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The Chinese people’s liberation army in the 1960’s : ideal and reality Louis, Randolph Vincent Craig 1974

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THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY IN THE 1960's: IDEAL AND REALITY  by RANDOLPH VINCENT CRAIG LOUIS B.A., University of British Columbia, 1970  A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in the Department of History  We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard  THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA April 1974  In presenting this  in partial  fulfilment  of the requirements  an a d v a n c e d d e g r e e a t t h e U n i v e r s i t y  of B r i t i s h  Columbia,  the Library I  further  for  thesis  s h a l l make i t  available  agree t h a t p e r m i s s i o n f o r  f o r r e f e r e n c e and  extensive copying of t h i s  representatives.  of t h i s  thesis  written  permission.  Department o f  for  financial  i s understood t h a t  thesis  29. 1 Q74-  copying or  Columbia  or  publication  g a i n s h a l l n o t be a l l o w e d w i t h o u t my  History  The U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h V a n c o u v e r 8 , Canada  April  It  that  study.  s c h o l a r l y p u r p o s e s may be g r a n t e d by t h e Head o f my D e p a r t m e n t  by h i s  Date  freely  I agree  for  ii  ABSTRACT  The subject of the paper i s the nature of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) during the 1960s.  The primary aim i s  to analyze the basic characteristics of this complex bureaucratic i n s t i t u t i o n , especially i t s internal nature and i t s relationship to society.  The principal problem explored i s whether the PLA in the  1960s developed into a d i s t i n c t , professionalized military organization (as i s the common pattern in the West) or whether i t remained relatively close to i t s particular nature of the pre-1949 People's War era. However, i t transpired that the very incomplete state of our knowledge concerning contemporary Chinese society made i t extremely d i f f i c u l t to resolve the problem with any certainty or precision.  The main contribution of the paper i s placing the topic  in a conceptual framework which, i t i s argued, brings us closer to the actual situation in China. The body of the paper i s divided into three main parts. The f i r s t gives the general conceptual and historical framework used to approach the topic, mainly through a comparison of the PLA's m i l i tary tradition with those of other areas.  The second part explores  the ideal nature of the PLA as revealed in three different o f f i c i a l sources, both c l a s s i f i e d government documents and the public Chinese press and from both the national and provincial levels.  The third  part examines the actual behaviour of the PLA in a precise situation, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in Kwangtung province.  ii i The line of argument developed i s that the three PLAs examined, the pre-1949 PLA, the ideal PLA of the early 1960s, and the active PLA in the Cultural Revolution, shared a basic common nature.  This was  closely related to the communist Chinese approach to fighting, to their approach to social development, and to the nature of Chinese society. The general conclusion is that, during the 1960s, the PLA did not develop into a d i s t i n c t , professionalized military organization. Rather, i t remained as a highly active and well-integrated participant in the d i s t i n c t i v e social development of the People's Republic of China. The PLA's intensive involvement in society had led to the reflection of Chinese society's trends and characteristics within i t .  iv  TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter  Page  INTRODUCTION I.  1  HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: A COMPARISON OF THE PRC's MILITARY TRADITION WITH THOSE OF OTHER AREAS  7  A. WESTERN NATIONS  7  B. THE DEVELOPING NATIONS  14  C.  PRE-MODERN CHINA  16  1. Imperial Military Tradition  16  2. Heterodox Military Tradition  20  EARLY MODERN CHINA  24  D.  E. PLA's MILITARY TRADITION 1.  Pre-1949 People's War Era  2. Post-1949 Modernization II.  25 25 30  PRC POLICY STATEMENTS ON THE PLA IN THE 1960s . . . .  34  A.  INTRODUCTION  34  B.  THE 1961 WORK BULLETINS  1. Nature of Source  .  36  36  2. PLA's Military Approach  38  3. PLA's Relations with Society  42  4.  43  PLA's Work-Style  5. PLA's Leadership Style  44  V  Chapter  Page  C. THE 1964 "LEARN FROM THE PLA" CAMPAIGN AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL  • .52  1. Nature of Source 2.  PLA's Work-Style  3. PLA's Relations with Society  52 .  54 59  D. THE 1964 "LEARN FROM THE PLA" CAMPAIGN IN KWANGTUNG PROVINCE  60  1. Problem of Regionalism  62  2.  63  PLA's Work-Style  3. PLA's Relations with Society  70  4. Summary of the "Learn from the PLA" Campaign  III.  76  F. CONCLUSIONS FOR CHAPTER II . . .  78  THE REALITY: THE PLA IN THE GPCR  80  A. BACKGROUND  80  B. WESTERN INTERPRETATIONS OF THE PLA IN THE GPCR C. CASE STUDY: THE PLA IN THE KWANGTUNG GPCR  84  FROM FEBRUARY 1968 TO JUNE 1970  92  1. Introduction  92  2. Periodi zation  95  3. Development of Mass Factionalism  95  4. The PLA in the Kwangtung GPCR before February 1968 5. General Character of the February 1968June 1970 Period i n Kwangtung 6. The Fourth Phase of the GPCR i n Kwangtung: The PLA as Mediator  101 104 105  vi Chapter  Page  D.  7. The Fifth Phase of the GPCR i n Kwangtung: The PLA as Bystander  108  8. The Sixth Phase of the GPCR in Kwangtung: The PLA as Suppressor of Factionalism . . .  115  9. The Post-GPCR Period i n Kwangtung: The PLA as Administrator of Society  121  CONCLUSIONS TO CHAPTER III  129  CONCLUSIONS  133  FOOTNOTES  137  BIBLIOGRAPHY  163  vii  LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS  CB  Current Background  CCP  Chinese Communist Party  GPCR  Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution  JPRS  Joint Publications  NFJP  Nan-fang Jih-pao  PLA  Chinese People's Liberation Army  PRC  The People's Republic of China  SCMM  Survey of China Mainland Magazines  SCMP  Survey of China Mainland Press  Research  Service  (Southern Daily)  vi i i  ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS  This paper could not have been produced without the continuous assistance, encouragement, and inspiration of my superior, Edgar Wickberg.  Thanks are also due to Cameron Louis for proof-reading,  to Heath Chamberlain for valuable advice, and to Evelyn Johnson for both.  Special thanks must be given to Winnie Leung for indispensable  language and moral support.  1  INTRODUCTION  The basic aim of this paper i s to analyze the nature of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (hereafter PLA), the military forces of the People's Republic of China (hereafter PRC), both in ideal and in r e a l i t y during the 1960s. It should be emphasized at the outset that this paper i s not an e l i t e study of the motivations, p o l i t i c a l machinations, or the power status of leading PLA figures.  Nor i s i t intended to be a study  of the PLA's military strategy or military capabilities. Rather, this paper seeks to explore the basic characteristics of this bureaucratic organization, especially the nature of i t s internal organization and of the roles i t i s called upon to play.  More specific-  a l l y , i t examines whether, during the 1960s, the PLA developed into a Western-style military i n s t i t u t i o n :  that i s , one highly differentiated  from the rest of society and being led by a professional o f f i c e r corps possessing a distinctive corporate identity.  Or, i f not, then,  whether the PLA remained relatively close to i t s particular pre-1949 nature. Having posed these problems, i t soon became clear that the materials available from the PRC could not d e f i n i t i v e l y answer them. This i s not simply because of the very real limitations of the a v a i l able materials (which consist mainly of PRC newspapers and radio broadcasts as well as accounts by v i s i t o r s and refugees)J  The real  2  root problem i s that the outsider's knowledge of the PRC i s so incomplete that he cannot interpret the sources from the PRC with any great degree of certainty or precision. This i s because the PRC government, to a remarkable degree, has succeeded in denying outsiders comprehensive information from the PRC.  I t has done so mainly through maintaining an extremely tight  control over the flow abroad of any written or oral material.from inside China.  At the same time, i t has made China almost inaccessible  to long-term, meaningful v i s i t s by foreigners.  As a result, scholars  of contemporary China not only largely lack many of the usual source materials, such as on-the-spot surveys, personal interviews, and a broad range of local papers, but,  more importantly, also  lack a large proportion of the basic information about PRC society and government. This has meant that scholars of contemporary China have had to rely relatively heavily upon educated surmise and borrowing from studies of other areas.  In particular, they have tended to employ  social models and historical patterns from other societies such as the overseas Chinese communities (especially HongKong and  Taiwan),the  Western nations, and the Soviet Union. In general, in this paper I cannot overcome the basic problem in contemporary China studies of the scarcity of information.  I will  be attempting to use the available limited materials in a conceptual approach which I would argue w i l l bring us closer to the actual situation i n the PRC.  3  Thus, throughout this paper, considerable attention w i l l be devoted to an analysis of Western methodology and other Western interpretations on the subject of the PLA in the 1960s.  In order to  maintain a more concentrated focus and because of personal limitations of time, space, language, and experience, i t was found necessary to limit the scope here to the West (meaning basically North America and Western Europe).  The paper w i l l be unable to treat the other  important centers of contemporary China studies in the world in Japan, HongKong, Taiwan, and the Soviet Union. In view of i t s highly subjective nature, I would argue that i t i s essential to preface any study of contemporary China with a statement of the writer's own particular approach to the general topic of the PRC.  2  In this regard, I would t o t a l l y reject those approaches which are largely an arbitrary imposition of internal Western p o l i t i c a l disputes onto the study of China.  This includes the hostile conser-  vative approach which views the PRC as part of a monolithic Communist empire unalterably bent upon unlimited expansion abroad and terrorist i c suppression at home. Such also covers the u n c r i t i c a l l y sympathetic approach which projects dissatisfaction with Western society onto the study of China. I would also strongly qualify what can be termed the orthodox "social-science" approach, the predominant one at present i n Western contemporary China studies. " s c i e n t i f i c " in methodology.  This poses as p o l i t i c a l l y neutral and However, I would argue that, in fact,  4 this approach i s based upon a p r i o r i t y of values and a model of social development derived from Western historical experience and morality. It assumes that modern Western industrialized society i s the universal objective of human social development.  In particular,  this approach employs the goals of individual freedom, democratic government, and material prosperity as the standards to judge a l l societies.  Similarly, the methods with which Western society was  developed, such as gradual, non-violent social change, c a p i t a l i s t i c enterprise, high standards of technology, and uncontrolled economic growth, are viewed as the most appropriate ones. This approach regards the PRC, which has set forth a d i f f e r ent p r i o r i t y of values and methods i n social development, as in some degree mis-guided, i r r a t i o n a l , or as running against basic human nature.  It especially views the leadership of Mao Tse-tung as  fanatical and even dangerous to China. As a result, this approach views the masses of China as really very "human," that i s , similar to Westerners, interested in material well-being, and opposed to Maoist "radical" p o l i t i c s . I would classify my own approach to contemporary China as " c r i t i c a l empathy."  I accept the PRC as the popularly generally  accepted and functioning government of China and seek to understand i t within the Chinese context.  In particular, I believe that the  PRC value p r i o r i t i e s (as I interpret them) are both morally defensible and practically feasible.  These emphasize national  strength, self-reliance, self-respect as the primary goals, achieved  5  through methods that ensure equitable distribution of wealth, mass participation in decision-making, and a sense of community. This does not mean that, within this general approach, I necessarily accept a l l the particular methods the PRC has adopted to achieve these goals as being either necessary or right. I have divided the body of the paper into three main parts or chapters.  The f i r s t provides the basic broad conceptual and  historical framework with which to approach the topic.  I t analyzes  the PRC's military tradition within the context of Chinese military history while, at the same time, also comparing i t with the military traditions of other areas.  The second chapter explores the ideal  nature of the PLA during the 1960s as revealed by three different o f f i c i a l sources, both c l a s s i f i e d and public and national and provincial.  The third examines the behavior of the PLA in a partic-  ular situation, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR) in the specific period from February 1968 to July 1970 in the province of Kwangtung.  The GPCR, while plainly an atypical period, did force  each group in Chinese society to make definite stands on issues and to take concrete actions, both of which were in some manner reported in the unofficial press which temporarily thrived at that time.  Although  the GPCR dated from' mid-1966 to at least mid-1969 in i t s entirety, I chose to l i m i t the scope to the later part, partly in order to allow for more detailed coverage, and partly because this period has been the least studied in the West.  The particular place, Kwangtung, was  chosen mainly because of the relatively greater a v a i l a b i l i t y of materials pertaining to i t .  6 The paper w i l l generally conclude that, with regard to the nature of the PLA as an i n s t i t u t i o n , there i s a strong line of continuity underlying a l l the many changes i n leadership between the pre-1949 PLA, the o f f i c i a l ideal of the PLA in the 1960s, and the behavior of the PLA in the GPCR.  The characteristics of this consis-  tent basic nature of the PLA w i l l be closely linked to the continuing overwhelmingly rural agrarian nature of Chinese society.  7  CHAPTER I HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: A COMPARISON OF THE PRC's MILITARY TRADITION WITH THOSE OF OTHER AREAS  A.  WESTERN NATIONS  In the West (meaning here Europe including the Soviet Union, North America, and Australia) a great deal of d i f f i c u l t y can be encountered in the study of the military histories of very different societies because many of the basic concepts connected with the study of military history have become so deeply intertwined with the specific processes of Western historical development.  This has led to what I  feel i s the unsound application of particularly Western military characteristics and connotations to the very different Chinese situation. At the beginning, then, what i s required i s an investigation of the f u l l meanings of the Western terminology connected with military history with an eye to stripping them as much as possible of their s p e c i f i c a l l y Western historical trappings.  In this way, one could  at-least become more aware of the limitations and dangers of the existing ones,even i f he could not come up with verbal tools he could universally employ without any cultural prejudice in the study of the military histories of very different societies.  To this end, in this  section, I propose to f i r s t examine the Western military tradition and  8  then to compare i t with those of the developing countries, traditional China, early modern China, and f i n a l l y the  PLA.  Most basically, the Oxford English Dictionary (1933) defines "military" as "pertaining to soldiers," soldier," And,  or  "engaged in the l i f e of a  "having reference to armed forces or to the army."^  i f one defines a soldier as simply a member of an organized body  of men armed primarily for war,  then, as far as this very generalized  sense goes, the term "military" could be applied to any armed force. However, at present in the West the term "military" taken many much more specific meanings and connotations.  has  It refers  to a particular type of society and to a particular approach to waging warfare, one in which "military" signifies permanent and  "specialized  structures maintained in peacetime for the eventuality of armed c o n f l i c t and managed by a professional military."  In this Western  meaning of the word, "military" not only refers to the  specialized  structures, but also to the specialists in the task of organized armed c o n f l i c t , and to the characteristics of their particular profession. In this sense, then, the term "military" connotes a d i s t i n c t i f not complete differentiation with regard to function, t r a i t s , s k i l l s , and personnel between the "military" and the non-military or " c i v i l i a n " aspects o f  society. Furthermore, in the West, "military" very commonly has taken  upon i t s e l f many unfavorable connotations which are w e l l - i l l u s t r a t e d in the concept of "militarism."  Like racism and imperialism,  "militarism" has become a catch-all emotional, pejorative term which  9  i l l o g i c a l l y encompasses a great many disliked aspects.  It presupposes  a s t r i c t differentiation between the military and the c i v i l i a n aspects and sectors of society, each with i t s own different characteristics. The military i s regarded as "naturally" possessing certain "undesirable" characteristics such as narrow-mindedness, authoritarianism and aggressiveness.  Thus, being very different and at best a necessary e v i l , the  military clearly should be segregated as much as possible from c i v i l i a n society and certainly subordinated to the p o l i t i c a l authorities.  If  the military should "usurp" i t s proper position and attempt to spread i t s influence or policies into society, then, of necessity, this would 3  have far-reaching and "tad" results. I would argue that the specific meanings and connotations of "military" are the products of the particular development of military history in the West and are not applicable to societies different processes of historical development.  with very  In the West the dis-  t i n c t corporate nature of the modern professional military officer has been brought about by two very special historical phenomena: the aristocratic feudal military of the West and the modernization of 4 Western society. Although the medieval period had ended by the sixteenth century, the officer corps in the West for many centuries afterwards s t i l l were almost the exclusive preserves of the o l d , feudal, rural aristocratic class.  This class succeeded i n imposing particular  class traditions and values on the armies and military tradition of the West, particularly the beliefs in a stable organic society, unchanging hierarchy, the feudal sense of honor, and conservative  10 Christianity.  Originally,  none o f these t r a i t s was c o n f i n e d  solely  t o the m i l i t a r y , and they cannot be regarded as the i n e v i t a b l e o f any m i l i t a r y .  traits  I n f a c t , a r i s t o c r a t i c o f f i c e r corps were u s u a l l y more  i n t e r e s t e d i n making the army express t h e i r c l a s s values than i n i m proving m i l i t a r y  efficiency.  The values o f the a r i s t o c r a t i c c l a s s were d i a m e t r i c a l l y t o those o f the r i s i n g urban m i d d l e c l a s s which came i n c r e a s i n g l y dominate the n o n - m i l i t a r y and e s p e c i a l l y the p o l i t i c a l society.  sectors  opposed to  of  The l a t t e r c l a s s v a l u e d a dynamic, changing s o c i e t y ,  equality,  m a t e r i a l i s m , democracy and i n d i v i d u a l i s m . That these two so d i f f e r e n t c l a s s e s would e v e n t u a l l y become engaged i n b i t t e r p o l i t i c a l  and s o c i a l c o n f l i c t was almost  inevitable,  b u t i t was not i n e v i t a b l e t h a t the f e u d a l a r i s t o c r a c y would become entrenched i n the army w h i l e t h e m i d d l e c l a s s sought power i n  civilian  politics. The c l a s s d i f f e r e n c e s between t h e o f f i c e r s and t h e  politicians  i n the West were so deep and b i t t e r a t times t h e y even transcended national  differences:  I t has sometimes happened t h a t armies became so i n v o l v e d i n c o n t e m p l a t i n g domestic c r i t i c s and f o e s , l i b e r a l s i n an e a r l i e r age, s o c i a l i s t s l a t e r and Communists more r e c e n t l y , t h a t t h e y have f o r g o t t e n t o c o n c e n t r a t e on t h e enemy abroad - - o r t h a t they have even sympathized w i t h f o r e i g n armies and made common f r o n t w i t h them a g a i n s t internal antagonists. 5 This c o n f l i c t between the two c l a s s e s i n e v i t a b l y  affected  Western images and d e f i n i t i o n s o f " m i l i t a r y " and " c i v i l i a n "  or  "political."  aristocrats  The d i s t i n c t i o n between the m i l i t a r y and the  11  who happened to be entrenched in i t became rather blurred, so that many t r a i t s of that class became identified as something inherently "military."  In short, the peculiar characteristics of a particular  unpopular class have become inseparably linked with the common concepts and images of the m i l i t a r y . ^ Then with the Napoleonic Wars, the modernization of Western society began to transform radically the nature, conduct and requirements of warfare.  The industrial revolution and the rise of national-  ism, made war increasingly all-encompassing as material and human resources were mobilized on a scale never before imagined.  This also  made the conduct of war a highly complex administrative and s c i e n t i f i c matter requiring for i t s management a highly trained and motivated officer corps.^ The Western military now was no longer the exclusive preserve of the aristocrats.  But since the Industrial Revolution was a relatively  gradual process in the West, the old m i l i t a r y traditions inherited from the feudal aristocracy were not t o t a l l y supplanted.  They con-  tinued to strongly influence the attitudes and the values of the Western m i l i t a r y o f f i c e r , who s t i l l cultivated a wide variety of feudal anachronisms such as duelling and horsemanship.  Needless to  say, the negative attitudes of the c i v i l i a n s towards the m i l i t a r y were maintained throughout.  In other words, the strong modern  tendency towards r i g i d and complete specialization, in the case of the Western m i l i t a r y , became superimposed on top of an older but s t i l l influential differentiation based largely on old social differences.  12  As a result of this entire process, the modern military officer in the West monopolizes and specializes in the single task of training, managing and leading the very complex modern military machines in peace and war.** But the professionalism of the Western o f f i c e r corps i s much deeper and more profound than the simple specialization of the craftsman or the technician, for his job includes two additional aspects, o  "responsibility" and "corporateness." The former indicates a sense of commitment to one's profession beyond mere desire for wealth or personal prestige or even devotion to one's own unique s k i l l (although a l l clearly play a part). Rather, because he alone i s charged with this essential social function, the military officer sees himself as answering a "higher calling" in the service of society, much as a doctor or lawyer does.^ Inevitably such a strong sense of commitment and responsibility leads to an inflated sense of the importance of one's profession. As a result, the officer often tries to increase the military's role and influence in society and even to impose i t s special characteristics upon the rest of society. The corporate nature of the Western officer corps, or i t s conscious sense of organic unity, i s highly developed.  Partly because  of the demands of the military profession, the professional aspect of a officer's l i f e takes up an unusually high proportion of his attention and time, physically and mentally separating him from the surrounding society.^  As a result, the Western military officer corps i s at  present so self-contained that i s i s v i r t u a l l y an autonomous social  13  unit, possessing i t s own distinctive hierarchical organization, entrance c r i t e r i a , educational and training system, j u d i c i a l system, places of residence, uniforms, customs and tradition. Such a strong corporate nature inevitably has resulted in the development of correspondingly distinctive and persistent habits of thought, perspectives, attitudes, values and policy tendencies.  In  particular, this Western "military mind" has strongly tended to conservatism; a belief in order, hierarchy, patriotism, duty and selfsacrifice and an abhorrance for individualism  and materialism.  As well,  the Western officer corps has manifested a distaste for the prolonged negotiations, constant compromises, and obscuring of issues inherent 12  in the democratic p o l i t i c a l process. Given the existing situation in the West, when the military intervenes in society, through direct takeover or through increasing i t s p o l i t i c a l and social influence with the aid of c i v i l i a n a l l i e s , the effects w i l l be far-reaching because the military o f f i c e r corps is so different from the rest of  society.  In retrospect, i t can be clearly seen how the historical development of Western military institutions and society gave the modern Western military a highly specific nature and meaning.  The  term "military" implies there i s a fundamental differentiation between the military and the non-military, and that the resulting differentiation has a distinct character of i t s own, to both.  assigning certain t r a i t s  Thus, the military and the non-military are regarded in  the West not only as being naturally different and incompatible but 13  also as being inevitably in actual c o n f l i c t .  14  B. THE DEVELOPING NATIONS  That the Western m i l i t a r y model i s not necessarily the inevitable or natural one i s demonstrated by the case of the socalled developing nations.  The military officers in most of these  nations have been trained in Western schools or by Western officers. They consciously attempt to create modern, Western-style professional armies, which can be a r t i f i c i a l l y maintained by Western aid.  But  the lack of the p o l i t i c a l , economic and social pre-requisites for a modern Western state and armed force s t i l l has resulted in an o f f i c e r corps in many of these nations with a very different nature 14  and pattern of behavior. Few of the armed forces i n these nations have actually been used i n their intended role of making war, but rather they have assumed a great variety of important roles in c i v i l i a n society.  In some  cases the roles were assumed unintentionally, as for example, when armies have become major vehicles for spreading nationalism and technology.  Furthermore, since the military i s often technologically  and administratively the most modernized bureaucracy in these societies, i t may expand into managing economic enterprises and building capital construction. But the outstanding role of the military i n the developing nations has been that of the p o l i t i c a l ruler after a m i l i t a r y coup has removed the existing c i v i l i a n p o l i t i c a l leadership.  The tenuous  legitimacy and limited experience of the p o l i t i c a l authorities, combined with the general high expectations  in society, creates the  15 pre-conditions for a relatively easy takeover by a disciplined and determined group. One of the main catalysts for the frequent military takeovers i s the prevalence of officers of the "Young Turk" type i n these nations.  The typical "Young Turk" i s n a t i o n a l i s t i c , puritanical  and r e l a t i v e l y young, with a well-developed p o l i t i c a l awareness often taking the form of radical and c o l l e c t i v i s t ideologies, either of the extreme right or l e f t .  Impatient and chauvinistic, he i s passion-  ately committed to making his country modern, r i c h , powerful and democratic in the shortest possible time. In short, the o f f i c e r corps in the developing nations tend not to be the isolated, highly differentiated professional groups performing just one task, but rather very active, at times the dominant, participants  in the p o l i t i c a l , economic and social develop-  ment of their nations. The d i f f i c u l t y of transplanting the entire Western military model i s i l l u s t r a t e d by the o f f i c e r corps of the developing nations. Even i f an o f f i c e r corps consciously attempts to copy the Western military model, there i s l i t t l e chance of success unless the traditions and the social situation are similar.  16 C. PRE-MODERN CHINA  1.  Imperial Military Tradition The military development of traditional China (up to about  1840), has been entirely different from that of the West, at least 15 since the foundation of the imperial system in 220 B.C.  Admittedly,  before that date, during the Shang and Chou dynasties, China was ruled by a warrior aristocracy.  With the advent of the Ch'in Dynasty i n  221 B.C., however, this society was gradually replaced by one with a different o f f i c i a l ideology, Confucianism; a different government system, a centralized bureaucratic state; and a different social e l i t e , the l i t e r a t i or gentry.  Naturally, this revolutionary change was not  achieved through government f i a t overnight, and, i n fact, i t took several centuries of gradual change for the entire transformation to be achieved.  S t i l l , the basic direction of society had been set and,  at least by the Sung Dynasty (960-1279), the imperial system had become a r e a l i t y . Confucianism, as i t came to be interpreted during the imperial era, held that persuasion through education, discussion, and example was far superior as a means of government to any system of laws or form of coercion.  In effect, "the primary means for perserv-  ing the social order was indoctrination i n the orthodox principles of social conduct ( l i ) and the secondary means was suasive coercion through rewards and punishments." Naturally, war and armed c o n f l i c t s t i l l existed i n t r a d i t ional China.  At times, the empire expanded abroad through very large  17 scale military operations, and almost every dynasty was overthrown and replaced through often very prolonged and very bloody c i v i l wars. But i n traditional China those in command of the armies, as a group, never gained the distinctive corporate identity, the prestige, or the influence of the aristocratic Western officer corps.  An  individual military leader could and did, by dint of his own individual genius and luck, use his armies to seize the imperial power.  But then  the tremendous social and cultural strength of the Confucian pattern would invariably prevail, and he or his successors would in the end follow the well-worn path of Confucian bureaucratic government based on the gentry e l i t e .  In a famous instance, an advisor to Liu Pang,  the founder of the Han Dynasty (206 B.C. - 220 A.D.), admonished his ruler "You might have won the empire on horseback, but you cannot govern i t on horseback. The philosophical downgrading of force as a means to achieve p o l i t i c a l ends was also reflected in the social structure of traditional China.  At the top were the gentry scholars, followed  by the peasants, the artisans and then the merchants.  At the bottom,  common soldiers were grouped with prostitutes and other outcasts. A common saying in traditional China was that, "good iron i s not used 1g to make a nail nor a good man to make a soldier."  Indeed, among  the common people, i t was taken for granted that soldiering was to be avoided at a l l cost by respectable people, and communities dreaded the coming of rowdy, undisciplined troops, friendly or otherwise, about as much as a swarm of locusts. 19  18 The ideal method of warfare i n traditional China similarly reflected the supremacy of Confucian doctrines.  It was geared  primarily to attempting to persuade or trick the enemy into bloodless surrender.  Only i f these f a i l e d , was the physical destruction of the  enemy attempted. The traditional Chinese even extended the supremacy of their p o l i t i c a l values into military techniques.  For they believed  that, "wars are fought primarily to establish or maintain a desired social order, and therefore p o l i t i c a l ends and technical means are so inextricably intermingled that the Western concept of the a p o l i t i c a l 20 military means i s not permitted."  Consequently, the Chinese ideal  approach to war, as exemplified in Sun Tzu's The Art of War, contained many non-violent, p o l i t i c a l and psychological techniques (many of which would be considered as "unsportmanlike," "cowardly" or "unmilitary" in the aristocratic Western mi 1itary tradition).  Examples  included "mediation by third parties, negotiation, espionage, bribery, and subversion, s p l i t t i n g followers from leaders, intimidation and 21 cajolery and a l l forms of deception." With this general approach to war, rulers of traditional China were usually more interested in building an armed force more designed for internal control, one which would be p o l i t i c a l l y reliable and not too costly, rather than one with the greatest possible numbers and military efficiency.  Generally in traditional China, a l l efforts  to create such an army of sufficient size and adequate efficiency at an acceptable p o l i t i c a l and financial cost proved an impossibility 22 over an extended period of time. Often the government simply  19 would resort to conscripting large masses of untrained peasants or employing "barbarian" mercenaries. Traditional Chinese governments alternated between using temporary armies based in theory upon compulsory universal military 23 service and permanent armies made up of hereditary soldiers.  In  the early imperial period before Sung the tendency was to the former. For example, during the T'ang Dynasty (618-906), under the so-called Fu-ping m i l i t i a system, ideally, as part of the tax burden "every peasant was made a soldier and was l i a b l e to m i l i t a r y service whenever 24 the government called upon him."  However, there i s considerable  doubt whether this ideal was realized in practice even during the times of greatest central government power; probably the system usually 25 was one of a hereditary trained m i l i t i a . In any case, the continuing problem of m i l i t a r y regionalism, during the Sung Dynasty, caused a s h i f t to permanent armies of mercenaries stationed mainly in the capital.  During the following  Yuan (1279-1368), Ming (1368-1662) and Ch'ing (1662-1911) dynasties, this process was carried even further by making soldiering a hereditary trade and garrisoning the army in small, scattered, self-supporting military-agrarian colonies around the country.  However, inevitably,  during periods of extended peace, these full-time soldiers became increasingly ineffective and c i v i l i a n i z e d , being peasants more than 27 soldiers. During the latter period of traditional China, the aim was to l i m i t the military sector only to actual battle f i e l d command, while placing a l l peacetime a c t i v i t i e s connected with maintaining the  20 military establishments under parts of the c i v i l i a n  bureaucracy.  28  In particular, at the upper levels, "military planning, equipment, and personnel matters were a l l i n the hands of the c i v i l service Ministry of War, and control over military matters on a regional basis throughout the interior and along the frontiers was vested i n supreme 29 commanders or viceroys who were also of the c i v i l service."  This  separation of peacetime administrative and wartime military commands through dispersed military colonies, was designed to s t r i p local commanders of i n i t i a t i v e and independence while making high military officers i n the capital dependent upon distant and widely scattered contingents of troops which were brought together i n large formations only under carefully routinized procedures. 30  2.  Heterodox M i l i t a r y Tradition In traditional China, below this o f f i c i a l military tradition,  there was at the same time inside the country another, very different military tradition, that of the peasant uprising.  Although large  scale peasant rebellions occurred usually during periods of great economic privation and gross government breakdown, they were only the most obvious and spectacular manifestations of a heterodox or rebel subculture beneath the o f f i c i a l Confucian superstructure.  This  opposing way of l i f e was widespread among the peasantry and i t s a c t i v i t i e s constituted an endemic military control problem for the government.  21  The o f f i c i a l s termed them "bandits" but, in r e a l i t y , they consisted of much more than mere bands of criminals or deserters. They included not only members of secret societies and minority groups, but also wandering knight-errants or military adventurers type exemplified by the heroes of  SHui-Hu-Chuan).  (of the  The latter had a  moral and behavioral code somewhat similar to the heroic, romantic 31  and i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c code of chivalry of feudal Europe. In the West, the code of chivalry became the distinctive code of one class, the feudal aristocracy, and as a consequence later was identified with one profession, the military.  In China these  military adventurers were essentially opposed to the orthodox controls of family and state and became the champions of the poor, the weak and the distressed against the r i c h , the powerful and the corrupt. The power of the rebels, and the arena around which this entire heterodox-rebel military tradition revolved, "rested on the 32  control of the countryside, i t s manpower and i t s food supply." For, whenever there was overweening o f f i c i a l corruption or economic distress, a rebel band could win the support of the masses and thereby obtain food, horses, arms, money, shelter, recruits or whatever else was essential to this type of warfare. If the rebels could maintain momentum, then they would win over increasingly higher and higher levels of the traditional society. F i r s t the semi-trained and poorly equipped local m i l i t i a groups would come over, then entire villages along with the village or clan headmen, and f i n a l l y the local gentry, who were the pivotal local economic  22  and administrative e l i t e and basis of a l l organized government in traditional China.  When the rebel movement reached the latter stage,  i t would begin to lose i t s original heterodox rebel nature and to become increasingly a legitimate contender for the imperial throne, adopting the o f f i c i a l Confucian doctrines and ways of governing. However, until then the rebel movements could pose a security problem beyond the control of the regular imperial forces. For the nature of the resulting warfare and the problems the government forces faced in suppressing these movements were entirely different from those of the o f f i c i a l military tradition described above. Being based l o c a l l y , what the rebels lacked in administrative experience, military expertise and discipline they could make up through popular support and tactical mobility.  Philip Kuhn sums up the reasons  for the success of the White Lotus Rebellion (1796-1804) against the Ch'ing Dynasty in these terms: the tactics of the White Lotus were those of the rebel group with ramified connections of the local community; guerrilla warfare by small, highly mobile bands, supplied and informed by the surrounding populace. The Ch'ing battalions, heavily armed, slow and lacking local support, spent great effort for small success. 33 In fact, because "there was no distinguishing the rebels and the human stream in which they swam,"and because they had superior mobility, the regular forces could seldom even locate them. ^ 3  Furthermore, accumulating frustration and deprivation caused the regular imperial units to become more and more brutal towards the local population.  Naturally, such conduct only served to increase 35 the popularity and strength of the rebels.  23 Siang-tseh Chiang, i n a study of the Nien Rebellion (18531868), a particularly long-lived rebel movement, blamed the repeated failures of the regular forces on similar reasons: the o f f i c i a l s overlooked the fact that behind each earthwall of the villages a flock of peasants devoted their lives and resources to the Nien cause. Popular support constituted the Nien's real fortress, which was unbreakable so long as the o f f i c i a l s could not succeed, in detaching the peasants from the leaders. 36 In short, the heterodox military tradition depended upon a p o l i t i c a l base, the winning of the support of the peasantry. I t followed that the most effective traditional procedure for suppressing rebel movements was to deprive them of their essential  political  support among the peasants. And only when the rebels had been starved of their supplies of food and recruits, were regular forces committed to mop up the isolated remnants.  This was done through  the system of "strengthening the walls and clearing the countryside," meaning the construction of strategic hamlets, in which the local peasantry and their goods could be forcibly concentrated and protected 37 by l o c a l , gentry-led m i l i t i a forces.  At the same time, the regular  forces tried to separate the rebel leaders from their followers by pursuing a p o l i t i c a l policy of reconciliation towards the rebel rank and f i l e . ^ In brief, the military history of traditional China, a l though i t demonstrated great variety, was clearly very different from that of any period i n the West.  Both at the orthodox and heterodox  levels, war was primarily seen s t r i c t l y in a p o l i t i c a l context, so  that there was  l i t t l e or no place provided for the development of  the concept of d i s t i n c t military procedures.  Thus, the military  sector was stripped of the long-established separate institutional autonomy necessary to develop any distinctive identity of i t s  D.  own.  EARLY MODERN CHINA  In the nineteenth century the coincidence of internal p o l i t ical and social disintegration  and the external incursions of the  imperial powers combined to t o t a l l y discredit the traditional imperial military system (along with most of the traditional society).  At  the same time, the consequent general increase in violence ensured that military force was the usual means of settling p o l i t i c a l disputes, that an army was the only guarantee of p o l i t i c a l survival, and that 39  war was  the primary function and concern of state. Quite naturally the Chinese at f i r s t attempted to borrow  only the actual military weapons from the West while retaining  the  rest of their traditional ways. However, i t soon became clear that such were only the outermost manifestations of the real sources of the overwhelming Western military superiority, which, in fact, lay deeply buried in the very nature and traditions of Western society. Since the Chinese never seriously considered complete Westernization of their entire society, the basic military problem of modern China became one of finding a. workable compromise between the seemingly contradictory demands of building an army modernized enough to stand  25 up to modern foreign armies and, at the same time, able to win popular 40 support i n a Chmese society. ;  The military development of the Kuomintang in many ways represented an attempt to answer this basic military problem emphasizing Westernization and modernization. Particularly under Chiang Kai-shek, the  Kuomintang army became increasingly a modernized one, but only  through a heavy reliance on foreign military advisors and a i d , f i r s t German and later American.  However, in this process the Kuomintang  army became also increasingly separated from i t s s t i l l  unmodernized  social base, and thus more dependent lupon foreign aid. During the later stages of World War II and during the C i v i l War  (1945-1949),  this trend reached i t s climax when the Kuomintang armies became t o t a l l y dependent upon costly American a i r l i f t s for transportation and supplies.  E.  1.  PLA's MILITARY TRADITION  Pre-1949 People's War Era It was not until the advent of the PLA in 1928 that a Chinese  movement was able to develop an approach to war and to build an armed force which would both be effective against the modernized armies of the  imperial powers and t o t a l l y viable in the Chinese environment.  It was at that time that the CCP was forced by circumstances into the r u r a l , interior areas of China, which lacked the educational, economic  26 and administrative prerequisites for the creation of a modern, highly specialized and technologically sophisticated military machine. Here the Communist Chinese gradually realized that they would have to develop an alternative means of producing military power, one which was better suited to the primitive conditions in which they found themselves. The military formula the CCP eventually evolved, after much experimentation  and many f a i l u r e s , gradually became codified into the  People's War approach to warfare, which was successful against both the more modernized Japanese and Kuomintang armies from 1935-1949. In the process, the PLA»by being in the forefront of the national liberation struggle, to the Chinese became not the symbol of the oppressive aristocarcy as in the West, but of "China's selfsufficient rise to strength after more than a century of humiliation 41 and near destruction by Western and Japanese invaders." Apart from the obvious concepts of a highly organized, i n doctrinated and disciplined Marxist-Leninist party, People's War has four other basic elements:  the creation  of.  easily defended  rural revolutionary bases; the gathering of the greatest possible mass support, taking as the core the peasantry won through a combination of economic and nationalistic programs; the formation of united fronts with the greatest possible number of groups; and adopting a military strategy whose outstanding characteristics were f l e x i b i l i t y , 42 mobility and surprise. Unlike in the West, where retreating i s scorned as cowardice and bravado or standing firm to the last man against impossible odds i s praised as heroism,  People's War emphasized the patient and  long-term accumulation and husbanding of one's own strength, while  27 avoiding the enemy's strong points and fighting only under the most favorable conditions when the advantages of terrain and superiority 43 in numbers made victory certain. In such an approach to war the key was to be able to maintain a high level of morale and support among the soldiers and the general population during prolonged periods of low military p r o f i l e and constant tactical retreating, when victory would appear to be a very 44 distant goal.  And this i s precisely where p o l i t i c a l  mobilization  and indoctrination played such a crucial role i n the PLA's tradition. For without the consciously cultivated, firm conviction that human w i l l and perseverence could ultimately defeat much better equipped, trained, and often larger armies, People's War would be impossible to sustain. With such an approach to war, the other basic element of People's War, the PLA,  similarly took on a special nature.  In contrast  to the usual situation i n the West, there was a fusion of the p o l i t i c a l and military bureaucracies and e l i t e s , especially i n the lower levels where the CCP cadre was usually a simultaneous p o l i t i c a l , m i l i t a r y , economic and social leader.  Structurally the CCP and PLA were  integrated through the system of party committees within the PLA down to the platoon level which was to be the final authority on executing 45 and interpreting a l l orders i n the unit.  The relationship between  the PLA and the CCP t r a d i t i o n a l l y was not one of imposed external p o l i t i c a l control but one of natural p o l i t i c a l integration. Similarly the intimate relationship between the PLA and the surrounding population required by the very nature of People's  28  War meant that the dividing line between the c i v i l i a n and the m i l i t a r y sectors was considerably blurred.  For instance, the work or i n s t i t u -  tional style of the PLA was voluntary, irregular and informal to conform 46  better to rural society.  Furthermore, the PLA s task was  not  simply that of fighting, which in any case i t shared with the m i l i t i a , but included a great many other functions.  These were p o l i t i c a l  duties, such as conducting propaganda work and training Party cadres; administrative duties, such as organizing and managing Party and government bureaucracies; and economic duties such as aiding agriculture 47  and producing for i t s own needs. In such a situation, the m i l i t a r y branch of the CCP, the  PLA,  plainly did not develop into a highly specialized and differentiated military structure led by a distinct group of military professionals as in the West. The basic, traditional ideal of the PLA as a disciplined force to be employed massively in any socio-political task i s the complete antithesis of the prevailing theory and practice in the West where the armed forces are segregated as much as possible from at least group participation in " c i v i l i a n society."  I t i s also much  more extensive than the usual m i l i t a r y interventions in the developing nations, where commonly the m i l i t a r y i s simply content to replace the top leaders in the government.  In any case, in China, the widespread  PLA participation in many aspects of society, such as p o l i t i c a l propaganda work, industrial management and the direction of sports, which would be considered as "wholly c i v i l i a n " in the West, has always  29  been a commonplace phenomenon in Communist Chinese society, and, in i t s e l f , cannot be taken as a manifestation of "militarism." In summary, the military tradition of the PLA, or the theory and practice of People's War i s an approach to warfare in which stable mass popular support, resulting from intensive p o l i t i c a l mobilization and organization, was used to deny the enemy permanent access to the bulk of the national population or any lasting support from i t . P o l i t i c a l values were transformed through proper organizational techniques directly into effective military power (or rather effective military staying power) without the need for a group of military specialists. The genius of the CCP lay in their superior awareness of the r e a l i t i e s of Chinese society in the r u r a l , relatively backward areas, where the bulk of the population did and s t i l l does reside, and of the implications these conditions held for the creation of the most powerful army possible in that society.  Crucial in this regard  was  their recognition of the limitations of the indiscriminate application of the Western military traditions and models to China.  Furthermore,  they realized that there was a need to revive and adapt the traditional heterodox military models based on peasant support in order to create a new military tradition more suitable to the existing nature of Chinese society. A Western commentator believed the traditional PLA doctrines, "were essentially pragmatic and well-tailored to China's internal strengths and weaknesses" in that they provided "the best available defense of a vast, multitudinous, semi-developed state" by exploiting  30  the most readily available and abundant resources of "time, space, 48 manpower and w i l l . 2.  Post-1949 Modernization After the victory over the Kuomintang in 1949, the PLA suddenly  found i t s e l f plunged into the Korean War, a type of war for which they were t o t a l l y unprepared and ill-equipped, in that i t was a regular positional war fought on foreign s o i l against the most highly modernized armed forces in the world.  In this situation, it.was not surprising  that the People's War tradition was found to be insufficient and that the Chinese then turned to their new a l l y , the Soviet Union, for a 49 model to modernize their army. In the five year period from 1951-1956, the PLA created modern a r t i l l e r y , engineer, communications and l o g i s t i c a l units as well as created an a i r force and navy.  But the effective management and use  of such sophisticated weapons systems require consistently high standards of education and training, which were conspicuously absent in the PLA. Thus, the PLA was forced to institute crash programs to educate the soldiers in basic literacy, and s c i e n t i f i c and mechanical information. At the same time they also introduced more centralized and uniform training procedures and tighter, more formal standards of discipline. This trend was climaxed in 1955 by the introduction of conscription and of military ranks, decorations and awards.  Thus by 1956, on  paper the PLA had become a Soviet-style army. However, I would argue that in these five years i t i s  31  doubtful that the PLA could have adopted not only the outward forms but also the inner essence of the Soviet Red Army.  For the development  of the latter has been inseparable from the Western military traditions i t inherited and from the development of Soviet society from an agrarian one into a relatively modern urbanized and industrialized one. Because the Soviets seized power f i r s t at the top through a p o l i t i c a l coup and then hurriedly had to create their own army to fight a c i v i l war, they were forced to accept a large number of officers from the old imperial army. The Soviets attempted to counteract the potentially counter-revolutionary effects of building their army with an o f f i c e r corps from the old society by i n s t i t u t i n g an elaborate system of p o l i t i c a l commissars to keep a close watch on the professional officers. The Soviets also created in the Secret Police a separate, wholly Party oriented armed force which could be used to purge the regular officer 50 corps.  Nevertheless, with no separate military tradition of i t s  own and with Soviet society becoming modernized in the Western sense, the Red Army became more and more a Western-style professional army, highly differentiated from the rest of society. Among Western observers, the tendency i s cormion to believe that, "in the space of five years, the PLA had changed . . . 51 conscript army staffed by professional career o f f i c e r s . "  to a Specifically,  E l l i s Joffe asserted that, because the primary orientation of these new specialized officers "has been to the performance of their professional tasks," the "professionally oriented officers have developed views and values which in some basic respects d i f f e r drastically from  32  those of p o l i t i c a l l y oriented" Party leaders and officers.  52  While  conceding that their professionalism has not undermined their basic loyalty to the Party, he argued that these professional officers f e l t that the People's War tradition had been rendered largely obsolete by modern military technology.  Consequently, these officers were said  to oppose overly extensive p o l i t i c a l controls in the army, the time spent on p o l i t i c a l study, overly informal relations between officers and men, the frequent use of the army for non-military purposes, the upgrading of the m i l i t i a , and the PRC's increasingly anti-Soviet foreign p o l i c y . ^  3  However, I would strongly argue that the growth of these disputes involving the PLA cannot be construed as indicating the development of a "professional" or "conservative" thinking in the PLA.  Rather,  these differences over the PLA should be viewed as simply a part of a much broader policy dispute among the entire PRC hierarchy over whether to follow the Soviet or the Maoist strategies of development i n China. In other words, i t was not a dispute which broke down along s t r i c t PLA versus CCP, or '.'military" versus " c i v i l i a n " lines. In any case, l i t t l e over five years of modernizing the PLA on the Soviet model could not have produced a professional military o f f i c e r corps i n the pattern of the West. As was argued above, the particular nature of the Western officer was the product of a very long, complex, and individual historical evolution.  Such a special  professional group could not have been reproduced i n a relatively short time in the very different h i s t o r i c a l , p o l i t i c a l , and social environment of contemporary China.  33 In summary, from this extended discussion of the military traditions of the West and China, I would argue that no military force can exist for long in complete isolation and that i t w i l l be to a substantial degree influenced by the traditions and the developments of the surrounding society.  Thus, I would argue that the common  situation in the West i n which there i s a very s t r i c t distinction between the "military" and " c i v i l i a n " aspects of society cannot be taken as the universal, natural, and ideal pattern.  Nor can i t be  assumed that any military force w i l l naturally possess the "conservative" attitudes associated with Western m i l i t a r i e s .  In the particular case  of the PLA before 1949, the differences the PLA and the rest of society were relatively much less developed because of the PLA's intensive involvement in social a c t i v i t i e s .  34  CHAPTER II THE IDEAL: PRC POLICY STATEMENTS ON THE PLA IN THE 1960s  A. INTRODUCTION  Given this conceptual framework for the study of the PLA, the paper now turns to a description of the ideal nature of the PLA during the 1960s as revealed i n three different o f f i c i a l sources. The three sources to be used here are the 1961  Work  Bulletins,  which are apparently c l a s s i f i e d PRC materials covertly obtained by the U.S. government, the 1964 "Learn from the PLA" campaign as reported in the Chinese national press, and in one example of the provincial press, namely, the Kwangtung paper  Nan-fang  Jih-pao.  Hopefully, by  employing three sources of different natures and from different areas, i t w i l l be possible to extract from them a consensus and relatively detailed model of what the ideal PLA was held to be from the point of view of the Chinese authorities. Before discussing these three parts in d e t a i l , l e t us f i r s t c l a r i f y what i s included i n the term "PLA" in general and i n this paper. As was mentioned i n the previous chapter, by the 1960s the PLA had grown from the relatively homogeneous force of infantry of the pre-1949 era to a relatively modernized armed force with several diverse, specialized branches.  At present, the PLA includes every organized  35  armed force in the PRC and totals some 2.9 million.^  For the purposes  of this paper, I would divide the PLA into three principal parts: 2 high command, the specialized services, and the ground forces.  the  It  w i l l be the intention of this paper to concentrate on the ground forces only. A study of the high command or an e l i t e study of the PLA i s one for which I have the least f a c i l i t i e s , interest or incentive to attempt, since i t i s by far the most commonly studied part of the PLA. The specialized services, which include the PRC navy, airforce, and the Second A r t i l l e r y  Command responsible for the nuclear weapons and  guided missile programs, w i l l also be excluded in the paper. This i s mainly because i t i s a relatively small (less than 10%) part of the PLA, i t i s atypical i n that i t i s r e l a t i v e l y much more modernized, and i t 3  is the least documented part of the PLA. It should be recognized that the ground forces i t s e l f i s not a completely homogeneous unit.  I t includes several small technical  arms such as the armored force, the engineering corps, and the railway corps.  But the two main components in size of the ground forces are  the regular or main force ground forces which are geared more for national defense, and the local forces which are more concerned with internal security, m i l i t i a training and production roles. The main force f i e l d armies or army corps are deployed in the eleven military regions of China, each of which contains several military d i s t r i c t s .  Each military d i s t r i c t  in turn contains usually  one army of three divisions, each of which i s divided into regiments, battalions, companies, and platoons.  36 The local forces include at least fpur major parts; the many small and scattered independent and garrison units; the Public Security forces,  comprising primarily the secret police and the  People's Armed Police (not to be confused with the regular police forces or the Public Security Bureau i n the State Administration); the border forces i n the frontier areas; and the special Production and 4  Construction Corps deployed mainly along the Sino-Soviet border. It would have been best to keep at least the two main components of the ground forces separate i n this paper, but this proved an impossibility, mainly because the source materials consistently would not allow i t .  B.  THE  1961  WORK BULLETINS  1. Nature of Source The People's Liberation Army's  Work Bulletins  (Kung-Tso  T'ung-Hsun) was an irregularly published (29 editions from January 1, 1961 to August 26, 1961 are available), c l a s s i f i e d journal solely for the perusal of military cadres at the regiment level and above. I t was published by the General P o l i t i c a l Department (GPD), which i s a party organization directly under the M i l i t a r y Affairs Committee and charged with the special task of insuring the proper p o l i t i c a l and ideological standards i n the PLA through an extensive system of p o l i t i c a l commissars and officers.^  The journal not only contained  37  detailed discussions of day to day p o l i t i c a l problems (although these comprise a clear majority of the items) but also wide-ranging accounts of PLA training, morale, and leadership as well as a r t i c l e s on general s o c i a l , economic, p o l i t i c a l and foreign policy problems of the period. Regarding their general r e l i a b i l i t y and value as sources, they are relatively less concerned with policy in the ideal than the public press i s .  The overall tone i s s c i e n t i f i c and rational  and the work method i s to obtain and use the real facts no matter how unpleasant and unflattering these may be.  Thus, there are many  detailed descriptions of dissident opinions, mistakes, failures and calamities. The nature of the  Work Bulletins  was clearly shaped to a  great degree by the very specific historical circumstances existing at the time in China.  Although this was at least two years since the  advent of the cataclysmic Great Leap., the  Bulletins  are f i l l e d with  discussions of the catastrophic effects of the lightning campaign to communize the countryside. The army seems to have been affected, with many manifestations of c r i s i s and disorder, such as a very high accident rate caused by a breakdown in training and l o g i s t i c a l support f a c i l i t i e s , widespread i l l n e s s due to insufficient diet, even signs of anti-Party feelings among the rank and f i l e .  However, i t should be remembered that this  was a highly irregular situation, and that materials written under i t s impact should be used with caution'in a wide-ranging study. Bulletins  The  do provide a unique glimpse into the internal thinking and  38  organizational workings of the PLA, but only from the point of view of one part of the PLA, and even then only over a relatively short and rather unusual period. From the Bulletins  3  despite the great variety of subjects  covered, i t i s possible to derive a f a i r l y consistent and coherent image of what the PLA was to be l i k e i n the view of the GPD.  2.  PLA's Military Approach The essential nature of any army l i e s in i t s strategic and  tactical outlook, and the Bulletins  in this regard were very consistent  in their development of the traditional PLA doctrines of People's War described in the previous chapter. The specific formula to be followed was the so-called FourF i r s t s , which was f i r s t published in 1960. According to t h i s , the PLA should adhere to the principles, f i r s t that "the human factor i s primary as compared to weapons," secondly that, " p o l i t i c a l work i s primary" over a l l other types of military work including training, thirdly that in executing p o l i t i c a l work the ideological work i s more important than routine work, and fourthly that practical or " l i v i n g " thought i s more important than book learning in executing ideological work.^ The military doctrine described above clearly depends upon a high degree of mass support, p o l i t i c a l motivation and tight organization to compensate for material shortages.  The Bulletins  fully  agreed that "The revolutionary war i s the war of the masses, and a war  39  can only be conducted by mobilizing the masses."^ Given such a strategic approach, the PLA well recognized that they were largely powerless to retaliate against intercontinental b a l l i s t i c missiles launched from distant sites or submarines. The Bulletins  based the continued fervent belief in their traditional  approach upon their conviction that, although any future war would i n i t i a l l y be conducted over long distances, the enemy would s t i l l have to occupy China with a massive land army, at which time "close" People's War tactics would be effective.  As one a r t i c l e stated, " i n the case  of close combat, especially face to face combat, we are in a superior position," because then, "what can be counted upon i s nothing more 8  than hand grenades, bayonets, and flame throwers." The  Bulletins  prescribed for the PLA to concentrate on "the  special talents of the army such as those required for night combat, Q  combat at close range, subterranean warfare. . . .  This tactical  approach, which relies on the individual soldier's bravery, perseverence, and i n i t i a t i v e , f i t s very coherently into the PLA's traditional military doctrine of using the readily available resources. The  Bulletins  stated clearly that the basis for building  such an army was the traditional PLA model emphasizing p o l i t i c a l and ideological training.  For example, one a r t i c l e stated, " p o l i t i c s  must direct and control actual practise;" because, only with a strong p o l i t i c a l and ideological work, the promotion of the p o l i t i c a l awareness of the many officers and soldiers, the inspiration of man's courageous s p i r i t and firm w i l l , and the display of man's high positivism, can we stand ever victorious. 10  40 As pointed out above, this approach to war means the absolute supremacy of the Party, the supreme p o l i t i c a l authority, over the PLA.  The Bulletins  hammered away at the theme the PLA "must,  under the absolute leadership of the Party, be the tool for carrying out the lines and policy of the Party. During this period of great d i f f i c u l t i e s in the PLA, the Bulletins  called for increasing the degree of party control.  commissar system under the GPD was to be strengthened.  The  Also, Party  membership was to be substantially increased within the PLA. More importantly, the Bulletins  aimed at making the Party  committees in the PLA the main center of authority in a l l units down to the company l e v e l .  In effect, the committee was to be "the center 12  of uniform authority and s o l i d a r i t y in the army units."  In  particular, i t was hoped "the assembly of the Party branch should really become the highest organ of the company," so that " a l l major problems of the company should be discussed and then decided by the 13 Party branch committee.  ...  One document claimed that the previously existing situation of a largely moribund Party organization within the PLA had been rectified.  I t was claimed that a l l companies in the PLA now had Party  committees, 80% of the platoons had Party c e l l s , and 50% of the squads 14 had Party committees. Up to this juncture then, the ideal model of the PLA in the Bulletins earlier.  conforms quite closely to the PLA's tradition described  41 The one major difference was the recognition in the  Bulletins  of the importance of modern military technology in general and of the necessity for extended specialized military training in particular.  To  be sure, this awareness of the significance of technology was never to threaten the essentials of the PLA's particular approach to fighting. As one a r t i c l e noted: the development of modern military s c i e n t i f i c technique . . . certainly w i l l have important effects on the progress of war and combat action, but they can never change the basics of war and combat. . . . 15 Nevertheless, i t was recognized that "modern weapons are far more complicated than the old ones."^  Thus, one a r t i c l e urged:  in a l l branches of services more emphasis should be based upon the development of specialization than on general skills. It i s requested that a l l men should be able to get acquainted thoroughly with the weapons and technical equipment in their hands. 17 Even more prevalent in the Bulletins  were demands for greater  emphasis upon purely military training at the expense of p o l i t i c a l work: the primary importance of p o l i t i c s . . . cannot be taken to mean that with p o l i t i c s in command, we no longer need the military. . . . As far as time for military and p o l i t i c a l training i s concerned, the military requirement is the principal part and therefore should be given more time than p o l i t i c a l training. 18 Another example of this sentiment stated:  42 We usually emphasize the fact that p o l i t i c s must come f i r s t because p o l i t i c s leads to everything, but i n terms of time consumed, the study of p o l i t i c s must not be f i r s t , nor cultural a c t i v i t i e s ; especially must labor projects not make too many demands upon time and energy, Military training must come f i r s t of a l l . 19  3.  PLA's Relations with Society In the Bulletins  there was relatively l i t t l e concerning the  ideal PLA-society relations.  There were scattered statements that  the PLA must oppose "lavish spending" in order "to show our army i s ready to share both good and i l l fortune with the people," and that the PLA should unite with local cadres, treat local cadres correctly, and struggle to overcome temporary d i f f i c u l t i e s in coordination and cooperation with a l l the people of the nation. 20 There was also reference to a less ideal role of the PLA i n society, namely that of enforcer of law and order when the regular security organs proved unable to handle the situation. period of social unrest, this duty p a r t i a l l y entailed the  During this suppression  of roaming bands of "counter-revolutionaries" mainly in the minority 21 areas. It also included the disbanding of undisciplined m i l i t i a 22 groups. Nevertheless, the most striking aspect of the PLA's relations with society to emerge from the Bulletins  was the very close ties  maintained by soldiers with their families and home l o c a l i t i e s . Through them, the entire PLA was made very sensitive to the trends and problems of the whole society.  43 One a r t i c l e stated that, "Soldiers are but farmers and workers wearing military uniforms. . . .  Whatever happens i n the 23  l o c a l i t y w i l l affect the soldiers. . . ."  In discussing particularly  peasant recruits, another a r t i c l e stated, they have a relatively close contact with society and their own families. . . . The situation in their native places and their family problems easily affect their ideological emotions. 24 In fact, many a r t i c l e s were mainly concerned with containing the demoralizing trends in society brought on by the failures of the Great Leap.  In the Bulletins,  there were several detailed discussions  of how the PLA should deal with the ideological wavering and apathy caused by stories from home of starvation, i l l n e s s , and deprivation, 25 as well as o f f i c i a l corruption, oppression, and incompetence. Certainly, the picture of the PLA which emerged here was not of an isolated, insulated force of soldiers.  Rather, i t was that of  an institution which has not implanted i t s own pre-occupations and values deeply enough to exclude more basic loyalties,, such as those of family and home. 4. PLA's Work-Style The aspect of the PLA covered in the Bulletins  which was  the most important, both in terms of attention and significance, was i t s proper work-style or institutional orientation and manner. Bulletins'  The  tremendous concern for ensuring the proper work style was  directly related to the PLA's (and the PRC's) basic emphasis on human  44 relationships.  Thus, to ensure that tasks be done in the prescribed  manner, the PLA took a general, moral, and humanist approach rather than a detailed, technical, and l e g a l i s t i c one. In the Bulletins  the "Three-Eight Work-Style" was held up as  the ideal general one for the PLA.  The "three" stood for the three  phrases "a trim, correct p o l i t i c a l orientation," "to work hard and live plainly," (also translated as diligence and t h r i f t ) , and "flexible strategy and tactics."  The "eight" meant the eight Chinese characters  translated as the four English words "unity," "vigour," 26 and " l i v e l i n e s s . " 5.  "seriousness,"  PLA's Leadership Style However, another aspect of the PLA's work-style, leadership,  received by far the greater attention i n the Bulletins.  Partly this  emphasis reflected the upper-echelon nature of the journal's authors and readers, but i t also at least in part reflected the very serious problems and deficiencies among the PLA's leaders or cadres at the time. These were especially dangerous in the case of the PLA because they were 27 undermining i t s traditional relationship between officers and The Bulletins  men.  attributed these PLA leadership shortcomings  to a lack of proper supervisory or management education.  The  Bulletins  traced the root causes of the deterioration in leadership to the changed nature of the PLA since  1949.  The most basic was the change from a fighting army to a peace-time garrison one.  And i t was f u l l y acknowledged how "a  45 victorious army can easily become arrogant and complacent, indulg28 ing in peace and pleasure." The altered situation made the proper leadership, i f anything, more necessary. For, whereas previously the 29 PLA had trained through actual fighting, now i t must train to fight. At the same time, the very nature of that leadership in the PLA had been undergoing a d i s t i n c t dilution in quality.  Because  of the rapid increase in the number of technical branches in the PLA during the 1950s, a large number of intellectuals had been recruited directly into the PLA.  Besides being inexperienced in leadership,  in fighting, and in army l i f e , they also often possessed many non30 proletarian ideas.  Simultaneously, time was gradually reducing  the ranks of the experienced, battle-hardened veterans who had served in the pre-1949 PLA. As a result, two major problems had arisen in the leadership of the PLA.  One was termed excessive harshness in leadership and  the other excessive laxity. According to the Bulletins, and widespread.  the f i r s t was the more serious  I t was directly attributed to cadres who s t i l l had  "warlord" tendencies (which was considered to be the forerunner of the bourgeois military l i n e ) . These "leaning to the right" PLA cadres were characterized as being too pessimistic and too interested in individual gain, 31 prestige, and family. More s p e c i f i c a l l y , they were accused of being "obstinate and heavy-handed," often using "struggle meetings" 32 without j u s t i f i c a t i o n in order to intimidate soldiers.  They  also were said to use "rough and rude methods"; to be subjective,  46 p a r t i a l , and impulsive; to be unsympathetic towards sick and backward soldiers; and to be unconsiderate of the special needs of soldiers from 33 minority groups. Finally, they were accused of at times resorting 34 to "the imposition of bodily punishment, beating and cursing.  ..."  The second c r i t i c i z e d tendency in leadership, l a x i t y , was aimed at those leaders who permitted discipline to become loose and work very careless.  It was blamed upon the cadres from a peasant  background, who i t was said, "inevitably brought with them.. . . the ideas of extreme democracy and absolute equality . . . and were not 35 accustomed to the r i g i d military l i f e . " They were said to have advocated general "freedom" and l e t "bad thinking and bad habits to 36 creep upon them l i k e poisonous plants." To rectify these bad tendencies in PLA leadership, the Bulletins  offered a model of leadership, which I would divide into  five basic principles:  understanding, strictness, democracy, penetra-  tion to the basic units, and egalitarianism. The f i r s t principle, understanding, can be regarded as the antithesis  of the "warlord-bourgeois" military style.  It was said  that " a l l cadres should treat soldiers well, s k i l l f u l l y use the method of persuasive education" and reject "the application of simple adminis37 trative orders and coercive means."  The ideal PLA cadre was to  "persist in his efforts of persuasion . . . and proceed i i i a painstaking, detailed manner so as to make himself a bosom friend of the masses of soldiers."  38  In a l l matters the cadre was to investigate thoroughly and scientifically.  He was to never rush through cases using mere prejudice  47 or emotion.  For example, in matters of p o l i t i c a l opinion, cadres  were "allowed to urge but not to force the acceptance of anything." Such methods as "scolding harshly" or corporal punishment were strongly attacked.  Instead cadres were to use "reasoning and teaching" 39  and "patience and understanding" at a l l times. With the "backward" or stupid soldier, the cadre was not to look upon him as different from others, rejecting and reprimanding him constantly and r i d i c u l i n g him before others, following him everywhere with sarcastic remarks. 40 On the contrary, there was to be encouragement, patience, sympathy, and kindness. As a balance to "understanding" and as a direct antidote to "laxity" i n leadership, the PLA cadre was to practise "strictness"; that i s , strictness in demanding a high level of performance in work and unyielding i n upholding basic p o l i t i c a l principles. Partly this entailed training under the most d i f f i c u l t and complex conditions and not simply under the most convenient and speedy. We should resolutely oppose the simple, easy, mechanical, hopeful working method prepared for only one way and not several ways of dealing with the enemy. 41 "Strictness" also required the cadre to maintain a firm degree of control over the soldiers' p o l i t i c a l and ideological situation.  According to the Bulletins  3  many cadres had taken refuge  in "the control of too many general administrative a f f a i r s " in order  48 to evade their responsibilities.  The result had been a failure  "to investigate the ideological conditions of party members" and a 42 "relaxation of ideological work." The ideal cadre was urged to be vigilant to ideological backsliding among the soldiers and to struggle fearlessly against these tendencies. Democracy, the third principle of ideal PLA leadership prescribed in the Bulletins,  in essence meant that the  relationship  in the PLA between "the leaders" and "the fighters" should be that between equal comrades rather than that between a superior and subordinate.  The Bulletins  of distinction for the PLA.  took this principle to be a special point For example, one a r t i c l e effusively  proclaimed that the PLA "differs from the old army in the serious way  in which i t seeks to convince an erring member of his mistakes  . . ."  with the result that " a l l work together harmoniously, 43  happily, naturally and consciously.  ..."  Much in the manner of classical l i b e r a l s , the proponents of this principle of democracy took for granted the optimistic rational belief that there were no irreconcilable  and  "antagonistic"  contradictions within the PLA and that, once everyone had a l l the true facts, a correct and generally agreed upon decision was  possible.  One a r t i c l e stated that: The soldiers of our army come from the t o i l i n g people. They have a r e l a t i v e l y high p o l i t i c a l awareness, fresh energy and ambition to advance their knowledge. Only by patiently educating them, talking to them with reason, developing their knowledge, and commanding their a b i l i t y shall we be able to motivate their positivism. 44  49 In other words, the discipline in the PLA ideally was to be "built on the basis of p o l i t i c a l self-awareness and i s completely consistent with the supreme interests of the cadres and soldiers 45 . . . ." Therefore, the ideal cadre was to have complete confidence and trust in the soldiers and "must not avoid the d i f f i c u l t i e s but 46 inform everyone about the d i f f i c u l t situation. . . ." the Bulletins,  According to  the result would not be a disintegration of discipline  but just the opposite: The majority of the people in our army . . . come from poor peasants, and their basic interests coincide with the Party's interests without any fundamental contradiction. We have only to explain the situation to them and keep on persuading them and they are sure to throw off their wrong thoughts. 47 Every soldier was to have the right to c r i t i c i s e his superiors: "each of the revolutionary army personnel should be assured of the right to struggle with those whose behaviors are in violation of Party polic48 ies."  Cadres were urged to "make self-criticisms of their own  defects and mistakes, so as to influence and develop the soldiers' self-awareness and have them reveal their own defects, and to ask 49 them to say whatever they want without coercion."  In addition,  through the elected "revolutionary armymen's council" and "revolutionary armymen's congress" in each company, the soldiers were to have means both to control their extra-curricular a c t i v i t i e s and to have liaison 50 with their leaders on an equal basis. In this regard, the Bulletins  emphasized the need for  c o l l e c t i v e , consensus style leadership among cadres. directed to  They were  50 take the i n i t i a t i v e to get in touch with each other, co-operate with each other, respect each other, attribute merits of their work to the collective, sincerely accept lessons without mutual complaints for the defects. . . . 51 Above a l l , "no individual should be allowed to monopolize the power of 52 decision. . . . "  Nor was the situation to develop where a l l activ-  i t i e s , especially p o l i t i c a l , were entirely dependent for their progress 53 on the efforts of a few p o l i t i c a l cadres or advanced elements. Penetration to the basic levels, the fourth principle of ideal PLA leadership, was considered to be a crucial one. By this was meant that the PLA's chain of command and communication should be direct and responsive right down the lowest levels. the  Bulletins  In particular,  identified the company as the key level at which orders  from above were or were not translated into concrete action. This principle was particularly directed at cadres with what was termed a "superficial," "non-aggressive,"  and lazy leadership  style, characterized by "the lack of the s p i r i t for verifying the 54 facts to arrive at the truth." At worst, some cadres were said to have ignored the situation at the basic levels, and to report to their superiors "only things which were good and withheld . . . things 55 which were bad." Under egalitarianism, the f i f t h and final principle of ideal leadership, PLA cadres were not to receive the privileged treatment of the sort accorded to military officers of most countries. Rather, PLA cadres were supposed to  51 treat the soldiers as class brothers, protect and be concerned with the soldiers and be prepared to eat, l i v e , operate, work and play with the soldiers without showing their privileged status or putting on a bureaucratic attitude. 56 Furthermore, the "hsia-fang" system under which a l l PLA cadres were to spend a certain period every year working as common soldiers, according to one a r t i c l e , was to be continued with undiminished 57 vigour. Clearly these five principles are inter-related to a degree that they are parts of a coherent approach to leadership in the PLA, whose whole emphasis i s directed at creating a relationship between the leaders and the fighters characterized by harmony and mutual understanding. In summary, the picture of the ideal PLA which emerged from the Bulletins  i s by no means a complete or comprehensive one.  Most  s i g n i f i c a n t l y , these c l a s s i f i e d documents revealed l i t t l e indication that the PLA had discarded the essence of i t s traditional People's War model in theory or in practice. Even though the situation inside China had changed substant i a l l y , with the nation at peace, with Maoist-style modernization being actively pursued, and with greater specialization throughout society, there was manifested a great determination to keep the PLA intensively involved in society and thus relatively undifferentiated from the rest of society. denied.  The importance of modern military technology was not  But this was under no circumstances to cause the rapid  and fundamental transformation of the PLA so that i t would threaten the traditional value p r i o r i t i e s of the PLA or of the PRC.  52  In this regard, I think i t i s very significant that the rank and f i l e of the PLA maintained very close contact with the rural society of China from where the majority of them came, and that this had a major impact on the PLA as a whole. The most outstanding and important aspect of the PLA to emerge was the ideal work-style and especially leadership. The ideal in the PLA was for an intimate, equal, and harmonious relationship between a humane, yet demanding leadership, and a p o l i t i c a l l y very aware rank and f i l e . Certainly this presents a very sharp contrast with the ideal work-style in most Western armies.  There a very r i g i d distinction  is created between the officers and men.  The role of the officer i s  to draw up and issue orders Which the men are to obey without question. It i s a work-style tough and demanding to the point of rendering the members of the rank and f i l e passive objects, especially with regard to p o l i t i c s .  C.  1.  THE 1964 "LEARN FROM THE PLA" CAMPAIGN AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL  Nature of Source It has been seen that the Work Bulletins  available to us  emphasize the shortcomings and deficiencies of the PLA.  However, on  February 1, 1964, a short three years after the publication of these documents, the PRC leaders i n i t i a t e d a national campaign in which they  53 called upon the whole nation to emulate the PLA's "outstanding character58 i s t i e s " and learn from i t s experience. The key towards understanding this apparent paradox and what makes itoespecially d i f f i c u l t to compare the ideal PLA in the  Bulletins  with the one presented in the 1964 "Learn from the PLA" campaign i s the very dissimilar source materials for each.  While the  Bulletins  were documents made available fortuitously and not intended for public consumption, for the 1964 case we are entirely dependent upon the public press for sources. In the West, there i s a strong tendency either to dismiss the Chinese press t o t a l l y as " p o l i t i c a l propaganda" or to b e l i t t l e i t as grossly distorted, presenting only what the government has selected as being f i t t i n g at the time for the public to know. Some in the West have also argued that p o l i t i c a l regionalism and administrative backwardness are so pronounced the government press is f a i r l y ignorant of 59 the real conditions in i t s own nation. Certainly the entire Chinese approach to the media i s very different than that in the West with the "freedom of the press" being interpreted in a very different manner.^  But problems are discussed  and opinions aired and they can be deciphered i f one i s sensitive to the environment and context in which they were written. To me the real origin of the d i f f i c u l t i e s  outsiders have in using the PRC  press i s that i t i s written for and by people who are Marxist-Leninists in ideology and Chinese in culture and language. Western scholars simply do not possess the basic and comprehensive knowledge of con-  54 temporary Chinese society which would allow them to interpret these materials in a definitive manner. Two other problems with regard to the sources for this section should be noted here.  One mainly arises from the very nature  of journalism which places a heavy emphasis on the issues and events which appear important and interesting on the given day or week. This inevitably leads to discontinuities in coverage with certain topics discussed very intensively over a very short period, making i t more d i f f i c u l t to establish long-range trends or the perspective required for in-depth analysis. The other problem i s the fact that a l l the materials used in this section are from the translation series of the American Consulate General in HongKong. Presumably, this body's c r i t e r i a for selecting materials to be published are based on i t s perception of what, at that particular time, i s important for the U.S. government and public, and what image of China best serves the interests of American foreign policy.  But, even taken simply.from the American government point  of view, what appears to be significant and valuable at one time may well not prove to be so later.  2.  PLA's Work-Style However, whatever reservations we may have about using the  available source materials, i t i s s t i l l important to describe the aspects of the PLA which were apparently considered worthy of society's study and emulation in 1964.  55 The campaign dwelt heavily upon the PLA's massive emphasis on the study and application of Mao Tse-tung's Thought. Indeed, the leader's ideas were claimed to be the key to the PLA's " i n v i n c i b i l i t y . " The concepts of the Four-Firsts, the Three-Eight Work Style, the Four-Good Companies, the Five-Good Individuals, the mass l i n e , and the penetration to the basic units were portrayed during the 1964 campaign as essentials of the ideal PLA, just as they were in the Bulletins.  These concepts were expressed somewhat differently for the rest of society.  For example, the relevence of the Four-Firsts was  stated i n the following terms: A l l our work i s done by people and therefore good ideology among people determines the successful accomplishment of work in various f i e l d s . Therefore to do our work w e l l , we must make a success of dealing with people. . . . 61 The PLA's correct p o l i t i c a l stand (part of the Three-Eight Work-Style), for the rest of society was interpreted as steadfastness and courage i n the face of d i f f i c u l t y and danger, loyalty to the fatherland, and total selflessness. Diligence and t h r i f t were expanded to include the PLA's " s c i e n t i f i c attitude of seeking the truth and conducting intensive investigation and research," and i t s fighting s p i r i t of persisting "in battle under extremely d i f f i c u l t ces" and of taking up "the hardest and heaviest tasks."  circumstanThe PLA was 62  also praised for employing f l e x i b l e strategy and tactics. The PLA was said to have embodied unity (also part of the Three-Eight Work-Style) in that i t had attained a harmony in p o l i t i c a l  56 terms between theory and practice, as well as unity among the parts of the PLA and with the government and society.  The entire nation was  urged to display similar respect and concern for other parts of the . . 63 society. Two related virtues of the ideal PLA were particularly singled out for attention in the national press's coverage of the "Learn from the PLA" campaign -- modesty and toughness.  The former was especially  aimed at preventing the development of arrogance or complacency.  The  PLA was repeatedly called upon to continue to learn from the masses and local cadres.  The PLA was reminded that i t was greatly dependent upon  the "care, support, assistance, encouragment given by the local mass 64 organizations."  S p e c i f i c a l l y , PLA units were urged to continue to  send PLA members to "nearby steel works, chemical works, electrical and technical works and local workers" to study their occupational and 65 p o l i t i c a l techniques. By toughness, or the bone-hard s p i r i t of the PLA, was meant the ideal PLA's determination and steadfastness when faced with the most d i f f i c u l t and dangerous tasks.  This quality seems to have been  particularly aimed at the youth, who often did not realize that "ours is s t i l l a very poor country, and that we cannot change this situation radically in a short time," unless a great deal of hard work, determination, and s e l f - s a c r i f i c e was expended.  Here, the PLA was  held up as a model of those who were not afraid of facing t o i l and d i f f i c u l t i e s , but, on the contrary, "gladly started [their] work from the most d i f f i c u l t point" because they realized "that struggle and d i f f i c u l t i e s are big furnaces for tempering revolutionaries and  57 schools for training them."  66  The national press's human embodiment of the Five-Good model soldier was Lei Feng, who gave his l i f e to prevent a train accident.  He was portrayed as the absolute paragon of the Three-  Eight Work-Style:  t o t a l l y loyal to the CCP and Chairman Mao,  t h r i f t y , t i r e l e s s , optimistic, "down-to-earth," and, above a l l , totally s e l f l e s s .  In particular, he possessed not a superficial  devotion but one firmly rooted i n an awareness of a situation's d i f f i culties: The determination to bear hardships and face d i f f i c u l t i e s , to brave the rigors of the elements, to stand firm before sword, threat and temptation, and to shun no t r i v i a l and troublesome things, neither afraid of taking the devious path of meeting rebuffs and setback and of suffering grievances, nor afraid of facing 'fragrant' wind and poisonous weeds, and of being laughed at. . . . 67 At the same time, Kuo Hsing-fu was the national press's model of correct leadership.  He was supposed to have devised a very  effective method of conducting training by translating into r e a l i t y 68 the main ideal PLA principles, such as the Four-Firsts.  This method  was claimed not only to have great significance for peace-time military training, but for a l l society i n training "new ranks of both red and 69 specialized personnel. . . ." S p e c i f i c a l l y , Kuo Hsing-fu was said to have executed " s t r i c t ness" i n leadership "by implementing the principle of launching different training programs to meet the requirements of actual t r a i n ing.  At the same time, he also included "understanding" by his  58  emphasis on teaching through patient persuasion, reasoning, and individual instruction, but never through the simple application of orders or coercion.^  His training method also met the ideal leader-  ship principle of democracy in " i t s a b i l i t y to promote mutual training among soldiers . -. . and to f u l l y mobilize the soldiers to participate 72 simultaneously in military training."  The leadership principle of  "taking a firm grip on the work of the basic level units i n a more penetrating and thoroughgoing manner" was f u l f i l l e d by requiring cadres to spend as much time as possible with the soldiers.  Cadres were to  conduct extensive personal inspections, to give verbal instructions based upon a f l e x i b l e application of the principles i n light of the actual conditions, and to give personal demonstrations as much as 73 possible.  Finally, Kuo Hsing-fu exemplified egalitarianism i n  leadership by always sharing i n the same livelihood as his soldiers. The individual model PLA soldiers were held up as heroes in the national press during the 1964 "Learn from the PLA" campaign to be copied by the rest of society solely because of their superior p o l i t i c a l virtues. Unlike military heroes elsewhere, these had not performed individual epic martial feats i n battle against the enemies of the nation.  In fact, the qualities and achievements held up here  were so generalized and so concerned with routine peace-time a c t i v i t i e s that any other group or individuals in Chinese society could have given rise to them.  59 3.  PLA's Relations with Society Despite the great amount of verbiage here on the ideal PLA  and what society should learn from i t , there was l i t t l e specific information disclosed on PLA-society relations.  There were only very  general statements that "the PLA serves the people with heart and soul and i s inseparably linked with the people l i k e flesh and blood."  74  There were scattered references to so-called "greeting groups."  They consisted of local individuals from a l l walks of l i f e .  Their purpose was to convey "to the officers and men [of the PLA] the regards and respects of the people for them," and to commend the PLA "for making great contributions and displaying their revolutionary s p i•r i-t . „75 +  The only other aspect of the PLA's role in society that was accorded mention in the national press at this time was the special practise of sending PLA cadres to serve permanently in the economic sector of society.  At the same time, cadres from the economic organs  were sent to study in PLA units or schools.  Here again, the underlying  aim was p o l i t i c a l ; that i s , to spread the PLA's model accomplishments in p o l i t i c a l work.  The newly transferred PLA personnel were praised  because: A l l of them were steeled in a s t r i c t military l i f e . . . . A l l of them were experienced in army company work or p o l i t i c a l work and have a definite a b i l i t y of organizational leadership. 76 The press enthusiastically reported on the reception these PLA cadres were said to have received at their new posts in the economic  60 sector.  They were praised "for working hard, l i v i n g simply, facing  r e a l i t y , making contact with the masses, and for their s p i r i t of not being afraid of d i r t or t r i a l . " ^  D.  THE 1964 "LEARN FROM THE PLA" CAMPAIGN IN KWANGTUNG PROVINCE  In order to view the ideal PLA from yet another, third point of view, I have chosen to examine how the "Learn from the PLA" Campaign was reported at the provincial l e v e l , s p e c i f i c a l l y in the province of Kwangtung.  This choice results primarily from the  relatively high a v a i l a b i l i t y of that province's principle Party organ, Nan-fang Jih-pao  (hereafter NFJP).  Unlike the preceding section, which was based upon a collection of translated materials edited by an American government agency, this section i s based upon an apparently unedited and untranslated collection of a l l complete copies of NFJP available outside of China.  1.  Problem of Regionalism While limiting the area to one province should bring about  greater detail and perhaps greater control over the material, i t also introduces one of the major methodological problems of contemporary China studies, regionalism. By this is meant both social regionalism, or the extent to which the inhabitants of different areas of China  61 possess significant special characteristics, and p o l i t i c a l regionalism, which i s the extent to which leaders in areas can evade central policies, build up their own autonomous, s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t power bases, and substantially influence central policy formation. Before 1949 (when China was relatively more accessible to Western scholars), Kwangtung could be clearly distinguished from other Chinese provinces in important social characteristics.  There were the  distinct Cantonese, Hakka, and Chao-Chou spoken dialects, the long commercial heritage of the coastal areas, the close links of many Kwangtung residents with the very distinct overseas Chinese communities, and the proximity to the highly-Westernized colonies of HongKong and 78 Macao.  The Cantonese (who constitute the large majority of the  province's population) had developed a distinct set of widely recognized group characteristics: The Cantonese are proud of their cleverness, quickness, worldliness, and technical s k i l l just as northerners and foreigners c r i t i c i z e them for their selfishness, hot temperament, crudity and lack of restraint. 79 Before 1949, and especially during the Warlord (1912-1927) and Nationalist (1927-49) periods of modern Chinese history, very pronounced and highly developed p o l i t i c a l regionalism in Kwangtung was a recurring phenomenon. Precisely to what extent, during the 1960s, social or p o l i t i c a l regionalism existed in Kwangtung i s a question that no one in the West has been able to answer with any degree of certainty. I would surmise that social regionalism has been substantially lessened,  because, since 1949, the PRC government has brought  62 about general internal peace in China and has instituted ambitious modernization programs in education, transportation, and communications. With regard to p o l i t i c a l regionalism, a very contentious issue among Western scholars of the PRC, I w i l l attempt no surmise. A reading of a five-month run of NFJP from January to June of 1964 did not reveal any significant evidence of either p o l i t i c a l or social regionalism in Kwangtung.  In fact, Kwangtung's proximity  to c a p i t a l i s t i c HongKong was the only special characteristic of the province that was given any special attention. The "Learn from the PLA" campaign in NFJP closely followed the broad framework set out above in the national press, both in terms of sequence of publication and content.  For example, one day after  the lead editorial heralding the start of the campaign appeared in Jen-min Jih-pao on February 1, 1964, the entire a r t i c l e was printed verbatim on the front page of NFJP.  And, throughout the next several  months, important articles on the campaign were similarly copied from the national press in NFJP. To a significant extent, the s i m i l a r i t i e s between the two coverages of the "Learn from the PLA" campaign also extended to the a r t i c l e s written by the NFJP's own staff.  The differences were  relatively minor in nature and never entailed basic principles or policies.  For example, the NFJP seemed to lose interest in the  campaign somewhat e a r l i e r , by June 1964. Generally, i t could be stated that the articles on the campaign written by the staff of NFJP were more concrete and less theoretical in nature than those in the national press.  In other  63  words, in a r t i c l e s appearing in NFJP, the basic p o l i t i c a l principles were either assumed to be known or simply copied from the national press, while i t s own contribution was limited to i l l u s t r a t i o n s and amplifications of these basic themes through very detailed, concrete and often rather mundane examples drawn from the l o c a l i t y .  2.  PLA's Work-Style In general the NFJP's coverage of the "Learn from the  PLA"  campaign stated that a l l the people of the various sectors must learn from the PLA, and should apply the PLA's experiences in various areas to the tasks of s o c i a l i s t revolution and reconstruction, so that our cadres and people can increase their revolutionization, and so that our offices, factories, schools and villages can increase their revolutionization, and that our various tasks in s o c i a l i s t reconstruction can be done even better. 80 As indicated in the above quotation there seemed to be no segment of society which was considered exempt from learning from the PLA, be i t industrial workers, women, cultural workers or businessmen. Even during a concurrent campaign in Canton to improve sanitation standards, i t was stated that "one must also learn from the PLA's experience in using the revolutionary s p i r i t and the fighting work style to do hygiene work."^ And, as in the national press, the aspect of the PLA most emphasized as being worthy of society's attention was i t s extremely heavy emphasis on the study and application of Chairman Mao's thought and instructions in every aspect of i t s work. The extent of the  64 personality cult of Mao Tse-tung seemed to be, i f anything, more pervasive and simplistic in NFJP than in the national press. In particular, the reporting of some of the PLA meetings in NFJP consisted of l i t t l e more than a procession of soldiers a l l exclaiming words to the effect that "they never stop reading Chairman Mao's books and that they are determined to listen to Chairman Mao's words and 82 obey his instructions."  Foreshadowing the l i t t l e red book of  Mao's quotations, many model soldiers described how certain of Mao's phrases had directly inspired and guided them. Nor were the other aspects of the ideal PLA presented in NFJP substantially different from those in the national press from February to June 1964.  Once again, the Four-Firsts, the Three-Eight  Work-Style, the Four-Good model units, and the Five-Good model individuals were emphasized as the basic components of the ideal PLA. The PLA was generally characterized in one a r t i c l e as being unlike any other army, Chinese or foreign, traditional or modern, because i t "has the weapon of Mao Tse-tung's thought and has highly revolutionized p o l i t i c a l work."  The same a r t i c l e went on to praise  the PLA in the following tones: Our forces are people's forces, they struggle for the thorough liberation of the Fatherland and of the whole world's laboring people, for the extinguishing of class exploitation and class oppression, and to allow our sons and daughters to enjoy the s o c i a l i s t l i f e . 83 Only certain aspects of the Three-Eight Work-Style were accorded detailed attention in NFJP during the 1964 "Learn from the PLA" Campaign.  For instance, Ou-yang Hai (Like Lei Feng a soldier  martyred in a successful railway rescue), was depicted as a model of  N  65  a correct p o l i t i c a l  o r i e n t a t i o n to the p o i n t of s a c r i f i c i n g  l i f e f o r t h e advancement o f the r e v o l u t i o n .  one's  Since he came f r o m a poor  peasant background, he possessed a deep h a t r e d f o r t h e o l d , o p p r e s s i v e s o c i e t y and a c o r r e s p o n d i n g l y deep l o y a l t y f o r the new s o c i a l i s t one. Thus, u n l i k e many o t h e r y o u t h s i n t h e PRC born a f t e r 1949, Ou-yang Hai was f u l l y aware o f the s i g n i f i c a n c e o f l i b e r a t i o n and the  "life  84 and d e a t h " need t o p r e s e r v e and advance  it.  Another aspect o f t h e i d e a l PLA emphasized a t t h i s time was d i l i g e n c e and t h r i f t .  For example, the model head o f a company's  c o m m i s s a r i a t spared no e f f o r t  t o d i s c o v e r , buy, and t r a n s p o r t the  expensive and h i g h e s t q u a l i t y m a t e r i a l s .  He was a l s o p r a i s e d 85  for  a t t e m p t i n g t o r e c y c l e waste p r o d u c t s as much as p o s s i b l e . typical  As was  i n r e p o r t s o f model s o l d i e r s , h i s p r i v a t e and personal  was a c l o s e r e f l e c t i o n o f h i s model p u b l i c l i f e . never used h i s o f f i c i a l  least  This model  expense account and wore h i s c l o t h e s 86  life soldier  the  l o n g e s t i n the company. Still  a n o t h e r p a r t o f the T h r e e - E i g h t W o r k - S t y l e  brought  o u t i n NFJP was the s e l f l e s s a t t r i b u t e o f t a k i n g t h e i n i t i a t i v e f i g h t i n the f r o n t l i n e , " o r t a k i n g upon o n e s e l f the h e a v i e s t , most d i f f i c u l t ,  and the most dangerous t a s k s .  "to the  One example c i t e d  concerned a h i g h l y - e d u c a t e d model PLA h o s p i t a l w o r k e r , who e a g e r l y performed the d i r t i e s t h o s p i t a l work such as c l e a n i n g 87  toilets,  s p i t o o n s , and bedpans. I n t h i s r e g a r d , mention was made a t t h i s time i n b o t h t h e national  press and NFJP o f the Nan-ni-wan s p i r i t .  T h i s was named  a f t e r the v a l l e y i n n o r t h e r n Shensi w h e r e , d u r i n g the 1942-1944  66  period, a PLA brigade had converted a desolute area into a thriving agrarian one simply through the application of determination and hard work. This aspect of the PLA's ideal work-style was said to have made the greatest impression on society.  People were quoted as saying  they could not f a l t e r in the face of normal d i f f i c u l t i e s i f the PLA could have the vigorous revolutionary s p i r i t and the unflinching determination to train until their s k i l l s are superior under the very d i f f i c u l t conditions . . . . 88 Continuing with other aspects of the Three-Eight Work-Style, the  NFJP  depicted unity within the PLA as a humanistic sense of  comradeship, one transcending a l l a r t i f i c i a l barriers of rank, occupation, and role.  I t was emphasized that in the PLA, " a l l people  in the revolutionary ranks must a l l be concerned with each other, 89 love and protect each other and help each other." In particular, model soldiers were praised for their w i l l i n g ness to go out of their way to v i s i t various units in order to help soldiers solve their problems and spread their advanced experience. Thus, persons were chosen as models not so much as rewards for meritorious service but to become active teachers.  Many model  soldiers were said to have secretly sent money from their own savings to fellow-soldiers whose homes had been stricken by illness or other 90 difficulties.  In another example, a model soldier was marked  out for particular praise because he had stopped for four days i n one unit just in order to help one soldier who was having d i f f i c u l t i e s 91 in handling a delicate sighting instrument.  67  However, this strong sense of unity or togetherness i n the PLA was not to take the form of the.:"barrack" mentality, a sense of common isolation from a very different and suspicious society. This was demonstrated by the even greater emphasis in the NFJP's  coverage of the "Learn from the PLA" campaign on the ideal  PLA's virtue of modesty.  The PLA was constantly being admonished  not to become arrogant, superior, or aloof towards others because of i t s achievements.  Rather, at a l l times, the PLA was to remain w i l l i n g  to learn from a l l other groups i n i t s l o c a l i t i e s . Thus, model soldiers were warned never to be satisfied with their present levels of thinking and performance.  Rather constantly  to be striving to learn more from everyone and, thus, to be continually 92  improving themselves.  I t was often pointed out in  NFJP  that the  general trend towards greater specialization only served to increase each individual's ignorance of what was happening outside his own narrow f i e l d . More concretely, i n Kwangtung modesty took the form of sending PLA groups into the agrarian and industrial sectors or of inviting model groups from them to v i s i t PLA units.  In both cases  the intention was to have the advanced p o l i t i c a l and technological 93  techniques of the masses taught to the basic PLA units.  Since  the PLA maintained large establishments of i t s own i n both the agricultural and technical sectors, there was also much direct incentive for the PLA to keep i n close touch with their c i v i l i a n counterparts.  68 One specially i l l u s t r a t i v e PLA model of modesty'was a gunboat of the South China Sea Fleet.  For i t s PLA crew, the process  of learning to be modest began while their warship was s t i l l being built.  The crew lived at the shipyard i n order to learn the art of  ship-building, help the workers build the boat, and to learn the workers' own work-style which, in fact, was l i t t l e different from the PLA's own Three-Eight Work Style The same process of learning modesty continued even afterwards when the ship was on active service except that now the teachers were local fishermen and other advanced naval units.  Even the ship's  highest officers and advanced technicians were said to have eagerly and modestly sought to learn the old fishermen's experiences in b i t t e r class struggle under the old society, to learn their s p i r i t of enduring under conditions of extreme physical hardship, and to learn their special s k i l l s of seamanship and catching f i s h .  And i n  praising the feats of the ship, the NFJP did not c i t e any military 94  duties but only rescue operations. The NFJP's coverage of the "Learn from the PLA" campaign, l i k e that of the national press, did not contain as much on the PLA's ideal leadership as did the Bulletins.  In NFJP i t was noted  that the model officer was not supposed to r e s t r i c t his understanding only to the periods when he was on duty or even just to his own area of responsibility. Rather, for the model o f f i c e r whoever's thinking has knots, he w i l l go to help them solve i t ; whoever's home has d i f f i c u l t i e s , he w i l l go to help them solve them; even with regard to the fighter's personal affairs and body hygiene, he w i l l also help  69 Also, in training, cadres were to follow Kuo Hsing-fu's teaching method to emphasize patient teaching through example and demonstration rather than classroom lectures or book learning.  The model cadre  was to " f u l l y motivate the fighter's activism in training" by honestly, clearly and simply teaching. He also f u l l y used concrete, f i t t i n g , clear and concise metaphor, explained complicated doctrines simply, and made them easily understood, so that the fighters could easily study, remember, understand and execute them. 96 As was seen in the two previous sections, one of the primary goals in the ideal PLA was to make i t very responsive to the orders of the central command, even at the company level. this,  Towards achieving  cadres were to pay great attention to work in the companies: the comrades recognize that in order to serve the companies, they must take the work of the companies as their own, after going down into the companies they must, regardless i f the matter i s great or small, vigorously and enthusiastica l l y help the companies. . . . 97  Therefore, the ideal PLA cadre was not to spend his time in a cloistered office dispensing orders and regulations, and attending meetings. Rather he was to invest long periods of time in the companies observing, researching and listening.  S p e c i f i c a l l y , this entailed giving on-  the-spot guidance and aid to the soldiers, and even spending time working as a common soldier, a practice called "tun-tien." For example, in one a r t i c l e two model cadres went down into a single company for an extensive stay, not once but five times. During this time' they concerned themselves with every possible manner  of problem ranging from helping to improve marksmanship, organizing p o l i t i c a l work and setting up recreational a c t i v i t i e s , to such small details as checking bedding, teaching singing and treating the 98 soldiers' feet. In such a way, then, i t would be possible for PLA cadres to have opportunities to conduct extensive personal inspections in order to procure the essential first-hand experience and information that would allow them to produce orders and regulations which would be voluntarily and enthusiastically followed at the basic levels because they f u l l y conformed to the wishes and needs of the soldiers. 3. PLA's Relations with Society One major topic that at this time received more attention in  NFJP  than in the national press was the PLA's ideal relations  with society. According to NFJP, the PLA in Kwangtung enjoyed the deep affection and gratitude of the local populace: they a l l f e l t joyous, enthusiastic and proud because their Fatherland had such an extremely revolutionized and invincible red, fraternal army. They a l l said that . . . they would certainly put a great deal of effort into propagating the unit's excellent work style, and to promote i t s achievements and experience. 99 One small manifestation of this attachment was the fact that representatives of the PLA were routinely invited to participate in the major c i v i l i a n festivals held i n Canton.  In them there were included  71 speeches by local dignitaries praising the PLA's contributions "in protecting the Fatherland and i n s o c i a l i s t construction" and c a l l i n g upon the people to learn from the P L A . ^ More.significantly, there was also mention in so-called "greeting groups."  NFJP  of the  As in the national press, these teams  were said to have been organized throughout the province by a l l sectors of society.  Their function, was to "express the concern and  respect of the party, the government, and the people of the whole province for their fraternal troops," and to pledge that the people would learn from the PLA in a l l areas of their livelihood.  But i t  was not a t o t a l l y one-sided a f f a i r ; the greeting groups also described their own achievements in p o l i t i c s and production. part pledged to always learn from the masses.  The PLA for i t s  There also were various  recreational a c t i v i t i e s , such as acrobatic exhibitions, movie shows, opera performances, parties, and hospital v i s i t s , connected with the greeting g r o u p s . ^ But what in particular had the PLA done i n Kwangtung i n order to win this apparently high prestige among the local populace? The a r t i c l e s of NFJP provided the answer i n the slogans "serve the people" and "support the government and love the people." For example, during times of emergency such as drought or flood, entire PLA units (including dependents) would abandon their work in order to help "drawing water by water wheels, bailing water, 102 striking wells and repairing dykes."  PLA units also provided  disaster victims with water, f e r t i l i z e r , animals, seeds, and farm  72 tools (from PLA-operated farms) in order to tide them over the period 103 of d i f f i c u l t y .  On a more individual l e v e l , model soldiers were  said to have lent more personal assistance.  Such was the case of a  soldier who gave a l l his money in order to help defray the medical 104 costs for the sick child of a peasant he had never met. However, i n gaining such high prestige i n society, the PLA's a c t i v i t i e s in Kwangtung society were of a much more long-term and comprehensive nature than simple disaster r e l i e f . in  NFJP,  In fact, as revealed  the PLA i n Kwangtung was a regular and large-scale contributor  of manpower, guidance, and equipment to a wide range of c i v i l i a n groups for a wide range of non-military roles. Since Kwangtung was s t i l l predominantly an agrarian, rural society, the most important of these PLA social roles was i n assisting farm production.  But the overall picture that emerged from  NFJP  of  the PLA's involvement in Kwangtung agriculture was not confined to only that of a reserve labor force used mainly during the peak laboring periods of sowing, transplanting, and harvesting rice. The PLA's role in the countryside was also that of an i n tensively active participant i n a l l aspects of agriculture, and of rural society i t s e l f throughout the year.  The specific tasks the  PLA performed in agriculture ranged from basic labor ones such as transporting produce to market and collecting f e r t i l i z e r to more technical ones such as aiding i n the construction and maintenance of water conservation projects, the repair of farm machinery, the making of farm tools, and the construction of roads and buildings on communes.  73 The extent of the PLA's work went even deeper into the fabric of rural l i f e .  For, the PLA also trained technicians, sent medical teams  to communes, and educated rural cadres, m i l i t i a leaders, and the 105 masses. Some more concrete indication of the extent of the PLA's work in the countryside of Kwangtung can be gauged from one example in which a model PLA division was stated to have contributed 990,000 labor/days in one year in aiding local ploughing and planting a l o n e . ^ Assuming that one division has 15,000 men, this averages out to about 66 days in just farm labor alone for each man in the d i v i s i o n . ^ From this very wide-ranging l i s t of tasks, i t i s clear the PLA was very deeply involved in the rural society of Kwangtung in very many ways.  In fact, i t could be said that the PLA was playing  a large leadership and service role in the p o l i t i c a l and material development of Kwangtung rural society. Aside from articles directly copied from the national press, in  NFJP  I could discover only one a r t i c l e on the transfer of PLA  cadres to the urban economic sector during the "Learn from the PLA" campaign.  The particular a r t i c l e in question stated that three  hundred PLA cadres had been moved into Canton economic offices in 1 go one year.  But, although i t was said the transferees were warmly  welcomed and had done well in their new positions, in fact, most of the a r t i c l e concerned lauding the PLA cadres "bone-hard s p i r i t of eating a great of bitterness and enduring a l o t of hard work" in order to overcome "the great and d i f f i c u l t problems arising out of their unfamilarity with their new missions."  It appears that the  74 cadres were assigned to positions throughout the entire economic sector without previous orientation or training, so that the problems of adjusting and mastering t o t a l l y new s k i l l s must have been very great. Fortunately, their primary function was not technical, but to spread the PLA's experience in p o l i t i c a l work: to put p o l i t i c s in command, to cling fast to doing the work of the people's thinking well, to cling fast to leading commercial work using p o l i t i c a l , production and mass concepts, and to actively raise the class consciousness of the staff. 109 As such, the duties of these transferred PLA cadres were mainly to ensure that proper attention was being paid i n their new posts to p o l i t i c a l work and to the proper style of leadership.  Their duty,  thus, entailed such things as mediating i n conflicts among the s t a f f , increasing morale i n the offices and workshops, and in general being a model of humane leadership. One very striking non-military PLA role i n Kwangtung, both in terms of i t s nature and the attention devoted to i t in as a model producer of culture.  NFJP,  was  Previously these cultural a c t i v i t i e s  by PLA professional and amateur groups had been for the benefit of PLA units only.  Now, in the "Learn from the PLA" campaign, they  were held up as models for a l l cultural performers and creators, and the highest Party o f f i c i a l s in Kwangtung attended PLA cultural programs and e x h i b i t s . ^ As described in  NFJP,  the scope and the output of PLA  cultural a c t i v i t i e s was prodigious.  It included the writing and  producing of movies, Western and Chinese-style operas, ballets,  75 songs, and dances, as well as the writing of magazines, poetry, and novels. These PLA cultural a c t i v i t i e s were lavishly praised because they "increase the stature of Chairman Mao's cultural thought" and also because they follow "the policy of serving the workers, peasants and soldiers and to serve s o c i a l i s t c o n s t r u c t i o n . " ^ In short, the purpose of PLA cultural a c t i v i t i e s was not to provide "simply rest and amusement," but to serve as the "most timely and the brightest reflection" of "one's own struggles and 112 tasks" and of the nation's "noble revolutionary enterprises."  PLA  cultural work was being held up as a model because i t was a form of p o l i t i c a l education promoting Chinese Communist ideals. As one a r t i c l e summed i t up; PLA cultural work "must praise our great party, our great leader, our great nation, our great people, and our great army."„ H 3 PLA cultural workers were especially praised for spending extended periods of time l i v i n g among the common soldiers and people in order to better "intimately unite with" and reflect the 114 real lives of the masses.  Some PLA cultural works were said to  have been produced by complete amateurs, common soldiers with no formal or; professional training in the arts.  They were praised for  making up for their lack of education and training with the proper 115 thinking and s p i r i t in art. PLA performing groups were praised for having made special efforts, despite the d i f f i c u l t i e s in transportation and the physical  76 hardships involved, to bring cultural performances and exhibitions into the more backward and inaccessible rural areas of Kwangtung As might be expected, the content of PLA cultural works was heavily oriented towards the PLA.  However, the clear emphasis was  upon the PLA i n peacetime, covering a c t i v i t i e s such as d r i l l , training, and rescue operations.  Only occasionally were events with  a more martial bent covered, such as the uncovering of "AmericanChiang secret a g e n t s . " ^  4. Summary of the "Learn from the PLA" Campaign To summarize the ideal PLA revealed during the 1964 "Learn from the PLA" campaign in both the national press and i n the provincial paper  NFJP,  although there were differences with regard to coverage and  emphasis, these were complimentary not contradictory i n nature.  There  s t i l l was a common core of basic s i m i l a r i t y , the essentials of which were the Four-Firsts, the Three-Eight Work-Style, the virtues of modesty and toughness, the five principles of leadership, and the intensive cultivation of close relations with society. S p e c i f i c a l l y , the Four-Firsts set forth a method of fighting which, l i k e the People's War tradition, emphasized the importance of man and p o l i t i c s .  The Three-Eight Work-Style was the corresponding  institutional work-style encompassing such basic points as correct political  outlook, hard work, t h r i f t , thorough investigation, and  flexibility.  The special virtues of toughness and modesty highlighted  the PLA's model role as the never arrogant vanguard of the revolution.  77  The five principles of proper leadership conceived of an equal relationship between the leaders and the led, one which was both very humane and very e f f i c i e n t . The most outstanding phenomenon concerning the PLA to emerge from the "Learn from the PLA" campaign was the extent to which the PLA i n Kwangtung was deeply involved in many non-military, social tasks, of which agriculture was only the most prominent.  I f such  intensive and comprehensive involvement of the PLA in Kwangtung society as was portrayed in  NFJP  had been a long-term trend, then  the PLA would have established firm connections with segments of the local society, inter-relationships which presumably could be converted into real p o l i t i c a l , economic, and social influence and power for the PLA. In general, i t i s clear that the "Learn from the PLA" campaign was not a case of the PLA as a d i s t i n c t " m i l i t a r i s t " pressure group attempting to spread i t s own particular p o l i c i e s , values, or interests throughout a different society.  Rather, i t was a situation in which  the PLA, a national i n s t i t u t i o n enjoying widespread social prestige, was being used as a model of principles and techniques widely held or accepted by both the PRC leadership and population. The PLA, in fact, was being held up as a model of the virtues required of everyone in a nation striving to escape poverty and backwardness.  These entailed such basic virtues as courage, hard work,  t h r i f t , and s e l f - s a c r i f i c e .  They also included other, less obvious  ones such as the necessity of squarely facing r e a l i t y , of close  78  contact between various levels and sectors, and of taking an active interest in aiding ones comrades.  F.  CONCLUSIONS FOR CHAPTER II  In this chapter, the ideal PLA was described through three quite different PRC sources.  There were substantial differences among  the three sources i n the scope of coverage of the PLA. The  Bulletins,  being a c l a s s i f i e d government document, were by far the most comprehensive as well as the most informative with regard to problems within the PLA. The national PRC press coverage of the "Learn from the PLA" campaign was the most general, the least informative and the least comprehensive on the ideal PLA.  The Kwangtung  NFJP  public newspaper  at least contained the special element of a detailed treatment of the local PLA's non-military roles in society. Yet,  beneath these superficial differences, there emerged  c l e a r l y from a l l three sources a single, coherent consensus of what the ideal PLA should be, principally in terms of the PLA work style. The essentials of the PLA's ideal work style most importantly of a l l meant the supremacy of the PRC's basic value p r i o r i t i e s and p o l i t i c a l ideology i n a l l aspects of the PLA's work.  I t also i n -  cluded such characteristics as f l e x i b i l i t y , toughness, and modesty. In the c r i t i c a l aspect of leadership, the PLA's ideal work style aimed at using an egalitarian, harmonious, and intimate relationship between the  leaders and the led to produce high levels of discipline and  efficiency.  79 It is d i f f i c u l t to perceive in any of these sources many characteristics of the ideal PLA which pertained to the military profession, the warrior mystique, or even to war i t s e l f .  On the  contrary, the aggregate ideal model of the PLA presented here could, with a few minor changes, have been applied to any bureaucratic institution in the PRC, since i t was primarily concerned with how best to perform tasks within the o f f i c i a l PRC value and ideological guidelines. Viewed in the context of the PLA's own tradition, the ideal of the 1960s could be seen as a concerted effort to preserve many of the essentials of the People's War model.  Especially crucial in this  regard was the determination of the PRC authorities that the PLA, by virtue of i t s special tasks, must not become separate and differentiated from the great mass of Chinese people i n the countryside.  80  CHAPTER III THE REALITY: THE PLA IN THE GPCR  A. BACKGROUND: BASIC FACTS OF THE GPCR  There appears to be general agreement among outside observers that Mao Tse-tung personally was largely responsible for launching the GPCR i f not for a l l i t s eventual results.  The usual general  analysis i s that, after the disasters of the 1958-59 Great Leap Forward Campaign, the Party and state bureaucrats guided China's recovery mainly through "revisionist" policies based upon material incentives and some degree of elitism.  But, i t transpired that Mao, although i n temporary  eclipse, had not at a l l abandoned his vision of a revolutionary society based upon egalitarianism and p o l i t i c a l fervour.  During the Socialist  Education campaign of 1962-3 and the "Learn from the PLA" campaign of 1964, Mao came to the conviction that the Party bureaucrats, although nominally supporting his goals, were i n practice continuing to execute the same revisionist policies with apparent impunity. In this situation, Mao gradually came to the conviction that his opposition i n the Party and the government administration (such as Liu Shao-ch'i, P'eng Chen and Teng Hsiao-p'ing) was too entrenched to be eradicated through normal methods. In order to destroy these "bourgeois representatives who have sneaked into the organs of proletarian dictatorship, the small handful of power holders within  81 the party who are taking the c a p i t a l i s t road," Mao decided to raise support among the students t o t a l l y outside the regular Party apparatus. Since the ultimate goal of Mao was to ensure the continuation of his a n t i - e l i t i s t , i d e a l i s t i c and struggle-oriented type of revolution, the choice of a mass student movement to spearhead the GPCR was quite explicable.  Such an approach also meant an ad hoc mass movement, one  which would by i t s very nature be d i f f i c u l t to closely control and direct from above.  But Mao seems to have been determined to achieve  his goals whatever the risks. Similarly, there seems to be general consensus among Western scholars of the GPCR as to i t s national periodization, one into six phases. According to this general scheme, the f i r s t phase from about June 1966 to January 1967 was characterized by the formation of the large Red Guard groups and the rapid broadening of their targets, beginning with only the sphere of education and culminating with the leadership of the Party during the "January storm of Revolution" i n 1967.  In this phase the PLA's active role was limited to transporting,  feeding and encouraging the Red Guards. However, during this phase of the GPCR the Red Guards did not s a t i s f a c t o r i l y achieve their principal appointed task of removing the entrenched Party bureaucrats throughout society. The latter had been evading the Red Guard attacks by adopting various subterfuges such as i n f i l t r a t i n g the Red Guard organizations i n order to deflect the targets of attack elsewhere, organizing their own Red Guard groups, 2  and "sacrificing pawns to save knights."  Mao's opponents in the  82 Party also attempted to exaggerate his directives in order to arouse greater popular opposition to the Red Guards, that i s putting forth slogans which were ' l e f t ' in form but right in essence such as 'suspecting a l l and 'overthrowing a l l . ' 3 1  In any case, during the second phase, lasting from February to March 1967, a national directive of January 23, 1967 ordered the PLA into active intervention into the Cultural Revolution for the f i r s t time: The PLA i s a proletarian revolutionary army personally created by Chairman Mao and i s the most v i t a l tool of proletarian dictatorship. In this great struggle of the proletarian dictatorship to seize power from the bourgeoisie, the PLA must firmly take the side of the proletarian revolutionaries and resolutely support and help the proletarian l e f t i s t s . 4 Throughout the GPCR, the ideal role for the PLA generally was summed up in the slogan "three supports and two m i l i t a r i e s . "  According  to this formula the PLA was to support agriculture, industry, and "the revolutionary l e f t " as Well as to provide p o l i t i c a l training and military control.  and military  In other words, i n the GPCR the PLA  was to ensure the maintenance of economic production and at the same time to assist actively the groups supporting Mao's policies i n the locality. After the PLA intervened in the GPCR i n January 1967, a definite national pattern arose of alternating phases of intensive factional a c t i v i t y , struggle and at times violence, followed by relative calm.  83 The second phase of the GPCR, lasting from February until March 1967, was followed in the third phase, from April to August 1967, by renewed and intensified factional struggle, which included verbal and physical attacks on the PLA.  The following fourth phase, from  September 1967 to March 1968, (during which phase the detailed analysis in this chapter w i l l s t a r t ) , saw a return to relative peace and order. Then, in the f i f t h phase, from April to July 1968, came the last upsurge in factional disorders nationally. Finally, the sixth phase, from July 1968 to April 1969, included the final PLA-directed  crack-  down on mass factionalism i n society and the completion of the i n i t i a l reconstruction stage through a national network of revolutionary committees. As the GPCR progressed, the degree of PLA presence i n every sector of society increased markedly.  This trend was exemplified  in the composition of the Ninth Congress of the CCP in April 1969 (the convening of which i s usually taken as marking the end of the GPCR). According to one computation, 51% of the Central Committee of 170 and a l most half the all-important Politburo (10 out of 21) were active PLA 5 leaders.  Similarly, in the newly created revolutionary committees  at the provincial level 76% (22 or 29) of the chairmen and 49% (235 of 479) of the standing committee members were PLA members.  84  B. BASIC WESTERN INTERPRETATIONS OF THE PLA IN THE GPCR  While the greatly increased presence of the PLA in Chinese society during the GPCR i s a universally accepted fact, among Western observers there is no such clear-cut unanimity as to i t s meaning and implications.  What follows is only a selection of the more significant  interpretations which especially paid attention to the PLA's role i n the GPCR, since the tremendous proliferation of Western studies on the GPCR made i t impossible to cover a l l of them. Of the Western studies of the PLA in the GPCR I examined ( a l l but one of which were national in scale), there was a very clear division of opinion into two general schools, one of which basically interpreted the PLA's behavior in the GPCR as being disloyal to Mao Tse-tung's policies and one which viewed i t as being loyal o v e r a l l . Since these interpretations were rooted in very differing views on the basic nature of the PRC, i t would do well to examine individual examples of each interpretation in somewhat greater d e t a i l . The interpretation which saw PLA opposition to the policies of Mao in general could be said to follow the "social science" approach I described in the introduction.  That i s , i t rejected the p r i o r i t i e s  and methods of Mao as unfeasible and not " r e a l i s t i c , " and thus strongly downplayed the relevance of Maoist ideology in explaining the events in the PRC. Instead, this interpretation tended to view the PRC i n terms of various occupational and interest groups scheming and struggling for power and wealth while paying only nominal obedience to Mao.  In particular, the PLA was viewed as basically similar to  85 Western m i l i t a r y organizations; that i s , "rational," "pragmatic," and "authoritarian" in attitudes and interests; favouring the development of highly-technically developed forces; and opposed to "radical" Maoist m i l i t a r y and social doctrines.  As a result i n the  GPCR, according to this interpretation, the PLA basically worked to thwart Mao's revolutionary aims and to further i t s own interests and p o l i c i e s . ^ For example, William Whitson depicted the PLA e l i t e as anti-Mao i n basic policies but also divided within i t s e l f by personal o  rivalries.  The PLA was "not a highly p o l i t i c i z e d force devoutly Q  loyal to Mao but a congeries of conflicting loyalties. . . . " In the GPCR Whitson argued that, i n view of the prevailing chaos, the massive PLA intervention was largely unavoidable. PLA "conservative and conventional,"  But, the  "professional military men" in  the process worked to further their own anti-Mao policies and interests: the Cultural Revolution was f i n a l l y brought under control by a 1967-68 campaign of military suppression of Red Guards and a national defense mobilization process that soon involved the military in a l l aspects of daily l i f e in China, including Party rebuilding and daily administration of everything from import to export control, to rationing and compensation of production teams. . . . 10 The heart of Whitson's interpretation of the PLA i n the GPCR was his elaborate portrayal of several intra-PLA divisions; some personal i n nature (the five f i e l d armies), others regional (the eleven Military Regions)., and bureaucratic channels).^  (the six "career  The foundation of Whitson's thesis was his belief that  86  the primary concern of PLA leaders was "their own status, their own resources, and their own p o l i t i c a l survival" and to resist "Mao's 12 efforts to render the PLA into a school of Maoist revolution."  In  policy they were more interested in evolution than revolution and i n rational routinization of scarce resource allocation for the sake of solid progress toward priority goals instead of erratic sloganeering, mass movements toward image building. 13 In one place Whitson argued that, as a result of the GPCR, there was the p o s s i b i l i t y of the appearance of "warlordism" or at least "regional military dictatorship" i n China because PLA leaders were concerned more with "the lure of immediate local power," and s t i l l held "regional and personal loyalties and interests over national ones."^  4  In his many articles on the PLA in the GPCR, Ralph L. Powell went into considerable detail i n analyzing the nature of PLA penetration into Chinese society, particularly in the areas of Party r e c t i f i c a t i o n , agriculture, industry, public security, transportation, and state administration.^ Powell argued that in the GPCR many military leaders had "opposed the radical aspects of Mao's policies," because, "given their traditional missions, training, and tight organizational structure, military men -- whatever the ideology -- naturally tend to abhor disorder and lack of d i s c i p l i n e . " ^ For example, Powell evaluated the PLA's general performance in the economic sphere as demonstrating greater interest in promoting  87 production than Maoist revolution, believing that the PLA had been "pragmatic and cautious," seeking mainly to "preserve order, strengthen national economy, increase their own power and avoid Mao's wrath. Powell maintained that the PLA in the GPCR had tremendously increased i t s power mainly at the expense of Mao and his supporters, and that there are some rather striking s i m i l a r i t i e s between the regional leaders of the PLA and the major m i l i t i a commanders of the l a t t e r half of the nineteenth century. Both added influential c i v i l posts and economic controls in the provinces to their important military commands. Both groups shifted the balance of power from Peking toward the provinces. Both emphasized military reforms and progress. S t i l l , both remained loyal to the 'system,' but were divided by factionalism. Hence they did not overthrow the regime. 18 In his analysis of the PLA i n the GPCR, Parris Chang particul a r l y emphasized the theme of military regionalism predominating . .,. . ,. 19 c i v i l i a n centralism.  over  While "power devolved into i t s hands largely by default," the PLA, once i t had intervened massively in the GPCR, worked to 20 further i t s own particular interests and not those of Mao.  To  Chang i t was inevitable for "conservative" and "moderate" PLA leaders to support "anti-Maoist rebel groups" and to make every effort "to 21 crack down on unruly rebel groups." The result "in many provinces approximated a military takeover" because, "the military did not rule d i r e c t l y , but i t s influence was nevertheless dominant and i t s representatives actually constituted 22 the backbone of the new leadership structure."  In the process,  regional military leaders had increased their a b i l i t y to evade the  88 directives of Peking "by means of subterfuge, sabotage and passive 23 resistance while displaying outward conformity." Chang suggested that, "in pushing the military into active participation in the p o l i t i c a l arena, 24 of his revolutionary crusade." He i t seems quite doubtful that the the Party would be able again to under the control and reduce the in the system. 25  Mao also signed the death warrant also concluded that, c i v i l i a n elements of place the military leaders p o l i t i c a l role of the PLA  Jurgen Domes argued that, "the only entirely obvious result of the Cultural Revolution so far has been a military takeover in the provinces. ..."  His basic view was that, in the GPCR, the PLA  "professional soldiers" were opposed to "the attempts to enact a 27 radical change in Chinese domestic p o l i t i c s . "  Consequently, when  called upon to support the Maoists, most of the local PLA leaders refused to render "unconditional and all-out support to Maoist factions," and gradually they pressured the center to adopt more "moderate" 28 *ur policies. The eventual result was "an old shattered society run „29 by a combination of cool, professional military engineers of power. E l l i s Joffe stood somewhat in the middle between the two 30  principal interpretations of the PLA in the GPCR.  On the one hand,  he argued the GPCR had shown that the PLA leaders were "largely pragmatic military men, who have . . . demonstrated their disdain 31  for radical revolutionary policies. As evidence, he asserted that the PLA in the GPCR had "intervened not as a radical revolutionary 32  force, but rather as a moderating and s t a b i l i z i n g element."  89  Pronounced in this regard were the tendencies of "military commanders to a l l y with, rather than to attack, local Party o f f i c i a l s " and "when forced to choose between the conflicting demands of order and 33 revolution, to choose the former." On the other hand, Joffe believed that PLA commanders had been motivated not by a desire to have 'the gun control the Party,' nor by a desire to chip away at the power of the central leadership but rather by the conflicting pressures to which the Cultural Revolution subjected them.34 In particular, the PLA had been saddled with the impossible assignment of implementing two mutually exclusive objectives; to maintain order and to encourage revolutionary a c t i v i t y which by i t s very nature i s disruptive of order. 35 Overall, Joffe concluded that, in the GPCR, the commitment of regional commanders to national unity and their basic allegiance to the Center have far outweighed the centrifugal tendencies inherent in their newly-attained power. 36 We now turn to examples of the general interpretation which emphasized the basic loyalty of the PLA in the GPCR to the Center headed by Mao Tse-tung. In an a r t i c l e on the movement of o f f i c i a l s in the provinces, Gordon Bennett attacked what he termed the "regionalism-militarization" 37 interpretation or the "modern warlord hypothesis." He believed that  90 his evidence showed continued strong central power and surmised that "the highly v i s i b l e military presence after the Cultural Revolution 38 might well be no more that a period in a cycle." William Parish, in a critique of Whitson's factional model of the PLA leadership, maintained not only was the "Chinese m i l i t a r y , in fact, a united national force" before the GPCR, but, "even in the 39 Cultural Revolution military leadership was highly centralized." He concluded, "There i s s t i l l l i t t l e evidence . . . for vast loyalty 40 systems that are a constant threat to a centralized government." Similarly, Harvey Nelsen concluded that his study of troop movements in the GPCR "revealed far greater central control" over the 41 PLA than any factional " f i e l d army" thesis could allow for. did  Nelsen  concede that a portion of the PLA, the regional forces (independent  and garrison units), had proven "not organizationally or p o l i t i c a l l y suited for the job of supporting the Left and eradicating a l l influence of the former provincial and municipal Party committees" because of 42 their long-standing, close ties with the l a t t e r .  He s t i l l believed  that, overall, the immense latent p o l i t i c a l power of the centrally controlled [main force] units i s such that the national leadership need have l i t t l e fear of strong regional challenges from the new e l i t e of military officers in the seats of provincial power. 43 David Wilson emphasized that the PLA's task in the GPCR had been made "extremely d i f f i c u l t " largely because of the "extreme 44 vagueness of the directives" from the Center.  He did admit that  the PLA at times had acted "with too heavy a hand and in too conservative a manner" or had distorted "the s p i r i t of orders" by interpreting them  91 in "accordance with the situation in the individual areas."  45  However,  Wilson argued that i t was more significant that no PLA commander "seems AC  deliberately to have opposed the orders of the center." cluded his study with the statement:  He con-  "the PLA seems to have tried 47  to carry out i t s almost impossible task with remarkable loyalty." John Gittings maintained that the outstanding characteristic of the PLA's behavior in the GPCR had been " i t s ambiguity" in the midst 48 of a very confusing and chaotic situation.  His main point was that  there was " l i t t l e specific evidence to show the Army has been actively disloyal," especially when viewed in light of the fact that far less has the PLA shown any intention of 'taking over' the country, despite the impressive amount of actual p o l i t i c a l power placed in i t s hands, as a less well i n doctrinated or more ambitious army might have done long before. 49 In particular, the PLA had acted with "self-restraint in view of the provocation, of the purge of high-ranking o f f i c e r s , and of the indignities" which had been i n f l i c t e d upon i t in the course of the GPCR. On the other hand, Gittings did concede that in the provinces: the PLA almost invariably sided with, and sometimes even gave financial and material support to, the less radical 'rebel' groups while seeking to restrain . . . the more revolutionary and truly Maoist factions. 50 James Jordan took the strongest stand of those who emphasized the basic loyalty of the PLA to the center i n the GPCR. He characterized the PLA as "unique among military organizations in the world in i t s organization and in i t s relationship to the people and the country's 51 p o l i t i c a l apparatus."  Jordan defined the PLA as a "proletarian"  army, "an army of the people in which the people identify themselves  92 as part of the military system and soldiers regard themselves as 52 members of the masses."  In the GPCR, he maintained, the PLA, by  and large, " j u s t i f i e d Mao's confidence in i t s thorough p o l i t i c i z a t i o n , 53 and lived up to i t s reputation as being an 'army of the whole people." And after the GPCR; "In spite of i t s predominant role and obvious power, 54 1  the PLA has remained subordinate to the Party." To summarize, in contrast to the interpretation which portrayed the PLA as a factionalized i n s t i t u t i o n opposed to Mao, this interpretation pictured the PLA in general as a basically loyal, unified and wellintegrated i n s t i t u t i o n , suddenly confronted with a very complex and confusing situation i n the GPCR. And, while admitting that at times in the GPCR certain PLA units did not wholeheartedly follow the directives from the center, overall the pattern of PLA behavior was seen as one of obedience. CASE STUDY: THE PLA IN THE KWANGTUNG GPCR FROM FEBRUARY 1968 TO JUNE 1970 1. Introduction  The last section of the body of this paper i s an analysis of the PLA's behavior in a concrete situation, the GPCR, in a precise area, Kwangtung province, and over a distinct time span, February 1968 to June 1970. As I intimated in the introduction to the paper, the GPCR, which in i t s entirety lasted roughly from early 1966 to at least .mid-1969 was a cataclysmic phenomenon, plainly atypical and s t i l l very  93 perplexing.  But, since i t took in a l l of Chinese society, each  sector, including the PLA, was forced i n some way to react positively to the rapidly unfolding chain of events.  The time span to be  considered in detail was limited to the latter half of the GPCR partly in order to allow for more detailed coverage in a rapidly changing and confusing situation and partly because, relatively speaking, i t i s the part of the GPCR period which has been the least studied both with respect to the GPCR as a whole and to the PLA's place i n i t .  Kwang-  tung province was chosen simply because i t was the only area of China for which anything approaching comprehensive data were available. As an introduction to this section, i t i s necessary to consider one special methodological problem, that of sources,and also to analyze in summary form the overall GPCR period in Kwangtung, concentrating on the development of factionalism throughout society and also the nature of the PLA's involvement in the Kwangtung GPCR before February 1968. Unlike the normal situation with regard to sources from the PRC, during the GPCR there temporarily thrived a large number of factional publications not formally censored by the government and expressing r e l a t i v e l y different points of view (although none I saw openly advocated anti -CCP or anti-Mao Tse-tung policies). However, since a l l these special GPCR publications (which usually took the form of small tabloids) reached the outside through surrept i t i o u s and haphazard means, they suffered from a glaring lack of continuity in coverage.  Furthermore, a l l the GPCR materials I had  access to had been through the unknown selection processes of the  American Consulate in HongKong.  Thus, a l l in a l l , the case of  the GPCR represented only a partial improvement in the situation with regard to sources. In this chapter for the f i r s t time in the paper, I made extensive use of accounts by refugees from China.  In particular,  I used the accounts by two refugees who personally witnessed and participated in the Kwangtung GPCR, although both did so during 1967, 56 before the period to be considered in detail here.  Generally I  have a low opinion of the value of any material by refugees who, by d e f i n i t i o n , were i n some way disaffected or unsuccessful i n their previous situations and who are generally unrepresentative i n terms of geographic and socio-economic backgrounds.  However, the  two in question here seem to have been unusually perceptive observers and, more importantly, describe details and examples not obtainable elsewhere. Precisely to what extent regionalism, either of the social or p o l i t i c a l varieties, existed in Kwangtung during the GPCR and influenced events i s a problem which cannot be resolved with any degree of certainty.  The term "provincialist" was at times used i n  factional tabloids i n Kwangtung, but at a l l times only as a p o l i t i c 57 a l l y derogatory epithet for one's enemies.  There was no .other  overt sign of any regionalism in a l l the many factional tabloids, although public papers would be expected to be one of the least l i k e l y forums for the expression of illegitimate regionalist views. Much more significant in this regard to me i s the fact that the sequence and pattern of events in the GPCR in Kwangtung closely followed the national ones.  95 2.  Periodization The general periodization of the GPCR in Kwangtung broadly  followed the national pattern which was outlined above, that i s to say,  in the Kwangtung GPCR there were s i x basic phases; the f i r s t  lasting approximately from July 1966 until January 1967, the second from February to March 1967, the third from April to August 1967, the fourth from September 1967 to March 1968, the f i f t h from April to July 1968, and the sixth from July 1968 to April 1969.  As was also  evident in the national case, in the Kwangtung GPCR there too emerged a very definite pattern or cycle of alternating phases of relative disorder (the f i r s t , t h i r d , and f i f t h phases) followed by relative calm (the  second, fourth, and sixth phases).  I t should be reiterated here  again that this chapter w i l l concentrate mainly upon the PLA i n the Kwangtung GPCR only during the three later phases, that i s the fourth, f i f t h , and sixth.  3.  The Development of Mass Factionalism The single most important characteristic of the Kwangtung  GPCR and the key to understanding i t was the development of mass factional organizations outside of government control in every significant sector of society.  In the history of the PRC this was  an unprecedented development and one which forms the major appeal in studying the GPCR. Only during the beginning of the f i r s t phases from July to September 1966 was the Kwangtung GPCR confined to the student Red  96  Guard organizations and the education sector.  Very rapidly the Red  Guards broadened and intensified their targets for attack to the c u l t u r a l , p o l i t i c a l and economic spheres.  As the disorder spread throughout  society and the government became increasingly paralyzed, the masses of workers and peasants started to become involved directly in the GPCR and to organize their own  autonomous factional organizations.  At the same time the GPCR in Kwangtung was broadening into v i r t u a l l y every school, factory, o f f i c e , and commune, i t was also breaking up into many factions. In a single work unit several competing factions would be formed i n i t i a l l y but typically one of them would gradually become predominant.  Rapidly, channels of communi-  cation and some degree of co-operation were established between individual factional organizations with similar views.  In rural and  suburban areas, the unit of cooperation was the neighbourhood, while in urban, industrialized areas i t was the work place.  More elaborate  coalitions of factions embracing large areas or entire occupations appeared. How well-organized some of the factions or coalitions in Kwangtung eventually became i s indicated from one tabloid, which charged that the factions of their enemies were "recruiting supporters everywhere" and setting up "separate mountain strongholds to expand their own influence," adding that these "not only have set up  new  mountain strongholds mixing different occupations" but were "extending their a c t i v i t i e s to other administrative d i s t r i c t s , c i t i e s and hsien. Another tabloid charged that one faction c o a l i t i o n , the August 1 Combat Corps, had a total of between 50-80 thousand members, organized in 110  97  units throughout Kwangtung's factories, offices, businesses, schools, 59 communes, and neighborhood committees. A more detailed indication of the nature of factional a c t i v i t y and, in particular, of how b i t t e r and highly developed at least some of the factional infighting had become, was clearly evident in the text of a peace agreement worked out in Peking during November 60 1967 among various contending factions in Kwangtung. In particular, the third article, of i t ordered a l l mass organizations to hand a l l weapons over and forbade any further "manufacture of weapons." raiding and arrests."  I t also banned "property smashing, looting,  The same a r t i c l e also stated that a l l "road-  blocks," "strongholds," "residential j o i n t defenses," and "private radio stations" were to be dismantled.  A r t i c l e five ordered a l l  workers, peasants, cadres, and students to return to their original units with the assurance that reprisals would not be taken against them by other members of their units.. The sixth a r t i c l e demanded a restoration of the "smooth flow of communications and transportation areas."  between the c i t y and rural  This a r t i c l e , in particular, forbade any faction from  interfering with trains and ships, from stealing means of transportation, and imposing their own curfews on areas. A r t i c l e seven forbade "anyone to instigate the peasants to enter the c i t y or to go to the countryside to s t i r up factional struggles." A r t i c l e eight stipulated that any outsiders "who have taken over factories, enterprises, rural areas, State organs, newspaper  98  offices, broadcasting stations, schools and other public centers should withdraw immediately." It i s clear from the above document (which apparently was from the c l a s s i f i e d , private collection of a high o f f i c i a l and not meant for publication) that, during the GPCR period in Kwangtung, what had occurred was a general breakdown of the state control over society, allowing individuals and factions to move about and to organize as they wished.  And, while certainly not a l l factions  would be as well-organized nor as lawless as the above indicated, the fact s t i l l remains that such behavior could be and was committed with apparent impunity. In studying the GPCR, determining the nature of factionalism is the most basic and crucial problem.  For, the factions were the  new element whose relatively differing policies and e x p l i c i t actions were the principal dynamic in the turbulent GPCR situation.  Their  tabloids form by far the most important source for the GPCR i n Kwangtung.  Thus, the interpretation one places on the nature of  factionalism, particularly the identity of the issues and considerations motivating their actions and struggles, inevitably w i l l play a decisive role in one's overall interpretation of the GPCR.  For  this reason, my view of the nature of factionalism in Kwangtung i s here presented. Fortunately for the sake of simplicity, outside observers as well as the Chinese tabloids themselves did strongly tend to categorize the multitude of factions that sprang up in Kwangtung during the GPCR into two broad groups or coalitions of factions.  99 In Kwangtung these two coalitions went through several name changes but, since they were usually known popularly as the Flag and East Wind groups of factions, I w i l l fbllow this nomenclature throughout the chapter. It should be remembered, however, that, while reducing the many factions into two distinct categories was a necessary step in order to bring the confusing subject into more manageable proportions  (both  for the Chinese participants at the time and for later Western observers), this did not mean that there existed throughout the Kwangtung GPCR two great faction coalitions embracing a l l aspects of society and each possessing a high level of p o l i t i c a l unanimity and organizational efficacy.  Rather, the terms "East Wind" and "Flag"  should be regarded as representing more the two predominating states of mind which under certain conditions could be converted into united action among many factions. A former Red Guard in Canton turned refugee summed up the basic differences between the factions by describing the East Wind group "as the less militant of the two, less antagonistic to existing authority, and less sweeping i n the scope of i t s attacks."  While  this does provide some indication of the relative difference between the two major faction coalitions, i t s t i l l does not spell out the specific attitudes and policies of each, particularly i n terms of Western p o l i t i c a l categories. Among Western scholars of the GPCR there has been a very marked tendency to characterize the inter-factional struggle as being one between "radicals" and "conservatives."  This interpretation  100  sees the GPCR as a temporary loosening of controls which unintentionally unleashed a whole series of long suppressed tensions and contradictions throughout Chinese society between the "haves," or those with a vested personal interest in the status quo in society, and the "have-nots," or those who f e l t in some way at a disadvantage, be i t economically or 62 educationally. I would argue f i r s t , that the inter-factional situation in the Kwangtung GPCR was much more complex than can be accommodated in a straight "radical" and "conservative" distinction based upon economic, p o l i t i c a l , and social self-interest, and secondly, that any labels or characterizations placed on the factions must be seen in their Chinese context. While here we are seriously handicapped in the West by the lack of basic knowledge concerning the workings of contemporary Chinese society, nevertheless i t seems just as reasonable to believe that the factors of personality, l o c a l i t y , place of work, ethnic group and ideology also played significant parts in determining factional coalitions and enemies.  The factional tabloids themselves  emphasized ideology and, to a much lesser extent, personalities. Yet, even with regard to ideology, i t seems clear to me that the differences between the East Wind and Flag groups were not over basic goals or values but rather only details of timing, method and interpretation.  None of the factional sources available to me,  even though any state control over the press had lapsed, ever questioned the basic goals and policies of the GPCR set forth by the Center i n the name of Mao-Tse-tung.  On the contrary, the tabloids  101 of a l l factions constantly vied with each other in proclaiming ever more fervent loyalty to Mao and his GPCR policies. Thus, neither faction group could in any way be termed "conservative" or even "moderate" i n the prevailing Western p o l i t i c a l parlance.  4. The PLA i,h the Kwangtung GPCR before February 1968 At this point a brief summary must be made of the PLA's i n volvement in the Kwangtung GPCR before the period to be examined i n d e t a i l , that i s before February 1968. As with the rest of the nation, so i n the Kwangtung case the beginning of the PLA's direct involvement can be precisely dated with the January 25, 1967 national proclamation ordering i t into active participation in the GPCR. It w i l l be remembered that the PLA's responsibilities in the GPCR were summed up i n the slogan "threesupports and two-militaries," which in effect called upon the PLA to assist both in maintaining essential economic production and i n overthrowing the discredited entrenched p o l i t i c a l authorities. Towards these ends, the PLA began to send small groups or individuals into work units in a l l sectors of Kwangtung society.  Thus,  the PLA set up military control committees in urban economic and governmental units, military training groups in the universities and middle schools, and military front commands in the rural communes. This whole process culminated in the proclamation  of military control  63 over the whole province in early March 1967.  What i s not clear i s  the extent to which these military advisory groups were or were not  102 set up i n every work, study and l i v i n g unit of Kwangtung society. What i s clear i s that during this phase from January to March 1967 the PLA in Kwangtung signally failed in executing the task of supporting the overthrowing of the existing authorities in the Party.  In fact, the net practical effect of the PLA intervention  at this juncture was a definite dampening of the factional a c t i v i t y and thus a halting of the momentum of the GPCR in Kwangtung.  Naturally  this development especially infuriated the more determined Flag factions (whose more strident commitment to the goals of the GPCR as they saw them w i l l be more f u l l y documented below).  In such a manner  a deep suspicion on the part of the Flag group was established towards the PLA and particularly Huang Yung-sheng, the commander of the Canton Military Region Command (CMRC).  64  As to the real reasons for the PLA's failure to promote the GPCR at this time, the refugee source tentatively attributed i t to the exceedingly confused and complex situation the PLA faced i n Kwangtung and to the PLA's relative lack of experience in handling such complicated p o l i t i c a l situations: Since local commanders had been told simply to help the true l e f t suppress the right, i t was l e f t to them to decide which groups were associated with which category of opinion. They had no experience in sorting out the many views and arguments surrounding issues which had divided . . . [the two groups], and were thus very unsure of themselves. 65 On the other hand, i n his study of Huang Yung-sheng's role in the Kwangtung GPCR, Jurgen Domes argued that the PLA i n Kwangtung from the very start of active participation i n January 1967 as  103 "professional" soldiers had fundamentally been opposed to the "radical" Flag factions.  Domes interpreted the PLA's actions in Kwangtung as  a wei1-organized plot with their a l l i e s , the "conservative" East Wind factions, to liquidate the Flag factions.  Temporarily the PLA in  Kwangtung was restrained by fears of reprisals from the Peking leadership, but eventually in 1968, after many vicissitudes, i t was able to launch i t s long contemplated brutal campaign of suppression 66  and revenge against the "radical" Flag group.  Domes concluded  that the behaviour of PLA officers in the Kwangtung GPCR had demonstrated that they were not "highly influenced by Maoist theories of revolution," and were "against the attempts to enact a radical change in Chinese domestic p o l i t i c s . " * '  7  Whatever the feelings between the PLA and the Flag group, to me the far more significant fact i s that the PLA stepped aside without any overt display of dissent when Peking again greatly encouraged factional a c t i v i t i e s from April until August 1967 (the third phase of the GPCR). Despite i t s tremendously increased presence throughout Kwangtung society the PLA now suddenly became "an essentially 68 passive force" possessing "no clear p o l i t i c a l policy."  In fact,  during this phase, the PLA was said to have been "roundly c r i t i c i z e d " by both the Flag and the East Wind groups for f a i l i n g to render whole69 hearted support to them.  Huang Yung-sheng himself was temporarily  recalled to Peking where he made a public confession of the CMRC's previous errors in handling the Kwangtung GPCR.^ As the PLA stepped aside, inevitably the conflict between the two faction groups quickly escalated into f u l l - s c a l e armed struggle.  71  Caught in the cross-fire with no positive policy  104 mandate from Peking, the PLA in Kwangtung could only watch helplessly while maintaining the facade of military control.  Both faction  groups even could and did carry out raids upon PLA armories for 72 military weapons and equipment with total impunity.  In the process  PLA men were humiliated, beaten and even murdered, but in spite of the flagrant provocation, the PLA in Kwangtung showed no sign of breaking discipline and taking the law into i t s own hands. Eventually, beginning in September 1967, the GPCR policy of the Center again shifted sharply and rampant factional a c t i v i t y was discouraged while the PLA was given broader powers to prevent factional violence.  In November 1967 a comprehensive peace agreement between  the various factions in Kwangtung was hammered out in Peking under the personal auspices of Premier Chou En-lai. 5.  The General Character of the February 1968-June 1970 Period in Kwangtung We now reach the GPCR period i n Kwangtung which i s to be  examined in greatest d e t a i l , that i s from February 1968 to April 1969.  As was stated previously, this time-span encompasses part of  the fourth phase of the GPCR and a l l of the f i f t h (April to July 1968) and sixth (July 1968 to April 1969) phases.  As well, I propose  to take the detailed analysis of the PLA's role in the Kwangtung GPCR one step further in time by examining the PLA's role in the immediate post-GPCR phase from June 1968 to about July 1970 in Kwangtung. In this period from February 1969. to June 1970, as in earlier periods, the abrupt and widely gyrating course of the GPCR  105 was closely reflected in the equally abrupt and widely divergent changes in the roles the PLA was called upon to play in Kwangtung. In brief, we shall see the PLA successively assume the roles of arbitrator between contending factions, helpless bystander amidst rampant factional struggle (the f i f t h GPCR phase from April to July 1968), tough suppressor of factional organizations (the sixth GPCR phase from July 1968 to April 1969), and administrator of society after the GPCR.  6. The Fourth Phase of the GPCR i n Kwangtung: The PLA as Mediator The formation of the Kwangtung Provincial and the Canton Municipal Revolutionary Committees (which were to replace the discredited Party and government organs) on February 21, 1968 marked the climax of the fourth phase of the GPCR, a phase characterized by relative inter-factional peace and i n i t i a l p o l i t i c a l reconstruction. The composition of both committees reflected the existing shaky coalition of soldiers and rehabilitated cadres, as well as 73 members of both the Flag and East Wind faction groups. The PLA held a large majority of the highest positions i n both revolutionary committees but were in a definite minority in 74 total membership.  This could either indicate that the PLA had  simply seized the predominant p o l i t i c a l power in the province (as Jurgen Domes argues), or that, in a situation of p o l i t i c a l stalemate, 75 i t was the only group generally trusted as an arbitrator. Certainly the published speeches of the leading PLA figures on the committees at the time lent more credence to the latter view.  106  For there was no special attention in them devoted to the role of the PLA in the GPCR. Rather, i t was stated that the PLA supported a l l factions equally and that the PLA was with "the greatest patience" attempting to conciliate and unite the contending factions, although at the same time a l l factions were cautioned to "support," "learn from" and "protect" the PLA,, and warned against "the sowing of dissension and sabotage of the unity between the army and the people." One of the speeches by a leading PLA figure diplomatically blamed the factional violence and the previous attacks on the PLA upon a small number of "bad elements," e x p l i c t l y exonerating both the Flag and East Wind groups.^ A national report of the same month had glowingly reported that in Kwangtung, under the guidance of the PLA, "the differences between the revolutionary mass organizations have been ironed out" as the factions had overcome "the bourgeois factionalism i n their 78 own heads."  The same report went on to state that the PLA had  performed well "the three-supports  and two-militaries" tasks and that  i t was s t i l l stationed in the province's "factories, villages, 79 schools and government institutions." However, a l l other evidence for this phase indicated that the PLA had not been successful in arbitrating an end to the factional h o s t i l i t y and that in fact the feud between the two main faction groups was as alive as ever, i f temporarily r e l a t i v e l y subdued in form.  In their tabloids both sides maintained unabated their harsh  and strident verbal warfare.  Each attempted to blame the other for  causing the violence and destruction of the GPCR i n Kwangtung.  107 During t h i s , the fourth phase of the GPCR, the tabloids of the East Wind group condemned "factionalism" with great indignation, called for i t s vigorous suppression, and urged the swift implemen80 tation of a great alliance between a l l groups in Kwangtung. With regard to the PLA, the East Wind tabloids placed great emphasis upon praising the PLA's behaviour in the GPCR, adding that "we must further trust and rely on the PLA, and cherish i t , learn from 81 i t and help i t . "  On the other hand, they accused the Flag group  of "directing the spearhead against the great Chinese PLA," of not trusting the commitment of the PLA towards the GPCR, and of plotting 82 to attack the PLA p o l i t i c a l l y and m i l i t a r i l y . The strategy of the East Wind factions here was clearly to pin the blame upon the Flag group for perpetrating the violent acts of the GPCR.  The former particularly wished to portray their r i v a l s as  being anti-PLA in order to persuade the PLA to suppress the Flag factions. On the other hand, the Flag group in their tabloids of the phase continued to emphasize realizing the original goals of the GPCR (that i s overthrowing the existing Party authorities throughout society), while downplaying the significance of the violence (for which the Flag heatedly disclaimed any direct responsibility) as an inevitable but small price to pay for the overthrow of the old system. The Flag group tabloids did emphasize the exposure of what they saw as a sinister plot on the part of the East Wind group to alienate D O  the PLA from themselves and disclaimed any anti-PLA intentions.  108 They, however, did reserve the right to c r i t i c i z e any mistakes the 8d PLA might make. 7.  The Fifth Phase of the GPCR in Kwangtung: The PLA as Bystander In any case, given the depth and sharpness of the h o s t i l i t y  between the two principal faction groups i n Kwangtung and the high level of organizational and military sophistication attained by each, i t i s not surprising that even PLA-directed discussions and  negotiations  t o t a l l y failed in their purpose of peaceful reconciliation. Since both sides s t i l l maintained intact their highly developed and wellarmed organizations, the next s h i f t in the policy of the Center in April 1968 towards encouraging factional a c t i v i t y predictably brought about a renewed upsurge in factional armed struggle.  Thus, during  t h i s , the f i f t h phase of the GPCR, lasting from April until July 1968, there occurred a large number of incidents involving armed factional clashes. Since the PLA in Kwangtung was s t i l l stationed in work units in society, of necessity i t was forced to react to these incidents in some manner, even i f their role was supposed to be that of bystander. However, there was a signal lack of reports of specific instances of factional s t r i f e involving the PLA at this time in the tabloids.  This  fact would seem to indicate that the PLA was scrupulously remaining in the background. From the factional tabloids available from Kwangtung, I was able to find only six specific instances of factional s t r i f e in which the PLA's role was mentioned.  Of these there were three  109 alleged instances of PLA suppression of Flag faction members reported in Flag tabloids. In the f i r s t case, a Flag tabloid asserted that certain fiercely anti-Flag PLA. leaders on Hainan Island had k i l l e d twelve local Flag members i n the process of evicting a group of Flag faction members from a government building they had been occupying.^ This incident, which occurred on June 6, 1968, was said to have been the culmination of a long-term policy pursued by some local PLA officers of intimidating and suppressing the local Flag faction. The second incident of alleged PLA suppression of the Flag group occurred on May 13, 1968 at Chungshan University i n Canton. The incident concerned the arrest by the PLA in Canton of Huang I-chien, an important leader of the Flag faction at the university on charges of "spreading false rumours" against the PLA.^^ The third alleged incident happened on May 30, 1968 near the Canton Middle School No. !22 in which some soldiers were said to have "brutally attacked" a Flag faction Red Guard group which was on i t s 87 way to rescue a comrade kidnapped by a rival East Wind faction. It i s quite possible that in a l l three there was prior provocation of the PLA by the Flag factions involved.  Also i t i s  important to note that the Flag tabloids e x p l i c i t l y accused only "a small handful" of PLA officers of being anti-Flag while praising the PLA as a whole. On the other hand, there were three other instances reported in factional tabloids in which PLA units supported neither side in factional struggles.  110 The f i r s t concerned an incident of serious factional armed struggle at the Canton Electric U t i l i t y on May 27, 1968.  Separate  Flag and East Wind accounts both agreed that the small military control committee at the factory had been unable to prevent the outbreak of violence through persuasion.  At f i r s t the PLA limited their actions  to keeping from the battle scene the many reinforcements which were streaming toward the factory.  for both sides  Eventually, and only after  receiving a specific directive from the municipal revolutionary committee, did the PLA move in and forcibly put an end to the fighting 88 (at the cost of 11 PLA soldiers seriously injured). In the second incident an East Wind tabloid reported that a Flag faction had been besieging an East Wind faction in a building at Chungshan University for three days in early-1968.  The Flag faction  was said to be armed with handguns, machine guns, grenades, mines, and bombs.  The East Wind faction claimed that they had appealed to the  PLA for help but that the local PLA had done nothing because "the Red Flag Group thugs blocked the entrance of the university with their guns and refused to admit the PLA soldiers." Thereupon the soldiers 89 were said to have meekly gone away. The third incidence of PLA "neutrality happened on June 8, 1968 at the Canton Middle School No. 29.  A Flag tabloid claimed that  a party of Flag Red Guards had been attacked by a East Wind faction armed with stones, grenades and guns. The Flag Red Guards reported that they, "adopting the attitude of trusting and relying on the Chinese People's Liberation Army," had attempted several times to persuade the PLA training group in their school at least to arbitrate  m the matter.  However, the PLA members were said to have always refused,  claiming that, "we came to propagate Mao Tse-tung's Thought, not to 90 interfere in matters of this kind." Clearly here there are not a sufficient number of specific examples from which definitive conclusions could be arrived at, except perhaps that the scarcity of examples of PLA reactions to violent factional incidents reflects i t s avoidance of any involvement.  Even  within the limited context of the few available examples of PLA behaviour i n factional clashes, no clearcut pattern of PLA reaction or action could be perceived. The only other type of evidence concerning the PLA's role in the Kwangtung GPCR reported i n the factional tabloids was much more frequent but indirect and d i f f i c u l t to interpret.  This concerned the  differing attitudes of the two major faction groups towards the PLA. In the case of the East Wind faction group, during t h i s , the f i f t h phase of the GPCR, from April to July 1968, their tabloids repeated basically the same charges against the Flag group as previously.  At great length and in l u r i d d e t a i l , they described the  violence and destruction in Kwangtung at the time, blaming i t a l l upon the "factionalism" of the Flag group, and calling for the imposition 91 of a great alliance of a l l factions.  Once again they expressed  lavish praise for the PLA's actions in the GPCR, while accusing the Flag group of attempting to slander, divide, provoke, attack, and 92 even overthrow the PLA i n Kwangtung. On the other hand, the attitude of the Flag group towards the PLA was closely bound up with i t s general attitude towards the  112 GPCR.  The Flag group s t i l l  viewed the GPCR i n very s t r i c t  ideological  terms as a " l i f e and d e a t h " s t r u g g l e o f c l a s s e s : between the p r o l e t a r i a t (i.e.  themselves) and the b o u r g e o i s i e ( t h e i r enemies i n the East Wind  group).  I t constantly r e i t e r a t e d i t s f i r m determination to  a g a i n s t any odds u s i n g any means u n t i l  struggle  the r e a l i z a t i o n o f i t s v i s i o n  of  93 the GPCR. In p a r t i c u l a r ,  the Flag group c l a i m e d t h a t i t s enemies had  excluded i t s cadres from any meaningful p a r t i c i p a t i o n on t h e new 94 r e v o l u t i o n a r y committees.  F u r t h e r m o r e , a l t h o u g h the Flag group  r e p e a t e d l y a f f i r m e d i t s o p p o s i t i o n t o v i o l e n c e and " b o u r g e o i s "  factional-  i s m , i t claimed i t s enemies had used f a l s e propaganda t o magnify the d i s r u p t i o n s caused by the GPCR and t o s h i f t t h e blame f o r them s o l e l y 95 upon t h e Flag group o f f a c t i o n s .  Even w o r s e , i t s enemies were s a i d  t o have provoked armed i n c i d e n t s i n o r d e r t o engage t h e Flag f a c t i o n s i n i n c i d e n t s o f f i g h t i n g , thus p r o v i d i n g the p r e t e x t s w i t h which t o persuade the new r e v o l u t i o n a r y committees and the PLA t o suppress the 96 Flag g r o u p . I n such a s i t u a t i o n , the Flag group a s s e r t e d t h a t i t was bound by the d i c t a t e s o f i d e o l o g i c a l  p r i n c i p l e to continue to  vigor-  o u s l y expose and s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t i t s enemies i n the East Wind group and t o oppose the PLA-sponsored e f f o r t s t o form a l l i a n c e s o f t h e two f a c t i o n groups.  As an e s s e n t i a l means o f s e l f - d e f e n s e , the Flag  group f e l t i t had t o m a i n t a i n i t s own independent o r g a n i z a t i o n s 97  with  t h e i r own armed f o r c e s . Thus, the Flag g r o u p ' s a t t i t u d e towards t h e PLA was bound t o be a h i g h l y complex one.  On the one hand, the Flag f a c t i o n s  never  113 openly attacked the PLA as a whole, asserting that, "any course of actions that impairs the prestige and authority of the Liberation Army ,,98 are wrong." They also often indicated that the Flag group attached great importance to winning the active support of the PLA and were w i l l i n g to concede to the PLA "the leading role" i n the revolutionary 99 committees. On the other hand, the Flag tabloids also intimated that the PLA was overly sensitive to any c r i t i c i s m of i t s behaviour by the Flag factions. Rather, the PLA in Kwangtung would turn upon i t s c r i t i c s and accuse them of wanting to overthrow the PLA or "directing the spearhead at the P L A . " ^  The Flag tabloids asserted that, on  the contrary, they were simply constructively and forthrightedly c r i t i c i z i n g the honest but inevitable mistakes of the PLA i n the GPCRJ It was the enemies of the Flag group who were seizing upon such misunderstandings in order to convince the PLA that the Flag group was f u l l of "monsters and demons" intent upon attacking and overthrowing 102 the PLA i n Kwangtung. The Flag tabloids did suspect that some PLA members were so deeply hostile to their factions that they "never can adapt to the 103 requirements of the present struggle."  These PLA members were  claimed to have misused the slogans of "equal treatment for a l l " and "support the l e f t but not factionalism" i n order to feign neutrality and to evade their proper responsibilities of supporting the Flag 104 group. Furthermore, such hostile PLA cadres were said to have 105 struggled against those PLA members who supported the Flag group.  114 Some Flag tabloids went even further and openly charged that "a handful of diehard reactionaries had sneaked" into the PLA in Kwangtung and were w i l l f u l l y suppressing the factions of the Flag 106 group. Taking together the evidence about the PLA in the f i f t h phase from April to July 1968, the scattered reports of PLA involvement in factional incidents and the respective attitudes of the Flag and East Wind faction groups towards the PLA, the most significant fact to emerge i s that there i s l i t t l e evidence to substantiate the view that the PLA in the Kwangtung GPCR pursued a distinct "military" policy. What i s clear i s that there was a propaganda war being waged among the faction groups towards winning the support of the  PLA.  In this the East Wind group held the advantages of less i n f l e x i b l e p o l i c i e s , more sophisticated propaganda, and greater desire to win over the PLA, but even so the East Wind was not able to turn the PLA into an active body in i t s favour. On the other hand, there can be l i t t l e doubt that there existed some degree of suspicion and h o s t i l i t y , which at times exploded into open c o n f l i c t , between the PLA in Kwangtung and the Flag group of factions.  However, I would argue that this state of affairs  arose not because of any pre-ordained PLA and "radical" Flag group.  conflict between a "conservative"  Rather the sources of the conflict  are to be found in the general GPCR situation in which both the PLA and the Flag group found themselves spread throughout society with  115 very different aims, making ample opportunities for misunderstandings and f r i c t i o n to develop.  It should rather be emphasized that, in the  existing situation with the two confronting each other on a societywide scale and with the high organizational state of both, unless the PLA and the Flag group exercised considerable restraint and shared many values and attitudes, the result very early in the GPCR would have been an all-out and very bloody c i v i l  8.  war.  The Sixth Phase of the GPCR in Kwangtung: The PLA as Suppressor of Factionalism With a l l the inter-factional enmity and struggles, i t i s  thus somewhat surprising how quickly such a c t i v i t i e s were suppressed when the central government so ordered.  This abrupt change came at  the end of July 1968 and marked the beginning of the sixth phase of the GPCR lasting from July 1968 until April  1969.  Some indication of the speed and the effectiveness of the campaign to suppress factionalism can be gauged from the fact that the multitude of tabloids which a l l important factions had been publishing since 1967 abruptly became unavailable by the end of July 1968.  Thus the sources for most of this late period of the  GPCR are no longer these varied factional tabloids, but rather the normal, relatively controlled and uniform o f f i c i a l Party press. In Kwangtung the turning point was the July 10,  1968  proclamation of the Kwangtung Provincial Revolutionary Committee. This promised stern punishment for a l l the "bad men in the mass organizations" who had " k i l l e d people or burned down homes,"  116 disrupted communications, stolen State secrets, operated private radio stations, or attacked the P L A . ^  What transpired was not  only an attack on the criminal elements but also a systematic campaign to discredit, disarm and ultimately break up the faction organizations. Since the PLA was the i n s t i t u t i o n least affected by the ravages of the GPCR and was already stationed throughout society, i t i s not surprising that i t was now called upon to play the major role in this campaign. After July 1968 the PLA usually was referred to in the press as "the p i l l a r of the dictatorship of proletariat." A typical reference described how the PLA "launched a powerful attack on the class enemies" and thus "the streets and alleys of Canton were 1 f)R  cleaned up by the heroic actions of the PLA." In many ways the situation the PLA faced i n suppressing factionalism could be likened to that in a traditional Chinese peasant rebellion.  The enemies, the factional organizations, were not  readily distinguishable from the local populace.  The basis of their  strength lay in their support among the masses who supplied the essential recruits and supplies. In any case, given the high degree of organizational development of the factions, the wide diffusion of weapons among them, and the very uncompromising p o l i t i c a l positions of some of them, the simple application of military force against them could well have been a long and costly process.  Thus, the strategy chosen by the  PLA in Kwangtung emphasized non-violent, psychological, and p o l i t i c a l tactics, such as mobilizing public opinion and support and s p l i t t i n g  117 the leaders from the rank and f i l e in the factions, combined with the judicious use of force or the threat of i t only against the r e c a l c i t rant.  In the now state-controlled press this was termed as "mobiliz-  ing the masses" to wage "a People's War"  in order to surround "the  class enemies" in the factions. The PLA's emphasis on p o l i t i c a l tactics becomes even more apparent and appropriate when viewed in light of the counter-strategy adopted by the factions who refused to accept the new situation. Confronted with this crackdown on factionalism, they do not appear to have offered overt, armed resistance.  Instead, according to the  available state-controlled publications, these factions f i r s t tried to persuade public opinion that the PLA was mistakenly suppressing 109 true "revolutionary rebels."  When this failed (as we shall see  below partly because of the intensive propaganda campaign mounted by the PLA), they "lay down and feigned death," that is they went underground and waited for another change in the policy of the Center. They also offered passive resistance by sabotaging the circulation of directives, destroying documentary evidence, hiding weapons, and no  spreading false rumours. In fact, specific examples of physical, "military" tactics on the part of the PLA, such as armed clashes, intimidation by force, mass arrests, or even physical occupations of premises, were few in number.  There were two specific examples cited of PLA occupations  of faction centers: on July 13* 1968 a military control group took over the CCP's Central-South Bureau in Canton, and on July 31,  1968  Chungshan University was occupied by a combined soldier-worker-peasant  118 team. ^ 11  There were many general statements that the PLA had  "unsparingly  h i t at the class enemies and firmly suppressed them" or  t h a t . i t had imposed "the dictatorship of the proletariat" (which 112 could mean anything from arrest to execution) on "a small  handful."  To spearhead the actual suppression of factionalism, socalled Mao Tse-tung Thought Propaganda Teams, consisting of one-third soldiers, one-third workers, and one-third peasants, were formed i n individual factories, o f f i c e s , schools, communes, and residential 113 organizations.  The use of these teams, even though the PLA  was plainly i n the leadership position and was already stationed throughout society, highlights the fact that the PLA was taking great pains to make i t at least appear that i t was not acting alone in the suppression of factionalism but was acting i n concert with major non-PLA groups. Even these teams ideally were only supposed to lead and guide the individual work and study units to destroy factionalism within their units themselves.  Ideally, as reported i n the state-  controlled press, the actual vehicle for suppressing factionalism in each unit was the organization of Mao Tse-tung Thought Classes. In these classes, through intensive p o l i t i c a l persuasion and mobilization, the intent was to mobilize the majority in each unit to expose and struggle against the "bad elements" who were continuing to foment factionalism, while at the same time to bring about the reconciliation and fusion of the once feuding faction organizations.^' Another p o l i t i c a l tactic adopted i n the suppression of factionalism was to mount an intensive propaganda campaign i n the  119 once again state-controlled press to convince public opinion that the "innumerable misdeeds" committed by certain factions f u l l y j u s t i f i e d the strong measures being taken. In great and lurid detail i t was described how in Kwangtung as a result of the "bad" factions regular economic production had been disrupted, transportation and communications paralyzed, public property stolen and destroyed, and innocent c i v i l i a n s robbed and murdered.^ In order to give concrete evidence of these misdeeds, many public displays and exhibitions of weapons, instruments of torture, and stolen goods allegedly seized from certain factions were arranged by the PLA. ^ 1  At one particular exhibition, the a r t i c l e s on display  included: different types of firearms and accessories, handgrenades, home made p i s t o l s , mines, detonators, explosives, sulphuric acid, '666' insecticide, chain whips, choppers, Japanese sabres, spears, kitchen choppers as well as other lethal weapons . . . as well as tons of imported seamless alloy steel tubing for making weapons. 117 Thus, i t was said that "the broad revolutionary masses" had become "extremely indignant" at the "lawless actions" of some factions, and "one after another" had requested "the revolutionary committee and 118 the PLA to eliminate the evils for the sake of the people." Another p o l i t i c a l tactic for suppressing factionalism that was emphasized in the press was to separate leaders from followers in the factions.  On the one hand, lenient treatment was promised  for those who "confess frankly" or who had been forced or "hoodwinked" into participating in factional criminal a c t i v i t i e s .  On the other  120 hand, harsh treatment was promised for the "principal offenders" and 119 those "who r e s i s t . " In order to l i m i t the size of the latter category, blame for having caused the misdeeds in the GPCR was placed entirely on the shoulders of "a small handful of class enemies" in the factions.  It  was asserted that they had sneaked into the factions under the guise of true "revolutionary rebels" and then had provoked the armed feuds among the factions in order to further their own selfish plots to 120 seize power.  To further channel the public resentment towards only  a very few, these were portrayed as e v i l , arrogant and corrupt individuals who had committed a l l sorts of l u r i d crimes such as setting 121 up concentration camps and torture chambers. In this regard, the few individuals and factions specifically mentioned as being "class enemies" more often than not were from the 122 Flag group of factions. They included Wu Ch'uan-pin, a prominent Flag faction leader at Chungshan University and a member of the Standing 123 Committee of the Provincial Revolutionary Committee.  On the other  hand, of the five other individuals most often cited as being class enemies, two were PLA leaders, being the former director and vice124 director of the CMRC P o l i t i c a l Department. Domes argued that the target of the suppression campaign was exclusively the "radical" Flag group while the "conservative" PLA and the "conservative" East Wind group in alliance were the principal 125 suppressors.  Granted that the Flag group protested by far the  loudest at the suppression of factionalism, but to me the more significant fact i s that a l l the factions of both the East Wind and  121 the Flag groups disappeared at this time (that i s July 1968 to April 1969). In the propaganda campaign to swing public opinion against factionalism, the only blatant indication of the PLA's predominating role i n the suppression of factionalism Was the frequent repetition of the charge that the "small handful of class enemies" had pursued an anti-PLA policy.  Their crimes against the PLA in Kwangtung during  the GPCR were said to have included attempting to s p l i t the PLA into opposing factions, slandering the intentions and behavior of the PLA in the GPCR, stealing PLA weapons and equipment, robbing, beating and murdering soldiers, and even plotting to overthrow the PLA high •j 2g command i n Kwangtung.  In particular, these "class enemies" were  said to have slandered the PLA as being "Northern Warlords" and "Kuonintang Reactionaries" plotting to execute a military coup.  Also  incidents of e a r l i e r periods i n the GPCR, in which the PLA had been humiliated when caught in the cross-fire of factional s t r i f e , were 127 now revived with great indignation in the press. 9. The Post-GPCR Period i n Kwangtung: The PLA as Administrator of Society To this point we have been examining the role of the PLA i n detail i n the GPCR in three different phases from February 1968 until April 1969.  Now I propose to take this detailed analysis one step  further in time by looking at the PLA's role i n Kwangtung during the immediate post-GPCR period from May 1969 until mid-1970.  In any  122 case the sixth and last period of the GPCR merged inperceptably into the post-GPCR period during which time the PLA's main role changed from active suppressor of factionalism to chief administrator of society. The following section i s based on the assumption that the greatly increased presence of the PLA throughout Kwangtung society as a result of the GPCR meant that there must have been a substantial degree of at least PLA approval i f not outright sponsorship of the policies i t was now playing a major role in administering.  More  s p e c i f i c a l l y , in every one of the specific examples cited below PLA units were d i r e c t l y involved i n producing the conditions  described  since in each work or study unit the guidance of PLA units stationed there was s p e c i f i c a l l y mentioned.  In other words, the, presence of  PLA groups i n the schools, o f f i c e s , factories, and communes of Kwangtung cited must have meant some PLA input into the formulation and execution of policies i n p o l i t i c s , in economics and in education. If one accepts this assumption, then the changes (or lack of them) brought about i n the various sectors of Kwangtung society would constitute evidence (albeit indirect) of the nature of the PLA. It should be kept in mind here that the source for this period (after April 1969) once again was the state-controlled press, the factional tabloids having ceased publication much earlier i n July 1968. By way of introduction, some concrete indication of the scale and the extent of the PLA's involvement in Kwangtung society during this period comes from two separate a r t i c l e s which together  123  reported that " s l i g h t l y more than 10,000 soldiers" had been assigned to the 2,575 Mao Tse-tung Thought Propaganda Teams, which had a total 128 membership of 29,300,> in the province. Assuming that these teams had absorbed the e a r l i e r PLA military control groups and thus now represented the sum total of PLA direct involvement in society, then the figure for the PLA i s a low one relative both to the population of Kwangtung (45 million) and to the size of the PLA in Kwangtung (which I would estimate at around 129  180,000).  The figures would also indicate that the PLA, in i t s  work in society, rather than concentrating large units at certain strategic locations, deployed them in small (from the figures the average would be four soldiers per team), scattered units. Also, the fact that the PLA s proportional, representation on the teams l  amounted to roughly one-third i l l u s t r a t e s again the PLA's concern to make i t at least appear i t was acting in alliance with workers and peasants.. These figures probably can be taken as indicative of the scale and the extent of PLA commitment of manpower in the GPCR period. Surprisingly, p o l i t i c s was the important aspect of society afforded the least extensive and detailed coverage in the press.  Only  two particular issues were given much attention: the nature of leadership and the question of party r e c t i f i c a t i o n i n Kwangtung. With regard to leadership, a l l cadres were urged to place the highest emphasis upon, f i r s t , developing close contact with the basic levels, second, humility in accepting c r i t i c i s m from the masses, third,courage to execute responsible leadership and,fourth,  124 vigilance to guard against complacency and timidity.  130  The other aspect, r e c t i f i c a t i o n , was a crucial one because i t involved the question of how the CCP was to be rebuilt.  While the  available press materials here were generally very nebulous, i t was clear that the new revolutionary committees were meant to be the base, or the "small leading group," around which the new CCP committees were 131 to be b u i l t . On the other hand, i t was also urged that cadres adopt the policy of "open-door Party r e c t i f i c a t i o n " by allowing non132 Party members to participate i n the rectifying process.  Similarly,  with regard to qualifications, the sources were also very generalized, but  there was to be provision made for including "outstanding  revolutionary rebels" who had been "steeled and experienced i n the 133 Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" i n the new Party Committees. The economic sector Kwangtung society was strongly divided into a small urban, industrialized part and a much larger r u r a l , agrarian one and both must be treated separately here. With regard to the former, after re-establishing normal labor d i s c i p l i n e , the emphasis was placed f i r s t upon promoting p o l i t i c a l principles and secondly upon increasing production through d i s t i n c t l y non-Western methods. technical experts  In fact, reliance upon material incentives and  were especially singled out as the principal  targets to be attacked and the main impediments to increasing production 134 and improving technology. The "experts" and the "authorities" were both accused of suppressing the workers by preserving a monopoly over production technology and by shackling the workers under a complex system of  125 135 labor rules and administrative procedures.  In the particular case  of the Canton Petroleum and Chemical Engineering Works, part of an especially strategic industry, the PLA group stationed there led the workers in removing two-thirds of the administrative and nine-tenths of 1 oc the technical personnel of the plant. In the Canton Machine Tools Plant, the old work-quota and attendance systems were similarly 137 abolished. Henceforth, i t was said, the workers themselves would 12g  be their own managers and technicians. On the other hand, PLA units stationed in other plants were praised for protecting experienced industrial managers from being unfairly attacked and for helping give them renewed confidence to 139 manage. In the all-important rural sector of the economy,.most immediately the PLA was  said to be helping the communes re-establish d i s c i -  pline by dealing with "the sabotage" of "the class enemies" and thus 140 bringing about a great increase i n production.  In particular,  PLA units, through p o l i t i c a l struggle and pursuasion, were battling such " c a p i t a l i s t i c " tendencies as allocating surplus production funds for individual personal  brigade  consumption, i l l e g a l l y appropriating  surplus production for individual use rather than selling i t to the state, seizing public land for use as private plots, and working harder 141 on private plots than on the commune lands. Furthermore, in the communes PLA units were said to be helping to protect the new local revolutionary committees when "class enemies" seized upon "certain defects and mistakes" of these 142 cadres to again s t i r up "bourgeois factionalism."  To meet this  threat the PLA units acted as impartial mediators to bring the  126 contending groups together in study classes where they could be led 143 in conducting s e l f - c r i t i c i s m and promoting "great alliances." More generally, as had been very evident in the NFJP coverage of the 1964 "Learn from the PLA" campaign, the PLA was again heavily involved in a whole host of a c t i v i t i e s connected with the normal functioning and development of rural society.  For instance,  PLA units in Kwangtung were cited for helping in large and small emergencies, improving i r r i g a t i o n systems, i n s t a l l i n g e l e c t r i c a l networks, and educating the peasants to combat superstitions and 144 obsolete social customs. The close contact of the PLA in Kwangtung with the surrounding rural society was exemplified in the medical policies.  PLA  doctors were praised for going deep into the countryside in order to 145 treat the peasants under very d i f f i c u l t and primitive conditions. Furthermore, the PLA was said to be persuading recent medical graduates to establish and work in a network of rural health centers in order to serve the peasants who often found the existing, urban-concentrated 146 medical f a c i l i t i e s too distant and costly. The intense concern, for and s e n s i t i v i t y to the needs and i n terests  of rural society on the part of the PLA in Kwangtung should  not be surprising in view of i t s long, heavy involvement in rural tasks and proximity to rural l i f e and the fact that the great majority of the PLA recruits probably are of ..peasant background.  This i s not  to say that the PLA has become the main p o l i t i c a l and social spokesman for rural society, but that in order to remain close to the great bulk of Chinese society i t had no choice but to reflect rural interests and needs.  127 The rural bias of the PLA was even clearer in education policy.  Most immediately, the PLA was concerned with maintaining  the alliances forged earlier in each school —  a task which meant  continuing to struggle against the remaining dissidents and patiently convincing the majority that a l l had committed mistakes in the GPCR and that their rivals were basically class brothers, not class . 147 enemies. However, this was just a temporary prelude to a much more radical solution which was to sent permanently most students and teachers from the institutions of higher learning as well as most middle school graduates into the countryside to engage in productive labor.  The avowed intention was for the students to receive re-  education from "workers, peasants, and soldiers" and to gain actual 148 experience in class struggle and in production work. The PLA was heavily involved in this campaign since i t played a major l o g i s t i c a l role in transporting the students to the countryside and also because many students were sent to PLA-operated farms.  The PLA also played a major propaganda role here to convince  the students to voluntarily and enthusiastically accept their new assignments, and to overcome their fears that they would have no useful function to play in the countryside and that they would not be 149  well-received or well-treated by the peasants. At the same time in the press  a comprehensive attack was  launched on the pre-GPCR education system with i t s emphasis upon bureaucratism, e l i t i s m , specialization and foreign technology in light of the actual state and needs of the s t i l l developing rural sector of society.  128 Basically the old education system, even i n the case of applied sciences, was said to produce highly-trained specialists who could not effectively apply their knowledge to the existing conditions 150 of rural China.  Worse s t i l l , i t produced graduates with c a p i t a l i s -  t i c ideas "of going to school to become o f f i c i a l s , " of "intellectualism f i r s t , " of "blind f a i t h " i n foreign things, and of desiring only to secure an easy job in a comfortable place, thus being both unable and 151 unwilling to serve the peasants. In one particularly illuminating example, a peasant-run 152 commune school was compared with a government-managed one.  The  former was praised for being cheaper to operate, for recruiting i t s teachers from the local area, for gearing i t s entrance requirements and schedules to conform to local conditions, for producing a curriculum emphasizing practical work experience on the commune, and for producing graduates who were w i l l i n g to serve as teachers, leaders and managers on the commune.  On the other hand, the expensive, isolated and  e l i t i s t government school had l i t t l e contact with the surrounding communes, discriminated against peasant children by enforcing unreal i s t i c a l l y high entrance standards and academic requirements, and produced graduates who knew l i t t l e of the situation i n the countryside and looked down upon the peasants and their way of l i v i n g . As a result, hereafter a l l schools i n Kwangtung were to be run by the peasants and workers, curriculum was to have a very strong emphasis upon practical work experience, and those aspects which discriminated against the and relatively disadvantaged peasants, such as 15 fees, examinations, marks promotion systems, were to be abolished.  129 Unfortunately, there was l i t t l e coverage in the press concerning how this intensive PLA involvement in administrating society after the GPCR was received by the public, or what, i f any, problems arose-.  One a r t i c l e did state that PLA representatives on  revolutionary committees must make efforts to modestly unite with the other members and not l e t too much praise or power make them 154 become arrogant and distant. I t stated that, whenever "relations between military cadres are not good," then "the military leaders 155 should be held primarily responsible." More generally, there continued to appear some a r t i c l e s l i k e those i n the "Learn from the PLA" campaign, which extravagantly praised the PLA and i t s exemplary characteristics, especially for what was termed i t s meritorious behavior in "the extremely 156 dangerous and d i f f i c u l t tasks in the GPCR."  D. CONCLUSIONS TO CHAPTER III  This study of the behaviour of the PLA in the Kwangtung GPCR with particular emphasis on the period from February 1968 to mid-1970 has found l i t t l e evidence to support the interpretation which argues that in the GPCR the PLA was a distinct and unified entity, actively disloyal to the Maoist center and pursued i t s own "conservative" policies and interests.  Rather, the evidence from  Kwangtung indicated clearly that the PLA, at the behest of the central government, carried out a wide range of very different roles and  130 tasks.  I would in fact turn on i t s head the interpretation that a  united, coherent, and "conservative" PLA view of the GPCR emerged, and argue rather that in the GPCR the PLA more reflected the issues of the government and society. In fact, the behaviour of the PLA, as far as can be determined from the available sources, evidenced no such purposefulness or direction.  Rather, the sharp and abrupt changes i n the GPCR policies  of the center forced the PLA in Kwangtung to assume a wide range of very different, at times quite contradictory, roles:  from being a  p o l i t i c a l arbitrator, to a powerless bystander amidst violent factional s t r i f e , to an active director in the suppression of factionalism, and f i n a l l y to a major administrator of the post-GPCR reconstruction. The general GPCR situation i n Kwangtung the PLA faced was an extremely complex and potentially explosive one, principally because of the development of highly motivated, well-organized, and armed factional organizations throughout society. Even though before 1968 the PLA had greatly increased i t s presence throughout Chinese society as a result of the GPCR, that presence had not been converted into increased power for the PLA as an i n s t i t u t i o n .  Thus, when the central government encouraged  factional a c t i v i t y during the f i f t h period of the GPCR from April to July 1968, the PLA was reduced to being a passive onlooker, at times humiliatingly caught in the crossfire of words and guns between the feuding factions. Then, when Peking ordered a decisive crackdown on factionalism in July 1968, the very speed with which the PLA achieved this  131  only serves to emphasize the discipline and self-restraint with which i t had behaved previously in the GPCR, since clearly i t had always possessed the potential power to break up any of the factions had i t so desired. The methods the PLA adopted in the final suppression of factionalism, in their emphasis upon non-violent p o l i t i c a l tactics, demonstrated not only substantial p o l i t i c a l s k i l l and perceptiveness but also the continued PLA links with i t s very p o l i t i c a l People's War tradition and, more distantly, with the military tradition of China before modern times. Thus, the post-GPCR period in Kwangtung, in which the PLA played a very significant i f not dominant role as the temporary director of the shattered Party and government organs, marked no return, at least in the economic and educational spheres, to what i n the West might be termed "moderate" policies, but rather a continuation of many central GPCR aims, although through less disruptive methods. Clearly there existed a greater degree of h o s t i l i t y between the PLA leadership in Kwangtung and the Flag factions than with the East Wind.  Partly this could be explained by the more determined  positions of the Flag group, which demanded total support from a l l groups.  But partly this could also be because some PLA leaders may  have f e l t more sympathy for the established Party authorities in Kwangtung of the same generation and with whom close p o l i t i c a l and social links had been b u i l t up due to the PLA's previous large-scale and long-term involvement in social tasks.  132  But the significant point here is that however much some PLA leaders may have disapproved of certain center policies or the a c t i v i t i e s of certain factions i n Kwangtung, they could not or would not use the units under their control in order to take direct action to further their desires.  This was so even though the East Wind  factions had mounted an intensive propaganda campaign aimed at convincing the PLA i t should m i l i t a r i l y suppress their rivals i n the Flag group. This i s quite different from the behaviour of m i l i t a r y forces in other areas of the world where o f f i c e r corps can and often do use their troops as tools of brute force i n pursuing goals which are diametrically opposed to the prevailing views and interests of the rank and f i l e or of the society. I would argue that such behaviour was very unlikely i n the PLA at least partly because the egalitarian and p o l i t i c a l l y active relationship i n the PLA between the leaders and the led simply would not allow the PLA to be used for not generally condoned actions.  133  CONCLUSIONS  Before summing up the principal arguments of the paper, i t would be well to recall the tentative nature of them. This was  due  in large part to the highly incomplete state of our general knowledge of PRC society.  For one thing, this meant that in the paper (beyond  the lack of perspective inherent in any topic dealing with contemporary events) a great many basic problems could only be surmised at, for example, these included whether PRC state and society were in fact well-integrated, whether Kwangtung, the major area of concentration  in the paper, was •  representative of the entire nation, and whether the great majority of PLA recruits did come from the peasantry. At the same time, the scarcity of basic knowledge had the further result of making i t very d i f f i c u l t to precisely analyze and d e f i n i t i v e l y interpret the available PRC sources.  On top of t h i s ,  there were the limitations of the sources themselves, especially the great d i s c o n t i n u i t i e s in coverage, a fact which made i t more d i f f i c u l t to contrast topics or problems over a long time span.  I t was  coincidence that the most informative sources, the 1961 Work  no Bulletins  and the GPCR tabloids, were the most unique. For these reasons, i t would be dishonest on my part to claim that the paper's findings are anything but tentative and conditional. The general argument in the paper was that the PLA of the pre-1949 People's War era, the ideal PLA of the 1961 Work  Bulletins  and of the 1964 "Learn from the PLA" campaign, and the active PLA in  134 the Kwangtung GPCR a l l shared a basic nature.  This common nature was  closely related to the PRC's particular approach to fighting, the PRC's approach to social development, and the PRC's general value p r i o r i t i e s as well as to the largely agrarian society of China.  The PLA's  intensive involvement in many levels and aspects of PRC society, during the 1960s, resulted more in the reflection within the PLA of society's attitudes, characteristics, and trends including society's struggles and d i f f i c u l t i e s . In this important regard, the PLA of the 1960s was very d i f f e r ent from the d i s t i n c t , professionalized m i l i t a r i e s of the West, be i t either the d i s l o y a l , m i l i t a r i s t i c type (such as in pre-1933 Germany) which actively compete with the c i v i l i a n s for p o l i t i c a l and social influence, or the coerced, controlled type (such as in S t a l i n i s t Russia), or the l o y a l , isolated type (such as in Great Britain and the United States) which generally obey c i v i l i a n orders.  The PLA's intensive  involvement in society was also greater than that of the m i l i t a r i e s i n the developing nations. The PLA's People's War tradition had been the direct product of the straitened and backward conditions in the rural sector of Chinese society in which the CCP had spent the greater part of i t s formative period.  There the CCP was able to derive effective military strength  through the p o l i t i c a l mobilization, to the greatest degree possible of the military potential of the only abundantly available resource, namely, human w i l l .  In fact, this approach to fighting, particularly  in i t s concentration upon the p o l i t i c a l support of the peasantry, showed  strong a f f i n i t i e s to the military tradition of pre-modern China.  135 After the formal establishment of the PRC i n 1949, the institution of a program of modernization (at f i r s t for a short period along Soviet lines but then along Maoist) did s i g n i f i c a n t l y alter the PLA, along with the whole of PRC society, but, I have argued that this did not fundamentally overturn the basic nature of the PLA.  This was  borne out by the main elements of the ideal PLA of the 1960s. Most importantly, the PLA has remained intensively involved in and wellintegrated with the society as a whole.  Similarly, the PLA's ideal  approach to fighting, work-style and leadership style emphasized the factors of national self-reliance, p o l i t i c a l mobilization, ism, and mass participation.  egalitarian-  Taken altogether, these elements formed  a comprehensive and f a i r l y coherent ideal model for building the PLA, one which was directly derived from the People's War tradition. In the Kwangtung GPCR, the behaviour of the PLA, on balance, did not basically contradict the essentials of this ideal model of the PLA in the 1960s or of the People's War tradition.  The GPCR  had confronted the PLA with a very complex, d i f f i c u l t , and perilous situation.  Yet, through i t a l l , the PLA executed the many diverse  roles placed upon i t .  The nature of these tasks reflected more the  conflicts and needs of society rather than any monolithic military position.  In the process, the PLA in Kwangtung demonstrated a high  degree of d i s c i p l i n e , f l e x i b i l i t y , social consciousness, and p o l i t i c a l s k i l l as well as a minimum of military prowess. During the 1960s, neither the ideal nor the active PLA cases manifested positive indications of the development of a d i s t i n c t  136 military consciousness or i n s t i t u t i o n .  On the contrary, during the  1964 "Learn from the PLA" campaign, the virtues and the achievements attributed to the PLA could have been those of any  bureaucratic  institution in China. To return directly to the question posed i n the introduction, I would conclude that, during the 1960s, the PLA had not developed into a highly d i s t i n c t , professionalized Western-style military i n s t i t u t i o n . Rather, the PLA in the 1960s had remained a very active and wellintegrated participant in the distinctive social development of the PRC.  137 FOOTNOTES INTRODUCTION  Michel Oksenburg, "Sources and Methodological Problems i n the Study of Contemporary China," in A.D. Barnett, ed., Communist Chinese P o l i t i c s in Action (Seattle & London: University of Washington Press, 1969), 577. 2  This section on the approaches to the study of contemporary China has benefited from the points presented in the following: Edward Friedman, "Teaching Materials on Contemporary China, A C r i t i c a l Evaluation," in Arlene Posner and Arne J. de Keijzer, eds., China: A Resource and Curriculum Guide (Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press, 1973), 3-8; A. Doak Barnett, Cadres, Bureaucracy, and P o l i t i c a l Power i n Communist China. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), x-xxi; Judith Coburn, "Asian Scholars and Government: The Chrysanthemum on the Sword," i n Edward Friedman and Mark Selden, eds., America's Asia: Dissenting Essays on Asian-American Relations (New York: Patheon Books, 1971), 67-107; Harold C. Hinton, An Introduction to Chinese P o l i t i c s (New York & Washington: Prager Publishers, 1973), v i i i - x i i ; Leigh and Richard Kagan, "Oh Can You See? American Cultural Blinders on China," in America's Asia, 3-59; James Peck, "The Roots of Rhetoric: The Professional Ideology of America's China Watchers," in America's Asia, 40-66.  138  FOOTNOTES CHAPTER I  Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford University Press, 1933), VI, 438. Kurt Lang, "Military," International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, ed. David L. S i l l s (New York: The MacMillan Company & The Free Press, 1968), Vol. X, 305. 3 For more detailed discussions of the meaning of militarism see Kurt Lang, Military Institutions and the Sociology of War (London: Sage Publications, 1972), 105; Alfred Vagts, A History of Militarism: C i v i l i a n and Military (rev. ed., New York: Meridian Books, 1959), 13-17; Lawrence L. Radaway, "Militarism," International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. X, 300-1; Stanislav Andreski, Military Organization and Society (2nd ed., London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1968), 184-6. 4 This analysis of the meaning of Western military professionalism i s derived i n large part from Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and P o l i t i c s of C i v i l - M i l i t a r y Relations (New ~~ York: Random House, 1957), 7-79. 5 Vagts, A History of Militarism, 16. ^As a p o l i t i c a l scientist cautioned when studying the military of different societies: one focusing upon the "military" as the subject of investigation may be tempted to explain actions and attitudes of persons in his investigation solely as a function of their participation i n the military (that i s , as a function of socialization into and identification with the m i l i t a r y ) ; whereas, i n fact, other independent or intervening variables (e.g., regional i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , socio-economic class, age or education) may have equal or greater explanatory relevence. John P. Lowell, ed., The Military and P o l i t i c s i n Five Developing Nations (Kensington, Maryland: American Institutes for Research, Center for Research i n Social Systems, 1970), 3.  139 'Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 32-4; Military Institutions, 30.  1 0  8  Lang, Military Institutions, 31.  9  Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 11-17.  Lang,  I b i d . , 15. Ibid., 16.  Ibid., 59-79; Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier; A Social and P o l i t i c a l Portrait (Glencoe, I l l i n o i s : The Free Press of Glencoe, 1960), 242-50. 13  Some Western scholars of the military have suggested that the Western o f f i c e r corps has become an increasingly obsolete i n s t i t u tion because modern military machines have become such complex and s c i e n t i f i c organizations encompassing many c i v i l i a n members and s k i l l s ; Lang, Military Institutions, 50. 14 The following section on the military in the developing countries i s largely based on the following; Henry Bienen, ed., The Military and Modernization (Chicago: Aldine and Atherton, 1971); Morris Janowitz, The M i l i t a r y i n the P o l i t i c a l Development of New Nations, An Essay i n Comparative Analysis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964); John J. Johnson, ed., The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1962); Wilson C. McWilliams, ed., Garrisons and Governments: P o l i t i c s and the Military i n New States (San Francisco: Chandler Co., 1967); Claude E. Welch, ed., Soldier and State in A f r i c a , A Comparative Analysis of Military Intervention and P o l i t i c a l Change (Evanston, I l l i n o i s : Northwestern University Press, 1970). 15 This section i s mainly based on S.T. Chiang, The Nnen. Rebel!ion (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1954); Edward L. Dreyer, "Military Continuities: The PLA and Imperial China," in W.W. Whitson, ed., The M i l i t a r y and P o l i t i c a l Power in China in the 1970s (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972), 3-24; John K. Fairbank and Edwin 0. Reischauer, East Asia: The Great Tradition (Boston: Houghton M i f f l i n Company, 1960); John K. Fairbank, The United States and China, Third Edition (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971); Charles 0. Hucker, "Aspects of Chinese C i v i l i z a t i o n : P o l i t i c a l Institutions," in John Meskill, ed., An Introduction to Chinese C i v i l i z a t i o n (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973), 551-586; Philip A. Kuhn, Rebellion and Its Enemies i n Late Imperial China: M i l i t a r i z a t i o n and Social Structure, 1796-1864 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970).  140  Fairbank, The United States and China, 47. ^Hucker, An Introduction to Chinese C i v i l i z a t i o n , 565. 18 Fairbank, The United States and China, 50. 1Q  Hucker, An Introduction to Chinese C i v i l i z a t i o n , 565. 20 Dreyer, The Military and P o l i t i c a l Power in China, 21. 21 Fairbank, The United States and China, 48-9. 22 Hucker, An Introduction to Chinese C i v i l i z a t i o n , 566. 2 3  Ibid.  24 Franz Schurmann, Ideology and Organization i n Commumst China, (rev. ed., Berkeley, C a l i f . : University of California Press,  T968T, 558.  25  Edwin G. Pulleyblank, The Background of the Rebellion of An Lu-shan (New York: Oxford University Press, 1955), 61. Fairbank, East Asia, Organization, 558. 27  205; Schurmann, Ideology and  Fairbank, East Asia, 301 & 365.  28 Dreyer, The Military and P o l i t i c a l Power in China, 8. 29 Hucker, An Introduction to Chinese C i v i l i z a t i o n , 565. 30 Kuhn, Rebellion and Its Enemies, 20. 31 James J.Y. Liu, The Chinese Knight Errant (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967), 3-6. 32 Fairbank, The United States and China, 156. 33 Kuhn, Rebellion and Its Enemies, 40.  141 Ibid. 3 5  I b i d . , 41.  36  Chiang, The Nien Rebellion, 134.  37 Kuhn, Rebellion and Its Enemies, 41-2. oo  Fairbank, The United States and China, 159. 39 As Mao Tse-tung summed up the bitter and bloody experience of the CCP during this period; "All things grow out of the barrel of a gun," "Whoever wants to seize and retain state power must have a strong army," and "Without a people's army the people have nothing." Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, "Problems of War and Strategy (November 6, 1938)," (2nd ed., Peking; Foreign Languages Press, 1965), I I , 225. John Gittings, The Role of the Chinese Army (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), x i i i - x v . 40  41  1972), 131.  Edgar Snow, The Long Revolution (New York: Rand m House,  42  Samuel B. G r i f f i t h , The Chinese People's Liberation Army (New York: McGraw H i l l , 1967), 257; Ralph L. Powell, "Maoist M i l i t a r y Doctrines," Asian Survey, VIII, 4 (April, 1968), 249-50. 43 HJ  P o w e l l , Asian Survey, VIII, 4, 253.  44 Mao summed up the military strategy of People's War as follows: "The enemy advances, we retreat. The enemy halts, we harass. The enemy t i r e s , we attack. The enemy retreats, we pursue," Powell, Asian Survey, VIII, 4, 251-2. 45 Alexander L. George, The Chinese Communist Army in Action; The Korean War and Its Aftermath (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), 114. 46 E l l i s Joffe, Party and Army: Professionalism and P o l i t i c a l Control in the Chinese Officer Corps (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard East Asia Research Center, 1965), 145. 47  G r i f f i t h , The Chinese People's Liberation Army, 5.  142 ^"Powell, Asian Survey, VIII, 4, 261. 49 See Alexander L. George, The Chinese Communist Army i n Action; The Korean War and Its. Aftermath (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967) for a graphic description, based on POW interviews, of the breakdown of the PLA's traditional p o l i t i c a l control and encouragement techniques when i t had to face American firepower head to head i n Korea. 50 Lang, Military Institutions, 111. The Nazis in Germany, a revolutionary movement of the extreme right, went one step further by creating i t s own Party army, the Waffen SS. 51  G i t t i n g s , The Role of the Chinese Army, 158.  52 Joffe, Party and Army, x - x i . Ibid., 148-9; Powell, Asian Survey, VIII, 4, 257-8.  143  FOOTNOTES CHAPTER II  The M i l i t a r y Balance: 1971-72 (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1971), 41. 2 This section i s based partly upon the following: John Gittings, The Role of the Chinese Army (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967); and William W. Whitson, Organizational Perspectives and Decision-Making in the Chinese Communist High Command," i n Robert A. Scalapino, ed., Elites in the People's Republic of China (Seattle: University of Washington, 1972), 381-415. 3 Alan S. Whiting, "The Struggle for Power," New Republic, Vol. 165, No. 23 (December 4, 1971), 19-21. 4 Harvey Nelsen, "Regional and Paramilitary Forces," i n William W. Whitson, ed., The Military and P o l i t i c a l Power i n China in the 1970s (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972), 135-152; and Ralph L. Powell and Chung-kun Yoon, "Public Security and the PLA," Asian Survey, XII, 12 (December, 1972), 1082-1099. 5 For instance, one a r t i c l e quotes at length to i l l u s t r a t e the doubting attitude among the peasantry; "Chairman Mao lives i n Peking. Does he know about the everyday-life of the peasant?" and "At present what the peasants eat in the villages i s even worse than what dogs ate in the past." Kung-tso T'ung-hsun (Bulletin of A c t i v i t i e s , published by the General P o l i t i c a l Department of the Chinese People's Liberation Army) in Chester J. Cheng, ed., The P o l i t i c s of the Chinese Army: A Translation of the Bulletins of A c t i v i t i e s of the People's Liberation Army (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institute on War, Revolution and Peace, 1966), Issue No. 1 (January 1, 1961), 13. Jen-min Jih-pao a r t i c l e of January 23, 1964, "PLA P o l i t i c a l Work Terms Explained," i n Survey of China Mainland Press (hereafter SCMP), (HongKong: American Consulate General), No. 3162, 8. 7  Kung-tso, No. 29 (August 1, 1961), 731.  144 8  I b i d . , No. 10 (February 20, 1961), 253.  9  I b i d . , No. 29, 732.  I b i d . , No. 5 (January 17, 1961), 134; No. 3 (January 7, 1961), 67 & 69. 1 0  1bid.  11  a  No. 18 (August 1, 1961), 731.  1 2  I b i d . , 732.  1 3  ! b i d . , No. 3, 81.  1 4  I b i d . , No. 23, 595.  1 5  I b i d . , No. 29, 731.  1 6  I b i d . , No. 2 (January 3, 1961), 35.  1 7  I b i d . , No. 8 (February 6, 1961), 219.  1P, Ibid., No. 3, 88. I b i d . , No. 1 (January 1, 1961), 10.  1 9  20 Ibid., No. 3, 89; No. 2, 33. Ibid., No. 7 (February 1 , 1961), 190.  2 1  2 2  I b i d . , No. 18 (April 30, 1961), 501-507.  2 3  I b i d . , No. 1, 8.  24 Ibid., No. 24 (June 18, 1961), 618. 2 5  I b i d . , No. 17 (April 25, 1961), 471-4.  26  SCMP, No. 3162, 8-9.  27  Kung-tso, No. 22, 577.  2 8  I b i d . , No. 13, 69.  145 29 Ibid., No. 5, 135. I b i d . , No. 24, 619.  3 0  Ibid., No. 3, 76.  3 1  32  Ibid., No. 7, 204-6.  33Ibid., No. 24, 619. 34Ibid., 617. 35Ibid., 622. 36 Ibid., No. 7, 205. 3 7  I b i d . , No. 3, 74.  3 8  J b i d . , 85.  3 9  I b i d . , No. 7, 206-8.  4 0  Ibid.  41 Ibid., No. 8, 220. 42 43  Ibid., No. 3, 68; No. 23, 594. Ibid., No. 22, 576.  44 Ibid., No. 24, 625. 4 5  I b i d . , 621  46 Ibid., No. 25, 640. 47 Ibid., No. 17, 472-3. 4 8  I b i d . , No. 3, 74.  4 9  I b i d . , No. 24, 629.  146 5 0  I b i d . , No. 3, 74. Ibid., No. 23, 596.  5 1  5 2  I b i d . , No. 3, 91.  5 3  I b i d . , 72.  54 °^Ibid., 92-3. 5 5  I b i d . , No. 11, 303-4; No. 3, 92-3.  5 6  I b i d . , No. 24, 627.  5 7  I b i d . , No. 3, 74.  58 John Gittings, "The 'Learn from the Army Campaign," China Quarterly, 18 (April-June, 1964), 153-9; Ralph L. Powell, "Commissars in the Economy: 'Learn from the PLA' Movement in China," Asian Survey, Vol. 5, No. 3, March 1965, 125-138. 59 Oksenberg, Communist Chinese P o l i t i c s in Action, 599. ^ T h i s i s not to say that the Western press does achieve the democratic ideal of a t o t a l l y free and unbiased press; they are influenced by small economic group interest and other minority pressure groups. 1  Kung-jen Jih-pao (Workers' Daily), commentary of March 8, 1964, in SCMP, No. 3191,14. 61  6 2  Ibid.  63 Jen-min Jih-pao (People's Daily) editorial of February 1, 1964, in SCMP, No. 3164, 3-5; and of February 23, 1964, No. 3178, 1-4. 64 Jen-min Jih-pao a r t i c l e of February 3, 1964, i n SCMP, No. 3164, 8-10. 65 No. 3165, 7.Jen-min Jih-pao a r t i c l e of February 8, 1964, in SCMP,  147 cc  Jen-min Jih-pao a r t i c l e of March 10, 1964, in SCMP, No. 3192, 1-3. ^Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien Pao (Chinese Youth) a r t i c l e of March 3, 1964, in SCMP, No. 3184, 1-4. Jen-min Jih-pao a r t i c l e of April 2, 1964, in SCMP, No. 3207, 7-10. 68  69  Jen-mm Jih-pao editorial of February 17, 1964, in SCMP, No. 3175, 1. ^Jen-min Jih-pao a r t i c l e of February 17, 1964, in SCMP, No. 3175, 6. 7  71  Jen-min Jih-pao a r t i c l e of April 2, 1964, in SCMP, No.  3207, 10. 72 Jen-min Jih-pao editorial of February 17, 1864, in SCMP, No. 3175, 1. Ibid.  7 3  74 Jen-min Jih-pao editorial of February 23, 1964, in SCMP, No. 3178, 1. 75 New China News Agency (hereafter NCNA) a r t i c l e of February 4, 1964, in SCMP, No. 3167, 11. 76  T a Kung Pao editorial of February 29, 1964, in SCMP, No.  3183, 1. Jen-min Jih-pao a r t i c l e of February 20, 1964, in SCMP, No. 3177, 4. 77  78  Ezra Vogel, Canton under Communism: Programs and P o l i t i c s in a Provincial Capital, 1949-1968 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969), 18-24. 7 9  I b i d . , 21.  on  Nan-fang Jih-pao (hereafter NFJP), February 12, 1964, 1. 81  NFJP, February 25, 1964, 1; March 20, 1964, 1.  82  NFJP, February 5, 1964, 1.  83  NFJP, March 30, 1964, 1.  8 4  Ibid.  85  NFJP, February 7, 1964, 2.  8 6  lbid.  8 7  Ibid.  88  NFJP, May 16, 1964, 1.  89  NFJP, February 7, 1964, 2.  90  F o r example, see NFJP, February 7, 1964, 2.  91  NFJP, February 9, 1964, 2.  92  NFJP, February 7, 1964, 2.  93  NFJP, February 17, 1964, 1.  94  NFJP, March 5, 1964, 2.  95  NFJP, February 7, 1964, 2.  96  NFJP, February 20, 1964, 1.  97  NFJP, February 10, 1964, 3.  9 8  Ibid.  99  NFJP, February 16, 1964, 1.  100  N F J P , February 12, 1964, 1.  101  NFJP, February 16, 1964, 1.  102  N F J P , January 31, 1964, 1.  149 103  NFJP, February 29, 1964, 1.  104  NFJP, February 7, 1964, 2.  For,example, see NFJP, January 31, 1964; February 8, 1964, 2; February 29, 1964, 1. 105  NFJP, January 31, 1964, 1.  106  ^ 0 n e important aspect of the PLA's production work only mentioned in passing in NFJP was the PLA's own production, mainly in agriculture, ranging from backyard vegetable plots to large PLA farms. One a r t i c l e in NFJP praises the head of a company's commissariat who converts a garbage dump into a vegetable patch and hog-raising ipen i n his spare time. NFJP, February 7, 1964, 2. 7  NFJP, March 11, 1964, 1 & 4.  108  Ibid. 1 1 0  F o r example, see NFJP, February 12, 1964, 1.  111  NFJP, January 31 , 1964, 1.  112  NFJP, February 9, 1964, 3.  113  NFJP, February 12, 1964, 1.  114 For example, see NFJP, February 9, 1964, 3; February 25,  1964, 1 115  NFJP, February 9, 1964, 3.  116  NFJP, February 12, 1964, 1  117  NFJP, February 9, 1964, 3.  150  FOOTNOTES CHAPTER III  Chang-hsueh Hunq-wei-bing a r t i c l e of July 16, 1968, "A Letter to the Provincial Revolutionary Committee," in SCMP, No. 4241, 8. 2 Vogel, Canton under Communism, 322. 3 Lin Piao, Report to the 9th National Congress of the Communist Party of China," NCNA-English (Peking, April 27, 1969), i n SCMP, No. 4406, 26. See also, Parris Chang, "Provincial Party Leaders' Strategies for Survival During the Cultural Revolution," in R.A. Scalapino, ed., Elites in the People's Republic of China (1972), 501539. 4 "Decision of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, the State Council, the Military Commission of the Central Committee, the Cultural Revolution Group under the Central Committee on Resolute Support for the Revolutionary Masses of the Left, [dated January 23, 1967]," in Current Background (hereafter CB_), (HongKong: American Consulate General), No. 852, 49. 5 E l l i s Joffe, "The Chinese Army after the Cultural Revolution: the Effects of Intervention," China Quarterly, 55 (July-September, 1973), 457. 6  I b i d . , 456.  This tendency to equate the-PLA with the image commonly held in the West of the military was even more pronounced in general studies of the GPCR. For example, Stanley Karnow in his Mao and China: From Revolution to Revolution (New York: The Viking Press, 1972) stated on page 277 that "Chinese soldiers, l i k e soldiers everywhere i n the world, were essentially dedicated to the preservation of s t a b i l i t y , " and on page 405 that "As soldiers, they [PLA officers] were instinctive conservative men suspicious of grandiose schemes." In an a r t i c l e on the GPCR; "China: Year of the Mangoes," Asian Survey, IX, 1 (January 1969), Richard Baum said on page 9 that the actions of the PLA in the GPCR reflected "the 'natural conservatism' generally assumed to be a universal attribute of the 'military mentality' -- a conservatism born of the professional soldier's long exposure to martial discipline and his positive orientation toward hierarchical authority relationships."  151 This section i s based on the following works by William Whitson: "The Concept of the Military Generation: The Chinese Communi s t Case," Asian Survey, VIII, 11 (November, 1968), 921-947; "The Field Army i n Communist Chinese M i l i t a r y P o l i t i c s , " China Quarterly, 37 (January-March, 1969), 1-30; "Where Power Lies," Christian Science Monitor, Vol. 64, No. 64 (February 16, 1972), 9; "Introduction," i n The Military and P o l i t i c a l Power i n China in the 1970s (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972), i i i - x x x i i ; "Organizational Perspectives and Decision-Making in the Chinese Communist High Command," in Robert A. Scalapino, ed., Elites in the People's Republic of China (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1972), 381-415; "Domestic Constraints on Alternative Chinese Military Policies and Strategies in the 1970s," The Annals of the American Academy of P o l i t i c a l and Social Science, Vol. 402, July 1972, 40-54; with Chen-hsia Huang, The Chinese High Command: A History of Communist M i l i t a r y P o l i t i c s , 1927-71 (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973). 9 Whitson, The Military and P o l i t i c a l Power, xxvi. Whitson, Annals of the American Academy, Vol. 402, 49. See Whitson, Asian Survey, VIII, 11, 921-47; China Quarterly, 37, 1-30; Elites in the People's Republic of China, 383 & 400-15. 12 Whitson, Elites i n the People's Republic of China, 404. Whitson, Annals of the American Academy, Vol. 402, 47. Whitson, The Chinese High Command, 557. This section i s based on the following articles by Ralph L. Powell: "The Increasing Power of Lin Piao and the Party Soldiers, 19591966," China Quarterly, 34 (April-June, 1968), 38-65; "The Party, the Government, and the Gun," Asian Survey, X, 6 (June, 1970), 441-471; "The Power of the Chinese M i l i t a r y , " Current History, Vol. 59, No. 349 (September, 1970), 129-133, 175-178; "Soldiers in the Chinese Economy," Asian Survey, XI, 8 (August, 1971), 742-760; "The Role of the Military in China's Transportation and Communications Systems," Current Scene, X, 2 (February 7, 1972), 5-11; "The Military and the Struggle for Power in China," Current History, Vol. 63, No. 373 (September, 1972), 97-102, 134; and Chang-kun Yoon, "Public Security and the PLA," Asian Survey, XII, 12 (December, 1972), 1082-1099; "Party S t i l l Striving to Retain Control of 'the Gun' in China," Christian Science Monitor, September 21, 1973, 2.  152 16  P o w e l l , Asian Survey, X, 6, 445; Asian Survey, XII, 12,  17  P o w e l l , Asian Survey, XI, 8, 747-8.  1 8  I b i d . , 760.  1095.  19 This section i s based on the following a r t i c l e s by Parris Chang: "Mao's Great Purge: A P o l i t i c a l Balance Sheet," Problems of Communism, XVIII, 2 (March-April, 1969), 1-10; "Peking and the Provinces: Decentralization of Power," Problems of Communism, XXI, 4 (JulyAugust, 1972), 67-75; "Changing Patterns of Military Poles i n Chinese P o l i t i c s , " i n William W. Whitson, ed., The Military and P o l i t i c a l Power in China in the 1970s, 47-70; "Regional Military Power: The Aftermath of the Cultural Revolution," Asian Survey, XII, 12 (December, 1972), 999-1013; "The Changing Patterns of Military Participation in Chinese P o l i t i c s , " Orbis, 16 ( F a l l , 1972), 780-802. 20  Chang, Asian Survey, XII, 12, 1003. 2 1  Ibid., 1004.  2 2  I b i d . , 1003-1004.  2 3  I b i d . , 1008-1009.  2 4  I b i d . , 1003.  I b i d . , 1011. 26 Jurgen Domes, "The Cultural Revolution and the Army," Asian Survey, VIII, 5 (May, 1968), 349. 27 Jurgen Domes, "Generals and Red Guards: The Role of Huang Yung-sheng and the Canton Area Command i n the Kwangtung Cultural Revolution," Asia Quarterly, 1971, 2, 154. 28 Jurgen Domes, "The Role of the Military i n the Formation of Revolutionary Committees, 1967-8," China Quarterly, 44 (OctoberDecember, 1970), 144. 29 Domes, Asian Survey, XI, 9, 39. 30 This section i s based on the following articles by E l l i s Joffe: "The Chinese Army i n the Cultural Revolution: The P o l i t i c s of 2 5  153 Intervention," Current Scene, VIII, 18 (December 7, 1970), 1-24; "The Chinese Army under Lin Piao: Prelude to P o l i t i c a l Intervention," i n John M.H. Lindbeck, ed., China: Management of a Revolutionary Society (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1971), 343-374; "The Chinese Army after the Cultural Revolution: The Effects of Intervention," China Quarterly, 55 (July-September, 1973), 450-477. 3 1  J o f f e , Current Scene, VIII, 18, 23.  3 2  J o f f e , China Quarterly, No. 55, 454.  3 3  J o f f e , Current Scene, VIII, 18, 8.  3 4  I b i d . , 17.  3 5  I b i d . , 13.  36  China Quarterly, No. 55, 459.  37  Gordon A. Bennett, "Military Regions and Provincial Party Secretaries: One Outcome of China's Cultural Revolution," China Quarterly, 54 (April-June, 1973), 294-307. 3 8  Ibid.  3Q  William Parish J r . , "Factions i n Chinese Military P o l i t i c s , " China Quarterly, 56 (October-December, 1973), 667 & 689-90. 4 0  I b i d . , 695.  ^Harvey Nelsen, "Military Forces in the Cultural Revolution," China Quarterly, 51 (July-September, 1972), 467. 4  4 2  I b i d . , 452.  4 3  I b i d . , 466.  David C. Wilson, "The Role of the PLA in the Cultural Revolution," Papers on Far Eastern History, No. 3 (March, 1971), 37. 44  45 ^ I b i d . , 38. 4 6 4 7  Ibid. Ibid.  154 John Gittings, "Army-Party Relations in the Light of the Cultural Revolution," in John Wilson Lewis, ed., Party Leadership and Revolutionary Power in China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 399. 49 Ibid., 400. 5 0  I b i d . , 401.  51  James D. Jordan, " P o l i t i c a l Orientation of the PLA," Current Scene, XI, 11 (November, 1973), 1. 52 James D. Jordan, "The Maoist vs. the Professional Vision of a People's Army," in William W. Whitson, ed., The Military and P o l i t i c a l Power i n China in the 1970s, 25. 53 Jordan, Current Scene, XI, 11, 2. I b i d . , 14. F o r this section on the Kwangtung GPCR, I used three main collections of materials from the PRC: (a) The three translated and edited series of the U.S. Consulate-General in HongKong, Survey of China Mainland Press (SCMP), Selections from China Mainland Magazines (SCMM), and Current Background (CB). (b) The translated and edited series of the U.S. Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS): China and Asia (Exclusive of the Near East), Translations on Communist China, (c) The untranslated series of the Center for Chinese Research Materials, Association of Research Libraries: Red Guard Publications. The f i r s t two are U.S. government agency published materials, while the third apparently materials released by the American government. See Andrew J . Nathan, Modern China, 1840-1972: An Introduction to Sources and Research Aids (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, The University of Michigan, 1973), 41. 5 4  JJ  56  Gordon A. Bennett and Ronald A. Montaperto, Red Guard: The P o l i t i c a l Biography of Dai Hsiao-ai (Garden City: Doubleday & Co., 1971); Hai-feng, Kwang-chou ti-chu wen-ko li-cheng shu-lueh (An Account of the Cultural Revolution i n the Canton Area) (HongKong: Union Research Institute, 1971). Both Dai Hsiao-ai and Hai-feng are pseudonyms. Fan-fu-p'i (Reversing Verdicts), May 1968, 1 & 3; Kuang-chou Kung-tai-hui (Canton Workers Congress), May 1, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4183, 1-6 & No. 4188, 5-7.  155 CO  Chan-chung-nan in SCMP, No. 4262, 1.  (Fighting South China), August 23, 1968,  Kang-pa-i (Steel No. 4096, 1-8. 59  60  August 1), October 15, 1967, in SCMP,  Document dated November 16, 1967, in SCMP, No. 4082,  6-11. ^Bennett and Montaperto, Red Guard, 161. 62 Vogel, Canton under Communism, 344. Bennett and Montaperto, Red Guard, 159; Domes, Asia Quarterly, 1971, 1, 29. 63  Bennett and Montaperto, Red Guard, 157-72; Domes, Asia Quarterly, 1, 27-30. 64  65Bennett and Montaperto, Red Guard, 155. 66  Domes, Asia Quarterly, 1971, 1, 3-21.  6 7  I b i d . , 2, 159.  68  Bennett and Montaperto, Red Guard, 179-80.  6 9  70  I b i d . , 179.  Document dated November 17, 1968, i n SCMP, No. 4082, 3. See Bennett and Montaperto, Red Guard, 180-88.  7 1  72 Bennett and Montaperto, Red Guard, 194-7. 343.  73  See Domes, Asia Quarterly, 1971, 2, 143; Hai-feng, Kwang-chou,  0 f 39 total members on the Standing Committee of the Kwangtung Provincial Revolutionary Committee, nine were identified as PLA members. But the Chairman,;the F i r s t Vice Chairman, and two of the s i x Vice Chairmen were PLA members. Of the 23 total members on the Standing Committee of the Canton Municipal Revolutionary Committee, seven were 7 4  156 from the PLA. But, again, the Chairman and two out of five Vice Chairman were PLA members. See: Hung Tien-hsun (Red Telegraphic Dispatch), March 27, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4160, 4-8. 75 Hung Tien-hsun (Red Sky Investigation), March 27, 1968, i n SCMP, No. 4160, 4-8. NFJP_, February 23, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4138, 4 & 14.  76  1-6.  77,. Kuang-chou Kung-tai-hui, May 1, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4183,  NCNA (English-Kwangchow), February 2, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4112, 8 78  7 9  Ibid.,  9.  80  Kuang-chou Kunq-jen (Canton Workers), February 20, 1968, in Joint Publications Research Service, China and Asia(Exclusive of the Near East), Translations on Communist China (hereafter known as JPRS), No. 47701, 1-3; NFJP, March 19, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4149, 6-11. 81  NFJP, March 7, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4144, 8.  82 See Chiu-hei-shou Chan-pao (Drag Out Black Hand Combat Bulletin), February 11, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4131, 16; Fan-fu-p'i, May 1968, 3; Kuang-chou Kung-tai-hui, May 1, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4188, 6. 83 Hung-ch'i P'ing-lun (Red Flag Criticism), February 1968, in SCMP, No. 4133, 1-5. 84 Wench'an Hsueh-an Chuan-k'an (The Heroes of Wench'an), February 10, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4178, 7-9; Chung-ta Hung-ch'i (Chungshan University Red Flag), April 4, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4169, 16. 85 Kung-lien (Worker's Association), July 16, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4233, 1-11. OP  87  Chung-ta Hung-ch'i , May 28, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4202, 7.  Document in SCMP, No. 4204, 9-10.  88 San-chun Lien-wei Chan-pao (Three Forces United Committee Combat B u l l e t i n ) , September 7, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4282, 1-6; Pai-yuan Hung-ch'i (Paiyuan Red Flag), in SCMP, No. 4204, 7.  157 89  Document dated June 5, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4204, 11-13.  Liu-1iu Hsueh-an T'e-k'an, June 7, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4204, 1-6. Hai-feng described two other instances of factional violence i n volving the PLA; on June 8 at Canton Middle School No. 81 where the PLA refused to prevent a Flag faction arson attack, and on June 11 when soldiers participated in an attack on a foraging Flag faction group. Hai-feng, Kwang-chou, 374 & 375. u  91  Kung-jen P'ing-lun (Workers' Review), June 1968, in SCMP, No. 4211, 1-9; NFJP, June 11, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4217, 1-3; July 10, 1968, i n SCMP, No. 4229, 1-3. Q?  Document dated May 28, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4204, 6; Kung-jen P'ing-lun, in SCMP, No. 4211 , 1. 93 See Hung Hua-kung (South China Engineering College Red), May 5, 1968, in JPRS, No. 47799, 49; Fan-yu T'e-k'an (Anti-right Special Edition), May 26, 1968, 3; Kung-chiao Kung-ko-lien (Workers' Revolutionary Alliance of Industrial and Communications Systems), June 1, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4239, 1-2; T'iao Chan (Challenge), June 8, 1968, in CB, No. 861 , 33. 94  See Kuang-chou Kung-jen, May 28, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4208, 9-14; Kung-chiao Kung-ko-lien, June 1, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4239, 4; Hung-se Tsao-fan-che (Red Rebels), in CB, No. 861, 24; Chan Kuang-chou (Fighting Canton), July 10, 1968, i n SCMP, No. 4388, 4 & 7. 95  Kung-chiao Kung-ko-,1ien, June 1 , 1968, in SCMP, No.4239, 4; T'iao Chan, June 8, 1968, in CB, No. 861, 32; Pa-san-i (August 31), May 31, 1968, in JPRS, No. 46472, 14; Chung-ta Hung-ch'i, May 27, 1968, 3; Hung-se Tsao-fan-che, June 1968, in CB, No. 861, 7-18; Chan Kuang-chou, July 10, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4388, 6 & in JPRS, No. 47112, 44; Kuang-chou Kung-jen, July 10, 1968, in Survey of China Mainland Magazines (hereafter SCMM), No. 626, 3; Tien-shan Lei-ming (Lightning and Thunder), July 1968, in SCMM, No. 627, 37. Hung Hua-kung, May 5, 1968, in JPRS, No. 47701, 12; T'iao Chan, June 8, 1968, in CB_, No. 861, 31; I-yueh Feng-pao (January Storm B u l l e t i n ) , June 1968, in SCMM, No. 625, 17; I-yueh Feng-pao, July 1968, in JPRS, No. 47112, 54; Kuang-chou Kung-jen, July 10, 1968, i n SCMM, No. 626, 3; Tien-shan Lei-ming, July 1968, in SCMM, No. 627, 30. 96  97 Fan-yu T'e-k'an, May 26, 1968, 3; Hung-ch'i T'ung-hsun (Red Flag Report), June 1968, in JPRS, No. 46192, 17.  158 98 *°Hung Hua-kunq, May 15, 1968, in JPRS, No. 47799, 52; I-yueh Feng-pao, June 1968, in SCMM, No. 625, 22; Kuang-chou Kung-jen, July 10, 1968, in SCMM, No. 626, 6. 99  Pa-san-i, May 31, 1968, 2; Tien-shan Lei-ming, July 1968, in SCMM, No. 627, 28. 100  Tien-shan Lei-ming, July 1968, in SCMM, No. 627, 39.  101  Kanq Pa-i, June 1968, in JPRS, No. 47084, 24-5.  102 lu  ^Tien-shan Lei-ming, July 1968, in SCMM, No. 627, 28. P a - s a n - i , May 31, 1968, 2.  103  104 Hunq-se Tsao-fan-che, May 1968, 2; I-yueh Feng-pao, June 1968, i n SCMM, No. 625, 19. 1 05  Kuang-chou Kung-jen, July 10, 1968, 3. P a - s a n - i , May 31, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4202, 7; Chung-hsueh Hung-wei-bing (Middle School Red Guards), May 1968, in JPRS, No. 461925; T'ien-shan Lei-ming, July 1968, in SCMP, No. 627, 32. 106  107  Document dated July 12, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4243, 6-8.  1 og Chung-ta Chan-pao (Chungshan University Combat News), August 7, 1968, in JPRS, No. 47701, 21; September 22, 1968, in JPRS, No. 47701, 28. 109  Chung-hsueh Hung-wei-bing, July 16, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4241, 8. San-chun Lien-wei Chan-pao (Three Services United Committee Combat B u l l e t i n ) , August 14, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4256, 71-2; Kuang-chou Hung-wei-ping (Canton Red Guards), in CB, No. 866, 32-3; Kuang-chou Hung-tai-hui (Canton Peasants Assembly!? September 12, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4271, 4; Chung-ta Chan-pao, September 22, 1968, in JPRS, No. 47701, 32; Chung-ta Chan-pao, September 22, 1968, 7. 110  111  Chih-tao Chung-nan (Direct Pounding of Central South), in SCMP, No. 4367, 1; Chung-ta Chan-pao, August 4, 1968, 1. S e e NFJP, August 5, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4252, 7; KuangHung-tai-hui, September 12, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4271, 4-5. 112  chou  159 S e e NFJP, August 5, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4252, 6; ch'u Nung-tai-hui, October 11, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4293, 3. 113  Chiao-  114 See San-chun Lien-wei Chan-pao, September 7, 1968, 2; Kuang-chou Hung-tai-hui, September 12, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4271, 6. 115 See San-chun Lien-wei (Three Forces United Committee), July 25, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4243, 3; San-chun Lien-wei Chan-pao, July 25, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4259, 4; document dated August 3, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4248, 8; Chan Chung-nan (Fighting Central South), August 23, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4262, 1-4; Kuang-chou Hung-tai-hui, August 29, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4302, 5; San-chun Lien-wei Chan-pao, September 16, 1968- in SCMP, No. 4272, 11-1z; Kuang-chou Kuang-tai-;hu'i (Canton Workers' Congress), October 10, 1968, i n SCMP, No. 4342, 2. Document dated August 3, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4248, 7-10; Kung-jen Mao Tse-tung Szu-hsiang Hsuan-ch'uan-yuan, September 16, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4272, 7-10. 116  117  SCMP, No. 4248, 8.  Document dated July 31, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4259, 4. See also San-chun Lien-wei, July 25, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4243, 3; San-chun Lien-wei Chan-pao, July 31, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4259, 5; Kung-jen P'inglun (Workers' Forum), August 1968, in SCMP, No. 4254, 4; Kuang-chou Hung-tai-hui, August 19, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4303, 1-2. 118  119  Kung-jen P'ing-lun, August 1968, in SCMP, No. 4254, 4; San-chun Lien-wei Chan-pao, August 14, 1968, in JPRS, No. 47112, 69; Kuang-chou Kung-tai-hui, October 10, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4342, 2. Chih-tao Chung-nan, July 13, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4367, 3-4; Chung-ta Chan-pao, August 7, 1968, in JPRS, No. 47701, 18; San-chun Lien-wei, August 10, 1968, in JPRS, No. 47084, 26-32; Kuang-chou Hungwei-ping, September 5, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4322, 7-8; San-chun Lien-wei Chan-pao, September 24, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4280, 6-7; Chiao-ch'u Nungtai-hui , October 11, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4293, 6-7. 120  121  See Hsin Chu-ying (New Pearl River Film Studio), August 1, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4265, 11; San-chun Lien-wei, August 10, 1968, in JPRS, No. 47084, 27 & 31; San-chun Lien-wei Chan-pao, August 14, 1968, in JPRS, No. 47112, 59-60; Kuang-chou Hung-tai-hui, August 29, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4305, 9; Ibid., September 12, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4268, 4.  ,1.6,0 122 See Kung-jen Mao Tse-tung Szu-hsiang Hsuan-ch'uan-yuan (Worker's Mao Tse-tung Thought Propagandist), September 1968, 4. 123  Chung-ta Chan-pao, August 4, 1968, 3-4 and in SCMP, No.  4257, 1-5. 124  Chiang Min-feng & Hsiang Wei. See Chih-tao Chung-nan, July 13, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4367, 3; Kuang-chou Hung-wei-bing-, August 28, 1968, in CB, No. 866, 3-4; San-chun Lien-wei Chan-pao, September 24, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4275, 6-7. The other three were identified as former high level o f f i c i a l s in the Central-South Bureau of the CCP: Min I-fan, Ch'e Hsueh-tsao & Chang T'ien-t'ao. S e e Domes, Asia Quarterly, 1971-72, 149-153; Hai-feng, Kwang-chou, 399 & 412. 125  Chih-tao Chung-nan, July 13, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4367, 3; Ibid., July 21 , 1968, 3; Document dated July 21 , 1968, in SCMP, No. 4248, 2; San-chun Lien-wei, July 25, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4243, 5; Sanchun Lien-wei Chan-pao, July 31, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4259, 2; Hsin Chu-ying, August 1, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4265, 12; Chung-ta Chan-pao August 4, 1968, 3-4; Ibid., August 4, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4257, 2-4; Ibid., August 7, 1968, in JPRS, No. 47701 , 17-24; Kuang-chou Hung-wei-bing, August 28, 1968, in CB, No. 866, 28-32; Ibid., August 29, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4302, 4; San-chun Lien-wei Chan-pao, September 1 , 1968, in JPRS, No. 47112, 9; Ibid., September 7, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4268, 2-5 & No. 4271, 2-7; San-chun Lien-wei Chan-pao, September 18, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4275, 11 ; Chung-ta Chan-pao, September .22, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4283, 3 & 9-10; San-chun Lien-wei Chan-pao, September 24, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4280, 7. 126  127 See Kuang-chou Hung-wei-ping, August 28, 1968, in CB, No. 866, 3-24; Ibid., September 5, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4316, 1-4, No. "4317, 1-4, No. 4318, 11-12; San-chun Lien-wei Chan-pao, September 13, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4272, 1-3, No. 4273, 7-13, No. 4275, 1-5; Ibid., September 24, 1968, 35-40. 1 ?P,  NCNA, April 9, 1969, in SCMP, No. 4396, 19; NFJP, February 5, 1970, 1. 1 ?9 On p. 13 of Asia Quarterly, 1, 1971, Domes, based on information given to him by a HongKong expert in the PLA, estimated that there were about 500,000 soldiers under the Canton M i l i t a r y Region Command, which included the provinces of Hunan, Kwangsi and Kwangtung. I then a r b i t r a r i l y divided that total by three in order to arrive at the figure of 180,000.  161 1 30 Kuang-chou ti-ch'u ta-chuan-yuan-hsiao hung-tai-hui (Canton Area Red Guards' Congress of Universities, Institutes and Schools), February 12, 1970, 2. 131 Tzu-liao Ch'uan-ch'i (Reference Materials), November  1968, 21  ' I b i d . , 20; Kuang-chou Hung-tai-hui, December 20, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4314, 2. 133  T z u - l i a o Ch'uan-ch'i, November 1968, 19-21.  NCNA, October 25, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4289, 2V; NFJP, February 14, 1970, 1; Ibid., February 6, 1970, 1. 134  NCNA, October 28, 1968, i n SCMP, No. 4291, 28-30; NFJP, December 2, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4338, 11-13. 135  136  N F J P , November 18, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4317, 8-9.  1 3 7  Ibid.,  Decembers, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4338, 11.  S e e Jen-min Jih-pao, May 3, 1969, in SCMP, No. 4413, 11 Ibid., July 18, 1968, i n SCMP, No. 4461, 19. 138  Ibid., January 23, 19 1969, in SCMP, No. 4355, 5; Ibid., June 2, 1969, in SCMP, No. 4442, 1-2 1 3 9  140  NCNA, November 12, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4305, 20; Jen-min Jih-pao, August 9, 1969, in SCMP, No. 4475, 19. 141  'Jen-min Jih-pao, February 21, 1969, in SCMP, No. 4376, 1; NFJP, January 21 , 1970, 2; Ibid., February 12, 1970, 2. 1 42 Jen-min Jih-pao, June 23, 1969, i n SCMP, No. 4452, 5. IH  I b i d . , June 25, 1969, in SCMP, No. 4453, 1-3; Ibid., June 28, 1969, in SCMP, No. 4456, 5-7. 1 4 3  144  See Jen-min Jih-pao, August 23, 1969, in SCMP, No. 4485, 20-7; Kuang-chou Nung-tai-hui, February 2, 1970, 2; NFJP, February 5, 1970, 3. 145 Kuang-chou Nung-tai-hui, February 2, 1970, 2; NFJP, February 5, 1970, 3.  162 146  Jen-min J i h - p a o , January 12, 1969, i n CB, No. 872, 3 6 - 7 ; NFJP, February 6, 1969, 1 . 147 Kuang-chou H u n g - t a i - h u i , October 28, 1968, i n SCMP, No. 4307, 3-4 and i n JPRS, No. 47933, 4 2 - 4 4 ; I b i d . , January 10, 1969, 1 ; Ibid., February 12, 1970, 1 ; Kuang-ming J i h - p a o , A p r i l 2 0 , 1969, 1; NCNA, May 9, 1969, i n SCMP, No. 4415, 2 1 . 148 Chanq-hsueh H u n g - t a i - h u i , October 30, 1968, i n SCMP, No. 4306, 1 2 - 1 4 ; Kuang-chou H u n g - t a i - h u i , November 1 0 , 1968, i n SCMP, No. 4304, 1 1 ; Jen-min J i h - p a o , August 15, 1969, i n SCMP, No. 4488, 1-4. 149  Chanq-hsueh H u n g - t a i - h u i , October 30, 1968, i n SCMP, No. Jen-min J i h - p a o , August 15, 1969, i n SCMP, No. 4488, 2.  4305, 6 - 7 ;  i 50  Ibid.,  Jen-min J i h - p a o , December 7, 1968, i n CB, No. 869, 32; August 15, 1969, i n SCMP, No. 4488, 4 .  1 51 Jen-mm J i h - p a o , November 29, 1968, i n CB, No. 869, 31 ; I b i d . , December 7, 1968, i n CB, No. 869, 33; I b i d . , March 7, 1969, i n SCMP, No. 4383, 10. 1 52 NFJP, November 1 8 , 1968, i n SCMP, No. 4314,  1-6.  153 Kuang-chou H u n g - t a i - h u i , November 10, 1968, i n SCMP, No. 4304, 1 2 - 1 3 ; NCNA, October 24, 1967, i n SCMP, No. 4289, 12. 1 54 Jen-min J i h - p a o , June 9, 1969, i n SCMP, No. 4 4 4 1 , 1-4. 1 5 5  Ibid.,  1.  156 See Kuang-chou H u n g - t a i - h u i , February 4 , 1970, 1 ; I b i d . , February 12, 1970, 2.  163 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 1.  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