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POLITICAL CLEAVAGES AND POLITICAL MOBILISATION  
IN GUYANA: THE 1968 GENERAL ELECTION

by

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# ABSTRACT

This study is about the 1968 General Election in Guyana. It argues that while racial cleavage within the society is the single most important determinant of political behaviour, party organisation provides the motive force behind 'the people's choice'. Using aggregate and survey data, the study shows that between 1953 (when the first election under universal adult suffrage was held) and 1968, party identification and political mobilisation had shifted from those based on class antagonism to those based on racial disaffection. However, the change in the electoral machinery -- from a system of plurality voting to proportional representation -- has forced parties to reform their campaign strategy. The emphasis is on votes gained rather than on seats won. As a result, the local party organisations have become important sources of electoral mobilisation. The victory of Burnham's People's National Congress over Jagan's People's Progressive Party, and D'Aguiar's United Force, is partly explained by the greater impact on the electorate, of the former than the latter. The PNC benefited most from the switching of party support which occurred between the 1964 and 1968 elections, i.e., a switch of party support across the traditional lines of race. Therefore, that the political system of Guyana has not disintegrated is partly because there is this marginal element in the electorate willing to identify across the racial boundaries of party support. The system is saved also by the fact that political patronage is used as a bait to attract and maintain support across racial lines and by the small but articulate band of "political

dissenters" whose ideal is to broaden the base of political support more in terms of class than of race.

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## ABBREVIATIONS

ASCRIA	Association for the Promotion of Social and Cultural Relations with Independent Africa
CSA	Civil Service Association
GAWU	Guyana Agricultural Workers' Union
GUMP	Guyana United Muslim Party
LCP	League of Coloured People
MPCA	Manpower Citizen's Association
NDP	National Democratic Party
NLF	National Labour Front
PEC	People's Education Committee
PNC	People's National Congress
PP	Popular Party
PPP	People's Progressive Party
UDP	United Democratic Party
UF	United Force
WFP	Workers' and Farmers' Party
WPEO	Women's Political and Economic Organisation

## CHAPTER 1

### 1. THE PROBLEM

#### INTRODUCTION

The 1968 General Election in Guyana was the first election since the country attained independent status.<sup>1</sup> There has been much debate on the fairness of the administration and results of that election. This study discusses the Election in terms of political cleavages and political mobilisation. First, race<sup>2</sup> is seen as the dominant factor in the formation and manifestation of political attitudes of the Guyanese electorate. Second, party organisation, whether it reflects racial cleavages or not, is seen as a motive force behind 'the people's choice'. In Guyana, race and party organisation are interrelated. Both help to explain the processes whereby voters select between alternatives -- real or perceived --

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<sup>1</sup> Guyana became an independent nation on May 26, 1966. Since then Guyana modified its constitutional status by becoming a Republic on February 16, 1970. The Election was contested under the system of proportional representation, the mechanisms of which are discussed in Chapter 2.

<sup>2</sup> In this study we are not concerned with what anthropologists mean by race, but only with what people in Guyana think the word means when they encounter it in their daily lives. For our purpose, race refers to a group of people who are felt to be similar in their essential nature. The word race therefore defines differences in ethnic identification among Guyanese. It is as much a question of culture as it is of social structure. In Guyana racial problems and racial cleavages are generally among the ethnic groups (African, East Indian, Chinese, Portuguese and Whites) which originated out of different cultural and social backgrounds and which were brought together under the plantation system. Among the many studies on this topic see M. G. Smith, The Plural Society in the British West Indies (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1965); Leo Despres, Cultural Pluralism and Nationalist Politics in Guyana (New York: Rand McNally, 1967).

that have been defined by leaders or groups.

Many commentators say that the victory of the People's National Congress (PNC)<sup>3</sup> was due to the fact that the electoral machinery was "rigged" to ensure such a victory; that given race as the prime determinant of voting behaviour, the People's Progressive Party (PPP) should have won. In Chapter 2, the major irregularities in the administration of the Election are discussed. Suffice it to say that based on our observations of the 1968 election campaign<sup>4</sup> we believed that the PNC's victory could only be partly explained by administrative malpractices. The organisation of the PNC prior to, and during the election campaign, appeared to be more efficient than either the PPP's or the UF's. If this were so, then party organisation could, also, partly explain the PNC's victory.

The problem of this study, therefore, requires answers to the following questions: To what extent was race a determinant of voting behaviour? What was the relative strength of party organisation in, and identification with, the political parties contesting the Election? What was the impact of party organisation on voting behaviour?

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<sup>3</sup> Of the 53 seats to the House of Representatives the PNC led by Forbes Burnham won 30 seats, the People's Progressive Party (PPP), led by Cheddi Jagan, won 18 seats and the United Force (UF), led by Peter D'Aguiar won 5 seats.

<sup>4</sup> We spent four weeks in Guyana and this included three weeks prior to the Election on December 16, 1968. During this period we were involved in participant observation of the campaign conducted by the three parties throughout the country.

## 2. THE CONTEXT OF RESEARCH

Analysis of the 1968 General Elections can be meaningful only in the context of political development of which it is a part. Throughout this study we flash back to the 1950s either to compare events or to elucidate trends. During the early 1950s a revolution began in Guyana. It was not a fundamental transformation of thought and society such as took place in Russia under Lenin or in Cuba under Castro. It was, however, a revolution in the sense of a new dimension of political participation and consciousness made manifest by the Guyanese masses under the stimuli of an avant-garde of ideologues, men of a third world philosophy who challenged the legitimacy of imperialism. If scholars romanticise the period of the early 1950s it is because they relate to a high point of Guyanese nationalism with its potential for superstructural change; its bold attempt to unite a poly-ethnic mass into a viable political movement, its daring and dynamic leadership. If scholars lament the decline in the quality of political thought and development in Guyana, it is because the period after 1955 was characterised by the collapse of a local political consensus on fundamentals, the upsurge of institutionalised racism, the growth of potential for violence and the general demoralisation of society itself, especially between 1962 and 1964.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> In 1955 the PPP split into two factions, one led by Burnham, the other by Jagan. Scholars tend to lament the break-up of this Indian-African, working class coalition. See among much else, Gordon Lewis, The Growth of the Modern West Indies (London: McGibbon and Kee, 1963), pp. 259-260; Ernst Halpern, Racism and Communism in British Guiana (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Centre for International Studies, 1964); CISCLA, Report: First Institute on British Guiana (San German, Puerto Rico: Inter-American University, 1965); B.A.N. Collins, "Acceding to Independence: Some Constitutional Problems of a poly-ethnic society (British Guiana)," Civilisations, 15 (1965), pp. 3-15.

Historical crises have often provided the modus operandi for the formation, evolution, development or decay of social and political movements and of political attitudes. The Bolshevik revolution in 1917, the Fascist Movements of Hitler and Mussolini, the Cultural revolution in China, and the Third World struggles of Nkrumah, Nasser, Nehru, Castro are only a few examples. Very often a political party created by particular social and political factors continues to persist long after the factors which precipitated its creation have disappeared. The Guyanese National Movement in 1953 was conceived as a united workers front and as ultimately inducing a coalition of the urban creole and rural Indian middle classes.<sup>6</sup> This working class unity was achieved in 1953 under the PPP, as the catalyst of a struggle against the upper classes and the expatriot sector which owned and controlled the means of production in the country. One writer commented on the potential of the working class struggle as follows:

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<sup>6</sup> In this study, 'creole' society refers to a system which originated in plantation economies under colonialism. A creole society embraces the white, the mixed and the African groups. In Guyana, these groups all came to share a common conception of the colonial society; a conception in which things English and 'white' were valued highly, whilst things African and 'black' were valued lowly. However, what we refer to as the creole society has more or less been built up around the 'coloured' or racially mixed groups who were poised uneasily between the white aristocracy and the black proletariat. They were for a long time a privileged group, occupying important positions in the society and government and they demanded special consideration on the grounds that they were English in all but colour. See Raymond T. Smith, British Guiana (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), pp. 40-45 and Lloyd Braithwaite, "Social Stratification and Cultural Pluralism," Annals of New York Academy of Science, 83 (1960), pp. 821-822.

This would no doubt have produced tensions, but the society would probably have remained fairly coherent, and given the tendency to creolization on the part of the East Indians, it would have become increasingly integrated, capable of an independent and reasonably stable political and economic life. The pattern which has in fact developed is disastrous.

While the PPP still remains a viable political force in Guyana, a variety of political crises have precipitated structural alterations and factional disputes with deleterious consequences for a working class movement and a working class struggle, which were the original aims of the party.<sup>8</sup> The rise of political consciousness and activity, and the various events that shattered the hope and promise of a political revolution in Guyana are well enough known to make recounting them here unnecessary.<sup>9</sup> Chief among the changes, however, are the manifest configurations of political support in terms of race.

To determine the effects of these changes on political legitimacy, political integration and political participation is crucial to an

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<sup>7</sup> Peter Newman, British Guiana: Problems of Cohesion in an Immigrant Society (London, Institute of Race Relations: Oxford University Press, 1964), pp. 78-79.

<sup>8</sup> For an outline of the political ideals of the 1953 movement, see Cheddi Jagan, The West on Trial: My Fight for Guyana's Freedom (London: Michael Joseph, 1966), Chapter VI.

<sup>9</sup> See Peter Newman, op. cit., R. T. Smith, British Guiana (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), Philip Reno, The Ordeal of British Guiana (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1964), Cheddi Jagan, Forbidden Freedom: The Story of British Guiana (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1954), Ashton Chase, 133 Days Towards Freedom in Guiana (Georgetown, British Guiana, N.D.), and for an official version of the British Government, see British Guiana, Suspension of the Constitution (London: H.M.S.O. Cmd. 8980, 1953).

understanding of the nature of political behaviour in Guyana, manifested in the 1968 elections. But Guyana is by no means unique. Most culturally plural societies pass through phases of acute tension along the cultural axis of differentiation. Yet at other times cultural antagonisms are relatively quiescent. One of the demonstration effects of cultural conflict in Guyana is illustrated in its electoral competitions. Especially since political party divisions have been absorbed into cultural cleavages, elections have in fact become confrontations between communities. It seems paradoxical that Guyana, like most developing nations, has clung theoretically to the crucial value of democracy, i.e., majoritarianism. Like so many other developing countries, the major cleavages of society tend to follow cultural contours. When this happens "elections translate cultural plurality through the mechanism of majority rule into hegemony of one group over another."<sup>10</sup> Indeed this defect inherent to majoritarian democracy is one of the most compelling arguments for the single party system adopted in many developing African states. Zolberg provides another rationale:

Many of the single party regimes represent compromises between prevailing groups and a militant vanguard party; the dialogue between them serves as an instrument of modernisation and communication by generating grievances in which genuine issues are reflected. Indeed, out of such compromises a stable pattern may be created. Immediately after independence, however, single-party regimes are concerned to create authority.

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<sup>10</sup> Charles W. Anderson, Fred R. Von der Mehden and Crawford Young, Issues of Political Development (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1967), p. 65.

This is why the role of political opposition has proved ambiguous in most newly independent nations.<sup>11</sup>

When in this study we analyse the strength of party identification among the electorate and the basic realignments of party strength between 1953 and 1968, we are really referring to a special kind of relationship between political leaders and masses. Changes in mass alignment in Guyana are influenced largely by racial cleavages. The rise of the working class party, the PPP under Cheddi Jagan and Forbes Burnham in 1953, did not sustain itself to 1968. So what in 1953 was basically a polarisation of electoral alignment along class lines has been transformed into an electoral alignment along racial lines. In 1955 after the Jagan-Burnham split, Jagan, an East Indian by origin, continued as leader of the PPP while Burnham, an African, formed the PNC taking with him some of the original membership of the PPP. In 1961, D'Aguiar, a Portuguese, formed a third party, the United Force (UF). Since 1961, Burnham, Jagan and D'Aguiar have become symbols of a racial expression in Guyanese politics which is representative of the plural society in its most vicious form. That is to say, parties and leaders are no longer seen as national coalitions but as exclusive ethnic groupings fostering a kind of ethnic chauvinism. It is for this reason that we have investigated whether local party activity acts as a countervailing force to these dominant political indicators, or rather, hardens the manifold cleavages in the society. It is our contention that as in the

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<sup>11</sup> See Aristide Zolberg, Creating Political Order: The Party State of West Africa (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1966), p. 102.

case of tribal or sectarian politics, political parties whose essential base is race constitute a threat to national development because they challenge the very existence of the state and nation, since what is proffered is another framework of loyalty and identity. According to Rupert Emerson, "it is one thing to have parties which are divided on programmatic differences, but something very different to have them follow the lines of ethnic cleavage within the society."<sup>12</sup>

### 3. UNDERLYING ASSUMPTIONS IN THE STUDY

Throughout the discussion of our main hypothesis -- that race and political organisation influence voting behaviour in Guyana -- certain underlying assumptions prevail:

- i. that political cleavage is a function of political socialisation
- ii. that electoral mobilisation is only one aspect of political mobilisation.
- iii. that leaders and parties are required to perform new roles under the system of proportional representation.

These three assumptions are briefly discussed below.

#### Political Cleavages and Political Socialisation

Political cleavage is a function of political socialisation.

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<sup>12</sup> Rupert Emerson, "Parties and National Integration in Africa" in Joseph La Polambara and Myron Weiner (Eds.), Political Parties and Political Development (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 268.

Guyanese of different ethnic origins were brought into the political system at different stages of the plantation system, ranging from slavery through indentureship to economic organisation under the multinational corporations.<sup>13</sup> Through these experiences Guyanese have acquired their political attitudes and behavioural patterns. Suffice it to say that the two major ethnic groups, the Africans and the East Indians adhere basically to different forms of kinship and family, identify with different religions and display distinctive residential patterns.<sup>14</sup> Demographic factors in Guyana illustrate the tendency among Afro-Guyanese (i.e., Guyanese of African descent) to be primarily urban dwellers belonging to a Protestant religion and Indo-Guyanese (of East Indian descent) to be rural dwellers and to be either Hindu or Muslim.<sup>15</sup> Racial cleavages have, therefore, been inherent in the primary agents of socialisation. In this study political socialisation is expressed through the perceptions of the individual: how he views the leaders, the parties, the issues; how he views himself in the world of politics. These perceptions may reflect or reject the racial biases of the system

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<sup>13</sup> Here we share the view of G. L. Beckford, Persistent Poverty (Kingston, Jamaica: Institute of Social and Economic Studies, 1971) that the plantation system is a total system of exploitation and control of colonial peoples and their resources. It is a system characterised as much by the sugar plantations of the eighteenth century as by the bauxite companies in the twentieth century.

<sup>14</sup> A vast amount of work has been done in this area. Among the more popular studies are R. T. Smith, British Guyana (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), and E. P. Skinner, "Group Dynamics and Social stratification in British Guyana", Annals of the New York Academy of Science, 83 (1960), pp. 705-716.

<sup>15</sup> See Appendix 6, Tables 2, 3, and 7.

as a whole.

### Political and Electoral Mobilisation

Political and electoral mobilisation are closely associated with the notion of political socialisation and, as in the case of Guyana, the patterns of cultural pluralism associated with it. Political socialisation and political mobilisation are different aspects of basically the same process. But whereas political socialisation encompasses all members of a given community in a process whereby they learn to become active citizens, the process of mobilisation is concerned only with those members of the community who actually become active citizens, at minimum participating in the electoral process. Political mobilisation relates to an individual's disposition, towards political participation in any of several types of groups, associational, non-associational, institutional or anomic.<sup>16</sup> Political mobilisation suggests that there is some organisation for though not necessarily in political action.<sup>17</sup> Political mobilisation when it refers to organisation for action merely assumes a level of partisanship towards one set of political structures and political goals or activity than to others. When, however, political mobilisation refers to organisation in action, then the individual members of a political community operate in a value system in which there

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<sup>16</sup> Here we used Almond and Coleman's Categories as a convenient classification. See Almond and Coleman, Developing Areas, pp. 28-36.

<sup>17</sup> The distinction here is essential. Organisation for action shows a "preparedness" which does not necessarily extend to "actual participation" in a certain action as is meant by organisation in action.

is a sense of purpose and a feeling of individual self-realisation.

Electoral mobilisation is only one aspect of political mobilisation. It relates mainly to the whole panoply of structures, personalities and procedures acting upon an individual to elicit his vote, support, and loyalty in a contest for governmental power. A high propensity for electoral mobilisation does not necessarily guarantee a comparable level of political mobilisation on the part of an individual. It must be noted however, that an individual may display electoral mobilisation by, for example, casting his ballot. At the same time, the individual may manifest a high level of political mobilisation in terms of the zeal with which he pursues his activity in social and political movements, or perhaps by his manifest commitment to a political ideology.<sup>18</sup>

#### Political Parties and Political Leaders

An immensely important element of mobilising the electorate is provided by the parties and leaders who seek the public's support. To many voters, candidates have no identity apart from a political party. In Guyana, the introduction of proportional representation has increased the importance of the political party since electoral teams are forced to be national in scope and organisation if they hope to win office. Under the former system of plurality voting, loose coalitions of

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<sup>18</sup> In fact, some writers have referred to a similar problem of classifying individuals in the political system. One writer notes that a reduction of ideology in politics accounts for demobilisation or depoliticisation, which shifts the emphasis of mobilisation itself to an enquiry into form and location rather than into quantity. See J. P. Nettl, Political Mobilisation: A Sociological Analysis of Methods and Concepts (New York: Basic Books Inc., 1967), pp. 288-316.

individuals or even independent candidates could hope for electoral success. One consequence of the change of the electoral system is the quest by the dominant parties to strengthen the party bureaucracy and to expand the party apparatus. Any analysis of electoral behaviour must therefore take account, not only of the electorate itself, but also of the parties and their leaders. To do this is to strike at the heart of the electoral process whereby individuals band themselves together to reject or support the rules of existing authority with the main aim of gaining a share in the control of the state apparatus.

#### 4. METHODOLOGY

With two exceptions,<sup>19</sup> studies of political behaviour in Guyana have dealt mainly with voting behaviour as a function of the racial composition of the electorate, utilising aggregate data to arrive at speculative conclusions. No real attempt has been made to develop or even apply any empirical theory of voting behaviour. It is in the light of this methodological sterility that our present research site and procedure were evolved. In this study, we have combined survey and aggregate data to arrive at conclusions about electoral behaviour in Guyana. We believe that political behaviour needs to be interpreted both at the level of the individual elector and at the level of aggregating the behaviour of the electorate as a whole. Disaggregation or analytic reduction is important because of the need to discover what

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<sup>19</sup> Leo Despres, Cultural Pluralism and Nationalist Politics in British Guiana (Chicago, Ill.: Rand McNally and Co., 1967), Ralph Premdas, "Political Culture and Political Development in Guyana," unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1971.

motives different individuals ascribe to different decisions. And this discovery is not possible by merely focusing on the collective choice presented in the form of official election results. In Guyana, the ballot is secret; the election results are given at the level of the constituency; the smallest unit for which general election figures are available contain an average of 5,277 electors. No doubt, aggregate data for constituency turnout and party preference may hold certain clues about the nature of swings in party support across constituencies. Yet aggregate data can tell us very little about who does not vote. What kind of people support which party? Why people change party loyalties? What issues are important to them?

Three months after the December 1968 General Elections we went into the field to survey the Guyanese electorate and party activists drawn from a cross section of the 38 constituencies into which the country was divided. The surveys of 1000 randomly selected electors and 106 party activists were confined to 6 constituencies chosen after we had stratified constituencies according to partisan support and geographical location.<sup>20</sup> While we were interested in the actual behaviour pattern of the voter, i.e., how he voted, we were also interested in his attitudes and perceptions, his recollections and speculations. Hence we introduced several open-ended questions in our sample to give our respondent as much latitude as possible to express his ideas. Among the rank and file as well as among the party

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<sup>20</sup> For a full account of the method of data collection used in this study see Appendix 1.

activists, these questions provided us with some of our most important findings.

While a great deal of the findings of this study are furnished by our interview survey, we have tapped other sources of evidence and have raised issues outside the scope of our questionnaire. We have also omitted from this study many aspects of the replies given by our respondents either because we found them uninteresting or because, with the passage of time, they have become irrelevant. This study is therefore not intended to be a conventional survey report.

What follows is an attempt to present a more precise picture of the Guyanese electors than we have at present. Chapter 2 examines the development of the electoral system between 1831-1968, identifying landmarks with implications both for the extension of the idea of citizenship and the upsurge in local participation in politics. Chapter 3 sets forth the framework for understanding the development and persistence of racial cleavages, the switch from "class" to "race" as the dominant factor in electoral mobilisation. What emerges is a pattern of political socialisation in Guyana based on clearly identifiable political and social cleavages. In Chapter 4, we note that the cleavages are related to perceptions; that perceptions are as important as actual behaviour; that perceptions provide a push and pull effect toward party and group identification. What concerns us in Chapter 5 are the various levels of party identification, the differences between "party supporters", "party sympathisers" and "political dissenters", that is to say, groups of people who participate in politics with different motives which are

not always clearly distinguishable one from the other. Chapter 6 examines levels of support for the political regime and its authorities which are displayed by different groups of electors. It provides some idea of why some people readily identify with the system while others reject it. Those people who are active in the local party organisations are selected in Chapter 7 for special treatment. This chapter provides a clue as to why in spite of the dominance of race in the politics of Guyana the system has not yet disintegrated. Finally in Chapter 8 we make our conclusions.

## CHAPTER II

## ELECTORAL DEVELOPMENT 1831-1968

## 1. INTRODUCTION

Electoral development in Guyana is characterised by three distinct phases, viz., plantation monopoly; crown colony modification and the civic mode. During the era of plantation monopoly (1831-1928), politics was dominated by one class, the pantocracy. The period of Crown Colony modification (1928-1953), witnessed a concentration on legal-constitutional reforms by local pressure groups and the ascendancy of the Governor's powers dispensed on behalf of the British Crown. In the phase we call the Civic Mode (after 1953), there has been an extension of the idea of citizenship, an upsurge in local participation in politics and a proliferation of social and political groupings.

## 2. PLANTATION MONOPOLY

The Colony of British Guiana was inaugurated in 1831 when the Colony of Berbice joined in a union with the Colonies of Demerara and Essequibo.<sup>1</sup> As a result, the Constitution of the Two Rivers --

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<sup>1</sup> See H. Wrong, Government of the West Indies (London: Oxford University Press, 1923), pp. 113-116 for a brief account of these three Colonies under the Dutch. For a more detailed account of the old Dutch institutions inherited when the British made the final conquest of these three Dutch river colonies, see Sir Cecil Clementi, A Constitutional History of British Guiana (London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1937), pp. 83-98.

effected by a prior merger of Demerara and Essequibo in 1812 -- became the Constitution of the Colony of British Guiana. This constitutional change in 1831 together with the abolition of slavery in 1833 ushered in a new phase in the politics of Guyana. It is a phase noted more for the attempts by a rising class of native politicians to reduce the elective monopoly of the plantocracy than for far-reaching changes in the structure of Guyanese society. The major dispute which occurred during this period (1831-1928) of monopoly by the planter-class was the controversy over the precise legislative powers of the Court of Policy and the Combined Court.<sup>2</sup>

Both of these institutions originated prior to the unification of 1831. The Court of Policy was presided over by the governor and included three official members and six unofficial members elected by a College of Keizers (Electors). This College was created as early as 1743 primarily for the purpose of electing the representatives of the private planters. The Combined Court comprised the Court of Policy and six financial representatives who were also elected by the Keizers. As with the members of the Court of Policy, the financial representatives were elected for an eight year term. In turn, the Keizers were elected for life by the Colonists. After the unification, there were two institutional changes. First, the Keizers no longer elected unofficial members to the Court of Policy and financial representatives, they only

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<sup>2</sup> For a detailed account of constitutional development, see Clementi, op. cit., Part II.

nominated them when vacancies occurred. Second, the elective franchise no longer required the ownership of twenty-five slaves but was extended to include males assessed to pay direct taxes to the Colonial revenue on an income of not less than 143 pounds.<sup>3</sup>

While the franchise throughout this period remained restrictive, the colonists claimed supreme power over the institutions as guaranteed by the Articles of Capitulation. At the same time the planters with their monopoly in the Combined Court could uphold these claims by withholding fiscal power from the Crown.<sup>4</sup> In fact, the tactics of the sugar oligarchy typified their resolve to influence the politics of the Colony in a way commensurate with their economic preeminence. "All other interests were subjugated to the policy of the sugar industry whether it was the public works, lands and mines, transport and harbours or health and welfare."<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> See British Guiana Ordinance, No. 39, 1834, Section 5; British Guiana Laws, Vol. 1, 1870, p. 108; British Guiana Ordinance, No. 57, 1835, Section 2; British Guiana Laws, Vol. 1, 1870, p. 212.

<sup>4</sup> One example of this was 1840 to 1848 when the Combined Court refused to pass revenue for government supplies in retaliation against the Crown's refusal to use general revenues for immigration of indentured workers and the Tariff Act of 1846 which affected Sugar. Another example was the case of the colony's medical inspector in 1887 whose report described the decadent conditions on the sugar estate, thus incurring the wrath of the unofficial members of the Court of Policy. On the refusal of the governor to withdraw or suppress the report all the elected members withdrew from the Court making that body inoperative. According to the Constitutional Convention, at least one elected member should be present before the business of the Court could be conducted.

<sup>5</sup> W. Alleyne Ireland, "Sugar and Gold," Demerariana Essays: Historical Critical and Descriptive (Georgetown, Guyana: Royal Agricultural and Cultural Society Publication n.d.), p. 37.

The plantocracy had grown accustomed to operating the system devoid of opposition. But local opposition smothered by lack of opportunities and local leadership was beginning to emerge. Table 2.1 shows the notable limitations of the electoral franchise on the number and percentage of registered voters between 1833 and 1929. While the population increased from 39,560 in 1833 to 150,761 in 1929 the number of registered voters increased from 621 to 9,513; the largest percentage increase occurred between 1915-1929 when the number doubled.

TABLE 2.1  
REGISTERED VOTERS, 1833-1929

	Total Adult Male Population	Total Number of Registered Voters	Percentage
1833	39,560	621	1.2
1850	47,256	916	1.9
1915	93,377	4,312	4.6
1929	150,761	9,513	8.2

Sources: British Guiana: Population Census,  
Colonial Office Publ., 1833-1929  
British Guiana, Annual Register, Colonial Office  
Ordinances, 1833-1929

Although there was an absolute increase in the number of registered voters during this period, a very large majority of the population remained disenfranchised.

The Reform Association and the Progressive Association were two

movements which sprang up during this period primarily to articulate demands for electoral reform. The Reform Association led by a coloured Guyanese, petitioned the Court of Policy to recommend that the present legislative and financial institutions of the colony should cease; that they be replaced by a Council and House of Assembly as in Barbados and the Chartered colonies.<sup>6</sup> Peter Rose and his colleague, Mr. Haynes, launched their attack on the plantocracy from within the Court of Policy to which they had been elected in 1845. Their aim was the acquisition of "full and direct representation". The tactics they employed suggested a resolve to evoke a certain political awareness in the masses of the new freed population which had increased from 10,000 in 1833 to 95,000 in 1849.<sup>7</sup> Not only did the association campaign for the resignations of elective members opposed to their programme but its leaders in the Court of Policy hinted at the possible recourse to physical force as a means of coercing the Home Government or local legislature. The Association further sponsored the first political mass meeting in the history of Guyana in 1850, and was able to get 5,000 signatures for its petition to the Court of Policy demanding a more representative Constitution.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Compared with the constitutions of Barbados, Jamaica and other British dominions (1833-1928) the Constitution of British Guiana has been described as "Crown Colony Government gone mad." See Clementi, op. cit., p. 204.

<sup>7</sup> British Guiana Ordinance, No. 150, 1849, Section 7.

<sup>8</sup> Clementi, op. cit., p. 135.

The Progressive Association (or Club) which was formed in 1887 was intent on further changing the qualifications for elective members in the Court of Policy. Candidates for election were required to own 80 acres of land..."actually under cultivation", a requirement clearly discriminative of the non-planter class. The Club secured 4,000 signatures demanding further electoral reform to permit groups outside the plantocracy representation in the legislature. Governor Irving explicitly supported the demands of these movements when he wrote:

"It has been long obvious that...a Constitution in which one interest is represented and in which the interest can...bring about a deadlock in public affairs from which there is no constitutional mode of escape, is politically indefensible".<sup>9</sup>

The Constitutional changes of 1891<sup>10</sup> were therefore a response to the sustained agitation for reform by the local movements. The changes were also a recognition that the system of administration inherited from the Dutch since 1581 had become unworkable. Hence in the General Elections of 1896, the Progressive Association competed under

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<sup>9</sup> Governor's despatch, Guyana Official Records, No. 5, Georgetown, October 26, 1887, p. 15. Also reported in Clementi, op. cit., p. 299.

<sup>10</sup> Chief among the reform measures were:

1. The reduction of the income requirement for eligibility to vote, to \$480 (BWI);
2. the power given to the Governor to dissolve the Court of Policy;
3. the statutory life of the Court of Policy was not to exceed five years;
4. the Executive functions of the Court of Policy were transferred to a Council consisting of the Governor, two (2) ex officio members and three (3) nominated unofficial members.

the banner of the Progressive Party. It was however more popularly called, the Steam Intellect Party as it had attracted a set of bright professionals like A. A. Thorne, its General Secretary, and had made the 'disestablishment of the Church' one of its main election issues. The 'progressives' were the only well organised party on the scene. Like the PPP of 1953, they were faced with minimal opposition. In 1896 their strongest opposition came from the Church. As a result, the 'progressives' attempted to counter clerical interference by an appeal to race. "Race game, race game, play the race game"<sup>11</sup> was one of the campaign slogans used.

The Progressives had associated exploitation, plantocracy, white supremacy and the Church and had pitched their attack to destroy these. The Progressives won 6 of the 12 seats in the Legislative Council. But in spite of all this, the Constitution still retained the major defect, viz., financial control was divorced from executive responsibility. As Table 2.1 shows, the franchise, though extended in 1850, 1891 and 1909, remained limited; so much so that the absentee planter could vote by proxy up to as late as 1928, while the majority of Guyanese remained disenfranchised. Table 2.2 summarises the racial distribution of the electorate in 1928 and shows the great discrepancies between population and the vote. While East Indians made up 51.8 per cent of the population, they formed a mere 6.4 per cent of the total electorate and 0.6 per cent of the registered voters. The Africans with 42.3 per cent of

<sup>11</sup> See British Guiana Report on the 1896 Elections (Georgetown, Guyana: Government Publication 1896).

of the population comprised 62.7 per cent of the total electorate and 6.8 per cent of the registered voters. In contrast to the East Indians and the Africans, the Whites with 1.7 of the population and 17 per cent of the total electorate had 46.1 per cent of the registered voters.

TABLE 2.2  
REGISTRATION, ELECTORATE AND POPULATION 1928

Race	Percentage of Each Race in the Adult Male Population	Percentage of Each Race in the Total Electorate	Percentage of Adult Males of each Race Regis- tered as Voters
East Indians	51.8	6.4	0.6
Africans	42.3	62.7	6.8
Portuguese	2.9	11.4	17.7
British	1.7	17.0	46.1
Chinese	0.9	2.4	12.3

Source: Guyana Official Records, 1928

### 3. CROWN COLONY MODIFICATION

In spite of the enlarged electorate, the first election under Crown Colony government signalled little change in the composition of the Court of Policy. Over the period 1833 to 1892 shown in Table 2.3, of the 110 unofficial members elected to the Court of Policy and the financial representatives only 2 per cent were African while 16 per cent were of mixed descent and 82 per cent, White. Professionally,

44 per cent were white planters, 22 per cent businessmen and 34 per cent lawyers or solicitors. That no other occupations for colonial representatives are listed can be explained by the fact that representatives received no remuneration.

Nevertheless the period of Crown Colony modification witnesses three significant electoral changes. First, in 1928 in accordance with an Act of Parliament an order of the King in Council abolished the Court of Policy and the Combined Court and replaced it by a Legislative Council. The new Council consisted of the governor as president, of 10 official members and 19 unofficial members. The Colonial Secretary and Attorney General were ex-officio members and of the 19 unofficial members, 14 were elected and the remainder nominated by the Governor.<sup>12</sup> Second, in 1943 the Constitution of 1928 was amended so that the Legislative Council consisted of 24 members in addition to the Governor as president. The ex-officio members were three in number: the Colonial Secretary, the Attorney General and the Colonial Treasurer. There were seven nominated members and 14 elected members, the latter having a clear majority in the House.<sup>13</sup>

Second, instrumental in moving the British Parliament to act in the reforming of Guyanese politics was the Popular Party. Under Anthony Webber, a Trinidad journalist who came to Guyana in the early twentieth century, the Popular Party mobilised support from among the local non-planter class. The Popular Party provided an economic alternative to

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<sup>12</sup> See British Guiana Order in Council, No. 192, 1928.

<sup>13</sup> British Guiana Order in Council, No. 274, 1943.

the planter interest when it put forward a firm proposal for developing the Guyanese hinterland.<sup>14</sup> When in 1926 Webber's party swept the polls an important blow had been struck at the political edifice at the plantocracy. The victory of the Popular Party was even more remarkable in the light of one columnist's vivid description of the political tenor of the times:

Those were the days when the Santepede bands were units of electioneering material when banners and buntings and rosettes were part of the party apparatus, when rum carts rumbled through the streets behind political processions, when buttmen, jug throwers and bottle throwers and 'pick-you-up-and-dash-you-down and break-your-back boys' were paid to persuade voters to vote.<sup>15</sup>

TABLE 2.3  
COMPOSITION OF THE REPRESENTATIVE BODIES BY  
RACE/OCCUPATION (UNOFFICIAL MEMBERS), 1833-92  
(in percentages)

Race	Occupation (N = 110)			Total
	Legal	Business	Planter	
White	18	20	44	82
Mixed	16	-	-	16
African	-	2	-	2
Total	34	22	44	100

Source: British Guiana Ordinances, 1834-1892.

<sup>14</sup> Webber, it is said, was greatly influenced by Marryshow of Grenada and Cipriani of Trinidad. His plan to develop the hinterland was based on an agreement reached with Henry Ford who had made a tentative offer to build a road from Georgetown to the Brazilian frontier. His plan was strongly opposed by the sugar interests, which saw hinterland development as pulling away their source of cheap labour.

<sup>15</sup> See Daily Chronicle, Georgetown, Guyana, August 11, 1937, p. 5.

The third change of electoral significance was the Waddington Constitution in 1952 which enacted Universal Adult Suffrage for the first time in Guyana. The political alignments, the electoral campaign, the hundred and thirty three days of PPP rule and the subsequent suspension of the Constitution have been well documented.<sup>16</sup> Suffice it to say that it took Guyana one hundred and twenty years after its unification for a National movement to emerge in the form of the People's Progressive Party (PPP). In spite of the fierce attacks against the party both by the local and international mass media, the PPP emerged victorious in the 1953 general elections winning 18 of the 24 seats to the legislature. Yet its life as a people's government was short. The suspension of the Constitution as a logical culmination of an entire 120 years of political experience is commented upon by Ayeairst as follows:

Of course the constitutional collapse of 1953 had its roots in the long history of neglect during which the colony had been governed as if it were nothing more than a complex, large-scale enterprise with almost no attention paid to the wellbeing, physical or social, of its inhabitants and no attempt to advance their political education. The result of the long domination by the indifferent rather than malevolent autocracy of the sugar and

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<sup>16</sup> Peter Newman, British Guiana (London: Institute of Race Relations, Oxford University Press, 1964); Raymond T. Smith, British Guiana (London: Oxford University Press, 1962); Phillips Reno, The Ordeal of British Guiana (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1964); Cheddi Jagan, Forbidden Freedom: The Story of British Guiana (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1954); Ashton Chase, 133 Days Towards Freedom in Guiana (Georgetown, Guyana, n.d.). These are a few of a large volume of writings, including official reports, on this period in Guyana.

commercial interests was grinding poverty for the many and a galling sense of frustration among a number of the educated few. The political advances and projects for economic development came too late to forestall the results of accumulated grievances.<sup>17</sup>

The Guyanese experience was similar to other Crown Colony regimes. For this reason Gordon Lewis' point is well taken when he says, "the psychological consequences of the system especially as they affect the Guyanese politician type were also the same as elsewhere and are not to be regarded, as some English writers too readily assume as peculiar to the Guyanese psychology."<sup>18</sup> Nevertheless there is an intrinsic quality of "citizenship" that emerged in the 1950's in Guyana which needs to be emphasised. This period marks the beginning of the Civic Mode.

#### 4. THE CIVIC MODE

Table 2.4 illustrates the highly participant political culture in Guyana. Except for the 1957 elections, the five elections held during this period, 1953-1968, all show a voting turnout of above 75 per cent and as high as 96.9 in 1964.

The period between 1954 and 1957 was characterised by an interim legislature, all members of whom were nominated by the Governor, Sir Alfred Savage. This period contributed towards a certain malaise in local politics. The restoration of a normal constitution though inevitable, was uncertain as to its timing. Uncertainty was also accompanied

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<sup>17</sup> Ayearst, op. cit., p. 125.

<sup>18</sup> Gordon Lewis, Modern West Indian Government (London: MacGibbon and Kee, 1968), p. 259.

TABLE 2.4

COMPARATIVE SUMMARY OF BALLOTS CAST IN  
FIVE GENERAL ELECTIONS 1953-1968

Year	No. of Electors on Register	No. of Votes Cast	Per- cent- age	No. of Votes Accepted	Per- cent- age	No. of Votes Rejected	Per- cent- age
1953	208,939	156,226	74.8	152,231	97.4	3,995	2.6
1957	212,518	118,564	55.8	116,939	98.6	1,625	1.4
1961	246,120	220,125	89.4	218,357	99.2	1,768	0.8
1964	247,604	240,120	96.9	238,530	99.3	1,590	0.7
1968	369,088	314,216*	85.1*	312,391	99.4	1,855	0.6

Source: Report on the National Assembly General Election, 1968.

\* If non-resident vote is excluded then the percentage increases to 93.5 per cent.

by repression on the part of the British Government since several leading political figures (including Dr. Jagan, leader of the PPP and Janet his wife, general secretary), were either detained in prison under the Emergency Orders or were restricted in their movements to certain specified areas. When however the state of emergency was eventually relaxed in 1956, several new political alignments had been formed. These included the two factions of the PPP, the "Jaganites" and the "Burnhamites", the National Labour Front (NLF) headed by Lionel Luckhoo and the Guyana National Party (GNP) led by Cecil Grey. As a result of the split in the PPP, the Trade Union movement which to a great extent supported the party in 1953, also became fragmented in its loyalty. Hence the 1957 elections,

the first to the interim legislative council provided a test of strength for the new groupings.

The electoral campaign proved to be a bitter confrontation between the Jaganites and the Burnhamites in what was recognised to be a crisis of leadership. Though unanimous in their condemnation of British imperialism both Jagan and Burnham claimed to be the legitimate leader of the nation. However the election results ascribed that legitimacy to Jagan whose faction won 9 out of 14 seats, with 48 per cent of the total votes. The Burnham faction won only 3 seats, all of which were in Georgetown, the capital, and gaining 39 per cent of the total votes cast.

If the 1957 elections reflected the uncertainty and demoralisation of the times, the 1961 elections reflected the deep racial divisions which in Guyana were quickly rising to the surface of the political arena. The general elections were held in August 1961 under the new constitution which made provision for the first time for registration by enumeration. Jagan won 20 seats, Burnham 11 and D'Aguiar 4. Prior to the general elections, the Burnham faction had changed its name to the People's National Congress (PNC) and had absorbed a large African middle class leadership and following of the United Democratic Party which was led by John Carter, presently Guyana's Ambassador to the United Kingdom and Russia. In the meantime, a new party led by Peter D'Aguiar, a Portuguese businessman, was launched, which judging from its leadership corps represented the white, the Roman Catholic, the business and upper middle class layers of the society. While Jagan's PPP maintained the ideological basis of its organisation, it increasingly failed to escape the racial stigma

of being a party for the Indians; a stigma which whether true or false had come to be associated with its political practices of allocating the spoils of office in a way which gave an unfair advantage to the Indian elements in the population. Ironically, in 1961, two predominantly working class parties, the PPP supported by Indians and the PNC by Africans were each waging a two-pronged political battle. One battle between themselves and the other battle against the United Force which seemed set on reinforcing the values of capitalism and colonialism, the same issues against which the now fragmented working classes were fighting in 1953.

Informed opinion supports the view that especially after 1961, Jagan was forced to compromise the ideological basis of his party to make allowances for the expression of the more conservative values of the Indian business community which contributed heavily to the party's finances and had adopted the popular slogan, "we wukking wid de govoment."<sup>19</sup> The growing Indianness of Jagan's party became more obvious between 1961 and 1964 with the resignations from the party of some of the non-Indians who held top echelon positions. Among these were Bunny Mann, Rudy Luck, Fred Bowman, George Robertson and Lionel Jeffrey. Hence while the Indian supporters of the PPP boasted "Ah we pon top" (we are on top) the anti-PPP forces chided, "things gon change." In 1961, when the Indians comprised 49 per cent of the population, the PPP gained 43 per

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<sup>19</sup> See C. Paul Bradley, "The Party System in British Guiana and the General Election of 1961," Caribbean Studies, 1 (1961), pp. 15-28.

cent of the votes cast at the General Elections of that year. At the same time, the Africans comprised 30 per cent of the population, but the PNC received 41 per cent of the votes. The disparity between percentage votes received by the PPP and Indians as a percentage of the population was mainly accountable to the large proportion of East Indians under voting age. That the PNC received 41 per cent of the votes meant that it acquired substantial support from outside the African population among the mixed group. In each of the general elections since the formation of the United Force (UF) in 1961, its percentage of votes has closely approximated the size of the combined European, Chinese, Amerindian and Portuguese populations.

Indeed, while Jagan continued to espouse his belief in, and to be identified with, Marxism abroad, the nature and the requirements of political strategy at home provided fewer clues about a socialist revolution in view of the rising racial tensions among the working classes. International developments too undermined Jagan's position. Not only was his independence movement seen as a communist plot but Jagan was also linked in the foreign press with Castro. Unfortunately for Jagan, the United States of America was not unmindful of another possible Cuba in the Caribbean. And in any case the conditions which brought Castro to power in Cuba did not exist in Guyana. Jagan's mass support failed to cut across the racial barriers in the way that the Cuban masses confronted the compradore bourgeoisie in 1953. When therefore the Colonial Office in 1964 rationalised its recommendation for proportional representation on the grounds of the need for greater parity between votes cast and seats

won by respective parties one is prompted to think of this solution as the culmination of a general contrivance between Britain and the United States of America to replace a radical force by a more moderate political coalition.

TABLE 2.5

PERCENTAGE OF VOTES AND NUMBER OF SEATS GAINED IN  
PRE-PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS 1953-1961

	<u>Percentage Votes</u>			<u>Percentage Seats</u>		
	<u>1953</u>	<u>1957</u>	<u>1961</u>	<u>1953</u>	<u>1957</u>	<u>1961</u>
PPP	51	47.6	42.6	75 (18)	65 (9)	57 (19)
PNC	-	39.4	41.0	-	28 (4)	31 (12)
UF	-	-	16.3	-	-	12 (4)
OTHER	49	15		25 (6)	7 (1)	

Table 2.5 shows distribution of seats in relationship to the percentage votes cast for the major parties in four elections under plurality voting since 1953. The table shows that in the 1957 elections the PPP with less than half the total votes received over twice as many seats as the opposition parties. In 1961 with 1.6 per cent more votes than the PNC, the PPP obtained 9 more seats. Expressed in actual percentages in 1953, the PPP with 51 per cent of the votes obtained 75 per cent of the seats. In 1957 with 48 per cent of the votes it secured 65 per cent of the seats. In 1961 the PPP polled 43 per cent of the votes and obtained 57 per cent of the seats as compared with the PNC party which polled 41 per cent but obtained only 31 per cent of the seats.

In the light of the minority representation in Government, Duncan Sandys, Secretary of State for the Colonies justified changing the electoral procedure in 1964 from a plurality system to one of proportional representation. He said:

The wide disparity between votes and seats which this system has consistently produced in British Guiana has not unnaturally engendered a sense of frustration and grievance among the opposition parties, which together polled a majority of the votes at the last elections. On the other hand, it is argued that a certain measure of over-representation should be accepted as the price of strong government.

Unfortunately, in British Guiana this electoral system, while providing clear parliamentary majorities, has not provided strong government. The fact is that the administration of the country has been largely paralysed, the Government is insolvent and law and order can be maintained only with the help of outside troops. Without attempting to apportion blame, the reason for this state of affairs is that the ruling party has alienated the confidence of the non-Indian communities, while they on their side have obstructed and resisted the Government at every turn.<sup>20</sup>

One of the major reasons for the disparity between votes and seats was the mal-distribution of electoral divisions, a careful scrutiny of which reveals that both in 1957 and 1961 there was a wide variation in the size of constituencies. In 1957, for example, the PPP polled 34.8 per cent of its total vote in one constituency, Eastern Berbice. Similarly, the PNC polled 17.6 per cent of its vote in the constituency of Georgetown South. In 1961, the UF polled 46 per cent of its total vote in two hinterland constituencies. Proportional representation would correct

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<sup>20</sup> Report on the British Guiana Conference (London: H.M.S.O. Cmd. 2203, 1963), p. 6.

this and would also have another advantage. Sandys recommended a system of proportional representation "to encourage coalition between parties and to make it easier for new political groupings to form on a multi-racial basis."<sup>21</sup> These two objectives were only partially met. While a coalition government emerged after the 1964 elections there was no evidence to suggest that political groupings were formed on "a multi-racial basis." The election results showed that the PPP with 46 per cent of the votes won 24 seats, the PNC gained 41 per cent of the votes and 22 seats, the U.F., 7 seats with 12 per cent of the votes. While the overall turnout in this election was very high (96.9 per cent), racial cleavages seemed to harden. The number of votes received by each of the major parties so closely approximated the racial groupings -- Indian, African and Others -- in the electorate, that one ponders whether the effect of this election was merely to oust Jagan from office. One observer commenting on the 1964 elections explains the high electoral turnout as follows:

"The heavy poll is no more than a seeking for racial security, by grouping one against the other. As for the minorities, the election results showed their fate, they have been wiped out. They have only helped the formation of a weak Government. No weak Government can solve the problem that British Guiana faces. Where there is a sense of fear and where an Election divides racially and politically, there, I maintain, the election can not be called fair. If just the maintenance of law and order (it may not be possible to maintain it in the next Election) and heavy polling are the criteria of the fairness of Elections, then these exist in ample measure in some

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<sup>21</sup> Ibid., p. 5.

dictatorial countries. Political scientists term them unfair."<sup>22</sup>

The coalition Government of the PNC and the UF which followed the 1964 elections, exemplified unprecedented compromise and conciliation. It is difficult to understand the basis for that coalition which lasted until 1968. The UF was recognised as representing the white, commercial and upper class wedded to free enterprise and opposed to independence for Guyana. Hence its association with the PNC -- supported predominantly by Afro-Guyanese of the working and middle classes and espousing socialism as a political goal -- reflects some degree of ideological incongruity. Perhaps the major explanation for the conciliation and compromise that brought about the coalition was the common opposition of both the UF and the PNC to the PPP rule. In the period of great uncertainty and conflict (1962-64), it was as if the PNC and UF allied themselves in battle against the PPP.<sup>23</sup> But uncertainty and conflict in Guyanese society have been a legacy not only

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<sup>22</sup> Memorandum by Baker Ali Mizra. This was a dissenting judgment by Mizra, one member of the eleven man team. See British Guiana, Report by the Commonwealth Team of Observers on the election in December, 1964 (London: H.M.S.O.: Colonial No. 359, 1965), p. 15.

<sup>23</sup> For a variety of accounts of the period 1962-1964, see B.A.N. Collins, "The Civil Service in the General Strike of 1963," Caribbean Quarterly, 10 (1964), pp. 12-24; "Consultative Democracy in British Guiana," Parliamentary Affairs, 19 (1965-66), pp. 11-21; "Acceding to Independence: Some Constitutional Problems of a Polyethnic society (British Guiana)," Civilizations, 15 (1965), pp. 1-21; "The Three Faces of British Guiana," Social and Economic Studies, 14 (1965), pp. 51-56 and "The End of a Colony - British Guiana 1965," The Political Quarterly, 10 (1964), pp. 12-24.

of the period of plantation monopoly but also of the demographic divergencies of Guyana. An examination of voting distribution over the last three elections in constituencies grouped according to their geographical location which reveals a general urban-rural dichotomy of party support is shown in Table 2.6

TABLE 2.6

DISTRIBUTION OF VOTES BY CONSTITUENCIES  
CLASSIFIED ACCORDING TO URBAN-RURAL TYPE  
(in Percentages)

	URBAN			RURAL								
				Plantation			Village			Hinterland		
	<sup>a</sup> N = 11			N = 10			N = 11			N = 3		
	PNC	PPP	UF	PNC	PPP	UF	PNC	PPP	UF	PNC	PPP	UF
1961	65	10	25	10	88	2	40	52	8	12	29	69
1964	70	14	16	8	90	1	50	40	10	14	25	71
1968 <sup>b</sup>	78	11	11	14	85	2	60	36	4	30	20	50

<sup>a</sup>N denotes the number of constituencies in each cluster.

<sup>b</sup> In 1968 the number of constituencies was increased from 35 to 38; to facilitate comparisons we simulated the 1968 constituencies to equal 35. This could easily be done since the increase in constituencies involved dividing each of three constituencies into two.

In the plantation constituencies,<sup>24</sup> the PPP has consistently

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<sup>24</sup> Constituencies located in plantation communities and village communities are both to be found in the rural areas of Guyana. But whereas sugar estates provide the dominant mode of life in plantation communities, village communities originated with a different set of values after emancipation and provide basically a different style of life from the plantations. What is more, plantation communities have

gained over 85 per cent of the votes, while the PNC has averaged only 10 per cent. In the villages, except for 1968 when the PNC seemed to have made considerable gains, the voting distribution for the two major parties is about even. In the urban areas the UF has slid from 25 per cent to 11 per cent while the PPP has averaged just over 10 per cent. The PNC dominates the urban cluster with an average of 72 per cent. Finally, the Hinterland Cluster which comprises a preponderance of

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a predominantly East Indian population, whereas village communities tend to be more evenly divided among Indian and African dwellers. It is interesting to note that each village tends also to have either a predominantly East Indian or a predominantly African population. Hinterland communities on the other hand are to be located in the back-lands of Guyana where the dominant ethnic group is the Amerindians. For a useful distinction between these types of communities, see Leo Despres, Cultural Pluralism and Nationalism in Guyana (New York: Rand McNally, 1967), Chp. 2, and R. T. Smith, British Guiana (London, N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1962), Chps. 2 and 3; E. P. Skinner, "Group Dynamics and Social Stratification in British Guiana," Annals of New York Academy of Science, 83, (1960), pp. 705-716.

For specific references to plantation society, see D. Jayawardena, Conflict and Solidarity in a Guyanese Plantation (London: Athlone Press, 1963), and R. T. Smith, "Marriage and Family amongst East Indians in British Guiana," Social and Economic Studies, 8 (1959), pp. 20-41; K. S. Nair, "Indians in British Guiana," Indo-Asian Culture, 6 (1958), pp. 75-89; D. Nath, A History of Indians in British Guiana, (London: Thomas, Nelson and Sons Ltd., 1950), esp. pp. 200-16; Philip Singer and Enrique Araneta Jr., "Hinduzation and Creolization in Guyana: The Plural Society and the Basic Personality," Social and Economic Studies, 16 (1967), pp. 221-237.

On the village, see Rawle Farley, "Peasant Society in British Guiana," Social and Economic Studies, 1 (1955), pp. 5-21; R. T. Smith, The Negro Family in British Guiana: Family Structure and Social Status in the Village (London: Routledge and K. Paul in association with Institute of Social and Economic Research, University of the West Indies, 1956); Allan Young, Approaches to Local Self-Government in British Guiana (London: Longmans, 1958), esp. Chapter 3.

Amerindians has been the domain of the UF, even though its support has declined from 71 per cent in 1964 to 50 per cent in 1968. On the other hand, support for the PNC is on the upswing from 12 per cent in 1961 to 30 per cent in 1968.

## 5. GENERAL ELECTIONS 1968

The 1968 elections were the first post-independence elections to be held.<sup>25</sup> Once again the system of proportional representation was used. Although this system changed the electoral procedure, the electoral infrastructure had retained, to a considerable extent, the features of the pre-"PR" situation. For example, the same 35 electoral divisions used in 1961, were used in 1964 under proportional representation. In the 1968 Elections, the electoral divisions were increased to 38 which meant the splitting up of one electoral division into two rather than any drastic redivision of boundaries. The system of proportional representation in Guyana uses the basic technique to determine seats to the House of Representatives. It applies a quota to the total vote and awards seats according to the number of quotas each party receives. In the 1968 General Election, 53 seats were being contested. The quota was calculated by taking the 53 seats up for election, adding one and dividing the total (54) into the total valid vote. One is then added to the figure for the quota. That is to say, given the number of seats in the House of Representatives (53), the quota rises or falls as the

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<sup>25</sup> Guyana became an independent nation on May 26, 1966.

total vote rises or falls.

To determine the 53 representatives to the House, the parties contesting the 1968 election were required to present a list of candidates in alphabetical order. Once the party's quotas were announced, the party leader was required to select from the list the number of representatives equivalent to the number of quotas his party received. This provision for alphabetical listing amended the regulations for the 1964 election when the parties were required to present their list of candidates according to a numerical ranking. That is to say, if a party presented a list of 53 candidates, it also needed to rank each candidate from 1 to 53. In 1964 it was obvious to voters and candidates alike that those candidates further down the list had less chances of getting selected than those higher on the list. The numerical list implied the relative importance of candidates to the party. As a result, party leaders complained that between the publication of the lists and election day, two things happened: (1) they spent much time pacifying constituents whose local heroes would not be selected except for an unprecedented landslide victory for the party; (2) candidates who felt they had little chance of being selected, did not generally campaign so vigorously for the party as those with greater hopes of being selected. However, in meeting these two problems, the 1968 amendment (alphabetical listing) strengthened the role of the party leader in making the final selection of candidates. What also happened was a reduction in the ability of voters to express any direct feeling toward any candidates. Yet the introduction of proportional representation did not altogether obliterate the "candidate-orientation" of electoral politics. The two

major political parties were still conscious of the psychic attachment of their supporters who liked to identify with "men", perceived to empathise with their community. As a result, both parties operated on a specific policy of nominating or assigning specific candidates to specific constituencies. In other words, only the leaders of the respective parties campaigned on the basis that under "PR" the entire country was one constituency. Among the most popular criticisms of proportional representation for Guyana were: (i) that it was likely to lead more directly to racial voting than the system of plurality voting, (ii) that it would encourage fragmentation of parties without destroying their racial basis, (iii) that it could not be expected to result in a clear victory for any party not to mention that it seemed designed to ensure the defeat of the PPP.<sup>26</sup>

Proportional representation introduced several new features in the electoral experience of Guyana.<sup>27</sup> The most fundamental of these were the innovations in the electoral law of 1968, which generated controversy -- to say the least -- throughout and in the aftermath of the

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<sup>26</sup> See Roy McKitterick, "PR" in Guyana", Economist, October 29, 1965, p. 31.

<sup>27</sup> Guyana: Report on the National Assembly General Elections, Georgetown, Government Printery, 1969. See also Representation of the People (Adaptation and Modification of Laws) Act, 1968, No. 16, Georgetown, Guyana, Government Printery 1968. For an appraisal of overseas voting and registration, see Sunday Times, London, November 5, 1968, p. 4. It is also worth noting that the system of overseas registration and voting is not novel nor is it new to Guyana. As early as 1833 absentee non-Guyanese planters were eligible to vote in elections to the various representative assemblies. See Clementi, op. cit., pp. 175-181.

electoral campaign.

The Representation of the People's Act 1968 provided for the compilation of Registers of electors under the National Registration Act, 1967 in regard to every subsequent election to the National Assembly. The Bill amended the constitution in two main ways:

- (i) to allow balloting by non-resident citizens of Guyana
- (ii) to enable casual vacancies to be filled by way of selection and extraction from the relevant list of candidates entered at the preceding election.<sup>28</sup>

The latter innovation means that the possibility of parliamentary by-elections has been eliminated. At the same time, the former established the principle that Guyanese residents overseas should vote in all future General Elections. Of all the new provisions this was the most controversial issue. Under the new act provision was made to allow balloting by non-resident electors to take place before election day and to allow their registration and polling to be supervised by the Elections Commission and carried out by the same machinery as for Guyanese living in Guyana, under the National Registration Act of 1967. Opinion Research Centre in England carried out a survey of 1000 names and addresses from the preliminary registration list of 43,000 names. Giving a sampling error of 3 per cent the pollsters concluded that not more than 10,000 people on the overseas register were genuine eligible voters, i.e., less than a quarter of the total registered voters. According to Adrian Mitchell:

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<sup>28</sup> Representation of the People (Adaptation and Modification of Laws) Act, 1968.

The most devastating evidence of inaccuracy in the programme came from Wolverhampton where the only registration agent Mr. Joe Hughes, said he had registered all 41 Guyanese in his area. The official list showed more than 200 people eligible to vote in Wolverhampton. Mr. Hughes could not explain where the others came from.<sup>29</sup>

The Election Commission was set up in 1964. It has been charged with the responsibility of issuing such instructions and taking such actions "as appears to it to be necessary or expedient to ensure impartiality, fairness and compliance with the provisions of the Constitution or any Act of Parliament (including the 1968) on the part of persons exercising powers or performing duties connected with or relating to the administrative conduct of elections."<sup>30</sup> In spite of the formal supervisory powers of the Elections Commission, an examination of the way the registration process actually operated in 1968 shows how impossible it was for the Commission to avert irregularities in the process, unless as one writer states "the Commission accepted the word of the government that this was the case."<sup>31</sup>

Another election anomaly was the National registration procedure. Most commentators were baffled at the increase in the electoral register

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<sup>29</sup> Adrian Mitchell, "Jagan and Burnham: It's polling day Tomorrow. Has Guyana election already been decided in Britain?" The Sunday Times (London), December 15, 1968, p. 5.

<sup>30</sup> "Elections Commission Sinecure," Evening Post (Georgetown, Guyana), October 22, 1968, p. 3.

<sup>31</sup> Evening Post (Georgetown, Guyana), December 12, 1969.

of 1968.<sup>32</sup> But the official explanation states that the 1964 register with which most critics compared the 1968 register was in fact inaccurate. Table 2.7 shows the comparative size of the electorate between 1953 and 1968.

TABLE 2.7

## REGISTERED ELECTORATE 1953-1968

Year	Registered Electorate
1953	208,939
1957	212,518
1961	246,120
1964	247,604
1968	297,404*

\*This figure refers only to the internal register; when the overseas register is added, the total registered electorate is 367,945.

Using 1953 as the base year, and calculating annual growth rates, the 1961 figure represents a growth rate of 2.1 per cent; 1968 one of 2.3 per cent and 1964 one of 1.6 per cent. Using 1961 as the base year, the 1968 figure represents a growth of 2.8 per cent, while the 1964 figure gives growth of 0.2 per cent. This interpretation of the table suggests that the 1964 series is the outstanding anomaly, i.e., "it is far too low." The compulsory registration in 1968 tended to redress the 1964 inconsistency, and what has therefore resulted is that the 1968

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<sup>32</sup> See a very trenchant attack by Janet Jagan, "Election Fraud," Daily Mirror (Georgetown, Guyana), November 29, 1963, p. 1.

figures represent both natural increases from 1964 to 1968 together with corrections for the under registration in 1964 which was voluntary:

registration in 1964 must have been partial, not only because it was voluntary, but also because, coming as it did at the end of a period of serious dislocation, people were living in areas to which they had temporarily moved for safety and the country was still divided into areas which some parties could not venture.<sup>33</sup>

In addition, increased economic activity in some areas may have resulted in sizeable migration. For example, the 1968 construction programme of Taylor Woodrow in MacKenzie may have resulted in a significant influx of workers into the area -- a situation with no parallel anywhere in 1964. However, the increases in the 1968 register become questionable when we locate certain characteristic features about the distribution of those increases. For example, the average increase over six strong PPP areas was 10 per cent, while increases in the constituencies with strong PNC support ranged from 109 per cent in MacKenzie, 58 per cent in Mazaruni Potaro and 49 per cent in Abary. Additionally, the failure of the election machinery to expedite its task efficiently also affected the credibility of the election itself. As a case in point, elaborate procedures were adopted to ensure that each

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<sup>33</sup> Compare Report on the British Guiana General Elections, 1964 (Georgetown, Guyana Government Printery, 1965), with Report on the National Assembly General Elections, 1968 (Georgetown, Guyana, Government Printery, 1969) and the quotation taken from a tapescript, spoken by Kit Nascimento, one of three panelists on "Focus on the General Elections," Guyana Broadcasting Corporation, Dec. 22, 1968.

voter ought to have an identification card bearing his fingerprint and photograph. Yet in many cases identification cards were not distributed until polling day, after both proxy and overseas votes had been administered. This phenomenon made it difficult for even the keenest of observers to check out the propriety with which identification cards were distributed.

From the point of view of any objective analysis of the 1968 elections there was another anomaly which affected the legitimacy of the electoral machinery, viz., the proxy voting. Under the electoral provision one person could be appointed to vote for up to five electors. According to the report of the Chief Electoral Officer, "this (proxy vote) was used to its fullest advantage as the examination of 19,287 applications did not permit the returning officers to prepare lists of proxies by the appointed time."<sup>34</sup> Table 2.8 shows that the proxies increased from 300 or 0.5 per cent of the total number of votes cast in 1961 to 7,000 or 2.5 per cent of the electoral votes cast in 1964 to 7 per cent in 1968. Proxies therefore became the second greatest

TABLE 2.8

## PROXIES AS A PERCENTAGE OF VOTES CAST - 1961-1968

	Votes Cast	Proxies	Proxies % of Votes
1961	220,125	300	0.5
1964	240,120	7,000	2.5
1968	314,216	19,297	7.0

<sup>34</sup> Report of 1968 Elections, op. cit., p. 10.

issue in the electoral process and administration. As early as 1964 a Commonwealth team of observers to the General Elections commented that the one administrative provision which seemed open to manipulation was the proxy vote. The report concluded:

"We cannot ignore the possibility of misuse of proxies...we feel it is our duty to point out that the proxy system is liable to abuse."<sup>35</sup>

Our own scepticism of administration and actual use of the proxy votes stems from the fact that no real distribution of these proxies was provided in the Chief Electoral Officer's report to inform us how they were allocated among the parties and the constituencies. This omission, together with the overseas voting make the analysis of electoral behaviour in Guyana based mainly on gross electoral data, somewhat spurious. Especially when the proxies number 7 per cent of the national vote (the equivalent of two seats) there is need for a fuller explanation of the administration of these proxies.

In the 1968 elections, the clienteles of the four parties contesting these elections were the main indicators of their positions not in terms of an ideological left-wing spectrum, but rather in terms of an ethno-class axis. The PPP continued to attract its hard core support from East Indian workers on the sugar estates and rice farmers along the coast belt, and middle class support of East Indian businessmen. What seems very noteworthy is that whereas a small group of negro and mixed intellectuals rallied to its cause up to possibly 1961, this support

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<sup>35</sup>British Guiana, Report by the Commonwealth Team, p. 5.

was now absent. PNC clientele came predominantly from the African workers in the towns, coloured middle class, especially civil servants, the police and professionals. Though the support for the UF declined, it retained the allegiances of Catholics, businessmen of European, Portuguese and Chinese descent, some East Indian businessmen and a waning group of mixed middle class. The fourth party contesting these elections was the Guyana United Muslim Party (GUMP) which was nothing more than a splinter group of Indian Muslims who had defected from the PPP.

Judging from the issues presented in this election the PPP had modified its ideological image even more than in 1964, to accommodate the moderate elements of the Indian community, viz., businessmen and professionals. The PNC had long thrown off the Socialist camouflage in its attempt to attract the black middle classes as in fact its absorption of a formerly bourgeois party, the UDP illustrates. The 1968 election campaign was disappointing from the point of view of substance. The PNC's strategy was to reiterate: "We brought you peace and stability, let the facts speak."

The PPP exhausted its efforts on proving that the electoral machinery was fraudulent. Opinions were divided within the party on whether or not it should have contested the elections. But so much time was spent on negating the PNC government and the electoral malpractices that, as some party officials confessed, the electoral strategy of the party was neglected.

In deciding between two electoral systems, "first past the post"

and proportional representation, the Secretary of State for the Colonies felt that proportional representation would be likely to result in the formation of coalition parties supported by different races, and this would go a long way toward reducing racial tension.<sup>36</sup> In fact, the elections proved to be an extension of the previous racial tensions and hostilities. in 1968 as in 1964, 'people used their ballots like bullets.'

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<sup>36</sup> Report on the British Guiana Conference (London: H.M.S.O. Cmnd. 2203, 1963).

### CHAPTER III

#### POLITICAL CLEAVAGES AND THE PROCESS OF POLITICAL SOCIALISATION 1953-1968

##### 1. INTRODUCTION

This chapter deals with the formation of political attitudes as they are influenced by a series of factors chief among which are the cleavages between political parties and social movements; the importance of a working class consciousness as a solidifying force; the change from "class" to "race" as an agent of political mobilisation and the cross-cutting memberships of people not only in political but also in social and religious organisations. By drawing upon information specifically in the period 1953-1968, we show several dimensions of the process of political socialisation among Guyanese which help us in some way to understand why Guyanese perceive their politics in a certain way and why their political behaviour reflects so much of the cleavages based on race.

##### 2. CLEAVAGES BETWEEN POLITICAL PARTIES AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

Although social and political movements have been present in Guyana throughout its history, mass politics in Guyana could be dated from the early 1950s. In 1953, the advent of universal adult suffrage saw the proliferation of movements and pressure groups in a struggle for political power. Fig. 3.1 represents the relationship between movements and political parties, starting at the time of the general

1953

PPP  
(Jagan and Burnham)

UNITED WORKERS AND FARMERS PARTY  
(DAN DEBIDIN)

NDP  
(Carter & Others)

GUYANA  
NATIONAL  
PARTY  
Sharples

1. Trade Unions: Industrial  
Agricultural  
Workers  
(Most)

Hindu Sanatan  
Maha Sabha

League of Coloured  
People

Chamber of Commerce

Catholic Church/  
Asson.

Anjuman-E-Islam  
Society

M.P.C.A.

G A W U  
Agricultural Workers

Industrial  
Workers

Guyana Teachers Asson.  
Guyana Civil Service Asson.  
& Other Clerical Unions

Sugar Producers  
Asson.

PPP  
(Jagan)

PPP  
(Burnham)

UDP,  
Carter & Others

American Ayrian  
League

PNC  
(Burnham & Carter)

GULP  
(Mohammed Saffee)

NLF  
Luckhoo & Others

U.F.  
(D'Aguiar)

PPP  
Jagan

ASCRIA

PNC  
(Burnham)

UF  
(D'Aguiar)

50

PPP  
(Jagan)

PNC

UF

57

961

964

968

elections of 1953. As is shown, the PPP as it was then constituted, provided a vital function of uniting the working class in a way that was unique among West Indian societies at the time, except for Barbados whose Barbados Workers' Union-Barbados Labour Party partnership from 1945-1960 proved somewhat of a bastion of working class political supremacy in that island.<sup>1</sup> The relationship between class and party affiliation in 1953 was clearly defined and recognised by the party elites. The National Democratic Party (NDP) was closely associated with the League of Coloured People (LCP), so much so that the leaders of the NDP held top positions in the LCP. John Carter was General Secretary of both, while Rudy Kendal was first vice-president of the NDP and vice-president of the LCP also. J. A. Nicholson and C. P. Denbow executive members of the NDP were vice-president and president of the League respectively. The NDP-LCP nucleus of the middle class African and creole elements of the society received the backing of the commercial community and the established churches, mainly Roman Catholic and Anglican. John Fernandes, a prominent Portuguese businessman was chairman of the party; Peter D'Aguiar, a Portuguese businessman, who was later to become the leader of the United Force also contested the 1953 elections under the banner of the NDP. Eugene Correia,

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<sup>1</sup> F. A. Hoyos, The Rise of West Indian Democracy The Life and Times of Sir Grantley Adams (Bridgetown Advocate Press, 1963); William H. Knowles, Trade Union Development and Industrial Relations in the British West Indies (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1959); Francis Mark, The History of the Barbados Workers' Union (Bridgetown, Barbados: Advocate Press, 1966).

a Portuguese businessman later joined the PNC, and Sheik Mohammed Shakoor, a wealthy East Indian, then General Secretary of the MPCA, Lionel Luckhoo, a barrister, later to become Guyanese High Commissioner to London, completed the hierarchy of the NDP.

Besides the NDP, the other groups opposing the PPP, the Guiana National Party and the United Workers and Farmers Party, merely mushroomed at election time. Both of these were splinter groups, an odd assortment of personalities with no programmes as a basis of solidarity. Like the NDP both of these groups drew heavily on the middle classes. The GNP, based principally in Berbice contested the elections under the Presidency of a revered physician, Loris Rohan Sharples. It has been claimed that this group was sponsored by the Sugar Producers Association to challenge the PPP especially in Berbice since the NDP concentrated mainly on its urban middle-class backing in the urban constituencies in Georgetown and New Amsterdam. The United Farmers and Workers Party (UFWP) which was curiously devoid of support from both workers and farmers, was united only in the sense that its middle-class Indian support revolved around the personality of Daniel Debidin, a solicitor from a well known creolised Indian family.

It is therefore in the background of the middle-class bias of the major political opponents of the PPP, that one can fully appreciate the impact of its organisation appealing as it did to the working classes. Through its joint leadership of Jagan (an Indian) and Burnham (an African) and its organisation strategists, Janet Jagan and Sidney King (now Eusi Kwayama) the party coopted secondary

leadership from all sections of the community which is illustrated by the occupational distribution of the 18 successful candidates of the PPP in the 1953 general elections. There were 3 lawyers, 2 medical doctors, 1 dentist, 2 trade unionists, 4 teachers, 2 farmers, 1 businessman, 2 labourers, 1 journalist, 1 housewife. The racial composition too was very representative as it included 6 East Indians, 5 Africans, 2 Chinese, 3 mixed, 1 white and 1 Portuguese. When in addition to these factors which cut across racial divisions, fourteen of the sixteen trade unions in 1953 were known to be affiliated to the PPP, this indeed confirms the boast of Janet Jagan at a meeting on Bourda Green to celebrate the party's election success, that 1953 must mark "the end of the old era and the beginning of mass politics". The PPP as a mass organisation not only articulated the demands of the working classes but also aggregated their interests in a way that appeared to be consensual. That is to say, a consensus which institutionally, if not psychologically, cut across the segmentary values of the racial groups in the society. Psychologically, it may be argued that the Afro-Indian leadership was a crucial factor in the unification stifled only by the constitutional limitations of the Waddington Constitution of 1953. Jagan is very expressive of this when he said:

We took our seats feeling proud of ourselves and all too aware of our constitutional limitations. We told our supporters that even though we had won the elections we were really Her Majesty's Government's Opposition.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Cheddi Jagan, The West on Trial: My Struggle For my People's Freedom (London: Michael Joseph, 1966), p. 139.

In his memorable reply to the Governor's address to the inaugural session of the House of Assembly in 1953, Jagan remarked:

Your Excellency's optimistic views about the new constitution and in particular the state council have been remarked. We however harbour no illusions about the nominated state council which can only serve the purpose of curbing the will of the people -- a reactionary and undemocratic purpose.

The presence of three civil servants in the House and their control of the three Key Ministries in the Government and the Governor's veto are an anomaly and contrary to the professed democratic principles of Her Majesty's Government. We shall continue to struggle for a democratic constitution for British Guiana.<sup>3</sup>

Jagan summed up the mood of a national coalition of working class interests which broke down, at least temporarily, the notion that Guyana is a plural society comprising cultural sections polarised in terms of cultural institutions. The PPP, in 1953, acting as a broker institution induced shared values, integrative in terms of the struggle for independence. The PPP was thus able to represent the level of alienation that existed within the ranks of the working class against 'government by officials'. If social tension is to be minimal, society must be seen to be the condition for the satisfaction of emotional and material needs of its members. Once the PPP leadership shed its Afro-Indian solidarity in 1955, the cross-cultural and class alliances were aborted.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>3</sup>"Jagan says, 'We harbour no illusion'," Daily Chronicle (Georgetown, Guyana: June 18, 1953), p. 1.

<sup>4</sup> In fact, factionalism existed below the surface of the party's organisation since 1951 when disintegrative pressures began to build up. That the 1955 split was merely the culmination of internal suspicions that pervaded the party's hierarchy is dealt with in some detail in Leo Despres, Cultural Pluralism and Nationalist Politics in British Guiana (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1967), pp. 192-220.

### 3. THE WORKING CLASS OR RACE AS THE BASIS OF POLITICAL CLEAVAGE

Table 3.1 illustrates that on the basis of occupational distribution,<sup>5</sup> the PPP in 1953 won the support of a very large proportion of the working class,<sup>6</sup> irrespective of race: 80 per cent of the Africans, 92 per cent East Indians and 66 per cent of the other races in the lower occupational grades voted for the PPP in 1953. Among our respondents in the middle occupational grades (III-V), 46 per cent of the Africans, 77 per cent East Indians and 51 per cent of the other races voted for the PPP. Among our respondents in the higher occupational grades (I-II), except for the East Indians (52 per cent) a relatively small number voted for the PPP, while a relatively large number voted for the National Democratic Party.

In Table 3.2, the emphasis changes from one of working class support for the PPP to support on the basis of race. Here we were mainly concerned with those who in the four General Elections between

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<sup>5</sup> For the purposes of our sample we ranked occupations as follows:

- i Higher managerial or professional
- ii Lower managerial, administrative, large farmer
- iii Skilled or supervisory non-manual
- iv Lower non-manual - clerks, etc.
- v Skilled manual
- vi Unskilled manual
- vii Unemployed (excluding housewife).

<sup>6</sup> The notion of class is a fairly complicated one. While our use of the occupational index is inadequate in assessing all criteria of the class positions of our respondents it provides a useful guide to socio-economic status in Guyana where the type of job a person has is often indicative of his educational background and of his social mobility.

TABLE 3.1

RESPONDENTS' VOTES FOR PPP AND OTHER PARTIES IN THE 1953 GENERAL ELECTIONS  
BY RACE AND OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION

Party	Africans			East Indians			Other Races		
	Occupational Grades			Occupational Grades			Occupational Grades		
	V-VII	III-IV	I-II	V-VII	III-IV	I-II	V-VII	III-IV	I-II
(1953) PPP	80	46	25	92	77	52	66	51	27
NDP	12	34	55	2	8	20	28	32	43
Other	3	12	4	3	10	13	4	11	15
Can't remember or didn't vote	5	8m	16	3	5	15	2	6	15
	100 (21)	100 (6)	100 (140)	100 (31)	100 (98)	100 (111)	100 (11)	100 (17)	100 (11)

TABLE 3.2

RESPONDENTS WHO VOTED FOR THE PPP, THE PNC OR OTHER PARTIES CONTINUOUSLY IN  
THE 4 GENERAL ELECTIONS BETWEEN 1957 AND 1968 BY RACE AND OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION\*

	Africans			East Indians			Other Races		
	Occupational Grades			Occupational Grades			Occupational Grades		
	V-VII	III-IV	I-II	V-VII	III-IV	I-II	V-VII	III-IV	I-II
PPP	6	3	5	92	88	56	14	17	-
PNC	84	90	80	2	4	14	29	33	10
Other Party	10	7	15	6	8	30	57	50	90
	100 (25)	100 (120)	100 (106)	100 (20)	100 (105)	100 (121)	100 (7)	100 (12)	100 (10) 2

\* The tabulations here take into account those who voted in at least 2 elections since 1957. Hence the table includes those who voted in all 4 elections for one party, those who voted in 3 elections only, but for the same party and those who voted in 2 elections only, but for the same party on each occasion.

1957 and 1968 had maintained support either for the PPP or the PNC or for one of the other parties. Hence we see that while a very large majority of Africans of all occupational categories supported the PNC continuously since 1957, as large a majority of East Indians supported the PPP continuously. Our respondents of other races seemed generally to have given the most continuous support to the other political parties that appeared on the electoral scene between 1957 and 1968.

When we come in Tables 3.3 to 3.5 to examine those respondents who were voting for the first time in the 1968 General Elections, the findings are interesting. Here we were concerned with examining the relationship in party preference of the new voters with their race and with the voting background of their parents. Our reason for selecting new voters is that mass involvement in General Elections in Guyana dates only from 1953. Most respondents other than the new voters had either very little knowledge of their parents' party preference or were wary of stating their parents' preference or had parents who lived in an era prior to the attainment of adult suffrage and therefore ineligible to vote. While, therefore, we asked several questions on inter-generational voting patterns, the number of our total sample actually answering these questions was so small that our strategy to concentrate on new voters seemed to us to be justified. There were 121 respondents in our sample who were voting for the first time in 1968.

In Table 3.3, of the new African voters, 76 per cent voted for the PNC while only 4 per cent voted for the PPP. Of the new Indian voters on the other hand, 27 per cent voted for the PNC while 70 per cent voted

PPP. The respondents who were new voters of other races, voted overwhelmingly in favour of the PNC with very few voting for the PPP.

Turning to the party preference of the new voters in comparison to that of their parents we see in Table 3.4, that the parents of new African voters were more inclined to favour the PNC than the PPP; that the parents of new East Indian voters were more inclined to support the PPP than the PNC. The new voters of the other races had parents whose loyalties were more evenly spread. In Table 3.5 we were concerned with matching the new voters' party preference with that of his parents. What we see here is that there is a high correspondence between the preferences of new voters and the preferences of their parents, which in any case showed definite racial biases.

The gross electoral data between 1957 and 1964 are also highly indicative of the accelerated trends towards racial cleavages in the politics of Guyana. In 1957, the PPP won all but 5 of the fourteen seats contested; four of these seats in predominantly urban-African constituencies, three of which were won by the PNC and the remaining seat by the UDP. The NLF, a new party formed by Lionel Luckhoo won the fifth seat in the predominantly Amerindian constituency of North West District. But the gross data of the 1961 and 1964 elections are more instructive.

In 1961 Elections when the UF contested the elections for the first time, the number of constituencies was increased to 35. Again the correlation between constituency support for a party and the racial

TABLE 3.3

## PARTY PREFERENCE OF NEW VOTERS BY RACE (1968)

		New Voter Voted			
		PNC	Neither	PPP	
New Voter was	African (47)	76	20	4	100
	Other (18)	60	38	2	100
	East Indian (56)	27	3	70	100

TABLE 3.4

PARTY PREFERENCE OF NEW VOTERS (1968) BY RACE  
COMPARED WITH PARENTS' PREFERENCE\*

		At least one parent was PNC	Both Parents were Neither	At least one parent was PPP
New Voter was	African (47)	68	21	27
	Other (18)	38	44	21
	East Indian (56)	11	21	79

TABLE 3.5

## PARTY PREFERENCE OF NEW VOTERS (1968) COMPARED WITH PARENTS' PREFERENCE\*

		At least one Parent was PNC	Both Parents were Neither	At least one Parent was PPP
New Voter was	PNC (62)	81	28	23
	Neither (12)	21	66	15
	PPP (37)	9	12	90

\* Parents, preferences were computed on the basis of respondents answer to the following questions: Do you know if your father/mother ever voted at an election in Guyana? If yes, do you know which party your father/mother normally votes/voted for? See Appendix II, Q. 34-35.

composition of the constituency was high. The PPP won twenty of the thirty-five seats of which fifteen were in predominantly East Indian dominated areas and five from marginally populated constituencies. The PNC, on the other hand, won its 11 seats from among the predominantly urban-African constituencies. The UF's support came partly from two Amerindian constituencies and partly from two urban middle-class constituencies. What needs to be stressed is that after the Burnham-Jagan split in 1955, class formations as a basis of party support tended to give way to race. The trend of racial voting became so entrenched in the political process that in the Elections of 1961, both the PPP and the PNC were using the slogan, apanjhat (vote for your own race).

It is therefore not surprising that when (as in Table 3.6) we compare the "swing"<sup>7</sup> among the parties in the constituencies, we find that between the 1961 and 1964 elections there was very little swing in the number of votes and the constituencies strongly identified with one

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<sup>7</sup> By "swing" we mean the net percentage of voters who transfer their support from one party to another between one election and the next. For analysis of the swing, see M. Faber, "A 'Swing' Analysis of the Jamaican Election of 1962", Social and Economic Studies, 13 (June, 1964). In this same study Faber uses the "safety margin" to mean the percentage of points above 50 per cent by which a party holds a seat. We use the concept differently to mean the difference in the percentage between the party gaining the highest number of votes and the party gaining the second highest number of votes in a given constituency. Hence in Corentyne East Central, the 1964 election results were as follows: PPP, 84 per cent; PNC, 15.5; and UF, .5 per cent of the votes cast. The safety margin for the PPP was therefore 68.5 per cent. Our main reason for modifying the criteria of the safety margin is that whereas in Faber's study his concern was the number of seats won (under single member plurality voting) in this study we are concerned primarily with the number of votes cast (under the system of simple proportional representation).

TABLE 3.6

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SWING IN THE DIRECTION OF VOTING FOR PARTIES BY CONSTITUENCIES IN THREE  
GENERAL ELECTIONS - 1961, 1964 and 1968

CONSTITUENCIES	1961 Safety Margin			1964 Swing to:			CONSTITUENCIES	1964 Safety Margin			1968 Swing to:		
	PPP	PNC	UF	PPP	PNC	UF		PPP	PNC	UF	PPP	PNC	UF
1. Corentyne East Central	68.4	-	-	0.1	-	-	Corentyne East Central	68.5	-	-	-	36.0	-
2. Corentyne River	65.4	-	-	-	0.26	-	Corentyne River	64.9	-	-	5.3	-	-
3. Corentyne West	58.7	-	-	0.17	-	-	Corentyne West	59.4	-	-	2.2	-	-
4. Berbice East	55.2	-	-	-	-	-	Corentyne East	58.9	-	-	-	33.6	-
5. Essequibo Islands	49.2	-	-	1.8	-	-	Berbice East	55.1	-	-	-	1.3	-
6. Berbice West	46.2	-	-	2.7	-	-	Essequibo Islands	51.6	-	-	-	7.5	-
7. Corentyne East	45.6	-	-	3.9	-	-	Boerasirie	51.3	-	-	-	1.5	-
8. Boerasirie	44.6	-	-	2.6	-	-	Berbice West	50.6	-	-	-	4.6	-
9. Demerara Coast West	34.3	-	-	2.7	-	-	Demerara Coast West	37.1	-	-	-	13.1	-
10. Leonora	32.8	-	-	-	2.4	-	Vreed-en-hoop	36.2	-	-	-	3.9	-
11. Suddie	32.7	-	-	-	-	-	Suddie	33.5	-	-	-	28.9	-
12. Vreedenhoop	32.5	-	-	1.5	-	-	Mahaicony	28.9	-	-	-	3.3	-
13. Mahaicony	26.4	-	-	2.0	-	-	Lower Demerara River	27.6	-	-	-	8.9	-
14. Canals Polder	22.7	-	-	0.2	-	-	Leonora	27.3	-	-	2.6	-	-
15. Lower Demerara River	22.0	-	-	3.7	-	-	Demerara Coast East	25.7	-	-	-	2.5	-
16. Demerara Coast East	21.8	-	-	0.2	-	2.96	Canals Polder	24.1	-	-	-	3.8	-
17. Mahaica	9.2	-	-	-	1.1	-	Demerara Coast W. Gen.	8.0	-	-	17.8	-	-
18. Pomeroon	8.1	-	-	-	0.4	-	Mahaica	7.0	-	-	-	2.8	-
19. Demerara Coast W. Gen.	7.0	-	-	1.0	-	-	Pomeroon	6.7	-	-	-	34.3	-
20. Houston	6.1	-	-	-	1.9	-	Houston	2.4	-	-	-	9.3	-
21. Berbice River	-	8.4	-	-	-	1.22	Berbice River	-	8.4	-	-	11.3	-
22. Georgetown Central	-	9.6	-	15.8	-	-	Georgetown Central	-	13.0	-	-	11.8	-
23. Kitty	-	20.0	-	3.5	-	-	Kitty	-	16.2	-	-	3.7	-
24. Abary	-	24.0	-	1.3	-	-	Georgetown North	-	21.7	-	-	9.9	-
25. Georgetown North	-	26.01	-	-	15.8	-	Abary	-	22.7	-	-	23.4	-
26. New Amsterdam	-	27.0	-	19.7	-	-	Campbellville	-	27.6	-	-	6.3	-
27. Campbellville	-	27.5	-	-	1.7	-	Mazaruni-Potaro	-	30.4	-	-	11.6	-
28. Georgetown South	-	28.0	-	-	3.8	-	Georgetown South	-	30.9	-	-	10.5	-
29. North West	-	-	30.2	1.1	-	2.5	North West	-	-	38.3	-	2.4	-
30. Werk-en-Rust	-	31.4	-	-	12.4	-	New Amsterdam	-	43.1	-	-	5.0	-
31. Mazaruni-Potaro	-	38.8	-	-	-	4.5	Werk-en-Rust	-	45.5	-	-	11.6	-
32. Rupununi	-	-	43.2	2.2	-	5.5	Rumiveldt	-	46.1	-	-	2.8	-
33. Rumiveldt	-	44.6	-	23.4	-	-	La-Penitence-Lodge	-	53.2	-	-	5.5	-
34. La-Penitence-Lodge	-	49.6	-	-	3.2	-	Rupununi	-	-	58.4	-	5.0	-
35. Upper Demerara River	-	64.2	-	-	10.8	-	Upper Demarara River	-	76.1	-	-	10.9	-

or other of the parties. While the introduction of the third party, the UF tends to complicate our interpretation of the simple concept of swing analysis, yet the mean percentage of UF and PPP votes captured by the PNC was 12.15 while the mean UF-PNC votes captured by the PPP was 9.51. The comparable figure for the UF was much lower, 7.15, but most of the swing to the UF was in the urban constituencies which affect the PNC more than the PPP. In the urban area the swing to the UF was 11.7 while in the rural area the swing to the UF was 3.4 per cent.

The concept of "swing" is important in our analysis of the racial tendencies in Guyanese politics. In Guyana, the gross electoral data of the four elections between 1957 and 1968, with the exception of 1968, show a marked tendency for rural-Indian support to be highly in favour of the PPP, urban, and (increasingly since 1961) rural-village support to favour the PNC, while the UF tends to attract the support of the marginal racial sectors and the Amerindians who have been christianised into Catholicism. Unfortunately the major drawback in swing analysis is that it does not tell us the details of the swing, what kinds of people change party affiliations and for what reasons. These factors are important to any conclusions that can be arrived at about political integration.

Tables 3.7 and 3.8 illustrate the qualitative factors of the swing to and from each party. In Table 3.7, for example, among 84 people who switched party identification between the elections of 1961 and 1968, 27 per cent of the Indians changed from PPP to PNC while 69 per cent changed from PNC to PPP. Similarly 28 per cent of the Africans

TABLE 3.7

SHIFTS IN PARTY IDENTIFICATION BETWEEN THE  
GENERAL ELECTIONS OF 1961, 1964 and 1968 BY RACE  
(In Percentages)  
(N = 84)

	African	East Indian*	Mixed	Other
PPP to PNC	42	27	33	28
UF to PNC	36	4	39	55
PNC to PPP	12	69	28	7
UF to PPP	-	-	-	-
PNC to UF	-	-	-	10
PPP to UF	-	-	-	-
	100	100	100	100
	(40)	(29)	(10)	(6)

TABLE 3.8

SHIFTS IN PARTY IDENTIFICATION BETWEEN THE  
GENERAL ELECTIONS OF 1961, 1964 and 1968 BY RELIGION  
(N = 84)

	Catholic	Hindu*	Muslim*	Protestant
PPP to PNC	6	38	62	64
UF to PNC	42	22	28	24
PNC to PPP	4	32	5	10
UF to PPP	-	-	-	-
PNC to UF	36	8	5	2
PPP to UF	-	-	-	-
	100	100	100	100
	(12)	(20)	(11)	(41)

\* Note that while the number of East Indians is 29, Muslims (11) and Hindus (20) amount to 31. Among those listed as Muslims 2 were non-Indians, a phenomenon not unusual today in Guyana where there is a growing number of Black Muslims, adherents of Islam.

who supported the PNC in 1964 switched to the PPP in 1968 while 42 per cent switched from PPP to PNC. What is reflected in these data is that in the swing to each party the "changers" to the party were mostly from the race on which the party depended for its support.

Religious differences in Table 3.8 do not by themselves explain racial cleavages but they are very informative. As many as 64 per cent of the "changers" of the Muslim religion and 38 per cent of the Hindu religion switched loyalties from the PPP to the PNC. While the switching of Muslims is not so surprising, the relatively large switch among Hindus from PPP to PNC may be indicative of the possibility that the traditional support for the PPP could be weakening. Of lesser significance is that 88 per cent of the Protestant "changers" switched from the UF and the PPP to the PNC, 32 per cent of the Hindu "changers" moved to the PPP while 36 per cent of the Catholics shifted to the UF.

Insofar as these responses on religious affiliation, social group participation and switching of party loyalties are related to political integration, we note that "cultural sections" are somewhat rigidly defined in terms of their attachment to one or other party. A very high proportion of the Hindus vote for the PPP along with a high proportion of the rural East Indians; most of the Afro-Guyanese vote for the PNC and the majority of the UF support is derived from the Catholic and Portuguese sections of the population. Yet these cleavages do not express themselves in any extreme demands toward separation of the various sections. The idea of partitioning Guyana, for example, was unanimously

rejected by the respondents in our sample.<sup>8</sup>

#### 4. OVERLAPPING MEMBERSHIPS IN SOCIO-POLITICAL FACTIONS

In Guyana, the PPP in 1953 initiated a political community which combined a broad nationalist front with the principles of Marxist-Leninism. But as evident in the subsequent racial tensions and the 1955 split within the party, the leaders of the PPP failed to consolidate a combination of Marxism and nationalism and this contributed to the tendency of disintegration in the political community of Guyana especially between 1961 and 1964. This period epitomised an acute crisis of legitimacy mainly due to a crisis of community support on other than racial grounds. Partly contributory to this crisis of community support were the roles of secondary leaders in pseudo-political organisations. During this period, ethnic groups tended to seek psychological comfort by identifying themselves with the respective cultures and national societies from which they originated. Such organisations as ASCRIA with its emphasis on African culture and the Maha Sabha with its enthusiasm for Indian culture compromise support for the political community in Guyana by projecting

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<sup>8</sup> We posed the question in the following way: Here are some people's opinion on certain developments in Guyana. Kindly state how strongly you agree or disagree.

Divide Guyana into three sections: one for East Indians, one for Africans and one for the rest of the population.  
The responses were as follows:

Strongly agree	3	per	cent
Agree	9	"	"
Can't decide	8	"	"
Disagree	19	"	"
Strongly disagree	56	"	"

loyalties of ethnic groups outside the system.

ASCRIA was formed in 1964 by Eusi Kwayana, a person of great leadership legitimacy in view of his universal reputation almost unique among Caribbean politicians, for incorruptible honesty.<sup>9</sup> Among the major aims of ASCRIA are the revival of African culture in Guyana; a programme of educational reform to project African history, politics and philosophy and to stimulate pride in African heritage by a knowledge and association with the activities in Black Africa. In 1968-1969, ASCRIA greatly increased the efficiency in the structure and organisation of its movement across the country by its regular recruitment drives and cultural programmes. Especially in the rural areas, there is a great overlap between membership in ASCRIA and membership in the PNC. In New Amsterdam according to our sample, 35 per cent of the PNC membership also held membership in ASCRIA. In Abary, the percentage was as high as 58, while in Houston it was 11 percent and 5 per cent in Suddie. When we compare overlapping membership in the Maha Sabha and the PPP, the percentages range from 63 per cent in Skeldon, 61 per cent in Corentyne West Central to 15 per cent in Suddie and 8 per cent in Houston. What emerges here is that these two cultural groupings act as broker

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<sup>9</sup> Kwayana is reputed by many to be the second most powerful person in the country after Burnham -- a rating which is supported by the reports given to us in confidence by some local leaders of the PNC. We were informed that in some instances the rank-and-file membership of PNC groups, who are also members of ASCRIA will vote for local officials only if they are known to be supporters, members or sympathisers of ASCRIA. Herein lies the infiltration of the PNC by ASCRIA, even though Kwayana insists on the apolitical pursuits of his organisation.

institutions between primary and local institutions in the village, plantation and cities and the national political organisations. But moreover both the Maha Sabha and ASCRIA tend to consolidate the attachment of their membership to the PPP and PNC respectively by explicitly dramatising the cultural differences between Africans and Indians. As broker institutions, both of these groups illustrate the problems of attracting broad-base support for any set of authorities and for any regime in Guyana.

ASCRIA's role is critical since in some instances it is seen as the cultural arm of the PNC and has attracted the support -- at least morally -- of many of the top personnel of that party who are always prominent at the many functions sponsored by ASCRIA. One of ASCRIA's major objectives is for a return to the land by Afro-Guyanese. ASCRIA was among the chief advocates of a "cooperative" republic, one which emphasises farming and distribution of the lands in Guyana among groups and individuals so as to encourage both small and large agricultural ventures. Eusi Kwayana is himself Chairman of one of the land distribution committees which fits perfectly with the official government policy of getting the underemployed and unemployed out of the cities to the farmlands in the hinterland. At the same time ASCRIA has promoted several manufacturing and farming cooperatives. It seems justified from the example of Eusi Kwayana to think that ASCRIA is attempting to inculcate in its followers puritan values similar to those fostered by the Black

Muslims.<sup>10</sup> As a result of such activities, apparently partial toward the PNC, the cultural tensions between African and Indian tend to be intensified with grave implications for legitimacy. Ironically, two executive members of Ratoon, the radical group, are also members of ASCRIA; one of these, Omawali, is the vice-president of ASCRIA.

The Maha Sabha retains much of its traditional religious aura but has been closely associated with the PPP since it mobilises the same traditional elements of the Indian communities who are most attached to the PPP. Several prominent members of the PPP have held high positions in the Maha Sabha: Sase Narine, its president, Reepu Daman Persaud,<sup>11</sup> its secretary, Dalchand, Macie Amid and Moneer Khan. The Maha Sabha is perhaps one of the most efficiently organised institutions in Guyana, judging from the sustained growth in its membership and the actual commitment of these to the organisation. Of the 169 members of the Maha Sabha in our sample over 80 per cent reported that they attended its functions regularly.

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<sup>10</sup> We are grateful to Victor and Barbara Ferkiss for pointing out this connection. See Victor C. Ferkiss and Barbara Ferkiss, "Race and Politics in Trinidad and Guyana," Unpublished MS., (a paper presented to the American Political Science Association meeting in New York, Sept. 1969).

<sup>11</sup> Reepu Daman Persaud was expelled from the Maha Sabha in January 1970 for allegedly undermining the religious aspects of the organisation. It could be that Persaud's position became tenuous within the organisation following a break in friendship between Jagan and some of the pundits and leading personalities within the Maha Sabha, after Jagan had announced at the 1969 Congress that the PPP was a Marxist-Leninist party. Jagan's announcement was followed by a reorganisation of the party to create a more centralised structure patterned after the Communist Party in the Soviet Union.

TABLE 3.9

OVERLAPPING MEMBERSHIP OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND A SELECTED  
NUMBER OF SOCIAL-CULTURAL-RELIGIOUS ORGANISATIONS - 1968-1969  
(In Percentages)

		Maha Saba	Anjuman	Catholic Church/Guild	ASCRIA
SKELDON (rural)	( PNC ( PPP ( UF	.5 65 -	.11 12 -	- - 100	- - -
CORENTYNE WEST CENT. (rural)	( PNC ( PPP ( UF	25 72 -	44 10 25	- - 75	- - -
HOUSTON (urban)	( PNC ( PPP ( UF	10 45 -	26 13 -	16 - 60	22 - -
SUDDIE (rural)	( PNC ( PPP ( UF	11 52 -	21 27 10	18 - 45	29 - -
NEW AMSTERDAM (urban)	( PNC ( PPP ( UF	6 43 7	18 12 -	12 - 61	35 - -
ABARY (rural)	( PNC ( PPP ( UF	6 51 -	14 20 -	- - 100	58 - -

The Anjuman is an arm of the Muslim religious league. Its functions are mainly cultural though to a large extent it does for the Muslim community what the Maha Sabha does for the Hindus. Its organisation is however much smaller. In our sample 68 respondents claimed membership in the Anjuman.

While the two dominant cultural movements ASCRIA and the Sanatan Maha Sabha tend to strengthen the ethnic ties within Guyana and to

contribute to a crisis of legitimacy, there are other associations which also make their contributions to this crisis. Judging from our data, the ethnic sodalities are maintained to a much greater extent in the rural areas than in the urban areas.<sup>12</sup> As a generalised interpretation of our data in Table 3.9, patterns emerge which differentiate Africans from Indians. Compared with Africans, Indians are not "joiners" of voluntary associations except if they are religious in character or unless they are formed for a special purpose such as a land development association, an irrigation improvement association or some agricultural cooperative. Africans on the other hand participate in a wide variety of organisations ranging from educational groups to burial societies. In the urban areas the disparity between the two dominant ethnic groups is not as marked. Both join youth groups, trade unions, sports clubs, in an undifferentiated manner suggesting a greater degree of interrelationship between the races at this secondary level of interaction. Interestingly in all areas only PNCites are members of ASCRIA.

One of the most important types of movement is the trade union. It is largely true to say that the trade unions provide mass support for the two major parties. However that the Guyana Agricultural Workers' Union (GAWA)<sup>13</sup> and the Manpower Citizens Association (MPCA)

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<sup>12</sup> See Despres, Cultural Pluralism, pp. 103-108 for a survey of the impact of associational activity in a selected number of village and plantation communities. The conclusions arrived at in this study support his findings.

<sup>13</sup> The conflict for recognition between the G.A.W.A. and the M.P.C.A. has resulted in a series of strikes; it triggered off the 1962-63 crisis in Guyana and the reactions to the proposed Labour Relations Bill, 1970. See Clive Thomas, "Sugar Economics in a Colonial Situation: A Study of Guyana Sugar Industry," Studies in Exploitation, No. 1, June, 1970.

cater almost exclusively to the needs of the sugar workers cannot be dissociated from the fact that their leadership is predominantly Indian. Similarly, outside the sugar belt, the trade union is monopolised by African politicians and workers. In the 1968 elections for example most of the unions openly expressed support for the PNC. Among these were the Guyana Labour Union with approximately 2,725 members drawn mainly from African workers in Georgetown; the Guyana Mine Workers Union; the Transport Workers Union, whose president Winslow Carrington, is also Minister of Labour; the Post Office Workers Union (whose president was ex-general secretary of the PNC); the Teachers Association, Civil Service Association and the Printers Industrial Union.<sup>14</sup>

The trade union organisations are really responses to the historical and colonial experiences of Guyana's economy. Unions organised in the rural and agricultural sectors of the country inevitably represent the economic and political interests of the East Indians while those organised in the urban sectors represent African interests. Therefore even though it is not surprising to find a divergence between the economic and political interests of urban and rural workers yet Guyana's rural-urban differentiation is due to cultural and colonial factors. According to Despres, "such a situation cannot but affect the organisational strategies of national political movements."<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> See advertisements to this effect in Guyana Graphic, December 2 to December 17, 1968.

<sup>15</sup> Despres, op. cit., p. 158.

More recently some union leaders have been perturbed by the continued alliance between the trade union movement and the PNC. This skepticism is revealed by Leslie Melville, president of the Civil Service Association when he says:

The battle is none-the-less won and the alliance is often described as an unholy one must be dissolved, and the form of association that must now exist between the former allies is of importance to the Movement, for the political opposition has now become the Government and they with many platitudes have openly sought the co-operation of the Trade Union Movement. Just how far can this co-operation extend without embarrassing the Movement must be determined for the policy of the Government from here on is going to be under deep scrutiny, and it is known that at some time its policy must divert from that of the movement and it is not going to be easy for the Movement to decide on a line of action.<sup>16</sup>

Between May 1969 and the present time the Trade Union Council was forced to decide on a line of action. It confronted the government on the issue of its proposed Trades Disputes Bill<sup>17</sup> intent on curbing strike action on the part of the unions and of setting up an Industrial Court to deal with disputes. The unions rejected the proposals in the government's draft bill mainly for, (1) its failure to set up some criteria for recognising a Trade Union within an industry or trades; (2) its failure to truly define an expeditious system for settling disputes

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<sup>16</sup> Leslie Melville, "Militancy in the Civil Service Association and Free Elections," New World Quarterly (Guyana), II (May 1969), p. 37.

<sup>17</sup> The Trades Disputes Bill empowered the Government to decide which union should be the bargaining agent for specific categories of employees although workers retained the right to join the union of their choice.

and (3) its failure to set up machinery for the regulation of prices.<sup>18</sup> One possible effect of such a bill is that it would place collective bargaining in a purely politicised framework in which the government and the employers would be seen to be ranged against the trade unions and the employees. This image of government alliance with the employers against the workers together with the unanimous rejection of the proposed bill by the trade unions must have had some effect on the legitimacy of the PNC's regime.<sup>19</sup>

It seems reasonable to suggest that already, organisational strategies of national political movements are affected in two main ways: (1) by the level of mobilisation generated by membership in the secondary and broker institutions and (2) by the system of patronage which determines 'who gets, what, why and where'. Since cultural and economic associations in Guyana tend to retain their ethnic group identity, to a large extent they consolidate the political cleavages of individuals socialised into a fragmented political culture with perceptions and attitudes reflecting the fragmentation of that political culture. It is not surprising that political parties, in their struggle to acquire or maintain political control of the state apparatus aggregate interests in such a way that they perpetuate the generalised and irrational fear of

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<sup>18</sup> The Trade Union Council prepared an alternative bill known as the "Jackson Proposals". But the government has refused to accept these proposals which sought mainly to reduce the powers of the Minister in addition to regulating prices, and accepting strikes as legal, after a minimum period for negotiations has expired.

<sup>19</sup> James Millette, "Comparing Two Labour Bills", New World Quarterly (Guyana) II, May 1969, p. 41.

the other ethnic group. This lack of empathic understanding between both national and local groups heightens the "we-they" quality of the conflict and makes the resolution of the national goals a most difficult task to resolve.

The system of patronage too heightens racial disaffection. What is involved here is what the Americans call 'pork barrel politics': the distribution of jobs, government contracts, scholarships and public works. Important too, is who receives the benefits -- fees, concessions, roads, public housing, farmlands, salaries, trips abroad, invitations to the Prime Minister's residence? Since unemployment is a critical economic factor and since as in most other developing areas the government is the greatest source of employment, its power to dispense jobs is a vital monopoly in the political decision-making structure. Allegations of discrimination by government has always been and continues to be prevalent in Guyana. And this is highly related to the financial support given by government to one project or activity instead of another. It was said for example, that Jagan discriminated against the urban workers (mostly Africans) in favour of the farmers (mostly Indians). In Jagan's development Plan 1956-60 almost 50 per cent of the development funds were allocated to agriculture, 15 per cent for urban housing and 2 per cent for industrial development.<sup>20</sup> In Jagan's 1960-64 plan a similar distribution was made except that allocations to agriculture were 5 per cent

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<sup>20</sup> See British Guiana Development Plan 1956-60, Georgetown, Guyana: Government Printers, 1956.

higher than in the 1956-60<sup>21</sup> plan while allocations to urban housing and industrial development had declined. In Burnham's 1966-70 Development Plan all this has been altered. Capital spending on agriculture, including sea defences and new land development is estimated at 16 per cent of development expenditure while improvement of communications is 40 per cent and other public works is 22 per cent. The crucial factor in terms of patronage is a shift in the proportion of government expenditure away from the Indian farmers into the pockets of the African wage earners.<sup>22</sup>

Both in relation to political mobilisation inherited from the process of social forces, and the dispensation of patronage at the level of policy-making, support for the political regime has been considerably undermined since partisan and ethnic attitudes of group affiliation tarnish the expectations and confuse the norms delimiting the scope of political interaction and consensus in Guyana. In other words, instead of strengthening supports for a cohesive regime, the nature of political mobilisation and the pattern of patronage would dispose the people to remain loyal to the regime only if their particular group was in control of the structures of authority.

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<sup>21</sup> British Guiana Development Plan 1960-64, Georgetown, Guyana: Government Printers, 1960.

<sup>22</sup> Guyana Development Plan 1966-70, Georgetown, Guyana: Government Printers, 1966.

## CHAPTER IV

### POLITICAL PERCEPTION AND POLITICAL MOBILISATION

#### 1. INTRODUCTION

In this chapter we shall investigate how an individual perceives the political groups, their personalities, their activities, the competing issues; how he perceives himself in the world of politics; how he perceives the future of this world of politics. Very often a voter's perceptions in these matters may be ill-formed but they provide crucial clues to actual behaviour.

#### 2. PERCEPTUAL BASIS OF POLITICAL BEHAVIOUR

In assessing the patterns of political identification in the Guyanese electorate, what mattered was not merely their objective positions but the corresponding patterns of behaviour they developed and the pictures they carried around in their heads of themselves, of others and of the system itself.<sup>1</sup> Hyman states the case succinctly when he says, "Men are urged to certain ends but the political scene in which they act is perceived and given meaning. Some cognitive map

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<sup>1</sup> This perceptual basis of political mobilisation is neglected in most traditional studies of voting behaviour like Stuart A. Rice, Quantitative Methods in Politics (New York: Knopf, 1928); Walter Berns, "Voting Studies" in Herbert J. Storing (Ed.), Essays on Scientific Study of Politics (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston 1962), pp. 1-62; V. O. Key Jnr., Southern Politics (New York: Knopf, 1949). For a criticism of the "common-sense" approach and the value of rigorous methodological experimentation see Karl Deutsch, "The Limits of Common-sense," Psychiatry, 22 (May, 1959), pp. 105-12.

accompanies their movement toward their end."<sup>2</sup>

All political practices and orientations have historical antecedents. "We do not inherit our political behaviour, attitudes and values through our genes. They must be learned in some way."<sup>3</sup> How the citizen perceives the political system and his role in it are dependent on his beliefs, feelings and judgments about the system, its roles and the incumbents of these roles.<sup>4</sup> Recognising the significance of citizenship perceptions, Campbell and others wrote:

Perceptions are the free-floating creations of the individual voter or the small social groupings in which they are shared. They are tied in fundamental ways to the properties of the stimulus objects that are perceived. As these properties change the perceptions will also tend to change. As a result the flow of historical reality has enormous influence on the electorate's perceptions of its political environment.<sup>5</sup>

What is therefore important here is not only the extent to which the historical factors influence perceptions of one's political environment but also what effect do these perceptions have on the process of pol-

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<sup>2</sup> Herbert Hyman, Political Socialization (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1959), p. 18.

<sup>3</sup> David Easton and Jack Dennis, Children in the Political System: Origins of Political Legitimacy (New York: McGraw-Hill, Co., 1969), p. 13.

<sup>4</sup> G. A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 14-15 refer to these attitudes as the psychological orientation towards social objects.

<sup>5</sup> Angus Campbell, et al., The American Voter (New York: John Wiley, 1960), p. 43.

itical mobilisation. How are citizens' public image of parties and political leaders affected by their environment? What are their images of non-party groupings and of the issues that are currently engaging the political process? Experimental psychologists explain motivational significance of the political environment in terms of perceptual push and perceptual pull.<sup>6</sup> Hence, for example, ethnic hostility or group prejudice in the political environment will account for members of prejudiced groups assigning other groups to parties associated with a particular racial type.<sup>7</sup> This property of individual psychology can be described as the perceptual push. The other property of individual psychology applies because of the tendency of people to associate with each other, on the basis of similarity in socio-economic background. The peer group as an association of fellow workers, colleagues, or friends may provide the criteria not only of socio-group identification but also of political

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<sup>6</sup> See George C. Homans, Social Behaviour: Its Elementary Forms (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World), 1961, and H.J. Eysenck, Sense and Nonsense in Psychology (Penguin Books, Inc., 1957), Chapter III.

<sup>7</sup> Psychological factors of this kind are very common in a wide range of systems: in Britain as described by David Butler and Donald Stokes, Political Change in Britain: Forces Shaping Electoral Choice (London: McMillan and Co. Ltd., 1969); in America, Donald Matthews and James Prothro, Negroes and the New Southern Politics, (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World Inc., 1966); in Canada, J. A. Laponce, People vs. Politics: A Study of Opinions, Attitudes and Perceptions in Vancouver - Burrard 1963-1965 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969); in Africa A. Zolberg, One Party Government in the Ivory Coast (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1964); in South-East Asia, R. S. Milne, Government and Politics in Malaysia (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1967); in the Caribbean, see L. Bahadoorsingh, Trinidad Electoral Politics: The Persistence of the Race Factor (London: Institute of Race Relations, 1968).

affiliations. This socio-political relationship can be classified as the perceptual pull.<sup>8</sup> In other words, social needs tend to be made manifest in political percepts. As a result, perceptions may reflect the need for social support and the need for aggression against outsiders. Perceptions are not necessarily synonymous with reality but they circumscribe individual decisions, making them easier. They may also deepen the cleavages within society by emphasising the differences between we and they; they can also heighten political stability by reducing the feeling of insecurity, suppression and alienation of individuals in the process of being politically mobilised. These perceptual bases of individual behaviour are sometimes described as their reference set.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> The Milne and McKenzie studies in Britain and the SCR studies in U.S.A. have pioneered the study of voting behaviour in relationship to socio-group identifications. See R. S. Milne and H. C. McKenzie, Straight Fight (London: Hansard Society, 1954); R.S. Milne, "Some Recent Studies in Voting: The Middle Class Vote," Political Studies, 3 (1955), pp. 148-150. See also V. O. Key and Frank Munger, "Social Determinism and Electoral Decision: The Case of Indiana" in Eugene Burdick and Arthur J. Brodbeck (Eds.), American Voting Behaviour (New York: The Free Press, 1959); Donald Matthews and James W. Prothro, "An Analysis of White and Negro Attitudes" in Avery Leiserson (Ed.), The American South in the 1960's (New York: Praeger, 1964).

<sup>9</sup> The idea of a reference set as a motivational basis of role behaviour was developed by Theodore D. Kemper, "The Relationship Between Self Concept and the Characteristics and Expectations of the Significant Others," (Unpub. Ph. D. Dissertation, New York: New York University, 1963) and incorporates the earlier thesis of the reference group as set out in M. Sherif, An Outline of Social Psychology (New York: Harper and Row, 1956); R. H. Kelley, "Two Functions of Reference Groups" in G. E. Swanson, T. M. Newcomb and E. Hartley (Eds.), Readings in Psychology (New York: Holt and Rhinehart, 1952), pp. 410-414; and Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1957), pp. 225-281. Very instructive to our analysis is an interesting

To determine the nature of the perceptual pull and push and their effects on political mobilisation, our interviews were intent on exploring several dimensions of the public images as manifested in the Guyanese electorate. In Guyana political mobilisation assumes, historically, an index of conflict between two major ethnic groups, the Indians and the Africans. Racial conflict in the decade immediately preceding the 1968 elections seemed to be enshrined in the perceptions of the electorate and this reflected not only the patterns of their identification but their susceptibility to political cleavages which reflected the nature of that conflict. Some of the pictures which people carried around in their heads are vividly reflected in statements such as these:<sup>10</sup>

(Indian

Teacher) : Guyana could never be the same after the violence and bloodshed of the last six years.

Negroes and Indians are growing further apart. The slightest thing will trigger off a violent confrontation.

(Mixed

Lawyer) : Look at what happened in 1962, 1963 and 1964.

Nothing can change that. You could never expect

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section of "I-them", "They-Me" and "I-Me" relationships in which the authors refer to a multiple set of figures (group and person) performing different social roles and to whom the individual refers his behaviour. See Orville G. Brim Jr. and Stanton Wheeler, Socialization After Childhood: Two Essays (New York: John Wiley, 1966), pp. 12-17.

<sup>10</sup> The question here was: Do you personally expect that this country will be faced with racial troubles in the next five years or so or do you think that there is a good chance of avoiding this?

Indians and Africans to live peacefully again.

(African  
Unemployed) : My brother was killed by them stinking Coolie bastards, I could never forget that.

(Indian  
farmer) : Now that the Africans are in power they acting wrong and strong. We people (Indians) bound to rebel sooner or later.

(Portuguese  
business-  
man) : The Government is a black man government, the police is black, the army is black, the civil service is black. Now to get jobs coolie turning blackmen. This situation must end up in violence.

(African  
farmer) : While Coolie fight blackman and blackman killing Coolie we leffing (leaving) the country to the Chineemen and the putagee (Portuguese).

(African  
carpenter) : Wash a coolie, starch a coolie and iron a coolie is the same coolie -- always want to stab you in you back -- is time we black people see 'bout we self'.

(Chinese  
dentist) : People have not really forgotten nor forgiven the tortures of 1962, 1963 and 1964. Violence could erupt at any time.

As we can see from the comments above, people in making judgments about political identification today are still severely affected by the

violence of the 1962-64 period. This experience partly explains the nature of the perceptual pull. For example, it has been reported that when the three-month general strike ended on July 8, 1963, 135 persons had been killed, 450 were injured and the estimated cost of damage to houses and other business property was \$50 million (BWI).<sup>11</sup> Again in 1964 it was established that when the 161 day strike ended on July 27, 160 persons had died as a result of racial violence while 950 were injured and 1000 houses were destroyed at a financial cost of \$13 million (BWI).<sup>12</sup> Group violence expressed itself mainly in terms of clashes between Africans and Indians. On May 24, 1964, for example, 1200 Indians were evacuated from Wismar, a mining town, as a result of attacks by Africans. It was reported that in this case 100 houses were burned and 60 persons were killed, including two Indian shopkeepers beaten to death by Africans.<sup>13</sup> What is more, as a result of these violent clashes between the two racial groups it is reported that there was voluntary segregation in some villages such as Paradise, Good Hope, Better Hope, Sorrow, Bachelor's Adventure, Friendship, and Annandale where Indians and Africans formerly lived side by side. This spontaneous movement seemed to have been caused by well-founded fears of the minority group in most villages that they might be bombed, murdered or burned in their

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<sup>11</sup> John Crocker, "Guiana Tragedy," Sunday Guardian, June 7, 1963, p. 2.

<sup>12</sup> Elizabeth Wallace, "British Guiana: Causes of the Present Discontent," International Journal, 19 (Autumn 1964), pp. 520-522.

<sup>13</sup> "Mob Violence at Wismar," Daily Chronicle, (Georgetown, Guyana, May 25, 1964), p. 1.

TABLE 4.1

EXPECTATIONS OF VIOLENCE/NON-VIOLENCE  
IN PERCENTAGES POST ELECTION 1968

(N = 985)

Expects violence	6
Did not expect violence	52
Expects violence if PPP gets into power	21
Expects violence for other reasons	9
Does not expect violence as long as PNC remains in power	3
Don't Know	<u>7</u>
	<u>100</u>

TABLE 4.3

EXPECTATIONS OF PROSPERITY/DEPRESSION  
IN PERCENTAGES POST ELECTION 1968

Expects prosperity	44
Expects depression	17
Expects depression if the PPP gets into power	21
Expects depression for other reasons	6
Expects prosperity providing PNC remains in power	6
Don't Know	<u>6</u>
	<u>100</u>

TABLE 4.2

EXPECTS VIOLENCE/NON VIOLENCE  
IN PERCENTAGES BY PARTY SUPPORT

(N = 985)

	<u>PNC</u>	<u>PPP</u>	<u>UF</u>
Expects violence	7	10	-
Did not expect violence	63	28	73
Expects violence if PPP gets into power	74	40	27
Expects violence for other reasons	13	12	-
Does not expect violence provided the PNC remains in power	3	10	-
	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>

TABLE 4.4

EXPECTS PROSPERITY/DEPRESSION -  
IN PERCENTAGES BY PARTY SUPPORT

	<u>PNC</u>	<u>PPP</u>	<u>UF</u>
Expects prosperity	62	15	-
Expects depression	9	29	53
Expects depression if the PPP gets into power	9	42	47
Expects depression for other reasons	11	12	-
Expects prosperity provided PNC remains in power	9	2	-
	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>

beds.<sup>14</sup> Group violence was not only widespread, but it underscored the growing emotionalism based on race. It is in the background of this social conflict that the perceptions of respondents in this study have been formed, consolidated or dispelled.

Tables 4.1 and 4.2 tell us about the citizens' perception of social conflict. Of 865 respondents in Table 4.1, 52 per cent did not expect violence, 8 per cent unreservedly expected another period of violence in Guyana. Of the remainder, 21 per cent expected violence if the PPP returned to power while 3 per cent thought violence would not occur provided the PNC remained in power. But these categories are not mutually exclusive of each other. According to the expectations of our respondents, should the PNC stay in office, only 15 per cent actually perceive another period of violence while 76 per cent do not expect violence. In Table 4.2 where the data is distributed according to party support, 63 per cent of the PNC supporters and 73 per cent of the UF supporters did not expect violence while only 28 per cent of the PPP supporters did not expect violence. Interestingly, while only 14 per cent of the PNC supporters and 27 per cent of the UF supporters expected violence if the PPP were to get into power, 40 per cent of the PPP supporters expected violence in this situation.

Similar perceptual patterns are displayed with regard to respondents' expectations of the economic future of the country. An overwhelming majority of the PNC supporters expected prosperity while

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<sup>14</sup> For a full account of these events see Wallace, op. cit., pp. 540-542.

a majority of UF supporters expected imminent economic depression.

Again over 40 per cent of the PPP supporters and as many as 47 per cent of the UF supporters expected an economic depression if the PPP were to take office. The relatively low expectations even by PPP supporters of that party may be a reflection of two factors: one is an association of the period of sustained violence (1962-64) with the inability of their party-government to maintain law and order. The fact that the police force and the Guyana Defence Force are comprised essentially of Afro-Guyanese<sup>15</sup> could account for this perceptual pull. The second factor may be a recognition of external pressures, especially from America, in the form of refusals to grant loans and aid for economic

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<sup>15</sup> Recent statistics on the police and the military give the following racial breakdown:

Racial Origin of Guyana Defence Force and Police Force

	1965		1970	
	No.	%	No.	%
Indian	733	20	995	24
Mixed	154	4	250	6
Negro	2701	74	2840	69
Other	83	2	60	1
Total	3671	100	4145	100

Source: 1965: G. W. Roberts and Joycelyn Byrne, Memorandum Presented by the Government of British Guiana to the Commission of Inquiry Part 1 (Georgetown Govt. Printery, 1965), p.4.

1970: Ministry of External Affairs Memo (N. D.). The statistics to which we gained access failed to draw a more detailed breakdown. But "Security Force" here includes the Guyana Police Force, Rural Constabularies, Supernumerary Police, Guyana Volunteer Force which since independence has become the nucleus of the Guyana Defence Force, and the Special Service Unit.

development during the Jagan regime.<sup>16</sup> "Expectations" here is an evaluative factor of the citizen's cognitive map. Hence to the degree that he expects electoral success of the party he supports, to that degree are his expectations rated as being high. Similarly, electoral defeat is likely to generate low expectations of the party with which individuals identify. In this respect, supporters of the PPP may have suffered most, the effects of a declining self-image, i.e., a feeling of deprivation, of alienation, of second-class citizenship, even though there may be no commensurate diminution of their economic status, their ability to retain their group institutions or their access to a share in political decision-making. However, once we relate the self-image of individuals to party identification, we are assuming that our respondents see political conflict in terms of party conflict. Perceptions of group behaviour by individuals are related to feelings of historical and social distance.<sup>17</sup> Social proximity and direct knowledge of a socio-economic or an ethnic group usually affect an individual's evaluation of the political support of that group. In Trinidad, one analyst found that the possession of a common characteristic, viz., race, was more important in predicting political behaviour than formal

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<sup>16</sup> The role of super states in dominating the politics of small states by their economic stranglehold is well documented in Stephen Hymer, "The Role of the multi-national corporation in Small States," paper presented at the Seminar on Hemispheric Relations of the Caribbean, University of the West Indies, January 1970. See also William Demas, Economics of Small States (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1967).

<sup>17</sup> See Homans, Social Behaviour (1961).

associations or informal friendship groups.<sup>18</sup> In Guyana (as we shall soon show) images of group support seem consistent with this general hypothesis.

### 3. IMAGE OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES

To establish what role political parties play in giving shape and direction to the behaviour of voters, we tried to discover what kind of identity the three major parties in Guyana had in the public's mind. We therefore asked a series of questions so as to get our respondents to identify different types of people with one or more parties. Ten descriptions or types were proposed to our respondents:

labourers	East Indians
civil servants	teachers
poor people	Africans
businessmen	rice farmers
catholics	Portuguese

Each description was prefaced by the statement, "which party or parties do you think these people voted for?" Although we might have added more categories to our list, we believe that it was sufficiently representative to extract images of the respective parties from the respondent's field of perception. Whereas civil servants, teachers and Africans are perceived in Table 4.5 as having voted overwhelmingly for the PNC, rice farmers and

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<sup>18</sup> Krishna Bahadoorsingh, Trinidad Electoral Politics: The Persistence of the Race Factor (London: Institute of Race Relations, 1968), pp. 48-56.

East Indians were perceived to have voted predominantly in favour of the PPP, Roman Catholics and Portuguese for the UF. These images of political parties tend to support the view that race is the dominant factor in the voting behaviour of the Guyanese electorate. In Guyana both the civil service and the teaching professions are dominated by Africans; most rice farmers are East Indians; and Portuguese, for the most part belong to the Roman Catholic religion. What is surprising,

TABLE 4.5  
PERCEPTION OF PARTY SUPPORT  
(In percentages)\*

	PNC	PPP	UF	Don't Know	Won't vote as a bloc
Labourers	31	18	1	23	27
Civil Servants	55	1	-	27	17
Poor People	32	19	-	19	30
Businessmen	25	1	34	23	17
Catholics	4	1	59	26	10
East Indians	2	70	-	16	12
Teachers	48	2	-	28	22
Africans	75	1	-	16	8
Rice Farmers	10	56	1	19	14
Portuguese	1	1	72	19	7

Q. Which party do you think the following types of people voted for?

\* In Tables 4.8 - 4.10 we controlled for party preference on this question to see among other things whether racial groups are allocated to other parties.

in the tables is that businessmen were perceived as being anti-PPP, notwithstanding the prominence of Indians in the business sector of the country. One explanation for this perceptual trend among the rank and file electorate, is a recognition that businessmen would be least attracted to a party which when in office not only sought to introduce legislation -- Company tax and Capital gains tax --<sup>19</sup> inimical to the interest of their community, but also one which was associated with economic depression and stagnation. Interesting also, is that no respondent associated the United Force with support from civil servants, teachers, East Indians and Africans even though as indicated in Table 4.6, the slate of candidates presented by the United Force was more representative of the racial groupings in Guyana than was any of the other two parties. In other words, what seemed to be prominent in the voters' minds may be summed up in a reply by one respondent:

Question: "As things stand now, which political party you think is best suited to govern the country?"

Answer: "I is a coolie (Indian), the UF is a white man party and the PPP is a coolie party. Wha you think ah gon say?"

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<sup>19</sup> The 1962 Budget presented by the Minister of Finance (in the PPP administration), C. R. Jacobs on the advice of Prof. John Kaldor, resulted in a general strike lasting 80 days with the consequent withdrawal of the budget. For an account of this see B. A. N. Collins, "Racial Imbalance in the Public Service and Security Forces," Race, 3 (1966), pp. 253-53.

TABLE 4.6

RACIAL DISTRIBUTION OF CANDIDATES PRESENTED  
BY EACH PARTY IN THE 1968 GENERAL ELECTION  
(In percentages)

	African	East Indian	Mixed	Chinese	Portuguese/ White
PNC	(29) 54.7	(10) 18.9	(10) 18.9	(1) 1.9	(3) 5.6
PPP	(10) 18.9	(36) 67.9	(3) 5.6	(2) 3.8	(2) 3.8
UF	(13) 24.5	(17) 32.1	(11) 20.7	(2) 3.8	(10) 18.9

Among those factors which induce the voter to see the parties as the key figure of politics, racial images of the parties probably lead him to see them as more unitary objects than they really are. Another factor, however, is the politicians' success in appealing for mass support in the name of their parties. Here we are concerned with the leadership of the parties in a general and collective sense, i.e., with how the various options presented to the electorate are perceived by them as having capabilities for solving problems of national question. The most positive references by our respondents were given to the PNC. While 56 per cent believed that PNC leadership was most capable of providing solutions to national problems, 11 per cent saw the PPP as being thus capable and only 3 per cent chose the UF. The trend of favourable and unfavourable feeling about the parties' general ability to govern is set out on a constituency to constituency basis in Table 4.7.

TABLE 4.7

CHOICE OF PARTY TO SOLVE PROBLEMS BY REGISTRATION  
DISTRICTS AND PARTY I.D.  
(In percentages)

N = 712

	Strong PPP		Marginal		Strong PNC		Total % whole country	
	1	2	3	4	5	6		
PNC	29	43	59	51	54	85	358	56
PPP	32	22	9	2	7	3	71	11
UF	5	3	2	5	3	2	24	3
None	7	5	7	7	7	1	35	5
Don't know	20	18	18	27	23	5	120	18
	100	100	100	100	100	100	608	100

Q. Which party do you think can best solve these problems (i.e., the race question, getting more money to run the country, the border dispute, etc.)?

The image of the PPP was favourable in strong PPP constituencies only, declining in marginal and strong PNC constituencies. A generally unfavourable image was attributed to the UF. But for the PNC, there was an overall acceptance of its capacity to govern. If we are to explain the reason for the perceptual bias in favour of the PNC, we can only assume that our respondents associated with competence to govern, the relative ease with which the PNC-D'Aguiar coalition 1964-1968, was able to raise loans for investment capital in public works, housing, sea defence and light industries. D'Aguiar's

resignation<sup>20</sup> as leader of the United Force party has probably also, reduced the impact and contribution of the UF in the public's mind, and this no doubt partly accounts for the poor image of that party vis-à-vis problem solving.

TABLE 4.8

SOCIAL GROUPS SEEN BY EACH PARTY  
ELECTORATE AS GIVING THEM PRIMARY SUPPORT  
(In percentages)

Social Groups	Party of Respondent		
	PNC	PPP	UF
Labourers	*	*	
Civil servants	+		
Poor people	*	*	
Businessmen	*		+
Catholics			+
East Indians		+	
Teachers	+		
Africans			
Rice farmers		+	
Portuguese			+

\* indicates that the mode of answers of party identifiers favour their party

+ indicates that a large majority of the answers of the party identifiers is for their party.

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<sup>20</sup> D'Aguiar resigned from the UF in March 1969, three months after the 1968 General Elections in Guyana. This event happened while we were conducting the interviews for this study and may have had some effect in biasing the answers on the image of the UF.

The description above is fairly consistent with the tendency to describe political parties by the social groups which a majority of the electors of that party see as voting for it.<sup>21</sup> Hence the PNC-ites describe themselves as the party of Africans, Labourers, civil servants and teachers; the PPPites as the party of East Indians, poor people, and rice farmers; the UFites as the party of Portuguese, businessmen and Roman Catholics. But apart from describing the party by the composition of its majority in Table 4.8, we used a modified version of Laponce's technique<sup>22</sup> to describe the mode of distribution of answers to the questionnaire. What is discerned is that conflicting claims emerge between the PNCites and the PPPites who both see "labourers" and "poor people" as voting for their party. There are also conflicting claims between PNCites and UFites, in respect to businessmen. No such clash occurred between PPPites and UFites, which implies that insofar as party identifiers perceive social group-political party linkages, there is less in common between the PPP and the UF than between the PNC and either the PPP or the UF.

But in order to give some idea of the relative strength and weakness of the association between specific social groups and political parties, we used two tables showing the comparable linkages on these

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<sup>21</sup> The reason for this association between social group and political party by electors may be because of a knowledge of or a desire for such an association. Or as Laponce thinks, "it may also be a response to party propaganda". See J. A. Laponce, op. cit., p. 72.

<sup>22</sup> See Laponce, op. cit., p. 73.

two variables.

In the first (Table 4.9) we show the constituencies in which the respondents of a given party score higher than 25 per cent support for a particular social group. In the second (Table 4.10) we show when that score is less than 25 per cent. Hence in Table 4.9, 40 per cent of the PNCites see "labourers" as voting for the PNC and 18 per cent of PPPites see "labourers" as voting for the PPP.

TABLE 4.9

SOCIAL GROUP SEEN BY MORE THAN 25 PER CENT OF  
THE RESPONDENTS OF A GIVEN PARTY AS SUPPORTING THAT PARTY  
(In percentages)

Social Groups	Party of Respondent		
	PNC	PPP	UF
Labourers	40	-	-
Civil servants	55	-	-
Poor people	32	25	-
Businessmen	25	-	33
Catholics	-	-	58
East Indians	-	69	-
Teachers	44	-	-
Africans	75	-	-
Rice farmers	-	56	-
Portuguese	-	-	69

TABLE 4.10

SOCIAL GROUP SEEN BY LESS THAN 25 PER CENT OF  
THE RESPONDENTS OF A GIVEN PARTY AS SUPPORTING THAT PARTY  
(In percentages)

Social Groups	Party of Respondent		
	PNC	PPP	UF
Labourers	-	18	1
Civil servants	-	0	0
Poor people	-	-	1
Businessmen	-	0	-
Catholics	4	0	-
East Indians	3	-	0
Teachers	-	2	1
Africans	-	1	1
Rice Farmers	11	-	1
Portuguese	1	1	-

No social group scored more than 25 per cent in the three electorates. Only in one group, "businessmen", did two party electorates, the PNC and UF, share a score higher than 25 per cent. What emerges from these tables are indicators of the relative social weaknesses which each electorate assigns to its party. The PNCites see themselves as weak among Catholics, East Indians, rice farmers and Portuguese; the PPPites among civil servants, businessmen, Catholics, teachers, Africans and Portuguese; the UFites among labourers, civil servants, poor people,

East Indians, teachers, Africans and rice farmers. These perceptions of group support tend to illustrate the factors in the minds of different electorates which distinguish their party from the other parties. What is important in Tables 4.8-4.10 is the implication that the different party electorates perceived the PNC to be an exclusively African party, the PPP, an exclusively East Indian party and the UF, a Portuguese party. It is true that these differences may be exaggerated but they remain fairly important aspects of mobilisation. While recognising the importance of these perceptual differences we are cautious of arriving at any rash conclusions in view of the number of respondents (in Table 4.11) who either did not make an association between social group and political parties or who believed that social groups do not necessarily vote as a block.

To a large extent party images emphasise the importance of the party leader. As Butler and Stokes point out, "parties do plainly owe some of their personification in the public's mind to their identification with those who lead them."<sup>23</sup> In countries like Guyana where politics is more affective and expressive than institutionally oriented, personification of the leader is even more evident than it is in Britain. Singham, for example, analyses the flamboyance of this type of charismatic man on horseback, a hero, who by direct appeals to the subconscious personality needs of a colonial polity, caters to an expressive style.

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<sup>23</sup> David Butler and Donald Stokes, Political Change in Britain (London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd., 1969), p. 360

It is a style which allows the leader to have a pull effect on the electorate<sup>24</sup>, i.e., to mould the image of the party in his person.

TABLE 4.11

PERCENTAGE OF ABSTENTIONS ON THE QUESTION:  
"WHAT PARTY OR PARTIES DO YOU THINK THE  
FOLLOWING PEOPLE VOTE FOR?"

Social Groups	Abstentions (percentages)	
	Said Groups Won't Vote as a Block	Didn't know
Labourers	26.9	22.8
Civil Servants	17	26.9
Poor people	29.2	18.7
Businessmen	17.5	22.5
Catholics	9.8	25.9
East Indians	12.3	15.3
Teachers	20.4	28.3
Africans	7	16
Rice Farmers	14	18.5
Portuguese	7.6	19.6

<sup>24</sup> A. W. Singham, The Hero and the Crowd in a Colonial Polity (Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1968).

#### 4. IMAGE OF PARTY LEADERS

In focusing on the electoral images of the three party leaders, we were concerned not necessarily with the objectivity of assessments but with a whole range of subjective pre-dispositions which could determine an individual's push or pull towards one or other of the political leaders. Although a leader is likely to be seen partly in terms of his connection with a party and with issues of public policy and matters of group interest, he will be evaluated as well in terms of personal attributes, his record and experience, his ability and his personal characteristics. Since both Jagan and Burnham entered the 1968 electoral campaign as established public figures, it is not surprising that their personal attributes were much more fully described in public responses than were those of D'Aguiar.

In order to assess the various images of Burnham, D'Aguiar and Jagan, which people carried around in their heads, we asked our respondents to choose from a given list of words, which ones came closest to describing the idea they had of each leader. The list included the following words:

conservative	confused
radical	"smartman"
honest	thrifty
"so-so"	racial
communist	

Given the limited range of possible descriptions on the list, the respondents were free to choose as many of the words as they thought

of to describe each of the leaders. Words on the list were chosen partly on the basis of what we believed to be a cross-section of generally accepted characteristics of party leaders in Guyana and partly on the basis of characteristics which when grouped could provide a three dimensional image rating of the respective leaders, viz., favourable, moderate and unfavourable.<sup>25</sup> The images we sought after were mainly psychological. No attempts, for example, were made to deduce images from the actual physical appeal or repulsion a leader had for our respondents. Yet we believe that the psychological traits elicited from our respondents gave a relatively vivid picture of the perceptions of the leaders that they carried around with them. We were less interested in counting how many times a particular leader scored than whether he was mentioned at all. Figures 4.1-4.3 show that 22 percent of our respondents saw Burnham as a conservative, 9 per cent rated Jagan and 24 per cent rated D'Aguiar as a conservative. On the trait, "smart-man", Burnham received 57 percent, Jagan 8 per cent and D'Aguiar, 6 per cent; on "honesty", Burnham got only 12 per cent, Jagan 36 per cent and D'Aguiar, 34 per cent. As many as 56 per cent of our respondents saw Jagan as being "confused". Very few attributed this trait to Burnham and D'Aguiar. Surprising, however, was that no leader was seen to be either "racial" or "communist". In view of the racial cleavages believed to be dominant in the politics of Guyana and the widespread

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<sup>25</sup> For details of the three dimensional image scale of party leaders see Appendix V.

Fig. 4.1 Public Image of Burnham by Traits  
(In percentages)






Fig. 4.2 Public Image of D'Aguiar by Traits  
(In percentages)



#### Index of Traits

1. Honest
2. Smartman
3. Thrifty
4. Conservative
5. Radical
6. "So-so"
7. Confused
8. Racial
9. Communist

Fig. 4.3 Public Image of Jagan by Traits  
(In percentages)



charges of Jagan's communist activities, one would have expected that an overwhelming majority would have branded both Jagan and Burnham as "racial" and some, at least those with anti-Jagan sentiments, would have described him as a "communist". Our only explanation of this unusual twist of events is that our respondents may have perceived "racialism" to be so widespread that there was no need to mention that which was considered to be obvious. In fact, we believe that a large percentage of the non-responses to this question indicate partly that respondents may have seen very little differences if any, among the three leaders on the psychological traits presented. Table 4.12 shows that of the total respondents in our sample either those who refused or were unable to answer the question on leadership images, 10 per cent were for Burnham, 10 per cent for Jagan and 14 per cent for D'Aguiar. On the characteristic, "communist", it may be that the lack of mention merely reflected its insignificance as an issue in the 1968 General Elections. Whereas in 1953, 1961, and 1964, the 'communist bogey' was used as a whipping boy of the anti-Jagan camp, we cannot recall that it was even mentioned on the hustings in 1968.

TABLE 4.12

ABSTENTIONS ON THE QUESTION: WHICH WORD COMES CLOSEST TO DESCRIBING THE IMAGE YOU HAVE OF THE THREE LEADERS?

Leaders	Abstention	
	Percentage	Total
Burnham	10.3	(77)
Jagan	10	(75)
D'Aguiar	14.4	(108)

Fig. 4.4 Public Image of Burnham by Constituency




Fig. 4.5 Public Image of D'Aguiar by Constituency





Fig. 4.6 Public Image of Jagan by Constituency



Figures 4.4-4.6 show the public image of the three party leaders in each of six constituencies which made up our sample. These variations in the image-ratings of the parties' leaders are interesting insofar as we see that Burnham's image fluctuated from a favourable assessment by only 9 per cent of our respondents in a PPP stronghold to 94 per cent in a PNC stronghold; Jagan's image was most favourable in the two PPP strongholds and most unfavourable in PNC strongholds; D'Aguiar's image was more evenly distributed ranging from 54 per cent favourable assessment in Suddie to 33 per cent in Skeldon. When the image-ratings are aggregated in Table 4.13, Burnham and D'Aguiar both have a more favourable image than Jagan.

TABLE 4.13  
PUBLIC IMAGE OF PARTY LEADERS  
(In percentages)

	N = 720		
	Favourable	Moderate	Unfavourable
Burnham	47	29	8
Jagan	17	41	28
D'Aguiar	40	33	7

There are numerous factors in the leader's own personality which may have been responsible for any pull effect on the electorate. Burnham's greatest asset was, in the local parlance, his "gift of the gab", i.e., his eloquence, his ability to manipulate the feelings and to prey upon

the sentiments of his audience, his ability to switch with ease from standard English to the dialect, to quote extensively from the Bible and most of all to "lash out" and tantalise<sup>26</sup> the opposition in a most vindictive manner. When, for example, Burnham is referred to as a "smartman", this is more a form of endearment than of ridicule. A "smartman" in Guyana is an outstanding success whether as a politician or as a bandit (these two are not necessarily synonyms) and as a result is usually a highly revered personality. Jagan, though less eloquent than Burnham is also widely revered. He is seen as the "fire ball" in Guyanese politics, whose favourite pastime is a denunciation of imperialism. Even among his foremost rivals, Jagan is still recognised to be in the vanguard of political change in Guyana. He is generally seen by the Indian peasantry to be "ah we own boy", i.e., one of the people, a man who rose to fame from humble beginnings. When therefore opinion overwhelmingly supports the notion of Jagan's honesty, that opinion is somewhat divided as to its meaning. On the one hand, it recognises the integrity required of a man to denounce American Imperialism while needing aid for economic development. On the other hand, it recognises a certain political naiveté which is often paraphrased in the dialect, "he too honest to be a politician." D'Aguiar came from a different political era than either Burnham or Jagan. His white

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<sup>26</sup> "Tantalise" is a local habit of mockery of an opponent, a somewhat satirical presentation of an event so as to ridicule the object of the "tantalise". In Trinidad a similar form of social indulgence is referred to as "fatigue" or "picong".

background, his wealth and his political associates, the business community, the Roman Catholic Church and other marginal groups in the society were commonly referred to by D'Aguiar's opponents during the campaign. One PNC speaker referred to D'Aguiar as "a nice Christian white chap who really is a little presumptuous to think that he has any business in running the affairs of black people."<sup>27</sup>

Taking the analysis one stage further, Table 4.14 shows the image-rating of Burnham, Jagan and D'Aguiar respectively by PPP supporters and PNC supporters. Of the PPP supporters who gave leaders a favourable rating only 10 per cent would actually vote for Burnham while 90 per cent would vote for Jagan. While no PPP supporters gave Jagan an unfavourable image-rating, 20 per cent gave Burnham and 60 per cent gave D'Aguiar such a rating. Interestingly, 25 per cent of the strong PPP supporters could give no rating to D'Aguiar mainly because in the very strong PPP areas, many constituents had never heard of D'Aguiar. Conversely, Burnham scored a very favourable rating among the PNC supporters compared with Jagan's unfavourable rating. What is evident here is the highly partisan nature of the leadership image ratings. Strong PNC constituencies gave the most favourable rating to Burnham, while strong PPP constituencies did the same for Jagan. In these circumstances it is difficult to say whether mass perception of the party leaders influenced the direction of party

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<sup>27</sup> Llewellyn John in a speech on the platform of the PNC in Georgetown on December 7, 1968.

TABLE 4.14

IMAGE OF PARTY LEADERSHIP BY PARTY IDENTIFIER  
(In percentages)

	PPP Identifier      N = 182				PNC Identifier      N = 325			
	Favour- able	Moderate	Unfavour- able	No Rating	Favour- able	Moderate	Unfavour- able	No Rating
Burnham	10	64	20	6	85	5	-	10
D'Aguiar	3	-	62	35	10	38	37	15
Jagan	90	10	-	-	5	40	45	5

support or whether the level of party support manifested by an elector determined his image-rating of party leaders. What is important for our purpose is the central role of the party leader in the electoral campaign. No other party official was required to cover the entire country. At political meetings, the star billing went to the party leaders, party advertisements featured the photographs of the leader, the party broadcasts on the radio also featured the leaders; so did the press. One illustration of the dominance of the party leaders in the campaign may be measured by the amount of radio time they utilised compared with other party officials. Of 550 minutes of radio time given to party political broadcasts in the seven weeks immediately preceding the 1968 general elections the party leaders among them used 340 minutes. The press also gave overwhelming publicity to the utterances of the party leaders presenting photographs of their political activity almost daily. Over the same seven week period immediately preceding the

TABLE 4.15

RADIO TIME (IN MINUTES) ALLOCATED TO POLITICAL PARTY BROADCASTS  
FOR THE PERIOD BETWEEN OCTOBER 27 AND DECEMBER 15, 1968

PNC		PPP		UF	
Burnham	145	Jagan	110	D'Aguiar	95
Others	<u>75</u>	Others	<u>65</u>	Others	<u>30</u>
Total	120		175		125

Source: Radio Schedules of the "Guyana Broadcasting" Corporation and "Radio Demerara", October 27 to December 15, 1968.

elections Burnham's photograph appeared in the main daily newspaper, "Guyana Graphic" 62 times, 18 of these on the front page. Jagan's photograph appeared 47 times, 12 of these on the front page, while D'Aguiar's appeared 10 times on the front page and 32 times in all. It was as if the spotlight was reserved for the party leaders as they hopped between constituencies, shaking hands, kissing babies, and addressing audiences. In the absence of a television network in Guyana the face-to-face relationships between the leaders and the crowd demanded constant public appearances among the people, at village fairs, at church services, at cricket matches in the village pastures, even at weddings of the remotest party supporters where the leader is required to "fire one" (have a drink) with the joyful celebrants. A study of the itinerary of the three party leaders over the eight weeks just prior to the elections shows that Burnham and Jagan covered all 38 registration districts stretching over the most hazardous and remotest parts of the country, while D'Aguiar covered 28 of these 38 constituencies. When therefore we speak of the leadership image as a function of personal perceptions, we refer to the whole range of audio-visual aids (the press, the radio, the face-to-face contact) which represent or illustrate various characteristics of the party leader in the public's mind.

## CHAPTER V

## THE NATURE OF PARTISANSHIP

## 1. INTRODUCTION

At minimum, political participation could mean mobilisation at the polls, whether as a voter or non-voter. At maximum, political participation could mean total mobilisation in terms of activist politics, whether designed to preserve the status quo or to destroy it. In 1964, there was a debate within the People's Progressive Party on the question of whether or not the ballot was a necessary and sufficient cause in bringing about social transformation in Guyana.<sup>1</sup> The corollary therefore, is that maximal mobilisation (and this is only one possible meaning) may be formulated in terms of a commitment to destroy the established political order, rejecting the ballot as a legitimate source of representation and adopting revolutionary methods, in the form of guerilla warfare and coup d'état. Indeed, political mobilisation may take place outside the framework of political parties. The politics of Latin America, for example, abound with examples of this type of mobilisation. In fact, the military is a highly political organisation.

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<sup>1</sup> See "Brindley Benn and the PPP," New World Fortnightly, Georgetown, Guyana, 1966, pp. 8-12. The party was divided. There were those who argued that competing in elections under a system intent on ousting the Party from power was to place too great a trust in elections as a useful means of legitimising governmental agents for structural transformation of the society. Others including Jagan argued that a refusal by his party to take part in the elections would have lost it many supporters whose main identification with politics was in casting their vote for one or other party in the electoral competition for governmental power.

From time to time it establishes restrictive boundaries on freedom of party activity as occurred with the Apristas of Peru and the Peronistas in Argentina during 1962. The low esteem in which political parties are often held in Latin America is a demonstration that a political process need not be very dependent upon the functions performed by the party system. Cuba, is another example of a system which has been able to promote political change by literally driving out of Cuba large numbers of traditionally oriented citizenry and by simultaneously enforcing a kind of fidelista legitimacy. Nor are elections necessary for participation to occur. Only a writer who is convinced of the sacrosanctity of electoral mobilisation as the criteria for political participation can write of Cuba as follows: "The system has managed to hold together but sooner or later the crisis of political participation will have to be faced and this may overload the shaky political machinery."<sup>2</sup> To us, statements like this, not by any means infrequent in the literature on political development, are dogmatic, ethnocentric and deterministically biased towards the prototypes of Westernisation. Whether participation arises from a consensual perspective or from an emphasis on conflict as a means to a higher synthesis is immaterial to the analysis we are developing. We agree with Campbell and his colleagues that, "the act of voting is not an end in itself; that it is a choice of means

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<sup>2</sup> See Robert E. Scott, "Political Parties and Policy-Making in Latin America" in La Palombara and Weiner, Political Parties and Political Development (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 343.

towards other ends."<sup>3</sup> Hence, in relating the role of the party to the process of political mobilisation, we classify the process as follows:

1. Mobilisation at the polls, i.e., casting a vote on election day.
2. Mobilisation in terms of willingness to identify with political parties in addition to merely voting.
3. Mobilisation in terms of political activity as a party activist or as a non-party activist.

In the first place, we are concerned with the mobilisation of citizens in the electoral contests, their professed interest and level of public participation and the formal incorporation of strata and categories of residents -- most specifically, newly enfranchised citizens -- in the electoral contest. In the second instance, we are concerned with the nature of involvement in party activity as an organisational as distinguished from an individualistic basis of politicisation. What is important is the citizen's identification with the mobilising agencies themselves, i.e., the local party organisations and the campaign workers. Thirdly, we are concerned with the level of political commitment to change whether as a party activist supporting the norms of the electoral system or as a dissenter committed to an anti-electoral style of politics.

In this chapter we shall examine the first two aspects of political mobilisation leaving our assessment of the third for Chapter VII. We are

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<sup>3</sup> Angus Campbell et al., The American Voter (New York: John Wiley, 1960), p. 118.

therefore presently concerned with the polls, with partisan identification and non-identification as a function of political mobilisation.

## 2. THE POLLS AND MOBILISATION

One of the primary indicators of mobilisation of the electorate is the level of attendance at political meetings. In Guyana meetings are usually held outdoors at the street corner, under a shop or in the park. In the absence of the T.V., political meetings provide a vital source of contact between the candidates and the masses.

TABLE 5.1

PARTY MEETINGS MOST ATTENDED BY RACIAL DISTRIBUTION  
(In percentages)

	(N = 435)				
	Amerindians	Indians	Negroes	Mixed	Others
	(N = 22)	(N = 160)	(N = 201)	(N=34)	(N=18)
PNC	85	16	84	77	62
PPP	-	62	3	15	-
UF	15	1	1	8	28
Can't decide	-	21	12	-	10
Total	100	100	100	100	100

In response to our question, "did you attend any political meetings during the electoral campaign?" 56 per cent of our sample said yes. Of those who actually attended political meetings we asked to indicate which party meetings they did attend most. Table 5.1 gives the racial

distribution of attendance at meetings. Except for the Indo-Guyanese, the majority of the respondents of all races attended PNC meetings most. In Figure 5.1 we represent the attendance at party meetings by partisans in the six constituencies that comprise our sample. We see that in a strong PPP constituency (1) as many as 76 per cent of our respondents attended PPP meetings most, while in a strong PNC constituency (6) only 2 per cent attended PPP meetings most while 88 per cent attended the PNC meetings most. In the marginal constituencies many more people said that they attended PNC meetings than either those held by the UF or the PPP. As an indicator of political mobilisation, attendance at political meetings may or may not suggest a higher degree of political involvement than voting. In some cases, going to a political meeting is like any other social event, to meet and "gaff" (talk) with one's friends, to hear the political gossip and to be entertained. These aspects of the people's political response are peripheral to political involvement which implies that a certain weight is given to various political options prior to the taking of a political decision. Generally speaking therefore, the act of voting for one or other party at elections is the most ritualistic political function to be performed by the mass citizenship. As Laponce so aptly puts it, "dropping a ballot into a box on a day of strong moral obligation -- a national election day for example -- is among the most popular community rituals."<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> J.A. Laponce, People vs. Politics: A Study of Opinions, Attitudes and Perceptions in Vancouver-Burrard 1963-65 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969), p. 31.




Fig. 5.1 PARTY MEETINGS MOST ATTENDED BY PARTISANS AND BY CONSTITUENCY

We have already referred to the high voting turnout at general elections in Guyana.<sup>5</sup> In our sample, mobilisation at the polls, represented in Table 5.2 and complementarily in Figure 5.2, is very high. In the 1968 general elections, only 1 per cent of our sample said that they did not vote. More impressively however, when non-voting is correlated with eligibility to vote, we see that only 24 per cent of the electorate eligible to vote in all four elections since 1957, did not do so. In fact, 76 per cent voted in all four elections, 20 per cent voted in three of the four elections while 4 per cent voted twice. Of all those who were eligible to vote since 1961, 86 per cent voted in all three elections, 12 per cent voted twice and 2 per cent voted only once. In 1964, only 4 per cent of the electorate did not vote while in 1968 all but 1 per cent of the electorate voted. Summarising the pattern of mobilisation at the polls, only 1 per cent of the respondents eligible to vote have never cast a vote. This level of mobilisation at the polls is even more phenomenal when, as we have determined, a very persistent reason for non-voting was "absence from the country" at the time of the elections.

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<sup>5</sup> See Chapter II, pp. 29-30. The extra-ordinarily low non-voting element (1 per cent) in the 1968 elections (Table 5.2) may be due to the fact that: (1) respondents' answers to the questions on voting may have been misleading; (2) sample bias caused by the fact that refusals to answer questionnaire probably highly, positively correlated with non-voting.


TABLE 5.2

## VOTING DISTRIBUTION IN THE GENERAL ELECTIONS, 1957, 1961, 1964, 1968

-----ELIGIBLE TO VOTE-----				% voted	% voted	% voted in	% voted in	% voted in
All 4	From	From	From	in all 4	in 3	2 elections	1 election	no election
<u>Elections</u>	<u>1961</u>	<u>1964</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>elections</u>	<u>elections</u>	<u>only</u>	<u>only</u>	<u>only</u>
536				76	20	4	-	-
	576				86	12	2	-
		640				96	4	-
			761				99	1

Figure 5.2

## VOTING DISTRIBUTION OVER FOUR ELECTIONS



### 3. PARTY IDENTIFICATION AND MOBILISATION

Taking the electorate as a whole, Figure 5.3 graphically illustrates the very high ratio of partisans to non-partisans and floaters. While partisans were mobilised at least at the level of casting their vote consistently for one or other of the parties, non-partisans were those who would definitely not vote if an election were held at the time of the survey. Even when probed for a semblance of identification, non-partisans manifested "no leanings" towards any political party. It should, however, be pointed out that non-partisanship did not necessarily imply a lack of political mobilisation, as 45 per cent of those classified as non-partisans in the electoral process actually claimed active membership in a social or labour movement and over 58 per cent displayed a level of political awareness commensurate with those who professed strong partisanship.<sup>6</sup> In the case of the floaters, these were people who shifted their choice of party at least once and were undecided for whom they would vote were an election to be held "tomorrow". Figure 5.4 indicates the nature of switching which occurred between 1961 and 1968 among the respondents of our sample. Translating actual figures into percentages, among the 80 people who switched party loyalties from election to election, 5 per cent of former PNC voters switched to PPP and 6 per cent to the UF. Of the former PPP voters, 20 per cent switched to PNC and 8 per cent to the UF. From among former UF members, the PNC benefited most from switching, gaining 25 per cent while the PPP gained 6 per cent.

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<sup>6</sup> See Tables 5.7 and 5.8.

Fig. 5.3 DISTRIBUTION OF PARTISAN-Non-PARTISAN  
FLOATER (N = 882)




Fig. 5.4 NET EFFECT OF PARTY SWITCHING AMONG "SWITCHERS"  
1961-1968





Fig. 5.5

NET EFFECT OF INTER-PARTY SWITCHING ON PARTY IDENTIFICATION



The overall effect of the inter-party switching shown in Figure 5.5 reveals a net gain of 35 per cent by the PNC during the 1961-1968 period, but a net loss of 16 per cent and 17 per cent for the PPP and the UF respectively.

Since the 1955 split in the PPP<sup>7</sup> political mobilisation has been characterised by party conflict. The crucial factor for both the PPP and the PNC was the competitive pressure to develop a broader mass base for their organisations and to ensure greater continuity and stability of local party agencies.

In 1961, the PPP organised its party cells to correspond to the revision of the electoral boundaries recommended by the Hallett Report.<sup>8</sup> In order to coordinate the work of the party groups in the constituencies, the party's structure was altered to include regional committees as organisational links between the constituency committees and the Central

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<sup>7</sup> It must be recalled that after the suspension of the Guyanese constitution in 1953 the PPP consequently split up into two factions, one led by Burnham and the other by Jagan. After the 1957 elections, the Burnham faction changed its name to the Peoples National Congress (PNC).

<sup>8</sup> Report of the British Guiana Electoral Boundaries Commission, 1960, Hugh Hallett (Georgetown, Government of British Guiana, 1960). This report emanated from a one-man commission, Sir Hugh Hallett. Hallett saw little virtue in the PPP's recommendation of using the adult population as the basis of distributing electoral boundaries. Instead he implemented a quota of population method under which the estimated total population 56,000 was divided by 35 constituencies giving a constituency approximately 16,000 persons. Given the mean population of a constituency, Hallett introduced above and below quotas, which formed the basis of protests from the PPP about "gerrymandering" harmful to its interest. See C. P. Bradley, "The Party System in British Guiana and the General Elections of 1961," Caribbean Studies, I (October, 1961), pp. 8-12.

party Executive. A number of public relations and educational committees were also added to the party structure, chief among which is Accabre College, founded in 1965, and the Cultural Committee introduced in 1966. It is interesting to note that a Race Advisory Committee has also been an additional ad hoc committee of the Executive Council since 1964. These changes by the PPP have been symptomatic of an attempt to reach a wider cross-section of the electorate. Although no official figures have been disclosed, the number of active party groups are approximately 195 with a paid-up membership of 24,575.<sup>9</sup>

The organisation of the PNC in the period 1957-61 was marked by its failure to make any significant impact on the rural constituencies. The reorganisation of the party following the 1966 Annual Congress took several forms. In the first place the Young Socialist Movement, the youth arm of the Party, was given increased representation both on the Central Executive, and in the number of delegates to the annual party convention. The slate of candidates disclosed that twelve of the 53 candidates in the 1968 general elections were members of the Young Socialist Movement. The emphasis on youth representation was said to

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<sup>9</sup> Shortly after Dr. Jagan's return to Guyana from a Moscow Conference of Communist and Workers parties in August 1969, the PPP announced a further restructuring of the party. The party abolished the posts of leader and chairman in a reconstitution of the hierarchy, making the party, structurally, more like the political parties in Russia and Eastern Block countries. Dr. Jagan now holds the position of first secretary. See Reorganising the Party (PPP Publication, Georgetown: Freedom House, 1970).

arise from Burnham's attempt to pacify the YSM<sup>10</sup> and to attract more support among the younger sections of the population.

A second feature of the PNC's organisation was its intensified membership drive which concentrated mainly on the rural and hinterland areas, where support had previously been marginal or weak. In January 1967, the party introduced a system called the "fan-out", whereby once every two months party officials would tour each constituency for three to four days to keep in touch and to disseminate information on party policy, to the constituents. These "fan-outs" involved all members of the parliamentary party, the Central executive and the local party executive.

In addition to the "fan-outs" the office of the Prime Minister increased rapidly between 1965-68 from 10 to 32 members of staff including an expansion in the Public Relations office headed by Frank Pilgrim. It was the Public Relations Office and the 1968 Elections Campaign Office, combined into a special ad hoc office under the organisation of Hugh Chomodelly and an American, Dick Jones, which

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<sup>10</sup> The militancy of the YSM and its resultant occasions of conflicts with the parent body, the PNC, have been few, according to our evidence. Nevertheless, there have been instances when crises threatened the party as for example, the severe criticism by a faction of the YSM in May 1965, of Burnham's "demagogic leadership", and his attack at the party's 1965 Congress, on Stanley Hugh, former Vice-President of the Party. It was felt, in many circles that the resignation of Oswald Benthams from the chairmanship of the YSM in April 1966 was the hatchet job of the party, directly related to Benthams' anti-Burnham stand on the Stanley Hugh issue. For commentary on this see New World Fortnightly No. 15, May 28, 1965, p. 11, and No. 38, April 4, 1966, pp. 6-7.

spearheaded the propaganda and the strategy of the 1968 general elections. The PNC claimed that its organisation at the time of the elections included 252 local party groups and a total membership of 35,675.

In 1968, the UF also made genuine attempts at mobilising mass support by expanding its local party organisations and restructuring its party headquarters. While however the party organisation in the urban areas, Georgetown and New Amsterdam, was geared to the task of competing with the PNC and the PPP, the party was poorly organised in most of the rural areas especially on the Corentyne and the Essequibo coasts where it was forced for the most part to employ the services of paid activists outside the formal structure of the party.

One comparable factor of the parties' organisations is that while the United Force could be classified as a caucus-type party, both the PNC and the PPP are branch-type organisations.<sup>11</sup> Both the PNC and the PPP are extensive in their organisation. Their primary objective is to multiply their membership and to increase their total strength.

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<sup>11</sup> For a detailed description of structural units and organisational typology such as caucus and branch see Maurice Duverger, Political Parties: Their Organisation, and Activity in a Modern State translated by Barbara and Robert North, (London: Methuen University Paperbacks, 1964), pp. 17-40. The caucus is composed of a small, seasoned nucleus of professionals -- in the case of the UF, businessmen included -- who fulfill primarily electoral functions for the middle-class constituents they serve. The branch is a common feature of Socialist parties and is characterised by a highly bureaucratised though democratic structure. This type of organisation provides a clear division of duties and responsibilities among its sub-units, a wide range of activities available to its membership and a permanent organisation. It could be pointed out that in 1953, the PPP began in a cell type organisation built around an ideologically committed nucleus of people.

In both these parties membership rules and entrance requirements are defined but to a large extent these are merely theoretical constructs, as in practice, one only has to wish to belong to a party to do so. This is not to say that membership fees and membership cards are not important. Owning a party card, especially of the party in power, is like having a passport, since it opens up avenues for jobs and promotion which might not have otherwise been possible. The party in power normally uses its party headquarters as an employment agency, often with greater efficiency than the Government's Labour Exchange in finding jobs for its clients. It is common practice for people to pay membership dues and to own party cards as an insurance against unemployment or to increase their chances of gaining employment. Hence, it is not unusual to find one person owning membership cards of three different parties. For these reasons membership cards and membership dues may be functional for reasons other than those associated with the phenomenon of political involvement. What is important, is that included in the PNC, the PPP and the UF are many ancillary organisations chief among which are the Trade Unions and Cultural groups which assist in strengthening the bonds of partisanship and the process of political mobilisation.

Partisanship is determined by the level of party identification manifested by our respondents. To determine the level of party identification we asked the following question of those of our respondents who had explicitly stated a party preference:

Right now how strongly do you feel about your choice of  
\_\_\_\_\_ party? (giving name of party chosen by respondent).

Would you say you feel very strongly, fairly strongly,  
not strongly or you don't know?

Once a person is willing to identify with a party whether strongly or moderately, he is a partisan. But if he refuses to be identified he is classified as a non-partisan or a non-identifier. The feeling of partisanship may be generated from many sources including the family, social class, age-cohorts, and the whole political life cycle of an individual's experiences. What is important are the beliefs and values of a wider culture to which one has been exposed. To be brought up as a "blackman" or a "coolie" or a "putague" must have immense consequences for a man's approach to politics; consequences of being part of one of the sub-cultures of a nation and particularly relevant to Guyana, are those defined by race. Apart from ascertaining the level of party identification by the party electorates we were also interested in disaggregating the electorates in terms of race, religion and age.

TABLE 5.3

STRENGTH OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION  
(In percentages)

	N = 555			
	PNC	PPP	UF	Total
Very strong	80	72	70	437
Fairly strong	14	18	-	75
Not strong	3	6	15	24
Don't know	3	4	15	19

TABLE 5.4

## STRENGTH OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION BY RACE, IN PERCENTAGES

N = 551

	-----PNC-----				-----PPP-----				-----UF-----				Total
	V.Str.	F.Str.	N.Str.	DK	V.Str.	F.Str.	N.Str.	DK	V.Str.	F.Str.	N.Str.	DK	
Amerindian	40	5	-	-	-	5	-	-	50	-	-	-	20
East Indian	21	16	1	3	48	5	4	-	-	-	1	1	213
Africans	80	9	-	-	2	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	245
Mixed	64	6	4	6	4	6	-	-	10	-	-	-	50
Others	40	15	20	15	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	36

TABLE 5.5

## STRENGTH OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION BY RELIGION, IN PERCENTAGES

N = 551

	-----PNC-----				-----PPP-----				-----UF-----				Total
	V.Str.	F.Str.	N.Str.	DK	V.Str.	F.Str.	N.Str.	DK	V.Str.	F.Str.	N.Str.	DK	
Protestant	80	8	2	-	8	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	83
Catholic	55	14	-	7	7	4	-	2	8	-	-	2	270
Hindu	18	3	-	-	22	7	5	3	1	-	-	-	101
Muslim	45	25	-	5	25	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	40
Others	58	4	4	12	30	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	37

Question (a) As things look now, which political party do you think is best suited to govern this country?

(b) If a definite party choice is given ask:

Right now how strongly do you feel about your choice (name party)?

As one indicator of the success of these organisations in mobilising mass support, Table 5.3 shows the strength of party identification manifested in our sample. An overwhelming majority of partisans claimed very strong party identification: 80 per cent of the PNC supporters, 72 per cent of the PPP supporters and 70 per cent of the UF supporters. Of the remaining partisans, 14 per cent from within the ranks of the PNC and 18 per cent from the PPP claimed fairly strong attachments to the respective party of their choice. Very few partisans identified mildly with the parties while fewer still were uncertain of the strength of their identity.

#### 4. RACE, RELIGION, AGE AND PARTY IDENTIFICATION

Turning to race and party identification, we observe in Table 5.4 that as high as 80 per cent of the Africans identify very strongly with the PNC while only 2 per cent identify very strongly with the PPP. The East Indians (48 per cent) on the other hand, identify very strongly with the PPP, but over 40 per cent (over 21 per cent, very strongly) identify with the PNC. Except for the Amerindians who identified with both UF and PNC, the other races identified almost entirely with the PNC.

Another measure of the strength of party identification is given in Table 5.5. Except for the Hindus all religious denominations including Catholics show a partisanship in favour of the PNC. Even the Muslims have identified very strongly with the PNC compared with the PPP. The ratio of very strong to fairly strong identification especially among PNC Muslims suggests, maybe, activity of Muslim organisations. This partiality towards the PNC is perhaps best explained historically, in

the sectional jealousies and rivalry between the Hindus and the Muslims.<sup>12</sup> In recent years, the PNC has made great efforts to capitalise on the Hindu-Muslim rivalry and to attract members of the Muslim community into its fold. In 1966, the Muslim League became affiliated to the PNC. Since then the number of Muslim party groups has increased rapidly from one in 1966 to three in 1968 to seven in 1969. While no accurate statistics are available, the number of delegates representing exclusively local Muslim party affiliates, at the 1969 Annual Convention suggests Muslim membership in the PNC to be in the vicinity of 3,960.<sup>13</sup>

It seems somewhat plausible to infer that organisational factors have been partly responsible for the Muslims to be identified with the PNC party more than with the party of their race. Hence, the need to question Jayawardena when he says, "it is true to say that the overall tie of 'being Indian' is strong enough to override religious distinctions."<sup>14</sup> Moreover, 'cultural cleavages' seem to be breaking down more rapidly among the Muslim sections of the Indian community than among the Hindus. Consequently, the proximal creole values are more easily assimilated by the former group making it reasonable to expect a greater tendency among the Muslims than the Hindus to identify with the PNC.

Age has also been used as a measure of party identification in Table 5.6 Accordingly, there was very little distinction in the levels

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<sup>12</sup> C. Jayawardena, Conflict and Solidarity in a Ceylonese Plantation (London: Athlone Press, 1963), p. 13.

<sup>13</sup> The estimate arrived at by calculating the ratio of delegates to members as stipulated in the party's constitution.

<sup>14</sup> Jayawardena, op. cit., p. 15.

TABLE 5.6

## PARTY IDENTIFICATION BY AGE AND RACE IN PERCENTAGES

	-----EAST INDIANS-----					-----AFRICANS-----				
	<u>25 &amp; Under</u>	<u>26-35</u>	<u>36-45</u>	<u>46-55</u>	<u>56+</u>	<u>25 &amp; Under</u>	<u>26-35</u>	<u>36-45</u>	<u>46-55</u>	<u>56+</u>
PNC	15	12	5	12	8	88	89	94	85	87
PPP	65	72	75	63	76	6	8	2	5	4
UF	-	6	8	5	4	-	-	2	-	3
Other	1	1	2	1	1	-	1	-	-	-
None	19	9	10	19	11	6	2	2	10	6
TOTAL	52	117	61	25	28	30	100	51	26	21

of identification between the various age cohorts. The youngest citizens displayed as strong partisan attachments based on race as any other group, with the exception that a greater percentage of Indians under 25, than in any other Indian age group, were identified as supporters of the PNC. Yet, interestingly, under twenty-fives and the "46-55" Indian age groups were the greatest single groups in our sample to profess "no identification" for any party. Under-25 Africans, on the other hand, professing no identification, were very few in number. Since the under-25 Indian group accounts

TABLE 5.7

## EXTRA ELECTORAL ACTIVITY OF NON-IDENTIFIERS

	N = 78		
	Indians	Negroes	Others
	N = 48	N = 21	N = 9
Belong to Trade Union	95	85	15
Participated in demonstrations, protests, etc.	70	64	-
Will volunteer to fight for Guyana	72	99	-
Electoral process useful	15	26	-
Electoral process useless	85	74	-
Cuban type revolution as an alternative	51	40	-
"Black Power" essential	10	25	-

for 26 per cent of the Indian population of our sample, 19 per cent "non-identification" is critical in terms of votes. Yet failure to identify

with the electoral structures does not mean a lack of political involvement per se. The crucial determinant as seen in Table 5.7 is whether our subjects are involved in any other form of political struggle -- revolutionary or counterrevolutionary -- outside the electoral framework. In fact, of the non-identifiers in the formal political structures 90 per cent are members of trade unions, 72 per cent have taken part in demonstrations, protest meetings, 72 per cent of the Indians and 99 per cent of the Africans will volunteer to fight for Guyana against Venezuelan or Surinam aggression.<sup>15</sup> But most importantly, 80 per cent of these non-party identifiers describe the electoral process as a "facade", "useless", "a Colonial appendage" and 45 per cent believe that Cuban type revolution is Guyana's only salvation. Twenty-five per cent of all Africans spoke of a cultural revolution and of a "Black power" philosophy as the primary means of Black economic and political supremacy in Guyana. Only 10 per cent of the Indians mentioned "Black power" as an essential philosophy for the society. Unlike the classification of most political scientists who neglect the role of these non-partisans, we see them as being highly mobilised against the transplanted version of political and social change of the Westminster and White House traditions. If as we have seen, some people reject formal attachment to party politics, then we cannot automatically assume that they are apolitical, for while their response to elections may be minimal, they can be highly politicised. It is therefore

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<sup>15</sup> Since 1964 with Venezuela and 1966 with Surinam, Guyana has been involved in border disputes, which have intermittently disrupted internal politics. In both cases a temporary truce has been agreed upon.

not impossible to find non-partisans who are maximally involved in politics, even if they happen to display mobilisation for political dissent. Walter Rodney aptly summarises the mode of this style of politics especially among the youths in Guyana when he says:

...black people don't need to be told that Garvey is a national hero -- they know that. Nor do they need to be told to mourn when blacks are murdered by White Power, because they mourn everyday right here in Jamaica where white power keeps them ignorant, unemployed, ill-clothed and ill-fed. They will stop mourning when things change -- and that means a revolution, for the first essential is to break the chains which bind us to white imperialists, and that is a very revolutionary step. Cuba is the only country in the West Indies and in this hemisphere which has broken with white power. That is why Stokely Carmichael can visit Cuba but he can't visit Trinidad or Jamaica. That is why Stokely can call Fidel 'one of the blackest men in the Americas' and that is why our leaders in contrast qualify as 'white'.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> Very often when we refer to radical politics we imply "mobilisation only for political dissent." The international phenomenon of student protest is one current example. So have been the articulated voice of protest à la Rodney. Hence "Abeng" in Jamaica, "Moko" in Trinidad and subsequently "Ratoon" in Guyana, have emerged as organised opinion of protest against authoritarianism and the infringement of academic freedom. Some informed sources in the Caribbean, chief among whose, Vaughn Lewis and Trevor Munroe, are of the opinion that the Modern History of the West Indies entered a new phase with the Rodney incident. Dr. Walter Rodney, a Guyanese lecturer at U.W.I. was declared a persona non grata by the Jamaican Government in October 1968. A wave of protest throughout the Caribbean followed Rodney's banning and since this time numerous "ginger groups" have been organised espousing the philosophy of Black Power for the Caribbean. Although it may be difficult to elevate Rodney to the exalted niche of patron saint of the new politics of protest, his words and actions which precipitated his exile from the West Indies -- he is now resident of Tanzania -- have inspired most of the effective protest movements in the Caribbean and his example of bridge-building between thought and action, between university and community is by no means remotely connected with the February crisis in Trinidad. Walter Rodney, Groundings with my Brothers (London: Bogle-L'Ouverture Publications, 1969).

Generally speaking, however, the important variable in the location of partisan support is not age but race. The overwhelming majority of Negroes, 88 per cent on average, supported the PNC, while 70 per cent of the East Indians supported the PPP. One key observation for the principle of mobilisation is the relatively high percentage (15 per cent on average) of Indians compared with Negroes (3 per cent) who claimed no party identification. Non-identification of the Indians in our sample exceeded the national non-voting percentage by almost 10 per cent (and the underestimated non-voting percentage in the sample by even more). This disparity may be a peculiarity of post-election dejection on the part of the supporters of a losing party. Psychologists normally refer to the law of effect<sup>17</sup> to express the function of success and failure in influencing the emotional status of the person, his goals, his evaluations and his social relations. Many psychologists argue that success and failure do not depend on achievement as such, but rather upon the relationship between the achievement and the person's "level of aspiration". In other words, the experience and the degree of success and failure depend upon whether the achievement is above or below the momentary level of aspiration.<sup>18</sup> What we are

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<sup>17</sup> By the Law of Effect one learns quickly those reactions which are accompanied or followed by a satisfying state of affairs; one does not learn quickly those which result in an annoying state of affairs or learns not to make such reactions. See H. B. English, A Student's Dictionary of Psychological Terms, (New York: Harper and Row, 1954).

<sup>18</sup> For experimental work in this field, see K. Lewin, A Dynamic Theory of Personality (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1935).

suggesting here is a certain psychological reaction on the part of the Indo-Guyanese to the failure of the PPP to gain office. If a defeat of their party is seen to be a thwarting of what Maslow calls the 'self-esteem need of human motivation', then this could produce feelings of inferiority, of weakness, and of helplessness. These feelings in turn give rise to either basic discouragement or else, compensatory or withdrawal trends. These are all forms of what may be called political neuroticism<sup>19</sup> similar to Abrams' evaluation of Labour supporters between 1955 and 1964,<sup>20</sup> in Britain when their party suffered electoral defeat on three successive occasions.

#### 5. PARTY MEMBERS, SWITCHERS AND SPECTATORS

Apart from the parties' ability to attract partisans in terms of party identification, the parties' ability to mobilise the citizenry is also measurable by the actual party membership. In our sample, 86 per cent of the respondents belonged to one or other of the political parties, either by a simple claim to membership or as a due-paying member. Among those who did not claim party membership, 29 per cent sympathised with one or other of the parties and actually made contributions to party funds.

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<sup>19</sup> For an appreciation of the necessity of basic self-confidence and an understanding of how helpless people are without it, see A. A. Maslow, "Dominance, Personality and Social Behaviour in Women," Journal of Social Psychology 10 (1939), pp. 3-39 and "A Theory of Human Motivation" in Harold J. Levitt and Louis R. Pondy, Readings in Managerial Psychology, (New York: University of Chicago Press, 1966), pp. 6-24.

<sup>20</sup> Mark Abrams and Richard Rose, Must Labour Lose? (London: New Fabian Publication, 1960) and H. A. Turner, "Labour's Diminishing Vote," Guardian (London, October 20, 1961), p. 9.

TABLE 5.8  
CATEGORIES OF PARTY MEMBERS - ALL PARTIES  
(In percentages)

	Strong PPP		Marginal		Strong PNC		% Total	Total
	1	2	3	4	5	6		
Party Members by claim only	21	28	48	35	62	51	44	355
Party Members by regular pay- ment of party dues	66	65	46	35	22	19	42	332
Non-party Members but make financial contribution	13	7	6	30	16	20	14	103
	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	790

In strong PPP constituencies actual party membership and contributions by party members and non-party members alike are on the whole higher than in strong PNC constituencies. In Abary (6), for example, a strong PNC constituency, party membership is relatively low and so are contributions from all sources. More meaningful interpretations of party membership might have accrued had we been able to get information on the exact party to which individual respondents actually made contributions. However, the large number of non-responses to this question in our pre-test suggested that a direct question on party membership was too sensitive an area to elicit reliable responses.

Most of our respondents have crystallised their membership for particular parties. Of the 355 professed party members, 20 per cent

have switched party loyalties as indicated in Table 5.9. The highest percentage of switching has occurred equally from membership in the PPP and the UF to the PNC. On the other hand, very little switching occurred from within the ranks of the PNC to the other parties. Most people gave their reason for switching from the PPP to the PNC as due to the "racial politics" of the PPP and to dissatisfaction with the leadership. These issues were also important for those who switched from the UF to the PNC. Lack of ideological fulfillment and dissatisfaction with the leadership on the other hand were the main causes of the switch from the PNC to the PPP. "Internal rifts" in the party were generally given as a minor reason for switching of membership, but all the PNC members who subsequently joined the UF gave this reason for switching. Figure 5.6 focuses on inter-party switching. Here we grouped the constituencies according to partisan strength, combining two strong PNC constituencies, two marginal constituencies and two strong PPP constituencies respectively. Of the 22 switchers in the two strong PNC constituencies, 12 voted for the PPP in 1964, 3 for the PNC and 6 for the UF. In 1968, only 2 out of these 22 switchers voted for the PPP while 19 voted for the PNC and 1 for the UF. In the two marginal constituencies, 28 people switched loyalties; of these, 21 voted for the PPP in 1964, but only 2 voted for that party in 1968 and while 1 person voted for the PNC in 1964, 24 voted for the PNC in 1968. In strong PPP constituencies, of the 24 people who switched loyalties, 5 voted for the PPP in 1964 and 15 in 1968; 15 voted for the PNC in 1964 and 9 in 1968; 4 for the UF in 1964 but none in 1968. What is generally

TABLE 5.9

## PARTY SWITCHERS AND REASON FOR SWITCHING

	N = 14 Bad <u>Organization</u>	N = 20 Leadership Dissatis- <u>faction</u>	N = 11 <u>Ideology</u>	N = 22 Racial <u>Policy</u>	N = 12 Internal <u>Rifts</u>	N = 5 <u>Other</u>	<u>Total</u>	(N = 4)
PPP - PNC	25	28	12	35	-	-	100	(43)
UF - PNC	25	25	12	30	8	-	100	(17)
Other PNC	-	-	-	-	-	100	100	( 3)
PNC - PPP	-	50	33	17	-	-	100	( 9)
PNC - UF	-	-	-	-	100	-	100	( 2)
PNC - Other	}							
UF - PPP		-	-	-	-	-	-	
PPP - UF								

reflected in this figure is the net gain for the PNC compared with the other two parties even though in the strong PPP constituencies the PPP gained most from the switching of party loyalties.

Among the rank and file electorate, there is a special kind of partisan whom we could refer to as spectator. He is a spectator because he refuses to identify himself with any party even though he is fully involved in the process of voting at elections. And even though he does not identify with any particular party over a long period of time, he has "leanings" towards a particular party for the purposes of casting his vote. These leanings indicate a racial bias in that 68 per cent of the spectators of African descent had a 'leaning' toward the PNC while 58 per cent of East Indian origin were 'leaning' towards the PPP. A high proportion of Whites, Chinese and Portuguese were more inclined toward the PNC, relatively few toward the UF, but none toward the PPP. Nevertheless, the very high "don't know" category<sup>21</sup> -- as high as 58 per cent among the Amerindians and the refusal of 50 per cent of those of mixed origin to indicate some party leaning suggest that some spectators may be identical to non-partisans in their reluctance to be mobilised at the polls.

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<sup>21</sup> The respondents in these categories "don't know" and "none" make up the classification null-electoral mobilisation.

FIGURE 5.6

PARTY DISTRIBUTION OF SWITCHES BETWEEN 1964 and 1968 ELECTIONS BY CONSTITUENCIES  
CLUSTERED ACCORDING TO PARTISAN IDENTIFICATION




TABLE 5.10  
PARTY LEANINGS OF SPECTATORS BY RACE  
(In percentages)

	N = 239				
	Amerindian	East Indian	African	Mixed	Others
	N = 11	N = 76	N = 120	N = 13	N = 19
PNC	20	5	68	25	66
PPP	-	58	5	-	-
UF	-	-	3	-	16
None	22	7	3	50	-
Don't know	58	30	21	25	18
	100	100	100	100	100

Q. Well, even though you don't particularly care for any of the parties, which one are you leaning towards now?

## 6. ISSUES AND MOBILISATION

In the 1968 elections, issues seem to have been relegated to a minor role in the actual campaign. Nevertheless, several events were occurring at the time to engage the concern of the electorate. Unemployment continued to be high, cost of living, work stoppages and industrial disputes continued to plague the economy. During the period January to December 1968, 72 industrial strikes caused 108,638 man-days to be lost, providing the government with rationale for introducing the Labour Relations Bill.<sup>22</sup> Additionally, the election machinery became a

<sup>22</sup> See "Draft Text of Industrial Relations Bill," (Georgetown, Guyana Ministry of Labour Publ., 1968), Appendix 1. This Draft Bill aroused severe criticisms from several sections of the population, chief among which, the Trade Unions. The TUC, Guyana, subsequently submitted amendments to the Draft Bill which the government refused to accept. The stalemate between the government and the unions has now put the Bill in a state of limbo. See "Trades Dispute Bill Controversy," Guyana Graphic, Georgetown, Guyana, November 5th, 1970, p. 3.

major source of pre-election conflict. The exposé on the irregularities of overseas registration and the subsequent court injunctions against the Elections Commission took on the proportions of an international scandal. A writ against the Electoral Commission was filed on the grounds that the provisions of the Representation of the Peoples (Adaptation and Modification of Laws) October 1968 were ultra vires and unconstitutional.<sup>23</sup> Guyanese were therefore provided with political gossip which formed the basis of many profound arguments during and after the 1968 electoral campaign. Looking at the issues as a source of mobilisation, most of the electorate had an opinion on the socio-economic and political issues. Fifty-nine per cent of our respondents in Table 5.11 identified cost of living and unemployment as the most important issues. Only 4 per cent identified these issues as least important. While 17 per cent thought of labour disputes as the major issue, 40 per cent thought this to be the least important. However, in spite of the topical and controversial nature of the electoral machinery, only 7 per cent saw this issue as the most important while as many as 30 per cent decided that it was the least important.

Interestingly, when issue-orientations were matched against race in Table 5.12, 70 per cent of the Afro-Guyanese voters saw economic issues, unemployment and cost of living as most important, compared with 50 per cent of the mixed group and 44 per cent of the East Indian voters.

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<sup>23</sup> See Report on Guyana: General Elections 1968, pp. 65-90, for a summary of this case and the judgment which concluded that the Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the writ.

On the other hand, a higher percentage of Indo-Guyanese than Afro-Guyanese voters saw labour management relations as the most important. For all sections, the electoral issues were relatively unimportant in helping them to decide which party to vote for. In interpreting these data, it is essential to note that as high as 20 per cent of the Indo-Guyanese voters could not identify the most important issue, while the same was true for 12 per cent of the Afro-Guyanese, 10 per cent of the mixed Guyanese and 5 per cent of "other" Guyanese. Additionally, from the data in our study no positive interpretations could be provided on the issue-oriented voter<sup>24</sup> as distinguished from the party identifier. In the latter case, the citizen sees the party as the central focus of political thought and action. In the former, the citizen sees political issues, not the party or its leader or its candidates, as paramount.

However, our data in Table 5.13 show that strong party identifiers were by far more cognizant of the issues than were the weak identifiers. Among those whose identity with the party was strong, only 3 per cent could not state the most important issue and 4 per cent the least important. Among those with moderately strong party identification, 92 per cent could identify the most important issue and 88 per cent the least important issue. Among the weak identifiers, issue familiarity

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<sup>24</sup> See Campbell *et al.*, Voter Decides, p. 12. Issue-orientation according to Campbell *et al.*, is seen as embracing two major components: i) Sensitivity to differences in party positions on issues related to Governmental action and ii) Involvement in issues perceived as being affected by the outcome of an election. Our analysis of party activists deals more directly with issue orientations, their sensitivity to partisan differences, the extent of their involvement, and the direction of issue orientation. See Chapter 7.

TABLE 5.11  
IMPORTANCE OF ISSUES  
(In percentages)

N = 833		
	Most Important	Least Important
Economic	59	4
Management Labour	17	40
Electoral Procedures	7	30
Don't know	16	24

TABLE 5.12  
MOST IMPORTANT ISSUE CONCEPTS BY RACE  
(In percentages)

N = 925				
	Indian	Negro	Mixed	Other
Economic	44	70	56	75
Management Labour	20	10	26	20
Electoral Procedure	6	8	14	-
Don't know	20	12	10	5

TABLE 5.13  
ISSUE FAMILIARITY BY STRENGTH OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION  
(In percentages)

N = 732			
	Most Important	Least Important	Don't know
Strong I.D.	97	96	4
Moderate I.D.	92	88	10
Weak I.D.	78	75	21
Non-Partisan	51	46	40

was much smaller while in the case of non-partisans issue familiarity tended to be smallest.

## 7. SUMMARY

The findings in this chapter indicate that most Guyanese conceive of their politics as made up of candidates and parties which are intricately related to the fortunes of particular social, economic and racial groups, and have some effect on the general prosperity or depression of the time. Politics is to a lesser extent conceptualised in terms of issues or ideologies. As a result, a very large proportion of the Guyanese electorate have acquired the minimal level of involvement in politics. Many people attend party meetings at election time. Voting turnout is also extremely high. We have also shown that marginal political involvement as reflected in partisanship toward one or other of the political parties, is also high; very few respondents were non-partisans and less still were classified as floating voters or "switchers". An examination of partisanship by race, shows that Afro-Guyanese, mixed and the middle minorities identify strongest with the PNC, while East Indians identify strongest with the PPP and Amerindians with the UF. In terms of religion, people of all religious denominations except Hindus identified most with the PNC. There was little significance in the partisanship expressed as a function of age. But most interesting was the nature of political activity in which non-identifiers were involved. An overwhelming majority of those who refused to identify with one or other political party were members of Trade Unions, had participated in demonstrations and protests, will fight to defend Guyana if required,

but found the electoral process irrelevant and saw a Cuban type revolution as an alternative to the present system of Government. Finally, while most people were familiar with the issues prevalent in Guyana at the time of the elections, these issues were remotely connected to influencing their decision to vote.

## CHAPTER VI

## LEVELS OF INVOLVEMENT IN THE ELECTORAL PROCESS

## 1. INTRODUCTION

In this chapter we investigate the reasons why different individuals or groups of individuals display different levels of involvement in the electoral process. Here we recognise that the political evaluations and judgments of the individuals of the state apparatus are only partly explained by their participation or non-participation in the electoral process. Numerous authors writing on Guyana, for example, have demonstrated how violent eruptions, riots and demonstrations are means by which protest can express itself far more dramatically than petitions or ballots.<sup>1</sup> To participate in politics out of sheer interest does not necessarily mean approval of the political apparatus or its authorities; to participate as an activist does not necessarily mean acquiescence in the regime. The major questions that concern us are: What is the feeling of political efficacy shared by our respondents, i.e., the belief fostered by individuals, that they can achieve their personal objectives, or at least some of them through the electoral process? What feelings of citizenship are reflected in their electoral behaviour? What expressions of political dissent may be gleaned from their involvement or non-involvement in electoral politics?

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<sup>1</sup>Peter Newman, "Racial Tension in British Guiana," *Race*, 3 (May, 1962); Philip Reno, *The Ordeal of British Guiana* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1964); Gordon Lewis, *The Growth of the Modern West Indies* (London: MacGibbon and Kee, 1968), pp. 265-289.

## 2. LEVELS OF POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT AND POLITICAL EFFICACY

To describe the levels of involvement of our respondents in the electoral process we needed some criterion of political participation. We therefore used the campaign activity index<sup>2</sup> to arrive at the following:

- (i) local party activists: those local party leaders who were actually involved in the organisation and administration of the election campaign as officials of one or other of the political parties<sup>3</sup>;
- (ii) strong party identifiers: those who were not party officials but who were actually members of one or other of the political parties and who voted regularly for one party;
- (iii) party sympathisers: those who, though not party members or regularly voting for a party, nevertheless, identify with one or other of the parties in several ways such as sometimes voting for a party or giving financial assistance to it;
- (iv) political spectators: those who refuse to identify with any party but who may vote if they feel like it or who over a period of time may even show "leanings" toward a particular party;

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<sup>2</sup> See Appendix V.

<sup>3</sup> We deal with these activists in some detail in Chapter VII.

- (v) political dissenters: those who do not belong or identify or show "leanings" to any party (even though they may be members of other social groups), and who do not vote at elections.

In Table 6.1, our data describe the relationship between different levels of involvement in the electoral process and the feeling of political efficacy of our respondents. To measure feelings of efficacy, we adopted the efficacy scale devised by Campbell and others.<sup>4</sup> We asked our respondents:

Would you kindly give your opinion on the following: i.e., I would like you to state if you strongly agree, agree, can't decide, disagree or strongly disagree --

- (i) I don't think ministers of Government care much what people like me think;
- (ii) Voting is the only way people like me have any say about how the government runs things;
- (iii) People like me don't have any say about what the Government does;
- (iv) Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what is going on.

From the cross-tabulation of the efficacy scale with the Campaign Activity Index we find a stronger relationship between those people who

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<sup>4</sup> This scale was devised by the Political Behaviour Research team of the Survey Research Center, University of Michigan. See Campbell, et al., The American Voter (New York: John Wiley, 1960), Appendix V for details of this scale. See also our Appendix V.

feel politically efficacious and those who are actively involved in politics. Hence the local party leaders professed a higher level of efficacy than did the strong party identifiers, the party sympathisers and the political spectators, all of whom showed greater efficacy than the dissenters.

TABLE 6.1

PERCENTAGE AT DIFFERENT LEVELS OF POLITICAL  
INVOLVEMENT BY RANK ON POLITICAL EFFICACY SCALE

Campaign Activity Index	RANK ON POLITICAL EFFICACY					
	Low		High			
	1	2	3	4	5	Total
Party Activists	-	-	-	25	75	100 (106)
Strong Party Identifiers	-	-	45	50	5	100 (395)
Party Sympathisers	-	9	51	36	4	100 (259)
Political Spectators	-	2	92	4	2	100 (139)
Political Dissenters	-	-	90	10	-	100 (83)

When, however, we describe our data in terms of constituencies, we see in Table 6.2 that although a high percentage of our sample thought of politics as something with which they could empathise, more people in strong PPP constituencies than in strong PNC ones felt a sense of "helplessness" in the face of the political panoply confronting them. Less people in the strong PNC constituencies (1 per cent) than in strong PPP constituencies (9 per cent) were ranked as having low political

efficacy. Similarly more people in strong PNC constituencies (47 per cent) than in strong PPP constituencies (15 per cent) were ranked as having high political efficacy. One possible reason for the difference between strong PPP and strong PNC constituencies may be related to their respective geographical locations.

TABLE 6.2

RANK ON POLITICAL EFFICACY SCALE BY CONSTITUENCY  
(In percentages)

						(N = 770)	
Constituency	Low 1	2	3	4	High 5	% Total	TOTAL
<u>STRONG PPP</u>							
Skeldon (rural)	10	-	35	35	20	100	(126)
Corentyne (rural)	8	3	37	42	10	100	(132)
<u>MARGINAL</u>							
Suddie (rural)	18	3	16	50	13	100	(102)
Houston (urban)	10	14	12	28	36	100	(156)
<u>STRONG PNC</u>							
New Amsterdam (urban)	2	2	18	46	32	100	(110)
Abary (rural)	-	14	16	7	63	100	(142)

In the strong urban PNC constituency of New Amsterdam very few people seem overwhelmed by politics generally. This was much less so in any case than in the other strong rural PNC constituency and the two strong rural PPP constituencies on the Corentyne Coast. The importance of the geographical factor is again present in the case of the two

marginal constituencies in our sample. In the urban Houston constituency less people felt that politics was an impediment to their individual objectives than was the case in the rural constituency of Suddie. An overall explanation of these tendencies may be that in urban centres people who are more constantly in touch with the apparatus of politics and of the state -- the parties' headquarters, the parties' press, the politicians, governmental departments -- tend as a result to become more psychologically adjusted to the barrage of propaganda poured upon them during a political campaign.

The urban-rural factor is evident when, as in Table 6.3, we examine the feelings of efficacy not only by the different levels of political involvement, but also by the urban-rural location of our

TABLE 6.3

PERCENTAGE AT DIFFERENT LEVELS OF POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT  
ACCORDING TO RURAL-URBAN LOCATION BY RANK ON POLITICAL EFFICACY SCALE

		RANK ON POLITICAL EFFICACY					
		Low		High			
Campaign Activity		1	2	3	4	5	Total
Party Activists	urban				22	78	100 ( 50)
	rural				24	76	100 ( 56)
Strong Party Identifiers	urban			40	56	6	100 (165)
	rural			45	52	3	100 (235)
Party Sympathisers	urban		-	41	49	10	100 (100)
	rural		10	61	28	1	100 (159)
Political Spectators	urban		2	84	8	4	100 ( 50)
	rural		2	98	-	-	100 ( 89)
Political Dissenters	urban		-	89	11	-	100 ( 35)
	rural		-	91	9	-	100 ( 49)

respondents. The least difference is displayed between the urban party activists and the rural party activists. There is very little difference between strong party identifiers, urban and rural and between urban-rural political dissenters. But between urban-rural party sympathisers and spectators the differences tend to be relatively marked. In all cases rural respondents manifest lower efficacy than do urban respondents.

### 3. POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT AND A SENSE OF CITIZENSHIP DUTY

Whereas the notion of political efficacy identifies the achievement of personal objectives with the political process generally, a measure of citizenship duty deals specifically with the level of personal involvement in the electoral process. So that in arriving at the level of citizenship duty of our respondents, we asked them to give an opinion on the following statements.<sup>5</sup>

- (i) It isn't so important to vote when you know that your party doesn't have a chance;
- (ii) A good many elections aren't important enough to bother with;
- (iii) So many people vote in the national election that it doesn't matter much to me whether I vote or not;
- (iv) If a person doesn't care how an election comes out, he should vote in it;

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<sup>5</sup> See Appendix V for the sense of citizenship duty scale.

In Table 6.4 we describe the sense of citizenship duty associated with the different party electorates. Whereas the PNC supporters generally expressed a relatively high sense of citizenship duty, the PPP supporters claimed to be moderately disposed to citizenship duties as were the UF supporters. In Table 6.5 when racial categories are matched against the citizenship duty index, the Afro-Guyanese are rated higher than the Indo-Guyanese and others. Very few respondents, 3 per cent Africans and 7 per cent East Indians, displayed a weak sense of citizenship duty. This factor partly explains why the voting turnout in Guyana has been so consistently high.<sup>6</sup> When, however, we look at levels of involvement in the electoral process (Table 6.6), it is very obvious that most of the people who can be described as having a weak sense of citizenship duty are also political dissenters while those having a strong sense of citizenship duty are strong party identifiers. Both spectators and sympathisers tend to be moderate in their sense of citizenship duty.

Feelings of citizenship duty like feelings of efficacy are instilled in individuals by the process whereby they are socialised. But while these feelings have their roots in the society they also reflect the level of support among citizens for their community, the regime and for those in authority. One hypothesis which may be generated from these observations is: to the extent that there is a belief among the masses that those who control the governmental roles are usually

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<sup>6</sup> See Chapter 2, pp. 29-30, and Chapter 4, pp.

TABLE 6.4

SENSE OF CITIZENSHIP DUTY BY PARTY IDENTIFICATION  
(In percentages)

	Citizenship Duty Index			
	Strong	Moderate	Weak	Total
PNC	83.8	15.7	0.5	100 (394)
PPP	56.8	40.3	2.9	100 (139)
UF	-	100.0	-	100 (13)

TABLE 6.5

SENSE OF CITIZENSHIP DUTY BY RACE  
(In percentages)

	Citizenship Duty Index			
	Strong	Moderate	Weak	Total
African	80.2	16.7	3.1	100 (281)
East Indian	60.2	32.7	7.1	100 (321)
Mixed	85.3	14.7	-	100 ( 68)
Other	72.6	27.4	-	100 ( 62)

TABLE 6.6

SENSE OF CITIZENSHIP DUTY BY LEVELS OF INVOLVEMENT  
(In percentages)

	Strong	Moderate	Weak	Total
Party Identifiers	91	9	-	100
Sympathisers	53	47	-	100
Spectators	39	58	3	100
Dissenters	11	22	67	100

concerned with racial and political loyalties rather than loyalties to the nation, the authorities tend to lack support and the legitimacy of the regime is thereby diminished.

If the levels of "efficacy" and "citizenship duty" are any guide to feelings of legitimacy, then in Guyana, judging from the responses in our sample, the legitimacy of the regime is held in question, most, by those we classify as political dissenters.

In Figures 6.1 to 6.4 we examined four items -- attendance at political meetings, membership in a political organisation, working for a party, displaying or wearing party buttons, flags and stickers -- so as to be able to compare the different levels of campaign activity between "party identifiers," "sympathisers," "spectators" and "dissenters". We did not include party activists since by definition they are involved directly in the organisation and administration of all four items.

Figures 6.1 and 6.2 show that between the different types of actors, there is little difference in the level of attendance at meetings and of membership in political organisations and clubs. On the other hand, for those items dealing with working for the party and encouraging people to vote, wearing campaign buttons and giving money to one or other of the parties, Figures 6.3 and 6.4 show that the difference increases significantly. In the latter instance, the items are more directly related to specific items of party support and electoral politics than to general political activity (in the first two items in Figures 6.1 and 6.2) which derive from a sense of political awareness

LEVELS OF CAMPAIGN ACTIVITY ON FOUR  
ITEMS BY LEVEL OF INVOLVEMENT

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


Fig. 6.1 ATTENDANCE AT ELECTION MEETINGS




Fig. 6.2 MEMBERSHIP IN POLITICAL ORGANISATION




Fig. 6.3 WORKING FOR A PARTY




Fig. 6.4 WEARING BUTTONS ETC.

not confined to the electoral campaign per se, sometimes disregarding the electoral process as a legitimate expression of political power.

#### 4. POLITICAL DISSENT VERSUS ELECTORAL INVOLVEMENT

In Guyana, what distinguishes the political dissenter from the political loyalist,<sup>7</sup> i.e., one who supports the norms of the regime, is not the alienation of the former from the political system per se but rather his unwillingness to seriously identify himself with one or other of the political parties.<sup>8</sup> In Guyana, the politics of dissent focuses mainly on a small group of radical intellectuals whose membership in the New World, Movement Against Oppression (NAO) and Ratoon groups overlaps to a great extent. These groups propose radical policies such as nationalisation of bauxite and sugar and are very critical of government's attachment to United States and to its gradualist approach toward Guyanisation. While a very insignificant number of our sample are

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<sup>7</sup> "Political loyalist" is used here mainly as a summary term for those categories of political involvement (activists, identifiers, sympathisers and spectators) who more or less participate in the electoral process.

<sup>8</sup> As is evident from Table 6.4 and previous data on electoral activity of the masses (voting, party identification, etc.), political apathy is almost non-existent in Guyana. The highly participant culture and highly mobilised citizenry are differentiated only by their commitment to regime structures. This experience is different from the U.S.A., Britain and most other developing countries where apathy is a function of alienation, and non-participatory politics. See among all else, Almond and Verba, Civic Culture Chps. IV-V and Kenneth Janda, "A Comparative Study of Political Alienation and Voting Behaviour in Three Suburban Communities" in Studies in History and Social Sciences Studies in Honor of John A. Kenneman (Normal, Illinois: Illinois State University Press, 1965).

members of the New World Group,<sup>9</sup> Ratoon<sup>10</sup> and more recently MAO<sup>11</sup> they remain qualitatively the only effective group outside the traditional party system to offer serious criticism of government policy. Like most radical groups in the Caribbean, New World, Ratoon and MAO have failed to mobilise expressions of dissent in Guyana, not because of the lack of skills, but because of the configuration of racial interests which impose themselves on the movement and dilute its goals. In other words, these groups which champion the goals of structural transformation of

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<sup>9</sup> New World Group (Guyana), in association with New World Associates covering the Caribbean, print a quarterly journal which is a broad social commentary on West Indian politics, society and economics. New World Associates which have operated in the West Indies since 1962 have provided invaluable service to the Caribbean, by focusing critically on the serious issues of Caribbean society and politics and have been the foremost advocates of regional integration. Although since 1968, the group has become less vibrant, its impact on Caribbean governments can be likened somewhat to Fabian socialism in Britain of the early twentieth century. These new-worlds-men were attempting to nurture a home grown ideology of West Indian nationalism. The recent decline in the group's activity is related to the perennial problem confronting the academia, i.e., how to wed ideas and actions. Commentaries on the internal problems contributing to New World's present stasis are best reiterated by those responsible for the debate in the first place. See Lloyd Best, "Independent Thought and Caribbean Freedom," New World Quarterly, Vol. III, No. 4, (1967); "Whither New World," New World Quarterly, Vol. IV, No. 1, (1968); and "The New World Approach," Express, Port of Spain, Trinidad, Sept. 23 and 24, 1968; James Millette, Chairman's Report to the Second Annual General Meeting, New World (Trinidad), Confidential and Unpublished, (February, 1969); "Round and Round" (editorial) New World Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 4, (1968); and Norman Girvan, "Mona New World Report; Abeng, Moko and New World: A Review," New World Quarterly, Vol. 5, Nos. 1 & 2, 1969.

<sup>10</sup> Ratoon formed in September 1969 after the expulsion of one of its editors, Clive Thomas, from Jamaica, produces a monthly paper Ratoon.

<sup>11</sup> MAO was formed in December 1970 to agitate for civil liberties for the deprived and oppressed. The organisation stresses education for the masses to equip them with the basic skills.

of the Guyanese society find themselves somewhat ostracised by the masses, because the ideal they promote, viz., solidarity of the Indo-African working classes in the struggle for liberation, runs counter to the present organisational and psychological ethos of Guyanese society. By the sporadic nature of their activity, these radical groups have so far been able neither to sustain the political loyalties of more than a hard core of adherents nor to orient the political support of a broad constituency of people. Political education which is an integral part of socio-economic transformation of society cannot be adequately implemented by means of a quarterly journal which, as a general rule is six months to a year behind schedule, or by a monthly paper with inadequate distribution among the rural sector. Political activity that is as specialised as this, fails to engage the masses who are the main allies in any system of radical political change. Thus in terms of political participation, radical groups are only peripherally significant in Guyana.

The marginality of Ratoon, New World and MAO, is perhaps also explained by the increasingly radical posture of the present government as it advances its policies to naturalise local resources. Policies such as the nationalisation of the Canadian-owned Bauxite Company, Alcan, substantial donations to the freedom fighters in Africa, withdrawal of "Peace Corps" technical assistance to Guyana, support for the Black Power philosophy, advocating greater regional integration -- these have all been advocated by the radical groups but have now been incorporated into the policies of the government, perhaps in a less extreme manner,

but nevertheless enacted and promulgated with as much cogency as is required to knock the radical props aside or at least weaken their claims to novelty and insightfulness.<sup>12</sup>

Implicit in our analysis of political involvement is that except at the level of the political dissenter, racial loyalties persist as the major factor in the electoral behaviour of Guyanese. Respondents in rural constituencies and supporters of the PPP tend to have less faith in the efficacy of the electoral process than urban constituents and PNC supporters. PNC supporters and Africans feel a greater sense of citizenship duty than PPP supporters and East Indians. The resistance of political dissenters to the dominant racial cleavages in the society, i.e., their attempt to broaden the base of political support more in terms of class than of race, have left them outside the main stream of electoral politics. They may yet be a significant political force.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> The Guyana government has implemented several left wing policies in recent times, chief among which is the recent announcement that it has acquired the controlling shares in the multi-million-dollar Canadian owned Demerara Bauxite Company from January 1, 1971. See Norman Girvan, "Why we Need to Nationalize Bauxite and How to do it," in N. Girvan and O. Jefferson (Eds.), Readings in Political Economy (Kingston, Jamaica: New World Group Ltd., 1971).

<sup>13</sup> I have pursued this speculation in greater detail in my concluding Chapter 8.

## CHAPTER VII

THE IMPACT OF LOCAL PARTY ACTIVITY  
ON ELECTORAL MOBILISATION

## 1. INTRODUCTION

What concerns us most in this chapter are the functions performed by the local party organisations, the types of activity carried out by the local party leaders and the impact of these activities on the electorate. While we maintain our previous argument (Chapter V) that the national party leader plays a dominant role, it is our contention that party activity under the system of proportional representation is much more a function of organisational strategy than of candidate orientation since the important factor is votes rather than seats. Our interest is therefore centred on the point of personal contact between the individual and the party organisation. The major emphasis of local party activity tends to be in mobilising support and the vote through a variety of organisational techniques, chief among which is the campaign activity. And this leads us to hypothesise, that the local party activity is a vital source of sustaining and crystallising the allegiance of the rank and file to the political party and of determining choice of party on election day. Additionally, the local party apparatus is a crucial factor in minimising the racial cleavages currently reflected in the politics of Guyana.

Our data are taken primarily from intensive interviews with 106 party leaders in the six constituencies of our sample. We also supplement the information from the local party leaders with corresponding information from our rank and file sample. Of particular interest to

us are the perceptions of party activities by the electorate and the description of these activities by the local party leaders.<sup>1</sup>

For the purposes of this study, we identify five dimensions of leadership<sup>2</sup> which we put forward as local organisational functions of electoral mobilisation. These dimensions are briefly described as follows:

1. The Internal dimension: (mobilisation of own group).

This rests on the capacity of the local leadership to organise the campaign and to sustain the activities of its helpers throughout the campaign. It measures mobilisation of the leader's own group.

2. The Representative dimension: (mobilisation within the

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<sup>1</sup> For a full description of the sample design employed in this study to select local leaders, see Appendix 1. Suffice it to say that these leaders were chosen partly because of their official designation by the party apparatus or in the hierarchy of the local party organisation. Local leaders were also selected partly on the basis of the reputational method which involved the rank and file's ratings of specific personalities in the campaign activity. At the same time, the sample of the rank and file electorate was stratified to reflect the strength of the respective parties in the six constituencies under review and the urban-rural grids.

<sup>2</sup> These dimensions of leadership correspond with the five characteristics presented in Daniel Katz and Samuel J. Eldersveld, "The Impact of Local Party Activity upon the Elections," The Public Opinion Quarterly, 25 (1961), pp. 1-24. They are by no means mutually exclusive of each other. For example, the internal and the administrative dimensions overlap immensely. The distinction here is that while the former deals with keeping the campaign team together, the latter is more concerned with being able to cope with the rules and regulations of the party and with applying them. Again while the representative dimension is concerned with intra-party organisational links, the public relations dimension emphasises the need to attract support outside the party organisation.

party). This is determined by the quality of communications between the local leader and other local party organisations on the one hand and the central campaign headquarters on the other.

3. The Public Relations dimension: (mobilisation within the community). This relates to the kind and the success of the activities embarked upon by the local leadership. It is mainly concerned with the capabilities of the local leaders to generate the support and enthusiasm for the party, of groups and individuals normally outside the party.
4. The Administrative dimension: Here the major focus is on the local leader as an "organisation man", his capacity to comply with party regulations and to administer campaign activity among the different ranks of activists, helpers and sympathisers of the party.
5. The Motivational Dimension: As an overriding function of electoral mobilisation, this dimension summarises the aspirations, the optimisms and pessimisms of the local leaders vis-à-vis the party, its personalities, and its organisation and ideology.

## 2. DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF LOCAL PARTY LEADERSHIP

Before analysing the leadership dimensions and their impact on electoral mobilisation, we shall briefly present the demographic profile of the local party leaders in our sample. Most striking in the composition of local leaders is the overwhelming majority of male activists

(Table 7.1). Only within the ranks of the PNC is there any appreciable number of women participating at this level of the party's hierarchy. In many respects, the non-participation of Indian women at the leadership level is somewhat expected. In Indian communities, the ideal of male dominance in the family is very strong and it is reinforced by religious beliefs and practices. What R. T. Smith wrote of Indian women in 1960 is still true today:

This does not mean that they (Indian women) are without influence; in domestic and kinship matters they exercise great influence and women who have a drunken, irresponsible husband often carry the economic burden of the family. Now that the proportion of girls who attend school is much higher than it was, the pattern of overt submissiveness will change.<sup>3</sup>

TABLE 7.1

SEX DISTRIBUTION OF LEADERS BY PARTY  
(In percentages)

	N = 106			
	PNC (57)	PPP (27)	UF (22)	% of Each Group
Male	78	100	95	88
Female	22	-	5	12
Total	100	100	100	100

<sup>3</sup> R.T. Smith, British Guiana (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 133. In fact, Janet Jagan is often accredited the role of chief architect in the politicisation of Indian women. When in 1946, along with Winifred Gaskin, and Frances Stafford, she founded the Women's Political and Economic Organisation (W.P.E.O.), Janet Jagan as its general secretary became a household name, emulated by women of all races. It was, however, her ability to combine political organisation with the life style of an Indian women, that endeared her, an American Jew by birth, to Guyana's Indian community resulting in her universal nickname, "blue-eye bhowgie" (White-Indian).

In the case of the UF one explanation of the dearth of women activists is the alleged fear of hostility towards "women of fair complexion"<sup>4</sup> in some parts of the country. Be that as it may, the United Force used a high proportion of paid activists as campaign organisers in many electoral districts. There were no female paid activists in our sample.<sup>5</sup>

All three political parties tried to present a more or less multiracial leadership front (Table 7.2). However, a closer examination of the racial composition of the local leadership reveals the superficiality of the multiracial image. In the case of the PNC, ethnic leadership was almost evenly distributed between Indian (42 per cent) and

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<sup>4</sup> It will be recalled that most of the UF support comes from the Portuguese, the white, the upper-middle and upper class sections of the community. Hence the party conjures up an image of "de white people party." In predominantly African working class districts, hostilities against the UF tend to take on ideological proportions, as Portuguese or white campaigners, especially when they spoke on the platform of "de white people party," were branded exploiters. The break-up of the coalition government between the UF and the PNC in 1968 prior to the elections, also added to the hostilities engendered by the UF by both Indian and African Communities. The Indians did not forgive the UF for teaming up with the PNC to form the coalition government of 1964-68. As a result, most of the campaign violence in predominantly Indian areas were carried out against the UF. See "Electoral Clashes," Sunday Chronicle, Georgetown, Guyana, Sunday, December 8, 1968, p. 5.

<sup>5</sup> Indeed our evidence has conclusively shown that in some instances these paid activists had performed their tasks incompetently, unreliably, even fraudulently. Some of these paid activists were known to have supported and campaigned for one of the other parties while actually in the pay of UF. One incident was specially revealing of this kind of deceit. A certain activist was actually listed as the UF party agent in a certain district, while his name appeared on another list of key activists given to us by the PNC. On close investigation, we discovered that even though this agent was provided with a car, an office and a salary from the UF, he campaigned vigorously for the PNC.

TABLE 7.2  
RACIAL DISTRIBUTION OF LEADERS BY PARTY  
(In percentages)

	N = 106				TOTAL
	PNC	PPP	UF	% of Each Group	
Amerindian	4	-	5	3	4
Indian	42	65	18	42	44
Mixed	4	24	20	17	18
African	50	11	25	28	29
Portuguese	-	-	32	10	11
Other	-	-	-	-	-
Total	100	100	100	100	

African (50 per cent) which together comprised 92 per cent of the total leadership in the six constituencies. The ethnic distribution of the PPP's local leadership was more predominantly Indian (65 per cent) but comprised a relatively fair percentage of Mixed (24 per cent) and a not insignificant number of Africans (11 per cent). Neither of the two major parties had Portuguese, Whites or Chinese within the ranks of its local leaders in the six constituencies of our sample. On the other hand, the UF's claim to being a multiracial party seems justified by the even spread of ethnic leadership among its ranks, 18 per cent Indian, 20 per cent Mixed, 25 per cent African, 32 per cent Portuguese and 5 per cent Amerindian. In fact, when compared with the actual

proportion of each racial group in the population, the UF leadership overrepresented the minority groups of Mixed and Portuguese, while underrepresenting the majority groups of Indians and Africans. In some instances, the strategy adopted by the parties was one of co-opting activists phenotypically<sup>6</sup> acceptable to the electorate in the particular districts. Hence Indian organisers would be taken into Indian districts and Africans to African districts when the racial leadership was lacking in the particular district. For example, the three top PNC activists in the predominantly Indian constituency, Corentyne West Central, lived in an adjacent constituency. In Abary, a strong PNC constituency, the two PPP activists came from the two polling divisions within the constituency which embraced solid clusters of the Indian population. In the case of the UF, neither of the two local leaders in the two Corentyne constituencies lived in these constituencies. But, because of the heavy East Indian concentration along the Corentyne coast, the UF co-opted two East Indians, both business men, as area supervisors for their electoral campaign. As was to be expected, the area proved too expansive for only two leaders to operate efficiently, and this may have accounted for the disastrous performance of that party

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<sup>6</sup>M. G. Smith, The Plural Society in the British West Indies (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1965), uses the term to refer to the racial appearance of a person. Hence Smith speaks of white phenotypes, black phenotypes and Indian phenotypes. For a full discussion of the distinction between phenotypical and genealogical colour in relationship to 'associational/structural colour' see Smith, pp. 60-66.

TABLE 7.3  
AGE OF LEADERS BY PARTY  
(In percentages)

	N = 106				TOTAL
	PNC	PPP	UF	% of Each Group	
Under 30	20	50	62	38	40
31-55	69	50	30	34	56
Over 55	11	-	8	8	10
Total	100	100	100	100	

in the five registration districts on the Corentyne Coast.<sup>7</sup> In these five constituencies the UF gained 3.5 per cent of the votes cast, the PNC got 29.5, and the PPP 63 per cent.

Also contributing to the general profile of our local party leadership are their religion, occupation, educational background and age, as shown in Tables 7.3 - 7.6 respectively. Most of the local leadership were between 18 and 30, while very few were over 55 years of age. Interestingly, while 20 per cent of the PNC local leaders were in the youngest age group, 50 per cent of the PPP and 62 per cent of the UF local leadership were in this category. Our religious-dimension also shows some differences. The majority of UF local leaders were Catholics, while the largest percentage of PPP leaders were Hindu. In the case of

<sup>7</sup> See Report on the National Assembly General Elections 1968 (Georgetown, Guyana: Government Printery 1969).

TABLE 7.4  
RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION OF LEADERS BY PARTY  
(In percentages)

	PNC	PPP	UF	N = 106	
				% of each Group	TOTAL
Catholic	12	8	75	24	25
Protestant	41	21	10	29	32
Hindu	14	46	-	23	24
Muslim	25	8	7	16	16
Other	8	8	8	13	19
Total	100	100	100	100	106

TABLE 7.5  
OCCUPATION OF LEADERS BY PARTY  
(In percentages)

	PNC	PPP	UF	N = 106	
				% of each Group	TOTAL
Professional	45	50	60	55	58
White Collar	31	21	35	29	30
Blue Collar	24	29	5	16	18
Unemployed	-	-	-	-	-
Total	100	100	100	100	106

TABLE 7.6  
EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND OF LEADERS BY PARTY  
(In percentages)

N = 106					
	PNC	PPP	UF	% of each Group	TOTAL
Primary	35	50	14	32	35
Secondary	53	25	76	53	53
University	12	25	10	15	18
Total	100	100	100	100	106

the PNC, their local leadership was relatively more evenly spread over the various religious affiliations, except that the relative high percentage of Muslims (25 per cent) is one indicator of the attempts of the PNC to capitalise on the Muslim-Hindu rivalry and to promote Muslim leadership within the organisation as one strategy of attracting greater Indian support. Finally, most of the local leaders were professional people like lawyers, teachers and small business-men. These leaders had generally attained a relatively high level of education as shown by the number of people who had secondary and university education.

### 3. CHARACTER OF LOCAL PARTY LEADERSHIP

Some studies on local party organisations suggest that the local party leaders perform their functions inefficiently; that the local party leader who carries out his task is the exception rather than the rule. Very often the local leadership is overshadowed by the central party

organisation in essential aspects of electoral mobilisation.<sup>8</sup> Whether these relate to routine activity such as fund raising and party membership or the more technical activity of voter registration and selection of candidates, the general effect is to lower the morale of the local leadership, to weaken its motivational strength and its level of involvement in the activities of the party.

The introduction of the system of proportional representation has foisted greater burdens on the local party machinery than under the older electoral system of first-past-the-post. In Guyana, most of the local leaders perform their party functions in their spare time. Of the 106 local leaders, only 5 were full-time party organisers. Hence the man-hours they can allocate to an electoral campaign as well as to other party activity tend to be marginal. Under the former system there was the tendency for the party to neglect its local machinery in those constituencies known to be strongly committed to its opponent. Since what was at stake in each constituency was one seat, there was a justification for harnessing organisational resources in those constituencies of a marginal nature and to consolidate support in areas strongly committed to the party. Under the new system, every vote is as important as the other, since votes and not seats is the crucial factor. Hence, even in

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<sup>8</sup> Among the studies on local organisations see N. Valen and D. Katz, "The Effect of Local Party Organisation upon the Electorate in a Norwegian Province" in S. M. Lipset, Philips Cutright and Peter Rossi, "Grass Roots Politicians and the Vote," American Sociological Review, 23 (1958), pp. 171-179; Philips Cutright and Peter H. Rossi, "Party Organisation in Primary Elections," American Journal of Sociology, 64 (1958), pp. 262-269.

constituencies weakly identified with a party, that party must pursue votes, if it desires electoral victory. It therefore seems reasonable to expect a greater spread in the devolution of power among local organisations not necessarily at the expense of Central party organisation but as an essential complement to it.

Nevertheless, although campaign activity is sponsored by higher levels in the parties' organisation, the specific details of conducting an efficient election and of mobilising various constituents are heavily dependent upon the skill and enthusiasm of the local leadership. On four of our five dimensions of leadership<sup>9</sup> (Table 7.7) as well as on the combined index (in Table 7.8), the PNC leaders scored higher than the PPP and the UF respectively. But on the motivational index, the PPP leadership excelled in a manner which is probably explained by the harmonising effect of the Marxist-Leninist ideology espoused by the leadership. Hence, even though the nucleus of its leadership has a much narrower base than the PNC, it is rooted in a cohesive manner far different from the broad coalition of interests subsumed in the leadership ranks of the PNC and the UF. Strength of motivation in the PPP is dependent less on a broad consensus which often tends to make factions within organisations disenchanted especially when they consistently fail to wring concessions favourable to themselves. Failure on the part of leaders to cope with factional disputes was among the major reasons for the lower/weak motivational strength within the PNC. One further reason

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<sup>9</sup> For classification of these dimensions see p. 163 above.

TABLE 7.7  
STRENGTH AND CHARACTER OF LOCAL PARTY LEADERSHIP  
IN THE PNC, PPP AND UF  
(In percentages)\*

Index	Negligible (under 9) <sup>a</sup>	Moderate (9-14) <sup>a</sup>	Strong (15-20) <sup>a</sup>	Total (N)	Median Score (Max. 20)
<u>Mobilisation of own group</u>					
PNC	25	45	30	100 (52)	16
PPP	43	50	7	100 (27)	9
UF	66	33	-	100 (24)	5
<u>Mobilisation of Community</u>					
PNC	-	38	62	100 (56)	15
PPP	-	69	31	100 (27)	12
UF	18	57	25	100 (24)	11
<u>Mobilisation within party</u>					
PNC	7	9	85	100 (56)	15
PPP	8	46	46	100 (28)	12
UF	9	82	9	100 (24)	13
<u>Administrative strength</u>					
PNC	9	20	71	100 (56)	14
PPP	7	33	60	100 (28)	14
UF	38	33	29	100 (24)	10
<u>Motivational strength</u>					
PNC	25	25	50	100 (56)	13
PPP	-	7	93	100 (28)	16
UF	20	33	47	100 (27)	10

\* Each dimension of local party leadership consisted of responses by 106 local leaders to questions evaluated on a 5-point scale. The indices were eventually classified as "negligible", "moderate" and "strong".

<sup>a</sup> These figures indicate the range of the raw scores associated with each index.

for weak motivation was the disappointment of local leaders when political rewards for contributions to the party's success at the polls are not apparently forthcoming. One local PNC leader actually said "we wuk so hard for the party and now the Prime Minister sharing out the rewards to the coolie man." Although this assessment might not

TABLE 7.8

COMBINED INDEX FOR STRENGTH AND CHARACTER  
OF LOCAL PARTY LEADERSHIP IN THE PNC, PPP AND UF  
(In percentages)\*

	Low (under 40)	Moderate 41-75	Strong (over 75)	Total N	Median percentage <sup>a</sup>
PNC	13	28	59	100 (56)	76
PPP	12	48	40	100 (28)	53
UF	31	46	22	100 (24)	41

\* The combined index represents the mean percentage of the 5 indices of leadership strength in Table 7.7.

<sup>a</sup> In this column we present the median percentage of the leadership score so as to give a better picture of the level of leadership strength associated with each party.

have been properly founded, yet this leader was referring to a series of appointments of Indians to positions within the PNC party and the government. On the whole, the distribution of leadership strength of the three sets of leaders on the various indices shows the relative superiority of the PNC local party organisation. On the combined index (Table 7.8) we observe that the UF leadership are leaders in name only. While only 22 per cent of the UF leaders can be classified as strong

leaders, the figure for the PPP is 48 per cent and 60 per cent for the PNC. The median percentages show that the level of leadership strength is much higher for the PNC than the PPP; much higher for the PPP than the UF, with the greatest disparity between the PNC and the UF.

One notable feature of the local party leadership of the three parties is the relatively large number of activists who emerged in the ranks of the PNC compared with the PPP and the UF. In all six constituencies in our sample, we asked our respondents if they knew activists from the various parties. The actual question was as follows: "Do you know anyone personally who is an active member of the PNC in this Registration district? who is an active member of the UF in this Registration district? who is an active member of the PPP in this Registration district?"<sup>10</sup>

Whereas the average number of PPP activists named in each constituency was 4.5 (and 3 for the UF), the average number of PNC activists known in each constituency was 10. If, as we assume, electoral mobilisation is a function of local leadership activity, then among the many conclusions that may be drawn from Tables 7.7 and 7.8 is that PNC leaders seemed to be more active than the other local leaders in their contacts within the community and within their own party and also did the best job in mobilising their own local groups to action. Although

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<sup>10</sup> We followed these questions with another set of questions:  
 (a) If yes, ask: who is that? (Note if relation to respondent)  
 (b) If yes, ask: what does he or she do for the party?

leaders of all the parties displayed somewhat equal willingness to work for the party of their choice, yet the PPP leadership seemed more highly motivated as a group while the PNC leaders showed greater familiarity with the organisational procedures within their party than did either the PPP or the UF leaders.

#### 4. LOCAL PARTY LEADERSHIP AND PARTY IDENTIFICATION

Figures 7.1 and 7.3 are graphical representations of the strength of party leadership and the intensity of rank and file identification with the party in the six constituencies of our sample.<sup>11</sup> In Figure 7.1 the strength of party leadership increases gradually from 58 per cent in the strong PNC constituencies through 70 per cent in marginal constituencies to 78 per cent in weak constituencies. At the same time, party identification on the part of the rank and file is extremely high in the strong PNC constituencies, moderately high in the marginal constituencies and low but positive in the weak PNC constituencies. This trend can be contrasted with those shown for the PPP in Figure 7.2 and the UF in Figure 7.3. In both these cases, the trends are parallel in that low leadership strength is accompanied by extremely low strength of party identification in the strong PNC constituencies while as leadership strength increases in the marginal and strong PPP constituencies,

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<sup>11</sup> The percentages for strength of party leadership in each constituency are derived in the same way as the combined index in Table 7.8. However, in Figures 7.1 - 7.3 we are using mean instead of median percentages. Our concern is to match strength of leadership with strength of party identification of our rank and file sample in each constituency. We have previously explained and analysed strength of party identification. See Table 5.5.

so does strong partisan identification. In Figure 7.3 the correspondence between relatively weak leadership and party identification by the rank and file is evident with leadership being very negative in the strong PPP constituencies and party identification almost zero. In the marginal constituencies the UF performed moderately well in both leadership strength and partisan identification.

The pattern which emerges therefore shows that constituencies where its leadership strength is weakest, the number of people who identify strongly with the PPP is relatively insignificant. As leadership strength improves, so does the proportion of supporters who identify strongly. In the case of the UF, the consistently low leadership strength is paralleled by an equally modest percentage of strong party identifiers. As a matter of general interest, the overall pattern of party identification is higher in the case of the PNC than for the PPP. In strong PPP constituencies the proportion of strong identifiers is much lower in comparison with the overwhelming attachment to the PNC professed by its supporters. Even in weak constituencies, the PNC has attracted more strong identifiers (18 per cent) than in the case of the PPP (4 per cent) in weak PPP constituencies. Contrary to the trend in the UF and the PPP, we note that the strength of leadership curve for the PNC rises in weak PNC constituencies. According to our indices on strength of local leaders this trend can be interpreted to mean that the PNC intensified its local party machinery in weak PNC constituencies. This observation is supported by the reports of the rank and file electors in our sample on the campaign activity of the various parties.

Fig. 7.1 PNC Leadership-Party Identification Curves




Fig. 7.2 PPP Leadership-Party Identification Curves





Fig. 7.3 U.F. Leadership-Party Identification curves



## 5. VOTERS' IMAGE OF LOCAL PARTY ORGANISATION

One additional dimension in assessing the impact of the local party organisations on the electorate is an examination of the voters' image of these organisations. Here we are mainly concerned with the people's awareness and knowledge of specific aspects of the local party activity. But for the purpose of comparison, it seems appropriate, first, to report the details of specific activities that were supposed to have been performed by the local party leaders. According to the reports by the local leaders of their own activity, most of them claimed that they had performed their functions effectively. The answers of 106 local leaders to closed questions, on specific items of their campaign activity are summarised below (per cent):

Kept some kind of record of voters in the district	85
Has complete record of supporters	72
Knows whether voters in district are registered	80
Used records to check voters on polling day	81
Has helpers for work in the district	95
Had meetings with their local helpers	90
Supervised the field activity of these helpers	86
Participated in meetings for planning and/or assessing party campaign strategy	96
Participated in fund raising activity for the party	62

Turning now to the actual rank and file perception of the local party organisations, we note that generally these organisations can be characterised as relatively strong and active. As many as 82 per cent

of our sample were aware that there were local party leaders in their district, 32 per cent could actually name the PPP local leaders while 44 per cent could name the PNC local leaders. However, only 12 per cent knew who the UF local leaders were. Some of the answers to specific questions are given below (in per cent):

Is aware of some local political leader	82
Yes, actually knows leaders in the district	68
Didn't know	29
No answer	3
Yes, knew of PNC leaders in the district	74
Can identify by name	44
Yes, knew of PPP leaders in the district	70
Can identify by name	32
Yes, knew of UF leaders in the district	45
Can identify by name	12
Yes, but don't know which party	4
Knows some worker active for political party in district	73

This brief summary of answers by the electorate gives us some indication of the level of impact of the local organisation on the electorate. It suffices here to say that from the responses given, the UF local organisation was little known in the two PPP strongholds, while both PNC and PPP leaders were generally known in all the constituencies. Nevertheless, in spite of the high level of local activity during the election campaign reported by the local leaders, the image

of this activity as reported by the rank and file electorate is much more modest. Table 7.9 gives the constituency breakdown of local leadership activity as perceived by the voters. Roughly 25 per cent of the electorate remembered being called upon or canvassed by party activists. While 28 per cent remembered receiving campaign literature, only 13 per cent reported that they wore party buttons or displayed party stickers. More useful, however, is the image of the individual parties in the three major types of constituencies classified in this study. What emerges is that the voters' image of the PNC's campaign activity is consistently stronger than the PPP's or UF's. Only in the strong PPP constituency cluster did voters report having received more house calls and having displayed more buttons and stickers for the PPP than for the PNC. Even in strong PPP constituencies the voters reported that they received more campaign material from the PNC than from the PPP. The very meagre contact with the electorate displayed by the UF in the strong PPP cluster is compensated by its relative performance in the PNC cluster and especially in the marginal constituency cluster, where its campaign activity exceeds that of the PPP and was just slightly under that of the PNC.

More important are the specific details of the thrust of the electoral campaign reported by our rank and file sample. The local party activists of the PNC, were reported to have made proportionately more house calls in the constituencies in which its support was weakest, i.e., the strong PPP constituency, than they did in the constituencies in which their support was strongest. In the case of the PPP and the UF, the concentration of party activity was somewhat different. For the PPP most

TABLE 7.9

VOTERS PERCEPTION OF PARTY ACTIVITY BY CONSTITUENCY AND PARTY  
(In percentages)

	Strong PPP			Marginal			Strong PNC			TOTAL		
	PNC	PPP	UF	PNC	PPP	UF	PNC	PPP	UF	PNC	PPP	UF
Received a house call by	31	45	8	47	21	35	24	20	21	33	31	21
Received more than one house call by	11	13	7	24	10	14	8	8	14	12	12	11
Received letters, pamphlets, etc. from	30	18	7	42	33	26	39	11	12	37	21	16
Wore buttons & displayed stickers etc. for	15	17	2	23	4	4	48	2	6	29	7	3

of its house calls were reported in the stronghold constituencies and least of these calls in those constituencies weakly supporting it. In the case of the UF, all its campaign activities were reported to be highest in the marginal constituencies and lowest in the strong PPP constituencies. One notable feature was that while the PNC maintained a comparable pattern of the distribution of campaign literature in all the constituencies in our sample, like the PPP, it disseminated more letters, pamphlets and brochures in the marginal constituencies than in any of the other two types of constituencies. According to our survey many more people displayed stickers and wore buttons in support of the PNC than they did for the PPP and the UF. It is interesting to note that the last item on Table 7.10 required active participation in or display of electoral

propaganda. The first three items required a mere passive receipt of house calls and campaign literature. On the last item, the PNC scored highest among PNCites in strong PNC constituencies and not as high relatively in the strong PNC seats on the other three items.

If therefore campaign activity is assumed to affect voter decision-making, then the impact of local campaign activity on electoral mobilisation cannot be dismissed casually. Indeed the activity of house canvassing, of the distribution of party literature, stickers, buttons, shopping bags, plastic umbrellas is like the mass media. It acts as an advertisement for the partner which even in a minimal way is of some significance during the time span of the campaign, and influences the formulation of the voters' decision. We are not here suggesting rationality on the part of the voter to the extent that he would deliberately weigh the sales campaign of the parties<sup>12</sup>, nor are we suggesting that the campaign was a period during which the voter, relatively unencumbered by previous loyalties made an "independent" decision on the party options. Instead, we are suggesting, to the extent that the local party agents were instrumental in "activating" or "reinforcing" or "converting" support for their party, they made an impact on mobilising the electorate. Such

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<sup>12</sup> Paul E. Lazarsfeld, Barnard Berelson and Hazel Gaudet, The People's Choice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1948), makes rationality of voting decision the underlying premise of their study. In fact, the analysis in the same study refuted its original assumption, concluding that voting decision is not analogous to consumer decision-making. "Brand-name loyalty", socio-economic status and the campaign itself were ultimately combined to provide a synthetic determinant of voter-decision-making.

an impact is by no means diminished by the argument that campaign propaganda simply serves "to convince many voters of the correctness of their original decision."<sup>13</sup> The mere act of reinforcing loyalties is a factor of mobilisation. However, we will accept the argument that the most explicit function of mobilisation by the local party is its ability to convert individuals to a new value set or to a new set of loyalties, electorally evidenced by the switching of voting patterns.

We have already shown how party switching has occurred most from the PPP and UF to the PNC.<sup>14</sup> Although we cannot ascribe with any precision the relationship between switching and strength of local leadership, we hazard the opinion that it was significant. Testing of this hypothesis requires the use of the technique known as panel design so as to measure changes in electoral predisposition of people over a period of time. What is implicit in our analysis is that while race is the important determinant of voting behaviour among the Guyanese electorate, the role of the local party leadership and his local party organisation may be emerging as a critical factor in mobilising people at the polls. One caveat in the interpretations we have so far given is the possibility that the impact on the voter which we have attributed to local leadership activity may have been as much the effect as the cause of strong leadership. The political ethos prevailing in the respective

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<sup>13</sup> See Robert T. Golembiewski, William A. Welsh and William J. Crotty, A Methodological Primer for Political Scientists (New York: Rand McNally and Company, 1969), pp. 400-403.

<sup>14</sup> See Chapter 5, pp. 117-122.

communities at the time of the 1968 General Election may, for example, be one explanation of the differences in local party organisations and/or the strength of party identification. During the electoral campaign and even after, reports in the local and international media seemed generally more favourable to the PNC than the PPP. These reports may have contributed to changes in the objective conditions of the PPP supporters and to produce a state of mind in which they believe their party would be deprived of office. As a result of this factor, a schizoid perception of reality may be formed whereby first of all people develop an image of being on the winning side; second they develop the belief that they are entitled to be on the winning team; and thirdly, they despair of ever being on the winning team. The following selected responses by local PPP leaders are illustrations of a discrepancy between the desire to win and a recognition of the evil consequences of winning:

"I expect depression if the PPP came to power because the Americans and British would do to them exactly what they did to Cuba."

"I expect depression because 'might is right'. The external forces have ensured that we don't get into power. If by some miracle we manage to do this by electoral means (and we can do it if the elections were not rigged) the same external forces will do their best to embarrass us the way they did in 1962-64 when they planned, supported and encouraged the violent overthrow of our party."

"No matta wuh we duh we cork duck,"<sup>14</sup>

One writer's conception of dissonance may be used here to summarise the possible trajectory of attitudes and behavioural responses of people

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<sup>14</sup> These were typical responses of PPP supporters to the question: "Do you personally expect this country will enjoy a period of economic prosperity in the next 5 years?"

who find themselves in the same cognitive dilemma as the supporters of the PPP:

Dissonance is not comfortable and it produces pressures towards dissonance reduction. One means of reducing this dissonance is to alter the environment so that it produces the desired state of social protest or revolutionary behaviour.<sup>15</sup>

While we agree that revolutionary behaviour or social protest may be one effect of dissonance, our data suggest that dissonance reducing activity on the part of the PPP supporters may have taken the form of a relative withdrawal of attachment, not necessarily because of a switch of party allegiance per se, but because of a declining self-image of the political prospects of their party.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> James A. Gershwender, "Explorations in the theory of Social and Revolutionary movements," Social Forces, 47 (December 1968), p. 133.

<sup>16</sup> For an analysis of this, see above pp. 82-88.

## CHAPTER VIII

## CONCLUSIONS

It was very rewarding for me to be involved in almost all aspects of the field survey, assisting with interviews, acting as a guide or as a chauffeur for the interviewers, but more importantly, performing the role of participant observer. As a result, the conclusions which I am about to give go beyond the realms of mere inference from computer print-outs and official reports. The conclusions also reflect a certain subjectivity based primarily on my hope throughout this study that I would find some variable, other than race, as an important determining factor of how people see politics and of how they are willing to act.

What emerges from this study is that race is the most persistent factor determining how people vote in Guyana. The perceptions and party identifications of the Guyanese electors show distinct racial biases. These biases lead to the general conclusion that East Indians vote for the PPP, Africans for the PNC and the other minority groups for the UF. The political cleavages in the 1968 Election proved to be structurally opposed to those in the 1953 Election. In 1953, class not race appeared to be the major determinant of voting behaviour. Then, the PPP, under Burnham and Jagan, mobilised the support of the Afro-Indian working class.

Interestingly, this study shows that between the 1964 and 1968 Elections there was a net shift of party support to the PNC from the PPP and UF, respectively. The shift occurred among people of the

minority races, the Chinese, the mixed, the Portuguese and the Whites, who previously supported the UF; among the Muslims who supported the PPP; among the Hindus, a group most strongly identified with the PPP. Such shifts in party loyalty did not take place by mere chance. The data in Chapter 7 suggest that the PNC displayed greater strength of party organisation than either the PPP or the UF. Party organisation, then, provides another possible explanation of voting behaviour in the Guyanese electorate. We say "possible determinant" to imply the tentativeness with which this conclusion was made. To be more definite would have required a stronger statistical test (viz., multivariate or regression analysis) to measure more precisely the impact of party organisation on voting behaviour of Guyanese, compared with the impact of other factors such as religion, education, age and, most important, race.

The cognitive and affective aspects of public behaviour recorded in our interviews suggest that the objects toward which the electorate reacted -- the issues, the candidates, the parties, the leaders and their supporters -- were all contiguous and related. Perception requires evaluations as well as cognitions about objects, issues and personalities. We have shown (Tables 4.8-4.11) that some attitudes, for example, those relating to perception of group support are also directly related to historical and social responses outside the political order; that some attitudes, especially those toward the party leaders (Figures 4.1-4.3) are proximal to party identification. Throughout the study, identifications on the part of our respondents have been internalised and have become essential aspects of their perceptual pull as well as their perceptual push.

When these perceptions are translated into actual political behaviour, we see that a very high proportion of the Guyanese electorate has acquired the minimal level of involvement in politics. Many people attend party meetings at election time. Voting turnout is also extremely high. We have also shown that marginal political involvement as reflected in partisanship toward one or other of the political parties, is also high; very few respondents were non-partisans and less still were classified as floating voters or "switchers". An examination of partisanship by race (Table 5.4), shows that Afro-Guyanese, mixed and the middle minorities identify strongest with the PNC, while East Indians identify strongest with the PPP, and Amerindians with the UF. In terms of religion, (Table 5.5) people of all religious denominations except Hindus identified most with the PNC. There was little significance in the partisanship expressed as a function of age (Table 5.6), but most interesting was the nature of political activity in which non-identifiers were involved. An overwhelming majority of those who refused to identify with one or other political party, were members of trade Unions, had participated in demonstrations and protests, will fight to defend Guyana if required, but found the electoral process irrelevant and a Cuban type revolution as an alternative to the present system of Government. Finally, while most people were familiar with the issues prevalent in Guyana at the time of the elections, these issues were remotely connected with influencing their decision to vote.

In estimating the impact of party activity on voting behaviour, we were concerned with the specific aspects of the party's campaign that made contact with the electorate. Hence the

electorate's perception of these activities is also a factor in determining their effectiveness. Although our measures of awareness may not be fully persuasive in view of the lapse in time between the campaign activity of the parties and the interviewing of respondents, their value has not been destroyed since they are intended as indicators of the total impact of the local party activity. If a respondent could not recall a visit by a party worker or of having received campaign literature from the political parties, we assume that these activities would not have affected him significantly.

The data show how highly aware the Guyanese electorate is of party activity and this no doubt reveals a special feature of political life in Guyana. Guyanese see politics as a phenomenon that can protect or destroy their most cherished values. And to a growing extent elections are seen as a great crisis in the combat between good and evil. In Guyana, politics is not conceived of as a sporadically interesting spectator sport. Guyanese think of politics as something that affects their welfare; a situation quite unlike the experience of America and other European polities which is aptly summarised as follows

"They think of election day as they think of Sunday: a time to do one's civic duty as respectable people should and to reaffirm one's loyalty to the faith in which he was reared."<sup>1</sup>

In attempting to account for the highly mobilised state of Guyanese politics, it is very tempting to overstress race as the crucial

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<sup>1</sup> Hugh A. Bone and Austin Ranney, Politics and Voters (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1963), p. 21.

factor, while underestimating the importance of party organisation.

The local party organisation is something of a broker or a middleman between the central party organisation and the mass of people in the process of electoral mobilisation. What more than ever has increased the importance of the local party organisation is the system of proportional representation. When under the system of plurality voting, the candidate-orientation of the constituency was a key factor in electoral mobilisation, now, the candidate-syndrome is less important than the organisational-syndrome. It is the need to attract every single possible vote in all the constituencies which creates the necessity for a concentration on organisation. A political party if it is to gain the optimum number of votes cannot neglect its local party organisation even in those areas known to display antipathy towards it. For example, in the 1961 elections contested under the plurality system of voting, the PPP did not enter any candidates in four urban constituencies in which it had very little support; did not campaign in these constituencies hence received no votes from these 4 constituencies representing 60,000 electors (approximately), but yet won the elections by a wide majority of seats, 20 out of 35. This underscores the difference in organisational requirements of the party between elections contested under different premises. Under the system of proportional representation used in Guyana, parties are forced to take their campaign to the most marginal areas of their support if they seriously contemplate gaining state power. It is in the light of both the psychological factor of the prominence of local personalities and the formal requirements of

the electoral system, that we envisage the rise of "countervailing elites" in the form of local party activists.

Our emphasis on local party organisation in no way suggests insensitivity to the dominance of the central party activity. To the extent that our local party activists perform functions that can be considered input functions, they may not indeed relate critically to the decision-making function of the party. That local leaders perform administrative, internal, representational and public relations functions may not affect the general apparatus of the national party. In fact, insofar as the national party retains its monopoly over the dispensation of patronage, local party leaders may be functional merely as "face men" in the struggle to maintain a party in government or to put another in power. While we cannot conclude that strengthening the local party organisation holds the key toward the destruction of racial politics in Guyana, we believe that it would help to sharpen the political identification, if not political consciousness of the individuals at the 'grassroots'.

One important omission in this study is that no attempt was made to deal with the problem of political development in any detail. However, included in our analysis are measures of participation, integration and legitimacy, that are closely related to developmental goals and that have provided clues about the nature of developmental change in Guyana.

As a process, developmental change relates the transformation of the individual to the transformation of society itself. Certain

decisions of the individuals are crucial indicators of this process. Chief among these individual decisions are those dealing with (1) participation: what social and political movements must he join? How active must he become? (2) Integration: must he act politically in such a way that he is relating more to nationalist than to sectional goals? (3) Legitimacy: must he be prepared to support the authorities and the regime, even when his party is out of power? Does he feel any attachments to the norms, symbols and values of the regime even when he is opposed to the authorities?<sup>2</sup>

We saw that on the whole the Guyanese society is highly participant. People identify with various organisations even though in many cases, race and membership in social and political organisations were clearly associated. This, as we have shown, is as a result of the economic, the demographic and the social indicators which group people together on the basis of segmental values. Indeed these segmental patterns of group identification have resulted from time to time in group violence and have retarded the trend toward political integration in Guyana. Hence, when individuals make decisions about what organisations to join and how politically active they will become, they may be reacting to "expressive" and "structural" factors simultaneously. In

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<sup>2</sup> The notion of legitimacy could be more fully explored by asking questions about the intensity of support for, or, rejection of, the regime and its authorities experienced by different individuals and groups over a period of time. Hence, we could ask questions to probe the changes of support by certain individuals, whether on grounds of assessment of issues, personalities, class, race, etc.

the former, they are susceptible to the appeals of "heroes" and "doctors". In the latter, they are attracted to programmes for reform, to ideologies and to the nature of group organisation. It is therefore often very difficult to distinguish the real from the apparent reasons of group identification and of political participation.

However, what we discovered was, that given the highly participant political culture in Guyana, the more politically active an individual, the more politically efficacious he felt; the higher his educational attainment and the greater his political interest, the higher was his feeling of political efficacy. In classifying individuals as "activists" "identifiers", "sympathisers" and "dissenters" we saw among other things that dissenters manifested the highest tendencies toward alienation. But we notice also that, to a large extent, the differential in participant orientations of these four types of citizens was very small. The major factor distinguishing dissenters from the others was their total rejection of party affiliations.

Implicit in the notion of "national integration" is the role of racial violence and group alignment in shaping the tendencies toward or away from integration. We suggested that these tendencies are rooted in the historical process of the Guyanese society and are crucial to the understanding of the emergence of the modern phase of politics which was ushered in by the PPP in 1953. Very illustrative of the pattern of integration and group identification is our examination of the gross electoral data. Since the 1955 split in the PPP, the tendency is toward the persistence of a hard-core of support for the parties identified on

the basis of race. But a growing number of constituencies have fallen into the classification of being marginal and as a result, party competition in these constituencies is keen.

Nevertheless, insofar as individuals in the political system profess allegiance to the political authorities and the political regime, legitimacy may be seen to be maintained. In Guyana, legitimacy of party government is undermined somewhat by the structural relationship between social, religious and economic groupings and political parties. That Trade Unions, Cultural Associations and parties by and large consolidate the lines of racial cleavages; that in addition, groups feel discriminated against by the authorities on the basis of their race; that the administration and the military apparently manifest partisan loyalties -- these are all prejudicial to the notion of legitimacy as a function of political development.

Why, we may ask, has not the political system in Guyana disintegrated? Our study suggests three reasons:

- i that there has been a zone of voters willing to shift votes from party to party, cutting across the barriers of race
- ii that the system of political patronage is a vital form for attracting support to parties and party governments on a basis which may be wider than race
- iii that there are "political dissenters", a relatively small but vocal lobby, proponents of class as opposed to racial cleavages as the underpinning of political organisation.

While local party organisation is relatively important in mobilising voters and dispensing political patronage, a significant increase in the number of political dissenters may broaden the basis of politics in Guyana. Paradoxically, it is the individuals whose collective decisions help to shape the nature of political participation, integration and legitimacy; yet, once these tendencies have been institutionalised in the society they help to determine the possible political decisions that any individual can make. Once certain values are accepted by various socio-economic groupings and inculcated in the nature and trajectory of group demands, the individuals within these groups may find themselves responding rather than innovating.

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## APPENDIX I

We may learn much from all societies, from a single society ..... if unusual insight is combined with patient and prolonged study. A good researcher looks at the people then looks back at the books and then looks again at the people. (Robert Redfield)<sup>1</sup>

Field work in the Caribbean has, to date, not concentrated on the use of sophisticated data gathering techniques. The relatively small number of studies reflecting a behavioural persuasion has for the most part reiterated the experience of social science research in other developing areas notably Latin America, Asia and Africa.<sup>2</sup> This experience demonstrates that methodology-oriented research enterprise has the characteristic of a space probe in which considerable planning and expenditure on research projects are involved but a mere speck of dirt is realised from the planetary surface. In other words, what Kaplan calls the "honorific reference" to the deity, gives a certain hope of methodological fulfilment only to be replaced by speculation.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>See Redfield's introduction in Bronislaw Malinowski, Magic Science and Religion and Other Essays (Garden City, New York; Doubleday Anchor Books, 1955).

<sup>2</sup>Chief among these studies are Wendell Bell, Jamaican Leaders (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1964); Krishna Bahadoorsingh, Trinidad Electoral Politics: The Persistence of The Race Factor (London: Institute of Race Relations, Oxford University Press, 1968); Charles C. Moskos, The Sociology of Independence (Massachusetts: Schenkman Publ. Co., 1967); James A. Mau, Social Change and Images of the Future (Massachusetts: Schenkman Publ. Co., 1967).

<sup>3</sup>Abraham Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry (California: Chandler Publishing Co., 1964), p. 17.

The problem confronting the social scientist is the nebulosity and diffuseness of his subject which is often broadly conceived and, equally, broadly treated. One way of coping with unforeseen obstacles that arise in the collection of data is for the social scientists engaged in field work to provide research reports not only of their results but also of the methodological procedure and problems in the implementation of their studies. At minimum these reports could provide an understanding of the linkages between theory, methods and results as a guide to future research.

### SAMPLES IN THE STUDY

#### Rank and File

The major focus of our design is the study of the different party organizations, the different levels of leadership and the relationship of these to key dimensions of political mobilization and development. As a result, interviews were conducted with a cross-sectional sample of the electorate and with central and local party leaders of the PPP, PNC and the UF respectively.

While the universe of our study is the Guyanese political system, the basic geographical area used as our primary sampling unit is the registration district. For the purposes of general elections, Guyana is presently divided into 38 registration districts, more popularly known as constituencies. Our sample was therefore stratified by the criteria of demography and classified strength of the political parties in 38 registration districts. On this basis we evolved the following strata or grids:

	<u>PNC</u>	<u>PPP</u>	<u>Marginal</u>
Urban	1	-	1
Rural	1	2	1

From the six major strata thus identified we aimed at selecting one registration district from each, and these six were to have constituted our primary sampling points. However, the absence of an urban predominantly PPP stronghold provided the rationale for selecting an additional rural-PPP-stratum. Thus the stratified selection of our sample of registration districts finally included:

1. Skeldon
  2. Corentyne West Central
  3. New Amsterdam: urban, mixed, safe PNC
  4. Abary: rural, predominantly African, safe PNC
  5. Houston: urban, heterogeneous, marginal
  6. Suddie: rural, heterogeneous, marginal.
- } rural, predominantly Indian  
safe PPP

We should also point out that we had originally scheduled a seventh sampling grid to account for one of two hinterland, predominantly Amerindian registration districts, which since 1961 has displayed a strong partisanship towards the United Force. However, the chosen area, Rupununi, proved so enormous<sup>4</sup> and hazardous that our interviewers were forced to abandon the effort. Additionally, the reticence, high level of illiteracy and ignorance of the native peoples in this district demonstrated the futility of pursuing research by means of formal

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<sup>4</sup>For accounts of the Rupununi and the Amerindian peoples, see Everard F. im Thurn, Among the Indians of Guiana (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1967) and Colin Henfrey, Through Indian Eyes: A Journey Among the Tribes of Guiana (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964).

interview schedules.<sup>5</sup> Instead, we spent two weeks in the area talking to a cross section of the population including the District Commissioner, hotelier, police officers, army personnel, and civil servants, most of whom are temporarily resident in the area. However, our most vital sources of information were the relatively few missionaries, predominantly Roman Catholic, remaining in this area, the Tooshaws and the ordinary Amerindian. The Amerindian population in the Rupununi is divided into two main tribes, the Wapisiana Indians estimated at 3950 and the Mukusi population estimated at 2500. In all we spoke to 55 persons. We also spoke at length with the Commissioner and Secretary of Interior development.<sup>6</sup> The information provided by these respondents together with our observations of party alignment, leadership mobilization and the implications of these for political development in Guyana, is reported in Appendix IV of this study.

Our experience in the Rupununi underscores the importance of testing procedures for sampling in the field before accepting a particular sampling design. What may appear in the abstract to be a clear cut and rigorous plan can prove a nightmare to apply.

Two features of our rank and file sample of the electorate should be noted. First, we clustered the enumeration districts - the standard cluster contained three enumeration districts - in each

<sup>5</sup>Some reasonable approaches to sampling transient, precariously housed and reticent populations in cities and rural areas are proposed in Frank Bonilla, "Elites and Public Opinion in Areas of High Social Stratification," Public Opinion Quarterly, 3 (1958), pp. 349-359.

<sup>6</sup>The Commission of Interior Development was set up in January 1969 following the Rupununi uprising with a specific charge to promote projects to develop the area both in the economic and social welfare aspects.

of the six registration districts chosen in our sample. There are, on average, 21 enumeration districts in each registration district. Second, we randomly selected 2 clusters from each registration district as our final sampling unit. Given this sampling frame, the procedure for selecting respondents was by random selection from the electoral lists. These lists, up to date for the previous general elections of 1968, were the best available. They were not completely accurate as we subsequently discovered, but no feasible alternative was open to us without the expenditure of tremendous time and money. Block listings and house listings especially in the rural registration districts would be misleading because large numbers of residences have no address. Our experience suggests that the electoral rolls are a fairly reliable list of adults. A more serious problem is the mobility and transiency of the population, both rural and urban, which makes the discovery of the whereabouts of respondents often impossible.

We used standard procedures in selecting our sample respondents from the list, employing a random starting point and a specified interval determined by the number of adults on the given list. Because of the problem of transiency, we selected a random and an alternate second sample to provide us with enough interviews if the original sample mortality was too high. No substitutes could be selected by our interviewers. They were given the names and addresses of specific individuals and required to interview only those individuals. As many as five call-backs were made as well as special trips in some cases to registration and enumeration districts outside our sampling frame to find individual respondents.

Despite our careful and determined work, the completion rate fell below our expectations particularly in the rural districts.

The rates were as follows:

Rural 70 per cent  
Urban 86 per cent

The reasons for non-completion varied:

Percentages of all interviews which were not completed

<u>Reasons</u>	N = 75	N = 62	(Total 137)
	<u>Rural</u>	<u>Urban</u>	
Deceased; ill	8	9	
Moved, not traceable plus Working elsewhere or left country	54	45	
Not available	28	42	
Refusals	<u>10</u>	<u>4</u>	
	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	

The major problems were residential mobility and emigration. In the latter case a substantial number, 11 per cent in the rural sample and 23 per cent in the urban sample, were reported to have "left the country". In addition, the number of "refusals" would have been appreciably higher in the rural districts had we not spent considerable time with the village leaders, pandits and the head-teachers of the village schools whenever possible, explaining the purpose of our study and becoming familiar with village conditions. As a supplementary technique, we selected and deployed our interviewers, so that Indian interviewers worked in Indian districts and African interviewers in African districts. Interestingly, some people not included in our lists actually requested that they be interviewed, especially if they held some party or local government office. In fact, these non-sample interviews were invariably taken and proved informative.

#### PARTY LEADERS

Our sample of party leaders was administered in two distinct phases. In the first phase we concentrated on interviewing "primary"

party leaders, i.e. top party officials including the party leaders, chairmen, general secretaries, and members of parliament of the three major parties. In the second phase we interviewed local party leaders and activists from the areas coinciding with our rank and file sample.

#### Primary Party Activists

Interviews with top party officials were secured after the 1968 elections at intermittent periods between March 1969 and June 1970. Information by these leaders was gained partly from the use of a standardized questionnaire and partly by unstructured interviews, the combination of which yielded very rich and considerable detail. No attempt was made to randomise the sample of these primary party officials. We merely sought interviews with whoever was available and willing to co-operate. Our strategy for soliciting interviews included regular attendance at the sessions of the House of Assembly, frequent visits to the various party headquarters, telephone conversations, luncheons and attendance at functions given by various political parties.

As table 2 shows, of the 71 primary party activists contacted 50 returned the short questionnaires, 39 were interviewed in addition, and information from the remaining 15 was gained by personal interview.

Percentage Distribution of "Primary" Party  
Activists response by Party

	(N = 71)		
	<u>PNC</u>	<u>PPP</u>	<u>UF</u>
Returned questionnaire plus interviewed	81	60	76
Returned questionnaire only	10	16	18
Interviewed only	5	13	-
No response	4	11	6
<u>Total</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>
	(30)	(23)	(18)

The greatest source of resistance viz., "no response" among primary party activists was found among the PPP, a few members of which objected to our investigation of "sensitive areas of politics".<sup>7</sup> Notwithstanding this minor setback our contact with these party leaders provided exceptional information on the latent patterns of party leadership, organizational activity, inter- and intra- party conflicts; on the social and psychological profile of top party leaders; on the stresses of office; and on how this leadership corps perceived their respective roles in the political development of Guyana.

#### Local Party Activists

This phase of our study involved a sample of 106 local party leaders drawn from the same six geographical sample units as that of our cross-national sample. Local party leaders comprise known agents, organizers and activists in the six registration districts under review. In all, we interviewed 56 PNC, 28 PPP and 22 UF local leaders between February and September 1969. The number of local leaders interviewed was smaller than we had anticipated but not all registration districts had representatives from all three parties. Except for the PPP, we were given letters of identification from the party secretaries asking their respective local activists to co-operate with the study. Beside the activists officially designated as local leaders by the Central party, we selected for interview other secondary leaders who were

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<sup>7</sup>Originally the PPP executive objected to this kind of investigation into the structure of their party on the grounds that they were in the process of reorganising their party. Subsequently, however, we obtained co-operation from local leaders, in spite of the initial objection by the party headquarters.

recognised by the rank and file sample as key party agents in the respective districts. Responses to particular questions<sup>8</sup> by the rank and file on local party activists provided the reputational basis for selecting additional local party leaders.

As a rule, interviews with the secondary party leadership were of shorter duration than those with the top leaders but provided a valuable body of data for comparison with attitudes and perceptions of the top leadership on the one hand and the rank and file on the other. Time was willingly given for personal interviews which often lasted one hour and, in a few instances, over two hours. That only one local activist refused to give us an interview reflects the overwhelming success of our enterprise. Suffice it to say that the mass media in Guyana contributed in no small way to popularizing the study and of gaining for it widespread acceptance and tolerance, in spite of initial opposition from certain party officials.<sup>9</sup> This factor would be better appreciated in the light of the wide variety of party officials geographically dispersed which made this phase of the study the most difficult to execute. The interest in the project, shown by local, primary party leaders was considerable and was no doubt responsible for its successful completion. Although completion rates especially in our cross national sample were less than optimal we feel highly satisfied with our results. The sample selection process attempted to be as essentially sound and rigorous as possible as were the other field

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<sup>8</sup> See Questions 38-40, Appendix II.

<sup>9</sup> The author of this study appeared on two ten minute programmes on the national broadcasting service, Guyana Broadcasting Corporation. In addition, both national newspapers and one party newspaper, the United Force's Sun, gave coverage to the study, its aims, methods and benefits. The Government Information Service and the University of Guyana news bulletins were also useful in disseminating information about the study.

operations in this study. For the most part we adopted acceptable procedures of sampling theory, without great difficulty and without seriously compromising scientific requirements of investigation.

One problem which we surmised was the "reporting" error. In some cases there were obvious inaccuracies in the respondents' answers and in the way they were recorded by the interviewer. Another problem was the sampling error.<sup>10</sup> We discovered that the sample, for example, underestimated the number of Catholic Amerindians but this is explained by our decision to withdraw the Rupununi district from the formal analysis of this study. Although we recognize that clustering tends to increase sampling error, we felt that certain reductions in sampling error were achieved through the use of a stratified sample. One possible means of reducing sampling error was to increase the size of our sample, but the increment in cost for enhanced precision and confidence made us more amenable to our present, and more risky estimate. Having fixed our sample size at 1000 our main concern was to make the sample as representative as possible. More generally, there are problems involved in operationalising our field work which lead us to question many of the principles of survey methods and social investigation enumerated in social science text books.

One recurrent methodological maxim is the notion of "downward interviewing". Especially in the case of our "primary" party leaders,

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<sup>10</sup>For a detailed analysis of sampling error and for a general picture of the degree of variability that should be attached to sample estimates see, Herbert Hyman, Survey Design and Analysis (New York: John Wiley, 1965); and for formulas of sampling error under complex sample designs see David Butler and Donald Stokes, Political Change in Britain: Forces Shaping Electoral Choice (London: MacMillan and Co. Ltd., 1969), pp. 457-62.

there was no alternative but upward interviewing. The use of obscure, condescending and circuitous items as a gauge of individual attitudes is often resented by the more sophisticated and articulate respondent.<sup>11</sup> Direct questions in this respect were always the most rewarding as most respondents were willing to discuss topical and perceptual matters in a free, frank and critical way. Hence from the point of view of validity many of the scaled questions could have been reduced to single direct questions.

Another maxim is uniformity in the asking of questions and the recording of answers. Interviewers are expected to ask all the applicable questions; to ask them in the order given, and with no more elucidation and probing than is explicitly allowed, and to make no unauthorised variations in the wording. Our experience suggests that cultural differences among people often affect the permissible area of conversation and the willingness itself to converse. As a result, when, for example, an interviewer was confronted with a totally peasant or rural-type respondent, his ability to open conversation in the vernacular, even to phrase some questions in this way, was an asset to the establishment and the maintenance of rapport. In most cases in dealing with the less educated respondent the interviewer by using nicknames of local politicians, by changing the order of the interview and enquiring beforehand about the personality of the individual to be interviewed often enhanced the results and strategy of his interview.

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<sup>11</sup>The same experience was shared by Charles C. Moskos, The Sociology of Independence, Appendix I, when he interviewed leaders and elites in the West Indies. The procedure of "downward" interviewing is one where questions are so geared that to arrive at the required attitude of an individual, one uses several "leading questions", time consuming and often inconsequential except for the very illiterate.

Additionally, there is the problem of acquiring an adequate methodology for coping with the concept, 'change'. In discussing the potential of political development in Guyana, our study, like that of many other discrete studies concerned with this phenomenon, makes an implicit comparison with the politics of some other area. The utility of such comparison is unquestionable in so far as it draws on references to evidence on parallel phenomena already available for other areas. What is distressing is that in spite of cross-national comparability, meaningful results may be unobtainable unless the sample and scope of the investigation are expanded to cover a wider area and longer periods of time.<sup>12</sup> As one writer states "field research concerned with political change must become more intensive and extensive if it is to be more than a concern with hortatory and declaratory activity."<sup>13</sup>

Allied to this problem of studying social and political change is the one-shot survey operation. To study variation over time, or the variation in socio-cultural-political factors on the structuring of behaviour, attitudes, values and opinions, more use should be made of trend analysis.<sup>14</sup> By sampling a given population more than once

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<sup>12</sup>See Herbert Hyman, "Research Design" in Robert E. Ward, (ed.), Studying Politics Abroad (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1964), pp. 175-178. Here the author embarks on an interesting discussion of the role of various kinds of longitudinal studies in the analysis of political modernization.

<sup>13</sup>Henry L. Bretton, "Political Science Field Research in Africa," Comparative Politics, 64 (April, 1970), pp. 413-443. The International Social Science Council and the International Committee on Social Science Documentation both supported by UNESCO, have since 1962 organised several conferences on problems of data archiving in the Social Sciences. For full details see S. Rokkan, Data Archives for the Social Sciences (Paris: Mouton Inc., 1966); and 'Second Conference on Data Archives in the Social Sciences', Social Science Information, 4 (1965), pp. 67-84.

<sup>14</sup>Among the studies that have used this technique see David Butler and Donald Stokes, Political Change in Britain (London: McMillan and Co. Ltd., 1969).

over a given period, this survey technique not only permits the study of opinions, attitudes and movements over time but provides, also, a comparative basis for analysing changes within political systems. Especially in the Caribbean where comparative surveys in the social sciences are almost non-existent, trend analysis could help fill the gap.

In the wider area of our discipline there have been indications in recent years of greater interest in long-term analyses of processes of electoral change and in systematic studies of variations in sequences of change within given nations. The increasing interest in the development of data archives and in the use of electronic computers in processing historical information can be expected to accelerate the process of diachronic as well as synchronic analyses of political data. More importantly, the findings of such analyses can again be expected to have a profound impact on current conceptualization and theorizing in the field of comparative politics.

Another kind of impediment to field research is the political sensitivities of bureaucracies, leaders and members of the community. However, what is stated as the interest of some leaders is often in conflict with the interest of others in the same community. Hence as social scientists, we need to assert rather than abdicate our critical function of the profession in the light of these sensitivities. Instead of abject surrender, Bretton rightly favours dialogues between intellectuals and political leaders on research, its problems, purposes and functions.

Connected with the problem of political sensitivity is the dual role of the field researcher as theory-builder and data collector. There is very little that the field researcher in the Caribbean can take

for granted. He can often assume that others have collected little information pertinent to the questions he has set himself. In a very fundamental sense the student of a changing society can least afford to adhere to the pretensions of a "value-free label" of political science research. It is only by engaging himself in the dynamic processes of change that the researcher could hope to build his concepts consistent with reality. As Pye aptly states, "Any division of labour between theory-building and data gathering cannot go far, because each needs the disciplining effect of the other and neither has enough of an independent tradition to be even temporarily self contained."<sup>15</sup>

In presenting this study we are aware that empirical investigation of the interplay between political parties, political mobilization and political development, requires data beyond those we have highlighted. Indeed our observations and impressions of political activity in Guyana provided us with a kind of data, which are more normative, yet by no means unimportant to the overarching values which we bring to this study. In interviewing party leaders for example, we were personally impressed with some, unimpressed with others, but at all times we tried to suppress these prejudices to the best of our ability. However, the most pervasive biases were the ideological ones, those dealing with nationalism, black power and their relationship to the process of decolonization. We fully endorse the present policy of new

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<sup>15</sup>Lucien Pye, "The Developing Areas: Problems for Research" in Robert E. Ward, Studying Politics Abroad (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1964), p. 10.

nations to seek to control their own economies, to reduce ties of cultural imperialism imposed upon them by big nations and to forge closer international, geopolitical and cultural linkages with other black nations of the third world. However, given the peculiar pluralist nature of the Guyanese society whereby the African and Indian communities have inherited sectional values and sectional rivalry and suspicion, one finds it difficult to avert charges of partisanship whether one is an administrator, a politician, a mere citizen, or a scholar.

In conducting the field work for this study we have attempted to suppress partisanship values but have lived with the hope that in Guyana, the concept of the working-class struggle would eventually re-emerge, the way it did in 1953, and would loom larger and with greater cogency than the phenomenon of race.



5. ARE YOU PRESENTLY EMPLOYED (EXCEPT HOUSEWIFE)?

YES .... 10 -1      NO .... 2      REFUSAL .... 3

5a If no, how long is it since you last worked? .....11

6. EDUCATION: What is the highest class you reached in School?

1	NONE	....	12 -1
2	PRIMARY COMPLETE	....	2
3	PRIMARY INCOMPLETE	....	3
4	SECONDARY COMPLETE	....	4
5	SECONDARY INCOMPLETE	....	5
6	VOCATIONAL/TECHNICAL	....	6
7	HIGHER TECHNICAL	....	7
8	UNIVERSITY	....	8

7. RELIGION: What church do you belong to?

CATHOLIC	....	13 -1
PROTESTANT (Which Denomination)	....	2
HINDU	....	3
MUSLIM	....	4
OTHER	....	5

8. MARITAL STATUS: Are you single or married?

SINGLE	...	14 -1
MARRIED	...	2
OTHER	...	3

9. POLITICAL PARTICIPATION: Where did you get most of your news about the last Election: from the radio, newspaper, magazine, talking to people or from some other source:

Radio	....	15 -1
Newspaper	....	2
Magazine	....	3
Talking to people	....	4
Other (specify)	....	5
Don't know	....	6

10. If by talking to people, ask:

What sort of people did you talk to most?

Relatives	....	16 -1
Party workers	....	2
People at the work place ...		3
Close friends	....	4

11. Did you attend any political meetings?

Yes	....	17 -1	No	....	2
-----	------	-------	----	------	---

12. (a) If yes, ask:

Which party meetings you attended most?

GUMP	....	18 -1
PNC	....	2
PPP	....	3
UF	....	4

- (b) If yes, ask:

Which party meetings you did not attend at all?

GUMP	....	19 -1
PNC	....	2
PPP	....	3
UF	....	4

13. (a) In the 1968 Election, there were some important problems facing the country; which two of the problems were the most important to you personally in making up your mind how to vote?
- (b) which two seem to you to be least important compared with the others?

(Show CARD 1)

<u>Issues</u>	(a) most <u>important</u>	(b) least <u>important</u>
How to reduce unemployment	.... 20 -1	.... 21 -1
How to settle disputes between Trade Unions and Management	.... 2	.... 2
Cost of living	.... 3	.... 3
Whether there should be more or less control over big business	.... 4	.... 4
Changing the Electoral system	.... 5	.... 5
A National Insurance Plan	.... 6	.... 6
Don't know most important	.... 7	.... 7
Don't know least important	.... 8	.... 8

PARTY IDENTIFICATION

14. As things look now, which political Party do you think is best suited to govern this country?

GUMP .... 22 -1

PNC .... 2

PPP .... 3

UF .... 4

Don't know .... 5

Qualified answer (write  
in specific details 6

.....

(a) If a definite party choice, ask:

Right now how strongly do you feel about your choice  
(name Party)?

Very strongly	....	23 -1
Fairly strongly	....	2
Not strongly	....	3
Don't know	....	4

(b) If a party choice or a qualified answer to question 14, ask:

Did you personally do anything to help your party during  
the last Election?

Yes	....	24 -1	No	....	2
-----	------	-------	----	------	---

(c) If yes, ask:      What sort of things did you do?      25

.....

(d) If no party choice or no qualified answer, ask:

Well, even though you don't particularly care for any of  
the parties which one are you leaning towards now?  
(If prompting is required, ask: If there was an  
election tomorrow, for which party would you vote?)

GUMP	....	26 -1
PNC	....	2
PPP	....	3
UF	....	4
NONE	....	5
Don't Know ...		6

15. Do you remember for certain if you voted in the 1964 General  
Election (under the new system of proportional representation)?

Voted	....	27 -1
Did not vote	....	2
Too young to vote	....	3
Don't remember	....	4

(a) If voted, ask: Which party did you vote for?

GUMP	....	28 -1
GIF	....	2
PNC	....	3
PPP	....	4
UF	....	5
NLF	....	6

16. How about the 1961 Election (when the UF made its first appearance) did you vote then?

Voted	....	29 -1
Didn't vote	....	2
Too young to vote	....	3
Don't remember	....	4

(a) If voted, ask: For which party did you vote?

GNP	....	30 -1
PNC	....	2
PPP	....	3
UF	....	4
NLF	....	5

17. And what about the 1957 Election (the first Election after the constitution was suspended) did you vote?

Voted	....	31 -1
Didn't vote	....	2
Too young to vote	....	3
Don't remember	....	4

(a) If voted, ask: For which party did you vote?

PPP (Burnham)	....	32 -1
PPP (Jagan)	....	2
UDP (Carter)	....	3
Other (?)	....	4

PERCEPTION OF PARTY SUPPORT

18. Now back to the last Election, which party do you think the following types of people voted for?: (N.B. for each type repeat "Which party do you think the following types of people voted for)?

	<u>GUMP</u>	<u>PNC</u>	<u>PPP</u>	<u>UF</u>	<u>Don't know</u>	<u>Won't vote as a bloc</u>
Labourers	... 33 -1	... 2	... 3	... 4	... 5	... 6
Civil Servants	... 34 -1	... 2	... 3	... 4	... 5	... 6
Poor People	... 35 -1	... 2	... 3	... 4	... 5	... 6
Businessmen	... 36 -1	... 2	... 3	... 4	... 5	... 6
Catholics	... 37 -1	... 2	... 3	... 4	... 5	... 6
East Indians	... 38 -1	... 2	... 3	... 4	... 5	... 6
Teachers	... 39 -1	... 2	... 3	... 4	... 5	... 6
Negroes	... 40 -1	... 2	... 3	... 4	... 5	... 6
Rice Farmers	... 41 -1	... 2	... 3	... 4	... 5	... 6
Portuguese	... 42 -1	... 2	... 3	... 4	... 5	... 6

19. Here in this village (city or town) what clubs and organizations such as social, business or political, do you belong to?

If respondent does not state membership of a political party ask specifically:

Are you a member of a political party?

- (a) About how often do you attend meetings - would you say usually, only occasionally, or almost never?
- (b) Are you, or were you ever an office holder or Committee member?

MEETING ATTENDANCE

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>ALWAYS OR USUALLY</u>	<u>OCCASIONALLY</u>	<u>NEVER OR ALMOST NEVER</u>	<u>OFFICER OR COMMITTEE MEMBER</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____

BELONG TO NO ORGANIZATION

20. If a member of a political party, ask:

(a) Do you ever contribute money to the \_\_\_\_\_ Party?

Yes .... 45 -1      No .... 2

(b) Were you ever a member of any other political party?

Yes .... 46 -1      No .... 2

If yes, ask:

(c) Which party? \_\_\_\_\_ 47

(d) Why did you leave \_\_\_\_\_ party (c) to join  
\_\_\_\_\_ party (a)? \_\_\_\_\_ 48

#### PERCEPTION OF PARTY LEADERSHIP

21. Which of these words comes closest to describing the idea you have of:

- (a) Burnham
- (b) Jagan
- (c) D'Aguiar

Use as many words as you can think of to describe him.  
(Show CARD 2).

	(a) Burnham	(b) Jagan	(c) D'Aguiar
CONSERVATIVE	... 49 -1	... 50 -1	... 51 -
RADICAL	... 2	... 2	...
HONEST	... 3	... 3	...
"SO-SO"	... 4	... 4	...
CONFUSED	... 5	... 5	...
"SMARTMAN"	... 6	... 6	...
THRIFTY	... 7	... 7	...
RACIAL	... 8	... 8	...
COMMUNIST	... 9	... 9	...

ASSESSMENT OF LOCAL PARTY ORGANIZATION

22. During the Election campaign last year, did canvasers (or people) from any of the political parties come around trying to get you to vote for their party (PROBE FOR EACH PARTY IF NECESSARY - e.g. If respondent mentions a visit from the PNC and not the PPP canvasser, ask: Didn't the PPP or the UF come around to see you?)

	YES	NO
GUMP	... 52 -1	... 2
PNC	... 53 -1	... 2
PPP	... 54 -1	... 2
UF	... 55 -1	... 2

23. Please try and remember how many times you were visited by the Canvasser (or people) from these parties: once, twice, three times, not at all?

	NONE	ONCE	TWO	THREE	FOUR
GUMP	... 56 -0	... 1	... 2	... 3	... 4
PNC	... 57 -0	... 1	... 2	... 3	... 4
PPP	... 58 -0	... 1	... 2	... 3	... 4
UF	... 59 -0	... 1	... 2	... 3	... 4

24. Did you receive any letter, pamphlets or other Campaign material from any of these parties?

	YES	NO
GUMP	... 60 -1	... 2
PNC	... 61 -1	... 2
PPP	... 62 -1	... 2
UF	... 63 -1	... 2

25. During the campaign did you wear party buttons or display party stickers or posters for any of the political parties? Which one?

	YES	NO
GUMP	... 64 -1	... 2
PNC	... 65 -1	... 2
PPP	... 66 -1	... 2
UF	... 67 -1	... 2

PERCEPTIONS ON GUYANA'S FUTURE

26. Some people say that the major problem in Guyana is the race situation; others say that the major problem is to get more money to invest in building roads, schools, houses and so on, but still others say the most important of all is our border dispute with Venezuela and Surinam. Can you think of any pressing problems facing this country at present?

YES .... 68 -1      No .... 2

If yes, ask:

(a) What are these problems? ..... 69

(b) Which party do you think can best solve these problems (i.e. the race question, getting more money, the border dispute etc.)?

GUMP	.... 70 -1
PNC	.... 2
PPP	.... 3
UF	.... 4
NONE	.... 5
DON'T KNOW	.... 6

27. Do you personally expect that this country will enjoy a period of economic prosperity in the next five years or so, i.e. that there will be more money and jobs available for the people? Do you expect money to be scarce and unemployment to increase?

Expects prosperity .... 71 -1

Expects depression .... 2

Depends (on what) ..... 3

Don't know .... 4

28. Do you personally expect that this country will be faced with racial troubles in the next five years or so, or do you think there is a good chance of avoiding this?

Expects violence	....	72 -1
Doesn't expect violence	....	2
Depends (on what) .....		3
Don't know	....	4

Here are some people's opinion on certain developments in Guyana. Kindly state how strongly you agree or disagree with each of these.

29. A national insurance scheme is a waste of time.

<u>sa</u>	<u>a</u>	<u>cd</u>	<u>d</u>	<u>sd</u>
73 -1	2	3	4	5

30. The people in the Rupununi should be allowed to form a separate state.

<u>sa</u>	<u>a</u>	<u>cd</u>	<u>d</u>	<u>sd</u>
74 -1	2	3	4	5

31. Guyanese living abroad should not be permitted to vote in the Elections.

<u>sa</u>	<u>a</u>	<u>cd</u>	<u>d</u>	<u>sd</u>
75 -1	2	3	4	5

32. Guyana should not have joined CARIFTA

<u>sa</u>	<u>a</u>	<u>cd</u>	<u>d</u>	<u>sd</u>
76 -1	2	3	4	5

33. Divide Guyana into three sections: one for East Indians, one for negroes and one for the rest of the population.

<u>sa</u>	<u>a</u>	<u>cd</u>	<u>d</u>	<u>sd</u>
77 -1	2	3	4	5

## (Punch CARD No. 2)

Before asking questions 34 - 35, ask: Are your parents alive?

Mother: Living ..... Dead ..... Don't know .....

Father: Living ..... Dead ..... Don't know .....

Other: (specify) \_\_\_\_\_

PARENTS VOTING PREFERENCE

34. Do you know if your mother ever voted at an Election in Guyana?

Voted ..... 58 -1

Never voted ..... 2

Don't know ..... 3

If yes, ask:

34a. Which party does/did she normally vote for?

PRESENT PARTIES:

GUMP ..... 59 -1

PNC ..... 2

PPP ..... 3

UF ..... 4

FORMER PARTIES:

OLD PPP (1953) ..... 5

UDP (John Carter) ..... 6

NDP } ..... 7  
NLF }

PEPP } ..... 8  
JP }

Other, specify ..... 9

35. Do you know if your father ever voted at an Election in Guyana?

Voted	....	60 -1
Never voted	....	2
Don't know	....	3

If yes, ask:

35a. Do you know which party your father normally votes/voted for?

PRESENT PARTIES:

GUMP	....	61 -1
PNC	....	2
PPP	....	3
UF	....	4

FORMER PARTIES:

PPP (1953)	....	5
UDP (John Carter)	....	6
NDP }	....	7
NLF }		
PEPP }	....	8
JP }		
Other, (specify)	....	9

36. Do any of your closest friends disagree with your political views?

YES	...	....	62 -1
No	...	....	2
DON'T KNOW	....		3

37. If yes, ask: Would you say most of your closest friends disagree with you, some of them, or only a few?
- |            |      |       |
|------------|------|-------|
| MOST       | .... | 63 -1 |
| SOME       | .... | 2     |
| ONLY FEW   | .... | 3     |
| DON'T KNOW | .... | 4     |
38. Do you know anyone personally who is an active member or worker of the Peoples' National Congress in \_\_\_\_\_ (name district)
- |     |      |       |    |      |   |
|-----|------|-------|----|------|---|
| YES | .... | 64 -1 | NO | .... | 2 |
|-----|------|-------|----|------|---|
- (a) If yes, ask: Who is that? (relation to respondent).  
..... 65
- (b) If yes, ask: What does he (or she) do for the Party?  
..... 66
39. Do you know of anybody personally who is an active member or worker for the Peoples' Progressive Party?
- |     |      |       |    |      |       |
|-----|------|-------|----|------|-------|
| YES | .... | 67 -1 | NO | .... | 67 -2 |
|-----|------|-------|----|------|-------|
- If yes, ask: Who is that? (relation to respondent)  
..... 68
- If yes, ask: What does he (or she) do for the Party?  
..... 69
40. Finally, do you know anyone personally who is an active member or worker of the United Force?
- |     |      |       |    |      |   |
|-----|------|-------|----|------|---|
| YES | .... | 70 -1 | No | .... | 2 |
|-----|------|-------|----|------|---|
- If yes, ask: Who is that? (relation to respondent)  
..... 71
- If yes, ask: What does he (or she) do for the Party?  
..... 72

SENSE OF CITIZEN DUTY

Would you kindly give your opinion on the following: i.e. I would like you to state if you strongly agree, agree, can't decide, disagree, or strongly disagree -

	<u>sa</u>	<u>a</u>	<u>cd</u>	<u>d</u>	<u>sd</u>	
41. It isn't so important to vote when you know your party doesn't have a chance to win.	1	2	3	4	5	73-
42. A good many Elections aren't important enough to bother with.	1	2	3	4	5	74-
43. So many people vote in the national Election that it doesn't matter much to me whether I vote or not.	1	2	3	4	5	75-
44. If a person doesn't care how an Election comes out, he shouldn't vote in it	1	2	3	4	5	76-

SENSE OF POLITICAL EFFICACY

45. I don't think that Ministers of the Government care much what people like me think	1	2	3	4	5	77-
46. Voting is the only way people like me have any say about how the government runs things.	1	2	3	4	5	78-
47. People like me don't have any say about what the government does.	1	2	3	4	5	79-
48. Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what is going on	1	2	3	4	5	80-

APPENDIX IIIGROUP LEADER INTERVIEW SCHEDULEGUYANA 1969

## SCHEDULE OF QUESTIONS

PARTY GROUP	CONSTITUENCY	ELECTORAL DISTRICT	DATE OF INTERVIEW AND NO. OF VISITS
.....	.....	.....	1. ....
			1. ....
			2.to.4.....

1. Let's start with some questions about your background in politics. What was the first campaign in which you were a party worker? ..... 5-1

If not last campaign, ask:

- 1a. Have you worked for this party continuously since then?

1. Yes .... 6-1      2. No ..... 2

If no, ask:

- 1b. Between what years were you not working for this party?

..... to ..... 7 -1

- 1c. Did you work for another party?

1. Yes .... 8 -1      2. No ..... 2

If yes, to 1c, ask:

- 1d. Which Party? ..... 9-

2. What first led you to become active as a party worker?

..... 10-

If not clear, ask: How was it you became active at that

time? ..... 11-

3. Before you got into party work, how did you first develop an interest in political matters?

..... 12-

4. We have found that party organisations in the different districts vary quite a bit. In this village (town) what is the next party organisational level between your group and the party headquarters in Georgetown? (If prompting or clarification is required ask: e.g. is there a Constituency group or a County group?)

..... 13-

5. Here is a list of different party positions (SHOW CARD 1). Which of these do you now hold?

NONE .... 14 -0      SOME (RECORD BELOW) .... -1

<u>CARD 1</u>	<u>If now Holds</u>	<u>If previously Held</u>
a. Delegate to party convention	.....15-1	..... a - 2
b. Party official of local group	..... 16-1	..... b - 2
c. Member of Party's Central executive	..... 17 -1	..... c - 2
d. Member of Village (or town) Council	..... 18-1	..... d - 2
e. Others: Official in youth organisation or club attached to party	..... 19-1	..... e - 2

SPECIFIC POSITIONS ..... 20

- 5a. Which of these have you previously held?

NONE .... 21-0      SOME (Record above) ..... -1

#### ADMINISTRATIVE LEADERSHIP

6. Some party groups keep records or files on people in their districts to aid campaign activities. Did you have such records for the last campaign?

1. Yes .... 22-1      2. No .... -2

If yes, ask:

- 6a. In these records did you have information about all the people in your district who supported your party .... about most of these people.... or about a few of your party's supporters in this district?

1. All .... 23-1      2. Most .... -2      3. A few .... -3

6b. From your records could you tell who was registered and who wasn't?

1. Yes .... 24 -1      2. No.... -2

6c. Did you use these records on election day?

1. Yes .... 25 -1      2. No.,,, -2

If yes, ask: How then did you use them? ..... 26-

### INTERNAL LEADERSHIP

7. What helpers did you have during the last campaign?  
(GET NUMBER AND ROLE, e.g. 1 sister, 3 neighbours, 2 nurses).

If any helpers, ask:

7a. How many of these people helped you right through the campaign? (Get number) ..... 27-8

7b. Were all these helpers from your own group or did you share workers from other groups, or were none of your workers from your own group?

1. own .... 29-1      2. share ... -2      3. none ... -3

7c. About how many meetings you had during the campaign with just the workers from your own district?  
(Get number) ..... 30-

7d. Were there other ways in which you directed the activities of your own workers?

1. Yes ... 31-1      2. No ... -2

If yes, ask:

7e. What were they? ..... 32-

If shared workers, ask:

7f. You mentioned that you shared workers with other districts. How was the work of these people directed? i.e. with regular meetings, phone calls or what?

..... 33-

REPRESENTATIVE LEADERSHIP

8. In your opinion, was there a fairly clear plan for your party in this district about the type of activity to be followed?

Yes .... 34-1                      No .... -2

If yes, ask:

- 8a. How were you informed about this plan? ..... 35-

If no, ask:

- 8b. Did you ever have meetings of Group leaders of your party to discuss election strategy?

Yes .... 36-1                      No .... -2

If yes to 8b ask:

- 8c. Where did these meetings usually take place?  
e.g. at your house, at a party office, at a friends home?  
..... - 37

9. During the last campaign, about how many meetings of group leaders were there in this constituency? (Get Number) ..... 38
10. About how many of these did you actually attend?  
(Get number) ..... 39-
11. At these meetings, who was normally the Chairman?  
(Get name) Interviewee ..... 40-1  
Other ..... -2  
No Chairman ..... -0

EXTERNAL LEADERSHIP

12. Are there any party activities that go on in your district between elections such as dances, outings, political rallies, and so forth?

Yes .... 41-1                      No .... -2

If yes, ask:

- 12a. What are they? ..... 42-

- 12b. What part have you taken in these activities? ..... 43-

13. Here in this village (city or town), what clubs and organisations such as social, business or political, do you belong to?

.....

- (a) About how often do you attend meetings? Would you say usually, only occasionally, or almost never?
- (b) Are you or were you an office holder or committee member?

<u>ORGANISATION</u>	<u>ALWAYS OR USUALLY</u>	<u>MEETING ATTENDANCE</u>		<u>OFFICER OR COMMITTEE MEMBER</u>
		<u>OCCASION- ALLY</u>	<u>NEVER OR ALMOST NEVER</u>	
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____

BELONG TO NO ORGANISATION ..... 44-45

#### STRENGTH OF MOTIVATION

14. Do you think that officials of district party groups should have more say than they do in running the party; that they have sufficient say, or should they have less.

Should have more say ,..... 46 -1

Have sufficient say ..... -2

Should have less say ..... -3

15. If you were re-elected, do you think that you'll continue in your job as district party leader?

Yes ..... 47 -1

No ..... -2

Don't know ..... -3

Depends (on what) ..... -4

If no, ask:

- 15a. Do you have any particular reason for not wanting to continue? ..... 48-

16. Suppose you were nominated to some position in the Central party Executive, would you accept it?
- |                   |       |      |
|-------------------|-------|------|
| Yes               | ..... | 49-1 |
| No                | ..... | -2   |
| Don't know        | ..... | -3   |
| Depends (on what) | ..... | -4   |
17. What position within the Central Executive do you think you're best suited to have?
- |                |                   |       |      |
|----------------|-------------------|-------|------|
| (Get position) | PARTY CHAIRMAN    | ..... | 50-1 |
|                | GENERAL SECRETARY | ..... | -2   |
|                | COMMITTEE MEMBER  | ..... | -3   |
|                | OTHER             | ..... | -4   |
- PERCEPTION OF PARTY'S ROLE
18. Would you say that there are important differences between your party and the ..... party?
- |          |      |         |    |
|----------|------|---------|----|
| Yes .... | 51-1 | No..... | -2 |
|----------|------|---------|----|
- If yes, ask:
- 18a. What are the major differences you see? ..... 52
19. And would you say that there are major differences between your party and the ..... party?
- |           |      |         |    |
|-----------|------|---------|----|
| Yes ..... | 53-1 | No..... | -2 |
|-----------|------|---------|----|
- If yes,ask:
- 19a. What are ;the major differences you see? ..... 54
20. What do you particularly like about your own party?.....55
21. What, if anything, do you dislike about your own party?
- ..... 56
22. What, if anything, do you like about the opposition parties?
- ..... 57-58
- Other ..... 59

POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE

23. In your opinion what was the most important issue in the last campaign? ..... 60-61
24. What was your party's stand on CARIFTA? ..... 62
25. What do you think about the proposed National Insurance Act? .....63
26. Some people think that the overseas registration should not be allowed. Do you support this view? ..... 64
27. If you were giving advice to the Government what solutions would you propose for the Rupununi? ..... 65
28. Esu Kayama (the former Sidney King) once suggested partitioning the country. What do you think about this idea? ..... 66
29. What in your opinion is the major problem that the Guyana Government must try to solve immediately? ..... 67-
30. Do you personally expect that this country will enjoy a period of economic prosperity in the next five years or so, i.e. that there will be more money and jobs available for the people? Or do you expect money to be scarce and unemployment to increase?
- |                    |       |      |
|--------------------|-------|------|
| Expects prosperity | ..... | 68-1 |
| Expects depression | ..... | -2   |
| Depends (on what)  | ..... | -3   |
| Don't know         | ..... | -4   |
31. Do you personally think that this country will be faced with racial troubles in the next five years or so, or do you think there is a good chance of avoiding it?
- |                         |       |      |
|-------------------------|-------|------|
| Expects violence        | ..... | 69-1 |
| Doesn't expect violence | ....  | -2   |
| Depends (on what)       | ..... | -3   |
| Don't know              | ..... | -4   |

BIOGRAPHICAL

SEX: Male ..... 70-1      Female ..... -2

RACE: Amerindian ..... 71-1      Portuguese ..... -5  
 Chinese ..... -2      White ..... -6  
 East Indian ..... -3      Mixed ..... -7  
 Negro ..... -4

AGE: Under 25 ..... 72-1      46-55 ..... -4  
 26-35 ..... -2      56-65 ..... -5  
 36-45 ..... -3      Over 65 ..... -6

USUAL OCCUPATION

If housewife note occupation of the breadwinner ..... 73-

Father's occupation ..... 74

Mother's occupation ..... 75

PRESENTLY EMPLOYED (EXCEPT HOUSEWIFE)?

Yes .... 76-1      No.... -2      Refusal .... -9

EDUCATION

None ..... 77-1      Secondary Incomplete..-5  
 Primary Complete .... -2      Vocational/Technical..-6  
 Primary Incomplete... -3      Higher Technical .... -7  
 Secondary Complete .. -4      University ..... -8

RELIGION

Which Church do you Belong to?

Catholic .... 78-1      Protestant (which denomination ... -2  
 Hindu ..... -3      Muslim .... -4      Other ..... -5  
 Agnostic .... -6

MARITAL STATUS

Single ..... 79-1      Married .... -2      Other ..... -3

## APPENDIX IV

## AMERINDIANS AND THE RUPUNUNI DISTRICT

The Rupununi District consists of that part of Guyana, which lies south of the 5th degree of north latitude. It is bounded on its eastern side by Surinam and on its southern and western sides by the state of Para and the Federal Territory of the Rio Branco in Brazil. The district has an area of 40,772 square miles, which is about 45 per cent of the total area of Guyana. Its population of 9,000 (approximately) is only 1.4 per cent of the total population of Guyana, made up to a large extent of Amerindians, a handful of Europeans, mostly ranchers and settlers and a sprinkling of creole migrants who are either miners or workers of forest products, or public servants, police and military personnel.

This district takes its name from the Rupununi River which flows through it. The inhabitants of the area are mainly descendants of the indigenous people of the country and may be classified in five tribes, Wai-Wais, Wapisianas, Makusis, Patamonas and Arecunas. Of these the Wai-Wais are represented by two small villages of about 150 inhabitants, while the Wapisianas, Makusis and Patamonas are still relatively strong numbering approximately 1800, 1600 and 450 respectively.

When the English took over the colony of Guyana from the Dutch, they evinced interest in the hinterland and its Amerindians. In 1813 Colonel Codd, acting for Governor Murray, advocated the development of the Indians under missionary guidance as practised in Venezuela and Brazil, where the missions had instructed them in such crafts as carpentry, leather tanning, masonry etc. William Hilhouse however, who

was appointed Quartermaster General of Indians in 1823, when the post was first introduced, condemned the British policy with regard to the Indians saying that "the Government was transforming Indians into pauperized pensioners." Little attempt was made to improve communications between the coastlands and the Rupununi savannahs, and official policy for the Amerindians was merely in the form of benevolence and charity rather than in the form of sponsoring viable communities of indigenous folk.

To a large extent the missions performed a modernizing function among the Amerindians. The first mission is said to have come into operation in 1834, when Rev. Mr. Youd, an Anglican priest established a mission at Waraputa on the lower Essequibo river. In 1893 interest in the Rupununi grew under the influence of Bishop Swaby and by 1909 over six Anglican churches had been established in the district. While the Anglicans continued to be influential, their missions were for the most part located along the Rupununi River from the Kanuka Mountains north, to Annai. The Catholics concentrated their missions in the south savannahs or Wapisiana country, as well as the Ireng area.

The missions became the centre of the social life of the Amerindians. They provided education, recreation and religion. They provided too the most fundamental contact of the Amerindians with the culture and values of the rest of the society. That most of the priests on these missions were white, may also have had important implications for the pattern of political allegiances that emerged, subsequently. More recently, since the Rupununi uprising in January 1969, white priests are no longer to be found in the area. This is a direct result of government policy to avert any further conspiracy against its legitimacy in the area. Not only have the white priests and missionaries

been associated with the rebels in the January 1969 revolt, but they have also been accused of gross misunderstanding of the social and economic significance of the Indians' various customs which they suppressed indiscriminately. One of the most trenchant criticisms of the church in the Amerindian settlements was written as early as 1896 by a passing traveller who said: "As far as my observations lead me, the only benefit the Indian has yet derived from the effort to Christianize him is that he has learnt to steal, indulge in strong drink and wear ill-fitting clothes."<sup>1</sup>

But before the intervention of the white man and Christianity, the Indian social system revolved around the authority of the father of the family, of the peaiman and of the headman of the settlement. Each family, whether living apart or in a settlement is ruled over by the father, whose authority is great. As long as he lives, or at least while he is strong and active, his wives, his daughters and their husbands and his sons until they marry and thus pass from their own family under the rule of a new house-father, are almost completely under his sway. Thus, wherever one family lives by itself the sole authority rests with the father. But the father of each, while retaining his authority over his own family, is to some extent under the authority - that is, under the fear and influence - of the peaiman, and, where several families live in one place, he is also under the authority of the headman of the settlement. The authority of the peaiman, depends on the power which the man is supposed to exercise over spirits of all kinds and, as all diseases are supposed to be the work of spirits, over diseases, and, yet further, consequently over the bodies of his fellows. The headman,

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<sup>1</sup>C.A. Lloyd, "On the Potaro," Timehri (Georgetown: R.A.C.S., 1896).

on the other hand, is generally the most successful hunter, who, without having any formal authority, yet because he organises the fishing and hunting parties, obtains a certain amount of deference from the other men of the village. He settles all disputes within the settlement, and in the not distant days when Indians were in the habit of waging war, the one on the other, he used, according to Richard Schomburgk, to determine the commencement of hostilities. His orders to any of the men of his settlement to go anywhere or to do anything are implicitly obeyed. And after a successful hunting or fishing excursion, he always receives a larger share than the others, of the booty.

On this original Indian system, a new system was imposed by the colonial government. In each of certain very vaguely defined districts, one Indian of each tribe was officially recognised as "captain" of all Indians of his own tribe living in that district. He who would be captain or chief of a district, if his influence was sufficient to persuade a number of his tribe to support his claim, travelled to Georgetown and appeared before the Governor. If it seemed the wish of the majority of the Indians concerned, he was nominally made captain of the Indians of his district, invariably he was, comically enough, commissioned to be 'rural constable'.

Up to 1964, the Government's slender policies were reflected in the fact that Indian affairs were only the part-time concern of the Commissioner for Lands and Mines. Very little was done to implement the recommendations of the Peberdy report.<sup>2</sup> The proposals included a new administrative system based on local superintendents with Indian

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<sup>2</sup>P.S. Peberdy, Report on a Survey of Amerindian Affairs in the Remote Interior of British Guiana (Guyana: Government, 1948).

assistants, village councils and a central tribal committee. All 'undesirable religious bodies' which impose harmful religious taboos should be excluded from Indian districts. Peberdy additionally advocated three large Indian districts in the North West, the Mazaruni and the Rupununi, a cooperative framework for the production of timber, balata, mineral products and for the rearing of cattle. His major contention was that a new system of land tenure must be introduced to destroy the monopoly of the Rupununi Development Corporation (run by a few businessmen and Booker Bros.) and private ranchers.

Since 1967, under the D'Aguiar-Burnham coalition, many aspects of the Peberdy report were considered. In 1969 (March), the government set up a Department of Interior Development with special responsibility for Amerindian Affairs. The preliminary document put out by this department suggests that it has been greatly influenced by the Peberdy report.<sup>3</sup>

Mainly because of a series of socializing factors by which creolized Guyanese have been identified with an exploiting sector of the community, the Indians maintain their suspicion of other Guyanese. It is therefore not surprising that the ability of the United Force to coopt Amerindians into their party in 1961 was a major reason for their success. The growing support in Amerindian areas for the PNC is most likely accounted for by its vigorous efforts to attract Amerindians into its apparatus. In addition the PNC is using its monopoly of state power to dispense patronage to the Amerindians in a way that appeals to them. In 1968 the PNC introduced an Annual Convention of Amerindian

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<sup>3</sup>British Guiana, Confidential Report of the Commissioner of Interior Development (Guyana: Georgetown, Sept. 1969).

Captains at which policy is discussed. The government also increased the stipend to these Captains from \$25.00 (Guy.) to \$150.00 (Guy.). We discovered that as a result most Captains saw themselves as employees of the Government and therefore morally bound to support the Government. Given the authority of the Captains over their Indian colleagues, it is quite conceivable that the strength of the PNC's support in these areas is likely to grow. Especially when along with this policy is one of minimizing the influence of the missionaries most of whom, loyal to the UF prior to the January '69 revolt, have since been expelled.

Most ascendant in the government's proposals for this area is increasing the level of the cooperative structure. Hence farming and mining and ranching have all been facilitated. The major setback however is the influx of Afro-Guyanese into the area. This is viewed with great suspicion by the natives who see these intruders as threats to their own traditional society. Sometimes too, the unscrupulous behaviour of Government personnel, who continue to exploit the natives both in terms of their resources and their women, tarnish the image of government's policy directed towards uplifting the morale of the Indians.

In terms of party organisation, there is very little incentive to maintain other than a face to face relationship. Perhaps the tactical policy is one which capitalizes on the prebendary relationships and authority which pervade the traditional structure of the Indian family and his community. Attachment of the Captains to a party is partly indicative of the incipient support of that party from the district.

## APPENDIX V

## EXPLANATION OF SOME SCALES USED IN THIS STUDY

L. THREE DIMENSIONAL IMAGE SCALE OF PARTY LEADERS<sup>1</sup>

The following dimensions were used to group respondents' descriptions of party leaders.

A	B	C
honest	conservative	confused
"smartman"	radical	racial
thrifty	"so-so"	communist

Image rating resulting from respondents' descriptions were as follows

A    )  
 AB    ) - favourable  
  
 B    )  
 ABC    ) - moderate  
 AC    )  
  
 BC    )  
 C    ) - unfavourable.

2. CAMPAIGN ACTIVITY INDEX<sup>2</sup>

1. Helped to organise/plan campaign whether as official/non official of the party.
2. Member of a party - paying dues/attending party meetings.

<sup>1</sup>See above pp. 93-94

<sup>2</sup>See pp. 137-138

3. Not a formal member of any party but made contributions to the campaign either financially or otherwise/vote regularly for a particular party.
4. Not a formal member of any political party, normally, neither contributes to the campaign nor votes regularly for any party but showed a "leaning" toward a particular party during the 1968 campaign.
5. Did not even show "leanings" toward any party during the 1968 campaign

### 3. POLITICAL EFFICACY SCALE<sup>3</sup>

Respondents given a score on each item as indicated in Questions 45-48 Appendix 2, page 218. Scale Score as follows:

- Under 9 - low level of citizenship duty
- 10-14 - moderate level of citizenship duty
- Over 14 - high level of citizenship duty

### 4. SENSE OF CITIZENSHIP DUTY SCALE<sup>4</sup>

Same principle as Political Efficacy Scale.

### 5. ANOMIE SCALE<sup>5</sup>

Two each of the following questions which make up the scale are derived from the Political Efficacy Scale and the Sense of Citizenship Duty Scale respectively.

1. People like me don't have any say about how the government runs things.
2. I don't think ministers of the Government care much what people like me think.
3. A good many elections aren't important enough to bother with.
4. So many people vote in the national elections that it doesn't matter much

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<sup>3</sup>See pp. 139-141.

<sup>4</sup>See pp. 142-144.

<sup>5</sup>See pp. 144-147.

## APPENDIX VI

## SELECTED DEMOGRAPHIC DATA

TABLE VI      RACIAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE POPULATION OF GUYANA ACCORDING TO THE CENSUS 1891-1970

Year	Amer- Indian	Chinese	East Indian	Mixed	Negro	Portuguese	White	Other	TOTAL
1891	-	3,714	105,463	29,029	115,588	12,166	4,558	374	270,892
1921	9,150	2,722	124,938	30,589	117,169	9,175	3,291	659	297,693
1946	16,322	3,567	163,434	37,685	143,385	8,543	2,480	285	375,701
1960	25,453	4,074	267,790	67,191	183,950	8,346	3,217	302	560,323
1970	32,794	4,678	377,256	84,077	227,091	9,668	4,056	576	740,196

Sources:    International Commission of Jurists, Memorandum presented by the Govt. of British Guiana (Part II DEMOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS) Prepared by G.W. Roberts and J. Byrne, July 1965.  
               Census Bulletin No. 1, Population Census, 1960. Series D, British Guiana, (Port of Spain, Population Census Division, 1963).  
               Guyana: Preliminary Population Report, (Georgetown: Ministry of Information) June 1970.

TABLE VI

PERCENTAGE COMPOSITION OF POPULATION BY RACE

Year	Indian	Chinese	Indian	Mixed	Negro	Portu- guese	White	Other	TOTAL
1891	-	1.4	38.9	10.7	42.7	4.5	1.7	0.1	100.0
1921	3.1	0.9	42.0	10.3	39.4	3.1	1.1	0.2	100.0
1946	4.3	0.9	43.5	10.0	38.2	2.3	0.7	0.1	100.0
1960	4.5	0.7	47.8	12.0	32.8	1.5	0.6	0.1	100.0
1970	4.4	0.6	51.0	11.4	30.7	1.3	0.5	0.1	100.0

Sources: International Commission of Jurists, Memorandum presented by the Govt. of British Guiana (Part II DEMOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS) Prepared by G.W. Roberts and J. Byrne, July 1965.

Census Bulletin No. 1, Population Census, 1960. Series D, British Guiana, (Port of Spain, Population Census Division, 1963).

Guyana: Preliminary Population Report, (Georgetown; Ministry of Information) June 1970.

TABLE VI                      PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION BY RACE FOR SUGAR ESTATES,  
VILLAGES AND URBAN CENTRES

	<u>Amerindian</u>	<u>Chinese</u>	<u>East Indian</u>	<u>Mixed</u>	<u>Negro</u>	<u>Portuguese</u>	<u>White</u>	<u>Other</u>
<u>SUGAR ESTATES</u>								
1891	-	1.59	79.36	2.42	14.44	1.12	0.93	0.14
1921	-	0.76	81.77	2.29	13.96	0.39	0.72	0.12
1931	-	0.62	80.98	2.35	15.29	0.32	0.41	0.02
1960	-	0.38	80.45	3.35	14.76	0.18	0.58	0.31
1970	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<u>VILLAGES</u>								
1891	-	1.03	26.70	6.11	61.20	4.31	0.33	0.32
1921	-	0.77	41.16	5.48	49.86	2.15	0.22	0.36
1931	-	0.70	38.73	5.27	52.53	1.76	0.10	0.11
1960	-	0.65	42.6	5.07	50.5	1.66	0.10	0.12
1970	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<u>URBAN CENTRES</u>								
1891	-	1.50	8.44	27.03	47.19	10.23	5.02	0.59
1921	-	1.60	11.34	24.08	50.59	8.54	3.45	0.40
1931	-	1.77	11.98	22.68	53.57	7.60	2.01	0.39
1960	-	1.81	22.13	21.72	49.00	3.78	1.22	0.34
1970	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Sources: ICJ, Memorandum, Part II, p. 33.  
B.G. Population Census, 1960, No. 1  
Guyana: Preliminary Population Report.

"Urban" is used here to classify those constituencies which reflect a relatively high population density coupled with a tendency towards industrialization as opposed to agriculture, which is a characteristic of the rural areas. Following this criteria of urban-rural classification, George Roberts found only 2 urban areas in Guyana viz., Georgetown and New Amsterdam. See George Roberts and Joycelyn Byrne, Demographic, Economic and Sociological Background: Memorandum to the International Commission of Jurists, Part III (Georgetown, Guyana, Government Printers, 1965).

TABLE VI                      AGE DISTRIBUTION OF THE POPULATION, 1921-1970

<u>Age Group</u>	<u>1921 Census</u>	<u>1931 Census</u>	<u>1946 Census</u>	<u>1960 Census</u>	<u>1970 Census</u>
Over 0 and under 5	30754	45077	62732	98195	117560
" 5 " " 15	64613	66369	84338	161075	205632
" 15 " " 45	148448	146563	162241	215255	218285
" 45 " " 64	42666	43607	47597	67072	69098
" 65	9136	8459	12422	18809	20167
Age not stated	2074	858	348	-	-
<u>Total</u>	<u>297691</u>	<u>310933</u>	<u>369678</u>	<u>560406</u>	<u>720740</u>

TABLE VI                      AGE DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION (In Percentages)

Over 0 and under 5	10.4	14.5	17.0	17.5	18.5
" 5 " " 15	21.9	21.4	22.8	28.7	30.2
" 15 " " 45	50.2	47.3	43.9	38.4	38.8
" 45 " " 64	14.4	14.1	12.9	12.0	10.5
" 65	3.1	2.7	3.4	3.4	2.0
<u>Total</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>100.0</u>

Number of dependents  
per person of working  
age (15-64)

0.55                      0.63                      0.76                      0.98

Sources: 1921 and 1931, R.R. Kuczynski, Demographic Survey, Table on p. 1946, R.R. Kuczynski, Demographic Survey, Table 4, p. 160.  
1960, Census Bulletins No. 1 and No. 12, Population Census, 1960 Series D. British Guiana (Port of Spain: Population Census Division, 1963).  
1970, Preliminary Census.

TABLE 6

RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION OF ADULT GUYANESE POPULATION ACCORDING TO RACE  
(In Percentages)

	CHRISTIAN									NON CHRISTIAN								
	Roman Catholic			Protestant			Other			Hindu			Muslim			Atheist		
	1946	1960	1970	1946	1960	1970	1946	1960	1970	1946	1960	1970	1946	1960	1970	1946	1960	1970
African	22	25	24	69	70	64	9	5	8	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	1
East Indian	1	11	14	3	28	34	-	-	-	72	48	40	24	13	12	-	-	-
Portuguese	-	85	77	-	15	23	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Amerindians	-	-	72	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	18

Source: British Guiana Population Census 1946, Vol. 2, Part B, 1946

British Guiana Population Census 1960, Vol. 2, Part A.

Guyana Preliminary Census, (Guyana: Ministry of Economic Planning, 1971)

TABLE 7

EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT OF THE POPULATION  
(In Percentages)

	5 - 20 Year Age Group		Whole Population	
	1962 N = 235*	1968 N = 243*	1960 N = 572*	1970 N = 612*
None	15	4	8	6
Primary School (only)	45	30	60	52
Secondary School (incomplete)	20	16	15	12
Secondary School	19	26	10	21
<u>Higher Education</u>				
a. Technical	7	10	3	6
b. University	3	8	1	3

Source: Education Bulletin (Georgetown, Guyana, Ministry of Information)

British Guiana Population Census 1960 Vol. II, Part B.

Facts Sheet (Georgetown, Guyana, Ministry of Information, 1969)

Preliminary Population Census 1970 (Georgetown, Guyana, 1971).

\*These are given in '000.

ATLANTIC  
OCEAN

BRITISH GUIANA

NORTH-EAST SHEET

Compiled in the Cartographic Section of  
The Department of Lands and Mines, Georgetown,  
British Guiana.

Scale: 1:500,000

Statute Miles

Transverse Mercator Projection

Point of Origin at the Equator and 59° West Longitude, the Co-ordinates of which are 0 and 910,000 feet

1947

REFERENCE

- Canals: .....
- Roads: Primary .....
- Roads: Secondary .....
- Trails: .....
- Boundaries: International .....
- Boundaries: Provincial .....
- Boundaries: District .....
- Boundaries: Amerindian Reservation .....
- Railways (Single Track) .....
- Cities and Townships .....
- Heights above Sea Level .....
- Mountains .....
- Landing Field .....
- Frame Survey Station .....

MAP I

(Sgd.) HUGH HALLETT  
24<sup>th</sup> NOVEMBER 1960.

BRITISH GUIANA

NORTH-WEST SHEET

Compiled in the Cartographic Section of  
The Department of Lands and Mines, Georgetown,  
British Guiana.

Scale: 1:500,000

Statute Miles

For Reference see North-East Sheet

NORTH WEST DISTRICT

POMEROON XXXII

BERBICE  
RIVER

RUPUNUNI XXXV

BRITISH GUIANA

SOUTH-WEST SHEET

Compiled in the Cartographic Section of  
The Department of Lands and Mines, Georgetown,  
British Guiana.

Scale: 1:500,000

Statute Miles

For Reference see North-East Sheet

BRITISH GUIANA

SOUTH-EAST SHEET

Compiled in the Cartographic Section of  
The Department of Lands and Mines, Georgetown,  
British Guiana.

Scale: 1:500,000

Statute Miles

For Reference see North-East Sheet

ATLANTIC  
OCEAN

# BRITISH GUIANA

Continued in the Cartographic Series of  
The Department of Lands and Mines, Georgetown,  
British Guiana

Scale 1:500,000

Sheet No.

1:500,000  
Vertical Mercator Projection  
One Inch to the Mile in Latitude and Longitude

Symbol	Description
[Symbol]	Mountain Peak
[Symbol]	Mountain Range
[Symbol]	Waterfall
[Symbol]	Stream
[Symbol]	River
[Symbol]	Canal
[Symbol]	Coastline
[Symbol]	Island
[Symbol]	Bay
[Symbol]	Harbour
[Symbol]	Port
[Symbol]	Fort
[Symbol]	Station
[Symbol]	Post Office
[Symbol]	Police Station
[Symbol]	Government Building
[Symbol]	Church
[Symbol]	School
[Symbol]	Public Building
[Symbol]	Industrial Building
[Symbol]	Warehouse
[Symbol]	Store
[Symbol]	Hotel
[Symbol]	Cinema
[Symbol]	Theatre
[Symbol]	Club
[Symbol]	Bar
[Symbol]	Restaurant
[Symbol]	Cafe
[Symbol]	Public House
[Symbol]	Public Hall
[Symbol]	Public Library
[Symbol]	Public Office
[Symbol]	Public Works Office
[Symbol]	Public Works Department
[Symbol]	Public Works Corporation
[Symbol]	Public Works Board
[Symbol]	Public Works Commission
[Symbol]	Public Works Committee
[Symbol]	Public Works Council
[Symbol]	Public Works Department
[Symbol]	Public Works Corporation
[Symbol]	Public Works Board
[Symbol]	Public Works Commission
[Symbol]	Public Works Committee
[Symbol]	Public Works Council

MAP I  
(Sgd) HUGH HALLETT  
24<sup>th</sup> NOVEMBER 1960

## BRITISH GUIANA

NORTH-WEST SHEET

Continued in the Cartographic Series of  
The Department of Lands and Mines, Georgetown,  
British Guiana

Scale 1:500,000

Sheet No.

1:500,000  
Vertical Mercator Projection  
One Inch to the Mile in Latitude and Longitude

For Reference see North East Sheet

NORTH WEST DISTRICT XXXIII

POMEROY XXXII

MAHAICONY

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## BRITISH GUIANA

SOUTH-WEST SHEET

Continued in the Cartographic Series of  
The Department of Lands and Mines, Georgetown,  
British Guiana

Scale 1:500,000

Sheet No.

1:500,000  
Vertical Mercator Projection  
One Inch to the Mile in Latitude and Longitude

For Reference see North East Sheet

## BRITISH GUIANA

SOUTH-EAST SHEET

Continued in the Cartographic Series of  
The Department of Lands and Mines, Georgetown,  
British Guiana

Scale 1:500,000

Sheet No.

1:500,000  
Vertical Mercator Projection  
One Inch to the Mile in Latitude and Longitude

For Reference see North East Sheet

ROBUN UNIT XXXV