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Political cleavages and political mobilisation in Guyana : the 1968 general election Greene, John Edward 1972

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POLITICAL CLEAVAGES AND POLITICAL (MOBILISATION IN GUYANA: THE 1963 GENEPAL ELECTION by JOHN EDWARD GREENE B.Sc. (Econ), London University, 1965 M.A., McMaster University, 1966 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REOUIRENEWTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in the Department of P o l i t i c a l Science We accept this dissertation as conforming to th required standard UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA In p r e s e n t i n g t h i s t h e s i s in p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t o f the ..requi rements f o r an advanced degree at the U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree that the L i b r a r y s h a l l make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r reference and study . I f u r t h e r agree t h a t permiss ion for e x t e n s i v e copy ing of t h i s t h e s i s f o r s c h o l a r l y purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . It i s understood that copying o r p u b l i c a t i o n o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r f i n a n c i a l ga in s h a l l not be a l lowed wi thout my w r i t t e n p e r m i s s i o n . Department of TOLiriCAt ' S ' c . i e ^ C c The U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Columbia Vancouver 8 , Canada Professor R. Stephen Milne ABSTRACT This study is about the 1968 General Election in Guyana. It argues that while rac ia l cleavage within the society is the single most important determinant of p o l i t i c a l behaviour, party organisation provides the motive force behind 'the people's choice' . Using aggregate and survey data, the study shows that between 1953 (when the f i r s t election under universal adult suffrage was held) and 1968, party ident i f icat ion and political mobilisation had shifted from those based on class antagonism to those based on rac ia l d isaffect ion. However, the change in the electoral machinery — from a system of p lura l i ty voting to proportional representation — has forced parties to reform their campaign strategy. The emphasis is on votes gained rather than on seats won. As a resul t , the loca l party organisations have become important sources of e lectoral mobil isation. The victory of Burnham's People's National Congress over Jagan's People's Progressive Party, and D'Aguiar's United Force, is partly explained by the greater impact on the electorate, of the former than the la t ter . The PNC benefited most from the switching of party support which occurred between the 1964 and 1968 elect ions, i . e . , a switch of party support across the t radi t ional l ines of race. Therefore, that the p o l i t i c a l system of Guyana has not disintegrated is partly because there is this marginal element in the electorate wi l l ing to identify across the rac ia l boundaries of party support. The system is saved also by the fact that p o l i t i c a l patronage is used as a bait to attract and maintain support across rac ia l l ines and by the small but art iculate band of " p o l i t i c a l i i i dissenters" whose ideal is to broaden the base of p o l i t i c a l support more i n terras of class than of race. iv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS In the preparation of this study, I have been helped in many ways by a variety of people, a l l of whom i t would be d i f f i c u l t to name. The major f inancia l support for this study came from The Institute of Social and Economic Research, University of the West Indies, of which I was a Research Fellow 1968-70 and from a Graduate Fellowship awarded by the University of Br i t i sh Columbia 1968-69. My indebtedness cannot be adequately conveyed to Professor R. S. Milne for his patience, en-couragement and friendship and whose personal standards of scholarly excellence and sense of responsibi l i ty together with those of Professors F. Langdon, W. Young, J . Laponce and J . Wood, continue to be a model for my own endeavours. Among those who assisted me in the actual col lect ion of data in the f i e l d , I would l ike to pay special tribute to the 12 students of the University of Guyana who laboured so val iantly on behalf of this project. To my colleagues Pat Anderson, Louis Lindsay, and Archie Singham, with whom I discussed my work, I owe thanks for many helpful suggestions. The hospital i ty and assistance of party leaders and rank-and- f i le electorate in Guyana was warm and generous. Indeed I would ever have to record an inadequate appreciation. I am convinced that Guyanese must be among the most p o l i t i c a l l y conscious beings in the world today. For Kathie Miles who typed many drafts and part of the f ina l version of this study and to Esther McDonald for typing the f ina l version, no praise can truly convey my gratitude to them. And to my wife I am especially indebted. Not only did she collaborate with me in col-lecting the data and in performing some of the secretarial duties during and after the Survey, but she endured stoically the deprivations of time and companionship that ray involvement in this project necessitated. v i TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Abstract i i Acknowledgments i v Table of Contents v i Lis t of Tables x i Lis t of Figures xv Abbreviations xvi CHAPTER I THE PROBLEM 1 1. Introduction 1 2. The Context of Research 3 3. Underlying Assumptions i n the Study 8 P o l i t i c a l Attitudes arid P o l i t i c a l Socialisation . . . . . . . 8 P o l i t i c a l and Electoral Mobilisation . . . 10 P o l i t i c a l Parties and P o l i t i c a l Leaders . . 11 4. Methodology 12 CHAPTER II ELECTORAL DEVELOPMENT 1831-1963 . . . . 16 1. Introduction 16 2. Plantation Monopoly 16 3. Crown Colony Modification . 23 4. The Civic Mode 27 5. General Elections 1968 38 v i i Page CHAPTER III POLITICAL CLEAVAGES AND THE PROCESS OF POLITICAL SOCIALISATION 1953-1963 49 1. Introduction 49 2. Cleavages Between P o l i t i c a l Parties and Social Movements 49 3. The Working Class or Race as the Basis of P o l i t i c a l Cleavage . . 55 4. Overlapping Memberships in Socio-p o l i t i c a l Factions 65 CHAPTER IV POLITICAL PERCEPTION AND POLITICAL MOBILISATION . . 76 1. Introduction 76 2. Perceptual Basis of P o l i t i c a l Behaviour . . . . 76 3. Image of the P o l i t i c a l Parties 87 4. Image of Party Leaders 98 CHAPTER V THE NATURE OF PARTISANSHIP 109 1. Introduction -. 109 2. The Polls and Mobilisation 112 3. Party Identification and Mobilisation 117 4. Race, Religion, Age and Party Identification . 128 5. Party Members, Switchers and Spectators . . . . 135 6. Issues and Mobilisation 141 7. Summary 145 CHAPTER VI LEVELS OF INVOLVEJIENT IN THE ELECTORAL PROCESS . . 147 1. Introduction 147 2. Levels of P o l i t i c a l Involvement and P o l i t i c a l Efficacy 148 v i i i Page 3. P o l i t i c a l Involvement and a Sense of Citizenship Duty 153 4. P o l i t i c a l Dissent versus Electoral Involvement 158 CHAPTER VII THE IMPACT OF LOCAL PARTY ACTIVITY ON ELECTORAL MOBILISATION 162 1. Introduction 162 2. Demographic Prof i le of Local Party Leadership . 164 3. Character of Local Party Leadership 171 4. The Impact of Local Party Leadership 177 5. Voters' Image of Local Party Organisation . . . 180 CHAPTER VIII CONCLUSION . 188 Bibliography 198 APPENDIX I 218 SAMPLES IN THE STUDY 219 Rank F i l e . 219 PARTY LEADERS 223 Primary Party Act iv ists 224 Local Party Act iv ists 225 APPENDIX II PARTY POLITICS IN GUYANA POST ELECTIONS SURVEY 1969 233 APPENDIX HI GROUP LEADER INTERVIEW SCHEDULE GUYANA 1969 . . . . 248 APPENDIX IV AMERINDIANS AND THE RUPUNUNI DISTRICT 256 ix Page APPENDIX V EXPLANATION OF SOME SCALES USED IN THIS STUDY . . 262 APPENDIX VI SELECTED DEMOGRAPHIC DATA 264 Map of Guyana 269 x i LIST OF TABLES TABLE Page 2.1 Registered Voters, 1833-1929 . 19 2.2 Registration, Electorate and Population 1928 23 2.3 Composition of the Representative Bodies by Race/Occupation (Unoff ic ial Members) 1833-92 . 25 2.4 Comparative Summary of Ballots Cast in Five General Elections 1953-1968 28 2.5 Percentage of Votes and Number of Seats Gained in Pre-pro-portional Representation Elections 1953-1961 32 2.6 Distribution of Votes by Constituencies Class i f ied According to Urban-Rural Type 36 2.7 Registered Electorate 1953-1968 43 2.8 Proxies as a Percentage of Votes Cast 1961-1968 45 3.1 Respondents' votes for PPP and Other Parties in the 1953 Elections by Race and Occupational Distr ibution 56 3.2 Respondents who Voted for the PPP, the PNC or Other Parties Continuously in the 4 General Elections Between 1957 and 1968 by Race and Occupational Distribution . . . 56 3.3 Party Preference of New Voters by Race 59 3.4 Party Preference of New Voters by Race Compared with Parents' Preference 59 3.5 Party Preference of New Voters Compared with Parents' Preference 59 3.6 Swing in the Direction of Voting for Parties by Constituencies in Three General Elections - 1961, 1964 and 1968 61 3.7 Shifts in Party Identif icat ion Between General Elections of 1961, 1964 and 1968 by Race 63 3.8 Shifts in Party Identif ication Between General Elections of 1961, 1964 and 1968 by Religion 63 x i i TABLE Page 3.9 Overlapping Membership of P o l i t i c a l Parties and a Selected Number of Social -Cultural -Rel igious Organisations 69 4.1 Expectations of Violence/Non-Violence Post Elect ions, 1968 83 4.2 Expects Violence/Non-Violence by Party Support 83 4.3 Expectations of Prosperity/Depression Post Elections 1968 83 4.4 Expects Prosperity/Depression by Party Support 83 4.5 Perception of Party Support 88 4.6 Racial Distr ibution of Candidates Presented by Each Party in the 1968 General Elections 90 4.7 Choice of Party to Solve Problems by Registration Dist r ic ts and Party Identif icat ion . . 91 4.8 Social Group Seen by Each Party Electorate as Giving them Primary Support 92 4.9 Social Group Seen by More than 25 Per Cent of the Respondents of a Given Party as Supporting that Party . . . 94 4.10 Social Groups Seen by Less than 25 Per Cent of the Respondents as Supporting that Party 95 4.11 Percentage of Abstentions on the Question: What Party or Parties Do You Think the Following People Vote For? . . 97 4.12 Abstentions on the Question: Which Word Comes Closest to Describing the linage you Have of the Three Leaders . . . 101 4.13 Public Image of Party Leaders 103 4.14 Image of Party Leadership by Party Identif ier 106 4.15 Radio Time (in minutes) Allocated to P o l i t i c a l Party Broadcasts for the Period Between October 27 and December 15, 196P. 107 x i i i TABLE Page 5.1 Party Meetings Most Attended by Racial Distribution . . . . 112 5.2 Voting Distribution in the General Elections 1957, 1961,^1964, 1968 116 5.3 Strength of Party Identification 126 5.4 Strength of Party Identification by Race 127 5.5 Strength of Party Identification by Religion 127 5.6 Party Identification by Age and Race 130 5.7 Extra-Electoral Activity of Non-Identifiers . 131 5.8 Categories of Party Members 136 5.9 Party Switchers and Reasons for Switching 138 5.10 Party Leanings of Spectators by Race 141 5.11 Importance of Issues 144 5.12 Most Important Issue Concepts by Race 144 5.13 Issue Familiarity by Strength of Party Identification . . . 144 6.1 Percentage at Different Levels of P o l i t i c a l Involvement by Rank on P o l i t i c a l Efficacy Scale 150 6.2 Rank on P o l i t i c a l Efficacy Scale by Constituency 151 6.3 Percentage at Different Levels of P o l i t i c a l Involvement According to Rural-Urban Location by Rank on P o l i t i c a l Efficacy Scale • • 152 6.4 Sense of Citizenship Duty by Party Identification 155 6.5 Sense of Citizenship Duty by Race 155 6.6 Sense of Citizenship Duty by Levels of Involvement . . . . 155 7.1 Sex Distribution of Leaders by Party 165 7.2 Racial Distribution of Leaders by Party 167 7.3 Age of Leaders by Party 169 xiv Table Page 7.4 Religious A f f i l i a t i o n of Leaders by Party 170 7.5 Occupation of Leaders by Party 170 7.6 Educational Background of Leaders by Party 171 7.7 Strength and Character of Local Party Leadership . . . . . 174 7.S Combined Index for Strength and Character of Local Party Leadership 175 7.9 Voters' Perception of Party A c t i v i t y by Constituency and Party 178 X V FIGURE Page 3.1 Cleavages Between P o l i t i c a l Parties and Social Movements 1953-1968 50 4.1 Public Image of Burnham by Traits . . . . . 100 4.2 Public Image of D'Aguiar by Traits 100 4.3 Public Image of Jagan by Trai ts 100 4.4 Public Image of Burnham by Constituency 102 4.5 Public Image of D'Aguiar by Constituency 102 4.6 Public Image of Jagan by Constituency 102 5.1 Party Meetings most Attended by Partisans and by Constituency 114 5.2 Voting Distr ibution over Four Elections 116 5.3 Distr ibution of Partisan-Non-Partisan Floater 118 5.4 Net Effect of Party Switching among "Switchers" 1961-1968 119 5.5 Net Effect of Inter-Party Switching on Party Identif icat ion 120 5.6 Party Distr ibution of Switchers Between 1964 and 1968 Elections by Constituencies Clustered According to Partisan Identi f icat ion 140 6.1 Attendance at Election Meetings 157 6.2 Membership in P o l i t i c a l Organisation 157 6.3 Working for a Party 157 6.4 Wearing Buttons, etc. . 157 7.1 PNC Leadership-Party Identif ication Curves 179 7.2 PPP Leadership-Party Identif icat ion Curves 179 7.3 UF Leadership-Party Identif ication Curves . 179 xvi ABBREVIATIONS ASCRIA Association for the Promotion of Social and Cultural Relations with Independent Africa CSA C i v i l Service Association GAVJU Guyana Agricultural Workers' Union GUMP Guyana United Muslim Party LCP League of Coloured People MPCA Manpower Citizen's Association NDP National Democratic Party NLF National Labour Front PEC People's Education Committee PNC People's National Congress PP Popular Party PPP People's Progressive Party UDP United Democratic Party UF United Force UFP Workers' and Farmers' Party UPEO Women's P o l i t i c a l and Economic Organisation CHAPTER 1 1. THE PROBLEM INTRODUCTION The 1968 General Election in Guyana was the f i r s t election since the country attained independent status.^ There has been much debate on the fairness of the administration and results of that e lect ion. This study discusses the Election in terms of p o l i t i c a l cleavages and p o l i t i -2 cal mobil isation. F i r s t , race is seen as the dominant factor in the formation and manifestation of p o l i t i c a l attitudes of the Guyanese e lec -torate. Second, party organisation, whether i t ref lects rac ia l cleavages or not, i s seen as a motive force behind 'the people's choice ' . In Guyana, race and party organisation are interrelated. Both help to explain the processes whereby voters select between alternatives — real or perceived — Guyana became an independent nation on May 26, 1966. Since then Guyana modified i t s constitutional status by becoming a Republic on February 16, 1970. The Election was contested under the system of propor-t ional representation, the mechanisms of which are discussed in Chapter 2. 9 In this study we are not concerned with what anthropologists mean by race, but only with what people in Guyana think the word means when they encounter i t in their daily l i ves . For our purpose, race refers to a group of people who are fe l t to be similar in their essential nature. The word race therefore defines differences in ethnic ident i f icat ion among Guyanese. It i s as much a question of culture as i t i s of soc ia l structure. In Guyana r a c i a l problems and r a c i a l cleavages are generally among the ethnic groups (African, East Indian, Chinese, Portuguese and Whites) which originated out of different cultural and soc ia l backgrounds and which were brought together under the plantation system. Among the many studies on this topic see M. G. Smith, The Plural Society in the  Br i t i sh West Indies (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of Cal i fornia Press, 1965); Leo Despres, Cultural Pluralism and Nationalist Po l i t i cs  in Guyana (New York: Rand McNally, 1967). 2 that have been defined by leaders or groups. Many commentators say that the victory of the People's National Congress (PNC) was due to the fact that the electoral machinery was "rigged" to ensure such a v ictory ; that given race as the prime determinant of voting behaviour, the People's Progressive Party (PPP) should have won. In Chapter 2, the major i r regular i t ies in the admin-i s t ra t ion of the Elect ion are discussed. Suffice i t to say that based on our observations of the 1968 election campaign^we believed that the PNC's victory could only be partly explained by administrative mal-pract ices. The organisation of the PNC prior to , and during the election campaign, appeared to be more ef f ic ient than either the PPP's or the UF's. If this were so, then party organisation could, a lso , partly explain the PNC's v ictory . The problem of this study, therefore, requires answers to the following questions: To what extent was race a determinant of voting behaviour? What was the relat ive strength of party organisation i n , and ident i f icat ion with, the p o l i t i c a l parties contesting the Election? What was the impact of party organisation on voting behaviour? Of the 53 seats to the House of Representatives the PNC led by Forbes Burnham won 30 seats, the People's Progressive Party (PPP), led by Cheddi Jagan, won 18 seats and the United Force (UF), led by Peter D'Aguiar won 5 seats. 3 We spent four weeks in Guyana and this included three weeks pr ior to the Election on December 16, 1968. During this period we were involved in participant observation of the campaign conducted by the three parties throughout the country. 3 2. THE CONTEXT OF RESEARCH Analysis of the 1968 General Elections can be meaningful only in the context of p o l i t i c a l development of which i t i s a part. Through-out this study we flash back to the 1950s either to compare events or to elucidate trends. During the early 1950s a revolution began in Guyana. It was not a fundamental transformation of thought and society such as took place in Russia under Lenin or in Cuba under Castro. It was, how-ever, a revolution i n the sense of a new dimension of p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i -pation and consciousness made manifest by the Guyanese masses under the stimuli of an avant-garde of ideologues, men of a third world philosophy who challenged the legitimacy of imperialism. If scholars romanticise the period of the early 1950s i t is because they relate to a high point of Guyanese nationalism with i t s potential for superstructural change; i t s bold attempt to unite a poly-ethnic mass into a viable p o l i t i c a l movement, i t s daring and dynamic leadership. If scholars lament the decline in the quality of p o l i t i c a l thought and development in Guyana, i t i s because the period after 1955 was characterised by the collapse of a local p o l i t i c a l consensus on fundamentals, the upsurge of institutionalised racism, the growth of potential for violence and the general demoralisation of society i t s e l f , especially between 1962 and 1964.5 ^ In 1955 the PPP s p l i t into two factions,one led by Burnham, the other by Jagan. Scholars tend to lament the break-up of this Indian-African, working class coalition. See among much else, Gordon Lewis, The Growth of the Hodarn West Indies (London: McGibbon and Kee, 1968), pp. 259-260; Ernst Haipern, Racism and Communism in British Guiana (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Centre for International Studies, 1964); CISCLA, Report: First Institute on British Guiana (San Cerman, Puerto Rico: Inter-American University, 1965); B.A.N. Collins, "Acceding to Independence: Some Con-stitut i o n a l Problems of a poly-ethnic society (British Guiana)," Civilisations, 15 (1965), pp. 3-15. 4 Histor ica l crises have often provided the modus operandi for the formation, evolution, development or decay of soc ia l and p o l i t i c a l movements and of p o l i t i c a l att i tudes. The Bolshevik revolution in 1917, the Fascist Movements of H i t le r and Mussol ini , the Cultural revolution in China, and the Third World struggles of Nkrumah, Nasser, Nehru, Castro are only a few examples. Very often a p o l i t i c a l party created by part icular soc ia l and p o l i t i c a l factors continues to persist long after the factors which precipitated i t s creation have disappeared. The Guyanese National Movement in 1953 was conceived as a united workers front and as ultimately inducing a coal i t ion of the urban Creole and rural Indian middle classes.^ This working class unity was achieved in 1953 under the PPP, as the catalyst of a struggle against the upper classes and the expatriot sector which owned and controlled the means of production in the country. One writer commented on the potential of the working class struggle as follows: In this study, ' C r e o l e ' society refers to a system which o r i g i -nated in plantation economies under colonialism. A creole society embraces the white, the mixed and the African groups. In Guyana, these groups a l l came to share a common conception of the colonial society; a conception in which things English and 'white' were valued highly, whilst things African and 'black' were valued lowly. However, what we refer to as the creole society has more or less been bu i l t up around the 'coloured' or rac ia l l y mixed groups who were poised uneasily be-tween the white aristocracy and the black proletar iat . They were for a long time a privi leged group, occupying important positions in the society and government and they demanded special consideration on the grounds that they were English in a l l but colour. See Raymond T. Smith, Br i t i sh Guiana (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), pp. 40-45 and Lloyd Braithwaite, "Social S t rat i f i cat ion and Cultural P lural ism," Annals of New York Academy of Science, 83 (1960), pp. 821-822. 5 This would no doubt have produced tensions, but the society would probably have remained f a i r l y coherent, and given the tendency to creolization on the part of the East Indians, i t would have become increasingly integrated, capable of an independent and reasonably stable p o l i t i c a l and economic l i f e . The pattern which has i n fact developed i s disastrous. While the PPP s t i l l remains a viable p o l i t i c a l force in Guyana, a variety of p o l i t i c a l crises have precipitated structural alterations and factional disputes with deleterious consequences for a working class movement and a working class struggle, which were the original aims of o the party. The rise of p o l i t i c a l consciousness and activity, and the various events that shattered the hope and promise of a p o l i t i c a l revolution in Guyana are well enough known to make recounting them here 9 unnecessary. Chief among the changes, however, are the manifest con-figurations of p o l i t i c a l support in terms of race. To determine the effects of these changes on p o l i t i c a l legitimacy, p o l i t i c a l integration and p o l i t i c a l participation i s crucial to an Peter Newman, Brit i s h Guiana: Problems of Cohesion in an Immigrant  Society (London, Institute of Race Relations: Oxford University Press, 1964), pp. 78-79. g For an outline of the p o l i t i c a l ideals of the 1953 movement, see Cheddi Jagan, The West on T r i a l : lly Fight for Guyana's Freedom (London: Michael Joseph, 1966), Chapter VI. 9 See Peter Newman, op. c i t . , R. T. Smith, British Guiana (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), Philip Reno, The Ordeal of Br i t i s h  Guiana (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1964), Cheddi Jagan, Forbidden  Freedom: The Story of British Guiana (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1954), Ashton Chase, 133 Days Towards Freedom in Guiana (Georgetown, Brit i s h Guiana, N.D.), and for an o f f i c i a l version of the British Government, see British Guiana, Suspension of the Constitution (London: K.M.S.O. Cmd. 8980, 1953). 6 understanding of the nature of p o l i t i c a l behaviour in Guyana, manifested in the 1968 elect ions. 3ut Guyana is by no means unique. Host cultural ly p lural societies pass through phases of acute tension along the cultural axis of d i f ferent iat ion . Yet at other times cultural antagonisms are re lat ively quiescent. One of the demonstration effects of cultural conf l ic t in Guyana is i l lus t rated in i t s electoral competitions. Espe-c i a l l y since p o l i t i c a l party divisions have been absorbed into cul tural cleavages, elections have in fact become confrontations between communi-t i e s . It seems paradoxical that Guyana, l i ke most developing nations, has clung theoretical ly to the cruc ia l value of democracy, i . e . , majori-tarianism. Like so many other developing countries, the major cleavages of society tend to follow cultural contours. When this happens "elections translate cul tural p lura l i ty through the mechanism of majority rule into hegemony of one group over another."-^ Indeed this defect inherent to niajoritarian democracy is one of the most compelling arguments for the single party system adopted in many developing African states. Zolberg provides another rat ionale: Many of the single party regimes represent com-promises between prevail ing groups and a mil i tant vanguard party; the dialogue between them serves as an instrument of modernisation and communica-tion by generating grievances in which genuine issues are ref lected. Indeed, out of such com-promises a stable pattern may be created. Im-mediately after independence, however, s ingle -party regimes are concerned to create authority. Charles W. Anderson, Fred R. Von der Mehden and Crawford Young, Issues of P o l i t i c a l Development (Englewood C l i f f s , New Jersey: Prent ice-Hal l Inc . , 1967), p. 65. 7 This is why the role of p o l i t i c a l opposition has proved ambiguous in most newly independent nations. When in this study we analyse the strength of party ident i f icat ion among the electorate and the basic realignments of party strength between 1953 and 1968, we are real ly referr ing to a special kind of relationship between p o l i t i c a l leaders and masses. Changes in mass alignment in Guyana are influenced largely by r a c i a l cleavages. The r ise of the working class party, the PPP under Cheddi Jagan and Forbes Burnham in 1953, did not sustain i t s e l f to 1968. So what in 1953 was basical ly a polarisation of e lectoral alignment along class l ines has been trans-formed into an electoral alignment along rac ia l l ines . In 1955 after the Jagan-Burnham s p l i t , Jagan, an East Indian by o r ig in , continued as leader of the PPP while Burnham, an Afr ican, formed the PNC taking with him some of the or ig inal membership of the PPP. In 1961, D'Aguiar, a Portuguese, formed a third party, the United Force (UF). Since 1961, Burham, Jagan and D'Aguiar have become symbols of a r a c i a l expression in Guyanese po l i t i cs which is representative of the plural society in i t s most vicious form. That is to say, parties and leaders are no longer seen as national coal it ions but as exclusive ethnic groupings fostering a kind of ethnic chauvinism. It i s for this reason that we have investigated whether loca l party act iv i ty acts as a countervailing force to these dominant p o l i t i c a l indicators, or rather, hardens the manifold cleavages in the society. It is our contention that as in the 1 1 See Ar ist ide Zolberg, Creating P o l i t i c a l Order: The Party State  of West Afr ica (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co. , 1966), p. 102. 8 case of t r i b a l or sectarian p o l i t i c s , p o l i t i c a l parties whose essential base is race constitute a threat to national development because they challenge the very existence of the state and nation, since what is proferred i s another framework of loyalty and identity. According to Rupert Emerson, " i t i s one thing to have parties which are divided on programmatic differences, but something very different to have them follow the l ines of ethnic cleavage within the s o c i e t y . " ^ 3. UNDERLYING ASSUMPTIONS IN THE STUDY Throughout the discussion of our main hypothesis — that race and p o l i t i c a l organisation influence voting behaviour in Guyana — certain underlying assumptions preva i l : i . that p o l i t i c a l cleavage is a function of p o l i t i c a l soc ia l isat ion i i . that electoral mobilisation is only one aspect of p o l i t i c a l mobil isation, i i i . that leaders and parties are required to perform new roles under the system of proportional representation. These three assumptions are b r ie f l y discussed below. P o l i t i c a l Cleavages and P o l i t i c a l Social isat ion P o l i t i c a l cleavage is a function of p o l i t i c a l soc ia l i sat ion . Rupert Emerson, "Parties and National Integration in Af r ica" in Joseph La Polambara and Myron Weiner (Eds.) , P o l i t i c a l Parties and P o l i t i c a l Development (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 268. 9 Guyanese of different ethnic origins were brought into the p o l i t i c a l system at different stages of the plantation system, ranging from slavery through indentureship to economic organisation under the raulti-13 national corporations. Through these experiences Guyanese have ac-quired their p o l i t i c a l attitudes and behavioural patterns. Suff ice i t to say that the two major ethnic groups, the Africans and the East Indians adhere bas ical ly to different forms of kinship and family, identify with different rel igions and display dist inct ive resident ia l patterns."^Demographic factors in Guyana i l l us t ra te the tendency among Afro-Guyanese ( i . e . , Guyanese of African descent) to be primarily urban dwellers belonging to a Protestant re l ig ion and Indo-Guyanese (of East Indian descent) to be rural dwellers and to be either Hindu or Mus l im.^ Racial cleavages have, therefore, been inherent in the primary agents of soc ia l i sat ion . In this study p o l i t i c a l socia l isat ion is expressed through the perceptions of the indiv idual : how he views the leaders, the part ies , the issues; how he views himself in the world of p o l i t i c s . These perceptions may ref lect or reject the rac ia l biases of the system 13 Here we share the view of G. L. Beckford, Persistent Poverty (Kingston, Jamaica: Institute of Social and Economic Studies, 1971) that the plantation system is a total system of exploitation and control of colonial peoples and their resources. It i s a system characterised as much by the sugar plantations of the eighteenth century as by the bauxite companies in the twentieth century. 14 A vast amount of work has been done in this area. Among the more popular studies are R. T. Smith, Br i t i sh Guyana (London: Oxford Univer-s i ty Press, 1962), and E. P. Skinner, "Group Dynamics and Social s t ra t -i f i c a t i o n in Br i t i sh Guyana", Annals of the New York Academy of Science, 83 (1960), pp. 705-716. See Appendix 6, Tables 2, 3, and 7. 10 as a whole. P o l i t i c a l and Electoral Mobil isation P o l i t i c a l and electoral mobilisation are closely associated with the notion of p o l i t i c a l soc ia l isat ion and, as in the case of Guyana, the patterns of cultural pluralism associated with i t . P o l i t i c a l s o c i a l i s a -tion and p o l i t i c a l mobilisation are different aspects of bas ica l ly the same process. But whereas p o l i t i c a l soc ia l isat ion encompasses a l l mem-bers of a given community in a process whereby they learn to become active c i t i zens , the process of mobilisation i s concerned only with those members of the community who actually become active c i t i zens , at minimum part ic ipat ing in the electoral process. P o l i t i c a l mobi l isa-tion relates to an indiv idual 's d isposi t ion, towards p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i -pation in any of several types of groups, associat ional , non-associational, ins t i tu t iona l or anomic.^ P o l i t i c a l mobilisation suggests that there is some organisation for though not necessarily in p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n . ^ P o l i t i c a l mobilisation when i t refers to organisation for action merely assumes a level of partisanship towards one set of p o l i t i c a l structures and p o l i t i c a l goals or act iv i ty than to others. When, however, p o l i t i c a l mobilisation refers to organisation in act ion, then the individual mem-bers of a p o l i t i c a l community operate in a value system in which there Here we used Almond and Coleman's Categories as a convenient c lass i f i ca t ion . See Almond and Coleman, Developing Areas, pp. 28-36. ^ The d is t inct ion here is essent ia l . Organisation for action shows a "preparedness" which does not necessarily extend to "actual part ic ipat ion" in a certain action as is meant by organisation in action. 11 i s a sense of purpose and a feeling of individual s e l f - r e a l i s a t i o n . E lectoral mobilisation is only one aspect of p o l i t i c a l mobil isa-t ion . It relates mainly to the whole panoply of structures, personal i -t ies and procedures acting upon an individual to e l i c i t his vote, support, and loyalty in a contest for governmental power. A high propensity for e lectoral mobilisation does not necessarily guarantee a comparable leve l of p o l i t i c a l mobilisation on the part of an indiv idual . It must be noted however, that an individual may display e lectoral mobilisation by, for example, casting his ba l lo t . At the same t ine, the individual may manifest a high level of p o l i t i c a l mobil isation in terms of the zeal with which he pursues his act iv i ty in soc ia l and p o l i t i c a l movements, 18 or perhaps by his manifest commitment to a p o l i t i c a l ideology. P o l i t i c a l Parties and P o l i t i c a l Leaders An immensely important element of mobilising the electorate is provided by the parties and leaders who seek the publ ic 's support. To many voters, candidates have no identity apart from a p o l i t i c a l party. In Guyana, the introduction of proportioral representation has increased the importance of the p o l i t i c a l party since electoral teams are forced to be national in scope and organisation i f they hope to win o f f i c e . Under the former system of p lura l i ty voting, loose coalit ions of In fact , some writers have referred to a similar problem of c lass i fy ing individuals in the p o l i t i c a l system. One writer notes that a reduction of ideology in po l i t i cs accounts for demobilisation or depol i t ic isat ion , which shi f ts the emphasis of mobilisation i t s e l f to an enquiry into form and location rather than into quantity. See J . P. Net t l , P o l i t i c a l Mobi l isat ion: A Sociological Analysis of Methods and  Concepts (New York: Basic Books Inc. , 1967), pp. 288-316. 12 individuals or even independent candidates could hope for e lectoral success. One consequence of the change of the electoral system is the quest by the dominant parties to strengthen the party bureaucracy and to expand the party apparatus. Any analysis of e lectoral behaviour must therefore take account, not only of the electorate i t s e l f , but also of the parties and their leaders. To do this i s to str ike at the heart of the electoral process whereby individuals band themselves together to reject or support the rules of existing authority with the main aim of gaining a share in the control of the state apparatus. 4. METHODOLOGY 19 With two exceptions, studies of p o l i t i c a l behaviour in Guyana have dealt mainly with voting behaviour as a function of the rac ia l com-posit ion of the electorate, u t i l i s i n g aggregate data to arrive at speculative conclusions. No real attempt has been made to develop or even apply any empirical theory of voting behaviour. It i s in the l ight of this methodological s t e r i l i t y that our present research s i te and procedure were evolved. In this study, we have combined survey and aggregate data to arr ive at conclusions about electoral behaviour in Guyana. We believe that p o l i t i c a l behaviour needs to be interpreted both at the leve l of the indiv idual elector and at the leve l of ag-gregating the behaviour of the electorate as a whole. Disaggregation cr analytic reduction i s important because of the need to discover what 19 Leo Despres, Cultural Pluralism and Nationalist P o l i t i c s in  Br i t i sh Guiana (Chicago, 111. : Rand McNally and Co., 1967), Ralph Premdas, " P o l i t i c a l Culture and P o l i t i c a l Development in Guyana," unpublished Ph. D. d issertat ion, University of Pennsylvania, 1971. 13 motives different individuals ascribe to different decisions. And this discovery is not possible by merely focusing on the col lect ive choice presented in the form of o f f i c i a l election results . In Guyana, the bal lot i s secret; the election results are given at the leve l of the constituency; the smallest unit for which general election figures are available contain an average of 5,277 electors. No doubt, aggregate data for constituency turnout and party preference may hold certain clues about the nature of swings in party support across constituencies. Yet aggregate data can t e l l us very l i t t l e about who does not vote. What kind of people support which party? Why people change party loyalt ies? What issues are important to them? Three months after the December 1968 General Elections we went into the f i e l d to survey the Guyanese electorate and party act iv is ts drawn from a cross section of the 38 constituencies into which the country was divided. The surveys of 1000 randomly selected electors and 106 party act iv is ts were confined to 6 constituencies chosen after we had s t ra t i f i ed constituencies 20 according to partisan support and geographical location. While we were interested in the actual behaviour pattern of the voter, i . e . , how he voted, we were also interested in his attitudes and perceptions, his re -collections and speculations. Hence we introduced several open-ended questions in our sample to give our respondent as much latitude as possible to express his ideas. Among the rank and f i l e as well as among the party For a f u l l account of the method of data col lect ion used in this study see Appendix 1. 14 a c t i v i s t s , these questions provided us with some of our most important f indings. While a great deal of the findings of this study are furnished by our interview survey, we have tapped other sources of evidence and have raised issues outside the scope of our questionnaire. We have also omitted from this study many aspects of the replies given by our respondents either because we found them uninteresting or because, with the passage of time, they have become irrelevant. This study is there-fore not intended to be a conventional survey report. What follows i s an attempt to present a more precise picture of the Guyanese electors than we have at present. Chapter 2 examines the development of the electoral system between 1831-1968, identify ing land-marks with implications both for the extension of the idea of c i t i zen -ship and the upsurge in loca l part ic ipat ion in p o l i t i c s . Chapter 3 sets forth the framework for understanding the development and persistence of r a c i a l cleavages, the switch from "c lass" to "race" as the dominant factor in electoral mobil isation. What emerges is a pattern of p o l i t i c a l soc ia l isat ion in Guyana based on clearly ident i f iable p o l i t i c a l and soc ia l cleavages. In Chapter 4, we note that the cleavages are related to perceptions; that perceptions are as important as actual behaviour; that perceptions provide a push and pu l l effect toward party and group ident i f i cat ion . What concerns us in Chapter 5 are the various levels of party ident i f i ca t ion , the differences between "party supporters", "party sympathisers" and " p o l i t i c a l dissenters", that is to say, groups of people who participate in po l i t i cs with different motives which are 15 not always clearly distinguishable one from the other. Chapter 6 examines levels of support for the p o l i t i c a l regime and i ts authori -t ies which are displayed by different groups of electors. It provides some idea of why some people readily identify with the system while others reject i t . Those people who are active in the local party organisations are selected in Chapter 7 for special treatment. This chapter provides a clue as to why in spite of the dominance of race in the po l i t i cs of Guyana the system has not yet disintegrated. F inal ly in Chapter 8 we make our conclusions. 16 CHAPTER II ELECTORAL DEVELOPMENT 1831-1968 1. INTRODUCTION Electoral development in Guyana is characterised by three d is -t inct phases, v i z . , plantation monopoly; crown colony modification and the c i v i c mode. During the era of plantation monopoly (1831-1928), po l i t i c s was dominated by one c lass , the pantocracy. The period of Crown Colony modification (1928-1953), witnessed a concentration on legal -const i tut ional reforms by loca l pressure groups and the ascen-dancy of the Governor's powers dispensed on behalf of the Br i t i sh Crown. In the phase we c a l l the Civ ic Mode (after 1953), there has been an extension of the idea of citizenship., an upsurge in loca l par-t ic ipat ion in po l i t i c s and a pro l i ferat ion of socia l and p o l i t i c a l groupings. 2. PLANTATION MONOPOLY The Colony of Br i t i sh Guiana was inaugurated in 1831 when the Colony of Berbice joined in a union with the Colonies of Demerara and Essequibo.^ As a resul t , the Constitution of the Two Rivers — 1 See H. Wrong, Government of the West Indies (London: Oxford University Press, 1923), pp. 113-116 for a br ief account of these three Colonies under the Dutch. For a more detailed account of the old Dutch inst i tut ions inherited when the Br i t ish made the f ina l conquest of these three Dutch r iver colonies, see Sir Ceci l Clementi, A Constitutional  History of Br i t i sh Guiana (London: MacMlllan and Co., L t d . , 1 9 3 7 ) , pp. 83-98. 17 effected by a pr ior merger of Demerara and Essequibo in 1812 — became the Constitution of the Colony of Br i t i sh Guiana. This constitutional change in 1831 together with the abol it ion of slavery in 1833 ushered in a new phase in the po l i t i c s of Guyana. It i s a phase noted more for the attempts by a r i s ing class of native polit icians to reduce the elective monopoly of the plantocracy than for far-reaching changes in the structure of Guyanese society. The major dispute which occurred during this period (1331-1928) of monopoly by the planter -c lass was the controversy over the precise leg is lat ive powers of the Court of Policy 2 and the Combined Court. Both of these inst i tut ions originated prior to the unif icat ion of 1831. The Court of Policy was presided over by the governor and included three o f f i c i a l members and six unof f i c ia l members elected by a College of Keizers (Electors). This College was created as early as 1743 primarily for the purpose of elect ing the representatives of the private planters. The Combined Court comprised the Court of Policy and six f inancia l representatives who were also elected by the Keizers. As with the members of the Court of Pol icy , the f inancial representatives were elected for an eight year term. In turn, the Keizers were elected for l i f e by the Colonists. After the un i f icat ion , there were two inst i tu t iona l changes. F i r s t , the Keizers no longer elected unof f i c ia l members to the Court of Policy and f inancia l representatives, they only 1 For a detailed account of constitutional development, see Clementi, op. c i t . , Part II. 18 nominated them when vacancies occurred. Second, the elective franchise no longer required the ownership of twenty-five slaves but was extended to include males assessed to pay direct taxes to the Colonial revenue 3 on an income of not less than 143 pounds. While the franchise throughout this period remained res t r i c t i ve , the colonists claimed supreme power over the inst i tut ions as guaranteed by the Art ic les of Capitulation. At the same time the planters with their monopoly in the Combined Court could uphold these claims by with-holding f i s c a l power from the Crown.^ In fact , the tact ics of the sugar oligarchy typ i f ied their resolve to influence the po l i t i cs of the Colony in a way commensurate with their economic preeminence. " A l l other interests were subjugated to the policy of the sugar industry whether i t was the public works, lands and mines, transport and harbours or health and welfare."^ 3 See Br i t i sh Guiana Ordinance, No. 39, 1834, Section 5; Br i t i sh Guiana  Laws, Vol . 1, 1870, p. 108; Br i t i sh Guiana Ordinance, No. 57, 1835, Section 2; Br i t i sh Guiana Laws, Vol . 1, 1870, p. 212. ^ One example of this was 1840 to 1848 when the Combined Court refused to pass revenue for government supplies in reta l iat ion against the Crown's refusal to use general revenues for immigration of inden-tured workers and the Tar i f f Act of 1846 which affected Sugar. Another example was the case of the colony's medical inspector in 1887 whose report described the decadent conditions on the sugar estate, thus i n -curring the wrath of the unof f i c ia l members of the Court of Pol icy . On the refusal of the governor to withdraw or suppress the report a l l the elected members withdrew from the Court making that body inoperative. According to the Constitutional Convention, at least one elected member should be present before the business of the Court could be conducted. ^ W. Alleyne Ireland, "Sugar and Gold,' ! Demerariana Essays: His - to r i ca l C r i t i c a l and Descriptive (Georgetown, Guyana: Royal Agricultural and Cultural Society Publication n .d . ) , p. 37. 1 9 The plantocracy had grown accustomed to operating the system devoid of opposition. But loca l opposition smothered by lack of oppor-tunit ies and loca l leadership was beginning to emerge. Table 2.1 shows the notable l imitations of the electoral franchise on the number and percentage of registered voters between 1833 and 1929. While the pop-ulation increased from 39,560 in 1833 to 150,761 in 1929 the number of registered voters increased from 621 to 9,513; the largest percentage increase occurred between 1915-1929 when the number doubled. TABLE 2.1 REGISTERED VOTERS, 1833-1929 Total Adult Male Population Total Number of Registered Voters Percentage 1833 39,560 621 1.2 1850 47,256 916 1.9 1915 93,377 4,312 4.6 1929 150,761 9,513 8.2 Sources: B r i t i sh Guiana: Colonial Off ice Br i t i sh Guiana, Population Census Publ., 1333-1929 Annual Register, Colonial Off ice Ordinances 1833-> -1929 Although there was an absolute increase in the number of registered voters during this period, a very large majority of the population remained disenfranchised. The Reform Association and the Progressive Association were two 20 movements which sprang up during this period primarily to art iculate demands for e lectoral reform. The Reform Association led by a coloured Guyanese, petitioned the Court of Policy to recommend that the present leg is lat ive and f inancia l inst i tut ions of the colony should cease; that they be replaced by a Council and House of Assembly as in Barbados and the Chartered colonies.^ Peter Rose and his colleague, Mr. Haynes, launched their attack on the plantocracy from within the Court of Policy to which they had been elected in 1845. Their aim was the acquisit ion of " f u l l and direct representation". The tact ics they employed suggested a resolve to evoke a certain p o l i t i c a l awareness in the masses of the new freed population which had increased from 10,000 in 1833 to 95,000 in 1849.^ Not only did the association campaign for the resignations of elective members opposed to their programme but i t s leaders in the Court of Policy hinted at the possible recourse to physical force as a means of coercing the Home Government or loca l legis lature. The Association further sponsored the f i r s t p o l i t i c a l mass meeting in the history of Guyana in 1850, and was able to get 5,000 signatures for i t s pet i t ion Q to the Court of Policy demanding a more representative Constitution. Compared with the constitutions of Barbados, Jamaica and other Br i t i sh dominions (1833-1928) the Constitution of Br i t i sh Guiana has been described as "Crown Colony Government gone mad." See Clementi, op. c i t . , p. 204. ^ Br i t i sh Guiana Ordinance, No. 150, 1849, Section 7. Clementi, op. c i t . , p. 135. 21 The Progressive Association (or Club) which was formed in 1887 was intent on further changing the qual i f icat ions for elective members in the Court of Pol icy . Candidates for election were required to own 80 acres of land . . . "actua l l y under cu l t i vat ion" , a requirement clearly discriminative of the non-planter c lass . The Club secured 4,000 s i g -natures demanding further electoral reform to permit groups outside the plantocracy representation in the legis lature. Governor Irving exp l i c i t l y supported the demands of these movements when he wrote: "It has been long obvious t h a t . . . a Constitution in which one interest i s represented and in which the interest can. . .br ing about a deadlock in public a f fa i rs from which there is no constitutional mode of escape, is p o l i t i c a l l y indefensible".^ The Constitutional changes of 1891^ were therefore a response to the sustained agitation for reform by the local movements. The changes were also a recognition that the system of administration i n -herited from the Dutch since 1581 had become unworkable. Hence in the General Elections of 1896, the Progressive Association competed under Governor's despatch, Guyana O f f i c i a l Records, No. 5, Georgetown, October 26, 1887, p. 15. Also reported in Clementi, op. c i t . , p. 299. ^ Chief among the reform measures were: 1. The reduction of the income requirement for e l i g i b i l i t y to vote, to $480 (BWT); 2. the power given to the Governor to dissolve the Court of Po l icy ; 3. the statutory l i f e of the Court of Policy was not to exceed five years; 4. the Executive functions of the Court of Pol icy were transferred to a Council consisting of the Governor, two (2) ex o f f i c io members and three (3) nominated unof f ic ia l members. 22 the banner of the Progressive Party. It was however more popularly ca l led , the Steam Intel lect Party as i t had attracted a set of bright professionals l ike A. A. Thorne, i t s General Secretary, and had made the 'disestablishment of the Church' one of i t s main election issues. The 'progressives' were the only well organised party on the scene. Like the PPP of 1953, they were faced with minimal opposition. In 1896 their strongest opposition came from the Church. As a resul t , the "progressives' attempted to counter c l e r i c a l interference by an appeal to race. "Race game, race game, play the race game''^ was one of the campaign slogans used. The Progressives had associated exploitat ion, plantocracy, white supremacy and the Church and had pitched their attack to destroy these. The Progressives won 6 of the 12 seats in the Legislative Council. But in spite of a l l th i s , the Constitution s t i l l retained the major defect, v i z . , f inancia l control was divorced from executive responsibi l i ty . As Table 2.1 shows, the franchise, though extended in 1850, 1891 and 1909, remained l imited; so much so that the absentee planter could vote by proxy up to as late as 1928, while the majority of Guyanese remained disenfranchised. Table 2.2 summarises the rac ia l distr ibution of the electorate in 1928 and shows the great discrepancies between population and the vote. While East Indians made up 51.8 per cent of the popula-t ion , they formed a mere 6.4 per cent of the total electorate and 0.6 per cent of the registered voters. The Africans with 42.3 per cent of ^ See Br i t i sh Guiana Report on the 1896 Elections (Georgetown, Guyana: Government Publication 1896). 23 of the population comprised 62.7 per cent of the tota l electorate and 6.8 per cent of the registered voters. In contrast to the East Indians and the Afr icans, the Whites with 1.7 of the population and 17 per cent of the total electorate had 46.1 per cent of the registered voters. TABLE 2.2 REGISTRATION, ELECTORATE AND POPULATION 1928 Percentage of Percentage of Percentage of Each Race in the Each Race in Adult Males of Adult Male the Total each Race Regis-Race Population Electorate tered as Voters East Indians 51.8 6.4 0.6 Africans 42.3 62.7 6.8 Portuguese 2.9 11.4 17.7 Br i t i sh 1.7 17.0 46.1 Chinese 0.9 2.4 12.3 Source: Guyana O f f i c i a l Records, 1928 3. CROWN COLONY MODIFICATION In spite of the enlarged electorate, the f i r s t election under Crown Colony government signalled l i t t l e change in the composition of the Court of Pol icy . Over the period 1833 to 1892 shown in Table 2.3, of the 110 unof f i c ia l memb ers elected to the Court of Policy and the f inancia l representatives only 2 per cent were African while 16 per cent were of mixed descent and 82 per cent, White. Professional ly , 24 44 per cent were white planters, 22 per cent businessmen and 34 per cent lawyers or s o l i c i t o r s . That no other occupations for colonial repre-sentatives are l i s ted can be explained by the fact that representatives received no remuneration. Nevertheless the period of Crown Colony modification witnesses three s ignif icant electoral changes. F i r s t , in 1928 in accordance with an Act of Parliament an order of the King in Council abolished the Court of Policy and the Combined Court and replaced i t by a Legislative Council . The new Council consisted of the governor as president, of 10 o f f i c i a l members and 19 unof f i c ia l members. The Colonial Secretary and Attorney General were ex -o f f i c io members and of the 19 unof f i c ia l members, 14 12 were elected am the remainder nominated by the Governor. Second, in 1943 the Constitution of 1928 was amended so that the Legislat ive Council consisted of 24 members in addition to the Governor as president. The ex- of f i c i o members were three in number: the Colonial Secretary, the Attorney General and the Colonial Treasurer. There were seven nominated members 13 and 14 elected members, the la t ter having a clear majority in the House. Second, instrumental in moving the Br i t i sh Parliament to act in the reforming of Guyanese po l i t i c s was the Popular Party. Under Anthony Webber, a Trinidad journal ist who came to Guyana in the early twentieth century, the Popular Party mobilised support from among the local non-planter c lass. The Popular Party provided an economic alternative to See Br i t i sh Guiana Order in Council , No. 192, 1928. Br i t i sh Guiana Order in Council , No. 274, 1943. 25 the planter interest when i t put forward a firm proposal for developing the Guyanese hinterland. ^  '.-Then in 1926 Webber's party swept the polls an important blow had been struck at the p o l i t i c a l edifice at the planto-cracy. The victory of the Popular Party was even more remarkable in the light of one columnist's vivid description of the p o l i t i c a l tenor of the times: Those were the days when the Santepede bands were units of electioneering material when banners and buntings and rosettes were part of the party ap-paratus, when rum carts rumbled through the streets behind p o l i t i c a l processions, when buttmen, jug throwers and bottle throwers and 1pick-you-up-and-dash-you-down and break-your-back boys' were paid to persuade voters to vote. " TABLE 2.3 COMPOSITION OF THE REPRESENTATIVE BODIES BY RACE/OCCUPATION (UNOFFICIAL METERS) , 1833-92 (in percentages) Occupation (N = 110) Race Legal Business Planter Total White 18 20 44 82 Mixed 16 - - 16 African - 2 - 2 Total 34 22 44 100 Source: British Guiana Ordinances, 1334-1892. Webber, i t is said, was greatly influenced by Marryshow of Grenada and Cipriani of Trinidad. His plan to develop the hinterland was based on an agreement reached with Henry Ford who had made a tentative offer to build a road from Georgetown to the Brazilian frontier. His plan was strongly opposed by the sugar interests, which saw hinterland development as pulling away their source of cheap labour. See Daily Chronicle, Georgetown, Guyana, August 11, 1937, p. 5. 2 6 The third change of electoral significance was the Waddington Constitution in 1952 which enacted Universal A.dult Suffrage for the. f i r s t tine in Guyana. The p o l i t i c a l alignments, the electoral campaign, the hundred and thirty three days of PPP rule and the subsequent sus-pension of the Constitution have been well documented.^ Suffice i t to say that i t took Guyana one hundred and twenty years after i t s unifica-tion for a National movement to emerge in the form of the People's Progressive Party (PPP). In spite of the fierce attacks against the party both by the local and international mass media, the PPP emerged victorious in the 1953 general elections winning 18 of the 24 seats to the legislature. Yet i t s l i f e as a people's government was short. The suspension of the Constitution as a logical culmination of an entire 120 years of p o l i t i c a l experience is commented upon by Ayearst as follows: Of course the constitutional collapse of 1953 had i t s roots in the long history of neglect during which the colony had been governed as i f i t were nothing more than a complex, large-scale enterprise with almost no attention paid to the wellbeing, physical or social, of i t s inhabitants and no at-tempt to advance their p o l i t i c a l education. The result of the long domination by the indifferent rather than malevolent autocracy of the sugar and Peter Newman, British Guiana (London: Institute of Race Relations, Oxford University Press, 1964); Raymond T. Smith, British Guiana (London: Oxford University Press, 1962); Phi l l i p s Reno, The Ordeal of British  Guiana (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1964); Cheddi Jagan, Forbidden  Freedom: The Story of British Guiana (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1954); Ashton Chase, 133 Days Towards Freedom in Guiana (Georgetown, Guyana, n.d.). These are a few of a large volume of writings, including o f f i c i a l reports, on this period in Guyana. I 27 commercial interests was grinding poverty for the many and a gal l ing sense of frustration among a number of the educated few. The p o l i t i c a l advances and projects for economic development came too late to fo resta l l the results of accumulated grievances. The Guyanese experience was similar to other Crown Colony regimes. For this reason Gordon Lewis' point is well taken when he says, "the psychological consequences of the system especially as they affect the Guyanese po l i t i c ian type were also the same as elsewhere and are not to be regarded, as some English writers too readily assume as peculiar to 18 the Guyanese psychology." Nevertheless there is an in t r ins i c quality of "c i t izenship" that emerged in the 1950's in Guyana which needs to be emphasised. This period marks the beginning of the Civ ic Mode. 4. THE CIVIC MODE Table 2.4 i l lus t ra tes the highly participant p o l i t i c a l culture in Guyana. Except for the 1957 elect ions, the five elections held during this period, 1953-1968, a l l show a voting turnout of above 75 per cent and as high as 96.9 in 1964. The period between 1954 and 1957 was characterised by an interim legis lature , a l l members of whom were nominated by the Governor, S i r Alfred Savage. This period contributed towards a certain malaise in loca l p o l i t i c s . The restoration of a normal constitution though i n -evitable, was uncertain as to i t s timing. Uncertainty was also accompanied Ayearst, op. c i t . , p. 125. 18 Gordon Lewis, Modern West Indian Government (London: MacGibbon and Kee, 1968), p. 259'. 28 TA3LE 2.4 COMPARATIVE SUMMARY OF BALLOTS CAST IN FIVE GENERAL ELECTIONS 1953-1968 No. of Electors No. of Per- No. of Per- No. of Per-on Votes cent- Votes cent- Votes cent-Year Register Cast age Accepted age Rejected age 1953 208,939 156,226 74.8 152,231 97.4 3,995 2.6 1957 212,518 118,564 55.8 116,939 98.6 1,625 1.4 1961 246,120 220,125 89.4 218,357 99.2 1,768 0.8 1964 247,604 240,120 96.9 238,530 99.3 1,590 0.7 1968 369,088 314,216* 85.1* 312,391 99.4 1,855 0.6 Source: Report on the National Assembly General Election, 1968. * If non-resident vote i s excluded then the percentage increases to 93.5 per cent. by repression on the part of the British Government since several leading p o l i t i c a l figures (including Dr. Jagan, leader of the PPP and Janet his wife, general secretary), were either detained in prison under the Emer-gency Orders or were restricted in their movements to certain specified areas. When however the state of emergency was eventually relaxed in 1956, several new p o l i t i c a l alignments had been formed. These included the two factions of the PPP, the "Jaganites" and the "Burnharaites", the National Labour Front (NLF) headed by Lionel Luckhoo and the Guyana National Party (GNP) led by Cecil Grey. As a result of the s p l i t in the PPP, the Trade Union movement which to a great extent supported the party in 1953, also becane fragmented in i t s loyalty. Hence the 1957 elections, 29 the f i r s t to the interim legislative council provided a test of strength for the new groupings. The electoral campaign proved to be a bitter confrontation between the Jaganites and the Bumhamites in what was recognised to be a c r i s i s of leadership. Though unanimous in their condemnation of British imperialism both Jagan and Burnham claimed to be the legitimate leader of the nation. However the election results ascribed that legitimacy to Jagan whose faction won 9 out of 14 seats, with 48 per cent of the total votes. The Burnham faction won only 3 seats, a l l of which were in Georgetown, the capital, and gaining 39 per cent of the total votes cast. If the 1957 elections reflected the uncertainty and demoralisation of the tines, the 1961 elections reflected the deep ra c i a l divisions which in Guyana were quickly rising to the surface of the p o l i t i c a l arena. The general elections were held in August 1961 under the new constitution which made provision for the f i r s t time for registration by enumeration. Jagan won 20 seats, Burnham 11 and D'Aguiar 4. Prior to the general elections, the Burnham faction had changed i t s name to the. People's National Congress (PNC) and had absorbed a large African middle class leadership and f o l -lowing of the United democratic Party which was led by John Carter, presently Guyana's Ambassador to the United Kingdom and Russia. In the meantime, a new party led by Peter D'Aguiar, a Portuguese businessman, was launched, which judging from i t s leadership corps represented the white, the Roman Catholic, the business and upper middle class layers of the society. 'Jhile Jagan's PPP maintained the ideological basis of it s organisation, i t increasingly failed to escape the racial stii^na 30 of being a party for the Indians; a stigma which whether true or false had come to be associated with i t s p o l i t i c a l practices of al locating the spoi ls of o f f ice in a way which gave an unfair advantage to the Indian elements in the population. I ron ica l ly , in 1961, two predomi-nantly working class part ies , the PPP supported by Indians and the PNC by Africans were each waging a two-pronged p o l i t i c a l bat t le . One batt le between themselves and the other batt le against the United Force which seemed set on reinforcing the values of capitalism and colonialism, the same issues against which the now fragmented working classes were f ighting in 1953. Informed opinion supports the view that especially after 1961, Jagan was forced to compromise the ideological basis of his party to make allowances for the expression of the more conservative values of the Indian business community which contributed heavily to the party's finances and had adopted the popular slogan, "we wukking wid de govoment."^"^ The growing Indianness of Jagan' s party became more obvious between 1961 and 1964 with the resignations from the party of some of the non-Indians who held top echelon posit ions. Among these were Bunny Mann, Rudy Luck, Fred Bowman, George Robertson and Lionel Jeffrey. Hence while the Indian supporters of the PPP boasted "Ah we pon top" (we are on top) the anti-PPP forces chided, "things gon change." In 1961, when the Indians comprised 49 per cent of the population, the PPP gained 43 per See C. Paul Bradley, "The Party System in Br i t i sh Guiana and the General Election of 1961," Caribbean Studies, 1 (1961), pp. 15-28. 31 cent of the votes cast at the General Elections of that year. At the same time, the Africans comprised 30 per cent of the population, but the PNC received Al per cent of the votes. The disparity between percentage votes received by the PPP and Indians as a percentage of the population was mainly accountable to the large proportion of East Indians under voting age. That the PNC received Al per cent of the votes meant that i t acquired substantial support from outside the African population among the mixed group. In each of the general elections since the formation of the United Force (UF) in 1961, i t s percentage of votes has closely approximated the size of the combined European, Chinese, Amerindian and Portuguese populations. Indeed, while Jagan continued to espouse his be l ie f i n , and to be ident i f ied with, Marxism abroad, the nature and the requirements of p o l i t i c a l strategy at home provided fewer clues about a soc ia l i s t revolution in view of the r is ing rac ia l tensions among the working classes. International developments too undermined Jagan's posit ion. Not only was his independence movement seen as a communist plot but Jagan was also linked in the foreign press with Castro. Unfortunately for Jagan, the United States of America was not unmindful of another possible Cuba in the Caribbean. And in any case the conditions which brought Castro to power in Cuba did not exist in Guyana. Ja?an's mass support fa i led to cut across the rac ia l barriers in the way that the Cuban masses confronted the compradore bourgeoisie in 1953. When therefore the Colonial Off ice in 196A rationalised i t s recommendation for proportional representation on the grounds of the need for greater parity between votes cast and seats 32 won by respective parties one is prompted to think of this solution as the culmination of a general contrivance between Br i ta in and the United States of America to replace a radical force by a more moderate p o l i t i c a l coal i t ion . TABLE 2.5 PERCENTAGE OF VOTES AND NUMBER OF SEATS GAINED IN PRE-PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS 1953-1961 Percentage Votes Percentage Seats 1953 195J 19_6i 19_5J 1957 1961, PPP 51 47.6 42.6 75 (18) 65 (9) 57 (19) PNC - 39.4 41.0 - 28 (4) 31 (12) UF - 16.3 - 12 (4) OTHER 49 15 25 (6) 7 (1) Table 2.5 shows distr ibut ion of seats in relationship to the percentage votes cast for the major parties in four elections under p lura l i ty voting since 1953. The table shows that in the 1957 elections the PPP with less than half the tota l votes received over twice as many seats as the opposition part ies. In 1961 with 1.6 per cent more votes than the PNC, the PPP obtained 9 more seats. Expressed in actual per-centages in 1953, the PPP with 51 per cent of the votes obtained 75 per cent of the seats. In 1957 with 48 per cent of the votes i t secured 65 per cent of the seats. In 1961 the PPP polled 43 per cent of the votes and obtained 57 per cent of the seats as compared with the PNC party which polled 41 per cent but obtained only 31 per cent of the seats. 33 In the l ight of the minority representation in Government, Duncan Sandys, Secretary of State for the Colonies jus t i f i ed changing the electoral procedure in 1964 from a p lura l i t y system to one of proportional repre-sentation. He sa id : The wide disparity between votes and seats which this system has consistently produced in Br i t ish Guiana has not unnaturally engendered a sense of frustration and grievance among the opposition part ies, which to -gether polled a majority of the votes at the last elect ions. On the other hand, i t i s argued that a certain measure of over-representation should be ac-cepted as the price of strong government. Unfortunately, In Br i t i sh Guiana this e lectoral system, while providing clear parliamentary majorit ies, has not provided strong government. The fact is that the administration of the country has been largely paralysed, the Government is insolvent and law and order can be maintained only with the help of outside troops. Without attempting to apportion blame, the reason for this state of a f fa i rs i s that the rul ing party has alienated the confidence of the non-Indian communities, while they on their side have obstructed and resisted the Government at every turn.20 One of the major reasons for the disparity between votes and seats was the mal-distr ibution of e lectoral d iv is ions, a careful scrutiny of which reveals that both in 1957 and 1961 there was a wide variation in the size of constituencies. In 1957, for example, the PPP polled 34.8 per cent of i t s total vote in one constituency, Eastern Berbice. S imi lar ly , the PNC polled 17.6 per cent of i t s vote in the constituency of Georgetown South. In 1961, the UF polled 46 per cent of i t s total vote in two hinterland constituencies. Proportional representation would correct u Report on the Br i t i sh Guiana Conference (London: H.M.S.O. Cmnd. 2203, 1963), p. 6. 34 this and would also have another advantage. Sandys recommended a system of proportional representation "to encourage coal i t ion between parties and to make i t easier for new p o l i t i c a l groupings to form on a raulti-21 rac ia l bas is . " These two objectives were only par t ia l l y met. While a coal i t ion government emerged after the 1964 elections there was no evidence to suggest that p o l i t i c a l groupings were formed on "a mult i -r a c i a l b a s i s . " The election results showed that the PPP with 46 per cent of the votes won 24 seats, the PNC gained 41 per cent of the votes aid 22 seats, the II.F. , 7 seats with 12 per cent of the votes. While the overal l turnout in this election was very high (96.9 per cent), rac ia l cleavages seemed to harden. The number of votes received bv each of the major parties so closely approximated the rac ia l groupings — Indian, Afr ican and Others — in the electorate, that one ponders whether the effect of this election was merely to oust Jagan from o f f i c e . One observer commenting on the 1964 elections explains the high electoral turnout as follows: "The heavy po l l i s no more than a seeking for rac ia l security, by groupine one against the other. As for the minorit ies, the election results showed their fate, they have been wiped out. They have only helped the formation of a weak Government. No weak Government can solve the problem that 3 r i t i s h Guiana faces. '•There there is a sense of fear and where an Election divides rac ia l l y and p o l i t i c a l l y , there, I maintain, the election can not be cal led f a i r . If just the maintenance of law and order (it may not be possible to maintain i t in th^. next Election) and heavy pol l ing are the c r i t e r i a of the fairness of Elect ions, then these exist in amnle measure in some Ibid. , p. 5. 35 dictatorial countries. P o l i t i c a l scientists term them u n f a i r . " 2 2 The coalition Government of the PNC and the UF which followed the 1964 elections, exemplified unprecedented compromise and concilia-tion. It is d i f f i c u l t to understand the basis for that coalition which lasted u n t i l 1968. The UF was recognised as representing the white, commercial and upper class wedded to free enterprise and op-posed to independence for Guyana. Hence i t s association with the PNC — supported predominantly by Afro-Guyanese of the working and middle classes and espousing socialism as a p o l i t i c a l goal — reflects some degree of ideological incongruity. Perhaps the major explanation for the conciliation and compromise that brought about the coalition was the common opposition of both the UF and the PNC to the PPP rule. In the period of great uncertainty and conflict (1962-64), i t was as i f 23 the PNC and UF a l l i e d themselves in battle against the PPP. But un-certainty and conflict in Guyanese society have been a legacy not only Memorandum by Baker A l i Mizra. This was a dissenting judgment by Mizra, one member of the eleven man team. See British Guiana, Report by the Commonwealth Team of Observers on the election in December, 1964 (London: H.M.S.O.: Colonial No. 359, 1965), p. 15. 23 For a variety of accounts of the period 1962-1964, see B.A.N. Collins, "The C i v i l Service in the General Strike of 1963," Caribbean  Quarterly, 10 (1964), pp. 12-24; "Consultative Democracy in British Guiana," Parliamentary Affairs, 19 (1965-66), pp. 11-21; "Acceding to Independence: Some Constitutional Problems of a Polyethnic society (British Guiana)," Civilizations, 15 (1965), pp. 1-21; "The Three Faces of British Guiana," Social and Economic Studies, 14 (1965), pp. 51-56 and "The End of a Colony - British Guiana 1965," The P o l i t i c a l Quarterly, 10 (1964), pp. 12-24. 36 of the period of plantation monopoly but also of the demographic divergencies of Guyana. An examination of voting distr ibution over the last three elections in constituencies grouped according to their geographical location which reveals a general urban-rural dichotomy of party support is shown in Table 2.6 TABLE 2.6 DISTRIBUTION OF VOTES BY CONSTITUENCIES CLASSIFIED ACCORDING TO URBAN-RURAL TYPE (in Percentages) URBAN RURAL Plantation Vi l lage Hinterland = 11 N = 10 N = 11 N = 3 PNC PPP UF PNC PPP UF PNC PPP UF PNC PPP UF 1961 65 10 25 10 88 2 40 52 8 12 29 69 1964 70 14 16 8 90 1 50 40 10 14 25 71 1968b 78 11 11 14 85 2 60 36 4 30 20 50 a N denotes the number i of constituencies in each cluster . In 1968 the number of constituencies was increased from 35 to 38; to f a c i l i t a t e comparisons we simulated the 1968 constituen-cies to equal 35. This could easily be done since the increase in constituencies involved dividing each of three constituencies into two. In the plantation const i tuenc ies ,^ the PPP has consistently Constituencies located in plantation communities and v i l lage communities are both to be found in the rural areas of Guyana. But whereas sugar estates provide the dominant mode of l i f e in plantation communities, v i l lage communities originated with a different set of values after emancipation and provide basical ly a different style of l i f e from the plantations. What is more, plantation communities have 37 gained over 85 per cent of the votes, while the PNC has averaged only 10 per cent. In the v i l lages , except for 1968 when the PNC seemed to have made considerable gains, the voting distr ibution for the two major parties is about even. In the urban areas the UF has s l i d from 25 per cent to 11 per cent while the PPP has averaged just over 10 per cent. The PNC dominates the urban cluster with an average of 72 per cent. F ina l l y , the Hinterland Cluster which comprises a preponderance of a predominantly East Indian population, whereas v i l lage communities tend to be more evenly divided among Indian and African dwellers. It i s interesting to note that each v i l lage tends also to have either a predominantly East Indian or a predominantly African population. Hinterland communities on the other hand are to be located in the back-lands of Guyana where the dominant ethnic group i s the Amerindians. For a useful d ist inct ion between these types of communities, see Leo Despres, Cultural Pluralism and Nationalism in Guyana (New York: Rand McNally, 1967), Chp. 2, and R. T. Smith, Br i t i sh Guiana (London, N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1962), Chps. 2 and 3; E. P. Skinner, "Group Dynamics and Social S t rat i f i cat ion in Br i t i sh Guiana," Annals of New York  Academy of Science,83,(1960), pp. 705-716. For speci f ic references to plantation society, see D. Jayawardena, Confl ict and Sol idar i ty in a Guyanese Plantation (London: Athlone Press, 1963), and R. T. Smith, "Marriage and Family amongst East Indians in Br i t i sh Guiana," Social and Economic Studies, 8 (1959), pp. 20-41; K. S. Nair , "Indians in Br i t i sh Guiana," Indo-Asian Culture, 6 (1958), pp. 75-89; D. Nath, A History of Indians in Br i t ish Guiana, (London: Thomas, Nelson and Sons L t d . , 1950), esp. pp. 200-16; Phi l ip Singer and Enrique Araneta J r . , "Hinduzation and Creolization in Guyana: The Plural Societv and the Basic Personal ity ," Social and Economic Studies, 16 (1967)', pp. 221-237. On the v i l lage , see Rawle Farley, "Peasant Society in Br i t ish Guiana," Social and Economic Studies, 1 (1955), pp. 5-21; R. T. Smith, The Negro Family in Br i t i sh Guiana: Family Structure and Socia1 Status in the Vi l lage (London: Routledge and K. Paul in association with Institute of Social and Economic Research, University of the West Indies, 1956); Al lan Young, Approaches to Local Self-Govemment in Br i t i sh  Guiana (London: Longmans, 195S), esp. Chapter 3. 38 Amerindians has been the domain of the UF, even though i t s support has declined from 71 per cent in 1964 to 50 per cent in 1968. On the other hand, support for the PNC is on the upswing from 12 per cent in 1961 to 30 per cent in 1963. 5. GENERAL ELECTIONS 1968 The 1968 elections were the f i r s t post-independence elections 25 to be held. Once again the system of proportional representation was used. Although this system changed the electoral procedure, the electoral infrastructure had retained, to a considerable extent, the features of the pre-"PR" situation. For example, the same 35 electoral divisions used i n 1961, were used in 1964 under proportional representation. In the 1968 Elections, the electoral divisions were increased to 38 which meant the s p l i t t i n g up of one electoral division into two rather than any drastic redivision of boundaries. The system of proportional representation in Guyana uses the basic technique to determine seats to the House of Representatives. It applies a quota to the total vote and awards seats according to the number of quotas each party receives. In the 1968 General Election, 53 seats were being contested. The quota was calculated by taking the 53 seats up for election, adding one and dividing the total (54) into the total valid vote. One is then added to the figure for the quota. That is to say, given the number of seats in the House of Representatives (53), the quota rises or f a l l s as the 25 Guyana became an independent nation on May 26, 1966. 39 total vote rises or f a l l s . To determine the 53 representatives to the House, the parties contesting the 1968 election were required to present a l i s t of candidates in alphabetical order. Once the party's quotas were announced, the party leader was required to select from the l i s t the number of representatives equivalent to the number of quotas his party received. This provision for alphabetical l i s t i n g amended the regulations for the 1964 election when the parties were required to present their l i s t of candidates ac-cording to a numerical ranking. That is to say, i f a party presented a l i s t of 53 candidates, i t also needed to rank each candidate from 1 to 53. In 1964 i t was obvious to voters and candidates alike that those candidates further down the l i s t had less chances of getting selected than those higher on the l i s t . The numerical l i s t implied the relative importance of candidates to the party. As a result, party leaders complained that between the publication of the l i s t s and election day, two things happened: (1) they spent much time pacifying constituents whose local heroes would not be selected except for an unprecedented landslide victory for the party; (2) candidates who f e l t they had l i t t l e chance of being selected, did not generally campaign so vigor-ously for the party as those with greater hopes of being selected. How-ever, in meeting these two problems, the 1968 amendment (alphabetical l i s t i n g ) strengthened the role of the party leader in making the f i n a l selection of candidates. What also happened was a reduction in the a b i l i t y of voters to express any direct feeling toward any candidates. Yet the introduction of proportional representation did not altogether obliterate the "candidate-orientation" of electoral p o l i t i c s . The two AO major p o l i t i c a l parties were s t i l l conscious of the psychic attachment of their supporters who l iked to identify with "men", perceived to empathise with their community. As a resul t , both parties operated on a speci f ic policy of nominating or assigning speci f ic candidates to speci f ic constituencies. In other words, only the leaders of the respective parties campaigned on the basis that under "PR" the entire country was one constituency. Among the most popular cr i t ic isms of proportional representation for Guyana were: (i) that i t was l ike ly to lead more di rect ly to rac ia l voting than the system of p lura l i t y voting, ( i i ) that i t would encourage fragmentation of parties without destroying their rac ia l bas is , ( i i i ) that i t could not be expected to result in a clear victory for any party not to mention that i t seemed 2fi designed to ensure the defeat of the PPP. Proportional representation introduced several new features in the electoral experience of Guyana. The most fundamental of these were the innovations in the electoral law of 1968, which generated con-troversy — to say the least — throughout and in the aftermath of the z t > See Roy McKitterick, "PR" in Guyana", Economist, October 29, 1965, p. 31. 27 Guyana: Report on the National Assembly General Elect ions, Georgetown, Government Printery, 1969. See also Representation of the People (Adaptation and Modification of Laws) Act, 1968, No. 16, George-town, Guyana, Government Printery 1968. For an appraisal of overseas voting and registrat ion, see Sunday Times, London, November 5, 1968, p. A. It i s also worth noting that the system of overseas registrat ion and voting i s not novel nor is i t new to Guyana. As early as 1833 absentee non-Guyanese planters were e l ig ib le to vote in elections to the various representative assemblies. See Clementi, op. c i t . , pp. 175-181. 41 electoral campaign. The Representation of the People's Act 1968 provided for the compilation of Registers of electors under the National Registration Act, 1967 in regard to every subsequent election to the National As-sembly. The B i l l amended the constitution in two main ways: (i) to allow bal lot ing by non-resident cit izens of Guyana ( i i ) to enable casual vacancies to be f i l l e d by way of selection and extraction from the relevant l i s t of candidates entered at the preceding e lec t ion .^ 8 The lat ter innovation means that the poss ib i l i t y of parliamen-tary by-elections has been eliminated. At the same time, the former established the pr inciple that Guyanese residents overseas should vote in a l l future General Elect ions. Of a l l the new provisions this was the most controversial issue. Under the new act provision was made to allow bal lot ing by non-resident electors to take place before election day and to allow thei r registrat ion and pol l ing to be supervised by the Elections Commission and carried out by the same machinery as for Guyanese l i v ing in Guyana, under the National Registration Act of 1967. Opinion Research Centre in England carried out a survey of 1000 names and addresses from the preliminary registrat ion l i s t of 43,000 names. Giving a sampling error of 3 per cent the pollsters concluded that not more than 10,000 people on the overseas register were genuine e l ig ib le voters, i . e . , less than a quarter of the total registered voters. According to Adrian Mitchel l : Representation of the People (Adaptation and Modification of  Laws) Act, 196S. 42 The most devastating evidence of inaccuracy in the programme came from Wolverhanpton where the only registrat ion agent Mr- Joe Hughes, said he had registered a l l 41 Guyanese in his area. The of -f i c i a l l i s t showed more than 200 people e l ig ib le to vote in Wolverhampton. Mr. Hughes could not explain where the others came frora.'-^ The Election Commission was set up in 1964. It has been charged with the responsibi l i ty of issuing such instructions and taking such actions "as appears to i t to be necessary or expedient to ensure im-p a r t i a l i t y , fairness and compliance with the provisions of the Constitu-t ion or any Act of Parliament (including the 1968) on the part of persons exercising powers or performing duties connected with or relating to the 30 administrative conduct of e lect ions ." In spite of the formal super-visory powers of the Elections Commission, an examination of the way the registrat ion process actually operated in 1968 shows how impossible i t was for the Commission to avert i r regu lar i t ies in the process, unless as one writer states "the Commission accepted the word of the government that this was the case." Another election anomaly was the National registration procedure. Most commentators were baff led at the increase in the electoral register 29 Adrian Mi tche l l , "Jagan and Burnham: I t ' s pol l ing day Tomorrow. Has Guyana election already been decided in Britain?" The Sunday Times (London), December 15, 1968, p. 5. "Elections Commission Sinecure," Evening Post (Georgetown, Guyana), October 22, 1968, p. 3. 31 Evening Post (Georgetown, Guyana), December 12, 1969. 43 of 1968. But the o f f i c i a l explanation states that the 1964 register with which most c r i t i c s compared the 1968 register was in fact inaccurate. Table 2.7 shows the comparative size of the electorate between 1953 and 1968. TABLE 2.7 REGISTERED ELECTORATE 19 53-1968 Year Registered Electorate 1953 208,939 1957 212,518 1961 246,120 1964 247,604 1968 297,404* *This figure refers only to the internal register ; when the overseas register is added, the total registered electorate is 367,945. Using 1953 as the base year, and calculating annual growth rates, the 1961 figure represents a growth rate of 2.1 per cent; 1963 one of 2.3 per cent and 1964 one of 1.6 per cent. Using 1961 as the base year, the 1968 figure represents a growth of 2.8 per cent, while the 1964 figure gives growth of 0.2 per cent. This interpretation of the table suggests that the 1964 series is the outstanding anomaly, i . e . , " i t is far too low." The compulsory registration in 1968 tended to redress the 1964 inconsistency, and what has therefore resulted is that the 1968 -*2 See a very trenchant attack by Janet Jagan, "Election Fraud," Daily Mirror (Georgetown, Guyana), November 29, 1963, p. 1. 44 figures represent both natural increases from 1964 to 1968 together with corrections for the under registration in 1964 which was voluntary: registration in 1964 must have been p a r t i a l , not only because i t was voluntary, but also because, coming as i t did at the end of a period of serious dis locat ion, people were l i v ing in areas to which they had temporarily moved for safety and the country was s t i l l divided into areas which some parties could not venture. In addit ion, increased economic act iv i ty In some areas may have resulted in sizeable migration. For example, the 1968 construction programme of Taylor Woodrow in MacKenzie may have resulted in a s i g -n i f icant inf lux of workers into the area — a situation with no para l le l anywhere in 1964. However, the increases in the 1968 register become questionable when we locate certain characterist ic features about the distr ibut ion of those increases. For example, the average increase over six strong PPP areas was 10 per cent, while increases in the con-stituencies with strong PNC support ranged from 109 per cent in MacKenzie, 58 per cent in Mazaruni Potaro and 49 per cent in Abary. Addit ionally , the fa i lure of the election machinery to expedite i t s task e f f i c ient l y also affected the c red ib i l i t y of the election i t s e l f . As a case in point, elaborate procedures were adopted to ensure that each Compare Report on the Br i t i sh Guiana General Elect ions, 1964 (Georgetown, Guyana Government Printery, 1965), with Report^ on the National Assembly General Elect ions, 1968 (Georgetown, Guyana, Govern-ment Printery, 1969) and the quotation taken from a tapescript, spoken by Kit Nascimento, one of three panelists on "Focus on the General E lect ions ," Guyana Broadcasting Corporation, Dec. 22, 1968. 45 voter ought to have an i d e n t i f i c a t i o n card bearing his fingerprint and photograph. Yet i n many cases i d e n t i f i c a t i o n cards were not distributed u n t i l p o l l i n g dav, after both proxy and overseas votes had been admin-istere d . This phenomenon made i t d i f f i c u l t for even the keenest of observers to check out the propriety with which i d e n t i f i c a t i o n cards were dist r i b u t e d . From the point of view of any objective analysis of the 1968 elections there was another anomaly which affected the legitimacy of the e l e c t o r a l machinery, v i z . , the proxy voting. Under the e l e c t o r a l provision one person could be appointed to vote for up to f i v e electors. According to the report of the Chief E l e c t o r a l O f f i c e r , " t h i s (proxy vote) was used to i t s f u l l e s t advantage as the examination of 19,287 applications did not permit the returning o f f i c e r s to prepare l i s t s 34 of proxies by the appointed time. Table 2.8 shows that the proxies increased from 300 or 0.5 per cent of the t o t a l number of votes cast i n 1961 to 7,000 or 2.5 per cent of the e l e c t o r a l votes cast i n 1964 to 7 per cent i n 1968. Proxies therefore became the second greatest TABLE 2.8 PROXIES AS A PERCENTAGE OF VOTES CAST - 1961-1968 Votes Cast Proxies Proxies % of Votes 1961 220,125 300 0.5 1964 240,120 7,000 2.5 1968 314,216 19,297 7.0 Report of 1968 Elections, op. c i t . , p. 10. 46 issue in the electoral process and administration. As early as 1964 a Commonwealth team of observers to the General Elections commented that the one administrative provision which seemed open to manipulation was the proxy vote. The report concluded: "We cannot ignore the poss ib i l i t y of misuse of proxies.. .we feel i t is our duty to point out that the proxy system is l iab le to abuse. Our own scepticism of administration and actual use of the proxy votes stems from the fact that no real distr ibut ion of these proxies was provided in the Chief E lectoral Of f i cer ' s report to inform us how they were allocated among the parties and the constituencies. This omission, together with the overseas voting make the analysis of e lectoral behaviour in Guyana based mainly on gross electoral data, somewhat spurious. Especial ly when the proxies number 7 per cent of the national vote (the equivalent of two seats) there is need for a fu l le r explanation of the administration of these proxies. In the 1968 elect ions, the cl ienteles of the four parties con-testing these elections were the main indicators of their positions not in terms of an ideological left -wing spectrum, but rather in terms of an ethno-class axis. The PPP continued to attract i t s hard core support from East Indian workers on the sugar estates and r ice farmers along the coast be l t , and middle class support of East Indian businessmen. What seems very noteworthy is that whereas a small group of negro and mixed inte l lectuals ra l l i ed to i t s cause up to possibly 1961, this support Br i t i sh Guiana, Report by the Commonwealth Team, p. 5. 47 was now absent. PNC c l ientele came predominantly from the African workers in the towns, coloured middle c lass , especially c i v i l servants, the police and professionals. Though the support for the UF declined, i t retained the allegiances of Catholics, businessmen of European, Portuguese and Chinese descent, some East Indian businessmen and a waning group of mixed middle c lass . The fourth party contesting these elections was the Guyana United Muslim Party (GUMP) which was nothing more than a spl inter group of Indian Muslims who had defected from the PPP. Judging from the issues presented in this election the PPP had modified i t s ideological image even more than in 1964, to accommodate the moderate elements of the Indian community, v i z . , businessmen and professionals. The PNC had long thrown off the Socia l is t camouflage in i t s attempt to attract the black middle classes as in fact i t s absorption of a formerly bourgeois party, the UDP i l l us t ra tes . The 1968 election campaign was disappointing from the point of view of substance. The PNC's strategy was to re i terate: "We brought you peace  and s t a b i l i t y , let the facts speak." The PPP exhausted i ts efforts on proving that the electoral machinery was fraudulent. Opinions were divided within the party on whether or not i t should have contested the elections. But so much time was spent on negating the PNC government and the electoral mal-practices that, as some party o f f i c i a l s confessed, the electoral strategy of the party was neglected. In deciding between two electoral systems, " f i r s t past the post" 48 and proportional representation, the Secretary of State for the Colonies f e l t that proportional representation would be likely to result in the formation of coalition parties supported by different races, and this 36 would go a long way toward reducing ra c i a l tension. In fact, the elections proved to be an extension of the previous ra c i a l tensions and h o s t i l i t i e s , i n 1968 as i n 1964, 'people used their ballots l i k e bullets.' 3 b Report on the British Guiana Conference (London: H.M.S.O. Cmnd. 2203, 1963). 49 CHAPTER III POLITICAL CLEAVAGES AMD THF. PROCESS OF POLITICAL SOCIALISATION 1953-1968 1. INTRODUCTION This chapter deals with the formation of p o l i t i c a l attitudes as they are influenced by a series of factors chief among which are the cleavages between p o l i t i c a l parties and soc ia l movements; the importance of a working class consciousness as a so l id i fy ing force; the change from "c lass" to "race" as an agent of p o l i t i c a l mobilisation and the cross-cutt ing memberships of people not only in p o l i t i c a l but also in soc ia l and rel igious organisations. By drawing upon information spec i f i ca l l y in the period 1953-1968, we show several dimensions of the process of p o l i t i c a l soc ia l isat ion among Guyanese which help us in some way to understand why Guyanese perceive their po l i t i cs in a certain way and why their p o l i t i c a l behaviour ref lects so much of the cleavages based on race. 2. CLEAVAGES BETWEEN POLITICAL PARTIES AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS Although soc ia l and p o l i t i c a l movements have been present in Guyana throughout i t s history , mass po l i t i cs in Guyana could be dated from the early 1950s. In 1953, the advent of universal adult suffrage saw the prol i ferat ion of movements and pressure groups in a struggle for p o l i t i c a l power. F ig . 3.1 represents the relationship between movements and p o l i t i c a l part ies , start ing at the time of the general PPP (Jagan and Burnham) UNITED WORKERS AND FARMERS PARTY (DAN DEBIDIN) 1. Trade Unionoi I n d u s t r i a l A g r i c u l t u r a l Workers (Moat) VI C A W U A g r i c u l t u r a l Workers PPP (Jagan) PPP Jagan PPP — (Jagan) PPP (Jnpin) Hindu Sanatan Maha Sabha Anjuman-E-Is}am Sooiety American Ayrian League League of Coloured People Chamber of Commerce (Car t e r & Others) GUYANA NATIONAL PAHTY Sharpies A C a t h o l i c Church/ Aoson. I M.P.C.A. ~1 Cuyana Teachers Asson. Guyana C i v i l Service Asson. t. Other C l e r i c a l Unions Sugar Producers Asson. 4 PPP (Burnham) UDP. Carter & Others (Burnham & Carter) GULP (Mohammed Saffee) NLF Luckhoo & Others ILL. « (D'AguiarJ • » PNC^ (Burnham) J. PNC ASCRIA UF ui (D'Aguiar) ° 1 UF 51 elections of 1953. As is shown, the PPP as i t was then constituted, provided a v i t a l function of uniting the working class in a way that was unique among West Indian societies at the time, except for Barbados whose Barbados Workers' Union-Barbados Labour Party partnership from 1945-1950 proved somewhat of a bastion of working class p o l i t i c a l supremacy in that island.^" The relationship between class and party a f f i l i a t i o n in 1953 was clearly defined and recognised by the party e l i t e s . The National Democratic Party (NDP) was closely associated with the League of Coloured People (LCP), so much so that the leaders of the NDP held top positions in the LCP. John Carter was General Secretary of both, while Rudy Kendal was f i r s t vice-president of the NDP and vice-president of the LCP also. J. A. Nicholson and C. P. Denbow executive members of the NDP were vice-president and president of the League respectively. The NDP-LCP nucleus of the middle class African and creole elements of the society received the backing of the commercial community and the established churches, mainly Roman Catholic and Anglican. John Fernandes, a prominent Portuguese business-man was chairman of the party; Peter D'Aguiar, a Portuguese business-man, who was later to become the leader'of the United Force also con-tested the 1953 elections under the banner of the NDP. Eugene Correia, F. A. Hoyos, The Rise of West Indian Democracy The Life and Times of Sir Grantley Adams (Bridgetown Advocate Press, 1963); William H. Knowles, Trade Union Development and Industrial Relations in the  British West Indies (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1959); Francis Mark, The History of the Barbados Workers' Union (Bridgetown, Barbados: Advocate Press, 1966). 52 a Portuguese businessman later joined the PNC, and Sheik Mohamried Shakoor, a wealthy East Indian, then General Secretary of the >Q?CA, Lionel Luckhoo, a barr is ter , later to become Guyanese High Commissioner to London, completed the hierarchy of the NDP. Besides the NDP, the other groups opposing the PPP, the Guiana National Party and the United Workers and Farmers Party, merely mush-roomed at election time. Both of these were spl inter groups, an odd assortment of personalit ies with no programmes as a basis of so l idar i ty . Like the NDP both of these groups drew heavily on the middle classes. The GNP, based pr inc ipal ly in Berbice contested the elections under the Presidency of a revered physician, Loris Rohan Sharpies. It has been claimed that this group was sponsored by the Sugar Producers Association to challenge the PPP especially in Berbice since the NDP concentrated mainly on i t s urban middle-class backing in the urban constituencies in Georgetown and New Amsterdam. The United Farmers and Workers Party (UFWP) which was curiously devoid of support from both workers and farmers, was united only in the sense that i t s middle-class Indian support revolved around the personality of Daniel Debidin, a s o l i c i t o r from a well known creolised Indian family. It i s therefore in the background of the middle-class bias of the major p o l i t i c a l opponents of the PPP, that one can fu l ly appreciate the impact of i ts organisation appealing as i t did to the working classes. Through i t s joint leadership of Jagan (an Indian) and Burnham (an African) and i t s organisation strategists , Janet Jagan and Sidney King (now Eusi Kwayama) the party coopted secondary 53 leadership from a l l sections of the community which is illustrated by the occupational distribution of the IS successful candidates of the PPP in the 1953 general elections. There were 3 lawyers, 2 medical doctors, 1 dentist, 2 trade unionists, 4 teachers, 2 farmers, 1 businessman, 2 labourers, 1 journalist, 1 housewife. The racial composition too was very representative as i t included 6 East Indians, 5 Africans, 2 Chinese, 3 mixed, 1 white and 1 Portuguese. When in addition to these factors which cut across racial divisions, fourteen of the sixteen trade unions in 1953 were known to be a f f i l i a t e d to the PPP, this indeed con-firms the boast of Janet Jagan at a meeting on Bourda Green to celebrate the party's election success, that 1953 must mark "the end of the old era and the beginning of mass p o l i t i c s " . The PPP as a mass organisation not only articulated the demands of the working classes but also aggregated their interests i n a way that appeared to be consensual. That is to say, a consensus which institutionally, i f not psychologically, cut across the segmentary values of the rac i a l groups in the society. Psychologi-cally, i t may be argued that the Afro-Indian leadership was a crucial factor in the unification s t i f l e d only by the constitutional limitations of the Waddington Constitution of 1953. Jagan is very expressive of this when he said: We took our seats feeling proud of ourselves and a l l too aware of our constitutional limitations. We told our supporters that even though we had won the elections we were really Her Majesty's Government's Opposition. 2 1 Cheddi Jagan, The West on T r i a l : My Struggle For my People's Freedom (London: Michael Joseph, 1966), p. 139. 54 In his memorable reply to the Governor's address to the inaugural session of the House of Assembly in 1953, Jagan remarked: Your Excellency's optimistic views about the new constitution and in part icular the state council have been remarked. We however harbour no i l -lusions about the nominated state council which can only serve the purpose of curbing the w i l l of the people — a reactionary and undemocratic purpose. The presence of three c i v i l servants in the House and their control of the three Key Ministr ies in the Government and the Governor's veto are an anomaly and contrary to the professed democratic pr inciples of Her Majesty's Government. We sha l l continue to struggle for a democratic constitution for Br i t i sh Guiana. 3 Jagan summed up the mood of a national coal i t ion of working class interests which broke down, at least temporarily, the notion that Guyana i s a p lural society comprising cultural sections polarised in terms of cul tural inst i tut ions . The PPP, in 1953, acting as a broker inst i tut ion induced shared values, integrative in terms of the struggle for indepen-dence. The PPP was thus able to represent the level of al ienation that existed within the ranks of the working class against 'government by of -f i c i a l s ' . If soc ia l tension is to be minimal, society must be seen to be the condition for the sat isfact ion of emotional and material needs of i t s members. Once the PPP leadership shed i t s Afro-Indian sol idar i ty in 1955, the cross -cul tura l and class al l iances were aborted.^ Jagan says, 'We harbour no i l l u s i o n ' , " Daily Chronicle (George-town, Guyana: June 18, 1953), p. 1. ^ In fact , factionalism existed below the surface of the party's organisation since 1951 when disintegrative pressures began to build up. That the 1955 sp l i t was merely the culmination of internal suspicions that pervaded the party's hierarchy is dealt with in some detai l in Leo Despres, Cultural Pluralism and Nationalist Po l i t i cs in Br i t ish Guiana (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1967), pp. 192-220. 55 3. THE WORKING CLASS OR RACE AS THE BASIS OF POLITICAL CLEAVAGE Table 3.1 i l lus t ra tes that on the basis of occupational d ist r ibut ion, the PPP in 1953 won the support of a very large propor-tion of the working c lass ,^ irrespective of race: 80 per cent of the Afr icans, 92 per cent East Indians and 66 per cent of the other races in the lower occupational grades voted for the PPP in 1953. Among our respondents in the middle occupational grades (III-V), 46 per cent of the Afr icans, 77 per cent East Indians and 51 per cent of the other races voted for the PPP. Among our respondents in the higher occupa-t ional grades (I - I I) , except for the East Indians (52 per cent) a re lat ive ly small number voted for the PPP, while a re lat ively large number voted for the National Democratic Party. In Table 3.2, the emphasis changes from one of working class support for the PPP to support on the basis of race. Here we were mainly concerned with those who in the four General Elections between -> For the purposes of our sample we ranked occupations as follows: i Higher managerial or professional i i Lower managerial, administrative, large farmer i i i Sk i l led or supervisory non-manual iv Lower non-manual - c lerks, etc. v Sk i l led manual v i Unskilled manual v i i Unemployed (excluding housewife). ^ The notion of class is a fa i r l y complicated one. While our use of the occupational index is inadequate in assessing a l l c r i te r ia of the class positions of our respondents i t provides a useful guide to socio-economic status in Guyana where the type of job a person has is often indicative of his educational background and of his soc ia l mobil ity. TABLE 3.1 RESPONDENTS1 VOTES FOR PPP AND OTHER PARTIES IN THE 1953 GENERAL ELECTIONS BY RACE AND OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION A f r i c a n s East Indians Other Races Party (1953) PPP NDP Other Can't remember or didn't vote Occupational Grades V-VII I I I - I V 1 I - I I 80 12 3 100 (21) 46 34 12 8m 100 (6) 25 55 4 16 100 (140) Occupational Grades V-VII I I I - I V I - I I 92 2 3 100 (3D 77 8 10 100 (98) 52 20 13 15 100 (111) Occupational Grades V-VII I I I - I V I - I I 66 28 4 100 (11) 51 32 11 100 (17) 27 43 15 21 100 ( i i ) TABLE 3.2 RESPONDENTS WHO VOTED FOR THE PPP, THE PNC OR OTHER PARTIES CONTINUOUSLY IN THE 4 GENERAL ELECTIONS BETWEEN 1957 AND 1968 BY RACE AND OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION* Af r i c a n s East Indians Other Races Occupational V-VII I I I - I V Grades I - I I Occupational V-VII I I I - I V Grades I - I I Occupational V-VII I I I - I V Grades I - I I PPP 6 3 5 92 88 56 14 17 — PNC 84 90 80 2 4 14 29 33 10 Party 10 7 15 6 8 30 57 50 90 100 (25) 100 (120) 100 (106) 100 (20) 100 (105) 100 (121) 100 (7) 100 (12) 100 (10) * The t a b u l a t i o n s here take i n t o account those who voted i n at l e a s t 2 e l e c t i o n s since 1957• Hence the t a b l e includes those who voted i n a l l 4 e l e c t i o n s f o r one party, those who voted i n 3 e l e c t i o n s only, but f o r the same party and those who voted i n 2 e l e c t i o n s only, but f o r the same party on each occasion. 57 1957 and 1963 had maintained support either for the PPP or the PNC or for one of the other part ies. Hence we see that while a very large majority of Africans of a l l occupational categories supported the PNC continuously since 1957, as large a majority of East Indians supported the PPP continuously. Our respondents of other races seemed generally to have given the most continuous support to the other p o l i t i c a l parties that appeared on the electoral scene between 1957 and 1963. When we come in Tables 3.3 to 3.5 to examine those respondents who were voting for the f i r s t time in the 1968 General Elect ions, the findings are interest ing. Here we were concerned with examining the relationship in party preference of the new voters with their race and with the voting background of their parents. Our reason for selecting new voters is that mass involvement in General Elections in Guyana dates only from 1953. Most respondents other than the new voters had either very l i t t l e knowledge of their parents' party prefer -ence or were wary of stating their parents' preference or had parents who l ived in an era pr ior to the attainment of adult suffrage and therefore ine l ig ib le to vote. While, therefore, we asked several ques-tions on inter-generational voting patterns, the number of our total sample actually answering these questions was so small that our strategy to concentrate on new voters seemed to us to be j u s t i f i e d . There were 121 respondents in our sample who were voting for the f i r s t time in 1968. In Table 3 .3 , of the new African voters, 76 per cent voted for the PNC while only A per cent voted for the PPP. Of the new Indian voters on the other hand, 27 per cent voted for the PNC while 70 per cent voted 58 PPP. The respondents who were new voters of other races, voted overwhelmingly in favour of the PNC with very few voting for the PPP. Turning to the party preference of the new voters in comparison to that of their parents we see in Table 3.4, that the parents of new African voters were more incl ined to favour the PNC than the PPP; that the parents of new East Indian voters were more incl ined to support the PPP than the PNC. The new voters of the other races had parents whose loyal t ies were more evenly spread. In Table 3.5 we were con-cerned with matching the new voters' party preference with that of his parents. What we see here is that there is a high correspondence between the preferences of new voters and the preferences of their parents, which in any case showed def inite rac ia l biases. The gross electoral data between 1957 and 1954 are also highly indicative of the accelerated trends towards rac ia l cleavages in the po l i t i cs of Guyana. In 1957, the PPP won a l l but 5 of the fourteen seats contested; four of these seats in predominantly urban-African constituencies, three of thich were won by the PNC and the remaining seat by the UDP. The NLF, a new party formed by Lionel Luckhoo won the f i f t h seat in the predominantly Amerindian constituency of North West D i s t r i c t . But the gross data of the 1961 and 1964 elections are more instruct ive. In 1961 Elections when the UF contested the elections for the f i r s t time, the number of constituencies was increased to 35. Again the correlation between constituency support for a party and the rac ia l 59 TAELE 3.3 PARTY PREFERENCE OF NEW VOTERS BY RACE (1968) New Voter was New Voter Voted PNC Neither PPP Afr ican (47) 76 20 Other (18) 60 38 East Indian (56) 27 3 4 100 2 100 70 100 TABLE 3.4 PARTY PREFERENCE OF NEW VOTERS (1968) BY RACE COMPARED WITH PARENTS' PREFERENCE* » -, B o t h At least one Parents At least one parent was were parent was PNC Neither p p p New Voter was African (47) 68 Other (18) 38 East Indian (56) 11 21 44 21 27 21 79 TABLE 3.5 PARTY PREFERENCE OF NEW VOTERS (1968) COMPARED WITH PARENTS' PREFERENCE* New Voter was PNC (62) Neither (12) PPP (37) At least one Parent was PNC 81 21 9 Both Parents were Neither At least one Parent was PPP 28 66 12 23 15 90 * Parents, preferences were computed on the basis of respondents answer to the following questions: Do you know i f your father/mother ever voted at an election in Guyana? If yes, do you know which party your father/mother normally votes/voted for? See Appendix II, Q. 34-35. 60 composition of the constituency was high. The PPP won twenty of the th i r t y - f i ve seats of which f i f teen were in predominantly East Indian dominated areas and f ive from marginally populated constituencies. The PNC, on the other hand, won i t s 11 seats from among the predominantly urban-African constituencies. The UF's support came partly from two Amerindian constituencies and partly from two urban middle-class con-st i tuencies. What needs to be stressed i s that after the Burnham-Jagan s p l i t in 1955, class formations as a basis of party support tended to give way to race. The trend of r a c i a l voting became so entrenched in the p o l i t i c a l process that in the Elections of 1961, both the PPP and the PNC were using the slogan, apanjhat (vote for your own race). It i s therefore not surprising that when (as in Table 3.6) we compare the "swing"^ among the parties in the constituencies, we find that between the 1961 and 1964 elections there was very l i t t l e swing in the number of votes and the constituencies strongly ident i f ied with one By "swing" we mean the net percentage of voters who transfer their support from one party to another between one election and the next. For analysis of the swing, see M. Faber, "A "Swing' Analysis of the Jamaican Election of 1962", Social and Economic Studies, 13 (June, 1964). In this same study Faber uses the "safety margin" to mean the percentage of points above 50 per cent by which a party holds a seat. We use the concept di f ferent ly to mean the difference in the percentage between the party gaining the highest number of votes and the party gaining the second highest number of votes in a given constituency. Hence in Corentyne East Central , the 1964 election results were as f o l -lows: PPP, 84 per cent; PNC, 15.5; and UF, .5 per cent of the votes cast. The safety margin for the PPP was therefore 68.5 per cent. Our main reason for modifying the c r i t e r i a of the safety margin is that whereas in Faber's study his concern was the number of seats won (under single member p lura l i ty voting) in this study we are concerned primarily with the number of votes cast (under the system of simple proportional representation). TABLE 5.6 61 SWING IN THE DIRECTION OP VOTING I GENERAL ELECTIONS :OR PARTIES BY-CONSTITUENCIES IN THREE - 1961, 1964 and 1968 CONSTITUENCIES 1961 Safety Margin 1964 Swing to: CONSTITUENCIES 1964 Safety Margin 1968 Swing1 to PPP PNC UP PPP PNC UP PPP PNC UP PPP PNC UP 1. Corentyne East Central 68.4 - - 0.1 - - Corentyne East Central 68.5 - . - - 36.0 -2. Corentyne River 65.4 - - - 0.26 - Corentyne River 64.9 - - 5-3 ' • - -3. Corentyne West 58.7 • - • - 0.17 • - ' - Corentyne West 59.4 - - - 2.2 - -4. Berbice East 55-2 - - - - Corentyne East 58.9 - - 33.6 -5- Essequibo islands 49.2 - - 1.8 - - Berbice East .55.1. • - - 1-3 6. Berbice West 46.2 - • - 2.7 - . - - Essequibo Islands : V 51.6 - - - 7-5 -7. Corentyne East 45.6 - . -' 3.9 - - Boerasirie 51.3 - ' - 1.5 -a. Boerasirie 44.6 - - 2.6 - - Berbice West 50.6 - - 4.6 9. Demerara Coast Vest 34.3 - • - 2.7 - - Demerara Coast West 37.1 - - - 13.1 -10. Leonora 32.8 - - 2.4 - Vreed-en-hoop 36.2 • - - - 3.9 -11. Suddie 32.7 - - - - - Suddie 33.5 - - - 28.9 12. Vreedenhoop 32.5 - - • 1.5 - ; - Mahaicony 28.9 - - . - 3.3 -13. Mahaicony 26.4 - - 2.0 - - Lower Demerara River 27.6 - 8.9 -14. Canals Polder 22.7 - - 0.2 - Leonora 27.3 - - 2.6 - -15. Lower Demerara River 22.0 - - 3.7 • - Demerara Coast East 25.7 - - - 2.5 -16. Demerara Coast East 21.8 - - 0.2 - 2.96 Canals Polder 24.1 - • - - 3.8 -17. Mahaica 9.2 - - - 1.1 - Demerara Coast W. Cen. 8.0 - - 17.8 - -18. Poneroon 8.1 - - - 0.4 - Mahaica 7.0 - - - 2.8 -19. Demerara Coast W. Cen. 7.0 - - 1.0 - - Poneroon 6.7 - - - 34.3 20. Houston 6.1 - - - 1.9 - Houston 2.4 - - - 9.3 -21. Berbice River - 8.4 ' - - - 1.22 Berbice River - .8.4 • - - 11.3 -22. Georgetown Central - '9.6 - 15.8 - - Georgetown Central - 13.0 - - 11.8 -23. Kit ty - 2Q.0 - 3-5 - K i t t y - 16.2 - - . 3-7 -24. AToary 24.0 - 1.3 - . - . Georgetown North - 21.7 - • . - 9,9 -25. Georgetown North - 26.01 - - 15.8 - Abary - ' 22.7 - - 23.4. -26. New Amsterdam -• 27.0 - 19.7 - • • - • Campbellville - 27.6 - - 6.3 -27. Campbellville 27.5 . - - 1.7 - Mazaruni-Potaro - . 30.4 - - . 11.6 -28. Georgetown South - 28.0 . - 3.8 - Georgetown South - 30.9 • - - 10.5 29. North West - - 30.2 1.1 - 2.5 • North West - . - 38.3 - 2.4 -30. We rk-en-Rust - 31.4 - . - 12.4 r New Amsterdam - 43-1 - - . 5.0 -31. Mazaruni-Potaro - 38.8 - - 4.5 Werk-en-Rust - 45.5 - - 11.6 -32. Rupununi - - 43.2 2.2 - 5-5 Rumiveldt - 46.1 - ' - 2.8 -33'. Rumiveldt - 44.6 - 23.4 - - La-Penitenoe-Lodge - 53.2 - • - 5.5 -34. La-Penitence-Lodge' - 49.6 - ' - 3.2 - Rupununi - - . 58.4 - 5.0 -35. Upper Demerara River - 64.2 -' 10.8 - Upper Demarara River - 76.1 - - 10.9 62 or other of the part ies. While the introduction of the third party, the LT tends to complicate our interpretation of the simple concept of swing analysis, yet the mean percentage of UF and PPP votes captured by the PNC was 12.15 while the mean UF-PNC votes captured by the PPP was 9.51. The comparable figure for the UF was much lower, 7.15, but most of the swing to the UF was in the urban constituencies which affect the PNC more than the PPP. In the urban area the swing to the UF was 11.7 while in the rural area the swing to the UF was 3.4 per cent. The concept of "swing" is important in our analysis of the rac ia l tendencies in Guyanese p o l i t i c s . In Guyana, the gross electoral data of the four elections between 1957 and 1968, with the exception of 1968, show a marked tendency for rural- Indian support to be highly in favour of the PPP, urban, and (increasingly since 1961) rura l - v i l lage support to favour the PNC, while the UF tends to attract the support of the marginal rac ia l sectors and the Amerindians who have been christ ianised into Catholicism. Unfortunately the major drawback in swing analysis is that i t does not t e l l us the details of the swing, what kinds of people change party a f f i l i a t i o n s and for what reasons. These factors are important to any conclusions that can be arrived at about p o l i t i c a l integration. Tables 3.7 and 3.8 i l l us t ra te the qual itat ive factors of the swing to and from each party. In Table 3 .7 , for example, among 84 people who switched party ident i f icat ion between the elections of 1961 and 1968, 27 per cent of the Indians changed from PPP to PNC while 69 per cent changed from PNC to PPP. Similarly 28 per cent of the Africans 63 TABLE 3.7 SHIFTS IN PARTY IDENTIFICATION BETWEEN THE GENERAL ELECTIONS OF 1961, 1964 and 1968 BY RACE (In Percentages) (N = 84) African East Indian'"* Mixed Other PPP to PNC UF to PNC PNC to PPP UF to PPP PNC to UF PPP to UF 42 36 12 100 (40) 27 4 69 100 (29) 33 39 28 100 (10) 28 55 10 100 (6) TA3LE 3.8 SHIFTS IN PARTY IDENTIFICATION BETWEEN THE GENERAL ELECTIONS OF 1961, 1964 and 1968 BY RELIGION (N = 84) Catholic Hindu* Muslin* Protestant PPP to PNC 6 UF to PNC 42 PNC to PPP 4 UF to PPP PNC to UF 36 PPP to UF 100 (12) 38 62 64 22 28 24 32 5 10 8 5 2 100 100 100 (20) (11) (41) * Note that while the number of East Indians is 29, Muslims (11) and Hindus (20) amount to 31. Among thos3 lis t e d as Muslims 2 were non-Indians, a phenomenon not unusual today in Guyana where there i s a growing number of Black -luslims, adherents of Islam. 64 who supported the PNC in 1964 switched to the PPP in 1968 while 42 per cent switched from PPP to PNC. What is reflected in these data Is that in the swing to each party the "changers" to the party were mostly from the race on which the party depended for i t s support. Religious differences in Table 3.8 do not by themselves explain rac ia l cleavages but they are very informative. As many as 64 per cent of the "changers" of the Muslim re l ig ion and 38 per cent of the Hindu re l ig ion switched loyalt ies from the PPP to the PNC. While the switching of Muslims is not so surpr is ing, the re lat ive ly large switch among Hindus from PPP to PNC may be indicative of the poss ib i l i t y that the t radi t ional support for the PPP could be weakening. Of lesser s i g n i f i -cance is that 88 per cent of the Protestant "changers" switched from the UF and the PPP to the PNC, 32 per cent of the Hindu "changers" moved to the PPP while 36 per cent of the Catholics shifted to the UF. Insofar as these responses on rel igious a f f i l i a t i o n , soc ia l group part ic ipat ion and switching of party loyalt ies are related to p o l i t i c a l integration, we note that "cultural sections" are somewhat r ig id ly defined in terms of their attachment to one or other party. A very high proportion of the Hindus vote for the PPP along with a high proportion of the rural East Indians; most of the Afro-Guyanese vote for the PNC and the majority of the UF support is derived from the Catholic and Portuguese sections of the population. Yet these cleavages do not ex-press themselves in any extreme demands toward separation of the various sections. The idea of part i t ioning Guyana, for example, was unanimously 65 rejected by the respondents in our sample. 4. OVERLAPPING MEMBERSHIPS IN SOCIO-POLITICAL FACTIONS In Guyana, the PPP in 1953 in i t ia ted a p o l i t i c a l community which combined a broad national ist front with the principles of Marxist-Leninism. But as evident in the subsequent rac ia l tensions and the 1955 s p l i t within the party, the leaders of the PPP fai led to consolidate a combination of Marxism and nationalism and this contributed to the ten-dency of disintegration in the p o l i t i c a l community of Guyana especial ly between 1961 and 1964. This period epitomised an acute c r i s i s of l e g i t -imacy mainly due to a c r i s i s of community support on other than rac ia l grounds. Partly contributory to this c r i s i s of community support were the roles of secondary leaders in pseudo-pol i t ical organisations. During this period, ethnic groups tended to seek psychological comfort by ident i -fying themselves with the respective cultures and national societies from which they originated. Such organisations as ASCRIA with i t s emphasis on African culture and the Maha Sabha with i t s enthusiasm for Indian culture compromise support for the p o l i t i c a l community in Guyana by projecting We posed the question in the following way: Here are some people's opinion on certain developments in Guyana. Kindly state how strongly you agree or disagree. Divide Guyana into three sections: one for East Indians, one for Africans and one for the rest of the population. The responses were as follows: Strongly agree S per cent Agree 9 " Can't decide 8 " Disagree 19 " " Strongly disagree 56 " " 66 loyal t ies of ethnic groups outside the system. ASCRIA was formed in 1964 by Eusi Kwayana, a person of great leadership legitimacy in view of his universal reputation almost unique o among Caribbean po l i t i c ians , for incorruptible honesty. Among the major aims of ASCRIA are the revival of African culture in Guyana; a programme of educational reform to project African history, po l i t i cs and philosophy and to stimulate pride in African heritage by a knowledge and association with the act i v i t ies in Black Af r ica . In 1968-1969, ASCRIA greatly increased the eff ic iency in the structure and organisa-tion of i t s movement across the country by i t s regular recruitment drives and cultural programmes. Especial ly in the rural areas, there i s a great overlap between membership in ASCRIA and membership in the PNC. In New Amsterdam according to our sample, 35 per cent of the PNC membership also held membership in ASCRIA. In Abary, the percentage was as high as 58, while in Houston i t was 11 percent and 5 per cent in Suddie. When we compare overlapping membership in the Maha Sabha and the PPP, the percentages range from 63 per cent in Skeldon, 61 per cent in Corentyne West Central to 15 per cent in Suddie and 8 per cent in Houston. What emerges here is that these two cultural groupings act as broker Kwayana is reputed by many to be the second most powerful person in the country after Burnham — a rating which is supported by the reports given to us in confidence by some loca l leaders of the PNC. We were i n -formed that in some instances the rank-and-f i le membership of PNC groups, who are also members of ASCRIA w i l l vote for local o f f i c i a l s only i f they are known to be supporters, members or sympathisers of ASCRIA. Herein l i es the i n f i l t r a t i o n of the PNC by ASCRIA, even though Kwayana ins ists on the apo l i t i ca l pursuits of his organisation. 67 inst i tut ions between primary and loca l inst i tut ions in the v i l l a g e , plantation and c i t i es and the national p o l i t i c a l organisations. But moreover both the Haha Sabha and ASCRIA tend to consolidate the attach-ment of their membership to the PPP and PNC respectively by exp l i c i t l y dramatising the cultural differences between Africans and Indians. As broker inst i tu t ions , both of these groups i l l us t ra te the problems of at -tract ing broad-base support for any set of authorities and for any regime In Guyana. ASCRIA's role is c r i t i c a l since in some instances i t i s seen as the cultural arm of the PNC and has attracted the support — at least morally — of many of the top personnel of that party who are always prominent at the many functions sponsored by ASCRIA. One of ASCRIA's major objectives is for a return to the land by Afro-Guyanese. ASCRIA was among the chief advocates of a "cooperative" republic, one which emphasises farming and distr ibut ion of the lands in Guyana among groups and individuals so as to encourage both small and large agr icultural ventures. Eusi Kwayana is himself Chairman of one of the land d is t r ibu -tion committees which f i t s perfectly with the o f f i c i a l government policy of getting the underemployed and unemployed out of the c i t i es to the farmlands in the hinterland. At the same time ASCRIA has promoted several manufacturing and farming cooperatives. It seems jus t i f ied from the ex-ample of Eusi Kwayana to think that ASCRIA is attempting to inculcate in i t s followers puritan values similar to those fostered by the Black 68 Muslims. As a result of such a c t i v i t i e s , apparently par t ia l toward the PNC, the cul tural tensions between African and Indian tend to be Intensified with grave implications for legitimacy. I ronical ly , two ex-ecutive members of Ratoon, the radica l group, are also members of ASCRIA; one of these, Omawali, i s the vice-president of ASCRIA. The Maha Sabha retains much of i t s t radi t ional rel igious aura but has been closely associated with the PPP since i t mobilises the same t radi t ional elements of the Indian communities who are most at -tached to the PPP. Several prominent members of the PPP have held high positions in the Maha Sabha: Sase Marine, i t s president, Reepu Daman Persaud ,^ i t s secretary, Dalchand, Macie Amid and Moneer Khan. The Maha Sabha is perhaps one of the most e f f i c ien t l y organised inst i tut ions in Guyana, judging from the sustained growth in i t s membership and the actual commitment of these to the organisation. Of the 169 members of the Maha Sabha in our sample over 80 per cent reported that they attended i t s functions regularly. 1 0 We are grateful to Victor and Barbara Ferkiss for pointing out this connection. See Victor C. Ferkiss and Barbara Ferkiss, "Race and Po l i t i cs in Trinidad and Guyana," Unpublished MS., (a paper presented to the American P o l i t i c a l Science Association meeting in New York, Sept. 1969). H Reepu Daman Persaud was expelled from the Maha Sabha in January 1970 for allegedly undermining the rel igious aspects of the organisation. It could be that Persaud's position became tenuous within the organisation following a break in friendship between Jagan and some of the pundits and leading personalit ies within the Maha Sabha, after Jagan had announced at the 1969 Congress that the PPP was a Marxist-Leninist party. Jagan's announcement was followed by a reorganisation of the party to create a more centralised structure patterned after the Communist Party in the So-v iet Union. 69 TABLE 3.9 OVERLAPPING MEMBERSHIP OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND A SELECTED NUMBER OF SOCIAL-CULTURAL-RELIGIOUS ORGANISATIONS - 1968-1969 (In Percentages) Maha Catholic Saba Anj uman Church/Guild ASCRIA ( PNC .5 .11 SKELDON ( PPP 65 12 - -(rural) ( UF - - 100 -CORENTYNE ( PNC 25 44 _ WEST CENT. ( PPP 72 10 - — (rural) ( UF - 25 75 -HOUSTON £ PNC 10 26 16 22 (urban) ^ PPP 45 13 — — UF 60 SUDDIE £ PNC 11 21 18 29 (rural) £ PPP 52 27 - — UF — 10 45 — -NEW ( PNC 6 18 12 35 AMSTERDAM ( PPP 43 12 - -(urban) ( UF 7 - 61 -ABARY ^ PNC 6 14 - 58 (rural) p PPP 51 20 — — UF 100 The Anjuman is an arm of the Muslim rel igious league . Its are mainly cu l tura l though to a large extent i t does for the Muslim com-munity what the Maha Sabha does for the Hindus. Its organisation is how-ever much smaller. In our sample 68 respondents claimed membership in the Anjuman. While the two dominant cultural movements ASCRIA and the Sanatan Maha Sabha tend to strengthen the ethnic t ies within Guyana and to 70 contribute to a c r i s i s of legitimacy, there are other associations which also make their contributions to this c r i s i s . Judging from our data, the ethnic sodal i t ies are maintained to a much greater extent 12 in the rural areas than in the urban areas. As a generalised inter -pretation of our data in Table 3 .9 , patterns emerge which dif ferent iate Africans from Indians. Compared with Afr icans, Indians are not " joiners" of voluntary associations except i f they are rel igious in character or unless they are formed for a special purpose such as a land development associat ion, an i r r igat ion improvement association or some agr icul tural cooperative. Africans on the other hand part icipate in a wide variety of organisations ranging from educational groups to bur ia l soc iet ies . In the urban areas the disparity between the two dominant ethnic groups is not as marked. Both jo in youth groups, trade unions, sports clubs, in an undifferentiated manner suggesting a greater degree of in te r re la -tionship between the races at this secondary level of interact ion. In-terestingly in a l l areas only PNCites are members of ASCRIA. One of the most important types of movement is the trade union. It i s largely true to say that the trade unions provide mass support for the two major part ies. However that the Guyana Agr icul tural 13 Workers' Union (GAWA) and the Manpower Citizens Association (MPCA) 12 See Despres, Cultural Pluralism, pp. 103-108 for a survey of the impact of associational act iv i ty in a selected number of v i l lage and plantation communities. The conclusions arrived at in this study support his f indings. 1^ The conf l ic t for recognition between the G.A.W.A. and the M.P.C.A. has resulted in a series of s t r ikes ; i t triggered off the 1962-63 c r i s i s in Guyana and the reactions to the proposed Labour Relations B i l l , 1970. See Clive Thomas, "Sugar Economics in a Colonial Situation: A Study of Guyana Sugar Industry," Studies in Exploitat ion, Mo. 1, June, 1970. 71 cater almost exclusively to the needs of the sugar workers cannot be dissociated from the fact that their leadership is predominantly Indian. S imi lar ly , outside the sugar be l t , the trade union is monopolised by African po l i t ic ians and workers. In the 1968 elections for example most of the unions openly expressed support for the PNC. Among these were the Guyana Labour Union with approximately 2,725 members drawn mainly from African workers in Georgetown; the Guyana Mine Workers Union; the Transport Workers Union, whose president Winslow Carrington, i s also Minister of Labour; the Post Off ice Workers Union (whose president was ex-general secretary of the PNC); the Teachers Association, 14 C i v i l Service Association and the Printers Industrial Union. The trade union organisations are real ly responses to the h is tor -i c a l and colonial experiences of Guyana's economy. Unions organised in the rural and agr icultural sectors of the country inevitably represent the economic and p o l i t i c a l interests of the East Indians while those organised in the urban sectors represent African interests. Therefore even though i t is not surprising to f ind a divergence between the eco-nomic and p o l i t i c a l interests of urban and rural workers yet Guyana's rural-urban di f ferent iat ion i s due to cultural and colonial factors. According to Despres, "such a s i tuat ion cannot but affect the organisa-t ional strategies of national p o l i t i c a l movements. See advertisements to this effect in Guyana Graphic, December 2 to December 17, 1968. Despres, op. c i t . , p. 158. 72 More recently some union leaders have been perturbed by the continued al l iance between the trade union movement and the PNC. This skepticism is revealed by Les l ie Melv i l le , president of the C i v i l Service Association when he says: The batt le is none-the-less won and the a l -l iance i s often described as an unholy one must be dissolved, and the form of association that must now exist between the former a l l i e s is of importance to the Movement, for the p o l i t i c a l opposition has now become the Government and they with many p la t -itudes have openly sought the co-operation of the Trade Union Movement. Just how far can this co-operation extend without embarrassing the Movement must be determined for the policy of the Government from here on is going to be under deep scrutiny, and i t i s known that at some time i t s policy must divert from that of the movement and i t i s not going to be easy for the Movement to decide on a l ine of action. Between May 1969 and the present time the Trade Union Council was forced to decide on a l ine of action. It confronted the government on the issue of i t s proposed Trades Disputes Bi l l^" ' intent on curbing st r ike action on the part of the unions and of setting up an Industrial Court to deal with disputes. The unions rejected the proposals in the government's draft b i l l mainly for , (1) i t s fa i lure to set up some c r i -te r ia for recognising a Trade Union within an industry or trades; (2) i t s fa i lure to truly define an expeditious system for set t l ing disputes Lesl ie Melv i l le , "Militancy in the C i v i l Service Association and Free E lect ions ," New World Quarterly (Guyana), II (May 1969), p. 37. ^ The Trades Disputes B i l l empowered the Government to decide which union should be the bargaining agent for spec i f ic categories of em-ployees although workers retained the right to jo in the union of their choice. 73 and (3) i t s fa i lure to set up machinery for the regulation of pr ices. One possible effect of such a b i l l i s that i t would place col lect ive bargaining in a purely po l i t i c i sed framework in which the government and the employers would be seen to be ranged against the trade unions and the employees. This image of government al l iance with the employers against the workers together with the unanimous rejection of the proposed b i l l by the trade unions must have had some effect on the legitimacy of the PNC's regime. 1 9 It seems reasonable to suggest that already, organisational strategies of national p o l i t i c a l movements are affected in two main ways: (1) by the leve l of mobilisation generated by membership in the secon-dary and broker inst i tut ions and (2) by the system of patronage which determines 'who gets, what, why and where'. Since cultural and economic associations in Guyana tend to retain their ethnic group ident i ty , to a large extent they consolidate the p o l i t i c a l cleavages of individuals social ised into a fragmented p o l i t i c a l culture with perceptions and at -titudes ref lect ing the fragmentation of that p o l i t i c a l culture. It is not surprising that p o l i t i c a l part ies , in their struggle to acquire or maintain political control of the state apparatus aggregate interests in such a way that they perpetuate the generalised and i r ra t iona l fear of 18 The Trade Union Council prepared an alternative b i l l known as the "Jackson Proposals". But the government has refused to accept these proposals which sought mainly to reduce the powers of the Minister in addition to regulating pr ices, and accepting str ikes as l ega l , after a minimum period for negotiations has expired. x y James M i l l e t t e , "Comparing Two Labour Bills",New World Quarterly (Guyana) II, May 1969, p. 41. 74 the other ethnic group. This lack of empathic understanding between both national and local groups heightens the "we-they" quality of the conf l ict and makes the resolution of the national goals a most d i f f i c u l t task to resolve. The system of patronage too heightens rac ia l d isaffect ion. What is involved here is what the Americans c a l l 'pork barrel p o l i t i e s ' : the distr ibut ion of jobs, government contracts, scholarships and public works. Important too, is who receives the benefits — fees, concessions, roads, public housing, farmlands, sa lar ies , t r ips abroad, invitat ions to the Prime Minister 's residence? Since/unemployment is a c r i t i c a l econo-mic factor and since as in most other developing areas the government i s the greatest source of employment, i t s power to dispense jobs is a v i t a l monopoly in the p o l i t i c a l decision-making structure. Allegations of discrimination by government has always been and continues to be pre-valent in Guyana. And this i s highly related to the f inancia l support given by government to one project or act iv i ty instead of another. It was said for example, that Jagan discriminated against the urban workers (mostly Africans) in favour of the farmers (mostly Indians). In Jagan's development Plan 1956-60 almost 50 per cent of the development funds were allocated to agriculture, 15 per cent for urban housing and 2 per cent 20 for industr ia l development. In Jagan's 1960-64 plan a similar d i s t r ib -ution was made except that al locations to agriculture were 5 per cent See Br i t i sh Guiana Development Plan 1956-60, Georgetown, Guyana: Government Pr inters , 1956. 7 5 higher than in the 1956-60 plan while al locations to urban housing and industr ia l development had declined. In Burnham's 1966-70 Develop-ment Plan a l l this has been altered. Capital spending on agriculture, including sea defences and new land development is estimated at 16 per cent of development expenditure while improvement of communications is 40 per cent and other public works i s 22 per cent. The crucia l factor in terms of patronage is a sh i f t in the proportion of government ex-penditure away from the Indian farmers into the pockets of the African wage earners.22 Both in relat ion to p o l i t i c a l mobilisation inherited from the process of soc ia l forces, and the dispensation of patronage at the leve l of policy-making, support for the p o l i t i c a l regime has been considerably undermined since partisan and ethnic attitudes of group a f f i l i a t i o n tarnish the expectations and confuse the norms delimiting the scope of p o l i t i c a l interaction and consensus in Guyana. In other words, instead of strengthening supports for a cohesive regime, the nature of p o l i t i c a l mobilisation and the pattern of patronage would dispose the people to remain loyal to the regime only i f their part icular group was in control of the structures of authority. 21 Br i t ish Guiana Development Plan 1960-64, Georgetown, Guyana: Government Pr inters , 1960. 22 Guyana Development Plan 1966-70, Georgetown, Guyana: Govern-ment Pr inters , 1966. 76 CHAPTER IV POLITICAL PERCEPTION AND POLITICAL MOBILISATION 1. INTRODUCTION In this chapter we sha l l investigate how an individual perceives the p o l i t i c a l groups, their personal i t ies , their a c t i v i t i e s , the competing issues; how he perceives himself in the world of p o l i t i c s ; how he per-ceives the future of this world of p o l i t i c s . Very often a voter 's per-ceptions in these matters may be i l l - formed but they provide cruc ia l clues to actual behaviour. 2. PERCEPTUAL BASIS OF POLITICAL BEHAVIOUR In assessing the patterns of p o l i t i c a l ident i f icat ion in the Guyanese electorate, what mattered was not merely their objective positions but the corresponding patterns of behaviour they developed and the pictures they carried around in their heads of themselves, of others and of the system itself .^" Hyman states the case succinctly when he says, "Men are urged to certain ends but the p o l i t i c a l scene in which they act is perceived and given meaning. Some cognitive map This perceptual basis of p o l i t i c a l mobilisation is neglected in most t radi t ional studies of voting behaviour l ike Stuart A. Rice, Quantitative Methods in Po l i t i cs (New York: Knopf, 1928); Walter Berns, "Voting Studies" in Herbert J . Storing (Ed.) , Essays on Sc ient i f i c Study  of Po l i t i cs (New York: Holt , Rinehart and Winston 1962), pp. 1-62; V. 0. Key Jnr . , Southern Po l i t i cs (New York: Knopf, 1949). For a c r i t ic ism of the "common-sense" approach and the value of rigorous methodological experimentation see Karl Deutsch, "The Limits of Common-sense," Psychiatry,22 (May, 1959), pp. 105-12. 77 accompanies their movement toward their end." A l l p o l i t i c a l practices and orientations have h i s to r i ca l ante-cedents. "We do not inherit our p o l i t i c a l behaviour, attitudes and values through our genes. They must be learned in some way." 3 How the c i t i zen perceives the p o l i t i c a l system and his role in i t are dependent on his b e l i e f s , feelings and judgments about the system, i t s roles and the incumbents of these roles.^ Recognising the s i g -nif icance of cit izenship perceptions, Campbell and others wrote: Perceptions are the f ree - f loat ing creations of the indiv idual voter or the small social groupings in which they are shared. They are t ied in fundamental ways to the properties of the stimulus objects that are perceived. As these properties change the perceptions w i l l also tend to change. As a result the flow of h i s to r i ca l rea l i ty has enormous influence on the electorate's perceptions of i t s p o l i t i c a l environment. -* What is therefore important here is not only the extent to which the h i s to r i ca l factors influence perceptions of one's p o l i t i c a l environment but also what effect do these perceptions have on the process of p o l -Herbert Hyman, P o l i t i c a l Social izat ion (Glencoe, I l l i n o i s : The Free Press, 1959), p. 18. 3 David Easton and Jack Dennis, Children in the P o l i t i c a l System: Origins of P o l i t i c a l Legitimacy (New York: McGraw-Hill,Co., 1969),p. 13. 4 G. A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civ ic Culture: P o l i t i c a l At - titudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 14-15 refer to these attitudes as the psychological orientation towards soc ia l objects. Angus Campbell, et a l . , The American Voter (New York: John Wiley, 1960), p. 43. 78 i t i c a l mobil isation. How are c i t i zens ' public image of parties and p o l i t i c a l leaders affected by their environment? What are their images of non-party groupings and of the issues that are currently engaging the p o l i t i c a l process? Experimental psychologists explain motivational s i g -nif icance of the p o l i t i c a l environment in terms of perceptual push and perceptual p u l l . ^ Hence, for example, ethnic host i l i t y or group pre j -udice in the p o l i t i c a l environment w i l l account for members of prejudiced groups assigning other groups to parties associated with a part icular rac ia l type.^ This property of individual psychology can be described as the perceptual push. The other property of individual psychology ap-p l ies because of the tendency of people to associate with each other, on the basis of s imi lar i ty in socio-economic background. The peer group as an association of fellow workers, colleagues, or friends may provide the c r i t e r i a not only of socio-group ident i f icat ion but also of p o l i t i c a l See George C. Homans, Social Behaviour: Its Elementary Forms (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World), 1961, and H.J. Eysenck, Sense and  Nonsense in Psychology (Penguin Books, Inc. , 1957), Chapter III. ^Psychological factors of this kind are very common in a wide range of systems: in Br i ta in as described by David Butler and Donald Stokes, P o l i t i c a l Change in Br i ta in : Forces Shaping Electoral Choice (London: McMillan and Co. L t d . , 1969); in America, Donald Matthews and James Prothro, Negroes and the New Southern P o l i t i c s , (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World Inc. , 1966); in Canada, J . A. Laponce, People vs. Po l - i t i c s : A Study of Opinions, Attitudes and Perceptions in Vancouver -Burrard 1963-1965 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969); in Afr ica A. Zolberg, One Party Government in the Ivory Coast (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1964); in South-East As ia , R. S. Milne, Government and Po l i t i cs in Malaysia (Boston: Houghton Mi f f in Co. , 1967); in the Caribbean, see L. Bahadoorsingh, Trinidad Electoral P o l - i t i c s : The Persistence of the Race Factor (London: Institute of Race Relations, 1968). 79 a f f i l i a t i o n s . This s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l relationship can be c lass i f ied as Q the perceptual p u l l . In other words, soc ia l needs tend to be made manifest in p o l i t i c a l percepts. As a resul t , perceptions may ref lect the need for soc ia l support and the need for aggression against out-s iders . Perceptions are not necessarily synonymous with real i ty but they circumscribe individual decisions, making them easier . They may also deepen the cleavages within society by emphasising the differences between we and they; they can also heighten p o l i t i c a l s tab i l i t y by reducing the feel ing of insecuri ty , suppression and al ienation of individuals in the process of being p o l i t i c a l l y mobilised. These perceptual bases of indiv idual behaviour are sometimes described as their reference set . • The Milne and McKenzie studies in Br i ta in and the SCR studies in U.S.A. have pioneered the study of voting behaviour in relationship to socio-group ident i f icat ions . See R. S. Milne and H. C. McKenzie, Straight  Fight (London: Hansard Society, 1954); R.S. Milne, "Some Recent Studies in Voting: The Middle Class Vote," P o l i t i c a l Studies, 3 (1955), pp. 148-150. See also V. 0. Key and Frank Hunger, "Social Determinism and E lec -tora l Decision: The Case of Indiana" in Eugene Burdick and Arthur J . Brodbeck (Eds.), American Voting Behaviour (New York: The Free Press, 1959) ; Donald Matthews and James W. Prothro, "An Analysis of White and Negro Attitudes" in Avery Leiserson (Ed.) , The American South in the  1960's (New York: Praeger, 1964). The idea of a reference set as a motivational basis of role behaviour was developed by Theodore D. Kemper, "The Relationship Between Self Concept and the Characteristics and Expectations of the Signif icant Others," (Unpub. Ph. D. Dissertat ion, New York: New York University, 1963) and incorporates the ear l ier thesis of the reference group as set out in M. Sherif , An Outline of Social Psychology (New York: Harper and Row, 1956); R. H. Kel ley, "Two Functions of Reference Groups" in G. E. Swanson, T. M. Newcomb and E. Hartley (Eds.), Readings in Psychology (New York: Holt and Rhinehart, 1952), pp. 410-414; and Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (Glencoe, I l l i n o i s : The Free Press, 1957), pp. 225-281. Very instructive to our analysis is an interesting 80 To determine the nature of the perceptual pu l l and push and their effects on p o l i t i c a l mobil isation, our interviews were intent on exploring several dimensions of the public images as manifested in the Guyanese electorate. In Guyana p o l i t i c a l mobilisation assumes, h i s t o r i -ca l l y , an index of conf l ic t between two major ethnic groups, the Indians and the Afr icans.Racial conf l ic t in the decade immediately preceding the 1968 elections seemed to be enshrined in the perceptions of the electorate and this reflected not only the patterns of their ident i f icat ion but their suscept ib i l i ty to p o l i t i c a l cleavages which reflected the nature of that con f l i c t . Some of the pictures which people carried around in their heads are v iv id ly ref lected in statements such as these (Indian Teacher) : Guyana could never be the same after the violence and bloodshed of the last s ix years. Negroes and Indians are growing further apart. The sl ightest thing w i l l tr igger off a violent confron-tat ion. (Mixed Lawyer) : Look at what happened in 1962, 1963 and 1964. Nothing can change that. You could never expect section of "I-them", "They-Me" and "I-Me" relationships in which the authors refer to a multiple set of figures (group and person) performing different soc ia l roles and to whom the individual refers his behaviour. See Orv i l le G.Brim Jnr. and Stanton Wheeler, Social ization After Chi ld - hood : Two Essays (New York: John Wiley, 1966), pp. 12-17. ^ The question here was: Do you personally expect that this country w i l l be faced with r a c i a l troubles in the next f ive years or so or do you think that there is a good chance of avoiding this? 81 Indians and Africans to l ive peacefully again. (African Unemployed) : My brother was k i l l e d by them stinking Coolie bastards, I could never forget that. (Indian farmer) : Now that the Africans are in power they acting wrong and strong. We people (Indians) bound to rebel sooner or la ter . (Portuguese business- : The Government is a black man government, the man) pol ice i s black, the army is black, the c i v i l service i s black. Now to get jobs coolie turning blackmen. This situation must end up in violence. (African farmer) : While Coolie fight blackraan and blackman k i l l i n g Coolie we le f f ing (leaving) the country to the Chineemen and the putagee (Portuguese). (African carpenter) : Wash a cool ie , starch a coolie and iron a coolie is the same coolie — always want to stab you in you back — is time we black people see 'bout we s e l f . (Chinese dentist) : People have not real ly forgotten nor forgiven the tortures of 1962, 1963 and 1964. Violence could erupt at any time. As we can see from the comments above, people in making judgments about p o l i t i c a l ident i f icat ion today are s t i l l severely affected by the 82 violence of the 1962-64 period. This experience partly explains the nature of the perceptual p u l l . For example, i t has been reported that when the three-month general st r ike ended on July 8, 1963, 135 persons had been k i l l e d , 450 were injured and the estimated cost of damage to houses and other business property was $50 mil l ion (BWI).''"""' Again in 1964 i t was established that when the 161 day str ike ended on July 27, 160 persons had died as a result of rac ia l violence while 950 were injured and 1000 houses were destroyed at a f inancial cost of $13 mi l l ion 12 (BWI). Group violence expressed i t s e l f mainly in terms of clashes between Africans and Indians. On May 24, 1964, for example, 1200 Indians were evacuated from Wismar, a mining town, as a result of attacks by Afr icans. It was reported that in this case 100 houses were burned and 60 persons were k i l l e d , including two Indian shopkeepers beaten to death 13 by Afr icans. What is more, as a result of these violent clashes between the two rac ia l groups i t is reported that there was voluntary segregation in some vi l lages such as Paradise, Good Hope, Better Hope, Sorrow, Bachelor's Adventure, Friendship, and Annandale where Indians and Africans formerly l ived side by side. This spontaneous movement seemed to have been caused by well-founded fears of the minority group in most v i l lages that they might be bombed, murdered or burned in their ^ John Crocker, "Guiana Tragedy," Sunday Guardian, June 7, 1963, p. 2. 12 Elizabeth Wallace, "Br i t i sh Guiana: Causes of the Present Dis -content," International Journal, 19 (Autumn 1964), pp. 520-522. 13 "Mob Violence at Wismar," Daily Chronicle, (Georgetown, Guyana, May 25, 1964), p. 1. TABLE 4.1 EXPECTATIONS OP VIOLENCE/NON-VIOLENCE IN PERCENTAGES POST ELECTION 1968 (N = 985) Expects violence 6 Did not expect violence 52 Expects violence i f PPP gets into power 21 Expects violence f o r other reasons 9 Does not expect violence as long as PNC remains i n power 5 . Don't Know 7 100 TABLE 4.-3 EXPECTATIONS OP PROSPERITY/DEPRESSION IN PERCENTAGES POST ELECTION 1968 Expects prosperity 44 Expects depression 17 Expects depression i f the PPP gets into power 21 Expects depression for other reasons 6 Expects prosperity providing PNC remains i n power 6 Don't Know 6 100 TABLE 4.2 EXPECTS VIOLENCE/NON VIOLENCE . IN PERCENTAGES BY PARTY SUPPORT (N = 985) PNC PPP Expects violence 7 10 Did not expect violence 63 28 Expects violence i f PPP gets into power 74 40 Expects violence f o r other reasons . 13 12 Does not expect violence provided the PNC remains i n power 3 10_ 100 100 100 TABLE 4.4 EXPECTS PROSPERITY/DEPRESSION -IN PERCENTAGES BY PARTY SUPPORT PNC PPP Expects prosperity 62 15 Expects depression 9 29 Expects depression i f the PPP gets i n t o power 9. 42 Expects depression f o r other reasons 11 12 Expects prosperity provided PNC remains i n power . 9 2 100 100 100 84 beds. Group violence was not only widespread, but i t underscored the growing emotionalism based on race. It is in the background of this social conflict that the perceptions of respondents in this study have been formed, consolidated or dispelled. Tables 4.1 and 4.2 t e l l us about the citizens' perception of social conflict. Of 865 respondents in Table 4 .1 , 52 per cent did not expect violence, 8 per cent unreservedly expected another period of vio-lence in Guyana. Of the remainder, 21 per cent expected violence i f the PPP returned to power while 3 per cent thought violence would not occur provided the PNC remained in power. But these categories are not mutually exclusive of each other. According to the expectations of our respondents, should the PNC stay i n office, only 15 per cent actually perceive another period of violence while 76 per cent do not expect violence. In Table 4.2 where the data i s distributed according to party support, 63 per cent of the PNC supporters and 73 per cent of the UF supporters did not expect violence while only 28 per cent of the PPP supporters did not expect violence. Interestingly, while only 14 per cent of the PNC supporters and 27 per cent of the UF supporters expected violence i f the PPP were to get into power, 40 per cent of the PPP sup-porters expected violence in this situation. Similar perceptual patterns are displayed with regard to respondents' expectations of the economic future of the country. An overwhelming majority of the PNC supporters expected prosperity while L ^ For a f u l l account of these events see Wallace, op. c i t . , pp. 540-542. 85 a majority of UP supporters expected imminent economic depression. Again over 40 per cent of the PPP supporters and as many as 47 per cent of the UF supporters expected an economic depression i f the PPP were to take o f f i c e . The re lat ive ly low expectations even by PPP supporters of that party may be a ref lect ion of two factors: one is an association of the period of sustained violence (1962-64) with the inab i l i t y of their party-government to maintain law and order. The fact that the pol ice force and the Guyana Defence Force are comprised essential ly of Afro-Guyanese^"' could account for this perceptual p u l l . The second factor may be a recognition of external pressures, especially from America, in the form of refusals to grant loans and aid for economic Recent s ta t i s t i cs on the pol ice and the mil i tary give the f o l -lowing rac ia l breakdown: Racial Origin of Guyana Defence Force and Police Force 1965 1970 No. % No. % Indian 733 20 995 24 Mixed 154 4 250 6 Negro 2701 74 2840 69 Other 83 2 60 1 Total 3671 100 4145 100 Source: 1965: G. W. Roberts and Joycelyn Byrne, Memorandum Presented by the Government of Br i t i sh Guiana to the Commission of Inquiry Part 1 (Georgetown Govt. Printery, 1965), p.4. 1970: Ministry of External Af fa i rs Memo (N. D.). The s t a t i s -t ics to which we gained access fa i led to draw a more detailed breakdown. But "Security Force" here includes the Guyana Police Force, Rural Constabularies, Supernumerary Po l ice , Guyana Volunteer Force which since independence has become the nucleus of the Guyana Defence Force, and the Special Service Unit. 86 development during the Jagan regime. "Expectations" here is an evaluative factor of the c i t i zen 's cognitive map. Hence to the degree that he expects electoral success of the party he supports, to that degree are his expectations rated as being high. S imi lar ly , e lectoral defeat i s l ike ly to generate low expectations of the party with which individuals ident i fy . In this respect, supporters of the PPP may have suffered most, the effects of a declining self- image, i . e . , a feel ing of deprivation, of a l ienat ion, of second-class c i t izenship, even though there may be no commensurate diminution of their economic status, their ab i l i t y to retain their group inst i tut ions or their access to a share in p o l i t i c a l decision-making. However, once we relate the self-image of individuals to party ident i f i ca t ion , we are assuming that our respondents see p o l i t i c a l conf l ict in terms of party conf l i c t . Percep-tions of group behaviour by individuals are related to feelings of h i s to r i ca l and soc ia l distance."*"' Social proximity and direct knowledge of a socio-economic or an ethnic group usually affect an indiv idual 's evaluation of the p o l i t i c a l support of that group. In Tr inidad, one analyst found that the possession of a common character ist ic , v i z . , race, was more important in predicting p o l i t i c a l behaviour than formal The role of super states in dominating the po l i t i cs of small states by their economic stranglehold is wel l documented in Stephen Hyner, "The Role of the mult i -national corporation in Small States," paper presented at the Seminar on Hemispheric Relations of the Caribbean, University of the West Indies, January 1970. See also William Demas, Economics of Small States (Montreal: McGil l University Press, 1967). """^ See Homans, Social Behaviour (1961). 87 18 associations or informal friendship groups. In Guyana (as we sha l l soon show) images of group support seem consistent with this general hypothesis. 3. IMAGE OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES To establish what role p o l i t i c a l parties play in giving shape and direct ion to the behaviour of voters, we tr ied to discover what kind of identity the three major parties in Guyana had in the publ ic 's mind. We therefore asked a series of questions so as to get our respondents to ident i fy different types of people with one or more part ies. Ten descriptions or types were proposed to our respondents: labourers East Indians c i v i l servants teachers poor people Africans businessmen r ice farmers catholics Portuguese Each description was prefaced by the statement, "which party or parties do you think these people voted for?" Although we might have added more categories to our l i s t , we believe that i t was suf f ic ient ly representative to extract images of the respective parties from the respondent's f i e ld of perception. Whereas c i v i l servants, teachers and Africans are perceived in Table 4.5 as having voted overwhelmingly for the PNC, r ice farmers and Krishna Bahadoorsingh, Trinidad Electoral P o l i t i c s : The  Persistence of the Race Factor (London: Institute of Race Relations, 1968), pp. 48-56. 88 East Indians were perceived to have voted predominantly in favour of the PPP, Roman Catholics and Portuguese for the UF. These images of p o l i t i c a l parties tend to support the view that race is the dominant factor in the voting behaviour of the Guyanese electorate. In Guyana both the c i v i l service and the teaching professions are dominated by Afr icans; most r ice farmers are East Indians; and Portuguese, for the most part belong to the Roman Catholic re l ig ion . What is surpr is ing, TABLE 4.5 PERCEPTION OF PARTY SUPPORT (In percentages)* Won't vote PNC PPP UF Don't Know as a bloc Labourers 31 18 1 23 27 C i v i l Servants 55 1 - 27 17 Poor People 32 19 - 19 30 Businessmen 25 1 34 23 17 Catholics 4 1 59 26 10 East Indians 2 70 - 16 12 Teachers 48 2 - 28 22 Africans 75 1 - 16 8 Rice Farmers 10 56 1 19 14 Portuguese 1 1 72 19 7 Q. Which party do you think the following types of people voted for? * In Tables 4.8 - 4.10 we controlled for party preference on this question to see among other things whether rac ia l groups are allocated to other part ies. 89 in the tables is that businessmen were perceived as being anti-PPP, not withstanding the prominence of Indians in the business sector of the country. One explanation for this perceptual trend among the rank and f i l e electorate, is a recognition that businessmen would be least attracted to a party which when in of f ice not only sought to introduce leg is lat ion — Company tax and Capital gains tax — 1 ° in imical to the interest of their community, but also one which was associated with economic depression and stagnation. Interesting also, i s that no respondent associated the United Force with support from c i v i l servants, teachers, East Indians and Africans even though as indicated in Table 4 .6, the s late of candidates presented by the United Force was more representative of the rac ia l groupings in Guyana than was any of the other two part ies . In other words, what seemed to be prominent in the voters' minds may be summed up in a reply by one respondent: Question: "As things stand now, which p o l i t i c a l party you think i s best suited to govern the country?" Answer: "I i s a coolie (Indian), the UF is a white man party and the PPP i s a coolie party. Wha you think ah gon say?" The 1962 Budget presented by the Minister of Finance (in the PPP administration), C. R. Jacobs on the advice of Prof. John Kaldor, resulted in a general str ike last ing 80 days with the consequent withdrawal of the budget. For an account of this see B. A. N. Col l ins , "Racial Imbalance in the Public Service and Security Forces," Race,3 (1966), pp. 253-53. 90 TABLE 4.6 RACIAL DISTRIBUTION OF CANDIDATES PRESENTED BY EACH PARTY IN THE 1968 GENERAL ELECTION (In percentages) African East Indian Mixed Chinese Portuguese/ White PNC (29) 54.7 (10) 18.9 (10) 18.9 (1) 1.9 (3) 5.6 PPP (10) 18.9 (36) 67.9 (3) 5.6 (2) 3.8 (2) 3.8 UF (13) 24.5 (17) 32.1 (11) 20.7 (2) 3.8 (10) 18.9 Among those factors which induce the voter to see the parties as the key figure of p o l i t i c s , r a c i a l images of the parties probably lead him to see them as more unitary objects than they real ly are. Another factor, however, i s the po l i t i c ians ' success in appealing for mass sup-port in the name of their part ies . Here we are concerned with the leadership of the parties in a general and col lect ive sense, i . e . , with how the various options presented to the electorate are perceived by them as having capabi l i t ies for solving problems of national question. The most posit ive references by our respondents were given to the PNC. While 56 per cent believed that PNC leadership was most capable of pro-viding solutions to national problems, 11 per cent saw the PPP as being thus capable and only 3 per cent chose the UF. The trend of favourable and unfavourable feel ing about the part ies ' general ab i l i t y to govern i s set out on a constituency to constituency basis in Table 4.7. 91 TABLE 4.7 CHOICE OF PARTY TO SOLVE PROBLEMS BY REGISTRATION DISTRICTS AND PARTY I.D. (In percentages) N = 712 Total % whole Strong PPP Marginal Strong PNC country 1 2 3 A 5 6 PNC 29 A3 59 51 5A 85 358 56 PPP 32 22 9 2 7 3 71 11 UF 5 3 2 5 3 2 2A 3 None 7 5 7 7 7 1 35 5 Don't know 20 18 18 27 23 5 120 18 100 100 100 100 100 100 608 100 Q. Which party do you think can best solve these problems ( i . e . , the race question, getting more money to run the country, the border dispute, etc.)? The image of the PPP was favourable in strong PPP constituencies only, declining i n marginal and strong PNC constituencies. A general-ly unfavourable image was attributed to the UF. But for the PNC, there was an overall acceptance of i t s capacity to govern. If we are to explain the reason for the perceptual bias i n favour of the PNC, we can only assume that our respondents associated with com-petence to govern, the relative ease with which the PNC-D'Aguiar coa-l i t i o n 1964-1968, was able to raise loans for investment capital in public works, housing, sea defence and light industries. D'Aguiar's 92 20 resignation as leader of the United Force party has probably a lso, reduced the impact and contribution of the UF in the publ ic 's mind, and this no doubt partly accounts for the poor image of that party v i s - a - v i s problem solving. TABLE 4.8 SOCIAL GROUPS SEEN BY EACH PARTY ELECTORATE AS GIVING THEM PRIMARY SUPPORT (In percentages) Party of Respondent Social Groups PNC PPP UF Labourers * * C i v i l servants + • Poor people * * Businessmen * + Catholics + East Indians + Teachers + Africans Rice farmers + Portuguese + indicates that the mode of answers of party ident i f ie rs favour their party + indicates that a large majority of the answers of the party ident i f iers is for their party. 2 ^ D'Aguiar resigned from the UF in March 1969, three months after the 1968 General Elections in Guyana. This event happened while we were conducting the interviews for this study and may have had some effect in biasing the answers on the image of the UF. 93 The description above i s fa i r l y consistent with the tendency to describe p o l i t i c a l parties by the soc ia l groups which a majority of the electors of that party see as voting for i t .~ Hence the PNC- i tes describe themselves as the party of Afr icans, Labourers, c i v i l servants and teachers; the PPPites as the party of East Indians, poor people, and r ice farmers; the UFites as the party of Portuguese, bus i -nessmen and Roman Catholics. But apart from describing the party by the composition of i t s majority in Table 4.8, we used a modified oo version of Laponce's technique to describe the mode of distr ibut ion of answers to the questionnaire. What i s discerned i s that conf l ict ing claims emerge between the PNCites and the PPPites who both see "labourers" and "poor people" as voting for their party. There are also conf l ic t ing claims between PNCites and UFites, in respect to businessmen. No such clash occurred between PPPites and UFites, which implies that insofar as party ident i f iers perceive socia l group-pol i t ical party linkages, there is less in common between the PPP and the UF than between the PNC and either the PPP or the UF. But in order to give some idea of the relative strength and weak-ness of the association between spec i f ic soc ia l groups and p o l i t i c a l part ies , we used two tables showing the comparable linkages on these 21 The reason for this association between social group and p o l i t i c a l party by electors may be because of a knowledge of or a desire for such an association. Or as Laponce thinks, " i t may also be a response to party propaganda". See J . A. Laponce, op. c i t . , p. 72. See Laponce, op. c i t . , p. 73. 94 two variables. In the f i r s t (Table 4.9) we show the constituencies in which the respondents of a given party score higher than 25 per cent support for a part icular soc ia l group. In the second (Table 4.10) we show when that score is less than 25 per cent. Hence in Table 4 .9 , 40 per cent of the PNCites see "labourers" as voting for the PNC and 18 per cent of PPPites see "labourers" as voting for the PPP. TABLE 4.9 SOCIAL GROUP SEEN BY MORE THAN 25 PER CENT OF THE RESPONDENTS OF A GIVEN PARTY AS SUPPORTING THAT PARTY (In percentages) Party of Respondent Social Groups PNC PPP UF Labourers 40 - — C i v i l servants 55 - -Poor people 32 25 -Businessmen 25 - 33 Catholics - - 58 East Indians - 69 -Teachers 44 - -Africans 75 - -Rice farmers - 56 -Portuguese - - 69 95 TABLE A.10 SOCIAL GROUP SEEN BY LESS THAN 25 PER CENT OF THE RESPONDENTS OF A GIVEN PARTY AS SUPPORTING THAT PARTY (In percentages) Party of Respondent Social Groups PNC PPP UF Labourers - 18 1 C i v i l servants - 0 0 Poor people - - 1 Businessmen - 0 -Catholics A 0 -East Indians 3 - 0 Teachers - 2 1 Africans - 1 1 Rice Farmers 11 - 1 Portuguese 1 1 -No soc ia l group scored more than 25 per cent in the three electo-rates. Only in one group, "businessmen", did two party electorates, the PNC and UF, share a score higher than 25 per cent. What emerges from these tables are indicators of the relat ive soc ia l weaknesses which each electorate assigns to i t s party. The PNCites see themselves as weak among Catholics, East Indians, rice farmers and Portuguese; the PPPites among c i v i l servants, businessmen, Catholics, teachers, Africans and Portuguese; the UFites among labourers, c i v i l servants, poor people, 96 East Indians, teachers, Africans and r ice farmers. These perceptions of group support tend to i l l us t ra te the factors in the minds of different electorates which distinguish their party from the other part ies . What is important in Tables A . 8 - 4 . 1 0 is the implication that the different party electorates perceived the PNC to be an exclusively African party, the PPP, an exclusively East Indian party and the UF, a Portuguese party. It is true that these differences may be exaggerated but they remain f a i r l y important aspects of mobil isation. While recognising the impor-tance of these perceptual differences we are cautious of arr iv ing at any rash conclusions in view of the number of respondents (in Table A . 11) who either did not make an association between soc ia l group and p o l i t i c a l parties or who believed that soc ia l groups do not necessarily vote as a block. To a large extent party images emphasise the importance of the party leader. As Butler and Stokes point out, "parties do plainly owe some of their personif ication in the publ ic 's mind to their i d e n t i f i c a -23 t ion with those who lead them." In countries l ike Guyana where po l -i t i c s is more affective and expressive than inst i tut ional ly oriented, personif ication of the leader i s even more evident than i t i s in Br i ta in . Singhan, for example, analyses the flamboyance of this type of charis -matic man on horseback, a hero, who by direct appeals to the subconscious personality needs of a colonial po l i t y , caters to an expressive sty le . 23 David Butler and Donald Stokes, P o l i t i c a l Change in Br i ta in (London: Macmillan and Co. L t d . , 1969),. p. 360 97 It i s a sty le which allows the leader to have a pul l effect on the electorate , i . e . , to mould the image of the party in his person. TABLE 4.11 PERCENTAGE OF ABSTENTIONS ON THE QUESTION: "WHAT PARTY OR PARTIES DO YOU THINK THE FOLLOWING PEOPLE VOTE FOR?" Abstentions (percentages) Said Groups Won't Vote Social Groups as a Block Didn't know Labourers 26.9 22.8 C i v i l Servants 17 26.9 Poor people 29.2 18.7 Businessmen 17.5 22.5 Catholics 9.8 25.9 East Indians 12.3 15.3 Teachers 20.4 28.3 Africans 7 16 Rice Farmers 14 18.5 Portuguese 7.6 19.6 A. W. Singham, The Hero and the Crowd in a Colonial Pol i ty (Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1968). 98 4. IMAGE OF PARTY LEADERS In focusing on the e lectoral images of the three party leaders, we were concerned not necessarily with the objectiv ity of assessments but with a whole range of subjective pre-disposit ions which could determine an indiv idual 's push or pu l l towards one or other of the p o l i t i c a l leaders. Although a leader i s l i ke l y to be seen partly in terms of his connection with a party and with issues of public policy and matters of group interest , he w i l l be evaluated as well in terras of personal attr ibutes, his record and experience, his ab i l i t y and his personal character ist ics . Since both Jagan and Burnham entered the 1968 electoral campaign as established public f igures, i t i s not surprising that their personal attributes were much more fu l l y described in public responses than were those of D'Agiiiar. In order to assess the various images of Burnham, D'Aguiar and Ja -gan, which people carried around in their heads, we asked our respondents to choose from a given l i s t of words, which ones came closest to descr i -bing the idea they had of each leader. The l i s t included the following words: conservative confused radical "smartman" honest thr i f ty "so-so" rac ia l communist Given the l imited range of possible descriptions on the l i s t , the respondents were free to choose as many of the words as they thought 99 of to describe each of the leaders. Words on the l i s t were chosen partly on the basis of what we believed to be a cross-section of generally accepted characterist ics of party leaders in Guyana and partly on the basis of characterist ics which when grouped could provide a three dimensional image rating of the respective leaders, v i z . , 25 favourable, moderate and unfavourable. The images we sought after were mainly psychological. No attempts, for example, were made to deduce images from the actual physical appeal or repulsion a leader had for our respondents. Yet we believe that the psychological t ra i ts e l i c i t e d from our respondents gave a re lat ive ly v iv id picture of the per-ceptions of the leaders that they carried around with them. We were less interested in counting how many times a part icular leader scored than whether he was mentioned at a l l . Figures 4 .1 -4 .3 show that 22 percent of our respondents saw Burnham as a conservative, 9 per cent rated Jagan and 24 per cent rated D'Aguiar as a conservative. On the t r a i t , "smart-man", Burnham received 57 percent, Jagan 8 per cent and D'Aguiar, 6 per cent; on "honesty", Burnham got only 12 per cent, Jagan 36 per cent and D'Aguiar, 34 per cent. As many as 56 per cent of our respondents saw Jagan as being "confused". Very few attributed this t ra i t to Burnham and D'Aguiar. Surprising, however, was that no leader was seen to be either " r a c i a l " or "communist". In view of the rac ia l cleavages believed to be dominant in the po l i t i cs of Guyana and the widespread For detai ls of the three dimensional image scale of party leaders see Appendix V. 100 Fig. 2 90-g 80-g 70-« 60-cy ^ 50-£ 40-cc 30-to •S 20-3 10-4.1 Public Image of Burnham by Traits (In percentages) n i i X 2 . 1 2 3 4 5 6 TRAITS Fig. 4.2 Public Image of D'Aguiar by Traits (In percentages) 3 90-I 80-g 70-n 60-* 50-£ 40-cn 30-•S 20-« 10-ci J=L n 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 TRAITS Fig. 4.3 Public Image of Jagan by Traits (In percentages) ? 9 0 H Si 80-g 70 w 60H c 50 1' 40 05 3to c 20 3 10 £1 O . n 3 4 5 6 TRAITS Index of Traits 1. Honest 2. Smartman 3. Thrifty 4. Conservative 5. Radical 6. So-so 7. Confused 8. Racial 9. Communist 101 charges of Jagan's communist a c t i v i t i e s , one would have expected that an overwhelming majority would have branded both Jagan and Burnham as " r a c i a l " and some, at least those with anti-Jagan sentiments, would have described him as a "communist". Our only explanation of this unusual twist of events is that our respondents may have perceived "racialism" to be so wide-spread that there was no need to mention that which was considered to be obvious. In fact, we believe that a large percentage of the. non-responses to this question indicate partly that respondents may have seen very l i t t l e differences i f any, among the three leaders on the psychological traits presented. Table 4.12 shows that of the total respondents in our sample either those who refused or were unable to answer the question on leader-ship images, 10 per cent were for Burnham, 10 per cent for Jagan and 14 per cent for D'Aguiar. On the characteristic, "communist", i t may be that the lack of mention merely reflected i t s insignificance as an issue in the 1968 General Elections, whereas in 1953, 1961, and 1964, the 'com-munist bogey' was used as a whipping boy of the anti-Jagan camp, we cannot r e c a l l that i t was even mentioned on the hustings in 1968. TABLE 4.12 ABSTENTIONS ON THE QUESTION: WHICH WORD COMES CLOSEST TO DESCRIBING THE IMAGE YOU HAVE OF THE THREE LEADERS? Abstention Leaders Percentage Total Burnham 10.3 (77) Jagan 10 (75) D'Aguiar 14.4 (108) 102 4-1 c o *o c o c tn 0) .Q 0) 60 c CO erf Fig. 4.4 Public Image of Burnham by Constituency 90-80-70-60-50-40 30 20 10 1 2 Strong PNC 3 4 Marginal 5 6 Strong PPP cn 4-1 c a) -3 C O D. in <D Pd -O 0) 60 C •H 4 - ) cc H Fig. 4.5 Public Image of D'Aguiar by Constituency 90-30-70-60-50 40 30-20-10-1 2 Strong PNC 3 4 Margin a 1 5 6 Strong PPP Fig. 4.6 Public Image of Jagan by Constituency c o c o tn G 03 to c •H 4-1 C3 90 80-70-6^ -50H 1 2 Strong PNC 5 6 Strong HC 103 Figures 4.4-4.6 show the public image of the three party leaders in each of six constituencies which made up our sample. These variations in the image-ratings of the patties' leaders are interesting insofar as we see that Burnham's image fluctuated from a favourable assessment by only 9 per cent of our respondents in a PPP stronghold to 94 per cent in a PNC stronghold; Jagan's image was most favourable in the two PPP strongholds and most unfavourable in PNC strongholds; D'Aguiar's image was more evenly distributed ranging from .54 per cent favourable assess-ment in Suddie to 33 per cent in Skeldon. When the image-ratings are aggregated in Table 4.13, Burnham and D'Aguiar both have a more favourable image than Jagan. TABLE 4.13 PUBLIC IMAGE OF PARTY LEADERS (In percentages) N = 720 Favourable Moderate Unfavourable Burnham 47 29 8 Jagan 17 41 28 D'Aguiar 40 33 7 There are numerous factors in the leader's own personality which may have been responsible for any pull effect on the electorate. Burnhan's greatest asset was, in the local parlance, his " g i f t of the gab", i.e., his eloquence, his a b i l i t y to manipulate the feelings and to prey upon 10A the sentiments of his audience, his ab i l i t y to switch with ease from standard English to the d ia lect , to quote extensively from the 3ible and most of a l l to "lash out" and tantal ise the opposition in a most v indict ive manner. When, for example, Burnham is referred to as a "smartman", this is more a form of endearment than of r id i cu le . A "smartman" in Guyana is an outstanding success whether as a po l i t i c ian or as a bandit (these two are not necessarily synonyms) and as a result is usually a highly revered personality. Jagan, though less eloquent than Burnham is also widely revered. He i s seen as the " f i r e b a l l " in Guyanese p o l i t i c s , whose favourite pastime i s a denounciation of imperialism. Even among his foremost r i v a l s , Jagan is s t i l l recognised to be in the vanguard of p o l i t i c a l change in Guyana. He is generally seen by the Indian peasantry to be "ah we own boy", i . e . , one of the people, a man who rose to fame from humble beginnings. When therefore opinion overwhelmingly supports the notion of Jagan's honesty, that opinion is somewhat divided as to i t s meaning. On the one hand, i t recognises the integrity required of a man to denounce American Impe-r ia l ism while needing aid for economic development. On the other hand, i t recognises a certain p o l i t i c a l naivete which is often paraphrased in the d ia lec t , "he too honest to be a p o l i t i c i a n . " D'Aguiar came from a different p o l i t i c a l era than either Burnham or Jagan. His white "Tantalise" is a loca l habit of mockery of an opponent, a some-what s a t i r i c a l presentation of an event so as to r id icule the object of the " tanta l ise" . In Trinidad a similar form of soc ia l indulgence is referred to as "fatigue" or "picong". 105 background, his wealth and his p o l i t i c a l associates, the business com-munity, the Roman Catholic Church and other marginal groups in the society were commonly referred to by D'Aguiar's opponents during the campaign. One PNC speaker referred to D'Aguiar as "a nice Christian white chap who real ly is a l i t t l e presumptuous to think that he has 97 any business in running the af fa i rs of black people.' Taking the analysis one stage further, Table 4.14 shows the image-rating of Burnham, Jagan and D'Aguiar respectively by PPP sup-porters and PNC supporters. Of the PPP supporters who gave leaders a favourable rating only 10 per cent would actually vote for Burnham while 90 per cent would vote for Jagan. While no PPP supporters gave Jagan an unfavourable image-rating, 20 per cent gave Burnham and 60 per cent gave D'Aguiar such a rat ing. Interestingly, 25 per cent of the strong PPP supporters could give no rating to D'Aguiar mainly because in the very strong PPP areas, many constituents had never heard of D'Aguiar. Conversely, Burnham scored a very favourable rating among the PNC supporters compared with Jagan's unfavourable rat ing. What is evident here is the highly partisan nature of the leadership image ratings. Strong PNC constituencies gave the most favourable rating to Burnham, while strong PPP constituencies did the same for Jagan. In these circumstances i t i s d i f f i c u l t to say whether mass perception of the party leaders influenced the direction of party Llewellyn John in a speech on the platform of the PNC in Georgetown on December 7, 1968. TABLE 4.14 IMAGE OF PARTY LEADERSHIP BY PARTY IDENTIFIER (In percentages) PPP Identifier N = 182 PNC Identifier N = 325 Favour- Unfavour- No Favour- Unfavour- No able Moderate able Rating able Moderate able Rating Burnham 10 . 64 20 6 85 5 - 10 D'Aguiar 3 - 62 35 10 38 37 15 Jagan 90 10 - - 5 40 45 5 o 107 support or whether the l e v e l of party support manifested by an elector determined his image-rating of party leaders. What i s important for our purpose i s the central role of the party leader i n the e l e c t o r a l campaign. No other party o f f i c i a l was required to cover the entire country. At p o l i t i c a l meetings, the star b i l l i n g went to the party leaders, party advertisements featured the photographs of the leader, the party broadcasts on the radio also featured the leaders; so did the press. One i l l u s t r a t i o n of the dominance of the party leaders i n the campaign may be measured by the amount of radio time they u t i l i s e d com-pared with other party o f f i c i a l s . Of 550 minutes of radio time given to party p o l i t i c a l broadcasts i n the seven weeks immediately preceding the 1968 general elections the party leaders among them used 340 minutes. The press also gave overwhelming p u b l i c i t y to the utterances of the party leaders presenting photographs of t h e i r p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y almost d a i l y . Over the same seven week period immediately preceding the TABLE 4.15 RADIO TIME (IN MINUTES) ALLOCATED TO POLITICAL PARTY BROADCASTS FOR THE PERIOD BETWEEN OCTOBER 27 AND DECEMBER 15, 1968 PNC PPP UF Burnham 145 Jagan 110 D'Aguiar 95 Others 75 Others 65 Others 30 Total 120 175 125 Source: Radio Schedules of the "Guyana Broadcasting" Corporation and "Radio Demerara", October 27 to December 15, 1968. 108 elections Burnham's photograph appeared in the main daily newspaper, "Guyana Graphic" 62 times, 18 of these on the front page. Jagan's photograph appeared 47 times, 12 of these on the front page, while D'Aguiar's appeared 10 times on the front page and 32 times in a l l . It was as i f the spotlight was reserved for the party leaders as they hopped between constituencies, shaking hands, kissing babies, and ad-dressing audiences. In the absence of a televis ion network in Guyana the face-to- face relationships between the leaders and the crowd demanded constant public appearances among the people, at v i l lage f a i r s , at church services, at cricket matches in the v i l lage pastures, even at weddings of the remotest party supporters where the leader is required to " f i r e one" (have a drink) with the joyfu l celebrants. A study of the i t inerary of the three party leaders over the eight weeks just pr ior to the elections shows that Burnham and Jagan covered a l l 38 registrat ion d is t r i c ts stretching over the most hazardous and remotest parts of the country, while D'Aguiar covered 28 of these 38 constituen-c ies . When therefore we speak of the leadership image as a function of personal perceptions, we refer to the whole range of audio-visual aids (the press, the radio, the face-to- face contact) which represent or i l l us t ra te various characterist ics of the party leader in the publ ic 's mind. 109 CHAPTER V THE NATURE OF PARTISANSHIP 1. INTRODUCTION At minimum, p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n could mean mobilisation at the p o l l s , whether as a voter or non-voter. At maximum, p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n could mean t o t a l mobilisation i n terras of a c t i v i s t p o l -i t i c s , whether designed to preserve the status quo or to destroy i t . In 1964, there was a debate within the People's Progressive Party on the question of whether or not the b a l l o t was a necessary and s u f f i c i e n t cause i n bringing about s o c i a l transformation i n Guyana.^ The coro l l a r y therefore, i s that maximal mobilisation (and th i s i s only one possible meaning) may be formulated i n terms of a commitment to destroy the established p o l i t i c a l order, rejecting the b a l l o t as a legitimate source of representation and adopting revolutionary methods, i n the form of g u e r i l l a warfare and coup d'etat. Indeed, p o l i t i c a l mobilisation nay take place outside the framework of p o l i t i c a l parties. The p o l i t i c s of Latin America, for example, abound with examples of th i s type of mobilisation. In f a c t , the m i l i t a r y i s a highly p o l i t i c a l organisation. 1 See "Brindley Benn and the PPP," New-World Fortnightly, Georgetown, Guyana, 1966, pp. 8-12. The party was divided. There were those who argued that competing i n elections under a system intent on ousting the Party from power was to place too great a trust i n elections as a useful means of l e g i t i m i s i n g governmental agents for s t r u c t u r a l transformation of the society. Others including Jagan argued that a ref u s a l by his party to take part i n the elections would have lost i t many supporters whose main i d e n t i f i c a t i o n with p o l i t i c s was i n casting t h e i r vote for one or other party i n the e l e c t o r a l competition for governmental power. 110 From time to time i t establishes restrictive boundaries on freedom of party activity as occurred with the Apristas of Peru and the Peronistas in Argentina during 1962. The low esteem in which p o l i t i c a l parties are often held in Latin America is a demonstration that a p o l i t i c a l process need not be very dependent upon the functions performed by the party system. Cuba, i s another example of a system which has been able to promote p o l i t i c a l change by l i t e r a l l y driving out of Cuba large numbers of traditionally oriented citizenry and by simultaneously en-forcing a kind of f i d e l i s t a legitimacy. Nor are elections necessary for participation to occur. Only a writer who is convinced of the sacro-sanctity of electoral mobilisation as the c r i t e r i a for p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i -pation can write of Cuba as follows: "The system has managed to hold together but sooner or later the c r i s i s of p o l i t i c a l participation w i l l 2 have to be faced and this may overload the shaky p o l i t i c a l machinery." To us, statements like this, not by any means infrequent in the l i t e r a -ture on p o l i t i c a l development, are dogmatic, ethnocentric and determinis-t i c a l l y biased towards the prototypes of Westernisation. Whether pa r t i -cipation arises from a consensual perspective or from an emphasis on conflict as a means to a higher synthesis i s immaterial to the analysis we are developing. We agree with Campbell and his colleagues that, "the act of voting is not an end in i t s e l f ; that i t is a choice of means z See Robert E. Scott, " P o l i t i c a l Parties and Policy-Making in * Latin America" in La Palombara and Weiner, P o l i t i c a l Parties and Pol-i t i c a l Development (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 343. I l l towards other ends." Hence, in relat ing the role of the party to the process of p o l i t i c a l mobil isation, we c lass i fy the process as follows: 1. Mobil isation at the po l l s , i . e . , casting a vote on election day. 2. Mobil isation in terms of willingness to identify with p o l i t i c a l parties in addition to merely voting. 3. Mobil isation in terms of p o l i t i c a l act iv i ty as a party act iv is t or as a non-party ac t i v i s t . In the f i r s t place, we are concerned with the mobilisation of cit izens in the electoral contests, their professed interest and level of public part ic ipation and the formal incorporation of strata and categories of residents — most s p e c i f i c a l l y , newly enfranchised cit izens — in the electoral contest. In the second instance, we are concerned with the nature of involvement in party act iv i ty as an organisational as d i s t i n -guished from an ind iv idua l i s t i c basis of p o l i t i c i s a t i o n . What is important is the c i t i zen 's ident i f icat ion with the mobilising agencies themselves, i . e . , the loca l party organisations and the campaign workers. Thirdly, we are concerned with the leve l of p o l i t i c a l commitment to change whether as a party act iv is t supporting the norms of the electoral system or as a dissenter committed to an ant i -e lectora l style of p o l i t i c s . In this chapter we sha l l examine the f i r s t two aspects of p o l i t i c a l mobilisation leaving our assessment of the third for Chapter VII. We are Angus Campbell et a l . , The American Voter (New York: John Wiley, 1960) , p. 118. 112 therefore, presently concerned with the po l l s , with partisan i d e n t i f i c a -tion and non- ident i f icat ion as a function of p o l i t i c a l mobil isation. 2. THE POLLS AND MOBILISATION One of the primary indicators of mobilisation of the electorate is the level of attendance at p o l i t i c a l meetings. In Guyana meetings are usually held outdoors at the street corner, under a shop or in the park. In the absence of the T .V . , p o l i t i c a l meetings provide a v i t a l source of contact between the candidates and the masses. TABLE 5.1 PARTY MEETING? MOST ATTENDED BY RACIAL DISTRIBUTION "(In percentages) (N = 435) Amerindians Indians Negroes Mixed Others (N = 22) (N = 160) (N= 201) (N=34) (N=1S) PNC 85 16 84 77 62 PPP - 62 3 15 -UF 15 1 1 8- 28 Can't decide - 21 12 - 10 Total 100 100 100 100 100 In response to our question, "did you attend any p o l i t i c a l meetings during the electoral campaign?" 56 per cent of our sample said yes. Of those who actually attended p o l i t i c a l meetings we asked to indicate which party meetings they did attend most. Table 5.1 gives the rac ia l 113 distribution of attendance at meetings. Except for the Indo-Guyanese, the majority of the respondents of a l l races attended PNC meetings most. In Figure 5.1 we represent the attendance at party meetings by partisans in the six constituencies that comprise our sample. We see that in a strong PPP constituency (1) as many as 76 per cent of our respondents attended PPP meetings most, while in a strong PNC constituency (6) only 2 per cent attended PPP meetings most while 88 per cent attended the PNC meetings most. In the marginal constituencies many more people said that they attended PMC meetings than either those held by the UF or the PPP. As an indicator of p o l i t i c a l mobilisation.attendance at p o l i t i c a l meetings may or may not suggest a higher degree of p o l i t i c a l involvement than voting. In some cases, going to a p o l i t i c a l meeting is like any other social event, to meet and "gaff" (talk) with one's friends, to hear the p o l i t i c a l gossip and to be entertained. These aspects of the people's p o l i t i c a l response are peripheral to p o l i t i c a l involvement which implies that a certain weight is given to various p o l i t i c a l options prior to the taking of a p o l i t i c a l decision. Generally speaking therefore, the act of voting for one or other party at elections i s the most r i t u a l i s t i c p o l i t i c a l function to be performed by the mass citizenship. As Laponce so aptly puts i t , "dropping a ballot into a box on a day of strong moral obligation — a national election day for example — is among the most popular community ritu a l s . 4 J.A. Laponce, People vs. P o l i t i c s : A Study of Opinions, Attitudes  and Perceptions in Vancouver-Burrard 1963-65 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969), p. 31. Fig. 5-1 PARTY MEETINGS MOST ATTENDED BY PARTISANS AND BY CONSTITUENCY 115 We have already referred to the high voting turnout at general elections in Guyana."' In our sample, mobilisation at the p o l l s , represented in Table 5.2 and complementarily in Figure 5.2, is very high. In the 1968 general e lect ions, only 1 per cent of our sample.said that they did not vote. More impressively however, when non-voting is cor-related with e l i g i b i l i t y to vote, we see that only 24 per cent of the electorate e l i g ib le to vote in a l l four elections since 1957, did not do so. In fact , 76 per cent voted in a l l four e lect ions, 20 per cent voted in three of the four elections while 4 per cent voted twice. Of a l l those who were e l i g ib le to vote since 1961, 86 per cent voted in a l l three elect ions, 12 per cent voted twice and 2 per cent voted only once. In 1964, only 4 per cent of the electorate did not vote while in 1968 a l l but 1 per cent of the electorate voted. Summarising the pattern of mobilisation at the po l l s , only 1 per cent of the respondents e l i g ib le to vote have never cast a vote. This level of mobilisation at the pol ls is even more phenomenal when, as we have determined, a very persistent reason for non-voting was "absence from the country" at the time of the elect ions. See Chapter II, pp. 29-30. The extra-ordinari ly low non-voting element (1 per cent) in the 1968 elections (Table 5.2) may be due to the fact that: (1) respondents' answers to the questions on voting may have been misleading; (2) sample bias caused by the fact that refusals to answer questionnaire probably highly, posit ively correlated with non-voting. TABLE 5-2 VOTING DISTRIBUTION IN THE GENERAL ELECTIONS, 1957, 1961, 1964, 1968 ELIGIBLE TO VOTE-A l l 4 From From E l e c t i o n s 1961 1964 536 576 640 From 1968 $ voted i n a l l 4 e l e c t i o n s 76 $ voted i n 3 e l e c t i o n s 20 86 $ voted i n 2 e l e c t i o n s only 4 12 96 761 $ voted i n 1 e l e c t i o n only 2 4 99 $ voted i n no e l e c t i o n Figure 5«2 VOTING DISTRIBUTION OVER FOUR ELECTIONS io voted' 2 times 20$ voted 3 times 76$ voted 4 times .....if i l l voted once p 12$ voted 2 times 86$ voted 3 times ki4 4$ voted once 96$ voted twice Ii rM •.|!.. ;, •:•:?••.! T ' ! : r ! j ! ^- •' '':'fj ill I ' I i 'Y* 1957 1961 1964 V,f;>i. (-.1 " if ^ !'-f fe;.;i . 1$ d i d not vote 99$ voted 1968 117 3. PARTY IDENTIFICATION AND MOBILISATION Taking the electorate as a whole, Figure 5.3 graphically i l l u s -trates the very high ratio of partisans to non-partisans and floaters. While partisans were mobilised at least at the level of casting their vote consistently for one or other of the parties, non-partisans were those who would definitely not vote i f an election were held at the time of the survey. Even when probed for a semblance of identification, non-partisans manifested "no leanings" towards any p o l i t i c a l party. It should, however, be pointed out that non-partisanship did not necessarily imply a lack of p o l i t i c a l mobilisation, as 45 per cent of those classified as non-partisans in the electoral process actually claimed active member-ship in a social or labour movement and over 58 per cent displayed a level of p o l i t i c a l awareness commensurate with those who professed strong partisanship.^ In the case of the floaters, these were people who shifted their choice of party at least once and were undecided for whom they would vote were an election to be held "tomorrow". Figure 5.4 indicates the nature of switching which occurred between 1961 and 1968 among the re-spondents of our sample. Translating actual figures into percentages, among the 80 people who switched party loyalties from election to election, 5 per cent of former PNC voters switched to PPP and 6 per cent to the UF. Of the former PPP voters, 20 per cent switched to PNC and 8 per cent to the UF. From among former UF members, the PNC benefited most from switching, gaining 25 per cent while the PPP gained 6 per cent. See Tables 5.7 and 5.8. 118 p . c T DISTRIBUTION OF PARTISAN-Non-PARTISAN B ' 5 ° FLOATER (N = 882) V Fig. 5.4 NET EFFECT OF PARTY SWITCHING AMONG "SWITCHERS" 1961-1968 17 PNC (+41) PPP (-22) + 3 +17 UF (-15) -17 +43 +43 < -41 -19 -2 -> -19 +19 +2 OTHER PARTIES Fig. 5-5 NET EFFECT OF INTER-PARTY SWITCHING ON PARTY IDENTIFICATION 121 The overall effect of the inter-party switching shown in Figure 5.5 reveals a net gain of 35 per cent by the PNC during the 1961-1968 period, but a net loss of 16 per cent and 17 per cent for the PPP and the UF respectively. Since the 1955 s p l i t in the PPP^ p o l i t i c a l mobilisation has been characterised by party conflict. The crucial factor for both the PPP and the PMC was the competitive pressure to develop a broader mass base for their organisations and to ensure greater continuity and sta-b i l i t y of local party agencies. In 1961, the PPP organised i t s party cells to correspond to the a revision of the electoral boundaries recommended by the Hallett Report. In order to coordinate the work of the party groups in the constituencies, the party's structure was altered to include regional committees as organisational links between the constituency committees and the Central 7 It must be recalled that after the suspension of the Guyanese consti-tution in 1953 the PPP consequently s p l i t up into two factions, one led by Burnham and the other by Jagan. After the 1957 elections, the Burn-ham faction changed i t s name to the Peoples National Congress (PNC), g Report of the British Guiana Electoral Boundaries Commission, 1960, Hugh Hallett (Georgetown, Government of British Guiana, 1960). This report emanated from a one-man commission, Sir Hugh Hallett. Hallett saw l i t t l e virtue in the PPP's recommendation of using the adult popula-tion as the basis of distributing electoral boundaries. Instead he im-plemented a quota of population method under which the estimated total population 56,000 was divided by 35 constituencies giving a constituency approximately 16,000 persons. Given the mean population of a consti-tuency, Hallett introduced above and below quotas, which formed the basis of protests from the PPP about "gerrymandering" harmful to i t s interest. See C. P. Bradley, "The Party System in British Guiana and the General Elections of 1961," Caribbean Studies,! (October, 1961), pp. 8-12. 122 party Executive. A number of public relations and educational committees were also added to the party structure, chief among which is Accabre College, founded in 1965, and the Cultural Committee introduced in 1966. It is interesting to note that a Race Advisory Committee has also been an addit ional ad hoc committee of the Executive Council since 1964. These changes by the PPP have been symptomatic of an attempt to reach a wider cross-section of the electorate. Although no o f f i c i a l figures have been disclosed, the number of active party groups are approximately 195 9 with a paid-up membership of 24,575. The organisation of the PNC in the period 1957-61 was marked by i t s fa i lure to make any s ignif icant impact on the rural constituencies. The reorganisation of the party following the 1966 Annual Congress took several forms. In the f i r s t place the Young Socia l is t Movement, the youth arm of the Party, was given increased representation both on the Central Executive, and in the number of delegates to the annual party convention. The slate of candidates disclosed that twelve of the 53 candidates in the 1968 general elections were members of the Young Socia l is t Movement. The emphasis on youth representation was said to Shortly after Dr. Jagan's return to Guyana from a Moscow Confer-ence cf Communist and Workers parties in August 1969, the PPP announced a further restructuring of the party. The party abolished the posts of leader and chairman in a reconstitution of the hierarchy, making the party, s t ructural ly , more l ike the p o l i t i c a l parties in Russia and Eastern Block countries. Dr. Jagan now holds the posit ion of f i r s t secretary. See Reorganising the Party (PPP Publication, George-town: Freedom House, 1970). 123 arise from Burnham's attempt to pacify the YSM and to att r a c t more support among the younger sections of the population. A second feature of the PNC's organisation was i t s i n t e n s i f i e d membership drive which concentrated mainly on the r u r a l and hinterland areas, where support had previously been marginal or weak. In January 1967, the party introduced a system c a l l e d the "fan-out", whereby once every two months party o f f i c i a l s would tour each constituency for three to four days to keep i n touch and to disseminate information on party p o l i c y , to the constituents. These "fan-outs" involved a l l members of the parliamentary party, the Central executive and the l o c a l party executive. In addition to the "fan-outs" the o f f i c e of the Prime Minister increased rapidly between 1965-68 from 10 to 32 members of s t a f f i n -cluding an expansion i n the Public Relations o f f i c e headed by Frank Pi l g r i m . I t was the Public Relations Office and the 1968 Elections Campaign O f f i c e , combined into a s p e c i a l ad hoc o f f i c e under the organisation of Hugh Chomodelly and an American, Dick Jones, which The militancy of the YSM and i t s resultant occasions of con-f l i c t s with the parent body, the PNC, have been few, according to our evidence. Nevertheless, there have been instances when crises threatened the party as for example, the severe c r i t i c i s m by a faction of the YSM i n ?Iay 1965, of Burnham's "demogogic leadership", and his attack at the party's 1965 Congress, on Stanley Hugh, former Vice-President of the Party. I t was f e l t , i n many c i r c l e s that the resigna-tion of Oswald Bentham from the chairmanship of the YSM i n A p r i l 1966 was the hatchet job of the party, d i r e c t l y related to Bentham's a n t i -Burnhara stand on the Stanley Hugh issue. For commentary on this see New World Fortnightly No. 15, May 2S, 1965, p. 11, and No. 33, A p r i l 4, 1966, pp. 6-7. 124 spearheaded the propaganda and the strategy of the 1963 general elec-tions. The PNC claimed that i t s organisation at the time of the elections included 252 local party groups and a total membership of 35,675. In 1968, the UF also made genuine attempts at mobilising mass support by expanding i t s local party organisations and restructuring i t s party headquarters. While however the party organisation in the urban areas, Georgetown and New Amsterdam, was geared to the task of competing with the PNC and the PPP, the party was poorly organised in most of the rural areas especially on the Corentyne and the Essequibo coasts where i t was forced for the most part to employ the services of paid activists outside the formal structure of the party. One comparable factor of the parties' organisations i s that while the United Force could be classified as a caucus-type party, both the PNC and the PPP are branch-type organisations."^ Both the PNC and the PPP are extensive in their organisation. Their primary objective is to multiply their membership and to increase their total strength. For a detailed description of structural units and organisational typology such as caucus and branch see Maurice Duverger, P o l i t i c a l  Parties: Their Organisation, and Activity in a Modern State translated by Barbara and Robert North, (London: Methuen University Paperbacks, 1964), pp. 17-40. The caucus is composed of a small, seasoned nucleus of professionals — in the case of the UF, businessmen included — who f u l f i l l primarily electoral functions for the middle-class constituents they serve. The branch is a common feature of Socialist parties and is characterised by a highly bureaucratised though democratic structure. This type of organisation provides a clear division of duties and re-sponsibilities among i t s sub-units, a wide range of acti v i t i e s available to i t s membership and a permanent organisation. It could be pointed out that in 1953, the PP? began in a c e l l type organisation built around an ideologically committed nucleus of people. 125 In both these parties membership rules and entrance requirements are defined but to a large extent these are merely theoretical constructs, as i n pract ice, one only has to wish to belong to a party to do so. This is not to say that membership fees and membership cards are not important. Owning a party card, especially of the party in power, is l ike having a passport, since i t opens up avenues for jobs and promotion which might not have otherwise been possible. The party in power nor-mally uses i t s party headquarters as an employment agency, often with greater eff ic iency than the Government's Labour Exchange in finding jobs for i t s . c l i e n t s . It i s common practice for people to pay membership dues and to own party cards as an insurance against unemployment or to increase their chances of gaining employment. Hence, i t i s not unusual to find one person owning membership cards of three different part ies . For these reasons membership cards and membership dues may be functional for reasons other than those associated with the phenomenon of p o l i t i c a l involvement. What is important, is that included in the PNC, the PPP and the UF are many anci l lary organisations chief among which are the Trade Unions and Cultural groups which assist in strengthening the bonds of partisanship and the process of p o l i t i c a l mobil isation. Partisanship is determined by the level of party ident i f icat ion manifested by our respondents. To determine the level of party i d e n t i f i -cation we asked the following question of those of our respondents who had exp l i c i t l y stated a party preference: Right now how strongly do you fee l about your choice of _ _ _ _ _ party? (giving name of party chosen by respondent) . 126 Would you say you feel very strongly, f a i r l y strongly, not strongly or you don't know? Once a person i s willing to identify with a party whether strongly or moderately, he i s a partisan. But i f he refuses to be identified he is classified as a non-partisan or a non-identifier. The feeling of partisanship may be generated from many sources including the family, social class, age-cohorts, and the whole p o l i t i c a l l i f e cycle of an individual's experiences. What is important are the beliefs and values of a wider culture to which one has been exposed. To be brought up as a "blackman" or a "coolie" or a "putaguee" must have immense consequences for a man's approach to p o l i t i c s ; consequences of being part of one of the sub-cultures of a nation and particularly relevant to Guyana, are those defined by race. Apart from ascertaining the level of party identi-fication by the party electorates we were also interested in disaggrega-ting the electorates in terms of race, religion and age. TABLE 5.3 STRENGTH OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION (In percentages) N = 555 PNC PPP UF Total Very strong 80 72 70 437 Fairly strong 14 18 - 75 Not strong 3 6 15 24 Don't know 3 4 15 19 TABLE 5 . 4 STRENGTH OP PARTY IDENTIFICATION BY RACE, IN PERCENTAGES N = 5 5 1 PNC PPP UF' V.Str. F.Str. N.Str. DK V.Str. F.Str. N.Str. DK V.Str. F.Str. N.Str. DK Tota! Amerindian 4 0 5 — — — 5 — _ 5 0 — _ _ 2 0 East Indian 2 1 1 6 1 3 4 8 5 4 - - - 1 1 2 1 3 A f r i c a n s 80 9 - - 2 - - - 2 - - - 2 4 5 Mixed 6 4 6 4 6 4 6 - - 1 0 - - - 5 0 Others 4 0 1 5 2 0 1 5 - - - - - - - - 3 6 TABLE 5 - 5 STRENGTH OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION BY RELIGION, IN PERCENTAGES N = 5 5 1 PNC PPP • UF V.Str. F.Str. N.Str. DK V.Str. F.Str. N.Str. DK V.Str. F.Str. N.Str. DK T o t a l Protestant 80 8 2 8 1 1 - - - - - 8 3 C a t h o l i c 5 5 1 4 7 7 4 - 2 8 - - 2 2 7 0 Hindu 18 3 - 2 2 7 5 3 1 - - - 1 0 1 Muslim 4 5 2 5 - 5 2 5 - - - - 4 0 Others 5 8 4 4 1 2 3 0 - 4 - - - - - 3 7 Question (a) As things look now, which p o l i t i c a l party do you think i s best s u i t e d to govern t h i s country? (b) I f a d e f i n i t e party choice i s given ask: M Right now how strongly do you f e e l about your choice (name party)? -0 128 As one indicator of the success of these organisations in mobilising mass support, Table 5.3 shows the strength of party identi-fication manifested in our sample. An overwhelming majority of p a r t i - . sans claimed very strong party identification: 80 per cent of the PNC supporters, 72 per cent of the PPP supporters and 70 per cent of the UF supporters. Of the remaining partisans, 14 per cent from within the ranks of the PNC and 18 per cent from the PPP claimed f a i r l y strong attachments to the respective party of their choice. Very few partisans identified mildly with the parties while fewer s t i l l were uncertain of the strength of their identity. 4. RACE, RELIGION, AGE AND PARTY IDENTIFICATION Turning to race and party identification, we observe in Table 5.4 that as high as 80 per cent of the Africans identify very strongly with the PNC while only 2 per cent identify very strongly with the PPP. The East Indians (48 per cent) on the other hand, identify very strongly with the PPP, but over 40 per cent (over 21 per cent, very strongly) identify with the PNC. Except for the Amerindians who identified with both UF and PNC, the other races identified almost entirely with the PNC. Another measure of the strength of party identification i s given in Table 5.5. Except for the Hindus a l l religious denominations including Catholics show a partisanship in favour of the PNC. Even the Muslims have identified very strongly with the PNC compared with the PPP. The ratio of very strong to f a i r l y strong identification especially among PNC Muslims suggests, maybe, activity of Muslim organisations. This pa r t i a l i t y towards the PKC is perhaps best explained h i s t o r i c a l l y , in 129 1 o the sectional jealousies and rivalry between the Hindus and the Muslims. In recent years, the PMC has made great efforts to capitalise on the Hindu Muslim rivalry and to attract members of the Muslim community into i t s fold. In 1966, the Muslim League became a f f i l i a t e d to the PNC. Since then the number of Muslim party groups has increased rapidly from one in 1966 to three in 1968 to seven in 1969. While no accurate s t a t i s t i c s are available, the number of delegates representing exclusively local Muslim party a f f i l i a t e s , at the 1969 Annual Convention suggests Muslim member-13 ship in the PNC to be in the v i c i n i t y of 3,960. It seems somewhat plausible to infer that organisational factors have been partly responsible for the Muslims to be identified with the PNC party more than with the party of their race. Hence, the need to question Jayawardena when he says, " i t is true to say that the overall tie of 'being Indian' is strong enough to override religious distinctions. Moreover, 'cultural cleavages' seem to be breaking down more rapidly among the Muslim sections of the Indian community than among the Hindus. Conse-quently, the proximal creole values are more easily assimilated by the former group making i t reasonable to expect a greater tendency among the Muslims than the Hindus to identify with the PMC. Age has also been used as a measure of party identification in Table 5.6 Accordingly, there was very l i t t l e distinction in the levels 1 7 x C Jayawardena, Conflict and Solidarity in a Guyanese Plantation (London: Athlone Press, 1963X p. 13. 13 The estimate arrived at by calculating the ratio of delegates to members as stipulated in the party's constitution. ^ Jayawardena, op. c i t . , p. 15. TABLE 5 . 6 PARTY IDENTIFICATION BY AGE AND RACE IN PERCENTAGES i EAST INDIANS — AFRICANS 2 5 & 2 5 & Under 2 6 - 5 5 3 6 - 4 5 4 6 - 5 5 5 6 + Under 2 6 - 3 5 5 6 - 4 5 4 6 - 5 5 5 6 + PNC 1 5 1 2 5 1 2 8 8 8 8 9 9 4 8 5 8 7 P P P 6 5 7 2 7 5 6 3 • 7 6 6 8 2 5 4 UF - 6 8 5 4 - - 2 - 3 Other 1 1 2 1 1 - 1 - -None 1 9 - 9 1 0 1 9 1 1 6 2 2 1 0 6 TOTAL 5 2 1 1 7 6 1 2 5 28 3 0 1 0 0 5 1 2 6 2 1 131 of ident i f icat ion between the various age cohorts. The youngest c i t izens displayed as strong partisan attachments based on race as any other group, with the exception that a greater percentage of Indians under 25, than in any other Indian age group, were ident i f ied as supporters of the PNC. Yet, interest ingly , under twenty-fives and the "46-55" Indian age groups were the greatest single groups in our sample to profess "no ident i f icat ion" for any party. Under-25 Afr icans, on the other hand, professing no ident i -f i ca t ion , were very few in number. Since the under-25 Indian group accounts TABLE 5.7 EXTRA ELECTORAL ACTIVITY OF NON-•IDENTIFIERS N = 78 Indians Negroes Others N = 48 N = 21 N = 9 Belong to Trade Union 95 85 15 Participated in demonstra-t ions, protests, etc. 70 64 -Wil l volunteer to fight for Guyana 72 99 -Electoral process useful 15 26 -Electoral process useless 85 74 -Cuban type revolution as an alternative 51 40 -"Black Power" essential 10 25 -for 26 per cent of the Indian population of our sample, 19 per cent "non-ident i f i cat ion" is c r i t i c a l in terms of votes. Yet fa i lure to identify 132 with the electoral structures does not mean a lack of p o l i t i c a l invol-vement per se. The crucial determinant as seen in Table 5.7 i s whether our subjects are involved in any other form of p o l i t i c a l struggle — revolutionary or counterrevolutionary — outside the electoral framework. In fact, of the non-identifiers in the formal p o l i t i c a l structures 90 per cent are members of trade unions, 72 per cent have taken part in demonstrations, protest meetings, 72 per cent of the Indians and 99 per cent of the Africans w i l l volunteer to fight for Guyana against Venezuelan or Surinam aggression."^ But most importantly, 80 per cent of these non-party identifiers describe the electoral process as a "facade", "useless", "a Colonial appendage" and 45 per cent believe that Cuban type revolution is Guyana's only salvation. Twenty-five per cent of a l l Africans spoke of a cultural revolution and of a "Black power" philosophy as the primary means of Black economic and p o l i t i c a l supremacy in Guyana. Only 10 per cent of the Indians mentioned "Black power" as an essential philosophy for the society. Unlike the classification of most p o l i t i c a l scientists who neglect the role of these non-partisans, we see them as being highly mobilised against the transplanted version of p o l i t i c a l and social change of the Westminster and White House traditions. If as we have seen, some people reject formal attachment to party p o l i t i c s , then we cannot automa-t i c a l l y assume that they are a p o l i t i c a l , for while their response to elections may be minimal, they can be highly politicised. It is therefore Since 1964 with Venezuela and 1966 with Surinam, Guyana has been involved in border disputes, which have intermittently disrupted internal p o l i t i c s . In both cases a temporary truce has been agreed upon. 133 not impossible to find non-partisans who are maximally involved in p o l i t i c s , even i f they happen to display mobilisation for p o l i t i c a l dis-sent. Walter Rodney aptly summarises the mode of this style of p o l i t i c s especially among the youths in Guyana when he says: ...black people don't need to be told that Garvey i s a national hero — they know that. Nor do they need to be told to mourn when blacks are murdered by White Power, because they mourn everyday right here in Jamaica where white power keeps them ignorant, unemployed, il l - c l o t h e d and i l l - f e d . They w i l l stop mourning when things change — and that means a revolution, for the f i r s t essential is to break the chains which bind us to white imperialists, and that is a very revolutionary step. Cuba is the only country in the West Indies and in this hemisphere which has broken with white power. That is why Stokely Carmichael can v i s i t Cuba but he can't v i s i t Trinidad or Jamaica. That is why Stokely can Call Fidel 'one of the blackest men in the Americas' and that is why our leaders in contrast qualify as 'white'. Very often when we refer to radical p o l i t i c s we imply "mobilisa-tion only for p o l i t i c a l dissent." The international phenomenon of stu-dent protest i s one current example. So have been the articulated voice of protest a l a Rodney. Hence "Abeng" in Jamaica, "Moko" in Trinidad and subsequently "Ratoon" in Guyana, have emerged as organised opinion of protest against authoritarianism and the infringement of academic freedom. Some informed sources in the Caribbean, chief among whose, Vaughn Lev/is and Trevor Munroe, are of the opinion that the Modern History of the West Indies entered a new phase with the Rodney incident. Dr. Walter Rodney, a Guyanese lecturer at U.W.I, was declared a persona non grata by the Jamaican Government in October 1968. A wave of protest throughout the Caribbean followed Rodney's banning and since this time numerous "ginger groups" have been organised espousing the philosophy of Black Power for the Caribbean. Although i t may be d i f f i c u l t to elevate Rodney to the exalted niche of patron saint of the new p o l i t i c s of pro-test, his words and actions which precipitated his exile from the West Indies — he is now resident of Tanzania — have inspired most of the effective protest movements in the Caribbean and his example of bridge-building between thought and action, between university and community is by no means remotely connected with the February c r i s i s in Trinidad. Walter Rodney, Groundings with my Brothers (London: Bogle-L'Ouverture Publications, 1969). 134 Generally speaking, however, the important variable in the location of partisan support is not age but race. The overwhelming majority of Negroes, 88 per cent on average, supported the PNC, while 70 per cent of the East Indians supported the PPP. One key observation for the pr inciple of mobilisation is the relat ively high percentage (15 per cent on average) of Indians compared with Negroes (3 per cent) who claimed no party ident i f i cat ion . Non-Identification of the Indians in our sample exceeded the national non-voting percentage by almost 10 per cent (and the underestimated non-voting percentage in the sample by even more). This disparity may be a pecul iar i ty of post-elect ion dejection on the part of the supporters of a losing party. Psychologists normally refer to the law of ef fect^ ' to express the function of success and fa i lure in influencing the emotional status of the person, his goals, his evaluations and his socia l relat ions. Many psychologists argue that success and fa i lure do not depend on achieve-ment as such, but rather upon the relationship between the achievement and the person's " leve l of aspirat ion". In other words, the experience and the degree of success and fa i lure depend upon whether the achievement 18 is above or below the momentary level of aspiration. What we are ^ By the Law of Effect one learns quickly those reactions which are accompanied or followed by a sat isfy ing state of a f f a i r s ; one does not learn quickly those which result in an annoying state of af fa i rs or learns not to make such reactions. See H. B. Engl ish, A Student's Dictionary of Psychological Terms, (New York: Harper and Row, 1954). 18 For experimental work in this f i e l d , see K. Lewin, A Dynamic  Theory of Personality (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1935). 135 suggesting here is a certain psychological reaction on the part of the Indo-Guyanese to the fa i lure of the PPP to gain o f f i ce . If a defeat of their party is seen to be a thwarting of what Maslow cal ls the ' s e l f -esteem need of human motivation' , then this could produce feelings of i n fe r io r i t y , of weakness, and of helplessness. These feelings in turn give r ise to either basic discouragement or e lse , compensatory or with-drawal trends. These are a l l forms of what may be cal led p o l i t i c a l 19 neuroticism similar to Abrams' evaluation of Labour supporters between 20 1955 and 1964, in Br i ta in when their party suffered electoral defeat on three successive occasions. 5. PARTY MEMBERS, SWITCHERS AMD SPECTATORS Apart from the part ies ' ab i l i t y to attract partisans in terms of party ident i f i ca t ion , the part ies ' ab i l i t y to mobilise the cit izenry is also measurable by the actual party membership. In our sample, 86 per cent of the respondents belonged to one or other of the p o l i t i c a l part ies , either by a simple claim to membership or as a due-paying member. Among those who did not claim party membership, 29 per cent sympathised with one or other of the parties and actually made contributions to party funds. I Q For an appreciation of the necessity of basic self -confidence and an understanding of how helpless people are without i t , see A. A. Maslow, "Dominance, Personality and Social Behaviour in Women," Journal  of Social Psychology 10 (1939), pp. 3-39 and "A Theory of Human Motiva-t ion" in Harold J . Levitt and Louis R. Pondy, Readings in Managerial  Psychology,(New York: University of Chicago Press, 1966), pp. 6-24. 20 Mark Abrams and Richard Rose, Must Labour Lose? (London: New Fabian Publication,1960) and H. A. Turner, "Labour's Diminishing Vote," Guardian (London, October 20, 1961), p. 9. 136 TABLE 5.8 CATEGORIES OF PARTY MEMBERS - ALL PARTIES (In percentages Strong PPP Marginal Strong PNC % Total Total 1 Party Members by claim only 21 Party Members by regular pay-ment of party dues 66 Non-party Members but make f inancia l contribution 13 100 2 3 4 5 28 48 35 62 65 46 35 22 7 6 30 16 100 100 100 100 6 51 44 355 19 42 332 20 14 103 100 100 790 In strong PPP constituencies actual party membership and contribu-tions by party members and non-party members al ike are on the whole higher than in strong PNC constituencies. In Abary (6), for example, a strong PNC constituency, party membership is re lat ively low and so are contributions from a l l sources. More meaningful interpretations of party membership might have accrued had we been able to get information on the exact party to which individual respondents actually made con-tr ibut ions. However, the large number of non-responses to this ques-tion in our pre-test suggested that a direct question on party member-ship was too sensitive an area to e l i c i t re l iable responses. Most of our respondents have crysta l l ised their membership for part icular part ies . Of the 355 professed party members, 20 per cent 137 have switched party loyalties as indicated in Table 5.9. The highest percentage of switching has occurred equally from membership in the PPP and the UF to the PNC. Cn the other hand, very l i t t l e switching occurred from within the ranks of the PNC to the other patties. Most people gave their reason for switching from the PPP to the PNC as due to the " r a c i a l p o l i t i c s " of the PPP and to dissatisfaction with the leadership. These issues were also important for those who switched from the UF to the PNC. Lack of ideological fulfillment and dissatisfaction with the leader-ship on the other hand were the main causes of the switch from the PNC to the PPP. "Internal r i f t s " i n the party were generally given as a minor reason for switching of membership, but a l l the PNC members who subsequently joined the UF gave this reason for switching. Figure 5.6 focuses on inter-party switching. Here we grouped the constituencies according to partisan strength, combining two strong PNC constituencies, two marginal constituen-cies and two strong PPP constituencies respectively. Of the 22 switchers in the two strong PNC constituencies, 12 voted for the PPP in 1964, 3 for the PNC and 6 for the UF. In 1968, only 2 out of these 22 swtichers voted for the PPP while 19 voted for the PNC and 1 for the UF. In the two marginal constituencies, 28 people switched loyalties; of these, 21 voted for the PPP in 1964, but only 2 voted for that party in 1968 and while 1 person voted for the PNC in 1964, 24 voted for the PNC in 1968. In strong PPP constituencies, of the 24 people who switched loyalties, 5 voted for the PPP in 1964 and 15 in 1968; 15 voted for the PNC in 1964 and 9 in 196S; 4 for the UF in 1964 but none in 1968. VHiat is generally TABLE 5-9 PARTY SWITCHERS AND REASON FOR SWITCHING N o 20 N = 14 Bad Organization Leadership D i s s a t i s -f a c t i o n N = 11 Ideology N = 22 R a c i a l P o l i c y N = 12 I n t e r n a l R i f t s N = 5 Other T o t a l (N = PPP - PNC 25 28 12 35 - - 100 (43) UF - PNC 25 25 12 30 8 - 100 (17) Other PNC - - - - 100 100 ( 3) PNC - PPP - 50 33 17 - - 100 ( 9) PNC - UF — — — — 100 — 100 ( 2) PNC - Other UF - PPP PPP - UF 139 reflected in this figure i s the net gain for the PNC compared with the other two parties even though in the strong PPP constituencies the PPP gained most from the switching of party loyalties. Among the rank and f i l e electorate, there is a special kind of partisan whom we could refer to as spectator. He i s a spectator because he refuses to identify himself with any party even though he i s fully involved in the process of voting at elections. And even though he does not identify with any particular party over a long period of time, he has 'leanings" towards a particular party for the purposes of casting his vote. These leanings indicate a raci a l bias in that 68 per cent of the specta-tors of African descent had a 'leaning' toward the PNC while 58 per cent of East Indian origin were 'leaning' towards the PPP. A high proportion of Whites, Chinese and Portuguese were more inclined toward the PNC, relatively few toward the UF, but none toward the PPP. Nevertheless, the very high "don't know" category — as high as 58 per cent among the Amerindians and the refusal of 50 per cent of those of mixed origin to indicate some party leaning suggest that some spectators may be iden-t i c a l to non-partisans in their reluctance to be mobilised at the polls. The respondents in these categories "don't know" and "none" make up the classification null-electoral mobilisation. FIGURE 5.6 N T U E N PPP '6h PNT; UP OTHEI 141 TABLE 5.10 PARTY LEANINGS OF SPECTATORS BY RACE (In percentages) N = 239 Amerindian East Indian African Mixed Others N = 11 N = 76 N = 120 N = 13 N= 19 PNC 20 5 68 25 66 PPP - 58 5 - -UF - - 3 - 16 None 22 7 3 50 -Don1t know 58 30 21 25 18 100 100 100 100 100 Q. Well, even though you don't particularly care for any of the parties, which one are you leaning towards now? 6. ISSUES AND MOBILISATION In the 1968 elections, issues seem to have been relegated to a minor role i n the actual campaign. Nevertheless, several events were occurring at the time to engage the concern of the electorate. Un-employment continued to be high, cost of l i v i n g , work stoppages and industrial disputes continued to plague the economy. During the period January to December 1963, 72 industrial strikes caused 108,638 man-days to be lost, providing the government with rationale for introducing the 22 Labour Relations B i l l . Additionally, the election machinery became a " z See "Draft Text of Industrial Relations B i l l , " (Georgetown, Guyana Ministry of Labour Publ., 1968), Appendix 1. This Draft B i l l aroused severe criticisms from several sections of the population, chief among which, the Trade Unions. The TUC, Guyana, subsequently submitted amend-ments to the Draft B i l l which the government refused to accept. The stale-mate between the government and the unions has now put the B i l l in a state of limbo. See "Trades Dispute B i l l Controversy," Guyana Graphic, George-town, Guyana, November 5th, 1970, p. 3. 142 major source of pre-elect ion conf l i c t . The expose on the i r regular i t ies of overseas registrat ion and the subsequent court injunctions against the Elections Commission took on the proportions of an international scandal. A writ against the Electoral Commission was f i l e d on the grounds that the provisions of the Representation of the Peoples (Adaptation and Modification of Laws) October 1968 were u l t ra vires and unconstitu-23 t iona l . Guyanese were therefore provided with p o l i t i c a l gossip which formed the basis of many profound arguments during and after the 1968 electoral campaign. Looking at the issues as a source of mobil isat ion, most of the electorate had an opinion on the socio-economic and p o l i t i c a l issues. F i f ty -n ine per cent of our respondents in Table 5.11 ident i f ied cost of l i v ing and unemployment as the most important issues. Only 4 per cent ident i f ied these issues as least important. While 17 per cent thought of labour disputes as the major issue, 40 per cent thought this to be the least important. However, in spite of the topical and contro-vers ia l nature of the electoral machinery, only 7 per cent saw this issue as the most important while as many as 30 per cent decided that i t was the least important. Interestingly, when issue-orientations were matched against race in Table 5.12, 70 per cent of the Afro-Guyanese voters saw economic issues, unemployment and cost of l i v ing as most important, compared with 50 per cent of the mixed group and 44 per cent of the East Indian voters. See Report on Guyana: General Elections 1968, pp. 65-90, for a summary of this case and the judgment which concluded that the Court had no jur isd ic t ion to entertain the writ . 143 On the other hand, a higher percentage of Indo-Guyanese than Afro-Guyanese voters saw labour management relations as the most important. For a l l sections, the electoral issues were relat ively unimportant in helping them to decide which party to vote for. In interpreting these data, i t i s essential to note that as high as 20 per cent of the Indo-Guyanese voters could not identify the most important issue, while the same was true for 12 per cent of the Afro-Guyanese, 10 per cent of the mixed Guyanese and 5 per cent of "other" Guyanese. Addit ional ly , from the data in our study no posit ive interpretations could be provided on the issue-oriented voter as distinguished from the party ident i f i e r . In the latter case, the c i t i zen sees the party as the central focus of p o l i t i c a l thought and action. In the former, the c i t i zen sees p o l i t i c a l issues,not the party or i t s leader or i t s candidates, as paramount. However, our data in Table 5.13 show that strong party ident i -f iers were by far more cognizant of the issues than were the weak ident i f ie rs . Among those whose identity with the party was strong, only 3 per cent could not state the most important issue and 4 per Cent the least important. Among those with moderately strong party ident i f i cat ion , 92 per cent could identify the most important issue and 88 per cent the least important issue. Among the weak ident i f ie rs , issue famil iar i ty See Campbell et a l . , Voter Decides, p. 12. Issue-orientation according to Campbell et a l . , is seen as embracing two major components: i ) Sensit iv i ty to differences in party positions on issues related to Governmental action and i i ) Involvement m issues perceived as being af -fected by the outcome of an elect ion. Our analysis of party act iv ists deals more direct ly with issue orientations, their sensi t iv i ty to p a r t i -san differences, the extent of their involvement, and the direction of issue orientation. See Chapter 7. TABLE 5.11 144 IMPORTANCE OF ISSUES (In percentages) Most Important N = 833 Least Important Economic 59 4 Management Labour 17 40 Electoral Procedures 7 30 Don11 know 16 24 TABLE 5.12 MOST IMPORTANT ISSUE CONCEPTS BY RACE (In percentages) N = 925 Indian Negro Mixed Other Economic 44 70 56 75 Management Labour 20 10 26 20 Electoral Procedure 6 8 14 -Don't know 20 12 10 5 TABLE 5.13 ISSUE FAMILIARITY BY STRENGTH OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION (In percentages) N =732 Most Important Least Important Don't know Strong I.D. 97 96 4 Moderate I.D. 92 88 10 Weak I.D. 78 75 21 Non-Partisan 51 46 40 145 t was much smaller while in the case of non-partisans issue familiarity tended to be smallest. 7. SUMMARY The findings in this chapter indicate that most Guyanese con-ceive of their p o l i t i c s as made up of candidates and parties which are intricately related to the fortunes of particular social, economic and racia l groups, and have some effect on the general prosperity or depression of the time. P o l i t i c s is to a lesser extent conceptualised i n terms of issues or ideologies. As a result, a very large proportion of the Guyanese electorate have acquired the minimal level of involvement in po l i t i c s . Many people attend party meetings at election time. Voting turnout is also extremely high. We have also shown that marginal pol-i t i c a l involvement as reflected in partisanship toward one or other of the p o l i t i c a l parties, is also high; very few respondents were non-par-tisans and less s t i l l were classified as floating voters or "switchers". An examination of partisanship by race, shows that Afro-Guyanese, mixed and the middle minorities identify strongest with the PNC, while East Indians identify strongest with the PPP and Amerindians with the UF. In terms of religion, people of a l l religious denominations except Hindus identified most with the PNC. There was l i t t l e significance in the par-tisanship expressed as a function of age. But most interesting was the nature of p o l i t i c a l activity in which non-identifiers were involved. An overwhelming majority of those who refused to identify with one or other p o l i t i c a l party were members of Trade Unions, had participated in demonstrations and protests, w i l l fight to defend Guyana i f required, 146 but found the electoral process irrelevant and saw a Cuban type revolution as an alternative to the present•system of Government. Finally, while most people were familiar with the issues prevalent in Guyana at the time of the elections, these issues were remotely connected to influencing their decision to vote. 147 CHAPTER VI LEVELS OF INVOLVE?^ ENT IN THE ELECTORAL PROCESS . 1. INTRODUCTION In this chapter we investigate the reasons why different i n -dividuals or groups of individuals display different levels of invol-vement in the electoral process. Here we recognise that the p o l i t i c a l evaluations and judgments of the individuals of the state apparatus are only partly explained by their participation or non-participation in the electoral process. Numerous authors writing on Guyana, for example, have demonstrated how violent eruptions, riots and demonstrations are means by which protest can express i t s e l f far more dramatically than petitions or ballots. To participate i n p o l i t i c s out of sheer interest does not necessarily mean approval of the p o l i t i c a l apparatus or i t s authorities; to participate as an activist does not necessarily mean acquiescence i n the regime. The major questions that concern us are: What i s the feeling of p o l i t i c a l efficacy shared by our respondents, i.e., the belief fostered by individuals, that they can achieve their personal objectives, or at least some of- them through the electoral process? What feelings of citizenship are reflected in their electoral behaviour? VThat expressions of p o l i t i c a l dissent nay be gleaned from their involvement or non-involvement in electoral politics? "^Peter Newman, "Racial Tension in British Guiana," Race, 3 (May, 1962); Philip "eno, The Ordeal of British Guiana (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1964); Gordon Lewis, The Growth of the Modern /Test Indies (London: MacGibbon and Kee, 1963), pp. 265-289. 148 2. LEVELS OF POLITICAL INVOLVEJIENT AND POLITICAL EFFICACY To describe the levels of involvement of our respondents in the electoral process we needed some criterion of p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i -*> pation. We therefore used the campaign activity index" to arrive at the following: (i) local party activ i s t s : those local party leaders who were actually involved in the organisation and adminis-tration of the election campaign as o f f i c i a l s of one or other of,the p o l i t i c a l parties ; ( i i ) strong party identifiers: those who were not party of-f i c i a l s but who were actually members of one or other of the p o l i t i c a l parties and who voted regularly for one party; ( i i i ) party sympathisers: those who, though not party members or regularly voting for a party, nevertheless, identify with one or other of the parties in several ways such as sometimes voting for a party or giving financial assis-tance to i t ; (iv) p o l i t i c a l spectators: those who refuse to identify with any party but who may vote i f they feel like i t or who over a period of time may even show "leanings" toward a particular party; See Appendix V. We deal with these activists in some detail in Chapter VII. 149 ( v) p o l i t i c a l dissenters: those who do not belong or identify or show "leanings" to any party (even though they may be nenbers of other social groups), and who do not vote at elections. In Table 6.1, our data describe the relationship between different levels of involvement in the electoral process and the feeling of pol-i t i c a l efficacy of our respondents. To measure feelings of efficacy, we adopted the efficacy scale devised by Campbell and others.^1 We asked our respondents: Would you kindly give your opinion on the following: i.e., I would like you to state i f you strongly agree, agree, can't decide, disagree or strongly disagree — (i) I don't think ministers of Government care much what people like me think; ( i i ) Voting is the only way people like me have any say about how the government runs things; ( i i i ) People like ne don't have any say about what the Govern-ment does; (iv) Sometimes pol i t i c s and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what is going on. From the cross-tabulation of the efficacy scale with the Campaign Activity Index we find a stronger relationship between those people who This scale was devised by the P o l i t i c a l Behaviour Research team of the Survey Research Center, University of Michigan. See Campbell, et a l . , The American Voter (New York: John Wiley, 1960), Appendix V for details of this scale. See also our Appendix V. 150 feel p o l i t i c a l l y efficacious and those who are actively involved in po l i t i c s . Hence the local party leaders professed a higher level of efficacy than did the strong party identi f i e r s , the party sympathisers and the p o l i t i c a l spectators, a l l of whom showed greater efficacy than the dissenters. TABLE 6.1 PERCENTAGE AT DIFFERENT LEVELS OF POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT BY RANK ON POLITICAL EFFICACY SCALE Campaign Activity Index RANK ON POLITICAL EFFICACY Low 1 2 3 4 High 5 Total Party Activists - - 25 75 100 (106) Strong Party Identifiers - 45 50 5 100 (395) Party Sympathisers 9 51 36 4 100 (259) P o l i t i c a l Spectators 2 92 4 2 100 (139) P o l i t i c a l Dissenters - 90 10 - 100 (83) When, however, we describe our data in terms of constituencies, we see in Table 6.2 that although a high percentage of our sample thought of p o l i t i c s as something with which they could empathise, more people in strong PPP constituencies than in strong PNC ones fel t a sense of "helplessness" in the face of the p o l i t i c a l panoply confronting them. Less people in the strong PNC constituencies (1 per cent) than in strong PPP constituencies (9 per cent) were ranked as having low p o l i t i c a l 151 efficacy. Similarly more people in strong PNC constituencies (47 per cent) than in strong PP? constituencies (15 per cent) were ranked as having high p o l i t i c a l efficacy. One possible reason for the difference between strong PPP and strong PNC constituencies may be related to their respective geographical locations. TABLE 6.2 RANK ON POLITICAL EFFICACY SCALE BY CONSTITUENCY (In percentages) Constituency Low 1 2 3 4 High 5 (N % Total = 770) TOTAL STRONG PPP Skeldon (rural) 10 - 35 35 20 100 (128) Corentyne (rural) S 3 37 42 10 100 (132) MARGINAL Suddie (rural) 18 3 16 50 13 100 (102) Houston (urban) 10 14 12 28 36 100 (156) STRONG PNC New Amsterdam (urban) 2 2 18 46 32 100 (110) Abary (rural) - 14 16 7 63 100 (142) In the strong urban PNC constituency of New Amsterdam very few people seem overwhelmed by pol i t i c s generally. This was much less so in any case than in the other strong rural PNC constituency and the two strong rural PPP constituencies on the Corentyne Coast. The importance of the geographical factor is again present in the case of the two 152 marginal constituencies in our sample. In the urban Houston constitu-ency less people fe l t that po l i t i c s was an impediment to their i n d i v i -dual objectives than was the case in .the rural constituency of Suddie. An overall explanation of these tendencies may be that i n urban centres people who are more constantly in touch with the apparatus of p o l i t i c s and of the state — the parties' headquarters, the parties' press, the politicians, governmental departments — tend as a result to become more psychologically adjusted to the barrage of propaganda poured upon them during a p o l i t i c a l campaign. The urban-rural factor i s evident when, as in Table 6.3, we examine the feelings of efficacy not only by the different levels of p o l i t i c a l involvement, but also by the urban-rural location of our TABLE 6.3 PERCENTAGE AT DIFFERENT LEVELS OF POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT ACCORDING TO RURAL-URBAN LOCATION BY RANK. ON POLITICAL EFFICACY SCALE RANK ON POLITICAL EFFICACY Campaign Activity Low 1 2 3 4 High 5 Total Party Activists urban 22 78 100 ( 50) rural 24 76 100 ( 56) Strong Party Identifiers urban 40 56 6 100 (165) rural 45 52 3 100 (235) Party Sympathisers urban - 41 49 10 100 (100) rural 10 61 28 1 100 (159) P o l i t i c a l Spectators urban 2 84 8 4 100 ( 50) rural 2 98 - - 100 ( 89) P o l i t i c a l Dissenters urban 89 11 - 100 ( 35) rural 91 9 - 100 ( 49) 153 respondents. The least difference is displayed between the urban party activists and the rural party activ i s t s . There is very l i t t l e difference between strong party identifiers, urban and rural and between urban-rural p o l i t i c a l dissenters. But between urban-rural party sympa-thisers and spectators the differences tend to be relatively marked. In a l l cases rural respondents manifest lower efficacy than do urban respondents. 3. POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT AND A SENSE OF CITIZENSHIP DUTY Whereas the notion of p o l i t i c a l efficacy identifies the achieve-ment of personal objectives with the p o l i t i c a l process generally, a measure of citizenship duty deals specifically with the level of personal involvement in the electoral process. So that in arriving at the level of citizenship duty of our respondents, we asked them to give an opinion on the following statements."* (i) It isn't so important to vote when you know that your party doesn't have a chance; ( i i ) A good many elections aren't important enough to bother with; ( i i i ) So many people vote in the national election that i t doesn't matter much to me whether I vote or not; (iv) If a person doesn't care how an election comes out, he should vote in i t ; See Appendix V for the sense of citizenship duty scale. 154 In Table 6.4 we describe the sense of citizenship duty associated with the different party electorates. Whereas the PNC supporters generally expressed a relatively high sense of citizenship duty, the PPP supporters claimed to be moderately disposed to citizenship duties as were the UF supporters. In Table 6.5 when racial categories are matched against the citizenship duty index, the Afro-Guyanese are rated higher than the Indo-Guyanese and others. Very few respondents, 3 per cent Africans and 7 per cent East Indians, displayed a weak sense of citizenship duty. This factor partly explains why the voting turnout in Guyana has been so consistently high.^ When, however, we look at levels of involvement in the electoral process (Table 6.6), i t is very obvious that most of the people who can be described as having a weak sense of citizenship duty are also p o l i t i c a l dissenters while those having a strong sense of citizenship duty arc strong party identifiers. Both spectators and sympathisers tend to be moderate in their sense of citizenship duty. Feelings of citizenship duty like feelings of efficacy are i n s t i l l e d in individuals by the process whereby they are socialised. But while these feelings have their roots in the society they also reflect the level of support among citizens for their community, the regime and for those in authority. One hypothesis which may be generated from these observations i s : to the extent that there i s a belief among the masses that those who control the governmental roles are usually 6 See Chapter 2, pp. 29-30, and Chapter 4, pp. 155 TABLE 6.4 SENSE OF CITIZENSHIP DUTY BY PARTY IDENTIFICATION (In percentages) Citizenship Duty Index Strong Moderate Weak Total PNC 83.8 15.7 0.5 100 (394) PPP 56.8 40.3 2.9 100 (139) UF 100.0 - 100 (13) TABLE 6.5 SENSE OF CITIZENSHIP DUTY BY (In percentages) RACE Citizenship Duty Index Strong Moderate Weak Total African 80.2 16.7 3.1 100 (281) East Indian 60.2 32.7 7.1 100 (321) Mixed 85.3 14.7 - 100 ( 68) Other 72.6 27.4 - 100 ( 62) TABLE 6.6 SENSE OF CITIZENSHIP DUTY BY LEVELS OF INVOLVEMENT (In percentages) Strong Moderate Weak Total Party Identifiers 91 9 - 100 Sympathisers 53 47 - 100 Spectators 39 58 3 100 Dissenters 11 22 67 100 156 concerned with ra c i a l and p o l i t i c a l loyalties rather than loyalties to the nation, the authorities tend to lack support and the legitimacy of the regime i s thereby diminished. If the levels of "efficacy" and "citenzenship duty" are any guide to feelings of legitimacy, then in Guyana, judging from the responses in our sample, the legitimacy of the regime is held in ques-tion, most, by those we classify as p o l i t i c a l dissenters. In Figures 6.1 to 6.4 we examined four items — attendance at p o l i t i c a l meetings, membership in a p o l i t i c a l organisation, working for a party, displaying or wearing party buttons, flags and stickers — so as to be able to compare the different levels of campaign activity between "party i d e n t i f i e r s , " "sympathisers," "spectators" and "dis-senters". We did not include party activists since by definition they are involved directly in the organisation and administration of a l l four items. Figures 6.1 and 6.2 show that between the different types of actors, there is l i t t l e difference in the level of attendance at meetings and of membership in p o l i t i c a l organisations and clubs. On the other hand, for those items dealing with working for the party and encouraging people to vote, wearing campaign buttons and giving money to one or other of the parties, Figures 6.3 and 6.4 show that the d i f -ference increases significantly. In the latter instance, the items are more directly related to specific items of party support and electoral p o l i t i c s than to general p o l i t i c a l activity (in the f i r s t two items in Figures 6.1 and 6.2) which derive from a sense o f . p o l i t i c a l awareness LEVELS OP CAMPAIGN ACTIVITY ON FOUR ITEMS BY LEVEL OF INVOLVEMENT F i g . 6.1 ATTENDANCE AT ELECTION MEETINGS 157 ^ I d e n t i f i e r Sympathizer Spectator D i s s e n t e r A B Strong C D Moderate E F Weak F i g . 6.2 MEMBERSHIP IN POLITICAL ORGANISATION 60 50 S 40 to a - p S 50 u o P4 20 10 60 50 40 50 20 10 A B C D E F A Lot Moderately Not at a l l F i g . 6.3 WORKING FOR A PARTY / A B C — Y E S — D E F NO F i g . 6.4 WEARING BUTTONS ETC. 158 not confined to the electoral campaign per se, sometimes disregarding the electoral process as a legitimate expression of p o l i t i c a l power. A. POLITICAL DISSENT VERSUS ELECTORAL INVOLVEMENT In Guyana, what distinguishes the p o l i t i c a l dissenter from the p o l i t i c a l loyalist,'' i.e., one who supports the norms of the regime, is not the alienation of the former from the p o l i t i c a l system per se but rather his unwillingness to seriously identify himself with one or g other of the p o l i t i c a l parties. In Guyana, the p o l i t i c s of dissent focuses mainly on a small group of radical intellectuals whose member-ship in the New World, Movement Against Oppression (MAO) and Ratoon groups overlaps to a great extent. These groups propose radical pol-icies such as nationalisation of bauxite and sugar and are very c r i t i c a l of government's attachment to United States and to i t s gradualist approach toward Guyanisation. While a very insignificant number of our sample are " P o l i t i c a l l o y a l i s t " i s used here mainly as a summary term for those categories of p o l i t i c a l involvement (activists, i d e n t i f i e r s , sympathisers and spectators) who more or less participate i n the electoral process. g As is evident from Table 6.4 and previous data on electoral activity of the masses (voting, party identification, etc.), p o l i t i c a l apathy is almost non-existent in Guyana. The highly participant culture and highly mobilised citizenry are differentiated only by their commitment to regime structures. This experience i s different from the U.S.A., Britain and most other developing countries where apathy is a function of alienation, and non-participatory p o l i t i c s . See air.ong a l l else, Almond and Verba, Civic Culture Chps. IV-V and Kenneth Janda, "'A Comparative Study of Pol-i t i c a l Alienation and Voting Behaviour in Three Suburban Communities" in Studies in History and Social Sciences Studies in Honor of John A. Kenneman (Normal, I l l i n o i s : I l l i n o i s State University Press, 1965). 159 9 1° 11 members of the New World Group, Ratoon and more recently >\A0 they remain qualitatively the only effective group outside the traditional party system to offer serious criticism of government policy. Like most radical groups in the Caribbean, New World, Ratoon and MAO have failed to mobilise expressions of dissent in Guyana, not because of the lack of s k i l l s , but because of the configuration of racial interests which impose themselves on the movement and dilute i t s goals. In other words, these groups which champion the goals of structural transformation of 9 New World Group (Guyana), in association with New World Asso-ciates covering the Caribbean, print a quarterly journal which is a broad social commentary on West Indian p o l i t i c s , society and economics. New World Associates which have operated in the West Indies since 1962 have provided invaluable service to the Caribbean, by focusing c r i t i c a l -ly on the serious issues of Caribbean society and p o l i t i c s and have been the foremost advocates of regional integration. Although since 1968, the group has become less vibrant, i t s impact on Caribbean governments can be likened somewhat to Fabian socialism in Britain of the early twentieth century. These new-worlds-men were attempting to nurture a home grown ideology of West Indian nationalism. The recent decline in the group's activity i s related to the perennial problem confronting the academia, i.e., how to wed ideas and actions. Commentaries on the internal problems contributing to New World's present stasis are best reiterated by those responsible for the debate in the f i r s t place. See Lloyd Best, "Independent Thought and Caribbean Freedom," New World  Quarterly, Vol. I l l , No. 4, (1967); "whither New World," New World  Quarterly, Vol. IV, No. 1, (1968); and "The New World Approach," Express, Port of Spain, Trinidad, Sept. 23 and 24, 1968; James Millette, Chairman's Report to the Second Annual Genera l Meeting, New World (Trinidad), Confidential and Unpublished, (February, 1969); "Round and Round" (editorial) New World Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 4, (1968); and Norman Girva n , "Mona New World Report; Abeng, Moko and New World: A Review," New World Q u a r t e r l y , Vol. 5, Nos . 1 £.- 2, 1969. 10 Ratoon formed i n September 1969 a f t e r the expulsion of one of i t s editors, Clive Thomas, from Jamaica , produces a monthly paper Ratoon. MAO was formed i n December 1970 to a g i t a t e f o r c i v i l liberties f o r the deprived and oppressed . The organisation s t r e s s e s education f o r the masses to eauip then w i t h the b a s i c s k i l l s . 160 of the Guyanese society find themselves somewhat ostracised by the masses, because the ideal they promote, viz . , solidarity of the Indo-African working classes in the struggle for liberation, runs counter to the pre-sent organisational and psychological ethos of Guyanese society. By the sporadic nature of their activity, these radical groups have so far been able neither to sustain the p o l i t i c a l loyalties of more than a hard core of adherents nor to orient the p o l i t i c a l support of a broad constituency of people. P o l i t i c a l education which is an integral part of socio-economic transformation of society cannot be adequately implemented by means of a quarterly journal which, as a general rule i s six months to a year behind schedule, or by a monthly paper with inadequate distribu-tion among the rural sector. P o l i t i c a l activity that is as specialised as this, f a i l s to engage the masses who are the main a l l i e s in any sys-tem of radical p o l i t i c a l change. Thus in terms of p o l i t i c a l participa-tion, radical groups are only peripherally significant in Guyana. The marginality of Ratoon, New World and MAO, is perhaps also explained by the increasingly radical posture of the present government as i t advances i t s policies to naturalise local resources. Policies such as the nationalisation of the Canadian-owned Bauxite Company, Alcan, substantial donations to the freedom fighters in Africa, withdrawal of "Peace Corps" technical assistance to Guyana, support for the Black Power philosophy, advocating greater regional integration — these have a l l been advocated by the radical groups but have now been incorporated into the policies of the government, perhaps in a less extreme manner, 161 but nevertheless enacted and promulgated with as much cogency as is required to knock the radical props aside or at least weaken their claims to novelty and insight fulness. Implicit in our analysis of p o l i t i c a l involvement is that except at the level of the p o l i t i c a l dissenter, racial loyalties persist as the major factor in the electoral behaviour of Guyanese. Respondents in rural constituencies and supporters of the PPP tend to have less faith in the efficacy of the electoral process than urban constituents and PMC supporters. PNC supporters and Africans feel a greater sense of citizenship duty than PPP supporters and East Indians. The resistance of p o l i t i c a l dissenters to the dominant racial cleavages in the society, i . their attempt to broaden the base of p o l i t i c a l support more in terms of class than of race, have l e f t them outside the main stream of electoral 13 p o l i t i c s . They may yet be a significant p o l i t i c a l force. The Guyana government has implement.ad several l e f t wing pol-icies in recent times, chief among which is the recent announcement that i t has acquired the controlling shares in the ir :ulti-million-dollar Canadian owned Demerara Bauxite Company from January 1, 1971. See Norman Girvan, "'•ray we Need to Nationalize Bauxite and iiow to do i t , " in N. Girvan and 0. Jefferson (Eds.), Readings in P o l i t i c a l Economy (Kingston, Jamaica: New World Group Ltd., 1971). 13 I have pursued this speculation in greater detail in my concluding Chapter 8. 162 CHAPTER VII THE IMPACT OF LOCAL PARTY ACTIVITY ON ELECTORAL MOBILISATION 1. INTRODUCTION What concerns us most in this chapter are the functions per-formed by the local party organisations, the types of activity carried out by the local party leaders and the impact of these a c t i v i t i e s on the electorate. While we maintain our previous argument (Chapter V) that the national party leader plays a dominant role, i t is our conten-tion that party activity under the system of proportional representation i s much more a function of organisational strategy than of candidate orientation since the important factor is votes rather than seats. Our interest i s therefore centred on the point of personal contact between the individual and the party organisation. The major emphasis of local party activity tends to be in mobilising support and the vote through a variety of organisational techniques, chief among which is the campaign activity. And this leads us to hypothesise, that the local party . activity is a v i t a l source of sustaining and crystallising the allegiance of the rank and f i l e to the p o l i t i c a l party and of determining choice of  party on election day. Additionally, the local party apparatus is a  crucial factor in minimising the raci a l cleavages currently reflected  in the po l i t i c s of Guyana. Our data are taken primarily from intensive interviews with 106 party leaders in the six constituencies of our sample. We also sup-plement the information from the local party leaders with corresponding information from our rank and f i l e sample. Of particular interest to 163 us are the perceptions of party ac t i v i t i e s by the electorate and the description of these activities by the local party leaders. 1 For the purposes of this study, we identify five dimensions of 2 leadership which we put forward as local organisational functions of electoral mobilisation. These dimensions are briefly described as follows: 1. The Internal dimension: (mobilisation of own group). This rests on the capacity of the local leadership to organise the campaign and to sustain the ac t i v i t i e s of i t s helpers throughout the campaign. It measures mo-b i l i s a t i o n of the leader's own group. 2. The Representative dimension: (mobilisation within the For a f u l l description of the sample design employed in this study to select local leaders, see Appendix 1. Suffice i t to say that these leaders were chosen partly because of their o f f i c i a l designation by the party apparatus or in the hierarchy of the local party organisa-tion. Local leaders were also selected partly on the basis of the repu-tational method which involved the rank and f i l e ' s ratings of specific personalities in the campaign activity. At the same time, the sample of the rank and f i l e electorate was s t r a t i f i e d to reflect the strength of the respective parties in the six constituencies under review and the urban-rural grids. 2 These dimensions of leadership correspond with the five charact-e r i s t i c s presented in Daniel Katz and S a m u 2 l J. Eldersveld, "The Impact of Local Party Activity upon the Elections," The Public Opinion Quarterly, 25 (1961), pp. 1-24. They are by no means mutually exclusive of each other. For example, the internal and the administrative dimensions over-lap immensely. The distinction here is that while the former deals with keeping the campaign team tofether, the latter is more concerned with being able to cone with the rules and regulations of the party and with applying them. Again while the representative dimension is concerned with intra-party organisational links, the public relations dimension emphasises the need to attract support outside the party organisation. 164 p a r t y ) . T h i s i s determined by the q u a l i t y of communica-t i o n s between the l o c a l l e a d e r and other l o c a l p a r t y o r -g a n i s a t i o n s on the one hand and the c e n t r a l campaign head-q u a r t e r s on the o t h e r . 3. The P u b l i c R e l a t i o n s d i m e n s i o n : ( m o b i l i s a t i o n w i t h i n the community) . T h i s r e l a t e s to the k i n d and the success of the a c t i v i t i e s embarked upon by the l o c a l l e a d e r s h i p . I t i s m a i n l y concerned w i t h the c a p a b i l i t i e s of the l o c a l l e a d e r s to generate the support and enthusiasm f o r the p a r t y , o f groups and i n d i v i d u a l s n o r m a l l y o u t s i d e the p a r t y . 4. The A d m i n i s t r a t i v e d i m e n s i o n : Here the major focus i s on the l o c a l l e a d e r as an " o r g a n i s a t i o n man", h i s c a p a c i t y t o comply w i t h p a r t y r e g u l a t i o n s and to a d m i n i s t e r campaign a c t i v i t y among the d i f f e r e n t ranks of a c t i v i s t s , h e l p e r s and sympathisers of the p a r t y . 5. The M o t i v a t i o n a l Dimens ion : As an o v e r r i d i n g f u n c t i o n of e l e c t o r a l m o b i l i s a t i o n , t h i s dimension summarises the a s -p i r a t i o n s , the optimisms and pessimisms of the l o c a l l e a d e r s v i s - a - v i s the p a r t y , i t s p e r s o n a l i t i e s , and i t s o r g a n i s a t i o n and i d e o l o g y . 2. DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF LOCAL PARTY LEADERSHIP Before a n a l y s i n g the l e a d e r s h i p dimensions and t h e i r impact on e l e c t o r a l m o b i l i s a t i o n , we s h a l l b r i e f l y present the demographic p r o f i l e of the l o c a l p a r t y l e a d e r s i n our sample. Most s t r i k i n g i n the composi-t i o n of l o c a l l e a d e r s i s the overwhelming m a j o r i t y of male a c t i v i s t s 165 (Table 7.1). Only within the ranks of the PNC is there any appreciable number of women participating at this level of the party's hierarchy. In many respects, the non-participation of Indian women at the leader-ship level i s somewhat expected. In Indian communities, the ideal of male dominance in the family i s very strong and i t is reinforced by religious beliefs and practices. What R. T. Smith wrote of Indian women in 1960 is s t i l l true today: This does not mean that they (Indian women) are without influence; in domestic and kinship matters they exercise great influence and women who have a drunken, irresponsible husband often carry the economic burden of the family. Now that the pro-portion of g i r l s who attend school i s much higher than i t was, the nattem of overt submissiveness w i l l change. TABLE 7.1 SEX DISTRIBUTION OF LEADERS BY PARTY (In percentages) N = 106 PNC PPP UF % of Each (57) (27) (22) Group Male 78 100 95 83 Female 2 2 - 5 12 Total 100 100 100 100 R.T. Smith, British Guiana (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 133, In fact, Janet Jagan is often accredited the role of chief architect in the poli t i c i s a t i o n of Indian women. '.Then in 1946, along with Winifred Gaskin, and Frances Stafford, she founded the Women's P o l i t i c a l and Economic Organisation (W.P.E.O.), Janet Jagan as i t s general secretary became a household name, emulated by women of a l l races. It was, however, her ab i l i t y to combine p o l i t i c a l organisation with the l i f e style of an Indian women, that endeared her, an American Jew by birth, to Guyana's Indian community resulting in her universal nickname, "blue-eye bhowgie" (White-Indian). 166 In the case of the UF one explanation of the dearth of women activists i s the alleged fear of h o s t i l i t y towards "women of f a i r complexion"^ in some parts of the country. Be that as i t may, the United Force used a high proportion of paid activists as campaign organisers in many electoral d i s t r i c t s . There were no female paid activists in our sample. A l l three p o l i t i c a l parties tried to present a more or less multiracial leadership front (Table 7.2). However, a closer examination of the r a c i a l composition of the local leadership reveals the superfi-c i a l i t y of the multiracial image. In the case of the PNC, ethnic leader-ship was almost evenly distributed between Indian (42 per cent) and It w i l l be recalled that most of the UF support comes from the Portuguese, the white, the upper-middle and upper class sections of the community. Hence the party conjures up an image of "de white people party." In predominantly African working class d i s t r i c t s , h o s t i l i t i e s against the UF tend to take on ideological proportions, as Portuguese or white campaigners, especially when they spoke on the platform of "de white people party," were branded exploiters. The break-up of the coalition government between the UF and the PNC in 1968 prior to the elections, also added to the h o s t i l i t i e s engendered by the UF by both Indian and African Communities. The Indians did not forgive the UF for teaming up with the PNC to form the coalition government of 1964-68. As a result, most of the campaign violence in predominantly Indian areas were carried out against the UF. See "Electoral Clashes," Sunday Chron- i c l e , Georgetown, Guyana, Sunday, December 8, 1968, p. 5. Indeed our evidence has conclusively shown that in some instances these paid activists had performed their tasks incompetently, unreliably, even fraudulently. Some of these paid activists were known to have sup-ported and campaigned for one of the other parties while actually in the pay of UF. One incident was specially revealing of this kind of deceit. A certain activist was actually l i s t e d as the UF party agent in a certain d i s t r i c t , while his name appeared on another l i s t of key activists given to us by the PNC. On close investigation, we discovered that even though this agent was provided with a car, an office and a salary from the UF, he campaigned vigorously for the PNC. 167 TABLE 7.2 RACIAL DISTRIBUTION OF LEADERS BY PARTY (In percentages) N = 106 % of Each PNC PPP UF Croup TOTAL Amerindian 4 — 5 3 4 Indian 42 65 18 42 44 Mixed 4 24 20 17 18 African 50 11 25 28 29 Portuguese - - 32 10 11 Other - - - - -Total 100 100 100 100 African (50 per cent) which together comprised 92 per cent of the total leadership in the six constituencies. The ethnic distribution of the PPP's local leadership was more predominantly Indian (65 per cent) but comprised a relatively f a i r percentage of Mixed (24 per cent) and a not insignificant number of Africans (11 per cent). Neither of the two major parties had Portuguese, Whites or Chinese within the ranks of i t s local leaders in the six constituencies of our sample. On the other hand, the UF's claim to being a multiracial party seems j u s t i f i e d by the even spread of ethnic leadership among i t s ranks, 18 per cent Indian, 20 per cent Mixed, 25 per cent African, 32 per cent Portuguese and 5 per cent Amerindian. In fact, when compared with the actual 168 proportion of each racial group in the population, the UF leadership overrepresented the minority groups of Mixed and Portuguese, while underrepresenting the majority groups of Indians and Africans. In some instances, the strategy adopted by the parties was one of co-opting activists phenotypically^ acceptable to the electorate in the particular d i s t r i c t s . Hence Indian organisers would be taken into Indian d i s t r i c t s and Africans to African dis t r i c t s when the racial leadership was lacking in the particular d i s t r i c t . For example, the three top PNC activists in the predominantly Indian constituency, Corentyne West Central, lived in an adjacent constituency. In Abary, a strong PNC constituency, the two PPP activists came from the two pol l i n divisions within the constituency which embraced solid clusters of the Indian population. In the case of the UF, neither of the two local leaders in the two Corentyne constituencies lived in these constituencies But, because of the heavy East Indian concentration along the Corentyne coast, the UF co-opted two East Indians, both business men, as area supervisors for their electoral campaign. As was to be expected, the area proved too expansive for only two leaders to operate e f f i c i e n t l y , and this may have accounted for the disastrous performance of that party °M. G. Smith, The Plural Society in the British West Indies (Berkele; and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1965), uses the tern to refer to the racial appearance of a person. Hence Smith speaks of white phenotypes, black phenotypes and Indian phenotypes. For a f u l l discus-sion of the distinction between phenotypical and genealogical colour in relationship to 'associational/structural colour' see Smith, pp. 60-65 169 TABLE 7.3 AGE OF LEADERS BY PARTY (In percentages) N =106 % of Each PNC PPP UF Group TOTAL Under 30 20 50 62 38 40 31-55 69 50 . 30 34 56 Over 55 11 - 8 8 10 Total 100 100 100 100 in the five registration d i s t r i c t s on the Corentyne Coast. In these five constituencies the UF gained 3.5 per cent of the votes cast, the PNC got 29.5, and the PPP 63 per cent. Also contributing to the general profile of our local party leader-ship are their religion, occupation, educational background and age, as shown in Tables 7.3 - 7.6 respectively. Most of the local leadership were between 18 and 30, while very few were over 55 years of age. Interestingly, while 20 per cent of the PNC local leaders were in the youngest age group, 50 per cent of the PPP and 62 per cent of the UF local leadership were in this category. Our religious-dimension also shows some differences. The majority of UF local leaders were Catholics, while the largest percentage of PPP leaders were Hindu. In the case of See Report on the National Assembly General Elections 1968 (George-town, Guyana: Government Printery 1969). TABLE 7.4 RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION OF LEADERS BY PARTY (In percentages) N = 105 PNC PPP ct /a UF of each Group TOTAL Catholic 12 o 75 24 25 Protestant 41 21 10 29 32 Hindu 14 46 - 23 24 Muslim 25 o o 7 16 15 Other 3 8 8 13 19 Total 100 100 100 100 106 TABLE 7.5 OCCUPATION (In OF LEADERS BY PARTY percentages) N = 106 PNC PPP UF % of each Group TOTAL Professional 45 50 60 55 58 White Collar 31 21 35 29 30 Blue Collar 24 29 5 16 18 Unemployed - - - - -Total 100 100 100 100 106 171 TABLE 7.6 EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND OF LEADERS BY PARTY (In percentages) 11 =106 % of each PNC PPP UF Group TOTAL Primary 35 50 14 32 35 Secondary 53 25 75 53 53 University 12 25 10 15 18 Total 100 100 100 100 106 the PNC,their local leadership was relatively more evenly spread over the various religious a f f i l i a t i o n s , except that the relative high per-centage of Muslims (25 per cent) is one indicator of the attempts of the PNC to capitalise on the Muslim-Hindu rivalry and to promote Muslim leadership within the organisation as one strategy of attracting greater Indian support. Finally, most of the local leaders were professional people like lawyers, teachers and small business-men. These leaders had generally attained a relatively high level of education as shewn by the number of people who had secondary and university education. 3. CHARACTER OF LOCAL PARTY LEADERSHIP Some studies on local party organisations suggest that the local party leaders perform their functions inefficiently; that the local party leader who carries out his task is the exception rather than the rule. Very often the local leadership is overshadowed by the central party 172 organisation in essential aspects of electoral mobilisation. Whether these relate to routine activity such as fund raising and party member-ship or the more technical activity of voter registration and selection of candidates, the general effect i s to lower the morale of the local leadership, to weaken i t s motivational strength and i t s level of invol-vement in the a c t i v i t i e s of the party. The introduction of the system of proportional representation has • foisted greater burdens on the local party machinery than under the older electoral system of first-past-the-post. In Guyana, most of the local leaders perform their party functions in their spare time. Of the 106 local leaders, only 5 were full-time party organisers. Hence the man-hours they can allocate to an electoral campaign as well as to other party activity tend to be marginal. Under the former system there was the tendency for the party to neglect i t s local machinery in those con-stituencies known to be strongly committed to i t s opponent. Since what was at stake in each constituency was one seat, there was a j u s t i f i c a t i o n for harnessing organisational resources in those constituencies of a marginal nature and to consolidate support in areas strongly committed to the party. Under the new system, every vote is as important as the other, since votes and not seats is the crucial factor. Hence, even in Among the studies on local organisations see N. Valen and D. Katz, "The Effect of Local Party Organisation upon the Electorate in a Norwegian Province" in S. M. Lipset, Philips Outright and Peter Rossi, "Grass Roots Politicians and the Vote," American Sociological Review, 23 (1958), pp. 171-179; Philips Outright and Peter H. Rossi, "Party Organisation in Primary Elections," American Journal of Sociology, 64 (1958), pp. 262-269. 173 constituencies weakly ident i f ied with a party, that party must pursue votes, i f i t desires electoral v ictory. It therefore seems reasonable to expect a greater spread in the devolution of power among local organi-sations not necessarily at the expense of Central party organisation but as an essential complement to i t . Nevertheless, although campaign act iv i ty is sponsored by higher levels in the part ies ' organisation, the speci f ic details of conducting an ef f ic ient election and of mobilising various constituents are heavily dependent upon the s k i l l and enthusiasm of the local leadership. o On four of our f ive dimensions of leadership (Table 7.7) as well as on the combined index (in Table 7.8), the PNC leaders scored higher than the PPP and the UF respectively. But on the motivational index, the PPP leadership excelled in a manner which i s probably explained by the harmonising effect of the Marxist-Leninist ideology espoused by the leadership. Hence, even though the nucleus of i t s leadership has a much narrower base than the PNC, i t i s rooted in a cohesive manner far d i f -ferent from the broad coal i t ion of interests subsumed in the leadership ranks of the PNC and the UF. Strength of motivation in the PPP is dependent less on a broad consensus which often tends to make factions within organisations disenchanted especially when they consistently f a i l to wring concessions favourable to themselves. Failure on the part of leaders to cope with factional disputes was among the major reasons for the lower/weak motivational strength within the PNC. One further reason For c lass i f i cat ion of these dimensions see p. 163 above. 174 TABLE 7.7 STRENGTH AND CHARACTER OF LOCAL PARTY LEADERSHIP IN THE PNC, PPP AND UF (In percentages)* Index Negligible Moderate Strong Total (N) Median Score (under 9 ) a (9-14) a (15-20) a (Max. 20) Mobil isation of own group PNC 25 45 30 100 (52) 16 PPP 43 50 7 100 (27) 9 UF 66 33 - 100 (24) 5 Mobil isation of Community PNC 38 62 100 (56) 15 PPP - 69 31 100 (27) 12 UF 18 57 25 100 (24) 11 Mobil isation within party PNC 7 9 85 100 (56) 15 PPP 8 46 46 100 (28) 12 UF 9 82 9 100 (24) 13 Administrative strength PNC 9 20 71 100 (56) 14 PPP 7 33 60 100 (28) 14 UF 38 33 29 100 (24) 10 Motivational strength PNC 25 25 50 100 (56) 13 PPP - 7 93 100 (28) 16 UF 20 33 47 100 (27) 10 * Each dimension of local party leadership consisted of responses by 106 loca l leaders to questions evaluated on a 5-point scale. The indices were eventually c lass i f ied as "negl ig ib le" , "moderate" and strong . These figures indicate the range of the raw scores associated with each index. 175 for weak motivation was the disappointment of local leaders when pol-i t i c a l rewards for contributions to the party's success at the polls are not apparently forthcoming. One local PNC leader actually said "we wuk so hard for the party and now the Prime Minister sharing out the rewards to the coolie man." Although this assessment'might not TABLE 7.8 COMBINED INDEX FOR STRENGTH AND CHARACTER OF LOCAL PARTY LEADERSHIP IN THE PNC, PPP AND UF (In percentages)* Low Moderate Strong Total N Median (under 40) 41-75 (over 75) percentage 3 PNC 13 28 59 100 (56) 76 PPP 12 48 40 100 (28) 53 UF 31 46 22 100 (24) 41 * The combined index represents the mean percentage of the 5 indices of leadership strength in Table 7.7. In this column we present the median percentage of the leadership score so as to give a better picture of the level of leadership strength associated with each party. have been properly founded, yet this leader was referring to a series of appointments of Indians to positions within the PNC party and the government. On the whole, the distribution of leadership strength of the three sets of leaders on the various indices shows the relative superiority of the PNC l o c ^ l party organisation. On the combined ind (Table 7.3) we observe that the UF leadership are leaders in name onl While only 22 per cant of the UF leaders can be classified as strong 176 leaders, the figure for the PPP is 48 per cent and 60 per cent for the PNC. The median percentages show that the level of leadership strength is much higher for the PNC than the PPP; much higher for the PPP than the UF, with the greatest disparity between the PNC and the UF. * ' One notable feature of the local party leadership of the three parties i s the relatively large number of activists who emerged in the ranks of the PNC compared with the PPP and the UF. In a l l six constituencies in our sample, we asked our respondents i f they knew activists from the various parties. The actual question was as follows: "Do you know anyone personally who is an active member of the PNC in this Registration district? who is an active member of the UF in this Registration district? who is an active member of the PPP in this Registration d i s t r i c t ? " ^ Whereas the average number of FPP activists named in each constituency was 4.5 (and 3 for the UF), the average number of PNC ac-t i v i s t s known in each constituency was 10. If, as we assume, electoral mobilisation is a function of local leadership activity, then among the many conclusions that may be drawn from Tables 7.7 and 7.8 is that PNC leaders seemed to be more active than the other local leaders in their contacts within the community and within their own party and also did the best job in mobilising their own local groups to action. Although (a) (b) We followed these questions with another set of questions: If yes, ask: who is that? (Note i f relation to respondent) If yes, ask: what does he or sh-: do for the party? 177 leaders of a l l the parties displayed somewhat equal willingness to work for the party of their choice, yet the PPP leadership seemed more highly motivated as a group while the PNC leaders showed greater familiarity with the organisational procedures within their party than did either the PPP or the UP leaders. 4. LOCAL PARTY LEADERSHIP AND PARTY IDENTIFICATION Figures 7.1 and 7.3 are graphical representations of the strength of party leadership and the intensity of rank and f i l e identification with the party in the six constituencies of our sample.^ In Figure 7.1 the strength of party leadership increases gradually from 58 per-centage in the strong PNC constituencies through 70 per cent in marginal constituencies to 78 per cent in weak constituencies. At the same time, party identification on the part of the rank and f i l e i s extremely high in the strong PNC constituencies, moderately high in the marginal consti-tuencies and low but positive in the weak PNC constituencies. This trend can be contrasted with those shown for the PPP in Figure 7.2 and the UF in Figure 7.3. In both these cases, the trends are parallel in that low leadership strength is accompanied by extremely low strength of party identification in the strong PNC constituencies while as leader-ship strength increases in the marginal and strong PPP constituencies, The percentages for strength of party leadership in each constituency are derived in the same way as the combined index in Table 7.8. However, in Figures 7.1 - 7.3 we are using mean instead of median percentages. Our concern is to match strength of leadership with strength of party identification of our rank and f i l e sample in each constituency. We have previously explained and analysed strength of party identifica-tion. See Table 5.5. 178 so does strong partisan identification. In Figure 7.3 the correspondence between relatively weak leadership and party identification by the rank and f i l e is evident with leadership being very negative in the strong PPP constituencies and party identification almost zero. In the marginal constituencies the UF performed moderately well in both leadership strength and partisan identification. The pattern which emerges therefore shows that constituencies where i t s leadership strength i s weakest, the number of people who identify strongly with the PPP is relatively insignificant. As leader-ship strength improves, so does the proportion of supporters who identify strongly. In the case of the UF, the consistently low leadership strength is paralleled by an equally modest percentage of strong party identifiers. As a matter of general interest, the overall pattern of party identifica-tion i s higher in the case of the PNC than for the PPP. In strong PPP constituencies the proportion of strong identifiers i s much lower in comparison with the overwhelming attachment to the PNC professed by i t s supporters. Even in weak constituencies, the PNC has attracted more strong identifiers (18 per cent) than in the case of the PPP (4 per cent) in weak PPP constituencies. Contrary to the trend in the UF and the PPP, we note that the strength of leadership curve for the PNC rises in weak PNC constituencies. According to our indices on strength of local leaders this trend can be interpreted to mean that the PNC intensified i t s local party machinery in weak PNC constituencies. This observation i s supported by the reports of the rank and f i l e electors in our sample on the campaign activity of the various parties. COMPARISONS OP LEADERSHIP STRENGTH AND STRENGTH OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION BY CONSTITUENCY 179 « H - P O o u CO cd Xi -p totH to C o u o Q) Q vo U Xi - H • P E H H 03 Cd - H "V • P © ft C o •"51 ca ^ xi +> Id H P ! H . ' fl) CD o O J» J H cd CD CD r P 4 r-3 F i g . 7.1 PNC Leadership-Party I d e n t i f i c a t i o n Curves Strength of Leadership curve Party I.D. curve 1 2 3 6 Strong PNC Marginal Strong PPP Constituencies -p ~ CS Xi P4 - P C o CU o CO o vo H i d CD - P C - H O CO ca C H CO ft-P cd - p CD o M CD Xi O CQ rrf O H H W CD Xi cd CD (-3 F i g . 7.2 PPP Leadership-Party I d e n t i f i c a t i o n Curves F i g . 7.3 U.F. Leadership-Party I d e n t i f i c a t i o n curves 1 2 3 4 5 6 Strong PNC Marginal Strong PPP Constituencies 1 2 3 4 5 6 Strong PNC Marginal Strong PPP Constituencies ISO 5. VOTERS' IMAGE OF LOCAL PARTY ORGANISATION One additional dimension in assessing the impact of the local party organisations on the electorate is an examination of the voters' image of these organisations. Here we are mainly concerned with the people's awareness and knowledge of specific aspects of the local party activity. But for the purpose of comparison, i t seems appropriate, f i r s t , to report the details of specific activities that were supposed to have been performed by the local party leaders. According to the reports by the local leaders of their own activity, most of them claimed that they had performed their functions effectively. The answers of 106 local leaders to closed questions, on specific items of their campaign activity are summarised below (per cent): Kept some kind of record of voters in the d i s t r i c t 85 Has complete record of supporters 72 Knows whether voters in d i s t r i c t are registered 80 Used records to check voters on polling day 81 Has helpers for work in the d i s t r i c t 95 Had meetings with their local helpers 90 Supervised the f i e l d activity of these helpers 86 Participated in meetings for planning and/or assessing party campaign strategy 96 Participated in fund raising activity for the party 62 Turning now to the actual rank and f i l e perception of the local party organisations, we note that generally these organisations can be characterised as relatively strong and active. As many as 82 per cent 181 of our sample were aware that there were local party leaders in their d i s t r i c t , 32 per cent could actually name the PPP local leaders while 44 per cent could name the PNC local leaders. However, only 12 per cent knew who the UF local leaders were. Some of the answers to specific questions are given below (in per cent): Is aware of some local p o l i t i c a l leader 82 Yes, actually knows leaders in the d i s t r i c t 68 Didn't know 29 No answer 3 Yes, knew of PNC leaders in the d i s t r i c t 74 Can' identify by name 44 Yes, knew of PPP leaders in the d i s t r i c t 70 Can identify by name 32 Yes, knew of UF leaders in the d i s t r i c t 45 Can identify by name 12 Yes, but don't know which party 4 Knows some worker active for p o l i t i c a l party in di s t r i c t 73 This brief summary of answers by the electorate gives us some indication of the level of impact of the local organisation on the electorate. It suffices here to say that fro~ the responses given, the UF local organisation was l i t t l e known in the two PPP strongholds, while both PNC and PPP leaders were generally known in a l l the constitu-encies. Nevertheless, in spite of the high level of local activity during the election campaign reported by the local leaders, the image 182 of t h i s a c t i v i t y as reported by the rank and f i l e e l e c t o r a t e i s much more modest. Table 7.9 gives the constituency breakdown of l o c a l leadership a c t i v i t y as perceived by the voters. Roughly 25 per cent of the e l e c t o r a t e remembered being c a l l e d upon or canvassed by party a c t i v i s t s . While 28 per cent remembered r e c e i v i n g campaign l i t e r a t u r e , only 13 per cent reported that they wore party buttons or displayed party s t i c k e r s . More u s e f u l , however, i s the image of the i n d i v i d u a l p a r t i e s i n the three major types of constituencies c l a s s i f i e d i n t h i s study. What emerges i s that the voters' image of the PNC's campaign a c t i v i t y i s c o n s i s t e n t l y stronger than the PPP's or UF's. Only i n the strong PPP constituency c l u s t e r d i d voters report having received more house c a l l s and having displayed more buttons and s t i c k e r s f o r the PPP than fo r the PNC. Even i n strong PPP constituencies the voters reported that they received more campaign material from the PNC than from the PPP. The very meagre contact with the e l e c t o r a t e displayed by the UF i n the strong PPP c l u s t e r i s compensated by i t s r e l a t i v e performance i n the PNC c l u s t e r and e s p e c i a l l y i n the marginal constituency c l u s t e r , where i t s campaign a c t i v i t y exceeds that of the PPP and was j u s t s l i g h t l y under that of the PNC. • More important are the s p e c i f i c d e t a i l s of the thrust of the e l e c t o r a l campaign reported by our rank and f i l e sample. The l o c a l party a c t i v i s t s of the PNC, were reported to have made proportionately more house c a l l s i n the constituencies i n which i t s support was weakest, i . e . . the strong PPP constituency, than they did i n the constituencies i n which t h e i r support was strongest. In the case of the PPP and the UF, the con-centration of party a c t i v i t y was somewhat d i f f e r e n t . For the PPP most 183 TABLE 7.9 VOTERS PERCEPTION OF PARTY ACTIVITY BY CONSTITUENCY AND PARTY (In percentages) N ="929 Strong PPP Marginal Strong PNC TOTAL PNC PPP UF PNC PPP UF PNC PPP UF PNC PPP UF Received a house c a l l by 31 45 3 47 21 35 24 20 21 33 31 21 Received more than one house c a l l by 11 13 7 24 10 14 8 8 14 12 12 11 Received letters, pamph-lets, etc', from 30 18 7 42 33 26 39 11 12 37 21 16 Wore buttons & displayed stickers etc. for 15 17 2 23 4 4 48 2 6 29 7 3 of i t s house calls were reported in the stronghold constituencies and least of these calls in those constituencies weakly supporting i t . In the case of the UF, a l l i t s campaign ac t i v i t i e s were reported to be highest in the marginal constituencies and lowest in the strong PPP constituencies. One notable feature was that while the PNC maintained a comparable pattern of the distribution of campaign literature in a l l the constituencies in our sample, like the PPP, i t disseminated more letters, pamphlets and brochures in the marginal constituencies than in any of the other two types of constituencies. According to our survey many more people dis-played stickers and wore buttons in support of the PNC than they did for the PPP and the UF. It is interesting to note that the last item on Table 7.10 required active participation in or display of electoral 184 propaganda. The f i r s t three items required a mere passive receipt of house calls and campaign literature. On the last item, the PNC scored highest among PNCites in strong PNC constituencies and not as high relatively in the strong PNC seats on the other three items. If therefore campaign activity i s assumed to affect voter decision-making, then the impact of local campaign activity on electoral mobilisation cannot be dismissed casually. Indeed the activity of house canvassing, of the distribution of party literature, stickers, buttons, shopping bags, plastic umbrellas is like the mass media. It acts as an advertisement for the partner which even i n a minimal way is of some sig-nificance during the time span of the campaign, and influences the formu-lation of the voters' decision. We are not here suggesting rationality on the part of the voter to the extent that he would deliberately weigh 12 the sales campaign of the parties , nor are we suggesting that the cam-paign was a period during which the voter, relatively unencumbered by previous loyalties made an "Independent" decision on the party options. Instead, we.are suggesting, to the extent that the local party agents were instrumental in "activating" or "reinforcing" or "converting" support for their party, they made an impact on mobilising the electorate. Such Paul E. Lazarsfeld, Barnard Berelson and Hazel Gaudet, The People's  Choice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1948), makes rationality of voting decision the underlying premise of their study. In fact, the analysis in the same study refuted i t s original assumption, concluding that voting decision is not analogous to consumer decision-making. "Brand-name loyalty", socio-economic status and the campaign i t s e l f were ultimately combined to provide a synthetic determinant of voter-decision-making. 185 an impact is by no means diminished by the argument that campaign pro-paganda simply serves "to convince many voters of the correctness 1 3 of their original decision." i J The mere act of reinforcing loyalties is a factor of mobilisation. However, we w i l l accept the argument that the most explicit function of mobilisation by the local party is i t s a b i l i t y to convert individuals to a new value set or to a new set of loyalties, electorally evidenced by the switching of voting patterns. We have already shown how party switching has occurred most from the PPP and UF to the PNC. Although we cannot ascribe with any precision the relationship between switching and strength of local leadership, we hazard the opinion that i t was significant. Testing of this hypothesis requires the use of the technique known as panel design so as to measure changes in electoral predisposition of people over a period of time. What is implicit in our analysis is that while race is the important determinant of voting behaviour among the Guyanese electo-rate, the role of the local party leadership and his local party organi-sation may be emerging as a c r i t i c a l factor in mobilising people at the polls. One caveat in the interpretations we have so far given is the possibility that the impact on the voter which we have attributed to local leadership activity may have been as much the effect as the cause of strong leadership. The p o l i t i c a l ethos prevailing in the respective See Robert T. Golembiewski, William A. Welsh and William J. Crotty, A Methodological Primer for P o l i t i c a l Scientists (New York: Rand McNally and Company, 1969), pp. 400-403. See Chapter 5, pp. 117-122. 186 communities at the time of the 1968 General Election may, for example, be one explanation of the differences in local party organisations and/ or the strength of party identification. During the electoral campaign and even after, reports in the local and international media seemed generally more favourable to the PMC than the PPP. These reports may have contributed to changes in the objective conditions of the PPP sup-porters and to produce a state of mind in which they believe their party would be deprived of office. As a result of this factor, a schizoid perception of reality may be formed whereby f i r s t of a l l people develop an image of being on the winning side; second they develop the belief that they are entitled to be on the winning team; and thirdly, they despair of ever being on the winning team. The following selected responses by local PPP leaders are illustrations of a discrepancy between the desire to win and a recognition of the e v i l consequences of winning: "I expect depression i f the PPP came to power because the Americans and British would do to them exactly what they did to Cuba." "I expect depression because 'might is right'. The external forces have ensured that we don't get into po'.rer. If by some miracle we manage to do this by electoral means (and we can do i t i f the elections were not rigged) the same external forces w i l l do their best to embarrass us the way they did in 1962-64 when they planned, supported and encouraged the violent overthrow of our party." "No matta wuh we duh we cork duck,"^ One writer's conception of dissonance may be used here to summarise the possible trajectory of attitudes and behavioural responses of people These were typical responses of PPP supporters to the question: "Do you personally expect this country w i l l enjoy a period of economic prosperity in the next 5 years?" 187 who find themselves in the same cognitive dilemma as the supporters of the PPP: Dissonance is not comfortable and i t produces pressures towards dissonance reduction. One means of reducing this dissonance is to alter the en-vironment so that i t produces the desired state of social protest or revolutionary behaviour. While we agree that revolutionary behaviour or social protest may be one effect of dissonance, our data suggest that dissonance reducing activity on the part of the PPP supporters may have taken the form of a relative withdrawal of attachment, not necessarily because of a switch of party allegiance per se, but because of a declining se l f -16 image of the p o l i t i c a l prospects of their party. James A. Gersnwender, "Explorations in the theory of Social and Revolutionary movements," Social Forces, 47 (December 1968), p. 133. For an analysis of this, see above pp. 82-88. 188 CHAPTER VIII CONCLUSIONS It was very rewarding for me to be involved in almost a l l aspects of the f i e l d survey, assisting with interviews, acting as a guide or as a chauffeur for the interviewers, but more importantly, performing the role of participant observer. As a result, the conclu-sions which I am about to give go beyond the realms of mere inference from computer print-outs and o f f i c i a l reports. The conclusions also reflect a certain subjectivity based primarily on my hope throughout this study that I would find some variable, other than race, as an important determining factor of how people see p o l i t i c s and of how they are willi n g to act. What emerges from this study is that race is the most persistent factor determining how people vote in Guyana. The perceptions and party identifications of the Guyanese electors show distinct r a c i a l biases. These biases lead to the general conclusion that East Indians vote for the PPP, Africans for the PNC and the other minority groups for the UF. The p o l i t i c a l cleavages in the 1963 Election proved to be structurally opposed to those in the 1953 Election. In 1953, class not race appeared to be the major determinant of voting behaviour. Then, the PPP, under Burnham and Jagan, mobilised the support of the Afro-Indian working class. Interestingly, this study shows that between the 1964 and 1968 Elections there was a net shift of party support to the PMC from the PPP and UF, respectively. The shift occurred among people of the 189 minority races, the Chinese, the mixed, the Portuguese and the Whites, who previously supported the UF; among the Muslims who supported the PPP; among the Hindus, a group most strongly i d e n t i f i e d with the PPP. Such s h i f t s i n party l o y a l t y did not take place by mere chance. The data i n Chapter 7 suggest that the PNC displayed greater strength of party organisation than either the PPP or the UF. Party organisation, then, provides another possible explanation of voting behaviour i n the Guyanese electorate. We say "possible determinant" to imply the tenta-tiveness with which t h i s conclusion was made. To be more d e f i n i t e would have required a stronger s t a t i s t i c a l test ( v i z . , multivariate or regres-sion analysis) to measure more precisely the impact of party organisation on voting behaviour of Guyanese, compared with the impact of other factors such as r e l i g i o n , education, age and, most important, race. The cognitive and a f f e c t i v e aspects of public behaviour recorded i n our interviews suggest that the objects toward which the electorate reacted — the issues, the candidates, the p a r t i e s , the leaders and t h e i r supporters — were a l l contiguous and related. Perception requires evaluations as w e l l as cognitions about objects, issues and personalities. We have shown (Tables 4.8-4.11) that some attitudes, for example, those r e l a t i n g to perception of group support are also d i r e c t l y related to h i s t o r i c a l and s o c i a l responses outside the p o l i t i c a l order; that some attitudes, especially those toward the party leaders (Figures 4.1-4.3) are proximal to party i d e n t i f i c a t i o n . Throughout the study, i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s on the part of our respondents have been internalised and have become es-s e n t i a l aspects of t h e i r perceptual p u l l as w e l l as t h e i r perceptual push. 190 When these perceptions are translated into actual p o l i t i c a l behaviour, we see that a very high proportion of the Guyanese electo-rate has acquired the minimal level of involvement in p o l i t i c s . Many people attend party meetings at election time. Voting turnout is also extremely high. We have also shown that marginal p o l i t i c a l involvement as reflected in partisanship toward one or other of the p o l i t i c a l part ies, i s also high; very few respondents were non-partisans and less s t i l l were c lass i f ied as f loat ing voters or "switchers". An examination of part isan-ship by race (Table 5.A), shows that Afro-Guyanese, mixed and the middle minorities identify strongest with the PNC, while East Indians identify strongest with the PPP, and Amerindians with the UF. In terms of re l ig ion , (Table 5.5) people of a l l rel igious denominations except Hindus ident i f ied most with the PNC. There was l i t t l e signif icance in the partisanship ex-pressed as a function of age (Table 5.6), but most interesting was the nature of p o l i t i c a l act iv i ty in which non- identif iers were involved. An overwhelming majority of those who refused to identify with one or other p o l i t i c a l party, were members of trade Unions, had participated in demon-strations and protests, w i l l f ight to defend Guyana i f required, but found the electoral process irrelevant and a Cuban type revolution as an alternative to the present system of Government. F ina l l y , while most people were famil iar with the issues prevalent in Guyana at the time of the e lec -t ions, these issues were remotely connected with influencing their decision to vote. In estimating the impact of party act iv i ty on voting behaviour, we were concerned with the speci f ic aspects of the party's campaign that made contact with the electorate. Hence the 191 electorate's perception of these activities is also a factor in determi-ning their effectiveness. Although our measures of awareness may not be f u l l y persuasive in view of the lapse in time between the campaign activity of the parties and the interviewing of respondents, their value has not been destroyed since they are intended as indicators of the total impact of the local party activity. If a respondent could not recall a v i s i t by a party worker or of having received campaign literature from the p o l i t i c a l parties, we assume that these a c t i v i t i e s would not have affected him significantly. The data show how highly aware the Guyanese electorate is of party activity and this no doubt reveals a special feature of p o l i t i c a l l i f e in Guj'ana. Guyanese see p o l i t i c s as a phenomenon that can protect or destroy their most cherished values. And to a growing extent elections are seen as a great c r i s i s in the combat between good and e v i l . In Guyana, p o l i t i c s i s not conceived of as a sporadically interesting spectator sport. Guyanese think of p o l i t i c s as something that affects their welfare; a situation quite unlike the experience of America and other European polities which is aptly summarised as follows "They think of election day as they think of Sunday: a time to do one's c i v i c duty as respectable people should and to reaffirm one's loyalty to the faith in which he was reared. In attempting to account for the highly mobilised state of Guyanese p o l i t i c s , i t is very tempting to overstress race as the crucial ^ Hugh A. Bone and Austin Ranney, P o l i t i c s and Voters ("Jew York McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1963), p. 21. 192 factor, while underestimating the importance of party organisation. The local party organisation is something of a broker or a middleman between the central party organisation and the mass of people in the process of electoral mobilisation. What more than ever has i n -creased the importance of the local party organisation is the system of proportional representation. When under the system of plurality voting, the candidate-orientation of the constituency was a key factor in electoral mobilisation, now, the candidate-syndrome is less impor-tant than the organisational-syndrome. It is the need to attract every single possible vote in a l l the constituencies which creates the neces-sity for a concentration on organisation. A p o l i t i c a l party i f i t is to gain the optimum number of votes cannot neglect i t s local party organisation even in those areas known to display antipathy towards i t . For example, in the 1961 elections contested under the plurality system of voting, the PPP did not enter any candidates in four urban constitu-encies in which i t had very l i t t l e support; did not campaign in these constituencies hence received no votes from these 4 constituencies rep-resenting 60,000 electors (approximately), but yet won the elections by a wide majority of seats, 20 out of 35. This underscores the d i f -ference in organisational requirements of the party between elections contested under different premises. Under the system of proportional representation used in Guyana, parties are forced to take' their campaign to the most marginal areas of their support i f they seriously contemplate gaining state power. It is in the light of both the psychological factor of the prominence of local personalities and the formal requirements of 193 the electoral system, that we envisage the rise of "countervailing e l i t e s " in the form of local party activists. Our emphasis on local party organisation in no way suggests insensitivity to the dominance of the central party activity. To the extent that our local party activists perform functions that can be considered input functions, they may not indeed relate c r i t i c a l l y to the decision-making function of the party. That local leaders perform administrative, internal, representational and public relations functions may not affect the general apparatus of the national party. In fact, insofar as the national party retains i t s monopoly over the dispensation of patronage, local party leaders may be functional merely as "face men" in the struggle to maintain a party in government or to put another in power. While we cannot conclude that strengthening the local party organisation holds the key toward the destruction of ra c i a l p o l i t i c s in Guyana, we believe that i t would help to sharpen the p o l i t i -cal identification , i f not p o l i t i c a l consciousness of the individuals at the rgrassroots'. One important omission in this study is that no attempt was made to deal with the problem of p o l i t i c a l development in any detail. How-ever, included in our analysis are measures of participation, integra- tion and legitimacy, that are closely related to developmental goals and that have provided clues about the nature of developmental change in Guyana. As a process, developmental change relates the transformation of the individual to the transformation of society i t s e l f . Certain 194 decisions of the individuals are cruc ia l indicators of this process. Chief among these individual decisions are those dealing with (1) part ic ipat ion: what socia l and p o l i t i c a l movements must he join? How active must he become? (2) Integration: must he act p o l i t i c a l l y in such a way that he is relat ing more to national ist than to sectional goals? (3) Legitimacy: must he be prepared to support the authorities and the regime, even when his party is out of power? Does he feel any attachments to the norms, symbols and values of the regime even when 2 he is opposed to the authorities? We saw that on the whole the Guyanese society is highly p a r t i c i -pant. People identify with various organisations even though in many cases, race and membership in soc ia l and p o l i t i c a l organisations were clearly associated. This, as we have shown, is as a result of the economic, the demographic and the socia l indicators which group people together on the basis of segmental values. Indeed these segmental pat-terns of group ident i f icat ion have resulted from time to time in group violence and have retarded the trend toward p o l i t i c a l integration in Guyana. Hence, when individuals make decisions about what organisa-tions to jo in and how p o l i t i c a l l y active they w i l l become, they may be reacting to "expressive" and "structural" factors simultaneously. In The notion of legitimacy could be more ful ly explored by asking questions about the intensity of support for, or, rejection of, the regime and i t s authorities experienced by different individuals and groups over a period of time. Hence, we could ask questions to probe the changes of sup-port by certain indiv iduals, whether on grounds of assessment of issues, personal i t ies , c lass , race, etc. 195 the former, they are susceptible to the appeals of "heroes" and "doctors". In the latter, they are attracted to programmes for reform, to ideologies and to the nature of group organisation. It is therefore often very d i f f i c u l t to distinguish the real from the apparent reasons of group identification and of p o l i t i c a l participation. However, what we discovered was, that given the highly p a r t i c i -pant p o l i t i c a l culture in Guyana, the more p o l i t i c a l l y active an i n d i v i -dual, the more p o l i t i c a l l y efficacious he f e l t ; the higher his educational attainment and the greater his p o l i t i c a l interest, the higher was his feeling of p o l i t i c a l efficacy. In classifying individuals as "ac t i v i s t s " " i d e n t i f i e r s " , "sympathisers" and "dissenters" we saw among other things that dissenters manifested the highest tendencies toward alienation. But we notice also that, to a large extent, the differential in p a r t i c i -pant orientations of these four types of citizens was very small. The major factor distinguishing dissenters from the others was their total rejection of party a f f i l i a t i o n s . Implicit in the notion of "national integration" i s the role of rac i a l violence and group alignment in shaping the tendencies toward or away from integration. We suggested that these tendencies are rooted in the hi s t o r i c a l process of the Guyanese society and are crucial to the understanding of the emergence of the modern phase of po l i t i c s which was ushered in by the PPP in 1953. Very i l l u s t r a t i v e of the pattern of integration and group identification i s our examination of the gross electoral data. Since the 1955 s p l i t in the PPP, the tendency i s toward the persistence of a hard-core of support for the parties identified on 196 the basis of race. But a growing number of constituencies have fallen into the cl a s s i f i c a t i o n of being marginal and as a result, party competition in these constituencies i s keen. Nevertheless, insofar as individuals in the p o l i t i c a l system profess allegiance to the p o l i t i c a l authorities and the p o l i t i c a l regime, legitimacy may be seen to be maintained. In Guyana, legitimacy of party government i s undermined somewhat by the structural relationship between social, religious and economic groupings and p o l i t i c a l parties. That Trade Unions, Cultural Associations and parties by and large consolidate the lines of r a c i a l cleavages; that in addition, groups feel discrimina-ted against by the authorities on the basis of their race; that the ad-ministration and the military apparently manifest partisan loyalties — these are a l l prejudicial to the notion of legitimacy as a function of p o l i t i c a l development. Why, we may ask, has not the p o l i t i c a l system in Guyana disinte-grated? Our study suggests three reasons: i that there has been a zone of voters w i l l i n g to shift votes from party to party, cutting across the barriers of race i i that the system of p o l i t i c a l patronage is a v i t a l form for attracting support to parties and party governments on a basis which may be wider than race i i i that there are " p o l i t i c a l dissenters", a relatively small but vocal lobby, proponents of class as opposed to r a c i a l cleavages as the underpinning of p o l i t i c a l organi-sation. 197 While local party organisation is relatively important in mobilising voters and dispensing p o l i t i c a l patronage, a significant increase in the number of p o l i t i c a l dissenters may broaden the basis of p o l i t i c s in Guyana. 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SINGHAM, A.W., " P o l i t i c a l S o c i a l i s a t i o n of Marginal Groups", I n t e r n a t i o n a l J o u r n a l of Comparative Sociology, 7 (1967), 182-198. SIRES, R.V., " B r i t i s h Guiana, A Suspension of the C o n s t i t u t i o n " , Western P o l i t i c a l Quarterly, 7 (1954), 45-57. SKINNER, E.P., "Group Dynamics and S o c i a l S t r a t i f i c a t i o n i n B r i t i s h Guiana", Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences,83 (1966), 904-12. SMITH, M.G., " S o c i a l and C u l t u r a l P l u r a l i s m " i n Vera Rubin (ed.), S o c i a l and C u l t u r a l P l u r a l i s m i n the Caribbean, Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 83 ( i960), 763-777. SMITH, Raymond T. and Chandra JAYAWARDENA, "Hindu Marriage Customs i n B r i t i s h Guiana", S o c i a l and Economic Studies, 7 (1958), 178-194. 217 and Chandra JAYAWARDENA, "Marriage and the Family Amongst East Indians i n B r i t i s h Guiana", S o c i a l and Economic Studies, 8 (1959), 321-76. " " SMITH, Raymond T., "Review of S o c i a l and C u l t u r a l P l u r a l i s m i n the Caribbean", American A n t h r o p o l o g i s t , 63 ( l 9 6 l ) , 155-57. VERBA, Sidney, "Comparative P o l i t i c a l C u l t u r e " i n Pye and Verba (eds.), P o l i t i c a l C u l t u r e and P o l i t i c a l Development, P r i n c e t o n , New Jersey: P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1966. WAGLEY, C., " P l a n t a t i o n America: A Cultur e Sphere" i n Vera Rubin (ed.), Caribbean Studies: A Symposium, Mona, Jamaica: I n s t i t u t e of S o c i a l and Economic Research, U n i v e r s i t y of the West I n d i e s , 1957, 3-13. WALLERSTEIN, Immanuel, "Voluntary A s s o c i a t i o n s " i n James Coleman and C a r l Rosberg, J r . , P o l i t i c a l P a r t i e s and N a t i o n a l I n t e g r a t i o n  i n T r o p i c a l A f r i c a , Berkeley and Los Angeles: U n i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a Press, 1964, 315-321. WHITAKER, C S . J r . , " A Dysrhythmic Process of P o l i t i c a l Change", World P o l i t i c s , 19 (1967), 190-217. 218 APPENDIX I W.a may learn much from a l l s o c i e t i e s , from a single scSciety i f unusual insight i s combined with patient and prolonged study. A good researcher looks at: the people then looks back at the books and then looks again at the people. (Robert Redfield)! F i e l d work i n the Caribbean has^ to date, not•concentrated on the use of sophisticated data gathering techniques. The r e l a t i v e l y small number of studies r e f l e c t i n g a behavioural persuasion has f o r the most part r e i t e r a t e d the experience of s o c i a l science research i n 2 other developing areas notably L a t i n America, Asia and A f r i c a . This experience demonstrates that methodology-oriented research enterprise has the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of a space probe i n which considerable planning and expenditure on research projects are involved but a mere speck of d i r t i s r e a l i s e d from the planetary surface. In other words, what Kaplan c a l l s the "honorific reference" to the deity, gives a c e r t a i n hope of methodological f u l f i l m e n t only to be replaced by speculation. See Redfield's introduction i n Bronislaw Malinowski, Magic Science and Religion and Other Essay^s (Garden City, Hew York; Doubleday Anchor Books, 1955 f. 2 Chief among these studies are Wendell B e l l , Jamaican_Leaders (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of C a l i f o r n i a Press, 1964); Krishna Bahadoorsingh, Trinidad E l e c t o r a l P o l i t i c s : The Persistence of  the Race Factor (London: I n s t i t u t e of Race Relations, Oxford University Press, 1963); Charles C. Moskos, The Sociology of Independence (Massachusetts: Schenkman Publ. Co., I967X; James A. Mau, Social Change  and Images of the Future (Massachusetts: Schenkman Publ. Co~7] 1967). ^Abraham Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry ( C a l i f o r n i a : Chandler Publishing Co., 1964), p. 17. . 219 The problem confronting the s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t i s the nebulosity and diffuseness of his subject which i s often broadly conceived and, equally, broadly treated. One way of coping with unforeseen obstacles that a r i s e i n the c o l l e c t i o n of data i s f o r the s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s i engaged i n f i e l d work to provide research reports not only of t h e i r r e s u l t s but also of the methodological procedure and problems i n the implementation of t h e i r studies. At minimum these reports could provide an understanding of the linkages between theory, methods and r e s u l t s as a guide to future research. SAMPLES IN THE STUDY Rank and P i l e The major focus of our design i s the study of the d i f f e r e n t party organizations, the d i f f e r e n t l e v e l s of leadership and the r e l a t i o n s h i p of these to key dimensions of p o l i t i c a l mobilization and development. As a r e s u l t , interviews were conducted with a cross-sectional sample of the electorate and with central and l o c a l party leaders of the PPP, PNC and the UP respectively. While the universe of our study i s the Guyanese p o l i t i c a l system, the basic geographical area used as our primary sampling unit i s the r e g i s t r a t i o n d i s t r i c t . For the purposes of general elections, Guyana i s presently divided into 38 r e g i s t r a t i o n d i s t r i c t s , more popularly known as constituencies. Our sample was therefore s t r a t i f i e d by the c r i t e r i a of demography and c l a s s i f i e d strength of the p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s i n 38 r e g i s t r a t i o n d i s t r i c t s . On t h i s basis we evolved the following strata or grids: 220 PNC PPP Marginal ! - Urban 1 - 1 R u r a l 1 2 1 Prom the s i x major s t r a t a thus i d e n t i f i e d we aimed at s e l e c t i n g one r e g i s t r a t i o n d i s t r i c t from each, and these s i x were to have c o n s t i -t u t e d our primary sampling p o i n t s . However, the absence of an urban predominantly PPP stronghold provided the r a t i o n a l e f o r s e l e c t i n g an a d d i t i o n a l rural-PPP-stratum. Thus the s t r a t i f i e d s e l e c t i o n of our sample of r e g i s t r a t i o n d i s t r i c t s f i n a l l y i n c l u d e d : 1. Skeldon ) .. , . T ,. < r u r a l , predominantly Indian 2. Corentyne West C e n t r a l ) s a ^ e 3. New Amsterdam: urban, mixed, safe PNC 4. Abary: r u r a l , predominantly A f r i c a n , safe PNC 5. Houston: urban, heterogeneous, marginal 6. Suddie: r u r a l , heterogeneous, marginal. We should a l s o p o i n t out that we had o r i g i n a l l y scheduled a seventh sampling g r i d to account f o r one of two h i n t e r l a n d , predominantly Amerindian r e g i s t r a t i o n d i s t r i c t s , which since 1961 has d i s p l a y e d a str o n g p a r t i s a n s h i p towards the United Force. However, the chosen area, Rupununi, proved so enormous^ and hazardous that our i n t e r v i e w e r s were f o r c e d to abandon the e f f o r t . A d d i t i o n a l l y , the r e t i c e n c e , h i g h l e v e l of i l l i t e r a c y and ignorance of the native peoples i n t h i s d i s t r i c t demonstrated the f u t i l i t y of pursuing research by means of formal For accounts of the Rupununi and the Amerindian peoples, see Everard F. im Thurn, Among the Indians of Guiana (New York: Dover P u b l i c a t i o n s , Inc., 1967) and C o l i n Henfrey, Through Indian Eyes: A Journey Among the Tribes of Guiana (New York: H o l t , Rinehart and Winston, 1964). 221 5 i n t e r v i e w schedules. Instead, we spent two weeks i n the area t a l k i n g to a cross s e c t i o n of the po p u l a t i o n i n c l u d i n g the D i s t r i c t Commissioner, h o t e l i e r , p o l i c e o f f i c e r s , army personnel, and c i v i l servants, most of whom are te m p o r a r i l y r e s i d e n t i n the area. However, our most v i t a l sources of i n f o r m a t i o n were the r e l a t i v e l y few m i s s i o n a r i e s , pre-dominantly Roman C a t h o l i c , remaining i n t h i s area, the Tooshaws and the o r d i n a r y Amerindian. The Amerindian population i n the Rupununi i s d i v i d e d i n t o two main t r i b e s , the Vapisiana Indians estimated at 3 9 5 0 and the Mukusi p o p u l a t i o n estimated at 2 5 0 0 . In a l l we spoke to 5 5 persons. We a l s o spoke at l e n g t h w i t h the Commissioner and Secretary of I n t e r i o r development.^ The i n f o r m a t i o n provided by these respondents together w i t h our observations of par t y alignment, l e a d e r s h i p m o b i l i z a -t i o n and the i m p l i c a t i o n s of these f o r p o l i t i c a l development i n Guyana, i s reported i n Appendix IV of t h i s study. Our experience i n the Rupununi underscores the importance of t e s t i n g procedures f o r sampling i n the f i e l d before a c c e p t i n g a p a r t i c u l a r sampling design. What may appear i n the a b s t r a c t to be a c l e a r cut and ri g o r o u s p l a n can prove a nightmare to apply. Two fe a t u r e s of our rank and f i l e sample of the e l e c t o r a t e should be noted. F i r s t , we c l u s t e r e d the enumeration d i s t r i c t s -the standard c l u s t e r contained three enumeration d i s t r i c t s - i n each 5 Some reasonable approaches to sampling t r a n s i e n t , p r e c a r i o u s l y housed and r e t i c e n t populations i n c i t i e s and r u r a l areas are proposed i n Frank B o n i l l a , " E l i t e s and P u b l i c Opinion i n Areas of High S o c i a l S t r a t i f i c a t i o n , " P u b l i c Opinion Quarterly, 3 ( 1 9 5 8 ) , pp. 3 4 9 - 3 5 9 . ^The Commission of I n t e r i o r Development was set up i n January 1 9 6 9 f o l l o w i n g the Rupununi u p r i s i n g w i t h a s p e c i f i c charge to promote p r o j e c t s to develop the area both i n the economic and s o c i a l welfare aspects. 222 of the s i x r e g i s t r a t i o n d i s t r i c t s chosen i n our sample. There are, on average, 21 enumeration d i s t r i c t s i n each r e g i s t r a t i o n d i s t r i c t . Second, we randomly selected 2 c l u s t e r s from each r e g i s t r a t i o n d i s t r i c t as our f i n a l sampling u n i t . Given t h i s sampling frame, the procedure fo r s e l e c t i n g respondents was by random selection from the e l e c t o r a l l i s t s . These l i s t s , up to date f o r the previous general elections of 1968, were the best a v a i l a b l e . They were not completely accurate as we subsequently discovered, hut no f e a s i b l e a l t e r n a t i v e was open to us without the expenditure of tremendous time and money. Block l i s t i n g s and house l i s t i n g s e s p e c i a l l y i n the r u r a l r e g i s t r a t i o n d i s t r i c t s would "be misleading because large numbers of residences have no address. Our experience suggests that the e l e c t o r a l r o l l s are a f a i r l y r e l i a b l e l i s t of adults. A more serious problem i s the mobility and transiency of the population, both r u r a l and urban, which makes the discovery of the whereabouts of respondents often impossible. Ve used standard procedures i n s e l e c t i n g our sample respondents from the l i s t , employing a random s t a r t i n g point and a s p e c i f i e d i n t e r v a l determined by the number of adults on the given l i s t . Because of the problem of transiency, we selected a random and an alternate second sample to provide us with enough interviews i f the o r i g i n a l sample mortality was too high. No substitutes could be selected by our i n t e r -viewers. They were given the names and addresses.of s p e c i f i c i n d i v i d u a l s and required to interview only those i n d i v i d u a l s . As many as f i v e call-backs were made as well as special t r i p s i n some cases to r e g i s t r a t i o n and enumeration d i s t r i c t s outside our sampling frame to f i n d i n d i v i d u a l respondents. Despite our c a r e f u l and determined work, the completion rate f e l l below our expectations p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the r u r a l d i s t r i c t s . 223 The r a t e s were as f o l l o w s : R u r a l 70 per cent Urban 86 per cent The reasons f o r non-completion v a r i e d : Percentages of a l l i n t e r v i e w s which were not completed N = 75 N = 62 Reasons Rural Urban ( T o t a l 157) Deceased; i l l 8 9 Moved, not tr a c e a b l e p l u s Working elsewhere or l e f t country 54 45 Not a v a i l a b l e 28 42 Refusals 10 4. 100 100 The major problems were r e s i d e n t i a l m o b i l i t y and emigration. In the l a t t e r case a s u b s t a n t i a l number, 11 per cent i n the r u r a l sample and 23 per cent i n the urban sample, were reported to have " l e f t the country". I n a d d i t i o n , the number of " r e f u s a l s " would have been ap p r e c i a b l y higher i n the r u r a l d i s t r i c t s had we not spent consider-able time w i t h the v i l l a g e l e a d e r s , pandits and the head-teachers of the v i l l a g e schools whenever p o s s i b l e , e x p l a i n i n g the purpose of our study and becoming f a m i l i a r w i t h v i l l a g e c o n d i t i o n s . As a supplementary tech-nique, we s e l e c t e d and deployed our i n t e r v i e w e r s , so that Indian i n t e r v i e w e r s worked i n Indian d i s t r i c t s and A f r i c a n i n t e r v i e w e r s i n A f r i c a n d i s t r i c t s . I n t e r e s t i n g l y , some people not i n c l u d e d i n our l i s t s a c t u a l l y requested that they be interviewed, e s p e c i a l l y i f they h e l d some pa r t y or l o c a l government o f f i c e . I n f a c t , these non-sample i n t e r -views were i n v a r i a b l y taken and proved i n f o r m a t i v e . PARTY LEADERS Our sample of pa r t y leaders was administered i n two d i s t i n c t phases. In the f i r s t phase we concentrated on i n t e r v i e w i n g "primary" 224 party leaders, i . e . top party o f f i c i a l s including the party leaders, chairmen, general secretaries, and members of parliament of the three major p a r t i e s . In the second phase we interviewed l o c a l party leaders and a c t i v i s t s from the areas c o i n c i d i n g with our rank and f i l e sample. Primary Party A c t i v i s t s Interviews with top party o f f i c i a l s were secured a f t e r the 1 9 6 8 elections at intermittent periods between March 1 9 6 9 and June 1 9 7 0 . Information by these leaders was gained p a r t l y from the use of a standardized questionnaire and p a r t l y by unstructured interviews, the combination of which yielded very r i c h and considerable d e t a i l . No attempt was made to randomise the sample of these primary party o f f i c i a l s . We merely sought interviews with whoever was available and w i l l i n g to co-operate. Our strategy f o r s o l i c i t i n g interviews included regular attendance at the sessions of the House of Assembly, frequent v i s i t s to the various party headquarters, telephone conversations, luncheons and attendance at functions given by various p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s . As table 2 shows, of the 7 1 primary party a c t i v i s t s contacted 5 0 returned the short questionnaires, 3 9 were interviewed i n addition, and information from the remaining 1 5 was gained by personal interview. Percentage D i s t r i b u t i o n of A c t i v i s t s response "Primary" by Party Party (N = 7 1 ) PNC PPP UF Returned questionnaire plus interviewed 81 60 7 6 Returned questionnaire only 10 16 18 Interviewed only 5 1 3 -No response 4 11 6 Total 100 100 100 ( 5 0 ) ( 2 3 ) (18) 225 The greatest source of r e s i s t a n c e v i z . , "no response" among primary p a r t y a c t i v i s t s was found among the PPP, a few members of 7 which objected to our i n v e s t i g a t i o n of " s e n s i t i v e areas of p o l i t i c s " . Notwithstanding t h i s minor setback our contact w i t h these p a r t y leaders provided e x c e p t i o n a l i n f o r m a t i o n on the l a t e n t patterns of pa r t y l e a d e r -s h i p , o r g a n i z a t i o n a l a c t i v i t y , i n t e r - and i n t r a - p arty c o n f l i c t s ; on the s o c i a l and p s y c h o l o g i c a l p r o f i l e of top party l e a d e r s ; on the st r e s s e s of o f f i c e ; and on how t h i s l e a d e r s h i p corps perceived t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e r o l e s i n the p o l i t i c a l development of Guyana. L o c a l Party A c t i v i s t s This phase of our study i n v o l v e d a sample of 106 l o c a l p a r t y l e a d e r s drawn from the same s i x geographical sample u n i t s as that of our c r o s s - n a t i o n a l sample. L o c a l p a r t y leaders comprise known agents, organizers and a c t i v i s t s i n the s i x r e g i s t r a t i o n d i s t r i c t s under review. In a l l , we int e r v i e w e d 56 PNC, 28 PPP and 22 UP l o c a l leaders between February and September 1969. The number of l o c a l l eaders interviewed was smaller than we had a n t i c i p a t e d but not a l l r e g i s t r a t i o n d i s t r i c t s had r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s from a l l three p a r t i e s . Except f o r the PPP, we were given l e t t e r s of i d e n t i f i c a t i o n from the party s e c r e t a r i e s asking t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e l o c a l a c t i v i s t s to co-operate wi t h the study. Beside the a c t i v i s t s o f f i c i a l l y designated as l o c a l leaders by the C e n t r a l p a r t y , we s e l e c t e d f o r i n t e r v i e w other secondary leaders who were ' O r i g i n a l l y the PPP executive objected to t h i s k i n d of i n v e s t i g a t i o n i n t o the s t r u c t u r e of t h e i r p a r t y on the grounds that they were i n the process of r e o r g a n i s i n g t h e i r party. Subsequently, however, we obtained co-operation from l o c a l l e a d e r s , i n s p i t e of the i n i t i a l o b j e c t i o n by the party headquarters. 2 2 6 recognised by the rank and f i l e sample as key party agents i n the Q r e s p e c t i v e d i s t r i c t s . Responses to p a r t i c u l a r questions by the rank and f i l e on l o c a l p a r t y a c t i v i s t s provided the r e p u t a t i o n a l b a s i s f o r s e l e c t i n g a d d i t i o n a l l o c a l p a r t y l e a d e r s . As a r u l e , i n t e r v i e w s w i t h the secondary party l e a d e r s h i p were of s h o r t e r d u r a t i o n than those w i t h the top leaders but provided a v a l u a b l e body of data f o r comparison w i t h a t t i t u d e s and perceptions of the top l e a d e r s h i p on the one hand and the rank and f i l e on the other. Time was w i l l i n g l y given f o r personal i n t e r v i e w s which of t e n l a s t e d one hour and, i n a few i n s t a n c e s , over two hours. That only one l o c a l a c t i v i s t refused to give us an i n t e r v i e w r e f l e c t s the overwhelming success of our e n t e r p r i s e . S u f f i c e i t to say that the mass media i n Guyana c o n t r i b u t e d i n no small way to p o p u l a r i z i n g the study and of g a i n i n g f o r i t widespread acceptance and t o l e r a n c e , i n s p i t e of i n i t i a l 9 o p p o s i t i o n from c e r t a i n p a r t y o f f i c i a l s . This f a c t o r would be b e t t e r appreciated i n the l i g h t of the wide v a r i e t y of p a r t y o f f i c i a l s geo-g r a p h i c a l l y dispersed which made t h i s phase of the study the most d i f f i c u l t to execute. The i n t e r e s t i n the p r o j e c t , shown by l o c a l , primary p a r t y leaders was considerable and was no doubt responsible f o r i t s s u c c e s s f u l completion. Although completion r a t e s e s p e c i a l l y i n our cross n a t i o n a l sample were l e s s than optimal we f e e l h i g h l y s a t i s f i e d w i t h our r e s u l t s . The sample s e l e c t i o n process attempted to be as e s s e n t i a l l y sound and r i g o r o u s as p o s s i b l e as were the other f i e l d Q See Questions 38-40, Appendix I I . 9 The author of t h i s study appeared on two ten minute programmes on the n a t i o n a l b r o a d c a s t i n g s e r v i c e , Guyana Broadcasting Corporation. In a d d i t i o n , both n a t i o n a l newspapers and one party newspaper, the United Force's Sun, gave coverage to the study, i t s aims, methods and b e n e f i t s . The Government Information Service and the U n i v e r s i t y of Guyana news b u l l e t i n s were a l s o u s e f u l i n d i s s e m i n a t i n g i n f o r m a t i o n about the study. 227 operations i n t h i s study. For the most part we adopted acceptable procedures of sampling theory, without great d i f f i c u l t y and without s e r i o u s l y compromising s c i e n t i f i c requirements of i n v e s t i g a t i o n . One problem which we surmised was the " r e p o r t i n g " e r r o r . In some cases there were obvious i n a c c u r a c i e s i n the respondents' answers and i n the way they were recorded by the i n t e r v i e w e r . Another problem was the sampling e r r o r . ^ Ve discovered that the sample, f o r example, underestimated the number of C a t h o l i c Amerindians but t h i s i s explained by our d e c i s i o n to withdraw the Rupununi d i s t r i c t from the formal a n a l y s i s of t h i s study. Although we recognize that c l u s t e r i n g tends to increase sampling e r r o r , we f e l t that c e r t a i n reductions i n sampling e r r o r were achieved through the use of a s t r a t i f i e d sample. One p o s s i b l e means of reducing sampling e r r o r was to increase the s i z e of our sample, but the increment i n cost f o r enhanced p r e c i s i o n and confidence made us more amenable to our present, and more r i s k y estimate. Having f i x e d our sample s i z e at 1000 our main concern was to make the sample as r e p r e s e n t a t i v e as p o s s i b l e . More g e n e r a l l y , there are problems i n v o l v e d i n o p e r a t i o n a l i s i n g our f i e l d work which l e a d us to question many of the p r i n c i p l e s of survey methods and s o c i a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n enumerated i n s o c i a l science t e x t books. One r e c u r r e n t methodological maxim i s the n o t i o n of "downward i n t e r v i e w i n g " . E s p e c i a l l y i n the case of our "primary" p a r t y l e a d e r s , For a d e t a i l e d a n a l y s i s of sampling e r r o r and f o r a general p i c t u r e of the degree of v a r i a b i l i t y that should be attached to sample estimates see, Herbert Hyman, Survey Design and A n a l y s i s (New York: John Wiley, 1965); and f o r formulas of sampling e r r o r under complex sample designs see David B u t l e r and Donald Stokes, P o l i t i c a l Change i n B r i t a i n : Forces  Shaping E l e c t o r a l Choice (London: MacMlllan and Co.Ltd., 1 9 6 9 ) , pp. 457-62. 228 there was no a l t e r n a t i v e hut upward i n t e r v i e w i n g . The use of obscure, condescending and c i r c u i t o u s items as a gauge of i n d i v i d u a l a t t i t u d e s i s o f t e n resented by the more s o p h i s t i c a t e d and a r t i c u l a t e respondent.^ D i r e c t questions i n t h i s respect were always the most rewarding as most respondents were w i l l i n g to d i s c u s s t o p i c a l and perceptual matters i n a f r e e , frank and c r i t i c a l way. Hence from the p o i n t of view of v a l i d i t y many of the scaled questions could have been reduced to s i n g l e d i r e c t question^. Another maxim i s u n i f o r m i t y i n the asking of questions and the r e c o r d i n g of answers. Interviewers are expected to ask a l l the a p p l i c a b l e questions; to ask them i n the order given, and w i t h no more e l u c i d a t i o n and probing than i s e x p l i c i t l y allowed, and to make no unauthorised v a r i a t i o n s i n the wording. Our experience suggests that c u l t u r a l d i f f e r e n c e s among people o f t e n a f f e c t the p e r m i s s i b l e area of conversation and the w i l l i n g n e s s i t s e l f to converse. As a r e s u l t , when, f o r example, an i n t e r v i e w e r was confronted w i t h a t o t a l l y peasant or r u r a l - t y p e respondent, h i s a b i l i t y to open conversation i n the vernacular, even to phrase some questions i n t h i s way, was an asset to the establishment and the maintenance of rapport. In most cases i n d e a l i n g w i t h the l e s s educated respondent the i n t e r v i e w e r by u s i n g nicknames of l o c a l p o l i t i c i a n s , by changing the order of the i n t e r v i e w and e n q u i r i n g before-hand about the p e r s o n a l i t y of the i n d i v i d u a l to be i n t e r v i e w e d o f t e n enhanced the r e s u l t s and strategy of h i s i n t e r v i e w . "'""''The same experience was shared by Charles C. Moskos, The Sociology  of Independence, Appendix I , when he interviewed leaders and e l i t e s i n the Vest In d i e s . The procedure of "downward" i n t e r v i e w i n g i s one where questions are so geared that to a r r i v e at the r e q u i r e d a t t i t u d e of an i n d i v i d u a l , one uses s e v e r a l " l e a d i n g questions", time consuming and o f t e n i n c o n s e q u e n t i a l except f o r the very i l l i t e r a t e . 229 A d d i t i o n a l l y , there i s the problem of a c q u i r i n g an adequate methodology f o r coping w i t h the concept, 'change'. In d i s c u s s i n g the p o t e n t i a l , of p o l i t i c a l development i n Guyana, our study, l i k e that of many other d i s c r e t e s t udies concerned w i t h t h i s phenomenon, makes an i m p l i c i t comparison w i t h the p o l i t i c s of some other area. The u t i l i t y of such comparison i s unquestionable i n so f a r as i t draws on references to evidence on p a r a l l e l phenomena already a v a i l a b l e f o r other areas. •What i s d i s t r e s s i n g i s that i n s p i t e of c r o s s - n a t i o n a l c o m p a r a b i l i t y , meaningful r e s u l t s may be unobtainable unless the sample and scope of the i n v e s t i g a t i o n are expanded to cover a wider area and longer periods 12 of time. As one w r i t e r s t a t e s " f i e l d research concerned w i t h p o l i t i c a l change must become more i n t e n s i v e and extensive i f i t i s 13 to be more than a concern w i t h h o r t a t o r y and d e c l a r a t o r y a c t i v i t y . " A l l i e d to t h i s problem of studying s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l change i s the one-shot survey operation. To study v a r i a t i o n over time, or the v a r i a t i o n i n s o c i o - c u l t u r a l - p o l i t i c a l f a c t o r s on the s t r u c t u r i n g of behaviour, a t t i t u d e s , values and opinions, more use should be made of trend' analysis."''^ By sampling a given population more than once 12 See Herbert Hyman, "Research Design" i n Robert E. Ward, (ed.), Studying  P o l i t i c s Abroad (Boston: L i t t l e , Brown & Co., 1964), pp. 175-178. Here the author embarks on an i n t e r e s t i n g d i s c u s s i o n of the r o l e of v a r i o u s kinds of l o n g i t u d i n a l studies i n the a n a l y s i s of p o l i t i c a l modernization. 13 ^Henry L. B r e t t o n , " P o l i t i c a l Science F i e l d Research i n A f r i c a , " Comparative P o l i t i c s , 64 ( A p r i l , 1970), pp. 413-443. The I n t e r n a t i o n a l S o c i a l Science C o u n c i l and the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Committee on S o c i a l Science Documentation both supported by UNESCO, have since 1962 organised s e v e r a l conferences on problems of data a r c h i v i n g i n the S o c i a l Sciences. For f u l l d e t a i l s see S. Rokkan, Data Archives f o r the S o c i a l Sciences ( P a r i s : Mouton Inc., 1966); and 'Second Conference on Data Archives i n the S o c i a l Sciences', S o c i a l Science Information, 4 (1965), pp. 67-84. 14 Among the s t u d i e s that have used t h i s technique see David B u t l e r and Donald Stokes, P o l i t i c a l Change i n B r i t a i n (London: McMillan and Co. L t d . , 1969). 230 over a given p e r i o d , t h i s survey technique not only permits the study of opinions, a t t i t u d e s and movements over time hut provides, a l s o , a comparative "basis f o r a n a l y s i n g changes w i t h i n p o l i t i c a l systems. E s p e c i a l l y i n the Caribbean where comparative surveys i n the s o c i a l sciences are almost non-existent, trend a n a l y s i s could help f i l l the gap. In the wider area of our d i s c i p l i n e there have been i n d i c a t i o n s i n recent years of greater i n t e r e s t i n long-term analyses of processes of e l e c t o r a l change and i n systematic studies of v a r i a t i o n s i n sequences of change w i t h i n given n a t i o n s . The i n c r e a s i n g i n t e r e s t i n the development of data archives and i n the use of e l e c t r o n i c computers i n p r o c e s s i n g h i s t o r i c a l i n f o r m a t i o n can be expected to a c c e l e r a t e the process, of d i a c h r o n i c as w e l l as synchronic analyses of p o l i t i c a l data. More imp o r t a n t l y , the f i n d i n g s of such analyses can again be expected to have a profound impact on current c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n and t h e o r i z i n g i n the f i e l d of comparative p o l i t i c s . Another k i n d of impediment to f i e l d research i s the p o l i t i c a l s e n s i t i v i t i e s of bureaucracies, leaders and members of the community. However, what i s s t a t e d as the i n t e r e s t of some leaders i s o f t e n i n c o n f l i c t w i t h the i n t e r e s t of others i n the same community. Hence as s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s , we need to a s s e r t r a t h e r than abdicate our c r i t i c a l f u n c t i o n of the p r o f e s s i o n i n the l i g h t of these s e n s i t i v i t i e s . Instead of abject surrender, B r e t t o n r i g h t l y favours dialogues between i n t e l l e c t u a l s and p o l i t i c a l leaders on research, i t s problems, purposes and f u n c t i o n s . Connected wi t h the problem of p o l i t i c a l s e n s i t i v i t y i s the dual r o l e of the f i e l d researcher as t h e o r y - b u i l d e r and data c o l l e c t o r . There i s very l i t t l e that the f i e l d researcher i n the Caribbean can take 231 f o r granted. He can often assume that others have c o l l e c t e d l i t t l e information pertinent to the questions he has set himself. In a very fundamental sense the student of a changing society can l e a s t a f f o r d to adhere to the pretensions of a "value-free l a b e l " of p o l i t i c a l science research. It i s only by engaging himself i n the dynamic processes of change that the researcher could hope to b u i l d h i s concepts consistent with r e a l i t y . As Pye aptly states, "Any d i v i s i o n of labour between theory-building and data gathering cannot go f a r , because each needs the d i s c i p l i n i n g e f f e c t of the other and neither has enough of an 15 independent t r a d i t i o n to be even temporarily s e l f contained." In presenting t h i s study we are aware that empirical i n v e s t i -gation of the i n t e r p l a y between p o l i t i c a l parties, p o l i t i c a l mobilization and p o l i t i c a l development, requires data beyond those we have high-l i g h t e d . Indeed our observations and impressions of p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y i n Guyana provided us with a kind of data, which are more normative, yet by no means unimportant to the overarching values which we b r i n g to t h i s study. In interviewing party leaders f o r example, we were personally impressed with some, unimpressed with others, but at a l l times we t r i e d to suppress these prejudices to the best of our a b i l i t y . However, the most pervasive biases were the i d e o l o g i c a l ones, those dealing with nationalism, black power andiiierr r e l a t i o n s h i p to the process of decolonization. We f u l l y endorse the present p o l i c y of new Lucien Pye, "The Developing Areas: Problems f o r Research" i n Robert E. Ward, Studying P o l i t i c s Abroad (Boston: L i t t l e Brown and Company, 1964), p. 10. 232 nations to seek to c o n t r o l t h e i r own economies, to reduce t i e s of c u l t u r a l i m p e r i a l i s m imposed upon them by b i g nations and to forge c l o s e r i n t e r n a t i o n a l , g e o p o l i t i c a l and c u l t u r a l l i n k a g e s w i t h other b l a c k nations of the t h i r d world. However, given the p e c u l i a r p l u r a l i s t nature of the Guyanese s o c i e t y whereby the A f r i c a n and Indian communities have i n h e r i t e d s e c t i o n a l values and s e c t i o n a l r i v a l r y and s u s p i c i o n , one f i n d s i t d i f f i c u l t to avert charges of p a r t i s a n s h i p whether one i s an a d m i n i s t r a t o r , a p o l i t i c i a n , a mere c i t i z e n , or a sc h o l a r . In conducting the f i e l d work f o r t h i s study we have attempted to suppress p a r t i s a n s h i p values but have l i v e d w i t h the hope that i n Guyana, the concept of the working-class s t r u g g l e would e v e n t u a l l y re-emerge, the way i t d i d i n 1953, and would loom l a r g e r and w i t h greater cogency than the phenomenon of race. 233 APPENDIX II PARTY POLITICS IN GUYANA POST ELECTIONS SURVEY 1969 ELECTORAL REGISTRATION NO. CONSTITUENCY ELECTORAL DISTRICT DATE OF INTERVIEW AND NO. OF VISITS I WOULD LIKE TO BEGIN WITH SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT YOURSELF BIOGRAPHICAL 1. SEX: 2. RACE: 3. 4a 4b MALE 4 - 1 AMERINDIAN .... CHINESE .... EAST INDIAN .... NEGRO .... FEMALE .... 2 5 - 1 PORTUGUESE -5 2 WHITE .... 6 3 MIXED 7 4 AGE: What i s your age? (Show CARD A and ask respondent to c a l l the number corresponding to his/her age range). UNDER 25 26-35 36-45 6 -1 2 3 46-55 56-65 Over 65 4 5 -6 USUAL OCCUPATION: What work do you do? (Write i n d e t a i l ) . I f housewife, note occupation of the breadwinner 7 What is/was your father's l a s t occupation? (Write i n d e t a i l ) 8 What is/was your mother's l a s t occupation? (Write i n d e t a i l ) 234 ARE YOU PRESENTLY EMPLOYED (EXCEPT HOUSEWIFE)? YES .... 1 0 - 1 NO 2 REFUSAL I f no, how lon g i s i t since you l a s t worked? EDUCATION: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 RELIGION: What i s the highest c l a s s you reached i n School? NONE .... 1 2 - 1 PRIMARY COMPLETE 2 PRIMARY INCOMPLETE 3 SECONDARY COMPLETE .... 4 SECONDARY INCOMPLETE 5 VOCATIONAL/TECHNICAL .... 6 HIGHER TECHNICAL 7 UNIVERSITY .... 8 What church do you belong to? CATHOLIC 1 3 - 1 PROTESTANT (Which Denomination) .... 2 HINDU .... 3 MUSLIM 4 OTHER 5 MARITAL STATUS: Are you s i n g l e or married? SINGLE ... 1 4 - 1 MARRIED ... 2 OTHER ... 3 235 9. POLITICAL PARTICIPATION: Where d i d you get most of your news about the l a s t E l e c t i o n : from the r a d i o , news-paper, magazine, t a l k i n g to people or from some other source: Radio Newspaper Magazine T a l k i n g to people Other ( s p e c i f y ) Don't know 15 -1 2 5 4 5 6 10. 11. 12. I f by t a l k i n g to people, ask: What s o r t of people d i d you t a l k to most? R e l a t i v e s .... 1 6 - 1 Pa r t y workers .... 2 People at the work place ... 5 Close f r i e n d s .... 4 Did you attend any p o l i t i c a l meetings? Yes .... 17-1 No .... 2 (a) I f yes, ask: Which p a r t y meetings you attended most? GUMP 1 8 - 1 PNC .... 2 PPP .... 5 UP .... 4 (b) I f yes, ask: Which party meetings you d i d not attend at a l l ? GUMP PNC PPP UF 19 -1 2 3 4 2 3 6 13- (a) (b) In the 1968 E l e c t i o n , there were some important problems f a c i n g the country; which two of the problems were the most important to you p e r s o n a l l y i n making up your mind how to vote? which two seem to you to be l e a s t important compared wi t h the others? (Show CARD 1) Issues How to reduce unemployment How to s e t t l e disputes between Trade Unions and Management Cost of l i v i n g Whether there should be more or l e s s c o n t r o l over b i g business Changing the E l e c t o r a l system A N a t i o n a l Insurance P l a n Don't know most important Don't know l e a s t important (a) most important 20 -1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 (b) l e a s t important 21 -1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 PARTY IDENTIFICATION 14. As things look now, which p o l i t i c a l P a r t y do you t h i n k i s best s u i t e d to govern t h i s country? GUMP .... 2 2 - 1 PNC 2 PPP .... 3 UF .... 4 Don't know .... 5 Q u a l i f i e d answer ( w r i t e i n s p e c i f i c d e t a i l s 6 2 3 7 (a) I f a d e f i n i t e party choice, ask: Right now how s t r o n g l y do you f e e l about your choice (name P a r t y ) ? Very s t r o n g l y F a i r l y s t r o n g l y Not s t r o n g l y Don't know 23 -1 2 3 4 (b) I f a party choice or a q u a l i f i e d answer to question 14i ask: Did you p e r s o n a l l y do anything to help your party d u r i n g the l a s t E l e c t i o n ? Yes 24 -1 No (c) I f yes, ask: What s o r t of things d i d you do? 25 (d) I f no par t y choice or no q u a l i f i e d answer, ask: We l l , even though you don't p a r t i c u l a r l y care f o r any of the p a r t i e s which one are you l e a n i n g towards now? ( i f prompting i s r e q u i r e d , ask: I f there was an e l e c t i o n tomorrow, f o r which party would you vote?) GUMP PNC PPP UF NONE Don't Know 26 -1 2 3 4 5 6 Do you remember f o r c e r t a i n of you voted i n the 1964 General E l e c t i o n (under the new system of p r o p o r t i o n a l representation) Voted Did not vote Too young to vote Don't remember 27 -1 2 3 4 238 (a) I f voted, ask: Which party d i d you vote f o r ? GUMP GIF PNC PPP UF NLF 28 -1 2 3 4 5 6 16. How about the 1961 E l e c t i o n (when the UF made i t s f i r s t appearance) d i d you vote then? Voted Didn't vote Too young to vote Don't remember 29 - 1 2 3 4 (a) I f voted,ask; For which p a r t y d i d you vote? GNP .... 3 0 - 1 PNC PPP UF NLF 2 3 4 5 17. And what about the 1957 E l e c t i o n (the f i r s t E l e c t i o n a f t e r the c o n s t i t u t i o n was suspended) d i d you vote? Voted .... Didn't vote .... Too young to vote .... Don't remember .... 31 -1 2 3 4 (a) I f voted, ask; For which party d i d you vote? PPP (Burnham) 3 2 - 1 PPP (Jagan) .... 2 UDP (C a r t e r ) .... 3 Other (?) .... 4 2 3 9 PERCEPTION OF PARTY SUPPORT 18. Now back to the l a s t E l e c t i o n , which party do you think the following types of people voted for?: (N.B. f o r each type repeat "Which party do you think the following types of people voted for)? Won't Don't vote as GUMP PNC PPP UF know a bio Labourers . . . 3 3 -1 . . . 2 . . . 3 • • • 4 • • • 5 . . . 6 C i v i l Servants . . . 3 4 -1 . . . 2 . . . 3 • • • 4 • • • 5 . . . 6 Poor People . . . 3 5 -1 . . . 2 . . . 3 • • • 4 • • • 5 . . . 6 Businessmen . . . 3 6 -1 . . . 2 . . . 3 • • • 4 • • • 5 . . . 6 Catholics . . . 3 7 -1 . . . 2 . . . 3 • • • 4 • • 0 5 . . . 6 East Indians . . . 3 8 -1 . . . 2 . . . 3 • • • 4 • • © 5 . . . 6 Teachers . . . 3 9 -1 . . . 2 . . . 3 • • • 4 • • • 5 . . . 6 Negroes . . . 40 -1 . . . 2 . . . 3 • • • 4 • • • 5 . . . 6 Rice Farmers . . . 4 1 -1 . . . 2 . . . 3 • • • 4 • • • 5 . . . 6 Portuguese . . . 4 2 -1 . . . 2 . . . 3 • • • 4 • • • 5 . . . 6 19. Here i n t h i s v i l l a g e ( c i t y or town) what clubs and organizations such as s o c i a l , business or p o l i t i c a l , do you belong to? I f respondent does not state membership of a p o l i t i c a l party  ask s p e c i f i c a l l y : Are you a member of a p o l i t i c a l party? (a) About how often do you attend meetings - would you say usually, only occasionally, or almost never? (b) Are you, or were you ever an o f f i c e holder or Committee member? MEETING ATTENDANCE NEVER OR OFFICER OR ALWAYS OR ALMOST COMMITTEE ORGANIZATION USUALLY OCCASIONALLY NEVER MEMBER BELONG TO NO ORGANIZATION 43-44 240 20. I f a member of a p o l i t i c a l p arty, ask: (a) Do you ever c o n t r i b u t e money to the Party? Yes .... 4 5 - 1 No .... 2 (b) Were you ever a member of any other p o l i t i c a l party? Yes .... 4 6 - 1 No .... 2 I f yes, ask: (c) Which party? 47 (d) Why d i d you leave p a r t y (c) to j o i n p a r t y (a)? 48 PERCEPTION OF PARTY LEADERSHIP 21. Which of these words comes c l o s e s t to d e s c r i b i n g the idea you have of: (a) Burnham (b) Jagan (c) D'Aguiar Use as many words as you can t h i n k of to describe him. (Show CARD 2) . (a) Burnham (b) Jagan (c) D'Agui CONSERVATIVE ... 49 -1 . . . 50 -1 . . . 51 RADICAL ... 2 . . . 2 HONEST ... 5 . . . 5 "SO-SO" ... 4 . . . 4 CONFUSED ... 5 . . . 5 "SMARTMAN" ... 6 . . . 6 THRIFTY ... 7 . . . 7 . . . . RACIAL ... 8 ... 8 COMMUNIST ... 9 . . . 9 241 ASSESSMENT OF LOCAL PARTY ORGANIZATION 22. During the E l e c t i o n campaign l a s t year, d i d canvasers (or people) from any of the p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s come around t r y i n g to get you to vote f o r t h e i r party (PROBE FOR EACH PARTY IF NECESSARY -e.g. I f respondent mentions a v i s i t from the PNC and not the PPP canvasser, ask: Didn't the PPP or the UF come around to see you?) YES NO GUMP . . . 52 -1 . . . 2 PNC . . . 53 -1 • • • 2 PPP . . . 54 -1 • • • 2 UF . . . 55 -1 . . . 2 23. Please t r y and remember how many times you were v i s i t e d by the Canvasser (or people) from these p a r t i e s : once, twice, three times, not at a l l ? NONE ONCE TWO THREE FOUR GUMP . . . 56 -0 . . . 1 . . . 2 . . . 3 . . . 4 PNC . . . 57 -0 . . . 1 . . . 2 . . . 3 0 0 © 4 PPP . . . 58 -0 . . . 1 . . . 2 . . . 3 0 0« 4 UF . . . 59 -0 . . . 1 . . . 2 . . . 3 . . . 4 24. Did you re c e i v e any l e t t e r , pamphlets or other Campaign m a t e r i a l from any of these p a r t i e s ? YES NO GUMP . . . 60 -1 . . . 2 PNC . . . 61 -1 . . . 2 PPP . . . 62 -1 . . . 2 UF . . . 63 -1 . . . 2 242 25. During the campaign d i d you wear party buttons or d i s p l a y p arty s t i c k e r s or posters f o r any of the p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s ? Which one? YES NO GUMP ... 64 -1 . . . 2 PNC ... 65 -1 . . . 2 PPP ... 66 -1 . . . 2 UP ... 67 -1 . . . 2 PERCEPTIONS ON GUYANA'S FUTURE 26. Some people say that the major problem i n Guyana i s the race s i t u a t i o n ; others say that the major problem i s to get more money to i n v e s t i n b u i l d i n g roads, schools, houses and so on, but s t i l l others say the most important of a l l i s our border dispute w i t h Venezuela and Surinam. Can you t h i n k of any p r e s s i n g problems f a c i n g t h i s country at present? YES 68 -1 No I f yes, ask; (a) What are these problems? 69 (b) Which p a r t y do you t h i n k can best solve these problems ( i . e . the race question, g e t t i n g more money, the border dispute e t c . ) ? GUMP PNC PPP UF NONE DON'T KNOW 70 -1 2 3 4 5 6 27* Do you p e r s o n a l l y expect that t h i s country w i l l enjoy a period of economic p r o s p e r i t y i n the next f i v e years or so, i . e . that there w i l l be more money and j>bs a v a i l a b l e f o r the people? Do you expect money to be scarce and unemployment to increase? Expects p r o s p e r i t y .... 7 1 - 1 Expects depression .... 2 Depends (on what) J Don't know 4 243 28. Do you p e r s o n a l l y expect that t h i s country w i l l be faced with r a c i a l t r o u b l e s i n the next f i v e years or so, or do you t h i n k there i s a good chance of a v o i d i n g t h i s ? Expects v i o l e n c e .... 7 2 - 1 Doesn't expect v i o l e n c e .... 2 Depends (on what) 3 Don't know .... 4 Here are some people's o p i n i o n on c e r t a i n developments i n Guyana. K i n d l y s t a t e how s t r o n g l y you agree or diasgree w i t h each of these. 29. A n a t i o n a l insurance scheme i s a waste of time. sa a cd d_ sd 73 -1 2 3 4 5 30. The people i n the Rupununi should be allowed to form a separate s t a t e . sa a cd d _sd 74 -1 2 3 4 5 31. Guyanese l i v i n g abroad should not be permitted to vote i n the E l e c t i o n s . sa a cd d sd 75 -1 2 3 4 5 32. Guyana should not have j o i n e d CARIPTA sa a cd d sd 76 -1 2 3 4 5 33. D i v i d e Guyana i n t o three s e c t i o n s : one f o r East Indians, one f o r negroes and one f o r the r e s t of the population. sa a cd. d sd. 77 -1 2 3 4 5 244 (Punch CARD Ho. 2) Before asking questions 34 - 35i ask: Are your parents alive? Mother: L i v i n g Dead Don't know .... Father: L i v i n g Dead Don't know .... Other: (specify) PARENTS TOTING PREFERENCE 34. Do you know i f your mother ever voted at an E l e c t i o n i n Guyana? Voted .... 58 -1 Never voted .... 2 Don't know .... 3 I f yes, ask: 34a. Which party does/did she normally vote for? PRESENT PARTIES: GUMP .... 59-1 PNC .... 2 PPP 3 UF .... 4 FORMER PARTIES: OLD PPP (1953) 5 UDP (John Carter) .... 6 NDP ) _ j . . . . / NLF ) PEPP) o JP 5 Other, specify .... 9 245 Do you know i f your father ever voted at an E l e c t i o n i n Guyana Voted .... 6 0 - 1 Never voted .... 2 Don't know .... 3 I f yes, ask; Do you know which party your father normally votes/voted for? PRESENT PARTIES; GUMP .... 6 1 - 1 PNC .... 2 PPP 3 UP .... 4 FORMER PARTIES: PPP ( 1 9 5 3 ) 5 UDP (John Carter) .... 6 NDP ) 7 j • • • • i NLF ) PEPP) Q j . . • . o JP ) Other,(specify) .... 9 Do any of your closest friends disagree with your p o l i t i c a l views? YES ... .... 6 2 - 1 No ... .... 2 DON'T KNOW .... 3 246 37* I f yes, ask: Would you say most of your c l o s e s t f r i e n d s disagree w i t h you, some of them, or only a few? MOST SOME ONLY PEW DON'T KNOW 63 -1 2 3 4 38. Do you know anyone p e r s o n a l l y who i s an a c t i v e member or worker of the Peoples' N a t i o n a l Congress i n (name d i s t r i c t YES .... 64-1 NO 2 (a) I f yes, ask: Who i s that? ( r e l a t i o n to respondent). 65 (b) I f yes, ask: What does he (or she) do f o r the Party? 66 39. Do you know of anybody p e r s o n a l l y who i s an a c t i v e member or worker f o r the Peoples' Progressive Party? YES 67-1 NO 67-2 I f yes, ask: Who i s that? ( r e l a t i o n to respondent) I f yes, ask: What does he (or she) do f o r the Party? 68 69 40. F i n a l l y , do you know anyone p e r s o n a l l y who i s an a c t i v e member or worker of the United Force? YES 70-1 No 2 I f yes, ask: Who i s that? ( r e l a t i o n to respondent) I f yes, ask: What does he (or she) do for. the Party? 71 72 247 SENSE OF CITIZEN DUTY Would you k i n d l y give your o p i n i o n on the f o l l o w i n g : i . e . I would l i k e you to state i f you s t r o n g l y agree, agree, can't decide, disagree, or s t r o n g l y disagree -sa cd sd 4 1 . I t i s n ' t so important to vote when you know your party doesn't have a chance to win. 4 2 . A good many E l e c t i o n s aren't important enough to bother with. 4 3 ' So many people vote i n the n a t i o n a l E l e c t i o n that i t doesn't matter much to me whether I vote or not. 7 3 -7 4 -7 5 -4 4 « I f a person doesn't care how an E l e c t i o n comes out, he shouldn't vote i n i t 7 6 -SENSE OF POLITICAL EFFICACY 4 5 ' I don't t h i n k that M i n i s t e r s of the Government care much what people l i k e me t h i n k 4 6 . V o t i n g i s the only way people l i k e me have any say about how the government runs t h i n g s . 7 7 -7 8 -4 7 « People l i k e me don't have any say about what the government does. 79-4 8 . Sometimes p o l i t i c s and government seem so complicated that a person l i k e me can't r e a l l y understand what i s going on 80-248 APPENDIX I I I GROUP LEADER INTERVIEW SCHEDULE  GUYANA 1969 SCHEDULE OP QUESTIONS PARTY GROUP CONSTITUENCY ELECTORAL DATE OF INTERVIEW DISTRICT AND NO. OF VISITS 1. 1 2.to.4. 1. Let's s t a r t w i t h some questions about your background i n p o l i t i c s . What was the f i r s t campaign i n which you were a p a r t y worker? ^ ^  I f not l a s t campaign, ask: l a . Have you worked f o r t h i s p a r t y continuously since then? 1. Yes 6-1 2. No 2 I f no, ask: l b . Between what years were you not working f o r t h i s party? to 7-1 l c . Did you work f o r another party? 1. Yes 8-1 2. No 2 I f yes,to l c , ask: Id. Which Party? 9-2. What f i r s t l e d you to become a c t i v e as a par t y worker? 10-I f not c l e a r , ask: How was i t you became a c t i v e at that time? 11-3. Before you got i n t o party work, how did you f i r s t develop an i n t e r e s t i n p o l i t i c a l matters? 12-249 4. We have found that party organisations i n the different d i s t r i c t s vary quite a b i t . In t h i s v i l l a g e (town) what i s the next party organisational l e v e l between your group and the party headquarters i n Georgetown? ( i f prompting or c l a r i f i c a t i o n i s required ask; e.g. i s there a Constituency group or a County group?) U -5. Here i s a l i s t of different party positions (SHOW CARD l ) . Which of these do you now hold? NONE 1 4 - 0 SOME (RECORD BELOW) -1 CARD 1 I f now I f previously Holds Held a. Delegate to party convention 15-1 a - 2 b. Party o f f i c i a l of l o c a l group 16-1 b -• 2 c. Member of Party's Central executive 17-1 c - 2 d. Member of V i l l a g e (or town) Council 18-1 d - 2 e. Others: O f f i c i a l i n youth organisation or club attached to party 19-1 e - 2 SPECIFIC POSITIONS 20 5a. Which of these have you previously held? NONE .... 21-0 SOME (Record above) -1 ADMINISTRATIVE LEADERSHIP 6. Some party groups keep records or f i l e s on people i n t h e i r d i s t r i c t s to aid campaign a c t i v i t i e s . Did you have such records for the l a s t campaign? 1. Yes 22-1 2. No .... -2 I f yes, ask: 6a. In these records did you have information about a l l the people i n your d i s t r i c t who supported your party .... about most of these people.... or about a few of your party's supporters i n t h i s d i s t r i c t ? 1. A l l 23-1 2. Most .... -2 3- A few -3 250 6b. From your records could you t e l l who was r e g i s t e r e d and who wasn't? 1. Yes .... 24 -1 2. No -2 6c. Did you use these records on e l e c t i o n day? 1. Yes .... 25 -1 2. No.,,, -2 I f yes, ask: How then d i d you use them? 26-INTERNAL LEADERSHIP 7. What hel p e r s d i d you have d u r i n g the l a s t campaign? (GET NUMBER AND ROLE, e.g. 1 s i s t e r , 3 neighbours, 2 nurses). I f any h e l p e r s , ask: 7a. How many of these people helped you r i g h t through the campaign? (Get number) 27-8 7b. Were a l l these helpers from your own group or d i d you share workers from other groups, or were none of your workers from your own group? 1. own .... 29-1 2. share ... -2 3« none ... -3 7 c About how many meetings you had during the campaign with;, j u s t the workers from your own d i s t r i c t ? (Get number) 30-7d. Were there other ways i n which you d i r e c t e d the a c t i v i t i e s of your own workers? 1. Yes ... 31-1 2. No ... -2 I f yes, ask: 7e. What were they? 32-I f shared workers, ask: 7f. You mentioned that you shared workers wi t h other d i s t r i c t s . How was the work of these people d i r e c t e d ? i . e . wi t h r e g u l a r meetings, phone c a l l s or what? 33-REPRESENTATIVE LEADERSHIP 251 8. In your opinion, was there a f a i r l y clear plan for your party i n t h i s d i s t r i c t about the type of a c t i v i t y to be followed? Yes .... 34-1 No .... -2 I f yes, ask: 8 a . How were you informed about t h i s plan? 35-I f no, ask: 8 b . Did you ever have meetings of Group leaders of your party to discuss election strategy? Yes .... 36-1 No .... -2 I f yes to 8b ask: 8 c . Where did these meetings usually take place? e.g. at your house, at a party o f f i c e , at a friends home? - 37 9 . During the l a s t campaign, about how many meetings of group leaders were there i n t h i s constituency? (Get Number) 38 10. About how many of these did you actually attend? (Get number) 39-11. At these meetings, who was normally the Chairman? (Get name) Interviewee 40-1 Other -2 No Chairman -0 EXTERNAL LEADERSHIP 12. Are there any party a c t i v i t i e s that go on i n your d i s t r i c t between elections such as dances, outings, p o l i t i c a l r a l l i e s , and so forth? Yes .... 41-1 No .... -2 I f yes, ask: 12a. What are they? 42-12b. What part have you taken i n these a c t i v i t i e s ? 43-252 13. Here i n t h i s v i l l a g e ( c i t y or town), what clubs and organisa-tions such as s o c i a l , business or p o l i t i c a l , do you belong to? (a) About how often do you attend meetings? Would you say usually, only occasionally, or almost never? (b) Are you or were you an o f f i c e holder or committee member? MEETING ATTENDANCE ORGANISATION ALWAYS OR OCCASION- NEVER OR OFFICER USUALLY ALLY ALMOST OR NEVER COMMITTEE MEMBER BELONG TO NO ORGANISATION 44-45 STRENGTH OF MOTIVATION 14. Do you think that o f f i c i a l s of d i s t r i c t party groups should have more say than they do i n running the party; that they have s u f f i c i e n t say, or should they have less. Should have more say , 46 -1 Have s u f f i c i e n t say -2 Should have less say -3 15. I f you were re-elected, do you think that y o u ' l l continue i n your job as d i s t r i c t party leader? Yes 47 -1 No -2 Don't know -3 Depends (on what) -4 I f no, ask: 15a. Do you have any p a r t i c u l a r reason for not wanting to continue? 48-253 16. Suppose you were nominated to some p o s i t i o n i n the C e n t r a l party Executive, would you accept i t ? Yes 49-1 No -2 Don't know -3 Depends (on what) -4 17. What p o s i t i o n w i t h i n the C e n t r a l Executive do you t h i n k you're best s u i t e d to have? (Get p o s i t i o n ) PARTY CHAIRMAN 50-1 GENERAL SECRETARY -2 COMMITTEE MEMBER -3 OTHER -4 PERCEPTION OF PARTY'S ROLE 18. Would you say that there are important d i f f e r e n c e s between your p a r t y and the party? Yes .... 51-1 No -2 I f yes, ask; 18a. What are the major d i f f e r e n c e s you see? 52 19. And would you say that there are major d i f f e r e n c e s between your p a r t y and the party? Yes 53-1 No -2 I f yes,ask; 19a. What are ;the major d i f f e r e n c e s you see? 54 20. What do you p a r t i c u l a r l y l i k e about your own party? 55 21. What, i f anything, do you d i s l i k e about your own party? 56 22. What, i f anything, do you l i k e about the o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s 57-58 2 5 4 POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE 2 3 . In your opinion what was the most important issue i n the l a s t campaign? 6 Q _ 6 l 2 4 . What was your party's stand on CARIFTA? 6 2 2 5 - What do you think about the proposed National Insur-ance Act? ^ 2 6 . Some people think that the overseas r e g i s t r a t i o n should not be allowed. Do you support t h i s view? 2 7 « I f you were giving advice to the Government what solutions would you propose for the Rupununi? 6 5 28. Esu Kayama (the former Sidney King) once suggested p a r t i t i o n i n g the country. What do you think about t h i s idea? 6 6 29. What i n your opinion i s the major problem that the Guyana Government must t r y to solve immediately? 6 7 -3 0 . Do you personally expect that t h i s country w i l l enjoy a period of economic prosperity i n the next f i v e years or so, i . e . that there w i l l he more money and jobs a v a i l a b l e f o r the people? Or do you expect money to he scarce and unemployment to increase? Expects prosperity 6 8 - 1 Expects depression - 2 Depends (on what) - 3 Don't know - 4 3 1 . Do you personally think that t h i s country w i l l he faced with r a c i a l troubles i n the next f i v e years or so, or do you think there i s a good chance of avoiding i t ? Expects violence 6 9 - 1 Doesn't expect violence .... - 2 Depends (on what) - 3 Don't know - 4 255 BIOGRAPHICAL  SEX: RACE: AGE: Male Amerindian Chinese East Indian Negro Under 25 26-55 36-45 70-1 . . . . 71-1 - 2 . . . . - 3 . . . . -4 72-1 - 2 . . . . - 3 Female Portuguese White Mixed 46-55 . . . 56-65 . . . Over 65 -5 -6 -7 -4 - 5 -6 USUAL OCCUPATION I f housewife note occupation of the breadwinner 73-Father's occupation 74 Mother's occupation 75 PRESENTLY EMPLOYED (EXCEPT HOUSEWIFE)? Yes .... 76-1 No.... - 2 R e f u s a l .... -9 EDUCATION None 77-1 Primary Complete .... -2 Primary Incomplete. .. - 3 Secondary Complete .. -4 Secondary Incomplete. V o c a t i o n a l / T e c h n i c a l . Higher Technical .... U n i v e r s i t y RELIGION Which Church do you Belong to? C a t h o l i c .... 78-1 Pr o t e s t a n t (which denomination Hindu .... - 3 Muslim .... -4 Other Agnostic .... -6 MARITAL STATUS Si n g l e 79-1 Married .... -2 Other 256 APPENDIX IY AMERINDIANS AND THE RuPMTJNI DISTRICT The Rupununi D i s t r i c t c o n s i s t s of that part of Guyana, which l i e s south of the 5 t h degree of north l a t i t u d e . I t i s hounded on i t s eastern side by Surinam and on i t s southern and western sides by the st a t e of Para and the Federal T e r r i t o r y of the Rio Branco i n B r a z i l . The d i s t r i c t has an area of 40,772 square m i l e s , which i s about 45 per cent of the t o t a l area of Guyana. I t s population of 9>000 (approximately) i s only 1.4 per cent of the t o t a l p o p u l a t i o n of Guyana, made up to a l a r g e extent of Amerindians, a handful of Europeans, mostly ranchers and s e t t l e r s and a s p r i n k l i n g of Creole migrants who are e i t h e r miners or workers of f o r e s t products, or p u b l i c servants, p o l i c e and m i l i t a r y personnel. This d i s t r i c t takes i t s name from the Rupununi R i v e r which flows through i t . The i n h a b i t a n t s of the area are mainly descendants of the indigenous people of the country and may be c l a s s i f i e d i n f i v e t r i b e s , Wai-Wais, Vapisianas, Makusis, Patamonas and Arecunas. Of these the Wai-Wais are represented by two small v i l l a g e s of about 150 i n h a b i t a n t s , while the Wapisianas, Makusis and Patamonas are s t i l l r e l a t i v e l y strong numbering approximately 1800, 1600 and 450 r e s p e c t i v e l y . When the E n g l i s h took over the colony of Guyana from the Dutch, they evinced i n t e r e s t i n the h i n t e r l a n d and i t s Amerindians. In 1813 Colonel Codd, a c t i n g f o r Governor Murray, advocated the development of the Indians under missionary guidance as p r a c t i s e d i n Venezuela and B r a z i l , where the missions had i n s t r u c t e d them i n such c r a f t s as carpentry, l e a t h e r tanning, masonry etc. W i l l i a m Hilhouse however, who 257 was appointed Quartermaster General of Indians i n 1823, when the post was f i r s t introduced, condemned the B r i t i s h p o l i c y w i t h regard to the Indians saying that "the Government was transforming Indians i n t o pauperized pensioners." L i t t l e attempt was made to improve communica-t i o n s between the coastlands and the Rupununi savannahs, and o f f i c i a l p o l i c y f o r the Amerindians was merely i n the form of benevolence and c h a r i t y r a t h e r than i n the form of sponsoring v i a b l e communities of indigenous f o l k . To a l a r g e extent the missions performed a modernizing f u n c t i o n among the Amerindians. The f i r s t m ission i s s a i d to have come i n t o o p e r a t i o n i n 1834> when Rev. Mr. Youd, an Anglican p r i e s t e s t a b l i s h e d a m i s s i o n at Waraputa on the lower Essequibo r i v e r . I n 1893 i n t e r e s t i n the Rupununi grew under the i n f l u e n c e of Bishop Swaby and by 1909 over s i x A n g l i c a n churches had been e s t a b l i s h e d i n the d i s t r i c t . While the Anglicans continued to he i n f l u e n t i a l , t h e i r missions were f o r the most part l o c a t e d along the Rupununi R i v e r from the Kanuka Mountains no r t h , to Annai. The C a t h o l i c s concentrated t h e i r missions i n the south savannahs or Wapisiana country, as w e l l as the Ireng area. The missions became the centre of the s o c i a l l i f e of the Amerindians. They provided education, r e c r e a t i o n and r e l i g i o n . They provided too the most fundamental contact of the Amerindians w i t h the c u l t u r e and values of the r e s t of the s o c i e t y . That most of the p r i e s t s on these missions were white, may a l s o have had important i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r the p a t t e r n of p o l i t i c a l a l l e g i a n c e s that emerged, subsequently. More r e c e n t l y , since the Rupununi u p r i s i n g i n January 1969, white p r i e s t s are no longer to be found i n the area. This i s a d i r e c t r e s u l t of government p o l i c y to avert any f u r t h e r conspiracy against i t s l e g i t i m a c y i n the area. Not only have the white p r i e s t s and m i s s i o n a r i e s 258 been associated with the rebels i n the January 1969 revolt, but they have also been accused of gross misunderstanding of the s o c i a l and economic si g n i f i c a n c e of the Indians' various customs which they suppressed i n d i s c r i m i n a t e l y . One of the most trenchant c r i t i c i s m s of the church i n the Amerindian settlements was written as early as 1896 by a passing t r a v e l l e r who said: "As f a r as my observations lead me, the only benefit the Indian has yet derived from the e f f o r t to C h r i s t i a n -i z e him i s that he has learnt to s t e a l , indulge i n strong drink and wear i l l - f i t t i n g clothes. ""^  But before the intervention of the white man and C h r i s t i a n i t y , the Indian s o c i a l system revolved around the authority of the father of the family, of the peaiman and of the headman of the settlement. Each family, whether l i v i n g apart or i n a settlement i s ruled over by the father, whose authority i s great. As long as he l i v e s , or at l e a s t while he i s strong and active, h i s wives, h i s daughters and t h e i r husbands and hi s sons u n t i l they marry and thus pass from t h e i r own family under the r u l e of a new house-father, are almost completely under hi s sway. Thus, wherever one family l i v e s by i t s e l f the sole authority rests with the father. But the father of each, while r e t a i n i n g h i s authority over hi s ovn family, i s to some extent under the authority - that i s , under the fear and influence - of the peaiman, and, where several families l i v e i n one place, he i s also under the authority of the headman of the settlement. The authority of the peaiman, depends on the power which the man i s supposed to exercise over s p i r i t s of a l l kinds and, as a l l diseases are supposed to be the work of s p i r i t s , over diseases, and, yet further, consequently over the bodies of his fellows. The headman, C A . Lloyd, "On the Potaro," Timehri (Georgetown: R.A.C.S., 1896) . 2 5 9 on the other hand, i s g e n e r a l l y the most s u c c e s s f u l hunter, who, without having any formal a u t h o r i t y , yet because he organises the f i s h i n g and hunting p a r t i e s , obtains a c e r t a i n amount of deference from the other men of the v i l l a g e . He s e t t l e s a l l disputes w i t h i n the settlement, and i n the not d i s t a n t days when Indians were i n the h a b i t of waging war, the one on the other, he used, according to Richard Schomburgk, to determine the commencement of h o s t i l i t i e s . H is orders to any of the men of h i s settlement to go anywhere or to do anythihg are i m p l i c i t l y obeyed. And a f t e r a s u c c e s s f u l hunting or f i s h i n g excursion, he always r e c e i v e s a l a r g e r share than the others, of the booty. On t h i s o r i g i n a l Indian system, a new system was imposed by the c o l o n i a l government. In each of c e r t a i n very vaguely defined d i s t r i c t s , one Indian of each t r i b e was o f f i c i a l l y recognised as " c a p t a i n " of a l l Indians of h i s own t r i b e l i v i n g i n t h a t d i s t r i c t . He who would be c a p t a i n or c h i e f of a d i s t r i c t , i f h i s i n f l u e n c e was s u f f i c i e n t to persuade a number of h i s t r i b e to support h i s c l a i m , t r a v e l l e d to Georgetown and appeared before the Governor. I f i t seemed the wish of the m a j o r i t y of the Indians concerned, he was nominally made c a p t a i n of the Indians of h i s d i s t r i c t , i n v a r i a b l y he was, c o m i c a l l y enough, commissioned to be ' r u r a l constable'. Up to 19&4» ^ e Government's slender p o l i c i e s were r e f l e c t e d i n the f a c t that Indian a f f a i r s were only the part-time concern of the Commissioner f o r Lands and Mines. Very l i t t l e was done to implement 2 the recommendations of the Peberdy r e p o r t . The proposals i n c l u d e d a new a d m i n i s t r a t i v e system based on l o c a l superintendents w i t h Indian P.S. Peberdy, Report on a Survey of Amerindian A f f a i r s i n the Remote  I n t e r i o r of B r i t i s h Guiana (Guyana: Government, 1948). 2 6 0 a s s i s t a n t s , v i l l a g e councils and a central t r i b a l committee. A l l 'undesirable r e l i g i o u s bodies' which impose harmful r e l i g i o u s taboos should be excluded from Indian d i s t r i c t s . Peberdy a d d i t i o n a l l y advocated three large Indian d i s t r i c t s i n the North West, the Mazaruni and the Rupununi, a cooperative framework f o r the production of timber, balata, mineral products and f o r the rearing of c a t t l e . His major contention was that a new system of land tenure must be introduced to destroy the monopoly of the Rupununi Development Corporation (run by a few business-men and Booker Bros.) and private ranchers. Since 1967» under the D'Aguiar-Burnham c o a l i t i o n , many aspects of the Peberdy report were considered. In 1969 (March), the government set up a Department of I n t e r i o r Development with s p e c i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r Amerindian A f f a i r s . The preliminary document put out by t h i s department suggests that i t has been greatly influenced by the Peberdy 3 report. Mainly because of a series of s o c i a l i z i n g factors by which c r e o l i z e d Guyanese have been i d e n t i f i e d with an e x p l o i t i n g sector of the community, the Indians maintain t h e i r suspicion of other Guyanese. I t i s therefore not s u r p r i s i n g that the a b i l i t y of the United Force to coopt Amerindians into t h e i r party i n 1961 was a major reason f o r t h e i r success. The growing support i n Amerindian areas f o r the PNC i s most l i k e l y accounted f o r by i t s vigorous e f f o r t s to a t t r a c t Amerindians into i t s apparatus. In addition the PNC i s using i t s monopoly of state power to dispense patronage to the Amerindians i n a way that appeals to them. In 1968 the PNC introduced an Annual Convention of Amerindian B r i t i s h Guiana, Confidential Report of the Commissioner of I n t e r i o r  Development (Guyana: Georgetown, Sept. 1969). 261 Captains at which p o l i c y i s discussed. The government a l s o increased the s t i p e n d to these Captains from $25.00 (Guy.) to $150.00 (Guy.). We discovered that as a r e s u l t most Captains saw themselves as employees of the Government and there f o r e morally hound to support the Govern-ment. Given the a u t h o r i t y of the Captains over t h e i r Indian colleagues, i t i s q u i t e conceivable that the strength of the PNC's support i n these areas i s l i k e l y to grow. . E s p e c i a l l y when along w i t h t h i s p o l i c y i s one of min i m i z i n g the i n f l u e n c e of the m i s s i o n a r i e s most of whom, l o y a l to the UP p r i o r to the January '69 r e v o l t , have since been e x p e l l e d . Most ascendant i n the government's proposals f o r t h i s area i s i n c r e a s i n g the l e v e l of the cooperative s t r u c t u r e . Hence farming and mining and ranching have a l l been f a c i l i t a t e d . The major setback however i s the i n f l u x of Afro-Guyanese i n t o the area. This i s viewed w i t h great s u s p i c i o n by the n a t i v e s who see these i n t r u d e r s as th r e a t s to t h e i r own t r a d i t i o n a l s o c i e t y . Sometimes too, the unscrupulous behaviour of Government personnel, who continue to e x p l o i t the n a t i v e s both i n terms of t h e i r resources and t h e i r women, t a r n i s h the image of government's p o l i c y d i r e c t e d towards u p l i f t i n g the morale of the Indians. In terms of par t y o r g a n i s a t i o n , there i s very l i t t l e i n c e n t i v e to maintain other than a face to face r e l a t i o n s h i p . Perhaps the t a c t i c a l p o l i c y i s one which c a p i t a l i z e s on the prebendary r e l a t i o n s h i p s and a u t h o r i t y which pervade the t r a d i t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e of the Indian f a m i l y and h i s community. Attachment of the Captains to a par t y i s p a r t l y i n d i c a t i v e of the i n c i p i e n t support of that party from the d i s t r i c t . 2 6 2 APPENDIX V EXPLANATION OP SOME SCALES USED IN THIS STUDY L. THREE DIMENSIONAL IMAGE SCALE OF PARTY LEADERS1 The following dimensions were used to group respondents' descriptions of party leaders. A B C honest conservative confused "smartman" r a d i c a l r a c i a l t h r i f t y "so-so" communist Image r a t i n g r e s u l t i n g from respondents' descriptions were as follows A } 4 - favourable AB ) B ABC) - moderate AC BC ^ \ - unfavourable, 2. CAMPAIGN ACTIVITY INDEX2 1. Helped to organise/plan campaign whether as o f f i c i a l / n o n o f f i c i a l of the party. 2. Member of a party - paying dues/attending party meetings. See above pp. 93-94 2See pp. 137-138 263 3. Not a formal member of any party but made c o n t r i b u t i o n s to the campaign e i t h e r f i n a n c i a l l y or otherwise/vote r e g u l a r l y f o r a p a r t i c u l a r party. 4. Not a formal member of any p o l i t i c a l party, normally, n e i t h e r c o n t r i b u t e s to the campaign nor votes r e g u l a r l y f o r any party but showed a " l e a n i n g " toward a p a r t i c u l a r p a r t y d u r i n g the 1968 campaign. 5. Did not even show "le a n i n g s " toward any party d u r i n g the 1968 campaign 3. POLITICAL EFFICACY SCALE^ Respondents given a score on each item as i n d i c a t e d i n Questions 45-43 Appendix 2, page 218. Scale Score as f o l l o w s : Under 9 - low l e v e l of c i t i z e n s h i p duty 10-14 - moderate l e v e l of c i t i z e n s h i p duty Over 14 - h i g h l e v e l of c i t i z e n s h i p duty ' 4. SENSE OF CITIZENSHIP DUTY SCALE 4 Same p r i n c i p l e as P o l i t i c a l E f f i c a c y Scale. 5. ANOMIE SCALE^ Two each of the f o l l o w i n g questions which make up the s c a l e are derived from the P o l i t i c a l E f f i c a c y Scale and the Sense of C i t i z e n -s hip Duty Scale r e s p e c t i v e l y . 1. People l i k e me don't have any say about how the government runs t h i n g s . 2. I don't t h i n k m i n i s t e r s of the Government care much what people l i k e me t h i n k . 3. A good many e l e c t i o n s aren't important enough to bother wit> 4. So many people vote i n the n a t i o n a l e l e c t i o n s that i t doesn't matter much 5See pp. 139-141. 4See pp. 142-144. 5See pp. 144-147. APPENDIX VI SELECTED DEMOGRAPHIC DATA TABLE VI RACIAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE POPULATION OF GUYANA ACCORDING TO THE CENSUS 1891-1970 Year Amer-i n d i a n Chinese East Indian Mixed Negro Portuguese White Other TOTAL 1891 - 3 , 7 1 4 1 0 5 , 4 6 3 2 9 , 0 2 9 1 1 5 , 5 8 8 1 2 , 1 6 6 4 , 5 5 8 374 2 7 0 , 8 9 2 1 9 2 1 9 , 1 5 0 2,722 1 2 4 , 9 3 8 3 0 , 5 8 9 1 1 7 , 1 6 9 9 , 1 7 5 3 , 2 9 1 659 2 9 7 , 6 9 3 1946 1 6 , 3 2 2 3 , 5 6 7 1 6 3 , 4 3 4 3 7 , 6 8 5 1 4 3 , 3 8 5 8 , 5 4 3 2 , 4 8 0 285 3 7 5 , 7 0 1 I 9 6 0 2 5 , 4 5 3 4 , 0 7 4 2 6 7 , 7 9 0 6 7 , 1 9 1 1 8 3 , 9 5 0 8 , 3 4 6 3 , 2 1 7 302 5 6 0 , 3 2 3 1970 3 2 , 7 9 4 4 , 6 7 8 377 , 2 5 6 8 4 , 0 7 7 2 2 7 , 0 9 1 9 , 6 6 8 4 , 0 5 6 576 7 4 0 , 1 9 6 Sources: I n t e r n a t i o n a l Commission of J u r i s t s , Memorandum presented by the Govt, of B r i t i s h Guiana (Part I I DEMOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS) Prepared by G.W. Roberts and J . Byrne, J u l y 1 9 6 5 . Census B u l l e t i n No. 1 , Population Census, I 9 6 0 . Series D, B r i t i s h Guiana, (Port of Spain, Population Census D i v i s i o n , 1 9 6 3 ) . Guyana: Pre l i m i n a r y Population Report, (Georgetown: M i n i s t r y of Information) June 1 9 7 0 . TABLE VI PERCENTAGE COMPOSITION OF POPULATION BY RACE Portu-Year Indian Chinese Indian Mixed Negro. guese White Other TOTAL 1891 - 1 . 4 3 8 . 9 1 0 . 7 4 2 . 7 4 . 5 1 . 7 0 . 1 1 0 0 . 0 1 9 2 1 3 . 1 0 . 9 4 2 . 0 1 0 . 3 3 9 . 4 3 . 1 1 . 1 0 . 2 1 0 0 . 0 1 9 4 6 4 - 3 0 . 9 4 3 . 5 1 0 . 0 3 8 . 2 2 . 3 0 . 7 0 . 1 1 0 0 . 0 I 9 6 0 4 . 5 0 . 7 4 7 . 8 1 2 . 0 3 2 . 8 1 . 5 0 . 6 0 . 1 , 1 0 0 . 0 1 9 7 0 4 . 4 0 . 6 5 1 . 0 1 1 . 4 3 0 . 7 1 . 3 0 . 5 0 . 1 1 0 0 . 0 Sources: I n t e r n a t i o n a l Commission of J u r i s t s , Memorandum presented by the Govt, of B r i t i s h Guiana (Part I I DEMOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS) Prepared by G.W. Roberts and J . Byrne, J u l y 1 9 6 5 -Census B u l l e t i n No. 1 , Population Census, I 9 6 0 . Series D, B r i t i s h Guiana, (Port of Spain, Population Census D i v i s i o n , 1 9 6 3 ) . Guyana: Pre l i m i n a r y Population Report, (Georgetown; M i n i s t r y of Information) June 1 9 7 0 . to ON TABLE VI PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION BY RACE FOR SUGAR ESTATES. VILLAGES AND URBAN CENTRES Amerindian Chinese East Indian Mixed Negro Portuguese White Other SUGAR ESTATES 1891 - 1.59 79.36 2.42 14.44 1.12 0.93 0.14 1921 - 0.76- 81.77 2.29 13.96 0.39 0.72 0.12 1931 - 0.62 80.98 2.35 15.29 O.32 0.41 0.02 i960 - 0.38 80.45 3.35 14.76 0.18 0.58 0.31 1970 - •• • _ - - - -VILLAGES 1891 - 1.0-3 26.70 6.11 61.20 4.31 0.33 O.32 1921 - 0.77 41.16 5-48 49.86 2.15 0.22 O.36 1931 - 0.70 38.73 5.27 52.53 1.76 0.10 0.11 I960 - 0.65 42.6 5.07 50.5 1.66 0.10 0.12 1970 - - - -URBAN CENTRES 1891 - 1.50 8.44 27.03 47.19 10.23 5.02 O.59 1921 - 1.60 I I . 3 4 24.08 50.59 8.54 5.45 0.40 1931 - 1.77 11.98 22.68 53.57 7.60 2.01 0.39 I960 - 1.81 22.13 21.72 49.00 3.78 1.22 O.34 1970 - - - - _ _ _ Sources: ICJ, Memorandum, Part I I , p. 33. B.G. Population Census, I960, No. 1 Guyana: Pr e l i m i n a r y Population Report. "Urban" i s used here to c l a s s i f y those c o n s t i t u e n c i e s which r e f l e c t a r e l a t i v e l y high population d e n s i t y coupled wi t h a tendency towards i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n as opposed to a g r i c u l t u r e , which i s a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the r u r a l areas. Following t h i s c r i t e r i a of urban-rural c l a s s i f i c a t i o n , George Roberts found only 2 urban areas i n Guyana v i z . , Georgetown and New Amsterdam. See George Roberts and Joycelyn Byrne, Demographic, Economic and S o c i o l o g i c a l Background: Memorandum to the I n t e r - n a t i o n a l Commission "of J u r i s t s , Part III (Georgetown, Guyana, Government P r i n t e r s , 1965). N J 2 6 8 TABLE VI AGE DISTRIBUTION OF THE POPULATION, 1921-1970 Age Group Over 0 and under II II II II 1 5 " " II fiX^ ti II " 6 5 Age not stated . Total 1 9 2 1 1 9 3 1 1 9 4 6 I 9 6 0 1 9 7 0 Census Census Census Census Census 5 3 0 7 5 4 4 5 0 7 7 6 2 7 3 2 9 8 1 9 5 1 1 7 5 6 0 1 5 6 4 6 1 3 66369 8 4 3 3 8 1 6 1 0 7 5 2 0 5 6 3 2 45 1 4 8 4 4 8 1 4 6 5 6 3 162241 2 1 5 2 5 5 218285 64 42666 4 3 6 0 7 47597 6 7 0 7 2 6 9 0 9 8 . 9 1 3 6 8 4 5 9 12422 18809 20167 2 0 7 4 8 5 8 348 - -2 9 7 6 9 1 3 1 0 9 3 3 3 6 9 6 7 8 5 6 0 4 0 6 7 2 0 7 4 0 TABLE VI AGE DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION ( i n Percentages) Over 0 and under 5 1 0 . 4 1 4 . 5 1 7 . 0 1 7 . 5 18.5 it 5 it 11 1 5 21.9 2 1 . 4 22.8 28 . 7 30.2 11 1 5 11 11 45 50.2 4 7 . 3 43.9 38.4' 38.8 11 45 11 it 64 • 14.4 1 4 . 1 12.9 12.0 10.5 it 65 3 . 1 2 . 7 3.4 3.4 2.0 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Number of dependents per person of working age ( 1 5 - 6 4 ) 0 . 5 5 O . 6 3 O . 7 6 0 . 9 8 Sources: 1 9 2 1 and 1 9 3 1 , R.R. Kuczynski, Demographic Survey, Table on p.! 1 9 4 6 , R.R. Kuczynski, Demographic Survey, Table 4 , P- 1 6 0 . I960, Census B u l l e t i n s No. 1 and No. 1 2 , Population Census,196( Series D. B r i t i s h Guiana (Port of Spain: Population Census D i v i s i o n , 1 9 6 3 ) . 1 9 7 0 , Preliminary Census. TABLE- 6 RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION OF ADULT GUYANESE POPULATION ACCORDING TO RACE (In Percentages) - . CHRISTIAN NON CHRISTIAN Roman Catholic Protestant Other Hindu Muslim Atheist 1 ? 4 6 I 9 6 0 •1970 1946 I 9 6 0 1 ? 7 0 1?46 I 9 6 0 1?70 1946 I 9 6 0 1970 1946 I 9 6 0 1970 ' 1946 I960 197C A f r i c a n 22 25 24 69 ' 7 0 64. 9 5 8 - - -. 3 • _ 1. East Indian 1 11 14 3 28 34 - - - ' 72 48 40 24 13 12 - -Portuguese 85 77 15 23 - - - - - - — - - -Amerindians . - - 72 - - - - - - - • - - - - _ 18 Source: B r i t i s h Guiana Population Census 1946, Vol. 2, Part B, 1946 B r i t i s h Guiana Population Census I 9 6 0 , Vol. 2, Part A. . Guyana Preliminary Census, (Guyana: Mi n i s t r y of Economic Planning, 1 9 7 1 ) TABLE 7 EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT OF THE POPULATION ' ( I n P e r c e n t a g e s ) ' • None Primary School (only) Secondary School (incomplete) Secondary School Higher Education a. Technical h. U n i v e r s i t y 5 - 20 Year Age Group 1962 N = 2 3 5 * 15 45 20 19 7 3 1968 N = 243* • 4 30 16 26 10 8 Whole Population I960 N = 572* 8 60 15 10 1970 N = 612* 6 52 12 21 Source: Education B u l l e t i n (Georgetown, Guyana, Ministry of Information) B r i t i s h Guiana Population Census I960 Vol. I I , Part B. Facts Sheet (Georgetown, Guyana, M i n i s t r y of Information, 1969) Preliminary Population Census 1970 (Georgetown, Guyana, 1 9 7 1 ) . *These are given i n '5>00. A T L A N T I C O C E A N B R I T I S H G U I A N A NORTH-EAST SHEET Compiled In the Cartographic Section of The Department of Lands and Mines, Georgetown, British Guiana. Scale: 1 :500 ,000 Transverse Mercator Projection 1 9 4 7 REFERENCE MAP I (Sgd.) HUGH HALLETT 2 4** NOVEMBER I960. B R I T I S H G U I A N A - I 6«)TISH GUIANA 7 % kit*' age / «£<r; HUGH HALLfTT 2+m .12,l*S£* .'S6C 1/ /' '> U£o A - ^ ^ T f « s > 1 9/> B K i T I S M G U H N * | CM B R I T I S H GUIANA 

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