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THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY IN THE
1960's: IDEAL AND REALITY

by

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ABSTRACT

The subject of the paper is the nature of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) during the 1960s. The primary aim is to analyze the basic characteristics of this complex bureaucratic institution, especially its internal nature and its relationship to society. The principal problem explored is whether the PLA in the 1960s developed into a distinct, professionalized military organization (as is the common pattern in the West) or whether it remained relatively close to its particular nature of the pre-1949 People's War era.

However, it transpired that the very incomplete state of our knowledge concerning contemporary Chinese society made it extremely difficult to resolve the problem with any certainty or precision. The main contribution of the paper is placing the topic in a conceptual framework which, it is argued, brings us closer to the actual situation in China.

The body of the paper is divided into three main parts. The first gives the general conceptual and historical framework used to approach the topic, mainly through a comparison of the PLA's military tradition with those of other areas. The second part explores the ideal nature of the PLA as revealed in three different official sources, both classified government documents and the public Chinese press and from both the national and provincial levels. The third part examines the actual behaviour of the PLA in a precise situation, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in Kwangtung province.

The line of argument developed is that the three PLAs examined, the pre-1949 PLA, the ideal PLA of the early 1960s, and the active PLA in the Cultural Revolution, shared a basic common nature. This was closely related to the communist Chinese approach to fighting, to their approach to social development, and to the nature of Chinese society.

The general conclusion is that, during the 1960s, the PLA did not develop into a distinct, professionalized military organization. Rather, it remained as a highly active and well-integrated participant in the distinctive social development of the People's Republic of China. The PLA's intensive involvement in society had led to the reflection of Chinese society's trends and characteristics within it.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<i>CB</i>	<i>Current Background</i>
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
GPCR	Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution
<i>JPRS</i>	<i>Joint Publications Research Service</i>
<i>NEJP</i>	<i>Nan-fang Jih-pao</i> (Southern Daily)
PLA	Chinese People's Liberation Army
PRC	The People's Republic of China
<i>SCMM</i>	<i>Survey of China Mainland Magazines</i>
<i>SCMP</i>	<i>Survey of China Mainland Press</i>

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INTRODUCTION

The basic aim of this paper is to analyze the nature of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (hereafter PLA), the military forces of the People's Republic of China (hereafter PRC), both in ideal and in reality during the 1960s.

It should be emphasized at the outset that this paper is not an elite study of the motivations, political machinations, or the power status of leading PLA figures. Nor is it intended to be a study of the PLA's military strategy or military capabilities.

Rather, this paper seeks to explore the basic characteristics of this bureaucratic organization, especially the nature of its internal organization and of the roles it is called upon to play. More specifically, it examines whether, during the 1960s, the PLA developed into a Western-style military institution: that is, one highly differentiated from the rest of society and being led by a professional officer corps possessing a distinctive corporate identity. Or, if not, then, whether the PLA remained relatively close to its particular pre-1949 nature.

Having posed these problems, it soon became clear that the materials available from the PRC could not definitively answer them. This is not simply because of the very real limitations of the available materials (which consist mainly of PRC newspapers and radio broadcasts as well as accounts by visitors and refugees).¹ The real

root problem is that the outsider's knowledge of the PRC is so incomplete that he cannot interpret the sources from the PRC with any great degree of certainty or precision.

This is because the PRC government, to a remarkable degree, has succeeded in denying outsiders comprehensive information from the PRC. It has done so mainly through maintaining an extremely tight control over the flow abroad of any written or oral material from inside China. At the same time, it has made China almost inaccessible to long-term, meaningful visits by foreigners. As a result, scholars of contemporary China not only largely lack many of the usual source materials, such as on-the-spot surveys, personal interviews, and a broad range of local papers, but, more importantly, also lack a large proportion of the basic information about PRC society and government.

This has meant that scholars of contemporary China have had to rely relatively heavily upon educated surmise and borrowing from studies of other areas. In particular, they have tended to employ social models and historical patterns from other societies such as the overseas Chinese communities (especially HongKong and Taiwan), the Western nations, and the Soviet Union.

In general, in this paper I cannot overcome the basic problem in contemporary China studies of the scarcity of information. I will be attempting to use the available limited materials in a conceptual approach which I would argue will bring us closer to the actual situation in the PRC.

Thus, throughout this paper, considerable attention will be devoted to an analysis of Western methodology and other Western interpretations on the subject of the PLA in the 1960s. In order to maintain a more concentrated focus and because of personal limitations of time, space, language, and experience, it was found necessary to limit the scope here to the West (meaning basically North America and Western Europe). The paper will be unable to treat the other important centers of contemporary China studies in the world in Japan, HongKong, Taiwan, and the Soviet Union.

In view of its highly subjective nature, I would argue that it is essential to preface any study of contemporary China with a statement of the writer's own particular approach to the general topic of the PRC.²

In this regard, I would totally reject those approaches which are largely an arbitrary imposition of internal Western political disputes onto the study of China. This includes the hostile conservative approach which views the PRC as part of a monolithic Communist empire unalterably bent upon unlimited expansion abroad and terroristic suppression at home. Such also covers the uncritically sympathetic approach which projects dissatisfaction with Western society onto the study of China.

I would also strongly qualify what can be termed the orthodox "social-science" approach, the predominant one at present in Western contemporary China studies. This poses as politically neutral and "scientific" in methodology. However, I would argue that, in fact,

this approach is based upon a priority of values and a model of social development derived from Western historical experience and morality.

It assumes that modern Western industrialized society is the universal objective of human social development. In particular, this approach employs the goals of individual freedom, democratic government, and material prosperity as the standards to judge all societies. Similarly, the methods with which Western society was developed, such as gradual, non-violent social change, capitalistic enterprise, high standards of technology, and uncontrolled economic growth, are viewed as the most appropriate ones.

This approach regards the PRC, which has set forth a different priority of values and methods in social development, as in some degree mis-guided, irrational, or as running against basic human nature. It especially views the leadership of Mao Tse-tung as fanatical and even dangerous to China. As a result, this approach views the masses of China as really very "human," that is, similar to Westerners, interested in material well-being, and opposed to Maoist "radical" politics.

I would classify my own approach to contemporary China as "critical empathy." I accept the PRC as the popularly generally accepted and functioning government of China and seek to understand it within the Chinese context. In particular, I believe that the PRC value priorities (as I interpret them) are both morally defensible and practically feasible. These emphasize national strength, self-reliance, self-respect as the primary goals, achieved

through methods that ensure equitable distribution of wealth, mass participation in decision-making, and a sense of community. This does not mean that, within this general approach, I necessarily accept all the particular methods the PRC has adopted to achieve these goals as being either necessary or right.

I have divided the body of the paper into three main parts or chapters. The first provides the basic broad conceptual and historical framework with which to approach the topic. It analyzes the PRC's military tradition within the context of Chinese military history while, at the same time, also comparing it with the military traditions of other areas. The second chapter explores the ideal nature of the PLA during the 1960s as revealed by three different official sources, both classified and public and national and provincial. The third examines the behavior of the PLA in a particular situation, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR) in the specific period from February 1968 to July 1970 in the province of Kwangtung. The GPCR, while plainly an atypical period, did force each group in Chinese society to make definite stands on issues and to take concrete actions, both of which were in some manner reported in the unofficial press which temporarily thrived at that time. Although the GPCR dated from mid-1966 to at least mid-1969 in its entirety, I chose to limit the scope to the later part, partly in order to allow for more detailed coverage, and partly because this period has been the least studied in the West. The particular place, Kwangtung, was chosen mainly because of the relatively greater availability of materials pertaining to it.

The paper will generally conclude that, with regard to the nature of the PLA as an institution, there is a strong line of continuity underlying all the many changes in leadership between the pre-1949 PLA, the official ideal of the PLA in the 1960s, and the behavior of the PLA in the GPCR. The characteristics of this consistent basic nature of the PLA will be closely linked to the continuing overwhelmingly rural agrarian nature of Chinese society.

CHAPTER I

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: A COMPARISON OF THE PRC's MILITARY TRADITION WITH THOSE OF OTHER AREAS

A. WESTERN NATIONS

In the West (meaning here Europe including the Soviet Union, North America, and Australia) a great deal of difficulty can be encountered in the study of the military histories of very different societies because many of the basic concepts connected with the study of military history have become so deeply intertwined with the specific processes of Western historical development. This has led to what I feel is the unsound application of particularly Western military characteristics and connotations to the very different Chinese situation.

At the beginning, then, what is required is an investigation of the full meanings of the Western terminology connected with military history with an eye to stripping them as much as possible of their specifically Western historical trappings. In this way, one could at-least become more aware of the limitations and dangers of the existing ones, even if he could not come up with verbal tools he could universally employ without any cultural prejudice in the study of the military histories of very different societies. To this end, in this section, I propose to first examine the Western military tradition and

then to compare it with those of the developing countries, traditional China, early modern China, and finally the PLA.

Most basically, the Oxford English Dictionary (1933) defines "military" as "pertaining to soldiers," "engaged in the life of a soldier," or "having reference to armed forces or to the army."¹ And, if one defines a soldier as simply a member of an organized body of men armed primarily for war, then, as far as this very generalized sense goes, the term "military" could be applied to any armed force.

However, at present in the West the term "military" has taken many much more specific meanings and connotations. It refers to a particular type of society and to a particular approach to waging warfare, one in which "military" signifies permanent and "specialized structures maintained in peacetime for the eventuality of armed conflict and managed by a professional military."² In this Western meaning of the word, "military" not only refers to the specialized structures, but also to the specialists in the task of organized armed conflict, and to the characteristics of their particular profession. In this sense, then, the term "military" connotes a distinct if not complete differentiation with regard to function, traits, skills, and personnel between the "military" and the non-military or "civilian" aspects of society.

Furthermore, in the West, "military" very commonly has taken upon itself many unfavorable connotations which are well-illustrated in the concept of "militarism." Like racism and imperialism, "militarism" has become a catch-all emotional, pejorative term which

illogically encompasses a great many disliked aspects. It presupposes a strict differentiation between the military and the civilian aspects and sectors of society, each with its own different characteristics. The military is regarded as "naturally" possessing certain "undesirable" characteristics such as narrow-mindedness, authoritarianism and aggressiveness. Thus, being very different and at best a necessary evil, the military clearly should be segregated as much as possible from civilian society and certainly subordinated to the political authorities. If the military should "usurp" its proper position and attempt to spread its influence or policies into society, then, of necessity, this would have far-reaching and "bad" results.³

I would argue that the specific meanings and connotations of "military" are the products of the particular development of military history in the West and are not applicable to societies with very different processes of historical development. In the West the distinct corporate nature of the modern professional military officer has been brought about by two very special historical phenomena: the aristocratic feudal military of the West and the modernization of Western society.⁴

Although the medieval period had ended by the sixteenth century, the officer corps in the West for many centuries afterwards still were almost the exclusive preserves of the old, feudal, rural aristocratic class. This class succeeded in imposing particular class traditions and values on the armies and military tradition of the West, particularly the beliefs in a stable organic society, unchanging hierarchy, the feudal sense of honor, and conservative

Christianity. Originally, none of these traits was confined solely to the military, and they cannot be regarded as the inevitable traits of any military. In fact, aristocratic officer corps were usually more interested in making the army express their class values than in improving military efficiency.

The values of the aristocratic class were diametrically opposed to those of the rising urban middle class which came increasingly to dominate the non-military and especially the political sectors of society. The latter class valued a dynamic, changing society, equality, materialism, democracy and individualism.

That these two so different classes would eventually become engaged in bitter political and social conflict was almost inevitable, but it was not inevitable that the feudal aristocracy would become entrenched in the army while the middle class sought power in civilian politics.

The class differences between the officers and the politicians in the West were so deep and bitter at times they even transcended national differences:

It has sometimes happened that armies became so involved in contemplating domestic critics and foes, liberals in an earlier age, socialists later and Communists more recently, that they have forgotten to concentrate on the enemy abroad -- or that they have even sympathized with foreign armies and made common front with them against internal antagonists. 5

This conflict between the two classes inevitably affected Western images and definitions of "military" and "civilian" or "political." The distinction between the military and the aristocrats

who happened to be entrenched in it became rather blurred, so that many traits of that class became identified as something inherently "military." In short, the peculiar characteristics of a particular unpopular class have become inseparably linked with the common concepts and images of the military.⁶

Then with the Napoleonic Wars, the modernization of Western society began to transform radically the nature, conduct and requirements of warfare. The industrial revolution and the rise of nationalism made war increasingly all-encompassing as material and human resources were mobilized on a scale never before imagined. This also made the conduct of war a highly complex administrative and scientific matter requiring for its management a highly trained and motivated officer corps.⁷

The Western military now was no longer the exclusive preserve of the aristocrats. But since the Industrial Revolution was a relatively gradual process in the West, the old military traditions inherited from the feudal aristocracy were not totally supplanted. They continued to strongly influence the attitudes and the values of the Western military officer, who still cultivated a wide variety of feudal anachronisms such as duelling and horsemanship. Needless to say, the negative attitudes of the civilians towards the military were maintained throughout. In other words, the strong modern tendency towards rigid and complete specialization, in the case of the Western military, became superimposed on top of an older but still influential differentiation based largely on old social differences.

As a result of this entire process, the modern military officer in the West monopolizes and specializes in the single task of training, managing and leading the very complex modern military machines in peace and war.⁸

But the professionalism of the Western officer corps is much deeper and more profound than the simple specialization of the craftsman or the technician, for his job includes two additional aspects, "responsibility" and "corporateness."⁹

The former indicates a sense of commitment to one's profession beyond mere desire for wealth or personal prestige or even devotion to one's own unique skill (although all clearly play a part). Rather, because he alone is charged with this essential social function, the military officer sees himself as answering a "higher calling" in the service of society, much as a doctor or lawyer does.¹⁰ Inevitably such a strong sense of commitment and responsibility leads to an inflated sense of the importance of one's profession. As a result, the officer often tries to increase the military's role and influence in society and even to impose its special characteristics upon the rest of society.

The corporate nature of the Western officer corps, or its conscious sense of organic unity, is highly developed. Partly because of the demands of the military profession, the professional aspect of a officer's life takes up an unusually high proportion of his attention and time, physically and mentally separating him from the surrounding society.¹¹ As a result, the Western military officer corps is at present so self-contained that it is virtually an autonomous social

unit, possessing its own distinctive hierarchical organization, entrance criteria, educational and training system, judicial system, places of residence, uniforms, customs and tradition.

Such a strong corporate nature inevitably has resulted in the development of correspondingly distinctive and persistent habits of thought, perspectives, attitudes, values and policy tendencies. In particular, this Western "military mind" has strongly tended to conservatism; a belief in order, hierarchy, patriotism, duty and self-sacrifice and an abhorrence for individualism and materialism. As well, the Western officer corps has manifested a distaste for the prolonged negotiations, constant compromises, and obscuring of issues inherent in the democratic political process.¹²

Given the existing situation in the West, when the military intervenes in society, through direct takeover or through increasing its political and social influence with the aid of civilian allies, the effects will be far-reaching because the military officer corps is so different from the rest of society.

In retrospect, it can be clearly seen how the historical development of Western military institutions and society gave the modern Western military a highly specific nature and meaning. The term "military" implies there is a fundamental differentiation between the military and the non-military, and that the resulting differentiation has a distinct character of its own, assigning certain traits to both. Thus, the military and the non-military are regarded in the West not only as being naturally different and incompatible but also as being inevitably in actual conflict.¹³

B. THE DEVELOPING NATIONS

That the Western military model is not necessarily the inevitable or natural one is demonstrated by the case of the so-called developing nations. The military officers in most of these nations have been trained in Western schools or by Western officers. They consciously attempt to create modern, Western-style professional armies, which can be artificially maintained by Western aid. But the lack of the political, economic and social pre-requisites for a modern Western state and armed force still has resulted in an officer corps in many of these nations with a very different nature and pattern of behavior.¹⁴

Few of the armed forces in these nations have actually been used in their intended role of making war, but rather they have assumed a great variety of important roles in civilian society. In some cases the roles were assumed unintentionally, as for example, when armies have become major vehicles for spreading nationalism and technology. Furthermore, since the military is often technologically and administratively the most modernized bureaucracy in these societies, it may expand into managing economic enterprises and building capital construction.

But the outstanding role of the military in the developing nations has been that of the political ruler after a military coup has removed the existing civilian political leadership. The tenuous legitimacy and limited experience of the political authorities, combined with the general high expectations in society, creates the

pre-conditions for a relatively easy takeover by a disciplined and determined group.

One of the main catalysts for the frequent military takeovers is the prevalence of officers of the "Young Turk" type in these nations. The typical "Young Turk" is nationalistic, puritanical and relatively young, with a well-developed political awareness often taking the form of radical and collectivist ideologies, either of the extreme right or left. Impatient and chauvinistic, he is passionately committed to making his country modern, rich, powerful and democratic in the shortest possible time.

In short, the officer corps in the developing nations tend not to be the isolated, highly differentiated professional groups performing just one task, but rather very active, at times the dominant, participants in the political, economic and social development of their nations.

The difficulty of transplanting the entire Western military model is illustrated by the officer corps of the developing nations. Even if an officer corps consciously attempts to copy the Western military model, there is little chance of success unless the traditions and the social situation are similar.

C. PRE-MODERN CHINA

1. Imperial Military Tradition

The military development of traditional China (up to about 1840), has been entirely different from that of the West, at least since the foundation of the imperial system in 220 B.C.¹⁵ Admittedly, before that date, during the Shang and Chou dynasties, China was ruled by a warrior aristocracy. With the advent of the Ch'in Dynasty in 221 B.C., however, this society was gradually replaced by one with a different official ideology, Confucianism; a different government system, a centralized bureaucratic state; and a different social elite, the literati or gentry. Naturally, this revolutionary change was not achieved through government fiat overnight, and, in fact, it took several centuries of gradual change for the entire transformation to be achieved. Still, the basic direction of society had been set and, at least by the Sung Dynasty (960-1279), the imperial system had become a reality.

Confucianism, as it came to be interpreted during the imperial era, held that persuasion through education, discussion, and example was far superior as a means of government to any system of laws or form of coercion. In effect, "the primary means for perserving the social order was indoctrination in the orthodox principles of social conduct (li) and the secondary means was suasive coercion through rewards and punishments."¹⁶

Naturally, war and armed conflict still existed in traditional China. At times, the empire expanded abroad through very large

scale military operations, and almost every dynasty was overthrown and replaced through often very prolonged and very bloody civil wars. But in traditional China those in command of the armies, as a group, never gained the distinctive corporate identity, the prestige, or the influence of the aristocratic Western officer corps. An individual military leader could and did, by dint of his own individual genius and luck, use his armies to seize the imperial power. But then the tremendous social and cultural strength of the Confucian pattern would invariably prevail, and he or his successors would in the end follow the well-worn path of Confucian bureaucratic government based on the gentry elite. In a famous instance, an advisor to Liu Pang, the founder of the Han Dynasty (206 B.C. - 220 A.D.), admonished his ruler "You might have won the empire on horseback, but you cannot govern it on horseback."¹⁷

The philosophical downgrading of force as a means to achieve political ends was also reflected in the social structure of traditional China. At the top were the gentry scholars, followed by the peasants, the artisans and then the merchants. At the bottom, common soldiers were grouped with prostitutes and other outcasts. A common saying in traditional China was that, "good iron is not used to make a nail nor a good man to make a soldier."¹⁸ Indeed, among the common people,

it was taken for granted that soldiering was to be avoided at all cost by respectable people, and communities dreaded the coming of rowdy, undisciplined troops, friendly or otherwise, about as much as a swarm of locusts. ¹⁹

The ideal method of warfare in traditional China similarly reflected the supremacy of Confucian doctrines. It was geared primarily to attempting to persuade or trick the enemy into bloodless surrender. Only if these failed, was the physical destruction of the enemy attempted.

The traditional Chinese even extended the supremacy of their political values into military techniques. For they believed that, "wars are fought primarily to establish or maintain a desired social order, and therefore political ends and technical means are so inextricably intermingled that the Western concept of the apolitical military means is not permitted."²⁰ Consequently, the Chinese ideal approach to war, as exemplified in Sun Tzu's *The Art of War*, contained many non-violent, political and psychological techniques (many of which would be considered as "unsportmanlike," "cowardly" or "unmilitary" in the aristocratic Western military tradition). Examples included "mediation by third parties, negotiation, espionage, bribery, and subversion, splitting followers from leaders, intimidation and cajolery and all forms of deception."²¹

With this general approach to war, rulers of traditional China were usually more interested in building an armed force more designed for internal control, one which would be politically reliable and not too costly, rather than one with the greatest possible numbers and military efficiency. Generally in traditional China, all efforts to create such an army of sufficient size and adequate efficiency at an acceptable political and financial cost proved an impossibility over an extended period of time.²² Often the government simply

would resort to conscripting large masses of untrained peasants or employing "barbarian" mercenaries.

Traditional Chinese governments alternated between using temporary armies based in theory upon compulsory universal military service and permanent armies made up of hereditary soldiers.²³ In the early imperial period before Sung the tendency was to the former. For example, during the T'ang Dynasty (618-906), under the so-called Fu-ping militia system, ideally, as part of the tax burden "every peasant was made a soldier and was liable to military service whenever the government called upon him."²⁴ However, there is considerable doubt whether this ideal was realized in practice even during the times of greatest central government power; probably the system usually was one of a hereditary trained militia.²⁵

In any case, the continuing problem of military regionalism, during the Sung Dynasty, caused a shift to permanent armies of mercenaries stationed mainly in the capital.²⁶ During the following Yüan (1279-1368), Ming (1368-1662) and Ch'ing (1662-1911) dynasties, this process was carried even further by making soldiering a hereditary trade and garrisoning the army in small, scattered, self-supporting military-agrarian colonies around the country. However, inevitably, during periods of extended peace, these full-time soldiers became increasingly ineffective and civilianized, being peasants more than soldiers.²⁷

During the latter period of traditional China, the aim was to limit the military sector only to actual battle field command, while placing all peacetime activities connected with maintaining the

military establishments under parts of the civilian bureaucracy.²⁸

In particular, at the upper levels, "military planning, equipment, and personnel matters were all in the hands of the civil service Ministry of War, and control over military matters on a regional basis throughout the interior and along the frontiers was vested in supreme commanders or viceroys who were also of the civil service."²⁹ This separation of peacetime administrative and wartime military commands through dispersed military colonies,

was designed to strip local commanders of initiative and independence while making high military officers in the capital dependent upon distant and widely scattered contingents of troops which were brought together in large formations only under carefully routinized procedures. 30

2. Heterodox Military Tradition

In traditional China, below this official military tradition, there was at the same time inside the country another, very different military tradition, that of the peasant uprising. Although large scale peasant rebellions occurred usually during periods of great economic privation and gross government breakdown, they were only the most obvious and spectacular manifestations of a heterodox or rebel subculture beneath the official Confucian superstructure. This opposing way of life was widespread among the peasantry and its activities constituted an endemic military control problem for the government.

The officials termed them "bandits" but, in reality, they consisted of much more than mere bands of criminals or deserters. They included not only members of secret societies and minority groups, but also wandering knight-errants or military adventurers (of the type exemplified by the heroes of *Shui-Hu-Chuan*). The latter had a moral and behavioral code somewhat similar to the heroic, romantic and individualistic code of chivalry of feudal Europe.³¹

In the West, the code of chivalry became the distinctive code of one class, the feudal aristocracy, and as a consequence later was identified with one profession, the military. In China these military adventurers were essentially opposed to the orthodox controls of family and state and became the champions of the poor, the weak and the distressed against the rich, the powerful and the corrupt.

The power of the rebels, and the arena around which this entire heterodox-rebel military tradition revolved, "rested on the control of the countryside, its manpower and its food supply."³² For, whenever there was overweening official corruption or economic distress, a rebel band could win the support of the masses and thereby obtain food, horses, arms, money, shelter, recruits or whatever else was essential to this type of warfare.

If the rebels could maintain momentum, then they would win over increasingly higher and higher levels of the traditional society. First the semi-trained and poorly equipped local militia groups would come over, then entire villages along with the village or clan headmen, and finally the local gentry, who were the pivotal local economic

and administrative elite and basis of all organized government in traditional China. When the rebel movement reached the latter stage, it would begin to lose its original heterodox rebel nature and to become increasingly a legitimate contender for the imperial throne, adopting the official Confucian doctrines and ways of governing.

However, until then the rebel movements could pose a security problem beyond the control of the regular imperial forces. For the nature of the resulting warfare and the problems the government forces faced in suppressing these movements were entirely different from those of the official military tradition described above.

Being based locally, what the rebels lacked in administrative experience, military expertise and discipline they could make up through popular support and tactical mobility. Philip Kuhn sums up the reasons for the success of the White Lotus Rebellion (1796-1804) against the Ch'ing Dynasty in these terms:

the tactics of the White Lotus were those of the rebel group with ramified connections of the local community; guerrilla warfare by small, highly mobile bands, supplied and informed by the surrounding populace. The Ch'ing battalions, heavily armed, slow and lacking local support, spent great effort for small success. 33

In fact, because "there was no distinguishing the rebels and the human stream in which they swam," and because they had superior mobility, the regular forces could seldom even locate them.³⁴

Furthermore, accumulating frustration and deprivation caused the regular imperial units to become more and more brutal towards the local population. Naturally, such conduct only served to increase the popularity and strength of the rebels.³⁵

Siang-tseh Chiang, in a study of the Nien Rebellion (1853-1868), a particularly long-lived rebel movement, blamed the repeated failures of the regular forces on similar reasons:

the officials overlooked the fact that behind each earthwall of the villages a flock of peasants devoted their lives and resources to the Nien cause. Popular support constituted the Nien's real fortress, which was unbreakable so long as the officials could not succeed in detaching the peasants from the leaders. 36

In short, the heterodox military tradition depended upon a political base, the winning of the support of the peasantry. It followed that the most effective traditional procedure for suppressing rebel movements was to deprive them of their essential political support among the peasants. And only when the rebels had been starved of their supplies of food and recruits, were regular forces committed to mop up the isolated remnants. This was done through the system of "strengthening the walls and clearing the countryside," meaning the construction of strategic hamlets, in which the local peasantry and their goods could be forcibly concentrated and protected by local, gentry-led militia forces.³⁷ At the same time, the regular forces tried to separate the rebel leaders from their followers by pursuing a political policy of reconciliation towards the rebel rank and file.³⁸

In brief, the military history of traditional China, although it demonstrated great variety, was clearly very different from that of any period in the West. Both at the orthodox and heterodox levels, war was primarily seen strictly in a political context, so

that there was little or no place provided for the development of the concept of distinct military procedures. Thus, the military sector was stripped of the long-established separate institutional autonomy necessary to develop any distinctive identity of its own.

D. EARLY MODERN CHINA

In the nineteenth century the coincidence of internal political and social disintegration and the external incursions of the imperial powers combined to totally discredit the traditional imperial military system (along with most of the traditional society). At the same time, the consequent general increase in violence ensured that military force was the usual means of settling political disputes, that an army was the only guarantee of political survival, and that war was the primary function and concern of state.³⁹

Quite naturally the Chinese at first attempted to borrow only the actual military weapons from the West while retaining the rest of their traditional ways. However, it soon became clear that such were only the outermost manifestations of the real sources of the overwhelming Western military superiority, which, in fact, lay deeply buried in the very nature and traditions of Western society. Since the Chinese never seriously considered complete Westernization of their entire society, the basic military problem of modern China became one of finding a workable compromise between the seemingly contradictory demands of building an army modernized enough to stand

up to modern foreign armies and, at the same time, able to win popular support in a Chinese society.⁴⁰

The military development of the Kuomintang in many ways represented an attempt to answer this basic military problem emphasizing Westernization and modernization. Particularly under Chiang Kai-shek, the Kuomintang army became increasingly a modernized one, but only through a heavy reliance on foreign military advisors and aid, first German and later American. However, in this process the Kuomintang army became also increasingly separated from its still unmodernized social base, and thus more dependent upon foreign aid. During the later stages of World War II and during the Civil War (1945-1949), this trend reached its climax when the Kuomintang armies became totally dependent upon costly American airlifts for transportation and supplies.

E. PLA's MILITARY TRADITION

1. Pre-1949 People's War Era

It was not until the advent of the PLA in 1928 that a Chinese movement was able to develop an approach to war and to build an armed force which would both be effective against the modernized armies of the imperial powers and totally viable in the Chinese environment. It was at that time that the CCP was forced by circumstances into the rural, interior areas of China, which lacked the educational, economic

and administrative prerequisites for the creation of a modern, highly specialized and technologically sophisticated military machine. Here the Communist Chinese gradually realized that they would have to develop an alternative means of producing military power, one which was better suited to the primitive conditions in which they found themselves.

The military formula the CCP eventually evolved, after much experimentation and many failures, gradually became codified into the People's War approach to warfare, which was successful against both the more modernized Japanese and Kuomintang armies from 1935-1949.

In the process, the PLA, by being in the forefront of the national liberation struggle, to the Chinese became not the symbol of the oppressive aristocracy as in the West, but of "China's self-sufficient rise to strength after more than a century of humiliation and near destruction by Western and Japanese invaders."⁴¹

Apart from the obvious concepts of a highly organized, indoctrinated and disciplined Marxist-Leninist party, People's War has four other basic elements: the creation of easily defended rural revolutionary bases; the gathering of the greatest possible mass support, taking as the core the peasantry won through a combination of economic and nationalistic programs; the formation of united fronts with the greatest possible number of groups; and adopting a military strategy whose outstanding characteristics were flexibility, mobility and surprise.⁴²

Unlike in the West, where retreating is scorned as cowardice and bravado or standing firm to the last man against impossible odds is praised as heroism, People's War emphasized the patient and long-term accumulation and husbanding of one's own strength, while

avoiding the enemy's strong points and fighting only under the most favorable conditions when the advantages of terrain and superiority in numbers made victory certain.⁴³

In such an approach to war the key was to be able to maintain a high level of morale and support among the soldiers and the general population during prolonged periods of low military profile and constant tactical retreating, when victory would appear to be a very distant goal.⁴⁴ And this is precisely where political mobilization and indoctrination played such a crucial role in the PLA's tradition. For without the consciously cultivated, firm conviction that human will and perseverance could ultimately defeat much better equipped, trained, and often larger armies, People's War would be impossible to sustain.

With such an approach to war, the other basic element of People's War, the PLA, similarly took on a special nature. In contrast to the usual situation in the West, there was a fusion of the political and military bureaucracies and elites, especially in the lower levels where the CCP cadre was usually a simultaneous political, military, economic and social leader. Structurally the CCP and PLA were integrated through the system of party committees within the PLA down to the platoon level which was to be the final authority on executing and interpreting all orders in the unit.⁴⁵ The relationship between the PLA and the CCP traditionally was not one of imposed external political control but one of natural political integration.

Similarly the intimate relationship between the PLA and the surrounding population required by the very nature of People's

War meant that the dividing line between the civilian and the military sectors was considerably blurred. For instance, the work or institutional style of the PLA was voluntary, irregular and informal to conform better to rural society.⁴⁶ Furthermore, the PLA's task was not simply that of fighting, which in any case it shared with the militia, but included a great many other functions. These were political duties, such as conducting propaganda work and training Party cadres; administrative duties, such as organizing and managing Party and government bureaucracies; and economic duties such as aiding agriculture and producing for its own needs.⁴⁷

In such a situation, the military branch of the CCP, the PLA, plainly did not develop into a highly specialized and differentiated military structure led by a distinct group of military professionals as in the West.

The basic, traditional ideal of the PLA as a disciplined force to be employed massively in any socio-political task is the complete antithesis of the prevailing theory and practice in the West where the armed forces are segregated as much as possible from at least group participation in "civilian society." It is also much more extensive than the usual military interventions in the developing nations, where commonly the military is simply content to replace the top leaders in the government. In any case, in China, the widespread PLA participation in many aspects of society, such as political propaganda work, industrial management and the direction of sports, which would be considered as "wholly civilian" in the West, has always

been a commonplace phenomenon in Communist Chinese society, and, in itself, cannot be taken as a manifestation of "militarism."

In summary, the military tradition of the PLA, or the theory and practice of People's War is an approach to warfare in which stable mass popular support, resulting from intensive political mobilization and organization, was used to deny the enemy permanent access to the bulk of the national population or any lasting support from it. Political values were transformed through proper organizational techniques directly into effective military power (or rather effective military staying power) without the need for a group of military specialists.

The genius of the CCP lay in their superior awareness of the realities of Chinese society in the rural, relatively backward areas, where the bulk of the population did and still does reside, and of the implications these conditions held for the creation of the most powerful army possible in that society. Crucial in this regard was their recognition of the limitations of the indiscriminate application of the Western military traditions and models to China. Furthermore, they realized that there was a need to revive and adapt the traditional heterodox military models based on peasant support in order to create a new military tradition more suitable to the existing nature of Chinese society.

A Western commentator believed the traditional PLA doctrines, "were essentially pragmatic and well-tailored to China's internal strengths and weaknesses" in that they provided "the best available defense of a vast, multitudinous, semi-developed state" by exploiting

the most readily available and abundant resources of "time, space, manpower and will."⁴⁸

2. Post-1949 Modernization

After the victory over the Kuomintang in 1949, the PLA suddenly found itself plunged into the Korean War, a type of war for which they were totally unprepared and ill-equipped, in that it was a regular positional war fought on foreign soil against the most highly modernized armed forces in the world. In this situation, it was not surprising that the People's War tradition was found to be insufficient and that the Chinese then turned to their new ally, the Soviet Union, for a model to modernize their army.⁴⁹

In the five year period from 1951-1956, the PLA created modern artillery, engineer, communications and logistical units as well as created an air force and navy. But the effective management and use of such sophisticated weapons systems require consistently high standards of education and training, which were conspicuously absent in the PLA. Thus, the PLA was forced to institute crash programs to educate the soldiers in basic literacy, and scientific and mechanical information. At the same time they also introduced more centralized and uniform training procedures and tighter, more formal standards of discipline. This trend was climaxed in 1955 by the introduction of conscription and of military ranks, decorations and awards. Thus by 1956, on paper the PLA had become a Soviet-style army.

However, I would argue that in these five years it is

doubtful that the PLA could have adopted not only the outward forms but also the inner essence of the Soviet Red Army. For the development of the latter has been inseparable from the Western military traditions it inherited and from the development of Soviet society from an agrarian one into a relatively modern urbanized and industrialized one. Because the Soviets seized power first at the top through a political coup and then hurriedly had to create their own army to fight a civil war, they were forced to accept a large number of officers from the old imperial army. The Soviets attempted to counteract the potentially counter-revolutionary effects of building their army with an officer corps from the old society by instituting an elaborate system of political commissars to keep a close watch on the professional officers. The Soviets also created in the Secret Police a separate, wholly Party oriented armed force which could be used to purge the regular officer corps.⁵⁰ Nevertheless, with no separate military tradition of its own and with Soviet society becoming modernized in the Western sense, the Red Army became more and more a Western-style professional army, highly differentiated from the rest of society.

Among Western observers, the tendency is common to believe that, "in the space of five years, the PLA had changed . . . to a conscript army staffed by professional career officers."⁵¹ Specifically, Ellis Joffe asserted that, because the primary orientation of these new specialized officers "has been to the performance of their professional tasks," the "professionally oriented officers have developed views and values which in some basic respects differ drastically from

those of politically oriented" Party leaders and officers.⁵² While conceding that their professionalism has not undermined their basic loyalty to the Party, he argued that these professional officers felt that the People's War tradition had been rendered largely obsolete by modern military technology. Consequently, these officers were said to oppose overly extensive political controls in the army, the time spent on political study, overly informal relations between officers and men, the frequent use of the army for non-military purposes, the upgrading of the militia, and the PRC's increasingly anti-Soviet foreign policy.⁵³

However, I would strongly argue that the growth of these disputes involving the PLA cannot be construed as indicating the development of a "professional" or "conservative" thinking in the PLA. Rather, these differences over the PLA should be viewed as simply a part of a much broader policy dispute among the entire PRC hierarchy over whether to follow the Soviet or the Maoist strategies of development in China. In other words, it was not a dispute which broke down along strict PLA versus CCP, or "military" versus "civilian" lines.

In any case, little over five years of modernizing the PLA on the Soviet model could not have produced a professional military officer corps in the pattern of the West. As was argued above, the particular nature of the Western officer was the product of a very long, complex, and individual historical evolution. Such a special professional group could not have been reproduced in a relatively short time in the very different historical, political, and social environment of contemporary China.

In summary, from this extended discussion of the military traditions of the West and China, I would argue that no military force can exist for long in complete isolation and that it will be to a substantial degree influenced by the traditions and the developments of the surrounding society. Thus, I would argue that the common situation in the West in which there is a very strict distinction between the "military" and "civilian" aspects of society cannot be taken as the universal, natural, and ideal pattern. Nor can it be assumed that any military force will naturally possess the "conservative" attitudes associated with Western militaries. In the particular case of the PLA before 1949, the differences the PLA and the rest of society were relatively much less developed because of the PLA's intensive involvement in social activities.

CHAPTER II

THE IDEAL: PRC POLICY STATEMENTS ON THE PLA IN THE 1960s

A. INTRODUCTION

Given this conceptual framework for the study of the PLA, the paper now turns to a description of the ideal nature of the PLA during the 1960s as revealed in three different official sources.

The three sources to be used here are the 1961 *Work Bulletins*, which are apparently classified PRC materials covertly obtained by the U.S. government, the 1964 "Learn from the PLA" campaign as reported in the Chinese national press, and in one example of the provincial press, namely, the Kwangtung paper *Nan-fang Jih-pao*. Hopefully, by employing three sources of different natures and from different areas, it will be possible to extract from them a consensus and relatively detailed model of what the ideal PLA was held to be from the point of view of the Chinese authorities.

Before discussing these three parts in detail, let us first clarify what is included in the term "PLA" in general and in this paper.

As was mentioned in the previous chapter, by the 1960s the PLA had grown from the relatively homogeneous force of infantry of the pre-1949 era to a relatively modernized armed force with several diverse, specialized branches. At present, the PLA includes every organized

armed force in the PRC and totals some 2.9 million.¹ For the purposes of this paper, I would divide the PLA into three principal parts: the high command, the specialized services, and the ground forces.² It will be the intention of this paper to concentrate on the ground forces only.

A study of the high command or an elite study of the PLA is one for which I have the least facilities, interest or incentive to attempt, since it is by far the most commonly studied part of the PLA. The specialized services, which include the PRC navy, airforce, and the Second Artillery Command responsible for the nuclear weapons and guided missile programs, will also be excluded in the paper. This is mainly because it is a relatively small (less than 10%) part of the PLA, it is atypical in that it is relatively much more modernized, and it is the least documented part of the PLA.³

It should be recognized that the ground forces itself is not a completely homogeneous unit. It includes several small technical arms such as the armored force, the engineering corps, and the railway corps. But the two main components in size of the ground forces are the regular or main force ground forces which are geared more for national defense, and the local forces which are more concerned with internal security, militia training and production roles.

The main force field armies or army corps are deployed in the eleven military regions of China, each of which contains several military districts. Each military district in turn contains usually one army of three divisions, each of which is divided into regiments, battalions, companies, and platoons.

The local forces include at least four major parts; the many small and scattered independent and garrison units; the Public Security forces, comprising primarily the secret police and the People's Armed Police (not to be confused with the regular police forces or the Public Security Bureau in the State Administration); the border forces in the frontier areas; and the special Production and Construction Corps deployed mainly along the Sino-Soviet border.⁴

It would have been best to keep at least the two main components of the ground forces separate in this paper, but this proved an impossibility, mainly because the source materials consistently would not allow it.

B. THE 1961 *WORK BULLETINS*

1. Nature of Source

The People's Liberation Army's *Work Bulletins* (Kung-Tso T'ung-Hsun) was an irregularly published (29 editions from January 1, 1961 to August 26, 1961 are available), classified journal solely for the perusal of military cadres at the regiment level and above. It was published by the General Political Department (GPD), which is a party organization directly under the Military Affairs Committee and charged with the special task of insuring the proper political and ideological standards in the PLA through an extensive system of political commissars and officers.¹ The journal not only contained

detailed discussions of day to day political problems (although these comprise a clear majority of the items) but also wide-ranging accounts of PLA training, morale, and leadership as well as articles on general social, economic, political and foreign policy problems of the period.

Regarding their general reliability and value as sources, they are relatively less concerned with policy in the ideal than the public press is. The overall tone is scientific and rational and the work method is to obtain and use the real facts no matter how unpleasant and unflattering these may be. Thus, there are many detailed descriptions of dissident opinions, mistakes, failures and calamities.⁵

The nature of the *Work Bulletins* was clearly shaped to a great degree by the very specific historical circumstances existing at the time in China. Although this was at least two years since the advent of the cataclysmic Great Leap, the *Bulletins* are filled with discussions of the catastrophic effects of the lightning campaign to communize the countryside.

The army seems to have been affected, with many manifestations of crisis and disorder, such as a very high accident rate caused by a breakdown in training and logistical support facilities, widespread illness due to insufficient diet, even signs of anti-Party feelings among the rank and file. However, it should be remembered that this was a highly irregular situation, and that materials written under its impact should be used with caution in a wide-ranging study. The *Bulletins* do provide a unique glimpse into the internal thinking and

organizational workings of the PLA, but only from the point of view of one part of the PLA, and even then only over a relatively short and rather unusual period.

From the *Bulletins*, despite the great variety of subjects covered, it is possible to derive a fairly consistent and coherent image of what the PLA was to be like in the view of the GPD.

2. PLA's Military Approach

The essential nature of any army lies in its strategic and tactical outlook, and the *Bulletins* in this regard were very consistent in their development of the traditional PLA doctrines of People's War described in the previous chapter.

The specific formula to be followed was the so-called Four-Firsts, which was first published in 1960. According to this, the PLA should adhere to the principles, first that "the human factor is primary as compared to weapons," secondly that, "political work is primary" over all other types of military work including training, thirdly that in executing political work the ideological work is more important than routine work, and fourthly that practical or "living" thought is more important than book learning in executing ideological work.⁶

The military doctrine described above clearly depends upon a high degree of mass support, political motivation and tight organization to compensate for material shortages. The *Bulletins* fully agreed that "The revolutionary war is the war of the masses, and a war

can only be conducted by mobilizing the masses."⁷

Given such a strategic approach, the PLA well recognized that they were largely powerless to retaliate against intercontinental ballistic missiles launched from distant sites or submarines. The *Bulletins* based the continued fervent belief in their traditional approach upon their conviction that, although any future war would initially be conducted over long distances, the enemy would still have to occupy China with a massive land army, at which time "close" People's War tactics would be effective. As one article stated, "in the case of close combat, especially face to face combat, we are in a superior position," because then, "what can be counted upon is nothing more than hand grenades, bayonets, and flame throwers."⁸

The *Bulletins* prescribed for the PLA to concentrate on "the special talents of the army such as those required for night combat, combat at close range, subterranean warfare. . . ." ⁹ This tactical approach, which relies on the individual soldier's bravery, perseverance, and initiative, fits very coherently into the PLA's traditional military doctrine of using the readily available resources.

The *Bulletins* stated clearly that the basis for building such an army was the traditional PLA model emphasizing political and ideological training. For example, one article stated, "politics must direct and control actual practise;" because,

only with a strong political and ideological work, the promotion of the political awareness of the many officers and soldiers, the inspiration of man's courageous spirit and firm will, and the display of man's high positivism, can we stand ever victorious. 10

As pointed out above, this approach to war means the absolute supremacy of the Party, the supreme political authority, over the PLA. The *Bulletins* hammered away at the theme the PLA "must, under the absolute leadership of the Party, be the tool for carrying out the lines and policy of the Party."¹¹

During this period of great difficulties in the PLA, the *Bulletins* called for increasing the degree of party control. The commissar system under the GPD was to be strengthened. Also, Party membership was to be substantially increased within the PLA.

More importantly, the *Bulletins* aimed at making the Party committees in the PLA the main center of authority in all units down to the company level. In effect, the committee was to be "the center of uniform authority and solidarity in the army units."¹² In particular, it was hoped "the assembly of the Party branch should really become the highest organ of the company," so that "all major problems of the company should be discussed and then decided by the Party branch committee. . . ."¹³

One document claimed that the previously existing situation of a largely moribund Party organization within the PLA had been rectified. It was claimed that all companies in the PLA now had Party committees, 80% of the platoons had Party cells, and 50% of the squads had Party committees.¹⁴

Up to this juncture then, the ideal model of the PLA in the *Bulletins* conforms quite closely to the PLA's tradition described earlier.

The one major difference was the recognition in the *Bulletins* of the importance of modern military technology in general and of the necessity for extended specialized military training in particular. To be sure, this awareness of the significance of technology was never to threaten the essentials of the PLA's particular approach to fighting. As one article noted:

the development of modern military scientific technique . . . certainly will have important effects on the progress of war and combat action, but they can never change the basics of war and combat. . . . 15

Nevertheless, it was recognized that "modern weapons are far more complicated than the old ones."¹⁶ Thus, one article urged:

in all branches of services more emphasis should be based upon the development of specialization than on general skills. It is requested that all men should be able to get acquainted thoroughly with the weapons and technical equipment in their hands. 17

Even more prevalent in the *Bulletins* were demands for greater emphasis upon purely military training at the expense of political work:

the primary importance of politics . . . cannot be taken to mean that with politics in command, we no longer need the military. . . . As far as time for military and political training is concerned, the military requirement is the principal part and therefore should be given more time than political training. 18

Another example of this sentiment stated:

We usually emphasize the fact that politics must come first because politics leads to everything, but in terms of time consumed, the study of politics must not be first, nor cultural activities; especially must labor projects not make too many demands upon time and energy, Military training must come first of all. 19

3. PLA's Relations with Society

In the *Bulletins* there was relatively little concerning the ideal PLA-society relations. There were scattered statements that the PLA must oppose "lavish spending" in order "to show our army is ready to share both good and ill fortune with the people," and that the PLA should

unite with local cadres, treat local cadres correctly, and struggle to overcome temporary difficulties in coordination and cooperation with all the people of the nation. 20

There was also reference to a less ideal role of the PLA in society, namely that of enforcer of law and order when the regular security organs proved unable to handle the situation. During this period of social unrest, this duty partially entailed the suppression of roaming bands of "counter-revolutionaries" mainly in the minority areas.²¹ It also included the disbanding of undisciplined militia groups.²²

Nevertheless, the most striking aspect of the PLA's relations with society to emerge from the *Bulletins* was the very close ties maintained by soldiers with their families and home localities. Through them, the entire PLA was made very sensitive to the trends and problems of the whole society.

One article stated that, "Soldiers are but farmers and workers wearing military uniforms. . . . Whatever happens in the locality will affect the soldiers. . . ." ²³ In discussing particularly peasant recruits, another article stated,

they have a relatively close contact with society and their own families. . . . The situation in their native places and their family problems easily affect their ideological emotions. ²⁴

In fact, many articles were mainly concerned with containing the demoralizing trends in society brought on by the failures of the Great Leap. In the *Bulletins*, there were several detailed discussions of how the PLA should deal with the ideological wavering and apathy caused by stories from home of starvation, illness, and deprivation, as well as official corruption, oppression, and incompetence. ²⁵

Certainly, the picture of the PLA which emerged here was not of an isolated, insulated force of soldiers. Rather, it was that of an institution which has not implanted its own pre-occupations and values deeply enough to exclude more basic loyalties, such as those of family and home.

4. PLA's Work-Style

The aspect of the PLA covered in the *Bulletins* which was the most important, both in terms of attention and significance, was its proper work-style or institutional orientation and manner. The *Bulletins'* tremendous concern for ensuring the proper work style was directly related to the PLA's (and the PRC's) basic emphasis on human

relationships. Thus, to ensure that tasks be done in the prescribed manner, the PLA took a general, moral, and humanist approach rather than a detailed, technical, and legalistic one.

In the *Bulletins* the "Three-Eight Work-Style" was held up as the ideal general one for the PLA. The "three" stood for the three phrases "a trim, correct political orientation," "to work hard and live plainly," (also translated as diligence and thrift), and "flexible strategy and tactics." The "eight" meant the eight Chinese characters translated as the four English words "unity," "vigour," "seriousness," and "liveliness."²⁶

5. PLA's Leadership Style

However, another aspect of the PLA's work-style, leadership, received by far the greater attention in the *Bulletins*. Partly this emphasis reflected the upper-echelon nature of the journal's authors and readers, but it also at least in part reflected the very serious problems and deficiencies among the PLA's leaders or cadres at the time. These were especially dangerous in the case of the PLA because they were undermining its traditional relationship between officers and men.²⁷

The *Bulletins* attributed these PLA leadership shortcomings to a lack of proper supervisory or management education. The *Bulletins* traced the root causes of the deterioration in leadership to the changed nature of the PLA since 1949.

The most basic was the change from a fighting army to a peace-time garrison one. And it was fully acknowledged how "a

victorious army can easily become arrogant and complacent, indulging in peace and pleasure."²⁸ The altered situation made the proper leadership, if anything, more necessary. For, whereas previously the PLA had trained through actual fighting, now it must train to fight.²⁹

At the same time, the very nature of that leadership in the PLA had been undergoing a distinct dilution in quality. Because of the rapid increase in the number of technical branches in the PLA during the 1950s, a large number of intellectuals had been recruited directly into the PLA. Besides being inexperienced in leadership, in fighting, and in army life, they also often possessed many non-proletarian ideas.³⁰ Simultaneously, time was gradually reducing the ranks of the experienced, battle-hardened veterans who had served in the pre-1949 PLA.

As a result, two major problems had arisen in the leadership of the PLA. One was termed excessive harshness in leadership and the other excessive laxity.

According to the *Bulletins*, the first was the more serious and widespread. It was directly attributed to cadres who still had "warlord" tendencies (which was considered to be the forerunner of the bourgeois military line).

These "leaning to the right" PLA cadres were characterized as being too pessimistic and too interested in individual gain, prestige, and family.³¹ More specifically, they were accused of being "obstinate and heavy-handed," often using "struggle meetings" without justification in order to intimidate soldiers.³² They also were said to use "rough and rude methods"; to be subjective,

partial, and impulsive; to be unsympathetic towards sick and backward soldiers; and to be unconsiderate of the special needs of soldiers from minority groups.³³ Finally, they were accused of at times resorting to "the imposition of bodily punishment, beating and cursing. . . ." ³⁴

The second criticized tendency in leadership, laxity, was aimed at those leaders who permitted discipline to become loose and work very careless. It was blamed upon the cadres from a peasant background, who it was said, "inevitably brought with them. . . . the ideas of extreme democracy and absolute equality . . . and were not accustomed to the rigid military life."³⁵ They were said to have advocated general "freedom" and let "bad thinking and bad habits to creep upon them like poisonous plants."³⁶

To rectify these bad tendencies in PLA leadership, the *Bulletins* offered a model of leadership, which I would divide into five basic principles: understanding, strictness, democracy, penetration to the basic units, and egalitarianism.

The first principle, understanding, can be regarded as the antithesis of the "warlord-bourgeois" military style. It was said that "all cadres should treat soldiers well, skillfully use the method of persuasive education" and reject "the application of simple administrative orders and coercive means."³⁷ The ideal PLA cadre was to "persist in his efforts of persuasion . . . and proceed in a painstaking, detailed manner so as to make himself a bosom friend of the masses of soldiers."³⁸

In all matters the cadre was to investigate thoroughly and scientifically. He was to never rush through cases using mere prejudice

or emotion. For example, in matters of political opinion, cadres were "allowed to urge but not to force the acceptance of anything." Such methods as "scolding harshly" or corporal punishment were strongly attacked. Instead cadres were to use "reasoning and teaching" and "patience and understanding" at all times.³⁹

With the "backward" or stupid soldier, the cadre was not to

look upon him as different from others, rejecting and reprimanding him constantly and ridiculing him before others, following him everywhere with sarcastic remarks. 40

On the contrary, there was to be encouragement, patience, sympathy, and kindness.

As a balance to "understanding" and as a direct antidote to "laxity" in leadership, the PLA cadre was to practise "strictness"; that is, strictness in demanding a high level of performance in work and unyielding in upholding basic political principles.

Partly this entailed training under the most difficult and complex conditions and not simply under the most convenient and speedy.

We should resolutely oppose the simple, easy, mechanical, hopeful working method prepared for only one way and not several ways of dealing with the enemy. 41

"Strictness" also required the cadre to maintain a firm degree of control over the soldiers' political and ideological situation. According to the *Bulletins*, many cadres had taken refuge in "the control of too many general administrative affairs" in order

to evade their responsibilities. The result had been a failure "to investigate the ideological conditions of party members" and a "relaxation of ideological work."⁴² The ideal cadre was urged to be vigilant to ideological backsliding among the soldiers and to struggle fearlessly against these tendencies.

Democracy, the third principle of ideal PLA leadership prescribed in the *Bulletins*, in essence meant that the relationship in the PLA between "the leaders" and "the fighters" should be that between equal comrades rather than that between a superior and subordinate. The *Bulletins* took this principle to be a special point of distinction for the PLA. For example, one article effusively proclaimed that the PLA "differs from the old army in the serious way in which it seeks to convince an erring member of his mistakes" with the result that "all work together harmoniously, happily, naturally and consciously. . . ."⁴³

Much in the manner of classical liberals, the proponents of this principle of democracy took for granted the optimistic and rational belief that there were no irreconcilable "antagonistic" contradictions within the PLA and that, once everyone had all the true facts, a correct and generally agreed upon decision was possible. One article stated that:

The soldiers of our army come from the toiling people. They have a relatively high political awareness, fresh energy and ambition to advance their knowledge. Only by patiently educating them, talking to them with reason, developing their knowledge, and commanding their ability shall we be able to motivate their positivism. 44

In other words, the discipline in the PLA ideally was to be "built on the basis of political self-awareness and is completely consistent with the supreme interests of the cadres and soldiers" ⁴⁵ Therefore, the ideal cadre was to have complete confidence and trust in the soldiers and "must not avoid the difficulties but inform everyone about the difficult situation. . . ." ⁴⁶ According to the *Bulletins*, the result would not be a disintegration of discipline but just the opposite:

The majority of the people in our army . . . come from poor peasants, and their basic interests coincide with the Party's interests without any fundamental contradiction. We have only to explain the situation to them and keep on persuading them and they are sure to throw off their wrong thoughts. ⁴⁷

Every soldier was to have the right to criticise his superiors: "each of the revolutionary army personnel should be assured of the right to struggle with those whose behaviors are in violation of Party policies." ⁴⁸ Cadres were urged to "make self-criticisms of their own defects and mistakes, so as to influence and develop the soldiers' self-awareness and have them reveal their own defects, and to ask them to say whatever they want without coercion." ⁴⁹ In addition, through the elected "revolutionary army men's council" and "revolutionary army men's congress" in each company, the soldiers were to have means both to control their extra-curricular activities and to have liaison with their leaders on an equal basis. ⁵⁰

In this regard, the *Bulletins* emphasized the need for collective, consensus style leadership among cadres. They were directed to

take the initiative to get in touch with each other, co-operate with each other, respect each other, attribute merits of their work to the collective, sincerely accept lessons without mutual complaints for the defects. . . . 51

Above all, "no individual should be allowed to monopolize the power of decision. . . ."52 Nor was the situation to develop where all activities, especially political, were entirely dependent for their progress on the efforts of a few political cadres or advanced elements.⁵³

Penetration to the basic levels, the fourth principle of ideal PLA leadership, was considered to be a crucial one. By this was meant that the PLA's chain of command and communication should be direct and responsive right down the lowest levels. In particular, the *Bulletins* identified the company as the key level at which orders from above were or were not translated into concrete action.

This principle was particularly directed at cadres with what was termed a "superficial," "non-aggressive," and lazy leadership style, characterized by "the lack of the spirit for verifying the facts to arrive at the truth."⁵⁴ At worst, some cadres were said to have ignored the situation at the basic levels, and to report to their superiors "only things which were good and withheld . . . things which were bad."⁵⁵

Under egalitarianism, the fifth and final principle of ideal leadership, PLA cadres were not to receive the privileged treatment of the sort accorded to military officers of most countries. Rather, PLA cadres were supposed to

treat the soldiers as class brothers, protect and be concerned with the soldiers and be prepared to eat, live, operate, work and play with the soldiers without showing their privileged status or putting on a bureaucratic attitude. 56

Furthermore, the "hsia-fang" system under which all PLA cadres were to spend a certain period every year working as common soldiers, according to one article, was to be continued with undiminished vigour.⁵⁷

Clearly these five principles are inter-related to a degree that they are parts of a coherent approach to leadership in the PLA, whose whole emphasis is directed at creating a relationship between the leaders and the fighters characterized by harmony and mutual understanding.

In summary, the picture of the ideal PLA which emerged from the *Bulletins* is by no means a complete or comprehensive one. Most significantly, these classified documents revealed little indication that the PLA had discarded the essence of its traditional People's War model in theory or in practice.

Even though the situation inside China had changed substantially, with the nation at peace, with Maoist-style modernization being actively pursued, and with greater specialization throughout society, there was manifested a great determination to keep the PLA intensively involved in society and thus relatively undifferentiated from the rest of society. The importance of modern military technology was not denied. But this was under no circumstances to cause the rapid and fundamental transformation of the PLA so that it would threaten the traditional value priorities of the PLA or of the PRC.

In this regard, I think it is very significant that the rank and file of the PLA maintained very close contact with the rural society of China from where the majority of them came, and that this had a major impact on the PLA as a whole.

The most outstanding and important aspect of the PLA to emerge was the ideal work-style and especially leadership. The ideal in the PLA was for an intimate, equal, and harmonious relationship between a humane, yet demanding leadership, and a politically very aware rank and file.

Certainly this presents a very sharp contrast with the ideal work-style in most Western armies. There a very rigid distinction is created between the officers and men. The role of the officer is to draw up and issue orders which the men are to obey without question. It is a work-style tough and demanding to the point of rendering the members of the rank and file passive objects, especially with regard to politics.

C. THE 1964 "LEARN FROM THE PLA" CAMPAIGN AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL

1. Nature of Source

It has been seen that the *Work Bulletins* available to us emphasize the shortcomings and deficiencies of the PLA. However, on February 1, 1964, a short three years after the publication of these documents, the PRC leaders initiated a national campaign in which they

called upon the whole nation to emulate the PLA's "outstanding characteristics" and learn from its experience.⁵⁸

The key towards understanding this apparent paradox and what makes it especially difficult to compare the ideal PLA in the *Bulletins* with the one presented in the 1964 "Learn from the PLA" campaign is the very dissimilar source materials for each. While the *Bulletins* were documents made available fortuitously and not intended for public consumption, for the 1964 case we are entirely dependent upon the public press for sources.

In the West, there is a strong tendency either to dismiss the Chinese press totally as "political propaganda" or to belittle it as grossly distorted, presenting only what the government has selected as being fitting at the time for the public to know. Some in the West have also argued that political regionalism and administrative backwardness are so pronounced the government press is fairly ignorant of the real conditions in its own nation.⁵⁹

Certainly the entire Chinese approach to the media is very different than that in the West with the "freedom of the press" being interpreted in a very different manner.⁶⁰ But problems are discussed and opinions aired and they can be deciphered if one is sensitive to the environment and context in which they were written. To me the real origin of the difficulties outsiders have in using the PRC press is that it is written for and by people who are Marxist-Leninists in ideology and Chinese in culture and language. Western scholars simply do not possess the basic and comprehensive knowledge of con-

temporary Chinese society which would allow them to interpret these materials in a definitive manner.

Two other problems with regard to the sources for this section should be noted here. One mainly arises from the very nature of journalism which places a heavy emphasis on the issues and events which appear important and interesting on the given day or week. This inevitably leads to discontinuities in coverage with certain topics discussed very intensively over a very short period, making it more difficult to establish long-range trends or the perspective required for in-depth analysis.

The other problem is the fact that all the materials used in this section are from the translation series of the American Consulate General in HongKong. Presumably, this body's criteria for selecting materials to be published are based on its perception of what, at that particular time, is important for the U.S. government and public, and what image of China best serves the interests of American foreign policy. But, even taken simply from the American government point of view, what appears to be significant and valuable at one time may well not prove to be so later.

2. PLA's Work-Style

However, whatever reservations we may have about using the available source materials, it is still important to describe the aspects of the PLA which were apparently considered worthy of society's study and emulation in 1964.

The campaign dwelt heavily upon the PLA's massive emphasis on the study and application of Mao Tse-tung's Thought. Indeed, the leader's ideas were claimed to be the key to the PLA's "invincibility."

The concepts of the Four-Firsts, the Three-Eight Work Style, the Four-Good Companies, the Five-Good Individuals, the mass line, and the penetration to the basic units were portrayed during the 1964 campaign as essentials of the ideal PLA, just as they were in the *Bulletins*.

These concepts were expressed somewhat differently for the rest of society. For example, the relevance of the Four-Firsts was stated in the following terms:

All our work is done by people and therefore good ideology among people determines the successful accomplishment of work in various fields. Therefore to do our work well, we must make a success of dealing with people. . . . 61

The PLA's correct political stand (part of the Three-Eight Work-Style), for the rest of society was interpreted as steadfastness and courage in the face of difficulty and danger, loyalty to the fatherland, and total selflessness. Diligence and thrift were expanded to include the PLA's "scientific attitude of seeking the truth and conducting intensive investigation and research," and its fighting spirit of persisting "in battle under extremely difficult circumstances" and of taking up "the hardest and heaviest tasks." The PLA was also praised for employing flexible strategy and tactics.⁶²

The PLA was said to have embodied unity (also part of the Three-Eight Work-Style) in that it had attained a harmony in political

terms between theory and practice, as well as unity among the parts of the PLA and with the government and society. The entire nation was urged to display similar respect and concern for other parts of the society.⁶³

Two related virtues of the ideal PLA were particularly singled out for attention in the national press's coverage of the "Learn from the PLA" campaign -- modesty and toughness. The former was especially aimed at preventing the development of arrogance or complacency. The PLA was repeatedly called upon to continue to learn from the masses and local cadres. The PLA was reminded that it was greatly dependent upon the "care, support, assistance, encouragement given by the local mass organizations."⁶⁴ Specifically, PLA units were urged to continue to send PLA members to "nearby steel works, chemical works, electrical and technical works and local workers" to study their occupational and political techniques.⁶⁵

By toughness, or the bone-hard spirit of the PLA, was meant the ideal PLA's determination and steadfastness when faced with the most difficult and dangerous tasks. This quality seems to have been particularly aimed at the youth, who often did not realize that "ours is still a very poor country, and that we cannot change this situation radically in a short time," unless a great deal of hard work, determination, and self-sacrifice was expended. Here, the PLA was held up as a model of those who were not afraid of facing toil and difficulties, but, on the contrary, "gladly started [their] work from the most difficult point" because they realized "that struggle and difficulties are big furnaces for tempering revolutionaries and

schools for training them."66

The national press's human embodiment of the Five-Good model soldier was Lei Feng, who gave his life to prevent a train accident. He was portrayed as the absolute paragon of the Three-Eight Work-Style: totally loyal to the CCP and Chairman Mao, thrifty, tireless, optimistic, "down-to-earth," and, above all, totally selfless. In particular, he possessed not a superficial devotion but one firmly rooted in an awareness of a situation's difficulties:

The determination to bear hardships and face difficulties, to brave the rigors of the elements, to stand firm before sword, threat and temptation, and to shun no trivial and troublesome things, neither afraid of taking the devious path of meeting rebuffs and setback and of suffering grievances, nor afraid of facing 'fragrant' wind and poisonous weeds, and of being laughed at. . . . 67

At the same time, Kuo Hsing-fu was the national press's model of correct leadership. He was supposed to have devised a very effective method of conducting training by translating into reality the main ideal PLA principles, such as the Four-Firsts.⁶⁸ This method was claimed not only to have great significance for peace-time military training, but for all society in training "new ranks of both red and specialized personnel. . . ."69

Specifically, Kuo Hsing-fu was said to have executed "strictness" in leadership "by implementing the principle of launching different training programs to meet the requirements of actual training."⁷⁰ At the same time, he also included "understanding" by his

emphasis on teaching through patient persuasion, reasoning, and individual instruction, but never through the simple application of orders or coercion.⁷¹ His training method also met the ideal leadership principle of democracy in "its ability to promote mutual training among soldiers . . . and to fully mobilize the soldiers to participate simultaneously in military training."⁷² The leadership principle of "taking a firm grip on the work of the basic level units in a more penetrating and thoroughgoing manner" was fulfilled by requiring cadres to spend as much time as possible with the soldiers. Cadres were to conduct extensive personal inspections, to give verbal instructions based upon a flexible application of the principles in light of the actual conditions, and to give personal demonstrations as much as possible.⁷³ Finally, Kuo Hsing-fu exemplified egalitarianism in leadership by always sharing in the same livelihood as his soldiers.

The individual model PLA soldiers were held up as heroes in the national press during the 1964 "Learn from the PLA" campaign to be copied by the rest of society solely because of their superior political virtues. Unlike military heroes elsewhere, these had not performed individual epic martial feats in battle against the enemies of the nation. In fact, the qualities and achievements held up here were so generalized and so concerned with routine peace-time activities that any other group or individuals in Chinese society could have given rise to them.

3. PLA's Relations with Society

Despite the great amount of verbiage here on the ideal PLA and what society should learn from it, there was little specific information disclosed on PLA-society relations. There were only very general statements that "the PLA serves the people with heart and soul and is inseparably linked with the people like flesh and blood."⁷⁴

There were scattered references to so-called "greeting groups." They consisted of local individuals from all walks of life. Their purpose was to convey "to the officers and men [of the PLA] the regards and respects of the people for them," and to commend the PLA "for making great contributions and displaying their revolutionary spirit."⁷⁵

The only other aspect of the PLA's role in society that was accorded mention in the national press at this time was the special practise of sending PLA cadres to serve permanently in the economic sector of society. At the same time, cadres from the economic organs were sent to study in PLA units or schools. Here again, the underlying aim was political; that is, to spread the PLA's model accomplishments in political work. The newly transferred PLA personnel were praised because:

All of them were steeled in a strict military life. . . .
All of them were experienced in army company work or political work and have a definite ability of organizational leadership. 76

The press enthusiastically reported on the reception these PLA cadres were said to have received at their new posts in the economic

sector. They were praised "for working hard, living simply, facing reality, making contact with the masses, and for their spirit of not being afraid of dirt or trial."⁷⁷

D. THE 1964 "LEARN FROM THE PLA" CAMPAIGN IN KWANGTUNG PROVINCE

In order to view the ideal PLA from yet another, third point of view, I have chosen to examine how the "Learn from the PLA" Campaign was reported at the provincial level, specifically in the province of Kwangtung. This choice results primarily from the relatively high availability of that province's principle Party organ, *Nan-fang Jih-pao* (hereafter *NFJP*).

Unlike the preceding section, which was based upon a collection of translated materials edited by an American government agency, this section is based upon an apparently unedited and untranslated collection of all complete copies of *NFJP* available outside of China.

1. Problem of Regionalism

While limiting the area to one province should bring about greater detail and perhaps greater control over the material, it also introduces one of the major methodological problems of contemporary China studies, regionalism. By this is meant both social regionalism, or the extent to which the inhabitants of different areas of China

possess significant special characteristics, and political regionalism, which is the extent to which leaders in areas can evade central policies, build up their own autonomous, self-sufficient power bases, and substantially influence central policy formation.

Before 1949 (when China was relatively more accessible to Western scholars), Kwangtung could be clearly distinguished from other Chinese provinces in important social characteristics. There were the distinct Cantonese, Hakka, and Chao-Chou spoken dialects, the long commercial heritage of the coastal areas, the close links of many Kwangtung residents with the very distinct overseas Chinese communities, and the proximity to the highly-Westernized colonies of HongKong and Macao.⁷⁸ The Cantonese (who constitute the large majority of the province's population) had developed a distinct set of widely recognized group characteristics:

The Cantonese are proud of their cleverness, quickness, worldliness, and technical skill just as northerners and foreigners criticize them for their selfishness, hot temperament, crudity and lack of restraint.⁷⁹

Before 1949, and especially during the Warlord (1912-1927) and Nationalist (1927-49) periods of modern Chinese history, very pronounced and highly developed political regionalism in Kwangtung was a recurring phenomenon.

Precisely to what extent, during the 1960s, social or political regionalism existed in Kwangtung is a question that no one in the West has been able to answer with any degree of certainty. I would surmise that social regionalism has been substantially lessened, because, since 1949, the PRC government has brought

about general internal peace in China and has instituted ambitious modernization programs in education, transportation, and communications. With regard to political regionalism, a very contentious issue among Western scholars of the PRC, I will attempt no surmise.

A reading of a five-month run of *NFJP* from January to June of 1964 did not reveal any significant evidence of either political or social regionalism in Kwangtung. In fact, Kwangtung's proximity to capitalistic HongKong was the only special characteristic of the province that was given any special attention.

The "Learn from the PLA" campaign in *NFJP* closely followed the broad framework set out above in the national press, both in terms of sequence of publication and content. For example, one day after the lead editorial heralding the start of the campaign appeared in *Jen-min Jih-pao* on February 1, 1964, the entire article was printed verbatim on the front page of *NFJP*. And, throughout the next several months, important articles on the campaign were similarly copied from the national press in *NFJP*.

To a significant extent, the similarities between the two coverages of the "Learn from the PLA" campaign also extended to the articles written by the *NFJP*'s own staff. The differences were relatively minor in nature and never entailed basic principles or policies. For example, the *NFJP* seemed to lose interest in the campaign somewhat earlier, by June 1964.

Generally, it could be stated that the articles on the campaign written by the staff of *NFJP* were more concrete and less theoretical in nature than those in the national press. In other

words, in articles appearing in *NFJP*, the basic political principles were either assumed to be known or simply copied from the national press, while its own contribution was limited to illustrations and amplifications of these basic themes through very detailed, concrete and often rather mundane examples drawn from the locality.

2. PLA's Work-Style

In general the *NFJP's* coverage of the "Learn from the PLA" campaign stated that

all the people of the various sectors must learn from the PLA, and should apply the PLA's experiences in various areas to the tasks of socialist revolution and reconstruction, so that our cadres and people can increase their revolutionization, and so that our offices, factories, schools and villages can increase their revolutionization, and that our various tasks in socialist reconstruction can be done even better. 80

As indicated in the above quotation there seemed to be no segment of society which was considered exempt from learning from the PLA, be it industrial workers, women, cultural workers or businessmen. Even during a concurrent campaign in Canton to improve sanitation standards, it was stated that "one must also learn from the PLA's experience in using the revolutionary spirit and the fighting work style to do hygiene work."⁸¹

And, as in the national press, the aspect of the PLA most emphasized as being worthy of society's attention was its extremely heavy emphasis on the study and application of Chairman Mao's thought and instructions in every aspect of its work. The extent of the

personality cult of Mao Tse-tung seemed to be, if anything, more pervasive and simplistic in *NFJP* than in the national press. In particular, the reporting of some of the PLA meetings in *NFJP* consisted of little more than a procession of soldiers all exclaiming words to the effect that "they never stop reading Chairman Mao's books and that they are determined to listen to Chairman Mao's words and obey his instructions."⁸² Foreshadowing the little red book of Mao's quotations, many model soldiers described how certain of Mao's phrases had directly inspired and guided them.

Nor were the other aspects of the ideal PLA presented in *NFJP* substantially different from those in the national press from February to June 1964. Once again, the Four-Firsts, the Three-Eight Work-Style, the Four-Good model units, and the Five-Good model individuals were emphasized as the basic components of the ideal PLA.

The PLA was generally characterized in one article as being unlike any other army, Chinese or foreign, traditional or modern, because it "has the weapon of Mao Tse-tung's thought and has highly revolutionized political work." The same article went on to praise the PLA in the following tones:

Our forces are people's forces, they struggle for the thorough liberation of the Fatherland and of the whole world's laboring people, for the extinguishing of class exploitation and class oppression, and to allow our sons and daughters to enjoy the socialist life. 83

Only certain aspects of the Three-Eight Work-Style were accorded detailed attention in *NFJP* during the 1964 "Learn from the PLA" Campaign. For instance, Ou-yang Hai (Like Lei Feng a soldier martyred in a successful railway rescue), was depicted as a model of

a correct political orientation to the point of sacrificing one's life for the advancement of the revolution. Since he came from a poor peasant background, he possessed a deep hatred for the old, oppressive society and a correspondingly deep loyalty for the new socialist one. Thus, unlike many other youths in the PRC born after 1949, Ou-yang Hai was fully aware of the significance of liberation and the "life and death" need to preserve and advance it.⁸⁴

Another aspect of the ideal PLA emphasized at this time was diligence and thrift. For example, the model head of a company's commissariat spared no effort to discover, buy, and transport the least expensive and highest quality materials. He was also praised for attempting to recycle waste products as much as possible.⁸⁵ As was typical in reports of model soldiers, his private and personal life was a close reflection of his model public life. This model soldier never used his official expense account and wore his clothes the longest in the company.⁸⁶

Still another part of the Three-Eight Work-Style brought out in *NFJP* was the selfless attribute of taking the initiative "to fight in the front line," or taking upon oneself the heaviest, the most difficult, and the most dangerous tasks. One example cited concerned a highly-educated model PLA hospital worker, who eagerly performed the dirtiest hospital work such as cleaning toilets, spittoons, and bedpans.⁸⁷

In this regard, mention was made at this time in both the national press and *NFJP* of the Nan-ni-wan spirit. This was named after the valley in northern Shensi where, during the 1942-1944

period, a PLA brigade had converted a desolate area into a thriving agrarian one simply through the application of determination and hard work.

This aspect of the PLA's ideal work-style was said to have made the greatest impression on society. People were quoted as saying they could not falter in the face of normal difficulties

if the PLA could have the vigorous revolutionary spirit
and the unflinching determination to train until their
skills are superior under the very difficult conditions
. 88

Continuing with other aspects of the Three-Eight Work-Style, the *NEJP* depicted unity within the PLA as a humanistic sense of comradeship, one transcending all artificial barriers of rank, occupation, and role. It was emphasized that in the PLA, "all people in the revolutionary ranks must all be concerned with each other, love and protect each other and help each other."⁸⁹

In particular, model soldiers were praised for their willingness to go out of their way to visit various units in order to help soldiers solve their problems and spread their advanced experience. Thus, persons were chosen as models not so much as rewards for meritorious service but to become active teachers. Many model soldiers were said to have secretly sent money from their own savings to fellow-soldiers whose homes had been stricken by illness or other difficulties.⁹⁰ In another example, a model soldier was marked out for particular praise because he had stopped for four days in one unit just in order to help one soldier who was having difficulties in handling a delicate sighting instrument.⁹¹

However, this strong sense of unity or togetherness in the PLA was not to take the form of the "barrack" mentality, a sense of common isolation from a very different and suspicious society.

This was demonstrated by the even greater emphasis in the *NFJP*'s coverage of the "Learn from the PLA" campaign on the ideal PLA's virtue of modesty. The PLA was constantly being admonished not to become arrogant, superior, or aloof towards others because of its achievements. Rather, at all times, the PLA was to remain willing to learn from all other groups in its localities.

Thus, model soldiers were warned never to be satisfied with their present levels of thinking and performance. Rather constantly to be striving to learn more from everyone and, thus, to be continually improving themselves.⁹² It was often pointed out in *NFJP* that the general trend towards greater specialization only served to increase each individual's ignorance of what was happening outside his own narrow field.

More concretely, in Kwangtung modesty took the form of sending PLA groups into the agrarian and industrial sectors or of inviting model groups from them to visit PLA units. In both cases the intention was to have the advanced political and technological techniques of the masses taught to the basic PLA units.⁹³ Since the PLA maintained large establishments of its own in both the agricultural and technical sectors, there was also much direct incentive for the PLA to keep in close touch with their civilian counterparts.

One specially illustrative PLA model of modesty was a gunboat of the South China Sea Fleet. For its PLA crew, the process of learning to be modest began while their warship was still being built. The crew lived at the shipyard in order to learn the art of ship-building, help the workers build the boat, and to learn the workers' own work-style which, in fact, was little different from the PLA's own Three-Eight Work Style

The same process of learning modesty continued even afterwards when the ship was on active service except that now the teachers were local fishermen and other advanced naval units. Even the ship's highest officers and advanced technicians were said to have eagerly and modestly sought to learn the old fishermen's experiences in bitter class struggle under the old society, to learn their spirit of enduring under conditions of extreme physical hardship, and to learn their special skills of seamanship and catching fish. And in praising the feats of the ship, the *NFJP* did not cite any military duties but only rescue operations.⁹⁴

The *NFJP's* coverage of the "Learn from the PLA" campaign, like that of the national press, did not contain as much on the PLA's ideal leadership as did the *Bulletins*. In *NFJP* it was noted that the model officer was not supposed to restrict his understanding only to the periods when he was on duty or even just to his own area of responsibility. Rather, for the model officer

whoever's thinking has knots, he will go to help them solve it; whoever's home has difficulties, he will go to help them solve them; even with regard to the fighter's personal affairs and body hygiene, he will also help
 95

Also, in training, cadres were to follow Kuo Hsing-fu's teaching method to emphasize patient teaching through example and demonstration rather than classroom lectures or book learning. The model cadre was to "fully motivate the fighter's activism in training" by honestly, clearly and simply teaching.

He also fully used concrete, fitting, clear and concise metaphor, explained complicated doctrines simply, and made them easily understood, so that the fighters could easily study, remember, understand and execute them. 96

As was seen in the two previous sections, one of the primary goals in the ideal PLA was to make it very responsive to the orders of the central command, even at the company level. Towards achieving this, cadres were to pay great attention to work in the companies:

the comrades recognize that in order to serve the companies, they must take the work of the companies as their own, after going down into the companies they must, regardless if the matter is great or small, vigorously and enthusiastically help the companies. . . . 97

Therefore, the ideal PLA cadre was not to spend his time in a cloistered office dispensing orders and regulations, and attending meetings. Rather he was to invest long periods of time in the companies observing, researching and listening. Specifically, this entailed giving on-the-spot guidance and aid to the soldiers, and even spending time working as a common soldier, a practice called "tun-tien."

For example, in one article two model cadres went down into a single company for an extensive stay, not once but five times. During this time they concerned themselves with every possible manner

of problem ranging from helping to improve marksmanship, organizing political work and setting up recreational activities, to such small details as checking bedding, teaching singing and treating the soldiers' feet.⁹⁸

In such a way, then, it would be possible for PLA cadres to have opportunities to conduct extensive personal inspections in order to procure the essential first-hand experience and information that would allow them to produce orders and regulations which would be voluntarily and enthusiastically followed at the basic levels because they fully conformed to the wishes and needs of the soldiers.

3. PLA's Relations with Society

One major topic that at this time received more attention in *NFJP* than in the national press was the PLA's ideal relations with society.

According to *NFJP*, the PLA in Kwangtung enjoyed the deep affection and gratitude of the local populace:

they all felt joyous, enthusiastic and proud because their Fatherland had such an extremely revolutionized and invincible red, fraternal army. They all said that . . . they would certainly put a great deal of effort into propagating the unit's excellent work style, and to promote its achievements and experience. 99

One small manifestation of this attachment was the fact that representatives of the PLA were routinely invited to participate in the major civilian festivals held in Canton. In them there were included

speeches by local dignitaries praising the PLA's contributions "in protecting the Fatherland and in socialist construction" and calling upon the people to learn from the PLA.¹⁰⁰

More significantly, there was also mention in *NFJP* of the so-called "greeting groups." As in the national press, these teams were said to have been organized throughout the province by all sectors of society. Their function, was to "express the concern and respect of the party, the government, and the people of the whole province for their fraternal troops," and to pledge that the people would learn from the PLA in all areas of their livelihood. But it was not a totally one-sided affair; the greeting groups also described their own achievements in politics and production. The PLA for its part pledged to always learn from the masses. There also were various recreational activities, such as acrobatic exhibitions, movie shows, opera performances, parties, and hospital visits, connected with the greeting groups.¹⁰¹

But what in particular had the PLA done in Kwangtung in order to win this apparently high prestige among the local populace? The articles of *NFJP* provided the answer in the slogans "serve the people" and "support the government and love the people."

For example, during times of emergency such as drought or flood, entire PLA units (including dependents) would abandon their work in order to help "drawing water by water wheels, bailing water, striking wells and repairing dykes."¹⁰² PLA units also provided disaster victims with water, fertilizer, animals, seeds, and farm

tools (from PLA-operated farms) in order to tide them over the period of difficulty.¹⁰³ On a more individual level, model soldiers were said to have lent more personal assistance. Such was the case of a soldier who gave all his money in order to help defray the medical costs for the sick child of a peasant he had never met.¹⁰⁴

However, in gaining such high prestige in society, the PLA's activities in Kwangtung society were of a much more long-term and comprehensive nature than simple disaster relief. In fact, as revealed in *NEJP*, the PLA in Kwangtung was a regular and large-scale contributor of manpower, guidance, and equipment to a wide range of civilian groups for a wide range of non-military roles.

Since Kwangtung was still predominantly an agrarian, rural society, the most important of these PLA social roles was in assisting farm production. But the overall picture that emerged from *NEJP* of the PLA's involvement in Kwangtung agriculture was not confined to only that of a reserve labor force used mainly during the peak laboring periods of sowing, transplanting, and harvesting rice.

The PLA's role in the countryside was also that of an intensively active participant in all aspects of agriculture, and of rural society itself throughout the year. The specific tasks the PLA performed in agriculture ranged from basic labor ones such as transporting produce to market and collecting fertilizer to more technical ones such as aiding in the construction and maintenance of water conservation projects, the repair of farm machinery, the making of farm tools, and the construction of roads and buildings on communes.

The extent of the PLA's work went even deeper into the fabric of rural life. For, the PLA also trained technicians, sent medical teams to communes, and educated rural cadres, militia leaders, and the masses.¹⁰⁵

Some more concrete indication of the extent of the PLA's work in the countryside of Kwangtung can be gauged from one example in which a model PLA division was stated to have contributed 990,000 labor/days in one year in aiding local ploughing and planting alone.¹⁰⁶ Assuming that one division has 15,000 men, this averages out to about 66 days in just farm labor alone for each man in the division.¹⁰⁷

From this very wide-ranging list of tasks, it is clear the PLA was very deeply involved in the rural society of Kwangtung in very many ways. In fact, it could be said that the PLA was playing a large leadership and service role in the political and material development of Kwangtung rural society.

Aside from articles directly copied from the national press, in *NFJP* I could discover only one article on the transfer of PLA cadres to the urban economic sector during the "Learn from the PLA" campaign. The particular article in question stated that three hundred PLA cadres had been moved into Canton economic offices in one year.¹⁰⁸ But, although it was said the transferees were warmly welcomed and had done well in their new positions, in fact, most of the article concerned lauding the PLA cadres "bone-hard spirit of eating a great of bitterness and enduring a lot of hard work" in order to overcome "the great and difficult problems arising out of their unfamiliarity with their new missions." It appears that the

cadres were assigned to positions throughout the entire economic sector without previous orientation or training, so that the problems of adjusting and mastering totally new skills must have been very great.

Fortunately, their primary function was not technical, but to spread the PLA's experience in political work:

to put politics in command, to cling fast to doing the work of the people's thinking well, to cling fast to leading commercial work using political, production and mass concepts, and to actively raise the class consciousness of the staff. 109

As such, the duties of these transferred PLA cadres were mainly to ensure that proper attention was being paid in their new posts to political work and to the proper style of leadership. Their duty, thus, entailed such things as mediating in conflicts among the staff, increasing morale in the offices and workshops, and in general being a model of humane leadership.

One very striking non-military PLA role in Kwangtung, both in terms of its nature and the attention devoted to it in *NFJP*, was as a model producer of culture. Previously these cultural activities by PLA professional and amateur groups had been for the benefit of PLA units only. Now, in the "Learn from the PLA" campaign, they were held up as models for all cultural performers and creators, and the highest Party officials in Kwangtung attended PLA cultural programs and exhibits.¹¹⁰

As described in *NFJP*, the scope and the output of PLA cultural activities was prodigious. It included the writing and producing of movies, Western and Chinese-style operas, ballets,

songs, and dances, as well as the writing of magazines, poetry, and novels.

These PLA cultural activities were lavishly praised because they "increase the stature of Chairman Mao's cultural thought" and also because they follow "the policy of serving the workers, peasants and soldiers and to serve socialist construction."¹¹¹

In short, the purpose of PLA cultural activities was not to provide "simply rest and amusement," but to serve as the "most timely and the brightest reflection" of "one's own struggles and tasks" and of the nation's "noble revolutionary enterprises."¹¹² PLA cultural work was being held up as a model because it was a form of political education promoting Chinese Communist ideals. As one article summed it up; PLA cultural work "must praise our great party, our great leader, our great nation, our great people, and our great army."¹¹³

PLA cultural workers were especially praised for spending extended periods of time living among the common soldiers and people in order to better "intimately unite with" and reflect the real lives of the masses.¹¹⁴ Some PLA cultural works were said to have been produced by complete amateurs, common soldiers with no formal or professional training in the arts. They were praised for making up for their lack of education and training with the proper thinking and spirit in art.¹¹⁵

PLA performing groups were praised for having made special efforts, despite the difficulties in transportation and the physical

hardships involved, to bring cultural performances and exhibitions into the more backward and inaccessible rural areas of Kwangtung.¹¹⁶

As might be expected, the content of PLA cultural works was heavily oriented towards the PLA. However, the clear emphasis was upon the PLA in peacetime, covering activities such as drill, training, and rescue operations. Only occasionally were events with a more martial bent covered, such as the uncovering of "American-Chiang secret agents."¹¹⁷

4. Summary of the "Learn from the PLA" Campaign

To summarize the ideal PLA revealed during the 1964 "Learn from the PLA" campaign in both the national press and in the provincial paper *NFJP*, although there were differences with regard to coverage and emphasis, these were complimentary not contradictory in nature. There still was a common core of basic similarity, the essentials of which were the Four-Firsts, the Three-Eight Work-Style, the virtues of modesty and toughness, the five principles of leadership, and the intensive cultivation of close relations with society.

Specifically, the Four-Firsts set forth a method of fighting which, like the People's War tradition, emphasized the importance of man and politics. The Three-Eight Work-Style was the corresponding institutional work-style encompassing such basic points as correct political outlook, hard work, thrift, thorough investigation, and flexibility. The special virtues of toughness and modesty highlighted the PLA's model role as the never arrogant vanguard of the revolution.

The five principles of proper leadership conceived of an equal relationship between the leaders and the led, one which was both very humane and very efficient.

The most outstanding phenomenon concerning the PLA to emerge from the "Learn from the PLA" campaign was the extent to which the PLA in Kwangtung was deeply involved in many non-military, social tasks, of which agriculture was only the most prominent. If such intensive and comprehensive involvement of the PLA in Kwangtung society as was portrayed in *NFJP* had been a long-term trend, then the PLA would have established firm connections with segments of the local society, inter-relationships which presumably could be converted into real political, economic, and social influence and power for the PLA.

In general, it is clear that the "Learn from the PLA" campaign was not a case of the PLA as a distinct "militarist" pressure group attempting to spread its own particular policies, values, or interests throughout a different society. Rather, it was a situation in which the PLA, a national institution enjoying widespread social prestige, was being used as a model of principles and techniques widely held or accepted by both the PRC leadership and population.

The PLA, in fact, was being held up as a model of the virtues required of everyone in a nation striving to escape poverty and backwardness. These entailed such basic virtues as courage, hard work, thrift, and self-sacrifice. They also included other, less obvious ones such as the necessity of squarely facing reality, of close

contact between various levels and sectors, and of taking an active interest in aiding ones comrades.

F. CONCLUSIONS FOR CHAPTER II

In this chapter, the ideal PLA was described through three quite different PRC sources. There were substantial differences among the three sources in the scope of coverage of the PLA. The *Bulletins*, being a classified government document, were by far the most comprehensive as well as the most informative with regard to problems within the PLA. The national PRC press coverage of the "Learn from the PLA" campaign was the most general, the least informative and the least comprehensive on the ideal PLA. The Kwangtung *NEJP* public newspaper at least contained the special element of a detailed treatment of the local PLA's non-military roles in society.

Yet, beneath these superficial differences, there emerged clearly from all three sources a single, coherent consensus of what the ideal PLA should be, principally in terms of the PLA work style.

The essentials of the PLA's ideal work style most importantly of all meant the supremacy of the PRC's basic value priorities and political ideology in all aspects of the PLA's work. It also included such characteristics as flexibility, toughness, and modesty. In the critical aspect of leadership, the PLA's ideal work style aimed at using an egalitarian, harmonious, and intimate relationship between the leaders and the led to produce high levels of discipline and efficiency.

It is difficult to perceive in any of these sources many characteristics of the ideal PLA which pertained to the military profession, the warrior mystique, or even to war itself. On the contrary, the aggregate ideal model of the PLA presented here could, with a few minor changes, have been applied to any bureaucratic institution in the PRC, since it was primarily concerned with how best to perform tasks within the official PRC value and ideological guidelines.

Viewed in the context of the PLA's own tradition, the ideal of the 1960s could be seen as a concerted effort to preserve many of the essentials of the People's War model. Especially crucial in this regard was the determination of the PRC authorities that the PLA, by virtue of its special tasks, must not become separate and differentiated from the great mass of Chinese people in the countryside.

CHAPTER III

THE REALITY: THE PLA IN THE GPCR

A. BACKGROUND: BASIC FACTS OF THE GPCR

There appears to be general agreement among outside observers that Mao Tse-tung personally was largely responsible for launching the GPCR if not for all its eventual results. The usual general analysis is that, after the disasters of the 1958-59 Great Leap Forward Campaign, the Party and state bureaucrats guided China's recovery mainly through "revisionist" policies based upon material incentives and some degree of elitism. But, it transpired that Mao, although in temporary eclipse, had not at all abandoned his vision of a revolutionary society based upon egalitarianism and political fervour. During the Socialist Education campaign of 1962-3 and the "Learn from the PLA" campaign of 1964, Mao came to the conviction that the Party bureaucrats, although nominally supporting his goals, were in practice continuing to execute the same revisionist policies with apparent impunity.

In this situation, Mao gradually came to the conviction that his opposition in the Party and the government administration (such as Liu Shao-ch'i, P'eng Chen and Teng Hsiao-p'ing) was too entrenched to be eradicated through normal methods. In order to destroy these "bourgeois representatives who have sneaked into the organs of proletarian dictatorship, the small handful of power holders within

the party who are taking the capitalist road," Mao decided to raise support among the students totally outside the regular Party apparatus.¹ Since the ultimate goal of Mao was to ensure the continuation of his anti-elitist, idealistic and struggle-oriented type of revolution, the choice of a mass student movement to spearhead the GPCR was quite explicable. Such an approach also meant an ad hoc mass movement, one which would by its very nature be difficult to closely control and direct from above. But Mao seems to have been determined to achieve his goals whatever the risks.

Similarly, there seems to be general consensus among Western scholars of the GPCR as to its national periodization, one into six phases.

According to this general scheme, the first phase from about June 1966 to January 1967 was characterized by the formation of the large Red Guard groups and the rapid broadening of their targets, beginning with only the sphere of education and culminating with the leadership of the Party during the "January storm of Revolution" in 1967. In this phase the PLA's active role was limited to transporting, feeding and encouraging the Red Guards.

However, during this phase of the GPCR the Red Guards did not satisfactorily achieve their principal appointed task of removing the entrenched Party bureaucrats throughout society. The latter had been evading the Red Guard attacks by adopting various subterfuges such as infiltrating the Red Guard organizations in order to deflect the targets of attack elsewhere, organizing their own Red Guard groups, and "sacrificing pawns to save knights."² Mao's opponents in the

Party also attempted to exaggerate his directives in order to arouse greater popular opposition to the Red Guards, that is

putting forth slogans which were 'left' in form but right in essence such as 'suspecting all' and 'over-throwing all.' 3

In any case, during the second phase, lasting from February to March 1967, a national directive of January 23, 1967 ordered the PLA into active intervention into the Cultural Revolution for the first time:

The PLA is a proletarian revolutionary army personally created by Chairman Mao and is the most vital tool of proletarian dictatorship. In this great struggle of the proletarian dictatorship to seize power from the bourgeoisie, the PLA must firmly take the side of the proletarian revolutionaries and resolutely support and help the proletarian leftists. 4

Throughout the GPCR, the ideal role for the PLA generally was summed up in the slogan "three supports and two militaries." According to this formula the PLA was to support agriculture, industry, and "the revolutionary left" as well as to provide political and military training and military control. In other words, in the GPCR the PLA was to ensure the maintenance of economic production and at the same time to assist actively the groups supporting Mao's policies in the locality.

After the PLA intervened in the GPCR in January 1967, a definite national pattern arose of alternating phases of intensive factional activity, struggle and at times violence, followed by relative calm.

The second phase of the GPCR, lasting from February until March 1967, was followed in the third phase, from April to August 1967, by renewed and intensified factional struggle, which included verbal and physical attacks on the PLA. The following fourth phase, from September 1967 to March 1968, (during which phase the detailed analysis in this chapter will start), saw a return to relative peace and order. Then, in the fifth phase, from April to July 1968, came the last upsurge in factional disorders nationally. Finally, the sixth phase, from July 1968 to April 1969, included the final PLA-directed crack-down on mass factionalism in society and the completion of the initial reconstruction stage through a national network of revolutionary committees.

As the GPCR progressed, the degree of PLA presence in every sector of society increased markedly. This trend was exemplified in the composition of the Ninth Congress of the CCP in April 1969 (the convening of which is usually taken as marking the end of the GPCR). According to one computation, 51% of the Central Committee of 170 and almost half the all-important Politburo (10 out of 21) were active PLA leaders.⁵ Similarly, in the newly created revolutionary committees at the provincial level 76% (22 or 29) of the chairmen and 49% (235 of 479) of the standing committee members were PLA members.⁶

B. BASIC WESTERN INTERPRETATIONS OF THE PLA IN THE GPCR

While the greatly increased presence of the PLA in Chinese society during the GPCR is a universally accepted fact, among Western observers there is no such clear-cut unanimity as to its meaning and implications. What follows is only a selection of the more significant interpretations which especially paid attention to the PLA's role in the GPCR, since the tremendous proliferation of Western studies on the GPCR made it impossible to cover all of them.

Of the Western studies of the PLA in the GPCR I examined (all but one of which were national in scale), there was a very clear division of opinion into two general schools, one of which basically interpreted the PLA's behavior in the GPCR as being disloyal to Mao Tse-tung's policies and one which viewed it as being loyal overall.

Since these interpretations were rooted in very differing views on the basic nature of the PRC, it would do well to examine individual examples of each interpretation in somewhat greater detail.

The interpretation which saw PLA opposition to the policies of Mao in general could be said to follow the "social science" approach I described in the introduction. That is, it rejected the priorities and methods of Mao as unfeasible and not "realistic," and thus strongly downplayed the relevance of Maoist ideology in explaining the events in the PRC. Instead, this interpretation tended to view the PRC in terms of various occupational and interest groups scheming and struggling for power and wealth while paying only nominal obedience to Mao. In particular, the PLA was viewed as basically similar to

Western military organizations; that is, "rational," "pragmatic," and "authoritarian" in attitudes and interests; favouring the development of highly-technically developed forces; and opposed to "radical" Maoist military and social doctrines. As a result in the GPCR, according to this interpretation, the PLA basically worked to thwart Mao's revolutionary aims and to further its own interests and policies.⁷

For example, William Whitson depicted the PLA elite as anti-Mao in basic policies but also divided within itself by personal rivalries.⁸ The PLA was "not a highly politicized force devoutly loyal to Mao but a congeries of conflicting loyalties. . . ."⁹

In the GPCR Whitson argued that, in view of the prevailing chaos, the massive PLA intervention was largely unavoidable. But, the PLA "conservative and conventional," "professional military men" in the process worked to further their own anti-Mao policies and interests:

the Cultural Revolution was finally brought under control by a 1967-68 campaign of military suppression of Red Guards and a national defense mobilization process that soon involved the military in all aspects of daily life in China, including Party rebuilding and daily administration of everything from import to export control, to rationing and compensation of production teams. . . .¹⁰

The heart of Whitson's interpretation of the PLA in the GPCR was his elaborate portrayal of several intra-PLA divisions; some personal in nature (the five field armies), others regional (the eleven Military Regions), and bureaucratic (the six "career channels").¹¹ The foundation of Whitson's thesis was his belief that

the primary concern of PLA leaders was "their own status, their own resources, and their own political survival" and to resist "Mao's efforts to render the PLA into a school of Maoist revolution."¹² In policy they were

more interested in evolution than revolution and in rational routinization of scarce resource allocation for the sake of solid progress toward priority goals instead of erratic sloganeering, mass movements toward image building. ¹³

In one place Whitson argued that, as a result of the GPCR, there was the possibility of the appearance of "warlordism" or at least "regional military dictatorship" in China because PLA leaders were concerned more with "the lure of immediate local power," and still held "regional and personal loyalties and interests over national ones."¹⁴

In his many articles on the PLA in the GPCR, Ralph L. Powell went into considerable detail in analyzing the nature of PLA penetration into Chinese society, particularly in the areas of Party rectification, agriculture, industry, public security, transportation, and state administration.¹⁵

Powell argued that in the GPCR many military leaders had "opposed the radical aspects of Mao's policies," because, "given their traditional missions, training, and tight organizational structure, military men -- whatever the ideology -- naturally tend to abhor disorder and lack of discipline."¹⁶

For example, Powell evaluated the PLA's general performance in the economic sphere as demonstrating greater interest in promoting

production than Maoist revolution, believing that the PLA had been "pragmatic and cautious," seeking mainly to "preserve order, strengthen national economy, increase their own power and avoid Mao's wrath."¹⁷

Powell maintained that the PLA in the GPCR had tremendously increased its power mainly at the expense of Mao and his supporters, and that

there are some rather striking similarities between the regional leaders of the PLA and the major militia commanders of the latter half of the nineteenth century. Both added influential civil posts and economic controls in the provinces to their important military commands. Both groups shifted the balance of power from Peking toward the provinces. Both emphasized military reforms and progress. Still, both remained loyal to the 'system,' but were divided by factionalism. Hence they did not overthrow the regime. ¹⁸

In his analysis of the PLA in the GPCR, Parris Chang particularly emphasized the theme of military regionalism predominating over civilian centralism.¹⁹

While "power devolved into its hands largely by default," the PLA, once it had intervened massively in the GPCR, worked to further its own particular interests and not those of Mao.²⁰ To Chang it was inevitable for "conservative" and "moderate" PLA leaders to support "anti-Maoist rebel groups" and to make every effort "to crack down on unruly rebel groups."²¹

The result "in many provinces approximated a military takeover" because, "the military did not rule directly, but its influence was nevertheless dominant and its representatives actually constituted the backbone of the new leadership structure."²² In the process, regional military leaders had increased their ability to evade the

directives of Peking "by means of subterfuge, sabotage and passive resistance while displaying outward conformity."²³

Chang suggested that, "in pushing the military into active participation in the political arena, Mao also signed the death warrant of his revolutionary crusade."²⁴ He also concluded that,

it seems quite doubtful that the civilian elements of the Party would be able again to place the military leaders under the control and reduce the political role of the PLA in the system. ²⁵

Jurgen Domes argued that, "the only entirely obvious result of the Cultural Revolution so far has been a military takeover in the provinces. . . ."²⁶ His basic view was that, in the GPCR, the PLA "professional soldiers" were opposed to "the attempts to enact a radical change in Chinese domestic politics."²⁷ Consequently, when called upon to support the Maoists, most of the local PLA leaders refused to render "unconditional and all-out support to Maoist factions," and gradually they pressured the center to adopt more "moderate" policies.²⁸ The eventual result was "an old shattered society run by a combination of cool, professional military engineers of power."²⁹

Ellis Joffe stood somewhat in the middle between the two principal interpretations of the PLA in the GPCR.³⁰ On the one hand, he argued the GPCR had shown that the PLA leaders were "largely pragmatic military men, who have . . . demonstrated their disdain for radical revolutionary policies."³¹ As evidence, he asserted that the PLA in the GPCR had "intervened not as a radical revolutionary force, but rather as a moderating and stabilizing element."³²

Pronounced in this regard were the tendencies of "military commanders to ally with, rather than to attack, local Party officials" and "when forced to choose between the conflicting demands of order and revolution, to choose the former."³³

On the other hand, Joffe believed that PLA commanders had been

motivated not by a desire to have 'the gun control the Party,' nor by a desire to chip away at the power of the central leadership but rather by the conflicting pressures to which the Cultural Revolution subjected them.³⁴

In particular, the PLA had been saddled with

the impossible assignment of implementing two mutually exclusive objectives; to maintain order and to encourage revolutionary activity which by its very nature is disruptive of order. ³⁵

Overall, Joffe concluded that, in the GPCR,

the commitment of regional commanders to national unity and their basic allegiance to the Center have far outweighed the centrifugal tendencies inherent in their newly-attained power. ³⁶

We now turn to examples of the general interpretation which emphasized the basic loyalty of the PLA in the GPCR to the Center headed by Mao Tse-tung.

In an article on the movement of officials in the provinces, Gordon Bennett attacked what he termed the "regionalism-militarization" interpretation or the "modern warlord hypothesis."³⁷ He believed that

his evidence showed continued strong central power and surmised that "the highly visible military presence after the Cultural Revolution might well be no more than a period in a cycle."³⁸

William Parish, in a critique of Whitson's factional model of the PLA leadership, maintained not only was the "Chinese military, in fact, a united national force" before the GPCR, but, "even in the Cultural Revolution military leadership was highly centralized."³⁹ He concluded, "There is still little evidence . . . for vast loyalty systems that are a constant threat to a centralized government."⁴⁰

Similarly, Harvey Nelsen concluded that his study of troop movements in the GPCR "revealed far greater central control" over the PLA than any factional "field army" thesis could allow for.⁴¹ Nelsen did concede that a portion of the PLA, the regional forces (independent and garrison units), had proven "not organizationally or politically suited for the job of supporting the Left and eradicating all influence of the former provincial and municipal Party committees" because of their long-standing, close ties with the latter.⁴² He still believed that, overall,

the immense latent political power of the centrally controlled [main force] units is such that the national leadership need have little fear of strong regional challenges from the new elite of military officers in the seats of provincial power. ⁴³

David Wilson emphasized that the PLA's task in the GPCR had been made "extremely difficult" largely because of the "extreme vagueness of the directives" from the Center.⁴⁴ He did admit that the PLA at times had acted "with too heavy a hand and in too conservative a manner" or had distorted "the spirit of orders" by interpreting them

in "accordance with the situation in the individual areas."⁴⁵ However, Wilson argued that it was more significant that no PLA commander "seems deliberately to have opposed the orders of the center."⁴⁶ He concluded his study with the statement: "the PLA seems to have tried to carry out its almost impossible task with remarkable loyalty."⁴⁷

John Gittings maintained that the outstanding characteristic of the PLA's behavior in the GPCR had been "its ambiguity" in the midst of a very confusing and chaotic situation.⁴⁸ His main point was that there was "little specific evidence to show the Army has been actively disloyal," especially when viewed in light of the fact that

far less has the PLA shown any intention of 'taking over' the country, despite the impressive amount of actual political power placed in its hands, as a less well indoctrinated or more ambitious army might have done long before. 49

In particular, the PLA had acted with "self-restraint in view of the provocation, of the purge of high-ranking officers, and of the indignities" which had been inflicted upon it in the course of the GPCR. On the other hand, Gittings did concede that in the provinces:

the PLA almost invariably sided with, and sometimes even gave financial and material support to, the less radical 'rebel' groups while seeking to restrain . . . the more revolutionary and truly Maoist factions. 50

James Jordan took the strongest stand of those who emphasized the basic loyalty of the PLA to the center in the GPCR. He characterized the PLA as "unique among military organizations in the world in its organization and in its relationship to the people and the country's political apparatus."⁵¹ Jordan defined the PLA as a "proletarian" army, "an army of the people in which the people identify themselves

as part of the military system and soldiers regard themselves as members of the masses."⁵² In the GPCR, he maintained, the PLA, by and large, "justified Mao's confidence in its thorough politicization, and lived up to its reputation as being an 'army of the whole people.'"⁵³ And after the GPCR; "In spite of its predominant role and obvious power, the PLA has remained subordinate to the Party."⁵⁴

To summarize, in contrast to the interpretation which portrayed the PLA as a factionalized institution opposed to Mao, this interpretation pictured the PLA in general as a basically loyal, unified and well-integrated institution, suddenly confronted with a very complex and confusing situation in the GPCR. And, while admitting that at times in the GPCR certain PLA units did not wholeheartedly follow the directives from the center, overall the pattern of PLA behavior was seen as one of obedience.

C. CASE STUDY: THE PLA IN THE KWANGTUNG GPCR FROM FEBRUARY 1968 TO JUNE 1970

1. Introduction

The last section of the body of this paper is an analysis of the PLA's behavior in a concrete situation, the GPCR, in a precise area, Kwangtung province, and over a distinct time span, February 1968 to June 1970.

As I intimated in the introduction to the paper, the GPCR, which in its entirety lasted roughly from early 1966 to at least mid-1969 was a cataclysmic phenomenon, plainly atypical and still very

perplexing. But, since it took in all of Chinese society, each sector, including the PLA, was forced in some way to react positively to the rapidly unfolding chain of events. The time span to be considered in detail was limited to the latter half of the GPCR partly in order to allow for more detailed coverage in a rapidly changing and confusing situation and partly because, relatively speaking, it is the part of the GPCR period which has been the least studied both with respect to the GPCR as a whole and to the PLA's place in it. Kwangtung province was chosen simply because it was the only area of China for which anything approaching comprehensive data were available.

As an introduction to this section, it is necessary to consider one special methodological problem, that of sources, and also to analyze in summary form the overall GPCR period in Kwangtung, concentrating on the development of factionalism throughout society and also the nature of the PLA's involvement in the Kwangtung GPCR before February 1968.

Unlike the normal situation with regard to sources from the PRC, during the GPCR there temporarily thrived a large number of factional publications not formally censored by the government and expressing relatively different points of view (although none I saw openly advocated anti-CCP or anti-Mao Tse-tung policies). However, since all these special GPCR publications (which usually took the form of small tabloids) reached the outside through surreptitious and haphazard means, they suffered from a glaring lack of continuity in coverage. Furthermore, all the GPCR materials I had access to had been through the unknown selection processes of the

American Consulate in HongKong.⁵⁵ Thus, all in all, the case of the GPCR represented only a partial improvement in the situation with regard to sources.

In this chapter for the first time in the paper, I made extensive use of accounts by refugees from China. In particular, I used the accounts by two refugees who personally witnessed and participated in the Kwangtung GPCR, although both did so during 1967, before the period to be considered in detail here.⁵⁶ Generally I have a low opinion of the value of any material by refugees who, by definition, were in some way disaffected or unsuccessful in their previous situations and who are generally unrepresentative in terms of geographic and socio-economic backgrounds. However, the two in question here seem to have been unusually perceptive observers and, more importantly, describe details and examples not obtainable elsewhere.

Precisely to what extent regionalism, either of the social or political varieties, existed in Kwangtung during the GPCR and influenced events is a problem which cannot be resolved with any degree of certainty. The term "provincialist" was at times used in factional tabloids in Kwangtung, but at all times only as a politically derogatory epithet for one's enemies.⁵⁷ There was no other overt sign of any regionalism in all the many factional tabloids, although public papers would be expected to be one of the least likely forums for the expression of illegitimate regionalist views.

Much more significant in this regard to me is the fact that the sequence and pattern of events in the GPCR in Kwangtung closely followed the national ones.

2. Periodization

The general periodization of the GPCR in Kwangtung broadly followed the national pattern which was outlined above, that is to say, in the Kwangtung GPCR there were six basic phases; the first lasting approximately from July 1966 until January 1967, the second from February to March 1967, the third from April to August 1967, the fourth from September 1967 to March 1968, the fifth from April to July 1968, and the sixth from July 1968 to April 1969. As was also evident in the national case, in the Kwangtung GPCR there too emerged a very definite pattern or cycle of alternating phases of relative disorder (the first, third, and fifth phases) followed by relative calm (the second, fourth, and sixth phases). It should be reiterated here again that this chapter will concentrate mainly upon the PLA in the Kwangtung GPCR only during the three later phases, that is the fourth, fifth, and sixth.

3. The Development of Mass Factionalism

The single most important characteristic of the Kwangtung GPCR and the key to understanding it was the development of mass factional organizations outside of government control in every significant sector of society. In the history of the PRC this was an unprecedented development and one which forms the major appeal in studying the GPCR.

Only during the beginning of the first phases from July to September 1966 was the Kwangtung GPCR confined to the student Red

Guard organizations and the education sector. Very rapidly the Red Guards broadened and intensified their targets for attack to the cultural, political and economic spheres. As the disorder spread throughout society and the government became increasingly paralyzed, the masses of workers and peasants started to become involved directly in the GPCR and to organize their own autonomous factional organizations.

At the same time the GPCR in Kwangtung was broadening into virtually every school, factory, office, and commune, it was also breaking up into many factions. In a single work unit several competing factions would be formed initially but typically one of them would gradually become predominant. Rapidly, channels of communication and some degree of co-operation were established between individual factional organizations with similar views. In rural and suburban areas, the unit of cooperation was the neighbourhood, while in urban, industrialized areas it was the work place. More elaborate coalitions of factions embracing large areas or entire occupations appeared.

How well-organized some of the factions or coalitions in Kwangtung eventually became is indicated from one tabloid, which charged that the factions of their enemies were "recruiting supporters everywhere" and setting up "separate mountain strongholds to expand their own influence," adding that these "not only have set up new mountain strongholds mixing different occupations" but were "extending their activities to other administrative districts, cities and hsien."⁵⁸ Another tabloid charged that one faction coalition, the August 1 Combat Corps, had a total of between 50-80 thousand members, organized in 110

units throughout Kwangtung's factories, offices, businesses, schools, communes, and neighborhood committees.⁵⁹

A more detailed indication of the nature of factional activity and, in particular, of how bitter and highly developed at least some of the factional infighting had become, was clearly evident in the text of a peace agreement worked out in Peking during November 1967 among various contending factions in Kwangtung.⁶⁰

In particular, the third article of it ordered all mass organizations to hand all weapons over and forbade any further "manufacture of weapons." It also banned "property smashing, looting, raiding and arrests." The same article also stated that all "road-blocks," "strongholds," "residential joint defenses," and "private radio stations" were to be dismantled. Article five ordered all workers, peasants, cadres, and students to return to their original units with the assurance that reprisals would not be taken against them by other members of their units.

The sixth article demanded a restoration of the "smooth flow of communications and transportation between the city and rural areas." This article, in particular, forbade any faction from interfering with trains and ships, from stealing means of transportation, and imposing their own curfews on areas.

Article seven forbade "anyone to instigate the peasants to enter the city or to go to the countryside to stir up factional struggles."

Article eight stipulated that any outsiders "who have taken over factories, enterprises, rural areas, State organs, newspaper

offices, broadcasting stations, schools and other public centers should withdraw immediately."

It is clear from the above document (which apparently was from the classified, private collection of a high official and not meant for publication) that, during the GPCR period in Kwangtung, what had occurred was a general breakdown of the state control over society, allowing individuals and factions to move about and to organize as they wished. And, while certainly not all factions would be as well-organized nor as lawless as the above indicated, the fact still remains that such behavior could be and was committed with apparent impunity.

In studying the GPCR, determining the nature of factionalism is the most basic and crucial problem. For, the factions were the new element whose relatively differing policies and explicit actions were the principal dynamic in the turbulent GPCR situation. Their tabloids form by far the most important source for the GPCR in Kwangtung. Thus, the interpretation one places on the nature of factionalism, particularly the identity of the issues and considerations motivating their actions and struggles, inevitably will play a decisive role in one's overall interpretation of the GPCR. For this reason, my view of the nature of factionalism in Kwangtung is here presented.

Fortunately for the sake of simplicity, outside observers as well as the Chinese tabloids themselves did strongly tend to categorize the multitude of factions that sprang up in Kwangtung during the GPCR into two broad groups or coalitions of factions.

In Kwangtung these two coalitions went through several name changes but, since they were usually known popularly as the Flag and East Wind groups of factions, I will follow this nomenclature throughout the chapter.

It should be remembered, however, that, while reducing the many factions into two distinct categories was a necessary step in order to bring the confusing subject into more manageable proportions (both for the Chinese participants at the time and for later Western observers), this did not mean that there existed throughout the Kwangtung GPCR two great faction coalitions embracing all aspects of society and each possessing a high level of political unanimity and organizational efficacy. Rather, the terms "East Wind" and "Flag" should be regarded as representing more the two predominating states of mind which under certain conditions could be converted into united action among many factions.

A former Red Guard in Canton turned refugee summed up the basic differences between the factions by describing the East Wind group "as the less militant of the two, less antagonistic to existing authority, and less sweeping in the scope of its attacks."⁶¹ While this does provide some indication of the relative difference between the two major faction coalitions, it still does not spell out the specific attitudes and policies of each, particularly in terms of Western political categories.

Among Western scholars of the GPCR there has been a very marked tendency to characterize the inter-factional struggle as being one between "radicals" and "conservatives." This interpretation

sees the GPCR as a temporary loosening of controls which unintentionally unleashed a whole series of long suppressed tensions and contradictions throughout Chinese society between the "haves," or those with a vested personal interest in the status quo in society, and the "have-nots," or those who felt in some way at a disadvantage, be it economically or educationally.⁶²

I would argue first, that the inter-factional situation in the Kwangtung GPCR was much more complex than can be accommodated in a straight "radical" and "conservative" distinction based upon economic, political, and social self-interest, and secondly, that any labels or characterizations placed on the factions must be seen in their Chinese context.

While here we are seriously handicapped in the West by the lack of basic knowledge concerning the workings of contemporary Chinese society, nevertheless it seems just as reasonable to believe that the factors of personality, locality, place of work, ethnic group and ideology also played significant parts in determining factional coalitions and enemies. The factional tabloids themselves emphasized ideology and, to a much lesser extent, personalities.

Yet, even with regard to ideology, it seems clear to me that the differences between the East Wind and Flag groups were not over basic goals or values but rather only details of timing, method and interpretation. None of the factional sources available to me, even though any state control over the press had lapsed, ever questioned the basic goals and policies of the GPCR set forth by the Center in the name of Mao-Tse-tung. On the contrary, the tabloids

of all factions constantly vied with each other in proclaiming ever more fervent loyalty to Mao and his GPCR policies. Thus, neither faction group could in any way be termed "conservative" or even "moderate" in the prevailing Western political parlance.

4. The PLA in the Kwangtung GPCR before February 1968

At this point a brief summary must be made of the PLA's involvement in the Kwangtung GPCR before the period to be examined in detail, that is before February 1968.

As with the rest of the nation, so in the Kwangtung case the beginning of the PLA's direct involvement can be precisely dated with the January 25, 1967 national proclamation ordering it into active participation in the GPCR. It will be remembered that the PLA's responsibilities in the GPCR were summed up in the slogan "three-supports and two-militaries," which in effect called upon the PLA to assist both in maintaining essential economic production and in overthrowing the discredited entrenched political authorities.

Towards these ends, the PLA began to send small groups or individuals into work units in all sectors of Kwangtung society. Thus, the PLA set up military control committees in urban economic and governmental units, military training groups in the universities and middle schools, and military front commands in the rural communes. This whole process culminated in the proclamation of military control over the whole province in early March 1967.⁶³ What is not clear is the extent to which these military advisory groups were or were not

set up in every work, study and living unit of Kwangtung society.

What is clear is that during this phase from January to March 1967 the PLA in Kwangtung signally failed in executing the task of supporting the overthrowing of the existing authorities in the Party. In fact, the net practical effect of the PLA intervention at this juncture was a definite dampening of the factional activity and thus a halting of the momentum of the GPCR in Kwangtung. Naturally this development especially infuriated the more determined Flag factions (whose more strident commitment to the goals of the GPCR as they saw them will be more fully documented below). In such a manner a deep suspicion on the part of the Flag group was established towards the PLA and particularly Huang Yung-sheng, the commander of the Canton Military Region Command (CMRC).⁶⁴

As to the real reasons for the PLA's failure to promote the GPCR at this time, the refugee source tentatively attributed it to the exceedingly confused and complex situation the PLA faced in Kwangtung and to the PLA's relative lack of experience in handling such complicated political situations:

Since local commanders had been told simply to help the true left suppress the right, it was left to them to decide which groups were associated with which category of opinion. They had no experience in sorting out the many views and arguments surrounding issues which had divided . . . [the two groups], and were thus very unsure of themselves. ⁶⁵

On the other hand, in his study of Huang Yung-sheng's role in the Kwangtung GPCR, Jurgen Domes argued that the PLA in Kwangtung from the very start of active participation in January 1967 as

"professional" soldiers had fundamentally been opposed to the "radical" Flag factions. Domes interpreted the PLA's actions in Kwangtung as a well-organized plot with their allies, the "conservative" East Wind factions, to liquidate the Flag factions. Temporarily the PLA in Kwangtung was restrained by fears of reprisals from the Peking leadership, but eventually in 1968, after many vicissitudes, it was able to launch its long contemplated brutal campaign of suppression and revenge against the "radical" Flag group.⁶⁶ Domes concluded that the behaviour of PLA officers in the Kwangtung GPCR had demonstrated that they were not "highly influenced by Maoist theories of revolution," and were "against the attempts to enact a radical change in Chinese domestic politics."⁶⁷

Whatever the feelings between the PLA and the Flag group, to me the far more significant fact is that the PLA stepped aside without any overt display of dissent when Peking again greatly encouraged factional activities from April until August 1967 (the third phase of the GPCR). Despite its tremendously increased presence throughout Kwangtung society the PLA now suddenly became "an essentially passive force" possessing "no clear political policy."⁶⁸ In fact, during this phase, the PLA was said to have been "roundly criticized" by both the Flag and the East Wind groups for failing to render wholehearted support to them.⁶⁹ Huang Yung-sheng himself was temporarily recalled to Peking where he made a public confession of the CMRC's previous errors in handling the Kwangtung GPCR.⁷⁰

As the PLA stepped aside, inevitably the conflict between the two faction groups quickly escalated into full-scale armed struggle.⁷¹ Caught in the cross-fire with no positive policy

mandate from Peking, the PLA in Kwangtung could only watch helplessly while maintaining the facade of military control. Both faction groups even could and did carry out raids upon PLA armories for military weapons and equipment with total impunity.⁷² In the process PLA men were humiliated, beaten and even murdered, but in spite of the flagrant provocation, the PLA in Kwangtung showed no sign of breaking discipline and taking the law into its own hands.

Eventually, beginning in September 1967, the GPCR policy of the Center again shifted sharply and rampant factional activity was discouraged while the PLA was given broader powers to prevent factional violence. In November 1967 a comprehensive peace agreement between the various factions in Kwangtung was hammered out in Peking under the personal auspices of Premier Chou En-lai.

5. The General Character of the February 1968-June 1970 Period in Kwangtung

We now reach the GPCR period in Kwangtung which is to be examined in greatest detail, that is from February 1968 to April 1969. As was stated previously, this time-span encompasses part of the fourth phase of the GPCR and all of the fifth (April to July 1968) and sixth (July 1968 to April 1969) phases. As well, I propose to take the detailed analysis of the PLA's role in the Kwangtung GPCR one step further in time by examining the PLA's role in the immediate post-GPCR phase from June 1968 to about July 1970 in Kwangtung.

In this period from February 1969 to June 1970, as in earlier periods, the abrupt and widely gyrating course of the GPCR

was closely reflected in the equally abrupt and widely divergent changes in the roles the PLA was called upon to play in Kwangtung. In brief, we shall see the PLA successively assume the roles of arbitrator between contending factions, helpless bystander amidst rampant factional struggle (the fifth GPCR phase from April to July 1968), tough suppressor of factional organizations (the sixth GPCR phase from July 1968 to April 1969), and administrator of society after the GPCR.

6. The Fourth Phase of the GPCR in Kwangtung: The PLA as Mediator

The formation of the Kwangtung Provincial and the Canton Municipal Revolutionary Committees (which were to replace the discredited Party and government organs) on February 21, 1968 marked the climax of the fourth phase of the GPCR, a phase characterized by relative inter-factional peace and initial political reconstruction.

The composition of both committees reflected the existing shaky coalition of soldiers and rehabilitated cadres, as well as members of both the Flag and East Wind faction groups.⁷³

The PLA held a large majority of the highest positions in both revolutionary committees but were in a definite minority in total membership.⁷⁴ This could either indicate that the PLA had simply seized the predominant political power in the province (as Jurgen Domes argues), or that, in a situation of political stalemate, it was the only group generally trusted as an arbitrator.⁷⁵

Certainly the published speeches of the leading PLA figures on the committees at the time lent more credence to the latter view.

For there was no special attention in them devoted to the role of the PLA in the GPCR. Rather, it was stated that the PLA supported all factions equally and that the PLA was with "the greatest patience" attempting to conciliate and unite the contending factions, although at the same time all factions were cautioned to "support," "learn from" and "protect" the PLA, and warned against "the sowing of dissension and sabotage of the unity between the army and the people."⁷⁶ One of the speeches by a leading PLA figure diplomatically blamed the factional violence and the previous attacks on the PLA upon a small number of "bad elements," explicitly exonerating both the Flag and East Wind groups.⁷⁷

A national report of the same month had glowingly reported that in Kwangtung, under the guidance of the PLA, "the differences between the revolutionary mass organizations have been ironed out" as the factions had overcome "the bourgeois factionalism in their own heads."⁷⁸ The same report went on to state that the PLA had performed well "the three-supports and two-militaries" tasks and that it was still stationed in the province's "factories, villages, schools and government institutions."⁷⁹

However, all other evidence for this phase indicated that the PLA had not been successful in arbitrating an end to the factional hostility and that in fact the feud between the two main faction groups was as alive as ever, if temporarily relatively subdued in form. In their tabloids both sides maintained unabated their harsh and strident verbal warfare. Each attempted to blame the other for causing the violence and destruction of the GPCR in Kwangtung.

During this, the fourth phase of the GPCR, the tabloids of the East Wind group condemned "factionalism" with great indignation, called for its vigorous suppression, and urged the swift implementation of a great alliance between all groups in Kwangtung.⁸⁰

With regard to the PLA, the East Wind tabloids placed great emphasis upon praising the PLA's behaviour in the GPCR, adding that "we must further trust and rely on the PLA, and cherish it, learn from it and help it."⁸¹ On the other hand, they accused the Flag group of "directing the spearhead against the great Chinese PLA," of not trusting the commitment of the PLA towards the GPCR, and of plotting to attack the PLA politically and militarily.⁸²

The strategy of the East Wind factions here was clearly to pin the blame upon the Flag group for perpetrating the violent acts of the GPCR. The former particularly wished to portray their rivals as being anti-PLA in order to persuade the PLA to suppress the Flag factions.

On the other hand, the Flag group in their tabloids of the phase continued to emphasize realizing the original goals of the GPCR (that is overthrowing the existing Party authorities throughout society), while downplaying the significance of the violence (for which the Flag heatedly disclaimed any direct responsibility) as an inevitable but small price to pay for the overthrow of the old system. The Flag group tabloids did emphasize the exposure of what they saw as a sinister plot on the part of the East Wind group to alienate the PLA from themselves and disclaimed any anti-PLA intentions.⁸³

They, however, did reserve the right to criticize any mistakes the PLA might make.⁸⁴

7. The Fifth Phase of the GPCR in Kwangtung: The PLA as Bystander

In any case, given the depth and sharpness of the hostility between the two principal faction groups in Kwangtung and the high level of organizational and military sophistication attained by each, it is not surprising that even PLA-directed discussions and negotiations totally failed in their purpose of peaceful reconciliation. Since both sides still maintained intact their highly developed and well-armed organizations, the next shift in the policy of the Center in April 1968 towards encouraging factional activity predictably brought about a renewed upsurge in factional armed struggle. Thus, during this, the fifth phase of the GPCR, lasting from April until July 1968, there occurred a large number of incidents involving armed factional clashes.

Since the PLA in Kwangtung was still stationed in work units in society, of necessity it was forced to react to these incidents in some manner, even if their role was supposed to be that of bystander. However, there was a signal lack of reports of specific instances of factional strife involving the PLA at this time in the tabloids. This fact would seem to indicate that the PLA was scrupulously remaining in the background.

From the factional tabloids available from Kwangtung, I was able to find only six specific instances of factional strife in which the PLA's role was mentioned. Of these there were three

alleged instances of PLA suppression of Flag faction members reported in Flag tabloids. In the first case, a Flag tabloid asserted that certain fiercely anti-Flag PLA leaders on Hainan Island had killed twelve local Flag members in the process of evicting a group of Flag faction members from a government building they had been occupying.⁸⁵ This incident, which occurred on June 6, 1968, was said to have been the culmination of a long-term policy pursued by some local PLA officers of intimidating and suppressing the local Flag faction.

The second incident of alleged PLA suppression of the Flag group occurred on May 13, 1968 at Chungshan University in Canton. The incident concerned the arrest by the PLA in Canton of Huang I-chien, an important leader of the Flag faction at the university on charges of "spreading false rumours" against the PLA.⁸⁶

The third alleged incident happened on May 30, 1968 near the Canton Middle School No. 22 in which some soldiers were said to have "brutally attacked" a Flag faction Red Guard group which was on its way to rescue a comrade kidnapped by a rival East Wind faction.⁸⁷

It is quite possible that in all three there was prior provocation of the PLA by the Flag factions involved. Also it is important to note that the Flag tabloids explicitly accused only "a small handful" of PLA officers of being anti-Flag while praising the PLA as a whole.

On the other hand, there were three other instances reported in factional tabloids in which PLA units supported neither side in factional struggles.

The first concerned an incident of serious factional armed struggle at the Canton Electric Utility on May 27, 1968. Separate Flag and East Wind accounts both agreed that the small military control committee at the factory had been unable to prevent the outbreak of violence through persuasion. At first the PLA limited their actions to keeping from the battle scene the many reinforcements for both sides which were streaming toward the factory. Eventually, and only after receiving a specific directive from the municipal revolutionary committee, did the PLA move in and forcibly put an end to the fighting (at the cost of 11 PLA soldiers seriously injured).⁸⁸

In the second incident an East Wind tabloid reported that a Flag faction had been besieging an East Wind faction in a building at Chungshan University for three days in early 1968. The Flag faction was said to be armed with handguns, machine guns, grenades, mines, and bombs. The East Wind faction claimed that they had appealed to the PLA for help but that the local PLA had done nothing because "the Red Flag Group thugs blocked the entrance of the university with their guns and refused to admit the PLA soldiers." Thereupon the soldiers were said to have meekly gone away.⁸⁹

The third incidence of PLA neutrality happened on June 8, 1968 at the Canton Middle School No. 29. A Flag tabloid claimed that a party of Flag Red Guards had been attacked by a East Wind faction armed with stones, grenades and guns. The Flag Red Guards reported that they, "adopting the attitude of trusting and relying on the Chinese People's Liberation Army," had attempted several times to persuade the PLA training group in their school at least to arbitrate

the matter. However, the PLA members were said to have always refused, claiming that, "we came to propagate Mao Tse-tung's Thought, not to interfere in matters of this kind."⁹⁰

Clearly here there are not a sufficient number of specific examples from which definitive conclusions could be arrived at, except perhaps that the scarcity of examples of PLA reactions to violent factional incidents reflects its avoidance of any involvement. Even within the limited context of the few available examples of PLA behaviour in factional clashes, no clearcut pattern of PLA reaction or action could be perceived.

The only other type of evidence concerning the PLA's role in the Kwangtung GPCR reported in the factional tabloids was much more frequent but indirect and difficult to interpret. This concerned the differing attitudes of the two major faction groups towards the PLA.

In the case of the East Wind faction group, during this, the fifth phase of the GPCR, from April to July 1968, their tabloids repeated basically the same charges against the Flag group as previously. At great length and in lurid detail, they described the violence and destruction in Kwangtung at the time, blaming it all upon the "factionalism" of the Flag group, and calling for the imposition of a great alliance of all factions.⁹¹ Once again they expressed lavish praise for the PLA's actions in the GPCR, while accusing the Flag group of attempting to slander, divide, provoke, attack, and even overthrow the PLA in Kwangtung.⁹²

On the other hand, the attitude of the Flag group towards the PLA was closely bound up with its general attitude towards the

GPCR. The Flag group still viewed the GPCR in very strict ideological terms as a "life and death" struggle of classes: between the proletariat (i.e. themselves) and the bourgeoisie (their enemies in the East Wind group). It constantly reiterated its firm determination to struggle against any odds using any means until the realization of its vision of the GPCR.⁹³

In particular, the Flag group claimed that its enemies had excluded its cadres from any meaningful participation on the new revolutionary committees.⁹⁴ Furthermore, although the Flag group repeatedly affirmed its opposition to violence and "bourgeois" factionalism, it claimed its enemies had used false propaganda to magnify the disruptions caused by the GPCR and to shift the blame for them solely upon the Flag group of factions.⁹⁵ Even worse, its enemies were said to have provoked armed incidents in order to engage the Flag factions in incidents of fighting, thus providing the pretexts with which to persuade the new revolutionary committees and the PLA to suppress the Flag group.⁹⁶

In such a situation, the Flag group asserted that it was bound by the dictates of ideological principle to continue to vigorously expose and struggle against its enemies in the East Wind group and to oppose the PLA-sponsored efforts to form alliances of the two faction groups. As an essential means of self-defense, the Flag group felt it had to maintain its own independent organizations with their own armed forces.⁹⁷

Thus, the Flag group's attitude towards the PLA was bound to be a highly complex one. On the one hand, the Flag factions never

openly attacked the PLA as a whole, asserting that, "any course of actions that impairs the prestige and authority of the Liberation Army are wrong."⁹⁸ They also often indicated that the Flag group attached great importance to winning the active support of the PLA and were willing to concede to the PLA "the leading role" in the revolutionary committees.⁹⁹

On the other hand, the Flag tabloids also intimated that the PLA was overly sensitive to any criticism of its behaviour by the Flag factions. Rather, the PLA in Kwangtung would turn upon its critics and accuse them of wanting to overthrow the PLA or "directing the spearhead at the PLA."¹⁰⁰ The Flag tabloids asserted that, on the contrary, they were simply constructively and forthrightly criticizing the honest but inevitable mistakes of the PLA in the GPCR.¹⁰¹ It was the enemies of the Flag group who were seizing upon such misunderstandings in order to convince the PLA that the Flag group was full of "monsters and demons" intent upon attacking and overthrowing the PLA in Kwangtung.¹⁰²

The Flag tabloids did suspect that some PLA members were so deeply hostile to their factions that they "never can adapt to the requirements of the present struggle."¹⁰³ These PLA members were claimed to have misused the slogans of "equal treatment for all" and "support the left but not factionalism" in order to feign neutrality and to evade their proper responsibilities of supporting the Flag group.¹⁰⁴ Furthermore, such hostile PLA cadres were said to have struggled against those PLA members who supported the Flag group.¹⁰⁵

Some Flag tabloids went even further and openly charged that "a handful of diehard reactionaries had sneaked" into the PLA in Kwangtung and were willfully suppressing the factions of the Flag group.¹⁰⁶

Taking together the evidence about the PLA in the fifth phase from April to July 1968, the scattered reports of PLA involvement in factional incidents and the respective attitudes of the Flag and East Wind faction groups towards the PLA, the most significant fact to emerge is that there is little evidence to substantiate the view that the PLA in the Kwangtung GPCR pursued a distinct "military" policy.

What is clear is that there was a propaganda war being waged among the faction groups towards winning the support of the PLA. In this the East Wind group held the advantages of less inflexible policies, more sophisticated propaganda, and greater desire to win over the PLA, but even so the East Wind was not able to turn the PLA into an active body in its favour.

On the other hand, there can be little doubt that there existed some degree of suspicion and hostility, which at times exploded into open conflict, between the PLA in Kwangtung and the Flag group of factions. However, I would argue that this state of affairs arose not because of any pre-ordained conflict between a "conservative" PLA and "radical" Flag group. Rather the sources of the conflict are to be found in the general GPCR situation in which both the PLA and the Flag group found themselves spread throughout society with

very different aims, making ample opportunities for misunderstandings and friction to develop. It should rather be emphasized that, in the existing situation with the two confronting each other on a society-wide scale and with the high organizational state of both, unless the PLA and the Flag group exercised considerable restraint and shared many values and attitudes, the result very early in the GPCR would have been an all-out and very bloody civil war.

8. The Sixth Phase of the GPCR in Kwangtung: The PLA as Suppressor of Factionalism

With all the inter-factional enmity and struggles, it is thus somewhat surprising how quickly such activities were suppressed when the central government so ordered. This abrupt change came at the end of July 1968 and marked the beginning of the sixth phase of the GPCR lasting from July 1968 until April 1969.

Some indication of the speed and the effectiveness of the campaign to suppress factionalism can be gauged from the fact that the multitude of tabloids which all important factions had been publishing since 1967 abruptly became unavailable by the end of July 1968. Thus the sources for most of this late period of the GPCR are no longer these varied factional tabloids, but rather the normal, relatively controlled and uniform official Party press.

In Kwangtung the turning point was the July 10, 1968 proclamation of the Kwangtung Provincial Revolutionary Committee. This promised stern punishment for all the "bad men in the mass organizations" who had "killed people or burned down homes,"

disrupted communications, stolen State secrets, operated private radio stations, or attacked the PLA.¹⁰⁷ What transpired was not only an attack on the criminal elements but also a systematic campaign to discredit, disarm and ultimately break up the faction organizations.

Since the PLA was the institution least affected by the ravages of the GPCR and was already stationed throughout society, it is not surprising that it was now called upon to play the major role in this campaign. After July 1968 the PLA usually was referred to in the press as "the pillar of the dictatorship of proletariat." A typical reference described how the PLA "launched a powerful attack on the class enemies" and thus "the streets and alleys of Canton were cleaned up by the heroic actions of the PLA."¹⁰⁸

In many ways the situation the PLA faced in suppressing factionalism could be likened to that in a traditional Chinese peasant rebellion. The enemies, the factional organizations, were not readily distinguishable from the local populace. The basis of their strength lay in their support among the masses who supplied the essential recruits and supplies.

In any case, given the high degree of organizational development of the factions, the wide diffusion of weapons among them, and the very uncompromising political positions of some of them, the simple application of military force against them could well have been a long and costly process. Thus, the strategy chosen by the PLA in Kwangtung emphasized non-violent, psychological, and political tactics, such as mobilizing public opinion and support and splitting

the leaders from the rank and file in the factions, combined with the judicious use of force or the threat of it only against the recalcitrant. In the now state-controlled press this was termed as "mobilizing the masses" to wage "a People's War" in order to surround "the class enemies" in the factions.

The PLA's emphasis on political tactics becomes even more apparent and appropriate when viewed in light of the counter-strategy adopted by the factions who refused to accept the new situation. Confronted with this crackdown on factionalism, they do not appear to have offered overt, armed resistance. Instead, according to the available state-controlled publications, these factions first tried to persuade public opinion that the PLA was mistakenly suppressing true "revolutionary rebels."¹⁰⁹ When this failed (as we shall see below partly because of the intensive propaganda campaign mounted by the PLA), they "lay down and feigned death," that is they went underground and waited for another change in the policy of the Center. They also offered passive resistance by sabotaging the circulation of directives, destroying documentary evidence, hiding weapons, and spreading false rumours.¹¹⁰

In fact, specific examples of physical, "military" tactics on the part of the PLA, such as armed clashes, intimidation by force, mass arrests, or even physical occupations of premises, were few in number. There were two specific examples cited of PLA occupations of faction centers: on July 13, 1968 a military control group took over the CCP's Central-South Bureau in Canton, and on July 31, 1968 Chungshan University was occupied by a combined soldier-worker-peasant

team.¹¹¹ There were many general statements that the PLA had "unsparingly hit at the class enemies and firmly suppressed them" or that it had imposed "the dictatorship of the proletariat" (which could mean anything from arrest to execution) on "a small handful."¹¹²

To spearhead the actual suppression of factionalism, so-called Mao Tse-tung Thought Propaganda Teams, consisting of one-third soldiers, one-third workers, and one-third peasants, were formed in individual factories, offices, schools, communes, and residential organizations.¹¹³ The use of these teams, even though the PLA was plainly in the leadership position and was already stationed throughout society, highlights the fact that the PLA was taking great pains to make it at least appear that it was not acting alone in the suppression of factionalism but was acting in concert with major non-PLA groups.

Even these teams ideally were only supposed to lead and guide the individual work and study units to destroy factionalism within their units themselves. Ideally, as reported in the state-controlled press, the actual vehicle for suppressing factionalism in each unit was the organization of Mao Tse-tung Thought Classes. In these classes, through intensive political persuasion and mobilization, the intent was to mobilize the majority in each unit to expose and struggle against the "bad elements" who were continuing to foment factionalism, while at the same time to bring about the reconciliation and fusion of the once feuding faction organizations.¹¹⁴

Another political tactic adopted in the suppression of factionalism was to mount an intensive propaganda campaign in the

once again state-controlled press to convince public opinion that the "innumerable misdeeds" committed by certain factions fully justified the strong measures being taken.

In great and lurid detail it was described how in Kwangtung as a result of the "bad" factions regular economic production had been disrupted, transportation and communications paralyzed, public property stolen and destroyed, and innocent civilians robbed and murdered.¹¹⁵

In order to give concrete evidence of these misdeeds, many public displays and exhibitions of weapons, instruments of torture, and stolen goods allegedly seized from certain factions were arranged by the PLA.¹¹⁶ At one particular exhibition, the articles on display included:

different types of firearms and accessories, handgrenades, home made pistols, mines, detonators, explosives, sulphuric acid, '666' insecticide, chain whips, choppers, Japanese sabres, spears, kitchen choppers as well as other lethal weapons . . . as well as tons of imported seamless alloy steel tubing for making weapons. ¹¹⁷

Thus, it was said that "the broad revolutionary masses" had become "extremely indignant" at the "lawless actions" of some factions, and "one after another" had requested "the revolutionary committee and the PLA to eliminate the evils for the sake of the people."¹¹⁸

Another political tactic for suppressing factionalism that was emphasized in the press was to separate leaders from followers in the factions. On the one hand, lenient treatment was promised for those who "confess frankly" or who had been forced or "hoodwinked" into participating in factional criminal activities. On the other

hand, harsh treatment was promised for the "principal offenders" and those "who resist."¹¹⁹

In order to limit the size of the latter category, blame for having caused the misdeeds in the GPCR was placed entirely on the shoulders of "a small handful of class enemies" in the factions. It was asserted that they had sneaked into the factions under the guise of true "revolutionary rebels" and then had provoked the armed feuds among the factions in order to further their own selfish plots to seize power.¹²⁰ To further channel the public resentment towards only a very few, these were portrayed as evil, arrogant and corrupt individuals who had committed all sorts of lurid crimes such as setting up concentration camps and torture chambers.¹²¹

In this regard, the few individuals and factions specifically mentioned as being "class enemies" more often than not were from the Flag group of factions.¹²² They included Wu Ch'uan-pin, a prominent Flag faction leader at Chungshan University and a member of the Standing Committee of the Provincial Revolutionary Committee.¹²³ On the other hand, of the five other individuals most often cited as being class enemies, two were PLA leaders, being the former director and vice-director of the CMRC Political Department.¹²⁴

Domes argued that the target of the suppression campaign was exclusively the "radical" Flag group while the "conservative" PLA and the "conservative" East Wind group in alliance were the principal suppressors.¹²⁵ Granted that the Flag group protested by far the loudest at the suppression of factionalism, but to me the more significant fact is that all the factions of both the East Wind and

the Flag groups disappeared at this time (that is July 1968 to April 1969).

In the propaganda campaign to swing public opinion against factionalism, the only blatant indication of the PLA's predominating role in the suppression of factionalism was the frequent repetition of the charge that the "small handful of class enemies" had pursued an anti-PLA policy. Their crimes against the PLA in Kwangtung during the GPCR were said to have included attempting to split the PLA into opposing factions, slandering the intentions and behavior of the PLA in the GPCR, stealing PLA weapons and equipment, robbing, beating and murdering soldiers, and even plotting to overthrow the PLA high command in Kwangtung.¹²⁶ In particular, these "class enemies" were said to have slandered the PLA as being "Northern Warlords" and "Kuonintang Reactionaries" plotting to execute a military coup. Also incidents of earlier periods in the GPCR, in which the PLA had been humiliated when caught in the cross-fire of factional strife, were now revived with great indignation in the press.¹²⁷

9. The Post-GPCR Period in Kwangtung: The PLA as Administrator of Society

To this point we have been examining the role of the PLA in detail in the GPCR in three different phases from February 1968 until April 1969. Now I propose to take this detailed analysis one step further in time by looking at the PLA's role in Kwangtung during the immediate post-GPCR period from May 1969 until mid-1970. In any

case the sixth and last period of the GPCR merged imperceptibly into the post-GPCR period during which time the PLA's main role changed from active suppressor of factionalism to chief administrator of society.

The following section is based on the assumption that the greatly increased presence of the PLA throughout Kwangtung society as a result of the GPCR meant that there must have been a substantial degree of at least PLA approval if not outright sponsorship of the policies it was now playing a major role in administering. More specifically, in every one of the specific examples cited below PLA units were directly involved in producing the conditions described since in each work or study unit the guidance of PLA units stationed there was specifically mentioned. In other words, the presence of PLA groups in the schools, offices, factories, and communes of Kwangtung cited must have meant some PLA input into the formulation and execution of policies in politics, in economics and in education. If one accepts this assumption, then the changes (or lack of them) brought about in the various sectors of Kwangtung society would constitute evidence (albeit indirect) of the nature of the PLA.

It should be kept in mind here that the source for this period (after April 1969) once again was the state-controlled press, the factional tabloids having ceased publication much earlier in July 1968.

By way of introduction, some concrete indication of the scale and the extent of the PLA's involvement in Kwangtung society during this period comes from two separate articles which together

reported that "slightly more than 10,000 soldiers" had been assigned to the 2,575 Mao Tse-tung Thought Propaganda Teams, which had a total membership of 29,300, in the province.¹²⁸

Assuming that these teams had absorbed the earlier PLA military control groups and thus now represented the sum total of PLA direct involvement in society, then the figure for the PLA is a low one relative both to the population of Kwangtung (45 million) and to the size of the PLA in Kwangtung (which I would estimate at around 180,000).¹²⁹ The figures would also indicate that the PLA, in its work in society, rather than concentrating large units at certain strategic locations, deployed them in small (from the figures the average would be four soldiers per team), scattered units. Also, the fact that the PLA's proportional representation on the teams amounted to roughly one-third illustrates again the PLA's concern to make it at least appear it was acting in alliance with workers and peasants.

These figures probably can be taken as indicative of the scale and the extent of PLA commitment of manpower in the GPCR period.

Surprisingly, politics was the important aspect of society afforded the least extensive and detailed coverage in the press. Only two particular issues were given much attention: the nature of leadership and the question of party rectification in Kwangtung.

With regard to leadership, all cadres were urged to place the highest emphasis upon, first, developing close contact with the basic levels; second, humility in accepting criticism from the masses, third, courage to execute responsible leadership and, fourth,

vigilance to guard against complacency and timidity.¹³⁰

The other aspect, rectification, was a crucial one because it involved the question of how the CCP was to be rebuilt. While the available press materials here were generally very nebulous, it was clear that the new revolutionary committees were meant to be the base, or the "small leading group," around which the new CCP committees were to be built.¹³¹ On the other hand, it was also urged that cadres adopt the policy of "open-door Party rectification" by allowing non-Party members to participate in the rectifying process.¹³² Similarly, with regard to qualifications, the sources were also very generalized, but there was to be provision made for including "outstanding revolutionary rebels" who had been "steeped and experienced in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" in the new Party Committees.¹³³

The economic sector Kwangtung society was strongly divided into a small urban, industrialized part and a much larger rural, agrarian one and both must be treated separately here.

With regard to the former, after re-establishing normal labor discipline, the emphasis was placed first upon promoting political principles and secondly upon increasing production through distinctly non-Western methods. In fact, reliance upon material incentives and technical experts were especially singled out as the principal targets to be attacked and the main impediments to increasing production and improving technology.¹³⁴

The "experts" and the "authorities" were both accused of suppressing the workers by preserving a monopoly over production technology and by shackling the workers under a complex system of

labor rules and administrative procedures.¹³⁵ In the particular case of the Canton Petroleum and Chemical Engineering Works, part of an especially strategic industry, the PLA group stationed there led the workers in removing two-thirds of the administrative and nine-tenths of the technical personnel of the plant.¹³⁶ In the Canton Machine Tools Plant, the old work-quota and attendance systems were similarly abolished.¹³⁷ Henceforth, it was said, the workers themselves would be their own managers and technicians.¹³⁸

On the other hand, PLA units stationed in other plants were praised for protecting experienced industrial managers from being unfairly attacked and for helping give them renewed confidence to manage.¹³⁹

In the all-important rural sector of the economy, most immediately the PLA was said to be helping the communes re-establish discipline by dealing with "the sabotage" of "the class enemies" and thus bringing about a great increase in production.¹⁴⁰ In particular, PLA units, through political struggle and persuasion, were battling such "capitalistic" tendencies as allocating surplus production brigade funds for individual personal consumption, illegally appropriating surplus production for individual use rather than selling it to the state, seizing public land for use as private plots, and working harder on private plots than on the commune lands.¹⁴¹

Furthermore, in the communes PLA units were said to be helping to protect the new local revolutionary committees when "class enemies" seized upon "certain defects and mistakes" of these cadres to again stir up "bourgeois factionalism."¹⁴² To meet this threat the PLA units acted as impartial mediators to bring the

contending groups together in study classes where they could be led in conducting self-criticism and promoting "great alliances."¹⁴³

More generally, as had been very evident in the *NFJP* coverage of the 1964 "Learn from the PLA" campaign, the PLA was again heavily involved in a whole host of activities connected with the normal functioning and development of rural society. For instance, PLA units in Kwangtung were cited for helping in large and small emergencies, improving irrigation systems, installing electrical networks, and educating the peasants to combat superstitions and obsolete social customs.¹⁴⁴

The close contact of the PLA in Kwangtung with the surrounding rural society was exemplified in the medical policies. PLA doctors were praised for going deep into the countryside in order to treat the peasants under very difficult and primitive conditions.¹⁴⁵ Furthermore, the PLA was said to be persuading recent medical graduates to establish and work in a network of rural health centers in order to serve the peasants who often found the existing, urban-concentrated medical facilities too distant and costly.¹⁴⁶

The intense concern for and sensitivity to the needs and interests of rural society on the part of the PLA in Kwangtung should not be surprising in view of its long, heavy involvement in rural tasks and proximity to rural life and the fact that the great majority of the PLA recruits probably are of peasant background. This is not to say that the PLA has become the main political and social spokesman for rural society, but that in order to remain close to the great bulk of Chinese society it had no choice but to reflect rural interests and needs.

The rural bias of the PLA was even clearer in education policy. Most immediately, the PLA was concerned with maintaining the alliances forged earlier in each school -- a task which meant continuing to struggle against the remaining dissidents and patiently convincing the majority that all had committed mistakes in the GPCR and that their rivals were basically class brothers, not class enemies.¹⁴⁷

However, this was just a temporary prelude to a much more radical solution which was to send permanently most students and teachers from the institutions of higher learning as well as most middle school graduates into the countryside to engage in productive labor. The avowed intention was for the students to receive re-education from "workers, peasants, and soldiers" and to gain actual experience in class struggle and in production work.¹⁴⁸

The PLA was heavily involved in this campaign since it played a major logistical role in transporting the students to the countryside and also because many students were sent to PLA-operated farms. The PLA also played a major propaganda role here to convince the students to voluntarily and enthusiastically accept their new assignments, and to overcome their fears that they would have no useful function to play in the countryside and that they would not be well-received or well-treated by the peasants.¹⁴⁹

At the same time in the press a comprehensive attack was launched on the pre-GPCR education system with its emphasis upon bureaucratism, elitism, specialization and foreign technology in light of the actual state and needs of the still developing rural sector of society.

Basically the old education system, even in the case of applied sciences, was said to produce highly-trained specialists who could not effectively apply their knowledge to the existing conditions of rural China.¹⁵⁰ Worse still, it produced graduates with capitalistic ideas "of going to school to become officials," of "intellectualism first," of "blind faith" in foreign things, and of desiring only to secure an easy job in a comfortable place, thus being both unable and unwilling to serve the peasants.¹⁵¹

In one particularly illuminating example, a peasant-run commune school was compared with a government-managed one.¹⁵² The former was praised for being cheaper to operate, for recruiting its teachers from the local area, for gearing its entrance requirements and schedules to conform to local conditions, for producing a curriculum emphasizing practical work experience on the commune, and for producing graduates who were willing to serve as teachers, leaders and managers on the commune. On the other hand, the expensive, isolated and elitist government school had little contact with the surrounding communes, discriminated against peasant children by enforcing unrealistically high entrance standards and academic requirements, and produced graduates who knew little of the situation in the countryside and looked down upon the peasants and their way of living.

As a result, hereafter all schools in Kwangtung were to be run by the peasants and workers, curriculum was to have a very strong emphasis upon practical work experience, and those aspects which discriminated against the relatively disadvantaged peasants, such as fees, examinations, marks and promotion systems, were to be abolished.¹⁵³

Unfortunately, there was little coverage in the press concerning how this intensive PLA involvement in administrating society after the GPCR was received by the public, or what, if any, problems arose. One article did state that PLA representatives on revolutionary committees must make efforts to modestly unite with the other members and not let too much praise or power make them become arrogant and distant.¹⁵⁴ It stated that, whenever "relations between military cadres are not good," then "the military leaders should be held primarily responsible."¹⁵⁵

More generally, there continued to appear some articles like those in the "Learn from the PLA" campaign, which extravagantly praised the PLA and its exemplary characteristics, especially for what was termed its meritorious behavior in "the extremely dangerous and difficult tasks in the GPCR."¹⁵⁶

D. CONCLUSIONS TO CHAPTER III

This study of the behaviour of the PLA in the Kwangtung GPCR with particular emphasis on the period from February 1968 to mid-1970 has found little evidence to support the interpretation which argues that in the GPCR the PLA was a distinct and unified entity, actively disloyal to the Maoist center and pursued its own "conservative" policies and interests. Rather, the evidence from Kwangtung indicated clearly that the PLA, at the behest of the central government, carried out a wide range of very different roles and

tasks. I would in fact turn on its head the interpretation that a united, coherent, and "conservative" PLA view of the GPCR emerged, and argue rather that in the GPCR the PLA more reflected the issues of the government and society.

In fact, the behaviour of the PLA, as far as can be determined from the available sources, evidenced no such purposefulness or direction. Rather, the sharp and abrupt changes in the GPCR policies of the center forced the PLA in Kwangtung to assume a wide range of very different, at times quite contradictory, roles: from being a political arbitrator, to a powerless bystander amidst violent factional strife, to an active director in the suppression of factionalism, and finally to a major administrator of the post-GPCR reconstruction.

The general GPCR situation in Kwangtung the PLA faced was an extremely complex and potentially explosive one, principally because of the development of highly motivated, well-organized, and armed factional organizations throughout society.

Even though before 1968 the PLA had greatly increased its presence throughout Chinese society as a result of the GPCR, that presence had not been converted into increased power for the PLA as an institution. Thus, when the central government encouraged factional activity during the fifth period of the GPCR from April to July 1968, the PLA was reduced to being a passive onlooker, at times humiliatingly caught in the crossfire of words and guns between the feuding factions.

Then, when Peking ordered a decisive crackdown on factionalism in July 1968, the very speed with which the PLA achieved this

only serves to emphasize the discipline and self-restraint with which it had behaved previously in the GPCR, since clearly it had always possessed the potential power to break up any of the factions had it so desired.

The methods the PLA adopted in the final suppression of factionalism, in their emphasis upon non-violent political tactics, demonstrated not only substantial political skill and perceptiveness but also the continued PLA links with its very political People's War tradition and, more distantly, with the military tradition of China before modern times.

Thus, the post-GPCR period in Kwangtung, in which the PLA played a very significant if not dominant role as the temporary director of the shattered Party and government organs, marked no return, at least in the economic and educational spheres, to what in the West might be termed "moderate" policies, but rather a continuation of many central GPCR aims, although through less disruptive methods.

Clearly there existed a greater degree of hostility between the PLA leadership in Kwangtung and the Flag factions than with the East Wind. Partly this could be explained by the more determined positions of the Flag group, which demanded total support from all groups. But partly this could also be because some PLA leaders may have felt more sympathy for the established Party authorities in Kwangtung of the same generation and with whom close political and social links had been built up due to the PLA's previous large-scale and long-term involvement in social tasks.

But the significant point here is that however much some PLA leaders may have disapproved of certain center policies or the activities of certain factions in Kwangtung, they could not or would not use the units under their control in order to take direct action to further their desires. This was so even though the East Wind factions had mounted an intensive propaganda campaign aimed at convincing the PLA it should militarily suppress their rivals in the Flag group.

This is quite different from the behaviour of military forces in other areas of the world where officer corps can and often do use their troops as tools of brute force in pursuing goals which are diametrically opposed to the prevailing views and interests of the rank and file or of the society.

I would argue that such behaviour was very unlikely in the PLA at least partly because the egalitarian and politically active relationship in the PLA between the leaders and the led simply would not allow the PLA to be used for not generally condoned actions.

CONCLUSIONS

Before summing up the principal arguments of the paper, it would be well to recall the tentative nature of them. This was due in large part to the highly incomplete state of our general knowledge of PRC society. For one thing, this meant that in the paper (beyond the lack of perspective inherent in any topic dealing with contemporary events) a great many basic problems could only be surmised at, for example, these included whether PRC state and society were in fact well-integrated, whether Kwangtung, the major area of concentration in the paper, was representative of the entire nation, and whether the great majority of PLA recruits did come from the peasantry.

At the same time, the scarcity of basic knowledge had the further result of making it very difficult to precisely analyze and definitively interpret the available PRC sources. On top of this, there were the limitations of the sources themselves, especially the great discontinuities in coverage, a fact which made it more difficult to contrast topics or problems over a long time span. It was no coincidence that the most informative sources, the 1961 *Work Bulletins* and the GPCR tabloids, were the most unique.

For these reasons, it would be dishonest on my part to claim that the paper's findings are anything but tentative and conditional.

The general argument in the paper was that the PLA of the pre-1949 People's War era, the ideal PLA of the 1961 *Work Bulletins* and of the 1964 "Learn from the PLA" campaign, and the active PLA in

the Kwangtung GPCR all shared a basic nature. This common nature was closely related to the PRC's particular approach to fighting, the PRC's approach to social development, and the PRC's general value priorities as well as to the largely agrarian society of China. The PLA's intensive involvement in many levels and aspects of PRC society, during the 1960s, resulted more in the reflection within the PLA of society's attitudes, characteristics, and trends including society's struggles and difficulties.

In this important regard, the PLA of the 1960s was very different from the distinct, professionalized militaries of the West, be it either the disloyal, militaristic type (such as in pre-1933 Germany) which actively compete with the civilians for political and social influence, or the coerced, controlled type (such as in Stalinist Russia), or the loyal, isolated type (such as in Great Britain and the United States) which generally obey civilian orders. The PLA's intensive involvement in society was also greater than that of the militaries in the developing nations.

The PLA's People's War tradition had been the direct product of the straitened and backward conditions in the rural sector of Chinese society in which the CCP had spent the greater part of its formative period. There the CCP was able to derive effective military strength through the political mobilization, to the greatest degree possible of the military potential of the only abundantly available resource, namely, human will. In fact, this approach to fighting, particularly in its concentration upon the political support of the peasantry, showed strong affinities to the military tradition of pre-modern China.

After the formal establishment of the PRC in 1949, the institution of a program of modernization (at first for a short period along Soviet lines but then along Maoist) did significantly alter the PLA, along with the whole of PRC society, but, I have argued that this did not fundamentally overturn the basic nature of the PLA. This was borne out by the main elements of the ideal PLA of the 1960s. Most importantly, the PLA has remained intensively involved in and well-integrated with the society as a whole. Similarly, the PLA's ideal approach to fighting, work-style and leadership style emphasized the factors of national self-reliance, political mobilization, egalitarianism, and mass participation. Taken altogether, these elements formed a comprehensive and fairly coherent ideal model for building the PLA, one which was directly derived from the People's War tradition.

In the Kwangtung GPCR, the behaviour of the PLA, on balance, did not basically contradict the essentials of this ideal model of the PLA in the 1960s or of the People's War tradition. The GPCR had confronted the PLA with a very complex, difficult, and perilous situation. Yet, through it all, the PLA executed the many diverse roles placed upon it. The nature of these tasks reflected more the conflicts and needs of society rather than any monolithic military position. In the process, the PLA in Kwangtung demonstrated a high degree of discipline, flexibility, social consciousness, and political skill as well as a minimum of military prowess.

During the 1960s, neither the ideal nor the active PLA cases manifested positive indications of the development of a distinct

military consciousness or institution. On the contrary, during the 1964 "Learn from the PLA" campaign, the virtues and the achievements attributed to the PLA could have been those of any bureaucratic institution in China.

To return directly to the question posed in the introduction, I would conclude that, during the 1960s, the PLA had not developed into a highly distinct, professionalized Western-style military institution. Rather, the PLA in the 1960s had remained a very active and well-integrated participant in the distinctive social development of the PRC.

FOOTNOTES

INTRODUCTION

¹Michel Oksenburg, "Sources and Methodological Problems in the Study of Contemporary China," in A.D. Barnett, ed., Communist Chinese Politics in Action (Seattle & London: University of Washington Press, 1969), 577.

²This section on the approaches to the study of contemporary China has benefited from the points presented in the following: Edward Friedman, "Teaching Materials on Contemporary China, A Critical Evaluation," in Arlene Posner and Arne J. de Keijzer, eds., China: A Resource and Curriculum Guide (Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press, 1973), 3-8; A. Doak Barnett, Cadres, Bureaucracy, and Political Power in Communist China (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), x-xxi; Judith Coburn, "Asian Scholars and Government: The Chrysanthemum on the Sword," in Edward Friedman and Mark Selden, eds., America's Asia: Dissenting Essays on Asian-American Relations (New York: Patheon Books, 1971), 67-107; Harold C. Hinton, An Introduction to Chinese Politics (New York & Washington: Prager Publishers, 1973), viii-xii; Leigh and Richard Kagan, "Oh Can You See? American Cultural Blindness on China," in America's Asia, 3-59; James Peck, "The Roots of Rhetoric: The Professional Ideology of America's China Watchers," in America's Asia, 40-66.

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER I

¹Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford University Press, 1933), VI, 438.

²Kurt Lang, "Military," International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, ed. David L. Sills (New York: The MacMillan Company & The Free Press, 1968), Vol. X, 305.

³For more detailed discussions of the meaning of militarism see Kurt Lang, Military Institutions and the Sociology of War (London: Sage Publications, 1972), 105; Alfred Vagts, A History of Militarism: Civilian and Military (rev. ed., New York: Meridian Books, 1959), 13-17; Lawrence L. Radaway, "Militarism," International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. X, 300-1; Stanislaw Andreski, Military Organization and Society (2nd ed., London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1968), 184-6.

⁴This analysis of the meaning of Western military professionalism is derived in large part from Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (New York: Random House, 1957), 7-79.

⁵Vagts, A History of Militarism, 16.

⁶As a political scientist cautioned when studying the military of different societies:

one focusing upon the "military" as the subject of investigation may be tempted to explain actions and attitudes of persons in his investigation solely as a function of their participation in the military (that is, as a function of socialization into and identification with the military); whereas, in fact, other independent or intervening variables (e.g., regional identification, socio-economic class, age or education) may have equal or greater explanatory relevance.

John P. Lowell, ed., The Military and Politics in Five Developing Nations (Kensington, Maryland: American Institutes for Research, Center for Research in Social Systems, 1970), 3.

⁷Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 32-4; Lang, Military Institutions, 30.

⁸Lang, Military Institutions, 31.

⁹Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 11-17.

¹⁰Ibid., 15.

¹¹Ibid., 16.

¹²Ibid., 59-79; Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier; A Social and Political Portrait (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1960), 242-50.

¹³Some Western scholars of the military have suggested that the Western officer corps has become an increasingly obsolete institution because modern military machines have become such complex and scientific organizations encompassing many civilian members and skills; Lang, Military Institutions, 50.

¹⁴The following section on the military in the developing countries is largely based on the following; Henry Bienen, ed., The Military and Modernization (Chicago: Aldine and Atherton, 1971); Morris Janowitz, The Military in the Political Development of New Nations, An Essay in Comparative Analysis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964); John J. Johnson, ed., The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1962); Wilson C. McWilliams, ed., Garrisons and Governments: Politics and the Military in New States (San Francisco: Chandler Co., 1967); Claude E. Welch, ed., Soldier and State in Africa, A Comparative Analysis of Military Intervention and Political Change (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1970).

¹⁵This section is mainly based on S.T. Chiang, The Nien Rebellion (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1954); Edward L. Dreyer, "Military Continuities: The PLA and Imperial China," in W.W. Whitson, ed., The Military and Political Power in China in the 1970s (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972), 3-24; John K. Fairbank and Edwin O. Reischauer, East Asia: The Great Tradition (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1960); John K. Fairbank, The United States and China, Third Edition (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971); Charles O. Hucker, "Aspects of Chinese Civilization: Political Institutions," in John Meskill, ed., An Introduction to Chinese Civilization (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973), 551-586; Philip A. Kuhn, Rebellion and Its Enemies in Late Imperial China: Militarization and Social Structure, 1796-1864 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970).

- ¹⁶Fairbank, The United States and China, 47.
- ¹⁷Hucker, An Introduction to Chinese Civilization, 565.
- ¹⁸Fairbank, The United States and China, 50.
- ¹⁹Hucker, An Introduction to Chinese Civilization, 565.
- ²⁰Dreyer, The Military and Political Power in China, 21.
- ²¹Fairbank, The United States and China, 48-9.
- ²²Hucker, An Introduction to Chinese Civilization, 566.
- ²³Ibid.
- ²⁴Franz Schurmann, Ideology and Organization in Communist China, (rev. ed., Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1968), 558.
- ²⁵Edwin G. Pulleyblank, The Background of the Rebellion of An Lu-shan (New York: Oxford University Press, 1955), 61.
- ²⁶Fairbank, East Asia, 205; Schurmann, Ideology and Organization, 558.
- ²⁷Fairbank, East Asia, 301 & 365.
- ²⁸Dreyer, The Military and Political Power in China, 8.
- ²⁹Hucker, An Introduction to Chinese Civilization, 565.
- ³⁰Kuhn, Rebellion and Its Enemies, 20.
- ³¹James J.Y. Liu, The Chinese Knight Errant (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967), 3-6.
- ³²Fairbank, The United States and China, 156.
- ³³Kuhn, Rebellion and Its Enemies, 40.

³⁴Ibid.

³⁵Ibid., 41.

³⁶Chiang, The Nien Rebellion, 134.

³⁷Kuhn, Rebellion and Its Enemies, 41-2.

³⁸Fairbank, The United States and China, 159.

³⁹As Mao Tse-tung summed up the bitter and bloody experience of the CCP during this period; "All things grow out of the barrel of a gun," "Whoever wants to seize and retain state power must have a strong army," and "Without a people's army the people have nothing." Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, "Problems of War and Strategy (November 6, 1938)," (2nd ed., Peking; Foreign Languages Press, 1965), II, 225.

⁴⁰John Gittings, The Role of the Chinese Army (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), xiii-xv.

⁴¹Edgar Snow, The Long Revolution (New York: Rand 'm House, 1972), 131.

⁴²Samuel B. Griffith, The Chinese People's Liberation Army (New York: McGraw Hill, 1967), 257; Ralph L. Powell, "Maoist Military Doctrines," Asian Survey, VIII, 4 (April, 1968), 249-50.

⁴³Powell, Asian Survey, VIII, 4, 253.

⁴⁴Mao summed up the military strategy of People's War as follows: "The enemy advances, we retreat. The enemy halts, we harass. The enemy tires, we attack. The enemy retreats, we pursue," Powell, Asian Survey, VIII, 4, 251-2.

⁴⁵Alexander L. George, The Chinese Communist Army in Action; The Korean War and Its Aftermath (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), 114.

⁴⁶Ellis Joffe, Party and Army: Professionalism and Political Control in the Chinese Officer Corps (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard East Asia Research Center, 1965), 145.

⁴⁷Griffith, The Chinese People's Liberation Army, 5.

⁴⁸Powell, Asian Survey, VIII, 4, 261.

⁴⁹See Alexander L. George, The Chinese Communist Army in Action; The Korean War and Its Aftermath (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967) for a graphic description, based on POW interviews, of the breakdown of the PLA's traditional political control and encouragement techniques when it had to face American firepower head to head in Korea.

⁵⁰Lang, Military Institutions, 111. The Nazis in Germany, a revolutionary movement of the extreme right, went one step further by creating its own Party army, the Waffen SS.

⁵¹Gittings, The Role of the Chinese Army, 158.

⁵²Joffe, Party and Army, x-xi.

⁵³Ibid., 148-9; Powell, Asian Survey, VIII, 4, 257-8.

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER II

¹The Military Balance: 1971-72 (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1971), 41.

²This section is based partly upon the following: John Gittings, The Role of the Chinese Army (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967); and William W. Whitson, "Organizational Perspectives and Decision-Making in the Chinese Communist High Command," in Robert A. Scalapino, ed., Elites in the People's Republic of China (Seattle: University of Washington, 1972), 381-415.

³Alan S. Whiting, "The Struggle for Power," New Republic, Vol. 165, No. 23 (December 4, 1971), 19-21.

⁴Harvey Nelsen, "Regional and Paramilitary Forces," in William W. Whitson, ed., The Military and Political Power in China in the 1970s (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972), 135-152; and Ralph L. Powell and Chung-kun Yoon, "Public Security and the PLA," Asian Survey, XII, 12 (December, 1972), 1082-1099.

⁵For instance, one article quotes at length to illustrate the doubting attitude among the peasantry; "Chairman Mao lives in Peking. Does he know about the everyday-life of the peasant?" and "At present what the peasants eat in the villages is even worse than what dogs ate in the past." Kung-tso T'ung-hsun (Bulletin of Activities, published by the General Political Department of the Chinese People's Liberation Army) in Chester J. Cheng, ed., The Politics of the Chinese Army: A Translation of the Bulletins of Activities of the People's Liberation Army (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institute on War, Revolution and Peace, 1966), Issue No. 1 (January 1, 1961), 13.

⁶Jen-min Jih-pao article of January 23, 1964, "PLA Political Work Terms Explained," in Survey of China Mainland Press (hereafter SCMP), (HongKong: American Consulate General), No. 3162, 8.

⁷Kung-tso, No. 29 (August 1, 1961), 731.

⁸Ibid., No. 10 (February 20, 1961), 253.

⁹Ibid., No. 29, 732.

¹⁰Ibid., No. 5 (January 17, 1961), 134; No. 3 (January 7, 1961), 67 & 69.

¹¹Ibid., No. 18 (August 1, 1961), 731.

¹²Ibid., 732.

¹³Ibid., No. 3, 81.

¹⁴Ibid., No. 23, 595.

¹⁵Ibid., No. 29, 731.

¹⁶Ibid., No. 2 (January 3, 1961), 35.

¹⁷Ibid., No. 8 (February 6, 1961), 219.

¹⁸Ibid., No. 3, 88.

¹⁹Ibid., No. 1 (January 1, 1961), 10.

²⁰Ibid., No. 3, 89; No. 2, 33.

²¹Ibid., No. 7 (February 1, 1961), 190.

²²Ibid., No. 18 (April 30, 1961), 501-507.

²³Ibid., No. 1, 8.

²⁴Ibid., No. 24 (June 18, 1961), 618.

²⁵Ibid., No. 17 (April 25, 1961), 471-4.

²⁶SCMP, No. 3162, 8-9.

²⁷Kung-tso, No. 22, 577.

²⁸Ibid., No. 13, 69.

- ²⁹Ibid., No. 5, 135.
- ³⁰Ibid., No. 24, 619.
- ³¹Ibid., No. 3, 76.
- ³²Ibid., No. 7, 204-6.
- ³³Ibid., No. 24, 619.
- ³⁴Ibid., 617.
- ³⁵Ibid., 622.
- ³⁶Ibid., No. 7, 205.
- ³⁷Ibid., No. 3, 74.
- ³⁸Ibid., 85.
- ³⁹Ibid., No. 7, 206-8.
- ⁴⁰Ibid.
- ⁴¹Ibid., No. 8, 220.
- ⁴²Ibid., No. 3, 68; No. 23, 594.
- ⁴³Ibid., No. 22, 576.
- ⁴⁴Ibid., No. 24, 625.
- ⁴⁵Ibid., 621.
- ⁴⁶Ibid., No. 25, 640.
- ⁴⁷Ibid., No. 17, 472-3.
- ⁴⁸Ibid., No. 3, 74.
- ⁴⁹Ibid., No. 24, 629.

⁵⁰Ibid., No. 3, 74.

⁵¹Ibid., No. 23, 596.

⁵²Ibid., No. 3, 91.

⁵³Ibid., 72.

⁵⁴Ibid., 92-3.

⁵⁵Ibid., No. 11, 303-4; No. 3, 92-3.

⁵⁶Ibid., No. 24, 627.

⁵⁷Ibid., No. 3, 74.

⁵⁸John Gittings, "The 'Learn from the Army' Campaign," China Quarterly, 18 (April-June, 1964), 153-9; Ralph L. Powell, "Commissars in the Economy: 'Learn from the PLA' Movement in China," Asian Survey, Vol. 5, No. 3, March 1965, 125-138.

⁵⁹Oksenberg, Communist Chinese Politics in Action, 599.

⁶⁰This is not to say that the Western press does achieve the democratic ideal of a totally free and unbiased press; they are influenced by small economic group interest and other minority pressure groups.

⁶¹Kung-jen Jih-pao (Workers' Daily), commentary of March 8, 1964, in SCMP, No. 3191, 14.

⁶²Ibid.

⁶³Jen-min Jih-pao (People's Daily) editorial of February 1, 1964, in SCMP, No. 3164, 3-5; and of February 23, 1964, No. 3178, 1-4.

⁶⁴Jen-min Jih-pao article of February 3, 1964, in SCMP, No. 3164, 8-10.

⁶⁵Jen-min Jih-pao article of February 8, 1964, in SCMP, No. 3165, 7.

⁶⁶Jen-min Jih-pao article of March 10, 1964, in SCMP, No. 3192, 1-3.

⁶⁷Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien Pao (Chinese Youth) article of March 3, 1964, in SCMP, No. 3184, 1-4.

⁶⁸Jen-min Jih-pao article of April 2, 1964, in SCMP, No. 3207, 7-10.

⁶⁹Jen-min Jih-pao editorial of February 17, 1964, in SCMP, No. 3175, 1.

⁷⁰Jen-min Jih-pao article of February 17, 1964, in SCMP, No. 3175, 6.

⁷¹Jen-min Jih-pao article of April 2, 1964, in SCMP, No. 3207, 10.

⁷²Jen-min Jih-pao editorial of February 17, 1964, in SCMP, No. 3175, 1.

⁷³Ibid.

⁷⁴Jen-min Jih-pao editorial of February 23, 1964, in SCMP, No. 3178, 1.

⁷⁵New China News Agency (hereafter NCNA) article of February 4, 1964, in SCMP, No. 3167, 11.

⁷⁶Ta Kung Pao editorial of February 29, 1964, in SCMP, No. 3183, 1.

⁷⁷Jen-min Jih-pao article of February 20, 1964, in SCMP, No. 3177, 4.

⁷⁸Ezra Vogel, Canton under Communism: Programs and Politics in a Provincial Capital, 1949-1968 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969), 18-24.

⁷⁹Ibid., 21.

⁸⁰Nan-fang Jih-pao (hereafter NFJP), February 12, 1964, 1.

⁸¹NFJP, February 25, 1964, 1; March 20, 1964, 1.

⁸²NFJP, February 5, 1964, 1.

⁸³NFJP, March 30, 1964, 1.

⁸⁴Ibid.

⁸⁵NFJP, February 7, 1964, 2.

⁸⁶Ibid.

⁸⁷Ibid.

⁸⁸NFJP, May 16, 1964, 1.

⁸⁹NFJP, February 7, 1964, 2.

⁹⁰For example, see NFJP, February 7, 1964, 2.

⁹¹NFJP, February 9, 1964, 2.

⁹²NFJP, February 7, 1964, 2.

⁹³NFJP, February 17, 1964, 1.

⁹⁴NFJP, March 5, 1964, 2.

⁹⁵NFJP, February 7, 1964, 2.

⁹⁶NFJP, February 20, 1964, 1.

⁹⁷NFJP, February 10, 1964, 3.

⁹⁸Ibid.

⁹⁹NFJP, February 16, 1964, 1.

¹⁰⁰NFJP, February 12, 1964, 1.

¹⁰¹NFJP, February 16, 1964, 1.

¹⁰²NFJP, January 31, 1964, 1.

¹⁰³NFJP, February 29, 1964, 1.

¹⁰⁴NFJP, February 7, 1964, 2.

¹⁰⁵For example, see NFJP, January 31, 1964; February 8, 1964, 2; February 29, 1964, 1.

¹⁰⁶NFJP, January 31, 1964, 1.

¹⁰⁷One important aspect of the PLA's production work only mentioned in passing in NFJP was the PLA's own production, mainly in agriculture, ranging from backyard vegetable plots to large PLA farms. One article in NFJP praises the head of a company's commissariat who converts a garbage dump into a vegetable patch and hog-raising pen in his spare time. NFJP, February 7, 1964, 2.

¹⁰⁸NFJP, March 11, 1964, 1 & 4.

¹⁰⁹Ibid.

¹¹⁰For example, see NFJP, February 12, 1964, 1.

¹¹¹NFJP, January 31, 1964, 1.

¹¹²NFJP, February 9, 1964, 3.

¹¹³NFJP, February 12, 1964, 1.

¹¹⁴For example, see NFJP, February 9, 1964, 3; February 25, 1964, 1.

¹¹⁵NFJP, February 9, 1964, 3.

¹¹⁶NFJP, February 12, 1964, 1.

¹¹⁷NFJP, February 9, 1964, 3.

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER III

¹Chang-hsueh Hung-wei-bing article of July 16, 1968, "A Letter to the Provincial Revolutionary Committee," in SCMP, No. 4241, 8.

²Vogel, Canton under Communism, 322.

³Lin Piao, "Report to the 9th National Congress of the Communist Party of China," NCNA-English (Peking, April 27, 1969), in SCMP, No. 4406, 26. See also, Parris Chang, "Provincial Party Leaders' Strategies for Survival During the Cultural Revolution," in R.A. Scalapino, ed., Elites in the People's Republic of China (1972), 501-539.

⁴"Decision of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, the State Council, the Military Commission of the Central Committee, the Cultural Revolution Group under the Central Committee on Resolute Support for the Revolutionary Masses of the Left, [dated January 23, 1967]," in Current Background (hereafter CB), (HongKong: American Consulate General), No. 852, 49.

⁵Ellis Joffe, "The Chinese Army after the Cultural Revolution: the Effects of Intervention," China Quarterly, 55 (July-September, 1973), 457.

⁶Ibid., 456.

⁷This tendency to equate the PLA with the image commonly held in the West of the military was even more pronounced in general studies of the GPCR. For example, Stanley Karnow in his Mao and China: From Revolution to Revolution (New York: The Viking Press, 1972) stated on page 277 that "Chinese soldiers, like soldiers everywhere in the world, were essentially dedicated to the preservation of stability," and on page 405 that "As soldiers, they [PLA officers] were instinctive conservative men suspicious of grandiose schemes." In an article on the GPCR; "China: Year of the Mangoes," Asian Survey, IX, 1 (January 1969), Richard Baum said on page 9 that the actions of the PLA in the GPCR reflected "the 'natural conservatism' generally assumed to be a universal attribute of the 'military mentality' -- a conservatism born of the professional soldier's long exposure to martial discipline and his positive orientation toward hierarchical authority relationships."

⁸This section is based on the following works by William Whitson: "The Concept of the Military Generation: The Chinese Communist Case," Asian Survey, VIII, 11 (November, 1968), 921-947; "The Field Army in Communist Chinese Military Politics," China Quarterly, 37 (January-March, 1969), 1-30; "Where Power Lies," Christian Science Monitor, Vol. 64, No. 64 (February 16, 1972), 9; "Introduction," in The Military and Political Power in China in the 1970s (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972), iii-xxxii; "Organizational Perspectives and Decision-Making in the Chinese Communist High Command," in Robert A. Scalapino, ed., Elites in the People's Republic of China (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1972), 381-415; "Domestic Constraints on Alternative Chinese Military Policies and Strategies in the 1970s," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 402, July 1972, 40-54; with Chen-hsia Huang, The Chinese High Command: A History of Communist Military Politics, 1927-71 (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973).

⁹Whitson, The Military and Political Power, xxvi.

¹⁰Whitson, Annals of the American Academy, Vol. 402, 49.

¹¹See Whitson, Asian Survey, VIII, 11, 921-47; China Quarterly, 37, 1-30; Elites in the People's Republic of China, 383 & 400-15.

¹²Whitson, Elites in the People's Republic of China, 404.

¹³Whitson, Annals of the American Academy, Vol. 402, 47.

¹⁴Whitson, The Chinese High Command, 557.

¹⁵This section is based on the following articles by Ralph L. Powell: "The Increasing Power of Lin Piao and the Party Soldiers, 1959-1966," China Quarterly, 34 (April-June, 1968), 38-65; "The Party, the Government, and the Gun," Asian Survey, X, 6 (June, 1970), 441-471; "The Power of the Chinese Military," Current History, Vol. 59, No. 349 (September, 1970), 129-133, 175-178; "Soldiers in the Chinese Economy," Asian Survey, XI, 8 (August, 1971), 742-760; "The Role of the Military in China's Transportation and Communications Systems," Current Scene, X, 2 (February 7, 1972), 5-11; "The Military and the Struggle for Power in China," Current History, Vol. 63, No. 373 (September, 1972), 97-102, 134; and Chang-kun Yoon, "Public Security and the PLA," Asian Survey, XII, 12 (December, 1972), 1082-1099; "Party Still Striving to Retain Control of 'the Gun' in China," Christian Science Monitor, September 21, 1973, 2.

¹⁶Powell, Asian Survey, X, 6, 445; Asian Survey, XII, 12, 1095.

¹⁷Powell, Asian Survey, XI, 8, 747-8.

¹⁸Ibid., 760.

¹⁹This section is based on the following articles by Parris Chang: "Mao's Great Purge: A Political Balance Sheet," Problems of Communism, XVIII, 2 (March-April, 1969), 1-10; "Peking and the Provinces: Decentralization of Power," Problems of Communism, XXI, 4 (July-August, 1972), 67-75; "Changing Patterns of Military Power in Chinese Politics," in William W. Whitson, ed., The Military and Political Power in China in the 1970s, 47-70; "Regional Military Power: The Aftermath of the Cultural Revolution," Asian Survey, XII, 12 (December, 1972), 999-1013; "The Changing Patterns of Military Participation in Chinese Politics," Orbis, 16 (Fall, 1972), 780-802.

²⁰Chang, Asian Survey, XII, 12, 1003.

²¹Ibid., 1004.

²²Ibid., 1003-1004.

²³Ibid., 1008-1009.

²⁴Ibid., 1003.

²⁵Ibid., 1011.

²⁶Jurgen Domes, "The Cultural Revolution and the Army," Asian Survey, VIII, 5 (May, 1968), 349.

²⁷Jurgen Domes, "Generals and Red Guards: The Role of Huang Yung-sheng and the Canton Area Command in the Kwangtung Cultural Revolution," Asia Quarterly, 1971, 2, 154.

²⁸Jurgen Domes, "The Role of the Military in the Formation of Revolutionary Committees, 1967-8," China Quarterly, 44 (October-December, 1970), 144.

²⁹Domes, Asian Survey, XI, 9, 39.

³⁰This section is based on the following articles by Ellis Joffe: "The Chinese Army in the Cultural Revolution: The Politics of

Intervention," Current Scene, VIII, 18 (December 7, 1970), 1-24; "The Chinese Army under Lin Biao: Prelude to Political Intervention," in John M.H. Lindbeck, ed., China: Management of a Revolutionary Society (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1971), 343-374; "The Chinese Army after the Cultural Revolution: The Effects of Intervention," China Quarterly, 55 (July-September, 1973), 450-477.

³¹Joffe, Current Scene, VIII, 18, 23.

³²Joffe, China Quarterly, No. 55, 454.

³³Joffe, Current Scene, VIII, 18, 8.

³⁴Ibid., 17.

³⁵Ibid., 13.

³⁶China Quarterly, No. 55, 459.

³⁷Gordon A. Bennett, "Military Regions and Provincial Party Secretaries: One Outcome of China's Cultural Revolution," China Quarterly, 54 (April-June, 1973), 294-307.

³⁸Ibid.

³⁹William Parish Jr., "Factions in Chinese Military Politics," China Quarterly, 56 (October-December, 1973), 667 & 689-90.

⁴⁰Ibid., 695.

⁴¹Harvey Nelsen, "Military Forces in the Cultural Revolution," China Quarterly, 51 (July-September, 1972), 467.

⁴²Ibid., 452.

⁴³Ibid., 466.

⁴⁴David C. Wilson, "The Role of the PLA in the Cultural Revolution," Papers on Far Eastern History, No. 3 (March, 1971), 37.

⁴⁵Ibid., 38.

⁴⁶Ibid.

⁴⁷Ibid.

⁴⁸John Gittings, "Army-Party Relations in the Light of the Cultural Revolution," in John Wilson Lewis, ed., Party Leadership and Revolutionary Power in China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 399.

⁴⁹Ibid., 400.

⁵⁰Ibid., 401.

⁵¹James D. Jordan, "Political Orientation of the PLA," Current Scene, XI, 11 (November, 1973), 1.

⁵²James D. Jordan, "The Maoist vs. the Professional Vision of a People's Army," in William W. Whitson, ed., The Military and Political Power in China in the 1970s, 25.

⁵³Jordan, Current Scene, XI, 11, 2.

⁵⁴Ibid., 14.

⁵⁵For this section on the Kwangtung GPCR, I used three main collections of materials from the PRC: (a) The three translated and edited series of the U.S. Consulate-General in HongKong, Survey of China Mainland Press (SCMP), Selections from China Mainland Magazines (SCMM), and Current Background (CB). (b) The translated and edited series of the U.S. Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS): China and Asia (Exclusive of the Near East), Translations on Communist China. (c) The untranslated series of the Center for Chinese Research Materials, Association of Research Libraries: Red Guard Publications. The first two are U.S. government agency published materials, while the third apparently materials released by the American government. See Andrew J. Nathan, Modern China, 1840-1972: An Introduction to Sources and Research Aids (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, The University of Michigan, 1973), 41.

⁵⁶Gordon A. Bennett and Ronald A. Montaperto, Red Guard: The Political Biography of Dai Hsiao-ai (Garden City: Doubleday & Co., 1971); Hai-feng, Kwang-chou ti-chu wen-ko li-cheng shu-lueh (An Account of the Cultural Revolution in the Canton Area) (HongKong: Union Research Institute, 1971). Both Dai Hsiao-ai and Hai-feng are pseudonyms.

⁵⁷Fan-fu-p'i (Reversing Verdicts), May 1968, 1 & 3; Kuang-chou Kung-tai-hui (Canton Workers Congress), May 1, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4183, 1-6 & No. 4188, 5-7.

⁵⁸Chan-chung-nan (Fighting South China), August 23, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4262, 1.

⁵⁹Kang-pa-i (Steel : August 1), October 15, 1967, in SCMP, No. 4096, 1-8.

⁶⁰Document dated November 16, 1967, in SCMP, No. 4082, 6-11.

⁶¹Bennett and Montaperto, Red Guard, 161.

⁶²Vogel, Canton under Communism, 344.

⁶³Bennett and Montaperto, Red Guard, 159; Domes, Asia Quarterly, 1971, 1, 29.

⁶⁴Bennett and Montaperto, Red Guard, 157-72; Domes, Asia Quarterly, 1, 27-30.

⁶⁵Bennett and Montaperto, Red Guard, 155.

⁶⁶Domes, Asia Quarterly, 1971, 1, 3-21.

⁶⁷Ibid., 2, 159.

⁶⁸Bennett and Montaperto, Red Guard, 179-80.

⁶⁹Ibid., 179.

⁷⁰Document dated November 17, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4082, 3.

⁷¹See Bennett and Montaperto, Red Guard, 180-88.

⁷²Bennett and Montaperto, Red Guard, 194-7.

⁷³See Domes, Asia Quarterly, 1971, 2, 143; Hai-feng, Kwang-chou, 343.

⁷⁴Of 39 total members on the Standing Committee of the Kwang-tung Provincial Revolutionary Committee, nine were identified as PLA members. But the Chairman, the First Vice Chairman, and two of the six Vice Chairmen were PLA members. Of the 23 total members on the Standing Committee of the Canton Municipal Revolutionary Committee, seven were

from the PLA. But, again, the Chairman and two out of five Vice Chairman were PLA members. See: Hung Tien-hsun (Red Telegraphic Dispatch), March 27, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4160, 4-8.

⁷⁵Hung Tien-hsun (Red Sky Investigation), March 27, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4160, 4-8.

⁷⁶NFJP, February 23, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4138, 4 & 14.

⁷⁷Kuang-chou Kung-tai-hui, May 1, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4183, 1-6.

⁷⁸NCNA (English-Kwangchow), February 2, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4112, 8.

⁷⁹Ibid., 9.

⁸⁰Kuang-chou Kung-jen (Canton Workers), February 20, 1968, in Joint Publications Research Service, China and Asia (Exclusive of the Near East), Translations on Communist China (hereafter known as JPRS), No. 47701, 1-3; NFJP, March 19, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4149, 6-11.

⁸¹NFJP, March 7, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4144, 8.

⁸²See Chiu-hei-shou Chan-pao (Drag Out Black Hand Combat Bulletin), February 11, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4131, 16; Fan-fu-p'i, May 1968, 3; Kuang-chou Kung-tai-hui, May 1, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4188, 6.

⁸³Hung-ch'i P'ing-lun (Red Flag Criticism), February 1968, in SCMP, No. 4133, 1-5.

⁸⁴Wench'an Hsueh-an Chuan-k'an (The Heroes of Wench'an), February 10, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4178, 7-9; Chung-ta Hung-ch'i (Chungshan University Red Flag), April 4, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4169, 16.

⁸⁵Kung-lien (Worker's Association), July 16, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4233, 1-11.

⁸⁶Chung-ta Hung-ch'i, May 28, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4202, 7.

⁸⁷Document in SCMP, No. 4204, 9-10.

⁸⁸San-chun Lien-wei Chan-pao (Three Forces United Committee Combat Bulletin), September 7, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4282, 1-6; Pai-yuan Hung-ch'i (Paiyuan Red Flag), in SCMP, No. 4204, 7.

⁸⁹Document dated June 5, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4204, 11-13.

⁹⁰Liu-liu Hsueh-an T'e-k'an, June 7, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4204, 1-6. Hai-feng described two other instances of factional violence involving the PLA; on June 8 at Canton Middle School No. 81 where the PLA refused to prevent a Flag faction arson attack, and on June 11 when soldiers participated in an attack on a foraging Flag faction group. Hai-feng, Kwang-chou, 374 & 375.

⁹¹Kung-jen P'ing-lun (Workers' Review), June 1968, in SCMP, No. 4211, 1-9; NFJP, June 11, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4217, 1-3; July 10, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4229, 1-3.

⁹²Document dated May 28, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4204, 6; Kung-jen P'ing-lun, in SCMP, No. 4211, 1.

⁹³See Hung Hua-kung (South China Engineering College Red), May 5, 1968, in JPRS, No. 47799, 49; Fan-yu T'e-k'an (Anti-right Special Edition), May 26, 1968, 3; Kung-chiao Kung-ko-lien (Workers' Revolutionary Alliance of Industrial and Communications Systems), June 1, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4239, 1-2; T'iao Chan (Challenge), June 8, 1968, in CB, No. 861, 33.

⁹⁴See Kuang-chou Kung-jen, May 28, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4208, 9-14; Kung-chiao Kung-ko-lien, June 1, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4239, 4; Hung-se Tsao-fan-che (Red Rebels), in CB, No. 861, 24; Chan Kuang-chou (Fighting Canton), July 10, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4388, 4 & 7.

⁹⁵Kung-chiao Kung-ko-lien, June 1, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4239, 4; T'iao Chan, June 8, 1968, in CB, No. 861, 32; Pa-san-i (August 31), May 31, 1968, in JPRS, No. 46472, 14; Chung-ta Hung-ch'i, May 27, 1968, 3; Hung-se Tsao-fan-che, June 1968, in CB, No. 861, 7-18; Chan Kuang-chou, July 10, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4388, 6 & in JPRS, No. 47112, 44; Kuang-chou Kung-jen, July 10, 1968, in Survey of China Mainland Magazines (hereafter SCMM), No. 626, 3; Tien-shan Lei-ming (Lightning and Thunder), July 1968, in SCMM, No. 627, 37.

⁹⁶Hung Hua-kung, May 5, 1968, in JPRS, No. 47701, 12; T'iao Chan, June 8, 1968, in CB, No. 861, 31; I-yueh Feng-pao (January Storm Bulletin), June 1968, in SCMM, No. 625, 17; I-yueh Feng-pao, July 1968, in JPRS, No. 47112, 54; Kuang-chou Kung-jen, July 10, 1968, in SCMM, No. 626, 3; Tien-shan Lei-ming, July 1968, in SCMM, No. 627, 30.

⁹⁷Fan-yu T'e-k'an, May 26, 1968, 3; Hung-ch'i T'ung-hsun (Red Flag Report), June 1968, in JPRS, No. 46192, 17.

⁹⁸Hung Hua-kung, May 15, 1968, in JPRS, No. 47799, 52; I-yueh Feng-pao, June 1968, in SCMM, No. 625, 22; Kuang-chou Kung-jen, July 10, 1968, in SCMM, No. 626, 6.

⁹⁹Pa-san-i, May 31, 1968, 2; Tien-shan Lei-ming, July 1968, in SCMM, No. 627, 28.

¹⁰⁰Tien-shan Lei-ming, July 1968, in SCMM, No. 627, 39.

¹⁰¹Kang Pa-i, June 1968, in JPRS, No. 47084, 24-5.

¹⁰²Tien-shan Lei-ming, July 1968, in SCMM, No. 627, 28.

¹⁰³Pa-san-i, May 31, 1968, 2.

¹⁰⁴Hung-se Tsao-fan-che, May 1968, 2; I-yueh Feng-pao, June 1968, in SCMM, No. 625, 19.

¹⁰⁵Kuang-chou Kung-jen, July 10, 1968, 3.

¹⁰⁶Pa-san-i, May 31, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4202, 7; Chung-hsueh Hung-wei-bing (Middle School Red Guards), May 1968, in JPRS, No. 461925; T'ien-shan Lei-ming, July 1968, in SCMP, No. 627, 32.

¹⁰⁷Document dated July 12, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4243, 6-8.

¹⁰⁸Chung-ta Chan-pao (Chungshan University Combat News), August 7, 1968, in JPRS, No. 47701, 21; September 22, 1968, in JPRS, No. 47701, 28.

¹⁰⁹Chung-hsueh Hung-wei-bing, July 16, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4241, 8.

¹¹⁰San-chun Lien-wei Chan-pao (Three Services United Committee Combat Bulletin), August 14, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4256, 71-2; Kuang-chou Hung-wei-ping (Canton Red Guards), in CB, No. 866, 32-3; Kuang-chou Hung-tai-hui (Canton Peasants Assembly), September 12, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4271, 4; Chung-ta Chan-pao, September 22, 1968, in JPRS, No. 47701, 32; Chung-ta Chan-pao, September 22, 1968, 7.

¹¹¹Chih-tao Chung-nan (Direct Pounding of Central South), in SCMP, No. 4367, 1; Chung-ta Chan-pao, August 4, 1968, 1.

¹¹²See NFJP, August 5, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4252, 7; Kuang-chou Hung-tai-hui, September 12, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4271, 4-5.

¹¹³See NFJP, August 5, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4252, 6; Chiao-ch'u Nung-tai-hui, October 11, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4293, 3.

¹¹⁴See San-chun Lien-wei Chan-pao, September 7, 1968, 2; Kuang-chou Hung-tai-hui, September 12, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4271, 6.

¹¹⁵See San-chun Lien-wei (Three Forces United Committee), July 25, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4243, 3; San-chun Lien-wei Chan-pao, July 25, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4259, 4; document dated August 3, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4248, 8; Chan Chung-nan (Fighting Central South), August 23, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4262, 1-4; Kuang-chou Hung-tai-hui, August 29, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4302, 5; San-chun Lien-wei Chan-pao, September 16, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4272, 11-12; Kuang-chou Kuang-tai-hui (Canton Workers' Congress), October 10, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4342, 2.

¹¹⁶Document dated August 3, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4248, 7-10; Kung-jen Mao Tse-tung Szu-hsiang Hsuan-ch'uan-yuan, September 16, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4272, 7-10.

¹¹⁷SCMP, No. 4248, 8.

¹¹⁸Document dated July 31, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4259, 4. See also San-chun Lien-wei, July 25, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4243, 3; San-chun Lien-wei Chan-pao, July 31, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4259, 5; Kung-jen P'ing-lun (Workers' Forum), August 1968, in SCMP, No. 4254, 4; Kuang-chou Hung-tai-hui, August 19, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4303, 1-2.

¹¹⁹Kung-jen P'ing-lun, August 1968, in SCMP, No. 4254, 4; San-chun Lien-wei Chan-pao, August 14, 1968, in JPRS, No. 47112, 69; Kuang-chou Kung-tai-hui, October 10, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4342, 2.

¹²⁰Chih-tao Chung-nan, July 13, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4367, 3-4; Chung-ta Chan-pao, August 7, 1968, in JPRS, No. 47701, 18; San-chun Lien-wei, August 10, 1968, in JPRS, No. 47084, 26-32; Kuang-chou Hung-wei-ping, September 5, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4322, 7-8; San-chun Lien-wei Chan-pao, September 24, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4280, 6-7; Chiao-ch'u Nung-tai-hui, October 11, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4293, 6-7.

¹²¹See Hsin Chu-ying (New Pearl River Film Studio), August 1, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4265, 11; San-chun Lien-wei, August 10, 1968, in JPRS, No. 47084, 27 & 31; San-chun Lien-wei Chan-pao, August 14, 1968, in JPRS, No. 47112, 59-60; Kuang-chou Hung-tai-hui, August 29, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4305, 9; Ibid., September 12, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4268, 4.

¹²²See Kung-jen Mao Tse-tung Szu-hsiang Hsuan-ch'uan-yuan (Worker's Mao Tse-tung Thought Propagandist), September 1968, 4.

¹²³Chung-ta Chan-pao, August 4, 1968, 3-4 and in SCMP, No. 4257, 1-5.

¹²⁴Chiang Min-feng & Hsiang Wei. See Chih-tao Chung-nan, July 13, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4367, 3; Kuang-chou Hung-wei-bing, August 28, 1968, in CB, No. 866, 3-4; San-chun Lien-wei Chan-pao, September 24, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4275, 6-7. The other three were identified as former high level officials in the Central-South Bureau of the CCP: Min I-fan, Ch'e Hsueh-tsao & Chang T'ien-t'ao.

¹²⁵See Domes, Asia Quarterly, 1971-72, 149-153; Hai-feng, Kwang-chou, 399 & 412.

¹²⁶Chih-tao Chung-nan, July 13, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4367, 3; Ibid., July 21, 1968, 3; Document dated July 21, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4248, 2; San-chun Lien-wei, July 25, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4243, 5; San-chun Lien-wei Chan-pao, July 31, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4259, 2; Hsin Chu-ying, August 1, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4265, 12; Chung-ta Chan-pao August 4, 1968, 3-4; Ibid., August 4, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4257, 2-4; Ibid., August 7, 1968, in JPRS, No. 47701, 17-24; Kuang-chou Hung-wei-bing, August 28, 1968, in CB, No. 866, 28-32; Ibid., August 29, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4302, 4; San-chun Lien-wei Chan-pao, September 1, 1968, in JPRS, No. 47112, 9; Ibid., September 7, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4268, 2-5 & No. 4271, 2-7; San-chun Lien-wei Chan-pao, September 18, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4275, 11; Chung-ta Chan-pao, September 22, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4283, 3 & 9-10; San-chun Lien-wei Chan-pao, September 24, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4280, 7.

¹²⁷See Kuang-chou Hung-wei-ping, August 28, 1968, in CB, No. 866, 3-24; Ibid., September 5, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4316, 1-4, No. 4317, 1-4, No. 4318, 11-12; San-chun Lien-wei Chan-pao, September 13, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4272, 1-3, No. 4273, 7-13, No. 4275, 1-5; Ibid., September 24, 1968, 35-40.

¹²⁸NCNA, April 9, 1969, in SCMP, No. 4396, 19; NFJP, February 5, 1970, 1.

¹²⁹On p. 13 of Asia Quarterly, 1, 1971, Domes, based on information given to him by a HongKong expert in the PLA, estimated that there were about 500,000 soldiers under the Canton Military Region Command, which included the provinces of Hunan, Kwangsi and Kwangtung. I then arbitrarily divided that total by three in order to arrive at the figure of 180,000.

¹³⁰Kuang-chou ti-ch'u ta-chuan-yuan-hsiao hung-tai-hui (Canton Area Red Guards' Congress of Universities, Institutes and Schools), February 12, 1970, 2.

¹³¹Tzu-liao Ch'uan-ch'i (Reference Materials), November 1968, 21.

¹³²Ibid., 20; Kuang-chou Hung-tai-hui, December 20, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4314, 2.

¹³³Tzu-liao Ch'uan-ch'i, November 1968, 19-21.

¹³⁴NCNA, October 25, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4289, 21; NFJP, February 14, 1970, 1; Ibid., February 6, 1970, 1.

¹³⁵NCNA, October 28, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4291, 28-30; NFJP, December 2, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4338, 11-13.

¹³⁶NFJP, November 18, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4317, 8-9.

¹³⁷Ibid., December 2, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4338, 11.

¹³⁸See Jen-min Jih-pao, May 3, 1969, in SCMP, No. 4413, 11; Ibid., July 18, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4461, 19.

¹³⁹Ibid., January 23, 1969, in SCMP, No. 4355, 5; Ibid., June 2, 1969, in SCMP, No. 4442, 1-2.

¹⁴⁰NCNA, November 12, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4305, 20; Jen-min Jih-pao, August 9, 1969, in SCMP, No. 4475, 19.

¹⁴¹Jen-min Jih-pao, February 21, 1969, in SCMP, No. 4376, 1; NFJP, January 21, 1970, 2; Ibid., February 12, 1970, 2.

¹⁴²Jen-min Jih-pao, June 23, 1969, in SCMP, No. 4452, 5.

¹⁴³Ibid., June 25, 1969, in SCMP, No. 4453, 1-3; Ibid., June 28, 1969, in SCMP, No. 4456, 5-7.

¹⁴⁴See Jen-min Jih-pao, August 23, 1969, in SCMP, No. 4485, 20-7; Kuang-chou Nung-tai-hui, February 2, 1970, 2; NFJP, February 5, 1970, 3.

¹⁴⁵Kuang-chou Nung-tai-hui, February 2, 1970, 2; NFJP, February 5, 1970, 3.

¹⁴⁶Jen-min Jih-pao, January 12, 1969, in CB, No. 872, 36-7; NFJP, February 6, 1969, 1.

¹⁴⁷Kuang-chou Hung-tai-hui, October 28, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4307, 3-4 and in JPRS, No. 47933, 42-44; Ibid., January 10, 1969, 1; Ibid., February 12, 1970, 1; Kuang-ming Jih-pao, April 20, 1969, 1; NCNA, May 9, 1969, in SCMP, No. 4415, 21.

¹⁴⁸Chang-hsueh Hung-tai-hui, October 30, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4306, 12-14; Kuang-chou Hung-tai-hui, November 10, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4304, 11; Jen-min Jih-pao, August 15, 1969, in SCMP, No. 4488, 1-4.

¹⁴⁹Chang-hsueh Hung-tai-hui, October 30, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4305, 6-7; Jen-min Jih-pao, August 15, 1969, in SCMP, No. 4488, 2.

¹⁵⁰Jen-min Jih-pao, December 7, 1968, in CB, No. 869, 32; Ibid., August 15, 1969, in SCMP, No. 4488, 4.

¹⁵¹Jen-min Jih-pao, November 29, 1968, in CB, No. 869, 31; Ibid., December 7, 1968, in CB, No. 869, 33; Ibid., March 7, 1969, in SCMP, No. 4383, 10.

¹⁵²NFJP, November 18, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4314, 1-6.

¹⁵³Kuang-chou Hung-tai-hui, November 10, 1968, in SCMP, No. 4304, 12-13; NCNA, October 24, 1967, in SCMP, No. 4289, 12.

¹⁵⁴Jen-min Jih-pao, June 9, 1969, in SCMP, No. 4441, 1-4.

¹⁵⁵Ibid., 1.

¹⁵⁶See Kuang-chou Hung-tai-hui, February 4, 1970, 1; Ibid., February 12, 1970, 2.

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