@prefix vivo: . @prefix edm: . @prefix ns0: . @prefix dcterms: . @prefix skos: . vivo:departmentOrSchool "Arts, Faculty of"@en, "History, Department of"@en ; edm:dataProvider "DSpace"@en ; ns0:degreeCampus "UBCV"@en ; dcterms:creator "Richardson, Richard Calam"@en ; dcterms:issued "2011-05-26T17:34:10Z"@en, "1969"@en ; vivo:relatedDegree "Master of Arts - MA"@en ; ns0:degreeGrantor "University of British Columbia"@en ; dcterms:description """The problem of disarmament is the problem of the effective management of power within international society. Force cannot be eliminated as a factor in international relations, but it can be controlled. And a disarmament convention - an agreement to limit and perhaps reduce national armaments - can secure this control by stabilizing the configuration of world power. The obstacles to the negotiation of a disarmament convention are political rather than technical, and at the World Disarmament Conference of 1932-4, the major problem was the reconciliation of French and German claims. Germany, disarmed by the Peace Treaty of 1919, demanded "equality of rights" with other nations while France demanded additional security guarantees before she would agree to limit her arms. The reconciliation of French and German claims was in Britain's interest, because her security depended, in part at least, on a stable and peaceful Continent. Yet the British Government followed a policy that was not conducive to a reconciliation. British Ministers refused to offer France security guarantees to compensate for the inevitable increase in German power accompanying a grant of equality of rights and this refusal was the major factor leading to the breakdown of the Disarmament Conference in 1934. The main reason for the refusal was that British Ministers subscribed to the putative existence of an international "harmony of interests". They assumed that each state had a common interest in peace and that this common interest was compatible with the pursuit of the national interest, and they therefore hoped that international problems could be settled without recourse to force or threat of force. This was a delusion. Although professing a desire to achieve their objectives by peaceful means, "revisionist" states - including Germany - were not averse to using or threatening force if it would lead to the fulfilment of their national ambitions. "Harmony of interests" was a very self-serving doctrine. It permitted Britain to exert a large measure of influence on the Continent with very few commitments and at little cost, allowing the Government to concentrate on defending Britain's more immediate interests - the security of the Empire and the protection of her trade routes. Thus, the various disarmament schemes put forward by the Government at Geneva were based almost solely on Britain's immediate interests and made little attempt at trying to reconcile the interests of France and Germany – the main problem facing the Disarmament Conference. The British public came to believe in the premise of a "harmony of interests" and in consequence, despite its overwhelming majority in the Commons, the Government found it difficult - or chose to find it difficult – to deviate from its policy of "no commitments". Britain was even averse to mediating between France and Germany. Although the two Continental Powers looked to Britain for help in solving their problems, the British Government refused to play the role of "honest broker" - except when the role was inescapable — and thus failed to take advantage of many excellent opportunities for concluding a Franco-German settlement. By adopting a policy which offered short-term advantages but little hope of a long-term settlement of European problems, Britain was instrumental in causing the failure of the Geneva Disarmament Conference. This study is based on the records of the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments and the published diplomatic documents of Britain, France, Germany, America, and Belgium. Memoir sources, in general, were unhelpful, but did provide some useful information, as did a few unpublished documents from the Public Record Office, London provided by Dr. F. Marzari."""@en ; edm:aggregatedCHO "https://circle.library.ubc.ca/rest/handle/2429/34911?expand=metadata"@en ; skos:note "THE PROBLEM OP DISARMAMENT IN BRITISH DIPLOMACY 1932-1934 *>y RICHARD CALAM RICHARDSON 3.Sc.(Econ.)., London (England), 1968 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in the Department of History We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA September, 1969 I n p r e s e n t i n g t h i s t h e s i s i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t o f t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r a n a d v a n c e d d e g r e e a t t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a , I a g r e e t h a t t h e L i b r a r y s h a l l m a k e i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r r e f e r e n c e a n d s t u d y . I f u r t h e r a g r e e t h a t p e r m i s s i o n f o r e x t e n s i v e c o p y i n g o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r s c h o l a r l y p u r p o s e s may be g r a n t e d by t h e H e a d o f my D e p a r t m e n t o r by h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . I t i s u n d e r s t o o d t h a t c o p y i n g o r p u b l i c a t i o n o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r f i n a n c i a l g a i n s h a l l n o t be a l l o w e d w i t h o u t my w r i t t e n p e r m i s s i o n . D e p a r t m e n t o f Hi, T h e U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a V a n c o u v e r 8, C a n a d a D a t e 2 S - V 7 0 i ABSTRACT The problem of disarmament is the problem of the effective management of power within international society. Force cannot be eliminated as a factor in international relations, but i t can be controlled. And a disarmament convention — an agreement to limit and perhaps reduce national armaments - can secure this control by stabilizing the configuration of world power. The obstacles to the negotiation of a disarmament convention are political rather than technical, and at the World Disarmament Conference of 1932-^4, the major problem was the reconciliation of French and German claims. Germany, disarmed by the Peace Treaty of 1919» demanded \"equality of rights\" with other nations while France demanded additional security guarantees before she would agree to limit her arms. The reconciliation of French and German claims was in Britain's interest, because her security depended, in part at least, on a stable and peaceful Continent. Yet the British Government followed a policy that was not oonducive to a reconciliation. British Ministers refused to offer France security guarantees to compensate for the inevitable increase in German power accompanying a grant of equality of rights and this refusal was the major factor leading to the breakdown of the Disarmament Conference in 1934» The main reason for the refusal was that British Ministers subscribed, to the putative existence of an international \"harmony of interests\". They assumed that each state had a common interest in peace and that this common interest was compatible with the pursuit of the national interest, and they therefore hoped that international problems could i i be settled without recourse to foroe or threat of force. This was a delusion. Although professing a desire to achieve their objectives by peaceful means, \"revisionist\" states — including Germany - were not averse to using or threatening force i f i t would lead to the fulfilment of their national ambitions. \"Harmony of interests\" was a very self-serving doctrine. It permitted Britain to exert a large measure of influence on the Continent with very few commitments and at l i t t l e cost, allowing the Government to concentrate on defending Britain*s more immediate interests - the security of the Qnpire and the protection of her trade routes. Thus, the various disarmament schemes put forward by the Government at Geneva were based almost solely on Britain's immediate interests and made l i t t l e attempt at trying to reconcile the interests of Prance and Germany - the main problem facing the Disarmament Conference. The British publio came to believe in the premise of a \"harmony of interests\" and in consequence, despite i t s overwhelming majority in the Commons, the Government found i t d i f f i c u l t - or chose to find i t d i f f i c u l t - to deviate from i t s policy of \"no commitments\". Britain was even averse to mediating between France and Germany. Although the two Continental Powers looked to Britain for help in solving their problems, the British Government refused to play the role of \"honest broker\" - except when the role was inescapable — and thus failed to take advantage of many excellent opportunities; for concluding a Franco-German settlement. By adopting a polioy which offered! short-term advantages but l i t t l e hope of a long-term settlement of European problems, Britain was instrumental in causing the failure of the Geneva Disarmament Conference. i i i This study is \"based on the records of the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments and the published diplomatic documents of Britain, Prance, Germany, America and Belgium. Memoir sources, in general, were unhelpful, but did provide some useful information, as did a few unpublished documents from the Public Record Office, London provided by Dr. P. Marzari. TABLE OP CONTENTS ABSTRACT i CHAPTER I. THE DISARMAMENT PROBLEM :'l CHAPTER II. THE FIRST PHASE OF THE DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE ....... 39 CHAPTER III. THE GERMAN CLAIM TO EQUALITY OF RIGHTS 75 CHAPTER IV. THE ADVENT OF HITLER AND THE SECOND PHASE OF THE DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE 110 CHAPTER V. DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS AND THE SECOND GERMAN WITHDRAWAL FROM; THE DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE 152 CHAPTER VI. LAST ATTEMPTS AT A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT 175 CHAPTER VII. CONCLUSIONS 202 FOOTNOTES ............... ... 208 BIBLIOGRAPHY ., 243 1 CHAPTER I THE DISARMAMENT PROBLEM 1919-1932 The widespread support gained toy movements for disarmament during the 1920s and early 1930s became a major factor in the formulation of British foreign policy* Disarmament was seen by i t s protagonists as the one sure way of avoiding a recurrence of the catastrophe of the Great War and of establishing a firm foundation for peace; war would be eliminated by the removal of the means to fight* It was an appealing doctrine and one which required serious consideration* A sophisticated theory of disarmament was developed. Armaments, i t was claimed, not only made war possible but made i t much more probable. Once one nation possessed arms, so must others as no nation would tempt others into aggression by remaining defenceless. Measures takengtoy one nation to increase security caused counter-measures by others, producing feelings* of fear and insecurity. Further measures caused further counter-measures, and the consequent increase of suspicion and distrust among nations led governments to believe that every precaution should be taken against possible opponents and that \"precautions\" taken by any other country were evidence of hostile intent. An arms race would develop and eventually, by accident or design, break down into war. The final spark might occur when one party utilized a temporary ascendancy in armaments to strike an opponent; i t might come with an over-reaction to a minor incident; or i t might just \"happen\"* It did not matter which. This was not the only oritique of the balanoe of power system that disarmament protagonists offered. They also emphasised that armaments, 2 e s p e c i a l l y s u b s t a n t i a l a r m a m e n t s , n e c e s s a r i l y l e d t o t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f a p r o f e s s i o n a l m i l i t a r y c l a s s a n d a s i z e a b l e a r m a m e n t s i n d u s t r y , b o t h o f w h i c h , i n t h e i r o w n i n t e r e s t s , c o n t i n u a l l y p r e s s e d f o r t h e e x p a n s i o n o f w a r p o t e n t i a l . T h i s t e n d e d t o s p r e a d f e e l i n g s o f f e a r a n d i n s e c u r i t y . M o r e o v e r , t h e s e \" m i l i t a r y - i n d u s t r i a l c o m p l e x e s \" t e n d e d t o g a i n a n i n o r d i n a t e a m o u n t o f p o w e r w i t h i n e a c h s t a t e a n d e n c o u r a g e d g o v e r n m e n t s t o f o l l o w u n n e c e s s a r i l y i n t r a n s i g e n t a n d b e l l i c o s e p o l i c i e s . I f a s t a t e h a d ( o r w a s t h o u g h t t o h a v e ) m i l i t a r y s u p e r i o r i t y o v e r a n o p p o n e n t a n d r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n t h e t w o w e r e u n e a s y , t h e m i l i t a r y e s t a b l i s h m e n t w o u l d a d v i s e t h e g o v e r n m e n t t o t a k e t h e m i l i t a r y p a t h , a n d i n t h e a b s e n c e o f s u p e r i o r i t y i t w o u l d w i e l d i t s i n f l u e n c e t o d e m a n d i n c r e a s e s i n a r m a m e n t s . G e n e r a l d i s a r m a m e n t , i t w a s c l a i m e d , w o u l d e l i m i n a t e t h e s e s c o u r g e s o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l s o c i e t y . I n t h e e v e n t o f d i s p u t e s , s t a t e s w o u l d b e p r o v i d e d w i t h a n a u t o m a t i c c o o l i n g - o f f p e r i o d d u r i n g w h i c h t h e y w o u l d b e u n a b l e t o g o t o w a r o r m o u n t a s u c c e s s f u l o f f e n s i v e b e c a u s e t h e a r m s t h a t t h e y r e t a i n e d w o u l d b e i n s u f f i c i e n t f o r t h e p u r p o s e . M o r e o v e r , t h e i n f l u e n c e o f t h e m i l i t a r y - i n d u s t r i a l c o m p l e x w o u l d b e w e a k e n e d a n d s t a t e s i n d u c e d t o f o l l o w m o r e c o n c i l i a t o r y p o l i c i e s . T h e p o w e r f a c t o r i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s c o u l d b e c o n t r o l l e d b y a n e f f e c t i v e s y s t e m o f c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y r a t h e r t h a n t h e m e c h a n i s m o f t h e b a l a n c e o f p o w e r , t h u s a l l o w i n g n a t i o n a l r e s o u r c e s u s e d i n t h e m a n u f a c t u r e o f a r m a m e n t s t o b e c h a n n e l l e d i n t o m o r e p r o d u c t i v e a n d s o c i a l l y a c c e p t a b l e p r o j e c t s . O p p o n e n t s o f d i s a r m a m e n t c o u n t e r e d t h a t a r m a m e n t s w e r e t h e p r o d u c t r a t h e r t h a n t h e c a u s e o f t e n s i o n . P e a o e w a s a p o l i t i c a l p r o b l e m r e q u i r i n g a p o l i t i c a l s o l u t i o n , a n d t h o u g h s e c u r i t y m i g h t l e a d t o 3 disarmament, i t could not result from disarmament. The idea of the overpowering influence of a military-industrial complex was ridiculed and i t was suggested that any influence brought to bear by the military would breed a rising consciousness of the total destructiveness of modern warfare. Statesmen, i t was argued, would not allow the military to gain the upper hand in decisions of state. The sceptics also suggested that even i f these political objections were overcome, technioal objections alone would nullify attempts to reach a disarmament convention. Reductions of armaments to a level necessary for purposes of police and legitimate defence were \"impossible\" beoause some countries had a far greater productive capacity or potential which could be utilized for war purposes than others. Moreover, developments in military technology would make i t impracticable to freeze the distribution of power within international society. The power factor could not be taken away from international relations - and i t was \"impossible\" to measure this factor. How could a battleship be compared to a tank or a bomber? How could one distinguish between an \"offensive\" and a \"defensive\" weapon? What, i f any, account should be taken of geographical and industrial factors? And surely there were no adequate means of supervising a disarmament agreement? Even with the strictest agreements regarding control, i t was argued, states would be able to build up stocks of materiel in secret. The more appealing of these arguments are those of the disarmament protagonists. Certainly the competitive massing of national power tends to exacerbate rather than diminish frictions and to heighten the tensions of insecurity.* There i s also l i t t l e doubt that powerful 4 military-industrial complexes tend to encourage intransigent rather than paoific courses of policy. A disarmament agreement would overcome these problems and provide states with an automatic cooling—off period for their disputes. To be successful, however, such an agreement must take the factors of power and power potential into consideration; total disarmament, advocated by some, i s impracticable because i t ignores these factors. A degree of armament i s inevitable, and as no country would willingly remain disarmed i f i t s neighbours were not, i t follows that a vioious cirole of arms and tension i s inherent in the structure of international society. The problem facing statesmen therefore is how to control power within the international system, and the problem of disarmament i s how to reduce and more especially, limit and control armaments and yet establish an adequate system of international security. Military establishments are related in the f i r s t instance to the problem of the status quo. The function of national power is to uphold or ohallenge the existing pattern of relationships, and a scheme for the regulation of armaments must therefore involve either a freezing of the configuration of power (at, above or below existing quantitative 2 levels) or i t s alteration through differential degrees of disarmament. Governments attempting to uphold the status quo will accept a scheme of arms control i f i t wi l l not interfere with the adequacy of their power position, while \"revisionist\" states will accept i f they are convinced that the distribution of national power will be irrelevant in the future organization of international relations. Consequently, the urge to avoid the worsening of the national power position is the passion of most participants in disarmament conferences rather than enthusiasm for disarmament i t s e l f . A scheme which freezes the status quo by stabilizing 5 the power situation i s frustrating to ambitious states; one which promises to undermine the status quo i s alarming to the beneficiaries of the established order. A p r a c t i c a l scheme i s one which takes these factors - power potential and p o l i t i c a l motivation - into account. This can only be done by giving additional security guarantees to states that otherwise would be disadvantaged by the scheme. There are three alternatives: c o l l e c t i v e security, regional security agreements or alliances. Alliances are based on the theory that a state can best guarantee i t s security by aligning i t s e l f with other states having the same common enemy and by the a l l i e d states maintaining a reserve of military power to deter t h e i r enemy from aggression. Such arrangements may be considered inconsistent with the s p i r i t of general disarmament - for they tend to divide international society into opposing groups - but even opposing groups may agree to limit t h e i r respective armaments. Such \"arms control\" agreements may be unusual, especially when military technology i s not at an advanced stage and new developments can cause profound changes i n the d i s t r i b u t i o n of power within international society, but, at least i n theory, they are a practicable p o s s i b i l i t y . , Provided there i s an effective method of supervising i t s arrangements, an arms control convention i s f a r more l i k e l y to produce feelings of security between the Powers concerned than no agreement. A c o l l e c t i v e security agreement recognizes that peace i s \" i n d i v i s i b l e \" and provides for a guarantee of national security, the maintenance of the t e r r i t o r i a l status quo, the p a c i f i c settlement of international disputes - and disarmament. Disarmament and the machinery for p a c i f i c settlement provide a f i r s t l i n e of defence against international 6 conflict, and a further line of defence is provided \"by moral, diplomatic, economic and military sanctions, which can he used to deter any aggressor. Eventually, i t might he possible to dispense with national forces and replace them by international forces. Before a collective security system can be implemented, however, certain conditions have to be met.^ Subjectively, states must accept that peace i s indivisible and that loyalty to the world community i s an absolute necessity, even in conflicts affecting their immediate national interest. They must also agree to sacrifice a certain amount of their freedom and bind themselves in the future by renouncing the use of force except under international authorization and by agreeing not to withhold support from any collective aotion. Aggressor states; must always be confronted with the certainty of collective action. And the system must function impartially and be seen to function impartially; states must be flexible in their policies and agree to defend their traditional enemies as well as their traditional friends. Only then can confidence in the system be fostered. Objectively, a considerable diffusion of power i s fundamental to such a system, as i s the need for universal or near-universal membership of the international organization established to implement the system. Great Powers must be roughly equal in size or potential and endorse the collective arrangements, while naval Powers must be effective members in order that sanctions can be applied efficiently. States must also be vulnerable to the application of sanctions. \"Potentially criminal\" states might be omitted from the international organization, but notwithstanding the diffioulty of choosing them, i t would be better to have them within the collective framework for this would ensure their theoretical 7 acceptance of the system and might amel iorate t h e i r fu ture p o l i c y once they d iscovered that working w i t h i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l community o f fe red advantages. The success fu l operat ion of a system of c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y a l so depends on m i l i t a r y technology hav ing reached a stage of development where defence has an advantage over o f fence, because i f s ta tes possess weapons that can break through f i x e d f o r t i f i o a t i o n s and entrenched p o s i t i o n s , the c o l l e c t i v e agency may be unable to act q u i c k l y enough to prevent an aggressor being s u c c e s s f u l . Prov ided these cond i t ions are met, c o l l e c t i v e secu r i t y i s a p r a c t i c a b l e p o s s i b i l i t y . Opponents have argued that the margin of power of a c o l l e c t i v e agency over an aggressor i s always l e s s than i t s t h e o r e t i c a l va lue and that c o l l e c t i v e fo rces might be d i v i ded and slow to ac t ; but although t h i s may be t r u e , a c o l l e c t i v e system i s based on the prevent ion of war by p a r t i a l disarmament. I f the m i l i t a r y fo rces of each state are reduced to a l e v e l necessary f o r p o l i c e purposes and a s m a l l , l i g h t l y -armed defence cont ingent whi le i n t e r n a t i o n a l fo rces are equipped w i th heavier m a t e r i e l , . n o aggressor w i l l be s t rong enough to r e s i s t the fo rces of a c o l l e c t i v e agency, even i f the agency i s slow to react to i n i t i a l aggress ion. A state could b u i l d up a \" c i t i z e n army\" w i t h i n a comparat ively short t ime , but such an army would be unable to break through f i x e d f o r t i f i c a t i o n s and entrenched p o s i t i o n s and would be i n e f f e c t i v e against the p ro fess i ona l s o l d i e r s and heav ier ma te r ie l of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l f o r c e s . Moreover, as the armaments of each s ta te would be supervised by the i n t e r n a t i o n a l agency, s ta tes would not be i n a p o s i t i o n to b u i l d up armaments and prepare f o r an aggressive war; aggressive weapons such as heavy m a t e r i e l , tanks and bombers would be p roh ib i t ed from na t i ona l 8 armies, and i t would not be d i f f i c u l t to detect states producing such weapons. Although i t is relatively easy to conceal light weapons such as machine guns, under an effective system of supervision i t would be almost impossible to conceal heavy weapons; German rearmament in the early 1930s was soon detected by Britain and Prance. Thus, an international agency would have ample time in whioh to prepare plans to counteract aggressors. A more serious objection to collective security i s the claim that i t i s impossible to define aggression since aggression can take many forms, such as the inf i l t r a t i o n of guerillas, subversion, the support of armed bands or even propaganda. It i s also argued that aggression might be justifiable in certain circumstances - to rectify an injustice or take preventive action. But these arguments miss the point. Collective security i s a legal rather than a moral system and is based on the idea that disturbers of the peace - states taking forcible measures to alter the status quo - should be penalized and that international \"law and order\" wil l provide a stable context in which the quest for substantive justice can be pursued.^ Moreover, the disarmament provisions of a collective system would ensure deteotion of any state making preparations for an attack or attempting to supply arms to support a rebellion in another country. Furthermore, the international organization would formulate specific rules regarding the peaceful settlement of international disputes, and states violating these rules would be locked on as aggressors and would be subject to the application of sanctions. 9 Even i f the conditions necessary for the implementation and operation of a collective security system are not met in the world as a whole, i t is s t i l l conceivable that these conditions may exist within a clearly defined region. Consequently, i t may he possible to negotiate one or more regional seourity pacts based on \"collective\" principles. Seourity in regions not covered by these pacts could be provided by alliances and the balance of power mechanism. It would s t i l l be possible under these arrangements to negotiate a general disarmament convention. Before the Great War, international security depended to a large extent on the successful operation of the balance of power mechanism. But the outbreak of hostilities: led! a great number of intellectuals (and others) to re-examine the efficacy of the mechanism, as many believed that the pre-1914 arms race and system of alliances were major causes of the War. Modern research has shown that these conclusions were, at best, inadequate, but intellectuals and respected statesmen of the time were convinced that i t was necessary to find a more effective method of controlling power within international relations than the balance of power mechanism. By the end of the War, the doctrine of collective security had won general acceptance (at least among the Allied Powers), and the foundation of an international security organization became one of the chief goals of Allied policy. Practical suggestions were worked out, and on April 28 1919 the Covenant of the League of Nations was adopted by the 10 Powers represented at the Versailles Peace Conference. Members of the new organization recognized that peace was indivisible (Article 11 of the Covenant) and undertook to respect and preserve each other's po l i t i c a l independence and te r r i t o r i a l integrity against external aggression (Article 1 0 ) . They also agreed to submit their differences to arbitration, judicial settlement at the Permanent Court or inquiry by the Counoil (Artioles 1 2 , 13 and 1 5 ) , though i n the event of decisions not being unanimous, the parties concerned reserved the right to go to war after a period of three months - the so-called \"gap in the Covenant\". Article 19 gave the League Assembly the power to advise the reconsideration of treaties that had become \"inapplicable\" and whose continuance \"might endanger\" world peace, otherwise there was no provision in the Covenant for \"peaceful change\". If a member resorted to war in violation of i t s obligations, the other members were to impose an absolute and immediate economic and diplomatic boycott on the Covenant-breaking state and respect the decisions of the League Council i f i t was found necessary to employ military sanctions (Article 1 6 ) . But members retained the right to abstain from participating in military measures, and there was no provision for an international army and general staff. The Covenant did not establish a perfect system of collective security; i t s provisions for sanctions were somewhat weak and i t imposed inadequate legal restrictions upon potential aggressors. There was no guarantee that the combined resources of the international community would be available to thwart aggressors, and there was no positive obligation for states to participate in military sanctions. 1 1 The p r o v i s i o n s of the Covenant f o r disarmament were a l s o somewhat d'efiicient. A r t i c l e 8 s t i p u l a t e d t h a t the maintenance of peace r e q u i r e d the r e d u c t i o n of n a t i o n a l armaments t o the lowest point c o n s i s t e n t with n a t i o n a l s a f e t y and the enforcement by common a c t i o n of i n t e r n a t i o n a l o b l i g a t i o n s , and the Counpil, t a k i n g geographical and other f a c t o r s i n t o account, was t o formulate plans f o r arms r e d u c t i o n s and l i m i t a t i o n f o r \"the c o n s i d e r a t i o n and a c t i o n \" of member governments. The C o u n c i l would a l s o advise how the \" e v i l e f f e c t s \" of the p r i v a t e manufacture of arms c o u l d be m i t i g a t e d . D e f i n i t i v e measures of disarmament were r e s t r i c t e d t o the p r o v i s i o n s of the Peace T r e a t i e s : n e g o t i a t e d with the former C e n t r a l Powers. By Part V of the Tre a t y of V e r s a i l l e s , Germany's armed f o r c e s were reduced t o \"the lowest l i m i t c o n s i s t e n t with the maintenance of order and the c o n t r o l of her f r o n t i e r s \" - 100,000 men i n the c o l o u r s , i n c l u d i n g no more than 4,000 o f f i c e r s . Servicemen were t o serve f o r twelve y e a r s and o f f i c e r s f o r t w e n t y - f i v e . The General S t a f f was abo l i s h e d and c o n s o r i p t i o n and the m i l i t a r y t r a i n i n g of c i v i l i a n s i n governmental and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e s e r v i c e such as coastguards, customs o f f i c e r s and f o r e s t guards p r o h i b i t e d . The possession of \"aggressive weapons\" - tanks, heavy guns over 105mm, armoured ca r s , m i l i t a r y a v i a t i o n , submarines, b a t t l e s h i p s over 10,000 tons and poisonous and as p h y x i a t i n g gases - was forb i d d e n , and severe q u a n t i t a t i v e r e s t r i c t i o n s were p l a c e d on permitted arms. Reserve stocks of arms and ammunition were l i m i t e d and s t r i c t r e g u l a t i o n s a p p l i e d t o a l l m i l i t a r y establishments. But the enforcement of these p r o v i s i o n s was l e f t t o the Germans themselves; an A l l i e d C o n t r o l Commission was set up, but i t merely had su p e r v i s o r y d u t i e s . 12 Because of German protests, the A l l i e s inserted a clause i n the Peace Treaty s t i p u l a t i n g that the reductions i n German armaments were to \"render possible the i n i t i a t i o n of a general l i m i t a t i o n of armaments of a l l nations\" . And on June 16 1919* after being asked to c l a r i f y t h i s clause, the A l l i e s handed a Note to the German delegation at the Peace Conference deolaring that \"The A l l i e d and Associated Powers wish to make i t clear that t h e i r requirements i n regard to German armaments were not made sole ly with the object of rendering i t impossible for Germany to resume her pol icy of m i l i t a r y aggression. They are also the f i r s t steps towards that general reduction and l i m i t a t i o n of armaments which they seek to br ing about as one of the most f r u i t f u l preventives of war, and which i t w i l l be one of the f i r s t duties of the League of Nations to promote.\"6 Thus the A l l i e s were under a moral obligation ( i f such a thing exists i n internat ional p o l i t i c s ) to disarm - i f not a legal one. And i t seemed that negotiations for a general disarmament convention could proceed smoothly provided that the League proved adequate as an organ of securi ty . The main cause of insecurity wi th in the international system was the \"German problem\". The Treaty of Versa i l l e s l e f t Germany united, a country with the greatest i n d u s t r i a l (and therefore war) potential of any European state with the exception of Russia. Moreover, despite her reparations obl igat ions, Germany was i n a posi t ion to make a rapid recovery from her post-war s i t u a t i o n . The Soviet Union, on the other 13 h a n d , w a s i n a s t a t e o f c h a o s a f t e r m o r e t h a n f i v e y e a r s o f c i v i l a n d i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n f l i c t . T h u s , w i t h t h e \" R u s s i a n c h e c k \" g o n e , s o o n e r o r l a t e r G e r m a n y w o u l d r e s u m e h e r p r e p o n d e r a n t p o s i t i o n a m o n g t h e E u r o p e a n P o w e r s - u n l e s s t h e A l l i e s c h o s e t o m a i n t a i n t h e r e s t r i c t i o n s i m p o s e d o n h e r a t V e r s a i l l e s . T h e p r o b l e m f a c i n g B r i t a i n a n d P r a n c e w a s w h e t h e r t o l e t G e r m a n y r e g a i n h e r \" n a t u r a l \" p r e p o n d e r a n c e a n d , i f t h e y d i d , u n d e r w h a t p r o v i s i o n s f o r s e c u r i t y . A n g l o - F r e n c h s t r a t e g i e s t o w a r d s t h e G e r m a n p r o b l e m w e r e c o m p l e t e l y d i f f e r e n t . T h e F r e n c h f e l t t h a t t h e P e a c e T r e a t y d i d n o t p r o v i d e t h e m w i t h e n o u g h s e c u r i t y a g a i n s t a r e v i v e d G e r m a n y a n d t h e r e f o r e i n s i s t e d t h a t t h e G e r m a n s b e m a d e t o c o m p l y r i g i d l y w i t h t h e T r e a t y . T h e B r i t i s h b e l i e v e d t h a t s o m e G e r m a n g r i e v a n c e s w e r e j u s t i f i e d a n d t h o u g h t i t n e c e s s a r y t o r e d r e s s t h e s e g r i e v a n c e s i n o r d e r t o a t t a i n s e c u r i t y . P r a n c e w a n t e d t o s o l v e t h e G e r m a n p r o b l e m b y t r e a t i n g G e r m a n y a s a s e c o n d - c l a s s P o w e r ; B r i t a i n w a n t e d t o s o l v e t h e p r o b l e m b y m a k i n g c o n c e s s i o n s t o \" l e g i t i m a t e \" G e r m a n d e m a n d s . T h e r e w a s s o m e j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r F r e n c h f e a r s . E x c e p t f o r t h e f i f t e e n y e a r o c c u p a t i o n o f t h e d e m i l i t a r i z e d R h i n e l a n d a n d , m o r e r e m o t e l y , t h e t h r e a t o f s a n c t i o n s u n d e r t h e L e a g u e , n o m a c h i n e r y f o r t h e e n f o r c e m e n t o f t h e P e a c e T r e a t y h a d b e e n e s t a b l i s h e d . T h e G e r m a n a r m y w a s n o t a l l o w e d t o p o s s e s s \" o f f e n s i v e \" w e a p o n s a n d h a d b e e n r e d u c e d t o 100,000 l o n g - s e r v i c e v o l u n t e e r s - b u t i t w a s t h e G e r m a n s ; t h e m s e l v e s w h o a r r a n g e d t h e d i s a r m a m e n t ; t h e A l l i e d C o n t r o l C o m m i s s i o n m e r e l y h a d s u p e r v i s o r y p o w e r s . S i m i l a r l y , t h e A l l i e s p r o v i d e d n o m a c h i n e r y t o e n f o r c e t h e p a y m e n t o f r e p a r a t i o n s ; t h e G e r m a n g o v e r n m e n t 14 was responsible for discharging i t s admitted obligations. Before 1914» Germany had been held in check by'rthe Franco-Russian alliance, but a resuscitation of the alliance in 1920 was inconceivable because of French hostility to the Soviet regime and the destruction of Russian power during the Great Mar and the Bolshevik revolution. France did gain a l l i e s among the East European successor states, notably Poland and Czechoslovakia, but these alliances did not provide the same degree of security as the old Franco-Russian alliance.' French security was weakened even further when the American Senate rejected the Treaty of Versailles and the projected Anglo-American guarantee of the Frenoh froatier, for i t became extremely doubtful whether the United States would co-operate with the League in frustrating aggression. Consequently, successive French governments sought to strengthen the League as an organ of security and to make Germany comply rigidly with the provisions of the Peace Treaty. In the long run, the French \"solution\" to the German problem was impracticable. Germany would not condescend to become a second-class Power. In January 1923, using a default in reparations deliveries as the pretext, French troops occupied the Ruhr in an attempt to oause such inconvenience in the economic and politi c a l organization of Germany that the German government would g prefer to \" f u l f i l \" i t s obligations under the Treaty of Versailles. The attempt was unsuccessful. Germany organized a \"passive resistance\" to the occupation and, in continuing their campaign, the French found that they were hurting their own economy almost as much as the German. Gn May 11 1924t Frenoh voters rejected the policy of 15 intransigence and returned a liberal government under Edouard Herriot. Britain felt that French security was adequately guaranteed by the Peace Treaty and that the German problem should be solved by a policy of pacification rather than coercion. Since the scuttling of the German fleet at Scapa Flow. Germany posed no immediate threat to British security and, consequently, successive British governments sought to \"wipe out the past\" and promote the cause of European 9 reconciliation. Peace and economic recovery were the ultimate goals of British policy and neither could be established while the Continent remained unsettled. The chief threat to European peace seemed to be German grievances against the Peace Treaty, so Britain favoured a gradual and peaceful revision of the more controversial provisions of the Treaty. Although Britain was willing to appease German grievances, the Government did not anticipate restoring Germany to the preponderant position she had held in 1914, as this might prove dangerous to British seourity. Beoause of developments in military technology — particularly in aviation - Britain was now more vulnerable to attack than previously? her military frontier was no longer the Strait of 10 Dover - i t was the River Rhine. The Government looked on France as a friendly Power - Britain's \"guardian on the Rhine\".1* In theory, therefore, Britain was faced with the problem of reconciling the \"Rhine dogma\" with that of appeasing Germany. But in practice, not anticipating a major war for at least ten years (the so-called \"ten year rule\", repudiated in 1932), the Government based i t s policy on the conciliation of Germany. 16 U n l i k e t h e p o l i c y o f c o e r c i o n , c o n c i l i a t i o n o f f e r e d t h e h o p e t h a t a l a s t i n g s o l u t i o n t o t h e G e r m a n p r o b l e m m i g h t h e o b t a i n e d . B u t a t t h e s a m e t i m e , t h e p o l i c y c o u l d b e s u c c e s s f u l o n l y i f i t t o o k p o w e r f a c t o r s i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n . B r i t a i n a n d P r a n c e h a d t o e n s u r e t h a t G e r m a n y d i d n o t g a i n s u f f i c i e n t s t r e n g t h t o b e a m e n a c e t o E u r o p e a n s e c u r i t y , m o r e p a r t i c u l a r l y W e s t E u r o p e a n s e c u r i t y ; a n d , i n p r a c t i c e , P r a n c e h a d t o b e a s s u r e d o f h e r o w n s e c u r i t y b e f o r e s h e w o u l d m a k e c o n c e s s i o n s t o G e r m a n y . I f t h e p o w e r f a c t o r w a s n o t t a k e n i n t o a c c o u n t , t h e r e w a s a d a n g e r t h a t a p p e a s e m e n t w o u l d m e r e l y e n c o u r a g e G e r m a n y t o d e m a n d m o r e c o n c e s s i o n s a n d , e v e n t u a l l y , l e a d t o G e r m a n y b e c o m i n g d a n g e r o u s l y o v e r p o w e r f u l . U n t i l B r i t a i n a n d P r a n c e r e a c h e d a m o d u s v i v e n d i o n a s e c u r i t y s y s t e m f o r E u r o p e , a d i s a r m a m e n t c o n v e n t i o n w a s u n l i k e l y . I n 1920, t h e F i r s t A s s e m b l y o f t h e L e a g u e h a d e s t a b l i s h e d a T e m p o r a r y M i x e d C o m m i s s i o n f o r t h e R e d u c t i o n o f A r m a m e n t s , b u t a f t e r e a r l y a t t e m p t s t o c o n c l u d e a c o n v e n t i o n b a s e d o n q u a n t i t a t i v e r e d u c t i o n s ( n o t a b l y t h e E s h e r p l a n ) , i t b e c a m e e v i d e n t t h a t t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f s e c u r i t y w a s a p r e c o n d i t i o n o f a n y a g r e e m e n t . T h e m o s t s i g n i f i c a n t r e s u l t o f t h e o c c u p a t i o n o f t h e R u h r w a s t h a t B r i t a i n a n d F r a n c e b e c a m e m o r e w i l l i n g t o c o m p o s e t h e i r d i f f e r e n c e s o n t h e s e c u r i t y q u e s t i o n . P r a n c e , u n d e r H e r r i o t , r e d u c e d h e r d e m a n d s o n G e r m a n y ; B r i t a i n b e g a n t o c o n s i d e r g i v i n g F r a n c e a d d i t i o n a l s e c u r i t y g u a r a n t e e s , i f o n l y b e c a u s e t h e n e w P r e m i e r , R a m s a y M a c D o n a l d , w a s 12 c o n f i d e n t t h e y w o u l d n o t n e e d t o b e i m p l e m e n t e d . T h u s , a t t h e 17 b e g i n n i n g o f 1924» i t s e e m e d t h a t a E u r o p e a n s e c u r i t y s e t t l e m e n t w a s p o s s i b l e . A s c h e m e f o r s u c h a s e t t l e m e n t h a d b e e n d r a w n u p i n t h e T e m p o r a r y M i x e d C o m m i s s i o n i n S e p t e m b e r 1923 - t h e D r a f t T r e a t y o f M u t u a l A s s i s t a n c e , w h i c h w o u l d h a v e o b l i g e d e a c h s i g n a t o r y s t a t e t o g i v e m i l i t a r y s u p p o r t t o a n y o t h e r i n t h e s a m e c o n t i n e n t t h a t h a d b e e n t h e s u b j e c t o f a g g r e s s i o n . T h e L e a g u e C o u n c i l w o u l d d e s i g n a t e a n a g g r e s s o r w i t h i n f o u r d a y s o f a n o u t b r e a k o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l h o s t i l i t i e s , d e c i d e o n t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f e c o n o m i c s a n c t i o n s , d e t e r m i n e a n d o r g a n i z e t h e m i l i t a r y f o r c e s r e q u i r e d t o f r u s t r a t e t h e a g g r e s s o r a n d f u r n i s h f i n a n c i a l h e l p t o t h e v i c t i m . L o c a l a l l i a n c e s w o u l d b e p e r m i t t e d i f \" a p p r o v e d \" b y t h e C o u n c i l a n d c o u l d b e i m p l e m e n t e d w i t h o u t n e c e s s a r i l y w a i t i n g f o r a n a g g r e s s o r t o b e d e f i n e d . T h e s e c u r i t y g u a r a n t e e s : w o u l d n o t a p p l y t o a n y s i g n a t o r y t h a t h a d n o t r e d u c e d i t s a r m a m e n t s a c c o r d i n g t o p l a n s p r e p a r e d b y t h e C o u n c i l . T h e m a j o r d e f e c t o f t h e D r a f t T r e a t y w a s i t s u n i v e r s a l i t y . I t p r e s u m e d t h a t c o n d i t i o n s o n e a c h c o n t i n e n t w o u l d e n a b l e t h e s a m e s e c u r i t y s y s t e m t o b e a p p l i e d t o e a c h . C l e a r l y t h i s w a s n o t t h e c a s e . S e c u r i t y i n t h e A m e r i c a s a n d t h e P a r E a s t d e p e n d e d t o a l a r g e e x t e n t o n t h e r o l e o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , a n o n - m e m b e r o f t h e L e a g u e . C o n s e q u e n t l y , a n u m b e r o f c o u n t r i e s o p p o s e d t h e D r a f t T r e a t y f o r f e a r t h a t i t b r i n g t h e m i n t o c o n f l i c t w i t h t h e A m e r i c a n c o l o s s u s . A n d a l a r g e b o d y o f o p i n i o n i n B r i t a i n a n d t h e D o m i n i o n s o p p o s e d i t i n c a s e t h e a p p o r t i o n m e n t o f l i a b i l i t y o n c o n t i n e n t a l l i n e s w o u l d p l a c e a d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e s h a r e o f t h e b u r d e n o f r e s i s t i n g a g g r e s s i o n o n t h e E m p i r e . 18 The merit of the Treaty was that although i t did not purport to establish a European security system based on collective principles -i t lacked a definition of aggression - i t was acceptable to Prance audi her al l i e s . This; went to the heart of the disarmament problem. Prance and her East European satellites would agree to disarm i f they were granted additional security guarantees, which in practice could be provided only by Britain because Russia had been excluded from the ranks of the Great Powers and the United States refused to become involved in European disputes. Despite his readiness to give some additional security guarantees to Prance, Ramsay MacDonald was unwilling to accept the Draft Treaty; he was afraid that i t s concrete commitments would necessitate an increase in British armaments and restrict the freedom of British policy. 1^ Yet Britain could prevent the operation of the Treaty's military guarantees by using her veto in the Council. MacDonald's action in rejecting the Treaty typified British policy under the Conservative and National Governments in the next ten years. The refusal to give Prance specific guarantees of support made French governments less willing to make concessions to Germany, thus frustrating the British Government's aim of conciliating Germany. Unfortunately, few British statesmen understood that seourity was a necessary precondition of disarmament. Consciously or unconsciously, they based their policy on the nineteenth-century liberal theory of the \"harmony of interests\". They assumed that each nation had a common interest in peace, that the common interest was compatible with the pursuit of the national interest and that wars arose from 19 misunderstandings. They assumed that the experiences of 1914-18 had' demonstrated the f u t i l i t y of war and believed that an i n t e l l e c t u a l grasp of t h i s fact was a l l that was neoessary to induce nations to keep the peace i n future . *^ This was a misconception. Not a l l states believed that war brought no advantages. Germans attr ibuted the i r sufferings to the i r defeat i n the War rather than the War i t s e l f ; and the East European successor states owed t h e i r very existence to the War. Some states wanted to maintain the status quo; others wanted to change i t . Thus, the premise on which successive B r i t i s h governments based t h e i r pol icy regarding the German problem was untenable. They postulated that an internat ional harmony of interests existed; i n r e a l i t y , i t was necessary to create such a harmony. In national p o l i t i c s , i t i s the function of the government to create harmony; i n international p o l i t i c s there i s no s imi lar body to carry out the task. Yet just as governments must adjust to change within society, so must states adjust to changes within international sooiety. The B r i t i s h Government understood t h i s . But i t d id not understand that power was an essential element i n the process of \"peaceful change\" within international society. In t r y i n g to induce Prance to make concessions to Germany without offer ing equivalent compensation, B r i t a i n f a i l e d to take the power factor into consideration. In September 1924, at the F i f t h Assembly of the League, MacDonald and Herriot made new efforts to reach a security agreement. The outcome of t h e i r endeavours was the Geneva Protocol . States were to 20 sett le t h e i r disputes \"by submitting them to the Council , the Permanent Court or a r b i t r a t i o n , and states refusing to submit the i r disputes or accept an award would be designated aggressors. The procedure for pac i f i c settlement would not apply to \" p o l i t i c a l \" disputes such as; a 15 demand for treaty r e v i s i o n . There was no modification of A r t i c l e 16 of the Covenant, but states were to co-operate \" l o y a l l y and e f fec t ive ly\" against aggressors. The Protocol would become operative only after the conclusion of a disarmament convention, and a conference for t h i s purpose would convene i n Geneva on June 16 1925• Apart from the provision for compulsory arb i t ra t ion and the d e f i n i t i o n of an aggressor, the Protoool did not impose any new obligations on Members of the League. But i t had the great merit of c losing the \"gap i n the Covenant\" and providing Prance with an addit ional j u r i d i c a l prop to her security - i t might even have provided a nucleus around which a European security system based on co l lec t ive pr inc iples could be b u i l t . Herriot accepted the scheme as providing suf f ic ient security to allow the convening of a disarmament conference at which Prance would make concessions to Germany. But despite t h i s , the new Conservative administration i n B r i t a i n rejected the scheme on the grounds that i t involved B r i t a i n i n extensive new commitments and that security could best be attained by making \"special arrangements to meet special n e e d s \" . ^ Actual ly , the only addit ional obligations devolving on B r i t a i n was an undertaking to refer oertain n o n - p o l i t i c a l disputes to a r b i t r a t i o n . A r t i c l e 16 of the Covenant was not strengthened, and i n any case, B r i t a i n could prevent the League imposing m i l i t a r y sanctions by using her veto i n the Counci l . 21 The Conservative \" so lut ion\" to the French security problem was the Treaty of Locarno, i n i t i a l l e d ! on October 16 1925* Germany, Belgium and1 France accepted t h e i r coterminous frontiers; and the demil i tar ized Rhineland as invio lable and pledged themselves not to attack, invade or resort to war against eaoh other. B r i t a i n and I t a l y guaranteed these arrangements and i n a case of \"f lagrant aggression\" they were to come to the a id of the vict im immediately. There were no s imilar agreements guaranteeing the i n v i o l a b i l i t y of Germany's eastern f r o n t i e r s , but the B r i t i s h rather grudgingly agreed that French action i n fulf i lment of her a l l iances with Poland and Czechoslovakia would not constitute aggression against Germany. Germany agreed to apply for admission to the League. Although the Locarno agreements inaugurated a period of re la t ive calm i n European re lat ionships , the French Government continued to press for addit ional security guarantees. Unlike the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance and the Geneva Protocol , the Locarno Treaty gave no assurance that B r i t a i n would stand by France i n conf l i c t s resul t ing from German rev i s ion i s t ambitions i n Eastern Europe. Moreover, the Locarno guarantees would come into operation only i n a case of \"f lagrant aggression\", g iving B r i t a i n an excuse for withholding her support i n the event of a Franco-German dispute. Indeed the nature of the guarantees was such that B r i t a i n retained oomplete freedom to decide how to f u l f i l her pledges. Thus, although the Part ies to the Locarno Treaty undertook to negotiate a general disarmament agreement, the prospects of such an agreement effect ing substantial measures of disarmament were not great; France would not make extensive 22 concessions to German demands u n t i l B r i t a i n gave more ooncrete assurances of support. Even so, the Locarno Treaty was a f i r s t step towards solving the German problem. It represented an adjustment to a new configuration of power within Europe and gave Prance some assurance of B r i t i s h support and insured Germany against a renewed occupation of the Ruhr. I f B r i t a i n and Prance would make s imi lar adjustments to future changes; i n the configuration of power - and a redis t r ibut ion of power i n favour of Germany was inevitable - a peaceful solution of the German and disarmament problems was possible . The Locarno Treaty represented a considerable success for B r i t a i n . Her treaty obligations were moral rather than m i l i t a r y i n charaoter, were l imi ted to Western Europe, where her main interests l a y , and thus were i n l i n e with the \"harmony of interests\" premise, which permitted B r i t a i n to exert a great deal of influence on the Continent with few commitments and minimum cost. The Government could hardly make detai led preparations for intervening against an aggressor i n Western Europe when the aggressor was unspecif ied. Austen Chamberlain apparently f a i l e d to rea l ize that the negotiation of the Locarno Treaty had been possible because, at that time, French fears of a revived Germany were counterbalanced by German fears of a Ruhr-type invasion, and hesseemed unaware that , at some time i n the future, i t might be necessary to adjust to changes i n the d i s t r i b u t i o n of European power by involving B r i t a i n more d i r e c t l y i n the European security system. He thus began to fol low a pol icy of \"comparative detachment\" from European a f f a i r s , concerning himself with defending 23 Britain's more immediate interests: - the security of the Empire and the protection of her trade routes. The period of calm following the conclusion of the Locarno Treaty induoed the League Council to establish a Preparatory Commission for. the Disarmament Conference, and in effect, discussion of the German problem was \"transferred\" to the new body. Even in 1926, when the Commission began i t s deliberations, i t was evident that unless an international disarmament agreement was negotiated, Germany would begin to rearm. Basing their arguments on Article 8 of the Covenant and the Allied Note of June 16 1919» \"the German delegation claimed that a contractual relationship existed between German disarmament and the contemplated general disarmament and demanded that the other Powers disarm to the German level. If a general treaty was not concluded, Germany would consider herself freed from the obligations imposed by the Treaty of Versailles. Most Ministers in the British Government, including the Premier, Stanley Baldwin, and the Foreign Secretary, were unconvinced of the need for disarmament and believed French fears of a revived Germany 17 to be exaggerated. The fighting services were also opposed to disarmament and resisted any suggestions that Britain should reduce •I Q her own armaments. Neither Ministers nor Services appeared to appreciate that failure to conclude a general disarmament convention would lead to German rearmament and probably frustrate peaceful 19 settlement of the German problem. ' Early in 1927» a Government Committee was established to consider British policy at the 2 4 Preparatory Commission, but i t rejected Lord C e c i l ' s contention that 20 further security was prerequisite of disarmament. The Committee drew up a skeleton convention set t ing out general pr inc ip les and', machinery by which disarmament might be pursued, but the document was l i t t l e more than a demand for the disarmament of France and her a l l i e s . In the immediate post-war years, B r i t a i n had reduced her own armaments considerably because there was no imminent threat to her security - though the B r i t i s h delegation i n the Preparatory Commission suggested that the reductions had taken place to set an example to other Powers. France and her a l l i e s , less secure than B r i t a i n , were not deceived by t h i s claim and demanded, further security guarantees. The B r i t i s h refused to undertake addit ional Continental commitments and, as a resu l t , discussions i n the Commission became academic and s t e r i l e , bogged down i n a morass of technical d i f f i c u l t i e s - d i f f i c u l t i e s which ref lected the p o l i t i c a l posit ion of each of the Powers. Each proposal put before the Commission was based on the s trategica l considerations of the Power concerned. B r i t a i n , a naval Power with a small standing army, was vulnerable to a force capable of de l iver ing a \"knockout blow\" before her own vast reserves of i n d u s t r i a l power could be mobilized i n defence, so she advocated the l i m i t a t i o n of \"aggressive\" forces - effect ives and materiel available immediately on mobi l izat ion. France, a land Power, with no great reserves of manpower or i n d u s t r i a l potent ia l , considered! i t necessary to maintain a s t r i k i n g force that could mount an overwhelming attack on an enemy (Germany) before the enemy could mobilize i t s resources. B r i t a i n advocated that the number of effect ives for each country be f ixed i n a re la t ive r a t i o on the basis of requirements f o r the 25 maintenance of order and the p o l i c i n g of f r o n t i e r s ; Prance suggested, that the r a t i o had been f ixed by the Treaty of Versa i l l e s and that she could reduce her armaments only i f t h i s r a t i o was maintained, preferably through the establishment of a security system based on the Geneva Protocol . B r i t a i n favoured the direct l i m i t a t i o n of materiel i n service and reserve; Prance believed that direct l i m i t a t i o n was dangerous to the effectiveness of national defence and so suggested indirect l i m i t a t i o n through a control of budgetary expenditures. B r i t a i n proposed that m i l i t a r y a i r c ra f t be l imi ted quant i tat ively ; Prance favoured l i m i t a t i o n by t o t a l horse-power. The Anglo-Prenoh controversies resulted i n two draft conventions, one B r i t i s h , one French, being placed before the Commission i n March 1927 - though they were l i t t l e more than restatements of the p o l i c i e s the two Powers had followed since the Commission had opened. The task of the delegates thereafter became the reconc i l i a t ion of these two po l i c ies though, i n r e a l i t y , they were i rreconci lable unless they were discussed i n conjunction with new security proposals. The B r i t i s h Government was not convinced of the need for additional security guarantees and continued to believe that disarmament could best be obtained by each state vigorously pursuing i t s own national in teres t . Austen Chamberlain was especial ly eager to uphold the B r i t i s h interest - at leas t , h i s own conception of i t - and the B r i t i s h representatives at the Geneva Naval Conference of 1927 were instructed to break up the Conference because America would not 21 accept the B r i t i s h demand for seventy cruisers . This number was claimed to be the minimum B r i t a i n required to meet normal service 22 requirements, though i n fact she only possessed f i f t y . At the 1927 26 Assembly, the Foreign Secretary frustrated an attempt to revive the Geneva Protocol and asserted that Britain was not prepared to extend the guarantees given at Locarno; i t was \"for other countries to 23 complete the work\". Chamberlain was even reluctant to accept proposals involving no commitments; he accepted the Kellogg Pact for the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy grudgingly and only on condition that i t did not apply to wars of self-defence or in ^certain regions of the world the welfare and integrity of which constitute a special and v i t a l interest for ^British] peace and safety\" In May 1929t when the Tories f e l l from power, negotiations for a settlement of the disarmament and German problems had almost come to a standstill. L i t t l e progress was being made in the Preparatory Commission. Chamberlain had contributed to European appeasement by assisting in the negotiation of the Locarno agreements, but he hindered the future development of appeasement - and disarmament - by following a policy of \"comparative detachment\" from European affairs and the defence of Britain's immediate national interests. Chamberlain's successor at the Foreign Office, Arthur Henderson, was one of the few British statesmen who believed in collective seourity. He was convinced that nations would disarm \"in proportion to the measure 25 of their confidence in the constructive machinery of peace\", and sought to prepare the ground for the convening of the Disarmament Conference by strengthening the provisions of the League 2 7 C o v e n a n t a n d p r o m o t i n g t h e c a u s e o f E u r o p e a n a p p e a s e m e n t . H e b e l i e v e d t h a t a c o l l e c t i v e s y s t e m b a s e d o n t h e L e a g u e c o u l d f a c i l i t a t e a p e a c e f u l s o l u t i o n o f t h e G e r m a n p r o b l e m a n d p r o v i d e a j u r i d i c a l f r a m e w o r k i n w h i c h s t a t e s c o u l d p u r s u e t h e i r p o l i t i c a l o b j e c t i v e s . H e n d e r s o n ' s i d e a l w a s a n i n t e r n a t i o n a l s y s t e m b a s e d o n t h e G e n e v a P r o t o c o l , a n d h e w a s p a r t i c u l a r l y k e e n t o d e v e l o p m a c h i n e r y f o r t h e p a c i f i c s e t t l e m e n t o f d i s p u t e s . O n S e p t e m b e r 19 1929, h e s i g n e d t h e \" O p t i o n a l C l a u s e \" o f t h e S t a t u t e o f t h e P e r m a n e n t C o u r t , p l e d g i n g B r i t a i n t o r e s o l v e h e r j u d i c i a l d i s p u t e s b y s u b m i t t i n g t h e m t o c o m p u l s o r y j u r i s d i c t i o n a t t h e C o u r t . T e h d a y s l a t e r , h e p e r s u a d e d t h e L e a g u e A s s e m b l y t o a d o p t t h e C o n v e n t i o n f o r F i n a n c i a l A s s i s t a n c e t o S t a t e s V i c t i m s o f A g g r e s s i o n o n c o n d i t i o n t h a t i t c a m e i n t o o p e r a t i o n s i m u l t a n e o u s l y w i t h t h e f i r s t g e n e r a l d i s a r m a m e n t t r e a t y . A n d o n M a r c h 9 1931, B r i t a i n a c c e d e d t o t h e G e n e r a l A c t , w h i c h , l i k e t h e G e n e v a P r o t o c o l , p u r p o r t e d t o p r o v i d e f o r t h e s e t t l e m e n t o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l d i s p u t e s - j u s t i c i a b l e a n d n o n - j u s t i c i a b l e - b y m e a n s o f c o m p u l s o r y a r b i t r a t i o n . A l t h o u g h H e n d e r s o n r e c o g n i z e d t h a t p r o v i s i o n s f o r s a n c t i o n s w e r e e s s e n t i a l i n a c o l l e c t i v e s y s t e m , h e b e l i e v e d t h a t \" t r u e s e c u r i t y \" 26 c o u l d b e o b t a i n e d o n l y b y i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o - o p e r a t i o n . H e w a s a f i r m b e l i e v e r i n E u r o p e a n r e c o n c i l i a t i o n , a n d a t t h e H a g u e C o n f e r e n c e o f A u g u s t 1929 h e p r o m o t e d a F r a n c o - G e r m a n a g r e e m e n t l i n k i n g t h e e v a c u a t i o n o f F r e n c h t r o o p s f r o m t h e R h i n e l a n d w i t h a \" f i n a l \" s e t t l e m e n t o f t h e r e p a r a t i o n s p r o b l e m . F r a n c e a g r e e d t o e v a c u a t e t h e R h i n e l a n d b e f o r e J u n e 1930 - f i v e y e a r s a h e a d o f t h e s c h e d u l e l a i d d o w n a t V e r s a i l l e s - a n d G e r m a n y , i n r e t u r n , a c c e p t e d t h e \" Y o u n g P l a n \" f o r r e p a r a t i o n s , e v e n t h o u g h i t i n v o l v e d a h i g h e r s c a l e o f p a y m e n t s 28 than the \"Dawes\" settlement of 1924* Appeasement and B r i t i s h mediation between Prance and Germany were Henderson's solution to the German problem. In preparation for the Disarmament Conference, the Foreign Secretary speeded up the work of the Preparatory Commission by making concessions to Prance regarding budgetary l i m i t a t i o n and exclusion of trained reserves i n the ca lculat ion of e f fect ives . He also helped to negotiate the London naval Treaty of A p r i l 22 1930, by which B r i t a i n , America and Japan agreed to l i m i t the i r cruisers i n a r a t i o of 5*5*3 and destroyers i n a r a t i o of 10:10:7 and to construct an equal number of submarines. A t o t a l tonnage l i m i t was imposed for each category of vesse l . The agreement was made possible by B r i t a i n reducing her demand for cruisera from seventy (the 1927 demand) to f i f t y . But the two smaller naval Powers, Prance and I t a l y , were unable to come to an agreement as the French, with t h e i r extra commitments, would agree to the I t a l i a n demand for par i ty i n cruisers , destroyers and submarines only i f they received further guarantees of security such as a \"Mediterranean Locarno\". Henderson was disturbed by the posi t ion taken by Prance and hoped to bring about a Franco-Ital ian rapprochement on the naval question before the Disarmament Conference was held. In March 1931, when the two Continental Powers drafted the so-called \"Bases of an Agreement\", he appeared to have succeeded. Disarmament was the foremost element i n Henderson's p o l i c y . Like most of h is contemporaries i n B r i t a i n , he had been appalled by the slaughter of the Great War, and he believed that disarmament within a system of co l lec t ive security would make another war unthinkable. He hoped to s t r ike at \"mi l i ta r i sm\" and improve security by promoting an 29 agreement that would lead, eventually, to each state reducing i t s forces to a l eve l necessary for the maintenance of internal order and the p o l i c i n g of f r o n t i e r s , the agreement to he enforced \"by co l lec t ive sanctions i f necessary. Unfortunately, co l lec t ive security had been made impracticable by America's refusal to j o i n the League, and though the implementation of the provisions of the Covenant within Europe might s t i l l have been possible, the oombined forces of the European Powers were barely suf f ic ient to deter an aggressor - especial ly Germany. In suoh conditions, the Powers applying sanctions might be hurt almost as much as the aggressor against whom the sanctions were^Jjivoked. The occupation of the Ruhr had shown the l imi ta t ions of a security system based on a narrow margin of power. A European security system based on co l lec t ive pr inc iples was pract icable , i n the long run, only i n conjunction with the appeasement of Germany - and appeasement was practicable only i f France was compensated for the concessions she would be asked to make. Henderson had a better conception of the p o l i t i c a l r e a l i t i e s of Europe than most B r i t i s h statesmen of h is time, for he rea l ized that Germany would rearm i f a disarmament convention was not negotiated and that i t might be necessary to use force to deter her from v i o l a t i n g 27 her internat ional obl igat ions. But even he thought that French fears of insecuri ty were somewhat exaggerated, thus his emphasis on appeasement and the development of machinery for the p a c i f i c settlement of disputes rather than sanctions. At least i n 1930, he was unwi l l ing to make spec i f ic m i l i t a r y commitments to France - except maybe i n conjunction with a disarmament convention - though he considered 30 entering some kind of \"Mediterranean Locarno\". Like the Tories before him, he based his policy on the \"harmony of interests\" theory. He believed that the horrors of a future war made i t inconceivable that a disarmament convention would not be negotiated, and he never quite understood that a Franco-Italian naval agreement was frustrated by a clash of national interest rather than a desire on the part of France to effect a rapid and substantial increase i n her naval 2Q armaments. But he did understand that i t might be necessary for B r i t a i n to involve herself more actively i n European a f f a i r s i f solutions to the German and disarmament problems were to be found. In the autumn of 1929» \"the prospects for disarmament seemed good. Henderson, Briand and Stresemann, the Foreign Ministers of B r i t a i n , France and Germany, appeared to be working i n harmony, and c r i t i c i s m of the slowness of the work of the Preparatory Commission came from the B r i t i s h delegate, Lord C e c i l , rather than from the Germans. But the years 1930 and 1931 witnessed a deterioration i n European relations, mainly because of the effects of the economic depression res u l t i n g from the \"Wall Street crash\" of October 1929. In Germany, the \"Grand Coalition\" of Social Democrats, Democrats, Centre and German Peoples Party f e l l from o f f i c e i n March 1930, and the new Chancellor, Heinrich Bruning, had to resort to rule by presidential decree under A r t i c l e 48 of the Constitution as he had no consistent majority i n the Reichstag. President Hindenburg and General Schleicher, head of the Reichswehr, assumed greater powers and moved Germany more 31 to \"the Right. Faith in democratic government, never particularly strong among the German people, began to decline, and militant nationalists took advantage of the economic distress and the authoritarian nature of the German mind to blame the situation on the Peace Treaty. In September 1930, the extremist parties - the Nazis and the Communists - made substantial gains in the Reichstag elections, and the Nazis became the second largest party in the House. The new militancy of the German people was reflected in the Preparatory Commission. Count Bernstorff, the German delegate, made numerous reservations to the draft convention in course of preparation, and on December 9 be voted against the adoption of the completed document. Certainly theJDraft Convention^1 had many defects. Part I was unacceptable to Germany and the other non-conscriptionist oountries because i t provided for the limitation of effectives but not the limitation of trained reserves. Germany, with her long-service army and no reserves, could hardly be expected to accept permanent inferiority in effectives relative to her oonscriptionist neighbours. Another serious defect of the Draft Convention was i t s provision for indirect rather than direot limitation of materiel. The Germans found i t impossible to accept because i t limited the future acquisition of materiel while leaving existing stocks untouched. The main threat to German seourity lay in a \"knockout blow\" from a nation possessing large forces capable of immediate mobilization, and i t was in Germany's interest to restrict the materiel available to the armies of Prance and her a l l i e s . Direot limitation applied equally to a l l the major 32 Powers would reduce Frenoh preponderance in Europe and thus improve Germany's bargaining power in European politics. Germany was not the only Power dissatisfied at the provisions for effectives and materiel. Britain was basically in favour of limiting trained reserves, though Ceoil abstained from voting on this proposal in the Commission because he realized that Japan, Italy and France would not abandon conscription and that i t was necessary for Britain to keep on good terms with France. Similar reasons accounted for his acceptance of budgetary limitation. Other Powers took their dislike of the provisions for effectives and materiel further; Italy, America and the Soviet Union, for example, voted against budgetary limitation. A further weakness of the Draft Convention was i t s provisions for air disarmament, as the states disarmed by the Peace Treaties were forbidden to own military aircraft while the other Powers were allowed to retain their air arms - though they were required to limit the number of aircraft in service and \"immediate reserve\" by number and total horse-power. Bernstorff proposed the abolition of bombing, but this was rejected by the other Powers. There was no provision for control over c i v i l aviation except that states agreed to \"refrain from prescribing\" the embodiment of military features in c i v i l i a n aircraft and make no preparations for the conversion of such machines to military use in time of peace. France had suggested the internationalization of c i v i l aviation, but Britain, Germany and America rejected the proposal. In contrast, there was some measure of agreement over the limitation of naval arms, as the Washington and London Treaties provided a solid 33 basis for further l i m i t a t i o n s . Eaoh naval Power was to be a l lo t ted a t o t a l tonnage l i m i t for eaoh category of vesse l , and rules were to be formulated allowing a \"transfer of tonnage\" between categories. At the same time, i t was evident that disputes were almost oertain to arise when the time came for inser t ing f igures i n the blank tables of the convention. The most sat is factory section of the convention was that i n which each Party was to undertake to \"abstain unreservedly\" from using bacter io logica l weapons and, subject to rec iproc i ty , from using asphyxiating, poisonous or \" s i m i l a r \" gases and analogous \" l i q u i d s , substances or processes\". Only s l i g h t l y less sat isfactory was a provision for the establishment of a Permanent Disarmament Commission to supervise the execution of the convention and deal with any complaints concerning v io la t ions or \"attempted v i o l a t i o n s \" . I ts members were to be appointed by the i r governments but were not to represent them and could not be removed by them. Gn receiving a complaint, they would draw up a report so that the Part ies to the convention could advise on any action to be taken, and i n the case of a dispute between members of the League, any action would be taken i n accordance with the Covenant. In contrast to the general harmony regarding the Permanent Disarmament Commission, a olause s tat ing that the Draft Convention would i n no way affect the provisions of previous disarmament treat ies aroused intense bi t terness , for Germany, Bulgaria and Turkey saw i t as an attempt to secure a reaff irmation of the conditions imposed by the Peace Treaties . The B r i t i s h delegation had inserted the clause to ensure that the Washington and London Treaties would not be weakened, but t h i s seemed 34 i rrelevant to the delegates of the ex-Central Powers. There was no real surprise when Germany rejected the Draft Convention on the groundsthat i t would not provide equality of r ights and equality of security for a l l nations. The c r i t i c i s m was j u s t i f i e d . The convention had been formulated at a time when Prance was the preponderant Power i n Europe and Germany was fee l ing the effects of the occupation of the Ruhr, hut \"by 1930 the German people were more aware of t h e i r national strength than they had been f i v e years previously and they sought to use t h i s strength to gain concessions from the other Powers. The d i s t r i b u t i o n of power within Europe was changing i n Germany's favour, and i t was necessary for the other Powers to adjust to t h i s change. The Draft Convention could not f a c i l i t a t e such an adjustment and therefore could not provide a basis for the solution of the disarmament or German problems. During 1931, as the world depression became worse, European relat ions became exacerbated. On March 21, Austr ia and Germany announced t h e i r intention to establ ish a customs union, and though they claimed that the motives behind the proposal were economio, there i s l i t t l e doubt that they were p o l i t i c a l ? the German leaders trusted that t h e i r public would regard the Zdl lvere in as a f i r s t step towards Anschluss, whilst hoping that the European Powers would regard the proposal as 32 n o n - p o l i t i c a l . Bruning's hopes were soon disappointed. Prance, I t a l y and Czechoslovakia believed that the customs union was a portent of Anschluss, and to protect t h e i r interests they made demarches i n B e r l i n claiming that a customs union was prohibited by the Austrian 35 Reconstruction Protocol of 1922 and Article 8 of the Treaty of St. Germain. Thus the Zoilverein proposal did l i t t l e more than aggravate European tensions. Henderson's attitude towards the Zollverein proposal was governed by his desire to ensure that the Disarmament Conference was held under the most favourable conditions.^ He was ooncerned at the apprehension caused by the proposal and sought to promote a Pranoo-German compromise by suggesting that the League Council examine the legality of the proposal. Eventually, both Prance and Germany acoepted this course. In a further attempt to ease the prevailing tension in Europe, Henderson supported Prance in demanding concessions from Germany in return for French aid to \"save\" the German economy. His proposals,^' including a suggestion that Germany agree to a five-year \"political moratorium\", were somewhat unrealistic, but they did demonstrate that he recognized that good Anglo-French relations were an essential preliminary to disarmament and the appeasement of Germany. Unfortunately, the British Chancellor (Philip Snowden), the Governor of the Bank of England (Montagu Norman) and Ramsay MacDonald opposed Henderson's policy and tried to persuade the French to make concessions to Germany in order to consolidate Bruning's position in relation to the German extremists. This aroused the bitterness of the French, who began to withdraw their short-term credits from London, causing a financial c r i s i s that led to the downfall of the Labour Government on August 24. In his two years in office, Henderson had taken a more realistic 36 attitude towards the problems confronting him than his predecessor at the Foreign Office and had done his best to bring France and Germany together. He was the f i r s t , i f not the only, Foreign Secretary between the two World Wars who gained the confidence of both French and German leaders, and for t h i s reason he was appointed President of the Disarmament Conference on May 22. Because of his b e l i e f i n an international \"harmony of interests\", interests which he thought could be pursued within the framework of a system of c o l l e c t i v e security, he may have been over-optimistic about the chances of a Franco-German reconciliation, but unlike most B r i t i s h statesmen, he recognized that B r i t a i n would have to play an active role i f there was to be any chance of improving relations between the two Continental Powers. Thus, although he appeared to regard disarmament as an end i n i t s e l f rather than as a method for f a c i l i t a t i n g a solution of the German problem, his policy offered some hope that an agreement might be reached at the Disarmament Conference. The f a l l of the Labour Government had serious consequences. Henderson's personal influence as President of the Disarmament Conference was weakened by his loss of o f f i c e , and the new B r i t i s h Government - a Conservative ( i n the guise of National) administration with MacDonald as Premier - was more concerned with solving Britain's economic problems than discussing disarmament. Not u n t i l the general election of October 27 had given the \"National Coalition\" a convincing majority of over 400 seats i n the Commons did the Cabinet consider i t s policy towards the disarmament and German problems. 37 Foreign Secretary in the new Government was Sir John Simon - an unfortunate choice. A.gifted lawyer, he had l i t t l e interest in foreign affairs, was reluctant to take a strong line on any problem confronting him and tended to look on other countries 1 policies as opposing 35 briefs. J His appointment was criticized by many leading Conservatives, including Sir Austen Chamberlain,\"^ and i t is possible that KacDonald, who was intensely interested in foreign affairs wanted to enhance his own prestige by having an indifferent performer at the Foreign 37 Offioe. It was suggested that the allocation of offices within the government coalition necessitated a Liberal Foreign Secretary, but other high-ranking Liberals, notably Sir Herbert Samuel, had better qualifications for the post than Simon. The Government abandoned Henderson's policy of \"active mediation\" between France and Germany and reverted to Austen Chamberlain's policy of \"comparative detaohment\" and the defence of Britain's immediate interests. Neither MacDonald nor Simon seemed to appreciate the role played by power in international relations, and the Premier remained convinced that goodwill was a l l that was necessary to 39 resolve international disputes. ^ Apparently, he did not recognize that the German problem could not be solved unless Britain took a more active part in European affairs and assumed additional Continental commitments. His own solution to both the German and disarmament problems was for France and Germany to \"put their demands in such a 40 way that Britain could say that she supported both sides\". The Government's refusal to play an active part in reconciling Franco-German differences was a serious blow to the Disarmament 38 Conference. Germany would no longer tolerate being treated as a second-class Power, and unless an agreement was reached at Geneva, it was certain that she would begin to rearm unilaterally, thus causing an arms race. To meet this danger, the other Powers had three courses open to them. They could uphold the provisions of the Peace Treaty by force; but this was unrealistic, the occupation of the Ruhr having demonstrated that a policy of force hurt the other Powers almost as much as Germany. They could f a l l back on their own military resources; but this would precipitate an arms race rather than avoid one. Or they could appease German grievances and adjust peacefully to the new configuration of power within Europe. Only this last course offered any real hope that a peaceful solution of the German and disarmament problems could be achieved; and in practice i t meant reconciling the French claim for security with the German claim for equality of rights by means of a Franco-German agreement or through British mediation between the two Continental Powers. The latter was the most efficacious method, though for mediation to be successful i t would be necessary for Britain to offer France compensations for the increase in German power accompanying a grant of equality. 39 CHAPTER I I THE FIRST PHASE OP THE DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE February 2 - July 23 1932 The b e l i e f that goodwill alone was suf f ic ient to set t le major international problems led the Government to adopt a non-committal pol icy at the Disarmament Conference. MacDonald wrote to Lord Londonderry, the A i r Minis ter , \"We need at Geneva a pol icy quiet ly pursued without turning off our way to r ight or l e f t \" , 1 and the instructions sent to the B r i t i s h delegation i n Geneva were somewhat 2 nebulous on questions l i k e l y to cause d i f f i c u l t y . Moreover, the B r i t i s h Cabinet was s t i l l arguing about the substance of the B r i t i s h disarmament programme. The Government o r i g i n a l l y intended to follow a s imilar po l i cy to that advocated i n the Preparatory Commission - the direct l i m i t a t i o n of materiel and ef fect ives^- but i n January 1932 the Cabinet began to study a scheme for qual i ta t ive disarmament drawn up by Capt. B. H. L i d d e l l Hart, a re t i red army o f f i c e r and one of the foremost m i l i t a r y strategists of the time.^ The Preparatory Commission had revealed that France and Germany were unl ike ly to agree upon a scheme of quantitative disarmament because of t h e i r d i f f e r i n g strategical needs andffthe d i f f i c u l t y of imposing numerical r e s t r i c t i o n s . A successful agreement had to prevent squabbles over numbers and ra t ios of armaments and sa t i s fy each state that i t s security was not impaired. L i d d e l l Hart believed that t h i s could be achieved by reducing the offensive power of armies and rendering them incapable of invading a neighbour's t e r r i t o r y with any prospect of success. y He therefore suggested the abol i t ion of heavy guns of over 4\" (105 mm) cal ibre and tanks of over f i v e , eight or ten tons, as 40 these were the only land weapons capable of making any impression on modern f o r t i f i c a t i o n s or entrenched posi t ions . Lighter weapons such as machine guns and automatic weapons were unable to break through modern f o r t i f i c a t i o n s or entrenchments; and i n any case they were d i f f i c u l t to l i m i t as they could eas i ly be concealed - unlike heavy guns and tanks. At least two members of the Cabinet, Simon and S i r Samuel Hoare, gave L i d d e l l Hart ' s ideas a favourable reception.** MacDonald and Baldwin (the Conservative leader and Lord President of the Council) also seem to have viewed them sympathetically, but the Service Ministers apparently opposed them and pressed for increases i n 7 B r i t i s h armaments.1 The conf l io t had not been resolved when the Disarmament Conference assembled on February 2. At the opening of the \"general discussion\" on February 8 , Simon asserted that B r i t a i n was i n favour of both quantitative and qual i ta t ive disarmament, and he went on to suggest that submarines and other weapons whose character was pr imari ly offensive oould be abolished or reduced i n size and that res t r i c t ions could be placed on permissible weapons. \" U n c i v i l i z e d \" or offensive methods of warfare such as a e r i a l bombardment and the use of gas and chemical weapons could be prohibited and a Permanent Disarmament Commission could be established to supervise the convention. Simon's suggestions were rather vague and more an outl ine of the methods by which disarmament should be pursued rather than def ini te proposals for l i m i t a t i o n . The proposals for qual i ta t ive l i m i t a t i o n represented a possible l i n e of advance, but i n the i r ex is t ing form they were insuf f i c i en t to give an effect ive lead to the deliberations of the Conference. 41 Most delegations restated the posi t ion that they had taken i n the Preparatory Commission or set out the i r maximum demands. The French Premier, Andre\" Tardieu, repeated the fami l iar argument that peace and disarmament depended on security and that security depended on each state being w i l l i n g to f u l f i l i t s obligations under the Covenant. He accepted the Draft Convention as a basis of an agreement, and suggested that i t could be complemented by the creation of an internat ional force, the prohib i t ion of bombing, the internat ional izat ion of c i v i l av ia t ion , the protection of c i v i l i a n populations, compulsory a r b i t r a t i o n , the strengthening of the League and international oontrol of the execution of a l l agreements concerning armaments. Countries owning heavy a r t i l l e r y , submarines over an agreed tonnage, capi ta l ships over 10,000 tons or with guns over 8\" ca l ibre , and bombers exceeding a weight to be speci f ied, would be permitted to use these weapons only i n self-defence or on orders from the League. The use of poison gas and incendiary and bacter io logica l weapons would be forbidden. The French were not so u n r e a l i s t i c as to believe that t h e i r scheme would gain general acceptance; the discussions i n the Preparatory Commission had revealed that many countries, B r i t a i n included, would refuse to strengthen the League as an organ of security. The real objectives of the \"Tardieu plan\" were to enable the French demand for security to dominate the Geneva disouss ions^ and to postpone the question of concessions to Germany u n t i l af ter the May elections i n France. When Simon pointed out that B r i t i s h opinion prevented the Government from entering new Continental commitments ans suggested 42 that i t was rather doubtful whether the \"French thesis\" oould be useful ly discussed. Tardieu did not ins i s t that his proposals be given f u l l c o n s i d e r a t i o n . 1 1 The proposals were useful e lect ion propaganda and a valuable bargaining counter at Geneva - but l i t t l e e l se . Host speakers i n the \"general discussion\" seem to have recognized that the Tardieu plan was l i t t l e more than an exercise i n propaganda and omitted to mention the French proposals i n the i r own speeches. Hugh Gibson, the chief American delegate, suggested the abol i t ion of submarines, l e tha l gases and bacter io logica l warfare and the r e s t r i c t i o n of \"pr imar i ly offensive\" weapons such as tanks and heavy mobile guns. Armies would be divided into forces necessary for the maintenance of internal order and \"some suitable contingent for defence\" and the 12 London naval Treaty extended to include France and I t a l y . Dino Grandi, the I t a l i a n Foreign Minis ter , advocated an agreement based on equality of r ights and the \"proportionate adjustment\"«4f armed forces at the lowest possible l e v e l , and he advanced concrete suggestions for the qual i ta t ive l i m i t a t i o n of the most powerful and deadly weapons. A i r c r a f t - c a r r i e r s , heavy a r t i l l e r y , tanks, bombers and chemioal and bacter iological weapons would be abolished and capi ta l ships and submarines were to be disposed of \"simultaneously\". Other armaments would be l imi ted quant i tat ively and the laws of war revised to assure a more complete protection of c i v i l i a n populat ions. 1 ^ The Soviet delegate, Maxim L i t v i n o v , repeated his f a m i l i a r demands for general and t o t a l disarmament or the \"complete destruction\" of the most aggressive types of armaments - tanks, super-heavy long—range a r t i l l e r y , naval a r t i l l e r y over 12\" ca l ibre , ships over 10,000 tons, 43 a i r c r a f t - c a r r i e r s , m i l i t a r y d i r i g i b l e s , h e a v y b o m b e r s a n d \" a l l m e a n s a n d a p p a r a t u s \" f o r c h e m i c a l , i n c e n d i a r y a n d b a c t e r i o l o g i c a l w a r f a r e . L i t v i n o v p o u r e d s c o r n o n t h e F r e n c h p r o p o s a l s , s u g g e s t i n g t h a t t h e y w o u l d n o t l e a d t o a r m s r e d u c t i o n a n d t h a t t h e p r o p o s e d i n t e r n a t i o n a l a r m y w o u l d n o t b e l a r g e e n o u g h t o d e t e r a n a g g r e s s o r e v e n i f s t a t e s w e r e w i l l i n g t o j o i n i n c o e r o i v e a c t i o n . ^ O n F e b r u a r y 1 8 , R u d o l f N a d o l n y , t h e G e r m a n d e l e g a t e , l a i d a n e w s e t o f p r o p o s a l s b e f o r e t h e C o n f e r e n c e . A e r i a l b o m b a r d m e n t , \" f o r t r e s s e s c o n s t i t u t i n g a d i r e c t m e n a c e t o o t h e r n a t i o n s \" a n d t h e u s e a n d m a n u f a c t u r e o f c h e m i c a l a n d b a c t e r i o l o g i c a l w e a p o n s w o u l d b e p r o h i b i t e d , t a n k s a n d h e a v y a r t i l l e r y a b o l i s h e d a n d s t o c k s o f a r m s l i m i t e d i n q u a n t i t y a n d b y c a t e g o r y , e x c e s s m a t e r i e l b e i n g d e s t r o y e d . C o n s c r i p t i o n w o u l d b e a b o l i s h e d o r , i f t h i s p r o v e d i m p o s s i b l e , t r a i n e d r e s e r v e s w o u l d b e l i m i t e d . , F o r c e s s u c h a s p o l i c e a n d g e n d a r m e r i e w o u l d b e p l a c e d u n d e r s e v e r e r e s t r i c t i o n s . A n d c a p i t a l s h i p s w o u l d b e l i m i t e d t o 1 0 , 0 0 0 t o n s , t h e s i z e o f c r u i s e r s a n d d e s t r o y e r s r e d e f i n e d a n d s u b m a r i n e s 1 5 a b o l i s h e d . B y F e b r u a r y 2 4 , w h e n t h e \" g e n e r a l d i s c u s s i o n \" e n d e d , i t w a s e v i d e n t t h a t a l l d e l e g a t i o n s w e r e i n f a v o u r o f t h e a b o l i t i o n o f c h e m i c a l a n d b a c t e r i o l o g i c a l w a r f a r e a n d t h e g r e a t m a j o r i t y i n f a v o u r o f t h e a b o l i t i o n o f b o m b e r s a n d b o m b i n g . A n d a s r e g a r d s t h e c r u c i a l i s s u e o f l a n d d i s a r m a m e n t , m o s t s t a t e s h a d a c c e p t e d t h e p r i n c i p l e o f q u a l i t a t i v e l i m i t a t i o n ; G e r m a n y , I t a l y a n d R u s s i a h a d p u t f o r w a r d s p e c i f i c p r o p o s a l s a n d b o t h B r i t a i n a n d A m e r i c a h a d s u g g e s t e d t h e l i m i t a t i o n o f t h e m o s t ; o f f e n s i v e w e a p o n s . F r a n c e , o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , w a n t e d t o r e t a i n h e r h e a v y w e a p o n s , t h o u g h t h e p l a n t o d e p o s i t t h e m w i t h t h e L e a g u e w a s a n 44 i m p l i c i t r e c o g n i t i o n o f t h e q u a l i t a t i v e p r i n c i p l e . D e s p i t e F r e n c h h e s i t a t i o n s , i t d i d s e e m t h a t p r o g r e s s t o w a r d s a d i s a r m a m e n t c o n v e n t i o n m i g h t b e m a d e i f B r i t a i n w a s w i l l i n g t o g i v e a n e f f e c t i v e l e a d t o t h e d e l i b e r a t i o n s o f t h e C o n f e r e n c e . M e m b e r s o f t h e F r e n c h d e l e g a t i o n f e a r e d t h a t t h e r e l a t i v e l y c o n c i l i a t o r y B r U n i n g m i g h t b e r e p l a c e d a s C h a n c e l l o r b y a m i l i t a n t n a t i o n a l i s t a n d s o w e r e c o n s i d e r i n g t h e r e c o g n i t i o n i n p r i n c i p l e o f t h e G e r m a n c l a i m t o e q u a l i t y o f s t a t u s c o u p l e d w i t h a n a g r e e m e n t t h a t l i m i t e d G e r m a n a r m a m e n t s t o a f i g u r e w e l l b e l o w t h a t o f F r a n c e a n d h e r a l l i e s . ^ A n d a s i n s u r a n c e a g a i n s t G e r m a n b a d f a i t h , t h e F r e n c h d e s i r e d s o m e m a t e r i a l 1 7 p l e d g e o f s u p p o r t - p o s s i b l y a p r o m i s e o f a i r c r a f t . B u t a l t h o u g h S i m o n a p p r e c i a t e d t h a t t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f a n a g r e e m e n t e x i s t e d , h e w a s ; u n w i l l i n g t o g i v e a n y a d d i t i o n a l a s s u r a n c e s o f s u p p o r t e i t h e r t o F r a n c e 18 a l o n e o r t o b o t h F r a n c e a n d G e r m a n y a n d w a s r e l u c t a n t t o t a k e t h e l e a d i n b r i n g i n g t h e t w o . C o n t i n e n t a l P o w e r s t o g e t h e r . H e s o u n d e d 1 9 T a r d i e u o n M a r c h 1 2 , b u t a p p a r e n t l y d i d n o t f o l l o w u p t h e e n q u i r y . T h u s t h e c h a n c e o f a r r i v i n g a t a F r a n c o - G e r m a n s e t t l e m e n t o u t s i d e t h e C o n f e r e n c e w a s t e m p o r a r i l y l o s t . W o r k w i t h i n t h e C o n f e r e n c e p r o c e e d e d i n t h e G e n e r a l C o m m i s s i o n ( t h e : C o n f e r e n c e s i t t i n g a s a c o m m i s s i o n ) c o n s i s t i n g o f o n e m e m b e r f r o m e a c h i d e l e g a t i o n . I t s f i r s t t a s k w a s t o c o - o r d i n a t e t h e p r o p o s a l s o f t h e v a r i o u s d e l e g a t i o n s a n d l a y d o w n a m o d e o f p r o c e d u r e , a n d i t a d o p t e d S i m o n ' s s u g g e s t i o n o f c a r r y i n g o n i t s d i s c u s s i o n s w i t h i n t h e f r a m e w o r k o f t h e D r a f t C o n v e n t i o n w h i l e r e s e r v i n g f u l l l i b e r t y f o r a l l d e l e g a t i o n s t o d e v e l o p t h e i r o w n p r o p o s a l s a n d m o v e a m e n d m e n t s . T h e G e n e r a l C o m m i s s i o n w a s t o m a k e a l l d e c i s i o n s r e g a r d i n g p r i n c i p l e s o f d i s a r m a m e n t , 45 a n d f i v e t e c h n i c a l c o m m i s s i o n s ( L a n d , N a v a l , A i r , N a t i o n a l D e f e n c e E x p e n d i t u r e a n d P o l i t i c a l ) w e r e e s t a b l i s h e d t o a d v i s e t h e b e s t m e a n s . o f a p p l y i n g t h e p r i n c i p l e s . T h e s e p r o c e d u r a l m a t t e r s c a u s e d p r o g r e s s t o b e s l o w , a n d i t s o o n b e c a m e a p p a r e n t t h a t m a j o r d e c i s i o n s o f p r i n c i p l e c o u l d n o t b e s e t t l e d b e f o r e t h e E a s t e r r e c e s s o n M a r c h 19. E l e c t i o n c a m p a i g n s i n F r a n c e a n d G e r m a n y w e r e a f u r t h e r i m p e d i m e n t t o p r o g r e s s , a n d t h e s u m t o t a l o f t h e G e n e r a l C o m m i s s i o n ' s l a b o u r s b e f o r e t h e b r e a k w a s a r e s o l u t i o n s t a t i n g t h a t a m a j o r a t t e m p t w o u l d b e m a d e t o t a c k l e \" t h e m o s t d i f f i c u l t 20 p r o b l e m s \" w h e n t h e C o n f e r e n c e r e c o n v e n e d o n A p r i l 11. S i m o n m i g h t h a v e u t i l i z e d t h e t h r e e - w e e k b r e a k t o t r y t o b r i n g F r a n c e a n d G e r m a n y t o g e t h e r , b u t i n s t e a d h e s a t b a c k a n d h o p e d t h a t t h e y w o u l d c o m e t o a n a g r e e m e n t b y t h e m s e l v e s . W h e n N a d o l n y s u g g e s t e d t h a t p r o b l e m s s u c h a s G e r m a n y ' s c l a i m t o e q u a l i t y o f s t a t u s s h o u l d b e t a c k l e d m o r e s p e e d i l y , t h e F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y m e r e l y a d v i s e d t h a t B r i t a i n w a s w o r k i n g f o r \" a n a p p r o x i m a t i o n o f v i e w s t o w a r d s a g r e a t e r e q u a l i t y o f t r e a t m e n t \" a n d t h a t i n t h e m e a n t i m e \" e v e r y b o d y m u s t II 21 e x e r c i s e p a t i e n c e . \" N o a g r e e m e n t w a s r e a c h e d d u r i n g t h e r e c e s s r e g a r d i n g t h e f u t u r e p r o c e d u r e o f t h e C o n f e r e n c e a n d t h u s t h e r e s u m p t i o n o f t h e G e n e r a l C o m m i s s i o n w a s c h a r a c t e r i z e d b y a s e r i e s o f s t e r i l e d i s c u s s i o n s . T w o a t t e m p t s w e r e m a d e t o s p e e d m a t t e r s . O n A p r i l 11, t h e A m e r i c a n s p u t f o r w a r d a p r o p o s a l f o r q u a l i t a t i v e d i s a r m a m e n t s u g g e s t i n g t h a t t h e L a n d C o m m i s s i o n b e c h a r g e d w i t h f o r m u l a t i n g p l a n s f o r t h e a b o l i t i o n o f 22 t a n k s , h e a v y m o b i l e g u n s o v e r 155mm c a l i b r e a n d p o i s o n g a s . A n d o n A p r i l 12, L i t v i n o v p u t f o r w a r d a p l a n f o r \" p r o g r e s s i v e - p r o p o r t i o n a l \" 46 disarmament, a refurbishing of his scheme of 1928 whereby states with armies over 200,000 men would be reduced by half and those from 30-200,000 men from 0-50$. But both these schemes were objectionable to France and her a l l i e s because they divorced the discussion of 24 disarmament from discussion of security. Progress might have been possible on the basis of either of these two schemes i f B r i t a i n had been w i l l i n g to increase her security commitments on the Continent, but the Government refused to a l t e r i t s stance on this question. After much discussion, the American and Soviet proposals were passed to the Bureau of the Conference \"for consideration i n light of the discussion that had taken plaoe, especially with regard to the remarks of M. Tardieu.\" But the Bureau dodged the issues involved by recommending that the General Commission decide whether i t s goal should be a reduction of armaments to the lowest possible level or a \"d e f i n i t i v e reduction\" and whether to arrive at the goal by means of a single disarmament convention or a number of successive agreements. Simon had taken l i t t l e part i n the procedural discussions i n the hope that B r i t i s h intervention would not be necessary to secure an agreement. But the f a i l u r e of the Powers to reach agreement led him to play an active role i n securing a compromise between the Germans, Italians and Soviets on the one hand and the French and t h e i r a l l i e s on the other. The outcome was the adoption (on A p r i l 19> 20 and 22 respectively) of three resolutions whose astute drafting enabled them to be accepted unanimously. The f i r s t declared that after the Conference had taken \"the f i r s t decisive step of general reduction to the lowest possible l e v e l \" , disarmament would be achieved by means of \"successive 47 revisions at appropriate i n t e r v a l s \" . J The second was l i t t l e more than a recasting of A r t i c l e 8 of the Covenant, on which a l l members of the 26 League based the i r po l i cy i n any case. The t h i r d approved the pr inc ip le of qual i ta t ive disarmament - \"the select ion of certain classes or description of weapons the possession or use of which should be absolutely prohibited to a l l states or international ized by means of 27 a general convention\". The t h i r d resolut ion was the most important as i t opened the way for the technical commissions to examine the range of land, sea and a i r armaments \"with a view to select ing those weapons whose character was the most s p e c i f i c a l l y offensive or . . . most eff icacious against 28 national defence or most threatening to c i v i l i a n s \" . Yet, as Li tv inov pointed out, the resolution was so general and oould be interpreted i n so many different ways that i t delayed a decision regarding the 29 weapons concerned and the method of reducing them. The Preparatory Commission had demonstrated that m i l i t a r y \"experts\" were unable to agree on a c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of aggressive weapons because each state assumed that i t s own armaments were defensive and i t s neighbours* offensive. In formulating the three procedural resolutions, Simon was probably inspired by a desire to i n i t i a t e private discussions between leaders of the Great Powers during the Amerioan Secretary of State Stimson*s v i s i t to Geneva at the end of A p r i l . Hitherto, the B r i t i s h had adopted a pol icy of \"wait and see\" as regards the Franoo-German dispute, but they now seemed to rea l ize the necessity of bringing government 48 leaders together outside the Conference. Accordingly, i t was arranged that Stimson, MaeBonald, Tardieu and Bruning should meet for a semi-official exchange of views at Stimson*s v i l l a at Bessinge on April 29.^° On April 24, at provincial elections in Prussia, Bavaria, Wurttemburg, Anhalt and Hamburg (an area representing four-fifths of Germany) the Nazis made considerable gains. Bruning*s position as Chancellor was seriously weakened by the results, and he determined to steal the Nazi thunder by returning to Berlin with an agreement securing equality of rights for Germany. Three days before the proposed four-Power meeting, Bruning put his plan to the British and American Ministers. He demanded equality of treatment - not equality of armaments - and insisted that he would be satisfied with a reduction in the period of service of the Reichswehr from twelve years to six, the transfer of Germany*s obligations under Part V of the Treaty of Versailles to the Disarmament Convention, and a reduction in the armed forces of Prance - though not to Germany's level - through the abolition or restriction of \"particularly aggressive\" weapons. In return, the Chancellor would consider an agreement along the lines of the Tardieu plan for an international force, with the ultimate objective of abolishing the weapons under its control. The convention might last for ten years.^ Bruning's proposals were very moderate and might well have formed the basis of a disarmament convention. They satisfied Germany's demand for equality - temporarily at least - yet also assured Prance of military superiority in Europe for a considerable length of time. 49 Prospects for a settlement seemed good, particularly as the French delegation at Geneva had \"been considering a scheme that closely resembled Brttning*s, except for a provision for increased security 32 pledges by Britain. MaoDonald and Stimson, while not accepting Bruning*s plan, agreed that the discussions of April 26 had helped \"towards immediately clearing away some of the fundamental obstacles towards ultimate agreement.\"\"^ Unfortunately, the meeting planned for April 29 did not take place as Tardieu was unable to journey to Geneva because of an attack of laryngitis. Two days later, he was defeated in the f i r s t round of: the French general elections and the convening of a four-Power meeting became impracticable. It is often claimed that Tardieu*s illness was diplomatic rather than physical and that he refused to go to Geneva because he had been informed by Andre Francois-Poneet, the French Ambassador in Berlin, that Brttning was about to be displaced and that his successor would be more amenable to French demands.^ But the evidence available does not substantiate these claims. Franoois-Poncet admits having advised the French Premier that Brttning's days were numbered but denies having suggested that the Chancellor's successor would be more 35 amenable. J Moreover, i t seems unlikely that the anti-German Tardieu would accept assurances from General Schleicher (Francois-Poncet's informant) regarding the amenability or otherwise of a new German leader. At the same time, apart from Brttning's claim that the French had agreed to his disarmament plan on May 31f the day after his dismissal, 50 there i s l i t t l e evidence to suggest that Tardieu would have agreed to the German proposals as they stood. Although the French Premier had come to rea l ize that continued French domination on the Continent was impracticable and that a prostrate Germany was as dangerous to 37 France as a m i l i t a r i s t i c one, he seems to have considered i t necessary to gain security compensations from B r i t a i n (and maybe America) i f he was to agree to a settlement on the basis of Brttning*s •JO demands. Tardieu was worried lest concessions on the German claim to equality might cause his defeat i n the French elect ions, and he seems to have been angling for a consultative pact with B r i t a i n and an assurance from the Americans that they would not interfere with a 39 course of action determined by the League. ' I f B r i t a i n had been w i l l i n g to give Tardieu the guarantees he required or give s imilar guarantees to both France and Germany, an agreed solution to the disarmament problem might well have been possible . B r i t a i n ' s att itude to the Brttning proposals i s uncertain because of a lack of documentary evidence. No record appears to have been , A O made of the conversations, of A p r i l 26. The Germans claimed subsequently that MacDonald had agreed to the i r claim for equality of r i g h t s , but t h i s was denied by the Foreign O f f i c e . At the same time, i t i s evident that the Prime Minister regarded the German plan 42 as a basis of a settlement. It i s astonishing, therefore, that he made no r e a l effort to press Tardieu into returning to Geneva.^ He must have recognized that to send Brttning back to B e r l i n with no agreement regarding equality of status was tantamount to ensuring the Chancellor's downfall . Possibly his lack of i n i t i a t i v e in^ t ry ing 51 to arrange another four-Power meeting was due to a r e a l i z a t i o n that agreement was improbable unless B r i t a i n increased her Continental . . . 44 commitments. Whatever the cause, the chance of securing a disarmament convention at Bessinge was missed. Tardieu's defeat i n the French elections of May 1 and 8 made a resumption of four-Power conversations d i f f i c u l t , and an American attempt to c a l l a four-Power meeting before the Lausanne Conference i n June was frustrated by the dismissal of Bruning on May 30. Meanwhile, the technical commissions had begun the i r attempts to define aggressive weapons. But the lack of p o l i t i c a l agreement among the states represented at the Conference ensured that the m i l i t a r y \"experts\" were u n l i k e l y to reach an agreement. Each state claimed that i t s own armaments were defensive and opponents' armaments offensive. 45 There was l i t t l e pretence of o b j e c t i v i t y . y In the Land Commission, Germany, the other former Central Powers and I t a l y maintained that the weapons denied to Germany by the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s were s p e c i f i c a l l y offensive and that guns over 100-105mm and a l l tanks should be abolished. France, anxious to maintain her m i l i t a r y superiori ty over Germany, claimed that guns of 240mm and tanks of 70 tons were unable to breach permanent f o r t i f i c a t i o n s and 4.6 were necessary to launch successful counter-offensives. B r i t a i n , represented by Brigadier Temperley and Lord Stanhope, took an intermediate pos i t ion , maintaining that guns up to 155nun and tanks up to 20-25 tons were not offensive and that \"medium tanks\" were 52 necessary to compensate Powers such as Britain for reductions in 4 7 effectives already made. The vast majority of the delegations supported the complete abolition of tanks and most believed that heavy guns should be limited to a calibre of either 105mm or 155nmi» Only Japan, who was consolidating her new conquests in Manchuria, supported Prance. On June 7 the Commission reported that no agreement A A could be reached on a olassifioation of offensive weapons. The conclusion was not unexpected. The position taken by the British representatives reflected the growing influence of the fighting services on government policy. The War Office, Air Ministry and Admiralty were opposed to reductions in British armaments, and the Air Minister Lord Londonderry, and the Minister for War, Lord Hailsham were against the whole concept of 4 9 qualitative disarmament. y The Government had intended to advocate the restriction of tanks to ten tons, but the General Staff, prompted by the Assistant Director of Mechanization in the War Office, Tim Pile, apparently convinced the Cabinet that Britain led the world in the development of \"medium tanks\" and that the Army could not give them up; in fact, Britain possessed only a few experimental 50 models of 16-20 tons. There was as l i t t l e agreement in the Naval Commission as in the Land Commission, each state basing i t s definition of an aggressive weapon on i t s own strategical needs. Britain and America, both Great naval Powers argued that no single type of warship was offensive but that submarines should be abolished on \"humanitarian and financial\" grounds, while Japan, the third Great naval Power, claimed that 53 b a t t l e s h i p s a n d s u b m a r i n e s w e r e d e f e n s i v e b u t a i r c r a f t - c a r r i e r s o f f e n s i v e . P r a n c e m a i n t a i n e d t h a t a l l w a r s h i p s , b u t e s p e c i a l l y s u b m a r i n e s , w e r e d e f e n s i v e . T h e l e s s e r n a v a l P o w e r s a n d t h o s e w h o c o u l d n o t a f f o r d c a p i t a l s h i p s s u g g e s t e d t h a t s u b m a r i n e s w e r e d e f e n s i v e a n d - b a t t l e s h i p s o f f e n s i v e , a n d G e r m a n y a n d I t a l y a r g u e d t h a t s h i p s d e n i e d t o G e r m a n y b y t h e T r e a t y o f V e r s a i l l e s w e r e o f f e n s i v e . O n M a y 28, a f t e r a m o n t h o f s t e r i l e d i s c u s s i o n , t h e C o m m i s s i o n w a s 5 1 c o m p e l l e d t o r e p o r t t h a t n o a g r e e m e n t w a s p o s s i b l e . T h e A i r . C o m m i s s i o n w a s a l s o u n s u c c e s s f u l . P r a n c e s u p p o r t e d a S p a n i s h s c h e m e f o r t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n o f c i v i l a v i a t i o n o n t h e l i n e s o f t h e U n i v e r s a l P o s t a l U n i o n w h i l e G e r m a n y a n d I t a l y s u g g e s t e d t h a t s t r i n g e n t i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n t r o l w o u l d r e t a r d t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f c i v i l a v i a t i o n . B r i t a i n w a s b a s i c a l l y i n f a v o u r o f t h e G e r m a n p o s i t i o n b u t a t t e m p t e d t o d e v i s e a p l a n p r e v e n t i n g t h e u s e o f c i v i l a i r c r a f t f o r m i l i t a r y p u r p o s e s . A m e r i c a d e c l a r e d t h a t t h e p r o b l e m w a s a E u r o p e a n o n e . G e r m a n y , I t a l y a n d R u s s i a a d v o o a t e d t h e c o m p l e t e a b o l i t i o n o f b o m b i n g a n d m i l i t a r y a v i a t i o n , w h i l e P r a n c e f a v o u r e d t h e c r e a t i o n o f a n i n t e r n a t i o n a l a i r f o r c e a n d t h e B r i t i s h d e l e g a t i o n o p p o s e d a c o m p l e t e b a n o n b o m b i n g . N o t s u r p r i s i n g l y , t h e r e p o r t o f t h e A i r C o m m i s s i o n o f J u n e 8 w a s m e r e l y p l a t i t u d i n o u s , c o n t a i n i n g s u c h o b s e r v a t i o n s a s \" A l l a i r a r m a m e n t s c a n b e u s e d t o s o m e e x t e n t f o r o f f e n s i v e p u r p o s e s \" , \" C i v i l a i r c r a f t . . . c a n i n v a r y i n g d e g r e e s ; s u b s e r v e m i l i t a r y e n d s \" a n d \" A l l a i r c r a f t . . . m a y c o n s t i t u t e a 5 2 d a n g e r t o c i v i l i a n s \" . B r i t a i n ' s p o l i c y i n t h e A i r C o m m i s s i o n a g a i n r e f l e c t e d t h e g r o w i n g i n f l u e n c e o f t h e S e r v i c e D e p a r t m e n t s o n t h e G o v e r n m e n t . M a n y m e m b e r s 54 of the Cabinet, inc luding Simon and Baldwin, favoured the complete abo l i t ion of bombing together with some control - though not the internat ional izat ion of - c i v i l aviat ion to prevent c i v i l a i r c r a f t 53 being used for m i l i t a r y purposes. But the A i r Staff suggested that B r i t a i n should re ta in bombers for deterrent purposes and that bombing was an e f f i c i e n t and humane method of p o l i c i n g outlying d i s t r i c t s of the B r i t i s h Empire such as the North West Frontier of 54 I n d i a . y Lord Londonderry feared the abo l i t ion of bombing might lead to the ext inct ion of the R . A . F . and he vigorously expounded the A i r 55 Staff view i n the Cabinet. ^ The i n a b i l i t y of the technical commissions to define aggressive weapons was not surpr i s ing . States had been unable to compose t h e i r p o l i t i c a l differences, and t h e i r divergent viewpoints had been ref lected i n the commissions. Lord C e c i l complained that the m i l i t a r y \"experts\" were preventing agreement by los ing themselves i n a maze of 56 t e c h n i c a l i t i e s , but the faul t lay with the p o l i t i c i a n s , who f a i l e d to come to grips with the main problems facing the Conference -the French demand for security and the German demand for equality of r i g h t s . Baldwin was apprehensive at the lack of progress i n the technical commissions, and on May 13 he put forward spec i f i c proposals to Andrew Mellon, the American Ambassador i n London, i n the hope that B r i t a i n and Amerioa could unite i n presenting a radica l programme to the Conference at Geneva. Closely resembling the I t a l i a n proposals, 55 and t o be accepted or rejected as a whole, the Baldwin plan envisaged the a b o l i t i o n of c a p i t a l ships, submarines, a i r c r a f t - c a r r i e r s , tanks, heavy mobile guns and a l l m i l i t a r y a v i a t i o n ( i n c l u d i n g pursuit and observation planes), the p r o h i b i t i o n of subsidies to c i v i l a v i a t i o n 57 and a \" d r a s t i c reduction\" of e f f e c t i v e s . There was l i t t l e chance of Baldwin's scheme being accepted i n i t s o r i g i n a l form. Although i t provided f o r German equality, i t offered no corresponding concessions to French s e c u r i t y ; there were no provisions f o r e i t h e r the supervision or the enforcement of the convention. Baldwin gave, no i n d i c a t i o n that B r i t a i n was w i l l i n g t o increase her Continental commitments, though he d i d suggest that America might agree to some form of co-operation with the League i n 58 the case of sanctions being applied. But i t was u n l i k e l y that President Hoover would r i s k h i s p o l i t i c a l future - i t was an e l e c t i o n year - by undertaking f u r t h e r commitments i n matters not d i r e c t l y i n v o l v i n g h i s country. The Baldwin plan represented a considerable departure i n B r i t i s h p o l i c y - i f i t was a serious proposal. There i s some doubt about t h i s . Mellon described the Conservative leader's a t t i t u d e towards the scheme 59 as resigned rather than hopeful, \"almost apologetic\", and Baldwin himself was convinced that the a i r proposals were impracticable and would not be accepted by the other Powers.^ Moreover, a f t e r Stimson had r e j e c t e d the plan, Baldwin began to i n s i s t that i t was a purely personal i n i t i a t i v e that should be kept s e c r e t . ^ 1 This was untrue; the Cabinet had discussed the proposals at l e a s t twice with a view t o 62 presenting them at Geneva. Baldwin's r e a l reason f o r wanting the 56 scheme to remain secret was fear lest the Labour Party learn of i t and place the Government i n an embarrassing p o s i t i o n * ^ A further reason for doubting Baldwin's sin c e r i t y i s that abolition of capital ships, submarines and a i r c r a f t - c a r r i e r s would have increased the strength of the Royal Navy, whose main strength was i n cruisers and destroyers, at the expense of America and Japan, whose main strength was i n the classes of ship to be abolished. The American Under-Secretary of State, W. R. Gastle Jnr., believed, probably correctly, that the naval proposals were an attempt to appeal to the Tories, who had a philosophical aversion to disarmament unless i t was the disarmament of others. 4 Stimson was seriously concerned by the Baldwin plan, especially the proposed abolition of capital ships and a i r c r a f t - c a r r i e r s . America needed battleships and a i r c r a f t - c a r r i e r s to protect her interests i n the Par East and he would not even agree to \" r e l a t i v e and proportional\" reductions 65 i n them. ^ He wanted, above a l l , to prevent B r i t a i n from presenting Baldwin's proposals at Geneva i n case they reveal the Anglo-American differences on naval questions.^ Apparently, he feared that Hoover might support the Baldwin plan, and he began to formulate counter-proposals which eventually formed the basis of the \"Hoover plan\" of 67 June 22. After a demarche by Mellon on June 8, Baldwin quietly dropped his disarmament scheme. While the Anglo-American conversations were taking place, Herriot had succeeded Tardieu as Frenoh President du Conseil. The change i n personnel did not lead to any great change i n French policy. Although 57 Herriot sincerely hoped for a Franco-German reconciliation and was under pressure from the Socialists for a 25$ cut in the military budget as part of their price for co-operation with the Government, he was \"deeply under the impression of the Stresemann letters'* published in \"L*Illustration\" and \"Revue de Paris\" in March. Conversing with Norman Davis, one of the American delegates at Geneva, he even remarked that \"Briand's body i s not yet oold before 68 they the Germans lay on his tomb the Stresemann insults!\" In Germany, President Hindenburg had dismissed Brttning and replaoed him with a \"Government of Barons\" under Franz von Papen, a relative nonentity who owed his position to his personal relationship with Hindenburg and General Schleicher. Baron von Neurath was appointed Foreign Minister. Yet despite the more conservative nature of the new Cabinet, German disarmament policy remained fundamentally the same. Apart from Papen*s insistence that the negotiations at Geneva be speeded up and that Germany pursue a more aotive policy there, the main difference between him and Brttning was his vigorous espousal of a Franco-German 69 rapprochement. Schleicher, who became Minister of Defence in the new Cabinet, hoped that a deal might be arranged with the French, l i f t i n g 7 0 some of the restrictions on German disarmament. Provided that public opinion on either side of the Rhine was not aroused, there seemed to be a distinot possibility that the new French and German leaders would come to an agreement. It was the British who made the f i r s t new suggestion for improving European relations. Simon took up Francois-Poneet*s old idea of a \"political truce\", an agreement by which European states would not 58 raise p o l i t i c a l issues or pursue p o l i c i e s l i k e l y to disturb their good relations with each other for f i f t e e n years. It would e n t a i l a periodic exchange of views on matters of common importance and Simon hoped that i t might cajole the French into accepting the cancellation of German 71 reparations. But neither the French nor German Governments favoured the scheme. Herriot believed i t might be another \"scrap of paper\" similar to the Covenant and Kellogg Pact and that the p o l i t i c a l questions i t was hoped to sweep under the carpet would be raised 72 automatically at the end of f i f t e e n years; to him, a p o l i t i c a l truce was certainly no quid pro quo for the cancellation of German reparations-. The Germans, who i n any case were determined not to pay any more reparations, preferred a direct Franco-German settlement. The proposal, in fact, would only have benefitted B r i t a i n , who wanted a period of calm on the Continent (without herself having to undertake any additional commitments) and the cancellation of reparations (so that she could renege on her war debts to the United States). Thus, on June 16, when the Lausanne Conference on reparations opened, the ground had been cleared of a l l p o l i t i c a l proposals and the way was open for Papen to reveal his plan for a Franco-German rapprochement privately to Herriot. He demanded that reparations be cancelled and, i n return, offered an accord directed against communism (in effect against Russia), p o l i t i c a l guarantees (for example, i n 73 Eastern Europe) and contacts between the two General Staffs. On June 18, Bernhard von Billow, one of the German Secretaries of State, i n conversation with M. de Laboulay, one of Herriot's Secretaries of State, offered to reaffirm the provisions of Locarno r e l a t i v e to Germany's Eastern f r o n t i e r and suggested a four-Power consultative pact 59 \"between Prance, Germany, B r i t a i n and I t a l y . ^ Two days l a t e r he added that i n return for a recognition of equality of treatment and the replacement of Part V of the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s by a f r e e l y -negotiated disarmament convention, Germany would be w i l l i n g to f i x definite ratios: between the two armed forces and to forgo her claim. 75 to parity i n both men and armaments. J On the following day, Papen informed MaoDonald that he was prepared to enter a five-year consultative paot with Pranoe, B r i t a i n and I t a l y \"for the purpose of ensuring French security\" and added that, i n return for a recognition of her equality of rights, Germany would r e f r a i n from increasing her armaments to the maximum which would be permitted her and would l i m i t her m i l i t a r y expenditure to the existing l e v e l . On June 24 he repeated his previous proposals to Herriot and promised not to raise the Anschluss or the revision of Germany's Eastern f r o n t i e r without 77 prior consultation. Herriot was attracted by the scheme, though he was suspicious of the proposed accord between the General Staffs and the prospect of co-operation against Soviet Russia. De Laboulay composed a draft formula and the French Premier returned to Paris to gain Cabinet 7ft approval for continuing the negotiations. However, when he came back to Lausanne, he found Papen i n a more guarded frame of mind because 79 of attacks i n the German nationalist press. \" The German Chancellor now proposed a more comprehensive settlement, including a customs union, the cancellation of reparations, the recognition of German equality of rights, a m i l i t a r y entente ( i f not an alliance) between 80 the General Staffs and1 an accord to eliminate credits to Russia. 60 D e s p i t e t h e u n d e r l y i n g F r e n c h d i s t r u s t o f G e r m a n m o t i v e s , P a p e n * S; p l a n m i g h t w e l l h a v e f o r m e d t h e \" b a s i s o f a F r a n c o - G e r m a n a c c o r d o n d i s a r m a m e n t . I t o f f e r e d G e r m a n y e q u a l i t y o f r i g h t s a n d t h e c a n c e l l a t i o n o f r e p a r a t i o n s , w h i l e F r a n c e w o u l d h a v e r e t a i n e d h e r s u p e r i o r i t y i n a r m a m e n t s a n d w o u l d h a v e b e e n g i v e n a c c e s s t o a l l d e p a r t m e n t s o f t h e G e r m a n G e n e r a l S t a f f , t h u s p r o v i d i n g h e r w i t h g r e a t e r s e c u r i t y . A n a g r e e m e n t t o c o - o p e r a t e a g a i n s t R u s s i a w o u l d h a v e b e e n u n t h i n k a b l e s i n c e F r a n c e d e s i r e d t o i m p r o v e r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e S o v i e t s , b u t t h e p r o p o s e d c u s t o m s u n i o n w o u l d h a v e b e n e f i t t e d b o t h F r a n c e a n d . G e r m a n y , e s p e c i a l l y i n t h e d e p r e s s e d c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f t h e t i m e . H o w e v e r , t h e a u s p i c i o u s o p e n i n g o f t h e F r a n c o - G e r m a n t a l k s d i d n o t c o n t i n u e a n d n e g o t i a t i o n s s o o n b r o k e d o w n . T h e a t t a c k s o n P a p e n b y t h e n a t i o n a l i s t p r e s s c a u s e d t h e C h a n c e l l o r t o a s s u m e a m o r e c a u t i o u s 8 l a t t i t u d e , b u t t h e m a i n f a c t o r i n t h e b r e a k d o w n w a s t h e a t t i t u d e o f t h e B r i t i s h . M a c D o n a l d p u t p r e s s u r e o n b o t h P a p e n a n d H e r r i o t t o d e s i s t f r o m f u r t h e r n e g o t i a t i o n s b e c a u s e h e w a s h a u n t e d b y t h e s p e c t r e o f a F r a n c o - G e r m a n a l l i a n c e w h i c h w o u l d \" u p s e t t h e b a l a n c e o f 82 E u r o p e a n p o w e r . \" O n J u n e 28, w h e n a l l t h r e e c o u n t r i e s c a m e t o g e t h e r t o d i s c u s s t h e q u e s t i o n o f a F r a n c o - G e r m a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g , b o t h P a p e n a n d H e r r i o t w e r e d e c i d e d l y r e t i c e n t . P a p e n m a d e n o m e n t i o n o f h i s p r o p o s a l f o r a m i l i t a r y e n t e n t e , a n d H e r r i o t b e g a n t o m a i n t a i n t h a t r e p a r a t i o n s a n d d i s a r m a m e n t s h o u l d b e t r e a t e d s e p a r a t e l y a n d t h a t a c o n s u l t a t i v e p a c t w o u l d h a v e t o b e \" r e a l a n d e f f i c a c i o u s \" t o i n d u c e h i m t o g i v e u p t h e F r e n c h c l a i m t o r e p a r a t i o n s . A n e n t e n t e o r , a t l e a s t , g o o d r e l a t i o n s w i t h B r i t a i n h a d a l w a y s b e e n a c o r n e r s t o n e o f t h e F r e n c h s t a t e s m a n ' s p o l i c y , a n d i t s o o n b e c a m e a p p a r e n t t h a t t h i s 61 appealed \"to him more than an u n c e r t a i n agreement with Germany. Although Papen o f f e r e d a customs union, a very a t t r a c t i v e p r o p o s i t i o n , he decided t o d i s c o n t i n u e the conver s a t i o n s . The B r i t i s h a t t i t u d e was very s h o r t s i g h t e d . A Franco-German agreement such as Papen a n t i c i p a t e d would have improved the p o l i t i c a l atmosphere on the Continent c o n s i d e r a b l y and would have enabled a more concerted a t t a c k t o have been made on the disarmament problem. MacDonald*s f e a r s of an adverse change i n the European balance of power were exaggerated; as the precedent of 1883-5 had shown, a Franco-German rapprochement d i d not n e c e s s a r i l y e n t a i l an a n t i - B r i t i s h p o l i c y as the French would ensure that any a n t i - B r i t i s h tendencies were not c a r r i e d t o an extreme. S i m i l a r l y , the new grouping would not have f o l l o w e d an extreme a n t i - R u s s i a n course - because of French o b j e c t i o n s - though even i f i t had, the B r i t i s h would have been the l a s t t o ob j e c t ; the Government had l i t t l e sympathy f o r the Bols h e v i k regime. Another f a c t o r i n the breakdown of the Papen-Herriot t a l k s was the i n t e r v e n t i o n of Pr e s i d e n t Hoover, who presented a comprehensive scheme f o r general disarmament t o the General Commission at Geneva on June 85 22. ^ The new American proposal complicated the n e g o t i a t i o n s at Lausanne by r a i s i n g new is s u e s before o l d ones had been s e t t l e d . The proposal was welcomed by German opinion, and t h i s undermined Papen's p o s i t i o n i n advocating a Franco-German rapprochement. Hoover's i n t e r v e n t i o n a l s o made H e r r i o t ' s p o s i t i o n d i f f i c u l t . The French Premier was i n favour of improving r e l a t i o n s with the Americans, but i f he accepted the Papen p l a n he would i n c u r t h e i r wrath. Not only were t h e 62 Americans opposed to the old-style diplomacy of the European Powers, they were opposed to the cancellation of reparations - they believed that any such action would he used as an excuse by the former A l l i e d Powers to renege on t h e i r war debts. But i f nothing else, the Papen-Herriot talks caused the B r i t i s h to r e a l i z e that they had lost the i n i t i a t i v e i n directing European a f f a i r s . On July 5? therefore, they proposed a consultative pact among the six Inviting Powers at the Lausanne Conference - B r i t a i n , Prance, Germany, Ita l y , Japan and Belgium; the governments concerned would refuse to discuss p o l i t i c a l questions affecting interests of two or more of them a r i s i n g from treaties or instruments to which they were parties without a preliminary f r i e n d l y consultation. But any p o s s i b i l i t y of an agreement was prevented by the Franco-German differences over reparations; Germany wanted to pay only 2.6 milliards of Reichsmarks as a \" f o r f a i t \" for the termination of reparations and to include a renunciation of the \"war g u i l t \" clause of the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s and the recognition of equality of rights i n 86 a f i n a l settlement, while France insisted on a \" f o r f a i t \" of 4 m i l l i a r d s and the exclusion of references to \"war g u i l t \" and 87 disarmament. The B r i t i s h were alarmed when th e i r proposal foundered since they feared that i t might revive the negotiations f o r a Franco-German entente. They therefore offered to sign a consultative accord with 88 France alone. Herriot promptly agreed and on July 13, four days after the F i n a l Act of the Lausanne Conference, the Anglo-French Declaration was announced i n London and Paris. It stated that the two Bowers intended to exchange views and information on \"any questions 63 ... similar in origin to that ... settled at Lausanne\" and to work together to find a solution of the disarmament question which would he \"beneficial and equitable\" to a l l Powers concerned; i t was hoped 89 that other governments would join them in adopting the same procedure. But i t was not these innocuous platitudes that attracted the French to the soheme; i t was Britain's secret interpretation of them. On a l l points raised by Germany in connection with her \"liberation\" from the Treaty of Versailles, MacDonald promised to give no definite answer to the German Government until he had f i r s t consulted with the French and come to some kind of agreement with them on the policy to be followed. France was to give a reciprocal undertaking, thus \"protecting\" both Governments against \"the dangers of piecemeal approaches by 90 Germany\". Herriot accepted willingly; in the 1920s the Frenoh had suffered considerably from \"piecemeal approaches\" by the German Government to London. The Anglo—French Declaration represented no great change in the British policy of \"no further commitments\" on the Continent. The desire to move closer to France seems to have been a temporary phenomenum, the objectives being to hinder a resumption of Franoo-German negotiations on disarmament, to prevent the conclusion of an agreement behind Britain's back and to gain an ally against the 91 \"Hoover plan\" for disarmament. MacDonald was oareful to insist that 92 the Declaration was not a renewal of the entente cordiale. and he willingly agreed to invite other Powers to adhere to the agreement when i t became clear that they were suspicious of a purely Anglo-French accord. The main object of his polioy had been secured by the secret interpretation of the agreement. 64 On June 22, Pr e s i d e n t Hoover had advanced a new set of proposals i n an attempt t o \"break the deadlock i n the p r i v a t e n e g o t i a t i o n s of the Powers at Geneva. He suggested a r e d u c t i o n i n world armaments of n e a r l y one t h i r d based on f i v e main p r i n c i p l e s - the K e l l o g g Pact, an i n c r e a s e i n the comparative power of defence by a r e d u c t i o n i n the power of attack, the p r e s e r v a t i o n \" i n a general sense\" of the e x i s t i n g r e l a t i v i t y i n armaments, \" r e a l and p o s i t i v e \" r e d u c t i o n s and the interdependence 93 of a l l arms. The terms of the Hoover scheme were c l e a r and comprehensive. Land f o r c e s i n excess of a \" p o l i c e component\" necessary f o r the maintenance of i n t e r n a l order ( t o be determined on the b a s i s of the f o r c e s allowed t o Germany by the T r e a t y of V e r s a i l l e s - 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 men per 6 5 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 population) would be reduced by one t h i r d and the o f f e n s i v e power of the f o r c e s remaining decreased by the a b o l i t i o n of tanks, l a r g e mobile guns and chemical warfare. F i x e d f o r t i f i c a t i o n s would be t o l e r a t e d as they were defensive i n c h a r a c t e r . ^Adjustments\" t o the formula would be made f o r c o l o n i a l Powers who needed a d d i t i o n a l f o r c e s because of t h e i r e x t r a commitments. Bombers and a i r bombardment would be a b o l i s h e d , though reconnaissance planes would be allowed. The t o t a l tonnage of b a t t l e s h i p s would be reduced by one t h i r d and destroyers and c r u i s e r s ; by one q u a r t e r , the r e d u c t i o n s b e i n g based on the Washington and London naval T r e a t i e s and the F r a n c o - I t a l i a n \"Bases of an Agreement\" of March 1 1931. Submarine tonnage would be reduced by one t h i r d . These proposals p l a c e d B r i t a i n i n an embarrassing p o s i t i o n . The naval p r o v i s i o n s were unacceptable because they reduced B r i t i s h c r u i s e r s t r e ngth below the number of u n i t s necessary f o r the c o n t r o l of her t r a d e r o u t e s yet f a i l e d t o a b o l i s h submarines, the c h i e f t h r e a t t o 65 her maritime commerce. Moreover, the land and air terms included the abolition of bombers, tanks and air bombardment, a l l of which Britain was unwilling to give up - i f the Baldwin plan is considered as a serious disarmament proposal - except in return for the abolition of capital ships and submarines. Yet the Government could not reject the American plan outright as this would jeopardize the good relations between the two countries and give the impression to both British and world opinion that Britain was not in favour of disarmament. This dilemma was the direct result of Britain's own policy. Her unwillingness to come to grips with the main problems facing the Conference had caused her to lose the diplomatic initiative to the Germans at Lausanne and the Americans at Geneva. At Lausanne, she was faced with the possibility of a Franco-German agreement negotiated behind her back; at Geneva, she was faced with a plan for disarmament that was quickly accepted in i t s entirety by Italy and as a basis of 9 4 agreement by Germany and the Soviet Union. Faced with these circumstances, the Government played for time and, while welcoming the \"breadth of view taken of the disarmament problem in President Hoover's declaration\", took action to delay consideration of the American proposals. When Henderson attempted to use his position as President of the Conference to speed matters - he suggested that the Hoover proposals might be discussed in the private conversations of the Powers that had been proceeding intermittently since June 14 -Simon declared that this was impossible. Similarly, when the Labour Party tried to speed matters by attempting to draw a statement from the Government, both Simon and Baldwin claimed that i t was necessary to have prior consultation with the Dominions.95 66 F o r t u n a t e l y f o r the Government, a f t e r the major Powers had made t h e i r i n i t i a l observations the Conference decided t o postpone c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the American scheme so that the v a r i o u s governments could examine i t more c a r e f u l l y . T h i s gave B r i t a i n time t o formulate counter-proposals and look f o r a l l i e s , and approaches were made t o Japan, whom the Government hoped would support t h e i r objections; t o 96 Hoover's naval p r o p o s a l s . T h i s was a s i g n i f i c a n t move f o r at the same time B r i t a i n was.working c l o s e l y with the Americans against Japanese p o l i c y i n Manchuria; but i t was; a move that promised (and achieved) success because the Japanese m i l i t a r y were i n e f f e c t i v e c o n t r o l of the country. More important was the B r i t i s h move towards 97 France - the secret i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the Anglo-French D e c l a r a t i o n . On J u l y 7 » the Government presented a disarmament p l a n of i t s own t o the Conference i n Geneva i n the guise of a \"Statement of Views\" on the Hoover p r o p o s a l s . The p r e s e n t a t i o n c o i n c i d e d with the resumption of the d i s c u s s i o n of the Hoover p l a n i n the General Commission, and there can be l i t t l e doubt th a t the B r i t i s h move was a d e l i b e r a t e attempt t o d i m i n i s h the e f f e c t of the warm approval that the smaller Powers were expected to give t o the American scheme. In order t o preserve appearances, the B r i t i s h p l a n was claimed t o be a s e r i e s of proposals f o r \"implementing the general p r i n c i p l e s of the 98 Hoover P l a n \" but, i n f a c t , i t was the negation of i t . B r i t a i n claimed t h a t she had a l r e a d y reduced her f o r c e s t o the lowest l e v e l c o n s i s t e n t with n a t i o n a l s a f e t y and t h a t , i n consequence, the proposed d i v i s i o n of land f o r c e s between \"defence\" and \" p o l i c e components\" would r e q u i r e \"very c a r e f u l examination\". The Government r e j e c t e d the a b o l i t i o n of tanks: except f o r those over twenty tons on 67 the grounds that l i g h t e r tanks \"could not he regarded as aggressive weapons\" and i n small vo luntar i ly -en l i s ted armies l i k e the B r i t i s h were \"an essential compensation for lack of numbers\". The only parts of the Hoover land proposals which the B r i t i s h accepted were the abol i t ion of chemical and bacter io logical warfare (which had already been outlawed i n 1 9 2 5 ) and the abol i t ion of heavy mobile guns. The B r i t i s h naval proposals d i f fered considerably from those of the Americans and revealed the same divergences of opinion that had been apparent i n the Naval Commission. The number and widespread nature of her commitments led B r i t a i n to advocate qual i ta t ive rajjher than quantitative disarmament and, i n contrast to the Hoover proposals, she envisaged reductions i n the size rather than the number of naval c r a f t . She suggested a reduction i n the maximum size of a l l future capi ta l ships and a i r c r a f t - c a r r i e r s to 2 2 , 0 0 0 tons, the former to be allowed 1 1 \" guns, the l a t t e r 6 . 1 \" guns, while cruisers would be l imited to 7 , 0 0 0 tons with 6 . 1 \" guns; i f agreement on cruisers proved impossible, cap i ta l ships would be allowed 1 2 \" guns. Submarines would be abolished, f a i l i n g which they would' be l imi ted i n both number and t o t a l tonnage, with a maximum tonnage per indiv idual unit of 2 5 0 tons. The only measure of quantitative l i m i t a t i o n i n the proposals was a suggestion that destroyer tonnage be reduced by one t h i r d -though t h i s was made dependent on the abol i t ion of submarines. The a i r proposals di f fered considerably from the American a i r proposals. Whereas Hoover had proposed; the abol i t ion of bombers and aer ia l bombardment, B r i t a i n suggested that both be allowed \"within l i m i t s to be l a i d down as precisely as possible\" for pol ice and control purposes i n \"out ly ing and underdeveloped\" regions. Londonderry 6 8 had won his battle in the Cabinet - at least temporarily. The British disarmament proposals were doomed to failure because they avoided the real issues facing the Disarmament Conference - the French claim for security and the German claim for equality. Germany would not be released from her obligations under Part V of the Treaty of Versailles - even in theory - and there was no provision for additional guarantees to France. The British plan was based on Britain's own seourity requirements and did not take the requirements of the other Powers into consideration; i t presumed that an international \"harmony of interests\" existed and that a disarmament plan that satisfied British requirements would satisfy the requirements of other countries. It was no solution to the disarmament problem. Neither was the Hoover plan a solution to the disarmament problem, for like the British proposals i t attempted to divorce disarmament from security. But i t did offer some hope for the future. The Americans had oome to realize that their participation in the work of the proposed Permanent Disarmament Commission would involve them - whether they liked i t or not - in consultations with the other Powers in the event of breaches of a convention, and Stimson intimated that at some time in the future - presumably after the presidential elections - America might be willing to enter into a consultative accord with the other Powers.\"^ Such a step would ease French anxieties about security and might induce Britain to enter into further commitments in the general interest, thus facilitating the conclusion of a disarmament convention based on equality of rights for a l l nations. But in June 1932 neither Britain nor America were willing to undertake new commitments. 69 Simon was worried about the warm welcome given to the Hoover plan by the great majority of Powers at Geneva and so determined to sidetrack the plan - though without making i t too apparent - and bring the f i r s t phase of the Conference to an end by induoing the General Commission to pass a resolution summarizing the results that had been a c h i e v e d . T h e French were quiok to agree to this course. But the Americans, who wanted such a resolution to contain explicit references to the Hoover plan and concrete measures of disarmament, were hesitant and only concurred because they could see no better alternative in the circumstances.^^\" On July 5» Britain, France and America reported to the Bureau that as a result of private negotiations \"a certain measure of agreement was possible\" on various points - the abolition of chemical and bacteriological warfare, the restriction of air bombardment to certain colonial areas and zones within specified limits of battlefields, the prohibition of the bombardment of oivilian populations, the restriction of military airoraft by weight, some kind of international oontrol over o i v i l aviation and budgetary limitation. And the three Governments suggested that the General Commission pass a resolution deolaring that agreement had been reached on these points and expressing the hope that more substantial measures of disarmament 102 could be agreed upon in the future. Some members of the Bureau demurred at the scheme, claiming (correctly) that i t was an admission that the Conference's progress had been negligible. The abolition of chemical and bacteriological warfare had already been accepted by the majority of Powers in the Geneva Protocol of June 17 1925» the proposals for the international control 70 of c i v i l aviation were sure to be resisted by both Germany and Italy; and the provisions regarding bombing were no more than rules of war that could easily be broken in the eventuality of hostilities. In the absence of any better suggestion, however, the Bureau deoided to adopt the scheme and requested Simon to draft a resolution. He did this without delay and handed his draft to Edouard Benes, the Rapporteur of the Conference, who was charged with the difficult task of composing i t into a formula acceptable to the Conference as a whole. The resolution, which Benes presented to the General Commission on July 20, represented a considerable victory for British policy as i t avoided a l l reference to the major problems facing the Conference. The preamble was platitudinous; i t repeated the various bases and principles on which a convention was to be negotiated (Article 8 of the Covenant, the Kellogg Pact and the resolutions of April 19 and 20), welcomed the initiative taken by President Hoover and concluded with a declaration that \"a substantial reduction of world armaments should be effected**, a primary objective being to reduce the means of attack. Part II of the resolution, summarizing the \"results** obtained in the f i r s t five months of the Conference*s work, was of similarly negligible value. There were to be maximum and minimum calibre limits for heavy art i l l e r y (subject to an effective method being established to prevent the rapid transformation of guns on fixed mountings into mobile guns), different limits for guns in permanent frontier or fortress defensive systems, mobile guns and coastal guns, tanks were to be limited in individual tonnage. Air attack against civilian 71 populat ions was to be forb idden u n c o n d i t i o n a l l y , and a l l a i r bombardment p roh ib i t ed subject to an \"agreement wi th regard to measures to be adopted f o r the purpose of render ing e f f e c t i v e the observance of t h i s r u l e \" . Th is was to inc lude a l i m i t a t i o n by number and r e s t r i c t i o n by \" c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s \" of a l l m i l i t a r y a i r c r a f t , the submission of c i v i l a i r c r a f t to \" r egu la t i on and f u l l p u b l i c i t y \" and the sub jec t ion of a i r c r a f t not conforming wi th s p e c i f i e d r e s t r i c t i o n s to an i n t e r n a t i o n a l regime. Chemical , b a c t e r i o l o g i c a l and incendiary warfare were to be p roh ib i t ed under the cond i t ions recommended by the Spec ia l Committee 104 on the problem, \" and a Permanent Disarmament Commission was to be es tab l i shed to superv ise the eventual convent ion. No p rov i s i ons f o r naval disarmament were inc luded - ne i ther the B r i t i s h and Americans nor French and I t a l i a n s had been able to reso lve t h e i r d i spu tes . Par t I I I of the d ra f t r e s o l u t i o n ( \"Prepara t ion of the Second Phase of the Conference\") was even more vague. The Bureau was to continue working dur ing the adjournment of the General Commission \"wi th a view to f raming dra f t t e x t s concerning the quest ions on which agreement had a l ready been reached\" . I t would a l so make a \" d e t a i l e d examinat ion\" of such quest ions as Hoover 's proposals r e l a t i n g to e f f e c t i v e s and the regu la t i ons to be app l ied to the t rade i n and manufacture of arms and implements of war and to set up a Spec ia l Committee to formulate ru les , of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law i n connect ion wi th the p r o h i b i t i o n of chemical and b a c t e r i o l o g i c a l weapons and a e r i a l bombardment. The P a r t i e s to the Washington and London T rea t i es were to undertake conversat ions and report to the General Commission on the f e a s i b i l i t y of f u r the r naval l i m i t a t i o n , and the Committee on Nat iona l Defence Expenditure was 7 2 requested to report as soon as possible so that the Bureau could draw up a specific plan for budgetary limitation. It was hoped that, on the resumption of i t s labours, the Conference would be in a position to decide as to which system of limitation and publicity of national defence expenditure would provide \"the best guarantee of an alleviation of financial burdens\" and prevent the convention from being neutralized by increases or improvements in authorized armaments. Both in part and in whole, the resolution was l i t t l e more than a confession that no real progress had been achieved by the Conference in the five months of i t s existence. The provisions for land disarmament were so vague that they were unlikely to lead to any more agreement than had been obtained in the Land Commission. The proposals for the abolition of air bombardment were surrounded by so many qualifications as to be of questionable importance. The abolition of chemical, bacteriological and incendiary warfare went l i t t l e further than the provisions of the Geneva Protocol of June 17 1925* And the establishment of a Permanent Disarmament Commission was one of the few points on which the Powers had been able to agree unanimously in the Preparatory Commission. The vagueness of the draft resolution reflected the inability of the Powers to negotiate a political settlement that would facilitate an arms agreement. Limitation of armaments is a political rather than a technical matter, and there was no possibility of concluding a general convention unless the German claim to equality was reconciled with the French claim for security. 73 Two attempts at reconciling the claims had been made during the fi r s t five months of the Conference - Brttning's proposals at Bessinge and Papen*s at Lausanne. But the attempts had failed, mainly because of the negative attitude of the British towards both sets of proposals. Tardieu would probably have accepted the Bruning plan i f Britain had been willing to undertake relatively minor commitments on the Continent - a consultative pact, or maybe a pledge to supply aircraft to a 105 victim of aggression. And Herriot might have accepted the Papen plan i f Britain had not been so resolutely opposed to i t . \" ^ ^ Britain's unwillingness to enter into new commitments was very shortsighted. In the long run, European security depended on a peaceful solution of the German problem, and this could be achieved only through the appeasing of German grievances over the Peace Treaty. Germany would not condescend to remain a second-class Power, and i t was certain that i f a disarmament convention was not concluded she would denounce Part V of the Treaty of Versailles and start to rearm. The other Powers were faced with the inevitability of a redistribution of European power in favour of Germany, and i t was in their interests to control the extent and speed of this redistribution of power. Prance, quite naturally, wanted to ensure that an increase in German power was offset by increased assurances of support from Britain and possibly America. But the British Government believed that a disarmed Germany posed no threat to European security and so refused to undertake additional Continental commitments. The Government's adoption of Ea quiet policy, turning neither right nor l e f t \" and its failure to act as mediator between Prance and 74 Germany was the chief cause of the lack of progress at Geneva. The refusal to take the lead i n t r y i n g to reconcile the French demand f o r security with the German claim for equality resulted i n the Conference becoming bogged down i n a maze of t e c h n i c a l i t i e s . The outcome was the draft resolut ion of July 20, which the acting I t a l i a n delegate. Marshal Balbo, j u s t l y described as a \"formulation of general p r i n c i p l e s \" 107 contributing nothing to disarmament. I n t r i n s i c a l l y , the draft resolut ion had l i t t l e value. I t s importance was that i t provoked a c r i s i s at Geneva. The Germans, who had followed a moderate pol icy since the opening of the Conference and had put forward two r e a l i s t i c suggestions for a d e f i n i t i v e agreement, demanded that the resolut ion contain a d e f i n i t e acceptance of t h e i r claim to equality of r i g h t s . On July 20, Nadolny informed the B r i t i s h and American delegations that Germany would oppose the resolution i n i t s ex is t ing form, and on the fo l lowing day he warned that f a i l u r e to meet 10 S his demands would lead to a German withdrawal from the Conference. Germany was not the only Power that c r i t i c i z e d the vagueness and generality of the draft resolut ion, but during the debate of the General Commission of July 21-23 most delegations declared themselves i n favour of i t i n the absence of anything better . Forty-one states voted i n favour of the resolution and two against - Germany and the Soviet Union. Eight states abstained - Afghanistan, Albania , Aust r ia , Bulgaria , China, Hungary, I t a l y and Turkey. Germany proceeded to walk out of the Conference. 75 CHAPTER III THE GERMAN CLAIM TO EQUALITY OP RIGHTS July 23 - December 11 1932 Almost immediately after withdrawing from the Disarmament Conference, the German Government began to put forward specific demands. In a broadcast to the nation on July 26, General Sohleicher stated that i f the other Powers refused to disarm to the German level, Germany would increase her security by reconstructing - though not expanding - her defence forces, 1 and on August 23, Billow clarified the German position. In conversation with Prancois-Ponoet, he denied that Germany wanted to rearm but suggested that his country might be allowed a militia; military instruction would be given for three months at a time to 40,000 men, who thereafter would return to civ i l i a n l i f e . He further demanded that his oountry be permitted to own \"samples'* of any weapons not prohibited by international convention and that a disarmament convention replace Part V of the Treaty of Versailles. As regards security, he indicated that Germany would welcome \"perfection\" of the existing regime and would accept the control of an international armaments commission. He proposed that the question of equality be settled in private between Germany and France before the reunion of the Bureau on September 20 2 and promised to formulate a memorandum summarizing the German position. The promised memorandum was handed to Francois—Ponoet on August 29. It was almost an ultimatum, stating that i f Germany did not reoeive satisfaction she would not return to the Disarmament Conference. The demands themselves were very similar to those outlined by Bttlow on August 23 - though i t was suggested that implementation of them might 76 b e d e l a y e d u n t i l a s e c o n d d i s a r m a m e n t c o n v e n t i o n h a d b e e n n e g o t i a t e d . I t w a s a l s o i n d i c a t e d t h a t G e r m a n y w o u l d b e p r e p a r e d t o d i s c u s s a n y n e w s e c u r i t y p r o p o s a l s p r o v i d e d t h e y m a d e f o r e q u a l s e c u r i t y f o r a l l n a t i o n s . \" ^ H e r r i o t * s i n i t i a l r e a c t i o n t o t h e G e r m a n m e m o r a n d u m w a s r e t i c e n t y e t h o p e f u l . H e b e l i e v e d t h a t s a t i s f a c t i o n o f t h e c l a i m t o e q u a l i t y o f r i g h t s m i g h t b e c o u p l e d w i t h a r e c o g n i t i o n o f \" e q u a l i t y o f d u t i e s ' * a n d t h o u g h t t h a t t h e p r o b l e m a s t o w h e t h e r a d i s a r m a m e n t c o n v e n t i o n s h o u l d r e p l a c e P a r t V o f t h e T r e a t y o f V e r s a i l l e s w a s \" n o t i n s o l u b l e \" . H e h e l d t h a t d i f f i c u l t i e s c o u l d b e o v e r c o m e m o r e e a s i l y i f G e r m a n y h e l p e d i n s t i t u t e a n \" i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e g i m e o f s e c u r i t y \" o f e q u a l a d v a n t a g e t o a l l P o w e r s a n d m a i n t a i n e d t h a t P r a n c e w o u l d n o t a v o i d h e r o b l i g a t i o n t o d i s a r m . H e w a s u n w i l l i n g , h o w e v e r , t o a g r e e t o a n y d e m a n d s f o r G e r m a n r e a r m a m e n t , w h e t h e r f o r \" s a m p l e s \" o f w e a p o n s , i n c r e a s e d e f f e c t i v e s , a m i l i t i a o r a \" v i o l a t i o n \" o f t h e d e m i l i t a r i z e d R h i n e l a n d . ^ S i r H o r a c e R u m b o l d , t h e B r i t i s h A m b a s s a d o r i n B e r l i n , a n d R . H . C a m p b e l l , t h e B r i t i s h M i n i s t e r i n P a r i s , b o t h b e l i e v e d t h a t a P r a n c o -5 G e r m a n a g r e e m e n t w a s p o s s i b l e o n t h e b a s i s o f t h e G e r m a n m e m o r a n d u m . S o d i d F r a n c o i s - P o n e e t , w h o p r e s s e d H e r r i o t t o c o m e t o a s e t t l e m e n t . ^ T h e F r e n c h A m b a s s a d o r c o n s i d e r e d t h a t a i i d i r e e t a F r a n G O - G e m a n i t t a c c o r d w o u l d g i v e F r a n c e n e w g u a r a n t e e s o f s e c u r i t y w i t h o u t c o m p r o m i s i n g h e r r e l a t i o n s w i t h h e r f o r m e r a l l i e s o r w i t h t h e g r e a t m a j o r i t y o f n e u t r a l s t a t e s a n d , i f c o n c l u d e d f o r t e n o r t w e n t y y e a r s , w o u l d p u t 7 F r a n c e i n a s t r o n g p o s i t i o n t o o p p o s e n e w G e r m a n c l a i m s . T h e Q u a i d ' O r s a y t o o k a s i m i l a r s t a n c e , b e l i e v i n g t h a t a s n e i t h e r B r i t a i n n o r 77 America were willing to commit themselves further towards Prance, an agreement with Germany based on an accord between the two General Staffs and concessions on disarmament - including recognition of the 8 principle of German equality - would increase French security. Unfortunately, information concerning the German aims was leaked o to the French press, which began to suggest that under the cloak of equality the Germans were wanting to rearm. Herriot himself was suspicious of this, and he was also anxious about the manner in which the German claims had been presented and about nationalist demonstrations and police activities in the demilitarized Rhineland.1^ Consequently, his attitude to the German demands hardened, and though there was no question of his refusing them outright (as this would have given Germany an excuse to prooeed openly with rearmament), his reply to the memorandum of August 29 was st i f f e r than i t might otherwise have been. Presented on September 11, the Frenoh Note1*' rejected the (legal) claim, based on the League Covenant and the Allied Note of June 16 1919, that the Disarmament Convention should replace Part V of the Treaty of Versailles. It avoided a direct answer to the claim for equality of rights but reiterated French willingness to take part in discussions on the disarmament problem and to arrive at a solution which would provide for the maximum security and disarmament for a l l nations. On the other hand, i t saw the German memorandum as a \"clear demand\" for aircraft, tanks, heavy and anti-aircraft artillery, submarines, aircraft-carriers and battleships - a demand for rearmament. A reduction in the period of service in the Reichswehr would 78 \"immeasurably i n c r e a s e -the number of h i g h l y - t r a i n e d r e s e r v i s t s \" , while the possession of \"sample\" arms would \" g r e a t l y f a c i l i t a t e t h e i r manufacture and accustom men t o t h e i r use.\" In making such a s t i f f r e p l y , H e r r i o t c e r t a i n l y quietened French opinion, but at the same time he reduced the chances of a quick agreement with Germany, There was l i t t l e s u r p r i s e , t h e r e f o r e , when Neurath informed Henderson on September 14 t h a t , as the problem of e q u a l i t y of r i g h t s had not been s e t t l e d , Germany would r e f u s e t o 1 p a r t i c i p a t e i n the proceedings of the Bureau when i t reopened on 12 September 21. B r i t a i n ' s immediate r e a c t i o n t o the renewed German olaim was one of concern l e s t France and Germany s t a r t n e g o t i a t i n g behind her back as they had done at Lausanne, and Simon t h e r e f o r e invoked the Anglo-French D e c l a r a t i o n t o t r y t o ensure that B r i t a i n was informed of any d i r e c t n e g o t i a t i o n s between the two C o n t i n e n t a l Powers. 1^ He was s t i l l concerned on September 9 a n d suggested that d i s c u s s i o n of the German claim should i n c l u d e B r i t a i n and I t a l y as w e l l as France and Germany. 1^ He was reassured when the French memorandum of September 11 discounted the p o s s i b i l i t y of d i r e c t Franco-German n e g o t i a t i o n s . On the German cl a i m i t s e l f , the Government seems t o have been somewhat d i v i d e d . MacDonald, apparently, was i n favour of a c c e p t i n g the claim, while Simon was r a t h e r r e l u c t a n t t o take such a step because of i t s p o s s i b l e e f f e c t on France. C e r t a i n l y the Quai d'Orsay was convinoed that MacDonald had assured Papen tha t the German demands would be met with approval - at l e a s t i n p r i n c i p l e - but t h a t Simon 15 and the F o r e i g n O f f i c e were r e t i c e n t towards g r a n t i n g them. J The 79 Germans acted on a s imi lar assumption, hoping that the moral just ice of the i r demands would overcome the prac t i ca l objections put forward by the Foreign O f f i c e . The German hope was f u l f i l l e d ; the B r i t i s h Cabinet decided to accept the claim to equal i ty . Accordingly, on September 19, the Government published a \"Statement 17 of Views\" concerning the German claim. The f i r s t part regretted the r a i s i n g of the question of equality of r ights so soon af ter the Lausanne Conference and contained an i n c i s i v e re ject ion of the German claim on legal grounds; although accepting that one of the objectives of Part V of the Treaty of Versa i l l es was \"to render possible the i n i t i a t i o n of a general l i m i t a t i o n of the armaments of a l l nations\"; i t maintained that the statement of t h i s objective was \"very different from making i t s successful ful f i lment the condition of the or ig ina l s t i p u l a t i o n \" . But the second part of the B r i t i s h statement admitted that Germany had a strong claim to equality on moral grounds. The Government therefore hoped that a convention might be framed on the pr inc ip le that each state adopted, i n agreement with others, a l i m i t a t i o n of.armaments that was \"self-imposed and free ly entered i n t o , as part of the mutual obligations of the signatories to one another\",,^ and t h i s document would be \"binding on a l l \" and contain \"measures of qual i ta t ive and quantitative disarmament which would tend i n the direc t ion of greater equal izat ion\" . Questions of status might be sett led by \" f r i e n d l y negotiation and agreed adjustment\" involving neither disregard for treaty obligations nor the increase i n the sum t o t a l of armed force* The armaments of heavily-armed states should be reduced as much as possible , while those of l ightly-armed states should undergo \"no material increase\" - though \" t h i s desirable 80 c o n s u m m a t i o n \" c o u l d o n l y b e a t t a i n e d t h r o u g h p a t i e n t d i s c u s s i o n i n t h e D i s a r m a m e n t C o n f e r e n c e a n d n o t b y w i t h d r a w a l f r o m i t s d e l i b e r a t i o n s . A s S i m o n e x p l a i n e d t o G r a n d i , n o w t h e I t a l i a n A m b a s s a d o r i n L o n d o n , B r i t a i n w o u l d r e c o g n i z e t h e G e r m a n c l a i m t o 18 e q u a l i t y i n p r i n c i p l e b u t r e f u s e a n y d e m a n d s f o r r e a r m a m e n t . . T h e e f f e c t o f t h e i m p a s s e i n t h e D i s a r m a m e n t C o n f e r e n c e a n d t h e s u b s e q u e n t r e n e w a l o f t h e G e r m a n c l a i m t o e q u a l i t y w a s t h u s t o f o r c e B r i t a i n i n t o a s s u m i n g a m o r e p r o m i n e n t r o l e i n t h e d i s a r m a m e n t d i s c u s s i o n s . P r e v i o u s l y s h e h a d b e e n r e l u c t a n t t o t a k e t h e l e a d , b u t t h e n e w c r i s i s h a d o b l i g e d h e r t o g i v e a f u l l e r e x p o s i t i o n o f h e r a i m s t o t h e p u b l i c , w h i c h w a s a n x i o u s a t t h e l a c k o f p r o g r e s s m a d e a t G e n e v a , a n d t o t a k e u p a m o r e a c t i v e m e d i a t o r y p o s i t i o n b e t w e e n P r a n c e a n d G e r m a n y . A l t h o u g h t h e B r i t i s h m e m o r a n d u m h e l d n o p r a c t i c a l s u g g e s t i o n f o r r e s o l v i n g t h e p r o b l e m s c o n f r o n t i n g t h e P o w e r s , i t d i d o f f e r t h e h o p e t h a t f u r t h e r n e g o t i a t i o n s m i g h t f i n d a s o l u t i o n . A f t e r a n i n i t i a l o u t c r y o f t h e G e r m a n p r e s s a g a i n s t t h e B r i t i s h 19 \" S t a t e m e n t o f V i e w s \" b e c a u s e o f i t s l e g a l i s t i c t o n e , S i m o n d e c i d e d t o u t i l i z e t h e m e e t i n g o f t h e L e a g u e A s s e m b l y t o t a k e s o u n d i n g s a s t o w h e t h e r a s e t t l e m e n t c o u l d b e r e a c h e d o n t h e b a s i s o f t h e B r i t i s h p o s i t i o n . T h e m a i n d i f f i c u l t i e s i n a c h i e v i n g s u c h a s e t t l e m e n t w e r e t h a t , l o g i c a l l y , r e c o g n i t i o n o f t h e p r i n c i p l e o f e q u a l i t y w o u l d e n a b l e G e r m a n y t o c l a i m t h e r i g h t t o p o s s e s s a n y t y p e o f w e a p o n p e r m i t t e d t o t h e o t h e r P o w e r s , a n d t h a t s u c h a r i g h t w o u l d b e o p p o s e d b y t h e F r e n c h , w h o b e l i e v e d t h a t i t w a s e q u i v a l e n t t o a d e m a n d f o r r e a r m a m e n t . O n S e p t e m b e r 23, t h e r e f o r e , S i m o n a p p r o a c h e d N e u r a t h w i t h t h e s u g g e s t i o n t h a t G e r m a n y m i g h t a g r e e t o m a k e r e d u c t i o n s i n o t h e r t y p e s o f a r m s i f s h e w e r e a l l o w e d . t o p o s s e s s \" s a m p l e s \" o f w e a p o n s 81 which were not generally forbidden but which Germany had been 20 prohibited from owning by the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s . Baron Al -o i s i , who had suoceeded. Grandi as the chief I t a l i a n delegate to the Disarmament Conference, had been carrying out s imi lar soundings and i n conversation on September 25, both he and Simon agreed that a Franco-German compromise was possible on the basis of three p r i n c i p l e s : that equality of r ights should be reoognized i n p r i n c i p l e ; that there should be no rearmament of Germany; and that the other Powers should 21 disarm to the greatest extent possible . Paul-Boncour, the French Minister of War and Permanent Delegate to the League of Nations, acquiesced i n the f i r s t of Simon's three p r i n c i p l e s , agreeing that , under certain conditions, the Disarmament Convention should replace Part V of the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s . He accepted the seoond pr inc ip le i n i t s ent irety , and also agreed to the t h i r d - provided that the \"disarmament of other Powers\" was measured from 1919. For Germany, Neurath welcomed the f i r s t p r i n c i p l e (which recognized equality of rights) and intimated that he would consent to the second provided that h i s country would be allowed to \"adjust\" i t s land foroes by \"mechanizing the cavalry\" , by purchasing specimens of hitherto-forbidden weapons and by halving the period of service i n the Reichswehr. He also agreed to the t h i r d p r i n c i p l e , though he stipulated that Germany's wil l ingness to l i m i t her demands would depend on the 23 extent of the disarmament of the other Powers. The main obstacle to a Franco-German agreement, therefore, was the German demand for \"samples\", though i t seemed that a four-Power Declaration enabling the Germans to return to the Disarmament Conference was perfect ly feasible 24 provided that i t was judic iously worded. 82 The immediate o b j e c t i v e of B r i t i s h p o l i c y was t o coax the Germans i n t o r e t u r n i n g t o the Conference. On October 3, Simon proposed a four-Power meeting of B r i t i s h , French, German and I t a l i a n Ministers i n London; i t would take place on October 11, and the U n i t e d States would be i n v i t e d t o allow Norman Davis t o take part i n the d i s c u s s i o n s . The conversations would be based on the r e c o g n i t i o n of the p r i n c i p l e of e q u a l i t y of r i g h t s , no rearmament, the \" p r o g r e s s i v e \" disarmament of the heavily-armed Powers and the g r a n t i n g t o Germany of the r i g h t t o possess a l l c a t e g o r i e s of arms, though not t o the extent of the former A l l i e d Powers. In the meantime, France would be i n v i t e d t o take part 25 i n p r e l i m i n a r y c o n s u l t a t i o n s . ' O r i g i n a l l y , the F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y had a l s o hoped tha t the reunion of the Bureau might be postponed u n t i l the proposed n e g o t i a t i o n s were held, but the French had objected 26 and t h i s aspect of B r i t i s h p o l i c y had been d i s c o n t i n u e d . I t a l y q u i c k l y accepted the i n v i t a t i o n t o the four-Power meeting as her p o l i c y was s i m i l a r t o that of B r i t a i n , r e c o g n i z i n g the German 27 c l a i m t o e q u a l i t y but r e f u s i n g any claims t o rearmament. Moreover, the proposal was i n l i n e with her t r a d i t i o n a l p o l i c y of advocating four-Power d i s c u s s i o n s as the best way t o s e t t l e European problems. Germany and France, on the other hand, were r e t i c e n t about a c c e p t i n g 28 the p r o p o s a l . The former d e s i r e d the p r i o r r e c o g n i t i o n of her claims, while the l a t t e r put forward a number of o b j e c t i o n s on the grounds that a four-Power meeting i n London would be considered a success f o r Germany 29 and a defeat f o r France. ' E v e n t u a l l y , on October 7, the Germans accepted the B r i t i s h proposal u n c o n d i t i o n a l l y and even added that t h e i r c l a i m f o r \"adjustments\" of t h e i r f o r c e s \" a f f o r d e d scope f o r n e g o t i a t i o n \" . ^ 0 The problem f a c i n g B r i t a i n , t h e r e f o r e , was how t o c a j o l e France i n t o a c c e p t i n g . 8 3 Herriot had \"become more and more concerned at the machinations of German diplomacy, especial ly the periodic outbursts of General Schleicher, and he believed, r i g h t l y , that the claim for , ,samplesM would mean rearmament. I t would not have seemed so menaoing i f he had been able to count on B r i t i s h support, but since September the B r i t i s h had given p r i o r i t y to securing Germany's return to the Disarmament Conference.^ 1 Although the Foreign Off ice had informed the Quai d'Orsay scrupulously of \"piecemeal approaches\" by Germany, i n compliance with the Anglo-French Declaration, the Government had not changed i t s basic po l i cy - French disarmament, the sat i s fac t ion of \" legi t imate\" German demands and a refusal to enter into any further commitments i n Europe. As far as B r i t a i n was concerned, the Anglo-French Declaration had been a temporary expedient to prevent a possible Franco-German entente and to gain an a l l y against the Hoover plan; i t had not been 3 2 signed as the forerunner of an a l l i a n c e . Certainly the secret interpretat ion of the Declaration had referred to \"a general desire to come to an agreement\", but i t had also asserted that \" i t was not a question of an agreement to agree\", rather i t was an agreement to consult and hold \"preliminary exchanges of v i e w s \" . ^ The German withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference and claim for equality of r ights had thus exposed the true nature of the Declaration. Even so, the French Premier decided to continue his po l i cy of rapprochement with B r i t a i n (and America^) even i f i t entailed concessions on disarmament, and as immediate objectives he hoped to secure a postponement of the proposed four-Power meeting i n London and to ensure that any such conference should be held at Geneva. On October 5 , he stated his posi t ion to Simon, and after some hesi tat ion 84 the B r i t i s h Government decided to accept the French demands for a postponement of the \"London Conference\" and to \"consider\" i t s transfer to Geneva, They also invi ted Herriot to take part i n \"preliminary consultations\" i n London on Octoher 13 and 1 4 , ^ During the London discussions, Herriot demanded that Germany he made to set out her demands i n w r i t i n g . He believed that equality of r ights - a phrase whioh seemed eminently f a i r to many sections of public opinion i n most countries - was, i n fac t , an abstract term that had been in tent iona l ly i l l - d e f i n e d by the Germans. Consequently, he was u n w i l l i n g to enter into negotiations on the subject u n t i l the ambiguity of the phrase had been resolved by means of a wri t ten d e f i n i t i o n . This would expose the true nature of the German claims and determine whether they involved rearmament. MacDonald and Simon agreed that the German aims were unclear, but suggested that i f B r i t a i n and) France asked for writ ten c l a r i f i c a t i o n , the Milhelmstrasse would reply that the claims had already been elucidated s u f f i c i e n t l y i n the memorandum of August 29; or they would keep producing documents which defeated the purpose of the inquiry . The B r i t i s h Ministers therefore considered that the best means of resolving the issue was a four-Power conference, where the chairman's duty would be to see that the conversations were as precise as possible. Eventually, a oompromise between the French and B r i t i s h views was reached; France agreed to take part i n a four-Power conference rather than seek a written d e f i n i t i o n of German aims, and B r i t a i n agreed to 35 transfer the deliberations of the conference to Genevai Asmore important aspect of these discussions was t h e i r revelat ion of the motives behind B r i t i s h p o l i c y . Speaking pr ivate ly to Herriot , 85 MacDonald admitted that he was concerned \"not so much by the disarmament s i tua t ion , as by the handling of i t \" . As the subsequent discussion revealed, he was less concerned about a possible breakdown of the Disarmament Conference than whether h is government would be held responsible for the breakdown. Germany held the diplomatic i n i t i a t i v e , the apparent fairness of her demands having ingratiated her with B r i t i s h opinion, and therefore the task of B r i t i s h diplomacy was \"to dislodge her from her strong psychological posi t ion into her weak disarmament p o s i t i o n . \" ^ Simon, who was apt to be more pro-French than h is Prime Minis ter , endorsed t h i s l i n e . Indeed he had advocated i t for some time, having t o l d F leur iau , the French Ambassador i n London, on September 15 that i f Britain] and France could \"preserve appearances\", \"the persistence of Germany's present att i tude would reduce the Disarmament Conference to nothing\". I t was a clear indicat ion that the Government's \"support\" of disarmament was not ent i re ly genuine. In h is meeting with Herriot on October 5, \"the 37 Foreign Secretary had maintained a s imi lar pos i t ion , and he admitted that the only preoccupation of B r i t i s h diplomacy was to ensure that the proposed four-Power meeting took place, i f possible with American a i d . ^ This att i tude on the part of the B r i t i s h Ministers was irresponsible . Without the genuine support of the B r i t i s h Government, disarmament was probably impossible. In June there had been the p o s s i b i l i t y of a direct Franco-German accord, but such an understanding had now become u n l i k e l y because of the growth of ultra-national ism i n Germany and Papen*s; aggressive pursuit of equality of r i g h t s . The best chance of reaching a disarmament agreement, therefore, was the active mediation 86 of B r i t a i n i n the Franco-German dispute. I f the Government had \"been w i l l i n g to give greater guarantees of security to France - and to Germany too, i f she complained that guarantees: to France were incompatible with a grant of equality - a convention might s t i l l have been attained. Herriot consistently declared that he was i n 3 9 favour of disarmament, while the German \"Government of Barons\" was conservative at heart and unwi l l ing to press i t s demands too far for fear that i t might be blamed for f rus t ra t ing the Disarmament Conference and lose the support of opinion i n countries such as B r i t a i n and America.^ 0 The nucleus of a settlement might wel l have been the German Note of August 29# Despite professions that B r i t a i n was against German rearmament, i t had soon become apparent that the Government was w i l l i n g to accept the German Note as the basis of ta lks and to consider, i f not accede to , the demands for \"samples\".^* This being the case, i t would have been d i f f i c u l t for the Germans to raise the i r claims without los ing the support of opinion i n other countries. But i t was d i f f i c u l t for France to make the large concessions that the Germans demanded, p a r t i c u l a r l y on the claim for \"specimen\" weapons, and u n t i l October 14 Herriot refused to discuss even the p o s s i b i l i t y of accepting them. Yet on t h i s date, he promised to submit the question of \"samples\" to his Government,^ and i t seems l i k e l y that , i f B r i t a i n had offered greater security guarantees, he would have agreed to accept the German Note as the basis of a settlement. But although the B r i t i s h Government was i n favour of moving closer to France,^there was l i t t l e l ike l ihood of t h e i r agreeing to offer the guarantees which would have allowed France to follow a more conci l ia tory p o l i c y . 87 The divergences of view between B r i t a i n and Franoe had been a major factor i n encouraging the Germans to press the i r claims to equality so strongly, for they believed they could drive a wedge between the two former a l l i e s . ^ This also seems to have been the motivation behind t h e i r next move, which was to refuse to accept Geneva as the venue of the proposed four-Power conference. After an 45 ear l ie r indicat ion that they would not object to Geneva, J on October 14 they refused to agree, and they continued to do so despite B r i t i s h p r e s s u r e . ^ On October 28, Herriot outlined a new French disarmament plan i n the Chamber of Deputies and declared that the success of the Disarmament Conference was the best practicable way to prevent German rearmament; even i f the proposals were rejected, his Government would \"continue to co-operate with the other Powers to f i n d an alternative so lu t ion\" . Answering M. Frankl in-Boui l lon , the chief Opposition speaker, he ins is ted that , i n a t r i a l of strength with Germany, the balance of forces might not favour France and that , t h i s being so, the friendship of the Anglo-Saxon Powers should not be jeopardized by a pol icy of r e l y i n g sole ly on force . France could not afford to f i n d herself i solated i n the face of a \"free\" Germany, and the best way of overcoming a \"new German menace\" was by a further effort to organize peace .^ Moreover, i t was necessary to show that France was not 48 responsible for the c r i s i s at Geneva. 88 On 4 November, further deta i l s of the French project were communicated to the Bureau of the Disarmament Conference by 49 Paul-Boncour, the main author of the scheme. Security would be maintained through the \"organization\" of the states of the world into three concentric \" c i r c l e s \" . The outermost would consist of a l l Powers represented at the Disarmament Conference, and i t s members would agree to enter into consultation i n the event of a breach of the Kellogg Pact. The second would be comprised of a l l members of the League, who would reaff irm the obligations they had assumed under the Covenant (especial ly A r t i c l e 16) and a l l other t rea t ies , such as Locarno, that had been concluded i n conformity with the Covenant. The t h i r d and innermost c i r c l e would include the nations of continental 50 Europe, who would enter into a Pact of Mutual Assistance. Within t h i s pact, each of the Powers would organize t h e i r \"permanent defensive forces\" on a standardized model based on universal short-term service and l imited ef fect ives , and t h i s would permit \"equitable, mutual and equal reductions i n armaments to be made, capable of ensuring equality of secur i ty\" . \"Aggressive\" weapons would be l imi ted to f ixed f o r t i f i c a t i o n s for f ront ie r and coastal defence and to \"special ized contingents\", constantly ready for service but s t r i c t l y l i m i t e d i n number, which each of the Powers would place permanently at the disposal of the League. An international a i r force (based on the Tardieu plan of February 1932) would also be placed at the disposal of the League and to make t h i s possible, c i v i l aviat ion would be internat ional ized. Overseas forces would be organized separately under conditions to be l a i d down i n the Convention. 89 This outline seemed to indioate a considerable change i n French p o l i c y , hut as the f u l l plan had not been published, no immediate discussion of the proposals took place. The impasse at the Disarmament Conference remained. Because of the seemingly endless delays at Geneva, B r i t i s h opinion had become aroused. For some time, the l i b e r a l press had urged the Government to play a more active role i n bringing about a settlement, and now even \"The Times\" was demanding act ion; i n a leading a r t i c l e of September 30, i t declared that the Disarmament Conference was threatened with complete breakdown unless the problem of equality was solved and reproached the Government for fol lowing a pol icy that 51 was \"neither consistent nor c lear \" . On November 10, the Labour Party tabled a censure motion i n the Commons exhorting the Government to give \"c lear and unequivocal support to an immediate, universal and substantial reduction of 52 armaments on the basis of equality for a l l nations\" . Clement Att lee led the attack i n masterly fashion and came very near the t ruth when suggesting that the attitude of the Government was \" l i k e the Pharisee who said 'Lord , I thank thee, that I am not as other men* — French, German or even Russians. I have reduced my armaments more than anyone e lse . I am ready to give up submarines, which I do not want, and tanks over 20 tons, which I have not got. But when i t comes to act ion, when we pass from general declarations and come down to business, we are l i k e the otheryEowers, we always •Compound for sins we are inc l ined to By damning those we have no mind t o . * \" 5 3 90 Attlee also likened the retinue of m i l i t a r y and naval experts accompanying the B r i t i s h delegation i n Geneva to a group of licensed v i c t u a l l e r s , brewers and d i s t i l l e r s advising the Government on how to reduce the consumption of l i q u o r . B r i t a i n , he believed, should advocate the reduction of armaments to the l e v e l permitted to Germany under Part V of the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s and, in;^particular, should propose the abol i t ion of aer ia l bombardment and the internat ional izat ion 54 of c i v i l av ia t ion . Other Labour speakers made s imilar suggestions. ^ Although these proposals would cer ta inly have asserted German equality and made for a substantial reduction of arms, they would have been unacceptable to Prance f o r , l i k e the Government's own proposals, they envisaged no changes i n the ex is t ing security system. The Labour Party was host i le to new Continental commitments because of i t s b e l i e f that one of the prime causes of the Great War had been the \"system\" of secret a l l iances and agreements, and the Parliamentary Leader of the Party, George Lansbury, was a p a c i f i s t ; a considerable change i n the Party 's outlook on internat ional a f f a i r s had occurred since Henderson was defeated i n the elections of 1931. The Government was concerned at the support the Opposition's pol icy 55 received i n the country. In general, i t was believed that wars started by mistake or were caused by grievances and that , consequently, ex i s t ing internat ional grievances -predominantly German - should be redressed. Soc ia l i s t s attributed wars to capital ism, substantial armaments and the influence of arms manufacturers. Like the Government, the B r i t i s h people apparently accepted that an international \"harmony 91 of interests\" existed - possibly a result of the Government's own propaganda during the 1920s - and they believed that peace should be sought through general disarmament. They were convinced that disarmament would lead to security and were opposed to new Continental commitments. But even the dilemma caused by a pro-disarmament (and, i n many cases, pro-German) public opinion on the one hand and the c r i s i s caused by the r i s e of German ultra-nat ional ism on the other was barely suff ic ient to explain the pessimism of Baldwin's speech i n the disarmament debate of November 10. He prophesied a war that would destroy European c i v i l i z a t i o n and refused to believe that disarmament could prevent i t . The chief menace would come from bombimg: \"I think i t i s wel l also for the man i n the street to real ise that there i s no power on earth that can protect him from being bombed. Whatever people may t e l l him, the bomber w i l l always get through, , . . . . The only defence i s i n offence, which means that you have to k i l l more women and chi ldren more quickly than the enemy i f you want to save yourselves.\"56 Baldwin argued that neither the internat ional izat ion of c i v i l aviat ion and the t o t a l abo l i t ion of bombing nor the r e s t r i c t i o n of a i rcra f t by size and weight would be of any use as preventive measures, for sc ient i s ts would develop \"bombs the size of peanuts\". Yet the Lord President of the Counoil neither could nor would offer a solution which might prevent the future war. He was pessimistic as to the resul ts to be expected from Geneva, yet he did not even mention the more t r a d i t i o n a l remedies for meeting an internat ional c r i s i s - an increase i n armaments and an entente or a l l iance with Prance. He was content to make the extraordinary remark that , i f war came, the youth of the world 57 would be to blame for not forc ing older men into the path of peace. 92 C o m p a r e d w i t h s u c h u t t e r a n c e s , S i m o n ' s s t a t e m e n t o f B r i t i s h p o l i c y 58 w a s u n r e m a r k a b l e . H e w e l c o m e d t h e o u t l i n e o f t h e F r e n c h p r o p o s a l s g i v e n b y P a u l - B o n c o u r a s \" a d e f i n i t e e f f o r t t o m e e t t h e G e r m a n c l a i m t o e q u a l i t y o f t r e a t m e n t \" : a n d a \" t a c i t a d m i s s i o n t h a t t h e c l a u s e s o f t h e T r e a t y o f V e r s a i l l e s w e r e n o t s a c r o s a n c t \" , b u t r e f u s e d t o c o m m e n t a n y f u r t h e r u n t i l t h e f u l l p l a n w a s p u b l i s h e d . A s r e g a r d s t h e c l a i m t o e q u a l i t y , h e m e r e l y r e i t e r a t e d t h e B r i t i s h v i e w t h a t G e r m a n y ' s a r m a m e n t s s h o u l d b e r e g u l a t e d b y t h e s a m e d i s a r m a m e n t c o n v e n t i o n a n d b y \" t h e s a m e s o r t o f p r o c e s s \" a s t h e a r m a m e n t s o f t h e o t h e r P o w e r s ; t h e c o n v e n t i o n w o u l d r e p l a c e P a r t V o f t h e T r e a t y o f V e r s a i l l e s , l a s t f o r a s p e c i f i c n u m b e r o f y e a r s a n d b e a p p l i c a b l e t o a l l P a r t i e s . T h e F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y a c k n o w l e d g e d t h a t , p r o v i d e d t h e r e w a s n o r e a r m a m e n t , \" t h e k i n d o f a r m s p e r m i t t e d t o o t h e r c o u n t r i e s o u g h t n o t t o b e p r o h i b i t e d t o G e r m a n y \" a n d h e w e l c o m e d t h e F r e n c h p r o p o s a l f o r a H E u r o p e a n n o n - a g g r e s s i o n p a c t \" w h i c h d i d n o t i n v o l v e B r i t a i n i n f u r t h e r c o m m i t m e n t s . H e a l s o a d d e d a n e w p r o p o s a l f o r a \" D e c l a r a t i o n o f N o R e s o r t t o F o r c e \" t o \" m o b i l i z e w o r l d a n d d o m e s t i c o p i n i o n \" a g a i n s t d i s t u r b e r s o f t h e p e a c e . O n t h e s u r f a c e , S i m o n ' s s t a t e m e n t r e p r e s e n t e d a m o v e t o w a r d s G e r m a n y , f o r i t a c c e p t e d t h e b a s i c d e m a n d s o f t h e m e m o r a n d u m o f A u g u s t 2 9 . Y e t , f u n d a m e n t a l l y , B r i t i s h p o l i c y r e m a i n e d u n c h a n g e d . T h e s t a t e m e n t r e v e a l e d n o g r e a t e r w i l l i n g n e s s t o e n t e r i n t o n e w C o n t i n e n t a l c o m m i t m e n t s , t h e p r o p o s e d \" n o - f o r c e p a c t \" b e i n g l i t t l e m o r e t h a n a \" d e c l a r a t i o n o f i n t e n t \" s i m i l a r t o t h e K e l l o g g P a c t . A l t h o u g h S i m o n d e c l a r e d t h a t t h e p a c t w o u l d b e a n i m p o r t a n t a s s u r a n c e b e c a u s e a n y d i s r e g a r d o f i t w o u i d i m o b i l i z e w o r l d a n d d o m e s t i c o p i n i o n , 93 the Japanese invasion of Manchuria and the creation of the puppet state of Manchukuo had already shown that words and public opinion would not deter a potent ia l aggressor. But the Government s t i l l did not rea l ize t h i s . 90a November 14, four days after Simon's statement, the French 59 published the f u l l text of the i r disarmament plan. In the event of a breach or threat of breach of the Kellogg Pact, those Powers i n the outermost of the three concentric \" c i r c l e s \" would concert \"with a view to appealing to public opinion and agreeing upon steps to be taken\" and would \"prohibi t direct or indirect economic or f i n a n c i a l re lat ions with the aggressor country\". They would also refuse to recognize \"any de facto s i tuat ion brought about i n consequence of the v i o l a t i o n of an international undertaking\". Those i n the second \" c i r c l e \" would be required to reaff irm t h e i r obligations under the Covenant, especial ly under A r t i c l e 16, while those i n the innermost \" c i r c l e ! ! would part ic ipate i n a mutual assistance pact involving spec i f ic p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y obl igat ions. The p o l i t i c a l arrangements contemplated would establ ish a right to assistance when a t e r r i t o r y under the authority of one of the signatory Powers was attacked by foreign forces, except i n cases where an agreement to the contrary existed, i n self-defence or under authorization from the League. The League Council would be charged with determining whether an attack or invasion had taken place and, to f a c i l i t a t e i t s decisions - which would be taken by majority vote - i t was to establish a commission consist ing of diplomatic agents and m i l i t a r y , naval and 94 a i r attaches i n each signatory state . Disputes between these states would be resolved by resort to the General Act . The m i l i t a r y arrangements for the mutual assistance pact envisaged a d i v i s i o n of the land foroes of the contracting Powers between a \"national army\" (a force assigned for \"the defence of home front iers\" ) and a \"specia l ized contingent\". The national armies would be standardized on the basis of short-term service, l imited effect ives and uniform mater ie l . The period of t r a i n i n g would include time spent i n \"pre-regimental\" t r a i n i n g and t r a i n i n g received i n p o l i t i c a l organizations, and the number of effect ives would be f ixed so as to overcome \" inequal i t i es i n the resources of recruitment\" — to ensure that Prance would be allowed a s imi lar number of men i n the colours as Germany. The possession of powerful mobile a r t i l l e r y and tanks would be prohibited. The special ized units would consist of troops serving a r e l a t i v e l y long term and would be provided with the powerful weapons prohibited to the national armies. These contingents would be placed permanently at the disposal of the League, kept \"constantly ready for act ion\" and would be formed along s imilar l ines i n each state. No one state would have suf f i c ient of these foroes to menace a neighbour, but the combined force at the disposal of the League would be \" s u f f i c i e n t l y powerful to give pause to an aggressor\".^ 0 Inventories of mobile land materiel would be stored i n each of the contracting states under internat ional supervision. The diminution of the power of offence would thus be attained through the reduction of effect ives rather than the reduction of mater ie l . At least once a year, there would be an internat ional invest igat ion to ensure that the provisions for land disarmament as a whole were being executed. 95 This continental system of organization would not he extended to overseas:, naval or a i r forces. Forces overseas would be \"calculated and special ized for the par t icular tasks incumbent on them\", and a i r armaments would be regulated on s imilar l ines to those envisaged i n the \"Tardieu pflan\" of February except that the internat ional izat ion of c i v i l aviat ion would only be applicable to Europe. Navies whose aggregate tonnage i n 1931 exceeded 100,000 tons would be subject to both quantitative and qual i ta t ive reductions. The French plan was probably the most eff icacious to be l a i d before the Powers. Despite i t s somewhat doubtful proviso that disputes should be settledSpeacefully by resort to the General Act , i t was a practicable proposal for the organization of peace. It was also an ingenious plan, s k i l f u l l y drafted to avoid the features of previous French plans that had been unacceptable to the Anglo-Saxon Powers. In par t i cu lar , i t did not require the accession of either B r i t a i n or America to the provisions for automatic mutual assistance and sanctions against an aggressor. America was included i n only the outermost of the three \" d i r c l e s \" , and three out of the four pr inciples that states i n t h i s \" c i r c l e \" were asked to accept had been enunciated by Stimson i n a speech on August 8, when he had declared that the existence of the Kellogg Pact implied the \" a b o l i t i o n \" of neutra l i ty and an obligation to consult i n the event of a breach of the international 61 peace; the only pr inc ip le he had not accepted was that involving the prohibi t ion of \"direct or indirect economic and f i n a n c i a l re la t ions\" with an aggressor. In a further attempt to conci l ia te America, the French plan was presented as a complement to the Hoover proposals, 96 e s p e c i a l l y t h e p r o v i s i o n s f o r l a n d d i s a r m a m e n t \" b a s e d o n \" p o l i c e a n d d e f e n c e c o m p o n e n t s \" a n d s u b s t a n t i a l a r m s r e d u c t i o n s . M o r e o v e r , t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n o f c i v i l a v i a t i o n w o u l d n o t e x t e n d t o A m e r i c a , w h e r e i t w a s d e e m e d t o b e i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h p r i v a t e e n t e r p r i s e . A s : f a r a s B r i t a i n w a s c o n c e r n e d , t h e . P . I a n r e q u i r e d n e i t h e r t h e ; a d o p t i o n o f c o n s c r i p t i o n n o r t h e p l e d g e o f n e w s e c u r i t y g u a r a n t e e s ; t h e B r i t i s h G o v e r n m e n t w o u l d m e r e l y b e r e q u e s t e d t o r e a f f i r m i t s o b l i g a t i o n s u n d e r t h e C o v e n a n t a n d t h e L o c a r n o T r e a t y a n d t o e n t e r t h e g e n e r a l c o n s u l t a t i v e p a c t . T h e F r e n c h p l a n a l s o m a d e a n e f f o r t t o m e e t t h e G e r m a n c l a i m f o r e q u a l i t y . I t s p r o v i s i o n s f o r l a n d d i s a r m a m e n t e n v i s a g e d a k i n d o f m i l i t i a a n d t h e r e d u c t i o n i n t h e t e r m o f s e r v i c e i n t h e R e i c h s w e h r , w h i l e i t i m p l i c i t l y a c c e p t e d t h e d e m a n d t h a t P a r t V o f t h e T r e a t y o f V e r s a i l l e s b e r e p l a c e d b y a l i d i s a r m a m e n t c o n v e n t i o n . I t s c a r e f u l d r a f t i n g a l s o o p e n e d t h e w a y f o r a d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e \" s a m p l e s \" i s s u e ; p r i v a t e l y , t h e F r e n c h w e r e w i l l i n g t o a c k n o w l e d g e t h a t G e r m a n y s h o u l d h a v e t h e s a m e r i g h t t o p o s s e s s a l l t y p e s o f m a f e r i e l a s t h e o t h e r P o l l e r s , t h o u g h t h e y h o p e d t h a t s h e w o u l d r e s t r i c t h e r c l a i m s v o l u n t a r i l y , a l l o w i n g \" f u l l r e a l i z a t i o n o f e q u a l i t y \" t o b e r e a c h e d b y s t a g e s o v e r a p e r i o d o f y e a r s . ^ T h e G e r m a n r e a c t i o n t o t h e P l a n w a s f a v o u r a b l e a t f i r s t a n d o m N o v e m b e r 8 , P a p e n t o l d t h e f o r e i g n p r e s s t h a t i t c o n s t i t u t e d a \" b a s i s f o r u s e f u l d i s c u s s i o n \" . ^ B u t i t c a m e u n d e r g r e a t e r c r i t i c i s m w h e n t h e f u l l t e x t w a s r e l e a s e d . A s e m i - o f f i c i a l N o t e p u b l i s h e d i n t h e B e r l i n p a p e r s o n N o v e m b e r 15 s u g g e s t e d t h a t t h e P l a n w a s \" a r e s u r r e c t i o n o f t h e G e n e v a P r o t o c o l d e s i g n e d t o e n s u r e t h e t e r r i t o r i a l 97 s t a t u s q u o \" a n d t h a t i t a v o i d e d a d i r e c t a n s w e r t o t h e c l a i m f o r e q u a l i t y o f s t a t u s a n d , m o r e e s p e c i a l l y , t h e d e m a n d f o r \" s a m p l e s \" . A l t h o u g h t h e G e r m a n G o v e r n m e n t h a d n o o b j e c t i o n i n p r i n c i p l e t o e i t h e r a \" m i l i t i a \" o r a n i n t e r n a t i o n a l f o r c e , i t b e l i e v e d t h a t t h e p r o v i s i o n s f o r s t o c k i n g h e a v y m a t e r i e l t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e e q u i v o c a l r e f e r e n c e s t o c o l o n i a l f o r c e s a n d t h e p r o p o s e d m u t u a l a s s i s t a n c e p a c t w o u l d t e n d t o p e r p e t u a t e F r e n c h h e g e m o n y i n E u r o p e . N e v e r t h e l e s s , i t i s p r o b a b l e t h a t t h e G e r m a n s w o u l d h a v e r e v i s e d t h e i r a t t i t u d e i f t h e B r i t i s h h a d a c c e p t e d t h e F r e n c h p l a n a s t h e b a s i s o f a c o n v e n t i o n . C e r t a i n l y F r a n c o i s - P o n e e t w a s c o n v i n c e d t h a t 65 t h i s w a s t h e c a s e , a n d N o r m a n D a v i s a n d h i s f e l l o w , d e l e g a t e a t 66 G e n e v a , H u g h W i l s o n , s u s p e c t e d i t a l s o . F o r t h o u g h t h e W i l h e l m s t r a s s e c o n s i d e r e d t h e p r o p o s a l s f o r c o l o n i a l a r m i e s a n d i n v e n t o r i e s o f h e a v y m a t e r i e l t o b e u n a c c e p t a b l e , B i l l o w i n s i s t e d t h a t o t h e r p a r t s o f t h e P l a n o f f e r e d s c o p e f o r n e g o t i a t i o n a n d e v e n i n t i m a t e d t h a t a p r e v i o u s l e v e l l i n g d o w n o f a r m a m e n t s a n d \" e q u a l i z a t i o n o f m i l i t a r y s t a t u t e s \" m i g h t e n a b l e h i s c o u n t r y t o a c c e p t t h e p o l i t i c a l r e o r g a n i z a t i o n 67 p r o p o s e d f o r E u r o p e . T h u s , i f B r i t a i n h a d o f f e r e d f u r t h e r s e c u r i t y g u a r a n t e e s t o F r a n c e - a n d p e r h a p s G e r m a n y - i t i s p r o b a b l e t h a t a n a g r e e m e n t m i g h t h a v e b e e n r e a c h e d o n t h e b a s i s o f t h e F r e n c h p l a n . I f t h e B r i t i s h h a d b e e n w i l l i n g t o a s s u m e n e w c o m m i t m e n t s , i t i s p r o b a b l e t h a t t h e A m e r i c a n s w o u l d h a v e r e c o n s i d e r e d t h e i r d e c i s i o n t o r e j e c t a f o r m a l i z a t i o n , o f t h e i r o w n \" c o m m i t m e n t \" o f A u g u s t 8 t o e n t e r i n t o c o n s u l t a t i o n s i n t h e e v e n t o f a b r e a c h o f t h e K e l l o g g P a c t ; c e r t a i n l y S t i m s o n w a s i n f a v o u r o f a n E x e c u t i v e D e c l a r a t i o n so o n t h e s u b j e c t . T h e A m e r i o a n s h o p e d t o f i n d a \" t h e s i s \" o n w h i c h 98 the European s t a t e s c o u l d agree and were r e l a t i v e l y unconcerned about i t s d e t a i l s . Thus, although the French p l a n \"contravened t h e i r conception of how the machinery of peace shouldl be organized\", they were w i l l i n g t o regard i t b e n e v o l e n t l y i f i t proved acceptable t o 69 the European Powers. The combined pressure of B r i t a i n and France - and a l s o the Soviet Union, as became c l e a r i n February 1933 - would have made i t d i f f i c u l t f o r Germany t o r e j e c t a convention based on the French plan;. Germany was i n no p o s i t i o n t o r i s k a c o n f r o n t a t i o n with the major Powers. The German lea d e r s based t h e i r p o l i c y on e x p l o i t i n g the divergences of o p i n i o n between France and the Anglo-Saxon Powers, and i f they were unable t o t h i s they would have had t o make the best deal p o s s i b l e i n the circumstances or r i s k a c o n f r o n t a t i o n . Thus, a disarmament agreement was p o s s i b l e i f B r i t a i n was w i l l i n g t o accept the French p l a n as a b a s i s . But apparently, Simon was not a t t r a c t e d by the p o s s i b i l i t y . Despite h i s c l a i m that he could not comment at* such short n o t i c e , h i s speech i n the Bureau on November 17 amounted t o an emphatic r e j e c t i o n of the m a j o r i t y of the French 70 pr o p o s a l s . H i s statement was l i t t l e more than a r e c a p i t u l a t i o n of B r i t i s h p o l i c y based on the memorandum of September 19 and h i s own speech t o the Commons of November 10. He accepted the German demands of August 29 provided that there was no rearmament and repeated h i s proposal f o r a \"no-force pact\" i n the hope that i t might e n t i c e France i n t o adhering t o the B r i t i s h p o s i t i o n . He then o u t l i n e d a p o s s i b l e programme f o r the f i r s t stage of disarmament. \"Heavy\" tanks would be a b o l i s h e d and new la r g e mobile guns l i m i t e d t o a c a l i b r e of 99 \"about 105mm\" - the maximum permitted to Germany by the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s . The size of the a i r forces of the leading Powers would be reduced to that of B r i t a i n pending a more comprehensive agreement prohibi t ing bombers and aer ia l bombardment except for \"pol ice purposes i n outlying places\" and establ ishing \"effect ive international control\" over c i v i l av ia t ion . Submarines would be abolished and cruisers l imited to 7,000 tons with 6\" guns. And a Permanent Disarmament Commission would be set up to supervise the execution of the convention. These proposals went a long way towards meeting Germany's demands for the p r a c t i c a l applicat ion of equality of r i g h t s . Although the reorganization of her forces was to involve \"no increase i n her powers of aggression\", she would be permitted to own \"samples\" of \" l i g h t tanks\". She would also be allowed to bui ld capi ta l ships of the same types as the Great naval Powers provided that \"subject to minor adjustments\" she did not increase the t o t a l tonnage of ships i n any speci f ic category of vessel i n her navy. But the Simon proposals were no answer to the disarmament problem. The provisions regarding tanks and m i l i t a r y aviat ion were designed almost so le ly to increase B r i t i s h strength at the expense of the other Powers and Prance was offered no more than a \"no-force pact\" to compensate for material concessions to Germany. Simon's i m p l i c i t re ject ion of the French plan was unfortunate, for B r i t a i n would not have been affected adversely by i t s implementation. Her posi t ion i n the second of the three ooncentric \" c i r c l e s \" required her to assume no new commitments, only to reaffirm^.those she had undertaken already. Certainly she would be expected to part ic ipate i n 100 a g e n e r a l c o n s u l t a t i v e p a c t , b u t i f a E u r o p e a n c r i s i s b r o k e o u t a t a n y 71 t i m e , B r i t a i n w a s c e r t a i n t o b e i n v o l v e d i n n e g o t i a t i o n s t o s e t t l e i t . M o r e o v e r , t h e s u c c e s s f u l i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f t h e E u r o p e a n m u t u a l a s s i s t a n c e p a c t w o u l d h a v e a s s u r e d h e r o f a c o n s i d e r a b l e p e r i o d o f p e a c e o n t h e C o n t i n e n t a n d , t h i s b e i n g s o , i t w a s u n l i k e l y t h a t t h e R o y a l N a v y w o u l d b e c a l l e d o n b y t h e L e a g u e t o s u p p l y e m e r g e n c y a s s i s t a n c e t o a v i c t i m o f a g g r e s s i o n w i t h i n E u r o p e . A n d B r i t a i n w o u l d h a v e b e e n a l l o w e d t o o r g a n i z e h e r a r m y o n a n y l i n e s s h e w i s h e d a n d t o e q u i p i t w i t h a n y w e a p o n s n o t g e n e r a l l y f o r b i d d e n . T h u s t h e F r e n c h l a n d p r o p o s a l s w o u l d n o t h a v e w e a k e n e d B r i t i s h s e c u r i t y . N e i t h e r w o u l d t h e F r e n c h a i r p r o p o s a l s h a v e w e a k e n e d B r i t i s h s e o u r i t y . I f a n y t h i n g , t h e y w o u l d h a v e s t r e n g t h e n e d i t , S s B r i t a i n w o u l d h a v e b e e n a l l o w e d \" s p e c i a l i z e d a i r u n i t s \" o n t h e s a m e b a s i s a s t h e P o w e r s ; i n t h e E u r o p e a n p a c t w h e r e a s h e r e x i s t i n g a i r f o r c e w a s m e r e l y t h e 72 f o u r t h l a r g e s t i n E u r o p e . T h u s t h e F r e n c h p r o p o s a l s m i g h t h a v e s e c u r e d L o n d o n a n d t h e S o u t h - E a s t f r o m t h e h o r r o r s o f b o m b i n g p o r t r a y e d b y B a l d w i n i n h i s s p e e c h o f N o v e m b e r 10. C o n s i d e r i n g t h a t B r i t i s h p o l i c y w a s b a s e d i n p a r t o n t h e t h e s i s t h a t t h e R i v e r R h i n e w a s B r i t a i n ' s m i l i t a r y f r o n t i e r , t h e G o v e r n m e n t ' s a t t i t u d e t o t h e F r e n c h d i s a r m a m e n t p l a n i s t h e m o r e r e m a r k a b l e . C e r t a i n l y B r i t i s h M i n i s t e r s b e l i e v e d t h a t i t w a s i m p o s s i b l e t o t r e a t ; G e r m a n y a s a s e c o n d - c l a s s P o w e r f o r a l l t i m e a n d t h a t i t w a s b e s t t o \" d e f e n d t h e R h i n e f r o n t i e r \" b y r e d r e s s i n g G e r m a n y ' s \" l e g i t i m a t e \" g r i e v a n c e s , b u t i t w a s u n r e a l i s t i c t o p u r s u e a p o l i c y o f a p p e a s e m e n t w i t h o u t t a k i n g f a c t o r s o f p o w e r i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n - f o r i f a p p e a s e m e n t p r o v e d u n s u c c e s s f u l , i t w o u l d b e n e c e s s a r y f o r B r i t a i n t o d e f e n d t h e 101 R h i n e f r o n t i e r b y f o r c e . T h e m i l i t a r y a r r a n g e m e n t s o f t h e F r e n c h p l a n o f f e r e d s o m e h o p e o f d o i n g t h i s s u c c e s s f u l l y ; S i m o n ' s p r o p o s a l s o f N o v e m b e r 17 o f f e r e d l e s s . A s S i m o n h a d i n d i c a t e d i n h i s s p e e c h t o t h e B u r e a u , B r i t a i n ' s i n i t i a l o b j e c t i v e r e m a i n e d t h a t o f c o m p o s i n g a f o r m u l a t h a t w o u l d f a c i l i t a t e G e r m a n y ' s r e t u r n t o t h e D i s a r m a m e n t C o n f e r e n c e . A n d , t o a c c o m p l i s h t h i s , t h e G o v e r n m e n t w a s w i l l i n g t o a c c e p t t h e m a j o r G e r m a n d e m a n d s a n d p u t p r e s s u r e o n F r a n c e t o a d h e r e t o t h e B r i t i s h p o i n t o f v i e w . T h e r e w a s l i t t l e s u r p r i s e , t h e r e f o r e , w h e n N e u r a t h a g r e e d t h a t G e r m a n y c o u l d r e t u r n t o t h e C o n f e r e n c e o n t h e b a s i s o f S i m o n ' s s p e e c h o f N o v e m b e r 1 7 ; i f h e h a d n o t a g r e e d , h e w o u l d h a v e g i v e n t h e i m p r e s s i o n t h a t G e r m a n y w a s b e i n g i n t r a n s i g e n t a n d c a u s e d B r i t a i n t o m o v e c l o s e r t o F r a n c e . H a v i n g g a i n e d G e r m a n y ' s a c c e p t a n c e i n p r i n c i p l e , S i m o n b e g a n t o p r e s s F r a n c e t o t a k e p a r t i n f i v e - P o w e r c o n v e r s a t i o n s a t G e n e v a . B u t H e r r i o t w a s r e t i c e n t , a n t i c i p a t i n g t h a t t h e o b j e c t i v e o f G e r m a n p o l i c y w o u l d b e t o i s o l a t e F r a n c e a n d p o r t r a y h e r a s t h e m a i n o b s t a c l e 7 3 t o d i s a r m a m e n t . S p e a k i n g w i t h N o r m a n D a v i s o n N o v e m b e r 2 6 , h e d e c l a r e d t h a t , o n c e , h e \" h a d h o n e s t l y b e l i e v e d i n \" a F r a n c o - G e r m a n e n t e n t e b u t t h a t h e n o l o n g e r h e l d t h a t b e l i e f . ^ T h e P r e s i d e n t d u C o n s e i l w a s d i s a p p o i n t e d a t t h e B r i t i s h r e a c t i o n t o t h e F r e n c h d i s a r m a m e n t p l a n , a n d i t s e e m e d t o D a v i s t h a t F r a n c e \" w a s w a l k i n g i m 7 t h e d a r k n e s s t o w a r d s a g o a l w h i c h s h e c o u l d n o t c l e a r l y a s c e r t a i n \" . 102 E v e n t s i n G e r m a n y a l a r m e d t h e F r e n c h P r e m i e r . G e n e r a l S c h l e i c h e r , w h o h o p e d t o \" h a r n e s s t h e b e t t e r e l e m e n t s o f \" t h e N a z i P a r t y , t u r n e d a g a i n s t P a p e n a n d c a u s e d t h e d o w n f a l l o f t h e G o v e r n m e n t o n N o v e m b e r 1 7 . A p o l i t i c a l c r i s i s o c c u r r e d a n d , o n D e c e m b e r 2 , S c h l e i c h e r h i m s e l f w a s e n t r u s t e d w i t h f o r m i n g a n o t h e r \" P r e s i d i a l G o v e r n m e n t \" . N e u r a t h r e m a i n e d F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r , b u t H e r r i o t c o n t i n u e d t o b e a p p r e h e n s i v e a b o u t t h e f o r t h c o m i n g c o n v e r s a t i o n s i n G e n e v a , m a i n t a i n i n g t h a t h e c o u l d n o t d i s c u s s t h e G e r m a n c l a i m t o e q u a l i t y e x c e p t i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h t h e F r e n c h c l a i m t o s e c u r i t y . T h u s , w h e n M a c D o n a l d a n d S i m o n a r r i v e d i n G e n e v a o n D e c e m b e r 2 2 , t h e p r o s p e c t s o f a n a g r e e m e n t w e r e n o t v e r y g o o d . B r i t a i n ' s i m m e d i a t e o b j e c t i v e w a s t o f a c i l i t a t e G e r m a n y ' s r e t u r n t o t h e D i s a r m a m e n t C o n f e r e n c e , w h i l e F r a n c e d e s i r e d a n a g r e e m e n t o n s e c u r i t y i n c l u d i n g a g e n e r a l c o n s u l t a t i v e p a c t , a r e a f f i r m a t i o n o r r e i n f o r c e m e n t o f A r t i c l e 16 o f t h e C o v e n a n t a n d a r e a f f i r m a t i o n o f t h e L o c a r n o T r e a t y . B r i t a i n w a s w i l l i n g t o a c c e d e t o t h e G e r m a n c l a i m f o r ^ s a m p l e s \" ; F r a n c e w a n t e d a f u r t h e r d e f i n i t i o n o f \" e q u a l i t y \" . B r i t a i n . w a n t e d t h e n a t u r e o f t h e G e r m a n c l a i m s t o b e r e v e a l e d i n f i v e - P o w e r c o n v e r s a t i o n s ; F r a n c e w a n t e d t h e m r e v e a l e d i n a w r i t t e n d o c u m e n t . B r i t a i n w a s u n w i l l i n g t o a s s u m e f u r t h e r o b l i g a t i o n s u n l e s s A m e r i c a e n t e r e d a g e n e r a l c o n s u l t a t i v e p a c t ; F r a n o e w a s u n w i l l i n g t o m a k e f a r - r e a c h i n g 77 a r m s r e d u c t i o n s u n t i l s h e r e c i v e d n e w s e c u r i t y a s s u r a n c e s . B r i t a i n d i d s u g g e s t a c o m p r o m i s e b y w h i c h s h e w o u l d r e f u s e t o d i s c u s s e q u a l i t y i n a b s t r a c t o f r o m s e c u r i t y i f F r a n c e w o u l d a g r e e t o t h e B r i t i s h p o s i t i o n o n e q u a l i t y , b u t t h e F r e n c h r e f u s e d b e c a u s e t h e B r i t i s h a l s o s u g g e s t e d t h a t G e r m a n y s h o u l d b e a l l o w e d t o u n d e r t a k e 103 78 \"cer ta in measures of qual i ta t ive rearmament\" by means of stages. Two days of conversations i n Geneva f a i l e d to produce a change i n either the French or B r i t i s h a t t i tude . The Americans were anxious to achieve posi t ive resul ts before the Christmas break, but believed that neither the B r i t i s h nor French 79 disarmament proposals would lead to substantial progress being made. Conseqently, Davis and Wilson proposed an immediate preliminary convention based on the resolution of July 23? i t would last for about three years and incorporate a l l the points on which agreement was possible . B r i t a i n and France indicated that they would welcome such a proposal and Davis drew up a memorandum putting forward a 80 number of points for consideration. MacDonald and Simon doubted the f e a s i b i l i t y of the American scheme but gave i t t h e i r \"warm support\" as they were w i l l i n g to consider almost anything which might f a c i l i t a t e Germany's return to the Disarmament Conference. They were also anxious to assure America's 8 l continued par t i c ipa t ion i n the Conference — for i t had been suggested that Congress might refuse to vote the necessary funds i f the deadlock at Geneva was not broken. Baron A l o i s i , the acting I t a l i a n delegate at Geneva, and Herriot also favoured the plan, though the l a t t e r made h is support conditional on no German rearmament, for i n the absence of new security guarantees the French Premier was reluctant to commit himself to certain provisions of the scheme allowing Germany to 82 \"improve her means of defence\". 104 N e u r a t h ' s r e a c t i o n t o t h e A m e r i c a n p l a n w a s u n f a v o u r a b l e , f o r h e b e l i e v e d t h a t i t i m p l i e d t h e p o s t p o n e m e n t o f d i s a r m a m e n t f o r a t l e a s t t h r e e y e a r s a n d t h a t i t w a s a r e g r e s s i o n f r o m t h e p r o p o s a l s t h a t S i m o n h a d o u t l i n e d i n t h e C o m m o n s o n N o v e m b e r 10 a n d i n t h e B u r e a u o n N o v e m b e r 17. A l t h o u g h h e d i d n o t r e j e c t i t o u t r i g h t , h e c a m e f o r w a r d w i t h a n e w p l a n o f h i s o w n . D e l e g a t e s o f t h e f i v e c o u n t r i e s p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n t h e G e n e v a c o n v e r s a t i o n s w o u l d b e c h a r g e d w i t h f o r m u l a t i n g \" t h e g e n e r a l l i n e s a l o n g w h i c h t h e p r i n c i p l e o f e q u a l i t y o f s t a t u s c o u l d b e p u t i n t o e f f e c t \" a n d w i t h e x a m i n i n g \" t h e p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f c r e a t i n g f u r t h e r c o n t r a c t u a l d e g r e e s o f s e c u r i t y \" . T h e f o r m e r w o u l d b e b a s e d o n t h e G e r m a n m e m o r a n d u m o f A u g u s t 29, t h e l a t t e r o n t h e F r e n c h p l a n o f N o v e m b e r 14 a n d t h e B r i t i s h p r o p o s a l s o f N o v e m b e r 10 a n d 17 . T h e w o r k o f t h e d e l e g a t e s w o u l d b e c o m p l e t e d b y J a n u a r y 1 1933 a n d w o u l d f o r m t h e b a s i s o f t h e f i r s t d i s a r m a m e n t c o n v e n t i o n . ^ H e r r i o t d i s l i k e d t h e G e r m a n s c h e m e b e c a u s e F r a n c e w a s a s k e d t o m a k e c o n s i d e r a b l e c o n c e s s i o n s r e g a r d i n g t h e p r a c t i c a l a p p l i c a t i o n o f G e r m a n e q u a l i t y w h i l e G e r m a n y w a s n o t r e q u i r e d t o m a k e s i m i l a r c o n c e s s i o n s r e g a r d i n g F r e n c h s e c u r i t y . T h u s , o n t h e s a m e d a y , D e c e m b e r 6, t h e F r e n c h P r e m i e r p u t f o r w a r d a c o u n t e r — p r o p o s a l o f h i s o w n . B r i t a i n , F r a n c e , I t a l y a n d t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s w o u l d d e c l a r e t h a t \" o n e o f t h e a i m s o f t h e D i s a r m a m e n t C o n f e r e n c e w a s t o a c c o r d t o G e r m a n y . . . e q u a l i t y o f r i g h t s i n a s y s t e m w h i c h w o u l d p r o v i d e s e c u r i t y f o r a l l n a t i o n s \" . T h i s , h e b e l i e v e d , w o u l d a l l o w G e r m a n y t o r e t u r n t o t h e C o n f e r e n c e , a n d , o n c e t h i s h a d b e e n e f f e c t e d , a p r e l i m i n a r y c o n v e n t i o n o n t h e l i n e s o f t h e A m e r i c a n p l a n m i g h t b e 105 f o r m u l a t e d . B r i t a i n a n d I t a l y q u i c k l y a g r e e d t o t h e H e r r i o t p r o p o s a l a n d N e u r a t h r e f e r r e d i t t o B e r l i n . T w o d a y s l a t e r , h e d e c l a r e d t h a t h i s c o u n t r y c o u l d a g r e e p r o v i d e d h e r e c e i v e d a s s u r a n c e s t h a t e q u a l i t y o f s t a t u s w o u l d b e \" p u t i n t o p r a c t i c a l e f f e c t i n e v e r y r e s p e c t \" a n d t h a t t h e \" s y s t e m o f s e c u r i t y f o r a l l n a t i o n s \" w o u l d i n c l u d e \" t h e e l e m e n t o f s e c u r i t y w h i c h l a y i n g e n e r a l d i s a r m a m e n t \" . ^ B r i t a i n ' s i m m e d i a t e o b j e c t i v e r e m a i n e d t h a t o f f a c i l i t a t i n g G e r m a n y ' s r e t u r n t o t h e C o n f e r e n c e , t h o u g h b y n o w , M a c D o n a l d a n d S i m o n h a d c o m e t o b e l i e v e t h a t i t w a s t h e G e r m a n s w h o w e r e p r e v e n t i n g a n a g r e e m e n t . B r i t a i n , I t a l y a n d F r a n c e w e r e n o w w i l l i n g t o a c c e p t G e r m a n y ' s c l a i m t o e q u a l i t y , a n d i f t h e G e r m a n s i n s i s t e d o n d e m a n d i n g s p e c i f i c p l e d g e s , M a c D o n a l d b e l i e v e d i t w o u l d b e i m p o s s i b l e t o a t t a i n a n a g r e e m e n t b e f o r e C h r i s t m a s a n d t h i s w o u l d h a v e s e v e r e r e p e r c u s s i o n s . T o p r e v e n t t h i s , h e w a n t e d b o t h F r a n c e a n d G e r m a n y \" t o p u t t h e i r d e m a n d s i n s u c h a w a y t h a t B r i t a i n c o u l d s a y t h a t s h e s u p p o r t e d b o t h s i d e s \" - a n d J h e y c o u l d d o t h i s b y a d h e r i n g t o t h e H e r r i o t f o r m u l a b y w h i c h G e r m a n y w o u l d b e a c c o r d e d e q u a l i t y w i t h i n 85 a s y s t e m p r o v i d i n g s e c u r i t y f o r a l l n a t i o n s . N o r m a n D a v i s , w h o s e o w n p r o p o s a l f o r a n i n t e r i m c o n v e n t i o n h a d b e e n s h e l v e d , p l a c e d A m e r i c a f i r m l y o n t h e s i d e o f B r i t a i n a n d , o n D e c e m b e r 10, t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f t h e f i v e P o w e r s a g r e e d u p o n t h e t e x t o f a d e c l a r a t i o n - N e u r a t h h a v i n g d r o p p e d h i s d e m a n d f o r a m o r e p r e c i s e d e f i n i t i o n o f \" e q u a l i t y \" . B o t h P a r i s a n d B e r l i n a c c e p t e d t h e f o r m u l a a n d o n t h e f o l l o w i n g d a y i t w a s a n n o u n c e d t h a t B r i t a i n , F r a n c e a n d I t a l y h a d a g r e e d t h a t G e r m a n y a n d t h e o t h e r P o w e r s d i s a r m e d b y t r e a t y s h o u l d b e a c c o r d e d e q u a l i t y o f r i g h t s i n a s y s t e m w h i c h 106 w o u l d p r o v i d e s e c u r i t y f o r a l l n a t i o n s a n d t h a t t h i s p r i n c i p l e w o u l d h e \" e m h o d i e d i n t h e c o n v e n t i o n c o n t a i n i n g t h e c o n c l u s i o n s o f t h e D i s a r m a m e n t C o n f e r e n c e \" . T h e m e t h o d s o f a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h i s p r i n c i p l e w o u l d b e d i s c u s s e d b y t h e C o n f e r e n c e a n d a l l s t a t e s w o u l d h a v e t h e i r a r m a m e n t s r e g u l a t e d b y t h e s a m e c o n v e n t i o n . B r i t a i n , F r a n c e , I t a l y a n d G e r m a n y d e c l a r e d t h a t t h e y w e r e r e a d y , a l o n g w i t h t h e o t h e r E u r o p e a n s t a t e s , t o e n t e r i n t o a n o - f o r c e p a c t \" w i t h o u t p r e j u d i c e t o f u l l e r d i s c u s s i o n s o n s e c u r i t y \" a n d t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , t h e y a n n o u n c e d t h a t t h e y w o u l d c o - o p e r a t e i n t h e C o n f e r e n c e \" t o w o r k o u t a c o n v e n t i o n w h i c h s h a l l e f f e c t a s u b s t a n t i a l r e d u c t i o n a n d l i m i t a t i o n o f a r m a m e n t s w i t h p r o v i s i o n f o r f u t u r e 86 r e v i s i o n w i t h a v i e w t o f u r t h e r r e d u c t i o n . \" A l t h o u g h i t e n a b l e d G e r m a n y t o r e t u r n t o t h e C o n f e r e n c e , t h e D e c l a r a t i o n o f D e c e m b e r 11 c o n c e a l e d m a n y i m p o r t a n t d i f f e r e n c e s b e t w e e n F r a n c e a n d G e r m a n y r e g a r d i n g t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f b o t h s e c u r i t y a n d e q u a l i t y . F r a n c e w a n t e d a s e c u r i t y s y s t e m b a s e d o n t h e p l a n o f N o v e m b e r 14; G e r m a n y w a n t e d a m o r e f l e x i b l e s y s t e m w h i c h d i d n o t c o m m i t h e r t o t h e m a i n t e n a n c e o f t h e t e r r i t o r i a l s t a t u s q u o . T h e F r e n c h w e r e p r e p a r e d t o c o n c e d e n o m o r e t h a n \" q u a l i t a t i v e e q u a l i t y \" t o G e r m a n y ; G e r m a n y , h a v i n g e x t r a c t e d t h i s c o n c e s s i o n f r o m t h e B r i t i s h , w a s n o w i n t e n t o n s e c u r i n g \" q u a n t i t a t i v e e q u a l i t y \" a s w e l l . F r a n c e w a n t e d t h e C o n f e r e n c e t o w o r k o u t a p r a c t i c a l f o r m u l a f o r d i s a r m a m e n t ; 87 G e r m a n y h o p e d t h a t i t m i g h t b e d o n e t h r o u g h f i v e - P o w e r d i s c u s s i o n s . 88 T h u s t h e r e a l s t r u g g l e o v e r a r m a m e n t s w a s s t i l l t o c o m e . T h e m a i n i m p o r t a n c e o f t h e d i s c u s s i o n s l e a d i n g t o t h e D e c l a r a t i o n o f D e c e m b e r 11 w a s t h e i r d e m o n s t r a t i o n t h a t i f B r i t a i n ( p o s s i b l y i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h A m e r i c a ) c o m b i n e d w i t h F r a n c e t o p u t p r e s s u r e o n 107 Germany, then the j o i n t pressure would he s u c c e s s f u l , f o r the Germans were ve r y worried about a p o s s i b l e rapprochement between Prance and 89 the Anglo-Saxon Powers. y And i t would be l o g i c a l t o assume that i f B r i t a i n had given more support t o Prance at an e a r l i e r stage, both Prance and Germany co u l d have been coaxed i n t o a d e f i n i t i v e disarmament agreement. C e r t a i n l y t h i s would have been p o s s i b l e at Bessinge i n A p r i l . But although the B r i t i s h Government d e s i r e d b e t t e r r e l a t i o n s with the French - a n o t i c e a b l e rapprochement between the two countries: had taken p l a c e d u r i n g the Geneva d i s c u s s i o n s - B r i t i s h M i n i s t e r s were s t i l l u n w i l l i n g t o enter i n t o new C o n t i n e n t a l commitments unless 90 the Americans gave c e r t a i n assurances t o B r i t a i n . Despite Papen*s t r u c u l e n c e , the B r i t i s h Government s t i l l b e l i e v e d that Germany o f f e r e d no r e a l t h r e a t - or at l e a s t no immediate t h r e a t -t o European s e c u r i t y . M i n i s t e r s were convinced that European Powers could r e s o l v e t h e i r d i s p u t e s without recourse t o f o r c e - the \"harmony of i n t e r e s t s \" premise - thus t h e i r \"no-force\" proposal and t h e i r u n w i l l i n g n e s s t o enter i n t o new commitments. MacDonald had t y p i f i e d the Government's c o n v i c t i o n s when he suggested that Prance and Germany \"put t h e i r demands i n such a way that B r i t a i n c o u ld say that she supported both s i d e s \" . A b e l i e f i n an i n t e r n a t i o n a l \"harmony of i n t e r e s t s \" was not the only reason f o r the Government's r e l u c t a n c e t o enter i n t o new C o n t i n e n t a l commitments. The B r i t i s h people had been shocked by the h o r r o r s of the Great War and the d i k t a t of V e r s a i l l e s and were opposed t o new commitments f o r f e a r that B r i t a i n might be drawn i n t o another European war; even the Anglo-French D e c l a r a t i o n of J u l y 13 had caused 108 a considerable outcry i n the press. The Government, alarmed by the r i f t s i n society produced by the events of August 1931 (the f inanc ia l c r i s i s and the f a l l of the Labour Government), d id not want to widen the r i f t s and cause new ones by adopting such an unpopular pol icy as 92 offer ing new security guarantees to the Continental Powers. But even so, MacDonald*s concern over public opinion was probably exaggerated; the Government had a majority of over 400 seats i n the Commons and was i n no danger of los ing i t . B r i t a i n ' s refusal to increase her commitments was the main reason for the continuing lack of progress towards a disarmament convention. By accepting the moral justice of Germany's claim to equality of r ights ( i n the \"Statement of Views\" of September 19) and by agreeing to \"qual i ta t ive equal i ty\" , i f not a certain amount of \"quantitative equality\" ( i n Simon's speeches of November 10 and 17), the Government made the serious mistake of allowing the Germans to drive a wedge between B r i t a i n and Prance. The pol icy of appeasing German grievances without of fer ing Prance security guarantees i n return had the opposite effeot to that intended; the Germans increased t h e i r demands from \"equal i ty i n p r i n c i p l e \" i n July to \"quantitative equality\" i n December, while the French became more anxious about t h e i r security. I f B r i t a i n had maintained a closer relat ionship with France, i t i s probable that Papen and Neurath would have reduced the i r claims, because the German Ministers were a fra id of a possible resusci tat ion of the entente cordiale or, worse, the old wartime a l l i a n c e . As Rumbold pointed out, the best way of dealing with the Germans was to be f i r m , for they understood a pol icy based on force whereas they interpreted a pol icy based on c o n c i l i a t i o n as a sign of weakness. 109 I f B r i t a i n had accepted the French plan of November 14 as the basis of a disarmament agreement, there i s l i t t l e doubt that the Germans would have accepted i t also; even i n February 1933 Neurath and Billow 93 declared that a s o l u t i o n on t h i s basis was p o s s i b l e . But HacDonald and Simon opposed the plan and thus f r u s t r a t e d any chance of an agreement. B r i t a i n ' s own disarmament proposals of November 17 were l i t t l e more than a r e c a p i t u l a t i o n of previous proposals that had been reje c t e d , such as the r e t e n t i o n of \" p o l i c e bombing i n o u t l y i n g d i s t r i c t s \" and medium tanks but the a b o l i t i o n of heavy tanks and submarines. Although going some way towards meeting Germany's demand fo r the p r a c t i c a l a p p l i c a t i o n of equ a l i t y of status, the proposals offered few compensations f o r France. To the French, a \"no-force pact\" to \"mobilize world opinion\" was of no more value than the \"paper guarantees\"oof the K e l l o g g Pact. The B r i t i s h plan was no s o l u t i o n to the disarmament problem. 110 C H A P T E R I V T H E A D V E N T O P H I T L E R A N D T H E S E C O N D P H A S E O F T H E D I S A R M A M E N T C O N F E R E N C E D e c e m b e r 11 1932 - J u n e 8 1933 B e t w e e n t h e D e c l a r a t i o n o f D e c e m b e r 11 1932 a n d t h e r e c o n v e n i n g o f t h e G e n e r a l C o m m i s s i o n o n F e b r u a r y 2 1933 f a n u m b e r o f p o l i t i c a l c h a n g e s o c c u r r e d w i t h i n E u r o p e , t h e m o s t s i g n i f i c a n t b e i n g t h e a p p o i n t m e n t o f H i t l e r a s G e r m a n C h a n c e l l o r o n J a n u a r y 30. Y e t t h e r e w a s n o i n d i c a t i o n t h a t G e r m a n f o r e i g n p o l i c y w o u l d c h a n g e , f o r N e u r a t h h a d b e e n r e a p p o i n t e d F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r t o e n s u r e c o n t i n u i t y . 1 M o r e o v e r , t h e n e w C h a n c e l l o r ' s a i m s a p p e a r e d t o b e l i t t l e d i f f e r e n t f r o m t h o s e o f t h e c o n s e r v a t i v e p o l i t i c i a n s o f t h e W e i m a r R e p u b l i c - t o f r e e G e r m a n y f r o m t h e s h a c k l e s o f t h e T r e a t y o f V e r s a i l l e s a n d t o s e c u r e a r e v i s i o n o f t h e E a s t e r n f r o n t i e r . H e p r o b a b l y h o p e d t o m a k e G e r m a n y t h e d o m i n a n t P o w e r i n E u r o p e , b u t h e h a d n o c l e a r l y - d e f i n e d m a s t e r s c h e m e b y w h i c h t o a c c o m p l i s h h i s a i m s ; h e h a d o u t l i n e d a n u m b e r o f i d e a s i n \" M e i n K a m p f \" - b u t h e d i d n o t a d h e r e t o t h e m r i g i d l y i n p r a c t i c e . L i k e B i s m a r c k , h e w a s a n o p p o r t u n i s t r a t h e r t h a n a p l a n n e r . P r o b a b l y t h e p r i n c i p a l d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n h i m a n d t h e G e r m a n c o n s e r v a t i v e s w a s h i s w i l l i n g n e s s t o t a k e g r e a t e r r i s k s i n p u r s u i t o f h i s a i m s . A c h a n g e i n g o v e r n m e n t h a d a l s o t a k e n p l a c e i n F r a n c e . H e r r i o t h a d b e e n d e f e a t e d i n t h e C h a m b e r o n D e c e m b e r 14 a n d , a f t e r a s h o r t m i n i s t r y h e a d e d b y P a u l - B o n c o u r , E d o u a r d D a l a d i e r b e c a m e P r e s i d e n t d u C o n s e i l t t f i t h P a u l - B o n c o u r a t t h e Q u a i d ' O r s a y . T h e n e w P r e m i e r w a s t h e l e a d e r o f t h e l e f t w i n g o f H e r r i o t ' s p a r t y , a n d h i s a p p r o a c h t o t h e G e r m a n p r o b l e m w a s s i m i l a r t o , t h o u g h m o r e f l e x i b l e t h a n , t h a t o f h i s p r e d e c e s s o r . H e w a s s y m p a t h e t i c t o t h e i d e a o f a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g w i t h I l l Germany - even a Germany under H i t l e r - and r e j e c t e d a p o l i c y of uncompromising nationalism, no concessions t o Germany and t o t a l 2 r e l i a n c e on the French a l l i a n c e system. He placed more emphasis on the c o n c i l i a t o r y aspect of R a d i c a l - S o c i a l i s t f o r e i g n p o l i c y than did H e r r i o t , though he was aware of the possible dangers to France of a Nazi government i n B e r l i n and wanted to move cl o s e r t o B r i t a i n , Russia and I t a l y . ^ Paul-Boncour s t i l l hoped that a disarmament convention might be negotiated on the b a s i s of the French plan of November 14, and t h i s seemed possible when Neurath intimated that he also was i n favour of such a settlement.^ But i t became cl e a r during the debate i n the General Commission from February 2-8 that there were considerable differences between the French and German points of view regarding the a p p l i c a t i o n of the plan. M a s s i g l i , the a c t i n g French delegate, maintained that disarmament was dependent on s e c u r i t y ; Nadolny suggested that s e c u r i t y was dependent on disarmament. France believed that a mutual assistance pact and an i n t e r n a t i o n a l force were a precondition f o r the attainment of German e q u a l i t y ; Germany refused to discuss them on t h i s b asis. France wanted the problem of e f f e c t i v e s to be dealt with before that of m a t e r i e l ; Germany wanted materiel to 5 be reduced before the problem of e f f e c t i v e s was t a c k l e d . The r e a c t i o n of the other Powers to the French plan was mixed. A l o i s i c r i t i c i s e d the proposals on the grounds that the mutual assistance pact would not include B r i t a i n , thus i n t i m a t i n g that I t a l y desired any European \" d i r e c t o r a t e 1 1 to be based on the four Western Powers - B r i t a i n , France, Germany and I t a l y . Support f o r 112 P r a n c e c a m e f r o m L i t v i n o v , w h o s u g g e s t e d a c o n c r e t e d e f i n i t i o n o f a g g r e s s i o n a n d d e c l a r e d t h a t t h e S o v i e t U n i o n w a s r e a d y t o h e i n c l u d e d i n t h e o u t e r m o s t o f t h e t h r e e c o n c e n t r i c \" c i r c l e s \" . T h e S o v i e t d e l e g a t e s t i l l m a i n t a i n e d t h a t G e r m a n y s h o u l d h e a c c o r d e d e q u a l i t y , b u t h i s s p e e c h i n g e n e r a l r e f l e c t e d t h e g r o w i n g F r a n c o - S o v i e t r a p p r o c h e m e n t . B e l g i u m , G r e e c e a n d t h e L i t t l e E n t e n t e a l s o s u p p o r t e d P r a n c e , b u t o t h e r s t a t e s r a i s e d o b j e c t i o n s t o a t v l e a s t s o m e o f t h e F r e n c h p r o p o s a l s . A s h a d b e e n a p p a r e n t b e f o r e C h r i s t m a s , a n y a g r e e m e n t o n t h e b a s i s o f t h e F r e n c h p l a n w a s d e p e n d e n t o n B r i t i s h s u p p o r t . I f B r i t a i n h a d b e e n w i l l i n g t o i n c r e a s e h e r C o n t i n e n t a l c o m m i t m e n t s , p o s s i b l y t h r o u g h a d h e s i o n t o t h e m u t u a l a s s i s t a n c e p a c t ( a s A l o i s i s e e m e d t o a d v o c a t e ) , a n a g r e e m e n t h a v e b e e n a t t a i n e d . B r i t a i n w a s t h e o n e P o w e r a c c e p t a b l e t o b o t h F r a n c e a n d G e r m a n y a s m e d i a t o r ; s h e c o u l d a s s u r e F r a n c e o f a d d i t i o n a l g u a r a n t e e s o f s u p p o r t a n d s h e c o u l d a s s u r e G e r m a n y t h a t s h e w o u l d u s e h e r i n f l u e n c e t o m a k e F r e n c h p o l i c y m o r e c o n c i l i a t o r y . I t h a d a l w a y s b e e n c l e a r t h a t F r a n c e w a n t e d B r i t a i n t o e n g a g e h e r s e l f m o r e a c t i v e l y i n E u r o p e a n p o l i t i c s , w h i l e t h e G e r m a n s h a d m a i n t a i n e d f o r s o m e t i m e t h a t t h e y p r e f e r r e d t o e n t e r i n t o a E u r o p e a n P a c t i f 7 i t h a d a B r i t i s h s i g n a t u r e . M o r e o v e r , i f B r i t a i n w a s s u c c e s s f u l i n h e r m e d i a t i o n , s h e w o u l d a u t o m a t i c a l l y s t r e n g t h e n h e r o w n s e c u r i t y . B u t i n a s p e e c h t o t h e G e n e r a l C o m m i s s i o n o n F e b r u a r y 3, A n t h o n y E d e n , U n d e r - S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e a n d a c t i n g B r i t i s h d e l e g a t e a t G e n e v a , d e c l a r e d t h a t B r i t a i n c o u l d u n d e r t a k e n o f r e s h c o m m i t m e n t s i n E u r o p e . H e m a d e n o a l l u s i o n t o a g e n e r a l c o n s u l t a t i v e p a c t a n d s u g g e s t e d t h a t e x i s t i n g g u a r a n t e e s o f s e c u r i t y w e r e s u f f i c i e n t t o j u s t i f y a \" r e a l 8 a n d i m m e d i a t e \" r e d u c t i o n i n a r m a m e n t s . T h u s h i s s p e e c h a m o u n t e d t o 1 1 3 a rejection of the French proposals - though he denied i t to 9 Paul-Boncour.^ To ensure that the Conference did not grind to a halt, Britain put forward a \"programme of work\".10 Drafted on January 30, i t suggested, that the future convention should replace Part V of the Treaty of Versailles and should last for the same period of time and he subject to the same methods of revision for a l l Powers. A l l European states would enter into a \"no-force\" pact, the details of which were to be discussed by the Political Commission, and the continental European states were to study the possibility of their entering into a mutual assistance pact. The Bureau would be charged with drawing up a formula for the standardization of European armies and with securing an interim solution to the problem of air disarmament. Subsequently, a committee representing the principal air Powers would report on the possibility of abolishing military aviation and aerial bombardment and of securing the effective international control of c i v i l aviation. Qualitative equality would be applied to materiel either immediately or in stages, and the Bureau would! fix limits for the tonnage and number of tanks and the gun calibre andi number of heavy mobile guns. It would also set limits for the tonnage and gun calibre of capital ships, aircraft-carriers, cruisers, destroyers and submarines. This programme was an attempt to mediate between France and Germany on the procedure to be adopted in the Conference, but i t was unsatisfactory as i t s proposals for disarmament were far more 114 d e f i n i t e than those f o r s e c u r i t y . Moreover, disarmament was: to he d iscussed i n the Bureau, a smal ler and more e f f e c t i v e body than the P o l i t i c a l Commission, i n which s e c u r i t y was to he d i scussed . Consequently, on February 9 and 10, when the programme was d iscussed i n the Bureau, Paul-Boncour proposed (and secured) severa l amendments, the most important be ing that a l l secu r i t y quest ions should be d iscussed by the P o l i t i c a l Commission and those r e l a t i n g to disarmament by the General Commiss ion . 1 1 Together wi th the Dec la ra t i on of December 11, the \"programme of work\" marked a d e f i n i t e stage i n the development of B r i t i s h p o l i c y . P r e v i o u s l y , the Government had tended to remain i n the background of the disarmament d i s c u s s i o n s , hoping that France and Germany would come to an agreement on terms acceptable to B r i t a i n , but now, wh i l s t s t i l l hoping that the two con t inen ta l Powers would \"put t h e i r demands; i n such a way that B r i t a i n could say that she supported both s i d e s \" , the Government was t r y i n g to ensure that p r a c t i c a l nego t ia t ions between the two Powers took p lace as soon as p o s s i b l e . The dra f t programme was not an o f f e r of mediat ion - but i t was an intermediate stage to i t . The programme was a l so an in termediate stage i n the development of B r i t i s h p o l i c y on the German problem. Simon's speeches of November 10 and 17, had been almost e x c l u s i v e l y pro-German i n charac te r , but the new B r i t i s h proposal r e f l e c t e d a s l i g h t move towards France because i t envisaged a f u l l d i s cuss ion of secu r i t y as w e l l as disarmament; moreover, Eden made no ob jec t ions when Paul-Boncour sought to t r a n s f e r the d i scuss ions on disarmament from the Bureau to the General Commission. 115 T h e G o v e r n m e n t h a d r e a p p r a i s e d , i t s d i s a r m a m e n t p o l i c y t o t a k e i n t o a c c o u n t t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s a r i s i n g f r o m t h e G e r m a n c l a i m t o e q u a l i t y o f r i g h t s , b u t a s H i t l e r w a s n o w G e r m a n C h a n c e l l o r i t w a s c l e a r t h a t a f u r t h e r r e a p p r a i s a l m i g h t b e n e c e s s a r y . A l t h o u g h t h e y t r i e d t o c o n c e a l t h e i r a n x i e t y o v e r t h e N a z i l e a d e r ' s a p p o i n t m e n t , B r i t i s h M i n i s t e r s w e r e v e r y c o n c e r n e d l e s t i t l e a d t o a d e t e r i o r a t i o n 12 m i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s a n d c o n s e q u e n t l y , t h e y b e g a n t o h a s t e n t h e r a p p r o c h e m e n t w i t h P r a n c e , O m F e b r u a r y 17, H a l f W i g r a m , F i r s t S e c r e t a r y t o t h e B r i t i s h E m b a s s y i n P a r i s a n d a c l o s e c o n f i d a n t o f M a c D o n a l d , t o l d L o u i s A u b e r t , o n e o f t h e F r e n c h d e l e g a t e s t o t h e L e a g u e o f N a t i o n s , t h a t B r i t a i n w a n t e d t o c o l l a b o r a t e \" i n t i m a t e l y a n d a c t i v e l y \" w i t h F r a n c e a n d t h a t a s u i t a b l e b a s i s ; f o r t h i s c o l l a b o r a t i o n 1 3 m i g h t b e t h e F r e n c h P l a n o f N o v e m b e r 1 4 . T h e B r i t i s h d i p l o m a t i n d i c a t e d t h a t B r i t a i n h o p e d t h a t s e c u r i t y w o u l d b e b a s e d o n a \" n o - f o r c e \" p a c t a n d t h a t E u r o p e s h o u l d \" d r a w t h e i n f e r e n c e \" a s r e g a r d s a m u t u a l a s s i s t a n c e p a c t . H e a l s o h o p e d t h a t a d e f i n i t i o n o f a g g r e s s i o n c o u l d b e f o r m u l a t e d s o t h a t w o r l d o p i n i o n w o u l d b e m o b i l i z e d , i n c a s e s ; w h e r e a g g r e s s i o n t o o k p l a c e . A s f o r d i s a r m a m e n t , B r i t a i n w o u l d s u p p o r t t h e F r e n c h p r o p o s a l s c o n c e r n i n g o v e r s e a s f o r c e s , a n d t h e C a b i n e t \" m i g h t o v e r c o m e \" t h e o p p o s i t i o n o f L o r d L o n d o n d e r r y a n d a g r e e t o t h e t o t a l a b o l i t i o n o f m i l i t a r y a v i a t i o n . B u t B r i t a i n w o u l d n o t a c c e p t t h e F r e n c h n a v a l p r o p o s a l s - e s p e c i a l l y t h a t f o r a \" M e d i t e r r a n e a n L o c a r n o \" - o r t h e p r o p o s a l s f o r \" s p e c i a l i z e d c o n t i n g e n t s \" , w h i c h w o u l d b e o p p o s e d b e c a u s e t h e y r e q u i r e d t h e r e a r m i n g o f G e r m a n y . T h i s w a s a n u n u s u a l a r g u m e n t , f o r B r i t a i n h a d a l r e a d y a g r e e d t o G e r m a n \" q u a l i t a t i v e e q u a l i t y \" , t h o u g h p o s s i b l y t h e B r i t i s h M i n i s t e r s f e a r e d 116 a \" c o n t i n e n t a l a l l i a n c e \" s i m i l a r t o t h a t a d v o c a t e d b y P a p e n a t L a u s a n n e . B u t e v e n s o , t h e i r d e s i r e t o i m p r o v e r e l a t i o n s w i t h P r a n c e w a s g e n u i n e . F u r t h e r e v i d e n c e o f t h i s c a m e i n t h e d i s c u s s i o n s o f t h e G e n e r a l a n d P o l i t i c a l C o m m i s s i o n s a f t e r t h e c o m p l e t i o n o f t h e g e n e r a l d e b a t e o n t h e F r e n c h p l a n , f o r B r i t a i n t e n d e d t o s u p p o r t F r a n c e o n m a j o r q u e s t i o n s o f p r o c e d u r e . B u t l i t t l e p r o g r e s s t o w a r d s d i s a r m a m e n t w a s m a d e . T h e v a r i o u s P o w e r s d i d l i t t l e m o r e t h a n m a n o e u v r e f o r p o s i t i o n i n o r d e r t o p l a c e t h e i r o w n p r o p o s a l s i n t h e b e s t l i g h t a n d t o e n s u r e t h a t t h e y t h e m s e l v e s w o u l d n o t b e h e l d r e s p o n s i b l e f o r a n y c h e c k s : i n t h e w o r k o f t h e C o n f e r e n c e . I n t h e G e n e r a l C o m m i s s i o n , N a d o l n y u r g e d t h a t r e d u c t i o n o f m a f e r i e l b e d i s c u s s e d f i r s t a n d t h a t q u e s t i o n s r e l a t i n g t o e f f e c t i v e s s h o u l d b e r e f e r r e d t o t h e E f f e c t i v e s C o m m i t t e e , w h i l e P a u l - B o n c o u r s u g g e s t e d t h a t t h e l a t t e r c o m m i t t e e c o u l d n o t b e e x p e c t e d t o d o u s e f u l w o r k u n t i l q u e s t i o n s o f p r i n c i p l e h a d f i r s t b e e n s e t t l e d b y t h e G e n e r a l C o m m i s s i o n . T h e C o m m i s s i o n d e c i d e d i n f a v o u r o f F r a n c e - t h o u g h w h e n i t p r o c e e d e d t o a d i s c u s s i o n o f p r o p o s a l s f o r t h e s t a n d a r d i z a t i o n o f C o n t i n e n t a l a r m i e s , N a d o l n y r e s e r v e d h i s G o v e r n m e n t ' s a t t i t u d e a n d a b s t a i n e d f r o m v o t i n g o n t h e p r o p o s a l s . T h e G e r m a n s w e r e n o w c o n v i n c e d o f t h e a d v a n t a g e s o f a p r o f e s s i o n a l a r m y a n d w a n t e d t o r e t a i n t h e R e i c h s w e h r . i n a m o d i f i e d f o r m a n d t o s u p p l e m e n t i t w i t h a m i l i t i a . T h u s , t h o u g h t h e y h a d n o o b j e c t i o n i n p r i n c i p l e t o a s t a n d a r d i z e d a r m y b a s e d o n c o n s c r i p t i o n , t h e y r e f u s e d t o s u p p o r t i t i n t h e C o m m i s s i o n . 1 ^ S i m i l a r l y , t h e y o p p o s e d m a n y o t h e r p r o p o s a l s r e g a r d i n g t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f s t a n d a r d i z a t i o n , a n d b y t h e e n d o f t h e d e b a t e o n e f f e c t i v e s l i t t l e p r o g r e s s h a d b e e n 117 made. Other inconclusive debates took place concerning the abol i t ion of m i l i t a r y aviat ion, the internat ional izat ion of c i v i l aviat ion, a \"no-force\" pact and the proposed European mutual assistance pact. By the f i r s t week i n March, the Conference was i n almost complete deadlock. Henderson was so worried that he drafted a convention which he hoped would lead to a Franco-German compromise, even though he was a private indiv idual and could not count on the support of any government - least of a l l his own. 1^ To a great extent, the impasse was the result of a serious deterioration i n international re la t ions . On February 24, Japan had withdrawn from the special session of the League Assembly considering the Sino-Japanese dispute, and though on March 6 the delegation to the Disarmament Conference confirmed that they would continue to part ic ipate they also announced that the i r government found i t necessary to make \"various important modifications\" i n national 17 defence. As early as December 1932, Japan had l a i d naval proposals: before the Conference to increase the rat ios allowed to her by the 18 Washington and London Treaties, and i t was now evident that the leve l of a l l Japanese armaments was to be ra ised. The p o s s i b i l i t y of a naval agreement at Geneva, already endangered by the Anglo-American and Franco-Ital ian disputes, seemed even more remote. More important was the c r i s i s sparked off by events i n Germany, where H i t l e r had used the elect ion campaign and the Reichstag f i r e to induce President Hindenburg into signing an emergency decree to suppress c i v i l l i b e r t i e s and curb the a c t i v i t i e s of the opposition part ies . The Chancellor enforced the decree by a reign of terror and 118 \" b e g a n t o e n r o l m e m b e r s o f t h e S . A . a n d S t a h l h e l m a s a u x i l i a r y p o l i c e e q u i p p e d w i t h g u n s - a c l e a r b r e a c h o f G e r m a n y ' s t r e a t y o b l i g a t i o n s . T h e n , a f t e r h i s N a z i - N a t i o n a l i s t c o a l i t i o n h a d g a i n e d a m a j o r i t y i n t h e R e i c h s t a g i n t h e e l e c t i o n s o f M a r c h 5» h e s e t a b o u t c e n t r a l i z i n g t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n a n d s u p p r e s s i n g o p p o s i t i o n c o m p l e t e l y . A f u r t h e r b r e a c h o f G e r m a n y ' s t r e a t y o b l i g a t i o n s o c c u r r e d o n M a r c h 9t w h e n a d e t a c h m e n t o f N a z i s o c c u p i e d t h e d i s u s e d b a r r a c k s a t K e h l i n t h e d e m i l i t a r i z e d R h i n e l a n d , a n d o n M a r c h 11, i n a s p e e c h a t E s s e n , t h e A i r M i n i s t e r , H e r m a n n G B r i n g , d e c l a r e d t h a t t h e t i m e h a d c o m e t o r e s t o r e t h e G e r m a n a i r f o r c e . T h e r e a c t i o n t o e v e n t s i n G e r m a n y w a s s w i f t . T h e P o l e s s e e m t o h a v e c o n s i d e r e d a p r e v e n t i v e w a r , p o s s i b l y i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h P r a n c e , a n d e v e n o f f e r e d a n a l l i a n c e t o C z e c h o s l o v a k i a , w i t h w h o m 19 t h e y h a d b e e n o n b a d t e r m s . B e n e s r e f u s e d t h e o f f e r o n t h e g r o u n d s t h a t t h e G e r m a n s w o u l d c r y \" e n c i r c l e m e n t \" a n d u s e i t a s a n e x c u s e t o p r e s s t h e i r c l a i m s , b u t h e d i d f a c i l i t a t e t h e c r e a t i o n o f t h e P e r m a n e n t C o u n c i l o f t h e L i t t l e E n t e n t e i n a n a t t e m p t t o c o - o r d i n a t e t h e p o l i c y o f C z e c h o s l o v a k i a , Y u g o s l a v i a a n d R u m a n i a - t h o u g h t h i s n e w o r g a n i z a t i o n w a s d i r e c t e d m o r e a g a i n s t H u n g a r y t h a n a n y o t h e r - 20 P o w e r . T h e S o v i e t U n i o n r e a c t e d t o H i t l e r ' s a c c e s s i o n b y i n s i s t i n g o n t h e r a t i f i c a t i o n o f t h e F r a n c o - S o v i e t n o n - a g g r e s s i o n p a c t o f N o v e m b e r 29 1932 a n d t h e e x c h a n g e o f r a t i f i c a t i o n s d u l y t o o k . p l a c e 21 o n F e b r u a r y 15 1933. F r a n c e h e r s e l f t o o k a n u n c o m p r o m i s i n g p o s i t i o n a t t h e D i s a r m a m e n t C o n f e r e n c e , w h e r e M a s s i g l i d e c l a r e d t h a t h i s c o u n t r y c o u l d n o t . a g r e e t o m a k e a r m s r e d u c t i o n s u n l e s s t h e p r o p o s a l s f o r a E u r o p e a n m u t u a l a s s i s t a n c e p a c t a n d t h e s t a n d a r d i z a t i o n o f 119 C o n t i n e n t a l a r m i e s w e r e a c c e p t e d . M o s t d e l e g a t i o n s b e l i e v e d t h a t t h e b e s t c h a n c e o f a v e r t i n g a b r e a k d o w n o f t h e C o n f e r e n c e w a s f o r B r i t a i n t o p u t f o r w a r d a d e f i n i t e 22 p l a n t o f a c i l i t a t e a F r a n c o - G e r m a n c o m p r o m i s e , a n d c e r t a i n l y t h e c o n d i t i o n s f o r s u c h a s e t t l e m e n t e x i s t e d . G e r m a n y h o p e d t h a t a n a g r e e m e n t a c c o r d i n g h e r e q u a l i t y m i g h t s t i l l b e r e a c h e d a t G e n e v a a n d w a s r e l u c t a n t t o w i t h d r a w f r o m t h e C o n f e r e n c e u n l e s s F r a n c e 2 3 c o u l d b e b l a m e d f o r t h e w i t h d r a w a l , w h i l e F r a n c e , u n d e r D a l a d i e r , w a s a d o p t i n g a m o r e c o n c i l i a t o r y p o l i c y . T h e d e b a t e i n t h e G e n e r a l C o m m i s s i o n h a d s h o w n t h a t t h e r e w a s l i t t l e o r n o c h a n c e o f t h e F r e n c h p l a n o f N o v e m b e r 14 b e i n g a c c e p t e d , a n d s o t h e D a l a d i e r g o v e r n m e n t w a s r e a d y t o f a l l b a c k o n i t s m i n i m u m p r o p o s a l s - t h e s t a n d a r d i z a t i o n o f E u r o p e a n a r m i e s a n d t h e a d e q u a t e s u p e r v i s i o n o f t h e d i s a r m a m e n t 2 4 c o n v e n t i o n . T h e F r e n c h P r e m i e r w a s e v e n r e a d y t o c o n s i d e r G e r m a n 2 5 e q u a l i t y i n m a t U r i e l a t a l a t e r d a t e . ' B u t t h o u g h B r i t a i n h a d t h e c h a n c e t o p r o c u r e a F r a n c o - G e r m a n a g r e e m e n t , M a c D o n a l d a n d S i m o n , a s ; u s u a l , h a d n o p o s i t i v e p r o g r a m m e a n d o n l y v a g u e i n t e n t i o n s o f a r b i t r a t i n g b e t w e e n t h e t w o C o n t i n e n t a l P o w e r s a n d a d e s i r e t h a t B r i t a i n s h o u l d n o t 26 b e h e l d r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e b r e a k d o w n o f t h e C o n f e r e n c e . B u t i t w a s c l e a r t o S i r A l e x a n d e r C a d o g a n , c h i e f d i p l o m a t i c a d v i s e r t o t h e B r i t i s h d e l e g a t i o n i n G e n e v a , a n d E d e n , c h i e f B r i t i s h d e l e g a t e a t t h e t i m e , t h a t a B r i t i s h i n i t i a t i v e w a s n e c e s s a r y i f t h e C o n f e r e n c e w a s t o b e s a v e d . A s s i s t e d b y t h e i r S e r v i c e a d v i s e r s , T e m p e r l e y i n p a r t i c u l a r , E d e n a n d C a d o g a n p r e p a r e d a d r a f t c o n v e n t i o n d u r i n g t h e w e e k e n d o f F e b r u a r y 25-26, a n d o n M a r c h 2 t h e y r e t u r n e d t o E n g l a n d t o p u t t h e i r c a s e t o t h e P r i m e M i n i s t e r . T h e C a b i n e t C o m m i t t e e o n 120 Disarmament met twice, Baldwin backing the plan and MacDonald expressing his wil l ingness to go to Geneva, On March 3, i\"t was announced that the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary would journey to Geneva as soon as possible , and by March 7 \"the Cabinet had agreed that the two B r i t i s h Ministers should have discret ion 27 to use the Eden-Cadogan plan \"as they saw f i t \" . Actua l ly , MacDonald and Simon were sceptical about the draft convention and had not made the f i n a l decision to present i t to 28 the Conference. Indeed, they were considering other p o s s i b i l i t i e s of improving the s i tuat ion at Geneva - an adjournment of the Conference, five-Power exchanges of views, a declaration of intent or an interim 29 convention based on the Davis proposal of December 1932. They arrived i n Geneva on March 11, after preliminary discussions i n . P a r i s , but after three days of t a lks they were on the point of abandoning the draft convention and proceeding to Rome for ta lks with Mussolini.^\"* Eventually, after t a l k i n g to Eden, the Prime Minister decided to present the convention to the Conference. On March 16, he outlined i t to the General Commission.^1 Unlike previous B r i t i s h plans, the ''MacDonald plan\" contained a provision for a consultative pact. In the event of a breach or threatened breach of the Kellogg Pact, a conference could be cal led at the request of any f i v e of the parties to the convention provided that one of them was a Great Power. The object of the conference would be to \"agree upon steps to be taken\" to prevent a breach of the Pact or, i f the breach had occurred, to define the aggressor. To be v a l i d , decisions of the conference had to be concurred i n by a l l 121 t h e G r e a t P o w e r s a n d b y a m a j o r i t y o f t h e o t h e r p a r t i c i p a t i n g g o v e r n m e n t s . T h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t s e c t i o n o f t h e B r i t i s h p l a n w a s t h a t r e l a t i n g t o d i s a r m a m e n t , e s p e c i a l l y t h e l a n d p r o p o s a l s . T h e a r m i e s o f C o n t i n e n t a l E u r o p e w e r e t o b e s t a n d a r d i z e d o n t h e b a s i s o f e i g h t - m o n t h s e r v i c e a n d e a c h c o u n t r y l i m i t e d t o a d e f i n i t e n u m b e r o f \" a v e r a g e d a i l y e f f e c t i v e s \" ; P r a n c e , G e r m a n y , I t a l y a n d P o l a n d w e r e e a c h a l l o t t e d 2 0 0 , 0 0 0 , t h e U . S . S . R . 5 0 0 , 0 0 0 . T h e c a l c u l a t i o n o f e f f e c t i v e s w a s t o t a k e p r e - m i l i t a r y a n d p a r a - m i l i t a r y t r a i n i n g i n t o a c c o u n t , d o u b t f u l c a s e s b e i n g r e f e r r e d t o t h e P e r m a n e n t D i s a r m a m e n t C o m m i s s i o n . O v e r s e a s f o r o e s w o u l d b e t r e a t e d s e p a r a t e l y , b u t l i m i t s w o u l d a g a i n b e s e t f o r e f f e c t i v e s -P r a n c e w a s a l l o t t e d 2 0 0 , 0 0 0 , I t a l y 5 0 , 0 0 0 . T h e m a x i m u m c a l i b r e o f m o b i l e l a n d g u n s w a s t o b e 105mm ( 4 . 1 \" ) , b u t s t a t e s w o u l d b e a l l o w e d t o r e t a i n e x i s t i n g g u n s u p t o 155mm ( 6 . 1 \" ) ; t h e l i m i t f o r c o a s t a l d e f e n c e g u n s w o u l d b e 406mm ( 1 6 \" ) , t h e s i z e o f t h e l a r g e s t n a v a l g u n . T a n k s w i t h a n u n l a d e n w e i g h t o f o v e r 16 t o n s w o u l d b e p r o h i b i t e d a n d a l l p r o h i b i t e d m a t e r i e l d e s t r o y e d w i t h i n t h r e e y e a r s o f t h e c o m i n g i n t o f o r c e o f t h e c o n v e n t i o n . T h e r e w e r e t o b e n o a l t e r a t i o n s i n t h e L o n d o n a n d W a s h i n g t o n n a v a l T r e a t i e s u n t i l t h e p r o j e c t e d n a v a l c o n f e r e n c e o f 1 9 3 5 » t h o u g h i n t h e m e a n t i m e P r a n c e a n d I t a l y w e r e t o a d h e r e t o t h e L o n d o n T r e a t y . N o P o w e r w a s t o b u i l d c a p i t a l s h i p s e x c e p t I t a l y , w h o c o u l d l a y d o w n o n e s h i p o f 2 6 , 5 0 0 t o n s ( i n a n s w e r t o o n e a l r e a d y l a i d d o w n b y t h e F r e n c h ) , a n d t h e r e w a s t o b e n o c o n s t r u c t i o n o f 8 \" c r u i s e r s e x c e p t a s a l l o w e d i n p r e v i o u s t r e a t i e s ; a l l o t h e r c o n s t r u c t i o n w o u l d b e f o r r e p l a c e m e n t p u r p o s e s . G e r m a n y w o u l d b e f r e e d f r o m t h e l i m i t a t i o n s i m p o s e d o n h e r 122 at V e r s a i l l e s , \"but i n the p e r i o d before the e x p i r y of the London and Washington T r e a t i e s she would be allowed t o b u i l d only replacement v e s s e l s . A e r i a l bombardment would be p r o h i b i t e d \"except f o r p o l i c e purposes i n o u t l y i n g d i s t r i c t s . \" and m i l i t a r y planes r e s t r i c t e d i n number (each Great Power would be allowed 5 0 0 ) u n t i l the Permanent Disarmament Commission prepared a scheme f o r the complete a b o l i t i o n of m i l i t a r y a v i a t i o n and the \" e f f e c t i v e s u p e r v i s i o n \" of c i v i l a v i a t i o n . I f no e f f e c t i v e method of s u p e r v i s i o n could be devised, the Commission would determine the minimum number of machines r e q u i r e d by each c o n t r a c t i n g p a r t y . A l l warplanes except t r o o p - c a r r i e r s and f l y i n g - b o a t s would be l i m i t e d t o an unladen weight of t h r e e tons, and at l e a s t h a l f of the a i r c r a f t exceeding the q u a l i t a t i v e and q u a n t i t a t i v e r e s t r i c t i o n s imposed were t o be disposed of by June 30 1 9 3 6 . Germany and other s t a t e s without m i l i t a r y a v i a t i o n would not be allowed warplanes d u r i n g the p e r i o d of the convention. Chemical, i n c e n d i a r y and b a c t e r i o l o g i c a l warfare were t o be p r o h i b i t e d i n accordance with the proposals already accepted by the Conference, and a Permanent Disarmament Commission would be e s t a b l i s h e d to supervise the execution of the convention as a whole. The Commission would be composed of r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s from each s i g n a t o r y s t a t e , and on request from one or more of the c o n t r a c t i n g p a r t i e s i t could conduct i n v e s t i g a t i o n s i n the t e r r i t o r y of any s t a t e suspected of breaching the convention. I t s r e p o r t s were t o be communicated to the League C o u n c i l . The convention i t s e l f would re p l a c e the disarmament chapters of the Peace T r e a t i e s and would l a s t f o r f i v e years, a f t e r which i t 123 would be replaced by a new convention. The MacDonald plan was a good one in that i t attempted to meet the German demand for the practical application of equality of rights. European armies were to be standardized and Germany allowed the same number of home-based effectives as Prance. Moreover, although Prance could retain her existing materiel of 1 0 5 - 1 5 5 m m , Germany would be allowed to build up to the same limit as Prance in a l l future construction. She would also be permitted tanks of 16 tons - a measure of rearmament - though she would not be accorded equality in air armaments. But although the MacDonald plan made substantial concessions to Germany's demands for equality, i t did not make corresponding concessions to French demands for security. The consultative pact was less efficacious than that of the French plan of November 14 and the reference to the possibility of a European mutual assistance pact was included more for courtesy than hope. The suggested powers of the Permanent Disarmament Commission were weaker than France desired, and there was no provision for sanctions in case the convention was breached. Nevertheless, Daladier had shown himself to be more conciliatory than Herriot, and i t seemed that i f Britain was willing to assume additional - though relatively minor - Continental commitments then a convention based on the MacDonald plan was a distinct possibility. But once they had laid the draft convention before the Conference, neither MacDonald nor Simon had any clear idea as to what they should 32 do next. A debate on the British plan was postponed so that 124 governments could study i t more c lose ly , and i n the meantime the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary accepted an i n v i t a t i o n from Mussolini to v i s i t Rome. On March 14, A l o i s i had intimated that the Duce wanted to disouss the p o s s i b i l i t y of an agreement between B r i t a i n , France, I t a l y and Germany on p o l i t i c a l questions such as equality of r ights , security, the Disarmament Conference and the \"method of approaching treaty r e v i s i o n \" , a n d , professing interest i n such an agreement, the B r i t i s h Ministers journeyed to Rome, where they arrived on March 18. Immediately upon t h e i r a r r i v a l , they were handed a draft \" P o l i t i c a l Agreement of Understanding and Co-operation Between the Four Western Powers\"^ envisaging the establishment,^ of a four-Power European \"directorate\" which would maintain the peace and \"induce\" other states to fol low i t s lead. A second a r t i c l e reaffirmed the pr inc ip le of the rev is ion of peace t reat ies \"given the existence of conditions which might lead to a c o n f l i c t \" and a t h i r d affirmed that i f the Disarmament Conference should lead to p a r t i a l resul ts only, Germany would be accorded equality of r ights i n stages by an agreement between the four Western Powers. The Pact would last fot ten years. Mussol in i ' s basic objective for suggesting the Pact was his uneasiness 3 5 at the new German government. P u b l i c l y , he stressed the s i m i l a r i t i e s of Fascism and National Socialism, but i n private he was afra id of a possible Anschluss between Germany and A u s t r i a . ^ He was also worried about the possible f a i l u r e of the Disarmament Conference and wanted 3 7 to ensure that any German rearmament was control led. He wanted a balance of French and German power so that I t a l y could revert to her 125 t r a d i t i o n a l policy of \"balancing between Paris and B e r l i n \" i n order to gain advantages fo r herself. The Duce's plan was to divert Germany's rev i s i o n i s t ambitions from Austria to the Polish Corridor, leaving Ita l y free to pursue her own ambitions i n the Balkans by means of 3 8 agreements with Austria and an enlarged Hungary. This \"Danubian bloc\" would be a buffer against Germany, and Mussolini hoped that Prance would accept i t i n return for co-operation against Germany on the Anschluss question. * He also hoped for colonial compensations i n North A f r i c a . 4 0 The disarmament provisions of Mussolini's draft Pact were very important. I f the Disarmament Conference f a i l e d , B r i t a i n , Prance and Ital y would be able to control German rearmament, whereas under the provisions of the Covenant, Germany had an excellent moral, i f not j u d i c i a l , case for being freed from the disarmament clauses of the Peaoe Treaty. Moreover, the Pact would.have limited Germany's armaments for ten years whereas the MacDonald plan envisaged a convention l a s t i n g f i v e years. The Wilhelmstrasse was quick to note t h i s , and though welcoming the clauses of the I t a l i a n project concerning treaty revision, Neurath and Bulow were reluctant to commit themselves to 41 the clauses concerning disarmament and equality. MacDonald and Simon did not perceive the true nature of the Duce's scheme. They were convinced that i t s most important aspect was treaty 4$ revision, a and whilst agreeing that revision was inevitable i n the long run, they suggested an amendment confirming the sanctity of existing treaties to make the Pact more palatable to Prance and public opinion. They also put forward an amendment to the disarmament 126 clause, as they believed that the original implied the f a i l u r e of the Conference at Geneva. Yet even though these amendments d r a s t i c a l l y altered the meaning of the Pact, Mussolini accepted them - he was more concerned with the four-Power formula of the Pact than with i t s content s . ^ Whilst d i s l i k i n g the references to revision, MacDonald and Simon were very impressed by the four-Power concept. Their immediate objective was to ensure that the B r i t i s h draft convention was accepted as the 4'4 basis of a l l future discussion at Geneva, and they knew that the support of the four Western Powers was essential for t h i s . They were also concerned lest Europe be divided into opposing blocs and were 4*5 anxious to prevent Mussolini from a l l y i n g himself with H i t l e r . •* Consequently, they supported the principle of the Paot to appease the Duee but opposed the provisions f o r treaty revision and a four-Power \"directorate\" to make i t acceptable to Prance. In many ways, Mussolini's proposal was put forward at an inauspicious moment. Poland and the L i t t l e Entente suspected that i t was a \"plot to dish the League\" and they put pressure on Prance and B r i t a i n to oppose i t .« Franoe had similar suspicions, and as Siaon pointed out. the promotion of the Pact \"did not provide an inducement for her to support the MacDonald P l a n \" . ^ He was concerned lest Prance be held responsible for a breakdown of negotiations for either the MacDonald plan or the Pour-Power Paot because \"intransigence\" on the part of the French would react i n favour of Germany. Between March 24 and 27, the f i r s t discussions of the B r i t i s h draft convention took place i n the General Commission. The Marquis d i 127 Soragna, the acting I t a l i a n delegate, announced that h is country adhered to the plan uncondit ionally, but l a s s i g l i and Hadeilny were more reserved. The former emphasized the relat ionship between seourity and disarmament and declared that the reduction and abol i t ion of armaments had to be governed by the s i tuat ion l i k e l y to arise after the expiry of the f i r s t convention; the l a t t e r accepted the provisions regarding the implementation of the Kellogg Pact only on condition that the heavily-armed states disarmed. The German delegate also accepted the pr inc ip le of a t r a n s i t i o n a l period before the implementation of equality of r i g h t s , but he indicated that h is country would desire modifications consistent with her dignity and need for securi ty . The American delegate did not j o in i n the discussion since the new President, Frankl in D. Roosevelt, had taken of f i ce only at the beginning of the month and was s t i l l formulating his p o l i c y . Dovgalevsy, for the D.S .S .R. , regretted that the figures inserted i n the draft convention applied only to European states, but he did not oppose the convention as a whole. Several speakers disapproved of the retention of bombing i n outlying regions, and the proposals for the implementation of the Kellogg Paot were c r i t i c i z e d on the grounds that they ignored the machinery of the League. But on March 27, despite the differences of opinion, the General Commission decided to accept the B r i t i s h plan as the basis of i t s future discussions. The Commission then adjourned for the Easter hol iday. B r i t i s h pol icy was to proceed as quickly as possible to a detailed examination of the MacDonald plan, but during the adjournment few 128 discussions concerning disarmament took place except i n connection with the proposal for a Pour-Power Pact. B r i t i s h Ministers were p a r t i c u l a r l y anxious to ensure that the Frenoh did not reject the Pact (as t h i s would enable Germany to claim that France was being intransigent) and so on larch 31 they produced a counter-draft of the I t a l i a n project , weakening the \"treaty r e v i s i o n \" clauses considerably! i n any negotiations for r e v i s i o n , governments d i r e c t l y concerned would be placed \"on an equal foot ing with\" the four Great Powers. A new disarmament clause st ipulated that the four Powers would recommend acceptance of the MacDonald plan to the Disarmament 49 Conference. But, as both France and Germany had objections to the MacDonald plan, neither of them would accept the B r i t i s h version of the Four-Power Pact. At the same time, B r i t i s h pressure on France not to reject the Pact was successful, for on A p r i l 10 the French produced a draft of the i r own whioh replaced the reference to treaty revis ion by a reaff irmation of A r t i c l e s 10, 16 and 19 of the Covenant and suggested that any four-Power consultations should be pursued within the framework of the'lLeague. I t recognized the MacDonald plan only as a basis for discussion and asserted that German equality of r ights should be real ized i n stages i n a system affording security to a l l nations. Mussol in i , more concerned about the conoept of the Pact 51 than i t s contents, * accepted i t as a basis of discussion, leaving the onus for a refusal on Germany. At t h i s point , there appears to have been a struggle for control of German pol icy between the Wilhelmstrasse and certain sections of 129 t h e N a z i P a r t y . T h e c a r e e r d i p l o m a t s , i n g e n e r a l , c o n t i n u e d t o h e 52 s c e p t i c a l a s t o t h e v a l u e o f t h e P o u r - P o w e r P a c t , w h i l e t h e P a r t y w a n t e d c l o s e r r e l a t i o n s w i t h I t a l y . G B r i n g , w h o v i s i t e d M u s s o l i n i b e t w e e n A p r i l 10 a n d 18, a d v o c a t e d a \" g e n t l e m a n ' s a g r e e m e n t \" b y w h i c h G e r m a n y w o u l d s u p p o r t I t a l y ' s c o l o n i a l c l a i m s i n e x c h a n g e f o r I t a l i a n 53 s u p p o r t o n t h e q u e s t i o n o f e q u a l i t y o f r i g h t s ; h e b e l i e v e d t h a t s u c h a n a g r e e m e n t w o u l d a l l o w a s o f t e r l i n e t o b e t a k e n o n t h e P a c t . V i c e - C h a n c e l l o r P a p e n , w h o h i m s e l f v i s i t e d R o m e b e t w e e n A p r i l 9 a n d 18, a d o p t e d G B r i n g ' s p o l i c y , p o s s i b l y t o e n s u r e t h a t t h e l a t t e r c o u l d 54 n o t c l a i m s o l e c r e d i t f o r a s u c c e s s f u l G e r m a n - I t a l i a n a g r e e m e n t . E v e n t u a l l y , t h o u g h s o m e w h a t r e l u c t a n t l y , t h e W i l h e l m s t r a s s e f o l l o w e d s u i t . ^ ^ M u s s o l i n i w a s a t t r a c t e d b y t h e s u g g e s t i o n o f a \" g e n t l e m a n ' s a g r e e m e n t \" 56 b u t m a d e i t c o n d i t i o n a l o n t h e c o n c l u s i o n o f t h e P o u r - P o w e r P a c t . H e s t i l l h o p e d t h e G e r m a n s w o u l d a g r e e t o i m p l e m e n t e q u a l i t y o f 57 r i g h t s o v e r a p e r i o d o f t e n y e a r s r a t h e r t h a n f i v e , a n d w h e n t h e W i l h e l m s t r a s s e p r o d u c e d a d r a f t P a c t b a s e d o n t h e F r e n c h d r a f t b u t s u g g e s t i n g o n l y a f i v e - y e a r c o n t r o l o f G e r m a n y ' s a r m a m e n t s , h e s a w 58 \" t h e g r e a t e s t d i f f i c u l t y \" i n i t s b e i n g a c c e p t e d . H i s p r e s s u r e w a s s u c c e s s f u l ; o n M a y 4, t h e G e r m a n s p r o d u c e d a r e v i s e d d r a f t s p e c i f y i n g 59 n o t i m e l i m i t f o r G e r m a n r e a r m a m e n t . A l t h o u g h M u s s o l i n i ' s a l l u s i o n t o a f u t u r e \" g e n t l e m a n ' s a g r e e m e n t \" m u s t h a v e b e e n a m a j o r f a c t o r i n c h a n g i n g G e r m a n p o l i c y r e g a r d i n g t h e d i s a r m a m e n t p r o v i s i o n s o f t h e F o u r - P o w e r P a c t , i t i s p r o b a b l e t h a t o t h e r f a c t o r s w e r e e q u a l l y i m p o r t a n t . G e r m a n y w a s i s o l a t e d p o l i t i c a l l y a n d d i p l o m a t i c a l l y , a n d h e r l e a d e r s w e r e a f r a i d o f a 130 renewed Anglo-French entente, especial ly i f I t a l y looked on i t 60 benevolently. Moreover, there were renewed fears that the Poles were planning a preventive w a r . ^ Neurath was so worried about the s i tuat ion that he suggested to Francois-Poncet that Germany might be w i l l i n g to discuss an \"improvement'* i n the European security system and examine the p o s s i b i l i t y of a mutual assistance pact. The B r i t i s h att i tude to the new German government was shown very d e a r l y i n the Commons debate of A p r i l 13, when Members on both sides of the House c r i t i c i z e d the r e v i v a l of German mi l i tar ism and the p o l i t i c a l repression and anti-Semitism of the H i t l e r regime. Attlee declared that the country \"would not countenance for a moment the y i e l d i n g to H i t l e r and force what was denied to Stresemann and 63 reason\", while Austen Chamberlain deplored the \"new s p i r i t of German nationalism\" and demanded that the Government refuse to 64 entertain suggestions of r e v i s i o n . Even MacDonald raised the question as to whether the new German regime could be trusted to carry out i t s undertakings: \" I t i s no use t a l k i n g about disarming by agreement, i t i s no use t a l k i n g about t rea t ies , i t i s no use t a l k i n g about pacts, i t i s no use t a l k i n g about co-operation for peace unless you have had some experience which j u s t i f i e s you i n accepting the word of those with whom you are to co-operate.\"65 At the same time, German aggressiveness enabled B r i t a i n to pursue her po l i cy at Geneva more energetical ly . MacDonald had launched his disarmament plan i n an effort to ensure that Germany would be held responsible for a breakdown of the Disarmament Conference rather 131 than i n any great hope that the plan might he successful, and any German intransigence at Geneva would enable him to blame Germany i f a convention was not agreed upon. Thus, when the General Commission resumed i t s labours on A p r i l 25, B r i t i s h policy was to secure the adoption of the MacDonald plan with as few amendments as possible, even i f i t meant breaking up the Conference.^ Confronted by a grave c r i s i s , i t seemed that B r i t a i n had at last decided to mediate between Prance and Germany. B r i t i s h mediation would have stood a far better chance of being successful at almost any other time i n the fifteen-month existence of the Conference. But t h e i r was s t i l l a p o s s i b i l i t y i t might succeed. It was certain that both Prance and Germany would put forward t h e i r maximum demands at the outset of the f i r s t reading of the draft convention i n the General Commission, but provided that B r i t a i n followed a consistent l i n e , refused to give way on essential points such as the standardization of Continental armies and was w i l l i n g to strengthen the security provisions of the convention, a negotiated solution of the disarmament problem was possible. Gn A p r i l 26, the day after the General Commission reassembled, discussion of Part I (Security) of the MacDonald plan came to a s t a n d s t i l l because Norman Davis announced that the new American 68 government was s t i l l discussing the question of consultation. Privately, Roosevelt had t o l d MacDonald that he was n i n f u l l general sympathy\" with the B r i t i s h on the question of consultation and that he contemplated making a presidential declaration announcing that America would \" r e f r a i n from any action tending to defeat\" a c o l l e c t i v e 132 6Q effort against an aggressor, ' b u t Davis had not yet received instruct ions to t h i s e f fec t . Unsure of American p o l i c y , many delegations - including Prance - were unwi l l ing to commit themselves 70 on the security provisions of the B r i t i s h plan, and on A p r i l 27 the Bureau decided that the General Commission should proceed to the f i r s t reading of Part I I (Effect ives and Materiel). The discussion of Part I I produced a Franco-German confrontation. Nadolny urged that the standardization of European armies be considered by the Permanent Disarmament Commission, proposed amendments so as to inolude trained reserves as effect ives and l i m i t overseas forces stationed near the home country and demanded that Germany be authorized to own a l l arms permitted to other states. And i n the Effect ives Committee, the German delegate opposed the inc lusion of the Sohutzpolizei i n e f fec t ives . H a s s i g l i and Eden opposed the German amendments vigorously, and, s i g n i f i o a n t l y , no delegation supported Nadolny. 7 3 , Nadolny's aim was to put forward Germany's maximum demands i n the hope that concessions might be gained on the section of the B r i t i s h plan r e l a t i n g to mater ie l . Although the Germans wanted to re ta in a modified Reichswehr i f possible , they had no objection i n pr inc iple to a standardized army based on conscription. Their amendments were 72 put forward almost so le ly as a bargaining counter. The proposal for the standardization of Continental armies was one of the essential p i l l a r s of the MacDonald plan, and both B r i t a i n and France regarded i t as a sine qua non of any convention. Consequently, the B r i t i s h Cabinet reacted to the German demands by demanding a 133 \"reasonable\" agreement on e f f e c t i v e s and the withdrawal of the amendments. On May 5, a f t e r the B r i t i s h d e l e g a t i o n i n Geneva had t r i e d , u n s u c c e s s f u l l y , t o reason with the Germans, Eden was i n s t r u c t e d t o maintain the B r i t i s h p o s i t i o n even i f i t meant br e a k i n g up the Conference - f o r i f a break occurred, Germany would be blamed and B r i t a i n would not have t o d i s c l o s e her own demands f o r a twenty per 73 cent i n c r e a s e i n e f f e c t i v e s . Indeed, i t appears t h a t the Government b e l i e v e d that disarmament was an i m p o s s i b i l i t y , f o r i n a meeting on May 5 the Cabinet Committee on Disarmament acceded t o the demands of the S e r v i c e Departments r a t h e r than the advice of the F o r e i g n O f f i c e and decided t o press at Geneva f o r a c o n s i d e r a b l e expansion i n B r i t i s h armaments. A d d i t i o n a l tanks were t o be c o n s t r u c t e d i n accordance with a programme devised by the Mar O f f i c e , and the number of e f f e c t i v e s was t o be i n c r e a s e d from 180,000J,tos>230,000 men - e x c l u d i n g the 60,000 based i n I n d i a . The demands were sure t o r a i s e an outcry at Geneva, e s p e c i a l l y as B r i t i s h t r oops were l o n g - s e r v i c e p r o f e s s i o n a l s whereas the standardized armies of Europe would be formed of c o n s c r i p t s . And i n a i r armaments, the Government adhered t o Lord Londonderry's arguments and continued t o oppose the complete a b o l i t i o n of bombing and advocate r e d u c t i o n s i n the a i r s t r e n g t h of the other Great Powers t o the B r i t i s h l e v e l - or s i x t y per cent below i t i f the demands of the Dominions were taken i n t o account. At Geneva, a p r o v i s i o n a l compromise concerning m i l i t a r i z e d p o l i c e was concluded on May 3, a l l o w i n g every s t a t e a f i x e d quota of such p o l i c e , the number b e i n g p r o p o r t i o n a t e t o the s i z e of the country's e f f e c t i v e s . But no agreement was reached on r e s e r v i s t s , overseas 134 forces and the standardization of Continental armies as the Germans refused to withdraw their amendments to the draft convention.\"^ On May 5» in a manoeuvre for position at the Conference, the German Ambassadors in London, Washington and Rome made demarches suggesting that Germany would consider the question of standardization i f the General Commission continued the f i r s t reading of the other sections 7 6 of the draft convention, and three days later, General Blomberg, 7 7 the Reichswehr Minister, made a similar suggestion. On May 8 and 9, the German demand for a discussion of materiel was opposed by Eden and Massigli, who pressed for an immediate decision on effectives. Hugh Wilson proposed that Nadolny should make a general reservation on effectives or propose definite amendments on standardization, but the German delegate refused. The Bureau of the Conference could only agree that private discussions between the Great Powers should take plaoe. Between May 9 and 11, Eden and Nadolny held a number of conversations to try to break the deadlock. On May 9, \"the German delegate agreed in principle to the \"transformation\" of the Reichswehr over a period of time i f Germany reoeived concessions on reservists and oolonial troops and was accorded immediate and complete equality in materiel. Eden refused to consider such a scheme, and by May 11 Nadolny had reduced his demands for materiel to \"samples\" and equality in 7 9 p r i n c i p l e . O n May 10, the British Cabinet instructed Eden to continue opposing a postponement of a decision on effectives and to reveal Germany's demands to the other Powers so that the Reich could 86 be blamed for any break in the Conference. 135 The B r i t i s h M i n i s t e r s were unsure of German i n t e n t i o n s and almost as unsure of the c o r r e c t course t o f o l l o w , except that they hoped t o keep the Reich on the d e f e n s i v e . Simon even deigned t o ask Temperley's advioe on the s i t u a t i o n , r e c e i v i n g the r e p l y t h a t B r i t a i n should \"reoccupy\" the Rhine bridgeheads i n c o n j u n c t i o n with Prance and Belgium. Lord Hailsham, i n a Lords debate of May 11, suggested t h a t i f Germany r e f u s e d the o f f e r s made t o her and l e f t the Disarmament Conference, the T r e a t y of V e r s a i l l e s would remain i n f o r c e and any c o n t r a v e n t i o n of i t s disarmament p r o v i s i o n s would b r i n g sanctions 82 i n t o o p e r a t i o n . But whatever the i n d e o i s i o n s of the v a r i o u s M i n i s t e r s , the Cabinet Committee on Disarmament came t o the c o n c l u s i o n that Germany's demands were b a s i c a l l y a manoeuvre f o r p o s i t i o n and that Eden's i n s t r u c t i o n s of May 10 should remain unchanged, except f o r a 83 few a d d i t i o n s , telegraphed t o Geneva on May 12. The B r i t i s h Government had decided t o c a l l Germany's b l u f f - though they were i n a quandry as t o the next step i f Germany withdrew from the Conference r a t h e r than aocede t o B r i t a i n ' s demands r e g a r d i n g e f f e c t i v e s ; they were astonished by Hailsham*s outburst i n the Lords, and Simon gave an evasive answer when asked i n the Commons whether the M i n i s t e r f o r 84 War's speech represented Cabinet p o l i c y . On May 11, Germany made a l a s t attempt t o break the opposing f r o n t of B r i t a i n , Prance, I t a l y and America. The German Ambassadors i n London and Washington made f u r t h e r demarches suggesting that agreement had p r a c t i c a l l y been reached at Geneva and that a f i n a l settlement could be a r r i v e d at i f Germany was allowed ^samples\" of h i t h e r t o - f o r b i d d e n m a t e r i e l , but the demarches came t o n o t h i n g as 136 only the I t a l i a n s would agree t o the demand f o r \"samples\". ? I n a f u r t h e r attempt t o exert pressure on the other Powers, Neurath p u b l i s h e d an a r t i c l e i n the German press demanding complete and p r a c t i c a l a p p l i c a t i o n of e q u a l i t y of r i g h t s i n c l u d i n g the r i g h t t o 8 6 b u i l d an a i r f o r c e i f the other Powers were allowed t o keep t h e i r s . But, l i k e the demarches i n London and Washington, t h i s move was u n s u c c e s s f u l and had the reverse e f f e c t t o t h a t intended, f o r on the f o l l o w i n g day Paul-Boncour p u b l i s h e d a statement i n the French press 8 ? on s i m i l a r l i n e s t o Hailsham's speech i n the Lords. 1 Eden informed Henderson t h a t h i s t a l k s with Nadolny had broken down, and on May 12 the Bureau decided t o o a l l a meeting of the General Commission f o r May 15, when the B r i t i s h proposals r e g a r d i n g m a t e r i e l would be 88 d i s c u s s e d \" i n a very broad sense\" and no amendments allowed. L a t e r , the meeting of the General Commission was postponed f o r two days, because the German Cabinet decided t o c a l l a s p e c i a l meeting of the R e i c h s t a g f o r May 17 so t h a t H i t l e r c o u l d make an o f f i c i a l statement of p o l i c y . On May 16, i n an attempt t o ease the t e n s i o n i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s , Roosevelt addressed an appeal t o the Heads of State of the n a t i o n s represented at the Disarmament Conference. The u l t i m a t e object of the Conference, he d e c l a r e d , was the complete e l i m i n a t i o n of a l l o f f e n s i v e weapons, e s p e c i a l l y warplanes, heavy mobile a r t i l l e r y , tanks and poison gas, while the immediate o b j e c t i v e was a convention based on the MacDonald p l a n p r o v i d i n g f o r immediate and s u b s t a n t i a l arms r e d u c t i o n s . As an i n t e r i m measure, he suggested t h a t a l l s t a t e s 137 should l i m i t t h e i r armaments s t r i c t l y to the levels st ipulated i n ex is t ing t reat ies and enter into a \"solemn and def in i te \" non-aggression pact by which they would reaff irm t h e i r obligations to reduce and l i m i t arms and agree to send no armed forces across the i r f r o n t i e r s . I f \"any strong nation\" refused to jo in i n these concerted ef for ts for peace -i f Germany began to rearm - \"the C i v i l i s e d World would know where the 89 respons ib i l i ty lay? . Although B r i t a i n was pleased that the Americans were exerting pressure on Germany to r e f r a i n from rearming and accept the MacDonald plan as the basis of the f i r s t disarmament convention, the Foreign Office d i s l i k e d the clause forbidding the sending of armed forces across f ront iers for fear that i t might interfere with \"pol ice measures\" i n Aden and India and with steps such as the sending of troops to Shanghai. Even after the Amerioans explained that the contemplated arrangements applied only to neighbouring countries and were subject to ex i s t ing treaty r i g h t s , the B r i t i s h reply to the Roosevelt message was non-oommittal. More pleasing to the B r i t i s h Government was the fact that the Americans now intended to consult with other Powers i f the agreements suggested by the American 90 President were v i o l a t e d . The day after the Roosevelt message, H i t l e r made his statement of pol icy i n the Reichstag, discussing the internat ional c r i s i s i n a ra t ional manner and proclaiming his \"earnest desire\" to avoid war. At the same time, h i s speech indicated l i t t l e change i n German p o l i c y , for he oontinued to demand \"at least qua l i ta t ive\" equality and oppose the inc lus ion of para-mil i tary organizations and the exclusion of 138 t r a i n e d r e s e r v e s i n the c a l c u l a t i o n of e f f e c t i v e s . He wanted e q u a l i t y t o he a t t a i n e d through the disarmament of other Powers r a t h e r than the rearmament of Germany and accepted the MacDonald p l a n as \"a p o s s i b l e b a s i s f o r the s o l u t i o n o f \" the disarmament q u e s t i o n and agreed i n p r i n c i p l e t o the t r a n s i t i o n a l p e r i o d of f i v e y ears f o r implementing i t provided that any changes i n the Reichswehr took plaoe at the same time and t o the same degree as the disarmament of the heavily-armed s t a t e s . As regards s e c u r i t y , Germany was w i l l i n g t o undertake any f u r t h e r o b l i g a t i o n s g e n e r a l l y agreed upon, provided they b e n e f i t t e d a l l n a t i o n s , and the C h a n c e l l o r \"warmly welcomed\" Roosevelt's suggestion of \" b r i n g i n g the U n i t e d States i n t o European r e l a t i o n s as a guarantor of peace\". Gn the other hand, any attempt t o f o r c e Germany i n t o s i g n i n g another d i k t a t on the disarmament i s s u e 91 would be countered by a withdrawal from the League. Gn May 22, f u r t h e r developments seemed t o i n d i o a t e t h a t B r i t i s h p o l i c y had been s u c c e s s f u l on two counts. Henderson announced that Nadolny had withdrawn h i s proposal f o r r e f e r r i n g the s t a n d a r d i z a t i o n of C o n t i n e n t a l armies t o the Permanent Disarmament Commission, and Norman Davis, i n a f u l l statement of American p o l i c y , d e c l a r e d t o the General Commission that h i s country \"would consult w i t h other s t a t e s i n case of a t h r e a t t o peace, with a view t o a v e r t i n g c o n f l i c t , \" and \"would r e f r a i n from any a c t i o n t e n d i n g t o defeat a c o l l e c t i v e e f f o r t against s t a t e s which had v i o l a t e d t h e i r i n t e r n a t i o n a l o b l i g a t i o n s \" provided t h a t the American Government agreed that the aggressor had been d e f i n e d * c o r r e c t l y . Then, a f t e r r e i t e r a t i n g the 139 disarmament aims outlined i n the Roosevelt message the American delegate accepted the MacDonald Plan \"wholeheartedly\", pledged American support for i t and proposed an amendment to make f o r \"e f fec t ive , 9 2 automatic and continuous\" supervision of the convention. The withdrawal of the German proposal on the standardization of Continental armies and the declaration by Davis had important consequences. Germany's acceptance of the p r i n c i p l e o f standardization meant that B r i t a i n would be forced to reveal her own demands for rearmament, while America's acceptance of the pr inc ip le of consultation made i t d i f f i c u l t f o r B r i t a i n to plead that American p o l i c y made i t impossible for her to enter into new commitments or carry out her obligations under A r t i c l e 16 of the Covenant. Moreover, i t was evident that Prance would ask B r i t a i n to increase her commitments or reaffirm A r t i c l e 16 of the Covenant f o r although Roosevelt had renounced America's t r a d i t i o n a l po l i cy of i s o l a t i o n from European p o l i t i o a l a f f a i r s , French Ministers s t i l l believed that Prance needed more posi t ive and more automatio guarantees of securi ty . As T y r r e l l pointed out, unless France f e l t confident that B r i t a i n and America would j o i n i n set t ing a de f in i te l i m i t to German ambitions, she would base her po l i cy on the fact that i n the las t resort she had to be prepared to 93 defend herself a lone . ' There was s t i l l a p o s s i b i l i t y of reconci l ing French and German claims. French p o l i c y , as decided at a Cabinet meeting of May 2 and reaffirmed on May 20, was to implement the MacDonald F lan i n two stages, eaoh l a s t i n g four years. During the f i r s t stage, France would stop a l l construction of materiel over 155 «nm ca l ibre , l i m i t her tanks 14© •to a global tonnage of 3,000 tons (the ex is t ing figure being 12,000 tons) , and reduce her naval and m i l i t a r y a i r c r a f t by f i f t y per cent -on condition that agreement could be reached on budgetary control , the abo l i t ion or \" s t r i c t supervision\" of the private trade i n and manufacture of arms and the appl icat ion of sanctions i f the convention was v i o l a t e d . The supervisory mechanism would be continuous and automatic, and provided i t proved sat is factory , i n the second period Prance would either destroy her prohibited materiel or hand i t over 94 to the League. French Ministers were concerned lest Germany might regain complete freedom to rearm i f the MacDonald plan was implemented without amendmentt^ ** but i t seems that a reaff irmation of A r t i c l e 16 of the Covenant would have r a l l i e d them to the B r i t i s h draft convention. 96 Certainly the Foreign Office suspected t h i s . There were no adequate reasons why B r i t a i n should not take t h i s course. There was l i t t l e p o s s i b i l i t y of a European war i n the immediate future,»despite anxiety at the r i s e of H i t l e r , while the American statements of May 16 and 22 had freed B r i t a i n from the worry that enforcement of sanctions by the Royal Navy would have led to an Anglo-American breach. Outside Europe, there was no rea l danger that sanctions would be applied; the security of the Americas, for good or bad, was ensured by the Monroe Doctrine and had never been dependent on the League; most of A f r i c a and Asia were co lonia l t e r r i t o r i e s , where security was ensured by the Colonial Power; and the Manchurian c r i s i s had shown that i t was impossible for the League to act i n the Far East without the active co-operation of America, which was not forthcoming. In these circumstances, i t was unreasonable 141 f o r B r i t a i n to claim that her navy would he used c o n t i n u a l l y f o r a v e r t i n g c o n f l i c t round the world, neglecting i t s impe r i a l r o l e and causing expense. C e r t a i n l y M u s s o l i n i had c o l o n i a l ambitions i n North A f r i c a , e s p e c i a l l y i n Abyssinia, but i n 1933 he was more concerned about the H i t l e r government than h i s own ambitions, and B r i t a i n and Prance might w e l l have negotiated an agreement with the Duce, exchanging support f o r I t a l y i n North A f r i c a f o r support of a disarmament convention c o n t r o l l i n g Germany. A r e a f f i r m a t i o n of A r t i c l e 16 a l s o offered p o s i t i v e advantages t o B r i t a i n . New assuranoes of support were necessary i f Prance was t o adopt a more f l e x i b l e p o l i c y towards disarmament and the German problem - the Locarno Treaty struck French opinion more f o r the safeguards and delays which i t afforded the guarant or Powers against the immediate f u l f i l m e n t of t h e i r m i l i t a r y o b l i g a t i o n s than f o r the 9 7 d i s t i n c t n e s s of the guarantee t o defend France. A new assurance to France would also be a l o g i c a l development of the p o l i c y of the \"Rhine f r o n t i e r \" , while the e f f i c a c y of a close Anglo-French r e l a t i o n s h i p had been shown by the success of t h e i r j o i n t pressure on Germany during the c r i s i s concerning the standardization of Continental armies. Moreover, i f B r i t a i n intended t o appease German grievances, the best method of doing so was t o ensure that Germany's armaments were c o n t r o l l e d so that the Reich would be i n no p o s i t i o n t o threaten other states m i l i t a r i l y i f her r e v i s i o n i s t demands were not accepted; and the most d e s i r a b l e , i f not the only, way of a r r i v i n g at a s a t i s f a c t o r y convention was f o r B r i t a i n t o give new assurances t o France. The B r i t i s h Government was s t i l l u n w i l l i n g t o give these assurances. MacDonald and Simon continued t o base t h e i r p o l i c y on the \"harmony of 142 interests\" premise, and they also feared the effects that 98 addit ional guarantees would have on public opinion. Thus, i n renewed discussions on the Pour-Power Pact, Simon refused to accept a French amendment requir ing an examination by the four Powers of proposals \"tending to give f u l l ef f icacy to A r t i c l e s 10, 16 and 19 of the Covenant with a view to the i r ultimate appl i ca t ion\" . The Foreign Secretary would agree only to examine \" a l l proposals r e l a t i v e to the methods and procedures calculated, i n case of need, to give due effect 99 to these a r t i c l e s \" . \" Yet even t h i s he believed to be \"a great effort to meet French s e n t i m e n t \" . 1 ^ Speaking to the General Commission on May 22, he disappointed the French by f a i l i n g to respond to the abandonment of the t r a d i t i o n a l American pol icy regarding n e u t r a l i t y . 1 ^ 1 Then, ron May 26, he t o l d the Commons that B r i t a i n had no intention of jo in ing \"the innermost c i r c l e of securi ty\" , and while emphasizing the importance of Davis ' pronouncement of May 22, he gave no indicat ion that B r i t a i n would enter into any further commitments i n Europe or would be w i l l i n g to take part i n an applicat ion of economic 102 sanctions. The French suspected that Roosevelt's pol icy might be unacceptable to Congress, and the f a i l u r e of B r i t a i n to respond to the American statements of May 16 and 22 made them more anxious for t h e i r security. Consequently, they upheld the decisions of the Council of Ministers of May 2, and on May 23 Paul-Boncour outlined t h i s pol icy to the General Commission - exoept for the p o s s i b i l i t y of d i v i d i n g the convention into two four-year p e r i o d s . F r e n o h pol icy hardened even more i n the fol lowing week, for on May 28 the American Senate Committee on Foreign 143 Relations secured an amendment to a resolution empowering the President to declare an embargo on the export of arms or munitions of war to the effect that any prohibi t ion of export or sale of arms would apply to a l l parties i n a dispute or c o n f l i c t . Moreover, by June 1, i t had become d e a r that B r i t a i n wanted to avoid a discussion of the French amendments for continuous and automatic supervision of the disarmament.10^\" Thus, because B r i t a i n f a i l e d to give adequate support to France, the gap between the French and German points of view f a i l e d to narrow, making the conclusion of a disarmament convention even more d i f f i c u l t . After the withdrawal of the German amendments on the standardization of Continental armies, many delegations hoped that a convention might be negotiated before the World Economic Conference opened on June 12, but i t soon became clear that negotiation of a convention i n such a short time was improbable. Progress i n the General Commission was slow, and to a great extent the respons ib i l i ty lay with B r i t a i n . On May 25 and 29, B r i t a i n , along with I t a l y opposed the d e f i n i t i o n of aggression drawn up by Nicholas P o l i t i s , the Greek delegate and Vice-President of the Conference. 1 0 ^ Based on L i t v i n o v ' s suggestion of February 6, P o l i t i s * proposal defined an aggressor as the f i r s t state to commit any of a number of actions - a declaration of war, an invasion or attack by armed forces (with or without a declaration of war) on another state's, t e r r i t o r y , vessels or a i r c r a f t , a naval blockade, the support of armed bands invading another s t a t e , or a refusal to take measures to deprive such armed bands of a l l assistance or protect ion. Eden opposed t h i s d e f i n i t i o n because i t was \"too r i g i d \" and d id not take \"other circumstances1' into account - i n r e a l i t y because America had 144 not agreed to i t , and because, l e g a l l y , B r i t a i n would be prevented from defending her imperial interests by means of expeditions such as the despatch of a \"defence force\" to Shanghai i n January 1927.^^ In the end, Eden, Dovgalevsky, Madariaga (the Spanish delegate to the Disarmament Conference) and P o l i t i s were charged with formulating a more e l a s t i c d e f i n i t i o n (using the P o l i t i s proposal as a basis) before the second reading of the convention. Certainly t h i s was essential i f agreement was to be reached, as both America and I t a l y , and to a lesser extent Germany, supported B r i t a i n , but even when Davis produced, i n Eden's words, an \"innocuous\" d e f i n i t i o n , Simon refused to accept i t , 107 merely re fe r r ing i t to the Cabinet Committee on Disarmament. The B r i t i s h att i tude on t h i s question disappointed Prance, because an i n e l a s t i c d e f i n i t i o n of aggression f a c i l i t a t e d the prompt applicat ion of A r t i c l e 16 of the Covenant against \" g u i l t y \" par t ies . On the question of a i r armaments, B r i t a i n was even more responsible for the lack of progress. The debate i n the General Commission on May 27 showed that most delegates were i n favour of the t o t a l abo l i t ion of m i l i t a r y avia t ion , possibly i n conjunction with the internat ional izat ion of c i v i l av ia t ion , and opinion was almost 108 unanimously i n favour of the immediate abol i t ion of bombing. The main obstacle to progress was the provision of the draft convention for the retention of bombing \" for police purposes i n outlying d i s t r i c t s \" . B r i t a i n ' s insistence on t h i s clause was sure to lead to s imilar claims by Prance and I t a l y , and, i f these two Powers were allowed bombers, Germany would claim bombers. B r i t a i n ' s claim was l i t t l e more than an attempt by the A i r Staff to prevent the \" a b o l i t i o n \" of the Royal A i r Poroe, despite Eden's argument that bombing was a more 1 4 5 economic, i f not a more humane, method of p o l i c i n g \"inaccessible mountain d i s t r i c t s , sparsely inhabited, where wi ld and armed h i l l t r ibes had sometimes:ai passionate appetite for disturbing the t r a n q u i l l i t y of t h e i r neighbours\"• Prance had s imilar problems i n her empire - and a larger a i r force to deal with them - yet she was w i l l i n g to accept the complete abol i t ion of both bombing and m i l i t a r y av ia t ion . The delegates at Geneva must have wondered how B r i t a i n had kept the peace i n her empire before the development of aviat ion and also why the B r i t i s h Government considered bombing to be rather less inhumane i f the sufferers of bombing raids were h i l l tribesmen rather than Europeans. B r i t a i n ' s claim was so spurious that when Eden arrived i n Geneva, he had no idea how to j u s t i f y i t 109 and had to refer back to Simon for ins truct ions . \" O n l y Iraq, Pers ia and Siam supported B r i t a i n i n the General Commission, but Eden refused to withdraw the B r i t i s h claims. This was especial ly unfortunate because Nadolny modified his opposition to the internat ional izat ion of c i v i l aviat ion i n the event of the complete abol i t ion of m i l i t a r y avia t ion , declaring that \"Germany was prepared to go as far as possible to prevent the use of c i v i l a i r c r a f t for m i l i t a r y purposes\". I t was evident that Japan wanted to re ta in bombing, but i t was probable that she would a l te r her posi t ion i f her sphere of 110 influence i n Manchukuo and North China was recognized. Thus, because of the B r i t i s h refusal to accept the complete prohibi t ion of bombing and agree to the immediate abol i t ion of mi l i t a ry aviat ion, the discussion of the a i r chapter of the draft convention was inconclusive. B r i t a i n also hindered progress on the \"no-force\" declarat ion, which was discussed as part of the draft European security pact formulated 146 by the Security Committee of the Conference and proposed i n the General 111 Commission on Hay 30. Pers ia , Turkey and Afghanistan urged that the obligation not to resort to force should apply to a l l countries, and Russia and Prance accepted the suggestion. Norman Davis declared that i t was \"not incompatible\" with Roosevelt's suggestion for a universal non-aggression pact, and agreement on t h i s point seemed possible . But the B r i t i s h Cabinet had already decided (on February 17) that a universal \"no-force\" declaration might interfere with operations such as the despatch of troops to Shanghai i n 1927, and. Eden was instructed to assert that a universal declaration would \"destroy the entire 112 usefulness\"' 6fv;the \"no-force\" proposal. As t h i s would have given the impression of intransigence, Eden eventually suggested to the General Commission that , i n view of Davis* statement and the fact that a \"no—force\" pact was to some extent dependent on the d e f i n i t i o n of aggression, the whole question of a pact should be reconsidered and l e f t open u n t i l the seoond reading of the draft convention. To a great extent, therefore, B r i t a i n was holding up progress towards a disarmament convention, and Eden came near to admitting i t on May 31, when he telegraphed to Simon that one of the major arguments for accepting a proposal by Davis to hold five-Power discussions before the second reading of the convention was that such discussions would 113 postpone \"the embarrassments\" of a seoond reading. B r i t i s h pol icy on the d e f i n i t i o n of aggression, a i r armaments and the \"no-force\" pact had slowed down the work of the Conference considerably, and the Government's plans for increases i n the number of tanks and effectives were sure to retard progress even further when (or i f ) they were 147 r e v e a l e d . Another q u e s t i o n on which B r i t a i n r e t a r d e d progress was that of the s u p e r v i s i o n of the convention. Prance had l o n g maintained tha t s t r i c t s u p e r v i s i o n was a sine qua non of a convention, and on June 1, supported by America, she proposed amendments t o the MacDonald p l a n making s u p e r v i s i o n \"continuous and automatic\". But Londonderry 114 reserved B r i t a i n ' s o p i n i o n on them. B r i t a i n had always opposed automatic and continuous s u p e r v i s i o n i n the past - f o r no adequate reason - and Simon saw no merit i n changing B r i t i s h p o l i c y on t h i s . . . 115 p o i n t . The Government's f e a r t h a t a u n i v e r s a l \"no-force\" pact would make i t i l l e g a l t o c a r r y out c e r t a i n measures of \" i m p e r i a l defence\" was incomprehensible. Other i m p e r i a l s t a t e s - no t a b l y Prance and America -were w i l l i n g t o accept such a pact, b e l i e v i n g t h a t the formulas, proposed 116 o f f e r e d no r e a l hindrances t o i m p e r i a l a c t i o n i n cases of n e c e s s i t y . In any case, i t was u n l i k e l y t h a t an i n t e r n a t i o n a l body would d e f i n e B r i t a i n as an aggressor f o r undertaking operations such as the despatch of t r o o p s t o Shanghai i n 1927» even though operations of t h i s type were incompatible with both the l e t t e r and the s p i r i t of a \"no-force\" p a c t . The Government's anxiety t o ensure the l e g a l i t y of i t s i n t e r n a t i o n a l a c t i o n s was h y p o c r i t i c a l , f o r i n December 1932 i t had been announced that B r i t a i n would not f u l f i l her war debt o b l i g a t i o n s t o the United States. B r i t i s h M i n i s t e r s were a l s o h y p o c r i t i c a l i n expecting Prance and America t o make concessions r e g a r d i n g German e q u a l i t y and European s e c u r i t y r e s p e c t i v e l y while they themselves r e f u s e d t o make s i m i l a r concessions i n the general i n t e r e s t . 148 Progress towards a convention was negl igible during the last week of May, and on June 1 the General Commission decided to adjourn as soon as the f i r s t reading of the B r i t i s h draft convention had ended. Henderson was invi ted to undertake \"any necessary private negotiations\" to overcome the main d i f f i c u l t i e s facing the Conference before the second reading of the convention and the delegates decided to reconvene on July 3 at the l a t e s t . Once they had sett led future procedure, they continued the f i r s t reading of the convention, the discussions revealing a considerable amount of agreement on the a b o l i t i o n of chemical warfare and the p u b l i c i t y of national defence expenditure but disagreement on the regulation of the trade i n and manufacture of arms and the p o s s i b i l i t y of introducing a global l i m i t a t i o n of defence expenditure. On June 7t ^ e MacDonald plan was accepted as the basis 117 of a convention, and on June 8 the Conference adjourned. 1 In the four months since the General Commission had reconvened i n February, l i t t l e p r a c t i c a l progress had been made. A disarmament convention on the basis of the French plan of November 14 1932 was a p o s s i b i l i t y u n t i l B r i t a i n f a i l e d to support i t on the grounds that the Government could not assume further Continental commitments. Although Ralph Wigram suggested that B r i t a i n wanted to collaborate \" int imately and ac t ive ly\" with France on the basis of the French plan, the pol icy of entering into no new commitments negated the suggestion i n the eyes of the French. Professions of goodwill and a desire to mobilize world opinion against an aggressor were of l i t t l e use to the French, who needed to control the might of Germany by gaining new a l l i e s , strengthening the \"organization of peace\" or 149 maintaining superior m i l i t a r y forces. Although B r i t a i n had already guaranteed the Franco-German f ront ie r by the Locarno Treaty and had adhered to the Covenant of the League, the French were suspicious of B r i t i s h pol icy and were worried about t h e i r security because the Locarno guarantees were not automatic and the B r i t i s h Government would not reaff irm A r t i c l e 16 of the Covenant. To keep Germany i n check, therefore, the Frenoh Government thought i t necessary to maintain m i l i t a r y superiori ty u n t i l B r i t a i n gave increased assuranoes of support or agreed to a strengthening of the organization of peace. I f B r i t a i n had been w i l l i n g to reaff irm A r t i c l e 16 and enter into a general consultative pact, France would have been more w i l l i n g to reduce her armaments and a disarmament convention based on the French plan might we l l have been negotiated. B r i t a i n ' s refusal to give addit ional guarantees - or reaff irm those she had already given - was incomprehensible, i f not i l l o g i c a l , as the Government d i s l i k e d the new German regime and wanted to move closer to France to maintain the \"Rhine f r o n t i e r \" . Moreover, the extra guarantees suggested by France were acceptable to Germany since they were applicable i n the event of a French attack upon Germany as well as a German attack on France. One faotor i n the Government's decision was that B r i t a i n might f i n d herself involved i n East European troubles or ig inat ing i n the \"unsatisfactory\" t e r r i t o r i a l arrangements of the V e r s a i l l e s Treaty, but i n the event of an East European c r i s i s , B r i t a i n was certain to be involved i n negotiations for a settlement — and a close accord with France would have enabled the Government to press Franoe and her a l l i e s into a more conci l ia tory p o l i c y . Moreover, i f a peaceful solution to 150 the German problem was to be found, i t was necessary for B r i t a i n to part ic ipate more d i r e c t l y i n the European security system. A B r i t i s h alignment with Prance could force the Reich into accepting a disarmament agreement imposing l i m i t s on German power - as the question of the standardization of Continental armies demonstrated - but i f Prance and B r i t a i n could not agree on the conditions to be imposed on Germany, the Germans would merely increase t h e i r demands and attempt to play off the two Western Powers against each other. But the B r i t i s h Government was reluctant to accept that additional and more effect ive seourity guarantees were necessary for a solution of the disarmament problem*. The consultative pact proposed i n the B r i t i s h draft convention of March 16 was less eff icacious than the one proposed i n the French plan, and even after Roosevelt had discarded the t r a d i t i o n a l American pol icy regarding the neutra l i ty of the seas and declared himself i n favour of consultations i f the Kellogg Pact was breached, the Prime Minister refused to reaff irm A r t i c l e 16 of the Covenant or consider automatic and continuous supervision of a disarmament convention. The best, i f not only, method of f a c i l i t a t i n g disarmament was for B r i t a i n to mediate between France and Germany. But the Governments main aim was to avoid respons ib i l i ty for a breakdown of the Conference. MacDonald and Simon were reluctant to place a draft convention before the General Commission, and even when they did decide to take t h i s step, they had l i t t l e idea as to what to do next. They might have t r i e d to i n i t i a t e immediate negotiations on the basis of the draft 118 convention - as Temperley and Eden suggested - but during the 151 Easter adjournment of the Conference they held few conversations with other Powers, except i n connection with Mussol ini ' s proposal for a Pour-Power Pact. After the Easter adjournment, the Government did fol low a more posit ive pol icy for a time and forced Germany into accepting the standardization of Continental armies. But despite t h i s success, the B r i t i s h Ministers f a i l e d to draw the inference that a s imi lar pol icy could achieve s imi lar results on other problems. Instead, they rested on t h e i r l a u r e l s , ooncealed t h e i r rearmament plans and refused to make concessions on the questions of bombing, the \"no-force\" pact, the supervision of the convention and the d e f i n i t i o n of aggression. To a large extent, therefore, the B r i t i s h were responsible for the slow progress of the Conference during the, four months since February, and progress would continue to be slow u n t i l the Government changed i t s p o l i c y . 152 CHAPTER V DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS AND THE SECOND GERMAN WITHDRAWAL PROM THE DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE June 8 - October 14 1933 At the end of May, to f a c i l i t a t e the rapid conclusion of a convention, Norman Davis had suggested five-Power conversations s imi lar to those of December 1932. But Paul-Boncour had objected, ostensibly because such conversations would usurp the pos i t ion of the General Commission, i n r e a l i t y because France would be subjected to considerable pressure to disarm. 1 Nevertheless, the French Foreign Minister did agree to conversations with B r i t a i n and America, and on June 8 Londonderry, Eden and Davis had extensive discussions with Paul-Boncour, Daladier and Massigl i at the Quai d'Orsay, c l a r i f y i n g the problems facing the 2 Conference. Daladier agreed to \"consider\" the destruction of a st ipulated amount of materiel i n three years time on condition that the system of supervision and the transformation of the Reiehswehr had both been implemented s a t i s f a c t o r i l y , while Londonderry and Eden acceded to the French demand 'that materiel should not be destroyed u n t i l the eff icacy of the system of supervision had been proved and agreed to ask the Cabinet to reconsider i t s att itude towards continuous and automatic supervision. But Franoo-German differences remained unsett led, and i t was unl ike ly that they could be resolved unless B r i t a i n took the lead i n producing a settlement at Geneva. Real iz ing t h i s , Eden urged his superiors to reconsider the i r p o l i c y , especial ly regarding supervision of the convention and the abo l i t ion of bombing, and he suggested that they i n i t i a t e private discussions between the Powers during the World 153 Economic Conference i n London. But MacDonald and Simon were more, concerned with the Economic Conference than disarmament and were unwi l l ing to adopt Eden's suggestions. MacDonald was so unconcerned about the disarmament s i tuat ion that he refused to let Henderson use 4 a room i n the bui ld ing where the Economic Conference was being held . The refusal placed Henderson i n the invidious posi t ion of having to roam around the lobbies of the Eoonomic Conference i n h is attempts to i n i t i a t e discussions with the leaders of the major Powers. Consequently, he accomplished l i t t l e of importance and the Disarmament Conference was again faced with the problem of procedure. The B r i t i s h Government considered three main courses of action -immediate negotiations between the Powers ( i n ef fect , B r i t i s h mediation between Prance and Germany), an adjournment of the Conference u n t i l the Autumn, and the reconvening of the General Commission to deal with secondary problems coupled with private negotiations on the 5 6 major problems. Eden favoured the f i r s t oourse, Henderson the t h i r d , and either of these two courses offered a reasonable chance of a disarmament settlement. But Simon's mistrust of Germany led him to seek an adjournment of the Conference u n t i l October and he refused to modify the draft convention u n t i l the \"acute differences\" between France and Germany had been removed} he also believed that Henderson should i n i t i a t e the conversations whioh had not taken place during the 7 Eoonomic Conference. The French Government feared that a delay i n reconvening the General Commission might lead Germany to proclaim her freedom af action and undertake a programme of rearmament. Consequently, Paul-Boncour 154 advocated private negotiations between his Government, the B r i t i s h , Henderson, P o l i t i s and Benes, and the new French Ambassador i n London, 8 Charles Corbin, made a demarohe to t h i s effect on June 23. But, after some discussion, the French came round to the B r i t i s h point of view regarding procedure, and on June 29 the General Commission adjourned u n t i l October 16, when the second reading of the MacDonald plan was to begin. In the meantime, Henderson was charged with continuing his ef forts to reconcile the d i f f e r i n g points of view. The only opposition came from Hungary and Germany, Nadolny suggesting that the Conference was evading decisions on the problems before i t and that the best method of procedure was for the Bureau to prepare the way for the second reading of the convention and for the various delegations at Geneva to enter into private negotiations whenever a d i f f i c u l t point 9 arose. Nadolny 1s c r i t i c i s m of the decision to adjourn u n t i l October was j u s t i f i e d , for the Conference had been i n progress for seventeen months yet had produced few r e s u l t s . The Powers had avoided taking decisions of rea l importance - to a great extent because of the ambiguous and negative attitude of the B r i t i s h Government - and the adjournment merely delayed matters. The most r e a l i s t i c method of resolving the disarmament problem was B r i t i s h mediation between Franoe and Germany and the holding of immediate negotiations between the Great Powers, while the alternative p o l i c i e s suggested by Henderson and Nadolny might also have f a c i l i t a t e d a settlement. But MacDonald and Simon, s t i l l be l ieving that France and Germany should \"put the i r demands i n such a way that B r i t a i n could say that 155 she supported both s ides\" , continued to fol low the i r old pol icy of \"wait and see\" which had f a i l e d to produce resul ts i n the past and offered l i t t l e prospect for the future. I t was certain that Germany would rearm i f an agreement was not concluded at Geneva, and i t was better that any rearmament was controlled and supervised by means of an internat ional convention - and for a convention to be negotiated, i t was imperative that B r i t a i n give new assurances of support to Prance to compensate her for the increase i n German power resul t ing from the concession of equality of r i g h t s . But although they real ized that f a i l u r e to conclude a disarmament agreement would lead to German rearmamentj the B r i t i s h Ministers f a i l e d to understand that addit ional assurances to Prance were a sine qua non of any convention - the resul t of t h e i r basing t h e i r po l i cy on the existence of an internat ional \"harmony of in teres ts \" . Although private negotiations between the Powers had been \"vetoed\" by the General Commission on June 1, there was nothing to prevent such negotiations taking place through diplomatic channels. But Simon ins is ted that Henderson should be allowed to undertake h is \"disarmament tour\" - though he must have known that there was l i t t l e chance of the tour being a success; Henderson was under the disadvantage of not representing a government, and despite his extraordinary s k i l l s as a mediator, s k i l l s whioh had enabled the Conference to overcome several c r i ses , the leaders of the Powers did not confide i n him as freely as 10 they did with government representatives. Moreover, the B r i t i s h Government i t s e l f had f a i l e d to establish a rapport with the President 156 of the Conference, mainly because MacDonald had had disagreements with him during the second Labour Government and because the Conservative and Labour parties were so irrevocably opposed to each other on B r i t i s h internal p o l i c y . 1 1 Indeed, considering the host i le att i tude of the Prime Minister and most of h is colleagues towards the former Foreign Secretary (an att i tude that was not reciprocated) i t i s even plausible to suggest that the Government was motivated, p a r t i a l l y at least , by the hope that Henderson might be blamed for a f a i l u r e at Geneva. In preparation for h is v i s i t s to the various European capi ta l s , Henderson had formulated a l i s t of the p r i n c i p a l questions B t i l l d i v i d i n g the Conference. These were the \"no-force\" pact, the d e f i n i t i o n of aggression, supervision and contro l , sanctions against v io la tors of the convention, a i r bombardment, mi l i t a ry and naval avia t ion , the abol i t ion and destruction of aggressive land materiel , the size of tanks and a r t i l l e r y , the period of t r a i n i n g for short-term ef fect ives , colonial forces, budgetary l i m i t a t i o n and the manufacture of and 12 trade i n arms. But though at f i r s t sight the l i s t appeared rather formidable, i f B r i t a i n put her mind to securing solutions, agreement on most - i f not a l l - of these points was s t i l l possible. On July 10, Henderson departed from London i n pursuance of his disarmament mission, and i n the next fortnight he v i s i t e d P a r i s , Rome, B e r l i n , Prague, Munich and Paris again before returning to England. L i t t l e of importance emerged from his discussions. In P a r i s , he was handed an aide-memoire. but i t was l i t t l e more than a recapitulat ion of the pol icy outlined to Londonderry and Eden on June 8 together with some of the amendments to the B r i t i s h draft convention that France 157 had put forward i n the General Commission.1\"^ During the f i r s t four years of the convention, the \"periode d'Spreuve\", the manufacture of arms would he l imited by means of f ixed quotas and there would be yearly inspections of the armaments of each contracting state. National defence expenditure would be publ ic ized , i n preparation for f u l l budgetary l i m i t a t i o n i n the second four-year period, and the most powerful materiel would be stocked on national t e r r i t o r y under the control of the League. During the second four-year periofil, t h i s materiel would be handed over to the League, which would decide either to destroy i t i n part or i n f u l l or keep i t for use against aggressors. The French were refusing to commit themselves either to the destruction of materiel or to a d e f i n i t i o n of the materiel that might be destroyed. In Rome, Henderson found that MussEolini was adopting a non-committal att itude towards disarmament questions u n t i l the results of the President 's mission could be evaluated, though Henri de Jouvenel, the French Ambassador, noted that the Duce's opposition to the proposed periode d'epreuve was less strong than expected. 1^ In B e r l i n , Henderson was handed a memorandum summarizing German disarmament p o l i c y , and though i t di f fered l i t t l e from a memorandum given to Londonderry on 15 June 2, i t did suggest that progress was possible on some points . Germany would agree to a universal \"no-force\" pact and accept the d e f i n i t i o n of aggression drafted by the Committee on Security Questions. More important, the Reich agreed to periodic and automatic supervision and also to a system of national licences for arms factories and state supervision of them provided these arrangements were accepted generally. On other points , German pol icy remained the 158 same - the standardization of Continental armies and the progressive destruction of aggressive materiel within f i v e years, p u b l i c i t y (but not l imi ta t ion) of m i l i t a r y expenditure, the complete a b o l i t i o n of bombing and m i l i t a r y and naval av ia t ion , \"samples\" of defensive weapons permitted to other states, and the inc lusion of trained reserves and overseas troops stationed i n or near the Hetropole i n the ca lculat ion of e f fec t ives . The Germans were w i l l i n g to forgo the i r r ight to replace overage capi ta l ships with the exception of one k e e l , to be l a i d down i n replacement before December 31 1936. A meeting between Henderson and H i t l e r i n Munich on July 21 brought few r e s u l t s ; H i t l e r ins i s ted that Germany could not accept a periode d'^epreuve and the d i v i s i o n of the convention into two four-year 16 IT periods. Then, aftei* further t a l k s with Benes and Paul-Boncour, Henderson returned to London. The main result of the President*s mission was a c l a r i f i c a t i o n of the issues facing the Conference, though some progress towards disarmament had been achieved - the Germans had aocepted continuous and automatic supervision and had not excluded control over arms fac tor ies . And i n London, the B r i t i s h had intimated that they intended to withdraw t h e i r opposition to a universal \"no-force\" pact and to withdraw t h e i r claim 18 to police bombing i n outlying d i s t r i c t s . But the main questions facing the Conference - the German demand for a f ive-year convention and the destruction of aggressive weapons and the French demand for a p^riode d'epreuve and an eight-year convention - remained unresolved, though Massigl i intimated to Ol iver Harvey, F i r s t Secretary to the 159 B r i t i s h Embassy i n P a r i s , that France \"had not made her f i n a l 19 concessions\"• y Another result of Henderson's mission was that Franoe began to i n s i s t that private negotiations take place between B r i t a i n , France and America before the reconvening of the Conference after the summer vacation; B r i t a i n agreed, and conversations were 20 scheduled for September 18. The French Government's proposal for ta lks with B r i t a i n ref lected a desire for an Anglo-French rapprochement i n the face of renewed German stridency i n both internal and external p o l i c y . On March 23, the Reichstag had passed an Enabling Act conferring v i r t u a l l y d i c t a t o r i a l powers\" on the government for four years, and i n the next four months a l l opposition to the H i t l e r regime was crushed. The trade unions, p o l i t i c a l parties and the i r subsidiary organizations ( including the Nat ional is ts and Centre) were dissolved and the i r property expropriated, and central government was imposed over the whole of Germany. Opponents of the regime, Marxists , S o c i a l i s t s , Jews, l i b e r a l s and p a c i f i s t s were either j a i l e d or put i n concentration camps. The \"Nazi revolut ion\" had been so complete and swift that on July 11, Dr. F r i c k , the Minister of the In ter ior , declared i t s end. Even more alarming to the Frenoh were German pressure on Austr ia and renewed reports of/ German rearmament. Austro-German relat ions had deteriorated almost continuously since H i t l e r had come to power, and by July they were on the point of breaking down completely. The Nazis attempted to undermine Austrian independence by economic pressure, encouraging the terrorism of the Austrian Nazis , dropping seditious 160 l ea f l e t s from German planes over Austrian t e r r i t o r y and by persistent subversive broadcasting, i n c i t i n g Austrians to res is t the Dollfuss government. The s i tuat ion became so strained that on July 24, the Austrian Minister i n London asked B r i t a i n to jo in with Prance and I t a l y to make representations i n B e r l i n demanding an end to the campaign against A u s t r i a . At the beginning of August, after demarches by the three Western Powers, the c r i s i s was sett led temporarily, H i t l e r agreeing to halt radio propaganda, a i r f l i g h t s and subversive 21 - though not economic - pressure against A u s t r i a . But European relat ions had been exacerbated, and consequently the chances of a disarmament settlement were not improved. Another simultaneous development adversely affected the disarmament problem - German rearmament, especial ly i n the a i r . On June 24, the Prussian Minister of the Inter ior issued a press communique stat ing that unident i f ied foreign a i rc ra f t had flown over B e r l i n and dropped l ea f l e t s i n s u l t i n g the German Government, and la ter i n the same day the German A i r Minis t ry demanded \"pol ice a i r c r a f t \" to prevent a recurrence of such attacks and put forward a claim for equality i n 22 a i r armaments. Three days l a t e r , Rumbold reported to Simon that the Germans had already started bui ld ing m i l i t a r y a i r c ra f t i n contravention of the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s and that certain German o f f i c i a l s had admitted t h i s to Group-Captain Herring, the B r i t i s h a i r 23 attache. On July 14, the Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Of f i ce , S i r Robert Vans i t tar t , composed a memorandum on the extent of German rearmament, suggesting that B r i t a i n , France and I t a l y 161 should make representations i n B e r l i n , and on July 29 a B r i t i s h demarche was made, asking for assurances about German a i r armaments.^4 Meanwhile, on July 15, GtSring had asked B r i t a i n to supply \"twenty-five 25 or f i f t y pol ice a i r c r a f t s imi lar to those sold to A u s t r i a \" . Actual ly , no such sale had taken place, and B r i t a i n refused to supply any a i rcra f t or parts of a i r c r a f t unless Germany would guarantee that they would not be used i n contravention of the Par is A i r Agreement of 26 1926. The Wilhelmstrasse claimed that Group-Captain Herring had not been t o l d about plans for rearmament and that GBring had not requested police a i r c ra f t - but these claims were not convincing. The effect of mi l i tant German p o l i c i e s i n June, July and August was to draw B r i t a i n , Prance and I t a l y much closer together than they had been for some time. B r i t a i n and Prance had oo-operated i n presenting a demarche against German subversion i n Austr ia and B r i t a i n had kept Prance and I t a l y informed when making representations about German rearmament. The two l a t t e r Powers had agreed to refuse any German requests for a i rc ra f t contravening the Paris Agreement of 1926, and Prance had renewed her feelers for a Franco-Ital ian entente. Despite differences concerning the organization of \"Danubia\", re lat ions 27 between the two L a t i n Powers improved considerably. The B r i t i s h reaction to German militancy was s i g n i f i c a n t . Since the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s , the Government had urged the appeasing of German grievances, and as recently as A p r i l 10 1933 B r i t i s h Ministers had put pressure on France to r e f r a i n from making representations 28 about alleged infract ions of the Peace Treaties , but now, the same 162 B r i t i s h Ministers had gone ahead and made t h e i r own representations concerning German rearmament. B r i t i s h pol icy regarding both the German and disarmament problems was thus becoming markedly intransigent. Even more s igni f icant was the fact that French pol icy i n Europe had become more susoeptible to B r i t i s h leadership. France was becoming progressively weaker i n effect ives - she had agreed to par i ty with Germany - and maintained m i l i t a r y superiori ty over her former enemy by means of more powerful materie l . Consequently, she would consent to reduce t h i s superiori ty only i f she was convinced that B r i t a i n would support her i n putt ing forward a f irm offer of disarmament to Germany and face the consequences of a possible German r e f u s a l . I f B r i t a i n did not a l ign herself with France, i t was u n l i k e l y that any French government could res i s t the pressure of public opinion for a preliminary inspection of Germany's ex is t ing armaments. And a demand for such an inspection was sure to meet with a German refusal and probably cause the breakdown of the Disarmament Conference, forc ing France to re ly 29 on her own resources to maintain her security. But although B r i t a i n was sure to play the decisive role at Geneva, I t a l y was the f i r s t country to put forward a solution to the disarmament problem. On September 5, Mussolini presented a ten-point proposal to the new French Ambassador i n Rome, the Comte de Chambrun.^0 Based on the MacDonald plan and the French amendments, i t proposed the destruction within two years of stockpiled chemioal and bacter io logica l weapons and the factor ies where these weapons were made and envisaged the immediate abol i t ion of chemical and bacter io logica l warfare and a i r bombardment against c i v i l i a n populations. There would be a periode d'epreuve of 163 not less than four years, during which states would not increase the i r land or a i r armaments or excedd the i r present m i l i t a r y budgets, and after t h i s period had elapsed, the highly-armed states would agree to reduce t h e i r offensive weapons. Armies would be standardized on the basis of the B r i t i s h draft convention, and disarmed Powers would be allowed to have quotas of \"purely defensive\" weapons by stages. A Permanent Disarmament Commission would be established and control would be per iodic , permanent and automatic.^ 1 Naval problems would be resolved when the Washington Treaty expired and the Disarmament Conference would reconvene on January 1 1938 to f i x the provisions for the second period of the convention. These suggestions offered a r e a l i s t i c compromise between the French and German points of view. France would be accorded her periode d'Hpreuve and continous, automatic supervision of the convention, while Germany was assured of a reduction i n the armaments of the highly-armed states af ter four years and would be allowed to obtain quotas of hitherto-forbidden weapons. P o l i t i c a l l y , i t was d i f f i c u l t for France to concede \"samples\", but as Mussolini pointed out, i t was certain that Germany was rearming and i t was possible that she 32 already possessed \"forbidden\" weapons. Control over German armaments was advantageous to B r i t a i n , France and I t a l y , the concession of \"samples\" would ingrat iate the three Western Powers with l i b e r a l opinion, and even i f Germany v io la ted her obligations during the periode d'epreuve, or l a t e r , the wartime a l l i e s would s t i l l maintain a considerable superiori ty of materiel over the Reich. 164 Mussol in i ' s proposals ref lected a considerable change i n his disarmament p o l i c y . Previously, he had favoured the German point of view, but the manifestations of German nationalism during the summer of 1933 had modified his outlook considerably, especial ly regarding automatio contro l , budgetary l i m i t a t i o n and the provisions for overseas forces. Daladier and Paul-Boncour were pleased with the I t a l i a n volte-face and responded favourably to Mussol in i ' s suggestions.^ In an aide-memoire transmitted to the Duce on September 1 5 , ^ they declared themselves to be i n agreement on the majority of points , the s igni f icant exception being that of \"samples\". While Daladier was w i l l i n g to let Germany increase;jher numbers of l ight arms proportionate to the doubling of her ef fect ives , he thought i t impossible to allow her any heavy weapons because an unlimited number of men could be trained to use them. On the other hand, the French Premier went further than Mussolini i n suggesting that bombers as wel l as bombing could be abolished i f effect ive international control were exercised over c i v i l av ia t ion . I t a l y ' s rapprochement with France s impl i f ied the problems facing the B r i t i s h Government, for i t seemed that that the three Western Powers would be able to jo in i n exerting pressure on Germany. Daladier and Paul-Boncour informed Eden of the rapprochement during conversations at the Quai d'Orsay on September 18 and suggested that i t might f a c i l i t a t e an Anglo-French accord. Eden was impressed, and though the Paris disoussions were of a preliminary nature, they proved very sat is factory . Ho def in i te decisions were made, but 165 Daladier oonsented to specify the reduction i n armaments that Prance would make during the second period of the convention provided the system of control had worked s a t i s f a c t o r i l y during the f i r s t period. The French Premier agreed to surrender a l l materiel exceeding 155™n and transfer i t to the League during the second period for possible destruction; he also abandoned the idea of a preliminary invest igat ion of German armaments. But there were s t i l l divergences of view between B r i t a i n and Prance on the s ize of tanks to be permitted, the number 35 of a i r c r a f t to be retained and the question of sanotions» On September 20, a Cabinet meeting took place to redefine B r i t i s h pol icy i n the l ight of the new^oircumstances. The Government accepted i n pr inc ip le the d i v i s i o n of the convention into two four-year periods, i n the f i r s t of which the Reichswehr would be transformed and the effect ives of Continental armies standardized, and, more important, i t was agreed that i f the only barr ier to a convention was the method of supervision, then B r i t a i n would consider the proposal for automatic and continuous supervision \" s y m p a t h e t i c a l l y \" . ^ But the Cabinet maintained i t s opposition to the automatic applicat ion 37 of sanctions against v io la tors of the convention. On September 22, Simon, Baldwin and Eden met Daladier, Paul-Boncour and Hass ig l i at the B r i t i s h Embassy i n Paris and declared t h e i r 38 adherence i n pr inc ip le to the Franco-Ital ian disarmament plan . In the fol lowing week, further discussions took place between B r i t a i n , France, I t a l y and the United States to formulate an \"of fer of disarmament\" that Germany could be induced to accept, and by September 39 29 \"the most important deta i l s of the offer had been out l ined. 166 B r i t a i n accepted permanent and automatic supervision and agreed to a four-year periode d'epreuve during which there would he no increases i n arms and European armies standardized, while Prance agreed to specify the amount of disarmament she would carry out during the ensuing four-year period i f the system of supervision proved sat isfactory i n operation. During the second period, Prance would reduce her materiel to either 155 or 105mra and Germany would be allowed materiel of the same cal ibre as the French. The tonnage of tanks to be permitted s t i l l presented problems, though France appeared more w i l l i n g to reduce her heavy tanks, and an agreement seemed possible on a i r forces based on Eden's suggestion that each Great Power should re ta in 800 u n i t s , Prance, B r i t a i n and other colonia l Powers being granted an addit ional number. During the ptiriode d'epreuve. Germany would be allowed an increase i n the arms permitted by the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s , but she would not be allowed prototypes of heavier mat'eriel retained by the other Powers; u n t i l the second period. Naval problems would be shelved u n t i l the Naval Conference of 1935* A new s i tuat ion was thus created. B r i t a i n , France, I t a l y and the United States had agreed to amend the MaoDonald plan considerably, making i t far less favourable to Germany. The duration of the convention was extended from f i v e years to eight and the disarmament of the highly-armed Powers and the concession of ^samples\" were delayed for four years. Although Germany was to gain equality i n effect ives within four years, she would not gain equality i n materiel for at least eight years. Moreover, there was always the p o s s i b i l i t y that at the end of the periode d'epreuve. when the Reichswehr had been 167 abolished and Germany had been saddled with an army of raw r e c r u i t s , the French might say the system of supervision had proved unsatisfactory, freeing them from t h e i r obligations to disarm. Thus the main question i n international p o l i t i c s at the end of September was whether four-P-ower pressure would be suf f ic ient to induce Germany to accept a convention considerably less favourable than the MacDonald p lan . In May, s imi lar pressure had gained agreement on the standardization of Continental armies. At f i r s t , the prospects of German agreement seemed br ight , for on September 23 Neurath t o l d Simon that he accepted the pr inc ip le of a two-period convention provided the provisions for disarmament during the second period were s p e c i f i e d . 4 0 By September 29, when Neurath returned to B e r l i n for ta lks with H i t l e r , the main divergence between Germany and the other Powers seemed to be the German demand for \"samples\" during the periode d 'Spreuve. 4 1 and the I t a l i a n s , who had closer l i n k s with the Germans than the other Western Powers, believed i t would be necessary to concede only a few l i g h t tanks and f ighter a i r c ra f t for Germany to acoept a convent ion. 4 2 Another obstacle to an agreement, Germany's demand for a shorter periode d'e\"preuve. was l i k e l y to be overcome by 43 d i v i d i n g the convention into three and f i v e year periods. Neurath's ta lks i n B e r l i n were c r u c i a l , for Simon's repeated requests for a d e f i n i t i o n of \"samples\" and a clearer statement of German po l i cy could not remain unanswered i f Germany was to avoid appearing responsible for a breakdown of the Conference. Actual ly , i n face of the united pressure of B r i t a i n , France, I t a l y and America, the German leaders were divided. Neurath ins i s ted on Germany being 168 permitted \"samples\" during the periode d'epreuve i n the^knowledge that t h i s might break up the Conference, while H i t l e r was more conc i l ia tory , maintaining that a disarmament convention would be desirable even i f i t d id not f u l f i l Germany's wishes completely and that , with regard to equality i n materiel , i t would be wrong to demand more than Germany 44 could procure by her own l imi ted resources i n the coming years. The outcome of the debate i n B e r l i n was apparently decided by a despatch concerning B r i t i s h pol i cy from Prince Bismarck, the Charge d 'Af fa i res i n London, on October 4 * A close confidant of Simon had informed the Prince that on the previous day, the Foreign Secretary had revised the MacDonald plan along the l ines of the Geneva conversations of the previous week and that B r i t a i n would reject the demand for \"samples\" during the periode d'epreuve and withdraw from the Disarmament Conference i f the \"new draft convention\" was not 45 accepted. J H i t l e r , Bfllow and Blomberg held a conference la ter on October 4 and decided to demand a \"return\" to the MacDonald plan and threaten to withdraw from the League and the Conference i f the \"new draf t \" was brought up for debate .^ H i t l e r reserved for himself: the decision as to whether the threat should be carried o u t . ^ On October 6, Bismarck informed Simon that Germany based her pol icy on the declaration of December 11 1932 and that although the Reich could accept a convention l a s t i n g for f i v e years, \"equali ty would have to be applied i n the f i r s t two years\" and a \"period of probation\" was in to lerab le . Germany demanded \"samples\" of hitherto-forbidden weapons that were not to be abolished generally and complete freedom to increase the number of arms already permitted. U n t i l she was informed 169 of the measures of disarmament to he undertaken by the other Powers, Germany \"would not be able to be more spec i f ic about the equipment her new army would need\" . 4 ^ On the surface, the German demands appeared to be dangerously near an ultimatum — though Billow's instruct ions to Bismarck stated s p e c i f i c a l l y that an ultimatum was to be avoided and that aegotiations 49 for a convention should continue. The main aim of the German demands was to l i f t the prohibi t ion on weapons allowed to the other Powers; Germany already possessed a few of these weapons i n secret and permanent and automatic supervision of the convention might have revealed t h e i r existence. I f Germany was granted r e l a t i v e l y minor concessions as regards \"samples\", a disarmament convention was possible but i f these concessions were not granted, Germany would withdraw from the Disarmament Conference. Simon f a i l e d to perceive the true aim of the German demands. Although Bismarck t o l d him that they were \"a preliminary statement of Germany's at t i tude\" pending further negotiations, he believed that 51 they were put forward as an ultimatum. Consequently, i n the week preceding October 14, when the Disarmament Conference was due to reconvene, the Foreign Secretary refused to make concessions regarding the periode d'epreuve or \"samples\", hoping that Germany would 52 eventually agree to the proposals he had drafted on October 3« In refusing concessions, Simon assured the breakdown of the Conference since for Germany the early possession of at least some hitherto-forbidden weapons was a sine qua non of any convention. Mussolini real ized t h i s and on October 12 he suggested a compromise 17© \"between the B r i t i s h and German proposals. During the f i r s t year of the convention, chemical warfare and the bombardment of c i v i l i a n populations would be prohibited, a system of permanent and automatic supervision established and Germany allowed double the number of the weapons permitted by the V e r s a i l l e s Treaty. In the second year, the Reich would be able to acquire a number of a n t i - a i r c r a f t batter ies , and i n the t h i r d a \"minimum number of technical weapons, reconnaissance planes and small tanks\". Also i n the t h i r d year, a conference would be cal led to consider the effectiveness of the system of supervision, and i n the fol lowing two years Germany would be permitted a number of \"models\" of weapons retained under the convention by the other Powers:. In the s ix th and seventh years, the Reich would be allowed to double the number of these \"models\", and i n the eighth to t r i p l e them. Progressively, during years four to eight, the other Powers would destroy any weapons not permitted by the convention, beginning with 53 the bigger guns, tanks and planes. Mussol in i ' s appraisal of the internat ional s i tuat ion was perceptive. I f Germany was not accorded a certain sat i s fac t ion of her demands and the Conference broke down, the only means of contro l l ing her would be to apply sanctions and reoccupy the Rhineland, maybe even embark on a preventive war. But both B r i t a i n and Prance had rejected t h i s course 54 of ac t ion . Thus the l o g i c a l al ternative was to sat is fy a minimum of German demands and assure that her rearmament took place under s t r i c t internat ional control . I f Simon had consented to negotiate on the basis of Mussol in i ' s proposal, i t would have been possible to conclude a convention. On 171 October 13, H i t l e r t o l d , a Conference of Ministers that he accepted 5 5 the I t a l i a n p l a n , \" and there were signs that the French might also agree. On October 6, M a s s i g l i , not the most conci l ia tory of French diplomats, said that he would oonsider a suggestion by Davis that Germany be permitted a number of observation a i rcra f t during the 5 6 periode d'epreuve. and on October 1 4 , Chambrun t o l d Graham he was hopeful that negotiations on the basis of Mussol in i ' s proposals would 5 7 be s u c c e s s f u l . \" The French, apparently, were impressed by the argument that to concede Germany's demands for defensive armaments i n stages under s t r i c t regulation and control was less dangerous than to concede nothing f o r four years and \"everything\" i n the ensuing four . For the United] States, Norman Davis had suggested! the concession of a n t i - a i r c r a f t guns and observation a i r c r a f t , and on October 14 S i r E r i c Phipps, who had succeeded Rumbold as Ambassador i n B e r l i n , reported that the 5 8 Americans would give way to Germany's demands. O f f i c i a l l y , Davis gave Simon his f u l l support i n re jec t ing German rearmament, but i n private he was concerned at the Foreign Secretary's intransigence and 5 9 hoped he would reduoe h is demands.\" On the morning of October 1 4 , i n what appears to have been a f i n a l attempt to secure concessions at Geneva, German newspapers published reports from the Swiss capi ta l suggesting that the B r i t i s h delegation to the Conference was more intransigent than the French and that respons ib i l i ty for the future of the Conference rested on B r i t a i n . * * 0 But Simon, possibly influenced by the confidence of the American delegation that Germany would aocept the B r i t i s h programme of October 3,^ decided to refuse any concessions. In h i s speech to the Bureau 172 on October 14, be rejected any immediate rearmament by disarmed Powers, except for \"proport ional\" increases i n weapons permitted by the Peace Treaties i n conjunction with the transformation of Continental armies. Davis, A l o i s i and Paul-Boncour backed the Foreign Secretary, thus maintaining a united f ront , but Baron von Rheinbaben, deputizing for Nadolny, merely declared that he would report Simon's remarks to B e r l i n and that Germany demanded the substantial disarmament of the heavily-armed Powers and the immediate implementation 62 of the pr inc ip le of equal i ty . On the same afternoon, Henderson received a telegram from Neurath s tat ing that Germany was withdrawing from the Conference because the Conference had f a i l e d to f u l f i l i t s \"sole object, namely, general disarmament\". The unwillingness of the highly-armed states to carry out t h e i r \"contractual obl igat ion to disarm\" made i t \"impossible\" for Germany to obtain sat i s fac t ion of her \"reoognized claim\" to equality of r i g h t s . ^ In the same evening, Germany announced her intention to withdraw from the League. To a great extent, B r i t a i n was responsible for the German withdrawal. The most eff icacious method for securing a convention would have been private negotiations between the Powers and B r i t i s h mediation between France and Germany, but i n the early summer, when i t would have been possible to take advantage of the German acceptance of the standardization of Continental armies i n order to i n i t i a t e private discussions, Simon refused to do so. Instead, he advised an adjournment of the Conference u n t i l autumn and supported Henderson's \"disarmament pilgrimage\" to various European capita ls i n the knowledge that the journey had l i t t l e chance of success. The Foreign Secretary 173 refused to take the respons ib i l i ty of mediating between Prance and Germany, and except for Eden and Londonderry's ta lks i n Par is on June 8 , few disarmament disoussionB were held u n t i l September, A considerable change i n internat ional p o l i t i c s took place during June, Ju ly and August, because of German pol i cy regarding a i r armament and A u s t r i a , B r i t a i n , Prance and I t a l y aligned themselves, and together with America they were i n a pos i t ion to exert joint pressure on Germany. Yet when disarmament negotiations resumed at the beginning of September, I t a l y , not B r i t a i n , took the lead i n t r y i n g to mediate between Prance and Germany, Mussolini putting forward his ten-point proposal f o r a convention. France and I t a l y quickly negotiated the basis of an agreement, but only la ter did B r i t a i n accept i t , Simon dra f t ing a d e f i n i t i v e proposal on October 3» As regards securi ty , t h i s plan was cer ta in ly pract icable , for apart from a provision for sanctions, nearly a l l the Frenoh demands were met. Moreover, I t a l y was prepared to agree to sanctions under certain circumstances,**4 and B r i t a i n seems to have been considering the 65 invoking of A r t i c l e 11 of the Covenant i n cases of treaty v i o l a t i o n s . On the other hand, Simon's proposals regarding \"samples\" were unsatisfactory, leading to Germany's near-ultimatum of October 6. The demand for \"samples\" was the major obstacle to a convention, and i f i t had been accepted an agreement at Geneva would have been within s ight . I t a l y accepted the demand, and France and America would probably have done so a l so . But Simon rejected' i t and Germany withdrew from the Conference. The B r i t i s h Foreign Seoretary apparently f a i l e d to understand that i t was not so much reductions i n armaments that lead to securi ty , but 174 the internat ional control of armaments. He complained that B r i t i s h opinion would not agree to German rearmament, hut by October 1933 t h i s was an irrelevant question, since i t was clear that Germany would rearm to some extent. B r i t a i n and the other Powers could not have prevented German rearmament, except by adopting a po l i cy of coercion, but they could have control led i t by a convention imposing a s t r i c t system of internat ional supervision. I f such a system had been implemented and Germany v io la ted her freelynaegotiated obligations, the other states could have conferred together and agreed upon measures to counteract the v i o l a t i o n . And i f Germany continued to v io la te her obl igations, world opinion, more especial ly B r i t i s h opinion, could probably have been induced to aecept foroib le measures against the Reioh such as a reocoupation of the Rhineland by Prance. Although Germany would have res is ted such a move, i n 1933 there was l i t t l e chance of the resistance being successful . And though at a l a ter date, the resistance would have been stronger, the system of supervision would have prevented Germany from gaining any major advantages from her treaty v i o l a t i o n s , and the concerted action of her neighbours could s t i l l have been successful . 175 CHAPTER VI LAST ATTEMPTS AT A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT October 15 1933 - June 11 1934 B r i t a i n accepted the German withdrawal from the Conference with comparative oalm. In a broadcast address on October 17, Simon remarked that the object of B r i t i s h pol i cy was \"not to rouse resentful feel ings\" but to \"promote and i n v i t e co-operation between a l l nations of good w i l l \" , and as regards disarmament to \"seek an honest and honourable compact i n a great cause upon whioh the hopes of Mankind for the future peace of the world are so -largely founded\". 1 The s i tuat ion confronting the Government was de l i ca te . Although Germany had withdrawn from the Conference and the League, H i t l e r continued to express a desire for peace, a disarmament settlement 2 according Germany equality of r ights and a Franco-German detente. I f he was sincere, the p o s s i b i l i t y of coming to terms with him s t i l l existed; i f he was insincere, he had to be shown to be insincere . Germany's'departure from the Conference and the League was no proof of H i t l e r ' s i n s i n c e r i t y ; the drast ic amendments to the MacDonald plan during September had placed Germany i n a strong moral pos i t ion , with many sections of world opinion. In B r i t a i n , for example, Lloyd George maintained that European tensions arose from the refusal of France and her a l l i e s to disarm.^ MacDonald and Simon had f a i l e d i n t h e i r attempts to ensure that a breakdown of the Conference would be blamed on Germany. There were three main courses which B r i t a i n could adopt to t r y to retr ieve the s i t u a t i o n . The f i r s t was the applicat ion of sanctions against Germany i n conjunction with France and her a l l i e s . But unless sanctions were applied a outranee, they could not f a c i l i t a t e a long-term 176 solution of the German problem. Moreover, they were unacceptable to B r i t i s h opinion, for whilst d i s l i k i n g the H i t l e r regime, the B r i t i s h people i n general d id not believe that a disarmed Germany was a danger to national securi ty . I f Germany v io la ted a freely-negotiated agreement such as a disarmament convention, the s i tuat ion might be different• The second course open to B r i t a i n was to declare that disarmament was no longer a p r a c t i c a l p o s s i b i l i t y , that each Power had the right to adjust i t s armaments as i t pleased, and that B r i t a i n would rearm. But t h i s would be an admission that the Government had f a i l e d i n i t s efforts to br ing about a negotiated settlement at Geneva, and i n the circumstances of the time such an admission was inconceivable for on October 26, the Labour candidate i n a by-elect ion at East Fulham turned a minority of 14,000 votes into a majority of 5,000, campaigning on a programme of disarmament. The result was probably due to a natural swing back to Labour af ter the freak elect ion result of 1931 and a detestation of the means tes t , but the Government interpreted the Labour v ic tory as a v ic tory for disarmament and paci f ism. Baldwin, the rea l power behind the Government, described the result as a \"nightmare\"; he was a f ra id of the p a c i f i s t s , a f ra id to advocate 4 rearmament and even a f ra id to think about advocating rearmament. In conjunction with B r i t i s h rearmament, the Government might have negotiated an entente or even an a l l iance with France to deter Germany from aggression. But a po l i cy of both substantial rearmament and! a l l iance with France would tend to divide Europe into opposing groups; and might precipi tate a denunciation by Germany of the armaments 177 provisions of the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s . The result would probably be an arms race, with a l l i t s inherent uncertaint ies , and thus t h i s pol icy offered no r e a l hope of a long-term solution to the German problem. Moreover, within B r i t a i n , the pol icy of al l iances: was anathema to the p a c i f i s t s and many of the protagonists of disarmament whom Baldwin so feared. Thus, although the Government apparently desired a close relat ionship with the French - a noticeable rapprochement between the two countries had taken place during 1933 - the pol icy of entente was not pressed. The t h i r d possible course was for B r i t a i n to mediate between France and Germany, a pol icy that Simon and MacDonald had shirked for the previous two years, except f o r a few occasions - for example, during the c r i s i s over the standardization of European armies. The chances of t h i s pol icy being successful i n practice were now more remote than formerly, as Germany's withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference made i t more d i f f i c u l t for the French to make concessions. But i f B r i t a i n gave France addit ional assurances of support i t was; possible that the French Government would make enough concessions to secure an agreement with the Reich. And to fol low a polioy offer ing even a remote chance of a Franco-German settlement was better than fol lowing p o l i c i e s tending to divide Europe into opposing blocs and cause an arms race. Moreover, i f Germany negotiated i n bad f a i t h , adept diplomacy by B r i t a i n could expose German ins inoer i ty , enabling the Government to take a firmer l i n e with the Reich and gain public support for doing so. The pol i cy of B r i t i s h mediation between France and Germany, as always, offered at least some chance of securing a long-term settlement to the German problem, the al ternat ive solution to the problem being preventive action against the Reich. 178 Simon's \"broadcast address of October 17 indicated that the Government had already decided to adopt the pol icy of mediation between Prance and Germany. During an adjournment of the General Commission from October 16-26, the French began to urge that the Conference continue i t s work and conclude a convention which could be handed to Germany for signature, i n the be l i e f that a German refusal would cause the Reich to be blamed for the collapse of the disarmament negotiations.** But Simon distrusted the idea, as he believed a f a i l u r e to reach an agreement at Geneva would strengthen the elements i n Germany opposed to disarmament and \"almost j u s t i f y \" the German 7 withdrawal from the Conference. Moreover, there was l i t t l e point i n presenting Germany with a convention based on proposals she had already rejected. The Foreign Secretary therefore proposed an adjournment of the Conference on the grounds that the General Commission should not undertake important discussions \" u n t i l the dust 8 raised by the recent action of the Germans had had time to s e t t l e \" . On October 25, after discussions between the Powers as to the procedure to be adopted, a temporary compromise between B r i t i s h and French viewpoints was reached and the Bureau decided to recommend the adjournment of the General Commission on condition that i t meet again not la ter than December 4. The intervening period would be u t i l i z e d for private negotiations between the Powers and the preparation of an up-to-date text of the B r i t i s h draft convention. The adjournment of the General Commission was a v ic tory of sorts for Simon's diplomacy as i t gained time i n which to formulate a more def in i te p o l i c y . The s i tuat ion was complicated when Daladier 's 179 government f e l l on October 24 over a budgetary question, though French foreign pol icy under Sarraut, Daladier*s successor, remained unchanged, Paul-Boncour reta ining the Minis t ry for Foreign A f f a i r s and Daladier the Minis t ry of War. At the same time, the d i f f i c u l t i e s facing the new administration i n internal p o l i t i c s were so great that l i t t l e time could be spared for the discussion of foreign a f f a i r s . On November 7, Simon proposed an immediate meeting between B r i t i s h and French Minis ters , but although the French welcomed the suggestion, discussions did not commence u n t i l November 18. The delay i n i n i t i a t i n g an Anglo-French dialogue had important consequences, the most s igni f icant being that the divergence of opinion over the future procedure at the Conference, shelved by the Bureau's decisions of October 25, had not been resolved. Simon was anxious to i n i t i a t e private negotiations i n order to \"c lear up the 9 differences between the four p r i n c i p a l European Powers\", while the French were s t i l l eager to conclude a convention at Geneva i n Germany's absence. 1 0 On November 11, the Bureau decided that rapporteurs; should be appointed to deal with most of the outstanding questions facing the Conference and that committees should be appointed to deal with effect ives and supervision, but t h i s was merely a temporary settlement of the procedural problem. During November, Simon began to press more strongly for negotiations with Germany through diplomatic channels, and on November 7 Eden i hinted to the Commons that the Government was prepared to abandon the 1 11 programme outlined to the Bureau on October 14. Paul-Boncour, on the other hand, continued to believe that a disarmament convention should 180 be negotiated at Geneva as i f Germany were s t i l l present and: he 12 ins is ted that France had made her maximum concessions. Mussolini took the r e a l i s t i c view that to continue discussions at Geneva i n Germany's absence would serve no useful purpose, and on November 12 the Marquis d i Soragna made reservations during the f i r s t meetings of the new oommittees on effect ives and supervision, int imating that the I t a l i a n representatives would r e f r a i n from voting on del icate technical questions and would be free to act ass observers 13 i f p o l i t i c a l questions were discussed. The action taken by the I ta l ians made.1 a settlement of the procedural question imperative, as the alignment of October 14 between B r i t a i n , France, I t a l y and the United States had been broken. Discussions 1 A between these Powers were held at Geneva from November 18 to 22, and eventually the French were forced, very re luctant ly , to accept an adjournment of the General Commission u n t i l January 1934 and agree to negotiations for a disarmament agreement through diplomatic channels. As a sop to French wishes, i t was also agreed that \"af ter consultation with the of f i cers and Chairmen of the Committees\", Henderson should \"advise how far the work of the Committees should be carr ied on i n the meantime\". But the appearanoe of unity between B r i t a i n , France, I t a l y and the United States was deceptive. Simon had intimated that B r i t a i n would be prepared to offer concessions to Germany, or rather that B r i t a i n would press France to make concessions, while Paul-Boncour wanted to base future negotiations on the programme of October 14. The I t a l i a n s backed a stronger version of the B r i t i s h l i n e , while the Americans indicated that although they were anxious for an agreement, 181 they considered the ex is t ing phase of discussions to he of a purely European character. Meanwhile, on November 13, the Japanese representative on the Supervision Committee had announced that i t was impossible for Japan to accept internat ional control over her armaments. The conclusion of a disarmament convention, either inside?or outside the Disarmament Conference was thus made improbable, since supervision was an essential element i n any disarmament agreement. The Soviets, whose relat ions; with the Japanese were extremely poor, were almost certain to follow the lead of t h e i r internat ional r i v a l s , and i f the Soviets rejected supervision i t was l i k e l y that other European states would also reject i t . Moreover, the United States would probably refuse to r a t i f y 15 a convention that Japan refused to s ign. Hitherto , the pol i cy of Japan had been an unknown factor , as the Japanese representatives i n the Disarmament Conference had contributed l i t t l e to the proceedings. I t might be argued that the Japanese Government, controlled by the m i l i t a r y , did not intend to reach an agreement at Geneva, p a r t i c u l a r l y after withdrawing from the League i n March; but i t seems more l i k e l y that the Japanese hoped to secure an agreement, though on regional rather than general l i n e s , for on June 27 Naotsake Sato, the Japanese delegate to the Disarmament Conference, suggested such an agreement to Hugh Wi l son . 1 ^ The condition for Japanese par t i c ipat ion i n a disarmament agreement was recognition 17 of her interests i n the Par East - not an unreasonable demand. A A s imi lar pol icy had been followed at the Washington Conference i n 1921-2 - p o l i t i c a l compensations on the Chinese mainland i n return 182 for disarmament. But whatever Japanese intentions, the announcement of November 13 that Japan would not agree to supervision made a general disarmament 18 convention, at best, u n l i k e l y . Nevertheless, there was s t i l l a p o s s i b i l i t y that France and B r i t a i n could negotiate an arms control agreement with Germany, because H i t l e r had put forward new proposals for an eight-year convention to Phipps on October 24. The Ftthrer was; convinced that the highly-armed states were unwi l l ing to reduce t h e i r armaments, so he suggested that France could be allowed to re ta in her ex is t ing army of over 600,000 men, together with a l l i t s offensive weapons, i f Germany i n return were allowed a short-service army of 300,000 men with no offensive weapons - such as tanks over s ix tons, heavy a r t i l l e r y over 150mm and bombers - but as many defensive weapons as might be necessary to arm her forces. The P o l i s h , Czech and other armies would be l imited to t h e i r ex is t ing numbers, and poison gas and bombing behind bat t le zones would be \"ent i re ly 19 prohib i ted\" . y H i t l e r ' s proposals were extremely important, as they were the f i r s t d e f i n i t i v e proposals put forward by the Germans since the memorandum of August 29 1932. During most of 1933, B r i t a i n , France, I t a l y and the United States had discussed disarmament among themselves, seldom consulting the Germans, and i n the end t h i s pol icy had proved disastrous. Germany had refused the \"of fer\" of October 14 and withdrawn from the Disarmament Conference without offending l i b e r a l opinion, and the four-Power alignment against her had disintegrated. But now, i f B r i t a i n , 183 Prance, Italy and the United States accepted Hitler's proposals either in whole or as the basis of a settlement, Germany would be unable to claim that the other Powers were trying to impose a diktat on her. Although the German proposals involved rearmament, this was irrelevant since i t was certain that Germany would rearm whether or not an agreement was negotiated. Moreover, unless concessions were made to German demands, a large section of British opinion would believe German rearmament to be justified, while i f Germany violated a freely-negotiated convention, British opinion would support the Government in taking more forcible measures against the Reich. Thus, the most realistic policy for Britain to adopt would have been to accept the German proposals. If a settlement of the German problem was to be negotiated, i t was necessary to make concessions to German demands; the alternative was to take preventive action. The proposals of October 14 were clearly unacceptable to Germany and a return to the original MaoDonald plan was less advantageous to both Britain and Prance than the new German proposals, which offered Prance a greater margin of superiority in effectives and materiel. It would also have been realistic to offer greater assurances of support to Prance. A policy of pressing the French to make concessions without offering additional assurances of British support in return was impracticable because the French would not reduce their margin of superiority over Germany unless their security was strengthened in other ways. There was a growing movement on the French Right, in newspapers such as \"Le Temps\" and in a section of the Radical-Socialist Party for a direct Franco-German accord - even i f i t involved German 184 rearmament. But the movement was s t i l l not strong enough to overthrow the pol icy of Paul-Boneour, who sought an in terna t iona l ly -agreed solut ion to the German and disarmament problems. Simon could not accept that further assuranoes to Prance were necessary, and i n a speech to the Commons on November 7 he deprecated the idea of addit ional Continental commitments and even declared that 21 B r i t a i n was not \" b l i n d l y fettered\" by the Treaty of Locarno. Even though the Germans informed him that they would not object to an Anglo-French a l l iance i n return for a disarmament agreement based on 22 the H i t l e r plan, the Foreign Secretary refused to be drawn into extra commitments. The reason for the refusal was fear of public 23 opinion. Yet i t was inconceivable that an Anglo-Frenoh a l l iance would be rejected i n the House, for the National Government's raison d'Stre was to keep the Labour Party out of of f ice and a defeat of the Government on the issue of an Anglo-French a l l iance would probably have led to a Labour v ic tory i n the ensuing e lec t ion . Although B r i t i s h Ministers rea l ized that a degree of German rearmament was inevitable and that an arms control agreement involving rearmament was better than no agreement, 2 4 they were slow to reply to H i t l e r ' s proposals. Their preliminary impressions were not communicated to the German Chancellor u n t i l Decemb«r|»8, s i x weeks af ter Phipps' interview with H i t l e r on October 24. The Chancellor had u t i l i z e d the period to offer non-aggression pacts to Germany's neighbours (with the notable exceptions of Belgium and Austria) and he had also defined h i s disarmament proposals more f u l l y - f o r example, he had asked for a number of \"chaser\" a i r c r a f t - as d i s t i n c t from bombers - and declared 1 185 that Germany was w i l l i n g to agree to international supervision. But despite the Ftthrer's repeated e f for ts to renew the disarmament discussions, the B r i t i s h had not responded, the communication of 25 December 8 being l i t t l e more than an attempt to e l i c i t further information, especial ly regarding periodic and automatic supervision, the \"disappearance\" of the Reiohswehr and the terms and form of the proposed non-aggression pacts. Direct comments on the German proposals were l imi ted to a demand that the S. A. and S. S. be absorbed into the army or cease to exist as \"supplementary organizations\" and to an observation that the German claims to guns, a i rc ra f t and an array of 300,000 men were excessive. 26 H i t l e r ' s reply to the B r i t i s h request for information was encouraging, h i s disarmament proposals remaining very moderate. He pointed put that the MacDonald plan granted Germany an equal number of metropolitan effect ives as Prance while his own plan allowed Prance a considerable super ior i ty , and he agreed to transform the Reiohswehr into a short-service army within three or four years. He refused to disband the S. A. and S. S. (he compared them to the Salvation Armyj), but he agreed to regulate them according to s t r i c t international rules and to submit them to periodic and automatic supervision. He also gave assurances that he was ready to oonclude non-aggression pacts with a l l Germany's neighbours, B r i t a i n and Yugoslavia. On December 12, Phipps was handed a l e t t e r from H i t l e r (dated December 11) g iv ing the 27 Chancellor's plan a more o f f i c i a l character. Despite H i t l e r ' s encouraging reply , the B r i t i s h Government responded 28 slowly, and although a second Note was handed to the German Government on December 20, i t again was l i t t l e more than a request 1 8 6 for information, t h i s time regarding the categories and quantities; of the \"defensive\" weapons that Germany demanded and the form of the proposed non-aggression pacts. On a l l other points except the proposed increase i n the German army, the B r i t i s h Government merely \"took note\" of the German proposals and emphasised that i t was giving i t s \"earnest consideration\" to the l e t t e r of December 11. The only point on which the Government committed i t s e l f was the projected increase in the German army. This German demand was rejected on the grounds that i t would produce \"disastrous effects on the mind of Europe\" and was based on an erroneous calculation of French effectives. The slow and restrained response of the B r i t i s h Government was unfortunate, as Hi t l e r ' s desire f o r a disarmament convention seems to have been genuine. He needed time i n which to oarry out the internal reconstruction of Germany and he was afraid of a possible Herriot 29 government i n France ' where the p o l i t i o a l situation was s t i l l unstable. Herriot*s return to power seemed imminent to many observers, and H i t l e r was afraid that the ex-Premier, now almost f a n a t i c a l l y anti-German, would negotiate a Franco-Russian alliance or even occupy the l e f t bank of the Rhine.^ Further evidence of Hit l e r ' s sincerity i s his willingness to negotiate an arms control agreement within Europe even though he realized that general disarmament was improbable 32 because of the policy being pursued by Japan. A B r i t i s h lead i n following up the German disarmament proposals was now more necessary than before, because the French Government was too weak to take such an i n i t i a t i v e . Camille Chautemps had replaced Sarraut as Premier on November 27, but p o l i t i c a l circumstances led him to follow a similar policy to his predecessor - reliance on the 187 proposals of October 14. Yet, as T y r r e l l pointed out, the r i g i d appl icat ion of t h i s po l i cy could have only two possible r e s u l t s ; depending on the po l i cy adopted by B r i t a i n , i t would lead either to a close Anglo-French alignment against German rearmament or to a de f in i te breach i n Anglo-French co -opera t ion .^ The extent to which France would disarm or would agree to German rearmament s t i l l depended on the strength of B r i t i s h security guarantees, and French Ministers were even slower to reply to H i t l e r ' s disarmament scheme than t h e i r B r i t i s h counterparts. A reply was not made u n t i l December 11, and, l i k e the B r i t i s h repl ies of December 8 and 20, i t was l i t t l e more than a 34 request for information. On December 22, Simon v i s i t e d the Quai d'Orsay to assure Chautemps and Paul-Boncour that B r i t a i n d id not intend to accept H i t l e r ' s 35 demands. -But, apparently, the French Ministers were not reassured, for on January 1 1934» Francois-Poncet handed an aide-memoire^** to the Ftthrer, s tat ing the terms on which France would continue the disarmament discussions. I t was an astute move, as B r i t a i n ' s own counter-proposals to the H i t l e r plan had not yet been formulated; i t was i n the French interest to base disarmament negotiations on a French rather than a B r i t i s h or German plan . Thus, although the aide-memoire was very conci l ia tory i n tone, i t s proposals were very s imilar to those of October 14, including a de facto periode d'epreuve. The only major difference was a proposal f o r an immediate and universal f i f t y per cent reduction of m i l i t a r y a i r c r a f t prov id ing : i t was accompanied by the ef fect ive oontrol of c i v i l aviat ion and a i rc ra f t manufacture. On the other hand, the French Note stressed three points that were u n l i k e l y to please H i t l e r . I t was emphasized that a convention 1 8 8 should he attained through the disarmament of the heavily-armed Powers rather than the rearmament of Germany and that the agreement should he negotiated within the Conference at Geneva. More important, France demanded that the S. A. and S. S. he disbanded or be counted as ef f e c t i v e s . On January 1 9 , the Germans replied to the B r i t i s h Note of Deoember 2 0 3 7 and the French Note of January 1 . But although the tone of the German communications was conciliatory, they were merely a defence of the German position, a rejection of the October 1 4 proposals and a request f o r further information regarding B r i t i s h and French policy. H i t l e r ' s one concession was to submit Germany's compulsory Labour Corps to international supervision. The situation now facing B r i t a i n had remained unchanged since Phipps* interview with H i t l e r on October 2 4 1 9 3 3 . As the B r i t i s h Ambassador i n B e r l i n pointed out, there were two r e a l i s t i c p o l i c i e s for B r i t a i n to adopt - sanctions, or the conclusion of a convention 3 8 with Germany granting her limited, gradual and controlled rearmament. And for the l a t t e r p o l i cy to be successful, B r i t a i n and France had t--o present a united front and, i f necessary, threaten sanctions i f the Germans refused to be \"reasonable\". Germany's fear of a possible French attack was diminishing. Like his predecessors, H i t l e r based hi s 3 9 policy on the exploitation of Anglo-Frenoh differences and i n e r t i a . Tardiness on the part of B r i t a i n would lead either to a r a i s i n g of German demands or uncontrolled German rearmament. B r i t a i n had been preparing a new disarmament scheme sinoe at least December 1 9 3 3 , 4° hoping that a Franco-German compromise might be negotiated on the basis of French disarmament and German rearmament 189 rather than German rearmament alone. Mussolini assented to the 41 pr inc ip le of the plan during conversations with Simon on January 3-4, (though the Duce preferred an agreement based on H i t l e r ' s proposals), 42 and on January 29 the new scheme was l a i d before the Powers. Effect ives were to be l imi ted according to the MacDonald p lan , except that the period of service i n the short-term Continental armies would be open to discussion, as would the number of e f fect ives , i f 200,000 were found to be inadequate. French overseas forces would be reduced \"considerably\", and para-mil i tary t r a i n i n g prohibited, though organizations such as the S. A. and S. S. would be permitted provided the i r non-mil i tary character was assured by a system of permanent and automatic internat ional supervision. Germany would be allowed a n t i - a i r c r a f t guns, 155 mm mobile guns and tanks of s ix tons, as H i t l e r had demanded, and the other Powers would destroy t h e i r tanks over sixteen tons wi th in f i v e years and materiel over 155 mm within seven years. M i l i t a r y a i r c ra f t were to be l imi ted to t h e i r exis t ing numbers pending the formulation of a scheme for the complete a b o l i t i o n of m i l i t a r y and naval aviat ion and the \"ef fect ive supervision of c i v i l a v i a t i o n \" . I f the Permanent Disarmament Commission was unable to formulate such a scheme within two years, a l l countries would be ent i t led to m i l i t a r y aviat ion and Germany would obtain par i ty with the other Great Powers within ten years. The construction or acquis i t ion of types of weapons to be destroyed during the convention would be prohibited and a system of permanent and automatic supervision would be ins t i tu ted to ensure the applicat ion of the convention. 190 There was a provision for consultation i n the event of the convention being violated, and i t was suggested that European security could also be strengthened by Germany returning to the League and negotiating ten-year non-aggression pacts with her neighbours. In many ways, the proposed convention was more favourable to Prance than the proposals of October 14, as Prance would retain a superiority i n materiel over Germany. At the same time, the B r i t i s h land proposals were more favourable to Germany than H i t l e r * s , probably to induce the Ffthrer to accept the a i r proposals. Thus, even though the Chancellor's demand for an army of 300,000 was not granted, the land proposals taken as a whole represented a f a i r compromise between French and German views, as did the provisions for the S. A. and S. S. The two major weaknesses of the B r i t i s h plan were the a i r proposals, which Germany was unlikely to accept - because she had already started to rearm i n the a i r - and the security proposals, which France would probably consider i n s u f f i c i e n t . I n i t i a l reactions to the B r i t i s h plan were not unfavourable. Daladier, who had been asked to form a new government on January 2 9 , realized that the B r i t i s h land proposals were less favourable than Hi t l e r ' s and suggested that the provisions f o r para-military organizations provided an \"overwhelming d i f f i c u l t y \" (as the S. A. and S. S. were not to be included i n the calculation of German effectives), but he 43 welcomed the proposal f o r consultation as an \"important advance\". This was especially encouraging i n that the French (and Daladier i n particular) were prone to overreact to disarmament plans entailing French concessions, even i f the other Powers offered concessions i n return.^\" For Germany, Blomberg expressed his Government:*;® \"warm 191 appreciation\" of the B r i t i s h proposals except for those concerning 45 avia t ion , y and the German m i l i t a r y , fearing the establishment of a r i v a l body, were pleased that the S. A. and S. S. would be subject to 46 international oontrol . The Wilhelmstrasse, \"more cathol ic than the 47 Pope\", received the B r i t i s h proposals less favourably. Since October 1933, progress towards disarmament had been hindered by the i n s t a b i l i t y of French Governments, and by the end of January 1934 i t seemed to many observers that French democracy i t s e l f might be i n danger. Following the revelations of the Stavisky A f f a i r , neo-fascist disturbances had taken place i n an attempt to topple the Government, and on January 27 Ghautemps, despite h is majority i n the Chamber, lost his nerve and resigned. Daladier became Premier and won a vote of confidence on February 6 but a f ter a further Rightest disturbance, during which Herriot was a l l but thrown into the Seine, Daladier himself capitulated. On February 9» a new \"government of national concentration\" took o f f i ce under Gaston Doumergue. Unfortunately for disarmament, i t was biased to the Right, and included' Tardieu, Marshal Peta in , and Louis Barthou, who became Foreign M i n i s t e r . The remaining Radicals i n the Cabinet were mostly conservative as regards foreign pol i cy - especial ly Herr io t . French disarmament polioy became s t i f f e r almost overnight. To discover the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of an agreement based on the memorandum of January 29, the B r i t i s h Government sent Eden, now Lord P r i v y Seal , on a special exploratory mission to P a r i s , B e r l i n and Rome. On February 17, the B r i t i s h Minis ter had conversations with Doumergue and Barthou i n P a r i s . ^ The ta lks were not very encouraging. 192 Doumergue c r i t i c i s e d the proposals r e g a r d i n g the S. A. and S. S ., even suggesting t h a t s u p e r v i s i o n over these bodies; should he a p p l i e d immediately. Barthou complained about the l a c k of a periode d'€preuve and the concessions t o German rearmament and observed t h a t as regards naval and a i r armaments, i n which B r i t a i n was e s p e c i a l l y i n t e r e s t e d , German e q u a l i t y would be delayed f o r two y e a r s . The F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r deprecated the B r i t i s h proposal f o r c o n s u l t a t i o n as i n s u f f i c i e n t t o provide f o r French s e c u r i t y , and demanded a d d i t i o n a l guarantees f o r the execution of a convention. Almost the only encouraging remark tha t Barthou made was t h a t i t would be b e t t e r t o have a convention which s a t i s f i e d no-one r a t h e r than no convention at a l l . Eden's t a l k s i n B e r l i n were more s u c c e s s f u l as H i t l e r accepted the 4 9 B r i t i s h proposals as the b a s i s of a convention. Apart from a r e l u c t a n c e t o r e t u r n t o the League — a point which B r i t a i n d i d not 50 regard as a p r e - c o n d i t i o n of a convention — the Ftihrer had only one major o b j e c t i o n t o the B r i t i s h p roposals - the delay i n a c c o r d i n g Germany e q u a l i t y of r i g h t s i n the a i r . He demanded that Germany be e n t i t l e d t o possess short-range defensive a i r c r a f t (not bombers), the number of which would be l i m i t e d t o t h i r t y per cent of the t o t a l a i r f o r c e s of Germany's neighbours or f i f t y per cent of the French a i r f o r c e , whichever was the l e s s e r . The enquiry i n t o the a b o l i t i o n of m i l i t a r y and naval a v i a t i o n would be h e l d as proposed. I n r e t u r n f o r concessions over the a i r p r o p o s a l s , Germany would agree t o French disarmament b e i n g delayed f o r f i v e years and t o s t r i c t s u p e r v i s i o n olf the S. A. and S.1 S. The Ftthrer a l s o promised t h a t these o r g a n i z a t i o n s would not possess or be t r a i n e d t o use arms; n e i t h e r would they be concentrated or t r a i n e d i n m i l i t a r y camps, be commanded or i n s t r u c t e d 193 \"ei ther d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y \" by army of f i cers or \"engage or take part i n \" \" f i e l d exercises. He d id not want a \"second army\" within the state. Moreover, i f Germany was granted an army of 300,000, the Chancellor would even agree to reduce the \"Green\" (armed) police by 50,000. H i t l e r ' s proposals were moderate, even generous. He was w i l l i n g to le t Prance re ta in a considerable superiori ty i n mat'eriel for f i v e years; and a superiori ty i n a i r strength for ten years. He would also accept permanent and automatic supervision, not only over Germany's armaments but over the S. A. and S. S. Thus apart from the immediate increases i n Germany's armaments, increases: that were r e l a t i v e l y minor i f i l l e g a l rearmament was taken into consideration, the Puhrer had accepted, i n ef fect , the proposals of October 14. And i f Prance s t i l l d id not believe that her security was s u f f i c i e n t l y guaranteed, he would not oppose an Anglo-French a l l i a n c e . Eden, who had consistently advocated a more r e a l i s t i c po l i cy than his superiors, wrote to MacDonald on the night of February 22, suggesting that a convention based on H i t l e r ' s proposals was preferable 51 to no convention at a l l . German v i o l a t i o n of a freely-negotiated arms agreement would arouse B r i t i s h opinion, whereas a v i o l a t i o n of the more punitive aspects of the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s would not. But the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s f i r s t reaction to H i t l e r ' s suggestions was that 52 they were \" i n substance . . . inacceptable\". Then, on February 25, o 53 an a r t i c l e i n fashf. Observer\", probably inspired by the Government, suggested that the resul ts of Eden's ta lks i n B e r l i n had made a \"deplorable impression\" i n \"governmental quarters\", and that Eden 194 himself was \"not competent either to negotiate or prepare for 54 negotiat ion\" . The unfortunate point was that the same \"governmental 55 quarters\" had no al ternat ive pol i cy i f a convention was not concluded. Mussol in i , as r e a l i s t i c as ever, appreciated that a convention l i m i t i n g German armaments was essent ia l . Thus, on February 26, he 56 informed Eden that he was w i l l i n g to accept either the B r i t i s h proposals of January 29 or H i t l e r ' s amendments to them, and i f neither proved acceptable to both France and Germany, he believed i t possible to gain agreement on the basis of the I t a l i a n plan of January 31, a 57 scheme based on H i t l e r ' s proposals of October 24» The Buce believed that France would be prepared to agree to the latest H i t l e r proposals since they delayed French disarmament and provided for effect ive supervision over the S. A. and S* S. Mussolini had also assured the Frenoh that I t a l y would f u l f i l her obligations under the Treaty of Locarno. I t was now apparent that the conclusion of a disarmament convention depended mainly on the French att i tude to the B r i t i s h plan and the amendments formulated by H i t l e r . But by March 1, when Eden returned to P a r i s , the French had not considered the B r i t i s h proposals f u l l y because of the internal d i f f i c u l t i e s resul t ing from the Stavisky A f f a i r . Nevertheless, Doumergue and Barthou c r i t i c i s e d the proposals 58 severely and avoided accepting them even as a basis of a convention. Doumergue declared himself d i s s a t i s f i e d with H i t l e r ' s undertakings with regard to the S. A. and S. S. and maintained that France needed greater security guarantees on the l ines of the French disarmament plan of November 1932 or at least the Paul-Boncour proposals of December 59 1933 for guaranteeing the execution of a convention. Barthou, on 195 the other hand, declared that the main d i f f i c u l t y was the acceptance of German rearmament. The two French Ministers also c r i t i c i z e d . H i t l e r ' s a i r proposals and demanded that as part of any settlement, Germany return to the League. The French Ministers were unwi l l ing to state t h e i r security demands s p e c i f i c a l l y , though they did t e l l Eden that the Senate Committees on Foreign A f f a i r s , the Army, Navy and A i r Force had suggested a reversion to the disarmament plan of November 1932. The o f f i c i a l French reply** 0 to the B r i t i s h proposals was not handed to Simon u n t i l March 19« The Note, drafted by Barthou, with 6 l some help from Herriot and Tardieu, was, i n ef fect , a re ject ion of the memorandum of January 29. Franoe had \"most serious\" objections to disarming at the same time as Germany was rearming and desired greater security guarantees to ensure the execution of the convention. The Treaty of Locarno and the proposed consultative pact were i n s u f f i c i e n t to provide seourity and \" i n the f i n a l analys is \" , i t was necessary to \"revert t o \" the Covenant of the League of Nations. Franoe considered Germany's return to the League \"an essential condition\" of any arms agreement, and i t was also necessary to \"determine important points\" concerning pre-mi l i tary organizations, the l i m i t a t i o n of national defence expenditure and the manufacture of mater ie l . During Eden's t a l k s i n P a r i s , i t had become clear that the French preferred a convention based on H i t l e r ' s amendments to the B r i t i s h proposals. Consequently, the Lord Pr ivy Seal put pressure on his Government to accept H i t l e r ' s demands i f t h i s was necessary to secure a convention, and he also advised the re-examination of the B r i t i s h 62 posi t ion regarding addit ional security guarantees to France. Phipps backed Eden's pol icy and sent Andrew Thome, the M i l i t a r y Attache i n 196 B e r l i n , to put the case to Lord Hailsham, the Secretary of State for W a r . ^ Brigadier Temperley supported t h i s p o l i c y * ' 4 , as diet the Foreign O f f i c e , which i n a memorandum prepared for the Cabinet on March 21 suggested that B r i t a i n ' s best po l i cy might be the negotiation 65 of an Anglo-French a l l iance involv ing specif io m i l i t a r y commitments. ^ The negative response of Franoe to the memorandum of January 29 and the pressure exerted by Eden and the Foreign Off ice had some effect on the B r i t i s h Government. I t had been clear for some time that 66 B r i t a i n would agree to many of H i t l e r ' s demands, and i t now became apparent that the Government might be w i l l i n g to give certain guarantees i n the^event of a breach of the convention. On March 22, Simon suggested to Leopold von Hoesch, the German Ambassador i n London, that supervision be l imi ted to \"certa in European\" states and that these states would agree to take joint action against a v i o l a t o r of the convention. This was a \"personal suggestion . . . not yet approved by the Cabinet\", and B r i t a i n would commit herself to f i n a n c i a l and 67 economic, though not m i l i t a r y , measures against v i o l a t o r s . On March 26, the Germans accepted the Simon plan, provided that both B r i t a i n and Russia were members of the European agreement and supervision was general, though one or two exceptions, such as Japan and America, might be permitted. The German acceptance was not to be communicated to P a r i s , where i t might be used to extract further concessions from Germany.**^ A major factor i n B r i t a i n ' s decision to reconsider her pol icy as 69 regards guarantees was the reports of Lord T y r r e l l from P a r i s . ' The B r i t i s h Ambassador reported that there were two schools of thought i n France, one bel ieving that any convention would be in jurious to Franoe 197 because Germany would not observe i t s terms, the other be l ieving that even an \" i n d i f f e r e n t \" convention was worthwhile because i t would set l i m i t s to German rearmament and \"maintain international s o l i d a r i t y \" , and he believed that the l a t t e r would be successful i f B r i t a i n agreed to the Paul-Boncour proposals of December 5 1933 for 70 guarantees. The M i n i s t e r i a l Disarmament Committee discussed T y r r e l l ' s reports on March 26, and Simon appears to have pressed his colleagues 71 to agree to increase B r i t a i n ' s Continental commitments. The Foreign Secretary's proposals were not we l l received. Most Ministers were opposed to g iv ing France addit ional guarantees and some believed that 72 disarmament was no longer possible anyway. A compromise was reached, . and i t was decided that T y r r e l l should ask Barthou whether France would accept a convention based on H i t l e r ' s amendments to the B r i t i s h proposals i f B r i t a i n gave guarantees regarding the execution of the 73 convention. On March 29, the Ambassador carr ied out h is ins truct ions . Barthou refused to answer the B r i t i s h inquiry immediately and counselled delay while the French Government discussed i t s att itude towards the whole disarmament question. An interim Note was handed to T y r r e l l on A p r i l 6 , ^ but i t avoided a direct answer to the B r i t i s h questions. The delay probably accurred because the French Cabinet was divided. Tardieu and Herriot (together with General Weygand, Chief of the General Staff) were opposed to a convention l e g a l i z i n g German rearmament, while Barthou and Flandin were i n favour of a convention 75 provided B r i t a i n inoreased her security guarantees. ^ Francois-Poncet also favoured the l a t t e r course and made a special journey to Paris 76 on A p r i l 9 to put his case to the more important French Minis ters . There was some doubt about Doumergue*s a t t i tude , though by A p r i l 9 198 77 he had decided i n favour of the H e r r i o t - T a r d i e u l i n e . On A p r i l 17 7ft Barthou handed Campbell a Note s a y i n g t h a t Prance would not be j u s t i f i e d i n proceeding with n e g o t i a t i o n s f o r a convention l e g a l i z i n g German rearmament. A c o n s i d e r a b l e f a c t o r i n determining the French d e c i s i o n t o break o f f n e g o t i a t i o n s was the p u b l i c a t i o n on March 27 of the German defence 79 estimates f o r 1934-5* Army expenditure was i n c r e a s e d by t h i r t y - s i x per cent, n a v a l expenditure by twenty-seven per^cent and a i r 80 expenditure by two hundred and seventy per cent, over the preoeeding year, and the French Note of A p r i l 17 used these i n c r e a s e s as grounds f o r a g e n e r a l indictment of German p o l i c y . The p u b l i c a t i o n of the estimates d u r i n g the c r i t i c a l stage of the disarmament n e g o t i a t i o n s was, at b e s t , a blunder of the highest order, because i t strengthened the p o s i t i o n o f T a r d i e u and H e r r i o t w i t h i n the French Cabinet. I t seems t h a t the g a f f e was due t o the u l t r a - m e t h o d i c a l o f f i c i a l s of the 8 l German Treasury, who d i d not have the sense t o withhold the f i g u r e s . The q u e s t i o n remains as t o whether B r i t a i n c o u l d have induced France t o accept an arms convention by o f f e r i n g her a d d i t i o n a l s e c u r i t y 8 2 guarantees. Eden thought a B r i t i s h o f f e r might have been s u c c e s s f u l , and Doumergue admitted t o Campbell th a t i f B r i t a i n had d e c l a r e d her \" s o l i d a r i t y with France i n the event of a German aggre s s i o n \" then the French r e p l y of A p r i l 17 would have been of a d i f f e r e n t nature. But i f t h i s were t r u e , why d i d the French not r e p l y t o the B r i t i s h demarche of March 29? Doumergue's suggestion t h a t a B r i t i s h d e c l a r a t i o n 8A of s o l i d a r i t y was \"too muoh t o expect\" i s not very c o n v i n c i n g . Nevertheless, B r i t a i n can be c r i t i c i z e d f o r not c l a r i f y i n g her p o s i t i o n 199 as regards guarantees. Simon did not follow up the demarche of March 29 u n t i l A p r i l 10, when he did no more than repeat the enquiry.. I f B r i t a i n had offered Prance a defensive a l l i a n c e , i t i s conceivable that Prance might have been induced to sign a convention. To a great extent, the f a i l u r e of the disarmament negotiations since October 1933 had been caused by B r i t a i n ' s u n r e a l i s t i c p o l i c i e s . H i t l e r ' s demands of October 24 were very moderate, yet B r i t a i n did not reply to them u n t i l December 8 and did not put forward a d e f i n i t i v e disarmament plan u n t i l January 29 1934« The delay was unnecessary - and also unfortunate, as the French Government became progressively weaker and less able to follow a strong l i n e i n foreign p o l i c y . By March, the B r i t i s h Government had more or less accepted H i t l e r ' s proposals of October 24 1933, but by t h i s time there was a conservative administration i n France, reluctant to agree to an arms convention which legalized 1 German rearmament. B r i t a i n had at last rea l ized that concessions to Germany were necessary to secure a convention but apart from Eden and, at the last minute, a reluctant Simon, there were few within the Government who real ized that i t was also necessary to make concessions to French security demands. Daladier would have accepted H i t l e r ' s demands i f B r i t a i n had given 85 guarantees regarding the execution of the convention, but by the time the B r i t i s h Cabinet was considering such guarantees, the Daladier Government had f a l l e n . I t might s t i l l have been possible to achieve a convention i f B r i t a i n had been prepared to conclude an Anglo-French a l l iance - as the Foreign Off ice advocated - but the Cabinet was; against increasing B r i t a i n ' s Continental commitments. 200 After the French Note of A p r i l 17, there was l i t t l e that B r i t a i n could do to revive the disarmament discussions. On A p r i l 28, Joachim von Ribbentrop, Germany's newly appointed Special Commissioner for disarmament questions, t o l d Phipps that the only way out of the deadlock was for B r i t a i n to persuade the French to reverse the i r e a r l i e r decision to break off negotiations, otherwise Germany would 86 be freed from her ex is t ing l i m i t a t i o n s . But the French had already made up t h e i r minds. Norman Davis believed that the Note of A p r i l 17 87 was; a b l u f f , and some credence was given to t h i s idea by Barthou*s suggestion of May 15 that a convention was s t i l l possible i f B r i t a i n 88 guaranteed the French and Belgian f ront iers against German attack. But H i t l e r was now opposed to a close Anglo-French re la t ionship , which, i n the aftermath of the French Note, would give the impression that B r i t a i n had succumbed to anti-German pressure and abandoned her 89 t r a d i t i o n a l pol icy of \"balancing\" between Par is and B e r l i n . ' On May 29, on French i n s t i g a t i o n , the General Commission reassembled to oonsider the s i t u a t i o n . Davis reaffirmed that America would co-operate i n the preservation of peace but would not \"part ic ipate i n European p o l i t i o a l negotiations and settlements and would not make any commitment whatsoever to use i t s armed forces for the settlement 90 of any dispute anywhere\". L i tv inov suggested that the Conference 91 should convert i t s e l f into a Peace Conference i n permanent session. On May 30, Simon stated that , although B r i t a i n had no further proposals to o f fer , he believed that i f good w i l l prevai led, a compromise based on the memorandum of January 29 was s t i l l possible and that , i n any case, protocols should be signed on such matters as the prohibi t ion 201 of chemical warfare, budgetary p u b l i c i t y and the establishment of a 92 Permanent Disarmament Commission. But Barthou, i n a speech which was \"quite indescribable by those who heard i t and no account did jus t ice 93 to i t s i rony, i t s insolence and i t s passion\", dispel led any remaining hopes that a convention might be attained. He condemned German p o l i c y , made i t clear that Prance would follow a pol i cy of raison d'e*tat. and referred to Simon as \"mon oher collegue et presque ami\".94 After the meeting of the General Commission of May 30, the Bureau drafted a resolut ion as to the future work of the Conference and set up committees to deal with the problems of security, a i r armaments, guarantees of execution for a convention and the manufacture of and trade i n arms. On June 11, the General Commission appointed the Chairmen of these committees, and then adjourned sine d i e . The Conference d id not meet again. After June 11 1934, i t was \"every nation for i t s e l f and God for them a l l \" . 202 CHAPTER ¥11 CONCLUSIONS I t would be wrong t o suggest th a t the f a i l u r e of the Disarmament Conference was s o l e l y the f a u l t of B r i t a i n , as both Prance and Germany could have foll o w e d more c o n c i l i a t o r y p o l i c i e s . But given the circumstances of the time, the p o l i c i e s of the two C o n t i n e n t a l Powers? are understandable. B r i t i s h p o l i c y i s not. The Government perceived! tha t B r i t i s h s e c u r i t y depended, i n part at l e a s t , on a s e t t l e d Continent, y et i t f o l l o w e d p o l i c i e s that d i d not f a c i l i t a t e a disarmament convention. Concessions t o both France and Germany were made r e l u c t a n t l y , and most M i n i s t e r s d i d not understand the i n t i m a t e connection between s e c u r i t y and disarmament or the r o l e played by f o r c e i n the settlement of i n t e r n a t i o n a l d i s p u t e s . In the l o n g run, European s e c u r i t y depended on a p e a c e f u l s o l u t i o n of the German problem, and t h i s c o u l d be achieved only through the appeasement of German grievances over the Peaoe Treaty. Germany would not w i l l i n g l y remain a second-class Power and other Powers were f a c e d with the i n e v i t a b i l i t y of a r e d i s t r i b u t i o n of European power i n her favour. Consequently, i t was i n the i n t e r e s t s of the other Powers t o c o n t r o l the extent and speed of t h i s r e d i s t r i b u t i o n of power, and t h i s might have been accomplished, i n p a r t , by a disarmament convention. But France, q u i t e n a t u r a l l y , wanted t o ensure that any i n c r e a s e i n German power was o f f s e t by i n c r e a s e d assurances of support from B r i t a i n , and thus a disarmament convention was p o s s i b l e only i f B r i t a i n gave France the assurances she demanded. But although B r i t i s h M i n i s t e r s understood t h a t s t a t e s had t o adjust t o changes w i t h i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l s o c i e t y , they f a i l e d t o understand that power was an 203 essential element i n the process of \"peaceful change\". They believed that French security was adequately protected by the Treaty of Versa i l l e s and were opposed to undertaking new commitments on the Continent. B r i t i s h Ministers repeatedly t o l d the French that public opinion would not support a polioy based on new security guarantees to France, and though the effect of opinion should not be over—estimated a fear of p o l i t i c a l repercussions was cer ta in ly a factor whioh led the Government to adhere to a po l i cy of \"no commitments\". I t might even be said that B r i t i s h Ministers became vict ims of t h e i r own myth vigorously propounded during the 1920s - that an international \"harmony of interests\" existed and that direct B r i t i s h involvement i n the European security system was not essential for the negotiation of a disarmament convention. \"Harmony of interests\" was a very se l f - serv ing doctrine. I t permitted! B r i t a i n to exert an amount of influence on the Continent out of a l l proportion to B r i t i s h involvement i n the European security system and allowed the Government to concentrate on defending B r i t a i n more immediate interests - the security of the Empire and the defence of her trade routes. The disarmament schemes put forward by the Government at Geneva were based almost sole ly on these immediate interests and made l i t t l e attempt to solve the main problem facing the Disarmament Conference - the German problem. Although France and Germany looked to B r i t a i n for help i n solving t h e i r problems, the B r i t i s h Government del iberately avoided the role of \"broker\" - except when the role was unavoidable. The Government adopted the negative pol icy of \"wait and see\" and was reluctant to come forward with 204 proposals for a Franco-German settlement. MacDonald would only suggest that Prance and Germany \"put t h e i r demands i n such a way that B r i t a i n could say that she supported both s ides\" . During 1932, both Prance and Germany put forward disarmament proposals which, though r e f l e c t i n g national requirements, might we l l have formed the basis of a convention. But each soheme proved abortive, mainly because of B r i t i s h opposition. B r i t i s h aversion to a consultative pact or a pledge to supply a i r c r a f t to a v i c t im of aggression was the main reason for the f a i l u r e of the Brttning plan i n A p r i l ; MacDonaldfs h o s t i l i t y to a Franco-German entente or a l l iance was instrumental i n causing Herriot to break off his negotiations with Papen at Lausanne; and the Government's unwillingness to undertake new commitments was the major obstacle to an agreement based on the French plan of November 14. Yet whilst obstructing these attempts to seoure a Franco-German compromise, B r i t i s h Ministers were reluctant to offer al ternative proposals. Baldwin's scheme for qual i ta t ive disarmament of May 13 seems to have been inspired by a desire to improve B r i t i s h naval strength, and the schemes enunciated on July 7 and November 17 were l i t t l e more than negative reaotions to the Hoover proposals of June 22 and the French plan of November 14 respect ively. Each plan was based on B r i t a i n ' s security requirements, or rather the Government's conception of these requirements. The proposals of July 7 and November 17 envisaged the a b o l i t i o n or r e s t r i c t i o n of weapons that threatened B r i t i s h security or which the armed forces d id not f i n d useful (\"submarines, whioh they d id not want and tanks over twenty tons, which they did not possess\") but the retention of weapons that B r i t a i n 205 found u s e f u l , notably medium tanks and bombers. And the Baldwin plan - i f i t was intended as a serious proposal - was l i t t l e more than an attempt to increase B r i t a i n ' s naval strength at the expense of America and Japan by abolishing capi ta l ships, a i r c r a f t - c a r r i e r s and submarines (the main strength of the American and Japanese navies) but not cruisers or destroyers (the main strength of the Royal Wavy). None of the three B r i t i s h plans of 1932 made any rea l attempt to oome to grips with the German problem. Eaoh contained concessions to Germany's demands for equality - i f only because German security requirements were f a i r l y s imi lar to B r i t a i n ' s - but offered no corresponding concessions to French demands for securi ty . The November 17 scheme d i d envisage a \"no-force a pact\" to mobilize world opinion against an aggressor, but to France this was of no more use than the \"paper guarantee\" of the Kellogg Pact . By October 1932, most members of the B r i t i s h Government seem to have been convinced that disarmament was impossible, and from t h i s time onwards a desire to ensure that B r i t a i n would not be held responsible for a breakdown of the negotiations became a prominent, i f not dominant, factor i n B r i t i s h disarmament p o l i c y . Certainly t h i s was the main reason for MaoDonald lay ing the B r i t i s h draft convention before the Disarmament Conference on March 16 1933. Neither the Prime Minister nor Foreign Secretary had any great hope that the draft oonvention would be successful and indeed,, after presenting i t> to the General Commission, they had no idea as to what should be done next. The MacDonald plan d i d make some attempt at f a c i l i t a t i n g a Franco-German compromise, but l i k e previous B r i t i s h plans, i t was 206 based p r i m a r i l y on B r i t a i n ' s own s e o u r i t y requirements. I t envisaged r e d u c t i o n s i n the a i r f o r c e s of the Great Powers - except the R.A.P. -and the other Powers were expected t o abandon the p r i v i l e g e of bombing w h i l s t B r i t a i n would be f r e e t o use t h i s method of warfare \" f o r p o l i c e purposes i n o u t l y i n g d i s t r i c t s \" . The other Powers were a l s o expected t o g i v e up t h e i r heavy tanks, w h i l e B r i t a i n , who d i d not possess any heavy tanks, would be allowed t o r e t a i n her medium tanks of s i x t e e n tons, of which she had few models but r e p u t e d l y l e d the world i n development. As regards the German problem, the MacDonald p l a n made a number of concessions t o German demands and went a l o n g way towards s e c u r i n g the p r a c t i c a l a p p l i c a t i o n of e q u a l i t y of r i g h t s over a p e r i o d of f i v e y e a r s . But i t f a i l e d t o o f f e r corresponding concessions t o France. There was no p r o v i s i o n f o r continuous and automatic s u p e r v i s i o n of the convention or f o r \"guarantees of execution\". The Government wanted t o maintain i t s i n f l u e n c e on the Continent without paying the p r i c e of g r e a t e r involvement i n the European s e c u r i t y system. B r i t i s h M i n i s t e r s d i d make some attempt t o meet French wishes d u r i n g 1933 by r e l a x i n g t h e i r o p p o s i t i o n t o continuous and automatic s u p e r v i s i o n and by agreeing t o a f o u r - y e a r periode d'epreuve and an e i g h t - y e a r convention, but at no time were they w i l l i n g t o accept guarantees f o r the execution of the convention i n v o l v i n g d i r e c t involvement on the European Continent. A convention might s t i l l have been n e g o t i a t e d i n October 1933, but the B r i t i s h Government decided t o uphold the MacDonald p l a n as amended i n September and r e j e c t the German demand f o r \"samples\" -u n l i k e the I t a l i a n s , and p o s s i b l y the French and Americans - and 207 consequently, Germany withdrew from the Disarmament Conference. Simon maintained that B r i t a i n could not agree to German rearmament, hut t h i s was an irrelevant question as i t was clear that Germany would rearm whether a disarmament convention permitted i t or not. B r i t i s h Ministers apparently f a i l e d to understand that i t was the international l i m i t a t i o n and control of armaments rather than reductions i n armaments which lead to securi ty . Thus they were slow to follow up H i t l e r * s disarmament proposals of Octoher 24, and by March 1934, when a convention seemed possible , there was a conservative administration i n Prance, u n w i l l i n g to legal ize German rearmament. An Anglo-French a l l iance might s t i l l have enabled a convention to be concluded, but the Cabinet was reluctant to increase B r i t a i n ' s Continental commitments and did no more than inquire whether France would accept a convention based on H i t l e r ' s amendments to the B r i t i s h proposals of January 29 i f B r i t a i n gave certain guarantees for the execution of the convention. On A p r i l 17, the Frenoh e f fec t ive ly broke off a l l negotiations for a disarmament convention. I f B r i t a i n had had a clearer v i s i o n of what was required to conclude a disarmament convention, the Government might, i n i t s own interes t , have smoothed the way at various points and f a c i l i t a t e d the conclusion of a Franco-German compromise of fer ing some hope of a peaceful solut ion to the German problem. Instead, B r i t i s h Ministers misconstrued t h e i r long-term interests for short-term advantages and followed a pol icy that was not conducive to a Franco-German settlement. Anthony Eden suggested that MacDonald and Simon \"missed the disarmament bus\" while Bruning was i n power and thereafter found i t impossible to overtake i t . 1 In fac t , they made no rea l attempt to catch i t , perhaps even f a i l e d to r e a l i z e why they should catch i t . 208 FOOTNOTES P r i n c i p a l A b b r e v i a t i o n s D B F P G r e a t B r i t a i n , F o r e i g n O f f i c e , D o c u m e n t s o n B r i t i s h F o r e i g n P o l i c y 1919-1939. D D B B e l g i u m , M i n i s t e r e d e s A f f a i r e s E t r a n g e r e s , D o c u m e n t s D i p l o m a t i c r u e s B e i g e s 1920-1940. D D F F r a n c e , M i n i s t d r e d e s A f f a i r e s E t r a n g e r e s , D o c u m e n t s D i p l o m a t i c r u e s F r a n c a i s 1932-1939. D G F P U n i t e d S t a t e s , D e p a r t m e n t o f S t a t e , D o c u m e n t s o n G e r m a n F o r e i g n P o l i c y 1918-1945. D I A R o y a l I n s t i t u t e o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s , D o c u m e n t s o n I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s . F R U S U n i t e d S t a t e s , D e p a r t m e n t o f S t a t e , F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . P D C G r e a t B r i t a i n , H o u s e o f C o m m o n s , P a r l i a m e n t a r y D e b a t e s . P D L G r e a t B r i t a i n , H o u s e o f L o r d s , P a r l i a m e n t a r y D e b a t e s . R D G L e a g u e o f N a t i o n s , C o n f e r e n c e f o r t h e R e d u c t i o n a n d L i m i t a t i o n o f A r m a m e n t s , R e c o r d s o f t h e C o n f e r e n c e f o r t h e R e d u c t i o n a n d L i m i t a t i o n o f a r m a m e n t s . C D C o n f e r e n c e D o c u m e n t s . M A C M i n u t e s o f t h e A i r C o m m i s s i o n . M B M i n u t e s o f t h e B u r e a u . M G C M i n u t e s o f t h e G e n e r a l C o m m i s s i o n . M L C M i n u t e s o f t h e L a n d C o m m i s s i o n . MNC M i n u t e s o f t h e N a v a l C o m m i s s i o n . V R P M V e r b a t i m R e c o r d s o f P l e n a r y M e e t i n g s . S I A R o y a l I n s t i t u t e o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s , S u r v e y o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s . N o t e s t o C h a p t e r I 1 I n i s L . C l a u d e J n r . , S w o r d s i n t o P l o w s h a r e s , p . 263 209 2 I b i d . , p. 268-9. 3 See i b i d . , pp. 228-38. 4 I b i d . , p . 256. 5 Cited i n P. J . Noel Baker, Disarmament, p . 25. 6,All ied Note, June 16 1919, c i ted i n J . W. Wheeler-Bennett, The Disarmament Deadlock, p . 3. 7 Opinion on t h i s point was div ided. P. J . Noel Baker, an eminent authority on internat ional law, considered the obligation to be legal (see Noel Baker, l o c . c i t . ) while the B r i t i s h Foreign Office considered the obligation to be moral only (see DBFP Ser. 2, v o l . 4, no. 92). 8 Great B r i t a i n , Foreign Off ice , Correspondence with the A l l i e d Governments concerning Reparation Payments by Germany, Misc. No. 5 (1923), Cmd. 1943, p. 28. 9 The phrase \"wipe out the past\" i s that of Lord Curzon (Foreign Secretary) speaking to representatives of the U . K . , the Dominions and India , June 22 1921, c i ted i n Ear l of Ronaldshay, The L i f e of Lord Curzon, v o l . 3, p . 226. 10 Stanley Baldwin (Lord President) , July 30 1934, PDC, 5th Ser. , v o l . 292, c o l . 2339. 11 Austen Chamberlain (Lord Pr ivy Seal), Feb. 8 1922, PDC. 5th Ser . , v o l . 150, e o l . 198. The expression \"Guardian on the Rhine\" seems to have been coined by Arnold Wolfers. See A. Wolfers, B r i t a i n and France between Two Wars, pp. 229-41. 12 J . R. MacDonald, \"Protocol or Pact?\", International Conci l ia t ion September 1925, pp. 256-63. 13 MacDonald to Secretary-General of the League of Nations, July 5 1924, Great B r i t a i n , Foreign Of f i ce , Correspondence between his Majesty's Government and the League of Nations respecting the proposed Treaty of Mutual Assistance, Misc. No. 13 (1924), Cmd. 2200; Viscount C e c i l , A Great Experiment, p . 158. 14 E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years C r i s i s 1919-1939, p . 67. 15 The Assembly report on the Protocol explained that the Protocol did not apply to \"disputes which aim at rev is ing treat ies and international acts i n force or which seek to jeopardise the ex is t ing t e r r i t o r i a l in tegr i ty of signatory states\" . I b i d . , pp. 257-8. 16 See Chamberlain's declaration to the League Council of March 12 1925, International C o n c i l i a t i o n , September 1925, PP» 245-55• 210 17 C e c i l , op. c i t . , pp. 183 and 188. 18 Ibid., pp. 171-2 and 183. Ibid., pp. 183-4* 20 Ibid., p. 183. 21 Ibid., pp. 186-7. 22 A. J . P. Taylor, English History 1914-1945. P. 255, n. 3 . 23 C e c i l , op. c i t . , p. 190. 24 Cited i n G. M. Gathorne-Hardy. A Short History of International A f f a i r s 1920-1939. pp. 182-3. 25 Henderson, March 9 1931, PDC, 5th Ser., v o l . 249, c o l . 827. 26 Henderson, September 11 1930, League of Nations, Record of the Eleventh Assembly, fourth plenary meeting, September 11 1930, p. 3 , cited i n G. A. Craig and F. Gilbert, The Diplomats 1919-1939, v o l . 2, P. 333. 27 M. A. Hamilton, Arthur Henderson, pp. 336-40; A. Henderson, Labour's Way to Peace, pp. 46-50. 28 Memorandum respecting the Development of the Idea of a Mediterranean Pact, July 2 1934, printed for the use of the Foreign Office and deposited i n the archives of the Public Record Office, London (no reference). A photocopy of th i s document was supplied to the author by Dr. P. Marzari. 29 Henderson to Lindsay (Washington), May 3 1931, DBFP Ser. 2, v o l . 2, no. 350. 30 P. P. Walters, A History of the League of Nations, p. 416. 31 Por the text of the Draft Convention, see League of Nations, Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference, Draft Convention. 32 E.\"W. Bennett, Germany and the Diplomacy of the Financial Crisis; 1931. p. 78. For a f u l l discussion of the German attitude towards the customs union proposal, see i b i d . , pp. 40-81 . 33 T y r r e l l (Paris) to Rumbold (Berlin) and Phipps (Vienna), March 25 1931, DBFP Ser. 2, v o l . 2, no. 5 . 34 Henderson to Lindsay, June 26 1931, i b i d . , no. 87; aide-memoire to the French Government, July 2 1931, i b i d . , no. 118; conversation between Henderson and Curtius, July 21 1931, i b i d . , no. 221. 211 35 L o r d L o n d o n d e r r y , W i n g s o f D e s t i n y , p p . 96-7; H . M a c m i l l a n , W i n d s o f C h a n g e , p . 314; A . C . T e m p e r l e y , T h e W h i s p e r i n g G a l l e r y o f E u r o p e , p p . 216-9; M . A . H a m i l t o n , R e m e m b e r i n g M y G o o d F r i e n d s , p . 250. 36 E a r l o f A v o n ( S i r A . E d e n ) , T h e E d e n M e m o i r s ; F a c i n g t h e D i c t a t o r s , p . 2 2 . 37 H a m i l t o n , o p . c i t . , p p . 250-1. 38 I b i d . . p . 250. S a m u e l h a d b e e n o n e o f t h e L i b e r a l m e m b e r s o n a t h r e e - p a r t y s u b - c o m m i t t e e o f t h e C o m m i t t e e o f I m p e r i a l D e f e n c e e s t a b l i s h e d i n M a r c h 1931 t o M a d v i s e a s t o t h e p o l i c y t o b e a d o p t e d a t t h e f o r t h c o m i n g D i s a r m a m e n t C o n f e r e n c e \" . V i s c o u n t T e m p l e w o o d , N i n e T r o u b l e d Y e a r s , p . 118. 39 S e e M a c D o n a l d , l o c . c i t . 40 R e c o r d o f a F i v e - P o w e r M e e t i n g , D e c e m b e r 6 1932, D B P P S e r . 2, v o l . 4, n o . 211. N o t e s t o C h a p t e r I I 1 L e t t e r f r o m M a c D o n a l d t o L o n d o n d e r r y , F e b r u a r y 1932, c i t e d i n L o n d o n d e r r y , o p . c i t . . p . 56. 2 T e m p e r l e y , o p . c i t . , p . 174* 3 T e m p l e w o o d , l o c . c i t . 4 S e e B . H . L i d d e l l H a r t , M e m o i r s , v o l . . 1, p p . 184-90. 5 I b i d . , p . 187. 6 I b i d . , p . 190. 7 K . M i d d l e m a s a n d J . B a r n e s ^ B a l d w i n ; a B i o g r a p h y . p . 731. 8 S i m o n , F e b r u a r y 8 1932, R D C , V R P M v o l . 1, p p . 55-9. 9 T a r d i e u , F e b r u a r y 8 1932, i b i d . , p p . 60-4. F o r t h e t e x t o f t h e F r e n c h p l a n , s e e R D C , C D v o l . 1, p p . 113-6. 10 G i b s o n t o S t i m s o n ( S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e ) , M a r c h 17 1932, PRUS;?,1932 v o l . 1, p p . 54-9» 11 M e m o r a n d u m b y S i m o n o n a c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h T a r d i e u , F e b r u a r y 24 1932, D B F P S e r . 2, v o l . 3, n o . 235. 212 12 Gibson, February 9 1932, RDC, YRPM vol. 1, pp. 64-7. 13 Grandi, February 10 1932, ibid., pp. 71^4. 14 Litvinov, February 11 1932, ibid.. pp. 8 I - 7 . 15 Hadolny, February 18 1932, ibid., pp. 143-9* 16 Liddell Hart, op. c i t . , pp. 194 - 5 . 17 Ibid., p. 194'. 18 Memorandum by Simon on a conversation with Tardieu, February 24 1932, DBFP Ser. 2, vol. 3» n 0 « 2355 memorandum by Simon on a conversation with Tardieu, March 12 1932, ibid.. no. 236. 19 At least, there i s nothing in the published British documents or in any memoir sources to suggest that Simon followed up his enquiries. 20 Originally, the Easter break was to have ended on April 4. but i t was extended to April 11 because of an Extraordinary Session of the League Assembly discussing the Far Eastern situation resulting from the Japanese occupation of Manchuria. RDC, MGC vol. 1, pp. 31-3. 21 Simon to Rumbold, March 30 1932, DBFP Ser. 2, vol. 3, no. 239. 22 Gibson, April 11 1932, RDC, 1GG vol. 1, pp. 38^41. 23 Litvinov, April 12 1932, ibid., pp. 4 6 - 5 O ; RDC, CDvol. 1, pp. 124-37. 24 Tardieu, April 11 1932, RDC, MGC vol. 1, pp. 44-6; Tardieu, April 12 1932, ibid., pp. 50-5. 25 Ibid.. p. 82. 26 For the text of the resolution, see ibid., p. 91. The Soviets voted against the resolution because of i t s reference to the application of Article 8 of the Covenant, a document the Soviet Union had not signed. 27 Ibid., p. 113. 28 Ibid.. p. 116. 29 Ibid., p. 113.' 30 Meeting between representatives of the U.K. and U.S., April 23 1932, DBFP Ser. 2, vol. 3, no. 240. 213 31 Conversat ion among members of the American, B r i t i s h and German de lega t ions , A p r i l 26 1932, FRUS 1932 v o l . 1, pp. 108-12. 32 See above, p. 44• a l so L i d d e l l Har t , l o c . c i t . 33 Gibson to Ac t i ng Secretary of S ta te , A p r i l 29 1932, FRUS 1932 v o l . 1, pp. 112-4. 34 See, e . g . , Wa l te rs , op. c i t . t pp. 506-7, Wheeler-Bennett, op. c i t . , p. 33 and Franz von Papen, Memoirs, p. 140. 35 A. F ranco is -Ponoet , Souvenirs d'une ambassade a B e r l i n , p. 41• 36 Papen, l o c . c i t . Apparent ly , Brttning d i d not inform h i s successor that the French had accepted h i s p l a n ! 37 Memorandum by Dav i s , February 12 1932, FRUS 1932 v o l . 1, pp. 34-9. See a l s o , i b i d . , p. 62. 38 Gibson to St imson, Maroh 17 1932, i b i d . , pp. 54—9» Gibson to Aot ing Secretary of S t a t e , A p r i l 21 1932, i b i d . . pp. 10-4-6. 39 Gibson to St imson, March 17 1932, i b i d . , pp. 54-9; Gibson to Ac t i ng Secretary of S ta te , A p r i l 21 1932, i b i d . . pp. 104-i6j M d d e l l Har t , op. o i t . . p. 195* 40 DBFP Ser . 2, v o l . 3 , no. 240, n.'4. 41 See DBFP Ser . 2, v o l . 4 , nos . 52, 74, 110 and 136. 42 Gibson to Aot ing Secretary of S ta te , A p r i l 29 1932, FRUS; 1932 v o l . 1, pp. 112-4, Temperley, op. c i t . , p. 203. 43 I b i d . , p. 204. 44 Th is i s a personal suggest ion based mainly on c i r cums tan t i a l ev idence. Apparent ly , no B r i t i s h record was kept of the conversat ions of A p r i l 26. On A p r i l 23, however, MacDonald d i d inform Stimson that the B r i t i s h Cabinet had decided unanimously against g i v i n g fu r ther assuranoes such as a Mediterranean Locarno \" f o r en ter ing i n t o a d d i t i o n a l commitments i n v o l v i n g the p o s s i b i l i t y of m i l i t a r y or naval r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s i n the event of Cont inen ta l war\" . DBFP Ser . 2, v o l . 3 , no . 240. See a l s o , Gibson to Ac t i ng Secretary of S ta te , A p r i l 25 1932, FRUS 1932 v o l . 1, pp. 106-8. 45 Temperley, op. c i t . . p. 192. 46 The French found t h e i r argument d i f f i c u l t to substant ia te and were embarrassed by the fac t that they had chr is tened tanks \"chars d ' a s s a u t \" . A hasty change to \"chars de combat\" d i d not improve the French repu ta t ion f o r l o g i c . I b i d . , p. 195* 214 47 Lord Stanhope, May 31 1932, RDC:, MLG. pp. 63-5-48 RDC, MLC, pp. 1 12-28. Por the debates in the Land Commission, see ibid.. pp. 1-96. 49 Liddell Hart, op. c i t . . pp. I85 and 2 0 8 . 50 Ibid., pp. 2 0 9 - 1 0 . 51 See RDC, MNC, pp. 126-37. 52 For the report of the Air Commission, see RDC, MAC, pp. 2 9 9 - 3 1 2 . See also, ibid., pp. 1-116. 53 Cabinet meeting of May 4, Middlemas and Barnes, op. c i t . . pp. 731-2. 54 Lord Londonderry, op. c i t . . pp. 39-40 and 6 6 - 7 . 55 Ibid.. pp. 52-3 and 66; Lord Londonderry, Ourselves and Germany. PP. 53-4. 56 Lord Cecil, reported in the \"Manchester Guardian\" of May 18 1932, cited in Carr, op. c i t . . p. 2 5 . 57 Mellon to Acting Secretary of State, May 13 1932, FRUS 1932 vol. 1, pp. 121-5; Gibson to Stimson, May 17 1932, ibid.. pp. 130-1. 58 Mellon to Acting Secretary of State, May 13 1932, ibid., pp., 121-5. 59 Ibid. 60 Baldwin, speaking in the Cabinet on May 4, Middlemas and Barnes, loc. c i t . 61 Mellon to Stimson, June 8 1932, FRUS: 1932 vol. 1, pp. I58-6O; Gibson to Stimson, June 10 1932, ibid., pp. 163-6; Stimson to the American delegation in Geneva, June 11 1932, ibid., pp. 166-8. 62 Gibson to Stimson, May 17 1932, ibid., pp. 130-1; Gibson to Stimson, June 7 1932, ibid.. p. 157. 63 Gibson to Stimson, June 10 1932, ibid.. pp. 163-6. 64 Castle (Under-Secretary of State) to Stimson, May 25 1932, ibid.. pp. I 8 5 - 6 . 65 Stimson to Gibson, May 16 1932, ibid.. p. 129; Stimson to Gibson, June 7 1932, ibid., pp. 153-7; Stimson to Mellon, June 7 1933, ibid., pp. 157-8. 66 Ibid. 215 67 S t i m s o n t o G i b s o n , J u n e 7 1932, i b i d . , p p . 153-7* S t i m s o n * s p r o p o s a l s e n v i s a g e d a o n e - t h i r d r e d u c t i o n i n t h e t o t a l t o n n a g e o f b a t t l e s h i p s a n d s u b m a r i n e s , a o n e - f i f t h r e d u c t i o n i n a i r c r a f t -c a r r i e r s , c r u i s e r s a n d d e s t r o y e r s a n d t h e l i m i t a t i o n o f i n d i v i d u a l s u b m a r i n e s t o 250 t o n s . L a n d f o r c e s i n e x c e s s o f t h o s e n e c e s s a r y f o r i n t e r n a l p o l i c e d u t i e s w o u l d b e r e d u c e d b y o n e - t h i r d a n d a l l m i l i t a r y a v i a t i o n a s p a r t o f l a n d a r m a m e n t s w o u l d b e a b o l i s h e d i n t i m e o f p e a c e . B o m b i n g w o u l d b e p r o h i b i t e d , b u t r e c o n n a i s s a n c e p l a n e s a l l o w e d . I n a m e m o r a n d u m o f M a y 24, H o o v e r h a d o u t l i n e d p r o p o s a l s e n v i s a g i n g t h e a b o l i t i o n o f s u b m a r i n e s a n d a i r c r a f t - c a r r i e r s , a o n e - t h i r d r e d u c t i o n i n b a t t l e s h i p s , c r u i s e r s a n d d e s t r o y e r s a n d t h e a b o l i t i o n o f t a n k s , h e a v y m o b i l e g u n s a n d m i l i t a r y a v i a t i o n ( e x c e p t f o r s c o u t i n g p u r p o s e s ) . S e e i b i d . , p p . 180-2. 68 M e m o r a n d u m b y D a v i s o n a , c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h H e r r i o t , M a y 22 1932, i b i d . , p p . 132-9. 69 P a p e n , o p . c i t . . p p . 2, 113, 156 a n d 175, F r a n c o i s - P o n e e t , o p . c i t . . p . 43. 70 P a p e n , o p . c i t . , p . 156; F r a n c o i s - P o n c e t , o p . c i t . . p p . 47-8. 71 S i m o n t o N e w t o n ( B e r l i n ) , J u n e 6 1932, D B P P S e r . 2, v o l . 3, n o . 124? S i m o n t o N e u r a t h , J u n e 9 1932, i b i d . , n o . 128; T y r r e l l t o F o r e i g n O f f i c e , J u n e 11 1932, i b i d . . n o . 133; n o t e s o f a n A n g l o -F r e n c h M e e t i n g , J u n e 11 1932, i b i d . , n o . 134* S e e a l s o , i b i d . , n o . 108. 72 N o t e s o f a n A n g l o - F r e n c h M e e t i n g , J u n e 11 1932, i b i d . . n o . 134* 73 E . H e r r i o t , J a d i s ; d ' u n e g u e r r e £ l ' a u t r e . p . 322; P a p e n , o p . c i t . . p . 176. A p p a r e n t l y , t h e i d e a o f a m i l i t a r y e n t e n t e o r i g i n a t e d w i t h G e n e r a l s H a m m e r s t e i n a n d B l o m b e r g , n o t S c h l e i c h e r . S e e D D F S e r . 1, v o l . 1, n o . 46, a n n e x 2. 74 I b i d . 75 I b i d . . S e r . 1, v o l . 1, n o . 46, a n n e x 3. 76 P a p e n t o M a c D o n a l d , J u n e 21 1932, D B F P S e r . 2, v o l . 3, n o . 144; P a p e n , l o c . c i t . 77 H e r r i o t , o p . c i t . , p p . 338-9. 78 P a p e n , o p . c i t . . p p . 176-7; n o t e s o f a n A n g l o - F r e n c h c o n v e r s a t i o n , J u n e 27 1932, D B F P S e r . 2, v o l . 3, n o . 148; n o t e s o f a n A n g l o - G e r m a n c o n v e r s a t i o n , J u l y 5 1932, i b i d . » , n o . 176. S e e D D F S e r . 1, v o l . 1, n o . 46, a n n e x e s 2-4 a n d n o . 68, a n n e x e s 1-2. 79 N o t e s o f a n A n g l o - F r e n c h c o n v e r s a t i o n , J u n e 27 1932, D B P P S e r . 2, v o l . 3, n o . 148; H e r r i o t , o p . c i t . , p p . 343-5* 216 80 ITaid,. p. 347; memorandum \"by Papen, June 29 1932, c i t e d i n DGFP Ser. C, v o l . 1, no. 43, 2; notes of an Anglo-French conversation, June 27 1932, DBFP Ser. 2, v o l . 3, no. 148. 81 Papen had dropped h i n t s about h i s proposals t o Stephane Lauzanne of \"Le Matin\", but t h e i r r e c e p t i o n i n Germany was u n e n t h u s i a s t i c and t h e . n a t i o n a l i s t press opposed them. See, e.g., notes of an Anglo-German conversation, June 27 1932, i b i d . , no. 149* 82 I b i d ; H e r r i o t , op. c i t . . p. 345? Papen, op. c i t . . p. 177• 83 See notes of an Anglo-French-German conversation, June 28 1932, DBFP Ser. 2, v o l . 3, no. 150. 84 Papen, op. c i t . . pp. 181-2. 85 See below, p. 64* 86 Notes of an Anglo-German conversation, J u l y 5 1932, DBFP Ser. 2, v o l . 3, no. 174* 87 Notes of an Anglo-French conversation, J u l y 5 1932, i b i d . . no. 175* 88 Notes of an Anglo-French conversation, J u l y 8 1932, i b i d . . no. I84. 89 F o r the t e x t of the Anglo-French D e c l a r a t i o n , see i b i d . . no. 189, enclosure. 90 Notes of an Anglo-French c o n v e r s a t i o n , J u l y 5 1932, i b i d . , no. 172. 91 See i b i d . . nos. 172 and I84. D i r e c t evidence that the h i n d e r i n g of Franco-German n e g o t i a t i o n s and the need f o r an a l l y against the Hoover p l a n were the primary o b j e c t i v e s of the B r i t i s h proposal i s l a c k i n g , but the c i r c u m s t a n t i a l evidence i s co n v i n c i n g i n i t s e l f . 92 Notes of an Anglo-French conversation, J u l y 5 1932, i b i d . . no. 172; notes of an Anglo-French con v e r s a t i o n , J u l y 8 1932, i b i d . . no. 184; MacDonald t o H e r r i o t , J u l y 13 1932, DDF Ser. 1, v o l . 1, no. 17. 93 Gibson, June 22 1932, RDC, MGC v o l . 1, pp. 122-4. For the genesis of Hoover's proposals and the con s i d e r a b l e amendments made by the State Department t o the o r i g i n a l p lan, see FRUS 1932 v o l . 1, pp. 180-214. 94 See RDC, MGC v o l . 1, pp. 129-30. 95 Simon, June 22 1932, i b i d . , pp. 124-6; Simon, June 23 1932, PDC. 5th Ser., v o l . 267, c o l s . 1264-5; Simon, June 27 1932, i b i d . , c o l s . 1459-60; Baldwin, June 27 1932, i b i d . , c o l s . I 4 6 O - I ; Baldwin, June 28 1932, i b i d . . c o l s . 1776-80; note by Samuel (Home Secretary) of a con v e r s a t i o n with Henderson, June 24 1932, DBFP Ser. 2, v o l . 3, no. 254» 217 96 Gibson to Stimson, July 1 1932, FRUS. 1932 vol. 1, p. 252. 97 See above, p. 63. 98 The f u l l Statement of Views circulated by the Government is published in RDC, CD vol. 1, pp. 265-8. 99 Gibson to Stimson, June 25 1932, FRUS: 1932 vol. 1, pp. 234-6? memorandum by Stimson, June 30 1932, ibid.. pp. 249-51* 100 Gibson to Stimson, July 2 1932, ibid., pp. 253-^ 5. 101 Gibson to Stimson, July 2 1932, ibid., pp. 253-5-and 255-7. 102 For the progress of the private conversations leading to the report of July 5, see DBFP Ser. 2, vol. 3, nos. 241-9, 251-3, 256-7 and 261. 103 The f u l l resolution and Benes' appraisal of i t is in RDC, MGC vol. 1, pp. 153-61. Simon's original draft is in FRUS. 1932 vol. 1, pp. 284-7-104 The Committee had reported i t s (unanimous) findings to the General Commission on May 31. RDC. CD vol. 1, pp. 210-5. 105 See above, pp. 44 and 50. 106 See above, pp. 60-1. 107 Balbo, July 21 1932, RDC. MGC vol. 1, p. 168. 108 Patteson (Geneva) to Vansittart (Permanent Under-Secretary), July 20 1932, DBFP Ser. 2, vol. 3, no. 265; Rumbold to Simon, July 21 1932, ibid.. no. 269; Gibson to Stimson, July 21 1932, FRUS 1932 vol. 1, p. 309. Notes to Chapter III 1 DBFP Ser. 2, vol. 4, no. 46, n. 1. 2 Francois-Poncet to Herriot, August 23 1932, DDF Ser. 1, vol. 1, no. 115; Francois-Poncet to Herriot, August 25 1932, ibid., no. 125, annex; DBFP Ser. 2, vol. 4, nos. 49 and 55-7. 3 Memorandum from the German Government to the French Government, August 29 1932, ibid., no. 62. 218 4 H e r r i o t t o t h e F r e n c h R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s i n R o m e , B r u s s e l s , L o n d o n , P r a g u e a n d B e r l i n , A u g u s t 25 1932, D B F S e r . 1, v o l . 1, n o . 120; S i m o n t o R u m b o l d , A u g u s t 26 1932, D B F P S e r . 2, v o l . 4, n o . 50; R u m b o l d t o S i m o n , S e p t e m b e r 3 1932, i b i d . , n o . 67* 5 C a m p b e l l t o S i m o n , S e p t e m b e r 1 1932, i b i d . , n o . 59» C a m p b e l l t o S i m o n , S e p t e m b e r 2 1932, i b i d . , n o . 64; R u m b o l d t o S i m o n , S e p t e m b e r 3 1932, i b i d . . n o . 67. S e e a l s o , S i m o n t o R u m b o l d , A u g u s t 26 1932, i b i d . . n o . 50. 6 F r a n c o i s - P o n c e t t o H e r r i o t , A u g u s t 23 1932, D D F S e r . 1, v o l . 1, n o . 115. 7 F r a n c o i s - P o n c e t t o H e r r i o t , A u g u s t 25 1932, i b i d . , n o . 125, a n n e x ; F r a n c o i s - P o n c e t t o H e r r i o t , S e p t e m b e r 1 1932, i b i d . , n o . 137, a n n e x 1. 8 N o t e d e l a D i r e c t i o n p o l i t i q u e , A u g u s t 28 1932, i b i d . , n o . 127. 9 I t i s n o t k n o w n w h e t h e r t h e l e a k w a s a c c i d e n t a l o r d e l i b e r a t e . T h e o n l y c l u e i s a r e m a r k b y M a c D o n a l d o f l a r c h 14 1933 t h a t a n y t h i n g s a i d t o P a u l - B o n c o u r ( M i n i s t e r o f W a r ) a p p e a r e d i n t h e p r e s s . D B F P S e r . 2, v o l . 4, n o . 301. 10 H e r r i o t t o F r a n c o i s - P o n c e t , A u g u s t 30 1932, D D F S e r . 1, v o l . 1, n o . 130; H e r r i o t t o t h e F r e n c h A m b a s s a d o r s i n L o n d o n , R o m e a n d W a s h i n g t o n , A u g u s t 3 1 1932, i b i d . , n o . 132; C a m p b e l l t o S i m o n , S e p t e m b e r 1 1932, D B F P S e r . 2, v o l . 4, n o . 59. 11 N o t e h a n d e d t o t h e G e r m a n M i n i s t e r f o r F o r e i g n A f f a i r s b y t h e F r e n c h A m b a s s a d o r i n B e r l i n o n S e p t e m b e r 11 1932, i b i d . , n o . 84. S e e a l s o , C a m p b e l l t o S i m o n , S e p t e m b e r 14 1932, i b i d . , n o . 90* 12 N e u r a t h t o H e n d e r s o n , S e p t e m b e r 1 4 1932, R D C , M B v o l . 1, p . 3. 13 S i m o n t o R u m b o l d , A u g u s t 29 1932, D B F P S e r . 2, v o l . 4, n o . 52; F l e u r i a u ( L o n d o n ) t o H e r r i o t , A u g u s t 30 1932, D D F S e r . 1, v o l . 1, n o . 129. 14 S i m o n t o C a m p b e l l , S e p t e m b e r 9 1932, D B F P S e r . 2, v o l . 4, n o s . 79-80; F l e u r i a u t o H e r r i o t , S e p t e m b e r 9 1932, D D F S e r . 1, v o l . 1, n o s . 158 a n d 160-1. T h e G e r m a n m e m o r a n d u m h a d b e e n r e l e a s e d t o t h e p r e s s o n S e p t e m b e r 6 f o r p u b l i c a t i o n o n t h e f o l l o w i n g d a y . F l e u r i a u h a d h a n d e d S i m o n t h e d r a f t F r e n c h N o t e o n S e p t e m b e r 6. 15 N o t e d e l a D i r e c t i o n p o l i t i q u e , A u g u s t 18 1932, i b i d . , n o . 106; N o t e d e l a D i r e c t i o n p o l i t i q u e , A u g u s t 28 1932, i b i d . , n o . 127* 16 F r a n o o i s - P o n c e t t o H e r r i o t , O c t o b e r 4 1932, i b i d . , n o . 224. 2 1 9 1 7 U.K. Statement of Views, September 15 1 9 3 2 , DBPP Ser. 2 , vol. 4 , no. 92. Copies of the document were handed to the French, German, Italian and American Governments on September 1 7 - 1 8 . 1 8 Simon to Murray (Rome), September 1 9 1 9 3 2 , ibid., no. 9 9 * Mussolini had taken over the Foreign Ministry from Grandi on July 2 0 , Grandi being appointed Ambassador in London on the following day. 1 9 Rumbold to Simon, September 2 0 1 9 3 2 , ibid., no. 1 0 4 . The British memorandum was regarded as; a move towards France, and there was, severe criticism of the juridical basis of the British proposals. See Rumbold to Simon, September 2 0 1 9 3 2 , ibid., no. 105 and Rumbold to Simon, September 2 1 1 9 3 2 , ibid., no. 1 0 6 . 2 0 Memorandum by Simon, September 23 1 9 3 2 , ibid., no. 1 1 1 . 2 1 Memorandum by Simon, September 25 1 9 3 2 , ibid.. no. 1 1 2 . 2 2 Ibid. 2 3 Ibid. 2 4 Ibid. 25 Simon to H.M.'s Representatives at Paris, Berlin and Rome, September 3 0 1 9 3 2 , ibid., nos. 115 -6; Vansittart to H.I.*s Representatives at Paris, Berlin and Rome, October 3 1 9 3 2 , ibid., no. 1 2 4 ; Patteson to Osborne (Washington), October 3 1 9 3 2 , ibid., no. 1 2 2 ; Vansittart to Osborne, October 3 1 9 3 2 , ibid., no. 1 2 5 ; Herriot to Paul-Boncour, October 6 1 9 3 2 , DDF Ser. 1 , vol. 1 , no. 2 2 8 ; ibid.. n. 1 , p. 1 1 5 . 26 The French were anxious that a postponement of the reunion of the Bureau would be interpreted by Germany as evidence that \"blackmail\" succeeded. See ibid., nos. 1 6 0 - 1 , 1 6 3 , 1 7 0 , 1 7 4 - 5 and 1 8 0 , also DBFP, Ser. 2 , vol. 4 , nos. 7 9 - 8 0 , 82, 8 6 and 91.. 2 7 Simon to Murray, September 1 9 1 9 3 2 , ibid., no. 9 9 * 2 8 Hewton to Simon, October 4 1 9 3 2 , ibid.. 1 3 1 . 2 9 Simon to Tyrrell, October 5 1 9 3 2 , ibid., no. 1 3 4 . 3 0 Hewton to Simon, October 7 1 9 3 2 , ibid., nos. 1 4 3 - 4 and 1 4 6 . 31 It was for this reason that the four-Power meeting had been proposed, and i t also explains the urgency with which Simon had endeavoured to secure a postponement of the reunion of the Bureau. See memorandum by Simon of a conversation with Heurath, September?23 1 9 3 2 , ibid., no. 1 1 1 . \"; 32 See above, p. 6 3 . 220 33 N o t e s o f a n A n g l o - F r e n c h c o n v e r s a t i o n , J u l y 5 1932, D B F P S e r . 2, v o l . 3, n o . 172. 34 S i m o n t o T y r r e l l , O c t o b e r 5 1932, D B F P S e r . 2, v o l . 4, n o s . 134-5J T y r r e l l t o S i m o n , O c t o b e r 6 1932, i b i d . , n o . 140; H e r r i o t t o M a c D o n a l d , O c t o b e r 6 1932, i b i d . , n o . 141; H e r r i o t t o P a u l - B o n c o u r , O c t o b e r 6 1932, D D E S e r . 1, v o l . 1, n o . 228. 35 C o n v e r s a t i o n b e t w e e n M a c D o n a l d a n d H e r r i o t , O c t o b e r 13 1932, D B F P S e r . 2, v o l . 4, n o . 15.2; n o t e s o f a n A n g l o - F r e n c h M e e t i n g , O c t o b e r 13 1932, i b i d . , n o s . 153-4> n o t e s o f a n A n g l o - F r e n c h M e e t i n g , O c t o b e r 14 1932, i b i d . , n o . 156. 36 C o n v e r s a t i o n b e t w e e n M a c D o n a l d a n d H e r r i o t , O c t o b e r 13 1932, i b i d . , n o . 152. F u r t h e r e v i d e n c e t h a t t h e B r i t i s h G o v e r n m e n t w a s n o t r e a l l y i n f a v o u r o f d i s a r m a m e n t i s t h e p h r a s i n g o f t h e S t a t e m e n t o f V i e w s o f S e p t e m b e r , w h i c h e x p r e s s e d t h e h o p e t h a t \" t h e r e m a y r e s u l t f r o m G e n e v a . . . a r e a l l y v a l u a b l e m e a s u r e o f d i s a r m a m e n t . . . . \" T h e u s e o f t h e w o r d \" m a y \" i m p l i e s t h a t B r i t i s h M i n i s t e r s w e r e f u n d a m e n t a l l y u n c o n c e r n e d a t t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f t h e r e b e i n g n o r e s u l t a t G e n e v a . 37 F l e u r i a u t o H e r r i o t , S e p t e m b e r 15 1932, D D F S e r . 1, v o l . 1, n o . 184; S i m o n t o T y r r e l l , O c t o b e r 5 1932, D B F P S e r . 2, v o l . 4, n o . 134. 38 S i m o n t o N e w t o n a n d G r a h a m ( R o m e ) , O c t o b e r 13 1932, i b i d . , n o . 155* S e e i b i d . , n o s . 153 a n d 156 f o r t h e F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y ' s b a c k i n g o f t h e M a c D o n a l d l i n e . 39 S e e , e . g . , S i m o n t o T y r r e l l , O c t o b e r 5 1932, i b i d . , n o . 134. 40 S e e , e . g . , N e w t o n t o S i m o n , O c t o b e r 7 1932, i b i d y , n o . 145» a l s o F r a n c o i s - P o n c e t t o H e r r i o t , O c t o b e r 4 1932, D D F S e r . 1, v o l . 1, n o . 224. 41 M a s s i g l i t o H e r r i o t , S e p t e m b e r 23 1932, i b i d . , n o . 208; i b i d . , p . 415» n . 1; n o t e s o f a n A n g l o - F r e n c h M e e t i n g , O c t o b e r 14 1932, D B F P S e r . 2, v o l . 4, n o . 156; S i m o n t o G r a h a m , O c t o b e r 17 1932, i b i d . , n o . 161. S e e a l s o , m e m o r a n d u m b y S i m o n , S e p t e m b e r 23 1932, i b i d . . n o . 111.. 42 N o t e s o f a n A n g l o - F r e n c h M e e t i n g , O c t o b e r 14 1932, i b i d . , n o . 156. 43 S i m o n t o Tyrrell, O c t o b e r 5 1932, i b i d . . n o . 135« I n a c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h F l e u r i a u o n S e p t e m b e r 15 ( s e e D D F S e r . 1, v o l . 1, n o . I84), S i m o n h a d s u g g e s t e d t h a t \" i f w e c o u l d p r e s e r v e a p p e a r a n c e s G e r m a n y ' s p e r s i s t e n c e . . . w o u l d r e d u c e t h e D i s a r m a m e n t C o n f e r e n c e t o n o t h i n g \" . A n d d e s p i t e t h e o b v i o u s d i f f e r e n c e s b e t w e e n F r e n c h a n d B r i t i s h p o l i c y , t h e d i s c u s s i o n s o f O c t o b e r 13-14 ( s e e D B F P S e r . 2, v o l . 4, n o s . 152-4, 156 a n d 163) h a d t a k e n p l a c e i n a v e r y a m i c a b l e a t m o s p h e r e . 44 F r a n c o i s - P o n c e t t o H e r r i o t , O c t o b e r 4 1932, D D F S e r . 1, v o l . 1, n o . 224. 221 45 Newton to Simon, October 7 1932, DBFP Ser. 2, v o l . 4, no. 144; Francois-Poncet to Herr io t , October 7 1932, DDF Ser. 1, v o l . 1, no. 232. 46 Newton to Simon, October 14 1932, DBFP Ser. 2, v o l . 4, no. 157; Newton to Simon, October 15 1932, i b i d . , no. 160; Newton to Simon, October 17 1932, i b i d . , no. 162; Simon to Newton, October 15 1932, i b i d . , no. 159. 47 H e r r i o t , October 28 1932, France, Chambre des Deputes, Debate Parlementaires. 1932, no. 85, pp. 2916-20; Herriot to the Supreme Council of National Defence, October 28 1932, DDF Ser. 1, v o l . 1, no. 286. For the background of the French plan, see i b i d . , nos. 244, 250, 255, 260, 264, 266, 268, 272-3 and 286. 48 Herriot to the Supreme Council of National Defence, October 28 1932, i b i d . . no. 286; Herr io t , October 28 1932, Chambre des Deputes, Debats Parlementaires. l o c . c i t . 49 RDC:. MB v o l . 1, pp. 32-8. 50 Paul-Boncour d i d not specify the nations that would be expected to part ic ipate i n the mutual assistance pact, and neither did the f u l l French plan when i t was released on November 14. In pr ivate , however, the French regarded the par t i c ipa t ion of both I t a l y and Germany as a sine qua non of any agreement. 51 \"The Times\", September 30 1932. See a lso , DBFP Ser. 2, v o l . 4, nos. 119 and 153. 52 PDC, 5th Ser . , v o l . 270, c o l . 525. 53 A t t l e e , November 10 1932, i b i d . . c o l . 530. For his f u l l speech, see i b i d . , c o l s . 525-34* 54 Although Att lee summarized Labour's aims, there was some disagreement within the Party as to the means by which they should be implemented. See, e . g . , the speeches of George Lansbury ( i b i d . . co l s . 623-30) who made h is usual plea for t o t a l disarmament and Frederick Cooks ( i b i d . , c o l s . 565-72) who advocated a pol icy based on the Geneva Protocol . 55 See, e . g . , conversation between MacDonald and Herr io t , October 13 1932, DBFP Ser. 2, v o l . 4, no. 152 and notes of an Anglo-French Meeting, October 13 1932, i b i d . , no. 153. 56 Baldwin, November 10 1932, PDC. 5th Ser . , v o l . 270, c o l . 632. For Baldwin's f u l l speech, see i b i d . . co l s . 630-8. 57 \"But when the next war comes then do not let them [the young men] lay the blame upon the old men. Let them remember that they, they p r i n c i p a l l y or they alone, are responsible for the terrors that have , f a l l e n upon the earth\" . I b i d . . c o l . 638. 222 58 Simon, November 10 1932, i b i d . , co ls . 534-48. 59 For the French text , see DDF Ser. 1, v o l . 1, no. 331. An English t ranslat ion is ; i n DIA 1932. pp. 217-27. 60 Wilson (Geneva) to Stimson, November 3 1932, FRUS 1932 v o l . 1, pp. 356-8. 61 The relevant portions of Stimson's speech are i n DIA 1932, PP. 295-303. 62 Wilson to Stimson, November 3 1932, FRUS, 1932 v o l . 1, pp. 356-8. 63 Francois-Poncet to Herr iot , November 15 1932, DDF Ser. 1, v o l . 2, no. 1; Francois-Poncet to Herr iot , November 17 1932, i b i d . , no. 9« See also, i b i d . . p . 3, n . 1, and Wilson to Stimson, November 1 1932, FRUS 1932 v o l . 1 , pp. 472-3. 64 Francois-Poncet to Herr iot , November 15 1932, DDF Ser. 1, v o l . 2, no. 1; Francois-Poncet to Herr iot , November 17 1932, i b i d . , no. 9» 65 Francois-Poncet to Herr iot , November 17 1932, i b i d . , no. 9» 66 Wilson to Stimson, November 16 1932, FRUS 1932 v o l . 1, pp. 388-90. 67 Francois-Poncet to Herr iot , November 15 1932, DDF Ser. 1, v o l . 2, no. 2. 68 For the American re ject ion of a formalized commitment, see Marriner (France) to Stimson, October 29 1932, FRUS 1932 v o l . 1, pp. 348-50 and Wilson to Stimson, November 3 1932, i b i d . . pp. 356-8. For Stimson*s wil l ingness to agree to an Executive Declaration, see memorandum by Stimson, November 4 1932, i b i d . , pp. 359-60 and memorandum by Stimson, November 15 1932, i b i d . . pp. 387-8. 69 Wilson to Stimson, November 16 1932, i b i d . , pp. 388-90. 70 Simon, November 17 1932, RDC,, MB v o l . 1, pp. 89-94. 71 Simon t o l d Mass ig l i (probably on November 17, but possibly during the proceeding week) that he envisaged that the \"no-forceM pact would be activated i n the event of a c r i s i s i n the P o l i s h Corridor or i n s i tuations s imi lar to that i n Manchuria, where force had been used but no war declared. Massigl i to Herr iot , November 17 1932, DDF Ser. 1, v o l . 2, no. 6. (Massigli was head of the League of Nations section of the Quai d'Orsay). 72 Figures for the leading European Powers towards the end of 1933 were (approx.): U.S.S .R. 1300-1900 machines; France I65O machines; I t a l y 1000 machines; B r i t a i n 850 machines. See G. M. Young, Stanley Baldwin, p . 177 and Londonderry, Wings of Destiny, p. 88. 223 73 T y r r e l l t o S i m o n , D e c e m b e r 1 1932, D B F P S e r , 2, v o l . 4, n o . 201. F o r t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g S i m o n ' s p r o p o s a l f o r f i v e - P o w e r n e g o t i a t i o n s i n G e n e v a , s e e i b i d . , n o s . 187-99* 74 C o n v e r s a t i o n b e t w e e n H e r r i o t a n d D a v i s , N o v e m b e r 26 1932, F R U S 1932 v o l . 1, p p . 476-81. 75 I b i d . 76 C o n v e r s a t i o n b e t w e e n H e r r i o t a n d D a v i s , N o v e m b e r 28 1932, i b i d . , p p . 48I-6. 77 N o t e d e l a D e l e g a t i o n F r a n c a i s e a l a C o n f e r e n c e d u D S s a r m e m e n t , D e c e m b e r 2 1932, D D F S e r . 1, v o l . 2, n o . 59; c o n v e r s a t i o n b e t w e e n M a c D o n a l d , S i m o n a n d B e n e s , D e c e m b e r 2 1932, D B F P S e r . 2, v o l . 4, n o . 203; c o n v e r s a t i o n b e t w e e n M a c D o n a l d , S i m o n a n d P a u l - B o n c o u r , D e c e m b e r 2 1932, i b i d . . n o . 204; c o n v e r s a t i o n b e t w e e n M a c D o n a l d , S i m o n , H e r r i o t a n d P a u l - B o n c o u r , D e c e m b e r 3 1932, i b i d . . n o . 206 ( c f . t h e F r e n c h r e c o r d , D D F S e r . 1, v o l . 2, n o . 60); c o n v e r s a t i o n b e t w e e n M a c D o n a l d , S i m o n a n d A l o i s i , D e c e m b e r 3 1932, D B F P Ser. 2, v o l . 4, n o . 207. 78 N o t e d u M a r c e l R a y ( c h e f a d j o i n t d u c a b i n e t d u P r e s i d e n t d u C o n s e i l ) , N o v e m b e r 28 1932, D D F S e r . 1, v o l . 2, n o . 42. S e e e s p e c i a l l y , \" a n n o t a t i o n m a n u s c r i t e d u P r e s i d e n t [ d u C o n s e i l J \" . 79 W i l s o n t o S t i m s o n , N o v e m b e r 21 1932, F R U S ; 1932 v o l . 1, p p . 398-401; S t i m s o n t o W i l s o n , N o v e m b e r 22 1932, i b i d . , p p . 404-5* 80 W i l s o n t o S t i m s o n , N o v e m b e r 21 1932, i b i d . , p p . 398-401; m e m o r a n d u m b y D a v i s , N o v e m b e r 28 1932, D B F P S e r . 2, v o l . 4, n o . 200.. 81 C o n v e r s a t i o n b e t w e e n M a c D o n a l d , S i m o n i a n d A l o i s i , D e c e m b e r 3 1932, i b i d . , n o . 207. 82 C o n v e r s a t i o n b e t w e e n M a c D o n a l d , S i m o n a n d A l o i s i , D e c e m b e r 3 1932, i b i d . , n o . 207; r e c o r d o f a m e e t i n g b e t w e e n M a c D o n a l d , S i m o n a n d m e m b e r s o f t h e F r e n c h a n d A m e r i c a n d e l e g a t i o n s , D e c e m b e r 5 1932, i b i d . , n o . 208. 83 R e c o r d o f a f i v e - P o w e r M e e t i n g , D e c e m b e r 6 1932, i b i d . , n o s . 210-1. C f . D D F S e r . 1, v o l . 2, n o s . 71-2 a n d F R U S . 1932 v o l . 1, p p . 492-7* 84 R e c o r d o f a f i v e - P o w e r M e e t i n g , D e c e m b e r 6 1932, D B F P S e r . 2, v o l . 4, n o s . 210-1; r e c o r d o f a f i v e - P o w e r M e e t i n g , D e c e m b e r 7 1932, i b i d . , n o . 212; r e c o r d o f a f i v e - P o w e r M e e t i n g , . D e c e m b e r 8 1932, i b i d . . n o s . 214-5; r e c o r d o f a M e e t i n g o f t h e B r i t i s h , F r e n c h , I t a l i a n a n d A m e r i c a n d e l e g a t i o n s , D e c e m b e r 8 1932, i b i d . . n o . 213* C f . D D F S e r . 1, v o l . 2, n o s . 71-2, 76 a n d 80-2, a l s o F R U S - 1932 v o l . 1, p p . 492-9* 224 85 Record of a five-Power Meeting, December 6 1932, DBFP Ser.. 2, v o l . 4, no. 211; record of a five-Power Meeting, December 7 1932, i b i d . , no. 212; record of a Meeting of the B r i t i s h , French, I t a l i a n and American delegations, December 8 1932, i b i d . . no. 213; record of a five-Power Meeting, December 8 1932, i b i d . . nos. 214-5; record of a five-Power Meeting, December 9 1932, i b i d . , no. 216. Cf . DDF Ser. 1, v o l . 2, nos. 72, 76, 80-2 and 88, also FRUS 1932 v o l . 1, ' PP. 492-501. 86 Record of a five-Power Meeting, December 9 1932, DBFP Ser. 2, v o l . 4, no. 217; record of a five-Power Meeting, December 10 1932, i b i d 5 . , no. 218; record of a five-Power Meeting, December 11 1932, i b i d . . , no. 219. Cf . DDF Ser. 1, v o l . 2, nos. 89 and 92-6, also FRUS.\", 1932 v o l . 1, pp- 499-508. The text of the Declaration of December 11 i s i n DBFP Ser. 2, v o l . 4, no. 220.. 87 Record of a five-Power Meeting, December 8 1932, i b i d . , no. 215; record of a five-Power Meeting, December 9 1932, i b i d . . nos. 216-7; record of a five-Power Meeting, December 10 1932, i b i d . , no. 218; record of a five-Power Meeting, December 11 1932, i b i d . . no. 219. Cf. DDF Ser. 1, v o l . 2, nos. 82, 88-9 and 92-6, also FRUS 1932 v o l . 1, pp. 498-508. 88 See Francois-Poncet's analysis of the s i tua t ion , especial ly concerning German intentions, DDF Ser. 1, v o l . 2, no. 109. 89 I b i d . 90 Record of a five-Power Meeting, December 6 1932, DBFP Ser. 2, v o l . 4, no. 211; DDF Ser. 1, v o l . 2, no. 72. Cf . FRUS 1932 v o l . 1, PP. 494-5. 91 See, e . g . , the \"Dai ly Herald\" of July 14 1932. 92 See, e . g . , DBFP Ser. 2, v o l . 3, no. 235 and DBFP Ser. 2, v o l . 4» no. 211. 93 Francois-Poncet to Paul-Boncour, January 18 1933, DDF Ser. 1, v o l . 2, no. 205? Francois-Poncet to Paul-Boncour, February 4 1933, i b i d . , no. 260. Notes to Chapter I? 1 Simon to Rumbold, January 31 1933, DBFP Ser. 2, v o l . 4, no. 232; Rumbold to Simon, February 4 1933, i b i d . . nos. 235 and 279; Francoiss-Poncet to Paul-Boncour, February 4 1933, DDF Ser. 1, v o l . 2, no. 260; c i r cu lar by Btilow, January 30 1933, DGFP Ser. C, v o l . 1, no. 1. 225 2 W.. E . S c o t t , A l l i a n c e a g a i n s t H i t l e r , p . 127. 3 S e e \" L e T e m p s \" o f F e b r u a r y 4 a n d M a r c h 15 1933, a l s o T y r r e l l t o S i m o n , M a r c h 20 1933, D B F P S e r . 2, v o l . 4, n o . 266 a n d S c o t t , o p . c i t . . p p . 103-4 a n d 125-7. 4 F r a n c o i s - P o n c e t t o P a u l - B o n c o u r , J a n u a r y 18 1933, D D F S e r . 1, v o l . 2, n o . 205; F r a n c o i s - P o n c e t t o P a u l - B o n c o u r , F e b r u a r y 4 1933, i b i d . , n o . 260. C f . u n s i g n e d m e m o r a n d u m , F e b r u a r y 18 1933, D G F P S e r . C , v o l . 1, n o . 2 3 . 5 M a s s i g l i , F e b r u a r y 2 1933, R D C , M G C v o l . 2, p p . 216-7; P a u l - B o n c o u r , F e b r u a r y 8 1933, i b i d . , p p . 253-62; N a d o l n y , F e b r u a r y 2 1933, i b i d . . pp.220-2. 6 A l o i s i , F e b r u a r y 2 1933, i b i d . . p p . 217-20; L i t v i n o v , F e b r u a r y 6 1933, i b i d . . p p . 234-9« t h e r e m a r k s o f t h e o t h e r d e l e g a t e s , s e e i b i d . , p p . 224-33 a n d 239-53. 7 S i m o n t o N e w t o n , N o v e m b e r 12 1932, D B F P S e r . 2, v o l . 4, n o . 171. 8 E d e n , F e b r u a r y 3 1933, R D C . M G C v o l . 2, p p . 222-4. 9 P a t t e s o n t o S i m o n , F e b r u a r y 6 1933, D B F P S e r . 2, v o l . 4, n o . 280. E d e n t o l d P a u l - B o n c o u r t h a t h e h a d o m i t t e d a n y r e f e r e n c e t o t h e g e n e r a l c o n s u l t a t i v e p a c t b e c a u s e o f A m e r i c a n \" s u s c e p t i b i l i t i e s \" - b u t i t h a d a l w a y s b e e n c l e a r t h a t B r i t i s h p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n a g e n e r a l c o n s u l t a t i v e p a c t w a s d e p e n d e n t o n A m e r i c a n p a r t i c i p a t i o n . S e e , e . g . , i b i d . . n o . 211. 10 D r a f t P r o p o s a l s b y t h e U . K . D e l e g a t i o n , i b i d . . n o . 278.. 11 S e e R D C . M B v o l . 1, p p . 149-61. 12 F l e u r i a u t o P a u l - B o n c o u r , F e b r u a r y 3 1933, D D F S e r . 1, v o l . 2, n o . 258. 13 A u b e r t t o P a u l - B o n c o u r , F e b r u a r y 18 1933, i b i d . , n o . 320. 14 S e e D G F P S e r . C , v o l . 1, n o . 2 3 . 15 T h e r e c o r d o f t h e s e i n c o n c l u s i v e d e b a t e s i s i n R D C , M G C v o l . 2, p p . , 262-352. 16 G i b s o n t o H u l l ( S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e ) , M a r c h 8 1933, F R U S 1933 v o l . 1, p p . 25-7. 17 D B F P S e r . 2, v o l . 4, n o . 294, a n n e x . 18 D I A 1932, p p . 234-9. 226 19 D G F P S e r . C , v o l . 1, n o s . 180 a n d 183-4; P h i p p s t o S i m o n , N o v e m b e r 21 1933, D B F P S e r . 2, v o l . 6, n o . 59; c o n v e r s a t i o n b e t w e e n M a c D o n a l d , S i m o n a n d B e n e s , M a r c h 13 1933, D B F P S e r . 2, v o l . 4 , n o . 298. S e e a l s o , Z . G a s i o r o w s k i , \" D i d P i l s u d s k i a t t e m p t t o i n i t i a t e a p r e v e n t i v e w a r i n 1933?\", J o u r n a l o f M o d e r n H i s t o r y , J u n e 1955, p p . 135-51 . 20 C o n v e r s a t i o n b e t w e e n M a c D o n a l d , S i m o n a n d B e n e s , M a r c h 17 1933, D B F P S e r . 2, v o l . 5, n o . 43; D I A 1933, p p . 4 1 5 - 8 . 21 N o t e d u S o u s - S e c r e t a r a r i a t d ' E t a t a l a P r e s i d e n c e , J a n u a r y 20 1933, D D F S e r . 1, v o l . 2, n o . 218. 22 T e m p e r l e y , W h i s p e r i n g G a l l e r y o f E u r o p e , p . 243; D B F P S e r . 2, v o l . 4 , n o s . 295-7 a n d 299. 23 N e u r a t h t o N a d o l n y , F e b r u a r y 15 1933, D G F P S e r . C , v o l . 1, n o . 20; m e m o r a n d u m b y B i l l o w , M a r c h 13 1933, i b i d . , n o . 79« 24 P a t t e s o n t o S i m o n , F e b r u a r y 24 1933, D B F P S e r . 2, v o l . 4 , n o . 283; P a u l - B o n c o u r t o M a s s i g l i , M a r c h 1 1933, D D F S e r . 1, v o l . 2, n o . 358. S e e a l s o , D B F P S e r . 2, v o l . 4 , n o s . 281, 290 a n d 292. 25 R e c o r d o f a n A n g l o - F r e n c h M e e t i n g , M a r c h 10 1933, i b i d . , n o . 290. 26 R e c o r d o f a n A n g l o - F r e n c h M e e t i n g , M a r c h 10 1933, i b i d . , n o . 290; J e a n P a u l - B o n c o u r ( S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l t o t h e F r e n c h d e l e g a t i o n t o t h e D i s a r m a m e n t C o n f e r e n c e ) t o P a u l - B o n c o u r , M a r c h 6 1933, D D F S e r . 1, v o l . 2, n o . 372; H a s s e l l ( R o m e ) t o F o r e i g n M i n i s t r y , M a r c h 10 1933, D G F P S e r . C , v o l . 1, n o . 68. S e e a l s o , E d e n , F a c i n g t h e D i c t a t o r s , p p . 27 -33 . 27 F o r t h e b a c k g r o u n d o f t h e B r i t i s h p l a n , s e e i b i d . , p p . 30 -3 , a l s o T e m p e r l e y , o p . o i t . . p p . 2 3 4 - 9 « 28 E d e n , o p . c i t . t p . 34; T e m p e r l e y , o p . o i t . . p . 2 3 9 « 29 P a t t e s o n t o S i m o n , M a r c h 2 1933, D B F P S e r . 2, v o l . 4 , n o . 284; P a t t e s o n t o S i m o n , M a r c h 6 1933, i b i d . . n o . 287; S i m o n t o T y r r e l l , M a r c h 3 1933, i b i d . . n o . 286; r e c o r d o f a n A n g l o - F r e n c h M e e t i n g , M a r c h 10 1933, i b i d . . n o . 290; r e c o r d o f a M e e t i n g b e t w e e n M a c D o n a l d , S i m o n , E d e n a n d W i l s o n , M a r c h 11 1933, i b i d . , n o . 294« 30 E d e n , o p . c i t . . p . 34* F o r t h e G e n e v a c o n v e r s a t i o n s , s e e D B F P S e r . 2, v o l . 4 , n o s . 292-304, 306-7 a n d 310. 31 F o r t h e t e x t o f t h e B r i t i s h d r a f t c o n v e n t i o n , s e e W h e e l e r - B e n n e t t , T h e D i s a r m a m e n t D e a d l o c k , p p . 267-92. F o r M a c D o n a l d * s i s p e e c h t o t h e G e n e r a l C o m m i s s i o n , s e e R D C , M G C v o l . 2, p p . 352-7* 227 32 See, e . g . , DBFP Ser. 2, v o l . 5, nos. 43 and 48. 33 Record of a Meeting \"between MacDonald', Simon and A l o i s i , March 14 1933, DBFP Ser. 2, v o l . . 4, no. 301. 34 DBFP Ser. 2, v o l . 5, no. 44. See enclosures B 1 and D 3 for the text of the Pact . 35 Jouvenel (Rome) to Paul-Boncour, March 18 1933, DDF Ser. 1, v o l . 3, no. 2. Cf . Jouvenel's previous despatches of February 24 1933, DDF Ser. 1, v o l . 2, no. 339 and March 17 1933, i b i d . . no. 427. 36 Jouvenel to Paul-Boncour, March 8 1933, i b i d ! . . no. 382; Jouvenel to Paul-Bibncour, March 17 1933, ibid?., no. 427; Graham to Vans i t tar t , March 16 1933, DBFP Ser. 2, v o l . 5, no. 40; memorandum by Neurath, March 14 1933.,DGFP Ser. C, v o l . 1, no. 83. 37 Be Ligne (Rome) to Hymans (Foreign M i n i s t e r ) , January 18 1933, DDR v o l . 3, no. 10; Jouvenel to Paul-Boncour, A p r i l 11 1933, DDF Ser. 1, v o l . 3, no. 112. 38 Jouvenel to Paul-Boncour, February 24 1933, DDF Ser. 1, v o l . 2, no. 339; Jouvenel to Paul-Boncour,March 3 1933, i b i d . . no. 368. 39 Ibid. . 40 See A r t i c l e IV of the draft Pact, DBFP Ser. 2, v o l . 5, no. 44, enclosure D. 3 • On March 3, Jouvenel reported to Paul-Boncour that \"the time i s long past when Mussol ini ' s ambitions can be s a t i s f i e d by a few palm trees i n L i b y a \" . DDF Ser. 1, v o l . 2, no. 368. 41 Aide-memoire for the I t a l i a n Ambassador, March 15 1933, DGFP Ser. C, v o l . 1, no. 84; Billow to Hassell (Rome), March 15 1933, i b i d . , no. 88; memorandum by Billow, March 17 1933, i b i d 1 . . no. 95; Neurath to Hassel l , March 24 1933, i b i d . . no. 115; Kerchove (Berl in) to Hymans, March 28 1933, DDB v o l . 3, no. 18. 42 MacDonald, March 23 1933, PDC, 5th Ser. , v o l . 276, co l s . 516-7. 43 DBFP Ser. 2, v o l . 5, no. 44, enclosures 4 and 5. Cf . Graham to Vans i t tar t , March 21 1933, i b i d . , no. 45. 44 Vansit tart to Patteson, March 24 1933, i b i d . . no. 51; Patteson to Vans i t tar t , March 25 1933, i b i d . , no. 53. 45 De Cart ier (London) to Hymans, A p r i l 5 1933, DDB v o l . 3, no. 23. Cf. Simon to Granvi l le (Brussels) , A p r i l 4 1933, DBFP Ser. 2, v o l . 5, no. 68. 228 46 S e e , e . g . , P a t t e s o n t o V a n s i t t a r t , M a r c h - 25 1933, i b i d . , n o . 53; c o n v e r s a t i o n b e t w e e n S i m o n a n d B e n e s , M a r c h 25 1933, i b i d . , n o . 54, S i m o n t o F o r e i g n O f f i c e , M a r c h 27 1933, i b i d . , n o s . 56-7; E r s k i n e ( W a r s a w ) t o S i m o n , M a r c h 29 1933, i b i d . , n o . 58; n o t e b y t h e F r e n c h d e l e g a t i o n t o t h e D i s a r m a m e n t C o n f e r e n c e , M a r c h 25 1933, D D F S e r . 1, v o l . 3, n o . 47• 47 P a t t e s o n t o V a n s i t t a r t , M a r c h 25 1933, D B F P S e r . 2, v o l . 5, n o . 53. F o r F r e n c h s u s p i c i o n s , s e e i b i d 1 . . n o . 46. 48 S e e R D C . M G C v o l . 2, p p . 361-403, e s p e c i a l l y p p . 372-4 ( d i S o r a g n a , t h e a c t i n g I t a l i a n d e l e g a t e ) , p p . 381-2 ( D o v g a l e v s k y , f o r t h e U . 3 . S . R . ) , p p . 388-90 ( B o u r q u i n , f o r B e l g i u m ) a n d p p . 391-4 ( N a d o l n y ) . 49 F o r t h e B r i t i s h d r a f t , s e e D B F P S e r . 2, v o l . 5, n o . 64. F o r t h e B r i t i s h p r e s s u r e o n F r a n c e , s e e c o n v e r s a t i o n s a t t h e B r i t i s h E m b a s s y i n P a r i s , M a r c h 21 1933, i b i d . , n o . 46. 50 I b i d . , n o . 76, a n n e x . 51 H a s s e l l t o F o r e i g n M i n i s t r y , A p r i l 19 1933, D G F P S e r . C , v o l . 1, n o . I64. 52 N e u r a t h t o H a s s e l l , A p r i l 12 1933, i b i d . . n o . 153; m e m o r a n d u m b y B i l l o w , A p r i l 19 1933, i b i d . , n o . 165; A r n a l ( B e r l i n ) t o P a u l - B o n c o u r , A p r i l 15 1933, D D F S e r . 1, v o l . 3, n o . 133; F r a n c o i s - P o n c e t t o P a u l - B o n c o u r , A p r i l 20 1933, i b i d . . n o . 145* 53 H a s s e l l t o F o r e i g n M i n i s t r y , A p r i l 19 1933, D G F P S e r . C , v o l . 1, n o . I64; n o t e s o f a n u n p u b l i s h e d G e r m a n d o c u m e n t ( n o r e f e r e n c e ) s u p p l i e d b y D r . F . M a r z a r i . 54 N o t e s o f a n u n p u b l i s h e d G e r m a n d o c u m e n t ( n o r e f e r e n c e ) s u p p l i e d b y D r . F . M a r z a r i ; H a s s e l l t o F o r e i g n M i n i s t r y , A p r i l 19 1933, D G F P S e r . C , v o l . 1, n o . 164; m e m o r a n d u m b y S m e n d , A p r i l 20 1933, i b i d . . n o . 172.. 55 M e m o r a n d u m b y B i l l o w , A p r i l 20 1933, i b i d . . n o . 170; N e u r a t h t o H a s s e l l , A p r i l 22 1933, i b i d ' . , n o . 176. 56 H a s s e l l t o F o r e i g n M i n i s t r y , A p r i l 20 1933, i b i d . , n o . 171; H a s s e l l t o F o r e i g n M i n i s t r y , A p r i l 24 1933, i b i d . . n o . 181. 57 H a s s e l l t o F o r e i g n M i n i s t r y , A p r i l 22 1933, i b i d . , n o . 178. 58 I b i d . . 59 I b i d . , n o . 208. 60 F r a n c o i s - P o n c e t t o P a u l - B o n c o u r , M a r c h 15 1933, D D F S e r . 1, v o l . 2, n o . 413; F r a n c o i s - P o n c e t t o P a u l - B o n c o u r , A p r i l 27 1933, D D F S e r . 1, v o l . 3, n o s . 199-200. 229 61 D G F P S e r . G , v o l . 1, n o s . 177, 180, 183-4 a n d 192} F r a n c o i s -P o n c e t t o P a u l - B o n c o u r , A p r i l 27 1933, D D F S e r . 1, v o l . 3, n o . 199. 62 F r a n c o i s - P o n c e t t o P a u l - B o n c o u r , A p r i l 27 1933, i b i d . , n o s . 191 a n d 199. 63 A t t l e e , A p r i l 13 1933, P D C . 5th S e r . , v o l . 276, c o l . 2742. 64 A u s t e n C h a m b e r l a i n , A p r i l 13 1933, i b i d . , c o l s . 2755-9. 65 M a c D o n a l d , A p r i l 13 1933, i b i d . . c o l . 2754. 66 R e c o r d o f a n A n g l o - F r e n c h M e e t i n g , M a r c h 10 1933, D B F P S e r . 2, v o l . 4, n o . 290. 67 T e m p e r l e y , o p . o i t . . p p . 243 a n d 248. S e e a l s o , L i n d s a y t o S i m o n , A p r i l 25 1933, D B F P S e r . 2, v o l . 5, n o . 86$ S i m o n t o L i n d s a y , A p r i l 25 1933, i b i d * , n o . 87; c o n v e r s a t i o n b e t w e e n b e t w e e n R o o s e v e l t a n d M a c D o n a l d , \" u n d a t e d , F R U S 1933 v o l . 1, p p . 102-4* 68 D a v i s , A p r i l 26 1933, R D C . M G C v o l . 2, p . 416. F o r t h e p r e v i o u s d i s c u s s i o n , s e e i b i d . . p p . 405-16. 69 S e e e . g . , H u l l t o D a v i s , A p r i l 25 1933, F R U S 1933 v o l . 1, p p . 106-7* 70 S e e R D C . M G C v o l . 2, p p . 416-9; R D C , M K v o l . 1, p p . 162-6; P a t t e s o n t o S i m o n , A p r i l 27 1933, D B F P S e r . 2, v o l . 5, n o s . 93 a n * 95. 71 R D C . M G C v o l . 2, p p . 420-57; P a t t e s o n t o S i m o n , A p r i l 28 1933, D B F P S e r . 2, v o l . 5, n o s . 99-100. 72 U n s i g n e d m e m o r a n d u m , M a y 15 1933, D G F P S e r . C , v o l . 1, n o . 239* S e e a l s o , i b i d . . n o . 23. 73 M a s s i g l i t o P a u l - B b n c o u r , M a y 9 1933, D D F S e r . 1, v o l . 3, n o . 257; D B F P S e r . . 2, v o l . 5, n o . 124, n . 4; T e m p e r l e y , o p . c i t . . p . 248. F o r E d e n ' s a t t e m p t s t o n e g o t i a t e w i t h N a d o l n y , s e e D B F P S e r . 2, v o l . 5, n o s . 103 a n d 106-12. F o r B r i t a i n ' s r e a r m a m e n t d e m a n d s , s e e i b i d . . n o . 105. 74 M e m o r a n d u m b y L e e p e r ( F o r e i g n O f f i c e ) , M a y 29 1933, i b i d . . n o . 179. S e e a l s o , P a t t e s o n t o S i m o n , M a y 1 1933, i b i d . . n o . 105* 75 C o n v e r s a t i o n b e t w e e n E d e m a n d N a d o l n y , M a y 1 1933, i b i d . . n o . 112, e n c l o s u r e ; P a t t e s o n t o S i m o n , M a y 3 1933. i b i d . , n o . I l l ; R D C . M G C v o l . 2, p p . 440-1. 76 U n s i g n e d m e m o r a n d u m , M a y 15 1933, D G F P S e r . C , v o l . 1, n o . 239; S i m o n t o R u m b o l d , M a y 5 1933, D B F P S e r . 2, v o l . 5, n o . 113. C f . H u l l t o W i l s o n , M a y 6 1933, F R U S 1933 v o l . 1, p . 128. 77 U n s i g n e d m e m o r a n d u m , M a y 15 1933, D G F P S e r . C , v o l . 1, n o . 239. 230 78 ffiDC, M B v o l . 1, p p . 167-71? P a t t e s o n t o S i m o n , M a y 8 1933, D B F P ' S e r . 2, v o l . 5, n o . 117; P a t t e s o n t o S i m o n , M a y 9 1933, i b i d . , n o . 119. 79 P a t t e s o n t o S i m o n , M a y 9 1933, i b i d . , n o . 123; P a t t e s o n t o S i m o n , M a y 10 1933, i b i d . , n o s . 124-5; P a t t e s o n t o S i m o n , M a y 11 1933, i b i d . , n o s . 131-3.. 80 I b i d . , n o . 124, n . 4« 81 T e m p e r l e y , o p . o i t . , p . 249* 82 L o r d H a i l s h a m , M a y 11 1933, P D L , 5th S e r . , v o l . 87, c o l . 898.. F o r H a i l s h a m ' s f u l l s p e e c h , s e e i b i d . . c o l s . 892-901. 83 S i m o n t o P a t t e s o n , M a y 12 1933, D B F P S e r . 2, v o l . 5, n o . 141. 84 H o e s c h ( L o n d o n ) t o F o r e i g n M i n i s t r y , M a y 16 1933, D G F P S e r . G , v o l . 1, n o . 242; S i m o n , M a y 15 1933, P D C , 5th S e r . , v o l . 278, c o l s . , 11-12. 85 U n s i g n e d m e m o r a n d u m , M a y 15 1933, D G F P S e r . C , v o l . 1, n o . 239; P a t t e s o n t o S i m o n , M a y 11 1933, D B F P S e r . 2, v o l . 5, n o s . 132-3 a n d 135; m i n u t e b y V a n s i t t a r t , M a y 11 1933, i b i d . , n o . 137* 86 R u m b o l d t o S i m o n , M a y 11 1933, i b i d . , n o . 136. 87 F o r t h e t e x t o f t h e s t a t e m e n t , s e e \" T h e T i m e s \" . M a y 13 1933, p . 12. 88 R D C . M B v o l . 1, p p . 171-2. 89 F o r t h e o r i g i n s o f R o o s e v e l t ' s m e s s a g e , s e e F R U S 1933 v o l . 1, p p . 140-2 a n d 145-6. F o r t h e t e x t , s e e D B F P S e r . 2, v o l . 5, n o . 146. 90 M i n u t e b y H o w a r d S m i t h ( F o r e i g n O f f i c e ) , M a y 17 1933, i b i d . . n o . 152; L i n d s a y t o S i m o n , M a y 18 1933, i b i d . . n o . 156; V a n s i t t a r t t o L i n d s a y , M a y 23 1933, i b i d . , n o . 168.. 91 F o r t h e t e x t o f H i t l e r ' s s p e e c h , s e e D I A 1933, p p . 196-208. 92 F o r t h e t e x t o f t h e D a v i s d e c l a r a t i o n , s e e R D C . M G C v o l . 2, p p . 474-6. 93 T y r r e l l t o S i m o n , M a y 19 1933, D B F P S e r . 2, v o l . 5, n o . 161. 94 G e n e r a l i n s t r u c t i o n s o f t h e C o n s e i l d e s M i n i s t r e s , M a y 2 1933, D D F S e r . 1, v o l . 3, n o . 229; c o n v e r s a t i o n h e l d a t t h e Q u a i d'0rsay,: J u n e 8 1933, D B F P S e r . 2, v o l . 5, n o . 207. 95 G e n e r a l i n s t r u c t i o n s o f t h e C o n s e i l d e s M i n i s t r e s , M a y 2 1933, D D F S e r . 1, v o l . 3, n o . 229. 231 96 M e m o r a n d u m b y L e e p e r , M a y 29 1933, D B F P S e r . 2, v o l . 5, n o . 179. 97 T y r r e l l t o S i m o n , M a y 19 1933, i b i d . , n o . 161. 98 M e m o r a n d u m b y V a n s i t t a r t , M a y 23 1933, P u b l i c R e c o r d O f f i c e , L o n d o n , 225/Ref. C A B . 24/241. A p h o t o c o p y o f t h i s d o c u m e n t w a s s u p p l i e d t o t h e a u t h o r b y D r . F . M a r z a r i . 99 T y r r e l l t o S i m o n , M a y 26 1933, D B F P S e r . 2, v o l . 5, n o . 171. 100 S i m o n t o T y r r e l l , M a y 30 1933, i b i d . , n o . 186. 101 S e e R D C , M G C v o l . 2, p p . 477-8. 102, S i m o n , M a y 26 1933, P D C , , 5th S e r . , v o l . 278, c o l s . 1439-54. 103 T y r r e l l t o S i m o n , M a y 19 1933, D B F P S e r . 2, v o l . 5, n o . 1 6 1 ; T y r r e l l t o S i m o n , J u n e 7 1933, i b i d . . n o . 205; P a u l - B o n c o u r , M a y 23 1933, R D C , M G C v o l . 2, p p . 491-3. S e e a l s o , M a r r i n e r ( F r a n c e ) t o H u l l , M a y 17 1933, F R U S 1933 v o l . 1, p p . 147-8. 104 E d e n , M a y 30 1933, R D C . M G C v o l . 2, p . 570; L o r d L o n d o n d e r r y , J u n e 1 1933, i b i d . . p . 584; T y r r e l l t o S i m o n , J u n e 7 1933, D B F P S e r . , 2, v o l . 5, n o . 205. S e e a l s o , S i m o n t o P a t t e s o n , J u n e 1 1933, i b i d . , n o . 194. 105 F o r t h e d e b a t e o n t h e d e f i n i t i o n o f a g g r e s s i o n , s e e R D C . M G C v o l . 2, p p . 499-502, 510-7 a n d 547-59. 106 D a v i s t o H u l l , M a y 30 1933, F R U S 1933 v o l . 1, p p . 175-8; P a t t e s o n t o S i m o n , M a y 30 1933, D B F P S e r . 2, v o l . 5, n o . 183; S i m o n t o P a t t e s o n , M a y 31 1933, i b i d . , n o . I89. 107 P a t t e s o n t o S i m o n , M a y 30 1933, i b i d . , n o . 183; S i m o n t o P a t t e s o n , M a y 31 1933, i b i d . . n o . 189; S i m o n t o P a t t e s o n , J u n e 1 1933, i b i d . , n o . 194* 108 T h e c o m p l e t e d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e B r i t i s h a i r p r o p o s a l s i s i n R D C . M G C . v o l . 2, p p . 529-46. 109 P a t t e s o n t o S i m o n , A p r i l 26 1933, D B F P S e r . 2, v o l . 5, n o . 91. 110 O n M a y 30, S a t o , t h e J a p a n e s e d e l e g a t e t o t h e D i s a r m a m e n t C o n f e r e n c e , t o l d D a v i s t h a t J a p a n w o u l d b e u n w i l l i n g t o a g r e e t o t h e p r o h i b i t i o n o f b o m b i n g u n l e s s a i r c r a f t - c a r r i e r s w e r e a b o l i s h e d , p o s s i b l y i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h t h e a b o l i t i o n o f s u b m a r i n e s , a n d h e a d d e d t h a t h e c o u l d n o t a g r e e t o a n o n - a g g r e s s i o n p a c t u n t i l t h e s i t u a t i o n i n t h e F a r E a s t h a d b e e n l i q u i d a t e d . B u t i t s e e m s r e a s o n a b l e t o s u g g e s t t h a t , a t t h a t t i m e , J a p a n m i g h t h a v e a g r e e d t o t h e a b o l i t i o n o f b o m b i n g i f h e r i n t e r e s t s i n , a n d t h e n e w t e r r i t o r i a l a r r a n g e m e n t s o f , M a n c h u k u o a n d N o r t h C h i n a w e r e r e c o g n i z e d , a s t h e m a i n a s p e c t o f J a p a n e s e p o l i c y w a s t o s t a b i l i z e t h e F a r E a s t e r n p o s i t i o n - o n M a y 3 1933, t h e T r u c e o f T a n g k u h a d b e e n s i g n e d w i t h C h i n a . S a t o w a s a n g l i n g 232 f o r a r e g i o n a l s e t t l e m e n t o f t h e d i s a r m a m e n t p r o b l e m l i n k i n g p o l i t i c a l i s s u e s w i t h d i s a r m a m e n t , o r a t l e a s t h e b e g a n t o s u g g e s t s u c h a n a g r e e m e n t i n J u n e . S e e F R U S 1933 v o l . 1, p p . 178-9, 188-90 a n d 200-1. 111 F o r t h e d i s c u s s i o n s o n t h e p r o p o s e d E u r o p e a n S e c u r i t y P a c t a n d \" n o - f o r c e \" d e c l a r a t i o n , s e e R D C . M G C v o l . 2, p p . 560-7. 112 D a v i s t o H u l l , M a y 30 1933, F R U S : 1933 v o l . 1, p p . 175-8; S i m o n t o P a t t e s o n , J u n e 1 1933, D B F P S e r . 2, v o l . 5, n o . 194. S e e a l s o , i b i d . , n o s . 175, 183-4» 189 a n d 196. 113 P a t t e s o n t o S i m o n , M a y 31 1933, i b i d . . n o . 188. 114 L o n d o n d e r r y , J u n e 1 1933, R D C , MGC v o l . 2, p . 584. F o r t h e d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e c l a u s e s o f t h e B r i t i s h d r a f t c o n v e n t i o n r e g a r d i n g s u p e r v i s i o n ( a n d t h e F r e n c h a m e n d m e n t s ) , s e e i b i d . . p p . 570 a n d 578-88. 115 S i m o n t o P a t t e s o n , J u n e 1 1933, D B F P S e r . 2, v o l . 5, n o . 194., 116 S e e , e . g . , R o o s e v e l t ' s c o m m e n t o n t h i s p o i n t , F R U S 1933 v o l . 1, p p . 180-1. 117 F o r t h e l a t e r m e e t i n g s o f t h e G e n e r a l C o m m i s s i o n , s e e R D C . M G C v o l . 2, p p . 562-637. 118 T e m p e r l e y , o p . c i t . . p . 243; E d e n , F a c i n g t h e D i c t a t o r s , p . 35* M o t e s t o C h a p t e r V 1 P a t t e s o n t o S i m o n , M a y 31 1933, D B F P S e r . 2, v o l . 5, n o . 188; c o n v e r s a t i o n b e t w e e n L o n d o n d e r r y a n d D a v i s , M a y 31 1933, i b i d . . no..191; c o n v e r s a t i o n a t t h e Q u a i d ' O r s a y , J u n e 8 1933, D D F S e r . 1, v o l . 3, n o . 376. S e e a l s o , D B F S e r . 1, v o l . 2, n o s . 290, 356, 358, 364, 369 a n d 392. 2 F o r t h e B r i t i s h r e c o r d o f t h e s e c o n v e r s a t i o n s , s e e D B F P S e r . 2, v o l . 5, n o s . 207-8; f o r t h e F r e n c h r e c o r d , s e e D D F S e r . 1, v o l . 3, n o . 376; f o r t h e A m e r i c a n r e c o r d , s e e F R U S 1933 v o l . 1, p p . 190-2. 3 E d e n , o p . c i t . . p p . 42-3. 4 T e m p e r l e y , o p . o i t . . p . 252. 5 E d e n , l o c . c i t . 6 H e u r a t h t o F o r e i g n M i n i s t r y , D G F P S e r . C , v o l . 1, n o . 322; C o r b i n ( L o n d o n ) t o P a u l - B o n c o u r , J u n e 21 1933, D D F S e r . 1, v o l . 3, n o . 412. 233 7 Simon to T y r r e l l , June 26 1933, DBFP Ser. 2, v o l . 5, no. 221; Corbin t o Paul-Boncour, June 21 1933, DBF Ser. 1, v o l . 3, no. 412; Eden, op. c i t . . p. 43. 8 Paul-Boncour t o Corbin, June 22 1933, DBF Ser. 1, v o l . 3, no. 416; Corbin t o Paul-Boncour, June 23-4 1933, i b i d . . no. 421. 9 For the meeting of the General Commission, see RDC, MGC v o l . 2, pp. 637-43-10 See, e.g., the French a t t i t u d e on t h i s p o i nt, DBFP Ser. 2, v o l . 5, no. 226. 11 For the lack of rapport between Henderson and the B r i t i s h Government, see, e.g., Hamilton, Arthur Henderson., pp. 406-8 and 414-5* 12 RDC, MGC. v o l . 2, p. 638. 13 See DBFP Ser. 2, v o l . 5, no. 251, also DDF Ser. 1, v o l . 3, no. 486. 14 Jouvenel t o Paul-Boncour, J u l y 18 1933, DDF Ser. 1, v o l . 4, no. 14; conversation between Paul-Boncour and Henderson at the Quai d'Orsay, J u l y 22 1933, i b i d . . no. 36, annex; Hassell t o Foreign M i n i s t r y , J u l y 16 1933, DGFP Ser. C, v o l . 1, no. 367. 15 For the memorandum of June 2 1933, see DBFP Ser. 2, v o l . 5, no. 201, enclosure 2. For the memorandum given t o Henderson on J u l y 18 1933, see DGFP Ser. C, v o l . 1, no. 370, enclosure. 16 Memorandum by Neurath, J u l y 22 1933, i b i d . , no. 374* 17 See Paul-Boncour t o Corbin, J u l y 24 1933, DDF Ser. 1. v o l . 4, no. 36, e s p e c i a l l y the annex, which i s the record of Henderson's conversation with Paul-Boncour of J u l y 22. 18*DGFP Ser. C, v o l . 1, no. 370. 19 Harvey to V a n s i t t a r t , J u l y 24 1933, DBFP Ser. 2, v o l . 5, no. 269. 20 See i b i d . , nos. 269,.283, 331, 348tand 359, also DDF Ser. 1, v o l . 4, nos. 50 and 68. 21 For the diplomacy of the \"Austrian c r i s i s \" from mid-July to the: beginning of August, see DBFP Ser. 2, v o l . 5, nos. 236-7, 245-6, 249, 255, 257, 264, 270-2, 274, 285, 288, 291-2, 296, 301-4 and 307-10, DDF Ser. 1, v o l . 4, nos. 8, 30, 34, 40, 43, 46, 49, 52, 56, 59, 71, 76, 82-3, 92-3 and 98, also DGFP Ser. C, v o l . 1, nos. 375, 383, 385 and 390-3. For the background of German p o l i c y , see i b i d . . nos. 298, 305-7, 310, 313 and 346. 22 Rumbold t o Simon, June 24 1933, DBFP Ser. 2, v o l . 5, no. 219. 234 23 Rumbold to Simon, June 27 1933, i b i d . , no. 223. See a lso , i b i d . , no. 231. 24 For Vansi t tar t*s memorandum and the diplomacy of the question of German a i r rearmament, see i b i d . , nos. 253, 256, 277-8, 280-1, 284, 287, 289, 298, 305 and 326-7. 25 I b i d . , no. 256. 26 See i b i d . . nos. 259, 261-3, 265, 267-8, 275, 286, 294-5, 300, 306, 313, 318, 320 and 325. 27 See DDF Ser. 1, v o l . 3, nos. 363, 383, 385-6, 394, 400, 415, 422-3, 428, 440, 450, 453, 459*and 478, also DDF Ser. 1, v o l . 4, nos. 14, 53, 77, 109 and 113. 28 See DBFP Ser. 2, v o l . 5, no. 24. 29 See Campbell's analysis of the s i tuat ion , i b i d . . no. 386. 30 Chambrun to Paul-Boncour, September 5 1933, DDF Ser. 1, v o l . 4, nos. 177-9. 31 Mussol in i ' s draft proposal (see i b i d . . no. 177) envisaged permanent or automatic control , but i t i s probable that \"or \" was a typographical error for \"and\". 32 Chambrun to Paul-Boncour, August 15 1933, i b i d . , no. 113; Chambrun to Paul-Boncour, September 5 1933, i b i d . . no. 177* 33 See Paul-Boncour to Chambrun, September 7 1933, i b i d . , no. 187; Paul-Boncour to Cambrun, September 9 1933, i b i d . , no. 192; note du Cabinet du Minis t re , September 12 1933, i b i d . , no. 203. 34 I b i d . . no. 213, annex. 35 For the B r i t i s h record of these conversations, see DBFP Ser. 2, v o l . 5, no. 399, annex. For the French record, see DDF Ser. 1, v o l . 4, no. 260, annexes 1 and 2. See a lso , Paul-Boncour to the French Representatives i n London, B e r l i n , Rome and Prague, i b i d . . no. 227, also memorandum by Eden, September 19 1933, DBFP Ser. 2, v o l . 5, no. 399* 36 Simon to T y r r e l l , September 21 1933, i b i d . , no. 403; Simon to Murray, September 21 1933, i b i d . . no. 404* 37 Simon to T y r r e l l , September 21 1933, i b i d . , no. 403; Corbin to Paul-Boncour, September 21 1933, DDF Ser. 1, v o l . 4, no. 233. 38 Paul-Boncour to the French Representatives i n London, Rome, Brussels, Washington, B e r l i n , Warsaw and Prague, i b i d . , no. 242; conversation at the B r i t i s h Embassy, September 22 1933, i b i d . , no. 261, annex; conversation at the B r i t i s h Embassy i n P a r i s , September 22 1933, DBFP Ser. 2, v o l . 5, no. 406. 235 39 See ibid., nos. 407 and 419f \"the enclosures in ibid., nos. 409-10, 412-4 and 420-1, also DDF Ser. 1, vol. 4, nos. 242-3, 246-7, 254, 257 arid 259 and the annexes to ibid., no. 261. Cf. DGFP Ser. G, vol. 1, nos. 445-7, 454, 466 and 469, also FRUS 1933 vol. 1, pp. 226-32 and pp. 232-5. 40 Conversation between Simon and Neurath, September 23 1933, DBFP Ser. 2, vol. 5, no. 411, enclosure. Cf. Neurath to Foreign Ministry, September 24 1933, DGFP Ser. C, vol. 1, no. 447. 41 Conversation between Hymans, Simon and Qrmsby Gore (First Commissioner of Works), September 26 1933, DDB vol. 3, no. 53; Patteson to Vansittart, September 29 1933, DBFP Ser. 2, vol. 5, no. 419; conversation between Neurath and Simon, September 29 1933, ibid., no. 422, enclosure. 42 Conversation between Simon and Aloisi, September 23 1933, ibid., no. 409, enclosure; conversation between Simon, Suvich (Italian Under-Secretary of. State) and Aloisi, September 25 1933, ibid., no. 412, enclosure; Patteson to Vansittart, September 29 1933, ibid., no. 419; conversation between Suvich, Aloisi and Simon, September 29 1933, ibid., no. 421; note by the French delegation to the Disarmament Conference, September 26 1933, DDF Ser. 1, vol. 4, no. 246; note by the French delegation to the Disarmament Conference, September 28 1933, ibid., no. 254* 43 Conversation between Simon and Aloisi, September 23 1933, DBFP Ser. 2, vol. 5, no. 409, enclosure; conversation between Simon and Neurath, September 23 1933, ibid., no. 411, enclosure; conversation between Eden and Massigli;,! September 29 1933, ibid., no. 420, enclosure. 44 Memorandum by Neurath, September 30 1933, DGFP Ser. C, vol. 1, no. 475. 45 Bismarck to Foreign Ministry, October 4 1933, ibid., no. 478. For Simon's proposals of October 3 1933, see DBFP Ser. 2, vol. 5, no. 44O, n. 1. 46 Memorandum by Bttlow, October 4 1933, DGFP Ser. C, vol. 1, no. 479* 47 Unsigned memorandum, October 6 1933, ibid., no. 484* 48 Simon to Phipps (Berlin), October 6 1933, DBFP Ser. 2, vol. 5, no. 434. 49\"Btllow to Legation in Switzerland, October 4 1933, DGFP Ser. C, vol. 1, no. 480. 50 Neurath to German delegation in Geneva, October 11 1933, ibid., no. 489; minutes of the Conferences of Ministers of October 13 and 14, 1933, ibid., no. 499* 236 51 Simon \"to Phipps, October 6 1933, DBFP Ser. 2, v o l . 5, no. 434;, Simon to Phipps, October 10 1933, i b i d . , no. 443* 52 See i b i d . . nos. 434, 437-8, 440-1, 443, 445 and 447. 53 DGFP Ser. C, v o l . 1, no. 494, enclosure. 54 Memorandum by Eden, September 19 1933, DBFP Ser. 2, v o l . 5, no. 399; Herry (Paris) to Hymans, September 22 1933, DDB v o l . 3, no. 47., .F...r55 Minutes of the Conferences of Ministers of October 13 and 14 1933, DGFP Ser. C, v o l . 1, no. 499. 56 Patteson to Simon, October 6 1933, DBFP Ser. 2, v o l . 5, no. 432. 57 Graham to Mellesley (Foreign Of f i ce ) , October 14 1933, i b i d . , no. 453. 58 Patteson to Simon, October 6 1933, i b i d . , no. 432; Patteson to Simon, October 10 1933, i b i d . , no. 441; Phipps to Wellesley, October 14 1933, i b i d . . \" no. 451. 59 Note by the French delegation to the Disarmament Conference, October 12 1933, DDF Ser. 1, v o l . 4, no. 300. 60 Phipps to Wellesley, October 14 1933, DBFP Ser. 2, v o l . 5, no. 451. 61 Patteson to Wellesley, October 14 1933, i b i d . , no. 445; Temperley, op. c i t . . p . 257. 62 For the meeting of the Bureau of October 14 1933, see RDC. MB v o l . 2, pp. 181-5. 63 Neurath*s telegram i s c i ted i n SIA 1933, p . 306. 64 Chambrun to Paul-Bonoour, September 17 1933, DDF Ser. 1, v o l . 4, no. 224; Chambrun to Paul-Boncour, October 11 1933, i b i d . , no. 291; note by the French delegation to the Disarmament Conference, September 26 1933, i b i d . , no. 246; conversation between Simon, Suvich and A l o i s i , September 25 1933, DBFP Ser. 2, v o l . 5, no. 412. 65 Bismarck to Foreign Min is t ry , October 4 1933, DGFP Ser. C, v o l . 1, no. 478. Notes to Chapter VI 1 Cited i n SIA 1933, p . 309 237 2 P r o c l a m a t i o n b y H i t l e r , O c t o b e r 14 1933, D I A 1933, p p . 94-6; r a d i o a d d r e s s b y H i t l e r , O c t o b e r 14 1933, i b i d . , p p . 289-94. 3 D B F P S e r . 2, v o l . 5, n o . 451, n . 1; i b i d . , n o . 459, n . 2. 4 Y o u n g , S t a n l e y B a l d w i n , p p . 177 a n d 200. 5 S e e a b o v e , p . 175, a l s o S I A 1933, p . 309. 6 T y r r e l l t o S i m o n , O c t o b e r 16 1933, D B F P S e r . 2, v o l . 5, n o . 465. 7 S i m o n t o T y r r e l l , O c t o b e r 17 1933, i b i d . , n o . 467; S i m o n t o T y r r e l l , O c t o b e r 19 1933, i b i d . . n o . 470; T y r r e l l t o S i m o n , O c t o b e r 20 1933, i b i d . , n o . 474. 8 S i m o n t o T y r r e l l , O c t o b e r 21 1933, i b i d . , n o . 478; m i n u t e b y R o n a l d ( F o r e i g n O f f i c e ) , O c t o b e r 24 1933, i b i d . , n o . 488. 9 S i m o n t o T y r r e l l , N o v e m b e r 7 1933, D B F P S e r . 2, v o l . 6, n o . 9. 10 T y r r e l l t o S i m o n , N o v e m b e r 9 1933, i b i d . , n o . 27. 11 E d e n , N o v e m b e r 7 1933, P D C , 5th S e r . , v o l . 281, c o l s . 1 5 0 - 6 1 . S e e e s p e c i a l l y , c o l s . 156-7. 12 N o t e c o m m u n i c a t e d b y t h e F r e n c h M i n i s t r y f o r F o r e i g n A f f a i r s , N o v e m b e r 15 1933, D B F P S e r . 2, v o l . 6, n o . 46, e n c l o s u r e ; T y r r e l l t o S i m o n , N o v e m b e r 17 1933, i b i d . , n o . 49« 13 D r u m m o n d ( R o m e ) t o S i m o n , N o v e m b e r 8 1933, i b i d . . n o . 20; D r u m m o n d t o S i m o n , N o v e m b e r 15 1933, i b i d . , n o s . 36-7; D r u m m o n d t o S i m o n , N o v e m b e r 18 1933, i b i d . , n o . 50;. S I A 1933, p p . 314-5. 14 F o r t h e c o u r s e o f t h e s e n e g o t i a t i o n s , s e e D B F P S e r . 2, v o l . 6, n o s . 51, 58 a n d 61-3, a l s o t h e e n c l o s u r e s i n i b i d . , n o s . 52-7 a n d 64-6. S e e a l s o , R D C , M B v o l . 2, p . 200. 15 S e e F R U S 1933 v o l . 1, p p . 232-5 a n d 237-8. 16 W i l s o n t o A c t i n g S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e , J u n e 27 1933, i b i d . , p p . . 200 -1 . 17 I b i d . 18 A s e a r l y a s S e p t e m b e r 27 1933, S a t o h a d t o l d D a v i s t h a t J a p a n w o u l d n o t a g r e e t o s u p e r v i s i o n ( i b i d . , p p . 232-5), b u t t h i s m a y h a v e b e e n m e a n t a s a l e v e r t o d r a w A m e r i c a i n t o a F a r E a s t e r n a g r e e m e n t c o n c e r n i n g b o t h p o l i t i c a l i s s u e s a n d d i s a r m a m e n t . C h i n a h a d m a d e - p e a c e w i t h J a p a n i n M a y 1933 ( T r e a t y o f T a n g k u ) , b u t n e i t h e r t h e A m e r i c a n s n o r t h e B r i t i s h h a d a c c e p t e d t h e s t a t u s q u o r e s u l t i n g f r o m t h a t t r e a t y - t h u s t h e J a p a n e s e a t t e m p t s t o l i n k d i s a r m a m e n t w i t h p o l i t i c a l i s s u e s . I t i s s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t J a p a n w i t h h e l d t h e p u b l i c a n n o u n c e m e n t o f h e r a t t i t u d e t o s u p e r v i s i o n u n t i l a f t e r t h e G e r m a n w i t h d r a w a l 238 f r o m t h e D i s a r m a m e n t C o n f e r e n c e - t h a t i s , u n t i l g e n e r a l d i s a r m a m e n t s e e m e d i m p o s s i b l e o f a t t a i n m e n t . I t m i g h t b e a r g u e d t h a t t h e J a p a n e s e h a d n o i n t e n t i o n o f c o m i n g t o a d i s a r m a m e n t a g r e e m e n t a n d w i t h h e l d t h e a n n o u n c e m e n t o n s u p e r v i s i o n s o t h a t t h e i r c o u n t r y w o u l d n o t b e b l a m e d f o r a b r e a k d o w n a t G e n e v a ; b u t e v e n i f t h i s w e r e s o , t h e n e g o t i a t i o n o f a n a r m s c o n t r o l a g r e e m e n t b e t w e e n t h e E u r o p e a n P o w e r s ( a s d i s t i n c t f r o m a g e n e r a l d i s a r m a m e n t c o n v e n t i o n ) w a s n o t p r e c l u d e d . 19 P h i p p s t o S i m o n , O c t o b e r 24 1933, D B F P S e r . 2, v o l . 5, n o s . 485 a n d 489; P h i p p s t o S i m o n , O c t o b e r 26 1933, i b i d . t n o . 494; m e m o r a n d u m b y N e u r a t h , O c t o b e r 24 1933, D G F P S e r . C , v o l . 2, n o . 23. 20 T y r r e l l t o S i m o n , N o v e m b e r 16 1933, D B F P S e r . 2, v o l . 6, n o . 43; T y r r e l l t o S i m o n , N o v e m b e r 17 1933, i b i d . , n o . 49. 21 S i m o n , N o v e m b e r 7 1933, P D C . 5th S e r . , v o l . 281, c o l s . 4I-64. S e e e s p e c i a l l y , c o l s . 59-63. 22 P h i p p s t o S i m o n , N o v e m b e r 21 1933, D B F P S e r . 2, v o l . 6, n o . 60; P h i p p s t o S i m o n , N o v e m b e r 22 1933, i b i d . , n o . 67; P h i p p s t o S i m o n , N o v e m b e r 27 1933, i b i d . , n o . 79; P h i p p s t o S i m o n , D e c e m b e r 5 1933, i b i d . , n o . 99« T h e m a j o r r e a s o n f o r H i t l e r ' s \" p r o p o s a l \" o f a n A n g l o -F r e n c h a l l i a n c e w a s p r o b a b l y a f e a r o f a H e r r i o t g o v e r n m e n t i n F r a n c e a n d t h e c o n c l u s i o n o f a F r a n c o - R u s s i a n a l l i a n c e . S e e i b i d . , n o s , 67, 99 a n d 101. G e r m a n y h a d l i t t l e t o l o s e b y a n A n g l o - F r e n c h a l l i a n c e ( B r i t a i n w o u l d u s e i t t o p r e s s F r a n c e i n t : o m a k i n g c o n c e s s i o n s ) , b u t a F r a n c o - R u s s i a n a l l i a n c e m i g h t f o r e s h a d o w a p o s s i b l e r e s u s c i t a t i o n o f t h e a n t i - G e r m a n c o a l i t i o n o f t h e G r e a t W a r . 23 P h i p p s t o S i m o n , D e c e m b e r 5 1933, i b i d . t n o s . 97 a n d 99« 24 S i m o n t o T y r r e l l , N o v e m b e r 8 1933, i b i d . , n o . 19; S i m o n t o T y r r e l l , D e c e m b e r 7 1933, i b i d . , n o . 112. 25 S i m o n t o P h i p p s , D e c e m b e r 7 1933, i b i d . , n o . 105. 26 P h i p p s t o S i m o n , D e c e m b e r 8 1933, i b i d . , n o . 114; P h i p p s t o S i m o n , D e c e m b e r 9 1933, i b i d . , n o . 120. 27 H i t l e r t o P h i p p s , D e c e m b e r 11 1933, i b i d . , n o . 132, e n c l o s u r e . 28 P h i p p s t o H i t l e r , D e c e m b e r 20 1933, i b i d . , n o . 140, e n c l o s u r e . 29 P h i p p s t o S i m o n , N o v e m b e r 22 1933, i b i d . , n o . 67; P h i p p s t o S i m o n , D e c e m b e r 6 1933, i b i d . , n o . 101. 30 C h a u t e m p s h a d r e p l a c e d S a r r a u t a s P r e s i d e n t d u C o n s e i l o n N o v e m b e r 27, t h o u g h P a u l - B o n c o u r r e m a i n e d a t t h e Q u a i d ' O r s a y a n d D a l a d i e r a t t h e M i n i s t r y o f W a r . 31 P h i p p s t o S i m o n , N o v e m b e r 22 1933, D B F P S e r . 2, v o l . 6, n o . 67; P h i p p s t o S i m o n , D e c e m b e r 5 1933, i b i d . , n o . 99; P h i p p s t o S i m o n , D e c e m b e r 6 1933, i b i d . , n o . 101. H i t l e r ' s f e a r o f H e r r i o t w o u l d a c c o u n t f o r t h e C h a n c e l l o r ' s \" p r o p o s a l \" o f a n A n g l o - F r e n c h a l l i a n c e . 239 32 H i t l e r to Ph ipps , December 11 1933, i b i d . , no. 132, enc losure ; Phipps to Simon, January 19 1934, i b i d . , no . 190. 33 T y r r e l l to Simon, December 15 1933, i b i d . , no. 134* 34 Aide-memoire l e f t w i th German M i n i s t e r f o r Fore ign A f f a i r s by French Ambassador, (^December 13 1933J , i b i d . , no. 143, enc losure . 35 Eden. Fac ing the D i c t a t o r s , p.. 53?. For the record of the conversa t ions , see DBFP Ser . 2, v o l . 6, no . 144• 36 Aide-memoire, January 1 1934, i b i d . , no.. 160, enc losure . C f . minute by V a n s i t t a r t , January 1 1934, i b i d . , no.. 153. 37 For the German Note to B r i t a i n , see i b i d . , no. 191; f o r the German Note to France, see i b i d . , no . 193. See a l s o , DGFP Ser . G, v o l . 2, nos . 172 and 194. 38 Phipps to Simon, January 22 1934, DBFP Ser . 2, v o l . 6, no. 195. 39 I b i d . 40 I b i d . , nos. 157-8. 41 For the record of these conversat ions , see i b i d . , nos . 161 and I 6 4 . 42 Memorandum on disarmament, January 25 1934, i b i d . , no . 206. A few t e x t u a l a l t e r a t i o n s were made before the memorandum was communicated to the other Powers. See i b i d . , no. 217. 43 Campbell to Simon, February 2 1934, i b i d . , no. 245. 44 P o s s i b l y the most i n t e r e s t i n g of these over react ions was that of Da lad ie r to the MacDonald p lan and the Roosevelt dec la ra t i on of May 16 1933. On May 19, the French Premier t o l d Baron de G a i f f i e r , the Be lg ian Ambassador i n P a r i s , that \"As long as I am i n power, France w i l l not destroy the arms, whether they be o f fens ive or de fens ive , that Germany i s not permit ted by the terms of the Treaty [of V e r s a i l l e s } . Th is would be a crime against the na t ion . . . . \" DDB v o l . 3, no. 33. 45 Phipps to Simon, January 31 1934, DBFP Ser . 2, v o l . 6, no. 240. 46 Phipps to Sargent (Foreign O f f i c e ) , February 1 1934, i b i d . , no. 244. 47 Phipps to Simon, February 1 1934, i b i d . , no. 242; Phipps to Sargent, February 1 1934, i b i d . , no. 244* C f . c i r c u l a r of the Fore ign M i n i s t e r , February 10 1934, DGFP Ser . C, v o l . 2, no. 245. 48 For a 1«6BUBIQ of these conversat ions , see DBFP Ser . 2, v o l . 6, no. 291. For the f u l l reco rd , see i b i d . , no. 297* For Eden's ve rs ion (based on i b i d . ) , see Eden, op. c i t . , pp. 57-60. C f . Kbs ter (Pa r i s ) t o Fore ign M i n i s t r y , February 19 1934, DGFP Ser . C, v o l . 2, no . 268. See a l s o , T y r r e l l to Simon, February 17 1934, DBFP Se r . 2, v o l . 6, no. 287. 240 49 For the record of Eden's; talks in Berlin, see Ibid., nos. 302-6 and DGFP Ser. C, vol. 2, nos. 270-1, 273 and 276, also Eden, op. c i t . , pp. 60-72. 50 The British memorandum of January 29 1934 suggested that a German return \"ought to he an essential condition of agreement\". 51 Eden, op. oit., p. 71* See also, Drummond to Simon, February 24 1933, DBFP Ser. 2, vol. 6, no. 316. 52 Ibid., no. 303, n. 4. 53 Eden, op. c i t . , p. 75» 54 Ibid. 55 Ibid. 56 For Eden's talks with Mussolini, see DBFP Ser. 2, vol. 6, nos. 320 and 322, also Eden, op. c i t . t pp. 76-9 and DGFP Ser. C, vol. 2, no. 283.. 57 The Italian proposal corresponded in substance with a memorandum handed to Simon during his vi s i t to Rome on January 3-4 1934 (see DBFP Ser. 2, vol. 6, no. l6l). For the text of the proposal, see DIA 1933, PP. 354-60. 58 For Eden's discussions in Paris, see DBFP Ser. 2, vol. 6, nos. 323-4, also Eden, op. c i t . . pp. 79-82, DGFP Ser. C, vol. 2, no. 301, and Herriot, Jadis, p.5396. 59 See above, pp. 93-5 f° r the French disarmament plan of November 1932. For the Paul-Boncour proposals of December 1933 for guaranteeing the execution of a convention, see DBFP Ser. 2, vol. 6, no. 172, n. 2. 60 For the text, see DBFP Ser. 2, vol. 6, no. 355, enclosure. 61 Herriot, op. c i t . , pp. 398-9* 62 Eden, op. c i t . , p. 86; minute by Eden, March 16 1934, DBFP Ser. 2, vol. 6, no. 337, n* 3. 63 Eden, op. c i t . , pp. 84-5* 64 Temperley, Whispering Gallery of Europe, p. 264. 65 Memorandum on Germany's il l e g a l rearmament and i t s effects on British policy, March 21 1934, DBFP Ser. 2, vol. 6, no. 363. 66 Simon to Tyrrell, March 6 1934, ibid., no. 333. 67 Simon to Phipps, March 22 1934, ibid.. no. 364; Hoesch to Foreign Ministry, March 23 1934, DGFP Ser. C, vol. 2, no. 351-241 68 Neurath to Hoesch, March 24 1934, ibid., no. 357? Hoesoh to Foreign Ministry, Maroh 27 1934, ibid.. no. 360; Simon to Phipps, March 26 1934, DBFP Ser. 2, vol. 6, no. 366. 69 Simon to Tyrrell, March 27 1934, ibid.. no. 368. 70 Tyrrell to Simon, March 21 1934, ibid.. no. 359. 71 Simon to Tyrrell, March 27 1934, ibid.. no. 368; Eden, op. c i t . . P. 87. , 72 Ibid. 73 Simon to Tyrrell, March 27 1934, DBFP Ser. 2, vol. 6, no. 368. 74 For the text, see ibid.. no. 377, enclosure. 75 Campbell to Simon, April 17 1934, ibid.. no. 394; Campbell to Simon, April 30 1934. ibid., no. 415; Patteson to Simon, May 15 1934, ibid., nos. 425-6; Franoois-Poncet, Souvenirs d'une ambassade a Berlin, pp. 175-7? General M. Weygand, Memoires: Mirages et realitS, pp. 419-21; Herriot, op. oit.. p. 410; testimony of ex-President Lebrun and the Belgian Senator, Baron de Dordolot to the parliamentary investigation Les evSnements survenus en Franoe de 1933 £ 1945. vol. 3, pp. 830-1 and vol. 4, pp. 957-8. 76 Franoois-Ponoet, loo, c i t . 77 Ibid.. p. 177. 78 For the text, see DBFP Ser. 2, vol. 6, no. 395, enclosure. 79 Campbell to Simon, April 30 1934, ibid.. no. 415; Patteson to Simon, May 15 1934. ibid., no. 426. 80 For the f u l l estimates as reported to Simon, see ibid., no. 374, enclosure. 81 Temperley, op. oit.. p. 262; Phipps to Simon, April 4 1934, DBFP Ser. 2, vol. 6, no. 374. 82 Eden, op. c i t . . p. 89. 83 Campbell to Simon, April 30 1934, DBFP Ser. 2, vol. 6, no. 415. 84 Ibid. 85 Testimony of Daladier at the Riom t r i a l , February 27 1942, in P. Maze and S . Genebrier, eds., Les Grandes Journees du Proems de Riom. pp. 36-7, cited in Scott, Alliance against Hitler, p. 161, n. 27. 86 Phipps to Simon, April 29 1934, DBFP Ser. 2, vol. 6, no. 412. 242 87 Conversation between Simon and Davis, May 28 1934, i b i d . , no. 435» enclosure. 88 Patteson to Simon, May 15 1934, i b i d . , no. 426. 89 Simon to Phipps, May 26 1934, i b i d . . no. 432. 90 Davis, May 29 1934, DIA 1934, p . 135- See i b i d . , pp. 133-8 for his f u l l speech. 91 L i t v i n o v , May 29 1934, i b i d . , p . 145. See i b i d . . pp. 138-47 for his f u l l speech. 92 Simon, May 30 1934, i b i d . . pp. 147-56. 93 Temperley, op. c i t . . p . 265. Por a t ranslat ion of Barthou's speech, see DIA 1934, PP* 156-66. 94 Eden, op. c i t . , p . 93. Notes to Chapter VII 1 Eden, op. c i t . . p . 47* 243 BIBLIOGRAPHY I . DOCUMENTS AND OFFICIAL SOURCES A. B r i t i s h Government Publications Foreign O f f i c e . Documents on B r i t i s h Foreign Pol icy 1919-1939. Second Series (1930-1938). Eds. E. L . Woodward and R. But ler . London, H.M.S .O. , 1946 et seq. (Vols . 1-6) . House of Commons. Parliamentary Debates. F i f t h Series. London, H.M.S.O. , 1909 et seq. (Vols , for 1920-1935). House of Lords. Parliamentary Debates. F i f t h Series, London, H.M.S.O. , 1909 et seq. (Vols , for 1920-1935). B. Frenoh Government Publications Chambre des Deputes. Debate Parlementaires. P a r i s , Imprimerie des Journaux O f f i c i e l s . (Microfilm copies for 1930-4, U.B.G. Library)• La Commission ehargSe d*enqueter sur les Evenements survenus en France de 1933 a 1945. Ed. Charles Serre. P a r i s , Presses Univers i ta i res de France, 1947* 2 v o l s . La Commission chargee d*enqu3ter sur les EvSnements survenus en France de 1933 & 1945. P a r i s , Presses Univers i ta ires de France, 1947. 9 v o l s . Ministere des Af fa i res Etrangeres. Documents Diplomatiques Francais 1932-1939. F i r s t Series (1932-1935). P a r i s , Imprimerie Nationale, 1964 et seq. (Vols . 1-^4). Senat. Debate Parlementaires. P a r i s , Imprimerie des Journaux O f f i c i e l s . (Microfi lm copies for 1930-4, U.B.C. L i b r a r y ) . C. American Government Publications Department of State. Documents on German;:)Foreign Po l i cy 1918—1945. Series G (1933-1937). Washington, Government P r i n t i n g Of f i ce , 1957 et seq. (Vols . 1-2). Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States. Diplomatic Papers. Washington, Government P r i n t i n g Of f i ce , 1948 et seq. (Vols , for 1932-4). 244 D. Belgian Government Publications Ministere des Af fa i res Etrangeres. Documents Diplomatiques Beiges 1 9 2 0 - 1 9 4 0 . Eds. Ch. de Visscher and P. Vanlangenove, Brussels, Pa la i s des Academies, 1 9 6 4 . ( V o l . 3 ) . E. League of Nations Publications Conference for the Reduotion and Limitat ion of Armaments. Records of the Conference for the Reduction and Limitat ion of Armaments. Geneva, League of Nations, 1933-7* Conference Documents. 3 v o l s . Series A. Verbatim Reoords of Plenary Meetings. Series B . Minutes of the General Commission. 3 v o l s . Series C. Minutes of the Bureau. 2 v o l s . Series Df v o l . 1 . Minutes of the Land Commission. Series D, v o l . 2 . Minutes of the Naval Commission, Series D, v o l . 3 . Minutes of the A i r Commission. Series D, v o l . 4 . Minutes of the National Defence Expenditure Commission. Series D, v o l . 5 . Minutes of the P o l i t i c a l Commission. Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference. Draft Convention. Geneva, League of Nations, 1 9 3 1 . P. Other Publications Royal Ins t i tute of International A f f a i r s . Documents on International A f f a i r s . Annual. Ed. J . W. Wheeler-Bennett. London, Oxford Universi ty Press, 1929 et seq. (Vols , for 1 9 2 9 - 3 4 ) . I I . MEMOIRS. SPEECHES AND CONTEMPORARY WORKS A. B r i t a i n Amery, L . S. My P o l i t i c a l L i f e . London, Hutchinson, 1 9 5 3 . 3 v o l s . Amery, L . S. The forward View. London, Bles , 1935* A t t l e e , C. R. As i t happened. London, Heinemann, 1 9 5 4 . A t t l e e , C. R. The Labour Party i n Perspective. London, Gollancz, 1937« Avon, E a r l of. See Eden, A. Boothby, R. I f ight to l i v e . London, Gollancz, 1947• C e c i l , Viscount. A l l the Way. London, Stodder and Houghton, 1949* C e c i l , Viscount. A Great Experiment. London, Cape, 1 9 4 1 . 245 Chamberlain, S i r , A. Down the Years. London, C a s s e l l , 1935. Cooper, A. D. Old Men Forget. London, Hart-Davis, 1953. Dalton, H. C a l l Back Yesterday. London, M u l l e r , 1953. Dalton, H. The F a t e f u l Years. London, M u l l e r , 1957. Eden, A. The Eden Memoirs; F a c i n g the D i c t a t o r s . London, C a s s e l l , 1962. Eden, A. F o r e i g n A f f a i r s . New York, Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1939. Hamilton, M. A. Remembering My Good F r i e n d s . London, Cape, 1944. Henderson, A. Labour's Wav t o Peace. London, Methuen, 1935* Jones, T. A D i a r y with L e t t e r s 1931-1950. London, Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1954. K i r k p a t r i c k , S i r I . The Inner C i r c l e . London, Macmillan, 1959. L i d d e l l Hart, B. H. Memoirs. London, C a s s e l l , 1965• 2 v o l s . Londonderry, Marquess o f . Ourselves and Germany. Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1938. Londonderry, Marquess, of. Wings of De s t i n y . London, Macmillan, 1943. Macmillan, H. Winds of Change. New York, Harper and Row, 1966. N i c o l s o n , H. D i a r i e s and L e t t e r s 1930-1939. Ed. N i g e l N i c o l s o n . London, C o l l i n s , 1966. Rothermere, L o r d . Warnings and P r e d i c t i o n s . London, Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1939* Samuel, V i s c o u n t . Memoirs. London, C r e s s e t , 1945* Selby, W. Dip l o m a t i c T w i l i g h t 1930-1940. London, Murray, 1953. Simon, S i r J . A. Retrospect. London, Hutchinson, 1952. Strang., L o r d . Home and Abroad. London, Deutsch, 1956. Temperley, Major-General A. C. The Whispering G a l l e r y of Europe. London, C o l l i n s , 1938. Templewood, V i s c o u n t . Nine Troubled Years. London, C o l l i n s , 1954. V a n s i t t a r t , S i r . R . Even Now. New York, Hutchinson, 1949* 246 V a n s i t t a r t , S i r R. Lessons of My L i f e . New York, Knopf, 1943. V a n s i t t a r t , S i r R. The Mist Procession. London, Hutchinson, 1958. Ward P r i c e , G. I know these Dictators . London, Harrap, 1937. B. France Bonnet, G. Defense de l a Paix : De Washington au Quai d'Orsay. Geneva, Edit ions du Cheval A i l e , 1946. Francois-Poncet, A. Memoires d'une Ambassade a B e r l i n . P a r i s , Flammarion, 1946. Gamelin, General M. Servir : Le Prologue du Drame. 1930-Aout 1939. P a r i s , P lon, 1946. H e r r i o t , E . Jadis : D'une Guerre a l ' A u t r e . 1914-1936. P a r i s , Flammarion, 1952. Laroche, J . La Pologne de P i l s u d s k i : Souvenirs d'une Ambassade. 1926-1935. P a r i s , Flammarion, 1953. Reynaud, P . Memoirest Yenu de ma Montagne. P a r i s , Flammarion, I 9 6 0 . Tardieu, A. Sur l a Pente. P a r i s , Flammarion, 1935* Weygand, General M. Memoires: Mirages et RSa l i t^ . P a r i s , Flammarion, 1957* C. Germany H i t l e r , A. Mein Kampf. Trans. R. Manheim. Boston, Houghton M i f f l i n , 1943. H i t l e r , A. The Speeches of Adolf H i t l e r . 1922-1939. Ed. N. H . Baynes. London, Oxford Universi ty Press, 1942. Papen, F . von. Memoirs. Trans. B. Connell . Hew York, Button, 1953. Schacht, H. Account Sett led. London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1949* Schaoht, H . Confessions of the Old Wizard. Trans. D. Pyke. Boston, Houghton M i f f l i n , 1956. Weizsaoker, E. von. Memoirs. Trans. J . Andrews (pseud.). London, Gollancz, 1951. D. United States Dodd, W. E. Ambassador Dodd's Diary 1933-1938. Eds. W. E . Dodd Jnr . and M. Dodd. New York, Harcourt, Brace and Co. , 1941« 247 H u l l , G. Memoirs. New York, MacMillan, 1948. 2 v o l s , Shirer , W. L . A B e r l i n Diary. New York, Knopf, 1941. E. Other Beck, C o l . J . Dernier Rapport. NeuchStel, Editions de l a Baoconie*re, 1951. Maisky, I . Who Helped H i t l e r ? London, Hutchinson, 1964. I I I . NEWSPAPERS AND JOURNALS: A. B r i t i s h Dai ly Herald. New Statesman and Nation. Spectator. The Times. B. French L'Europe nouvelle. L * I l l u s t r a t i o n . Mercure de Franoe. Nouvelle Revue Francaise. Revue des Deux Mondes. La Revue Hebdomadaire. Le Temps. C. American Foreign Pol i cy Reports. International C o n c i l i a t i o n . New York Times. 248 17. SECONDARY WORKS - BIOGRAPHIES Binion, R. Defeated Leaders. New York, Columbia Universi ty Press, I960. Bowie, J . Viscount Samuel. London, Gollancz, 1957• Bullock, A. Hit ler : , A Study i n Tyranny. Harmandsworth, Penguin, [1962] • But ler , J . R. M. Lord Lothian. London, Macmillan, i 9 6 0 . Colv in , I . Vansit tart i n O f f i c e . London-, Gollancz, 1965* Cooke, C. The L i f e of Richard Stafford Cripps. London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1957* Deutscher, I . S t a l i n . London, Oxford Universi ty Press, 1967* F o i l i n g , K. G. The L i f e of N e v i l l e Chamberlain. London, Macmillan, 1946* Hamilton, M. A. Arthur Henderson. London, Heinemann, 1938. Houston, R. F . V . Lives of the Lord Chancellors 1885-1940. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1964* Jenkins, R. Mr. A t t l e e : An interim Biography. London, Heinemann, 1948. K i r k p a t r i c k , S i r I . Mussol in i : A Study i n Power. New York, Hawthorn Books, 1964. Marwiok, A. C l i f f o r d A l l e n : The open Conspirator. Edinburgh, Ol iver and Boyd, 1964. Middlemas, K. and Barnes, J . Baldwin: A Biography. London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969• P e t r i e , S i r C. The L i f e and Letters of the Rt . Hon. S i r Austen Chamberlain. London, Casse l l , 1 9 4 0 . 3^vbls. Roberts, C. E. B. S i r John Simon. London, Hale,51938. Soulie , M. La Vie Pol i t ique d'Edonard Herr io t . P a r i s , Armand C o l i n , 1962. Warner, G. Pierre Laval and the Eclipse of France. London, Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1968. 249 Wrench, J . E. Geoffrey Dawson and our Times. London, Hutchinson, 1955* Young, G. 1 . Stanley Baldwin. London, Hart-Davis, 1952. V. SECONDARY WORKS - BOOKS Alhrecht-Carr ie , R. Prance. Europe and the Two World Wars. New York, Harper, 1961. Armstrong, G. G. Why another World War? How we missed Col lect ive Security. London, A l l e n and Unwin, 1941. Bassett, R. Democracy and Foreign P o l i c y . London, Longmans, Green and Co. , 1952. Beloff , M. The Foreign Pol i cy of Soviet Russia 1929-1941. New York, Bennett, E . W. Germany and the Diplomacy of the Financial C r i s i s 1931. Cambridge, Harvard Universi ty Press, 1962. Cameron, E . R. Prologue to Appeasement. Washington, American Council on Publ ic A f f a i r s , 1942. Carr, E. H . Conditions of Peace. New York, Macmillan, 1942. Carr, E . H . International Relations between the Two World Wars. London, Macmillan, 1950* Carr, E. H . The Twenty Years C r i s i s 1919-1939. London, Macmillan, 1940. Castel lan, G. Le Rearmement Clandestin du Reich 1930-1935. P a r i s , P lon, 1954. Chaput, R. A. Disarmament i n B r i t i s h Foreign P o l i c y . London, Al len and Unwin, 1935* C h u r c h i l l , W. S. The Gathering Storm. London, Casse l l , 1955» Claude, I n i s L . Jnr . Power and International Relations. New York, Random House, 1962. Claude, In i s L . Jnr . Swords into Plowshares. New York, Random House, [1964J . Craig , G. A . , and G i l b e r t , P . The Diplomats 1919-1939. New York, Atheneum, 1963 [[copyright 1953, by Princeton Universi ty Press}. 2 v o l s . 2 5 0 Furnia, A. H. The Diplomacy of Appeasement. Washington, Washington U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1 9 6 0 . Gathorne-Hardy, G. M. A Short H i s t o r y of I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s 1 9 1 9 - 1 9 3 9 . London, Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1 9 6 4 . Gehl, J . A u s t r i a . Germany and the Anschluss 1 9 3 1 - 3 8 . London, Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1 9 6 3 . G i l b e r t , M. B r i t a i n and Germany between the Wars.London. Longmans, 1 9 6 4 . G i l b e r t , M. The Roots; of Appeasement. London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1 9 6 6 . Granzow, B. A M i r r o r of Nazism. B r i t i s h Opinion and the Emergence of H i t l e r 1 9 2 3 - 3 3 . London, Gollancz, 1 9 6 4 . H i l g e r , G. and Meyer, A. The Incompatible A l l i e s . New York, MacMillan, 1 9 5 3 . Jarausch, K. H. The Four Power Pact 1933. New York, Arno Press, 1 9 6 6 . Jordan, W. M. Great B r i t a i n and the German Problem 1 9 1 9 - 1 9 3 9 . London, Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1 9 4 3 . Kennan, G. F. Russia and the West under Lenin and S t a l i n . Boston, L i t t l e , Brown and Co., 1 9 6 1 . K l e i n , B., Germany's Economic Preparations f o r War. Cambridge, Harvard U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1 9 5 9 * Macartney, C. A. and Palmer, A . Independent Eastern Europe. London, MacMillan, 1 9 6 2 . Madariaga, S. de. Disarmament. New York, Coward-McCann, 1 9 2 9 . Micaud, C. The French Right and Nazi Germany 1 9 3 3 - 1 9 3 9 . New York, Octagon, 1 9 6 4 . Medlioott, W. N. B r i t i s h Foreign P o l i c y since V e r s a i l l e s . London, Methuen, 1 9 4 0 . M e d l i c o t t , W. N. Contemporary England. 1 9 1 4 - 1 9 6 4 . New York, McKay, 1 9 6 7 . Noel Baker, P. Disarmament. London, Hogarth Press, 1 9 2 6 . Northedge, F. S. The Troubled Giant. London, G. B e l l and Son, 1 9 6 6 . Mowat, C. L. B r i t a i n between the Wars. London, Methuen, 1 9 6 2 . Rappard, W. E. The Quest f o r Peaoe sinoe the World War. Cambridge, Harvard U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1 9 4 0 251 Renouvin, P . His to i re des Relations Internationales. P a r i s , Hachette, 1958. Royal Inst i tute of International A f f a i r s . P o l i t i c a l andl Strategical Interests of the United Kingdom. London, Oxford Univers i ty Press, 1939. Royal Inst i tute of International A f f a i r s . Survey of International A f f a i r s . (Annual) Eif. A. J . Toynbee. Oxford, Oxford Universi ty Press. (Vols , f o r 1929-34.) Robhinsi, K. Munich 1938. London, C a s s e l l , 1968. Robertson, E . M. H i t l e r ' s ; Pre-war P o l i c y and m i l i t a r y Plans. London, Longmans, 1963. Scott, W. E . Al l iance against H i t l e r . Durham, Duke Univers i ty Press, 1962. Shirer , W. L . The Rise and P a l l of the Third Reich. New York, Simon and Schuster, I960. . , Taylor, A. J . P . English History 1914-1945. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1965. Taylor, A. J . P . The Origins of the Second World War. Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1968. Tucker, W. R. The Att i tude of the B r i t i s h Labour Party towards; European and Col lec t ive Security Problems 1920-39. Geneva, Imprimerie du Journal de Geneve, 1950* V i l l a r i , L . I t a l i a n Foreign P o l i c y under Musso l in i . New York, Devlin Adair , 1956\". Walters, F . P.. A History of the Leagne of Nations. London, Oxford; Univers i ty Press, 1952. Watt, D. C. Personal i t ies andl P o l i c i e s . London, Longmans, 1965* Wheeler-Bennett, J . W. Disarmament and Security since Locarno. London, Al len and Unwin, 1932. Wheeler-Bennett, J . W. The Disarmament Deadlock. London, Routledge, 1934* Wheeler-Bennett, J . W. The Wreck of Reparations. London, A l l e n and Unwin, 1933. Wiskemann, E. Europe of the Dictators 1919-1945. London, C o l l i n s , 1966. Wiskemann, E . The Rome-Berlin A x i s . London, Oxford Universi ty Press, 1949* Wolfers, A. B r i t a i n and France between Iwo Wars. New York, Harcourt Brace and Co. , 1940. 252 VI. SECONDARY WORKS - ARTICLES AND ESSAYS C a t l i n , G. E. G. \"The Dying Peace?\". The Contemporary Review, A p r i l 1934, pp. 404-10. Davies, Lord. \"The French P l a n \" . The Contemporary Review, January 1933, pp. 1-10. D i v i n e , R. A. \" F r a n k l i n D. Roosevelt and C o l l e c t i v e S e c u r i t y , 1933\". M i s s i s s i p p i V a l l e y H i s t o r i c a l Review, June 1961, PP* 42-59* Gasiorowski, 2 . \"Did P i l s u d s k i attempt t o i n i t i a t e a prev e n t i v e war i n 1933?\". J o u r n a l of Modern H i s t o r y , June 1955, PP* 135-51* Gasiorowski, Z. \"The German-Polish Non-Aggression Pact of 1934\"• J o u r n a l of C e n t r a l European A f f a i r s , A p r i l 1955, PP* 3-29* Lutz, H. \"Foreign P o l i c y i n the T h i r d Reich\". Current H i s t o r y , A p r i l 1955, PP* 222-35* MacDonald, J . R. \" P r o t o c o l or P a c t ? \" . I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o n c i l i a t i o n , September 1925, pp. 256-63. Poole, DeWitt C. \"L i g h t on Nazi Foreign P o l i c y \" . F o r e i g n A f f a i r s , October 1946, pp. 130-54. Watt, D. C. \"The German Diplomats and the Nazi Leaders 1933-1939\". J o u r n a l of C e n t r a l European A f f a i r s , J u l y 1955, PP* 148-60. "@en ; edm:hasType "Thesis/Dissertation"@en ; dcterms:spatial "Great Britain"@en ; edm:isShownAt "10.14288/1.0093347"@en ; dcterms:language "eng"@en ; ns0:degreeDiscipline "History"@en ; edm:provider "Vancouver : University of British Columbia Library"@en ; dcterms:publisher "University of British Columbia"@en ; dcterms:rights "For non-commercial purposes only, such as research, private study and education. Additional conditions apply, see Terms of Use https://open.library.ubc.ca/terms_of_use."@en ; ns0:scholarLevel "Graduate"@en ; dcterms:title "Problem of disarmament in British diplomacy, 1932-1934"@en ; dcterms:type "Text"@en ; ns0:identifierURI "http://hdl.handle.net/2429/34911"@en .