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The October Crisis : focus on several decision models Denoual, Daniel Guy 1974

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1 THE OCTOBER CRISIS: FOCUS ON SEVERAL DECISION MODELS by DANIEL GUY DENOUAL H.E.C., 1964, I.E.P., 1967 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE IN BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION i n the Faculty of Commerce and Business Administration We accept t h i s t hesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA July, 1974 In p r e s e n t i n g t h i s t h e s i s in p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t o f the r equ i r emen t s f o r an advanced degree at the U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a , I agree that the L i b r a r y s h a l l make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r r e f e r e n c e and s tudy . I f u r t h e r agree t h a t p e r m i s s i o n f o r e x t e n s i v e c o p y i n g o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r s c h o l a r l y pu rposes may be g r a n t e d by the Head o f my Department o r by h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . It i s u n d e r s t o o d that c o p y i n g o r p u b l i c a t i o n o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r f i n a n c i a l g a i n s h a l l not be a l l owed w i thout my w r i t t e n p e r m i s s i o n . Depa rtment The U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Co lumbia Vancouver 8, Canada Date A B S T R A C T The purpose of t h i s research i s to focus on a l t e r n a t i v e ways of p e r c e i v i n g the same r e a l i t y : The a c t i o n s taken by the FLQ and the a u t h o r i t i e s during the October 1970 c r i s i s . Among the abundant l i t e r a t u r e that was published during and a f t e r the c r i s i s and o f t e n with strong emotional overtones, two main attempts o f explanation have emerged: One t r y i n g to describe the a c t i o n s chosen, as the more or l e s s purposive acts o f u n i f i e d i n s t i t u t i o n s or groups (the FLQ, the A u t h o r i t i e s ) and which i s o f t e n found among e i t h e r E n g l i s h Canadian commentators or c l o s e sources to the Government The other one attempting to r e l a t e the chosen a c t i o n s , as the r e s u l t a n t of va r i o u s b a r g a i n i n g games among pl a y e r s i n the i n s t i t u t i o n s or groups (the i n t e l l e c t u a l s , the a c t i v i s t s , i n the case of the FLQ, Quebec, Ottawa and Montreal i n the case of the Government) and which i s of t e n found among proponents o f the New L e f t or Quebec Independentists. Two aspects o f the c r i s i s however, have l a r g e l y been ignored or neglected: The r o l e o f the information u n i t s and the r o l e of the implementation u n i t s i n the shaping of Government de-c i s i o n s , except i n r a r e cases and only to deplore t h e i r i n -e f f i c i e n c y or t h e i r p r e j u d i c e s . Given t h i s background, we propose to focus our a t t e n t i o n on f i v e main questions: - How can the a c t i o n s of the FLQ and of the a u t h o r i t i e s be explained i n the context of a u n i t a r y and comprehensively r a t i o n a l a c t o r perspective? How can the a c t i o n s of the FLQ and of the a u t h o r i t i e s be explained i n the context of a u n i t a r y and boundedly r a t i o n a l a c t o r p e r s p e c t i v e ? - How can the a c t i o n s o f the a u t h o r i t i e s be explained, as being the output of m u l t i p l e , boundedly r a t i o n a l , separate inform a t i o n u n i t s ? How can the outcome r e s u l t i n g from the a u t h o r i t i e s ' chosen a c t i o n be explained as the output of m u l t i p l e , boundedly r a t i o n a l , separate implementation u n i t s ? How can the a c t i o n s of the FLQ and of the a u t h o r i t i e s be explained, as the r e s u l t a n t of the b a r g a i n i n g process t a k i n g p l a c e among m u l t i p l e , boundedly r a t i o n a l , separate d e c i s i o n u n i t s ? In t r y i n g to answer those questions, we w i l l draw h e a v i l y on the work of Graham A l l i s o n (Essence of D e c i s i o n , L i t t l e Brown and Company, Boston, 1971), whose methodology and terminology w i l l be used abundantly as f a r as the b a s i c concepts are concerned. In many cases, as we have not got any access to " i n t e r n a l " i n f o r m a t i o n , we w i l l t r y to r e c o n s t i t u t e the d e c i s i o n processes from the evidence at hand, hypothesizing the developments that have taken p l a c e . This same l i m i t a t i o n (the lack of i n t e r n a l i n f o r m a t i o n ) , w i l l lead us to concentrate mostly on the r e p e t i t i v e character o f bounded behaviour and to search f o r antecedents among past a c t i o n s . In doing so, we hope to minimize our own p r e j u d i c e s and con-t r i b u t e to the understanding of a c r i s i s which has appeared to many as a t u r n i n g p o i n t i n Canadian h i s t o r y . V TABLE OF CONTENTS The S e t t i n g : An overview of the events 1. The FLQ A c t i v i t i e s p r i o r to October 5, 1970 1 2. , The P o l i t i c a l S i t u a t i o n i n Canada and i n Quebec i n October 1970 2 3. The Development of the C r i s i s , October 5 to October 16 . 3 Focus I A: Un i t a r y Actor (Comprehensive R a t i o n a l i t y ) 1. The FLQ o b j e c t i v e s 50 2. The FLQ options 51 3. The FLQ chosen a c t i o n 55 4. The FLQ a n t i c i p a t e d f u t u r e a c t i o n s 58 5. The A u t h o r i t i e s ' chosen a c t i o n 62 6. The A u t h o r i t i e s o b j e c t i v e s 67 7. Had the A u t h o r i t i e s other a l t e r n a t i v e s 72 8. V a r i a t i o n s on the U n i t a r y Actor theme 74 Focus I B: Un i t a r y Actor (Bounded R a t i o n a l i t y ) 1. Antecedents of the FLQ chosen a c t i o n 77 2. Antecedents o f the A u t h o r i t i e s chosen a c t i o n 79 Focus I I : M u l t i p l e Separate Information U n i t s (Bounded R a t i o n a l i t y ) 1. The R.C.M.P. as an informat i o n u n i t 86 2. The other P o l i c e Forces as information u n i t s 90 3. Cooperation between the three P o l i c e Forces 91 4. R e s u l t i n g d i s t o r t i o n s i n O r g a n i z a t i o n a l I n t e l l i g e n c e 92 5. The Mass Media as information u n i t s 103 VI Focus I I I : M u l t i p l e Separate Implementation U n i t s (Bounded R a t i o n a l i t y ) 1. The Implementation of the W.M.A. i n other Provinces than Quebec 106 2. The Implementation o f the W.M.A. i n other. Provinces than Quebec 108 2. 1 The A r r e s t Process 108 2. 2 The Detention Process 119 2. 3 The Indictment Process 123 2. 4 The J u d i c i a l Process : 126 Focus IV: M u l t i p l e Separate D e c i s i o n Units (Bounded R a t i o n a l i t y ) 1. The FLQ 1. 1 "Thinkers and Men of A c t i o n " 130 1. 2 L i b e r a t i o n C e l l and Chenier C e l l 131 2. The A u t h o r i t i e s 2. 1 Some Evidence on the Pushing and Hauling Process 136 2. 2 The A c t i o n Channels Involved 142 2.3 The Actors 148 2. 4 Issues i n C o n f l i c t 156 Bib l i o g r a p h y 162 Appendixes Appendix I FLQ Reported A c t i o n s 1963-1970 168 Appendix I I O r g a n i z a t i o n a l Chart of the R.C.M.P 169 Appendix I I I Summary of the Indictment Process 170 Appendix IV Summary of the A c t i o n Channels Involved 172 Appendix V Status of the 23 P o l i t i c a l P r i s o n e r s 173 Appendix VI A l l e g e d Communications between J . Cross, P. Laporte and the A u t h o r i t i e s 175 LIST OF TABLES TABLE I Actors i n the Federal Government TABLE II Actors i n the P r o v i n c i a l Government TABLE III Actors i n the Municipal Government TABLE IV Summary of the Indictment Process TABLE V Status of the 23 P o l i t i c a l Prisoners LIST OF FIGURES FIGURE I FLQ Reported Actions FIGURE II Organizational Chart of the R.C.M.P. FIGURE III Summary of the Action Channels involved THE SETTING: AN OVERVIEW OF THE EVENTS THE FLQ ACTIVITIES PRIOR TO OCTOBER 5, 1970 As shown i n Appendix I, during a p e r i o d of 7 years (from 1963 to 1970) the FLQ (or s i m i l a r movements) accomplished more than 200 v i o l e n t a c t i o n s , mostly i n the Montreal area. Among those a c t i o n s more than h a l f of them were bombings, the others being e i t h e r t h e f t s of m i l i t a r y equipment (r a d i o t r a n s m i t t e r s , u n i -forms, arms, and ammunition)or hold-ups.Most of them were d i r e c t e d against Federal I n s t i t u t i o n s (armouries, p u b l i c b u i l d i n g s ) or t r a d i t i o n a l symbols o f E n g l i s h Economic i n f l u e n c e (the Montreal Stock Exchange, U.S. firms or l o c a t i o n s i n the Westmount a r e a ) , but a few of them managed to reach such d i -verse t a r g e t s as the home of Mayor Jean Drapeau, the c e n t r a l o f f i c e o f the C.N.T.U. (National C o u n c i l o f Quebec Trade Unions) or even the greenhouse at M c G i l l U n i v e r s i t y . During those seven years, those v i o l e n t a c t i o n s caused the death of s i x persons and l e d to the a r r e s t and c o n v i c t i o n of successive groups of a c t i v i s t s who were condemned to p e n a l t i e s ranging from 5 years to l i f e imprisonment. In 1965, the movement had rec e i v e d the support and approval of some members of the l e f t wing i n t e l l i g e n t s i a ( l i k e Gagnon and V a l l i e r e s ) , who r a p i d l y became the more or l e s s o f f i c i a l spokesmen and t h e o r i s t s f o r the cause, c l a i m i n g an a c t i v e s o l i d a r i t y w i t h the P a l e s t i n i a n l i b e r a t i o n s t r u g g l e and the Black Panthers. In 1967, V a l l i e r e s and Gagnon were charged w i t h ho-micide ( i n connection with the La Grenade bombing which had caused the death o f one employee) and were f i n a l l y r e l e a s e d on b a i l i n May 1970. A f t e r a f i r s t t r i a l r e p l e t e w i t h e r r o r s and excesses which s t i r r e d numerous p r o t e s t s i n the ranks o f the Quebec New L e f t and l e d to the c r e a t i o n o f the M.D.P.P.Q. (Mouvement de Defence des P r i s o n n i e r s P o l i t i q u e s Quebecois) On the other hand, at the s o c i a l l e v e l , the s e p a r a t i s t cause had been repeatedly connected w i t h manifestations l e a d i n g to v i o l e n c e mostly i n the Montreal area. B i l l 63 (on the language i s s u e ) , St. Jean B a p t i s t e day, Murray H i l l a f f a i r , and the Con s t r u c t i o n s t r i k e i n 1969, had developped i n t o v i o l e n t con-f r o n t a t i o n s and i n one case l e d to the l o s s o f a human l i f e (shot by an u n i d e n t i f i e d sniper) THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN CANADA AND QUEBEC IN OCTOBER 1970 In the two years preceeding the c r i s i s , s e v e r a l changes had taken place on the Federal and P r o v i n c i a l p o l i t i c a l scenes: i n 1968 P.E. Trudeau, a french Canadian had been nominated at the head o f the L i b e r a l P a r t y and won a f e d e r a l e l e c t i o n on both h i s personal appeal, h i s determination t o handle the Quebec problem and a rejuvenated program i n 1968 Ex-Natural Resources M i n i s t e r Rene Levesque, l e f t the Quebec L i b e r a l P a r t y to regroup the proponents o f i n -dependance i n the Province under the banner of the P a r t i Quebecois i n January 1970, Robert Bourassa, w i t h the a c t i v e support of the p a r t y machine and the "quiet support o f Ottawa" was no-minated as the successor o f Jean Lesage as leader o f the L i b e r a l P a r t y of Quebec, l a r g e l y dominating h i s two opponents P i e r r e Laporte and Claude Wagner - On A p r i l 29, 1970, during a c l o s e l y watched e l e c t i o n , R. Bourassa was e l e c t e d on a pla t f o r m of economic reform (100,000 jobs f o r Quebec) with a m a j o r i t y of 72 seats.Among the op-p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s , the f i r s t appearance of the P a r t i Quebecois on the E l e c t o r a l scene netted i t w i t h 23% of the votes, mostly at the expense of the Union Nationale (the Party of l a t e Maurice Duplessis) which having dropped from 41% to 20% of the votes was nevertheless r e t a i n e d as the O f f i c i a l Oppo-s i t i o n i n the N a t i o n a l Assembly. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CRISIS: OCTOBER 5 TO OCTOBER 16 In t h i s short summary we have t r i e d to regroup the various info r m a t i o n a v a i l a b l e to an e x t e r n a l observer during the c r i s i s . This means that we have l i m i t e d our d e s c r i p t i o n mostly to o f f i c i a l statements and reported f a c t s a v a i l a b l e to the p u b l i c at the time of the c r i s i s . In doing so we have probably neglected v a l u a b l e pieces of i n -formation, at l e a s t at t h i s l e v e l of our p r e s e n t a t i o n , but we have considered that our purpose was n e i t h e r to give a " t o t a l " account of the s i t u a t i o n (which would have been m i s l e a d i n g , s i n c e d e c i s i o n makers were a c t i n g on incomplete information) or an "actor-centered" account (which would have r e s t r i c t e d our a n a l y s i s to one d e c i s i o n maker) In order to f a c i l i t a t e the perc e p t i o n of the c o n t i n u i t y , the events t a k i n g place from October 5 to October 16, have been c l a s s i f i e d by date and type o f o r i g i n a l sources ( L i b e r a t i o n C e l l , Chenier C e l l , P r o v i n c i a l Government, Federal Government, Municipa l Government, P o l i c e Forces, Media, Canadian Armed Forces and o t h e r s ) . LIBERATION CELL (L.B.) i 08.15 Cross abduction (1279 Redpath Crescent, by 4 men i n a car bearing a LaSalle t a x i domelight) L.B. Comm #1 Deadline = 48hrs. In exchange f o r the safe release of J . Cross the ^authorities must: 1. Release 23 p o l i t i c a l prisoners whose names where l i s t e d 2. Provide an a i r c r a f t for t h e i r transportation to Cuba or A l g e r i a 3. Turn over $500,000. i n gold bars 4. Reinstate the Lapalme postal d r i v e r s 5. Identify the informer who helped p o l i c e apprehend members of another FLQ c e l l 6. Publish (newspapers, radio, T.V.) the f u l l text of the FLQ i manifesto } ] 7. Cease a l l p o l i c e a c t i v i t i e s S r e l a t e d to the kidnapping / CHENIER CELL (CC.) PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT (P.GO 15.00 Quebec J u s t i c e M i n i s t e r J . Choquette makes a pu b l i c statement o u t l i n i n g the ransom demands and refuses to answer any question at least u n t i l . a f t e r an emergency Cabinet meeting l a t e r i n the day Incident at the end: J.C. t e l l s R. Lemieux: "Go and see your pals and t e l l them to free Cross 20.00 Af t e r a three hour evening Cabinet meeting i n Quebec C i t y , Mr. Choquette says only "We are i n close contact with the F.G. and any action taken on the kidnapping w i l l be a j o i n t e f f o r t . " FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (F.G.) MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT (M.G.) A communication center with an adhoc force i s located i n the East Block 14.40 M. Sharp makes a b r i e f statement i n the commons mentionning: 20.00: Mayor J . Drapeau during several broadcasted interviews emphasizes that the present s i t u a t i o n has been prepared by those (although no t e r r o r i s t s themselves) who have manifested f o r the l a s t years. The abduction of J. Cross The close consultations between the F.G. and the B r i t i s h , P r o v i n c i a l and Municipal Governments - The awareness of the F.G. r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for the protection of foreign representatives / POLICE FORCES (P.F.) 08.35 After some confusion Montreal Police reaches the Cross home. A general alarm i s issued: A l l the bridges and tunnels from Montreal Island are closed. The combined a n t i - t e r r o r i s t squad (M.P. § R.C.M.P. § S.Q.)' begin checks on a l l known members of t e r r o r i s t s or r a d i c a l independantist movements. MEDIA 10.25 Radio Canada Broadcasts the nexs of Cross abduction 12.00 An anonymous telephone c a l l d i r e c t s radio s t a t i o n CKLM to L.B. Comm #1 ( which the p o l i c e forces manage to seize before the media) CANADIAN ARMY OTHERS A speaker f o r the M.D.D.P.P.Q. (Defence Movement f o r the P o l i t i c a l Prisoners i n Quebec) precises that the Movement has nothing to do with the kidnap-ping and the press has just t o l d him the news LIBERATION CELL (L.B.) 12.00 L.B. Comm #2 1. Mentions a l e t t e r sent by Cross to h i s wife 2. Ask the newsmen to cooperate, i n "breaking the w a l l of silence erected by f a c i s t p o l i c e who s t e a l s the communiques addressed to the media 3. Wants the a u t h o r i t i e s to comply with the demands 4. Stresses conditions 3 and 5 of L.B. Comm #1 / CHENIER CELL (CC.) . PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT (P.G.) 9.00 The Cabinet meet to discuss the s i t u a t i o n i Quebec J u s t i c e M i n i s t e r j Jerome Choquette mentions that he has i n i t i a t e d t a l k s with the three implied p o l i c e forces, and that he intends to communicate with G. M c l l r a i t h who i s i n charge of the R.C.M.P. on the problem of the respective j u r i s d i c t i o n s of-the forces. He remarks however that the Quebec J u s t i c e Minister i s l e g a l l y i n charge of the implementation of the law Premier Bourassa confirms h i s agreement to Ottawa's attitude and decides to maintain h i s t r i p to New York on Thursday i ! FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (F.G.) MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT (M.G.) . 9.00 Inner Cabinet meeting, whose apparent decision i s to r e j e c t the FLQ demands 20.00 M. Sharp declares i n the Commons that: "I need hardly to say, t h i s set of demands w i l l not be met ... I continue however to hope that some basis can be found for Mr. Cross safe return. I hope the abductors w i l l f i n d a way to establish.communications to achieve t h i s " Mr. Heath confirms h i s agreement on Ottawa's a t t i t u d e and put Mr. G. Rippon i n charge of communications between the two governments Prime Mi n i s t e r Garden Party / POLICE FORCES (P.F.) P o l i c e forces begin to keep 'under observation' as many FLQ members as they knew MEDIA 9.30 L.B. Comm #1 i s broadcasted 16.,00 L.B. Comm #2 delivered at the home of a CKAC j o u r n a l i s t CKLM i s informed that a message for the Canadian Government has been deposited i n a Bus s t a t i o n (L.B. Comm #3?) i oo CANADIAN ARMY OTHERS - 100 Winch 30-30 carbines are stolen from Japanese ship i n Trois Rivieres (50 miles from Montreal) R. Lemieux accuses Ottawa of playing a cat and mouse game with the l i f e of Mr. Cross - Newspapers mention that the d r a f t ransom note recovered i s almost i d e n t i c a l to the one used i n an e a r l i e r FLQ plot I t i I I t 1 LIBERATION CELL (L.B.) . j 12.00 (?) L.B. Comm #4: I The present a u t h o r i t i e s , get 3 a 24 hour extension to who I t h e i r good f a i t h i n : WEDNESDAY OCTOBER 7 Broadcasting i n f u l l the FLQ manifesto Putting an immediate end to p o l i c e i n v e s t i g a t i o n s The Comm mentions that " J . Cross l i f e w i l l not be endangered f o r a question of d o l l a r s " Plus two l e t t e r s from J . Cross one to his wife, one to the au t h o r i t i e s CHENIER CELL (CC.) PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT (P.C) 11.00 Press Conference from J . Choquette where he mentions that: - The abduction has had. a negative effect'on the population "The governments are ready to investigate a l l p r a c t i c a l means out of th i s impasse. - He w i l l continue to make himself a v a i l a b l e during the next 36 hours . FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (F.G.) MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT (M.G.) . In the commons P.M. Trudeau confirms "that he i s not decided to leave the negociations to the Quebec government" Governor General's party to celebrate the beginning of the 28th l e g i s l a t u r e 22.00 O f f i c i a l statement read | by M. Sharp, where he an- I nounces that: j 1 the manifesto w i l l be i broadcasted j ! S the government needs j 'a precise basis on j which i t can be assured i of Mr. Cross safe release' \ \ t the set of seven o r i g i n a l \ conditions i s wholly J unreasonable | i some acceptaole means of 5 communication are to be \ arranged between the j government and the | abductors (he suggests j them to "name some person") j POLICE FORCES (P.F.) MEDIA At dawn po l i c e raids "a number of houses" and take 27 men and 3 women into custody. Unsuccessful tentative i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of suspects by Mrs. Cross i s reported i n the afternoon - Assistant Montreal P o l i c e Director P.E. O l i v i e r says the forces' work was being hampered by the c o l l e c t i o n , copying and handling of • FLQ messages by radio stations before p o l i c e had a chance to examine them. " I t seems some radio stations and other newsrooms have closer contacts with the FLQ than we do" Canadian Press mentions that 10,000 s t i c k s of dynamite have been stolen i n Quebec | so far t h i s year | 1:30 L.B. Comm #4 i s |. brought at CKLM by a cabbie The FLQ manifesto i s on CKAC read CANADIAN ARMY OTHERS ! Robert Lemieux « ! | - contacts (and i s contacted) j by the prisoners mentioned | i n L.B. Comm #1 i I j - declares that the j a u t h o r i t i e s should stop j to make "vague and I incautious d e c l a r a t i o n s " j and appoint a neutral j intermediary i j - mentions during a Radio ! Canada interview that p o l i c e a c t i v i t i e s are s t i l l taking place M. Sharp mentions that a i communique found i n a locker j at Ottawa"s bus terminal I and i n s i s t i n g on compliance | with f i v e demands of the FLQ, } i s assumed to be a hoax LIBERATION CELL (L.B.) , 12.00 L.B. Comm #5 I f at I 24.00 the a u t h o r i t i e s have I not broadcasted the manifesto § and put an end to p o l i c e I a c t i v i t i e s , the FLQ w i l l | be obliged to do away with j. Cross THURSDAY The a u t h o r i t i e s are asked to specify what they describe as i r r a t i o n a l demands OCTOBER 8 I i - The idea of a mediator i s re j ected "Cross w i l l be released w i t h i n 24 hours following the r e a l i z a t i o n of another condition dealing with the l i b e r a t i o n of 'consenting', p o l i t i c a l prisoners" CHENIER CELL (CC.) PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT (P.C) Prime Minister Bourassa leaves for N.Y. c i t y . After saying that "The problems at home are no reason enough for me to cancel t h i s t r i p . I have a plane ready and Montreal i s just one hour away " P. Laporte i s (defacto) Acting Premier of the province 23.00 After the manifesto d i f f u s i o n J . Choquette srefuses to make any statement sabout a moratorium on P o l i c e | A c t i v i t y i FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (F.G.) Ottawa i s said to have prepared a l i s t of people i t might name as i t s representative, and that a choice was to be made i n the l i g h t of whom the FLQ choose For the f i r s t time i n Ottawa Prime Minister Trudeau's limousine was preceded and followed by "ghosts" cars. Uniformed and p l a i n -clothed p o l i c e have followed him a l l the day in governmental buildings Speech from the Throne J.P. Cote (Post Master General) confirms the Government does not consider modifying i t s p o s i t i o n i n the Lapalme question Meeting between Prime Min i s t e r Trudeau and J.P. Saulnier (Montreal, President of the C.U.M.) MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT (M.G.) . POLICE FORCES (P.F.) MEDIA 6 persons are arrested (among them a former standardist i n the Premier's o f f i c e ) One of the kidnappers i s said to have been i d e n t i f i e d . P o l i c e i s rumoured frequently to be within hours of l o -cating the kidnappers. The Montreal Devoir reports that "without making any public statement, the autho r i t i e s have asked the p o l i c e forces to reduce t h e i r search a c t i v i t i e s at a minimum, as related to the l o c a l i -sation of Mr. Cross' abductors" (mentioned under the conditional "croit-on savoir") 14.30 A t i p to CKLM leads to L.B. Comm #5 22.30 The FLQ manifesto i read on Radio Canada 1 t I j CANADIAN ARMY OTHERS Late i n the night troops are moved at high speed from the base at V a l c a r t i e r (near Quebec City) to Ste Therese (about 15 miles North of Montreal). The movement i s described as a routine exercise a l e r t R. Lemieux declares on a press conference "that the F.G. claims i t wants to negociate ... but a l l t h i s i s another way to t r y to foo l the FLQ while gaining as much time as possible so the p o l i c e can f i n d where the kidnappers are holding Cross and so they can s t a r t a gunfire and cause an execution LIBERATION CELL (L.B.) L.B. Comm #6 FRIDAY OCTOBER 9 8.00: 2 conditions to save J. Cross' l i f e : 1. Freedom f o r the 23 Po-l i t i c a l Prisoners and t h e i r transport to A l g e r i a or Cuba | i n v e s t i g a t i o n s , arrests and S tortures by the " f a c i s t • p o l i c e " I 18.00 L.B. Comm #7 (dated | Oct. 8?) • -I | Warns against the f a c t that | Comm #6 has not been published f Give the a u t h o r i t i e s u n t i l § Saturday 18.00 to s a t i s f y | condition (1) from Comm #6 I t, 1 / CHENIER CELL (CC.) PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT (P.G.) 15.00 Mr. Choquette releases a b r i e f message to the kidnappers asking f o r proof that J . Cross i s s t i l l a l i v e FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (F.G.) MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT (M.G.) R. S t a n f i e l d asks the Prime Mi n i s t e r i n the Commons whether there i s any new development i n the Cross a f f a i r A... No, Mr. Speaker The Department of Foreign A f f a i r s affirms that Ottawa has never received Comm #6 POLICE FORCES (P.F.) MEDIA A member of the P r o v i n c i a l force says that the Force has just conducted i t s 1000 1st f a l s e r a i d Jacques Lanctot i s i d e n t i -f i e d as one of Cross's abductors | 20.40- A copy of Comm #6 | and Comm #7 and a l e t t e r | from J. Cross are brought at S CKLM • P.F.arrest one of CKAC reporters and seize FLQ communiques CANADIAN ARMY OTHERS 24 trucks loaded seen i n Montreal exercise says an Spokesman) with troops, j (routine j Army j j LIBERATION CELL (L.B.) SATURDAY OCTOBER 10 ! / CHENIER CELL (CC.) PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT (P.G.) 18.18 P. Laporte i s abducted by 4 men i n front of h i s home In consideration of bad weather conditions, Prime Minister Bourassa cancels a meeting with Ted Kennedy i n Boston and d i r e c t l y returns to Montreal from N.Y. C i t y 17.30 J. Choquette (on radio) - rejects negociations over the fate of the 23 prisoners offers safe conduct to a foreign country (as a f i n a l concession to save the l i f e of Mr.Cross The F.G. has instructed me that i t i s prepared . to ...) - proposes " s o c i a l re-c o n c i l i a t i o n , acceptance of change, and the r a l l y i n g of a l l Quebecois around a common i d e a l " -Prime M i n i s t e r Bourassa comes back to Montreal and confers with P.E. Trudeau i FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (F.G.) MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT (M.G.) M. Sharp i s contacted by J. Choquette and asked to approve the general content of h i s 17.30 conference Prime Mi n i s t e r states that he won't attend the UN 25th anniversary ceremony, during next week / POLICE FORCES (P.F.) 18.30 Montreal Police a r r i v e s at Laporte's home i n St. Hubert - Within minutes a general alarm i s sounded. Main intersections are blocked So are a l l bridges and the tunnel l i n k i n g the South Shore to the Island of Montreal P r o v i n c i a l Police begins assigning guards to the homes of a l l Cabinet Ministers and other public fi g u r e s , who might become kidnap victims - The combined'anti-terrorist force c a r r i e s out "scores of r a i d s " . Five suspects are said to have been j i d e n t i f i e d i MEDIA 13.00 Radio Canada announces that Prime Minister Trudeau w i l l apecify i t s d e f i n i t i v e attitude at 15.00 Several rumours about an FLQ Comm o CANADIAN ARMY OTHERS 18.30: Troups (10 trucks) move from V a l c a r t i e r base (near Quebec) to Ste Therese (near Montreal) Army spokes-man precise that t h i s movement i s only a normal part of the exercise Night Hawk taking place at Camp Bouchard The Ambassador of A l g e r i a moves from Ottawa to Montreal In the l a t e evening P. Bourassa phones C. Ryan who mentions : "That as long as government i s not a r e f l e c t i o n of a l l the true p o l i t i c a l forces which are at work i n Quebec, we w i l l have t h i s kind of problem. You are going to be shaken by c r i s i s l i k e t h i s . . . " 7" LIBERATION CELL (L.B.) I 22.00 L.B. Comm #8 v i | 1. Repeat the l a s t 2 demands | contained i n L.B. Comm #6 I | 2. Proposes t h e i r "word of \ honour" as guarantee for the ! release of Cross and Lacorte f ; 3. Does not f i x a time l i m i t ) and considers a prompt answer SUNDAY I as a demonstration of good I f a i t h by the a u t h o r i t i e s OCTOBER 11 'Plus l e t t e r from J . Cross \ "Thank you for saving my l i f e ! and that of Mr. Laporte" f. 4. R. Lemieux proposed as intermediary / CHENIER CELL (CC.) | 8.00 C C Comm #1 explains ! that the stuborness of the s a u t h o r i t i e s has lead to the • kidnapping of P. Laporte and { mentions that he w i l l be j executed Sunday night at | 10: P.M. i f between now and | then the r u l i n g a u t h o r i t i e s } have not acceeded to the 7 i demands ( i n conformity with j plan 3 established e a r l i e r to i provide for such a refusal) | v - C C Comm #2 (last ) warns [ that: 5 Liberation c e l l should \ send the a u t h o r i t i e s \ "a communique summing j up the s i t u a t i o n " \ j I f by 10: P.M. tonight the j 2 Governments have not ] favourably met the 7 i conditions set by the FLQ | P. Laporte w i l l be executed i l - C C Comm #3 (l a s t ) 1 Confirms the a u t h e n t i c i t y I of C C Comm #2 » Suggests that i f Cross i s I s t i l l a l i v e Liberation c e l l fi produces an 8th Comm which | w i l l be followed by a new i Comm that w i l l give i t s | decision about Laporte PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT (P.G.) j 16.00 Meeting of the Cabinet j at the Queen Elizabeth Hotel j i n Montreal - Prime Minister Bourassa | receives a l e t t e r from P. j Laporte "my l i f e i s i n your s hands" i i - Two P r o v i n c i a l Ministers I v i s i t Mrs. Laporte, Prime | Minister Bourassa phones her j i 21.55 After some discussion | with the opposition leaders, I Prime Mi n i s t e r Bourassa 3 broadcasts "an ambiguous I statement" where he asks the !kidnappers to contact the Government to discuss ! mechanisms to ensure that the | l i b e r a t i o n of prisoners would | i n fact r e s u l t i n the safety | of the hostages 3 ! " I t i s because we t r u l y want 1 to save Mr. Laporte and Mr. I Cross, that before discussing i the a p p l i c a t i o n of the demands < made, we want to es t a b l i s h j mechanisms which would gua-I rantee the safety of the 2 I hostages i f the P o l i t i c a l 1 prisoners are released" 3 j P.M. Bourassa i s reported to • | have mentioned that a specialty \ law could be prepared to im- M FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (F.G.) MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT (M.G.) Warns French Canadian men of Business and P o l i t i c s that " i t cannot be responsible f o r t h e i r personal s e c u r i t y " The M i n i s t r y of Foreign A f f a i r s l e t i t be known that P.M. Bourassa's communique has been released a f t e r consulta-tions with P.M. Trudeau. Ottawa precises that i t has nothing to add I' POLICE FORCES (P.F.) Several bomb c a l l s are received by Police Forces Police forces are reported to have long believed that the FLQ was a n a r x i s t s t y l e structure, with several specialized c e l l s of 3 to 6 members who know only t h e i r immediate superior i n the command chain. There are bombing c e l l s , propaganda c e l l s , i n t e l l i g e n c e gathering c e l l s , dynamite c e l l s and financing c e l l s that carry out robberies. So far t h i s year the FLQ has been blamed by the p o l i c e for holdups t o t a l l i n g more than $80,000. and thefts of 9,000 s t i c k s of dynamite 20.00 Police Forces investigate Charon's Island Warrants are issued "against individuals well known for t h e i r collaboration with certain committees, favourable to the FLQ" MEDIA 8.00 CKAC i s informed that a communique i s awaiting at Peel Street subway s t a t i o n 11.00 CKAC i s informed that a message from the FLQ has been deposited at P h i l i p p s Square 17.00 CKAC i s informed of the existence of a t h i r d communique Jou r n a l i s t s declare c a t e g o r i c a l l y that the Bourassa Government i s | deeply s p l i t following \ the Laporte kidnapping Police recovers a stolen t a x i domelight to CANADIAN ARMY OTHERS Pe r s i s t i n g rumours of m i l i t a r y intervention 6.00 or 7.00 R. Lemieux i s arrested on the basi s , that on Oct. 9, he had w i l l f u l l y and i l l e g a l l y im-peded p o l i c e agents i n the execution of t h e i r duty Meeting between L. Saulnier and C. Ryan, who want to discuss with him, three d i f f e r e n t possible issues of the c r i s i s The P.Q. issues a statement giving i t s support to P.M. Bourassa's de c l a r a t i o n Meeting of the permanent council of the FRAP (with most of the candidates absent) which endorses the objective of the FLQ manifesto LIBERATION CELL (L.B.) MONDAY OCTOBER 12 / CHENIER CELL (CC.) 00. 00 C C Comm #4 1. Refuses a l l negotiations on < the 6 remaining demands, but j sets no further deadline ] 2. Names R. Lemieux as spokes-i man for the FLQ i n t a l k s with j a u t h o r i t i e s i I 3. Assumes that Cross w i l l be | freed i f s t i l l a l i v e ("But | since Liberation c e l l has not I given any sign of l i f e we can-| not promise anything) ' Plus Laporte's l e t t e r "Thanks \ again ... and thanks to a l l i those who have contributed to S t h i s reasonable decision which I you announced with strength \ and d i g n i t y " | C C Comm #5 \ |1. Mr. Cross w i l l be freed on 'i the l i b e r a t i o n of the p o l i t i c a l 'prisoners and cessation of ]po l i c e a c t i v i t y 5 2. Mr. Laporte's freedom w i l l i !depend on the t o t a l acceptance j jof FLQ demands ; | 3 . In case of r e f u s a l , too ! |long h e s i t a t i o n s , p o l i c e I l o c a l i s a t i o n the "2 hostages j j w i l l be executed" * 4. This Comm. from the C C l i s the l a s t before the execution PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT (P.C) During the day R. Levesque (P.Q.) phones R. Bourassa and urges him to negotiate 19.15 Quebec Government names lawyer R. Demers as i t s spokesman for negotiations with the FLQ (presumably a f t e r consultation with the FLQ) 21.00 Mr. Demers meets b r i e f l y with R. Lemieux s t i l l held i n c e l l at Montreal p o l i c e H.Q. i n FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (F.G.) R.C.M.P. request for help i n protecting the federal establishment was made at a Cabinet meeting i n the morning During a special meeting between M. Sharp and Federal Ministers "the' p o s s i b i l i t y of engaging i n negotiations with the FLQ" i s studied P.M. Trudeau answers a question from R. S t a n f i e l d i n the Commons: "There i s a t o t a l agreement between the P.G. and the Government of Canada concerning the very c l e a r a t t i t u d e taken yesterday evening by P.M. Bourassa ... He s a i d that the only thing to do was to ensure through negotiations the creation of a mechanism dealing with Mr. Cross and Mr. Laporte's l i b e r a t i o n . That's what must be established i n the beginning." (Date of t h i s answer un-c e r t a i n since Monday Oct 12 was thanksgiving day) MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT (M.G.) Mayor J . Drapeau decides to c a l l o f f a l l h i s appointments and appearances i n the c i t y connected with the October 25 e l e c t i o n and declares: "The hour i s serious and the p o l i t i c i a n s need the support of the e n t i r e population i f they are not to lack courage ... One must note a c e r t a i n analogy between the kidnap-ping i n other countries ... That i s strangely s i m i l a r to revolutions i n other countries 7 POLICE FORCES (P.F.) Nearly a hundred members of the Security Squad of the Q.P.P. have combed the | Eastern part of the Province I and p a r t i c u l a r l y the Quebec ' Metropolitan area, where they have searched 38 houses of presumed FLQ members, as well as a bookshop MEDIA 2.10 CKLM receives telephone directions that lead to the discovery of L.B. Comm #8 10.45 CKAC receives . instr u c t i o n s and finds CC. Comm. #4 16.30 CKAC informed of CC. Comm. #5 23.00 Radio Canada: "Lieutenant Colonel Bonneau has declared that the second and t h i r d b a t a l l i o n s from the 22nd Royal Regiment are maintained under a l e r t and that i f the Quebec Government makes the request f o r i t , they could intervene with 600 to 1200 men. In the event of a M i l i t a r y intervention i n Montreal, the army has established i t s H.Q., on the 3rd f l o o r of the Surete du Quebec b u i l d i n g on Parthenais Street. to CANADIAN ARMY OTHERS 17.30 Petawa troops begin to move torwards Ottawa. Troops are reported to be prepared for "a number of eventuali-t i e s " . They have brought with them large supplies of barbed wire. During the night communication trucks and other m i l i t a r y vehicles move to key locations throughout the c i t y , although none have been seen across the Ottawa r i v e r into H u l l . The Front de J u s t i c e du Quebec, through the use of a f a l s e bomb threat, leaves a note promising "a three f o r one" r e p r i s a l against the famil i e s of the p o l i t i c a l prisoners. / to -J TUESDAY OCTOBER 13 LIBERATION CELL (L.B.) CHENIER CELL (CC.) PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT (P.C) Prime Mi n i s t e r Bourassa i n s i s t s that "there can be no question of the Government accepting or discussing FLQ demands before dealing with the i n i t i a l question (Laporte and Cross s a f e t y ) " 1st Meeting between Lemieux and Demers Lemieux suggests the p o l i t i c a l prisoners be held captive i n Cuba or A l g e r i a u n t i l the host government i s informed by the Canadian Government that C and L are safe - He further mentions that he i s net to discuss the 6 demands but only t h e i r implementation. K. Deme-s proposes to have one member of eacn c e l l held as hostage by the Government u n t i l the prisoners are freed. 2nd Meeting Demers informs Lemieux tnat ne cannot answer his questions (on the implementation) u n t i l the preliminary mecnanism nas oeen s e t t l e d . In a communique the bureau of the P.M. atfirms that the Government's p o s i t i o n has not changed and that the i preliminary question of the N J safety of C § L must be d e a l t 0 0 FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (F.G.) MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT (M.G.) Some M.P.'s f e e l rather uneasy about the extremely v i s i b l e presence of the Army i n Ottawa; some others ask for some form of Federal action against the FLQ. | Mayor J . Drapeau: The two I kidnappings by Montreal S t e r r o r i s t underground may I represent the preliminary I stage of a r e v o l u t i o n 20.00 M. Sharp admits that Canadian O f f i c i a l s had v i s i t e d Cuba and A l g e r i a to inform the Government of the FLQ demands. I t i s confirmed that one of the two governments i s ready to accept the f u g i t i v e s The Federal Cabinet i s reported to have met and heard urgent messages from Montreal and Quebec about the r i s i n g c r i s i s , the threats of disorders, the inadequacy of normal p o l i c e forces to meet the c r i s i s . The Cabinet i s reported to have discussed the possible use of d r a s t i c emergency measures POLICE FORCES I P . F . ) MEDIA Pol i c e raids continue through-out the province Paul Rose i s supposed to be followed by the p o l i c e (mention of a blue Volks) (his f i n g e r p r i n t s have been found on one of the communiques) The p o l i c e forces' telephone standards are burdened by c a l l s from the public Discussion between Prime Minister Trudeau and reporters ! of CBC and CJOH-TV .' "I'm suggesting that the press should perhaps use a ; b i t more r e s t r a i n t , which j you are not doing now" j "I'm suggesting that the j more recognition you give to f them, the greater the v i c t o r y i s , and I'm not interested ; i n giving them a v i c t o r y " j "They're c r i m i n a l prisoners, j they're not p o l i t i c a l p r i - j soners and they're bandits'.' i " I think society must take [ every means at his disposal ; to defend i t s e l f against the emergence' of p a r a l l e l powers F which defies the elected i powers i n t h i s country ... < I think that power must be ; stopped and: I.think i t ' s only, I repeat weakneed bleeding hearts who are ] a f r a i d to take these measures" t o CANADIAN ARMY OTHERS R. Lemieux refuses to plead arguing the charge of obstruction was p o l i t i c a l ; he i s l e f t out on his own recognizance Comm. from the Service Action c e l l "ve w i l l k i l l policemen who make raids without Iwarrants i n Quebec R. Lemieux ( i n the evening) asks f o r a new mandate to meet again R. Demers and charges that although Demers gives him the impression that the government wishes to negotiate i t i s possible that i t was only buying time Charles B. Neapole, President, of the Montreal Stock Exchange, mentions that he i s convinced of being the 4th on the l i s t of FLQ's p o t e n t i a l victims / 0 4 o WEDNESDAY OCTOBER 14 LIBERATION CELL (L.B.) CHENIER CELL (CC.) 5.00 L.B. § C C Comm #9 The FLQ refuses R. Demers' proposal (members of the c e l l s held as hostages) questions the "goodwill" of the concerned a u t h o r i t i e s gives R. Lemieux "carte blanche" to negotiate the aforementioned conditions - reviews i t s solemn commit-ment before the people of Quebec regarding the guarantees asked by the r u l i n g a u t h o r i t i e s I PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT (Cont'd) Reporters t e l l P.M. Bourassa i n Quebec C i t y that Mr. Trudeau has said there was no question of l i b e r a t i n g the prisoners. !A. "Yes, but Mr. Trudeau ap-proved my statement of Sunday night..." I When reporters i n s i s t e d that I Mr. Trudeau had been very I categorical i n r u l i n g out | any freeing of prisoners the | P.M. said I I "I have not read h i s i interview ; s p e c i f i c " he was not PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT (P.G.) 14.00 Demers meets R. Lemieux who refuses to accompany him i n Quebec C i t y and declares to the press "that the slowness of the negotiations endangers the l i v e s of the hostages. P.M. Bourassa modifies h i s i n i t i a l formula and considers, that i n s p i t e of the two c e l l members, two (already detained) p o l i t i c a l prisoners, could be held as hostages, and freed only af t e r C £ L's safe return. However, he s p e c i f i e s that such a formula (without precedent) should be r a t i f i e d by the Cabinet and submitted for ac-. ceptance to the J u s t i c e Minister. (Le Devoir 15-10-70) unconfirmed A close source to P.M.Bourassa says the "P.M. is'dead t i r e d from lack of sleep i n the l a s t few days and getting a l i t t l e fed-up with Ottawa's r e f u s a l to be f l e x i b l e " "Ottawa seems unable to see the problem from Quebec's point of view. Mr. Bourassa i s under considerable pressure, p a r t l y from the e a s i l y s p l i t Quebec Lib. Fede-r a t i o n , to obtain the freedom of P. Laporte" / FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (F.G.) Questions i n the Commons by R. S t a n f i e l d "Is there any consideration given to the declaring of emergency p o l i c e powers (search without warrant, arrest without charges or j u s t i f i c a t i o n s ) ? " P.M. Answers' l a t e r "This i s completely hypotheti-c a l . I repeat that i f such action were ever contemplated i t would c e r t a i n l y be discus-sed i n the House whether i t would be immediately before or immediately a f t e r , would depend of course on ... (interruption) " Without "commiting" himself P.M. Trudeau indicates to the Li b e r a l Caucus that the Government has no int e n t i o n of a l t e r i n g i t s opposition in an exchange of FLQ prisoners fo r the l i v e s of the FLQ kidnapped victims His general l i n e was ' i f you give now who w i l l be the next' One M.P. reported "he c e r t a i n l y did not sound l i k e a guy who's going to concede" 2 0 . 0 0 (according to Toronto G S M ) Meeting between P.M. Trudeau, MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT (M.G.) FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (Cont'd) D. McDonald, Turner, M c l l r a i t h (in.charge of the R.C.M.P.) "S u r p r i s i n g l y the Ministers appeared cheerful a f t e r 3 % hours of meeting" "With time apparently running out there i s a growing convic-t i o n among ministers that new t a c t i c s must be developped i f p o l i c e are to crack the case and have any changes to save C § L l i v e s " POLICE FORCES (P.F.) Paul Rose's track i s l o s t during the day Police forces are presently searching for about 10 persons considered as prime suspects i n the kidnappings of J . Cross § P. Laporte (Police forces were reported to have proceeded by elimination from a l i s t of FLQ sympathisers) During an interview P.M. .Bourassa declares that under actual circumstances, i t i s d i f f i c u l t to t e l l the {police forces not to do [anything" "This step (W.M.A.) has already been considered and rejected once, on the ground that i t might| provoke a p u b l i c outcry without s i g n i f i c a n t l y enhancing the likelyhood of discovering the two c e l l s " Now with reports from Montreal i n d i c a t i n g the two c e l l s w i l l soon move to set a new deadline on the v i c t i m s ' l i v e s . There i s a growing f e e l i n g that s p e c i a l p o l i c e measures, however impopular may be the only mean of avoiding a catastrophy. MEDIA 9:00 A.M. CKLM i s n o t i f i e d of a new FLQ communique Quebec j o u r n a l i s t seek l e g a l aid against p o l i c e Claude Ryan i s informed by P.M. Bourassa that there w i l l be a move towards a tougher l i n e . (A small step, un p e t i t virage) CANADIAN ARMY OTHERS An army spokesman declares that 300 s o l d i e r s may be i n Montreal, i f necessary, i n less than an hour. A group of 10 C.A.F. signal men move i n t o o f f i c e s adja-cent to R. Bourassa's own o f f i c e i n the National Assembly b u i l d i n g . A spo-kesman f o r the Premier's o f f i c e said a communication system has been set up through which troops at nearby V a l c a r t i e r base could be summoned by the Government at a moments notice * Troops continue to move to camp Bouchard 25 miles from Montreal * Some sources report that with the new system the Government i s able to j o i n a l l radio l i s t e n e r s !In Toronto, Premier J.Robarts declares that the Quebec t e r r o r i s t s i t u a t i o n has . evolved into " t o t a l war" and the time had come to 'stand j and f i g h t ' J A group of prominent 1 Quebecers (Levesque, Ryan, j Pepin, Charbonneau, Laberge, J Rouleau, Dumont) o f f e r t h e i r | most pressing support to the j P r o v i n c i a l Government for the j release of the two kidnapped ] men. They speak of "an j atmosphere of almost I m i l i t a r y r i g i d i t y which one I can blame on Ottawa, which !r i s k s reducing Quebec and i t s Government to t r a g i c impotence." I t i s reported that Trudeau" i s r e s t r a i n i n g Quebec and Montreal a u t h o r i t i e s from p r e c i p i t a t e l y demanding i the use of the army or of j the W.M.A. | Mass r a l l y at 1) of M with 5 Lemieux, V a l l i e r e , Chartrand, I Gagnon: Students are urged I to boycott classes. A campaign | to organize a general student j s t r i k e begins i n support of 1 the FLQ 1 4 / o> OJ 3 LIBERATION CELL (L.B.) j THURSDAY 8 OCTOBER 15 I I / CHENIER CELL (CC.) PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT (P.C) 3.07 After discussions with the opposition leaders, who i concurred, P.M. Bourassa j makes a statement i n the National Assembly "We have therefore, asked f o r ; m i l i t a r y support, so that the j p o l i c e force, may be able to I continue protecting public : buildings and the population" | Afternoon: Bourassa's | Government passes an order i n i council which places a l l j police and army personnel under j the command of Maurice St. [ Pie r r e , the Director of the | Quebec P r o v i n c i a l P o l i c e j Cabinet Meeting j 9.00 P.M. Bourassa's state- j ment: '. "The Government has, decided to give i t s f i n a l viewpoint ... i-The Government - promises to recommend fi r m l y the parole of 5 of the j prisoners - promises safe passage to the members of the 2 c e l l s I rejects the other J conditions and asks a re p l y | i n the next 6 hours i FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (F.G.) In the Commons P.M. admits that the Government had considered every possible way i n which the Government of Canada, i n conjunction with the Quebec Government, could meet t h i s very d i f -f i c u l t s i t u a t i o n , including the W.M.A. P.M. Trudeau meets opposi-t i o n leaders and suggests that s p e c i a l , less d r a s t i c l e g i s l a t i o n to deal with the FLQ might be introduced in the Commons i f opposi-t i o n p a r t i e s agree to pass i t without delay. Mr. St a n f i e l d and Mr. Douglas decline to commit them-selves without more informa-t i o n . Consultations between Ottawa and Quebec P.M.'s counsellor M. Lalonde i s i n Quebec C i t y Mr. Sharp says reporters should not overlook the fact that P.M. Bourassa has set a 6 hour deadline. MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT (M.G.) J . Drapeau and L. Saulnier prepare t h e i r l e t t e r to P.M. Trudeau | I (See following pages "B") 1 | M. Saulnier approves the i, a t t i t u d e taken by the I Government i n those serious 1 hours" t. 1 ! POLICE FORCES (P.F.) MEDIA !" Numerous bomb threats (evacuation of the Palais de Jus t i c e during the morning) S t a f f meeting at the P r o v i n c i a l P o l i c e Director's o f f i c e Montreal Police Director I prepares his l e t t e r to Mrs. Drapeau and Saulnier (See following pages "C") Montreal Police Director Mr. |St. Aubin asks the p o l i c e forces |to keep calm Producers of the CBC are ordered, by CBC President G. Davidson to "exercise a greater degree of r e s t r a i n t " i n t h e i r coverage of the c r i s i s The Montreal Gazette mentioning a c o n f i d e n t i a l RCMP report, estimates that the FLQ counts 22 ac t i v e c e l l s with a t o t a l of 130 members. The report estimates that 2,000 other members are not implied i n | the c e l l a c t i v i t i e s A few hundred persons support the "prominent Quebecers'" p o s i t i o n i n the Devoir CANADIAN ARMY OTHERS Within minutes a f t e r P.M.'s proclamation, troops a r r i v e on the Assembly grounds i n Quebec Less than an hour a f t e r P.M.'s declaration troops land at St. Hubert A i r base and take p o s i t i o n around " s t r a t e g i c " buildings (they have been c a l l e d under the c i v i l power clause of the National Defense Act) Troops carry small arms only (no tanks, a r t i l l e r y , heavy machine guns, or armoured personal c a r r i e r s ) "We are coming i n to help p o l i c e a u t h o r i t i e s protect c e r t a i n places and persons" Col. Lloyd Morrison (at the end of the evening the number of members of the Canadian Armed Forces are evaluated between 1,000 and 5,000) 1.30 A group of Laporte's friends and collaborators issue a statement asking for "an acceleration of the l i b e r a t i o n process i n order to obtain the l i b e -r a t i o n of the hostages". The statement underlines the opposition of the group to p o l i c e or m i l i t a r y i n -tervention. R. Lemieux declares that p o l i c e forces have found CC. and are only waiting to f i n d the L.C before attacking i n force to free the two men FRAP p u b l i c meeting (fund I r a i s i n g f o r the municipal j campaign) ]"Peaceful" student meeting 1 at U of M campus (no I trouble reported) $ I 1 s / 4 . ~ FRIDAY OCTOBER 16 LIBERATION CELL (L.B.) Some members of L.B. r e a l i z e that the Government w i l l not go further than i t s promise 1 of safe conduct. Fearing un-| remediable action from CC. 5 they issue a communique which I i s dropped i n a church. The I text s p e c i f i e s that Mr. Cross 1 w i l l be saved but kept as a |hostage (a p o l i t i c a l prisoner) 1 as long as the prisoners are Inot l i b e r a t e d . !Police forces ( r e f e r r i n g to (the IV.M.A.) f o r b i d the Ibroadcast of the communique .. CHENIER CELL ( C C ) St. Hubert firemen take action against a l i g h t f i r e i n the air p o r t area. PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT (P.G.) Prime Minister Bourassa's l e t t e r to P.M. Trudeau (See following pages "A") At a press conference during the afternoon P.M. Bourassa takes f u l l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for the decision pleading that the danger l i e s i n the con-tinued escalation of what i s seen as a coordinated plan for revolution. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (F.G.) MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT (M.G.) 3.00 Receives the l e t t e r s from Quebec and Montreal 4.00 The W.M.A. and the following regulations are approved 5.17 P.M.'s o f f i c e issues a formal statement that the act has been proclaimed (See following pages "C") P.M. b r i e f s the L i b e r a l Caucus before the meeting of the House where he j u s t i f i e s the Government's action on the grounds: of the d e t e r i o r a t i o n of the s i t u a t i o n i n Quebec as a response to the appeal from Quebec The use of the act he declares, i s "only an interim and.some-what unsatisfactory measure" and he promised to discuss with opposition leaders "the desira-b i l i t y of introducing l e g i s l a -t i o n of a less comprehensive nature" Apart from the S. C r e d i t , the 2 opposition parties seem rather doubtful the information that has lead to the d e c i s i o n . Letter from Mayor J . Drapeau to Prime M i n i s t e r Trudeau Letter from Mr. St. P i e r r e to L. Saulnier i | (See following pages "B") jMr. Drapeau and Saulnier [mentioning the existence of la revolutionary plan, praise jthe p o l i c e forces and ask "he c i t i z e n s to keep calm. MEDIA By noon, Police Forces have arrested more than 150 sus-pected members of the FLQ. Another hundred w i l l be picked up before night f a l l . (Other reports evaluate the t o t a l count over the whole province to 242 suspects) CKLM news d i r e c t o r says h i s , sta t i o n w i l l not broadcast • any more communication on . the ground that the broadcast ; could contrevene the emergency regulation. I i oo CANADIAN ARMY OTHERS } M u l t i p l i c a t i o n of student i s t r i k e s R. Levesque (P.QO says Quebec | has no more Government j J . Marchand declares : I f | we had not acted, the separa-I t i o n of Quebec would have been f a f a c t , a month or a year from | today; and implies that . .•. j the FLQ has i n f i l t r a t e d P o lice | Forces i n the province and other j key posts i n Quebec society I In Toronto 2 r a d i c a l lawyers j c a l l f o r a demonstration I against the Government "gross j overreaction" and Trudeau's I " P o l i c e State" "A" L e t t e r from Prime M i n i s t e r Bourassa to Prime M i n i s t e r Trudeau Government of Quebec The Prime M i n i s t e r Quebec C i t y , October 16,1970 Mr. Prime M i n i s t e r , During the l a s t few days the people of Quebec have been g r e a t l y shocked by the kidnapping of Mr. James R. Cross, r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of the B r i t i s h Government i n Montreal, and the Hon. P i e r r e Laporte, M i n i s t e r of Labour and Manpower and M i n i s t e r of Immigration of Quebec, as w e l l as by the t h r e a t s to the s e c u r i t y of the s t a t e and i n d i v i d u a l s expressed i n communiques issued by the Front de L i b e r a -t i o n du Quebec or on i t s b e h a l f , and f i n a l l y by a l l the circum-stances surrounding these events. A f t e r c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h a u t h o r i t i e s d i r e c t l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f j u s t i c e i n Quebec, the Quebec Government i s con-vinced that the law, as i t stands now, i s inadequate to meet t h i s s i t u a t i o n s a t i s f a c t o r i l y . Under the. circumstances, on b e h a l f of the Government of Quebec, I request that emergency powers be provided as soon as p o s s i b l e so that more e f f e c t i v e steps may be taken. I request p a r t i c u l a r l y t h a t such powers encompass the a u t h o r i t y to apprehend and keep i n custody i n d i v i d u a l s who, the Attorney General of Quebec has v a l i d reasons to b e l i e v e , are determined to overthrow the government through v i o l e n c e and i l l e g a l means. According to the information we have and which i s a v a i l a b l e t o you, we are f a c i n g a concerted e f f o r t to i n t i m i d a t e and overthrow the government and the democratic i n s t i t u t i o n s of t h i s province through planned and systematic i l l e g a l a c t i o n , i n c l u d i n g i n s u r r e c t i o n . I t i s obvious that those p a r t i c i -p a t i n g i n t h i s concerted e f f o r t completely r e j e c t the p r i n c i p l e of freedom under the r u l e o f law. The Quebec Government i s convinced t h a t such powers are necessary to meet the present emergency. Not only are two completely innocent men threatened w i t h death, but we are a l s o faced w i t h an attempt by a m i n o r i t y to destroy s o c i a l order through c r i m i n a l a c t i o n ; i t i s f o r those reasons that our government i s making the present request The government i s confident t h a t , through such powers, i t w i l l be able to put an immediate stop to i n t i m i d a t i o n and t e r r o r and to ensure peace and s e c u r i t y f o r a l l c i t i z e n s . Please accept, Mr. Prime M i n i s t e r , my very best regards. Robert Bourassa. "B" L e t t e r from Mayor Drapeau to Prime M i n i s t e r Trudeau C i t y o f Montreal, Canada O f f i c e of the Chairman o f the Executive Committee October 15, 1970. Mr. Prime M i n i s t e r , The c h i e f o f the Montreal P o l i c e Service has informed us that the means a v a i l a b l e to him are proving inadequate and th a t the a s s i s t a n c e of higher l e v e l s of government has become e s s e n t i a l f o r the p r o t e c t i o n of s o c i e t y against the s e d i t i o u s p l o t and the apprehended i n s u r r e c -t i o n i n which the recent kidnappings were the f i r s t step. We are forwarding as a matter o f the utmost urgency the report d e s c r i b i n g the scope of the t h r e a t and the urgent need to r e i n f o r c e the machinery to cope w i t h i t . We ask f o r every measure o f as s i s t a n c e the f e d e r a l government may deem u s e f u l and d e s i r a b l e i n order to c a r r y out the task of p r o t e c t i n g s o c i e t y and the l i v e s of c i t i z e n s i n t h i s d i f f i c u l t p e r i o d . Jean Drapeau Mayor o f Montreal Lucien S a u l n i e r Chairman o f the Executive Committee October 15, 1970 Gentlemen: An extremely dangerous subversive movement has p r o g r e s s i v e l y deve-loped i n Quebec i n recent years w i t h the o b j e c t i v e o f overthrowing the l e g i t i m a t e s t a t e by means of s e d i t i o n and e v e n t u a l l y armed i n s u r r e c t i o n . The recent kidnappings o f a f o r e i g n diplomat and a Crown m i n i s t e r of the.province have s i g n a l l e d the launching by t h i s movement of t h e i r s e d i t i o u s p r o j e c t s and acts l e a d i n g d i r e c t l y to the i n s u r r e c -t i o n and the overthrow of the s t a t e . Under these circumstances, the i n v e s t i g a t i o n which the p o l i c e au-t h o r i t i e s must undertake must n e c e s s a r i l y delve i n t o a l l aspects of the a c t i v i t i e s of the networks o f t h i s s e d i t i o u s movement, and should not be r e s t r i c t e d to simply searching f o r the i n d i v i d u a l s who perpetrated the odious kidnapping o f the two people who are s t i l l p r i s o n e r s - f o r t h i s would mean f a i l u r e . The t h r e a t served on s o c i e t y by t h i s s e d i t i o u s conspiracy, which has moved i n t o a c t i o n i n the past eleven days, the d i f f i c u l t i e s of i n v e s t i g a t i n g an o r g a n i z a t i o n s p l i t up i n t o manifold t i n y c e l l s , each impervious to the o t h e r s , and the unbelievable amount of checking and researching imposed on us have taxed, and continue to tax the resources our p o l i c e f o r c e has at i t s d i s p o s a l to t h e i r l i m i t . Considering how extremely urgent i t i s to achieve concrete r e s u l t s and unmask a l l the r a m i f i c a t i o n s o f t h i s movement and i t s s e d i t i o u s a c t i v i t i e s , c o n s i d e r i n g the volume and complexity o f the proofs which must be c o l l e c t e d and preserved, c o n s i d e r i n g , f i n a l l y , the enormity of the task we must accomplish, without moving i n t o a r e p r e s s i o n which would be n e i t h e r h e a l t h y nor d e s i r a b l e , the help of higher governments i s e s s e n t i a l to the completion of our job. The slowness of procedures and the r e s t r a i n t s imposed by the l e g a l methods and mechanisms now at our d i s p o s a l do not a l l o w us at t h i s time to cope with the s i t u a t i o n . Consequently, I recommend th a t the executive committee of the c i t y request t h a t the higher governments give us a l l the means they t h i n k appropriate and u s e f u l , so as to allow us to c o l l e c t and present the proofs needed to p r o t e c t s o c i e t y from the s e d i t i o u s and i n s u r -r e c t i o n a l manoeuvres unleashed by the kidnappings. Please accept, gentlemen, the expression o f my most d i s t i n g u i s h e d sentiments. The D i r e c t o r M. S t - P i e r r e PROCLAMATION OF THE W.M.A. AND OF THE PUBLIC ORDER REGULATIONS "C" Whereas the War Measures Act provides that the issue o f a p r o c l a -mation under the a u t h o r i t y of the gov e r n o r - i n - c o u n c i l s h a l l be co n c l u s i v e evidence that i n s u r r e c t i o n , r e a l or apprehended, e x i s t s and has e x i s t e d f o r any p e r i o d of time t h e r e i n s t a t e d and i t s continuance, u n t i l by the issue o f a f u r t h e r proclamation i t i s declared t h a t the i n s u r r e c t i o n no longer e x i s t s . And whereas there i s i n contemporary Canadian s o c i e t y an element or group.known as Le Front de L i b e r a t i o n du Quebec who advocate and r e s o r t to the use of force and the commission o f c r i m i n a l o f f ences, i n c l u d i n g murder, t h r e a t s o f murder and kidnapping, as a means of or as an a i d i n accomplishing a governmental change w i t h i n Canada and whose a c t i v i t i e s have given r i s e to a s t a t e of apprehended i n s u r r e c t i o n w i t h i n the province o f Quebec. Therefore, His E x c e l l e n c y the Governor-General-in-Council, on the recommendation of the prime m i n i s t e r , i s pleased to d i r e c t that a proclamation be issued p r o c l a i m i n g that apprehended i n s u r r e c t i o n e x i s t s and has e x i s t e d as and from the f i f t e e n t h day of October, one thousand nine hundred and seventy. P u b l i c Order Regulations, 1970 October 16, 1970 Whereas i t continues to be recognized i n Canada that men and i n -s t i t u t i o n s remain f r e e only when freedom i s founded upon respect f o r moral and s p i r i t u a l values and the r u l e of law; And whereas there i s i n contemporary Canadian s o c i e t y an element or group known as Le Front de L i b e r a t i o n du Quebec who advocate the use of force or the commission of crime as a means of or as an a i d i n accomplishing a governmental change w i t h i n Canada and who have r e s o r t e d to the commission o f serious crimes i n c l u d i n g murder, th r e a t o f murder and kidnapping; And whereas the government of Canada d e s i r e s to ensure that l a w f u l and e f f e c t i v e measures can be taken against those who thus seek to destroy the b a s i s of our democratic governmental system on which the enjoyment o f our human r i g h t s and fundamental freedoms, i s founded and to ensure the continued p r o t e c t i o n of those r i g h t s and freedoms i n Canada; Therefore, His E x c e l l e n c y the Governor-General-in-Council, on the recommendation of the prime m i n i s t e r , pursuant to the War Measures Act, i s pleased hereby to make the annexed r e g u l a t i o n s , to provide emergency powers f o r the p r e s e r v a t i o n of p u b l i c order i n Canada. Regulations to Provide Emergency Powers f o r the P r e s e r v a t i o n of P u b l i c Order i n Canada Short T i t l e 1. These r e g u l a t i o n s may be c i t e d as the P u b l i c Order Regulations, 1970. I n t e r p r e t a t i o n 2. In these r e g u l a t i o n s , "communicate" includes the act of communicating by telephone, broadcasting or other audible or v i s i b l e means; "peace o f f i c e r " means a peace o f f i c e r as defined i n the C r i m i n a l Code and i n c l u d e s a member of the Canadian Armed Forces; "statements" i n c l u d e s words spoken or w r i t t e n or recorded e l e c t r o n i c a l l y or e l e c t r o m a g n e t i c a l l y or otherwise, and gestures, signs or other v i s i b l e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s ; and "the unlawful a s s o c i a t i o n " means the group of persons or asso-c i a t i o n declared by these r e g u l a t i o n s to be an unlawful asso-c i a t i o n . 3. The group of persons or a s s o c i a t i o n known as Le Front de L i b e -r a t i o n du Quebec and any successor group or successor a s s o c i a t i o n of the s a i d Le Front de L i b e r a t i o n du Quebec, or any group of persons or a s s o c i a t i o n that advocates the use of f o r c e or the commission of crime as a means of or as an a i d i n accomplishing governmental change w i t h i n Canada i s declared to be an unlawful a s s o c i a t i o n . 4. A person who a) i s or professes to be a member of the unlawful a s s o c i a t i o n , b) acts or professes to act as an o f f i c e r of the unlawful a s s o c i a t i o n . c) communicates statements on b e h a l f o f or as a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e or professed r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of the unlawful a s s o c i a t i o n , d) advocates or promotes the unlawful a c t s , aims, p r i n c i p l e s or p o l i c i e s o f the unlawful a s s o c i a t i o n , e) c o n t r i b u t e s anything as dues or otherwise to the unlawful a s s o c i a t i o n or to anyone f o r the b e n e f i t o f the unlawful a s s o c i a t i o n , f) s o l i c i t s s u b s c r i p t i o n s or c o n t r i b u t i o n s f o r the unlawful a s s o c i a t i o n , or g) advocates, promotes or engages i n the use of force or the commission of c r i m i n a l offences as a means of accomplishing a governmental change w i t h i n Canada i s g u i l t y o f an i n d i c t a -b l e offence and l i a b l e to imprisonment f o r a term not exceeding f i v e years. A person who, knowing or having reasonable cause to b e l i e v e that another person i s g u i l t y of an offence under these regu-l a t i o n s , gives that other person any a s s i s t a n c e w i t h i n t e n t thereby to prevent, hinder or i n t e r f e r e w i t h the apprehension, t r i a l or punishment o f that person f o r that offence i s g u i l t y of an i n d i c t a b l e offence and l i a b l e to imprisonment f o r a term not exceeding f i v e years. An owner, l e s s e e , agent or superintendent o f any b u i l d i n g , room, premises or other place who knowingly permits t h e r e i n any meeting of the unlawful a s s o c i a t i o n or any branch, committee or members thereof, or any assemblage o f persons who promote the a c t s , aims, p r i n c i p l e s or p o l i c i e s of the unlawful a s s o c i a -t i o n i s g u i l t y o f an i n d i c t a b l e offence and l i a b l e to a f i n e of not more than f i v e thousand d o l l a r s or to imprisonment f o r a term not exceeding f i v e years or to both. 1. A person a r r e s t e d f o r an offence under s e c t i o n 4 s h a l l be detained i n custody without b a i l pending t r i a l unless the a t -torney-general o f the province i n which the person i s being detained consents to the r e l e a s e of th a t person on b a i l . 2. Where an accused has been a r r e s t e d f o r an offence under thes r e g u l a t i o n s and i s detained i n custody f o r the purpose only o f ensuring h i s attendance at the t r i a l of the charge under these r e g u l a t i o n s i n respect o f which he i s i n custody and the t r i a l has not commenced w i t h i n n i n e t y days from the time he was f i r s t detained, the person having the custody of the accused s h a l l , f o r t h w i t h upon the e x p i r a t i o n of such n i n e t y days, apply to a judge o f the super i o r court o f c r i m i n a l j u r i s d i c t i o n i n the prov i n which the accused i s being detained to f i x a date f o r the t r i a l and the judge may f i x a date f o r the beginning of the t r i a l or give such d i r e c t i o n s as he t h i n k s necessary f o r e x p e d i t i n g the t r i a l of the accused. In any prosecution f o r an offence under these r e g u l a t i o n s , e v i -dence that any person a) attended any meeting of the unlawful a s s o c i a t i o n b) spoke p u b l i c l y i n advocacy f o r the unlawful a s s o c i a t i o n , or c) communicated statements of the unlawful a s s o c i a t i o n as a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e or professed r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of the unlawful a s s o c i a t i o n i s , i n the absence of evidence to the c o n t r a r y , proof that he i s a member of the unlawful a s s o c i a t i o n . 1. A peace o f f i c e r may a r r e s t without warrant a) a person who he has reason to suspect i s a member of the unlawful a s s o c i a t i o n ; or b) a person who professes to be a member of the unlawful a s s o c i a t i o n ; or c) a person who he has reason to suspect has committed, i s committing or i s about to commit an act described i n paragraphs b. to g. of s e c t i o n 4. 2. A person a r r e s t e d pursuant to subsection 1 s h a l l be taken before a j u s t i c e having j u r i s d i c t i o n and charged w i t h an offence described i n s e c t i o n 4 not l a t e r than seven days a f t e r h i s ar-r e s t , unless the attorney-general of the province i n qhich the person i s being detained has, before the e x p i r y of those seven days, issued an order that the accused be f u r t h e r detained u n t i l the e x p i r y of a p e r i o d not exceeding twenty-one days a f t e r h i s a r r e s t , at the end of which p e r i o d the person a r r e s t e d s h a l l be taken before a j u s t i c e having j u r i s d i c t i o n and charged w i t h an offence described i n s e c t i o n 4 or rel e a s e d from custody. A peace o f f i c e r may enter and search without warrant any premises, p l a c e , v e h i c l e , v e s s e l or a i r c r a f t i n which he has reason to suspect a) anything i s kept or used f o r the purpose of promoting the unlawful a c t s , aims, p r i n c i p l e s or p o l i c i e s of the unlawful a s s o c i a t i o n ; b) there i s anything that may be evidence of an offence under these r e g u l a t i o n s ; - 47 -c) any member of the unlawful a s s o c i a t i o n i s present; or d) any person i s being detained by the unlawful a s s o c i a t i o n . 11. Any property that a peace o f f i c e r has reason to suspect may be evidence of an offence under these r e g u l a t i o n s may, without warrant, be s e i z e d by a peace o f f i c e r and h e l d f o r n i n e t y days from the date of s e i z u r e or u n t i l the f i n a l d i s p o s i t i o n of any proceedings i n r e l a t i o n to an offence under these r e g u l a -t i o n s i n which such property may be r e q u i r e d , whichever i s the l a t e r . 12. These r e g u l a t i o n s s h a l l be enforced i n such manner and by such c o u r t s , o f f i c e r s and a u t h o r i t i e s as enforce i n d i c t a b l e offences created by the C r i m i n a l Code. FOCUS 1 A: UNITARY ACTOR (COMPREHENSIVE RATIONALITY) PRELIMINARIES I d e a l l y , i n a pure Model 1 ( u n i t a r y a c t o r comprehensive r a t i o n a l i t y ) p e r s p e c t i v e , we s h o u l d have f o c u s e d our a t t e n t i o n e x c l u s i v e l y on the f i n a l outcome r e s u l t i n g from t h e a c t i o n s t a k e n by t h e A c t o r s , i n o r d e r t o be a b l e t o d e t e r m i n e w h i c h o b j e c t i v e ( o r more p r e c i s e l y , w h i c h f u n c t i o n ) t h e y were t r y i n g t o m aximize. However, i n our c a s e , we have d e c i d e d t o f o c u s o u r a t t e n t i o n on an i n t e r m e d i a r y outcome: The d e c i s i o n s made by the a u t h o r i t i e s , between O c t o b e r 15 i n the a f t e r n o o n and t h e e a r l y hours o f O c t o b e r 16, f o r v a r i o u s r e a s o n s h a v i n g t o d e a l both w i t h methodology and t h e a v a i l a b i l i t y o f i n -f o r m a t i o n . Among th e m e t h o d o l o g i c a l r e a s o n s i t a p p e a r e d . t o us t h a t two b a s i c l i m i t a t i o n s o f the M o d e l , the absence o f p r o v i s i o n s f o r u n c e r t a i n t y and t h e f i c t i o n o f a u n i t a r y a c t o r were r a t h e r c r i t i c a l i n o u r p r o b l e m , s i n c e - the l e n g t h y t i m e span c o v e r e d by t h e a c t i o n s ( i n J u l y 1971, a l l C o u r t s ' d e c i s i o n s had n o t y e t been r e n d e r e d ) and t h e u n c e r t a i n t y i n v o l v e d i n m u l t i p l e j u d i c i a l d e c i s i o n s - t h e f a c t the i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f t h e d e c i s i o n depended not o n l y on s e p a r a t e u n i t s , b u t on s t r u c t u r a l l y i n d e p e n d e n t u n i t s (The P r o v i n c i a l Government i n Quebec i s a d i s t i n c t p o l i t i c a l e n t i t y from t h e F e d e r a l Government and i s n o t supposed t o be a s m a l l e r u n i t i n c l u d e d w i t h i n the frame o f a l a r g e r one i . e . the F e d e r a l Government. The d i s t i n c t i o n i n o u r c a s e i s n o t a n o t i o n o f s u b o r d i n a t i o n , b u t a n o t i o n o f " s o v e r e i g n " competence - The same re a s o n s h o l d f o r the d i s t i n c t i o n between t h e p o l i t i c a l and j u d i c i a r y p o w e r s ) . Among t h e reason s h a v i n g t o do w i t h t h e a v a i l a b i l i t y o f i n f o r m a t i o n , t h e f a c t t h a t t h e P u b l i c Order R e g u l a t i o n s , f o r example, g i v e s us a good d e s c r i p t i o n o f the a c t i o n t a k e n by t h e a u t h o r i t i e s (which A l l i s o n , f o r example, d i d n o t po s s e s s i n t h e case o f t h e R u s s i a n Government, hence h i s method o f d e d u c t i n g i t s o b j e c t i v e from the o b s e r v e d outcome o f i t s a c t i o n s ; i t i s n o t e w o r t h y t o remark t h a t i n t h e case o f t h e U.S. Government f o r w h i c h he p o s s e s s e d d e s c r i p -t i o n s o f i n t e r m e d i a t e outcomes, l i k e t he d e c i s i o n t o r e s o r t t o t h e q u a r a n t i n e o f Cuba, he proceeds i n a d i f f e r e n t way a n a l y z i n g f i r s t t h e a c t i o n and s e c o n d l y the outcome) from w h i c h i t i s p o s s i b l e t o i n f e r t h e i r o b j e c t i v e s . T h i s d e c i s i o n t o f o c u s on i n t e r m e d i a t e outcomes w i l l l e a d us t o t r e a t t h e developments stemming f r o m a c t i o n s i n a Model I I I p e r s p e c t i v e . In f u t u r e d e v e l o p m e n t s , i t seems t o us t h a t c o m p a r i s o n s between a n a l y s i s f o c u s i n g on t h e a c t i o n s (when d e s c r i p t i o n a v a i l a b l e ) and on t h e outcomes c o u l d prove f r u i t f u l , b u t f o r t h e moment, t h e y appear t o us as f a l l i n g beyond t h e l i m i t e d scope o f t h i s r e s e a r c h . 1. THE FLQ OBJECTIVES In J u l y 1970, P i e r r e V a l l i e r e s t o l d P e t e r A l l n u t o f t h e CBC: "Yes, I am a member o f the FLQ. Today t h e FLQ r e p r e s e n t s a r e a l p o l i t i c a l f o r c e i n Quebec. I t i s no l o n g e r c o n s i d e r e d t o be a gang o f c r i m i n a l s . I t s p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y i s not j u s t p l a n t i n g bombs. The bombs a r e o n l y the t i p o f t h e i c e b e r g . The FLQ i s w o r k i n g and f i g h t i n g many o t h e r l e v e l s b o t h underground and p u b l i c l y . The FLQ i s n e c e s s a r y i n o r d e r t o meet the v i o l e n c e o f t h e p r e s e n t system w i t h r e v o l u t i o n a r y v i o l e n c e and t o c o n s t r u c t a new s o c i e t y , a f r e e s o c i e t y , f r e e from c o l o n i a l i s m , e x p l o i t a t i o n and f e a r . R e v o l u t i o n a r y a c t i v i t y i s n o t o n l y p l a n t i n g bombs o r t a k i n g up a gun, b u t w o r k i n g a t t h e same ti m e t o r a d i c a l i z e groups i n Quebec and o u t s i d e " (1) From t h i s s t a t e m e n t i t appears t h a t : - the u l t i m a t e g o a l o f the FLQ was t o b r i n g a r a d i c a l change i n Quebec s o c i e t y , e c o n o m i c a l l y , s o c i a l l y and p o l i t i c a l l y . - the more p r o x i m a t e g o a l s o f the FLQ were: - t o be c o n s i d e r e d as r e p r e s e n t i n g "a r e a l p o l i t i c a l f o r c e i n Quebec" and n o t o n l y a more o r l e s s c o n s i s t e n t group o f s p o r a d i c v i o l e n t a c t i v i s t s . R e t r o s p e c t i v e l y t h i s o r i e n t a -t i o n towards p o l i t i c a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v i t y appeared t o be one o f t h e l a n d marks o f P i e r r e V a l l i e r e s 1 c o l l a b o r a t i o n w i t h t h e movement: "By t h e t i m e V a l l i e r e s came t o t h e FLQ i n 1965 most o f t h e e a r l i e r "members" were i n j a i l . Few o f them had i d e o l o g i c a l c o n v i c t i o n s . Few were a b l e t o i n t e l l e t u a l i z e t h e i r c r i m i n a l a c t i v i t i e s , e x c e p t t h a t a l m o s t a l l had s u f f e r e d the deep h u r t o f b e i n g p u t down by E n g l i s h S p e a k i n g C a n a d i a n s . V a l l i e r e s was adept a t r o m a n t i c i z i n g t h e p a s t and c r e a t i n g t h e i l l u s i o n o f a c o n t i n u i n g underground p o l i t i c a l t e r r o r i s t movement." (2) P a s t developments ( l i k e t h e t r i a l o f V a l l i e r e s and Gagnon i n the La Grenade a f f a i r ) had proven t h e f r u i t f u l n e s s o f t h i s a p p r o ach: The a u t h o r i t i e s had been e x t r e m e l y un c i e v e r and awkward i n t h e i r t r e a t m e n t o f p o l i t i c a l p r o t e s t and t h e i r ex-c e s s e s had g e n e r a t e d a c u r r e n t o f sympathy f o r V a l l i e r e s and Gagnon ( c r e a t i o n o f t h e M.D.P.P.Q., movement f o r t h e Defence o f Quebec P o l i t i c a l P r i s o n e r s , i n f o r m a l s u p p o r t i n the P r e s s , l i k e t h e l e t t e r a d d r e s s e d by "a group o f C h r i s t i a n s o f t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f M o n t r e a l " and quoted i n G e r a r d P e l l e t i e r ' s O c t o b e r C r i s i s p 116) t o r a d i c a l i z e t he a l r e a d y e x i s t i n g examples o f spontaneous s o c i a l a g i t a t i o n l i k e t h e t r a d e u n i o n s , t h e c i t i z e n s ' com-m i t t e e s and t h e s t u d e n t a s s o c i a t i o n s On t he w h o l e , the t a c t i c a l o b j e c t i v e s o f t h e FLQ appeared t o be a t t h e t i m e : - t o g a i n p u b l i c r e c o g n i t i o n as a r e a l p o l i t i c a l f o r c e i n t h e P r o v i n c e - t o i n s e r t t h e m s e l v e s o p e n l y i n t h e p r o c e s s o f p o l i t i c a l d e c i s i o n s as one o f t h e emergent f o r c e s on Quebec c h a n g i n g p o l i t i c a l scene s i n c e t he days o f t h e q u i e t r e v o l u t i o n o r t o put i t i n Raymond B r e t o n ' s terms: " FLQ members wanted d e s p e r a t e l y t o be d e f i n e d as p o l i t i c a l enemies o f the e s t a b l i s h e d powers, a g o a l t h e y had f a i l e d t o a c h i e v e i n the p a s t . They wanted t o be a power i n t h e s o c i a l b a r g a i n i n g e q u a t i o n " (3) 2. THE FLQ OPTIONS Three main o p t i o n s were opened t o t h e FLQ g i v e n t h o s e o b j e c t i v e s : They c o u l d c o n t i n u e t h e p a t t e r n o f v i o l e n t a c t i o n s (bombing, r a i d s , h o l d u p s ) t o w h i c h t h e y had r e s o r t e d s i n c e 1963, t h e y c o u l d r a d i c a l i z e e x i s t i n g p r o t e s t movements i n o r d e r t o c r e a t e p u b l i c m a n i f e s t a t i o n l e a d i n g t o v i o l e n c e , o r d e v e l o p some form o f a c t i o n t h a t would f o r c e t h e a u t h o r i t i e s t o a head on c o n f r o n t a t i o n . - 52 -- 2. 1 C o n t i n u a t i o n o f the v i o l e n t a c t i o n s : In s p i t e o f t h e i r r e l a t i v e l y c o s t l e s s s e t up ( i n terms o f manpower and o t h e r r e s o u r c e s l i k e dynamite w h i c h was e a s y t o o b t a i n i n a C i t y l i k e M o n t r e a l u n d e r g o i n g a l a r g e program o f p u b l i c works) t h o s e a c t i o n s were o f l i t t l e bene-f i t ; r e s i d e n t s i n M o n t r e a l had more o r l e s s t a k e n them f o r a f a c t o f l i f e , l o s s o f i n n o c e n t l i v e s had d e t r a c t e d t h e i r e m o t i o n a l c o n t e n t and the p o l i c e f o r c e s had been h i g h l y s u c c e s s f u l i n c r a c k i n g t h e s u c c e s s i v e teams o f a c t i v i s t s , s i n c e the v e r y dynamics o f t h i s t y p e o f a c t i o n made them easy t a r g e t s f o r t h e a n t i t e r r o r i s t s q uad, as n o t e d by H aggart and G o l d e n : " There were s e v e r a l r e a s o n s f o r t h i s s u c c e s s ( o f the P o l i c e F o r c e s ) The FLQ needed t o b o a s t about i t s c r i m e s , and t h e r e was always a h i g h r a t e o f d e f e c t i o n , p a r t i c u l a r l y among a c t i v i s t s who became d i s i l l u s i o n e d a t t h e s l a u g h t e r o f i n n o c e n t v i c t i m s " (4) O t h e r t a c t i c s l i k e r a i d s a g a i n s t b a n k s , o r w a rehouses, were o f dubious r e v o l u t i o n a r y v a l u e and had more t o do w i t h t h e m aintenance o f the o r g a n i z a t i o n o r the i n d i v i d u a l needs o f t h e members tha n w i t h t h e f u l f i l l m e n t o f the c e n t r a l o b j e c t i v e s o f the FLQ. T h i s o p t i o n i n t h i s sense c o u l d h a r d l y p r o v i d e any s a t i s -f a c t o r y answer t o t h e p r oblem. - 2. 2 R a d i c a l i z e e x i s t i n g p r o t e s t s movements: T h i s o p t i o n , even i f i t c o u l d l e a d t o s p e c t a c u l a r r e s u l t s ( l i k e t h e Murray H i l l a f f a i r ) s u f f e r e d two main drawbacks: - i t o b l i g e d the o r g a n i z a t i o n t o keep a low p r o f i l e i n t h e a c t i o n , whose main c r e d i t was t o be g i v e n t o t h e p r o t e s t movement, whose o b j e c t i v e s c o u l d i n t h e end prove r a t h e r u n c o n g e n i a l t o t h e ones f o s t e r e d by the FLQ. - i t was c o s t l y i n terms o f r e s o u r c e s and t i m e , because i t r e q u i r e d a c o n s i d e r a b l e amount o f work i n r e c r u i t i n g o r i n f i l t r a t i n g and adequate competences t o i n f l u e n c e t h e d e c i s i o n s o f the movement. O b v i o u s l y n o t much o f immediate g a i n s c o u l d be o b t a i n e d from such an o p t i o n . Develop a form o f s p e c t a c u l a r a c t i o n t h a t w i l l o b l i g e the  Government t o d e a l w i t h t h e FLQ on p o l i t i c a l g r ounds: In t h i s r e s p e c t any form o f p o l i t i c a l k i d n a p p i n g appears t o be n e a r l y the o p t i m a l a c t i o n s i n c e : - i t tends t o g i v e t o the k i d n a p p e r s i n s t a n t p u b l i c r e c o g n i t i o n o r awareness both n a t i o n a l l y and i n t e r n a -t i o n a l l y (as i l l u s t r a t e d f o r example by t h e k i d n a p p i n g o f Juan F a n g i o i n Cuba i n 1956 by the C a s t r i s t movement, o r by P a t t y H e a r s t ' s k i d n a p p i n g by t h e S.L.A. o r by t h e a c t i o n s o f t h e Tupamaros) - i t tends t o f o r c e t h e a u t h o r i t i e s t o n e g o t i a t e w i t h t h e k i d n a p p e r s under p u b l i c p r e s s u r e , o r t o r e j e c t b l u n t l y t h e k i d n a p p e r s ' demands. In both c a s e s the r e s u l t s t e n d t o be damageable t o the a u t h o r i t i e s . In one case t h e y have t r o u b l e w i t h t h e i r h a r d l i n e r s , i n t h e o t h e r t h e y have t o f a c e the r e p r o a c h e s o f t h e o p i n i o n on t h e ground o f t h e i r " i n h u m a n i t y " . In t h a t sense k i d n a p p i n g i s b o th a p o t e n t i a l l y dangerous t r a p and a means t o o b t a i n c o n c e s s i o n s (money, l i b e r a t i o n o f p r i s o n e r s , p u b l i c i t y . . . ) - i t g i v e s t h e k i d n a p p e r s a good p r o t e c t i o n a g a i n s t i n -c r e a s e d and more a c t i v e p o l i c e a c t i o n s as l o n g as t h e y a r e a b l e t o d e t a i n t h e i r h o s t a g e . i t helps to maintain a good image f o r the movement as long as the hostage i s "humanely t r e a t e d and s a f e l y r e l e a s e d " i t creates an "event" s u s c e p t i b l e of extensive and con-tinuous coverage by the media e s p e c i a l l y by the e l e c -t r o n i c ones i t tends to give the impression of a "vacuum" i n the f i e l d of p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t i e s , which are o b l i g e d to keep a low p r o f i l e and are subjected to various pres-sures both e x t e r n a l l y ( i n t e r n a t i o n a l o p i n i o n , f o r e i g n governments) and i n t e r n a l l y (demands f o r increased p r o t e c t i o n , d i v i s i o n s on the course of action) Moreover, i t must be noted t h a t t h i s form of a c t i o n i s r a t h e r c o s t l e s s i n terms o f resources f o r the or-g a n i z a t i o n : The a c t i o n being accomplished by a small number of persons w i t h very l i m i t e d m a t e r i a l s (hand weapons, ca r s , hideout and cash f o r a l i m i t e d period) i s r a t h e r w e l l adapted to the urban context (anonimity, absence of personal r e l a t i o n s , m u l t i p l i c i t y of hideouts, a v a i l a b i l i t y of t r a n s p o r t a t i o n means) provides an e x c e l l e n t opportunity f o r f u r t h e r p o l i t i c a l developments and p o l i t i c a l a g i t a t i o n (vacuum i n p o l i t i c a l spheres, low p r o f i l e of the p o l i c e f o r c e s , extensive media coverage, development of supportive movements...) was at the time new i n North America or as expressed by John Saywell: " A l l evidence pointed to the e s c a l a t i o n o f r a d i c a l i s m and n a t i o n a l i s m , whether d i s t i n c t or j o i n e d i n the Province of Quebec. Only a few Canadians took s e r i o u s l y the evidence that r a d i c a l n a t i o n a l i s t s had adopted a s t r a t e g y f o r r e v o l u t i o n i n i t i a l l y designed f o r Banana r e p u b l i c s and the T h i r d World. Even those - i n the press or i n the P u b l i c - who could read the signs seemed t o discus s them as i d l e r h e t o r i c r a t h e r than impending r e a l i t y " (5) 3. THE FLQ CHOSEN ACTION "At 8:15 on Monday morning, October 5, two armed men pushed past the maid at 1297 Redpath Crescent i n Westmount. Wi t h i n minutes James Richard Cross, Senior B r i t i s h Trade Commissioner i n Montreal, had dressed under the b a r r e l of a sub-machine gun and been whisked away i n a t a x i " (6) At 12:00 an anonymous telephone c a l l d i r e c t s '. Radio S t a t i o n CKLM to a communique of the FLQ L i b e r a t i o n C e l l ' which s t a t e s that i n exchange f o r the safe r e l e a s e of J . Cross the a u t h o r i t i e s must: re l e a s e 23 " p o l i t i c a l p r i s o n e r s " whose names were l i s t e d provide an a i r c r a f t f o r t h e i r t r a n s p o r t a t i o n to Cuba or A l g e r i a t u r n over $500,000. i n gold bars r e i n s t a t e the Lapalme p o s t a l d r i v e r s i d e n t i f y the informer who helped P o l i c e Forces apprehend members of another FLQ c e l l p u b l i s h (newspaper, r a d i o , T.V.) the f u l l t e x t o f the FLQ manifesto cease a l l p o l i c e a c t i v i t i e s r e l a t e d to the kidnapping At t h i s p o i n t , i t seems important to n o t i c e the congruence between the implemented a c t i o n and the o b j e c t i v e s advocated by the FLQ: James Cross i s the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of a f o r e i g n n a t i o n whose importance i s s i g n i f i c a n t f o r both e n g l i s h speaking Canadians (emotionally and economically) and french Canadians ( c u l t u r a l l y ) i n terms of c r e d i b l e f o r e i g n e x p l o i t a t i o n (see the "Free S o c i e t y " Free from C o l o n i a l i s m and E x p l o i t a t i o n " from P. V a l l i e r e s ) The demand to p u b l i s h the FLQ manifesto and the use of the r a d i o to communicate with the a u t h o r i t i e s are designed to spread among the p u b l i c the awareness of the FLQ and of i t s o r i e n t a t i o n The demands to r e l e a s e the p o l i t i c a l p r i s o n e r s , to provide an a i r c r a f t f o r Cuba or A l g e r i a , to r e i n s t a t e the Lapalme p o s t a l d r i v e r s ( f o r whom P.M. Trudeau had r a t h e r arrogant unexpleted d e l e t i v e s ) are designed to prove t h a t the FLQ can change what had been described as u n f l e x i b l e d e c i s i o n s (since the " p o l i t i c a l p r i s o n e r s " had been deprived c o n d i t i o n a l l i b e r a t i o n ) The demands to p u b l i s h the manifesto and to r e i n s t a t e the Lapalme d r i v e r s are designed to show the s o l i d a r i t y o f the FLQ w i t h e x i s t i n g forms of S o c i a l P r o t e s t and d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n i n the Province. The other three remaining demands being o r i e n t e d towards the maintenance of the o r g a n i z a t i o n ( f i n a n c i a l resources, i n t e r n a l s e c u r i t y , e x t e r n a l s e c u r i t y ) However, a f t e r n e a r l y a week of n e g o t i a t i o n s i t appeared,as expressed i n J u s t i c e M i n i s t e r Choquette's statement of October 11, that i f the FLQ had been able to gain a f a i r amount of " p u b l i c i t y " i n the press ( d i f f u s i o n of the manifesto) and a c e r t a i n amount of v e r b a l support from the p o p u l a t i o n (as f o r example expressed i n the numerous hot l i n e s t h a t followed the d i f f u s i o n of the manifesto) and even some form of governmental r e c o g n i t i o n as a p o l i t i c a l f o r c e : "Without g i v i n g i n to undue pressure ;even dangerous pressure the ' r u l i n g a u t h o r i t i e s ' as you say are not unaware that there are areas of d i s c o n t e n t , without our s o c i e t y and t h a t . i n j u s t i c e e x i s t s ....On the contrary these opinions (the one of Mr. Cross' kidnappers) can be expressed i n a chat or a frank open d i s c u s s i o n between the d i f f e r e n t elements of s o c i e t y so as to c o n t r i b u t e to a c o n s t r u c t i v e and p o s i t i v e s o l u t i o n of our problems" (7) I t had been unable to i n f l u e n c e n o t i c e a b l y the Governmental d e c i s i o n process as f a r as the " p o l i t i c a l p r i s o n e r s " were concerned. This i n tur n was i d e n t i f i e d w i t h the f a c t that J . Cross,whatever h i s emotional r e p r e s e n t a t i v i t y , w a s a character of a too l i m i t e d importance to move Ottawa, and that a more val u a b l e hostage had to be secured to push the Government a b i t f u r t h e r i n i t s concessions. This was the aim of P i e r r e Laporte's kidnapping, a prominent member of the p o l i t i c a l establishment and an o l d l i b e r a l hand, as expressed i n the p r e l i m i n a -r y statement which accompanied the second communique o f the Chenier C e l l found at 9:00 A.M. on October 12: "In face of the p e r s i s t e n c e of the Governmental a u t h o r i t i e s i n not complying with the requirements of the FLQ and i n conformity with Plan 3 e s t a b l i s h e d e a r l i e r to provide f o r such a r e f u s a l , the Chenier f i n a n c i a l C e l l has j u s t kidnapped the M i n i s t e r of Unemployment and Quebec A s s i m i l a t i o n , P i e r r e Laporte The M i n i s t e r w i l l be executed Sunday evening at 10:00 P.M. i f between now and then the r u l i n g a u t h o r i t i e s have not responded favourably t o the seven demands set f o r t h f o l l o w i n g the kidnapping of Mr.James Cross. Any p a r t i a l assurance w i l l be considered as a r e f u s a l " (8) This time the blow was more serious and the a c t i o n apparently moved from Ottawa to Quebec where Premier Bourassa immediately had a meeting w i t h the Cabinet. During the f o l l o w i n g press conference j u s t before the 10:00 P.M. deadline Premier Bourassa s t a t e d that the a u t h o r i t i e s were ready to negoti a t e " I t i s because we p a r t i c u l a r l y want Mr. Laporte and Mr. Cross to l i v e t h a t we decide - before d i s c u s s i n g the demands that have  been made - to set up mechanisms that would guarantee, as Mr. Laporte says i t w i l l , t hat the r e l e a s e of the p o l i t i c a l p r i s o n e r s w i l l s u r e l y r e s u l t i n the safe r e l e a s e of the hostages" (9) However, the n e g o t i a t i o n s that followed between lawyer Demers on be h a l f of the Quebec Government and lawyer Lemieux on b e h a l f of the FLQ went r a p i d l y to a deadend, u n t i l Wednesday October 15, Premier Bourassa set a new governmental deadline, g i v i n g the FLQ 6 hours to accept c o n d i t i o n s that were n e a r l y the same as those proposed by J u s t i c e M i n i s t e r J . Choquette i n h i s press conference of October 11. Robert Lemieux was not long to express h i s f r u s t r a t i o n : "In o f f e r i n g to f r e e f i v e good Quebec guys who should have been p a r o l l e d a long time ago anyway and whose paroles are coming soon, the government i s simply mocking the people of Quebec. I urge the government to meet not i n the next few hours, but i n minutes and to reconsider. Reconsider t h i s t h i s i n c r e d i b l e mockery. My mandate has ended. I have nothing more to say..." Asked i f he was walking out of the n e g o t i a t i o n s Mr. Lemieux r e p l i e d " I have been thrown out on my ass" (10) As, however, some p u b l i c pressure to have the government negot i a t e was mounting (see the l e t t e r of the 14 prominent Quebecers or the support of the CNTU) and some student unrest was developing i n Montreal the FLQ decided to s e i z e the o p p o r t u n i t y i n order to have the govern-ment r e v e r t h i s p r i o r d e c i s i o n . In t h i s p e r s p e c t i v e P i e r r e V a l l i e r e s t o l d the 3,000 students present at the Paul Sauve arena on the evening of October 15: " ...The government clains the FLQ i s a small band of c r i m i n a l s ... But you are the FLQ and a l l the popular groups that f i g h t f o r the l i b e r a t i o n o f Quebec. We must organize the f i g h t f o r l i b e r a -t i o n i n every d i s t r i c t , i n each p l a n t , i n each o f f i c e , everywhere..." (11) 4. THE FLQ ANTICIPATED FUTURE ACTIONS On October 15 s e v e r a l a c t i o n s could be a n t i c i p a t e d from the FLQ - 4. 1 K i l l the hostages They could c a r r y on t h e i r t h r e a t to dispose of "the l i f e of the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of the ancient r a c i s t and c o l o n i a l i s t B r i t i s h System" ( l i b e r a t i o n c e l l communique #1) and/or to "execute M i n i s t e r P i e r r e Laporte" (chenier c e l l communique #1) - 59 -- 4. 2 Other kidnappings They could c a r r y on a t h i r d or f o u r t h kidnapping as ex-pressed i n P i e r r e Laporte's l e t t e r to Robert Bourassa " A f t e r me there w i l l be a t h i r d one,then a f o u r t h and a twe n t i e t h . I f a l l p o l i t i c a l men are pr o t e c t e d , they w i l l s t r i k e elsewhere i n other c l a s s e s of s o c i e t y " This t h r e a t was the more c r e d i b l e that the FLQ i n l e s s than a week a f t e r the kidnapping of J . Cross had been able i n l e s s than a few minutes a f t e r the r e j e c t i o n o f t h e i r f i r s t demands to kidnap a P r o v i n c i a l M i n i s t e r , who at the tim e was de f a c t o ( i n the absence of Robert Bourassa) Prime M i n i s t e r of the Province, and the t h r e a t was so i n t e n s e l y f e l t t hat "Mr. Charles B. Neapole, president of the Montreal and of the Canadian Stock Exchange, expressed h i s c o n v i c t i o n that he was the f o u r t h on the l i s t o f the FLQ's p o t e n t i a l v i c t i m s ..." (12) - 4. 3 S e l e c t i v e a s s a s s i n a t i o n They could indulge i n s e l e c t i v e a s s a s s i n a t i o n , as mentioned by Premier Bourassa i n h i s press conference i n the afternoon of October 16: " And they even made t h r e a t s o f s e l e c t e d a s s a s s i n a t i o n s as pa r t of the f o u r t h stage" 4.4 M a n i f e s t a t i o n s and R i o t s They could t r y to organize and develop the current of popular support, already e x i s t i n g i n some segments o f the po p u l a t i o n (students, workers) i n order to o b l i g e the a u t h o r i t i e s to come to term w i t h t h e i r demands ( p a r t i c u l a r l y w i t h the l i b e r a t i o n of the p o l i t i c a l p r i s o n e r s ) This s t r a t e g y , at the f i r s t glance, may appear r a t h e r r i s k y since the r i s k s of s p i l l - o v e r s ( r i o t s , s t r e e t d i s o r d e r s ) i n v o l v e d but a second look r e v e a l s that on these grounds the FLQ had nothing to los e . A few v i c t i m s would have given the cause p r o v i d e n t i a l martyrs that i n t u r n could have helped m o b i l i z e p u b l i c o p i n i o n . Apparently, t h i s e v e n t u a l i t y was a great subject of concern among the a u t h o r i t i e s , as expressed by Gerald P e l l e t i e r : "One of my sharpest f e a r s during t h i s part o f the c r i s i s was that a group of extremist students b e l i e v i n g the great day had come, would go out i n t o the s t r e e t s and create d i s t u r b a n c e s , which, w i t h the p o l i c e and the army exhausted might have ended i n shooting. I perhaps y i e l d e d to a tendancy towards alarmism: Yet t h i s k i n d of scenario has already been played out too o f t e n to make i t necessary to argue f o r i t s p l a u s i b i l i t y " (13) or by Prime M i n i s t e r Trudeau during an i n t e r v i e w w i t h M a r t i n on Format 60 on November 3: " . . . I f t r o u b l e had s t a r t e d , i f maybe i n defence o f l i v e s or goods, p i s t o l shots had been f i r e d on one si d e or another and that there had been perhaps two deaths l i k e i n Kent S t a t e . . . " (14) Those four conjectures seemed to be at the time, the only c r e d i b l e ones. However, as two others have been mentioned we must make them some j u s t i c e : The t h r e a t to overthrow the Quebec Government by f o r c e which has been dismissed by both Gerald P e l l e t i e r : "No one, I t h i n k , has ever assumed that there was a r e v o l u t i o n a r y army poised to overthrow the Quebec Government by f o r c e . . . " (15) and other commentators l i k e Denis Smith: "There was no d e c i s i v e concealed evidence o f an imminent c i v i l u p r i s i n g " (16) The " p r o v i s i o n a l governmental p l o t " which was mentioned l a t e l y through a w e l l managed leak i n the press and to which no c r e d i -b i l i t y was given i n Quebec (as expressed by Premier Bourassa "such an i l l u s o r y hypotheses"(17) and very l i t t l e i n Ottawa: "There was never of course a conspiracy to set up a p r o v i s i o n a l government i n Quebec. There was simply s p e c u l a t i o n s that i t might become necessary" (18) "The s t o r y ("Ryan has been out to take over the government") was o b v i o u s l y taken s e r i o u s l y , but my own cabinet sources i n d i c a t e that i t was never advanced as the major reason f o r imposing War Measures" (19) and which can be b e t t e r understood as a stone sent by P.E. Trudeau i n C. Ryan's n i c e l y - t e n d e d monastic gardens (who was the only c u l p r i t , w i t h maybe Rene Levesque, to be s i n g l e d out i n a group which included three Union leader s , a h i g h l y respected Academic and the President o f the C r e d i t Union movement). More-over, t h i s argument can h a r d l y r e s i s t to the f a c t that as the e d i t o r of the small but b i b l e - l i k e Le Devoir, Claude Ryan i s more i n f l u e n c i a l o u t s ide than w i t h i n any Quebec Government ( p r o v i s i o n a l or not) As the a u t h o r i t i e s ' o b j e c t i v e s have been the center of numerous co n t r o v e r s i e s a r i s i n g from the d e c i s i o n to use the War Measures Act we s h a l l t r e a t the problem a b i t d i f f e r e n t l y that i n the case of the FLQ; i n ther sense that we s h a l l f i r s t t r y to determine the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a t t r i b u t e s of the a u t h o r i t i e s ' chosen a c t i o n , i n f e r from those the o b j e c t i v e s the a u t h o r i t i e s were t r y i n g to maximize and check whether those o b j e c t i v e s could have been b e t t e r f u l f i l l e d by other a l t e r n a t i v e s which were at the a u t h o r i t i e s ' d i s p o s a l at the time. In t h i s way, we wish to reduce,as much as p o s s i b l e , the number of p o s s i b l e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s that have been proposed to e x p l a i n the government's a c t i o n s . 5. THE AUTHORITIES CHOSEN ACTIONS Between October 15, 3:07 P.M., and October 16, 4:00 A.M., three a c t i o n s were taken by the a u t h o r i t i e s : they had the Canadian Armed Forces intervene i n Montreal - • they had the D i r e c t o r of the Q.P.P., Maurice St. P i e r r e , take charge of the command of a l l p o l i c e and a l l i n v o l v e d armed forc e s i n the Province they had the Governor i n Council (which i s i n f a c t the Cabinet) p r o c l a i m the existence of a s t a t e of apprehended i n s u r r e c t i o n , which i n t u r n provided ground ( c o n c l u s i v e evidence) f o r the proclamation of the War Measures Act and of the subsequent P u b l i c Order Regulations as mentioned i n the formal statement issued by the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s o f f i c e at 5:17 A.M. on October 16: "Whereas the War Measures Act provides that the i s s u e of a pro-clamation under the a u t h o r i t y o f the Governor i n Council s h a l l be c o n c l u s i v e evidence that i n s u r r e c t i o n , r e a l or apprehended e x i s t s and has e x i s t e d f o r any p e r i o d of time t h e r e i n s t a t e d and i t s continuance, u n t i l by the i s s u e of a f u r t h e r proclamation i t i s declared that the i n s u r r e c t i o n no longer e x i s t s " (20) 5. 1 The a t t r i b u t e s o f the Canadian Army i n t e r v e n t i o n : Since the Canadian l e g i s l a t i o n s t r o n g l y l i m i t s the power o f the Army i n the case of a s s i s t a n c e to the C i v i l Powers (they cannot make a r r e s t s d i r e c t l y without being accompanied by law enforcement o f f i c e r s ) , the i n t e r v e n t i o n of the Army has mainly two dominant a t t r i b u t e s : i t provides f o r armed manpower i n p r o t e c t i v e tasks : ( b u i l d i n g s , p e r s o n a l i t i e s , s t r a t e g i c p o i n t s ) i t provides f o r manpower equipped and t r a i n e d f o r massive search operations e s p e c i a l l y i n r u r a l areas - 63 -- 5. 2 The a t t r i b u t e s of the nomination of the Q.P.P. d i r e c t o r  at the head of the law enforcement personnel The obvious a t t r i b u t e of t h i s a c t i o n appears to be the f a c t t h a t i t e s t a b l i s h e d some u n i t y of command among the v a r i o u s for c e s i n v o l v e d i n law enforcement (Municipal P o l i c e Forces, Q.P.P., R.C.M.P. and Canadian Armed Forces). Such a move takes f u l l s i g n i f i c a n c e when the need i s f e l t f o r coordina-ted operations i n v o l v i n g numerous and d i f f e r e n t i a t e d person-n e l . Moreover, the choice of the D i r e c t o r of the Q.P.P. makes r e a l sense only i f t h i s need f o r c o o r d i n a t i o n i s f e l t , a l l over the Province and not o n ly i n a l i m i t e d area l i k e Montreal ( f o r which the D i r e c t o r of the Montreal P o l i c e , should have been the optimal candidate) The i n t e r v e n t i o n of the Canadian Army and the c e n t r a l i z a -t i o n of P o l i c e powers seem to correspond to a p a t t e r n of q u a n t i t a t i v e and q u a l i t a t i v e reinforcement of the P o l i c e powers annunciating the development of massive p o l i c e a c t i o n s . 5.3 The a t t r i b u t e s of the War Measures Act Four main a t t r i b u t e s appear to be of some relevance i n our a n a l y s i s : i t i s a very comprehensive piece of l e g i s l a t i o n as noted by Gerald P e l l e t i e r : " . . . i t i s wide i n i t s powers (among other things i t gives the a u t h o r i t i e s the r i g h t to f o r b i d the s a l e o f g a s o l i n e and to r a t i o n c o f f e e ) . . . " (21) even excessive f o r the case at hand as noted by Anthony W e s t e l l : " He (P.E. Trudeau) recognized that the massive powers a v a i l a b l e under the War Measures Act were o v e r k i l l " (22) - 64 -- i t i s a p i e c e o f l e g i s l a t i o n t h a t p e r m i t s the C a b i n e t t o by-pass P a r l i a m e n t w h i c h means t h a t i t tends both t o reduce the p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f c o n t r o l and t o i n c r e a s e t h e Government e x p e d i e n c y . These c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s were n o t u n n o t i c e d by f o r m e r P r e m i e r MacKenzie K i n g , who m entioned i n 1939 t h a t t h e War Measures A c t was: "A law o f i n e s t i m a b l e v a l u e s i n c e i t p e r m i t t e d t h e Government t o t a k e a l l n e c e s s a r y measures w i t h o u t h a v i n g t o w a i t f o r t h e P a r l i a m e n t " (23) - i t i s a r a t h e r u n d i s c r i m i n a t i v e p i e c e o f l e g i s l a t i o n s i n c e a p p a r e n t l y i t was a p p l i c a b l e a l l o v e r Canada ( a p p a r e n t l y i t s a p p l i c a b i l i t y c o u l d n o t be l i m i t e d d i r e c t l y t o one s i n g l e P r o v i n c e ) - i t can o n l y be i n v o k e d under c o n d i t i o n s o f " r e a l o r apprehended i n s u r r e c t i o n " as d e f i n e d by t h e C a b i n e t - 5. 4 The a t t r i b u t e s o f the P u b l i c O r d e r R e g u l a t i o n s The P u b l i c O r d e r R e g u l a t i o n s p r o c l a i m e d by t h e Government i s t o be compared t o the e x i s t i n g l e g a l p r o v i s i o n s o f the c r i m i n a l code i n o r d e r t o s i n g l e b u t i t s main d i s t i n c t i v e f e a t u r e s . On t h e b a s i s o f such a " m a r g i n a l " a n a l y s i s f o u r main a t t r i b u t e s appear as c h a r a c t e r i z i n g t h e P u b l i c O r d e r R e g u l a t i o n s . - 5. 4 1. E x t e n s i o n o f P o l i c e Powers: One o f t h e s a l i e n t f e a t u r e s o f the R e g u l a t i o n s was t o i n c r e a s e s i g n i f i c a n t l y the powers a v a i l a b l e t o t h e Po-l i c e F o r c e s , as n o t e d f o r example by Douglas A. S c h m e i s e r "The most l e g a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t e f f e c t o f the emergency l e g i s l a t i o n i s t o t a k e away t h e r e q u i r e m e n t t h a t p o l i c e o f f i c e r s a c t r e a s o n a b l y . . . The key d i s t i n c t i o n , I would s u g g e s t a r e found i n the p r o v i s i o n s d e a l i n g w i t h a r r e s t and w i t h s e a r c h and s e i z u r e . You w i l l r e c a l l t h a t under the C r i m i n a l Code a p o l i c e o f f i c e r can a r r e s t o n l y on r e a s o n a b l e and p r o b a b l e g rounds. Under S e c t i o n 9 o f t h e new A c t a p o l i c e o f -f i c e r may a r r e s t w i t h o u t w a r r a n t a p e r s o n "who he has r e a s o n " t o s u s p e c t i s a member o f an u n l a w f u l a s s o c i a t i o n o r who "he has r e a s o n t o s u s p e c t " has committed o r i s about t o commit any o f t h e a c t i o n s p r e s c r i b e d by S e c t i o n 4 o f t h e A c t ... The same phrase " r e a s o n t o s u s p e c t " i s found i n t h e p r o -v i s i o n s r e l a t i n g t o e n t r y o f p r e m i s e s s e a r c h and s e i z u r e . O r d i n a r i l y , a p o l i c e o f f i c e r can e n t e r p r e m i s e s o n l y when a c t i n g under a s e a r c h w a r r a n t i s s u e d by a c o u r t . Under th e A c t however, a p o l i c e o f f i c e r may e n t e r and s e a r c h w i t h o u t w a r r a n t any p r e m i s e s , o r s e i z e any p r o p e r t y i f he has " r e a s o n t o s u s p e c t t h a t t h e s e a r c h o r p r o p e r t y w i l l p r o v i d e e v i d e n c e o f a v i o l a t i o n o f the A c t . . . " (24) o r by W a l t e r S t e w a r t "The new r e g u l a t i o n s p e r m i t t e d p o l i c e t o s e a r c h w i t h o u t w a r r a n t , a r r e s t w i t h o u t c h a r g e and h o l d w i t h o u t b a i l p e r sons t h e y s u s p e c t e d o f a c t i n g i n c o n t r a v e n t i o n o f the A c t " (25) Semi o f f i c i a l c e n s o r s h i p o f t h e p r e s s : S e c t i o n 4b o f the P u b l i c Order R e g u l a t i o n s p r o v i d e s that: "A p e r s o n who communicates s t a t e m e n t s ( i n c l u d e s words spoken o r w r i t t e n o r r e c o r d e d e l e c t r o n i c a l l y o r e l e c t r o -m a g n e t i c a l l y o r o t h e r w i s e , and g e s t u r e s , s i g n s o r o t h e r v i s i b l e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s ) on b e h a l f o f o r as a r e p r e -s e n t a t i v e o r p r o f e s s e d r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f the u n l a w f u l a s s o c i a t i o n . . . i s g u i l t y o f an i n d i c t a b l e o f f e n c e and l i a b l e t o i m p r i s o n m e n t f o r a term n o t e x c e e d i n g f i v e y e a r s " T h i s was q u i c k l y i n t e r p r e t e d by t h e media as a l a t e n t p r o v i s i o n f o r c e n s o r s h i p , as mentioned by E a r l e B e a t t i e "I n O c t o b e r t h e media became so d e e p l y i n v o l v e d i n r e p o r t i n g N o r t h A m e r i c a ' s f i r s t p o l i t i c a l k i d n a p p i n g by the FLQ t h a t t h e F e d e r a l Government c u r t a i l e d t h e i r c o v e r a g e under a u t h o r i t y o f t h e W.M.A. and i t s s u c c e s s o r t h e P u b l i c O r d e r (emergency measures) A c t . . . " (26) - 66 -o r by the London Observer: "The A c t b e s i d e s o u t l a w i n g the FLQ p r o v i d e s f o r pe-n a l t i e s o f up t o f i v e y e a r s i m p r i s o n m e n t f o r a s s i s t i n g i t o r i t s members i n any way. F o r i n s t a n c e , j o u r n a l i s t s who p u b l i s h o r b r o a d c a s t s t a t e m e n t s from t h e group c o u l d be a r r e s t e d " (27) - 5. 4 3. Redundancy o f the r e p r e s s i v e p r o v i s i o n s S e v e r a l commentators emphasized the p o i n t t h a t t h e p r o v i s i o n s i n c l u d e d i n t h e P u b l i c Order R e g u l a t i o n s were m e r e l y redundant t o , o r even weaker th a n e x i s t i n g p r o v i s i o n s a l r e a d y i n c l u d e d i n t h e C a n a dian C r i m i n a l Code, as m entioned f o r example by Douglas A. S c h n e i s e r " I t i s a c c o r d i n g l y s u g g e s t e d t h a t t h e sweeping p r o -v i s i o n s o f t h e o f f e n c e s d i s c u s s e d above (murder, t h r e a t o f murder, k i d n a p p i n g , m a l i c i o u s d e s t r u c t i o n o f p r o -p e r t y , p o s s e s s i o n o f e x p l o s i v e s , p o s s e s s i o n o f o f f e n s i v e weapons and f i r e a r m s , t h r e a t e n i n g t o i n j u r e o r t o d e s t r o y p r o p e r t y , o b s t r u c t i n g j u s t i c e , r e s i s t i n g o r o b s t r u c t i n g a p o l i c e o f f i c e r , t r e a s o n , u n l a w f u l assem-b l i e s and r i o t s and s e d i t i o n ) c o u p l e d w i t h t h e sweeping n o t i o n about p a r t i e s t o o f f e n c e s a d e q u a t e l y c o v e r any o v e r t c o n d u c t on t h e p a r t o f an i n s u r g e n t o r r e v o l u t i o n a -r y " (28) - 5. 4 4. I n a p p l i c a b i l i t y o f t h e r e p r e s s i v e p r o v i s i o n s S e v e r a l c r i t i c a l l i m i t a t i o n s have i n e f f e c t been d e t e c t e d by v a r i o u s l e g a l commentators - The e x i s t i n g c o n t r a d i c t i o n between t h e P u b l i c Order R e g u l a t i o n s and the p r o v i s i o n s o f S e c t i o n 6 o f the R e g u l a t i o n s A c t , o r as remarked by Douglas A. S c h m e i s e r "The emergency r e g u l a t i o n s were n o t exempted from th e o p e r a t i o n o f the R e g u l a t i o n s A c t and t h e r e c e r t a i n l y i s n o t doubt t h a t a t t h e d a t e o f t h e a l l e g e d c o n t r a v e n t i o n s r e a s o n a b l e s t e p s had n o t been t a k e n t o b r i n g t h e p r o c l a m a t i o n t o the a t t e n t i o n o f the p ersons c h a r g e d - i n f a c t t h e o r i g i n a l a r r e s t s were shrouded i n s e c r e c y " (29) The s e v e r e r e s t r i c t i o n s on r e t r o a c t i v e a p p l i c a t i o n s o r as n o t e d by S c h m e i s e r " I t i s a c a r d i n a l p r i n c i p l e o f the c r i m i n a l law t h a t a penal s t a t u t e does n o t a p p l y r e t r o a c t i v e l y i . e . an a c t must be an o f f e n c e a t the t i m e i t i s committed b e f o r e i t i s p u n i s h a b l e . The p r o s e c u t i o n s under the new A c t however, would n o r m a l l y r e l a t e t o c o n d u c t p r i o r t o i t s e n a c t m e n t . . B e c a u s e o f the g e n e r a l approach o f the c r i m i n a l law and because o f t h e r e v e r s i o n o f j u r o r s a g a i n s t ex f a c t o l a w s , s u c -c e s s f u l p r o s e c u t i o n s would be v e r y d i f f i c u l t i f n o t i m p o s s i b l e . " (30) - The f a c t t h a t the P u b l i c O r d e r R e g u l a t i o n s a r e a u s u r p a t i o n o f the j u d i c i a l f u n c t i o n o r as n o t e d by P r o f e s s o r Noel Lyon " P r o f e s s o r Lyon goes On t o c l a s s i f y t h e R e g u l a t i o n s as a " c r i m i n a l c l a s s a c t i o n " . The j u d i c i a r y , he s t a t e s , i s reduced t o t h e r o l e o f t i m e k e e p e r , k e e p i n g t r a c k o f who a t t e n d s what meetings and speaks o r communicates what s t a t e m e n t s on b e h a l f o f an a s s o c i a t i o n . Thus, he c o n c l u d e s t h a t c r i -m i n a l g u i l t i s d e t e r m i n e d n o t by the c o u r t s b u t by e x e c u t i v e d e c r e e . " (31) 6. THE AUTHORITIES' OBJECTIVES From what we have l e a r n e d from the a t t r i b u t e s o f t h e a c t i o n s chosen by the a u t h o r i t i e s i t appears t h a t some p o t e n t i a l o b j e c t i v e s can be r u l e d o u t w i t h l i t t l e chance o f e r r o r : - 6. 1 " F i n d t h e t e r r o r i s t s and Free t h e h o s t a g e s " The s e t o f measures had n o t h i n g d i r e c t l y t o do w i t h t h e c a s e o f P. L a p o r t e and J . C r o s s . F o r example, as d e n i e d by Anthony W e s t e l l "A more p r a g m a t i c c r i t i c i s m o f t h e use o f the War Measures A c t was t h a t i t proved q u i t e u n n e c e s s a r y f o r t r a c k i n g the t e r r o r i s t s . T h at was done by normal p o l i c e work under the r e g u l a r powers i n t h e C r i m i n a l Code. But t h e c r i t i c i s m overlooked the f a c t t h a t the d e c i s i o n to invoke emergency powers was never based on a declared need to f i n d the t e r r o r i s t s and f r e e the hostages" (32) In f a c t i f one considers the evidence at hand i t appears that numerous reasons preclude t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n : the a u t h o r i t i e s i n t h i s p e r s p e c t i v e had other a l t e r n a -t i v e s a v a i l a b l e : T a i l s on the suspects' f r i e n d s and r e l a t i v e s (which at the time were p o s i t i v e l y i d e n t i f i e d ) rewards f o r information l e a d i n g to the capture of the suspects (which had been used e a r l i e r i n 1970), massive search operations w i t h the. help of the army (the p o l i c e forces were b e l i e v e d t o know the "general" area where the v i c t i m s were detained) They seemed more e f f e c t i v e than r e l y i n g on the p r o v i s i o n s of the P u b l i c Order Act to a r r e s t and d e t a i n everybody more or l e s s connected to the FLQ (which i s r a t h e r a very i n d i r e c t way to approach the problem) i t would have been a very r i s k y s t r a t e g y : For two l i m i t e d and dubious r e s u l t s ( l o c a t i n g the hideouts, which d i d not change much the equation o f the problem s i n c e the kidnappers were s t i l l i n possession of t h e i r hostages and " d r y i n g the pond of p o t e n t i a l support" which could have been d i f f i c u l t l y exhaustive) the a u t h o r i t i e s would have r i s k e d the l i v e s o f Laporte and Cross (which they had been r a t h e r anxious to save f o r the past 11 days) the p r o v i s i o n s of the P u b l i c Order Regulations: In t h i s p e r s p e c t i v e what could have been the use of c r e a t i n g a new crime since the a r r e s t e d persons would have been proven g u i l t y or not g u i l t y o f an e x i s t i n g crime (com-p l i c i t y i n kidnapping)? Why d i d the r e g u l a t i o n s i n c l u d e p r o v i s i o n s against those "advocating or p u b l i c i z i n g FLQ - 69 -statements" since those were not r e t r o a c t i v e ? A l a r g e part of the P u b l i c Order Regulations become i r r e l e v a n t i n t h i s p e r s p e c t i v e . - 6. 2 "Counteract an apprehended i n s u r r e c t i o n " The set of measures had nothing d i r e c t l y to do w i t h the e x i s -tence of a s t a t e of "apprehended i n s u r r e c t i o n " . Numerous evidences permit to d i s c a r d t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n the a v a i l a b i l i t y of other a l t e r n a t i v e s : In the case of an "apprehended i n s u r r e c t i o n " (33) the proclamation o f the M a r t i a l Law would have seemed more appropriate to c o n t r o l armed and concerted v i o l e n t developments the equipment the m i l i t a r y forces d i s p l a y e d i n Montreal: In the case of an apprehended i n s u r r e c t i o n the m i l i t a r y f orces would have been dispatched w i t h heavy m a t e r i a l (armoured c a r s , personnel c a r r i e r s , heavy machine guns, tanks) but on the contrary they were only equipped w i t h submachine guns and t r u c k s the l o c a t i o n of the armed forces i n Montreal: In the case of an apprehended i n s u r r e c t i o n the armed for c e s would c e r t a i n l y have t r i e d to surround the areas from which most of the t r o u b l e could be expected ( l i k e St. H e n r i , f o r example) but on the contrary they were mostly l o c a t e d i n the business d i s t r i c t s and the well-to-do suburbs of Westmount or V i l l e Mont-Royal. In the same way they would have given heavy p r o t e c t i o n to s t r a t e g i c l o c a t i o n s but the road-blocks, which they i n s t a l l e d on the bridges f o r example, were i d e n t i c a l to those set up by p o l i c e forces i n o r d i n a r y occasions to check t r a f f i c . On the other hand, i t must be noted that the proclamation of a state of "apprehended insurrection" was the limiting factor in the proclamation of the W.M.A. and of the subse-quent emergency measures. 6. 3 Counteract further acts of selective violence The interpretation, by which the authorities were specifically trying to counteract further acts of selective violence (bombings, murders, kidnappings), suffers several short-comings : Specific pieces of legislation like the Quebec Coroner's Act or the Firearm Act, had already given the police forces extended powers of search and arrest emergency legislation would have then been unnecessary i f this had been the objective of the Government Numerous provisions were already existing in the Criminal Code (and those provisions had been already successfully employed against FLQ members) to curb nearly any type of violence against persons or properties It renders meaningless most of the content of the Public Order Regulations especially those provisions against "communicating, advocating and promoting" Those objectives having been discarded i f one tries now to reconstruct the objective the authorities appeared to maxi-mize one cannot f a i l to conclude that the authorities were simply trying to "freeze" the p o l i t i c a l situation in the Province. in providing the police forces with instant and massive powers of arrests, against a l l those that could be p u b l i c l y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the s e p a r a t i s t movement, and i d e n t i f i e d as i t s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s or even simply as i t s proponents i n urging other i n s t i t u t i o n s l i k e the media,the trade unions or the l e g a l independantists movements to show more r e s t r a i n t under the t h r e a t of an extended implementation o f the P u b l i c Order Regulations In order to o b l i g e the FLQ to f o l d and to accept the u l t i -mate proposal set f o r t h by Robert Bourassa, which d i d not give much but provided the kidnappers w i t h a minimal face saving device i n exchange of the safe r e l e a s e of the hosta-.ges. From the a u t h o r i t i e s p o i n t of view the set of chosen measures was p e r m i t t i n g to reduce at minimal l e v e l the mounting pressures urging the Government to neg o t i a t e and which could have l e d to p u b l i c m a n i f e s t a t i o n s and to serious p u b l i c d i s o r d e r s . to develop a form of a d m i n i s t r a t i v e internment ( d i s c r e -t i o n a r y a r r e s t plus detention without t r i a l ) p reventing the resumption of the s o c i a l unrest that had preceded the proclamation of the W.M.A. A d d i t i o n a l l y the s i t u a t i o n r e s u l t i n g from the proclamation of the W.M.A., had f u r t h e r b e n e f i c i a l consequences f o r the a u t h o r i t i e s : i t was d r y i n g out the pool of support on which the kidnappers could count i n order to o b t a i n i n f o r m a t i o n s h e l t e r and funds i t was reducing the r i s k s of f u r t h e r s e l e c t i v e v i o l e n c e . by the magnitude of the planned round up and by the checks more numerous p o l i c e f o r c e s (as supported by the army) w i t h sweeping search powers could impose on the m o b i l i t y of would-be t e r r o r i s t s i t was o s t e n s i b l y g i v i n g back the i n i t i a t i v e to the a u t h o r i t i e s and cornering the FLQ e i t h e r to f o l d or to commit a c o l d blooded a s s a s s i n a t i o n which would undoubtedly be d e t r i m e n t a l to i t s image In t h i s p e r s p e c t i v e the p r o v i s i o n s f o r f u r t h e r prosecutions (which we have noted were weak, redundant and more or l e s s a p p l i c a b l e ) included i n the P u b l i c Order Regulations were nothing more than dummies s e r v i n g as an umbrella to the extension of (quasi p o l i t i c a l ) p o l i c e powers that could only have been enforced under ex c e p t i o n a l contingencies thanks to the " r e a l i s m and progmatism" of the c o u r t s . But thanks to the improved means to c o l l e c t evidence given to the p o l i c e forces and the l i m i t a t i o n s exerted on the FLQ o p t i o n s , the usual p r o v i s i o n s of the C r i m i n a l Code were l i k e l y to be s u f f i c i e n t and the emergency measures could be confined to the emergency of the s i t u a t i o n without generating any unhealthy r e p r e s s i o n . The p o l i c e forces gathered t h e i r f i l e s and s t a r t e d the round up at 4:00 A.M. on October 16 7. HAD THE AUTHORITIES OTHER ALTERNATIVES? Apparently a few other a l t e r n a t i v e s were considered by the a u t h o r i t i e s The t o t a l acceptance of the rLQ demands had been r e j e c t e d and the a u t h o r i t i e s had to face the r i s k s o f a p o t e n t i a l e s c a l a t i o n i n v i o l e n c e . At t h i s l e v e l , i f we are to b e l i e v e Gerald P e l l e t i e r : " I have s t a t e d above that only l i m i t e d means of defence are a v a i l a b l e to a modern s t a t e when a t h r e a t to i t s i n t e r n a l s e c u r i t y must be countered. On the other hand the a p p l i c a t i o n of these means can vary i n i n t e n s i t y and d u r a t i o n " (34) A l t e r n a t i v e s are l i m i t e d e s p e c i a l l y as he f u r t h e r notes, one considers " . . . t h a t Canada, no doubt because of i t s peaceful past, had a v a i l a b l e no other r e s t r i c t i v e law that was more l i m i t e d and b e t t e r adapted to the problem" (35) Apparently, the only other way, which the Government t r i e d to explore, was to pass some ad-hoc piece of l e g i s l a t i o n through Parliament, as revealed by J u s t i c e M i n i s t e r John Turner i n h i s speech i n defence of Government a c t i o n on October 16: "This l e f t o n l y two p o s s i b l e courses of a c t i o n . The Government could have sought s p e c i a l l e g i s l a t i o n of the type embodied i n the r e g u l a -t i o n s which have been brought i n t o f o r c e under the War Measures or a l t e r n a t i v e l y the War Measures Act could have been r e s o r t e d to I suggest to the House that i f a s p e c i a l piece of l e g i s l a t i o n had been r e s o r t e d t o , the p r o v i s i o n s might w e l l have been s i m i l a r to the p r o v i s i o n s now found i n the r e g u l a t i o n s . But t h i s Government was assured by the Government of Quebec and by s e n i o r persons d i r e c t l y i n v o l v e d w i t h attempting to cope w i t h the t e r r o r i s t s that a search and a r r e s t o p e r a t i o n of considerable magnitude d i r e c t e d at the FLQ was necessary and that time was of the essence. Our i n i t i a l r e a c t i o n was the r e a c t i o n of s e v e r a l Members of the House to seek the a u t h o r i t y of Parliament f i r s t . But faced w i t h the seriousness of the s i t u a t i o n and w i t h the n e c e s s i t y of not broad-c a s t i n g what the Government of Quebec and the Government of Canada in t e n t e d to do, faced w i t h the urgency of a n t i c i p a t i n g any f u r t h e r e s c a l a t i o n of the s i t u a t i o n i n Montreal, the Government of Canada r e s o r t e d to the War Measures A c t " (36) From what has f i l t e r e d from Cabinet d i s c u s s i o n s , the only t h i n g we can i n f e r i s the f a c t that the War Measures Act and the I n t e r v e n t i o n of the army have been p o l a r i z i n g the debates si n c e October 11 and that apparently no other a l t e r n a t i v e s have been considered. To a c e r t a i n p o i n t t h i s i s not a s t o n i s h i n g , parliamentary democraties ( e s p e c i a l l y of B r i t i s h o r i g i n s ) have g e n e r a l l y as a r u l e very few p r o v i s i o n s that could provide f o r a d m i n i s t r a t i v e internment. 8. VARIATION ON THE UNITARY ACTOR THEME In h i s a n a l y s i s of p o s s i b l e v a r i a n t s of the c l a s s i c a l model Graham A l l i s o n mentions: "A r e l a t e d but nevertheless d i f f e r e n t type of a n a l y s i s focuses e x p l i c i t e l y on an i n d i v i d u a l leader or l e a d e r s h i p c l i q u e as the actor whose preference f u n c t i o n i s maximized and whose personal (or group) c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s are allowed to modify the b a s i c concepts of the paradigm. This i n d i v i d u a l ' s weighing of goals and o b j e c t i v e s , tendencies to perceive (and to exclude) p a r t i c u l a r range of a l t e r -n a t i v e s and p r i n c i p l e s employed i n e s t i m a t i n g the consequences that f o l l o w from each a l t e r n a t i v e serve as the b a s i c framework w i t h i n which the choice must be l o c a t e d " (37) As s e v e r a l commentators have been e x p l i c i t e l y r e f e r r i n g to the problem i n these terms, i . e . , t r y i n g to give a c e n t r a l place to P.E. Trudeau's motives and p r e j u d i c e s , i t appears t h a t some j u s t i c e must be rendered to the two f o l l o w i n g t h e o r i e s : - The theory that P.E. Trudeau had conspired to exaggerate the t h r e a t from the FLQ i n order to a t t a c k and d i s c r e d i t the demo-c r a t i c s e p a r a t i s t movement This i n t e r p r e t a t i o n seems to ignore f a c t o r s among which numerous statements from P.E. Trudeau hims e l f : " I would make every e f f o r t to make that d i s t i n c t i o n to make sure that there i s no m i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , no p o s s i b i l i t y of t h i n k i n g that a l l s e p a r a t i s t s b e l i e v e i n v i o l e n c e because a few FLQ have used v i o l e n c e to promote separatism" (38) and from se v e r a l Federal M i n i s t e r s l i k e Bryce MacKasey: "When we t r y to equate the FLQ and the P a r t i Quebecois we are equating b a n d i t s , t e r r o r i s t s and part of an i n t e r n a t i o n a l move-ment with a l e g i t i m a t e p o l i t i c a l p a r t y i n t h i s country" (39) He then added, i n one of h i s t y p i c a l I r i s h outbursts t h a t : "He would give h i s l i f e f o r the P.Q. to s u r v i v e " or Gerald P e l l e t i e r : " I t would of course be absurd to confuse the o b j e c t i v e s of the FLQ and those of the P a r t i Quebecois" (40) On other grounds such an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n g e n e r a l l y ignores the f a c t that even i f such a motive had been behind the War Measures Act, i t would have been remarkably u n s u c c e s s f u l . i n the b y - e l e c t i o n i n Chambly (which was P i e r r e Laporte's former r i d i n g ) The P.Q. made 33% of the votes (over the average, 27%, which i t made i n the 1970 e l e c t i o n s ) and three years l a t e r i t became the o f f i c i a l op-p o s i t i o n i n the Quebec Province a f t e r having improved i t s 1970 score. - The theory that P.E. Trudeau had conspired to get r i d (by l e g a l means) of the l e f t i s t o p p o s i t i o n i n Quebec Even i f more grounded or former statements of the Prime M i n i s t e r i t i s shaded by s e v e r a l f a c t s : the absence of c o n v i c t i o n s against the " b i g f i v e " i n 1971. the resumption o f t e r r o r i s t s a c t i v i t i e s i n 1971 (s e v e r a l bombs) the absence of c l e a r cut p r o v i s i o n s f o r e f f e c t i v e p r o s e c u t i o n i n the P u b l i c Order Regulations the r a t h e r l e n i e n t p o l i c y a p p l i e d towards people l i k e P i e r r e V a l l i e r e s who i n 1972 was h i r e d (at the outcry of some members of Parliament) as a f e d e r a l c i v i l servant. NOTE ON FOGUS 1A: Had we focused on u l t e r i o r outcomes, our conclusions would have been d i f f e r e n t . I f we consider, f o r example, two of the main a t t r i b u t e s of the P u b l i c Order Regulations (the redundancy and the i n a p p l i c a b i l i of some of i t s p r o v i s i o n s ) i t f u r t h e r appeared: that numerous s p e c i f i c charges were l a i d under those p r o v i s i o n s , and that charges were even l a i d under both the p r o v i s i o n s of the Regulations (FLQ membership) and the C r i m i n a l Code (S e d i t i o n ) that a few (2) c o n v i c t i o n s were obtained under the p r o v i s i o n s of the P u b l i c Order Regulations In our a n a l y s i s however, we w i l l t r y to inc o r p o r a t e those develop-ments i n a Model I I I p e r s p e c t i v e (Separate M u l t i p l e Implementation Units) FOCUS 1 B: UNITARY ACTOR (BOUNDED RATIONALITY) 1. ANTECEDENTS OF THE FLQ CHOSEN ACTION On October 6, former J u s t i c e M i n i s t e r Remi Paul i n the Lesage Government made a statement which u n d e r l i n e d , t h a t "the kidnapping of Mr. Cross had been planned, f o r more than a year" and that " h i s a f f i r m a t i o n was supported by i n f o r m a t i o n the M i n i s t r y of J u s t i c e had r e c e i v e d at the time" (41) In f a c t s e v e r a l elements could j u s t i f y Mr. Paul's p o s i t i o n : In recent years kidnappings had become a standard f e a t u r e of urban g u e r r i l l a operations and were duly i n c l u d e d i n Basic Manuals l i k e the one published by Carlos M a r i g h e l l a : "Kidnapping i s c a p t u r i n g and h o l d i n g i n a secret spot a p o l i c e agent, a North American spy, a p o l i t i c a l p e r s o n a l i t y , or a n o t o r i o u s and dangerous enemy of the r e v o l u t i o n a r y movement. Kidnapping i s used to exchange or l i b e r a t e imprisoned r e v o l u -t i o n a r y comrades, or to f o r c e suspension of t o r t u r e i n the j a i l c e l l s o f the m i l i t a r y d i c t a t o r s h i p The kidnapping of p e r s o n a l i t i e s who are known a r t i s t s , sports f i g u r e s , or outstanding i n some other f i e l d but who have e v i -denced no p o l i t i c a l i n t e r e s t can be a u s e f u l form of propaganda f o r the r e v o l u t i o n a r y . a n d p a t r i o t i c p r i n c i p l e s o f the urban g u e r r i l l a provided i t occurs under s p e c i a l circumstances, and the kidnapping i s handled so that the p u b l i c sympathizes w i t h i t and accepts i t . The kidnapping of North American r e s i d e n t s or v i s i t o r s i n B r a s i l c o n s t i t u t e s a form of p r o t e s t against the p e n e t r a t i o n and domi-n a t i o n of United States i m p e r i a l i s m i n our country" (42) In t h i s "operating procedure" most of the main c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f the a c t i o n chosen by the FLQ: The p e r s o n a l i t y of the v i c t i m (a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of a f o r e i g n i m p e r i a l i s t i c power), the nature of the b a r t e r (the p o l i t i c a l p r i s o n e r s ) and the consequences f o r the movement (accrued propaganda) are already u n d e r l i n e d . This t e x t was published a few months before the death of Carlos M a r i g h e l l a i n 1969, and i t i s not impossible s i n c e the manual was w i d e l y p u b l i c i z e d , that some people i n the FLQ took n o t i c e of i t . - One kidnapping attempt had already taken place i n Montreal i n 1970: "On February 26, Montreal p o l i c e stopped a rented panel truck and found two men, arms, a l a r g e wicker basket and a document announcing t h a t the FLQ had j u s t kidnapped Moshe Golan, the I s r a e l i Consul and Trade Commissioner i n Montreal. The men, Jacques Lanctot and P i e r r e M a r c i l , were charged w i t h conspiracy to kidnap and r e l e a s e d on b a i l , Lanctot disappeared" (43) - The p o l i c e f o r c e s , w h i l e d i s m a n t l i n g another FLQ c e l l a few months l a t e r , found c o n c l u s i v e evidence t h a t a second attempt had been planned: "The reward ( o f f e r e d on June 1 by J u s t i c e M i n i s t e r J . Choquette f o r i n f o r m a t i o n l e a d i n g to the a r r e s t o f bombers) apparently p a i d o f f . A t i p l e d p o l i c e to a summer home i n the Laurentians, near Prevost and a house i n suburban L a v a l . At Prevost the p o l i c e a r r e s t e d f o u r people...and found an FLQ communique announcing the kidnapping of the American Consul i n Montreal. By the kidnapping of Consul Burgess the FLQ wants to s t r e s s i t s r e v o l u t i o n a r y s o l i d a r i t y w i t h a l l those c o u n t r i e s that f i g h t against the economic, s o c i a l and c u l t u r a l nomination of the Americans i n the world. This means u n c o n d i t i o n a l support o f the movements i n L a t i n America and P a l e s t i n e , support of the American bla c k s and of a l l the people of A f r i c a and A s i a who work f o r t h e i r l i b e r a t i o n . " (44) This succession of events l e d James Cross h i m s e l f to express a r a t h e r disabused o p i n i o n when he was asked why he was chosen as a hostage: " I t h i n k they wanted a diplomat. They had already t r i e d t h r e e , two at l e a s t , and p o s s i b l y three kidnapping attempts i n Montreal which had been f r u s t r a t e d . They had surveyed a number of people. They gave me a few reasons when I asked them, c l a i m i n g B r i t i s h c u l t u r a l i m p e r i a l i s m i n Canada, but I don't b e l i e v e t h i s . I t h i n k they simply wanted to get a diplomat to get world o p i n i o n and I happened to be a v a i l a b l e " (44 b i s ) - At the same occasion a l i s t o f " i r r e v o c a b l e c o n d i t i o n s " f o r the l i f e o f the Consul was found, whose s i m i l a r i t y w i t h the l a t t e r demands of the FLQ i s s t r i k i n g . "The r e l e a s e of a l l " p o l i t i c a l p r i s o n e r s " and t h e i r t r a n s p o r t a -t i o n to Cuba. The reinstatement of the " r e v o l u t i o n a r y Lapalme workers. The payment of a v o l u n t a r y tax of $500,000. i n gold i n g o t s . The broadcasting and p u b l i c a t i o n of a l l FLQ communiques and the end of a l l p o l i c e i n v e s t i g a t i o n s and a r r e s t s " (45) The only d i f f e r e n c e between t h i s l i s t and the f i r s t communique of the l i b e r a t i o n c e l l which was found, r e s i d e s i n the f a c t that no mention of the informer i s made i n the former (which i s q u i t e l o g i c a l s i n c e i t i s t h i s very informer which l e d to the d i s c o v e r y of t h i s f i r s t communique) S u r p r i s i n g l y however, strong attacks against "informers" can be found i n a l a t e r i n t e r v i e w of a spokesman of the M.D.P.P.Q., Jacques Larue-Langlois. "Choquette i s t r y i n g to create a new n a t i o n a l hero i n Quebec... The s t o o l pigeon....We want to open a n a t i o n a l campaign against p o l i c e informers. We a l s o want to apply p u b l i c pressure on the Quebec newspaper monopolies, l i k e Quebec Corporation to p u b l i s h the statements put out by the FLQ" (46) From these evidences, one cannot f a i l to conclude that the a c t i o n chosen by the FLQ during the October c r i s i s had s t r i k i n g s i m i l a -r i t i e s w i t h i t s past a c t i o n s . Moreover t h i s c o n t i n u i t y found among ac t i o n s i s a l s o found among persons i n v o l v e d , Jacques Lanctot was i n v o l v e d i n the f i r s t attempt, h i s brother Francois i n the second, and Jacques Lanctot, h i s s i s t e r Louise and Jacques Cossette-Trudel (her husband) i n the t h i r d (the-one of J . Cross) 2. ANTECEDENTS OF THE AUTHORITIES' CHOSEN ACTIONS Under some of i t s aspects the a c t i o n s chosen by the a u t h o r i t i e s have n o t i c e a b l e s i m i l a r i t i e s w i t h a c t i o n s taken i n d i f f e r e n t e a r l i e r contexts The nomination of the D i r e c t o r of the Q.P.P. at the head of the j o i n t P o l i c e Forces. In October 1969 during and a f t e r the Montreal P o l i c e s t r i k e , Q.P.P. D i r e c t o r Maurice St. P i e r r e was nominated at the head of the law enforcement forces i n the Province (which included the members of the Canadian Armed Forces) The i n t e r v e n t i o n of the Canadian Army: For s e v e r a l years the Canadian Armed Forces had been i n v o l v e d w i t h the problem of law enforcement i n the Province: Members of the Canadian Armed Forces had p a r t i c i p a t e d i n the a c t i v i t i e s of the f i r s t a n t i - t e r r o r i s t squad, c o n s t i t u t e d i n 1963, as a j o i n t task f o r c e regrouping members of the Montreal p o l i c e , the Q.P.P. and the R.C.M.P. However, t h i s p a r t i c i p a -t i o n may be explained by the f a c t that the C.A.F. had the r e q u i r e d e x p e r t i s e i n defusing bombs which were the main problems of the squad at the time. During the Montreal P o l i c e s t r i k e , a l i m i t e d number of troops from the 22nd Regiment (Regiment de l a Chaudiere,also known as the Vandoos, the same one that was to intervene i n Montreal i n 1970) p a r t i c i p a t e d i n various tasks of law enforcement, under a formal request from the P r o v i n c i a l C i v i l Powers. However, what was supposed to be a punctual i n t e r v e n t i o n took apparently l a r g e r p r o p o r t i o n s , as suggested from the f o l l o w i n g a r t i c l e published i n Le Devoir on December 1, 1969: "On t h i s occasion (inauguration of the new c o n t r o l ward) Chief G i l b e r t , who gave a d e s c r i p t i o n of t h i s new t o o l put at the d i s p o s a l of the p o l i c e f o r c e s , declared t h a t the ward was achieved i n l e s s than a month at a cost of $50,000. I t i s p r i m a r i l y an i n t e r n a l communication center, equipped w i t h a screen r e p r e s e n t i n g a Map of Montreal ( C i t y ) , and w i t h c l o s e d c i r c u i t T.V. monitors which give p i c t u r e s from the events t a k i n g place i n the s t r e e t , thanks to a network of T.V. cameras i n s t a l l e d on the r o o f s . In case of important operations, l i k e the c o n t r o l of an important popular m a n i f e s t a t i o n , f o r example, s a i d Mr. G i l b e r t , - 81 -members o f the R.C.M.P., Canadian Armed Forces and of the Q.P.P. can take a place beside Montreal policemen on a p l a t -form f a c i n g the 8' x 40' mural screen" (47) During the same year, a d r a s t i c change appeared i n the missions assigned to the Canadian Armed Forces as noted by Paul Stevens and John Saywell: "There was some question, as w e l l , about the r o l e s of the f o r c e s . The Prime M i n i s t e r had defined the r o l e s as the p r o t e c t i o n of sovereignty, the defence of North America, the f u l f i l m e n t o f NATO commitments, and peacekeeping. But " P r i o r i t y One" at Canadian Forces Headquarters was s a i d to be " a i d to the c i v i l a u t h o r i t y , " and the forc e s were being organized and equipped f o r t h i s purpose. H e l i c o p t e r s were being purchased w i t h s e a r c h l i g h t s and loud h a i l e r s , and i n f a n t r y b a t t a l i o n s were reported to be t r a i n i n g i n t e n s i v e l y i n r i o t c o n t r o l , t e a r gas employment, and p o l i c e d u t i e s . The army's deployment of i n f a n t r y i n support of the c i v i l a u t h o r i t y i n Montreal during the r i o t s there was seen as the key f u t u r e r o l e f o r the f o r c e s . What was not c l e a r was the o r i g i n of t h i s P r i o r i t y One. C e r t a i n l y n e i t h e r the Prime M i n i s t e r nor the M i n i s t e r of Na t i o n a l Defence had given any p u b l i c i n k l i n g that a i d to the c i v i l a u t h o r i t y was anything more than one of a whole host o f d u t i e s f o r the Canadian Forces. S t i l l , i t seemed u n l i k e l y that some p e t t y bureaucrat could decree a s h i f t o f t h i s magnitude on h i s own. What was a l s o unclear was j u s t what t h r e a t e x i s t e d that could n e c e s s i t a t e a i d to the c i v i l a u t h o r i t y becoming the f i r s t p r i o r i t y of the f o r c e s " (48) Ap p a r e n t l y , t h i s deep i n t e r e s t , f o r domestic law enforcement and fo r the Quebec Province, of the Canadian Armed Forces was a long l a s t i n g one as revealed by two recent (May and June 1974) l e a k s : The curious s y n c h r o n i z a t i o n of the "Neat P i t c h " E x e r c i s e w i t h the general s t r i k e i n Quebec and the memo d e a l i n g w i t h separatism w i t h i n the Canadian Armed Forces. The use of the War Measures Act as a means f o r a d m i n i s t r a t i v e internment: During World War I I , 21,000 Japanese-Canadians were evacuated from t h e i r homes and communities, or as mentioned by Haggart and Golden: "The Japanese were herded i n t o Vancouver's Hasting Park, s l e e p i n g i n e x h i b i t i o n b u i l d i n g s , c a r r y i n g a l l they could w i t h them i n the maximum two s u i t c a s e s allowed per person. Gradually they were d i s p e r s e d , but w i t h considerable d i f f i -c u l t y , as community a f t e r community i n the i n t e r i o r r e j e c t e d the idea of the camps being placed t h e r e " (49) The use of the War Measures Act as a means f o r banning a s s o c i a t i o n s "During the war, the power to d e c l a r e o r g a n i z a t i o n s i l l e g a l was given to the Cabinet under the War Measures Act, and i t was used, both on the Jehovah's witnesses and t h e i r r e l a t e d o r g a n i z a t i o n s and on Technocracy Inc., a p r o s e l y t i z i n g o r g a n i z a t i o n w i t h semi r e l i g i o u s and a u t h o r i t a r i a n overtones" (49a) This extensive use of the emergency l e g i s l a t i o n s , enabled some o f the Quebec a c t i v i s t s of the time to gain f i r s t hand experience of the powerful e f f e c t s o f the War Measures Ac t , as r e l a t e d i n an i n t e r v i e w between Simone Chartrand and Nick auf der Maur "When B r i t a i n d eclared war i n September 1939, Canada q u i c k l y f o l l o w e d i t s lead. The same issues arose. The War Measures Act was imposed. During the 1940 general e l e c t i o n , the L i b e r a l s under Mackenzie King promised there would be no c o n s c r i p t i o n . A f t e r they won, they changed t h e i r minds. The Throne Speech i n January 1942 announced a n a t i o n a l p l e b i s c i t e on the c o n s c r i p t i o n i s s u e . Michel helped to organize the "Non" campaign. The n a t i o n a l i s t s o f the time, Andre Laurendeau, F r a n c o i s - A l b e r t Angers, Gerard F i l i o n , Jean Drapeau, Rene Chalout, Marc C a r r i e r e , and many others formed the Ligue pour l a Defense du Canada (Michel proposed the name). Even Henri Bourassa came out of retirement to take p a r t . I t was a very h e c t i c time, w i t h r a l l i e s and meetings being h e l d continuously. Michel poured a l l h i s energies i n t o the campaign. At the end of i t , on A p r i l 27, 1942, Quebec voted 75% "Non". The r e s t o f Canada voted d i f f e r e n t l y . C o n s c r i p t i o n was imposed and the War Measures Act enforced against d i s s i d e n t s . Many were a r r e s t e d , even the Mayor of Montreal, who spent the r e s t of the war i n an internment camp. The league prepared to f i g h t the November b y - e l e c t i o n i n Outre-mont, intended to provide a safe L i b e r a l seat f o r the M i n i s t e r of N a t i o n a l Defence, Major-General L a f l e c h e . Jean Drapeau, who had j u s t graduated from law s c h o o l , was chosen as candidate, Michel was h i s o r g a n i z e r . That f a l l , we s t a r t e d seeing P i e r r e E l l i o t t Trudeau a l o t , as he became i n c r e a s i n g l y a c t i v e i n the campaign. Michel and P i e r r e were f r i e n d s , having been school chums, and l i k e d each other although P i e r r e s a i d he thought Michel a b i t u n r e a l i s t i c . He s a i d Michel was a dreamer, a m y s t i c , and wasn't pragmatic enough. Despite h i s good i n t e n t i o n s , he s a i d , Michel would never get anywhere. There were many meetings to attend and we a l l worked f e v e r i s h l y I was f i v e months pregnant at the time, and sometimes the meetings could get p r e t t y rough. P o l i c e i n p l a i n c l o t h e s were . at every meeting t a k i n g notes, keeping tabs on t h i n g s . Gen. Lafleche's meetings, attended by s e v e r a l cabinet m i n i s t e r s and MPs, were p a r t i c u l a r l y tumultuous, s i n c e he a t t r a c t e d a large number of young c o n s c r i p t s who had a l o t of questions. Unfortunately questions weren't accepted at that time - whether i n the church, the f a m i l y or before a u t h o r i t y . At one meeting, Michel asked P i e r r e E l l i o t t Trudeau to keep an eye on me, to s o r t of act as my bodyguard. I t was a L i b e r a l e l e c t i o n meeting and the c o n s c r i p t s wanted to know why the Libe-r a l s went back on t h e i r promise of no c o n s c r i p t i o n . Everyone who posed a question was ejected. P i e r r e became very indignant, and demanded to know how a policeman could push a pregnant woman. He was very g a l l a n t , w i t h h i s c u l t u r e d language and n i c e manner, as he came to my defence. He became extremely upset when we were asked i n no u n c e r t a i n terms to leave the h a l l and were ushered out. Because of the War Measures Ac t , the i s s u e of c o n s c r i p t i o n  couldn't be discussed openly on the r a d i o and i n the press.  P i e r r e s a i d i t was i n t o l e r a b l e that there couldn't be f r e e  d i s c u s s i o n , that the p o l i c e were being used to crush c i v i l  l i b e r t i e s . As we were thrown out, the complained about the s t a t e u s i n g p o l i c e f o r c e to enforce i t s power. He was very indignant and upset about the f e d e r a l L i b e r a l P a r t y , although both our f a t h e r s were L i b e r a l m i l i t a n t s . Today, when people i n Quebec complain about what the s t a t e i s doing to people, he knows e x a c t l y how i t f e e l s . This i s what i s e x t r a o r d i n a r y about what he has done. Watch him. But i n those days my husband and he were good f r i e n d s . " (49b) FOCUS I I : MULTIPLE SEPARATE INFORMATION UNITS (BOUNDED RATIONALITY) PRELIMINARIES In h i s a n a l y s i s o f c r i s i s behaviour, Burton notes t h a t : "The study of c r i s i s behaviour i s va l u a b l e i n i t s e l f but i t s main value i s that i t p o i n t s d r a m a t i c a l l y to i n e f f i c i e n c i e s that go unnoticed i n o r d i n a r y d e c i s i o n making. In c r i s i s and de s p i t e increased a t t e n t i o n given to the problem, misperceptions are  gr e a t e r , perceptions become more stereotyped, every a c t i o n o f the enemy i s i n t e r p r e t e d as a t h r e a t . The h i s t o r y o f the c o n f l i c t i s  r e i n t e r p r e t e d to s u b s t a n t i a t e the theory that aggression always  the i n t e n t of the enemy, b e l i e f systems become closed and a l t e r - n a t i v e p o l i c i e s u n r e a l i s t i c , the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e process by which  f a c t s are examined are by-passed to secure quick d e c i s i o n s ^ f a c t s  that do not support p o l i c i e s are disregarded and t h e i r surveyors  t r e a t e d as h o s t i l e agents, a d v i s e r s , a r e those who give the advice  that i s wanted, p r i o r i t i e s lead to the neglect of matters not r e l a t e d to the c r i s i s power becomes c e n t r a l i z e d and i n t i m i d a t i o n of p a r t i e s w i t h opposing views i n c r e a s e s " (49c) In t h i s p e r s p e c t i v e , as most of the above comments r e l a t e to the way inf o r m a t i o n i s handled during a p e r i o d of c r i s i s , we are going to focus our a t t e n t i o n on the r o l e played by informa t i o n u n i t s (and i n t h i s case formal s p e c i a l i z e d o r g a n i z a t i o n s ) i n shaping the a u t h o r i t i e s ' d e c i s i o n s . In so doing,we w i l l have to determine: 1. What was the observable s i t u a t i o n 2. What was the informat i o n t r a n s m i t t e d by the s p e c i a l i z e d u n i t s , and 3. Why were there d i s t o r t i o n s between the observable s i t u a t i o n and the "image" provided to the decision-makers We could have t r e a t e d those questions s e p a r a t e l y i n focusing f i r s t on the information t h a t would have been provided.by " r a t i o n a l " i n f o r m a t i o n u n i t s (which would have c o n s t i t u t e d a Model IIA) and then on the informat i o n t r a n s m i t t e d by the e x i s t i n g i n f o r m a t i o n u n i t s (which would have c o n s t i t u t e d a Model IIB) i n order to concentrate f i n a l l y on the i n t r o d u c t i o n of c o r r e c t i v e ( a n t i - d i s t o r t i o n ) measures (which would have c o n s t i t u t e d a Model IIC) However, we have p r e f e r r e d to f o l l o w a step by step procedure, comparing,all along our a n a l y s i s , the "image" to the r e a l i t y and t r y i n g to r e l a t e the noted d i s c r e p a n c i e s to what we knew were the o r g a n i z a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t , demands and usual forms of a c t i o n of the informat i o n u n i t s i n v o l v e d . During the c r i s i s , s e v e r a l u n i t s , the R.C.M.P., the Q.P.P., the Montreal P o l i c e , the A n t i - T e r r o r i s t Squad, the Media, the MPs and numerous members of the L i b e r a l P a r t y , provided the autho-r i t i e s w i t h i n f o r m a t i o n a l i n p u t s which have not been without i n f e r r i n g w i t h t h e i r d e c i s i o n . On some of these u n i t s , the Q.P.P., the Montreal P o l i c e , the A n t i - T e r r o r i s t Squad, very l i t t l e informat f i l t e r e d , at l e a s t concerning the way they handled and transmit-ted i n f o r m a t i o n to the d e c i s i o n making A u t h o r i t i e s . However, thanks to the Report of the Royal Commission on S e c u r i t y , pu-b l i s h e d i n 1969, and to other v a r i o u s sources, i t i s e a s i e r to assess how the s t r u c t u r e s , the programs and the s t r a t e g i e s of other u n i t s , among which the R.C.M.P. and the Media p a r t l y shaped the A u t h o r i t i e s ' d e c i s i o n s . In the f i r s t part of t h i s a n a l y s i s , we s h a l l t r y to analyze the main c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of these u n i t s i n order to show i n a second p a r t , which b i a s and d i s t o r t i o n s they have introduced i n the decision-making process. 1. THE R.C.M.P. AS AN INFORMATION UNIT - 1. 1 The Organization The R.C.M.P. i s the main f e d e r a l o p e r a t i o n a l and i n -v e s t i g a t i v e body i n the f i e l d of s e c u r i t y . The force assumed t h i s r o l e during W.W. 1 because as the e x i s t i n g f e d e r a l p o l i c e f o r c e , i t was at that time the n a t u r a l f e d e r a l instrument i n t h i s area. There i s , however, no e x p l i c i t s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t y f o r the s e c u r i t y r o l e . Such a u t h o r i t y , as does e x i s t , i s der i v e d from c e r t a i n s e c t i o n s o f the R.C.M.P. Act (S.C. 1959 C. 54)-. S e c t i o n 44 (e) of the R.C.M.P. r e g u l a t i o n s and orders (1960) which have been proclaimed by the governor i n Council under the Act, provides that " i n a d d i t i o n to the du t i e s p r e s c r i b e d by the Act, i t i s the duty of the force...(e) to maintain and operate such s e c u r i t y and i n t e l l i g e n c e s e r v i c e s as may be re q u i r e d by the M i n i s t e r " A d d i t i o n a l a u t h o r i t y f o r the R.C.M.P.'s s e c u r i t y and i n t e l l i g e n c e operations i s contained i n c e r t a i n i n s t r u c -t i o n s and d i r e c t i v e s issued by the Government, which i n e f f e c t a u t h o r i z e the R.C.M.P. to conduct the i n -v e s t i g a t i o n s necessary f o r a s e c u r i t y program, and i n a d d i t i o n make the force r e s p o n s i b l e f o r various measures concerned with i n t e r n a l s e c u r i t y i n the event of a n a t i o n a l emergency, as proclaimed under the War Measures Act. In p r a c t i c e the R.C.M.P. i s concerned w i t h the f o l l o w i n g s e c u r i t y f u n c t i o n s : (a) A l l s e c u r i t y and s e c u r i t y i n t e l l i g e n c e operations and " p o l i c e " operations r e l a t e d to s e c u r i t y (b) Maintenance and examination of records and f i e l d i n q u i r i e s concerning personnel, but not e v a l u a t i o n of r e p o r t s , nor d e c i s i o n making i n i n d i v i d u a l cases (c) Advice concerning departmental s e c u r i t y (d) Record keeping •(e) C e r t a i n s t a f f f u n c t i o n s r e l a t e d to the management of the n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y e f f o r t These f u n c t i o n s are performed by a Headquarters D i r e c t o r a t e of S e c u r i t y and i n t e l l i g e n c e ( r e p o r t i n g to the Deputy Com-missioner i n charge of Operations, see o r g a n i z a t i o n chart i n Appendix II ) which maintains r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s at R.C.M.P. Regional H.Q. and detachments and at c e r t a i n l o c a t i o n s overseas and which operate i n clos e l i a i s o n w i t h the other D i r e c t o r a t e s of the Force. Nearly 60% of the personnel of the s e c u r i t y and i n t e l l i g e n c e D i r e c t o r a t e ( i n c l u d i n g a l l the sen i o r o f f i c e r s , a l l but three o f the branch heads and almost a l l the o f f i c e r s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r operations or - 88 -i n v e s t i g a t i o n s ) are r e g u l a r members of the Force; the remaining personnel i n c l u d e s some s p e c i a l constables employed on s u r v e i l l a n c e d u t i e s , c i v i l i a n members employed as t r a n s l a t o r s , t e c h n i c i a n s or researchers and p u b l i c servants on c l e r i c a l d u t i e s (50) In the Province of Quebec, as mentioned by Commissioner H i g g i t (51) of the 800 R.C.M.P. o f f i c e r s and men i n Montreal 99.2% are b i l i n g u a l and more than 70% of these have french as t h e i r mother tongue (no s p e c i f i c a t i o n however f o r the S e c u r i t y and I n t e l l i g e n c e Branch) 1.2 I t s l i m i t i n g f a c t o r s as an information u n i t The Commission on s e c u r i t y , was r a t h e r c r i t i c a l on some features of the Force that undoubtedly c o n s t i t u t e d severe l i m i t a t i o n s i n the f u l f i l l m e n t of i t s m i s s i o n as a s e c u r i t y agency. 1. 2 1. Absence o f a d e f i n i t e R e s p o n s i b i l i t y - A u t h o r i t y - Center " f o r s e c u r i t y matters": "At present the S e c u r i t y Panel and the concerned o f f i c e r s i n the P r i v y Council o f f i c e make an attempt to perform most o f these f u n c t i o n s ( p o l i c y determination, resource a l l o c a t i o n , c o n f l i c t a r b i t r a t i o n , issuance of r e g u l a t i o n s and procedures, l i n k w i t h the Government and the P u b l i c , r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r operations) but they do so without executive a u t h o r i t y or adequate resources and with an approach which i s necessary permissive r a t h e r than compelling. As f a r as the fo r m u l a t i o n and c o o r d i n a t i o n of S e c u r i t y p o l i c y i s concerned i t seems to us that under the present arrangements the t o t a l view of the r e -quirements of s e c u r i t y may o f t e n be obscured by the pressures exerted by i n d i v i d u a l departments and the exigencies o f t h e i r proposed p o l i c i e s . Nor are we c e r t a i n that the present s t r u c t u r a l arrangements ensure that issues and arguments concerned w i t h s e c u r i t y are presented to the Government i n an e x p l i c i t and u n d i l u t e d form" (52) - 89 -1. 2 2. Recruitment P o l i c y "At present a l l the r e g u l a r members of the D.S.I, are drawn from personnel r e c r u i t e d and t r a i n e d under normal R.C.M.P. procedures, although they are not s e l e c t e d f o r s e c u r i t y employment u n t i l they have had at l e a s t three years experience i n p o l i c e d u t i e s and have r e c e i v e d s p e c i a l t r a i n i n g . There i s at present no e f f e c t i v e program o f post u n i v e r s i t y r e c r u i t i n g , even f o r the more demanding tasks i n the Force (which would of course i n c l u d e many d u t i e s concerned w i t h s e c u r i t y ) and i n p r a c t i c e a p o t e n t i a l r e c r u i t who has attended a u n i v e r s i t y i s faced w i t h d i s i n c e n t i v e s . . . . These p o l i c i e s and p r a c t i c e s mean i n the f i r s t place that the R.C.M.P. i s c u t t i n g i t s e l f o f f from the whole of that group of p o t e n t i a l r e c r u i t s who attend a uni v e r -s i t y - i n other words and i n general terms, from those p o t e n t i a l r e c r u i t s who are l i k e l y to possess the most i n t e l l i g e n c e , i n i t i a t i v e and imagination." (53) 1. 2 3. Confusion between s e c u r i t y and p o l i c e a c t i v i t i e s " P o l i c e forces are concerned p r i m a r i l y w i t h law enforce-ment i n c l u d i n g p o s t - f a c t o i n v e s t i g a t i o n , w i t h the c o l -l e c t i o n of evidence and wi t h the prosecution of crimes. S e c u r i t y s e r v i c e s are p r i m a r i l y engaged i n preventive a c t i v i t i e s and the c o l l e c t i o n o f i n t e l l i g e n c e . A secu-r i t y o r g a n i z a t i o n w i l l almost i n e v i t a b l y be hindered i n i t s operations by the lack of f l e x i b i l i t y inherent i n a p o l i c e f o r c e such as R.C.M.P.... A s e c u r i t y s e r v i c e w i l l i n e v i t a b l y be in v o l v e d i n a c t i o n s that may contra -vene the s p i r i t i f not the l e t t e r of the law and wi t h c l a n d e s t i n e and other a c t i v i t i e s which may sometimes seem to i n f r i n g e on i n d i v i d u a l ' s r i g h t s ; these are not appropriate p o l i c e f u n c t i o n s . N e i t h e r i s i t appro-p r i a t e f o r a p o l i c e f o r c e to be concerned w i t h events or ac t i o n s that are not crimes or suspected crimes, while a s e c u r i t y s e r v i c e i s o f t e n i n v o l v e d w i t h such matters -Generally i n a p e r i o d i n which p o l i c e forces are subject  to some h o s t i l i t y , i t would appear unwise e i t h e r to add to the p o l i c e burden by an a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h s e c u r i t y  d u t i e s , or to make s e c u r i t y d u t i e s more d i f f i c u l t by an  a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h the p o l i c e f u n c t i o n . " (54) 1.3 I t s o p e r a t i o n a l p r i o r i t i e s as an information u n i t From the a n a l y s i s of the abridged report of the Royal Commission on s e c u r i t y i t appears t h a t two dimensions tend to p o l a r i z e the o v e r a l l a t t e n t i o n of the s e c u r i t y forces the communist th r e a t which appears to be some l a t e by-product of the c o l d war and of the A t l a n t i c (read i n t e r North American) cooperation the r i s k s o f i n f i l t r a t i o n ( i n the Government, unions, and u n i v e r s i t i e s ) of the abovementioned pervasive d o c t r i n e . Only i n t h i s context i s i t p o s s i b l e to understand the newly appointed Commissioner H i g g i t ' s statement i n 1969, that the a r r i v a l o f Chinese diplomats i n Ottawa was l i k e l y to "increase the problems of s e c u r i t y i n Canada" 2. THE OTHER POLICE FORCES AS INFORMATION UNITS Although l i t t l e i n f o r m a t i o n i s a c t u a l l y a v a i l a b l e on the two other p o l i c e forces i n v o l v e d , i t seems that what has been s a i d on r e c r u i t -ment, t r a i n i n g p o l i c i e s and confusion between s e c u r i t y p o l i c e a c t i -v i t i e s i s e q u a l l y r e l e v a n t i n the case of both the Q.P.P. and the Montreal P o l i c e . Moreover, i t appears that two of t h e i r s p e c i f i c features are l i k e l y to have i n f l u e n c e d t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s as informa-t i o n u n i t s : the f a c t t h a t t h e i r experience i n " c r i m i n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s " had been gained i n t h e i r f i g h t s against organized crime (whose s t r u c t u r e s they t r i e d more or l e s s according to an R.C.M.P. o f f i c e r on duty i n Montreal at the time of the c r i s i s to p l a c a t e on the subversive movements) the f a c t that the p o l i t i c a l dimension o f the problem was more or l e s s a l i e n to them (which caused the aforementioned R.C.M.P. o f f i c e r to p r o f e r a few s l i g h t l y c a u s t i c remarks on t h e i r candour; other d i r e c t witnesses have confirmed that i n s e v e r a l instances p o l i c e o f f i c e r s producing i n t e l l i g e n c e r e p o r t s had been more or l e s s mentioning a l l the persons they knew "to be . at the l e f t of the L i b e r a l P a r t y " or even " l i s t s of N.D.P. members") 3. COOPERATION BETWEEN THE THREE POLICE FORCES IN THE INFORMATION  PROCESS Apparently the cooperation w i t h i n the p o l i c e f o r c e s (Q.P.P., R.C.M.P., Montreal) had not been that good as f a r as i n t e l l i g e n c e gathering was concerned. The F i e l d of the f i g h t against organized crime had been a l a s t i n g subject o f f r u s t r a t i o n during the preceeding years (and i t i s d i f f i c u l t not to see how such a s i t u a t i o n could e q u a l l y a f f e c t the f i g h t against subversive a c t i v i t i e s ) The Commission of Enquiry i n t o the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n of J u s t i c e on C r i m i n a l and Penal matters i n Quebec mentions i n i t s r e p o r t : "Three years l a t e r ( i n 1969) the s i t u a t i o n i s p r a c t i c a l l y the same. I t i s h a r d l y an exaggeration to say that the R.C.M.P. continues to look upon organized crime as i t s e x c l u s i v e property and t r e a t s somewhat a r r o g a n t l y a l l those who c l a i m to be i n t e r e s t e d i n t h i s c r i m i n a l a c t i v i t y . At the present time, i t i s no longer p o s s i b l e to look upon the Montreal M u n i c i p a l P o l i c e as a second r a t e p o l i c e f o r c e . S i m i l a r l y , the P r o v i n c i a l P o l i c e , p a r t i c u l a r l y s i n c e i t has ap p r e c i a b l y improved i t s enrolment and t r a i n i n g p o l i c y has already c o r r e c t e d many weak-nesses of the past. However i n s p i t e of the progress achieved by the two main Quebec  p o l i c e f o r c e s , i t i s s t i l l not p o s s i b l e to t a l k of a f r e e flow of  inf o r m a t i o n amongst the large p o l i c e forces i n v o l v e d i n the Quebec  f i g h t against organized crime (R.C.M.P., P r o v i n c i a l P o l i c e , Montreal M u n i c i p a l P o l i c e ) However we are pleased to note some improvement. The R.C.M.P. shows more w i l l i n g n e s s to meet w i t h and even exchange some information w i t h the P r o v i n c i a l and Montreal P o l i c e l e t us hope t h i s improvement w i l l continue..." (55) This aspect of i n t e l l i g e n c e a c t i v i t i e s came under the b i t t e r remarks of Chairman S a u l n i e r a f t e r the Montreal S t r i k e , where he u n d e r l i n e d , complacently", that very few information on the r e a l s i t u a t i o n i n Montreal had been t r a n s m i t t e d to the Federal A u t h o r i t i e s . The c u l t u r a l f o l k l o r e o f the Q.P.P. t e s t i f i e s o f some k i n d of f r u s t r a t e d p a r e n t - c h i l d r e l a t i o n s h i p between the f o r c e and the R.C.M.P.: The l a t t e r being r e f e r r e d to as the "Hats" 4. RESULTING DISTORTIONS IN ORGANIZATIONAL INTELLIGENCE This set of l i m i t a t i o n s ( s t r u c t u r a l , o r g a n i z a t i o n a l , i d e o l o g i c a l ) has undoubtedly exerted some i n f l u e n c e on the nature and the q u a l i t y o f the i n f o r m a t i o n r e c e i v e d by the a u t h o r i t i e s . In the absence of d i r e c t evidence (G, P e l l e t i e r i s r a t h e r evasive on the subject and the Federal Government has been s u c c e s s f u l i n avoiding any type of enquiry having to do w i t h the circumstances surrounding the p r o c l a -mation of the War Measures Act) the only o p p o r t u n i t y l e f t to us c o n s i s t s i n t r y i n g to compare the statements made by the o f f i c i a l s i n v o l v e d w i t h the evidences at. hand to r e l a t e the apparent d i f f e r e n c e s between the statements and the evidences, w i t h the known p r o p e n s i t i e s of the i n f o r m a t i o n u n i t s analyzed before This approach, which can be c r i t i c i z e d on s e v e r a l grounds (among which the f a c t t h a t i t i s h i g h l y v u l n e r a b l e to any attempt of manipulation made by the o f f i c i a l s involved) i s apparently the only one on which we can p r e s e n t l y r e l y ; i t i s an attempt to u n d e r l i n e probable i n f l u e n c e s but d e c i s i v e l y not an attempt to prove them In order to l i m i t a t e i t s inherent r i s k s we w i l l t r y to j u x t a -pose d i f f e r e n t statements from d i f f e r e n t o f f i c i a l s and make the assumption that t h e i r correspondences can be explained by an iden-t i c a l source of i n f o r m a t i o n , and not by a d e l i b e r a t e and conspira-t o r i a l w i l l to mislead t h e i r audiences. In t h i s p e r s p e c t i v e the f o l l o w i n g elements of d i s t o r t i o n can be detected: - 4. 1 Over s e n s i t i v i t y to a l l e g e d f o r e i g n i n f l u e n c e i n the FLQ Numerous statements from p o l i t i c a l p e r s o n a l i t i e s and s e c u r i t y o f f i c e r s have r e f l e c t e d the l a s t i n g concern f o r f o r e i g n and e s p e c i a l l y communist involvement i n the s e p a r a t i s t movement as f o r example: Commissioner H i g g i t t "Some degree of t r a i n i n g f o r s u b v e r s i v e l y o r i e n t e d s e p a r a t i s t groups has taken place i n Cuba" (56) The Royal Commission on S e c u r i t y "What i s more, there i s no doubt about communist and t r o t s k y s t i n t e r e s t and involvement i n the movement ... Foreign involvement i s more d i f f i c u l t to e s t a b l i s h w i t h any c e r t a i n t y . However, i t i s c l e a r that c e r t a i n communist c o u n t r i e s have shown a marked i n t e r e s t i n the formation o f the Communist Party of Quebec" (57) Quebec Ex-Premier Bertrand "Speaking i n the Magdalen Islands on August 17 (1969) Premier Bertrand promised that the Government would use f o r c e i f necessary to crush the r a d i c a l s , the r e v o l u -t i o n a r i e s and the bearded l i t t l e C a s t r os" (58) Quebec E x - J u s t i c e M i n i s t e r Remi Paul "At a press conference on August 22 (1969) J u s t i c e Mi-n i s t e r Remi Paul o u t l i n e d a 10 point program worked out a f t e r meetings with 100 p o l i c e c h i e f s " among which p r o v i s i o n s one could f i n d a recommendation asking "the Federal immigration m i n i s t e r to prevent known t e r r o r i s t s from e n t e r i n g Canada" (59) However, the i n t e n s i v e searches and a r r e s t s that followed the proclamation of the W.M.A. d i d not r e s u l t e i t h e r i n the a r r e s t or even the expulsion of any f o r e i g n resident!: Apparently the i n f o r m a t i o n u n i t s had been o v e r l y s e n s i t i v e to the f a c t t h a t e a r l y FLQ members l i k e G. Schoel t e r s or F. Schrim were immigrants (but very u n l i k e l y communists) and to the proclamations of s o l i d a r i t y w i t h U.S. or T h i r d World movements which were common r h e t h o r i c s i n the speeches o f V a l l i e r e s and Gagnon. The n o t i o n of communist involvement on the other side appears to be a standard preoccupation of both the R.C.M.P. (some k i n d of l e f t o v e r from the c o l d war and the i n t e r d i c t i o n of the Canadian Communist Party) and the Q.P.P. (which i s s t i l l s t a f f e d by former Duplessis appointees, who are s t i l l r eminiscent of the " C h i e f ' s " a t t i t u d e s during the "Great Darkness") 2 O v e r s e n s i t i v i t y to the t r a d i t i o n a l subversive forms of o r g a n i - z a t i o n Several o f f i c i a l statements may enable us to recompose the p i c t u r e that was made of the subversive movement: - I t ' s a movement w i t h leaders Commissioner H i g g i t "...the a r r e s t s made under the W.M.A. have taken most of the leadership out of c i r c u l a t i o n " (59) J . Choquette, i n a more cautious manner "Choquette would not say whether p o l i c e b e l i e v e persons, now being h e l d under the W.M.A. are the a c t u a l leaders o f the FLQ, but s a i d : I am s a t i s -f i e d that among the persons we have detained are persons who bear a very considerable r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the d i s o r d e r s we have known i n the Province of Quebec" (60) I t ' s a movement s t r u c t u r e d according to f u n c t i o n a l requirements J . Choquette "The experience we have l i v e d during the l a s t years, and e s p e c i a l l y during the October c r i s i s , leads'us to conclude that d i f f e r e n t s p e c i a l i z a t i o n s are to be d i s t i n g u i s h e d among t e r r o r i s t personnel, but that i t i s extremely d i f f i c u l t to measure the very r e s p o n s i -b i l i t y o f each category. Thus, there are ideologues, the " t h i n k e r s " and the "speakers" who can d i s p l a y but always v e r b a l l y , some sympathy f o r the r e v o l u -t i o n a r y a c t i o n . On the other hand, there are a c t i o n men who indulge i n c r i m i n a l acts i n order to gain a t t e n t i o n " (61) - G. P e l l e t i e r "So we saw the successive appearance of the Information C e l l , the Viger (Communications) C e l l , the Dieppe C e l l , the Louis R i e l C e l l , the Nelson C e l l and the St. Denis C e l l , w h i l e the wording o f the communiques strove at the same time.to present an image o f a powerful orga-n i z a t i o n spread s e c r e t l y throughout a l l m i l i e u s of s o c i e t y . The fu t u r e may perhaps prove that the claims of the FLQ vested on a s o l i d e base, but u n t i l proof appears to the c o n t r a r y , I consider much exaggerated Nevertheless, during the phase of weighing the r i s k s  t hat preceded the d e c i s i o n s of the Government, one  could not simply discount the p o s s i b i l i t y that the  FLQ was indeed as powerful and w e l l organized as i t  claimed. (62) I t ' s a movement that has i n f i l t r a t e d v a r i o us o r g a n i z a t i o n s  (and that has been i n f i l t r a t e d i t s e l f ) Royal Commission on S e c u r i t y "What i s more, there i s no doubt about communist and t r o t s k y s t i n t e r e s t involvement i n the movement. Both groups have e s t a b l i s h e d "autonomous" Quebec or g a n i z a t i o n s as somewhat transparent attempts to e x p l o i t s e p a r a t i s t sentiment. Members of both have achieved p o s i t i o n s of i n f l u e n c e i n at l e a s t some of the s e p a r a t i s t groups and agencies helped by the b i t t e r f a c t i o n a l i s m o f the movement i t s e l f . " (63) J . Marchand "There i s no r e l a t i o n i n our a c t i o n to the e l e c t i o n i t s e l f but we had good reasons to b e l i e v e that the FLQ which (pause) as a f r o n t has the o r g a n i z a t i o n c a l l e d FRAP i n Montreal and i s running candidates i n Montreal, wanted to d i s t u r b the e l e c t i o n by exp l o s i o n of a l l kinds and by even kidnappings or even shooting (pause) people" On October 22, J . Marchand confessed i n the Commons, that he had used the word " f r o n t " i n c o r r e c t l y i n E n g l i s h and the a s s o c i a t i o n between FRAP and the FLQ was r e j e c t e d by the P.M. (64) Mayor J . Drapeau Q. "You say there are some a f f i n i t i e s between FRAP and FLQ. Can you elaborate on that? What are those a f f i n i t i e s ? A. " F i r s t o f a l l , t h i s municipal movement (FRAP), t h i s para-municipal movement i s a c o l l e c t i o n o f everything that i s t e r r o r i s t and r e v o l u t i o n a r y " (65) G. P e l l e t i e r "In t h e i r a n a l y s i s of the s i t u a t i o n and t h e i r attempt to evaluate the p o s s i b i l i t y of ser i o u s d e t e r i o r a t i o n i n the s o c i a l c l i m a t e o f Quebec, the Governments had to take i n t o account the a c t i v i t y of the d i f f e r e n t p r o t e s t movements and e s p e c i a l l y the signs of a concerted e f f o r t and of a r a l l y i n g o f f o r c e s favourable to the cause of the FLQ and presumably sympathic to i t s mode of o p e r a t i o n " (66) I t ' s a movement f o l l o w i n g an i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e v o l u t i o n a r y  p l a n - J . Choquette "This measure (the W.M.A.) caused the f o l l o w i n g r e s u l t s : F i r s t l y , d i s l o c a t i o n of the p l a n , or somewhat improvized s t r a t e g y i f you l i k e , covering propaganda, p u b l i c demonstration and i n s t r u c t i o n s aimed at the d i s o r g a n i z a t i o n of s o c i e t y and the s t a t e " (67) - D. McDonald "McDonald appearing on one CTV in t e r v i e w program Question P e r i o d , was responding to questions asking grounds f o r the Government's proclamation of the W.M.A. wi t h i t s broad P o l i c e Powers. McDonald s a i d recent a c t i v i t i e s of the FLQ i n c l u d i n g the abduction of two o f f i c i a l s , f o l l owed a p a t t e r n s i m i l a r to i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y detected o r t s "to create d i s o r d e r s . . . McDonald s a i d that t h e f t s o f dynamite and weapons i n Quebec before the kidnappings i n d i c a t e d "a p r e t t y c l e a r p a t t e r n . . . of p r e p a r a t i o n . . . . " I f you are saying do I have (or) i n the p o l i c e searches have we uncovered a master blue p r i n t f o r the takeover of the whole o r g a n i z a t i o n (of s o c i e t y ) I th i n k the answer i s no" (68) - Prime M i n i s t e r Bourassa on October 16 "... continued e s c a l a t i o n had revealed the g r a v i t y o f the s i t u a t i o n . F i r s t there were v i o l e n t demonstrations then there were bombs and afterwards s p e c t a c u l a r kidnap pings. Obviously, t h i s was a l l of a pl a n , l o g i c a l l y the f o u r t h stage would be more important s t i l l . A c t i o n was r e q u i r e d because there was no j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r l e t t i n g t h i s e s c a l a t i o n go on and which followed a plan we knew about...And they even made t h r e a t s o f sel e c t e d a s s a s s i n a t i o n as p a r t of the f o u r t h stage. As a r e s u l t "as soon as the r i s k s o f anarchy seemed to acquire a new dimension, I decided to act - f i r m l y and q u i c k l y " (69) On numerous grounds t h i s p e r c e p t i o n o f the FLQ that emerges from o f f i c i a l statements, appears at l e a s t to be r a t h e r inadequate ( i t i s nevertheless i n t e r e s t i n g to note that the l a t e r the statements are, the more evasive they tend to be: See f o r example the statements of J . Marchand and J . Drapeau i n the immediate aftermath o f the c r i s i s and those o f Gerald P e l l e t i e r , or Bourassa and McDonald) - The lea d e r s h i p o f the movement I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note some d i f f e r e n c e s i n the statements o f Commissioner H i g g i t and of J u s t i c e M i n i s t e r Choquette, the former r e f e r s e x p l i c i t l y to the "leader-s h i p " , whereas the l a t t e r mentions only "persons who bear a very considerable r e s p o n s i b i l i t y " . This d i f f e r e n c e i s not p u r e l y t r i v i a l , f o r Commissioner H i g g i t , the movement has le a d e r s , that i s people that give i t s impulse to the movement and to i t s a c t i o n s and who by consequence, c o n s t i t u t e the c r i t i c a l f a c t o r of any r e -pr e s s i v e s t r a t e g y . This n o t i o n o f le a d e r s h i p w i l l be re-examined i n a m u l t i p l e Decision-makers p e r s p e c t i v e , but we can already note that i n a f u r t h e r statement (61), M i n i s t e r J . Choquette only d i f f e r e n t i a t e s the FLQ member-ship i n terms of " t h i n k e r s " and " a c t i o n men" without any e x p l i c i t mention o f le a d e r s h i p . This deformation, apparently coming from the R.C.M.P., i s l a r g e l y congruent w i t h the o r g a n i z a t i o n a l experience of the force i n the f i e l d s o f "organized crime" and "communist subversion", both movements that operate under " c l a s s i c a l " p a t t e r n s ; the necessary c o r o l l a r y f o r sub-v e r s i v e or la r g e s c a l e c r i m i n a l a c t i o n being the existence of a " B i g Brother" The f u n c t i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n o f the movement Even i f such an assessment was s u b s t a n t i a t e d by the FLQ's vocabulary: " C e l l s " "Plan No. 3", subsequent i n v e s t i g a t i o n s d i d not tu r n much o f evidence, regarding the i n t e r n a l " s t r u c t u r e " o f the movement. What i s however s t r i k i n g i s the s i m i l a r i t y o f the o f f i c i a l d e s c r i p t i o n s , w i t h the standard s t r u c t u r e s depicted i n a n t i - g u e r r i l l a manuals (see f o r example, B. Singh and Ku-Wang Mei, Theory and P r a c t i c e o f Modern G u e r r i l l a Warfare). Apparently and as before, the inf o r m a t i o n u n i t s have a t t r i b u t e d to the movement, features learned or experienced i n other contexts. The I n f i l t r a t i o n of the movement Again very few cases turned by the subsequent i n v e s t i -gations appear to j u s t i f y t h i s presumption (a former s e c r e t a r y i n Prime M i n i s t e r Bourassa's o f f i c e and a former c l e r k o f the court i n Montreal) In some cases however, we have been p e r s o n a l l y reported that the c r i s i s r e s u l t e d i n minor purges o f personnel (3 persons i n the French CBC network) but i t i s r a t h e r d i f f i c u l t to assess both the v e r a c i t y and the relevance of such i n -formation. However, i t i s to be noted here that one of the formal tasks o f the R.C.M.P. c o n s i s t s i n checking p o t e n t i a l appointees i n the C i v i l S e r v i c e and monitoring s e c u r i t y matters i n the va r i o u s governmental departments, the Force was somewhat f r u s t r a t e d by the r a t h e r detached a t t i t u d e s which i t s e f f o r t s encountered among top C i v i l Servants. We can hypothesize that the c r i s i s provided the R.C.M.P. w i t h , r a t h e r i n t e r e s t i n g o p p o r t u n i t i e s to reassess i t s r o l e i n such matters. The Revolutionary p l a n followed by the movement As mentioned by Don McDonald " I f you are saying do I have (or) i n the p o l i c e searches have we uncovered a master blue p r i n t f o r the takeover of the whole o r g a n i z a t i o n (of s o c i e t y ) I t h i n k the answer i s no.." (70) The vast search powers given to the p o l i c e d i d not t u r n any evidence of a formal p l a n the FLQ was supposed to f o l l o w . The genesis of the concept on the other hand i s r a t h e r i n t e r e s t i n g . The f i r s t mention of i t was made by Michel Cote, the Montreal C i t y Attorney, during a meeting of the Commons Committee on broadcasting on November 27, 1969: "That was the three stage p l a n as presented to the Members of Parliament by. Michel Cote w i t h S a u l n i e r at h i s s i d e arid Mayor Drapeau s i t t i n g i n the audience. To r e s t a t e i t and rephrase i t s l i g h t l y to improve the t r a n s l a t i o n , i t c o n s i s t e d of 1. R a d i c a l i z i n g the already e x i s t i n g examples of spontaneous a g i t a t i o n (that i s to say implanting a r a d i c a l message with workers and students who were demonstrating f o r s p e c i f i c goals) 2. Organizing the e x p l o i t e d c l a s s e s on a vast s c a l e 3. F i n a l l y , when the time i s r i p e , popular i n s u r r e c t i o n w i t h armed ( i t was u n d e r l i n e d f o r c e s i n the o r i g i n a l occupation of f a c t o r i e s , schools and p u b l i c u t i l i t i e s . " (71) Even i f at the time, the "plan", which was p u r e l y a quotation of V a l l i e r e ' s w r i t i n g s (Revolutionary S t r a t e g y and the Role of the Avant Garde), was not taken very s e r i o u s l y , i t apparently made i t s way r a t h e r s u c c e s s f u l l y ; on October 16, i n Prime M i n i s t e r Bourassa's statement i t had become: - 101 -" F i r s t there were v i o l e n t demonstrations, then there were bombs and afterward s p e c t a c u l a r kidnappings... L o g i c a l l y the f o u r t h stage would be more important s t i l l . . . A n d they even made t h r e a t s of s e l e c t e d assas-s i n a t i o n as part of the f o u r t h stage" (72) Apparently, new v a r i a t i o n s had been developped and i f the kidnappings could be r e l a t e d to the preceeding events, the theme of s e l e c t i v e a s s a s s i n a t i o n came from a q u i t e d i f f e r e n t background. "In June 1970, Montreal broadcaster, P i e r r e Nadeau was i n Jordan making a f i l m on t e r r o r i s t g u e r r i l l a t r a i n i n g and q u i t e by accident came upon two men i n a camp o f the Popular Democratic f r o n t who although hooded by Bedouin scarves were conspicuous by t h e i r conversations i n French. They turned to be a p a i r of a c t i v e t e r r o r i s t s from Montreal who r e a d i l y admitted t h e i r p a r t i n some 20 acts o f v i o l e n c e i n Quebec... "We are l e a r n i n g more how to k i l l than how to m o b i l i z e popular movements... We want to o r i e n t our m i l i t a r y t a c t i c s toward s e l e c t i v e a s s a s s i n a t i o n . For too long the FLQ has been synonymous w i t h bombs and useless v i o l e n c e . We intend to p i c k our t a r g e t s so that the people who are r e s p o n s i b l e w i l l pay" An account of Nadeau's i n t e r v i e w w i t h f i l m by Ronald L a b e l l e , appeared i n P e r s p e c t i v e s and i n i t s E n g l i s h language companion p u b l i c a t i o n Weekend" (73) When they returned to Canada both Nadeau and L a b e l l e were interviewed by the p o l i c e and on the morning of October 16, L a b e l l e was a r r e s t e d (but never charged) under the p r o v i s i o n s of the W.M.A. Apparently the p o l i c e forces had " s y n t h e t i z e d " the i n f o r m a t i o n . 4. 3 I n s u f f i c i e n t d e f i n i t i o n o f purpose Apparently the weak c o o r d i n a t i o n e x i s t i n g between the o r g a n i z a t i o n i n charge of s e c u r i t y (a department of the R.C.M.P.) and the p o l i t i c a l powers, r e s u l t e d i n some form of confusion, as f a r as the purposes of i n t e l l i g e n c e and s e c u r i t y a c t i v i t i e s were concerned. O f f i c i a l statements on such matters are r a t h e r p u z z l i n g as expressed i n the f o l -lowing statements of purpose: Commissioner H i g g i t "For the R.C.M.P. the problem i s to d i s t i n g u i s h between l e g i t i m a t e p r o t e s t and subversion...Everybody has a p e r f e c t r i g h t to get up on a s t r e e t corner and advocate... the d i s s o l u t i o n of the Confederation. But i f they do i t w i t h subversive i n t e n t then of course i t becomes a d i f f e r e n t matter" (74) Royal Commission on S e c u r i t y "Separatism i n Quebec, i f i t commits no i l l e g a l i t i e s and appears to seek i t s ends by l e g a l and democratic means, must be regarded as a p o l i t i c a l movement to be d e a l t i n a p o l i t i c a l r a t h e r than a s e c u r i t y context. However, i f there i s any evidence of an i n t e n t i o n to engage i n subversive a c t i v i t i e s or i f there i s any suggestion of f o r e i g n i n f l u e n c e , i t seems to us inescapable t h a t the Federal Government has a c l e a r duty to take such s e c u r i t y measures as are necessary to p r o t e c t the Federation" (75) However, i t i s not sure that t h i s u n c e r t a i n d e f i n i t i o n o f purpose can only be a t t r i b u t e d to a weak c o o r d i n a t i o n between the s e c u r i t y agencies and the p o l i t i c a l powers, since those to some extent t e s t i f y of the same vagueness " A f t e r some time i t i s d i f f i c u l t to d i s t i n g u i s h between the necessary and productive s o c i a l c o n t e s t a t i o n and the systemat harassment of a u t h o r i t i e s . The t e r r o r i s t uses the s o c i a l c o n t e s t a t i o n , not to f o s t e r reforms, but simply to provocate a s t a t e i n t e r v e n t i o n i n the s o c i a l f i e l d " (76) Whatever i t s d i r e c t cause such a vagueness i n the purpose of s e c u r i t y matters had a d i r e c t e f f e c t on the d a i l y work of the f o r c e s : As they d i d not know what to c o l l e c t , they began t r a n s m i t t i n g a l l types of i n f o r m a t i o n and compiling l i s t s o f p o t e n t i a l suspects ( i . e . mostly people opposing the a c t u a l s t a t e of a f f a i r s i n the province, whatever t h e i r motives). This coupled w i t h the fac t , that the forces were p r i m a r i l y law enforcement bodies, w i t h r a t h e r meagre resources i n the f i e l d of s p e c i a l i z e d manpower,could only r e s u l t i n two developments: the exaggeration of the danger at hand the m u l t i p l i c a t i o n of f i l e s and name l i s t s (which could h a r d l y be reviewed i n the absence of adequate c r i t e r i a ) Those two developments were more or l e s s c o n s c i e n t i o u s l y i recognized by the Royal Commission on s e c u r i t y when i t proposed t h a t : "At the very l e a s t i t (the Federal Government) must take adequate steps to inform i t s e l f o f any such t h r e a t s and to c o l l e c t f u l l i n f o r m a t i o n about the i n t e n t i o n s and capabi-l i t i e s o f i n d i v i d u a l s or movements whose object i s to destroy the Confederation by subversive or s e d i t i o u s methods" (78) Apparently the needs f o r a more comprehensive and more e f f i c i e n t "counter r e v o l u t i o n a r y s u r v e i l l a n c e " was f e l t by the. Government: The c r i s i s " i n t e n s i f i e d cabinet review of the Royal Commission r e p o r t " (79) and a permanent com-mittee on s e c u r i t y was appointed i n 1971 (as recommended by the Royal Commission) .5. THE MASS MEDIA AS INFORMATION UNITS Several elements (among which the f a c t that M a r s h a l l MacLuhan has been reported as having been consulted by the Federal Government during the c r i s i s ) tend to u n d e r l i n e the r o l e played by the mass media during the October c r i s i s and a few commentators have focused t h e i r a n a l y s i s on the i n t e r a c t i o n between the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the media and the s t r a t e g y adopted by the FLQ. T h e i r arguments tend to focus on two main c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f the mass media i n a developped (and c a p i t a l i s t i c ) s o c i e t y . the media are i n a competitive s i t u a t i o n i n t h e i r quest f o r an audience and f o r the resources which i t commands ( a d v e r t i -s i n g , q u a l i f i e d personnel, i n f l u e n c e ) . They are both i n a s i -t u a t i o n of i n t r i n s i c competition (among the same type of media, l i k e between r a d i o s t a t i o n s f o r example) and of e x t r i n s i c com-p e t i t i o n (among d i f f e r e n t types o f media, between r a d i o s t a t i o n s and the w r i t t e n press f o r example). they tend to be of a low p o l i t i c a l content, mostly favouring the dominant i d e o l o g i e s ( i n order to maximize t h e i r audience), to c l u s t e r the in f o r m a t i o n according to predefined headings ( p o l i t i c s , n a t i o n a l , i n t e r n a t i o n a l , business, j u s t i c e , s o c i a l a f f a i r s ) , to p r i v i l e g e " f a c t s " over opinions ( f o r which s p e c i a l headings are reserved) and news over information. From t h i s premises i t appears that the mass media - have played the r o l e of an a m p l i f y i n g drum i n the sense that they have been o b l i g e d to "over-cover" the FLQ which e x p l i c i t e l y played on the competition between the r a d i o s t a t i o n s (The L i b e r a t i o n C e l l used to address i t s communiques to one s t a t i o n , whereas the Chenier C e l l used to address i t s communiques to another one). In the same way the d i f f u s i o n o f successive communiques without any f i x e d schedule had the e f f e c t o f c r e a t i n g both a "suspense" (which forced constant coverage) and " i n s t a n t news" (which broke down the esta-b l i s h e d p a t t e r n of information and d i f f u s i o n ) . Such a s t r a t e g y d i d not only give the FLQ an extensive amount of media coverage, but a l s o d e t e r i o r a t e d the . e x i s t i n g r e l a t i o n s between the media and the p o l i c e f o r c e s . U n t i l October 16, most FLQ communiques were a i r e d and manipulated before the p o l i c e f o r c e s could analyze them and search f o r f i n g e r p r i n t s . To a c e r t a i n p o i n t t h i s s t r a t e g y e q u a l l y a f f e c t e d the a u t h o r i t i e s , which had to take p o s i t i o n s on p u b l i c i z e d and already debated demands ( t h i s i n t u r n can e x p l a i n the outbursts of anger that people l i k e Louis P h i l i p p e L a c r o i x , the whip of the Quebec L i b e r a l P a r t y , were unable to r e t a i n i n the aftermath of the c r i s i s ) . have over emphasized some features of the FLQ: During the f i r s t week of the c r i s i s the coverage of the events was assigned to " c r i m i n a l " r e p o r t e r s , who i n t u r n , turned " c r i m i n a l " papers on the subject d e s c r i b i n g the FLQ as: "A p a r a - m i l i t a r y o r g a n i z a t i o n , having numerous members t r a i n e d i n f o r e i g n c o u n t r i e s ; (as) a w e l l organized movement, anonymous, f a c e l e s s , f e e l i n g l e s s , a movement w i t h no other purpose than pure v i o l e n c e , anarchy and d e s t r u c t i o n of s o c i e t y " (80) On t h i s account, a t h e f t of weapons i n T r o i s - R i v i e r e s was a t t r i -buted to the FLQ ( f u r t h e r i n v e s t i g a t i o n s revealed t h a t the crime had been committed by longshore men), as w e l l as a more or l e s s case of s a d i s t i c v i o l e n c e i n H u l l (to which i f my memory i s good J u s t i c e M i n i s t e r Turner r e f e r r e d i n the Commons, and which u l t i -mately proved to be only the exaggerations of a p s y c h o t i c woman). have c o n t r i b u t e d to the c l i m a t e of confusion which c h a r a c t e r i z e d Quebec at the time: Hoaxes and f a l s e news were p l e n t y f u l , f o r example, James Cross' death was announced s e v e r a l times (among which at l e a s t once on the French network CBC) have c o n t r i b u t e d to give the FLQ a p o l i t i c a l r e c o g n i t i o n through t h e i r d i f f u s i o n of the manifesto (which according to some com-mentators represented an i n t r u s i o n of the " r e a l " speech i n the universe of "commercial" speech of the media) and t h e i r coverage of the n e g o t i a t i o n s between the FLQ and the a u t h o r i t i e s (which according to the same commentators, placed the FLQ on the same p o l i t i c a l f o o t i n g than the Governments, and t h i s l e d to the down-grading of the t r a d i t i o n a l o p p o s i t i o n movements). FOCUS I I I : MULTIPLE SEPARATE IMPLEMENTATION UNITS (BOUNDED RATIONALITY) 1. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE W.M.A. IN OTHER PROVINCES THAN QUEBEC Following the proclamation of the W.M.A. (which we are to understand was designed to cope with the s i t u a t i o n p r e v a i l i n g i n the Province of Quebec) some "unforeseen" u t i l i z a t i o n s of the new l e g i s l a t i o n appeared i n other provinces: In Vancouver, the C i t y C ouncil took under c o n s i d e r a t i o n a motion i n s p i r e d by the W.M.A. to ban a l l "subversive gatherings" (81) - B r i t i s h Columbia passed an order i n Council banning any teachers from tax supported schools " i f they advocated the p o l i c i e s of Le Front de L i b e r a t i o n du Quebec" (82) "At the u n i v e r s i t y o f V i c t o r i a , A s s i s t a n t P r o f e s s o r Ronald Kirkby issued a statement d e c l a r i n g that Trudeau's a c t i o n s were r e s p o n s i -b l e f o r the death of P i e r r e Laporte, a b r u t a l assessment perhaps, but one a l s o shared by Rene Levesque, whose p o l i t i c a l p a r t y was supported by almost one quarter of the voters of Quebec. The p o l i c e came around to the o f f i c e s o f the M a r t l e t t , the U n i v e r s i t y o f V i c t o r i a student newspaper and warned them not to p u b l i s h a l e t t e r from Kirkby. They d i d n ' t . . . " (83) In O n t a r i o , a s i t u a t i o n has already a r i s e n which could be d e a l t w i t h under the W.M.A. i f Attorney General Arthur Wishart wanted to. A U n i v e r s i t y newspaper i n Toronto t h i s week pub l i s h e d the FLQ manifesto. Another paper i n Guelph c a n c e l l e d i t s press run because of f e a r s of prosecuti o n (84) Less d i r e c t l y , some a u t h o r i t i e s took advantage of the "law and order" mood (more than s p e c i f i c a l l y , o f the W.M.A.) to o b t a i n the f u l f i l m e n t of demands which could h a r d l y have been considered before The A l b e r t a movie censors refused a Quebec made f i l m , Red, the s t o r y of a Metis who leaves the reserve and goes to Montreal Mr. Caouette, who had repeatedly charged Radio-Canada w i t h favouring separatism i n i t s inf o r m a t i o n programming, asked whether the c o r p o r a t i o n would be placed under t r u s t e e s h i p f o r a clean-up. He c a l l e d the CBC a refuge f o r r e b e l s who are w e l l fed at the expense of the p u b l i c . - Mr. Lloyd Crouse (P.C. South Shore) c a l l e d the program "The Legacy of Lenin", that was to be broadcasted on CBC that evening, a documentary f o r r e v o l u t i o n and asked f o r i t s c a n c e l l a t i o n (apparently he gained s a t i s f a c t i o n ) . On the same day J.A. MacLean (P.C. Malpeque) won applause from both Conservative and L i b e r a l backbenchers, when he asked b a r r i n g CBC from going abroad to i n t e r v i e w people who are not allowed i n t o Canada: " I ask t h i s i n l i g h t o f the f a c t that some of t h e i r f a v o r i t e commentators such as Timothy Leary and others are now f u g i t i v e s from J u s t i c e " (84a) Confronted w i t h t h i s flow o f unpredicted developments, J u s t i c e M i n i s t e r Turner warned the provinces against abuse of the emergency measures l a i d down "to break the Front de L i b e r a t i o n du Quebec". In the Commons he made c l e a r t h a t : "The measures were designed to deal w i t h the emergency touched o f f by Quebec t e r r o r i s m i n Quebec - not w i t h r a d i c a l i s m i n general across the country". (g5) Apparently the a u t h o r i t i e s had come to r e a l i z e that the Government had no a u t h o r i t y to make c e r t a i n that the p o l i c e powers are not abused and invoked by p r o v i n c i a l p o l i t i c i a n s f o r "ad-hoc" purposes. In f a c t , according to the Canadian C o n s t i t u t i o n , the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f J u s t i c e r e l i e s on the provinces and t h e i r a ttorney generals g i v i n g the Federal Government no c o n t r o l over the implemented a c t i o n s . In order to solve t h i s problem and avoid p o t e n t i a l "harmful e f f e c t s " , J u s t i c e M i n i s t e r Turner took the f o l l o w i n g steps: Dispatched an a s s i s t a n t deputy m i n i s t e r to v i s i t the four A t l a n t i c and the four Western Provinces to discuss the matter w i t h attorney generals and t h e i r o f f i c e r s . I n i t i a t e d personal d i s c u s s i o n s w i t h the Ontario Attorney General and apparently reached the f o l l o w i n g agreement: "Municipal and Ontario P r o v i n c i a l P o l i c e , w i l l cooperate f u l l y w i t h the R.C.M.P. but any a r r e s t w i l l be on b e h a l f of the Federal Force.- Anyone a r r e s t e d would be turned to the R.C.M.P. f o r charging and de t e n t i o n " (86) Promised, w i t h i n days, a new act and r e g u l a t i o n s "of a l e s s comprehensive nature" to replace the W.M.A. 2. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE W.M.A. IN QUEBEC As f a r as the implementation of the War Measures.Act i s concerned i t seems necessary to d i s t i n g u i s h between four successive steps, which covered the p e r i o d from October 16, 1970, date o f the f i r s t a r r e s t s under the p r o v i s i o n s of the W.M.A. and August 1971, date of the Quebec J u s t i c e M i n i s t e r ' s d e c i s i o n to suspend the charges against the remaining i n d i c t e d persons. Those four steps i n c l u d e : The a r r e s t process ( a r r e s t s , s e i z u r e s ) - The detention process (questioning and dete n t i o n without indictment) - The indictment process (charges l a i d against the a r r e s t e d and detained persons) The t r i a l process ( d e c i s i o n s rendered by the courts) 2.1 The a r r e s t process This process i n c l u d e s two phases: The massive round up - 109 -f o l l o w i n g the proclamation of the W.M.A. and the cr a c k i n g of the L i b e r a t i o n and of the Chenier C e l l . Such a d i s -t i n c t i o n may a p r i o r i seem questionable but we intend to show i n our a n a l y s i s that they r e s u l t e d from such d i f f e r e n t circumstances that they may l e g i t i m a t e l y be he l d as two d i f f e r e n t e n t i t i e s . 2. 1 1. The round up f o l l o w i n g the proclamation o f the War  Measures Act Among the 497 persons a r r e s t e d under the p r o v i s i o n s of the W.M.A. 355 have been a r r e s t e d during the per i o d from October 16 to October 25 41 have been a r r e s t e d during the p e r i o d from October 25 to October 28 56 have been a r r e s t e d during the p e r i o d from October 28 to November 24 45 have been a r r e s t e d during the p e r i o d from November 24 to February 3, 1971. In other terms more than 70% of the persons a r r e s t e d , have been a r r e s t e d i n the nine f i r s t days f o l l o w i n g the proclamation o f the W.M.A. On those 497 a r r e s t s only two have been made by the R.C.M.P. (see the crac k i n g of the FLQ c e l l s ) a l l the others were the r e -s u l t s of the j o i n t e f f o r t s o f the Q.P.P. and the Montreal P o l i c e , which c o n s t i t u t e d the backbone o f the A n t i - t e r r o r i s t Squad. As no d e t a i l e d i n f o r m a t i o n has been rel e a s e d on the p r e c i s e d i v i s i o n o f labour among the three p o l i c e forces during the process and that by a l l accounts the Squad was s t i l l a c t i v e at the time, we w i l l consider any m a t e r i a l r e l a t e d to - 110 -one of the three forces as r e l e v a n t i n our a n a l y s i s . 2. 1 1. 1 O r g a n i z a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the f o r c e s The Q.P.P. was created i n 1959 and organized on s i m i l a r patterns than the R.C.M.P., wi t h detachments i n Montreal, major c i t i e s and r u r a l areas - The Montreal P o l i c e which,in the past, had.often been c r i t i c i z e d f o r both i t s c o r r u p t i o n and lack of p r o f e s s i o n a l i s m , was "reorganized" i n 1967 under the s u p e r v i s i o n of two f o r e i g n s p e c i a l i s t s , who apparently succeeded i n t h e i r task of "upgrading" the f o r c e but who at the same time generated "morale" r e l a t e d problems i n the ranks The A n t i - T e r r o r i s t Squad was f i r s t formed i n the Spring of 1963 w i t h the f i r s t wave of t e r r o r i s t bombings. I t was disbanded i n 1964. I t was r e -formed w i t h the resumption of bombings i n 1968 w i t h a membership of 50 to 70 men. Immediately before the kidnapping i t had 200 men. At the height of the c r i s i s the Squad was b e l i e v e d to have 400 men assigned to i t . P e r s i s t e n t l y p o l i c e and c i t y o f f i c i a l s have refused to d i v u l g e the Squad budget, although i t was known to be handsome. The l o c a t i o n of i t s command post, b e l i e v e d to be somewhere i n Montreal,was kept secret 2. 1 1. 2 O r g a n i z a t i o n a l past performances The Precedent of the Montreal P o l i c e S t r i k e By s e v e r a l of i t s aspects the P o l i c e S t r i k e i n . Montreal on October 7 and 8, 1969, appears to be some k i n d of a premiere to the implementa-t i o n o f the War Measures Act ( i n t e r v e n t i o n of the Army, nomination o f the Q.P.P. d i r e c t o r as the head o f law enforcement forces) and r e v e a l s some i n t e r e s t i n g evidence on the a c t i v i t i e s d i s -played by the P o l i c e Forces. Among these, was the gloomy performance o f the Q.P.P. i n t h i s new environment: "We are completely l o s t , declared a Q.P.P. spokesman, who recognized that most of the 700 Q.P.P. members dispatched to Montreal d i d not know the s t r e e t s of the metropole, the crime proned l o c a t i o n s and " c e r t a i n cha-r a c t e r s " w e l l known to the Municip a l Pol ice"(87) These shortcomings were not l e f t unnoticed by Defence M i n i s t e r Leo Cadieux who p e r f i d l y mentioned that he "was s a t i s f i e d by the s w i f t d i s p a t c h of troops at St. Hubert A i r Base" and who according to Le Devoir "appeared to have some doubts on the Q.P.P. e f f i c i e n c y . " As no c o r r e c t i v e measures were apparently taken, i t i s to be assumed that the Q.P.P. approached the October c r i s i s w i t h a " t a r n i s h e d coat o f arms" whose b r i l l i a n c e i t t r i e d to r e s t o r e . Apparently the r e l a t i o n s between the Q.P.P and the Montreal P o l i c e Forces were not a b s o l u t e l y " c l o u d l e s s " , members i n the Mu n i c i p a l P o l i c e Force r e s e n t i n g the r o l e of "scabs" played by t h e i r P r o v i n c i a l counterparts during the s t r i k e . In f a c t , at the time t h e i r r e l a t i o n s could be only described as "inamicable". "Many of the policemen (Montreal) began d r i n k i n g h e a v i l y i n bars near the arena, i n s p i t e of ap-peals by t h e i r leaders and f i s t f i g h t s broke out between c i t y and p r o v i n c i a l policemen. S i x or seven Q.P.P. c r u i s e r s were d r i v e n to the arena by C i t y policemen who ordered t h e i r p r o v i n c i a l colleagues to go home i n t a x i s " (88) The p r i o r a c t i v i t i e s of the A n t i - T e r r o r i s t Squad During the few years preceeding the c r i s i s , the Squad had apparently concerned i t s e l f w i t h other matters than bombs and t e r r o r i s t r a i d s : " U n t i l now the Squad's main task has been sur-v e i l l a n c e . I t has c a r r i e d out numerous r a i d s but a r r e s t s have been infrequent o f t e n because extremists and suspected t e r r o r i s t s were doing nothing u n l a w f u l . U n t i l the W.M.A. was invoked i t was no crime to possess r e v o l u t i o n a r y l i t e r a -t u r e that bordered but d i d not cross the l i n e i n t o s e d i t i o n . The same could be s a i d o f shouting slogans, making f i e r y speeches, h o l d i n g r e v o l u t i o n a r y meetings and conducting demonstra-t i o n s that d i d not lapse i n t o v i o l e n c e . The r a i d s c a r r i e d out under warrants a l l e g i n g s u s p i c i o n of possession of s t o l e n goods, firearms or pornographic l i t e r a t u r e or the commission of l i q u o r offences or a v a r i e t y of other offences, y i e l d e d mounds of a c t i v i s t l i t e r a t u r e and o f t e n previous l i s t s o f names, o r g a n i z a t i o n s and cor-respondence . A r r e s t s although small i n number compared to the number of r a i d s , nevertheless were s i g n i f i c a n t Hundreds over the past few years have been picked up on v a r i o u s charges photographed and f i n g e r -p r i n t e d . Roundups o f t e n took place before major demonstra-t i o n s and i n the view of the Prevost Commission on the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n of J u s t i c e i n Quebec amounted to a form o f preventive detention which "does not at a l l conform to the requirements of the law" (...) so a f t e r three years of continuous and con-centrated e f f o r t s , the Squad has compiled voluminous f i l e s on almost everyone who has had even a passing f l i r t a t i o n w i t h the r a d i c a l f r i n g e s " (89) From t h i s account, i t appears that the tempta-t i o n of a more a c t i v e r e p r e s s i v e p o l i c y must have been a growing subject o f concern i n the Squad. They had gathered the names of most of the p o t e n t i a l and proven a c t i v i s t s i n the Province, accumulated "mounds of a c t i v i s t l i t e r a t u r e " . . . b u t were r a t h e r f r u s t r a t e d i n * t h e i r attempts of making a r r e s t s . The October c r i s i s was g i v i n g i t a r a t h e r promising oppor-t u n i t y to get r i d of an e v e r l a s t i n g source of t r o u b l e and i n the same time to prove the ap-pro r i a t e n e s s of i t s approach. Organization values and b e l i e f s Among the values and b e l i e f s nurtured i n the f o r c e s , two o f them seem t o have exerted some form o f i n -fluence i n t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s during the c r i s i s : - t h e i r a t t i t u d e s toward the C i v i l R i g h t s : The same Prevost commission on the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f j u s t i c e i n Quebec,mentioned e a r l i e r , i n c l u d e d i n i t s r e p o r t the f o l l o w i n g conclusions of a research made by the department o f criminology of the U n i v e r s i t y o f Montreal: "The Quebec policeman b e l i e v e s that the p u b l i c perceives him r a t h e r unfavourably c h i e f l y because of a bad press coverage and a lack of i n f o r m a t i o n . He refuses to consider h i m s e l f as a r e p r e s s i v e agent and considers that h i s main r o l e i s t o maintain the order during mass m a n i f e s t a t i o n s . . . However, he i s very favourably i n c l i n e d toward the u t i l i z a t i o n o f some techniques, g e n e r a l l y - 114 -reproved by the Human Rights proponents: Com-pul s o r y i d e n t i t y cards, e l e c t r o n i c s u r v e i l l a n c e and preventive d e t e n t i o n . . . " t h e i r perceptions o f mounting t h r e a t s against t h e i r p h y s i c a l s e c u r i t y : In f a c t i t appears, that among the members of the P o l i c e Forces, many happened to f e a r f o r t h e i r l i v e s and the ones of t h e i r f a m i l y during the c r i s i s . This element was confirmed by Commissioner H i g g i t "Even p o l i c e and t h e i r f a m i l i e s have been threatened w i t h death i n the l a s t two years v i a l e t t e r s or telephone c a l l s . A u t h e n t i c i t y of the t h r e a t or t h e i r o r i g i n could not be e s t a b l i s h e d " (90) the Commissioner s a i d . - 2. 1 1. 4 The impact o f o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s on  the process of a r r e s t s One of the f i r s t consequences of these o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s on the process of a r r e s t s was ap-p a r e n t l y to s u r p r i s e Ottawa i f we are to b e l i e v e Anthony W e s t e l l : "Before the great round up f i n i s h e d , more than 400 people had been in t e r n e d - a much greater number than Ottawa had expected..." (91) This surabundant number of a r r e s t s can l a r g e l y be explained i f one takes i n t o account: the r a t h e r loose d e f i n i t i o n o f p o t e n t i a l suspects, accepted by the f o r c e s . the r a t h e r u n d i s c r i m i n a t i v e way under which those "standards" were a p p l i e d the q u a l i t y and untim e l i n e s s of the m a t e r i a l s accumulated by the forces (the f i l e s covered s e v e r a l years) - the conspicuous absence of a serious r e v i s i o n process: On October 15 i n the evening, the d i f f e r e n t p o l i c e forces pooled t h e i r l i s t s of suspects and c o n s t i t u t e d a master l i s t which J u s t i c e M i n i s t e r i s reported to have reviewed (given the circumstances one can s e r i o u s l y doubt of the q u a l i t y o f such a r e v i s i o n ) the absence of the t r a d i t i o n a l forms of r e s t r a i n t > which the W.M.A. had removed. Under the new circumstances p o l i c e o f f i c e r s were no longer l i a b l e f o r u n j u s t i f i e d a r r e s t s which induce them to a r r e s t by extension (case f o r example of people found i n the company of suspects, whether on the l i s t or not, or people found at a given address mentioned on the l i s t ) the f r u s t r a t i o n and fear p r e v a i l i n g among the members of the forc e s (or to r e v e r t the remark C h u r c h i l l a p p l i e d to S i r Edward Mosley "they are l e s s dangerous i n than out") the d e s i r e of the Q.P.P. to d i s p l a y i t s e f f i c i e n c y : I t i s reported t h a t : " A f t e r the proclamation o f the W.M.A., Q.P.P. D i r e c t o r Maurice St. P i e r r e , phoned the p o l i c e c h i e f o f a c i t y o f medium importance, to make i t c l e a r that r a t h e r few a r r e s t s had been made i n h i s area - The p o l i c e c h i e f answered that he could not a r r e s t people j u s t f o r the fun of i t . D i r e c t o r St. P i e r r e then suggested to make a few p e r q u i s i t i o n s , to search c a r s , which he s a i d was easy under the p r o v i s i o n s of the, W.M.A. i n order "to create some k i n d of atmosphere" " (92) The other consequence o f the p r o v i s i o n s of the W.M.A., coupled with the p o l i c e f o r c e s ' procedures, was to indulge them i n a f r a n t i c search f o r m a t e r i a l , which saw the Montreal and Q.P.P. p o l i c e o f f i c e r s c o l l e c t i n g - 116 i n a hurry, documents, telephone books ( f o r the phone numbers on the l a s t page presumably), f i l e s and p i l i n g them i n green garbage bags which they had brought w i t h them f o r the circumstances. Among other objects o f i n t e r e s t they have a l s o been reported to have repeatedly s e i z e d t y p e w r i t e r s and weapons of any k i n d . 2. 1 2. The cra c k i n g of the L i b e r a t i o n and Chenier C e l l I f the p o l i c e forces had se i z e d t y p e w r i t e r s to t r y to match them w i t h the communiques t h e i r attempt was by a l l accounts u n s u c c e s s f u l . Their search f o r the murderers of P i e r r e Laporte and f o r the l o c a t i o n of the hide-out of James Cross' kidnappers was at a low p o i n t , i n s p i t e of Rose's b o a s t f u l n e s s . On October 18, warrants had been emitted against Paul Rose, Marc Charbonneau, and on October 24, against F. Simard, Bernard L o r t i e and Jacques Rose, but w i t h no immediate r e s u l t s . The i n -v e s t i g a t o r s were apparently concentrating t h e i r e f f o r t s outside o f Montreal. " I n the meantime, according to informed sources, the armed forces have combed c e r t a i n areas i n the Western and North Western p a r t s o f the Province, i n order to f i n d the t e r r o r i s t s ...Reconnaissance a i r c r a f t s have j o i n e d the search. They f l y over woods and f o r e s t s i n order to detect b o n f i r e s that could e v e n t u a l l y s i g n a l the presence of t e r r o r i s t s ' camps. The armed forces and the p o l i c e have concentrated t h e i r e f f o r t s i n the regions o f the province where summer cottages are l o c a t e d . . . " (93) In the absence of d e c i s i v e progress. (the measure having been already postponed s e v e r a l t i m e s ) , J u s t i c e M i n i s t e r Choquette, announced on November 3, 1970 t h a t : "The Governments of Quebec and Ottawa, j o i n t l y o f f e r rewards up to $75,000. f o r inf o r m a t i o n l e a d i n g to the a r r e s t of the kidnappers or murderers of former Quebec Labour M i n i s t e r P i e r r e Laporte. S i m i l a r rewards are o f f e r e d at the same time f o r information l e a d i n g to the a r r e s t of the kidnappers of J . Cross. In the same way rewards w i l l be given f o r i n f o r m a t i o n l e a d i n g to the a r r e s t of f i v e suspects Paul Rose, Marc Charbonneau, Jacques Rose, Bernard L o r t i e and F. Simard" (94) This t a c t i c was not new: During a press conference on August 22, 1969, former Union Nationale J u s t i c e M i n i s t e r Paul had included . i n h i s ten point program to f i g h t t e r r o r i s m "the o f f e r i n g of a $50,000. reward f o r the i n f o r m a t i o n l e a d i n g to the a r r e s t of t e r r o r i s t s " I t had been used i n the beginning of 1970 and had l e d to the d i s c o v e r y of the FLQ hide-out i n Prevost which i n t u r n had revealed the p l o t against U.S. Consul Burgess. But at l e a s t i t was e f f i c i e n t , on November 6, Montreal p o l i c e during a " r o u t i n e " i n v e s t i g a t i o n a r r e s t e d B. L o r t i e and apparently came c l o s e to a r r e s t i n g the Rose brothers and F r a n c i s Simard (who were hidden i n a c l o s e t ) , who f i n a l l y were'located i n S a i n t Luc near Montreal on December 27. (Apparently on a lead o r i g i n a t i n g from the follow-up of L o r t i e ' s a r r e s t ) . The c r a c k i n g of the Chenier C e l l , however, turned i n t e r e s t i n g evidence on the c o l l a b o r a t i o n between the P o l i c e Forces e s p e c i a l l y between the R.C.M.P. and the two others. In f a c t i t appeared: that the discovery o f the St. Hubert p a v i l i o n i n which P. Laporte was detained was reported only 48 hours l a t e r by the Q.P.P. to the R.C.M.P. that the R.C.M.P. learned L o r t i e ' s a r r e s t by the newspapers and was only informed of th e existence of the c l o s e t hide-out four days a f t e r the a r r e s t (Montreal P o l i c e was not p a r t i c u l a r l y proud of the f a c t , since an FLQ communique sent by Jacques Rose was a l l e g i n g t h a t the weapons o f the policemen on duty had been stolen) On the same v e i n , c l a s s i c a l p o l i c e work (a t a i l on Jacques Lanctot's wife) l e d the R.C.M.P. to 10945 rue des R e c o l l e t s and to the a r r e s t o f Cossette-Trudels (the only two a r r e s t s made by the R.C.M.P.) and to the rel e a s e of James Cross a f t e r the acceptance of the Government o f f e r . As i n the preceeding case, b i t t e r evidence was turned on the lack of c o l l a b o r a t i o n among the P o l i c e Forces. On the t a i l of J . Lanctot,an R.C.M.P. o f f i c e r and hi s w i f e , s e t t l e d on the second f l o o r of 10945 rue des R e c o l l e t s , were n e a r l y a r r e s t e d by North Montreal Municip a l P o l i c e , on whose j u r i s d i c t i o n was the area, and who had not been informed of t h e i r presence. The m u l t i p l i c a t i o n o f c o n t r a d i c t o r y statements a f t e r James Cross' safe r e l e a s e " A f t e r the B r i t i s h Trade Commissioner won h i s freedom i n exchange f o r safe conduct to Cuba f o r h i s kidnappers the Q.P.P. D i r e c t o r gave lengthy i n t e r v i e w s to s e l e c t e d r e p o r t e r s from Montreal newspapers i n which he c l e a r l y l e f t the impression that h i s f o r c e was l a r g e l y r e s p o n s i -b l e f o r the s u c c e s s f u l c o n c l u s i o n of the i n v e s t i g a t i o n . Obviously peeved A s s i s t a n t Commissioner Dube revealed i n an in t e r v i e w that the R.C.M.P. was not given ac-cess to the St. Hubert bungallow where the Q.P.P. found masses of evidence that Labour M i n i s t e r P. Laporte had been h e l d hostage f o r a week and s t r a n g l e d on October 17"(94a) In the same mood, the Chief o f Montreal-North P o l i c e , added a few comments on h i s own by which a l l that was a l o t of noise f o r r e a l l y nothing (the heavy sur-rounding of the des R e c o l l e t s area) and that two or three Montreal North P o l i c e c r u i s e r s would have been s u f f i c i e n t . The d e t e n t i o n process At the apparent embarrassment of the Federal A u t h o r i t i e s numerous questions were r a i s e d i n the Commons on the way the Province was implementing the p r o v i s i o n s of the W.M.A. e s p e c i a l l y those regarding the dete n t i o n of "suspects". Among the most prominent were: The f a c t t h a t lawyers had not been permitted i n the f i r s t week to see t h e i r imprisoned c l i e n t s The f a c t that on October 27, n e i t h e r the S o l i c i t o r . General nor the J u s t i c e M i n i s t e r had been able to give the Commons the box score on a r r e s t s , r e l e a s e s and detentions under the r e g u l a t i o n s nor to t e l l them how much dynamite arms and ammunitions had been recovered i n r a i d s - The f a c t that apparently those a r r e s t e d had been f i n g e r -p r i n t e d which was not aut h o r i z e d e i t h e r by the W.M.A. or the I d e n t i f i c a t i o n of C r i m i n a l s Act. The f a c t that some p r i s o n e r s had been beaten or i l l - t r e a t e d . - The f a c t t h a t , i n s p i t e of the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s agreement on the demand, no l i s t of a r r e s t e d persons had been provided to the p u b l i c . Those c r i t i c i s m s against the a c t i o n s taken i n the Quebec Province were answered only with weak comments on the v i s s i c i t u d e s of the Canadian Federal System or as expressed by Prime M i n i s t e r Trudeau: "Here again, I cannot speak f o r the Province of Quebec, which was entrusted w i t h a d m i n i s t e r i n g the A c t " (95) or J u s t i c e M i n i s t e r Turner: "The a t t o r n e y generals are f r e e to i n t e r p r e t these regu-l a t i o n s on the advice given by t h e i r Governments" (95) In s p i t e of these d e c l a r a t i o n s of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l impotence a few c o r r e c t i v e measures were taken: - The Government, more or less,promised to s p e c i f y , i n the new r e g u l a t i o n s , a l i a i s o n committee and the r i g h t to counsel (on which Mr. J . Diefenbaker was e s p e c i a l l y s e n s i t i v e ) The Quebec J u s t i c e M i n i s t e r approved the formation by the C i v i l L i b e r t i e s Union of a three member sub-committee to f u r n i s h " c l o t h i n g and c i g a r e t t e s " to those he l d under the W.M.A. and to act as a l i a i s o n between the p r i s o n e r s and t h e i r f a m i l i e s - Mr. Turner's parliamentary s e c r e t a r y , A l b e r t Bechard, promised to b r i n g the question of unauthorized f i n g e r -p r i n t i n g to the Quebec J u s t i c e M i n i s t e r ' s a t t e n t i o n . S u r p r i s i n g l y , these d e v i a t i o n s from the l e g a l course of a c t i o n (any a r r e s t e d person has the r i g h t to r e t a i n counsel, no f i n g e r p r i n t i n g i s l e g a l u n t i l a person i s sentenced no one can be detained s e c r e t l y ) i f they can be tr a c e d back to the Attorney General - J u s t i c e M i n i s t e r o f the Province of Quebec, or at l e a s t to some of h i s statements, he argued f o r example, t h a t the p u b l i c a t i o n o f the names of those a r r e s t e d could be harmful to them, which c o n s t i -t uted a prime reason f o r not p u b l i s h i n g such a l i s t but als o to the Q.P.P. The C i v i l L i b e r t i e s Union Committee mentions i n i t s p r e l i -minary r e p o r t that i t had n o t i c e d t h a t : " i n c e r t a i n d e t e n t i o n c e n t e r s , e s p e c i a l l y o u t side Montreal the d i r e c t o r s were pressured by Q.P.P. o f f i c i a l s . The pressures were a l l i n the same d i r e c t i o n . People a r r e s t e d under the W.M.A. were to be maintained i n the most complete i s o l a t i o n and incommunicado" (96) Apparently t h i s n o t i o n of "incommunicado" went as f a r as preventing the a r r e s t e d persons to communicate w i t h t h e i r f a m i l i e s , or censuring the news broadcasted by the r a d i o s t a t i o n s which were turned on i n the detention centers. I t i s d i f f i c u l t a p r i o r i to conceive of any r a t i o n a l e behind such a f e a t u r e , unless one t r i e s to r e l a t e i t to the way the "suspects" were questioned (not a l l o f them, since i n some s p e c i f i c instances people have reported not to have been questioned) The persons that were questioned (see Serge Mondeau) never mentioned any s p e c i f i c question on t h e i r r e l a t i o n s w i t h the 10 prime suspects (which at the time were p o s i t i v e l y i d e n t i -f i e d ) but r e l a t e they have been submitted to some form of p o l i t i c a l q uestioning f o r which a standard form had been e s t a b l i s h e d . Among the r e c u r r i n g themes were questions such as "Are you a member of the FLQ" ... "Did you kidnap James Cross" ... "Do you agree with the FLQ Manifesto"... "Are you i n favour o f making s o c i a l change by v i o l e n c e " . . . Most people describe them as i n t e r v i e w s more than i n t e r r o g a -t i o n s , they were g e n e r a l l y f r i e n d l y , apparently p o i n t l e s s and gave a f a i r importance to standard questions on the i d e n t i t y o f r e l a t i v e s , job h i s t o r y , education... However naive those questions may appear, they were i n -c r i m i n a t i n g : The detained persons "could not know that making statement i n support of the FLQ, even to a p o l i c e o f f i c e r i n a f r i e n d l y chat about " p o l i t i c s and t h a t s o r t of t h i n g " , could be used i n court as proof they were g u i l t y o f the crime of belonging to the FLQ, which was defined i n a law of which they were not allowed to be aware, as the "unlawful a s s o c i a t i o n " " (97) On t h i s account, the Q.P.P. was f a c i l i t a t i n g the job of the Crown f o r f u r t h e r prosecutions. I t i s u n l i k e l y that t h i s was done without the consent (not to speak of the i n i t i a t i v e ) o f the Attorney General, who took the pairi to defend some h i g h l y questionable p o s i t i o n s ( l i k e the n o n - d i v u l g a t i o n of the suspects' l i s t s ) and who was one of the main b e n e f i -c i a r y (as the r e s p o n s i b l e f o r prosecutions) of that i l l e g a l procedure. This c o n c l u s i o n i s confirmed by two statements one s u r p r i s i n g l y emanating from the Quebec Finance M i n i s t e r R. Garneau: "The Finance M i n i s t e r explained t h a t the purpose of the a r r e s t s was to allow questioning i n order to b r i n g charges against those who p a r t i c i p a t e i n the a c t i v i t i e s o f t e r r o r i s t movements" (98) the other from J u s t i c e M i n i s t e r Choquette: "And I s h a l l add to t h i s , that the a r r e s t and d e t e n t i o n of a c e r t a i n number of persons have enabled us to c o l l e c t many u s e f u l i n f o r m a t i o n as f a r as p o t e n t i a l charges to be l a i d i n c o urts are concerned" (99) The c o m p l i c i t y of Ottawa i s more open to q u e s t i o n i n g : Some vague promises of i n t e r v e n t i o n were made but when compared w i t h the r e a l i n t e r v e n t i o n s that took p l a c e i n other - 123 -provinces (to prevent the use and abuse of the W.M.A.) they appear r a t h e r i n s i g n i f i c a n t but no f u r t h e r evidence permits to e s t a b l i s h whether i t was a matter of t o l e r a n c e or a matter of i n t e n t i o n . One of the P.R. agents of the Q.P.P. denied c a t e g o r i c a l l y the a l l e g a t i o n s made by Quebec lawyer Samson that p r i s o n e r s had been beaten i n O r s a i n v i l l e p r i s o n , who subsequently s p e c i f i e d that h i s accusations were, not against p o l i c e o f f i c e r s but p r i s o n wardens. L a t e r , i n s p i t e of M i n i s t e r Choquette's r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t p r i s o n e r s had been beaten but "only s l i g h t l y " and that the blows had not been v i o l e n t , the Q.P.P. D i r e c t o r a f f i r m e d on November 27 "that as f a r as he knew, no pr i s o n e r had been beaten i n the c e l l s " (100) - 2. 3 The indictment process As soon as October 27, Prime M i n i s t e r P.E. Trudeau mentioned i n the Commons: "I hope i t w i l l be as much as p o s s i b l e . . . t h a t charges w i l l be l a i d under the C r i m i n a l Code r a t h e r than on the W.M.A. (Pu b l i c Order Regulations) but here again I cannot speak f o r the province of Quebec, which was entrusted w i t h ad-m i n i s t e r i n g the Act. . ." (101) This statement seems pa r a d o x i c a l s i n c e the P u b l i c Order Regulations had been accepted by a huge m a j o r i t y a few days before i n the Commons: The Government had taken the pain to have a vote on the r e g u l a t i o n s (which i t was not at a l l o b l i g e d to do) to announce, l e s s than a week afterwards, that i t was recommending the Quebec Attorney General not to use some of i t s p r o v i s i o n s . . . ! This d r a s t i c change makes sense only under three p o s s i b l e c o n d i t i o n s : - The Federal Government had never intended to have the P u b l i c Order Regulations used f o r prosecutions ( i t was only an umbrella f o r extended P o l i c e powers) which i s i n l i n e w i t h the Model I per s p e c t i v e s The Federal Government had found the outcome of the a r r e s t s r a t h e r deceptive on the account o f the p r i o r i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t i t had r e c e i v e d (conformity w i t h Model I I perspectives) and the pressures f o r a c t i o n made by the two other Governments ( i n conformity as we w i l l f u r t h e r see w i t h Model IV per s p e c t i v e s ) The Federal Government had discovered that the P u b l i c Order Regulations i n t h e i r r e p r e s s i v e p r o v i s i o n s were i n a p p l i c a b l e (discrepancy between i n t e n t i o n and a c t i o n ) As c o n d i t i o n number three appears r a t h e r weak s i n c e i n p u r e l y r a t i o n a l terms the Government should have been able to con-v i n c e the Quebec Attorney General o f the i n t r i n s i c weakness of the Act, c o n d i t i o n number one and number two, even i f they focus on d i f f e r e n t causes (which can have intervened separa-t e l y or j o i n t l y ) lead to the same c o n c l u s i o n : The Federal Government had the f e e l i n g that the implementation o f the W.M.A. was being d i s t o r t e d from i t s i n i t i a l or (revised) i n t e n t i o n s and f e l t the n e c e s s i t y of a p u b l i c warning. This warning was not r e t a i n e d by the Crown ( i n f a c t the Attorney General and the task f o r c e o f lawyers t h a t prepared the indictments) as shown i n the t a b l e r e c o n s t i t u t e d from the v a r i o u s press r e l e a s e s , summarized by Canadian News Facts (101) and presented i n Appendix I I I . I f we t r y to summarize those f a c t s i t appears: - t h a t on 45 persons f o r whom known charges were l a i d , o nly 6 were charged on p r o v i s i o n s not in c l u d e d i n the P u b l i c Order Regulations that on 31 persons f o r whom known charges were l a i d i n Montreal, only two were charged on p r o v i s i o n s not inc l u d e d i n the P u b l i c Order Regulations that 13 persons, i n a d d i t i o n to charges under the P u b l i c Order Regulations, were charged on p r o v i s i o n s of s e d i -t i o u s conspiracy, as defined by the C r i m i n a l Code tha t the indictment was p a r t i c u l a r l y heavy (69 charges l a i d ) f o r the f i v e " b i g s " : Chartrand, Lemieux, V a l l i e r e s , Gagnon, Larue-Langlois - t h a t i n Montreal the Crown decided to take advantage of a r a r e l y used procedure ( p r e f e r r e d indictments) which, e f f e c t i v e l y prevented the defense from examining and t e s t i n g the evidence to be used against them p r i o r to t r i a l . The aggressive approach taken by the Crown was not e x a c t l y new. In 1968, during the t r i a l of V a l l i e r e s and Gagnon (on the charges of murder i n the case o f the La Grenade A f f a i r ) the Crown had used a l l the p o s s i b l e l e g a l t r i c k s to o b t a i n a heavy c o n v i c t i o n : i t delayed the trial,announced that i t wanted to proceed j o i n t l y on the two cases (which made V a l l i e r e s and Gagnon prepare a common defence) and then r e v e r t e d i t s d e c i s i o n and opted f o r separate t r i a l s (which as a r e s u l t delayed Gagnon's t r i a l , who was judged only three years a f t e r h i s a r r e s t ) i t t r i e d t o : " e x t r i c a t e i t s e l f from the embarrassment,that d e s p i t e a delay of a year and a h a l f , i t had no evidence that V a l l i e r e s had any knowledge of the La Grenade bombing. I t p i l e d the t a b l e s high w i t h examples of V a l l i e r e s 1 i n f l a m a t o r y w r i t i n g s which were read t o the j u r y at great length. As the Quebec Court of Appeal was to say l a t e r those w r i t i n g s might w e l l c o n t a i n evidence f o r some other charge but they contained no evidence of a s p e c i f i c murder" (102) Moreover, a l l those e f f o r t s had been f r u s t r a t e d ( i n s p i t e of the eloquent t h r e a t s made by the Crown Attorney l i k e "Gentlemen, f r e e V a l l i e r e s and you know what w i l l happen") the Quebec Court of Appeal ordered a new t r i a l and the sentence of l i f e imprisonment was reduced to 30 months. Those precedents may permit to understand the pugnacity of the Crown ( p a r t i c u l a r l y i n Montreal) and the inflamed statement d e l i v e r e d by Mr. Girouard during the t r i a l of V a l l i e r e s i n 1971 (outside the Court) " P i e r r e V a l l i e r e s has always, considered h i m s e l f as a p o l i t i c a l p r i s o n e r ; he has c o n s t a n t l y requested f o r a p o l i t i c a l t r i a l . He has d e s i r e d to be judged on h i s p o l i t i c a l ideas. His a c t u a l t r i a l f o r s e d i t i o u s conspi-racy i s a p o l i t i c a l t r i a l during which he w i l l be judged f o r h i s p o l i t i c a l ideas" (103) The Crown was apparently so determined that even a f t e r the charges of s e d i t i o u s conspiracy against the "Big F i v e " were quashed by J u s t i c e Ouimet, on February 12, i t l a i d new charges under the same p r o v i s i o n s , f o r n e a r l y the same per i o d of time against V a l l i e r e s , Gagnon and Larue-Langlois. The J u d i c i a l Process I f the courts made a r a t h e r heavy use of contempt c i t a t i o n s , t h e i r d e c i s i o n s nevertheless turned to be on the average f o r more clement than one could have expected (and d e c i s i v e l y more than the Crown had expected). Sentences rendered on Charges l a i d under the P u b l i c  Order Regulations A c q u i t a l s : R. Cormier a c q u i t t e d of three charges l a i d under the Regulations (FLQ membership, advocating the aims of the FLQ and communicating statements) i n Montreal on A p r i l 15, 1971. M. Gutowski a c q u i t t e d found not g u i l t y of advocating FLQ aims by reason of i n s a n i t y c o n v i c t i o n s / F. M e r c i e r , sentenced to 15 months i n j a i l f o r FLQ membership i n Cowansville on November 16, 1970 . C. Leblanc, sentenced t o 10 months i n j a i l f o r advo-c a t i n g FLQ aims, a c q u i t t e d of charges of FLQ membership and s e d i t i o u s conspiracy on February 15, 1971. Sentences rendered on charges l a i d under the C r i m i n a l Code A c q u i t a l s : Chartrand, V a l l i e r e s , Gagnon, Larue-Langlois, Lemieux "On February 12, Mr. J u s t i c e Ouimet had stunned the Court rooms by concluding that the charges of s e d i -t i o u s conspiracy (...between J a n a u r y l , 1968, and l a s t October 16, the f i v e p u b l i c f i g u r e s were p a r t y to a s e d i t i o u s conspiracy w i t h the i n t e n t of changing the Government i n Canada and e s p e c i a l l y i n the Province of Quebec by advocating the use of f o r c e . . . c o n t r a r y to the p r o v i s i o n s of S e c t i o n 62, paragraph (c) of the C r i m i n a l Code) against the b i g f i v e - Chartrand, Lemieux, Larue-Langlois, V a l l i e r e s , Gagnon were too vague" (104) S i m i l a r charges l a i d again by the Crown were turned down by the Court on June 15, 1971: Gagnon and Larue-Langlois being found not g u i l t y . R. Langevin of a charge of p u b l i s h i n g a s e d i t i o u s l i b e l on January 15, 1971 C. Caron of making anonymous phone c a l l s to alarm one or more persons, on J u l y 23, 1971 c o n v i c t i o n s A. Lavoie, sentenced to 2 weeks i n j a i l and a $200. f i n e f o r conspiracy to commit a hold-up to finance the FLQ R. Belanger sentenced to 15 days i n j a i l f o r possession of a sawed-off gun C. L a r i v i e r e and L. V e r r a u l t , sentenced to j a i l terms of 2 and 1 year (on various charges ranging from o b s t r u c t i n g j u s t i c e to a i d i n g the outlawed FLQ; they had aided Paul Rose to leave Montreal i n December) on A p r i l 27, 1971 J.G. L e l i e v r e , V. Daudelin, sentenced on the charges of having conspired to s t e a l machine guns and m i l i t a r y uniforms. From t h i s account (which does not pretend to be exhaustive, but which was r e c o n s t i t u t e d from s c a t t e r e d sources) i t appears that the Courts: - had been r e l u c t a n t to co n v i c t on charges of s e d i t i o n - had been i n c l i n e d to condemn people on charges r e l a t e d to t r a d i t i o n a l v i o l e n c e - had to render only i n 4 cases sentences on charges a r i s i n g from the P u b l i c Order Regulations. On J u l y 30, 1971, J u s t i c e M i n i s t e r Choquette, under "mounting pressure" (105) "Ordered Crown prosecutors to suspend proceedings under the charges a r i s i n g from the P u b l i c Order Regulations (but not under the C r i m i n a l Code). T e c h n i c a l l y the charges against one of the 32 accused could be reviewed at a l a t e r date, i f J u s t i c e M i n i s t e r Choquette or any of h i s successors should so decide" (106) FOCUS IV: MULTIPLE SEPARATE DECISION UNITS (BOUNDED RATIONALITY) 1. THE FLQ Numerous observers, at l e a s t during the p r e l i m i n a r y phase of the c r i s i s , have more or l e s s openly assumed th a t the FLQ was some kind of a u n i t a r y movement, operating according to a w e l l defined and predetermined s t r a t e g y (see Model I I f o r d e s c r i p t i v e statements). This view, however, h a r d l y r e s i s t s a more thorough a n a l y s i s of the evidence at hand. - 1. 1 "Thinkers" and "Men of A c t i o n " In the r e p o r t on "La J u s t i c e et l a S e c u r i t e des Citoyens", J u s t i c e M i n i s t e r Choquette describes the s e p a r a t i s t move-ment as a more or l e s s loose c o a l i t i o n between " t h i n k e r s " and "men of a c t i o n " without p r e c i s e l y s p e l l i n g the l i n k s e x i s t i n g between the two. A l l we can l e a r n i s that "some d i s p l a y , but always v e r b a l l y , some sympathy f o r the revo-l u t i o n a r y a c t i o n " and that the others "indulge i n c r i m i n a l acts i n order to gain a t t e n t i o n " . Apparently the Crown had the same problem, both i n the La Grenade and i n the t r i a l under charges of conspiracy against the " b i g f i v e " and was repeatedly unable to prove the existence of c r e -d i b l e and d i r e c t connections between the two groups. The problem was not a new one and one can even doubt that such connections had ever e x i s t e d : " I t was a t a c t i c of propagandists, such as P i e r r e V a l l i e r e s , to lump together a l l the c r i m i n a l a c t i v i t i e s over a seven year p e r i o d , as i f a l l had been c e n t r a l l y d i r e c t e d to a common cause. Thus, s h o r t l y a f t e r he " j o i n e d " the FLQ, V a l l i e r e s wrote "one of the o b j e c t i v e s of the FLQ was and s t i l l i s to a c c e l e r a t e (the) process of becoming conscious to make men aware of the n e c e s s i t y of f i g h t i n g to the death against the despotism of the c a p i t a l i s t system..." By the time V a l l i e r e s came to the FLQ i n 1965, most of the e a r l i e r "members" were i n j a i l . Few of them had i d e o l o g i c a l con-v i c t i o n s . Few were able to i n t e l l e c t u a l i z e t h e i r c r i m i n a l a c t i v i t i e s , except that almost a l l had s u f f e r e d the deep hurt of being put down by E n g l i s h speaking Canadians" (107) - 131 -In these c o n d i t i o n s , one can s t r o n g l y doubt about the e n f o r c i b i l i t y of the "plans" described by V a l l i e r e s i n h i s r e v o l u t i o n a r y works: The matter being more one of oppor-t u n i s t i c p o l i t i c s , than one o f planned and d e t a i l e d revo-l u t i o n a r y a c t i o n . - 1. 2 " L i b e r a t i o n C e l l " and "Chenier C e l l " M u l t i p l e evidence t e s t i f y of the existence o f a process of "pushing and h a u l i n g " between the two c e l l s : Discrepancies between L i b e r a t i o n C e l l communique number 7 and Chenier C e l l communique number 1: The former mentioning only two c o n d i t i o n s , whereas, the l a t t e r r e s t o r e s the FLQ demands to t h e i r o r i g i n a l l e v e l Discrepancies between L i b e r a t i o n C e l l communique number 8 and Chenier C e l l communique number 4: The former s t i l l l i m i t i n g i t s e l f to the same two c o n d i t i o n s (the l i b e r a t i o n of the p o l i t i c a l p r i s o n e r s and the j o i n t t r a n s p o r t a t i o n of the p r i s o n e r s and the members of the C e l l to Cuba), the l a t t e r more or l e s s maintaining the o r i g i n a l set of demands - The wording of L i b e r a t i o n C e l l communique number 10 dated October 17, 10:00 A.M., and addressed to r a d i o s t a t i o n CKLM (and which i n c i d e n t a l l y was not made p u b l i c before December 8, 1970, because of the p o l i c e f o r c e s ' o p p o s i t i o n to i t s immediate broadcasting) "As a consequence, the Front de L i b e r a t i o n du Quebec declares t h a t : 1. the death sentence against J . Cross i s i n d e f i n i t e l y suspended. J . Cross i s a p r i s o n e r of the FLQ. He w i l l not be l i b e r a t e d before the acceptance of our demands, by the a u t h o r i t i e s . He w i l l not be executed unless the p o l i t i c a l f a c i s t p o l i c e discovers us and attempts to intervene As f a r as P. Laporte i s concerned, the Chenier C e l l o f the Front de L i b e r a t i o n du Quebec'is actually-reviewing h i s case and w i l l soon l e t the d e c i s i o n be known" (108) I f one r e f e r s to the p a t t e r n of communication between the two c e l l s , e s p e c i a l l y to the f a c t that the commu-niques were apparently the' main source of communication between the two c e l l s (see Chenier C e l l communique number 3, mentioning "we d i d not get any news from L i b e r a t i o n C e l l " . . . " I f J . Cross i s a l i v e they should, the members of the C e l l , send an eighth communique" or Chenier C e l l communique number 4 s p e l l i n g a comprehen-s i v e s t r a t e g y f o r the two c e l l s ) : One cannot f a i l to i n t e r p r e t t h i s message as a warning to the Chenier C e l l (which had been repeatedly t h r e a t e n i n g to k i l l P. Laporte) I f one t r i e s to e x p l a i n those marked d i f f e r e n c e s between the a c t i o n s and the behavior of the two c e l l s , i t seems necessary to take s e v e r a l f a c t o r s i n t o account: The absence of any p r e - e x i s t i n g p lan of a c t i o n . According to some sources (109) only vague d i s c u s -sions between the two groups had taken place and no e x p l i c i t s t r a t e g y had been agreed upon. "There had been t a l k about forming two c e l l s . One a kidnap c e l l and one to r a i s e funds, but i t was j u s t t a l k " The Rose brothers had not been informed of the plans of the Chenier C e l l and decided on t h e i r own to i n -tervene, i n t e r r u p t i n g a t r i p to the U.S. to kidnap a known p o l i t i c a l f i g u r e i n the immediate Montreal area. "We heard on the r a d i o about the kidnapping of James Richard Cross. When we learned that there was only one hostage, we decided we had to r e t u r n to Canada i n case the Government refused to meet the demands of the L i b e r a t i o n C e l l . We a r r i v e d i n Longueuil on Thursday morning, October 8, 1970" (110) The d i f f e r e n c e between the o r g a n i z a t i o n o f the two operations i s that the L i b e r a t i o n C e l l had apparently taken s u f f i c i e n t precautions to be able to maintain i t s p o s i t i o n f o r at l e a s t two months (funds, choice of the hide-out) and on the other hand the members of the Chenier C e l l were not n e a r l y as r e s o u r c e f u l , i n that they had to use Laporte's money to buy food and on those grounds i t would have been d i f f i c u l t f o r them to l a s t more than one or two weeks without going i n the open and t a k i n g great r i s k s . The d i f f e r e n c e between the a c t o r s : There i s a number of s t r i k i n g d i f f e r e n c e s among the members of the two c e l l s : the people i n the L i b e r a t i o n C e l l were mostly people w i t h f a m i l i e s of t h e i r own (Charbonneau, Lanctot and Cossette-Trudel were married, Charbonneau had s e v e r a l c h i l d r e n , Lanctot had a c h i l d and h i s w i f e at the time was pregnant) whereas the people i n the Chenier C e l l had l i t t l e , i f none. the people i n the L i b e r a t i o n C e l l had gained most of t h e i r experience i n labour c o n f l i c t s (Charbonneau and Lanctot were i n v o l v e d i n the M.L.T., the l i b e -r a t i o n movement of the t a x i i n d u s t r y and had taken part i n the Murray H i l l c o n f l i c t i n 1969): They were more s e n s i t i v e to the impact o f t h e i r a c t i o n s and to t h e i r l o g i s t i c components than the b o a s t f u l Paul Rose, who was more preoccupied w i t h pure sensationalism (consider f o r example the r e t u r n of h i s passport to the a u t h o r i t i e s ) The d i f f e r e n c e between t h e i r o b j e c t i v e s : Jacques Lanctot and the Cossette-Trudels, f o r example, had personal connections w i t h some of the p o l i t i c a l p r i s o n e r s (Francois Lanctot, t h e i r brother and brot h e r - i n - l a w , and Andre Roy who had been a r r e s t e d at the same time) had a personal i n t e r e s t i n the denunciation o f the " s t o o l " (who was r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the a r r e s t of Francois L a n c t o t ) ; the members of the Chenier C e l l on the other hand had no per-sonal i n t e r e s t i n those demands, except t h a t they were a means to curb the "arrogance" of the au-t h o r i t i e s and of the establishment. Those d i f f e r e n c e s , combined w i t h the f a c t t h a t the Chenier C e l l had secured the more important hostage ( i n b a r g a i n i n g terms), appear t o shed some l i g h t on the r a t h e r d i f f e r e n t (and otherwise u n e x p l i c a b l e ) s t r a t e g i e s followed by the two c e l l s . 2. THE AUTHORITIES I f the u n i t a r y a c t o r p e r s p e c t i v e i s o f t e n a u s e f u l f i c t i o n , the a n a l y s i s of the p o l i t i c s of d e c i s i o n appears to be an e q u a l l y f r u i t f u l approach i n the process of governmental d e c i s i o n making. In t h i s d i r e c t i o n , we would l i k e to u n d e r l i n e some s p e c i f i c cha-r a c t e r i s t i c s of the problem at hand (as compared to A l l i s o n ' s ) t h a t make i t p a r t i c u l a r l y s u i t a b l e f o r a Focus IV treatment: The existence of s t r u c t u r a l l y d i f f e r e n t u n i t s , w i t h d i f f e r e n t powers, d i f f e r e n t types of resources and d i f f e r e n t s p e c i f i c r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s (both i n the r e s t r i c t e d and extended senses) The i n t e r n a l nature of the problem, as opposed to A l l i s o n ' s context of Foreign A f f a i r s . The d i s t i n c t i o n may seem tenuous, but i t s consequences are nevertheless important: E x t e r n a l i s s u e s , i n most c o u n t r i e s , are u s u a l l y a secondary concern f o r p o l i t i c i a n s and d e c i s i o n s i n that f i e l d u s u a l l y l i m i t themselves to a very l i m i t e d number of persons. Whereas i n t e r n a l issues ( e s p e c i a l l y when long l a s t i n g ) give r i s e to d i f f e r e n t i a t e d and s e n s i t i v e p o s i t i o n s not o n ly i n the Cabinets but i n the whole body of p o l i t i c s and p u b l i c o p i n i o n . E x t e r n a l i s s u e s , e s p e c i a l l y when t a k i n g the form of i n d i s c r i -minate t h r e a t s , tend to develop a form o f s o l i d a r i t y and consciousness (us vs. them) which tend to be absent i n i n -t e r n a l issues ( i n that case the d i v i d i n g l i n e i s i n t e r n a l , as i n the extreme case of c i v i l war) - The nature of the Canadian P o l i t i c a l System with i n s t i t u t i o n s l i k e the Prime M i n i s t e r (as opposed to a U.S. President whose power o r i g i n a t e s from a d i r e c t e l e c t i o n ) the P r o v i n c i a l and Federal nature of the p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s , t h e i r loose and heterogeneous i d e o l o g i e s (the L i b e r a l Party i s o f t e n r e f e r r e d as an i d e o l o g i c a l sponge), and the l i m i t e d recruitment of the Canadian P o l i t i c a l E l i t e . In t h i s model IV p e r s p e c t i v e we w i l l t r y to f i n d some evidence of the "pushing and h a u l i n g " process t a k i n g place among the governments and i n d i v i d u a l s and r e l a t e i t to the nature of the a c t i o n channels and to the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the Actors i n v o l v e d , i n order to determine the process which l e d to the a u t h o r i t i e s ' d e c i s i o n s . - 136 -- 2. 1 Some Evidence on the pushing and h a u l i n g process - 2. 1 1. P r i o r to October 1970 a) In November 1969, the Montreal a u t h o r i t i e s had been using the C.J.C. hearings i n Ottawa as a forum to express t h e i r concern about the pre-r e v o l u t i o n a r y s i t u a t i o n e x i s t i n g i n Canada at the time and the lack o f a v a i l a b l e means to p r o t e c t s o c i e t y : "He s a i d (Mr. S a u l n i e r ) that the r i o t on October 7, i n Montreal, had proved t h a t Canada was a defenceless country. Defence, s a i d Mr. S a u l n i e r , does not apply only to e x t e r n a l t h r e a t s , but to any a c t i o n that i s to be taken to prevent the i n t e r n a l d e s t r u c t i o n o f a country... Canada has to face a r e v o l u t i o n a r y p l a n ; some of our examples drawn from the s i t u a t i o n i n Montreal take place i n t h i s p l a n . Enquire elsewhere and you w i l l d i s c o v e r the same t h i n g , i f you r e a l l y want to f i n d what there i s to search" (111) At the time, h i s a l l e g a t i o n s were taken r a t h e r l i g h t l y by the members of parliament, whose f e e l i n g was th a t the Montreal a u t h o r i t i e s were t r y i n g to b u i l d a case i n order to dissimulate, t h e i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i n the r i o t s and d i s o r d e r s that had followed the s t r i k e o f the Montreal P o l i c e Forces. b) In J u l y 1970, J u s t i c e M i n i s t e r Turner, during the Attorney-General's conference i n Ha l i f a x , h a d unsuc-c e s s f u l l y proposed important m o d i f i c a t i o n s to the Cr i m i n a l Code, i n order t o curb "crimes forming p a r t of a n a t i o n a l p a t t e r n " The matter came back to surface i n the aftermath of the c r i s i s , when the f e d e r a l a u t h o r i t i e s took advantage of the circum-stances to give a new chance to t h e i r "pet p r o j e c t " . " J u s t i c e M i n i s t e r Turner w i l l seek the support of the p r o v i n c i a l Attorneys-General f o r h i s proposal t h a t a new category of n a t i o n a l crime be e s t a b l i s h e d . When the matter was f i r s t r a i s e d i n H a l i f a x , l a s t summer, the Attorneys-General were not keen, but the M i n i s t e r f e e l s that developments i n Quebec have strengthened h i s hand. Mr. Turner f e e l s t h a t the FLQ c r i s i s has demonstra-ted the need f o r f e d e r a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n and prose-c u t i o n when such crimes form part of a n a t i o n a l p a t t e r n . This could occur as a r e s u l t of p o l i t i c a l c onspiracy or organized crime. In such circumstances, the J u s t i c e M i n i s t e r b e l i e v e s Ottawa i s b e t t e r equipped to f e r r e t out evidence and b e t t e r able to handle prosecutions. In a l l of t h i s there i s more than a h i n t of d i s s a -t i s f a c t i o n ( i n the way the) FLQ t h r e a t (had been handled) i n the years preceeding the current c r i s i s . When th a t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n was put to the J u s t i c e M i n i s t e r yesterday, he denied i t . But a remark he made l a t e r i n another context seemed to confirm that Ottawa pins some of the blame f o r the current c r i s i s on what i t regards as a somewhat casual ap-proach to the FLQ problem by the Quebec a u t h o r i t i e s " (112) On those grounds, i t appears t h a t : - the problem of the implementation of J u s t i c e was part of a l a r g e r problem. The c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e p a r t i t i o n o f power between the Federal and P r o v i n c i a l governments, which was one of the c r i t i c a l i s sues of the l a t e s i x t i e s w i t h the provinces t r y i n g to defend themselves against any infringement on t h e i r t r a d i t i o n a l preroga-t i v e s . there was some k i n d of disagreement between the Federal government and the Quebec Province on the treatment to be given to " p o l i t i c a l - 138 conspiracy" (since the a s s i m i l a t i o n of p o l i t i c a l conspiracy w i t h organized crime as n a t i o n a l crimes, i s r a t h e r strange one being " n a t i o n a l " only by the extent of i t s operations, the other being " n a t i o n a l " only by i t s purpose i . e . the separa-t i o n of Quebec from Canada) - 2.1 2. From October 5 to October 16 a) D i f f e r e n c e s i n a t t i t u d e s toward the kidnappers between, Mitchell! Sharp and Prime M i n i s t e r Trudeau, e s p e c i a l l y on the issue o f n e g o t i a t i o n s . b) Repeated rumours of disagreement among the members of the Quebec Cabinet more or l e s s e x p l i c i t e l y con-firmed by Prime M i n i s t e r Bourassa: "When I rece i v e d the l e t t e r from P i e r r e and you know i t was a very personal l e t t e r , I s a i d " w e l l t h i s has to be a unanimous cabinet d e c i s i o n " I could not make d e c i s i o n s i n that s i t u a t i o n where we would have been d i v i d e d l e t us say 9 to 6 or 13 to 12. With the l i f e o f a colleague i n v o l v e d , I decided to take the time f o r d i s c u s s i o n . We discussed i t Sunday, Monday, very long d i s c u s s i o n s , and of course i n the beginning there were d i f f e r e n t view p o i n t s , but i t was unanimous i n the end" (113) J u s t i c e M i n i s t e r Choquette: "At the s t a r t not everybody was at the same p o i n t . There was a d i f f e r e n t way of seeing things ... we met Sunday f o r the f i r s t time and we had another meeting Monday; another Tuesday and so on... i t took three days... I t h i n k i t was Wednesday that there was agreement among everybody" (114) c) C o n f l i c t i n g statement on October 13 and October 14, from Prime M i n i s t e r s Trudeau and Bourassa: Prime M i n i s t e r Trudeau on October 13 " I t h i n k s o c i e t y must take every means at i t s d i s p o s a l to defend i t s e l f against the emergence of p a r a l l e l powers which defy the e l e c t e d powers i n t h i s country. I t h i n k that power must be stopped and I t h i n k i t ' s only weakened bleeding hearts who are a f r a i d to take these measures" (115) Whereas, on the same day, lawyer Lemieux and lawyer Demers, who had been appointed by the P r o v i n c i a l Government were having t h e i r f i r s t round o f nego-t i a t i o n s . Prime M i n i s t e r Trudeau on October 14, i s reported to have s a i d , at a meeting of the L i b e r a l Caucus i n Ottawa: "That the Government has no i n t e n t i o n of a l t e r i n g i t s o p p o s i t i o n i n an exchange o f FLQ p r i s o n e r s f o r the l i v e s o f FLQ kidnapped v i c t i m s " (116) When r e p o r t e r s t o l d Prime M i n i s t e r Bourassa, i n Quebec C i t y , that P i e r r e Trudeau had s a i d there was no question of l i b e r a t i n g the prisoners•,. he r e p l i e d that "Mr. Trudeau had approved h i s statement on Sunday n i g h t " When r e p o r t e r s i n s i s t e d that Mr. Trudeau had been very c a t e g o r i c a l i n r u l i n g out any f r e e i n g o f p r i s o n e r s , Prime M i n i s t e r Bourassa s a i d only that he "had not read h i s i n t e r v i e w " and that "he (Trudeau) was not s p e c i f i c " The "independent l e t t e r " addressed to Prime M i n i s t e r Trudeau on October 15 (whereas, Bourassa's l e t t e r was dated on the 16th) by J . Drapeau and L. S a u l n i e r , requesting " f o r the a s s i s t a n c e o f higher l e v e l s of government". This l e t t e r i s even more curious i n that no l e g a l b a s i s e x i s t s f o r such a request and - 140 that i n 1969, Chairman L. S a u l n i e r , when questioned on the f a c t t h a t the m u n i c i p a l i t y had not requested the i n t e r v e n t i o n o f the Canadian Army, had r e p l i e d t h a t : " C o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y speaking, the m u n i c i p a l i t y could not communicate with the Federal autho-r i t i e s t h i s a t t r i b u t i o n being of p r o v i n c i a l competence" e) The statement made by Mayor J . Drapeau on October 12: "The hour i s se r i o u s and the p o l i t i c i a n s need the support o f the e n t i r e p o p u l a t i o n , i f they are not to lack courage. One must note a c e r t a i n analogy between the kidnapping o f Mr. Laporte and kidnap-pings i n other c o u n t r i e s . . . That i s s t r a n g e l y s i m i l a r to r e v o l u t i o n s i n other c o u n t r i e s . . . " f) The personal l e t t e r addressed by Mrs. Laporte to sever a l Federal and P r o v i n c i a l M i n i s t e r s between October 10 and October 16. g) The statement made by a group o f P. Laporte's f r i e n d s and c o l l a b o r a t o r s on October 15 and asking f o r "an a c c e l e r a t i o n of the l i b e r a t i o n process i n order t o o b t a i n the l i b e r a t i o n o f the hostages" In the same open l e t t e r , the group was u n d e r l i n i n g i t s o p p o s i t i o n to p o l i c e or m i l i t a r y i n t e r v e n t i o n (at the time the army had not yet been o f f i c i a l l y requested i n Montreal) h) The pledge made by Prime M i n i s t e r Bourassa on October 12, t h a t he "had the support of the Na t i o n a l Assembly" i ) The presence o f Mr. Lalonde (reputed as Trudeau's eminence g r i s e ) i n Quebec C i t y on the evening o f the 15th. Mr. Lalonde i s reported to have taken - 141 Prime M i n i s t e r Bourassa's l e t t e r back to Ottawa. j ) Rumours of disagreement i n the Federal Government, among the Prime M i n i s t e r and a group of E n g l i s h speaking M i n i s t e r s l e d by John Munro, on the f a c t that the proposed l e g i s l a t i o n was a p p l i c a b l e a l l over Canada. - 2. 1 3. A f t e r October 16 a) On October 20 the Quebec Government nominates: Mr. Roy Fournier as P r o v i n c i a l Attorney-General. Up to that date the P r o v i n c i a l J u s t i c e M i n i s t e r had been i n charge of the two f u n c t i o n s . Mr. Jean Bienvenue, who had been shadow J u s t i c e M i n i s t e r on P. Laporte's s l a t e during the l a s t l i b e r a l l e a d e r s h i p convention, as M i n i s t e r of Immigration (before h i s death P. Laporte had been the Quebec M i n i s t e r of Manpower and Immi-grat i o n ) b) On November 1970, J u s t i c e M i n i s t e r Choquette i s reported t o have s a i d t h a t : "The P u b l i c Order Temporary Measures Act introduced i n the Commons Monday i s "an improvement" over the War Measures Act, but the Quebec Government, would l i k e to see a permanent law r a t h e r than temporary measures" (117) c) The o p p o s i t i o n between Ottawa and Quebec on the i n -d e f i n i t e extension of the P u b l i c Order Temporary Measures Act, as noted by Walter Stewart: - 142 -"Premier Bourassa wanted t h i s Act extended i n -d e f i n i t e l y and c r i t i c i z e d the Federal Government f o r not complying w i t h h i s wishes; but John Turner who could see the l i n k i n g o f h i s own name wi t h the r e p r e s s i v e l e g i s l a t i o n (the P u b l i c Order Act was i n v a r i a b l y r e f e r r e d to i n the French press as La l o i Turner) the death o f h i s own prime m i n i s t e r i a l ambitions, threatened to r e s i g n on the issue and the law d i e d " (118) 2. 2 The a c t i o n channels i n v o l v e d The kidnapping of James R. Cross, immediately t r i g g e r e d the meeting o f a task f o r c e i n the Operation Centre of the Department of E x t e r n a l A f f a i r s : "The task f o r c e was created w i t h i n minutes of the kidnapping; i t was an informal group o f o f f i c i a l s which functioned i n a very e l a s t i c manner i n the Operations Centre o f the Depart-ment of E x t e r n a l A f f a i r s . The Operations Centre i s designed f o r j u s t t h i s k i n d of " c r i s i s management" f u n c t i o n . I t s per-manent s t a f f and s p e c i a l f a c i l i t i e s and equipment sup-ported the task f o r c e operation i n a v a r i e t y of ways. The task f o r c e was interdepartmental. The Department of Ex t e r n a l A f f a i r s provided the f a c i l i t i e s , the head and a number of members of the group but s e v e r a l other departments al s o p a r t i c i p a t e d - the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s o f f i c e , the P r i v y C o u n c i l , the S o l i c i t o r General's o f f i c e , the Royal Canadian Mounted P o l i c e , the N a t i o n a l Defence Department, the J u s t i c e Department and the Transport Department. I t s main f u n c t i o n was to provide a base w i t h ready access to a l l the i n f o r -mation media and a l l decision-making centres i n v o l v e d i n the c r i s i s . By combining the r e c e i v i n g , d i s t r i b u t i o n and a n a l y s i s o f a l l inf o r m a t i o n on the c r i s i s , i t a l s o became a u s e f u l centre f o r c o n s u l t i n g w i t h a l l the f e d e r a l and p r o v i n c i a l a u t h o r i t i e s who played major r o l e s i n the c r i s i s . Of course i t was not the only centre of concern and a c t i v i t y i n t h i s f i e l d . While the task f o r c e was int e r d e p a r t m e n t a l , i t al s o represented the p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t o f the Department of E x t e r n a l A f f a i r s i n the matter because of course, the kidnap v i c t i m was a f o r e i g n r e p r e s e n t a t i v e and, as things turned out, the es-s e n t i a l safe-conduct had to be arranged w i t h a f o r e i g n govern-ment . - 143 As i t was a diplomat who was kidnapped, our Department was immediately s e i z e d o f the problem because o f our i n -t e r n a t i o n a l l e g a l o b l i g a t i o n s under the various conven-t i o n s f o r the p r o t e c t i o n and w e l l - b e i n g of diplomats." (119) Apparently, the f a c t that the operation was i n v o l v i n g a f o r e i g n diplomat, had dominated over the other a t t r i b u t e s o f the kidnapping (which was an operation of the FLQ and which could f o r example have been handled on p l a u s i b l e grounds, by the a n t i - t e r r o r i s t squad). As the matter was i n v o l v i n g d e c i s i o n s f a l l i n g under P r o v i n c i a l j u r i s d i c t i o n (the a c t i v i t i e s of the P o l i c e Forces, the d i s c l o s u r e o f the i d e n t i t y o f the informer) as w e l l as i n d i r e c t l y the whole p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n i n the province of Quebec, J u s t i c e M i n i s t e r J . Choquette was given a say i n the n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h the L i b e r a t i o n C e l l . However, the kidnapping o f P. Laporte, immediately introduced a d r a s t i c extension i n the a c t i o n channels i n v o l v e d . In order to s p e c i f y them as e x h a u s t i v e l y as p o s s i b l e , we s h a l l t r y to describe f i r s t those i n v o l v e d by the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the FLQ chosen a c t i o n , and then those i n v o l v e d by the set o f demands made by the FLQ (both of them being summa-r i z e d i n Appendix IV) 2. 2 1. A c t i o n channels i n v o l v e d by the FLQ chosen a c t i o n Place : As both kidnappings took place i n Montreal, one of the f i r s t e f f e c t of the FLQ chosen a c t i o n was to in v o l v e d i r e c t l y the Montreal P o l i c e Forces, which have j u r i s d i c t i o n over the c r i m i n a l a c t i o n s committed i n the Montreal area. At a f u r t h e r stage, as the municipal P o l i c e Forces are under the c o n t r o l of the municipal government, the municipal a u t h o r i t i e s became i n v o l v e d i n the process. In the same way, the Q.P.P. and i t s c o n t r o l l i n g a u t h o r i t y , the Attorney-General of the Province of Quebec were given a say i n the law enforce-ment process (however, i t must be noted that the exact b a s i s f o r t h e i r involvement i s not t o t a l l y c l e a r , s i n c e the b a s i s f o r the d i v i s i o n of labour, between the two forces i n the Montreal area i s unknown to us; f o r the moment) Type of A c t i o n : As both kidnappings i n v o l v e the FLQ, the task f o r c e on t e r r o r i s t s a c t i v i t i e s ( a n t i - t e r r o r i s t squad) becomes part o f the process. The task f o r c e includes members of the Montreal P o l i c e f o r c e s , R.C.M.P. and Q.P.P. I t s c o n t r o l l i n g a u t h o r i t y seems to be the Quebec Attorney-General but as 70% of the task force i s c o n s t i t u t e d by members of the Montreal P o l i c e Forces, the d i r e c t i o n of the municipal f o r c e s i s l i k e l y to have a preponderent i n f l u e n c e i n i t s p o l i c y (given a l s o the f a c t that the task f o r c e i s lo c a t e d i n Montreal, whereas the Quebec Attorney-General i s u s u a l l y i n Quebec C i t y ) P e r s o n a l i t y of James Cross: As a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of the B r i t i s h Government i n Canada, the s a f e t y o f James Cross i s a concern f o r the B r i t i s h Government (which placed Mr. Geoffrey Rippoh i n charge o f the contacts w i t h the Canadian Government, during the c r i s i s ) and f o r the m i n i s t r y of Ex t e r n a l A f f a i r s (which are of f e d e r a l competence) as mentioned e a r l i e r . This " f e d e r a l " channel i n t u r n i n v o l v e d the R.C.M.P. which i t i s to be noted i s the only law enforcement a u t h o r i t y included i n the "East Block" task f o r c e . In a d d i t i o n to these formal channels, the kidnapping o f James Cross i n d i r e c t l y i n v o l v e s the whole Diplomatic Corps i n post i n Canada ( e s p e c i a l l y i n Ottawa and Montreal) and h i s personal network of r e l a t i v e s , f r i e n d s and coll e a g u e s . - 145 P e r s o n a l i t y o f P. Laporte: As a member of the Quebec Government (and through h i s d i r e c t address to Robert Bourassa), the s a f e t y o f P. Laporte immediately i n v o l v e s the whole Quebec Cabinet, on the other hand h i s q u a l i t y of long standing M.P., makes h i s kidnapping a matter of concern f o r h i s colleagues at the N a t i o n a l Assembly, e s p e c i a l l y f o r those i n the L i b e r a l Deputation. On other grounds h i s q u a l i t y as a M i n i s t e r of Manpower and Immigration i n v o l v e s a network of c o l l a b o r a t o r s and "customers" whose welfare i s more or l e s s t i e d to P. Laporte's s u r v i v a l and i n f l u e n c e . F i n a l l y , on a personal l e v e l h i s kidnapping u l t i m a t e l y concerns h i s f a m i l y and h i s network of r e l a t i o n s (among which people l i k e C. Ryan, P. Laporte having been f o r a few years the par-liamentary correspondant of Le Devoir) 2. 2 2. A c t i o n channels i n v o l v e d by the seven FLQ demands I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note that the set of demands set f o r t h by the FLQ i n v o l v e by t h e i r very nature a complex network of o r g a n i z a t i o n s and p u b l i c o f f i c i a l s (whose complexity one cannot f a i l to wonder was probably under-estimated by the FLQ) D-l The r e l e a s e of the " P o l i t i c a l " P r i s o n e r s As the s t a t u s of the 23 p o l i t i c a l p r i s o n e r s were r a t h e r ' heterogeneous (15 were detained i n Federal i n s t i t u t i o n s , 5 i n P r o v i n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s and 3 were f r e e on b a i l : For a more d e t a i l e d account see Appendix V), any acceptance of the r e l e a s e of the p r i s o n e r s would have i n v o l v e d : the Federal Government and more p r e c i s e l y the M i n i s t e r of J u s t i c e , John Turner (since the p r i s o n e r s had been condemned under e x i s t i n g p r o v i s i o n s of the C r i m i n a l Code), and the Attorney-General, George M a c l l r a i t h , who c o n t r o l s the Canadian P e n i t e n t i a r y S e r v i c e (which had the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the detention of the p r i s o n e r s ) and the N a t i o n a l Parole Board (which i n t u r n c o n t r o l l e d one of the few l e g a l p r o v i s i o n s under which the p r i s o n e r s could have been r e l e a s e d w i t h a minimum of l e g a l decency) the P r o v i n c i a l Government and more p r e c i s e l y the Attorney-General, J u s t i c e M i n i s t e r Jerome Choquette, who had u l t i m a t e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the P r o v i n c i a l P e n i t e n t i a r y S e r v i c e , the Crown (which had obtained the condemnation of the p r i s o n e r s ) and the judges (who had condemned them and who would have not accepted to see t h e i r d e c i s i o n s r e v e r t e d without d i s c u s s i o n ) D-2 The t r a n s p o r t a t i o n of the P r i s o n e r s to Cuba  or A l g e r i a As i n d i c a t e d before t h i s demand in v o l v e d both the Federal M i n i s t r y of E x t e r n a l A f f a i r s (which had the a u t h o r i t y to n e g o t i a t e w i t h the p o t e n t i a l host co u n t r i e s ) and the R.C.A.F. under the c o n t r o l of the Defence Department (which was to provide the means of t r a n s p o r t a t i o n ) D-3 The $500,000 Gold Ransom In October 1970, as gold was •evaluated at $125. an ounce, the $500,000. ransom n e a r l y represented 225 pounds of gold. I t s payment would have n e c e s s i t a t e d an a u t h o r i z a t i o n from the M i n i s t r y of Finance (Federal or P r o v i n c i a l ) to purchase the gold e i t h e r from the Bank of Canada or from the Bank of Nova S c o t i a (which i s the only Canadian Bank, d e t a i n i n g gold i n l a r g e q u a n t i t i e s ) . However, t h i s demand was r a p i d l y e l i m i n a t e d since the kidnappers declared "that they would not k i l l f o r the sake of d o l l a r s " D-4 The r e h i r i n g o f the Lapalme mail d e l i v e r y workers The f u l f i l m e n t of t h i s demand would have o b l i g e d the Federal Post Master General to come to terms w i t h the Lapalme workers union, headed by Frank D i t t e r l i z z i . However, as the leaders of the union, q u i c k l y mentioned, that they were only i n t e r e s t e d i n reaching a settlement by t h e i r own means, the demand was consequently d i s a c t i v a t e d (but never-t h e l e s s p r e l i m i n a r y contacts had taken place between the Post Master General and the workers) D-5 The d i s c l o s u r e of the i d e n t i t y of the p o l i c e  informer Rested e n t i r e l y on the Quebec J u s t i c e M i n i s t e r ' s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , but i t i s c l e a r that no d e c i s i o n on such a p o i n t would have been reached a f t e r some thorough c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h the P o l i c e Forces (and e s p e c i a l l y of the Q.P.P., which had b e n e f i t e d from the information) D-6 The d i f f u s i o n o f the FLQ Manifesto This demand u l t i m a t e l y r e s t e d under the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the Federal Government which through the Secretary of S t a t e , Gerald P e l l e t i e r , was the c o n t r o l l i n g autho-r i t y f o r the CBC. The d e c i s i o n to p u b l i s h the mani-f e s t o i n other media being l e f t to the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o f t h e i r e d i t o r i a l boards. D-7 The c e s s a t i o n of P o l i c e Forces' a c t i v i t i e s - 148 -As three p o l i c e forces were in v o l v e d such a d e c i s i o n could only be taken by the r e s p e c t i v e d i r e c t o r a t e s of the three f o r c e s under the c o n t r o l of t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e h i e r a r c h i c a l a u t h o r i t i e s (the M u n i c i p a l Government, the Quebec Attorney-General and the Federal Attorney-General) This d e s c r i p t i o n of the a c t i o n channels i n v o l v e d both by the s i t u a t i o n and the FLQ demands, w i l l now enable us to examine the a c t o r s , e i t h e r as player s i n p o s i t i o n ( i n v o l v e d by t h e i r p o s i t i o n s along the a c t i o n channels) or as ad-hoc p l a y e r s ( i n v o l v e d by the impact o f the d e c i s i o n on t h e i r own o b j e c t i v e s ) . - 2. 3 The Actors In a n a l y z i n g the main actors of the c r i s i s (at l e a s t those f o r whom s u f f i c i e n t i n f o r m a t i o n i s a v a i l a b l e ) we s h a l l t r y to focus f i r s t on what determined t h e i r stand ( p r i o r i t i e s , preferences, perceptions, goals, stakes) and then t r y to appreciate t h e i r power s i t u a t i o n (bargaining p o s i t i o n , s k i l l , perceptions by other p a r t i c i p a n t s , r u l e s ) i n order to be able to assess t h e i r impact on the f i n a l d e c i s i o n . We have t r i e d to regroup them according to the i n s t i t u t i o n s to which they belonged, s i n c e i t appeared to us, that even i f d i f f e r e n c e s e x i s t e d among t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l p o s i t i o n s , the s i m i l a r i t y of t h e i r environments made them share some common b a s i c p e r s p e c t i v e s . 2 .3 1. Actors i n the Federal Government The main actors i n the Federal Government share the a t t r i b u t e of being n a t i o n a l (as opposed to p r o v i n c i a l ) c h a r a c t e r s , which u l t i m a t e l y means that they are accountable f o r t h e i r a c t i o n s to the whole Canadian n a t i o n , to the o p p o s i t i o n i n Ottawa, and to t h e i r own n a t i o n a l Party. As L i b e r a l s , moreover, they are p u b l i c l y committed to c e r t a i n issues l i k e the s u r v i v a l of the Confederation i n i t s a c t u a l form or t h e i r p o l i c y on b i l i n g u a l i s m and b i c u l t u r a l i s m . However, beyond those common a t t r i b u t e s i n d i v i d u a l s show n o t i -ceable d i f f e r e n c e s r e s u l t i n g e i t h e r from personal or environmental v a r i a t i o n s , as shown i n the f o l l o w i n g t a b l e . ACTORS IN POSITION - 150 P.E. TRUDEAU J.M. TURNER PRIORITIES AND PREFERENCES PERCEPTIONS GOALS STAKES BARGAINING POSITION SKILLS P E R C E P T I O N S BY O T H E R P A R T I C I P A N T S R U L E S • Solve Quebec's pro-blems wi t h i n the frame of Confederation • Use the "system" as i t i s but do not hesitate .to take harsh measures to face emergency si t u a t i o n s I n t e l l e c t u a l s do not represent e f f e c t i v e leadership i n Quebec Weak status of demo-cracy i n Quebec Maintain l e g a l i t y Check progress of se-paratism i n Quebec Save the l i v e s of the hostages 1 National leadership Expectations of English Canada Survi v a l of L i b e r a l Party i Control over most FLQ ; demands i Ultimate control on use of Armed Forces L i t t l e l o c a l control over information Low key p o s i t i o n i n f i r s t phase of c r i s i s Charismatic leadership Autocratic s t y l e of decision-making "Toughness" as a nego-t i a t o r Has to obtain some form of acceptance i n Commons in the case of emergency l e g i s l a t i o n Desire to improve Federal control on "national crimes" Desire to l i b e r a l i z e the Criminal Code Gain better control on implementation of law Avoid permanent re-pressive l e g i s l a t i o n of " i d e o l o g i c a l nature Prime M i n i s t e r i a l ambitions (heir ap-parent to Trudeau) Control over Criminal l e g i s l a t i o n Charismatic leadership Competence P r i v i l e g e d status in the Cabinet 151 AD-HOC PLAYERS M. SHARP Maintain the inter -national image of Canada G. MacILRAITH MUNR0E J. MARCHAND Save the l i v e s of the hostages, es-p e c i a l l y the one of J. Cross Defend the R.C.M.P. against reproaches of incompetence Reform of the R.C.M.P. and the implementation of the recommendations of the Report on Security Control over Federal Police Forces Limit actions to the Province of Quebec - Co l l u s i o n between separatism and " l e g a l " p o l i t i c a l movements Check progress of separatism i n Quebec Preserve the p o s i t i o n of the Quebec Wing of the L i b e r a l Party Status as main Quebec "Lieutenant" to P.E. Trudeau - 152 2. 3 2. Actors i n the P r o v i n c i a l Government The p r i n c i p a l a c t o r s i n the P r o v i n c i a l Government share the a t t r i b u t e s of being accountable f o r t h e i r a c t i o n s to t h e i r e l e c t o r a t e ( i n which E n g l i s h speaking members represent l e s s than 25% of the t o t a l p o p u l a t i o n ) , to the o p p o s i t i o n i n the N a t i o n a l Assembly (Union N a t i o n a l e , P a r t i Quebecois and C r e d i t S o c i a l ) and to t h e i r own P r o v i n c i a l Party. More s p e c i f i c a l l y , they represent a tendancy which was brought t o power i n the preceeding l e a d e r s h i p congress, with the d i s c r e t e b l e s s i n g o f Ottawa and of the p a r t y machinery. However, by some aspects, sharp d i f f e r e n c e s are to be noted i n the Cabinet, which in c l u d e s both t r a d i t i o n a l L i b e r a l s ( l i k e C. Ki r k l a n d - C a s g r a i n or W. Tetley) and newly appointed t e c h n i c i a n s ( l i k e Castonguay or L | A l l i e r ) w i t h few connections w i t h the t r a d i t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e . At the time of the c r i s i s , the Cabinet i s s t i l l u n t r i e d and a large amount of energy i s devoted to patch and smooth the b i t t e r n e s s which has f o l l o w e d the l e a d e r s h i p congress. Given those elements, important d i f f e r e n c e s appear i n the stands and power p o s i t i o n s o f the a c t o r s , as shown i n the f o l l o w i n g t a b l e : TABLE II STAND POWER PRIORITIES AND PREFERENCES PERCEPTIONS R. BOURASSA J . CHOQUETTE - 153 -C. CASGRAIN LAPORTE'S R. GARNEAU C. CASTONGUAY FRIENDS ANI W. TETLEY J.P. L'ALLIER RELATIVES Quebec Econo-mic Develop-ment Social P o l i c y (Introduction of medical plan) Feels h i s p r i o r i t i e s § even his secu-r i t y are threatened Restore the p o l i t i c a l sta-tus-quo Maintain h i s leadership Save the l i f e of P.Laporte -1 — Actual leg a l provisions are! i n s u f f i c i e n t | to curb "ideo-j l o g i c a l crimes',' Obtain a j tougher l e g i s - \ l a t i o n against! " i d e o l o g i c a l " Growing fear § discontent i n Montreal area STAKES BARGAINING POSITION SKILLS PERCEPTIONS BY OTHER PARTICIPANTS RULES Leadership over Cabinet P o l i t i c a l [ career j i i Conception of Prov. Fed. ; r e l a t i o n s L i t t l e control; over FLQ j demands Opportunity to use Prov. pub.' opinion to re-. inforce h i s po-s i t i o n i n face of Ottawa. | Bureaucratic leadership L i t t l e autho- • r i t y over ; Cabinet j Uncertain Unexpcri- : mented Technocratic Image Wants uhanim. j decisions in j Cabinet I P a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the Cabinet! I Authority over j Police Forces Control over implementation of le g a l pro-v i s i o n s (ar-re s t s , i n d i c t -ments) Limited expe-rience i n c r i - : minal matters j (main back- j ground i n f labour relations) i-Often perceived as too soft by j members of Lib j Caucus J Police Forces are reported to have l i t t l e confidence in him I "Tough" Hard Liners Oriented toward t h e i r s p e c i f i c tasks The problem i s l i m i t e d to negotia-t i o n s with the FLQ Opposision to conces-sions : Ask Gov't I a c t i o n to restore con-' fidence ' | Influence i n P r o v i n c i a l p o l i t i c s Influence i n the L i b e r a l Caucus Credible image i n Pu b l i c Opinion Techno-c r a t i c appeal Save l i f e of P. Laporte even at ex-pense of "major con-cessions" P a r t i c i p a -t i o n i n the Cabinet Save the l i f e of P. Laporte L i f e of P. Laporte (personal r e l a t i o n s , careers, influence) Influence : Li b e r a l Caucus A b i l i t y to develop "moral" 5 personal pressure Represent i tendancy dc feated at Leadership Congress - 154 2. 3 3. Ac t o r ( s ) i n the Mu n i c i p a l Government As very l i m i t e d i n d i v i d u a l d i f f e r e n c e s appear between Mayor J . Drapeau and Chairman Lucien S a u l n i e r , t h e i r common p o s i t i o n may be summarized as f o l l o w s : TABLE I I I STAND PRIORITIES AND PREFERENCES PERCEPTIONS GOALS STAKES BARGAINING POSITION POWER SKILLS PERCEPTION BY OTHER PARTICIPANTS J . DRAPEAU AND L. SAULNIER Preserve the status of Montreal as Canada's most important urban center Feel that a revo l u t i o n i s taking place i n Montreal Feel threats against h i s personal s e c u r i t y Collusion between p o l i t i c a l movements on the Municipal scene and the FLQ "Clean-up the mess" (eliminate demonstrations, p u b l i c protests, bombings...) Get re-elected with the minimum l e v e l of opposition Re-election as Mayor of Montreal V i r t u a l l y no o f f i c i a l control except on Montreal P o l i c e Forces, which i n fact means a large control over informa-t i o n and the implementation of legal provisions Autocratic leadership A b i l i t y to carry on long l a s t i n g proj ects Easy access to Federal leaders Tough Resolute RULES - No c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t to intervene - 156 2. 4 Issues i n c o n f l i c t I f we t r y to summarize the preceeding a n a l y s i s , i t appears that three issues were i n c o n f l i c t among the governmental decision-makers: - The a p p l i c a b i l i t y of the r e p r e s s i v e p r o v i s i o n s outside  Quebec This l i m i t e d c o n f l i c t e s s e n t i a l l y appeared i n the Federal Government, a group of Ottawa o f f i c i a l s apparently headed by John Munro opposing the n a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r of the new l e g i s l a t i o n . Apparently the worries o f that group were calmed by a promise to " l o c k " as much as p o s s i b l e .the implementation of the P u b l i c Order Regulations i n other Provinces than Quebec. - The acceptance of the FLQ demands By c o n f l i c t on t h i s i s s u e , we do not mean th a t there e x i s t e d two extreme p o s i t i o n s , one accepting a l l FLQ demands, the other r e j e c t i n g them, but t h a t there were d i f f e r e n c e s i n the e v a l u a t i o n of the number and the extent of the concessions, the a u t h o r i t i e s could make i n order to save the h o s t a g e s ' l i v e s . In Ottawa, the M i n i s t r y of E x t e r n a l A f f a i r s , who was co o r d i n a t i n g the task f o r c e , was i n the beginning pushing f o r a negotiated settlement w i t h the FLQ, at l e a s t during the f i r s t days of the c r i s i s . But as the FLQ g r a d u a l l y removed the demands, which were the e a s i e s t to agree upon only minimal concessions were proposed, propably under the j o i n t i n f l u e n c e o f P.E. Trudeau and J . Choquette. However, the e v e n t u a l i t y of the r e l e a s e of the 23 p o l i t i c a l p r i s o n e r s was never considered as i n d i c a t e d by Claude Roquet: "When planning f o r a safe conduct, what we were prepared to t h i n k about was the p o s s i b i l i t y o f t r a n s p o r t a t i o n out o f Canada f o r the kidnappers themselves... For various p r a c t i c a l reasons (geographical d i s t a n c e , presence of a Cuban Consulate i n Montreal, and of a r e s i d e n t Canadian M i s s i o n i n Havana) i t was decided t h a t these arrangements should be made with Cuba. We made a request t h a t Cuba a s s i s t us f o r humanitarian reasons and the Cuban Govern-ment agreed. The safe conduct o f f e r was then formulated i n c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h the Cubans" (119) A f t e r P. Laporte's kidnapping, the problem s h i f t e d to Quebec where n e i t h e r Bourassa nor the other Cabinet members had taken part i n the f i r s t round of n e g o t i a t i o n s . The t i m i d l e a d e r s h i p of R. Bourassa and i n t h i s respect i t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to n o t i c e the comments made by Anthony W e s t e l l , one year l a t e r during the V i c t o r i a conference: "When the b a r g a i n i n g began, i t was soon apparent that Bourassa was unsure of h i s ground on some i s s u e s . He h e s i t a t e d , p r o c r a s t i n a t e d and s e v e r a l times excused him-s e l f to go to the phone and take advice, presumably from Cabinet colleagues back home i n Quebec. To the other Premiers, i t seemed that he was not so much a head of Government as a spokesman f o r a c o l l e c t i v e l e a d e r s h i p -a c o l l e c t i v e which was d i v i d e d on major matters" (120) a l l i e d to the sharp d i f f e r e n c e s e x i s t i n g among Cabinet members, and to the d e s i r e expressed by R. Bourassa to reach a unanimous d e c i s i o n , l e d to three days of d i s c u s -sions among the Cabinet. From what we know "the f l e x i b l e " a t t i t u d e was defended by Castonguay and L ' A l l i e r , whereas, the "law and order one" was defended by Choquette, Casgrain, T e t l e y and Garneau, whose p o s i t i o n had been weakened by the kidnapping of P. Laporte, f o l l o w i n g J . Choquette's " f i r m " stand i n h i s address to the FLQ. Given t h i s s p l i t i n the Cabinet the determination of Ottawa, h i s weak bar g a i n i n g p o s i t i o n (he could only have " l i b e r a t e d " 8 p r i s o n e r s , under a " N o l l e P r o s e q u i " pro-v i s i o n , but i t i s h i g h l y doubtful that the Crown and the Quebec Attorney-General would have accepted such a move), the pressures emanating from Laporte's f r i e n d s and r e l a -t i v e s , and the promises o f the p o l i c e forces to crack the two c e l l s i n a matter o f hours, R. Bourassa decided t o "buy time". During h i s , Sunday, 12, statement, he t r i e d to be as l i t t l e compromising as p o s s i b l e and d e l i b e r a t e l y o r i e n t e d the n e g o t i a t i o n s toward t e c h n i c a l i t i e s (the mechanisms of the exchange) In h i s view,those two or three days he was t r y i n g to "buy" were to permit: the cabinet to make a unanimous d e c i s i o n the p o l i c e f o r c e s to make d e c i s i v e progress i n t h e i r i n v e s t i g a t i o n However, i f he succeeded i n convincing the FLQ (as expressed i n t h e i r l a t e r messages and i n Laporte's l e t t e r ) t h a t he was ready to negoti a t e h i s a t t i t u d e apparently generated some s i d e consequences, which he had not apparently foreseen or deemed worth c o n s i d e r i n g : the p o l i c e forces grew nervous, and h e l d R. Lemieux (who they had a r r e s t e d on t h e i r own i n i t i a t i v e ) i n j a i l even a f t e r the Quebec Government had proclaimed that he was accepted as a "bona f i d e " n e g o t i a t o r on b e h a l f of t h e FLQ. the o f f e r f o r n e g o t i a t i o n s r a i s e d FLQ expectations as can be seen i n Chenier C e l l communique No. 5 where a " s p l i t d e a l " was proposed ( J . Cross against the re l e a s e of the P o l i t i c a l P r i s o n e r s and the t e r m i n a t i o n of p o l i c e searches. P. Laporte against the f u l f i l l m e n t of the other four demands, among which some had been turned down the week b e f o r e ) . confusion appeared i n p u b l i c o p i n i o n (as t e s t i f i e d by the d i f f e r e n t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s developed i n the media) the development of a current of support f o r a nego-t i a t e d s o l u t i o n i n some segments of the p o p u l a t i o n (and i t i s not sure at a l l that Bourassa t r i e d to d i s -courage them, si n c e i t was improving h i s p o s i t i o n i n f r o n t of Ottawa) - An i n c r e a s i n g r e s t i v e n e s s among Montreal a u t h o r i t i e s , who are persuaded that the " r e v o l u t i o n i s t a k i n g p l a c e " (backed i n that by the a l a r m i s t i n f o r m a t i o n turned by the Montreal P o l i c e Forces) and that e l e c t i o n s are going to be a d i s a s t e r i f they take place i n a c l i m a t e of v i c t o r y f o r the s e p a r a t i s t movement. I n c r e a s i n g l y a f r a i d by the developments (which have more or l e s s been caused by the Government's a t t i t u d e ) the "doves" f o l d on Wednesday the 14th, and Bourassa concentra-tes h i s a t t e n t i o n on r e p r e s s i v e a c t i o n s ( he does not even take the pain to consult w i t h the Parole Board Director", i n order to check whether the Quebec Government recommenda-t i o n makes any sense) - The c r e a t i o n of new r e p r e s s i v e p r o v i s i o n s i n the C r i m i n a l  Code Apparently on the pressure of both the Crown and the P o l i c e Forces (which were s t i l l r e s e n t i n g t h e i r unsuccessful a t -tempt to have Gagnon and V a l l i e r e s c o n victed on conspiracy charges) J u s t i c e M i n i s t e r Choquette made h i m s e l f the advocate f o r the i n t r o d u c t i o n of new r e p r e s s i v e p r o v i s i o n s against " i d e o l o g i c a l crimes" i n the C r i m i n a l Code. But on these grounds he had to face J u s t i c e M i n i s t e r Turner who had committed h i m s e l f during h i s mandate to the " l i b e r a l i z a t i o n " of the C r i m i n a l Code (and who was not pleased w i t h the prospect of having h i s name t i e d to an "infamous" piece of l e g i s l a t i o n , which could have hampered h i s own p o l i t i c a l career) Apparently, however, J . Choquette got h i s p o i n t , as expressed by John Turner h i m s e l f : "Why these powers? Because i n the o p i n i o n of the Attorney-General of the Government of Quebec, an o p i n i o n which I share, i n the present s i t u a t i o n . . . u n d e r the present law, the prosecution of t h i s type of v i o l e n t c r i m i n a l conspi-racy i s rendered d i f f i c u l t , i f not impossible, under the present p r o v i s i o n s of the C r i m i n a l Code" (121) But apparently " t h i s shared o p i n i o n " l e d to r e s u l t s f a r under the Quebec Attorney-General's expectations. The P u b l i c Order Regulations were very s p e c i f i c (and by the f a c t d i f f i c u l t to extend) and r a t h e r cumbersome to im-plement. But as he was given a more or l e s s f r e e hand i n implementing them, he s a t i s f i e d h i m s e l f w i t h t h a t d e a l . The whole iss u e surfaced again at the e x p i r a t i o n of the emergency l e g i s l a t i o n but as i n d i c a t e d e a r l i e r , J u s t i c e M i n i s t e r Turner put h i s r e s i g n a t i o n i n the balance and the P u b l i c Order (temporary measures) Act was not pro-longed. But, t h i s was not the end of i t , as mentioned by Anthony W e s t e l l : "In Parliament, there was t a l k o f the need f o r permanent l e g i s l a t i o n l e s s fearsome than the all-embracing War - 161 Measures Act to provide emergency powers i n times of disturbance. This was a dubious p r o p o s i t i o n because the saving grace of the W.M.A..was that i t was a draco-n i a n measure which the government must h e s i t a t e to i n -voke. A handy l i t t l e law f o r suspending j u s t a few l i -b e r t i e s might be too tempting. A b e t t e r approach, perhaps, was suggested by Trudeau i n June 1971 when he asked the provinces to agree to entrench b a s i c po-l i t i c a l r i g h t s i n the c o n s t i t u t i o n . The d r a f t c h a r t e r provided that the government could l i m i t these r i g h t s when necessary to p r o t e c t p u b l i c s a f e t y and n a t i o n a l se-c u r i t y , among other t h i n g s . But according to J u s t i c e M i n i s t e r Turner, i t would then be open to the courts to determine i f the government had reasonable j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r i t s a c t i o n . I f the c h a r t e r had been i n f o r c e i n October 1970, the courts could have been asked t o decide i f the Government had reasonable grounds f o r suspending c i v i l r i g h t s , and to r e s t o r e them i f there was i n s u f -f i c i e n t evidence of an apprehended i n s u r r e c t i o n endangering order and s e c u r i t y . The c h a r t e r was not accepted by Quebec f o r q u i t e d i f -f e r e n t reasons, but Trudeau's proposal should not be ignored by those who argue that the c r i s i s s t r i p p e d him of any c l a i m to be a c i v i l l i b e r t a r i a n . " (122) B I B L I O G R A P H Y FOOT-NOTES (1) Quoted i n Ron Haggart and Aubrey E. Golden, New Press, Toronto, 1971, p. 134 (2) I b i d p. 127 (3) Raymond Breton, The S o c i o - P o l i t i c a l Dynamics of the October Events, i n Quebec S o c i e t y and P o l i t i c s , E d i t e d by Dale C. Thomson, McClelland § Stewart, Toronto, 1973, p. 229 (4) Haggart and Golden, op. c i t . p. 129 (5) John Saywell, Quebec 1970: A Documentary N a r r a t i v e , U n i v e r s i t y o f Toronto Press, Toronto, p. 3 (6) I b i d p. 28 (7) I b i d p. 53 (8) Quoted i n Saywell,op. c i t . p. 58 (9) Quoted i n Saywell, op. c i t p. 65 (10) Quoted i n Saywell,op. c i t . p. 82 (11) Quoted i n Saywell, op. c i t . p. 82 (12) Le S o l e i l , Quebec, October 14, 1970 (13) Gerald P e l l e t i e r , The October C r i s i s , t r a n s l a t e d by Joyce M a r s h a l l , McClelland $ Stewart, Toronto, 1971, p. 115 (14) Quoted i n J . Saywell, op. c i t . p. 140 (15) P e l l e t i e r , p. c i t . , p. I l l (16) Denis Smith, Bleeding Hearts...Bleeding Country M.G. H u r t i g P u b l i s h e r s , Edmonton, 1971, p. 50 (17) Le S o l e i l , Quebec, October 28, 1970 (18) Anthony W e s t e l l , Paradox: Trudeau as Prime M i n i s t e r P r e n t i c e - H a l l Canada L t d . , Scarborough, Ont., 1972, p. 244 (19) Walter Stewart, Shrug: Trudeau i n Power New Press, Toronto, 1971, p. 63 (20) Quoted i n Saywell,op. c i t . , p. 86 (21) P e l l e t i e r , op., c i t . , p. 138 (22) W e s t e l l , op. c i t . , p. 251 (23) Quoted i n Le S o l e i l , Quebec, October 17, 1970 (24) Douglas A. Schmeiser, Con t r o l o f Apprehended I n s u r r e c t i o n Emergency Measures vs The C r i m i n a l Code, Manitoba Law J o u r n a l , Winnipeg, V o l . 4 No. 2, 1971, p. 363 (25) Stewart, op. c i t . , p. 59 (26) E a r l B e a t t i e , Mass Media, Canadian Annual Review f o r 1970 (27) The Observer, London, October 18, 1970 (28) Schmeiser, op. c i t . , pp 363 § 364 (29) I b i d p. 364 (30) I b i d p. 364 (31) Quoted i n B. Marx "Apprehended I n s u r r e c t i o n of October 1970" U.B.C, Law Review, Vancouver, V o l . 7, No. 1, pp 62 5 63 (32) W e s t e l l , op. c i t . , p. 265 (33) I n s u r r e c t i o n = a r i s i n g up against e s t a b l i s h e d a u t h o r i t y , syn. = r e b e l l i o n , r e v o l t - Webster D i c t i o n a r y I n s u r r e c t i o n = the a c t i o n of r i s i n g i n arms or open r e s i s t a n c e against e s t a b l i s h e d a u t h o r i t y , o r govern-mental r e s t r a i n t . . . a n armed r i s i n g , a r e v o l t , an i n c i p i e n t or l i m i t e d r e b e l l i o n - Shorter Oxford D i c t i o n a r y (34) P e l l e t i e r , op. c i t . , p. 133 (35) I b i d p. 134 (36) Quoted i n Saywell, op. c i t . , p. 92 (37) Graham A l l i s o n , Essence of D e c i s i o n E x p l a i n i n g the Cuban M i s s i l e C r i s i s , L i t t l e Brown and Company, Boston, 1971, p. 37 (38) W e s t e l l , op. c i t . , p. 254 (39) I b i d (40) I b i d (41) Quoted i n Le S o l e i l , Quebec, October 6, 1970 (42) Carlos M a r i g h e l l a , Minimanual o f the Urban G u e r r i l l a Pulp Press, Vancouver, 1974, p. 27. (43) Saywell, op. c i t . , p. 30 (44) I b i d p. 32 (44bis) Globe and M a i l , Toronto, December 10, 1970 (45) Saywell, op. c i t . , p. 32 (46) I b i d p. 34 (47) Le Devoir, Montreal, December 1, 1969 (48) Paul Stevens and John Saywell, The New Defence P o l i c y , Canadian Annual Review f o r 1969, . p. 265 (49) Haggart and Golden, op. c i t . , p. 217 (49a) I b i d p. 147 (49b) Robert Chodos and Nick Auf Der Maur, Quebec: A C h r o n i c l e 1968-1972, A Last Post S p e c i a l , James Lewis § Samuel P u b l i s h e r s , Toronto, 1972, pp 82 § 83 (49c) J.W. Burton, Systems, States Diplomacy and Rules, Cambridge, 1968, p. 77 (50) Source: Abridged report of The Royal Commission on S e c u r i t y , Ottawa, 1969, p. 14 (51) Vancouver Sun, November 6, 1970 (52) Royal Commission on S e c u r i t y , op. c i t . , p.18 I b i d , p. 19 I b i d , p. 19 Royal Commission of Enquiry i n t o the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n of J u s t i c e on Penal and C r i m i n a l Matters, Quebec, Vo l . 3, T I I I , p. 125, p. 127 Quoted i n Globe and M a i l , Toronto, October 7, 1969 Royal Commission on S e c u r i t y , op. c i t . , p. 8 Canadian News Fac t s , August 15 / August 31, 1969 Vancouver Sun, November 6, 1970 The Province, Vancouver, November 1970 La P o l i c e et l a S e c u r i t e des Citoyens, M i n i s t e r e de l a J u s t i c e , Quebec, J u i n 1971 • p. 29 P e l l e t i e r , op. c i t . , p. I l l Royal Commission on S e c u r i t y , op. c i t . , p. 8 Interview w i t h CKNW (Vancouver) Jack Webster, October 17, 1970 Interview on CKAC (Montreal) October 21 or 22 P e l l e t i e r , op. c i t . , p. I l l Quoted i n Saywell p. 141 Quoted i n The Province, October 26, 1970 Quoted i n Saywell p. 92 Quoted i n The Province, October 26, 1970 Haggart and Golden, op. c i t . , p. 166 Quoted i n Saywell p. 92 Haggart and Golden, op. c i t . , p. 168 Quoted i n Toronto Globe and M a i l , October 7, 1969 Royal Commission on S e c u r i t y , op. c i t . , p. 89 (76) La P o l i c e et l a S e c u r i t e des Citoyens, op. c i t . , p. 30 (77) -(78) Royal Commission on S e c u r i t y , op. c i t . , p. 8 (79) Vancouver Sun, November 16, 1971 (80) Quebec Occupe, L'Agence de D i s t r i b u t i o n P o p u l a i r e , E d i t i o n s P a r t i P r i s , Montreal, 1971, p. 212 (81) Vancouver Sun, October 20, 1970 (82) Haggart and Golden, op. c i t . , p. 112 (83) Vancouver Sun, October 22, 1970 (84) Toronto Globe and. M a i l , October 27, 1970' (84a) I b i d (85) I b i d (86) Toronto Globe and M a i l , October 20, 1970 (87) Le Devoir, Montreal, October 8, 1969 (88) Toronto Globe and M a i l , October 8, 1969 (89) Toronto Globe and M a i l , October 20, 1970 (90) Vancouver Sun, November 6, 1970 (91) W e s t e l l , op. c i t . , p. 251 (92) Jacques Lacou r s i e r e , Alarme Citoyens, L ' A f f a i r e Cross Laporte du Connu a l,Inconnu, Les E d i t i o n s La Presse, Montreal, 1972, p. 311 (93) Le S o l e i l , Quebec, October 27, 1970 (94) Quoted i n Le S o l e i l , Quebec, November 3, 1970 (94a) Toronto Globe and M a i l , December 8, 1970 (95) Toronto Globe and M a i l , October 26 or 27 (96) L a c o u r s i e r e , op. c i t . , p. 318 (97) Haggart and Golden, op. c i t . , p. 194 (98) Le S o l e i l , Quebec, October 17, 1970 (99) I b i d , November 4, 1970 (100) L a c o u r s i e r e , op. c i t . , p. 314 (101) Toronto Globe and M a i l , October 28, 1970 (102) Haggart and Golden, op. c i t . , p. 131 (103) L a c o u r s i e r e , op. c i t . , p. 347 (104) Canadian Annual Review of P o l i t i c s and P u b l i c A f f a i r s 1971 Separatism, p. 94 (105) I b i d (106) Canadian News Fac t s , J u l y 15 - J u l y 31, 1971 i s s u e (107) Haggart and Golden, p. 127 (108) L a c o u r s i e r e , op. c i t . , p. 277 (109) B r i a n Moore, The Revolution S c r i p t , McClelland § Stewart Ltd. Toronto, 1971, p. 91 (110) Quoted i n Saywell, op. c i t . , p. 55 (111) Le Devoir, November 28, 1969 (112) Toronto Globe and M a i l , October 20, 1970 (113) Quoted i n Saywell, op. c i t . , p. 138 (114) I b i d p. 139 (115) I b i d p. 73 (116) Toronto Globe and M a i l , October 16, 1970 (117) I b i d , November 1970 (118) Stewart, op. c i t . , p. 62 (119) Interview w i t h Claude Roquet ( D i r e c t o r o f the task force) quoted i n E x t e r n a l A f f a i r s , Monthly B u l l e t i n o f the Department of E x t e r n a l A f f a i r s , Vol XX111, No. 1, Jan 1971 (120) W e s t e l l , op. c i t . , p. 41 (121) Stewart, op. c i t . , p. 61 (122) W e s t e l l , op. c i t . , p. 259 A P P E N D I X I FLQ REPORTED ACTIONS - 1 9 6 3 - 1 9 7 0 FIGURE I APPENDIX I - FLQ REPORTED ACTIONS - 1963-197^ - 168 o PH rt \ 0 1/1 ^ f ) C M < - H O O » O O t ^ v O L O T t t O C M i — I O* i—l i— I i-1 i-H i - l i-H i — I W O H i—i Di H O U 0- < Ui OS APPENDIX I I ORGANIZATIONAL CHART OF THE R.C.M.P. oenvamcrrnu. ?GteerAity U'MSOM Br. ( o p e r a t i o n s ) 3 Lrf fld>h-ning Br. H C e n t r a l «?a X I I DCPOTV COMN'fc 3> — T3 tr tn 2 o P-H 1 -x *-I—i i — i o JO AN i—t /—\ > p H h—i O o > f C - l P n a: C > P SO H O t—* to H «o a: m jo o T3 INSf toTtoN TEAM ANfc CMTeU4«eNCC ftLMiNisTeATwH A N D ffffeSoKCL *S* DifteCTDJCATC DlCEtTolUTC fJAfclKC frEANCH B " B r fti P * B r C e v T E W o 8 r l € N T Br. C o M T R O W Adapted from J.G.E. Murray O r g a n i z a t i o n , Functions and J u r i d i c t i o n of the R.C.M.P. Master Thesis i n P o l i t i c a l Science, Carleton U n i v e r s i t y , 1970. APPENDIX I I I SUMMARY OF THE INDICTMENT PROCESS TABLE IV 'LACE OF ARRAIGNMENT DATE OF ARRAIGNMENT NAMES C H A R G E S UNDER THE PUBLIC ORDER REGULATIONS UNDER THE CRIMINAL CODE MONTREAL MONTREAL NOVEMBER 2 NOVEMBER 5 J.G. L e l i e v r e V. Daudelin M. Chartrand Lemieux V a l l i e r e s Gagnon | Larue-Langlois | L. Balcer | L. Rose | A. F e r e t t i | J . B o i s j o l y G. Cormier R. Cormier R. Langevin C. Leblanc J.L. Arene P. Beauchamp J.F. B r o s s i n P. C a r r i e r G. Lachance A. Lavoie I G. L'Esperance I C. Roy L. Samson N. Turgeon F. Vickerson FLQ MEMBERSHIP x X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X ADVOCATING THE AIMS OF THE FLQ [COMMUNICATING STATEMENTS SEDITIOUS CONSPIRACY x x X X X X X X X X X X X OTHERS Conspiracy to s t e a l machine guns and m i l i -tary uniforms i t St. John's Base, Quebec Numerous other m i s c e l -laneous charges (69 f o r the f i v e ) S e d i t i o u s l i b e l posses-s i o n of weapons is DNTREAL DWANSVILLE ffiRBROOKE JEBEC :MOUSKI )NTREAL JN KNOWN (NOVEMBER 12) NOVEMBER 5 NOVEMBER 5 NOVEMBER 5 NOVEMBER 5 NOVEMBER 13 UNKNOWN xl (A. Vachon) x2 F. Mercier R. Jodoin J . Jodoin M. Gauthier J . Gauthier G. Hudon R. Noel jC. Caron * JL. Caron * JJ. Plante R. Belanger ** G. P e l l e t i e r P. Bourret J . Depatie 1J.J. Leroux |D. Seguin R. Belanger M. Gutowski P.J. Chantelaine H. Audet G. Courcelles J . Geoffroy F. Roux B. Simard C. L a r i v i e r e L. Verrault x x x x x X X X X X X -UNKNOWN UNKNOWN Making anony. mous phone c a l l s to alarm one or more persons Possession of sawed-off gun pbst. J u s t i c e aid to FLQ > ra z a n X APPENDIX IV SUMMARY OF THE ACTION CHANNELS INVOLVED APPENDIX V STATUS OF THE 23 POLITICAL PRISONERS TABLE V - 173 -APPENDIX V STATUS OF THE 23 POLITICAL PRISONERS CONDEMNED IN SENTENCE ELIGIBILITY FOR PAROLE* ELIGIBLE FOR "NOLLE PROSEQUI" F.P. P.P. OTHER F. Schirm Nov 67 L i f e Nov 74 X E. Guenette Nov 67 Death Committed to l i f e Nov 77 X C. D e i i s l e Nov 67 L i f e Nov 74 X S. Demers June 67 8 years 10 months June 70* X M. Faulkner June 67 6 years 8 months Sep 69* X G. Laquerre June 67 6 years 8 months Sep 69* X C. Simard June 67 5 years 10 months June 69* X R. Mathieu June 67 9 years 2 months Aug 70* X R. Levesque Nov 68 7 years Jan 71 X • P.P. Geoffroy Apr 69 L i f e Apr 76 X C. Morency Arrested June 70 X X A. Roy Arrested June 70 x x F. Lanctot Arrested June 70 x x G. Hudon Oct 63 Arrested 12 years Paroled 67 again May70 X X R. Hudon 1964 Arrested in June 8 years Paroled 69 25 years 1978 X A. Lessard Arrested • Liberated on b a i l i n 70 X X R. Tremblay Arrested Liberated on b a i l i n 70 X X M.A. Gagne June 70 25 years 1978 X P. Boucher 16 years X A. Ouellet 10 years 1,000 days X P. Demers Arrested early 70 held without b a i l X . j i x ' i j P. Marcil M. Loriot 1 - ~ Arrested > Liberated on b a i l i n 70 it ? X X X E l i g i b l e 5or6 N . E l i g i b l e 9 8 15 5 3 F.P. = Federal Prisons P.P. = Pr o v i n c i a l Prisons * According to Parole Board Regulations APPENDIX VI ALLEGED COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN J . CROSS, P. LAPORTE AND THE AUTHORITIES APPENDIX VI ALLEGED COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN J . CROSS, P. LAPORTE AND THE AUTHORITIES In any s i t u a t i o n having to do w i t h a search process they are u s u a l l y commentators who proclaim ( g e n e r a l l y a f t e r the f a c t ) that "everything was c l e a r , f o r those who know how to read" The October c r i s i s , d i d not f a i l to produce such a r e s u l t and gave b i r t h to at l e a s t three d i f f e r e n t . a c c o u n t s of " c l u e s " , d i s s i m u l a t e d i n the messages sent by the v i c t i m s to the a u t h o r i t i e s . "Route Rurale No. 4" Between the 11th and the 16th, Robert Lemieux has pretended, without much j u s t i f i c a t i o n , that the messages sent by R. Laporte were con-t a i n i n g some form of a code, which when i n t u r n t r a n s l a t e d was s t r e s s i n g the importance of a Route Rurale No. 4. But, apparently, he d i d not go f u r t h e r i n h i s i n v e s t i g a t i o n s . J . Cross' Message In December 1970, the Press r e f l e c t e d the f a c t s t h a t : i n one of the messages the time was mentioned, 9:45, and that the 1 preceeding the f i r s t paragraph was underlined twice. i n a f u r t h e r message, " r e c o l l e c t i n g " had been used more or l e s s out of context. This lead t o the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n t h a t , J . Cross had t r i e d to i n d i c a t e the l o c a t i o n of the hide-out on 10945 des R e c o l l e t s (since 9:45 i n m i l i t a r y coding was w r i t t e n 0945, which i n t u r n when added the one gave 10945). The authors of the a r t i c l e underligned that such a s t r a t e g y was c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the f a c t that p r i o r going to M a l a y s i a , where he had been posted before, J.R. Cross had been given a few courses by the M. 15. P. Laporte's Message An a r t i c l e p u blished i n 1973 (reference unknown) and based on i n t e r v i e w s w i t h former f r i e n d s and c o l l a b o r a t o r s of P. Laporte, gave a very s i m i l a r account of P. Laporte's f i r s t message to R. Bourassa. I t i s remarked t h a t i n h i s l e t t e r , P. Laporte i n s i s t s on both the number 12 (misdating h i s l e t t e r on the 12th i n s p i t e of the 11th and mentioning erroneously that he has 12 persons at charge i n h i s family) and the n o t i o n of h e a l t h ( f i r s t about him-s e l f and then about h i s f a m i l y . ) Those two clues 'are then core-l a t e d w i t h the f a c t t h a t i n St. Hubert P. Laporte was detained c l o s e to a v i a t i o n b u i l d i n g No. 12 (to which the people around r e f e r as the 12, a huge 12 being painted on the roof) and c l o s e to a h o s p i t a l . This i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s then backed by the f a c t that P. Laporte i s reported to have s a i d , i n the week f o l l o w i n g the kidnapping of James Cross, that i n such a case he would have t r i e d to smuggle out coded messages. I t i s d i f f i c u l t a p r i o r i to discount the value of such i n t e r p r e -t a t i o n s , but i t must nevertheless be noted t h a t : the sources f o r the f i r s t and t h i r d messages had a d i r e c t i n t e r e s t i n haying t h e i r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a c c r e d i t e d (Robert Lemieux had an i n t e r e s t i n m i s d i r e c t i n g the p o l i c e f o r c e s and the f r i e n d s of P. Laporte had apparently some resentment against the a u t h o r i t i e s ) the second i n t e r p r e t a t i o n was never confirmed by J . Cross h i m s e l f a f t e r h i s r e l e a s e NOTE: In the same " s e n s a t i o n a l i s t i c " v e i n , Robert Burns (P.Q. Member i n the Quebec Na t i o n a l Assembly) r a i s e d embarrassing questions on a l l e g e d connections between P. Laporte and the underworld. ( A c c r e d i t i n g the v e r s i o n that the government had a vested i n t e r e s t i n the s i l e n c i n g of Laporte). But on the whole, i t does not appear to be more than a case of c a r e l e s s p o l i -t i c a l campaign management from Laporte's part and a case of "aggressive" parliamentary t a c t i c s from R. Burns' p a r t . 

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