, Aristotle, Descartes and Leibniz, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Kant and Mill. What is the effect of such a course of reading? A new world of astonishingly subtle and vast abstractions opens itself before the reader; abstractions on an extremely high and difficult level. Thoughts and arguments are put before his mind which sometimes are not only hard to understand, but which seem to him irrelevant because he cannot find out what they may be relevant to. Yet the student knows that these are the great philosophers, that this is the way of philosophy. Thus he will make an effort to adjust his mind to what he believes (mistakenly, as we shall see) to be their way of thinking. He will attempt to speak their queer language, to match the tortuous spirals of their argumentation and perhaps even tie himself up in their curious knots. Some may learn these tricks in a superficial way, others may begin to become genuinely fascinated addicts. Yet I feel that we ought to respect the man who having made his effort comes ultimately to what may be described as Wittgenstein's conclusion: 'I have learned the jargon as well as anybody. It is very clever and captivating. In fact, it is dangerously captivating; for the simple truth about the matter is that it is much ado about nothing -- just a lot of nonsense.'74

72 Popper is talking fundamentally about philosophy only, but I think can be generalized.


74 Ibid., p. 72-72. The excellence of the argument justifies its
Popper talks here about the *prima facie method* in much the same way as Tussman uses the metaphor of the "bordello" to describe a particular kind of education -- or the only kind of education most students get in their university life. Students come to the college or university knowing little or nothing about the various disciplines of learning. During their undergraduate years, so the theory goes, they are to be exposed to as many disciplines as possible in order to be able to get an understanding of what they are about and thus to be able to choose what they are really interested in pursuing in their lives.

Popper argues that what in fact happens is that the student does learn how to 'do' science, or philosophy, or history, or whatever, that is, he learns how to copy the method of abstraction that is being taught. Furthermore, there is a kind of seduction in the very process, for once the student begins to relate to learning in this way, and becomes good at it - thus being rewarded for the proper procedures - he becomes committed to the process itself, often losing sight of the meaning.

However, Popper points out quite rightly, that eventually the abstract process and the reality of the problems that the process was designed to illuminate, get further and further apart. Finally the student becomes dissociated from the emotional energy and excitement that made those intellectual pursuits concerns in the first place. Eventually he must start all over again if he really wants to continue in the field with some kind of meaningful
experience. More often, he just becomes disillusioned.

Popper thinks there is another way to approach these kinds of intellectual concerns, a method which cuts across the division of knowledge into compartments with their own structures. It begins instead with the problems themselves:

The degeneration of philosophical schools in its turn is the consequence of the mistaken belief that one can philosophize without having been compelled to philosophize by problems which arise outside philosophy—in mathematics, for example, or in cosmology, or in politics, or in religion, or in social life. In other words my first thesis is this. Genuine philosophical problems are always rooted in urgent problems outside philosophy, and they die if these roots decay.75

Tussman's educational thrust, both in Obligation and the Body Politic and in Experiment in Berkeley is towards this approach.

He argues for a method of studying political problems based on fundamental and important issues: "freedom and authority, the individual and society, conscience and law, acceptance and rebellion"76 rather than the abstract study of a particular body of material divided up into compartments or categories.

We do not think in terms of "humanities" or "social science"; we do not even think in terms of "history" or "literature" or "political science" or "philosophy". It is not that we want to replace these categories with others. We do not quarrel with them; we simply do not use them, and, if they prescribe limits, we do not observe them. We read Homer, Thucydides, and Plato; but we do not say or think, "now we are on literature", "Now we turn to history", "At last we come to philosophy".77

75 Popper, Conjectures and Refutations, p. 72.
76 Tussman, Experiment at Berkeley, p. 38.
77 Ibid., p. 47.
Tussman calls this difference "the substitution of the program for the course" and what he has to say about the importance of this distinction for educating students in the lower division years is one of the most lucid arguments on the subject and parallels much of what Popper has to say about the teaching of philosophy and science. They are both talking about a method of inquiry and teaching.

My only complaint is that he doesn't develop this method as appropriate to subject areas other than the strictly 'political', that he doesn't see a wider range of worthwhile activities that can be considered the proper purpose of a liberal arts education. It would be exciting to see not only politics, but literature, art and science taught from the same perspective. Because of Tussman's narrow conception of liberal education as 'political' education, he aborts the "bordello" metaphor from some of its more natural implications.

To this charge of narrowness must be added a post-script. What is important in what Tussman has to say in this regard is the reminder of something we seem to have forgotten or never truly understood. He argues for the strengthening of one of the weakest links in our educational chain, and, as the logic of his arguments point out, a crucial one in a democracy. He demonstrates with power and skill the logical steps which connect the ideals of our democratic political theory to the necessity of some kind of political education. Whether or not one sees his description of "self-government" as the Platonic conception of a free mind, he forces
us to recognize that even at the simplest level of a notion of "self-government", the business of the state requires the training of minds in the intelligent exercise of the right to vote. If rights have duties attached, we may well require the exercise of the duties first.

As he points out, it is one of the great curiosities of political life that we require a special course of training for 'naturalized' citizens, but not for those who acquire their membership through the accident of birth. Though Tussman tends to lose sight of the broader spectrum of the purposes of education that we value as much as we do the 'political', he recognizes that the intelligent life of a member of the body politic means that we must see the political as one of the highest purposes of a free, universal and compulsory educational system in a democracy.

Furthermore, the idea that decision-making requires at least some modicum of skill may well mean that we need to re-think a theory of agency which includes at least Tussman's suggestion that training is a necessary precondition for the acquisition or actualization of those skills, though we may want to argue about the kind or method or training which is the most effective. It may very well make sense to set up some obligations on the part of a citizen before giving him the right to make decisions affecting us all; a course of study for a relatively brief time that is neither punitive nor restrictive, but a kind of acknowledgement that a process has been undergone.
The problem is, of course, as it always is with any movement towards 'qualifications' (especially for having the right to vote or standing for office), who administers the qualifying standards and how do we protect the purpose of those kind of provisions from being used in vicious and restrictive ways? We have seen how loyalty oaths or property qualifications or literacy tests have been used to maintain an 'aristocratic bias' that is unequal and unjust. What Tussman does is to remind us that it may not be altogether outrageous to re-think what the right to vote requires of us educationally.
CONCLUSION

I have been arguing throughout this paper that Tussman's reliance upon Platonic notions is the key to understanding his arguments in *Obligation and the Body Politic*. Specifically, I have argued that it is the promotion of this notion of the public interest, seen in its Platonic form, which Tussman sees as the fundamental purpose of the State. It is the notion which spawns his special view of freedom, his theory of political representation and his theory of education. I have argued that the way he develops the implications of the notion of the public interest leaves him open to the charge of Platonic elitism and authoritarianism.

The notion that individuals have different capacities, that authority must be placed in the hands of some decision-making body, and that 'the best' should rule is not necessarily an authoritarian point of view. In that sense Tussman is wrestling with a traditional and important problem. What pushes him over into the authoritarian camp is just his Platonic view of what the best consists of; in particular, the dilemma he gets into through setting up a dichotomy between reason and passion, and private and public interest respectively.

The distinction between private and public interest is an important one. It has been made in all kinds of ways which aren't really very satisfactory, and Tussman's Platonic attempt to align it with reason against passion isn't much of a solution either. However, where the distinction points to the necessity in peer relationships -- political or otherwise -- of a process which transforms a variety of individual private claims into a "system of interests" which is fair to all interests, it is on solid ground. Whenever a
group of people get together and try to live together, there has to be some movement out of just their own individual concerns or interests into something larger, something that takes account of everyone who is equally situated. How that process actually takes place is directly related to the kind of authority structure that characterizes a body politic.

Tussman sees that process as essentially the suppression of the emotional, irrational life to the rational, or the transformation of the private to the public, and this view colors his theory of representation. What he leaves us with in the end is the concept of the agent in the Platonic model of the guardian. His attempt in Obligation and the Body Politic to bring both Plato and democracy together into some kind of synthesis which tries to save the wisdom in each, turns out finally to resemble a Platonic model of a body politic rather than a democratic one.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

I. BOOKS:


- Utilitarianism; Liberty; Representative Government. London: Dent, 1957. (Everyman's Library, No. 482.)


II. ARTICLES:


My bibliography is not traditional in the sense that it does not pretend to be an exhaustive list of the books and articles available in the area of political and educational philosophy. This is not an oversight but a matter of principle. In an important sense all that I have ever read with interest is part of this thesis, for my commitment and focus for so many years of graduate work has always been centered around my own experiences with educating myself and finding answers to the problems – personal and theoretical – that have been generated by that struggle. Therefore it would be perfectly appropriate to list every book and article that I have been concerned enough to read. However, that task seems to me a rather stylish waste of time.

Instead, I have presented a working bibliography for the purposes of this paper, but in keeping with the main thesis expressed in these pages, I would like to include four learning experiences that have been major influences on my thinking:

1. Board Member in The New School, Vancouver, B.C.
2. The Experimental College at Berkeley, California.
3. The Resident Fellow Program at Cold Mountain Institute, Cortes Island, B.C.
4. My years of graduate work at U.B.C. both as a student and a teacher. I have been a student for so long that my youngest child finally asked me what I wanted to be when I grew up.