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Problem of disarmament in British diplomacy, 1932-1934 Richardson, Richard Calam 1969

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THE PROBLEM OP DISARMAMENT IN BRITISH DIPLOMACY 1932-1934  *>y  RICHARD CALAM RICHARDSON 3.Sc.(Econ.)., London (England), 1968  A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS  i n the Department of History  We accept t h i s thesis as conforming to the required standard  THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA September, 1969  In  presenting  an  advanced  the I  Library  further  for  degree shall  agree  scholarly  by  his  of  this  written  this  thesis  in  at  University  the  make  that  it  purposes  for  may  be  It  financial  for  of  2 S -  V 7 0  of  Columbia,  British  by  gain  Columbia  for  the  understood  Hi,  The U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h V a n c o u v e r 8, Canada  of  extensive  granted  is  fulfilment  available  permission.  Department  Date  freely  permission  representatives. thesis  partial  shall  Head  be  requirements  reference copying  that  not  the  of  agree  and  of my  I  this  or  allowed  without  that  study. thesis  Department  copying  for  or  publication my  i  ABSTRACT  The problem of disarmament i s the problem of the effective management of power within international society. Force cannot be eliminated as a factor i n international relations, but i t can be controlled. And a disarmament convention — an agreement to limit and perhaps reduce national armaments - can secure t h i s control by s t a b i l i z i n g the configuration  of world power.  The obstacles to the negotiation  of a disarmament convention are  p o l i t i c a l rather than technical, and at the World Disarmament Conference of 1932-^4, the major problem was the reconciliation of French and German claims. Germany, disarmed by the Peace Treaty of 1919» demanded "equality of rights" with other nations while France demanded additional security guarantees before she would agree to limit her arms. The reconciliation of French and German claims was i n Britain's interest, because her security depended, i n part at least, on a stable and peaceful Continent. Yet the B r i t i s h Government followed a policy that was not oonducive to a reconciliation. B r i t i s h Ministers refused to offer France security guarantees to compensate for the inevitable increase i n German power accompanying a grant of equality of rights and t h i s refusal was the major factor leading to the breakdown of the Disarmament Conference i n 1934» The main reason for the refusal was that B r i t i s h Ministers subscribed, to the putative existence of an international "harmony of interests". They assumed that each state had a common interest i n peace and that t h i s common interest was compatible with the pursuit of the  national  interest, and they therefore hoped that international problems could  ii  be settled without recourse to foroe or threat of force. This was a delusion. Although professing a desire to achieve their objectives by peaceful means, "revisionist" states — including Germany - were not averse to using or threatening force i f i t would lead to the fulfilment of their national ambitions. "Harmony of interests" was a very self-serving doctrine. It permitted Britain to exert a large measure of influence on the Continent with very few commitments and at l i t t l e cost, allowing the Government to concentrate on defending Britain*s more immediate interests - the security of the Qnpire and the protection of her trade routes. Thus, the various disarmament schemes put forward by the Government at Geneva were based almost solely on Britain's immediate interests and made l i t t l e attempt at trying to reconcile the interests of Prance and Germany - the main problem facing the Disarmament Conference. The B r i t i s h publio came to believe i n the premise of a "harmony of interests" and i n consequence, despite i t s overwhelming majority in the Commons, the Government found i t d i f f i c u l t - or chose to find i t d i f f i c u l t - to deviate from i t s policy of "no commitments". Britain was even averse to mediating between France and Germany. Although the two Continental Powers looked to Britain for help i n solving t h e i r problems, the B r i t i s h Government refused to play the role of "honest broker" - except when the role was inescapable — and thus f a i l e d to take advantage of many excellent opportunities; for concluding a Franco-German settlement. By adopting a polioy which offered! short-term advantages but l i t t l e hope of a long-term settlement of European problems, B r i t a i n was instrumental i n causing the f a i l u r e of the Geneva Disarmament Conference.  iii  This study i s "based on the records of the Conference f o r the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments and the published diplomatic documents of Britain, Prance, Germany, America and Belgium. Memoir sources, i n general, were unhelpful, but did provide some useful information, as did a few unpublished documents from the Public Record Office, London provided by Dr. P. Marzari.  TABLE OP CONTENTS  ABSTRACT  i  CHAPTER I . THE DISARMAMENT PROBLEM  :'l  CHAPTER I I . THE FIRST PHASE OF THE DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE ....... 39 CHAPTER I I I . THE GERMAN CLAIM TO EQUALITY OF RIGHTS  75  CHAPTER IV. THE ADVENT OF HITLER AND THE SECOND PHASE OF THE DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE  110  CHAPTER V. DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS AND THE SECOND GERMAN WITHDRAWAL FROM; THE DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE  152  CHAPTER VI. LAST ATTEMPTS AT A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT  175  CHAPTER VII. CONCLUSIONS  202  FOOTNOTES ............... BIBLIOGRAPHY .,  ... 208 243  1 CHAPTER I  THE DISARMAMENT PROBLEM  1919-1932 The widespread support gained toy movements for disarmament during the  1920s  and early  1930s  became a major factor i n the formulation of  B r i t i s h foreign policy* Disarmament was seen by i t s protagonists as the one sure way of avoiding a recurrence of the catastrophe of the Great War and of establishing a firm foundation f o r peace; war would be eliminated by the removal of the means to fight* It was an appealing doctrine and one which required serious consideration* A sophisticated theory of disarmament was developed. Armaments, i t was claimed, not only made war possible but made i t much more probable. Once one nation possessed arms, so must others as no nation would tempt others into aggression by remaining defenceless. Measures takengtoy one nation to increase security caused counter-measures by others, producing feelings* of fear and insecurity. Further measures caused further counter-measures, and the consequent increase of suspicion and distrust among nations led governments to believe that every precaution should be taken against possible opponents and that "precautions" taken by any other country were evidence of hostile intent. An arms race would develop and eventually, by accident or design, break down into war.  The  f i n a l spark might occur when one party u t i l i z e d a temporary ascendancy i n armaments to strike an opponent; i t might come with an over-reaction to a minor incident; or i t might just "happen"* It did not matter which. This was not the only oritique of the balanoe of power system that disarmament protagonists offered. They also emphasised that armaments,  2  especially of  a  of  which,  of  war  substantial  professional i n  follow  had  (or  own This  of  thought  between  the  tended  power  to  the  it  a  to  would  each  to  take  wield  and  the  of  and  i t s  influence  was  claimed,  fear  path,  to  the  to  over  insecurity.  gain  an  governments If  a  state  opponent  and  establishment  and  demand  an  i n  both  expansion  and  p o l i c i e s .  m i l i t a r y  m i l i t a r y  industry,  encouraged  bellicose  the  establishment  for  tended  superiority  uneasy,  the  pressed  feelings  state  to  armaments  complexes"  m i l i t a r y  were  sizeable  spread  within  have)  led  continually  intransigent  two  government  superiority  and  " m i l i t a r y - i n d u s t r i a l  amount  was  class  necessarily  interests,  unnecessarily  relations advise  t h e i r  these  inordinate to  m i l i t a r y  p o t e n t i a l .  Moreover,  armaments,  the  would  absence  increases  of  i n  armaments.  General of  international  provided be  disarmament,  unable  that  they  influence states  with to  retained of  the  induced  of  c o l l e c t i v e thus  armaments  war  or  would  the  event  mount be  a  follow  security  allowing  rather  national  to  be  channelled  Opponents  of  disarmament  disputes,  successful  be  than  complex  the  more  which  be  p o l i c i e s . by  mechanism used  an of  scourges  would they  because  purpose.  would  controlled  resources  into  during  the  these  states  offensive  for  c o n c i l i a t o r y  could  eliminate  period  insufficient  more  r e l a t i o n s  would of  cooling-off  m i l i t a r y - i n d u s t r i a l  to  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  In  automatic to  i n  power,  society.  an go  it  would the  Moreover,  weakened The  be  arms the  and  power  factor  effective  system  the  balance  of of  i n  the  manufacture  productive  and  s o c i a l l y  acceptable  projects.  rather  than  requiring  a  the  cause  p o l i t i c a l  of  countered  tension.  solution,  that  Peaoe  and  was  though  armaments a  were  p o l i t i c a l  security  the  product  problem  might  lead  to  3 disarmament, i t could not result from disarmament. The idea of the overpowering influence of a military-industrial complex was  ridiculed  and i t was suggested that any influence brought to bear by the military would breed a r i s i n g consciousness  of the t o t a l destructiveness of  modern warfare. Statesmen, i t was argued, would not allow the military to gain the upper hand i n decisions of state. The sceptics also suggested that even i f these p o l i t i c a l objections were overcome, technioal objections alone would n u l l i f y attempts to reach a disarmament convention. Reductions of armaments to a level necessary f o r purposes of police and legitimate defence were "impossible" beoause some countries had a f a r greater productive capacity or potential which could be u t i l i z e d for war purposes than others. Moreover, developments i n military technology would make i t impracticable to freeze the distribution of power within international society. The power factor could not be taken away from international relations - and i t was "impossible" to measure t h i s factor. How compared to a tank or a bomber? How  could a battleship be  could one distinguish between an  "offensive" and a "defensive" weapon? What, i f any, account should be taken of geographical and industrial factors? And surely there were no adequate means of supervising a disarmament agreement? Even with the strictest agreements regarding control, i t was argued, states would be able to build up stocks of materiel i n secret. The more appealing of these arguments are those of the disarmament protagonists. Certainly the competitive massing of national power tends to exacerbate rather than diminish f r i c t i o n s and to heighten the tensions of insecurity.* There i s also l i t t l e doubt that powerful  4 military-industrial complexes tend to encourage intransigent rather than paoific courses of policy. A disarmament agreement would overcome these problems and provide states with an automatic cooling—off period for t h e i r disputes. To be successful, however, such an agreement must take the factors of power and power potential into consideration; t o t a l disarmament, advocated by some, i s impracticable because i t ignores these factors. A degree of armament i s inevitable, and as no country would w i l l i n g l y remain disarmed i f i t s neighbours were not, i t follows that a vioious cirole of arms and tension i s inherent i n the structure of international society. The problem facing statesmen therefore i s how to control power within the international system, and the problem of disarmament i s how to reduce and more especially, limit and control armaments and yet establish an adequate system of international security. M i l i t a r y establishments are related i n the f i r s t instance to the problem of the status quo. The function of national power i s to uphold or ohallenge the existing pattern of relationships, and a scheme for the regulation of armaments must therefore involve either a freezing of the configuration of power (at, above or below existing quantitative 2 levels) or i t s alteration through d i f f e r e n t i a l degrees of disarmament. Governments attempting to uphold the status quo w i l l accept a scheme of arms control i f i t w i l l not interfere with the adequacy of their power position, while " r e v i s i o n i s t " states w i l l accept i f they are convinced that the distribution of national power w i l l be irrelevant i n the future organization of international relations. Consequently, the urge to avoid the worsening of the national power position i s the passion of most participants i n disarmament conferences rather than enthusiasm for disarmament i t s e l f . A scheme which freezes the status quo by s t a b i l i z i n g  5  the power s i t u a t i o n i s f r u s t r a t i n g to ambitious states; one promises to undermine the status quo of the e s t a b l i s h e d  i s alarming to the  which  beneficiaries  order. A p r a c t i c a l scheme i s one which takes these  f a c t o r s - power p o t e n t i a l and p o l i t i c a l motivation - i n t o account. T h i s can only be done by g i v i n g a d d i t i o n a l s e c u r i t y guarantees to that  otherwise would be disadvantaged by the  states  scheme. There are three  a l t e r n a t i v e s : c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y , r e g i o n a l s e c u r i t y agreements or alliances. A l l i a n c e s are based on the theory that a s t a t e can best guarantee i t s s e c u r i t y by a l i g n i n g i t s e l f with other s t a t e s having the same common enemy and by the  a l l i e d s t a t e s maintaining a reserve of m i l i t a r y  power to deter t h e i r enemy from aggression. Such arrangements may considered i n c o n s i s t e n t  with the  spirit  be  of general disarmament - f o r  they tend t o d i v i d e i n t e r n a t i o n a l s o c i e t y i n t o opposing groups - but even opposing groups may  agree t o l i m i t t h e i r respective  Such "arms c o n t r o l " agreements may technology i s not  be unusual, e s p e c i a l l y when m i l i t a r y  at an advanced stage and new  developments can cause  profound changes i n the d i s t r i b u t i o n of power within s o c i e t y , but,  armaments.  international  at l e a s t i n theory, they are a p r a c t i c a b l e p o s s i b i l i t y .  Provided there i s an e f f e c t i v e method of s u p e r v i s i n g  ,  i t s arrangements,  an arms c o n t r o l convention i s f a r more l i k e l y t o produce f e e l i n g s of s e c u r i t y between the Powers concerned than no agreement. A c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y agreement recognizes that peace i s " i n d i v i s i b l e " and provides f o r a guarantee of n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y , the maintenance of the t e r r i t o r i a l status quo,  the p a c i f i c settlement of i n t e r n a t i o n a l  disputes - and disarmament. Disarmament and the machinery f o r p a c i f i c settlement provide a f i r s t  l i n e of defence against  international  6  c o n f l i c t , and a further l i n e of defence i s provided "by moral, diplomatic, economic and m i l i t a r y sanctions, which can he used to deter  any  aggressor. Eventually, i t might he possible to dispense with national forces and replace them by international forces. Before a c o l l e c t i v e security system can be implemented, however, certain conditions have to be met.^  Subjectively, states must accept  that peace i s i n d i v i s i b l e and that loyalty to the world community i s an absolute necessity, even i n conflicts affecting their immediate national interest. They must also agree to s a c r i f i c e a certain amount of t h e i r freedom and bind themselves i n the future by renouncing the use of force except under international authorization and by agreeing not to withhold support from any collective aotion. Aggressor states; must always be confronted with the certainty of collective action. And the system must function impartially and be seen to function impartially; states must be f l e x i b l e i n t h e i r p o l i c i e s and agree to defend t h e i r t r a d i t i o n a l enemies as well as t h e i r traditional friends. Only then can confidence i n the system be fostered. Objectively, a considerable diffusion of power i s fundamental to such a system, as i s the need for universal or near-universal membership of the international organization established to implement the system. Great Powers must be roughly equal i n size or potential and endorse the collective arrangements, while naval Powers must be effective members i n order that sanctions can be applied e f f i c i e n t l y . States must also be vulnerable to the application of sanctions. "Potentially criminal" states might be omitted from the international organization, but notwithstanding the d i f f i o u l t y of choosing them, i t would be better to have them within the collective framework f o r t h i s would ensure t h e i r theoretical  7  acceptance of the  system and might a m e l i o r a t e t h e i r  f u t u r e p o l i c y once  t h e y d i s c o v e r e d t h a t w o r k i n g w i t h i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l  community  offered  advantages. The s u c c e s s f u l o p e r a t i o n of a system of c o l l e c t i v e depends on m i l i t a r y  security  t e c h n o l o g y h a v i n g reached a stage of  where defence has an advantage over o f f e n c e , because i f weapons t h a t  can break through f i x e d f o r t i f i o a t i o n s  development s t a t e s possess  and entrenched  p o s i t i o n s , t h e c o l l e c t i v e agency may be unable t o act q u i c k l y t o prevent  possibility.  i s a practicable  agency over an a g g r e s s o r i s always l e s s t h a n i t s  although t h i s  theoretical  c o l l e c t i v e f o r c e s might be d i v i d e d and slow t o a c t ; may be t r u e ,  of war by p a r t i a l  a collective  disarmament.  If  a l e v e l necessary f o r  armed defence c o n t i n g e n t heavier materiel,.no  while  aggression. A state but  fortifications  system i s based on the  the m i l i t a r y  p o l i c e purposes and a s m a l l ,  international  but  prevention  f o r c e s of each s t a t e  are  lightly-  f o r c e s are equipped w i t h  a g g r e s s o r w i l l be s t r o n g enough t o r e s i s t  of a c o l l e c t i v e agency, even i f  short t i m e ,  collective security  Opponents have argued t h a t the margin of power of a  v a l u e and t h a t  reduced t o  enough  an a g g r e s s o r b e i n g s u c c e s s f u l .  P r o v i d e d t h e s e c o n d i t i o n s are met,  collective  also  the agency i s  the  slow t o r e a c t t o  forces  initial  c o u l d b u i l d up a " c i t i z e n army" w i t h i n a c o m p a r a t i v e l y  such an army would be unable t o break t h r o u g h  fixed  and entrenched p o s i t i o n s and would be i n e f f e c t i v e  the p r o f e s s i o n a l s o l d i e r s and h e a v i e r m a t e r i e l  of t h e  against  international  f o r c e s . Moreover, as t h e armaments of each s t a t e would be s u p e r v i s e d by the i n t e r n a t i o n a l  agency, s t a t e s would not be i n a p o s i t i o n t o b u i l d up  armaments and prepare f o r heavy m a t e r i e l ,  an a g g r e s s i v e war;  a g g r e s s i v e weapons such as  t a n k s and bombers would be p r o h i b i t e d  from n a t i o n a l  8  armies, and i t would not be d i f f i c u l t to detect states producing such weapons. Although i t i s r e l a t i v e l y easy to conceal l i g h t weapons such as machine guns, under an effective system of supervision i t would be almost impossible to conceal heavy weapons; German rearmament in the early 1930s was soon detected by Britain and Prance. Thus, an international agency would have ample time i n whioh to prepare plans to counteract aggressors. A more serious objection to collective security i s the claim that i t i s impossible to define aggression since aggression can take many forms, such as the i n f i l t r a t i o n of guerillas, subversion, the support of armed bands or even propaganda. It i s also argued that aggression might be j u s t i f i a b l e i n certain circumstances - to r e c t i f y an injustice or take preventive action. But these arguments miss the point. Collective security i s a legal rather than a moral system and i s based on the idea that disturbers of the peace - states taking forcible measures to alter the status quo - should be penalized and that international "law and order" w i l l provide a stable context i n which the quest f o r substantive justice can be pursued.^ Moreover, the disarmament provisions of a collective system would ensure deteotion of any state making preparations for an attack or attempting to supply arms to support a rebellion i n another country. Furthermore, the international organization would formulate specific rules regarding the peaceful settlement of international disputes, and states v i o l a t i n g these rules would be locked on as aggressors and would be subject to the application of sanctions.  9  Even i f the conditions necessary for the implementation and operation of a collective security system are not met i n the world as a whole, i t i s s t i l l conceivable that these conditions may exist within a clearly defined region. Consequently, i t may he possible to negotiate one or more regional seourity pacts based on " c o l l e c t i v e " principles. Seourity i n regions not covered by these pacts could be provided by alliances and the balance of power mechanism. It would s t i l l be possible under these arrangements to negotiate a general disarmament convention.  Before the Great War, international security depended to a large extent on the successful operation of the balance of power mechanism. But the outbreak of h o s t i l i t i e s : led! a great number of intellectuals (and others) to re-examine the efficacy of the mechanism, as many believed that the pre-1914 arms race and system of alliances were major causes of the War. Modern research has shown that these conclusions were, at best, inadequate, but intellectuals and respected statesmen of the time were convinced that i t was necessary to find a more effective method of controlling power within international relations than the balance of power mechanism. By the end of the War, the doctrine of collective security had won general acceptance (at least among the A l l i e d Powers), and the foundation of an international security organization became one of the chief goals of A l l i e d policy. Practical suggestions were worked out, and on April 28 1919 the Covenant of the League of Nations was adopted by the  10  Powers represented at the Versailles Peace Conference. Members of the new organization recognized that peace was  indivisible  (Article 11 of the Covenant) and undertook to respect and preserve each other's p o l i t i c a l independence and t e r r i t o r i a l integrity against external aggression ( A r t i c l e 1 0 ) . They also agreed to submit their differences to arbitration, j u d i c i a l settlement at the Permanent Court or inquiry by the Counoil (Artioles 1 2 , 13 and 1 5 ) , though i n the event of decisions not being unanimous, the parties concerned reserved the right to go to war after a period of three months - the so-called "gap i n the Covenant". A r t i c l e 19 gave the League Assembly the power to advise the reconsideration of treaties that had become "inapplicable" and whose continuance "might endanger" world peace, otherwise there was no provision i n the Covenant for "peaceful change". I f a member resorted to war i n v i o l a t i o n of i t s obligations, the other members were to impose an absolute and immediate economic and diplomatic boycott on the Covenant-breaking  state and respect the decisions of  the League Council i f i t was found necessary to employ m i l i t a r y sanctions ( A r t i c l e 1 6 ) . But members retained the right to abstain from participating i n military measures, and there was no provision for an international army and general staff. The Covenant did not establish a perfect system of collective security; i t s provisions for sanctions were somewhat weak and i t imposed inadequate legal restrictions upon potential aggressors. There was no guarantee that the combined resources of the international community would be available to thwart aggressors, and there was no positive obligation f o r states to participate i n military sanctions.  11  The  provisions  d'efiicient. A r t i c l e the  reduction  o f t h e Covenant f o r disarmament were a l s o somewhat 8 s t i p u l a t e d t h a t t h e maintenance o f peace  o f n a t i o n a l armaments t o t h e l o w e s t p o i n t  required  consistent  w i t h n a t i o n a l s a f e t y and t h e e n f o r c e m e n t b y common a c t i o n o f international other  o b l i g a t i o n s , and t h e C o u n p i l ,  taking geographical  f a c t o r s i n t o a c c o u n t , was t o f o r m u l a t e p l a n s  and  l i m i t a t i o n f o r "the consideration  The  Council  would a l s o a d v i s e  how t h e " e v i l  effects" of the private  D e f i n i t i v e measures o f  disarmament were r e s t r i c t e d t o t h e p r o v i s i o n s  By  with t h e former C e n t r a l  Part V of the Treaty  reduced t o " t h e lowest and  consistent  the control of her f r o n t i e r s " -  i n c l u d i n g no more t h a n  4,000  Germany's armed f o r c e s were  w i t h t h e maintenance o f order  100,000  officers.  men i n t h e c o l o u r s ,  S e r v i c e m e n were t o s e r v e  t w e l v e y e a r s and o f f i c e r s f o r t w e n t y - f i v e . abolished  o f t h e Peace T r e a t i e s :  Powers.  of V e r s a i l l e s ,  limit  The G e n e r a l S t a f f was  s e r v i c e such a s c o a s t g u a r d s ,  o f f i c e r s and f o r e s t g u a r d s p r o h i b i t e d . The p o s s e s s i o n weapons" - t a n k s , h e a v y guns o v e r  were p l a c e d  g a s e s - was f o r b i d d e n , on p e r m i t t e d  were l i m i t e d and s t r i c t establishments.  it  105mm,  submarines, b a t t l e s h i p s over  asphyxiating  the  for  and c o n s o r i p t i o n and t h e m i l i t a r y t r a i n i n g o f c i v i l i a n s i n  g o v e r n m e n t a l and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  aviation,  reductions  and a c t i o n " o f member governments.  m a n u f a c t u r e o f arms c o u l d be m i t i g a t e d .  negotiated  f o r arms  and  But t h e e n f o r c e m e n t  Germans t h e m s e l v e s ; an A l l i e d merely had s u p e r v i s o r y  duties.  "aggressive  armoured c a r s , m i l i t a r y  10,000  t o n s and p o i s o n o u s and  and s e v e r e q u a n t i t a t i v e  arms. R e s e r v e s t o c k s regulations  of  customs  restrictions  o f arms and ammunition  applied t o a l l m i l i t a r y o f t h e s e p r o v i s i o n s was l e f t t o  Control  Commission was s e t up, b u t  12  Because of German protests, the A l l i e s inserted a clause i n the Peace Treaty s t i p u l a t i n g that the reductions i n German armaments were to "render possible the i n i t i a t i o n of a general l i m i t a t i o n of armaments of a l l n a t i o n s " .  And on June 16 1919* a f t e r being asked to c l a r i f y  t h i s clause, the A l l i e s handed a Note to the German delegation at the Peace Conference deolaring that "The A l l i e d and Associated Powers wish to make i t clear that t h e i r requirements i n regard to German armaments were not made s o l e l y with the object of rendering i t impossible f o r Germany to resume her p o l i c y of m i l i t a r y aggression. They are also the f i r s t steps towards that general reduction and l i m i t a t i o n of armaments which they seek to b r i n g about as one of the most f r u i t f u l preventives of war, and which i t w i l l be one of the f i r s t duties of the League of Nations to promote."6 Thus the A l l i e s were under a moral o b l i g a t i o n ( i f such a t h i n g e x i s t s i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s ) to disarm - i f not a l e g a l one.  And i t  seemed that negotiations f o r a general disarmament convention could proceed smoothly provided that the League proved adequate as an organ of s e c u r i t y .  The main cause of i n s e c u r i t y w i t h i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l system was the "German problem". The Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s l e f t Germany united, a country with the greatest i n d u s t r i a l (and therefore war) p o t e n t i a l of any European state with the exception of Russia. Moreover, despite her reparations o b l i g a t i o n s , Germany was i n a p o s i t i o n to make a rapid recovery from her post-war s i t u a t i o n . The Soviet Union, on the other  13  hand,  was  i n  a  state  of  international  c o n f l i c t .  later  would  Germany  Powers  -  on  at  her  whether did,  unless  the  let  under  Anglo-French different.  The  with  enough  that  the  B r i t i s h it  Prance  wanted  fifteen  was year  remotely, the army  was  to  made  that  solve  occupation threat of  of  of  the  allowed  100,000  German  supervisory enforce  the  and  sooner  the  Prance  preponderance  to  the  or  European imposed  was  and,  i f  they  and  with  i n  d i d  order  by  solve  not  provide  The  j u s t i f i e d  and  to  a t t a i n  by  thought  security.  Germany  problem  them  insisted  Treaty.  treating the  completely  therefore  the  were  were  as  a  making  demands.  for  French  fears.  demilitarized under  Treaty  had  the  disarmament; S i m i l a r l y , of  Rhineland  been  volunteers  Except  League,  "offensive"  payment  problem  Germany  problem  German  powers.  c i v i l  gone,  among  and  Treaty  r i g i d l y  wanted  long-service the  Peace  grievances  possess  arranged  of  r e s t r i c t i o n s  B r i t a i n  grievances  German  Peace  check"  the  German  revived  sanctions  to  merely  to  the  years  p o s i t i o n  maintain  the  the  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  who  machinery  a  these  "Russian  "natural"  comply  B r i t a i n  themselves had  to  some  redress  some  the  not  against  five  security.  that  "legitimate"  enforcement  reduced  be  to  to  her  towards  felt  than  facing  strategies  Power;  concessions  problem  regain  the  to  for  believed  second-class  The  more  preponderant  provisions  Germans  There  chose  French  to  with  A l l i e s  security  necessary  Thus, her  Germany  what  after  resume  V e r s a i l l e s .  to  chaos  no  for  and,  -  the the  but  i t  A l l i e d A l l i e s  reparations;  the  more  machinery  established. weapons  the  The  for  German  and  had  been  was  the  Germans;  Control  Commission  provided German  no  government  14  was responsible f o r discharging i t s admitted obligations. Before 1914» Germany had been held i n check by'rthe Franco-Russian  alliance, but a  resuscitation of the alliance i n 1920 was inconceivable because of French h o s t i l i t y to the Soviet regime and the destruction of Russian power during the Great Mar and the Bolshevik revolution. France did gain a l l i e s among the East European successor states, notably Poland and Czechoslovakia, but these alliances did not provide the same degree of security as the old Franco-Russian  alliance.' French security  was weakened even further when the American Senate rejected the Treaty of Versailles and the projected Anglo-American guarantee of the Frenoh froatier, f o r i t became extremely doubtful whether the United States would co-operate with the League i n frustrating aggression. Consequently, successive French governments sought to strengthen the League as an organ of security and to make Germany comply r i g i d l y with the provisions of the Peace Treaty. In the long run, the French "solution" to the German problem was impracticable. Germany would not condescend to become a second-class Power. In January 1923, using a default i n reparations deliveries as the pretext, French troops occupied the Ruhr i n an attempt to oause such inconvenience i n the economic and p o l i t i c a l organization of Germany that the German government would g prefer to " f u l f i l " i t s obligations under the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s . The attempt was unsuccessful. Germany organized a "passive resistance" to the occupation and, i n continuing t h e i r campaign, the French found that they were hurting t h e i r own economy almost as much as the German. Gn May 11 1924t Frenoh voters rejected the policy of  15  intransigence and returned a l i b e r a l government under Edouard Herriot. B r i t a i n f e l t that French security was adequately guaranteed by the Peace Treaty and that the German problem should be solved by a policy of pacification rather than coercion. Since the scuttling of the German f l e e t at Scapa Flow. Germany posed no immediate threat to B r i t i s h security and, consequently, successive B r i t i s h governments sought to "wipe out the past" and promote the cause of European 9 reconciliation.  Peace and economic recovery were the ultimate goals  of B r i t i s h policy and neither could be established while the Continent remained unsettled. The chief threat to European peace seemed to be German grievances against the Peace Treaty, so Britain favoured a gradual and peaceful revision of the more controversial provisions of the Treaty. Although Britain was w i l l i n g to appease German grievances, the Government did not anticipate restoring Germany to the preponderant position she had held i n 1914, as t h i s might prove dangerous to B r i t i s h seourity. Beoause of developments i n military technology — particularly i n aviation - B r i t a i n was now more vulnerable to attack than previously? her military frontier was no longer the Strait of 10  Dover - i t was the River Rhine.  The Government looked on France as  a friendly Power - Britain's "guardian on the Rhine". * In theory, 1  therefore, B r i t a i n was faced with the problem of reconciling the "Rhine dogma" with that of appeasing Germany. But i n practice, not anticipating a major war for at least ten years (the so-called "ten year rule", repudiated i n 1932), the Government based i t s policy on the conciliation of Germany.  16  Unlike l a s t i n g same  the  solution  time,  the  factors  into  Germany  d i d  security, Prance  account, Germany  to  becoming  for  a  became  of  any  based evident  only  to  security  power  factor  and,  i t  had a  was  would  But  she  i n  that  practice,  would  make  into  merely lead  the  European  taken  eventually,  a  power  to  and,  that  at  ensure  menace  not  hope  took  to  before  appeasement  concessions  i f  be  the  obtained.  security;  own  that  he  Prance  European  reached  disarmament  the  on  the  Prance  a  of  her  offered  encourage to  Germany  overpowerful.  and  of  If  and  strength  West  danger  more  Reduction  it  The  was  Europe,  Assembly  the  Germany.  B r i t a i n  convention  League  the  vivendi was  established but  quantitative  that  modus  convention  had  Armaments,  a  after  of  a  security  u n l i k e l y . Temporary  early  reductions  establishment  a  on  In  1920,  Mixed  attempts  to  the  Commission  conclude  (notably  the  Esher  security  was  a  a  plan),  precondition  agreement. most  B r i t a i n the  to  B r i t a i n  of  might  successful  sufficient  assured  c o n c i l i a t i o n  problem  be  p a r t i c u l a r l y  demand  for  German  could  dangerously  U n t i l  F i r s t  gain  be  there to  coercion,  the  p o l i c y  not  concessions  to  of  consideration.  more  had  system  p o l i c y  and  security  Germany;  significant France  guarantees,  became  question.  B r i t a i n i f  result  began  only  of  more  under  consider  because  occupation  w i l l i n g  Prance, to  the  the  new  to  compose  Herriot,  giving  of  t h e i r  reduced  France  Premier,  the  Ruhr  her  demands  they  would  not  need  to  be  implemented.  MacDonald,  Thus,  at  on on  security  12 confident  that  differences  additional  Ramsay  was  the  was  17  beginning  1924»  of  i t  seemed  that  a  European  security  settlement  was  possible. A  scheme  Mixed  for  such  Commission  Assistance, m i l i t a r y subject  i n  which  support of  a p p l i c a t i o n forces help  "approved" waiting not to  by  for  apply plans  The  days  to  of  an of  by  defect  of  security  system  to  Security  i n  Americas  the  r o l e  of  the  Consequently,  a  that  them  it  large the  b r i n g  body  of  opinion  apportionment  disproportionate Empire.  on  of  of  the  had  been  an  h o s t i l i t i e s ,  decide  organize  aggressor  and  f u r n i s h  would  be  the  permitted  without  security  the  aggressor  and  The  not  give  designate  implemented  defined.  to  determine  be  to the  States,  B r i t a i n  l i a b i l i t y of  Treaty  i f  necessarily  guarantees:  reduced  i t s  was  u n i v e r s a l i t y .  continent each. Par a  countries  conflict  i n  share  that  would  Temporary  Mutual  continent  could  each  and  United  into  of  same  alliances  Draft  applied  number  the  armaments  would  according  Council.  conditions be  Treaty  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  had  i n  state  Local  be  up  signatory  sanctions,  that  the  that  on  to  the  presumed  the  and  Draft  Council  of  drawn  each  frustrate  v i c t i m .  signatory  been the  the  League  to  aggressor  prepared  i n  outbreak  Council  -  obliged  economic  the  the  any  major  The  had  1923  other  required to  an  have  any  aggression.  on  f i n a n c i a l  September  to  four  m i l i t a r y  settlement  would  within the  a  the  on  would  C l e a r l y  East  depended  opposed the the  of  of  the  the  Draft  a  not  the  large  case. extent  League. Treaty  opposed  lines  It same  colossus.  Dominions  r e s i s t i n g  the  was to  American  continental  burden  enable  t h i s  non-member  with and  i t s  would  i t  for  fear  And  a  i n  place  aggression  on  case a the  18  The merit of the Treaty was that although i t did not purport to establish a European security system based on collective principles i t lacked a definition of aggression - i t was acceptable to Prance audi her a l l i e s . This; went to the heart of the disarmament problem. Prance and her East European s a t e l l i t e s would agree to disarm i f they were granted additional security guarantees, which i n practice could be provided only by B r i t a i n because Russia had been excluded from the ranks of the Great Powers and the United States refused to become involved i n European disputes. Despite his readiness to give some additional security  guarantees  to Prance, Ramsay MacDonald was unwilling to accept the Draft Treaty; he was afraid that i t s concrete commitments would necessitate an increase i n B r i t i s h armaments and r e s t r i c t the freedom of B r i t i s h p o l i c y . ^ Yet B r i t a i n could prevent the operation of the Treaty's 1  military guarantees by using her veto i n the Council. MacDonald's action i n rejecting the Treaty typified B r i t i s h policy under the Conservative and National Governments i n the next ten years. The refusal to give Prance specific guarantees of support made French governments less w i l l i n g to make concessions to Germany, thus frustrating the B r i t i s h Government's aim of conciliating Germany. Unfortunately, few B r i t i s h statesmen understood that seourity was a necessary precondition of disarmament. Consciously or unconsciously, they based their policy on the nineteenth-century l i b e r a l theory of the "harmony of interests". They assumed that each nation had a common interest i n peace, that the common interest was compatible with the pursuit of the national interest and that wars arose from  19  misunderstandings. They assumed that the experiences of  1914-18  had'  demonstrated the f u t i l i t y of war and believed that an i n t e l l e c t u a l grasp of t h i s fact was a l l that was neoessary to induce nations to keep the peace i n f u t u r e . * ^ This was a misconception. Not a l l states believed that war brought no advantages. Germans attributed t h e i r sufferings to t h e i r defeat i n the War rather than the War i t s e l f ; and the East European successor states owed t h e i r very existence to the War. Some states wanted to maintain the status quo; others wanted to change i t . Thus, the premise on which successive B r i t i s h governments based t h e i r p o l i c y regarding the German problem was untenable. They postulated that an i n t e r n a t i o n a l harmony of interests existed; i n r e a l i t y , i t was necessary to create such a harmony. In national p o l i t i c s , i t i s the function of the government to create harmony; i n i nt e r na t i o na l p o l i t i c s there i s no s i m i l a r body to carry out the task. Yet just as governments must adjust to change within society, so must states adjust to changes within in ternation al sooiety. The B r i t i s h Government understood t h i s . But i t d i d not understand that power was an essential element i n the process of "peaceful change" within i nt e r national society. In t r y i n g to induce Prance to make concessions to Germany without o f f e r i n g equivalent compensation, B r i t a i n f a i l e d to take the power factor into consideration.  In September 1924, at the F i f t h Assembly of the League, MacDonald and Herriot made new efforts to reach a security agreement. The outcome of t h e i r endeavours was the Geneva P r o t o c o l . States were to  20  s e t t l e t h e i r disputes "by submitting them to the Council, the Permanent Court or a r b i t r a t i o n , and states refusing to submit t h e i r disputes or accept an award would be designated aggressors. The procedure f o r p a c i f i c settlement would not apply to " p o l i t i c a l " disputes such as a 15 ;  demand f o r treaty r e v i s i o n .  There was no modification of A r t i c l e 16  of the Covenant, but states were to co-operate " l o y a l l y and e f f e c t i v e l y " against aggressors. The Protocol would become operative only a f t e r the conclusion of a disarmament convention, and a conference f o r t h i s purpose would convene i n Geneva on June  16 1925•  Apart from the provision f o r compulsory a r b i t r a t i o n and the d e f i n i t i o n of an aggressor, the Protoool d i d not impose any new obligations on Members of the League. But i t had the great merit of c l o s i n g the "gap i n the Covenant" and providing Prance with an additional j u r i d i c a l prop to her security - i t might even have provided a nucleus around which a European security system based on c o l l e c t i v e p r i n c i p l e s could be b u i l t . Herriot accepted the scheme as providing s u f f i c i e n t security to allow the convening of a disarmament conference at which Prance would make concessions to Germany. But despite t h i s , the new Conservative administration i n B r i t a i n rejected the scheme on the grounds that i t involved B r i t a i n i n extensive new commitments and that security could best be attained by making " s p e c i a l  arrangements  to meet special n e e d s " . ^ A c t u a l l y , the only additional obligations devolving on B r i t a i n was an undertaking to refer oertain n o n - p o l i t i c a l disputes to a r b i t r a t i o n . A r t i c l e 16 of the Covenant was not strengthened, and i n any case, B r i t a i n could prevent the League imposing m i l i t a r y sanctions by using her veto i n the C o u n c i l .  21  The Conservative " s o l u t i o n " to the French security problem was the Treaty of Locarno, i n i t i a l l e d ! on October 16 1925* Germany, Belgium and France accepted t h e i r coterminous frontiers; and the 1  d e m i l i t a r i z e d Rhineland as i n v i o l a b l e and pledged themselves not to attack, invade or resort to war against eaoh other. B r i t a i n and I t a l y guaranteed these arrangements and i n a case of "flagrant aggression" they were to come to the a i d of the victim immediately. There were no s i m i l a r agreements guaranteeing the i n v i o l a b i l i t y of Germany's eastern f r o n t i e r s , but the B r i t i s h rather grudgingly agreed that French action i n f u l f i l m e n t of her a l l i a n c e s with Poland and Czechoslovakia would not constitute aggression against Germany. Germany agreed to apply f o r admission to the League. Although the Locarno agreements inaugurated a period of r e l a t i v e calm i n European r e l a t i o n s h i p s , the French Government continued to press f o r a d d i t i o n a l security guarantees. Unlike the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance and the Geneva P r o t o c o l , the Locarno Treaty gave no assurance that B r i t a i n would stand by France i n c o n f l i c t s r e s u l t i n g from German r e v i s i o n i s t ambitions i n Eastern Europe. Moreover, the Locarno guarantees would come i n t o operation only i n a case of "flagrant aggression", g i v i n g B r i t a i n an excuse f o r withholding her support i n the event of a Franco-German dispute. Indeed the nature of the guarantees was such that B r i t a i n retained oomplete freedom to decide how to f u l f i l her pledges. Thus, although the P a r t i e s to the Locarno Treaty undertook to negotiate a general disarmament agreement, the prospects of such an agreement e f f e c t i n g substantial measures of disarmament were not great; France would not make extensive  22  concessions to German demands u n t i l B r i t a i n gave more ooncrete assurances of support. Even so, the Locarno Treaty was a f i r s t step towards s o l v i n g the German problem. It represented an adjustment to a new configuration of power within Europe and gave Prance some assurance of B r i t i s h support and insured Germany against a renewed occupation of the Ruhr. I f B r i t a i n and Prance would make s i m i l a r adjustments to future changes; i n the configuration of power - and a r e d i s t r i b u t i o n of power i n favour of Germany was inevitable - a peaceful solution of the German and disarmament problems was p o s s i b l e . The Locarno Treaty represented a considerable success f o r B r i t a i n . Her treaty obligations were moral rather than m i l i t a r y i n charaoter, were l i m i t e d to Western Europe, where her main interests l a y , and thus were i n l i n e with the "harmony of i n t e r e s t s " premise, which permitted B r i t a i n to exert a great deal of influence on the Continent with few commitments and minimum cost. The Government could hardly make d e t a i l e d preparations f o r intervening against an aggressor i n Western Europe when the aggressor was unspecified. Austen Chamberlain apparently f a i l e d to r e a l i z e that the negotiation of the Locarno Treaty had been possible because, at that time, French fears of a revived Germany were counterbalanced by German fears of a Ruhr-type invasion, and hesseemed unaware t h a t , at some time i n the future, i t might be necessary to adjust to changes i n the d i s t r i b u t i o n of European power by involving B r i t a i n more d i r e c t l y i n the European security system. He thus began to follow a p o l i c y of "comparative detachment" from European a f f a i r s , concerning himself with defending  23 Britain's more immediate interests: - the security of the Empire and the protection of her trade routes.  The period of calm following the conclusion of the Locarno Treaty induoed the League Council to establish a Preparatory Commission for. the Disarmament Conference, and i n effect, discussion of the German problem was "transferred" to the new body. Even i n 1926, when the Commission began i t s deliberations, i t was evident that unless an international disarmament agreement was negotiated, Germany would begin to rearm. Basing their arguments on A r t i c l e 8 of the Covenant and the A l l i e d Note of June 16 1919» "the German delegation claimed that a contractual relationship existed between German disarmament and the contemplated general disarmament and demanded that the other Powers disarm to the German l e v e l . I f a general treaty was not concluded, Germany would consider herself freed from the obligations imposed by the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s . Most Ministers i n the B r i t i s h Government, including the Premier, Stanley Baldwin, and the Foreign Secretary, were unconvinced of the need f o r disarmament and believed French fears of a revived Germany 17 to be exaggerated.  The fighting services were also opposed to  disarmament and resisted any suggestions that Britain should reduce Q •I  her own armaments.  Neither Ministers nor Services appeared to  appreciate that f a i l u r e to conclude a general disarmament convention would lead to German rearmament and probably frustrate peaceful 19 settlement of the German problem. ' Early i n 1927» a Government Committee was established to consider B r i t i s h policy at the  24 Preparatory Commission, but i t rejected Lord C e c i l ' s contention that 20  further security was prerequisite of disarmament.  The Committee drew  up a skeleton convention s e t t i n g out general p r i n c i p l e s and', machinery by which disarmament might be pursued, but the document was l i t t l e more than a demand f o r the disarmament of France and her a l l i e s . In the immediate post-war years, B r i t a i n had reduced her own armaments considerably because there was no imminent threat to her security - though the B r i t i s h delegation i n the Preparatory Commission suggested that the reductions had taken place to set an example to other Powers. France and her a l l i e s , less secure than B r i t a i n , were not deceived by t h i s claim and demanded, further security guarantees. The B r i t i s h refused to undertake a d d i t i o n a l Continental commitments and, as a r e s u l t , discussions i n the Commission became academic and s t e r i l e , bogged down i n a morass of technical d i f f i c u l t i e s - d i f f i c u l t i e s which r e f l e c t e d the p o l i t i c a l p o s i t i o n of each of the Powers. Each proposal put before the Commission was based on the s t r a t e g i c a l considerations of the Power concerned. B r i t a i n , a naval Power with a small standing army, was vulnerable to a force capable of d e l i v e r i n g a "knockout blow" before her own vast reserves of i n d u s t r i a l power could be mobilized i n defence, so she advocated the l i m i t a t i o n of "aggressive" forces - effectives and materiel available immediately on m o b i l i z a t i o n . France, a land Power, with no great reserves of manpower or i n d u s t r i a l p o t e n t i a l , considered! i t necessary to maintain a s t r i k i n g force that could mount an overwhelming attack on an enemy (Germany) before the enemy could mobilize i t s  resources.  B r i t a i n advocated that the number of effectives f o r each country be f i x e d i n a r e l a t i v e r a t i o on the basis of requirements f o r the  25  maintenance of order and the p o l i c i n g of f r o n t i e r s ; Prance suggested, that the r a t i o had been f i x e d by the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s and that she could reduce her armaments only i f t h i s r a t i o was maintained, preferably through the establishment of a security system based on the Geneva P r o t o c o l . B r i t a i n favoured the direct l i m i t a t i o n of materiel i n service and reserve; Prance believed that direct l i m i t a t i o n was dangerous to the effectiveness of national defence and so suggested i n d i r e c t l i m i t a t i o n through a control of budgetary expenditures. B r i t a i n proposed that m i l i t a r y a i r c r a f t be l i m i t e d q u a n t i t a t i v e l y ; Prance favoured l i m i t a t i o n by t o t a l horse-power. The Anglo-Prenoh controversies resulted i n two draft conventions, one B r i t i s h , one French, being placed before the Commission i n March 1927 - though they were l i t t l e more than restatements of the p o l i c i e s the two Powers had followed since the Commission had opened. The task of the delegates thereafter became the r e c o n c i l i a t i o n of these two p o l i c i e s though, i n r e a l i t y , they were i r r e c o n c i l a b l e unless they were discussed i n conjunction with new security proposals. The B r i t i s h Government was not convinced of the need f o r additional security guarantees and continued to believe that disarmament could best be obtained by each state vigorously pursuing i t s own national i n t e r e s t . Austen Chamberlain was especially eager to uphold the B r i t i s h interest - at l e a s t , h i s own conception of i t - and the B r i t i s h representatives at the Geneva Naval Conference of 1927 were instructed to break up the Conference because America would not 21  accept the B r i t i s h demand f o r seventy c r u i s e r s . This number was claimed to be the minimum B r i t a i n required to meet normal service 22  requirements, though i n fact she only possessed f i f t y .  At the 1927  26  Assembly, the Foreign Secretary frustrated an attempt to revive the Geneva Protocol and asserted that B r i t a i n was not prepared to extend the guarantees given at Locarno; i t was "for other countries to  23 complete the work".  Chamberlain was even reluctant to accept  proposals involving no commitments; he accepted the Kellogg Pact for the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy grudgingly and only on condition that i t did not apply to wars of self-defence or i n ^certain regions of the world the welfare and integrity of which constitute a special and v i t a l interest for ^British] peace and safety" In May 1929 when the Tories f e l l from power, negotiations for a t  settlement of the disarmament and German problems had almost come to a s t a n d s t i l l . L i t t l e progress was being made i n the Preparatory Commission. Chamberlain had contributed to European appeasement by assisting i n the negotiation of the Locarno agreements, but he hindered the future development of appeasement - and disarmament - by following a policy of "comparative detachment" from European a f f a i r s and the defence of Britain's immediate national interests.  Chamberlain's successor at the Foreign Office, Arthur Henderson, was one of the few B r i t i s h statesmen who believed i n collective seourity. He was convinced that nations would disarm " i n proportion to the measure  25 of their confidence i n the constructive machinery of peace", and sought to prepare the ground for the convening of the Disarmament Conference by strengthening the provisions of the League  27  Covenant that  a  and  promoting  c o l l e c t i v e  peaceful  solution  framework  i n  Protocol, p a c i f i c  and  based  of  German  states  B r i t a i n  Clause"  to  was  was  settlement  "Optional  the  ideal he  of  the  her  the  Assembly  States  Victims  operation  to  of  at  on  March  the  Geneva  9  1931,  adopt  of  a r b i t r a t i o n .  Although essential  Henderson  i n  a  -  on  Teh  f i r s t  recognized system,  for  the  and  that he  1929,  he  it  the  signed  the  pledging  them he  to  persuaded Assistance  came  Act,  into  provisions  treaty.  which,  settlement  non-justiciable  believed  the  disarmament  General  Geneva  for  Court,  that  for  the  F i n a n c i a l  general  to  on  machinery  later,  a  objectives.  submitting  days  provide  j u s t i c i a b l e  c o l l e c t i v e  by  condition  acceded to  19  believed  j u r i d i c a l  based  Permanent  Convention  the  purported  disputes  the  Court.  the  with  September  of  a  p o l i t i c a l  develop  He  f a c i l i t a t e  provide  system  to  disputes  Aggression  international compulsory  the  B r i t a i n  Protocol,  and  could  t h e i r  keen  On  appeasement.  League  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  Statute  simultaneously  And  the  pursue  j u d i c i a l  j u r i s d i c t i o n  European  problem  disputes.  compulsory  to  on  could an  of  p a r t i c u l a r l y  of  resolve  League  cause  system  which  Henderson's  the  for  that  -  of  by  means  sanctions  "true  l i k e  were  security"  26 could firm of  be  obtained  believer  August  1929  i n  only  he  French  settlement  of  the  down for  at  V e r s a i l l e s  reparations,  a  troops  -  even  1930  from  and  -  the  at  Rhineland  problem. five  Germany,  though  and  the  i t  France  years i n  ahead  return,  involved  a  with  He Hague  Franco-German agreement  reparations June  co-operation.  r e c o n c i l i a t i o n ,  promoted  of  before  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  European  evacuation  Rhineland  by  was  Conference  l i n k i n g a  to  of  schedule  accepted  higher  the  " f i n a l "  agreed the  a  evacuate  the  scale  of  the  l a i d  "Young  Plan"  payments  28  than the "Dawes" settlement  of 1924* Appeasement and B r i t i s h mediation  between Prance and Germany were Henderson's solution to the German problem. In preparation f o r the Disarmament Conference, the Foreign Secretary speeded up the work of the Preparatory Commission by making concessions to Prance regarding budgetary l i m i t a t i o n and exclusion of trained reserves i n the c a l c u l a t i o n of e f f e c t i v e s . He also helped to negotiate the London naval Treaty of A p r i l 22 1930, by which B r i t a i n , America and Japan agreed to l i m i t t h e i r cruisers i n a r a t i o of 5*5*3 and destroyers i n a r a t i o of 10:10:7 and to construct an equal number of submarines. A t o t a l tonnage l i m i t was imposed for each category of v e s s e l . The agreement was made possible by B r i t a i n reducing her demand for c r u i s e r a from seventy (the 1927 demand) to f i f t y . But the two smaller naval Powers, Prance and I t a l y , were unable to come to an agreement as the French, with t h e i r extra commitments, would agree to the I t a l i a n demand f o r p a r i t y i n c r u i s e r s , destroyers and submarines only i f they received further guarantees of security such as a "Mediterranean Locarno". Henderson was disturbed by the p o s i t i o n taken by Prance and hoped to b r i n g about a Franco-Italian rapprochement on the naval question before the Disarmament Conference was held. In March 1931, when the two Continental Powers drafted the so-called "Bases of an Agreement", he appeared to have succeeded. Disarmament was the foremost element i n Henderson's p o l i c y . Like most of h i s contemporaries i n B r i t a i n , he had been appalled by the slaughter of the Great War, and he believed that disarmament within a system of c o l l e c t i v e security would make another war unthinkable. He hoped to s t r i k e at " m i l i t a r i s m " and improve security by promoting an  29  agreement that would lead, eventually, to each state reducing i t s forces to a l e v e l necessary for the maintenance of i n t e r n a l order and the p o l i c i n g of f r o n t i e r s , the agreement to he enforced "by c o l l e c t i v e sanctions i f  necessary.  Unfortunately, c o l l e c t i v e security had been made impracticable by America's r e f u s a l to j o i n the League, and though the implementation of the provisions of the Covenant within Europe might s t i l l have been possible, the oombined forces of the European Powers were barely s u f f i c i e n t to deter an aggressor - especially Germany. In suoh conditions, the Powers applying sanctions might be hurt almost as much as the aggressor against whom the sanctions were^Jjivoked. The occupation of the Ruhr had shown the l i m i t a t i o n s of a security system based on a narrow margin of power. A European security system based on c o l l e c t i v e p r i n c i p l e s was p r a c t i c a b l e , i n the long run, only i n conjunction with the appeasement of Germany - and appeasement was practicable only i f France was compensated f o r the concessions  she  would be asked to make. Henderson had a better conception of the p o l i t i c a l r e a l i t i e s of Europe than most B r i t i s h statesmen of h i s time, for he r e a l i z e d that Germany would rearm i f a disarmament convention was not negotiated and that i t might be necessary to use force to deter her from v i o l a t i n g 27 her i n t e r n a t i o n a l obligations.  But even he thought that French fears  of i n s e c u r i t y were somewhat exaggerated, thus h i s emphasis on appeasement and the development of machinery f o r the p a c i f i c  settlement  of disputes rather than sanctions. At least i n 1930, he was u n w i l l i n g to make s p e c i f i c m i l i t a r y commitments to France - except maybe i n conjunction with a disarmament convention - though he considered  30  e n t e r i n g some kind of "Mediterranean Locarno". before him,  L i k e the  Tories  he based h i s p o l i c y on the "harmony of i n t e r e s t s " theory.  He b e l i e v e d that the horrors of a future war  made i t inconceivable  that a disarmament convention would not be negotiated,  and he never  quite understood that a F r a n c o - I t a l i a n naval agreement was  frustrated  by a c l a s h of n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t r a t h e r than a d e s i r e on the part of France t o e f f e c t a r a p i d and s u b s t a n t i a l increase i n her  naval  2Q armaments.  But he d i d understand that i t might be necessary f o r  B r i t a i n t o involve h e r s e l f more a c t i v e l y i n European a f f a i r s i f s o l u t i o n s t o the German and disarmament problems were t o be found.  In the autumn of 1929» "the prospects  f o r disarmament seemed good.  Henderson, Briand and Stresemann, the Foreign M i n i s t e r s of B r i t a i n , France and Germany, appeared t o be working i n harmony, and of the slowness of the work of the Preparatory  criticism  Commission came from  the B r i t i s h delegate, Lord C e c i l , rather than from the Germans. But the years 1930  and 1931  witnessed a d e t e r i o r a t i o n i n European  r e l a t i o n s , mainly because of the e f f e c t s of the economic r e s u l t i n g from the "Wall Street crash" of October 1929.  depression In Germany,  the "Grand C o a l i t i o n " of S o c i a l Democrats, Democrats, Centre  and  German Peoples Party f e l l from o f f i c e i n March 1930,  new  and the  Chancellor, H e i n r i c h Bruning, had t o r e s o r t t o r u l e by p r e s i d e n t i a l decree under A r t i c l e 48 of the C o n s t i t u t i o n as he had no majority i n the Reichstag. President  consistent  Hindenburg and General Schleicher,  head of the Reichswehr, assumed greater powers and moved Germany more  31  to "the Right. Faith i n democratic government, never particularly strong among the German people, began to decline, and militant nationalists took advantage of the economic distress and the authoritarian nature of the German mind to blame the situation on the Peace Treaty. In September 1930,  the extremist parties - the  Nazis and the Communists - made substantial gains i n the Reichstag elections, and the Nazis became the second largest party i n the House. The new militancy of the German people was reflected i n the Preparatory Commission. Count Bernstorff, the German delegate, made numerous reservations to the draft convention i n course of preparation, and on December 9 be voted against the adoption of the completed document. Certainly theJDraft Convention^ had many defects. Part I was 1  unacceptable to Germany and the other non-conscriptionist oountries because i t provided for the limitation of effectives but not the limitation of trained reserves. Germany, with her long-service army and no reserves, could hardly be expected to accept permanent i n f e r i o r i t y i n effectives relative to her oonscriptionist neighbours. Another serious defect of the Draft Convention was i t s provision for indirect rather than direot limitation of materiel. The Germans found i t impossible to accept because i t limited the future acquisition of materiel while leaving existing stocks untouched. The main threat to German seourity lay i n a "knockout blow" from a nation possessing large forces capable of immediate mobilization, and i t was i n Germany's interest to r e s t r i c t the materiel available to the armies of Prance and her a l l i e s . Direot limitation applied equally to a l l the major  32  Powers would reduce Frenoh preponderance i n Europe and thus improve Germany's bargaining power i n European p o l i t i c s . Germany was not the only Power d i s s a t i s f i e d at the provisions for effectives and materiel. B r i t a i n was basically i n favour of limiting trained reserves, though Ceoil abstained from voting on t h i s proposal in the Commission because he realized that Japan, Italy and France would not abandon conscription and that i t was necessary f o r Britain to keep on good terms with France. Similar reasons accounted for his acceptance of budgetary limitation. Other Powers took t h e i r d i s l i k e of the provisions f o r effectives and materiel further; Italy, America and the Soviet Union, f o r example, voted against budgetary limitation. A further weakness of the Draft Convention was i t s provisions f o r a i r disarmament, as the states disarmed by the Peace Treaties were forbidden to own military aircraft while the other Powers were allowed to retain t h e i r a i r arms - though they were required to limit the number of aircraft i n service and "immediate reserve" by number and t o t a l horse-power. Bernstorff proposed the abolition of bombing, but t h i s was rejected by the other Powers. There was no provision for control over c i v i l aviation except that states agreed to "refrain from prescribing" the embodiment of military features i n c i v i l i a n aircraft and make no preparations for the conversion of such machines to military use i n time of peace. France had suggested the internationalization of c i v i l aviation, but Britain, Germany and America rejected the proposal. In contrast, there was some measure of agreement over the limitation of naval arms, as the Washington and London Treaties provided a solid  33 basis f o r further l i m i t a t i o n s . Eaoh naval Power was to be a l l o t t e d a t o t a l tonnage l i m i t f o r eaoh category of v e s s e l , and rules were to be formulated allowing a "transfer of tonnage" between  categories.  At the same time, i t was evident that disputes were almost oertain t o arise when the time came f o r i n s e r t i n g figures i n the blank tables of the convention. The most s a t i s f a c t o r y section of the convention was that i n which each Party was to undertake to "abstain unreservedly" from using b a c t e r i o l o g i c a l weapons and, subject to r e c i p r o c i t y , from using asphyxiating, poisonous or " s i m i l a r " gases and analogous " l i q u i d s , substances or processes". Only s l i g h t l y l e s s s a t i s f a c t o r y was a p r o v i s i o n f o r the  establishment  of a Permanent Disarmament Commission to supervise the execution of the convention and deal with any complaints concerning v i o l a t i o n s or "attempted v i o l a t i o n s " . I t s members were to be appointed by t h e i r governments but were not to represent them and could not be removed by them. Gn receiving a complaint, they would draw up a report so that the Parties to the convention could advise on any action to be taken, and i n the case of a dispute between members of the League, any action would be taken i n accordance with the Covenant. In contrast t o the general harmony regarding the Permanent Disarmament Commission, a olause s t a t i n g that the Draft Convention would i n no way affect the provisions of previous disarmament t r e a t i e s aroused intense bitterness,  f o r Germany, Bulgaria and Turkey saw i t as an attempt to  secure a reaffirmation of the conditions imposed by the Peace Treaties. The B r i t i s h delegation had inserted the clause to ensure that the Washington and London Treaties would not be weakened, but t h i s seemed  34  irrelevant to the delegates of the ex-Central Powers. There was no r e a l surprise when Germany rejected the Draft Convention on the groundsthat i t would not provide equality of r i g h t s and equality of security f o r a l l nations. The c r i t i c i s m was j u s t i f i e d . The convention had been formulated at a time when Prance was the preponderant Power i n Europe and Germany was f e e l i n g the effects of the occupation of the Ruhr, hut "by 1930 the German people were more aware of t h e i r national strength than they had been f i v e years previously and they sought to use t h i s strength to gain concessions from the other Powers. The d i s t r i b u t i o n of power within Europe was changing i n Germany's favour, and i t was necessary f o r the other Powers t o adjust t o t h i s change. The Draft Convention could not f a c i l i t a t e such an adjustment and therefore could not provide a basis f o r the s o l u t i o n of the disarmament or German problems.  During 1931,  as the world depression became worse, European r e l a t i o n s  became exacerbated. On March 21, A u s t r i a and Germany announced t h e i r intention t o establish a customs union, and though they claimed that the motives behind the proposal were economio, there i s l i t t l e doubt that they were p o l i t i c a l ? the German leaders trusted that t h e i r public would regard the Z d l l v e r e i n as a f i r s t step towards Anschluss, whilst hoping that the European Powers would regard the proposal as 32 non-political.  Bruning's hopes were soon disappointed. Prance,  Italy  and Czechoslovakia believed that the customs union was a portent of Anschluss, and to protect t h e i r interests they made demarches i n B e r l i n claiming that a customs union was prohibited by the Austrian  35  Reconstruction Protocol of 1922 and A r t i c l e 8 of the Treaty of St. Germain. Thus the Zoilverein proposal did l i t t l e more than aggravate European tensions. Henderson's attitude towards the Zollverein proposal was governed by his desire to ensure that the Disarmament Conference was held under the most favourable c o n d i t i o n s . ^ He was ooncerned at the apprehension caused by the proposal and sought to promote a Pranoo-German compromise by suggesting that the League Council examine the l e g a l i t y of the proposal. Eventually, both Prance and Germany acoepted t h i s course. In a further attempt to ease the prevailing tension i n Europe, Henderson supported Prance i n demanding concessions from Germany i n return for French aid to "save" the German economy. His proposals,^' including a suggestion that Germany agree to a five-year " p o l i t i c a l moratorium", were somewhat unrealistic, but they did demonstrate that he recognized that good Anglo-French relations were an essential preliminary to disarmament and the appeasement of Germany. Unfortunately, the B r i t i s h Chancellor (Philip Snowden), the Governor of the Bank of England (Montagu Norman) and Ramsay MacDonald opposed Henderson's policy and t r i e d to persuade the French to make concessions to Germany i n order to consolidate Bruning's position i n relation to the German extremists. This aroused the bitterness of the French, who began to withdraw t h e i r short-term credits from London, causing a financial c r i s i s that led to the downfall of the Labour Government on August 24. In his two years i n office, Henderson had taken a more r e a l i s t i c  36  a t t i t u d e towards the problems c o n f r o n t i n g him than h i s predecessor at the F o r e i g n O f f i c e and had done h i s best to b r i n g France Germany together. He was  and  the f i r s t , i f not the only, F o r e i g n Secretary  between the two World Wars who  gained the confidence of both  and German leaders, and f o r t h i s reason he was the Disarmament Conference on May  French  appointed President of  2 2 . Because of h i s b e l i e f i n an  i n t e r n a t i o n a l "harmony of i n t e r e s t s " , i n t e r e s t s which he thought could be pursued w i t h i n the framework of a system of c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y , he may  have been o v e r - o p t i m i s t i c about the chances of a  Franco-German r e c o n c i l i a t i o n , but u n l i k e most B r i t i s h statesmen, he recognized that B r i t a i n would have to play an a c t i v e r o l e i f there was  to be any chance of improving r e l a t i o n s between the two  Continental  Powers. Thus, although he appeared to regard disarmament as an end i n i t s e l f r a t h e r than as a method f o r f a c i l i t a t i n g a s o l u t i o n of the German problem, h i s p o l i c y o f f e r e d some hope that an agreement might be reached  at the Disarmament  Conference.  The f a l l of the Labour Government had s e r i o u s consequences. Henderson's personal i n f l u e n c e as President of the Disarmament Conference was weakened by h i s l o s s of o f f i c e , and the new Government - a Conservative  British  ( i n the guise of National) a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  with MacDonald as Premier - was more concerned with s o l v i n g B r i t a i n ' s economic problems than d i s c u s s i n g disarmament. Not u n t i l the general e l e c t i o n of October 27 had given the "National C o a l i t i o n " a convincing majority of over 400 seats i n the Commons d i d the Cabinet p o l i c y towards the disarmament and German problems.  consider i t s  37  Foreign Secretary i n the new Government was S i r John Simon - an unfortunate choice. A.gifted lawyer, he had l i t t l e interest i n foreign a f f a i r s , was reluctant to take a strong line on any problem confronting him and tended to look on other countries policies as opposing 1  35  briefs.  J  His appointment was c r i t i c i z e d by many leading Conservatives,  including S i r Austen Chamberlain,"^ and i t i s possible that KacDonald, who was intensely interested i n foreign a f f a i r s wanted to enhance his own prestige by having an indifferent performer at the Foreign 37  Offioe.  It was suggested that the allocation of offices within the  government coalition necessitated a Liberal Foreign Secretary, but other high-ranking Liberals, notably Sir Herbert Samuel, had better qualifications for the post than Simon. The Government abandoned Henderson's policy of "active mediation" between France and Germany and reverted to Austen Chamberlain's policy of "comparative detaohment" and the defence of Britain's immediate interests. Neither MacDonald nor Simon seemed to appreciate the role played by power i n international relations, and the Premier remained convinced that goodwill was a l l that was necessary to 39  resolve international disputes. ^ Apparently, he did not recognize that the German problem could not be solved unless Britain took a more active part i n European a f f a i r s and assumed additional Continental commitments. His own solution to both the German and disarmament problems was for France and Germany to "put their demands i n such a 40  way that B r i t a i n could say that she supported both sides". The Government's refusal to play an active part i n reconciling Franco-German differences was a serious blow to the Disarmament  38  Conference. Germany would no longer tolerate being treated as a second-class Power, and unless an agreement was reached at Geneva, i t was certain that she would begin to rearm unilaterally, thus causing an arms race. To meet t h i s danger, the other Powers had three courses open to them. They could uphold the provisions of the Peace Treaty by force; but this was unrealistic, the occupation of the Ruhr having demonstrated that a policy of force hurt the other Powers almost as much as Germany. They could f a l l back on their  own  military resources; but this would precipitate an arms race rather than avoid one. Or they could appease German grievances and adjust peacefully to the new configuration of power within Europe. Only this last course offered any real hope that a peaceful solution of the German and disarmament problems could be achieved; and i n practice i t meant reconciling the French claim for security with the German claim for equality of rights by means of a Franco-German agreement or through B r i t i s h mediation between the two Continental Powers. The latter was the most efficacious method, though for mediation to be successful i t would be necessary for B r i t a i n to offer France compensations for the increase i n German power accompanying a grant of equality.  39  CHAPTER I I  THE FIRST PHASE OP THE DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE February 2 - J u l y 23 1932  The b e l i e f that goodwill alone was s u f f i c i e n t to s e t t l e major i n te r n a t io na l problems led the Government to adopt a non-committal p o l i c y at the Disarmament Conference. MacDonald wrote to Lord Londonderry, the A i r M i n i s t e r , "We need at Geneva a p o l i c y q u i e t l y pursued without t u r n i n g off our way to right or l e f t " ,  1  and the  instructions sent to the B r i t i s h delegation i n Geneva were somewhat 2 nebulous on questions l i k e l y to cause d i f f i c u l t y .  Moreover, the  B r i t i s h Cabinet was s t i l l arguing about the substance of the B r i t i s h disarmament programme. The Government o r i g i n a l l y intended to follow a s i m i l a r p o l i c y to that advocated i n the Preparatory Commission - the direct l i m i t a t i o n of materiel and e f f e c t i v e s ^ - but i n January 1932 the Cabinet began to study a scheme f o r q u a l i t a t i v e disarmament drawn up by Capt. B. H . L i d d e l l Hart, a r e t i r e d army o f f i c e r and one of the foremost m i l i t a r y s t r a t e g i s t s of the time.^ The Preparatory Commission had revealed that France and Germany were u n l i k e l y to agree upon a scheme of quantitative disarmament because of t h e i r d i f f e r i n g s t r a t e g i c a l needs andffthe d i f f i c u l t y of imposing numerical r e s t r i c t i o n s . A successful agreement had to prevent squabbles over numbers and r a t i o s of armaments and s a t i s f y each state that i t s security was not impaired. L i d d e l l Hart believed that t h i s could be achieved by reducing the offensive power of armies and rendering them incapable of invading a neighbour's t e r r i t o r y with any prospect of success.  y  He therefore suggested the a b o l i t i o n of heavy guns of over  4" (105 mm) calibre and tanks of over f i v e , eight or ten tons, as  40  these were the only land weapons capable of making any impression on modern f o r t i f i c a t i o n s or entrenched p o s i t i o n s . Lighter weapons such as machine guns and automatic weapons were unable to break through modern f o r t i f i c a t i o n s or entrenchments; and i n any case they were d i f f i c u l t to l i m i t as they could e a s i l y be concealed - unlike heavy guns and tanks. At least two members of the Cabinet, Simon and S i r Samuel Hoare, gave L i d d e l l H a r t ' s ideas a favourable reception.** MacDonald and Baldwin (the Conservative leader and Lord President of the Council) also seem to have viewed them sympathetically, but the Service Ministers apparently opposed them and pressed f o r increases i n 7  B r i t i s h armaments.  1  The c o n f l i o t had not been resolved when the  Disarmament Conference assembled on February 2. At the opening of the "general discussion" on February 8 , Simon asserted that B r i t a i n was i n favour of both quantitative and q u a l i t a t i v e disarmament, and he went on to suggest that submarines and other weapons whose character was p r i m a r i l y offensive oould be abolished or reduced i n size and that r e s t r i c t i o n s could be placed on permissible weapons. " U n c i v i l i z e d " or offensive methods of warfare such as a e r i a l bombardment and the use of gas and chemical weapons could be prohibited and a Permanent Disarmament Commission could be established to supervise the convention. Simon's suggestions were rather vague and more an outline of the methods by which disarmament should be pursued rather than d e f i n i t e proposals f o r l i m i t a t i o n . The proposals f o r q u a l i t a t i v e l i m i t a t i o n represented a possible l i n e of advance, but i n t h e i r e x i s t i n g form they were i n s u f f i c i e n t to give an effective lead to the deliberations of the Conference.  41  Most delegations restated the p o s i t i o n that they had taken i n the Preparatory Commission or set out t h e i r maximum demands. The French Premier, Andre" Tardieu, repeated the f a m i l i a r argument that peace and disarmament depended on security and that security depended on each state being w i l l i n g to f u l f i l i t s obligations under the Covenant. He accepted the Draft Convention as a basis of an agreement, and suggested that i t could be complemented by the creation of an i n t e r n a t i o n a l force, the p r o h i b i t i o n of bombing, the i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of c i v i l a v i a t i o n , the protection of c i v i l i a n populations, compulsory a r b i t r a t i o n , the strengthening of the League and international oontrol of the execution of a l l agreements concerning armaments. Countries owning heavy a r t i l l e r y , submarines over an agreed tonnage, c a p i t a l ships over  10,000  tons or with guns over 8" c a l i b r e , and bombers  exceeding a weight to be s p e c i f i e d , would be permitted to use these weapons only i n self-defence  or on orders from the League. The use  of poison gas and incendiary and b a c t e r i o l o g i c a l weapons would be forbidden. The French were not so u n r e a l i s t i c as t o believe that t h e i r scheme would gain general acceptance; the discussions i n the Preparatory Commission had revealed that many countries, B r i t a i n included, would refuse to strengthen the League as an organ of s e c u r i t y . The r e a l objectives of the "Tardieu plan" were to enable the French demand f o r security to dominate the Geneva d i s o u s s i o n s ^ and to postpone the question of concessions to Germany u n t i l a f t e r the May elections i n France. When Simon pointed out that B r i t i s h opinion prevented the Government from entering new Continental commitments ans suggested  42  that i t was rather doubtful whether the "French t h e s i s " oould be u s e f u l l y discussed. Tardieu d i d not i n s i s t that his proposals be given f u l l c o n s i d e r a t i o n .  11  The proposals were useful e l e c t i o n propaganda  and a valuable bargaining counter at Geneva - but l i t t l e e l s e . Host speakers i n the "general discussion" seem to have recognized that the Tardieu plan was l i t t l e more than an exercise i n propaganda and omitted to mention the French proposals i n t h e i r own speeches. Hugh Gibson, the chief American delegate, suggested the a b o l i t i o n of submarines, l e t h a l gases and b a c t e r i o l o g i c a l warfare and the r e s t r i c t i o n of " p r i m a r i l y offensive" weapons such as tanks and heavy mobile guns. Armies would be divided into forces necessary f o r the maintenance of i n t e r n a l order and "some suitable contingent f o r defence" and the 12 London naval Treaty extended to include France and I t a l y . Dino Grandi, the I t a l i a n Foreign M i n i s t e r , advocated an agreement based on equality of r i g h t s and the "proportionate adjustment"«4f armed forces at the lowest possible l e v e l , and he advanced concrete suggestions f o r the q u a l i t a t i v e l i m i t a t i o n of the most powerful and deadly weapons. A i r c r a f t - c a r r i e r s , heavy a r t i l l e r y , tanks, bombers and chemioal and b a c t e r i o l o g i c a l weapons would be abolished and c a p i t a l ships and submarines were to be disposed of "simultaneously". Other armaments would be l i m i t e d q u a n t i t a t i v e l y and the laws of war revised to assure a more complete protection of c i v i l i a n p o p u l a t i o n s . ^ 1  The Soviet delegate, Maxim L i t v i n o v , repeated h i s f a m i l i a r demands f o r general and t o t a l disarmament or the "complete destruction" of the most aggressive types of armaments - tanks, super-heavy long—range a r t i l l e r y , naval a r t i l l e r y over 12" c a l i b r e , ships over 10,000 tons,  43  a i r c r a f t - c a r r i e r s ,  m i l i t a r y  and  chemical,  apparatus"  Litvinov would  poured  not  arms  not  be  large  were  w i l l i n g  j o i n 18,  proposals  constituting manufacture tanks  to  February  of  and  on  to  would  set  scorn  lead  army  On  for  a of  by  to  before  and  to  the  other  category,  excess  abolished  would  be  l i m i t e d . , F o r c e s  under  severe  tons,  the  or,  i f  t h i s such  r e s t r i c t i o n s . of  cruisers  suggesting proposed  aggressor  German  means  warfare.  that  they  international  even  i f  states  and  proved  and  of  being  and  c a p i t a l  and  destroyers  use  would  arms  be  redefined  "fortresses  be  prohibited, i n  Conscription  trained  would  new  l i m i t e d  gendarmerie  ships  a  and  destroyed.  impossible,  And  the  weapons  stocks  police  l a i d  bombardment,  nations"  materiel  as  delegate,  A e r i a l  bacteriological  abolished  be  " a l l  a c t i o n . ^  a r t i l l e r y  would  and  b a c t e r i o l o g i c a l  the  an  Conference.  menace  and  that  deter  Nadolny,  the  and  bombers  proposals,  and  coeroive  quantity  size  French  enough  chemical  heavy  the  Rudolf  heavy  incendiary  reduction  i n  direct  d i r i g i b l e s ,  reserves  would  be  placed  l i m i t e d  to  10,000  and  submarines  15 abolished. By that  February a l l  24,  delegations  b a c t e r i o l o g i c a l a b o l i t i o n land  of  both  offensive heavy  bombers  were  B r i t a i n  and  weapons.  i n  favour the  states  I t a l y  America  the  had  and  plan  of  And  the to  the  as  suggested other  i n  regards  had  the put the  hand,  deposit  ended,  a b o l i t i o n  majority  accepted  Russia  had  on  discussion"  great  bombing.  France,  though  "general  and  and  most  Germany,  weapons,  the  warfare  disarmament,  l i m i t a t i o n ; and  when  them  of  i t  of  c r u c i a l  p r i n c i p l e forward  of  with  of  and  the issue  of  qualitative  specific  l i m i t a t i o n wanted  evident  chemical  favour the  was  proposals  the  to  r e t a i n  the  League  most;  her was  an  44  implicit  recognition  Despite  French  disarmament effective French be  to  the  delegation  replaced  as  equality  status  as  insurance  a  be  that by  recognition coupled  figure  against  i t  d i d  made  deliberations  Chancellor  the  to  qualitative  might  feared  considering of  the  hesitations,  convention  lead  armaments  of  the a  p r i n c i p l e .  seem i f  of  B r i t a i n the  an  of  below  that  of  German  bad  f a i t h ,  the  w i l l i n g  and  French  so  give of  an  the might  were  claim  her  a  BrUning  limited  and  to  Members  German  that  France  the  towards  conciliatory  agreement  well  was  nationalist  p r i n c i p l e  with  progress  Conference.  r e l a t i v e l y  militant  i n  that  to  German  a l l i e s . ^  desired  some  And  material  17 pledge Simon  of  support  -  appreciated  u n w i l l i n g  to  possibly  that  give  any  the  a  promise  of  a i r c r a f t .  p o s s i b i l i t y  of  an  additional  assurances  But  agreement of  although  existed,  support  either  he  to  was;  France  18 alone lead  or i n  to  both  France  bringing  the  and  Germany  and  two.Continental  was  Powers  reluctant  together.  to  He  take  the  sounded 19  Tardieu Thus  on  the  chance  Conference Work  March  was  within  Conference  12, of  temporarily the  Its  as  Simon's  suggestion Draft  to  develop  Commission  a  f i r s t  delegations  the  and of  was  to  own  lay  was  follow  Franco-German  proceeded  to  down  while  proposals a l l  not  up  the  settlement  enquiry. outside  the  lost.  carrying  make  a  d i d  commission)  task  Convention  t h e i r  at  Conference  various  of  apparently  a r r i v i n g  s i t t i n g  delegation.  but  i n  the  consisting  co-ordinate a  on  mode i t s  move  decisions  of the  one  f u l l  member  and  within  l i b e r t y  amendments.  regarding  Commission  proposals  procedure,  discussions  reserving and  of  General  the  for The  it  a l l  from of  (the: eachi  the adopted  framework delegations  General  p r i n c i p l e s  of  disarmament,  45  and  five  technical  commissions  Expenditure  and  P o l i t i c a l )  of  the  p r i n c i p l e s .  applying These  procedural  became  apparent  before  the  Germany the  Easter  were  General  stating  a  recess  further  a  major  progress  decisions  on March  labours  of  to  advise  to  be  be  made  Defence best  means.  slow,  and  i t  soon  could  not  be  settled  and  break to  the  campaigns  progress, the  National  to  p r i n c i p l e  before  would  A i r ,  E l e c t i o n  19.  impediment  attempt  Naval,  established  caused  major  Commission's  that  were  matters  that  (Land,  the was  i n  sum a  tackle  France t o t a l  and  of  r e s o l u t i o n  "the  most  d i f f i c u l t  20 problems" Simon France  when  the  might  and  have  sat  by  such  as  Germany's  claim  B r i t a i n  was  speedily, working  of  the  for  treatment" II  and  themselves.  Foreign  "an  to  to  t r y  to  back  and  hoped  of  merely  of  b r i n g  When N a d o l n y  equality  Secretary  approximation that  he  11.  views  i n  the  meantime  during  the  recess  suggested  status  should  advised towards  be  that a  "everybody  that  greater  must  21  patience."  agreement  procedure  of  Commission attempts  Land  instead  agreement  more  forward  but  an  tackled  No  break  to  problems  A p r i l  three-week  come  that  on  the  together,  would  exercise  u t i l i z e d  reconvened  Germany  they  equality  Conference  a  the  was  were  was  reached  Conference  and  characterized made  proposal  Commission be  to for  speed  thus  by  a  series  matters.  qualitative  charged  the  with  regarding  the  resumption  of  of  discussions.  s t e r i l e  On A p r i l  11,  disarmament  formulating  the  the  future  Americans  suggesting  plans  for  General  the  that  Two put the  a b o l i t i o n  22 tanks, A p r i l  heavy 12,  mobile  L i t v i n o v  guns put  over  forward  155mm a  calibre  plan  for  and  poison  gas.  And  on  "progressive-proportional"  of  46  disarmament, a r e f u r b i s h i n g of h i s scheme of 1928 whereby states with armies over 200,000 men would be reduced by h a l f and those from 30-200,000 men from 0-50$.  But both these schemes were objectionable  to France and her a l l i e s because they divorced the d i s c u s s i o n of 24 disarmament from d i s c u s s i o n of s e c u r i t y .  Progress might have been  p o s s i b l e on the b a s i s of e i t h e r of these two schemes i f B r i t a i n had been w i l l i n g t o increase her s e c u r i t y commitments but the Government refused t o a l t e r i t s stance  on the Continent,  on t h i s  question.  A f t e r much d i s c u s s i o n , the American and Soviet proposals were passed t o the Bureau of the Conference " f o r c o n s i d e r a t i o n i n l i g h t of the d i s c u s s i o n that had taken plaoe, e s p e c i a l l y with regard t o the remarks of M. Tardieu." But the Bureau dodged the issues involved by recommending that the General Commission decide whether i t s goal should be a reduction of armaments t o the lowest p o s s i b l e l e v e l or a " d e f i n i t i v e r e d u c t i o n " and whether t o a r r i v e at the goal by means of a s i n g l e disarmament convention  or a number of successive agreements.  Simon had taken l i t t l e part i n the procedural d i s c u s s i o n s i n the hope that B r i t i s h i n t e r v e n t i o n would not be necessary t o secure an agreement. But the f a i l u r e of the Powers t o reach agreement l e d him to play an a c t i v e r o l e i n securing a compromise between the Germans, I t a l i a n s and Soviets on the one hand and the French and t h e i r on the other. The outcome was the adoption  allies  (on A p r i l 19> 20 and 22  r e s p e c t i v e l y ) of three r e s o l u t i o n s whose astute d r a f t i n g enabled them t o be accepted  unanimously. The f i r s t declared that a f t e r the Conference  had taken "the f i r s t  d e c i s i v e step of general reduction t o the lowest  p o s s i b l e l e v e l " , disarmament would be achieved by means of "successive  47  r e v i s i o n s at appropriate i n t e r v a l s " .  J  The second was l i t t l e more than  a recasting of A r t i c l e 8 of the Covenant, on which a l l members of the 26  League based t h e i r p o l i c y i n any case.  The t h i r d approved the  p r i n c i p l e of q u a l i t a t i v e disarmament - "the selection of c e r t a i n classes or description of weapons the possession or use of which should be absolutely prohibited to a l l states or i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z e d by means of 27  a general convention". The t h i r d r e s o l u t i o n was the most important as i t opened the way f o r the t e c h n i c a l commissions to examine the range of land, sea and a i r armaments "with a view to s e l e c t i n g those weapons whose character  was  the most s p e c i f i c a l l y offensive or . . . most efficacious against 28  national defence or most threatening to c i v i l i a n s " .  Yet, as L i t v i n o v  pointed out, the r e s o l u t i o n was so general and oould be interpreted i n so many different ways that i t delayed a decision regarding the 29  weapons concerned and the method of reducing them.  The Preparatory  Commission had demonstrated that m i l i t a r y "experts" were unable to agree on a c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of aggressive weapons because each state assumed that i t s own armaments were defensive and i t s neighbours* offensive. In formulating the three procedural resolutions, Simon was probably inspired by a desire to i n i t i a t e private discussions between leaders of the Great Powers during the Amerioan Secretary of State Stimson*s v i s i t to Geneva at the end of A p r i l . Hitherto, the B r i t i s h had adopted a p o l i c y of "wait and see" as regards the Franoo-German dispute, but they now seemed to r e a l i z e the necessity of bringing government  48  leaders together outside the Conference. Accordingly, i t was  arranged  that Stimson, MaeBonald, Tardieu and Bruning should meet for a semi-official exchange of views at Stimson*s v i l l a at Bessinge on A p r i l  29.^°  On A p r i l 24, at provincial elections i n Prussia, Bavaria, Wurttemburg, Anhalt and Hamburg (an area representing f o u r - f i f t h s of Germany) the Nazis made considerable gains. Bruning*s position as Chancellor was seriously weakened by the results, and he determined to steal the Nazi thunder by returning to Berlin with an agreement securing equality of rights for Germany. Three days before the proposed four-Power meeting, Bruning put his plan to the B r i t i s h and American Ministers. He demanded equality of treatment  - not equality of armaments - and insisted that he would be  satisfied with a reduction i n the period of service of the Reichswehr from twelve years to six, the transfer of Germany*s obligations under Part V of the Treaty of Versailles to the Disarmament Convention, and a reduction i n the armed forces of Prance - though not to Germany's level - through the abolition or r e s t r i c t i o n of "particularly aggressive" weapons. In return, the Chancellor would consider an agreement along the lines of the Tardieu plan for an international force, with the ultimate objective of abolishing the weapons under i t s control. The convention might last for ten y e a r s . ^ Bruning's proposals were very moderate and might well have formed the basis of a disarmament convention. They satisfied Germany's demand for equality - temporarily at least - yet also assured Prance of military superiority i n Europe for a considerable length of time.  49  Prospects f o r a settlement seemed good, particularly as the French delegation at Geneva had "been considering a scheme that closely resembled Brttning*s, except for a provision for increased security 32 pledges by B r i t a i n .  MaoDonald and Stimson, while not accepting  Bruning*s plan, agreed that the discussions of April 26 had helped "towards immediately clearing away some of the fundamental obstacles towards ultimate agreement.""^ Unfortunately, the meeting planned for A p r i l 29 did not take place as Tardieu was unable to journey to Geneva because of an attack of l a r y n g i t i s . Two days later, he was defeated i n the f i r s t round of: the French general elections and the convening of a four-Power meeting became impracticable. It i s often claimed that Tardieu*s i l l n e s s was diplomatic rather than physical and that he refused to go to Geneva because he had been informed by Andre Francois-Poneet, the French Ambassador i n Berlin, that Brttning was about to be displaced and that his successor would be more amenable to French demands.^ But the evidence available does not substantiate these claims. Franoois-Poncet admits having advised the French Premier that Brttning's days were numbered but denies having suggested that the Chancellor's successor would be more 35 amenable.  J  Moreover, i t seems unlikely that the anti-German Tardieu  would accept assurances from General Schleicher (Francois-Poncet's informant) regarding the amenability or otherwise of a new German leader. At the same time, apart from Brttning's claim that the French had agreed to his disarmament plan on May 31  f  the day after his dismissal,  50  there i s l i t t l e evidence to suggest that Tardieu would have agreed to the German proposals as they stood. Although the French Premier had come to r e a l i z e that continued French domination on the Continent was impracticable and that a prostrate Germany was as dangerous to 37 France as a m i l i t a r i s t i c one,  he seems to have considered i t  necessary to gain security compensations from B r i t a i n (and maybe America) i f he was t o agree to a settlement  on the basis of Brttning*s  •JO  demands.  Tardieu was worried l e s t concessions on the German claim  to equality might cause h i s defeat i n the French elections, and he seems t o have been angling for a consultative pact with B r i t a i n and an assurance from the Americans that they would not i n t e r f e r e with a 39 course of action determined by the League. ' I f B r i t a i n had been w i l l i n g to give Tardieu the guarantees he required or give s i m i l a r guarantees to both France and Germany, an agreed solution to the disarmament problem might well have been possible. B r i t a i n ' s attitude to the Brttning proposals i s uncertain because of a lack of documentary evidence. No record appears to have been ,  made of the conversations, of A p r i l 26.  AO  The Germans claimed  subsequently that MacDonald had agreed to t h e i r claim f o r equality of r i g h t s , but t h i s was denied by the Foreign O f f i c e .  At the same  time, i t i s evident that the Prime M i n i s t e r regarded the German plan 42 as a basis of a settlement.  It i s astonishing, therefore, that he  made no r e a l effort to press Tardieu into returning to Geneva.^ He must have recognized that to send Brttning back to B e r l i n with no agreement regarding equality of status was tantamount to ensuring the Chancellor's downfall. Possibly h i s lack of i n i t i a t i v e i n ^ t r y i n g  51  to arrange another four-Power meeting was due t o a r e a l i z a t i o n that agreement was improbable unless B r i t a i n increased her Continental . . . 44 commitments. Whatever the cause, the chance of securing a disarmament convention at Bessinge was missed. Tardieu's defeat i n the French elections of May 1 and 8 made a resumption of four-Power conversations d i f f i c u l t , and an American attempt to c a l l a four-Power meeting before the Lausanne Conference i n June was frustrated by the dismissal of Bruning on May 30.  Meanwhile, the t e c h n i c a l commissions had begun t h e i r attempts t o define aggressive weapons. But the lack of p o l i t i c a l agreement among the states represented at the Conference ensured that the m i l i t a r y "experts" were u n l i k e l y to reach an agreement. Each state claimed that i t s own armaments were defensive and opponents' armaments offensive. 45 There was l i t t l e pretence of o b j e c t i v i t y .  y  In the Land Commission, Germany, the other former Central Powers and I t a l y maintained that the weapons denied t o Germany by the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s were s p e c i f i c a l l y offensive and that guns over 100-105mm and a l l tanks should be abolished. France, anxious t o maintain her m i l i t a r y s u p e r i o r i t y over Germany, claimed that guns of 240mm and tanks of 70 tons were unable t o breach permanent f o r t i f i c a t i o n s and 4.6  were necessary to launch successful counter-offensives.  Britain,  represented by Brigadier Temperley and Lord Stanhope, took an intermediate p o s i t i o n , maintaining that guns up to 155nun and tanks up t o 20-25 tons were not offensive and that "medium tanks" were  52  necessary to compensate Powers such as B r i t a i n f o r reductions i n 47  effectives already made.  The vast majority of the delegations  supported the complete abolition of tanks and most believed that heavy guns should be limited to a calibre of either 105mm or 155nmi» Only Japan, who was consolidating her new conquests i n Manchuria, supported Prance. On June 7 the Commission reported that no agreement A A  could be reached on a olassifioation of offensive weapons.  The  conclusion was not unexpected. The position taken by the B r i t i s h representatives reflected the growing influence of the fighting services on government policy. The War Office, A i r Ministry and Admiralty were opposed to reductions i n B r i t i s h armaments, and the A i r Minister Lord Londonderry, and the Minister f o r War, Lord Hailsham were against the whole concept of 49  qualitative disarmament.  y  The Government had intended to advocate  the r e s t r i c t i o n of tanks to ten tons, but the General Staff, prompted by the Assistant Director of Mechanization i n the War Office, Tim P i l e , apparently convinced the Cabinet that B r i t a i n led the world i n the development of "medium tanks" and that the Army could not give them up; i n fact, B r i t a i n possessed only a few experimental 50  models of 16-20 tons. There was as l i t t l e agreement i n the Naval Commission as i n the Land Commission, each state basing i t s d e f i n i t i o n of an aggressive weapon on i t s own strategical needs. Britain and America, both Great naval Powers argued that no single type of warship was offensive but that submarines should be abolished on "humanitarian and f i n a n c i a l " grounds, while Japan, the t h i r d Great naval Power, claimed that  53  battleships  and  offensive.  Prance  submarines, could  not  On  defensive. c a p i t a l  denied after  28,  were  maintained  to a  defensive  that The  ships  and-battleships  ships  May  were  afford  defensive that  submarines  a l l  Germany  month  of  naval  suggested  by  especially and  those  submarines  Germany  Treaty  s t e r i l e  but  Powers  that  and  the  a i r c r a f t - c a r r i e r s  warships,  lesser  offensive,  but  of  and  were  I t a l y  V e r s a i l l e s  discussion,  the  who  argued  were  offensive.  Commission  was  51 compelled The  that  report  scheme  of  the  for  attempted  for  m i l i t a r y  European  creation  of of  purposes.  bombing  the  Commission  offensive subserve danger  to  complete  influence  as  of  p o l i c y the  and  a i r  was  and  Not  a i r c r a f t " A l l  c i v i l  aviation  the  development  the  and  of  use the  of  c i v i l  the  Prance  B r i t i s h  a  favoured  the  delegation  the  report  of  containing  to  some  can  i n  varying  may  position  aircraft  was  used  . . .  of  complete  platitudinous,  aircraft  the  suggested  German  problem  while the  the  surprisingly,  . . .  on  retard  favour  be  a  I t a l y  advooated  merely can  supported  and  aviation, force  of  that  Russia  armaments  " C i v i l  ends"  declared  bombing. 8  i n  Prance  Germany  would  preventing  m i l i t a r y  June a i r  c i v i l i a n s " .  control  plan  on  while  b a s i c a l l y  I t a l y  ban  " A l l  m i l i t a r y  of  a  and  purposes",  B r i t a i n ' s  was  international  a  possible.  unsuccessful.  Union  America  Germany,  an  observations  Postal  devise  opposed A i r  also  was  i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n  B r i t a i n  to  one.  a b o l i t i o n  the  agreement  international  aviation.  but  no  was  Universal  stringent  c i v i l  that  Air. Commission  Spanish lines  to  extent  such  for  degrees;  constitute  a  52  i n  the  Service  A i r  Commission  Departments  on  again  the  reflected  Government.  the  Many  growing members  54  of the Cabinet, i n c l u d i n g Simon and Baldwin, favoured the complete a b o l i t i o n of bombing together with some control - though not the i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of - c i v i l a v i a t i o n t o prevent c i v i l a i r c r a f t 53 being used f o r m i l i t a r y purposes.  But the A i r Staff suggested  that B r i t a i n should r e t a i n bombers f o r deterrent purposes and that bombing was an e f f i c i e n t and humane method of p o l i c i n g o u t l y i n g d i s t r i c t s of the B r i t i s h Empire such as the North West F r o n t i e r of 54 India. Lord Londonderry feared the a b o l i t i o n of bombing might lead to the e x t i n c t i o n of the R . A . F . and he vigorously expounded the A i r 55 y  Staff view i n the Cabinet. ^ The i n a b i l i t y of the technical commissions to define aggressive weapons was not s u r p r i s i n g . States had been unable to compose t h e i r p o l i t i c a l differences, and t h e i r divergent viewpoints had been r e f l e c t e d i n the commissions. Lord C e c i l complained that the m i l i t a r y "experts" were preventing agreement by l o s i n g themselves i n a maze of 56 technicalities,  but the f a u l t lay with the p o l i t i c i a n s , who  f a i l e d t o come to grips with the main problems facing the Conference the French demand f o r security and the German demand f o r equality of rights. Baldwin was apprehensive at the lack of progress i n the technical commissions, and on May 13 he put forward s p e c i f i c proposals to Andrew Mellon, the American Ambassador i n London, i n the hope that B r i t a i n and Amerioa could unite i n presenting a r a d i c a l programme to the Conference at Geneva. Closely resembling the I t a l i a n proposals,  -  55  and t o be accepted  or r e j e c t e d as a whole, the Baldwin p l a n  envisaged  the a b o l i t i o n of c a p i t a l s h i p s , submarines, a i r c r a f t - c a r r i e r s , tanks, heavy mobile guns and a l l m i l i t a r y a v i a t i o n ( i n c l u d i n g p u r s u i t and o b s e r v a t i o n p l a n e s ) , the p r o h i b i t i o n of s u b s i d i e s t o c i v i l a v i a t i o n 57 and a " d r a s t i c r e d u c t i o n " of e f f e c t i v e s . There was  l i t t l e chance of Baldwin's scheme being accepted i n i t s  o r i g i n a l form. Although no corresponding  i t p r o v i d e d f o r German e q u a l i t y , i t o f f e r e d  concessions t o French s e c u r i t y ; t h e r e were no  p r o v i s i o n s f o r e i t h e r the s u p e r v i s i o n or the enforcement of the convention. Baldwin gave, no i n d i c a t i o n t h a t B r i t a i n was w i l l i n g t o i n c r e a s e her C o n t i n e n t a l commitments, though he d i d suggest t h a t America might agree t o some form of c o - o p e r a t i o n w i t h the League i n 58 the case of s a n c t i o n s b e i n g a p p l i e d .  But i t was u n l i k e l y t h a t  P r e s i d e n t Hoover would r i s k h i s p o l i t i c a l f u t u r e - i t was year - by u n d e r t a k i n g f u r t h e r commitments i n matters not  an e l e c t i o n directly  i n v o l v i n g h i s country. The Baldwin p l a n represented a c o n s i d e r a b l e departure  in British  p o l i c y - i f i t was a s e r i o u s p r o p o s a l . There i s some doubt about t h i s . M e l l o n d e s c r i b e d the Conservative  l e a d e r ' s a t t i t u d e towards the scheme 59  as r e s i g n e d r a t h e r t h a n h o p e f u l , "almost a p o l o g e t i c " , h i m s e l f was  and  Baldwin  convinced t h a t the a i r proposals were i m p r a c t i c a b l e and  would not be accepted by the other P o w e r s . ^ Moreover, a f t e r Stimson had r e j e c t e d the p l a n , Baldwin began t o i n s i s t t h a t i t was  a purely  p e r s o n a l i n i t i a t i v e t h a t should be kept s e c r e t . ^ T h i s was  untrue;  1  the Cabinet had d i s c u s s e d the p r o p o s a l s at l e a s t t w i c e w i t h a view t o 62 p r e s e n t i n g them at Geneva. Baldwin's r e a l reason f o r wanting the  56  scheme t o remain secret was  f e a r l e s t the Labour Party l e a r n of i t  and place the Government i n an embarrassing p o s i t i o n * ^ A f u r t h e r reason f o r doubting Baldwin's s i n c e r i t y i s that  abolition  of c a p i t a l s h i p s , submarines and a i r c r a f t - c a r r i e r s would have increased the strength of the Royal Navy, whose main strength was  i n c r u i s e r s and  destroyers, at the expense of America and Japan, whose main strength was  i n the c l a s s e s of ship t o be abolished. The American  Under-Secretary  of State, W. R. Gastle J n r . , b e l i e v e d , probably c o r r e c t l y , that the naval proposals were an attempt t o appeal t o the T o r i e s , who aversion t o disarmament unless i t was Stimson was  had a p h i l o s o p h i c a l  the disarmament of others.  4  s e r i o u s l y concerned by the Baldwin p l a n , e s p e c i a l l y the  proposed a b o l i t i o n of c a p i t a l ships and a i r c r a f t - c a r r i e r s . America needed b a t t l e s h i p s and a i r c r a f t - c a r r i e r s t o protect her i n t e r e s t s i n the Par East and he would not even agree to " r e l a t i v e and p r o p o r t i o n a l " reductions  65 i n them. ^ He wanted, above a l l , t o prevent B r i t a i n from presenting Baldwin's proposals at Geneva i n case they r e v e a l the Anglo-American d i f f e r e n c e s on naval q u e s t i o n s . ^ Apparently,  he feared that Hoover  might support the Baldwin plan, and he began t o formulate  counter-  proposals which e v e n t u a l l y formed the b a s i s of the "Hoover p l a n " of 67  June 22.  A f t e r a demarche by Mellon on June 8, Baldwin q u i e t l y dropped  h i s disarmament scheme.  While the Anglo-American conversations were t a k i n g p l a c e , H e r r i o t had succeeded Tardieu as Frenoh President du C o n s e i l . The  change i n  personnel d i d not l e a d t o any great change i n French p o l i c y . Although  57  Herriot sincerely hoped f o r a Franco-German reconciliation and was under pressure from the Socialists f o r a 25$ cut i n the military budget as part of their price f o r co-operation with the Government, he was "deeply under the impression of the Stresemann letters'* published i n " L * I l l u s t r a t i o n " and "Revue de Paris" i n March. Conversing with Norman Davis, one of the American delegates at Geneva, he even remarked that "Briand's body i s not yet oold before 68 they  the Germans  lay on his tomb the Stresemann i n s u l t s ! "  In Germany, President Hindenburg had dismissed Brttning and replaoed him with a "Government of Barons" under Franz von Papen, a relative nonentity who owed his position to his personal relationship with Hindenburg and General Schleicher. Baron von Neurath was appointed Foreign Minister. Yet despite the more conservative nature of the new Cabinet, German disarmament policy remained fundamentally the same. Apart from Papen*s insistence that the negotiations at Geneva be speeded up and that Germany pursue a more aotive policy there, the main difference between him and Brttning was his vigorous espousal of a Franco-German 69 rapprochement. Schleicher, who became Minister of Defence i n the new Cabinet, hoped that a deal might be arranged with the French, l i f t i n g 70  some of the restrictions on German disarmament. Provided that public opinion on either side of the Rhine was not aroused, there seemed to be a distinot p o s s i b i l i t y that the new French and German leaders would come to an agreement. It was the B r i t i s h who made the f i r s t new suggestion f o r improving European relations. Simon took up Francois-Poneet*s old idea of a " p o l i t i c a l truce", an agreement by which European states would not  58  r a i s e p o l i t i c a l i s s u e s or pursue p o l i c i e s l i k e l y t o d i s t u r b t h e i r good r e l a t i o n s with each other f o r f i f t e e n years. I t would e n t a i l a p e r i o d i c exchange of views on matters of common importance and Simon hoped that i t might c a j o l e the French i n t o accepting the c a n c e l l a t i o n of German  71 reparations.  But  n e i t h e r the French nor German Governments favoured  the scheme. H e r r i o t b e l i e v e d i t might be another "scrap of paper" s i m i l a r t o the Covenant and K e l l o g g Pact and that the questions  i t was  political  hoped t o sweep under the carpet would be r a i s e d  72 automatically at the end was  of f i f t e e n years;  t o him,  a political  truce  c e r t a i n l y no quid pro quo f o r the c a n c e l l a t i o n of German reparations-.  The Germans, who  i n any  case were determined not to pay  any more  r e p a r a t i o n s , p r e f e r r e d a d i r e c t Franco-German settlement. i n f a c t , would only have b e n e f i t t e d B r i t a i n , who calm on the Continent  (without  The  wanted a period of  h e r s e l f having t o undertake  any  a d d i t i o n a l commitments) and the c a n c e l l a t i o n of reparations she could renege on her war Thus, on June 16,  debts t o the United  proposal,  (so that  States).  when the Lausanne Conference on  reparations  opened, the ground had been c l e a r e d of a l l p o l i t i c a l proposals the way  was  and  open f o r Papen to r e v e a l h i s plan f o r a Franco-German  rapprochement p r i v a t e l y to H e r r i o t . He demanded that reparations c a n c e l l e d and,  i n r e t u r n , o f f e r e d an accord d i r e c t e d against  be  communism  ( i n e f f e c t against R u s s i a ) , p o l i t i c a l guarantees ( f o r example, i n  73 Eastern Europe) and June 18,  contacts between the two  Bernhard von Billow, one  i n conversation  with M.  General S t a f f s .  On  of the German S e c r e t a r i e s of State,  de Laboulay, one  of H e r r i o t ' s S e c r e t a r i e s of  State, o f f e r e d t o r e a f f i r m the p r o v i s i o n s of Locarno r e l a t i v e to Germany's Eastern f r o n t i e r and  suggested a four-Power c o n s u l t a t i v e pact  59  "between Prance, Germany, B r i t a i n and I t a l y . ^ Two  days l a t e r  he  added that i n r e t u r n f o r a r e c o g n i t i o n of e q u a l i t y of treatment  and  the replacement of Part V of the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s by a f r e e l y negotiated  disarmament convention, Germany would be w i l l i n g to f i x  d e f i n i t e r a t i o s : between the two  armed f o r c e s and to forgo her claim.  75 t o p a r i t y i n both men  and armaments.  informed MaoDonald that he was  J  On the f o l l o w i n g day,  Papen  prepared to enter a f i v e - y e a r  c o n s u l t a t i v e paot w i t h Pranoe, B r i t a i n and I t a l y " f o r the purpose of ensuring French s e c u r i t y " and added t h a t , i n r e t u r n f o r a r e c o g n i t i o n of her e q u a l i t y of r i g h t s , Germany would r e f r a i n from i n c r e a s i n g her armaments t o the maximum which would be permitted  her and would l i m i t  her m i l i t a r y expenditure to the e x i s t i n g l e v e l .  On June 24 he  repeated h i s previous proposals  to H e r r i o t and promised not to r a i s e  the Anschluss or the r e v i s i o n of Germany's Eastern f r o n t i e r without  77 prior consultation. H e r r i o t was  a t t r a c t e d by the scheme, though he was  suspicious  of the proposed accord between the General S t a f f s and the prospect co-operation  against  of  Soviet Russia. De Laboulay composed a d r a f t  formula and the French Premier returned t o P a r i s to gain Cabinet 7ft  approval f o r continuing the n e g o t i a t i o n s . However, when he came back t o Lausanne, he found Papen i n a more guarded frame of mind because  79 of attacks i n the German n a t i o n a l i s t press. "  The German Chancellor  now  i n c l u d i n g a customs  proposed a more comprehensive settlement,  union, the c a n c e l l a t i o n of r e p a r a t i o n s , the r e c o g n i t i o n of German e q u a l i t y of r i g h t s , a m i l i t a r y entente ( i f not an a l l i a n c e ) between  80 the General S t a f f s and  1  an accord t o eliminate c r e d i t s to  Russia.  60  Despite plan  the  might  well  disarmament. of  underlying have  It  armaments German  and  agreement since  to  France  proposed  nationalist  thus  have  given  her  improve  relations  the  would  depressed  auspicious  negotiations press  have  caused  would  the  of  broke  Chancellor  the  been  the  The  to  on  cancellation i n  of  the  security.  An  unthinkable  Soviets, France  but  and  the  .Germany,  time.  Franco-German  down.  accord  superiority  greater  the  P a p e n * S;  departments  both  of  the  her  have  benefitted  opening  motives,  and  a l l  with  circumstances  soon  to  with  desired  union  rights  retained  access  providing  German  Franco-German  of  Russia  to  of a  equality  would  been  of  against  the  and  "basis  Germany  have  distrust  co-operate  i n  However,  the  France  Staff,  customs  especially  continue  while  would  General  formed  offered  reparations,  French  attacks  assume  a  talks on  did  Papen  more  not  by  the  cautious  8l attitude, the  but  B r i t i s h .  desist  from  spectre  of  the  MacDonald further  a  main  factor  put  i n  the  pressure  negotiations  Franco-German  breakdown  on  both  because  alliance  Papen  he  which  was  was  would  the  and  attitude  Herriot  haunted "upset  by the  of  to  the balance  of  82 European to and  power."  discuss  the  Herriot  proposal  consultative him  to  least, the  a and  28,  of  a  decidedly  m i l i t a r y  pact the  would  up  good  relations  three  Herriot  be  countries  made began  treated  be  "real  claim  to  reparations.  policy,  and  had it  and  always soon  no to  been  became  entente a  Papen  of  maintain  efficacious" An  together  both  mention  separately  to  B r i t a i n  came  understanding,  Papen  and  should  have  with  a l l  Franco-German  entente,  French  statesman's  when  r e t i c e n t .  disarmament  give  French  June  question  were  for  reparations  On  and to  that that  a  induce  or,  cornerstone  apparent  his  that  at of t h i s  61  a p p e a l e d "to him more t h a n an u n c e r t a i n agreement w i t h Germany. A l t h o u g h Papen  offered  a customs u n i o n , a v e r y a t t r a c t i v e  proposition,  he d e c i d e d t o d i s c o n t i n u e t h e c o n v e r s a t i o n s . The B r i t i s h agreement  a t t i t u d e was v e r y  s h o r t s i g h t e d . A Franco-German  s u c h a s Papen a n t i c i p a t e d would have improved t h e p o l i t i c a l  atmosphere on t h e C o n t i n e n t  c o n s i d e r a b l y and would have e n a b l e d a more  c o n c e r t e d a t t a c k t o have been made on t h e disarmament p r o b l e m . MacDonald*s  f e a r s o f an a d v e r s e change i n t h e E u r o p e a n b a l a n c e o f  power were e x a g g e r a t e d ; a s t h e p r e c e d e n t Franco-German  of  1883-5 had shown, a  rapprochement d i d n o t n e c e s s a r i l y e n t a i l  p o l i c y a s t h e F r e n c h would e n s u r e t h a t  any a n t i - B r i t i s h  an a n t i - B r i t i s h tendencies  were n o t c a r r i e d t o an extreme. S i m i l a r l y , t h e new g r o u p i n g would not have f o l l o w e d a n extreme a n t i - R u s s i a n c o u r s e - b e c a u s e o f F r e n c h o b j e c t i o n s - t h o u g h e v e n i f i t h a d , t h e B r i t i s h would have been t h e last  t o o b j e c t ; t h e Government  had l i t t l e  sympathy f o r t h e B o l s h e v i k  regime. A n o t h e r f a c t o r i n t h e breakdown intervention of President  o f t h e P a p e n - H e r r i o t t a l k s was t h e  Hoover, who p r e s e n t e d a c o m p r e h e n s i v e scheme  f o r g e n e r a l disarmament t o t h e G e n e r a l Commission a t Geneva  on June  85 22. ^ The new A m e r i c a n p r o p o s a l c o m p l i c a t e d t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s a t Lausanne b y r a i s i n g new i s s u e s b e f o r e p r o p o s a l was welcomed  o l d ones had been s e t t l e d . The  b y German o p i n i o n , and t h i s u n d e r m i n e d  Papen's  p o s i t i o n i n a d v o c a t i n g a Franco-German r a p p r o c h e m e n t . H o o v e r ' s i n t e r v e n t i o n a l s o made H e r r i o t ' s p o s i t i o n d i f f i c u l t . The F r e n c h P r e m i e r was  i n f a v o u r o f i m p r o v i n g r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e A m e r i c a n s , b u t i f he  a c c e p t e d t h e Papen p l a n he would i n c u r t h e i r w r a t h . Not o n l y were t h e  62  Americans opposed t o the o l d - s t y l e diplomacy of the European Powers, they were opposed t o the c a n c e l l a t i o n of reparations - they b e l i e v e d that any  such a c t i o n would he used as an excuse by the former A l l i e d  Powers t o renege on t h e i r war But  i f nothing  debts.  e l s e , the Papen-Herriot t a l k s caused the  t o r e a l i z e that they had  British  l o s t the i n i t i a t i v e i n d i r e c t i n g European  a f f a i r s . On J u l y 5? t h e r e f o r e , they proposed a c o n s u l t a t i v e pact among the s i x I n v i t i n g Powers at the Lausanne Conference - B r i t a i n , Prance, Germany, I t a l y , Japan and Belgium; the governments concerned would r e f u s e t o d i s c u s s p o l i t i c a l questions two  a f f e c t i n g i n t e r e s t s of  or more of them a r i s i n g from t r e a t i e s or instruments t o which  they were p a r t i e s without a p r e l i m i n a r y f r i e n d l y c o n s u l t a t i o n . But any p o s s i b i l i t y of an agreement was  prevented by the Franco-German  d i f f e r e n c e s over r e p a r a t i o n s ; Germany wanted t o pay of Reichsmarks as a " f o r f a i t " f o r the termination and t o i n c l u d e a r e n u n c i a t i o n of the "war  only 2.6 m i l l i a r d s  of reparations  g u i l t " clause of the  Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s and the r e c o g n i t i o n of e q u a l i t y of r i g h t s i n  86 a f i n a l settlement,  while France i n s i s t e d on a " f o r f a i t "  4 m i l l i a r d s and the e x c l u s i o n of references t o "war  guilt"  of and  87 disarmament. The B r i t i s h were alarmed when t h e i r proposal  foundered since they  feared that i t might r e v i v e the n e g o t i a t i o n s f o r a Franco-German entente. They t h e r e f o r e o f f e r e d t o sign a c o n s u l t a t i v e accord  with  88 France alone.  H e r r i o t promptly agreed and  on J u l y 13,  f o u r days  a f t e r the F i n a l Act of the Lausanne Conference, the Anglo-French D e c l a r a t i o n was  announced i n London and P a r i s . I t stated that  two Bowers intended  t o exchange views and information  on "any  the questions  63  ... similar i n origin to that ... settled at Lausanne" and to work together to find a solution of the disarmament question which would he "beneficial and equitable" to a l l Powers concerned; i t was hoped 89 that other governments would join them i n adopting the same procedure. But i t was not these innocuous platitudes that attracted the French to the soheme; i t was Britain's secret interpretation of them. On a l l points raised by Germany i n connection with her "liberation" from the Treaty of Versailles, MacDonald promised to give no definite answer to the German Government u n t i l he had f i r s t consulted with the French and come to some kind of agreement with them on the policy to be followed. France was to give a reciprocal undertaking, thus "protecting" both Governments against "the dangers of piecemeal approaches by 90 Germany".  Herriot accepted w i l l i n g l y ; i n the 1920s the Frenoh  had suffered considerably from "piecemeal approaches" by the German Government to London. The Anglo—French Declaration represented no great change i n the B r i t i s h policy of "no further commitments" on the Continent. The desire to move closer to France seems to have been a temporary phenomenum, the objectives being to hinder a resumption of FranooGerman negotiations on disarmament, to prevent the conclusion of an agreement behind Britain's back and to gain an a l l y against the 91 "Hoover plan" for disarmament. MacDonald was oareful to insist that 92 the Declaration was not a renewal of the entente cordiale.  and he  w i l l i n g l y agreed to invite other Powers to adhere to the agreement when i t became clear that they were suspicious of a purely Anglo-French accord. The main object of his polioy had been secured by the secret interpretation of the agreement.  64  On June 22, an attempt  P r e s i d e n t Hoover had  t o "break t h e d e a d l o c k  Powers a t Geneva. He one t h i r d b a s e d  suggested  on f i v e  i n the comparative  advanced a new  i n t h e p r i v a t e n e g o t i a t i o n s of t h e  a r e d u c t i o n i n w o r l d armaments o f n e a r l y  main p r i n c i p l e s - t h e K e l l o g g P a c t , an i n c r e a s e  power o f d e f e n c e  by a r e d u c t i o n i n t h e power o f  attack, the p r e s e r v a t i o n " i n a general sense" i n armaments, " r e a l  set of p r o p o s a l s i n  of the e x i s t i n g  and p o s i t i v e " r e d u c t i o n s and t h e  relativity  interdependence  93 of a l l arms. The  t e r m s o f t h e Hoover scheme were c l e a r and  f o r c e s i n excess of i n t e r n a l  of a " p o l i c e  comprehensive.  component" n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e  o r d e r ( t o be d e t e r m i n e d  r e d u c e d by  one  third  be made f o r c o l o n i a l Powers who  of tanks, l a r g e  mobile  t o t h e f o r m u l a would  a i r bombardment w o u l d be a b o l i s h e d ,  t h o u g h r e c o n n a i s s a n c e p l a n e s w o u l d be b a t t l e s h i p s would be r e d u c e d by  as  needed a d d i t i o n a l f o r c e s b e c a u s e o f  t h e i r e x t r a commitments. Bombers and  one  65,000,000  c h e m i c a l w a r f a r e . F i x e d f o r t i f i c a t i o n s would be t o l e r a t e d  t h e y were d e f e n s i v e i n c h a r a c t e r . ^ A d j u s t m e n t s "  by  per  and t h e o f f e n s i v e power o f  t h e f o r c e s r e m a i n i n g d e c r e a s e d by t h e a b o l i t i o n guns and  maintenance  on t h e b a s i s o f t h e f o r c e s a l l o w e d  t o Germany by t h e T r e a t y o f V e r s a i l l e s - 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 men p o p u l a t i o n ) would be  Land  one  a l l o w e d . The  third  and  q u a r t e r , t h e r e d u c t i o n s b e i n g based  total  tonnage of  d e s t r o y e r s and  cruisers;  on t h e Washington and  London  n a v a l T r e a t i e s and t h e F r a n c o - I t a l i a n "Bases o f an Agreement" o f March 1931.  Submarine t o n n a g e would be  r e d u c e d by  These p r o p o s a l s p l a c e d B r i t a i n  one  third.  i n an e m b a r r a s s i n g  position.  n a v a l p r o v i s i o n s were u n a c c e p t a b l e b e c a u s e t h e y r e d u c e d B r i t i s h s t r e n g t h below t h e number o f u n i t s n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e c o n t r o l trade routes yet f a i l e d  to abolish  submarines,  The cruiser  of her  the c h i e f threat  to  1  65  her maritime commerce. Moreover, the land and a i r terms included the abolition of bombers, tanks and a i r bombardment, a l l of which B r i t a i n was unwilling to give up - i f the Baldwin plan i s considered as a serious disarmament proposal - except i n return for the abolition of capital ships and submarines. Yet the Government could not reject the American plan outright as this would jeopardize the good relations between the two countries and give the impression to both B r i t i s h and world opinion that B r i t a i n was not i n favour of disarmament. This dilemma was the direct result of Britain's own policy. Her unwillingness to come to grips with the main problems facing the Conference had caused her to lose the diplomatic i n i t i a t i v e to the Germans at Lausanne and the Americans at Geneva. At Lausanne, she was faced with the p o s s i b i l i t y of a Franco-German agreement negotiated behind her back; at Geneva, she was faced with a plan for disarmament that was quickly accepted i n i t s e n t i r e t y by Italy and as a basis of 94 agreement by Germany and the Soviet Union. Faced with these circumstances, the Government played for time and, while welcoming the "breadth of view taken of the disarmament problem in President Hoover's declaration", took action to delay consideration of the American proposals. When Henderson attempted to use his position as President of the Conference to speed matters - he suggested that the Hoover proposals might be discussed i n the private conversations of the Powers that had been proceeding intermittently since June 14 Simon declared that this was impossible. Similarly, when the Labour Party t r i e d to speed matters by attempting to draw a statement from the Government, both Simon and Baldwin claimed that i t was necessary to have prior consultation with the Dominions.95  66  F o r t u n a t e l y f o r t h e Government, a f t e r t h e m a j o r Powers h a d made their i n i t i a l  observations t h e Conference  decided t o postpone  c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f t h e A m e r i c a n scheme so t h a t t h e v a r i o u s governments c o u l d examine i t more c a r e f u l l y . T h i s gave B r i t a i n t i m e t o f o r m u l a t e counter-proposals  and l o o k f o r a l l i e s ,  and a p p r o a c h e s were made t o  J a p a n , whom t h e Government hoped w o u l d s u p p o r t  t h e i r objections; t o  96 Hoover's n a v a l p r o p o s a l s . same t i m e  T h i s was a s i g n i f i c a n t move f o r a t t h e  B r i t a i n was.working c l o s e l y w i t h t h e Americans a g a i n s t  J a p a n e s e p o l i c y i n M a n c h u r i a ; b u t i t was; a move t h a t p r o m i s e d ( a n d achieved) control  s u c c e s s b e c a u s e t h e J a p a n e s e m i l i t a r y were i n e f f e c t i v e  o f t h e c o u n t r y . More i m p o r t a n t  was t h e B r i t i s h move t o w a r d s  97 France On  - t h e secret i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e Anglo-French J u l y 7 » t h e Government p r e s e n t e d  t o t h e Conference  Declaration.  a disarmament p l a n o f i t s own  i n Geneva i n t h e g u i s e o f a "Statement  o f Views"  on t h e H o o v e r p r o p o s a l s . The p r e s e n t a t i o n c o i n c i d e d w i t h t h e resumption  o f t h e d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e Hoover p l a n i n t h e G e n e r a l  Commission, and t h e r e c a n be l i t t l e  doubt t h a t t h e B r i t i s h move was  a d e l i b e r a t e attempt t o d i m i n i s h t h e e f f e c t t h a t t h e s m a l l e r Powers were e x p e c t e d  o f t h e warm  approval  t o g i v e t o t h e A m e r i c a n scheme.  I n o r d e r t o p r e s e r v e a p p e a r a n c e s , t h e B r i t i s h p l a n was c l a i m e d t o be a s e r i e s o f proposals f o r "implementing t h e general p r i n c i p l e s o f t h e  98 Hoover P l a n " b u t ,  i n fact,  i t was t h e n e g a t i o n  claimed t h a t she had a l r e a d y reduced  of i t .  Britain  h e r f o r c e s t o t h e lowest  level  c o n s i s t e n t w i t h n a t i o n a l s a f e t y and t h a t , i n consequence, t h e proposed d i v i s i o n  o f l a n d f o r c e s between " d e f e n c e "  components" would r e q u i r e " v e r y c a r e f u l r e j e c t e d t h e a b o l i t i o n o f tanks: e x c e p t  and " p o l i c e  examination". f o r those  The Government  o v e r t w e n t y t o n s on  67  the grounds that l i g h t e r tanks "could not he regarded as aggressive weapons" and i n small v o l u n t a r i l y - e n l i s t e d armies l i k e the B r i t i s h were "an essential compensation f o r lack of numbers". The only parts of the Hoover land proposals which the B r i t i s h accepted were the a b o l i t i o n of chemical and b a c t e r i o l o g i c a l warfare (which had already been outlawed i n 1 9 2 5 ) and the a b o l i t i o n of heavy mobile guns. The B r i t i s h naval proposals d i f f e r e d considerably from those of the Americans and revealed the same divergences of opinion that had been apparent i n the Naval Commission. The number and widespread nature of her commitments led B r i t a i n to advocate q u a l i t a t i v e rajjher than quantitative disarmament and, i n contrast to the Hoover proposals, she envisaged reductions i n the size rather than the number of naval c r a f t . She suggested a reduction i n the maximum size of a l l future c a p i t a l ships and a i r c r a f t - c a r r i e r s to 2 2 , 0 0 0 tons, the former to be allowed 1 1 " guns, the l a t t e r 6 . 1 " guns, while cruisers would be l i m i t e d to 7 , 0 0 0 tons with 6 . 1 " guns; i f agreement on cruisers proved impossible, c a p i t a l ships would be allowed 1 2 " guns. Submarines would be abolished, f a i l i n g which they would' be l i m i t e d i n both number and t o t a l tonnage, with a maximum tonnage per i n d i v i d u a l unit of 2 5 0 tons. The only measure of quantitative l i m i t a t i o n i n the proposals was a suggestion that destroyer tonnage be reduced by one t h i r d though t h i s was made dependent on the a b o l i t i o n of submarines. The a i r proposals d i f f e r e d considerably from the American a i r proposals. Whereas Hoover had proposed; the a b o l i t i o n of bombers and a e r i a l bombardment, B r i t a i n suggested that both be allowed "within l i m i t s to be l a i d down as precisely as possible" for p o l i c e and control purposes i n " o u t l y i n g and underdeveloped" regions. Londonderry  68  had won his battle i n the Cabinet - at least temporarily. The B r i t i s h disarmament proposals were doomed to f a i l u r e because they avoided the real issues facing the Disarmament Conference - the French claim for security and the German claim for equality. Germany would not be released from her obligations under Part V of the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s - even i n theory - and there was no provision for additional guarantees to France. The B r i t i s h plan was based on Britain's own seourity requirements and did not take the requirements of the other Powers into consideration; i t presumed that an international "harmony of interests" existed and that a disarmament plan that s a t i s f i e d B r i t i s h requirements would satisfy the requirements of other countries. It was no solution to the disarmament problem. Neither was the Hoover plan a solution to the disarmament problem, for l i k e the B r i t i s h proposals i t attempted to divorce disarmament from security. But i t did offer some hope for the future. The Americans had oome to realize that t h e i r participation i n the work of the proposed Permanent Disarmament Commission would involve them - whether they liked i t or not - i n consultations with the other Powers i n the event of breaches of a convention, and Stimson intimated that at some time i n the future - presumably after the presidential elections - America might be w i l l i n g to enter into a consultative accord with the other Powers."^ Such a step would ease French anxieties about security and might induce B r i t a i n to enter into further commitments i n the general interest, thus f a c i l i t a t i n g the conclusion of a disarmament convention based on equality of rights for a l l nations. But i n June 1932 B r i t a i n nor America were w i l l i n g to undertake new  neither  commitments.  69  Simon was worried about the warm welcome given to the Hoover plan by the great majority of Powers at Geneva and so determined to sidetrack the plan - though without making i t too apparent - and bring the f i r s t phase of the Conference to an end by induoing the General Commission to pass a resolution summarizing the results that had been a c h i e v e d . T h e French were quiok to agree t o t h i s course. But the Americans, who wanted such a resolution to contain explicit references to the Hoover plan and concrete measures of disarmament, were hesitant and only concurred because they could see no better alternative i n the circumstances.^^" On July 5» Britain, France and America reported to the Bureau that as a result of private negotiations "a certain measure of agreement was possible" on various points - the abolition of chemical and bacteriological warfare, the r e s t r i c t i o n of a i r bombardment to certain colonial areas and zones within specified limits of b a t t l e f i e l d s , the prohibition of the bombardment of o i v i l i a n populations, the r e s t r i c t i o n of military airoraft by weight, some kind of international oontrol over o i v i l aviation and budgetary limitation. And the three Governments suggested that the General Commission pass a resolution deolaring that agreement had been reached on these points and expressing the hope that more substantial measures of disarmament  102 could be agreed upon i n the future. Some members of the Bureau demurred at the scheme, claiming (correctly) that i t was an admission that the Conference's progress had been negligible. The abolition of chemical and bacteriological warfare had already been accepted by the majority of Powers i n the Geneva Protocol of June 17 1925» the proposals for the international control  70  of c i v i l aviation were sure to be resisted by both Germany and Italy; and the provisions regarding bombing were no more than rules of war that could easily be broken i n the eventuality of h o s t i l i t i e s . In the absence of any better suggestion, however, the Bureau deoided to adopt the scheme and requested Simon to draft a resolution. He did t h i s without delay and handed his draft to Edouard Benes, the Rapporteur of the Conference, who was charged with the d i f f i c u l t task of composing i t into a formula acceptable to the Conference as a whole. The resolution, which Benes presented to the General Commission on July 20, represented a considerable victory f o r B r i t i s h policy as i t avoided a l l reference to the major problems facing the Conference. The preamble was platitudinous; i t repeated the various bases and principles on which a convention was to be negotiated ( A r t i c l e 8 of the Covenant, the Kellogg Pact and the resolutions of A p r i l 19 and 2 0 ) , welcomed the i n i t i a t i v e taken by President Hoover and concluded with a declaration that "a substantial reduction of world armaments should be effected**, a primary objective being to reduce the means of attack. Part II of the resolution, summarizing the "results** obtained i n the f i r s t f i v e months of the Conference*s work, was of similarly negligible value. There were to be maximum and minimum calibre limits for heavy a r t i l l e r y (subject to an effective method being established to prevent the rapid transformation of guns on fixed mountings into mobile guns), different limits f o r guns i n permanent frontier or fortress defensive systems, mobile guns and coastal guns, tanks were to be limited i n individual tonnage. A i r attack against c i v i l i a n  71  p o p u l a t i o n s was t o be f o r b i d d e n u n c o n d i t i o n a l l y , prohibited  subject  to  to  aircraft  not  bombardment  t h e observance of  this  i n c l u d e a l i m i t a t i o n by number and r e s t r i c t i o n  " c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s " of a l l m i l i t a r y aircraft  air  an "agreement w i t h r e g a r d t o measures t o be  adopted f o r the purpose of r e n d e r i n g e f f e c t i v e r u l e " . T h i s was t o  and a l l  aircraft,  " r e g u l a t i o n and f u l l p u b l i c i t y "  t h e s u b m i s s i o n of  civil  and the s u b j e c t i o n  conforming w i t h s p e c i f i e d r e s t r i c t i o n s t o  an  by  of  international  r e g i m e . C h e m i c a l , b a c t e r i o l o g i c a l and i n c e n d i a r y warfare were t o be p r o h i b i t e d under t h e c o n d i t i o n s recommended by t h e S p e c i a l Committee  104 on the p r o b l e m , established to  " and a Permanent Disarmament Commission was t o be s u p e r v i s e t h e e v e n t u a l c o n v e n t i o n . No p r o v i s i o n s  for  n a v a l disarmament were i n c l u d e d - n e i t h e r the B r i t i s h and Americans n o r F r e n c h and I t a l i a n s Part III  had been a b l e t o r e s o l v e t h e i r  of t h e d r a f t r e s o l u t i o n  disputes.  ( " P r e p a r a t i o n of t h e Second Phase  of the C o n f e r e n c e " ) was even more vague. The Bureau was t o w o r k i n g d u r i n g the adjournment to framing draft t e x t s  continue  of t h e G e n e r a l Commission " w i t h a v i e w  c o n c e r n i n g the q u e s t i o n s on which agreement  had a l r e a d y been r e a c h e d " . I t  would a l s o make a " d e t a i l e d e x a m i n a t i o n "  of such q u e s t i o n s as H o o v e r ' s p r o p o s a l s r e l a t i n g t o e f f e c t i v e s and t h e r e g u l a t i o n s t o be a p p l i e d t o t h e t r a d e i n and manufacture implements of war and t o of i n t e r n a t i o n a l  of arms and  set up a S p e c i a l Committee t o f o r m u l a t e  law i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h the p r o h i b i t i o n  rules,  of chemical  and b a c t e r i o l o g i c a l weapons and a e r i a l bombardment. The P a r t i e s t o  the  Washington and London T r e a t i e s were t o undertake c o n v e r s a t i o n s and r e p o r t t o t h e G e n e r a l Commission on the f e a s i b i l i t y limitation,  of f u r t h e r n a v a l  and t h e Committee on N a t i o n a l Defence E x p e n d i t u r e was  72 requested to report as soon as possible so that the Bureau could draw up a specific plan for budgetary limitation. It was hoped that, on the resumption  of i t s labours, the Conference would be i n a position to  decide as to which system of limitation and publicity of national defence expenditure would provide "the best guarantee of an alleviation of financial burdens" and prevent the convention from being neutralized by increases or improvements i n authorized armaments. Both i n part and i n whole, the resolution was l i t t l e more than a confession that no real progress had been achieved by the Conference i n the five months of i t s existence. The provisions for land disarmament were so vague that they were unlikely to lead to any more agreement than had been obtained i n the Land Commission. The proposals for the abolition of a i r bombardment were surrounded by so many qualifications as to be of questionable importance. The abolition of chemical, bacteriological and incendiary warfare went l i t t l e further than the provisions of the Geneva Protocol of June 17 1925* And the establishment of a Permanent Disarmament Commission was one of the few points on which the Powers had been able to agree unanimously i n the Preparatory Commission. The vagueness of the draft resolution reflected the i n a b i l i t y of the Powers to negotiate a p o l i t i c a l settlement that would f a c i l i t a t e an arms agreement. Limitation of armaments i s a p o l i t i c a l rather than a technical matter, and there was no p o s s i b i l i t y of concluding a general convention unless the German claim to equality was reconciled with the French claim for security.  73  Two attempts at reconciling the claims had been made during the f i r s t five months of the Conference - Brttning's proposals at Bessinge and Papen*s at Lausanne. But the attempts had f a i l e d , mainly because of the negative attitude of the B r i t i s h towards both sets of proposals. Tardieu would probably have accepted the Bruning plan i f B r i t a i n had been w i l l i n g to undertake r e l a t i v e l y minor commitments on the Continent - a consultative pact, or maybe a pledge to supply aircraft to a 105 victim of aggression.  And Herriot might have accepted the Papen  plan i f B r i t a i n had not been so resolutely opposed to i t . " ^ ^ Britain's unwillingness to enter into new commitments was very shortsighted. In the long run, European security depended on a peaceful solution of the German problem, and this could be achieved only through the appeasing of German grievances over the Peace Treaty. Germany would not condescend to remain a second-class Power, and i t was certain that i f a disarmament convention was not concluded she would denounce Part V of the Treaty of Versailles and start to rearm. The other Powers were faced with the i n e v i t a b i l i t y of a redistribution of European power i n favour of Germany, and i t was i n their interests to control the extent and speed of this redistribution of power. Prance, quite naturally, wanted to ensure that an increase i n German power was offset by increased assurances of support from Britain and possibly America. But the B r i t i s h Government believed that a disarmed Germany posed no threat to European security and so refused to undertake additional Continental commitments. The Government's adoption of Ea quiet policy, turning neither right nor l e f t " and i t s failure to act as mediator between Prance and  74  Germany was the chief cause of the lack of progress at Geneva. The refusal to take the lead i n t r y i n g to reconcile the French demand f o r security with the German claim f o r equality resulted i n the Conference becoming bogged down i n a maze of t e c h n i c a l i t i e s . The outcome was the draft r e s o l u t i o n of July 20, which the acting I t a l i a n delegate. Marshal Balbo, j u s t l y described as a "formulation of general p r i n c i p l e s " 107 contributing nothing t o disarmament. I n t r i n s i c a l l y , the draft r e s o l u t i o n had l i t t l e value. I t s  importance  was that i t provoked a c r i s i s at Geneva. The Germans, who had followed a moderate p o l i c y since the opening of the Conference and had put forward two r e a l i s t i c suggestions f o r a d e f i n i t i v e agreement, demanded that the r e s o l u t i o n contain a d e f i n i t e acceptance of t h e i r claim to equality of r i g h t s . On July 20, Nadolny informed the B r i t i s h and American delegations that Germany would oppose the resolution i n i t s e x i s t i n g form, and on the f o l l o w i n g day he warned that f a i l u r e to meet 10 S h i s demands would lead to a German withdrawal from the Conference. Germany was not the only Power that c r i t i c i z e d the vagueness and generality of the draft r e s o l u t i o n , but during the debate of the General Commission of July 21-23 most delegations declared themselves i n favour of i t i n the absence of anything b e t t e r . Forty-one states voted i n favour of the resolution and two against - Germany and the Soviet Union. Eight states abstained - Afghanistan, A l b a n i a , A u s t r i a , Bulgaria, China, Hungary, I t a l y and Turkey. Germany proceeded to walk out of the Conference.  75  CHAPTER III  THE GERMAN CLAIM TO EQUALITY OP RIGHTS July 23 - December 11 1932  Almost immediately after withdrawing from the Disarmament Conference, the German Government began to put forward specific demands. In a broadcast to the nation on July 26, General Sohleicher stated that i f the other Powers refused to disarm to the German level, Germany would increase her security by reconstructing - though not expanding - her defence forces,  1  and on August 23, Billow c l a r i f i e d the German position.  In conversation with Prancois-Ponoet, he denied that Germany wanted to rearm but suggested that his country might be allowed a m i l i t i a ; military instruction would be given for three months at a time to 40,000 men,  who  thereafter would return to c i v i l i a n l i f e . He further demanded that his oountry be permitted to own "samples'* of any weapons not prohibited by international convention and that a disarmament convention replace Part V of the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s . As regards security, he indicated that Germany would welcome "perfection" of the existing regime and would accept the control of an international armaments commission. He proposed that the question of equality be settled i n private between Germany and France before the reunion of the Bureau on September 20 2 and promised to formulate a memorandum summarizing the German position. The promised memorandum was handed to Francois—Ponoet on August 29. It was almost an ultimatum, stating that i f Germany did not reoeive satisfaction she would not return to the Disarmament Conference. The demands themselves were very similar to those outlined by Bttlow on August 23 - though i t was suggested that implementation of them might  76  be  delayed  It  was  new  u n t i l  also  a  second  indicated  security  disarmament  that  proposals  Germany  provided  convention  would  they  be  made  had  been  prepared  for  equal  to  negotiated.  discuss  security  any  for  a l l  nations."^  H e r r i o t * s yet of and  hopeful. rights  held  that  be  Part  to  for  increased  an  a l l  disarm.  German  to  be  was  rearmament,  effectives,  a  of  a  overcome regime  a  claim  for  equality  "equality  was  easily  Prance  however,  to  "samples"  of  duties'*  convention insoluble".  i f  Germany  of  would  of  of  "not  security"  " v i o l a t i o n "  reticent  to  disarmament  of  u n w i l l i n g ,  or  of  more  that  whether  m i l i t i a  the  V e r s a i l l e s  maintained  He  memorandum was of  whether  Treaty  could  and  German  recognition  " i n t e r n a t i o n a l  Powers  to  a  as  the  d i f f i c u l t i e s  obligation  demands  of  the  s a t i s f a c t i o n  with  problem V  to  that  coupled  the  i n s t i t u t e  advantage  reaction  believed  that  replace  helped  her  He  might  thought  should He  i n i t i a l  equal not  avoid  agree  to  any  weapons,  the  d e m i l i t a r i z e d  Rhineland.^  Sir  Horace  Campbell,  Rumbold,  the  the  B r i t i s h  B r i t i s h M i n i s t e r  i n  Ambassador P a r i s ,  i n  both  B e r l i n ,  believed  and  that  R. a  H.  Pranco-  5 German  agreement  So  Francois-Poneet,  The  did  French  would her  give  possible who  on  the  pressed  basis  considered  that  France  guarantees  of  new  with  states  and,  her i f  former  for  the  to  German  come  to  memorandum.  a  settlement.^  aiidireetaFranGO-Gemanittaccord  security  a l l i e s  concluded  of  Herriot  Ambassador  r e l a t i o n s  neutral  was  or  without  with  ten  or  the  compromising  great  twenty  majority  years,  would  of put  7 France d'Orsay  i n  a  took  strong a  p o s i t i o n  s i m i l a r  to  stance,  oppose  new  b e l i e v i n g  German that  as  claims. neither  The  Quai  B r i t a i n  nor  77  America were w i l l i n g to commit themselves further towards Prance, an agreement with Germany based on an accord between the two General Staffs and concessions on disarmament - including recognition of the 8 principle of German equality - would increase French security. Unfortunately, information concerning the German aims was leaked o to the French press,  which began to suggest that under the cloak  of equality the Germans were wanting to rearm. Herriot himself was suspicious of t h i s , and he was also anxious about the manner i n which the German claims had been presented and about nationalist demonstrations and police a c t i v i t i e s i n the demilitarized Rhineland. ^ 1  Consequently, his attitude to the German demands hardened, and though there was no question of his refusing them outright (as t h i s would have given Germany an excuse to prooeed openly with rearmament), h i s reply to the memorandum of August 29 was s t i f f e r than i t might otherwise have been. Presented on September 11, the Frenoh Note *' rejected the (legal) 1  claim, based on the League Covenant and the A l l i e d Note of June 16 1919, that the Disarmament Convention should replace Part V of the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s . It avoided a direct answer to the claim f o r equality of rights but reiterated French willingness to take part i n discussions on the disarmament problem and to arrive at a solution which would provide f o r the maximum security and disarmament for a l l nations. On the other hand, i t saw the German memorandum as a "clear demand" f o r a i r c r a f t , tanks, heavy and anti-aircraft a r t i l l e r y , submarines, a i r c r a f t - c a r r i e r s and battleships - a demand f o r rearmament. A reduction i n the period of service i n the Reichswehr would  78  "immeasurably i n c r e a s e while the  possession  -the number o f h i g h l y - t r a i n e d r e s e r v i s t s " ,  o f "sample" arms would " g r e a t l y  t h e i r m a n u f a c t u r e and  accustom men  I n making such a s t i f f opinion,  but  at the  same t i m e he  N e u r a t h i n f o r m e d H e n d e r s o n on o f r i g h t s had  use."  reply, Herriot c e r t a i n l y quietened reduced the  agreement w i t h Germany, T h e r e was  equality  to their  facilitate  not  little  chances of a  French  quick  surprise, therefore,  September 14  t h a t , as t h e  when  problem  been s e t t l e d , Germany would r e f u s e  of  to  1  participate  i n the  p r o c e e d i n g s o f t h e B u r e a u when i t r e o p e n e d  on  12 September  21.  B r i t a i n ' s immediate r e a c t i o n t o t h e one  of concern l e s t  b a c k as t h e y had  F r a n c e and  done a t Lausanne, and  direct negotiations  was  still  c o n c e r n e d on  the  German c l a i m  and  Germany. ^ He 1  was  between t h e two a  the  invoked  B r i t a i n was  Continental  suggested that  i n c l u d e B r i t a i n and  reassured  September 11 d i s c o u n t e d  Simon t h e r e f o r e  ensure t h a t  September 9 n d  should  was  Germany s t a r t n e g o t i a t i n g b e h i n d  Anglo-French Declaration t o t r y to o f any  renewed German o l a i m  the  informed  Powers. ^  He  1  discussion  I t a l y a s w e l l as  when t h e F r e n c h memorandum  possibility  her  of  France  of  o f d i r e c t Franco-German  negotiations. On  the  German c l a i m  itself,  the  Government  somewhat d i v i d e d . MacDonald, a p p a r e n t l y , the  c l a i m , w h i l e Simon was  was  seems t o h a v e been i n favour  of  accepting  r a t h e r r e l u c t a n t t o t a k e such a step  o f i t s p o s s i b l e e f f e c t on F r a n c e . C e r t a i n l y t h e  Quai d'Orsay  c o n v i n o e d t h a t MacDonald had  the  w o u l d be and  met  with approval  the Foreign  a s s u r e d Papen t h a t  because  was  German demands  - a t l e a s t i n p r i n c i p l e - but  that 15 O f f i c e were r e t i c e n t t o w a r d s g r a n t i n g them. J  Simon The  79  Germans acted on a s i m i l a r assumption, hoping that the moral j u s t i c e of t h e i r demands would overcome the p r a c t i c a l objections put forward by the Foreign O f f i c e .  The German hope was f u l f i l l e d ; the B r i t i s h  Cabinet decided to accept the claim to e q u a l i t y . Accordingly, on September 19, the Government published a "Statement 17  of Views" concerning the German c l a i m .  The f i r s t part regretted the  r a i s i n g of the question of equality of r i g h t s so soon a f t e r the Lausanne Conference and contained an i n c i s i v e r e j e c t i o n of the German claim on l e g a l grounds; although accepting that one of the objectives of Part V of the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s was "to render possible the i n i t i a t i o n of a general l i m i t a t i o n of the armaments of a l l nations"; i t maintained that the statement of t h i s objective was "very different from making i t s successful f u l f i l m e n t the condition of the o r i g i n a l s t i p u l a t i o n " . But the second part of the B r i t i s h statement admitted that Germany had a strong claim to equality on moral grounds. The Government therefore hoped that a convention might be framed on the p r i n c i p l e that each state adopted, i n agreement with others, a l i m i t a t i o n of.armaments that was "self-imposed and f r e e l y entered i n t o , as part of the mutual obligations of the signatories to one another",,^ and t h i s document would be "binding on a l l " and contain "measures of q u a l i t a t i v e and quantitative disarmament which would tend i n the d i r e c t i o n of greater e q u a l i z a t i o n " . Questions of status might be settled by " f r i e n d l y negotiation and agreed adjustment" involving neither disregard f o r treaty obligations nor the increase i n the sum t o t a l of armed force* The armaments of heavily-armed states should be reduced as much as possible, while those of lightly-armed states should undergo "no material increase" - though " t h i s desirable  80  consummation" the  could  Disarmament  deliberations. Ambassador  i n  only  be  Conference As  Simon  London,  attained and  not  explained  B r i t a i n  through  by to  would  patient  withdrawal Grandi,  from  now  recognize  discussion i t s  the  the  i n  I t a l i a n  German  claim  to  18 equality . The  i n  p r i n c i p l e  effect  subsequent B r i t a i n  into  new  aims  the  renewal  of  the a  had  she  to  the  public,  which  Geneva,  and  to  up  and  Germany.  suggestion offer  the  After  Although  for hope  an  a  that  had her  was  the  been to  the  outcry  to  role  give  active  a at  i n  to  f u l l e r the  memorandum  German  was  of  the  to  force  lead, of  no  but  her  progress  position  held  the  disarmament  exposition  lack  and  thus  take  confronting  negotiations the  Conference  the  mediatory  problems  rearmament.  equality  reluctant  anxious  of  for  Disarmament  claim  B r i t i s h  further  i n i t i a l  the  demands  prominent  more  r e s o l v i n g  any  German  obliged  take  i n  more  Previously  c r i s i s  refuse  impasse  assuming  discussions. the  of  but  made  between  at  Prance  p r a c t i c a l  the  Powers,  might  find  a  press  against  i t  d i d  solution. the  B r i t i s h  19 "Statement  of  to  the  u t i l i z e  whether  a  p o s i t i o n . that,  settlement The  permitted the  to  On  suggestion  types  of  arms  of  to  could  i t s  claim  be  other  the  September that she  23,  Germany were  i n  of  right  possess  that  i t  was  therefore, might  the  to  such  agree  allowed.to  such  of any a  to  possess  the  as  equality type  of  a  weapon be  demand  approached  of  opposed for  Neurath  reductions  "samples"  were  would  would  to  to  B r i t i s h  settlement  right  make  decided  soundings  of a  equivalent Simon  Simon  take  basis  p r i n c i p l e  to  and  that  on  achieving  the  tone,  Assembly  reached  Powers,  believed  l e g a l i s t i c  League  d i f f i c u l t i e s  who  i f  of  the  recognition  the  French,  rearmament. the  main  Germany  because  meeting  l o g i c a l l y ,  enable  by  Views"  i n  with  other  weapons  81  which were not generally forbidden but which Germany had been 20  prohibited from owning by the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s .  Baron A l - o i s i ,  who had suoceeded. Grandi as the chief I t a l i a n delegate to the Disarmament Conference, had been carrying out s i m i l a r soundings and i n conversation on September 25, both he and Simon agreed that a Franco-German compromise was possible on the basis of three p r i n c i p l e s : that equality of r i g h t s should be reoognized i n p r i n c i p l e ; that there should be no rearmament of Germany; and that the other Powers should 21  disarm to the greatest extent p o s s i b l e . Paul-Boncour, the French M i n i s t e r of War and Permanent Delegate to the League of Nations, acquiesced i n the f i r s t of Simon's three p r i n c i p l e s , agreeing t h a t , under certain conditions, the Disarmament Convention should replace Part V of the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s . He accepted the seoond p r i n c i p l e i n i t s e n t i r e t y , and also agreed to the t h i r d - provided that the "disarmament of other Powers" was measured from 1919.  For Germany, Neurath welcomed the f i r s t p r i n c i p l e (which  recognized equality of rights) and intimated that he would consent to the second provided that h i s country would be allowed to "adjust"  its  land foroes by "mechanizing the c a v a l r y " , by purchasing specimens of hitherto-forbidden weapons and by halving the period of service i n the Reichswehr. He also agreed to the t h i r d p r i n c i p l e , though he stipulated that Germany's w i l l i n g n e s s to l i m i t her demands would depend on the 23  extent of the disarmament of the other Powers.  The main obstacle  to a Franco-German agreement, therefore, was the German demand for "samples", though i t seemed that a four-Power Declaration enabling the Germans to return to the Disarmament Conference was p e r f e c t l y 24  provided that i t was j u d i c i o u s l y worded.  feasible  82 The  immediate o b j e c t i v e o f B r i t i s h p o l i c y was  i n t o r e t u r n i n g t o the  C o n f e r e n c e . On  O c t o b e r 3,  t o coax t h e  Simon p r o p o s e d  F r e n c h , German and  Italian  i n London; i t w o u l d t a k e p l a c e  on O c t o b e r 11,  the U n i t e d  The  i n v i t e d t o a l l o w Norman D a v i s t o t a k e p a r t  conversations  w o u l d be b a s e d on t h e  e q u a l i t y o f r i g h t s , no the  and  rearmament, t h e  h e a v i l y - a r m e d Powers and  possess a l l categories A l l i e d Powers. I n t h e  the  a  Ministers  four-Power meeting of B r i t i s h ,  w o u l d be  Germans  States  i n the  discussions.  r e c o g n i t i o n of the  p r i n c i p l e of  "progressive"  disarmament  g r a n t i n g t o Germany o f t h e  o f arms, t h o u g h not  t o the  meantime, F r a n c e w o u l d be  extent  of  right to  of the  former  i n v i t e d t o take  part  25 i n preliminary had  c o n s u l t a t i o n s . ' O r i g i n a l l y , the  a l s o hoped t h a t t h e  u n t i l the  reunion  of the  proposed n e g o t i a t i o n s  Foreign  B u r e a u might be  were h e l d , b u t  Secretary postponed  t h e F r e n c h had  objected  26 and  t h i s aspect  o f B r i t i s h p o l i c y had  I t a l y q u i c k l y accepted the her  p o l i c y was  s i m i l a r t o that  been  discontinued.  i n v i t a t i o n t o the of B r i t a i n ,  four-Power meeting  recognizing the  as  German  27 c l a i m t o e q u a l i t y but the  proposal  was  r e f u s i n g any  i n l i n e with her  four-Power d i s c u s s i o n s Germany and  France,  other  t o rearmament.  traditional  as t h e b e s t  on t h e  claims  way  to  p o l i c y of  Moreover, advocating  s e t t l e European problems.  hand, were r e t i c e n t about  accepting  28 the  proposal.  while the  The  former d e s i r e d the  l a t t e r put  p r i o r r e c o g n i t i o n of her  f o r w a r d a number o f o b j e c t i o n s  a f o u r - P o w e r m e e t i n g i n London w o u l d be  considered  on t h e  claims,  grounds t h a t  a s u c c e s s f o r Germany  29 and  a defeat  f o r France. ' Eventually,  accepted the B r i t i s h proposal  u n c o n d i t i o n a l l y and  c l a i m f o r "adjustments" of t h e i r negotiation".^  0  The  cajole France i n t o  on O c t o b e r 7,  forces "afforded  the  Germans  even added t h a t scope f o r  p r o b l e m f a c i n g B r i t a i n , t h e r e f o r e , was accepting.  how  to  their  83  Herriot had "become more and more concerned at the machinations of German diplomacy, e s p e c i a l l y the periodic outbursts of General Schleicher, and he believed, r i g h t l y , that the claim f o r  ,,  samples  M  would mean rearmament. I t would not have seemed so menaoing i f he had been able to count on B r i t i s h support, but since September the B r i t i s h had given p r i o r i t y to securing Germany's return to the Disarmament Conference.^  1  Although the Foreign O f f i c e had informed the Quai d'Orsay  scrupulously of "piecemeal approaches" by Germany, i n compliance with the Anglo-French Declaration, the Government had not changed i t s basic p o l i c y - French disarmament, the s a t i s f a c t i o n of " l e g i t i m a t e " German demands and a r e f u s a l to enter into any further commitments i n Europe. As f a r as B r i t a i n was concerned, the Anglo-French Declaration had been a temporary expedient to prevent a possible Franco-German entente and to gain an a l l y against the Hoover p l a n ; i t had not been 32  signed as the forerunner of an a l l i a n c e .  Certainly the secret  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the Declaration had referred to "a general desire to come to an agreement", but i t had also asserted that " i t was not a question of an agreement to agree", rather i t was an agreement to consult and hold "preliminary exchanges of v i e w s " . ^ The German withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference and claim f o r equality of rights had thus exposed the true nature of the Declaration. Even so, the French Premier decided to continue h i s p o l i c y of rapprochement with B r i t a i n (and America^) even i f i t entailed concessions on disarmament, and as immediate objectives he hoped to secure a postponement of the proposed four-Power meeting i n London and to ensure that any such conference should be held at Geneva. On October 5 , he stated h i s p o s i t i o n to Simon, and a f t e r some h e s i t a t i o n  84  the B r i t i s h Government decided to accept the French demands f o r a postponement of the "London Conference" and to "consider" i t s transfer to Geneva, They also i n v i t e d Herriot to take part i n "preliminary consultations" i n London on Octoher 13 and 1 4 , ^ During the London discussions, Herriot demanded that Germany he made to set out her demands i n w r i t i n g . He believed that equality of r i g h t s - a phrase whioh seemed eminently f a i r to many sections of public opinion i n most countries - was, i n f a c t , an abstract term that had been i n t e n t i o n a l l y i l l - d e f i n e d by the Germans. Consequently, he was u n w i l l i n g to enter into negotiations on the subject u n t i l the ambiguity of the phrase had been resolved by means of a w r i t t e n d e f i n i t i o n . This would expose the true nature of the German claims and determine whether they involved rearmament. MacDonald and Simon agreed that the German aims were unclear, but suggested that i f B r i t a i n and) France asked f o r w r i t t e n c l a r i f i c a t i o n , the Milhelmstrasse would reply that the claims had already been elucidated s u f f i c i e n t l y i n the memorandum of August 29; or they would keep producing documents which defeated the purpose of the i n q u i r y . The B r i t i s h M i n i s t e r s therefore considered that the best means of r e s o l v i n g the issue was a four-Power conference, where the chairman's duty would be to see that the conversations were as precise as possible. Eventually, a oompromise between the French and B r i t i s h views was reached; France agreed to take part i n a four-Power conference rather than seek a written d e f i n i t i o n of German aims, and B r i t a i n agreed to 35 transfer the deliberations of the conference to Genevai Asmore important aspect of these discussions was t h e i r revelation of the motives behind B r i t i s h p o l i c y . Speaking p r i v a t e l y to Herriot,  85  MacDonald admitted that he was concerned "not so much by the disarmament s i t u a t i o n , as by the handling of i t " . As the subsequent discussion revealed, he was l e s s concerned about a possible breakdown of the Disarmament Conference than whether h i s government would be held responsible f o r the breakdown. Germany held the diplomatic i n i t i a t i v e , the apparent fairness of her demands having ingratiated her with B r i t i s h opinion, and therefore the task of B r i t i s h diplomacy was "to dislodge her from her strong psychological p o s i t i o n into her weak disarmament p o s i t i o n . " ^ Simon, who was apt to be more pro-French than h i s Prime M i n i s t e r , endorsed t h i s l i n e . Indeed he had advocated i t f o r some time, having t o l d F l e u r i a u , the French Ambassador i n London, on September 15 that i f Britain] and France could "preserve appearances",  "the persistence of Germany's present attitude would  reduce the Disarmament Conference to nothing". It was a clear i n d i c a t i o n that the Government's "support" of disarmament was not e n t i r e l y genuine. In h i s meeting with Herriot on October 5, "the 37 Foreign Secretary had maintained a s i m i l a r p o s i t i o n ,  and he admitted  that the only preoccupation of B r i t i s h diplomacy was to ensure that the proposed four-Power meeting took place, i f possible with American a i d . ^ This attitude on the part of the B r i t i s h Ministers was i r r e s p o n s i b l e . Without the genuine support of the B r i t i s h Government, disarmament was probably impossible. In June there had been the p o s s i b i l i t y of a direct Franco-German accord, but such an understanding had now become u n l i k e l y because of the growth of ultra-nationalism i n Germany and Papen*s; aggressive pursuit of equality of r i g h t s . The best chance of reaching a disarmament agreement, therefore, was the active mediation  86  of B r i t a i n i n the Franco-German dispute. I f the Government had "been w i l l i n g to give greater guarantees of security to France - and to Germany too, i f she complained that guarantees: to France were incompatible with a grant of equality - a convention might s t i l l have been attained. Herriot consistently declared that he was i n 39  favour of disarmament,  while the German "Government of Barons" was  conservative at heart and u n w i l l i n g to press i t s demands too f a r f o r fear that i t might be blamed f o r f r u s t r a t i n g the Disarmament Conference and lose the support of opinion i n countries such as B r i t a i n and America.^  0  The nucleus of a settlement might w e l l have been the German Note of August 29# Despite professions that B r i t a i n was against German rearmament, i t had soon become apparent that the Government was w i l l i n g to accept the German Note as the basis of t a l k s and to consider, i f not accede t o , the demands f o r "samples".^* This being the case, i t would have been d i f f i c u l t f o r the Germans to r a i s e t h e i r claims without l o s i n g the support of opinion i n other countries. But i t was d i f f i c u l t f o r France to make the large concessions that the Germans demanded, p a r t i c u l a r l y on the claim f o r "specimen" weapons, and u n t i l October 14 Herriot refused to discuss even the p o s s i b i l i t y of accepting them. Yet on t h i s date, he promised to submit the question of "samples" to h i s Government,^ and i t seems l i k e l y t h a t , i f B r i t a i n had offered greater security guarantees, he would have agreed to accept the German Note as the basis of a settlement. But although the B r i t i s h Government was i n favour of moving closer to F r a n c e , ^ t h e r e was l i t t l e l i k e l i h o o d of t h e i r agreeing to offer the guarantees which would have allowed France to follow a more c o n c i l i a t o r y p o l i c y .  87  The divergences of view between B r i t a i n and Franoe had been a major f a c t o r i n encouraging the Germans to press t h e i r claims to equality so strongly, f o r they believed they could drive a wedge between the two former a l l i e s . ^ This also seems to have been the motivation behind t h e i r next move, which was to refuse to accept Geneva as the venue of the proposed four-Power conference. After an 45 e a r l i e r i n d i c a t i o n that they would not object to Geneva,  J  on  October 14 they refused to agree, and they continued to do so despite British pressure.^  On October 28, Herriot outlined a new French disarmament plan i n the Chamber of Deputies and declared that the success of the Disarmament Conference was the best practicable way to prevent German rearmament; even i f the proposals were rejected, h i s Government would "continue to co-operate with the other Powers to f i n d an alternative s o l u t i o n " . Answering M. F r a n k l i n - B o u i l l o n , the chief Opposition speaker, he i n s i s t e d t h a t , i n a t r i a l of strength with Germany, the balance of forces might not favour France and t h a t , t h i s being so, the friendship of the Anglo-Saxon Powers should not be jeopardized by a p o l i c y of r e l y i n g s o l e l y on f o r c e . France could not afford to f i n d herself i s o l a t e d i n the face of a "free" Germany, and the best way of overcoming a "new German menace" was by a further effort to organize p e a c e . ^ Moreover, i t was necessary to show that France was not 48 responsible f o r the c r i s i s at Geneva.  88  On 4 November, further d e t a i l s of the French project were communicated to the Bureau of the Disarmament Conference by 49 Paul-Boncour, the main author of the scheme.  Security would be  maintained through the "organization" of the states of the world into three concentric " c i r c l e s " . The outermost would consist of a l l Powers represented at the Disarmament Conference, and i t s members would agree to enter i n t o consultation i n the event of a breach of the Kellogg Pact. The second would be comprised of a l l members of the League, who would reaffirm the obligations they had assumed under the Covenant (especially A r t i c l e 16) and a l l other t r e a t i e s ,  such as  Locarno, that had been concluded i n conformity with the Covenant. The t h i r d and innermost c i r c l e would include the nations of continental 50 Europe,  who would enter into a Pact of Mutual Assistance. Within  t h i s pact, each of the Powers would organize t h e i r "permanent defensive forces" on a standardized model based on universal short-term service and l i m i t e d e f f e c t i v e s ,  and t h i s would permit  "equitable, mutual and equal reductions i n armaments to be made, capable of ensuring equality of s e c u r i t y " . "Aggressive" weapons would be l i m i t e d to f i x e d f o r t i f i c a t i o n s f o r f r o n t i e r and coastal defence and to " s p e c i a l i z e d contingents", constantly ready f o r service but s t r i c t l y l i m i t e d i n number, which each of the Powers would place permanently at the disposal of the League. An international a i r force (based on the Tardieu plan of February 1932) would also be placed at the disposal of the League and to make t h i s possible, c i v i l aviation would be i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z e d . Overseas forces would be organized separately under conditions to be l a i d down i n the Convention.  89  This outline seemed to indioate a considerable change i n French p o l i c y , hut as the f u l l plan had not been published, no immediate discussion of the proposals took place. The impasse at the Disarmament Conference remained.  Because of the seemingly endless delays at Geneva, B r i t i s h opinion had become aroused. For some time, the l i b e r a l press had urged the Government to play a more active r o l e i n bringing about a settlement, and now even "The Times" was demanding a c t i o n ; i n a leading a r t i c l e of September 30, i t declared that the Disarmament Conference was threatened with complete breakdown unless the problem of equality was solved and reproached the Government f o r f o l l o w i n g a p o l i c y that 51 was "neither consistent nor c l e a r " . On November 10, the Labour Party tabled a censure motion i n the Commons exhorting the Government to give " c l e a r and unequivocal support to an immediate, universal and substantial reduction of 52 armaments on the basis of equality f o r a l l nations".  Clement A t t l e e  led the attack i n masterly fashion and came very near the t r u t h when suggesting that the attitude of the Government was " l i k e the Pharisee who said ' L o r d , I thank thee, that I am not as other men* — French, German or even Russians. I have reduced my armaments more than anyone e l s e . I am ready to give up submarines, which I do not want, and tanks over 20 tons, which I have not got. But when i t comes to a c t i o n , when we pass from general declarations and come down to business, we are l i k e the otheryEowers, we always •Compound f o r sins we are i n c l i n e d t o By damning those we have no mind t o . * " 5 3  90  Attlee also likened the retinue of m i l i t a r y and naval experts accompanying the B r i t i s h delegation i n Geneva to a group of licensed v i c t u a l l e r s , brewers and d i s t i l l e r s advising the Government on how to reduce the consumption of l i q u o r . B r i t a i n , he believed, should advocate the reduction of armaments to the l e v e l permitted to Germany under Part V of the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s and, in;^particular, should propose the a b o l i t i o n of a e r i a l bombardment and the i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n 54 of c i v i l a v i a t i o n . Other Labour speakers made s i m i l a r suggestions. ^ Although these proposals would c e r t a i n l y have asserted German equality and made for a substantial reduction of arms, they would have been unacceptable to Prance f o r , l i k e the Government's own proposals, they envisaged no changes i n the e x i s t i n g security system. The Labour Party was h o s t i l e to new Continental commitments because of i t s b e l i e f that one of the prime causes of the Great War had been the "system" of secret a l l i a n c e s and agreements,  and the Parliamentary Leader of the  Party, George Lansbury, was a p a c i f i s t ; a considerable change i n the P a r t y ' s outlook on i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s had occurred since Henderson was defeated i n the elections of 1931. The Government was concerned at the support the Opposition's p o l i c y 55 received i n the country.  In general, i t was believed that wars  started by mistake or were caused by grievances and t h a t ,  consequently,  e x i s t i n g i n t e r n a t i o n a l grievances -predominantly German - should be redressed. S o c i a l i s t s attributed wars to c a p i t a l i s m , substantial armaments and the influence of arms manufacturers. Like the Government, the B r i t i s h people apparently accepted that an in ternation al "harmony  91  of i n t e r e s t s " existed - possibly a r e s u l t of the Government's own propaganda during the 1920s - and they believed that peace should be sought through general disarmament. They were convinced that disarmament would lead to security and were opposed to new Continental commitments. But even the dilemma caused by a pro-disarmament (and, i n many cases, pro-German) public opinion on the one hand and the c r i s i s caused by the r i s e of German u l t r a - n a t i o n a l i s m on the other was barely s u f f i c i e n t to explain the pessimism of Baldwin's speech i n the disarmament debate of November 10. He prophesied a war that would destroy European c i v i l i z a t i o n and refused to believe that disarmament could prevent i t . The chief menace would come from bombimg: "I think i t i s w e l l also f o r the man i n the street to r e a l i s e that there i s no power on earth that can protect him from being bombed. Whatever people may t e l l him, the bomber w i l l always get t h r o u g h , , . . . . The only defence i s i n offence, which means that you have to k i l l more women and c h i l d r e n more quickly than the enemy i f you want to save yourselves."56 Baldwin argued that neither the i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of c i v i l a v i a t i o n and the t o t a l a b o l i t i o n of bombing nor the r e s t r i c t i o n of a i r c r a f t by size and weight would be of any use as preventive measures, f o r s c i e n t i s t s would develop "bombs the size of peanuts". Yet the Lord President of the Counoil neither could nor would offer a solution which might prevent the future war. He was pessimistic as to the r e s u l t s to be expected from Geneva, yet he d i d not even mention the more t r a d i t i o n a l remedies f o r meeting an i n t e r n a t i o n a l c r i s i s - an increase i n armaments and an entente or a l l i a n c e with Prance. He was content t o make the extraordinary remark t h a t , i f war came, the youth of the world 57 would be to blame f o r not f o r c i n g older men i n t o the path of peace.  92  Compared  with  such  utterances,  Simon's  statement  of  B r i t i s h  p o l i c y  58 was  unremarkable.  given to  by  Paul-Boncour  equality  the  Treaty  any  further  to  of of  "the  the  should  be  sort  prohibited HEuropean further of  No  to  On  the  Germany, August  surface, for  29.  i t  Yet,  statement  of  years  the  B r i t i s h  and  of be  the  other  countries  He  of  he  welcomed  pact" also  to  added  basic  fundamentally,  declared  disregard  of  claim  Germany's  other  P a r t i e s .  there  was  no  not  new  proposal  not  involve  a  domestic  The  be for  B r i t a i n  for  last  rearmament,  to  proposal  and  Powers;  a l l  French  and  the  V e r s a i l l e s ,  ought  of  comment  convention  the of  to  to  did  world  statement  the  no  the  clauses  refused  that  claim  a  i n  "Declaration opinion"  peace.  Simon's  revealed  a  "mobilize  the  accepted  which  of  applicable  German  regards  Treaty  permitted and  As  proposals  the  disarmament  provided  to  the  that  view  that,  that i t  represented  demands  B r i t i s h  greater  of  any  published.  acknowledged  "declaration  because  was  French  but  V  more  Simon  sacrosanct",  Part  replace  the  Although  not  admission  armaments  commitments,  a  "tacit  plan  Continental than  meet  the  Force"  disturbers  a  r e i t e r a t e d  Germany"  to  and were  non-aggression  Resort  to  as  commitments.  against  The  arms  effort  definite  process"  of  number  of  the  same  a  kind  of  the  for  Secretary  outline  by  would  specific  the  regulated  convention  "the  "a  f u l l  merely  the  Foreign  as  V e r s a i l l e s  he  same  welcomed  treatment":  u n t i l  equality,  armaments by  He  p o l i c y  willingness  proposed intent" the  of  pact  the  would  wouidimobilize  move  towards  memorandum  of  remained  unchanged.  to  into  "no-force  s i m i l a r  a  enter pact"  being  to  the  Kellogg  be  an  important  world  and  new l i t t l e Pact.  domestic  assurance opinion,  93  the Japanese invasion of Manchuria and the creation of the puppet state of Manchukuo had already shown that words and public opinion would not deter a p o t e n t i a l aggressor. But the Government s t i l l did not r e a l i z e t h i s .  90a November 14, four days after Simon's statement, the French 59  published the f u l l text of t h e i r disarmament plan.  In the event of  a breach or threat of breach of the Kellogg Pact, those Powers i n the outermost of the three concentric " c i r c l e s " would concert "with a view t o appealing to public opinion and agreeing upon steps to be taken" and would " p r o h i b i t direct or i n d i r e c t economic or f i n a n c i a l r e l a t i o n s with the aggressor country". They would also refuse to recognize "any de facto s i t u a t i o n brought about i n consequence of the v i o l a t i o n of an i n t e r n a t i o n a l undertaking". Those i n the second " c i r c l e " would be required to r e a f f i r m t h e i r obligations under the Covenant, especially under A r t i c l e 16, while those i n the innermost " c i r c l e ! ! would p a r t i c i p a t e i n a mutual assistance pact involving s p e c i f i c p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y o b l i g a t i o n s . The p o l i t i c a l arrangements contemplated would e s t a b l i s h a right to assistance when a t e r r i t o r y under the authority of one of the signatory Powers was attacked by foreign forces, except i n cases where an agreement to the contrary existed, i n self-defence or under authorization from the League. The League Council would be charged with determining whether an attack or invasion had taken place and, to f a c i l i t a t e  its  decisions - which would be taken by majority vote - i t was to establish a commission consisting of diplomatic agents and m i l i t a r y , naval and  94  a i r attaches i n each signatory s t a t e . Disputes between these states would be resolved by resort to the General A c t . The m i l i t a r y arrangements f o r the mutual assistance pact envisaged a d i v i s i o n of the land foroes of the contracting Powers between a "national army" (a force assigned f o r "the defence of home f r o n t i e r s " ) and a " s p e c i a l i z e d contingent". The national armies would be standardized on the basis of short-term service, l i m i t e d effectives and uniform m a t e r i e l . The period of t r a i n i n g would include time spent i n "pre-regimental" t r a i n i n g and t r a i n i n g received i n p o l i t i c a l organizations, and the number of effectives would be f i x e d so as to overcome " i n e q u a l i t i e s i n the resources of recruitment" — to ensure that Prance would be allowed a s i m i l a r number of men i n the colours as Germany. The possession of powerful mobile a r t i l l e r y and tanks would be p r o h i b i t e d . The specialized units would consist of troops serving a r e l a t i v e l y long term and would be provided with the powerful weapons prohibited to the national armies. These contingents would be placed permanently at the disposal of the League, kept "constantly ready f o r action" and would be formed along s i m i l a r l i n e s i n each s t a t e . No one state would have s u f f i c i e n t of these foroes to menace a neighbour, but the combined force at the disposal of the League would be " s u f f i c i e n t l y powerful to give pause to an aggressor".^  0  Inventories  of mobile land materiel would be stored i n each of the contracting states under i n t e r n a t i o n a l supervision. The diminution of the power of offence would thus be attained through the reduction of  effectives  rather than the reduction of m a t e r i e l . At least once a year, there would be an i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n to ensure that the provisions f o r land disarmament as a whole were being executed.  95 This continental system of organization would not he extended to overseas:, naval or a i r forces. Forces overseas would be "calculated and specialized f o r the p a r t i c u l a r tasks incumbent on them", and a i r armaments would be regulated on s i m i l a r l i n e s to those envisaged i n the "Tardieu pflan" of February except that the i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of c i v i l a v i a t i o n would only be applicable to Europe. Navies whose aggregate tonnage i n 1931 exceeded 100,000 tons would be subject to both quantitative and q u a l i t a t i v e reductions. The French plan was probably the most efficacious to be l a i d before the Powers. Despite i t s somewhat doubtful proviso that disputes should be settledSpeacefully by resort to the General A c t , i t was a practicable proposal f o r the organization of peace. It was also an ingenious p l a n , s k i l f u l l y drafted to avoid the features of previous French plans that had been unacceptable to the Anglo-Saxon Powers. In p a r t i c u l a r , i t d i d not require the accession of either B r i t a i n or America to the provisions f o r automatic mutual assistance and sanctions against an aggressor. America was included i n only the outermost of the three " d i r c l e s " , and three out of the four p r i n c i p l e s that states i n t h i s " c i r c l e " were asked to accept had been enunciated by Stimson i n a speech on August 8, when he had declared that the existence of the Kellogg Pact implied the " a b o l i t i o n " of n e u t r a l i t y and an obligation to consult i n the event of a breach of the international 61 peace;  the only p r i n c i p l e he had not accepted was that involving  the p r o h i b i t i o n of " d i r e c t or i n d i r e c t economic and f i n a n c i a l r e l a t i o n s " with an aggressor. In a further attempt to c o n c i l i a t e America, the French plan was presented as a complement to the Hoover proposals,  96  especially defence  the  provisions  components"  and  i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n where far of  i t  as  was  deemed  B r i t a i n  was  conscription  B r i t i s h  c i v i l  nor  be  the  obligations  under  the  consultative  The  French  equality. m i l i t i a while  Its  and  i t  be  also  opened  p r i v a t e l y ,  should  have  the  Pollers,  v o l u n t a r i l y , by  stages The  November "basis when the  for  the  a  useful  resurrection  they  of  on  the  effort  Moreover, to  America,  the;  Locarno  Treaty  to  the  As:  adoption  guarantees; reaffirm  and the  enterprise.  neither  to  the  demand  of to the  of  the i t s  and  to  service that  i n  enter  Part  V  of  to  a l l she  r e a l i z a t i o n  of  would of  the  of  of  Treaty  of  careful  "samples"  acknowledge  types  kind  for  Reichswehr,  Its  the  claim  a  the  convention.  w i l l i n g  that  German  envisaged  discussion  possess  that  maferiel  r e s t r i c t  equality"  as  her  to  be  Germany the  claims reached  y e a r s . ^ the  Plan  foreign  released.  November Geneva  a  were  hoped  meet  disarmament term  for  to  " f u l l  was  the  the  d i s c u s s i o n " . ^  text  papers  way  right  t o l d  security  "police  extend  private  required  alidisarmament  French  reaction  with  not  requested  and  land  i n  by  period  Papen  f u l l  B e r l i n  same  though  over  8,  the  be  an  for  the  allowing  German  made  accepted  replaced  new  on  pact.  reduction  issue;  other  merely  provisions  the  of  "based  reductions.  would  t h e . P.Ian  Covenant  also  i m p l i c i t l y  V e r s a i l l e s drafting  plan  arms  incompatible  pledge  would the  disarmament  a v i a t i o n  concerned,  Government  general  land  substantial  of to  for  15  was  press  But A  favourable  it  that came  that  designed  to  f i r s t  and  constituted  under  s e m i - o f f i c i a l  suggested  Protocol  i t  at  greater  Note the  ensure  a  c r i t i c i s m  published  Plan  was  the  om  i n  "a  t e r r i t o r i a l  97  status  quo"  and  equality  of  Although  the  a  status  or  stocking  an  c o l o n i a l  to  perpetuate  attitude  basis  of  t h i s  a  was  and  i t i f  the  i s  the  case,  65  had  no  answer  proposed i n  B r i t i s h  i t  the  demand i n  the  mutual  for  for  "samples".  p r i n c i p l e  believed  with  claim  that  the  equivocal  assistance  to  either  provisions  references  pact  would  tend  Europe. that  had  Certainly  Norman  the  to  objection  force,  probable  and  direct  together  hegemony  convention.  the  a  especially,  Government  French  t h e i r  more  materiel  forces  Nevertheless,  avoided  international  heavy  to  i t  and,  German  " m i l i t i a "  for  that  the  Germans  accepted  the  would  French  Francois-Poneet  Davis  and  his  was  have  revised  plan  as  the  convinced  fellow,  delegate  that  at  66 Geneva,  Hugh  considered materiel Plan  Wilson,  the  to  l e v e l l i n g might  proposals  be  offered  for  unacceptable,  scope  down  enable  suspected  of  his  for  it  also.  c o l o n i a l Billow  negotiation  armaments country  and  to  For  armies  and  heavy  other  of  the  and  intimated  the  of  Wilhelmstrasse of  that  even  the  inventories  i n s i s t e d  "equalization  accept  though  parts that  a  m i l i t a r y  p o l i t i c a l  previous  statutes"  reorganization  67 proposed  for  guarantees agreement If  Europe.  to  France  might  the  have  B r i t i s h  -  and  been  that  reject  formalization,  enter  into  consultations  Pact;  c e r t a i n l y  Stimson  B r i t a i n  reached  Americans of  i f  perhaps  been  probable a  the  had  Thus,  i n was  Germany on  the  w i l l i n g  to  would  have  t h e i r the i n  had  own  offered -  i t  basis  assume  i s of  new  further probable  the  "commitment" of  a  favour  of  an  hoped  to  find  that  French  commitments,  reconsidered  event  security  of  breach  t h e i r  Executive  the  plan. it  8  to  Kellogg  Declaration  so on  the  subject.  The  Amerioans  a  "thesis"  i s  decision  August  of  an  on  which  to  98  the European about  s t a t e s c o u l d agree  and were r e l a t i v e l y  unconcerned  i t s d e t a i l s . Thus, a l t h o u g h t h e French p l a n "contravened  c o n c e p t i o n o f how t h e m a c h i n e r y  their  o f peace s h o u l d l be o r g a n i z e d " , t h e y  were w i l l i n g t o r e g a r d i t b e n e v o l e n t l y i f i t p r o v e d a c c e p t a b l e t o  69 the European The Union,  Powers.  combined p r e s s u r e o f B r i t a i n a s became c l e a r  f o r Germany t o r e j e c t  and F r a n c e - and a l s o t h e S o v i e t  i n F e b r u a r y 1933 - would have made i t d i f f i c u l t a c o n v e n t i o n based  on t h e F r e n c h plan;. Germany  was  i n no p o s i t i o n t o r i s k a c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i t h t h e m a j o r Powers.  The  German l e a d e r s b a s e d t h e i r p o l i c y on e x p l o i t i n g t h e d i v e r g e n c e s  o f o p i n i o n between F r a n c e and t h e A n g l o - S a x o n Powers, and i f t h e y were u n a b l e t o t h i s t h e y w o u l d have h a d t o make t h e b e s t d e a l p o s s i b l e i n the circumstances or r i s k a c o n f r o n t a t i o n . T h u s , a disarmament agreement was p o s s i b l e i f B r i t a i n was w i l l i n g t o a c c e p t t h e F r e n c h p l a n a s a b a s i s . But a p p a r e n t l y , Simon was n o t a t t r a c t e d b y t h e p o s s i b i l i t y . D e s p i t e h i s c l a i m t h a t he c o u l d n o t comment at* s u c h s h o r t n o t i c e , h i s s p e e c h i n t h e B u r e a u on November 17 amounted t o an emphatic  r e j e c t i o n of the majority of the French  70 proposals.  H i s statement  B r i t i s h p o l i c y based  was l i t t l e more t h a n a r e c a p i t u l a t i o n o f  on t h e memorandum o f September 19 and h i s own  speech t o t h e Commons o f November 10. He a c c e p t e d t h e German demands o f August  29 p r o v i d e d t h a t t h e r e was no rearmament and r e p e a t e d h i s  p r o p o s a l f o r a " n o - f o r c e p a c t " i n t h e hope t h a t  i t might  entice  F r a n c e i n t o a d h e r i n g t o t h e B r i t i s h p o s i t i o n . He t h e n o u t l i n e d a p o s s i b l e programme f o r t h e f i r s t  s t a g e o f disarmament. "Heavy" t a n k s  w o u l d be a b o l i s h e d and new l a r g e m o b i l e  guns l i m i t e d t o a c a l i b r e o f  99  "about 105mm" - the maximum permitted to Germany by the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s . The size of the a i r forces of the leading Powers would be reduced t o that of B r i t a i n pending a more comprehensive agreement p r o h i b i t i n g bombers and a e r i a l bombardment except f o r " p o l i c e purposes i n o u t l y i n g places" and e s t a b l i s h i n g " e f f e c t i v e i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n t r o l " over c i v i l a v i a t i o n . Submarines would be abolished and cruisers l i m i t e d t o 7,000 tons with 6" guns. And a Permanent Disarmament Commission would be set up to supervise the execution of the convention. These proposals went a long way towards meeting Germany's demands f o r the p r a c t i c a l a p p l i c a t i o n of equality of r i g h t s . Although the reorganization of her forces was to involve "no increase i n her powers of aggression", she would be permitted t o own "samples" of " l i g h t tanks". She would also be allowed to b u i l d c a p i t a l ships of the same types as the Great naval Powers provided that "subject to minor adjustments" she d i d not increase the t o t a l tonnage of ships i n any s p e c i f i c category of vessel i n her navy. But the Simon proposals were no answer to the disarmament problem. The provisions regarding tanks and m i l i t a r y a v i a t i o n were designed almost s o l e l y t o increase B r i t i s h strength at the expense of the other Powers and Prance was offered no more than a "no-force pact" to compensate for material concessions to Germany. Simon's i m p l i c i t r e j e c t i o n of the French plan was unfortunate, f o r B r i t a i n would not have been affected adversely by i t s implementation. Her p o s i t i o n i n the second of the three ooncentric " c i r c l e s " required her to assume no new commitments, only to reaffirm^.those she had undertaken already. Certainly she would be expected to p a r t i c i p a t e i n  100  a  general  time,  consultative  B r i t a i n  Moreover, pact  the  would  Continent would  be  victim to  c a l l e d  on  aggression  i n  would  allowed  the  the  they  a i t  League  European  would  the  that  u n l i k e l y supply And  she  emergency  B r i t a i n  wished  Thus  the  French  to  any  settle  i t .  peace Royal  have  equip  land  71  assistance on  the  Navy  assistance  would  and  at  mutual  of  the  out  to  European  was to  forbidden.  of  broke  negotiations  period  l i n e s  any  i n  c r i s i s  considerable  on  to  been i t  a  allowed  with  proposals  any  would  security.  French  pact  a  involved  Europe.  a i r  have  " s p e c i a l i z e d  European  of  so,  B r i t i s h the  be  i f  within  generally  anything,  been  army  weakened  Neither I f  her  to  her  being by  but  implementation  assured t h i s  not  have  successful  have  organize  not  c e r t a i n  and,  of  weapons  was  pact,  proposals  strengthened  a i r  whereas  units" her  on  have i t ,  the  existing  weakened Ss  same  a i r  B r i t i s h  B r i t a i n basis  force  as  was  seourity.  would  have  the  Powers;  merely  the  72 fourth  largest  i n  London  and  the  South-East  i n  his  speech  Baldwin  Considering the  River  attitude  Rhine to  Certainly as  "defend  the  grievances,  proved  that  a  of  taking  i t  unsuccessful,  i t  horrors  was  for  would  i s  that  be  might  bombing  have  secured  portrayed  a l l  to  into  i n  part  the  on  the  more  the  by  impossible  time  and  that  Germany's a  necessary  for  i t  was  to  treat;  best  to  "legitimate"  policy  consideration  that  remarkable.  was  pursue  thesis  Government's  i t  redressing  power  of  f r o n t i e r ,  plan  believed  by  proposals  based  m i l i t a r y  u n r e a l i s t i c of  French  10.  p o l i c y  Power  f r o n t i e r "  factors  the  disarmament  Ministers  was  the  November  second-class  but  from  B r i t a i n ' s  French  Rhine  Thus  B r i t i s h  was  B r i t i s h  Germany  without  the  Europe.  -  of for  B r i t a i n  to  appeasement i f  appeasement  defend  the  101  Rhine plan of  f r o n t i e r offered  17  As  had  i n i t i a l  force.  some  November  Simon  by  hope  The  of  offered  doing  i n  remained  his  that  f a c i l i t a t e  Germany's  return  accomplish  t h i s ,  Government  German point  demands of  agreed  that  Simon's given  view.  B r i t a i n  press But  There  of  move  Herriot would  to was  November that to  the  French  Simon's  proposals  Bureau,  a  w i l l i n g France  formula  surprise, to  the  he was  accept  adhere  not  being  the  to  therefore,  Conference  had  that  Conference.  to  to  B r i t a i n ' s  on  agreed,  the he  And,  to  major  the  when  would  B r i t i s h Neurath basis  of  would  have  and  caused  intransigent  France.  Germany's  to  on  Germany  the  Disarmament  was  i f  17;  to  composing  the  return  part  acceptance i n  reticent,  be  to  l i t t l e  could  take  of  successfully;  speech of  pressure  was  closer  gained  France  policy  put  impression  to  Having  and  Germany  speech  the  the  t h i s  arrangements  less.  indicated  objective  m i l i t a r y  i n  five-Power  a n t i c i p a t i n g  isolate  France  and  p r i n c i p l e ,  Simon  conversations that  the  portray  at  as  to  Geneva.  objective  her  began  of  the  German  main  obstacle  73 to  disarmament.  declared  that,  Speaking once, he  he no  with  "had  entente  but  that  Conseil  was  disappointed  honestly  longer at  Norman D a v i s  held  the  believed  that  B r i t i s h  disarmament p l a n , and i t seemed t o the darkness towards a goal which  on  i n "  b e l i e f . ^ reaction  Davis that she could  26,  November a  Franco-German  The to  he  President  the  du  French  F r a n c e "was not c l e a r l y  walking i m 7 ascertain".  102  Events  i n  Germany  hoped  to  "harness  who  against A  Papen  p o l i t i c a l  was  and  remained  the  French  better the  occurred  with  Foreign  the  caused  c r i s i s  entrusted  alarmed  forming  elements  downfall and,  on  another  M i n i s t e r ,  but  forthcoming  conversations  could  not  discuss  German  the  French  Thus, the  when  was  Conference, a  general 16  of  B r i t a i n  was  to  f a c i l i t a t e  w i l l i n g  France  wanted  a  nature  of  German  France  wanted  general  to  desired a  a  Party, on  turned  November  , Schleicher  himself  Government".  Neurath  to  be  equality  except  1 7 .  apprehensive  maintaining  not  to  be  revealed  i n  a  pact;  very  Geneva good.  return  to  agreement  the  d e f i n i t i o n  further  i n  i n  that  he  conjunction  or  German  of  written  obligations Franoe  was  immediate  including  reinforcement the  claim  for  Treaty.  ^samples";  Britain.wanted  document.  to  was  entered  make  the  conversations;  B r i t a i n  America  u n w i l l i n g  of  Locarno  five-Power  unless  2 2 ,  Disarmament  of  i n  December  security  "equality".  revealed  on  B r i t a i n ' s  the  on  reaffirmation  to  consultative  2  Geneva,  arrived  an  claims  assume  Nazi  Schleicher,  Government  reaffirmation  and  accede  further  the  continued  i n to  were  pact,  to  the  December  Germany's  Covenant  them  Simon  agreement  France  the  the  and  an  while  claim  General  security.  of  consultative  A r t i c l e  u n w i l l i n g  to  MacDonald  prospects  objective  claim  of  Herriot  the  with  of"  " P r e s i d i a l  about  the  Premier.  a  far-reaching  77 arms  reductions  B r i t a i n discuss to the  the  did  u n t i l  she  suggest  a  equality B r i t i s h  B r i t i s h  i n  new  compromise  abstracto  p o s i t i o n  also  recived  on  suggested  from  equality, that  security  by  which  security but  Germany  the  assurances.  she i f  would  France  French  should  be  refuse would  refused  allowed  to  to agree because undertake  103  " c e r t a i n measures of q u a l i t a t i v e rearmament" by means of stages.  78  Two days of conversations i n Geneva f a i l e d to produce a change i n either the French or B r i t i s h a t t i t u d e . The Americans were anxious to achieve p o s i t i v e r e s u l t s before the Christmas break, but believed that neither the B r i t i s h nor French 79 disarmament proposals would lead to substantial progress being made. Conseqently, Davis and Wilson proposed an immediate preliminary convention based on the r e s o l u t i o n of July 23? i t would l a s t f o r about three years and incorporate a l l the points on which agreement was p o s s i b l e . B r i t a i n and France indicated that they would welcome such a proposal and Davis drew up a memorandum putting forward a 80  number of points f o r consideration. MacDonald and Simon doubted the f e a s i b i l i t y of the American scheme but gave i t t h e i r "warm support" as they were w i l l i n g to consider almost anything which might f a c i l i t a t e Germany's return to the Disarmament Conference. They were also anxious to assure America's 8l  continued p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the Conference  — f o r i t had been suggested  that Congress might refuse to vote the necessary funds i f the deadlock at Geneva was not broken. Baron A l o i s i , the acting I t a l i a n delegate at Geneva, and Herriot also favoured the p l a n , though the l a t t e r made h i s support conditional on no German rearmament, f o r i n the absence of new security guarantees the French Premier was reluctant to commit himself t o certain provisions of the scheme allowing Germany to 82  "improve her means of defence".  104  Neurath's he  believed  least that  Bureau came  on  i t  years had  forward  with  that  new  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  of  The  former  would  the  l a t t e r  on  of  November  by  January  "the  status  1  plan i n  the  be  he  put  plan  The  and  would  disarmament from  not  reject  it  Delegates  which  effect"  and  November  form  the  the  of  of  of  be  charged of  29,  B r i t i s h be  f i r s t  "the  security".  August  would  the  five  examining  degrees  delegates  basis  the  he  p r i n c i p l e  the  at  the  outright,  with  and  14  for  i n  would  the  for  proposals  and  of  conversations  contractual  of  the 10  German memorandum  of  work  of  November  along  into  the  unfavourable,  on  own.  l i n e s  on  17.  d i d  Geneva  be  French  was  regression  his  further  based  a  Commons  of  general  could  and  1933  was  the  plan  postponement  creating  the  10  the  Although  17. a  American  it  i n  p a r t i c i p a t i n g  of  the  implied  outlined  formulating  equality  to  and  November  countries with  that  three Simon  reaction  proposals  completed  disarmament  convent i o n . ^  Herriot make  d i s l i k e d  considerable  German  equality  the  concessions  while  concessions  regarding  December  the  6,  B r i t a i n ,  "one  of  the  aims  Germany  . . .  equality  return  to  for  preliminary  France,  a l l  the  French  of  was  the of  not  security.  Premier I t a l y  because  put  and  the  Thus,  United  a  States  system  Conference, on  This, and, the  he  once l i n e s  which  believed, t h i s of  had  the  same  to  would  would been  day, of  declare  accord  his that  to  provide  allow  Germany  effected,  American  of  s i m i l a r  would  was  to  application  make  the  asked  counter—proposal  rights  a  to  on  Conference  i n  was  p r a c t i c a l  required  forward  the  France  Disarmament  nations".  convention  scheme  regarding  Germany  French  own.  security  German  plan  a  might  be  to  105  formulated.  B r i t a i n  and  Neurath  referred  his  country  could  of  status  that  the  element  would  of  return  Simon  come  an  agreement.  Germany's specific an  pledges,  put  t h e i r  supported Herriot  To  formula  I t a l y  i n  by  -  such  i n  the  that  of  by  now,  were  and  i f  Germans  and  a  it  t h i s  he  now  would would  wanted  way  that  that equality  respect"  include  and  "the  that  f a c i l i t a t i n g  Germans  France the  declared  every  would  and  t h i s ,  and  which  though  was  he  proposal  disarmament".^  remained  i t  Herriot  assurances  effect  general  the  l a t e r ,  nations"  believed  Christmas  sides"  a l l  i n  that  equality,  demands  both  for  to  received  Conference,  prevent  days  p r a c t i c a l  lay  MacDonald  agreed  Two  he  objective  the  before  repercussions.  B e r l i n .  into  believe  to  quickly  provided  which  to  to  claim  to  security  B r i t a i n ,  agreement  "to  of  immediate  Germany's had  i t  "put  security  B r i t a i n ' s  I t a l y  agree  be  "system  and  MacDonald who  w i l l i n g insisted  be  preventing  to  accept  on  demanding  impossible  have  both  were  to  attain  severe  France  B r i t a i n  and  and  could  Jhey  could  do  t h i s  by  Germany  would  be  accorded  Germany  say  that  adhering  to  equality  she the  within  85 a  system  providing  Norman been  shelved,  December text  Davis,  of  10, a  security  whose  placed the  own  for  proposal  America  -  Neurath  precise  d e f i n i t i o n  of  formula  and  following  France by  and  treaty  the  I t a l y should  f i r m l y  representatives  declaration  on  a l l  had be  of  agreed accorded  that  for on the  convention  side  B r i t a i n  and,  on  agreed  upon  the  five  Paris  was  Germany  equality  interim  of  of  Powers  dropped  Both it  an the  having  "equality". day  nations.  his  and  B e r l i n  announced and  the  rights  demand  that other  i n  a  for  had  a  more  accepted  the  B r i t a i n , Powers  system  disarmed  which  106  would  provide  would  he  the  security  "emhodied  Disarmament  p r i n c i p l e have  t h e i r  France, the  would  United  to  Conference  by  discussed  reduction  and  regulated  Germany  to  the by  they  announced  work  out  a  l i m i t a t i o n  a  conclusions  and  a l l  were  of  and  would  with  along  pact  with  "without  co-operate  with i n  effect  provision  would  B r i t a i n ,  together  s h a l l  of  t h i s  states  ready,  no-force  which  armaments  the  convention.  security" they  p r i n c i p l e  application  they  into  convention of  of  same  that  that  t h i s  containing  the  on  that  Conference  enter  discussions  and  methods  declared  states,  f u l l e r  "to  convention  be  and  States,  nations  The  European  prejudice  the  a l l  Conference".  armaments  I t a l y  other  i n  for  a  for  the  the substantial  future  86 r e v i s i o n  with  a  view  to  Although  it  enabled  Declaration  of  December  France  and  equality. November  Germany France  wanted  wanted  French  were  prepared  to  Germany;  Germany,  having  now  wanted  intent the  the  a  maintenance  on  to  return  to  many  Conference,  important  system  of  the no  more  a  both  on  the  system  than  this  plan  which  p r a c t i c a l  quo.  The  equality"  w e l l .  formula  of not  from  as  and  d i d  "qualitative  concession  between  security  status  equality"  the  differences  of  t e r r i t o r i a l  "quantitative out  based  f l e x i b l e  extracted  work  the  implementation  more  concede  securing  Conference  to  security  her  was  the  a  reduction."  concealed  11  commit  to  to  Germany  regarding  Germany  14;  further  for  the  B r i t i s h ,  France disarmament;  87 Germany  Thus  the  The of  hoped  r e a l  main  December  conjunction  that  i t  struggle  importance 11  was  with  might  over of  t h e i r  America)  be  done  through  armaments  the  was  discussions  demonstration combined  with  five-Power  s t i l l  to  leading  that  i f  France  88  come. to  the  B r i t a i n to  discussions.  put  Declaration  (possibly pressure  on  i n  107  Germany, t h e n t h e  joint  were v e r y  about a p o s s i b l e rapprochement between P r a n c e  worried  pressure  would he  s u c c e s s f u l , f o r the  Germans and  89 the  A n g l o - S a x o n Powers.  B r i t a i n had P r a n c e and  given  y  And  i t w o u l d be  l o g i c a l t o assume t h a t i f  more s u p p o r t t o P r a n c e a t an  earlier  stage,  Germany c o u l d have b e e n coaxed i n t o a d e f i n i t i v e  both  disarmament  agreement. C e r t a i n l y t h i s w o u l d have been p o s s i b l e at B e s s i n g e i n A p r i l . But with the had  although the  B r i t i s h Government d e s i r e d b e t t e r r e l a t i o n s  French - a noticeable  taken place  during the  s t i l l u n w i l l i n g to enter  rapprochement between t h e  Geneva d i s c u s s i o n s  i n t o new  Continental  two  countries:  - B r i t i s h M i n i s t e r s were commitments  unless  90 t h e A m e r i c a n s gave c e r t a i n a s s u r a n c e s t o Despite that  Papen*s t r u c u l e n c e ,  Germany o f f e r e d no  the  Britain.  B r i t i s h Government s t i l l  real threat  - or a t  l e a s t no  t o E u r o p e a n s e c u r i t y . M i n i s t e r s were c o n v i n c e d t h a t could resolve t h e i r disputes  without recourse  of i n t e r e s t s " premise - thus t h e i r unwillingness the  i n t o new  A belief  i n an  horrors t o new  that  Government's r e l u c t a n c e  and  "harmony  their typified and  B r i t a i n could  G r e a t War  and  even t h e  to enter  B r i t i s h p e o p l e had the  commitments f o r f e a r t h a t  E u r o p e a n war;  proposal  i n t e r n a t i o n a l "harmony o f i n t e r e s t s " was  commitments. The  of the  t o force - the  say  that  sides".  only reason f o r the Continental  E u r o p e a n Powers  suggested that Prance  t h e i r demands i n s u c h a way  supported both  immediate t h r e a t  commitments. MacDonald had  Government's c o n v i c t i o n s when he  Germany "put she  to enter  "no-force"  believed  into  B r i t a i n might be  the  new  been s h o c k e d by  d i k t a t o f V e r s a i l l e s and  Anglo-French D e c l a r a t i o n  not  the  were opposed  drawn i n t o a n o t h e r  o f J u l y 13  had  caused  -  108  a considerable outcry i n the press.  The Government, alarmed by the  r i f t s i n society produced by the events of August 1931 (the f i n a n c i a l c r i s i s and the f a l l of the Labour Government), d i d not want to widen the r i f t s and cause new ones by adopting such an unpopular p o l i c y as 92 o f f e r i n g new security guarantees to the Continental Powers.  But  even so, MacDonald*s concern over public opinion was probably exaggerated; the Government had a majority of over 400 seats i n the Commons and was i n no danger of l o s i n g i t . B r i t a i n ' s r e f u s a l to increase her commitments was the main reason f o r the continuing lack of progress towards a disarmament convention. By accepting the moral j u s t i c e of Germany's claim to equality of r i g h t s ( i n the "Statement of Views" of September 19) and by agreeing to " q u a l i t a t i v e e q u a l i t y " , i f not a certain amount of "quantitative equality" ( i n Simon's speeches of November 10 and 17), the Government made the serious mistake of allowing the Germans to drive a wedge between B r i t a i n and Prance. The p o l i c y of appeasing German grievances without o f f e r i n g Prance security guarantees i n return had the opposite effeot to that intended; the Germans increased t h e i r demands from " e q u a l i t y i n p r i n c i p l e " i n July to "quantitative equality" i n December, while the French became more anxious about t h e i r s e c u r i t y . I f B r i t a i n had maintained a closer r e l a t i o n s h i p with France, i t i s probable that Papen and Neurath would have reduced t h e i r claims, because the German Ministers were a f r a i d of a possible r e s u s c i t a t i o n of the entente cordiale or, worse, the old wartime a l l i a n c e . As Rumbold pointed out, the best way of dealing with the Germans was to be f i r m , f o r they understood a p o l i c y based on force whereas they interpreted a p o l i c y based on c o n c i l i a t i o n as a sign of weakness.  109 I f B r i t a i n had accepted the French p l a n of November 14 as the b a s i s of  a disarmament agreement, t h e r e i s l i t t l e doubt t h a t the Germans  would have accepted i t a l s o ; even i n February 1933 Neurath and Billow 93 d e c l a r e d t h a t a s o l u t i o n on t h i s b a s i s was p o s s i b l e .  But HacDonald  and Simon opposed the p l a n and thus f r u s t r a t e d any chance of an agreement. B r i t a i n ' s own disarmament p r o p o s a l s of November 17 were l i t t l e more than a r e c a p i t u l a t i o n of p r e v i o u s p r o p o s a l s t h a t had been r e j e c t e d , such as the r e t e n t i o n of " p o l i c e bombing i n o u t l y i n g d i s t r i c t s " and medium tanks but the a b o l i t i o n of heavy t a n k s and submarines. Although g o i n g some way towards meeting Germany's demand for  the p r a c t i c a l a p p l i c a t i o n of e q u a l i t y of s t a t u s , the p r o p o s a l s  o f f e r e d few compensations f o r France. To the French, a "no-force p a c t " to  " m o b i l i z e w o r l d o p i n i o n " was of no more v a l u e than the "paper  guarantees"oof the K e l l o g g P a c t . The B r i t i s h p l a n was no s o l u t i o n t o the disarmament problem.  110  CHAPTER  IV  T H E ADVENT  OP  HITLER  AND T H E SECOND P H A S E  DISARMAMENT December  Between the  the  General  changes  Commission  occurred  appointment was  no  had  been  the  new  of  the  conservative from  scheme  by i n  of  Probably was  his A  been  to  i n  by  was  predecessor.  wing  was  of  the  but  to  he  he was  difference take  had  the  Weimar of  V e r s a i l l e s  probably  had  no he  had  to  him  r i s k s taken  i n  14  Edouard  Daladier  became  H e r r i o t ' s  party,  though  sympathetic  more to  and  new  his  idea  i n  and,  flexible the  to  secure  make  than  of  a  Premier  planner.  that  conservatives aims.  Herriot short du  was to  of  i n  a  his  President  an  master  German  after  than,  Germany  number  France.  approach  of  a  those  free  r i g i d l y  the  pursuit  place  The  them  and  December  d'Orsay.  Moreover,  1  to  to  rather  on  Quai  -  outlined  Neurath  from  and  hoped  there  for  clearly-defined  adhere  between  also  change,  Republic  opportunist  greater  Chamber  to,  an  Yet  different  He  not  would  30.  the  l i t t l e  Treaty  d i d  being  January  of  p o l i t i c a l  be  aims;  -  of  significant on  reconvening  c o n t i n u i t y .  the  f r o n t i e r .  the  ensure  his  at of  to  and  1933  to  accomplish  the  similar He  appeared  8  number  policy  he  Paul-Boncour,  left  foreign  June  a  f  Chancellor  but  government i n  1932  most  M i n i s t e r  of  11  Europe,  Bismarck,  Paul-Boncour  problem  i n  p r i n c i p a l  defeated  the  Eastern  willingness  change  headed ttfith  the  aims  Kampf"  Like  the  p o l i t i c i a n s  Power  which  German  Foreign  -  2 1933  February  THE  CONFERENCE  1932  December  German  shackles  the  "Mein  practice.  of  the  of  Europe,  as  that  Chancellor's  dominant  ideas  H i t l e r  reappointed  r e v i s i o n  the  of  on  within  i n d i c a t i o n  Germany a  Declaration  11  OF  of  ministry Conseil  the  the  had  leader  German his  understanding  with  Ill  Germany - even a Germany under H i t l e r - and r e j e c t e d a p o l i c y of uncompromising n a t i o n a l i s m , no concessions t o Germany and  total  2 r e l i a n c e on the French a l l i a n c e system.  He placed more emphasis on  the c o n c i l i a t o r y aspect of R a d i c a l - S o c i a l i s t f o r e i g n p o l i c y than d i d H e r r i o t , though he was  aware of the p o s s i b l e dangers t o France  of a N a z i government i n B e r l i n and wanted t o move c l o s e r t o B r i t a i n , R u s s i a and  Italy.^  Paul-Boncour s t i l l hoped t h a t a disarmament convention might be negotiated  on the b a s i s of the French p l a n of November 14,  seemed p o s s i b l e when Neurath i n t i m a t e d t h a t he a l s o was  and  this  i n favour  of such a s e t t l e m e n t . ^ But i t became c l e a r d u r i n g the debate i n the General Commission from February 2-8  t h a t t h e r e were c o n s i d e r a b l e  d i f f e r e n c e s between the French and German p o i n t s of view r e g a r d i n g the a p p l i c a t i o n of the p l a n . M a s s i g l i , the a c t i n g French maintained t h a t disarmament was  delegate,  dependent on s e c u r i t y ; Nadolny  suggested t h a t s e c u r i t y was dependent on disarmament. France b e l i e v e d t h a t a mutual a s s i s t a n c e pact and an i n t e r n a t i o n a l f o r c e were a p r e c o n d i t i o n f o r the attainment of German e q u a l i t y ; Germany refused t o d i s c u s s them on t h i s b a s i s . France wanted the problem of e f f e c t i v e s t o be d e a l t w i t h before t h a t of m a t e r i e l ; Germany wanted m a t e r i e l t o be reduced before the problem of e f f e c t i v e s was  tackled.  5  The r e a c t i o n of the other Powers t o the French p l a n was A l o i s i c r i t i c i s e d the proposals  mixed.  on the grounds t h a t the mutual  a s s i s t a n c e pact would not i n c l u d e B r i t a i n , thus i n t i m a t i n g t h a t I t a l y d e s i r e d any European " d i r e c t o r a t e  1 1  t o be based on the  four  Western Powers - B r i t a i n , France, Germany and I t a l y . Support f o r  112  Prance  came  aggression i n  the  s t i l l  and  other  i n  Greece  had  w i l l i n g  to  adhesion  increase  to  the  an  agreement  to  both  additional  had  for  use  a c t i v e l y time  her  of  clear  pact  to  that  they  make  of  she  could  French wanted while  to  enter  into  a  basis  had  been  to  advocate), acceptable  France  of  that  c o n c i l i a t o r y .  to  engage had  h e r s e l f  maintained  European Pact  i f  7 it her  had  a  mediation, But  Eden,  i n  a  signature.  she  speech  would to  Under-Secretary  declared He  B r i t i s h  made  e x i s t i n g  that no  B r i t a i n  a l l u s i o n  guarantees  the of  Moreover,  i f  automatically General State  could  and  a  general  of  security  was  successful  strengthen  her  own  acting  undertake  to  B r i t a i n  Commission  no  February  B r i t i s h fresh  consultative were  on  i n  security. Anthony  3,  delegate  at  Geneva,  commitments  i n  Europe.  pact  sufficient  to  and  suggested  justify  a  that  " r e a l  8 and  immediate"  reduction  i n  armaments.  Thus  his  speech  of  through  Germany  more  Germans  proposals.  the  Power  assure  B r i t a i n  the  on  assure  p o l i c y  his  but  French  seemed  could  but  B r i t a i n  one  delegate  Prance,  possibly  the  included  rapprochement.  the  I f  A l o i s i  was  he  of  Soviet  agreement  support.  she  France  preferred  any  (as  mediator; and  The  supported some  to  equality,  commitments,  European p o l i t i c s ,  that  also  B r i t a i n  support  influence  been i n  attained.  ready  Franco-Soviet  B r i t i s h  assistance  as  accorded  Christmas, on  was  d e f i n i t i o n  " c i r c l e s " .  atvleast  Continental  Germany  guarantees  always  some  her  he  growing  to  concrete  Union  Entente  before  dependent  been  and  the  objections  mutual  have  France  would  was  should  L i t t l e  apparent  Soviet  a  concentric  Germany  the  suggested  the  three  r e f l e c t e d  and  plan  who  that  the  that  raised  been  French  more  of  general  states  As  It  declared  maintained  Belgium,  she  L i t v i n o v ,  outermost  speech  the  from  amounted  to  113  a rejection of the French proposals - though he denied i t to 9  Paul-Boncour.^ To ensure that the Conference did not grind to a halt, Britain put forward a "programme of work".  10  Drafted on January 30, i t  suggested, that the future convention should replace Part V of the Treaty of Versailles and should last for the same period of time and he subject to the same methods of revision f o r a l l Powers. A l l European states would enter into a "no-force" pact, the details of which were to be discussed by the P o l i t i c a l Commission, and the continental European states were to study the p o s s i b i l i t y of their entering into a mutual assistance pact. The Bureau would be charged with drawing up a formula f o r the standardization of European armies and with securing an interim solution to the problem of a i r disarmament. Subsequently, a committee representing the principal a i r Powers would report on the p o s s i b i l i t y of abolishing military aviation and aerial bombardment and of securing the effective international control of c i v i l aviation. Qualitative equality would be applied to materiel either immediately or i n stages, and the Bureau would! f i x limits f o r the tonnage and number of tanks and the gun calibre andi number of heavy mobile guns. It would also set limits f o r the tonnage and gun calibre of capital ships, a i r c r a f t - c a r r i e r s , cruisers, destroyers and submarines. This programme was an attempt to mediate between France and Germany on the procedure to be adopted i n the Conference, but i t was unsatisfactory as i t s proposals f o r disarmament were f a r more  114  definite  than those f o r  s e c u r i t y . Moreover, disarmament was:  t o he d i s c u s s e d i n t h e B u r e a u , a s m a l l e r and more e f f e c t i v e  body  t h a n t h e P o l i t i c a l Commission, i n which s e c u r i t y was t o he d i s c u s s e d . C o n s e q u e n t l y , on F e b r u a r y 9 and 10, when t h e programme was d i s c u s s e d i n t h e B u r e a u , P a u l - B o n c o u r proposed (and secured) s e v e r a l amendments, t h e most important b e i n g t h a t a l l  s e c u r i t y q u e s t i o n s s h o u l d be d i s c u s s e d  by t h e P o l i t i c a l Commission and t h o s e r e l a t i n g t o disarmament by t h e General C o m m i s s i o n .  1 1  Together w i t h t h e D e c l a r a t i o n of December 11, the "programme of work" marked a d e f i n i t e  stage i n t h e development of B r i t i s h  policy.  P r e v i o u s l y , t h e Government had tended t o remain i n the background of t h e disarmament d i s c u s s i o n s , h o p i n g t h a t F r a n c e and Germany would come t o an agreement on terms a c c e p t a b l e t o B r i t a i n , but now, still  h o p i n g t h a t t h e two c o n t i n e n t a l Powers would "put  i n such a way t h a t B r i t a i n c o u l d say t h a t  t h e i r demands;  she s u p p o r t e d b o t h  t h e Government was t r y i n g t o ensure t h a t p r a c t i c a l  whilst  sides",  negotiations  between t h e two Powers took p l a c e as soon as p o s s i b l e . The d r a f t programme was not stage t o  it.  development  an o f f e r  of m e d i a t i o n - but  it  was an  The programme was a l s o an i n t e r m e d i a t e  intermediate  stage i n  the  of B r i t i s h p o l i c y on t h e German p r o b l e m . S i m o n ' s speeches  of November 10 and 17, had been almost e x c l u s i v e l y pro-German i n c h a r a c t e r , but t h e new B r i t i s h p r o p o s a l r e f l e c t e d a s l i g h t move towards France because i t  e n v i s a g e d a f u l l d i s c u s s i o n of  s e c u r i t y as  w e l l as disarmament; moreover, Eden made no o b j e c t i o n s when P a u l - B o n c o u r sought t o t r a n s f e r  t h e d i s c u s s i o n s on disarmament from t h e Bureau t o  t h e G e n e r a l Commission.  115  The into  Government  account  equality  of  clear  that  t r i e d  to  B r i t i s h  the  had  circumstances  rights, a  reappraised,  but  further  conceal  H i t l e r  anxiety  were  very  disarmament  a r i s i n g  reappraisal  t h e i r  M i n i s t e r s  as  i t s  was  from now  might  over  concerned  German  German  be  the  the  p o l i c y  lest  claim  lead  to it  was  Although  leader's  i t  take  Chancellor  necessary.  Nazi  to  to  they  appointment, a  deterioration  12 m  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  the  rapprochement  Secretary  to  MacDonald, League and  r e l a t i o n s  of  the  t o l d  with  Nations,  actively"  Prance,  B r i t i s h Louis  consequently,  Om F e b r u a r y  Embassy  Aubert,  that  with  and  one  B r i t a i n  France  i n  and  P a r i s  of  the  wanted  that  a  17, and  they  began  Half  Wigram,  a  close  French  to  delegates  basis;  hasten F i r s t  confidant  collaborate  suitable  to  to  of  the  "intimately  for  t h i s  collaboration  13 might  be  the  indicated  that  "no-force" a  mutual  French  pact  aggression  took  place.  French  Cabinet  "might t o t a l the  He  overcome"  a b o l i t i o n  the  of  naval  or  proposals  -  the  would  opposed  unusual  "qualitative  because  argument,  equality",  that  opinion As  would  "draw  hoped  B r i t i s h  the a  would  for  of  they  "specialized  B r i t a i n  But  especially  required  though  Lord  aviation.  the  had  possibly  a as  of  regards aggression  i n  B r i t a i n  forces,  would  and  the  Londonderry  and  B r i t a i n  that  for  would a  contingents",  rearming  already the  on  mobilized,  disarmament,  opposition  for  based  inference"  be  overseas  -  be  diplomat  d e f i n i t i o n  concerning  proposals  for  The  security  m i l i t a r y  French  Locarno"  also  proposals  14.  should  world  the  an  Europe  that  support  was  that  that  so  where  be  hoped  formulated  cases;  accept  and  November  pact.  be  the  B r i t a i n  of  assistance  could  to  Plan  of  agreed  not  "Mediterranean which  Germany. to  agree  This  German  B r i t i s h M i n i s t e r s  feared  116  a  "continental  Lausanne. was  But  a l l i a n c e " even  P o l i t i c a l the  evidence  French  plan,  for  of  made.  various  The  order  that the  to  they work  that  that  desire  reduction  while  to  of  reserved  his  to  advocated  improve  and  to  objection  by  Papen  relations  i n  by  many the  though  and  end  of  be  at  with  when  of  now  f i r s t  to  with  to  a  Prance  the  debate  on  a  based  1  effectives  though on  l i t t l e  i n  urged  Committee,  could had  not  be  f i r s t  decided  i n  of  Nadolny  voting  i n  a  they  on of  the a  modified had  no  conscription,  S i m i l a r l y ,  application  ensure  questions  advantages  Reichswehr.  army  the  Nadolny  armies, from  was  checks:  discussion  the  Thus,  to  any  that  on  position  and  p r i n c i p l e  Commission. ^  regarding  for  and  major  for  light  Commission  of  debate  disarmament  committee  to  General  Effectives  abstained  m i l i t i a .  the  the  Continental  r e t a i n a  and  of  The  standardized i n  to  convinced  on  manoeuvre best  l a t t e r  and  the  Commission,  proceeded  attitude  proposals the  General  questions  i t  France  towards  the  of  general  responsible  Commission.  it  it  i n  the  the  than  referred  that  wanted  support  more  discussed  u n t i l  were  p r i n c i p l e  other  be  the  of  support  held  standardization  Germans  army  be  In  General  Government's  to  not  discussions  progress  proposals  should  supplement  refused  opposed  -  to  l i t t l e  suggested  the  the  completion  l i t t l e  own  work  i n  tended  did  maferiel  the  The  professional  But  would  useful  by  for  proposals.  they  of  do  the  Conference.  France  proposals  form  t h e i r  effectives  settled  favour  after  Powers  Paul-Boncour  expected been  the  came  B r i t a i n  themselves  to  t h i s  procedure.  place  of  r e l a t i n g  of  Commissions  questions  and  t h e i r  to  genuine.  Further  in  so,  similar  of  progress  they standardization, had  been  117  made. Other inconclusive debates took place concerning the a b o l i t i o n of m i l i t a r y a v i a t i o n , the i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of c i v i l a v i a t i o n , a "no-force" pact and the proposed European mutual assistance pact. By the f i r s t week i n March, the Conference was i n almost complete deadlock. Henderson was so worried that he drafted a convention which he hoped would lead to a Franco-German compromise, even though he was a private i n d i v i d u a l and could not count on the support of any government - least of a l l h i s own. ^ 1  To a great extent, the impasse was the result of a serious deterioration i n international r e l a t i o n s . On February 24, Japan had withdrawn from the special session of the League Assembly considering the Sino-Japanese dispute, and though on March 6 the delegation to the Disarmament Conference confirmed that they would continue to p a r t i c i p a t e they also announced that t h e i r government found i t necessary to make "various important modifications" i n national 17 defence. As early as December 1932, Japan had l a i d naval proposals: before the Conference to increase the r a t i o s allowed to her by the 18 Washington and London Treaties,  and i t was now evident that the  l e v e l of a l l Japanese armaments was to be r a i s e d . The p o s s i b i l i t y of a naval agreement at Geneva, already endangered by the Anglo-American and Franco-Italian disputes, seemed even more remote. More important was the c r i s i s sparked off by events i n Germany, where H i t l e r had used the e l e c t i o n campaign and the Reichstag f i r e to induce President Hindenburg into signing an emergency decree to suppress c i v i l l i b e r t i e s and curb the a c t i v i t i e s of the opposition p a r t i e s . The Chancellor enforced the decree by a reign of t e r r o r and  118  "began  to  enrol  equipped Then,  members  with  after  guns  his  Reichstag  the  administration of  i n  the  of  clear  occupied  A i r  Hermann GBring,  The have  German  reaction  to  considered  Prance,  and  a i r  a  even  as  of  Germany's  treaty  c o a l i t i o n  of  the  Rhineland,  the  Stahlhelm  March  and  on  had he  5»  set  March  barracks i n  11,  declared  that  a  majority  about  on  A  speech  the  time  further when  9t  Kehl  a  i n  c e n t r a l i z i n g  March at  police  obligations.  completely.  occurred  disused  a u x i l i a r y  gained  opposition  obligations  demilitarized  restore  and  breach  suppressing  treaty  Nazis  M i n i s t e r ,  S.A.  elections  and  Germany's  detachment  a  the  Nazi-Nationalist  the  breach  -  of  at  i n  the  Essen,  had  a  come  the to  force.  events  i n  Germany  preventive offered  an  war,  was  swift.  possibly  a l l i a n c e  to  i n  The  Poles  seem  conjunction  Czechoslovakia,  to  with  with  whom  19 they  had  been  that  the  Germans  press  t h e i r  Permanent  on  bad  would  claims,  Council  the  p o l i c y  of  new  organization  terms. cry  but  of  he  the  Benes  the  offer  and  use  did  the  creation  f a c i l i t a t e  L i t t l e  directed  Entente  i n  Yugoslavia more  an  and  against  it  on  "encirclement"  Czechoslovakia, was  refused  as  attempt Rumania  Hungary  the an  of  than  excuse  to  the  to -  grounds  co-ordinate  though any  t h i s other  - 20 Power. on  The  the  Soviet  Union  r a t i f i c a t i o n  November  29  1932  of  and  reacted  the  the  to  H i t l e r ' s  Franco-Soviet  exchange  of  accession  non-aggression  r a t i f i c a t i o n s  duly  by  i n s i s t i n g  pact  of  took.place  21 on  February  at  the  a  could  European  France  1933.  Disarmament  country for  15  h e r s e l f  Conference,  not. agree mutual  to  where  make  assistance  arms pact  took  an  Massigli  uncompromising declared  reductions and  the  unless  that the  p o s i t i o n his  proposals  standardization  of  119  Continental Most  armies  were  delegations  breakdown  of  the  accepted.  believed  Conference  that was  the  for  best  chance  B r i t a i n  to  of  put  averting  forward  a  a  definite  22 plan  to  f a c i l i t a t e  conditions agreement and  was  for  a  such  a  according  reluctant  Franco-German settlement  her  to  existed.  equality  withdraw  compromise,  might  from  Germany  s t i l l  the  and  be  c e r t a i n l y  hoped  that  reached  Conference  at  unless  the  an Geneva  France  23 could was  be  blamed  adopting  Commission plan was of  of  a  for more  had  to  European  14  f a l l  that  there  being  back  armies  withdrawal,  c o n c i l i a t o r y  shown  November  ready  the  and  while  policy. was  accepted,  on  i t s  the  France,  The  debate  l i t t l e  or  and  the  so  no  i n  chance  supervision  -  the  Daladier,  the of  Daladier  minimum p r o p o s a l s  adequate  under  General the  French  government standardization  of  the  disarmament  to  consider  24 convention.  equality  i n  chance  to  usual,  had  between  The  French  matUriel  procure no  the  a  at  was  later  date.  a  Franco-German  positive  two  Premier  programme  Continental  even 25 '  ready  But  though  agreement, and  Powers  only  and  a  B r i t a i n  MacDonald  vague desire  and  intentions that  German  had  the  Simon, of  B r i t a i n  as;  a r b i t r a t i n g should  not  26 be  held  responsible  But  i t  to  the  B r i t i s h  at  the  time,  was  to  be  was  to  put  of  that  Eden  a  S i r  and  case  to  breakdown Alexander  i n  B r i t i s h  Assisted  February  t h e i r  to  the  delegation  saved.  p a r t i c u l a r , weekend  clear  for  Cadogan  the  t h e i r  Prime  on  Conference.  and  chief  Eden,  chief  diplomatic B r i t i s h  necessary  i f  Service  advisers,  Temperley  a  March  M i n i s t e r .  draft  2  convention  they  The  returned  Cabinet  the  Conference  during to  adviser  delegate  was  prepared  and  the  Cadogan,  i n i t i a t i v e  by  25-26,  Geneva,  of  i n the  England  Committee  on  120  Disarmament met twice, Baldwin backing the plan and MacDonald expressing h i s willingness to go to Geneva, On March 3, i"t was announced that the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary would journey to Geneva as soon as p o s s i b l e , and by March 7 "the Cabinet had agreed that the two B r i t i s h Ministers should have d i s c r e t i o n 27 to use the Eden-Cadogan plan "as they saw f i t " . A c t u a l l y , MacDonald and Simon were sceptical about the draft convention and had not made the f i n a l decision to present i t to 28 the Conference.  Indeed, they were considering other p o s s i b i l i t i e s  of improving the s i t u a t i o n at Geneva - an adjournment of the Conference, five-Power exchanges of views, a declaration of intent or an interim 29 convention based on the Davis proposal of December 1932.  They arrived  i n Geneva on March 11, after preliminary discussions i n . P a r i s , but after three days of t a l k s they were on the point of abandoning the draft convention and proceeding to Rome f o r t a l k s with Mussolini.^"* Eventually, after t a l k i n g to Eden, the Prime Minister decided to present the convention to the Conference. On March 16, he outlined i t to the General Commission.^  1  Unlike previous B r i t i s h plans, the ''MacDonald plan" contained a provision f o r a consultative pact. In the event of a breach or threatened breach of the Kellogg Pact, a conference could be called at the request of any f i v e of the parties to the convention provided that one of them was a Great Power. The object of the conference would be to "agree upon steps to be taken" to prevent a breach of the Pact or, i f the breach had occurred, to define the aggressor. To be v a l i d , decisions of the conference had to be concurred i n by a l l  121  the  Great  Powers  and  by  a  majority  of  the  other  p a r t i c i p a t i n g  governments. The to  most  disarmament,  Europe each  were  mobile  land  r e t a i n  defence Tanks and  force  There  were  to  Treaties  u n t i l  meantime  Prance  Power ship  in  was of  to  there  was  previous  purposes.  the  each  account,  would  to  weight  of  the  over  destroyed  set  The  size  16  was  to  for  the of  limit the  the  p r e - m i l i t a r y  being  referred  would  be  c a l i b r e  would  be  for  would  be  within  three  years  of  allowed  coastal  largest  tons  and  effectives";  effectives  maximum  states  Continental  service  take  foroes  but  of  d a i l y  Overseas be  r e l a t i n g  200,000,  allotted  155mm ( 6 . 1 " ) ;  406mm ( 1 6 " ) ,  "average  cases  again  up  armies  doubtful  50,000.  I t a l y  that  eight-month  effectives  guns  no  alterations  projected  and  I t a l y capital  tons be  ( i n no  treaties;  Germany  of  The  of  of  was  naval  gun.  prohibited of  the  coming  convention. be  to  were  Commission.  l i m i t s  materiel  b u i l d  26,500  number  105mm ( 4 . 1 " ) ,  be  the  basis  be  unladen  of  Poland  plan  proposals.  the  and  into  B r i t i s h  to  was  prohibited  on  definite  200,000,  would  an  land  calculation  but  existing  the  a  Disarmament  guns  guns  the  t r a i n i n g  allotted  with  a l l  into  and  The  separately, was  to  I t a l y  500,000.  Prance  of  standardized  limited  Permanent  treated  to  be  p a r a - m i l i t a r y the  section  especially  Germany,  U.S.S.R. and  to  country  Prance,  to  important  i n  naval  were  to  ships  answer  adhere except  to  would  be  other freed  London  conference  one  construction a l l  the  of  to  the  I t a l y ,  already 8"  the  Washington  1935»  though  London who  l a i d  cruisers  construction from  of  and  would  down  lay by  except be  limitations  i n  Treaty.  could  for  the  No  down  the as  naval  one  French), allowed  replacement  imposed  on  her  122  at V e r s a i l l e s , "but i n t h e p e r i o d b e f o r e t h e e x p i r y o f t h e London Washington T r e a t i e s  she would be  allowed t o b u i l d  only  and  replacement  vessels. Aerial  bombardment would be p r o h i b i t e d " e x c e p t  for police  i n o u t l y i n g d i s t r i c t s . " and m i l i t a r y p l a n e s r e s t r i c t e d Great  Power would be  Commission p r e p a r e d  a scheme f o r t h e complete  s u p e r v i s i o n " of c i v i l  a v i a t i o n . I f no Commission  t h e minimum number o f m a c h i n e s r e q u i r e d by  c o n t r a c t i n g p a r t y . A l l warplanes l i m i t e d t o an u n l a d e n  of the a i r c r a f t  except  weight  t r o o p - c a r r i e r s and  o f t h r e e t o n s , and  exceeding the q u a l i t a t i v e  and  each flying-boats  at l e a s t  quantitative  military  during the p e r i o d of the Chemical, prohibited  allowed  other  warplanes  convention.  i n c e n d i a r y and b a c t e r i o l o g i c a l  i n accordance  Conference,  a v i a t i o n would not be  w a r f a r e were t o  be  w i t h t h e p r o p o s a l s a l r e a d y a c c e p t e d by  and a Permanent Disarmament Commission would be  request  composed o f r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s from from  one  o r more o f t h e  i n v e s t i g a t i o n s i n the t e r r i t o r y  o f any  convention i t s e l f  state  on  conduct  suspected of breaching  communicated t o t h e  League  w o u l d r e p l a c e t h e disarmament  o f t h e P e a c e T r e a t i e s and would l a s t  Commission  s i g n a t o r y s t a t e , and  contracting parties i t could  t h e c o n v e n t i o n . I t s r e p o r t s were t o be C o u n c i l . The  each  the  established  t o s u p e r v i s e t h e e x e c u t i o n o f t h e c o n v e n t i o n as a w h o l e . The would be  half  restrictions  imposed were t o be d i s p o s e d o f by June 3 0 1 9 3 6 . Germany and s t a t e s without  (each  a b o l i t i o n of m i l i t a r y  e f f e c t i v e method o f s u p e r v i s i o n c o u l d be d e v i s e d , t h e  would be  i n number  a l l o w e d 5 0 0 ) u n t i l t h e Permanent Disarmament  a v i a t i o n and t h e " e f f e c t i v e  would determine  purposes  chapters  f o r f i v e y e a r s , a f t e r which i t  123  would be replaced by a new convention. The MacDonald plan was a good one i n that i t attempted to meet the German demand for the practical application of equality of rights. European armies were to be standardized and Germany allowed the same number of home-based effectives as Prance. Moreover, although Prance could retain her existing materiel of  105-155mm,  Germany would be  allowed to build up to the same limit as Prance i n a l l future construction. She would also be permitted tanks of 16 tons - a measure of rearmament - though she would not be accorded equality i n air armaments. But although the MacDonald plan made substantial concessions to Germany's demands for equality, i t did not make corresponding concessions to French demands for security. The consultative pact was less efficacious than that of the French plan of November 14 and the reference to the p o s s i b i l i t y of a European mutual assistance pact was included more for courtesy than hope. The suggested powers of the Permanent Disarmament Commission were weaker than France desired, and there was no provision for sanctions i n case the convention was breached. Nevertheless, Daladier had shown himself to be more conciliatory than Herriot, and i t seemed that i f Britain was w i l l i n g to assume additional - though r e l a t i v e l y minor - Continental commitments then a convention based on the MacDonald plan was a distinct p o s s i b i l i t y . But once they had l a i d the draft convention before the Conference, neither MacDonald nor Simon had any clear idea as to what they should 32 do next.  A debate on the B r i t i s h plan was postponed so that  124  governments could study i t more c l o s e l y , and i n the meantime the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary accepted an i n v i t a t i o n from Mussolini to v i s i t Rome. On March 14, A l o i s i had intimated that the Duce wanted to disouss the p o s s i b i l i t y of an agreement between B r i t a i n , France, I t a l y and Germany on p o l i t i c a l questions such as equality of r i g h t s , security, the Disarmament Conference and the "method of approaching treaty r e v i s i o n " , a n d , professing interest i n such an agreement, the B r i t i s h Ministers journeyed to Rome, where they arrived on March 18. Immediately upon t h e i r a r r i v a l , they were handed a draft " P o l i t i c a l Agreement of Understanding and Co-operation Between the Four Western Powers"^ envisaging the establishment,^ of a four-Power European "directorate" which would maintain the peace and "induce" other states to follow i t s l e a d . A second a r t i c l e reaffirmed the p r i n c i p l e of the r e v i s i o n of peace t r e a t i e s "given the existence of conditions which might lead to a c o n f l i c t " and a t h i r d affirmed that i f the Disarmament Conference should lead to p a r t i a l r e s u l t s only, Germany would be accorded equality of r i g h t s i n stages by an agreement between the four Western Powers. The Pact would l a s t fot ten years. M u s s o l i n i ' s basic objective f o r suggesting the Pact was h i s uneasiness 35  at the new German government.  P u b l i c l y , he stressed the s i m i l a r i t i e s  of Fascism and National Socialism, but i n private he was a f r a i d of a possible Anschluss between Germany and A u s t r i a . ^ He was also worried about the possible f a i l u r e of the Disarmament Conference and wanted 37  to ensure that any German rearmament was c o n t r o l l e d .  He wanted a  balance of French and German power so that I t a l y could revert to her  125  t r a d i t i o n a l p o l i c y of "balancing between P a r i s and B e r l i n " i n order t o gain advantages f o r h e r s e l f . The Duce's p l a n was t o d i v e r t Germany's r e v i s i o n i s t ambitions from A u s t r i a t o the P o l i s h C o r r i d o r , l e a v i n g I t a l y f r e e t o pursue her own ambitions i n the Balkans by means of 38  agreements with A u s t r i a and an enlarged Hungary.  T h i s "Danubian b l o c "  would be a b u f f e r against Germany, and M u s s o l i n i hoped that Prance would accept i t i n r e t u r n f o r co-operation against Germany on the Anschluss question. * He a l s o hoped f o r c o l o n i a l compensations i n North  Africa.  4 0  The disarmament p r o v i s i o n s of M u s s o l i n i ' s d r a f t Pact were very important. I f the Disarmament Conference  f a i l e d , B r i t a i n , Prance and  I t a l y would be able t o c o n t r o l German rearmament, whereas under the p r o v i s i o n s of the Covenant, Germany had an e x c e l l e n t moral, i f not j u d i c i a l , case f o r b e i n g f r e e d from the disarmament clauses of the Peaoe T r e a t y . Moreover, the Pact would.have l i m i t e d Germany's armaments f o r t e n years whereas the MacDonald plan envisaged a convention f i v e y e a r s . The Wilhelmstrasse was  lasting  quick t o note t h i s , and though  welcoming the clauses of the I t a l i a n project concerning t r e a t y r e v i s i o n , Neurath and Bulow were r e l u c t a n t t o commit themselves t o 41 the clauses concerning disarmament and e q u a l i t y . MacDonald and Simon d i d not perceive the t r u e nature of the Duce's scheme. They were convinced that i t s most important aspect was  treaty  4$ revision,  a  and w h i l s t agreeing that r e v i s i o n was  i n e v i t a b l e i n the  long run, they suggested an amendment confirming the s a n c t i t y of e x i s t i n g t r e a t i e s t o make the Pact more p a l a t a b l e t o Prance and p u b l i c o p i n i o n . They a l s o put forward an amendment t o the disarmament  126  clause, as they b e l i e v e d that the o r i g i n a l i m p l i e d the f a i l u r e of the Conference at Geneva. Yet even though these amendments d r a s t i c a l l y a l t e r e d the meaning of the Pact, M u s s o l i n i accepted them - he was more concerned with the four-Power formula of the Pact than w i t h i t s content s . ^ Whilst d i s l i k i n g the references t o r e v i s i o n , MacDonald and Simon were v e r y impressed by the four-Power concept. T h e i r immediate o b j e c t i v e was t o ensure that t h e B r i t i s h d r a f t convention was accepted as the  4'4 b a s i s of a l l f u t u r e d i s c u s s i o n at Geneva,  and they knew that the  support of the f o u r Western Powers was e s s e n t i a l f o r t h i s . They were a l s o concerned l e s t Europe be d i v i d e d i n t o opposing b l o c s and were 4*5 anxious t o prevent M u s s o l i n i from a l l y i n g h i m s e l f with H i t l e r . •* Consequently, they supported the p r i n c i p l e o f the Paot t o appease t h e Duee but opposed the p r o v i s i o n s f o r t r e a t y r e v i s i o n and a four-Power " d i r e c t o r a t e " t o make i t acceptable t o Prance. In many ways, M u s s o l i n i ' s proposal was put forward at an i n a u s p i c i o u s moment. Poland and t h e L i t t l e Entente suspected that i t was a " p l o t t o d i s h t h e League" and they put pressure on Prance and B r i t a i n t o oppose i t . « Franoe had s i m i l a r s u s p i c i o n s , and as Siaon pointed out. the promotion of t h e Pact " d i d not provide an inducement f o r her t o support the MacDonald P l a n " . ^ He was concerned l e s t Prance be h e l d r e s p o n s i b l e f o r a breakdown of n e g o t i a t i o n s f o r e i t h e r t h e MacDonald plan or the Pour-Power Paot because " i n t r a n s i g e n c e " on the part of t h e French would react i n favour of Germany. Between March 24 and 27, the f i r s t d i s c u s s i o n s of the B r i t i s h d r a f t convention took place i n the General Commission.  The Marquis d i  127  Soragna, the acting I t a l i a n delegate, announced that h i s country adhered to the plan unconditionally, but l a s s i g l i and Hadeilny were more reserved. The former emphasized the r e l a t i o n s h i p between seourity and disarmament and declared that the reduction and a b o l i t i o n of armaments had to be governed by the s i t u a t i o n l i k e l y to arise after the expiry of the f i r s t convention; the l a t t e r accepted the provisions regarding the implementation of the Kellogg Pact only on condition that the heavily-armed states disarmed. The German delegate also accepted the p r i n c i p l e of a t r a n s i t i o n a l period before the implementation of equality of r i g h t s , but he indicated that h i s country would desire modifications consistent with her dignity and need f o r s e c u r i t y . The American delegate d i d not j o i n i n the discussion since the new President, F r a n k l i n D. Roosevelt, had taken o f f i c e only at the beginning of the month and was s t i l l formulating h i s p o l i c y . Dovgalevsy, f o r the D . S . S . R . , regretted that the figures inserted i n the draft convention applied only to European states, but he did not oppose the convention as a whole. Several speakers disapproved of the retention of bombing i n outlying regions, and the proposals f o r the implementation of the Kellogg Paot were c r i t i c i z e d on the grounds that they ignored the machinery of the League. But on March 27, despite the differences of opinion, the General Commission decided to accept the B r i t i s h plan as the basis of i t s future discussions. The Commission then adjourned for the Easter h o l i d a y . B r i t i s h p o l i c y was to proceed as quickly as possible to a detailed examination of the MacDonald p l a n , but during the adjournment few  128  discussions concerning disarmament took place except i n connection with the proposal f o r a Pour-Power Pact. B r i t i s h Ministers were p a r t i c u l a r l y anxious to ensure that the Frenoh did not reject the Pact (as t h i s would enable Germany to claim that France was being intransigent) and so on l a r c h 31 they produced a counter-draft of the I t a l i a n project, weakening the "treaty r e v i s i o n " clauses considerably! i n any negotiations f o r r e v i s i o n , governments d i r e c t l y concerned would be placed "on an equal f o o t i n g with" the four Great Powers. A new disarmament clause stipulated that the four Powers would recommend acceptance of the MacDonald plan to the Disarmament 49  Conference.  But, as both France and Germany had objections to the  MacDonald p l a n , neither of them would accept the B r i t i s h version of the Four-Power Pact. At the same time, B r i t i s h pressure on France not to reject the Pact was successful, f o r on A p r i l 10 the French produced a draft of t h e i r own whioh replaced the reference to treaty r e v i s i o n by a reaffirmation of A r t i c l e s 10, 16 and 19 of the Covenant and suggested that any four-Power consultations should be pursued within the framework of the'lLeague. I t recognized the MacDonald plan only as a basis f o r discussion and asserted that German equality of r i g h t s should be r e a l i z e d i n stages i n a system affording security to a l l nations. M u s s o l i n i , more concerned about the conoept of the Pact 51 than i t s contents, * accepted i t as a basis of discussion, leaving the onus for a r e f u s a l on Germany. At t h i s point, there appears to have been a struggle f o r control of German p o l i c y between the Wilhelmstrasse and certain sections of  129  the  Nazi  Party.  The  career  diplomats,  i n  general,  continued  to  he  52 sceptical wanted  as  to  closer  the  value  r e l a t i o n s  between  A p r i l  10  and  Germany  would  support  of  the  with  Pour-Power  I t a l y .  advocated  18,  I t a l y ' s  Pact,  GBring, a  who  while  v i s i t e d  "gentleman's  c o l o n i a l  claims  the  Mussolini  agreement"  i n  Party  exchange  by  for  which I t a l i a n  53 support  on  such  agreement  an  the  question  Vice-Chancellor adopted  18,  of  would  Papen,  GBring's  equality  allow who  a  rights;  softer  himself  policy,  of  l i n e  v i s i t e d  possibly  to  he  to  be  Rome  ensure  believed  taken  on  between that  that  the  A p r i l  the  Pact. and  9  l a t t e r  could  54 not  claim  sole  Eventually,  credit  though  for  a  successful  somewhat  German-Italian  reluctantly,  the  agreement.  Wilhelmstrasse  followed  suit.^^ Mussolini b u t made He s t i l l  rights  was  attracted  by  i t c o n d i t i o n a l on hoped the Germans  over  a  period  Wilhelmstrasse suggesting  of  only  a  a  suggestion  the conclusion would agree to  ten  produced  the  years  draft  five-year  rather  Pact  control  a  "gentleman's  of the Pour-Power implement equality  57  than  based of  of  on  five, the  Germany's  and  French  56  Pact. of  when draft  armaments,  agreement"  he  the but saw  58 "the  greatest  successful;  d i f f i c u l t y "  on  May  4,  i n  the  i t s  being  Germans  accepted.  produced  a  His  revised  pressure  draft  was  specifying  59 no  time  l i m i t  Although must the that  have  for  M u s s o l i n i ' s  been  disarmament other  p o l i t i c a l l y  German  a  major  a l l u s i o n factor  provisions  factors and  rearmament.  were  of  to  i n  diplomatically,  future  changing  the  equally  a  German  Four-Power  important. and  her  "gentleman's policy  Pact,  Germany  leaders  it  i s  was  were  agreement" regarding probable  isolated  a f r a i d  of  a  130  renewed Anglo-French entente, e s p e c i a l l y i f I t a l y looked on i t 60 benevolently.  Moreover, there were renewed fears that the Poles  were planning a preventive w a r . ^ Neurath was so worried about the s i t u a t i o n that he suggested to Francois-Poncet that Germany might be w i l l i n g to discuss an "improvement'* i n the European security system and examine the p o s s i b i l i t y of a mutual assistance pact.  The B r i t i s h attitude to the new German government was shown very d e a r l y i n the Commons debate of A p r i l 13, when Members on both sides of the House c r i t i c i z e d the r e v i v a l of German m i l i t a r i s m and the p o l i t i c a l repression and anti-Semitism of the H i t l e r regime. Attlee declared that the country "would not countenance for a moment the y i e l d i n g to H i t l e r and force what was denied to Stresemann and 63 reason", while Austen Chamberlain deplored the "new s p i r i t of German nationalism" and demanded that the Government refuse to 64 entertain suggestions of r e v i s i o n .  Even MacDonald raised the  question as to whether the new German regime could be trusted to carry out i t s undertakings: "It i s no use t a l k i n g about disarming by agreement, i t i s no use t a l k i n g about t r e a t i e s , i t i s no use t a l k i n g about pacts, i t i s no use t a l k i n g about co-operation f o r peace unless you have had some experience which j u s t i f i e s you i n accepting the word of those with whom you are to co-operate."65 At the same time, German aggressiveness enabled B r i t a i n to pursue her p o l i c y at Geneva more e n e r g e t i c a l l y . MacDonald had launched h i s disarmament plan i n an effort to ensure that Germany would be held responsible f o r a breakdown of the Disarmament Conference rather  131  than i n any great hope that the p l a n might he s u c c e s s f u l ,  and  any  German i n t r a n s i g e n c e at Geneva would enable him t o blame Germany i f a convention was  not agreed upon. Thus, when the General  resumed i t s labours on A p r i l 25, B r i t i s h p o l i c y was adoption  Commission  t o secure  the  of the MacDonald plan with as few amendments as p o s s i b l e ,  even i f i t meant breaking up the C o n f e r e n c e . ^ Confronted  by a grave  c r i s i s , i t seemed t h a t B r i t a i n had at l a s t decided to mediate between Prance and Germany. B r i t i s h mediation would have stood a f a r b e t t e r chance of being s u c c e s s f u l at almost any other time i n the fifteen-month of the Conference. But t h e i r was It was  existence  s t i l l a p o s s i b i l i t y i t might succeed.  c e r t a i n that both Prance and Germany would put forward  maximum demands at the outset of the f i r s t convention  their  r e a d i n g of the d r a f t  i n the General Commission, but provided that B r i t a i n  followed a consistent l i n e , refused t o give way  on e s s e n t i a l p o i n t s  such as the s t a n d a r d i z a t i o n of Continental armies and was strengthen the s e c u r i t y p r o v i s i o n s of the convention,  willing to  a negotiated  s o l u t i o n of the disarmament problem was p o s s i b l e . Gn A p r i l 26, the day a f t e r the General Commission reassembled, d i s c u s s i o n of Part I ( S e c u r i t y ) of the MacDonald plan came t o a s t a n d s t i l l because Norman Davis announced that the new  American  68 government was  s t i l l d i s c u s s i n g the question of c o n s u l t a t i o n .  P r i v a t e l y , Roosevelt  had t o l d MacDonald that he was  n  i n full  general  sympathy" with the B r i t i s h on the question of c o n s u l t a t i o n and that he contemplated making a p r e s i d e n t i a l d e c l a r a t i o n announcing that America would " r e f r a i n from any a c t i o n tending t o defeat" a c o l l e c t i v e  132  6Q  effort against an aggressor, ' b u t Davis had not yet received i n s t r u c t i o n s to t h i s e f f e c t . Unsure of American p o l i c y , many delegations - i n c l u d i n g Prance - were u n w i l l i n g to commit themselves 70  on the security provisions of the B r i t i s h p l a n ,  and on A p r i l 27  the Bureau decided that the General Commission should proceed to the f i r s t reading of Part I I (Effectives and Materiel). The discussion of Part I I  produced a Franco-German confrontation.  Nadolny urged that the standardization of European armies be considered by the Permanent Disarmament Commission, proposed amendments so as to inolude trained reserves as effectives and l i m i t overseas forces stationed near the home country and demanded that Germany be authorized to own a l l arms permitted to other states. And i n the E f f e c t i v e s Committee, the German delegate opposed the i n c l u s i o n of the Sohutzpolizei i n e f f e c t i v e s . H a s s i g l i and Eden opposed the German amendments vigorously, and, s i g n i f i o a n t l y , no delegation supported Nadolny.  73,  Nadolny's aim was to put forward Germany's maximum demands i n the hope that concessions might be gained on the section of the B r i t i s h plan r e l a t i n g to m a t e r i e l . Although the Germans wanted t o r e t a i n a modified Reichswehr i f possible, they had no objection i n p r i n c i p l e to a standardized army based on conscription. Their amendments were 72  put forward almost s o l e l y as a bargaining counter. The proposal f o r the standardization of Continental armies was one of the essential p i l l a r s of the MacDonald p l a n , and both B r i t a i n and France regarded i t as a sine qua non of any convention. Consequently, the B r i t i s h Cabinet reacted to the German demands by demanding a  133  " r e a s o n a b l e " agreement amendments. On May  5,  on e f f e c t i v e s and t h e w i t h d r a w a l  of the  a f t e r t h e B r i t i s h d e l e g a t i o n i n Geneva had  t r i e d , u n s u c c e s s f u l l y , t o r e a s o n w i t h t h e Germans, Eden was  instructed  t o m a i n t a i n t h e B r i t i s h p o s i t i o n even i f i t meant b r e a k i n g up  the  Conference  and  - f o r i f a b r e a k o c c u r r e d , Germany w o u l d be b l a m e d  B r i t a i n w o u l d not have t o d i s c l o s e h e r own  demands f o r a t w e n t y  per  73 cent i n c r e a s e i n e f f e c t i v e s . Indeed, i t appears was  t h a t t h e Government b e l i e v e d t h a t disarmament  an i m p o s s i b i l i t y ,  f o r i n a m e e t i n g on May  on Disarmament a c c e d e d  Geneva f o r a c o n s i d e r a b l e e x p a n s i o n  t h e Mar  Office,  and d e c i d e d t o p r e s s a t  in British  c o n s t r u c t e d i n accordance  armaments.  Additional  w i t h a programme d e v i s e d  and t h e number o f e f f e c t i v e s was  180,000J,tos>230,000 men  Committee  t o t h e demands o f t h e S e r v i c e D e p a r t m e n t s  r a t h e r than the advice of the F o r e i g n O f f i c e  t a n k s were t o be  5 the Cabinet  t o be  - e x c l u d i n g t h e 60,000 b a s e d  by  i n c r e a s e d from  i n I n d i a . The  demands were s u r e t o r a i s e an o u t c r y a t Geneva, e s p e c i a l l y  as  B r i t i s h t r o o p s were l o n g - s e r v i c e p r o f e s s i o n a l s whereas t h e  standardized  armies  o f E u r o p e w o u l d be f o r m e d o f c o n s c r i p t s . And  t h e Government adhered  t o L o r d Londonderry's  t o oppose t h e c o m p l e t e a b o l i t i o n  s i x t y per into  arguments and  o f bombing and  the a i r s t r e n g t h of the other Great  i n a i r armaments,  advocate  continued  reductions i n  Powers t o t h e B r i t i s h  l e v e l - or  c e n t b e l o w i t i f t h e demands o f t h e D o m i n i o n s were  account.  At Geneva, a p r o v i s i o n a l compromise c o n c e r n i n g m i l i t a r i z e d was  taken  concluded  on May  3,  a l l o w i n g every state a f i x e d quota  p o l i c e , t h e number b e i n g p r o p o r t i o n a t e t o t h e e f f e c t i v e s . But  no  agreement was  reached  s i z e of the  on r e s e r v i s t s ,  of  police such  country's  overseas  134  forces and the standardization of Continental armies as the Germans refused to withdraw their amendments to the draft convention."^ On May 5» i n a manoeuvre for position at the Conference, the German Ambassadors i n London, Washington and Rome made demarches suggesting that Germany would consider the question of standardization i f the General Commission continued the f i r s t reading of the other sections of the draft convention,  76  and three days later, General Blomberg, 77  the Reichswehr Minister, made a similar suggestion.  On May 8 and 9,  the German demand for a discussion of materiel was opposed by Eden and Massigli, who pressed for an immediate decision on effectives. Hugh Wilson proposed that Nadolny should make a general reservation on effectives or propose definite amendments on standardization, but the German delegate refused. The Bureau of the Conference could only agree that private discussions between the Great Powers should take plaoe. Between May 9 and 11, Eden and Nadolny held a number of conversations to t r y to break the deadlock. On May 9, "the German delegate agreed i n principle to the "transformation" of the Reichswehr over a period of time i f Germany reoeived concessions on reservists and oolonial troops and was accorded immediate and complete equality i n materiel. Eden refused to consider such a scheme, and by May 11 Nadolny had reduced his demands for materiel to "samples" and equality i n 79  p r i n c i p l e . O n May 10, the B r i t i s h Cabinet instructed Eden to continue opposing a postponement of a decision on effectives and to reveal Germany's demands to the other Powers so that the Reich could  86  be blamed for any break i n the Conference.  135  The  B r i t i s h M i n i s t e r s were u n s u r e o f German i n t e n t i o n s and  as u n s u r e o f t h e c o r r e c t  course t o f o l l o w , except  t h a t t h e y hoped t o  keep t h e R e i c h on t h e d e f e n s i v e . Simon even d e i g n e d advioe  on t h e s i t u a t i o n ,  the Rhine bridgeheads  Belgium.  Lord Hailsham,  if  Germany r e f u s e d t h e  Conference,  t o ask  r e c e i v i n g the r e p l y that B r i t a i n  "reoccupy"  Temperley's should  i n c o n j u n c t i o n with Prance  i n a L o r d s d e b a t e o f May  o f f e r s made t o h e r and  almost  left  11,  and  suggested  that  t h e Disarmament  t h e T r e a t y o f V e r s a i l l e s w o u l d r e m a i n i n f o r c e and  any  c o n t r a v e n t i o n o f i t s disarmament p r o v i s i o n s w o u l d b r i n g s a n c t i o n s  82 into operation. the Cabinet  But  whatever t h e i n d e o i s i o n s o f the v a r i o u s M i n i s t e r s ,  Committee on Disarmament came t o t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t  Germany's demands were b a s i c a l l y a manoeuvre f o r p o s i t i o n and t h a t Eden's i n s t r u c t i o n s o f May  10  s h o u l d r e m a i n unchanged, e x c e p t  for a  83 few  a d d i t i o n s , t e l e g r a p h e d t o Geneva on May  Government had  decided to c a l l  q u a n d r y as t o t h e n e x t rather than  12.  The  British  Germany's b l u f f - t h o u g h t h e y were i n a  s t e p i f Germany w i t h d r e w f r o m t h e  Conference  aocede t o B r i t a i n ' s demands r e g a r d i n g e f f e c t i v e s ;  were a s t o n i s h e d by H a i l s h a m * s o u t b u r s t i n t h e L o r d s , and an e v a s i v e answer when a s k e d  they  Simon gave  i n t h e Commons w h e t h e r t h e M i n i s t e r f o r  84 War's s p e e c h On May front  represented Cabinet  11, Germany made a l a s t  of B r i t a i n , Prance,  policy. attempt  t o break the  I t a l y and A m e r i c a .  The  opposing  German Ambassadors  i n London and W a s h i n g t o n made f u r t h e r demarches s u g g e s t i n g t h a t agreement h a d settlement  p r a c t i c a l l y been r e a c h e d  c o u l d be  a t Geneva and t h a t a  a r r i v e d a t i f Germany was  final  allowed ^samples" of  h i t h e r t o - f o r b i d d e n m a t e r i e l , b u t t h e demarches came t o n o t h i n g  as  136  o n l y t h e I t a l i a n s w o u l d agree f u r t h e r attempt  t o t h e demand f o r " s a m p l e s " .  t o e x e r t p r e s s u r e on t h e  p u b l i s h e d an a r t i c l e  In  ?  a  o t h e r Powers, N e u r a t h  i n t h e German p r e s s demanding c o m p l e t e  and  p r a c t i c a l a p p l i c a t i o n of e q u a l i t y of r i g h t s i n c l u d i n g the r i g h t  to 86  b u i l d an a i r f o r c e i f t h e But,  o t h e r Powers were a l l o w e d t o k e e p  theirs.  l i k e t h e demarches i n London and W a s h i n g t o n , t h i s move  was  u n s u c c e s s f u l and h a d t h e r e v e r s e e f f e c t t o t h a t i n t e n d e d , f o r on f o l l o w i n g day P a u l - B o n c o u r p u b l i s h e d a s t a t e m e n t  i n the French  the  press  8?  on s i m i l a r  l i n e s t o Hailsham's speech  i n the Lords.  Eden  1  informed  H e n d e r s o n t h a t h i s t a l k s w i t h N a d o l n y had b r o k e n down, and the Bureau decided t o o a l l May  on May  12  a m e e t i n g o f t h e G e n e r a l Commission f o r  15, when t h e B r i t i s h p r o p o s a l s r e g a r d i n g m a t e r i e l w o u l d  be  88 discussed " i n a very broad  sense"  and no amendments  allowed.  L a t e r , t h e m e e t i n g o f t h e G e n e r a l Commission was  postponed  for  days,  a special  meeting  b e c a u s e t h e German C a b i n e t  o f t h e R e i c h s t a g f o r May statement On May  of 16,  17  decided t o c a l l  so t h a t H i t l e r  c o u l d make an  official  policy. i n an attempt  r e l a t i o n s , Roosevelt  t o ease the t e n s i o n i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l  addressed  an a p p e a l t o t h e Heads o f S t a t e o f  t h e n a t i o n s r e p r e s e n t e d a t t h e Disarmament C o n f e r e n c e . object  two  of the Conference,  he d e c l a r e d , was  the  o f a l l o f f e n s i v e weapons, e s p e c i a l l y w a r p l a n e s ,  complete  The  ultimate  elimination  heavy m o b i l e  artillery,  t a n k s and p o i s o n g a s , w h i l e t h e immediate o b j e c t i v e was  a  based  substantial  on t h e MacDonald p l a n p r o v i d i n g f o r immediate and  arms r e d u c t i o n s . As an i n t e r i m measure, he  suggested  convention  that a l l states  137  should l i m i t t h e i r armaments s t r i c t l y to the l e v e l s stipulated i n e x i s t i n g t r e a t i e s and enter into a "solemn and d e f i n i t e "  non-aggression  pact by which they would reaffirm t h e i r obligations to reduce and l i m i t arms and agree to send no armed forces across t h e i r f r o n t i e r s . I f "any strong nation" refused to j o i n i n these concerted e f f o r t s f o r peace i f Germany began to rearm - "the C i v i l i s e d World would know where the 89 responsibility lay?. Although B r i t a i n was pleased that the Americans were exerting pressure on Germany to r e f r a i n from rearming and accept the MacDonald plan as the basis of the f i r s t disarmament convention, the Foreign Office d i s l i k e d the clause forbidding the sending of armed forces across f r o n t i e r s f o r fear that i t might interfere with " p o l i c e measures" i n Aden and India and with steps such as the sending of troops to Shanghai. Even after the Amerioans explained that the contemplated arrangements applied only to neighbouring countries and were subject to e x i s t i n g treaty r i g h t s , the B r i t i s h reply to the Roosevelt message was non-oommittal. More pleasing to the B r i t i s h Government was the fact that the Americans now intended to consult with other Powers i f the agreements suggested by the American 90 President were v i o l a t e d . The day a f t e r the Roosevelt message, H i t l e r made h i s statement of p o l i c y i n the Reichstag, discussing the i n t e r n a t i o n a l c r i s i s i n a r a t i o n a l manner and proclaiming h i s "earnest desire" to avoid war. At the same time, h i s speech indicated l i t t l e change i n German p o l i c y , f o r he oontinued to demand "at least q u a l i t a t i v e " equality and oppose the i n c l u s i o n of p a r a - m i l i t a r y organizations and the exclusion of  138  trained reserves t o he the  i n the  c a l c u l a t i o n o f e f f e c t i v e s . He  a t t a i n e d through the  disarmament  rearmament o f Germany and  p o s s i b l e b a s i s f o r the  of other  the  that  same t i m e and  same d e g r e e as t h e disarmament  r e g a r d s s e c u r i t y , Germany was  Roosevelt's suggestion  and  and  Reichswehr took  the  Chancellor  of " b r i n g i n g the U n i t e d  r e l a t i o n s a s a g u a r a n t o r o f p e a c e " . Gn  the  of  willing  f u r t h e r o b l i g a t i o n s g e n e r a l l y a g r e e d upon,  they b e n e f i t t e d a l l nations,  "a  of f i v e years f o r  changes i n t h e  t o the  h e a v i l y - a r m e d s t a t e s . As  t o u n d e r t a k e any  any  as  than  disarmament q u e s t i o n  agreed i n p r i n c i p l e t o the t r a n s i t i o n a l p e r i o d  plaoe at the  Powers r a t h e r  a c c e p t e d t h e MacDonald p l a n  s o l u t i o n o f " the  implementing i t provided  wanted e q u a l i t y  provided  "warmly welcomed" States  other  i n t o European  hand, any  attempt  t o f o r c e Germany i n t o s i g n i n g a n o t h e r d i k t a t on t h e disarmament  issue  91 would be  c o u n t e r e d by  Gn May  22,  p o l i c y had N a d o l n y had  withdrawn h i s p r o p o s a l  Norman D a v i s ,  c o u n t s . H e n d e r s o n announced t h a t f o r r e f e r r i n g the  standardization  in a full  statement  of American p o l i c y , d e c l a r e d  G e n e r a l Commission t h a t h i s c o u n t r y "would c o n s u l t  "would r e f r a i n f r o m any  effort  against  with  action tending  that the  t o defeat  a  and to  other  t o peace, w i t h a view t o a v e r t i n g  s t a t e s w h i c h had  obligations" provided a g g r e s s o r had  British  a r m i e s t o t h e Permanent Disarmament Commission,  s t a t e s i n case of a t h r e a t and  League.  f u r t h e r d e v e l o p m e n t s seemed t o i n d i o a t e t h a t  b e e n s u c c e s s f u l on two  of C o n t i n e n t a l  the  a w i t h d r a w a l from t h e  conflict,"  collective  violated their international A m e r i c a n Government a g r e e d t h a t  b e e n d e f i n e d * c o r r e c t l y . Then, a f t e r r e i t e r a t i n g  the the  139  disarmament aims outlined i n the Roosevelt message the American delegate accepted the MacDonald Plan "wholeheartedly", pledged American support f o r i t and proposed an amendment to make f o r " e f f e c t i v e , 92  automatic and continuous" supervision of the convention. The withdrawal of the German proposal on the standardization of Continental armies and the declaration by Davis had important consequences. Germany's acceptance of the p r i n c i p l e o f standardization meant that B r i t a i n would be forced to reveal her own demands f o r rearmament, while America's acceptance of the p r i n c i p l e of consultation made i t d i f f i c u l t f o r B r i t a i n t o plead that American p o l i c y made i t impossible f o r her t o enter i n t o new commitments or carry out her obligations under A r t i c l e 16 of the Covenant. Moreover, i t was evident that Prance would ask B r i t a i n t o increase her commitments or reaffirm A r t i c l e 16 of the Covenant f o r although Roosevelt had renounced America's t r a d i t i o n a l p o l i c y of i s o l a t i o n from European p o l i t i o a l a f f a i r s , French M i n i s t e r s s t i l l believed that Prance needed more p o s i t i v e and more automatio guarantees of s e c u r i t y . As T y r r e l l pointed out, unless France f e l t confident that B r i t a i n and America would j o i n i n s e t t i n g a d e f i n i t e l i m i t to German ambitions, she would base her p o l i c y on the fact that i n the l a s t resort she had to be prepared to 93 defend herself a l o n e . ' There was s t i l l a p o s s i b i l i t y of r e c o n c i l i n g French and German claims. French p o l i c y , as decided at a Cabinet meeting of May 2 and reaffirmed on May 20, was to implement the MacDonald F l a n i n two stages, eaoh l a s t i n g four years. During the f i r s t stage, France would stop a l l construction of materiel over 155 «nm c a l i b r e , l i m i t her tanks  14©  •to a global tonnage of 3,000 tons (the e x i s t i n g figure being 12,000 tons), and reduce her naval and m i l i t a r y a i r c r a f t by f i f t y per cent on condition that agreement could be reached on budgetary c o n t r o l , the a b o l i t i o n or " s t r i c t supervision" of the private trade i n and manufacture of arms and the a p p l i c a t i o n of sanctions i f the convention was v i o l a t e d . The supervisory mechanism would be continuous and automatic, and provided i t proved s a t i s f a c t o r y , i n the second period Prance would either destroy her prohibited materiel or hand i t over 94 to the League.  French Ministers were concerned l e s t Germany might  regain complete freedom to rearm i f the MacDonald plan was implemented without amendment ^** but i t seems that a reaffirmation of A r t i c l e 16 t  of the Covenant would have r a l l i e d them to the B r i t i s h draft convention. 96 Certainly the Foreign Office suspected t h i s . There were no adequate reasons why B r i t a i n should not take t h i s course. There was l i t t l e p o s s i b i l i t y of a European war i n the immediate future,»despite anxiety at the r i s e of H i t l e r , while the American statements of May 16 and 22 had freed B r i t a i n from the worry that enforcement of sanctions by the Royal Navy would have led to an Anglo-American breach. Outside Europe, there was no r e a l danger that sanctions would be applied; the security of the Americas, for good or bad, was ensured by the Monroe Doctrine and had never been dependent on the League; most of A f r i c a and A s i a were c o l o n i a l t e r r i t o r i e s , where security was ensured by the Colonial Power; and the Manchurian c r i s i s had shown that i t was impossible f o r the League t o act i n the Far East without the active co-operation of America, which was not forthcoming. In these circumstances, i t was unreasonable  141  f o r B r i t a i n t o c l a i m t h a t her navy would he used c o n t i n u a l l y f o r a v e r t i n g c o n f l i c t round the w o r l d , n e g l e c t i n g i t s i m p e r i a l r o l e and c a u s i n g expense. C e r t a i n l y M u s s o l i n i had c o l o n i a l ambitions i n North A f r i c a , e s p e c i a l l y i n A b y s s i n i a , but i n 1933  he was more  concerned about t h e H i t l e r government than h i s own a m b i t i o n s , and B r i t a i n and Prance might w e l l have n e g o t i a t e d an agreement w i t h the Duce, exchanging support f o r I t a l y i n North A f r i c a f o r support of a disarmament convention c o n t r o l l i n g Germany. A r e a f f i r m a t i o n of A r t i c l e 16 a l s o o f f e r e d p o s i t i v e advantages t o B r i t a i n . New assuranoes of support were necessary i f Prance was t o adopt a more f l e x i b l e p o l i c y towards disarmament and t h e German problem - t h e Locarno T r e a t y s t r u c k French o p i n i o n more f o r the safeguards and d e l a y s which i t a f f o r d e d t h e guarant or Powers a g a i n s t t h e immediate f u l f i l m e n t of t h e i r m i l i t a r y o b l i g a t i o n s t h a n f o r the 97  d i s t i n c t n e s s of t h e guarantee t o defend France.  A new assurance t o  France would a l s o be a l o g i c a l development of the p o l i c y of the "Rhine f r o n t i e r " , w h i l e t h e e f f i c a c y of a c l o s e Anglo-French r e l a t i o n s h i p had been shown by t h e success of t h e i r j o i n t pressure on Germany d u r i n g the c r i s i s c o n c e r n i n g t h e s t a n d a r d i z a t i o n of C o n t i n e n t a l armies. Moreover, i f B r i t a i n intended t o appease German g r i e v a n c e s , the best method of d o i n g so was t o ensure t h a t Germany's armaments were c o n t r o l l e d so t h a t t h e R e i c h would be i n no p o s i t i o n t o t h r e a t e n other s t a t e s m i l i t a r i l y i f her r e v i s i o n i s t demands were not accepted; and the most d e s i r a b l e , i f not the o n l y , way of a r r i v i n g at a s a t i s f a c t o r y convention was f o r B r i t a i n t o g i v e new assurances t o France. The B r i t i s h Government was s t i l l u n w i l l i n g t o g i v e these assurances. MacDonald and Simon continued t o base t h e i r p o l i c y on t h e "harmony of  142  i n t e r e s t s " premise, and they also feared the effects that 98 additional guarantees would have on public opinion.  Thus, i n renewed  discussions on the Pour-Power Pact, Simon refused to accept a French amendment r e q u i r i n g an examination by the four Powers of proposals "tending to give f u l l e f f i c a c y to A r t i c l e s 10, 16 and 19 of the Covenant with a view to t h e i r ultimate a p p l i c a t i o n " . The Foreign Secretary would agree only to examine " a l l proposals r e l a t i v e to the methods and procedures calculated, i n case of need, to give due effect 99  to these a r t i c l e s " . " Yet even t h i s he believed to be " a great effort to meet French s e n t i m e n t " . ^ Speaking to the General Commission on 1  May 22, he disappointed the French by f a i l i n g to respond to the abandonment of the t r a d i t i o n a l American p o l i c y regarding n e u t r a l i t y . ^ 1  1  Then, on May 26, he t o l d the Commons that B r i t a i n had no intention r  of j o i n i n g "the innermost c i r c l e of s e c u r i t y " , and while emphasizing the importance of Davis' pronouncement of May 22, he gave no i n d i c a t i o n that B r i t a i n would enter into any further commitments i n Europe or would be w i l l i n g to take part i n an a p p l i c a t i o n of economic 102 sanctions. The French suspected that Roosevelt's p o l i c y might be unacceptable to Congress, and the f a i l u r e of B r i t a i n to respond to the American statements of May 16 and 22 made them more anxious f o r t h e i r s e c u r i t y . Consequently, they upheld the decisions of the Council of Ministers of May 2, and on May 23 Paul-Boncour outlined t h i s p o l i c y to the General Commission - exoept f o r the p o s s i b i l i t y of d i v i d i n g the convention into two four-year p e r i o d s . F r e n o h p o l i c y hardened even more i n the following week, f o r on May 28 the American Senate Committee on Foreign  143  Relations secured an amendment to a r e s o l u t i o n empowering the President to declare an embargo on the export of arms or munitions of war to the effect that any p r o h i b i t i o n of export or sale of arms would apply t o a l l parties i n a dispute or c o n f l i c t . Moreover, by June 1, i t had become d e a r that B r i t a i n wanted to avoid a discussion of the French amendments f o r continuous and automatic supervision of the disarmament. ^" Thus, because B r i t a i n f a i l e d to give adequate support 10  to France, the gap between the French and German points of view f a i l e d t o narrow, making the conclusion of a disarmament convention even more d i f f i c u l t . After the withdrawal of the German amendments on the standardization of Continental armies, many delegations hoped that a convention might be negotiated before the World Economic Conference opened on June 12, but i t soon became c l e a r that negotiation of a convention i n such a short time was improbable. Progress i n the General Commission was slow, and to a great extent the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y lay with B r i t a i n . On May 25 and 29, B r i t a i n , along with I t a l y opposed the d e f i n i t i o n of aggression drawn up by Nicholas P o l i t i s , the Greek delegate and Vice-President of the Conference. ^ Based on L i t v i n o v ' s suggestion of February 6, 10  P o l i t i s * proposal defined an aggressor as the f i r s t state to commit any of a number of actions - a declaration of war, an invasion or attack by armed forces (with or without a declaration of war) on another state's, t e r r i t o r y , vessels or a i r c r a f t , a naval blockade, the support of armed bands invading another s t t e , or a r e f u s a l to take measures a  to deprive such armed bands of a l l assistance or p r o t e c t i o n . Eden opposed t h i s d e f i n i t i o n because i t was "too r i g i d " and d i d not take "other circumstances ' i n t o account - i n r e a l i t y because America had 1  144  not agreed to i t , and because, l e g a l l y , B r i t a i n would be prevented from defending her imperial i n t e r e s t s by means of expeditions such as the despatch of a "defence force" to Shanghai i n January 1927.^^ In the end, Eden, Dovgalevsky, Madariaga (the Spanish delegate to the Disarmament Conference) and P o l i t i s were charged with formulating a more e l a s t i c d e f i n i t i o n (using the P o l i t i s proposal as a basis) before the second reading of the convention. Certainly t h i s was essential  if  agreement was to be reached, as both America and I t a l y , and to a lesser extent Germany, supported B r i t a i n , but even when Davis produced, i n Eden's words, an "innocuous" d e f i n i t i o n , Simon refused to accept i t , 107 merely r e f e r r i n g i t to the Cabinet Committee on Disarmament.  The  B r i t i s h attitude on t h i s question disappointed Prance, because an i n e l a s t i c d e f i n i t i o n of aggression f a c i l i t a t e d the prompt application of A r t i c l e 16 of the Covenant against " g u i l t y " p a r t i e s . On the question of a i r armaments, B r i t a i n was even more responsible f o r the lack of progress. The debate i n the General Commission on May 27 showed that most delegates were i n favour of the t o t a l a b o l i t i o n of m i l i t a r y a v i a t i o n , possibly i n conjunction with the i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of c i v i l a v i a t i o n , and opinion was almost 108 unanimously i n favour of the immediate a b o l i t i o n of bombing.  The  main obstacle t o progress was the provision of the draft convention f o r the retention of bombing " f o r police purposes i n o u t l y i n g d i s t r i c t s " . B r i t a i n ' s insistence on t h i s clause was sure to lead to s i m i l a r claims by Prance and I t a l y , and, i f these two Powers were allowed bombers, Germany would claim bombers. B r i t a i n ' s claim was l i t t l e more than an attempt by the A i r Staff to prevent the " a b o l i t i o n " of the Royal A i r Poroe, despite Eden's argument that bombing was a more  145 economic, i f not a more humane, method of p o l i c i n g "inaccessible mountain d i s t r i c t s , sparsely inhabited, where w i l d and armed h i l l t r i b e s had sometimes:ai passionate appetite f o r disturbing the t r a n q u i l l i t y of t h e i r neighbours"• Prance had s i m i l a r problems i n her empire - and a larger a i r force to deal with them - yet she was w i l l i n g to accept the complete a b o l i t i o n of both bombing and m i l i t a r y a v i a t i o n . The delegates at Geneva must have wondered how B r i t a i n had kept the peace i n her empire before the development of aviation and also why the B r i t i s h Government considered bombing to be rather less inhumane i f the sufferers of bombing r a i d s were h i l l tribesmen rather than Europeans. B r i t a i n ' s claim was so spurious that when Eden arrived i n Geneva, he had no idea how to j u s t i f y i t 109 and had to r e f e r back to Simon f o r i n s t r u c t i o n s .  " O n l y Iraq,  P e r s i a and Siam supported B r i t a i n i n the General Commission, but Eden refused to withdraw the B r i t i s h claims. This was especially unfortunate because Nadolny modified h i s opposition to the i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of c i v i l a v i a t i o n i n the event of the complete a b o l i t i o n of m i l i t a r y a v i a t i o n , declaring that "Germany was prepared to go as f a r as possible to prevent the use of c i v i l a i r c r a f t for m i l i t a r y purposes". I t was evident that Japan wanted to r e t a i n bombing, but i t was probable that she would a l t e r her p o s i t i o n i f her sphere of 110 influence i n Manchukuo and North China was recognized.  Thus,  because of the B r i t i s h refusal to accept the complete p r o h i b i t i o n of bombing and agree to the immediate a b o l i t i o n of m i l i t a r y a v i a t i o n , the discussion of the a i r chapter of the draft convention was inconclusive. B r i t a i n also hindered progress on the "no-force" declaration, which was discussed as part of the draft European security pact formulated  146  by the Security Committee of the Conference and proposed i n the General 111 Commission on Hay 30.  P e r s i a , Turkey and Afghanistan urged that the  obligation not to resort to force should apply to a l l countries, and Russia and Prance accepted the suggestion. Norman Davis declared that i t was "not incompatible" with Roosevelt's suggestion f o r a universal non-aggression pact, and agreement on t h i s point seemed p o s s i b l e . But the B r i t i s h Cabinet had already decided (on February 17) that a universal "no-force" declaration might i n t e r f e r e with operations such as the despatch of troops to Shanghai i n 1927, and. Eden was instructed to assert that a universal declaration would "destroy the entire 112 usefulness"'  6fv;the  "no-force" proposal.  As t h i s would have given  the impression of intransigence, Eden eventually suggested to the General Commission t h a t , i n view of Davis* statement and the fact that a "no—force" pact was to some extent dependent on the d e f i n i t i o n of aggression, the whole question of a pact should be reconsidered and l e f t open u n t i l the seoond reading of the draft convention. To a great extent, therefore, B r i t a i n was holding up progress towards a disarmament convention, and Eden came near to admitting i t on May 31, when he telegraphed to Simon that one of the major arguments f o r accepting a proposal by Davis to hold five-Power discussions before the second reading of the convention was that such discussions would 113 postpone "the embarrassments" of a seoond reading.  B r i t i s h policy  on the d e f i n i t i o n of aggression, a i r armaments and the "no-force" pact had slowed down the work of the Conference considerably, and the Government's plans f o r increases i n the number of tanks and effectives were sure to retard progress even further when (or i f ) they were  147  r e v e a l e d . Another  q u e s t i o n on w h i c h B r i t a i n r e t a r d e d p r o g r e s s was  that  o f t h e s u p e r v i s i o n o f t h e convention. Prance had l o n g maintained  that  strict  June 1,  s u p e r v i s i o n was a s i n e q u a non o f a c o n v e n t i o n , and on  supported by America,  she p r o p o s e d  p l a n making s u p e r v i s i o n "continuous  amendments t o t h e MacDonald  and a u t o m a t i c " . But  Londonderry  114 reserved B r i t a i n ' s automatic  o p i n i o n on them.  and c o n t i n u o u s  B r i t a i n h a d a l w a y s opposed  s u p e r v i s i o n i n t h e p a s t - f o r no adequate  r e a s o n - and Simon saw no m e r i t i n c h a n g i n g B r i t i s h p o l i c y on t h i s . . . 115 point. The it  Government's f e a r t h a t  a u n i v e r s a l " n o - f o r c e " p a c t w o u l d make  i l l e g a l t o c a r r y out c e r t a i n measures o f " i m p e r i a l d e f e n c e " was  incomprehensible. Other were w i l l i n g t o a c c e p t  imperial  s t a t e s - n o t a b l y Prance  and A m e r i c a  -  such a p a c t , b e l i e v i n g t h a t t h e formulas, p r o p o s e d  116 o f f e r e d no r e a l h i n d r a n c e s t o i m p e r i a l In  any c a s e , i t was u n l i k e l y t h a t  a c t i o n i n cases o f n e c e s s i t y .  an i n t e r n a t i o n a l body w o u l d d e f i n e  B r i t a i n a s an a g g r e s s o r f o r u n d e r t a k i n g o p e r a t i o n s such a s t h e d e s p a t c h of  t r o o p s t o Shanghai i n  1927» e v e n t h o u g h o p e r a t i o n s o f t h i s t y p e were  incompatible with both the l e t t e r The  and t h e s p i r i t  of a "no-force" pact.  Government's a n x i e t y t o e n s u r e t h e l e g a l i t y  a c t i o n s was h y p o c r i t i c a l ,  f o r i n December 1932  t h a t B r i t a i n would n o t f u l f i l  h e r war debt  i t h a d b e e n announced  obligations t o the United  S t a t e s . B r i t i s h M i n i s t e r s were a l s o h y p o c r i t i c a l and A m e r i c a  of i t s international  i n e x p e c t i n g Prance  t o make c o n c e s s i o n s r e g a r d i n g German e q u a l i t y  s e c u r i t y r e s p e c t i v e l y while they themselves concessions i n the general  interest.  and E u r o p e a n  r e f u s e d t o make  similar  148  Progress towards a convention was n e g l i g i b l e during the last week of May, and on June 1 the General Commission decided to adjourn as soon as the f i r s t reading of the B r i t i s h draft convention had ended. Henderson was i n v i t e d to undertake "any necessary private negotiations" to overcome the main d i f f i c u l t i e s facing the Conference before the second reading of the convention and the delegates decided to reconvene on July 3 at the l a t e s t . Once they had settled future procedure, they continued the f i r s t reading of the convention, the discussions revealing a considerable amount of agreement on the a b o l i t i o n of chemical warfare and the p u b l i c i t y of national defence expenditure but disagreement on the regulation of the trade i n and manufacture of arms and the p o s s i b i l i t y of introducing a global l i m i t a t i o n of defence expenditure. On June 7t ^  e  MacDonald plan was accepted as the basis 117  of a convention, and on June 8 the Conference adjourned.  1  In the four months since the General Commission had reconvened i n February, l i t t l e p r a c t i c a l progress had been made. A disarmament convention on the basis of the French plan of November 14 1932 was a p o s s i b i l i t y u n t i l B r i t a i n f a i l e d t o support i t on the grounds that the Government could not assume further Continental commitments. Although Ralph Wigram suggested that B r i t a i n wanted to collaborate " i n t i m a t e l y and a c t i v e l y " with France on the basis of the French plan, the p o l i c y of entering into no new commitments negated the suggestion i n the eyes of the French. Professions of goodwill and a desire to mobilize world opinion against an aggressor were of l i t t l e use to the French, who needed to control the might of Germany by gaining new a l l i e s , strengthening the "organization of peace" or  149  maintaining superior m i l i t a r y f o r c e s . Although B r i t a i n had already guaranteed the Franco-German f r o n t i e r by the Locarno Treaty and had adhered to the Covenant of the League, the French were suspicious of B r i t i s h p o l i c y and were worried about t h e i r security because the Locarno guarantees were not automatic and the B r i t i s h Government would not r e a f f i r m A r t i c l e 16 of the Covenant. To keep Germany i n check, therefore, the Frenoh Government thought i t necessary to maintain m i l i t a r y s u p e r i o r i t y u n t i l B r i t a i n gave increased assuranoes of support or agreed to a strengthening of the organization of peace. I f B r i t a i n had been w i l l i n g to r e a f f i r m A r t i c l e 16 and enter i n t o a general consultative pact, France would have been more w i l l i n g to reduce her armaments and a disarmament convention based on the French plan might w e l l have been negotiated. B r i t a i n ' s r e f u s a l t o give a d d i t i o n a l guarantees - or reaffirm those she had already given - was incomprehensible, i f not i l l o g i c a l , as the Government d i s l i k e d the new German regime and wanted to move closer to France to maintain the "Rhine f r o n t i e r " . Moreover, the extra guarantees suggested by France were acceptable to Germany since they were applicable i n the event of a French attack upon Germany as well as a German attack on France. One faotor i n the Government's decision was that B r i t a i n might f i n d herself involved i n East European troubles o r i g i n a t i n g i n the "unsatisfactory" t e r r i t o r i a l arrangements of the V e r s a i l l e s Treaty, but i n the event of an East European c r i s i s , B r i t a i n was certain to be involved i n negotiations f o r a settlement — and a close accord with France would have enabled the Government to press Franoe and her a l l i e s into a more c o n c i l i a t o r y p o l i c y . Moreover, i f a peaceful solution to  150  the German problem was to be found, i t was necessary f o r B r i t a i n to p a r t i c i p a t e more d i r e c t l y i n the European security system. A B r i t i s h alignment with Prance could force the Reich i n t o accepting a disarmament agreement imposing l i m i t s on German power - as the question of the standardization of Continental armies demonstrated - but i f Prance and B r i t a i n could not agree on the conditions to be imposed on Germany, the Germans would merely increase t h e i r demands and attempt to play off the two Western Powers against each other. But the B r i t i s h Government was reluctant t o accept that additional and more effective seourity guarantees were necessary f o r a solution of the disarmament problem*. The consultative pact proposed i n the B r i t i s h draft convention of March 16 was less efficacious than the one proposed i n the French p l a n , and even after Roosevelt had discarded the t r a d i t i o n a l American p o l i c y regarding the n e u t r a l i t y of the seas and declared himself i n favour of consultations i f the Kellogg Pact was breached, the Prime M i n i s t e r refused to r e a f f i r m A r t i c l e 16 of the Covenant or consider automatic and continuous supervision of a disarmament convention. The best, i f not only, method of f a c i l i t a t i n g disarmament was for B r i t a i n to mediate between France and Germany. But the Governments main aim was to avoid r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r a breakdown of the Conference. MacDonald and Simon were reluctant to place a draft convention before the General Commission, and even when they d i d decide to take t h i s step, they had l i t t l e idea as to what to do next. They might have t r i e d to i n i t i a t e immediate negotiations on the basis of the draft 118  convention - as Temperley and Eden suggested  - but during the  151  Easter adjournment of the Conference they held few conversations with other Powers, except i n connection with M u s s o l i n i ' s proposal for a Pour-Power Pact. After the Easter adjournment, the Government d i d follow a more p o s i t i v e p o l i c y f o r a time and forced Germany i n t o accepting the standardization of Continental armies. But despite t h i s success, the B r i t i s h Ministers f a i l e d to draw the inference that a s i m i l a r p o l i c y could achieve s i m i l a r r e s u l t s on other problems. Instead, they rested on t h e i r l a u r e l s , ooncealed t h e i r rearmament plans and refused to make concessions on the questions of bombing, the "no-force" pact, the supervision of the convention and the d e f i n i t i o n of aggression. To a large extent, therefore, the B r i t i s h were responsible f o r the slow progress of the Conference during the, four months since February, and progress would continue to be slow u n t i l the Government changed i t s policy.  152  CHAPTER V  DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS AND THE SECOND GERMAN WITHDRAWAL PROM THE DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE June 8 - October 14 1933  At the end of May, to f a c i l i t a t e the rapid conclusion of a convention, Norman Davis had suggested five-Power conversations s i m i l a r to those of December 1932. But Paul-Boncour had objected, ostensibly because such conversations would usurp the p o s i t i o n of the General Commission, i n r e a l i t y because France would be subjected to considerable pressure to d i s a r m . Nevertheless, the French Foreign M i n i s t e r d i d agree to 1  conversations with B r i t a i n and America, and on June 8 Londonderry, Eden and Davis had extensive discussions with Paul-Boncour, Daladier and Massigli at the Quai d'Orsay, c l a r i f y i n g the problems f a c i n g the 2  Conference.  Daladier agreed to "consider" the destruction of a  stipulated amount of materiel i n three years time on condition that the system of supervision and the transformation of the Reiehswehr had both been implemented s a t i s f a c t o r i l y , while Londonderry and Eden acceded to the French demand 'that materiel should not be destroyed u n t i l the efficacy of the system of supervision had been proved and agreed to ask the Cabinet to reconsider i t s attitude towards continuous and automatic supervision. But Franoo-German differences remained unsettled, and i t was u n l i k e l y that they could be resolved unless B r i t a i n took the lead i n producing a settlement  at Geneva. R e a l i z i n g t h i s , Eden urged h i s  superiors to reconsider t h e i r p o l i c y , especially regarding supervision of the convention and the a b o l i t i o n of bombing, and he suggested that they i n i t i a t e private discussions between the Powers during the World  153  Economic Conference i n London.  But MacDonald and Simon were more,  concerned with the Economic Conference than disarmament and were u n w i l l i n g to adopt Eden's suggestions. MacDonald was so unconcerned about the disarmament s i t u a t i o n that he refused to let Henderson use 4  a room i n the b u i l d i n g where the Economic Conference was being h e l d . The r e f u s a l placed Henderson i n the invidious p o s i t i o n of having to roam around the lobbies of the Eoonomic Conference i n h i s attempts to i n i t i a t e discussions with the leaders of the major Powers. Consequently, he accomplished l i t t l e of importance and the Disarmament Conference was again faced with the problem of procedure. The B r i t i s h Government considered three main courses of action immediate negotiations between the Powers ( i n e f f e c t , B r i t i s h mediation between Prance and Germany), an adjournment of the Conference u n t i l the Autumn, and the reconvening of the General Commission to deal with secondary problems coupled with private negotiations on the 5 6 major problems. Eden favoured the f i r s t oourse, Henderson the t h i r d , and either of these two courses offered a reasonable chance of a disarmament settlement. But Simon's mistrust of Germany led him to seek an adjournment of the Conference u n t i l October and he refused to modify the draft convention u n t i l the "acute differences" between France and Germany had  been removed} he also believed that Henderson  should i n i t i a t e the conversations whioh had not taken place during the Eoonomic Conference.  7  The French Government feared that a delay i n reconvening the General Commission might lead Germany to proclaim her freedom af action and undertake a programme of rearmament. Consequently, Paul-Boncour  154  advocated private negotiations between h i s Government, the B r i t i s h , Henderson, P o l i t i s and Benes, and the new French Ambassador i n London, 8 Charles Corbin, made a demarohe to t h i s effect on June 23.  But, a f t e r  some discussion, the French came round to the B r i t i s h point of view regarding procedure, and on June 29 the General Commission adjourned u n t i l October 16, when the second reading of the MacDonald plan was to begin. In the meantime, Henderson was charged with continuing h i s e f f o r t s to reconcile the d i f f e r i n g points of view. The only opposition came from Hungary and Germany, Nadolny suggesting that the Conference was evading decisions on the problems before i t and that the best method of procedure was for the Bureau to prepare the way f o r the second reading of the convention and f o r the various delegations at Geneva to enter i n t o private negotiations whenever a d i f f i c u l t point 9 arose. Nadolny s c r i t i c i s m of the decision to adjourn u n t i l October was 1  j u s t i f i e d , f o r the Conference had been i n progress f o r seventeen months yet had produced few r e s u l t s . The Powers had avoided taking decisions of r e a l importance - t o a great extent because of the ambiguous and negative attitude of the B r i t i s h Government - and the adjournment merely delayed matters. The most r e a l i s t i c method of resolving the disarmament problem was B r i t i s h mediation between Franoe and Germany and the holding of immediate negotiations between the Great Powers, while the alternative p o l i c i e s suggested by Henderson and Nadolny might also have f a c i l i t a t e d a settlement. But MacDonald and Simon, s t i l l b e l i e v i n g that France and Germany should "put t h e i r demands i n such a way that B r i t a i n could say that  155  she supported both s i d e s " , continued to follow t h e i r old p o l i c y of "wait and see" which had f a i l e d to produce r e s u l t s i n the past and offered l i t t l e prospect f o r the f u t u r e . It was certain that Germany would rearm i f an agreement was not concluded at Geneva, and i t was better that any rearmament was controlled and supervised by means of an i n t e r n a t i o n a l convention - and f o r a convention to be negotiated, i t was imperative that B r i t a i n give new assurances of support to Prance t o compensate her f o r the increase i n German power r e s u l t i n g from the concession of equality of r i g h t s . But although they r e a l i z e d that f a i l u r e to conclude a disarmament agreement would lead to German rearmamentj the B r i t i s h Ministers f a i l e d to understand that additional assurances to Prance were a sine qua non of any convention - the r e s u l t of t h e i r basing t h e i r p o l i c y on the existence of an i n t e r n a t i o n a l "harmony of  interests".  Although private negotiations between the Powers had been "vetoed" by the General Commission on June 1, there was nothing to prevent such negotiations t a k i n g place through diplomatic channels. But Simon i n s i s t e d that Henderson should be allowed to undertake h i s "disarmament tour" - though he must have known that there was l i t t l e chance of the tour being a success; Henderson was under the disadvantage of not representing a government, and despite h i s extraordinary s k i l l s as a mediator, s k i l l s whioh had enabled the Conference to overcome several c r i s e s , the leaders of the Powers d i d not confide i n him as f r e e l y as 10  they d i d with government representatives.  Moreover, the B r i t i s h  Government i t s e l f had f a i l e d to establish a rapport with the President  156  of the Conference, mainly because MacDonald had had disagreements with him during the second Labour Government and because the Conservative and Labour parties were so irrevocably opposed to each other on B r i t i s h internal p o l i c y .  1 1  Indeed, considering the h o s t i l e attitude of the  Prime M i n i s t e r and most of h i s colleagues towards the former Foreign Secretary (an attitude that was not reciprocated) i t i s even plausible to suggest that the Government was motivated, p a r t i a l l y at l e a s t , by the hope that Henderson might be blamed f o r a f a i l u r e at Geneva. In preparation f o r h i s v i s i t s to the various European c a p i t a l s , Henderson had formulated a l i s t of the p r i n c i p a l questions B t i l l d i v i d i n g the Conference. These were the "no-force" pact, the d e f i n i t i o n of aggression, supervision and c o n t r o l , sanctions against v i o l a t o r s of the convention, a i r bombardment, m i l i t a r y and naval a v i a t i o n , the a b o l i t i o n and destruction of aggressive land materiel, the size of tanks and a r t i l l e r y , the period of t r a i n i n g f o r short-term  effectives,  c o l o n i a l forces, budgetary l i m i t a t i o n and the manufacture of and 12  trade i n arms.  But though at f i r s t sight the l i s t appeared rather  formidable, i f B r i t a i n put her mind to securing solutions, agreement on most - i f not a l l - of these points was s t i l l possible. On July 10, Henderson departed from London i n pursuance of his disarmament mission, and i n the next fortnight he v i s i t e d P a r i s , Rome, B e r l i n , Prague, Munich and Paris again before returning to England. L i t t l e of importance emerged from h i s discussions. In P a r i s , he was handed an aide-memoire. but i t was l i t t l e more than a r e c a p i t u l a t i o n of the p o l i c y outlined to Londonderry and Eden on June 8 together with some of the amendments to the B r i t i s h draft convention that France  157  had put forward i n the General Commission. "^ During the f i r s t four 1  years of the convention, the "periode d'Spreuve", the manufacture of arms would he l i m i t e d by means of f i x e d quotas and there would be yearly inspections of the armaments of each contracting s t a t e . National defence expenditure would be p u b l i c i z e d , i n preparation f o r f u l l budgetary l i m i t a t i o n i n the second four-year period, and the most powerful materiel would be stocked on national t e r r i t o r y under the control of the League. During the second four-year periofil, t h i s materiel would be handed over to the League, which would decide either to destroy i t i n part or i n f u l l or keep i t f o r use against aggressors. The French were r e f u s i n g to commit themselves either to the destruction of materiel or to a d e f i n i t i o n of the materiel that might be destroyed. In Rome, Henderson found that  MussEolini  was adopting a non-committal  attitude towards disarmament questions u n t i l the results of the President's mission could be evaluated, though Henri de Jouvenel, the French Ambassador, noted that the Duce's opposition to the proposed periode d'epreuve was l e s s strong than expected. ^ In B e r l i n , Henderson 1  was handed a memorandum summarizing German disarmament p o l i c y , and though i t d i f f e r e d l i t t l e from a memorandum given to Londonderry on 15  June 2, i t d i d suggest that progress was possible on some p o i n t s . Germany would agree to a universal "no-force" pact and accept the d e f i n i t i o n of aggression drafted by the Committee on Security Questions. More important, the Reich agreed to periodic and automatic supervision and also to a system of national licences f o r arms f a c t o r i e s and state supervision of them provided these arrangements were accepted generally. On other p o i n t s , German p o l i c y remained the  158  same - the standardization of Continental armies and the progressive destruction of aggressive materiel within f i v e years, p u b l i c i t y (but not l i m i t a t i o n ) of m i l i t a r y expenditure, the complete a b o l i t i o n of bombing and m i l i t a r y and naval a v i a t i o n , "samples" of defensive weapons permitted to other states, and the i n c l u s i o n of trained reserves and overseas troops stationed i n or near the Hetropole i n the c a l c u l a t i o n of e f f e c t i v e s . The Germans were w i l l i n g to forgo t h e i r r i g h t to replace overage c a p i t a l ships with the exception of one k e e l , to be l a i d down i n replacement before December 31 1936. A meeting between Henderson and H i t l e r i n Munich on July 21 brought few r e s u l t s ; H i t l e r i n s i s t e d that Germany could not accept a periode d'^epreuve and the d i v i s i o n of the convention i n t o two four-year periods. 16 Then, aftei* further t a l k s with Benes and Paul-Boncour, IT Henderson returned to London. The main r e s u l t of the President*s mission was a c l a r i f i c a t i o n of the issues facing the Conference, though some progress towards disarmament had been achieved - the Germans had aocepted continuous and automatic supervision and had not excluded control over arms f a c t o r i e s . And i n London, the B r i t i s h had intimated that they intended to withdraw t h e i r opposition to a u n i v e r s a l "no-force" pact and to withdraw t h e i r claim 18 to police bombing i n outlying d i s t r i c t s .  But the main questions  facing the Conference - the German demand f o r a five-year convention and the destruction of aggressive weapons and the French demand f o r a p^riode d'epreuve and an eight-year convention - remained unresolved, though M a s s i g l i intimated to O l i v e r Harvey, F i r s t Secretary to the  159  B r i t i s h Embassy i n P a r i s , that France "had not made her f i n a l 19 concessions"•  y  Another result of Henderson's mission was that  Franoe began to i n s i s t that private negotiations take place between B r i t a i n , France and America before the reconvening of the Conference a f t e r the summer vacation; B r i t a i n agreed, and conversations were 20 scheduled f o r September 18. The French Government's proposal f o r t a l k s with B r i t a i n r e f l e c t e d a desire f o r an Anglo-French rapprochement i n the face of renewed German stridency i n both i n t e r n a l and external p o l i c y . On March 23, the Reichstag had passed an Enabling Act conferring v i r t u a l l y d i c t a t o r i a l powers" on the government f o r four years, and i n the next four months a l l opposition to the H i t l e r regime was crushed. The trade unions, p o l i t i c a l parties and t h e i r subsidiary organizations (including the N a t i o n a l i s t s and Centre) were dissolved and t h e i r property expropriated, and central government was imposed over the whole of Germany. Opponents of the regime, M a r x i s t s , S o c i a l i s t s , Jews, l i b e r a l s and p a c i f i s t s were either j a i l e d or put i n concentration camps. The "Nazi r e v o l u t i o n " had been so complete and swift that on J u l y 11, Dr. F r i c k , the Minister of the I n t e r i o r , declared i t s end. Even more alarming to the Frenoh were German pressure on Austria and renewed reports of/ German rearmament. Austro-German r e l a t i o n s had deteriorated almost continuously since H i t l e r had come to power, and by J u l y they were on the point of breaking down completely. The Nazis attempted to undermine Austrian independence by economic pressure, encouraging the terrorism of the Austrian Nazis, dropping seditious  160  l e a f l e t s from German planes over Austrian t e r r i t o r y and by persistent subversive broadcasting, i n c i t i n g Austrians to r e s i s t the Dollfuss government. The s i t u a t i o n became so strained that on J u l y 24, the Austrian M i n i s t e r i n London asked B r i t a i n to j o i n with Prance and I t a l y to make representations i n B e r l i n demanding an end to the campaign against A u s t r i a . At the beginning of August, after demarches by the three Western Powers, the c r i s i s was s e t t l e d temporarily, H i t l e r agreeing to halt radio propaganda, a i r f l i g h t s and subversive 21 - though not economic - pressure against A u s t r i a .  But European  r e l a t i o n s had been exacerbated, and consequently the chances of a disarmament settlement were not improved. Another simultaneous development adversely affected the disarmament problem - German rearmament, e s p e c i a l l y i n the a i r . On June 24, the Prussian M i n i s t e r of the I n t e r i o r issued a press communique s t a t i n g that u n i d e n t i f i e d f o r e i g n a i r c r a f t had flown over B e r l i n and dropped l e a f l e t s i n s u l t i n g the German Government, and l a t e r i n the same day the German A i r M i n i s t r y demanded " p o l i c e a i r c r a f t " to prevent a recurrence of such attacks and put forward a claim f o r equality i n 22 a i r armaments.  Three days l a t e r , Rumbold reported to Simon that  the Germans had already started b u i l d i n g m i l i t a r y a i r c r a f t i n contravention of the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s and that certain German o f f i c i a l s had admitted t h i s to Group-Captain Herring, the B r i t i s h a i r 23 attache.  On July 14, the Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign  O f f i c e , S i r Robert V a n s i t t a r t , composed a memorandum on the extent of German rearmament, suggesting that B r i t a i n , France and I t a l y  161  should make representations i n B e r l i n , and on July 29 a B r i t i s h demarche was made, asking f o r assurances about German a i r armaments.^  4  Meanwhile, on July 15, GtSring had asked B r i t a i n to supply "twenty-five 25  or f i f t y p o l i c e a i r c r a f t s i m i l a r to those sold to A u s t r i a " .  Actually,  no such sale had taken place, and B r i t a i n refused to supply any a i r c r a f t or parts of a i r c r a f t unless Germany would guarantee that they would not be used i n contravention of the P a r i s A i r Agreement of 26  1926.  The Wilhelmstrasse claimed that Group-Captain Herring had not  been t o l d about plans f o r rearmament and that GBring had not requested police a i r c r a f t - but these claims were not convincing. The effect of m i l i t a n t German p o l i c i e s i n June, July and August was to draw B r i t a i n , Prance and I t a l y much closer together than they had been f o r some time. B r i t a i n and Prance had oo-operated i n presenting a demarche against German subversion i n A u s t r i a and B r i t a i n had kept Prance and I t a l y informed when making representations about German rearmament. The two l a t t e r Powers had agreed to refuse any German requests f o r a i r c r a f t contravening the Paris Agreement of 1926, and Prance had renewed her feelers f o r a Franco-Italian entente. Despite differences concerning the organization of "Danubia", r e l a t i o n s 27  between the two L a t i n Powers improved considerably. The B r i t i s h reaction to German militancy was s i g n i f i c a n t . Since the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s , the Government had urged the appeasing of German grievances, and as recently as A p r i l 10 1933 B r i t i s h Ministers had put pressure on France to r e f r a i n from making representations 28  about alleged i n f r a c t i o n s of the Peace Treaties,  but now, the same  162  B r i t i s h M i n i s t e r s had gone ahead and made t h e i r own representations concerning German rearmament. B r i t i s h p o l i c y regarding both the German and disarmament problems was thus becoming markedly intransigent. Even more s i g n i f i c a n t was the fact that French p o l i c y i n Europe had become more susoeptible to B r i t i s h leadership. France was becoming progressively weaker i n effectives - she had agreed to p a r i t y with Germany - and maintained m i l i t a r y s u p e r i o r i t y over her former enemy by means of more powerful m a t e r i e l . Consequently, she would consent to reduce t h i s s u p e r i o r i t y only i f she was convinced that B r i t a i n would support her i n putting forward a firm offer of disarmament t o Germany and face the consequences of a possible German r e f u s a l . I f B r i t a i n d i d not a l i g n herself with France, i t was u n l i k e l y that any French government could r e s i s t the pressure of public opinion f o r a preliminary inspection of Germany's e x i s t i n g armaments. And a demand f o r such an inspection was sure to meet with a German r e f u s a l and probably cause the breakdown of the Disarmament Conference, f o r c i n g France to r e l y 29 on her own resources to maintain her s e c u r i t y . But although B r i t a i n was sure to play the decisive r o l e at Geneva, I t a l y was the f i r s t country to put forward a solution to the disarmament problem. On September 5, Mussolini presented a ten-point proposal t o the new French Ambassador i n Rome, the Comte de Chambrun.^ Based on 0  the MacDonald plan and the French amendments, i t proposed the destruction within two years of stockpiled chemioal and b a c t e r i o l o g i c a l weapons and the f a c t o r i e s where these weapons were made and envisaged the immediate a b o l i t i o n of chemical and b a c t e r i o l o g i c a l warfare and a i r bombardment against c i v i l i a n populations. There would be a periode d'epreuve of  163  not less than four years, during which states would not increase t h e i r land or a i r armaments or excedd t h e i r present m i l i t a r y budgets, and a f t e r t h i s period had elapsed, the highly-armed states would agree to reduce t h e i r offensive weapons. Armies would be standardized on the basis of the B r i t i s h draft convention, and disarmed Powers would be allowed to have quotas of "purely defensive" weapons by stages. A Permanent Disarmament Commission would be established and control would be p e r i o d i c , permanent and automatic.^ Naval problems 1  would be resolved when the Washington Treaty expired and the Disarmament Conference would reconvene on January 1 1938 to f i x the provisions f o r the second period of the convention. These suggestions offered a r e a l i s t i c compromise between the French and German points of view. France would be accorded her periode d'Hpreuve and continous, automatic supervision of the convention, while Germany was assured of a reduction i n the armaments of the highly-armed states a f t e r four years and would be allowed to obtain quotas of hitherto-forbidden weapons. P o l i t i c a l l y , i t was d i f f i c u l t f o r France to concede "samples", but as Mussolini pointed out, i t was c e r t a i n that Germany was rearming and i t was possible that she 32 already possessed "forbidden" weapons.  Control over German armaments  was advantageous to B r i t a i n , France and I t a l y , the concession of "samples" would i n g r a t i a t e the three Western Powers with l i b e r a l opinion, and even i f Germany v i o l a t e d her obligations during the periode d'epreuve, or l a t e r , the wartime a l l i e s would s t i l l maintain a considerable s u p e r i o r i t y of materiel over the Reich.  164  M u s s o l i n i ' s proposals r e f l e c t e d a considerable change i n h i s disarmament p o l i c y . Previously, he had favoured the German point of view, but the manifestations of German nationalism during the summer of 1933 had modified h i s outlook considerably, especially regarding automatio c o n t r o l , budgetary l i m i t a t i o n and the provisions f o r overseas forces. Daladier and Paul-Boncour were pleased with the I t a l i a n volte-face and responded favourably to M u s s o l i n i ' s suggestions.^ In an aide-memoire transmitted to the Duce on September 1 5 , ^ they declared themselves to be i n agreement on the majority of points, the s i g n i f i c a n t exception being that of "samples". While Daladier was w i l l i n g t o l e t Germany increase;jher numbers of l i g h t arms proportionate to the doubling of her e f f e c t i v e s , he thought i t impossible to allow her any heavy weapons because an unlimited number of men could be trained to use them. On the other hand, the French Premier went further than Mussolini i n suggesting that bombers as w e l l as bombing could be abolished i f effective i n t e r n a t i o n a l control were exercised over c i v i l a v i a t i o n . I t a l y ' s rapprochement with France s i m p l i f i e d the problems facing the B r i t i s h Government, f o r i t seemed that that the three Western Powers would be able to j o i n i n exerting pressure on Germany. Daladier and Paul-Boncour informed Eden of the rapprochement during conversations at the Quai d'Orsay on September 18 and suggested that i t might f a c i l i t a t e an Anglo-French accord. Eden was impressed, and though the Paris disoussions were of a preliminary nature, they proved very s a t i s f a c t o r y . Ho d e f i n i t e decisions were made, but  165  Daladier oonsented to specify the reduction i n armaments that Prance would make during the second period of the convention provided the system of control had worked s a t i s f a c t o r i l y during the f i r s t period. The French Premier agreed to surrender a l l materiel exceeding 155™n and transfer i t to the League during the second period f o r possible destruction; he also abandoned the idea of a preliminary i n v e s t i g a t i o n of German armaments. But there were s t i l l divergences of view between B r i t a i n and Prance on the size of tanks to be permitted, the number 35 of a i r c r a f t to be retained and the question of sanotions» On September 20, a Cabinet meeting took place to redefine B r i t i s h p o l i c y i n the l i g h t of the new^oircumstances. The Government accepted i n p r i n c i p l e the d i v i s i o n of the convention i n t o two four-year periods, i n the f i r s t of which the Reichswehr would be transformed and the effectives of Continental armies standardized, and, more important, i t was agreed that i f the only b a r r i e r to a convention was the method of supervision, then B r i t a i n would consider the proposal f o r automatic and continuous supervision " s y m p a t h e t i c a l l y " . ^ But the Cabinet maintained i t s opposition to the automatic a p p l i c a t i o n 37 of sanctions against v i o l a t o r s of the convention. On September 22, Simon, Baldwin and Eden met Daladier, Paul-Boncour and H a s s i g l i at the B r i t i s h Embassy i n P a r i s and declared t h e i r 38 adherence i n p r i n c i p l e to the Franco-Italian disarmament p l a n . In the following week, further discussions took place between B r i t a i n , France, I t a l y and the United States to formulate an " o f f e r of disarmament" that Germany could be induced to accept, and by September 39 29 "the most important d e t a i l s of the offer had been o u t l i n e d .  166  B r i t a i n accepted permanent and automatic supervision and agreed to a four-year periode d'epreuve during which there would he no increases i n arms and European armies standardized, while Prance agreed to specify the amount of disarmament she would carry out during the ensuing four-year period i f the system of supervision proved s a t i s f a c t o r y i n operation. During the second period, Prance would reduce her materiel to either  155  or  105mra  and Germany would be allowed  materiel of the same c a l i b r e as the French. The tonnage of tanks to be permitted s t i l l presented problems, though France appeared more w i l l i n g to reduce her heavy tanks, and an agreement seemed possible on a i r forces based on Eden's suggestion that each Great Power should r e t a i n 800 u n i t s , Prance, B r i t a i n and other c o l o n i a l Powers being granted an a d d i t i o n a l number. During the ptiriode d'epreuve. Germany would be allowed an increase i n the arms permitted by the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s , but she would not be allowed prototypes of heavier mat'eriel retained by the other Powers; u n t i l the second period. Naval problems would be shelved u n t i l the Naval Conference of 1935* A new s i t u a t i o n was thus created. B r i t a i n , France, I t a l y and the United States had agreed to amend the MaoDonald plan considerably, making i t f a r less favourable to Germany. The duration of the convention was extended from f i v e years t o eight and the disarmament of the highly-armed Powers and the concession of ^samples" were delayed f o r four years. Although Germany was to gain equality i n e f f e c t i v e s within four years, she would not gain equality i n materiel for at least eight years. Moreover, there was always the p o s s i b i l i t y that at the end of the periode d'epreuve. when the Reichswehr had been  167  abolished and Germany had been saddled with an army of raw r e c r u i t s , the French might say the system of supervision had proved unsatisfactory, freeing them from t h e i r obligations to disarm. Thus the main question i n international p o l i t i c s at the end of September was whether four-P-ower pressure would be s u f f i c i e n t to induce Germany to accept a convention considerably less favourable than the MacDonald p l a n . In May, s i m i l a r pressure had gained agreement on the standardization of Continental armies. At f i r s t , the  prospects  of German agreement seemed b r i g h t , f o r on September 23 Neurath t o l d Simon that he accepted the p r i n c i p l e of a two-period convention provided the provisions f o r disarmament during the second period were specified.  40  By September 2 9 , when Neurath returned to B e r l i n for  t a l k s with H i t l e r , the main divergence between Germany and the other Powers seemed to be the German demand for "samples" during the periode d ' S p r e u v e .  41  and the I t a l i a n s , who had closer l i n k s with the  Germans than the other Western Powers, believed i t would be necessary to concede only a few l i g h t tanks and f i g h t e r a i r c r a f t f o r Germany to acoept a c o n v e n t i o n .  42  Another obstacle to an agreement, Germany's  demand f o r a shorter periode d'e"preuve. was l i k e l y to be overcome by 43 d i v i d i n g the convention into three and f i v e year periods. Neurath's t a l k s i n B e r l i n were c r u c i a l , f o r Simon's repeated requests f o r a d e f i n i t i o n of "samples" and a clearer statement of German p o l i c y could not remain unanswered i f Germany was to avoid appearing responsible f o r a breakdown of the Conference. A c t u a l l y , i n face of the united pressure of B r i t a i n , France, I t a l y and America, the German leaders were divided. Neurath i n s i s t e d on Germany being  168  permitted "samples" during the periode d'epreuve i n the^knowledge that t h i s might break up the Conference, while H i t l e r was more c o n c i l i a t o r y , maintaining that a disarmament convention would be desirable even i f i t did not f u l f i l Germany's wishes completely and t h a t , with regard to equality i n m a t e r i e l , i t would be wrong to demand more than Germany 44 could procure by her own l i m i t e d resources i n the coming years. The outcome of the debate i n B e r l i n was apparently decided by a despatch concerning B r i t i s h p o l i c y from Prince Bismarck, the Charge d ' A f f a i r e s i n London, on October 4 * A close confidant of Simon had informed the Prince that on the previous day, the Foreign Secretary had revised the MacDonald plan along the l i n e s of the Geneva conversations of the previous week and that B r i t a i n would reject the demand f o r "samples" during the periode d'epreuve and withdraw from the Disarmament Conference i f the "new draft convention" was not 45 accepted.  J  H i t l e r , Bfllow and Blomberg held a conference l a t e r on  October 4 and decided to demand a " r e t u r n " to the MacDonald plan and threaten to withdraw from the League and the Conference i f the "new d r a f t " was brought up f o r d e b a t e . ^ H i t l e r reserved f o r himself: the decision as to whether the threat should be carried o u t . ^ On October 6, Bismarck informed Simon that Germany based her p o l i c y on the declaration of December 11 1932 and that although the Reich could accept a convention l a s t i n g f o r f i v e years, "equality would have to be applied i n the f i r s t two years" and a "period of probation" was i n t o l e r a b l e . Germany demanded "samples" of hitherto-forbidden weapons that were not to be abolished generally and complete freedom to increase the number of arms already permitted. U n t i l she was informed  169  of the measures of disarmament to he undertaken by the other Powers, Germany "would not be able to be more s p e c i f i c about the equipment her new army would n e e d " . ^ 4  On the surface, the German demands appeared to be dangerously near an ultimatum — though Billow's i n s t r u c t i o n s to Bismarck stated s p e c i f i c a l l y that an ultimatum was to be avoided and that 49 f o r a convention should continue.  aegotiations  The main aim of the German demands  was to l i f t the p r o h i b i t i o n on weapons allowed to the other Powers; Germany already possessed a few of these weapons i n secret and permanent and automatic supervision of the convention might have revealed t h e i r existence. I f Germany was granted r e l a t i v e l y minor concessions as regards "samples", a disarmament convention was possible but i f these concessions were not granted, Germany would withdraw from the Disarmament Conference. Simon f a i l e d to perceive the true aim of the German demands. Although Bismarck t o l d him that they were " a preliminary statement of Germany's a t t i t u d e " pending further negotiations, he believed that 51  they were put forward as an ultimatum.  Consequently, i n the week  preceding October 14, when the Disarmament Conference was due to reconvene, the Foreign Secretary refused to make concessions regarding the periode d'epreuve  or "samples", hoping that Germany would 52  eventually agree to the proposals he had drafted on October 3« In refusing concessions, Simon assured the breakdown of the Conference since f o r Germany the early possession of at least some hitherto-forbidden weapons was a sine qua non of any convention. Mussolini r e a l i z e d t h i s and on October 12 he suggested a compromise  17©  "between the B r i t i s h and German proposals. During the f i r s t year of the convention, chemical warfare and the bombardment of c i v i l i a n populations would be p r o h i b i t e d , a system of permanent and automatic supervision established and Germany allowed double the number of the weapons permitted by the V e r s a i l l e s Treaty. In the second year, the Reich would be able to acquire a number of a n t i - a i r c r a f t b a t t e r i e s , and i n the t h i r d a "minimum number of technical weapons, reconnaissance planes and small tanks". Also i n the t h i r d year, a conference would be c a l l e d to consider the effectiveness of the system of supervision, and i n the following two years Germany would be permitted a number of "models" of weapons retained under the convention by the other Powers:. In the s i x t h and seventh years, the Reich would be allowed to double the number of these "models", and i n the eighth to t r i p l e them. Progressively, during years four to eight, the other Powers would destroy any weapons not permitted by the convention, beginning with 53 the bigger guns, tanks and planes. M u s s o l i n i ' s appraisal of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n was perceptive. I f Germany was not accorded a c e r t a i n s a t i s f a c t i o n of her demands and the Conference broke down, the only means of c o n t r o l l i n g her would be to apply sanctions and reoccupy the Rhineland, maybe even embark on a preventive war. But both B r i t a i n and Prance had rejected t h i s course 54 of a c t i o n .  Thus the l o g i c a l a l t e r n a t i v e was to s a t i s f y a minimum  of German demands and assure that her rearmament took place under strict international control. I f Simon had consented to negotiate on the basis of M u s s o l i n i ' s proposal, i t would have been possible to conclude a convention. On  171  October 13, H i t l e r t o l d , a Conference of M i n i s t e r s that he accepted 55  the I t a l i a n p l a n , " and there were signs that the French might also agree. On October 6, M a s s i g l i , not the most c o n c i l i a t o r y of French diplomats, said that he would oonsider a suggestion by Davis that Germany be permitted a number of observation a i r c r a f t during the periode d'epreuve.  56  and on October 1 4 , Chambrun t o l d Graham he was  hopeful that negotiations on the basis of M u s s o l i n i ' s proposals would 57  be s u c c e s s f u l . " The French, apparently, were impressed by the argument that to concede Germany's demands f o r defensive armaments i n stages under s t r i c t regulation and control was l e s s dangerous than to concede nothing f o r four years and "everything" i n the ensuing f o u r . For the United] States, Norman Davis had suggested! the concession of a n t i - a i r c r a f t guns and observation a i r c r a f t , and on October 1 4 S i r E r i c Phipps, who had succeeded Rumbold as Ambassador i n B e r l i n , reported that the 58  Americans would give way to Germany's demands.  O f f i c i a l l y , Davis  gave Simon h i s f u l l support i n r e j e c t i n g German rearmament, but i n private he was concerned at the Foreign Secretary's intransigence and 59  hoped he would reduoe h i s demands." On the morning of October 1 4 , i n what appears to have been a f i n a l attempt t o secure concessions at Geneva, German newspapers published reports from the Swiss c a p i t a l suggesting that the B r i t i s h delegation t o the Conference was more intransigent than the French and that r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the future of the Conference rested on B r i t a i n . * *  0  But Simon, possibly influenced by the confidence of the American delegation that Germany would aocept the B r i t i s h programme of October 3,^ decided t o refuse any concessions. In h i s speech t o the Bureau  172  on October 14, be rejected any immediate rearmament by disarmed Powers, except f o r " p r o p o r t i o n a l " increases i n weapons permitted by the Peace Treaties i n conjunction with the transformation of Continental armies. Davis, A l o i s i and Paul-Boncour backed the Foreign Secretary, thus maintaining a united f r o n t , but Baron von Rheinbaben, deputizing f o r Nadolny, merely declared that he would report Simon's remarks t o B e r l i n and that Germany demanded the substantial disarmament of the heavily-armed Powers and the immediate implementation 62  of the p r i n c i p l e of e q u a l i t y . On the same afternoon, Henderson received a telegram from Neurath s t a t i n g that Germany was withdrawing from the Conference because the Conference had f a i l e d to f u l f i l i t s "sole object, namely, general disarmament". The unwillingness of the highly-armed states to carry out t h e i r "contractual o b l i g a t i o n t o disarm" made i t "impossible" f o r Germany t o obtain s a t i s f a c t i o n of her "reoognized claim" t o equality of r i g h t s . ^ In the same evening, Germany announced her i n t e n t i o n to withdraw from the League. To a great extent, B r i t a i n was responsible f o r the German withdrawal. The most efficacious method f o r securing a convention would have been private negotiations between the Powers and B r i t i s h mediation between France and Germany, but i n the early summer, when i t would have been possible to take advantage of the German acceptance of the standardization of Continental armies i n order to i n i t i a t e private discussions, Simon refused to do so. Instead, he advised an adjournment of the Conference u n t i l autumn and supported Henderson's "disarmament pilgrimage" to various European c a p i t a l s i n the knowledge that the journey had l i t t l e chance of success. The Foreign Secretary  173  refused to take the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of mediating between Prance and Germany, and except f o r Eden and Londonderry's t a l k s i n P a r i s on June 8 , few disarmament  disoussionB  were held u n t i l September,  A considerable change i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s took place during June, J u l y and August, because of German p o l i c y regarding a i r armament and A u s t r i a , B r i t a i n , Prance and I t a l y aligned themselves, and together with America they were i n a p o s i t i o n to exert joint pressure on Germany. Yet when disarmament negotiations resumed at the beginning of September, I t a l y , not B r i t a i n , took the lead i n t r y i n g to mediate between Prance and Germany, Mussolini putting forward h i s ten-point proposal f o r a convention. France and I t a l y quickly negotiated the basis of an agreement, but only l a t e r d i d B r i t a i n accept i t , Simon d r a f t i n g a d e f i n i t i v e proposal on October 3» As regards s e c u r i t y , t h i s plan was c e r t a i n l y p r a c t i c a b l e , f o r apart from a provision f o r sanctions, nearly a l l the Frenoh demands were met. Moreover, I t a l y was prepared to agree to sanctions under certain circumstances,** and B r i t a i n seems to have been considering the 4  65 invoking of A r t i c l e 11 of the Covenant i n cases of treaty v i o l a t i o n s . On the other hand, Simon's proposals regarding "samples" were unsatisfactory, leading to Germany's near-ultimatum of October 6. The demand f o r "samples" was the major obstacle to a convention, and i f i t had been accepted an agreement at Geneva would have been within s i g h t . I t a l y accepted the demand, and France and America would probably have done so a l s o . But Simon rejected' i t and Germany withdrew from the Conference. The B r i t i s h Foreign Seoretary apparently f a i l e d to understand that i t was not so much reductions i n armaments that lead to s e c u r i t y , but  174  the i n t e r n a t i o n a l control of armaments. He complained that B r i t i s h opinion would not agree to German rearmament, hut by October 1933 t h i s was an irrelevant question, since i t was clear that Germany would rearm to some extent. B r i t a i n and the other Powers could not have prevented German rearmament, except by adopting a p o l i c y of coercion, but they could have controlled i t by a convention imposing a s t r i c t system of i n t e r n a t i o n a l supervision. I f such a system had been implemented and Germany v i o l a t e d her freelynaegotiated  obligations,  the other states could have conferred together and agreed upon measures t o counteract the v i o l a t i o n . And i f Germany continued t o v i o l a t e her obligations, world opinion, more especially B r i t i s h opinion, could probably have been induced to aecept f o r o i b l e measures against the Reioh such as a reocoupation of the Rhineland by Prance. Although Germany would have r e s i s t e d such a move, i n 1933 there was l i t t l e chance of the resistance being successful. And though at a l a t e r date, the resistance would have been stronger, the system of supervision would have prevented Germany from gaining any major advantages from her treaty v i o l a t i o n s , and the concerted action of her neighbours could s t i l l have been successful.  175  CHAPTER VI  LAST ATTEMPTS AT A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT October 15 1933 - June 11 1934  B r i t a i n accepted the German withdrawal from the Conference with comparative oalm. In a broadcast address on October 17, Simon remarked that the object of B r i t i s h p o l i c y was "not to rouse resen tfu l f e e l i n g s " but to "promote and i n v i t e co-operation between a l l nations of good w i l l " , and as regards disarmament t o "seek an honest and honourable compact i n a great cause upon whioh the hopes of Mankind f o r the future peace of the world are so -largely founded".  1  The s i t u a t i o n confronting the Government was d e l i c a t e . Although Germany had withdrawn from the Conference and the League, H i t l e r continued to express a desire f o r peace, a disarmament  settlement 2  according Germany equality of r i g h t s and a Franco-German detente.  If  he was sincere, the p o s s i b i l i t y of coming t o terms with him s t i l l existed; i f he was i n s i n c e r e , he had to be shown to be i n s i n c e r e . Germany's'departure from the Conference and the League was no proof of H i t l e r ' s i n s i n c e r i t y ; the d r a s t i c amendments to the MacDonald plan during September had placed Germany i n a strong moral p o s i t i o n , with many sections of world opinion. In B r i t a i n , f o r example, Lloyd George maintained that European tensions arose from the r e f u s a l of France and her a l l i e s t o disarm.^ MacDonald and Simon had f a i l e d i n t h e i r attempts to ensure that a breakdown of the Conference would be blamed on Germany. There were three main courses which B r i t a i n could adopt t o t r y t o r e t r i e v e the s i t u a t i o n . The f i r s t was the a p p l i c a t i o n of sanctions against Germany i n conjunction with France and her a l l i e s . But unless sanctions were applied a outranee, they could not f a c i l i t a t e a long-term  176  solution of the German problem. Moreover, they were unacceptable to B r i t i s h opinion, f o r whilst d i s l i k i n g the H i t l e r regime, the B r i t i s h people i n general d i d not believe that a disarmed Germany was a danger to national s e c u r i t y . I f Germany v i o l a t e d a freely-negotiated agreement such as a disarmament convention, the s i t u a t i o n might be different• The second course open to B r i t a i n was t o declare that disarmament was no longer a p r a c t i c a l p o s s i b i l i t y , that each Power had the right to adjust i t s armaments as i t pleased, and that B r i t a i n would rearm. But t h i s would be an admission that the Government had f a i l e d i n i t s efforts to b r i n g about a negotiated settlement at Geneva, and i n the circumstances of the time such an admission was inconceivable f o r on October 26, the Labour candidate i n a by-election at East Fulham turned a minority of 14,000 votes i n t o a majority of 5,000, campaigning on a programme of disarmament. The result was probably due to a natural swing back to Labour a f t e r the freak e l e c t i o n result of 1931 and a detestation of the means t e s t , but the Government interpreted the Labour v i c t o r y as a v i c t o r y f o r disarmament and p a c i f i s m . Baldwin, the r e a l power behind the Government, described the r e s u l t as a "nightmare"; he was a f r a i d of the p a c i f i s t s , a f r a i d to advocate 4 rearmament and even a f r a i d to think about advocating rearmament. In conjunction with B r i t i s h rearmament, the Government might have negotiated an entente or even an a l l i a n c e with France to deter Germany from aggression. But a p o l i c y of both substantial rearmament and! a l l i a n c e with France would tend to divide Europe into opposing groups; and might p r e c i p i t a t e a denunciation by Germany of the armaments  177  provisions of the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s . The r e s u l t would probably be an arms race, with a l l i t s inherent u n c e r t a i n t i e s , and thus t h i s p o l i c y offered no r e a l hope of a long-term solution to the German problem. Moreover, within B r i t a i n , the p o l i c y of alliances: was anathema to the p a c i f i s t s and many of the protagonists of disarmament whom Baldwin so feared. Thus, although the Government apparently desired a close r e l a t i o n s h i p with the French - a noticeable rapprochement between the two countries had taken place during 1933 - the p o l i c y of entente was not pressed. The t h i r d possible course was f o r B r i t a i n to mediate between France and Germany, a p o l i c y that Simon and MacDonald had shirked f o r the previous two years, except f o r a few occasions - f o r example, during the c r i s i s over the standardization of European armies. The chances of t h i s p o l i c y being successful i n practice were now more remote than formerly, as Germany's withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference made i t more d i f f i c u l t f o r the French to make concessions. But i f B r i t a i n gave France a d d i t i o n a l assurances of support i t was; possible that the French Government would make enough concessions to secure an agreement with the Reich. And to follow a polioy o f f e r i n g even a remote chance of a Franco-German settlement was better than f o l l o w i n g p o l i c i e s tending to divide Europe i n t o opposing blocs and cause an arms race. Moreover, i f Germany negotiated i n bad f a i t h , adept diplomacy by B r i t a i n could expose German i n s i n o e r i t y , enabling the Government to take a firmer l i n e with the Reich and gain public support f o r doing so. The p o l i c y of B r i t i s h mediation between France and Germany, as always, offered at least some chance of securing a long-term settlement to the German problem, the a l t e r n a t i v e solution to the problem being preventive action against the Reich.  178  Simon's "broadcast address of October 17 indicated that the Government had already decided to adopt the p o l i c y of mediation between Prance and Germany. During an adjournment of the General Commission from October 16-26, the French began to urge that the Conference continue i t s work and conclude a convention which could be handed t o Germany f o r signature, i n the b e l i e f that a German r e f u s a l would cause the Reich to be blamed f o r the collapse of the disarmament negotiations.** But Simon distrusted the idea, as he believed a f a i l u r e to reach an agreement at Geneva would strengthen the elements i n Germany opposed to disarmament and "almost j u s t i f y " the German 7  withdrawal from the Conference.  Moreover, there was l i t t l e point i n  presenting Germany with a convention based on proposals she had already rejected. The Foreign Secretary therefore proposed an adjournment of the Conference on the grounds that the General Commission should not undertake important discussions " u n t i l the dust 8 raised by the recent action of the Germans had had time to s e t t l e " . On October 25, a f t e r discussions between the Powers as to the procedure to be adopted, a temporary compromise between B r i t i s h and French viewpoints was reached and the Bureau decided to recommend the adjournment of the General Commission on condition that i t meet again not l a t e r than December 4. The intervening period would be u t i l i z e d f o r private negotiations between the Powers and the preparation of an up-to-date text of the B r i t i s h draft convention. The adjournment of the General Commission was a v i c t o r y of sorts f o r Simon's diplomacy as i t gained time i n which to formulate a more d e f i n i t e p o l i c y . The s i t u a t i o n was complicated when D a l a d i e r ' s  179  government f e l l on October 24 over a budgetary question, though French foreign p o l i c y under Sarraut, Daladier*s successor, remained unchanged, Paul-Boncour r e t a i n i n g the M i n i s t r y f o r Foreign A f f a i r s and Daladier the M i n i s t r y of War. At the same time, the d i f f i c u l t i e s f a c i n g the new administration i n i n t e r n a l p o l i t i c s were so great that  little  time could be spared f o r the discussion of foreign a f f a i r s . On November 7, Simon proposed an immediate meeting between B r i t i s h and French M i n i s t e r s , but although the French welcomed the suggestion, discussions did not commence u n t i l November 18. The delay i n i n i t i a t i n g an Anglo-French dialogue had important consequences, the most s i g n i f i c a n t being that the divergence of opinion over the future procedure at the Conference, shelved by the Bureau's decisions of October 25, had not been resolved. Simon was anxious to i n i t i a t e private negotiations i n order to " c l e a r up the 9 differences between the four p r i n c i p a l European Powers",  while the  French were s t i l l eager to conclude a convention at Geneva i n Germany's absence.  10  On November 11, the Bureau decided that rapporteurs; should  be appointed to deal with most of the outstanding questions facing the Conference and that committees should be appointed to deal with effectives and supervision, but t h i s was merely a temporary settlement of the procedural problem. During November, Simon began to press more strongly f o r negotiations with Germany through diplomatic channels, and on November 7 Eden i  hinted to the Commons that the Government was prepared to abandon the programme outlined to the Bureau on October 14. 11 Paul-Boncour, on the other hand, continued to believe that a disarmament convention should 1  180  be negotiated at Geneva as i f Germany were s t i l l present and: he 12  i n s i s t e d that France had made her maximum concessions.  Mussolini  took the r e a l i s t i c view that to continue discussions at Geneva i n Germany's absence would serve no u s e f u l purpose, and on November 12 the Marquis d i Soragna made reservations during the f i r s t meetings of the new oommittees on e f f e c t i v e s and supervision, i n t i m a t i n g that the I t a l i a n representatives would r e f r a i n from v o t i n g on d e l i c a t e technical questions and would be free to act ass observers 13 i f p o l i t i c a l questions were discussed. The action taken by the I t a l i a n s made. a settlement of the procedural 1  question imperative, as the alignment of October 14 between B r i t a i n , France, I t a l y and the United States had been broken. Discussions 1  A  between these Powers were held at Geneva from November 18 to 22, and eventually the French were forced, very r e l u c t a n t l y , t o accept an adjournment of the General Commission u n t i l January 1934 and agree to negotiations f o r a disarmament agreement through diplomatic channels. As a sop to French wishes, i t was also agreed that " a f t e r consultation with the o f f i c e r s and Chairmen of the Committees", Henderson should "advise how f a r the work of the Committees should be c a r r i e d on i n the meantime". But the appearanoe of unity between B r i t a i n , France, I t a l y and the United States was deceptive. Simon had intimated that B r i t a i n would be prepared to offer concessions to Germany, or rather that B r i t a i n would press France to make concessions, while Paul-Boncour wanted t o base future negotiations on the programme of October 14. The I t a l i a n s backed a stronger version of the B r i t i s h l i n e , while the Americans indicated that although they were anxious f o r an agreement,  181  they considered the e x i s t i n g phase of discussions to he of a purely European character. Meanwhile, on November 13, the Japanese representative on the Supervision Committee had announced that i t was impossible f o r Japan to accept i n t e r n a t i o n a l control over her armaments. The conclusion of a disarmament convention, either inside?or outside the Disarmament Conference was thus made improbable, since supervision was an essential element i n any disarmament agreement. The Soviets, whose relations; with the Japanese were extremely poor, were almost certain to follow the lead of t h e i r i n t e r n a t i o n a l r i v a l s , and i f the Soviets rejected supervision i t was l i k e l y that other European states would also reject i t . Moreover, the United States would probably refuse to r a t i f y 15 a convention that Japan refused to s i g n . H i t h e r t o , the p o l i c y of Japan had been an unknown f a c t o r , as the Japanese representatives i n the Disarmament Conference had contributed l i t t l e to the proceedings. I t might be argued that the Japanese Government, controlled by the m i l i t a r y , d i d not intend to reach an agreement at Geneva, p a r t i c u l a r l y after withdrawing from the League i n March; but i t seems more l i k e l y that the Japanese hoped to secure an agreement, though on regional rather than general l i n e s , f o r on June 27 Naotsake Sato, the Japanese delegate to the Disarmament Conference, suggested such an agreement to Hugh W i l s o n . ^ The condition f o r 1  Japanese p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n a disarmament agreement was recognition 17 of her interests i n the Par East  - not an unreasonable demand. A  A s i m i l a r p o l i c y had been followed at the Washington Conference i n 1921-2 - p o l i t i c a l compensations on the Chinese mainland i n return  182  for disarmament. But whatever Japanese i n t e n t i o n s , the announcement of November 13 that Japan would not agree to supervision made a general disarmament 18  convention, at best, u n l i k e l y .  Nevertheless, there was s t i l l a  p o s s i b i l i t y that France and B r i t a i n could negotiate an arms control agreement with Germany, because H i t l e r had put forward new proposals f o r an eight-year convention to Phipps on October 24. The Ftthrer was; convinced that the highly-armed states were u n w i l l i n g to reduce t h e i r armaments, so he suggested that France could be allowed to r e t a i n her e x i s t i n g army of over 600,000 men, together with a l l i t s offensive weapons, i f Germany i n return were allowed a short-service army of 300,000 men with no offensive weapons - such as tanks over s i x tons, heavy a r t i l l e r y over 150mm and bombers - but as many defensive weapons as might be necessary to arm her forces. The P o l i s h , Czech and other armies would be l i m i t e d to t h e i r e x i s t i n g numbers, and poison gas and bombing behind b a t t l e zones would be " e n t i r e l y 19 prohibited".  y  H i t l e r ' s proposals were extremely important, as they were the f i r s t d e f i n i t i v e proposals put forward by the Germans since the memorandum of August 29 1932. During most of 1933, B r i t a i n , France, I t a l y and the United States had discussed disarmament among themselves, seldom consulting the Germans, and i n the end t h i s p o l i c y had proved disastrous. Germany had refused the " o f f e r " of October 14 and withdrawn from the Disarmament Conference without offending l i b e r a l opinion, and the four-Power alignment against her had disintegrated. But now, i f B r i t a i n ,  183  Prance, Italy and the United States accepted Hitler's proposals either i n whole or as the basis of a settlement, Germany would be unable to claim that the other Powers were t r y i n g to impose a diktat on her. Although the German proposals involved rearmament, t h i s was irrelevant since i t was certain that Germany would rearm whether or not an agreement was negotiated. Moreover, unless concessions were made to German demands, a large section of B r i t i s h opinion would believe German rearmament to be j u s t i f i e d , while i f Germany violated a freely-negotiated convention, B r i t i s h opinion would support the Government i n taking more forcible measures against the Reich. Thus, the most r e a l i s t i c policy for B r i t a i n to adopt would have been to accept the German proposals. I f a settlement of the German problem was to be negotiated, i t was necessary to make concessions to German demands; the alternative was to take preventive action. The proposals of October 14 were clearly unacceptable to Germany and a return to the original MaoDonald plan was less advantageous to both B r i t a i n and Prance than the new German proposals, which offered Prance a greater margin of superiority i n effectives and materiel. It would also have been r e a l i s t i c to offer greater assurances of support to Prance. A policy of pressing the French to make concessions without offering additional assurances of B r i t i s h support i n return was impracticable because the French would not reduce their margin of superiority over Germany unless their security was strengthened i n other ways. There was a growing movement on the French Right, i n newspapers such as "Le Temps" and i n a section of the Radical-Socialist Party for a direct Franco-German accord - even i f i t involved German  184  rearmament.  But the movement was s t i l l not strong enough to  overthrow the p o l i c y of Paul-Boneour, who sought an i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y agreed s o l u t i o n to the German and disarmament problems. Simon could not accept that further assuranoes t o Prance were necessary, and i n a speech to the Commons on November 7 he deprecated the idea of a d d i t i o n a l Continental commitments and even declared that 21 B r i t a i n was not " b l i n d l y fettered" by the Treaty of Locarno. Even though the Germans informed him that they would not object to an Anglo-French a l l i a n c e i n return f o r a disarmament agreement based on 22 the H i t l e r p l a n ,  the Foreign Secretary refused to be drawn into  extra commitments. The reason f o r the r e f u s a l was fear of public 23 opinion.  Yet i t was inconceivable that an Anglo-Frenoh a l l i a n c e  would be rejected i n the House, f o r the National Government's raison d'Stre was to keep the Labour Party out of o f f i c e and a defeat of the Government on the issue of an Anglo-French a l l i a n c e would probably have l e d to a Labour v i c t o r y i n the ensuing e l e c t i o n . Although B r i t i s h M i n i s t e r s r e a l i z e d that a degree of German rearmament was i n e v i t a b l e and that an arms control agreement i n v o l v i n g rearmament was better than no agreement,  24  they were slow to reply t o  H i t l e r ' s proposals. Their preliminary impressions were not communicated t o the German Chancellor u n t i l Decemb«r|»8, s i x weeks a f t e r Phipps' interview with H i t l e r on October 24. The Chancellor had u t i l i z e d the period t o o f f e r non-aggression pacts to Germany's neighbours (with the notable exceptions of Belgium and Austria) and he had also defined h i s disarmament proposals more f u l l y - f o r example, he had asked f o r a number of "chaser" a i r c r a f t - as d i s t i n c t from bombers - and declared 1  185  that Germany was w i l l i n g to agree to international supervision. But despite the Ftthrer's repeated e f f o r t s to renew the disarmament discussions, the B r i t i s h had not responded, the communication of 25 December 8  being l i t t l e more than an attempt to e l i c i t further  information, e s p e c i a l l y regarding periodic and automatic supervision, the "disappearance" of the Reiohswehr and the terms and form of the proposed non-aggression pacts. Direct comments on the German proposals were l i m i t e d to a demand that the S. A. and S. S. be absorbed into the army or cease to exist as "supplementary organizations" and to an observation that the German claims to guns, a i r c r a f t and an array of 300,000 men were excessive. 26 H i t l e r ' s reply  to the B r i t i s h request f o r information was  encouraging, h i s disarmament proposals remaining very moderate. He pointed put that the MacDonald plan granted Germany an equal number of metropolitan e f f e c t i v e s as Prance while h i s own plan allowed Prance a considerable s u p e r i o r i t y , and he agreed to transform the Reiohswehr into a short-service army within three or four years. He refused to disband the S. A. and S. S. (he compared them to the Salvation Armyj), but he agreed to regulate them according to s t r i c t international rules and to submit them t o periodic and automatic supervision. He also gave assurances that he was ready to oonclude non-aggression pacts with a l l Germany's neighbours, B r i t a i n and Yugoslavia. On December 12, Phipps was handed a l e t t e r from H i t l e r (dated December 11) g i v i n g the 27 Chancellor's plan a more o f f i c i a l character. Despite H i t l e r ' s encouraging r e p l y , the B r i t i s h Government responded 28 slowly, and although a second Note  was handed to the German  Government on December 20, i t again was l i t t l e more than a request  186  f o r information, t h i s time r e g a r d i n g the c a t e g o r i e s and quantities; of the " d e f e n s i v e " weapons that Germany demanded and the form of the proposed non-aggression p a c t s . On a l l other p o i n t s except the proposed increase i n the German army, the B r i t i s h Government merely "took note" of the German proposals and emphasised  that i t was g i v i n g i t s  "earnest c o n s i d e r a t i o n " t o the l e t t e r o f December 11. The only point on which t h e Government committed  i t s e l f was t h e p r o j e c t e d increase  i n the German army. T h i s German demand was r e j e c t e d on the grounds t h a t i t would produce " d i s a s t r o u s e f f e c t s on the mind of Europe" and was based on an erroneous c a l c u l a t i o n of French e f f e c t i v e s . The slow and r e s t r a i n e d response of the B r i t i s h Government was unfortunate, as H i t l e r ' s d e s i r e f o r a disarmament convention seems t o have been genuine. He needed time i n which t o oarry out the i n t e r n a l r e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f Germany and he was a f r a i d of a p o s s i b l e H e r r i o t  29 government i n France ' where t h e p o l i t i o a l s i t u a t i o n was s t i l l u n s t a b l e . H e r r i o t * s r e t u r n t o power seemed imminent t o many observers, and H i t l e r was a f r a i d t h a t the ex-Premier, now almost f a n a t i c a l l y anti-German, would n e g o t i a t e a Franco-Russian a l l i a n c e or even occupy the l e f t bank of the R h i n e . ^ F u r t h e r evidence of H i t l e r ' s  sincerity  i s h i s w i l l i n g n e s s t o negotiate an arms c o n t r o l agreement w i t h i n Europe even though he r e a l i z e d that general disarmament was improbable  32 because of the p o l i c y b e i n g pursued by Japan. A B r i t i s h l e a d i n f o l l o w i n g up t h e German disarmament proposals was now more necessary than before, because the French Government was too weak t o take such an i n i t i a t i v e . Camille Chautemps had r e p l a c e d Sarraut as Premier on November 27, but p o l i t i c a l circumstances l e d him t o f o l l o w a s i m i l a r p o l i c y t o h i s predecessor - r e l i a n c e on the  187  proposals of October 14. Yet, as T y r r e l l pointed out, the r i g i d a p p l i c a t i o n of t h i s p o l i c y could have only two possible r e s u l t s ; depending on the p o l i c y adopted by B r i t a i n , i t would lead either to a close Anglo-French alignment against German rearmament or to a d e f i n i t e breach i n Anglo-French c o - o p e r a t i o n . ^ The extent to which France would disarm or would agree to German rearmament s t i l l depended on the strength of B r i t i s h security guarantees, and French Ministers were even slower to reply to H i t l e r ' s disarmament scheme than t h e i r B r i t i s h counterparts. A reply was not made u n t i l December 11, and, l i k e the B r i t i s h r e p l i e s of December 8 and 20, i t was l i t t l e more than a 34  request f o r information. On December 22, Simon v i s i t e d the Quai d'Orsay to assure Chautemps and Paul-Boncour that B r i t a i n d i d not intend to accept H i t l e r ' s 35  demands.  -But, apparently, the French M i n i s t e r s were not reassured,  f o r on January 1 1934» Francois-Poncet handed an aide-memoire^** to the Ftthrer, s t a t i n g the terms on which France would continue the disarmament discussions. I t was an astute move, as B r i t a i n ' s own counter-proposals to the H i t l e r plan had not yet been formulated; i t was i n the French interest to base disarmament negotiations on a French rather than a B r i t i s h or German p l a n . Thus, although the aide-memoire was very c o n c i l i a t o r y i n tone, i t s proposals were very s i m i l a r t o those of October 14, including a de facto periode d'epreuve. The only major difference was a proposal f o r an immediate and universal f i f t y per cent reduction of m i l i t a r y a i r c r a f t p r o v i d i n g : i t was accompanied by the e f f e c t i v e oontrol of c i v i l a v i a t i o n and a i r c r a f t manufacture. On the other hand, the French Note stressed three points that were u n l i k e l y t o please H i t l e r . It was emphasized that a convention  188 should he a t t a i n e d through the disarmament of the  heavily-armed  Powers r a t h e r than the rearmament of Germany and that the agreement should he negotiated w i t h i n the Conference at Geneva. More  important,  France demanded that the S. A. and S. S. he disbanded or be counted as e f f e c t i v e s . On January 1 9 , the Germans r e p l i e d t o the B r i t i s h Note of Deoember 2 0  37 and the French Note of January 1 . German communications was  But although the tone of the  c o n c i l i a t o r y , they were merely a defence of  the German p o s i t i o n , a r e j e c t i o n of the October 1 4 proposals and  a  request f o r f u r t h e r information regarding B r i t i s h and French p o l i c y . H i t l e r ' s one concession was t o submit Germany's compulsory Labour Corps to international supervision. The Phipps*  s i t u a t i o n now  f a c i n g B r i t a i n had remained unchanged since  i n t e r v i e w with H i t l e r on October 2 4 1 9 3 3 . As the B r i t i s h  Ambassador i n B e r l i n pointed out, there were two r e a l i s t i c f o r B r i t a i n t o adopt - sanctions, or the conclusion of a  policies convention 38  with Germany g r a n t i n g her l i m i t e d , gradual and c o n t r o l l e d rearmament. And f o r the l a t t e r p o l i c y t o be s u c c e s s f u l , B r i t a i n and France had t--o present a u n i t e d f r o n t and,  i f necessary,  Germans refused t o be "reasonable". French a t t a c k was  threaten sanctions i f the  Germany's f e a r of a p o s s i b l e  d i m i n i s h i n g . L i k e h i s predecessors,  H i t l e r based h i s 39  p o l i c y on the e x p l o i t a t i o n of Anglo-Frenoh d i f f e r e n c e s and  inertia.  Tardiness on the part of B r i t a i n would l e a d e i t h e r t o a r a i s i n g of German demands or u n c o n t r o l l e d German rearmament. B r i t a i n had been preparing a new l e a s t December  1933, ° 4  disarmament scheme sinoe at  hoping that a Franco-German compromise might  be negotiated on the b a s i s of French disarmament and German rearmament  189  rather than German rearmament alone. Mussolini assented to the 41 p r i n c i p l e of the plan during conversations with Simon on January 3-4, (though the Duce preferred an agreement based on H i t l e r ' s proposals), 42 and on January 29 the new scheme  was l a i d before the Powers.  E f f e c t i v e s were to be l i m i t e d according to the MacDonald p l a n , except that the period of service i n the short-term Continental armies would be open t o discussion, as would the number of e f f e c t i v e s ,  if  200,000  were found to be inadequate. French overseas forces would be reduced "considerably", and p a r a - m i l i t a r y t r a i n i n g p r o h i b i t e d , though organizations such as the S. A . and S. S. would be permitted provided t h e i r non-military character was assured by a system of permanent and automatic i n t e r n a t i o n a l supervision. Germany would be allowed a n t i - a i r c r a f t guns, 155 mm mobile guns and tanks of s i x tons, as H i t l e r had demanded, and the other Powers would destroy t h e i r tanks over sixteen tons w i t h i n f i v e years and materiel over 155 mm within seven years. M i l i t a r y a i r c r a f t were t o be l i m i t e d to t h e i r e x i s t i n g numbers pending the formulation of a scheme f o r the complete a b o l i t i o n of m i l i t a r y and naval a v i a t i o n and the " e f f e c t i v e supervision of c i v i l a v i a t i o n " . I f the Permanent Disarmament Commission was unable to formulate such a scheme within two years, a l l countries would be e n t i t l e d to m i l i t a r y a v i a t i o n and Germany would obtain p a r i t y with the other Great Powers within ten years. The construction or a c q u i s i t i o n of types of weapons t o be destroyed during the convention would be prohibited and a system of permanent and automatic supervision would be i n s t i t u t e d t o ensure the a p p l i c a t i o n of the convention.  190  There was  a p r o v i s i o n f o r c o n s u l t a t i o n i n the event of the convention  being v i o l a t e d , and i t was  suggested that European s e c u r i t y c o u l d a l s o  be strengthened by Germany r e t u r n i n g t o the League and n e g o t i a t i n g ten-year non-aggression pacts with her  neighbours.  In many ways, the proposed convention was more favourable t o Prance than the proposals of October 14, as Prance would r e t a i n a s u p e r i o r i t y i n m a t e r i e l over Germany. At the same time, the B r i t i s h land proposals were more favourable t o Germany than H i t l e r * s , probably t o induce the Ffthrer t o accept the a i r p r o p o s a l s . Thus, even though the Chancellor's demand f o r an army of 300,000 was not granted, the land proposals taken as a whole represented a f a i r compromise between French  and  German views, as d i d the p r o v i s i o n s f o r the S . A. and S. S. The  two  major weaknesses of the B r i t i s h p l a n were the a i r proposals, which Germany was u n l i k e l y t o accept - because she had already s t a r t e d t o rearm i n the a i r - and the s e c u r i t y proposals, which France would probably consider i n s u f f i c i e n t . I n i t i a l r e a c t i o n s t o the B r i t i s h plan were not unfavourable. D a l a d i e r , who  had been asked t o form a new  29,  government on January  r e a l i z e d t h a t the B r i t i s h land proposals were l e s s favourable than H i t l e r ' s and suggested that the p r o v i s i o n s f o r p a r a - m i l i t a r y organizations provided an "overwhelming d i f f i c u l t y " (as the S. A. and S. S. were not t o be i n c l u d e d i n the c a l c u l a t i o n of German e f f e c t i v e s ) , but he  43 welcomed the proposal f o r c o n s u l t a t i o n as an "important T h i s was  advance".  e s p e c i a l l y encouraging i n that the French (and D a l a d i e r i n  p a r t i c u l a r ) were prone t o overreact t o disarmament plans e n t a i l i n g French concessions, even i f the other Powers o f f e r e d concessions i n r e t u r n . ^ " F o r Germany, Blomberg expressed h i s Government:*;® "warm  191  appreciation" of the B r i t i s h proposals except f o r those concerning 45  aviation, and the German m i l i t a r y , f e a r i n g the establishment of a r i v a l body, were pleased that the S. A. and S. S. would be subject to y  46  i n t e r n a t io n a l o o n t r o l .  The Wilhelmstrasse, "more c a t h o l i c than the 47  Pope", received the B r i t i s h proposals less favourably. Since October 1933, progress towards disarmament had been hindered by the i n s t a b i l i t y of French Governments, and by the end of January 1934 i t seemed to many observers that French democracy i t s e l f might be i n danger. Following the revelations of the Stavisky A f f a i r , neo-fascist  disturbances had taken place i n an attempt to topple the  Government, and on January 27 Ghautemps, despite h i s majority i n the Chamber, l o s t h i s nerve and resigned. Daladier became Premier and won a vote of confidence on February 6 but a f t e r a further Rightest disturbance, during which Herriot was a l l but thrown i n t o the Seine, Daladier himself c a p i t u l a t e d . On February 9» a new "government of national concentration" took o f f i c e under Gaston Doumergue. Unfortunately f o r disarmament, i t was biased to the Right, and included' Tardieu, Marshal P e t a i n , and Louis Barthou, who became Foreign M i n i s t e r . The remaining Radicals i n the Cabinet were mostly conservative as regards foreign p o l i c y - e s p e c i a l l y H e r r i o t . French disarmament polioy became s t i f f e r almost overnight. To discover the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of an agreement based on the memorandum of January 29, the B r i t i s h Government sent Eden, now Lord P r i v y Seal, on a special exploratory mission to P a r i s , B e r l i n and Rome. On February 17, the B r i t i s h M i n i s t e r had conversations with Doumergue and Barthou i n P a r i s . ^ The t a l k s were not very encouraging.  192  Doumergue c r i t i c i s e d t h e p r o p o s a l s r e g a r d i n g t h e S. A. and  S. S . ,  even  s u g g e s t i n g t h a t s u p e r v i s i o n o v e r t h e s e b o d i e s ; s h o u l d he a p p l i e d immediately.  Barthou  complained  about t h e l a c k o f a p e r i o d e d ' € p r e u v e  and t h e c o n c e s s i o n s t o German rearmament and n a v a l and  a i r armaments, i n w h i c h B r i t a i n was  observed  t h a t as  especially  regards  interested,  German e q u a l i t y w o u l d be d e l a y e d f o r two y e a r s . The F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r deprecated t h e B r i t i s h p r o p o s a l f o r c o n s u l t a t i o n as i n s u f f i c i e n t provide f o r French  s e c u r i t y , and  demanded a d d i t i o n a l g u a r a n t e e s  the e x e c u t i o n of a c o n v e n t i o n . Almost the o n l y encouraging Barthou  made was  convention at  for  remark t h a t  t h a t i t would be b e t t e r t o have a c o n v e n t i o n  s a t i s f i e d no-one r a t h e r t h a n no  to  which  all.  E d e n ' s t a l k s i n B e r l i n were more s u c c e s s f u l a s H i t l e r a c c e p t e d B r i t i s h p r o p o s a l s as t h e b a s i s of a c o n v e n t i o n .  49  Apart  from  the  a  r e l u c t a n c e t o r e t u r n t o t h e League — a p o i n t which B r i t a i n d i d not  50 regard as a p r e - c o n d i t i o n of a convention  — t h e Ftihrer had  only  one  major o b j e c t i o n t o t h e B r i t i s h p r o p o s a l s - t h e d e l a y i n a c c o r d i n g Germany e q u a l i t y o f r i g h t s i n t h e a i r . He e n t i t l e d t o possess  short-range  number o f w h i c h w o u l d be  defensive a i r c r a f t  l i m i t e d t o t h i r t y p e r cent  f o r c e s o f Germany's n e i g h b o u r s f o r c e , w h i c h e v e r was  demanded t h a t Germany be  or f i f t y per cent  t h e l e s s e r . The  ( n o t bombers),  of the t o t a l a i r  of the French a i r  enquiry i n t o the a b o l i t i o n  m i l i t a r y and  n a v a l a v i a t i o n w o u l d be h e l d a s p r o p o s e d .  concessions  o v e r t h e a i r p r o p o s a l s , Germany w o u l d a g r e e  disarmament b e i n g d e l a y e d f o r f i v e y e a r s and t o s t r i c t t h e S. A. and  S.  1  would not p o s s e s s  S. The  Ftthrer a l s o p r o m i s e d  o r be t r a i n e d t o u s e  concentrated or t r a i n e d  in military  of  In return f o r to  French  s u p e r v i s i o n olf  that these organizations  arms; n e i t h e r w o u l d t h e y  camps, be  the  commanded o r  be  instructed  193  " e i t h e r d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y " by army o f f i c e r s or "engage or take part i n " " f i e l d exercises. He d i d not want a "second army" within the s t a t e . Moreover, i f Germany was granted an army of 300,000, the Chancellor would even agree to reduce the "Green" (armed) police  by 50,000. H i t l e r ' s proposals were moderate, even generous. He was w i l l i n g to l e t Prance r e t a i n a considerable s u p e r i o r i t y i n mat'eriel for f i v e years; and a s u p e r i o r i t y i n a i r strength f o r ten years. He would also accept permanent and automatic supervision, not only over Germany's armaments but over the S. A. and S. S. Thus apart from the immediate increases i n Germany's armaments, increases: that were r e l a t i v e l y minor i f i l l e g a l rearmament was taken into consideration, the Puhrer had accepted, i n e f f e c t , the proposals of October 14. And i f Prance s t i l l d i d not believe that her security was s u f f i c i e n t l y guaranteed, he would not oppose an Anglo-French a l l i a n c e . Eden, who had consistently advocated a more r e a l i s t i c p o l i c y than h i s superiors, wrote t o MacDonald on the night of February 22, suggesting that a convention based on H i t l e r ' s proposals was preferable 51  to no convention at a l l .  German v i o l a t i o n of a freely-negotiated  arms agreement would arouse B r i t i s h opinion, whereas a v i o l a t i o n of the more punitive aspects of the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s would not. But the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s f i r s t reaction to H i t l e r ' s suggestions was that 52  they were " i n substance . . . inacceptable". Then, on February 25, an a r t i c l e i n fashf. Observer", probably inspired by the Government,53 suggested that the r e s u l t s of Eden's t a l k s i n B e r l i n had made a o  "deplorable impression" i n "governmental quarters", and that Eden  194  himself was "not competent either to negotiate or prepare f o r 54 negotiation".  The unfortunate point was that the same "governmental 55  quarters" had no a l t e r n a t i v e p o l i c y i f a convention was not concluded. M u s s o l i n i , as r e a l i s t i c as ever, appreciated that a convention l i m i t i n g German armaments was e s s e n t i a l . Thus, on February 26, he 56 informed Eden  that he was w i l l i n g to accept either the B r i t i s h  proposals of January 29 or H i t l e r ' s amendments to them, and i f neither proved acceptable to both France and Germany, he believed i t possible to gain agreement on the basis of the I t a l i a n plan of January 31, a 57 scheme based on H i t l e r ' s proposals of October 24»  The Buce believed  that France would be prepared to agree to the l a t e s t H i t l e r proposals since they delayed French disarmament and provided f o r  effective  supervision over the S. A. and S* S. Mussolini had also assured the Frenoh that I t a l y would f u l f i l her obligations under the Treaty of Locarno. It was now apparent that the conclusion of a disarmament convention depended mainly on the French attitude to the B r i t i s h plan and the amendments formulated by H i t l e r . But by March 1, when Eden returned to P a r i s , the French had not considered the B r i t i s h proposals f u l l y because of the i n t e r n a l d i f f i c u l t i e s r e s u l t i n g from the Stavisky A f f a i r . Nevertheless, Doumergue and Barthou c r i t i c i s e d the proposals 58 severely and avoided accepting them even as a basis of a convention. Doumergue declared himself d i s s a t i s f i e d with H i t l e r ' s undertakings with regard to the S. A . and S. S.  and maintained that France needed  greater security guarantees on the l i n e s of the French disarmament plan of November 1932 or at least the Paul-Boncour proposals of December 59 1933 f o r guaranteeing the execution of a convention. Barthou, on  195  the other hand, declared that the main d i f f i c u l t y was the acceptance of German rearmament. The two French Ministers also c r i t i c i z e d . H i t l e r ' s a i r proposals and demanded that as part of any settlement, Germany return to the League. The French Ministers were u n w i l l i n g to state t h e i r security demands s p e c i f i c a l l y , though they d i d t e l l Eden that the Senate Committees on Foreign A f f a i r s , the Army, Navy and A i r Force had suggested a reversion to the disarmament plan of November 1932. The o f f i c i a l French reply** to the B r i t i s h proposals was not 0  handed to Simon u n t i l March 19« The Note, drafted by Barthou, with 6l  some help from Herriot and Tardieu,  was, i n e f f e c t , a r e j e c t i o n of  the memorandum of January 29. Franoe had "most serious" objections  to  disarming at the same time as Germany was rearming and desired greater security guarantees to ensure the execution of the convention. The Treaty of Locarno and the proposed consultative pact were i n s u f f i c i e n t t o provide seourity and " i n the f i n a l a n a l y s i s " , i t was necessary to "revert t o " the Covenant of the League of Nations. Franoe considered Germany's return to the League "an essential condition" of any arms agreement, and i t was also necessary to "determine important points" concerning p r e - m i l i t a r y organizations, the l i m i t a t i o n of national defence expenditure and the manufacture of m a t e r i e l . During Eden's t a l k s i n P a r i s , i t had become clear that the French preferred a convention based on H i t l e r ' s amendments to the B r i t i s h proposals. Consequently, the Lord P r i v y Seal put pressure on his Government to accept H i t l e r ' s demands i f t h i s was necessary to secure a convention, and he also advised the re-examination of the B r i t i s h 62  p o s i t i o n regarding a d d i t i o n a l security guarantees to France.  Phipps  backed Eden's p o l i c y and sent Andrew Thome, the M i l i t a r y Attache i n  196  B e r l i n , to put the case to Lord Hailsham, the Secretary of State f o r W a r . ^ Brigadier Temperley supported t h i s p o l i c y * ' , as diet the 4  Foreign O f f i c e , which i n a memorandum prepared f o r the Cabinet on March 21 suggested that B r i t a i n ' s best p o l i c y might be the negotiation 65  of an Anglo-French a l l i a n c e i n v o l v i n g s p e c i f i o m i l i t a r y commitments. ^ The negative response of Franoe to the memorandum of January 29 and the pressure exerted by Eden and the Foreign O f f i c e had some effect on the B r i t i s h Government. I t had been clear f o r some time that 66  B r i t a i n would agree to many of H i t l e r ' s demands,  and i t now  became apparent that the Government might be w i l l i n g to give certain guarantees i n the^event of a breach of the convention. On March 22, Simon suggested to Leopold von Hoesch, the German Ambassador i n London, that supervision be l i m i t e d to " c e r t a i n European" states and that these states would agree to take joint action against a v i o l a t o r of the convention. This was a "personal suggestion . . . not yet approved by the Cabinet", and B r i t a i n would commit herself to f i n a n c i a l and 67  economic, though not m i l i t a r y , measures against v i o l a t o r s .  On  March 26, the Germans accepted the Simon p l a n , provided that both B r i t a i n and Russia were members of the European agreement and supervision was general, though one or two exceptions, such as Japan and America, might be permitted. The German acceptance was not to be communicated to P a r i s , where i t might be used to extract further  concessions  from Germany.**^ A major factor i n B r i t a i n ' s decision to reconsider her p o l i c y as 69  regards guarantees was the reports of Lord T y r r e l l from P a r i s . ' The B r i t i s h Ambassador reported that there were two schools of thought i n France, one b e l i e v i n g that any convention would be i n j u r i o u s to Franoe  197  because Germany would not observe i t s terms, the other b e l i e v i n g that even an " i n d i f f e r e n t " convention was worthwhile because i t would set l i m i t s to German rearmament and "maintain in ternation al s o l i d a r i t y " , and he believed that the l a t t e r would be successful i f B r i t a i n agreed to the Paul-Boncour proposals of December 5 1933 f o r 70 guarantees. The M i n i s t e r i a l Disarmament Committee discussed T y r r e l l ' s reports on March 26, and Simon appears to have pressed h i s colleagues 71 to agree to increase B r i t a i n ' s Continental commitments.  The Foreign  Secretary's proposals were not w e l l received. Most Ministers were opposed to g i v i n g France a d d i t i o n a l guarantees and some believed that 72 disarmament was no longer possible anyway.  A compromise was reached, .  and i t was decided that T y r r e l l should ask Barthou whether France would accept a convention based on H i t l e r ' s amendments to the B r i t i s h proposals i f B r i t a i n gave guarantees regarding the execution of the 73 convention.  On March 29, the Ambassador c a r r i e d out h i s i n s t r u c t i o n s .  Barthou refused to answer the B r i t i s h i n q u i r y immediately and counselled delay while the French Government discussed i t s attitude towards the whole disarmament question. An interim Note was handed to T y r r e l l on A p r i l 6 , ^ but i t avoided a d i r e c t answer to the B r i t i s h questions. The delay probably accurred because the French Cabinet was d i v i d e d . Tardieu and Herriot (together with General Weygand, Chief of the General Staff) were opposed to a convention l e g a l i z i n g German rearmament, while Barthou and Flandin were i n favour of a convention 75  provided B r i t a i n inoreased her security guarantees. ^ Francois-Poncet also favoured the l a t t e r course and made a special journey to Paris 76 on A p r i l 9 t o put h i s case to the more important French M i n i s t e r s . There was some doubt about Doumergue*s a t t i t u d e , though by A p r i l 9  198  he had  decided i n favour of the H e r r i o t - T a r d i e u l i n e .  77  On  April  17  7ft  B a r t h o u handed C a m p b e l l a N o t e justified  s a y i n g t h a t P r a n c e w o u l d not  i n proceeding with negotiations f o r a convention  be  legalizing  German rearmament. A c o n s i d e r a b l e f a c t o r i n determining the French d e c i s i o n t o break o f f n e g o t i a t i o n s was  the p u b l i c a t i o n  on M a r c h 27  o f t h e German  defence  79 e s t i m a t e s f o r 1934-5* Army e x p e n d i t u r e was i n c r e a s e d b y t h i r t y - s i x p e r c e n t , n a v a l e x p e n d i t u r e by t w e n t y - s e v e n p e r ^ c e n t and a i r 80 e x p e n d i t u r e by two y e a r , and  h u n d r e d and  the French Note of A p r i l  f o r a general indictment  at b e s t , a b l u n d e r  grounds  p u b l i c a t i o n of the  of the h i g h e s t order, because i t strengthened  seems t h a t t h e g a f f e was  The  preoeeding  s t a g e o f t h e disarmament n e g o t i a t i o n s  t h e p o s i t i o n o f T a r d i e u and H e r r i o t  German T r e a s u r y , who  over the  17 u s e d t h e s e i n c r e a s e s a s  o f German p o l i c y . The  estimates during the c r i t i c a l was,  seventy per cent,  w i t h i n the French Cabinet. I t  due t o t h e u l t r a - m e t h o d i c a l o f f i c i a l s  d i d n o t h a v e t h e sense t o w i t h h o l d t h e  of the 8l  figures.  q u e s t i o n r e m a i n s as t o w h e t h e r B r i t a i n c o u l d have i n d u c e d  t o accept  an arms c o n v e n t i o n b y  o f f e r i n g her a d d i t i o n a l  France  security 82  guarantees.  Eden thought  and Doumergue a d m i t t e d  But  i n the event  successful,  d e c l a r e d her  o f a German a g g r e s s i o n " t h e n  17 would have b e e n o f a d i f f e r e n t  i f t h i s were t r u e , why  demarche o f M a r c h 29?  o f f e r might have b e e n  t o C a m p b e l l t h a t i f B r i t a i n had  " s o l i d a r i t y with France French r e p l y of A p r i l  a British  the  nature.  d i d t h e French not r e p l y t o t h e  Doumergue's s u g g e s t i o n t h a t a B r i t i s h  British declaration  8A o f s o l i d a r i t y was  " t o o muoh t o e x p e c t "  Nevertheless, B r i t a i n  c a n be  criticized  i s not v e r y c o n v i n c i n g . f o r not  c l a r i f y i n g her  position  199  as regards guarantees. Simon d i d not follow up the demarche of March 29 u n t i l A p r i l 10, when he d i d no more than repeat the enquiry.. I f B r i t a i n had offered Prance a defensive a l l i a n c e , i t i s conceivable that Prance might have been induced to sign a convention. To a great extent, the f a i l u r e of the disarmament negotiations since October 1933 had been caused by B r i t a i n ' s u n r e a l i s t i c p o l i c i e s . H i t l e r ' s demands of October 24 were very moderate, yet B r i t a i n d i d not reply to them u n t i l December 8 and d i d not put forward a d e f i n i t i v e disarmament plan u n t i l January  29 1934«  The delay was  unnecessary - and also unfortunate, as the French Government became progressively weaker and less able to follow a strong l i n e i n foreign p o l i c y . By March, the B r i t i s h Government had more or l e s s accepted H i t l e r ' s proposals of October 24 1933, but by t h i s time there was a conservative administration i n France, reluctant to agree to an arms convention which legalized German rearmament. B r i t a i n had at l a s t 1  r e a l i z e d that concessions to Germany were necessary to secure a convention but apart from Eden and, at the l a s t minute, a reluctant Simon, there were few within the Government who r e a l i z e d that i t was also necessary to make concessions to French security demands. Daladier would have accepted H i t l e r ' s demands i f B r i t a i n had given 85  guarantees regarding the execution of the convention,  but by the  time the B r i t i s h Cabinet was considering such guarantees, the Daladier Government had f a l l e n . I t might s t i l l have been possible to achieve a convention i f B r i t a i n had been prepared to conclude an Anglo-French a l l i a n c e - as the Foreign O f f i c e advocated - but the Cabinet was; against increasing B r i t a i n ' s Continental commitments.  200  A f t e r the French Note of A p r i l 17, there was l i t t l e that B r i t a i n could do to revive the disarmament discussions. On A p r i l 2 8 , Joachim von Ribbentrop, Germany's newly appointed Special Commissioner f o r disarmament questions, t o l d Phipps that the only way out of the deadlock was f o r B r i t a i n to persuade the French to reverse t h e i r e a r l i e r decision to break off negotiations, otherwise Germany would 86  be freed from her e x i s t i n g l i m i t a t i o n s . But the French had already made up t h e i r minds. Norman Davis believed that the Note of A p r i l 17 87  was; a b l u f f , and some credence was given t o t h i s idea by Barthou*s suggestion of May 15 that a convention was s t i l l possible i f B r i t a i n 88  guaranteed the French and Belgian f r o n t i e r s against German attack. But H i t l e r was now opposed to a close Anglo-French r e l a t i o n s h i p , which, i n the aftermath of the French Note, would give the impression that B r i t a i n  had succumbed to anti-German pressure and abandoned her 89  t r a d i t i o n a l p o l i c y of "balancing" between P a r i s and B e r l i n . ' On May 29, on French i n s t i g a t i o n , the General Commission reassembled to oonsider the s i t u a t i o n . Davis reaffirmed that America would co-operate i n the preservation of peace but would not " p a r t i c i p a t e i n European p o l i t i o a l negotiations and settlements and would not make any commitment whatsoever to use i t s armed forces f o r the settlement 90 of any dispute anywhere". L i t v i n o v suggested that the Conference  91  should convert i t s e l f into a Peace Conference i n permanent  session.  On May 30, Simon stated t h a t , although B r i t a i n had no further proposals to o f f e r , he believed that i f good w i l l p r e v a i l e d , a compromise based on the memorandum of January 29 was s t i l l possible and t h a t , i n any case, protocols should be signed on such matters as the p r o h i b i t i o n  201  of chemical warfare, budgetary p u b l i c i t y and the establishment of a 92 Permanent Disarmament Commission. But Barthou, i n a speech which was "quite indescribable by those who heard i t and no account d i d j u s t i c e 93 t o i t s i r o n y , i t s insolence and i t s passion",  d i s p e l l e d any  remaining hopes that a convention might be attained. He condemned German p o l i c y , made i t clear that Prance would follow a p o l i c y of raison d'e*tat. and referred to Simon as "mon oher collegue et presque ami".94 After the meeting of the General Commission of May 30, the Bureau drafted a r e s o l u t i o n as t o the future work of the Conference and set up committees to deal with the problems of security, a i r armaments, guarantees of execution f o r a convention and the manufacture of and trade i n arms. On June 11, the General Commission appointed the Chairmen of these committees, and then adjourned sine d i e . The Conference d i d not meet again. A f t e r June 11 1934, i t was "every nation f o r i t s e l f and God f o r them a l l " .  202  CHAPTER ¥11  CONCLUSIONS  I t w o u l d be wrong t o s u g g e s t t h a t t h e f a i l u r e C o n f e r e n c e was  solely the fault  of Britain,  o f t h e Disarmament  as both Prance  and Germany  c o u l d h a v e f o l l o w e d more c o n c i l i a t o r y p o l i c i e s . But g i v e n t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f t h e t i m e , t h e p o l i c i e s o f t h e two C o n t i n e n t a l Powers? a r e u n d e r s t a n d a b l e . B r i t i s h p o l i c y i s n o t . The Government p e r c e i v e d ! that B r i t i s h  s e c u r i t y depended, i n p a r t a t l e a s t ,  on a  settled  C o n t i n e n t , y e t i t f o l l o w e d p o l i c i e s t h a t d i d n o t f a c i l i t a t e a disarmament c o n v e n t i o n . C o n c e s s i o n s t o b o t h F r a n c e and Germany were made r e l u c t a n t l y , and most M i n i s t e r s d i d n o t u n d e r s t a n d t h e i n t i m a t e c o n n e c t i o n between s e c u r i t y a n d disarmament o r t h e r o l e p l a y e d b y f o r c e i n t h e s e t t l e m e n t of i n t e r n a t i o n a l d i s p u t e s . I n t h e l o n g r u n , E u r o p e a n s e c u r i t y depended on a p e a c e f u l s o l u t i o n o f t h e German p r o b l e m , and t h i s c o u l d be a c h i e v e d o n l y t h r o u g h t h e appeasement  o f German g r i e v a n c e s o v e r t h e Peaoe T r e a t y . Germany w o u l d  n o t w i l l i n g l y r e m a i n a s e c o n d - c l a s s Power and o t h e r Powers were f a c e d with the i n e v i t a b i l i t y favour. Consequently,  o f a r e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f E u r o p e a n power i n h e r i t was i n t h e i n t e r e s t s o f t h e o t h e r Powers t o  c o n t r o l t h e e x t e n t a n d speed  o f t h i s r e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f power,  t h i s m i g h t have b e e n a c c o m p l i s h e d ,  and  i n p a r t , b y a disarmament c o n v e n t i o n .  But F r a n c e , q u i t e n a t u r a l l y , wanted t o e n s u r e t h a t any i n c r e a s e i n German power was Britain,  offset  by i n c r e a s e d a s s u r a n c e s o f support  from  and t h u s a disarmament c o n v e n t i o n was p o s s i b l e o n l y i f  B r i t a i n gave F r a n c e t h e a s s u r a n c e s she demanded. But a l t h o u g h M i n i s t e r s understood that international  British  s t a t e s had t o a d j u s t t o c h a n g e s w i t h i n  s o c i e t y , t h e y f a i l e d t o u n d e r s t a n d t h a t power was  an  203  essential element i n the process of "peaceful change". They believed that French security was adequately protected by the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s and were opposed to undertaking new commitments on the Continent. B r i t i s h Ministers repeatedly t o l d the French that public opinion would not support a polioy based on new security guarantees to France, and though the effect of opinion should not be over—estimated a fear of p o l i t i c a l repercussions was c e r t a i n l y a factor whioh led the Government to adhere to a p o l i c y of "no commitments". I t might even be said that B r i t i s h Ministers became v i c t i m s of t h e i r own myth vigorously propounded during the 1920s - that an internation al "harmony of i n t e r e s t s " existed and that d i r e c t B r i t i s h involvement i n the European security system was not essential f o r the negotiation of a disarmament convention. "Harmony of i n t e r e s t s " was a very s e l f - s e r v i n g doctrine. It permitted! B r i t a i n to exert an amount of influence on the Continent out of a l l proportion t o B r i t i s h involvement i n the European security system and allowed the Government t o concentrate on defending B r i t a i n more immediate i n t e r e s t s - the security of the Empire and the defence of her trade routes. The disarmament schemes put forward by the Government at Geneva were based almost s o l e l y on these immediate interests and made l i t t l e attempt to solve the main problem facing the Disarmament Conference - the German problem. Although France and Germany looked to B r i t a i n f o r help i n solving t h e i r problems, the B r i t i s h Government d e l i b e r a t e l y avoided the r o l e of "broker" - except when the r o l e was unavoidable. The Government adopted the negative p o l i c y of "wait and see" and was reluctant to come forward with  204  proposals f o r a Franco-German settlement. MacDonald would only suggest that Prance and Germany "put t h e i r demands i n such a way that B r i t a i n could say that she supported both s i d e s " . During 1932, both Prance and Germany put forward disarmament proposals which, though r e f l e c t i n g national requirements, might w e l l have formed the basis of a convention. But each soheme proved abortive, mainly because of B r i t i s h opposition. B r i t i s h aversion t o a consultative pact or a pledge t o supply a i r c r a f t to a v i c t i m of aggression was the main reason f o r the f a i l u r e of the Brttning plan i n A p r i l ; MacDonaldfs h o s t i l i t y to a Franco-German entente or a l l i a n c e was instrumental i n causing Herriot to break off h i s negotiations with Papen at Lausanne; and the Government's unwillingness to undertake new commitments was the major obstacle to an agreement based on the French plan of November 14. Yet w h i l s t obstructing these attempts to seoure a Franco-German compromise, B r i t i s h Ministers were reluctant to offer alternative proposals. Baldwin's scheme f o r q u a l i t a t i v e disarmament of May 13 seems to have been i n s p i r e d by a desire to improve B r i t i s h naval strength, and the schemes enunciated on July 7 and November 17 were l i t t l e more than negative reaotions to the Hoover proposals of June 22 and the French plan of November 14 r e s p e c t i v e l y . Each plan was based on B r i t a i n ' s security requirements, or rather the Government's conception of these requirements. The proposals of July 7 and November 17 envisaged the a b o l i t i o n or r e s t r i c t i o n of weapons that threatened B r i t i s h security or which the armed forces d i d not f i n d useful ("submarines, whioh they d i d not want and tanks over twenty tons, which they d i d not possess") but the retention of weapons that B r i t a i n  205  found u s e f u l , notably medium tanks and bombers. And the Baldwin plan - i f i t was intended as a serious proposal - was l i t t l e more than an attempt to increase B r i t a i n ' s naval strength at the expense of America and Japan by abolishing c a p i t a l ships, a i r c r a f t - c a r r i e r s and submarines (the main strength of the American and Japanese navies) but not cruisers or destroyers (the main strength of the Royal Wavy). None of the three B r i t i s h plans of 1932 made any r e a l attempt to oome t o grips with the German problem. Eaoh contained concessions to Germany's demands f o r equality - i f only because German security requirements were f a i r l y s i m i l a r to B r i t a i n ' s - but offered no corresponding concessions to French demands f o r s e c u r i t y . The November 17 scheme d i d envisage a "no-force pact" t o mobilize world opinion a  against an aggressor, but to France this was of no more use than the "paper guarantee" of the Kellogg Pact. By October 1932, most members of the B r i t i s h Government seem to have been convinced that disarmament was impossible, and from t h i s time onwards a desire to ensure that B r i t a i n would not be held responsible f o r a breakdown of the negotiations became a prominent, i f not dominant, factor i n B r i t i s h disarmament p o l i c y . C e r t a i n l y t h i s was the main reason f o r MaoDonald l a y i n g the B r i t i s h draft convention before the Disarmament Conference on March 16 1933. Neither the Prime M i n i s t e r nor Foreign Secretary had any great hope that the draft oonvention would be successful and indeed,, after presenting it> to the General Commission, they had no idea as to what should be done next. The MacDonald plan d i d make some attempt at f a c i l i t a t i n g a Franco-German compromise, but l i k e previous B r i t i s h plans, i t was  206  based  p r i m a r i l y on B r i t a i n ' s own  seourity requirements.  It  t h e R.A.P. -  r e d u c t i o n s i n t h e a i r f o r c e s o f t h e G r e a t Powers - e x c e p t and t h e whilst  o t h e r Powers were e x p e c t e d B r i t a i n would be  purposes  t o abandon t h e p r i v i l e g e  f r e e t o use  t h i s method o f w a r f a r e  i n o u t l y i n g d i s t r i c t s " . The  o f bombing "for police  o t h e r Powers were a l s o  t o g i v e up t h e i r h e a v y t a n k s , w h i l e B r i t a i n , who  d i d not  few models b u t  expected  possess  h e a v y t a n k s , w o u l d be a l l o w e d t o r e t a i n h e r medium t a n k s t o n s , o f w h i c h she had  envisaged  any  of sixteen  reputedly l e d the world i n  development. As r e g a r d s t h e German p r o b l e m , t h e MacDonald p l a n made a number o f c o n c e s s i o n s t o German demands and went a l o n g way practical But  application of equality  over a p e r i o d of f i v e  i t f a i l e d t o o f f e r corresponding concessions t o F r a n c e . There  no p r o v i s i o n f o r c o n t i n u o u s or f o r "guarantees its  of r i g h t s  towards s e c u r i n g t h e  and  automatic  o f e x e c u t i o n " . The  Government wanted t o  i n f l u e n c e on t h e C o n t i n e n t w i t h o u t  involvement  i n the European s e c u r i t y  make some attempt their  supervision of the  paying the p r i c e  and  automatic  t o a f o u r - y e a r p e r i o d e d ' e p r e u v e and  A c o n v e n t i o n might  still  maintain  of greater  by  relaxing  s u p e r v i s i o n and  guarantees  involvement  f o r the  on t h e E u r o p e a n  have been n e g o t i a t e d i n October  unlike the I t a l i a n s ,  reject  by  agreeing but  execution  t h e B r i t i s h Government d e c i d e d t o u p h o l d t h e MacDonald p l a n amended i n September and  convention  an e i g h t - y e a r c o n v e n t i o n ,  a t no t i m e were t h e y w i l l i n g t o a c c e p t of the convention i n v o l v i n g d i r e c t  was  system. B r i t i s h M i n i s t e r s d i d  t o meet F r e n c h w i s h e s d u r i n g 1933  o p p o s i t i o n t o continuous  years.  Continent.  1933, as  t h e German demand f o r " s a m p l e s "  and p o s s i b l y t h e F r e n c h  and  Americans -  but  and  -  207  consequently, Germany withdrew from the Disarmament Conference. Simon maintained that B r i t a i n could not agree to German rearmament, hut t h i s was an irrelevant question as i t was clear that Germany would rearm whether a disarmament convention permitted i t or not. B r i t i s h Ministers apparently f a i l e d to understand that i t was the i n te r n a t io n a l l i m i t a t i o n and control of armaments rather than reductions i n armaments which lead to s e c u r i t y . Thus they were slow to follow up H i t l e r * s disarmament proposals of Octoher 24, and by March 1934, when a convention seemed p o s s i b l e , there was a conservative administration i n Prance, u n w i l l i n g to l e g a l i z e German rearmament. An Anglo-French a l l i a n c e might s t i l l have enabled a convention to be concluded, but the Cabinet was reluctant to increase B r i t a i n ' s Continental commitments and did no more than inquire whether France would accept a convention based on H i t l e r ' s amendments to the B r i t i s h proposals of January 29 i f B r i t a i n gave c e r t a i n guarantees f o r the execution of the convention. On A p r i l 17, the Frenoh e f f e c t i v e l y broke off a l l negotiations f o r a disarmament convention. I f B r i t a i n had had a clearer v i s i o n of what was required to conclude a disarmament convention, the Government might, i n i t s own i n t e r e s t , have smoothed the way at various points and f a c i l i t a t e d the conclusion of a Franco-German compromise o f f e r i n g some hope of a peaceful s o l u t i o n t o the German problem. Instead, B r i t i s h Ministers misconstrued t h e i r long-term interests f o r short-term advantages and followed a p o l i c y that was not conducive to a Franco-German  settlement.  Anthony Eden suggested that MacDonald and Simon "missed the disarmament bus" while Bruning was i n power and thereafter found i t impossible t o overtake i t .  1  In f a c t , they made no r e a l attempt to catch i t , perhaps  even f a i l e d to r e a l i z e why they should catch i t .  208  FOOTNOTES  P r i n c i p a l  DBFP  Abbreviations  Great  B r i t a i n ,  Foreign  Office,  Documents  on  B r i t i s h  Foreign  P o l i c y  1919-1939. DDB  Belgium,  Ministere  Beiges DDF  France,  Ministdre  United  States,  P o l i c y DIA  Royal  Etrangeres,  States,  United  Affaires  Etrangeres,  of  State,  of  International  Department  of  State,  House  of  Commons,  PDL  Great  B r i t a i n ,  House  of  Lords,  RDG  League  SIA  on  German  Documents  Foreign  Nations,  Armaments, L i m i t a t i o n  Conference Records of  of  for the  1  to  Conference Minutes  of  the  A i r  MB  Minutes  of  the  Bureau.  MGC  Minutes  of  the  General  MLC  Minutes  of  the  Land  MNC  Minutes  of  the  Naval  VRPM  Verbatim  Inis  Chapter  L.  of  the  of  the  Debates.  Debates.  Reduction  Conference  for  and  Limitation  the  Reduction  armaments.  CD  Institute  Parliamentary  Documents.  Records  Commission.  of  Commission.  Commission. Commission. Plenary  International  Meetings.  A f f a i r s ,  Survey  of  A f f a i r s .  Notes  Foreign  on  Relations  Parliamentary  MAC  Royal  Diplomaticrues  States.  B r i t a i n ,  and  Documents  Documents  A f f a i r s ,  Great  of  Diplomaticrues  A f f a i r s .  PDC  of  Documents  1918-1945.  Institute  United  des  Department  International FRUS  Affaires  1932-1939.  Francais DGFP  des  1920-1940.  I  Claude  J n r . ,  Swords  into  Plowshares,  p.  263  International  209  2  I b i d . , p.  3  See i b i d . , pp.  268-9. 228-38.  4 I b i d . , p . 256. 5 Cited i n P . J . Noel Baker, Disarmament, p . 25. 6 , A l l i e d Note, June 16 1919, c i t e d i n J . W. Wheeler-Bennett, The Disarmament Deadlock, p . 3. 7 Opinion on t h i s point was d i v i d e d . P. J . Noel Baker, an eminent authority on i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, considered the obligation to be l e g a l (see Noel Baker, l o c . c i t . ) while the B r i t i s h Foreign O f f i c e considered the obligation to be moral only (see DBFP Ser. 2, v o l . 4, no. 9 2 ) . 8 Great B r i t a i n , Foreign O f f i c e , Correspondence with the A l l i e d Governments concerning Reparation Payments by Germany, Misc. No. 5 ( 1 9 2 3 ) , Cmd.  1943, p.  28.  9 The phrase "wipe out the past" i s that of Lord Curzon (Foreign Secretary) speaking to representatives of the U . K . , the Dominions and I n d i a , June 22 1921, c i t e d i n E a r l of Ronaldshay, The L i f e of Lord Curzon, v o l . 3, p . 226. 10 Stanley Baldwin (Lord President), July 30 1934, PDC, 5 t h Ser., v o l . 292, c o l . 2339. 11 Austen Chamberlain (Lord P r i v y Seal), Feb. 8 1922, PDC. 5 t h S e r . , v o l . 150, e o l . 198. The expression "Guardian on the Rhine" seems to have been coined by Arnold Wolfers. See A. Wolfers, B r i t a i n and France between Two Wars, pp. 229-41. 12 J . R. MacDonald, "Protocol or Pact?", International C o n c i l i a t i o n September 1925, pp. 256-63. 13 MacDonald to Secretary-General of the League of Nations, July 5 1924, Great B r i t a i n , Foreign O f f i c e , Correspondence between h i s Majesty's Government and the League of Nations respecting the proposed Treaty of Mutual Assistance, Misc. No. 13 ( 1 9 2 4 ) , Cmd. 2200; Viscount C e c i l , A Great Experiment, p . 158. 14  E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years C r i s i s 1919-1939, p . 67.  15 The Assembly report on the Protocol explained that the Protocol did not apply to "disputes which aim at r e v i s i n g t r e a t i e s and i n t e r n a t i o n a l acts i n force or which seek to jeopardise the e x i s t i n g t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y of signatory s t a t e s " . I b i d . , pp. 257-8. 16 See Chamberlain's declaration to the League Council of March 12 1925, International C o n c i l i a t i o n , September 1925, PP» 245-55•  210  17 C e c i l , op. c i t . , pp. 183 and 188. 18 I b i d . , pp. 171-2  and  183.  I b i d . , pp. 183-4*  20 I b i d . , p. 183. 21 I b i d . , pp. 186-7. 22 A. J . P. T a y l o r , E n g l i s h H i s t o r y 1914-1945. P. 255, n. 3 . 23 C e c i l , op. c i t . , p. 190. 24 C i t e d i n G. M. Gathorne-Hardy. A Short H i s t o r y of I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s 1920-1939. pp. 182-3. 25 Henderson, March 9 1931,  PDC, 5th Ser., v o l . 249,  c o l . 827.  26 Henderson, September 11 1930, League of Nations, Record of the Eleventh Assembly, f o u r t h plenary meeting, September 11 1930, p. 3 , c i t e d i n G. A. C r a i g and F. G i l b e r t , The Diplomats 1919-1939, v o l . 2, P. 333. 27 M. A. Hamilton, Arthur Henderson, pp. 336-40; Labour's Way t o Peace, pp. 4 6 - 5 0 .  A. Henderson,  28 Memorandum r e s p e c t i n g the Development of the Idea of a Mediterranean Pact, J u l y 2 1934, p r i n t e d f o r the use of the Foreign O f f i c e and deposited i n the archives of the P u b l i c Record O f f i c e , London (no r e f e r e n c e ) . A photocopy of t h i s document was supplied to the author by Dr. P. M a r z a r i . 29 Henderson t o Lindsay (Washington), May 3 1931, v o l . 2, no. 350.  DBFP Ser. 2,  30 P. P. Walters, A H i s t o r y of the League of Nations, p.  416.  31 Por the text of the Draft Convention, see League of Nations, Preparatory Commission f o r the Disarmament Conference, Draft Convention. 32 E."W. Bennett, Germany and the Diplomacy of the F i n a n c i a l C r i s i s ; 1931. p. 78. For a f u l l d i s c u s s i o n of the German a t t i t u d e towards the customs union proposal, see i b i d . , pp. 4 0 - 8 1 . 33 T y r r e l l ( P a r i s ) t o Rumbold ( B e r l i n ) and Phipps (Vienna), March 25 1931, DBFP Ser. 2, v o l . 2, no. 5 . 34 Henderson t o Lindsay, June 26 1931, i b i d . , no. 87; aide-memoire to the French Government, J u l y 2 1931, i b i d . , no. 118; conversation between Henderson and C u r t i u s , J u l y 21 1931, i b i d . , no. 221.  211  Lord  35 Winds  of  Europe,  Londonderry, Change,  pp.  E a r l  36  of  A.  314;  216-9;  M. A .  Avon  ( S i r A.  of  Dictators,  p.  Wings  C.  Destiny, Temperley,  Hamilton, Eden),  Hamilton,  op.  38  I b i d . .  The Eden  250.  p.  c i t . ,  Samuel  had been of  the  established  i n March  to  Madvise  forthcoming  Troubled  40 v o l .  Years,  Record  of  4,  211.  Notes  no.  t o  a  from  Londonderry,  p .  l o c .  op.  c i t . .  3  Templewood,  4  See B .  H . L i d d e l l  5  I b i d . ,  p .  187.  6  I b i d . ,  p .  190.  7  K.  8  Simon,  9  Tardieu,  10  11 1932,  250.  the  op.  Gibson  as  to  of  L i b e r a l  members  Imperial  the  policy  Viscount  December  Londonderry,  on  a  Defence t o  be  adopted  Templewood,  6  1932,  DBPP  Ser.  2,  1932,  cited  i n  p.  174*  c i t .  8  February see  February  56.  Hart,  Memoirs,  and J . Barnes^  February  t o  the  Conference".  Meeting,  t o  p .  c i t . ,  l o c .  Middlemas  plan,  one o f  Committee  c i t .  MacDonald  Temperley,  vol.  Facing  of p .  II  2  French  Memoirs;  Gallery  Friends,  118.  Five-Power  Chapter  Letter  1  1931  Disarmament  See MacDonald,  39  My Good  250-1.  pp.  sub-committee  Nine  Macmillan,  The Whispering  Remembering  three-party the  H .  96-7;  p.22.  37  at  pp.  1932,  Baldwin;  R D C , VRPM  a  v o l . 1, pp.  1,  pp.  113-6.  (Secretary  of  State),  1932,  R D C , CD v o l .  pp.  184-90.  Biography.  i b i d . ,  8  Stimson  v o l . . 1,  pp.  60-4.  731.  55-9.  F o r the  March  p .  17  text  1932,  of  the  PRUS; ,1932 ?  1, p p . 54-9» Memorandum DBFP  Ser.  by  Simon  2,  v o l .  on a 3,  no.  conversation 235.  with  Tardieu,  February  24  212  12 Gibson, February 9 1932, RDC, YRPM v o l . 1, pp. 64-7. 13 Grandi, February 10 1932, i b i d . , pp. 71^4. 14 Litvinov, February 11 1932, i b i d . . pp. 8 I - 7 . 15 Hadolny, February 18 1932, i b i d . , pp. 143-9* 16 L i d d e l l Hart, op. c i t . , pp. 1 9 4 - 5 . 17 Ibid., p. 194'. 18 Memorandum by Simon on a conversation with Tardieu, February 24 1932, DBFP Ser. 2, v o l . 3» « 2355 memorandum by Simon on a conversation with Tardieu, March 12 1932, i b i d . . no. 236. n 0  19 At least, there i s nothing i n the published B r i t i s h documents or i n any memoir sources to suggest that Simon followed up h i s enquiries. 20 Originally, the Easter break was to have ended on A p r i l 4. but i t was extended to April 11 because of an Extraordinary Session of the League Assembly discussing the Far Eastern situation resulting from the Japanese occupation of Manchuria. RDC, MGC v o l . 1, pp. 31-3. 21 Simon to Rumbold, March 30 1932, DBFP Ser. 2, v o l . 3, no. 239. 22 Gibson, April 11 1932, RDC, 1GG v o l . 1, pp. 38^41. 23 Litvinov, April 12 1932, i b i d . , pp. 4 6 - 5 O ; RDC, C D v o l . 1, pp. 124-37. 24 Tardieu, April 11 1932, RDC, MGC v o l . 1, pp. 44-6; Tardieu, April 12 1932, i b i d . , pp. 50-5. 25 Ibid.. p. 82. 26 For the text of the resolution, see i b i d . , p. 91. The Soviets voted against the resolution because of i t s reference to the application of A r t i c l e 8 of the Covenant, a document the Soviet Union had not signed. 27 Ibid., p. 113. 28 Ibid.. p. 116. 29 Ibid., p. 113.' 30 Meeting between representatives of the U.K. and U.S., April 23 1932, DBFP Ser. 2, v o l . 3, no. 240.  213  31 C o n v e r s a t i o n among members of the A m e r i c a n , B r i t i s h and German d e l e g a t i o n s , A p r i l 26 1932, FRUS 1932 v o l . 1, p p . 108-12. 32 See above, p.  44• a l s o L i d d e l l H a r t ,  33 G i b s o n t o A c t i n g S e c r e t a r y of  loc.  State, A p r i l  cit. 29 1932,  FRUS 1932  v o l . 1, p p . 112-4. 34 See, e . g . , W a l t e r s , op. c i t . pp. 506-7, Wheeler-Bennett, op. c i t . , p. 33 and F r a n z von Papen, Memoirs, p . 140. t  35 A . F r a n c o i s - P o n o e t , S o u v e n i r s d'une ambassade a B e r l i n , p . 36 Papen, l o c . c i t . A p p a r e n t l y , Brttning d i d not t h a t t h e F r e n c h had accepted h i s p l a n ! 37 Memorandum by D a v i s , F e b r u a r y 12 1932, See a l s o , i b i d . , p . 6 2 .  41•  inform h i s successor  FRUS 1932 v o l .  1,  pp. 34-9.  38 G i b s o n t o S t i m s o n , Maroh 17 A o t i n g S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e , A p r i l  1932, i b i d . , p p . 54—9» G i b s o n t o 21 1932, i b i d . . pp. 10-4-6.  39 G i b s o n t o S t i m s o n , March 17 A c t i n g S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e , A p r i l H a r t , o p . o i t . . p. 195*  1932, i b i d . , p p . 5 4 - 9 ; G i b s o n t o 21 1932, i b i d . . pp. 104-i6j M d d e l l  40 DBFP S e r . 2, v o l . 3 , n o . 240, n.'4. 41 See DBFP S e r . 2, v o l . 4 , n o s . 5 2 , 74,  110  42 G i b s o n t o A o t i n g S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e , A p r i l  and 136. 29 1932,  FRUS; 1932  v o l . 1, p p . 112-4, Temperley, o p . c i t . , p. 2 0 3 . 43 I b i d . ,  p.  204.  44 T h i s i s a p e r s o n a l s u g g e s t i o n based m a i n l y on c i r c u m s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e . A p p a r e n t l y , no B r i t i s h r e c o r d was kept of t h e c o n v e r s a t i o n s of A p r i l 2 6 . On A p r i l 2 3 , however, MacDonald d i d i n f o r m Stimson t h a t t h e B r i t i s h Cabinet had d e c i d e d unanimously a g a i n s t g i v i n g f u r t h e r assuranoes such as a M e d i t e r r a n e a n Locarno " f o r e n t e r i n g i n t o a d d i t i o n a l commitments i n v o l v i n g t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of m i l i t a r y or n a v a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s i n the event of C o n t i n e n t a l w a r " . DBFP S e r . 2, v o l . 3 , n o . 240. See a l s o , Gibson t o A c t i n g S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e , A p r i l 25 1932, FRUS 1932 v o l . 1, p p . 106-8. 45 Temperley,  op. c i t . .  p.  46 The F r e n c h found t h e i r were embarrassed by t h e f a c t d ' a s s a u t " . A h a s t y change t o French r e p u t a t i o n f o r l o g i c .  192. argument d i f f i c u l t t o s u b s t a n t i a t e and t h a t t h e y had c h r i s t e n e d t a n k s " c h a r s " c h a r s de combat" d i d not improve t h e I b i d . , p. 195*  214  47 Lord Stanhope, May 31 1932, RDC:, MLG. pp.  63-5-  48 RDC, MLC, pp. 1 1 2 - 2 8 . Por the debates i n the Land see i b i d . . pp. 1-96.  Commission,  49 L i d d e l l Hart, op. c i t . . pp. I85 and 2 0 8 . 50 Ibid., pp. 2 0 9 - 1 0 . 51 See RDC, MNC,  pp. 126-37.  52 For the report of the A i r Commission, See also, i b i d . , pp. 1-116.  see RDC, MAC,  pp. 2 9 9 - 3 1 2 .  53 Cabinet meeting of May 4, Middlemas and Barnes, op. c i t . . pp. 731-2. 54 Lord Londonderry, op. c i t . . pp. 39-40 and 6 6 - 7 . 55 Ibid.. pp. 52-3 and 66; Lord Londonderry, Ourselves and Germany.  PP. 53-4. 56 Lord Cecil, reported i n the "Manchester Guardian" of May 18 1 9 3 2 , cited i n Carr, op. c i t . . p. 2 5 . 57 Mellon to Acting Secretary of State, May 13 1932, FRUS 1932 v o l . 1, pp. 121-5; Gibson to Stimson, May 17 1 9 3 2 , i b i d . . pp. 130-1. 58 Mellon to Acting Secretary of State, May 13 1932, i b i d . , pp., 121-5. 59 Ibid. 60 Baldwin, speaking i n the Cabinet on May 4, Middlemas and Barnes, loc. c i t . 61 Mellon to Stimson, June 8 1 9 3 2 , FRUS: 1932 v o l . 1, pp. I58-6O; Gibson to Stimson, June 10 1 9 3 2 , i b i d . , pp. 163-6; Stimson to the American delegation i n Geneva, June 11 1 9 3 2 , i b i d . , pp. 166-8. 62 Gibson to Stimson, May 17 1 9 3 2 , i b i d . , pp. 130-1; Gibson to Stimson, June 7 1 9 3 2 , i b i d . . p. 1 5 7 . 63 Gibson to Stimson, June 10 1 9 3 2 , i b i d . . pp. 163-6. 64 Castle (Under-Secretary of State) to Stimson, May 25 1 9 3 2 , i b i d . . pp. I 8 5 - 6 . 65 Stimson to Gibson, May 16 1 9 3 2 , i b i d . . p. 129; Stimson to Gibson, June 7 1 9 3 2 , i b i d . , pp. 153-7; Stimson to Mellon, June 7 1 9 3 3 , i b i d . , pp. 157-8. 66 Ibid.  215  67  Stimson  proposals  battleships c a r r i e r s ,  and to  i n t e r n a l  m i l i t a r y time  of  In the  a  memorandum i n  scouting  71  and  forces  would of  be  reduced  Hoover  24,  battleships, mobile  purposes).  and  cruisers  guns  See  and  i b i d . ,  Davis  on  had and  i n d i v i d u a l necessary  one-third  would but  be  and  a l l  abolished  i n  reconnaissance  Papen,  op.  Simon  c i t . .  pp.  c i t . ,  p.  2,  113,  op. to  Newton  i b i d . ,  p.  v o l .  1,  no.  74  I b i d .  75  I b i d . .  76  Papen  the  a b o l i t i o n  (except  f o r  H e r r i o t ,  May  22  1932,  H e r r i o t ,  78  Papen,  v o l .  1,  and  9  op.  DBPP  1932,  Ser.  i b i d . ,  no.  no.  133;  notes  no.  134*  See  1932,  Meeting,  June  guerre  l ' a u t r e .  the  c i t . .  £  idea  of  Blomberg,  11  a  of  v o l .  3,  an  also,  322;  i b i d . ,  no.  no.  108.  134*  Papen,  entente  Schleicher.  to  Anglo-  i b i d . .  1932, p.  47-8.  T y r r e l l  128;  m i l i t a r y  not  2,  pp.  See  originated DDF S e r .  1,  2.  1,  MacDonald,  op.  op.  1932,  conversation,  of  c i t . ,  c i t . .  no.  June  Ser.  July  5  an  148;  2-4  pp.  pp.  DBFP  annexes  no.  Francois-Poneet,  175,  46,  21  annex  3.  DBFP  1932,  Ser.  v o l .  2,  3,  no.  144;  c i t .  77  3,  annex  Ser. to  d'une  Apparently,  Hammerstein  46,  l o c .  Notes  J a d i s ;  176.  Generals  46,  Anglo-French  H e r r i o t ,  with  27  an  June  6  1932,  of  Neurath,  June  11  Notes  to  ( B e r l i n ) ,  June  Papen,  with  Francois-Poncet,  156;  Meeting,  E .  envisaging  one-third  and  aviation  and  156  i b i d . .  c i t . .  a  43.  p.  Papen,  French  proposals  destroyers  a, c o n v e r s a t i o n  1932,  79  of  of  180-2.  pp.  11  v o l .  a i r c r a f t -  those  outlined  m i l i t a r y  June  no.  i n  a i r c r a f t - c a r r i e r s ,  Office,  June  tonnage  132-9.  pp.  c i t . .  May  Foreign  73  by  prohibited,  Simon  op.  of  Stimson*s  t o t a l  l i m i t a t i o n  excess  armaments  124?  72  the  reduction  the  i n  be  land  would  submarines  Memorandum b y  i b i d . ,  no.  part  of  of  heavy  tanks,  70  one-fifth  153-7*  pp.  i n  allowed.  of  69  Land  duties  as  a  i b i d . ,  reduction  destroyers  Bombing  reduction  op.  and  police  7 1932,  June  one-third  tons.  aviation  a b o l i t i o n  68  a  submarines,  250  peace.  planes  Gibson,  cruisers  submarines for  to  envisaged  176-7; v o l .  2,  notes  no.  68,  of  no.  3,  ibid.»,  1932, and  338-9.  no.  an  See  176.  annexes  Anglo-French  conversation, c i t . ,  pp.  of  DDF  an  Ser.  conversation,  Anglo-German 1,  v o l .  1,  1-2.  H e r r i o t ,  op.  Anglo-French notes  148;  June  343-5*  27  1932,  DBPP  Ser.  2,  216  80 ITaid,. p . 347; memorandum "by Papen, June 29 1932, c i t e d i n DGFP S e r . C, v o l . 1, no. 43, 2; n o t e s o f an A n g l o - F r e n c h c o n v e r s a t i o n , June 27 1932, DBFP S e r . 2, v o l . 3, n o . 148. 81 Papen had d r o p p e d h i n t s about h i s p r o p o s a l s t o Stephane Lauzanne o f "Le M a t i n " , but t h e i r r e c e p t i o n i n Germany was u n e n t h u s i a s t i c and t h e . n a t i o n a l i s t p r e s s opposed them. See, e.g., n o t e s o f an A n g l o German c o n v e r s a t i o n , June 27 1932, i b i d . , n o . 149* 82 I b i d ; H e r r i o t , op. c i t . . p . 345? Papen, 83 See n o t e s o f an A n g l o - F r e n c h - G e r m a n DBFP S e r . 2, v o l . 3, n o . 150. 84 Papen,  op. c i t . . p .  conversation,  177•  J u n e 28  1932,  op. c i t . . p p . 181-2.  85 See below, p . 64* 86 N o t e s o f an Anglo-German v o l . 3, n o . 174*  conversation,  J u l y 5 1932, DBFP S e r . 2,  87 N o t e s o f an A n g l o - F r e n c h c o n v e r s a t i o n ,  J u l y 5 1932,  i b i d . . no.  88 N o t e s o f an A n g l o - F r e n c h c o n v e r s a t i o n ,  J u l y 8 1932,  ibid..  89 F o r t h e t e x t o f t h e A n g l o - F r e n c h D e c l a r a t i o n , see i b i d . . enclosure. 90 N o t e s o f an A n g l o - F r e n c h c o n v e r s a t i o n ,  J u l y 5 1932,  no. I 8 4 .  no.  ibid.,  175*  189,  no.  172.  91 See i b i d . . n o s . 172 and I 8 4 . D i r e c t e v i d e n c e t h a t t h e h i n d e r i n g o f Franco-German n e g o t i a t i o n s and t h e need f o r an a l l y a g a i n s t t h e H o o v e r p l a n were t h e p r i m a r y o b j e c t i v e s o f t h e B r i t i s h p r o p o s a l i s l a c k i n g , but t h e c i r c u m s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e i s c o n v i n c i n g i n i t s e l f . 92 N o t e s o f an A n g l o - F r e n c h c o n v e r s a t i o n , J u l y 5 1932, i b i d . . n o . n o t e s o f an A n g l o - F r e n c h c o n v e r s a t i o n , J u l y 8 1932, i b i d . . no. 184; MacDonald t o H e r r i o t , J u l y 13 1932, DDF S e r . 1, v o l . 1, n o . 17.  172;  93 G i b s o n , June 22 1932, RDC, MGC v o l . 1, pp. 122-4. F o r t h e g e n e s i s o f H o o v e r ' s p r o p o s a l s and t h e c o n s i d e r a b l e amendments made b y t h e S t a t e Department t o t h e o r i g i n a l p l a n , see FRUS 1932 v o l . 1, pp. 180-214. 94 See RDC,  MGC  v o l . 1, pp. 129-30.  95 Simon, June 22 1932, i b i d . , pp. 124-6; Simon, June 23 1932, PDC. 5 t h S e r . , v o l . 267, c o l s . 1264-5; Simon, June 27 1932, i b i d . , c o l s . 1459-60; B a l d w i n , June 27 1932, i b i d . , c o l s . I 4 6 O - I ; B a l d w i n , June 28 1932, i b i d . . c o l s . 1776-80; n o t e b y Samuel (Home S e c r e t a r y ) o f a c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h H e n d e r s o n , June 24 1932, DBFP S e r . 2, v o l . 3, no. 254»  217 96 Gibson to Stimson, July 1 1932, FRUS. 1932 v o l . 1, p. 252. 97 See above, p. 63. 98 The f u l l Statement of Views circulated by the Government i s  published i n RDC, CD v o l . 1, pp. 265-8.  99 Gibson to Stimson, June 25 1932, FRUS: 1932 v o l . 1, pp. 234-6? memorandum by Stimson, June 30 1932, i b i d . . pp. 249-51* 100 Gibson to Stimson, July 2 1932, i b i d . , pp. 253-^5. 101 Gibson to Stimson, July 2 1932, i b i d . , pp. 253-5-and 255-7. 102 For the progress of the private conversations leading to the  report of July 5, see DBFP Ser. 2, v o l . 3, nos. 241-9, 251-3, 256-7 and 261. 103 The f u l l resolution and Benes' appraisal of i t i s i n RDC, MGC v o l . 1, pp. 153-61. Simon's original draft i s i n FRUS. 1932 v o l . 1,  pp. 284-7-  104 The Committee had reported i t s (unanimous) findings to the General Commission on May 31. RDC. CD v o l . 1, pp. 210-5. 105 See above, pp. 44 and 50. 106 See above, pp. 60-1. 107 Balbo, July 21 1932, RDC. MGC v o l . 1, p. 168. 108 Patteson (Geneva) to Vansittart (Permanent Under-Secretary), July 20 1932, DBFP Ser. 2, v o l . 3, no. 265; Rumbold to Simon, July 21 1932, i b i d . . no. 269; Gibson to Stimson, July 21 1932, FRUS 1932 v o l . 1, p. 309.  Notes to Chapter III  1 DBFP Ser. 2, v o l . 4, no. 46, n. 1. 2 Francois-Poncet to Herriot, August 23 1932, DDF Ser. 1, v o l . 1, no. 115; Francois-Poncet to Herriot, August 25 1932, i b i d . , no. 125, annex; DBFP Ser. 2, v o l . 4, nos. 49 and 55-7. 3 Memorandum from the German Government to the French Government, August 29 1932, i b i d . , no. 62.  218  4  Herriot  Prague Simon to  and to  1932,  to  i b i d . .  6  August  no.  2  no.  3  67.  Note  9  It  only  de  i s  l a  not  clue  i s  to  10 no.  4,  Herriot  to  1932,  1  handed  Neurath  13  Simon  14 nos. v o l .  Simon  the  15  16  v o l .  4,  no.  1  50;  Rumbold  67*  1932,  i b i d . ,  64;  Simon  London, 120;  no.  Rumbold  to  59»  to  Rumbold,  Campbell  Simon,  August  to  September  26  3  1932,  to  to  to  September  the  of  War)  1932,  to  Henderson,  Rumbold, to  August  the  DDF  Campbell 59.  14  1932,  August  9  14  Foreign 1932,  1932, DBFP  30  Ser.  1932,  DBFP  1,  Ser.  2,  Ser.  2,  v o l .  1,  Simon,  by  no.  no.  v o l . Ser.  said  and  1,  4,  1,  the 84.  90*  MB v o l .  2,  DDF  DBFP  A f f a i r s  i b i d . , RDC,  1932,  to  The  anything  Rome  1.  127.  deliberate.  i b i d . ,  1932,  annex; annex  no.  Ser.  London,  1,  125,  137,  press.  132;  September  September  or  no.  11  no.  that  4,  for  v o l .  i b i d . ,  1933  1932, i n  1,  no.  1932,  14 i n  30  September  29  i b i d . ,  no.  September  August  Ser.  accidental  l a r c h  M i n i s t e r  on  H e r r i o t ,  Campbell,  was  DDF  i b i d . , 28  appeared  v o l .  German  Simon,  1932,  1932,  Ambassadors  2,  B e r l i n  25 1  of  i b i d . ,  Ser.  the  i n  French  1932,  August  leak  MacDonald  23  p. no.  v o l .  v o l .  3. 52; 1,  4,  79-80; F l e u r i a u t o H e r r i o t , S e p t e m b e r 9 1932, D D F S e r . 1, 1, n o s . 158 a n d 160-1. T h e G e r m a n m e m o r a n d u m h a d b e e n r e l e a s e d press  F l e u r i a u  Note  2,  p o l i t i q u e ,  by  the  to  (London)  129.  no.  Ser.  no.  August  31  Campbell  12  F l e u r i a u  DBFP  H e r r i o t ,  DBFP  Ambassador  also,  no.  to  whether  to  August  See  1,  no.  Francois-Poncet,  Herriot  Note  v o l .  August  (Minister  September 11  Brussels,  1,  H e r r i o t ,  remark  Washington,  French  Rome,  Ser.  to  H e r r i o t ,  known a  301.  no.  130;  also,  D i r e c t i o n  Paul-Boncour  v o l .  i b i d . ,  i n  DBF  i b i d . ,  September  See  Francois-Poncet  8  1932,  1932,  1932,  115.  7  26  1932,  50.  Francois-Poncet  to  25  Francois-Poncet  no.  to  Representatives  August  Simon,  September  i b i d . .  French  September  Campbell  Simon,  the  Rumbold,  Simon, 5  to  B e r l i n ,  had  Note de  l a  de  on  September  handed  l a  Simon  D i r e c t i o n  D i r e c t i o n  Franoois-Poncet  6  for  the  p o l i t i q u e ,  p o l i t i q u e , to  p u b l i c a t i o n  draft  H e r r i o t ,  French  August  August  28  October  on Note  18  1932, 4  1932,  the on  1932,  following  day.  September  6.  i b i d . ,  i b i d . , i b i d . ,  no. no.  no. 127* 224.  106;  219  1 7 U.K. Statement of Views, September 15 1 9 3 2 , DBPP Ser. 2 , vol. 4 , no. 9 2 . Copies of the document were handed to the French, German, Italian and American Governments on September 1 7 - 1 8 . 1 8 Simon to Murray (Rome), September 1 9 1 9 3 2 , ibid., no. 9 9 * Mussolini had taken over the Foreign Ministry from Grandi on July 2 0 , Grandi being appointed Ambassador i n London on the following day. 1 9 Rumbold to Simon, September 2 0 1 9 3 2 , i b i d . , no. 1 0 4 . The B r i t i s h memorandum was regarded as; a move towards France, and there was, severe criticism of the j u r i d i c a l basis of the B r i t i s h proposals. See Rumbold to Simon, September 2 0 1 9 3 2 , i b i d . , no. 105 and Rumbold to Simon, September 2 1 1 9 3 2 , i b i d . , no. 1 0 6 . 2 0 Memorandum by Simon, September 23 1 9 3 2 , i b i d . , no. 1 1 1 . 2 1 Memorandum by Simon, September 25 1 9 3 2 , i b i d . . no. 1 1 2 . 2 2 Ibid. 2 3 Ibid. 2 4 Ibid. 25 Simon to H.M.'s Representatives at Paris, Berlin and Rome, September 3 0 1 9 3 2 , i b i d . , nos. 1 1 5 - 6 ; Vansittart to H.I.*s Representatives at Paris, Berlin and Rome, October 3 1 9 3 2 , i b i d . , no. 1 2 4 ; Patteson to Osborne (Washington), October 3 1 9 3 2 , i b i d . , no. 1 2 2 ; Vansittart to Osborne, October 3 1 9 3 2 , ibid., no. 1 2 5 ; Herriot to Paul-Boncour, October 6 1 9 3 2 , DDF Ser. 1 , v o l . 1 , no. 2 2 8 ; i b i d . . n. 1 , p. 1 1 5 . 26 The French were anxious that a postponement of the reunion of the Bureau would be interpreted by Germany as evidence that "blackmail" succeeded. See i b i d . , nos. 1 6 0 - 1 , 1 6 3 , 1 7 0 , 1 7 4 - 5 and 1 8 0 , also DBFP, Ser. 2 , v o l . 4 , nos. 7 9 - 8 0 , 82, 8 6 and 91.. 2 7 Simon to Murray, September 1 9 1 9 3 2 , i b i d . , no. 9 9 * 2 8 Hewton to Simon, October 4 1 9 3 2 , i b i d . . 1 3 1 . 2 9 Simon to T y r r e l l , October 5 1 9 3 2 , i b i d . , no. 1 3 4 . 3 0 Hewton to Simon, October 7 1 9 3 2 , i b i d . , nos. 1 4 3 - 4 and 1 4 6 . 3 1 It was for this reason that the four-Power meeting had been proposed, and i t also explains the urgency with which Simon had endeavoured to secure a postponement of the reunion of the Bureau. See memorandum by Simon of a conversation with Heurath, September?23 1 9 3 2 , i b i d . , no. 1 1 1 . "; 32 See above, p. 6 3 .  220  33  Notes  3,  v o l .  34  T y r r e l l  t o  October  6  35 DBFP  an Anglo-French  to  T y r r e l l ,  Simon, 1932,  October  1,  1,  v o l .  between  Ser.  4,  v o l .  6  no.  Conversation 2,  no.  1932, 141;  no.  13 1932,  i b i d . ,  nos.  October  14  i b i d . ,  no.  36  Conversation no.  r e a l l y  i n  Views from use  of  152. favour  the  . . .  a  word  unconcerned 37  of  at  F l e u r i a u to  Simon 38 See  to  r e a l l y  Simon  to  i b i d . ,  MacDonald  153  Simon t o  40  See,  e . g . ,  Newton  Francois-Poncet M a s s i g l i  DBFP  n .  Ser.  i b i d . ,  no.  i b i d . .  no.  42  43 with had  to  of  the  t o  MacDonald,  October  October  2,  134-5J  nos.  13  6  1932,  Meeting,  an Anglo-French  hope  Meeting,  15  the  1932,  the  may  were  result  DDF S e r .  October  4,  13  1932,  of  result The  fundamentally  at  1,  v o l .  not  Statement  "there  no  2,  Foreign  1932, was  disarmament...."  being  (Rome),  f o r  of  Ministers  Ser.  13  Government  that  of  B r i t i s h  DBFP  October  B r i t i s h  phrasing  the  to  1;  H e r r i o t ,  notes  2,  v o l .  161.  Simon,  of  4,  See  October October  October  September  4  Geneva.  v o l . n o .  1,  no.  184;  134.  i b i d . ,  Secretary's  5 7  1932,  no.  backing  23  no.  156;  also,  ibidy,  DDF S e r .  1,  i b i d . ,  no.  1932,  Simon  to  Graham,  memorandum b y  i b i d . ,  1932,  1932,  an Anglo-French Meeting,  155*  of  the  no.  134. 145»  v o l .  14  no.  224.  i b i d . , 1932,  17  September  also  1,  208;  October October  Simon,  no.  1932, 23  1932,  111..  Notes  of  an Anglo-French Meeting,  Simon  to  Tyrrell,  F l e u r i a u suggested  that  " i f we  . . .  would  the  obvious  the  discussions  156  a n d 163)  of  had taken  to  (see  could  reduce  preserve  the  i n  H e r r i o t ,  a  very  DBFP  135«  no.  v o l .  1,  Conference French  Ser.  amicable  October  1932,  i b i d . , In  4  1932,  2,  a  no.  appearances  between  (see  14  1,  Disarmament  13-14  place  i b i d . .  DDF S e r .  differences  October  Francois-Poncet  15  October  5 1932,  October  on September  despite  224.  Herriot  Paul-Boncour,  and H e r r i o t ,  there  T y r r e l l ,  to  And  44  of  1932,  H e r r i o t ,  persistence  no.  4,  v o l .  Ser.  l i n e . e . g . ,  415»  notes  measure  that  a n d Graham  See,  41  2,  DBFP  an Anglo-French  the  September 5  a n d 156  39  p.  i s  valuable  p o s s i b i l i t y  Newton  nos.  of  that  expressed  October  Ser. 140;  1932,  156.  MacDonald  H e r r i o t ,  T y r r e l l ,  5  and H e r r i o t ,  153-4>  evidence  which  J u l y  no. to  228.  notes  "may" i m p l i e s the  i b i d . ,  disarmament  September,  Geneva of  between  Further  DBFP  Herriot  MacDonald 15.2;  October  1932,  5 1932,  October  i b i d . ,  DDE Ser.  i b i d . ,  conversation,  172.  no.  Simon  1932,  of  156.  conversation I84),  Simon  Germany's to  nothing".  and B r i t i s h v o l .  no.  4,  nos.  p o l i c y ,  152-4,  atmosphere.  DDF S e r .  1,  v o l .  1,  221  45 Newton t o Simon, October 7 1932, DBFP Ser. 2, v o l . 4, no. 144; Francois-Poncet to H e r r i o t , October 7 1932, DDF Ser. 1, v o l . 1, no. 232. 46 Newton to Simon, October 14 1932, DBFP Ser. 2, v o l . 4, no. 157; Newton t o Simon, October 15 1932, i b i d . , no. 160; Newton t o Simon, October 17 1932, i b i d . , no. 162; Simon t o Newton, October 15 1932, i b i d . , no. 159. 47 H e r r i o t , October 28 1932, France, Chambre des Deputes, Debate Parlementaires. 1932, no. 85, pp. 2916-20; Herriot to the Supreme Council of National Defence, October 28 1932, DDF Ser. 1, v o l . 1, no. 286. For the background of the French p l a n , see i b i d . , nos. 244, 250, 255,  260,  264,  266,  272-3 and  268,  286.  48 Herriot to the Supreme Council of National Defence, October 28 1932, i b i d . . no. 286; H e r r i o t , October 28 1932, Chambre des Deputes, Debats Parlementaires. l o c . c i t . 49  RDC:. MB v o l .  1,  pp.  32-8.  50 Paul-Boncour d i d not specify the nations that would be expected to p a r t i c i p a t e i n the mutual assistance pact, and neither d i d the f u l l French plan when i t was released on November 14. In p r i v a t e , however, the French regarded the p a r t i c i p a t i o n of both I t a l y and Germany as a sine qua non of any agreement. 51 "The Times", September 30 1932. See a l s o , DBFP Ser. 2, v o l . 4, nos. 119 and 153. 52  PDC,  5th  Ser., v o l .  270,  col.  525.  53 A t t l e e , November 10 1932, i b i d . . c o l . 530. For h i s f u l l speech, see i b i d . , c o l s . 525-34* 54 Although A t t l e e summarized Labour's aims, there was some disagreement w i t h i n the Party as to the means by which they should be implemented. See, e . g . , the speeches of George Lansbury ( i b i d . . c o l s . 623-30) who made h i s usual plea f o r t o t a l disarmament and Frederick Cooks ( i b i d . , c o l s . 565-72) who advocated a p o l i c y based on the Geneva P r o t o c o l . 55 See, e . g . , conversation between MacDonald and H e r r i o t , October 13 1932, DBFP Ser. 2, v o l . 4, no. 152 and notes of an Anglo-French Meeting, October 13 1932, i b i d . , no. 153. 56 Baldwin, November 10 1932, PDC. 5 t h S e r . , v o l . 270, c o l . 632. For Baldwin's f u l l speech, see i b i d . . c o l s . 630-8. 57 "But when the next war comes then do not l e t them [the young men] lay the blame upon the old men. Let them remember that they, they p r i n c i p a l l y or they alone, are responsible f o r the t e r r o r s that have , f a l l e n upon the e a r t h " . I b i d . . c o l . 638.  222  58 Simon, November 10 1932, i b i d . , c o l s . 534-48. 59 For the French t e x t , see DDF Ser. 1, v o l . 1, no. 331. An English t r a n s l a t i o n i s ; i n DIA 1932. pp. 217-27. 60 Wilson (Geneva) to Stimson, November 3 1932, FRUS 1932 v o l . 1, pp. 356-8. 61 The relevant portions of Stimson's speech are i n DIA 1932, PP. 295-303. 62 Wilson to Stimson, November 3 1932, FRUS, 1932 v o l . 1, pp. 356-8. 63 Francois-Poncet to H e r r i o t , November 15 1932, DDF Ser. 1, v o l . 2, no. 1; Francois-Poncet to H e r r i o t , November 17 1932, i b i d . , no. 9« See also, i b i d . . p . 3, n . 1, and Wilson to Stimson, November 1 1932, FRUS 1932 v o l . 1 , pp. 472-3. 64 Francois-Poncet to H e r r i o t , November 15 1932, DDF Ser. 1, v o l . 2, no. 1; Francois-Poncet to H e r r i o t , November 17 1932, i b i d . , no. 9» 65 Francois-Poncet to H e r r i o t , November 17 1932, i b i d . , no. 9» 66 Wilson to Stimson, November 16 1932, FRUS 1932 v o l . 1, pp. 388-90. 67 Francois-Poncet to H e r r i o t , November 15 1932, DDF Ser. 1, v o l . 2, no. 2. 68 For the American r e j e c t i o n of a formalized commitment, see Marriner (France) to Stimson, October 29 1932, FRUS 1932 v o l . 1, pp. 348-50 and Wilson to Stimson, November 3 1932, i b i d . . pp. 356-8. For Stimson*s willingness to agree to an Executive Declaration, see memorandum by Stimson, November 4 1932, i b i d . , pp. 359-60 and memorandum by Stimson, November 15 1932, i b i d . . pp. 387-8. 69 Wilson to Stimson, November 16 1932, i b i d . , pp. 388-90. 70 Simon, November 17 1932, RDC,, MB v o l . 1, pp. 89-94. 71 Simon t o l d M a s s i g l i (probably on November 17, but possibly during the proceeding week) that he envisaged that the "no-force pact would be activated i n the event of a c r i s i s i n the P o l i s h Corridor or i n situations s i m i l a r to that i n Manchuria, where force had been used but no war declared. M a s s i g l i to H e r r i o t , November 17 1932, DDF Ser. 1, v o l . 2, no. 6. (Massigli was head of the League of Nations section of the Quai d'Orsay). M  72 Figures f o r the leading European Powers towards the end of 1933 were (approx.): U.S.S.R. 1300-1900 machines; France I65O machines; I t a l y 1000 machines; B r i t a i n 850 machines. See G. M. Young, Stanley Baldwin, p . 177 and Londonderry, Wings of Destiny, p. 88.  223  73 For  T y r r e l l the  to  negotiations 74  Simon,  negotiations i n  December  Geneva,  Conversation  see  76  Conversation  77  48I-6.  pp.  Note  December  de 2  MacDonald, 203;  Simon, (cf.  l a  26  between  Herriot  and  Davis,  November  28  2  Simon  and  Benes,  1932,  and  French  4,  78  Note  79  to  80 W i l s o n  to  no.  1932,  201.  FRUS  Stimson,  1932,  i b i d . ,  82  i b i d . , members  i b i d . ,  83  no.  of  Record  i b i d . ,  of  no.  American  2,  du no.  no.  206  conversation  1932,  cabinet v o l .  4,  MacDonald,  60);  3  v o l .  Paul-Boncour, i b i d . .  no.  between  2,  between  DBFP  President 42.  2,  Ser.  See  du especially,  C o n s e i l J " . F R U S ; 1932  22 1932,  21 1932, 1932,  28  and  1932,  2,  1932,  November  November  between 207;  the  i b i d . ,  DBFP  v o l .  i b i d . ,  pp.  2,  pp.  398-401;  pp.  Ser.  1,  404-5*  v o l .  4,  no.  200..  MacDonald,  Simoni a n d  A l o i s i ,  December  3  MacDonald,  Simon  A l o i s i ,  December  3  record  French  a  of  and  five-Power  212;  2,  v o l . a  a  meeting  American  record  record  record  of  delegations, nos.  71-2, 76  of a  Meeting,  71-2  nos.  five-Power  210-1;  nos.  214-5;  2,  1,  Ser.  4,  1, [du  21  3  Ser.  and  between  MacDonald,  delegations,  December  Simon 5  1932,  208.  Record  DDF  no. of  Simon  du  Ser.  President  November  DBFP  December  adjoint  DSsarmement,  207.  Conversation  1932,  1932,  v o l .  A l o i s i ,  November  between  no.  1,  du  1932,  conversation  conversation  DDF  Wilson,  Davis,  Conversation  81  v o l .  to by  du  Stimson,  Stimson  memorandum  (chef  1932,  manuscrite  Wilson  398-401;  Ray 28  2  Conference 59;  December  DDF S e r . and  l a  no.  MacDonald,  204;  Simon  Marcel  a  2,  December  no.  record,  November  "annotation  v o l .  Paul-Boncour,  207.  du  Conseil),  1,  between  i b i d . .  H e r r i o t  the  Francaise  Ser.  no.  nos.  4,  five-Power  November  DDF  v o l .  84  v o l .  Davis,  Delegation  MacDonald,  v o l .  187-99*  nos.  2, for  and  1932,  between  Cf.  i b i d . ,  Ser,  proposal  Herriot  conversation  December  and  DBFP  I b i d .  i b i d . ,  no.  1932,  Simon's  between  1932 v o l . 1, p p . 476-81. 75  1  concerning  Meeting, of  a  a  December  five-Power  December and  FRUS.  five-Power  Meeting  80-2,  of 8  the  1932, also  6 1932, i b i d . , n o s . 210-1. 1932 v o l . 1, p p . 492-7*  December  and  6  1932,  Meeting,  DBFP  M e e t i n g , . December B r i t i s h , i b i d . .  FRUS-  1932  French,  no.  213*  v o l .  Ser.  December  1,  8  1932,  I t a l i a n Cf. pp.  2,  7 1932,  DDF  i b i d . . and Ser.  492-9*  1,  224  85 Record of a five-Power Meeting, December 6 1932, DBFP Ser.. 2, v o l . 4, no. 211; record of a five-Power Meeting, December 7 1932, i b i d . , no. 212; record of a Meeting of the B r i t i s h , French, I t a l i a n and American delegations, December 8 1932, i b i d . . no. 213; record of a five-Power Meeting, December 8 1932, i b i d . . nos. 214-5; record of a five-Power Meeting, December 9 1932, i b i d . , no. 216. C f . DDF Ser. 1, v o l . 2, nos.