THE OCTOBER CRISIS:
FOCUS ON SEVERAL DECISION MODELS

by

DANIEL GUY DENOUAL

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Department of Management & Policy

The University of British Columbia
Vancouver 8, Canada

Date AUGUST 2, 1976
ABSTRACT

The purpose of this research is to focus on alternative ways of perceiving the same reality: The actions taken by the FLQ and the authorities during the October 1970 crisis.

Among the abundant literature that was published during and after the crisis and often with strong emotional overtones, two main attempts of explanation have emerged:

- One trying to describe the actions chosen, as the more or less purposive acts of unified institutions or groups (the FLQ, the Authorities) and which is often found among either English Canadian commentators or close sources to the Government.

- The other one attempting to relate the chosen actions, as the resultant of various bargaining games among players in the institutions or groups (the intellectuals, the activists, in the case of the FLQ, Quebec, Ottawa and Montreal in the case of the Government) and which is often found among proponents of the New Left or Quebec Independentists.

Two aspects of the crisis however, have largely been ignored or neglected: The role of the information units and the role of the implementation units in the shaping of Government decisions, except in rare cases and only to deplore their inefficiency or their prejudices.
Given this background, we propose to focus our attention on five main questions:

- How can the actions of the FLQ and of the authorities be explained in the context of a unitary and comprehensively rational actor perspective?

- How can the actions of the FLQ and of the authorities be explained in the context of a unitary and boundedly rational actor perspective?

- How can the actions of the authorities be explained, as being the output of multiple, boundedly rational, separate information units?

- How can the outcome resulting from the authorities' chosen action be explained as the output of multiple, boundedly rational, separate implementation units?

- How can the actions of the FLQ and of the authorities be explained, as the resultant of the bargaining process taking place among multiple, boundedly rational, separate decision units?

In trying to answer those questions, we will draw heavily on the work of Graham Allison (Essence of Decision, Little Brown and Company, Boston, 1971), whose methodology and terminology will be used abundantly as far as the basic concepts are concerned.

In many cases, as we have not got any access to "internal" information, we will try to reconstitute the decision processes
from the evidence at hand, hypothesizing the developments that have taken place.

This same limitation (the lack of internal information), will lead us to concentrate mostly on the repetitive character of bounded behaviour and to search for antecedents among past actions.

In doing so, we hope to minimize our own prejudices and contribute to the understanding of a crisis which has appeared to many as a turning point in Canadian history.
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THE SETTING:

AN OVERVIEW OF THE EVENTS
1. **THE FLQ ACTIVITIES PRIOR TO OCTOBER 5, 1970**

As shown in Appendix I, during a period of 7 years (from 1963 to 1970) the FLQ (or similar movements) accomplished more than 200 violent actions, mostly in the Montreal area. Among those actions more than half of them were bombings, the others being either thefts of military equipment (radio transmitters, uniforms, arms, and ammunition) or hold-ups. Most of them were directed against Federal Institutions (armouries, public buildings) or traditional symbols of English Economic influence (the Montreal Stock Exchange, U.S. firms or locations in the Westmount area), but a few of them managed to reach such diverse targets as the home of Mayor Jean Drapeau, the central office of the C.N.T.U. (National Council of Quebec Trade Unions) or even the greenhouse at McGill University.

During those seven years, those violent actions caused the death of six persons and led to the arrest and conviction of successive groups of activists who were condemned to penalties ranging from 5 years to life imprisonment.

In 1965, the movement had received the support and approval of some members of the left wing intelligentsia (like Gagnon and Vallieres), who rapidly became the more or less official spokesmen and theorists for the cause, claiming an active solidarity with the Palestinian liberation struggle and the Black Panthers. In 1967, Vallieres and Gagnon were charged with homicide (in connection with the La Grenade bombing which had caused the death of one employee) and were finally released on bail in May 1970. After a first trial replete with errors and excesses which stirred numerous protests in the ranks of the Quebec New Left and led to the creation of the M.D.P.P.Q. (Mouvement de Défense des Prisonniers Politiques Québécois)
On the other hand, at the social level, the separatist cause had been repeatedly connected with manifestations leading to violence mostly in the Montreal area. Bill 63 (on the language issue), St. Jean Baptiste day, Murray Hill affair, and the Construction strike in 1969, had developed into violent confrontations and in one case led to the loss of a human life (shot by an unidentified sniper).

2. THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN CANADA AND QUEBEC IN OCTOBER 1970

In the two years preceding the crisis, several changes had taken place on the Federal and Provincial political scenes:

- In 1968 P.E. Trudeau, a French Canadian had been nominated at the head of the Liberal Party and won a federal election on both his personal appeal, his determination to handle the Quebec problem and a rejuvenated program

- In 1968 Ex-Natural Resources Minister Rene Levesque, left the Quebec Liberal Party to regroup the proponents of independence in the Province under the banner of the Parti Quebecois

- In January 1970, Robert Bourassa, with the active support of the party machine and the "quiet support of Ottawa" was nominated as the successor of Jean Lesage as leader of the Liberal Party of Quebec, largely dominating his two opponents Pierre Laporte and Claude Wagner

- On April 29, 1970, during a closely watched election, R. Bourassa was elected on a platform of economic reform (100,000 jobs for Quebec) with a majority of 72 seats. Among the opposition parties, the first appearance of the Parti Quebecois on the Electoral scene netted it with 23% of the votes,
mostly at the expense of the Union Nationale (the Party of late Maurice Duplessis) which having dropped from 41% to 20% of the votes was nevertheless retained as the Official Opposition in the National Assembly.

3. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CRISIS: OCTOBER 5 TO OCTOBER 16

In this short summary we have tried to regroup the various information available to an external observer during the crisis. This means that we have limited our description mostly to official statements and reported facts available to the public at the time of the crisis.

In doing so we have probably neglected valuable pieces of information, at least at this level of our presentation, but we have considered that our purpose was neither to give a "total" account of the situation (which would have been misleading, since decision makers were acting on incomplete information) or an "actor-centered" account (which would have restricted our analysis to one decision maker).

In order to facilitate the perception of the continuity, the events taking place from October 5 to October 16, have been classified by date and type of original sources (Liberation Cell, Chenier Cell, Provincial Government, Federal Government, Municipal Government, Police Forces, Media, Canadian Armed Forces and others).
LIBERATION CELL  (L.B.)

08.15 Cross abduction
(1279 Redpath Crescent, by 4
men in a car bearing a
LaSalle taxi domelight)

L.B. Comm #1 Deadline = 48hrs.

In exchange for the safe
release of J. Cross the
authorities must:

1. Release 23 political
   prisoners whose names where listed

2. Provide an aircraft for
   their transportation to Cuba or Algeria

3. Turn over $500,000. in gold bars

4. Reinstate the Lapalme
   postal drivers

5. Identify the informer who
   helped police apprehend members of another FLQ cell

6. Publish (newspapers, radio,
   T.V.) the full text of the FLQ manifesto

7. Cease all police activities related to the kidnapping

---

CHENIER CELL  (C.C.)

---

PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT  (P.G.)

15.00 Quebec Justice Minister
J. Choquette makes a public
statement outlining the ransom
demands and refuses to answer
any question at least until
after an emergency Cabinet
meeting later in the day
Incident at the end: J.C. tells
R. Lemieux: "Go and see your
pals and tell them to free Cross"
20.00
After a three hour evening
Cabinet meeting in Quebec
City, Mr. Choquette says only
"We are in close contact with
the F.G. and any action taken
on the kidnapping will be a
joint effort."
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<td>A communication center with an adhoc force is located in the East Block</td>
<td>20.00: Mayor J. Drapeau during several broadcasted interviews emphasizes that the present situation has been prepared by those (although no terrorists themselves) who have manifested for the last years.</td>
<td>08.35 After some confusion Montreal Police reaches the Cross home. A general alarm is issued: All the bridges and tunnels from Montreal Island are closed. The combined anti-terrorist squad (M.P. &amp; R.C.M.P. &amp; S.Q.) begin checks on all known members of terrorists or radical independantist movements.</td>
<td>10.25 Radio Canada Broadcasts the news of Cross abduction</td>
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<td>14.40 M. Sharp makes a brief statement in the commons mentionning:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12.00 An anonymous telephone call directs radio station CKLM to L.B. Comm #1 (which the police forces manage to seize before the media)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The abduction of J. Cross</td>
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A speaker for the M.D.D.P.P.Q. (Defence Movement for the Political Prisoners in Quebec) precis that the Movement has nothing to do with the kidnapping and the press has just told him the news.
LIBERATION CELL
(L.B.)

12.00 L.B. Comm #2

1. Mentions a letter sent by Cross to his wife

2. Ask the newsmen to cooperate in "breaking the wall of silence erected by facist police who steals the communiques addressed to the media"

3. Wants the authorities to comply with the demands

4. Stresses conditions 3 and 5 of L.B. Comm #1

CHENIER CELL
(C.C.)

PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT
(P.G.)

9.00 The Cabinet meet to discuss the situation

- Quebec Justice Minister Jerome Choquette mentions that he has initiated talks with the three implied police forces, and that he intends to communicate with G. McIlraith who is in charge of the R.C.M.P. on the problem of the respective jurisdictions of the forces. He remarks however that the Quebec Justice Minister is legally in charge of the implementation of the law

- Premier Bourassa confirms his agreement to Ottawa's attitude and decides to maintain his trip to New York on Thursday
9.00 Inner Cabinet meeting, whose apparent decision is to reject the FLQ demands

20.00 M. Sharp declares in the Commons that:

"I need hardly to say, this set of demands will not be met ... I continue however to hope that some basis can be found for Mr. Cross safe return. I hope the abductors will find a way to establish communications to achieve this"

- Mr. Heath confirms his agreement on Ottawa's attitude and put Mr. G. Rippon in charge of communications between the two governments

- Prime Minister Garden Party

Police forces begin to keep 'under observation' as many FLQ members as they knew

9.30 L.B. Comm #1 is broadcasted

16.00 L.B. Comm #2 delivered at the home of a CKAC journalist

CKLM is informed that a message for the Canadian Government has been deposited in a Bus station (L.B. Comm #3?)
- 100 Winch 30-30 carbines are stolen from Japanese ship in Trois Rivieres (50 miles from Montreal)

- R. Lemieux accuses Ottawa of playing a cat and mouse game with the life of Mr. Cross

- Newspapers mention that the draft ransom note recovered is almost identical to the one used in an earlier FLQ plot
LIBERATION CELL  
(L.B.)  

12.00 (?) L.B. Comm #4:  
The present authorities, get a 24 hour extension to who their good faith in:

- Broadcasting in full the FLQ manifesto  
- Putting an immediate end to police investigations  

The Comm mentions that "J. Cross life will not be endangered for a question of dollars"

Plus two letters from J. Cross; one to his wife, one to the authorities

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CHENIER CELL  
(C.C.)

---

PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT  
(P.G.)

11.00 Press Conference from J. Choquette where he mentions that:

- The abduction has had a negative effect on the population  
- "The governments are ready to investigate all practical means out of this impasse."
- He will continue to make himself available during the next 36 hours.
In the commons P.M. Trudeau confirms "that he is not decided to leave the negociations to the Quebec government"

- Governor General's party to celebrate the beginning of the 28th legislature

22.00 Official statement read by M. Sharp, where he announces that:

- the manifesto will be broadcasted
- the government needs 'a precise basis on which it can be assured of Mr. Cross safe release'
- the set of seven original conditions is wholly unreasonable
- some acceptable means of communication are to be arranged between the government and the abductors (he suggests them to "name some person")

At dawn police raids "a number of houses" and take 27 men and 3 women into custody.

- Unsuccessful tentative identification of suspects by Mrs. Cross is reported in the afternoon
- Assistant Montreal Police Director P.E. Olivier says the forces' work was being hampered by the collection, copying and handling of FLQ messages by radio stations before police had a chance to examine them. "It seems some radio stations and other newsrooms have closer contacts with the FLQ than we do"

Canadian Press mentions that 10,000 sticks of dynamite have been stolen in Quebec so far this year

1:30 L.B. Comm #4 is brought at CKLM by a cabbie

The FLQ manifesto is read on CKAC
Robert Lemieux

- contacts (and is contacted) by the prisoners mentioned in L.B. Comm #1
- declares that the authorities should stop to make "vague and incautious declarations" and appoint a neutral intermediary
- mentions during a Radio Canada interview that police activities are still taking place

M. Sharp mentions that a communique found in a locker at Ottawa's bus terminal and insisting on compliance with five demands of the FLQ, is assumed to be a hoax
LIBERATION CELL
(L.B.)

12.00 L.B. Comm #5 If at 24.00 the authorities have not broadcasted the manifesto and put an end to police activities, the FLQ will be obliged to do away with Cross:

- The authorities are asked to specify what they describe as irrational demands
- The idea of a mediator is rejected
- "Cross will be released within 24 hours following the realization of another condition dealing with the liberation of 'consenting' political prisoners"

THURSDAY
OCTOBER 8

CHENIER CELL
(C.C.)

PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT
(P.G.)

- Prime Minister Bourassa leaves for N.Y. city. After saying that "The problems at home are no reason enough for me to cancel this trip. I have a plane ready and Montreal is just one hour away"
- P. Laporte is (defacto) Acting Premier of the province

23.00 After the manifesto diffusion J. Choquette refuses to make any statement about a moratorium on Police Activity
- Ottawa is said to have prepared a list of people it might name as its representative, and that a choice was to be made in the light of whom the FLQ choose.

- For the first time in Ottawa Prime Minister Trudeau's limousine was preceded and followed by "ghosts" cars. Uniformed and plain-clothed police have followed him all the day in governmental buildings.

Speech from the Throne

J.P. Cote (Post Master General) confirms the Government does not consider modifying its position in the Lapalme question.

Meeting between Prime Minister Trudeau and J.P. Saulnier (Montreal, President of the C.U.M.)
Late in the night troops are moved at high speed from the base at Valcartier (near Quebec City) to Ste Therese (about 15 miles North of Montreal). The movement is described as a routine exercise alert.

R. Lemieux declares on a press conference "that the F.G. claims it wants to negotiate ... but all this is another way to try to fool the FLQ while gaining as much time as possible so the police can find where the kidnappers are holding Cross and so they can start a gunfire and cause an execution."
LIBERATION CELL
(L.B.)

L.B. Comm #6
8.00: 2 conditions to save J. Cross' life:
1. Freedom for the 23 Political Prisoners and their transport to Algeria or Cuba
2. Cessation of activities, investigations, arrests and tortures by the "facist police"
18.00 L.B. Comm #7 (dated Oct. 8?)
Warns against the fact that Comm #6 has not been published
Give the authorities until Saturday 18.00 to satisfy condition (1) from Comm #6

CHENIER CELL
(C.C.)

PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT
(P.G.)

15.00 Mr. Choquette releases a brief message to the kidnappers asking for proof that J. Cross is still alive
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
(F.G.)

MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT
(M.G.)

POLICE FORCES
(P.F.)

MEDIA

R. Stanfield asks the
Prime Minister in the
Commons whether there is
any new development in
the Cross affair.

A... No, Mr. Speaker,

The Department of Foreign
Affairs affirms that
Ottawa has never received
Comm #6.

A member of the Provincial
force says that the Force
has just conducted its 1001st false raid.

Jacques Lanctot is identi-
fied as one of Cross's
abductors.

P.F. arrest one of CKAC
reporters and seize FLQ
communiques.

20.40 A copy of Comm
#6 and Comm #7 and a letter
from J. Cross are brought at
CKLM.

A copy of Comm #6 and Comm #7 and a letter from J. Cross are brought at CKLM.
24 trucks loaded with troops, seen in Montreal (routine exercise says an Army Spokesman)
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<th><strong>LIBERATION CELL</strong>&lt;br&gt;(L.B.)</th>
<th><strong>CHENIER CELL</strong>&lt;br&gt;(C.C.)</th>
<th><strong>PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT</strong>&lt;br&gt;(P.G.)</th>
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<td>SATURDAY OCTOBER 10</td>
<td>18.18 P. Laporte is abducted by 4 men in front of his home</td>
<td>- In consideration of bad weather conditions, Prime Minister Bourassa cancels a meeting with Ted Kennedy in Boston and directly returns to Montreal from N.Y. City</td>
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<td>17.30 J. Choquette (on radio)</td>
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<td>- rejects negotiations over the fate of the 23 prisoners</td>
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<td>- offers safe conduct to a foreign country (as a final concession to save the life of Mr.Cross The F.G. has instructed me that it is prepared to ...)</td>
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<td>- proposes &quot;social reconciliation, acceptance of change, and the rallying of all Quebecois around a common ideal&quot;</td>
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<td>Prime Minister Bourassa comes back to Montreal and confers with P.E. Trudeau</td>
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<td>FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (F.G.)</td>
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<td>- M. Sharp is contacted by J. Choquette and asked to approve the general content of his 17.30 conference</td>
<td>18.30 Montreal Police arrives at Laporte's home in St. Hubert</td>
<td>- Within minutes a general alarm is sounded. Main intersections are blocked. So are all bridges and the tunnel linking the South Shore to the Island of Montreal</td>
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<td>- Prime Minister states that he won't attend the UN 25th anniversary ceremony, during next week</td>
<td>- Provincial Police begins assigning guards to the homes of all Cabinet Ministers and other public figures, who might become kidnap victims</td>
<td>- The combined anti-terrorist force carries out &quot;scores of raids&quot;. Five suspects are said to have been identified</td>
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18.30: Troops (10 trucks) move from Valcartier base (near Quebec) to Ste Therese (near Montreal). Army spokesman precise that this movement is only a normal part of the exercise Night Hawk taking place at Camp Bouchard.

- The Ambassador of Algeria moves from Ottawa to Montreal.

In the late evening P. Bourassa phones C. Ryan who mentions:
"That as long as government is not a reflection of all the true political forces which are at work in Quebec, we will have this kind of problem. You are going to be shaken by crisis like this..."
LIBERATION CELL
(L.B.)

22.00 L.B. Comm #8

1. Repeat the last 2 demands contained in L.B. Comm #6

2. Proposes their "word of honour" as guarantee for the release of Cross and Laporte

3. Does not fix a time limit and considers a prompt answer as a demonstration of good faith by the authorities

SUNDAY

Plus letter from J. Cross
"Thank you for saving my life and that of Mr. Laporte"

4. R. Lemieux proposed as intermediary

CHENIER CELL
(C.C.)

8.00 C.C. Comm #1 explains that the stubborness of the authorities has lead to the kidnapping of P. Laporte and mentions that he will be executed Sunday night at 10: P.M. if between now and then the ruling authorities have not acceded to the 7 demands (in conformity with plan 3 established earlier to provide for such a refusal)

- C.C. Comm #2 (last) warns that:
  Liberation cell should send the authorities "a communiqué summing up the situation"

  If by 10: P.M. tonight the 2 Governments have not favourably met the 7 conditions set by the FLQ P. Laporte will be executed

- C.C. Comm #3 (last)
  Confirms the authenticity of C.C. Comm #2
  Suggests that if Cross is still alive Liberation cell produces an 8th Comm which will be followed by a new Comm that will give its decision about Laporte

PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT
(P.G.)

16.00 Meeting of the Cabinet at the Queen Elizabeth Hotel in Montreal

- Prime Minister Bourassa receives a letter from P. Laporte "my life is in your hands"

- Two Provincial Ministers visit Mrs. Laporte, Prime Minister Bourassa phones her

21.55 After some discussion with the opposition leaders, Prime Minister Bourassa broadcasts "an ambiguous statement" where he asks the kidnappers to contact the Government to discuss mechanisms to ensure that the liberation of prisoners would in fact result in the safety of the hostages

"It is because we truly want to save Mr. Laporte and Mr. Cross, that before discussing the application of the demands made, we want to establish mechanisms which would guarantee the safety of the 2 hostages if the Political prisoners are released"

P.M. Bourassa is reported to have mentioned that a special law could be prepared to im-
## FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (F.G.)

Warns French Canadian men of Business and Politics that "it cannot be responsible for their personal security."

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs let it be known that P.M. Bourassa's communique has been released after consultations with P.M. Trudeau. Ottawa precises that it has nothing to add.

## MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT (M.G.)

Several bomb calls are received by Police Forces.

Police forces are reported to have long believed that the FLQ was a narxist style structure, with several specialized cells of 3 to 6 members who know only their immediate superior in the command chain. There are bombing cells, propaganda cells, intelligence gathering cells, dynamite cells and financing cells that carry out robberies. So far this year the FLQ has been blamed by the police for holdups totalling more than $80,000 and thefts of 9,000 sticks of dynamite.

20.00 Police Forces investigate Charon's Island.

Warrants are issued "against individuals well known for their collaboration with certain committees, favourable to the FLQ."

Police recovers a stolen taxi domelight.

## POLICE FORCES (P.F.)

### MEDIA

- 8.00 CKAC is informed that a communique is awaiting at Peel Street subway station.
- 11.00 CKAC is informed that a message from the FLQ has been deposited at Philipps Square.
- 17.00 CKAC is informed of the existence of a third communique.
- Journalists declare categorically that the Bourassa Government is deeply split following the Laporte kidnapping.

- Warrants are issued "against individuals well known for their collaboration with certain committees, favourable to the FLQ."

- Police recovers a stolen taxi domelight.
Persisting rumours of military intervention

6.00 or 7.00
R. Lemieux is arrested on the basis, that on Oct. 9, he had willfully and illegally impeded police agents in the execution of their duty.

Meeting between L. Saulnier and C. Ryan, who want to discuss with him, three different possible issues of the crisis

The P.Q. issues a statement giving its support to P.M. Bourassa's declaration

Meeting of the permanent council of the FRAP (with most of the candidates absent) which endorses the objective of the FLQ manifesto
LIBERATION CELL  
(L.B.)

MONDAY  
OCTOBER 12

00.00 C.C. Comm #4
1. Refuses all negotiations on the 6 remaining demands, but sets no further deadline
2. Names R. Lemieux as spokesman for the FLQ in talks with authorities
3. Assumes that Cross will be freed if still alive ("But since Liberation cell has not given any sign of life we cannot promise anything)
Plus Laporte's letter "Thanks again ... and thanks to all those who have contributed to this reasonable decision which you announced with strength and dignity"

C.C. Comm #5
1. Mr. Cross will be freed on the liberation of the political prisoners and cessation of police activity
2. Mr. Laporte's freedom will depend on the total acceptance of FLQ demands
3. In case of refusal, too long hesitations, police localisation the "2 hostages will be executed"
4. This Comm. from the C.C. is the last before the execution

PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT  
(P.G.)

During the day R. Levesque (P.Q.) phones R. Bourassa and urges him to negotiate
19.15 Quebec Government names lawyer R. Demers as its spokesman for negotiations with the FLQ (presumably after consultation with the FLQ)
21.00 Mr. Demers meets briefly with R. Lemieux still held in cell at Montreal police H.Q.
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
(F.G.)

R.C.M.P. request for help in protecting the federal establishment was made at a Cabinet meeting in the morning.

During a special meeting between M. Sharp and Federal Ministers "the possibility of engaging in negotiations with the FLQ" is studied.

P.M. Trudeau answers a question from R. Stanfield in the Commons:

"There is a total agreement between the P.G. and the Government of Canada concerning the very clear attitude taken yesterday evening by P.M. Bourassa ... He said that the only thing to do was to ensure through negotiations the creation of a mechanism dealing with Mr. Cross and Mr. Laporte's liberation. That's what must be established in the beginning."

(Date of this answer uncertain since Monday Oct 12 was thanksgiving day)

MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT
(M.G.)

Mayor J. Drapeau decides to call off all his appointments and appearances in the city connected with the October 25 election and declares:

"The hour is serious and the politicians need the support of the entire population if they are not to lack courage ... One must note a certain analogy between the kidnap­ping in other countries ... That is strangely similar to revolutions in other countries.

POLICE FORCES
(P.F.)

Nearly a hundred members of the Security Squad of the Q.P.P. have combed the Eastern part of the Province and particularly the Quebec Metropolitan area, where they have searched 38 houses of presumed FLQ members, as well as a bookshop.

MEDIA

2.10 CKLM receives telephone directions that lead to the discovery of L.B. Comm #8

10.45 CKAC receives instructions and finds C.C. Comm. #4

16.30 CKAC informed of C.C. Comm. #5

23.00 Radio Canada:
"Lieutenant Colonel Bonneau has declared that the second and third battalions from the 22nd Royal Regiment are maintained under alert and that if the Quebec Government makes the request for it, they could intervene with 600 to 1200 men. In the event of a Military intervention in Montreal, the army has established its H.Q., on the 3rd floor of the Surete du Quebec building on Parthenais Street."
17.30 Petawa troops begin to move towards Ottawa. Troops are reported to be prepared for "a number of eventualities". They have brought with them large supplies of barbed wire. During the night communication trucks and other military vehicles move to key locations throughout the city, although none have been seen across the Ottawa river into Hull.

The Front de Justice du Quebec, through the use of a false bomb threat, leaves a note promising "a three for one" reprisal against the families of the political prisoners.
Prime Minister Bourassa insists that "there can be no question of the Government accepting or discussing FLQ demands before dealing with the initial question (Laporte and Cross safety)"

1st Meeting between Lemieux and Demers

Lemieux suggests the political prisoners be held captive in Cuba or Algeria until the host government is informed by the Canadian Government that C and L are safe - He further mentions that he is not to discuss the 6 demands but only their implementation.

K. Demers proposes to have one member of each cell held as hostage by the Government until the prisoners are freed.

2nd Meeting

Demers informs Lemieux that he cannot answer his questions (on the implementation) until the preliminary mechanism has been settled.

In a communique the bureau of the P.M. affirms that the Government's position has not changed and that the preliminary question of the safety of C & L must be dealt
Some M.P.'s feel rather uneasy about the extremely visible presence of the Army in Ottawa; some others ask for some form of Federal action against the FLQ.

20.00 M. Sharp admits that Canadian Officials had visited Cuba and Algeria to inform the Government of the FLQ demands. It is confirmed that one of the two governments is ready to accept the fugitives.

The Federal Cabinet is reported to have met and heard urgent messages from Montreal and Quebec about the rising crisis, the threats of disorders, the inadequacy of normal police forces to meet the crisis. The Cabinet is reported to have discussed the possible use of drastic emergency measures.

Mayor J. Drapeau: The two kidnappings by Montreal terrorist underground may represent the preliminary stage of a revolution.

Paul Rose is supposed to be followed by the police (mention of a blue Volks) (his fingerprints have been found on one of the communiques).

The police forces' telephone standards are burdened by calls from the public.

Discussion between Prime Minister Trudeau and reporters of CBC and CJOH-TV.

"I'm suggesting that the press should perhaps use a bit more restraint, which you are not doing now"

"I'm suggesting that the more recognition you give to them, the greater the victory is, and I'm not interested in giving them a victory"

"They're criminal prisoners, they're not political prisoners and they're bandits"

"I think society must take every means at his disposal to defend itself against the emergence of parallel powers which defies the elected powers in this country ... I think that power must be stopped and I think it's only, I repeat weakened bleeding hearts who are afraid to take these measures"
R. Lemieux refuses to plead arguing the charge of obstruction was political; he is left out on his own recognizance.

Comm. from the Service Action cell "we will kill policemen who make raids without warrants in Quebec"

R. Lemieux (in the evening) asks for a new mandate to meet again R. Demers and charges that although Demers gives him the impression that the government wishes to negotiate it is possible that it was only buying time.

Charles B. Neapole, President of the Montreal Stock Exchange, mentions that he is convinced of being the 4th on the list of FLQ's potential victims.
Liberation Cell (L.B.)

5.00 L.B. & C.C. Comm #9

The FLQ
- refuses R. Demers' proposal (members of the cells held as hostages)
- questions the "goodwill" of the concerned authorities
- gives R. Lemieux "carte blanche" to negotiate the aforementioned conditions
- reviews its solemn commitment before the people of Quebec regarding the guarantees asked by the ruling authorities

Chenier Cell (C.C.)

14.00 Demers meets R. Lemieux who refuses to accompany him in Quebec City and declares to the press "that the slowness of the negotiations endangers the lives of the hostages.

P.M. Bourassa modifies his initial formula and considers, that in spite of the two cell members, two (already detained) political prisoners, could be held as hostages, and freed only after C & L's safe return. However, he specifies that such a formula (without precedent) should be ratified by the Cabinet and submitted for acceptance to the Justice Minister. (Le Devoir 15-10-70) unconfirmed

A close source to P.M. Bourassa says the "P.M. is dead tired from lack of sleep in the last few days and getting a little fed-up with Ottawa's refusal to be flexible" "Ottawa seems unable to see the problem from Quebec's point of view. Mr. Bourassa is under considerable pressure, partly from the easily split Quebec Lib. Federation, to obtain the freedom of P. Laporte"

Provincial Government (P.G.)

Reporters tell P.M. Bourassa in Quebec City that Mr. Trudeau has said there was no question of liberating the prisoners.

A. "Yes, but Mr. Trudeau approved my statement of Sunday night..."

When reporters insisted that Mr. Trudeau had been very categorical in ruling out any freeing of prisoners the P.M. said

"I have not read his interview ... he was not specific"

(cont'd)
Questions in the Commons by R. Stanfield "Is there any consideration given to the declaring of emergency police powers (search without warrant, arrest without charges or justifications)?"

P.M. Answers later
"This is completely hypothetical. I repeat that if such action were ever contemplated it would certainly be discussed in the House whether it would be immediately before or immediately after, would depend of course on ... (interruption)"

Without "commiting" himself P.M. Trudeau indicates to the Liberal Caucus that the Government has no intention of altering its opposition in an exchange of FLQ prisoners for the lives of the FLQ kidnapped victims

His general line was 'if you give now who will be the next' One M.P. reported "he certainly did not sound like a guy who's going to concede"

20.00 (according to Toronto G & M)

Meeting between P.M. Trudeau, M. McDonald, Turner, McIffraith (in charge of the R.C.M.P.)

"Surprisingly the Ministers appeared cheerful after 3½ hours of meeting"

"With time apparently running out there is a growing conviction among ministers that new tactics must be developed if police are to crack the case and have any changes to save C & L lives"

"This step (W.M.A.) has already been considered and rejected once, on the ground that it might provoke a public outcry without significantly enhancing the likelyhood of discovering the two cells"

Now with reports from Montreal indicating the two cells will soon move to set a new deadline on the victims' lives. There is a growing feeling that special police measures, however unpopular, may be the only mean of avoiding a catastrophe.

Paul Rose's track is lost during the day

Police forces are presently searching for about 10 persons considered as prime suspects in the kidnappings of J. Cross & P. Laporte

(Police forces were reported to have proceeded by elimination from a list of FLQ sympathisers)

During an interview P.M. Bourassa declares that "under actual circumstances, it is difficult to tell the police forces not to do anything"

9:00 A.M. CKLM is notified of a new FLQ communique

Quebec journalist seek legal aid against police

Claude Ryan is informed by P.M. Bourassa that there will be a move towards a tougher line. (A small step, un petit virage)
### CANADIAN ARMY

An army spokesman declares that 300 soldiers may be in Montreal, if necessary, in less than an hour.

A group of 10 C.A.F. signal men move into offices adjacent to R. Bourassa's own office in the National Assembly building. A spokesman for the Premier's office said a communication system has been set up through which troops at nearby Valcartier base could be summoned by the Government at a moments notice.

Troops continue to move to camp Bouchard 25 miles from Montreal.

* Some sources report that with the new system the Government is able to join all radio listeners.

### OTHERS

In Toronto, Premier J. Robarts declares that the Quebec terrorist situation has evolved into "total war" and the time had come to 'stand and fight'.

A group of prominent Quebecers (Levesque, Ryan, Pepin, Charbonneau, Laberge, Rouleau, Dumont) offer their most pressing support to the Provincial Government for the release of the two kidnapped men. They speak of "an atmosphere of almost military rigidity which one can blame on Ottawa, which risks reducing Quebec and its Government to tragic impotence."

It is reported that Trudeau is restraining Quebec and Montreal authorities from precipitately demanding the use of the army or of the W.M.A.

Mass rally at U of M with Lemieux, Vallerie, Chartrand, Gagnon: Students are urged to boycott classes. A campaign to organize a general student strike begins in support of the FLQ.
THURSDAY OCTOBER 15

LIBERATION CELL (L.B.)

3.07 After discussions with the opposition leaders, who concurred, P.M. Bourassa makes a statement in the National Assembly: "We have therefore, asked for military support, so that the police force, may be able to continue protecting public buildings and the population."

Afternoon: Bourassa's Government passes an order in council which places all police and army personnel under the command of Maurice St. Pierre, the Director of the Quebec Provincial Police.

Cabinet Meeting

9.00 P.M. Bourassa's statement: "The Government has decided to give its final viewpoint ... The Government - promises to recommend firmly the parole of 5 of the prisoners - promises safe passage to the members of the 2 cells - rejects the other conditions and asks a reply in the next 6 hours.

PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT (P.G.)

CHENIER CELL (C.C.)
In the Commons P.M. admits that the Government had considered every possible way in which the Government of Canada, in conjunction with the Quebec Government, could meet this very difficult situation, including the W.M.A.

P.M. Trudeau meets opposition leaders and suggests that special, less drastic legislation to deal with the FLQ might be introduced in the Commons if opposition parties agree to pass it without delay. Mr. Stanfield and Mr. Douglas decline to commit themselves without more information.

Consultations between Ottawa and Quebec

P.M.'s counsellor M. Lalonde is in Quebec City

Mr. Sharp says reporters should not overlook the fact that P.M. Bourassa has set a 6 hour deadline.

Numerous bomb threats (evacuation of the Palais de Justice during the morning)

Staff meeting at the Provincial Police Director's office

Montreal Police Director prepares his letter to Mrs. Drapeau and Saulnier

(See following pages "C")

Montreal Police Director Mr. St. Aubin asks the police forces to keep calm

Producers of the CBC are ordered, by CBC President G. Davidson to "exercise a greater degree of restraint" in their coverage of the crisis

The Montreal Gazette mentioning a confidential RCMP report, estimates that the FLQ counts 22 active cells with a total of 130 members. The report estimates that 2,000 other members are not implied in the cell activities

A few hundred persons support the "prominent Quebecers" position in the Devoir
Within minutes after P.M.'s proclamation, troops arrive on the Assembly grounds in Quebec.

Less than an hour after P.M.'s declaration troops land at St. Hubert Air base and take position around "strategic" buildings (they have been called under the civil power clause of the National Defense Act).

Troops carry small arms only (no tanks, artillery, heavy machine guns, or armoured personal carriers).

"We are coming in to help police authorities protect certain places and persons."

Col. Lloyd Morrison (at the end of the evening the number of members of the Canadian Armed Forces are evaluated between 1,000 and 5,000)

1:30 A group of Laporte's friends and collaborators issue a statement asking for "an acceleration of the liberation process in order to obtain the liberation of the hostages". The statement underlines the opposition of the group to police or military intervention.

R. Lemieux declares that police forces have found C.C. and are only waiting to find the L.C. before attacking in force to free the two men.

FRAP public meeting (fund raising for the municipal campaign).

"Peaceful" student meeting at U of M campus (no trouble reported)
**FRIDAY**

**OCTOBER 16**

| LIBERATION CELL  
<table>
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<tr>
<th>(L.B.)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Some members of L.B. realize that the Government will not go further than its promise of safe conduct. Fearing unremediable action from C.C. they issue a communique which is dropped in a church. The text specifies that Mr. Cross will be saved but kept as a hostage (a political prisoner) as long as the prisoners are not liberated.</td>
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| CHENIER CELL  
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<td>St. Hubert firemen take action against a light fire in the airport area.</td>
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| PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT  
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<th>(P.G.)</th>
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<td>Prime Minister Bourassa's letter to P.M. Trudeau (See following pages &quot;A&quot;)</td>
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At a press conference during the afternoon P.M. Bourassa takes full responsibility for the decision pleading that the danger lies in the continued escalation of what is seen as a coordinated plan for revolution.
### FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (F.G.)

- **3.00** Receives the letters from Quebec and Montreal
- **4.00** The W.M.A. and the following regulations are approved
- **5.17** P.M.'s office issues a formal statement that the act has been proclaimed

(See following pages "C")

P.M. briefs the Liberal Caucus before the meeting of the House where he justifies the Government's action on the grounds:
- of the deterioration of the situation in Quebec
- as a response to the appeal from Quebec

The use of the act he declares, is "only an interim and somewhat unsatisfactory measure" and he promised to discuss with opposition leaders "the desirability of introducing legislation of a less comprehensive nature"

Apart from the S. Credit, the 2 opposition parties seem rather doubtful the information that has lead to the decision.

### MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT (M.G.)

- **Letter from Mayor J. Drapeau to Prime Minister Trudeau**
- **Letter from Mr. St. Pierre to L. Saulnier**

(See following pages "B")

Mr. Drapeau and Saulnier mentioning the existence of a revolutionary plan, praise the police forces and ask the citizens to keep calm.

### POLICE FORCES

- By noon, Police Forces have arrested more than 150 suspected members of the FLQ. Another hundred will be picked up before night fall.

(Other reports evaluate the total count over the whole province to 242 suspects)

### MEDIA

- CKLM news director says his station will not broadcast any more communication on the ground that the broadcast could contravene the emergency regulation.

By noon, Police Forces have arrested more than 150 suspected members of the FLQ. Another hundred will be picked up before night fall.

(Other reports evaluate the total count over the whole province to 242 suspects)
Multiplication of student
strikes

R. Levesque (P.Q.) says Quebec
has no more Government

J. Marchand declares: If
we had not acted, the separa-
tion of Quebec would have been
a fact, a month or a year from
today; and implies that...
the FLQ has infiltrated Police
Forces in the province and other
key posts in Quebec society

In Toronto 2 radical lawyers
call for a demonstration
against the Government "gross
overreaction" and Trudeau's
"Police State"
Government of Quebec  
The Prime Minister  
Quebec City, October 16, 1970.

Mr. Prime Minister,

During the last few days the people of Quebec have been greatly shocked by the kidnapping of Mr. James R. Cross, representative of the British Government in Montreal, and the Hon. Pierre Laporte, Minister of Labour and Manpower and Minister of Immigration of Quebec, as well as by the threats to the security of the state and individuals expressed in communiques issued by the Front de Libération du Quebec or on its behalf, and finally by all the circumstances surrounding these events.

After consultation with authorities directly responsible for the administration of justice in Quebec, the Quebec Government is convinced that the law, as it stands now, is inadequate to meet this situation satisfactorily.

Under the circumstances, on behalf of the Government of Quebec, I request that emergency powers be provided as soon as possible so that more effective steps may be taken. I request particularly that such powers encompass the authority to apprehend and keep in custody individuals who, the Attorney General of Quebec has valid reasons to believe, are determined to overthrow the government through violence and illegal means. According to the information we have and which is available to you, we are facing a concerted effort to intimidate and overthrow the government and the democratic institutions of this province through planned and systematic illegal action, including insurrection. It is obvious that those participating in this concerted effort completely reject the principle of freedom under the rule of law.

The Quebec Government is convinced that such powers are necessary to meet the present emergency. Not only are two completely innocent men threatened with death, but we are also faced with an attempt by a minority to destroy social order through criminal action; it is for those reasons that our government is making the present request.

The government is confident that, through such powers, it will be able to put an immediate stop to intimidation and terror and to ensure peace and security for all citizens.

Please accept, Mr. Prime Minister, my very best regards.

Robert Bourassa.
"B" Letter from Mayor Drapeau to Prime Minister Trudeau

City of Montreal, Canada
Office of the Chairman of the Executive Committee
October 15, 1970.

Mr. Prime Minister,

The chief of the Montreal Police Service has informed us that the means available to him are proving inadequate and that the assistance of higher levels of government has become essential for the protection of society against the seditious plot and the apprehended insurrection in which the recent kidnappings were the first step.

We are forwarding as a matter of the utmost urgency the report describing the scope of the threat and the urgent need to reinforce the machinery to cope with it.

We ask for every measure of assistance the federal government may deem useful and desirable in order to carry out the task of protecting society and the lives of citizens in this difficult period.

Jean Drapeau
Mayor of Montreal

Lucien Saulnier
Chairman of the Executive Committee
October 15, 1970

Gentlemen:

An extremely dangerous subversive movement has progressively developed in Quebec in recent years with the objective of overthrowing the legitimate state by means of sedition and eventually armed insurrection.

The recent kidnappings of a foreign diplomat and a Crown minister of the province have signalled the launching by this movement of their seditious projects and acts leading directly to the insurrection and the overthrow of the state.

Under these circumstances, the investigation which the police authorities must undertake must necessarily delve into all aspects of the activities of the networks of this seditious movement, and
should not be restricted to simply searching for the individuals who perpetrated the odious kidnapping of the two people who are still prisoners - for this would mean failure.

The threat served on society by this seditious conspiracy, which has moved into action in the past eleven days, the difficulties of investigating an organization split up into manifold tiny cells, each impervious to the others, and the unbelievable amount of checking and researching imposed on us have taxed, and continue to tax the resources our police force has at its disposal to their limit.

Considering how extremely urgent it is to achieve concrete results and unmask all the ramifications of this movement and its seditious activities, considering the volume and complexity of the proofs which must be collected and preserved, considering, finally, the enormity of the task we must accomplish, without moving into a repression which would be neither healthy nor desirable, the help of higher governments is essential to the completion of our job.

The slowness of procedures and the restraints imposed by the legal methods and mechanisms now at our disposal do not allow us at this time to cope with the situation.

Consequently, I recommend that the executive committee of the city request that the higher governments give us all the means they think appropriate and useful, so as to allow us to collect and present the proofs needed to protect society from the seditious and insurrectional manoeuvres unleashed by the kidnappings.

Please accept, gentlemen, the expression of my most distinguished sentiments.

The Director M. St-Pierre
PROCLAMATION OF THE W.M.A. AND OF THE PUBLIC ORDER REGULATIONS

"C"

Whereas the War Measures Act provides that the issue of a proclamation under the authority of the governor-in-council shall be conclusive evidence that insurrection, real or apprehended, exists and has existed for any period of time therein stated and its continuance, until by the issue of a further proclamation it is declared that the insurrection no longer exists.

And whereas there is in contemporary Canadian society an element or group known as Le Front de Liberation du Quebec who advocate and resort to the use of force and the commission of criminal offences, including murder, threats of murder and kidnapping, as a means of or as an aid in accomplishing a governmental change within Canada and whose activities have given rise to a state of apprehended insurrection within the province of Quebec.

Therefore, His Excellency the Governor-General-in-Council, on the recommendation of the prime minister, is pleased to direct that a proclamation be issued proclaiming that apprehended insurrection exists and has existed as and from the fifteenth day of October, one thousand nine hundred and seventy.

Public Order Regulations, 1970
October 16, 1970

Whereas it continues to be recognized in Canada that men and institutions remain free only when freedom is founded upon respect for moral and spiritual values and the rule of law;

And whereas there is in contemporary Canadian society an element or group known as Le Front de Liberation du Quebec who advocate the use of force or the commission of crime as a means of or as an aid in accomplishing a governmental change within Canada and who have resorted to the commission of serious crimes including murder, threat of murder and kidnapping;

And whereas the government of Canada desires to ensure that lawful and effective measures can be taken against those who thus seek to destroy the basis of our democratic governmental system on which the enjoyment of our human rights and fundamental freedoms is founded and to ensure the continued protection of those rights and freedoms in Canada;
Therefore, His Excellency the Governor-General-in-Council, on the recommendation of the prime minister, pursuant to the War Measures Act, is pleased hereby to make the annexed regulations, to provide emergency powers for the preservation of public order in Canada.

Regulations to Provide Emergency Powers for the Preservation of Public Order in Canada

Short Title

1. These regulations may be cited as the Public Order Regulations, 1970.

2. In these regulations,

"communicate" includes the act of communicating by telephone, broadcasting or other audible or visible means;

"peace officer" means a peace officer as defined in the Criminal Code and includes a member of the Canadian Armed Forces;

"statements" includes words spoken or written or recorded electronically or electromagnetically or otherwise, and gestures, signs or other visible representations; and

"the unlawful association" means the group of persons or association declared by these regulations to be an unlawful association.

3. The group of persons or association known as Le Front de Liberation du Quebec and any successor group or successor association of the said Le Front de Liberation du Quebec, or any group of persons or association that advocates the use of force or the commission of crime as a means of or as an aid in accomplishing governmental change within Canada is declared to be an unlawful association.

4. A person who

a) is or professes to be a member of the unlawful association,

b) acts or professes to act as an officer of the unlawful association.
c) communicates statements on behalf of or as a representative or professed representative of the unlawful association,

d) advocates or promotes the unlawful acts, aims, principles or policies of the unlawful association,

e) contributes anything as dues or otherwise to the unlawful association or to anyone for the benefit of the unlawful association,

f) solicits subscriptions or contributions for the unlawful association, or

g) advocates, promotes or engages in the use of force or the commission of criminal offences as a means of accomplishing a governmental change within Canada is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years.

5. A person who, knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that another person is guilty of an offence under these regulations, gives that other person any assistance with intent thereby to prevent, hinder or interfere with the apprehension, trial or punishment of that person for that offence is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years.

6. An owner, lessee, agent or superintendent of any building, room, premises or other place who knowingly permits therein any meeting of the unlawful association or any branch, committee or members thereof, or any assemblage of persons who promote the acts, aims, principles or policies of the unlawful association is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to a fine of not more than five thousand dollars or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or to both.

7. 1. A person arrested for an offence under section 4 shall be detained in custody without bail pending trial unless the attorney-general of the province in which the person is being detained consents to the release of that person on bail.

2. Where an accused has been arrested for an offence under these regulations and is detained in custody for the purpose only of ensuring his attendance at the trial of the charge under these regulations in respect of which he is in custody and the trial has not commenced within ninety days from the time he was first detained, the person having the custody of the accused shall, forthwith upon the expiration of such ninety days, apply to a judge of the superior court of criminal jurisdiction in the province
in which the accused is being detained to fix a date for the trial and the judge may fix a date for the beginning of the trial or give such directions as he thinks necessary for expediting the trial of the accused.

8. In any prosecution for an offence under these regulations, evidence that any person

a) attended any meeting of the unlawful association

b) spoke publicly in advocacy for the unlawful association, or

c) communicated statements of the unlawful association as a representative or professed representative of the unlawful association is, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, proof that he is a member of the unlawful association.

9. 1. A peace officer may arrest without warrant

a) a person who he has reason to suspect is a member of the unlawful association; or

b) a person who professes to be a member of the unlawful association; or

c) a person who he has reason to suspect has committed, is committing or is about to commit an act described in paragraphs b. to g. of section 4.

2. A person arrested pursuant to subsection 1 shall be taken before a justice having jurisdiction and charged with an offence described in section 4 not later than seven days after his arrest, unless the attorney-general of the province in which the person is being detained has, before the expiry of those seven days, issued an order that the accused be further detained until the expiry of a period not exceeding twenty-one days after his arrest, at the end of which period the person arrested shall be taken before a justice having jurisdiction and charged with an offence described in section 4 or released from custody.

10. A peace officer may enter and search without warrant any premises, place, vehicle, vessel or aircraft in which he has reason to suspect

a) anything is kept or used for the purpose of promoting the unlawful acts, aims, principles or policies of the unlawful association;

b) there is anything that may be evidence of an offence under these regulations;
c) any member of the unlawful association is present; or

d) any person is being detained by the unlawful association.

11. Any property that a peace officer has reason to suspect may be evidence of an offence under these regulations may, without warrant, be seized by a peace officer and held for ninety days from the date of seizure or until the final disposition of any proceedings in relation to an offence under these regulations in which such property may be required, whichever is the later.

12. These regulations shall be enforced in such manner and by such courts, officers and authorities as enforce indictable offences created by the Criminal Code.
FOCUS 1 A:

UNITARY ACTOR
(COMPREHENSIVE RATIONALITY)
Ideally, in a pure Model 1 (unitary actor comprehensive rationality) perspective, we should have focused our attention exclusively on the final outcome resulting from the actions taken by the Actors, in order to be able to determine which objective (or more precisely, which function) they were trying to maximize. However, in our case, we have decided to focus our attention on an intermediary outcome: The decisions made by the authorities, between October 15 in the afternoon and the early hours of October 16, for various reasons having to deal both with methodology and the availability of information.

Among the methodological reasons it appeared to us that two basic limitations of the Model, the absence of provisions for uncertainty and the fiction of a unitary actor were rather critical in our problem, since
- the lengthy time span covered by the actions (in July 1971, all Courts' decisions had not yet been rendered) and the uncertainty involved in multiple judicial decisions
- the fact the implementation of the decision depended not only on separate units, but on structurally independent units (The Provincial Government in Quebec is a distinct political entity from the Federal Government and is not supposed to be a smaller unit included within the frame of a larger one i.e. the Federal Government. The distinction in our case is not a notion of subordination, but a notion of "sovereign" competence - The same reasons hold for the distinction between the political and judiciary powers).
Among the reasons having to do with the availability of information, the fact that the Public Order Regulations, for example, gives us a good description of the action taken by the authorities (which Allison, for example, did not possess in the case of the Russian Government, hence his method of deducting its objective from the observed outcome of its actions; it is noteworthy to remark that in the case of the U.S. Government for which he possessed descriptions of intermediate outcomes, like the decision to resort to the quarantine of Cuba, he proceeds in a different way analyzing first the action and secondly the outcome) from which it is possible to infer their objectives.

This decision to focus on intermediate outcomes will lead us to treat the developments stemming from actions in a Model III perspective.

In future developments, it seems to us that comparisons between analysis focusing on the actions (when description available) and on the outcomes could prove fruitful, but for the moment, they appear to us as falling beyond the limited scope of this research.
1. THE FLQ OBJECTIVES

In July 1970, Pierre Vallieres told Peter Allnut of the CBC:

"Yes, I am a member of the FLQ. Today the FLQ represents a real political force in Quebec. It is no longer considered to be a gang of criminals. Its political activity is not just planting bombs. The bombs are only the tip of the iceberg. The FLQ is working and fighting many other levels both underground and publicly.

The FLQ is necessary in order to meet the violence of the present system with revolutionary violence and to construct a new society, a free society, free from colonialism, exploitation and fear. Revolutionary activity is not only planting bombs or taking up a gun, but working at the same time to radicalize groups in Quebec and outside" (1)

From this statement it appears that:

- the ultimate goal of the FLQ was to bring a radical change in Quebec society, economically, socially and politically.
- the more proximate goals of the FLQ were:
  - to be considered as representing "a real political force in Quebec" and not only a more or less consistent group of sporadic violent activists. Retrospectively this orientation towards political representativity appeared to be one of the landmarks of Pierre Vallieres' collaboration with the movement:

"By the time Vallieres came to the FLQ in 1965 most of the earlier "members" were in jail. Few of them had ideological convictions. Few were able to intellectualize their criminal activities, except that almost all had suffered the deep hurt of being put down by English Speaking Canadians.

Vallieres was adept at romanticizing the past and creating the illusion of a continuing underground political terrorist movement." (2)

Past developments (like the trial of Vallieres and Gagnon in the La Grenade affair) had proven the fruitfulness of this approach: The authorities had been extremely uncles and awkward in their treatment of political protest and their excesses had generated a current of sympathy for Vallieres and
Gagnon (creation of the M.D.P.P.Q., movement for the Defence of Quebec Political Prisoners, informal support in the Press, like the letter addressed by "a group of Christians of the University of Montreal" and quoted in Gerard Pelletier's October Crisis p 116)

- to radicalize the already existing examples of spontaneous social agitation like the trade unions, the citizens' committees and the student associations....

On the whole, the tactical objectives of the FLQ appeared to be at the time:

- to gain public recognition as a real political force in the Province

- to insert themselves openly in the process of political decisions as one of the emergent forces on Quebec changing political scene since the days of the quiet revolution or to put it in Raymond Breton's terms:

"FLQ members wanted desperately to be defined as political enemies of the established powers, a goal they had failed to achieve in the past. They wanted to be a power in the social bargaining equation" (3)

2. THE FLQ OPTIONS

Three main options were opened to the FLQ given those objectives: They could continue the pattern of violent actions (bombing, raids, holdups) to which they had resorted since 1963, they could radicalize existing protest movements in order to create public manifestation leading to violence, or develop some form of action that would force the authorities to a head on confrontation.
- 2.1 Continuation of the violent actions:

In spite of their relatively costless set up (in terms of manpower and other resources like dynamite which was easy to obtain in a City like Montreal undergoing a large program of public works) those actions were of little benefit; residents in Montreal had more or less taken them for a fact of life, loss of innocent lives had detracted their emotional content and the police forces had been highly successful in cracking the successive teams of activists, since the very dynamics of this type of action made them easy targets for the antiterrorist squad, as noted by Haggart and Golden:

"There were several reasons for this success (of the Police Forces) The FLQ needed to boast about its crimes, and there was always a high rate of defection, particularly among activists who became disillusioned at the slaughter of innocent victims" (4)

Other tactics like raids against banks, or warehouses, were of dubious revolutionary value and had more to do with the maintenance of the organization or the individual needs of the members than with the fulfillment of the central objectives of the FLQ.

This option in this sense could hardly provide any satisfactory answer to the problem.

- 2.2 Radicalize existing protests movements:

This option, even if it could lead to spectacular results (like the Murray Hill affair) suffered two main drawbacks:

- it obliged the organization to keep a low profile in the action, whose main credit was to be given to the protest movement, whose objectives could in the end prove rather uncongenial to the ones fostered by the FLQ.
it was costly in terms of resources and time, because it required a considerable amount of work in recruiting or infiltrating and adequate competences to influence the decisions of the movement.

Obviously not much of immediate gains could be obtained from such an option.

2.3 Develop a form of spectacular action that will oblige the Government to deal with the FLQ on political grounds:

In this respect any form of political kidnapping appears to be nearly the optimal action since:

- it tends to give to the kidnappers instant public recognition or awareness both nationally and internationally (as illustrated for example by the kidnapping of Juan Fangio in Cuba in 1956 by the Castrist movement, or by Patty Hearst's kidnapping by the S.L.A. or by the actions of the Tupamaros)

- it tends to force the authorities to negotiate with the kidnappers under public pressure, or to reject bluntly the kidnappers' demands. In both cases the results tend to be damageable to the authorities. In one case they have trouble with their hard liners, in the other they have to face the reproaches of the opinion on the ground of their "inhumanity". In that sense kidnapping is both a potentially dangerous trap and a means to obtain concessions (money, liberation of prisoners, publicity...)

- it gives the kidnappers a good protection against increased and more active police actions as long as they are able to detain their hostage.
- it helps to maintain a good image for the movement as long as the hostage is "humanely treated and safely released"

- it creates an "event" susceptible of extensive and continuous coverage by the media especially by the electronic ones

- it tends to give the impression of a "vacuum" in the field of political authorities, which are obliged to keep a low profile and are subjected to various pressures both externally (international opinion, foreign governments) and internally (demands for increased protection, divisions on the course of action)

Moreover, it must be noted that this form of action

- is rather costless in terms of resources for the organization: The action being accomplished by a small number of persons with very limited materials (hand weapons, cars, hideout and cash for a limited period)

- is rather well adapted to the urban context (anonymity, absence of personal relations, multiplicity of hideouts, availability of transportation means)

- provides an excellent opportunity for further political developments and political agitation (vacuum in political spheres, low profile of the police forces, extensive media coverage, development of supportive movements...)

- was at the time new in North America or as expressed by John Saywell:
"All evidence pointed to the escalation of radicalism and nationalism, whether distinct or joined in the Province of Quebec. Only a few Canadians took seriously the evidence that radical nationalists had adopted a strategy for revolution initially designed for Banana republics and the Third World. Even those - in the press or in the Public - who could read the signs seemed to discuss them as idle rhetoric rather than impending reality" (5)

3. THE FLQ CHOSEN ACTION

"At 8:15 on Monday morning, October 5, two armed men pushed past the maid at 1297 Redpath Crescent in Westmount. Within minutes James Richard Cross, Senior British Trade Commissioner in Montreal, had dressed under the barrel of a sub-machine gun and been whisked away in a taxi" (6)

At 12:00 an anonymous telephone call directs Radio Station CKLM to a communique of the FLQ Liberation Cell which states that in exchange for the safe release of J. Cross the authorities must:

- release 23 "political prisoners" whose names were listed
- provide an aircraft for their transportation to Cuba or Algeria
- turn over $500,000. in gold bars
- reinstate the Lapalme postal drivers
- identify the informer who helped Police Forces apprehend members of another FLQ cell
- publish (newspaper, radio, T.V.) the full text of the FLQ manifesto
- cease all police activities related to the kidnapping

At this point, it seems important to notice the congruence between the implemented action and the objectives advocated by the FLQ:

- James Cross is the representative of a foreign nation whose importance is significant for both English speaking Canadians (emotionally and economically) and French Canadians (culturally) in terms of credible foreign exploitation (see the "Free Society Free from Colonialism and Exploitation" from P. Vallieres)
The demand to publish the FLQ manifesto and the use of the radio to communicate with the authorities are designed to spread among the public the awareness of the FLQ and of its orientation.

The demands to release the political prisoners, to provide an aircraft for Cuba or Algeria, to reinstate the Lapalme postal drivers (for whom P.M. Trudeau had rather arrogant unexplored deletives) are designed to prove that the FLQ can change what had been described as unflexible decisions (since the "political prisoners" had been deprived conditional liberation).

The demands to publish the manifesto and to reinstate the Lapalme drivers are designed to show the solidarity of the FLQ with existing forms of Social Protest and dissatisfaction in the Province.

The other three remaining demands being oriented towards the maintenance of the organization (financial resources, internal security, external security)

However, after nearly a week of negotiations it appeared, as expressed in Justice Minister Choquette's statement of October 11, that if the FLQ had been able to gain a fair amount of "publicity" in the press (diffusion of the manifesto) and a certain amount of verbal support from the population (as for example expressed in the numerous hot lines that followed the diffusion of the manifesto) and even some form of governmental recognition as a political force:

"Without giving in to undue pressure, even dangerous pressure the 'ruling authorities' as you say are not unaware that there are areas of discontent, without our society and that injustice exists... On the contrary these opinions (the one of Mr. Cross' kidnappers) can be expressed in a chat or a frank open discussion between the different elements of society so as to contribute to a constructive and positive solution of our problems" (7)
It had been unable to influence noticeably the Governmental decision process as far as the "political prisoners" were concerned. This in turn was identified with the fact that J. Cross, whatever his emotional representativity, was a character of a too limited importance to move Ottawa, and that a more valuable hostage had to be secured to push the Government a bit further in its concessions. This was the aim of Pierre Laporte's kidnapping, a prominent member of the political establishment and an old liberal hand, as expressed in the preliminary statement which accompanied the second communique of the Chenier Cell found at 9:00 A.M. on October 12:

"In face of the persistence of the Governmental authorities in not complying with the requirements of the FLQ and in conformity with Plan 3 established earlier to provide for such a refusal, the Chenier financial Cell has just kidnapped the Minister of Unemployment and Quebec Assimilation, Pierre Laporte

The Minister will be executed Sunday evening at 10:00 P.M. if between now and then the ruling authorities have not responded favourably to the seven demands set forth following the kidnapping of Mr. James Cross. Any partial assurance will be considered as a refusal" (8)

This time the blow was more serious and the action apparently moved from Ottawa to Quebec where Premier Bourassa immediately had a meeting with the Cabinet. During the following press conference just before the 10:00 P.M. deadline Premier Bourassa stated that the authorities were ready to negotiate

"It is because we particularly want Mr. Laporte and Mr. Cross to live that we decide - before discussing the demands that have been made - to set up mechanisms that would guarantee, as Mr. Laporte says it will, that the release of the political prisoners will surely result in the safe release of the hostages" (9)

However, the negotiations that followed between lawyer Demers on behalf of the Quebec Government and lawyer Lemieux on behalf of the FLQ went rapidly to a dead end, until Wednesday October 15, Premier Bourassa set a new governmental deadline, giving the FLQ 6 hours to accept conditions
that were nearly the same as those proposed by Justice Minister J. Choquette in his press conference of October 11.

Robert Lemieux was not long to express his frustration:

"In offering to free five good Quebec guys who should have been paroled a long time ago anyway and whose paroles are coming soon, the government is simply mocking the people of Quebec. I urge the government to meet not in the next few hours, but in minutes and to reconsider. Reconsider this --- this incredible mockery. My mandate has ended. I have nothing more to say..."

Asked if he was walking out of the negotiations Mr. Lemieux replied "I have been thrown out on my ass" (10)

As, however, some public pressure to have the government negotiate was mounting (see the letter of the 14 prominent Quebecers or the support of the CNTU) and some student unrest was developing in Montreal the FLQ decided to seize the opportunity in order to have the government revert his prior decision. In this perspective Pierre Vallieres told the 3,000 students present at the Paul Sauve arena on the evening of October 15:

"...The government claims the FLQ is a small band of criminals ... But you are the FLQ and all the popular groups that fight for the liberation of Quebec. We must organize the fight for liberation in every district, in each plant, in each office, everywhere..." (11)

4. THE FLQ ANTICIPATED FUTURE ACTIONS

On October 15 several actions could be anticipated from the FLQ

- 4.1 Kill the hostages

They could carry on their threat to dispose of "the life of the representative of the ancient racist and colonialist British System" (liberation cell communiqué #1) and/or to "execute Minister Pierre Laporte" (chenier cell communiqué #1)
4.2 Other kidnappings

They could carry on a third or fourth kidnapping as expressed in Pierre Laporte's letter to Robert Bourassa:

"After me there will be a third one, then a fourth and a twentieth. If all political men are protected, they will strike elsewhere in other classes of society"

This threat was the more credible that the FLQ in less than a week after the kidnapping of J. Cross had been able in less than a few minutes after the rejection of their first demands to kidnap a Provincial Minister, who at the time was de facto (in the absence of Robert Bourassa) Prime Minister of the Province, and the threat was so intensely felt that

"Mr. Charles B. Neapole, president of the Montreal and of the Canadian Stock Exchange, expressed his conviction that he was the fourth on the list of the FLQ's potential victims ..." (12)

4.3 Selective assassination

They could indulge in selective assassination, as mentioned by Premier Bourassa in his press conference in the afternoon of October 16:

"And they even made threats of selected assassinations as part of the fourth stage"

4.4 Manifestations and Riots

They could try to organize and develop the current of popular support, already existing in some segments of the population (students, workers) in order to oblige the authorities to come to term with their demands (particularly with the
liberation of the political prisoners)

This strategy, at the first glance, may appear rather risky since the risks of spill-overs (riots, street disorders) involved but a second look reveals that on these grounds the FLQ had nothing to lose. A few victims would have given the cause providential martyrs that in turn could have helped mobilize public opinion. Apparently, this eventuality was a great subject of concern among the authorities, as expressed by Gerald Pelletier:

"One of my sharpest fears during this part of the crisis was that a group of extremist students believing the great day had come, would go out into the streets and create disturbances, which, with the police and the army exhausted might have ended in shooting. I perhaps yielded to a tendency towards alarmism: Yet this kind of scenario has already been played out too often to make it necessary to argue for its plausibility" (13)

or by Prime Minister Trudeau during an interview with Martin on Format 60 on November 3:

"...If trouble had started, if maybe in defence of lives or goods, pistol shots had been fired on one side or another and that there had been perhaps two deaths like in Kent State..." (14)

Those four conjectures seemed to be at the time the only credible ones. However, as two others have been mentioned we must make them some justice:

- The threat to overthrow the Quebec Government by force which has been dismissed by both Gerald Pelletier:

"No one, I think, has ever assumed that there was a revolutionary army poised to overthrow the Quebec Government by force..." (15)

and other commentators like Denis Smith:

"There was no decisive concealed evidence of an imminent civil uprising" (16)
The "provisional governmental plot" which was mentioned lately through a well managed leak in the press and to which no credibility was given in Quebec (as expressed by Premier Bourassa "such an illusory hypotheses"(17) and very little in Ottawa:

"There was never of course a conspiracy to set up a provisional government in Quebec. There was simply speculations that it might become necessary" (18)

"The story ("Ryan has been out to take over the government") was obviously taken seriously, but my own cabinet sources indicate that it was never advanced as the major reason for imposing War Measures" (19)

and which can be better understood as a stone sent by P.E. Trudeau in C. Ryan's nicely tended monastic gardens (who was the only culprit, with maybe Rene Levesque, to be singled out in a group which included three Union leaders, a highly respected Academic and the President of the Credit Union movement). Moreover, this argument can hardly resist to the fact that as the editor of the small but bible-like Le Devoir, Claude Ryan is more influential outside than within any Quebec Government (provisional or not)

As the authorities' objectives have been the center of numerous controversies arising from the decision to use the War Measures Act we shall treat the problem a bit differently that in the case of the FLQ; in the sense that we shall first try to determine the characteristic attributes of the authorities' chosen action, infer from those the objectives the authorities were trying to maximize and check whether those objectives could have been better fulfilled by other alternatives which were at the authorities' disposal at the time. In this way, we wish to reduce, as much as possible, the number of possible interpretations that have been proposed to explain the government's actions.
5. THE AUTHORITIES CHOSEN ACTIONS

Between October 15, 3:07 P.M., and October 16, 4:00 A.M., three actions were taken by the authorities:

- they had the Canadian Armed Forces intervene in Montreal
- they had the Director of the Q.P.P., Maurice St. Pierre, take charge of the command of all police and all involved armed forces in the Province
- they had the Governor in Council (which is in fact the Cabinet) proclaim the existence of a state of apprehended insurrection, which in turn provided ground (conclusive evidence) for the proclamation of the War Measures Act and of the subsequent Public Order Regulations as mentioned in the formal statement issued by the Prime Minister's office at 5:17 A.M. on October 16:

"Whereas the War Measures Act provides that the issue of a proclamation under the authority of the Governor in Council shall be conclusive evidence that insurrection, real or apprehended exists and has existed for any period of time therein stated and its continuance, until by the issue of a further proclamation it is declared that the insurrection no longer exists" (20)

- 5.1 The attributes of the Canadian Army intervention:

Since the Canadian legislation strongly limits the power of the Army in the case of assistance to the Civil Powers (they cannot make arrests directly without being accompanied by law enforcement officers), the intervention of the Army has mainly two dominant attributes:

- it provides for armed manpower in protective tasks (buildings, personalities, strategic points)
- it provides for manpower equipped and trained for massive search operations especially in rural areas
- 5.2 The attributes of the nomination of the Q.P.P. director at the head of the law enforcement personnel

The obvious attribute of this action appears to be the fact that it established some unity of command among the various forces involved in law enforcement (Municipal Police Forces, Q.P.P., R.C.M.P. and Canadian Armed Forces). Such a move takes full significance when the need is felt for coordinated operations involving numerous and differentiated personnel. Moreover, the choice of the Director of the Q.P.P. makes real sense only if this need for coordination is felt all over the Province and not only in a limited area like Montreal (for which the Director of the Montreal Police, should have been the optimal candidate)

The intervention of the Canadian Army and the centralization of Police powers seem to correspond to a pattern of quantitative and qualitative reinforcement of the Police powers announcing the development of massive police actions.

- 5.3 The attributes of the War Measures Act

Four main attributes appear to be of some relevance in our analysis:

- it is a very comprehensive piece of legislation as noted by Gerald Pelletier:
  "...it is wide in its powers (among other things it gives the authorities the right to forbid the sale of gasoline and to ration coffee)..." (21)
  even excessive for the case at hand as noted by Anthony Westell:
  "He (P.E. Trudeau) recognized that the massive powers available under the War Measures Act were overkill" (22)
it is a piece of legislation that permits the Cabinet to by-pass Parliament which means that it tends both to reduce the possibilities of control and to increase the Government expediency. These characteristics were not unnoticen by former Premier MacKenzie King, who mentioned in 1939 that the War Measures Act was:

"A law of inestimable value since it permitted the Government to take all necessary measures without having to wait for the Parliament" (23)

it is a rather undiscriminative piece of legislation since apparently it was applicable all over Canada (apparently its applicability could not be limited directly to one single Province)

it can only be invoked under conditions of "real or apprehended insurrection" as defined by the Cabinet

5.4 The attributes of the Public Order Regulations

The Public Order Regulations proclaimed by the Government is to be compared to the existing legal provisions of the criminal code in order to single out its main distinctive features. On the basis of such a "marginal" analysis four main attributes appear as characterizing the Public Order Regulations.

5.4 1. Extension of Police Powers:

One of the salient features of the Regulations was to increase significantly the powers available to the Police Forces, as noted for example by Douglas A. Schmeiser

"The most legally significant effect of the emergency legislation is to take away the requirement that police officers act reasonably..."
The key distinction, I would suggest are found in the provisions dealing with arrest and with search and seizure. You will recall that under the Criminal Code a police officer can arrest only on reasonable and probable grounds. Under Section 9 of the new Act a police officer may arrest without warrant a person "who he has reason" to suspect is a member of an unlawful association or who "he has reason to suspect" has committed or is about to commit any of the actions prescribed by Section 4 of the Act...

The same phrase "reason to suspect" is found in the provisions relating to entry of premises search and seizure. Ordinarily, a police officer can enter premises only when acting under a search warrant issued by a court. Under the Act however, a police officer may enter and search without warrant any premises, or seize any property if he has "reason to suspect that the search or property will provide evidence of a violation of the Act..." (24)

or by Walter Stewart

"The new regulations permitted police to search without warrant, arrest without charge and hold without bail persons they suspected of acting in contravention of the Act" (25)

- 5.4 2. Semi official censorship of the press:

Section 4b of the Public Order Regulations provides that:

"A person who communicates statements (includes words spoken or written or recorded electronically or electromagnetically or otherwise, and gestures, signs or other visible representations) on behalf of or as a representative or professed representative of the unlawful association...is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years"

This was quickly interpreted by the media as a latent provision for censorship, as mentioned by Earle Beattie

"In October the media became so deeply involved in reporting North America's first political kidnapping by the FLQ that the Federal Government curtailed their coverage under authority of the W.M.A. and its successor the Public Order (emergency measures) Act..." (26)
or by the London Observer:

"The Act besides outlawing the FLQ provides for penalties of up to five years imprisonment for assisting it or its members in any way. For instance, journalists who publish or broadcast statements from the group could be arrested" (27)

- 5. 4 3. Redundancy of the repressive provisions

Several commentators emphasized the point that the provisions included in the Public Order Regulations were merely redundant to, or even weaker than existing provisions already included in the Canadian Criminal Code, as mentioned for example by Douglas A. Schmeiser

"It is accordingly suggested that the sweeping provisions of the offences discussed above (murder, threat of murder, kidnapping, malicious destruction of property, possession of explosives, possession of offensive weapons and firearms, threatening to injure or to destroy property, obstructing justice, resisting or obstructing a police officer, treason, unlawful assemblies and riots and sedition) coupled with the sweeping notion about parties to offences adequately cover any overt conduct on the part of an insurgent or revolutionary" (28)

- 5. 4 4. Inapplicability of the repressive provisions

Several critical limitations have in effect been detected by various legal commentators

- The existing contradiction between the Public Order Regulations and the provisions of Section 6 of the Regulations Act, or as remarked by Douglas A. Schmeiser

"The emergency regulations were not exempted from the operation of the Regulations Act and there certainly is not doubt that at the date of the alleged contraventions reasonable steps had not been taken to bring the proclamation to the attention of the persons charged - in fact the original arrests were shrouded in secrecy" (29)
- The severe restrictions on retroactive applications or as noted by Schmeiser

"It is a cardinal principle of the criminal law that a penal statute does not apply retroactively i.e. an act must be an offence at the time it is committed before it is punishable. The prosecutions under the new Act however, would normally relate to conduct prior to its enactment....Because of the general approach of the criminal law and because of the reversion of jurors against ex facto laws, successful prosecutions would be very difficult if not impossible." (30)

- The fact that the Public Order Regulations are a usurpation of the judicial function or as noted by Professor Noel Lyon

"Professor Lyon goes on to classify the Regulations as a "criminal class action". The judiciary, he states, is reduced to the role of time keeper, keeping track of who attends what meetings and speaks or communicates what statements on behalf of an association. Thus, he concludes that criminal guilt is determined not by the courts but by executive decree." (31)

6. THE AUTHORITIES' OBJECTIVES

From what we have learned from the attributes of the actions chosen by the authorities it appears that some potential objectives can be ruled out with little chance of error:

- 6.1 "Find the terrorists and Free the hostages"

The set of measures had nothing directly to do with the case of P. Laporte and J. Cross. For example, as denied by Anthony Westell

"A more pragmatic criticism of the use of the War Measures Act was that it proved quite unnecessary for tracking the terrorists. That was done by normal police work under the regular powers in the Criminal Code. But the criticism
overlooked the fact that the decision to invoke emergency powers was never based on a declared need to find the terrorists and free the hostages" (32)

In fact if one considers the evidence at hand it appears that numerous reasons preclude this interpretation:

- the authorities in this perspective had other alternatives available: Tails on the suspects' friends and relatives (which at the time were positively identified) rewards for information leading to the capture of the suspects (which had been used earlier in 1970), massive search operations with the help of the army (the police forces were believed to know the "general" area where the victims were detained) They seemed more effective than relying on the provisions of the Public Order Act to arrest and detain everybody more or less connected to the FLQ (which is rather a very indirect way to approach the problem)

- it would have been a very risky strategy: For two limited and dubious results (locating the hideouts, which did not change much the equation of the problem since the kidnappers were still in possession of their hostages and "drying the pond of potential support" which could have been difficultly exhaustive) the authorities would have risked the lives of Laporte and Cross (which they had been rather anxious to save for the past 11 days)

- the provisions of the Public Order Regulations: In this perspective what could have been the use of creating a new crime since the arrested persons would have been proven guilty or not guilty of an existing crime (complicity in kidnapping)? Why did the regulations include provisions against those "advocating or publicizing FLQ
statements" since those were not retroactive? A large part of the Public Order Regulations become irrelevant in this perspective.

6.2 "Counteract an apprehended insurrection"

The set of measures had nothing directly to do with the existence of a state of "apprehended insurrection". Numerous evidences permit to discard this interpretation

- the availability of other alternatives: In the case of an "apprehended insurrection" (33) the proclamation of the Martial Law would have seemed more appropriate to control armed and concerted violent developments

- the equipment the military forces displayed in Montreal: In the case of an apprehended insurrection the military forces would have been dispatched with heavy material (armoured cars, personnel carriers, heavy machine guns, tanks) but on the contrary they were only equipped with submachine guns and trucks

- the location of the armed forces in Montreal: In the case of an apprehended insurrection the armed forces would certainly have tried to surround the areas from which most of the trouble could be expected (like St. Henri, for example) but on the contrary they were mostly located in the business districts and the well-to-do suburbs of Westmount or Ville Mont-Royal. In the same way they would have given heavy protection to strategic locations but the road-blocks, which they installed on the bridges for example, were identical to those set up by police forces in ordinary occasions to check traffic.
On the other hand, it must be noted that the proclamation of a state of "apprehended insurrection" was the limiting factor in the proclamation of the W.M.A. and of the subsequent emergency measures.

6.3 Counteract further acts of selective violence

The interpretation, by which the authorities were specifically trying to counteract further acts of selective violence (bombings, murders, kidnappings), suffers several shortcomings:

- Specific pieces of legislation like the Quebec Coroner's Act or the Firearm Act, had already given the police forces extended powers of search and arrest emergency legislation would have then been unnecessary if this had been the objective of the Government.

- Numerous provisions were already existing in the Criminal Code (and those provisions had been already successfully employed against FLQ members) to curb nearly any type of violence against persons or properties.

- It renders meaningless most of the content of the Public Order Regulations especially those provisions against "communicating, advocating and promoting".

Those objectives having been discarded if one tries now to reconstruct the objective the authorities appeared to maximize one cannot fail to conclude that the authorities were simply trying to "freeze" the political situation in the Province.

- in providing the police forces with instant and massive powers of arrests, against all those that could be
publicly associated with the separatist movement, and identified as its representatives or even simply as its proponents

- in urging other institutions like the media, the trade unions or the legal independantists movements to show more restraint under the threat of an extended implementation of the Public Order Regulations

In order to oblige the FLQ to fold and to accept the ultimate proposal set forth by Robert Bourassa, which did not give much but provided the kidnappers with a minimal face saving device in exchange of the safe release of the hostages. From the authorities point of view the set of chosen measures was permitting

- to reduce at minimal level the mounting pressures urging the Government to negotiate and which could have led to public manifestations and to serious public disorders.

- to develop a form of administrative internment (discretionary arrest plus detention without trial) preventing the resumption of the social unrest that had preceded the proclamation of the W.M.A.

Additionally the situation resulting from the proclamation of the W.M.A., had further beneficial consequences for the authorities:

- it was drying out the pool of support on which the kidnappers could count in order to obtain information shelter and funds

- it was reducing the risks of further selective violence.
by the magnitude of the planned round up and by the checks more numerous police forces (as supported by the army) with sweeping search powers could impose on the mobility of would-be terrorists

- it was ostensibly giving back the initiative to the authorities and cornering the FLQ either to fold or to commit a cold blooded assassination which would undoubtedly be detrimental to its image

In this perspective the provisions for further prosecutions (which we have noted were weak, redundant and more or less applicable) included in the Public Order Regulations were nothing more than dummies serving as an umbrella to the extension of (quasi political) police powers that could only have been enforced under exceptional contingencies thanks to the "realism and pragmatism" of the courts. But thanks to the improved means to collect evidence given to the police forces and the limitations exerted on the FLQ options, the usual provisions of the Criminal Code were likely to be sufficient and the emergency measures could be confined to the emergency of the situation without generating any unhealthy repression.

The police forces gathered their files and started the round up at 4:00 A.M. on October 16

7. **HAD THE AUTHORITIES OTHER ALTERNATIVES?**

Apparently a few other alternatives were considered by the authorities. The total acceptance of the FLQ demands had been rejected and the authorities had to face the risks of a potential escalation in violence. At this level, if we are to believe Gerald Pelletier:
"I have stated above that only limited means of defence are available to a modern state when a threat to its internal security must be countered. On the other hand the application of these means can vary in intensity and duration" (34)

Alternatives are limited especially as he further notes, one considers

"...that Canada, no doubt because of its peaceful past, had available no other restrictive law that was more limited and better adapted to the problem" (35)

Apparently, the only other way, which the Government tried to explore, was to pass some ad-hoc piece of legislation through Parliament, as revealed by Justice Minister John Turner in his speech in defence of Government action on October 16:

"This left only two possible courses of action. The Government could have sought special legislation of the type embodied in the regulations which have been brought into force under the War Measures or alternatively the War Measures Act could have been resorted to

I suggest to the House that if a special piece of legislation had been resorted to, the provisions might well have been similar to the provisions now found in the regulations. But this Government was assured by the Government of Quebec and by senior persons directly involved with attempting to cope with the terrorists that a search and arrest operation of considerable magnitude directed at the FLQ was necessary and that time was of the essence.

Our initial reaction was the reaction of several Members of the House to seek the authority of Parliament first. But faced with the seriousness of the situation and with the necessity of not broadcasting what the Government of Quebec and the Government of Canada intened to do, faced with the urgency of anticipating any further escalation of the situation in Montreal, the Government of Canada resorted to the War Measures Act" (36)

From what has filtered from Cabinet discussions, the only thing we can infer is the fact that the War Measures Act and the Intervention of the army have been polarizing the debates since October 11 and that apparently no other alternatives have been considered.
To a certain point this is not astonishing, parliamentary democracies (especially of British origins) have generally as a rule very few provisions that could provide for administrative internment.

8. VARIATION ON THE UNITARY ACTOR THEME

In his analysis of possible variants of the classical model Graham Allison mentions:

"A related but nevertheless different type of analysis focuses explicitly on an individual leader or leadership clique as the actor whose preference function is maximized and whose personal (or group) characteristics are allowed to modify the basic concepts of the paradigm. This individual's weighing of goals and objectives, tendencies to perceive (and to exclude) particular range of alternatives and principles employed in estimating the consequences that follow from each alternative serve as the basic framework within which the choice must be located" (37)

As several commentators have been explicitly referring to the problem in these terms, i.e., trying to give a central place to P.E. Trudeau's motives and prejudices, it appears that some justice must be rendered to the two following theories:

- The theory that P.E. Trudeau had conspired to exaggerate the threat from the FLQ in order to attack and discredit the democratic separatist movement

This interpretation seems to ignore factors among which numerous statements from P.E. Trudeau himself:

"I would make every effort to make that distinction to make sure that there is no misinterpretation, no possibility of thinking that all separatists believe in violence because a few FLQ have used violence to promote separatism" (38)

and from several Federal Ministers like Bryce MacKasey:

"When we try to equate the FLQ and the Parti Quebecois we are equating bandits, terrorists and part of an international movement with a legitimate political party in this country" (39)
He then added, in one of his typical Irish outbursts that:
"He would give his life for the P.Q. to survive"
or Gerald Pelletier:
"It would of course be absurd to confuse the objectives of the FLQ and those of the Parti Quebecois" (40)

On other grounds such an interpretation generally ignores the fact that even if such a motive had been behind the War Measures Act, it would have been remarkably unsuccessful. in the by-election in Chambly (which was Pierre Laporte's former riding) The P.Q. made 33% of the votes (over the average, 27%, which it made in the 1970 elections) and three years later it became the official opposition in the Quebec Province after having improved its 1970 score.

- The theory that P.E. Trudeau had conspired to get rid (by legal means) of the leftist opposition in Quebec

Even if more grounded or former statements of the Prime Minister it is shaded by several facts:

- the absence of convictions against the "big five" in 1971.
- the resumption of terrorists activities in 1971 (several bombs)
- the absence of clear cut provisions for effective prosecution in the Public Order Regulations
- the rather lenient policy applied towards people like Pierre Vallieres who in 1972 was hired (at the outcry of some members of Parliament) as a federal civil servant.

NOTE ON FOCUS 1A:

Had we focused on ulterior outcomes, our conclusions would have been different. If we consider, for example, two of the main attributes of the Public Order Regulations (the redundancy and the inapplicability
of some of its provisions) it further appeared:

- that numerous specific charges were laid under those provisions,
- and that charges were even laid under both the provisions of the Regulations (FLQ membership) and the Criminal Code (Sedition)
- that a few (2) convictions were obtained under the provisions of the Public Order Regulations

In our analysis however, we will try to incorporate those developments in a Model III perspective (Separate Multiple Implementation Units)
FOCUS 1 B:

UNITARY ACTOR

(BOUNDED RATIONALITY)
1. ANTECEDENTS OF THE FLQ CHOSEN ACTION

On October 6, former Justice Minister Remi Paul in the Lesage Government made a statement which underlined that "the kidnapping of Mr. Cross had been planned for more than a year" and that "his affirmation was supported by information the Ministry of Justice had received at the time" (41)

In fact several elements could justify Mr. Paul's position:

- In recent years kidnappings had become a standard feature of urban guerrilla operations and were duly included in Basic Manuals like the one published by Carlos Marighella:

"Kidnapping is capturing and holding in a secret spot a police agent, a North American spy, a political personality, or a notorious and dangerous enemy of the revolutionary movement.

Kidnapping is used to exchange or liberate imprisoned revolutionary comrades, or to force suspension of torture in the jail cells of the military dictatorship

The kidnapping of personalities who are known artists, sports figures, or outstanding in some other field but who have evidenced no political interest can be a useful form of propaganda for the revolutionary and patriotic principles of the urban guerrilla provided it occurs under special circumstances, and the kidnapping is handled so that the public sympathizes with it and accepts it.

The kidnapping of North American residents or visitors in Brasil constitutes a form of protest against the penetration and domination of United States imperialism in our country" (42)

In this "operating procedure" most of the main characteristics of the action chosen by the FLQ: The personality of the victim (a representative of a foreign imperialistic power), the nature of the barter (the political prisoners) and the consequences for the movement (accrued propaganda) are already underlined. This text was published a few months before the death of Carlos Marighella in 1969, and it is not impossible since the manual was
widely publicized, that some people in the FLQ took notice of it.

- One kidnapping attempt had already taken place in Montreal in 1970:

"On February 26, Montreal police stopped a rented panel truck and found two men, arms, a large wicker basket and a document announcing that the FLQ had just kidnapped Moshe Golan, the Israeli Consul and Trade Commissioner in Montreal. The men, Jacques Lanctot and Pierre Marcil, were charged with conspiracy to kidnap and released on bail, Lanctot disappeared" (43)

- The police forces, while dismantling another FLQ cell a few months later, found conclusive evidence that a second attempt had been planned:

"The reward (offered on June 1 by Justice Minister J. Choquette for information leading to the arrest of bombers) apparently paid off. A tip led police to a summer home in the Laurentians, near Prevost and a house in suburban Laval. At Prevost the police arrested four people...and found an FLQ communique announcing the kidnapping of the American Consul in Montreal.

By the kidnapping of Consul Burgess the FLQ wants to stress its revolutionary solidarity with all those countries that fight against the economic, social and cultural nomination of the Americans in the world. This means unconditional support of the movements in Latin America and Palestine, support of the American blacks and of all the people of Africa and Asia who work for their liberation." (44)

This succession of events led James Cross himself to express a rather disabused opinion when he was asked why he was chosen as a hostage:

"I think they wanted a diplomat. They had already tried three, two at least, and possibly three kidnapping attempts in Montreal which had been frustrated. They had surveyed a number of people. They gave me a few reasons when I asked them, claiming British cultural imperialism in Canada, but I don't believe this. I think they simply wanted to get a diplomat to get world opinion and I happened to be available" (44 bis)

- At the same occasion a list of "irrevocable conditions" for the life of the Consul was found, whose similarity with the latter
demands of the FLQ is striking.

"The release of all "political prisoners" and their transporta-
tion to Cuba. The reinstatement of the "revolutionary Lapalme
workers. The payment of a voluntary tax of $500,000. in gold
ingots. The broadcasting and publication of all FLQ communiques
and the end of all police investigations and arrests" (45)

The only difference between this list and the first communique
of the liberation cell which was found, resides in the fact that
no mention of the informer is made in the former (which is quite
logical since it is this very informer which led to the discovery
of this first communique)

Surprisingly however, strong attacks against "informers" can be
found in a later interview of a spokesman of the M.D.P.P.Q.,
Jacques Larue-Langlois.

"Choquette is trying to create a new national hero in Quebec....
The stool pigeon....We want to open a national campaign against
police informers. We also want to apply public pressure on
the Quebec newspaper monopolies, like Quebec Corporation to
publish the statements put out by the FLQ" (46)

From these evidences, one cannot fail to conclude that the action
chosen by the FLQ during the October crisis had striking simila-
rities with its past actions. Moreover this continuity found among
actions is also found among persons involved, Jacques Lanctot was
involved in the first attempt, his brother Francois in the second,
and Jacques Lanctot, his sister Louise and Jacques Cossette-Trudel
(her husband) in the third (the one of J. Cross)

2. ANTECEDENTS OF THE AUTHORITIES' CHOSEN ACTIONS

Under some of its aspects the actions chosen by the authorities have
noticeable similarities with actions taken in different earlier
texts
The nomination of the Director of the Q.P.P. at the head of the joint Police Forces. In October 1969 during and after the Montreal Police strike, Q.P.P. Director Maurice St. Pierre was nominated at the head of the law enforcement forces in the Province (which included the members of the Canadian Armed Forces)

The intervention of the Canadian Army: For several years the Canadian Armed Forces had been involved with the problem of law enforcement in the Province:

Members of the Canadian Armed Forces had participated in the activities of the first anti-terrorist squad, constituted in 1963, as a joint task force regrouping members of the Montreal police, the Q.P.P. and the R.C.M.P. However, this participation may be explained by the fact that the C.A.F. had the required expertise in defusing bombs which were the main problems of the squad at the time.

During the Montreal Police strike, a limited number of troops from the 22nd Regiment (Regiment de la Chaudiere, also known as the Vandoos, the same one that was to intervene in Montreal in 1970) participated in various tasks of law enforcement, under a formal request from the Provincial Civil Powers. However, what was supposed to be a punctual intervention took apparently larger proportions, as suggested from the following article published in Le Devoir on December 1, 1969:

"On this occasion (inauguration of the new control ward) Chief Gilbert, who gave a description of this new tool put at the disposal of the police forces, declared that the ward was achieved in less than a month at a cost of $50,000. It is primarily an internal communication center, equipped with a screen representing a Map of Montreal (City), and with closed circuit T.V. monitors which give pictures from the events taking place in the street, thanks to a network of T.V. cameras installed on the roofs.

In case of important operations, like the control of an important popular manifestation, for example, said Mr. Gilbert,
members of the R.C.M.P., Canadian Armed Forces and of the Q.P.P. can take a place beside Montreal policemen on a platform facing the 8' x 40' mural screen" (47)

During the same year, a drastic change appeared in the missions assigned to the Canadian Armed Forces as noted by Paul Stevens and John Saywell:

"There was some question, as well, about the roles of the forces. The Prime Minister had defined the roles as the protection of sovereignty, the defence of North America, the fulfilment of NATO commitments, and peacekeeping. But "Priority One" at Canadian Forces Headquarters was said to be "aid to the civil authority," and the forces were being organized and equipped for this purpose. Helicopters were being purchased with searchlights and loud hailers, and infantry battalions were reported to be training intensively in riot control, tear gas employment, and police duties. The army's deployment of infantry in support of the civil authority in Montreal during the riots there was seen as the key future role for the forces. What was not clear was the origin of this Priority One. Certainly neither the Prime Minister nor the Minister of National Defence had given any public inkling that aid to the civil authority was anything more than one of a whole host of duties for the Canadian Forces. Still, it seemed unlikely that some petty bureaucrat could decree a shift of this magnitude on his own. What was also unclear was just what threat existed that could necessitate aid to the civil authority becoming the first priority of the forces" (48)

Apparently, this deep interest, for domestic law enforcement and for the Quebec Province, of the Canadian Armed Forces was a long lasting one as revealed by two recent (May and June 1974) leaks: The curious synchronization of the "Neat Pitch" Exercise with the general strike in Quebec and the memo dealing with separatism within the Canadian Armed Forces.

The use of the War Measures Act as a means for administrative internment: During World War II, 21,000 Japanese-Canadians were evacuated from their homes and communities, or as mentioned by Haggart and Golden:
"The Japanese were herded into Vancouver's Hasting Park, sleeping in exhibition buildings, carrying all they could with them in the maximum two suitcases allowed per person. Gradually they were dispersed, but with considerable difficulty, as community after community in the interior rejected the idea of the camps being placed there" (49)

- The use of the War Measures Act as a means for banning associations:

"During the war, the power to declare organizations illegal was given to the Cabinet under the War Measures Act, and it was used, both on the Jehovah's Witnesses and their related organizations and on Technocracy Inc., a proselytizing organization with semi religious and authoritarian overtones" (49a)

This extensive use of the emergency legislations, enabled some of the Quebec activists of the time to gain first hand experience of the powerful effects of the War Measures Act, as related in an interview between Simone Chartrand and Nick auf der Maur:

"When Britain declared war in September 1939, Canada quickly followed its lead. The same issues arose. The War Measures Act was imposed. During the 1940 general election, the Liberals under Mackenzie King promised there would be no conscription. After they won, they changed their minds. The Throne Speech in January 1942 announced a national plebiscite on the conscription issue.

Michel helped to organize the "Non" campaign.

The nationalists of the time, Andre Laurendeau, Francois-Albert Angers, Gerard Filion, Jean Drapeau, Rene Chalout, Marc Carriere, and many others formed the Ligue pour la Defense du Canada (Michel proposed the name). Even Henri Bourassa came out of retirement to take part.

It was a very hectic time, with rallies and meetings being held continuously. Michel poured all his energies into the campaign.

At the end of it, on April 27, 1942, Quebec voted 75% "Non". The rest of Canada voted differently. Conscription was imposed and the War Measures Act enforced against dissidents. Many were arrested, even the Mayor of Montreal, who spent the rest of the war in an internment camp.
The league prepared to fight the November by-election in Outremont, intended to provide a safe Liberal seat for the Minister of National Defence, Major-General Lafleche. Jean Drapeau, who had just graduated from law school, was chosen as candidate, Michel was his organizer.

That fall, we started seeing Pierre Elliott Trudeau a lot, as he became increasingly active in the campaign. Michel and Pierre were friends, having been school chums, and liked each other although Pierre said he thought Michel a bit unrealistic. He said Michel was a dreamer, a mystic, and wasn't pragmatic enough. Despite his good intentions, he said, Michel would never get anywhere.

There were many meetings to attend and we all worked feverishly. I was five months pregnant at the time, and sometimes the meetings could get pretty rough. Police in plain clothes were at every meeting taking notes, keeping tabs on things.

Gen. Lafleche's meetings, attended by several cabinet ministers and MPs, were particularly tumultuous, since he attracted a large number of young conscripts who had a lot of questions. Unfortunately questions weren't accepted at that time - whether in the church, the family or before authority.

At one meeting, Michel asked Pierre Elliott Trudeau to keep an eye on me, to sort of act as my bodyguard. It was a Liberal election meeting and the conscripts wanted to know why the Liberals went back on their promise of no conscription. Everyone who posed a question was ejected. Pierre became very indignant, and demanded to know how a policeman could push a pregnant woman. He was very gallant, with his cultured language and nice manner, as he came to my defence. He became extremely upset when we were asked in no uncertain terms to leave the hall and were ushered out.

Because of the War Measures Act, the issue of conscription couldn't be discussed openly on the radio and in the press. Pierre said it was intolerable that there couldn't be free discussion, that the police were being used to crush civil liberties.

As we were thrown out, he complained about the state using police force to enforce its power. He was very indignant and upset about the federal Liberal Party, although both our fathers were Liberal militants.

Today, when people in Quebec complain about what the state is doing to people, he knows exactly how it feels. This is what is extraordinary about what he has done. Watch him.

But in those days my husband and he were good friends." (49b)
FOCUS II:

MULTIPLE SEPARATE INFORMATION UNITS

(BOUNDED RATIONALITY)
PRELIMINARIES

In his analysis of crisis behaviour, Burton notes that:

"The study of crisis behaviour is valuable in itself but its main value is that it points dramatically to inefficiencies that go unnoticed in ordinary decision making. In crisis and despite increased attention given to the problem, misperceptions are greater, perceptions become more stereotyped, every action of the enemy is interpreted as a threat. The history of the conflict is reinterpreted to substantiate the theory that aggression always the intent of the enemy, belief systems become closed and alternative policies unrealistic, the administrative process by which facts are examined are by-passed to secure quick decisions, facts that do not support policies are disregarded and their surveyors treated as hostile agents, advisers are those who give the advice that is wanted, priorities lead to the neglect of matters not related to the crisis power becomes centralized and intimidation of parties with opposing views increases" (49c)

In this perspective, as most of the above comments relate to the way information is handled during a period of crisis, we are going to focus our attention on the role played by information units (and in this case formal specialized organizations) in shaping the authorities' decisions. In so doing, we will have to determine:

1. What was the observable situation

2. What was the information transmitted by the specialized units, and

3. Why were there distortions between the observable situation and the "image" provided to the decision-makers
We could have treated those questions separately in focusing first on the information that would have been provided by "rational" information units (which would have constituted a Model IIA) and then on the information transmitted by the existing information units (which would have constituted a Model IIB) in order to concentrate finally on the introduction of corrective (anti-distortion) measures (which would have constituted a Model IIC).

However, we have preferred to follow a step by step procedure, comparing, all along our analysis, the "image" to the reality and trying to relate the noted discrepancies to what we knew were the organizational interest, demands and usual forms of action of the information units involved.

During the crisis, several units, the R.C.M.P., the Q.P.P., the Montreal Police, the Anti-Terrorist Squad, the Media, the MPs and numerous members of the Liberal Party, provided the authorities with informational inputs which have not been without inferring with their decision. On some of these units, the Q.P.P., the Montreal Police, the Anti-Terrorist Squad, very little information filtered, at least concerning the way they handled and transmitted information to the decision making Authorities. However, thanks to the Report of the Royal Commission on Security, published in 1969, and to other various sources, it is easier to assess how the structures, the programs and the strategies of
other units, among which the R.C.M.P. and the Media partly shaped the Authorities' decisions. In the first part of this analysis, we shall try to analyze the main characteristics of these units in order to show in a second part, which bias and distortions they have introduced in the decision-making process.

1. **THE R.C.M.P. AS AN INFORMATION UNIT**

   - 1.1 **The Organization**

   The R.C.M.P. is the main federal operational and investigative body in the field of security. The force assumed this role during W.W. 1 because as the existing federal police force, it was at that time the natural federal instrument in this area. There is, however, no explicit statutory authority for the security role. Such authority, as does exist, is derived from certain sections of the R.C.M.P. Act (S.C. 1959 C. 54). Section 44 (e) of the R.C.M.P. regulations and orders (1960) which have been proclaimed by the governor in Council under the Act, provides that "in addition to the duties prescribed by the Act, it is the duty of the force...(e) to maintain and operate such security and intelligence services as may be required by the Minister"......
Additional authority for the R.C.M.P.'s security and intelligence operations is contained in certain instructions and directives issued by the Government, which in effect authorize the R.C.M.P. to conduct the investigations necessary for a security program, and in addition make the force responsible for various measures concerned with internal security in the event of a national emergency, as proclaimed under the War Measures Act. In practice the R.C.M.P. is concerned with the following security functions:

(a) All security and security intelligence operations and "police" operations related to security
(b) Maintenance and examination of records and field inquiries concerning personnel, but not evaluation of reports, nor decision making in individual cases
(c) Advice concerning departmental security
(d) Record keeping
(e) Certain staff functions related to the management of the national security effort

These functions are performed by a Headquarters Directorate of Security and intelligence (reporting to the Deputy Commissioner in charge of Operations, see organization chart in Appendix II) which maintains representatives at R.C.M.P. Regional H.Q. and detachments and at certain locations overseas and which operate in close liaison with the other Directorates of the Force. Nearly 60% of the personnel of the security and intelligence Directorate (including all the senior officers, all but three of the branch heads and almost all the officers responsible for operations or
investigations) are regular members of the Force; the remaining personnel includes some special constables employed on surveillance duties, civilian members employed as translators, technicians or researchers and public servants on clerical duties (50) In the Province of Quebec, as mentioned by Commissioner Higgit (51) of the 800 R.C.M.P. officers and men in Montreal 99.2% are bilingual and more than 70% of these have French as their mother tongue (no specification however for the Security and Intelligence Branch)

- 1. 2 Its limiting factors as an information unit

The Commission on security, was rather critical on some features of the Force that undoubtedly constituted severe limitations in the fulfillment of its mission as a security agency.

- 1. 2 1. Absence of a definite Responsibility - Authority - Center "for security matters":

"At present the Security Panel and the concerned officers in the Privy Council office make an attempt to perform most of these functions (policy determination, resource allocation, conflict arbitration, issuance of regulations and procedures, link with the Government and the Public, responsibility for operations) but they do so without executive authority or adequate resources and with an approach which is necessary permissive rather than compelling. As far as the formulation and coordination of Security policy is concerned it seems to us that under the present arrangements the total view of the requirements of security may often be obscured by the pressures exerted by individual departments and the exigencies of their proposed policies. Nor are we certain that the present structural arrangements ensure that issues and arguments concerned with security are presented to the Government in an explicit and undiluted form" (52)
1.2.2. Recruitment Policy

"At present all the regular members of the D.S.I. are drawn from personnel recruited and trained under normal R.C.M.P. procedures, although they are not selected for security employment until they have had at least three years experience in police duties and have received special training. There is at present no effective program of post university recruiting, even for the more demanding tasks in the Force (which would of course include many duties concerned with security) and in practice a potential recruit who has attended a university is faced with disincentives....

These policies and practices mean in the first place that the R.C.M.P. is cutting itself off from the whole of that group of potential recruits who attend a university - in other words and in general terms, from those potential recruits who are likely to possess the most intelligence, initiative and imagination." (53)

1.2.3. Confusion between security and police activities

"Police forces are concerned primarily with law enforcement including post-facto investigation, with the collection of evidence and with the prosecution of crimes. Security services are primarily engaged in preventive activities and the collection of intelligence. A security organization will almost inevitably be hindered in its operations by the lack of flexibility inherent in a police force such as R.C.M.P.... A security service will inevitably be involved in actions that may contravene the spirit if not the letter of the law and with clandestine and other activities which may sometimes seem to infringe on individual's rights; these are not appropriate police functions. Neither is it appropriate for a police force to be concerned with events or actions that are not crimes or suspected crimes, while a security service is often involved with such matters - Generally in a period in which police forces are subject to some hostility, it would appear unwise either to add to the police burden by an association with security duties, or to make security duties more difficult by an association with the police function." (54)
1.3 **Its operational priorities as an information unit**

From the analysis of the abridged report of the Royal Commission on security it appears that two dimensions tend to polarize the overall attention of the security forces:

- the communist threat which appears to be some late by-product of the cold war and of the Atlantic (read inter North American) cooperation

- the risks of infiltration (in the Government, unions, and universities) of the abovementioned pervasive doctrine. Only in this context is it possible to understand the newly appointed Commissioner Higgit's statement in 1969, that the arrival of Chinese diplomats in Ottawa was likely to "increase the problems of security in Canada"

2. **THE OTHER POLICE FORCES AS INFORMATION UNITS**

Although little information is actually available on the two other police forces involved, it seems that what has been said on recruitment, training policies and confusion between security police activities is equally relevant in the case of both the Q.P.P. and the Montreal Police. Moreover, it appears that two of their specific features are likely to have influenced their activities as information units:

- the fact that their experience in "criminal organizations" had been gained in their fights against organized crime (whose structures they tried more or less according to an R.C.M.P. officer on duty in Montreal at the time of the crisis to placate on the subversive movements)
the fact that the political dimension of the problem was more or less alien to them (which caused the aforementioned R.C.M.P. officer to proffer a few slightly caustic remarks on their candour; other direct witnesses have confirmed that in several instances police officers producing intelligence reports had been more or less mentioning all the persons they knew "to be at the left of the Liberal Party" or even "lists of N.D.P. members")

3. COOPERATION BETWEEN THE THREE POLICE FORCES IN THE INFORMATION PROCESS

Apparently the cooperation within the police forces (Q.P.P., R.C.M.P., Montreal) had not been that good as far as intelligence gathering was concerned. The Field of the fight against organized crime had been a lasting subject of frustration during the preceding years (and it is difficult not to see how such a situation could equally affect the fight against subversive activities)

The Commission of Enquiry into the Administration of Justice on Criminal and Penal matters in Quebec mentions in its report:

"Three years later (in 1969) the situation is practically the same. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that the R.C.M.P. continues to look upon organized crime as its exclusive property and treats somewhat arrogantly all those who claim to be interested in this criminal activity.

At the present time, it is no longer possible to look upon the Montreal Municipal Police as a second rate police force. Similarly, the Provincial Police, particularly since it has appreciably improved its enrolment and training policy has already corrected many weaknesses of the past.

However in spite of the progress achieved by the two main Quebec police forces, it is still not possible to talk of a free flow of information amongst the large police forces involved in the Quebec fight against organized crime (R.C.M.P., Provincial Police, Montreal Municipal Police)
However we are pleased to note some improvement. The R.C.M.P. shows more willingness to meet with and even exchange some information with the Provincial and Montreal Police let us hope this improvement will continue..." (55)

This aspect of intelligence activities came under the bitter remarks of Chairman Saulnier after the Montreal Strike, where he underlined, complacently, that very few information on the real situation in Montreal had been transmitted to the Federal Authorities.

The cultural folklore of the Q.P.P. testifies of some kind of frustrated parent-child relationship between the force and the R.C.M.P.: The latter being referred to as the "Hats"

4. RESULTING DISTORTIONS IN ORGANIZATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

This set of limitations (structural, organizational, ideological) has undoubtedly exerted some influence on the nature and the quality of the information received by the authorities. In the absence of direct evidence (G, Pelletier is rather evasive on the subject and the Federal Government has been successful in avoiding any type of enquiry having to do with the circumstances surrounding the proclamation of the War Measures Act) the only opportunity left to us consists in trying

- to compare the statements made by the officials involved with the evidences at hand

- to relate the apparent differences between the statements and the evidences, with the known propensities of the information units analyzed before

This approach, which can be criticized on several grounds (among which the fact that it is highly vulnerable to any attempt of manipulation made by the officials involved) is apparently the
only one on which we can presently rely; it is an attempt to underline probable influences but decisively not an attempt to prove them. In order to limitate its inherent risks we will try to juxta-pose different statements from different officials and make the assumption that their correspondences can be explained by an identical source of information, and not by a deliberate and conspiratorial will to mislead their audiences.

In this perspective the following elements of distortion can be detected:

- 4.1 Over sensitivity to alleged foreign influence in the FLQ

Numerous statements from political personalities and security officers have reflected the lasting concern for foreign and especially communist involvement in the separatist movement as for example:

- Commissioner Higgitt

"Some degree of training for subversively oriented separatist groups has taken place in Cuba" (56)

- The Royal Commission on Security

"What is more, there is no doubt about communist and trotskyst interest and involvement in the movement ... Foreign involvement is more difficult to establish with any certainty. However, it is clear that certain communist countries have shown a marked interest in the formation of the Communist Party of Quebec" (57)

- Quebec Ex-Premier Bertrand

"Speaking in the Magdalen Islands on August 17 (1969) Premier Bertrand promised that the Government would use force if necessary to crush the radicals, the revolutionaries and the bearded little Castros" (58)
"At a press conference on August 22 (1969) Justice Minister Remi Paul outlined a 10 point program worked out after meetings with 100 police chiefs" among which provisions one could find a recommendation asking "the Federal immigration minister to prevent known terrorists from entering Canada" (59)

However, the intensive searches and arrests that followed the proclamation of the W.M.A. did not result either in the arrest or even the expulsion of any foreign resident! Apparently the information units had been overly sensitive to the fact that early FLQ members like G. Schoelters or F. Schrim were immigrants (but very unlikely communists) and to the proclamations of solidarity with U.S. or Third World movements which were common rhetorics in the speeches of Vallieres and Gagnon. The notion of communist involvement on the other side appears to be a standard preoccupation of both the R.C.M.P. (some kind of leftover from the cold war and the interdiction of the Canadian Communist Party) and the Q.P.P. (which is still staffed by former Duplessis appointees, who are still reminiscent of the "Chief's" attitudes during the "Great Darkness")

- Quebec Ex-Justice Minister Remi Paul

- Commissioner Higgit
  
  "...the arrests made under the W.M.A. have taken most of the leadership out of circulation" (59)

- J. Choquette, in a more cautious manner
"Choquette would not say whether police believe persons now being held under the W.M.A. are the actual leaders of the FLQ, but said: I am satisfied that among the persons we have detained are persons who bear a very considerable responsibility for the disorders we have known in the Province of Quebec" (60)

- It's a movement structured according to functional requirements

- J. Choquette

"The experience we have lived during the last years, and especially during the October crisis, leads us to conclude that different specializations are to be distinguished among terrorist personnel, but that it is extremely difficult to measure the very responsibility of each category. Thus, there are ideologues, the "thinkers" and the "speakers" who can display but always verbally, some sympathy for the revolutionary action. On the other hand, there are action men who indulge in criminal acts in order to gain attention" (61)

- G. Pelletier

"So we saw the successive appearance of the Information Cell, the Viger (Communications) Cell, the Dieppe Cell, the Louis Riel Cell, the Nelson Cell and the St. Denis Cell, while the wording of the communiques strove at the same time to present an image of a powerful organization spread secretly throughout all milieus of society. The future may perhaps prove that the claims of the FLQ vested on a solide base, but until proof appears to the contrary, I consider much exaggerated. Nevertheless, during the phase of weighing the risks that preceded the decisions of the Government, one could not simply discount the possibility that the FLQ was indeed as powerful and well organized as it claimed. (62)

- It's a movement that has infiltrated various organizations (and that has been infiltrated itself)
Royal Commission on Security

"What is more, there is no doubt about communist and trotskyst interest involvement in the movement. Both groups have established "autonomous" Quebec organizations as somewhat transparent attempts to exploit separatist sentiment. Members of both have achieved positions of influence in at least some of the separatist groups and agencies helped by the bitter factionalism of the movement itself." (63)

J. Marchand

"There is no relation in our action to the election itself but we had good reasons to believe that the FLQ which (pause) as a front has the organization called FRAP in Montreal and is running candidates in Montreal, wanted to disturb the election by explosion of all kinds and by even kidnappings or even shooting (pause) people"

On October 22, J. Marchand confessed in the Commons, that he had used the word "front" incorrectly in English and the association between FRAP and the FLQ was rejected by the P.M. (64)

Mayor J. Drapeau

Q. "You say there are some affinities between FRAP and FLQ. Can you elaborate on that? What are those affinities?

A. "First of all, this municipal movement (FRAP), this para-municipal movement is a collection of everything that is terrorist and revolutionary" (65)

G. Pelletier

"In their analysis of the situation and their attempt to evaluate the possibility of serious deterioration in the social climate of Quebec, the Governments had to take into account the activity of the different protest
movements and especially the signs of a concerted effort and of a rallying of forces favourable to the cause of the FLQ and presumably sympathetic to its mode of operation" (66)

- It's a movement following an international revolutionary plan

- J. Choquette

"This measure (the W.M.A.) caused the following results: Firstly, dislocation of the plan, or somewhat improvised strategy if you like, covering propaganda, public demonstration and instructions aimed at the disorganization of society and the state" (67)

- D. McDonald

"McDonald appearing on one CTV interview program Question Period, was responding to questions asking grounds for the Government's proclamation of the W.M.A. with its broad Police Powers. McDonald said recent activities of the FLQ including the abduction of two officials, followed a pattern similar to internationally detected orts "to create disorders...

McDonald said that thefts of dynamite and weapons in Quebec before the kidnappings indicated "a pretty clear pattern... of preparation...."If you are saying do I have (or) in the police searches have we uncovered a master blue print for the takeover of the whole organization (of society) I think the answer is no" (68)

- Prime Minister Bourassa on October 16

"... continued escalation had revealed the gravity of the situation. First there were violent demonstrations, then there were bombs and afterwards spectacular kidnappings. Obviously, this was all of a plan, logically the fourth stage would be more important still. Action was required because there was no justification for letting this escalation go on and which followed a plan we knew about...And they even made threats of selected assassination as part of the fourth stage. As a result "as soon as the risks of anarchy seemed to acquire a new dimension, I decided to act - firmly and quickly" (69)
On numerous grounds this perception of the FLQ that emerges from official statements, appears at least to be rather inadequate (it is nevertheless interesting to note that the later the statements are, the more evasive they tend to be: See for example the statements of J. Marchand and J. Drapeau in the immediate aftermath of the crisis and those of Gerald Pelletier, or Bourassa and McDonald)

- The leadership of the movement

It is interesting to note some differences in the statements of Commissioner Higgit and of Justice Minister Choquette, the former refers explicitly to the "leadership", whereas the latter mentions only "persons who bear a very considerable responsibility". This difference is not purely trivial, for Commissioner Higgit, the movement has leaders, that is people that give its impulse to the movement and to its actions and who by consequence, constitute the critical factor of any repressive strategy. This notion of leadership will be re-examined in a multiple Decision-makers perspective, but we can already note that in a further statement (61), Minister J. Choquette only differentiates the FLQ membership in terms of "thinkers" and "action men" without any explicit mention of leadership.

This deformation, apparently coming from the R.C.M.P., is largely congruent with the organizational experience of the force in the fields of "organized crime" and "communist subversion", both movements that operate under "classical" patterns; the necessary corollary for subversive or large scale criminal action being the existence of a "Big Brother"
The functional organization of the movement

Even if such an assessment was substantiated by the FLQ's vocabulary: "Cells" "Plan No. 3", subsequent investigations did not turn much of evidence, regarding the internal "structure" of the movement. What is however striking is the similarity of the official descriptions, with the standard structures depicted in anti-guerrilla manuals (see for example, B. Singh and Ku-Wang Mei, Theory and Practice of Modern Guerrilla Warfare). Apparently and as before, the information units have attributed to the movement, features learned or experienced in other contexts.

The Infiltration of the movement

Again very few cases turned by the subsequent investigations appear to justify this presumption (a former secretary in Prime Minister Bourassa's office and a former clerk of the court in Montreal) In some cases however, we have been personally reported that the crisis resulted in minor purges of personnel (3 persons in the French CBC network) but it is rather difficult to assess both the veracity and the relevance of such information. However, it is to be noted here that one of the formal tasks of the R.C.M.P. consists in checking potential appointees in the Civil Service and monitoring security matters in the various governmental departments, the Force was somewhat frustrated by the rather detached attitudes which its efforts encountered among top Civil Servants. We can hypothesize that the crisis provided the R.C.M.P. with rather interesting opportunities to reassess its role in such matters.
The Revolutionary plan followed by the movement

As mentioned by Don McDonald

"If you are saying do I have (or) in the police searches have we uncovered a master blue print for the takeover of the whole organization (of society) I think the answer is no." (70)

The vast search powers given to the police did not turn any evidence of a formal plan the FLQ was supposed to follow. The genesis of the concept on the other hand is rather interesting. The first mention of it was made by Michel Cote, the Montreal City Attorney, during a meeting of the Commons Committee on broadcasting on November 27, 1969:

"That was the three stage plan as presented to the Members of Parliament by Michel Cote with Saulnier at his side and Mayor Drapeau sitting in the audience. To restate it and rephrase it slightly to improve the translation, it consisted of

1. Radicalizing the already existing examples of spontaneous agitation (that is to say implanting a radical message with workers and students who were demonstrating for specific goals)

2. Organizing the exploited classes on a vast scale

3. Finally, when the time is ripe, popular insurrection with armed (it was underlined forces in the original occupation of factories, schools and public utilities." (71)

Even if at the time, the "plan", which was purely a quotation of Valliere's writings (Revolutionary Strategy and the Role of the Avant Garde), was not taken very seriously, it apparently made its way rather successfully; on October 16, in Prime Minister Bourassa's statement it had become:
"First there were violent demonstrations, then there were bombs and afterward spectacular kidnappings... Logically the fourth stage would be more important still...And they even made threats of selected assassination as part of the fourth stage" (72)

Apparently, new variations had been developped and if the kidnappings could be related to the preceeding events, the theme of selective assassination came from a quite different background.

"In June 1970, Montreal broadcaster, Pierre Nadeau was in Jordan making a film on terrorist guerrilla training and quite by accident came upon two men in a camp of the Popular Democratic front who although hooded by Bedouin scarves were conspicuous by their conversations in French. They turned to be a pair of active terrorists from Montreal who readily admitted their part in some 20 acts of violence in Quebec...

"We are learning more how to kill than how to mobilize popular movements... We want to orient our military tactics toward selective assassination. For too long the FLQ has been synonymous with bombs and useless violence. We intend to pick our targets so that the people who are responsible will pay"

An account of Nadeau's interview with film by Ronald Labelle, appeared in Perspectives and in its English language companion publication Weekend" (73)

When they returned to Canada both Nadeau and Labelle were interviewed by the police and on the morning of October 16, Labelle was arrested (but never charged) under the provisions of the W.M.A.

Apparently the police forces had "synthetized" the information.

4. 3 Insufficient definition of purpose

Apparently the weak coordination existing between the organization in charge of security (a department of the R.C.M.P.) and the political powers, resulted in some form
of confusion, as far as the purposes of intelligence and security activities were concerned. Official statements on such matters are rather puzzling as expressed in the following statements of purpose:

- Commissioner Higgit

"For the R.C.M.P. the problem is to distinguish between legitimate protest and subversion...Everybody has a perfect right to get up on a street corner and advocate... the dissolution of the Confederation. But if they do it with subversive intent then of course it becomes a different matter" (74)

- Royal Commission on Security

"Separatism in Quebec, if it commits no illegalities and appears to seek its ends by legal and democratic means, must be regarded as a political movement to be dealt in a political rather than a security context. However, if there is any evidence of an intention to engage in subversive activities or if there is any suggestion of foreign influence, it seems to us inescapable that the Federal Government has a clear duty to take such security measures as are necessary to protect the Federation" (75)

However, it is not sure that this uncertain definition of purpose can only be attributed to a weak coordination between the security agencies and the political powers, since those to some extent testify of the same vagueness

"After some time it is difficult to distinguish between the necessary and productive social contestation and the systematic harassment of authorities. The terrorist uses the social contestation, not to foster reforms, but simply to provoke a state intervention in the social field" (76)

Whatever its direct cause such a vagueness in the purpose of security matters had a direct effect on the daily work of the forces: As they did not know what to collect, they began transmitting all types of information and compiling lists of potential suspects (i.e. mostly people opposing the actual
state of affairs in the province, whatever their motives). This coupled with the fact that the forces were primarily law enforcement bodies, with rather meagre resources in the field of specialized manpower, could only result in two developments:

- the exaggeration of the danger at hand

- the multiplication of files and name lists (which could hardly be reviewed in the absence of adequate criteria)

Those two developments were more or less conscientiously recognized by the Royal Commission on security when it proposed that:

"At the very least it (the Federal Government) must take adequate steps to inform itself of any such threats and to collect full information about the intentions and capabilities of individuals or movements whose object is to destroy the Confederation by subversive or seditious methods" (78)

Apparently the needs for a more comprehensive and more efficient "counter revolutionary surveillance" was felt by the Government: The crisis "intensified cabinet review of the Royal Commission report" (79) and a permanent committee on security was appointed in 1971 (as recommended by the Royal Commission)

5. THE MASS MEDIA AS INFORMATION UNITS

Several elements (among which the fact that Marshall MacLuhan has been reported as having been consulted by the Federal Government during the crisis) tend to underline the role played by the mass media during the October crisis and a few commentators have focused their analysis on the interaction between the characteristics of the media and the strategy adopted by the FLQ.
Their arguments tend to focus on two main characteristics of the mass media in a developed (and capitalistic) society.

- the media are in a competitive situation in their quest for an audience and for the resources which it commands (advertising, qualified personnel, influence). They are both in a situation of intrinsic competition (among the same type of media, like between radio stations for example) and of extrinsic competition (among different types of media, between radio stations and the written press for example).

- they tend to be of a low political content, mostly favouring the dominant ideologies (in order to maximize their audience), to cluster the information according to predefined headings (politics, national, international, business, justice, social affairs), to privilege "facts" over opinions (for which special headings are reserved) and news over information.

From this premises it appears that the mass media

- have played the role of an amplifying drum in the sense that they have been obliged to "over-cover" the FLQ which explicitly played on the competition between the radio stations (The Liberation Cell used to address its communiques to one station, whereas the Chenier Cell used to address its communiques to another one). In the same way the diffusion of successive communiques without any fixed schedule had the effect of creating both a "suspense" (which forced constant coverage) and "instant news" (which broke down the established pattern of information and diffusion). Such a strategy did not only give the FLQ an extensive amount of media coverage, but also deteriorated the existing relations between the media and the police forces. Until October 16, most FLQ communiques were aired and manipulated before the police forces could analyze them and search for fingerprints. To a certain point this strategy equally affected the authorities, which had to take
positions on publicized and already debated demands (this in turn can explain the outbursts of anger that people like Louis Philippe Lacroix, the whip of the Quebec Liberal Party, were unable to retain in the aftermath of the crisis).

- have over emphasized some features of the FLQ: During the first week of the crisis the coverage of the events was assigned to "criminal" reporters, who in turn, turned "criminal" papers on the subject describing the FLQ as:

"A para-military organization, having numerous members trained in foreign countries; (as) a well organized movement, anonymous, faceless, feelingless, a movement with no other purpose than pure violence, anarchy and destruction of society" (80)

On this account, a theft of weapons in Trois-Rivieres was attributed to the FLQ (further investigations revealed that the crime had been committed by longshore men), as well as a more or less case of sadistic violence in Hull (to which if my memory is good Justice Minister Turner referred in the Commons, and which ultimately proved to be only the exaggerations of a psychotic woman).

- have contributed to the climate of confusion which characterized Quebec at the time: Hoaxes and false news were plentiful, for example, James Cross' death was announced several times (among which at least once on the French network CBC)

- have contributed to give the FLQ a political recognition through their diffusion of the manifesto (which according to some commentators represented an intrusion of the "real" speech in the universe of "commercial" speech of the media) and their coverage of the negotiations between the FLQ and the authorities (which according to the same commentators, placed the FLQ on the same political footing than the Governments, and this led to the downgrading of the traditional opposition movements).
FOCUS III:

MULTIPLE SEPARATE IMPLEMENTATION UNITS

(BOUNDED RATIONALITY)
1. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE W.M.A. IN OTHER PROVINCES THAN QUEBEC

Following the proclamation of the W.M.A. (which we are to understand was designed to cope with the situation prevailing in the Province of Quebec) some "unforeseen" utilizations of the new legislation appeared in other provinces:

- In Vancouver, the City Council took under consideration a motion inspired by the W.M.A. to ban all "subversive gatherings" (81)

- British Columbia passed an order in Council banning any teachers from tax supported schools "if they advocated the policies of Le Front de Liberation du Quebec" (82)

- "At the university of Victoria, Assistant Professor Ronald Kirkby issued a statement declaring that Trudeau's actions were responsible for the death of Pierre Laporte, a brutal assessment perhaps, but one also shared by Rene Levesque, whose political party was supported by almost one quarter of the voters of Quebec. The police came around to the offices of the Martlett, the University of Victoria student newspaper and warned them not to publish a letter from Kirkby. They didn't..." (83)

- In Ontario, a situation has already arisen which could be dealt with under the W.M.A. if Attorney General Arthur Wishart wanted to. A University newspaper in Toronto this week published the FLQ manifesto. Another paper in Guelph cancelled its press run because of fears of prosecution (84)

Less directly, some authorities took advantage of the "law and order" mood (more than specifically, of the W.M.A.) to obtain the fulfilment of demands which could hardly have been considered before

- The Alberta movie censors refused a Quebec made film, Red, the story of a Metis who leaves the reserve and goes to Montreal
Mr. Caouette, who had repeatedly charged Radio-Canada with favouring separatism in its information programming, asked whether the corporation would be placed under trusteeship for a clean-up. He called the CBC a refuge for rebels who are well fed at the expense of the public.

Mr. Lloyd Crouse (P.C. South Shore) called the program "The Legacy of Lenin", that was to be broadcasted on CBC that evening, a documentary for revolution and asked for its cancellation (apparently he gained satisfaction).

On the same day J.A. MacLean (P.C. Malpeque) won applause from both Conservative and Liberal backbenchers, when he asked barring CBC from going abroad to interview people who are not allowed into Canada:

"I ask this in light of the fact that some of their favorite commentators such as Timothy Leary and others are now fugitives from Justice" (84a)

Confronted with this flow of unpredicted developments, Justice Minister Turner warned the provinces against abuse of the emergency measures laid down "to break the Front de Liberation du Quebec". In the Commons he made clear that:

"The measures were designed to deal with the emergency touched off by Quebec terrorism in Quebec - not with radicalism in general across the country". (85)

Apparently the authorities had come to realize that the Government had no authority to make certain that the police powers are not abused and invoked by provincial politicians for "ad-hoc" purposes. In fact, according to the Canadian Constitution, the responsibility of the administration of Justice relies on the provinces and their attorney generals giving the Federal Government no control over the implemented actions.
In order to solve this problem and avoid potential "harmful effects", Justice Minister Turner took the following steps:

- Dispatched an assistant deputy minister to visit the four Atlantic and the four Western Provinces to discuss the matter with attorney generals and their officers.

- Initiated personal discussions with the Ontario Attorney General and apparently reached the following agreement:

"Municipal and Ontario Provincial Police, will cooperate fully with the R.C.M.P. but any arrest will be on behalf of the Federal Force. Anyone arrested would be turned to the R.C.M.P. for charging and detention" (86)

- Promised, within days, a new act and regulations "of a less comprehensive nature" to replace the W.M.A.

2. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE W.M.A. IN QUEBEC

As far as the implementation of the War Measures Act is concerned it seems necessary to distinguish between four successive steps, which covered the period from October 16, 1970, date of the first arrests under the provisions of the W.M.A. and August 1971, date of the Quebec Justice Minister's decision to suspend the charges against the remaining indicted persons. Those four steps include:

- The arrest process (arrests, seizures)
- The detention process (questioning and detention without indictment)
- The indictment process (charges laid against the arrested and detained persons)
- The trial process (decisions rendered by the courts)

2. 1 The arrest process

This process includes two phases: The massive round up
following the proclamation of the W.M.A. and the cracking of the Liberation and of the Chenier Cell. Such a distinction may a priori seem questionable but we intend to show in our analysis that they resulted from such different circumstances that they may legitimately be held as two different entities.

- 2.11. The round up following the proclamation of the War Measures Act

Among the 497 persons arrested under the provisions of the W.M.A.
- 355 have been arrested during the period from October 16 to October 25
- 41 have been arrested during the period from October 25 to October 28
- 56 have been arrested during the period from October 28 to November 24
- 45 have been arrested during the period from November 24 to February 3, 1971.

In other terms more than 70% of the persons arrested, have been arrested in the nine first days following the proclamation of the W.M.A. On those 497 arrests only two have been made by the R.C.M.P. (see the cracking of the FLQ cells) all the others were the results of the joint efforts of the Q.P.P. and the Montreal Police, which constituted the backbone of the Anti-terrorist Squad. As no detailed information has been released on the precise division of labour among the three police forces during the process and that by all accounts the Squad was still active at the time, we will consider any material related to
one of the three forces as relevant in our analysis.

2.11.1 Organizational characteristics of the forces

- The Q.P.P. was created in 1959 and organized on similar patterns than the R.C.M.P., with detachments in Montreal, major cities and rural areas.

- The Montreal Police which, in the past, had often been criticized for both its corruption and lack of professionalism, was "reorganized" in 1967 under the supervision of two foreign specialists, who apparently succeeded in their task of "upgrading" the force but who at the same time generated "morale" related problems in the ranks.

- The Anti-Terrorist Squad was first formed in the Spring of 1963 with the first wave of terrorist bombings. It was disbanded in 1964. It was reformed with the resumption of bombings in 1968 with a membership of 50 to 70 men. Immediately before the kidnapping it had 200 men. At the height of the crisis the Squad was believed to have 400 men assigned to it. Persistently police and city officials have refused to divulge the Squad budget, although it was known to be handsome. The location of its command post, believed to be somewhere in Montreal, was kept secret.

2.11.2 Organizational past performances

The Precedent of the Montreal Police Strike

By several of its aspects the Police Strike in
Montreal on October 7 and 8, 1969, appears to be some kind of a premiere to the implementation of the War Measures Act (intervention of the Army, nomination of the Q.P.P. director as the head of law enforcement forces) and reveals some interesting evidence on the activities displayed by the Police Forces.

Among these, was the gloomy performance of the Q.P.P. in this new environment:

"We are completely lost, declared a Q.P.P. spokesman, who recognized that most of the 700 Q.P.P. members dispatched to Montreal did not know the streets of the metropole, the crime prone locations and "certain characters" well known to the Municipal Police"(87)

These shortcomings were not left unnoticed by Defence Minister Leo Cadieux who perfidly mentioned that he "was satisfied by the swift dispatch of troops at St. Hubert Air Base" and who according to Le Devoir "appeared to have some doubts on the Q.P.P. efficiency."

As no corrective measures were apparently taken, it is to be assumed that the Q.P.P. approached the October crisis with a "tarnished coat of arms" whose brilliance it tried to restore.

Apparently the relations between the Q.P.P and the Montreal Police Forces were not absolutely "cloudless", members in the Municipal Police Force resenting the role of "scabs" played by their Provincial counterparts during the strike. In fact, at the time their relations could be only described as "inamicable".
"Many of the policemen (Montreal) began drinking heavily in bars near the arena, in spite of appeals by their leaders and fist fights broke out between city and provincial policemen. Six or seven Q.P.P. cruisers were driven to the arena by City policemen who ordered their provincial colleagues to go home in taxis" (88)

The prior activities of the Anti-Terrorist Squad

During the few years preceding the crisis, the Squad had apparently concerned itself with other matters than bombs and terrorist raids:

"Until now the Squad's main task has been surveillance. It has carried out numerous raids but arrests have been infrequent often because extremists and suspected terrorists were doing nothing unlawful. Until the W.M.A. was invoked it was no crime to possess revolutionary literature that bordered but did not cross the line into sedition. The same could be said of shouting slogans, making fiery speeches, holding revolutionary meetings and conducting demonstrations that did not lapse into violence.

The raids carried out under warrants alleging suspicion of possession of stolen goods, firearms or pornographic literature or the commission of liquor offences or a variety of other offences, yielded mounds of activist literature and often previous lists of names, organizations and correspondence.

Arrests although small in number compared to the number of raids, nevertheless were significant. Hundreds over the past few years have been picked up on various charges photographed and fingerprinted.

Roundups often took place before major demonstrations and in the view of the Prevost Commission on the Administration of Justice in Quebec amounted to a form of preventive detention which "does not at all conform to the requirements of the law"

(...) so after three years of continuous and concentrated efforts, the Squad has compiled
voluminous files on almost everyone who has had even a passing flirtation with the radical fringes" (89)

From this account, it appears that the temptation of a more active repressive policy must have been a growing subject of concern in the Squad. They had gathered the names of most of the potential and proven activists in the Province, accumulated "mounds of activist literature"...but were rather frustrated in their attempts of making arrests. The October crisis was giving it a rather promising opportunity to get rid of an everlasting source of trouble and in the same time to prove the appropriateness of its approach.

- 2.1 1. 3 Organization values and beliefs

Among the values and beliefs nurtured in the forces, two of them seem to have exerted some form of influence in their activities during the crisis:

- their attitudes toward the Civil Rights: The same Prevost commission on the administration of justice in Quebec, mentioned earlier, included in its report the following conclusions of a research made by the department of criminology of the University of Montreal:

"The Quebec policeman believes that the public perceives him rather unfavourably chiefly because of a bad press coverage and a lack of information. He refuses to consider himself as a repressive agent and considers that his main role is to maintain the order during mass manifestations... However, he is very favourably inclined toward the utilization of some techniques, generally
reproved by the Human Rights proponents: Compulsory identity cards, electronic surveillance and preventive detention...

- their perceptions of mounting threats against their physical security: In fact it appears, that among the members of the Police Forces, many happened to fear for their lives and the ones of their family during the crisis. This element was confirmed by Commissioner Higgit

"Even police and their families have been threatened with death in the last two years via letters or telephone calls. Authenticity of the threat or their origin could not be established" (90) the Commissioner said.

2.1.4 The impact of organizational characteristics on the process of arrests

One of the first consequences of these organizational characteristics on the process of arrests was apparently to surprise Ottawa if we are to believe Anthony Westell:

"Before the great round up finished, more than 400 people had been interned - a much greater number than Ottawa had expected..." (91)

This surabundant number of arrests can largely be explained if one takes into account:

- the rather loose definition of potential suspects, accepted by the forces.
- the rather undiscriminative way under which those "standards" were applied
- the quality and untimeliness of the materials accumulated by the forces (the files covered several years)
the conspicuous absence of a serious revision process: On October 15 in the evening, the different police forces pooled their lists of suspects and constituted a master list which Justice Minister is reported to have reviewed (given the circumstances one can seriously doubt of the quality of such a revision)

the absence of the traditional forms of restraint, which the W.M.A. had removed. Under the new circumstances police officers were no longer liable for unjustified arrests which induce them to arrest by extension (case for example of people found in the company of suspects, whether on the list or not, or people found at a given address mentioned on the list)

the frustration and fear prevailing among the members of the forces (or to revert the remark Churchill applied to Sir Edward Mosley "they are less dangerous in than out")

the desire of the Q.P.P. to display its efficiency: It is reported that:

"After the proclamation of the W.M.A., Q.P.P. Director Maurice St. Pierre, phoned the police chief of a city of medium importance, to make it clear that rather few arrests had been made in his area - The police chief answered that he could not arrest people just for the fun of it. Director St. Pierre then suggested to make a few perquisitions, to search cars, which he said was easy under the provisions of the W.M.A. in order "to create some kind of atmosphere" ")

The other consequence of the provisions of the W.M.A., coupled with the police forces' procedures, was to indulge them in a frantic search for material; which saw the Montreal and Q.P.P. police officers collecting
in a hurry, documents, telephone books (for the phone numbers on the last page presumably), files and piling them in green garbage bags which they had brought with them for the circumstances. Among other objects of interest they have also been reported to have repeatedly seized typewriters and weapons of any kind.

- 2.1.2. The cracking of the Liberation and Chenier Cell

If the police forces had seized typewriters to try to match them with the communiques their attempt was by all accounts unsuccessful. Their search for the murderers of Pierre Laporte and for the location of the hide-out of James Cross' kidnappers was at a low point, in spite of Rose's boastfulness. On October 18, warrants had been emitted against Paul Rose, Marc Charbonneau, and on October 24, against F. Simard, Bernard Lortie and Jacques Rose, but with no immediate results. The investigators were apparently concentrating their efforts outside of Montreal.

"In the meantime, according to informed sources, the armed forces have combed certain areas in the Western and North Western parts of the Province, in order to find the terrorists

...Reconnaissance aircrafts have joined the search. They fly over woods and forests in order to detect bonfires that could eventually signal the presence of terrorists' camps.

The armed forces and the police have concentrated their efforts in the regions of the province where summer cottages are located..." (93)

In the absence of decisive progress. (the measure having been already postponed several times), Justice Minister
Choquette, announced on November 3, 1970 that:

"The Governments of Quebec and Ottawa, jointly offer rewards up to $75,000. for information leading to the arrest of the kidnappers or murderers of former Quebec Labour Minister Pierre Laporte.

Similar rewards are offered at the same time for information leading to the arrest of the kidnappers of J. Cross.

In the same way rewards will be given for information leading to the arrest of five suspects Paul Rose, Marc Charbonneau, Jacques Rose, Bernard Lortie and F. Simard"

(94)

This tactic was not new:
- During a press conference on August 22, 1969, former Union Nationale Justice Minister Paul had included in his ten point program to fight terrorism "the offering of a $50,000. reward for the information leading to the arrest of terrorists"

- It had been used in the beginning of 1970 and had led to the discovery of the FLQ hide-out in Prevost which in turn had revealed the plot against U.S. Consul Burgess.

But at least it was efficient, on November 6, Montreal police during a "routine" investigation arrested B. Lortie and apparently came close to arresting the Rose brothers and Francis Simard (who were hidden in a closet), who finally were located in Saint Luc near Montreal on December 27. (Apparently on a lead originating from the follow-up of Lortie's arrest). The cracking of the Chenier Cell, however, turned interesting evidence on the collaboration between the Police Forces especially between the R.C.M.P. and the two others. In fact it appeared:
that the discovery of the St. Hubert pavilion in which P. Laporte was detained was reported only 48 hours later by the Q.P.P. to the R.C.M.P.

that the R.C.M.P. learned Lortie's arrest by the newspapers and was only informed of the existence of the closet hide-out four days after the arrest (Montreal Police was not particularly proud of the fact, since an FLQ communique sent by Jacques Rose was alleging that the weapons of the policemen on duty had been stolen)

On the same vein, classical police work (a tail on Jacques Lanctot's wife) led the R.C.M.P. to 10945 rue des Recollets and to the arrest of Cossette-Trudels (the only two arrests made by the R.C.M.P.) and to the release of James Cross after the acceptance of the Government offer. As in the preceeding case, bitter evidence was turned on the lack of collaboration among the Police Forces.

- On the tail of J. Lanctot, an R.C.M.P. officer and his wife, settled on the second floor of 10945 rue des Recollets, were nearly arrested by North Montreal Municipal Police, on whose jurisdiction was the area, and who had not been informed of their presence.

- The multiplication of contradictory statements after James Cross' safe release

"After the British Trade Commissioner won his freedom in exchange for safe conduct to Cuba for his kidnappers the Q.P.P. Director gave lengthy interviews to selected reporters from Montreal newspapers in which he clearly left the impression that his force was largely responsible for the successful conclusion of the investigation."
Obviously peeved Assistant Commissioner Dube revealed in an interview that the R.C.M.P. was not given access to the St. Hubert bungalow where the Q.P.P. found masses of evidence that Labour Minister P. Laporte had been held hostage for a week and strangled on October 17'(94a)

In the same mood, the Chief of Montreal-North Police, added a few comments on his own by which all that was a lot of noise for really nothing (the heavy surrounding of the des Recollets area) and that two or three Montreal North Police cruisers would have been sufficient.

- 2. 2 The detention process

At the apparent embarrassment of the Federal Authorities numerous questions were raised in the Commons on the way the Province was implementing the provisions of the W.M.A. especially those regarding the detention of "suspects". Among the most prominent were:

- The fact that lawyers had not been permitted in the first week to see their imprisoned clients

- The fact that on October 27, neither the Solicitor General nor the Justice Minister had been able to give the Commons the box score on arrests, releases and detentions under the regulations nor to tell them how much dynamite arms and ammunitions had been recovered in raids

- The fact that apparently those arrested had been fingerprinted which was not authorized either by the W.M.A. or the Identification of Criminals Act. The fact that some prisoners had been beaten or ill-treated.
- The fact that, in spite of the Prime Minister's agreement on the demand, no list of arrested persons had been provided to the public.

Those criticisms against the actions taken in the Quebec Province were answered only with weak comments on the vissicitudes of the Canadian Federal System or as expressed by Prime Minister Trudeau:
"Here again, I cannot speak for the Province of Quebec, which was entrusted with administering the Act" (95)

or Justice Minister Turner:
"The attorney generals are free to interpret these regulations on the advice given by their Governments" (95)

In spite of these declarations of constitutional impotence a few corrective measures were taken:
- The Government, more or less, promised to specify, in the new regulations, a liaison committee and the right to counsel (on which Mr. J. Diefenbaker was especially sensitive)

- The Quebec Justice Minister approved the formation by the Civil Liberties Union of a three member sub-committee to furnish "clothing and cigarettes" to those held under the W.M.A. and to act as a liaison between the prisoners and their families

- Mr. Turner's parliamentary secretary, Albert Bechard, promised to bring the question of unauthorized fingerprinting to the Quebec Justice Minister's attention.

Surprisingly, these deviations from the legal course of action (any arrested person has the right to retain counsel, no fingerprinting is legal until a person is sentenced
no one can be detained secretly) if they can be traced back to the Attorney General - Justice Minister of the Province of Quebec, or at least to some of his statements, he argued for example, that the publication of the names of those arrested could be harmful to them, which constituted a prime reason for not publishing such a list but also to the Q.P.P.

The Civil Liberties Union Committee mentions in its preliminary report that it had noticed that:

"in certain detention centers, especially outside Montreal the directors were pressured by Q.P.P. officials. The pressures were all in the same direction. People arrested under the W.M.A. were to be maintained in the most complete isolation and incommunicado" (96)

Apparently this notion of "incommunicado" went as far as preventing the arrested persons to communicate with their families, or censuring the news broadcasted by the radio stations which were turned on in the detention centers. It is difficult a priori to conceive of any rationale behind such a feature, unless one tries to relate it to the way the "suspects" were questioned (not all of them, since in some specific instances people have reported not to have been questioned)

The persons that were questioned (see Serge Mondeau) never mentioned any specific question on their relations with the 10 prime suspects (which at the time were positively identified) but relate they have been submitted to some form of political questioning for which a standard form had been established. Among the recurring themes were questions such as "Are you a member of the FLQ" ... "Did you kidnap James Cross" ... "Do you agree with the FLQ Manifesto"... "Are you in favour of making social change by violence"... Most
people describe them as interviews more than interrogations, they were generally friendly, apparently pointless and gave a fair importance to standard questions on the identity of relatives, job history, education...

However naive those questions may appear, they were incriminating: The detained persons "could not know that making statement in support of the FLQ, even to a police officer in a friendly chat about "politics and that sort of thing", could be used in court as proof they were guilty of the crime of belonging to the FLQ, which was defined in a law of which they were not allowed to be aware, as the "unlawful association" " (97)

On this account, the Q.P.P. was facilitating the job of the Crown for further prosecutions. It is unlikely that this was done without the consent (not to speak of the initiative) of the Attorney General, who took the pain to defend some highly questionable positions (like the non-divulgation of the suspects' lists) and who was one of the main beneficiary (as the responsible for prosecutions) of that illegal procedure. This conclusion is confirmed by two statements one surprisingly emanating from the Quebec Finance Minister R. Garneau:

"The Finance Minister explained that the purpose of the arrests was to allow questioning in order to bring charges against those who participate in the activities of terrorist movements" (98)

the other from Justice Minister Choquette:

"And I shall add to this, that the arrest and detention of a certain number of persons have enabled us to collect many useful information as far as potential charges to be laid in courts are concerned" (99)

The complicity of Ottawa is more open to questioning: Some vague promises of intervention were made but when compared with the real interventions that took place in other
provinces (to prevent the use and abuse of the W.M.A.) they appear rather insignificant but no further evidence permits to establish whether it was a matter of tolerance or a matter of intention.

One of the P.R. agents of the Q.P.P. denied categorically the allegations made by Quebec lawyer Samson that prisoners had been beaten in Orsainville prison, who subsequently specified that his accusations were not against police officers but prison wardens. Later, in spite of Minister Choquette's recognition that prisoners had been beaten but "only slightly" and that the blows had not been violent, the Q.P.P. Director affirmed on November 27 "that as far as he knew, no prisoner had been beaten in the cells" (100)

2.3 The indictment process

As soon as October 27, Prime Minister P.E. Trudeau mentioned in the Commons:

"I hope it will be as much as possible...that charges will be laid under the Criminal Code rather than on the W.M.A. (Public Order Regulations) but here again I cannot speak for the province of Quebec, which was entrusted with administering the Act..." (101)

This statement seems paradoxical since the Public Order Regulations had been accepted by a huge majority a few days before in the Commons: The Government had taken the pain to have a vote on the regulations (which it was not at all obliged to do) to announce, less than a week afterwards, that it was recommending the Quebec Attorney General not to use some of its provisions...! This drastic change makes sense only under three possible conditions:
- The Federal Government had never intended to have the Public Order Regulations used for prosecutions (it was only an umbrella for extended Police powers) which is in line with the Model I perspectives.

- The Federal Government had found the outcome of the arrests rather deceptive on the account of the prior information that it had received (conformity with Model II perspectives) and the pressures for action made by the two other Governments (in conformity as we will further see with Model IV perspectives).

- The Federal Government had discovered that the Public Order Regulations in their repressive provisions were inapplicable (discrepancy between intention and action).

As condition number three appears rather weak since in purely rational terms the Government should have been able to convince the Quebec Attorney General of the intrinsic weakness of the Act, condition number one and number two, even if they focus on different causes (which can have intervened separately or jointly) lead to the same conclusion: The Federal Government had the feeling that the implementation of the W.M.A. was being distorted from its initial or (revised) intentions and felt the necessity of a public warning.

This warning was not retained by the Crown (in fact the Attorney General and the task force of lawyers that prepared the indictments) as shown in the table reconstituted from the various press releases, summarized by Canadian News Facts (101) and presented in Appendix III.

If we try to summarize those facts it appears:
that on 45 persons for whom known charges were laid, only 6 were charged on provisions not included in the Public Order Regulations

that on 31 persons for whom known charges were laid in Montreal, only two were charged on provisions not included in the Public Order Regulations

that 13 persons, in addition to charges under the Public Order Regulations, were charged on provisions of seditious conspiracy, as defined by the Criminal Code

that the indictment was particularly heavy (69 charges laid) for the five "bigs": Chartrand, Lemieux, Vallieres, Gagnon, Larue-Langlois

that in Montreal the Crown decided to take advantage of a rarely used procedure (preferred indictments) which effectively prevented the defense from examining and testing the evidence to be used against them prior to trial.

The aggressive approach taken by the Crown was not exactly new. In 1968, during the trial of Vallieres and Gagnon (on the charges of murder in the case of the La Grenade Affair) the Crown had used all the possible legal tricks to obtain a heavy conviction:

- it delayed the trial, announced that it wanted to proceed jointly on the two cases (which made Vallieres and Gagnon prepare a common defence) and then reverted its decision and opted for separate trials (which as a result delayed Gagnon's trial, who was judged only three years after his arrest)
it tried to:

"extricate itself from the embarrassment, that despite a delay of a year and a half, it had no evidence that Vallieres had any knowledge of the La Grenade bombing. It piled the tables high with examples of Vallieres' inflammatory writings which were read to the jury at great length. As the Quebec Court of Appeal was to say later those writings might well contain evidence for some other charge but they contained no evidence of a specific murder" (102)

Moreover, all those efforts had been frustrated (in spite of the eloquent threats made by the Crown Attorney like "Gentlemen, free Vallieres and you know what will happen") the Quebec Court of Appeal ordered a new trial and the sentence of life imprisonment was reduced to 30 months.

Those precedents may permit to understand the pugnacity of the Crown (particularly in Montreal) and the inflamed statement delivered by Mr. Girouard during the trial of Vallieres in 1971 (outside the Court)

"Pierre Vallieres has always considered himself as a political prisoner; he has constantly requested for a political trial. He has desired to be judged on his political ideas. His actual trial for seditious conspiracy is a political trial during which he will be judged for his political ideas" (103)

The Crown was apparently so determined that even after the charges of seditious conspiracy against the "Big Five" were quashed by Justice Ouimet, on February 12, it laid new charges under the same provisions, for nearly the same period of time against Vallieres, Gagnon and Larue-Langlois.

2.4 The Judicial Process

If the courts made a rather heavy use of contempt citations, their decisions nevertheless turned to be on the average for more clement than one could have expected (and decisively more
than the Crown had expected).

Sentences rendered on Charges laid under the Public
Order Regulations

Acquitals:

- R. Cormier acquitted of three charges laid under the
  Regulations (FLQ membership, advocating the aims of
  the FLQ and communicating statements) in Montreal on
  April 15, 1971.

- M. Gutowski acquitted found not guilty of advocating
  FLQ aims by reason of insanity convictions.

- F. Mercier, sentenced to 15 months in jail for FLQ
  membership in Cowansville on November 16, 1970.

- C. Leblanc, sentenced to 10 months in jail for advo­
  cating FLQ aims, acquitted of charges of FLQ membership
  and seditious conspiracy on February 15, 1971.

Sentences rendered on charges laid under the Criminal Code

Acquitals:

- Chartrand, Vallieres, Gagnon, Larue-Langlois, Lemieux

"On February 12, Mr. Justice Ouimet had stunned the
Court rooms by concluding that the charges of sedi­
tious conspiracy (...between January 1, 1968, and
last October 16, the five public figures were party
to a seditious conspiracy with the intent of changing
the Government in Canada and especially in the Province
of Quebec by advocating the use of force...contrary
to the provisions of Section 62, paragraph (c) of the
Criminal Code) against the big five - Chartrand, Lemieux,
Larue-Langlois, Vallieres, Gagnon were too vague" (104)
Similar charges laid again by the Crown were turned down by the Court on June 15, 1971: Gagnon and Larue-Langlois being found not guilty.

- R. Langevin of a charge of publishing a seditious libel on January 15, 1971

- C. Caron of making anonymous phone calls to alarm one or more persons, on July 23, 1971 convictions

- A. Lavoie, sentenced to 2 weeks in jail and a $200. fine for conspiracy to commit a hold-up to finance the FLQ

- R. Belanger sentenced to 15 days in jail for possession of a sawed-off gun

- C. Lariviere and L. Verrault, sentenced to jail terms of 2 and 1 year (on various charges ranging from obstructing justice to aiding the outlawed FLQ; they had aided Paul Rose to leave Montreal in December) on April 27, 1971

- J.G. Lelievre, V. Daudelin, sentenced on the charges of having conspired to steal machine guns and military uniforms.

From this account (which does not pretend to be exhaustive, but which was reconstituted from scattered sources) it appears that the Courts:

- had been reluctant to convict on charges of sedition
- had been inclined to condemn people on charges related to traditional violence
- had to render only in 4 cases sentences on charges arising from the Public Order Regulations.

On July 30, 1971, Justice Minister Choquette, under "mounting pressure" (105)

"Ordered Crown prosecutors to suspend proceedings under the charges arising from the Public Order Regulations (but not under the Criminal Code). Technically the charges against one of the 32 accused could be reviewed at a later date, if Justice Minister Choquette or any of his successors should so decide" (106)
FOCUS IV:

MULTIPLE SEPARATE DECISION UNITS

(BOUNDED RATIONALITY)
1. THE FLQ

Numerous observers, at least during the preliminary phase of the crisis, have more or less openly assumed that the FLQ was some kind of a unitary movement, operating according to a well defined and predetermined strategy (see Model II for descriptive statements). This view, however, hardly resists a more thorough analysis of the evidence at hand.

- 1.1 "Thinkers" and "Men of Action"

In the report on "La Justice et la Securite des Citoyens", Justice Minister Choquette describes the separatist movement as a more or less loose coalition between "thinkers" and "men of action" without precisely spelling the links existing between the two. All we can learn is that "some display, but always verbally, some sympathy for the revolutionary action" and that the others "indulge in criminal acts in order to gain attention". Apparently the Crown had the same problem, both in the La Grenade and in the trial under charges of conspiracy against the "big five" and was repeatedly unable to prove the existence of credible and direct connections between the two groups. The problem was not a new one and one can even doubt that such connections had ever existed:

"It was a tactic of propagandists, such as Pierre Vallieres, to lump together all the criminal activities over a seven year period, as if all had been centrally directed to a common cause. Thus, shortly after he "joined" the FLQ, Vallieres wrote "one of the objectives of the FLQ was and still is to accelerate (the) process of becoming conscious to make men aware of the necessity of fighting to the death against the despotism of the capitalist system..." By the time Vallieres came to the FLQ in 1965, most of the earlier "members" were in jail. Few of them had ideological convictions. Few were able to intellectualize their criminal activities, except that almost all had suffered the deep hurt of being put down by English speaking Canadians" (107)
In these conditions, one can strongly doubt about the enforcibility of the "plans" described by Vallieres in his revolutionary works: The matter being more one of opportunistic politics, than one of planned and detailed revolutionary action.

- 1.2 "Liberation Cell" and "Chenier Cell"

Multiple evidence testify of the existence of a process of "pushing and hauling" between the two cells:

- Discrepancies between Liberation Cell communiqué number 7 and Chenier Cell communiqué number 1: The former mentioning only two conditions, whereas, the latter restores the FLQ demands to their original level.

- Discrepancies between Liberation Cell communiqué number 8 and Chenier Cell communiqué number 4: The former still limiting itself to the same two conditions (the liberation of the political prisoners and the joint transportation of the prisoners and the members of the Cell to Cuba), the latter more or less maintaining the original set of demands.

- The wording of Liberation Cell communiqué number 10 dated October 17, 10:00 A.M., and addressed to radio station CKLM (and which incidentally was not made public before December 8, 1970, because of the police forces' opposition to its immediate broadcasting).

"As a consequence, the Front de Liberation du Quebec declares that:

1. the death sentence against J. Cross is indefinitely suspended. J. Cross is a prisoner of the FLQ. He will not be liberated before the acceptance of our demands, by the authorities.
He will not be executed unless the political fascist police discovers us and attempts to intervene

2. As far as P. Laporte is concerned, the Chenier Cell of the Front de Liberation du Quebec is actually reviewing his case and will soon let the decision be known" (108)

If one refers to the pattern of communication between the two cells, especially to the fact that the communiques were apparently the main source of communication between the two cells (see Chenier Cell communiqués number 3, mentioning "we did not get any news from Liberation Cell"... "If J. Cross is alive they should, the members of the Cell, send an eighth communiqué" or Chenier Cell communiqué number 4 spelling a comprehensive strategy for the two cells): One cannot fail to interpret this message as a warning to the Chenier Cell (which had been repeatedly threatening to kill P. Laporte)

If one tries to explain those marked differences between the actions and the behavior of the two cells, it seems necessary to take several factors into account:

- The absence of any pre-existing plan of action.
  According to some sources (109) only vague discussions between the two groups had taken place and no explicit strategy had been agreed upon.

"There had been talk about forming two cells. One a kidnap cell and one to raise funds, but it was just talk"

The Rose brothers had not been informed of the plans of the Chenier Cell and decided on their own to intervene, interrupting a trip to the U.S. to kidnap a known political figure in the immediate Montreal area.
"We heard on the radio about the kidnapping of James Richard Cross. When we learned that there was only one hostage, we decided we had to return to Canada in case the Government refused to meet the demands of the Liberation Cell. We arrived in Longueuil on Thursday morning, October 8, 1970" (110)

- The difference between the organization of the two operations is that the Liberation Cell had apparently taken sufficient precautions to be able to maintain its position for at least two months (funds, choice of the hide-out) and on the other hand the members of the Chenier Cell were not nearly as resourceful, in that they had to use Laporte's money to buy food and on those grounds it would have been difficult for them to last more than one or two weeks without going in the open and taking great risks.

- The difference between the actors: There is a number of striking differences among the members of the two cells:

- the people in the Liberation Cell were mostly people with families of their own (Charbonneau, Lanctot and Cossette-Trudel were married, Charbonneau had several children, Lanctot had a child and his wife at the time was pregnant) whereas the people in the Chenier Cell had little, if none.

- the people in the Liberation Cell had gained most of their experience in labour conflicts (Charbonneau and Lanctot were involved in the M.L.T., the liberation movement of the taxi industry and had taken part in the Murray Hill conflict in 1969): They
were more sensitive to the impact of their actions and to their logistic components than the boastful Paul Rose, who was more preoccupied with pure sensationalism (consider for example the return of his passport to the authorities).

The difference between their objectives: Jacques Lanctot and the Cossette-Trudels, for example, had personal connections with some of the political prisoners (Francois Lanctot, their brother and brother-in-law, and Andre Roy who had been arrested at the same time) had a personal interest in the denunciation of the "stool" (who was responsible for the arrest of Francois Lanctot); the members of the Chenier Cell on the other hand had no personal interest in those demands, except that they were a means to curb the "arrogance" of the authorities and of the establishment.

Those differences, combined with the fact that the Chenier Cell had secured the more important hostage (in bargaining terms), appear to shed some light on the rather different (and otherwise unexplicable) strategies followed by the two cells.

2. THE AUTHORITIES

If the unitary actor perspective is often a useful fiction, the analysis of the politics of decision appears to be an equally fruitful approach in the process of governmental decision making.

In this direction, we would like to underline some specific characteristics of the problem at hand (as compared to Allison's) that make it particularly suitable for a Focus IV treatment:
- The existence of structurally different units, with different powers, different types of resources and different specific responsibilities (both in the restricted and extended senses)

- The internal nature of the problem, as opposed to Allison's context of Foreign Affairs. The distinction may seem tenuous, but its consequences are nevertheless important:

  - External issues, in most countries, are usually a secondary concern for politicians and decisions in that field usually limit themselves to a very limited number of persons. Whereas internal issues (especially when long lasting) give rise to differentiated and sensitive positions not only in the Cabinets but in the whole body of politics and public opinion.

  - External issues, especially when taking the form of indiscriminate threats, tend to develop a form of solidarity and consciousness (us vs. them) which tend to be absent in internal issues (in that case the dividing line is internal, as in the extreme case of civil war)

- The nature of the Canadian Political System with institutions like the Prime Minister (as opposed to a U.S. President whose power originates from a direct election) the Provincial and Federal nature of the political parties, their loose and heterogeneous ideologies (the Liberal Party is often referred as an ideological sponge), and the limited recruitment of the Canadian Political Elite.

In this model IV perspective we will try to find some evidence of the "pushing and hauling" process taking place among the governments and individuals and relate it to the nature of the action channels and to the characteristics of the Actors involved, in order to determine the process which led to the authorities' decisions.
- 2. 1 Some Evidence on the pushing and hauling process

- 2. 1 1. Prior to October 1970

a) In November 1969, the Montreal authorities had been using the C.J.C. hearings in Ottawa as a forum to express their concern about the pre-revolutionary situation existing in Canada at the time and the lack of available means to protect society:

"He said (Mr. Saulnier) that the riot on October 7, in Montreal, had proved that Canada was a defenceless country. Defence, said Mr. Saulnier, does not apply only to external threats, but to any action that is to be taken to prevent the internal destruction of a country...

Canada has to face a revolutionary plan; some of our examples drawn from the situation in Montreal take place in this plan. Enquire elsewhere and you will discover the same thing, if you really want to find what there is to search" (111)

At the time, his allegations were taken rather lightly by the members of parliament, whose feeling was that the Montreal authorities were trying to build a case in order to dissimulate their responsibility in the riots and disorders that had followed the strike of the Montreal Police Forces.

b) In July 1970, Justice Minister Turner, during the Attorney-General's conference in Halifax, had unsuccessfully proposed important modifications to the Criminal Code, in order to curb "crimes forming part of a national pattern" The matter came back to surface in the aftermath of the crisis, when the federal authorities took advantage of the circumstances to give a new chance to their "pet project".
"Justice Minister Turner will seek the support of the provincial Attorneys-General for his proposal that a new category of national crime be established.

When the matter was first raised in Halifax, last summer, the Attorneys-General were not keen, but the Minister feels that developments in Quebec have strengthened his hand.

Mr. Turner feels that the FLQ crisis has demonstrated the need for federal investigation and prosecution when such crimes form part of a national pattern. This could occur as a result of political conspiracy or organized crime.

In such circumstances, the Justice Minister believes Ottawa is better equipped to ferret out evidence and better able to handle prosecutions.

In all of this there is more than a hint of dissatisfaction (in the way the) FLQ threat (had been handled) in the years preceding the current crisis. When that interpretation was put to the Justice Minister yesterday, he denied it. But a remark he made later in another context seemed to confirm that Ottawa pins some of the blame for the current crisis on what it regards as a somewhat casual approach to the FLQ problem by the Quebec authorities" (112)

On those grounds, it appears that:

- the problem of the implementation of Justice was part of a larger problem. The constitutional repartition of power between the Federal and Provincial governments, which was one of the critical issues of the late sixties with the provinces trying to defend themselves against any infringement on their traditional prerogatives.

- there was some kind of disagreement between the Federal government and the Quebec Province on the treatment to be given to "political
conspiracy" (since the assimilation of political conspiracy with organized crime as national crimes, is rather strange one being "national" only by the extent of its operations, the other being "national" only by its purpose i.e. the separation of Quebec from Canada)

- 2.1 2. From October 5 to October 16

a) Differences in attitudes toward the kidnappers between, Mitchell Sharp and Prime Minister Trudeau, especially on the issue of negotiations.

b) Repeated rumours of disagreement among the members of the Quebec Cabinet more or less explicitly confirmed by Prime Minister Bourassa:

"When I received the letter from Pierre and you know it was a very personal letter, I said "well this has to be a unanimous cabinet decision" I could not make decisions in that situation where we would have been divided let us say 9 to 6 or 13 to 12.

With the life of a colleague involved, I decided to take the time for discussion. We discussed it Sunday, Monday, very long discussions, and of course in the beginning there were different view points, but it was unanimous in the end" (113)

Justice Minister Choquette:

"At the start not everybody was at the same point. There was a different way of seeing things ... we met Sunday for the first time and we had another meeting Monday; another Tuesday and so on... it took three days... I think it was Wednesday that there was agreement among everybody" (114)

c) Conflicting statement on October 13 and October 14, from Prime Ministers Trudeau and Bourassa:
Prime Minister Trudeau on October 13

"I think society must take every means at its disposal to defend itself against the emergence of parallel powers which defy the elected powers in this country. I think that power must be stopped and I think it's only weakened bleeding hearts who are afraid to take these measures" (115)

Whereas, on the same day, lawyer Lemieux and lawyer Demers, who had been appointed by the Provincial Government were having their first round of negotiations.

Prime Minister Trudeau on October 14, is reported to have said, at a meeting of the Liberal Caucus in Ottawa:

"That the Government has no intention of altering its opposition in an exchange of FLQ prisoners for the lives of FLQ kidnapped victims" (116)

When reporters told Prime Minister Bourassa, in Quebec City, that Pierre Trudeau had said there was no question of liberating the prisoners, he replied that "Mr. Trudeau had approved his statement on Sunday night" When reporters insisted that Mr. Trudeau had been very categorical in ruling out any freeing of prisoners, Prime Minister Bourassa said only that he "had not read his interview" and that "he (Trudeau) was not specific"

d) The "independent letter" addressed to Prime Minister Trudeau on October 15 (whereas, Bourassa's letter was dated on the 16th) by J. Drapeau and L. Saulnier, requesting "for the assistance of higher levels of government". This letter is even more curious in that no legal basis exists for such a request and
that in 1969, Chairman L. Saulnier, when questioned on the fact that the municipality had not requested the intervention of the Canadian Army, had replied that:

"Constitutionally speaking, the municipality could not communicate with the Federal authorities this attribution being of provincial competence"

e) The statement made by Mayor J. Drapeau on October 12:

"The hour is serious and the politicians need the support of the entire population, if they are not to lack courage. One must note a certain analogy between the kidnapping of Mr. Laporte and kidnappings in other countries... That is strangely similar to revolutions in other countries..."

f) The personal letter addressed by Mrs. Laporte to several Federal and Provincial Ministers between October 10 and October 16.

g) The statement made by a group of P. Laporte's friends and collaborators on October 15 and asking for

"an acceleration of the liberation process in order to obtain the liberation of the hostages"

In the same open letter, the group was underlining its opposition to police or military intervention (at the time the army had not yet been officially requested in Montreal)

h) The pledge made by Prime Minister Bourassa on October 12, that he "had the support of the National Assembly"

i) The presence of Mr. Lalonde (reputed as Trudeau's eminence grise) in Quebec City on the evening of the 15th. Mr. Lalonde is reported to have taken
Prime Minister Bourassa's letter back to Ottawa.

j) Rumours of disagreement in the Federal Government, among the Prime Minister and a group of English speaking Ministers led by John Munro, on the fact that the proposed legislation was applicable all over Canada.

- 2.1 3. After October 16

a) On October 20 the Quebec Government nominates:

- Mr. Roy Fournier as Provincial Attorney-General. Up to that date the Provincial Justice Minister had been in charge of the two functions.

- Mr. Jean Bienvenue, who had been shadow Justice Minister on P. Laporte's slate during the last liberal leadership convention, as Minister of Immigration (before his death P. Laporte had been the Quebec Minister of Manpower and Immigration)

b) On November 1970, Justice Minister Choquette is reported to have said that:

"The Public Order Temporary Measures Act introduced in the Commons Monday is "an improvement" over the War Measures Act, but the Quebec Government, would like to see a permanent law rather than temporary measures" (117)

c) The opposition between Ottawa and Quebec on the indefinite extension of the Public Order Temporary Measures Act, as noted by Walter Stewart:
"Premier Bourassa wanted this Act extended indefinitely and criticized the Federal Government for not complying with his wishes; but John Turner who could see the linking of his own name with the repressive legislation (the Public Order Act was invariably referred to in the French press as La loi Turner) the death of his own prime ministerial ambitions, threatened to resign on the issue and the law died" (118)

2.2 The action channels involved

The kidnapping of James R. Cross, immediately triggered the meeting of a task force in the Operation Centre of the Department of External Affairs:

"The task force was created within minutes of the kidnapping; it was an informal group of officials which functioned in a very elastic manner in the Operations Centre of the Department of External Affairs. The Operations Centre is designed for just this kind of "crisis management" function. Its permanent staff and special facilities and equipment supported the task force operation in a variety of ways.

The task force was interdepartmental. The Department of External Affairs provided the facilities, the head and a number of members of the group but several other departments also participated - the Prime Minister's office, the Privy Council, the Solicitor General's office, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the National Defence Department, the Justice Department and the Transport Department. Its main function was to provide a base with ready access to all the information media and all decision-making centres involved in the crisis. By combining the receiving, distribution and analysis of all information on the crisis, it also became a useful centre for consulting with all the federal and provincial authorities who played major roles in the crisis. Of course it was not the only centre of concern and activity in this field.

While the task force was interdepartmental, it also represented the particular interest of the Department of External Affairs in the matter because of course, the kidnap victim was a foreign representative and, as things turned out, the essential safe-conduct had to be arranged with a foreign government."
As it was a diplomat who was kidnapped, our Department was immediately seized of the problem because of our international legal obligations under the various conventions for the protection and well-being of diplomats."

(119)

Apparently, the fact that the operation was involving a foreign diplomat, had dominated over the other attributes of the kidnapping (which was an operation of the FLQ and which could for example have been handled on plausible grounds, by the anti-terrorist squad). As the matter was involving decisions falling under Provincial jurisdiction (the activities of the Police Forces, the disclosure of the identity of the informer) as well as indirectly the whole political situation in the province of Quebec, Justice Minister J. Choquette was given a say in the negotiations with the Liberation Cell.

However, the kidnapping of P. Laporte, immediately introduced a drastic extension in the action channels involved. In order to specify them as exhaustively as possible, we shall try to describe first those involved by the characteristics of the FLQ chosen action, and then those involved by the set of demands made by the FLQ (both of them being summarized in Appendix IV)

- 2. 2 1. Action channels involved by the FLQ chosen action

   Place: As both kidnappings took place in Montreal, one of the first effect of the FLQ chosen action was to involve directly the Montreal Police Forces, which have jurisdiction over the criminal actions committed in the Montreal area. At a further stage, as the municipal Police Forces are under the control of the municipal government, the municipal authorities became involved in the process. In the same way, the Q.P.P. and its
controlling authority, the Attorney-General of the Province of Quebec were given a say in the law enforcement process (however, it must be noted that the exact basis for their involvement is not totally clear, since the basis for the division of labour, between the two forces in the Montreal area is unknown to us; for the moment)

Type of Action: As both kidnappings involve the FLQ, the task force on terrorists activities (anti-terrorist squad) becomes part of the process. The task force includes members of the Montreal Police forces, R.C.M.P. and Q.P.P. Its controlling authority seems to be the Quebec Attorney-General but as 70% of the task force is constituted by members of the Montreal Police Forces, the direction of the municipal forces is likely to have a preponderent influence in its policy (given also the fact that the task force is located in Montreal, whereas the Quebec Attorney-General is usually in Quebec City)

Personality of James Cross: As a representative of the British Government in Canada, the safety of James Cross is a concern for the British Government (which placed Mr. Geoffrey Rippon in charge of the contacts with the Canadian Government, during the crisis) and for the ministry of External Affairs (which are of federal competence) as mentioned earlier. This "federal" channel in turn involved the R.C.M.P. which it is to be noted is the only law enforcement authority included in the "East Block" task force. In addition to these formal channels, the kidnapping of James Cross indirectly involves the whole Diplomatic Corps in post in Canada (especially in Ottawa and Montreal) and his personal network of relatives, friends and colleagues.
Personality of P. Laporte: As a member of the Quebec Government (and through his direct address to Robert Bourassa), the safety of P. Laporte immediately involves the whole Quebec Cabinet, on the other hand his quality of long standing M.P., makes his kidnapping a matter of concern for his colleagues at the National Assembly, especially for those in the Liberal Deputation. On other grounds his quality as a Minister of Manpower and Immigration involves a network of collaborators and "customers" whose welfare is more or less tied to P. Laporte's survival and influence. Finally, on a personal level his kidnapping ultimately concerns his family and his network of relations (among which people like C. Ryan, P. Laporte having been for a few years the parliamentary correspondant of Le Devoir).

2. 2 2. Action channels involved by the seven FLQ demands

It is interesting to note that the set of demands set forth by the FLQ involve by their very nature a complex network of organizations and public officials (whose complexity one cannot fail to wonder was probably underestimated by the FLQ).

D-1 The release of the "Political" Prisoners

As the status of the 23 political prisoners were rather heterogeneous (15 were detained in Federal institutions, 5 in Provincial institutions and 3 were free on bail: For a more detailed account see Appendix V), any acceptance of the release of the prisoners would have involved:

- the Federal Government and more precisely the Minister of Justice, John Turner (since the prisoners had been condemned under existing provisions of the Criminal Code), and the Attorney-General, George MacIlraith,
who controls the Canadian Penitentiary Service (which had the responsibility for the detention of the prisoners) and the National Parole Board (which in turn controlled one of the few legal provisions under which the prisoners could have been released with a minimum of legal decency)

- the Provincial Government and more precisely the Attorney-General, Justice Minister Jerome Choquette, who had ultimate responsibility for the Provincial Penitentiary Service, the Crown (which had obtained the condemnation of the prisoners) and the judges (who had condemned them and who would have not accepted to see their decisions reverted without discussion)

D-2 The transportation of the Prisoners to Cuba or Algeria

As indicated before this demand involved both the Federal Ministry of External Affairs (which had the authority to negotiate with the potential host countries) and the R.C.A.F. under the control of the Defence Department (which was to provide the means of transportation)

D-3 The $500,000 Gold Ransom

In October 1970, as gold was evaluated at $125. an ounce, the $500,000 ransom nearly represented 225 pounds of gold. Its payment would have necessitated an authorization from the Ministry of Finance (Federal or Provincial) to purchase the gold either from the Bank of Canada or from the Bank of Nova Scotia (which is the only Canadian Bank, detaining gold in large quantities). However, this demand was rapidly
eliminated since the kidnappers declared "that they would not kill for the sake of dollars"

D-4 The rehiring of the Lapalme mail delivery workers

The fulfilment of this demand would have obliged the Federal Post Master General to come to terms with the Lapalme workers union, headed by Frank Ditterlizzi. However, as the leaders of the union, quickly mentioned, that they were only interested in reaching a settlement by their own means, the demand was consequently disactivated (but nevertheless preliminary contacts had taken place between the Post Master General and the workers)

D-5 The disclosure of the identity of the police informer

Rested entirely on the Quebec Justice Minister's responsibility, but it is clear that no decision on such a point would have been reached after some thorough consultation with the Police Forces (and especially of the Q.P.P., which had benefited from the information)

D-6 The diffusion of the FLQ Manifesto

This demand ultimately rested under the responsibility of the Federal Government which through the Secretary of State, Gerald Pelletier, was the controlling authority for the CBC. The decision to publish the manifesto in other media being left to the responsibility of their editorial boards.

D-7 The cessation of Police Forces' activities
As three police forces were involved such a decision could only be taken by the respective directorates of the three forces under the control of their respective hierarchical authorities (the Municipal Government, the Quebec Attorney-General and the Federal Attorney-General).

This description of the action channels involved both by the situation and the FLQ demands, will now enable us to examine the actors, either as players in position (involved by their positions along the action channels) or as ad-hoc players (involved by the impact of the decision on their own objectives).

2.3 The Actors

In analyzing the main actors of the crisis (at least those for whom sufficient information is available) we shall try to focus first on what determined their stand (priorities, preferences, perceptions, goals, stakes) and then try to appreciate their power situation (bargaining position, skill, perceptions by other participants, rules) in order to be able to assess their impact on the final decision.

We have tried to regroup them according to the institutions to which they belonged, since it appeared to us, that even if differences existed among their individual positions, the similarity of their environments made them share some common basic perspectives.

2.3 1. Actors in the Federal Government

The main actors in the Federal Government share the attribute of being national (as opposed to provincial)
characters, which ultimately means that they are accountable for their actions to the whole Canadian nation, to the opposition in Ottawa, and to their own national Party. As Liberals, moreover, they are publicly committed to certain issues like the survival of the Confederation in its actual form or their policy on bilingualism and biculturalism. However, beyond those common attributes individuals show noticeable differences resulting either from personal or environmental variations, as shown in the following table.
<p>| TABLE 1                                                                 | <strong>ACTORS IN POSITION</strong>                                                                 |
|                                                                      | <strong>P.E. TRUDEAU</strong> | <strong>J.M. TURNER</strong>                                                |
| <strong>PRIORITIES AND PREFERENCES</strong>                                      | - Solve Quebec's problems within the frame of Confederation | - Desire to improve Federal control on &quot;national crimes&quot; |
|                                                                      | - Use the &quot;system&quot; as it is but do not hesitate to take harsh measures to face emergency situations | - Desire to liberalize the Criminal Code |
| <strong>PERCEPTIONS</strong>                                                      | - Intellectuals do not represent effective leadership in Quebec |                                      |
|                                                                      | - Weak status of democracy in Quebec |                                      |
| <strong>GOALS</strong>                                                           | - Maintain legality | - Gain better control on implementation of law |
|                                                                      | - Check progress of separatism in Quebec | - Avoid permanent repressive legislation of &quot;ideological nature&quot; |
|                                                                      | - Save the lives of the hostages |                                      |
| <strong>STAKES</strong>                                                          | - National leadership | - Prime Ministerial ambitions (heir apparent to Trudeau) |
|                                                                      | - Expectations of English Canada |                                      |
|                                                                      | - Survival of Liberal Party |                                      |
| <strong>BARGAINING POSITION</strong>                                            | - Control over most FLQ demands | - Control over Criminal legislation |
|                                                                      | - Ultimate control on use of Armed Forces |                                      |
|                                                                      | - Little local control over information |                                      |
|                                                                      | - Low key position in first phase of crisis |                                      |
| <strong>POWER</strong>                                                           | - Charismatic leadership | - Charismatic leadership |
|                                                                      | - Autocratic style of decision-making | - Competence |
| <strong>SKILLS</strong>                                                          | - &quot;Toughness&quot; as a negotiator | - Privileged status in the Cabinet |
| <strong>PERCEPTIONS BY OTHER PARTICIPANTS</strong>                               | - Has to obtain some form of acceptance in Commons in the case of emergency legislation |                                      |
| <strong>RULES</strong>                                                           |                                      |                                      |
| <strong>STAND</strong>                                                           |                                      |                                      |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>M. SHARP</th>
<th>G. MACILRAITH</th>
<th>MUNROE</th>
<th>J. MARCHAND</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Maintain the international image of Canada</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Save the lives of the hostages, especially the one of J. Cross</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Reform of the R.C.M.P. and the implementation of the recommendations of the Report on Security</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Control over Federal Police Forces</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Defend the R.C.M.P. against reproaches of incompetence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Limit actions to the Province of Quebec</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Collusion between separatism and &quot;legal&quot; political movements</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Check progress of separatism in Quebec</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Preserve the position of the Quebec Wing of the Liberal Party</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Status as main Quebec &quot;Lieutenant&quot; to P.E. Trudeau</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2.3 2. **Actors in the Provincial Government**

The principal actors in the Provincial Government share the attributes of being accountable for their actions to their electorate (in which English speaking members represent less than 25% of the total population), to the opposition in the National Assembly (Union Nationale, Parti Quebecois and Credit Social) and to their own Provincial Party.

More specifically, they represent a tendency which was brought to power in the preceding leadership congress, with the discrete blessing of Ottawa and of the party machinery.

However, by some aspects, sharp differences are to be noted in the Cabinet, which includes both traditional Liberals (like C. Kirkland-Casgrain or W. Tetley) and newly appointed technicians (like Castonguay or L'Allier) with few connections with the traditional political culture. At the time of the crisis, the Cabinet is still untried and a large amount of energy is devoted to patch and smooth the bitterness which has followed the leadership congress.

Given those elements, important differences appear in the stands and power positions of the actors, as shown in the following table:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE II</th>
<th>R. BOURASSA</th>
<th>J. CHOQUETTE</th>
<th>C. CASGRAIN</th>
<th>R. GARNEAU</th>
<th>C. CASTONGUAY</th>
<th>W. TETLEY</th>
<th>J.P. L'ALLIER</th>
<th>FRIENDS AND RELATIVES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PRIORITIES AND PREFERENCES</td>
<td>Quebec Economic Development</td>
<td>Social Policy (Introduction of medical plan)</td>
<td>- Feels his priorities &amp; even his security are threatened</td>
<td>Actual legal provisions are insufficient to curb &quot;ideological crimes&quot;</td>
<td>Growing fear &amp; discontent in Montreal area</td>
<td>The problem is limited to negotiations with the FLQ</td>
<td>- Oriented toward their specific tasks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STAND</td>
<td>Restore the political status-quo</td>
<td>Maintain his leadership</td>
<td>Save the life of P. Laporte</td>
<td>- Obtained a tougher legislation against &quot;ideological&quot; crimes</td>
<td>- Opposition to concessions</td>
<td>- Ask Gov't action to restore confidence</td>
<td>- Save life of P. Laporte even at expense of &quot;major concessions&quot;</td>
<td>- Save the life of P. Laporte</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOALS</td>
<td>Leadership over Cabinet</td>
<td>Political career</td>
<td>Conception of Prov. Fed. relations</td>
<td>Participation in the Cabinet</td>
<td>Authority over Police Forces</td>
<td>- Influence in Provincial politics</td>
<td>- Participation in the Cabinet</td>
<td>Life of P. Laporte (personal relations, careers, influence)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STAKES</td>
<td>- Little control over FLQ demands</td>
<td>Opportunity to use Prov. pub. opinion to reinforce his position in face of Ottawa.</td>
<td>Control over implementation of legal provisions (arrests, indictments)</td>
<td>- Influence in the Liberal Caucus</td>
<td>- Credible image in Public Opinion</td>
<td>Influence to Liberal Caucus</td>
<td>Ability to develop &quot;moral&quot; &amp; personal pressure</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BARGAINING POSITION</td>
<td>- Bureaucratic leadership</td>
<td>Little authority over Cabinet</td>
<td>Limited experience in criminal matters (main background in labour relations)</td>
<td>&quot;Tough&quot;</td>
<td>Technocratic appeal</td>
<td>Represent a tendency of defeated at Leadership Congress</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POWER</td>
<td>- Uncertain</td>
<td>Unexperienced</td>
<td>Technocratic Image</td>
<td>Often perceived as too soft by members of Lib. Caucus</td>
<td>Police Forces are reported to have little confidence in him</td>
<td>&quot;Hard Liners&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SKILLS</td>
<td>- Little control over FLQ demands</td>
<td>Opportunity to use Prov. pub. opinion to reinforce his position in face of Ottawa.</td>
<td>Control over implementation of legal provisions (arrests, indictments)</td>
<td>- Influence in the Liberal Caucus</td>
<td>- Credible image in Public Opinion</td>
<td>Influence to Liberal Caucus</td>
<td>Ability to develop &quot;moral&quot; &amp; personal pressure</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERCEPTIONS BY OTHER PARTICIPANTS</td>
<td>&quot;Tough&quot;</td>
<td>Technocratic appeal</td>
<td>Represent a tendency of defeated at Leadership Congress</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>RULES</td>
<td>Wants unanimous decisions in Cabinet</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
2.3.3. Actor(s) in the Municipal Government

As very limited individual differences appear between Mayor J. Drapeau and Chairman Lucien Saulnier, their common position may be summarized as follows:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STAND</th>
<th>PRIORITIES AND PREFERENCES</th>
<th>PERCEPTIONS</th>
<th>GOALS</th>
<th>STAKES</th>
<th>BARGAINING POSITION</th>
<th>POWER</th>
<th>SKILLS</th>
<th>PERCEPTION BY OTHER PARTICIPANTS</th>
<th>RULES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>J. DRAPEAU AND L. SAULNIER</td>
<td>Preserve the status of Montreal as Canada's most important urban center</td>
<td>Feel that a revolution is taking place in Montreal</td>
<td>Feel threats against his personal security</td>
<td>&quot;Clean-up the mess&quot; (eliminate demonstrations, public protests, bombings...)</td>
<td>Get re-elected with the minimum level of opposition</td>
<td>Virtually no official control except on Montreal Police Forces, which in fact means a large control over information and the implementation of legal provisions</td>
<td>- Autocratic leadership</td>
<td>- Tough</td>
<td>- No constitutional right to intervene</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Ability to carry on long lasting projects</td>
<td>- Resolute</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Easy access to Federal leaders</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE III
- 2.4 Issues in conflict

If we try to summarize the preceding analysis, it appears that three issues were in conflict among the governmental decision-makers:

- The applicability of the repressive provisions outside Quebec

This limited conflict essentially appeared in the Federal Government, a group of Ottawa officials apparently headed by John Munro opposing the national character of the new legislation. Apparently the worries of that group were calmed by a promise to "lock" as much as possible the implementation of the Public Order Regulations in other Provinces than Quebec.

- The acceptance of the FLQ demands

By conflict on this issue, we do not mean that there existed two extreme positions, one accepting all FLQ demands, the other rejecting them, but that there were differences in the evaluation of the number and the extent of the concessions the authorities could make in order to save the hostages' lives.

In Ottawa, the Ministry of External Affairs, who was coordinating the task force, was in the beginning pushing for a negotiated settlement with the FLQ, at least during the first days of the crisis. But as the FLQ gradually removed the demands, which were the easiest to agree upon only minimal concessions were proposed, probably under the joint influence of P.E. Trudeau and J. Choquette.
However, the eventuality of the release of the 23 political prisoners was never considered as indicated by Claude Roquet:

"When planning for a safe conduct, what we were prepared to think about was the possibility of transportation out of Canada for the kidnappers themselves... For various practical reasons (geographical distance, presence of a Cuban Consulate in Montreal, and of a resident Canadian Mission in Havana) it was decided that these arrangements should be made with Cuba. We made a request that Cuba assist us for humanitarian reasons and the Cuban Government agreed. The safe conduct offer was then formulated in consultation with the Cubans" (119)

After P. Laporte's kidnapping, the problem shifted to Quebec where neither Bourassa nor the other Cabinet members had taken part in the first round of negotiations. The timid leadership of R. Bourassa and in this respect it is interesting to notice the comments made by Anthony Westell, one year later during the Victoria conference:

"When the bargaining began, it was soon apparent that Bourassa was unsure of his ground on some issues. He hesitated, procrastinated and several times excused himself to go to the phone and take advice, presumably from Cabinet colleagues back home in Quebec. To the other Premiers, it seemed that he was not so much a head of Government as a spokesman for a collective leadership - a collective which was divided on major matters" (120)

allied to the sharp differences existing among Cabinet members, and to the desire expressed by R. Bourassa to reach a unanimous decision, led to three days of discussions among the Cabinet. From what we know "the flexible" attitude was defended by Castonguay and L'Allier, whereas, the "law and order one" was defended by Choquette, Casgrain, Tetley and Garneau, whose position had been weakened by the kidnapping of P. Laporte, following J. Choquette's "firm" stand in his address to the FLQ.
Given this split in the Cabinet the determination of Ottawa, his weak bargaining position (he could only have "liberated" 8 prisoners, under a "Nolle Prosequi" provision, but it is highly doubtful that the Crown and the Quebec Attorney-General would have accepted such a move), the pressures emanating from Laporte's friends and relatives, and the promises of the police forces to crack the two cells in a matter of hours, R. Bourassa decided to "buy time". During his, Sunday, 12, statement, he tried to be as little compromising as possible and deliberately oriented the negotiations toward technicalities (the mechanisms of the exchange). In his view, those two or three days he was trying to "buy" were to permit:

- the cabinet to make a unanimous decision
- the police forces to make decisive progress in their investigation

However, if he succeeded in convincing the FLQ (as expressed in their later messages and in Laporte's letter) that he was ready to negotiate his attitude apparently generated some side consequences, which he had not apparently foreseen or deemed worth considering:

- the police forces grew nervous, and held R. Lemieux (who they had arrested on their own initiative) in jail even after the Quebec Government had proclaimed that he was accepted as a "bona fide" negotiator on behalf of the FLQ.

- the offer for negotiations raised FLQ expectations as can be seen in Chenier Cell communique No. 5 where a "split deal" was proposed (J. Cross against the release of the Political Prisoners and the termination of police searches. P. Laporte against the fulfillment
of the other four demands, among which some had been turned down the week before).

- confusion appeared in public opinion (as testified by the different interpretations developed in the media)

- the development of a current of support for a negotiated solution in some segments of the population (and it is not sure at all that Bourassa tried to discourage them, since it was improving his position in front of Ottawa)

- An increasing restiveness among Montreal authorities, who are persuaded that the "revolution is taking place" (backed in that by the alarmist information turned by the Montreal Police Forces) and that elections are going to be a disaster if they take place in a climate of victory for the separatist movement.

Increasingly afraid by the developments (which have more or less been caused by the Government's attitude) the "doves" fold on Wednesday the 14th, and Bourassa concentrates his attention on repressive actions (he does not even take the pain to consult with the Parole Board Director, in order to check whether the Quebec Government recommendation makes any sense)

- The creation of new repressive provisions in the Criminal Code

Apparently on the pressure of both the Crown and the Police Forces (which were still resenting their unsuccessful attempt to have Gagnon and Vallieres convicted on conspiracy charges) Justice Minister Choquette made himself the
advocate for the introduction of new repressive provisions against "ideological crimes" in the Criminal Code.

But on these grounds he had to face Justice Minister Turner who had committed himself during his mandate to the "liberalization" of the Criminal Code (and who was not pleased with the prospect of having his name tied to an "infamous" piece of legislation, which could have hampered his own political career)

Apparently, however, J. Choquette got his point, as expressed by John Turner himself:

"Why these powers? Because in the opinion of the Attorney-General of the Government of Quebec, an opinion which I share, in the present situation...under the present law, the prosecution of this type of violent criminal conspiracy is rendered difficult, if not impossible, under the present provisions of the Criminal Code" (121)

But apparently "this shared opinion" led to results far under the Quebec Attorney-General's expectations. The Public Order Regulations were very specific (and by the fact difficult to extend) and rather cumbersome to implement. But as he was given a more or less free hand in implementing them, he satisfied himself with that deal.

The whole issue surfaced again at the expiration of the emergency legislation but as indicated earlier, Justice Minister Turner put his resignation in the balance and the Public Order (temporary measures) Act was not prolonged. But, this was not the end of it, as mentioned by Anthony Westell:

"In Parliament, there was talk of the need for permanent legislation less fearsome than the all-embracing War
Measures Act to provide emergency powers in times of disturbance. This was a dubious proposition because the saving grace of the W.M.A. was that it was a draconian measure which the government must hesitate to invoke. A handy little law for suspending just a few liberties might be too tempting. A better approach, perhaps, was suggested by Trudeau in June 1971 when he asked the provinces to agree to entrench basic political rights in the constitution. The draft charter provided that the government could limit these rights when necessary to protect public safety and national security, among other things. But according to Justice Minister Turner, it would then be open to the courts to determine if the government had reasonable justification for its action. If the charter had been in force in October 1970, the courts could have been asked to decide if the Government had reasonable grounds for suspending civil rights, and to restore them if there was insufficient evidence of an apprehended insurrection endangering order and security.

The charter was not accepted by Quebec for quite different reasons, but Trudeau's proposal should not be ignored by those who argue that the crisis stripped him of any claim to be a civil libertarian." (122)
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(72) Quoted in Saywell p. 92
(73) Haggart and Golden, op. cit., p. 168
(74) Quoted in Toronto Globe and Mail, October 7, 1969
(75) Royal Commission on Security, op. cit., p. 89
(76) La Police et la Securite des Citoyens, op. cit., p. 30

(77) -

(78) Royal Commission on Security, op. cit., p. 8

(79) Vancouver Sun, November 16, 1971

(80) Quebec Occupe, L'Agence de Distribution Populaire, Editions Parti Pris, Montreal, 1971, p. 212

(81) Vancouver Sun, October 20, 1970

(82) Haggart and Golden, op. cit., p. 112

(83) Vancouver Sun, October 22, 1970

(84) Toronto Globe and Mail, October 27, 1970

(84a) Ibid

(85) Ibid

(86) Toronto Globe and Mail, October 20, 1970

(87) Le Devoir, Montreal, October 8, 1969

(88) Toronto Globe and Mail, October 8, 1969

(89) Toronto Globe and Mail, October 20, 1970

(90) Vancouver Sun, November 6, 1970

(91) Westell, op. cit., p. 251


(93) Le Soleil, Quebec, October 27, 1970

(94) Quoted in Le Soleil, Quebec, November 3, 1970

(94a) Toronto Globe and Mail, December 8, 1970

(95) Toronto Globe and Mail, October 26 or 27

(96) Lacoursiere, op. cit., p. 318

(97) Haggart and Golden, op. cit., p. 194
(98) Le Soleil, Quebec, October 17, 1970

(99) Ibid, November 4, 1970

(100) Lacoursiere, op. cit., p. 314

(101) Toronto Globe and Mail, October 28, 1970

(102) Haggart and Golden, op. cit., p. 131

(103) Lacoursiere, op. cit., p. 347


(105) Ibid

(106) Canadian News Facts, July 15 - July 31, 1971 issue

(107) Haggart and Golden, p. 127

(108) Lacoursiere, op. cit., p. 277

(109) Brian Moore, The Revolution Script, McClelland & Stewart Ltd. Toronto, 1971, p. 91

(110) Quoted in Saywell, op. cit., p. 55

(111) Le Devoir, November 28, 1969

(112) Toronto Globe and Mail, October 20, 1970

(113) Quoted in Saywell, op. cit., p. 138

(114) Ibid p. 139

(115) Ibid p. 73

(116) Toronto Globe and Mail, October 16, 1970

(117) Ibid, November 1970

(118) Stewart, op. cit., p. 62

(119) Interview with Claude Roquet (Director of the task force) quoted in External Affairs, Monthly Bulletin of the Department of External Affairs, Vol XXI, No. 1, Jan 1971

(120) Westell, op. cit., p. 41

(121) Stewart, op. cit., p. 61

(122) Westell, op. cit., p. 259
APPENDIX I

FLQ REPORTED ACTIONS - 1963-1970
APPENDIX II

ORGANIZATIONAL CHART OF THE R.C.M.P.
Adapted from J.G.E. Murray, Organization, Functions and Jurisdiction of the R.C.M.P.,
Master Thesis in Political Science, Carleton University, 1970.
APPENDIX III

SUMMARY OF THE INDICTMENT PROCESS
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PLACE OF ARRAINMENT</th>
<th>DATE OF ARRAINMENT</th>
<th>NAMES</th>
<th>CHARGES</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>UNDER THE PUBLIC ORDER REGULATIONS</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>FLQ MEMBERSHIP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONTREAL</td>
<td>NOVEMBER 2</td>
<td>J.G. Lelievre</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>V. Daudelin</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONTREAL</td>
<td>NOVEMBER 5</td>
<td>M. Chartrand</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Lemieux</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Vallieres</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Gagnon</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Larue-Langlois</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>L. Balcer</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>L. Rose</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>A. Feretti</td>
<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>J. Boisjoly</td>
<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>G. Cormier</td>
<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>R. Cormier</td>
<td>x</td>
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<td>R. Langevin</td>
<td>x</td>
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<td></td>
<td>C. Leblanc</td>
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<td>J.L. Arene</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>P. Beauchamp</td>
<td>x</td>
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<td></td>
<td>J.F. Brossin</td>
<td>x</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>P. Carrier</td>
<td>x</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>G. Lachance</td>
<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>A. Lavoie</td>
<td>x</td>
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<td></td>
<td>G. L'Esperance</td>
<td>x</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>C. Roy</td>
<td>x</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>L. Samson</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>N. Turgeon</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>F. Vickerson</td>
<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Names</td>
<td>Comments</td>
</tr>
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<td>--------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------------------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montreal</td>
<td>November 12</td>
<td>x1 (A. Vachon), x2</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Gowansville</td>
<td>November 5</td>
<td>F. Mercier</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Sperbrooke</td>
<td>November 5</td>
<td>R. Jodoin, J. Jodoin, M. Gauthier, J. Gauthier</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jebec</td>
<td>November 5</td>
<td>G. Hudon, R. Noel</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Mouski</td>
<td>November 5</td>
<td>C. Caron *, L. Caron *, J. Plante, R. Belanger **</td>
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<tr>
<td>Montreal</td>
<td>November 13</td>
<td>G. Pelletier, P. Bourret, J. Depatie, J.J. Leroux, D. Seguin</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX IV

SUMMARY OF THE ACTION CHANNELS INVOLVED
APPENDIX V

STATUS OF THE 23 POLITICAL PRISONERS
### TABLE V

**APPENDIX V**

### STATUS OF THE 23 POLITICAL PRISONERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>CONDEMNED IN</th>
<th>SENTENCE</th>
<th>ELIGIBILITY FOR PAROLE*</th>
<th>ELIGIBLE FOR &quot;NOLLE PROSEQUI&quot;</th>
<th>F.P.</th>
<th>P.P.</th>
<th>OTHER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F. Schirm</td>
<td>Nov 67</td>
<td>Life</td>
<td>Nov 74</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Guenette</td>
<td>Nov 67</td>
<td>Death</td>
<td>Nov 77</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Delisle</td>
<td>Nov 67</td>
<td>Life</td>
<td>Nov 74</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Demers</td>
<td>June 67</td>
<td>8 years</td>
<td>June 70*</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M. Faulkner</td>
<td>June 67</td>
<td>6 years</td>
<td>Sep 69*</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G. Laquerre</td>
<td>June 67</td>
<td>6 years</td>
<td>Sep 69*</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Simard</td>
<td>June 67</td>
<td>5 years</td>
<td>June 69*</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R. Mathieu</td>
<td>June 67</td>
<td>9 years</td>
<td>Aug 70*</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R. Levesque</td>
<td>Nov 68</td>
<td>7 years</td>
<td>Jan 71</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>P.P. Geoffroy</td>
<td>Apr 69</td>
<td>Life</td>
<td>Apr 76</td>
<td>x</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>C. Morency</td>
<td>Arrested</td>
<td>June 70</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Roy</td>
<td>Arrested</td>
<td>June 70</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>F. Lanctot</td>
<td>Arrested</td>
<td>June 70</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G. Hudon</td>
<td>Oct 63</td>
<td>12 years</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Arrested</td>
<td>Paroled 67</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>again May 70</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>R. Hudon</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>8 years</td>
<td>Paroled 69</td>
<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Arrested in June</td>
<td>25 years</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>A. Lessard</td>
<td>Arrested</td>
<td>Liberated on bail in 70</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R. Tremblay</td>
<td>Arrested</td>
<td>Liberated on bail in 70</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M.A. Gagne</td>
<td>June 70</td>
<td>25 years</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P. Boucher</td>
<td></td>
<td>16 years</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>A. Ouellet</td>
<td></td>
<td>10 years</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,000 days</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>P. Demers</td>
<td>Arrested early 70</td>
<td>held without bail</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Arrested</td>
<td>Liberated on bail in 70</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>---</td>
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<td>---</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P. Marcil</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M. Loriot</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Eligible 5 or 6
N. Eligible 9
8 15 5 3

F.P. = Federal Prisons
P.P. = Provincial Prisons
* According to Parole Board Regulations
APPENDIX VI

ALLEGED COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN J. CROSS, P. LAPORTE AND THE AUTHORITIES
APPENDIX VI

ALLEGED COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN J. CROSS, P. LAPORTE AND THE AUTHORITIES

In any situation having to do with a search process they are usually commentators who proclaim (generally after the fact) that "everything was clear, for those who know how to read" The October crisis, did not fail to produce such a result and gave birth to at least three different accounts of "clues", dissimulated in the messages sent by the victims to the authorities.

"Route Rurale No. 4"

Between the 11th and the 16th, Robert Lemieux has pretended, without much justification, that the messages sent by R. Laporte were containing some form of a code, which when in turn translated was stressing the importance of a Route Rurale No. 4. But, apparently, he did not go further in his investigations.

J. Cross' Message

In December 1970, the Press reflected the facts that:
- in one of the messages the time was mentioned, 9:45, and that the 1 preceding the first paragraph was underlined twice.
- in a further message, "recollecting" had been used more or less out of context.

This lead to the interpretation that, J. Cross had tried to indicate the location of the hide-out on 10945 des Recollets (since 9:45 in military coding was written 0945, which in turn when added the one gave 10945). The authors of the article underlined that such a strategy was consistent with the fact that prior going to Malaysia, where he had been posted before, J.R. Cross had been given a few courses by the M. 15.
P. Laporte's Message

An article published in 1973 (reference unknown) and based on interviews with former friends and collaborators of P. Laporte, gave a very similar account of P. Laporte's first message to R. Bourassa. It is remarked that in his letter, P. Laporte insists on both the number 12 (misdating his letter on the 12th in spite of the 11th and mentioning erroneously that he has 12 persons at charge in his family) and the notion of health (first about himself and then about his family.) Those two clues are then correlated with the fact that in St. Hubert P. Laporte was detained close to aviation building No. 12 (to which the people around refer as the 12, a huge 12 being painted on the roof) and close to a hospital. This interpretation is then backed by the fact that P. Laporte is reported to have said, in the week following the kidnapping of James Cross, that in such a case he would have tried to smuggle out coded messages.

It is difficult a priori to discount the value of such interpretations, but it must nevertheless be noted that:

- the sources for the first and third messages had a direct interest in having their interpretation accredited (Robert Lemieux had an interest in misdirecting the police forces and the friends of P. Laporte had apparently some resentment against the authorities)

- the second interpretation was never confirmed by J. Cross himself after his release

NOTE:

In the same "sensationalistic" vein, Robert Burns (P.Q. Member in the Quebec National Assembly) raised embarrassing questions on
alleged connections between P. Laporte and the underworld. (Accrediting the version that the government had a vested interest in the silencing of Laporte). But on the whole, it does not appear to be more than a case of careless political campaign management from Laporte's part and a case of "aggressive" parliamentary tactics from R. Burns' part.